Section 52 (IPC) – “good faith”

Section 166A (IPC) - public servant disobeying a direction under the law
Section 257C (CrPC) – treatment of victims, punishment given in 166B IPC
Section 228 (IPC) – intentional insult or interruption to public servant sitting in judicial
proceeding
Section 228A (IPC) – disclosure of identity of identity of the victim of certain offences
Section 191 (IPC) – Giving false evidence
Section 201 (IPC) – Causing disappearance of evidence of offence, or giving false
information to screen offender
Section 268 (IPC) – Public nuisance
Section 292 (IPC) – Sale, etc. of obscene books
Section 295A (IPC) – Deliberate and malicious acts, intended to outrage religious feelings of
any class by insulting its religious beliefs
Section 354 (IPC) – Assault or criminal force on woman with the intent to outrage her
modesty

Mens Rea
Queen v. Tolson, 1889 QBD
The prisoner was married to Mr. Tolson on Sept. 11, 1880. Mr. Tolson deserted her on
December 13, 1881. The prisoner and her father made inquiries about Tolson and learnt from
his elder brother and from general report, that he had been on a vessel bound for America,
which had went down with all hands on board. On January 10, 1887, the prisoner supposing
herself to be a widow, went through the ceremony of marriage with another man. The
circumstances were all known to the second man and the ceremony was in no way concealed.
However, in December 1887, Tolson returned from America. The prisoner was charged for
the offence of bigamy under section 57 of the Offence Against the Persons Act, 1861 for
having gone through the ceremony of marriage within the 7 years after which she had been
deserted by her husband.
Held: A bonafide belief on reasonable grounds of the death of the husband at the time of the
second marriage afforded a good defence to the indictment and the conviction was wrong.
The following principles were laid down in the case:
1. Prima facie and as a general rule there must be a mind at fault before there can be a
crime.
2. Prima facie the statute was satisfied when the case was brought within its terms and it
then lay on the defendant to prove the violation of the law that had taken place.
3. At common law, an honest and reasonable belief in the existence of circumstances,
which if true would make the act for which the prisoner was indicted an innocent act,
has always been held to be a good defence.
4. It is a general rule that an alleged offender is deemed to have acted under the state of
facts which he in good faith and on reasonable grounds believed to have existed,
when he did the act alleged to be an offence.

Section 6 – Definitions in the code to be understood subject to exceptions

Khageswar Pujari v. State of Orissa, CriLJ, 1984 Orissa
The Court is duty bound to give the benefit of an exception to the accused, even if he had not
pleaded his defence [section 105 of the Indian Evidence Act puts upon the accused the
burden of proving the circumstances bringing the accused’s case within the exception
(general or offence-specific)].
Life Imprisonment
Lazar v. State of Tamil Nadu, 2013 (4) Crimes 398 (SC)
Life imprisonment means a sentence for the whole life of the convict. The state government
may remit the sentence as per the rules of the government.
Note: Section 57 (Fraction of Terms of Punishment) – In calculating fraction of terms of
punishment, imprisonment for life shall be reckoned as imprisonment for 20 years.
Life convict, Bengal @ Khoka @ Prasanta Sen v. B.K. Srivastava & Ors., AIR 2013 SC
1163
Life imprisonment means imprisonment for the whole life of the convict and not 20 years.
CHAPTER IV – GENERAL EXCEPTIONS
Section 76: Act done by a person bound, or by mistake of fact believing himself bound by
law
Ignorantia facti excusat, ignorantia legis neminem excusat
State of West Bengal v. Shew Mangal Singh & Ors, 1981 AIR 1917
The police, while on patrol duty, were compelled to open fire when respondent 1 Shew Singh
received injuries as a result of the mob violence. It was held that the situation prevailing on
the scene of the offence justified the Deputy Commissioner to give the shooting order, and
therefore the respondents can seek the protection of that order and plead in defence that they
acted in obedience to that order and cannot be found guilty of the offence they are charged
with.

Setion 79: Act done by a person justified, or by a mistake of fact believing himself justified,
by law
State of Orissa v. Khora Gassi, CriLJ 1978 Orissa
The accused while guarding his maize field shot an arrow at a moving object in the bona fide
belief that it was a bear, and in the process caused the death of a man that was hiding there.
He was held to not be liable, because of the benefit under section 79 as well as 80.
Raj Kapoor v. Laxman, CriLJ 1980 SC
A prosecution was conducted under section 292 of the IPC against the producer of he film
‘Satyam Shivam Sundaram’. The Board of Censors had issued a certificate to the film, giving
the producer the right to exhibit the fil publically. It was held that under the circumstances of
the case, the producer thought that they were justifies in exhibiting the film after getting the
certificate.
Sheo Surun Sahai v. Mohomed Fazil Khan, 1868 WR Calcutta
A police officer saw a horse tied up in B’s premises and it happened to resemble the one
which his father had lost a short time back. After due enquiry, he concluded that B had either
stolen the horse or had purchased it from the thief. It was held that the officer had not acted in
good faith, i.e. with due care and attention. Therefore he was held to be not entitled to the
benefit under section 79.
State of Orissa v. Ram Bahadur Thapa, AIR 1960 Ori 161
In the case the accused, a Nepali servant, went along with his master to see ghosts which
were believed by the villagers to have been existing at a particular place (the servant and his
master were outsiders). On seeing the flickering lights and shadows, the servant attacked with
a Khukri (under the impression that he was attacking ghosts) and as a result one person died
and several got injured. The High Court gave him the benefit of section 79 of the IPC.

Section 80: Accident in doing a lawful act

Sir James Stephen: “An effect is said to be accidental when the act by which it is caused is
not done with the intention of causing it, and when its occurrence as a consequence of such
act I not so probable that a person of ordinary prudence ought, under the circumstances in
which it is done, to take reasonable precautions against it.”
Hamilton, Fraser & Co. v. Pandorf & Co., 1887 AC
‘Accident’ and ‘incident’ are not one and the same thing. An idea of something fortuitous and
unexpected is involved in an accident
Fenwick v. Schmalz, 1886 LR
An accident is something that happens out of the ordinary course of things.
State of Orissa v. Khora Ghasi, CriLJ 1978 Orissa
Done under section 79. Benefit of section 80 was also provided.
State v. Rangaswami, 1952 Nagpur
Shooting with an unlicensed gun does not debar an accused from claiming immunity under
section 80, but he may be held liable under the Arms Act.
K.M. Nanawati v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1962 SC
Where the accused pleads exception under this section, that death was caused by an accident,
the court shall presume the absence of such circumstances and the burden of proving them
shall lie upon the accused, and that the case fell under the exception.
Shankar Narayan Bhodolkar v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2004 SC 1966
In this case the accused had picked up a gun from a different place, unloaded it, loaded it with
a cartridge and shot at from a 4-5 feet range at the crime scene. It was held that the act was
done without due care and caution.

Bhupendrasinh A Chudasama v. State of Gujarat, 1998 (2) SCC 603

Where the accused shot his own colleague at close range without knowing the identity of the
target, the act smacked of utter dearth of any care or caution.
81: Act done to cause harm, but done without criminal intent, and to prevent other harm
R v. Dudley and Stephen, 1884 QB
Stephen, Dudley, Brooks and Parker (minor) were cast away in a storm on the high seas and
were compelled to sail into an open boat. After sailing for a few days they had no food or
water in the boat. After 18 days Dudley suggested to Brooks to sacrifice the minor (Parker) to
which Brooks disagreed. On the 20 th day Dudley, with the consent of Stephen but not of
Brooks, killed the boy, but all the three fed upon him for four days, till when they were
picked up.
It was held that there was no such necessity that could justify the accused in killing the boy
and were therefore held guilty of murder. Coleridge observed: “To preserve one’s life is,
generally speaking, a duty, but it may be the plainest or the highest duty to sacrifice it. War
is one of the several instances in which it is a man’s duty to not live but to die. It is not
correct to say that there is necessity to preserve one’s life. A man has no right to declare
temptation to be an accused.”
Justice Grove observed that “If the two accused are declared to be justified in killing the boy,
all of them may be justifiably killed to give the fourth a chance of surviving and thus the
stronger would be justified in killing the weaker.”
Dr. H.S. Gour deduces three principles:
1. Self-preservation is not an absolute necessity.
2. No man as a right to take another’s life to preserve his own
3. There is no necessity that justifies homicide.

Section 82: Act of a child under seven years of age

Queen v. Lukhini Agradanini, 1874 WR (Cr)
If the accused were a child under seven years of age, the proof of that fact would be ipso
facto an answer to the prosecution.
Section 83: Act of a child above seven year and under twelve, of immature understanding
Krishna v. State, 1883 Madras
A child of nine years of age stole a necklace worth Rd. 2 and 8 annas and sold it to B, the
accused, for 5 annas. Evidence at the trial showed that the child had attained sufficient
maturity of understanding to judge the nature and consequences of his conduct. The child was
held to be guilty of theft, and B of receiving stolen property under section 411.
Section 84: Act of a person of unsound mind
M’Naghten Rules, 1843 (section 84 is based on the M’Naghten rules)
M’Naghten was tried for the murder of Edmond Drummond, Private Secretary of Sir Rober
Peel, the then Prime Minister. M’Naghten was under an insane delusion that Sir Robert Peel
had injured him, and mistaking Drummond for Sir Peel, he shot and killed him. The medical
evidence produced showed that he was laboring under a morbid delusion because of which he
lost his power of control. The accused was acquitted on the ground of insanity. His acquittal
causes much sensation and became a subject matter of debate in the House of Lords, which
referred the matter to a bench of 15 judges who were called upon to lay down the law relating
to criminal responsibility in case of lunacy.
The following principles were deduced:
1. If the accused was conscious that the act was one which he ought not to do and if the
act was at the same time contrary to the law, he would be punishable.
2. Every man is to be presumed to be sane and is to possess a sufficient degree of reason
to be responsible for his crimes, until the contrary be proved to the satisfaction of the
court.
3. The accused must clearly show that at the time of committing the act he was laboring
under such a defect of reason from decease of mind, that he did not know the nature
or quality of the act he was doing, or that he did not know that what he was doing was
wrong.
4. A medical witness who has not seen the accused previous to the trial, should not be
asked his opinion on whether on examining the evidence, he thinks that the accused
was insane.
5. Where the criminal act is committed by a man under an insane delusion as to the
surroundings, his act may be excused.

