ENCYCLOPEDIA OF IiNDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

General Editor, Karl H. Potter

The following volumes are published :

I. Bibliography, 2nd ed. ( 1984)
II. Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology : The Tradition of
Nyäya-Vais'esika up to Gangesa ( 1978)
III. Advaita Vedänta up to Samkara and His Pupils (1982)
IV. Sâmkhya : A Dualist Tradition in Indian Philosophy ( 1987)
V. The Philosophy of the Grammarians ( 1990)
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES
The Philosophy of
the Grammarians

HAROLD G. COWARD
AND
K. KUNJUNNI RAJA

MOTÏLAL BANARSIDASS
Delhi Varanasi Patna Bangalore Madras
 First Edition : Delhi, 1990

©1990 By Princeton University Press

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Contributors :

Ashok Aklujkar, University of British Columbia

John G. Arapura, McMaster University
S. R. Bannerjee,
S. D. Joshi, University of Poona
Shoryu Katsura, Hiroshima University
G. B. Palsule, University of Poona
Karl H. Potter, University of Washington
V. K. S. N. Raghavan, University of Madras
K. A. Subramania Iyer, Lucknow University
 CONTENTS

PREFACE xi
PART ONE :
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF
THE GRAMMARIANS
[Harold G. Coward andK. Kunjunni Raja)
1. Historical Résumé 3
2. Metaphysics 33
3. Epistemoiogy 51
4. Word Meaning , 63
5. Sentence Meaning 83

PART TWO :
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE OF
GRAMMARIAN PHILOSOPHY
1. Philosophical Elements in Vedic Literature 101
(John G. Ar apura and K. Kunjunni Raja)
2. Philosophical Elements in Yâska's Nirukta 107
(K. Kunjunni Raja)
3. Philosophical Elements in Pänini's Astadhyäyi 111
(K. Kunjunni Raja)
4. Philosophical Elements in Patanjali's Mahàbhasya 115
[K. Kunjunni Raja)
5. Bhartrhari 121
Trikândi or Vakyapadlya, with Vrtti on Books 1 and 2
(Ashok Aklujkar)
Tikä on Patanjali's Mahàbhasya (K. Kunjunni Raja)
6. Durvinïta or Avinïta 175
7. Dharmapäla 177
8. Hari Vrsabha or Vrsabhadeva 179
(Ashok Aklujkar)
9. Mandana Misra 181
Sphotasiddhi (G. B. Palsule, Harold G. Coward, and
Karl H. Potter)
Vlll , CONTENTS

10. Helârâja 193

Commentary on Bhartrhari's Trikândi
\K. Kunjunni Raja)
11. Prameyasamgraha 199
12. Punyaräja 201
13. Kaiyata 203
Pradipa on Patanjali's Mahabhäsya (S. R. B annerjee
and K. Kunjunni Raja)
14. Jyesthakaläsa 205
15. Maitreya Raksita 207
16. Purusottamadeva 209
17. Dhanesvara 211
18. (Rsiputra) Paramesvara II 213
Sphotasiddhigopälikä (K. A. Subramania Iyer)
19. SesaKrsna 215
Sphotatattvanirüpana (G.B. Palsule)
20. Satyânanda or Râmacandra Sarasvatï 219
21. Sesa Gintâmani 221
22. Sesa Vïresvara or Rämesvara 223
23. Sesa Näräyana Bhatta 225
24. Visnumitra 227
25. Isvaränanda or Isvarïdatta Sarasvatï 229
26. BharataMisra 231
Sphotasiddhi (G. B. Palsule)
27. Sphotasiddhinyâyavicâra (G.B. Palsule) 235
28. Annambhatta 237
29. Appayya Dïksita I 239
30. Bhattoji Dïksita 241
Sabdakaustubha
31. SesaVisnu 243
32. Sivarâmendra Sarasvatï 245
33. (Sesa) Cakrapäni (Datta) 247
34. Mallaya Yajvan 249
35. Nïlakantha Sukla 251
36. Näräyana (Sästrin) 253
37. Konda (or Kaunda) Bhatta 255
Vaiyäkaranabhüsana and Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära
(S. D. Joshi) '
38. Täraka Brahmänanda Sarasvatï 309
39. Cokkanätha or Sokanätha Dïksita 311
40. Tirumala Yajvan * 313
4L (Räma) Näräyana (Sarman) (Vandyopädhyäya) 315
42. Sadäsiva 317
43. Hari Dïksita / 319
TENTS IX

44. Rämabhadra Dïksita 321

Saddarsinisiddhânta samgraha {Vyäkarana Section)
(if. KunjunniRaja)
Sabdabhedanirüpana {K. Kunjunni Raja')
45. Nâgesa (or Nagoji) Bhatta 323
Paramalaghumahjüsä {K. Kunjunni Raja)
Mahäbhäsyapradipoddyota (F. K. S. N. Raghavan)
Sphotaväda (K. Kunjunni Raja)
46. Jnânendra Sarasvatï 351
47. Gopâlakrsna Sâstrin 353
48. Dharanïdhara 355,
49. Vaidyanâtha Payagunda 357
50. Satyapriya Tîrtha Svâmin 359
51. Jayakrsna Maunin 361
52. Harivallabha 363
53. Vâsudeva Dïksita 365
54. Srïkrsna Bhatta Maunin 367
Sphotacandrikâ (G. B. Palsule)
55. Umâmahesvara or Abhinava Kâlidâsa 371
56. Nïlakantha Dïksita 373
57. Asâdhara Bhatta 375
58. Ramasevaka 377
59. Indradatta Upädhyäya 379
60. Krsnamitrâcârya or Durbalâcârya 381
61. Haribhatta 383
62. Dharanïdhara (II) 385
63. Mannudeva or Manyudeva or Gopâladeva 387
64. Bhairava Misra 389
65. Kumâra Tâtaya 391
66. Satârà Ràghavendrâcârya (Gajendragadkar) 393
67. Gangâdhara Kavirâja 395
68. Täränätha Tarkaväcaspati 397
69. Khuddijhä (âarman) 399
70. Nityänanda Panta Parvatïya 401
71. Dravyesajhâ 403
72. Süryanäräyana Sukla 405
73. Gopàla Sâstrï Nene 407
74. P. S. Anantanàrâyana Sâstrï 409
75. Brahmadeva 411
76. V. Krsnamäcärya 413
77. Sadâsiva Sâstrï (Sarman) 415
78. Bâla Krsna Paficolï 417
79. Râma Prasâda Tripâthï 419
80. Rudradhara Jhâ Sarman 421
X CONTENTS

81. Kälikä Prasäda Sukla 423

82. Sabhäpati Sarman Upädhyäya 425
83. Raghunätha Sarman 427
84. Satyakäma Varmä 429
85. Rämäjnä Pändeya 431

BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GRAMMAR
{Vyäkarana) {KarlH. Potter) 433
Part 1 : Authors Whose Dates Are (More or Less)
Known 439
Part 2 : Authors and Works Whose Dates Are
Unknown 517
Part 3 : Secondary Literature on Vyäkarana
NOTES 549
CUMULATIVE INDEX 563
 PREFACE

This volume, the fifth in the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, is devoted

to the philosophy of the Grammarians. The introductory essay is
intended to set their school in its context and to summarize the main
Grammarian teachings. The summaries of primary sources that follow
the introduction aim at making available the substance of the main
philosophical ideas contained in these works, so that philosophers
who are unable to read the original Sanskrit and who find difficulty
in understanding and finding their way about in the translations (where
such exist) can get an idea of the positions taken and arguments offered.
The summaries, then, are intended primarily for philosophers and only
secondarily for indologists. Certain sections of the works have been
omitted or treated sketchily because they are repetitions or deemed less
interesting for philosophers, though they may be of great interest to
Sanskritists. The summaries, are not likely to make interesting consecu-
tive reading : they are provided in the spirit of a reference work. The
appendix, which contains a lengthy bibliography of original and
secondary writings on the philosophy of Grammar, is also presented as
an aid to research.
References in the footnotes such as "G273" are to the bibliography
presented in the appendix. References such as "RBI0337" are to the
first volume of this encyclopedia, 2nd edition (1984). Abbreviations
used are listed at the beginning of the appendix.
Preparation of this volume has been made possible by grants from the
American Institute of Indian Studies and the University of Calgary.
These grants made possible the obtaining of the summaries and funded
the travel that the editorial work required. The editors wish to thank
Pradip R. Mehendiratta for his good offices. A debt of gratitude is also
owed to the late Professor T. R. V. Murti, who gave generously of his
time in working with Harold Coward in the volume's planning stages.
A research fellowship awarded to K. Kunjunni Raja by the Calgary
Institute for the Humanities enabled the two editors to work together in
completing the project. Special gratitude is due to Karl H. Potter, editor
of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, for his many contributions,
which have added greatly to the value of this volume.

1987 HAROLD G. COWARD

K. KUNJUNNI RAJA
 PART ONE
INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF THE GRAMMARIANS
 1
HISTORICAL RÉSUMÉ

1. THE PLAGE OF LANGUAGE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Language has been one of the fundamental concerns of Indian

philosophy and has attracted the serious attention of all thinkers from
the outset. In India the study of language has never been the monopoly
of the Grammarians or the Rhetoricians. All schools of thought began
their philosophical discussions from the fundamental problem of
communication. The poet-philosophers of the Rg Veda were greatly
concerned with the powers and limitations of language as a means of
communicating their mystic, personal experiences of an ecstatic nature
to their fellows and they tried to stretch the power of language by
various means. They praised language as a powerful and benign deity
(vâc), ever ready to bestow favors on her devotees. The entire creation
of the world was attributed by some sages to divine language, and it
was generally recognized that the ordinary speech of mortals was only
a fraction of that language.
Among the six accessories to the study of the Vedas (Vedângas) two
are directly concerned with language: grammar (vyâkarana), or
linguistic analysis, and etymology (nirukta), or interpretation of the
meanings of selected words in the Vedas through etymological methods.
Another accessory, metrics (chandas), is concerned with prosody.
Among the systems of Indian philosophy (darsana), Purvamïmâmsâ
is called väkyasästra or the science of sentence interpretation, and the
Nyäya system was also intrinsically language oriented. The Buddhist
and Jain schools of thought have also devoted considerable attention to
the working of language. Grammar and literary criticism (sähitya)
are directly interested in language problems, including semantic and
philosophical issues, and Grammarians have claimed the status of an
independent darsana for themselves.
The Indian approach to the study of language and linguistic prob-
4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

lems has been characterized by both analysis and synthesis. On the

one hand, a systematic attempt was made to analyze speech utterance
in terms of sentences and words, stems and suffixes, morphemes and
phonemes. The verbal root was considered as the core element to
which preverbs, primary suffixes, and secondary suffixes, as well as
nominal or verbal terminations, were added to evolve the word. On the
other hand, rules of coalescence (samdhi) between these various elements -
and between words in a compound word or a sentence were studied and
systematized. Rules of syntax were also studied carefully and attempts
made to identify the cementing factors helping to form an integral unit.
The analytical method was older and more popular. The Sanskrit
term for grammar, vyâkarana, means literally "linguistic analysis".
Kumärila Bhatta, in the beginning of the seventh century, said that
"we cannot think of any point of time totally devoid of some work or
other dealing with the grammatical rules treating of the different
kinds of roots and suffixes."1 âakalya's Padapâtha of the Rg Veda was
one of the early attempts in the direction of analysis ; he broke down
the sarrihita text of the Rg Veda into words, identifying even the
separate elements of compound words. The Brhaddevata, attributed to
Saunaka, says that a sentence is made up of words, and words are
made up of phonemes (uarna).2 Pänini, who flourished about the
fifth century B.C., brought the descriptive grammar of the Sanskrit
language to its highest perfection in his Astâdhyâyi, which has been
praised by Leonard Bloomfield, the father of modern linguistics, as
"the greatest monument of human intelligence."3 Pânini's primary
concern was the building up of Sanskrit words, both Vedic and classical,
from verbal roots, preverbs, primary and secondary suffixes, and
nominal and verbal terminations; but he was also interested in
syntactic problems involved in the formation of compound words
and the relationship of the nouns in a sentence with the action
indicated by the verb. Pänini did not neglect meaning, but he was
aware of the fact that meaning was likely to change over time and
that the final authorities regarding meaning are the people who speak
the language.
It was the etymological school of Yäska, author of the JVirukta
commentary on the Nighantu list of select words in Vedic literature,
that undertook a semantic analysis of words with their components in
order to explain their meanings in the contexts of their occurrence.
This school generally subscribed to the view that nouns are derived
from verbal roots. The Unadisütras follow this view and attempt to
find derivations for even apparently integral words.
Mïmâmsâ, called uäkyafastra, was mainly concerned with the me-
thodology of textual interpretation in order to give a cogent explana-
tion of prescriptive scriptural texts. It had to deal with apparent
HISTORICAL RESUME 5

absurdities, inconsistencies, and contradictions, besides ambiguities,

and evolved rules of interpretation that were accepted generally by all
schools of thought and were used freely in legal practice and in
commentaries. The Mïmâmsakas used both analysis and synthesis in
their approach to textual problems. They gave a semantic definition
of the sentence, evolving the concepts of mutual expectancy (äkänksä),
consistency (yogyatâ), and contiguity [asatti) as factors necessary for
the existence of a sentence. It was the Mimämsä school that developed
the theory of metaphor to explain the apparent absurdities and in-
consistencies in Vedic texts.
The Nyäya school, mainly interested in the theory of knowledge and
the truth or falsity of judgments, had to be concerned with the theory
of meaning, because understanding the proposition was a primary
requirement for making any significant study about it.
The literary critics who were concerned with the understanding and
appreciation of literature were very much interested in the stylistic
analysis of language and in finding out the deviance of literary language
from ordinary language, in order to see how far poets have been able to
communicate their vision of beauty and emotional experience through
the medium of words.
It is clear that for centuries the various schools of thought in India
have carried out studies that have produced insights into the working of
language. The Grammarians5 interest was not confined to the description
and analysis of a particular language, but extended to the true nature
and potentialities of language, including its role in effecting liberation.

2. THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE

A. Linguistic Elements
One of the fundamental problems discussed is the relation between
the linguistic elements {sabda) and their meanings (artha). The term
sab da is normally used by the Grammarians to refer to a linguistic
element, a meaningful unit of speech.4 Patanjali's definition is that
sabda is that which, when articulated, is seen to convey the idea of the
referent. Mandana Misra defines it in his Sphotasiddhi as the cause that
produces the idea of its meaning. In any case, it is the meaning bearer.
In ordinary parlance people may use the word sabda to mean sound,
as pointed out by Patanjali himself, but for the Grammarian it is the
meaning-bearing unit.
Is it the articulated sound, or the phoneme (varna), or the word
(padä), or the sentence (vakya) that is referred to by the term fabda?
According to the sphota theory of Bhartrhari it is the complete utterance
of the sentence that is the unit, and it is called väkyasphofa; but at a
6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

lower analytical level the word can be considered as the unit, for which
the term padasphota is used by the Grammarian. Those who know the
language very well think and speak in units of sentences and also hear
whole sentences. It is .only those who do not know the language
properly who hear words or phonemes or bits of sounds and have to
struggle with them to get the connected sentence meaning. But in
grammatical texts the words are taken as the unit for the sake of easy
understanding.
This view is not acceptable to the Mïmâmsakas, who consider the
letter (permanent articulated sound-unit) or phoneme (varna) to be
the sabda or unit of language and the meaning bearer. They assume
phonemes to be permanent and each utterance to be their realization.
To the Naiyâyikas sabda means sound produced by the speaker and
heard by the listener, and it is impermanent; pada means a mor-
pheme (meaningful unit).

B. Meaning (Artha)
What is meant by artha or meaning? Is it the universal that is
intended, or the particular? According to Kâtyâyana and Patanjali,
two different positions were held by two ancient Grammarians,
Vyädi and Väjapyäyana, the former holding that words refer to dravya,
"substance" or "individual", and the latter holding that words
(including proper names) refer to jati, "universal" or "attribute".
Pänini seems to have left the question open, holding that words could
refer to individuals or to the universals. The Mïmâmsakas held that
the primary meaning of a word is the universal and the sense of the
particular in a sentence is obtained either through secondary signifi-
cative power (according to Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas) or through both the
universal and the particular being grasped by the same perceptive
effort simultaneously (according to the Präbhäkaras). The early
Naiyâyikas considered the meaning of words as comprising universal
(jäti), configuration (âkrti), and particular;5 later Naiyâyikas held that
the primary meaning of words is the individual as qualified by the
universal (jativisistavyakti). The Buddhists of Dignâga's school held that
the meaning is vikalpa, a mental construct that has no direct correspon-
dence with the real, its nature being tö exclude other things (anyâpoha).
The function ofawordor a name is the exclusion of other possibilities.
G. Significative Power (Sakti)
The significative power of words (sakti) is based on the relation
that exists between a word and its meaning. The Grammarians
hold that in the case of ordinary words in everyday speech it is
permanent; but in the case of technical terms it is based on the conven-
tion. The Mïmâmsakas consider the relation as "original" (autpattika),
 e f
HISTORICAL RESUME

that is, as permanent or eternal. The Grammarians explain this perma-

neflce in two ways : pravahanityata and yogyatanityata. We learn language
from our elders; they in turn learned it from their forefathers; thus
it could be traced back to any conceivable period of human society.
This type of permanence is pravahanityata. The other view is based on the
innate capacity of words to express any meaning; this capacity (yogyata)^
is restricted by convention. Patanjali made a distinction between
absolute eternality (kütasthanityatä), by which an item is not liable to
any modification, and the perennial nature as used through generations
of speakers {pravahanityata).

D. Polysemy
It is generally believed that in an ideal language a word must have
only one meaning, and a sense must have only one word to express it.
This binary relationship between a word and its meaning is accepted
in principle by all schools of thought. It is also believed that this
relationship, which is the basis for the significative power of words,
is stable and constant because linguistic communication would be
impossible without it. If there is no general understanding of the
meaning of words shared by the speaker and listener there will be
chaos and mutual comprehension will be jeopardized.
The existence of polysemy is recognized in actual practice, however.
Two words may have the same form, and the same word may develop
more than one meaning. The problem of homophones and homonyms
has been discussed by scholars like Bhartrhari. Yäska's discussion
about the principle of word derivation in Sanskrit also sheds consider-
able light on the problem of synonyms. Nouns are normally derived
from verbal roots. If all nouns are so derived from verbal roots denoting
action, every object will have as many names as the actions with which
it is associated, and by the same token each noun could be applied to
as many objects as are associated with that action indicated by that
verbal root. Yäska's answer to the problem is that there are no restric-
tions. Language designates things in an incomplete manner; it can
choose only one of the many activities associated with an object. Hence
there is some sort of permanent relation between a word and its
meaning.
It is accepted that even the primary meaning of a word is not
definitely circumscribed and that the boundaries of the meaning
often change on the basis of contextual factors, not only in the case of
ambiguous words but even in that of ordinary words: thus "man is
mortal" does not mean "woman is immortal"; but in the phrase "man
and woman", "man" does not include "woman". When there is
conflict between the correct etymological meaning and the popular
usage, the meaning current in popular usage among the educated
8 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

elite is to be accepted. Grammatical analysis and etymological inter-

pretations are only means of approach; the final authority is the
popular usage of the cultured.
E. Secondary Meaning [Laksana)
Even though it is accepted that every word has a primary stable
meaning core, in actual practice shifts in meaning, metaphoric transfers,
and secondary usages are quite common. If there is discrepancy in
sense when the primary meaning is taken, the passage will have to be
explained'by resorting to the secondary meaning. There are three
conditions considered necessary for resorting to secondary meaning. The
first, is inconsistency or incongruity of the words taken in the literal
sense. A sentence like "He is an ass" or "He is a firebrand" cannot
be taken in the literal sense because the human being referred to
cannot be an animal or an inanimate object. A sentence like "The
house is in the river" does not make sense, because a house cannot
exist in the river. In such cases the primary meaning of the word has
to be given up and another meaning used. The second condition is that
the actual meaning and the primary meaning must be related in some
way; it may be on the basis of similarity or common quality or it may
be on the basis of some other relationship like proximity. The example
"He is an ass" can be explained if the term "ass" is interpreted as
"a fool" (as the donkey is notorious for its dullness). The example
of the house on the river has to be explained by taking "river" to mean
the bank of the river on the basis of proximity. The third condition for
resorting to secondary significance is either sanction by popular
usage, as in the case of faded metaphors, or a special purpose for which
it is resorted to, as in the case of intentional metaphors. The inconsistency
of primary meaning can mean impossibility of syntactic connection
from the point of view of meaning, or it can mean inconsistency in the
context. As an example, in "see that crows do not spoil the curd"
"crows" implies all beings, including a dog, who might spoil it.
Literary critics like Änandavardhana proposed the element of
purpose in intentional metaphors and pointed out its importance in
enriching literature's content.
F. Conditions for Syntactic Relation
How can we get a connected meaning from a sentence if each word
gives only its isolated sense, which is of a universal nature? This problem
has been discussed in India since ancient times, and three main factors
have been pointed out as unifying of sentence meaning : expectancy
(äkänksä), consistency (jogyatä), and contiguity (âsatti). Words in a
sentence must have mutual expectancy. Pânini hinted as much when
he stressed the need for sâmarthya or capacity among the meanings of
HISTORICAL RESUME 9

words for mutual connection, mainly in compound words.6 This

sâmarthya has been interpreted as similar to âkânksâ or mutual expec-
tancy and unity of sense. Later the Mïmâmsakas developed this concept,
and the logicians made further modifications. Mutual expectancy
consists in a word being unable to convey a complete sense in the
absence of another word. Literally it is the desire on the part of the
listeners to know the other words in the sentence in order to complete
the sense. A word is said to have expectancy for another if it cannot,
without the latter, produce knowledge of its interconnection in an
utterance. The Mïmâmsakas were more interested in psychological
expectancy, while the logicians and the Grammarians stressed the
need for syntactic expectancy.
To this primary condition were added two more, yogyatâ or consis-
tency of sense and âsatti or the contiguity of the words. Grammarians
did not emphasize the importance of yogyatâ for to them it is enough
for a sentence to give a syntactically connected meaning. Its veracity
is not a condition. From the Grammarian's point of view laksanâ,
secondary meaning, is also of little interest. "He is a boy" and "He is
an ass" are equally valid for them. Even empty phrases like "the child
of a barren woman" are linguistically valid to them, for Grammarians
are not concerned with the real existence of the thing meant by an
expression. Yogyatâ involves a judgment on the sense or nonsense of a
sentence. There is difference of opinion about whether it should be
taken as a positive condition. If the lack of yogyatâ—inconsistency—is
only apparent and can be explained away by resorting to the meta-
phorical meaning of a word in the sentence, there is no difficulty in
understanding the sentence's meaning.
Äsatti or contiguity is the uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken
apprehension of the words in a sentence. In the case of elliptical
sentences, one school believes that the syntactic relation is known by
supplying the necessary meaning, while another school insists that the
missing words have to be supplied and the meaning obtained. Some
take tâtparya, the intention of the speaker known from contextual
factors, as a fourth condition for understanding the meaning of a
sentence.

G. Sentence Meaning
Regarding the comprehension of the sentence meaning there are
two main theories, called anvitäbhidhana and abhihitänvaya. Speech is
purposive in nature. People use words with the intention of conveying
a connected, unified sense. Hence from the use of words in juxtaposition
it^is assumed that the speaker has uttered them with the intention
of conveying a connected sense. Expectancy, consistency, and conti-
guity help in this comprehension of a unified sentence meaning. The
10 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

sentence meaning is something more than the sum of the word mean-
ings. Besides the word meanings, the syntactic connection of the word
meanings has to be conveyed. The abhihitanvaya theory says that in a
sentence each word gives out its individual isolated meaning (which is
universal) and their significative power is exhausted with that. Then
with the help of laksanâ (secondary significative power) the syntactic
relationship is obtained, and thus the sentence meaning is understood.
According to the anvitäbhidhäna school, by contrast, each word in a
sentence conveys not only its isolated meaning but also the syntactic
element. The words convey the meaning of the universal and simultan-
eously the meaning as referring to the particular. The words them-
selves also give the syntactic relationship. Thus the entire sentence
meaning is conveyed by the words themselves. The Naiyäyikas, who
believe that the words in a sentence denote primary meanings that are
particulars as qualified by universal traits, contend that the sentence
meaning is an association of the word meanings {samsargamaryäda).
H. Sphota Theory
Even in ancient India there were some scholars who emphasized
the unreal nature of words and advocated the need for taking the
sentence as a whole. In the JVirukta Yâska refers to Audumbarâyana's
theory that it is the statement as a whole that is regularly present in
the perceptive faculty of the hearer.7 The sphota theory, fully promulgat-
ed by Bhartrhari in the fifth century of the Christian era, is one of the
most important contributions of India to the problem of meaning.
He insisted that the fundamental linguistic fact is the complete utterance
or sentence. Just as a letter or a phoneme has no parts, so also
the word and the sentence are to be taken as complete integral units,
not as made up of smaller elements. Bhartrhari says that although
linguistic analysis—splitting sentences into words and further into
roots and suffixes and into phonemes—may be a useful means for
studying language, it has no reality. In a speech situation, communica-
tion is always through complete utterances. The speaker thinks and
the listener understands the utterance as a single unit. It is only those
who do not know the language thoroughly who analyze it into words,
and further bits, in order to get a connected meaning. Those who know
the language will conceive the idea and the expression as a single
unit and express it; and the listener likewise comprehends it as a whole,
the understanding is as an instantaneous flash of insight (pratibhä).
The fact that the expression has to be through the medium of phonemes,
through a temporal or spatial series, does not warrant our considering
it as made up of parts. When a painter conceives a picture in his
mind and paints it on a canvas, he may use various colors, and make
various strokes; that does not mean that the picture is not a unit. And
HISTORICAL RESUME 11

we see the picture as a unit, not as different colors and strokes. Just as
the meaning is unitary, integral, and indivisible, the symbol that
signifies it must also be unitary and indivisible. This concept is called
sphota—the sentence taken as an integral symbol, in which its apparent
parts are irrelevant to it as parts. It is not something hypothetically
assumed to explain language behavior; it is actually experienced and
known through perception. On hearing a sentence those who know
the language well hear the sentence, not the phonemes or sound bits
or even words. Those who do not know the language may hear only
the sound bits. The sphota theory says that hearing the whole sentence
is the real experience, while the apparent experience of hearing the
sound bits is only for those who do not know the language.
I. Componential Analysis of Word Meaning
It may be noted that even the so-called unity of meaning is often
an illusion, for it is the language that makes the unity. Yäska in the
fiftli century B.C. and, following him, Bhartrhari in the fifth century
of the Christian era have pointed out that a verb conveys a series of
operations or activities taking place in a particular temporal sequence.
Thus the word "cooks" conveys the idea of a series of activities—
preparing the fire, putting the vessel on it, pouring water in the vessel,
washing the rice, putting it in the water, blowing the fire to make it
jDurn properly, putting out the fire, removing the excess water, and
so on. It is the word "cooks" that collects all of these activities into a
unitary, integral action. Each of these activities can be further analyzed
into a series of activities taking place in time.
Later philosophers of language made further componential analysis
of words from the semantic point of view and declared that every
verbal root (dhatu) involved two semantic factors, activity {vyapard)
and goal or result {phala). The verb "he cooks" means an activity
directed toward the softening of the rice, and so forth. There is a
difference of opinion about whether both are primary meanings of the
verbal root or one can be taken as the main meaning and the other as
subsidiary. The verb was divided into the root and the suffix, and
separate meaning bits assigned to them. Mandana Misra said that
the meaning of the root is the result, and it is the suffix that indicates
the activity. With the addition of preverbs the meaning changes
considerably in Sanskrit, and there have been discussions of whether
all the meanings are present in a latent form in the root, to be revealed
by the preverbs, or these preverbs can be assigned specific meanings.
J. Suggestion (vyanjanä)
The theory of literal (primary) and metaphoric (secondary) mean-
ing developed by the Nyâya and Mïniâmsâ schools of sentence inter-
12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

pretation in ancient India was extended farther by Änandavardhana

in the second half of the ninth century to include emotive and
other associative meanings under linguistic meaning. He did not attack
the usual division of speech into words, into stems and suffixes and the
distinction between the primary and secondary meanings of words. He
accepted all of these concepts, but in addition he postulated a third
capability of language, which he called vyanjana or the capacity to
suggest meaning other than its literal or metaphoric meaning. Änanda-
vardhana pointed out that this suggestive function of language has a
vital role to play in literature.
K. Time
The concept of time and its divisions were discussed by such Gram-
marians as Patanjali and Bhartrhari. The division of time into past,
present, and future has a place in grammar, but the rules of usage given
are not strictly followed in actual practice. The present tense (lap) is
used to indicate the entire stretch of time included from the beginning
of the action till its completion. "He is cooking'5 can mean he has
started cooking and the operations are not yet completed. The present
need not be momentary. Usages like "the mountains are standing"
and "the rivers are flowing" mean that they continue to stand or flow.
Bhartrhari considers time to be the most important power of âabda
Brahman, relatively more independent than other powers, and to be
responsible for regulating them. The ancient authority Varsayani
said that becoming (bhävd) has six stages from birth to decay.8

L. Gender
Grammatical gender has attracted much speculation because in
Sanskrit the grammatical gender does not coincide with sex, and words
referring to the same object may occur in different genders.

3. THE LITERATURE ON GRAMMAR

Grammar {vyäkarana) was recognized from the earliest times in

India as a distinct science, a field of knowledge with its own parameters
that distinguished it from other sciences such as astronomy (jyotisa),
architecture (silpasastrd), agriculture (krsisâstra), and the like. The
coverage in this encyclopedia thus presents a peculiar problem somewhat
different from that faced in dealing with the literature of other philo-
sophical systems. Whereas in the cases of those other systems the
"philosophical" literature is confined to that material which relates to
the overall aim of liberation and those treatises which discuss theoretical
issues pertinent to that aim in a polemical context, in the case of the
HISTORICAL RESUME 13

grammatical literature the coverage has been widened to include those

works which deal with theory of meaning and the related issues discussed
in the previous section. As a result, the literature that is summarized
here in the subsequent pages represents a selection from the total corpus
of vyâkarana literature classified as such in India. For that reason it
seems appropriate to attempt at this point to place the writers treated
in the body of this volume within the total roster of authors whose
works constitute the entire corpus of grammatical literature.
To this end we have provided as an appendix a bibliography of
vyâkarana works and authors that covers what is currently known of the
literature on grammar in general. Within the confines of this literature
the present volume provides summaries of some works that are (1) in
print and (2) especially relevant to the concerns touched on in the
preceding section. Many of the works that are not summarized do,
without doubt, bear on these topics. The distinction drawn must seem
from the standpoint of Indian tradition rather artificial. We can only
remind our readers that the entire project of this encyclopedia is
directed toward a readership that comprises in the main those trained
in philosophy as understood in the western world. The bibliography will
suggest to such readers the extent of classical writings on grammar in
general. From these writings we have selected the ones that seem most
informative concerning matters of general philosophical interest, as
".philosophy" has been understood for the purpose of this entire
encyclopedic project.
The origin of grammar in India, as with so much else, is unclear.
What is clear is that it was recognized as a field of study from a very
early time. Pänini and Yäska, who must represent a stage of thought
several centuries prior to the Christian era, both refer to a number of
grammatical authorities and their views. In some cases the names cited
by both writers are identical. According to a statement in the
Brähmanas it was the god Indra who first analyzed a speech utterance
in terms of its parts.9 Some scholars speak of an "Aindra" school of
Grammarians in locating the origins of grammar. Patanjali refers to a
tradition involving the futile attempt of Brhaspati to teach the language
by enumerating its words and their meanings.10 The earliest historical
figure who dealt with linguistic study seems to be Säkalya, author of
the Padapâtha of the Rg Veda, who is mentioned by Pänini. According
to Bhartrhâri, the sage Audumbaräyana (also mentioned by Yäska),
together with Värttäksa, seems to have held views similar to the
sphota theory.11 A late tradition makes Sphotäyana, mentioned by
Pänini, the founder of the sphota theory.12 Sakatäyana held the view
that all words must be derived from verbal roots; some people consider
him to be the author of the Unadisütras. Gärgya and others held the
view that not all nouns can be traced to verbal roots. But no authenticat-
14 ENGYGLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

ed works of any of these pre-Päninian writers have come down to

us, and it is difficult if not impossible to say which, if any, of Pänini's
rules may have been taken from his predecessors.
Yäska and Pänini are the two great early writers on language.
They belong to a period several centuries before Christ, possibly
the fifth century. Yäska is generally considered to be earlier than Pänini,
but Paul Thieme holds that Yäska knew Pänini.13 George Gardona
thinks it wise to leave the problem open.14 The two writers are classified
into different genres of literature by the Indian tradition. Yäska's
JVirukta provides the name for a discipline of etymology counted as
separate from grammar (vyâkarana), the discipline for which Pänini
stands as the major seminal figure. (The bibliography appended to
this volume confines itself to works classed in the latter discipline.)
A. Pänini's Astadhyäyi
Pânini's basic work is merely titled "The Eight-Chaptered"
(Astâdhyâyi). But a very remarkable work it is, providing a model for
recent and contemporary work in descriptive linguistics that can stand
with the best efforts of modern analysts. The eight chapters constitute
a complete descriptive analytical grammar of the Sanskrit language,
comprising about four thousand rules called sütras preceded by a list of
sounds divided into fourteen groups, which are called the siva-, pratyâ-
hâra-, or mahesvara-sütras. In these rules the language is analyzed into
verbal and nominal bases, so that the bases have come to be cataloged
in two lists known as dhatupatha—the exhaustive lists of primitive
verbal roots—and ganapatha—the selective lists of nouns, verbs, and so
on for application in his rules. It is not clear whether one person wrote
all these different components of the fundamental Pâninian corpus. A
further feature of Pänini's method is a set of metarules of paribhasas,
which tell us in which order to apply the rules, where exceptions are to
be made, and so forth. All of these components are, in any case, made
the subject of a grand commentarial tradition extending to the present.
Certain additional materials are ascribed to Pänini by the tradition,
though scholarship is less agreed on the authenticity of these ascriptions.
Among them, one group of sütras, the Unädisütras, provides rules for
introducing affixes after verbal roots to derive nominal bases. The
authorship of these Unädisütras is frequently attributed to Sakatäyana
instead of Pänini ; and some scholars have found them to date from a
later period. It is likely that there is truth in all of these views, in other
words, that the sütras represent a development of analysis over a long
period.
A second set of ancillary sütras are the Phitsütras, which provide
principles of accentuation. A feature of these rules is that accents are
presupposed for nominal bases, from which the rules derive revisions
HISTORICAL RESUME 15

of accentuation for the wholes of which those bases form a part. Because
Pänini's rules contain none specifying accents for nominal bases,
Gardona reportsthat "it is clear that the phitsütras cannot be attributed
to Pänini."15 Iri lact, they are traditionally ascribed to Säntanava, a
rather later writer. Still, there are scholars who believe the Phitsütras
date from a pre-Päninian period.
The Lingânusasana rules concern gender ; they dictate how to determine
the gender of linguistic items based on their structure and meaning.
Although some scholars believe that this set of rules antedates Pänini
and was known to him, Pänini in fact had his own rules governing
gender, which in some respects complement and in others contradict
the rules in the LingânuÊâsana.
There are also two texts dealing with phonetics called Pâninïyasiksâ,
one of which has regularly been attributed to Pänini. It seems unlikely
that either of them is by Pänini himself.16
Pânini's system is remarkable in several respects. It purports to
derive all the forms of the Sanskrit language that correspond to correct
usage from operations on two kinds of primitives—affixes (pratyaya)
and bases (prahrti). The bases are of two kinds themselves, verbal
(dhatu) and nominal {prätipadika). The rules indicate how affixes are
to be introduced after bases to generate the correct inflected forms of
the language. They also tell us what compounds can be formed,
and how to derive, for example, active and passive sentences. Some
rules tell us under what conditions one form can be substituted for
another.
These rules are ordered, though not in a recognizable, systematic
fashion throughout. In some cases the actual order in which the rules
are given dictates the order in which they are to be applied. In other
cases one rule blocks application of another—for example, a particular
rule governs its own domain and restricts the scope of a more general
one. There are negative rules {nisedhasütra ), which preclude application,
as well as definitions (samjnäsütra) and metarules (paribhâsâ) which
serve to interpret and fix the scope of the operational rules (vidhisütra).
Still another type of rule is the extension rule (atidesasütra), which
extends the scope of a rule beyond its normal bounds.
The remarkably systematic nature of Pânini's grammar is further
reflected in Pânini's use of abbreviated expressions—symbols—to
indicate certain recurrent features, notably syntactic functions such as
agent, action, and object (known generally as kärakas). He also
introduces "markers" (Cardona's term for it) to provide placeholders
for certain functions and to form abbreviations (such as a marker X
followed by a marker M signifies X and all the items following in a
list up to and including M).17
16 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

B. Vârttikakâras
Inevitably, in such a complex undertaking as Pänini's system
provides, there were attempts to criticize and improve on his rules and
definitions. Within what comes to be known as the Päninian school of
grammar, comprising those who accept a tradition going back to
Pänini and not to others to be discussed shortly, the first emendation of
the Astâdhyàyi of which we know appears to have come in the form of
comments (värttika) attributed to Kätyäyana.
Considerable time must have elapsed between Pänini and Kätyäyana
because there are sufficient differences in their language 'to account
for some of the Vârttikas. A similar gap of time has to be assumed
between Kätyäyana and Patanjali, author of the Mahâbhâsya, so
Kätyäyana may be assigned to the third century B.C. Although he is
nowadays counted as a Päninian, he may have belonged to a different
school.
Various other authors of comments on and criticisms of Pänini
probably lived in this period, and some names are mentioned that
likely include a number of them, such as Sakatäyana, Säkalya,
Väjapyäyana, Vyädi, and Pauskarasädi. We know little about their
ideas, though a few of Vyädi's rules are held traditionally to have
come down to us, and Sakatäyana is believed to have been the author
of the Unâdisûtras accepted by Pänini.

G. Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
Kätyäyana's Vârttikas come to us as a part of the "great commentary"
{mahâbhâsya) on Pänini ascribed to Patanjali (who may or may not
be the same as the author of the Togasütras). The Mahâbhâsya takes the
form of dialogues between student and teachers, some of whose solutions
to problems are unacceptable, while one provides the final true view
(siddhänta). Not all of Pänini's rules are discussed, and it is not always
easy to identify the final view or to differentiate Kätyäyana's contri-
butions from those of Patanjali, not to speak of the possibility of
subsequent interpolations. Nevertheless, the Mahâbhâsya provides the
classical interpretation of Pänini's system and is made the subject of
subsequent commentaries through the centuries until the present time.
Furthermore, in Patanjali's work, especially in its introductory passages,
important philosophical ideas are broached, so that the Mahâbhâsya
is perhaps the earliest philosophical text of the Grammarians.

D. Other Schools of Grammar

For the period between the time of Patanjali (perhaps 150 B.C.)
and that of Bhartrhari (perhaps fifth century after Christ), scholars
trace the origins of a number of the other systems of Sanskrit Grammar,
HISTORICAL RESUME 17

including the Digambara school of Jainendra and the Buddhist Gândra

school, as well as the Kätantra tradition.
The Kätantrasütras are traditionally ascribed to Sarvavarman, who is
dated by Shripad Krishna Belvalkar without much evidence as having
flourished in the first century of the Christian era. The evidence, such
as it is, isthat Durgâsimha, a commentator on these sütras who must
have lived around or before A.D. 800, had a text of the sütras that had
already undergone considerable transformation or had possibly been
lost, as there is a quite distinct version of them current in Kashmir by
approximately the same time. The origins of Kätantra seem to have
come out of a felt desire for a more popular and easier grammar than
Panini's formidable system provides. It has spawned a fairly consistent
line of commentators lasting until the present time.
In keeping with the motivations to brevity and simplicity, the
Kätantrasütras return to the older method of ordering the syllables (as
found in the Pratisakhyas), arrange discussions of things more naturally
(similarly to the arrangement later adopted within the Pâninian
tradition by Bhattoji Dïksita in his Siddhântakaumudl), and omit many of
the most difficult rules prescribed by Pänini. The result is a work of
about fourteen hundred sütras only, in contrast to Panini's four thousand.
As is well known, the Jains were divided from an early period into
the Digambara and Svetämbara traditions. Each developed its own
literature, and not surprisingly each developed its peculiar grammatical
tradition.
The Digambara tradition goes back to the Jainendravyakarana, which
the Jains attribute to Mahâvïra, the Jina (founder of Jainism), who
answers questions put to him by Indra, but which is a work that
appears to have been composed about A.D. 500 by Püjyapäda or Deva-
nandin, who is also known as the author of certain fundamental philos-
ophical works (see the first volume of this encyclopedia [2d ed. p. 99] ).
According to Belvalkar the Jainendra grammar is a condensation of
Pänini and the varttikas, a condensation accomplished by the use of
short technical terms that make study of the work very complicated.
This difficulty may account for the relative dearth of commentaries
that have been composed on it, those of Abhayanandin (perhaps
750) and of Somadeva (1250) seeming to be the only ones still
extant.
The Svetämbara version of grammar stems from a later date. Its
basic works are the Sabdânusâsana and Amoghavrtti of Abhinava
Sakatäyana, not to be confused with the ancient authority by that
name. This Sabdânusâsana draws on the work of all the authors discussed
so far, as well as on Candragomin's Buddhist tradition; indeed, the
dependence on this last tradition is fairly widespread. This system was
carried on through the usual commentarial works until it was supplant-
18 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

ed for the most part by that of Hemacandra's SabdânuÊâsana, also address-

ed to the Svetämbaras.
Buddhist Grammar dates at least from Candragomin, to whom
the Cändrasütras are ascribed, and who appears to have lived about
Bhartrhari's time, in the fourth or fifth century» Once again it depends
largely on Pänini, Kätyäyana, and Patanjali, though it is somewhat
briefer—33100 sütras in all. There are also accessory lists: a Dhâtupatha,
Lingânusasana, Ganapätha, Upasargavrtti, and Varnasütras, and a comm-
entary on this material written by Candragomin, fragments of which
have come down to us. This grammar seems to have been popular,
was translated into Tibetan and was circulated throughout Buddhist
lands. It is still studied in Tibet, though not in Sri Lanka, where it was
later superseded by Kâsyapa's Baïâvabodha (ca. 1200).

E. Bhartrhari (perhaps fifth century)

It was Bhartrhari who led Grammar into philosophy proper, by
making a case for vyâkarana as a darfana, a view about ultimate things,
eventually about liberation. He was also the major architect of the
sphota theory, which is regularly identified as the unique contribution
of Grammarians to the philosophical problem of meaning. The locus
classicus for his thoughts on these matters is the work popularly called
Vakyapadlya, but he also wrote a commentary on the Mahabhasya and
possibly other works. We have made the commentarial tradition on
Bhartrhari's Väkyapadlya central to the concerns of this volume. The
first such commentator was Bhartrhari himself, it would seem, for
he now appears to have been the author of a commentary on at least
the first two books of the three that constitute the Vakyapadiya or
Trikändi.

F. The Fifth Through Tenth Centuries

Attacks were leveled against Bhartrhari's sphota theory by Kumärila
Bhatta, the famous Mïmâmsaka, and by the Buddhist Dharmakïrti.
Mandana Misra, the great Advaitin and Mïmâmsaka, wrote an
independent work, Sphotasiddhi, defending sphota against these attacks
and vindicating Bhartrhari's position. And just at the end of this period
we date Helârâja, probably the most important commentator after
Bhartrhari himself.
This period also features the production of a very influential comm-
entary, the oldest extant complete running commentary, on Pänini's
grammar, the Käsikävrtti. It was composed by two authors, Jayâditya
and Vamana, around the middle of the 7th century. The Käsikä was
in turn commented upon by Jinendrabuddhi, a Buddhist known for
philosophical works as well as for his grammatical erudition.
To this period likewise belong Abhayanandin, the Jainendra
HISTORICAL RESUME 19

commentator, Abhinava Sakatayana, author of Sabdänu§äsanay and

Durgäsimha, the Kätantra commentator, all mentioned earlier.
G. Eleventh Through Sixteenth Centuries
We have now arrived at an era in which a number of grammatical
traditions were in place. The next few centuries featured in the main
commentators explaining and furthering these traditions, with one or
two new additions to the field. .*
Within the Päninian tradition itself the most important comm-
entators early in this period included Ksïrasvâmin, author of a comm-
entary on Pänini's Dhatupâtha; Haradatta, a commentator on the Käsikä;
Maitreya Raksita, a Bengali Grammarian who wrote on the theory
of verbal bases ; and most notably, Kaiyata, the major commentator
on Patanjali's Mahâbhasya. It is on Kaiyata's Pradipa rather than on the
Mahâbhàsya itself that the subsequent commentators mainly based
their remarks. Kaiyata must have lived about the beginning of the
eleventh century. Still other figures of importance are Purusottamadeva,
author of commentaries on Pänini and Patanjali (though the latter
has been lost), and Rämacandra, author of Prakriyâkaumudï, on
Pänini.
The period is likewise marked by the composition of various materials
stemming from the traditions of Kätantia. In Jainism, as was pointed
out before, the field was commandeered, at least within the Svetambara
branch, by Hemacandra, a polymath writer who is probably the most
important and influential Jain scholar the tradition has ever known.
His Sabdânusâsana is even longer than Pänini's—some 4,500 sütras—
and draws on his predecessors, especially on âakatâyana's work. At least
a quarter of the work deals with the various präkrta (Prakrit) languages,
the ancestors of the modern regional languages of northern India, which
are today beginning to take on their developed form. Hemacandra
also composed a commentary, the Brhadvrtti, which quotes many
writers either to support or to criticize them.
A new school of Grammar, known as the Jaumara school and influen-
tial especially in West Bengal even today, takes its rise from a grammar
called Samksiptasara, composed by Kramadïsvara about the middle
of the eleventh century. This work again depends on Pänini, with a
few rules rejected and the sütras rearranged. He makes many innovations
both in the method and in the organization. The text as known to
Gopïcandra, another influential writer of this system, contains a
chapter on Prakrit. The school actually takes its name from Jumara-
nandin, who revised the Samksiptasâra, probably in the fourteenth
century.
Two other new systems are those of the Särasvata and the Mugdha-
bodha. The Särasvata school appears to have been popular in northern
20 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

India from its inception in the thirteenth century down to the time of
Bhattoji Dîksita, when the revival of the Päninian tradition put most
of the other schools of grammar into a decline. The basic work of the
system is the Särasuatiprakriyä, composed by Anubhüti Svarüpäcärya
about 1270. Anubhüti Svarüpäcärya also wrote works on Advaita
Vedänta. About the same time Vopadeva (or Bopadeva), a native of
the Maharashtra country, wrote a grammar known as Mugdhabodha,
which once more represents an attempt to simplify and abbreviate
Pânini's system, this time with evidence of a religious purpose.
Vopadeva's arrangement, like that of the Kätantra, promised to make
his grammar more accessible, but as he also rearranged the order of the
syllables and removed all the markers his system was not easily recogniz-
able to Päninians. Nevertheless, the Mugdhabodha system was very
popular up to the time of Bhattoji, who went out of his way to refute it.
The picture, then, of Grammar during the fifteenth and sixteenth
centuries is one in which a number of competing grammatical systems
flourished with different degrees of popularity in different parts of the
subcontinent, and the Päninian system itself was only one among them.

H. The Modern Period: Bhattoji Dîksita,

Konda Bhatta, and Nage sa Bhatta
The Päninian tradition suffered through the difficulty of its system
so that, as we have seen, other traditions grew up over the centuries
that rivaled or surpassed Pânini's school in popularity and influence.
Although some attempts had been made by grammarians who
remained within the Päninian tradition to simplify the system, notably
Râmacandra's Prakriyakaumudi, it was Bhattoji Dîksita at the end of
the sixteenth century who produced a version of the Päninian grammar
that made it generally accessible and served to elevate that tradition
to its present place of unrivaled eminence. Bhattoji's work is called
Siddhântakaumudi. Gardona, referring to a traditional explanation,
notes that kaumudi means "moonlight," and just as moonlight brightens
and cools, the kaumudi works "dispel ignorance while not involving
the great effort necessary to understand works like the Mahabhâsya"
works that previously had to be mastered in order to grasp the sense of
Pänini's rules. Bhattoji also wrote a commentary on the Siddhântakau-
mudi, the Praudhamanoramâ. The modern commentarial literature
concentrates on the Siddhântakaumudi version of the system; the number
of commentaries on it and on Praudhamanoramâ far outnumbers the
number composed after Bhattoji on Pänini and Patanjali themselves.
These commentaries are not always in agreement with Bhattoji; in
addition to abridgment, his approach involved * new interpretations
of some of the rules, which departed in several instances from the
interpretations of the classical Päninians.
HISTORICAL RESUME 21

Bhattoji wrote, in addition to the Siddhântakaumudi and its comm-

entary, another work, the Êabdakaustubha, in which he collected the
interpretations of earlier writers on Pänini's rules, especially those of
Patanjali. This work is incomplete, dealing only with the first, second,
fourth, and part of the third chapters of Pänini's eight. In addition,
Bhattoji is responsible for seventy-four verses on grammar, sometimes
referred to as the Vaiyâkaranamatonmajj'ana, which form the text around
which Konda Bhatta, the next great figure after Bhattoji, assembles
his magnum opus, the Vaiyäkaranabhüsana with its sära.
Konda Bhatta provided in his work of 1630 refutations of rival
theories of meaning proposed by other schools, principally the Nyäya
and Mîmâmsâ. The work thus stands as the most important treatise
after Bhartrhari's to stem from the Päninian school concerning
philosophy as understood for the purpose of this volume. Konda
Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära is an abridged version, presenting the
arguments alone without the considerations of other views that accom-
pany them in the Vaiyäkaranabhüsana itself.
Similarly, Nage sa Bhatta in the early eighteenth century dealt with
philosophical matters. Nägesa was the pupil of Hari Diksita, author
of Sabdaratna (or perhaps two Sabdaratnas, a longer and a shorter),
who in turn was Bhattoji's grandson. His output was lavish, including
commentaries on Bhattoji and Kaiyata as well as a number of original
works. Of the latter, three versions of a Manjüsä developing from
Bhattoji's verses are particularly pertinent to questions of philosophy.
The shortest of them, Paramalaghumanjüsa, is summarized below.
Nägesa is the most acknowledged grammarian of modern times, though
he also wrote treatises on several of the other philosophical systems—
Sämkhya, Yoga, and Nyâya. There is also a separate work on the sphota
theory, of great interest for purposes of this discussion.
The foregoing summary mentions only a small number of writers
on grammar who have graced the ages in India. The bibliography
appended to this volume will suggest to the casual reader the extensive
development of this topic and the attention given to it, and it may
offer the less casual reader guidance in seeking more detailed in-
formation. From among the welter of authors and works mentioned
there, this volume concentrates on those who contributed most tellingly
to the philosophical aspects of the subject—its theory of meaning and
related matters. Although it is hard, and perhaps not really necessary,
to distinguish the most philosophically relevant texts from the rest,
Table 1.1 will help the reader pick out those authors whose writings
promise the most rewards for the philosophically oriented.
 ENCYCLOPEDIA ÖF INÖIAN PHILOSOPHIES

TABLE 1.1
Vyäkarana Philosophy:
Checklist of Authors and Works

This list is not exhaustive and emphasizes writers on philosophy—

See appendix for details

T = Edited and translated

E=Edited, but not translated
M=Not published, but manuscript (s) available

Name Date Place Title

1. Patanjali 150 North of Mahäbhäsya on Pänini's Astädhyäyi

B.C.? Ayodhya? (T)
2. Bhartrhari A.D. Väkyapadiya or Trïkâtidï (T)
450? ? Mahabhasyadïpikâ or Tripâdï (E)
3. Vrsabhadeva or 650? ? Paddhatl on book I of Väkyapadiya
Hari Vrsabha (E)
4. Mandana Misra 690? ? Sphotasiddhi (T)
5. Heläräja 980? Kashmir Prakaêa on book 3 of Väkyapadiya
(E)
6. Punyaräja 1000? ? ?Tikä on book 2 of Väkyapadiya (E)
7. Kaiyata 1150? Kashmir Mahäbhäsyapradipa (E)
8. (Rsiputra) 1410 Kerala Sphotasiddhigopälikä (E)
Paramesvara II
9. Satyänanda or 1500 Mahäbhäsyapradipalaghuvivararia (E )
Râmacandra
Sarasvatï
10. Sesa Krsna 1540 Varanasi Sphotatattuanirüpaya (E )
11. Annambhatta 1540 Andhradesa Mahäbhäsyapradipoddyotana (E )
12. (Sesa) Näräyana 1546 Varanasi Mahâbhasyasûktiratnâkara (M)
(Bhatta)
13. Isvarânanda or 1550 ? Mahabhäsyapradipabrhadvivararia (E )
ïsvarïdatta Sarasvatï
SabdabodhatarangiV'ï (M)
14. Bhärata Misra 1550 ? Sphotasiddhi (E)
15. Author unknown 1550 ? Sphotasiddhinyäyavicära (E)
16. (&esa) Cintämani 1557 Varanasi Mahàbhasyapradïpaprakâêa (M)
17. Bhattqji Diksita 1590 Andhradesa Vaiyäkaranasiddhäntakarikä (E )
18. SesaVisnu 1605 Varanasi? Mahäbhäsyaprakäiikä (M)
19. Sivarämendra 1605 ? Mahäbhäsyaratnaprakäea (E)
Sarasvatï
20. Näräyana (Sästrin) 1640 ? Mahäbhäsyapradipavyäkhyä (E)
21. Konda Bhatta 1640 Varanasi Vaiyâkarayabhûsaria and &zra (E)
22. Näräyana Bhattatiri 1640 Melputtur Apäriiniyapramäyatä (T)
(Kerala)
23. Gokkanätha Diksita 1650 South Mahäbhäsyaratnävali (M)
24. Sadäsiva 1667 ? Mahâbhasyagûdharthadipanï (M)
25. Hari Diksita 1670 Varanasi Sabdaratna (Brhat- and Laghu-)
(E)
HISTORICAL RESUME 23

Name Date Place Title

26. Jagannätha 1670 Patna Prabodhacandrikä (M)

Pandita
27. Rämabhadra 1700 Tanjore Sa ddarêinisiddhantasamgraha (E )
Diksita Sabdabhedanirüpana (E)
28. Näges'a Bhatta 1714 Maharashtra/ Brhatmaüjüsä (M)
Allahabad; Laghumaüjüsä (E)
Nägesa spent Paramalaghumanjüsä (part T ; E)
his scholarly Mahäbhäsyapradipoddyota (E)
life in
Varanasi
29. Gopälakrsna 1720 Pudukottah MahäbhäsyaEäbdikacintamarii (M)

30. Dharanidhara 1730 Tiksnajnatiya Bodhapaddhati (M)

31. Vaidyanätha 1740 Varanasi Mahäbhäsyapradipoddyotachäyä (E)
Paiyagunde Laghumanjüsäkalä (E)
32. Käsisvara Sarman 1740 ? Jnänämrta (M)
33. Satyapriya 1745 p Mahâbhâsyavivararia (M)
Tïrtha Svâmin
34. Jayakrsna Maunin 1745 Sabdärthasäramanjari (M)
Sabdärthatarkämrta (M)
35. Harivallabha 1747 Gives his Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasäradarparia (M)
native place
as Kùrmagiri
36. &rïkrsna 1750 Sphotacandrikä (E)
Bhatta Maunin Tarkacandrikâ (M)
Vrttidlpikä (E)
37. Âsâdhara Bhatta 1770 Traditionally Sabdatrivemkâ (E)
considered to
have come
from Baroda
38. Ramasevaka 1770 Mahäbhäsyapradipavyäkhyä (M)
39. Indradatta 1800 Sabdatattvaprakäsa (M)
Upâdhyâya
40. Krsnamiträcärya or 1800 Vaiyäkaranalaghumanjüsäkuncikä (E )
Durbaläcärya
41. Manyudeva 1815 Vaiyakarawbhüsanasärakänti (M)
.42. Bhairava Misra 1824 Sphotapariksä (E) and commenta-
ries on the Tattvßbodhini, Sabden-
dusekhara, and Paribhäsendueekhara
43. Kumära Tatäya 1825 Mahäbhäsyapärijätam nätakam (M)
44. Satära Räghaven- 1840 Mahäbhäsyatripathagä (M)
dräcärya
Gajendragadkar
45. Gangädhara 1850 Jessore TrikâridafabdaMsana (E )
Kaviräja
Tnsütravyäkararia (E)
46. Anantäcärya 1906 Musarapakkam Saranasabdärthavicära (E)
47. Khuddijhä 1910 Varanasi Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasäratinarthaväda-
(oarman) sära (E)
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Name Date Place Title

48. Nityänanda Panta 1925 ? Commentary on Paramalaghuman-

Parvatiya jüsä (E)
49. Süryanäräyana Sukla 1937 p Väkyapadiyabhävapradipa (E)
50. Gopäla Sästri Nene 1940 p Vaiyäkaranabhusanasärasärala (E )
51. P.S. Anantanäräyana 1940 Trichur Väkyatattva (E)
Sästri
52. Brahmadeva 1943 p Vaiyäkaranasiddhäntamanjüsä (E )
53. V. Krsnamäcärya 1946 Madras Sphotaväda Upodghäta (E)
54. Sadäsiva Sästri Joshi 1946 p Paramalaghumänjüsärthadipikä (E )
55. Bäla Krsna Paficoli 1947 from Gujarat; Vaiyäkarariabhusanasäraprabhä (E)
taught in
Varanasi
56. Madhukänta Sarmä 1950 p Mahäbhäsyaprakäsa (E)
Jhä
57. Räma Prasäda 1952 Varanasi Vaiyäkarariabhüsanasarasubodhinl (E )
Tripä^hi
58. Rudradharajhä 1954 ? Mahäbhäsyatattväloka (E)
Sarman
59. Kälika Prasäda 1951 from Gujarat, Paramalaghumanjüsäjyotsnä (E)
âukla worked in
Baroda and at
Varanasi
60. Sabhäpati Sarman 1963 p Paramalaghumanjüsäratnaprabhä (E )
Upädhyäya
61. Raghunätha Sarman 1970 taught in Väkyapadlyämbakartn (E)
Varanasi, but
came from Vyâkaranadarêanabindu (E)
Chhata in
Ballia District,
U.P.
62. Satyakäma Varma 1970 Delhi Commentary on Vakyapadïya (E)
63. Rämäjfiä Pändeya 1979 Varanasi Vyäkaranadarsanapratimä (E )
( Because it is difficult to give an exhaustive list of modern scholars, main works are
given in the appendix. Dates for modern scholars given above are publication dates
for their major works. )

4. PROBLEMS OF LANGUAGE
DISCUSSED BY OTHER SCHOOLS

A. Mïmâmsâ
Mïmâmsâ deals mainly with the interpretation of the Vedic passages
that give rules about the various rituals and sacrifices. The Veda
consists of metrical hymns [mantras) and prose passages (bmhmanas).
The brahmanas are classified into two sections: (1) prescriptions,
including injunctions (vidhi) and prohibitions (nisedha); and (2) supple-
mentary descriptions (arthavâdas), which are classified into three
HISTORICAL RESUME 25

groups: (a) gunavädas, statements that are contradicted by our experi-

ences in the world and have to be explained figuratively to get a cogent
meaning, such as "the mind is a thief" (stenam manah), (b) anuvâdas,
involving repetition of ideas already known, such as "fire is the antidote
to snow" (agnir himasya bhesajam), and (c) bhütarthavadas, which deal
with things that are unknown but may be taken to be true, for example,
statements like "Indra killed Vrtra."
In the arthavâda section of Jaimini's Mimämsasütras the question is
raised whether the arthavâda passages in the Veda can be considered as
authoritative. The aim of the Vedic texts is to bring about action,
hence apparently only injunctions and prohibitions can be held to
be authoritative; the arthavâda passages, not directly related to any
command or prohibition, seem to be unauthoritative. But the final
view of the Mïmâmsakas is that the arthavädas are also valid instru-
ments of knowledge (pramâna), because they are supplementary texts
to be read along with the injunctions or prohibitions as a unit.
Regarding the interpretation of an injunction itself there is difference
of opinion between the two schools of Mïmamsà—the Bhäfta, following
Kumärila Bhatta's views, and the Präbhäkara, following Prabhäkara's
views. According to the Bhätta school the content of an injunction is
the realization that the action enjoined will produce some beneficial
result. For every Vedic injunction the three basic components that
must be indicated are: sâdhya (what is to be brought about), sâdhana
(the means or karana), and itikartavyatä (in what way it is to be brought
about). In the Bhätta system the sâdhya of the sabdl bhavanä is the
ârthi bhâvanâ and the itikartavyatä is the arthavâda associated with the
injunctions. Kumärila says that not even a fool will act without a
purpose. There is no need to say who should act, for anyone who is
desirous of the fruit will come forward to do it. According to the
Präbhäkaras, however, the basic components that need to be indicated
are: the visaya (the act enjoined), the niyojya, (the person who is
enjoined to doit), and the karana (the means of doing it). There is no
need to indicate the fruit of action for, according to Präbhäkara, the
Vedic injunction is to be obeyed simply because it is a command.
The law is to be obeyed because it is the law, not because of the
expectation of any reward or the fear of punishment.
The definition given by the Mïmâmsakas for a sentence is in
Mîmâmsâsutra 2.1.46. A group of words serving a single purpose (artha)
forms a sentence, if on analysis the separate words are found to have
mutual expectancy {akanksa). The principle of syntactic unity is that
"So long as a single purpose is served by a number of words, which on
being separated, are found to be wanting and incapable of effecting
the said purpose, they form one syntactical unit—one complete
Yajus-mantra."18 Here the sentence definition is based on psychological
26 ËKGYOLOPÈDIA ÖF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

âkânksâ and not syntactic âkânksâ. Prabhäkara says that in this definition
the term artha stands for both meaning and purpose and that the two
are interrelated. Kumärila Bhatta says that it is possible to take artha
as meaning in order to allow a wider scope to the principle, but he
does not accept that interpretation himself. Bhartrhari refers to this
definition and says that it is not identical with the definition given
by Kätyäyana, that a sentence is that (group of connected words)
which contains a single finite verb (ehatin).1*
It was the Mïmàmsakas who took a leading part in studying the
working of laksanä or the secondary significance of words. They had
to recognize it in order to explain apparent inconsistencies when words
are taken in their literal sense. The main condition of a metaphoric
transfer is this inconsistency {mukhyârthabâdha). The Präbhäkaras
held that the inconsistency is the impossibility of taking the word in
the literal sense, while according to the Bhättas it is the unsuitability
in the context. The role of contextual factors was also recognized by
both schools. A sentence may have a secondary meaning according to
both the schools, while the Nyâya school allows it only for the individual
words.

B. Nyâya
The Nyäya school is greatly interested in problems of language.
A considerable portion of Navya-Nyäya is concerned with logical
grammar, analyzing and classifying the significant elements of sentences
and discovering rules that determine the motion of a meaningful
sentence. It is to the Nyäya school that the modern sâbdabodha
studies look for inspiration and help. Sâbdabodha means "knowledge
of the sentence meaning," and it is studied from the listener's point
of view.
The Naiyâyikas use the term pada (word) for any meaningful unit,
not necessarily a free unit; and they use the term väkya (sentence) for
any syntactically connected "words". Thus for them an expression
like ghafam can be taken to be a "sentence" because it is made up of
two "words", ghata and -am, and is logically complete.
The Naiyäyikas believe that the relation between words and their
meanings is not natural, but conventional, being established by the will
of God in the case of ordinary words and by the will of man in the case
of technical terms. This conventional relation is called significative
power (sakti). Meaning {artha) includes the universal (Jâti), the
configuration (âkrti), and the individual (vyakti), according to early
Naiyäyikas; but later they considered it to be the individual as qualified
by the universal {jätiviEistavyakti) .20
There is significative power only for primary meaning; secondary
meaning is accepted as being related to the primary meaning. The
HISTORICAL RESUME 27

Naiyayikas accept secondary meaning only for an individual word in

a sentence, not for the sentence as a whole, by contrast to the Mïmâm-
sakas, who accept secondary meaning for a sentence. The early Naiyayi-
kas considered the impossibility of connecting the word meanings in a
sentence to be the incompatibility that prompts their having secondary
meaning; but according to the Navya-Nyäya school it is the unsuit-
ability of primary sense in view of the sense intended in the context.
The three conditions of expectancy, consistency, and contiguity
necessary to unify the sentence are accepted by the Naiyayikas; but to
them the expectancy is syntactic, not psychological. Some of the
Naiyayikas accept intention (tatparya) as another condition, but not
all. Suggestion (vyaftjanä) is not acceptable to the logicians who include
it under inference.

C. Buddhist Logicians21
The Buddhist Logicians of Dignäga's school have been very interested
in the philosophy of language. How far can verbal communication be
successful? Dignâga was greatly influenced by his elder contemporary
Bhartrhari. According to the Buddhist idealists reality consists of
unique particulars [svalaksana), which are momentary and in perpetual
flux. Perception is the sensation of the unique particulars, but all
cognitions are based on concepts that are conceptual constructions
(vikalpa), which cannot directly grasp reality. Words produce con-
ceptual constructions, and conceptual constructions produce words.
The Buddhists do not accept the universal as a reality. The function of
a word, that is, a name, is the exclusion or elimination of other pos-
sibilities. Construction-free (nirvikalpaka) perception of the unique
particular alone is real perception; verbal knowledge based on concepts
is only inference, according to them, and has no direct correspondence
with the real external things.
Bhartrhari too seems to have held an idealistic view of reality. All
verbal discourse is meaningful in terms of our conceptual images and
the words that symbolize them. He seems to deny the possibility of a
construction-free knowledge beyond the reach of words. All knowledge
is interpenetrated with words, and it is impossible to have a cognition
free from word association (see Vâkyapadïya 1.123).
Dignäga's indebtedness to Bhartrhari can be discovered in his main
work, Pramânasamuccayavrtti 5, on apohapariccheda.22 Looking for proto-
type of the theory of anyapoha (exclusion of others), Masaaki Hattori
successfully demonstrates that there is a striking resemblance between
Dignäga's concept of apoha and Bhartrhari's concept of the universal
(jâti) discussed in Vâkyapadïya 3.1, jâtisamuddesa.23
Dignâga quotes three verses of Vâkyapadïya in Pramânasamuccayavrtti 5
in order to support his arguments. To clarify the grammatical distinc-
28 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

tions between two words with different nominal endings and those
with identical endings, he quotes Väkyapadiya 3.14.8.24 To support the
argument that a universal word (jâtisabda) maybe applied directly to
members ofthat universal, he quotes Väkyapadiya 2.158. To support the
argument that a universal word may never be applied to members of
that universal, he quotes Väkyapadiya 2.155.25
Finally, Dignäga declares in Pramänasamuccayavrtti that the meaning
of a sentence (vâkyârtha) is c'intuition" (pratibhä), apparently under the
influence of Väkyapadiya 2.143ff. : "When abstracted from a sentence,
the meaning of a word is discriminated. The meaning of a sentence
called pratibhä is first produced by it [that is, the meaning of a word] ."26

D. Literary Criticism
Grammar provided the foundation from which the detailed discu-
ssions of literary criticism arose. The importance of emotions with
special reference to the theater were stressed in Bhârata's JVâtyafâstra
(third century of the Christian era), which gives detailed directions re-
garding the communication of emotions by the actors. Anandavardhana
accepted the importance of emotions in all literature and evolved
his dhvani theory to explain the poet's communication of aesthetic
experience through the medium of language by using the method of
suggestion.
Anandavardhana, the author of the Dhvanyäloka, flourished in
Kashmir under the patronage of King Avantivarman in the later half
of the ninth century. The theory of primary and secondary meaning,
developed by the Mïmâmsakas and the Naiyâyikas in ancient India,
was further extended by him to include emotive and other associative
meanings also under linguistic meaning. He postulated a third potency
of language named vyanjanâ, which he called the capacity to suggest
a meaning other than its literal and metaphorical (secondary) meaning.
Under the term "meaning" is included not only the information
conveyed but the sociocultural significance, the figures of speech, and
also the emotion induced; and among the indicators of meaning,
Anandavardhana did not confine himself to the words and sentences,
but included all the contextual factors, the intonation and gestures, the
sound effect produced, the rhythm and the meter, as well as the literal
sense. Although suggestion (vyanjanä) is a comprehensive linguistic
phenomenon, Anandavardhana confined his attention to poetic
language and studied the problem only from that standpoint. Strictly
speaking, the dhvani theory of Anandavardhana is only an extension
of the rasa theory of Bharata to the domain of literature, as has been
pointed out by writers like Abhinavagupta.
Änandavardhana's basic postulate is that an emotion cannot be
evoked in the reader by merely referring to its name or by its bare
HISTORICAL RESUME 29

description. It has to be suggested by describing the situation and

contextual factors such as the reactions of the characters. Not only the
literal meaning, but also the suggestive possibilities of the expression,
such as the sound echoing the sense, rhythm, imagery and symbols,
selective exaggeration of the prominent element, and the suppression
of the irrelevant, and bringing out the etymological significance through
subtle supplementation—all of these devices are to be used for helping
to evoke the right response in the reader. Words and expressions are
to be selected from those in common usage in such a way as to help
evoke the emotional effect desired.
The linguistic speculations of ancient Indians such as the grammar-
ians and logicians generally took a word as the unit of speech and
considered a sentence as a combination of words for the purpose of
communicating meaning. How is syntactic unity effected from a series
of isolated words uttered in a sequence? This question was discussed
and various explanations given by different schools of thought. The
literal and metaphorical meanings of words were also discussed and
the conditions for resorting to a word's metaphorical meaning in a
sentence were evolved. But there were some scholars, like Bhartrhari,
who exposed the unsatisfactory nature of a linguistic theory dependent
entirely on individual words and their lexical meanings; Bhartrhari's
theory of sphota emphasized the importance of taking the whole
utterance as a significant unitary linguistic symbol. Anandavardhana
took his cue from Bhartrhari in developing his theory of suggestion in
poetry.
Logicians, interested more in accuracy and precision in the use of
words that they want to analyze objectively than in the fullness of
expression and the possibilities of extending the range of meanings to
the domain of the inexpressible, are satisfied with the normal sense;
but poets and critics who deal with the totality of human experience
cannot ignore vast areas of human behavior. The suggested meaning
is too vague, fleeting, and subjective to have a place among logical
meanings; the subtle and subjective suggestions implied in language
(vyanjana) do not lend themselves to logical discussion and analysis.
The suggested meaning depends on contextual factors, and the same
utterance may convey different suggestions to different people depend-
ing on their mental makeup and expectations. There is no invariable
connection between an expression and the suggestions conveyed.
Anandavardhana included the emotions evoked in the listeners under
the rubric of meaning, which naturally necessitates the assumption of
a limitless suggestive power for language, for even logicians cannot
argue that the emotions induced by language can be included under the
literal meaning. Emotions can be evoked by music or dance where
no expressed sense is involved; the emotive element in a language
30 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

cannot be explained in terms of the primary literal meaning or even

the metaphorical sense of words.
It is true that intentional metaphors can suggest further ideas; but
these suggested meanings have to be assigned to the suggestive power
of language. The break in the flow, due to the incompatibility of the
expressed sense, in the case of a metaphor is a signal to the listener to
stop and think about the possible interpretations and thereby lead him
into the sphere of suggestions. Änandavardhana was concerned only
with poetic language and confined his attention to the suggestion of
meanings of aesthetic value. His theory oîdhvani is vyanjana or suggestion
as applied to poetry.
It was Änandavardhana who for the first time enunciated the theory
of angirasa according to which there should be one predominant
sentiment or rasa in a literary work such as a drama, epic, or lyric to
which all the other rasas introduced should be subordinate. Mutually
conflicting or supportive emotions could be delineated appropriately
in a work, provided there is one rasa predominant throughout, the
others being kept in the background as subsidiary. Earlier writers like
Bharata had not stressed this point but considered that a work such as
a drama has to cater to the different tastes of various types of people
and must therefore deal with various emotions and rasas. Bharata
seems to have felt that each character in a play may have one dominant
emotion, but he did not consider the need for a predominant rasa for
the work as a whole. Structural unity in plot was, however, stressed
by him. Änandavardhana perhaps felt that unity in theme implied a
predominant rasa for the work as a whole and that great classical
writers have always taken this idea for granted; so he boldly stated
that even the construction of the plot must be made in such a way
that there is scope for a predominant rasa; incidents and descriptions
irrelevant to the development of the main rasa should be avoided, and
even the introduction of figures of speech and selection of the work's
texture should be in keeping with the rasa delineated. In all such
cases the propriety from the point of view of the rasa is the most import-
ant factor to be considered.
Another point stressed by Änandavardhana is that the imaginative
sensibility requisite for proper literary appreciation can be acquired
only by a close study of classical works and by the constant practice
of response to works of art. Because the most important element in the
meaning of a poem is the emotion suggested, it can be understood and
appreciated only by sahrdayas or men of like sensibility, not by all
scholars and logicians, who may only be able to get at the literal meaning
through analytical study. The process is one of getting the reader's
heart and mind tuned to the same frequency as that of the transmitting
artist. Poetry does not give out its full charm to all, only to a select few.
HISTORICAL RESUME 31

As the Rg Vedic seer observed, the goddess of speech exposes her full
charm and yields herself completely only to the deserving devotee, just
as a loving wife does to her husband. Bharata, who had to deal with
the problems of the theatrical performances, considered that a drama
should please all types of people, not merely the specialists. Änanda-
vardhana, by contrast, considers that literary taste has to be acquired
through practice. Even among connoisseurs tastes differ; some themes
such as love stories and adventures may have a wider attraction than
stories dealing with the quiet life of a recluse. The ideal sahrdaya,
however, is one who can raise himself above his petty prejudices and
individual predilections and appreciate things from the poet's point of
view.
Änandavardhana exalts the freedom of the creative writer, which
transcends even the powers of nature. He says that in the boundless
samsara öf poetry the poet is the sole creator, the whole world transforms
itself depending on his wishes. If the poet is pervaded with rasa, the
whole world of his creation will be suffused with that rasa. A good poet
makes even insentient objects act as sentient beings. As Abhinavagupta
explains it, the poet's intuitive power (pratibhä) enables him to create
a world according to his wish. This tendency of infusing life into
insentient objects of nature is a special feature of Indian poetry, though
it has been criticized by Ruskin as the "pathetic fallacy."27
In India even poetics or literary criticism claims to be not only a
science {alamkaras*astro) but also a darsana or philosophy. The main
aim of literature and dramaturgy is to give unalloyed pleasure to the
readers or the audience by evoking rasa. This rasa realized and enjoyed
has often been compared to the bliss experienced by the mystics
on getting a glimpse of the ultimate Reality or Brahman; some have
claimed thatraiYZ-realizationis identical with Brahman-realization;
there has also been a claim that it is superior to the bliss the yogins get
in their deep meditation, for less effort is involved in it.
The Rg Veda can be considered not only as the earliest religious text,
but also as the earliest literary work in India, if not in the world. The
Vedic seers were mystic poets fully conscious of language's importance
and of the problems of faithfully communicating intimate personal
experiences. Some of the concepts that are universally accepted by the
critics and are clearly found in the Vedas include :
(1 -) The need for a vision in the mind, which is integral and pleasur-
able, as the source for all poetry and philosophy. The term pratibhä
was not found, but the root drs, "to see" or "to visualize" is frequently
used to convey the idea.
(2) The importance given to craftsmanship in composing poetry.
Words have to be selected (from those used in everyday life) and
arranged properly, with due regard to the meter used. The words
32 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

must be "as sharp as arrows" and the hymn is to be composed carefully,

like an artisan constructing a chariot.
(3) Poetry can be understood and appreciated only by the few
who are of the same mental nature as the poet ("sakhayah sakhyäni
jânate" Rg Veda 10,71.2c).
Bhattanâyaka (late ninth and early tenth centuries) seems to have
been the first to associate aesthetic experience with mystical experience.
The subject is completely dissolved in the object contemplated and the
entire surroundings disappear from his attention, because of the con-
centration on the thing contemplated, in both aesthetic experience
and mystical experience. Bhattanâyaka stated that aesthetic experience
is similar to the experience of the Absolute Brahman. Abhinavagupta
also accepts Bhattanäyaka's opinion regarding the similarity between
aesthetic experience and the mystic experience of the Absolute.
Bhattanâyaka seems to have gone one step further to claim the
superiority of aesthetic experience to the yogins'* mystical vision. He
says that rasa or aesthetic pleasure is poured forth spontaneously by
speech like a cow giving forth its milk to its calf; therefore, it is different
from (and superior to) that (mystical vision) milked (laboriously) by
the yogins.
Abhinavagupta recognizes the similarity between aesthetic experi-
ence and the mystical experience, but points out the boundary line
that separates the two. The mystical experience of the ultimate reality
is total and complete, and the yogin is far beyond any form of discursive
thought. Aesthetic experience gives bliss only temporarily and cannot
be considered supreme bliss, though it is superior to the worldly joys.
Änandavardhana was an advocate of rasa, but realized its limitations,
for in one of his verses quoted in the Dhvanyâloka he says that after
experimenting with the imaginative poetic vision capable of affording
aesthetic experience and also with the intellectual powers for analyzing
and understanding the truth about reality, he is exhausted and has
realized that the bliss that the devotee gets by contemplation of God
is far superior.
Later Jagannätha Panditarâja, author of the Rasagangâdhara, states
that rasa is identical with consciousness (cit) or Brahman, and aesthetic
experience, in its true sense, is the realization of that consciousness
by the removal of the veils covering it.
Rasa is unique and at the ultimate stage there is no plurality. The
division of rasa into eight or nine is based on the different permanent
moods (sthäyibhävas) that lead to the rasa. At a still lower level even
the sthäyibhävas are sometimes referred to as rasa.
 METAPHYSICS

• 1. Vyakarana AS A PHILOSOPHICAL SYSTEM

The goal of the Indian Grammarians' philosophy, which we here call
vyakarana^ is not mere intellectual knowledge, but direct experience of
ultimate truth. Knowledge of grammar resulting in correct speech not
only conveys meaning but also enables one to "see" reality. This is the
philosophical meaning of the Indian term darsana, which literally
means "sight". It is this feature that sets Indian philosophy apart from
modern western perspectives on language. Vyakarana not only addresses
itself to the analysis of grammatical rules (though that is certainly
important) or to theorizing about the way speech conveys meaning
(though that too is achieved), it also insists that one should not be
satisfied with mere intellectual conviction but should transform that
conviction into direct experience.1
From the early Vedas the Indian approach to language has never
been narrow or restrictive. Language was examined in relation to
consciousness—(the scope of the inquiry) not even limited to human
consciousness. All aspects of the world and human experience were
regarded as illuminated by language. Indian philosophy also postulated
that language had both phenomenal and metaphysical dimensions.
It is remarkable that in the ancient hymns of the Rg Veda a semitechnical
vocabulary was already developed to deal with such linguistic matters
as grammar, poetic creation, inspiration, illumination, and so on.2
Although there was careful concern for the phenomenal or outer aspects
of language, the Indians always paid equal attention to the inner or
metaphysical aspects of language. Indian philosophers of language
seem to have successfully avoided the two reductionist mistakes of much
western modern language speculation. They did not reduce language to
the condition of a merely human convention having only scientific or
factual referents; neither did they fell into the error of metaphysical
34 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

reductionism that so devalues the meanings of human words that

language ends up as obscure mysticism.3 Grammarians like Pänini
and Patanjali and etymologists like Yäska were clearly concerned with
human speech in the everyday empirical world, but they also made
room for metaphysical study. Similarly, the great Indian philosopher
of language, Bhartrhari, begins his Vâkyapadiya with a metaphysical
inquiry into the nature and origin of language in relation to Brahman,
but then goes on in the second and third chapters to explore technical
grammatical points involved in the everyday use of language. In
classical Indian thought on language, the study of a particular
phenomenon and the contemplation of it as a metaphysical mystery are
not mutually exclusive. They are both considered parts of a darSana or
systematic view of truth.
There is one more aspect of traditional Indian philosophy of langu-
age that must be understood by the modern reader. Whereas the
contemporary writer often thinks in terms of using language creatively,
that is, to create something "original" or "new", the vyakarana conception
is quite different. The correct or insightful use of language is not seen
as conveying new knowledge, but rather as uncovering ancient know-
ledge that has been obscured due to the accrual of ignorance. The
Vedic sage does not produce something new out of his own imagination,
but rather relates ordinary things to their forgotten eternal truth.
Thus, from the perspective of grammatical philosophy the philo-
sophical study of language and correct grammatical usage are seen as
"ignorance-clearing activities", which together open the way to a
direct perception of truth.
As a systematic means to knowledge vyakarana suffers from certain
special difficulties. Language is the object of study in vyakarana, yet
all thinking about language must, by virtue of human limitations, be
done in language itself. One cannot get outside of language so as to
examine it objectively. Language must be used to study language
from within. Vyakarana does not draw back from this difficulty but
relishes its challenge; it recognizes that, as Hans-Georg Gadamer puts
it, all knowledge of ourselves and all knowledge of the world comes to
us through language.4 Thus the correct knowledge of language is
basic to all other approaches to reality—all other darsanas.5

2. SABDA BRAHMAN AND ITS MANIFESTATIONS

It was Bhartrhari who in Vâkyapadiya 1.1 first systematically equated

Brahman (the Absolute) with language (sabdâ), going on to argue
that everything else arises as a manifestation of this one Sabda Brah-
man.6 But equating Brahman with language is found much earlier
METAPHYSICS 35

in the Vedic literature. The Asyavâmïya Hymn (Rg Veda 1.164) states
that the ultimate abode of language [vac) is Brahman.7 Language is
described as being at the pinnacle of the universe. Three-quarters
of language remain hidden in a cave, while the fourth part fashions
creation (Rg Veda 1.164.10, 41, 45). In Rg Veda 10.71 it is made clear
that the manifestations of Brahman in language are not equally
perceived by all people. Those who have purified themselves, namely,
the r$is or "seers", experience the full manifestation of language.
Others, whose ignorance obscures their minds and sense organs, hear
little of the fullness of language. The Vedic seers are not considered to
be composers of the hymns but rather the "seers" of eternal truth.
In Rg Veda 1.164.37 language is related to cosmic order (rta) and is
understood as logos, which manifests itself as both the uttered word
(for use in ritual chanting) and the inner word that reveals truth.
The equation of Brahman with language is also found within the
Upanisads. In the Brhadaranyaka Upanisad 4.1.2 Brahman is identified
as the one reality, without a second, which is identical with language.
The Mandükya Upanisad 3.3 links the unspeakable absolute with the
speakable via the symbol of aum. Aum is described as traversing the
phenomenal levels of waking, dreaming, and deep sleep and as
reaching out to the absolute. Brahman is identical with language, the
basic manifestation of which is aum. Bhartrhari echoes this assertion in
Vâkyapadïya 1.9 in describing aum as "the source of all scripture and
the common factor of all original causes."8 Vyäkarana scholars have
focused on those Vedas and Upanisads which equate language,
Brahman, and absolute reality. Passages that state otherwise are
ignored or passed over. This practice, of course, is usual within each
of the Indian philosophical schools (darsanas)—at least in those which
claim to be orthodox (ästika) or grounded on the Vedas.
The Vedas occupy a primary place in the manifestation of Sabda
Brahman, as well as being the means by which Sabda Brahman may
be realized and release experienced. The Veda, though One, is divided
into many and spreads out through its various recensions and mani-
festing sounds (dhvani) to the diversity of people. Although the experi-
ence of the Vedas may be many, the reality they reveal is the one
Sabda Brahman. Vedic language is at once the creator and sustainer
of the world cycles and the revealer of the Divine. Language is taken
as having Divine origin {daim vak)> as Spirit descending and embody-
ing itself in phenomena, assuming various guises and disclosing its
truth to the sensitive soul.9 As Aurobindo describes it,

The language of the Veda itself is fruti, a rhythm not compos-

ed by the intellect but heard, a divine Word that came vibrating
out of the Infinite to the inner aucUence of the man who had
36 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

previously made himself fit for the impersonal knowledge. The words
themselves, drsfi and êruti, sight and hearing, are Vedic expres-
sions; these and cognate words signify, in the esoteric terminology
of the hymns, revelatory knowledge and the contents of inspiration.10

In contrast with western views of revelation, there is nothing miraculous

in the manifestation of the Vedas to the rsi. The rsi "sees" the divine
truth not because it is given to him in an act of grace, but because he
has made himself fit, through heroic practices of self-purification, to
"see" the truth directly. He then puts it into spoken words, the Vedic
hymns, for the purpose of helping others who are still caught in
ignorance to purify themselves until they too have the experience of
directly "seeing" Sabda Brahman. Vyäkarana has the special task of
keeping the Vedas uncorrupted so that the manifestation of Sabda
Brahman remains available to all in pristine form.11 Should vyäkarana
fail to provide this service and allow the Vedas to become corrupted
through sloppy usage and transmission, then the possibility of realizing
truth could be lost for the generations yet to come in this cycle of
creation. For this reason vyäkarana is described by Bhartrhari as more
important than other darsanas. As the other schools base themselves
on the Vedas, the loss or corruption of the Vedas would render the
fruits of their particular approaches useless and misleading.
The fact that Indian philosophy is based on oral traditions12 is
another reason why vyäkarana takes its teaching to be of primary impor-
tance. Because the authoritative manifestation of Sabda Brahman is
found first in spoken form and only secondarily in written forms, the
role of vyäkarana in providing the rules and teaching that keeps the
oral forms of language pure is of fundamental importance to all other
philosophic schools. For example, Pänini's Astädhyäyi is a grammar
founded upon oral usage rather than upon etymology or derivation.13
The same stress on language's oral character is found in the discussions
offered by Patanjali in his Mahabhasya and Bhartrhari in the Väkyapadiya
of the way uttered words convey meaning. It is perhaps worth noting
in passing that for Indian philosophy, the normative form of language
is not written but oral and that vyäkarana plays the important role of
keeping the oral form disciplined and pure in its presentation. Without
this purity the truth-bearing capacity of language could be
restricted and the manifestation of Sabda Brahman obscured. Know-
ledge of the Vedas is not simply the "book-learning" of main ideas
that characterizes modern western scholarship. In the Indian tradition,
language is only fully alive when spoken. Thus knowledge of the Vedas
includes and requires the ability to speak the words with correct accent
and meter. And consistent with the oral emphasis, thinking is seen as
internal speaking to which not enough präna or breath has been added
METAPHYSICS 3?

to make it overt. Writing, the focus of attention for the modern West,
is seen by vyakarana as a coded recording of the oral, which can never
perfectly represent all the nuances of the spoken word and is therefore
always secondary. The vyakarana approach is opposite to that taken
in modern western scholarship. In modern biblical studies, for example,
the scholar's aim is to get back to the earliest available written manus-
cript and then to use it as a criterion against which to check the text
that is in use today» The rationale is that errors that have crept in over
the years would not be present in the earlier manuscript. In addition,
the modern school of Form Criticism has argued that before many of
the scriptures (such as the Gospels) were written down there was a
period of oral transmission, during which time the text (for example,
the original teachings of Jesus) was modified by the needs of the people
and the particular conditions under which they lived. This period of
oral transmission is judged to be unreliable due to its failure to carry
forward the original sayings in a pure and unchanged form.14
The vyakarana practice is the exact opposite. When India achieved
independence in 1947, one of the first acts of the new government
was to establish a commission of senior scholars to go from place to
place and listen to the assembled Brahmins reciting the Vedas. They
would listen for errors in meter, accent, and samdhi and for any loss or
change in words. It was the rigorous practice of the Pratisäkhyas that
was being checked by the senior scholars. They had mastered the
Pratisäkhyas and pure presentation of the Vedas through many years
of careful oral practice and checking with their teachers. And the
teachers of the present senior scholars had acquired their expertise
not from books hut from oral practice with the best teachers of the
generation before them, who in turn had been taught by the best
teachers before them, and so on in an unbroken oral tradition back to
the Vedas.
It is not the dead or entombed manuscript but the correct and clear
enunciation of the word in the here and now that makes for a living
language and scripture. Large numbers of copies of "The Living Bible"
stacked in bookstores or reverently placed on personal bookshelves
are not true language or living scripture, according to vyakarana. Only
when a passage is so well learned that it is with one wherever one goes
is the word really known. In such a state the words become part of
or, even more exactly, are one's consciousness in the act of speaking.
Books and all written forms are not knowledge in this sense of the word;
rather they represent a lower, inferior, second order of language
suitable only for the dull or the uneducated. The vyakarana provides
the training rules for the oral learning of language and for the presen-
tation of the Vedic word in its pure form.
For vyakarana, then, spoken language is the medium through which
38 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDÎAK PHILOSOPHIES

âabda Brahman is manifested, and the Vedas are the criterion expres-
sion of that manifestation.

