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The document discusses how the type of issues being negotiated (interests vs values) affects negotiator satisfaction with outcomes. It hypothesizes that negotiators are more satisfied with integrative outcomes for interest-based issues but more satisfied with distributive outcomes for value-based issues. Three experiments found support for this, showing the content of the negotiation influences satisfaction independently of objective outcomes.

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0% found this document useful (0 votes)
57 views7 pages

Jowrj

The document discusses how the type of issues being negotiated (interests vs values) affects negotiator satisfaction with outcomes. It hypothesizes that negotiators are more satisfied with integrative outcomes for interest-based issues but more satisfied with distributive outcomes for value-based issues. Three experiments found support for this, showing the content of the negotiation influences satisfaction independently of objective outcomes.

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nguyenhyanhminh
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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European Journal of Social Psychology, Eur. J. Soc. Psychol.

44, 202–208 (2014)


Published online 30 January 2014 in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com) DOI: 10.1002/ejsp.2003

Fast track report


Are integrative or distributive outcomes more satisfactory? The effects of interest-
based versus value-based issues on negotiator satisfaction

PETER LUCAS STÖCKLI1* AND CARMEN TANNER2


1
Department of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf,
Switzerland; 2Department of Banking and Finance, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

Abstract

Negotiation research usually distinguishes between integrative and distributive outcomes. Integrative outcomes satisfy the nego-
tiation parties’ most important interests (by trading off less important for more important issues). In contrast, distributive out-
comes require negotiators to give up their most important interests (as they make concessions on both less and more important
issues). Integrative outcomes are more beneficial, but do they offer greater satisfaction? In this research, we hypothesized that
satisfaction with integrative versus distributive outcomes depends on whether people negotiate interest-based or value-based
issues. Three experiments consistently revealed that people in interest-based negotiations were more satisfied with integrative
outcomes, whereas those in value-based negotiations tended to be more satisfied with distributive outcomes. Copyright ©
2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

The negotiation literature usually recommends aiming for integrative 2002b), and when they had focused on the aspiration rather
rather than distributive outcomes (e.g., Brett, 2007; Fisher & than the reservation price (Galinsky, Mussweiler, & Medvec,
Ury, 1991; Lewicki, Saunders, & Minton, 1997; Thompson, 2002a; see also Thompson, 1995), or when more, rather
2008). Distributive outcomes are agreements in which ne- than less, negotiation issues were at stake (Naquin, 2003).
gotiators make concessions on all negotiation issues. Such This is because people may be more apt to engage in coun-
50/50 or “split down the middle” outcomes (Neale & terfactual thinking (i.e., consider whether other, possibly
Fragale, 2006, p. 37) are suboptimal because they require better, outcomes might have been possible) when (i) the
both negotiators to concede on their most important issues other party’s acceptance was immediate, (ii) they focused
(Thompson, 2006). In contrast, integrative or win-win out- on the aspiration price, or (iii) there were many negotiation
comes are agreements in which negotiators obtain mutually issues (for reviews on negotiator satisfaction, see Barry,
better outcomes by making concessions on issues less impor- Fulmer, & Goates, 2006; Neale & Fragale, 2006; Thompson,
tant to them, while gaining something that is more important Wang, & Gunia, 2010).
(i.e., logrolling; Froman & Cohen, 1970). Integrative out- Without a doubt, negotiator satisfaction with the outcome
comes are more beneficial than distributive outcomes, but has important implications. Unsatisfied negotiators may feel
are benefits equivalent to negotiator satisfaction? less desire to meet the same counterpart again (Oliver et al.,
Intuitively, one would think that negotiators who gain more 1994) or committed to implementing the negotiated contract
should also be more satisfied (Gillespie, Brett, & Weingart, (Barry & Oliver, 1996), whereas satisfied parties may even
2000). However, objectively better outcomes are not necessarily cooperate on issues that were not part of the original deal
more satisfactory (e.g., Medvec & Savitsky, 1997). Negotia- (Novemsky & Schweitzer, 2004). In agreement, more recent
tion research has shown that negotiator satisfaction depends findings suggest that the subjective evaluation of negotiations
on more than the actual outcome, such as on how favorable have a greater and longer-lasting impact on a negotiator’s
the negotiator’s outcome is as compared with the other party’s future behavior than actual economic outcomes (Curhan,
outcome (i.e., social comparison, e.g., Gillespie et al., 2000; Elfenbein, & Kilduff, 2009).
Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989; Novemsky & In this paper, we aim to further this important line of
Schweitzer, 2004) or whether the negotiator’s outcome meets research by examining how the nature of conflict issues (i.e.,
his or her expectations (e.g., Oliver, Balakrishnan, & Barry, interests versus values) affects negotiator satisfaction. Past
1994). Furthermore, negotiators have been found to be less research has shown that negotiations on value-based rather
satisfied when the other party accepted their offer immediately than interest-based issues lead to less desirable outcomes
versus some time later (Galinsky, Seiden, Kim, & Medvec, (Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and more

