Disini, Jr. v.

Secretary of Justice
(716 SCRA 235, February 11, 2014)
ABAD, J.:

Doctrine: Under the Revised Penal Code, the mens rea of the accused is the determining
factor for criminal liability.23 It must be shown that he possessed a culpable mind or criminal
intent in addition to committing the illegal act. Therefore, as a general rule, criminal liability
requires that the act be committed with dolo or "malice"; otherwise, there is no crime.

Facts: Several provisions of Republic Act (RA) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012,
are challenged by the petitioners. The petitioners assert that the cybercrime law's approach to
regulating objectionable cyberspace activities violates a number of their constitutional rights.
The government asserts that the law merely aims to place cyberspace activities under
reasonable control, sanction wrongdoers, and prevent harmful system attacks.

Issues: Whether or not CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF THE CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT

ARE CONSTITUTIONAL

Rulings: Strict Scrutiny Standard not applicable in Illegal Access provision. Thus illegal Access
Section 4(a)(1) is constitutional. Petitioners argue that Section 4(a)(1) should be thrown down
because it does not satisfy the rigorous scrutiny threshold for statutes that violate basic rights.
The Court has used the strict scrutiny test, an American constitutional concept, to evaluate
legislation that target a group. This approach presumes unconstitutionality for legislative
classifications that impermissibly interfere with basic rights or disfavor suspicious groups. The
government must establish that classification is required to fulfill a compelling state interest and
is the least restrictive way to safeguard it. From equal protection, the rigorous scrutiny criterion
was applied to legislation regulating speech, gender, race, and other basic rights.

Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference is NOT unconstitutional

Under the overbreadth theory, a lawful governmental goal, legally susceptible to state control,
cannot be realized by unduly broadening its topic and infringing protected liberties. Section 4(a)
(3) does not violate these liberties. It sanctions vandalism—willfully deleting others' computer
data, electronic documents, or electronic data messages. This doesn't affect protected liberties.
Destroying private papers and computer systems is illegal. Petitioners fail to prove the
Overbreadth Doctrine invalidates the clause. All criminal laws, including the cybercrime
legislation, have a chilling effect, an in terrorem effect, or the threat of punishment that hovers
over those who want to break the law. However, prohibiting criminal laws because they induce
fear renders the state helpless to regulate and punish socially undesirable behavior. Section
4(a)(3) clearly states the evil it punishes and does not frighten constitutional rights, therefore the
chilling effect that paralyzes is a fiction.

No Section 4(a)(6) cyber-squatting Equal Protection violation. Section 4(a)(6), or cyber-

squatting, violates the equal protection principle because it treats users who use their true
names the same as those who use aliases or assume the name of another in satire, parody, or
other literary devices. For instance, if a famous billionaire-philanthropist called "Julio Gandolfo"
registers the name as his pseudo-name, the law would prosecute both him and the person who
registers it as his actual name for cyber-squatting. Petitioners say the law should reflect the
significant difference between the two. Whether he uses "Julio Gandolfo" as his true name or
as a pseudonym, the law punishes him for using the name for evil. The law is appropriate in
punishing him for purchasing the domain name in bad faith to profit, deceive, harm reputation,
or deny others who are not ill-motivated of the legitimate chance to register it. Section 4(a)(6)'s
equal protection claim is without merit.
Fermin vs. People,
550 SCRA 132, March 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:

Facts: Gossip Tabloid is published by Cristinelli S. Fermin, and Bogs Tugas is the editor-in-
chief. It is unlikely that Annabelle Rama and her husband, Eddie Gutierrez, will travel to the
United States, according to the tabloid's headline and lead story from June 14, 1995. According
to the tabloid, Annabelle Rama and Eddie Gutierrez converted the money paid to them by fellow
Filipinos in America for their business of distributing high-end cookware for their own personal
use, and they only returned to the Philippines with their family to avoid prosecution in the United
States. Respondents lodged libel complaints against the petitioner and Tugas before the RTC.
The RTC found the petitioner and Tugas of libel punishable under Article 355 of the Revised
Penal Code. Petitioner and Tugas filed an appeal with the CA, which upheld petitioner's
conviction but acquitted Tugas for lack of participation in the publication of the libelous article.