T.T. Lingardi v. State of Maharashtra, CriLJ 1991 Bombay

The accused and his sister were in a market place. The sister went to a police station to
complain about the conduct of the deceased. When she came back with a constable, the
accused suddenly attacked the deceased and being a wood-cutter by profession, he beheaded
him. He tossed the head into air three times. He then brought the head near the dead body and
chopped it so much that the brain matter fell out. He again threw the broken head into the air.
He was taken away by the police without any resistance.
The Bombay High Court held that there was evidence of insanity from the narration of the
facts themselves and the burden of the accused stood discharged.
Shama Tudu v. State, 1987 CriLJ 618
The accused killed his wife and the only son, and it was in evidence that he had made no
attempt to conceal the commission of the offence and to the contrary, had been sitting outside
the house with his clothes smeared heavily with blood, and a blood-stained dagger was lying
near him. He also saluted the people who came near him, and besides laughing, was uttering
something to himself. The court acquitted the accused.
Surendra Mishra v. State of Jharkhand, (2011) 11 SCC 495 (3 judges)
1. Every person who is suffering from mental disease is not ipso facto exempted from
criminal liability. The mere fact that the accused is conceited, odd, irascible and his
brain is not quite all right, or that the physical and mental ailments from which he
suffered had rendered his intellect weak and affected his emotions or indulges in
certain unusual acts, or had fits of insanity at short intervals or that he was subject to
epileptic fits and there was abnormal behaviour or the behaviour is queer are not
sufficient to attract the application of Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code.
2. Though the burden is on the accused but he is not required to prove the same beyond
all reasonable doubt, but merely satisfy the preponderance of probabilities.
3. The onus has to be discharged by producing evidence as to the conduct of the
accused prior to the offence, his conduct at the time or immediately after the offence
with reference to his medical condition by production of medical evidence and other
relevant factors.
4. Even if the accused establishes unsoundness of mind, Section 84 of the Indian Penal
Code will not come to its rescue, in case it is found that the accused knew that what
he was doing was wrong or that it was contrary to law.
5. In order to ascertain that, it is imperative to take into consideration the
circumstances and the behaviour preceding, attending and following the crime.
Behaviour of an accused pertaining to a desire for concealment of the weapon of
offence and conduct to avoid detection of crime go a long way to ascertain as to
whether, he knew the consequences of the act done by him.

T.N. Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219

1. . Under the Evidence Act, the onus of proving any of the exceptions mentioned in the
Chapter lies on the accused though the requisite standard of proof is not the same as
expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient if an accused is able to bring his case
within the ambit of any of the general exceptions by the standard of preponderance of
probabilities, as a result of which he may succeed not because that he proves his case
to the hilt but because the version given by him casts a doubt on the prosecution case.
 2. In a case where the exception under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code is claimed,
the court has to consider whether, at the time of commission of the offence, the
accused, by reason of unsoundness of mind, was incapable of knowing the nature of
the act or that he is doing what is either wrong or contrary to law. The entire conduct
of the accused, from the time of the commission of the offence up to the time the
sessions proceedings commenced, is relevant for the purpose of ascertaining as to
whether plea raised was genuine, bona fide or an afterthought.

85: Act of person incapable of judgment by reason of intoxication caused against his will
‘without his knowledge or against his will’
Jethuram Nagbanshi v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR1960 MP 242
The expression ‘without his knowledge’ means ignorance of the fact that what is being
administered is, or contains, or is mixed with, an intoxicant. An act which is ‘against the will'
must be an act which the performer performed not out of his own conscious volition but on
compulsion by some outside agency by overpowering or paralysing his will by overt physical
acts.
Director, Public Prosecution v. beard, 1920 AC HL
A girl of 13 years while going to a market, passed through the gate of a mill where the
accused Beard was the watchman on duty. The accused attempted to commit rape. The girls
struggled, therefore the accused placed his hand over her mouth and pressed his thumb on her
throat in a bid to prevent her from screaming. In this he unintentionally killed the girl. The
court of appeal found him guilty of manslaughter but the HL restored the conviction or
murder.
The following principles were laid down:
1. Where a specific intent is an essential element in an offence, evidence of the state of
drunkenness rendering the accused incapable of forming that intent, should be taken
into consideration. On proof of such incapacity he would be liable to be acquitted.
2. Insanity, whether produced by drunkenness or otherwise, is a defence to the crime
charged. An insane person cannot be convicted by a crime. The law takes no note of
the cause of insanity, even though temporary.
3. Where the accused is suffering from derilium tremens resulting from over indulgence
in drinking, he cannot be convicted. Drunkeness is one thing and the deceases to
which drunkenness leads are different things.
Section 86: Offence requiring a particular intent or knowledge, committed by one who is
intoxicated
Nga Sein Gale 1934 Rangoon
The accused was suffering from voluntary intoxication. He came to a road with a sword in his
hand and shouted that he would kill X. The deceased was a person going somewhere who
attempted to cool the accused down. Infuriated, the accused killed him. The accused pleaded
in his defence that he was intoxicated and therefore did not have the required intention to kill
the deceased. The defence was rejected and the accused was convicted for murder.
Basudeo v. State of PEPSU, AIR 1956 SC
The accused in a marriage function asked the deceased child to step aside so that he may
occupy a convenient seat, but the boy did not move. The enraged the accused who whipped
out a pistol and shot the boy in the abdomen causing his death. The accused was drunk at the
time and the question arose whether he be charged under section 302 or 304 of the IPC.
“It is no doubt true that while the first part of the section speaks of intent or knowledge, the
latter part deals only with knowledge and a certain element of doubt in interpretation may
possibly be felt by reason of this omission. If in voluntary drunkenness knowledge is to be
presumed in the same manner as if there was no drunkenness, what about those cases where
mens rea is required. Are we at liberty to place intent on the same footing, and if so, why has
the section omitted intent in its latter part ? This is not the first time that the question comes
up for consideration. It has been discussed at length in many decisions and the result may be
briefly summarised as follows:
So far as knowledge is concerned, we must attribute to the intoxicated man the same
knowledge as if he was quite sober. But so far as intent or intention is concerned, we must
gather it from the attending general circumstances of the case paying due regard to the
degree of intoxication. Was the man beside his mind altogether for the time being? If so it
would not be possible to fix him with the requisite intention. But if he had not gone so deep in
drinking, and from the facts it could be found that he knew what he was about, we can apply
the rule that a man is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his act or acts”
Note: 3 principles by HS Gaur:
1. Involuntary drunkenness is an excuse.
2. Voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for a crime which requires the mere
presence of knowledge.
3. Voluntary drunkenness is an excuse only as regards “intention”
 4. In any case though, voluntary drunkenness is no excuse for knowledge, it does
not imply actual knowledge giving rise to the presumed intention.

Section 87: Act not intended and not known to be likely to cause death or grievous hurt, done
by consent
Swei Kin, Rangoon 1915
The victim claimed that he is invulnerable to a strike by an edged weapon. He invited the
accused to verify his statement. The accused, with a view to test the claim made by the
victim, inflicted a cut on his hand. The victim dies out of excessive bleeding. It was held that
the accused shall be entitled to the benefit under section 87 of the IPC.
Section 90: Consent known to be given under fear or misconception
Dasrath Paswan v. State of Bihar, AiR 1958 Pat
The accused had failed at an examination for 3 successive years and was very much upset at
these failures. Accordingly, he decided to end his life and informed his wife of this decision.
The wife, who was of 19 years in age and was also literate, asked him to kill her first and then
take is life. The accused killed his wife but was arrested before he could kill himself. It was
held that the wife had not given her consent under fear of injury or misconception of fact. The
accused would not be liable for murder, but for culpable homicide not amounting to murder
as the case is covered by exception 5 to 300.
Parshottam Mahadev v. State, AIR 1963 Bom 74
The Bombay High Court reaffirmed the view that a consent given under a misconception of
facts, would not be a valid consent. Citing the Madras High Court’s decision in Re N.
Jaladu,ILR 36 Mad 453, the Court confirmed the view that a consent given on a
misrepresentation of facts is one given under a misconception of facts within the meaning of
section 90 of the IPC
Poonai Fatimah, 1869 W.R.
The accused professed to be snake-charmer and persuaded the deceased to allow themselves
to be bitten by a poisonous snake, inducing them to believe that they had the power to protect
them from harm. It was held that the consent given by the deceased was founded on a
misconception of fact and the accused was not entitled to the benefit of consent.
Section 93: Communication made in good faith
Veeda Menezes v. Yusaf Khan, CriLJ 1966 SC
In this section ‘harm’ means an ‘injurious mental reaction’.
Section 94: Act to which a person is compelled by threats
Bachhan Lal v. State, AIR 1957
The evidence showed that the accused continued to be under the threat of instant death, not
only when he held the legs of the deceased but also when he helped the murderers in
removing the body and concealing it. He was held to be entitled to the benefit of section 94.
Section 95: Act causing slight harm
De minimis non curat lex (the law takes no account of trifles)
South Indian Railway Co. v. Ramakrishna, 1889 Mad
Plaintiff complained of the harm caused to his reputation by the imputation that he was
travelling with a wrong ticket. The accused was given the benefit of section 95.
Kishori Mohan v. State of Bihar, 1976 CriLJ
The fraternity of non-gazetted employees who had gone on a strike made fun of the
complainant who was a loyalist co-worker and had not participated in the strike. A
photograph of the loyalist co-worker was taken with a garland of shoes around his neck. No
photograph was shown to the complainant and it was not published also. It was pleaded in
the prosecution under section 504 IPC that the act was done with a view of fooling a member
of the community and was trivial in nature. The plea was not accepted. The complainant had
been subjected to indignity although the court punished the offenders by merely admonishing
them.
OF THE RIGHT OF PRIVATE DEFENCE
Section 96: Things done in private defence
Gorie Shanker v. Sheikh Sultan, 1917 CriLJ
An act done in the exercise of the right of private defence is not an offence, and does not give
rise to any right of private defence in return.
State of UP v. Pussu @ Ram Kishore, 1983 CriLJ SC
A person who is an aggressor and who seeks an attack on himself by his own aggression,
cannot reply upon the right of private defence.
Viswas v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 1978 SC 44
1. The aggressor cannot claim a right of private defence.
2. There cannot be a right of private defence against private defence. There is no right of
private defence under the Code against any act which is not in itself an offence under
it.
3. In case of a free fight (where it cannot be ascertained who the initial aggressor is), it
would be dangerous to as a rule clothe either of them or their sympathizer(s) with a
 right of private defence. It is well settled that in a free fight no right of private defence
is available to either party and each individual is responsible for its own acts.
4. It is well settled that to claim the right of private defence to be extended to the
voluntary causing of death, the accused must show that there were circumstances
giving rise to a reasonable ground that either death or a grievous hurt would be
caused to him. [s. 100]