*Correspondence to: Peter Lucas Stöckli, Department of Military Psychology and Military Pedagogy, Military Academy at ETH Zurich, Birmensdorf, Switzerland.
E-mail: [email protected]

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Received 24 August 2012, Accepted 29 June 2013
Negotiator satisfaction 203

impasses (Tenbrunsel et al., 2009), but none has examined its EXPERIMENT 1
influence on outcome satisfaction. We propose that the negotia-
tion content is another essential determinant of negotiator
Method
satisfaction. More precisely, whether integrative or distributive
outcomes are experienced as more satisfactory depends on
Design and Participants
whether negotiators are dealing with interest-based or value-
based negotiation issues.
The first experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design,
Negotiations are interest-based when involving the alloca-
with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
tion of scarce resources, such as money or other benefits. Here,
between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative versus
the negotiators bargain over who gets how much (e.g., price of
distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator satisfac-
a product). Negotiations are value-based when the parties
tion as the dependent variable. Fifty-seven students (31 female,
focus on personal norms, deeper beliefs, or ideological
26 male; M age = 24.7 years) participated and received CHF 30
worldviews. Here, the negotiators focus on what is (morally)
(approximately USD 36) as compensation for their time. They
right or wrong (e.g., is the product price fair or unfair and is
were randomly assigned to the interest or value condition and
torture acceptable or not in a given situation) (e.g., Deutsch,
one of two orders of negotiation outcome. The order of negotia-
1973; Druckman, Broome, & Korper, 1977; Harinck & De
tion outcome had no effect on the results.
Dreu, 2004). In general, values can refer to abstract and
strong beliefs about desirable states or behavioral conduct
(i.e., freedom, justness, honesty, love, or honor; Rokeach, Procedure
1973; Schwartz, 1992), entities of the human or nonhuman
world that are valued “for their own sake” (such as human After participants engaged in a simulated negotiation (which is
or animal lives, endangered species, and environment; e.g., irrelevant to the present paper), they were given an additional
Hargrove, 1989; Tanner, 2009; Taylor, 1986) or rights (e.g., task and a questionnaire. In a first attempt to test our hypothe-
human rights). sis, we provided participants a scenario where a good friend
Recent findings suggest that people in value-based who desires to purchase a used car had requested their assis-
negotiations are very reluctant to make concessions (e.g., tance with negotiations to bargain for a low price and an
Tenbrunsel et al., 2009) and unwilling to make trade-offs extended warranty (participants were given a representative
among the issues (e.g., Harinck & De Dreu, 2004; Harinck, negotiator role, i.e., they were to negotiate on behalf of some-
De Dreu, & Van Vianen, 2000). To stimulate interest-based one else, to enable simpler manipulations of the interest versus
versus value-based negotiations, one group of participants value conditions). The introduction to the questionnaire
was instructed to aim for outcomes that would be advanta- provided information about the scenario and a payoff chart,
geous for their career (interest-based) while another aimed revealing that the friend considered the duration of the warranty
for the most just outcomes (value-based) (Harinck & De more important than the price (as they had engaged in a nego-
Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000). The authors found that tiation before, they were familiar with such payoff charts). The
participants in value-based negotiations had lower tendencies manipulation approach was adapted from Harinck and De
to make trade-offs among the issues (thus were less likely to Dreu (2004). Participants in the value condition were informed
reach integrative agreements) than those in interest-based that their friend aimed for both a fair price and a fair warranty
negotiations. duration. The payoff chart consisted of corresponding verbal
Thus, it appears that in value-based negotiations, people are labels, such as “unfair” and “fair” (Table 1). In the interest
reluctant to forsake one issue to obtain another. To avoid such condition, participants learned that their friend aimed for both
trade-offs, negotiators may make concessions on both issues, a favorable price and a warranty duration. The payoff chart
resulting in distributive agreements. Accordingly, and although consisted of points (Table 1).
distributive outcomes are suboptimal from an objective perspec- Participants were then presented with two possible negotia-
tive, we propose that parties in value-based negotiations would tion results: an integrative (a trade-off between the two issues,
achieve greater satisfaction with distributive than integrative
outcomes (because the former do not require any trade-offs Table 1. Negotiator payoff charts in Experiment 1
among the issues). In contrast, negotiators pursuing interest-
based issues would focus on obtaining the maximum benefit. Price Duration of guarantee
They would therefore be more satisfied with integrative rather Interest condition
than distributive outcomes. CHF 30 000 80 points 2.5 years 100 points
Even though the abovementioned results (Harinck & De CHF 32 500 60 points 2 years 75 points
Dreu, 2004; Harinck et al., 2000) could be related to negotia- CHF 35 000 40 points 1.5 years 50 points
CHF 37 500 20 points 1 years 25 points
tor satisfaction as hypothesized earlier, their purpose was not to CHF 40 000 0 points 0.5 years 0 points
measure satisfaction. We therefore conducted three experiments
Value condition
whereby participants indicated the degree of satisfaction with an CHF 30 000 Fair 2.5 years Very fair
integrative and distributive outcome. In all experiments, we CHF 32 500 Rather fair 2 years Fair
expected to identify an interaction effect between negotiation CHF 35 000 Neither fair 1.5 years Neither fair
content and outcome. Negotiators in interest-based negotiations nor unfair nor unfair
would prefer integrative to distributive, but those in value-based CHF 37 500 Rather unfair 1 years Unfair
CHF 40 000 Unfair 0.5 years Very unfair
negotiations would prefer distributive to integrative outcomes.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
204 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