Issue:
Whether or not both the publisher and the Editor-in-chief are guilty of libel based on the libelous
article written by Fermin.

Held: Yes. Based on precedent cases including U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under
Section 6 of Act No. 277, which states that "Every author, editor, or proprietor of any book,
newspaper, or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in
any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if he were the author of
the same." In People v. Topacio and Santiago, the Spanish wording of Article 360 of the
Revised Penal Code included "publicar." Thus, Article 360 covers both the creator and the
printer or publisher of defamatory material. People v. Clay (86 Ill., 147) stated that "A person
who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both
civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by the agent and all others who aid in publishing
it." As revealed by Gossip Tabloid's editorial box, petitioner was its "publisher," "president," and
"chairperson," as she testified on the witness stand. She also testified that she managed the
business side of the publication and assigned editors to handle everything, providing the means
to publish the article purportedly prepared by the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were her
employees. Thus, Fermin's libel conviction should be maintained, but the Supreme Court cannot
restore the trial court's conviction of Tugas since the CA's acquittal would violate his
constitutional protection against double jeopardy. The Court of Appeals decision is affirmed with
modifications.

Bonifacio vs. Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149,

G.R. No. 184800, May 05, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

FACTS: On August 25, 2005, Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI) officials, trustees, and
members published libelous articles and claims on their website. Their publication slandered the
Yuchengco Family, YGC, and Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.The Makati Prosecutor's Office filed 13 libel
informations against the defendants on May 5, 2006. The accused filed a Motion to Quash the Information
because the Makati RTC did not have jurisdiction. The material is fatally flawed since it fails to identify the
crime charged and the actions or omissions complained of as libel. The Makati RTC approved the
application and suppressed the information, but the prosecution filed a move for reconsideration, arguing
that even if the information was inadequate, it just required a formal modification. This motion for
reconsideration was granted by the RTC who then ordered the prosecution to amend the information to
read That on or about the 25th day of August 2005 in Makati City, Metro Manila, Philippines, a place
within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then the trustees of
Parents Enabling Parents Coalition and as such trustees they hold the legal title to the website which is of
general circulation, and publication to the public conspiring, confederating together with John Does,
whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and all of them mutually helping
and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and publicly and
maliciously with intention of attacking the honesty, virtue, honor and integrity, character and reputation of
complainant Malayan Insurance Co., Inc.,Yuchengco Family particularly Ambassador Alfonso Yuchengco
and Helen Dee and for further purpose exposing the complainant to public hatred and contempt published
an article imputing a vice or defect to the complainant and caused to be composed, posted and published
in the said website, a website accessible in Makati City , an injurious and defamatory article, which was
first published and accessed by the private complainant in Makati City Petitioners again sought to
suppress material they said did not vest jurisdiction. The prosecution placed the case where the
aggrieved party viewed the internet-published item. RTC denied petitioner's motion.

Issue:
Was there grave abuse of discretion by the RTC when it admitted the amended information

Ruling: Yes. In Macasaet, libel lawsuits might be prosecuted where the complainant lived at
the time of the crime or where the claimed defamatory publication was first published. The
modified case information chose the second choice to lay the venue. The prosecution said the
item was originally published and viewed by the complainant in Makati City. It equated
accessibility to printing and initial publishing. The Supreme Court examined libel matters before
RA 4363 changed Article 360 of the RPC. Before, the injured party chooses venue. However,
experience demonstrated that the injured party might harass the accused in a libel case by
setting the criminal action in a faraway location. To prevent this, RA 4363 set venue regulations.
If the offended party uses the circumstances of where the libel was printed and first published
as the venue for the criminal action, the Information must allege with particularity where the
defamatory article was printed and first published, such as the editorial or business offices of
newspapers, magazines, or serial publications. If the Court rules that the revised information
vested jurisdiction in the Makati Courts because the defamatory item was viewed there, the libel
claim might be launched in all other areas where the website was visited or capable of being
accessed.