Section 99: Acts against which there is no right of private defence

even if not strictly justifiable by law, no RPD against a public servant’s actions unless
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt

Keshav Ram, CriLJ 1974 SC

Some officers of the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, acting in good faith by virtue of the
powers delegated to them by the Commissioner, attempted to seize the buffalo of the accused
with a view to recover the arrears of milk tax. They had not issued notice to the accused as
required by the Municipal Act.
It was held that the accused had no right of private defence.
Queen Empress v. Jogendra Nath Mukherjee, 1897 Cal
When the police officers were acting under a warrant, the issue of which was altogether
illegal under the CrPC, the police officers would not get the benefit of section 99 of the IPC
and the accused would be justified in their resistance.
State of Orissa v. Rabindra Nath, CriLJ 1973 Orissa (FB)
A person in possession cannot be expected to leave his property at the mercy of armed
trespassers. Where there is imminent danger to the property and the person in possession
apprehends substantial damage thereto, he is entitled to raise his own arms in defence and
retaliate to keep away the attack without applying for the State’s aid.
Jaidev v. State of Punjab, CriLJ 1963 SC
No definite standard of the quantum of harm that may be caused in self-defence may be laid
down. It is not possible to define the same. The force which the threatened person uses in
self-defence should not be weighed in golden scales.
Section 100: When the right of private defence of the body extends to causing death
Vishwanath v. The State of Uttar Pradesh
The appellant’s sister was being abducted from her father’s house by her husband. The
appellant under his right of private defence of the body of his sister stabbed her husband and
caused his death. The SC upheld the appellant’s rights of private defence even to the extent of
causing death [see cl 5 of section 100]
Section 105: Commencement and continuance of the right of private defence of property
State v. Sidhnath Rai and Ors., AIR 1959 All 233
1. If the trespasser or the thief had already accomplished the act, and the person with the
right had acquiesced in the accomplishment, it is not open to the latter to avail himself
of the doctrine of self defence by inflicting injuries on the trespasser or the thief to
acquire possession of his property.
2. Recapture of the stolen or the plundered property, while it is in the course of being
carried away is authorized in view of section 105…but when the offence has been
committed and the property removed, a recapture after an interval of time by the
owner or other persons on his behalf, however justifiable cannot be deemed an
exercise of defense of private property.
3. The recovery which section 105 contemplates is the recovery either immediately
before or before the offender has reached his final retreat

Note: According to Myne, “when the robber had made his escape, the principle of self-
defence would not extend to killing him. If met with on a subsequent day and the property is
found in his possession, the right of defence would revive for the purpose of its recovery.
CHAPTER V: ABETMENT
Section 107: Abetment of a thing
Note: Abetment is envisaged, by
1. Instigation
2. Conspiracy
3. Intentionally aiding

Abetment by instigation
Queen v. Mohit Panday, 1871 NWP
A woman prepared herself to become Sati in the presence of the accused persons. They
followed her up to the pyre and stood by her step-sons crying “Ram Ram”. One of the
accused also admitted that he told the woman to say “Ram Ram”. It was held that all those
who followed her to the pyre and stood by her crying “Ram Ram” would be guilty of
abetment.
Protima Dutta, 1977 CriLJ Cal.
The mother-in-law by her cruel conduct, suggestions (direct or indirect) guided her daughter-
in-law to commit suicide. She was held to be guilty of abetment of suicide by instigation,
within the meaning of section 107.
Sheo Dial Mal, 1894 All
A write a letter to B instigating thereby to murder C. It was held that the offence of abetment
by instigation is complete as soon as the contents of the letter become known to B. Note that
in Ransford, 1874 COX it was held that if the letter never reaches B then it is only an
attempt to abet but not an abetment.
Pandala Venkatasami, 1881 Madras
If a person in conjunction with others makes a copy of an intended false document and buys a
stamped paper for the purpose of writing such a false document and also asks for information
as to the facts to be inserted in such a false document, he would be guilty of abetment of
forgery.
Abetment by conspiracy
Haradhan Chakrabarty v. Union of India, 1990 CriLJ SC
The petitioner along with others was charged with the offence of criminal conspiracy to abet
a certain theft. However all the others were acquitted and later on the appellant successfully
pleaded before the court that he alone cannot be convicted of abetment by conspiracy as one
alone cannot conspire with oneself.
Kehar Singh v. State, AIR 1988 SC 1883
Generally a conspiracy is hatched in secrecy and it may be difficult to deduce the direct
evidence of the same. The prosecution will rely more on circumstantial evidence.
Abetment by intentionally aiding
Emperor v. Umi, 1882 Bombay
A priest who had officiated a bigamous marriage had intentionally aided it but not the
persons who were merely present at the celebration or who permitted its celebration in their
house.
Shri Ram v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC
A invited B at his home to facilitate his murder at the hands of C. B came there and C
murdered him. It was held that A too art in the murder of B but he would be liable only if it
can be proved that the invitation was made with the intention to facilitate the commission of
the murder.
CHAPTER VA: CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY
Section 120A: Definition of criminal conspiracy
Haradhan Chakrabarty v. UoI 1990
Done above – one person cannot conspire with himself – two or more persons needed.
Note: According to Henry, under certain circumstances a single person can be tried and
convicted for conspiracy, say where the other persons are not in custody or are even
unknown. Even some of the conspirators may be unknown to the rest.
Pradumma, 1981, CriLJ Bombay
Where of the two accused, and he had to be acquitted because he was prosecuted without
obtaining a prior sanction from the government (under section 197 CrPC), the other could
still be convicted on a charge of conspiracy. This is so because the acquittal of the other
accused was not on facts but on a technical ground, despite the evidence establishing the
factum of the conspiracy.
Abdul Rehman v. Emperor, ILR 1935
It was held that the offence of criminal conspiracy did not come to an end on the date of the
agreement between two or more persons to do the illegal act, but “a criminal conspiracy may
come into existence and persist so long as persons constituting the conspiracy remain in
agreement, and so long as they acting in regard to any furtherance of the objects for which
they entered into the agreement.” In this case it was found that the conspiracy had begun in
1920 and continued till 1931, and also that during this interval several persons dropped out of
the conspiracy and several more joined the conspiracy, but it was nonetheless held to be a
single conspiracy.
Gulam Sarbar v. State of Bihar, 2013 (4) Crimes 364 (SC)
Meeting of minds is necessary to sustain the allegations of conspiracy. It was also held that
the quality of evidence is to be seen, rather than the quantity of it.
N.V. Subba Rao v. State, (2013) 2 SCC 162
In order to establish guilt, it is necessary to show a meeting of the minds of two or more
persons for doing or causing to be done an illegal act or an act by illegal means. It was
acknowledged by the Court that conspiracies are hatched in secrecy and for proving the said
offence, substantial direct evidence may not be possible to be obtained. Therefore an offence
of criminal conspiracy can also be proved by murder.
Section 34: Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention
Note:
1. Sections 34-38 are based on the thought that under certain circumstances an entire
act is attributable to one person who may have performed only a fractional part of it.
 2. Unless ‘common intention’ and ‘participation’ both are present, section 34 will not
apply