3. THE FUNCTION OF TIME

In Bhartrhari's systematization of vyäkarana philosophy time (kâla)

is assigned the function of enabling the one âabda Brahman to appear
as the many. This position is consistent with that given time in the
Atharva Veda and the Maitri Upanisad.15 In Vakyapadlya 1.3 Bhartrhari
describes the creation of the objects of the universe as occurring in the
first instance through the creative power of âabda Brahman's kâla
or time power. Kola is not different from âabda Brahman but is that
aspect of âabda Brahman which allows manifested sequence to come
into being. When such time sequences appear as differentiated objects,
then time as a power seems to be different from âabda Brahman,
but real]y it is not {Vakyapadlya \ .2). Vakyapadlya 1.3 states that all other
powers within the created universe are in the first instance governed
by the creative power of time. Through time things come to be and
pass away. Time is the efficient cause by which Brahman controls the
cycles of the universe.
Two illustrations are offered by Bhartrhari to make clear his mean-
ing. The power of time in the creative process is like that of the wire-
puller in a puppet play {Vakyapadlya 3.9.4). Just as the wire-puller is
in complete control of the puppet play so käla has full control over the
running of the world. Ordinary cause-and-effect processes cannot ope-
rate unless käla or time power infuses them with life-force. This control
of ordinary cause and effect by time is further illustrated in relation
to the strings a hunter ties to the feet of small birds that he uses as bait
for larger ones. The small birds can fly over a limited distance but they
cannot go beyond the length of their strings. Like the strings controlling
the movement of birds, so the objects of the created world are con-
trolled by the "string of time" {Vakyapadlya 3.9.15).
It is in Vakyapadlya 3.9 that Bhartrhari presents his detailed analysis
of time. Just as number measures material objects, time measures
activity (3.9.2). In answer to the question of how activities are mea-
sured by time, Bhartrhari states in verse 3, "In the creation (arising),
existence and destruction (of beings) which possess these (activities),
time, remaining in a divided state, is said to be the (instrumental)
cause."16 Heläräja, in his commentary,. explains the meaning of the
verse as follows. Time is the cause of the birth, existence, and decay
of everything. Thus we say some things are born in the spring, others
in the autumn. The same can be said about their existence and their
death. Time, though one, differentiates or sequences things through
METAPHYSICS 39

states of birth, existence, and decay. It is in this sense that time is called
the "wire-puller" of the universe. Yet, these everyday changes of state
or sequences of action are not the true nature of time but superimposi-
tions. Time in its own nature, as one with &abda Brahman, is transcen-
dent of all change, yet also its cause.
To one familiar with Advaita Vedânta, the preceding description
of time sounds very similar to Samkara's notion of mayä in relation to
Brahman. This view is certainly held by two eminent contemporary
interpreters of the Vâkyapadiya^ Gaurinath Sastri17 and K. A. Subra-
mania Iyer.18 As we examine Bhartrharis' description of kâla in
Vâkyapadiya 3,9, we will test this contention.
Verse 14 oî Vâkyapadiya 3.9 is worth careful attention in this regard.
It reads, "By means of activities similar to the turning of the water-
wheel, the eternal and all-pervasive time turns out (kalayati) all the
fragments (kalâh — objects) and thus acquires the name of kâla
(time)"." Like the ever-renewed pushing or lifting up of water by the
waterwheel, so the all-pervading and all-penetrating time drives or
pushes (kalayati) beings or objects, releasing them from their material
causes and making them move. That is why time is given the appro-
priate name of kâla. Heläräja goes on to observe that what Bhartrhari
means to say is,

The soul of the universe is but one, called "para-Brahman" i.e.,

, the real Being. This same one, due to its being the agent of
manifold actions, is defined as possessing unlimited power. And
thus, manifesting successive beings which revolve like the turnings
of a wheel, it "drives" (kalayati) the beings. Therefore it is called
time (kâla). This all-pervading one is independent. For this very
reason, it has been established as being an independent power
in the Vâkyapadiya.19

If Heläräja is right, then Bhartrhari views time as a power of &abda

Brahman, independent of all beings and objects yet also inherent in
them, pushing them through the successive changes of life. Instead of
the passive external superimposition of the successive changes upon
Brahman (the Advaita model), the image here is more characteristic
of urgent change through pregnant forces within &abda Brahman.
The distinction between Bhartrhari's conception of time and the
Advaita Vedänta view of mayä is not that the locus of time or mayä
is in Brahman (for both schools seem to agree on this point), but rather
a question of the ontological power ascribed to time or mayä. Bhartrhari's
time doctrine emphasizes the driving (kalayati) power inherent in
Sabda Brahman, which is the first cause of the bursting forth of worldly
phenomena. The Advaita conception of màyâ, though it does indeed
40 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INÖIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(in the Vivarana tradition, at least) locate maya in Brahman20 does not
attribute to mayä the same degree of ontological "pregnancy" or
"driving force" as Bhartrhari ascribes to time. While it is acknowledged
that maya has two aspects, obscuring (avarana) and projective (viksepa),
the stress in Advaita interpretation is on the former more than the
latter. For the Advaitin, the focus is on may a* s obscuring of Brahman;
for Bhartrhari, it is the projective power or driving force of time
that occupies center stage. While this difference may at first appear
to be merely a question of emphasis, a substantive distinction appears
when the ontological status of the phenomenal projection itself is
analyzed. While for Advaita the projected world of mayä is neither
real nor unreal but inexplicable (anirvacaniya), the time-driven world
of Bhartrhari, though increasingly impure as it becomes manifested
as worldly phenomena, never loses its direct ontological identity
with Brahman. The relation between the phenomenal world and
Brahman for Bhartrhari is continuous and does not have the mysterious
break of an "all or nothing" sort that Samkara's maya doctrine and its
rope-snake analogy requires. Whereas superimposition (adhyasa) is a
fitting term for Samkara,21 it does not seem appropriate to Bhartrhari.
The illustrations offered in the Vakyapadlya are more often associated
with images of &abda Brahman bursting forth in illumination (sphota),
of pregnancy (the peacock egg producing all the colors of creation),
and of driving force like the pushing-up or lifting-up action of the
waterwheel (halayati).
According to Bhartrhari, time is a creative power, while for Advaita
(the Vivarana Advaitin, at least) the obscuring function of avidyä is
equated with maya.22 Bhartrhari in his commentary on 1.1 describes
avidyä as the diversity of phenomena created by Sabda Brahman's time
power. It is probably open to question whether the term avidyä meant
the same for Bhartrhari as it came to be defined by Sarnkara some
centuries later. Modern commentators sometimes incorrectly apply
concepts they have learned from Advaita Vedänta when interpreting
the Väkyapadlya. Notions such as "superimposition" (adhyasa), if seen
through Advaita eyes, are probably misleading and unhelpful in under-
standing Bhartrhari. We may make more progress by staying with the
words of the verses and the clear illustrations offered in the commentary.
Bhartrhari apparently never wrote a commentary for chapter 3. At
present only Heläräja's Tikä (ca. A.D. 1050-1100) is available.23 In
Vakyapadlya 3.9.62, Bhartrhari discusses directly the ontological status
of time, and Heläräja adds some helpful comments. Bhartrhari observes
that there are different doctrines about time: some call it "power"
(sakti), some call it "soul" (atman), and others, "deity" (devatä). Time
is the first (stage) of avidyä, and does^not exist in knowledge.24 Heläräja
in his Tikä further describes time as an independent power of Brahman
METAPHYSICS 41

and discusses its ontological status in relation to avidyä: c 'According to

Bhartrhari, time is the. svatantrya sakti of Brahman.... Due to avidyä,
there is, first of all, appearance of diversity. Diversity is temporal and
spatial. The former comes first. Consciousness, at the stage called
pasyantiy is without any sequence. When it becomes associated with
pränavrtti, it appears to have sequence due to time.5'25 As this comment
makes clear, there are three ontological levels in Bhartrhari's thought :
Brahman, his powers of time and space, and the diversity of the pheno-
menal world. Once again he contrasts with Samkara's Advaita, where
there is only one ontological level—Brahman—with mäyä as an episte-
mological second level (which is neither real nor unreal but inexplica-
ble). For Bhartrhari the highest ontological level is pure Brahman
without sequence or diversity. It is the culmination of our experience
of vâc or language.26 Although time is inherent in âabda Brahman at
this stage, no sequence has yet occurred—it is still pure potentiality.
The next ontological level, in descending order, is madhyama. It is at this
level that time begins to push or drive delimited portions of Sabda
Brahman into sequence, which it accomplishes with the help of prana
or breath. In our experience of language this stage corresponds to the
separation of the unitary sphota into the mental sequence of thoughts.
The full-blown appearance of diversity appears when time has released
all the secondary cause-effect relations that have been waiting as stored
memory traces (saniskära) 01 "seed states" in all the cycles of the
universe. It is in this third or vaikhari level that the power of time as the
sequence evidenced in ordinary cause-effect relations is fully experienc-
ed. To return to Bhartrhari's own analogy, at this stage we see the
birds on time's strings flying about to the full limit that their strings
allow. Time is thus the governing power of all activity in the universe
of manifested objects. It is time that drives or pushes objects into action
to the point at which their own secondary cause-effect relations take
hold. But it is also the behind-the-scenes activity of time that controls
the extent of the secondary actions of objects, along with their moment
of decay or withdrawal.
The notion of time functioning by permitting and preventing worldly
activity is stated in Väkyapadiya 3.9.4 and reappears frequently through-
out section 9: "Time has been called the wire-puller of the world
Machine. It regulates the universe through prevention and permis-
sion."27 The Sanskrit terms involved are abhyanujnä (permission) and
pratibandha (prevention). As the wire-puller of the universe, time allows
some things to appear at a particular time and prevents others from
appearing. This scheduling activity is most important, for without it
everything would appear simultaneously and there would be mass
confusion.28 The function of time called "permission" allows things to
be born and to continue in existence.29 By its other function, prevention,
42 ENCYCLOPEDIA OÊ INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

time obstructs the inherent capacities of objects and "old age" is then
experienced. It is in this way that the stages of life and the seasons are
ordered. When time is functioning under its impulse of prevention,
decay (Jarâ) occurs. Decay and growth (krama) operate like pairs of
opposites. When decay is active, growth is blocked, and vice versa.30
But the underlying substratum of all of this activity is the driving
impulse of time.31 Time remains eternal even though the actions of
growth and decay come and go.
As a result of the activity of growth and decay, time, which is one,
attains the states of past, present, and future. Thus when an action
ceases, time, conditioned by that action, is called past. When something
is about to happen, time, conditioned by that event, is called future.
When action has been initiated but is not yet completed, time is then
called present.32 In this way the one transcendent reality—time—is
experienced, through the actions of the secondary causes it releases or
restrains, to be sequenced into past, present, and future. Time> says
Bhartrhari, is like the everflowing current of a river, which deposits
some things on the river bank and at the same time takes away others.33
So it is that the seasons change, as symbolized by the motions of the
sun and stars. As Heläräja puts it, "The seasons may be looked upon
as the abode of time, because it appears as the seasons. The powej
called 'Freedom' of Brahman is really time and it appears diversified
as the different seasons like Spring, etc."34 Thus the appearance of the
universe, which is really without sequence, as something with sequence,
is the work of time.35
In another analogy, past, present, and future are said to be like three
paths on which objects move without any confusion.36 Heläräja's
comment likens this view to the Sämkhya-Yoga explanation of time
found in Vyâsa's commentary on Yogasütra 2.13. Here the activity of
time is equated with the ever-present movement of the gunas on the
three paths of being {adhvan). The notion that objects and mental
states do not all occur simultaneously due to the prevention and
permission activities of time is clearly stated. The psychological mecha-
nism involved is that of inherent tendencies or memory traces
(samskâra), which sprout like seeds when the conditions created by the
ever-changing gunas are favorable.37 The point of this parallel between
Sämkhya-Yoga and vyäkarana doctrine is to show how the three
apparently conflicting qualities can coexist in harmony. As Heläräja
puts it,

Just as the three ingredients, having the characteristics of serenity

(sattva), activity (rajas) and inertia (tamas), though existing
simultaneously due to their eternity, acquire the subordinate and
principal relation and effect beings through their peculiar evo-
MËfAPHYSlGS 43

lution, in a proper manner in the splendor of their own course

of action, so also, these (three) time-divisions, by the magnificence
of their own power (become) capable of effecting sequence in
external aspects.38

The past and the future hide objects, so they are like tamas or darkness
(says Bhartrhari). The present enables us to see the objects, so it is like
light or the sattva of the Sâmkhyas. Rajas stands for the activity of time
itself.39 For both Sâmkhya-Yoga and the Grammarian the harmonious
coexistence of objects on the three paths of time makes the ordered
sequence of the world possible. Time, like an eternal road, is the sub-
stratum on which the objects of the world come and go. The road, like
time, always remains the same.40
The essence of Bhartrhari's viewpoint is that time is an independent
power (sakti) of Sabda Brahman. Time is characterized by its two
energies of prevention or decay and permission or growth. If we look
for the precursors of this doctrine of time, we can find a continuity back
through Patanjali's Mahabhäsya to the Vedas. Although Pänini is silent
on the philosophical aspects of time, Patanjali in his Mahabhasya dis-
cusses time in two places. At 2.2.5, kâla is described in terms of the
growth or decay of bodies. Vakyapadiya 3.9.13 seems to be a direct
reference to this passage of the Mahabhasya. Again, at 4.2.3 of the
Mahâbhâsya, Patanjali defines time as eternal.41 But Patanjali does not
say whether time is to be taken as a power of Brahman (Bhartrhari's
view) or as a substance (the Nyäya-Vaisesika view).42 In Nyäya-
Vaisesika theory time is viewed as an independent substance. Time is
present everywhere as the eternal connecting relations between pairs of
objects.43 Some later Nyâya-Vaisesika theories seem to have followed
Bhartrhari's lead and identified time and space with âkaÊa and with
Brahman.44
À direct precursor for Bhartrhari's view in the Vakyapadiya is available
in the Maitri Upanisad discussion of time. As mentioned earlier, in
Maitri 6.15 time is described as the form of Brahman that has parts.
These parts (namely, the year, and so on) grow and decay. Time is said
to cook all things in the Great Soul (mahatman).
Bhartrhari has on occasion been mistakenly called a Buddhist. The
Buddhist (Mädhyamika) view of time, however, is radically different
from that of the Vakyapadiya, For the Buddhist there is no present time
(vartamänakäla) apart from the past and future.45 But the Buddhist
emphasis on the constant process of change—and thus the necessary
reference to past and future—seems too one-sided when it leaves no
room for the present. We do experience the present as an ongoing
moment, and this concept Bhartrhari accommodates successfully.
Bhartrhari's notion of the dynamic limiting function of time
44 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of INDIAN PHILOSÔt>l£lËS

(kâlasakti) lies behind the discussion of the levels of language in the

Vâkyapadiya. After setting forth the absolute nature of Brahman as being
the one eternal essence of word and consciousness, Bhartrhari intro-
duces the notion of time as the power or means by which this one
unchanging absolute (Sabda Brahman) manifests itself as the dynamic
diversity mankind experiences as creation. Time is the creative power of
Sabda Brahman and is thus responsible for the birth, death, and
continuity of everything in the cosmos. Time is one, but when broken
or limited into sequences appears as moments or actions. These seg-
ments of time are mentally categorized as seconds or minutes. Such
limited segments of time are then mentally unified into day, week,
month, and year. In the same fashion notions of past, present, and
future are developed. When time is viewed as an action not yet com-
pleted, the notion of the present is established. An action that has been
completed is time as past, and an action yet to be completed is time as
future. All of ordinary life is sequenced by .these three powers of time.
Yet all the while, declares Bhartrhari, there is really no sequence at all.
From the ultimate viewpoint all three powers of time are constantly
present. Time is one. Although the effects of the three powers of time
(that is past, present, and future) are mutually contradictory, they
function without causing any disorder in the cosmos. They are like
three paths on which objects move about without any confusion.
Bhartrhari enters into this deep discussion of time in relation to the
absolute not as a fascinating metaphysical aside, but to explain how
the unitary Sabda Brahman manifests itself in experience as the diver-
sity of words called language. As a Grammarian, he is also providing a
metaphysical basis for the experience of the tenses past, present, and
future in language. And it is past and future that have the veiling
function of keeping one apart from the absolute eternal present. In
religious terms union with the eternal present is union with the divine,
which, for Bhartrhari, is the inherent goal toward which all language,
all grammar, is reaching.

4. VyâkaranaAS A MEANS OF RELEASE

(Sabdapürvayoga)

For the Hindu the ultimate goal of philosophy is liberation (moksa).

Before Bhartrhari, Patanjali in his Mahäbhäsya included in the aims of
grammatical study (vyäkarana) the attainment of heaven (svarga)
through the correct use of words and liberation from bondage (moksa).*6
While it is clear that for Patanjali liberation is the divine Word, he does
not specify how this divine Word is to be achieved. Satyakam Varma
solves this problem by assuming that the Patanjali of the Mahäbhäsya
METAPHYSICS . 45

is the same as the Patanjali of the Yogasütras and that the description
of how yoga of the Word is to take place is given in the latter work.47
While not all scholars agree that the same Patanjali authored both the
Mahabhâsya and the Togasütras, Satyakam Varma's suggestion of obtain-
ing help from the Togasütras has independent merit in the attempt to
understand the grammarian concept of êabdapurvayoga or the yoga of the
Word (literally, yoga preceded by the Word). For present purposes,
however, an attempt will be made to interpret sabdapüwayoga by using
only the Vâkyapadiya.
Bhartrhari emphasizes the aim of grammar as leading both to heaven
and to liberation not only in the Vâkyapadiya but also in his commentary
on PatanjaU's Mahâbhâsya.*8 At the beginning of the Vâkyapadiya
Bhartrhari says that grammar is the door leading to liberation (1.14) ;
it is the straight, royal road for those who desire salvation (1.16) ; and
by means of it one attains the supreme Brahman (1.22). At the end of
the first chapter Bhartrhari returns to the topic and states that "the
purification of the word is the means to the attainment of the Suprême
Self. One who knows the essence of its activity attains the immortal
Brahman" (1.131). The yoga of the Word, then, has the power to take
one from the ordinary experience of the word all the way to union with
the Divine.

A. The First Stage

The first requisite step is the purging of corrupt forms from one's
everyday language. While Bhartrhari allows that corrupt forms of
words can convey meaning, spiritual merit can be attained only by the
knowledge and use of the correct forms of words, which is the spiritual
role of grammar. As Bhartrhari puts it in the vrtti on 1.131: when
speech is purified by the adoption of the grammatically correct forms
and all obstruction in the shape of incorrect forms is removed, there
results a spiritual merit that brings the experience of well-being
(abhyudaya). This abhyudaya is also translated into English as "moral
power" of the sort that begins to move us in the direction of identifying
ourselves with the divine.49 This identification is the first step in the
yoga of the Word—the repeated use of grammatically correct language
that generates more and more abhyudaya until the way is prepared
through the lower levels of language {vaikhari and madhyamä vâk) for the
dawning of the mystical vision (pasyanti).
For the modern mind it is hard to imagine just how the grammatically
correct use of words could be understood as generating moral power,
spiritual well-being, and the dawning of the mystical vision. In order
for us to empathize with this first step in the yoga of the Word, it will
help to remind ourselves how Bhartrhari understands the function of
time in relation to the correct use of words. The appearance of the
46 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

unitary Sabda Brahman as having parts (words) and sequence (word

order) is the work of time.50 The entire universe is like a puppet show
with time as its wire-puller. Time regulates the universe through
prevention or decay and permission.51 Time controls the birth, death,
and sequence of all objects, including all words. Time allows some
things to appear at a particular time and prevents others from appear-
ing. As the sequencing activity of all experience, time translates into
grammar as the rules by which the appearance and disappearance of
words in correct linguistic sequence is to take place. Underlying all
activity, including all linguistic activity, is the driving impulse of time.52
Time, as the first power of the divine Word, remains eternal, though
the activity of language may come and go.53
Incorrect usage results from attempts by humans to change the
sequencing of language to suit themselves, without regard for the divine
Word. Such ego-centered word use leaves behind memory traces, which
serve to conflict and obscure the proper sequencing of Sabda Brahman
by its time power. Without the aid of grammar and its purifying rules,
such a confused mental state is the usual result. The truth of the Vedic
teaching and glimpses of Sabda Brahman are obscured within con-
sciousness by the layers of traces laid down by incorrect word use.
Strict adherence to grammar, and its teaching of correct word use,
gradually results in removal of these obscuring traces from consciousness.
As the proper, non-ego-centered sequencing of language is established,
the truth of the Vedic teaching can be seen and responded to. Then
increased moral power and the first glimpses of the divine Word are
experienced. This achievement is the truly creative function of the
Word-—not the making of something new by human ego-centered
activity (the modern western notion of creativity), but the revelation
of the real nature of things through the reflective power of language.54
Only when the rules of grammar are followed is word use crystalline
enough to let the divine show through. Repeated practice of proper
word use restores to language its mirrorlike quality, enabling a reflec-
tion of the transcendent Word to take place. Such a polishing and
purification of the mind and its constituent word structures is the goal
of stage one in the yoga of the Word.

B. The Second Stage

Stage two occurs when one focuses on the purified reflective power of
the word until union with Sabda Brahman is realized. Bhartrhari quotes
some verses describing the process in the urtti on Vakyapadlya 1,131 :

"After taking his stand on the word which lies beyond the activity of
breath, after having taken rest in oneself by the union resulting in
the suppression of sequence,"
METAPHYSICS 47

"After having purified speech and after having rested it on the mind,
after having broken its bonds and made it bond-free,"
"After having reached the inner light, he with his knots cut, becomes
united with the Supreme Light."55

The middle passage should be taken first. Speech has been purified
(stage one) until the mind is using only correct grammatical structures,
which is what the phrase "resting it on the mind" implies. The
purging of ego attachment is essential in such a purification and must be
carried even farther in stage two. The "breaking of bonds" referred to
are the memory traces and their tainted motivations left by egocentric
activity—in either spoken words (vaikhari vak) or inner thoughts
(madhyamä vak). These ego bonds are removed by meditating on the
divine Word (Sabda Brahman) so that the purified forms of language
are being clearly reflected. The amount of such meditation required
will be equal to the strength needed to negate the egocentric traces
stored up within the mind.
The first passage emphasizes the need for "suppression of sequence."
The function of time in sequencing the divine Word into thoughts and
uttered sounds must now be suppressed. While such sequencing of
language is essential in ordinary day-to-day activities, as well as in the
understanding of the Vedic teaching, there comes a time when all that
must be left behind. Immersion in worldly life as a student or house-
holder, while necessary and good in itself, is not the ultimate goal.
v
Study of the Vedic texts, while necessary, is not to be clung to as if it
were the final end. Attachment to language use in either of these areas
is only indicative of a failure to go beyond ego. Especially damaging is
ego attachment to the Vedic words themselves—a textual literalism or
fundamentalism reminiscent of a line from T.S. Eliot's play Murder in
the Cathedral'. "To do the right deed for-the wrong reason is the greatest
sin."56 Spiritual pride is always tragic, and spiritual pride attached to
the divine Word is especially so. The vyakärana practice of sabdapürvayoga
guards against such a result by insisting that the sequenced word of
scripture be allowed to carry one beyond itself to liberation. This
obstacle will undoubtedly be the most difficult one for the grammarian
yogi to overcome. After having honed his grammatical style and know-
ledge of scripture to a fine edge, it will be difficult to let go of that
laboriously won achievement. But that is exactly what Bhartrhari
requires, otherwise the traces of ego attachment to the uttered word
will block out the reflection of the divine in it.
Giving up attachment to sequenced language, purified though it may
be, implies moving from spoken words {vaikhari) and inner thoughts
(madhyamä) to the direct mystical vision (pasyanti, pratibhä, or sphota).
As the first passage indicates, the function of breath here is important.
48 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

In vaikhari breath is very active in producing the sequence of uttered

sounds. At the level of inner thought (madhyamâ) breath is still active,
though in a more subtle way, in fashioning sequences of thought.
Pasyanti lies beyond the activity of breath and sequence.57 The mind is
quiet and focused, allowing the pratïbhâ or intuitive perception of Sabda
Brahman. Thus, through sabdapürvayoga, the yoga of the Word, we are
to pass on from the gross sequence to the subtle sequence and finally
to that stage in which sequence is entirely eliminated. Like a perfectly
still pond, consciousness, when stilled from its sequencing activity,
clearly reflects the reality before it. For Bhartrhari, it is Sabda Brahman,
the essence of consciousness, that stands revealed at the center of the
stilled mind.
The third passage quoted by Bhartrhari reflects just such an expe-
rience: "After having reached the inner light, he, with his knots cut,
becomes united with the Supreme Light." Although the "cutting of
the knots" is not defined by Bhartrhari, Vrsabha describes it as a
cutting of the bonds and knots of "ego sense." Going beyond the ego-
sense of " I " and "mine" is obviously a major challenge in the yoga of
the Word. It is repeatedly mentioned by Bhartrhari. For example, in
the vrtti on Vâkyapadiya 1.130 he says that those who know the yoga of
the Word break the knots of ego-sense and are merged with the divine
Word. If ego attachment in any form remains, the pasyanti stage will not
be fully realized. In the vrtti on 1.142, pasyanti seems to be endowed
with a number of phases (of increasingly pure reflection). In the lowest
it seems to be still echoing some of the faint sequencing activity of
madhyamâ. At a higher level it assumes a quality in which all word forms
are submerged beyond recognition. At the highest level it completely
transcends all associations with word forms. Hence pafyanti can reflect
worldly word forms and can also totally transcend them. Even though
it may come into contact with the sequenced and often egocentric word
forms of vaikhari and madhyamâ, it remains pure, untouched, and
spiritual in nature. To those who are trapped in ego knots and impure
word usage, pasyanti may appear to be mixed up and contaminated.
But in reality it is not. As one adopts correct word forms through a
rigorous and reverent study of grammar, one's consciousness is purified
and the true inner vision of pasyanti revealed. As Bhartrhari puts it,
those whose inner vision is unobstructed (with ego knots) see, without
error, the power of words and know the true nature of things.58 The
word forms are seen for what they are, namely, partial manifestations of
the one divine Word, which in pasyanti stands clearly revealed. The yoga
of the Word is the meditational exercise in which the mind is concen-
trated on the unity of the divine Word and turned away from the
diverse thoughts and sounds that manifest it.59 The whole meditational
process, with its culmination in the vision of the divine Word and final
METAPHYSICS 49

reunion with it, is poetically described in the Fig Veda stanza "Maho
devo martyäm ävivesa" :

The spiritual aspirant reaches the Essence of Speech—the pure lumi-

nous Eternal Verbum, which lies beyond the vital plane (prânavrttim
atikrânte) by withdrawing his mind from external nature {atmanam
samhftya) and fixing it up on his inner nature (âtmani). This entails
the dissolution of temporal sequence of thought activity (krama-
samhara-yogena). The purification of the Verbum results from this and
the aspirant enters into it having severed all his ties with the material
objective plane. This leads him to the attainment of the internal light
and he becomes identical with the undying and undecaying Spirit,
the Word Absolute.60

Bhartrhari claims that in the spirituality attained through the

practice of the yoga of the Word a greater measure of divine light shines
through: ''Those persons in whom correct speech exists in a greater
measure, in them also resides, in a greater measure, the holy form of
the creator."61 And as long as a grammarian in the state of spirituality
is alive, the divine light of the Word resides in him as in a covered vessel.
When such a one dies this holy luster merges into Sabda Brahman, its
source.62
The yoga of the Word demonstrates that the meaningfulness of words
is not merely intellectual, it is meaningfulness that has spiritual power.
With the proper yoga, words have the power to remove ignorance
(auidyä), reveal truth (dharma), and realize liberation {moksa). The
vrtti on Väkyapadiya 1.5 states it clearly : "Just like making gifts, perform-
ing austerities and practicing continence are means of attaining
heaven. It has been said: When, by practicing the Vedas, the vast dark-
ness is removed, that supreme, bright, imperishable light comes into
being in this very birth."63 It is not only this lofty goal of final release
that is claimed for the spiritual power of words, but also-the very avail-
ability of human reasoning. Without the fixed power of words to convey
meaning, inference through words could not take place.64 Because of
the power inherent in mantras for both human inference and divine
truth, great care must be given to the yoga of words.
In word yoga, the repeated chanting of mantras is an instrument of
power. The more traces there are to be overcome the more repetitions
are needed. Väkyapadiya 1.14 Vrtti suggests that repeated use of correct
mantras removes all impurities, purifies all knowledge, and leads to
liberation. The psychological mechanism is described by Bhartrhari as
a holding of the sphota in place by continued chanting. Just as from a
distance, or in semidarkness, it takes repeated cognition of an object
before one sees it correctly, so also repeated chanting of the mantras
50 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

results in the sphota being perceived in all its fullness.65 Mandana Misra
describes it as a series of progressively clearer impressions until a clear
and correct apprehension takes place in the end.66 To begin with, such
mantra chanting will be mainly at the vaikhari or outer word level. But
as spiritual improvement is made, the chant will be more and more
internalized on the madhyamä or inner word level. Eventually all
sequenced chanting activity will submerge into the still steady mantra
samâdhi of pasyanti, and the final goal of the yoga of the Word will have
been realized.
For the vyakarana our outer words and inner thoughts are but reflec-
tions, more or less perfect, of the one divine Word. The great rsis or seers
recognized this fact and made themselves empty channels through
which the divine Word could reverberate with little distortion. The
great Grammarian teachers, basing themselves on the rsis9 utterances,
formulated this wisdom into a teaching informing all of life and even
into a pathway to final liberation.
While not all may agree with the spiritual vision of the Hindu
Grammarians it must be conceded that we do find here a view of
language that makes sense of poetry, revealed scripture, science, and
the mystical chanting of mantras, and which in addition strongly reso-
nates with our ordinary everyday experience of coffee-cup chat. It is a
way of seeing language that effectively explains why it is that sometimes
when we listen we do not hear. It also teaches how to remove the
obstructions in one's consciousness so that real hearing becomes possible
and suggests in a different' way the ultimate wisdom of the observation.
"In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God" (John 1:1).
 EPISTEMOLOGY

Recent western thought has focused much attention on the relation

between language and knowledge, but it has consistently taken a
narrower perspective than vyakarana would accept. Within the contem-
porary school of linguistic philosophy, language seems to be restricted
to the printed word and then analyzed for a one-to-one correspondence
with objective reality. While the computer-like functions of language
must be highly respected, modern linguists and philosophers often seem
to consign all other dimensions of the word to the unreality of a mystic's
silence.1 Ernst Gassirer has taken a much broader perspective including
the natural sciences, the humanities, and all human cultural activity of
language.2 Vyakarana would applaud Gassirer but expand the realm of
language even further. According to Bhartrhari, "There is no cognition
without the operation of words; all cognition is shot through and
through by the word. All knowledge is illumined through the word."3
The fundamental epistemological presupposition from Bhartrhari's
perspective is that the problem of meaning is basic. It is through the
meaning conveyed by words that all knowledge is experienced. In this
sense, then, the philosophy of language is not just another school of
philosophy but is the basic foundation for all philosophy. As T.R.V,
Murti has so aptly put it, "The problem of what we can know is closely
bound up with the question of what we can say. It is only thought as
expressed in words that can be understood, communicated and criticiz-
ed. Language is not an accidental, dispensable garb which could be put
on and put off. It grows with thought, or rather thought grows with it.
In the ultimate analysis they may be identical."4 Meaning and cogni-
tion are understood to manifest themselves together as expressions of
one deep spiritual impulse to know and to communicate. Consciousness
(caitanya) is identical with speech
52 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

1. Sabda AS Pramâna IN RELATION

TO OTHER Pramânas

Before a discussion of Sabda or testimony as a means of knowledge

{pramana)) it may be useful to sketch the scholastic Indian conception
of knowledge (prama). In Sanskrit the word jnâna stands for all kinds of
cognition, irrespective of the questions of truth or falsehood. Prama,
however, is used to designate only a true cognition {yathârthajflâna) as
distinct from a false one (mithyqjnâna). A pramâna is an active and
unique cause of a pramä or knowledge.6 The Sàmkhya and Yoga schools
of Indian philosophy accept three pramânas: pratyaksa (perception),
anumâna (inference), and sab da (testimony). 7 The Mïmâmsâ school
defines six pramânas: pratyaksa, anumâna, sabda, upamâna (analogy),
arthapatti (presumption), and abhâva (nonapprehension). 8 The same six
pramânas are also stated by Vedänta. 9 Of course, there are many diffe-
rences of definition regarding specific pramânas among the schools.
Within vyâkarana, Bhartrhari in his Mahâbhasyatîka accepts three
pramânas: perception {pratyaksa), inference {anumâna), and scripture
{âgama or sabda). Perception is judged as liable to be erroneous, and at
times inference is seen as superior to perception. But âgama or sabda,
which consists of the revealed {Êrutï) and remembered {smrti) scriptures,
is a strong pramâna and is more dependable than inference. Several verses
in the Vâkyapadiya (1.27-43) examine the relations obtaining between
the pramânas of reason and scripture. In Bhartrhari's view it is not
justifiable to replace scripture with inference in nonempirical matters
or to hold that philosophical views {vâda) can be free from scripture.
Inference alone, without the steadying influence of scripture, is an
inadequate means of valid knowledge. As Vâkyapadiya 1.34 puts it,
"Whatever is inferred with great effort by clever reasoners is explained
otherwise by cleverer ones." 10 Thus dharma or right conduct cannot be
determined by reasoning without the help of the scriptural tradition
(verses 1.30-31 ). And any attempt to establish the nature of objects by
inference will likely fail because their properties differ according to
place and time (verse 1.32). Knowledge of this sort can only be derived
from the scriptural tradition {sabda), and then only after long hours of
practice {abhyâsa; verse 1.35). The words of the rsis convey supersensory
knowledge that cannot be set aside by inference, because with their
consciousness purged of ignorance {avidya) they have directly perceived
divine truth (Sabda Brahman; verse 1.38). The role of vyâkarana is to
safeguard the transmission of this scriptural knowledge and to assist the
hearer in realizing the truth of Êabda.
The early grammarians Pânini and Patanjali define sabda primarily
in terms of the spoken word. In the beginning of his Mahabhâsya,
Patanjali defines the word as "That on the utterance of which there is
Èt>IStEMOLOOV ; 53

understanding regarding objects (sampratyaya) . " n This definition of

sabda does not identify the word with the uttered sound only. The dis-
tinction between word {sabda) and sound (dhvani) is basic to the under-
standing of language in Indian philosophy.12 To take the physical sound
as the word is to conflate entities of two different orders, like the con-
fusion of the soul with the body. "The word, like the soul, has a physical
embodiment in the sound and is made manifest through the latter, but
the conveyance of meaning is the function of the word; the sound only
invokes the word."13 If the word (sabda) is only invoked and not
constituted by the uttered sounds (dhvani), a question then arises about
the nature of this sabda that is manifested. The Cärväka, Buddhist, and
Jain schools, along with many modern linguists, think all words to be
the result of human convention. Where human convention is not allow-
able, the divine convention of God may be invoked—as is done by the
Nyäya, for example. Against this view, and in agreement with the
Mïmàmsâ, vyakarana maintains that the relation between words and
meaning is eternal, underived, and impersonal. The relation between
sabda and its meaning is not an arbitrary convention established by man
or God1 or both. Not only is there no record of any such convention,
says the vyakarana, but the very idea of "convention" itself presup-
poses language—the thing claimed to be derived from convention.14
Therefore,J language must be taken as having existed without
beginning.
Murti suggests that the attempt to discover a temporal beginning of
language may arise from a confusion of sabda with dhvani.15 While
speaking sounds and learning how to group sounds into syllables and
the like may well be conventional,^ the fact of verbal communication
necessitates the acceptance of sabda as a given that the learned sounds
manifest but do not constitute. Otherwise, there would be as many
different words "cow" as there are people speaking, for each person
produces the complex of sounds involved slightly differently, namely,
with different accent, speed, and so on. Each single utterance of the
word would be unique. The fundamental point of the vyakarana posi-
tion is that in spite of the individual differences in speaking it "cow" is
recognized as the same word, "cow". This aspect of vyakarana doctrine
provides an eastern parallel to the western notion of Platonic forms.
The word "cow", like a Platonic form, is identical and immutable even
though instances of its utterance may vary. The nub of the argument, as
in Plato, is that verbal communication necessitates the acceptance of
some kind of eternal word forms. The Platonic problem of the relation
of the Idea to the "copies" appears in vyäkarana as the relation of the
immutable word to the many verbal manifestations that evoke it. But
vyakarana goes beyond just establishing the eternality of sabda. It identi-
fies sabda with Brahman, so that all words ultimately mean Brahman—•
54 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

thus the absolute as âabda Brahman. As Mädhava puts it in his

Sarvadarsanasamgraha,

Brahman is the one object denoted by all words; and this one
object has various differences imposed upon it according to each
particular form; but the conventional variety of the differences
produced by these illusory conditions is only the result of igno-
rance. Non-duality is the true state; but through the power of
"concealment"' (exercised by illusion) at the time of the con-
ventional use of words a manifold expansion takes place.16

Thus, knowledge of the meaning of words not only removes ignorance

but also leads to the final bliss of identity with Sabda Brahman.

2. THEORIES OF ERROR

In vyäkarana as in most other Indian philosophies, error or ignorance

(avidya) is ascribed the important function of obstructing the real from
view. Although some scholars suggest that Bhartrhari's theory of error
is analogous to Samkara's^ analysis of the rope-snake illusion,17 other
interpretations, which would distinguish vyäkarana from Advaita
Vedänta, appear viable, Samkara describes error (avidyä) as being over-
come by a single negation. Bhartrhari, however, in his Väkyapadlya
seems to hold that error is overcome positively by an increasingly clear
cognition of the word form or spho.ta, which the succeeding perceptions
reveal. Whereas the overcoming of error for Samkara takes a negative
form, for Bhartrhari it is positive.
The vrtti on Bhartrhari's Väkyapadlya 1.89 and Mandana's comment
on sütra 19 of the Sphotasiddhi state that the final clear perception of the
sphota is achieved through a series of errors. The analogy is offered of
the way that, from a distance, one may (if one is in India) mistake a tree
for an elephant. But if one keeps on looking at it, the tree is ultimately
recognized in its true form. In this situation the truth has been arrived
at through a series of errors. The sense organ (in this case the eye) has
been in contact with the tree throughout. The errors of perception have
had the tree as their object, but the cognitions produced by the eye have
had an elephant as their form. When the final or true cognition takes
place, however, it has the form of the tree itself and is one with its
object; but this true cognition has been arrived at by going through the
series of erroneous perceptions that preceded it. Now this change from
error to true perception cannot be explained by factors such as change
in distance, for simply standing in the same spot and gazing with intense
concentration often produces the desired result. According to Mandana,
EPISTEMOLOGY 55

"it is the previous cognitions (having tree as the object and the form of
the elephant) leaving progressively clearer residual impressions, which
become the cause of the clear perception of the tree."18 There could
have been no erroneous cognition of elephant had the tree not been
there as an object for the sense organ to contact in the first place. The
error, therefore, may be described as misapprehension or vague percep-
tion. In Bhartrhari's theory of language, the sphota is similarly said to
be the object of the cognitions of each of the letters, and yet it at first
appears in the form of a letter. But through the additional cognitions of
the subsequent letters, the sphota is seen with increasing clarity until,
with the uttering of the final letter, the form of the letters has become
identical with that of the sphota. Here the letters are seen in a position that
at first glance seems parallel to the snake in the famous rope-snake
illusion of the Advaita Vedântîns. The perception of the rope as snake
is error, but it is through negating the erroneous snake perception that
the true- rope perception is finally realized. And were it not for the prior
existence of the rope, the erroneous perception would have lacked the
necessary ground for its phenomenal existence. Similarly, in this case,
the letters are seen as dependent on the sphota for their phenomenal
existence, but in that phenomenal existence as being the means by
which the noumenal sphota may be perceived. This apparent parallel,
however, does not hold up under closer analysis. Advaita theory pro-
vides for only true or false cognitions and allows no progressive approxi-
mation to the real,19 as is the case in a series of erroneous sphota percep-
tions. Whereas the Advaitin describes his error as being transcended
via a single negation (such as when it is realized that "it is not snake" ),
the grammarian holds that his error (for example, the vagueness of the
perception of the whole in the first letter) is positively overcome by the
increasingly clear perception of the sphota revealed by the succeeding
letters. This analysis of the way error is overcome would seem to give
further weight to Gaurinath Sastri's suggestion that in some ways the
doctrine of reflection {äbhäsa) of the Kashmir Trika writers may provide
the closest parallel to sphota theory.20 In the Kashmir Trika view
consciousness (caitanya) is the only reality, and all external manifestation
is held to be a reflection on consciousness as on a mirror. Error, in this
view, occurs not because the initial perception has no existence but
because its reflection of the object captures or includes only a part of its
totality and fills in the gaps with other material (traces) taken from the
old stock of memory. This error is positively transcended as the form of
the reflection is progressively purified of memory material until it
perfectly reflects the object. This perfect reflection, which is true know-
ledge, is further described as a union of the subjective and objective
aspects of consciousness—a return to the oneness that is its essential
nature.21 From this brief glance at the Kashmir abhasa theory, it would
$6 ÈNCYÔLOPÉDlA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

seem to provide a helpful parallel supporting the vyâkarana view of the

way in which the mainfest letters erroneously but positively approxi-
mate their true object, the sphota itself.
To return to Mandana, his explanation of the paradox of the way the
indivisible sphota appears as the letters, and the letters as the parts of the
partless sphota, is as follows. He says it is the sounds that resemble one
another that are the cause of both the error and the final correct cogni-
tion of the sphota. If, for the manifestation of two different word-sphotas,
one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the letters
produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of the indivisi-
ble words.22 This error is fostered by the construction of such artificial
devices as alphabet letters or word syllables, usually for teaching pur-
poses. It is precisely because of this kind of confusion, says Mandana,
that sentences, words and letters appear to have parts, whiJe in reality
they do not.23 The obverse applies to the sphota. From the phenomenal
viewpoint the sphota "cow", for example, may appear to possess qualities
such as accent, speed, loudness, time, place, and person in its utterance.
That they are qualities of the phenomenal sounds and not the noumenal
sphota is what makes possible the common recognition of the word
"cow" in spite of its diversity of utterance. From the sphota viewpoint,
it is this noumenal grounding or basis that makes possible such things
as the translation of thought from one phenomenal language to another.
Mandana offers the example of a picture. He points out that in our
cognition of a picture, although we may be aware of the different parts
and colors, the picture is perceived as a whole over and above its parts.24
Similarly, when we perceive a piece of cloth our cognition is of the cloth
as a whole and is quite distinct from the particular threads and colors
involved.25
In both of these examples there is a necessary perception of the parts
prior to the perception of the whole. This aspect is brought out clearly
by Bhartrhari, who describes the painter as going through three stages
when he paints a picture: "When a painter wishes to paint a figure
having parts like that of a man, he first sees it gradually in a sequence,
then as the object of a single cognition and then paints it on cloth or on
a wall in sequence."2,6 So also the hearer of a word perceives the word
in a sequence of letters, which manifest in him the whole word as the
object of a single cognition. As a speaker, however, he utters the whole
word in its differentiated appearance as a sequence of letters. It is in
this context that the perception of the many letters, before the final
perception of the unitary sphota, is described as error, illusion, or
appearance. But it is a unique kind of error in that it has a fixed
sequence and form, ultimately leads to the perception of the truth, and
is thus regarded as a universal error.27 The chief cause of this universal
error is described as avidyâ, the limitation of the individual self-con-
ËPISTÊMOLOÔY 57

sciousness. A characteristic of this avidyä is that it provides no means for

cognizing the sphota other than the letters. That is why all individual
selves universally experience the same error with regard to speech; but
it is an error that ultimately leads to cognition of truth. It is only
through this error or appearance of differentiation that the individual
sphota comes within the range of worldly usage so that we ordinary
mortals have a way of comprehending it.28
With the preceding understanding of Bhartrhari's sphota theory in
mind, we are now able to observe its significant difference from
Samkara's view of error. Whereas the Advaitin usually describes his
error as being transcended via negation (such as when it is said that "it
is not snake"), the Grammarian holds that his error (for example, the
vagueness of the perception of the whole in the first letter) is positively
overcome by the increasingly clear cognition of the sphota revealed by
the succeeding letters.29 And the final clear cognition is a case of perfect
perception or pratibhä—aflashof intuition revealing the sphota or whole
word.30 At the more mundane level of psychological functioning, how-
ever, the positive process of perfecting the perception is described by
Subramania Iyer as follows:

(The final) clear cognition is a case of perception. The previous

cognitions also had the sphota as their object, but the cognition of
it was vague and that is why they had the form of the sounds.
But when the final cognition reveals the sphota in all its clarity
and distinctness, it no longer has the form of sounds. The error has
given place to truth. Such a cognition can only be perception.
The object and forms of the cognition are now identical.31

Bhartrhari characterizes the conformity between the object and the

form of the cognition in the final intuition as a certainfitness(yogyatä)
between the sounds and the sphota, which results in the clear manifesta-
tion of the word.32 The perfect perception in which there is identity
between the object (namely, the sphota) and the form of its cognition
(namely, the letters of sounds) is a special kind of perception that—the
modern reader must realize—is held to be a function of the mind33
rather than of the external sense. The designation of the final cognition
of the sphota as a case of perception, not of inference, has important
logical implications.34 Mandana expresses the point clearly: "The
revelation (of an object) clearly or vaguely is confined to direct percep-
tion. In the case of the other means of knowledge there is either
apprehension (of the object) or not at all."35 According to almost all.
schools of Indian philosophy, the valid means of knowledge (pramâna)
other than perception either reveal the object completely or do not
reveal it at all. There can be increasing clarity of revelation only in the
58 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

case of perception. This point is most important for the sphota theory in
its contention that the error due to the vagueness of perception of the
initial letters may be gradually and positively overcome, as described
above. It is also crucial for the sphota theory in its contention that the
existence of the sphota is not a postulation, as the Mïmâmsakas maintain,
but is proved by direct perception.
Samkara in his commentary on Brahmasütra 1.3.28 argues against
Bhartrhari's notion that the sphota is directly perceived. According to
Samkara, only the individual letters of a word'are perceived, and they
are combined through the inferential activity of the mind into a word
aggregate.36 Because the psychological process is one of inference instead
of perception, there can be no question of degrees of cognition. The
inference pramäna is an all-or-nothing process. The error, if it is to be
overcome, must be completely replaced all at once by a new inferential
construction of the mind or by a superconscious intuition of Brahman.
Thus the position of Bhartrhari (that the overcoming of error is a
perceptual process admitting of degrees of positive approximation) and
the position of Samkara (that the overcoming of error is a negative
process of inference—admitting of no degrees) are not at all analogous.

3. THEORIES OF PARADOXES

The logical principle "everything is either P or not P " has its

limitations, especially in Indian philosophical discussions. Indian
Grammarians and Logicians have classified negation into two types:
prasajyapratisedha, verbally bound negative, and paryudasa, nominally
bound negative. The nominally bound negative like a-brahmana ("non-
brahmin," generally referring to a ksatriya, or the like) has a positive
significance, and the negation is mainly for excluding some from
the scope of the term negated. The verbally bound negation is a
form of total negation and precludes an activity.
The Mädhyamika Buddhist proposes the fourfold negation (catuskoti)
to deny all alternatives to the absolute. The Advaitin's "indescribable,"
used to indicate the nature of maya, is also not within the "either yes or
no" principle. The Mädhyamika thesis "The phenomenal world is
indeterminate" means that no predicate is applicable to the world.
Now the question is raised, "Is 'indeterminate' a predicate or not ?" If
it is, then the world is not indeterminate, for at least one predicate is
applicable to it. If it is not, then we cannot say that the world is indeter-
minate. Such paradoxes are met with the reply that "indeterminate"
itself is not a predicate.
Bhartrhari discussed some paradoxes in his Väkyapadiya. One is the
famous liar's paradox. "I am not telling the truth"; if this statement is
EPISTEMOLOGY 59

true, he is a liar and his statement cannot be true, in which case it is

true. Bhartrhari says that a statement of this type does not refer to
itself. Another interesting remark from Bhartrhari regards the term
c
'indescribable" {avacya) : "What you consider as avacya can at least be
referred to by the term avacya (indescribable), and then it becomes vâcya
or describable."

4. LEVELS OF LANGUAGE

The idea that various levels of language and knowing exist is present
in several schools of Indian philosophy, but it is an idea that modern
scholars in their first encounters with eastern thought either miss or
misunderstand. The notion of levels of language is a necessary develop-
ment in view of Bhartrhari's absolutism. A monistic hierarchy such as
the following necessarily results : just as the phonemes are only unreal
abstractions of the word, so also words are unreal abstractions of the
sentence, and the sentences are unreal abstractions of the paragraph.
Even the paragraph is not the ultimate unity, for it is only an artificial
division of the chapter of the book. At the top of this language hierarchy
there is only one indivisible reality within our literary self, which, due
to our human ignorance or limitation (avidyä), can only manifest itself
in such unreal forms as the book, the chapter, the paragraph, the
sentence, and the word. The underlying principle, maintains
Bhartrhari, is that all difference presupposes a unity (abhedapürvako hi
bhedah). Where there is difference or parts there must be an underlying
identity, otherwise the one could not be related to the other and each
would constitute a world by itself. This concept provides the grounding
for Bhartrhari's metaphysical speculation and for the notion of a
hierarchy of levels of languages (Väkyapadiya 1.1).
Language can be seen to operate on at least two levels. There is the
idea that comes as an inner flash (the cartoon image of the light bulb
going on), and there is the outer speaking of words and sentences that
attempts to convey the idea to others. The words and sentences are
called by Bhartrhari vaikhari vac—the uttered sounds that combine to
make up the sentence, book, or poem. The inner idea or sphota is aptly
designated as pasyanti väc—the intuitive flash of understanding of the
sentence, book, or poem as a whole.37 Between these two levels there is a
middle or madhyama vac—the level of thought. Here the unitary idea or
sphota appears separated into its sequence of thoughts, words, and
phrases, none of which has yet reached the level of uttered sound.
According to Bhartrhari, vac or language passes through these three
levels whenever one speaks. Éabda, which is at first quite internal, is
gradually externalized for the purpose of speaking. Hearing, of course,
60 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of1 INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

operates in the reverse direction. Whether one is dealing with factual

scientific language or a poem that can be understood on various levels,
Bhartrhari's sphota theory seems to provide an adequate explanation.
The complete continuum of cognition is covered. All of these points are
in complete accord with Bhartrhari's basic premise already mentioned,
namely, that there is no possible cognition in which language does not
figure. Knowledge, consciousness, and the word are all inextricably
intertwined.38 Once this supposition is accepted, the idea of levels of
language seems quite logical.
Thought at the buddhi or differentiated stage of word sequences is
perhaps best understood as internal speaking. And p/atibhâ, intuition,
may be seen as a kind of muted speaking. The point being emphasized
is that for Bhartrhari speaking is the essence of consciousness and the
means to all knowledge. And it must also be clearly understood that by
"speaking," "language," or "thought" what is meant is the conveyance
of meaning—"thinking" here does not primarily refer to concept for-
mation, the drawing of inferences, and so on, all of which would exist at
the two lowest levels (vaikhari and madhyama) only. When "meaning"
is identified as intertwined with consciousness (as Bhartrhari identifies
it), it satisfies instances of pratibhä as well as instances of more common-
place cognition and can therefore be held to be logically possible at all
levels of vac, including even the very highest (namely, the pramana).
Let us now examine each level in somewhat more detail.39 Vaikhari
is the most external and differentiated level in which vac is commonly
uttered by the speaker and heard by the hearer. It isprâna (breath) that
enables the organs of articulation and hearing to produce and perceive
sounds in a temporal sequence. Prâna may therefore be taken as the
instrumental cause of vaikhari vac. The chief characteristic of vaikhari vâc
is that it has a fully developed temporal sequence. At this level a
speaker's individual peculiarities (such as accent) are present, along
with the linguistically relevant parts of speech. Going further inward, as
it were, madhyama vac is the next level, and its association is chiefly with
the mind or intellect {buddhi). It is the idea or series of words as conceiv-
ed by the mind after hearing or before speaking out. It may be regarded
as inward speech. All the parts of speech that are linguistically relevant
to the sentence are present here in a latent form. At this level a variety
of manifestation is possible. The same sphota or meaning is capable of
being revealed by a variety of forms of madhyama, depending on the
language adopted. Although there is not full temporal sequence of the
kind experienced in spoken words, word and meaning are still distinct,
and word order is present. So temporal sequence must also be present,
along with its instrumental cause, prâna. Traditional yoga is able to
demonstrate a subtle but direct connection between breathing and
cognition.40
EPISTEMOLOGY 61

The next and innermost stage is pasyanti vac. Pasyanti is the direct
experience of the vakya-sphota—of meaning as a noumenal whole. At
this level there is no distinction between the word and the meaning, and
there is no temporal sequence. All such phenomenal differentiations
drop away with the intuition of the pure meaning in itself. Yet there is
present at this level a kind of "going-out" or desire for expression.
This impulse is thepratibhä "instinct," which in one sense may be said
to motivate the phenomenalization into sentences and words of the
pasyanti vision, so that communication may occur. Thus the Vedic
vision or dhi of the m, which in itself is pasyanti, becomes phenomenaliz-
ed so that by its uttered word men might rise above their ignorance
and be grasped in their cognition by the revelation of ultimate reality.
Therefore, there is a sense in which Veda and pratibhä are identified as
pasyanti vac. Because pasyanti is, by definition, beyond the level of diffe-
rentiated cognition, it is impossible to define it in word sentences. It
occurs at the level of direct intuition and therefore must finally be
understood through experience. Nevertheless, there has been no dearth
of speculation over the exact nature of pasyanti and the possibility of yet
a higher level of language, namely para vac.41
 WORD MEANING

" 1. SIGNIFICATIVE FUNCTION

Significative power (sakti) is defined as the relation that exists
between a word (sabda) and its meaning (artha). This relation is
considered to be permanent and stable, so that linguistic discourse be
possible. The Naiyäyikas consider this significative power to be conven-
tional, having been established by the will of God. The Grammarians
consider th.e relation to be based on the superimposition of one on the
other, creating a sort of identity, one evoking the other. The Buddhist
Logicians also consider that there is a causal relation between a word
and its meaning. This relation is primary denotative power and is called
abhidhä.
The function of words for conveying meaning is not restricted to this
primary significative power. The binary relationship—every meaning
having only one word and every word having only one meaning—may
be an ideal, for avoiding confusion and ambiguity. But in all natural
languages there are several exceptions to this rule. Even the borders
of the meaning are not always fixed and depend on contextual factors,
both situational and syntactic. Moreover, unconscious shifts of meaning
and figurative usages as well as conscious, intentional devices used by
poets and mystics have made the problem of meaning more complex.
Various other functions of language are accepted by different schools
of thought to explain the diverse types of language behavior within their
field of investigation. The number of functions also varies, depending on
the areas meant by sabda and artha. Abhidhä, lahsanä, gaunt, tatparya,
vyanjanä, bhâvakatva, and bhojakatva are the main functions introduced to
explain the various types of meaning conveyed by speech. Some are for
words, others may be for sentences or for the complete utterance.
Of these types laksanâ, secondary significative power, is the most
important and popular. Three conditions for a laksanä are generally
64 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

accepted by all schools. The first is incompatibility or inconsistency of

the primary meaning in the context, which produces a break in the
flow of thought, forcing the listener to think in order to understand
what the speaker has meant by the uncommon usage and why he has
used the word in an irregular way. This inconsistency can be either
the impossibility of associating the normal meaning with the other
word meanings of the sentence or the normal meaning's unsuitability
in the context. The second condition is some kind of relation between
the primary, normal meaning of the term and its actual meaning inten-
ded in the context. This relation can be one of proximity with contra-
riety or one of similarity or common quality. The latter type is called
gauni laksanâ, which the Mïmâmsakas treat as an independent function
called gauni ; according to them, real laksanä is only of the first type, a
relation of proximity with contrariety. The third condition is either
acceptance by common usage or a special purpose intended for intro-
ducing the laksanâ. All faded metaphors (nirüdhä laksanâ) fall into the
former category, and metaphoric usages, especially by poets, fall into
the latter.
It may be noted here that Pänini did not accept laksanâ as a separate
function in language, though later Grammarians such as Patanjali did
so. It was the Mïmâmsakas who developed it to enable them to explain
Vedic passages properly. To them there can be laksanä not only for
words, but also for sentences as a whole.1 The Buddhist who considered
that words deal only with mental constructs (vikalpa) that have no
direct connection with reality considered secondary meanings {laksanâ)
or metaphor (upacâra) as helping language to deal with reality.
Dignäga, the promulgator of the apoha theory, accepted that words may
not have any positive content, but the sentence conveys a meaning
that is of the nature of pratibha.
Additionally, Jayanta Bhatta introduced a new function called
tatparyavrtti to explain how individual word meanings in a sentence
combined to form a unified sentence meaning. Although he accepted a
kind of abhihitanvaya (verbal comprehension) theory, he could not
resort to laksanä like the Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas, because Naiyâyikas
accept laksanâ only for words.
Änandavardhana, who advocated the vyanjanä vrtti, included the
purpose of intentional metaphors under it and pointed out its impor-
tance in enriching the contents of literature. To him sabda meant not
only the words, but contextual factors also, and under artha he included
not only ideas, but figures of speech and emotions.
Bhattanäyaka claimed that poetic language has a special function
(vyapâra), which he called bhävanä or bhàvakatva, that helped in the
universalization of the emotions depicted and helped the readers to
concentrate. He also claimed anotherfanct\ori}bhojakatva,for literature;
WORD MEANING 65

bhojakatva is the power of making the listener share the poetic emotions.
These functions are not accepted by other scholars.
Pänini did not accept laksanä as a separate function in language. The
so-called incompatibility, either impossibility or unsuitability to the
context, on which laksanä is based according to later writers on the
various schools, including the Grammarians, he did not consider to be
linguistically relevant. "He is an ass" and "he is a boy" are equally
correct from the grammatical point of view. His grammar accounts for
some of the popular examples of laksanä like "the village on the river"
(gangàyâm ghosah) by considering proximity as one of the meanings of
the locative case. Similarly, Pänini does not mention or provide for
the condition of yogyatä or consistency, given as one of the conditions
for the unity of the sentence. Agninq sincati ("He sprinkles with fire")
is grammatically correct, though from the semantic point of view it
may not be proper, because sprinkling can be done only with a liquid
and not with fire.
These two cases are similar; in both there is an inconsistency or
incompatibility either real or apparent. If it is real, there is lack of
yogyatä and the sentence becomes a nonsentence. If it can be explained
by resorting to a transferred meaning for one of the terms, the sentence
becomes acceptable as an instance of laksanä. Pänini does not make
provision for the semantic appropriateness of the utterances derived
by his rules. Statements may be true or false intrinsically or extrinsically.
The correctness of a statement like the following depends on external
factors and has to be checked before decision, for example: "There are
fruits on the tree near the river." But there are other statements the
correctness of which can be self-evident if one examines the words and
their meanings: "He is the son of a barren woman"; "This triangle
has four sides"; "The circular square" are all anomalous utterances.
If one of the lexical items arrived at by componential analysis of a
word in a sentence prevents its co-occurrence with another word in it,
it is said to be anomalous. But sentences that have no such resistance are
acceptable. "A square has four sides"; "Linguistics is the science
dealing with language"; such sentences are intrinsically true. As far
as Pänini is concerned all of these sentences are grammatically accept-
able, and the Grammarian is not concerned with the correctness or
compatibility of the meaning.
A metaphoric sentence and a normal sentence cannot be distinguish-
ed by their syntactic form. All metaphoric sentences are semantically
deviant but syntactically normal. In such cases there is a semantic
obstruction based on the violence to the co-occurrence restrictions for
one of the lexical items. In the sentence "He is an ass," the word "ass,"
referring normally to the animal also called a donkey, is syntactically
identified with the boy, who is known from th,e context to be a
66 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

being (componential analysis also shows that he is a human being).

Semantically this identification is impossible. The apparent anomaly
can be solved by interpreting the word properly in the context of
utterance. Such intentional deviance is resorted to as a communication
device by poets everywhere. If the anomaly cannot be solved the
sentence becomes no sentence. But from Pänini's point of view all
such sentences, metaphoric as well as anomalous ones, are grammati-
cally acceptable.

2. Sphota AND WORD MEANING

In his Sarvadarsanasamgraha Mädhava describes sphota in two ways:

first, as that from which the meaning bursts or shines forth; and,
second, as an entity that is manifested by the spoken letters or sounds.
Sphota may thus be conceived as a two-sided coin. On one side it is
manifested by the word sound; on the other side it simultaneously
reveals word meaning. In more philosophic terminology sphota maybe
described as the transcendent ground in which the spoken syllables
and conveyed meaning find themselves united as word or sabda. Nägesa
Bhatta identifies this theory with a sage Sphotâyana, mentioned by
Pänini in one of his rules. This tradition is unknown to Bhartrhari,
who considers Audumbarâyana (mentioned by Yâska) as having a
view similar to subsequent sphota theory. The original conception of
sphota seems to go back to the Vedic period, when väc or speech was
considered to be a manifestation of the all-pervading Brahman, and
the pranava (aum) was regarded as the primordial speech sound from
which all forms of vâc were supposed to have evolved. Aum, the sacred
syllable, is said to have flashed forth into the heart of Brahman while
he was absorbed in deep meditation and to have given birth to the
three Vedas containing all knowledge. Perhaps this claim provided
the model upon which the vyâkarana philosophers based their concep-
tion of sphota. Indeed, sphota is often identified with th.e pranava.2'

A. Patanjali's Sphota
The Grammarians developed sphota theory as they set out to analyze
the way word knowledge is manifested and communicated in ordinary
experience. Patanjali provides the point of departure for the develop-
ment of sphota theory when, at the beginning of his Mahabhäsya, he
asks, "What is the word 'cow'?" and answers, "It is that which, when
uttered, brings us knowledge of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump,
hooves and horns."3 Thus Patanjali emphasizes the fact that knowledge
is the key factor—a word is a word only when it has a meaning. Here
he is arguing against the Mïmâmsâ view that a group of letters when
WORD MEANING 67

spoken is a word, even when there is no meaning or when the meaning

is not understood.4 After discussing the need for something to hold the
letters together as they come in temporal sequence so as to provide a
cognition of the whole,5 Patanjali concludes that even though the
letters cannot coexist at the time of utterance, they can do so in the
mind of the speaker as well as in the minds of the listeners. He distin-
guishes between sphota and dhvani. Sphota is the permanent element in
the word and may be considered the essential word. Dhvani—the
uttered sounds—is the actualized and ephemeral element and an
aspect of the sphota,6 For Patanjali the sphota may be a single letter or a
fixed pattern of letters. It is the norm that remains unaffected by the
peculiarities of the individual speakers. Thus the sphota is permanent,
unchanging, and is manifested by the changing sounds (dhvanis)
uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener. '
On the basis of Patanjali's thought sphota, though one, may be
classified as both internal and external. The internal form of sphota is
its innate expressiveness of the word meaning. The external aspect of
sphota is the uttered sound (or written word), which is perceived by
our sense organs but serves merelyto manifest the inner sphota with its
inherent word meaning.7
B. Bhartrhari's Sphota Theory
While Patanjali provided the initial framework, it is in Bhartrhari's
Vâkyapadiya that sphota is given systematic philosophical analysis.
Vâkyapadiya 1.44 states, "In the words which are expressive the Gramma-
rians discern two aspects: the one (the sphota) is the cause of the real
word (while) the other {dhvani) is used to convey the meaning".8 These
two aspects, though they may appear to be essentially different, are
really, identical. The apparent difference is seen to result from the
various external manifestations of the single internal sphota. The
process is explained as follows. At first the word exists in the mind of
the speaker as a unity or sphota. When he utters it, he produces a
sequence of different sounds so that it appears to have differentiation.
The listener, though first hearing a series of sounds, ultimately perceives
the utterance as a unity—the same sphota with which the speaker
began—and then the meaning is conveyed.9
In his discussion, Bhartrhari employs several technical terms: sabda]
sphota, dhvani, and nada. By sabda and/or sphota, he refers to that inner
unity which conveys the meaning. The dhvanis are described as all-
pervasive and imperceptible particles, which, when amassed by the
movement of the articulatory organs, become gross and perceptible
sounds and are then called nada. These nädas function to suggest the
word, sphota, or sabda. Because these nadas, which are gross and audible,
have division and sequence^ it is naturally assumecj that the suggested
68 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

word also has parts when in reality it is changeless and sequenceless.10

Bhartrhari offers the illustrative example of reflection in water. Just
as an object reflected in water may seem to have movement because of
the water's movement, so the word or sphota takes on the properties of
uttered speech (sequence, loudness or softness, accent, and so on)
in which it is manifested.11
The question may arise of why this changeless whole or sphota should
ever come to be expressed in the phenomenal diversity called language.
In Bhartrhari's view, such phenomenalization occurs because the
sphota itself contains an inner energy (kratu) that seeks to burst forth
into expression. Thus the unitary sphota is seen to contain all the
potentialities for diversity, like the seed and the sprout or the egg and
the chicken. Bhartrhari, in his vrtti on Väkyapadiya 1.51, explains it as
follows:

The external (audible) word employed in verbal usage is merged

in the mind after suppressing all assumption of differentiation,
without, however, abandoning the residual force of the differentia-
tion, as in the case of the yolk in the egg of the pea-hen. Just as
one single word can merge, so can passages consisting of as many as
ten parts. The word, thus merged, with all differentiation suppressed,
again assumes differentiation and sequence, when through the
speaker's desire to say something, the inner word is awakened and
it becomes the sentence or the word, each with its divisions.12

Here Bhartrhari seems to be suggesting two ways in which the energy

of speech (kratu) causes the phenomenalization of the sphota. On the
one hand, there is the potentiality for bursting forth pent up in the
sphota itself, while on the other hand there is the desire of the speaker
to communicate. This desire for communication, however, is described
as existing solely for the purpose of revealing the sphota that is within.13
Unlike thinkers who conceive of language in conventional or utilitarian
terms, Bhartrhari finds language to contain and reveal its own telos.