Spouses Isidro Dulay vs. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 215132, September 13, 2021
HERNANDO, J.:

People of the Philippines vs. Perlita Urquico,

G.R. No. 238910, July 20, 2022
HERNANDO, J.:

Facts:

In the period between November 2009 and May 2010, the accused-appellant, along with her co-
accused Perlita Castro Urquico, also known as "Fhey" Urquico, and Carlo Villavicencio, Jr., also
known as "Boyet" Villavicencio, conducted a series of transactions under the entity Mheyman
Manpower Agency (MMA). These transactions involved the solicitation of funds from a minimum
of 31 individuals seeking overseas employment opportunities. Nevertheless, despite fulfilling the
required financial obligations, none of these persons were able to successfully embark on their
intended international journeys. Consequently, this unfortunate outcome prompted the affected
parties to lodge many formal grievances against the three who were allegedly responsible for
the aforementioned circumstances. Five Informations charging the accused with violation of RA
8042 and Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the RPC were filed by the Office of the
Prosecutor

Due to the absence of any given evidence against the accused, Elnora Ebo Mandelma, in
Criminal Case Nos. 17319 to 17325, 17328 to 17331, 17333 to 17345, and 17347 to 17349, the
Demurrer to Evidence is hereby granted. Consequently, the aforementioned cases are ordered
to be dismissed only in relation to accused Elnora Ebo Mandelma. Given that the remaining
individuals implicated in the case, Perlita Castro Urquico alias 'Fhey' and Carlo Villavicencio Jr.
alias 'Boyet', are currently evading arrest and Alias Warrants of Arrest have already been issued
against them, it is recommended that Criminal Case Nos. 17319 to 17325, 17328 to 17331,
17333 to 17345, and 17347 to 17349 be archived, with the provision that they may be reopened
upon the apprehension of the aforementioned accused or their voluntary surrender to this Court.

Issue:

Rulings:

The appeal lacks merit. The prosecution has effectively demonstrated the guilt of the accused-
appellant to a degree that leaves no reasonable doubt. The subject of inquiry pertains to the
criminal case numbered 17318, which involves the offense of engaging in illegal recruitment on
a significant scale.

According to Article 13(6) of the Labor Code, recruiting and placement encompass various
activities such as canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or purchasing
people. This definition also encompasses referrals, contract services, and any promises or
advertisements related to employment, whether it is within the local or international context, and
regardless of whether it is conducted for profit or not.

In this case, all the constituent parts of the offense of Estafa are evident. The presented
testimonies of the private complainants, along with the documentary and object evidence,
provided substantial evidence to support the claim that the accused-appellant, by deceitfully
posing as a legitimate recruiter for overseas employment, unlawfully persuaded the private
complainants to relinquish their funds as a requirement for the purported recruitment procedure.
Considering that none of the private complainants were sent overseas due to being victims of
fraudulent activities, it is evident that they have experienced harm.

Thus, in this case considering that there are no mitigating or aggravating circumstances
present, accused appellant is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of two (2) months
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as maximum. WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DISMISSED.

Julie S. Sumbila vs. Matrix Finance Corporation,

G.R. No. 197582, June 29, 2015
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

Facts:

Matrix Finance Crop loaned Sumbilla money. She wrote six 6,667-peso cheques to repay the
debt. All checks were dishonored at maturity because they were drawn against a closed
account. Petitioner was charged with six BP 22 violations after refusing respondent's demand
letter. MeTC found the petitioner guilty criminally and civilly for issuing six bogus checks. The
MeTC fined the petitioner 80,000 pesos and imprisoned him for each instance of BP 22 violation
involving a 6,667-peso cheque. Her civil responsibility for six pooled lawsuits was 40,002 pesos.
Instead of appealing, she filed a Motion for Reconsideration with the MeTC, which was
dismissed as a prohibited argument under the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure. She filed
a Notice of Appeal but was dismissed for filing beyond the 15-day deadline. The RTC denied
her Rule 65 certiorari petition. She petitioned the CA under Rule 42. Because the RTC
exercised its original jurisdiction under Rule 65, the CA decided that an ordinary appeal under
Sec. 2(a), Rule 41 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy. The CA rejected reconsideration.
Sumbila filed her Petition for Review on Certiorari with the SC

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty imposed by the MeTC Decision dated January 14, 2009, which is
already final and enforceable, can be modified.