Common intention
Mahboob Shah v. Emperor, AIR 1945 PC
A (the deceased) along with a few others (including H) went by a boat to collect reeds along
the bank of the Indus river. After travelling around a mile downstream, they saw M (father of
W) bathing along the bank of the river. On being told that they were there to collect reeds, he
warned them from collecting reed from land belonging to him. Ignoring his warning they
collected about 16 bundles of reeds, and started for the return journey. While the boat was
being pulled upstream by means of a rope, G (nephew of M) who was standing by the bank
of the river asked A to give him the reeds he had collected from his uncle’s lands, which A
refused to. G then caught the rope (which was being used to pull the boat upstream) and tried
to snatch it away. He then pushed A and gave him a blow with a small stick. A then picked
up a lari (10 ft long and 6 inches thick – to propel the boat) from the boat and stuck G. He
shouted for help and W and another MS (G’s cousin) came up with guns in their hands. When
A and H tried to run away, W and MS came in front of them, and W fired at A who fell down
dead, and MS fired at H, causing him injuries.
It was held that both W and MS had a ‘similar intention’ and not the ‘common intention’ to
rescue the cousin. The evidence was lacking to show that there was any pre-concerted plan
to bring about A’s murder.
Krishna Govind Patil v. State of Maharashtra, 1963 AIR 1413
“It is well settled that common intention within the meaning of the section implies a pre-
arranged plan and the criminal act was done pursuant to the pre-arranged plan. The said
plan may also develop on the spot during the course of commission of the offence; but the
crucial circumstance is that the plan must precede the act constituting the offence.”
Therefore, before a court can convict a person under section 302 r/w section 34, it should
come to a definite conclusion that the said person had a prior concert with one or more other
persons, named or unnamed for committing the said offence.
Shreekantiah v. State of Bombay, AIR 1955 SC
It was held that the accused need not be present in the very room the offence is committed in,
but must be near enough, such as guarding te gate of the house, or keeping watch by standing
at the road.
J.M. Desai v. State of Bombay, AIR 1960 SC
To invoke section 34 successfully, participation of the several persons in doing the act is
necessary, and not merely in its planning. But this participation need not in all cases amount
to a physical presence. For instance, in an offence involving physical violence, normally the
offender’s presence on the scene of the offence is sought for a conviction under joint liability,
but such is not the case with other diverse acts which may be done at different times and
places (such as breach of trust under section 409).
Indar Singh v. The Crown, 1933 Lahore
Four persons A, B, C and D went armed with guns to the house of P to commit robbery.
However P was not present at his house at that point of time. A & B got P’s minor son to take
them to the field where P was working. During their absence the other robbers C & D
remained at P’s house. C stood near the main door of the house which he closed. Two sons of
P who were at their shops nearby had their suspicion arisen and came to the house and
pushed open the door, whereupon C fired at them resulting in the death of one of them.
A was also held guilty of murder because though temporarily absent, he was participating in
the joint criminal action in the course of which the murder was committed.
Section 35: When such an act is criminal by reason of it being done with a criminal
knowledge or intention
Adam Ali Taluqdar v. King Emperor, AIR 1927 Cal
A & B had beaten up C who dies consequently. A intended to murder him and knew that the
act would cause death. B only intended to cause grievous hurt and did not know that his act
would cause death or such bodily injury as was likely to cause death. It was held that A was
guilty of murder and B of causing grievous hurt.
Section 37: Cooperation by doing one of several acts constituting an offence
R v. Bingley’s, 1821 Russ. And Ry. 446
Several persons came together to forge an instrument, each executing at their level a distinct
part of the forgery, and all of them were not present together when the instrument was
completed. All of the were held to be guilty of forgery as principals.
Section 38: persons concerned in criminal act may be guilty of different offences
Emperor v. Barendra Kumar, (1925) 27 BOMLR 148
Section 38 provides for different punishments for different offences as an alternative to one
punishment for one offence, whether the persons engaged or concerned in the commission of
a criminal act are set in motion by one intention or the other.

RIOTING AND AFFRAY

Section 141: Unlawful Assembly
Note:
1. The essence of an unlawful assembly is the common object of the persons forming the
assembly.
2. Mere presence in an assembly does not make a person a member of an ‘unlawful’
assembly unless it is shown that had done something or omitted to do something
which would make him a member of the unlawful assembly, or unless being aware of
the facts that an assembly is unlawful, one intentionally joins that assembly or
continues to be its member. [s. 142]

5 or more persons
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR 1961 SC
7 persons were prosecuted for rioting but out of them four were acquitted. It was held that the
remaining persons cannot be convicted for rioting as members of an unlawful assembly.
Jit Singh and Others v. The State, AIR 1957 PH 278
The words “in prosecution of the common object” have to be strictly construed as equivalent
to “in order to attain the common object”. The relied on Raghunandan v. Emperor for the
view that “it means that the offence committed was immediately connected with the common
object of the assembly or the act is one which upon the evidence appears to have been done
with a view to accomplish the common object attributed to the members of the assembly.”
Section 146: Rioting
Samraruddin, 1912 Calcutta
On the two expressions being used in the section, the Court held that ‘force’ is restricted to
force used against persons only, but ‘violence’ extends also to force against inanimate
objects.
Note: Brit, per Patterson, J. noted that “If the parties assemble in a tumultuous manner and
actually execute their purpose with violence, it is a riot; but if they merely meet upon a
purpose which having done nothing, they separate without carrying the purpose into effect, it
is an unlawful assembly.” Similarly, Rasul, 1889 per Plowden, noted that it is only the use of
force that distinguishes rioting from an unlawful assembly.
State of U.P. v. Jodha Singh, AIR 1989 SC
A verbal quarrel converting itself into an armed group conflict is not punishable under this
section. In this case, the offence of rioting because the attack on the victims had taken place
in the course of a sudden quarrel. The accused had not formed themselves into an unlawful
assembly in order to commit the offence of rioting.
Mangal Singh v. State of M.P., 1996 CriLJ MP
In a free fight there cannot be said to be any formation of an unlawful assembly and a
common intention. Each accused will be responsible for his individual act.
Section 159: Affray
‘public place’
Note: a public garden is not a public place at all hours but it is a public place when open to
the public. Likewise, a court of law, a hospital, a church, a mosque or a temple are all public
places during the hours in which the public have access to them.
Queen Empress v. Madan Mohan, 1883 AWN
A railway platform when no train is due except a goods train is not a public place.
Sheoraj Singh v State, 1978 CriLJ All
There must be a clear evidence of fighting in a public place and mere words do not constitute
fighting, far less any assault or breach of peace.

Actus Reus - any physical conduct which the law seeks to prevent, or any conduct which leads to
the prohibited harm.
Causa causans: The prohibited act must be a direct outcome of the accused's actions. Or in other
words an immediate cause of the effect.
R V. BLAUE (1975) : there was a man who stabbed an 18 year old girl when she refused to her
request for a sexual favour. The girl staggered out of the house and went to the house of her
neighbour who toom her to the hospital where the surgical registrar had told her that she would die
if she wouldn’t take up a blood transfusion which she refused to because she was a Jehovah's
witness. Here it was held that the victims must be taken as they come, it is not open to an assailant
to assert that the victims religious beliefs which inhibited the victim from seeking treatment were
unreasonable. Moreover the physical cause of death which was the cavity in the neck which was a
direct consequence of the
R V. HOLLAND (1841) : The accused cut the finger of the deceased for which he was taken to the
hospital where he got his finger amputated and if he didn’t he would have died, but he refused
which led to his death. The accused was held liable in this case. The court
R V. JORDAN: A man was wounded because of which he was admitted in a hospital, where even
upon complete healing of the wounds, medications were given to him which led to the death. Thus
the wrong medication was supervening cause of death and not the original wound.
R V. SMITH:
Minimal Causation.
In case where the intervening act's effect on the outcome is only minimal, the original act is still
considered to be the causal act.
MOTI SINGH V. STATE OF UP: The accused stabbed the deceased in such a way that in the natural
course he would have died. The deceased was admitted in the hospital and the day of discharge, he
died. No post-mortem was conducted thus it couldn’t be proven or disproven that it was a direct
effect of the stabbing. The court laid down that the death was remotely connected to the stabbing,
hence the accused wasn’t held for murder. The key principle highlighted here was that the
connection between the primary cause and the death should not be too remote.
REWARAM V. STATE OF MP: The accused inflicted multiple injuries on his wife subsequent to which
she was admitted to a hospital where she developed a case of hyperpyrexia which led to her death.
Here it was held that, although the death wasn’t an effect of the primary act, it could still be
attributable to the death as it directly led to the supervening cause. The hyperpyrexia was a direct
outcome of the debilitated state that the husband left her in.
Causation And Criminal Negligence.
In cases of Negligence, the proof must show that there was a negligent act and such act caused
directly, a criminal act. There can be no conviction if the rashness or negligence of a third party
intervenes.
SULEMAN RAHIMAN MULANI V. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA: The accused, while driving a truck and
collided with the deceased. The deceased died when the accused tried to give him medical
treatment; after which he cremated the body. It was contended that since the accused only held a
learners licence, he was rash and negligent in his driving. And thus must be convicted
under Sec.304A. The court however, refused to presume that he was driving in a rash manner just
because he had only a drivers licence. The accused thus couldn’t be convicted of charges under
304A.
AMBALAL D.BHATT V. STATE OF GUJARAT: Accused was a chemist associated with a chemical
manufacturing company. In the manufacture of glucose a certain amount of Lead Nitrate was
permissible. It was compulsory to assign particular batch no. to all the lots. The drug inspector thus
couldn’t test the products batch wise. Some bottles of glucose contained lead nitrate which caused
12 deaths among its consumers. It was contended that the accused was negligent in not assigning
the batch numbers to the products, which would have otherwise avoided such an event by making
sure that the chief analyst tested the whole lot as different batches which could have facilitated in
the finding of the defective batch. It was held that mere contravention of rules wasn’t enough to
establish causation. It was rather the act of the drug inspector, who turned a blind eye to the fact
that there were no separate batch numbers that finally led to the event. To hold the accused
responsible for the contravention of the rule would be to make an attempt to somehow find the
scapegoat for the death of twelve persons.

Sec 34: When a criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention.