G. Mandana Misra's Defense of Bhartrhari's Sphota Theory

In the Väkyapadiya Bhartrhari masterfully supports his sphota theory
with illustrations from ordinary life. While they may convince one that
the sphota theory is not implausible, such examples can hardly be
taken as proof of the theory. Mandana Misra took up this challenge
in his Sphotasiddhi—to demonstrate the existence of the inner word as
distinct from its sounds in terms of logical necessity and consistency.
His opponent in this task was the skillful Mïmâmsâ philosopher,
Kumârila Bhatta.
The debate begins with a restatement of Patanjali's question, "What
WORD MEANING 69

is meant by 'word5?55 and his answer, éabda, or that which has a

meaning.14 Kumärila objects that Patafijali's definition fails by being
both too wide and too narrow. The definition of "word" in terms of
meaning alone is too wide. Smoke, for example, signifies the meaning
fire but is not taken as a word for fire. The definition is too narrow in
that it holds éabda to be that which is heard. But the ear hears only a
group of phonemes or letter sounds, each one of which (according to
Patanjali's definition) should be regarded as a word even though it
does not signify any external fact. This problem results in the difficulty
that in the word "cow," for example, the individualphonem.es c, o, and
w may be heard by the ear of the young child and therefore qualify
as éabda, even though the word "cow" «as yet carries no meaning for him.
This view conflicts with Patanjali's contention that the sabda is that signi-
ficant word-whole which conveys meaning. Consequently, the uttered
word "cow" would at the same time be sabda andnot-sabda. It would
be sabda in the sense that it consists in a commonly understood spoken
word. But it would not be sabda before its meaning was known—
although it would become sabda after the meaning is known. For three
reasons—first, that smoke should not be called sabda even though it
causes the cognition fire; second, that phonemes, even though they are
audible, should not be called éabda; and third, that the same thing
should not at one moment be asabda and the next moment sabda—
Kumärila maintains that Patanjali's definition of sabda as interpreted
by the Grammarians is not correct.15 In Kumärila's view, it is the fact
of being audible that is the criterion for sabda, and the phonemes alone
meet this requirement, so it is the phonemes that are commonly accepted
as sabda. Anything over and above the phonemes (such as sphota) does
not deserve to be called éabda, for there is no such common usage.
Mandana rejects Kumärila's criticism as frivolous misinterpretation.
Saying that the signifying power is the criterion for sabda does not
mean that a word ceases to be a word when it fails to communicate a
meaning to an unlearned child. According to the Grammarian, the
key point is that the word is capable of conveying meaning—regardless
of its being understood or not understood in specific instances. And
because the phonemes or letters that constitute a word do not have this
capacity individually, they cannot be called sabda. Having refuted
Kumärila in this summary fashion, Mandana goes on to elucidate the
Grammarian interpretation of éabda in answer to Patanjali's question :
"In that complex cognition expressed by the word ccow' and which
consists of many aspects such as the universal, the particular, quality,
action, phonemes, sphota, etc., which aspect is it to which the name éabda
refers?"16 Sabda, maintains Mandana, cannot refer to the individual
phonemes because in themselves they convey no meaning. In common
experience the whole word is the unit of language that is taken to be
70 . ENCYCLOPEDIA Of INDIA** PHILOSOPHIES

meaning-bearing. The common man takes a noun or verb to be a unity

signifying meaning—without reference to the plurality of letters and
syllables, which are the products of speculative thought. Mandana ,
further criticizes Rumania's objections and establishes the basis for the
sphota position as follows:

As for the definition that a word is what is cognized by the auditory

sense-organ, it is vitiated by serious defects. The auditory organ also
apprehends qualitative differences of pitch and modulation and
such universals as wordhood and the like. These attributes though
known through the organ of hearing are not words. Moreover,
word is not known only by the auditory organ but also by the mind.
So the definition proposed by Kumärila is misleading and apt
to create confusion. The verdict of unsophisticated common sense
that "cow" is a whole word which yields meaning, ought not
to be brushed aside as an uncritical appraisal. The unity of the
significant word is a felt fact and no amount of quibbling can
conjure it away.17

Of the various aspects of the complex cognition "cow," Mandana

makes clear that it is the sphota or felt word-unity that is capable of
conveying meaning and therefore is the essential characteristic—with-
out which it would cease to be what it is. Other aspects of the complex
cognition, such as the particular, the quality, the phonemes, and the
like, are merely occasional aspects.
The next step in the argument occurs when Kumärila extends his
definition of the phonemes as Êabda to rest not only on their uttered
quality but also now on the contention that it is they (and not a so-
called sphota) that cause the understanding of meaning. "Why not
say that the phonemes themselves are the cause of the understanding
of meaning and that, when grouped according to units of meaning
which are understood, they are called words (pada)?"ls
In rebutting this new contention that it is the phonemes that convey
meaning, Mandana reasons as follows. Phonemes cannot singly convey
the meaning because, as Kumärila admits, a collection of them in
the form of a word or pada is needed. Neither can the phonemes
coexist as a pada, for they are uttered singly and perceived in a certain
order. When they are spoken by different speakers or in a different
order or at the same time, they do not convey a meaning. At no time
can all the phonemes or letters of a word exist together and work
together; their individual natures, being eternal and unchanging,
are such that no joint simultaneity is possible. Phonemes are necessarily
successive and therefore cannot work together to produce a pada that
conveys a meaning. Therefore, the understanding of meaning, which
WORD MEANING 7l

cannot be due to the phonemes, points to a cause that is something

different from the phonemes.19
Kumârila counters this rebuttal by giving further development to
the Mïmâmsaka view as stated in the Sahara Bhasya on Mimämsäsütra
1.1.5. Let it be admitted that the understanding of meaning does not
take place from the phonemes in their individual condition. But if,
when grouped as pada, they are seen to acquire some special efficacy
that provides for the conveying of meaning, what then remains to block
the acceptance of the collection of phonemes alone as pada ? Nothing
is required but the phonemes. Without them, however, there is no
possibility of conveying meaning. In this regard, the case of the
phoneme is very much like that of the common seed. The seed will
not produce a new effect (a sprout) as long as it is isolated, but when
it is helped by a group of other factors such as soil, moisture, and so on,
the sprout appears. Now the sprout is commonly judged as being the
effect of the seed when combined with a group of helping factors.
Similarly, these phonemes, when combined with a group of helping
factors (such as being uttered by the same person in a particular
sequence), are commonly held to become the cause of the understan-
ding of meaning. As a parting shot, Kumârila invokes a principle of
economy: "As long as there is a visible cause and a visible mode of its
being, there is no occasion for thinking of an invisible cause."20
In reply, Mandana admits that a special efficacy may be shown
to be the property of an otherwise ordinary cause but maintains that
it is just that special efficacy which has not been demonstrated in the
case of phonemes as potential conveyers of meaning. Mandana asks,
What is the difference between o in the word go (cow) and an isolated
o ? The obvious difference is that in one instance the o is isolated, while
in the word it is accompanied by another phoneme. But can it really
be called accompaniment when, by the time of the speaking or hearing
of the 0, the other phoneme is no longer being perceived at all ? A
previously uttered phoneme, which has ceased to exist leaving no
trace, and an unborn phoneme (or one that is as yet unspoken) are on
the same footing. If previously spoken phonemes can be said to give
help to a successor, then it should also be admitted that unspoken
phonemes could also be of help—clearly discrediting the argument.
Thus, the previously uttered phoneme g cannot in any way help the o
to produce a special functional effect because it is dead and gone.21
Rumärila responds by putting forth yet another explanation. He
offers the example of how the new-moon and full-moon sacrifices,
along with other rites, have sequence and yet produce their effect
together—as do the repeated saying of the Veda for its memorization.
In such examples different acts occurring at different times are still
found to produce qualitatively and numerically different effects. This
72 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

same kind of process, he argues, should be accepted in the case of

phonemes.22
Mandana is quick to note, however, that although these examples
may seem plausible they are not parallel to the case of the phonemes.
In sequences such as the examples offered, where the resultant is
unitary, thinkers agree that the new effect is due to a trace or lasting
impression that each part in the series leaves behind and which helps
toward the one result. As Mandana puts it, "In new and full moon
sacrifices and the like, which have sequence, certain new elements
(apürva) which are produced by the acts and which last and are looked
upon as powers or functions actually help (in producing the single
effect)."23 In the case of Vedic recitation, the final learning is achieved
with the aid of the memory traces left by the preceding repetitions.
In the case of both the sacrificial apüwas and the memory traces, there
is a kind of continuing existence or simultaneity that allows for co-
operation among the serial instances toward a unitary result. But,
as Mandana points out, the same is clearly not possible in the case of
the phonemes, which have already been described as leaving no trace.
Kumärila counters by allowing that phonemes may indeed leave
lasting traces or impressions (samskäras), and through the traces left by
the perceptions of the earlier phonemes and the last phoneme, the
unitary meaning of the word may be conveyed.24 The last phoneme,
when helped out by the traces of the previous phonemes, conveys the
meaning.
Mandana finds a fallacy in Kumärila's reasoning. He points out that
traces that are generated by individual phonemes can only reinstate
those same individual phonemes. The memory trace for each phoneme
will be present but, just as in the case of the original utterance or hear-
ing, only individually—when the o is uttered, or remembered, the trace
for the g will have ceased to exist. There can only be the cognition of
one phoneme at a time, and this principle applies equally to the traces
and the original utterance or hearing of the phoneme. Thus, the possi-
bility of the phonemes producing traces gets one no closer to accounting
for the generation of a meaning whole.25
Kumärila defends his position by once again introducing an argu-
ment of economy (that position which resorts to the smallest number
of postulated special powers or entities is best). Now it is agreed that
each phoneme, whether in its original utterance or hearing or in its
trace, cannot coexist with other phonemes so as to give the meaning
of the word. Therefore, some cause for the occurrence of meaning must
be postulated. The weakness of the sphota theory is that it has too many
postulations : first, it must postulate the existence of the sphota as some
kind of unseen entity, and, second, it must then impose upon this postulat-
ed sphota the capacity to convey meaning. For the sphota theorist two
WORD MEANING 73

things have to be postulated. The upholder of the phoneme, by contrast,

has to make only one additional postulation. As has already been made
clear, the existence of the trace is accepted by both the disputants. The
only point at issue is whether it can be the cause of the understanding
of meaning. All that is needed, claims Kumärila, is that a new function
be postulated for the trace, which everyone agrees exists. It is the cogni-
tion of the final phoneme, accompanied by the special function of the
traces of the previous phonemes, that conveys the meaning. Thus only
one additional postulation is required, the postulation of a new function
for the.traces. The sphota theorist is in an inferior position because he
has to postulate both a new substance (namely, the sphota) and a new
function (its ability to convey meaning).26
To Mandana, Kumärila's explanation seems to be an oversimplifica-
tion. The. memory impression or trace is not seen but is a capacity or
function that is inferred from the existence of the original phoneme.
The difficulty comes when Kumärila postulates yet another function as
resulting from the trace, which is itself already an inferred function.
Mandana maintains that the postulation of functions and the like is
unacceptable because it results in an infinite regress. In addition to this
problem of infinite regress, Mandana finds logical weaknesses in
Kumärila's view that it is the cognition of the final phoneme, accom-
panied by the cognitions of the previous phonemes, that conveys the
meaning. This view cannot hold, says Mandana, because the traces
left by the letters are the same even when their order is reversed. How
is it, then, that the meanings of the words "now" and "won" are not
identical? As the letters and traces involved in the two words are
identical, their meanings should also be identical, which is clearly not
the case.
Letting go of this argument, Kumärila takes up his final and seem-
ingly most potent line of attack. He returns to the proposition that the
last phoneme, accompanied by the traces of the previous phonemes,
expresses the meaning. To avoid the difficulties encountered earlier, he
now defines samskara not as a memory trace, but rather as "something
else which is brought about by the cognition of the phonemes uttered
separately in a fixed order by a particular speaker and leading to the
understanding of meaning and it is similar to the effect called apüwa
(residual force) brought about by the performance of the different rites
like a sacrifice and leading to heaven."27 The distinguishing feature of
the trace that causes remembrance is that it causes something similar to
that which produced it, which is not, however, the case of apürva in a
sacrifice. In a sacrifice, the individual acts performed perish imme-
diately, but the apüwa or aftereffect of the whole sacrifice inheres in
the self of the sacrificer as a special kind of potency until it brings the
reward of heaven. Its result is thus very different from its cause, and
74 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

this unusual kind of causal relationship is necessitated by scripture's

declaration that the performance of a sacrifice produces such a result.
In Rumania's view, the apürva or aftereffect kind of samskara, which is
left by the different letters upon the subject, is analogous to such
religious heaven. Just as in a sacrifice it is the determinate order of
performance by a single agent that is responsible for the spiritual leaven,
here also the determinate order of the phonemes uttered by a single
person is responsible for the unusual result. Therefore, it is when the
last phoneme is spoken or heard in the midst of the ''leavening" effect
of the samskäras of the previous phonemes that the meaning is conveyed.
For Kumârila, sab da is the last phoneme being heard or spoken and
conveying the meaning (when helped by the samskäras of the previous
phonemes).
The exact nature of this help is that the samskäras of the previous
phonemes become a kind of intermediate cause {vyâpàra). They help the
last phoneme in its task of conveying meaning. This help does not
depreciate the causal value of the previous phonemes in any way, for
it is in harmony with their purpose—the phonemes are not uttered just
for the sake of pronouncing letters or leaving impressions, but also for
the purpose of conveying a meaning. This importance of and necessity
for the phonemes as causing the conveyance of meaning must also be
admitted by the proponent of the sphota, Kumârila claims. The propo-
nent of the sphota or undivided word entity has to admit that it is
manifested by the phonemes uttered or heard in a definite order. As no
single letter can be said to reveal the sphota, it must then be revealed by
all the phonemes combined with one another. Neither can it be that
each phoneme in succession reveals only a part of the sphota, because
the sphota, by definition, is held to be a simple indivisible whole. For
the very reasons given by the sphota theorist himself, the phonemes of
a word existing in a fixed sequence have no way of pooling themselves
or their traces so as to result in a unitary whole. Just as the Mïmâmsaka
has been forced to do, so also the sphota theorist is forced to postulate
some special kind of leaven of a trace by means of which the phonemes
reveal the whole meaning. Why then, asks Kumârila (revealing his
economy principle once more), does he not attribute the conveying of
meaning to a special trace function itself and leave out the extra step
of postulating a special kind of trace and then postulating the sphota?
For these reasons, concludes Kumârila, "it is better to assume that the
special trace which has to be postulated conveys the meaning (rather
than that it reveals the word)."28
Mandana answers the foregoing criticism by making clear that the
sphota theory does not postulate a new kind of apürva for the conveyance
of meaning. Sphota theory needs nothing more than the postulation of
the ordinary memory trace. It is just the commonly accepted traces
WORD MEANING 75

(samskâra) or dispositions [vasana) that result in the revelation of the

sphota. The only new thing postulated by sphota theory is the sphota
itself, and in fact even that need not be postulated because it is directly
perceptible.29 Now, maintains Mandana, this position is far superior to
Kumärila's, in which the one new thing (namely, the apüwa-type trace)
cannot be perceived and has to be postulated on the authority of
scripture and on analogy to religious merit. Even this analogy is very
weak, for although the postulation of apürva or religious merit is
necessary to validate the moral law and religious rites, there is no such
necessity in the apprehension of the word and its meaning. The cases
are not parallel. Also ignored is the common man's intuition, "I under-
stand the meaning from the word," and the teaching of tradition that
"the word, the meaning, and their relation are eternal." There is a
natural connection between word and meaning that is inalienable. The
conventions we learn as children serve only to bring that relation out
and to make the meaning present to us. Mandana summarizes his
rejection of Kumärila's position as follows: "Because it has been said
that the impressions, after all, do not constitute the word, the final
phoneme is not expressive, (therefore) a collection of phonemes does
not constitute the word and it does not convey any meaning."30
In this debate Kumärila's attempt to identify sabda with the uttered
phoneme seems to be discredited by the reasoning of Mandana, who
at the same time has vindicated the identification of sabda with sphota.
Nevertheless, Mandana still has to show how sabda as sphota may be
comprehended using only ordinary memory traces of the phonemes to
reveal the sphota. He must also show the sphota to be not a mere postula-
tion but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument
simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in karikas 18 and 19 of the
Sphotasiddhi.
In his explanation Mandana depends on the basic concepts put
forward by Bhartrhari in chapter 1 of his Väkyapadiya. The sphota is
something over and above the phonemes. The phonemes are change-
able (capable of variations such as accent, speed, and the like), and when
uttered serve only to manifest the changeless sphota, which exists within
the speaker and is potentially present within every hearer. The
phonemes do not convey the meaning, but the sphota, once manifested,
does so. Between the sphota and its word-meaning aspect the relation is
that of expression and thing or meaning expressed. It is a natural
relationship, and is indes true table and beginningless. Convention only
serves to bring it out. Bhartrhari emphasizes that the sphota is an entity
that exists within each person. All of us have the capacity instinctively
to feel its existence within, and ultimately to perceive it directly with
the mind. The contention that the sphota may be directly perceived,
and is not merely an inference, is one of the key points of sphota theory.
76 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Keeping these basic concepts in mind, let us now examine Mandana's

detailed description of the way the sphota is both cognized and perceived
without recourse to any new apürva-type postulations.
Mandana explains the piocess by which the sphota is cognized in his
commentary on kärikä 18 of the Sphofasiddhi:

Each sound individually reveals the whole sphota. Nor do the other
sounds thus become useless because there is a difference in the
revelation. It is like this : All the previous sounds bring about in the
listener whose mind is free from any particular residual impression
(samskära), cognitions in which the word figures vaguely and which
sow seeds in the form of residual impressions capable of producing
a later clear cognition of the word. The last sound produces a clear
cognition in which figures, as it were, clearly the image of the sphota
caused by all the seeds in the form of residual impressions left by the
vague cognitions of the previous sounds.31

Mandana offers the analogy of a jeweller who assesses the genuineness

of a precious stone. His continuous gaze is really a series of cognitions,
each of which perceives the genuineness of the stone but with increasing
clarity. Each cognition leaves its samskära or common memory trace.
The last cognition, helped by the trace of the previous ones, fully
perceives the genuineness of the stone; but for the traces of the interven-
ing cognitions, there would be no difference between the last one and
the first one. An important point is that the jeweller is described as
"expert", meaning that before beginning the examination he already
had the image of a precious stone ingrained in his subconscious, and it
was this image (like the inherent sphota) that was revealed tö the
jeweller's mind by his series of partial perceptions.
The sphota is a unity that already exists in the mind of the speaker.
He utters sounds in order to manifest it, and once manifested the
sphota conveys the meaning. A reasonable explanation of this process by
which the sphota and its meaning are held to be revealed is offered by
âesa Krsna in his Sphofatattvanirüpana. As the phoneme c is spoken by
someone who intends to say "cow", the hearer grasps not only the
phoneme c but also the whole word rather vaguely, as it is now known
that the speaker is pronouncing a word beginning with c and not with
any other sound. But there are a multitude of words beginning with c,
and we do not know which one is going to be uttered; thus the vague-
ness of our knowledge. But, when the speaker utters the next phoneme,
o, the field of possible words is further narrowed. All words not having
co at the beginning are now excluded, and the hearer's knowledge of
the whole is less vague. When the final phoneme, w, is uttered, all doubt
WORD MEANING ' 77

disappears as the w unites with the memory traces co to manifest the

whole sphota "cow", which immediately conveys its meaning.32
The preceding explanation makes clear the reason behind Mandana's
insistence that a speaker's efforts to utter the phonemes will differ
according to the sphota that he wants to manifest. Even though the
phoneme may be the same (for example, the w in "won" and "now"),
the physical effort involved in vocalizing it will vary according to the
position it occupies in the word. Thus the overall physical effort in
saying "won" will be markedly different from that involved in saying
"now^" even though the same three phonemes are involved in each
case. Consequently, the sphota theorist has a basis for claiming that the
sphotas manifested by the two vocalizations would be different, as
would the meanings revealed.
This last point is important in relation-to the Mïmâmsaka contention
that, because the phonemes are changeless, no mere difference in order
or effort of vocalization can be important to the production of different
meanings. Therefore, according to the Mïmâmsaka, were it not for the
postulation of th.e special "apürva-like effect," the same meaning should
result from "now" and "won." From the sphota viewpoint, however, it
is the sphota that is changeless and not the phoneme, and the evident
variations in the pronunciation and ordering of phonemes in speaking
different words is seen to be consistent with both sphota theory and the
evidence of experience. "Now" and "won" are composed of the same
three phonemes but do require that the vocalization of those phonemes
be given different orders and intentions or efforts for the appropriate
sphota to be manifested and its meaning revealed.
The strength of this sphota explanation of the way the word meaning
is-revealed rests not only on its concurrence with experience but also on
the fact that no new kind of trace is postulated. The trace employed is
the usual trace providing for the remembrance of the phoneme that
originally caused it. "The weak point of the Mïmâmsaka explanation,"
as Subramania Iyer puts it, "was that it either postulated a new power
for the ordinary kind of residual trace, or postulated a new kind of
residual trace in order to explain the fact that, though caused by the
cognition of the sound, it does not stop at causing a remembrance of it
but causes the understanding of the meaning also."33 In other words,
the trace is supposed to have an object different from that of the cogni-
tion that deposited it in the first place, which is, says the sphota theorist,
a logical impossibility. In his case, the original sphota (which lay behind
the vocalization of the phonemes by the speaker) and the end sphota
(which is the object of both the uttered phonemes and their traces)
are identical. Consequently, the object (that is, the sphota) of the
phonemes and the traces is the same, and there is no logical difficulty
of the kind that besets the Mïmâmsaka.
78 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Mandana's explanation of the paradox of the way the indivisible

sphota appears as the phonemes, and the phonemes as the parts of the
partless sphota, is as follows. He says it is the sounds that resemble one
another which are the cause of both the error and the final correct
cognition of the sphota. If, for the manifestation of two different word
sphotas, one has to make similar movements of the vocal organs, the
phonemes produced by these movements appear to be parts of both of
the indivisible words.34 This error is fostered by the construction of such
artificial devices as alphabet letters or word syllables, usually for teach-
ing purposes. It is precisely because of this kind of confusion, says
Mandana, that sentences, words, and phonemes appear to have parts
where in reality they have none. The obverse applies to the sphota. From
the phenomenal viewpoint the sphota "cow", for example, may appear
to possess qualities such as accent, speed, loudness, time, place, and
person in its utterance. That these qualities belong to the phenomenal
sounds and not to the noumenal sphota is what makes possible the
common recognition of the word "cow," in spite of its diversity of
utterance. From the sphota viewpoint, it is this noumenal grounding or
basis that makes possible such things as the translation of thought
from one phenomenal language to another.
A later scholar of considerable note, Vacaspati Misra, attempts to
reject Mandana's concept of the relation between the phonemes and
the sphota.35 This criticism occurs in its fullest form in Väcaspati's
Tattvabindu. The argument is stated as follows: "The particular sounds
which manifest sphota, are they different from sphota or non-different
therefrom?"36 If nondifferent, says Vacaspati, then each phoneme
should manifest the sphota, and the remaining phonemes would be
futile. If different, then there is no ground for relating the phonemes
to the manifestation of the sphota. If the phonemes are treated as
illusory, then their reality is discredited—yet in experience we un-
doubtedly cognize individual letters. What is the justification for
treating such cognitions as illusory?
In supporting the sphota argument of Mandana, S.S. Suryanarayana
Sastri effectively answers these criticisms of Vacaspati. To the criticisms
regarding difference and nondifference Sastri replies, "Such a question
has little application to Mandana's doctrine. To him indeed sphota is
non-different from the sounds, as a whole is from its parts; and yet it is
different too, since the whole is neither each part nor a mere aggregate
of parts. The existence of functioning of such wholes can only be
denied by defective psychology."37 As regards the justification for
treating cognitions of the phonemes as illusory, Sastri answers :

The obvious reply is that not the existence of these cognitions but
their significance is in question, just as in the case of the reflection;
WORD MEANING 79

The reflection exists without doubt, but it is not real. Andsublation

in this case consists not in that presentation ceasing to be or giving
place to another presentation, but in that presentation as such failing
to fulfil what is expected of it. If each cognition as an independent
part could by combination with other such parts explain the whole,
then it would be unsublated; since, however, it fails of its purpose,
since it seems to fit in more naturally with a theory which treats it
not as a producer but as manifester, it is insofarforthsublated. The
reflection is sublated not as a reflection, but as the face; the letter-
cognition is sublated not as letter-cognition but as an independent
productive constituent of meaning.38
Sastri observes that Vacaspati adopts and attempts to develop
Kumârila's viewpoint further by trying to show that meaning somehow
results from the phonemes,entering into a single memory. As Sastri
points out, however, such an explanation is untenable in the light of
experience. If "cowness" is associated with the remembered letters c,
o, w, that meaning should not be recalled except when all three letters
are present. How is it, then, that when there is a misprint such as "coe"
or a mispronunciation such as "coo" we still correctly apprehend the
meaning to be "cow"? The same sort ofthing is evident when a letter
or sound is omitted in the course of writing or speaking. The explana-
tion in all of these situations would seem to be that we do not pass
from part to part but rather apprehend the whole, filling up gaps or
correcting errors when they occur.
With regard to memory and sequence, Vacaspati, following
Kumärila, maintains that in the memory itself the phonemes have no
sequence, being presented together, but that memory follows expe-
rience, conforms to it, and the sequence in which the letters are
experienced is repeated in memory. This contention, however, does
not square with the view that letters, being eternal and pervasive, can
have no sequence belonging to themselves. This difficulty is overcome
in the sphota view, which holds that the sequence is determined by
something other than the letters—-by the sphota intended. It is not the
case that the letters in sequence constitute the word; rather, it is the
word or sphota that determines the sequence. The question may then be
asked, Is the word existent or nonexistent prior to the phonemes being
apprehended in sequence? In purely empirical terms, this question may
be shelved by saying that, though not present in my mind before I learn
the sequence, it is present in the mind of another who instructs me ; and
in this fashion the process may be pushed farther and farther back,
there being no authority for postulating the origin of language at any
particular time. But such empirical indefiniteness does not seem
adequate in the face of the common ground that necessarily appears
80 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

to underlie all empirical languages—requiring the sphota interpretation

that the word both is and is not prior to the apprehension of sequence.
This paradox is ridiculed by Vâcaspati, who describes it as the sphota
claim that the unreal helps the real. Sastri, in answer, states the sphota
argument, "It is real, otherwise it could not be manifested in sequence;
it is not existent, otherwise there would be no need for manifestation.5'39
This solution, Sastri observes, is in line with the solution to the problems
of human knowledge and activity in general. "Knowledge is of the
novel and yet not of the non-existent. Activity realizes a purpose which
is real yet not actual."40 As both the Advaita Vedänta and the sphota
theorists point out, the only solution to this paradox, which seems to
be universally present in human experience, would seem to be to take
the phenomenal as partial and therefore defective and illusory appea-
rances of the unitary real. It is from this viewpoint that sphota theory
claims that there is a whole (namely, spho ta) th&t is increasingly revealed
by particular phonemes uttered in sequence. As Sastri concisely puts
it, "The succeeding sounds make more clear what was less clearly
expressed by the preceding sounds; the latter provides the substructure,
former superstructure, while all of them together reveal the one
design, which while prompting their utterance is certainly not produced
by them."41

3. UNIVERSAL AND PARTICULAR

In his Sphotasiddhi Mandana Misra also analyzes the relation between

the universal and the particular. When one perceives the universal of
an object, the particular and its qualities are also perceived, yet the
essential cognition is that of the universal. To put it another way,
when the cognition of the whole takes place we are also aware of the
parts that make up the whole, but it is the cognition of the whole that
is dominant.42 Mandana offers the example of a picture. He points
out that in our cognition of a picture, although we may be aware of
the different parts and colors, the picture is perceived as a whole that
is over and above its parts.43 Similarly, when we perceive a piece of
cloth our cognition is of the cloth as a whole and is quite distinct from
the particular threads and colors involved.44
To illustrate this point, both Bhartrhari and Mandana refer to the
Vaisesika conception that when two things are brought before us we
first perceive each one separately, and only on the basis of these separate
perceptions does the notion of two arise. This method of perception
applies to all higher numbers—their cognition and production is
possible only by way of previously cognized lower numbers. So
WORD MEANING > 81

it is by way of the lower differentiated forms of speech that the higher

unities, the word sphotas, may be understood.45

4. CONTEXTUAL FACTORS

The need for taking 5into consideration the contextual factors in

determining the exact meaning of an expression has been emphasized
by various thinkers' in India from very early times. The Brhaddeuatä
says that the established rule regarding the meaning of â Vedic passage
as well as of an ordinary sentence is that the purpose to be served
{artha), the subject matter under discussion {prakarana), an indication
from another place in the text {linga), its suitability {aucitya), the place
{desa), and the time (käla) have to be taken into consideration for
determining it. Of these terms, vâkya, prakarana, linga, and artha are
also known to the Mïmâmsâ^ school of interpretation. According to
them there are six means of proof to be taken into consideration:
sruti or direct statement, linga or implication from another word,
väkya or syntactic connection, prakarana or context of situation, sthâna
or position, and samâkhya or the etymological meaning. Of these six,
each one is stronger than the succeeding ones. In the Vakyapadiya
Bhartrhari gives two lists of contextual factors; the first is almost a
paraphrase of the list given in the Brhaddevatâ. The second is a bigger
list and is given as contextual factors that determine the exact meaning
of a word in the case of ambiguous and equivocal expressions. This
second list is discussed in detail by later writers like Nâgesa, the
Grammarian and Älamkärikas like Mammata and Jagannâtha
Panditarâja. The contextual factors taken into consideration in deter-
mining the meanings of ambiguous expressions include the factors of
situational context and the context within the sentence.
Even to understand the purport of an essay or a text as a whole, the
Mïmâmsakas have pointed out certain factors to be taken into account.
The six factors for determining the purpose of a text are given thus :
consistency in the meaning between the introduction and conclusion;
repetition of the main topic; the novelty of the subject matter; the
result intended; corroborative and eulogistic remarks, as distinguished
from the main theme; and arguments in favor of the main topic.
These six lihgas or indications for deciding the purport of a text are
accepted by all schools of thought.
Literary critics from the time of Änandavardhana lay great stress
on the importance of contextual factors in conveying suggested mean-
ing. The situational context—such as the speaker, the listener, the
time and place, the tone, as well as the social and cultural background—
has an important role in bringing out the suggestion. It w^s
82 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

who pointed out that in many cases of language behavior, the literal
meaning conveyed by the expression is not the intended meaning and
that contextual factors play a vital role in determining the intended
sense of a passäge. It is because of these contextual and grammatical
factors determining the intended sense that homonyms do not introduce
the slightest confusion in actual speech.
 SENTENCE MEANING

1. FACTORS OF SENTENCE UNITY

A. Äkanksä
Those who believe that a sentence is made up of words, each with
an independent meaning of its own, will have to explain how a connec-
ted and cogent meaning is understood from the sentence. This problem
has been discussed by all schools of thought in India, and various
theories have evolved. Mîmâmsâ, the väkyafastra, takes a lead in this
field. Bhartrhari too has discussed various aspects of the problem and
made his observations, though his final view is that the partless sentence
is the unit of utterance.
Pänini uses the term väkya in the general sense of an utterance but
does not define a sentence. It is Kätyäyana who defines it as that (group
of words) containing a finite verb. Pänini does not seem to have
subscribed to such a view, for his rule tinatinah, referring to the appli-
cation of the accent of "a finite verb when not followed by another
finite verb", shows that he had no difficulty in allowing more than
one verb in the same sentence. Pänini's view of the sentence seems
more akin to that of the Mîmamsakas than to that of the Logicians.
Even later Grammarians agreed that there can be simple sentences
with more than one finite verb if other conditions are fulfilled, for
example, pasya mrgo dhävati, "See the deer is running."1 The Nyäyasütra
does not refer to the sentence or the sentence meaning, though Nyäya
is verbrauch interested in the word meanings. Perhaps early Naiyäyikas
believed that a sentence is-a collection of words and that the sentence
meaning is a combination-of the word meanings. A formal definition
of the sentence is also found in the Brhaddevatä (2. 117). But it is in the
Mimâmsâsutra that we first come across this definition: "A group of
words serving a single purpose forms a sentence, if on analysis the
separate words are found to have akanksä or mutual expectancy"
84 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(Mïmâmsâsutra 2.1.46). This definition was mainly for the Yajurveda

passages. Here for the first time the importance of âkânksa in unifying
the words in a sentence is brought out. In this definition two terms
deserve special attention, arthaikatva (unity of purpose) and akanksa
(mutual expectancy). The term arthaikatva can also be interpreted as
unity of meaning; explained in this way it can have an extended
application, even to ordinary sentences. The Mïmâmsâ principle of
syntactical unity [ekavâkyata) states that if a group of words can be
interpreted as a single sentence, it is not proper to split it and interpret
it as two sentences. A sentence like pasya mrgo dhâvati, "see the deer is
running," would be a single sentence according to this principle (not
treating it as two: "the deer is running" and "see him").
This condition of mutual expectancy, first promulgated by the
Mïmâmsakas and later accepted by other schools, stresses the necessity
of interdependence of words to give a unified sense as in a compound
word or a sentence. Pänini seems to have accepted something of the sort
while mentioning sämarthya, "capacity", as a condition for forming
compound words (Astâdhyàyi 2.1.1); for sämarthya refers to semantic
connection by syntactic elements.2 Two meanings are given by Kätyä-
yana for the term sämarthya: first, ekarthibhâva, emergence of single
integrated meaning, which is similar to arthaikatva in the Mïmâmsâ
definition of the sentence; and, second, vyâpeksâ, which is equivalent to
akanksa in the Mïmâmsâsutra. It is not clear whether Pänini himself
intended those meanings or Kätyäyana is reading them in the light of
the Mimärnsä definition. Strictly speaking, sämarthya is the capacity of
the words for mutual association, vyâpeksâ is their interdependence,
and âkânksa is the need one has for the other in order to complete
the sense. Pänini is referring to the compound formation while the
Mïmâmsakas are dealing with the Vedic sentence, but the principle
involved is the same. Patanjali explains the two views as mutually
exclusive and accepts the ekarthibhâva point of view as the final one,
for according to the Grammarians the elements of a compound give
up their individual meanings and acquire a special signification. He
thinks that according to the vyâpeksâ view the individual members
retain their own meanings but are mutually related. Kaiyata points
out that the former is a condition for the compound word, and the
latter for the sentence. According to Bhartrhari the sentence is the unit
spho ta,.and unity of meaning is certainly necessary. We may say that in
all cases there should be unity of meaning when viewed as an integral
unit and interdependence when viewed from the point of view of the
parts.
Äkanksä can be seen from two points of view, psychological and
syntactic. The Mïmâmsakas are interested in the psychological expec-
tancy, while the Naiyäyikas take it as a syntactic expectancy. Bhartrhari
SENTENCE MEANING 85

actually criticizes the Mïmâmsâ definition of the sentence on the ground

that its äkänksä would imply that a passage of several grammatical
sentences would have tobe considered as one sentence. TheMïmâmsakas
have to solve the problem by referring to the basic psychological
expectancy.
Sâlikanâtha, a follower of Prabhâkara, says that akanksâ^ being the
curiosity on the part of the listeners, has been explained by some as
invariable association.3 This definition will lead to complications, as
there is no limit to such mental association. He says that only those
that are essential for the accomplishment of the intended purpose
need be taken as requirements, not all the kâraka associations. "Bring
the cow" is complete in itself, but if the phrase "with a stick" is added,
that phrase is in need of a verb for completeness, and hence "Bring
the cow with a stick" becomes a single sentence. If the phrase were not
added, it would mean that the speaker was indifferent to the way the
cow was brought.
To the Präbhäkara Mïmâmsakas the three basic requirements for
the accomplishment of the intended purpose are: the person who is
enjoined to do the act, what to do, and how to do it. If one of these
essential requirements is not given in the sentence it has to be assumed
as in elliptical sentences. To the Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas, by contrast,
the essential psychological requirements in a sentence are: the act
enjoined (itikartavyata), the means [sadhana or karana), and the fruit of
action (phala or prayojana).
The Grammarians and the Logicians take âkânksa as syntactic, as it
is only the need for the syntactic completeness w i the sentence. The
later Naiyâyikas define äkänksä as a kind of syntactic need that one
word has for another in a sentence in order to convey the interrelation
of words. It is the akahksä that leads to the knowledge of the syntactic
relation in a sentence. Äkänksä plays an important role in the teaching
method of Sanskrit texts. In a sentence the finite verb is taken first
and then questions asked to get the necessary words to fill the karakä
relations.
Nâgesa says that akanksä is the desire on the part of the listeners,
on hearing a word in a sentence, to know the idea that can be related in
order to get a complete sense; it is only in a figurative sense that the
expectancy is attributed to the word.
In the Vedäntaparibhasä (4.4-7), Dharmarâjâdhvarîndra says that
there are two kinds oî akânksa, natural expectancy (utthitäkänksa) and
potential expectancy (utthâpyâkânksâ). Äkänksä can also be mutual or
one-sided. In "bring the cow with a stick," the phrase "with a stick"
has expectancy toward the verb "bring," but "bring the cow" has no
direct expectancy toward the phrase. There is no end to potential
06 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF iNftlAN PHILOSOPHIES

expectancy, and the addition of the word to resolve it depends on the

speaker's intention.
B. Yogyatä
To the primary condition of mutual expectancy were added two
more by the Mîmârnsakas, yogyatä (consistency of sense) axid.âsatti or
samnidhi, which stands for the contiguity of the words. These three
conditions have been generally accepted by all schools of thought
as essential for sabdabodha. To them some have added a fourth, namely,
the knowledge of tâtparya, the intention of the speaker or the general
purport of the sentence.
Togyata is the logical compatibility of the words' consistency in a
sentence for mutual association. Really it involves a judgment on a
sentence's sense or nonsense. The meaning of a sentence should not be
contradicted by experience. "He wets it with water"—-here there is
yogyatây because wetting is generally done with a liquid; but in a
sentence "He wets it with fire" there is no yogyatä^ because the idea of
wetting is incongruous with that of fire.
There is no unanimity of opinion regarding the exact role of yogyatä
in the comprehension of meaning from a sentence. Some Naiyäyikas
hold that a decisive knowledge of yogyatä is a prerequisite for verbal
cognition. Others say that what is required is only the absence of a
knowledge of incompatibility. Kumärila Bhatta says that incompati-
bility with the actual facts does not prevent verbal comprehension,
but only the validity of the knowledge.4 Perhaps it is the inconceivability
of the mutual association of the word meanings that renders the whole
sentence nonsensical; it is not the lack of correlation with the actual
facts but the impossibility of connecting the word meanings that stands
in the way of verbal comprehension.
Sometimes the lack of yogyatä is only apparent and can be explained
away by resorting to the metaphorical meaning of a word in the
sentence ; if the incompatibility can be removed thus zxidyogyata restored,
there is no difficulty in comprehending the meaning of the sentence.
The apparent incompatibility of the expressed sense is an essential
condition for laksanä (secondary meaning).

C. Samnidhi or Âsatti
Samnidhi or âsatti is generally explained as the condition that the
words in a sentence should be temporally contiguous. It is the
uninterrupted utterance or the unbroken comprehension of words
when they are in juxtaposition. Kumärila Bhatta says that it is the
continuous moving about of the words in the listener's mind {buddhau
viparivrtti). The Präbhäkaras also explain it that way. Lack of samnidhi
can occur in two ways—not being uttered together and not being
SENTENCE MEANING 87

signified by words. The Bhätta Mïmâmsakas hold that verbal cognition

is possible only when the necessary words are together in the mind.
The Präbhäkaras consider that only the contiguity of cognition of the
sense is necessary. Thus in the case of elliptical sentences, the Bhâtta
Mïmâmsakas want the missing words to be actually supplied.
The Navya-Nyäya school defines âsatti as an immediate recollection
of the meanings of words through their expressive power or secondary
signification (laksana) ; even if the words are separated there is âsatti
if the meanings of the words are recollected without any interruption.
This recognition happens in the case of verses. Early Naiyâyikas thought
that the knowledge of âsatti is the cause of verbal comprehension. The
Navya-Nyäya school considers that âsatti itself is the cause (suarüpe
sati tâbdabodhahetuh).
In the case of elliptical sentences, in which the intended meaning
is understood from the context even though some of the words necessary
for syntactic completeness are lacking, the Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas believe
that it is necessary to supply the missing words in order to have verbal
comprehension, of the sentence meaning. The Präbhäkaras hold that
it is easier to supply the meaning than to presume the missing words
as implied.

2. THE ROLE OF Tâtparya OR INTENTION

The term tâtparya has been used by the different schools of thought
in India with varying subtle nuances, depending on the basic stand-
point taken by each; but the general idea is quite clear.5 The term
refers to the meaning intended to be conveyed by an utterance, and it
can be viewed as the meaning intended by the speaker or as the
purport of the utterance. The role of contextual factors in deciding
this tâtparya is also generally accepted by all, along with the importance
of tâtparya in deciding the meaning of a sentence. There is, however,
no unanimity of opinion regarding the exact role played by tâtparya in
verbal comprehension.
The meaning of a sentence can be considered from two distinct
standpoints, from the point of view of the speaker and from the point
of view of the listener. The general western approach has been from the
speaker's point of view, while the Indian approach, especially the later
sâbdabodha approach, has been mainly from the listener's point of view.
In a normal speech situation there can be five different aspects of
the meaning of an utterance : what is in the mind of the speaker who
makes the utterance, what the speaker wants the listener to understand,
what the utterance actually conveys, what the listener understands
as the meaning of the utterance, and what is in the mind of the listener
on hearing the utterance.
80 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

In a perfect linguistic communication all five of these meanings

must coincide; but often due to various causes there are bound to be
differences standing in the way of easy communication. In all cases
of successful lying or misdirection, what is in the mind of the speaker
at the time of utterance is different from what is intended to be conveyed
to the listener. And very often what the listener understands as the
meaning of the utterance is different from what the speaker intends
to convey; this problem can be caused by the lack of expressive power
on the speaker's part or the inability to understand on the listener's
part. What is in the speaker's mind before he speaks or in the listener's
mind after hearing the utterance is rather intangible and does not
easily yield to objective scientific analysis. It is the actual utterance
that can be objectively analyzed into its components of words,
morphemes, and phonemes, and studied; but that does not mean that
the other aspects are less important.
The Mîmâmsakas and the Naiyäyikas, who take the sentence to
be a concatenation of the individual words it contains, have necessarily
to depend on the power oïtâtparya to explain how a connected meaning
is comprehended from a sentence. Each word in a sentence gives its
own isolated meaning; but a string of unconnected isolated senses
cannot produce a unified meaning. People use words with the intention
of conveying a connected sense; hence from the use of words in juxta-
position {samabhivyâhara) it is assumed that the speaker has uttered
them with the intention of conveying a connected sense, for otherwise
the simultaneous utterance would be of no avail, but fpr such an
intention tätparya works as a general motivating force to help in correla-
ting the word meanings and forming the sentence meaning.
Tätparya is the intention or the desire of the speakers, according to
the Naiyäyikas. According to the Mîmâmsakas, it is the purport of
the sentence. This tätparya is all-comprehensive, but not all-powerful
or absolute. Normally it cannot change the sakti, the primary meaning
of a word. According to the Mîmâmsakas, the sakti or the relation
between a word and its meaning is autpattika, innate or permanent;
according to the Naiyäyikas, this iakti is conventional or sämketika,
but permanent, being based on the will or icchâ of God in the case of
ordinary words and of the authors in the case of technical terms and
the like.
According to the Naiyäyika, the Éâbdabodha or understanding of
the sentence's meaning is possible only through the knowledge of the
words' meanings, which form the immediate cause (kârana) ; the
knowledge of the expressive power of sakti in the individual words
obtained through recollection is the sahakân kârana. Before one considers
the question of the speaker's intention, understanding the individual
meanings of words on the basis of their sakti is essential. It is only in
SENTENCE MEANING 80

the case of ambiguous words, in which more than one sense is possible,
that the speaker's intention or contextual factors are taken into account.
In the case of metaphoric expression, such as "the village on the
Ganges," in which the literal meaning is unsuitable, the incompatibility
has to be removed by taking one of the word meanings as having been
used in a sense different from its normal sense, but somehow related to
it. In a particular sentence in which there is contextual incompatibility,
it is on the basis of the tâtparya that the listener decides which of the
words is to be taken as metaphorical. Some farfetched relationship can
always be assumed between the primary meaning and the intended
meaning. %
Along with âkânksa, yogyatâ, and âsatti, some Naiyäyikas want to
include tâtparya or a general knowledge-of the meaning intended by the
speaker, which may be termed "prehension," as an essential factor in
all cases of verbal comprehension. Some others believe that the speaker's
intention need not be considered as a direct factor, as it could be
included in akânksâ itself. Tâtparya plays a part in deciding äsatti also.
Gangesa and Visvanätha have included tâtparya as a fourth requisite.
Even though the Mïmâmsakas do not accept tâtparya as a separate
factor, it is accepted as a general motivating force. According to the
Präbhäkaras, the tâtparya enables primary meaning itself to give both
its word meaning and the syntactic relation. These anvitâbhidhânavâdins
think that the sakti of words is understood with reference to a meaning
that is related to some kärya. All sentences, especially in the Veda,
have to be ultimately meaning injunctions or prohibitions. The later
theory of Dhanika, who includes dhvani under tâtparya, follows this
anvitâbhidhanavada.
According to the Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas, the individual words in a
sentence givextheir isolated meanings, and the sentence meaning is
located through laksanâ, based on tâtparyaInupapatti. It is Jayanta Bhatja
who in his JVyàyamanjari advocates tâtparya as a separate factor to explain
the emergence of the sentence meaning from the associationist point
of view. He does not refer to lakfanä in this case, because sentence
laksanä is not acceptable to the Naiyäyikas. Harisiddhäntavägisa, in
his commentary on Sähityadarpana, says that this tätparyaeakti is the same
as the samsargamaryâdâ of later Naiyäyikas.
Among Älamkärikas, Änandavardhana accepts only three functions
of words, abhidhây laksanâ, and tâtparya. He mentions the padârthavàkyâr-
thanyäya but does not refer co it as a function. Tâtparyavrtti was accepted
for the first time by Abhinavagupta in his Locana. He followed Jayanta
Bhatta in this respect. Later Älamkärikas took it as a general view
accepted by Dhvanikära himself. Thus Ruyyaka says wrongly that
Dhvanikära accepted vyanjanä as the fourth vyapâra, distinct from
abhidhâ, laksanâ, and tâtparya. Later Älamkärikas took the tâtparyavrtti
90 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

as the view of abhihitânvayavadins and confused it with the Bhätta view,

though the Bhättas have definitely stated that they accept only laksanä
and,not tätparya to explain the emergence of the sentence meaning
from the word meanings.

3. Anvitâbhidhâna AND Abhihitânvaya THEORIES

We saw earlier that the two main theories about sentence meaning
are the anvitâbhidhâna, advocated by the Präbhäkara Mïmâmsakas,
and the abhihitânvaya, held by the Bhätta Mîmâmsaka.
Präbhäkara and his followers denied that words convey a meaning
except in the context of a sentence, even though they regarded words as
real and actual constituents of language. Like the Bhättas, the Präbhä-
karas have to accept the reality of individual words and their individual
meanings, and agree that the primary meaning expressed by the word
is a universal (jâti). All of these points are specifically stated in the
Mimâmsâsutras, and no Mîmâmsaka can doubt its validity. It is also
clear that the purpose of words in a sentence is to give a cogent,
connected meaning. The difference between the two schools involves
the following questions:
(1) Does the unitary sentence meaning arise directly from the
words themselves or indirectly through the recollection of the word
meanings? The anvitâbhidhâna theory takes the former view, while
the abhihitânvaya theory takes the latter.
(2) The meaning of a sentence is made up of the individual word
meanings and their mutual relation. Can both of these elements be
directly conveyed by the words? The Präbhäkaras say that the in-
tention or purport, known from contextual factors, will make the
primary, denotative power of the words convey both. But Bhättas
hold that the primary denotative power of words is exhausted by
conveying their isolated, individual meanings and stop with that.
The connected meaning is conveyed through the secondary power
of the sentence (laksana). The individual meaning is a universal; but
in the sentence meaning has to apply to the individual. The latter is
also achieved by the power of laksanä.
Some of the Naiyäyikas also accept the abhihitânvaya theory, but
because according to them the primary meaning of a word is the parti-
cular qualified by the universal (jätivisistavyakti), they do not have to
depend on laksanä to get the sentence meaning. To get the syntactic
relationship between the words, they cannot resort to laksana, because
they accept it only for words, not for a sentence. One'of the Naiyäyikas,
Jayanta Bhatta, proposed a new function of the sentence, tätparya, to
account for the syntactically connected meaning.
The Präbhäkaras stress the natural process by which .children learn
SENTENCE MEANING . 91

their language. It is by watching language used and by witnessing the

activity of elders in daily life that children come to know the significance
of words. Through the substitution method they come to know the
meaning of words; this process is natural and subconscious. Later the
child comes to understand the meaning of even new sentences. But from
the world he knows that words are never used in isolation but have
meaning only in the context of a sentence. The constituent words in a
sentence convey meaning only as they are related to the sentence
meaning. Thus in the sentence "Bring the cow,55 the word "cow55
means not the isolated concept cowness, but cow as related to the action
of bringing. So also the word "bring55 means tjie action of bringing in
relation to the cow. The words themselves give their own meanings and
their syntactic relation, so the sentence meaning is directly conveyed by
, the sentence. ,
This view is rejected by the Bhâtta Mïmâmsaka because of the fallacies
of interdependence and complexity. According to them we are able to
understand the individual meanings of words, even though we might
have learned them by hearing people uttering sentences and watching
their reaction. Unlike the words, the sentence does not have an indivi-
dual meaning of its own. When we hear a sentence, we have first an
understanding of the separate meanings of the words one after another;
then these word meanings are related on the basis of expectancy and
other factors, and we arrive at the unified meaning of the sentence as a
whole.
The ^association of the word meanings is brought about by laksanâ,
according to Bhätta Mïmâmsâ, but the Naiyäyikas explain it by resort-
ing to samsargamaryâdâ.

4. SENTENCE Sphota
Bhartrhari identifies Brahman, the ultimate being, with the essence
of the speech principle; it is without beginning or end and indestructi-
ble. The entire world is an appearance (vivarta) of this speech principle.
Symbol and meaning are only two aspects of this speech essence. It is
the same speech essence that appears in the form of various ideas and
meanings on the one hand and their symbol»—words and sentences—on
the other, and thus constitutes the phenomenal world. This speech
essence is of the nature of consciousness : though unchanging and part-
less, it appears to be evolutionary and pluralistic on the basis of its own
powers like time, which, though really identical with it, seems to be
different. The eternal, timeless speech principle appears to be changing
because of the working of the time factor. Time is an inherent power of
the absolute, but it is relatively independent and exerts its influence in
bringing about the other powers of the speech essence.
92 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The basic principle of Bhartrhari's theory of language is that the

complete utterance or the sentence is the unit of speech and should be
considered as a single, unanalyzable entity. The utterance alone is valid
with respect to actual language. The meaning of the utterance or
sentence is also integral and indivisible and is of the nature oïpratibhâ, an
intuitive flash of insight. This partless expression in the sentence sphota
manifests in a flash the integral meaning. Sequence and time factor do
not really belong to the sentence but are unavoidable as means for
revealing the sentence. Sentence sphota as the expression (sabda) vand
pratibhâ as the meaning {artha) are the basic factors in linguistic
behavior.
In the speaker's mind before he begins to speak and in the listener's
mind after hearing, this unity is clear. But because of oui inability to
communicate it in an instantaneous flash, the sentence has to be uttered
as a sequence of words, each word in its turn being a definite sequence
of phonemes or letters. If both the speaker and the listener are quite
proficient in the language, as in the case of the mother tongue, they do
not feel that they are uttering or hearing articulated sound-bits or
words. The speaker utters the sentence and the listener hears it as a
sentence. If the language proficiency is meagre, the listener may be
hearing the words and trying to organize the meanings into a unit. If
the hearer does not know the language, he will hear only a series of
articulated sounds or mere sound bits. All analysis of the sentence into
lesser meaningful elements such as the word, bases, and affixes may be
a convenient fiction. It is true that Grammarians' main work is to
analyze the utterance into its component parts in order to help the
students understand the meaning, but they are aware that this linguistic
analysis has no real validity except as a help to the students.
Even*though the sphota theory envisages different subdivisions of the
sphota, Bhartrhari accepts only the sentence sphota as the real unit of
speech. Letters and words have only a pragmatic value, as useful units
that build up higher units of speech, the sentence. The meaning of this
single, indivisible utterance is pratibhâ, a flash of insight, the real nature
of which is indefinable. Its existence is ratified only in the individual's
experience of it, and the experiencer himself cannot describe it
adequately.
In the discussion of the sphota theory it has been pointed out that the
actual sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener are the
vaikrta dhvani, containing many irrelevant, idiosyncratic, and non-
linguistic elements. This vaikrta dhvani reveals the pmkrta dhvani, which
is the linguistically relevant phonematic pattern of the utterance, free
from the variations in intonation, tempo, pitch, and so on, which do not
affect the language. Of course in languages in which the tone or pitch
or length is relevant, these factors will be part of the präkrtä dhvani itself.
SENTENCE MEANING 93

In normal linguistic discourse both the speaker and the listener are
conscious of the normal phonological or phonematic pattern only. All
nonlinguistic matter is eliminated at this stage; but the time sequence
is still present. It is this präkrta dhvani that reveals gradually, phoneme
by phoneme and word by word, the sentence sphota, the integral linguis-
tic symbol. The role of the phonemes [varnd) is only to reveal th'^ word
sphota and the role of the words to reveal the sentence sphota. The
smaller elements cannot, individually or collectively, reveal the integral
unitary meaning directly because of their appearance in a temporal
sequence, because of their not being associated with parts of the
meaning; their role is to build up the higher unit until the sentence
sphota is revealed. This sentence sphota gives forfti instantaneously in a
flash the meaning of the sentence.
Bhartrhari has stated that the speech principle (sabdatattva) has three
stages in the course of its manifestation, namely pasyanti, madhyamâ, and
vaikhari. The vaikhari level corresponds to the vaikrtadhvani of the sphota
theory and is the actualized and manifested speech, the sounds spoken
by the speaker and heard by the listener. The madhyamâ level seems to
correspond to thé prâkrta dhvani, because the linguistically relevant
elements, including the sequence, are present in both. The next stage,
pasyanti, has been identified- with pratibhä indicated by the vâkyasphota.
When we speak of the vâkyasphota as the meaning revealer and of
pratibhä as the meaning, the two seem to be different; but actually they
are only two aspects of the same entity. Whether Bhartrhari considered
the Sabda Brahman as a level higher than the pasyanti is not certain, for
scholars are not unanimous on this point. He says that grammar is the
highest place for väc in its threefold aspect—pasyanti, madhyamâ, and
vaikhari. That claim does not preclude the possibility of a higher level
about which one cannot say anything. According to some scholars the
pasyanti level has two aspects, the higher being also called para pasyanti,
at which all distinctions are obliterated.
Even though Bhartrhari considered the sentence to be the only unit,
of expression in actual life, he was fully conscious of the importance of
linguistic analysis into words and other units as a useful means for
understanding the languages. This awareness is apparent from the third
book of the Väkyapadiya, where various problems are discussed on the
basis of morphemes and phonemes that make up the sentence.

5. Säbdabodha

Indian thinkers on language belonging to the different schools of

thought considered language behavior in a linguistic situation not only
from the speaker's point of view but also from the listener's. The various
94 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

theories of Mbdabodha or judgment consider the process of cognition of

the sentence meaning from the listener's point of view.
The modern technique of Mbdabodha was developed and perfected by
the school of Navya-Nyäya, founded by Gangesa about A.D. 1320 using
technical terms for specifying the meaning of a sentence precisely and
accurately. Literally the term Mbdabodha means "verbal comprehen-
sion" or "verbal cognition"; it is used to indicate the meaning of a
sentence as understood by the listeners. In modern works the term is
used to refer to the linguistic paraphrase of the sentence, in which the
exact denotation of each element in the sentence is clearly and precisely
indicated. The Mbdabodha approach of understanding a sentence mean-
ing is intended to avoid syntactic ambiguity by specifying the exact
relations among the various elements in a sentence. The vagaries of the
sentence's surface structure will be absent in the Mbdabodha paraphrase,
and the linguistic analysis at the syntactic level will become precise.
The Mbdabodha approach of analyzing the meaning of a sentence is
analogous to the deep-structure level in Noan Chomsky's analysis of a
sentence. He distinguishes between the surface level and the deep-
structure level.6 The underlying relations between the elements of a
sentence at the Mbdabodha level need not always be the apparent rela-
tions at the surface level. Thus ghatasya nirmitih, "making the pot," and
caitrasya nirmitih, "creation by Caitra," though similar in Sanskrit at
the surface level, have different Mbdabodhas. The genitive case in the
first phrase indicates the object of the verb, while in the second expres-
sion the genitive case indicates the agent; the former is ghatakarmikä
nirmitih, creation that has the pot as its object, but the latter is
caitrakartrkä nirmitih, creation that has caitra as its agent.
The technique of Mbdabodha was also adopted by later workers in the
various other schools of thought. But on the basis of the difference in
their basic assumptions there is difference in the emphasis, and the same
sentence or expression has different Mbdabodha paraphrases in the diffe-
rent schools, Nyâya, Mïmâmsâ, and Grammarians. They differ particu-
larly about which element in a sentence should be regarded as predomi-
nant. The Logicians (the Naiyäyikas) are mainly interested in analyzing
propositional sentences from a static point of view, so they consider the
substantive (in the nominative case) to be the most important element.
The Grammarians, as well as the early etymological schools, consider
the sentence from the dynamic point of view and take the finite verb to
be the most important element. The followers of the Mimämsä school,
mainly concerned with the interpretation of Vedic injunctions, try to
analyze the implications of imperative sentences. The same Sanskrit
sentence may be interpreted differently at the deep-structure level in
the Mbdabodha by the different schools of thought, because they differ
in their basic standpoints,
SENTENCE MEANING 95

The sentence caitrah ghatam karoti, c<cCaitra makes a pot/' will be inter-
preted by the Grammarians as "ekatvavacchinnacaitrakartrkah
ekatvävacchinnaghatakarmakah vartamänakälakah käranavyäpärah,
the operation or activity of making, in the present tense, which has
Caitra in the singular number as its agent and pot in the singular num-
ber as its object. To the Naiyâyika or the logician the same sentence
will mean "ghatakarmakakäranakrtimän caitrah," Gaitra who has the
activity of making which has pot as its object. These interpretations
could be further elaborated by pointing out all the implications of the
sentence. The passive sentence "caitrena ghatah kriyate" (a pot is
being made by Caitra) could be analyzed in the same way, because
from the Êabdabodha point of view there is little difference in meaning
between the active sentence and its passive form, according to the
Grammarians. The Naiyäyikas, however,' make a clear distinction
between the two.
Among ancient writers neither Pânini nor Gautama was interested
in discussing the sentence. Jayanta Bhatta says in his Nyayamanjari that
the absence of any reference to the sentence in the Nyäyasütras shows
that the early Naiyâyikas considered the sentence to be merely a
combination of words. Among Indian Grammarians it was Kätyäyana
who first defined a sentence as ekatin, that which has one finite verb.
Pänini seems to have held the view that a sentence may contain more
than one finite verb, for his rule tin atinah ordains the acute accent to a
verb when it follows a nonverb (in a sentence). Later Grammarians
have also accepted such sentences. Strictly from the formal surface-
level approach, as advocated by Kätyäyana, such a sentence may be
considered a complex sentence made up of two sentences, but at the
deep-structure level, from the semantic point of view, they constitute a
single sentence.
We have already seen that the Mïmâmsakas first promulgated and
the other schools later accepted the theory that the writing of the
sentence is based on the three factors of mutual expectancy or inter-
dependence of the meanings of the words in it, compatibility or absence
of incompatibility, and proximity. The Mïmâmsakas considered mutual
expectancy to be psychological, while the Logicians and Grammarians
took it to be syntactical. Between the two schools of Mimämsä, the
Bhätta arid the Präbhäkara, there is difference in view about the factors
involved in an injunctive sentence. According to Kumärila Bhatta,
every command to do something raises three questions: What should
be done? How is it to be done? and Who is to do it? A command or
law should be obeyed because it is a law, not because of any profit
motive or fear of punishment. Kumärila's view was that nobody would
act without a purpose. According to the two schools of Mimämsä, every
complete sentence must satisfy these basic psychological requirements*
96 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The Mïmàrnsa schools held that the finite verb is the central element
in a sentence. It consists of two elements: the verbal root (dhätu) and
the verbal suffix (pratyaya). Of these two, the Mïmâmsakas held that
the verbal suffix is semantically more important than the root. The
verbal suffix denotes bhâvanà or the efficient force, which is defined as
that activity which brings something into being, "bhavitur bhävänukü-
lah bhâvakavyâpâravisesah," the operation of the operator conducive
to the production of the result. Bhävanä in turn is of two kinds : sâbdi
bhâvanâ and ârthl bhävanä. The injunctive sentence induces the hearer
to perform some action, which is denoted by the optative suffix lin; this
type is the sabdl bhävanä. The ärthi bhävanä is based on it and is the
activity of the agent that leads to the result. In the Bhâvanâviveka,
Mandana Misra defines bhävanä as the absence of inactivity in general
(audâsïnyavicchittisâmânyarûpa).
The Mïmâmsakas and the Naiyäyikas accepted individual words
and their independent meanings. The Bhätta schools accepted the
abhihitanvaya theory of verbal comprehension, according to which the
words in a sentence escape their isolated meanings and the syntactic
connection among them is found through secondary meaning. The
Prâbhâkara school held that the words themselves conveyed their
individual meanings and the syntactic relation (the anvitâbhidhana
theory). The Nyäya school espoused the association theory of verbal
comprehension and held that the syntactic connection among word
meanings is obtained through the samsargamaryâdâ, the power of mutual
association.
In nllo ghatah, " a black pot", the syntactic relation between the two
word meanings is identity; it is conveyed through the power of associa-
tion, called samsargamaryädä by the Logicians. It is not directly conveyed
by any element in the sentence. If the underlying syntactic relation
between the elements in a sentence is conveyed through some morphe-
mic element in the surface structure itself, it is called prakara. Thus in
the phrase dhanyena dhanavân, "possessed of wealth in the form of grains,"
the relation of identity of dhänya and dhana is conveyed by the instru-
mental ending ena {dhänyäbhinnddhanavan). Thus a distinction is made
between the two types, one in which the syntactic relation is inherent
in the constituent elements and the other in which this relation is absent
and has to be found through implication or suggestion.
Every verbal root consists of two elements: phala, "the result," and
vyâpâra, "an activity." Thus the meaning of every root can be analyzed
as a kind of activity producing some result. Thus pac, "to cook," means
viklithyanuküla vyäpära, an activity conducive to the softening. In a
transitive sentence the activity pertains to the agent (kartr) and the
result of the operation accrues to the object.
In this chapter and the preceding ones we have shown how the
SENTENCE MEANING 97

Grammarian philosophers developed a consistent system for handling

technical grammatical issues as well as epistemology and metaphysics.
True to the Indian tradition the philosophy of Grammar has shown
itself to be both a means of theoretical knowledge and a spiritual
discipline leading to moksa or release. The Grammarians began simply,
with the investigations of words, of how to manipulate and acquire
them. But this systematic study of overt speech led to an awareness of
higher and higher levels of language until the Word Absolute, Sabda
Brahman, was discovered. From this metaphysical perspective, Sabda
Brahman is the underlying principle of unity that makes possible all
diversity.
For the philosophy of Grammar the division of speech into words
and letters is a convenient fiction made for pedagogical purposes, to
teach words with precision and economy of effort. The basic division
of sentences into words and words into bases (nouns and verb roots)
with their respective suffixes is seen to be phenomenal and not ulti-
mately real. A clear analysis of a hierarchy of levels of language is
offered from overt or vaikhari speech to internal or madhyamä speech,
with all of these levels being preceded logically by a more unitary stage,
pasyanti, in which there is no sequence of words but just a glimpse of
the separation of word and meaning—the intentionality of the primor-
dial urge to express onself. AU of these concepts presuppose a unitary
ground out of which distinction is manifested. This ground is called
Sabda Brahman because the approach to this Absolute (Brahman) and
the manifestation of it is through words (Jabda).
. The philosophical analysis of language offered in the Grammarian
literature that follows is not just a logical exercise to satisfy intellectual
curiosity, but an earnest and sustained spiritual approach to identify
onself with the ground of all speech phenomena, Sabda Brahman.
The philosophy of Grammar sees itself finally as a straight pathway
to ultimate freedom (moksamanamäm ajihmä räjapaddhatih).
 PART TWO
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE OF
GRAMMARIAN PHILOSOPHY
 1
PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN
VEDIC LITERATURE
John G. Ar apura andK. Kunjunni Raja

Rg Veda
The earliest available literature, thç Rg Veda, contains glowing tributes
to the power of speech. To the Vedic seers, who were facing the problem
of communicating their mystic experiences, language was naturally an
object of wonder and reverence. Many of the later philosophical
theories on language may be seen in a subtle form in the Vedic literature
itself. There are three hymns that deal mainly with divine Speech
(Väc): the Asyavamiya hymn (1.164), which is one of the most philo-
sophical hymns of the Rg Veda, but full of difficult symbols; 10.71 on the
origin of language, which has been subjected to a great deal of inter-
pretation by later Grammarians; and 10.125, where the Goddess of
Speech, Vâgambhrnï, herself describes her power and functions.
(These follow paraphrases of these three hymns. )

Asyavamiya Hymn
The seer Dïrghatamas asks the question: "I ask thee about the
ultimate abode of speech," and answers "the ultimate abode of speech
is this Brahman."
The place of Vâc is at the peak of the universe. "On the top of
yonder sky, they say, is Vâc, who knows all, but does not enter all"
(verse 10).
Vac has been divided into four parts. Those Brahmins with insight
know them. Three parts that are hidden in the cave, the mortals do
not activate. They speak only the fourth part (verse 45 ) .*
The seer Dïrghatamas tells us that Väc, like a bull, lowed and thus
fashioned the tumultuous, chaotic floods (verse 41 ). But she had also
102 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

produced the aksara, the permanent syllable with which the chaotic
material was to be organized. She taught it to Agni.
Vâc possessed the aksara of the Rg (verses 39, 42), who possesses a
thousand aksaras.
The same Vâc is described by the Brahmins by different names: Agni,
Yama, and Mätarisvan (verse 46 ).
Vâc is also identified with the river Sarasvati. In the Brähmanas the
two are equated: "Your inexhaustible breast, Sarasvati, a source of
delight with which you cause all the choicest things to flourish, which
grants treasure, bestows wealth, confers good food—present that here
to be sucked55 (verse 49).

Rg Veda 10.71
Brhaspati ! When they came forth to establish the first beginning of
language, setting up names, what has been hidden in them as their
best and purest good became manifest through love. (1)
When the sages fashioned language with their thought, filtering it
like parched grain through a sieve, friends recognized their friends.
Their beauty is marked on their language. (2 )
They traced the course of language through ritual; they found it
embodied in the seers. They gained access to it and distributed it widely;
the seven chanters cheered them. (3 )
Many who look do not see language, many who listen do not hear
her. She reveals herself like a loving and well-adorned wife to her
husband, only to some. (4)
Although all the friends have eyes and ears, their mental intuitions
are uneven. Some are like shallow ponds, which reach up to the mouth
or armpit; others are like ponds that are fit for bathing. (7)
Here the contrast between the two types of people is clearly
indicated—those who see Väc and understand her and those who see
the form but do not understand her. The Vedic seers were not claiming
to be composers of the hymns, rather the seers of an eternal, impersonal
truth.
gg Veda 10.125
Here Vâc is a personal deity.
I travel with the Rudras and the Vasus, the Ädityas and the
Visvedeväh. Both Varuna and Mitra do I support, Indra, Agni, and
the Asvins. (1 )
I am the sustainer and nourisher of Soma, Tvastr, Püsan, and Bhaga.
I bestow wealth on the zealous patron of the sacrifice who makes the
oblation and presses the Soma. (2)
I am the queen, the gatherer of treasures, the one with penetrating
perception, the first of those who should be worshipped. The gods have
VEDIG LITERATURE 103

distributed me manifoldly and caused (the chants) to enter many

places. (3)
I am the one through whose mäyä everyone sees, breathes, and
hears. (4)
I am the lone speaker of welcoming words for the feast to the gods
and men. Whoever is my favorite, him I make powerful, a true knower
of the mystic power, a rsi and an intelligent man. (5) A
I stretch the bow for Rudra so that his arrow may reach the hater of
religion and destroy him. I rouse the battle fury for the people. I have
penetrated heaven and earth. (6 )
I breathe like the wind supporting all the worlds. Beyond the sky,
beyond this earth so great have I become by my might. (8)
The Vedic seers believed that metaphysical knowledge can be had
through transcendental vision by the exercise of mental concentration.
It is a sort of intuition. The source of all true knowledge is Vac, who
may communicate it to whomsoever she favors.
Rg Veda 1.164.37 deals with the question of man's self-knowledge.
"What This is I know not (what I am in reality I know not). Shackled
in mind, I move about. As the first born of rta has approached me,
then I got a portion ofthat Vâc." This first born of rta is Agni; Agni
possesses a part of Väc, has a function in the cosmos, and is immortal.
Here Vâc must be clearly understood as Logos, and its connection
with self-knowledge is a seminal thought already exhibited by this
text. Furthermore, its connection with rta is significant, because the
latter stands for the regularity, invariability, and consistency of such
paramount importance in the Logos insofar as it is the ratio that goes
with it. The idea that the imperishable Vâc (Word/Logos) is the first
born of rta shows up again in the Taittiriya Brähmana 2.8.8.5 ("Väg
aksaram prathamajä rtasya"). Now the question about Vac and the
question about the self are not associated with each other accidentally,
for, on the contrary, that they are related at the greatest depth becomes
evident in the Brähmanas and the Upanisads.
Cows are often used as symbols for Vâc. Ancient texts on etymology
and interpretation inform us that "cow" stands for speech. The
Brhadaranyaka Upanisad (5.8.1 ) says that "one should meditate on
speech as a milch-cow."
The deity Vâc was identified with Sarasvatï in the Atharva Veda
(5,7.5) as Vâc Sarasvatï; also in the Brähmanas. In the Rg Veda, Sarasvatï
is an earthly river, 1.164; 49 foreshadows the later identification.
One of the most remarkable characteristics of the Vedas is that the
two aspects of Vac, which may be distinguished as the revealing word
and the word in invocation (or recitation), are at root the same. The
integrity of these two is quite significant in the way the Logos functions
in the Vedas. And it is because Väc as the Logos is the basis of the ratio
104 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

that ratiocination has the potential to act as the open door to truth
(satya), though by itself it can never realize its own potentiality. But
this frustrating incapacity of ratiocination teaches a positive lesson
too, namely, that as thinking (manana) it is dependent on, and follows,
the hearing (frauana) of the Vâc and that it also leads the way to the
deeper thinking called nididhyâsana. The primary complement to the
mystery of self-revelation, indeed to the very concrete possibility of it,
is the other mystery, namely, that of the release of truth the invoking
word signifies. With both these, man's power to know encounters its own
transcendence. The unfolding of all these hidden dimensions takes place
in the Upanisads.
Atharva Veda
Stanzas 1-47 of Rg Veda 1.164 are reproduced with some variations,
omissions, and additions in Atharva Veda as hymns 9.9 (Rg Veda, 1-22)
and 9.10 (Rg Veda 23-47). Stanzas 48-52 oïRg Veda 1.164 are omitted.
It may mean that Rg Veda 1.164 is a blend of two hymns originally
separate.

Upanisads

Equating of Brahman with speech is also found in the Upanisadic

literature.
"Speech, truly, is Brahman55 ("Vag vai brahmeti55, Brhadaranyaka
Upanisad, 4.1.2). Here Brahman is defined as one reality, without a
second, which is identical with speech.
The Mandukya Upanisad (3.3) tries to link this absolute, which is
unspeakable, with the speakable through speech itself "by creating the
deeply meaningful symbol of AUM which traversing the phenomenal
levels of consciousness, waking, dreaming, and deep, sleep reaches
out beyond to the transcendent where the sound itself comes to an end."
Brahman, identical with speech, is also identical with AUM. Just as
leaves are held together by a stalk, so is all speech held together by
AUM (Chandogya Upanisad 2.23.3).
The supersensuous vision of Vac is the ultimate experience of the
Real. For the Upanisadic seers this intuition of the self has an internal,
rather than an external, focus in its symbolic expression.
Uddalaka5s teaching in the Sadvidyä passage of Chândogyopanisad
refers to the role of Väc or language in the manifestation of the world
("Vâcârambhanam vikâro nâmadheyam mrttiketyeva satyam,5' 6.1.3 ).
In clay products clay alone is the real (satya), while the product such
as a pot or a bowl is the creation of Väc in its dual role of name and
form (nämarüpa), the appearances. Vâc represents Brahman as the
powerful and creative word.
VEDIG LITERATURE 105

There are several ancient statements quoted in Bhartrhari's vrtti on

his Vâkyapadiya proclaiming the greatness of the goddess of speech.
Many of them have not been identified. It is Vâc alone that created
the entire universe; the immortal and mortal—all came from Vac.. It
is Väc that sees objects, that talks about them ; Väc alone brings objects
-together; it is through Väc that the world becomes many, that one
reality transforms itself into many.
This attitude of high appreciation of language finds its echo in the
words of Dandin in the Kâvyâdarêa (1.3): "The entire world would
have been plunged in darkness, if the light in the form of language
had not been shining throughout."
It may, however, be noted that Upanisadic seers have at times
spoken also about the absolute reality as being beyond the range of
language and mind, to point out the inadequacy of language to reveal
Ideality fully and clearly; for example, "From which the words, as
well as the mind, return unable to approach it."

Vedângas
There are six Vedângas or auxiliary sciences in the study of the Vedas;
siksä (phonetics), vyäkarana (grammar), chandas (meter), nirukta
(etymology), kalpa (rubrics about rites and rituals), and jyotisa (astro-
nomy/astrology). The first four are linguistic disciplines and the other
two are nonlinguistic. Phonetics, grammar, and meter are traditionally
assigned the task of safeguarding the sound aspect of the words in the
Vedas, keeping the oral tradition intact. Nirukta is concerned with
the correct interpretation of the words of the Vedic text, and it goes
hand in hand with vyäkarana. Yäska says that a knowledge of grammar
is a prerequisite to the study of nirukta. The validity of nirukta is based
on the fact that it follows from a long tradition from the Brähmanas
themselves.
Like the tiksas, the pratUakhyas were also devoted to the preservation
of the correct pronunciation for the texts of the Vedic mantras and did
their work with meticulous care, prescribing rules for prosody, phonetics,
accentuation, and the rules of euphonic combination. The term
indicates that it is a practical handbook for each school of the Vedas.
There is a maxim that in case of conflict between the siksä and the
prätisäkhya, the pratisäkhya is to be followed.
While vyäkarana deals with linguistic analysis to determine the exact
form of words, nirukta is concerned with linguistic analysis of the words
to get the proper meaning of the words in the context. Nirukta empha-
sizes the derivation of difficult and apparently unanalyzable terms.
The Unädisütras take an intermediate standpoint and try to analyze
irregular terms, using to a great extent Pänini's technique.
106 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The earliest attempts at the interpretation of Vedic mantras is found

in the Brähmanas themselves, though not in a systematic manner.
Explaining the ritualistic background and pointing out the esoteric
significance underlying the rituals, they led the way for the ritualistic
(adhiyajna) and metaphysical {adhyâtma) interpretations of the Vedas,
though the emphasis is on the former. In his Nirukta Yäska refers to
the ancient view that the mantras of the Rg Veda admit of a threefold
interpretation—from the point of view of the performance of religious
rites (adhiyajna), with reference to the deities (adhidevata), and with
reference to the soul (adhyâtman). There was also a fourth way of inter-
preting the Vedas, the historical or aitihasika, considering that the gods
mentioned in the text are individuals figuring in legends and narratives.
It is generally accepted that a text need not have an absolute single
meaning. The Vedic poets like ellipses, double meanings, and
obscurities. The Satapatha Brahmana (6.1.1.2) says that the gods like
subtle ways ("paroksapriyä hi devatäh").
The Brhaddevatâ, another ancient tool of Vedic exegesis, ascribed to
Saunaka,- contains some discussions about language. At 11.117, it says
that a sentence is a collection of words, a word is a collection of phon-
emes. And at 11.118, it says that the meaning of Vedic passages has
to be understood with the help of contextual factors: the purpose to be
served (artha), the subject matter under discussion (prakarana), an
indication from another place (linga), propriety, the place, and the
time. This requirement applies even to ordinary sentences.
 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN
YÀSKA'S NIRUKTA
K. Kunjunni Raja

The JSfirukta1 by Yäska; (fifth century B.C.) is a commentary on the

Nighantu or collection of Vedic words, discussing the etymology in
context. Nirukta is one of the Vedangas or ancillaries to the study of the
Vedas. Yäska is generally considered to be earlier than Pänini ; but Paul
Thieme holds that Yäska knew Pänini's work.2 Cardona thinks that it
is better to leave open the question of priority of one over the other.3
Yäska follows a long tradition in the Brähmanas of giving the
etymological explanation of words. Critics who find some of his etymo-
logies fanciful forget this fact. He wanted etymology to work hand in
hand with grammar. He stressed the importance of considering the
context while explaining the meaning and etymology of words. The
same word could be derived and explained in different ways to suit
different contexts.

Yäska's Definitions of the Verb and the Noun

"A verb is chiefly concerned with bhâva, whereas nouns have sattva
as the chief element in their meaning."4 The term bhâva is derived
from the root bhü, meaning "to become," and the term sattva is derived
from the root as, meaning "to be." These two roots, as and bhü, are
almost synonymous and mean "to exist."
Nirukta 1.2 refers with approval to the view of Värsäyani that there
are six modes for this bhäua or "becoming." Värsäyani says that there
are six modes for bhâva: a thing comes into existence, exists, changes,
grows, decays, and ceases to exist.6 One of these modes, "exists" (asti)
is derived from the same root as sattva, hence there is a possibility of
confusion.
108 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Bhartrhari explains that reality (sattä), when it appears in a temporal

sequence in various particular things, is called kriyä or bhâva and, when
viewed without any such temporal sequence, is called sattua. Thus,
sattva and bhâva are two aspects of the same existence seen from the
static and the dynamic points of view, respectively.6 Yâska, himself
has suggested the same by saying, "The verb indicates the action,
which takes place in a temporal sequence."7 And Patanjali says that
even verbal nouns have the static element predominating their
meaning.8
Audumbarâyana's Theory
"It is the statement as a whole that is regularly present in the
perceptive faculty of the hearer.5'9 According to the interpretation of
this passage, Audumbaräyana and Värttäksa held the view that it is
only the sentence that is really found in the minds of the speaker and
the listener; therefore, the fourfold classification of words into nouns
(nâman), verbs (âkhyatà), prepositions (upasarga), and particles (nipâta)
has no absolute validity. Audumbarâyana's theory is considered the
forerunner of Bhartrhari's sphota theory.10

Derivation of Nouns from Verbal Roots

The fundamental assumption of the etymologist was that nouns were
derived from verbal roots. Yâska generally subscribed to this view, and
we find in his Nirukta the tendency, often mechanical, to derive words
from imaginary roots, as in the case oipuman from pums. Sâkatâyana,
to whom one tradition ascribed the Unädisütras and who is mentioned
by both Pânini and Yâska, seems to have been a staunch advocate of
this theory. But Gârgya and some of the Grammarians held a more
sober view that it is not possible to trace all nouns to verbal roots.11
Following Gärgya, Yäska discussed the pros and cons of this problem.
If all nouns are derived from verbal roots that denote action, on the
one hand every object will have as many names as the actions with
which it is associated, and on the other hand each noun can be applied
to as many objects as are associated with an action indicated by that
verbal root. Thus the term asva, "a horse," derived from the root as>
"to move," would have to be applied to a camel as well, and for a
pillar that stands upright fixed to a hole and joins a beam, different
names indicating these different aspects would have to be applied.
Yäska's explanation of this problem is that the words are used natural-
ly (svabhävatah). Language designates things in an incomplete
manner; it can choose only one of the many activities associated with
an object. Incidentally, this discussion also indicates the explanation
for the presence of synonyms and homonyms in language.
Yäska accepts the general rules that all nominal forms are to be
YÂSKA'S NIRUKTA 109

derived from verbal roots and that in deriving words proper attention
should be paid to accent, grammatical formation, and meaning. The
particular rules mentioned are the following:
(1 ) A nominal form is to be derived from a verbal root that has the
sense of that act which solely belongs to the thing denoted by the noun
in such a way that its accent and formation are based on rules of
grammar, for example, kâraka from kr.
(2) When the current meaning of a word does not agree with the
meaning of the root apparent in it and when its nominal form cannot
be developed in the ordinary manner from the root by the rules of
grammar, one should take one's stand on the general meaning only
and explain the word through its resemblance to the verbal or
nominal form of a root with the related meaning. For example, hasta,
"a hand," should be derived not from has, "to laugh" apparent in it,
but from han, "to strike" because the hand is quick at striking.
(3 ) When there is no resemblance between a word and any form
of a root that has its meaning, the resemblance or community of even
a single letter (vowel or consonant) should be the basis of etymology.
(4) Even inflected case forms may be adjusted to the meaning.
(5) Similarly, secondary {taddhita) derivatives (formed by adding
suffixes to nouns) and compounds (whether of two or more members)
should be broken down into their component elements and the com-
ponent elements explained. One should never give up the attempt
at derivation ("na tveva na nirbrüyät").

Secondary Meaning {Laksana)

Yäska knew that in etymology the semantic aspect is as important
as the phonetic aspect; a word may be applied to a thing through
similarity of meaning as well, through metaphoric transfer. He was
also aware of onomatopoeia (êabdânukrti) as a factor in the naming
of some birds, such as kaka; also dundubhi is derived similarly. But he
does not mention secondary meaning {laksanâ) explicitly.
Yäska's aim was to explain Vedic words in the contexts of the Vedic
passages themselves; hence to suit the contexts he gave different deri-
vations for the same word as it occurred in different contexts. Meaning
was the principal element to which other elements were subordinated.
Yäska was concerned mainly with the primary sense of words and did
not pay much attention to the importance of metaphoric meaning.
Thus the term asura referring to the gods and the same term referring
to the demons are differently derived; he does not consider that the
latter sense is through pejorative tendency. It may be noted here that
even Pänini did not recognize metaphoric transfer as an extension of
the primary sense, and he gave separate enumeration of the use of the
container for the contained among the meanings of the nominative case.
110 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Classification of Words
Yâska divided Sanskrit words into four parts of speech: noun, verb,
preposition, and particle. A verb is concerned with, dynamic activity
involving the time factor, while nouns represent static things.12 Sarva-
naman (pronouns) are also recognized. Regarding prepositions, Yäska
says that ââkatâyana held the view that a preposition detached from
the verb has no meaning, that it is only suggestive (dyotaka). Gârgya
held the opposite view, that prepositions do have a meaning. Yâska
seeins to have agreed with Gärgya, for he enumerates twenty preposi-
tions together with their meanings.
 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN
PANINFS ASTÄDHYÄYl
K. KunjunnvRaja

Pänini's Astädhyäyi of the fifth century B.C.1 is a complete grammar

of the Sanskrit language, including the Vedic language. In eight
chapters, each subdivided into four pädas, it contains about four
thousand rules in sütra style, preceded by abbreviation rules grouping
the phonemes of Sanskrit. The sütras refer to groups of verbal roots
(dhatu) and of nominal bases (gana), hence the dhätupatha and the
ganapätha form adjuncts to the work. It is believed that meanings were
attached to the roots later by Bhïmasena and did not form part of the
original. The Unädisütras as they survive today are not Pänini's.
Pänini refers to ten earlier authorities, most of them presumably
grammarians. He also refers to differences in the usage of words
by people in different parts of India ("northerners," "easterners,"
and so on). Considerable thought had been devoted before Pänini
to phonological and grammatical statements. On the basis of all of
these and his own observations of the language, Pänini composed the
Astâdhyâyï, which remains a monumental work, even now, as a model
of descriptive grammar.

Cultural Usage of Language

Pänini uses the term bhäsä (speech) for the Sanskrit spoken by the
cultured and educated people {Êista). They are the final authority
in the case of language, says Patanjali, who points out the importance
of cultivated usage in many places.2
Pänini (or Kätyäyana) says that the authority of the popular usage
of words (amjnâ) must supersede the authority of the meaning depen-
dent on derivation.3 The meanings of words (the relations between
112 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

word (êabda) and meaning (artha)) are also established by popular

usage.4
Derivation of Nouns from Verbal Roots
Pänini generally accepts the view that verbal roots are the basic
units to which affixes are added. But he does not accept Säkatäyana's
view that all nouns are derivable from verbal roots. The Unädisütras,
explaining the derivation of irregular nouns from verbal roots, are not
Pänini's, though Pänini was aware of such attempts (3.3.1, 3.4.75).
Patanjali refers to such irregular nouns as nonderivable nominal
bases.5 Pänini seems to accept Gärgya's view that it is not possible to
derive all nouns from verbal roots.6

Syntax
Pänini is mainly concerned with the formation of correct words.
But syntax is not completely excluded. His system implies a sentence
analysis, and his discussion of compound formations is based on syn-
tactic considerations.
Rule 2.1.1 is samärthah padauidhih, "an operation involving two or
more words {padas) applies only to such words as are syntactically and
semantically related." The term samarihya is explained by Patanjali
and Kätyäyana as implying unity of semantic function (ekârthïbhava)
and mutual syntactic connection (parasparâ vyapéksa).
Thus Pänini's concept of a sentence seems to be almost the same as
that of Jaimini, whose Mïmâmsâsutra defines it thus: "A group of words
serving a single purpose forms a sentence if on analysis the separate
words are found to have mutual expectancy."7
Of the three conditions of syntactic unity for a sentence, namely,
mutual expectancy {akanksa)^ phonetic contiguity (sannidhi), and
semantic fitness {yogyatä), the first two are tacitly accepted by Pänini
but not the third. Pänini does not make any provision for an utterance
derived by his rules to be semanticalJy appropriate; even deviant
and semantically unacceptable sentences can be grammatically correct.
Pänini does not define a sentence (uâkya). Kätyäyana's definition
{ekatin vâkyam), "a sentence is that collection of words having one
finite verb," does not seem to reflect Pänini's view. Pänini's rule "an
item terminating in a verbal ending (tin) has no high pitched vowel,
after an item that terminates in an ending other than a verbal ending
{tin atinah)" (8.1.28), shows that Pänini accepted the possibility of a
finite verb preceded by another finite verb in the same sentence.8

Laksanä or Secondary Meaning

Pänini sanctions the nominative case ending not only for the nominal
Stem notion (pratipädika) but also for indicating the additional notions
PÄNINI'S ASTÂDHYÂYÏ 113

of gender, measure and number. The rule reads: "The nominative

ending is to be added when there is nothing but the nominal stem
notion, nothing but the gender, nothing but the measure, nothing but
the number" (2.3.46).
From the discussion of the term "measure" {parimâna) in this rule
by later writers it is clear that Pänini wanted to justify the nominative
ending in transferred uses such as that of the container for the contained.
Jinendrabuddhi explains that the term parimâna here is an indicator
(upalaksana) of other transferred senses, as in "the boy is a lion"
(simho mänavahah).9 The term "measure" sanctions use of the nomina-
tive in cases like "a measure of grain" (prastho vrihih), in which there
is the additional notion of being measured by; hence even in cases like
"the Brähmana is fire," in which the additional notion of "similarity
to the fire" is to be indicated, the nominative ending is justified.
From the preceding it is clear that Pânini did not accept secondary
meaning as a separate function of words, for otherwise there was no
need to include measure in the sütra.
Explaining the sütra 1.4.42, sadhakatamam karanam ("karana is that
instrument which is the most immediate one in accomplishing action" ),
Patanjali says that the use of the superlative tama here is to indicate
that the rules relating to the case endings (kâraka) may be applied even
in extended cases, not only to those expressly stated but also to those
implied thereby. Thus instances of implied usages of secondary meaning
could also come under the scope of that sütra. For example, proximity
can be one of the implied meanings of the locative case, and gangayam
gavah^ "cows on the Ganges," can come under the purview of the
rule governing the locative.

Reference and Use

The dual function of an expression to refer to both its own form and
its meaning is noted by Pänini. Rule 1.1.68 ("svam rüpam sabdasyä-
sabdasamjfiä" ) states that in his grammatical text an expression
serves to denote itself unless it is a technical term.
In ordinary language a word normally refers to its meaning unless
it is a quotation ; and usually to indicate that it is a quotation the word
iti (thus) is added at the end of the word quoted. But in grammatical
metalanguage, a word normally refers to its own form except when it
is a technical term. The rule agner dhak (4.3.23) introduces dhak eya
after the term agni; the suffix is applied to the form agni and obviously
not to its meaning (or synonyms). When iti is added to an expression
in a rule, the preceding refers to the meaning and not to the form; thus
in na veti vibhasa the sanctioning option applies to the meaning "or not"
and not to the form na va,10
 PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN
PATANJALFS MAHÄBHÄSYA
K. Kunjunni Raja

Patafijali's Mahabhâsya of the second century B.C. is an extensive

discussion of select rules from Pänini and Kätyäyana's comments on
them given in his värttikas. It is not a full commentary on Pänini's
AstädhyäyL It incorporates Kätyäyana's värttikas; it also contains
vârttika-lïke statements in verse (called Üokavarttikas). It is an elaborate
commentary that analyzes each rule into its components, adding
items necessary to the understanding of the rule, giving examples and
counterexamples illustrating how the rule operates and discussing the
need for the värttikas to bring out the full significance of Pänini's sütra
or to account for usages apparently not covered by the ruj.e or against
the rule. Both Kätyäyana and Patanjali wanted to test the validity
and consistency of the rules. Some scholars have suggested that histo-
rical changes in Sanskrit are responsible for Kätyäyana's comments
that modify and correct Pänini. Patanjali often presents arguments to
support or reject several views, leaving it difficult to know his "finally
accepted view" (siddhânta).
As far as the philosophical ideas are concerned, Patanjali seems to
have been influenced by Vyädi's Samgraha, which is not extant; he
quotes many ideas from the Samgraha with approval. Most of the philo-
sophical ideas are found in the introductory section.