Rulings:

YES RATIO The petition merits consideration. SECTION 1. Checks without appropriate cash.
Any person who makes or draws and issues any check to apply on account or for value, x x x,
shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one (1) year or
by a fine of not less than but not more than double the amount of the check, which fine shall in
no case exceed Two hundred thousand pesos, or both at the discretion of the court.

Judgment Finality and Immutability After petitioner failed to timely file a notice of appeal, MeTC's
judgment is final. Under the doctrine of finality and immutability of judgments, a decision that
has reached finality becomes immutable and unalterable, even if it is meant to correct factual or
legal errors and whether it is made by the court that rendered it or the highest court of the land.

The Rules of Procedure are means to achieve justice. This punishment clearly exceeds BP 22
Sec. 1. Since the subsidiary imprisonment is based on the overall fine or one day for each
amount comparable to the highest minimum wage rate in the PH at the time of judgment.
Insolvent petitioners get lengthier jail sentences. Substantial fairness requires that the
petitioner's fine be adjusted within BP 22's limits.

BP 22 PreferenceAC No. 12-2000 does not eliminate jail as a penalty but establishes a
preference for BP 22 sanctions. BP 22 offenders may be imprisoned for this reason.
Therefore BP 22 is an authorized police authority exercise and does not violate the
constitutional ban on debt imprisonment.45 The petition is granted. The January 14, 2009
Branch 67, Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati City Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 321169 to
321174 is modified in the interest of justice.Accused Julie S. Sumbilla is found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of six counts of violating Batas Pambansa Big. 22 and sentenced to pay a fine
of thirteen thousand and three hundred thirty-four pesos (P13,334.00) for each count and
indemnify private complainant Matrix Finance Corporation the total amount of P40,002.00 plus
6% interest per annum from September 21, 2002 until full payment.

Maria Nympha Mandagan vs. Jose Valero Corporation,

G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019
CAGUIOA, J.:

Facts:

Paulo Pineda was murdered by Cesar Corpin.According to the Information, he attacked his
victims with a butcher's knife to cut up pork at the market where they were vendors.

One witness stated accused-appellant Corpin sold pork in the public market while Paulo sold
chicken. Their stalls shared a rear door and exit. Before the hacking event, accused-appellant
Corpin and Paulo were frequently laughing, and Paulo would remark "Ang baho" to Corpin,
making him scowl since he felt he was being referenced. Paulo did not provoke the hacking.
The witness said that Corpin abruptly assaulted the dead, who ran for three meters before
falling.

Corpin said that "biglang dumilim ang paningin ko" often happened to him, especially when the
deceased was "badmouthing" him.

Convicted by RTC. When the attack was unexpected and the victim had little chance to defend
himself, it recognized treachery as an aggravating factor. The CA agreed, noting that the act
was premeditated and deadly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appreciation of treachery is proper as to qualify the killing to murder.

RULING:

No, it has not been established that the accused's methods of defense were intentionally and
purposefully employed by the assailant.

There is treachery when the offender conducts any of the crimes against individuals, utilizing
means, techniques, or forms in the performance thereof that tend to directly and especially
secure its execution, without regard for the risk to himself deriving from the offended party's
defense. To qualify an offense, the following conditions must be met: (1) the assailant used
means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act that gave the person attacked no
opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) the assailant used said means, methods, or
forms of execution deliberately or consciously.

It has long been accepted that qualifying conditions must be supported by clear and compelling
evidence. Thus, in order for Corpin to be convicted of Murder, the prosecution must provide
clear and persuasive proof that the death of Paulo was aggravated by treachery.

Leonora Rimando vs. Sps. Winston And Elenita Aldaba,

G.R. No. 203583, October 13, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Rimando persuaded Sps. Aldaba to invest in Multitel Corporation on the promise that their
money would yield 8% per month. Rimando, in turn, sent Sps. Aldaba three post-dated
cheques. When the cheques matured, Sps. Aldaba sought to cash them but were refused
because they were drawn against insufficient funds. Sps. Aldaba has filed criminal charges
against BP 22 and estafa. Rimando was acquitted of both charges, but was found civilly
accountable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of their investment as an accommodation party to
one of the checks she wrote to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel in the estafa case.