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all each if
such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Also, Sec.33 defines an act or an omission as a single act or omission or a series of act and omissions.
So from 34 and 33 we can infer that a criminal could also be a series of acts committed by a number
of people, in such a way that they cannot be separated from one another.
R V. CRUISE: In this case, a constable and his assistants had gone to a house to arrest a person , A.
On seeing The constable, three other people B,C and D came out, gave him a blow and ran away.
The court here developed the concept of joint liability and ruled that all three, B,C and D were liable
irrespective of who delivered the blow.
Basic requirements for Group Liability, as per s.34
 Two or more persons
 Act done in furtherance of common intention
 There must be participation by all persons in furtherance of common intention
Sec.34 doesn’t create a substantive offence, it merely lays down that the principle of joint liability
will be invoked in cases of a group acting in furtherance of common intention.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor:
Several persons appeared at the door of the backroom of the post office where the post master was
counting his money and demanded the money be given to them. They fired pistols at him and he
died immediately. The accused took the defence that he was only standing guard outside the post
office and he was compelled to stand by the other accused and did not have the intention to kill. The
Calcutta high court had convicted him under s.302 r/w s.34. The privy council however dismissed the
conviction stating that sec.34 lays down the rule, that a common intention was necessary in this case
to hold a group jointly liable (Gurudatta Mal v. State of UP).
There, thus must be a common intention as well as participation to establish group liability. There
has to be a certain level of a pre-concerted plan, i.e there has to be a prior meeting of minds.
Mahboob Shah V. Emperor
The deceased and a few others were going to the banks of the Indus river to collect reeds. When
they travelled a mile downstream, they saw Mohammad Shah bathing at the banks of the river who
stopped them cutting reeds from his land. His nephew, Ghulam Shah caught the rope of the boat, in
reaction to which the deceased picked up a bamboo stick and hit him. Ghulam Shah shouted for help
and called MS and his son WS who stopped and fired at Hamidullah and the deceased respectively.
The privy council held that sec 34 implies the existence of a pre-concerted plan and acting towards
the same. There is a difference between common and similar intention. The existence of common
intention or a pre-arranged plan must be culled out from the facts or circumstances of the case.
(Also held in Dukhmochan Pandey, but with regards to CI being formed in the spur of the moment)
The common intention must be formed prior to the commission of the act. However this common
intention doesn’t necessarily require a detailed plan or a long period of time to be formed.
(Pandurang V. State of Hyderabad, no evidence of prior concert)
Dukhmochan Pandey V. State of Bihar
Complainant had sent 20 people to the fields to transplant paddy. The accused party came along
with 200 people with deadly weapons and directed the labourers to stop the work. When the
complainant objected, the accused directed the mob to kill the labourer, 2 accused fired their guns
on the labourers. The rest of the mob also assaulted the rest of the labourers with their weapons. In
the end, 2 persons died. The death was caused by shock and hemorrhage caused by sharp weapons.
Here the facts lead to the conclusion that the common intention of the mob was to stop the
labourers, not cause murder. Mere presence of the accused together doesn’t necessarily mean that
they had the common intention to commit the offence in question.
Pandurang V, State of Hyderabad
Five persons including the 3 appellants were accused the murder of Ramchander. The 5 accused had
assaulted him in his field. The three appellants attacked with axes while the 2 others attacked with
sticks. The medical evidence had shown that death had been caused by the injury Inflicted onto his
neck. It was held that there was nothing in the circumstances of the case to show that there was any
prior concert or premade plan to kill him.
Tukaram Ganpat V. State of Maharashtra
The appellants, along with some others were accused of stealing coper wire from a storehouse. The
appellant was standing outside near the weigh bridge during the commission of the crime. Also, later
on he was found to be in possession of the duplicate keys of the warehouse. Here it was held that
mere distance from the scene of the crime doesn’t absolve one of culpabiliy under sec.34. In
Barendra Kumar's case, even those who merely stand by and wait were brought under the net of
culpability. Here, all the circumstantial evidence point to the appellant having the common intention
(being in possession of the keysand presesnce at the bridge)
Suresh V. State of UP
A and his brother in law B entered the house of A's brother, where he hacked him, his wife and two
children to death, leaving only one child alive. All this while, A's wife W was standing outside. To
establish culpability under sec.34, all that needs to be proven is CI and presence at the scene of the
offence. There is no need to prove any overt act. However, there wasn’t any proof to show that W
shared the common intention.
Unlawful Assembly (s.141-145 & 149)
The law supresses unlawful assemblies because if not supressed, they may lead to more serious
crimes.
Sec.141 - An assembly of five or more persons is an unlawful assembly if the common object of the
assembly is to
 To overawe criminal force, or by show of criminal force, any legislature or public servant
 To resist the execution of any law
 To commit any mischief or criminal trespass
 Take or obtain posession of any property
 To compel any person to do that which he is not legally bound to do
Essentials of an Unlawful Assembly
 There must be an assembly of atleast 5 persons
 The assembly must have a common object
 The common object must be to commit one of the five illegal objects specifies in the section
Sec. 142 - Being member of unlawful assembly.—Whoever, being aware of facts which render any
assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a
member of an unlawful assembly.
Sec. 149 - If an offence is committed by any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
common object or knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the lawful object, then
every person who is a member of such an assembly is guilty of that offence.
Common Object
The common object of an assembly of persons is their shared purpose. It may be formed by express
agreement by mutual consultation, but that is not necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or
a few members of the assembly and others may just join in. By the way of sec.142 it is clear that
mere presence is not enough to be considered a part of that assembly. Common Intention is
different from Commo Object and thus a pre-concerted plan need not be proves to prove is
existence. The words "In prosecution of the common object" have to be constrained as "in order to
attain the common object", it doesn’t mean "during the prosecution of the common object" and
there must be a nexus between common object and the offence.
Mizaji V. State Of UP
There were disputes regarding the field between appellants and the complainants. 5 of the
appellants came to the deceased's land with weapons and started to ploght the field. When the
complainants arrived, one of the appellants was asked to fire by his father. The order finding them
guilty under Sec.302 r/w Sec.149 was upheld by the SC. The members fully knew, considering the
nature of the weapons they carried, that murder was likely to be committed in furtherance of their
object. Sec. 149 has two parts, first part; when offence is committed in furtherance of common
object, i.e. connected immediately to the object. Second part deals with when the offence is not
directly connected to the object but can reasonably be expected to be an outcome.
Maina Singh V. State of Rajasthan
The relations b/w the accused and the deceased were strained. The accused along with other
persons began to chase the deceased and fired at him. When the deceased fell down, the other
accussed went near him and gave him blows. The sessions Judge had acquitted the four other than
the accused and gave them the benefit of doubt. It was also recorded that one or more of the then
acccused may have committed the crime along with him. The accused was however convicted. The
hc upheld hid charge under 302/34 and 149. Here, it was held that the court cannot charge one
under 34 or 149 when all other accused are acquitted, especially when there is no proof of the act
being committed in conjunction with any other unnamed persons and also that he was responsible
for the injuries that caused death.
Chandra Bihari Gautham V. State of Bihar
The appellants accompanied by around 300-400 armed men attacked the house of an infromant.
The trial court convisted the 3 accused. The HC upheld this. The SC however held that the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of a CO amont he accused. The presence of all te
accused could also not be proved.
Madan Singh V. State of Bihar

INCHOATE CRIMES:
A Crime which is at its initial stages, i.e. before actual commission.
Stages in commission of an offence:
 Intention : Mere intention is not punishable, but in some cases if the intention is manifested
by way of words or conduct, It is punishable such a criminal Intimidation and unlawful
assembly
 Preparation: Arranging the means for the purpose of committing an offence. As a general
rule, preparation cannot be punishable, as there is no actual harm being done and because
the act was done as a step of preparation and not otherwise.
 Attempt: Taking a step towards the commission of the act.
 Commission: Actual commission of the prohibited act
There is a fine layer of distinction between attempt and preparation which is important as attempt is
punishable.

Sections 121, 307, 308, 393 and 511 of the IPC are the provisions under which attempt is punishable.
These are the only provisions that define "attempt"

Sec.511 provides for punishment for the attempt of those crimes which are punishable by
Imprisonment for life by the IPC only. Here the punishment awarded could be
 Imprisonment for a term determined by the provision which attempted
 Imprisonment for a term which extends to one-half of life imprisonment.
 Or one-half of the longest term of imprisonment provided.
 Or with such fine provided for the attempted offence.
According to Sec.57, for the purpose of calculating fractions of imprisonment, life imprisonment is
defined as a term of 20 years.
So, in-case of Sec.511, one half of life imprisonment would mean 10 years.

Characteristics of an attempt:
 Must be a step towards the actual commission.
 Need not be a penultimate act.