Sabda and Artha

Patanjali discusses whether the relation between a linguistic item
{sabda) and its meaning {artha) is permanent or the invention of
someone. A linguistic item, according to the grammarian, is not merely
the sound but that unit (or symbol) which, when articulated, brings
about the notion of the thing meant,1
116 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

"What is the word 'cow5? It is that by means of which, when uttered,

there arises the understanding of creatures with dewlap, tail, hump,
hooves, and horns."2 The commentators have made it clear that the
term "uttered" (uccarita) is used in the sense of "revealed" or brought
to light (abhivyakta). Thus Patanjali lays special emphasis on the fact
that a linguistic item is a word only when it has a meaning. This concept
contradicts the Mïmâmsâ view that an aggregate of letters, when mani-
fested, is a linguistic utterance, even when there is no meaning or when
the meaning is not understood.3
A linguistic item is considered eternal and not capable of being
newly produced. Patanjali says that one goes to a potter requesting him
to make a pot so that one may use it; but one does not go to a gramma-
rian with the request to make new words so that one may use them. A
distinction is made between absolute eternality (kütastha nityatä) and
the permanence of the items as used through generations by speakers
[pravähanityata). Bhartrhari distinguishes between normal permanent
words in a language (ajänika) and modern technical terms coined by
writers like Pânini (âdhunika).
Regarding the meaning of a word, the problem discussed is whether
it is the universal (jati) or the individual {dravya). According to
Patanjali, Pänini accepted both as meanings, and in either case
' 'meaning" refers to something permanent.4
The relation between linguistic item and meaning is established
(siddha) and is known from the usage of educated people.5
Are Letters Meaningful?
On the one hand, letters may be said to be meaningful, because
meaning can be understood from verbal roots, stems, suffixes, or
particles that consist of a single letter, and also because the substitution
of a different letter can produce a different meaning, while the absence
of a letter may make it impossible to understand the meaning of a word.
On the other hand, it may also be said that letters are meaningless in
themselves, because a meaning is not understood by the hearer from
each letter separately.6 Patanjali does not give any final answer to this
question. Unlike Bhartrhari, Patanjali did not consider the word to be
an indivisible * and timeless symbol, apart from the letters that are
revealed when the word is uttered.

The Primary Meaning of a Word

Patanjali discusses the problem of whether the primary meaning of a
nominal word is the particular substantive or the universal essential
attribute. Among grammarians Vyädi, author of the Samgraha, held
that a word primarily denotes a substance {dravya), while Väjapyäyana
PATANJALl's MAHÄBHÄSYA 117

held the Mïmâmsaka view that it is the universal (jâti) that forms the
primary meaning of a word.7
Patanjali says that according to Pänini the primary meaning of a
word is both the universal and the particular, for sütra 1.2.588 is based
on the view that a word means the universal, while sütra 1.2.649 is based
on the assumption that a word means a particular.10 Heläräja says that
according to the school of Pänini a word means both the universal and
the particular11
Bhartrhari discusses elaborately the various problems involved in
these two views and concludes that whether the meaning of a word is
the universal or the substance it is something real and permanent.
Patanjali has also denned an "individual" {dravya) as that which does
not lose its essence when different qualities come to inhere in it.12
(
Perception of a Temporal Series "
Patanjali and Kätyäyana discuss the problem of how a word can be
grasped as a whole, if the different sounds come one after another in
the exact order in which they are uttered and there is not a single
moment in which all of the sounds are perceived together.13
Taking the example of the word for cow, gauh, he says, "When the
speech is in g, it cannot be in au and h; when it is in au, it cannot be
in g and A, and when it is in h, it cannot be in g and au, ... Each letter
requires a special effort to produce it, and it disappears as the effort is
changed to produce the next letter."14
Patanjali solves the problem thus: even though the letters cannot
coexist at the time of utterance, they can do so in the mind of the
speaker as well as in that of the listeners; the sequence of the letters is
also to be grasped in the mind on the basis of the meaning.15 Patanjali
does not discuss the problem in detail ; but he says that the simultaneous
grasping of the word as a whole is somehow effected in the mind, even
though the letters that make it up are pronounced separately.
Patanjali's View of the Sphota
Patanjali distinguishes between sphota and dhvani. The former is the
permanent element in the word and may be considered the essential
word, while the latter is the actualized and ephemeral element and an
attribute of the former.16
The sphota as described by Patanjali may be a single letter or a fixed
pattern of letters. It is the norm: it remains constant and is not affected
by the peculiarities of the individual speakers. Even when pronounced
by different speakers with different tempos its linguistic value is the
same. The absolute vowel length and the individual peculiarities of the
particular instances are the sounds {dhvani) and depend on the indi-
viduality of the speaker and on the effort with which the words are
118 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

uttered. The sphota is permanent and unchanging and is manifested by

the ephemeral sounds uttered by the speaker and heard by the listener,
which are analogous to Bhartrhari's prâkrta sound and vaikrta sound.
This distinction is supposed to have been made by Vyädi, author of
the Samgraha. Vâkyapadiya 1.77,17 defining the two types of sounds, is
ascribed to Vyädi by commentators. According to this account, prâkrta
sound ( = Patanjali's sphota) causes the perception of letters, and
vaikrta sound ( = Patanjali's dhvani) causes the differences in speed of
utterance.
Kätyäyana on 1.1.70 says that the letters are fixed and that the styles
of diction depend on the speech habits of the speaker.18 Explaining this
concept, Patanjali illustrates it with the analogy of a drum beat: "When
a drum is struck, one drum beat may travel twenty feet, another thirty,
another forty; but the sphota is precisely such and such a size, the
increase in length is caused by the sound."19 Patanjali uses the term
sphota even to designate a single letter (varna) :20 "In both cases (r and
/) it is only the sphota that is taught in the sütra"
Gender
The Mahabhâsya on sütra 4.1.3 takes up the question of grammatical
gender and first attempts to correlate it with sex: "A female is charac-
terized by breasts and hair, a male by his body hair, and the others by
neither."21 But this concept of gender (linga) does not apply to Sanskrit
grammar. So Patanjali tries to explain grammatical gender in terms of
the constituents (gunas). He states clearly that the grammarians cannot
take the grammatical gender to be the same as the gender of normal
worldly usage (referring to the sex).22 Every object is characterized by
different states of constituent element (guna), and these states constitute
the gender of the thing.23 Patanjali does not refer to the three Sâmkhya
gunas of sattva, rajas, and tamas here; but later commentators consider
that they are implied.
Patanjali also proposed a formal definition of grammatical gender:
that which is referred to by the pronoun ay am is masculine, that which
is referred to by iyam is feminine, that which is referred to by idam is
neuter.
Purpose of Studying Grammar
One who knows the correct formation of words [ßabdasamskara) can
discriminate correct words (sâdhu) from incorrect words. Although
communication may be possible even by using incorrect words, it is
only by the use of proper words that one achieves merit (dharma).
While discussing the Vedic hymn beginning "catvâri smgäh..."
Patanjali does not refer to the later theory of Bhartrhari according to
which the symbolic meaning of the passage refers to the four stages in
PATANJALl's MAHÂBHÂÇYA 119

the evolution of speech from the highest speech principle—para, pasyanti,

madhyamâ, and vaikhari. The "four horns of the bull55 are explained by
Patanjali as the four classes of words, noun, verb, prefix, and particle
(nâmâkhyâtopasarganipâtâh ) .
 BHARTRHARI

The central figure of the philosophical development of grammar is

Bhartrhari, whose dates are still in dispute, though recent scholarship
has come to general agreement about their likely confines. It has been
shown that quotations from Bhartrhari's works appear in the
Pramanasamuccaya of Dignäga, the great Buddhist logician, who must
be dated in the fifth and sixth centuries. Furthermore, Sirnhasürigani,
a sixth-century Jain writer, tells us that Bhartrhari studied under a
Grammarian named Vasurâta, whom he identifies as a brother-in-law
of a pupil of another famous Buddhist, Vasubandhu. Erich Frauwallner
suggests, on the basis of these considerations, that because Dignäga
presumably flourished between A.D. 485 and 540, we may date
Bhartrhari between 450 and 510 and Vasurâta between 430 and 490.1
These dates are accepted by most recent scholarship as the best we can
currently do.
As with many great figures of classical times in India, a large number
of works have been attributed to Bhartrhari, and once again current
scholarship has hardly settled all questions concerning the authenticity
of some of these claims. By definition, the Bhartrhari we are speaking
of is the author of the work that is regularly referred to as the
Vâkyapadîya, a seminal work on Grammar and grammatical philosophy
the influence of which, though difficult to calculate precisely, is
certainly considerable in subsequent philosophical developments, both
within Grammar and outside it. This work has three chapters, and it
was more properly termed Trikândi on that account. Ashok Aklujkar
has argued that only the first two chapters constitute the Vâkyapddiya.
It seems likely that Bhartrhari also composed the commentary called
vrtti on at least the first two chapters of the Trikândi.2' Beside this body
of literature—verses and prose commentary—Bhartrhari apparently
also wrote a commentary—or part of one—on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya.
Again, the proper title is a matter of discussion: Aklujkar points out
122 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

that the title Tripadi for it has extensive sanction among early commen-
tators in the grammatical tradition, while the title under which it is
frequently known nowadays, Mahâbhâsyadipikâ, has only one manu-
script mention in its favor. No doubt the work is referred to regularly
as a tikä on the Mahabhâsya. It seems likely that it was a lengthy work,
perhaps covering the entire scope of Patanjali's masterpiece, though
only a small portion is now available.
There are occasional references to another work, called Sabdadhâtu-
samiksâ, which is attributed to Bhartrhari by Somänanda and
Utpalâcârya, two Kashmiri Saivas of the ninth and tenth centuries.
Utpalâcârya indicates that in this work Bhartrhari set forth the kind of
awareness he calls pasyanti, which is also discussed in the Trikândi. This
work has unfortunately not been preserved, as far as we can tell.
Indian tradition identifies Bhartrhari the Grammarian with the
famous poet who wrote the Subhâsitatrisati, three sets of a hundred
stanzas each bearing the titles of Niti-, Srngara-, and Vairägya-sataka.
Actually, the number of stanzas is many hundreds more than three
hundred, which complicates the arguments on identity of authorship
perhaps beyond hope of any definitive solution.

BRIEF ANALYSIS
Ashok Aklujkar

Language
( 1 ) Language (yak ) has four levels or phases : speech (vaikhari ), men-
tal/intellectual or potential speech (madhyamâ), latent totality of units
(pasyanti), and pure, basic language principle (para pasyanti-rüpa).
(2) Viewed as a specific totality or sign system, language consists of
three classes of units : phoneme (varna), word (pada), and sentence
(vakya).
(3) If what is cognized is a meaning having no expectancy for an
unused or absent word, then its signifier is a sentence. Such a signifier
may consist of only one word.
(4) A single phoneme signifying some fairly well-associated meaning
is a word.
(5) The sentence, word, and phoneme are unitary entities (sphota).
Only while being perceived (due to association with sound, which by
nature has a sequence) and when conscious or subconscious gram-
matical analysis is being carried out do they appear to be made up
of parts. Even so, the parts, though accepted commonsensically and on
the level of analysis, do not exhaust the wholes.
(6) The linguistic units sentence, word, and phoneme can be re-
garded either as universals (sabdâkrti) or as particulars (sabdavyakti)*
 123

(7) The linguistic units are permanent (nitya).3

( 8) The sentence is the primary linguistic unit.
(9) Language is infinite. There is no numerical limit to the
sentences possible in a language.
(10) Sentence meaning is the direct or indirect basis of meaning at
other linguistic levels. It is in the form of an action-oriented cognition or
"intuition55 (pratibhâ). It comes into being through the instrumentality
of word meanings but is not confined to them. As an event, it is a unitary
entity. On the level of analysis, it can be conceived in various ways: as
a coalescence (samsarga) of general word meanings; as a meaning that
comes in"addition (ädhikya) to the word meanings; as differentiation
(bheda, apoha) from entities that are not intended; as establishment of a
relation (sambandha); as relation that brings, words, associated with
general (sâmânya) meanings, into association with specific or qualified
(viÊista)^meanings; and as action as cognized from the verb (not the
physical action) and as qualified by the meanings of other sentence
components {viiista kriya).
(11) Word meanings are of the signified (vâcya, denotatum) or cosigni-
fied (dyotya, functional/grammatical) variety. The former are meanings
that are entirely unsignified prior to the use of words that signify them
(consider the meanings of "bull,55 "white,55 and "moves").The latter
are meanings that are possibly signified but are not definitely known
before the use of appropriate signifiers (consider the meaning of "and"
as revealed by the pair of phrases "Devadatta Dittha" and "Devadatta
andDittha").
(12) Signified (väcya) meanings have either a reified, accomplished
(siddha) nature or a sequential, to-be-accomplished {sâdhya) nature. If
a pronoun can stand for what a word signifies, then that signified
belongs to the former category.
(-13) Meanings of words, whether compound (urtti, samasta) or non-
compound (asàmasta), are unitary at the level of ordinary communica-
tion; they come to be viewed as made of parts on the level of analysis,
(14) Word meanings are primarily mental or intellectual entities
(buddhyartha), only secondarily and not always physical entities
{vastvartha). As mental entities, they are not just "images55. In fact, in
the ultimate analysis, meanings have no existence apart from the
linguistic units, which are also mental, that signify them.
(15 ) Word meanings, entertained as separate entities for the sake of
analysis and in deference to the common way of thinking, can be regar-
ded either as particulars or as universals.
(16) The relation between a word and its meaning can be charac-
terized in several ways : as the relation of capability (yogyata), as a cause-
and-effect relation (käryakaranabhäva), and as one of identification or
superimposition (abhedâdhyaropa or adhyâsa). Under any of these charac-
124 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

terizations, the relation is permanent (nitya), in different senses of the

word "permanent." 4 When a convention of the type "X means
Xx" is established, "X" is not newly made capable of signifying
"X^9; only its capacity is thereby restricted.
(17) Language is innate and without a beginning. It has been in
existence as long as living beings have been in existence.
Epistemology
(1 ) In the sphere of ordinary experience there is no cognition that
is not oriented to some kind of object, nor is there a cognition that is
purely of the thing or physical reality. Linguistic expressions and the
conceptual scheme they embody invariably figure in cognitions.
(2 ) No type of cognition (perceptual, inferential, testimonial) points
to reality without ever failing. Validity is not a built-in feature of any
type. It can be determined only by testing the content of the cognition
under consideration against the totality of experience and the princi-
ples the totality has developed.
(3) All cognitions are infused with language in one way or another.
( 4) Extraordinary cognitions—in other words, cognitions that trans-
cend the limitations of ordinary cognitions in terms of dependence on
objects, reflection of preconceptions, validity, and presence of
linguistic expressions—are possible in the case of those who have
spiritually perfected themselves; but such cognitions are not the basis
of worldly communication and conceptualization.
(5) Every cognition is unitary, that is, devoid of divison and
sequence. It appears as having parts or distinct elements (mâtrâ)
because the diversity of its objects is transferred to it.
(6) The similarity and hence the universal [sâmânya) of cognitions
are derived from the similarity of objects reflected in them.
(7) A cognition as an event, in its own consciousness form {samvida-
kara), does not ever become an object of cognition; it is self-manifest.
(8 ) All cognitions enjoy the same period of existence.
(9) The distinctions drawn among sentience (citi), cognizer {buddhi)
proceeding toward cognizing, instrument of cognition, fact of cognition,
and the reflected form of the object are only conceptual; the entities
spoken of are not physically distinct.
(10) The intellect can unify, juxtapose, differentiate, and identify
entities irrespective of what obtains in the realm of perceptible reality.
Furthermore, it has a capacity to view its own constituents as external
to itself.
Ontology
( 1 ) We can determine the existence or nonexistence of something
only if it is reflected in cognition and hence in language.
BHARTRHARI 125

Ontic decisions differ with difference of perspective. A scaled or

tiered ontology is therefore to be preferred. For the grammarian or
linguist, who has to work with meanings, it suffices to accept the
existence of everything that language reflects as existing. By contrast,
one who is out to find out what really exists will realize that ultimately
only the physical things and the language principle exist; the rest of the
multiplicity of objects is simply a result of the interaction of these two
existents. Qualities (gunajdharma), capacities (sakti), relations (sam-
bandha), univèrsals (jâti), numbers (samkhyâ), phases (avasthä), group-
ing (sâhitya, sâmagrî, samüha), and absence (abhava) do not have any
existence of their own apart from the physical objects. Time (kala)
and space (dis) are, however, capacities and creations of the language
principle. To come to the third tier of ontology, the perspective is of
someone who wishes to go beyond worldly experience and existence.
For him only the language principle exists; the traces of physical things
that exist in the intellect in the form of specific linguistic expressions are
necessarily wiped out.
( 3 ) As a thing can be cognized and spoken of in a number of ways,
it can be viewed as a collection of capacities.
(4) Actions can first be grouped into six categories: "is born,"
"exists," "changes," "increases," "decreases," and "is destroyed." These
categories can be further reduced to three: "is born," "exists," and "is
destroyed." Because birth (or production) and destruction can be
proved to be only appearance and disappearance of the specific forms
of the thing (the thing is never entirely destroyed to be born or produced
again),, only "exists" or existence (sattä) ultimately remains.
New Contributions to the System
Bhartrhari's work is chronologically the fourth surviving work in the
Pâninian grammatical tradition. Much earlier literature that shaped
his thinking and much subsequent literature that could have indicated
the extent of his original contribution has been lost to us. Consequently,
one cannot determine with ease or certainty the contribution he made
to his system for the first time. Bhartrhari does not write in a way that
would set apart his views from those of his predecessors or contempora-
ries. Although one feels the assurance of an original, self-confident
thinker in his style, and the tradition speaks of his having held distinct
views,5 Bhartrhari makes neither a general claim of distinction nor
specific statements identifying his own views. The following observations
are, therefore, to be read as stating what is probably a new contribution.
(1); Grammar (vyäkarana) becomes a full-scale darsana, a purposive
view of reality, in Bhartrhari's work.
(2) Speculation on the nature and role of speech (vâc) going back
to the earliest Vedic philosophers combines in Bhartrhari's work with
126 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

descriptive grammar, which arose out of concern with Vedic texts.

Theories of grammar and theories of language are treated together in
a measure far surpassing that of earlier available works.

Trikândî OR Vakyapadiya, WITH Vrtti ON BOOKS 1 AND 2

Ashok Aklujkar, with Karl H. Potter

The summary that follows is the work of Ashok Aklujkar, with

occasional adumbrations by Karl H. Potter. E references are to the
editions by K.A. Subramania Iyer for book 1 (Deccan College Mono-
graph Series 32, Poona, 1966); by K. Raghavan Pillai for book 2
(Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971); and by K.V. Abhyankar and
V.P. Limaye for book 3 (University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series
2, Poona, 1965 ). T references are to the translation of K.A. Subramania
Iyer for book 1 (Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee
Series 26, Poona, 1965), book 2 (Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1977),
book 3, part 1 (Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee
Series 71, Poona, 1971 ), and book 3, part2 (MotilalBanarsidass, Delhi,

BOOK 1

1—4 (El ; T l ) . Brahman has neither beginning nor end, either

temporarily or spatially. It is the language principle (sabdatattva), the
permanent syllable (aksara). It turns into (vivartate) a temporarily real
multiplicity through its capacities of time and space.
Vrtti [El A4; 7T-3). Brahman is a principle beyond all conceptual
constructions (vikalpa). It has all powers (sakti) that are neither
identical with nor different from it. Its form is a disjunction of vidyâ
and auidyâ. Even though its manifestations appear as temporally and
spatially ordered, Brahman remains unaffected; it is free from spatial
or temporal limitations. All of its manifestations, though apparently
different from one another, are to be understood as linguistic, because
they share their generative source (prakrti). Because we grasp things
through language they must be recognized as sharing in the language
principle.
Brahman is said to be the permanent syllable because it is the
condition (nimitta) of the permanent syllable. Its individual manifesta-
tion (vyakti) takes place for the purpose of making known to others
what is inside each person's consciousness (caitanya).
"It turns into a temporarily real multiplicity"—that is, manifestation
(vivaria) is a single thing's taking on unreal (asatya) distinctions as
belonging to other things and without losing its own unitary nature; it
is like the appearances of contents in dream*
BHARTRHARI .127

(A number of verses follow that may or may not be quoted from else-
where. These verses develop the idea of an inner controller
[antaryämin], Brahman, who while remaining unaffected creates the
diversity of the world out of language.)
2 (#14; 7*4). This (Brahman), which has been traditionally taught
as single and appears to be many through its various powers, though
not sepaisate from its powers, appears to be so.
Vrtti on 2 (£14-17 ; 74). "Through its various powers" the language
principle, in which Brahman's powers are collected, remains one, just
as an awareness that comprehends many contents—earth, people,
and so oh—remains one. Thus the form [akara) of the awareness is
not different from the form of the contents, for the unity of the one is
not opposed to the diversity of the other. "Though not separate from
its powers," in other words, it is not that some of Brahman's powers
differ from others as, say, particulars and universals differ from each
other, but rather, just as in illumination the illuminator appears
different from what is illumined, though they are really identical
{tâdâtmya)) so it is here.
3 (#18; 7*5). The six modifications—birth and so on—are the
source of the distinctions among states (bhava), depending on the
temporal power [kälcüakii) of that (Brahman).
Vrtti on 3 (£18-20; T5). All (other) powers come to be in depen-
dence on the independent (power of) time. The apparent temporal
sequence of things is a function of the limitations of the powers things
have to take many forms, limitations operating through obstruction
and permission. Thus time is the auxiliary cause (sahakärikärana) of all
modifications, in virtue of its postponing or effecting their occurrence.
Because it thus produces sequential appearances, sequence is attributed
to it (time), as the lines of a scale that result from contact with the
thing being weighed are attributed to the scale. In this way the six
transformations (parinäma) or modifications—birth and so on—
become the source of the modifications in (types of) existence.
4 (£21 ; T6). That single seed of all things thus comes to have a
state of multiplicity as experiencer (bhoktr), experienced (bhokta), and
experience (bhoga).
5 (£22; 77). The Veda is both a means of attaining to and a
reflection of That (Brahman). Though single, the Veda has been
passed down by tradition in many different ways.
Vrtti on 5 (£22-26; 7*7-8). Attainment of Brahman is merely getting
beyond egoity. Others say it is the absorption of the modifications into
prakrti, or stopping the organs (vaikaranya), or contentment not as a
means (asädhana-paritrpti), or the Self, or desire for the Self, or not
having any adventitious thing as one's purpose, or possession of perfect-
ed powers, or escape from functioning in time, or attainment of np-self,
128 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

"A reflection" of Brahman means that the Vedas as language reflect

Brahman as our dreams reflect or suggest waking things..
6-10 (£27-38; T9-15). Brief discussion of Vedic branches and of
the Veda as a source of rites, smrti, philosophical schools, and tradi-
tional lore.
11 (£39; T16). Grammar is the first among the (six) auxiliary
sciences, the one nearest to Brahman, the best austerity.
Vrtti on 11 (£"40-41 ; 716-17). It is "first" because most important
in gaining the same results as knowledge of the Vedas. It is "nearest to
Brahman" because it is that science through which all the others
are understood. It is the "best austerity" in contrast to other forms of
austerity because it leads to the highest results.
12 (£41 ; 717). Grammar is the shortest path to attainment of the
highest essence (rasa) of speech (vac) that has become differentiated.
13 (£44; 719). On language depend the principles governing
practical purposive activities (arthapravrttitattva), and the under-
standing of the principles of language cannot occur except through
grammar.
Vrtti on 13 (£44-47; 719-20). The Sanskrit compound arthapravrt-
titattva is analyzed in six alternative ways. What depends on language
may be the expression of the speaker's intended meaning, the possibi-
lity of applying a word to a thing, the ability to combine words into
sentences, the connecting of objects with actions, identification of a
thing as to be accomplished, or the projection of the content of an aware-
ness as an external object. By "the principles of language" is meant
the proper forms of language.
14 (£47; 7*21). Grammar is the door to liberation, the remedy of
blemishes of speech, the purifier of all branches of knowledge.
Vnti on 14 (£47-49; 7*21-22). One who knows the correct forms of
language understands the nature of language; he then goes beyond
temporal sequence and gains union (yoga). Through the merit he gets
by his correct usage he attains union with the greatest language essence
(mahäntam sabdâtmanam) and is without organs. He thus reaches the
stage of undifferentiated speech and appreciates the chief among its
modes, namely, intuition (pratibha). Through that intuition and the
repetition of the union the highest prakrti, free from allmodes, is realized.
15-22 (£49-51 ; T22-23). These stanzas dwell on the importance of
grammar.
23 (£51; 7*24). Words, meanings, and their relations are held to
be permanent (nitya) in grammar.
Vrtti on 23 (£52-63; T24-28). The basis of the science (of grammar)
is that linguistic sounds, meanings, and the relation between the two
is permanent. Here by "linguistic sound" we intend the general feature
(âkrtï) of each word? not the differentiating genus of language a.s
BHARTRHARI 129

such. "Being a linguistic sound" is a property that inheres in a

thing along with a set of features (äkrti) that are mutually opposed to
other such features and so cannot coinhere with them in the same thing.
It is this specific generic feature—for example, the feature of the word
"tree"—that we call a "linguistic sound." Just as the universals
"substanceness," "earthness," and "potness" can all coinhere in a pot,
so in "tre^" the universals "being attributive" (gunatva), "being a
linguistic sound" (sabdatva), and "being the word 'tree5 " (vrksasabdatva)
coinhere.
Objection: The cases are not alike. The parts of a pot, which are not
pots, combine to cause the manifestation of an instance of the universal
potness. But the parts of a word do not combine to produce a linguistic
sound, for they do not exist at the same time. The universal being
a linguistic sound exists in each part of the word "tree," but if the
general feature specific to the word "tree" exists in each part of the
word "tree" we should think of trees as soon as we hear the first letter
of the word.
Answer: No. The analogy intended is with specific actions such as
lifting, turning, pouring, and the like, which arise successively and do
not manifest a whole as product. And just as one does not recognize,
say, lifting until it has gone on a bit, likewise one does not recognize
that "tree" is being spoken until that action goes on a bit, so that
several elements in the series manifesting that word can be grasped.
The initial sounds in the series prepare the hearer's mind so that when
the last sound occurs he recognizes the word. Grammarians do not
necessarily think of inherence as the medium by which a general feature
or universal is suggested to the hearer. There are, indeed, various
views among grammarians about the constitution of linguistic sounds
and the manner in which such a sound is made known.
24-26 (E64; T30). Grammar deals directly or indirectly with eight
topics: (1) meanings determined through analysis-—abstracted mea-
nings [apoddharapadärtha)\ (2) given or stable meanings (sthitalaksana
artha) ; (3) linguistic forms that are to be analyzed [anvakhyeya êabda) ;
(4) linguistic forms that figure in grammatical derivations {pratipâdaka
Êabda); (5) the cause-and-effect relation (kâryakâranabhàva sambandha);
(6) the relation of capability [yogyatä sambandha) ; (7) the relation (s)
that lead(s) to merit; and (8) the relation (s) that bring (s) about
communication {pratyayanga sambandha). This work takes up some of
these topics for consideration.
Vrtti on 24-26 (£65-81 ; T31-37). (1) Abstracted meanings are a
matter of theoretical preconceptions, choice and convenience for the
purposes of the science of Grammar. (2 ) Given meanings are those
conveyed by sentences, single despite being made known through
awareness of the separated word, meanings. (3 ) The linguistic forms
130 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

that are to be analyzed will differ depending on which of them, words

or sentences, are taken to be the limit (avadhi) of analysis, and this
factor also determines (4) the forms that will figure in grammatical
derivations. (The rest are explained in turn.)
Verbal complementation is necessary for sentencehood. Where no
specific action is mentioned, an action as existing is understood. Such
single words or phrases are in fact sentences.
27-29 (£81-84; T4Q-42). While both grammatical and ungramma-
tical expressions are means of communication, only the grammatical
ones are means of merit (dharma). Matters of merit are determined by
reference to tradition {agama) as maintained by the spiritual elite
{tista).
30-43 (£85-99 ; T42-51 ). Merit cannot be determined by tarka alone
without the help of the tradition. Even the sages got their awareness
of merit through the tradition. The traditions about merit cannot be
sublated by tarka, because they are accepted by the world (lokasiddha).
The natures of things are very difficult to establish by inference, because
they have different properties in different circumstances, because there
are obstructors to the normal powers of a thing, and because what is
inferred by a clever thinker can always be explained otherwise by one
cleverer. Expertise in jewels or coins comes from practice (abhyâsa),
not from inference, and the fathers (pitr), demons {raksas), and goblins
have powers born of their karma that go beyond what perception or
inference can explain, as well as the yogi's power to s.ee the past and the
future. We must depend on the tradition, which hands down the direct
awareness of people with such expertise and powers ; one does not set
it aside, any more than one sets one's own perception aside, on the basis
of mere reasoning. So the elite have explained language on the basis
of impersonal scientific treatises (sästra) and tradition (smrti).
Vrtti on 38 (£95-96; T48). Examples of things seen directly by those
sages responsible for ägama include the inner controller (antaryâmin),
atoms, unmanifest language-Brahman (anabhivyakta sabdabrahman), the
gods, the tendencies bred by action leading to one result rather than
others, the subtle body.
44-48 (£100-106; T52-55). Expressions that convey meaning,
including their own form as meaning6 (upadâna sabda), can be viewed
in two ways: as mental (buddhistha, sphota), as cause of expressions that
are heard; or as audible (sruti, dhvani\näda), as sequential sound that
conveys meaning. Just as the fire in the sticks (that are rubbed) is the
cause of the fire that springs up, likewise the language in the mind of
the speaker is the cause of the audible language expressing it.
Vrtti on 47-48 (£105-107; T55 56). When the speaker seeks to
superimpose linguistic form onto his intended meaning, the language
appears to change its nature into something else (the meaning) and to
BHARTRHARI ^ *

project it as sounds from the vocal organ. Thus the unchanging (avivar-
tamâna) language principle appears to be changing: in other words,
it manifests through the imperceptible pervasive dhvani-soxmàs those
grossftööfo-soundswhich are articulated by the vocal organs. These
gross fzatffo-sounds, though temporarily ordered in a sequence, illuminate
the sphota or mental language by obstructing it and permitting it (to
manifest in the temporal sequence). Thus the sphota, though single,
appears to have parts sequentially arranged.
49-52 (El 07-111; T56-58). Other similes illustrating the relation-
ships in question are now offered. The reflection in the water seems to
move because the water ripples, just as the sphota appears to be protrac-
ted or short, fast or slow through being "reflected in" the gross näda-
sounds. Or, just as awareness by nature grasps its own form as well as
that of its object, likewise in language the forms of both the meaning
and the language principle itself are illuminated. Again, a painter
paints in stages a figure he sees as a single thing.
53-54 (El 13-114; T59-60). Just as the speaker first thinks of the
linguistic forms one by one, so tbe initial awareness (vyavasäya) of
the hearer is produced from those (linguistic forms). But people,
intent on understanding the meaning, do not attend to the linguistic
forms per se.
VrHi on 53 (El 13; T59 60). Because the hearer is concentrating on
understanding the meaning (of the entire utterance), he does not
identify a linguistic form as a separate item. So the linguistic forms are
first experienced as primary in importance and then become secondary
to the production of meaning.
55-60 (El 15-119 ; T61 -64 ). Just as light has two powers, as grasper
and as grasped, so all linguistic forms have those two powers. Linguistic
forms by themselves do not convey any meaning; only when they
themselves become contents of awareness do they do so. That is why
when the nature of a linguistic form is not understood the speaker is
asked "what did you say?" It is unlike the case of the sense organs, which
are not grasped when they reveal their objects. The action subsequent
to the perception of a linguistic form sometimes has the form and some-
times the meaning, depending on the purpose in a particular context.
For example, grammatical operations pertain to the forms of expressions
covered by rules of grammar.
61-64 (El 20-122; T65-67). In any case, that which is uttered can
itself never be the object of the subsequent action; that object must be
what it conveys.
65-57 (El 24-127 ; 7138-70). An expression may not convey meanings
of other types, but it is never without its own form as meaning.
68-69 (El27; T70-71 ). Pänini's rule 1.1.68, "svamrüpam sabdasyä-
sabdasamjnä"? has been interpreted variously, depending on whether the
132 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

own form (svarüpa) of an expression is viewed as an individual (vyakti)

or a universal (jâti).
Vrtti on 68-69 (El27—132; 7*70-73). Some Grammarians hold that
unalloyed perception of and reference to individuals do take place;
others are of the view that expressions, having come into existence
because of the perception of universals, can refer to individuals only as
colored by the universals.
70-74 (El 33-139; T74-77). Some Grammarians say that (a linguis-
tic form) is single, whether it be held to be a product or to be permanent;
others say it is many whether it be produced or eternal. Some view
realizations of an expression in different phonetic contexts as the pre-
sence of the same permanent individual; others as presence of what is
felt to be the same but has in fact perished with each occurrence; still
others as occurrence of what must be assumed to be the same for the
sake of communication. Furthermore, there are thinkers who view all
such realizations as different either because one permanent expression
cannot become part of another permanent expression (then the latter
will have parts and be impermanent) or because expressions are not
permanent and hence cannot last long enough to become part of some
other expression.
75-77 (£140-143; T78-80). Sphota, though without temporal dis-
tinctions, appears to have temporal divisions of two kinds : difference
in the form of short vowel or long vowel, and so on;7 and difference in
the form of a quick {druta), medium (madhyama), or slow (vilambita)
pace of utterance, due to division in the manifesting sound (dhvani).
A part of the sound is the minimum needed for the manifestation of
the linguistic units (präkrta dhvani) ; the remainder, if any, simply keeps
the manifestation in effect for a longer time (vaikrta dhvani). The former
is related to the distinction conveyed by "short," and so on, the latter
to the distinction conveyed by "fast," and so on.
78-80 (£144-146; T81-82). How exactly the sound manifests the
sphota is variously understood. Some think that a dispositional tendency
(samskara) is produced in the auditory sense organ, others that it is
produced in the linguistic form, and still others that it is produced in
both. Only the organ is conditioned by applying ointment or by concen-
tration (samâdhâna), say the first group. But those who believe that the
visual organ goes out to reach its object hold that both the content and
the organ are conditioned by light, and thus the analogous view about
sounds.
Vnti on 78-80 (£145-146; T81-82). That is to say, some think that
the sound, when it has arisen, conditions the auditory sense and that
the auditory sense, thus conditioned, becomes the means of auditory
awareness. The second view mentioned is that it is the linguistic form
that, conditioned by relation to the sound, is the content of the auditory
ÊHARTRHARÏ Î33

experience. The third view is that the sound conditions both the linguis-
tic form and the auditory organ, which, along with other causal factors,
produce awareness that has the linguistic form as content. This view
is analogous to the view, mentioned in the text, about the way light
conditions both sense organ and object in perception by those who
think the organ goes out.
81 (£f47; T83). Some Grammarians say that the sound is cognized
as being the same as the sphota. Others say the sound is not cognized at
all. Still others say that it is cognized as an independent thing.
82-92 (.El48-157; T84-90). There is no doubt, however, that the
manifestation (of the linguistic form) is gradual. Each succeeding
element of the sound continuum serves to make the nature of the inten-
ded sphota clearer and clearer. There are sometimes interim cognitions
of units other than the one intended—of units that could be regarded
as parts of the intended unit. They are an unavoidable feature of the
medium of manifestation and a consequence of the nature of the hearer's
cognitive mechanism. They are instrumental in producing the final
cognition, but they are not parts of it.
Vrtti on 92 (£157-158; T90-91 ). The Bhedavâdins (believers in the
ultimacy of distinctions between phoneme meanings) think that the
word "cow" is just the several phonemes c, o> and w and that there is no
indivisible linguistic form that they express and that is cognized by
the understanding hearer. But according to their view, because the
parts are manifested in sequence no single nature (of the linguistic
.form) could be cognized, and the final cognition in the series would
have no content. A second view would be that all the parts, being
eternal, are manifested at once, but then there would be no difference
between the nature of the sounds "vega" and "gave."
93-94 (£159-160; T91-92). The sphota is held by some to be a
universal that is manifested by the individuals, the sounds.8 Others
go beyond the level of specific units, where the distinction of universal
versus particular is applicable, and think of one linguistic form (that is,
one sphofa) being manifested in various forms.
Vrtti on 95 (£161 ; T92-93). Objection: The linguistic form is noneter-
nal, because it is manifested, like a jar.
95 (£161 ; T92). Answer: Manifestation does not only occur in that
which is noneternal; it is also seen that eternal universals are manifested
by their individual (instances).
Vrtti on 96 (£162 ; T93-94 ). Objection : Linguistic forms are not mani-
fested, because the manifester and the manifested are in different
places—the linguistic forms are in one place, the vocal organs elsewhere.
96 (£162; T93). Answer: Only embodied things (käyavat) can occupy
places. Neither sounds nor linguistic forms are actually located any-
where in space.
i34 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Vrtti on 97 (£163; T94). Objection: Linguistic forms are not mani-

fested, because their so-called "manifesters" are regulated—the sounds
that cause the manifestation of a particular phoneme cannot manifest
any other phoneme—while manifested things, properly speaking, can
always be manifested by several alternative things; a jar can be mani-
fested—in other words, made a content of awareness—by a jewel or
a lamp or some other source of illumination.
97 (£1 63; T94). Answer: Just as the fitness of a certain kind of sense
quality to be the manifestation of a certain kind of sense organ is
regular, so particular sounds are likewise fit to be manifested only by
sphota.
Vrtti on 99 (£164-165; T95-96) Objection: A linguistic form is
not manifested, because we find that its manifesters undergo increase
and decrease and difference in number depending on the way the
vocal organ is used, and in proper cases of manifestation, such as
illumination by a lamp, such changes in the manifesters never take
place.
99 (£164; 7"95). Answer: There are many kinds of manifestation;
consider a mirror, which manifests everything reflected in it; these
reflected things change in various ways, but the mirror remains one.
Vrtti on 99 (£165; 7*96). Objection: In the case of the mirror the
prototype, for example, the moon, gets into the mirror.
100 (£165; T97). Answer: Big objects like the moon or a mountain
cannot get into small objects, like a mirror or a diamond !
101 (£166; T97). So, phonemes, words, and sentences, which are
without temporal distinctions, are taken to have such because of the
temporal differences of their manifesting sounds.
102-107 (£167-173; T97-101). The terms sphota, dhvani, and nada
have been understood differently by those who do not advocate per-
manency. The explanation of short vowels, long vowels, and the like
given by these thinkers is also different.
Vrtti on 102-107 (£167-177; T9 8-101). They hold the sphota tobe
the first sound produced by the vocal organ. The dhvanis, according
to them, are the resulting sounds, which spread out from that first
sound and by hearing which awareness of the sphota or first sound is
made possible. Some say that the term nada refers to what is manifested
by the dhvanis that result from the activity of the vocal organ. Still
others think that the sphota and the dhvani come into existence at the
same time; the sphota is the meaningful sound, the dhvani mere articula-
ted sound. There is no consensus on this matter.
108-119 of Vrtti (£177-195; 7102-106). The process of speech
production can be described variously.
112-114 (of £183-188), 120-122 (of 7107-11Q). Knowers of the
tradition say that the world is the transformation of language. All
ÉHARTRHARÎ 135

understanding of what is to be done (itikartavyata) depends on lan-

guage. Even the child understands, because he has dispositional tenden-
cies arising from prior births. Without such dispositional tendencies
the child would not attempt to produce linguistic sounds.
Vrtti on the preceding. What exists is as good as nonexistent unless
it is spoken of. And even completely nonexistent things such as a hare's
horn or the city of the Gandharvas can be involved in our activities
like something real, provided they are brought to mind by hearing
language. Because children have speech in them through the traces born
of their use of language in previous births, they come to understand
how to act purposively through awareness based vaguely on heard
language. Children's attempts to speak are not taught them by others
but arise by intuition.
115-117 (of £188-192); 123-125 (of Til 0-112). Language infuses
all cognition. Without this close relationship between awareness and
language nothing would become known; it makes identification of
things possible. Language is the basis of all branches of knowledge
(vidyâ), or all crafts {supa) and arts (kalä).
Vrtti on the preceding. When the linguistic bhävanä is restrained, no
(practical) effect is produced from the nonconceptual (avikalpaka)
awareness that arises with regard to objects. For example, when walk-
ing quickly over earth and grass one is not aware of them and does
nothing to or with them. But when the seed of the linguistic bhävanä
is awakened and the powers of words to express meanings are manifes-
ted, then the object becomes cognized as having a certain form; thus
the object is clearly conceived and can be identified as having a certain
form, and we are said to be aware of it. And when this language seed
is awakened through certain other causal conditions it produces
memory. Some teachers say that sleeping persons have awarenesses
just like waking persons; the only difference is that the language-
bhavanâ-seeds operate subtly in dreams—that is why that state is
called "darkness." Finally, it is because of this close relation between
language and cognition that we are able to understand the meaning
of a sentence from hearirig the words.
118-119 (of £193-195), 126-127 (of 7113-114). The consciousness
of all transmigrating beings does not go beyond language. The linguis-
tic form that makes possible waking-state activities that are effective
also becomes the object of effective activities in dreams,
120-123 (of £196-201), 128-131 (of Til 5-118). Some take every-
thing to be merely the self (svamätra) ; others claim that everything is
merely the Highest (paramätra) ; in any case, as things are presented by
language so they are understood; the object is established by language.
Even such a thing as the "circle of fire" {alätacakra), which is not an
actual object, is brought clearly to mind by language describing it.
iâ6 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Because the Self is that with which one desires union and that Self is
the language within us, one attains that highest Self {paramatman)
through purification (samskära) of language, and one who is aware of
the principles of language's activity attains immortal Brahman.
Vrtti on the preceding. The first view (svamätraväda) itself has varie-
ties, (a) There are those who think that all modifications are merely
the self, existing inside each person but appearing to be external—
"internal" and "external" being the results merely of usage. But that
is impossible, for that self is single and immaterial, (b) Other svamà-
travädins say that all awareness and all differences are transformations
(parinäma) of a single principle of conscious activity [citkriyätattva).
Likewise the second view (of paramatraväda) has varieties: some say
that consciousness (caitanya) is the source of beings that differentiate
themselves from it as oil from sesame seed, while others hold that it is
more like sparks from a fire, or trees from seeds. But actually it does
not matter whether an object exists externally; in either case it is always
connected with language as the thing expressed by a linguistic form.
Language is of two kinds, eternal and produced. The produced sort
is involved in usage and reflects the nature of language (or the self,
which is language). The eternal sort of language is the source of all
usage, unsequenced, within everyone, the seat of all modifications, the
locus of all actions, the basis of satisfaction and frustration, capable of
producing any effects anywhere but with its field of enjoyment re-
strained like a lamp covered by a jar, the limitless generating cause of
all beings...the Lord of all (sarvesvara), omnipotent (saruasaktir), the
great bull of language (mahän sabdavrsabha). Those who know linguis-
tic yoga (vägyogavida) break the knot of egoity and are united with
language without any distinction from it.
Well-being (abhyudaya) regularly follows upon purification of the
language principle of all incorrect forms. Then by practice, after union
with the language principle, and after having understood the intuition
of which the source is that language-piinciple, attainment of the
summum bonum (ksema) must follow.
124-133 (of £203-212), 132-141 (of 7119-124). The thesis that
expressions sanctioned by the grammar of the elite can lead to merit
can be supported in two ways. First of all, the thesis is a matter of
tradition. One can always refuse to follow any tradition or to inter-
pret the accepted tradition differently, but the only interpretation of
the tradition that is proper is that which does justice to the capacities
of words by taking into consideration their context, and so on. That
grammatical expressions are meritorious is such an interpretation.9
In the second place, once a tradition is accepted, it can be supported
by appropriate inference. Because pronunciation of certain words (in
mantras and hymns) produces perceptible results like the removal
BHARTRHARÎ 137

of poison and is said to produce imperceptible results of a specified

sort, one can infer that it is possible that knowledge and use of gramma*
tical expressions lead to merit. Grammar is a smrti preserved or com-
posed by the spiritual elite.
134 (of £213), 142 (of 7125). Grammar is the highest station of the
threefold speech (vac) of vaikhari, madhyamâ, andpasyanti, and it appears
in a different form in each of its loci.
Vrtti on the preceding. The "correct/incorrect" (sadhujasädhu)
distinction extends only to the first three levels of phases of speech.
Vaikhari is so called because it is cognized by others, is a content of
auditory awareness, and is regulated according to the nature of what is
heard. It is produced from a drum or a flute, and it? correctness or
incorrectness is well established, being mixed up with or manifested in
varnas. Madhyamä, however, resides within and seems to have sequence.
The intellect (buddhi) is its only substratum (upadäna). Some think
that even though sequence in it is suppressed, still it is accompanied
by subtle breath. Pasyanti is achieved when sequence is suppressed,
but it has the power to produce sequence even though it is without
distinctions. It is restless and concentrated, hidden and pure. It is
without form (niräkära), or the forms of the objects of knowledge have
been suppressed within it, but it may or may not appear to support
distinctions of different sorts of objects. But the higher form of parapas-
yanti is beyond ordinary usage and experience. It is not covered by
grammar, which can at the most be an indirect instrument in reaching
it. In the threefold speech there is innumerable variation. Not more
than one-quarter of speech appears in human beings, and even of that
one-quarter only a portion figures in communication. The rest remains
unrealized potential.
135-137 (of £221-225), 144-146 (of 7129-132). Grammatical
treatises are composed from time to time by the spiritual elite in defe-
rence to differing capacities of individuals and by taking into considera-
tion the changed capacities of expressions as far as merit and demerit
are concerned. It cleanses one's language.
Vrtti on the preceding. Some hold that scripture is authoritative
only about things that have invisible consequences (adrstaphala) and
hold human opinion to be doubtful and untrustworthy. They say
that both sruti and smrti are the product of a continuous tradition; sruti
(scripture) is preserved in the same versions according to strict rules
of expression, while smrti was composed by the elite at different times
and places in prose, poetry, or other forms.
Some teachers believe that no action has in itself a visible or an
invisible consequence. Rather, by acting contrary to scripture one
manifests demerit (pratyaväya), and by acting according to scripture
one manifests merit (dharma). Scripture itself teaches that, for example.
138 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

killing a brahmin is a sin in some contexts but a cause of exceeding

well-being in others. Others think that scripture only makes known
the particular power of each object known. Merit and demerit are
the results of the natures of substances, not of scripture; scripture
merely makes the natures of substances known.
138-147 (of £228-234), 147-155 (of T132-136). An apabhramsa or
incorrect linguistic form (asädhu sab da) is that expression which the
speaker employs with the intention of expressing the meaning associated
with a specific expression derived by grammar, but which turns out to
be different from that specific expression. Apabhramsas are not to be
determined by taking only the form into consideration; with change in
the intended meaning, an expression may cease to be apabhramsa. For
those accustomed to grammatical speech, the apabhramsas convey mean-
ing through the corresponding grammatical expressions. A reverse
phenomenon is noticed when those who habitually use apabhramsas
encounter grammatical speech.

BOOK 2

1-2 (£36; T l ) . A sentence has been characterized by "logicians"

(nyâyauadins) in at least eight ways: (1) as verb (akhyâta), (2) as a
collection of linguistic forms (sabda samghatd), (3) as the proper univer-
sal (jäti) that occurs in the collection (samghâtavartini), (4) as a single
partless linguistic form, (5) as a sequence (of words), (6) as what
hangs together in the intellect (buddhyanusamhrti), (7) as the first word
(pada âdya), and (8) as all the words severally possessing expectancy
(for each other, prthaksarvapada sakamksa).
3-6 (£36-37; T2-4). The definition of Kätyäyana, the author of the
Värttika (namely, "a sentence verb along with the indéclinables,
case words, and qualifiers") does not agree with the Mïmâmsâ defini-
tion, "that in which the words have mutual expectancy and which
does not require additional words, has action as its principal element,
has other subordinate words, and is a single linguistic form." Some
objections to Kätyäyana's definition are met.
7-12 (E37-39; T4-5). Just as that single entity which is the aware-
ness of all objects (sarvârthapratyaya) is differentiated according to the
distinctions among what is perceived, so it is with the awareness of the
meaning of the sentence. Just as one picture may be analyzed as having
colored parts, so the one sentence, without expectancy, is said to con-
tain linguistic forms that require each other. Just as a word can be
analyzed as having stem, suffix, and so on (as parts), so the sentence
can be analyzed as having words as parts. The parts of words are
meaningless, but they come to be communicative through analysis
by agreement and difference (anvayavyatireka).
ÖHARTRHARi 139

13—14 (£39 ; 7"6). A linguistic form has no disjunction, so its meaning

has none either. Only the ignorant thinks it actually does have parts.
Vrtti on 13-14. The sentence sphota is indivisible; its meaning—that
is to say, intuition (pratibha)—is likewise indivisible. It would be very
difficult to understand the meaning of a sentence without analyzing
it; nonetheless, a good student understands that such analysis is only
a, means to an end and that the linguistic form and meaning are
indivisible.
15-16 (£39-40; 77-8). The general (noncontextual) meaning (of
an earlier word in a sentence), having disappeared (after its utterance),
cannot remain in the particular meaning (it has in the context of the
other words in the sentence). By contrast, if the meaning of the sentence
is not a matter of the linguistic forms that express it, the same should be
held about the meaning of each word, so the relation between language
and meaning would be destroyed.
17-18 (£4Q;.r8-9). Some10 hold that the words of a sentence are
only apparently similar to words noticed in isolation or in other senten-
ces. The words of each sentence are in fact expressive of the sentence's
particular meaning right from the start; the understanding of the
sense becomes firmer as the sentence is gradually perceived. Thus,
each word bears the meaning of the entire sentence in which it figures.
19 (£"40-41; 7*9). When sentence and sentence meaning are said
to be unitary, the reference is not to language in the form of sound. In
addition to its speech form, audible to individuals other than the
speaker, language has upämsu ("audibility only to the speaker"),
paramopâmsu ("appearance of an expression only in the intellect"), and
pratisamhrtakrama ("latent, unthought expression" ) forms. Beyond these
four exists its undifferentiated form, bereft of sequence.11
20-21 (£41 ; 710). Just as a motion is not grasped as distinct even
though it is a particular movement, but when it is repeated its universal
property as, say, turning is manifested, so linguistic forms such as
phonemes, sentences, and words,, even though quite different from
each other, appear to be the same.
22-26 (£41-42; 7*11-13). How can an eternal thing really be earlier
or later than something? It only appears to be so through the power of
the one (the sentence sphota). And just as, though awarenesses that
something is "fast" or "slow" are without temporal extent, they appear
to be temporally characterized, so vowels appear to be long or short.
Time, which is eternal, cannot be differentiated through mätras belong-
ing to something else. But in the absence of distinct mâtrâs, how can
there be any sequence? The awareness produced by them (the mâtrâs)
is single and without parts; through its own power it seems to be
differentiated and to have sequence.
27 (£43; 713). This sequenceless (sentence) (seemingly) has the
140 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

power of having sequence when analyzed. So its meaning, though not

differentiated, is experienced as having distinctions.
Vrtti on 27. It is like space (dis), which has no division but which we
speak of as if it had them when we speak of "east", "west", and so on.
28-29 (£"43; T14). If these words are in the sentence, and those
phonemes are in the word, then in the phonemes there would be distinc-
tions of parts, such as atoms. As these parts cannot combine there would
be neither phoneme nor word—and then what could a word be?
Vrtti on 28-29. If it is held (as in view [2] of kârikâs 1-2) that a sen-
tence is a collection of linguistic forms, then words and phonemes also
in turn should be analyzed into components, say, atoms. But these
ultimate atoms-—by analogy with the process of analysis in question—
would not be simultaneous and could not contact each other, so no
phoneme, word, or sentence could result, for nothing could express any
meaning.
30 (£43; T15). Others (who espouse view [6] of kârikâs 1-2) say that
the single inner language principle is illuminated by the sounds [nada)
uttered, and that unity is in the sentence.
Vrtti on 30. They think that language is an inner consciousness that
becomes the sentence when manifested by the sounds considered
(wrongly) to be its parts. It is like the written symbols that are mistaken
for the word.
31 (£44 ; T\ 5 ). According to them the inner meaning is illuminated
by its parts. Linguistic form and meaning are inseparable divisions of a
single nature.
Vrtti on 31. There are two versions of this opinion. On the assumption
that external things are noneternal, the meanings reflected in the
intellect are taken to be identical with the external objects. On the
contrary assumption, that external object is eternal, it manifests itself
according to the power of sequence in the intellect. So, both word and
object meant are in the intellect. Another variation of this second
assumption is that the object is reflected in the intellect, which inheres
in the self that is pure consciousness but which assumes the form of the
intellect, so that the power of being what is experienced and of being
the experiencer, though actually belonging to different things, become
indistinguishable in the intellect. In any case, on all such views the
single intellect, in which the different powers of being meant and con-
veying meaning are not separated, is the locus of language—that is, of
the sentence.
32 (£44; Til), The language principle (sabdatattva), the nature of
which is essentially internal (antarmâtratman), is cause and effect, illumi-
nator as well as illumined.
Vrtti on 32. The linguistic principle, being identical with conscious-
ness, is beyond the distinctions of presence and absence.
BHARTÇ.HARI 141

33 (£44; T1S). That linguistic principle has the powers of existing

or not existing; without sequence, it appears to have sequence and thus
provides the basis for communication (vyauahara).
34-40 (£"44-46; T18-21). Several possible objections to the thesis of
tmitariness can be refuted. The thesis can also be supported with positive
arguments. Any view that admits actual presence of words in a sentence
at the time of sentence cognition can be shown to end up in an absurd
conclusion. Compound words serve as an analogy in that they are also
made up of words. In their case too logic demands that unitariness be
accepted.
41-43 (£46; T22-23). Some think of sentence meaning as that
additional element which comes about when words with their ordi-
nary, lexical meanings are joined by a relation. The substratum of this
additional meaning is given differently as each word constituting the
sentence and as the string of words taken as a whole.
44-46 (2246-47; T23 -24). Some think of sentencehood as consisting
in the delimiting or qualification, through being related, of a generality.
Capabilities of words are only circumscribed when they join to form a
sentence.
47-48 (£47; T24-25). Some think of words in a sentence as circum-
scribed or qulified right from the start. The adjacent fellow words simply
make the qualification manifest.
49-53 (£48;- T25-26). Some think of sequence as the crucial element
of a sentence. It is sequence that reveals the unrevealed distinctions,
already existent, of word meanings.
54-55 (£49; T26-2 7). Restatement of the preceding views.
56-57 (£49-50 ; 7~27 ). The sentence is the primary unit of language.
Words and word meanings are derivative.
58-59 (£50; 7*27-28). Vedic statements and Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
are cited in favor of the view that the sentence is an indivisible unit
(akhandapaksa).
60 (£50; 7*29). Just as the meaning of the word is not understood
from hearing any single phoneme, so the meaning of the sentence is not
understood from hearing any single word.
Vrtti on 60. Awareness of sentence meaning is self-illuminating, as
well as illuminating its content. Being self-illuminating, that awareness
is its own authority.
61-87 (£51-57; T29-42). Objection (by a Padavâdin, Mîmâmsaka, or
upholder of the thesis that it is words that are the primary units of
meaning) : Just as sentence meaning is understood when the words are
gathered together, so word meaning is understood when all of the
phonemes are together. We only see a small object when it is together
with others. So it is here. (1) If words did not have meaning, then it
would be impossible to understand as we do (for example) "sacrifice
142 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

with rice" as meaning c'sacrifice with a substance—rice if possible, if

not some other substance"; for if "rice" excluded all alternatives it
would exclude the meaning of substance as well. (2) If words had no
meanings of their own, then one could not inquire about the meaning
of an unfamiliar word. (3 ) The method proposed by Jaimini, which
requires distinguishing primary from secondary meanings, becomes
hopeless to apply, for one cannot distinguish between what is directly
meant by a word and what is secondarily meant. (4) A compound (or
complex) sentence is one in which the component clauses, through their
expectancy for one another, combine to convey the meaning of the
whole, which cannot happen according to the indivisible meaning
thesis. (5) Jaimini's exegetical rules require the recognition of the
meanings of iniividual words for their application. Because such mean-
ings are denied the rules cannot be applied.
88-94 (E57-59 ;T42-44). Answer: These arguments do not contradict
our position, for we hold that a sentence, even though its meaning is
indivisible, can be analyzed into smaller sentences (which can in turn
be analyzed along the lines proposed in the objections). It is like the
scent that appears different when found in distinct flowers, or like the
"cowness" that is (erroneously) ascribed to a gayal because we have not
previously seen a gayal; in the same way, when two sentences differ in
only one word, they appear to be similar, even though the two sentences
have entirely distinct unitary meanings. Just as light (prakâsa) and
consciousness (cetas), though each without parts, seem to be similar
to each other in one part and different in another, so the two sentence
meanings appear to resemble each other in one part and to differ in
another, though they are really without parts.
95-111 (£59-63; T45-49). There are several instances in which a
meaning is cognized, but its usual signifier is either not explicitly present
(because of extended meaning [tantra] , or some other factor) or is
present in an altered form (due to word-connection [sarndht] , a different
pronunciation, or the like). One who thinks that a sentence is maçle up
of distinct words even at the time it delivers its meaning will not be able
to account for this phenomenon.
112 (£63 ; T50). Answer to item (4) of the objections in 61-87 above:
In the case of one-word sentences (padasarüpa väkya) one can say that
what is ordinarily a constituent of a sentence has acquired an indepen-
dent meaning. Similarly, if a sentence embedded in a larger sentence
appears in separation, it will have an independent meaning.
113-115 (£"63-64; T50-51 ). Those who maintain that a sentence has
only purpose (prayojana) as its meaning, who say that it does not have
a lexical (abhidheya) meaning as words do, cannot account for the
relations between (such) sentences. But if it is (qualified) word mean-
ing that is Held to be revealed (by each succeeding word), the process
BHARTRHARI 143

will be one of recurrence (ävrtti) or restatement (anuvada). The

(sentence) meaning that is (said to be) complete with each (word, it
should be noted), comes about when those (words) are together.12
116-118 (£"64-65; T51-5 2). Various views are held regarding mean-
ing. Despite the sentence's having a single meaning, different opinions
(vikalpa) with respect to the topic are derived based on the (different)
experiences (bhävanä) (of their proponents). Some say that every
linguistic form causes an intuition {pratibha) through practice
(abhyasa), as is seen in the understanding of meanings by children and
animals. This practice is not a matter of tradition. Some say it is conven-
tional. It is of the form "this is to be done after that."
119-124 (£65-66; T53-54). There are twelve views of meaning that
take sentence meaning to be constituted from word meanings : (1 ) Each
linguistic form marks a notion that the form has a meaning, so that a
word like "cow's" meaning is like the meaning of words like apürva,
devata, or svarga (in other words, each one means merely that something
exists that corresponds to that form). The association of a linguistic item
with a specific feature comes through usage, perception, and practice;
it is not the content of the linguistic form, but is based on a distinct effprt.
(2) According to a second view, some distinctive features (bheda) are
revealed by the linguistic units that designate them. Some things that
are only subsequently (or incidentally) understood are then taken to
be the meanings of linguistic forms as well.
Critique of (2) : But a linguistic form, when it evokes the notion of the
generic property (jâti), does not evoke the idea of the individual
distinguishing features that are characterized by that generic property.
125-142 (£66-70; 7*55-60). (3) Others say that the designation of a
linguistic form is regular both as to usage (prayoga) (in other words,
what is implied) and means {sadhana) (that is to say, instrumentality to
a resulting action).
(4) The designation is a collection (samudaya), but without choice or
combination {avikalpasamuccaya).
(5 ) Meaning is a nonexistent {asatya) relation (between the word and
the property designated).
(6 ) Meaning is the relation with a linguistic form of something exis-
tent as obstructed (or conditioned, upâdhi) by what is nonexistent.
(7) Linguistic form and its meaning are the same thing. In ordinary
affairs the meaning is the more important aspect, but in grammar either
may be relevant according to the speaker's intention.
(8) Linguistic forms are invented so as to present in a manner regu-
lated by a single meaning a thing having in itself no power, (9 ) or all
powers.
(10) The meaning is an intellectual content (buddhivisaya) that is
related to an external object (bähyavastu) and is cognized as such.
144 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(11) Some (meanings) are based on manifested memories that have

distinct features. Others present themselves as bare awareness
{samvinmâtra).
(12) Just as a sense organ indicates its content in various ways, so
the meaning is conveyed through language in many ways. A linguistic
form intended by the speaker to mean one thing is heard as having
various meanings by different hearers. And even the same hearer, at
different times or different places, may understand a particular linguis-
tic form in different ways. Everyone but those who have seen the natures
of things are subject to this unreliability of language, and their visions,
though based on reality, cannot be made relevant to practical affairs
because those visions are not related to language. Language is no more
reliable than perception—both are subject to illusions. The wise man
should examine through reasoning (yukti) even what has been directly
presented by perception, and in speaking he should follow the conven-
tions of ordinary usage concerning objects, for they are difficult to
explain correctly.
143-152 (£70-72; T60-63). Sentence meaning is produced by word
meanings but is not constituted by them. Its form is that intuition, that
innate "know-how" awareness {pratibha) possessed by all beings. It is a
cognitive state evident to the hearer. It is not describable or definable,
but all practical activities depend on it directly or through recollection
of it. It comes to a person through maturing, just as animals and birds
know innately how to act. Intuition is said to have six varieties: (1 )
natural {svabhaua), (2) Vedic {carana), (3) through practice {abhyâsa),
(4) yogic {yoga), (5) through invisible factors {adrsta), and (6)
through instruction or intervention {upapadita).
Vrtti on 143-152. Examples of (1), the tendency of prakrti to evolve
into buddhi, and the like, or our natural tendency to wake up after sleep-
ing. Of (2), Vasistha's knowledge. Of (3), water divination. Of (4),
awareness of the contents of other people's minds. Of (5), the power of
Raksaokas to enter others' bodies. Of (6), Sanjaya's knowledge of the
progress of the Mahäbhärata wars through Krsnadvaipäyana's spe-
cially qualified reports.
153-163 (£72-74; T63-68) Just as the word "cow" designates things
that are associated with certain substances but does not itself designate
those substances, so the linguistic form used to designate cows associated
with a certain shape, color, and parts does not designate those portions.
But language fails to function in usage if it is separated from its designa-
tion, as opposed to separation from the associated features, which does
not preclude the functioning of language. Thus even though "cow" can
be used of something where hair, hoof, and so on, are missing, it cannot
be used where cowness is missing.
164-169 (£75-76 ; T68-71 ). There are different views regarding the
BHARTRHARI 145

way that number and other factors are conveyed by the combination
of suffix and stem or root. Some see no difference between the mode of
conveying meaning seen in the case of stems or roots and the mode of
conveying meaning seen in the case of suffixes. Others characterize the
former as "designating" {abhidhayaka or vâcaka) and the suffixes as
"indicative" {dyotaka). Their criterion is that of positive and negative
concomitance (anvayavyatireka).
170-179 (£76-78; T70-76). Synchronie derivation of words
(niwacana, sabdavyutpatti) is an area in which there is considerable scope
for difference of perception and choice of elements. In such a derivation,
the precise meanings of elements are frequently ignored in favor of their
general, approximate meanings.
180-191 (£78-81 ; T76-82 ). Regarding the stage in which a prefix or
preposition is joined to à root, there are two views. Some see this stage
as preceding the semantic connection of the root, through the action it
denotes, with action bearers {sâdhana) ; others see it as succeeding this
semantic connection. The prefix can be said to be denotative {vâcaka),
indicative {dyotaka), or jointly signifying {sahabhidhayin).
191-196 (£81-82; T82-84; T81-82). The indeclinable particles
{nipâta) can be said to be either indicative or capable of conveying a
meaning only in conjunction with other words {pada) that constitute
the sentence.
197-204 (£82-84; T84-89). A fifth categoryof linguistic forms (in
addition to nouns, verbs, prepositions, and particles) is that of the post-
positions {karmapravacaniya). Linguistic forms in this category serve to
delimit in a unique way the action implicit in the relationship of the
two words they connect. The other justification for their separate group-
ing is formal. Once the postpositions are separated from the prepositions
the phenomenon of change of su to su can be better described in a
grammar.
205-212 (£84-86; T90 -93). Of words that have an identifiable desig-
nation several types can be specified from the point of view of their
constitution. In some words the constituents have no meaning of their
own; only the collection is a meaning bearer. In others, the constituents
too bear meanings. Among the latter, in some the constituents contribute
their meanings to make the meaning of the collection, while in some
there is no recognizable or definite relationship between the meanings
of the constituents and the meaning of the collection. There are also
words in which a part is a meaning bearer and the remainder is not.
One can also divide words into phonemes that have no meanings of
their own; unless one chooses to identify some single-phoneme words
with similar phonemes constituting a word. Some constituents of words
(such as a root) have only abstracted meaning, based on grammatical
analysis.
146 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

213-215 (£86 ; T93 -94 ). Phonemes do not express any meaning by

themselves. This fact is evident from the fact that word x9 which is
distorted due to loss, addition, or reversal of a phoneme, does not fail
to convey its usual meaning by reminding the hearer of the undistorted
form, provided that the distortion is not such as to turn x into another
wordj>.
216-228 (£87-89; T95-100). A compound word conveys a specific
undivided meaning. It should be viewed as made up of parts only in the
context of analysis.
229-234 (£90-91 ; T101 -102). The elements set up in grammar and
the meanings associated with them are a matter of practicality. It is
ignorance (auidya) that is described in the science (sâstra) of Grammar
in different ways. Understanding {pidya) arises spontaneously, free from
the alternative opinions (conceptual constructions?) (vikalpa) conveyed
through tradition. Just as the result is not related on its occasion
(nimitta) and is thus indescribable (nirupakhya), so understanding,
though inexpressible (anakhyeya), is regarded as having the science of
Grammar as its means (upäya).
235-238 (£91; T103). Understanding of linguistic meaning comes
from repetition, which is beginningless and false and appears to be
natural. For example, an uneducated person (apandita) takes an atom
to have parts, and takes a whole made of parts to be joined with the
parts (of other things). Because of our experience of pots and other
things (as spatially divided), we take the world to be so divided, and
because objects have a beginning, even the eternal Brahman is thought
to have a beginning. Means that are intended for students can be mis-
leading for children. One understands the truth by remaining on the
path of untruth.
239-249 (£91-94; T\ 04-108). (So), incompatibility of various sorts
is noticed between the final meaning of a sentence and the meaning
constructed by putting together the meanings of its components. Even
the explanation of a simple negative sentence is fraught with logical
difficulties as long as the explanation proceeds on the assumption that
each succeeding sentence constituent modifies the meaning of the
preceding constituent—that sentence meaning is perceived in parts and
pieces. This point goes to prove the validity of unitariness.
250-257 (£94-96; 7108-112). In the case of homophonous concate-
nations that figure as sentence constituents and are associated with more
than one meaning (mutually related or unrelated), there are two views.
Some theoreticians think of each such concatenation as one and the
same word. Others prefer to look on such a concatenation as different
words in reality.
Vrtti on 250-257. When identity of the word is presupposed, the
process of its association with a meaning other than its regular meaning
BHARTRHARI 147

is explained in various ways: first, the word, potentially capable of

expressing any meaning, is restricted to one meaning by context.
Second, the word is directly associated with only its regular meaning,
but that meaning is changed through superimposition of another
meaning. Third, the word has its own form as its invariable, immediate,
and unique meaning. That meaning, in the form of form, is super-
imposed on each contextual meaning as the case may be.
258-262 (£"96-97; 7113-115). Considerations analogous to the ones
in the preceding paragraph are applied by some thinkers to sentence
and to Vedic mantras.
263-297 (£97-104; 7115-129). Those who think that one linguistic
form has many meanings base the distinction between its primary and
secondary meanings on its being well known or not well known. Others
trace the distinction to context. Again, it is taken to be a matter of the
relative fullness or deficiency of features. Others think the meaning
conveyed is a universal property. Still others say that, the meaning
conveyed results from deviation or distortion (viparyäsa) of some sort,
as with the snake and the rope. Other such examples are cited.
298-313 (£104-107; 7129-135). A word form conveys a cluster of
(grammatical) meanings such as number, tense, and person. Not all of
them are intended when the action expressed by the sentence is to be
carried out. One must distinguish between possible and intended
meaning, usual and contextually appropriate meaning, meaning ele-
ment that prompts the use of a word (prayojaka artha) and meaning
element that is unavoidable {näntariyaka) because the word must appear
with a certain suffix, or meaning that simply serves to indicate the
participant in an action (upalaksana artha) and that means the partici-
pant itself (pradhäna artha).
314-317 (£108-109; 7135-138). The factors that determine the
meaning to be assigned to a linguistic form in a particular sentence are,
among others:13 sentence (väkya), especially the action expressed in the
sentence; context (prakarana), in terms of the general activity going on
at the time of utterance; meaning (artha) of co-occurring words, or
textual context; propriety or suitability (aucitya or auciti) ; spatial con-
text (desa); temporal context (käla); relation (samsarga or samyoga),
accompaniment by an entity that would serve to distinguish; absence
of an entity that would serve to distinguish (viprayoga or viyoga) ; mention
of an entity that regularly accompanies (sähacarya) ; opposition
(virodha); indication {lingo) available in a related sentence; presence of
a specifying word (anyasabdasamnidhi or fabdantarasarnnidhäna); probabi
lity (sämarthya) ; gender (uyakti) ; accent (svara).
In the bhedapaksa or, nanätvapaksa, which holds that a homophonous
expression is in reality many words, these factors serve only to reveal
tHe already existent distinction—to remove the obscuration caused by
148 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

the identity of form. According to the proponents of ekatvapaksa, they

make known the then-operative capacities of the word—they delimit
its potentiality.
318-324 (£'109-110; 7138-139). There are instances in which the
meanings of the constituent words do not add up to the import or
message of the sentence.
325-327 (£1 10-111 ; 7140-141 ). Whether something is a word or a
sentence does not depend on the number of constituents; the matter is
to be decided on the basis of the meaning conveyed. Single words,
whether noun or verb, that convey a self-sufficient meaning or one
free of expectancy are sentences.
328-345 (£111-116; 7*141-148). Some hold that "deficient sen-
tences" (elliptical sentences) or sentences in which one of the expected
or ordinary constituents is missing convey their meaning by first remind-
ing the hearer of their full form. This view is unacceptable; the so-called
full sentence and the deficient sentence are in fact different expressions
that are viewed as related in analysis and because of their similar out-
comes. Categorization of words as nouns and soon is a product of
analysis and a matter of convenience. It should not be viewed as
primary truth to be retained at any price.
346-351 (£116-117; 7148-151). In the case of a science like Gram-
mar, a sentence is to be interpreted by taking into consideration what
the related sentences state. The meaning to be assigned to a linguistic
form in a sentence is held to be qualified by exceptions, specifications,
and the like, right from the outset. The talk of a sentence (an exception
(apavada)), specification (visesavidhi), or prohibition (pratisedha) quali-
fying, obstructing, or canceling sentence p (a statement of a general
rule, utsargaväkya, samâny avidhi) is to be understood as an inference that
p does not reach the area of q and q does not reach the area of p
(apräptyanumäna). The cases in which acceptance of such demarcated
areas is not possible are cases of option.
352-361 (£117-119; 7152-155). There are instances in which an
entity is referred to by an identifying expression (samjnä) and also by
an expression that could be considered to be a part of that identifying
expression (for example, datta is a part of devadatta). Some thinkers
postulate the process of understanding the meaning here to be as
follows: perception of the part (datta), recollection of the (full) ex-
pression (devadatta), cognition of the named, that is, the person
Devadatta. It is better, however, to hold that the name and what seems
to be a part of it are in fact two names associated with each other in
genesis and analysis, but not in the act of signification. Grammar
derives, through devices such as elision (lopa) and the like, parts that
can designate,t as not all parts are acceptable substitutes for the full
name.
BHARTRIÎARÎ 149

362-370 (£120-122; 7156-159). Some forms are acceptable only as

identifying expressions, others almost identical with them are only
acceptable in a role other than that of identifying. A name can occa-
sionally be employed with the intention of designating the conditioning
factor (nimitta) that led to its coining; it can also apply appropriately
(in keeping with its meaning in nonidentifying use) to an entity (for
example, krsna, "black," employed as name of a person of dark skin).
When a word is said to be a designator of some entity, its capacity (to
designate) is only restricted; a new capacity for designation is not creat-
ed (for its designative capacity is natural to it). In science (principally
Pänini's Grammar), a longer identifying expression (mahati samjnä)
indicates that the conditioning factor is intended or that a special
consideration (such as assumption of recurrence) is involved. It is also
noticed that the technical sense and the ordinary sense of an identifying
expression are acceptable simultaneously in some instances and exclu-
sively in others.
371-383 (£122-125; 7160-164). How the action expressed in a
sentence takes place with respect to the entities mentioned in it depends
on the nature of the action and the intention in a particular context. An
action like eating applies in its completeness to each of the individuals
designated in the sentence. A fine imposed on a community, by contrast,
applies collectively, unless it is specified that each member of the
community must pay a specific amount. A dramatic performance is
realized only when each individual involved contributes his expected
share of subactions. Seeing, to illustrate another variety, can be brought
about either way : collectively or with respect to each member of the
collectivity. Similar variation is noticed when identifying expressions in
Pänini's Grammar are applied to their nominate or when rules describ-
ing changes, such as that from n to n, are interpreted.
384-388 (£125-126; 7164-166). There are two views regarding
the unity of an action involving many entities. Some think of it as be-
coming different with each change in the factors^ (agent, object, and
the like) that are involved. It is expressed as one because the entities
concerned are regarded as forming a collectivity. Others think of it as
essentially single, but expressed with an indication of differentiation
(such as plural number) because the factors involved are many and
different.
389-393 (£126-127; 7166-168). Objection: Each constituent sentence
(or clause) applies to each individual item to which the major sentence
applies. These constituents are not what is meant by the major sentence,
but when the major sentence is uttered the hearer understands the
distinct meanings of the constituent sentences.
Answer: If the whole meaning of a linguistic form is contained in the
meanings of its constituents, then what is the need for the existence of
ISO ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

separate word meanings? If the meaning of a linguistic form exists in

each constituent, then either it contradicts that constituent's own mean-
ing, or it accords with it. And if the latter, then linguistic forms do not
have eternal meanings (as the opponent believes).
394-398 (£127-128; 7168-170). The single generic meaning is
established with respect to each component expression as well as to the
whole collection of constituents and to each segment of the sentence.
Analogously, even though phonemes have meanings, the case ending is
added to the stem and not to each phoneme. Just as everyone sees the
same property by means of the same lamp, so grammatical number is
understood from one case ending. Thus meaningfulness does not
belong exclusively to word, phoneme, or sentence. Such a view, found
in tradition, only appears to conflict (with ours).
399-404 (£"128-129; 7*171-174). Alinguistic form does not illuminate
its objective unless it is used (that is to say uttered). Just as the visual
organ sees (an object) only when it has access to it, so language ex-
presses its meaning (or objective) only when intentionally applied to it.
Just as the relation between an instrument (karana) and its object
(karrnan) is brought about through action (kriyä), so the relation bet-
ween designating (abhidhäna) and its designatum (abhidheya) is brought
about through designation (abhidhä). And when several (distinct)
things might be designated by a certain designating expression, the
linguistic form is established in a particular case through its intentional
application {abhisamdhäna). So, some say that Vedic linguistic ele-
ments are meaningless when they are repeated and that when taught to
others they merely stand for their own forms, but that these same Vedic
expressions, which each have a single meaning, when in use have diffe-
rent meanings depending on the different intentions of their speakers.
405-407 (£129-130; T\ 74-175). Others, however, take each diffe-
rence in usage to signify complete difference (between the meanings of
the linguistic forms used), saying that a word such as aksa (which can
mean a fruit, or dice, or an axle) is indeed many linguistic forms being
considered as having a single common property (in virtue of all the
words having the same ordered set of phonemes). So each linguistic
form has its own fixed meaning, and there is no speaker's intention
other than just using the expression, which must have its meaning. The
fact that an expression means different things in different contexts just
shows that it is not one expression but several.
408-410 (£130; 7176). For the advocates of the unitary sentence
meaning, the question broached (between the advocates of fixed mean-
ing and speaker's intention) is a pseudoquestion because it rests on the
incorrect assumption that the speaker begins with unrelated words and
goes on to relate them.
411-418 (£131-132; Tl 76-180). Among those who view the speaker
BHARTRHARÎ 151

as proceeding forth with related words, there are two views. Some
think of the action expressed in the sentence as related to its bearers only
generally at the initial moment, while others think of the action as speci-
fically related to its bearers right from the first moment. Others think
that it is not language that establishes the meaning, but that language
only produces a memory (smrti), which is like the meaning in appear-
ance. Thus, a burned man understands burning from his contact with
fire; it is otherwise when one learns the meaning of burning from the
word "burning."
419-430 (#132-134; 7180-185). Just as the sense organs—which
differ by nature from one another and have each their specific sphere of
operation—cannot function except through the body, so words—which
are individually related to their meanings—do not have meaning dis-
joined from a sentence. Thé relational form (of the sentence) is grasped
when the actual objects that are meant are connected to it, but its essen-
tial nature is not indicated thereby, as the meanings of the words are
not seen. Awareness likewise remains in its true, formless state but
appears to be colored by relations to actual things. Again, a meaning
can only be designated as related to existence or nonoccurrence; so it
is the sentence that is fit (to designate). The meaning of a word,
whether existent or the opposite, is not understood in communication
without some connection to an action. So it does not exist. Even the
one-word sentence " (it) exists" cannot be thought without some rela-
tion (assumed) with an action in the form "it was" or "it was not." It
is the action (part of the meaning of the sentence) that is first analyzed,
because of its primacy. The other means is used to effect that action. Its
result is its motivation. But it is just the speaker, the intender, who forms
the conception of the thing to be effected, its means, and the relation
between them. A meaning (in other words, an objective that can be
meant), because it has all powers (to play any role needed), is estab-
lished as assisting in whatever the speaker wants to say.
431-440 (£135-136; 7185-189). (Through language) things far apart
can be presented as together, or vice versa ; and one may be presented
as many, or vice versa. This fact can be explained through supposing
either that an object's nature is everything or that it has no nature at
all. It is language that has extremely fixed power, that relates (the
things meant). A linguistic form is only an indicator (upalaksana) of an
actual object (vastu); it does not express the powers (if any) of an
object. The meanings of words are established through marks (laksana),
but not as they actually are (vastutas) ; such an object is understood in
different manners through its uses. The relationship that is the nature
of a sentence's meaning does not reside in the individual word meanings
or in their aggregate. In communication we speak of it that way, but
that is a product of analysis, which is needed to explain and thus under-
152 ENCYCLOPEDIA O£ INDIAN PH ILO SOPHIES

stand it. In such analysis parts are distinguished that require each other.
So the unity of sentence meaning must be understood from small
indications.
441 (£137; 7189-190). The external meaning (orobject), whether
existent or not, is to be distinguished from that meaning which is
notional (sampratyaya). That distinction consists in analyzing the powers
(of the words to signify external objects).
442-446 (El 37-138 ; 71 91 -194 ). A sentence is considered to be one by
some if it has one finite verb; others thinks of it as one even if it has more
than one finite verb, provided the verbs are expectant of (säkämksa)
each other. Whether a sentence is complete should be determined by
examining whether it is wanting in a word. Nonspecification of the way
that the action expressed is carried out does not make a sentence
incomplete.
447-450 (£138-139 ; 71 94-195). Action, while physically the same,
appears different if the point of emphasis in the sentence is changed.
Conversely, individual actions may be physically different due to
difference of agent, means, and the like and yet may be expressed with-
out an expression of the difference.
451-^56 (El 39-140 ; 71 95-197). Action expressed generally for a
group takes place recurrently with respect to each individual agent in
the group. Some explain this fact by pointing out that there is no one-
to-one correspondence between linguistic utterance ^uccärana) and
comprehension (pratipatti) in any case. Others theorize that the one
initial sentence gives rise to many sentences, which then apply indivi-
dually to the agents. The latter seek support for their view in Pânini's
practice of employing general and specific sentences.
457-458 (£140 ; Tl97-198). According to some thinkers the distinc-
tion between universal and particular is inapplicable to action. Others
view action as containing a particular element (vyaktibhaga) and a
common or universal element (sämänyabhäga). The latter, they say,
explains expressions in which distinctions of time, agent, or object are
not reflected.
459-475 (£141-145; Tl 98-203 ). Sentences in which a single word
performs a role in more than one part of the sentence—for example,
having a different sense in combination with each of several verbs in
the sentence—are explained in a variety of ways, based on (a) assump-
tion of difference between utterance and comprehension; (b) recogni-
tion of sequence and simultaneity as possible processes in the employ-
ment of expressions; (c) division of words as aggregates of phonemes
into those in which the distinction of parts is manifest, those in which
that distinction is not explicit, and those in which there are no parts to
begin with; (d) postulation of the arising of individual-oriented
sentences in the period between utterance and comprehension; (e)
BHART&ttAÎU 153
ascription of more than one capacity to an expression depending on the
expectation (arthitva) of the hearer; and (f) acceptance of recurrence
(àvrtti).
476-485 (£145-146; T203-205). These epilogue verses make a few
. remarks about the passing of the Pâninian tradition, starting with the
Samgraha (referred to also by Patanjali), proceeding through Patanjali
himself, Candra, and Bhartrhari's teacher, and having suffered at the
hands of "dry logicians" [suskatarkanusara) such as Baiji, Saubhava,
and Haryaksa. All the traditions discussed heretofore, and many more,
were mastered by Bhartrhari's teacher; a fuller discussion will be found
in the third book, to follow. It is important to become familiar with
other traditions than one's own and to understand the older teachers, in
order that one's understanding be clear.