thus no concessions on the high-priority and large concessions Method


on the low-priority issue; i.e., CHF 40 000, 2.5 years) and a
distributive outcome (a “classic” 50/50 outcome; i.e., CHF Design and Participants
35 000, 1.5 years). For each outcome, they would rate their
level of satisfaction from a scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to This experiment used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, with
7 (very satisfied). conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative
Results versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator
satisfaction as the dependent variable. Another sample of
A 2 × 2 repeated measures ANOVA showed the predicted 32 students (19 female, 13 male; M age = 23.9 years) partici-
interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation pated for monetary compensation (CHF 30). Participants
outcome, F(1,55) = 21.12, p < .001, η2 = .28. Participants in engaged in two succeeding negotiations tasks, one leading to
the interest condition displayed greater satisfaction with the an integrative and the other to a distributive outcome. The
integrative (M = 5.03) than the distributive (M = 4.07) allocation of participants to the interest or value condition and
outcome, F(1,55) = 16.49, p < .001, η2 = .23. In contrast, the order of negotiation tasks and outcomes were randomized.
those in the value condition were more satisfied with the dis- Neither variation of negotiation task order nor outcome order
tributive (M = 4.04) than the integrative (M = 3.39) outcome, affected the results and will therefore not be reported in the
F(1,55) = 6.31, p = .015, η2 = .10 (Figure 1). The analysis also succeeding text.
revealed a significant main effect for negotiation content.
Participants in the value condition generally reported lower Materials and Procedure
satisfaction (M = 3.71) than those in the interest condition
(M = 4.55), F(1,55) = 10.13, p = .002, η2 = .16. This Upon arrival, participants were seated in separate rooms and
unpredicted finding could suggest that making concessions informed that the experiment purported to investigate how
on value-based issues is experienced more aversively than people proceed in negotiations when they are only allowed
making concessions on interest-based issues. to make two offers and whether people learn from experiences
with such short negotiations (cover story). They were
instructed to play the role of a lawyer and to perform two
pen-and-paper negotiation tasks involving penalties for differ-
EXPERIMENT 2
ent criminal cases (adapted after Harinck & De Dreu, 2004;
Harinck et al., 2000) with a district attorney played by another
The first experiment provided preliminary evidence that the participant. Upon failure in reaching an agreement, the judge,
nature of the conflict issues affects whether distributive or also played by another participant, would determine the out-
integrative outcomes are more satisfactory. However, the use comes on the basis of the negotiation process.
of different payoff charts in the different conditions could have In reality, the actions of the other participants (district attorney
potentially influenced our results. The verbal labels (value and judges) were pre-prepared written arguments. The district
condition) may not correspond exactly to the points (interest attorney’s final negotiation offers were designed in a way that
condition) in terms of their subjective utility to the partici- the actual participants were likely to refuse them, thus the need
pants. Thus, participants may have perceived the contrast to employ judges for decision-making. The judge’s decision
between the high-priority and low-priority issues differently. was designed to be an integrative outcome after one negotiation
To account for this drawback in Experiment 2, we employed task and a distributive outcome after the other task.
the same payoff chart (consisting of points) in both conditions. One negotiation task concerned a case involving
pickpocketing (high-priority issue) and another involving a
domestic peace disturbance (low-priority issue). The other task
concerned a case involving clothes theft (high-priority issue)
and another involving minor assault (low-priority issue). For
each case, there were five possible levels of penalties, yielding
different numbers of points for participants (as an example, see
the payoff chart depicted in Table 2). Participants in the inter-
est condition were instructed to aim for monetary fines for
their clients because this would help their career. Those in
the value condition were asked to aim for monetary fines
because this penalty was most just (see Harinck & De Dreu, 2004).
Prior to the first negotiation, participants were tested to ensure
that they understood the payoff chart. They then began to ex-
change offers by filling out forms that the investigator carried
back and forth between the rooms. The simulated counterpart
consistently utilized the predetermined concession-making strat-
egy. For both negotiations, the opponent’s first counteroffer was
Figure 1. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 1 as a function of “two weeks jail penalty” on the participant’s high-priority issue
negotiation content and outcome and “one month jail penalty” on the participant’s low-priority