ABHAYANAND MISHRA V. STATE OF BIHAR: Accused wanted to apply to Patna University for an
M.A. for which he furnished certain documents of proof. The University realised that the documents
were fabricated. The University sued him for cheating but he used the defence that he was merely in
the stage of preparation. However the court held that the stage of preparation had ended when he
collected the fake documents and despatched them to the Univ. The court also ruled that it is not
necessary for an act to be penultimate for it to be an attempt.
SUDHIR KUMAR MUKHERJEE V. STATE OF WB (Proximity rule): The accused, employed at a firm,
colluded with a limestone dealer attempted to show the false delivery of limestone by forging the
signatures of his superiors on the invoice to present it for payment. He was caught before he could
do so. It was held that even though he hadn’t affixed the forged signatures, his acts were beyond the
stage of preparation and now entered the realm of attempt.
ASGHAR ALI PRADHANIA V. EMPEROR (test of impossibility): A woman who was divorced lived with
her father. Their neighbour (accused) developed an intimate relation with her. The neighbour
promised to marry her and as a result there was sexual intercourse that led to her being
impregnated. The accused directed her to cause miscarriage by consuming arsenic. Thus he
procured a certain white powder and told her to consume it. When she refused, the accused forced
her to do it and she screamed for help which subsequent to which the police arrived. Upon
examination it was found out that the white powder was indeed copper sulphate, which in the
normal course wouldn’t lead to any harm. The court held that his attempt leading to the commission
was impossible thus he wasn’t held liable.
The factor that leads to the failure of the attempt of the perpetrator must be independent of his
own volition for it to be held as an attempt.
STATE OF MAHARASHTRA V. MD. YAKUB: (Proximity rule - the act must be close enough to the goal
of commission to be held as an attempt. Proximity is not only in relation to time and place but the
intention to commit the said offence.)
The custom officials got the information of the planned smuggling of silver by way of a ship which
were to be transferred from a jeep onto a boat. The officials confiscated the silver when the driver of
the jeep neared the boat and the driver was detained. The question thus was whether it was an
attempt to smuggle. The Supreme Court answered that in the affirmative and held that the
impugned acts were proximate enough to the prohibited act in order to be termed an attempt.
MALKIAT SINGH V. STATE OF PUNJAB (Doctrine of locus poenitentiae):
A truck was carrying paddy from Delhi to Punjab. They were held by the officials for being in
violation of certain orders. The truck was held 15km before the border, thus it was held that he can't
be held for attempt as he had an opportunity to repent (Doctrine of locus poenitentiae)
This applies when there is
 An intention
 Preparation
 refrainment from final commission of the act.
Equivocality test: The act speaks for itself
Social danger test: Seriousness of the act being committed/attempted must be looked into.
Impossibility test:
 Legal Impossibility:
 Physical Impossibility: when the person is physically unable to commit the act.
 Impossibility due to ineptitude: when a person is physically capable to commit an offence,
but is unable to do so due to ineptitude.
Haughton v. Smith:
This case was overruled by the Criminal Attempts Act, 1981 wherein any act which is beyond the
stage of preparation can be held for attempt (clause 1 sec 1)
A person can be guilty for attempt if even in all probability the commission of the attempted offence
was impossible. (clause 2 sec 1)
Criminal Attempts Act 1981(U.K.):
 If, with intent to commit an offence to which this section applies, a person does an act which
is more than merely preparatory to the commission of the offence, he is guilty of attempting
to commit the offence.
 A person may be guilty of attempting to commit an offence to which this section applies
even though the facts are such that the commission of the offence is impossible.
  In any case where—

(a)apart from this subsection a person’s intention would not be regarded as having amounted
to an intent to commit an offence; but

(b)if the facts of the case had been as he believed them to be, his intention would be so
regarded,

R V. SHIVPURI {[1986] 2 All ER 334} (proximity rule): Custom officers had arrested the accused on a
belief that he was carrying prohibited drugs and he confessed that he was indeed a dealer of drugs,
but on examination it was found that it wasn’t drugs. It was held that he would still be held liable as
he had the guilty intention to commit the prohibited act as in all probability, his chance of
consummating the offence is non-existent. He was however held under Sec.1 of criminal attempts
act and Sec.170 of Customs and Excise Management act(being knowingly concerned in dealing with
and harbouring prohibited drugs.).
Sec.307: attempt to murder. Here, different punishments are awarded for attempts that causes hurt
and that which don’t cause any hurt. (life imprisonment and any term extending up to 10 years
respectively.)
State of Maharashtra V. Balram Patil: Two rival political parties got into a fight. The Supreme Court
held the accused guilty for attempting murder, even though only simple injuries were inflicted. The
court held that it wasn’t necessary for the act to cause death under normal circumstances, it is
sufficient for there to be an intention and an overt act.
Vasant Jadhav V. State of Maharashtra:
R V. Cassidy: the act would lead to death in the normal course of events would cause the
commission of the act but because the last proximate act wasn’t committed, so it would come under
the purview of sec.511
Om Prakash V. State Of Punjab:
Sec.309 - Attempt to commit suicide.
Aruna Ramchandra V. UOI
P Rathinam V. UOI
Smt. Gian Kaur V. State of Punjab
Abetment:
In English law, the person abetting the crime is known as the accessory.
 Principle of the first degree is somebody who has committed the crime or who gets the
crime done through an innocent agent.
 Principle at the second degree is someone who is present at the time of commission of a
crime and facilitates or instigates the same.
 Accessories before the fact is somebody who instigates the commission of the crime before
the commission
 Accessories after the fact; when someone facilitates in harbouring or help the offender after
the commission of an offence, (sec. 201)
Abetment of a thing (sec. 107):
There are three modes by which a person abets the doing of a thing:
 By instigating any person -------> (mere association cannot imply instigation) (mere words
without intention to instigate cannot be implied as instigation) (even wilful omission of an
act can lead to instigation)
 Engaging one or more persons in a conspiracy of doing that thing.---------> (here, the mere
agreement has been criminalised)
 Abetment by intentional aid.--------> (only clause that explicitly talks about intention)
Who is an abettor: For the purpose of IPC, is any person who abets an offence or the commission of
an act which is an offence, committed by a person capable to commit that offence with the same
intention or knowledge as that of the abettor.
Sec. 108: A person commits an offence who abets either the commission of an offence or the
commission of an act which would be an offence if committed by a person capable by law of
committing an offence with the same intention or knowledge as that of the abettor
Sections 109-120 ------> Principles for assessing the extent of punishment liable to be imposed for
various types of abettors.
 Sec. 109 (If the act abetted is committed in consequence and no express provision is made
for its punishment) : The impugned act must be a direct consequence of and done exactly
as abetted by the abettor. This creates a degree of intention between. The liability of
principal offender and abettor is equal. The charge under this section Is for the abetment of
some an offence which is represented by some substantive provision. This section doesn’t
operate in case of offences, the abetment of which isn't expressly mentioned in a separate
provision.
 Sec.110 (If person abetted does act with different intention from that of abettor): The
abettor is punished in such a way as he had done the act himself. The act done, however
must be the same as the act abetted. Mere difference of motive doesn’t absolve the
principle offender, he/she must be an innocent agent.
 Sec.111(Liability when act done and act abetted are different): The abettor is held directly
liable as though he had directly abetted the act actually committed. Proviso: The act done
must be the natural consequence of the act abetted. This follows the principle of
constructive liability.
 Sec.112(Abettor when liable for cumulative liability for act abetted and act done): If the act
done and act abetted are different and the act actually done constitutes a distinct offence,
the abettor is liable for both the offences. Here also the probable consequence requirement
applies
 Sec.113(Liability of abettor for effect caused by act abetted different from that intended by
the abettor): The abettor in this case is liable for the effect caused in the same manner as
though he had intended that effect from the act abetted. Here again, the test of knowledge
of likelihood of such effect is applied. This is distinct from a probable consequence because
knowledge is subjective but probability is objective.
 Sec.114(Abettor present when offence committed): In such a case, he shall be deemed to
have committed such an offence.
3 essentials of this section - i) Abetment should be prior to the offence
ii) abetment must be complete by itself
Iii) abettor must be present at the time of at the time of the commission of the act. This
section is merely evidentiary in nature and establishes that prior abetment and presence
during the commission translates to participation.
STATE OF KARNATAKA V. HEMAREDDY: Appellants were charged under sec.467 read with
Sec.114 of the IPC for the forging of some documents with respect to the alleged sale of some
land. The appellant was accused to have helped another person impersonate another person.
The Supreme court overturned the high court ruling that had acquitted them on technical
grounds.
MATHURALA ADI REDDY V. STATE OF HYDERABAD:
About 5-6 people armed with guns came to the village of Alwal, abducted and killed them. The
Appellant had allegedly instigated others to fire. Here the facts of the case had suggested that
there was common intention and not mere presence at the scene of the crime which proves
that there much more than instigation and also deemed participation in this case.
 Sections 115-117 deals with the quantum of punishment in different cases of abetment.
  Section 115' - When an act, punishable by death is abetted but is not committed, the abettor
and the abetment of such act doesn’t have any express provision, then the abettor may be
punished with a term that could extend to seven years and fine as well.
 Sec. 116 - Whoever abets an offence that is punishable by imprisonment and the act is not
committed and given that there is no express provision for the punishment of such
abetment, a punishment of a term extending up to 1/4 of the maximum sentence for the
commission of that offence may be provided along with a fine.
 Sec.117 - Whoever abets the public in general or any group or class of persons exceeding 10
will be punished by a term of up to 3 years or with fine or with both.
 Sec 118-120 punishment for concealing plans to commit certain offences.
 Sec.118 - Concealing design to commit offence punishable with death or life imprisonment
shall be , if the offence committed, be punished with a term of up to 7 years and if act not
committed, be punishable with a term of up to 3 years and be liable to fine in both cases.
 Sec.119 - If any public officer conceals the plan of commission of any offence......
When the principal offender is acquitted in a case involving charge of abetting and aiding.
Trilok Chand V. State of Delhi
Accused of abetting an inspector in the Delhi electricity supply undertaking. Bribe was given in
exchange for providing electricity connection. Here the principal offender was acquitted,
reason being that an employee of a lower cadre cannot be expected to accept bribes for such
acts. Thus conversely it was held that there cannot be the abetment or aiding of such an act.
Jamuna Singh V, State of Bihar : The accused Jamuna Singh had abetted a person to set fire to
a hut, but the act was committed by someone other than the person abetted. Also, the person
accused of having set the hut on fire was acquitted. Here the supreme court had held that
there was no connection between the acquittal of the alleged principal offender and the
liability of the offender. The act of abetment is complete as and when the abettor instigates
any person to commit an offence.
CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY:
The mere agreement among conspirators is a culpable act. The original 1860 code had no provision
for Criminal Conspiracy. Historically there were the following provisions for conspiracy
 Sec.107 - Conspiracy by way of abetment; an act or omission in furtherance of an illegal act.
 Sec.310 and 401 - Thug and its definition.
Some overt act was hence always necessary.
Mulcahy V. R (Mulcahy Dictum) - A conspiracy exists not merely in the intention of two or more
people to do an unlawful act, but in the agreement to carry it into effect. Such an agreement to carry
out an offence is an act in itself.
By the IPC (Amendment) Act of 1870, Sec. 121A (conspiracy to wage war against the state) was
inserted that no longer made the commission of an overt act necessary.
Indian Criminal Law amendment act of 1913 inserted 120 A and 120 B (Definition of and punishment
for Criminal Conspiracy)
Essential elements for Conspiracy (according to Sec.120A)
 Two or more persons
 Agreement between themselves
 Agreement must be to do or cause to be done any illegal act or a legal act by legal act by
illegal means.
 Proviso: No agreement except an agreement to commit an offence will be considered
criminal conspiracy unless some act besides the agreement is done in pursuance thereof.
Mohd. Khalid V. State of West Bengal & Devender Pal Singh V. State.
The broad essentials of CC
 An object to be accomplished
 A plan or a scheme embodying means to achieve that objective
  An agreement or understanding among the people whereby they become committed to co-
operate for the accomplishment of the object.
 An overt act in pursuance of that agreement, in case of non-offence act.
Mere agreement is not enough for a conspiracy is complete when the combination is framed to
commit an offence.
Conspiracy may comprise of a number of acts. Every conspirator is liable for the mere agreement to
do the same but not liable for the individual acts that he/she hasn’t done.
To establish conspiracy, it is important to have knowledge of involvement or indulgence in an illegal
act is necessary.
Separate and distinct acts committed without a common intention. There must be a common design
and a common intention to work in pursuance of the common design.
Different persons acting in the same manner but independently cannot be called conspiracy. It is not
necessary for the co-conspirators to know each other. There may be unity of object but plurality of
means. The only relevant factor is that all the conspirators worked towards the same object.
Proof of Conspiracy:
Since conspiracy is always hatched in secrecy, and direct evidence that could prove the same is
rarely available, the proof thus rests on circumstantial evidence and inference made from events.
Each and every incriminating circumstance must be clearly to the established by reliable evidence
and the circumstances proved must form a chain of events that point to the conclusion of the guilt of
the accused. The court must enquire whether persons involved are independently pursuing the
lawful object.
Sec 10 of the IEA lays down the conditions for assessing the evidence of co-conspirators to prove
conspiracy against other conspirators.
 There should be prima facie evidence of two or more persons forming an agreement
 If the above condition is fulfilled, anything said done or written by them with reference to
the common intention will be considered as evidence against each other
 Anything said or done by the conspirators after the common intention was formed by any of
them would be admissible.
State of Tamil Nadu V. Nalini -
 Offence of criminal conspiracy is a general exception to the general law where mere intent
cannot be punishable.
 In absence of proof, spouse or relatives providing shelter to the accused cannot be
considered to be conspiracy, even if there is knowledge of the same.
 Everything written said or done by the co-conspirators is said to be done by every individual
conspirator, if it is done in pursuance of the common object of the conspiracy.
 Prosecution has to prove that the accused not only had knowledge of the conspiracy but
also that he/she has agreed to the same.
Sec 120.B : Punishment of Criminal Conspiracy
 Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence that is punishable with
death, imprisonment for life or rigorous punishment for a term of two years or upwards,
shall, where there is no express provision is made for the same, be punished on the same
manner as he had committed the offence.
 Whoever is a party to a criminal offence other than ones aforementioned, shall be punished
with a term not extending 6 moths or fine or both.
Sec 120 B however must be read with sec.196 of the CrPC which states that the court cannot take
cognisance for criminal conspiracy for
 Committing an offence against the state
 Cause communal disharmony
 Insult a religion
 And cause public mischief
Without prior sanction of the Central or State gormint.
Effect of Acquittal of the Accused
It has been the case normally, that when all but one of the accused have been acquitted, the
prosecution case itself fails as there can be no conspiracy involving just one person.
CBI V. VC Shukla
Jain brothers had bribed prominent politicians from various parties to get certain favours. The court
in this case had held that the evidence against the politicians wasn’t substantial enough to prove
that they were indeed parties to the conspiracy. Jain brothers were ow the only parties
left..........??????