BOOK 3

1. On Universal Property (Jätisamuddesa)

1 -5 (JE5 8 ; 7*1 -9 ). Words abstracted from sentences have been regard-
ed as falling into two (noun, verb), four (with the addition of
prepositions and particles) or five (with the addition of postpositions)
categories. In the analysis into word meanings there are said to be two
eternal wofci meanings for all language (or linguistic forms), namely
universal and particular. Sometimes the particular as characterized by
the universal of its class is intended, and sometimes without such a
characterization.
6-13 (£58-59; T10-16). Every linguistic form first designates its
own universal property, which is then identified by conceptual construc-
tion superimposed (adhyaropakalpanä) as having the form of the universal
of a meaning (or thing meant, artha). This identification happens just as
the principle in the quality "red color" is attributed to lac and is then,
because of the lac's being in contact with a piece of clothing, say,
apprehended as residing in that piece of clothing; likewise, the universal
property residing in language, because of the relation between language
and meanings, is imagined to do the job of the universal property when
there is attribution of properties to things meant. The universal property
common to all universal properties is the linguistic form "universal
property"; it,is arrived at by elimination; the universal property
common to linguistic universals is also "linguistic universal." This
linguistic universal is in linguistic forms but is different from linguistic
forms; it includes as well the universal property "being a linguistic
universal" (sabdajätitva). Even if universals can actually designate
objects meant (and not only as an appearance, a superimposition),
every linguistic form designates a universal, for the meanings of words
are determined according to their (the words') operations (vyapâra).
154 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

So, even according to the view (not accepted by the author) that
words designate substances (that is, particulars) they do so by virtue
of having the properties of substances ; so it is the property that should
be held to be the meaning (of linguistic forms).
14-24 (£"59 ; T\ 7-21 ). A universal property is that property common
to all members of a class which distinguishes the particular members of
that class from nonmembers. Or, some say, the "general feature"
[äkrti) is that which is spoken of as common, and it is again spoken of
as "particular substance" (dravya) to indicate differentiation. But diffe-
rence or identity requires limitation (upädhi) by something other (than
the things differentiated or identified). Only if things are connected
(somehow) can they be thought to be different from or the same as
each other. In fact, it is ehe one Self that has all powers; to suppose
that things differ in their natures is unnecessary. So substance and the
like are distinctly marked powers in tandem that assist men in gaining
their purposes, but not separately. This connection among them is not,
however, something above and beyond the powers, any more than the
causal collocation (sämagri) of sense organs is something above and
beyond those organs.
25-40 (£60-61; T22-30). It is the universal that is the prompter
(prayojaka) of the coming to be of the particular, being present ante-
cedently in its causal conditions. Just as a face reflected in water is
called merely a "face," so it is only the universal manifested by the
individuals that is designated (by language). And just as the différences
among the sense organs, even though they be not perceived, lead us to
postulate differences among the sense objects grasped by those organs,
so in the same way the individuals, though not perceived, lead us to
accept differences in our awareness of (their) universal properties. But
it is the universal that is the existent (satya), the individual being non-
existent (asatya). Indeed, it is existence {satta) alone that differentiated
through its relata is said to be the "universal"; and all language is
based on that ("existence"). This existence is the meaning of the stem
and of the root; it is the great Self, and it is designated "action" (kriyä)
when there is sequence among individuals. This existence universal
takes on six states (avasthä) when there is modification of becoming
{bhävavikära) in apparent sequence; that sequence is likewise the nature
ofthat Self in which time is seen as if it were divided into stages of before
and after. The nonexistence of a thing is its being taken to be hidden
(tirobhâva) ; its origination (janma) occurs when that existence universal
has left a previous stage and has not yet arrived at the next one. The
causes of our finding distinctions in this existence universal arise from
its own powers.
41 -48 (E61 ; 7^30-35 ). A universal does not need to have any shape of
its own in order to manifest itself as earth or something else, and it
ËOARTRHARÎ 155

persists when its locus is destroyed. Some say that it is not the case that
everything is simultaneously dissolved at the time of pralaya; others say
that when the various objects are merged in prakrti their universals
have a single locus, the dravyasattva (pure Substance?). Still another
view is that each universal resides in every being, but only comes to be
known in its particular manifestations. Yogis, however, are aware of
universals through all their senses sharpened by practice.
Some universals—for example, the one expressed by the phrase
"man-lion" (in other words, a heroic person)—have no linguistic
forms that designate them but are established through expressions
designating their parts that appear similar (to other words, namely,
"man," "lion").
49-91 (£61-65; T35-56). That words have endings expressing
number—despite their designating a single uniyersal property each—
can be explained in various ways in different cases. Sometimes the
number serves othe^ purposes ; sometimes it is not even significant.
Cases are adduced of these sorts.
In general, activity with respect to a particular thing (or substance)
depends on our understanding its relevant qualities. Indeed, substance
and quality are mutually dependent [samarthya). A sentence that indi-
cates the relations of both quality and substance to an action should
not be viewed as a compound sentence; both are conveyed together.
Because it is the universal, and not the substance or quality, that is
designated by the words, and because it is therefore the universal that
is most closely connected with the action rather than the substance or
quality, we find that one can maintain the action meant while substitut-
ing another quality for the one first indicated (for example, one can
perform a sacrifice with a black goat if a white one is not available).
And even though substance and quality are mutually dependent, the
fact that one is allowed to find a substitute for a quality (in such a
context as above) but not for the substance can be explained by noting
that the universal property is closely associated with the kind of
substance (goat) but not so closely with the quality (say, its color).
92-102 (£65-66; T57-61). Synonyms for "universal" are "lack of
difference in form among things (of the same class)," "similarity," "the
powers involved in the very nature of things." But even though one
may get the idea of a stick from being aware that someone desires a
stick, one does not thereby get the idea that he is actually a stickholder.
For that one requires something else (namely, the universal). Otherwise
the natural powers of things would remain indeterminate (auyapadesya)
and communication could not occur. But when, abandoning distinc-
tions, the nature of individuals is apprehended as single, then a single
awareness occurs. When unity is considered to be among many, the idea
of a "collection" (samüha) is born. And when the individual members
156 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INÖIAN PHILOSOPHIES

of the collection are considered first as different and then in terms of

their unity, there arises the idea of their similarity. And just as an
awareness, though different from the next one, is considered to be the
same, so an object, though it has the nature of excluding others, is
apprehended (as being the same in nature).
We do not have language to express the differences among things
that are similar to one another; neither is that difference cognized.
Thus, because of the difficulty of establishing the different specific
contents of our awarenesses and of the meanings of linguistic expres-
sions, we come to see them as identical. Or, according to the view of
those who believe in relations, just as there are universal characters of
(in) our awarenesses, so there are universais of (in) all objects, and the
awareness universals prove the object universals.
103-106 (£"66 ; T61 -63 ). (Or, according to another view ) the univer-
sals in the objects of our awareness help distinguish the awarenesses as
well. An awareness does not require another awareness to cognize it,
any more than a lamp requires another lamp to illuminate it. The
awareness "this is an awareness of jar" is different from the awareness
"this is a jar"; the form of being an awareness is not cognized as a
content; we do not grasp its nature as distinct from the nature of the
object meant.

2. On Substance (Dravyasamuddesa)
1-6 (£"66-67; T64-68). Synonyms of dravya (substance) are "self"
(atman), "actual entity" (vastu), "(thing having its) own nature"
(svabhäva), "body" (tarira), "thatness" (tattva).14* This eternal existent
is made known to us through nonexistent forms (âkâra) ; likewise, it is
this existent alone that is designated by linguistic forms that designate
nonexistent limitations (upadhi). In the same way, though the word
"house" designates a bare house, Devadatta's house is designated by
the word through temporary indications (nimitta) of it; or the word
"gold" is used to refer to particular impermanent golden ornaments,
even though really it refers to gold in its purity alone. And just as the
power of the visual organ is limited when one looks through a tube, so
the power of language to express all meanings is limited by the
(particular) forms. But because those forms are essentially identical
with the substance (whose forms they are supposed to be), language
that designates them designates the eternal substance.15
7-18 (£67-68; T68-74), The tradition of old is that there is no
distinction between substance (tattva) and what is not substance
(atattva). Rather, substance when not properly understood (avicärita)
is thought to be something other than substance. That (real substance),
the form of which is not subject to conceptual construction (avikalpitd),
BHARTRHARI 157

appears as if subject to constructions. For example, though not subject

to temporal distinctions it appears as if it is. Just as the properties of
contents cannot characterize awarenesses, yet appear to be characteri-
zing them, so forms of the modifications, which cannot characterize
substance, appear to do just that.
What is existent is that which remains at the end when forms dis-
appear. It is eternal, expressed by language and not different from the
language principle. It is neither existent nor nonexistent; neither single
nor separate; neither connected nor disjoined; neither modified nor
unmodified. This single (substance) is seen as language, meaning, and
the relation between them. It is what is seen, seeing, the seer, and the
result of seeing.

3. On Relation (Sambandhapariksa) • . "

1-2 (E68; 7*76-77). From linguistic forms that are uttered three
entities can be known : the speaker's awareness (what he is thinking of),
the/external object, and the linguistic form's own nature. A hearer may
fail to cognize the first two, but not the third.
3-28 (£68-70 ; T79-92 ). The relation between word and meaning is
indicated by the use of the genitive case ("jy is the meaning of x" ). There
is no expression that designates this relation as a relation, for expressions
reify—-turn dependent entities like relation into independent, appa-
rently substantive entities. This problem can be seen in the case of
contact (samyoga) and inherence (samavaya), though neither of those
two relations is the relation that connects linguistic forms and their
meanings. Some say that relation is not among things meant by words
(padärtha) ; others say that relations such as contact and inherence fall
among the things meant. But they cannot comprehend the meaning
relation in their system, for language can designate substances, qualities,
and univérsals, and the relations between language and meaning differ
in different cases. Anyway, there can be no word expressing inherence.
Some words (such as akâsd) designate their own substrata, or their own
universal properties, to which they are related by inherence. Other
words designate a quality that coinheres in the same substratum as
they do. A word such as "jar" designates an item that is related to it by
the relation of being in contact with what it [the word) inheres in (samaveta
samyoga). An expression such as "the jar's black color" designates an
item that is related to it by the relation of inhering in what is in contact with
its (the word's) inherence locus (svâsrayasamyuktasamavaya). An expression
such as "colorness" designates an item that inheres in what inheres in what
is in contact with its (the woraus) inherence locus. A word such as "time"
designates' an item that is related to it by the relation of being in contact
with what is in contact with its (the word's) locus. (So the items belonging
158 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

to the other five categories of the Vaisesika six are accounted for, but)
no other relation is found to relate the word "inherence" to its alleged
designatum. But that word, "inherence," cannot be meaningless, nor
can any word mean any old object. So the (Vaisesika) analysis of
linguistic meaning in terms of contact and inherence will not work.
Objection: You say that inherence is inexpressible; but because you
have just expressed it, it has become expressible ! Or if you say even
the word "inexpressible" does not express it, we could not understand
what your claim means.
Prima facie reply : What we mean is that inherence's dependent nature
cannot be expressed.
Objector's reply : Then inherence itself cannot be expressed, and your
words do not convey anything.
Siddhäntin's answer: A doubt cannot be itself doubted. Again, a belief
cannot itself come to be the thing it itself believes. To take another
case: in saying "all that I am saying is false" (sarvam mithyä bravimi) one
does not intend to include that very sentence in the scope of its meaning,
for then, as what one is saying would be implicitly false, the intended
meaning would not be conveyed. Generally, what is expressive cannot
at the same time be what it expresses, and if something x is conveyed by
y thenjy cannot itself be expressed by something other thanjy. Another
example: "the thesis (pratijna) is not probative (sâdhaka)" does not
apply to itself.
29-38 (£"70-71 ; T92-97). The meaning relation is just the beginning-
less fitness {yogyata) between linguistic forms and their meanings,
analogous to the fitness sense organs possess for their contents. It is the
correct (sadhu) linguistic form that expresses thefitmeaning; incorrect .
forms are expressive only by inference. The word "relation" designates
relations, and "fitness" designates fitness, because they are fit to do so
(so that the analogous difficulty to the one about "inherence" does not
arise). Awareness of this capacity comes through convention. Langu-
age is the cause of meaning, so from the meaning that is a content of
(the speaker's), awareness language (for it) is understood (by the
hearer). There was never a time that this fitness between language and
meaning did not exist (as a general phenomenon) ; neither does it
cease to exist when the thing a word refers to ceases to exist, for the
thing is permanent as designatable {abhidheyatmana).
39-51 (£71-72; T98-104). What words convey or imply can be called
existence of a secondary nature {up aearasaita). This existence differs
from actual existence in that it can be reconciled with any property—
even with properties ordinarily thought to be contrary to existence.16
It is in this way that negative particles are meaningful, that we can talk
of things not yet in existence, and so on.
52-60 {E72; 7105-109). Coverage of only a part, grasping something
BHARTRHARI 159

as limited by something else (such as a universal), reversal (or error,

viparyaya), and absence or negation are inherent in linguistic communi-
cation. In this aspect it reflects features and limitations of cognition.
There is, therefore, no ordinary way in which external things are
cognized or expressed purely as they are. The child and the pandit,
insofar as they are communicators, both express only partial views of
things. Pure awareness (suddhajnana) (beyond the level of communica-
tion) embraces all objects and is not based (on sensory perception).
An even purer stage, some say, occurs in awareness without form
(arüpika). When awareness exhibits the forms of external objects it is,
as it were, impure through getting mixed up with those forms. And a
meaning becomes impure in the same >fay, falling away from its true
nature through being limited. And because the meaning, the linguistic
form, and the awareness are all thus in error, there is no essential
difference in the manner in which positive things (bhava) and negative
ones (abhäva) appear in communication; both are mutually dependent
in that respect.
61 -71 (£72-73; 7109-113). Positive and negative being are two
conceptual constructions and are not different from the one self.
Theories that seek to derive an existent from a nonexistent, or one
existent from another existent, or a nonexistent from (the destruction
of) an existent are logically problematic. They lead their proponents to
advocate either something existent or something nonexistent as the
ultimate source, but the derivation of the opposites from such sources
is logically questionable. One must, therefore, accept as ultimate source
an entity (ätman> artha) that unites in itself both existence and non-
existence—which is indifferent to the distinction, which can be thought
of either way. Linguistic usage does not proceed with this transcending
reality as its basis. Its basis is rather what is thought to exist, what is
conceptually constructed.
72-77 (£73-74; 7114-115). Those who know the Upanisads
(trayyantavedinah) have declared that what really exists is that on which
is constructed seer, seen, and seeing. Language expresses the universal
as well as the particular as differentiated. Therefore it operates with
distinctions that do not really exist? and among such distinctions is that
between positive being and negative being.
78-88 (£74-75; 7116-119). Furthermore, language is incapable of
expressing the cause-and-effect relationship without problematic impli-
cations. That an entity called effect comes into existence when another
entity called cause is present is a matter of experience; it cannot be
denied, it is like a miracle (atyadbhuta) in that words fail to convey it
with precision.17 The sequence (krama) presupposed in the transition
of cause to effect is not something physically different from the existent
that undergoes the change, just as simultaneity is not physically over
160 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

and above the entities involved. The philosophers who accept a perma-
nent existent have, therefore, thought of sequence as a capacity of the
(one) existent. An entity does not actually exist merely because an
expression for it exists. In the science of Grammar, however, all entities
presupposed by expressions are thought to exist, and meanings of
expressions are analyzed irrespective of actual existence or nonexistence.

4. More on Substance (Bhüyodravyasamuddesa)

1-3 (£75; 7*121-123). The subject matter of the following chapters
concerns certain word meanings (padartha) abstracted in traditional
ways from their forms in coalescence (samsarga, that is, the sentence)
and from awareness (samvid). The nature of these word meanings is
inferred from the rules of grammar. They are a basis of grammaticality
(sadhutva).
A substance (individual, particular, dravya) is any entity that can be
referred to by a demonstrative pronoun and that is viewed in the
utterance as capable of differentiation.18

5. On Quality (Gunasamuddesa)
1 -9 (£75-76 ; 7126-132 ). A quality {guna) is that entity which accom-
panies the substance, which is active in the role of differentiating it, and
which is viewed as dependent on the substance for its existence. A
substance cannot be referred to purely in itself; it needs qualities in
order to be expressed. It is the excellence (or superiority, prakarsa)19 of
a quality, not of the substance, that is expressed in comparison and
similar constructions. Because such expressions are particularistic (only
relatively more specific, visesasabda, than some other expression), they
cannot exhaust all elements of a substance that can be used for differen-
tiating it. Thus there is always the possibility of being able to specify in
a finer way, of turning the dependent element or guna of an earlier stage
into the principal element (pradhäna) or substance of the next stage.
(Compare the sentences "x has a form," "x has a white form," "x has a
whiter form," "The whiteness of A; has a shine to it," and so on. )

6. On Spatial Direction (Diksamuddesa)

1 (£76; 7133). Words refer to spatial direction (dik), action bearers
(or means, sädhana),20 action (kriyä), and time (kàla) as if they were
actual entities. That they are in reality powers {sakti) arising from
things is obliterated in usage.
2-5 (£76; 7133-135). Spatial direction isthat power which is behind
such cognitions and usages as "x i$ before y9" "this thing is straight
BHARTRHARI 161

(without bends)," and "this actionisone of going upward." It is single,

but is divided into many (for example, the ten directions) on account
of adjuncts (upâdhi, such as contact with the sun at a particular
time). Direction differentiates material things (murta) in terms of near-
ness and remoteness, while time distinguishes them in terms of sequence
of actions. Direction is the basis of the talk of contact and disjunction
through the perception of occupied and unoccupied regions of the sky
or âkàsa.21
6-11 (£76-77; n 36-139). There is no fixed arrangement of spatial
direction. The various compass directions, which seem to divide syste-
matically, are mere names when they are divested of reference to the
things (for example, the sun at a particular time) with which they are
associated. Names of regions of space contain in some cases-references
to the directions used conventionally without regard to the actual
position of the speaker or hearer.
12-22 (£77-78; 7139-144). Based on distinctions such as "this,"
"that," "eastern," "western," and the like, which are introduced by
spatial direction, are the divisions seen in things from mountains to
atoms. These divisions are characterized in terms of the accompanying
entity (for example, presence or absence of light) or configuration, but
the concept or capacity called "spatial direction" is their ultimate
foundation. Things per se are beyond division, sequence, and fixation
by region. Division with which the adjuncts invest them has no end and
cannot be something inherent to them. Yet division cannot be avoided.
Spatial direction is operational everywhere. Along with time, it is part
of the very nature of living beings. There would be confusion in com-
munication and action if entities such as spatial direction were to be
abandoned, if they could at all be abandoned. Sometimes they are
explicitly present (with extent or limit mentioned), sometimes implicitly.
23-28 (£78; 7144-146). It is also possible to view space as a property
or power of consciousness (so far it has been viewed as a power of
things). Under either alternative, there is no gain in trying to prove
either that it is ultimately one or that it is ultimately many (in other
words, that it is a set of several powers). Spatial direction is not an
actual entity. Its existence rests on convention. Besides, singularity and
plurality are mutually relative concepts; one presupposes the other.
They "cannot, therefore, be exclusively applied. If spatial direction is
declared to be single, the sense of "single" cannot be the usual sense,
which contains an implicit reference to plurality.

7. On the Means to Action (Sâdhanasamuddeêa)

1-8 (£78-79; T147-152). Means (sâdhana) is the power to bring
about the action (or actions) expressed in the sentence, This power is
162 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

located in what are viewed as the loci (agent, object) of the action as well
as in other entities mentioned in the sentence that are not so viewed (such
as the instrument, karana). It need not always be physically or really
present in the entities in which it is supposed to reside. It is what the
intellect assumes to be present there. Entities are bundles of powers.
The intellect enjoys autonomy in investing them with powers and in
activating only some powers at the time of sentence formation. Thus it
is possible, for example, to say "he is making a sound." Although the
sound has evidently not become a physical reality at the time of uttering
this sentence, it is viewed as an existent acting as the power of an object
with respect to the action of making.
9-13 (£79; 7153-156). The "relationalists" (samsargavâdinah, that is,
the Vaisesikas)22 view powers as ontically subsumed under the cate-
gories that they admit. A means for them is what should be viewed in
the context of their ontology as instrumental in bringing about the
action expressed. Thus, in "he sees a pitcher" the qualities of the
pitcher such as its medium dimension are the means, but in "he sees
a form (or color)" the universal called "formness" (or "colorness") is
the means. Such means are not specifically expressed in the words of
the sentences concerned; they are implied by endings (vibhakti) and are
logically reconstructed.
14-17 (£79-80 ; 71 56-157 ). Things that have come to exist are taken
as means when they, as it were, oblige the action by being instrumental
in bringing the object about. The power of being instrumental has been
claimed by some to be an entity identical with the thing, or over and
beyond the thing, which is instrumental in this manner. It does not
matter (to the Grammarian) which is the case. As long as it is seen to
be different it can be held to be the means. In the same fashion an
action can be a means with respect to a succeeding action it might
generate.
18-27 (£80 ; 7158-166 ). These passages discuss the range of applica-
tion of the terms karaka and hetu.
28-31 (£80-81 ; 7167-168). Powers are latent in substances that will
become means of actions. These powers are revealed at the time the
action takes place.
32-42 (£81-82; 7168-172). Some thinkers view means as existing
prior to the action, some as simultaneous with the action, and some as
subsequent to the action. There is also a difference of views concerning
what it is that brings about the action and bestows the status of means
on entities-—some of the candidates include karmic force (apürva), time
(kala), the power of time, and action itself. The division of means into
six kârakas has also been viewed by some as natural, By others as deriva-
tive. Some have defended the identity with, as well as the distinctness
from, the entity involved of the power that is means to action. It is not
BHART^HARI 163

realized that an assertion of identity has an implicit reference to differ-

ence and vice versa, and that reality transcends both concepts.
43-44 (£81 ; Tl 73-174). By comparing and contrasting (anvayavyati-
reka) pairs such as vrksasjvrksam, one is led to hold that case endings
(vibhakti) are themselves meaningful. The category to which their
meaning belongs is called karaka. It has seven varieties : karman, karana,
kartr, sampradâna, apâdana, adhikarana, a n d êesa.
45-53 (£82-83 ; T l 74-178 ). Karman, the object of action, which is of
the kind that is what the agent wishes most to reach with his action, has
three varieties: (a) a kind of object that is to be brought into existence
(niruartya) a.nd is not a transformation of its material cause; (b) a kind
of object that is a modification (vikärya) of its material cause; and (c)
a kind of object that is to be reached or obtained (präpya), in which no
change is seen to take place when the action succeeds. There are alter-
native ways of explaining (a) and (b), (a) as that kind of object which
did not exist before its production, and (b) as either the result of the;
destruction of material or the result of modification of substance. As for
those objects of action which are other than the kind most desired to be
obtained, they are of four kinds: (d) that regarding which the agent is
indifferent (audäsinya); (e) that which the agent (ordinarily) avoids
(anipsita) ; (f) that which is not covered by the other designations of
kinds of kârakas; and (g) that which, though logically another kind of
karaka, is to be viewed as object (karman) in the process of sentence
derivation on the Grammarian's instruction.
54-58 (£83; r i 79-181). The objects of types (a), (b), and (c) are
involved as elements that bring about the action of which they are the
objects. To that extent they are agents (kartr). But the logical, first-level
agenthood is replaced by objecthood in linguistic expression once
another entity appears on the scene as instigating or causing the
action^—an agent marked by presana, that is to say directing, commis-
sioning, impelling, or setting in motion.
"59-66 (£83-84; 7*183-187). These passages discuss Mahaf)hâsya on
Pânini 1.3.67 and 3.2.60, concerning certain complications about ex-
pressions that indicate objecthood and agency.
67-80 (£84-85; 71 88-197). Discussion of other sütras relating to
object. Time and the like are objects with a different status, having
become a kind of substratum for the substance objects. They are
secondary (apradhana) or external (bahiranga) objects. By contrast, the
principal (pradhâna) object is the one that is the prompter (prayojaka)
of the action.
81-86 (£85 ; 7*198-200 These kärikäs discuss constructions in which
the object does not appear in the accusative case.
87-89 (£85-86; 7*200-203). An action does not appear in a sentence
as akarmaka—not requiring an object—simply because the object it
164 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

requires already exists or is supposed to exist before it is related to the

object or because its relating to the object leaves no traces. It appears as
akarmaka either (a) because the root used to express it has a different
meaning elsewhere, or (b) because it already includes as a concept that
which would be object in a construction with similar meaning, or (c)
because its object is too well known to be specified, or (d) because the
intention is merely to state it without specifying the object.
90-100 (£86; T203-208). The second category of case ending,
instrument (karana), is now discussed. The instrument is that entity after
the activity or operation (vyapära) of which the action being expressed
takes place in the speaker's view at the time of sentence formation.
Whether a specific instrument's activity is actually or invariably neces-
sary for the realization of the action concerned, or whether that activity
in fact immediately precedes the realization of the action, or whether the
instrument physically exists does not matter. Similarly, there need not
be only one instrument for an action. All entities that are viewed as
more instrumental in bringing about the action than the rest of the
kâraka entities of the sentence can be instruments. Such an understand-
ing of "instrument" does not conflict with the eminence enjoyed by
the agent (kartr) with respect to the action on account of his freedom
to initiate or not to initiate it.
101-105 (£87; T209-211) The third category of case endings, the
agent (kartr), is next treated. An agent is defined as independent
(svatantra) by Pänini (1.4.54) in the sense that it takes precedence over
other kärakas in the speaker's perspective and is viewed as bestowing
particular roles on the other kärakas. It need not necessarily be sentient
and capable of willful action. Whatever the speaker chooses to present
as independent becomes the agent. This dependence on the speaker's
intention (vivaksâ) and the fact of kärakas such as agent being primarily
linguistic (as opposed to actual) are evident from the following: what
is physically single can be assumed to be different even in the course
of one sentence. Usages such as "he kills himself with his own hands"
(hanty âtmânam atmana) are possible because the (physically) same "he"
is cognized from the perspective of three possible capacities: the capa-
city to be the agent, the capacity to be the object (âtmânam), and the
capacity to be the instrument (ätmanä).
Realization of this phenomenon, namely, that different cognitive
stances toward the same thing are reflected in linguistic usage, provides
a key to the understanding, for example, of sentences speaking of the
birth or creation of something. A sentence such as "a sprout comes into
being" (ankuro jâyate) would have to be declared illogical, marred by
internal contradiction, if the reference of "sprout" in it is held to be
primarily to a sprout actually existent or nonexistent at the time of
utterance (if the sprout already exists, how can one assert that it
BHARTRHARI > 165

[newly] comes into being ? If the sprout does not exist at the time of
utterance, how can one assert its coining into being? ). But if the sen-
tence is understood as implicitly containing two views of the sprout—as
an entity in the mind of intellect and as a physical entity—then there
is no incongruence. Thé natural understanding of the expression
"sprout" is an existent sprout. As soon as the expression "comes into
being" is connected with "sprout," it is implied that the sprout cannot
be an existent in the usual sense—that it must have an assumed exis-
tence; then only can it be the agent of "comes into being."
106-113 (£87-88; T211 -215 ). Other possible ways of accounting
for a usage like "a sprout comes into being" follow:
(a) An effect is nothing but a specific form taken by the cause. The
real meaning of a sentence such as "a sprout comes into being" is that
the seed becomes a sprout. As the cause—the seed—becomes "the effect,
it is referred to by the word, "sprout," which denotes the effect.
Actually, there is no creation of something that did not exist before.23
(b) If the cause and the effect are not viewed as a continuum and
the effect is thought to be something previously nonexistent that came
into being, then also a usage such as "a sprout comes into being" can
be understood in such a way as to be free from internal contradiction ;
it can be understood as meaning that the sprout, which existed as a
universal, appeared in the form of an individual. As a universal it
already exists and hence can become the agent of the action of coming
into being.24 At the same time, as an individual the sprout is an entity
to be produced, hence its coming into being can be asserted.
(c) In all linguistic indication whatever entity is perceived is per-
ceived as a positive existent [bhäva). Even in sentences such as "X does
not exist," the word X denotes X as existing, as having some form
(akâra) or individuality (although the precise manner of existence,
whether actual or imagined, permanent or temporary, may be stated
later). Thus the existents as well as the nonexistents of the physical
world are on a par as far as language goes; language can proceed with-
out knowing which entity truly exists and which does not. As it is thus
indifférent to external reality, the kind of problem that is seen in the
case of "a sprout comes into being" is not a properly posed problem to
begin with. The problem assumes that words of language are there to
reflect external reality, when in fact the words are not intended to carry
any such assurance.25
(d) The very concepts of "coming into being" and "going out of
existence" are due to one's thinking being misled by mere appearances.
In reality there is only one undifferentiated, changeless entity. Hence,
just as other usage in which existence or nonexistence is explicit or
implicit is accepted as valid in ordinary life, "a sprout comes into
being" should be accepted.
166 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(e) The real meaning of "a sprout comes into being" is that the
cause of the sprout (say, the seed) takes the form of the sprout. Here,
although the cause is the real agent, it is referred to by "sprout", the
word standing for the effect, just as subactions that lead to the action
of cooking are referred to by a word like "cooks-," as in "he cooks rice."26
114-121 (£88; T215-219). Sometimes, as in "the seed becomes the
sprout" the cause (specifically, the material cause, prakrti) is presented
as the agent; sometimes, as in "a sprout comes into being," the effect
(the product, vikâra) is presented as agent.27 This twofold possibility of
expression is due to the very nature of coming into being, namely, birth
or creation. The entity that is coming into being straddles both the
earlier (causal) phase and the phase to come. Consequently, it can be
expressed through either.
122-128 (£88-89; T219-222). In causal constructions such as
"Yajfiadatta makes Devadatta cook rice," the agent of the (apparently)
incorporated sentence "Devadatta cooks rice" does not lose his indepen-
dence (svätantrya) with respect to the kârakas of that sentence. It con-
tinues as prompted agent, while Yajnadatta becomes the causal or
prompting agent.
The instigation of action that is seen in a causal construction is
different from the instigation seen in an imperative or optative mood
construction. The former applies to agents that are presumed to be
already engaged in action and is a property of the expressed content.
By contrast, the instigation in an imperative or optative mood cons-
truction belongs to one who expresses the content; in other words, in
that instance instigation is a disposition and presupposes absence of
engagement in action up to that point on the part of the one receiving
the command or request (allusions to Pänini 1.4.52-55 and 3.1.26, and
Màhâbhâsya thereon).
129-135 (£89; T223-226). The karaka called sampradäna (indicated
by the dative) is now discussed. Sampradäna is that kâraka which prompts
or participates in the action of giving/parting with as recipient or
destination of the object of the giving or parting.
136-147 (£89-90; T226-232). Next, the kâraka called apädäna (the
ablative) is discussed. (That is apâdâna which is uninvolved [udâsina]
in the action of moving away. Whether it be itself actually in motion
or not, it is considered to be fixed [dhruua] with respect to that which is
expressed as moving away from it.) 28
Apâdâna has three varieties: first, one in whose case the action of
moving away is explicitly stated (nirdisfavisqya), for example, "village"
in "he comes from the village"; second, one in whose case the expli-
citly stated action contains the element of moving away from it
(upâttavisaya), for example, "cloud" in "the lightning shines from the
cloud" ; and, third, one in whose case no action (implicitly or explicitly)
BHARTRHARI 167

containing movement is mentioned, but is nevertheless expected

(apeksitakriya)i, for example, "residents of Pâtaliputra" in "the residents
of Mathurä are richer than the residents of Pâtaliputra.29
Which item is taken to be the fixed thing, the starting point, depends
entirely on the context—in relation to the horse's trotting, Devadatta is
fixed, while in regard to Devadatta's falling, the horse infixed. If, as in
the case of two rams separating, both are moving, there are two starting
points, one for each act of separation. A speaker does not want to
predicate simultaneously such contrary properties as difference and
identity^ or being the separating element and being the element sepa-
rated from. A single item can be, for example, both an instrument
(karana) and a starting point (àpâdâna) at the same time, but either
there is a rule specifying which suffix takes priority, or else one assumes
that the two capacities are in fact one.
148-155 (£91; T232-236). Next comes a discussion of the locative
case relation (adhikarana). It indicates that which helps accomplish the
action by holding [dhârayan) the agent or the object. Such service may
include nondestruction (of the cause, which will be the effect), inde-
pendently supporting the weight of the agent or the object, or their
connection with portions of space. Some say the locus of everything in
contact with others is âkâfa, which allows us to say "this thing is here."
Likewise, the locus of all processes is time.
156-162 (£91-92; T237-240). The remaining type of meaning of
case endings (namely, of the genitive case ending) is called "the rest"
(êesa). It indicates secondary or subordinate relationships, not an added
kind of accessory to the action.
163-167 (£92; T241-243). The nature of the vocative case
(sambodhana) is to call the attention of the hearer to somebody already
there. The vocative is not part of the sentence meaning.
These meanings of the case endings are analyzed from the sentence
meaning.

8. On Action (Kriyâsamuddesa)
1 -10 (£92-93 ; 71 -11 ). Whenever something, whether completed
(siddha) or uncompleted (asiddha), is designated as something to be
completed (sâdhya), it is to be designated as an action (kriyâ), because it
has the nature of sequence (krama) inherent in it. For example "it
sounds," "it whites" indicate actions (namely, of sounding, of shining
as white) in contrast with merely "sound" or "white." An action is a
collection (samüha) ofparts that originate in sequence and is conceived
to be identical with those parts. Then each part comes to be called by
the name of the action, so that differences between the parts in the
process can be apprehended, along with different tenses indicating the
168 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

different times in the process. The whole action cannot be perceived,

but is grasped from its perceptible parts, like the fire wheel (alätacakra).
11-19 (£93-94; 711-16). That action, which is expressed through
verbs, has a form that, following temporal flow, is said to be existing
(asti), until it has completely finished, when it is said to have become
(bhâva). Each part of the action, which actually has no sequence,
appears to have sequence because the powers of the subsequent parts
are attributed to it. The primary meaning of "action" is that moment
(in the sequence) immediately after which the result occurs. The other
moments (prior to that one) are also called (parts of the) action
because they have the same outcome as their purpose. As long as a thing
exists in the form of a cause, before it is born, being something to be
accomplished, it is indicated (by a verb). Once it is accomplished it
does not require any more accessories, for its purpose is fulfilled. Thus,
the verb is not used then.
21-25 (of £94), 20-24 (of 716-18). Others say anactionisa universal
that inheres in many particulars. It is not to be accomplished (being a
universal and so eternal), but in its form as particular it is perceived as if
it were something to be accompJished. Alternatively, it is that universal
which inheres in the last (portion of the series of moments). Or,
action is existence inhering in the agent and the object, or inhering in
the specific operation. Still others say that action is something mental
that is superimposed on objects.
26-35 (of £94-95), 25-34 (of 719-23). Among (Yäska's) six
modifications of becoming (bhavavikâra), two, manifestation and being
hidden—or birth and destruction—are postulated of action for the
purposes of practical affairs. All six are ultimately not different from
existence. Birth is the stage of existence just prior to its accomplishment,
and its (the action's) destraction is the stage following that:—namely,
the accomplishment itself. We use a verb to express the former, a noun
for the latter. (Other versions of Yäska's account are considered.)
37-39 (of £95-96), 36-40 (of 723-25). Others think that action is
activity (pravrtti), not resident in anything particular, which together
with accessories produces the result. At first, it is general (sâmânya), then
it becomes disjoined into parts. Still later, in the form of the operation
(vyàpâra) it is established in the thing to be accomplished. This activity
is, the material (prakrti) of all the accessories, the first among them.
Others say that the operations are different from the activity.
40-53 (of £95-97), 41-52 (of 7*25-30). Because the (other) acces-
sories are all completed things, the verb primarily designates action.
Question: What about a word like "cooking" (pâka), which, having
case endings, functions as a noun but designates an action ? How can
the same word have two contrary attributes, of naming both an
accomplished thing and something to be accomplished?
BHARTRHARI 169

Answer: Just as in grammar we artificially divide a verb into two parts

^(root and suffix), one indicating the action, the other the accessories
(such as number, tense, and so on), so the same analysis holds good for
a noun (like paka) : its root designates the action, its ending the accesso-
ries. Thus the same word expresses both things, just as in a sent&Lce such
as "See ! The deer runs" the same word, "runs," expresses both the
object of the seeing and the action of the deer.
54-64 (of £97), 53-63 (of T30-35). Because the meaning of verbs is
an uncompleted process, there can be no identification of two actions
except through using the expression "as it were" (iva)> and no
comparison or similarity (upamâna) between actions. Every action is
completely present in its locus; so, because comparison (similarity)
requires a standard having more e~ less of the relevant property, no
comparison can obtain between actions of the same kind; and because
actions of different kinds have no points of similarity at all, they cannot
be compared either.

9. On Time (Kälasamuddes'a)
1-12 (£98-99; T36-39). Some say that time is a substance, single,
omnipresent, permanent, without operation, the measure or dimension
of things possessing motion. They say it is the cause of the origin,
maintenance, and destruction of objects. Time is said to be the thread
holder (sütradhära) of the worldyantra (puppet show?), who by holding
some back and allowing others to go on differentiates the universe. Time,
though single, has many forms because of its being the locus of differen-
ces among the things residing in it. Nothing is one or many, white or
nonwhite, in itself; a substance appears in one way or another due to
its relations to other things. Because of the distinctions among those
relata time is thought to be differentiated, so it provides the basis for
the stages of processes. Again, actualization of a power is caused by
time, so that the regulation of birth, maintenance, and destruction of a
thing depends on time. Every stage of the world requires time, so time
is the very self (ätman) of everything; it is operation itself.
13-26 (£99-100; T39-43). Time is the creator of the cycles. It holds
back the various functionings of everything and then releases them, so
that the potentialities come to mature at the appropriate time as
particular manifestations of eternal activity. Then that power called
inherence sublates differences and gives rise to an identity, as it were,
between effects and their causes. This identity is prompted by univer-
sals, which come to be reflected in the particular effects. Then the
qualities (guna)y conditioned by their (own ) causes, come to be perceived
in those effects and in turn lead to the manifestation of their own uni-
versals. Because the loci of the particulars are eternal they persist over
170 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

periods of time, dependent on relevant causes ofthat maintenance, and

continue to perform their functions with the help of other existing
things. Eventually time, through its power called "old age" (JÄTÄ ).,
which is opposed to its other powers, prevents things from performing
their functions by developing propensities that are contrary to those
functions, which in turn results in the cooperating objects disappearing.
So the thing perishes.
27-45 (£100-101; T43-48). Time is that with reference to which
processes can be distinguished as fast or slow. It is the measure of the
great ages differing in the moral qualities of the agents inhabiting them ;
it is the measure of the turning of the seasons. Though single, it comes
to go by myriad names because of the divisions and distinctions among
those things measured by it. When limited (upâdhi) by motions it be-
comes differentiated into eleven forms of past, present, and future,
specifically, five kinds of past, two kinds of present, and four kinds of
future. «
46-56 (£102; T49-52). It is time that makes the universe (visva),
which actually has no sequence, appear as if it had sequence. Past,
present, and future are three powers of time; past and future cover over
things while present illuminates them. The power called "future" allows
birth to take place; the power called "past" suppresses birth. These
three powers or "paths" (adhvan) have no sequence, but objects get
sequence from them. Two of them are like darkness, and one is like
light. An object is present while its causes are active and functioning;
when they have stopped functioning it is said to be "past."
Some say, however, that time has only two powers, one that brings
about the appearance, the other the disappearance of things.
57-58 (£102-103 ; T52-53). There are those who say that time is only
a mental construction. But whether it be dependent on awareness or
existent outside of awareness, it is not possible to speak except in a
temporal context.
59-62 (£103; 7"53-54). There are those who say that every object
has three powers; through these powers every object either exists or does
not. They say that sequence is just these powers. The same thing is seen
or not seen depending on these powers; nothing is really destroyed.
Whatever be the various views about time, whether it be a power,
the self, or a god, it is in any case the first form of ignorance to arise,
and it is not known in correct understanding.
63-84(£103-105;r55-62). Objection: If temporal differences are only
apparent, how can one explain the fact that there is actually more
water flowing out of the measuring instrument while pronouncing a
long vowel than there is while pronouncing a short one?
Answer: There actually are differences in the objects by reference to
which temporal differences are measured. The flow of water through
BHÂRTRHARI 171

the measuring tube is itself the result of time's prevention or permission,

though not solely; other factors enter in. For that matter, everything is
differentiated only through other things. Temporal differences result
from the dissimilarity between the parts of an action that are themselves
constitutive actions.
85-90 (£105; T63-64). Objection: An actual entity either exists or
does not; there is no third way. Thus there is no further possibility (for
an action) beyond being pastor future. A single thing without distinc-
tions cannot have sequence, and if an action could be single everything
would be unified, consisting of partly existent and partly nonexistent
elements. '
Answer: The present time of an action is when it is perceived in its
own form, when it is reflected in a single act of awareness.
91-114 (£105-107; 7*65-73). Objection: Thenonaccomplkhment of
an action is its complete nonarising; it can be neither past nor future.
Answer: But the opposite action (namely, the one that happens
because its opposite does not) has a limit either in the past or in the
future, so the unaccomplished action is temporally located by reference
to that.
The remainder of this section takes up further points relating to tense.

10. On Person (Purusasamuddesa).

1-3 (£107; T75-76). Certain suffixes indicate limitations (on the
action) according to whether the action is by the speaker or by some-
one else. Even when consciousness is not existent in these, it is under-
stood through use of these personal suffixes. But the third-person suffix
cannot express consciousness in the agent, even when the verb is such
as budhyjna, or cit (which indicate mental acts) ; these verbs themselves
indicate consciousness, not the suffixes.
4-9 (£108; T77-78). Some say that wherever the second-person
suffix is used the vocative meaning is to be understood as stemming
froin that suffix, hot from the rest of the sentence.

11. On Number (Samkhyasamuddesa)

1-14 (£108-109; T79-84). Any existent has number. It is on
number that identity and difference are based in the world. Whether
number is a property different from or the same as its locus, in any
case it is that on which differentiation is based. It distinguishes that
in which it inheres (namely, substance), though it is sometimes imagi-
ned in other things (such as quality) and enables us to speak of their
differences as well (as, for example, "twenty-four qualities"). Actually,
the separation of quality from substance is a result of abstraction;
172 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

language and thought cannot deal with things except in terms of their
properties. Thus we can think of, and speak of, the universal resident
in universals, the individuator of individuators, the number of numbers,
or the gender of genders. The different categories of things, though
distinguished in theory and each having its own function, actually are
found mixed up together, and their identification with one another
depends on the occasion.
15-32 (£109-111; T84-92 ). Unity is the source of duality, and so
on, for unity is prior to all other distinctions, which depend on a thing's
being single. Some think the two unities require a mediating enumera-
tive cognition (apeksäbuddhi) to create duality; others do not think so.
Still others say that duality and the like are a collection of two or more
unities, and that the number of a collection is due to the differences
among its constituents.
The remainder of this section treats the grammar of expressions
indicating number.

12. On Aspect (Upagrahasamuddesa)

1-27 (El 11-113; T93-104). Ways of indicating in the verb the
different sorts of purposes with which an action is done are discussed.

13. On Gender (Lingasamuddesa)

1-31 (£113-116; n05-119). There are seven views about what
gender is: it is the thing qualified by its relation to signs of gender such
as breasts or hair; it is those signs themselves so related; it is the
universal residing in those signs; it is (three) stages of the constituents
(guna) ; it is the three constituents themselves in these stages; it is a
meaning attributed to things by language; it is a property of language
itself. The author appears to lean toward the latter two views.

14. On Linguistic Formations (Vrttisamuddesa)

1-627 (£116-135; 7121-411). Five sorts of complex formations are
treated in this section: primary derivatives (krdanta), secondary deriva-
tives (taddhitanta), compounds (samâsa), reduction of two verbs to one
(ekasesa), and nominal verbs (nàmadhâtu). As the discussion concerns
technical grammar it will not be summarized here.

Tikä ON PATANJALI'S Mahâbhasya

. K. Kunjunni Raja - ' '
Bhartrhari's philosophical ideas are found in their fully developed form
in the Vakyapadiya, which is his magnum opus; but the germs of his
BHARTRHARI 173

theories may be found in his commentary on the Mahäbhäsya, of which

a fragmentary manuscript alone is now available. It has been establish-
ed that this fragmentary manuscript forms a genuine part of Bhartr-
hari's Mahäbhäsyatikä. This work was mentioned by Itsing in the
seventh century and by Kaiyata as a source book for his Pradipa com-
mentary on the Mahabhäsya.
The Tikä is not a regular word-for-word commentary on the Maha-
bhäsya. It contains observations and comments on select words and
points raised in them. Some of the ideas that were developed later into
a cogent system are found scattered here and there in the commentary
on the Mahabhäsya. In some cases BJaartrhari's comments in the Tikä
help us to understand his basic standpoint in the Väkyapadiya.

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. Sphota Theory
The sphota theory of the Grammarians considers the expressive word
or sentence to be an integral, indivisible unit. The word sphota occurs
in the Mahabhäsya twice, without any reference to its meaning-bearing
function but in the sense of a phoneme, shorn of all variations owing to
the special circumstance. But Patanjali uses the term sab da in the sense
of the meaning-bearing unit. Later commentators like Kaiyata explain
that by sabda Patanjali meant sphota. S. D. Joshi says that even in
Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya there is no clear statement that sphota is a
meaning-bearing unit of language.30
In the Bhäsyatikä Bhartrhari says that there are different views on
the problem. The one he seems to prefer is that sphota is the permanent
essence ("etac cärthasvarüpam sphoto' yam eva sabdätmä nityah").31
And Kaiyata says in the Pradipa that this definition has been established
by Bhartrhari in the Väkyapadiya. .....,
Patanjali says that sabda is of two kinds, the eternal one (nitya) and
the transitory one (kärya). Bhartrhari's commentary gives the following
clarification. The eternal one could be understood as either the uni-
versal or the sphota and the transitory one as either the particular or
the sound (dhvani).32 It is clear that Bhartrhari does identify sabda with
sphota, the meaning-bearing unit. Kaiyata is only following him.
Bhartrhari distinguishes prakrtadhvani and vaikrtadhvani in his Tikä
thus: "Among the sounds which manifest the eternal word, some are
primary and some secondary. That sound which is produced by the
contacts of the vocal organs and that which is produced by such a
sound, these two are primary. Through these two, distinction in vowels
can be perceived. That sound which comes from another sound is
called secondary, because no distinction is perceived through it."33
174 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

2. Meaning of the Term Mitya

While explaining the term siddha as nitya, Pätanjali discusses its
implications. Here Bhartrhari explains two kinds oînityatva (eternality ) ;
kütastha nityatâ, absolute eternality, and pravâhanityatâ or continuity,
which is free from three kinds ofanityatâ: samsargânityatâ (disappearance
due to contact, as in the case of the color of a crystal in the presence of
a colored flower) ; viparinâmânityata (disappearance through transfor-
mation, as in the case of the color of a fruit changing when it becomes
ripe) ; and vastuvinasânityatâ (disappearance due to destruction'34

3. Instruments of Knowledge [Pramana)

Bhartrhari accepts perception (pratyaksd), inference (anumäna), and
scriptures (agama) as means of valid cognition. Perception is liable to
be erroneous, and sometimes inference may be superior to perception.35
Thus the perception of a circle of fire (alâtacakra) is erroneous. Ägama
or sabda, which consists of sruti and smrti, is a strong instrument of
knowledge and is stronger than inference.
Scriptures form the basis for dharma. Dharma is the course of know-
ledge (jnana). All the scriptures have their source in the three Vedas
(trqyi). Grammar is a smrti revealed by sages who possess superhuman
powers of vision.

4. Contextual Meaning and Etymological Meaning

The meaning of a word depends on the words with which it is collo-
cated syntactically by association or contrast. In the phrase "Räma and
Laksmana," "Räma" means the son of Dasaratha; in "Rama and
Kesava" "Räma" means Balaräma; and in "Räma and Arjuna"
Räma means Parasuräma (Arjuna means Kärttaviryärjuna).
The derivation of a word also has to be made to suit the context.
"Väsudeva" in the sense of "the son of Väsudeva" has to be derived
according to the rule applicable to the ksatriyas. If it is in the sense of
"God," the term "Väsudeva" has to be derived as "vasanty asmin
deväh." (It is in this sense that the word is used in the sütra "Väsu-
devärjunäbhyäm vun.")

5. Language and the External World

Grammar is not directly concerned with the nature of the external
world. For grammar meaning is what the words present. Just as the
existence of words like "heaven" (svarga), apürva, and "god" {devata)
leads to the inference about the existence of things nieant by them,
the existence of words can also be inferred on the basis of the object
available.
 DURVINÏTA OR AVINÎTA

This writer has been identified as a seventh-century king of the western

Gangetic area. He was traditionally held to be a patron of Bhäravi,
author of the Kiratârjuniya, and of Dâmodara, ancestor of Dandin. The
title of his lost work on grammar is Sabdävatära.
 7
DHARMAPALA

Dharmapäla (530-561, or 625?), the Yogäcära teacher, is held to

have composed a vrtti on the Prakirna (third) book of Bhartrhari's
Trihândï, according to the Chinese tradition and I-tsing. The title of
this commentary is given as Prakimavrtti by Durveka Misra in his
Dharmottarapradipa.
 8
HARI VRSABHA OR VRSABHADEVA
Ashok Aklujkar

An author whom scholars date about A.D. 650, the son of Devayasas
and a protégé of King Visnugupta, this author provides the first extant
commentary on the Vakyapadiya or Trikândi composed by someone
other than Bhartrhari. The title of the work is Väkyapadiyapaddhati.
 MANDANA MISRA

For historical details on this author, see Advaita Vedanta up to Samkara

and His Pupils, volume III of this encyclopedia, pp. 346-347. Originally
a Purvamïmâmsaka, he is said to have been converted to Advaita, and
is in any case the author of an Advaita work, the Brahmasiddhi, as well
as of several Bhätta Mïmâmsâ works. The Sphotasiddhi is, as far as we
know, his only work written from the Grammarian standpoint.
Although Bhartrhari provided the basic insights into the sphota
theory, it remained for Mandana Misra to systematize Bhartrhari's
thinking for purposes of philosophic debate. This goal was brilliantly
accomplished by Mandana in his Sphotasiddhi, The main opponents
of Bhartrhari's sphota theory were the Mïmâmsakas. Kumärila Bhatta,
in his Slokavärttika, skillfully argues against Bhartrhari's ideas. Mandana
had this full debate before him as he wrote the Sphotasiddhi; his method
is to summarize Kumârila's position and to attack effectively from the
strong base of his logical reordering of Bhartrhari's position. A good
example of this method is found in kärikäs 2-15, where he debates
the question of how language conveys meaning. Mandana paraphrases
the main arguments of Kumärila with supporting quotations from the
Slokavârttika and then rephrases Bhartrhari's position in the form of a
counterargument.1
Mandana made an important contribution in first stating that the
sphota is an empirical entity that can be directly perceived by the sense
organs. This claim at once raised the sphota from being merely a theo-
retical postulate (as stated by Kumärila) to the status of a verifiable
fact; though what exactly the contents of the final cognition are, if
not phonemes themselves, still remains vague, because Mandana merely
says that ultimately the cognitions of phonemes are sublated by that
of the word. Mandana's insistence that every letter sound or phoneme
can manifest the whole of the sphota, his graphic description of the
182 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

process of perceiving the sphota, and his polemical sharpness made him
the greatest supporter of Bhartrhari's sphota theory.
Mandana also clarifies some aspects that were not very clear in
Bhartrhari's treatment and had tended to veil the theory in some sort
of mysticism. Mandana made it crystal clear that the sphota is not any
entity over and above the word and sentence, but is the word and
sentence themselves, which gave the sphota a much-needed earthly
character.

Sphotasiddhi
G. B. Palsule, Harold G. Coward,
and Karl H. Potter

References labelled ET are to the edition and translation by K. A.

Subramania Iyer (Poona : Deccan College, 1966). References are by
kärikäs. ,
3 (ET2-1). What is this "word" (whose doctrine is being defended
here) ? It is the linguistic element (êabda). What is meant by "linguistic
element"? Not the phonemes. Rather, a linguistic element is that which
is the occasion for the arising of awareness of a thing [arthâvasâyapras-
vanimitta).
Objection : If that were so, smoke, which is the occasion for the arising
of the awareness of fire, would be a linguistic element. Furthermore,
an item of speech would not be a linguistic element before understan-
ding of its meaning arises, and would be one after that—so that
"cow," for example, would be both a linguistic element and nota
linguistic element. The definition offered above is not right. The correct
definition is rather that a linguistic element is anything that can be
heard. It is the phonemes that satisfy this definition, and this fact acc-
ords with common usage, which also finds the phonemes to be linguistic
elements. - '
Answer: Our definition fits what the author of the Mahabhàsya has
said. In an experience involving the utterance of, say, "cow" many
items figure, such as universal, substance, quality, phoneme, sphota.
Among them, asks the author of the Mahabhàsya, which is the linguistic
element? Just so one might ask, which one among those in the hall is
Devadatta? Now if one should answer the latter question by saying
"(Devadatta is) the one wearing earrings," we will not understand
him to be speaking of someone outside the hall, nor will we require that
Devadatta has to wear earrings all the time to continue to be Devadatta.
Likewise, when we say that a linguistic element is the occasion for the
arising of awareness of a thing, the context assures that we are speaking
of heard sounds (and not of something like smoke), and furthermore,
MANDANA MISRA 183

a linguistic element continues to be one even during those times in

which it is not occasioning the arising of awareness. Occasioning of the
arising of awareness is an accidental indicator (upalaksana), and it is
language qua meaningful expressions that is indicated as the subject
matter of Grammar at the beginning of the Mahabhasya.
Merely being audible cannot be the correct definition of a linguistic
element, for all sorts of things are audible, including universals—like
existence, soundness, linguistic-elementness, phonemeness, all of which
reside in sounds and are grasped by the auditory organ.
Objection : We mean that a linguistic element is only graspable by
audition (universals are graspable by other means).
Answer: No, for phonemes (which are according to you the linguistic
elements) can also be grasped by the internal organ.
Objection : We do not admit the existence of universals such as exis-
tence or phonemeness. • .
Answer: Then you should not admit any universals, because the
basis for cognizing these two is as good as for any others. The only
reason for postulating universals is our experience of kinds. We cognize
cowness upon seeing Bähuleya, having seen Säbaleya previously, and
with no other information; likewise having heard ha, ca, ta, pa we
cognize phonemeness.
4 (ET9-13). Objection: The phonemes are the occasions for under-
standing designation; when grouped they are called words.
Answer: No, a phoneme cannot singly produce an awareness. Fur-
thermore, because phonemes occur one after another, they cannot
coexist and so cannot collective]y occasion cognition, and when uttered
by different speakers or in different order they do not occasion under-
standing of a meaning.
Objection: Even so, the phonemes should be viewed as occasioning
awareness of objects when in certain kinds of conditions—such as
having an appropriate sequence—even though they are not causative
by themselves, just as the seed is taken to be the cause of the sprout
when accompanied by soil, moisture, and so on, even though by itseJf
in the granary it does not produce a sprout.
Answer: But because each phoneme disappears immediately after
it arises, at a certain moment the only thing present to occasion aware-
ness is a single phoneme. ;
5 (ETl 3-15). Mimâmsaka: Ritual actions—sacrifices and the like—do
not occur simultaneously, and yet they produce their result together.
Likewise repetition of the Vedas, or for that matter the various subordi-
nate acts in the activity of moving, have a collective result provided
they are performed in the appropriate order and by the same agent,
and so on. It is the same with the phonemes producing awareness.
Answer: The cases are not alike. In the case of the sacrifices the
184 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

actions produce apürvas that last and eventually produce the final
result; no result is produced from an act in isolation. As for the repeti-
tion of Vedic passages, the result—learning the passages by heart—is
actually produced through the dispositional tendencies left by each
repetition aided by those produced by previous recitations. As for the
case of movement through space, the intermediary is the reaching
of a point of space; this reaching becomes the cause of reaching
the next point, and so on. But no such intermediary operates for the
phonemes.
6 (ET16-17). MimâmsakaiYes. In the case of the varnas, the earlier
ones leave latent dispositions, which then cooperate in producing the
result once the last one has been uttered.
Answer: No. A latent disposition produces the awareness of the thing
that occasioned it, and not anything else. Therefore it is still unexplained
how a phoneme can occasion awareness of an object.
7 (ET17-20). Objection: Because the result does not come from the
phonemes individually and they cannot coexist, some other cause for
occasioning awareness must be supposed. It cannot be sphota, for that
would involve unnecessary complexity of supposition. After all, every-
one admits latent dispositions to be present, so it is simpler to postulate
the ability of the latent dispositions to produce awareness of objects
other than the objects that caused them.
Answer: That would be to ascribe to a power—latent disposition—
another power, or disposition, namely, expressive power, which would
lead to infinite regress. Anyway, if the latent dispositions are cognized
in a different order they too do not occasion awareness, so they cannot
be the cause of the awareness in any case.
8 (ET20-24). Objector: Our view is that, though the latent disposi-
tions do not directly produce understanding of the meaning, because
they continue and thus all come to exist simultaneously they then pro-
duce a single awareness in which aU the phonemes figure. So the sphota
doctrine is unnecessary.
Objection to the objector: But the simultaneity is then a matter of memo-
ry, not of perception.
Objector: Fine. Construe the single awareness either as a memory pure
and simple, or as a complex involving both perception and memory.
Objection to the objector: Things perceived in a sequence cannot be
remembered all at the same time.
Objector: Surely they can. Everyone recognizes, for example, that
having perceived twenty things one remembers that there were twenty.
Mandants answer: The later phonemes reveal all the previous ones
simultaneously, and the previous awarenesses of previous varnas,
having ceased, do not affect this revelation.
Objection: The simultaneity is of the awareness, not of the things
MANDANA MISRA 185

cognized in it. The phonemes are sequential, but they are cognized
in a single memory.
Answer: No, for the phonemes qua phonemes have no sequence,
being eternal and all-pervasive. When, we remember the entire word,
we do not remember a sequence of phonemes. And furthermore, if the
objector's position were correct we should understand the meaning
of the word from the phonemes perceived in any order as long as they
now figured in the final cognition produced by them all together. But
we do not. Therefore we should conclude that it is something else
(the sphota) that is responsible for production of understanding of the
meaning.
9 (.ET25-29). It is generally said that we understand the meaning
from the linguistic elements (expressing that meaning) {sabdadartham
pratipadyamahe). Here the linguistic elements in question cannot be the
phonemes (as per above). They cannot be the universals of those
linguistic elements * (sabdajati), either, for linguistic elements qua
universals cannot signify a collection (samudaya). Thus, for example,
the words "cow" and "horse," both being words, should indicate the
same thing if all that counted were their wordness. A linguistic element
indicates either the universal (for example, "cow" signifies cowness)
or the individuals in which the universal inheres (the cows), but not a
collection of individuals.
Objection: An utterance such as "the mango trees are a forest"
{sahakaräh vanarri) shows that the expression "mango tree," which
signifies a universal, also expresses a collection (the forest).
Answer: Not really. Otherwise the expression for "mango trees"
(sahakârâh) would not be in the plural. Here the apposition proceeds
through ignoring the distinction between the collection and the things
that belong to it. This kind of apposition is not pertinent in the present
case—the word "cow" (gauh) is not plural and not a collective com-
pound of varnas. So, the popular saying (that we understand the
meaning from the linguistic elements) is inexplicable without postula-
ting a linguistic essence (sabdâtma, that is sphota).
Objection: So let it be inexplicable ! Popular sayings are sometimes
intelligible, sometimes not. One cannot draw any conclusion from
inability to construe one.
Answer: But we understand the popular saying in question, so we
must assume that it has an intelligible meaning. And in any case there
is proof for a linguistic essence, because people do make this (popular)
statement without doubting it or debating it.
10 (ET29-33). Objection: Then let the earlier view, according to
.which the last phoneme accompanied by the latent dispositions laid
down by the previous phonemes expresses the meaning, stand, but let
us understand by "latent disposition" something that operates analogo-
186 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

usly to the apürva that explains how ritual acts can have results much
later than their occurrence. The phonemes must have been produced
in a certain order and by the same person. This view does not violate
the (Mimämsä) view about the eternality of the relation between word
and meaning, nor does it imply that the previous phonemes are mea-
ningless, for they assist the final phoneme in producing understanding.
As such latent dispositions must in any case be admitted, the postulation
of sphota in addition is unnecessary and cumbrous.
Answer: The believer in the phonemes as expressing meaning has to
postulate something unseen (adrsta), namely apürva, while we, the
believers in sphota as expressing meaning, need only presume that kind
of latent disposition (namely, väsana) which is evidently the cause of
memories.
11 (ET33 ). Indeed, the believer in phonemes as expressing meaning
has to postulate much more on the basis of scripture—the restriction
of the results of a linguistic (or ritual) act to the same agent, the
proper sequence, and the like—none of which we are required to
postulate.
12 (ET35-36). The phonemes could only produce an additional
result (in other words, express a meaning) if they were peculiarly
suited to do so by their own nature or if they did so through association
with others. They are not suited to do so by their own nature (because
by themselves they do not produce understanding of word meaning).
And because they are not simultaneous they cannot produce meaning-
fulness in association.
13 (ET37). Even the final phoneme is in itself without meaning.
Objection: Does this objection not equally apply to sphota?
Answer: No, for we shall show that (the sphota) is cognizable by
sensory awareness.
Question: Why all this effort to produce inferential reasoning to
support it?
Answer: To convince someone who, perversely, does not trust even
perception.
15 (ET39-40). IS identity of the speaker of the phonemes constitu-
ting a meaningful expression a constituent (anga) of understanding or
not? Because we sometimes understand meaning when we do not know
(or wrongly assume) whether one or more speakers has spoken (for
example, in a crowd) it cannot be a causal constituent, but at best an
indicator (jMpaka).'
17 (i£!T41-42). Therefore, as singleness of speaker is not a causal
condition, arid as the latent dispositions produced by, the phonemes are
the same whether one or more speakers produced them, and yet we do
not generally understand sounds randomly collected as significant of
meaning, something else must be the cause of significance.
MANDANA MISRA 187

Objection : How does the postulation of sphota help avoid the difficulty?
Answer: Because when there is more than one speaker the sphota is
not perceived.
18 (J£T43-45). Our view is as follows. In the case of every significant
utterance an effort, depending on specific desires of the, utterer and
perceptible in his mental activity, produces a distinction in the sound
uttered. Each sound produced with such an effort (but not sounds not
so produced) reveals the entire sphota. The earlier sounds figuring in the
utterance of a word, when heard by a hearer without any particular
dispositions already conditioning his understanding, sows the seed of
the cognition of the meaning by producing a vague conception of the
sphota, which lays down a disposition capable of helping produce a
later clear understanding of the meaning. When the final sound
involved in the word is heard, the clear understanding of the sphota
ensues, caused by the dispositions left by the vague cognitions seeded
by the previous sounds.
19 (.ET46-50). Objection: This theory, as much as that of the believer
in phonemes as expressing meaning, has to maintain that one kind of
thing, a phoneme, when heard produces something entirely different,
a cognition of word meaning, qua sphota. But if one kind of thing can
produce awareness of something else entirely, then any awareness
might have anything whatever as its content. If latent dispositions
are adduced to connect the hearing of the varnas with the resultant
understanding of meaning, then the theory attributes to the disposi-
tions an ability they do not have, namely, to produce cognition of
something other than what produced them.: The theory is that hearing
the phonemes, through the latent dispositions produced, produces an
erroneous awareness of those phonemes appearing as a significant
word. But an erroneous awareness must have a cause—and the theory
does riot explain what that cause could be. The cause cannot be the
phonemes or the latent dispositions, for they serve to produce correct
apprehension (of the word itself). The theory also assumes that hearing
the phonemes under appropriate circumstances will always and
necessarily produce cognition of meaning, the erroneous awareness
in question. But other errors are not so necessitated—for example, if
one mistakenly cognizes a rope, one need not cognize it as a snake; one
might see it as a stream, or something else. In any case, to call this
awareness erroneous is to imply there is a later sublation—-and there
is not.
Answer: We do find that a thing when first cognized vaguely some-
times appears different from what it really is. It would be wrong to
suppose that, for example, the vague perception of a rope cognized as a
snake is not produced by the rope. Now contact of the senses with one
thing cannot cause cognition of something else. So it must be the
188 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

progressively clearer latent dispositions, which arise as our perceptions

become clearer, that eventually are responsible for the clear awareness
that, for example, it is a rope. Otherwise we would have had to have a
clear cognition at the first glance.
Objection : Surely it is because we got closer and inspected the rope
more carefully?
Answer: No, for it also arises for one who stays where he is and attends
more carefully. And even those whose sense organs are quite normal
sometimes misperceive at the outset and later get it right in this way.
So the initial erroneous awareness is not due to a defect in the organs.
Objection: What happens is that first the bare essence (svarupamàtra)
is perceived but is interpreted through its similarity as remembered
from previous experiences.
Answer: One could say the same thing about the linguistic case as
well—the bare essence of the sphota is first perceived but interpreted as
constituted of phonemes and soon because of previous experience.
20 (£7*51-52).' In any case it is the sounds, which resemble one
another, that are. the cause of the erroneous awareness, as well as what
causes eventual clarification. But because sounds are produced by
different intentions, efforts, articulations, which nevertheless resemble
one another, one naturally mistakes one thing (the sphota) for some-
thing else (the phoneme), as well as eventually getting it right on
further consideration.
21 (ET53-56). The misinterpretation of sphota as phoneme is inevi-
table, as it always occurs through the same procedure. It is analogous to
the case of cognition of a new (large) number—the cognition of the
previous (nonexistent) numbers is the cause of its cognition in a fixed
series leading to it. Here cognition of (nonexistent) phonemes is the
cause of cognition of word meaning. Likewise, when a word is taught by
one person to another there is inevitable misinterpretation of the word
as phonemes, for there is no other way of teaching it. It has been said
that the great sages, who did not learn language from others, appre-
hended the word essence without misconception and taught it directly
as mantras; the rest of us, by learning the text of the Vedas and Vedängas
as we were incapable of receiving the mantras, at least understand the
means of arriving at correct understanding.
22 (ET57-59). It has been remarked that to call something an
erroneous awareness is to imply that there is a later sublation, which
there is not in the case of the awareness of phonemes. But indeed there is
a later sublation, that sublation being the clear realization of the sphota.
Objection : There is no incompatibility between a word's being a single
sphota and its being composed of phonemes, for indeed we see that the
idea of the word is cognized as mixed up with that of the phonemes. So
the later realization is not a sublation of the earlier cognition.
MANDANA MISRA 189

Answer: Of course it is. Just as the face comes eventually to be known

as single, though initially confusedly thought to be in the mirror, so the
sphota is eventually known as single, though initially confusedly thought
to be subject to distinctions of the phonemes.
23 (£7*59-61). Only the sense organs are capable of apprehending
an object more or less clearly or confusedly. The other instruments of
knowledge either apprehend the object or not at all. Now the sphota is
cognized through perception. We know that it is perceptually cognized
because the clear cognition of the sphota, which is different from that of
the phonemes, must have some supporting object {alambana).
24 (i£T61-64). Objection: There is such a clear cognition, but it does
not have a different supporting object from the phonemes; they alone
are the supporting object. In the final cognition they are cognized
collectively, while in the preceding erroneous awarenesses they are
cognized distributively.
Answer: Even though a cognition concerns one thing it does not
follow that it may not have something else as its supporting object. For
example, the awareness of a universal property, though it is mixed up
with the form of the individual, still has the universal, not the indivi-
dual, as its supporting object; likewise, the idea of a picture, despite its
connection with the colors of its parts, is about the picture, not the parts.
25 (ET65). Objection: The unity of the phonemes is caused by their
being cognized in a single mental act or by their serving collectively a
single purpose.
Answer: Then there is no unity anywhere, for the same account can
be invoked to question any case of supposed unity.
26 (ET66-67). Unless the nature of a word is known, its meaning
cannot be understood; if that in turn depends on its cognition (as the
previous objection would imply), there will be mutual dependence.
27 (ET68-77). That which appears to be different even though the
phonemes are the same, and that which appears to be one even though
the phonemes are different, is the word; it is that which is perceived
(the sphota).
Objection (Kumärila, Sphota section, verse 131) : "Phonemes and
sounds do not manifest the sphota in words or sentences because they are
revealers, like lamplight."
Answer: Depending on precisely how this argument is interpreted, it
either proves what is already established (because words and sentences
are sphota according to the believer in sphota) or it commits fallacies of
unknown qualificandness in its paksa and unestablished locus
{âsrayâsiddha) in its hetu, as well as suffering from other faults.
Kumârila (Sphota section, verse 133): "Phonemes and sounds do not
manifest the sphota of words or sentences, because they are manifesters
(directly), like the light of a lamp.55 Or (according to a different
190 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

reading), "Phonemes and sounds belonging to words or sentences do

not manifest sphota, because they are manifesters, like the light of a
lamp."
Answer: According to the second reading, the argument commits the
fault of proving what is already accepted, for words and sentences are
themselves sphotas. The first formulation involves the fallacy of unestab-
lished locus, for the auditory sense and the internal organ manifest
sphotas but do not manifest meanings directly.
Rumania {Sphota section, verse 134) : "Phonemes and sounds do not
manifest the sphota of words or sentences, because they exist, like the
jar, and so on."
Answer: This hetu is inconclusive {anaikäntika), for it has been shown
that sphotas are directly perceptible by the auditory sense. Further, a
word that consists of just one phoneme is admitted by even the
Mïmâmsakas to be manifested by the sound that it consists of, so the
thesis contradicts their own tenet.
Kumärila {Sphota section, verse 135) : "The sphota is not expressive of
meaning, because it is other than the phoneme, like a jar, and so on."
Answer: Because the Mïmâmsaka does not accept sphota, his reason
is unestablished (svato'siddha). (Other reasons are also given.)
Kumärila {Sphota section, verse 136) : "Whoever denies that phonemes
are expressive of meaning denies what is perceived, just as one who
denies that 'moon5 denotes the, thing having the hare on it."
Answer: What is perceived is that words are expressive of meaning, not
the correct analysis of words.
Kumärila {Sphota section, verses 137-138): "Awareness of objects
arises from phonemes, because it arises immediately following aware-
ness of them, just as awareness of fire arises from awareness of smoke."
Answer: The Mïmâmsaka admits that the awareness of the word
arises from the phonemes before the comprehension of meaning, so he
cannot appeal to this argument.
{ET77-83). Buddhist objection: There is no sentence apart from the
phonemes, for no such thing is perceived.
Counterobjection: We can infer some such different thing, because
understanding requires a cause.
Buddhist: Just the phonemes are the cause.
Counterobjector: The same meaning does not arise from hearing jara
as from hearing raja, so the meaning cannot come just from the
phonemes.
Buddhist: It has to be shown that the phonemes (in the two words)
are not different.
Counterobjector: That is shown through recognition.
Buddhist: Recognition may be in error. Anyway, all objects are
momentary and so different from one another,
MANDANA MISRA 191

Counterobjector: Because we know that the sentences (one With jam in

it, the other with raja in it) are different we know that they mean
different things.
Buddhist: It is wrong to attribute the difference to an imporceptible
difference (among sentences) when there is a perceptible difference
among the phonemes. Furthermore, the notion of a single sentence is
problematic : does it have parts or not? If it has parts, are those parts
meaningful or not? If meaningless, how can they constitute a sentence?
If meaningful, do they have parts? If so, they are sentences, and the
argument repeats indefinitely. If a sentence has no parts, it would be
impossible to explain why one does not grasp the meaning of a sentence
until its utterance is completed. (Other arguments are offered as well. )
28 (ET84-85). Answer: Just because phonemes figure in awareness
of meaning, it does not follow that nothing else does.
29 (ETS5). The believer in sphota holds that neither the sentence nor
the word has parts. And we have already explained how grasping the
meaning of a word or^sentence is a gradual process.
30 (ETS6). Even if phonemes are different each time they are
produced, it is by virtue of their generic features, not of their newborn
individuality, that they figure in the expression of meaning.
31 (ETS7). What is "sequence" (krama, that is, the gradual under-
standing of the meaning)? Not merely the causal relation between the
experiences of sounds or phonemes, for then understanding should arise
even when the speakers of the sounds are known to be different.
32 (£"T88-89). Indeed, the causal relation between the experiences
of sounds cannot be what is called sequence; only when that causal
relation is itself known can it produce understanding.
33 (ETS9). A word is a unit. Analogously, scholars admit that an
action, like raising a hand, is a unit manifested by different moments
of activity.
34 (£7*90-91 ). That the sphota is eternal follows from its unity.
35 (ET91-92). Objection: Because awareness of a word depends on
something else (namely, the phonemes) it is a mere construction
{kalpana).
Answer: Awareness of a universal property depends on awareness of
the individual instances of it,
36-37 (£T92-93). Thus sphota is established.
 10
HELARAJA

This important commentator on Bhartrhari tells us that he is the son

of Bhütiräja and a descendant of a minister named Laksana, or King
Muktâpïda of Kashmir. Abhinavagupta, who flourished in 1014,
appears to have studied with Bhütiräja as well as with a son of
Bhütiräja whom Abhinavagupta calls "Induräja." It is clear that
Abhinavagupta is referring to Heläräja in some passages, as he is credit-
ed with having written a grammatical work called Prakirnakauivarana,
which may have been a comnjbentary on Heïâraja's Prakirnakaprakâsa—at
least the title strongly suggests Abhinavagupta's awareness of Heläräja's
work.1 Thus we may place ifeläräja's date about A.D. 980.
Regarding his commentary on Bhartrhari's Trikândi, it seems clear
that such a work was written covering the entire three chapters. There
is some doubt about which portions of the work are available to us
now. The commentary on book 3 is available in print.2 Aklujkar argues
that its proper title is Prakirnakaprakâsa, and that Heläräja's commen-
tary on book 1 was called Sahdaprabhâ, while that on book 2 was
Vâkyakandatïkâ or Vakyapradipa? Aklujkar further argues that the Tikä
on book 2, which is available in print and credited to Punyaräja, is in
fact Heläräja's work instead.4
Heläräja tells us that he wrote at least three other works, none of
which is now available. One was an explanation of Kätyäyana's
vârttikas on Pänini, titled Vârttikonmesa. Another work, called Kriyâuiveka,
is intended to establish that action (kriyä) is the main idea expressed by
a sentence. A third, named Advayasiddhi, seems to have been a work on
sabdädvaita or linguistic monism; Heläräja remarks that in it he "has
shown that the ultimate manifests itself as the experiencer and the
experienced and that all that is experienced rests in consciousness,"5
194 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

COMMENTARY ON BHARTRHARI'S Trikändi

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. On Universal Property
In the case of words abstracted from sentences Bhartrhari tries to
reconcile the universalist view of Väjapyäyana and the substantialist
view of Vyädi. The meaning of a word is permanent, whether a univer-
sal or a substance. All words—nouns, verbs, prefixes, and postpositions
—can be reduced to the category of universals. Every word primarily
refers to the universal of its form—the word universal—which is then
identified with the meaning universal through superimposition. Accord-
ing to Pânini both the universal and the particular are primarily
signified by words; and both are understood simultaneously, because
they are so intrinsically interconnected that one cannot exist without
the other. According to those who consider the primary meaning as the
universal, its connection with action may be direct or indirect. In the
sentence "one should not kill a Brähmana" the whole class is meant,
but in "fetch a Brähmana" only the individual is meant.
Although Vaisesikas do not accept a universal within a universal,
the Grammarians accept a hierarchy of universals, like classes and sub-
classes: for example, the animal universal entails the universals of
cowness and horseness.
All nominal stems signify Being, which is eternal. Just as treeness is
contained in the sim§apä-ness, Being is found in everything. It is the all-
comprehending universal. The status of the phenomenal universal
depending on convention (samketa) is not affected by the great
universal, mahasämanya. Being itself becomes action when viewed as
having a sequence of time.
Heläräja favored the metaphorical model of language rather than
the crystal model. According to his model an object in the external
world is given a name when the universal located in the name is super-
imposed upon a universal belonging to a particular bearer in the
external world.-The thing universals have an ontological separate
existence. But language is independent of the world.
2. On Substance
Another view is that all words denote substance {dravya)^ the
individual, the concrete, the particular. Substance is of two kinds, the
real {päramärthika) and the expressional (samvyavahârika). It is the
second kind of substance that is dealt with in the supplementary section
and is declared to be the meaning of all words by Vyädi. Through all
these things with different forms, it is the same Ultimate Reality
Brahman that is cognized. Words express these forms directly, and
HELÄRÄJA 195

through them the Ultimate Reality also. The many forms that we
cognize as the meanings of words are unreal, but the real runs through
them all. Although there are different gold ornaments, actually every-
thing is gold. Looking at a Jandscape through a tube, we are able to
perceive only a limited portion; similarly, every word expresses an
aspect of Reality.

3. On Relations
A word expresses the speaker's idea, the external object and the
word form. The word form is understood by all even without under-
standing the conventional meaning. The relation between a linguistic
form and its meaning is neither conjunction (samyoga) nor inherence
(samauqya). The meaning relation is the beginningless fitness (yogyatä),
like the fitness of sense organs for their contents. A word expresses only
its correct meaning ; incorrect words convey meaning only by inference
the correct form.
What words convey can be called existence of a secondary nature
(upacärasattä). External objects are conveyed only in parts by words.

4. On Quality
A substance requires qualities for being expressed. Qualities help to
specify a substance in a finer way.
5. On Direction
Direction (dik) is a power of Brahman, inferred from its effects.
Those who believe that the whole manifestation of the external world
exists within the Supreme Consciousness hold that the manifestation is
not external, though it seems to be so. Everything is an inner mani-
festation of Brahman. Strictly there is no distinction between inner and
outer; there is only one Reality.

6. On the Means to Action (Sâdhana)

The powers to produce various kinds of effects constitute the essential
nature of the objects in the world. A normal sentence expresses a
complex meaning of which the central meaning is some action, to
which the other elements contribute. The verb expresses the central
element and the nouns express the other elements. Sâdhana, means to
action, is the name given to the concrete objects that help to accomplish
the action.
In the use of words the power of a thing is more important than the
thing itself, and the speaker's intention plays an important role in
deciding what type oïkaraka is to be taken. "He cooks in the pot," "he
cooks with the pot," and "the pot cooks" are all correct. The sâdhana
can be purely mental, as when a storyteller narrates the story of Krsna
196 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

killing Kamsa. The means depends on the intention. In "he sees a pot"
it is the dimension of the pot that is seen, but in "he sees the form," it is
the color. The Grammarian is interested in what the expression says.

7. On Action
The root is defined as something that expresses action (kriya)—a
particular behavior on the part of the accessories. Kriyä is different
from the accessories that play a part, direct or indirect, in its accom-
plishment. It is not pratyaksa (perceptible) but has to be inferred, and
even in the case of "to exit" it is an action, the continued existence of
sattä in time. Heläräja makes it clear that what is being discussed in
grammar is not what action really is, but what action as presented by
words is. There were conflicting views among early writers—whether
it is a definite of action or the nature of the meaning conveyed by the
verbal roots, and so on. The idea that action is a process is found in
Yäska. Heläräja says that a process is something that has parts arranged
in a temporal sequence. How can the idea of a single action be convey-
ed, if the series of actions constituting it be not simultaneous? Unity is
ascribed to the series of actions on the basis of the ultimate result. The
unity is mental.

8. On Gender
The grammatical gender does not always correspond to the sex.
Several attempts have been made to explain this inconsistency. Does
gender depend on the form of words or on the meaning? Heläräja
merely elucidates the views of Bhatrhari and tries to correlate them
with the views found in the Mahabhäsya.