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
Negotiator satisfaction 205

Table 2. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 2


Pickpocketing Disturbance of public peace

Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points Jail penalty (1 month) 0 points


Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points Jail penalty (2 weeks) 0 points
Community service 20 points Community service 20 points
Monetary fine, big (CHF 3000) 35 points Monetary fine, big (CHF 3000) 30 points
Monetary fine, small (CHF 1500) 50 points Monetary fine, small (CHF 1500) 40 points

issue (see Table 2). The final counteroffer was “community p < .001, η2 = .48. Negotiators in the interest condition were
service” (high-priority issue) and “one month jail penalty” more satisfied with integrative (M = 5.59) than distributive
(low-priority issue) in the first negotiation (when the participant (M = 4.21) outcomes, F(1,30) = 25.18, p < .001, η2 = .46. In
refused this offer, the judge’s decision was an integrative out- contrast, those negotiating values were more satisfied with
come: a “small monetary fine” on the high-priority issue and a distributive (M = 5.27) than integrative (M = 4.53) outcomes,
“one month jail penalty” on the low-priority issue, yielding 50 F(1,30) = 6.25, p = .018, η2 = .17 (Figure 2). No other effects
points) and “two weeks jail penalty” on both issues in the second were significant.
(after which the judge’s decision was a distributive outcome: It appears unlikely that the negotiator satisfaction measure
“community service” on both issues, yielding 40 points). All but is confounded with an evaluation of the negotiation process
one participant (who was excluded from the analysis) refused itself or an evaluation of the purported counterpart: The ques-
the second counteroffers and decided to let the judge determine tionnaire employed after the two negotiations also included
the penalties. A few minutes after the negotiation, they received two questions designed to assess (i) the participant’s satisfac-
the judges’ decisions. Two participants who suspected that the op- tion with the negotiation process itself and (ii) the participant’s
ponent or the judge was not real were excluded from the analyses. willingness to negotiate with the same counterpart again. None
After each negotiation, participants rated two items on a of these items correlated significantly with the satisfaction
scale of 1 (very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Specifically, with the judge’s decision (r’s < .22, p’s > .20), neither were
participants were asked (i) how satisfied they were with the there differences between the two conflict issue conditions
judge’s decision and (ii) how satisfied they would have been (F’s < 0.29, p’s > .59) nor were there any significant
if they had agreed with their counterpart on this outcome. interaction effects between the conflict issue and outcome
These ratings were averaged to measure satisfaction (F’s < 2.64, p’s > .11).
(r = .562, p < .001).
As a manipulation check, participants rated the extent to
which they wanted monetary penalties for fairness (“because
EXPERIMENT 3
monetary penalties are most fair”) or career reasons (“because
monetary penalties are good for my career”) on two 7-point
scales (1 = not at all, 7 = very much) after the second negotiation. Findings from Experiments 1 and 2 provided consistent
evidence that people are more satisfied with integrative out-
Results comes in interest-based negotiations but more satisfied with
distributive outcomes in value-based negotiations. However,
Manipulation Check in both studies, we employed the same value (“fairness”) to
induce value-based negotiations. Our third experiment there-
A repeated measures ANOVA with conflict issue as the inde- fore aims to examine whether the effects of conflict issue on
pendent variable and the two questions checking the manipu-
lation of interest-based versus value-based conflict issues as
the dependent variables revealed a significant interaction
between conflict issue and reasons to aim for a monetary penalty
(career versus fairness), F(1,29) = 37.48, p < .001, η2 = .56.
Participants in the interest condition indicated that they had
aimed for monetary penalties because this would be good for
their career (M = 6.59) rather than it being most fair
(M = 2.18), F(1,29) = 46.22, p < .001, η2 = .61. In contrast,
participants in the value condition stated that they had aimed
for monetary penalties because they were most fair
(M = 5.36) rather than being good for their career (M = 3.86),
F(1,29) = 4.40, p = .045, η2 = .13. This result pattern suggests
that the manipulation was successful.