Private Defence
No state however resourceful can extend protection to all of its citizens. A private citizen who is
threatened by certain external forces may use all means available to him to protect him/herself in
case they are not able to take recourse to the help of state authorities.
The apprehension must be reasonable and an imminent danger must be present.
Indian law differs from english law in this matter,right to defence extends to threat to body as well
as property under Indian law whereas in english law it extends only to the reasonable apprehension
to person.
Sec.96 -
Nothing is an offence which is done in the exercise of private defence.
The subsequent sections define the limits within which the right can be exercised.
Sec.97
Every person has a right, subject to the restrictions in section 99, to defend,
 First - his own body and the body of any other person, against any offence affecting human
body;
 Secondly - The property, whether movable or immovable, of himself or any other person,
against act , which is an offence falling under the definition of theft, robbery or criminal
trespass.
Sec 97 thus defines the subject matter of the defence that is allowed and subjects it to the
restrictions stated in sec.99. The second sub clause states that right to defence against property is
available against threat of only certain acts.
Right of private defence is essentially a protective and not a punitive right.
Sec.99
Lays down restrictions on RPD. There is no RPD in cases where there is ability to take recourse to the
protection of public authorities. No harm that is proportionately more than that would be required
in the present situation is allowed. There is also no RPD done against act done by or under the
instructions of a public servant, except in cases where there is reasonable apprehension of grievous
hurt or death.
RPD is not available to aggressors
When the person who attacked by the accused is not an agressor, then there lies no claim to the
right of private defence.
State of UP V. Ram Swarup
The accused's father held a contract in the tehbazaari in a vegetable market for 10 years. In one
particular tender, he was outbid by the deceased. On the day of the incident, the accused went to
the market to buy melons from the deceased who refused to sell it to him as they were marked for
another customer. The accused's father returned with 3 of his sons, including the accused. There
was then a quarrel between the accused and the deceased, after which the accused shot the
deceased dead at point blank range. Here , it was contended that there was a quarrel between the
deceased, his servants and the accused's party and that in defence of the same, the accused shot the
deceased. Here, the court held that there couldn’t be any RPD as the accused himself was the
aggressor and he had gone to the deceased with the clear intention to cause a quarrel.
Time to have recourse to the public authorities
Amjad Khan V. State
A communal riot broke out between some sindhi refugees and the muslims. The mob approached
the appellant's shop and were about to break it down. Here it was obvious that there was no time to
recourse to the public authorities and that there was RPD
S.100 - lays down cases in which right of self-defence can be extended to causing death. The section
doenst mention that these circumstances enumerated actually have to occur. The person cliaming
RPD must be under bona fide fear.
S.102
The duration during which the right to defend the body begins as soon as the reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body arises.
As soon as the cause of RPD disappears, there is no more RPD.
Dominic Varkey V. State of Kerala
There was exchange of words between the appellant George and his elder brother Dominic in the
course of which George drew out dagger from his waist and Dominic bent down to pick up a stone.
Before Dominic could rise after picking up the stone. George rushed towards Dominic and stabbed
him with the knife. The stab was warded off by Dominic. George again stabbed Dominic on the left
thigh causing an incised gaping wound on the upper third of the left thigh. Immediately thereafter
George ran away. Dominic was taken to the Government dispensary and on the way he died. If it is
found that there was apprehension to life or property or of grievous hurt the right of private defence
is in operation. The person exercising right of private defence is entitled to stay and overcome the
threat. All the acts of George will have to be examined as to whether in overcoming the threat he
exceeded the right of defence. In the present case, it is found that Dominic was the aggressor and
when he was picking up a large piece of stone George had reasonable apprehension that Dominic
would kill him or cause him grievous hurt. Those features indicate that, apprehension. Dominic was
picking up a stone of a dangerous size. The two brothers had quarrelled before reaching the scene.
The antecedents are that the quarrels in the past were started by Dominic and he was in aggressive
attitude Mathai who was present at the scene of occurrence said that he did not see George bringing
out, the knife. Thus here it was clear that the accused wasn’t the aggressor and that there was a
reasonable apprehension of death or grievous hurt.
Deo Narain V. State of UP
There were disputes with respect to possessions if certain plots of land. The possession of the said
lands was with the accused. The complainants party had gone to the lands with the objective of
preventing the ploughing and cultivation on the field. There was a clash between the two , the
accused had several injuries in his body and the accused had also inflicted injuries in the complainant
that led to death. Here it was held that to say there is RPD after suffering certain serious injuries is a
wrong interpretation of Sec.102 and if after the injury there was no more apprehension of death,
then there was no RPD, which is why in this case there Indeed was RPD. In the moments of
excitement, it is difficult to expect parties to to coolly weigh as if in golden scales as to what precise
kind and severity of blow would be legally sufficient. Here, the appellant reasonably apprehended
danger to his body and it was quite clear that the other party intended to use their maximum force.
Kishan V. State of MP
Deceased was supervising the laying of the foundation near his house. One of the accused warned
him against using the bricks near his house as they belonged to him. After sometime, the accused
along with a few others came and dragged the deceased out of his house. The deceased, in an
attempt to save himself, picked up a Khutai that lay nearby and gave 3 blows to one of them in the
head after which they caught hold of the deceased and beat him to death. Here, it was quite clear
that the accused were agressors and thus they couldn’t claim the right to private defence.
James Martin V. State of Kerala
A Bharath Bandh was sponsored by certain political parties. All the offices and shops were shut. The
accused, James and his father Xavier's flour mill and bread factory was still open. Five men, activists
of the bandh got into the mill and made demands to shut it down. Whether in a particular
circumstance a person legitimately acted in exercise of RPD is a question of fact to be determined.
Non explanation of injuries sustained by the accused is an important circumstance but mere non
explanation might not affect the prosecution all cases. Not only were there acts of vandalism, but
also destruction of property and to expect the accused to stay calm in the midst of all this was
irrational. The accused were thus in the limits of RPD.
RPD of Property
When neither party was in peaceful possession of the property and there was a fight for the same,
there would be no RPD. The words "property of himself or any other person" can only mean
property of which he is in de-facto possession. Every true owner of land has a right to throw out the
trespasser who is in the process of trespassing and hasn’t accomplished possession. The right is not
available if the trespasser has been successful in accomplishing the trespass, to the knowledge of the
true owner. The possession against which the trespasser has an RPD must be settled and must
extend over a sufficiently long period of time. Mere passage of time does not necessarily confer any
right on the trespasser.
Puran Singh V. State of Punjab
Laid down four criteria as to the nature of possession which may entitle a trespasser to exercise RPD
of property.
 The trespasser must be in actual physical possession of the property
 The possession must be in the knowledge, either express or implied, of the owner or
without any concealment and which contains any element of animus possidendi
 The process of dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser must be complete and final
 One of the usual tests to determine settled possession of the trespasser in the case of
cultivable land would be whether any crop has been grown on the land. If crop has been
grown, even the true owner has no right to the destroy the crop grown.
RPD of property to the extent of causing death.
Sec.103
Under sec.103 it is only those cases under which not just the property, but also the person is under
threat, which justify the causing of death.
Mahavir Choudhary V. State of Bihar
A water stream flowed northwards reaching up to a village X, where the accused lived. The deceased
hailed from a nearby village y. Due to an acute drought situation, the deceased built a bund near
village X and blocked the water from flowing north. This act of the deceased was questioned by
some of the accused, but their concerns werent paid heed to. One morning, all the accused turned
up with guns and lathis.