9. On Time
Heläräja summarizes Bhartrhari's view of time as follows. Time is an
independent power of Brahman. On the basis of this power, differentia-
tion as the six transformations (birth and so on elaborated by
Värsyäyani) take place. The apparent sequence in the appearances of
being is based on this time factor. Time is a creative power, not an
eternal substance as the Vaisesikas hold. It is the svâtantrya§aktï (power
of complete freedom) of Brahman. As the creative power time is
responsible for the birth, continuity, and destruction of everything.
The other special causes, such as the material cause, depend on time,
which is the auxiliary cause. Time is compared to the stage manager
(sUtradhâra) of a puppet show, who pulls the strings and makes the
puppets move according to his wish. The appearance and the dis-
appearance of things are based on the permissive power and the
preventive power of time, respectively; the continuity of things is also
based on the permissive power of time.
HELÄRÄJA 197

Time is measured by action, and action is determined or measured

by time. Statements about an action being "slow" or "quick" are
based on time. Although time is really one, it appears to be differentiat-
ed and in sequence. It is because of actions that distinctions such as
past, present, and future are attributed to time. Action that is complete
is given the name of past. The fact that things are remembered is a
proof of the existence of time. All divisions of time into parts are artifi-
cial and based on actions that are brought about by it.
If external movements are not available for measuring time, one
can use one's own breathing movement for the purpose. The yogins
actually use the movement of their breath to determine time.
Heläräja says that Bhartrhari devoted a whole section on time not
to discussing its philosophical aspects, but to explaining adequately the
tenses in the language.
Brahman is true knowledge without any sequence, but under the
influence of time (which is a power of Brahman) it is presented in a
temporal sequence. Nescience {avidya) is the cause of the phenomenal
world, consisting of differentiation both temporal and spatial. Of the
two, temporal differentiation comes first. Consciousness in the form of
paeyanti is without any sequence, but in association with the prâna
principle, it shines as though it had sequence. When true knowledge
dawns, the division of sequence also disappears. The main function of
time is to present phenomena in a temporal sequence.
 11
PRAMEYASAMGRAHA

The unknown author of a lost commentary on the Väkyapadiya called

Prameyasamgraha must have flourished about A.D. 1000.
 12
PÜNYARAJA

Two different commentaries on the Trikândi have been credited to

this author, but in both cases the authorship has been questioned. For
a long while the tikä on Book 1, which had been published in the
Benares Sanskrit Series in 1887, was credited to Punyaräja, though the
colophon clearly mentions the author's name as Hari Vrsabha. The
mistake was pointed out by Haraprasad Shastri and again later by
C. Kunhan Raja, as well as by K.A. Subramania Iyer.1 In addition,
as mentioned previously, Ashok Aklujkar has offered reasons to doubt
Punyaraja's authorship of the commentary on Book 2.
 13
KAIYATA

Kaiyata, author of the Pradipa ("light") commentary on Patanjali's

Mahabhasya, occupies a high position in the history of the Päninian.
school of Grammar, along with Bhartrhari and Nägesa Bhatta. He was
the son of Jaiyata Upâdhyàya and pupil of Mahesvara, and probably
belonged to Kashmir. He generally followed the views of Bhartrhari,
as stated in the beginning of the commentary, and was influenced by
the Käsikä of Vämana and Jayäditya. He is assigned to the later
half of the eleventh century.
A verse from Kaiyata's work (bhâsyabdhih kvâtigambhirah) is quoted in
Ruyyaka's Alamkârasaruasva, composed between 1135 and 1150; another
verse is quoted by Mahesvarasüri in the commentary on the Anekârtha-
samgraha of his teacher Hemacandra (1088-1172). Purusottamadeva
refers directly to Kaiyata in his Bhasavrtti (about 1150 ). Kaiyata's
work contains indirect references to Heläräja's commentary on the
Vakyapadiya.1 The generally accepted posteriority of Haradatta -to
Kaiyata is rejected by Peri, because Haradatta is mentioned by name
in Dharmakïrti's Rüpävakära (before the tenth century). There is a
tradition that Kaiyata was a younger brother of Mammata.
The Pradipa is an elaborate and complete commentary on the
Mahâbhâsya, elucidating the meanings of words and expressions in that
work and discussing the different views held by scholars in the interpre-
tation of particular passages. There is little scope for giving his own
views about problems on the philosophy of Grammar; still, the impor-
tance of the Pradipa in elucidating the views of Patanjali and Bhartrhari
is considerable.

Pradipa ON PATANJALI'S Mahabhasya

S. R. Bannerjee and K. Kunjunni Raja

( 1) Sivasütras. About the arrangement of the alphabets of Sanskrit in
204 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

the Sivasütras, Kaiyata says that they are essential for pratyahara or selec-
ting groups of them as used by Pânini, and the enunciation of the
sütras is not for explaining the proper pronunciation of the alphabets
{svarüpakathana).
(2) Kaiyata enunciates the principle that among the three great
authorities on Sanskrit grammar—Pänini, Kätyäyana, and Patanjali—
the later the sage, the greater the authoritativeness.2 Elsewhere he
states that the authority rests with the three sages.3
(3 ) On Patanjali's statement regarding scripture as a prayojana for
the study of Grammar, Kaiyata says that the term prayojana should be
taken in the sense of motivating force (pravartaka). "A Brahman shall
learn and understand the Veda with its six ancillaries without any
motive of gain."4
 14
JYESTHAKALÀâA

Another Kashmiri author of a commentary on the Mahäbhäsya, now

lost, was Jyesthakaläsa of Kausika gotra (lineage), son of Räjakaläsa,
grandson of Muktikaläsa, of the Konmukha village in Kashmir. One
of his sons was Bilhana, author of a kävya work titled Vikramânkadeva-
carita. From Bilhana5s date Yudhisthira Mimamsaka has calculated
that Jyesthakaläsa must have lived between 1005 and 1082.
 15
MAITREYA RAKSITA

This Buddhist Grammarian in eastern India lived between 1092 and

1122, according to Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, who thinks he may have
been a Bengali. In addition to works on Buddhist Grammar, including
Dhâtupradipa, Durghatavrtti, and a Tantrapradipa on Jinendrabuddhi's
Kasikänyäsa (a fragmentary manuscript, which is listed as residing at
the Asiatic Society Library in Calcutta), he appears to have written
a tikä on the Mahäbhäsya, which has been lost.
 16
PURUSOTTAMADEVA

During the later half of the twelfth century in Bengal, during the reign
of Laksmanasena, a number of grammatical works were composed by
this writer, who may have been a Buddhist. One of his works was a
Prânâpana or Laghuvrtti on the Mahabhâsya, of which a fragment is avai-
lable. Other works axeiBhâsâvrtti, Paribhâsâvrtti, Ganavrtti, Jnâpakasamu-
ccaya, and a commentary on the Unadisütras, as well as a number of
lexicographical treatises.
 17
DHANESVARA

Yudhisthira Mimamsaka places this writer at the beginning of the

thirteenth century. In addition to a Prakriyaratnamani, preserved in a
single manuscript at Adyar, he also wrote a Cintamani on the Mahâbhâsya.
He was apparently the teacher of Vopadeva, the famous Bengali
Grammarian.
 18
(RSIPUTRA) PARAMESVARA II

This well-known Purvamïmâmsâ writer flourished about 1410. He was

a member of the important Payyur family of Bhättas and composed a
commentary on Mandana Misra's Sphotasiddhi, called Gopâlika. In
K. A. Subramania Iyer's translation of Sphotasiddhi use has been made of
the Gopâlika, and a number of readings and explanations in his footnotes
are based on Paramesvara's commentary. A few of the most important
are repeated in the following set of notes. References are by kârikâs.

Sphotasiddhigopâlikâ
K. A, Subramania Iyer

2. It is the Gopâlika that identifies the opponents in question as

Kumärila. Specifically Slokavärttika, sphota section 119, is cited.
7. Paramesvara says that the first sentence of Mandana's answer in
this section summarizes an explanation of "dispositional tendency55
provided by Kumärila in the Tantravârttika on Mimâmsâsutra
2.1.5., where Kumärila is specifically speaking about apürva.
13. Although Mandana's text, in explaining why the final varna is
without meaning, confines itself to showing how the latent dispo-
1
sition laid down by the previous phonemes is beyond the range of
perception and inference, Paramesvara goes farther and shows
that it is beyond the range of comparison and presumption as well.
10. The Gopâlika points out that all erroneous awarenesses are caused
by things that are the causes of veridical awarenesses as well.
21. Paramesvara explains that the analogy of our cognition of a new
large number is here predicated on the theory about number, that
it is neither a separate category nor a quality (guna), a view diffe-
rent from the more commonly held Vaisesika view that number
is a quality.
214 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

22. The Gopalikä points out that sublation may be by either a positive
or a negative cognition. For example, when one discovers that
"this is not silver," it is negative, but if the discovery is "this is
shell," it is positive.
23. The sense organs referred to here include both external and in-
ternal ones.
27. Last sentence. The Gopalikä explains why one does not grasp the
meaning of a sentence until its utterance is completed. It is because
the following stages take time: (1 ) understanding each phoneme;
(2) recognition of each one as a stem or a suffix and thus the cons-
truction of a word; (3) understanding each word's meaning;
(4) satisfying the requirements oi mutual expectancy, fitness, and
contiguity; (5 ) connecting the several word meanings ; (6) under-
standing the sentence.
 19
SESA KRSNA

The âesa family of Banaras is celebrated, and frequent attempts have

been made to reconstruct its genealogy. According to New Catalogus
Catalogorum, volume 4, p. 365b, this author was the grandson of âesa
Rämacandra and the son of Sesa Nrsimha, who was the author of the
work on dharma entitled Govindarnava. This Krsna was also the elder
brother of Sesa Cintämani, author of Rasamanjarivyäkhya. His sons were
Sesa Vïresvara, who was the guru of Jagannätha Panditaräja, a very
famous figure of those days, and (Sesa) Näräyana (Bhatta), author of
the Süktiratnäkara (see below, author 23). The New Catalogus Catalo-
gorum places Sesa Krsna in the latter half of the sixteenth century, but
if the preceding set of relationships is to be worked out consistently with
the secure facts that are known, it would seem this date should be
pushed back a bit—we suggest 1510 as the time in which he must have
flourished.
He is said to have composed a work entitled Sabdäharana or Sabdälan-
käm> which is lost. The New Catalogus also ascribes to him a small work
on sphota theory, entitled Sphotatattvanirüpana. A work with this title is
available, though manuscripts do not identify its author.

Sphotatattvanirüpana
G. B. Palsule

This work is small, consisting of nineteen stanzas with the author's own
commentary. The text has no pretensions to either original ideas or
an exhaustive treatment of the topic, its aim apparently being to present
the doctrine and the accompanying arguments in succinctly worded
stanzas. It is worth mentioning that, though one of the late works, it is
content with presenting the doctrine in its classical form and is free from
such innovations as we find in the Sphotacandrikâ.
216 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Its Vedântic bias is discernible when it speaks of the sphota ( = sabda-

brahman) as a basis {adhisthana), with the phoneme, word, and sentence
as its illusory manifestation (viuarta), which are wrongly imposed
{adhyasta) on it.
The work is edited by M. G. Bakre in Vadarthasamgraha (Bombay,
1913), vol. 1, pp. 1-15. Numbered references are to stanzas.
1. The first stanza salutes the sabdabrahman, the basis (adhisthana) for
the manifestations of phoneme, word, and sentence.
2. Previous authorities are named.
3. This stanza declares the inability of the phonemes in any way to
convey meaning. Sphota alone can do it. There are two kinds of sphota
(word and sentence). According to the view that sphota is partless,
sounds directly manifest sphota. But if sphota is accepted as having parts,
then the sounds manifest phonemes, which in turn manifest sphota. The
author refutes the view that sphota has parts.
4. Recognition of identity does not necessarily guarantee eternality
for phonemes. Cognitions like "g is produced" can show the opposite.
5. Even if one accepts the eternality of phonemes, there cannot be a
cognition of a simultaneous whole when they are screened by winds
(that manifest them) or by sounds.
6. There cannot be any conveying of meaning by the accumulated
dispositions in company with the final phoneme, because meaning-
conveying is against the nature (svabhâvasya vip ary ayat) oî the disposi-
tions. Assumption of such an ad hoc power involves unnecessary
assumption (gaurava).
7. No actual sequence is possible in the case of eternal and all-perva-
sive phonemes. Even in the final cognition sequence is impossible,
because cognition is one.
8. The phonemes in the final memory cannot retain the sequence of
their cognitions because they (previous cognitions) are not a subject of
the final memory.
9. A single sphota is clearly experienced in the cognitions "this is a
word," "this is a sentence," "this is a phoneme." So the sphota is a fact
of experience, it is not just a postulate, the commentary adds. The
commentary also adds that because no change of meaning is there, even
when the order of words in a sentence is changed, an indivisible sentence
has to be accepted.
10. Neither as perishable nor as imperishable can phonemes be the
parts of the sentence ( = sphota). They are only its illusory manifestations
as the world of the Brahman.
11. The variety of appearance of a single sphota is due to different
sounds, like the variety of reflections of a single face in different reflec-
tions. This fact also explains the differences in meaning from utterance
to utterance, the commentary adds. /
SESA KRSNA 217

12. Though different from the phonemes, the sphota appears to be

tinged by them, because of imposed identity.
13. This stanza describes the gradual perception of the sphota, with
the help of previous impressions, and provides the usual illustration of
the inspection of a gem.
14. The cognition of the superixnposed entity (here phonemes) is the
cognition of the substratum (here sphota) itself.
15. Erroneous cognitions can be a means of correct cognition. The
usual illustration, a tree mistaken as an elephant, is offered.
1.6. In section 19 of Mandana's text the progressive clarity must be
taken as referring to the perception of sphota, not to the understanding
of meaning (from phonemes), because this feature is peculiar to know-
ledge by direct perception (and the understanding of meaning is not an
act of direct perception, adds the commentary).
17. In spite of the sameness of phonemes the sphota differs in cases
like nâdijdinâ. So it must be different from the phonemes.
18-19. The unity of a word cannot be explained away as a secondary
one (for example, because it conveys a single meaning), because the
boundaries of a word are to be first understood before any meaning
can be known. Moreover, such reasoning will amount to banishing all
unity (and also the diversity based on it) from the face of the Earth.
 20
SATYÄNANDA OR
RÀMACANDRA SARASVATÏ

Author of a/Laghuuivarana on Kaiyata's Mahâbhâsyapradipa, this writer

appears to have been the father of I svarananda, who wrote a corres-
ponding "Brhad" Vivarana on Kaiyata. As a manuscript of Isvarânanda's
work dated 1603 ( = 1551?) is extant, we must date his father to the
first half of the sixteenth century.
 21
SESA CINTAMANI

A brother of Sesa Krsna, so presumably contemporaneous (thus, early

sixteenth century), he may have been the author of a commentary,
Prakäsa, on Kaiyata's Mahâbhâsyapradipa.1
 22
SESA VIRESVARA
OR RÄMESVARA

One of âesa Krsna's sons, he is mentioned in one or two grammatical

works of later times and may be identical with a Vâtesvara also named.
We know of no works authored by him. Annambhatta was a pupil
of his.
 23
SESA NÄRÄYANA BHATTA

Younger brother of Sesa Vïresvara, this writer must have flourished

about 1540 (though Yudhisthira Mimamsaka gives a date half a century
easlier). He is the author of a commentary on the Mahabhäsya titled
Süktiratnäkara, which appears to have been written at the instigation of
a King Pirinda or Phirinda. A manuscript of this work exists in the India
Office Library, London.
 24
VISNUMITRA

This writer's Kslrodara on the Mahâbhàsya appears to be lost. It is refer-

red to by Sivarâmendra Sarasvatï and by Bhattoji Dïksita. Because the
latter's date must be the late sixteenth century, Visnumitra must have
lived at least a few decades earlier, say about the middle of the sixteenth
century at the latest.
 25
ISVARANANDA or
ÏSVARÏDATTA SARASVATÏ

The son of Satyânanda (Râmacandra Sarasvatï, see above, author

20 ) and datable to about the middle of the sixteenth century on the
basis of evidence in a manuscript of his work, Isvaränanda wrote a
Brhat (large) Vivarana on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa, One manuscript
list cites another work by him, Sabdabodhatarangini.
 26
BHARATA MISRA

(The date of this writer is unknown. His work presumably precedes

the anonymous Sphotasiddhinyäyavicära [next entry] , which depends
on it. )

SPHOTASIDDHI
G. B. Palsule

Whereas Bharata Misra makes a clear-cut statement (not found in

Bhartrhari or Mandana) that it is the sounds (dhvani) and not the
phonemes (varna) (though he does not say how he differentiates the
two) that manifest the sphota, his most original contributions are in
reconciling the theories of sphota as universal (Jäti) and of spho ta as
individual (vyakti), and of sphota as inner mental word (antahsabda).
The universal theory takes division to be real and belonging to the
individuals, the individual theory regards it as superimposed, really
belonging to the manifesters. According to Bharata Misra the different
views are meant for students at different levels. The whole idea seems
to have been tacitly accepted by the later authors.
Mandana's influence on Bharata Misra is evident not only in the
title of the work but also in many an argument. But Bharata Misra is
by no means without originality. The progress in methodology can be
seen in the three clear-cut sections that offer three independent proofs
in support of the sphota. While the idea is not wholly new, Bharata
Misra seems to have been the first to have developed Vedic authority as
a full-fledged argument in favor of the sphota theory; the first section,
however, carries forward Mandana's concept that sphota is auditorily
perceptible.
The salutation to Bharata Misra in the anonymous Sphotasiddhinyä-
yavicära and adoption there of many of Bharata Misra's arguments and
232 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

methodological features (like the three sections) would indicate his

position among the writers on sphota.
The work is divided into three sections : perception, pp. 1-16; mean-
ing, pp. 16—27 ; and Vedic authority, pp. 27-42 in the edition by K.
Sambasiva Sastri (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series 89, Trivandrum, 1927).
It is a prose work, but when each argument is over, it is summarized in
a stanza (there are ten in all). E references are to Sastri's edition. The
summary here is by G. B. Palsule.

Survey of Philosophical Topics

1. Perception
(£1-9). An expression like "cow" (gauh), when heard, is directly
perceived to be a single word-entity (padatattva). But this cognition of
unity is sought to be explained with four alternative possibilities
(anyathäsiddhi) by the opponents so as to do away with the concept of a
single word-entity. These possibilities are that the feeling of unity is due
(1) to the phonemes appearing in a single cognition, (2) to their
conveying a single meaning, (3 ) to the quickness of pronunciation, or
(4) to a single power of the phonemes. They are contradicted as follows.
(1 ) There being no sequence in a single cognition, there will be nothing
to distinguish between the meanings of pika "a cuckoo55 and kapi "a
monkey,55 which contain the same phonemes but in different sequences.
(2 ) No meaning can be conveyed before a word is first grasped, because
the word is the cause and the meaning its result. (3 ) Even in the case of
long words like titau, there is a single perception. (4) Apart from other
objections to this suggestion, the objection contained in (1 ) remains,
that the phonemes cannot appear in a single cognition.
(£9-11). Bharata Misra confirms this unitary word-entity in the
context of the sentence "gosabdäd artham pratipadyämahe55 ("we
understand the meaning from the word "cow55). The opponents argu-
ments, seeking to explain the unity of the word "cow55 (go) on grounds
other than the positing of sphota, are refuted practically on the same
lines as in Mandana5s Sphotasïddhi.
Bharata Misra further points out that the statement concerned is not
just figurative, nor erroneous, and that by the word go the final sound
alone is not meant.
(El 1-14). The perception of parts in a word is explained. According
to the theory of sphota as universal, the division into parts belongs to
the individuals; according to the theory of sphota as individual, the
division into parts belongs to the manifesters (vyanjaka) that are super-
imposed on the word. The universal theory takes the division into
BHARATA MISRA 233

phonemes to be real; the individual theory, by contrast, takes it to be

erroneously imposed.
A parallel given for the unitariness of a word (and a sentence) despite
apparent differentiation is that of the special vowel ai, technically called
vrddhatälavya, believed to be unitary by the opponent (Mimamsaka)
himself (cf. Mimamsâsutras 9.2.32-33). If he questions the unitariness
of a word, he cannot logically hold the unitariness of this vowel.

2. Meaning
(£"16-21). In this section, which is meant to support the proof of
direct perception in favor of the sphota by showing that otherwise the
understanding of meaning cannot be accounted for (anyathânupapatti),
Bharata Misra makes the following points.
(1) Phonemes in no way have the meaning-conveying capacity.
(The arguments are much the same as in Mandana5 s Sphotasiddhi.)
(2 ) The case is similar for the dispositions. (Incidentally, Bharata
Misra defines power [sakti, a disposition is a power] as "extrasensory
form restricted to bringing about a specific effect of an object"
["kâryavisayaniyatam antïndriyam rüpam"] .
(3) The first phoneme is without the benefit of a preceding dispo-
sitional trace. So the progressive imparting of excellence to phoneme
cognitions is impossible, and, consequently, the dispositional trace
cannot have the ad hoc power of conveying meaning.
(4) There is no compelling reason to assume a trace of the type of
apürva.
(5) The singleness of the speaker cannot be a cause of conveying the
meaning.
(6) An important statement: according to the Grammarians it is the
sounds, and not phonemes, that manifest the sphota. The sounds in the
word vrsa are different from the first four in the word vrsabha.
(£22). The indistinctness {avyaktata) of the sphota is not of the nature
of cognition-cum-noncognition (upalabdhatânupalabdhatâtmikâ) but of
that of relative distinctness (târatamyena) .
(£23). The initial cognitions of phonemes constitute an anyathâkhyâti
of the sphota. (Mandana had used the word viparyäsa. ) (1 ) The sounds
bringing about the error (of part perception) are different from, but
similar to, the sounds that bring about the correct cognition of the
word. (Mandana, kärikä 2, simply says that the same sounds are res-
ponsible for both of these results.)
(£23-24). (2) Bharata Misra shows how the sounds cause the
erroneous cognition of parts in a sentence.
(£24-25). (3) The threefold uniformity of error is justified. (These
three kinds of niyatatä are already in Mandana. )
(£25). (4) The rsis perceive the partless spho}a directly (cf. Mandana,
234 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

p. 33). Only direct perception is capable of progressive clarity (see

Mandana, section 23).
(£25-26). This section states an important point. There is no con-
flict in the three theories about the sphota, as universal (jâti), as an
individual (uyakti), and as inner mental word {sabdatattva). They are
meant for different levels of students.

3. Vedic Authority
(£27-36). This section purports to establish the sphota (actually the
words used are varnätiriktam väktattvam, "superphonemic speech-princi-
ple") on the basis of scripture, by showing that this doctrine is tacitly
admitted in certain Vedic texts.
(1) The first line of the celebrated Vedic stanza "uta tvah pasyan"
(Rg Veda 10.71.4) is interpreted to mean that the common man, seeing
with his eyes the physical world, does not recognize it as an effect
(manifestation) of the language principle. Similarly, the second line is
interpreted to mean that, being deluded by the physical speech sounds,
he does not grasp the language principle that controls them.
(2) Bharata Misra also quotes some passages from the Brähmanas
like "saitam mantram apasyat" {Aitareya Brähmana 5.23) in which, he
maintains, the clairvoyant perception of a mantra or other passage is
possible only if a superphonemic word principle is accepted.
(3) It is also claimed that in the celebrated Nirukta passage (1.20)
beginning "säksätkrtadharmäna..." the direct perception of dharma is
meant to indicate that direct perception of word has preceded the per-
ception of phonemes.
(£36-40). The reality at the basis of the whole word is sphota, which
can also be perceived directly. In a lengthy argument Bharata Misra
tries to show that the ultimate reality is existence, with its indescribable
power and form, which descends to the level of the phenomenal world
( ' 'advitïya sattaivänirväcyasvasaktirüpavargadvayavati vyavahärapa-
tham avatarati").
Two additional noteworthy points are made. First, like Mandana,
Bharata Misra uses expressions such as "word above and beyond the
phonemes" {varnätiriktam padam)or "speech principle" {väktattvam) or
"language principle" {sabdatattvam) along with sphota. Second, Bharata
Misra mentions (£1 ) Audumbarâyana as the advocate of the sphota
theory and Upavarsa as its opponent, but adds that there is no real
difference of opinion between the two, because Uapavarsa's purpose is
only practical (£28).
 27
SPHOTASIDDHINYAYAVICARA
G.B. Palsule

This anonymous work is a good epitome of the usual arguments for and
against the sphota, but otherwise there is little originality in it. It is
considerably influenced by the Sphotasiddhi of Bharata Misra (to whom,
along with others, an obeisance is made in the initial stanza) ; indeed,
in a limited sense, the present work could be called a metrical recast of
Bharata's work.
One may in passing note that the author practically identifies,
without expressly saying so, the individual sphota (vyaktisphota) with the
language principle (sabdatattva). Another interesting item is the scathing
criticism of the notion of sequence (krama).
The edition (E ) is by T. Ganapati Sastri (Trivandrum Sanskrit
Series 54, Trivandrum, n.d.). References are by stanza.
1 (El). Apart from the three Munis and Hari, the author mentions
Bharata (and, of course, Mandana) in the initial stanza.
2 (E2). The object of the work is to establish the superphonemic
language principle (varnebhyo vyatirekena sabdatattvam) on the strength of
direct perception, presumption (arthäpatti, the difficulty of explaining
otherwise how we understand meaning), and scripture (ägama).
3 (£"3-10). The distinct cognition of the word as a single entity apart
from the phonemes is explained.
4 (2? 11-16). (a) This section elaborates the usual difficulties in the
way of attributing meaningfulness to phonemes.
(£17-116). (b) Various suggestions are put forth by the opponent
to show meaningfulness of phonemes and are refuted by the author :
(1 ) excellence (visesa) imparted by phonemes to one another (17-29) ;
(2 ) assigning a special power of conveying meaning, in the form of
dispositions^ to phonemes (30-49); (3) direct perception of the final
phoneme combined with the memory of the preceding phonemes
(49-53); (4) a simultaneous whole of the phonemes reflected in
236 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

the final memory (53-116). The arguments for rejecting these

suggestions are the same as those in the Sphotasiddhis of Mandana and
Bharata. Stanzas 84-115 contain a long-drawn-out argument chal-
lenging the concept of sequence and its usefulness in assigning meaning-
fulness to the phonemes. So the author concludes that if sphota be not
accepted, we cannot account for the difference of meaning in words
like sarah and rasah.
5 (£1 17—121 ). The popular saying "We understand meaning from
word" {ßabdäd artham vijânïmah) is explicable only by the sphota theory,
not by the phoneme theory.
6 (£121-131 ). Objections: There is no perception of any entity diffe-
rent from phonemes (as that of the thumb from other fingers) ; also,
if such an entity existed, what would be its relation to the phonemes?
(£131-174). Answer: By the relationship of the manifester and the
manifested, the sounds manifest either the words (as individuals mani-
fest a universal)—sphota as universal (136-144)—or a single word-
principle, with illusion of parts (word, phoneme, sentence)—sphota as
individual (vyaktisphota) (145-174). There are two kinds of sound,
präkrta and vaikrta, and their functions are described (151-155). Sounds
have a deceptive nature and hence produce an illusion (156-164). The
final cognition of unity sublates the initial cognitions of plurality
(165-174).
7 (£175-202). Sphota manifests itself gradually.
8 (£203-205). Indistinct cognition is possible only in sense percep-
tion (which grasps sphota), not in the understanding of meaning from
word.
9 (£206-209). The three theories about sphota (as universal, as indi-
vidual, as inner mental word) are reconciled.
10 (£210-242). Sphota is established as the authority of scripture (on
the same lines as in Bharata 5s Sphotasiddhi).
11 (£243-245). Conclusion.
 28
ANNAMBHATTA

This author, who flourished about 1560, is well known to students of

Nyàya as the author of the most commonly studied introduction to the
Nyäya system, the Tarkasamgraha, as well as of a commentary, Dipikä,
thereon. A native of the Telugu-speaking country, he identifies his
father as "Tirumala Äcärya" of the family of Advaitavidyâcârya
Räghava Somayäji.1 P.P.S. Sastri says the family of Räghava Somayäji
resided in Garikapada, which was formerly in the possession of Nizam
Ali.2
In addition to the Tarkasamgraha and several Nyäya commentaries,
Annambhatta wrote a. Mitäksara on the Brahmasütras, an Advaita com-
mentary on Nrsimhäsrama's Tattvaviveka, and Pürvammiämsä com-
mentaries on Kumärila's Tantravärüika and Somesvara Bhatta's Nyäya-
sudhâ. His works on grammar were a Mitaksara on Pänini's Astadhyâyi,
and an Uddyotana on Kaiyata's Mahabhäsyapradipa, which has been
edited several times
Annambhatta studied grammar with Sesa Vïresvara (see above,
author 22), the son of âesa Krsna, while in Kâsï. In his Uddyotana
commentary on Kaiyata's Pradipa, Annambhatta says, "There is no
reason to believe that only Sanskrit was created by God at the time of
creation. When the Yävanas, and so on, were created their language
was also created. We do not have any evidence to show that the Yävanas
also first used Sanskrit and only later shifted to their own language."
 29
APPAYYA DÏKSITAI

The first and most famous of "a number of members of the Bhäradväja
lineage that bear this name, this writer is responsible for a large number
of treatises that range over topics in Vedânta, Mïmâmsâ, Dharma, and
Alamkâra sâstras, as well as a handful of grammatical works. He was the
son of Rangarâjâdhvarïndra, a southern Brahmin, a grandson of Äcärya
Dïksita, and an elder brother of Accân Dïksita, who in turn was the
father of Nïlakantha Dïksita, a famous kävya author of more than one
hundred works.
A good deal is known about Appayya's life and times. Y. Mahalinga
Sastri gives Appayya's dates as 1520-1593. That he died in his seventy-
second year is declared by Nïlakantha Dïksita. He is known to have had
several royal patrons, of whom the first was Chinnâ Timma of the
Vijayanagara empire, who ruled until around 1550, and whom Appayya
himself credits with having commissioned Appayya's commentary
on Vedänta Desika's Yädaväbhyudaya. A second patron, Ghinna Bomma,
ruled at Vellore from 1549 to 1578, and Appayya mentions him more
than once. Finally, Venkatapati of Pennugonda, whose rule began in
1585, is mentioned in Appayya Dïksita's Vidhirasäyana andKuvalayänanda.
There is an inscription at Adayapalam dated 1582 that refers to
him as an author of a hundred works', as well as having been bathed in
gold by Chinna Bomma. He is associated most closely with the town of
Ghidambara, where he is held to have passed away.
Appayya Dïksita engaged in controversies with other Vedäntins,
through whose relative chronology Appayya's date can be further
confirmed. Notable among them is Srï Tâtâcârya (1508-1583), author
of Pancamatabhanjana, a critique of Appayya, who was influential at the
Vijayanagara court in the middle of the sixteenth century between
1545 and 1585, during which time Appayya had apparently nothing to
do with the Vijayanagara court. Mahäcärya, another famous Visistâ-
dvaitin, wrote Chandamaruta in response to Appayya's polemics. Another
240 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

important personality of the same period was Vijayïndra Bhiksu, the

Dvaitin, who died in 1595 and is said to have written 104 works to rival
the same number of Appayya's. Still another Dvaitin who responded to
Appayya's arguments was Vâdirâja, head of one of the Udipi maths
(ashrams), who lived in this same period.
One of Appayya Dïksita's important pupils was Bhattoji Dïksita, the
author of Siddhântakaumudi, who came from the north to study Vedänta
and Mïmâmsâ and wrote Sabdakaustubha as a commemoration of his
discipleship under Appayya. A story is told that Bhattoji found
Appayya living unostentatiously in a village, belying widespread fame
and royal patronage.
After Vacaspati Misra I in the tenth century, Appayya Dïksita is the
most outstanding instance of a writer who transcended the scholastic
boundaries to write treatises that were and still are revered and read by
followers of a variety of systems and indeed of a variety of sastras. His
works on Visistädvaita and Dvaita, as well as, of course, on Advaita and
Mïmâmsâ, are studied by proponents of those systems. He is the author
of poetry, learned, treatises on Alamkâmsâstra, literary criticism, and
word derivations, as well as popular works on prayer and didactic
works counseling how to live a fruitful life.
His works on Grammar are not in print. He wrote a commentary on
Pänini, a manuscript of which lies in the Adyar Library, according to
the New Catalogus Catalogorum. Other grammatical treatises ascribed to
him include the Tinantasesasamgraha and Kaumudîprakâsa.
 30

BHATTOJI DIKSITA

This famous Grammarian flourished toward the end of the sixteenth

century. He was a Brahmin of Maharashtra or Telugu country (un-
certain), a member of an important family that comprises several other
famous names among Grammar specialists. His father was Laksmï-
dhara; his brother Rangoji Bhatta, author of several Advaita works,
who was himself the father y of Kaunda Bhatta (see below, author
37). Bhattoji's own sons were Bhànuji Dïksita and Vïresvara, the father
of Hari Dïksita (see below author 43). His teachers are also well
known : they included the Mïmâmsaka Samkara Bhatta, the polymath
Appayya Dïksita (see above, author 29), and Sesa Krsna (see above,
author 19). Yudhisthira Mimamsaka dates him from 1513 to 1593.
He is held to have made his home in Varanasi, where he founded a
school of Grammarians. He was roundly attacked by Jagannätha
Panditaräja, a controversial figure.

Sabdakaustubha

E references in the following summary refer to the edition published

by the Asiatic Society of Bengal, no date given.

(El-5). The correctness of a word depends on the meaning also;

asva, instead of asva, in the sense of a horse, is incorrect, but the term is
correct if the intended meaning is "poor."
(E6-7 ). Division into stem and suffix in the study of words is only
a means, it has no reality. Alternative division is also possible. Although
grammar gives lat and the like as indicators of the tense, actually it is
the form ti and so on that are used (in, for example, pacati) to convey
the meaning, for meaning is known through the usage of elders, and
they use only the full words., never artificial symbols such as lat.
242 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Although grammar gives the meaning of the artificial suffixes such as lat
and then prescribes the actual form, such as ti, as substitutes for them,
it is the substitutes that actually bear the meaning, for they are the
forms used in the world.
(E8-11 ). Strictly speaking, meaningfulness is based on sphota alone.
There are several views: varnasphota; padasphota; väkyasphota; akhanda-
padasphota; and akhandavàkyasphota are individual sphofas; there are
three sphota universals, varnasphota and väkyasphota. (The arguments
are the same as in the Sphotaväda of Nâgesa. ) Bhattoji says that aD of
the views have been suggested in Mahäbhasya passages here and there;
and also in Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya. The experience as one word or
one sentence is the basis for assuming padasphota and väkyasphota. The
phonemes (varnas) suggest the sphota, which is the meaning bearer.
Because the primary source for understanding the language is the elders'
statements, which are in the form of sentences, the sentence has to be
taken as the primary unit of meaning.
(£12). The question of whether indéclinables are denotative or
suggestive of meaning is valid only at the analytical level.
 31
SESA VISNU

A great-grandson of âesa Näräyana, &esa Visnu composed a

PrakaÉikâ on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya, a manuscript of which is held at
a library in Bikaner. He must have flourished about 1605.
 32
SIVARAMENDRA SARASVATI

This author's Mahäbhäsyaratnaprakäsa is published. Theodor Aufrecht

cites him as having written a tikä called Ratnäkara on the Siddhänta-
kaumudi. There is also a reference to a commentary on Pänini. 1
 33
(SESA) CARRAPANI (DATTA)

Cakrapâni was the grandson of Sesa Krsna, the younger son and
pupil of Viresvara, and the younger brother of Sesa Purusottama, as
well as the father of Sesa Gopïnâtha. This important scion of the great
Sesa family of Varanasi wrote a critique of Bhattoji Dïksita's Praudhar
manorama, aptly named Khdndana. It is apparently the same work that
is called Paramatakhaîidana, though Yudhisthira Mimamsaka believes
then to be distinct works.1 He is also credited with a Kârakatattva or
Kärakavicära.2
 34
MALLAYA YAJVAN

The author of a Tippani on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa, Mallaya

was the father of Tirumala Yajvan (see below, author 40), the
author of Darsapaurnamäsamantrahhäsya. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka specu-
lates that Tirumala was the father of Annambhatta, which would, of
course, place Mallaya in the fifteenth century. There is no evidence to
support this view, however, and it seems more likely that this author
belongs to the seventeenth century, say, about 1630.
 35
NÏLAKANTHA SUKLA

This Nïlakantha flourished between 1610 and 1670. A pupil of

Bhattoji Diksita, he wrote in 1637 a grammatical work titled Sabdaiobhä,
as well as various works on rhetoric.1
 36
NÄRAYANA (âASTRIN)

In his Vyäkhyä on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa, Näräyana Sästrin

pays his respect to his guru, the famous Dharmaräjädhvarindra, author
of Vedäntapanbhäsä and other works. He is the father of Rämakrsna
Yavjan. His date must be about 1640.
 37
KONDA (or KAUNDA) BHATTA

The famous author of the Vaiyäkaranabhüsana was the son of Rangoji

Bhatta, the author of several Advaita manuals, 1 and the nephew of
Bhattoji Dïksita (see above, author 30). Thus he must have
flourished about 1650. He was a resident of Varanasi.

Vaiyäkaranabhüsana AND Vaiyâkaranabhûsanasâra

S.D.Joshi

The Vaiyäkaranabhüsana is a commentary on the verses of his uncle

Bhattoji Dïksita, which are known as Vaiyâkaranamatonmajjana.2 On this
commentary, which defends Grammarian views and refutes the theories
of meaning found in Nyäya and Mïmâmsâ, Konda Bhatta also com-
posed an abridgment known as Vaiyâkaranabhusanasâra. He is also credit-
ed with a Vaiyäkarannsiddhäntadipika. In the New Catalogus Catalogorum,
volume 5, p. 92, he is also cited as having written works in the Bhätta
tradition (Bhättamatapradipikä), as well as in Nyäya (Padârthadïpika,
Tarkapradîpa, Tarkaratna).3
The Vaiyäkaranabhüsana has been edited many times. Most of these
editions also contain the text of the sara. B references to the Bhüsana
edition are to the Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series edition of 1915,
while S references are to the edition of the -sära in the same volume.
"Verse" indicates Bhattoji's verses.

Section 1
(B2) verse 2. A verbal root denotes a result (phala) and an operation
(vyâpara). The personal endings of finite verbs denote either the agent
of activity or the object in which the result appears. That is to say, in
the active the personal endings denote the agent (kartr), and in the
passive, the object (karman). The operation is syntactically predomi-
256 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

nant with respect to the result. The meanings "agent" and "object"
are qualifiers of the operation and the result denoted by the verbal root,
respectively.
The relation between the operation and the result is that of an
accomplisher and the accomplished, for the activity produces the result.
(B3). The word "result" (phala) means a single effect of an action
{kriya), produced by various operations conveyed by the root. For
example, the root pac denotes any of the operations that go to make
up the action of cooking, such as setting fire under the pot, fanning the
fire, putting rice in the pot, and so on. Here, we see that all activities
result in a single effect.
An action is a specific sort of activity, another name for which is
productive operation (bhavanä, "bringing into being"), which is also
called sädhya, "to fre effected."
(53-4); It is by these terms—sädhya, "to be effected," and siddha,
"effected,"—-that verbs are distinguished from nouns. Pacati, "he
cooks," gives us the notion that the action of cooking is in progress,
while päka refers to an effected, completed action. The distinction
between pacati, "he cooks," and päkah, "cooking," is that the first
expression is complete in itself while the second is in expectation of
some other action.
(i?4-5). The root pac denotes in general any operation that leads to
the result, namely, the softening of the food. In different instances the
root pac refers to specific operations such as blowing, setting the fire
under the pot, fanning it, putting the rice in the pot, and so on. These
specific operations are limited by various properties such as "operation
limited by blowing" {phütkäratvävacchinna-vyapära) and "operation
limited by setting the fire below (the pot)" (samtäpanatväuacchinna-
vyäpära). In one instance, the root pac means blowing on the fire, while
in another instance, it denotes the activity of setting the fire, because
that is what is intended in these particular instances by the speaker.
The singleness of denotation is determined by the speaker's intention.
(£271 ). When one uses the pronoun tad, "it," one may be referring
to anything in the world. But this fact does not mean that tad has an
infinite number of denotations. It has only one denotation, which may
be limited by the speaker's intention.
(B5). In a majority of the cases pacati refers to the action of the main
agent. But in kästham pacati, "the sticks of the firewood cook," pacati
refers to the action of the firewood. In sthäli pacati, "the pot cooks"
(that is, contains a particular quantity), it refers to the action of
containing or holding. In this way pacati may refer to the action of
other kärakas also.
The Mïmâmsakas propose that the personal endings denote only the
productive operation. But because an operation is inconceivable with-
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 257

out an operator, we may say that agent is implied. Finally, the

Mîmâmsakas suggest that the notion of the agent can be furnished in
the sentence not by the verb at all but by the word in the nominative
case.
(B6). To this objection the Grammarians reply as follows: Pänini
3-4-69 prescribes /-suffixes (finite verb endings) to denote the sense of
object and agent.
Mimämsaka's objection : Pänini's rule 3.4.69 means that /-suffixes denote
kartrtva (agentness, volition, or productive operation) and karmatva
(objectness, result). The number denoted by the personal endings is to
be construed with the implied notion of the agent and the object.
Answer: The Mîmâmsakas maintain that the primary suffixes (krt)
such as -ana, -at (the present and future participle endings), which are
also substitutes of-/, denote the sense of agent, while the personal end-
ings inpacatiypacatahy and so on which are also substitutes of-/, denote
the sense of kartrtva (volition) and karmatva (result). This claim involves
contradiction. The personal endings must denote the sense agent (or
object) because we see syntactic agreement between the noun
"Devadatta" and the verb "cooks" in devadattah pacati. Unless the
meaning "agent" (or object) is denoted by the personal endings in
verbs like pacati, no syntactic agreement (coreferentiality ) would be
possible between the nouns and verbs.
, (B6-7). Moreover, the meaning "number" denoted by the personal
endings cannot be connected with the implied meanings "agent" or
"object," because the rule, according to the Mîmâmsakas, is that two
meanings ("number" and "productive operation") denoted by the
same word unit must be connected with each other. But it would be
wrong to connect "number" with "productive operation." Therefore,
we must admit that the meaning "number" denoted by a personal
ending should be connected with "agent" or "object". Consequently,
"agent" or "object" must also be the denoted meanings of the personal
endings.
(J521-22). The personal endings denote agent or (grammatical)
object, number, and time. Of them the agent is the qualifier of the
activity and the (grammatical) object is the qualifier of the result.
Number is a qualifier of the agent if the personal endings of the active
voice are used, and it is a qualifier of the (grammatical) object if the
passive endings are used. Time is a qualifier of an operation (action).
If a time is construed with the agent or object then the idea of past,
present, and future will depend on the state of the agent or object, As
long as the agent or object exists, the usage will be "he cooks" or "it
has been cooked" even if the action of cooking has ceased or not yet
begun.
The semantic analysis of "caitrah tandulam pacati" ("Caitra cooks
258 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

rice") is as follows: an operation (action) of the present time, of which

the agent is limited by singularity and is identical with (Caitra), which
operation is favorable to (a result, namely) softening, residing in (an
object) rice grains limited by singularity (generic singular). And the
analysis of "tandulah pacyate caitrena" ("rice is cooked by Caitra") is
essentially the same: an operation of the present time favorable to (a
result, namely) softening residing in (an object) which is identical with
rice grain limited by singularity (generic singular), of which (opera-
tion) the agent is limited by singularity and is identical with Gaitra.
(B23). Although elsewhere it is accepted that of the meanings
denoted by a base form and a suffix the meaning denoted by a suffix is
syntactically predominant, it is accepted here that meanings denoted
by a verbal base are syntactically predominant over the meanings
"agent" and "object" denoted by the personal endings. This claim is
made on the authority of the Nirukta, which states that a root presents
the meaning "substance" as predominant.
(J524) verse 9. The finite endings of the passive voice, the passive
vikarana suffix y a andthelike^ reveal the sense of object, and the present
stem formants reveal the sense of agent.
(B25). In the case of the reflexive passive (karmakartari), "pacyate
odanah svayam eve" ("the rice boils itself"), the personal endings
designate an object as an agent. Therefore, the personal endings have
an active sense in the reflexive passive. An operation (vyäpära) is a
producing {bhävana), which is the same as bringing into being
(utpädana) and as an action (kriyä). Roots cannot denote action only,
without any result, because in that case there would be no difference in
denotation of the roots kr and y at. Both denote the action of exertion
only. Consequently the root kr, like the root y at, would be intransitive.
(£24-27). Naiyàyikas argue that effort (volition) is the denotation of
personal endings on the basis of the fact that pacati, "cooks", is explained
aspäkam karoti, "he makes a cooking"; karoti, according to Nyäya, can
be applied only to sentient agent. When the root krn is used with refer-
ence to a nonsentient thing, it is used metaphorically, for instance,
ratho gacchati, "the chariot moves." According to Nyäya, the agent is
not simply a substratum of activity, as the grammarians would have it.
If we accept the Grammarians' view then every käraka can be an agent.
Nyäya distinguishes (the sentient) agent from the other kärakas by its
independence. The Naiyâyikas say that the meanings of the personal
endings fall within the area of exertion (krtitva, a universal property).
According to Grammarians the personal endings denote agent and
object. The limiting property of these meanings will be kartrtva (agent-
ness) and karmatva (objectness). The kartrtva or karmatva are properties
that are present in all agents and objects and present in no other entity.
These properties are nothing more than the actions and results residing
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 259

in agents and objects, respectively; and there will be many different

actions and results, depending on differences in agents and objects.
This situation involves complexity; but such complexity is no defect
if it accords with the fact.
(528-29). The result should be included in the denotation of the
root. If it is not included in the root meaning, then the roots gam (to go)
and tyaj (to leave) should be synonymous. The distinction between
gam and tyaj lies only in their denoted result. Gam means an activity in
the form of motion favorable to conjunction with a consequent point,
while tyaj means an activity in the form of motion favorable to disjunc-
tion from^a preceding point. The denoted activity in the form of
motion is the same in both instances.
The ancient Naiyâyikas, who denied to verbal roots the denotation
of result, said that the general idea of result is indicated by the accus-
ative case ending, which contains the meaning of the roots gam and tyaj-.
One can say that the meaning of gam, when it is juxtaposition with an
accusative, implies a result different from the result implied by tyaj,
when it is connected with an accusative case ending. The Grammarians'
point is that without an accusative also, gacchati and tyajati indicate
difference in meaning, therefore result should be included in the
denotation of root.
(531-32) verse 6. According to Grammarians, a root is transitive
when the operation and result denoted by it have different loci. Thus,
in pacati, "he cooks," the operation resides in the cook, the result in
rice. But such definitions are impossible unless the root denotes both
operation and result.
According to Naiyâyikas, the result is not part of the denoted meaning
of the root. But the general idea of result is denoted by the accusative
case endings. Thus a verb is transitive when it denotes activity condi-
tioned by result; the root's denotation includes result in the broadest
sense. In its specific form it is understood from an accusative.
Therefore, the roots krn and the like denote effect (and so on)
connected with a result in the form of coming into being, and not an
operation or result alone. So the reflexive passive construction
(karmavadbhäua), as in "kriyate odanah svayam eva" ("the rice comes
into being itself"), is allowed. This construction is permitted only with
roots of which the denoted results are visible in their objects. If we deny
to the root km the denotation of result, it will be impossible to use it in
such a reflexive construction.
(532-33) verse 7. The reflexive passive construction is permitted
when the object is producible or modifiable by the action of agent but
not when the object is simply attainable.
The grammatical object is of three sorts: producible, modifiable, and
attainable. An example of the first one is ghatam karoti, "he makes a
260 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

jar"; of the second one, somam sunoti, "he extracts the soma juice" ; of
the third one, rüpam paJyati, "he sees color." Attainability of an object
means nonapprehensibility of a change brought about in the object by
the action of the agent. By looking at an object (a village or pot) one
cannot apprehend that this pot is cognized by someone or that this
village has been visited by some. In the case of attainable objects the
reflexive passive construction is not permitted.
(J542) verse 8. Therefore, the roof Ar explains the sense of the root
(for example, pac) and not of the personal endings. The phrase
pakvavan, "he has cooked," is explained as päkam krtavân, "he has done
the cooking," and the phrase kim krtam, "what has been done?" is
answered by pakvam, "it has been cooked."
(545). The Mïmâmsakas and the Grammarians agree that pacati
may be explained as päkam karoti. The Mïmâmsakas claim, however,
that the word päkam in the explanation denoting result explains the
meaning of the root pac, while the word karoti, denoting activity,
explains the meaning of the personal ending. The Grammarians oppose
this claim by showing that the root kr is also used in explaining other
forms that contain no personal endings. Pakvavän is explained as päkam
krtavän. The Grammarians' assignment of meanings "result" and
"activity" to a verbal root is based on the following analysis:

FORMS MEANING

(1) pacatai {pac-{-personal ending) result, activity, agent

(2) pakvavan {pac-\-tavat) result, activity, agent
(3) pakvam (pac-\-vam) result, activity, object

One morpheme and two meanings are common in these examples.

Here the root morpheme denotes two meanings, "result" and
"activity."
(6*308). If the.root denotes the result alone, then we should have the
notion that the village is possessed of going (gramo gamanavän) because
the village is the substratum of the result of conjunction (reaching).
Likewise, when the result (namely), the softening of the rice, has not
yet occurred even though the activity (favorable to softening) is in
progress, we could not say päko bhavati, "cooking comes into being."
When, by contrast, the operation (favorable to softening) has ceased
and the result is present, we would say päko vidyate, "the cooking
continues." .
(545). The denotation of the agent by the primary endings is
necessary in order »to establish the.connection of the agent with number.
Furthermore, in words like pakvavän, the denotation of action is just
necessary in order to establish the connection (of the action) with the
notion, of.käraka. The meaning "number" can be construed only with
KÖNDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 261
the meaning "agent." The meaning "time" can be construed only with
the meaning "operation."
If the Mïmâmsakas claim that the root kr explains the sense of action
denoted by the personal endings because kirn karoti, "what does he do ?"
is answered by pacati, "he cooks" (päkam karoti), then they will have to
accept also that the root kr explains the sense of nouns derived from the
primary (krt) suffix. For instance, kirn käryam, "what is tobe done?" is
answered by pakvavän, "cooking should be done." But the Mïmâmsakas
say that the root morpheme denotes the result, the personal ending
denotes the productive operation, and the primary suffixes denote the
agent and object and imply productive operation. Thus the
Mïmâmsàkas' analysis violates the principle that the common nleaning
should correspond to the common element.
: (#45). verse 9. Furthermore, there can be no such thing as a root
without denotation of activity. That verbal roots denote actions
(kriyä) has been accepted by Pänini, Kätyäyana, and Patanjali.
In the word käryam, the primary suffix is used in the sense of karman
(in the passive sense). In jyotistomayäji, "who has sacrificed with
jyotisfoma sacrifice," the primary suffix in denotes the sense of agent.
The meaning of these suffixes must be connected with action, which
proves that the operation must be denoted by the root. It is impossible
to call something a käraka if it is not related to the notion of action. It
is, accordingly, impossible to use a suffix denoting a käraka in the
absence of a connection with the notion of action.
($50-51). Objection: If verbal roots are supposed to denote action
then the roots as (to be) and the like, which are not denotative of
action, would not be termed roots, for when we say asti, "he is," the
meaning "action" is not cognized.
Answer: Roots such as as also denote action. In the case of intransitive
roots, because agent and object of action are the same, the action is not
subservient to any other entity than the agent. Therefore, the distinc-
tion between the actor and the one acted on is lost. Consequently, the
notion of action in the case ofay is not immediately apparent. Further,
we do cognize an action favorable to the result "existence" from as
(to be) and similar roots. Suppose a man is on the verge of death and
with reference to him someone asks "what is he doing?" the answer
"he is," in other words, "he exists" is approved as meaningful by
everyone. Here the answer refers to a particular activity (existing with
great effort) on the part of the agent.
($50-51) verse 12. And further, if actions were not denoted by roots
like as, actions would not be specified as past, present, and future,
which they are.
(J556) verse 13. When the operation and the result reside in the same
262 ÈNÔYCLOPEDIÀ OF INDIAN PHlL OSOλ HÎES

substratum a root is intransitive; and when they reside in different

substrata the root is called transitive.
(£57). In "ätmä âtmânam jänäti" ("the self knows the self"), the
self limited by the adjunct body is the object, and it is the substratum
of the result, knowledge, while the self limited by the adjunct mind is
the agent, and it is the substratum of activity. Thus the activity and the
result have different substrata.
(£59) verse 14. In the verb the root morpheme denotes sädhya
(action), namely, action in progress or durative, and the finite verb
ending denotes the sädhana (operator), which is capable of bringing the
action into being. In a word like päka, which ends in the primary suffix
ghan(a), the root morpheme denotes action in the process and the pri-
mary suffix denotes siddha (accomplished) action that has the charac-
teristics of an operator {sädhana). An accomplished action behaves like
a substance and is thus always capable of being used as an instrument
of action in progress. Bhüsana explains this sense quite differently.
(£60) verse 15. In a noun ending in a suffix such as ghan(a), a root
portion denotes action in progress, while its frozen (accomplished)
aspect is associated with suffix ghan(a).
For this reason we have a distinction between the constructions
stokah päkah, "a small amount of cooking", and stokam päkah, "cooking
to a small extent." In the first case stoka is syntactically connected with
the primary suffix ghan(a), which denotes activity frozen (substanti-
vated), and in the second case stoka is syntactically connected with the
root pac, which denotes the action in process. Durative activity is void
of gender and number (asattvabhüta).
(£64-68) verses 16-17. A word ending in the vocative case suffixes
having the sense of krtvas (counting of recurrences), the kärakas (instru-
mental in bringing about the action), the first suffix vat (Pânini 5.1.115:
prescribed in the sense of what is similar is an activity), the suffixes,
infinitives, and so on, prescribed under the governing section (Pänini
3.4.1 ), verbal particle of negation (that is, other than nominally bound
negative), the locative absolute (Pänini 2.3.37) form proper construc-
tion only with durative action.
(£69). In stokam päkah the ending am is a formal constructional
appendage because a substantive cannot be used without a case ending.
Substantiated activity does possess, however, number and gender.
Therefore, when stoka is construed with the suffix ghan it takes masculine
gender and whatever number is appropriate.
(£69) verse 19. Just as the inseparable action (denoted by the root
gam) in the word gata, "has gone," is constructed with the object gräma
in the phrase grämam gata h, so the activity (denoted by the root kr) in
the phrase krtapürvi katam, "one who has made a mat before" is connec-
ted with the object katam.
 ÖR KAÜNDA B H A T t A y 263

Even when the activity denoted by a root is subordinate to the agent

or object denoted by a suffix, a kâraka denoted by a separate word with
oblique case ending is still construed with the action and not with the
denotatum of suffix. This fact holds true in cases like grämam gatah, "he
has gone to the village," where the käraka, grämam is construed with gam
rather than with the suffix -ta. In krtapürvi katam, "he who has made a mat
before/5 and bhuktapürvi odanam, "he who has already eaten rice," kata
and odana are construed with kr and bhuj rather than with the suffix -in.
In these cases, outside words grämam, katam, and odanam are indeed
construed with the subordinate members gam, kr, and bhuj, respectively.
Such constructions are allowable.
(J5.7Ö.) verse 21. Correctness has no invariable connection with com-
munication. Even in the absence of correct forms, verbal knowledge is
not denied by the Grammarians.
(570-71 ). The Naiyäyikas and the Mïmâmsakas hold the view that
whatever is denotative is correct. Corrupt words are not denotative, so
they are incorrect. The corrupt words like gävi appear to be denotative
of the meaning "cow" because they remind us of the correct words like
go. The Grammarians refute this view. If the corrupt words had no denot-
ative function they would convey no meaning. It does not help us to
say that the corrupt words remind us of correct words and through them
they are denotative, because ignorant persons who do not know the
correct words understand the meaning from incorrect ones. According
to the Grammarians, the correct word go and the corrupt word gävi
are both denotative of the cow. The only difference is that the use of
corrupt words leads to religious demerit, while the use of correct words
leads to merit.

Section 2: The Meanings of Tenses

and Moods (Lakärärthanirnaya)
(B73) verse 22. Lat and so on (the phrase stands for ten markers lap,
lit, and so on, which do not occur in actual utterances; they represent
the personal endings, ti, tas, and so on, that come in place of/- the
common symbol for all the finite suffixes of tenses and moods) are to
be understood in the following meanings: present, past not witnessed
(by the speaker), what is going to happen tomorrow, future (simple),
injunction, request, and so on.
(B73). Lat denotes the present. Presentness is defined as being (a
time) that is characterized by an action that is begun but not ended or
as the property of being a time other than the past or future.
(£73-75). The question is raised whether "time" is the denoted
(väcya) or the cosignified (dyotya) meaning of /-suffixes (personal end-
ings). According to the first view, time is the denoted meaning of the
/-suffixes. A verbal root cannot denote all the specific aspects of action,
264 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of" INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

including specific time. In that case the denotative area of verbal roots
will be too wide. It is simpler to say that a root denotes operation and
result, and /-suffixes (personal endings) denote specific aspects of
action/including time. Moreover, Pänini's rules (Pänini 3.2.123 and
elsewhere) lay down that /-suffixes denote time and aspects (injunction
and so on).
According to the second view, the /-suffixes are time-indicative
suffixes and not independently denotative of time. These /-suffixes ojnly
single out the particular meaning that is to be adopted in a particular
context. The verbal root already denotes all aspects of action, including
time in general. ,
In this connection, the final view of the Bhüsana is that time is consi-
dered to be the measurer of an action. But in reality time is measured by
action, for time cannot be divided without being associated with action.
According to Grammarians, time and action are identical because time
has no reference to anything outside the domain of an action. Thus the
general-notion of time is denoted by verbal roots, when it denotes action.
But the specific aspect of time, such as presentness, is indicated by
U suffixes. Therefore, the second view appears to be correct.
.{Bib). Then a question is raised: how to account for the use of
the present tense in such sentences as atmä asti, "the self exists," and
pawatäh santi, "the mountains stand," because existence and standing
go on continuously without stopping? Therefore, continuous actions
"existing" and "standing" cannot be associated with the three divisions
of time.
The Bhüsana, following the Mahäbhäsya, answers that the existence of
the self and the standing of the mountains are also differentiated. as
present or past with the aid of the contemporary actions of the kings
belonging to different periods of time.
Lit (perfect tense) expresses past action that happened at a definite
time in the past, not witnessed by the speaker. Paroksatva, imperceptibi-
lity (being not witnessed by the speaker) means the property of not
being the object of the knowledge that can be described as "I perceive,"
which resides in the speaker. Imperceptibility either means impercepti-
bility of action or imperceptibility of kärakas engaged in an action.
Although the action as a whole is always imperceptible, yet its parts
are clearly perceptible. Thus the perfect is not to be used when some
parts of the action as a whole are perceived by the narrator. The perfect
in the first person is allowed-when even one's activity is not perceived
by oneself due to one's being absorbed in something or for some other
reason.
(J576). Lut (periphrastic future) expresses only future action, exclu-
sive of today, that is, action that is going to take place at a definite time
to come. Lrf denotes any future action.
 OR KAÜNDA ËHATTA 265

Let (Vedic subjuntive) denotes permission, injunction, command

(Pänini 3.4.7), inquiry, and the like.
Lot (imperative) denotes command, permission, and the like. There
is no sharp line of distinction between the imperative (Lof), the subjunc-
tive (Let), and the optative (Lin).
Lan (imperfect) denotes a completed action that happened at a
definite time in the past (anadyatane).
Lin (optative) expresses vidhi, injunction (including command) ;
nimantrana,/$ummomng to do something; ämantrana, invitation; adhista;
respectful request; samprasna, inquiry; arid prärthanä, request. The first
four of these meanings can be reduced to one, namely, prompting or
instigation (pravartanä).Pravartanä is defined as an activity on the part
of the prompter that leads the prompted person to do something. Thé
definition cannot be applicable to Vediç injunctions because the Vedas
are not composed by any human being. Therefore, in connection with
Vedic injunctions we assume that the optative forms in the Veda itself
prompt someone to do the thing stated in the Veda.
(£77-79). But what is the precise nature oî pravartanä^ The Bhüsana
mentions several views on this subject, as put forward by the Naiyäyikas,
by the Prabhäkara Mïmâmsakas, and by Konda Bhatta himself.
According to th.e Naiyäyikas, the person to be prompted does not
become inclined to act unless he knows the following three factors of
action :
(1 ) Feasibility (krtisädhyatva) : the prompted person does not proceed
to perform impossible tasks such as bringing down the peak of Mount
Mem, bringing down the moon, and the like. Therefore, feasibility is
the meaning of /^-suffixes.
(2) Knowledge that this (act) leads to the desired result (istasadha-
natäjnäna): a person does not act unless he ascertains that this (act) will
achieve something he desires. The person desiring satisfaction of his
thirst does not thrash the water because he knows that this action will
not bring him the desired result. Therefore, istasädhanatva is the meaning
of the li«-suffixes.
(3) The cognition of not entailing a greatly undesired result (balava-
danistänanubandhitva). No one eats a food mixed with honey and poison.
There is no inclination toward the eating of such a food because it leads
to a greatly undersired result, namely, death.
Unless the person to be prompted knows these things beforehand he
does not proceed to perform any act.
(£79-82). According to the Präbhäkaras, something new to be
achieved (apürva) is the meaning of the injunctive sentence containing-
din (optative suffix). Apürva is the same as kärya, the thing to be brought
about by exertion (krti) or that toward which the activity is directed
(krtyuddesya). Apürva has been called prompting (niyoga) because it acts
266 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

as an incentive to the prompted person to perform the act prescribed.

The sacrifice does not directly precede heaven. Because apürva is the
immediately preceding cause of heaven, it is cognized as the thing
to be done (kärya) and it is the meaning of -lin.
The Präbhäkaras deny the property of being the means to a
desired result (istasädhanatva) as the meaning of the lin-suffixes (opta-
tive). The reason is that there are certain obligatory rites, the perfor-
mance of which does not lead to any desired result. Thus in the obliga-
tory rites the inclination to act is due to apürva.
It is also not correct to say that a lin-sufßx denotes the state of being
an indirect cause of the desired result, if no operation (vyäpära, that is,
apürva) be known. Therefore, it is better to suppose that apürva is the
direct cause that immediately precedes the result, heaven. Therefore,
apürva (the thing tobe done) is the meaning of-lin. It is also our common
experience that the knowledge "this act is to be done" acts as an
instigator (prompter).
(582-96). According to Konda Bhatta, the /zn-sufnxes express
istasädhanatva or hitasädhanatva, the property of being the means to a
desired result. Here Konda Bhatta follows the view of Mandana Misra,
the author of the Vidhiviveka. The person to be prompted requires some
incentive. There can be no inclination to activity unless one knows that
it leads to a desired result. Thus it is a means to a desired result and the
cause of the performance of the act in general.
Konda Bhatta, following Madhva (1197-1273), rejects feasibility
as the meaning oî -lin. If we accept that feasibility leads to an action,
there will be inclination for prohibited things such as killing a brahmin,
because killing is feasible. Further, the general rule is that only that
meaning which cannot be obtained by any other means is accepted as
verbal knowledge. There will be no inclination to act when the action
involved is not feasible. Our common experience shows that the efforts
toward nonfeasible acts are wasted, as they produce nothing. Then
aversion is created in the mind of a prompted person, and accordingly
he does not proceed to perform nonfeasible acts.
According to Konda Bhatta, the property of not entailing a greatly
undesired result (balavadanistänanubandhifva) is also not the meaning of
//^-suffixes. Noninclination toward disastrous acts can be caused by
aversion, which prevents the agent from undertaking any activity.
Moreover, there is no way to determine how much frustration will be a
deterrent factor in the case of different acts and in the case of different
individuals. For some persons, even a little trouble will be enough to
remove the inclination to act. Therefore, it is aversion that should be
accepted as the deterrent. Once it is accepted, the separate factor,
balavadanistänanubandhitva, for inclination to act is not necessary.
Konda Bhatta also rejects the view of the Prâbhâkara Mîmâmsakas
 Oft KAÜNDA SHA?fA 267

According to him, there is no evidence for saying that the immediately

preceding cause of a result (namely, the apürva accepted by the Präbhä-
karas) is a prompter or instigator. Moreover, what immediately pre-
cedes may not be necessarily the main cause of the effect. Further, apürva
means something to be produced by effort (kärya). This property of
being something to be effected (käryatä) in fact belongs to the action
denoted by the verbal root. So what is to be produced is sacrificing
iyäga) and not apürva, as accepted by the Präbhäkaras. According to
Prâbhâkaras, apürva is considered to be the denoted meaning of -lin.
But it is hard to grasp the relation of apürva and 'lin. Without first
knowing apürva. independently, how can one grasp the significatory
association of apürva and -lin? Konda Bhatta states that apürva cannot be
a goal at all. The object of desire alone can be the goal of action. There-
fore, apürva can be an intermediate link (as in, sacrifice-a^arc^-heaven),
and apürva cannot be the object of desire.
huh (aorist) denotes the past in general.
Lrn (conditional) is used in the past or future value to indicate that
something is going to happen without any effect.4.

Section 3 : Meanings of the Case Endings

(Subarthanirnaya)
(B99) verse 24. The substratum, the limit (of separation), the
recipient, relation, or capacities (of these things) are considered to be
the denotation of case endings on the authority of the Mahäbhäsya.
The accusative, the instrumental, and the locative denote the mean-
ing substratum. The accusative denotes the substratum of the result
{phaläsraya). The instrumental denotes the substratum of the operation,
and the locative denotes the substratum of either operation or result
through the medium of agent or object. The ablative case denotes the
sense of limit from which the separation is to be effected. The dative
case denotes the sense of recipient of the fruit of action (uddesya). The
genitive case denotes the relation êesa between the meanings denoted by
two nouns.
(£367). The term karman is defined (Pänini 1.4.49) as that which is
the most desired to be obtained (by the agent). The word karman means
the object that is the substratum of the result produced by the activity.
It is only through the possession of the result produced by the activity
that the object becomes the most desired to the agent.
In the sentence odanam pacati, "he cooks the rice," odana is the object,
because it is the substratum of the result softening (of the rice grains).
In the sentence ghatam karoti, "he makes ajar," the jar is the substratum
of the result production. In the sentence ghatam jänäti, "he knows ajar,"
the jar is the object because it is the substratum of the result breaking
of the veil (of ignorance) denoted by the root jfiä.
268 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(£369-370). Objection: While going to a village, the usage "caitrah

cat tram gacchati" ("Caitra goes to Caitra") would be correct, because
Caitra is also the substratum of the result conjunction produced by the
activity in the form of motion, like the objectvillage, because conjunc-
tion is a property, that resides in two things. Here it resides in the
object grama as well as in the agent Gaitra. Similarly, in the sentence
"prayägät kâsïm gacchati" ("he goes to Kâsi from Prayäga") the
apädäna-käraka, namely, prayäga, would also be karman because it is the
substratum of the result disjunction produced by the activity of motion.
The action of motion produces invariably two results: conjunction and
disjunction*
(5372). Answer \ Although Caitra, like the village, is the substratum
of the result, still the designation agent belonging to Caitra sets aside the
designation object, following Pänini 1.4.1'. Therefore, the usage "caitrah
caitram gacchati" is not allowed. The designation "object" to the word
prayäga in the sentence "prayägät kâsïm gacchati" is ruled out because
the word phala in phalasrayais qualified by the phrase dhatvartha. The
phrase dhatvartha debars the designation because the result disjunction is
not denoted by the root gam. The root gam denotes the action of moving,
producing invariably two results: conjunction with a consequent point
and disjunction with a subsequent point. Out of these two results, the
root gam denotes only the former one.
(.0102-105). The Naiyâyikas claim, however, that the word kriyä in
the definition "kriyâjanyaphalâsrayam karma" is qualified by the phrase
parasamavetatva, which serves to distinguish the object from the agent.
The definition "parasamavetakriyäjanyaphaläsrayam karma" means
that X is the karmakäraka^ if X is possessed of the result produced by the
action that appears in anything other than X. If X stands for Caitra in •
the definition "caitro grämam gacchati," the definition of the karma-*
käraka does not apply to Caitra because the action of going does not
inhere in anything other than X. If X stands for a village {grama) that
is the substratum of the result conjunction, the definition applies to the
village because the action of going inheres in Caitra, who is other than
the village.
Konda Bhatta does not agree with this definition given by the
Naiyâyikas. The meaning parasamaveta, inherent in the other, and so on,
is not the denoted meaning of the accusative because this assumption
involves complexity. Moreover, this definition does not exclude the
prompter agent (prayojaka) and reflexive agent (karmakartr) from the
province of the karmakäraka. Therefore, the simple answer to exclude the
agent from the province of the karmakäraka is to assume that the designa-
tion agent (kartr) prevails over the designation karman.
(Bl 05-106). The karmakäraka is divided into seven categories. The
ipsitatamakarman9 the object most desired by the agent, is of three kinds:
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 269

(1 ) Nirvartya, the object to be produced, for instance, ghatam karoti,

"he makes ajar." /
(2) Vikärya, the object to be modified. One kind of vikâryakarman is
that which arises on account of the destruction of the material, as ashes
from the firewood: kästham bhasma karoti, "he reduces firewood to
ashes"; another kind is that which arises on account of the origination
of new qualities, as a modification of gold : suvarnam kundalarri karoti,
"he fashions an earring out of gold."
(3 ) Präpya, attainable. Präpyakarman is that in which the effectuation
of particular features due to action cannot be understood from perception
of the object or from inference, for instance, ghatam paJyati, "he sees ajar."
The object not positively desired to be reached by the agent (anipsita-
karman) is categorized into four types:
(1 ) Udäsina, indifferent, for instance, grass trnam in "grämam gacchan
trnam sprsati" ("while going to the village he happens to touch the
grass".
(2) Dvesya, odious, for instance, visam bhunkte, "he eats poison."
(3) Anäkhyata, unexpressed object. That is an unexpressed object
{akaihitd)which is not intended to be otherwise expressed as apädäna,
adhikarana, and so on. In other words, that is a käraka which can be
expressed otherwise, but not expressed by way of any other käraka
relation. But if the speaker intends to express it as apädäna, adhikarana,
and so on, he is free to do so, for example, "gäm payo dogdhi" or "goh
payo dogdhi," ("he milks the cow" or "he milks from the cow").
(4) Anyapürvaka, an object that has been declared to be the
karmakäraka by the special rule in place of sampradäna, and the like, for
example, "krüram abhikrudhyati," ("he is angry with a cruel person" ).
(Z? 107-108). The third case representing agent denotes substratum.
A käraka is invariably considered to be an agent provided that the action
belonging to it be denoted by the verbal root.. In the sentence "devadat-
tah kâsthaih sthâlyâm odanam pacati" ("Devadatta cooks the rice
in a pot with the help of firewood"), Devadatta functions as the agent
who independently initiates the action and sets the other käraka in
motion. Normally, pacati refers to the action of the main agent; still, it
may also refer to the activities of the other kärakas. For instance, if the
speaker wants to convey the idea that firewood considerably facilitates
the action of cooking, he will say kästhäni pacanti, "firewood cooks."
Here pacanti refers to the action of the firewood. In,sthäli pacati, "the
vessel cooks," the verb pacati refers to the action of containing or holding.
(Z?108). The kartr-kärakä is divided into three types:
(1 ) Suddhakartä, simple agent, for instance devadattena in "devadat-
tena harih sevyate" ("Hari is worshiped by Devadatta").
(2) Prayojakakartä, prompter or causal agent, for instance käryate
harinä,Cfsomeone is^made to do.by Hari," , -.
270 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(3) Reflexive agent: when the object is transferred to the states of

the agent it is called reflexive agent. For instance, "odanah pacyate
svayam eva," "the rice cooks itself."
(5109). The instrumental case denotes the sense operation also* The
most effective means of operation is called karana. The most effective
means is nothing but possession of the most important operation that
produces the (desired) result immediately.
The feature of being the most effective means for the accomplishment
of an action is not fixed with regard to any specific käraka. Whether a
particular käraka plays the role of karana is determined by the speaker's
intention. One can say sthälyäm pacati, "he cooks in the vessel/5 sthälyä
pacyate, " (it) is cooked by means of the vessel," kästhaih pacati, "he cooks
by means of firewood," "or kästhäni pacanti, "the firewood cooks."
The locative case also denotes the substratum of action through the
medium of the agent or the object. The following are the varieties of the
locative case :
(1 ) Abhivyäpaka, coextensive or location of pervasion. For instance,
tilesu tailam, "oil in sesame seeds."
(2) Aupaêlesika, location of contact. When the superstratum (ädheya)
forms its connection with only a part of substratum, the adhikarana is
called aupaélesika; for example, kate äste, "he sits on the mat."
(3) Vaisayika, nonphysical location, as in mokse icchästi, "he desires
liberation." The ablative case denotes the sense limit or fixed point (in
connection with separation),, which is called apädäna.
(5110-112). Following Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya, Konda Bhatta
gives three varieties of the apädänakäraka:
(1 ) Nirdistavisaya, in which apäya "separation" has been directly
stated by the verbal base, for instance asvät patati, "he falls down from
the horse." -
(2) Upättavisaya, in which the verbal base denotes its own meaning,
whichindirectly includes the notion of separation; for instance, balähakäd
vidyotate, "(it) is lightning from the cloud."
(3) Apeksitakriyä, in which the word denoting the action of separa-
tion is not stated at all, for instance, pätaliputrät, " (I came) from Pâtali-
putra."
Following Pânini (1.4.32), Konda Bhatta says that the dative case
denotes the sampradana käraka. It is defined as that which is aimed at by
the agent through the instrumentality of theobject of action, forinstance,
{{
vipraya gâm dadäti" ("he gives a cow to the brahmin" ). Here the
brahmin is called sampradana because brahmin is connected with the
action of giving through the direct object cow.
According to Konda Bhatta, the dative denotes the sense uddeêya, the
object for which the action is intended. Here Konda Bhatta considers
that the sampradana käraka is positionally predominant (although a
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA / 271

brahmin does not syntactically predominate over the cows that are
given to him). Therefore, the sampradäna is called by the Mïmâmsakas
sesin, positionally predominant, tovwhich something is £esa, subservient.
Then Konda Bhatta makes two points: first, the designation sampra-
däna is not restricted in connection with the verbs having the sense of
giving. Further, the root dâ does not imply transference of ownership.
To prove this point he quotes usages from the Mahäbhäsya: "na süclräya
matim dadyät" ("one should not impart instruction to a §üdra"),
"khandikopädhyäyah tasmai capetäm dadàti" ("the khandika teacher
gives him a slap"). In these usages the dative is used in connection with
the root da when there is no question of ownership. But, according to the
Käsikävrtti, the genitive is used when the thing is not denoted. For
instance, "rajakasya vastram dadâti" ("he gives his clothes to the
washerman") is the correct usage, not "rajakäya vastram dadäti." .
Following the Väkyapadiya, Konda Bhatta divides sampradäna into
three types:
(1) Sampradäna by not denying the offer (anirakartr) : "Süryäya
arghyam dadäti" ("he offers the water to the Sun god").
(2) Sampradäna by making a request (preraka): "Vipräya gäm
dadâti" ("he gives a cow to the brahman" ). Hence the receiver incites
the giver to give something to him. .
(3) Sampradäna by giving one's consent (anumantr) : "Upädhyäyäya
gäm dadäti" ("he gives a cow to his teacher"). Here the teacher per-
mits a donor to present a cow to him, though he does not request the
donor to do so.
(5113). The genitive case denotes a very general relationship. The
relation denoted by the genitive (sesa) is not regarded as a käraka. The
kärakavibhaktis denote the relation between the noun and the verb,,
while ksa is the relation between two nouns.
(5114; 6*393). Then Konda Bhatta says that the relation between
the stem meaning and the case meaning is one of syntactic identity
The case endings stand for the possessors of properties {dharmin) rather
than for properties alone (dharma): For instance, the word tandulam,
ending in the accusative, denotes the sense tanduläbhinnäsrayaka, substra-
tum (of the result, softening) not different from the (objects) rice
grains. The primary (krt) and secondary (taddhita) endings also denote
the sense dharmin instead of dharma, for instance, devadàttah paktä, "Deva-
datta a cook." The syntactic agreement between Devadatta and a cook
cannot be maintained unless it is assumed that the suffix stands for the
concrete objects rather than for abstract properties. Therefore, the
accusative and so on denote the locus (äsraya) rather than locusness
(äsrayatva).
Finally, Konda Bhatta maintains that the direct denotation of the
case endings is dharma (in other words, the abstract property). Konçia
272 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Bhatja furnishes us with the support of the Mïmâmsakas' äkrtyadhikarana :

a word always denotes primarily the meaning attribute (that is, the
qualifier or visesana or property or generic notion), while the meaning
qualificand {visesya or vyakti or dharmin) is indicated by the secondary
function of the words. Thus, the case terminations primarily denote the
abstract property locusness {äsrayatva), and the concrete idea of locus
{äEraya) can be obtained from nominal stems or it can be inferred from
the fact that there is no dharma without dharmin,.
(J5115-116). Following Patanjali, Konda Bhatta states two alterna-
tive views with regard to the restriction of case endings and their
meanings. These two views are restriction imposed on case endings
(Jabdaniyama or vibhaktiniyama) and restriction imposed on meanings
conveyed by the case endings {arthaniyama). Pänini 4.1.2 introduces the
case endings without specifying the meanings to be conveyed by them.
Thus the accusative prescribed by Pänini 2.3.2 is available to convey
karman and other syntactic meanings. Because the accusative is already
available to convey the meaning karman from Pänini 4.1.2, the rule
karmani dvitiyä (Pänini 3.4.2) does not add anything new to our know-
ledge. Therefore, it becomes restricted. The restriction can be imposed
in two ways. The first is karmani eva dvitiyâ {vibhaktiniyama or êabdani-
yama) : the accusative case ending is used to convey the sense of% karman
only. From this restriction it does not follow that the sense of karman
is not bound to any specific case ending. The second is karmani dvitiya
eva {arthaniyama)'. to convey the sense of karman, the second (case
ending) only is used. Here the sense of karman becomes bound to the
accusative case ending only. But it does not follow that karman is the
only sense conveyed by the accusative case ending. The accusative case
ending may also convey the other syntactic meaning. Konda Bhatta
does not show any preference for either of these alternatives; he
simply says that both are useful.
Finally Konda Bhatta says that according to the modern Naiyäyikas
the relation between the verbal activity and the kärakas cannot be
determined by the logical definition of the different kârakas, but is
decided according to the nature of verbal activity and the context.
Therefore, in some cases the secondary function comes into play to
convey the accurate sense of the case terminations when the general
sense of the case termination is abstracted. By contrast, the Gramma-
rians and the ancient Naiyäyikas think that the kârakas are rational
and syntactic categories, and they have somewhat precise and con-
sistent meanings in the majority of the cases.

Section 4 : Nominal Meanings

{JVämärthanirnaya)5
{B\ 17 ) verse 25, First Konda Bhatta enumerates five different views
KONDA ORKAUNDA BHATTA ' 273

concerning nominal meanings. They can refer to (1 ) a generic property

(alone) or an individual alone; (2/ a generic property and an indi-
vidual; (3) a generic property, an individual, and gender; (4) a gene-
ric property, an individual, gender, and number; or (5) a generic
property, an individual, gender, number, and a käraka. The following
passages elaborate these views.
(£117-120). The first, view (jätiväda) claims that a generic property
alone is the primary meaning of nominal stems. This view was first
propagated by the pre-Kâtyâyana Grammarian Vâjapyâyana and was
later upheld by the Bhatta Mïmâmsakas:
According to the Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas, a generic property is cognized
first, before an individual is cognized. Therefore, in the jätiväda the
generic property alone is the primary meaning, and all the individuals
possessing that generic property are regarded as secondary meanings.
The individuals are infinite, and it would be practically impossible to
grasp the relation of a word with each individual (ânantya). If a word
denotes a specific individual (X) it would fail to convey many other
individuals (other than X, that is, vyabhicära). But in communica-
tion the individual object implied by the generic property is construed
with an action in sentences such as "bring a bull." Thus the primary
meaning of a word is only a generic property, and the individual object
is conveyed by implication (äksepa), secondary function (laksana),
inference (anumana), or presumption (arthäpatti).
(Bl 18-120 ). Next Konda Bhatta discusses the view that the primary
meaning of a nominal stem is only an individual (vyaktiväda). This view
is first proposed by Vyâdi, a pre-Kâtyâyana Grammarian, and followed
later by some of the Navya-Nyäya school. According to- this view, the
specific individual is the primary meaning, and other individuals are
indirect meanings through generic property. The undenoted generic
property as an indicator (upalaksana) is accepted as the limiter of pri-
mary meaning, which explains the cognition of all individuals. The
generic properties do not belong to the denotative area, yet their
ontological existence helps us in cognizing all individuals belonging to a
class. Konda Bhatta (following Gangesa) criticizes the Präbhäkara
Mïmâmsakas5 view that the primary function conveys reference to the
individual objects. His argument is that the simultaneous operation of
both of the functions, namely, primary and secondary, to convey the
sense of generic property and the individual is regarded as a fault. The
argument of infinity (anantya) and deviation (vyabhicära) launched
against vyaktiväda can equally be launched against jätiväda. The
reason is that, according to jätiväda, the individual is cognized
through the secondary function of words, and consequently we are
forced to accept an infinite number of secondary functions correspon-
ding to the infinite number of individuals. Usage shows that the indi-
274 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

vidual objects are primary denotations of words because actions

are not seen to be related to generic properties.
(5120-121.). The second view is jätwiHsfavyaktiväda. According to
this view an individual qualified by the generic property is the meaning
of a word, and both of these meanings figure in the meaning cognition.
This view is presented in two versions. First, according to the Naiyäyikas5
version, a cognition of a word's primary function produces the cognition
of an individual qualified by the generic property." Therefore, it is
necessary that the primary function of a word be grasped with respect
to an individual qualified by a generic property, not just with respect
to a generic property alone. The primary function bound with respect
to a generic property will never cause a cognition of an individual
qualified by a generic property.
Second, according to the Präbhäkaras5 version, the primary function
of a word is grasped with respect to a generic property alone. The
cognition of the primary meaning with respect to the generic property
produces the verbal cognition of an individual qualified by the generic
property. According to this view, the generic property is cognized from
a word at first, but it can in turn produce the verbal cognition of an
individual qualified by a generic property. The Präbhäkara Mïmâm-
sakas do not accept that the denotative function of words causes the
cognition in respect of the individual. The individual is cognized just
by its inseparable existence (svarüpasat). The denotative function is the
direct cause of cognition of the universal. The individual is grasped
by its inseparable relation with the generic property.
(5121-122). The third view proposes that the primary meaning of a
nominal stem includes gender as well as a generic property and an
individual. Konda Bhatta also offers a number of views on the nature
of gender.
(1) Arthadharma: the gender is a property of objects signified by
words. According to this, the naturalist view, the linguistic gender is an
expression of physical sex (laukikalinga). One who has breasts and long
hair is a woman. One who has hair on the body is a man. That which
has neither is neuter. The primary function of words is grasped with
respect to physical sex distinctions. The primary function of words like
kumära, ceboy,55, chägaX6goat," brähmana, "brahmin,55 is grasped with
respect to the technical masculine gender qualified by the physical sex.
Here the physical sex is also the primary meaning of words. While
actually inanimate objects do not have any sex genders, this naturalist
view assumes superimposition of physical sex on inanimate objects to
explain gender distinctions in the words that stand for inanimate
objects. The masculine gender of the word däräh, which signifies the
female sex, is explained by superimposing the masculine nature on the
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHAJTA 275

object. This explanation, in reality, amounts to saying that words

have no relation to physical sex.
(ÄL22-123 ). (2 ) Sabdadharma : this view maintains that the gender is
a property of words and not of objects signified by word. This view can
be further divided into two views: that gender as a property of
words is of metaphysical nature; and that the gender of words is of
purely formal linguistic nature.
Könda Bhatta states Patanjali's philosophical conception of gender.
Objects are composed of three elements: sattva, rajas, and tamos. The
masculine object represents an increase of these elements, the feminine
objects a decrease of these elements, the neuter gender merely represents
the existence of these elements. But the proportion of these elements
is constantly changing. Therefore, the objects of the world are never
stable. The activities of increase and decrease of constituent elements
are common to all objects, so the gender of the objects depends on the
intention of the speaker. If the speaker intends to represent increase
then he uses the word in masculine gender; decrease, in feminine
gender; neither decrease nor increase, in neuter gender. The speaker
decides the gender, and gender is considered to be located in words
{sabdadharma)..
Finally, Konda Bhatta says that there is nothing wrong in holding
that the gender of words has no necessary connection with physical sex.
Masculine and feminine words are used to signify members of the
opposite sex or objects with no physical sex. For instance, the masculine
gender signified by the word däräh does not necessarily imply the
physical sex of the object.
(.6125). According to the fourth and fifth views, gender, number,
and karakas are also signified by the case suffixes on the basis of agree-
ment (anvqya) and difference (vyatireka). For instance, when the case
suffix is dropped, the nominal stem itself signifies käraka, gender, and
number. In dadhipasya, "look at the curds," where the accusative singular
suffix -am is deleted, the nominal stem dadhi itself denotes all of the
nominal meanings, including the karma käraka. The neuter gender is
also the meaning of the prätipadika because lexical {lingänusäsana) texts
ascribe the meaning gender also to the nominal stem.
(J5125-128). In certain cases the nominal stem signifies the sixth
element, namely, the phonetic form of the word (svarüpa). The word
iti in Sanskrit indicates that a word stands for its own form. Without
the use of the word iti, sometimes words also stand for their own
form. In normal usage, a word signifies its meaning as qualified by its
own word form, while normally in grammar a word signifies its own
form as qualified by its meaning. In normal usage a word with iti
signifies the word form as qualified by its meaning, while in grammar
a word with iti signifies its meaning as qualified by its word form.
276 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(5130-132). With regard to a word form signified, Sanskrit Gram-

marians employ two terms: anukärya, "imitated word," and anukarana,
"imitation word." Again anukarana is of two types: it may be of
inarticulate sounds (avyakta) or of articulate sound (vyakta). The imita-
tion word patat is an onomatopoetic imitation of inarticulate physical
sound. By contrast, in the sentence "gauh iti ayam äha" ("he said the
word gauh"), the expression gauh is imitation of the word gauh that
occurs in such sentences as gauh tisthati, "a bull stands." The imitated
word gauh signifies a bull, while the imitation word signifies a word
form.
Then Konda Bhatta discusses the question of identity and difference
between the imitation word and the imitated word. He states that
according to Grammarians the imitation word and the imitated word
are identical because their phonetic shapes are not different. Difference
in signification does not differentiate words.
As a general rule, imitation words are not meaningful words, and
they are not nominal stems (prätipadika). But Pânini uses inflectional
suffixes after meaningless imitation words for metalinguistic purposes.
The phonetic form of a word may form part of verbal cognition, but it
is not considered to be the meaning of a word. Thus a word signifies its
phonetic form, and yet it is not regarded as a meaningful item. Accord-
ing to the Grammarians the imitated word and the imitation words are
identical as far as the phonetic forms are concerned.