Negotiator Satisfaction

A repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted interac- Figure 2. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 2 as a function of
tion between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,30) = 27.65, negotiation content and outcome

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
206 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

negotiator satisfaction also apply with another value, namely, participants answered the question “If you had reached this
environmental protection. outcome, how satisfied would you be?” on a scale from 1
(very unsatisfied) to 7 (very satisfied). Lastly, participants com-
Method pleted a similar manipulation check as in Experiment 2.

Design and Participants Results

The third experiment also used a 2 × 2 mixed factorial design, Manipulation Check
with conflict issue (interest-based versus value-based) as the
between-subjects factor, negotiation outcome (integrative A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interac-
versus distributive) as the within-subject factor and negotiator tion between conflict issue and reasons to oppose deforestation
satisfaction as the dependent variable. Fifty-one students (decline in guest nights versus protecting animal habitats),
(21 female, 30 male; M age = 24.1 years) voluntarily partici- F(1,49) = 73.78, p < .001, η2 = .60. Participants in the interest
pated in this study and were randomly assigned to the interest condition indicated that they opposed deforestation to avoid
or value condition. Again, the order of outcomes was varied declines in guest nights (M = 6.08) rather than protect
with no significant impact on the results. animal habitats (M = 4.83), F(1,49) = 7.47, p = .009, η2 = .13,
whereas those in the value condition stated that they
Procedure opposed deforestation to protect animal habitats (M = 6.63)
rather than avoid declines in guest nights (M = 2.48),
As in Experiment 1, participants read a negotiation scenario F(1,49) = 92.58, p < .001, η2 = .65.
(adapted after Ryf, Tanner, & Binder, 2007) and were then
asked to indicate how satisfied they would be with an integra- Negotiator Satisfaction
tive and with a distributive outcome. However, this time, the
study was conducted online where participants were sent The repeated measures ANOVA revealed the predicted inter-
e-mails containing a link to a website providing all informa- action between conflict issue and outcome, F(1,49) = 13.11,
tion and questions. On this website, participants were asked p = .001, η2 = .21. Participants in the interest condition were
to imagine that they were a representative of a winter sports more satisfied with integrative (M = 3.46) than distributive
resort and that they were negotiating about how many acres (M = 2.75) outcomes, F(1,49) = 10.68, p = .002, η2 = .18,
of two different forests (Forest 1 and 2) should be logged for whereas those in the value condition were more satisfied with
the construction of two additional ski slopes. A payoff chart distributive (M = 3.41) than integrative (M = 3.04) outcomes,
was provided, revealing that they could earn more points on F(1,49) = 3.28, p = .076, η2 = .06. Nevertheless, the latter
Forest 1 than Forest 2 (Table 3). difference was only marginally significant (Figure 3).
Participants in the interest condition were asked to oppose
deforestation to prevent financial loss. Because the forests were
highly popular for their nice hiking and biking trails, cutting it
DISCUSSION
down would potentially reduce resort guests during summer.
Also, they learned that Forest 1 was slightly more popular than
Forest 2. Participants in the value condition were asked to Across three experiments, we found consistent evidence for an
oppose deforestation to protect the environment. Because the interaction effect between conflict issue and negotiation out-
forests were environmentally valuable and rich in flora and come on negotiator satisfaction. Integrative outcomes were
fauna, cutting down the forest would destroy animal habitats. more satisfactory in interest-based negotiations, whereas
Forest 1 had a slightly greater species variety than Forest 2.
Participants were then checked for payoff chart understanding.
Those who failed the test were excluded from subsequent
analyses, which was the case for two participants. Successful
participants were presented with the integrative outcome
(i.e., “0 m2” of forest cut down on the high-priority issue
Forest 1, but “200 000 m2” of forest cut down on the low-priority
issue Forest 2, yielding 80 points) and the distributive outcome
(i.e., “100 000 m2” of both forests cut down, yielding 70 points)
on two consecutive webpages. On each of these two pages,