Sec 34: When a criminal act is done in furtherance of a common intention.

When a criminal act is done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all each if
such persons is liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.
Also, Sec.33 defines an act or an omission as a single act or omission or a series of act and omissions.
So from 34 and 33 we can infer that a criminal could also be a series of acts committed by a number
of people, in such a way that they cannot be separated from one another.
R V. CRUISE: In this case, a constable and his assistants had gone to a house to arrest a person , A.
On seeing The constable, three other people B, C and D came out, gave him a blow and ran away.
The court here developed the concept of joint liability and ruled that all three, B,C and D were liable
irrespective of who delivered the blow.
Basic requirements for Group Liability, as per s.34
 Two or more persons
 Act done in furtherance of common intention
 There must be participation by all persons in furtherance of common intention
Sec.34 doesn’t create a substantive offence, it merely lays down that the principle of joint liability
will be invoked in cases of a group acting in furtherance of common intention.
Barendra Kumar Ghosh v. King Emperor:
Several persons appeared at the door of the backroom of the post office where the post master was
counting his money and demanded the money be given to them. They fired pistols at him and he
died immediately. The accused took the defence that he was only standing guard outside the post
office and he was compelled to stand by the other accused and did not have the intention to kill. The
Calcutta high court had convicted him under s.302 r/w s.34. The privy council however dismissed the
conviction stating that sec.34 lays down the rule, that a common intention was necessary in this case
to hold a group jointly liable (Gurudatta Mal v. State of UP).
There, thus must be a common intention as well as participation to establish group liability. There
has to be a certain level of a pre-concerted plan, i.e there has to be a prior meeting of minds.
Mahboob Shah V. Emperor
The deceased and a few others were going to the banks of the Indus river to collect reeds. When
they travelled a mile downstream, they saw Mohammad Shah bathing at the banks of the river who
stopped them cutting reeds from his land. His nephew, Ghulam Shah caught the rope of the boat, in
reaction to which the deceased picked up a bamboo stick and hit him. Ghulam Shah shouted for help
and called MS and his son WS who stopped and fired at Hamidullah and the deceased respectively.
The privy council held that sec 34 implies the existence of a pre-concerted plan and acting towards
the same. There is a difference between common and similar intention. The existence of common
intention or a pre-arranged plan must be culled out from the facts or circumstances of the case.
(Also held in Dukhmochan Pandey, but with regards to CI being formed in the spur of the moment)
The common intention must be formed prior to the commission of the act. However this common
intention doesn’t necessarily require a detailed plan or a long period of time to be formed.
(Pandurang V. State of Hyderabad, no evidence of prior concert)
Dukhmochan Pandey V. State of Bihar
Complainant had sent 20 people to the fields to transplant paddy. The accused party came along
with 200 people with deadly weapons and directed the labourers to stop the work. When the
complainant objected, the accused directed the mob to kill the labourer, 2 accused fired their guns
on the labourers. The rest of the mob also assaulted the rest of the labourers with their weapons. In
the end, 2 persons died. The death was caused by shock and hemorrhage caused by sharp weapons.
Here the facts lead to the conclusion that the common intention of the mob was to stop the
labourers, not cause murder. Mere presence of the accused together doesn’t necessarily mean that
they had the common intention to commit the offence in question.
Pandurang V, State of Hyderabad
Five persons including the 3 appellants were accused the murder of Ramchander. The 5 accused had
assaulted him in his field. The three appellants attacked with axes while the 2 others attacked with
sticks. The medical evidence had shown that death had been caused by the injury Inflicted onto his
neck. It was held that there was nothing in the circumstances of the case to show that there was any
prior concert or premade plan to kill him.
Tukaram Ganpat V. State of Maharashtra
The appellants, along with some others were accused of stealing coper wire from a storehouse. The
appellant was standing outside near the weigh bridge during the commission of the crime. Also, later
on he was found to be in possession of the duplicate keys of the warehouse. Here it was held that
mere distance from the scene of the crime doesn’t absolve one of culpabiliy under sec.34. In
Barendra Kumar's case, even those who merely stand by and wait were brought under the net of
culpability. Here, all the circumstantial evidence point to the appellant having the common intention
(being in possession of the keysand presesnce at the bridge)
Suresh V. State of UP
A and his brother in law B entered the house of A's brother, where he hacked him, his wife and two
children to death, leaving only one child alive. All this while, A's wife W was standing outside. To
establish culpability under sec.34, all that needs to be proven is CI and presence at the scene of the
offence. There is no need to prove any overt act. However, there wasn’t any proof to show that W
shared the common intention.
Unlawful Assembly (s.141-145 & 149)
The law supresses unlawful assemblies because if not supressed, they may lead to more serious
crimes.
Sec.141 - An assembly of five or more persons is an unlawful assembly if the common object of the
assembly is to
 To overawe criminal force, or by show of criminal force, any legislature or public servant
 To resist the execution of any law
 To commit any mischief or criminal trespass
 Take or obtain posession of any property
 To compel any person to do that which he is not legally bound to do
Essentials of an Unlawful Assembly
 There must be an assembly of atleast 5 persons
 The assembly must have a common object
 The common object must be to commit one of the five illegal objects specifies in the section
Sec. 142 - Being member of unlawful assembly.—Whoever, being aware of facts which render any
assembly an unlawful assembly, intentionally joins that assembly, or continues in it, is said to be a
member of an unlawful assembly.
Sec. 149 - If an offence is committed by any member of the unlawful assembly in prosecution of the
common object or knew to be likely to be committed in the prosecution of the lawful object, then
every person who is a member of such an assembly is guilty of that offence.
Common Object
The common object of an assembly of persons is their shared purpose. It may be formed by express
agreement by mutual consultation, but that is not necessary. It may be formed at any stage by all or
a few members of the assembly and others may just join in. By the way of sec.142 it is clear that
mere presence is not enough to be considered a part of that assembly. Common Intention is
different from Commo Object and thus a pre-concerted plan need not be proves to prove is
existence. The words "In prosecution of the common object" have to be constrained as "in order to
attain the common object", it doesn’t mean "during the prosecution of the common object" and
there must be a nexus between common object and the offence.
Mizaji V. State Of UP
There were disputes regarding the field between appellants and the complainants. 5 of the
appellants came to the deceased's land with weapons and started to ploght the field. When the
complainants arrived, one of the appellants was asked to fire by his father. The order finding them
guilty under Sec.302 r/w Sec.149 was upheld by the SC. The members fully knew, considering the
nature of the weapons they carried, that murder was likely to be committed in furtherance of their
object. Sec. 149 has two parts, first part; when offence is committed in furtherance of common
object, i.e. connected immediately to the object. Second part deals with when the offence is not
directly connected to the object but can reasonably be expected to be an outcome.
Maina Singh V. State of Rajasthan
The relations b/w the accused and the deceased were strained. The accused along with other
persons began to chase the deceased and fired at him. When the deceased fell down, the other
accussed went near him and gave him blows. The sessions Judge had acquitted the four other than
the accused and gave them the benefit of doubt. It was also recorded that one or more of the then
acccused may have committed the crime along with him. The accused was however convicted. The
hc upheld hid charge under 302/34 and 149. Here, it was held that the court cannot charge one
under 34 or 149 when all other accused are acquitted, especially when there is no proof of the act
being committed in conjunction with any other unnamed persons and also that he was responsible
for the injuries that caused death.
Chandra Bihari Gautham V. State of Bihar
The appellants accompanied by around 300-400 armed men attacked the house of an infromant.
The trial court convisted the 3 accused. The HC upheld this. The SC however held that the
prosecution failed to establish the presence of a CO amont he accused. The presence of all te
accused could also not be proved.
Madan Singh V. State of Bihar