Section 5 : The Meaning of Compounds (Samäsärthanirnaya)

(5134) verse 28. Konda Bhatta gives a sixfold classification of com-
pounds on the basis of the morphological structure of constituents
without involving the primary and subordinate status of their meanings :
(1 ) Supäm supä, "combination of case-inflected words before entering
into compounding," for instance räjapurusa, "a king man," which is
derived from two case-inflected words, räjnah purusah.
(2) Supäm tinä, "combination of case-inflected words with a verb
form," for instance, paryabhüsat, "he attended to," anuvyacalat, "he
moved subsequently." This combination consists of the preverb as the
first member and the verb as the second member. These forms become
single finished words by compounding.
(3 ) Supâm namnä, "combination of case-inflected word with a nominal
stem {krdanta)" for instance, kumbhakära, "pot maker." Here the case-
inflected word kumbham is compounded with the krdanta noun kära before
the case ending has been added to it. This compound is called the
upapadasamäsa.
(4) Supâm dhätuna, "combination of case-inflected word with a
verbal base," for instance, âyatastiïh, "a panegyrist." Here the case-
inflected word äyatam is compounded with a verbal base stu.
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA , 277

(5) Titian tinä, "a combination of two finite forms/' for instance,
khädatamodatä, "eat and rejoice" (continual eating and rejoicing). Here
two finite verb forms khädata arid modata are compounded.
(6) Tinäm supa, "a combination of a finite verb form with a case-
inflected word," which consists of the verb as the first member and the
case inflected word as the second member, for instance, jahistambah,
constantly striking against the post."
(.0134-135) verses 29-30. According to Pänini, four broad categories
of compounds are avyayibhäva^ tatpurusa (with subdivisions vibhaktitat-
purusa, karmadharaya, and dvigu), dvandva (with subdivisions samähära-
dvandva and itaretarayogadvandva), and bahuvrlhi. This fourfold classifica-
tion cannot cover all cases of compounds. For instance, bhütapürva, iva-
compounds, qyatastü, and more do not come under any one of these
categories.
Patanjali has defined these terms semantically. The avyayibhäva is a
compound in which the meaning of the first member is predominant.
The tatpurusa is a compound in which the last member is predominant.
The bahuvrihi is a compound in which the meaning of another word is
predominant. Konda Bhatta says that these semantic definitions work
in the majority of cases, but not everywhere. For instance, in an
avyayibhäva compound such as süpaprati, "a small quantity of soup," the
meaning of the second member is predominant. In the avyayibhäva
compound unmattagangam, "the country where the Ganges flows impe-
tuously," the additional meaning stands predominant. In the tatpurusa
compound ardhapippali, "the half of a pepper," the first member stands
predominant.
(22135-140). First Konda Bhatta states Patanjali's views on com-
pound formation. Kâtyâyana and Patanjali maintain that compound
forms denote a single (integrated) meaning (ekärthibhäva). That is to say,
meanings of the compound's constituents are not presented separately,
but they present their meanings as inseparably fused together.
Then Kâtyâyana and Patanjali state another view, namely, paraspara-
vyapeksä, mutual dependency, according to which the constituents of
compounds present their meaning separately. This view maintains that
the constituents of a compound present their meaning the same way
that the constituents of the uncompounded word group present their
meaning. So mjapurusah and raj nah purusah are syntactically equivalents.
(.0140-142). Patanjali (under värttika 11 on Pänini 2.1.1 ) mentions
the nityapaksa view: there is no need to formulate grammatical rules to
explain the meaning of compounds, for compounds are not generated
by grammatical rules. In this view a compound is a single word standing
for a single meaning {ekärthibhäva). There cannot be mutual depen-
dency (vyapeksä) because the constituents of a compound do not present
their meanings separately.
278 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The karyasabdavada differs from the nityapaksaväda in the explanation

of the ekarthlbhâvapaksa view. According to this view the compounds
and the corresponding word groups are derived according to the rules
of grammar, and the underlying syntactic structures of a compound
and. the corresponding word group are identical. The unified sense of a
compound is not intrinsic {sväbhävika), rather it is the result of applying
grammatical rules. The kâryasabdavâda uses the term vrtti, "complex
formation/5 to explain how the compound is formed from the
corresponding word group. Vrtti means integration, which gives rise
to the additional meaning.
{B\ 35-142 ). But when the constituents are connected, what happens
to the meaning of constituents ? Patanjali mentions two theories :
jahatsvärtha vrtti, integration with loss of meanings of constituents, and
ajahatsvärtha vrtti, integration without abandoning the meaning of
constituents.
According to the first view the constituents of a compound give up
their own meaning. A compound as a whole conveys an integrated
meaning, and in conveying that meaning the constituents have no
separate function from the whole. It does not mean that constituents
lose their meaning completely. Still, in a compounding, the meanings
of the constituents are either related to each other {samsarga) or differen-
tiated from each other {bheda) or both related and differentiated
{ubhaya). For instance, in the compound räjapurusa the meanings, king
and servant, are related to each other {samsarga), excluding the servant,
which is not related to a king {bheda). Bheda and samsarga, which are
responsible for the syntax in the sentence, are also responsible for
compounds.
According to the second view the first constituent retains its meaning
as a qualificant to the meaning of the main member but does not
independently denote its meaning.
These two views have a place in the nityapaksa and the karyapaksa too
to explain the role of the constituent meaning in the meaning of a
compound. Konda Bhatta refers to the several opinions stated in the
Mahäbhäsya and then makes his own comments on their outcomes.
(5142-145). Konda Bhatta states first Kaiyata's view. Kaiyata sum-
» marizes the whole discussion of the Mahäbhäsya into three different
views. First, the compound as a whole denotes a single indivisible
meaning. The compound and the corresponding word group belong
to two different domains. In the uncompounded word group, mean-
ings are separately presented. This view of ekarthibhäva has been
propagated by the nityapaksavädin, who says that we do not require the
grammatical rules to explain the specialized compound meaning. A
compound is not to be derived; it is a natural element of language.
The second view says that a compound is derived from the corres-
KONDA OR K A U N D A B H A T T A 279

ponding uncompounded word group. For the formation of a compound,

mutual dependence of the constituents is required. But the derived
compound conveys a single integrated meaning. The generation of
compounds from the uncompounded word group is the view propagated
by the kärya§abdavädin. In the khryapaksa there are two theories, namely,
iahatsvärfha and ajahatsvärtha, which decide the meaning of compounds.
According to this second view the compound constituents give up their
own meaning and assume one undivided meaning (jahatsvârtha) /
The third view is that the compound and the corresponding uncom-
pounded word group are syntactically and semantically equivalent. In
both compound and uncompounded word group the constituents are
mutually dependent. This view has been adopted by the käryasabdavädin,
and it adopts the ajahatsvärthapaksa.
Next Konda Bhatta refers to Haradatta's theory. According to him
ekärthibhäva implies that the principal member denotes its meaning as
qualified by the meaning of the subordinate member, and the subordi-
nate member denotes its meaning in a qualifying function,, not-as-an
independently signifying something. If the constituents of the compound
are independently denotative of their meaning, the subordinate member
could form a connection with the word lying outside of the compound.
Haradatta says that for compound formation mutual dependence is
also equally necessary. Otherwise the compound could have been
formed out of constituents semantically unrelated. He also makes the
point that the jahatsvârtha vrtti has no place in compound formation,
because the constituents are related to each other without abandoning
their meaning. If we assume that the constituents lose their meaning
completely we will have to assign a special denotative function to the
compound as a whole, which becomes a separate lexical item. But the
assumption of such a denotative function is unnecessary because the
compound's meaning can be derived from the constituent's meaning
itself. Thus, Konda Bhatta remarks, according to Haradatta ekärthi-
bhäva, vyapeksä, and ajahatsvärtha vrtti are all necessary conditions for
forming a compound.
Konda Bhatta disagrees with Kaiyata and Haradatta and maintains
that the whole discussion of Patanjali can be reduced to two points,
namely, jahatsvârtha and ajahatsvärtha, which correspond to ekärthibhäva
and vyapeksä, respectively. According to the jahatsvârtha view, when
integration takes place the members of the compound do not express
their meaning separately. Therefore, a compound as a whole denotes
its meaning; for the denotation of single integrated meaning we have
to assign an aggregate denotative function {samudayasakti) to the com-
pound form as a whole. According to the vyapeksä view the meaning of
the constituents are presented separately, and syntactic connection
between them is denoted by the morphemic elements. So the vyapeksä
280 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

view is reduced to the ajahatsvärtha view, according to which constituents

retain their meaning.
Konda Bhatta criticizes Kaiyata's claim that according to Kaiyata,
in the nityapaksa view ekärthibhäva amounts to indivisibility of the mean-
ing of compound. But to Konda Bhatta this goes against the logical
interpretation of the Bhäsya. According to Patanjali, samartha means
emergence of a single integrated meaning of constituents that present
their meaning separately in the uncompounded word group. Kaiyata's
interpretation of the nityasabdaväda, which totally denies the relation
between the constituent meanings and the compound as a whole, is not
correct.. If the ekärthibhäva claims that the compound is indivisible and
the constituents in a compound do not have any meaning at all, then
one could also extend this theory to the sentence and deny meaning to
the constituents of the sentence, which would mean that the undivided
sentence conveys undivided meaning. But this extended theory goes
against the intention of Patanjali, who maintains the mutual depen-
dence (vyapeksä) of the constituents in a sentence.
(5145—156). Similarly, Haradatta's statement is also subject to criti-
cism. Haradatta says that both vyapeksä and ekärthibhäva are the
necessary conditions for the formation of compounds. But this claim
also goes against the intention of Patanjali, who, according to Kaiyata,
maintains that single integrated meaning (ekärthibhäva) exists in a
compound and that mutual dependence (vyapeksä) exists in a sentence.
It is also incorrect to consider that the jahatsvärtha view has no place in
a compound formation. Patanjali himself shows at length that in the
jahatsvärtha view the subordinate member of the compound does not
lose its meaning completely. The jahatsvärtha view is also necessary to
explain the relation between the constituent meanings and the meaning
of the compound as a whole.
Of these two views, ekärthibhäva and vyapeksä, the first one implies
according to Konda Bhatta that a compound, as a whole, denotes one
single meaning and has a separate denotative function (samudayasakti)
through which it gives rise to the single meaning. The second view,
however, states that each word in a compound has a separate denotative
function, and a compound as a whole has no separate denotative
function. Of these two views Bhattoji, the author of the verse text, and
Konda Bhatta maintain that the ekärthibhäva is the only correct view.
Just as in the case of the word pankaja its etymological meaning (grow-
ing in the mud) cannot explain the conventional meaning lotus, so it is
assumed that a word as a whole denotes the conventional meaning.
Similarly, the compound as a whole has the separate denotative
function.
(5153). Moreover, the ekärthibhäva view has been adopted because
the other vicwdnvolves complexities (gaurava). It is necessary to formu-
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 281

late rules to account for the following special features of a compound:

absence of inflectional suffixes after the constituent members of a
compound; inseparability of the members of a compound by other
words; the fixed order of the constituents; possession of a single accent;
ambiguity as regards the number of the subordinate member; ambi-
guity as regards the syntactic relation between the compound members;
inability to construe the subordinate word with a word outside the
compound; absence of words such as ca, "and/ 5 to indicate conjunction
and other connections; the statement of option between compound and
uncompounded word group.
(Bl 53-157). In the following compounds—niskausambih, "departed
from Kausämbi (departed from)," gorathah" a chariot to which oxen
have been yoked (to which have been yoked),55 ghrtaghatah" a. pot
filled with ghee (pürna, 'filled with5 ),55 gudadhänäh, "crisps made of barley
mixed with brown sugar (mixed with),55 suuarnälamkärah, "gold pro-
duced ornament (produced),55 dvida§a "two times ten (times),55 and
saptaparnahy "a tree having clusters of seven leaves55—(at each point),
we understand the additional meanings not conveyed by constituents,
namely, kränta (departed from), yukta (yoked), puma (filled), miira
(mixed), vikära (product), samkhyä (counting), vipsä (distribution). In
the vyapeksä view every meaning element should occur in the analytical
paraphrase. Therefore, the lexical items such as kränta, pürna, and so on,
should be supplied in the constituent analysis, which are subsequently
to be deleted. For the deletion of these elements we will have to phrase
new rules. But according to the ekärthibhäva view as explained by Konda
Bhatta there is no question of deriving compounds from the uncom-
pounded word groups to account for these meanings, for the compounds
and the corresponding uncompounded word groups may differ a great
deal as far as meaning is concerned. The compound as a whole conveys
the specialized meaning, and we do not require special rules. Thus
there is an advantage in adopting the ekärthibhäva view.
In other words, Konda Bhatta recognizes a separate denotative
function for the compounds that is called samudayaêakti, aggregate
denotative function, apart from that of constituents. He argues that the
compound should be assigned a distinct function because it conveys a
meaning that supersedes the meaning denoted by constituents. For
instance, the bahuvrihi compound citragu does not mean a brindle cow,
which is the meaning of the constituents, but refers to a person who
owns brindled cows. Similarly the compound pänipädam does not mean
"hands, feet" but rather an aggregation of hands and feet. Many
meanings like kränta (departed from), puma (filled with), and others
are denoted by the compound as a whole but not by its constituents.
Further, in the case of unanalyzed compounds (nityasamäsa) a formally
corresponding compounded word group is lacking. In such cases
282 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

the meaning of a compound is determined by the compound form as a

whole and not by the constituents themselves.
(£157, 168-170). The Naiyâyikas and the Mïmâmsakas hold that a
compound is formed of its constituents, and the meanings of the consti-
tuents give rise to the qualified meaning denoted by the compound.
They do not accept that there is a necessity to assign a separate denota-
tive function (samudqyas'akti) to a compound as a whole. Both the Naiyâ-
yikas and the Mïmâmsakas accept only mutual dependence (vyäpeksä),
not any vrtti or ekarthibhâva, in a compound. Both the Naiyâyikas
and the Mïmâmsakas resort to secondary meaning (laksanä) to explain
any additional meaning that is denoted by the compound over and
above the constituent meanings. For instance, in räjapurusah the consti-
tuent räjan signifies the sense of relation by the secondary function along
with its lexical meaning. In the case of karmadhâraya, laksanä need not
be resorted to; rather, the constituents themselves- can convey qualified
sense. In the case of bakuvrihi, the Naiyâyikas adopt the padalaksanä
while the Mïmâmsakas adopt the väkyalaksanä. So all these differences
between a compound and corresponding uncompounded word groups,
which are due to ekârthibhâva according to the Grammarians, are
explained as caused by the nirüdha laksanä or "conventional function."
(£182-183). Kumärila observes that denotative function assigned to
the bahuvrlhi as a whole conveys anyapadärtha, denotation of the meaning
of another word. In a bahuvrihi the constituents express their own mean-
ing but not anyapadärtha. The sense anyapadärtha cannot be brought out
by the primary or secondary function of words because the primary
meanings of the constituents are not given up at all. The reason is that
the reference to a meaning other than what is denoted by the com-
pound's constituents is understood only when the outside word is used
along with the bahuvrihi compound. Therefore, the anyapadärtha is the
denoted meaning of a compound. The Mïmâmsakas observe that the
anyapadärtha is conveyed by the nirüdha laksanä through the primary
meanings of the compound's constituents. In bahuvrihi the Mïmâmsakas
postulate the väkyalaksanä, where the väkya means a phrase as a whole.
The semantic connection exists between citraguh (and) devadattah,
"brindled cow (owner) Devadatta." The question is how this meaning
"owner" is arrived at; the answer, according to the later Mïmâmsakas,
is that this meaning "owner" is conveyed by the secondary function
belonging to a sentence. :
(£176-177). But, according to the Naiyâyikas, either the word citra
or the word go conveys the additional meaning, in other words, reference
to the anyapadärtha. But this view is untenable because the first member,
citra, cannot be indicative of the meaning "the owner of the brindled
cows." Consequently, go cannot be connected with citra. The reason is
that citra äoes not refer to the meaning "brindled" any longer. Simi-
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 283

larly, it is wrong to say that the word go indicates the sense of gosvâmin,
owner of the cows, because in that case extra no longer forms connection
with go. We cannot say either that both of the padas together convey
the sense "owner of the brindled cows/5 for even then it will be impos-
sible to bring out the proper sense of the bahuvrihis like praptodako
grämah, "water-reached village." In the analysis "präptam udakam
yam," udaka, "water" is thé agent and the village is the object of the
action of reaching. In präpta the suffix kta has been added in the sense
of agent. The sentence denotes primarily the agent of the action of
reaching, while the compound denotes primarily the object of the
action of reaching. Here reference to the object (the village) by a
compound form cannot be explained by the secondary function
(laksana) because the constituents in the sentence stand in the syntactic
agreement water, the agent of the action of reaching. If the secondary
function indicates the sense of object (village), then the compound
would mean the water, identical with the object of reaching. But this
meaning is not the one intended by the compound. The other word,
udaka, also cannot imply the sense of karman because the compound's
meaning cannot be judged without the proper understanding of the
first member. To avoid all of these difficulties, Konda Bhatta advocates
the aggregate denotative function on the basis of practical experience
that a compound is one word. He puts forth the view that the compound
meaning is understood even by children without knowing the gram-
matical or constitutional analysis of compounds.
(J5157-158). The Naiyâyikas also advocate that the indéclinables in
compounds are secondarily indicative (laksanä) of the sense of proximity
and so on, as in upakumbham, "in the vicinity of a jar." The sense of
nearness is not included in the meaning of the second member of the
compound. Therefore, it is held to be implied by the second member.
Konda Bhatta argues that the indéclinables are suggestive (dyotaka) of
the sense c'nearness," or whatever, but the sense of the compound as a
whole, namely, "near ajar," is denoted by the aggregate power of the
compound.
(#137, 151 ). Kâtyâyaiia proposes the viewyugapadadhikaranavacanatä
for the formation of dvandva compounds. According to this view, each
item in a dvandva compound, just as in the case o£ekasesa} represents the
meaning of the other item simultaneously. The ekasesa and dvandva items
are not singly represented but always together with another item or
other items. In the case of dvandva and ekasesa, we find joint representa-
tion of items.
But Patanjali rejects the view of joint representation and states that
in a dvandva the items are separately presented and that meaning of
conjunction comes from integration only. The joint representation of
items in a dvandva or ekasesa is a.result of ekârthibhâva (integration) only.
284 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Konda Bhatta remarks that this view of simultaneous representation

is formulated by the vyapeksavadins, who maintain that constituent
meanings are separately represented. This view {yugapadadhikaranavaca-
nata) is especially necessary to maintain the joint representation of the
two items in the constituent analysis. But this simultaneous representa-
tion, according to Konda Bhatta, cannot exist in the constituent ana-
lysis, because dual or plural is not added to each constituent in the
analytical paraphrase. We have instances like dyâvaprthivi in which
items are separately represented in the dual. But these instances are
Vedic usages, which are exceptions to the general rules. According to
the theory of samudayasakti or ekarthibhäva, a dvandva compound is a
single word denoting an aggregate of several individuals.
(.5158). In the case of dvandva the Naiyäyikas accept yugapadadhika-
ranavacanata in a different sense. They argue that there is a syntactic
relation between the primary sense of the constituents and the dual
number added to a compound. If each constituent is related to a dual,
then the compound dhavakhadirau would mean two dhavas and two
khadiras. Therefore, to justify the dual number we must assume that
the first constituent denotes association (sähitya). Because this sense of
association is not conveyed by the primary function of the constituents,
the Naiyäyikas resort to secondary meaning to convey sähitya, which
indicates the joint representation of two objects, while number, dual or
plural, represents the objects that have been associated. The sense
association indicated by the first member in compounds like dhavakhadi-
rau does not mean two dhavas. It {dhava) does not mean dhava and
khadira either, because dhava cannot mean khadira. The sense association
or simultaneous representation is only through secondary meaning.
According to Konda Bhatta, the aggregate denotative function ex-
presses the meaning of dvandva as in the case of other compounds. In the
itaretarqyoga, the aggregate denotative function expresses the items
that are grouped together, which justifies reference to two or more
items. In the case oîsamahara (group of items), the samudqyaJakti (aggre-
gate denotative function) denotes the aggregation or group, which
justifies the singular number.
(.5161). The Naiyäyikas and the Mïmâmsakas do not accept a separate
denotative function with regard to a compound as a whole. The Gram-,
marians argue that if an aggregate denotative function is not assigned
to a compound as a whole, the compound form cannot be called a
nominal stem {prätipadika) by Pânini 1.2.45, because the basic condition
for the designation prätipadika is meaningfulness. We cannot apply the
designation prätipadika by the next rule, Pänini 1.2.46, because the word
samäsa in that rule is restrictive. The sütra means that if the designation
prätipadika is to be applied to a collection of words having a sense it
must be restricted to a compound. It is not to be applied to a sentence.
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 285

Moreover, if the compound as a whole has no denotative function it

cannot have a secondary meaning, which is based on the denotative
function (abhidhä or sakti) ofwords.
(#174-175, 177). The Mîmâmsakas hold that a genitive compound
like räjapurusa must be analyzed as "räjä cäsau purusas ca" and not as
"râjfîah purusah." The first analysis indicates that the relation of
qualified and qualifier is dependent on the mutual expectancy of consti-
tuents and not on the case endings added to them. In the case of the
genitive tatpurusa compounds, the sense of relation, namely, "servant
and master,55 is to be conveyed by the genitive suffix. But the compound
räjapurusah does not refer to the relation between the two related;
rather, räjan in räjapurusah denotes the meaning oï purusa in the sense
that râjan becomes a qualifier to purusa. The constituent analysis must
convey the meaning of the compound. The constituent analysis "ràjâ
cäsau purusas ca55 can Gonvey the qualifier and qualified relation
(abheda), but the analysis "räjfiah purusah55 fails to point it out. There-
fore, "räjä cäsau purusas ca55 is a proper analysis. Similarly, the
bahuvrihi compound citraguh must be analyzed as "citränäm gaväm
ayam55 ("he, the owner of the brindled cows55) and not as "citrä gävo
yasya55 ("possessed of brindled cows55). In the case of bahuvrihi com-
pounds, the constituent analysis must be such as can convey reference
to the anyapadärtha. If we assume the analysis "citränäm gaväm ayam,55
it can point out reference to the anyapadärtha. But the constituent analy-
sis "citrä gavo yasya55 primarily refers to the svapadärtha "constituents5
own meaning.55
(J5180-181, 186). Later Mîmâmsakas do not accept the aggregate
denotative function of the whole compound or secondary meaning in
the case of a karmadhäraya compound. In nilaghata, "a blue jar,55 the
words nila and "ghata" are in apposition, and their coreferentiality is
brought out by merely joining the stems nila andghata. But in a tatpurusa
compound likeräjapurusah, "king's man,55 the servant-master relation-
ship cannot be brought about by mere constituents. The syntactic
relationship is dependent on the case ending: in the compound the case
ending is not there. Therefore, this relationship is indicated by the
secondary function. So in case of doubts, the karmadhäraya compound,
which does not involve the secondary function, is preferred to the
sasthUatpurusa, which does. Consequently, the word nisadasthapati is taken
to mean nisâdah sthapatih, a chief who himself is a nisäda, rather than
nisâdanâm sthapatih, a chief of the Nisâda tribe. But Konda Bhatta5s
standpoint is that the aggregate denotative function belongs to all
compounds, and there would be no difference between a tatpurusa and
a. karmadhäraya compound. Then it would go against the Mimämsä
doctrine, which proves that nisadasthapati h must be taken as a karmadhä-
raya compound and not as sasthitatpurusa for the sake of economy. To
286 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

avoid this difficulty, Konda Bhatta answers that when a compound

word denotes various meanings, the speaker's intention (tätparya) must
be taken to decide the sense of the compound. If we took the compound
nisâdasthapati in the context of ritual as a genitive tatpurusa compound, it
would go against the interest of the author's statement. Moreover,
the true meaning of the compound is determined by its accent.
(£183-186). Konda Bhatta replies that the constituent analysis and
the compound need not be semantically and syntactically equivalents.
Therefore, we may find the reversion of the principal and subordinate
relation in the meaning indicated by the constituent analysis and
compound. Therefore, the analysis "citrâ gâvo yasya" for the
compound citraguh and "räjfiah purusah" for the compound räjapurusah
may not be objectionable.
Even the Mîmâmsakas assume that productive operation {bhävanä)
stands as predominant with respect to the kärakas in the case of verbal
forms, while in the case oikrdanta words the kärakas stand predominant
with respect to bhävanä. Therefore, the constituent analysis may not be
exactly equivalent to the compound meaning.

Section 6 : The Relation Between

a Word and Its Meaning (Saktinirnaya)
(B\ 88). The relation of a word with its meaning, according to Konda
Bhatta, is power {éaktï) or intrinsic fitness (yogyata). Following Bhartr-
hari, Konda Bhatta states that semantic fitness (yogyatä) is the relation
between a word and its meaning. The natural or intrinsic capacity of
words to convey any meaning is called yogyata. Just as the organs of
perception (indriya) have a natural power to perceive objects, so words
also have an innate capacity for conveying any meaning. The Gramma-
rians and the Mïmâmsakas consider this power to be a separate cate-
gory, while the Naiyâyikas assume that it is based on convention.
(£496-497). According to the Naiyâyikas the connection between
the words and their meanings is not natural but rather based on con-
vention (samketa), which is established by God's desire. According to
this view language is created by God. The words are cap able of conveying
a sense because God has so desired. In the case of proper names like
Devadatta, however, the desire is that of Devadatta's father. The later
Naiyâyikas, however, maintain that this relation need not always be
established by the will of God.
(5189-190). According to the Mïmâmsakas the relation between
words and their meanings is natural and eternal, not something brought
about by convention of human beings. This relation between words and
their meanings is without beginning. The Mïmâmsakas and the Gram-
marians agree that the natural relationship is understood from the
use of the elderly persons. This relation between the words and their
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 287

meanings cannot be the desire of God because the Mîmàmsakas and

the Buddhists, who do not believe in the existence of God, also under-
stand the meanings of words.
(5191.). Konda Bhatta concludes that the nature of the power [ßakti ) of
words is to convey meaning, the signifierness {bodhakatva) of the words.
The primary function of the word ghata ("pot") is its power or capacity
to cause a cognition. This power of words is comparable to the power of
the organs of sense to cause the cognition of objects. Konda Bhatta
presents the view of the Paftcapädihäuivarana (an Advaita Vedänta text)
to support his position.
In addition to power, the Mïmâmsakas and the Naiyâyikas assume a
secondary function of words to convey their extended meaning. Konda
Bhatta refuses to accept the secondary meaning even though he accepts
suggestion (vyanjana) as a separate function to convey emotional over-
tones attached to words in literary writings. The argument for not acce-
pting secondary meaning is that the power that is bodhakatva, the capa-
city of words to cause cognition of meaning is also the same in the case
of extended meanings.
(5195-198). The Naiyâyikas maintain that the corrupt forms of
words that are current express their meaning indirectly by recalling
the correct forms. Kumärila, the Mïmâmsaka, states that the corrupt
words (mlecchasabda) equally convey meaning. But the corrupt forms
convey their meaning only through the original correct words, having
brought them to our mind, whenever corresponding correct usage is
available. The corrupt words that may convey their meaning indirectly
cannot be regarded as synonyms for the original correct words. Thus,
for instance, when the corrupt word gävi is pronounced, it brings to
our mind the correct Sanskrit word gauh.
The Grammarians do not accept the view of the Naiyâyikas and the
Mïmâmsakas that corrupt words have no denotative power. If
corrupt words have no denotative power, they can convey no meaning.
It will not be correct to say that incorrect words remind us of correct
words and we therefore know the meanings from the incorrect
words, because ignorant persons who do not know correct words know
the meaning from corrupt words. As far as conveying of meaning is
concerned, there is no difference between the correct and corrupt forms.
But the main difference is that the use of correct forms leads to
spiritual merit, while the use of incorrect forms leads to spiritual demerit.
And grammar teaches us the correct forms of words. The words that are
derived according to grammatical rules are considered to be correct.
(5197). The Grammarians insist that the corrupt forms derived from
Sanskrit equally convey meaning. Thus in the case of languages like
Marathi derived from Sanskrit, the meaning of words is understood not
indirectly through the correct Sanskrit forms.
288 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Following Bhartrhari, Konda Bhatta says that semantic fitness is

understood from the usage of elderly persons (vrddhavyavahâra). The
denotative potency of words to convey any meaning is intrinsic and
beginriingless, but the use of elderly persons makes us acquainted with
the natural capacity.

Section 7 : The Meaning of

the Negative Particle Nafi (Nafiarthanirnaya)
(#201 ). According to the first view proposed by Konda Bhatta (in
connection with the negative tatpurusa compound), the reference of the
compound is determined by the second member. The negative particle
nafi (na or a or an) suggests the sense of superimposition (äropitatva).
The function of nafi in abrähmana is to convey the secondary sense that
the word abrähmana is used with reference to a ksatriya. One superimposes
brahminhood on a ksatriya, on account of the fact that the ksatriya
shares a number of characteristics with a brahmin. To convey that the
word brâhmana is used in the sense of ksatriya, the speaker uses nafi along
with the word brâhmana.
If the negative particle stands for absence (abhäva), then abrähmana
would mean a person not existing as a brahmin, according to which
the first member would represent the main meaning. But this view is not
correct because it involves various difficulties. In the negative tatpurusa
compound asah, "other than he," the second member, sah (tat), will
be subordinate. Therefore, it will not be called sarvanäman. So we cannot
apply the operations prescribed for pronominal stems. The result is that
the compound form will be atad instead of asah. Therefore, this view
should be discarded.
(S515 ). There are six meanings in which the negative particle nafi (na
or a) is used in compounds: similarity (sädrsya), as in abrähmanah, "like
a brahmin 55 ; absence (abhäva), as in apäpam, "absence of sin55; being
other than something (tadanyatvam, mutual absence), as in anatvah,
"other than a horse55; smallness of something (tadalpatä), as in anudarä
kanyä, "a girl with a thin belly55; impropriety or unfitness (apraSastya),
as in apasavah, "unfit animals (for sacrifice)55; and contrariety (viro-
dha), as in adharma, "contrary to dharma" Of these six meanings only
one is primarily denoted by nafi, namely, absence. The rest are secon-
dary to this primary meaning.
(B201-202). According to the Naiyäyikas there are two primary
meanings of nafi, namely, absence, as in apäpam, "absence of sin,55 and
mutual absence (anyonyäbhäva), as in asah, "other than he.55 But accor-
ding to Konda Bhatta the basic meaning of nafi is only absence.
(£203-204). Patanjali explains that the function oï nafi is to convey
the sense nivrttapadärthaka, namely, bringing the absence of something
to our notice. In other words, the function of nafi is to convey the absence
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 289

of something in physical reality. Kaiyata interprets this Bhâsya to mean

that a word like brahmana in abrähmana is used in a secondary sense,
namely, that of ksatriya, upon whom brahminhood has been superim-
posed. The function of nan in abrähmana is only to bring to our notice
that brahmana is used in the secondary sense.
Konda Bhatta criticizes Kaiyata's view. In instances like ghato nästi,
"there is no jar," and abrähmana, " (he is) not a brahmin," the particle
(nan) does not have two different meanings of absence and superimpo-
sition (âropitatva). Rather, in both of these cases nafi denotes the sense
nivrttapadârthaka, which implies that nan brings to our notice the fact
that something is absent. In other words, according to Patanjalinan
denotes absence. He further argues that if superimposition were the
meaning of nan, as Kaiyata thinks, then nan would also denote the sense
of similarity (sadrsya). In that case there wou]d be six différent denota-
tions, as stated earlier. This position involves complexity.
The negative particle nan expressing absence may be sometimes
subject or qualificand (visesya) and sometimes adjunct or qualifier
(visesana). In the forms asah, "other than he," atvam bhavasi, "(some-
body) other than you become," or anekam, "more than one," the
second member is principal. That explains the pronominal operations,
the number, and the person, which are determined by the predomi-
nance of the second member. Thus the view of the meaning predomi-
nance of the second member (uttarapadarthaprâdhânya) explains these
examples. But according to the. other view, the particle nan denotes
"absence," which stands as a qualificand, so the meaning of nan is the
main meaning. In the aforementioned special cases the predominance
of the second member is retained by resorting to secondary meaning,
which conveys the sense of difference or mutual absence. In such cases
the negative particle denies the relation of identity in the form of
denying reference to the meaning of the second member.
Section 8: The Meanings of Preverbs and
Particles (Nipatârthanirnaya)
(B205). Grammarians and Naiyäyikas do not agree with each other
about the nature of particles (nipata). According to the Naiyäyikas the
particles are directly denotative (vâcaka). Particles belong to the cate-
gory of independently significant words, but preverbs (upasarga) do
not. The Grammarians disagree with this view.
(l?205) verse 41. Konda Bhatta following Patanjali and Bhartrhari,
maintains that both preverbs and particles are suggestive (dyotaka) and
not independently denotative (vâcaka). Preverbs and particles acquire
meaning only in combination with other words. We find contrast in the
meaning denoted by äste, "he sits," and upaste, "he worships," which
does not spring from the meaning inherent in, the preverb, The presence
290 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

and absence oïupa signal this contrast, which is actually inherent in the
root meaning. The root as- does not convey by itself the transitive
meaning "to worship." The passive endings are added only to the
transitive roots. Therefore, to explain the passive construction upâsyete
hariharau, "Hari and Hara are worshiped,35 we have to assume that the
root as- stands for the meaning "to worship."
(5205-206). In some cases the preverbs only enlarge the meaning of
roots. For instance, when we say prajayati, "he wins well," the meaning of
the preverb does not alter the meaning of the root ji. Sometimes pre-
verbs determine the specific meaning of the following root. For instance,
the root stha denotes the sense to stop the movement. But when it is
joined with the preverb pra it denotes altogether a different meaning,
"to move forward."
For the proper application of a grammatical operation such as
augmentation, it is necessary to separate a verbal root from a preverb.
For instance, the augment at (that is, a in forms like anvabhavat) is inser-
ted between a verbal root and a preverb. The finite verb form (abhauat)
is formed first. Subsequently, the preverb is united with the verb to
reveal its meaning. In such cases the preverbs are suggestive rather than
denotative.
(5206) verse 42. Particles (câdi), like preverbs (prâdi), are also
suggestive of the meanings of forms to which they are attached. Unless
we assume the suggestiveness of particles we cannot explain the passive
voice säksatkriyate, "it is perceived," alamkriyate, "it is adorned," or
namaskriyate, "he is saluted." These passive voices could be explained
if we assume that the root kr- denotes the sense of perceiving, adorning,
and saluting that make the root kr- transitive.
(5207). The Naiyäyikas make a specific distinction between particles
and preverbs. According to them, the particles are directly denotative*
but the preverbs are suggestive. Preverbs such as pra have independently
distinctive meanings of their own when they are disjoined from verbs.
The preverbs suggest different meanings in connection with different
verbs. Preverbs only disclose one of the several meanings of the verbal
root that is to be adopted in a particular case. But particles like saksat,
"directly," and namas, "salutation," denote fixed meaning.
(5215) verse 46. The Naiyäyikas maintain that the meaningfulness
of particles is established on the basis of agreement (anvaya) and diffe-
rence (vyatireka). Jf we examine the pair vrksah ca, "also tree," and
vrksah, "tree," we find that the particle ca reveals the contrast in mea-
ning and expression. When we say vrksah, "tree," we do not understand
the sense of conjunction (namely, also). Therefore, by the process of
agreement and difference it is clear that the particles are denotative.
The Grammarians criticize the view of the Naiyäyikas. According to
the Grammarians neither preverbs nor particles are capable of being
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 291

used independently of other words. For instance, we do not use the

phrase bhüyan pra, "greater excellence/' the way we use the phrase
bhüyan prakarsah, "greater excellence." Similarly, we do not use the
phrase sobhanas ca, "beautiful collection," the way we use the phrase
sojbhanah samuccayah, "beautiful collection."
(.008-209) verse 43. Konda Bhatta further points out that the
meaning of particles never stands in appositional relation with another
nominal stem meaning. Take the instance ghatas ca, "and jar." The
meaning conjunction (namely, and) does not stand in appositional
relation with the meaning "jar." But the semantic rule is that two
nominal stem meanings are related to each other appositionally. No
one understands, however, that the meaning "conjunction" stands in
appositional relation with the meaning "jar." To remove this difficulty
the Naiyäyikas have to make a special provision that the aforementioned
semantic rule does not apply to the particles. The Grammarians do not
have this difficulty. The particle ca, according to the Grammarians,
does not convey the sense of conjunction independently. It only functions
as the siiggester of meaning. Therefore, "conjunction" is not regarded
as nominal-stem-meaning (namârtha).
(5209-210) verse 44. In addition, Konda Bhatta points out that if
the particles are directly denotative of meaning we will have to assume
the discontinuousness of meaningful elements. To illustrate this point
he presents the phrase "usraih iva saraih," ("by rays, similar, by
arrows"). The phrase actually means: by rays (that are) like arrows.
The phrase consists of the following meaningful elements: usra (ray),
-ais (by), iva (similar), s ara (arrows), -als (by). The instrumental en-
ding ais added to the word usra does not convey the instrumentality of
usra alone, rather that oîusra+iva (by rays like). This sense is, however,
not allowed by the grammatical theory, which insists that the case
termination ais must be construed with the stem usra, Qne should not
disturb-the inseparable relation that exists between the stem and the
suffix. Therefore, the analysis usra-\-iva-\-bhis (rays like by) goes against
the principle of word formation. To avoid this difficulty, the Gramma-
rians maintain that the base usra denotes the sense usrasadrsa (rays like).
The following particle iva does not denote independently the meaning
"similar," it only discloses the meaning of usra, "rays like," which is to
be adopted in this particular context. Because in the phrase usraih iva,
the stem usra denotes the sense usrasadrsa, "rays like," the meaning of
the instrumental case ending "by" can be easily connected with it.
But according to the Naiyäyikas, the particle iva denotes the sense
"similar." Therefore, to maintain the meaningful relation between the
constituents of the phrase usraih iva the Naiyäyikas will have to assume the
construction usra (rays), iva (similar), ais (by). This construction violates
the principle that the case endings must be construed with the sterrts,
292 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(5210-211) verse 45. An objection is raised by the Naiyâyikas. If

particles are not independently denotative of meaning, then in the
tatpurusa compound formed with the negative particle nafï, the first
member, nan (that is, a in the compounds like abmhmana, "other than a
brahmin"), will be meaningless. If the first member is meaningless, the
question of the second member's predominance does not arise at all.
Consequently, the definition of the tatpurusa compound {tatpurusa is a
compound in which the meaning of the second member is predominant)
will not be applicable. Similarly, particles and preverbs that are not
independently meaningful will not be called nominal stems (prätipadi-
kas) because the basic condition for the designation prätipadika (Pänini
1.2.45) is meaningfulness.
The Grammarians answer that particles and preverbs are suggestive
of meaning, so they are not totally meaningless. If one takes into
account the suggestive nature of particles and preverbs, the designations
tatpurusa and prätipadika are applied.
(5215-216). Finally, Konda Bhatta points out that one should not
insist on any one of the two alternatives, suggestiveness or denotative-
ness. Some preverbs and particles are suggestive and some are
denotative. Nonetheless, he disagrees with the Naiyäyikas and the
Mïmâmsakas, who insist that particles are directly expressive, while
preverbs are always suggestive of meaning.
Section 9 : The Meaning of Suffixes Forming Abstract
Nouns (Bhâvapratyqyârthanirnaya)
(5217). In the case of a compound, a primary derivative (krt), or a
secondary derivative (taddhita), the suffixes prescribed in the sense of
bhâva, or abstract notion, convey a relation excluding the words that
have a conventional sense (rüdhi), adjectives (abhinnarüpa)} and words
expressing a relation that is inseparable. (The source of this statement
quoted by Konda Bhafta is not known. Heläräja also quotes it in his
commentary on the Väkyapadiya, kanda 3, chapter 5, verse 1. ) .
(5217-218). The addition of abstract suffixes to such compounds as
rqjapurusa, "king's servant," denotes the sense of king's relation to a
servant, and the expression aupagavatva, "cowherd-sonness," expresses
the son's relation to the father cowherd. The abstract noun päcakatva,
"cookness," stands for the actor-action relation, '
This rule has three exceptions. The rüdha word krsnasarpa conventio-
nally refers to a poisonous snake. The word sukla, when it is adjectivally
used, refers to a white thing, a substance. When we formulate the ex-
pression suklatva, "white-thingness," it means the quality "white
color." Sattâ is an instance of the third type, inseparable relation. The
word sat refers to an existing thing, and sattä denotes invariable relation
to an existing thing. In other words, sattâ cannot be. separated from
KÔNDA OR KAUNDA BHAT?A 293

sat. As opposed to this claim, the Mîmâmsakas maintain that in words

like dandi, "a person carrying a stick," the passive suffix -in denotes only
a substance and not a relation of owner-owned. The idea of the relation
between danda (a stick) and -in (that is, a person referred to by the
possessive suffix) arises after the relation of qualifier {danda) and the
qualified (in other words, a person qualified byr danda) is comprehended.
Therefore, dandi does not denote a relation between danda (stick) and
the person referred to by the taddhita suffix -in. Similarly, pâcaka does
not denote a relation between the stem meaning (action) and the
suffix meaning (agent). The relation between paka, the action of
cooking, and kartr, agent (the meaning of the suffix) is neither the sense
of the root nor that of the suffix. Thus the primary (krt) and the secon-
dary (taddhita) derivatives do not denote any relation. But the abstract-
noun-forming suffixes tva and tal in pâcakatva and danditva denote the
sense of relation. Konda Bhatta criticizes this Mïmamsaka view by
pointing out that if the relation is not expressed by the words dandin and
pâcaka, it will not be expressed by the words danditva and pâcakatva. The
Mîmâmsakas accept the principle halfway but not in its entirety.
(B2\9). Konda Bhatta refers to Kätyäyana's värttika 5 on Pänini
5.1.119. Kätyäyana says that the suffixes tva and tal denote the quality
due to the presence of which a word is applied to an object. The quality
denoted by an abstract suffix is any characteristic that is dependent on
the thing meant as its substratum. This characteristic (prakära) or
quality, which determines the meaning expressed by the stem, is deno-
ted by the suffixes tva and tal. For instance, when the word sukla denotes
a substance (white thing), the expression êuklatva denotes a white
quality. But when the word iukla denotes white color, then the expres-
sion suklatva stands for the universal common to white colors. Words
like arm, "atomic," mahat, "big," or dirgha, "long," always stand for the
objects that have these qualities. The expressions anutva, mahattva, or
dirghatva stand for the qualities (such as size or length) that distinguish
these objects from others. The expression pâcakatva stands for the relation
between the agent and the action (cooking). The expression ghatatva
stands for the notion of a universal jar. Konda Bhatta, following Bhartr-
hari, states that from the point of ultimate reality the different univer-
sals like ghatatva are nothing more than the mahâsattâ, the highest uni-
versal. All words express the mahâsatiâ as it exists in all different things.
(£220-221 ) . Konda Bhatta quotes another värttika on Pänini 5.1.119.
Each word is employed to express a thing (artha) on some ground
{pravrttinimitta), and it is this ground that is expressed by the addition
of the abstract suffixes tva and tal. > •
Kaiyata explains this view as follows. The expressions gotva, pâcakatva,
suklatva, and the like point to the thing (that is, the referent) through
some property known as its ground for application {pravrttinimitta). In
294 ËNGYÔLOPEDÎA ÔF INDIAN PHÎL ÖS OPHÎEg

the case of the word gö the expressed sense is a substance, while the
ground for the term's application is gotva, the universal feature. In the
case of the word pâcaka, the expressed sense is the agent of the action of
cooking, and the ground for the term's application is the action of
cooking. In the compounds râjapurusah, ''king's servant," and so on, the
referent is the king's servant and the ground for the term's application
is the relation between a king and a servant. "Dittha" refers to a person,
ditthatva refers to the ground for application, in other words, the name
that identifies the person called Dittha. Thus, according to Kaiyata,
the meaning of the suffix tva is pravrttinimitta, the ground for the appli-
cation of the term, which may be either a universal or action or relation
or name.
Konda Bhatta explains the real implication of the vârttika as follows :
all words express their meaning on account of their ground for the
term's application {pravrttinimitta). This pravrttinimitta in the case of
proper nouns is nothing but the word form. When we first learn to use
proper nouns like "Hari," "Hara," or "Nala" we know that someone
is expressed by these words. Here we do not have any property that
can be considered as ground for application of the term. The same
thing is true in case of medicinal herbs growing in a forest, which do not
convey any specific sense to persons living in cities. These names of
medicinal herbs refer to a substance, and the ground for application of
these terms is the name (word form) of these herbs. Then the abstract
expression like haratva refers to the word form or to the name.
Section 10 : The Meaning of Suffixes Added to the Names
of Deities (Devatâpratyayârthanirnaya)
(#224). In aindram havih, "an oblation presented to the god Indra,"
the taddhita suffix -an is added to the stem indra- in the sense of sa; for
example, sya devatâ (Pänini 4.2.24): "this is its deity." Therefore the
sense of the taddhita suffix -an and others like it is an oblation presented
to a particular deity. The meaning of the stem is construed with the
meaning "deity in relation of apposition (abhedasambandha)," which is
a part of the suffix's meaning. The meaning deuatä stands syntactically
subordinate (that is, as the qualifier) with respect to the meaning dey a,
an oblation. The meaning deya stands syntactically predominant
(that is, qualified) with respect to the meaning devatâ. Thus the meaning,
of the suffix is devatoddeêyakam deyam, an oblation to be presented that
is subservient to a deity.
Konda Bhatta mentions the second view that the meaning devatâ,
deity (of the rites), and deya, an oblation to be presented, are two
separate denotations of the taddhita suffix. According to the first view,
however, these meanings are always presented together and not the
one separately without the other.
KONDA OR KAUNÖA ËHATTA 295

(i?225). The third view stated by Konda Bhatta is that the sense
"deity" comes from the stem itself. The word indra, in the context of
the sacrificial rite, stands for the deity Indra, and it is an accepted
popular usage (nirüdhä laksana). Because the sense "deity" is already
expressed by the stem it need not be expressed again by the taddhita
suffix.
Section 11 : The Nondenotation of Number (by the Subordinate
Constituent of Vrtti or Complex Formation) (Abhedaikatvasamkhyä-
nirnaya)
(J5226) verse 54. In the case of a complex formation the question is
whether the subordinate member of the formation conveys the idea of
a particular number or of no number at all. In compounds like rqjapuru-
sak, "king servant," we do not know whether the man belongs to one
king, two kings, or more than two kings. Following Bhartrhari, Konda
Bhatta answers that we apprehend abhedaikatvasamkhyä^ singular number
without differentiation, from the subordinate member of the complex
formation.
The term abhedaikatvasamkhyä is interpreted in two ways. According
to the first interpretation, from a subordinate member of a complex
formation we apprehend singular number, which includes other num-
bers too. The notion of other numbers co-exists in the singular. From
the singular one can understand any required number according to
the fact of communication. In this view, the subordinate member expre-
sses singular number, which is noncommittal and may represent any
number. Just as the honey elixir represents an undifferentiated com-
bination of the flavors of many medical herbs, so all three numbers
have merged in the singular and become one.
The second interpretation is that abhedaikatvasamkhyä means the
notion of numbers in general, without specification being made. In the
same way, from a distance a person who cannot see the exact color of
a thing tells us that it has some indistinct color without knowing any
specific color, like white. The same is true of number conveyed by the
subordinate member of the complex formation : it conveys some number
without committing any specific one.
In some cases of compounds a particular number is clearly indicated,
for instance, dviputrah, "having two sons," triputrah, "having three sons,"
and so on, where the meaning of the nominal iteùi itself is a particular
number. In the word formation tâvakinah, "belonging to you," mäma-
kinah, "belonging to me," the substitutes tâvaka and mamaka indicate
singular number (Pänini 4.3.3).
(B227) verse 54. Konda Bhatta refers to the example kapinjalän
älabheta, "one should kill (three partridges by immolating)" from the
Purvamimâmsâ. Here from the plural kapinjalän only three partridges
296 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

are understood because the idea of three comes first. The idea of four
and more includes the idea of three, but the idea of three can exclude
the idea of four or more. There is no reason to abandon the idea of
three. Therefore, the Mïmâmsakas conclude that the scripture pres-
cribes killing of three partridges only and not of more than three.
Similarly, in complex formation, when there is nothing that gives us
an idea of a particular number we understand the idea of singularity,
which comes first (verse 54, Bhûsana, p. 227).
Section 12 : Intended and Unintended Denotation of Number
(Samkhyävivaksarthanirnayah)
(12229). Konda Bhatta refers to the Mïmâmsâ principle grahaikatva,
singularity of cups (unintended). In the sentence grahamsammärsti, "he
cleans a cup" the singular number of the cup is not intended. By this
sentence, cleaning with reference to a cup is prescribed. Here "cup"
functions as the subject (uddesya, in other words, that with reference
to which something is prescribed) and "cleaning" functions as the
predicate (vidheya, in other words, that which is prescribed with refe-
rence to something). The subject is guna, subsidiary, with regard to the
predicate, and the predicate is pradhäna, principal, with regard to the
subject. A subject phrase that figures as qualifier to a subject is avivaksita
(not intentionally used). Therefore the number of the subject is not
intentionally used, that is to say, no special significance is attached to
it. So "cup" stands for any cup and not for one particular cup.
Again, the Mïmâmsakas hold that whatever figures as a qualifier
in the predicate phrase is vivaksita, intentionally used, for instance,
pasunä yajeta, "one should bring about a sacrifice by means of an
animal." The sentence is interpreted to mean "yägam uddisya pasur
vidhïyate" ("with reference to a sacrifice an animal is enjoined"). In
the predicate the qualifying number is intentionally used. Therefore, in
pasunä, singular number is intentionally used. Accordingly, the sacrifice
should be performed with one animal.
The Grammarians do not accept this view. Whether number is in-
tentionally used or not intentionally used in subject and predicate
words depends on particular instances. We cannot make it a rule just
because the Mïmâmsakas have done it. The Grammarians do not
accept the view that a word that figures as the qualifier in the subject
phrase is not significant or intentionally used. For instance, valâdi, begin-
ning with a consonant other thanj>, which figures as a qualifying condi-
tion with reference to the qualified ardhadhätukasya in the subject phrase
"valâdeh ardhadhätukasya" (Pänini 7.2.35), is significant and inten-
tionally used.
(£229-230 ). Similarly, the view of the Mïmâmsakas that a work that
figures as the qualifier in the predicate phrase is significant and inten-
ItOÎSÏDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 297

tionally used is also not acceptable to the Grammarians. For instance,

the singular number conveyed by the phrase nah (replaced by the
phoneme ft), which figures as the qualifier in the predicate phrase
(Pänini 8.4.1 ), is not significant. That is why nn has been substituted
in bhinna for d and Tin bhid-\-ta. Finally, Konda Bhatta accepts that
whatever figures as a qualifier in the predicate phrase should be taken
to be intentionally used.
Section 13 : The Meaning of the Primary Suffixes Such as
Ktvä {Ktvâpratyayadinâm arthanirnayah)
'(5232). According to the Varttikakära (värttika 3 on Pänini 3.4.26),
the suffixes ktva (that is, tvä) and tumun (that is, turn) have the same
meaning (namely, agent/object) as the finite verb. But according to
Patanjali, tva or turn (gerunds or continuatives) denote only bhäva
(action).
Appayya Dïksita in his Parimala maintains the view that in "paktvä
odano bhujyate devadattena" ("the rice is eaten by Devadatta after
having cooked it"), the verb bhujyate along with the suffix tva expresses
the sense karman. Similarly, therefore, Pänini 2.3.1 stops it from adding
the accusative -am to the word odana by Pänini 2.3.2. In "paktvä oda-
nam bhunkte devadattah" ("Devadatta eats rice after having cooked
it"), the fact that Devadatta functions as the agent is abhihita, already
expressed, by the verb ending -ti as well as by suffix -tvâ. As the sense
"agent" is abhihita we are not allowed to add the instrumental ending
after the stem Devadatta, according to Pänini 2.3.18.
(.B232-235). Konda Bhatta disagrees with this view. According to
him the suffix -tvâ does not express the sense "agent." Pänini's rule
3.4.21 means: (the suffix -tvais added to a verbal root, which expresses)
the prior action of two (verbal actions) that have the same agent. The
rule only says that both actions have the same agent; it does not say
that the suffixes -tva and -turn denote the sense "agent." Following
Patanjali, Konda Bhatta maintains that the suffixes -tvä and -turn denote
only bhava, action. But this view does not mean that the object/agent
of the action expressed by -tvâ j-turn will be used in the accusative/instru-
mental. Following Bhartrhari, he maintains that in the examples
"paktvä odano bhujyate" and "paktvä odanam bhunkte devadattah,"
odana is the object of both actions (the action of eating, which is the
principal one, and the action of cooking, which is the subordinate one),
and Devadatta is the agent of both actions. In the first example the
sense "object" {karman) is expressed by the finite verb but not by the
suffix tvâ. Similarly, in the second example the sense "agent" (kartr) is
expressed by the finite verb but not by the gerund-forming suffix -tva.
When the sense "agent/object" is expressed by the main verb, the agent/
object word is used in the nominative. The object/agent of the subordi-
298 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ÎNDÎAft PHÎLÔSOPHÎËS

nate action is always in consonance with those of the principal action.

The fact is that the abhihitajanabhihita by the main verb determines
which case endings are to be added to a nominal stem.
The expression bhuktvä vrajati, "he goes away after eating," is regar-
ded as one single sentence. Bhuktvä and vrajati are not to be read in
isolation but as connected with each other by the qualifier-qualified
relation. The action denoted by the finite verb is the qualified one, and
the action denoted by the gerund is the qualifier one.
This qualifier qualified relation may be of four types: janyajanakabhâ-
va, the producer-produced relation, as in, for instance, bhoktum pacati,
"he cooks for eating," because eating cannot be undertaken without
cooking ; pûrvottarabhâva, the relation of preceding and succeeding, as
in, for instance, bhuktvä vrajati, "he goes after eating," where we find
that the action of going follows the action of eating ; sâmânâdhikaranya,
coreferentiality, as in, for instance, bhuktvä vrajati, where both of the
actions have the same agent, because we understand that the eater and
the goer are the same person; and vyapyatva, the relation of pervasion,
as in, for instance, adhltya tisthati, "while studying he stands," "or
mukham vyadaya svapiti, "while keeping his mouth open he sleeps." Here
the action of studying is coextensive with the action of standing, and
the action of keeping the mouth open is coextensive with the action of
sleeping. The main actions, studying and sleeping, are regarded as
coinciding with the actions of standing and keeping the mouth open.

Section 14: The Doctrine of Sphota (Sphotanirnaya)

(#236-239). Konda Bhatja classifies the sphota into eight different
varieties: varnavyaktisphota, the phoneme event is the conveyer of
meaning; padavyaktisphota, the word event is the conveyer of meaning;
vâkyavyaktisphota, the sentence event is the conveyer of meaning;
akhandapadasphota, the finished word as an undivided linguistic unit is
the conveyer of the meaning; akhandavâkyasphota, the sentence as an
undivided linguistic unit is the conveyer of meaning; varnajatisphota, the
phoneme type is the conveyer of meaning; padajatispho ta, the word type
is the conveyer of meaning; and vakyajätisphota, the sentence type is the
conveyer of meaning. The term varnasphota does not mean that each
single phoneme is regarded as sphota, but the phoneme or phonemes
constituting either a stem or a suffix are regarded as such.
(5257) verses 60-69. Although the eight varieties of sphota are accep-
ted by the Grammarians, it is the sentence sphota alone that represents
the essential nature of the sphota doctrine.
(5236-237) verse 59. According to the Naiyàyikas fictional
constituents, namely, sthanin, prototype, like the symbol -l"el" and the
like, are the conveyers of meaning. In opposition, the Grammarians
maintain that the constituents that belong to the usable form of the
kÔNDA OR KAUNDA BHATf A 29Ô

language, like -ti (in bhavati) or h (in ràmah) are conveyers of meaning,
not the fictional units such as -1 "el" or su.
The Naiyâyikas argue that it is more reasonable to maintain that the
prototypes are denotative of meaning than to assign the denotative
function to the suffixes that are actually used. The reason is that compa-
red to the prototype "el55 -1, which stands for all verb endings, the
substitutes -ti, -tas, -anti, and so on are numerous. If the denotative
functions were assigned to the substitutes it would lead to assumptions
of endless denotative functions.
As an answer to the objection raised by the Naiyâyikas, Konda
Bhatta argues that if the prototypes were denotative of meaning there
would be some ambiguity, because different grammatical schools have
chosen different prototypes. We find that the prototypes are variable,
while the substitutes are of fixed character. Further, the Grammarians
maintain that the substitutes that are actually heard by listeners are
meaning-bearing units but that the prototypes, which are not actually
used in the language, are not.
(£579). Some exponents of the phoneme sphota theory formulate a
different point of view. According to them, the meaning is conveyed
by the last phoneme only, and the impressions of the individual phone-
mes constituting a word are helpful to produce only the simultaneous
recollection of the phonemes heard. The last sound, helped by impre-
ssions left behind by the previous perceptions of sounds, reveals the
meaning.
Konda Bhatta criticizes this claim on the ground that it becomes
difficult to answer why the meaning is not understood, even if the
phonemes are uttered in different periods of time.

Padasphota
(5239) verse 63. In such forms as ghatena, "by a jar," it is very
difficult to determine precisely which part of the word represents the
stem and which, the suffix. There is no fixed criterion that would enable
us to determine that ghata is the base and na is the suffix or that ghat is
the base and ena is the suffix. Similarly, it is very difficult to point out
the division between the stem portion and the suffix in the accusative
optional plural vah, nah of the personal pronouns yusmad and asmad.
Therefore, the padasphota (word sphota) maintains that the finished
word as a unique entity conveys the meaning.
Väkyasphota
(£240-241 ) verse 64. The padasphota theory also presents a difficulty
in analyzing a sentence such as hare*va, "Hari protect me," because
the listener grasps the meaning even if he fails to recognize exactly
the isolated constituents hare and aua, due to ignorance of the laws
300 ENCYCLOPEDIA ÔF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

of euphonic combination. Because the listener grasps the meaning

without understanding the division of the sentence, the Grammarians
contend that the sentence should be considered as a single unit for the
purpose of communication.
The Grammarians5 vâkyasakti theory assumes that the entire sentence
is endowed with denotative function, and the sentence as a whole
conveys one single meaning.
The Naiyäyikas claim that the meaning of a word is first remembered,
and the relational meaning is cognized at the time of verbal knowledge.
Thus according to the Naiyäyikas the sentence conveys some new
meaning (apürva). This additional meaning, over and above the word
meaning, is the distinctive feature of the sentence meaning (vâkyartha),
and it is conveyed by factors like syntactic expectancy (âkanksâ), or
relational seam, or the particular juxtaposition of words {samsarga-
maryadâ), or speaker's intention {tâtparya). The Naiyäyikas raise the
objection to the vâkyasakti that according to the Grammarians the dis-
tinction between the meaning cognized through the denotative function
and the meaning cognized through the verbal cognition (sâbdabodha)
can no longer remain because, according to the vâkyasakti theory, the
entire meaning of a sentence is known before the verbal cognition has
taken place in the mind.
The Grammarians answer that the objection can be raised against
the theory of denotation of meaning as related to the meanings of other
words {anvitâbhidhanavâda) maintained by the Prabhäkara school of
Mïmâmsâ. The Präbhäkaras contend that the relational meaning is also
the denoted meaning of a word. According to this school, the relational
meaning of words, is also known in a general way, and the definite
relationship between the meanings of words in their precise form is
clearly brought out at the time of verbal knowledge. The Grammarians,
arguing on the same lines maintain that the denotative function of a
sentence denotes the meaning of the individual words distinctly and
their relation along with the other word meanings in a general way.
That is to say, the precise relation among the various word meanings is
cognized at the time of verbal knowledge alone.
To prove that the sentence meaning is known through the sentence
function, Konda Bhatta cites the example "haridräyäm nadyäm
ghosah" ("a hamlet [is situated] on [the bank of] the river Haridrä".)
When a person who has not heard the name of Haridrä previously hears
this sentence, he understands the meaning of the word haridrä. He can
guess the meaning of the word haridrä because he understands the
meaning of the rest of the sentence, and then he is able to identify the
meaning of the isolated words. The Präbhäkaras claim that meaning
exists in words that are fragments of a sentence. The procedure for
understanding the meaning is to set side by side the sentences in which
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 301

only one word is different. The child understands the meaning of words
by the method of avapoduäpa, agreement and contrast. According to the
Präbhäkaras, words first convey the meaning related to one another,
and later on we comprehend the meaning from isolated words. This
analytical approach claims that an individual word is endowed with
meaning, not the sentence as a whole.
The Grammarians who are exponents of the vâkyasaktivada maintain
that although a child in a later stage identifies and isolates the word in a
sentence, still it understands first the meaning from a sentence. The
division of à sentence into words is an analytical method. When one
hears a sentence it is not taken into account in terms of a series of
meaningful units but as a whole.
(5240-241 ) verse 65. Konda Bhatta points out that the Grammarians
agree partially with the Bhatta school, for they maintain that a unified
sentence meaning is verbal. According to the Bhätta school, the cogni-
tion of unified meaning becomes verbal (säbda) as it is conveyed by
secondary meaning. According to the Grammarians, primary designa-
tion or denotative function (abhidha) assigned to a sentence conveys a
unified sentence meaning. But according to the Bhättas, the secondary
function conveys syntactically unified meaning.
(#54-62). Konda Bhatta states that just as we comprehend the
meaning of words from the words, so also do we comprehend the mea-
ning of a sentence from the sentence. Consequently, just as the denota-
tive function conveying the sense of words is assigned to the words, so
the denotative function conveying the sense of a sentence should be
assigned to the sentence. Thus the word sphota and the sentence sphota
are established.
(5241-244). The Naiyäyikas hold that words primarily denote
isolated meanings and the relational or syntactic meaning is communi-
cated by the speaker's intention or specific juxtaposition of the words.
Thus, according to the Naiyäyikas, the denotative function resides in
isolated words. Now the Grammarians argue that if the denotative
function resides in isolated words and not in the sentence, the layman
might understand the meaning from the unconnected words: ghata,
"jar," karmatva, "objecthood," ânayanam, "bringing," and krtih, "effort,"
as he understands the meaning from the sentence ghatam ânaya, "bring
ajar," because the amount of information furnished by the unconnec-
ted words is practically the same as that furnished by the parts of the
sentence ghata-\-am, à-\-nay-\-a. But it is experienced that a layman
cannot grasp the meaning from unconnected words that do not form
an organized sentence. Yet if it is held that the sentence as a whole is
denotative of meaning, the difficulty does not arise, for the unconnected
words mentioned above do not form an organized sentence. If the
Naiyäyikas assume that the words convey the meaning only when they
302 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

are organized in a sentence form such as ghatam änaya, then nothing

but the theory of the väkyasphota is established.
(5249) verse 66, taken from Väkyapadiya. There are no phonemes in
the words, and (there are) no parts in the phonemes. There is no
absolute and clear-cut separation of words from sentence. Konda
Bhatta, on the basis of this statement, lays emphasis on the indivisible
nature of the sphota. The verse implies that the word is without any
sequence of phonemes and that the sentence is bereft of the sequence
of words, even if they are cognized as having the sequence of phonemes
and words. Konda Bhatta argues that, as in the phonemes e, o, /, r,
though the parts a, i, /, r are separately cognized, they are not regarded
as separate parts of the phonemes, so in the same manner a word should
not be considered to be divisible into stems and suffixes.
The diversity in knowledge such as "this is the phoneme £," "this
is the phoneme j , " can be justified simply by assuming a diversity in the
delimiting property of production (utpatti) or revelation (abhivyakti) of
various phonemes, residing in the conjunction of the wind (generally),
accepted as giving rise to the various sounds. It is clearly stated in the
section dealing with the deities (devata) in the Bhâmati (Vâcaspati
Misra's commentary on the Samkarabhâsya) that the shrillness (and
other qualities) residing in the wind are superimposed upon the
phonemes. Konda Bhatta points out that breath wind comes into
contact with the different vocal organs, and it assumes the form of
different phonemes. The diversity belonging to the airwaves" (vâyusam-
yoga) that come into contact with the different articulatory points is
superimposed upon sounds that are modifications of airy substances.
Thus the pürvapaksin raises the following objection : instead of assum-
ing that the phonemes are denotative, why do we not consider the
sound-producing movements themselves to be denotative? Konda
Bhatta answers by reasoning that the auditory perception of phonemes
experienced by people cannot be ascribed to the sound-producing
movements, which are beyond the sense organs. The speaker makes
the sound-producing movements, and from them, the listener perceives
the phonemes. The listener identifies the outer phonemes and not the
inner sound-producing movements, which are beyond the reach of
sense organs.
(5249-250). Konda Bhatta furnishes instances of recognition : it is
the same phoneme g, it is the same word, it is the same sentence. The
first instance points out that the phoneme sphota remains the same,
though it is distinctively revealed by the peculiarities of the individual
speakers. The experience shows that the phonemic g is a single entity
and gives a unitary character to the phoneme g. Similarly the experien-
ces of one word and of one sentence cannot be attributed to the
phonemes, or stems or suffixes or words, because the notion of unitari-
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 303

ness cannot present different objects as its contents. Konda Bhatta

suggests that we cannot attribute this unitary perception to the collec-
tive notions of the phonemes in a single memory. The perceptive
experience shows that the word gauh is a single entity, and it corresponds
to the unity of meaning. It is not possible to argue that this unitary
experience is based on the single memory of all phonemes combined
together, because meaningless phonemes cannot give rise to a meaning
even when they are put together in a single memory.
($250-251 ). Konda Bhatta maintains the view that sounds perceived
by the listeners are not different from the sphota. The sphota is cognized
in the form of the distinctive sounds g-h-a-t-a. Konda Bhatta holds the
view that the object of cognition is the indivisible word-sphota, but its
form is nothing else than the phonemes auditorily perceived. The
phoneme g manifested by sound is identified with the phoneme g, which
appears to be the part of indivisible sphota word. Owing to this con*
fusion, the sphota, which is partless, appears to have parts. In reality,
the individual phonemes are not conceived to be different from the
partless sphota progressively revealed by sounds. -
($252). The pürvapaksin raises the question. Do the sound-producing
airwaves reveal sphota individually or collectively? It cannot be held
that the sound-producing airwaves reveal sphota individually, because
if it were so, any particular sound-producing airwave would be enough
to reveal sphota, and the remaining .airwaves would be redundant. It
cannot be argued that the sound-producing airwaves reveal the sphota
collectively, because they are momentary, and each airwave perishes
as soon as the succeeding one comes into existence.
Konda Bhatta meets this argument by saying that the sound-produc-
ing movements reveal sphota individually. A single airwave, for instance,
in the word gauh reveals sphota through the medium of the sound g,
another reveals sphota through the medium of the sound aw, and the
third one reveals sphota through the medium of visarga (h). Thus the
sphota is more and more clearly revealed with each succeeding airwave.
In this manner, Konda Bhatta says, the sphota word gauh is revealed by
each individual wave through the medium of the order of sounds, g,
au, h. The different sounds are considered to be nondifferent from the
sphota word gauh.
($262). The Naiyäyikas object that the relation of immediate
sequence cannot be maintained between the two sounds, because the
first has died out by the time the second has come into existence. The
relation of priority and posteriority arises only when two things exist
simultaneously. There cannot be any combination of what is non-
existent with what exists.
Konda Bhatta answers this objection by assuming that the combina-
tion of nonexisting things is possible in cognition. The combination
304 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

can be maintained between two sounds, because at the time of the

knowledge of the utpatti (production), the knowledge of sthiti (duration)
of the first sound has not died out.
(5248, 252). Kaiyata contends that the unity of word or sentence
cannot be attributed to phonemes because one cannot account for the
simultaneity of phonemes. The combination of phonemes itself is
impossible, because each phoneme perishes as soon as it is uttered.
There cannot be a combination of what exists with what has ceased to
exist. Neither can the unity of the word be explained with reference to
the collective recollection of the phonemes. In the collective recollection
also, the phonemes do not figure in any sequence because the sequence
of phonemes is an impossible task. Further, it would lead to the cogni-
tion of the same meaning from words that contain the same phonemes
in a different order. The difference between the words nadi and dina and
their meanings ("river" and "poor") would be unaccountable by the
collective recollection of phonemes that constitute the words nadi
(river) and dina (poor), because the constituent phonemes of the said
words are the same. The impressions left by the phonemes will be the
same even when the order is reversed. There is no sequence in the
recollection because we cannot remember the objects in the same order
as we have perceived them. Because the unitary experience "this is one
word" cannot be explained with reference to the series of phonemes, and
because the difference between the words nadi and dina and the like is
otherwise unaccountable, the grammarians establish the existence of
the sphota as an indivisible meaning^bearing unit.
Konda Bhatta disagrees with the Grammarians' view that the main
justification of the sphota entity stems from the fact that the combination
of the sequence of phonemes that constitute the word cannot be explain-
ed. Following the theory of association, he maintains that each succeed-
ing phoneme progressively reveals the substructure of a word in the
form of a certain sequence, and all of these substructures directly or
indirectly reveal the word, which is an aggregate of phonemes p, a, t, a.
Now at the time of perceiving the second phoneme, not only is the
phoneme a cognized, but the substructure pa is also cognized through
the impression of phonemes that is left on the mind of listener. In this
manner, the whole structure pata is cognized at the time of perceiving
the last phoneme a. Each subsequent sound reveals the substructure of
the preceding and the succeeding, sounds, and thus we can establish the
coexistence of phonemes. Therefore, Konda Bhatta argues, the.main
reason for accepting the sphota theory is not unaccountability of the
idea of sequence, but the experience that the word is single and unitary.
(5251 ). (The question is raised in the Parimala commentary whether
the sphota revealed by synonyms ghata and kalasa [both mean "pot"]
are identical or different.) According to the Grammarian the sphota
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 305

word is indivisible, and it is something over and above the phonemes.

Accordingly, the sphota words cannot be said to have phonetic shapes.
Thus the sphota character of the word cannot be rendered different
through the differences in the phonetic shape of words. The sphota
character of synonyms like-ghata and kalasa cannot be distinguished
semantically either, because the meaning conveyed by these words is
identical. If the sphota character of the synonyms ghata and kalasa is
assumed to be identical, a man who is aware of the convention of the
word ghata but is ignorant of the convention of the word kalasa will
understand the meaning from the sphota word kalasay which is identical
with the sphota word ghata.
To get rid of this difficulty, the Grammarians maintain that the
difference in the phonetic shape (in other words in the revealing sound
of the sphota) causes the difference in the revealed sphota. The know-
ledge of the convention must be separately grasped in the case of the
different sphota, though they may convey the same meaning. When this
separation is maintained, the sphota word revealed by the phonetic
shape gh-a-t-a becomes different from the sphota word revealed by the
phonetic shape k-a-l-a-s-a. There remains no possibility of verbal cogni-
tion from the spho ta-word kalasa when one knows the convention of
the word ghata alone, because the two words are different.
Sphota words are different, and the knowledge of the denotative
function must be grasped separately, with reference to each sphota word.
The Grammarians do not maintain a difference between two things:
the difference in the sphota word and the difference in the phonetic
shape.
(.5253-254) verse 67. It is argued by the püwapaksin that if the
Grammarians maintain that the vakyasphota alone is real, how can they
be justified in analyzing the sentence into different words, and words
into stems and suffixes? The Grammarians answer that acceptance of
the padasphota and the vamasphota is undoubtedly a fiction, inasmuch as
there is no separate existence of words apart from the sentence of which
they are parts. This device, though unreal, is still helpful from the point
of unreal reality to describe our mind. The study of the grammatical
science enables us to realize the ultimate reality through the unreal or
illusory analysis of words. Just as the knowledge of the five sheaths
{pancakos'a) in the Vedänta is a means to attaining the knowledge of the
ultimate reality, Brahman, so also the teaching of eight divisions of
sphota is a practical device for comprehending the ultimate knowledge
of the real, partless sentence-sphofa (akhanda-vâkya-sphota).
(5257) verse 69. The Mïmâmsakas maintain that the different
attributes (upädhi) such as shortness (hrasuatva), longness (dirghatva),
lowness {anudâttatva), and the like, belong in reality to the sound-
producing airwaves, though they are superimposed on the phonemes.
306 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

These superimposed qualities serve to distinguish one phoneme from

the others. Arguing on the same lines, the Grammarians maintain that
the Â;-ness (katua) and so on, which belong to the airwaves, appear to be
superimposed on the phonemes revealed by the airwaves. Similarly,
the production and destruction are properties of airwaves, but they
are felt to be associated with the phonemes. In this manner the cognition
"the phoneme k is produced" is justified.
(B255). The Grammarians maintain that the phoneme g in gana and
gati is the same and permanent, because we have the recognition so'yam
gakarah, "this is the same phoneme g.". The recognition referring to the
sameness of individual phoneme g forces one to accept the permanency
of phonemes. The Naiyâyikas disagree with the Grammarians, however,
and maintain that the cognition so*yam gakârah, "this is the same
phoneme g," does not follow from the identity of the individuals but
from the sameness of the individuals5 universal character. The two
phonemes gt and g2 a r e different from each other, still they are consider-
ed to be the same and can be grouped under the universal character
"g-ness."
The Grammarians say that the recognition "this is the same phoneme
g" does not follow from the knowledge of the two individuals as related
to the same class, but it refers to the sameness of the individual phoneme
g pronounced at different times and by different individuals. The
Naiyâyikas controvert the Grammarians5 theory by pointing out the
fact that, if the phonemes are permanent, it cannot be justified to make
a statement like gakara utpannah because the phonemes are not subjected
to the origination. The Grammarians respond that the cognition
gakâra utpannah, "g is produced,55 refers to internal air issued forth from
speaker's mouth. This internal air, which appears and vanishes, is
identified with the auditory image of the phoneme g. .
By contrast, the Naiyâyikas maintain that the cognition so*yam
gakârah, which points out the sameness of the phonemes g1 and g2 is,
considered erroneous as far as it refers to the sameness of individuals.
According to the Naiyâyikas the cognition of appearance and dis-
appearance is valid, while the cognition of identity between the two
individuals is invalid or erroneous. Thus the controversial point between
the Grammarians and the Naiyâyikas is whether the vocal organs
produce a sound or make it manifest.
Jatisphota and Vyaktisphota
(5255) verse 69. The word gauh is a class that comprises varied
utterances by different individuals. If the individual utterance gauh is
regarded as denotative of meaning it would lead to the assumption of
multiplicity of the denotative functions corresponding to the differences
in the utterance of words. Therefore, it is assumed that the universal
KONDA OR KAUNDA BHATTA 307

word (jâtisphota), into which all the different spoken words with varied
accents and tones are assembled, is denotative of meaning. This concept
is called the class-character of the sphota word.
The vyaktisphofa view maintains that there are no different individual
words that might be grouped into a single class. The vyaktisphota denies
the plurality of individual words. The loudness, length, lowness, and
so on are the properties of the articulate sound but not of the sphota
word. It is the articulate sound that usually appears to be long or short,
but the sphota word or manifested sound remains entirely unchanged.
The varnavyakti or padavyakti is one, but it appears divergent due to the
variation in the articulated sound of different individuals.
The Phonemes and Sphota
(5256-257). The phonemes and sphota are intimately related to each
other. In the cognition of the sphota the phonemes are not irrelevant
because they are not different from the sphota. One cannot remain
indifferent to the differences of phonemes when we think of the cogni*
J
tion of the word. We undoubtedly cognize the individual phonemes
when we perceive or cognize the indivisible single sphöta. The phonemic
entity {varnavyakti) isolated from the other members of the class is
distinct from the sphofa. The perception gatvavân sphota, "the sphota
word contains the phoneme g," is an illusory perception because the
sphota word as a whole is indivisible. When the indivisible word is
manifested by the sounds, the phonemes appear to be cognized as a
part of the word owing to the hearer's incapacity to perceive the word
without perceiving the sequence of phonemes. We undoubtedly cognize
the individual phonemes, but they are not identical with sphota word.
The sphota word is unitary, and it is taken as a single and indivisible
meaning-bearing unit of the language. While phonemes are many they
are not considered to be the meaning-bearing units. They only prog-
ressively reveal the sphota word.
Revelation of the sphota by the same phonemes but in a different
order does not convey the same meaning. For instance, the words sarah
and rasah, which contain the same phonemes, do not convey the same
idea. The sequence of phonemes, which is the character of articulate
sound, is left to be associated with the revealed sphota. The difference
in the sphota words sarah and rasah, which have the same constituent
sound uni|§, is justified because the cognition of the sequence of
phonemes appears in the sphota word as its associative feature.
(£258-260) verse 70, taken from Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadiya 1.93. This
verse supports the class sphota (jâtisphota) theory. Konda Bhatta inter-
prets it to mean that phonetic entities such as/>, a, t, a reveal the sphota
word pata. The word pata represents a class that comprises varied
utterances made by different people. The universal sphofa is the con-
308 ENGYGLOPEDIA.OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

veyer of meaning because an expression uttered by different people

does not convey different meaning to the listeners. There is only one
class of all the particular events of the spoken word ghata.
The idea of the varnasphota is not concerned with the meaning. The
vamajâtisphota means that the phoneme/* represents a class sound that
comprises varied utterances made by different people.
The second half of the verse 70, according to Konda Bhatta, denies
the distinction between varnavyakti and dhvani as pointed out by other
Grammarians who maintain that the term varnavyakti stands for the
individual auditory perception of the articulated sound, while the term
dhvani stands for the varied individual articulated sounds.
(J325 8-260) verse 71. There are two elements, real and unreal, in
every object. The unreal elements are regarded as particulars (vyakti).
The real element is known as the universal. The term jâti ultimately
refers to Brahman which essentially underlies all objects (verse 71).
Jâti, which is the essence of things, is equated with mahâsattâ, the highest
universal.
(i?258-260) verse 72. The Grammarians equate the term $abda with
the sphota, which is again identical with Brahman. It is also called
the sabdatattva by the Grammarians; The word sphota etymologically
means "from which meaning bursts forth" or "that which is revealed by
sounds."
 38
TARAKA BRAHMANANDA SARASVATI

A disciple of Gopâlânanda Yati, and thus presumed to have flourished

about 1650, this writer composed some notes on Grammar called
Vyakaranakroçlapattra.
 39
COKKANATHAOR
S'OKANATHA DIKSITA

The New Catalogus Catalogorum dates this writer to the middle of the
seventeenth century and indentifies him as the "son of Näräyana, alias
Dvädasähayäjin of Kausikagotra and preceptor and father-in-law of
Râmabhadra Dîksita (author of Jänakiparinayanätaka) ; preceptor of
Sadâsiva Dxksita (a. oîGitàsundara) and father of Nalla Perumal Dîksita
(a. of G. on Sabdakaumudi" (vol. 7, p. 85a). He is held to have composed
at least two works, the Sabdakaumudi and a Mahäbhäsyaratnävali. At the
foregoing location in the New Catalogus, Cokkanâtha is also said to have
written a commentary on Sabdakaumudi entitled Sâbdikaraksâ, but at
vol. 10, p. 62b, the Säbdikaraksä is ascribed to (Bälapatanjali) Dvädasä-
hayäjin, grandson of Näräyana.
 40
TIRUMALA YAJVAN

The son of Venkatesa and grandson of Sarasvatï Makhin of the Saddar-

sana family, this writer composed a Sumanoramä on the Siddhäntakaumudi
(Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 355). He may also have been responsible for a
commentary on the Mahäbhasya titled Anupäta. He appears to have
lived around 1660. Yudhisthira Mimamsäka1 thinks he is the father
of Annambhatta, but he would seem to have been a different Tirumala.
 41
(RÄMA) NARÄYANA (SARMAN)
(VANDYOPADHYAYA)

The New Catalogus Catalogorum (vol. 10, p. 85a) lists this writer, "of the
Vandyaghâtïya family" and flourishing in 1664, as author of Suddhi
(tattva) kârikâ, Sâravail (and vrtti in seven padas), and possibly a
Dhäturatnäkara.
 42
SADASIVA

This Sadâsiva, the author of a commentary, Gudhârthadipani, on the

Mahäbhäsya, was a son of Nîlakantha Dïksita and a pupil of Kamaläkara
Dïksita, who was in turn a pupil of Dattâtreya.1
 43
HARI DIKSITA

Hari Dïksita was the grandson of Bhattoji Dïksita and the son of
Vïresvara, alias Bhânuji, also called Rämäsrama. He taught Nägesa
Bhatta. He is considered to have written two commentaries on Bhattoji's
Praudhamanoramâ called Sabdaratna, a larger (Brhat) and a shorter
(Laghu) one. Some scholars hold the opinion that Nägesa actually
wrote the Brhatsabdaratna and ascribed it to his teacher Hari.
Students of Grammar regularly study the Laghusabdaratna up to the
end of the käraka chapter along with the Praudhamanoramâ after they
have mastered the Siddhântakaumudi.
 44
RAMABHADRA DIKSITA

Rämabhadra Dïksita was the son of Yajnarâma Dïksita, student and

son-in-law of Cokkanâtha Dïksita (author of the Sabdakaumudi on
Sanskrit grammar, protégé of King ââhaji of Tanjore who ruled from
1684 to 1712 and belonged to Kandaramänikkam in Tamil Nadu. He
was also a student and protégé of the great poet Nïlakantha Dïksita.
Among his works are the Jânakiparinqya JVâtaka; several stotras on Rama,
Pataftjalicarita, which is a Mahakavya on the life of Patanjali; and the
following technical works : Unädimanidipika an elaborate commentary
on the Päficapädi version of the Unâdisutras; Saddarsinisiddhântasam-
graha; with a section on Grammar; and Sabdabhedanirüpana,

Saddarsinisiddhântasamgraha (Vyâkarana Section)

K. Kunjunni Raja

Sanskrit words may be classified into Vedic and classical {laukika).