Rimando contends that her acquittal and exoneration from civil culpability in the BP 22 cases
should have precluded Sps. Aldaba from suing her in the estafa case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rimando’s acquittal from said criminal cases extinguished her civil liability.

RULING:

It is widely established that "the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a
judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case where the accused's civil liability does not
arise from or is not based on the crime of which the accused is acquitted."

Rimando's civil responsibility in this lawsuit did not come from any alleged act constituting the
crime of estafa since Rimando never used deception on Sps. Aldaba to encourage them to
invest money in Multitel. Rather, her legal culpability was appropriately linked from her role as
an accommodation party to one of the checks she wrote on behalf of Multitel to Sps. Aldaba.
She effectively served as a guarantor for Multitel by lending her name to the latter, and as such,
she may be held personally accountable for the amount of the issued check.

People of the Philippines vs. Cresencia C. Reyes,

G.R. No. 101127-31, November 18, 1993
CRUZ, J.:

Facts:

Lorie Garcia supplied rice to Cresencia Reyes as a courtesy to her friend Manny Cabrera, who
was out of stock. Reyes issued six checks for six orders delivered on various dates. Only three
of the six cheques were cashed; the remaining three were rejected by the bank owing to
"insufficient funds." Garcia informed Reyes of the disgrace, and the latter agreed to pay her the
full amount. Despite repeated requests, Reyes did not make good on the checks or replace
them with cash. Reyes was charged with three counts of violating BP 22 and two counts of
estafa.

Issue: whether or not a single act of issuing a check can result in criminal responsibility under
both BP 22 and Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code (Estafa).

Rulings: A same criminal conduct can result in many crimes if the elements of an offense differ
between laws. BP 22 punishes the act of creating and issuing a worthless check or one that is
dishonored when presented for payment, which is harmful to public welfare. BP 22 applies even
if the dishonored checks were only deposits or guaranties. The checks were not for a pre-
existing obligation but for each rice shipment. The duped individual received cheques to
relinquish her property. Reyes cashed 3 cheques, assuring Garcia that the rest were paid. Her
check-bouncing sparked suspicions of deception.

Iluminada Batac vs. People of the Philippines,

G.R. No. 191622, June 06, 2018
MARTIRES, J.:

FACTS:
The individual under scrutiny purportedly visited a business owned by Frias with the intention of
having her checks rediscounted. After receiving confirmation from UponBatac, Frias was
convinced and proceeded to purchase a total of fourteen (14) checks. The checks were
returned on the specified due dates owing to the reason of "Account Closed." Despite being
requested to make payment and given a period of five (5) days, Batac failed to fulfill this
obligation, which caused Frias to initiate legal proceedings for estafa.

ISSUE:

Whether the accused is liable for estafa under Article ·315, paragraph 2(d) of the RevisedPenal
Code

Rulings:

Yes. Consistently, jurisprudence has held that such estafa consists of the followingelements: (1)
the offender has postdated or issued a check inpayment of an obligation contracted at the time
of the postdating or issuance; (2) at the time of the postdating or issuance ofsaid check, the
offender does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover the amount of the check; and (3) the
payee has been defrauded.

In the above-described form of estafa, it has been established that it is not the nonpayment of a
debt that is punishable, but rather the criminal fraud or duplicity in the issuance of a check. The
definition of deceit is "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct,
by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed,
which deceives or is intended to deceive another to his legal injury."

Batac induced Frias to purchase her checks at a rediscounted rate by falsely representing to
him that she had sufficient funds in her account to cover them, according to the evidence
presented by the prosecution.

Also, Batac's argument that she can be held accountable for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is without
merit. Although originating from the same act, namely the issuance of a check that was
subsequently dishonored, estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct because
they involve various causes of action.20 The Court has held, among otherdifferences, that
damage and duplicity are essential elements for estafa under Article 315 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, but are not for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the sheer issuance of a
bounced check.