Table 3. Negotiator payoff chart in Experiment 3

Forest 1 Forest 2
0 m2 80 points 0 m2 60 points
50 000 m2 60 points 50 000 m2 45 points
100 000 m2 40 points 100 000 m2 30 points
150 000 m2 20 points 150 000 m2 15 points
200 000 m2 0 points 200 000 m2 0 points Figure 3. Negotiator satisfaction in Experiment 3 as a function of
negotiation content and outcome

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
Negotiator satisfaction 207

distributive agreements tended to be more satisfactory in and could reflect the loss-aversive focus of negotiators in the
value-based negotiations. This suggests that gaining more via value-based condition.
integrative trade-offs is appealing in interest-based but not In sum, two mechanisms could account for our findings:
value-based negotiations. trade-off reluctance or loss avoidance. The former posits that
But why would people in value-based negotiations prefer distributive outcomes are more appealing because it is not
suboptimal 50/50 outcomes to more beneficial win-win out- necessary to make trade-offs among the issues, whereas the
comes? It is possible that people reject trading off value-based latter posits that distributive outcomes are more satisfactory
issues and consider integrative trade-offs unacceptable because none of the two issues were lost. Nevertheless, it is
because this “would undercut their self-images and social also plausible that both of the mechanisms interact. Exploring
identities as moral beings” (Fiske & Tetlock, 1997, p. 256; such underlying mechanisms could be an interesting avenue
Harinck & De Dreu, 2004). Such a view is in line with Curhan, for future research. Thus, whereas previous research showed
Elfenbein, and Xu (2006) who found that evaluations of nego- that objectively better outcomes are not necessarily more satis-
tiations involve multiple dimensions; negotiations are not just factory due to counterfactual thinking (e.g., Galinsky et al.,
evaluated in terms of their instrumental quality, but for 2002a, 2002b; Naquin, 2003) or social comparison (e.g.,
instance, also in terms of implications for the negotiators’ self- Gillespie et al., 2000; Loewenstein et al., 1989; Novemsky
understanding. Besides that, studies have shown that people & Schweitzer, 2004), our findings suggest that the negotiation
confronted with “tragic trade-offs” (pitting two so-called content itself can be influential.
sacred values—values which people hold to be absolute and One limitation to our experiments is that we linked both ne-
not exchangeable for anything else—against each other; gotiation issues to the same value (fairness in Experiments 1
Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) experienced and 2 and environmental concerns in Experiment 3). It thus
high levels of negative emotions and stress when contemplating remains unclear what would happen if one issue was linked
which sacred value to protect at the expense of the other to fairness and the other to loyalty, for instance. Furthermore,
(Hanselmann & Tanner, 2008). In accordance, negotiators we are not able to say how negotiations involving both inter-
would not want to settle on one value issue at the expense of est-based and value-based issues (“mixed cases”; see Harinck
the other, thus the preference for agreements which allow them & De Dreu, 2004) are related to negotiator satisfaction. We
to attain some “balance” between the issues: Instead of making presume that appropriate integrative outcomes, which occur
large concessions on one issue and low concessions on the when negotiators make concessions on interest-based issues
other, negotiators may opt for a (fair) compromise by making in order to gain on value-based issues, may be associated with
similar concessions on both issues, thus greater satisfaction greater satisfaction. It should also be highlighted again, that
with distributive outcomes. we utilized only one item to measure negotiator satisfaction
An alternative explanation could be that the manipulation in Experiments 1 and 3, and two items in Experiment 2. Future
of the negotiation content (interest-based versus value-based) research should address this issue with the use of a more
has led to different subjective utilities across conditions.1 In elaborate measure.
the first experiment, the payoff chart’s verbal labels in the Another potential limitation concerns our negotiation sce-
value condition may not have corresponded exactly to the narios. More precisely, all of our participants assumed the role
chart’s points in the interest condition, which could lead to dif- of a representative negotiator (negotiating on behalf of one’s
ferent negotiator priorities. Also, in the second and third exper- friend in Experiment 1, negotiating on behalf of one’s clients
iment, even when points were used in both conditions, such in Experiment 2, and negotiating on behalf of a winter sports
different utilities could be influential. For instance, people in resort in Experiment 3). We chose such negotiator roles (i)
interest-based negotiations may tend to be profit-oriented, because it is easier to successfully manipulate interest-based
whereas those in value-based negotiations may be more loss- versus value-based negotiation content (a participant would
aversive. Because participants in the interest condition priori- probably be more willing to overtake the view that an issue
tize more on gaining profits or winning, they report greater is value-based when the actual outcome affects someone
satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they won one else) and (ii) because the scenarios in the second (Harinck
issue and more points) than distributive outcomes (because et al., 2000; Harinck & De Dreu, 2004) and third experiments
they won less points). On the other hand, participants in the (Ryf et al., 2007) have been used successfully in past studies.
value condition prioritize on preventing losses, thus reporting However, representative negotiators may generally be more
less satisfaction with integrative outcomes (because they lost motivated to achieve a desirable outcome in order to make a
one issue) than distributive outcomes (because they did not good impression on those that they are negotiating on behalf
lose the issues but agree on a compromise). of (e.g., Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus, it is possible that par-
This alternative explanation is consistent with the finding of ticipants in the second experiment’s value condition preferred
Tenbrunsel et al. (2009) that negotiators are more reluctant to the distributive option simply because they do not leave a bad
make concessions on value-based issues than on interest-based impression on their clients due to an unfair outcome (rather than
issues. Our results from Experiment 1 show that participants in because the participants view the distributive outcome as the
the value condition generally reported being less satisfied than fairer option). One could argue that the results may differ, if
those in the interest condition. Even though we did not predict the participants’ very own outcome would be affected. In such
this finding, it compliments the findings of Tenbrunsel et al. cases, the participants may be less reluctant to pursue integra-
tive outcomes rather than distributive ones. Future research
should therefore develop a scenario in which the participant’s
1
We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion. very own outcome is at stake.

Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. Eur. J. Soc. Psychol. 44, 202–208 (2014)
208 Peter Lucas Stöckli and Carmen Tanner

Notwithstanding the limitations and beyond contributing to Social Psychology, 30, 779–797. DOI:10.1002/1099-0992(200011/12)
30:6<779::AID-EJSP15>3.0.CO;2-7
negotiation research, we believe that this work has important
Hanselmann, M., & Tanner, C. (2008). Taboos and conflicts in decision making:
practical implications. In fact, our findings present a certain Sacred values, decision difficulty, and emotions. Judgments and Decision
dilemma. When aiming for optimal outcomes, negotiation Making, 3, 51–63. Retrieved from http://journal.sjdm.org/vol3.1.htm
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tor satisfaction, following this advice could sometimes backfire, porary impasses. European Journal of Social Psychology, 34, 595–611.
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perceived as more satisfactory than distributive outcomes in conflict issues on fixed-pie perceptions, problem solving, and integrative
interest-based negotiations but, in value-based negotiations, outcomes in negotiation. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS worse: The effects of categorial cutoff points on counterfactual thinking and
satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 1284–1296.
DOI:10.1037/0022-3514.72.6.1284
Naquin, C. E. (2003). The agony of opportunity in negotiation: Number of
This research was supported by a research grant from the negotiable issues, counterfactual thinking, and feelings of satisfaction.
University of Zurich (no. 56232603) to the first author. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 91, 97–107.
DOI:10.1016/S0749-5978(02)00532-0
Neale, M. A., & Fragale, A. R. (2006). Social cognition, attribution, and
perception in negotiation: The role of uncertainty in shaping negotiation
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