The former class consists of those occurring in the four Vedas, while the
latter comprises words found in Sanskrit literature from thé Vedängas
and Smrtis to contemporary works.
Rejecting the view that correct or incorrect usage makes little differ-
ence as long as the intended meaning is understood by the listeners,
because the purpose of language is communication, Rämabhadra
points out that one has to be choosy and use only what is correct. The
analogies of selecting proper food and of taking an eligible woman as
wife are also mentioned.
Laukika or common words are classified into four: jati, guna, kriyä,
and samjM.
Regarding wrong usages (apasabda), Rämabhadra points out that
the term applies not only to words but also to sentences and expressions;
322 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Not using the proper kârakas and case endings and not observing the
rules of concordance between adjective and the noun qualified are also
instances of apafabda; for example, "bhavän gäm änaya" is wrong
because the term bhavän requires the third person singular änatyatu.
The correctness also depends on the intention or the context. A§vam
ânaya, "bring the poor man," may be correct in itself, but is an apa§abda
when the context requires asvam änaya, "bring a horse."
Râmabhadra Dîksita accepts the view that among the three great
sages, Pänini, Kätyäyana, and Patanjali, each preceding author is
more authoritative than the next.
A brief analysis of the contents of the Astadhyayi is also given in the
text.

Sabdabhedanirüpana

K. Kunjunni Raja

Use of words in literature is divided into primary, secondary, and

suggestive. Abhidhâ is the primary meaning. Laksanä, secondary mean-
ing, is resorted to when it is impossible to take the literal sense in the
context (anvayânupapatti), but there is no incongruity with the speaker's
intention (tâtparyânupapatti). Secondary meaning may be based on
different relations between the primary and the actual referents. One
is dhâryadhârakabhâva, relation of the possessor and the possessed, for
example, "the pa'ncajanya was heard." YLçxtpâficajanya, a conch, is used
for the sound produced by it (hearing the bell for hearing the sound of
the bell), The second relation is âdhârâdheyabhâva, the locus for what is
on it, for example, Lankâtankà, "anxiety of Lanka." Here "Lanka"
stands for the people of Lanka, for anxiety is for the people. The third
is sâdrsya, similarity, as in nagotsanga, "the lap of the mountain." Here
"lap" is used for the slope, through similarity. This third variety is also
called gaunt.
 45
NAGESA
(OR NÄGOJI) BHATTA

Of all the great Grammarians of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries—

indeed, of all those after Bhartrhari himself—perhaps none is more
important for philosophical contributions than Nägesa Bhatta. He
came from the family of Bhattoji Dïksita, who was his great-grand-
father. Nägesa's father was named Siva Bhatta; his mother was Satï,
of the Kale family of Maharashtra Brahmins. He was patronized by
Ramavarman of Srngaverapura near Allahabad. He taught such illus-
trious followers as Gangäräma, Vaidyanätha Payagunda, and his own
son, Bälasarman. His literary activity extended between 1670 and 1750.1
Nägesa's output was extensive and ranged widely. He wrote Padârtha-
dipikä and Tarkabhâsâtyuktimuktâvali on Nyâya, a commentary (Laghu-
vrtti) on the Sanikhyasütras, another vrtti on the Togasütras, and a work
on Vedänta titled Vedântabhâsyapradipoddyota. In Sanskrit grammar he
is accepted as the final authority. Some fourteen works on Grammar
are known to exist by his hand, and others are mentioned in the litera-
ture. In addition to the works that focus on philosophical grammatical
theories, summarized below, Nägesa wrote a commentary, Sabdendu-
tekhara, as well as a briefer version of the same {Laghu§abdenduSekhara)
on the Siddhäntakaurnudi, and a number of independent treatises on
various aspects of Grammar. The latter include the Paribhâsendusekhara,
the definitive treatise on that subject, works on particular grammatical
forms {Sabdânantasâgarasamuccaya, Suptinantasâgarasamuccaya, Sankäsama-
dhâna), and commentaries on other grammatical works (Visampadi
on Sabdakaustubha, Prabhâkaracandra on Tattvadipika, and perhaps a
Laghusabdaratna based on his teacher Hari Dïksita's larger Sabdaratna,
though this ascription is controversial.
Nägesa wrote three works on the philosophy of Grammar titled
Manjüsä, Laghusiddhäntamaftjüsa, and Paramalaghumanjusâ. The last is an
324 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

abridgment of the second, which is in turn an abridgment of the first.

Like Konda Bhatta's Vaiyâkaranabhûsana and -sâra, these works are
comprehensive, establishing the view of the Grammarians after discuss-
ing and refuting the views of other schools, mainly the Nyäya and
Mïmâmsâ. Nâgesa has been influenced by Konda Bhatta, but in many
cases he takes independent positions. As far as the sphota theory is
concerned, he differs from Bhartrhari, though he does not say so, and
he was influenced by Kashmir Saivism and by Tantric works.

Paramalaghumanjüsä

K. Kunjunni Raja

E references ajre to the edition by Kalika Prasad Sukla (with the

editor's Jyotsnä commentary), published at Baroda in 1961.

Significative Power (Sakti)

(El-13). Sphota can be classified into eight varieties: varnasphota,
padasphota, vakyasphota (each divided into the universal or the parti-
cular), akhanda padasphota, and akhanda vakyasphota. Of these types the
vakyasphota is the most important, for the sentence is the unit of speech
in worldly usage. The division of the sentence into words, and further
into the stems and suffixes, is only a grammatical device for analysis
and has no reality. • - . • • •
(El 5-32 ). Verbal testimony is accepted as a means of valid cognition ;
but it is defined as the statement of a reliable person. For understanding
the statement a knowledge of the meanings of the words spoken is
essential. One who does not know the meaning of a word in. the utter-
ance, or who has forgotten it, cannot understand the statement.
(£37). Meaning (vrtti) is of three kinds, primary significative power
(sakti), secondary meaning (laksanâ), and suggestion (vyanjanä). The
Naiyäyikas consider the significative power to be conventional, having
been established by the will of God; but according to the. Grammarians
it is a relation between a word and its meaning, the signifier-signified
relationship. On the basis of the superimposition of one over the other,
there is a sort of identity and one evokes the other.
(£"40). This relationship exists both in words and in sentences. It is
known through recollection (smrti). Even though the relationship is
there permanently, it becomes effective only when it is known.
(£41 ). The Naiyäyika view that the significative power is based on
the convention set by the will of God is not acceptable. Meaning is
known from words directly, without the intervention of God's will.
(£43). The identity and the superimposition of word and meaning
are in the mind. Strictly speaking, the existence of the meaning, as well
NÂGESA OR NÄGOJI B H A Ï Ï A 325

as that of the word, is only in the mind. The word is the integral sphota.
The meaning is a vikalpa, a mental construct that comes along with
the knowledge of the word and has nothing to do with the actual
existence. Empty words like "the son of a barren woman" (vandhyäsuta)
are meaningful, though there may not be any corresponding external
object. But for meaningfulness, the nominal suffixes ordained for
meaningful stems (prätipadika) cannot be applied to such empty words.
(£44). The Naiyäyika's view that in "the hare's horn" (ßasasrnga
there is only error in the horn's belonging to the hare is not acceptable;
for in the sentence "there is no hare's horn," there is no need to see such
an animal, and the suffixes are possible if the stem is meaningful.
On the basis of the identity of a word and its meaning, it is accepted
that when the meaning changes, the word also changes (in the case of
homophones) ; the usage "the word has many meanings" is in the sense
that the words are similar. -
(£"46-48). This significative power exists in correct words and
corrupt words equally, for usage by the people, which is the best means
of learning the meaning of words, works in the same way in both. On
observing the behavior of elderly people, one may remember the
meaning known in one's previous birth. That is how children and
animals understand the connected sense (of utterances).
Objection'. The Naiyâyikas say that the meaning of corrupt words
is known by recollecting the correct words.
Answer \ This claim is false, for meaning is known (from corrupt
words) even without recollecting the corresponding correct words.
Otherwise one who does not know the corresponding correct word will
not be able to understand the meaning.
One cannot say that meaning is got from corrupt words through an
erroneous notion of the meaningfulness. Meaning is known without
any doubt (from corrupt words), hence no confusion is to be assumed.
That is why women, uneducated people, and children have to be told
the corrupt words, when they have doubts on hearing the correct
words. The Mahâbhasya passage, "although meaning is known from
correct as well as corrupt words, grammar gives the rules about merito-
rious usage," and Bhartrhari's line, "Although there is no difference
in meaningfulness, the grammatical rules are for metrit and demerit in
usage," are in favor of this view. The discussion regarding the Aryan
and Mleccha usages in Mïmâmsâ also shows this view. This discussion
itself shows that both the Aryan and the Mleccha usages are valid; the
Aryan usage is preferred as far as the Vedic terms are concerned.
(£"49-50). This significative power is of three kinds: conventional
(rüdhi), derivative (yoga), and conventional derivative (yogarüdhi).
When the whole word gives the meaning, which cannot be analyzed
into its components through grammatical rules, it is conventional, as
326 ÈNGYÔLÔPEDiA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

in the case of words like mani and nüpura. If the meaning is analyzable
into its components according to the rules of grammar, it is derivative,
as in the case of words like pâcaka, "cook" (from pac, "to cook," and
agent suffix aha). Conventional derivation is that significative power
in which, along with the meaning determined through grammatical
analysis, some special restriction is also present, as in pankaja (literally
"mud-born," but restricted to the lotus). Sometimes on the basis of
the intention (tâtparya), the word can be used in the pure (yoga) deri-
vational sense also, a usage calledyaugikarüdha (derivative-cum-conven-
tional). Examples are aêvagandhâ ("a kind of herb" and "having the
smell of horses").
(E51 -53 ). In case of ambiguous expressions, the meaning is restricted
by contextual factors. They are given by Bhartrhari (Vâkyapadiya
2.315-17): samyoga, mention of the accompaniment of an entity;
viprayoga, mention of the absence of it; sâhacarya, mention of something
that usually goes with it; virodhita, mention of its well-known adversary;
artha, the purpose served ; prakarana, the situational context; linga, indi-
cation available (in a related sentence) ; anya§abdasannidhi> the presen-
ce of another word in collocation; sâmarthya, "probability"; aucitya,
propriety, the time, the place, the gender, and accent.
Secondary Meaning (Laksana)
(£54-57). According to the Naiyâyikas, secondary meaning is a
relation to the primary meaning. It is of two types: gaunt, based on
common quality, and suddhâ or pure, in which the relation is something
other than similarity. It can be divided into two classes in another way:
ajahatsvärthä, in which the primary meaning is not abandoned, and
jahatsvärthä, in which the primary meaning is abandoned. The former
takes some additional meaning along with its own; for instance,
chatrino yänti, "people with umbrellas are going" (used for some people
with umbrellas and some without), kâkebhyo dadhi raksyatäm, "protect
the curd from crows" (used for protecting from crows and also non-
crows, such as dogs). The latter abandons its primary meaning. "Teach
the Bâhika bull" ; here the bull cannot be taught, so the term gives up
its meaning and is applied to the man who is dull (like the bull). The
relation between the primary meaning and the actuai meaning is
given as the substratum, common quality, proximity, association, and
purpose (for example, "the cats are crying," "he is a lion," "the
village is on the Ganges," "bring the sticks" [for stick bearers] , and
"Indra" [used for the pole intended for Indra] .
The actual basis of secondary meaning is the incompatibility of the.
primary meaning with the meaning intended in the context; the in-
compatibility could be removed in different ways by assuming secon-
dary meanings for different words.
NÄGESA OR NÂGOJI BHATTA 327

(£59). According to early authorities, there is also a variety of

laksana called jahadajahallaksanâ, in which part of the primary meaning
of a term is abandoned and part retained, as in pato dagdhah, "the cloth
is burned" (when only part is burned). In tattvam asi, "That thou art,"
both tat and tvam have to give up some of their primary sense to permit
identification.
(£60). Some say that secondary meaning is the relation to what is
conveyed by the expression, for instance, "the village is on the deep
river." Here the term "deep" cannot refer to the bank of the river;
hence the connected meaning "deep river" is to be understood first and
then the sense of bank is determined through secondary meaning. In
dvirepha ("two rc"), referring first to the word bhramara and then to a
bee, the term laksitalaksanä is used by some.
(£63). Again, secondary meaning can be of two types, intentional—*
used with a purpose in view— (prayojanavati) and conventional (rüdhä).
In "the village is on the Ganges," the purpose is to indicate the sanctity
and coolness of the place.
The Grammarians reject secondary meaning per se. The Mahâbhâsya
says that "every word has the capacity to express any meaning if there
is the intention." The significative power is of two kinds, well known and
less known. The first is called primary and the second secondary. The
tâtparya (intention ) can be that of God or the tradition of elders.
Suggestion (Vyafijanâ)
(£63). Suggestion is a kind of impression in the mind produced by a
flash of insight (pratibha) or similar event, on the basis of the contextual
factors, which is independent of any incompatibility to the literal
meaning and which may or may not be associated with the literal
meaning.
(£64). Suggestion is acceptable to the Grammarians, for they consi-
der nipâtas as suggestors (dyotakas) ; the nipatas suggest the power existing
in the words that are uttered along with them. The sphota is also accep-
ted as suggested by the phonemes. This suggestive power is experienced
in the phoneme, the literal meaning, the word, part of a word, the
texture of the expression, and so on. Contextual factors are only helpful
in revealing the suggestive power.
(£65). The Naiyâyikas reject suggestion, saying that it can be inclu-
ded in secondary meaning. This view is not acceptable, for secondary
meaning requires incompatibility of the primary meaning and leads to a
meaning somehow connected to it. Suggestion does not meet these
criteria and cannot be included in secondary meaning.
Sphota
(£66). Now, what is the meaning-bearing element in an expression?
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The Mïmâmsaka view that it is the individual phonemes is not correct,

for then the utterance of later phonemes (other than the first) will be
superfluous and unnecessary. It cannot be the collection of phonemes,
for simultaneity of the phonemes is impossible, as each phoneme disap-
pears as soon as it is uttered. Revelation or production is an instantaneous
one, ,and there is no time available for the phonemes or their group to
be perceptible.
(E67). The Naiyäyikas say that even though the phonemes are
impermanent, the word can be perceived on the basis of the last
phoneme, together with the impressions of the experience of the previous
phonemes in their specific order. Or it can be assumed that each earlier
phoneme produces its own subtle echo, extending till the last phoneme
is revealed, and hence the word can be considered perceptible. Or the
meaning is understood from the last phoneme together with the impre-
ssions of the earlier phonemes.
None of these explanations is possible. In the first view sequence can-
not be perceived, because one phoneme is lost and the next alone
remains. In the second, meaning cannot be assigned to the word,
because the word does not exist. In the third, the order of sequence
cannot be retained, because in recollection of impressions there is no
need for such sequence.
Then what is the meaningful element? It is sphota.
(E68-69), There are four levels of speech (vâc) : para, pasyanti,
madhyamâ, and vaikhari. Of the, para vâc is sabdabrahman without any
activity (spanda) of the form of bindu, originating (from Kundalini) in
the mûlâdharacakra, the spot inside the body between the anus and the
sex organ. When it is raised by the internal air to the nabhicakra (or
svâdhisthânacakra in the navel region) and becomes perceptible to the
mind, it is called patyanti. These two are said to be realized by yogins
in their nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka types of samadhi. Raised farther up
by the same air to the anähatacakra in the region of the heart, it is called
madhyamâ, still too subtle to be comprehended by the sense organs, but
in the form of sphota, bearing the meaning, and comprehensible by the
mind at the time oïjapa (concentrated, silent utterance). Then, coming
to the vocal organs in the mouth and articulated, it becomes the vaikhari
and is capable of being heard by others also.
(£71-72). For madhyamâ and vaikhari the sound is produced simulta-
neously; the former reveals the sphota, the meaning bearer; the latter is
just meaningless sound. The madhyamâ is subtle, can be realized inter-
nally at the time of japa, and so on. It reveals the permanent sab da
sphota identical with Brahman, the speech principle according to Bhartr-
hari. Though integral and indivisible, the padasphota or väkyasphota
appears as phonemes and the like on the basis of the adjuncts through
which it is revealed. Strictly speaking, it has no parts;
NÂGESA OR NÂGOJÏ BHAffA 329

(£72). The phonemes, which are factors of the sound (dhvani) that
reveal the sphota, seem to be part of the sphota: The apparent multipli-
city in the sphota is due to that of the dhvani that reveals it. According
to the view that sphota can be analyzed, it is revealed by the last
phoneme, the previous phonemes being helpful to indicate the intention.
(£"73-75). Dhvani is of two kinds, präkrta and vaikrta. The former is
the revealer of the sphota, the latter is produced from the former and
keeps it (to be heard by the listener), and is responsible for such
modifications of the sound as the speed of utterance (vrtti).
(£76-77). When a man utters a sentence like "bring the pot", the
speech at the vaikhari-level is heard by the listener, reaches his mind
through the sense organ, and reveals the meaning. The term sphota can
be derived as that from which the meaning bursts forth. As far as the
speaker is concerned, the sound is produced simultaneously by the
madhyamâ and the vaikharu To the listener, the vaikhari helps in reveal-
ing the madhyamâ that gives the sphota, the meaning bearer.
All eight varieties of sphota are based on their meaningfulness.
Strictly, only the väkyasphota is meaningful, for in the word it is the
complete utterance that reveals the meaning.
Accessory Conditions for Understanding
Sentence Meaning
(£77-80). Expectancy (âkanksâ), consistency (yogyatä), contiguity
(âsatti), and intention (tâtparya) are the accessory conditions for under-
standing the sentence's meaning. Expectancy is responsible for giving
the unity of the sentence. It is the desire on the part of the listener on
hearing a word in a sentence to know the idea that can be related to its
meaning, in order to get a complete sense; though expectancy is on the
listener's part, it is figuratively attributed to the words and their
meanings. It can be called incompleteness of the expression. Patanjali
says (in 2.1.1 ) that sâmarthya is vyapeksä, or interdependence, which is
not between words but between their meanings. In a sentence such as
"See, the deer is running," the word "see" requires an object, and hence
the whole utterance becomes a complete sentence; in "Devadatta
cooks rice," the verb "cooks" requires the agent and object for comple-
tion of meaning, and thus there is unity of sentence. "The pot is the
object, bringing is the action" is not a single sentence like "bring the
pot," for expectancy requires the relevant kärakas in the proper case
endings.
(£81-82). Semantic fitness (yogyatä) is the competence for mutual
connection. "He wets it with water" has fitness, because wetting
requires a liquid and water is a liquid; but "he wets it with fire" has no
fitness, because fire is not a liquid and has no competence for wetting,
which can be done only with a liquid. The Naiyäyikas say that in such
330 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

cases (of incongruity) the words give their individual meanings, but
there is no knowledge of the syntactic connection; this claim is wrong.
The meaning being mental, there is no obstruction for a connected idea.
Hence empty words like "the son of a barren woman" are meaningful.
Bhartrhari has said that worlds convey meanings, even if they are
nonexistent in the world. The knowledge of incongruity itself is based
on the knowledge of the sentence meaning.
(£82-83). Contiguity (âsatti) is the absence of words unconducive to
understanding the syntactical connection. It exists to help dull people
to get the sentence meaning; intelligent persons can easily get it with
the help of expectancy, even if there is no contiguity. Intervention of
irrelevant words may stand in the way of understanding the meaning.
(£"84-85). Intention (tatparya) is God's desire that a word or a
sentence must be uttered to indicate its particular meaning. Although
the Grammarians accept that any word can be capable of conveying a
meaning, it only does so when there is tâtparya \ the word "pot" does
not convey the meaning of a cloth, because there is no intention. In the
case of ambiguous expressions the disambiguating intention is that of
the speaker, and the intention is to be ascertained on the basis of contex-
tual factors. In the case of Vedic sentences, God's intention is to be
assumed.
If the significative power (sakti) can be regulated through contextual
factors, what is the need for assuming intention? Our experience is that
in ambiguous expressions we get both meanings through the power of
the expressions themselves, and we feel uncertain regarding the inten-
tion.
Meaning of Verbal Roots {Dhâtvartha)
(£"85-87). The meaning of the verbal root is an operation (vyâpâra)
conducive to the production of a result (phala) and accompanied by a
volition or effort (yatna). The term "result" means the effect of the
action indicated by the verbal root. And "operation" means the opera-
tion indicated by the root for producing the result. "Conducive"
(anuküla) means the association {samsarga) of the action and the result.
(£88). The Mirukta statement "The verb has an operation as its
predominant element, and the nouns have existence (sattva) as their
predominant element" shows that the operation is the most important
element in a verb. The verbal suffix indicates the number and the
kâraka relationship; the time (tense) qualifies the activity.
(£89-90). Others say that a verbal root denotes both the result and
the operation, and that the relation between the two is one of the accom-
plisher (uddesya) and the accomplished (vidheya). The two meanings
arise separately and are connected with difficulty. And it is cumbersome
to assume two separate explanations for the same word. So they say
NAGERA OR NÂGOjt BHATfA 331

that the significative power of the verbal root is the operation delimited
by the effect or the effect delimited by the operation.
(£92). The Mîmâmsakas (Mandana Misra) say that the meaning of
the verbal root is the effect, and the meaning of the personal suffix is
the operation. This view is against such a rule as Pânini's "La is added
in the sense oîkarman" and so on (3.4.69), where the personal suffix is
not assigned the meaning of operation. Moreover, for words in different
tenses—pacati, "cooks," paksyati, "will cook," and soon—the meaning
of the operations of blowing the fire and the rest will have to be assigned
to different suffixes, which is more cumbersome than assigning it to
the single verbal root.
Again, if the suffix indicates the operations of blowing and so on,
even in words like gacchati, "he goes," the same operation will be meant,
and to avoid that problem one will have to say that the suffix indicates
the operations of blowing and so on, when used along with the root pac.
(£94). Moreover, the distinction between transitive and intransitive
verbs will be affected, if such a view is taken.
(£95-96). Bhartrhari has stated that what is accomplished (siddha)
or what is not accomplished {asiddha) is described as a durative process
of bringing into being (sâdhya). It is called a verb (kriya). The various
minor operations, subordinate to the main operation, taking place in
an order of sequence, considered in the mind as integral are called a
verb {kriya). The various operations that form parts of the overall
operation take place in a sequence, but together, considered as a single
operation, they form the verb {kriya). The unity of the various opera-
tions is only in the mind. Thus the term pacati, "he cooks," can be
applied for any one of the various operations involved in cooking.
(£98). Objection: In ghatam karoti, "he makes a pot," the noun ghata,
"pot," seems to be sâdhya or "to be accomplished", hence seems to
come under the classification of verb.
Answer: From the word ghata it is the accomplished pot that is under-
stood, along with the word karoti, "he makes." The word may convey
the idea that the pot is yet to be made.
Existence (satta) is the meaning of the roots as, bhü, vrt, and vid. They
come under kriyâ or activity because existence continues to operate in
time, as a durative activity. "Existence" here means continuously
having its own nature.
(£99). When the operation and the effect take place in different
substrata, the verb is called transitive; and when the operation and the
effect take place in the same substratum, the verb is called intransitive.
It is intransitive when there is no question of effect, as in the case of the
root as, "to be," for which the meaning is only existence, and no
effect is discernible. The Nirukta explains it. while interpreting the term
asti in the six bhâva vikâras.
332 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(£100). Strictly speaking, transitiveness is to be taken as the possibi-

lity of association with the meaning of what is karman (object) according
to the rules of grammar. In the case of adhyâsitâ bhümayah, "the grounds
have been occupied," adhyâs is transitive, for bhümi, "ground," though
semantically a substratum (adhikarana), is karman according to a special
rule of Pänini, adhisinsthasâm karma. In the verb jivati, "lives," the idea
of bearing life may be implied, still grammatically it is intransitive. In
the verb jânâti, "he knows," knowledge is the effect, and the operation
is the contact of the atman and the mind; hence usages like mano jänäti,
"the mind knows," atrna ätmanam jânâti, "one knows oneself," and the
like are acceptable, for the operation and the effect have different
substrata, one self limited by the body and the other self limited by
mind.
(£103). Naiyäyikas say that the effect and the operation form the
meaning of the verbal root, and the personal endings indicate the effort
or volition (krti). The meaning of the verbal root is subordinate to the
meaning of the suffix, which is predominant, and the meaning of the
personal endings is subordinate to that of the noun in the nominative
case.
(£1 04 ). Naiyäyikas distinguish sentient agent from insentient beings ;
effort (yatna) can be applied only to a sentient agent. Caitrah pacati,
"Caitra cooks," means Caitra whose effort is conducive to the operation
favorable to the softening of food. In ratho gacchati, "the chariot goes,"
because the chariot is insentient and cannot have a volition, the usage
is explained as secondary.
(£'104-105). This view is not acceptable to the Grammarian;
Pänini's rule "yusmady upapade samänädhikarane...says that the
second-person suffix in the present tense is to be used when the kâraka
indicated by the suffix and the second person (you) have the same
substratum. This rule is not possible according to the Naiyäyika view.
Even in the case of present participles, which are also substitutes of la
just like the personal endings, only the meaning of volition will be
obtained. You cannot say that the participles have significative power
toward the agent, for according to the Nyäya view the prototype la has
expressive power, not its many substitutes such as the participles and
personal endings.
(£107). Assumption of secondary meaning for explaining usages like
"the chariot moves" is cumbersome.
Pänini 's rule kartrkaranayostrtiyâ (2.3.12) comes under the general rule
anabhihite (2.3.1); if the personal endings express only the volition
(krti), as the Naiyäyika believes, the agent and the object (karman)
being unexpressed, a sentence like Caitrah pacati, "Caitra cooks" will be
impossible, because the word for the agent, Caitra, will have to be in
the instrumental case. ,
NÄGESA OR NÄGOJI BHATTA 333

(El 08-109 ). The view that the meaning of the verbal root qualifies the
meaning of the personal endings is also not correct. The general rule is
that in a word the meaning of the stem and the meaning of the suffix go
together to give the full meaning, and that the suffix meaning is predo-
minant. Thus in pacaka, "cook", the meaning "agent" is predominant.
Yaska's statement that the akhyâta (verbal ending) has activity as the
predominant meaning is an exception to that rule. Here bhävapradhänam
has to be taken as a bahuvrihi compound.
(El 10—111 ). The Naiyâyikas believe that in a sentence the principal
qualificand is what is denoted by a nominative form. According to this
view, a sentence like "pasya mrgo dhävati" ("see the deer is running")
could be "pasya mrgam dhävati" (which is wrong). But according to
the Grammarians the activity of seeing (indicated by pasya) is the pre-
dominant sense. The running of the deer would be its object. Through
mutual association (samsarga), the idea of karman is achieved. Even a
verb can qualify another verb, the main verb.

Meaning of Particles (JVipâta)

(£"113-114). In an expression like sukham anubhüyate, "happiness is
being experienced," happiness being the object of experience, the verb
is transitive. But that meaning of experiencing cannot be in the root, for
without the preverb it is not known; and it cannot be in the preverb,
because the meaning of personal ending associates only with the mea-
ning of the verbal root. Hence suggestive power has to be assigned to
the preverb.
This suggestiveness (dyotakatva) is the capacity to reveal the meaning
potentially present in the word along with which it is used. Sometimes
the suggestiveness may modify the action; sometimes it may indicate a
relationship, as in the case of karmapravacaniya.
(£"115). Naiyâyikas consider preverbs to be suggestive and the other
indéclinables to be expressive, because lexicons give the meaning of
indéclinables such as saksat and namah. This view is improper because
in both cases the understanding of the meaning is similar.
(£'118-120). Even the meaningfulness of particles is based on their
suggestive power. Verbal roots have several meanings; in pratisthate
the less-known sense ("to move") of the root sthâ, "to stand," is made
clear by the preverb pra. The accepted position is that the root is first
associated with its kârakas and then only with the preverb.
In candra iva mukham, "moonlike face," the word candra, "moon,"
gets the meaning "something like the moon" figuratively, and the word
iva, "like", acts only to suggest that intended meaning.
(£122-128). Some say that the word iva has the meaning of simila-
rity, so there is no need for secondary meaning here. This notion is not
correct, for according to this view the words candra and mukha cannot
334 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

have the same substratum (and the genitive case ending may come for
the word candra).
Some others consider the word iva to be suggesting the standard of
comparison, indicating that both have the same qualities.
Negation is of two types, paryudâsa and prasajyapratisedha (the former
is nominally bound and the latter is verbally bound). The negation in
paryudâsa suggests some positive entity, for instance, abrahmana (non-
Brahmin) indicates a ksatriya. The compound is tatpurusa, which
normally requires predominance for the meaning of the second member.
The suggestive nature of the negation is quite in .keeping with it.
Normally this paryudâsa negation applies to someone similar to the one
negated. Bhartrhari says that the negative particle naft indicates five
meanings: similarity ("nonhorse," referring to a donkey), absence
("bring a nonhuman being"), littleness ("a girl without waistline,"
anudarâ kanyâ), pejoration ("non-Brahmin" applied to a Brahmin),
and opposition (adharma, "demerit"). Gases of mutual exclusion (as in
"the pot is not a piece of cloth") also come under this type; but nor-
mally examples of paryudâsa are compound words (ofnan-tatpurusa type).
Prasajyapratisedha (verbally bound negative) can be either in a com-
pound or in an uncompounded expression : "There is no pot in the house" ;
asüryampasya râjadârâh, "the king's wives do not see the sun." Examples
like "no doubt" (na sandehah) come under this heading. Prâgabhâva
(prior absence) and pradhvamsabhâua (posterior absence or destruction)
are not suggested by the negative particle. Atyantabhâva (nonexistence)
is syntactically connected with the verb, for instance, "There is no pot".
(£"130-131). Objection: Anything that exists cannot be negated;
negation does not apply to a nonexistent thing; thus negation becomes
meaningless.
Answer9. Both the expression and the meaning exist in the mind; what
exists in the mind can be negated outside in real life. The word "pot"
gives the idea of the existence of the pot, while the negation is to remove
it—this view of the Naiyäyikas (who do not consider the meaning of
words to be purely mental) has no stand, for existence or negation can-
not apply to the mind. According to the Mahâbhâsya, secondary meaning
is not accepted, and particles are not considered to be meaningful.
(£132-138). The word eua> "only," suggests the meanings of restric-
tion and negation. .Even without the use of the word, the meaning may
be obtained. So they say that every word in a sentence has a restrictive
sense. The restriction is of three kinds: when applied to a qualificand,
it negates it in other places (for example, "Arjuna alone is a bowman") ;
when applied to an adjective, it emphasizes it ("the conch is white
alone"); and when applied to a verb, it indicates absence of nonassocia-
tion nilarn saw jam bhavaty eva, "the blue lotus does exist" ).
Sometimes eva is understood. What Mïmâmsakas call parisamkhyä
NÄGESA OR NÄGOJI BHATTA 335

(for instance, paftca paftcanakhâ bhaksyâh, ' 'among five-nailed animals,

five may be eaten") is included by the Mahâbhâsya as niyama or restri-
ction.
Meaning of Verbal Endings (Tenses and Moods)
(£"138-140). Although the Naiyäyikas discuss the meaning of the
ten L-signs, the Grammarians accept meaningfulness only for what is
actually spoken and therefore discuss the meaning of the substitutes,
the actual verbal suffixes used in the world. Pânini gives meaning to
lap and so on as a simpler means for description.
The meanings of the L-substitutes are number, time (present, past,
and future tenses), kurakas, and the action noun (bhava). Thus lap-.
substitutes express the present tense; along with class suffixes such as
éap, the agent; and along with the suffixes yak and ein, the action and the
object.
Bhattoji Dïksita says that the verbal root denotes both the result and
the activity and that the verbal suffixes denote the substratum (âiraya).
In the active voice the activity is more important, and in the passive
voice the result is more important. Together with the verbal suffixes,
the verbal roots also indicate the number and the kâraka relationship.
(£141-143). The present tense is indicated by an activity that is
started but not completed. Lip indicates the past tense earlier than today
and also indirect information (in other words, information not directly
perceived). In the case of auxiliary verbs Ar, as, and bhü used along with
other roots and the affix -am, they indicate only action in general (as in
edhäm cakre).
(£143-145). Lut indicates future, other than today, in addition. Lrt
is used in simple future. Let is used only in Vedic language and has the
same sense as lin (injunction and so on). Lot has the same sense of
injunction and so on. Lan indicates the past tense, other than today.
Lin has various meanings: injunction (vidhi), a summoning to do some-
thing (nimantrana), an invitation to do something (âmantrana), respect-
ful command (adhispa), permission (samprasna), and request (prarihana).
The first four meanings are different shades of prompting (pravartana)
to action; this prompting is through the knowledge that the action will
lead to a desired object, that the action is capable of performances, and
that it is not associated with a strong undesirable result.
Lun indicates past tense in general, with past meaning prior to the
present. Lrn indicates the conditional sense, suggesting that the action
is over, that if something had happened (which did not happen)
another action (which also did not take place) would have taken place,
for instance, "if fuel had been available, food would have been cooked."
(£146-149). The Naiyäyika view is that there are ten L-suffixes.
£-suffixes indicate the agent, time (tense and mood), and the number.
336 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

The Grammarians think that agent is inferred from the term ca,cCand"
in Pänini's rule la h karmani ca-. Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas consider that
operation [vyapara) is meant instead. The Naiyâyikas take volition or
effort to be the meaning, as it is simpler ; they consider that L-suffixes
indicate the meaning, not L-substitutes, which are many. In the passive
sentence "maitrena gamy ate grämah" ("the village is reached by
Maitra"), the Z,-suffixes indicate volition (given in the instrumental
case) and the ätmanepada indicates the result (the village). The main
idea in the comprehension of the sentence meaning is the noun in the
nominative case.
(£"149-151). Lat indicates the present tense; Ian, lun, and lit -indU
cate the past tense; and lut and Irt indicate the future. Lin, lot, and let
indicate injunction. The number is also indicated by the suffixes. Let
is used only in the Veda. The tenses, such as the present, are for the
activity. Lat directly expresses the present tense and through secondary
meaning indicates the substratum (âsraya). Time (past or future) that
is very near the present may also be indicated by lat.
(£"152-154). According to the Grammarians and the Bhâtta Mïmâ-
msakas the meaning obtained from the verbal suffixes has an operation
as its main factor ; according to the former an operation is the meaning
of the verbal root, and according to the latter it is the mental activity
{bhâvana) and is conveyed by the verbal suffixes. "Caitrah tandulam
pacäti" ("Caitra cooks rice") means to the Grammarians "the activity
of cooking that has Caitra as the agent and rice as the object." To the
Mïmâmsakas it means "the mental activity toward the action of cook-
ing that has Gaitra as its agent and rice as its object." The Naiyäyika
insists that the meaning of the sentence has the îioun in the nominative
case as the main element, "Caitra who has a volition conducive to the
action of cooking that has rice as the object."
(£157-158). Lin has the meanings injunction and benediction. Lot
can mean injunction or permission. The Bhâtta Mïmâmsakas explain
vidhi (injunction) as pravartana or prompting. On hearing a lin from
the teacher the student has the knowledge that the teacher wants him
to do something; this view is not correct. There is no authority to consi-
der such knowledge as the causé for action on the student's part. It is
the knowledge that the action will lead to some desired result that
prompts action.
(£159-164). The Präbhäkara Mïmâmsakas say that the injunction
means something should be done. Svargakamo yajeta, "one desirous of
heaven should perform the sacrifice" means (1) something should be
done regarding sacrifice by heaven seeker; (2) something should be
done, which is the means for heaven, and which is about sacrifice by one
who is qualified; (3) sacrifice should be performed by heaven seeker,
who is the person qualified to do it; (4) the performer of sacrifice is the
NAGERA OR NÄGOJI BHATTA 337

heaven seeker; (5)1 am a heaven seeker, therefore the sacrifice can be

performed by my effort.
Naiyäyikas consider three powers for lift, meaning the knowledge of
prompting. First, it is capable of being performed by effort; second,
it will lead to a desirable result; and third, it will not be associated with
a very bad effect. The power is not in all three together, but separately.
In the case of Irn there is an argument based on the influence involved,
as in "if there had been no fire, there would have been no smoke."
Kârakas
(£164-168). The six kârakas are kartr, agent; karma, object; karana)
instrument; sampradâna, recipient; apâdâna, the fixed point from which
splitting takes place; and adhikarana, substratum. Kârakas such as the
agent bring about the action. Kartr, agent, is the substratum of the
operation indicated by the verbal root in the context. Thus in the
example "he cooks with fire," burning may be an operation of fife but
not of the contextual action, cooking, so fire is not the agent. When this
operation is expressed by the verbal root, the agent will be in the
nominative case; according to Pänini's view the nominative case indi-
cates the prâtipadika stem, and the kârakas are expressed by specific
suffixes. In Caitro bhavati, "Caitra exists," Gaitra is the agent (kartr);
although that kâraka (kartr) is already expressed by the verbal suffix, the
nominative case also indicates the same. In "Caitrena grämam gamya-
te" ("the village is reached by Gaitra"), the meaning understood is
"the contact with the village is a result of the action whose agent
is Gaitra."
The vocative (sambodhana) is also a kâraka because it is syntactically
connected with "you" (understood from the context) and thereby
with the action to be performed.
(£169-170). The definition of kâraka as the cause of action (kriyâni-
mittam) is not correct, for it will apply even to the genitive case in
"Gaitrasya tandulam pacati" ("he cooks Gaitra's food"), because
Gaitra is indirectly responsible for the cooking. The definition "those
bringing about the action" is better; direct connection with the opera-
tion indicated by the verb is necessary. That is why the meaning of the
genitive case, as well as of the nouns directly connected with other
words (upapada), is not considered by the Grammarians to be kâraka.
If the expectancy is not resolved, necessary words have to be taken as
understood to explain the elliptical sentence.
{El 69-170 ). The Naiyâyika view that the agent (kartr) is the kâraka
that prompts all the other kârakas (to bring about the action) is not
correct, for in cases like sthâli pacati, "the vessel cooks," and asih chinatti,
"the sword cuts," there is no prompting on the part of the vessel or the
sword.
338 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(£1 71-178). Karmayobject, is that (kâraka) which is intended to have

the same substratum as the effect of the action meant by the relevant
verbal root and prompted by its main activity. It is the meaning of
ipsitatama, "intended most" in Pänini's rule on karma. In "kâsïm
gacchan pathi mrtah" ("going to Kâsï, he died on the way"), though
he does not reach Kâsï, the intention was there, hence Kâsï is karma
kâraka.
(£178-179). Karana, instrument, is that kâraka the activity of which
immediately brings about the action (meant by the verb). In "Ramena
bänena hato bâlï" ("Bali was killed by Räma with an arrow"), the
activity of the arrow is the immediate cause for the death, though
Räma's activity may have begun earlier. Hence bâna is the instrument
and Räma the agent (kartr).
(£"180-183). Sampradâna, recipient, is that kâraka for whom the
operation meant by the verb is taking place. In "brähmanäya gäm
dadâti" ("he gives the Brahmin a cow"), the Brahmin is the recipient.
The view that the gift meant is not to be returned is not valid. For
giving clothes to the laundry man sampradâna is also possible: "rajakâya
vastram dadäti" and "rajakasya vastram dadäti" are both correct.
Patanjali gives the example "the teacher gave the student a thrashing."
Sampradâna, used in the dative case, means the person to whom the
action is intended. "Maiträya värttäm kathayati" ("he tells the news
to Maitra") means the operation of telling that has the news as object
and Maitra as the person for whom the operation is intended. In an
intransitive verb also, as va palye êete, "she lies down for her husband,"
it is similar, it means she is lying down for the sake of her husband.
(£183-187). Apâdâna is the substratum of the point of departure
indicated by the contextual verb, and it is the same as the limit. The
departure can be real or mentally conceived. In "vrksarn tyajati
khàgah" ("the bird abandons the tree"), separation is not the meaning
of the root tyaj, hence vrksa does not become apâdâna. By limit is meant
only the relatively fixed point as far as the relevant action is concerned.
Hence we get "dhävatah asvât patati" ("falls from the running horse"),
for as far as falling is concerned, the horse is the fixed point, though it is
also running. The meaning of the ablative case is the limit. "Vrksät
parnam patati" ("the leaf falls from the tree") means the falling that
has the leaf as the agent and the limit (or the fixed point from which the
separation takes place) as the tree.
(£187-189). Adhikarana, substratum, is where the activity takes
place, either through the agent or through the object. In "sthälyäm
odanam grhe pacati" ("he cooks food in a vessel in the house"), the
vessel is the place in which the object is affected by the action, and the
house is the place of the agent's activity.
This adhikarana is of three types. The first is abhivyâpaka, ail-compre-
NAGERA OR NÄGOJI BHATTA 339

hensive, as in "tilesu tailam asti" ("there is oil in the sesame"). The

second is aupaJlesika, proximity, as in Pänini's sütra "iko yan aci" (c%
u, r, I change toy, v, r, and /, respectively in the proximity of [when
followed by] a vowel"). Kaiyata's example kate äste, "he sits on the
mat," is not happy. (It means he sits on a part of the mat.) The third
type is "vaisayika kate äste."
(£1 90). Relations, like that of master and servant, which are different
from the kâraka relations are indicated by the genitive case, as in râjfiah
purusah, "the king's servant."
Meaning of Nouns
(£"192-196). The Mïmâmsakas say that words denote the universal;
the particulars are innumerable and it is cumbersome to assign the
meaning to the particulars. Even though the word directly means the
universal, the particulars are known through secondary meaning. If
one particular is given as the meaning of a word (like "cow"), it will
not be possible to associate the word with another particular.
Answer: Although particulars are innumerable, a particular can be an
indication (upalaksana) of the universal, and there is no need to assume
innumerable powers to refer to the individuals. Among the means of
understanding the meaning of words, the most important—namely,
the usage of elders—will give the meaning as applied to the particular.
As Patanjali has said, even to one who takes the universal to be the
meaning of a word, the particular does not cease to be the meaning*
(£197). The gender is also the meaning of a noun; the suffixes only
suggest. The gender of many Sanskrit words, such as khatva, "a cot"
(feminine), has nothing to do with sex. One formal way of distinguishing
the genders is the following: whatever can be put in apposition with
"he" is masculine, with "she" is feminine, and with "it" is neuter.
(£198-203 ). The number is also the meaning of a noun. The nominal
suffixes only suggest number; it is the stem that actually expresses it.
The kâraka is also the meaning of nominal stem. Thus the nominal stem
indicates five things—the universal, the particular, gender, number,
and kârakas. Sometimes the expression itself can be the meaning of the
word, as in referring to a name, in imitating sounds, and similar
instances.
Meaning of Compound Words
(£203-204). The meaning of compounds is of two kinds : jaKatsvârtha,
giving up their own meaning, and ajahatsvârtha, without giving up their
original meaning. The word susrüsa, "serving," has given up the deriva-
tive meaning, "desire to hear". In rajapurusa, "the king's servant," the
parts do not give up their meaning completely. In all five vrttis accepted
by the Grammarians—£rt? taddhita^ samâsa, ekaÊesa^ a.nd vâkya—the
340 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

meaningfulness is in the whole, not in parts, because something more

than the sum of the meanings of the parts is conveyed by them.
(£"211-212). Naiyäyikas and Mïmâmsakas, who accept vyapeksâ
(mutual expectancy or association) in compound words and the like,
say that there is no special power for the compound word. In a com-
pound like rajapurusa, "the king's servant," the word raja can mean
related to rajan through secondary meaning. In an example like
ghanasyäma, "cloud-black," the meaning of similarity (black like the
cloud) can be obtained through secondary meaning. Understanding the
meaning of the components is essential for determining the meaning
of the compound.
Answer: If a special meaning is not accepted for the compound word
as a whole, the stem will not be a pratipadika, so nominal suffixes cannot
be applied. The rule krttaddhitasamâsasca is not to make the compound a
pratipadika, but to restrict the term pratipadika to compounds alone (and
not to a sentence).
Objection: If unity of meaning (ekarthibhava) is accepted for com-
pounds, the components will be meaningless, and syntactic connection
will be difficult.
Answer: The special meaning comes only after the componential
meanings have been understood and connected.
(E213-216). When the componential meaning is against the accepted
popular usage, the individual meanings are rejected, and the compo-
nent will hejahatsvârtha.

MAHÄBHÄSTAPRADlPODDTOTA

V. K. S. JV. Raghavan
This work is a commentary by Nägesa Bhatta on Kaiyata's Pradipa.
In it Nägesa explains the views of Patanjali following Kaiyata for the
most part though sometimes he differs from him. E references are to
the edition of the work in five volumes by Vedavrata, publishedby the
Haryana Sahitya Samsthana, Gurukula Jhajjhar, Rohtak, 1969. A
small section (2.1.2-2.1.49) has been translated by Shivaram Dattatrey
Joshi (Centre for Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University of Poona,
Poona, 1969: G627), and references labeled ET are to this publication.
The numbers refer to philosophical points made in the text.

Summary of Philosophical Topics

1 (£716-17). Explaining the Mahâbhâsya passage "catväri padajä-
täni, nämäkhyätopasarganipätäsca" ("there are four types of words,
noun, verb, preverb, and indéclinables also"), Nägesa says that the
NAGERA OR NÂGOJI BHATTA 341

word ca, "also", suggests the fourfold classification of speech (vac):

para, pasyanti, madhyamâ, and vaikhari.
2 Referring to the two heads of the bull (of vâc) mentioned in the
Vedic stanza, Patanjali's explanation that they were the permanent
(nitya) and the produced (kärya) was interpreted by Kaiyata to mean
the suggested (vyangya) and the suggestor (vyanjaka). Nâgesa elucidates
this interpretation by saying that the suggested is the madhyamâ type and
the suggestor the vaikhari type of speech.
3 (ETl 8 ). Rg Veda 1.164.45, quoted by Patanjali, says : Vâc has been
divided into four levels, which the learned Brahmins know; the first
three are kept (hidden) in the cave; people speak only the fourth.
Nâgesa gives two explanations : first, each of the four parts of speech—
noun, verb, preverb, and indeclinable—has only one-fourth in the
speech of common people; and, second, the first three parts of speech
(namely, para, paÊyanti, and madhyamâ) are hidden.
4 He quotes Vakyapadlya 1.143 "(Vaikharyä madhyamäyäsca...
tryayya väcah param padam) and explains: vaikhari is the audible
speech ; madhyamâ is the speech in the mind of the speaker, and cannot
be perceived (by the listener), but is the cause of the speech utterance.
Pasyanti is beyond the scope of worldly parlance (being undifferentia-
ted), but the yogins are able to visualize it and even analyze it. At the
para stage, speech is beyond the reach even of yogic perception.
Nâgesa gives another quotation in support of His view. "Svarüpajyotir
evântah para väg anapâyinï tasyäm drstasvarüpäyäm adhikäro niva-
tate" ("The supreme speech [para vâk ] is imperishable and is of intrin-
sic brilliance; if one realizes the exact nature of the eternal resplendent
luster, the (karmic) bondage or avidya-karman retracts from one").
Just as Vedantins hold the supreme being to be Absolute, Nâgesa
considers the supreme speech [para vâk) to be Absolute, the realization
of which leads one to release from karmic bonds.
5 (is 19). While commenting on the Rg Vedic stanza "saktum iva"
(10.71.2), quoted in the Mahabhâsya,N3Lgeé3. identifies vâc with Supreme
Brahman. Those persons who have an adequate knowledge and capa-
city to think deeply with regard to Vedic grammar achieve union
(sayujya) with Sabda Brahman. First they acquire deep knowledge by
correctly understanding the unique import of words.
In the case of word conveying the meaning of Brahman, there is the
knowledge of the identity between the word and its meaning. Persons
of extraordinary wisdom achieve sayujya or identity with the Supreme
Speech because the blessed goddess Laksmî, with self-brilliance and
Brahman's form, resides in every articulated speech of those well-versed
Grammarians.
6 (£8). Explaining Patanjali's explanation of sabda (word) as "the
sound that conventionally conveys a particular sense," Nâgesa says:
342 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

"The term pratitapadärthaka refers to a word that is well known among the
people as capable of indicating precisely a certain object." It is the word
that is made up of sounds (in the form of articulated sound syllables)
that are audible to the sense of hearing. It is also necessary that a word
must have a precise meaning well known in the world. The grammatical
text analyzes such words into their components and explains them.
7 Explaining the terms dkvani and sphota used in the Mahäbhäsya,
Nägesa says that sphota refers to the madhyamä type of väk, while dhvani
refers to the vaikhari type.
8 Among the uses of Grammar, Patanjali gives the first place to the
protection of the Vedas; Kaiyata explains it as gaining the purusärthas.
Elaborating this notion, Nägesa says that purusârtha means dharma and
moksa here. Grammar is useful for obtaining a correct understanding
of the forms and meanings of Vedic texts, so it forms part of the means
for the achievement of dharma and moksa. The study of Grammar results
in understanding the correct sense of Vedic passages, enabling one
thereby to perform the ordained rituals, hence causing the enjoyment
of heavenly bliss (svarga). Grammar is also useful for correctly under-
standing the meaning of Upanisadic passages, thereby causing the
attainment of supreme bliss (moksa). A study of Grammar is essential
for understanding the Vedic and Upanisadic texts correctly, enabling
one to perform one's duties properly and to have a correct knowledge of
reality. .

SPHOTAVÄDA
K.KunjunniRaja
Sphotavâda is an independent work by Nägesa Bhatta on the sphota
theory. According to Nägesa, the founder of the theory was the sage
Sphotäyana, mentioned by Pänini in formulating one of his rules. This
tradition is unknown to Bhartrhari, who considers Audumbarâyana
(mentioned by Yâska) as having held a view similar to the sphota
theory. Nägesa differs considerably from Bhartrhari and shows the
influence of Kashmir Saivism and the Tantric tradition. Minor differen-
ces can be seen between the views given in this work and those offered
in the sphota section of the Paramalaghumanjûsâ (see above).
The edition (E) referred to is that by V. Krishnamacharya (Adyar
Library and Research Centre, Madras, 1946). Numbers refer to philo-
sophical points made in the text.
Summary
(El). According to the Grammarians there are eight kinds of
sphota: phoneme (varna) sphota (particular and universal forms), indi-
NÂGESA ÖR NÄGOjf BHATTA 343

visible-word (akhandapada) sphota, word (pada) sphota (particular and

universal forms), indivisible-sentence (akhandavâkya) sphota, and sen-
tence (vâkya) sphota (particular and universal forms).
(2£5-6). The term sphota means that from which the meaning
bursts out, that is, the signifier. The eight types of sphota are all desig-
nating (vâcaka) linguistic signs. The letters actually heard, along with
the order of sequence, bear the meaning, not the prototype (sthânin),
the grammatical technical term (like la in bhavati). It may seem simpler
to assume that tl^e meaning-bearing capacity belongs to the single
technical term la, instead of to its substitutes like ti; but the common
man (who is not a Grammarian) will not understand the meaning from
la and the like. Even though Pänini's Grammar may be an accessory to
the Vedas (Vedânga), terms like la (for verbal endings) have no mean-
ing bearing power. Even secondary meaning cannot apply to them,
Objection: One who has learned the various substitutes for different
technical terms may get confused and have difficulty understanding the
meaning.
Answer: As in the case of the scripts reminding the phonemes, here
also it is possible. All of the items are needed to help the recollection.
(E7). Moreover, worldly usage, the most important among the
means of understanding the meaning of words, applies only to the
words used, not to the artificial technical term, such as 1 -suffixes.
(E9). It may be noted that the meaning-bearing capacity is only
for the phonemes when they are together (in a particular sequence), not
for them individually. Otherwise, each phoneme will be a nominal
(pmtipadika) stem and get nominal suffixes.
(EIO). Thus meaningfulness is only for the actual expressions used
in language, not for the artificially assumed prototype. The word
ghatena has ghata as the stem and -ena as the instrumental singular suffix;
only the grammarian knows it, not the ordinary man who uses the
language, to whom the splitting is artificial. Hence the whole word
ghatena must be assumed to convey the full meaning.
Similarly in the sentences hare9va, "Oh Hari! protect (us)" and
vimo'va, "O Visnu! protect (us)," the same argument shows that the
whole sentence has to be taken as the meaning-bearing unit. Thus word
sphota and sentence sphota have to be accepted.
(EM). The sentence meaning, which is of the form of the associa-
tion (of word meanings), is something new, and therefore here the
significative power is the relationship.
Objection: The primary meaning of words is understood from the
behavior of elderly people. Still, after the individual meanings of words
have been understood from the words, the mind with the knowledge of
their mutual expectancy understands the sentence meaning; there is no
need for a special power,
344 ENGYCLOPEDIA'OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Answer: The understanding of the word meanings from the words is

impossible if the words are not understood clearly; mutual expectancy
(akânksâ) is the same as the sentence power (vâkyasakti).
Objection by a Mïmâmsaka: The mutual association of the word
meanings is known as the object of intention (tatparya). Intention is
desire to convey the particular meanings; in the absence of such an
intention or in the presence of another intention, the proper meaning
will not be understood. Instead of taking these last two cases as obstruc-
tions to the knowledge of the sentence meaning, it is simpler to take
the knowledge of intention as one of the positive conditions for under-
standing the sentence meaning.
(£"12-13). Answer: The novelty (apürvatva) of the sentence meaning
cannot be the object of intention, and even from the primary meanings
of th.e words the sentence meaning can be obtained (without the help
of intention). In the case of words uttered by a parrot, the meaning
of the utterance is understood, even though it is certain that there is no
intention on the part of the parrot. Hence intention is not essential for
understanding the sentence meaning. God's intention also cannot be
assumed, for it can be known only through the effect. Mïmâmsakas who
do not accept the existence of God understand the meaning (without
the help of intention); and Vedic sentences will be meaningless if
intention is necessary (for there is no intention of the speaker or God
there). Even the intention of the teacher cannot be assumed for the
Veda, for the teacher may be a fool or a wise man. "Two meanings
appear from the sentence, we do not know which one will suit the
context—such general experience is also against assuming intention as
a cause for the understanding of the sentence's meaning.
(£15-17). In ambiguous cases it is the context that helps in deciding
the meaning, not the intention. Thus in a sentence like "bring the pot"
the sentence meaning, which is of the nature of the mutual association
of the word meanings, is determined from the sentence itself. From
worldly experience it is known that the sentence gives the connected
sentence meaning; but through the method of substitution the words
are also assumed to have their individual meanings. Hence the sentence
meaning can be considered to be mutual association (samsarga)of
word meanings, which is obtained from the sentence as a whole
(vâkyasakti).
, (£17-18). JVaiyâyika objection: What is the need for assuming a signi-
ficative power for the sentence, if the mutual association (samsargà) can
be obtained from the word meanings themselves with the help of mutual
expectancy and so on? Mutual expectancy (akânksâ) is the desire to
understand the word syntactically related to the other words in the
sentence in order to bring out the intended connected meaning. The
sentence "bring the pot" will be understood by the ordinary man, but
NÂGESA OR NÄGOJI BHATTA 345

not the statement ".bringing is the activity and the pot is the object";
the latter may be understood by the Nyäya scholar, to whom the
morphemes ghata (pot), -am (the accusative singular suffix indicative
of the object), and so on are separate words {pada).
(£18-21 ). Answer: You cannot say that because the intention of God
is fixed (this word must give this particular meaning), a special new
sense in the sentence meaning cannot be obtained, for I can accept
God's intention for the sentence meaning as well (Let this sentence
give this particular meaning). You cannot say that a special power
should be assumed to convey the special added meaning in the sentence,
for assumption of a special power involves complexity. The view that a
pada is a meaningful item is not affected, for it is not the pada but its
knowledge that leads to the sentence meaning. Thus what the Gramma-
rians call the significative power of the sentence (vakyafakti) is the same
as what the Naiyäyikas call mutual expectancy {âkânksà). Hence it is
said that the sentence meaning is the mutual association of the word
meanings (samsargo vâkyârthah). Andth&tiswhy the Mahâbhâsya says that
Pânini's rule krttaddhitasamâsasca uses the term samasa to exclude the
sentence.
(£24-27). Some others say that meaningfulness is located only in
the sentence and not in its parts, the words. People understand the
meaning only from the behavior of elders, and that is with reference
to sentences. The meaning of words is understood separately through
the substitution method; but that does not make the sentence meaning
unreal. And in cases like hare'ua, "O Hari! protect," it is necessary to
take the sentence as a whole. With the help of the knowledge of word
meanings one can get the sentence meaning; but then without the help
of word meanings also the sentence meaning can be understood directly
(through observing the behavior of elders).
(£28-29). This view is not accepted by some others. The word
ghatam indicates the meaning of the pot and its being the object;
hence there is no need to accept a collective power for the sentence.
Knowledge of meaning is based on the way it is learned.
(£29-30). Even among those who accept significative power for the
sentence, some may get the knowledge of sentence meaning directly,
others after understanding the kârakas, and some by other means. But
the sentence meaning is based on the mutual association of the indivi-
dual word meanings.
(£30-31). Objection: Knowledge of word meaning is the cause for
the knowledge of the connected sentence meaning, for on hearing a new
sentence one who knows the word meanings does have the knowledge
of the sentence's meaning.
Answer: Without knowing the significative power of the sentence,
one does not know the sentence's meaning. People who are able to
346 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

understand the meaning from a sentence sometimes find it difficult to

identify the words and other parts, if they have no grammatical know-
ledge. And acceptance of significative power for words does not involve
complexity, because it is valid in worldly usage.
(E31 -53 ). Question : Just as words convey word meanings, why should
the sentence not also convey the sentence meaning? And just as the
word meanings are remembered; why should the sentence meaning not
also be remembered? The sentence meaning itself is the sabdabodha, the
meaning arrived at for the sentence.
Answer: The sentence meaning is not directly experienced. The
words produce their individual meanings through recollection, but the
sentence does not. The words convey their meaning to the listener
through recollection ; then with the help of the sentence's significative
power, the knowledge of the sentence meaning is determined, consist-
ing of the word meanings and their mutual association.
(£54-55). The Mïmâmsakas say that it is not proper to assume a
special power for the sentence, because secondary meaning is sufficient.
The sentence meaning is not something new. On hearing the sentence
"the village is on the river Haridrä," even a person who does not
know such a river will know that it is the name of a river because of the
use of the word "river" accompanying it in the sentence; similarly,
when the words have conveyed their individual meanings, it is possible
to understand the sentence meaning with the help of the knowledge of
mutual expectancy. To make it a verbal knowledge, secondary meaning
is assumed. The secondary meaning gives the meaning related to what
is conveyed by the primary meaning. It does not affect the authorita-
tiveness of the Vedas, even though the sentence meaning is conveyed,
not directly, but by secondary meaning from the word meanings on the
basis of expectancy and so on.
Answer: This view is not acceptable. Secondary meaning operates
when there is some incompatibility with the literal sense. We cannot say
that the condition for secondary meaning is the incompatibility with the
speaker's intention, for that does not work everywhere; and we have to
assume an intention. It is simpler to assume a power to the sentence
than to assume an intention.
In fact, secondary meaning is the relation to the literal meaning, not
the relation to what is understood; according to the Vedas it is not
possible to assume secondary meaning here.
(£56-58). Objection: by Präbhäkara Mïmâmsakas: The sentence has
no special power to convey the sentence meaning. By contrast, the words
have the power to convey the connected meaning. When it can be
explained by the significative power of words, there is no valid reason
for assuming a power to the sentence. The understanding of the sentence
meaning is not possible unless it becomes the object of the significative
NÄGESA OR NÄGOji BHATTA 347

power. It is simpler to assume it for the words instead of assuming a

separate power (to the sentence). So each word gives the syntactic
connection also (along with its own meaning) on the basis of mutual
expectancy and so on and the fact that the words have been uttered
together (as one group). Moreover, on hearing a word there is always
a desire to know its syntactic position, and that desire can be satisfied
only from words. It is not something new, for the syntactic relation of
each word is known in a general way. The view that the power of a
word is to give its meaning as syntactically connected with that of
other words is not correct. The meaning of the other words can be
obtained only from those words. The impression that a word like ghata,
"a pot," gives only its isolated meaning is erroneous.
(£59). Answer: This view is not acceptable, for even though you
assume that the words have a power to indicate the syntactic relation-
ship, its exact nature is known only by the other words uttered, and
the utterance together (samabhivyähära) of the words has to be assumed
as a cause for knowing it, which is more complex.
(£60-61). You have to assume that the words give the syntactic
relation in a general way and that the specific relation is understood
through inference. Then that inference itself can give the syntactic
relation (samsarga). The experience is that the sentence's meaning is
determined from the sentence itself, not that it is determined from
inference or perception.
(£66-68 ). Objection : The cause of understanding the sentence mean-
ing is the word meanings or their recollection, not the knowledge of
words. On seeing a vague white form and hearing the sound of hooves
and neighing, one gets the idea that a white horse is running. Here
there is no syntactic relation between the seeing of the white form and
the hearing of the neighing.
Answer: Such a knowledge can be obtained even from inference. If
the knowledge is to be verbal, it must be from words.
(£68-69). Objection: Knowledge of a word or a sentence is impossible,
because sequence is part of the utterance, and the phonemes are never
together.
Answer: Each phoneme is received as associated with the previous
ones; that is why there is difference between sara and rasa, where the
same phonemes appear in different sequence. The view that the word is
grasped through the perception of the last phoneme and the recollection
of the earlier phonemes is not acceptable, because there is no rule
regarding the sequence between what is heard and what is recollected.
There is no rule that recollection of past experience is always in the
same order.
(£69-70). The three types of sphota discussed (phoneme, word, and
sentence) are differentiated on the basis of the listener. Some understand
348 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

the distinct meanings of the stem and the suffix, some get the meaning
from the words, and some others from the sentence as a whole. The
meaning is understood from the whole.
Akhandasphofa
(£"71-74). On the basis of the experience "it is a single word" and
"it is a single sentence," it is necessary to assume an indivisible word
{sphota) and an indivisible sentence (sphota) free from the distinctions
of phonemes, stems, and suffixes. It is not like the idea of "forest" for a
collection of trees. Otherwise even a phoneme could be divided like r,
split into r and vowel bits.
(£"74-75). Objection: There is no evidence for the existence of the
phonemes. It is the articulated sounds that are heard, and the sphota can
directly be suggested by these sounds, even without the assumption of a
phoneme between them.
Answer: Let the articulated sounds be identical with the phonemes.
But mere sounds may not be able to reveal the sphota. The phonemes are
the revealers of sphota.
This sphota is the designator (vacaka), because we have the experience
"This meaning is obtained from this word or sentence." According to
some, the sphotas are innumerable (each word or sentence having a
separate sphota). Others say that it is simpler to assume that there is
only one sphota and that it appears to be many on the basis of the differ-
ences in the phonemes that suggest it.
(£76). It is to be noted that the meaning is understood from the
sphota revealed by the phonemes in a specific sequential order. In the
case of synonyms, the sphotas are to be taken as different (the synonyms
ghata and kalasa, both meaning a pot, are different sphotas).
(£80-83). Others say that there is only one phoneme. It appears to
be many on the basis of the differences in the place of articulation, in the
effort taken, and so on. Recognition of the same phoneme or word is
on the basis of the differences in the revealing medium. This view is
not acceptable.
(£92-94). The sphota theory that claims the word or the sentence as
indivisible does not take away the validity of the science of Grammar,
which is concerned with the linguistic analysis of words into stem and
suffixes. Just as the discussion of the five sheaths (paficakosa) in the
Upanisads is to lead the seeker after truth step by step to the knowledge
of Brahman, so linguistic analysis of words is a step in the right direction.
Even if the division into stem and suffixes may be artificial, it is useful
as a means for arriving at the ultimate truth.
(£95-96). Some say that "phoneme sphota" means those monophone-
mic words found in lexicons: "sakhanda word sphota" means that a word
indicates its meaning when its derivation is also known; so also the
NÄGESA OR NÂGOJI BHATTA 349

sentence sphota is the sentence understood along with its further analysis.
The indivisible word and the indivisible sentence are not understood in
a way that involves knowledge of their derivations.

£/>Ä0/<z-Universal (Jätisphota)
(£"96—101 ). Some say it is reasonable to assume meaningfulness of
the universal word or sentence rather than of the individuals. This
universal is revealed by the phonemes in the specific order of sequence.
Although sphota, being a universal, is eternal, the meaning is understood
only when it is known. The universal is identical with existence (sattä),
identical with Brahman. Thus both the signifier sphota and the signi-
fied meaning (sattâ existence) are identical with Brahman.
(£102). The Grammarian Nägesa has revised and explained the
sphota theory of the ancient seer Sphotäyana.
 46
JNANENDRA SARASVATI

This writer appears to have flourished about 1730. He was the teacher
of Nilakantha Dïksita and himself a pupil of Vâmanendrasvâmin. He
composed a Tattvabodhini on the Siddhäntakaumudi, which he was appa-
rently unable to complete; it was completed by Jayakrsna Maunin as
Subodhini (see below, summary 51).
 47
GOPÂLAKRSNA SÄSTRIN

Gopâlakrsna is the author of Sâbdikacintâmani, on the Mahäbhäsya. His

father's name was Vaidyanätha, and he identifies his guru as Räma-
bhadra Adhvarin. The Mew Catalogus Catalogorum tells us that Gopâla-
krsna was a classmate of Sadäsivendra Brahmendra (who flourished
about 1720) and the spiritual teacher of King Vijaya Raghunätha
Tondaiian I of Pudukottah (1730-1769), as well as the teacher of the
Appayya Dïksita who composed Pâniniyasûtraprakâsa. Yudhisthira
Mimamsaka infers from all this information that his dates fall between
1597 and 1647,J but hé is probably about a century early, and a date
approximating 1725 would be preferable. Gopâlakrsna also composed a
commentary on the Unâdisûtras.
 48
DHARANIDHARA

The New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 9, p. 237b, cites a work on Grammar

called Bodhapaddhati, composed in 1730 by Dharanïdhara, son of
Jvalânanda of Tïksnajnatïya.
 49
VAIDYANATHA PAYAGUNDA

Vaidyanätha, the son of Venï and Mahädeva, was a direct disciple of

Nàgesa Bhatta, so he should have flourished about 1735. He hailed
from Kasï, that is, Varanasi, where he prepared a line of pupils. The
name Bälambhatta is given as the author of some of his works, such as
the Kalä on Nägesa's Laghumanjüsä, but his son, who wrote a Mitâksara-
vrttiy was known as Bälambhatta.
Vaidyanâtha wrote a number of commentaries, including Prabhä on
Bhattoji's Sabdakaustubha, Bhâvaprakâsika on Hari Dïksita's Sabdaratna,
a Chayâ on Nägesa's Pradipoddyota, Kalä on Nägesa's Laghumanjüsä,
and BhâvaprakâÊa on Bhattoji's Praudhamanoramâ. The last two works
have been edited. He also wrote a Bhâvaprakâsika on the Brhatsabdendu-
hkhara, a Cidasthimala on the LaghuÊabdendusekhara (which has been
edited), and a Kasikâ or Gadä on Paribhasendusekhara, in addition to a
short independent treatise called Rapratyâhârakhandana, He seems to
have been the most important of Nägesa's commentators, and probably
the premier Grammarian after Nägesa.
 50
SATYAPRIYA TIRTHA SVÄMIN

This writer composed a Vivarana on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya. Yudhisthira

Mimamsaka gives samvat 1764-1801 (1711-1748 ) as his dates.
 51
JAYAKRSNA MAUNIN

Jayakrsna was the elder brother of Sri Krsna Maunin, the son of
Raghunätha Bhatta and Jânakî, and grandson of Govardhana Bhatta.
He wrote a number of independent works in the grammatical tradition,
including {Sabdârthà) Sâramanjari, Sabdârthatarkâmrta, Suddhicandrika,
Vibhaktyarthanirnqya, Vrttidipikâ, and an Arthanimaya on Raghunätha
Siromani's Âkhyâtavâda. He also completed Jfiänendra Sarasvatï's
Tattvaboßhini on Bhattoji's Siddhântakaumudi (see above, number 46).
He is sometimes credited with authorship of the Sphotacandrikä (see
introduction to the section on ârïkrsna Maunin, below, number 54).
 52
HARIVALLABHA

According to V. Krsnamacarya, this writer was the son of Vallabha

Utprabatiya, author of a Vedänta work called Vinodamanjari (cf.
volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed. ], p. 585). Harivallabha flourished
in 1747. He is the author of a Darpana on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyâkara-
nabhüsanasära (Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 574), which has been edited.
 53
VÄSUDEVA DIKSITA

Väsudeva is known to Mïmamsakas as the author of the Kutühalavrtti

on Jaimini's Mïmâmsâsutras, edited several times (cf. volume 1 of this
encyclopedia [2d ed. ], p. 466). He was the son of Annapürnämbä and
Mahädeva Dïksita and the younger brother of Visvesvara Diksita. He
seems to have lived about the middle of the eighteenth century. His
Bâlamanorama on Siddhântakaumudi has been published.
 54
SRÏKRSNA BHATTA MAUNIN

ârïkrsna was apparently Jayakrsna's younger brother, though there is

a suspicion that the two may be the same person. He wrote a series of
works on grammatical topics, the most important of which is perhaps
the Sphotacandrikä, summarized below. In addition, he produced the
Tarkacandrikâ, "a set of Krodapatras on grammatical works of recent
times" (Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 457), such as Kaiyata's Pradipa, the
Siddhâritakaumudi, Praudhamanoramâ, Laghusahdaratna, a n d Laghu§abden-
dusekhara. His Vrttidipikä has been twice published; it deals with the
powers of words. In addition, he is credited in the New Catalogus
Catalogorum with a commentary on Raghunätha's Âkhyâta called
Arthacandrikâ (nirnqya), and a Lakârârthanirnaya.

SPHOTACANDRIKÄ

G.B. Palsule

The Sphotacandrikä is one of those late works on sphota doctrine which

gives it something of a final form and which betrays considerable influ-
ence of standard texts such as the Vaiyakaranabfiüsana. While on the one
hand this text shows a certain staunchness and a penchant for hair-
splitting polemics, on the other hand it also shows a spirit of accommo-
dation and realism. The form of the sphota doctrine here is considerably
different from its classical form—indeed, there is a revolutionary change
in some respects. The transitoriness of the phonemes or their incapacity
to form a simultaneous whole is no longer the reason for accepting the
sphota theory: phonemes can be permanent, or, alternatively, even
transient phonemes can form a simultaneous whole in memory. The
reason is only tactical: it achieves simplicity of procedure (lâghava).
Similarly, sphota need not now be necessarily over and above the
368 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

phonemes; it can consist of the phonemes themselves. Altogether, one

is not quite sure that, while successful in preserving the name sphota
in their grim fight against the Naiyäyikas, these texts have not lost some
of the old soul of sphota. But at the same time, in optionally equating an
indivisible (akhanda) word sphota with an unanalyzable (rüdha) word,
or a divisible (sakhanda) word sphota with a partly (yogarüdha) or wholly
analyzable (yaugika) word, the author displays a robust realism that
serves to bring down the sphota theory from its mystic heights to a solid
earthly footing.
E references are to the edition by M. G. Bakre in Vâdârthasamgraha
(Bombay, 1913), vol. l , p p . 1-16. The references are to philosophical
points made in the text.
Summary
1 (£1). Sphota is a. yogarüdha (conveying a partly etymological and
partly conventional meaning) word, so called because the meaning
bursts out (sphutati) from it. The name sphota attaches either to the
individual words or to the universals inhering in them.
2 In all, eight kinds of sphota are recognized : the five individual
(vyakta) sphotas, namely, phoneme (varna), word (pada), sentence
(vâkyà), indivisible word (akhandapada), and indivisible sentence
(akhandaväkya) sphotas; and the three universal (jâti) sphotas, namely,
phoneme, word,, and sentence sphotas, all three of which, by the very
nature of the universal, are indivisible (akhanda). By implication,
padasphota and vâkyasphota are divisible (sakhançla).
3 Only the indivisible sentence is the real sphota. The designation
sphota for the others (phonemes, and the like ) is a fiction resorted to as
a convenient means of analysis. It is like the designation "Brahman"
given to sheaths like the annamaya (1.13-19).

Phoneme Sphota
4 (El -6 ). This term refers to single phonemes or phoneme complexes
that form grammatically significant elements, such as stems and suffixes
(likepac-, ti(P), and the like). It is clear that in the cases of suffixes the
term applies to those actually used, and not to their prototypes (like-/),
which appear only in the system.
Srîkrsna refutes the Naiyäyikas' definition of a word, Êaktam padam,
and of the four varieties of words, conventional (rüdha), derivative (or
etymological, yaugika), derivative and conventional (yogarüdha), and
derivative or conventional (yaugikarüdha).
Another view of phoneme sphota is that it consists of all single letters
to which meaning has been assigned by the lexicons of words consisting
of single letters (ekâksarakoêa ).
SRÏKRSNA BHATTA MAUNIN 369

ârïkrsna criticizes Konda Bhatta's Bhüsana, which regards the word

sphota as purely etymological (kevala yaugikà).
There follows a lengthy discussion of what constitutes denotative
power (sakti), whether it be one or many, whether it resides in incorrect
words also, and so on. The author's view is that despite their meaning-
fulness, incorrect words do not get the designation sphota because such
words are not accepted by Grammar,

Word Sphota
5 (E6-9). More internal (antaranga) to the sentence because it
directly forms a constituent of the sentence in the word sphota. A
phoneme is only an indirect constituent in that it builds the direct
constituents of the sentence, namely, the words (pada).
What is called a divisible word sphota (sakhandapadasphota) by the
Grammarians {pac -\- ati; râmah) is the väkyasphota of the Naiyäyikas.
The indivisible word sphota (akhanclapadasphota) is the one in which the
whole word is manifested by all the phonemes.
ârïkrsna refutes the objections against sphota by the Naiyäyikas and
Vedäntins, taking a remarkable position (partly following the Bhüsana),
in contrast to the classical sphota doctrine, that phonemes are not
transitory and that even if they were they could form a whole in
memory.
Still the sphota (as an entity over and above phonemes) is accepted
for the sake of economy of process, in that here the physical speech
sounds (dhvani) are regarded as directly revealing the sphota (thus doing
away with the phonemes). This sphota is identified with the Êabdabrahman.
Next he presents a variation of the indivisible word sphota. Here the
sphota is not regarded as over and above the phonemes. The idea is
that what the Naiyäyikas call derivative {yaugika) and derivative-
conventional (yogarüdha, wholly or partly analyzable) words are regard-
ed here as divisible word sphotas, while conventional (rüdha) words
are regarded here as indivisible word sphotas. (A grammatically ignorant
person accepts the individual word sphota even in the case of derivative
words.)
According to this view of the indivisible and divisible word sphotas,
the difference between the Grammarians and the Naiyäyikas boils
down to a quarrel over the name, as the author remarks.
He closes this part with an incidental refutation of some doctrines of
the Tärkikas (which have nothing to do with linguistic theory).
Sentence Sphota
6 (E9-1 1 ). The basis of the sentence sphota is the actual communi-
cation, which consists of sentences and from which later one learns a
language.
370 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Sentence sphotas are of two kinds: divisible and indivisible. The latter
is revealed by the indivisible words and is distinct from them. It alone
is meaningful. It is accepted for the purpose of economy of process.
The indivisible sentence sphota, further, is of two kinds, either over
and above the phonemes, or not (where the physical speech sounds
directly reveal the sentence).
A variation of the indivisible sentence sphota is accepted only in cases
like Hare'va, "Save me, O Hari," where word boundaries cannot be
distinguished. In those cases in which word boundaries are clear (such
as ghatam anaya, ''bring a j a r " ) , one accepts the divisible word sphota.
7 (£11-12). This section discusses whether the import of a sentence
is predominantly nominal {prathamantavisesyakah sâbdabodhah) and
similar topics (such as whether the sentence meaning is the grammatical
object in such sentences as "pasya, mrgo dhävati" ["See, a deer is
running"]. Srlkrsna also refutes the Vyutpattivâda.
8 (£12-13). This section treats the application of divisibility and
indivisibility in certain other types of sentences. A proposal is considered
for a secondary sentence sphota in the case of the statement "tat tvam
asi" ("that thou art"). Ultimately it is rejected, and the designative
sentence sphota (vâcakavâkyasphota) is accepted. The type of secondary
meaning posited by Advaitins, jahadajahallaksana, is refuted.
9 (£13-14 ). So far the discussion has concerned a sentence that is not
poetic (kâvyatmaka). Now the poetic sentence is considered. Mammata's
definition is justified against the attacks of Jagannâtha.
10 (£14-15). ârïkrsna discusses some figurative sentences (such as
vahninä sificati, "sprinkles with fire") and establishes sentence sphota in
such cases.
11 (£15-16). What is the indivisible sentence sphota? It is a single
phoneme [eko varnah), auditorially perceived (srauana). It is like the
extra rüpa of the Nyäya or the composite vowels accepted by Gramma-
rians. It is this indivisible sentence sphota, consisting of a single phoneme,
that is designative (väcaka)., It is identical with êabdabrahman.
 55
UMAMAHESVARA or
ABHINAVA KALIDASA

This author was responsible for several Advaita works (cf. volume 1
of this encyclopedia [2d ed.] , p. 465) as well as a work on Grammar,
Päniniyavadanaksatramalä. Of a Vellala family, he was the son of Vefika-
tärya of the Moksagunda family; a pupil of Aksayasüri; and himself the
guru of Kavikunjara, author of Sabharanjanasataka. He flourished about
1750.
 56
NILAKANTHA DIKSITA

The grandson of Rämabhadra Dîksita and a pupil of Jnänendra

Sarasvatï, Nïlakantha was patronized by Puratam Tirumal Devanara-
yana of Ambalappuzha. His father was Varadesvara Dîksita, who
studied with the son of some Appayya Dîksita and died at Varanasi
as an ascetic. He had an elder brother called Sundaresvara Yajvan,
who composed a work titled Päninipradipa. Although Yudhisthira
Mimamsaka attributes his works to Nïlakantha Vâjapeyin of the
sixteenth century, it seems more likely this author flourished about the
middle of the eighteenth century.
This Nîlakantha's works include a Paribhäsävrtti, a Tattvaviveka on the
Mahâbhâsya, Güdhärthadipikä on his teacher Jnänendra's Tattvabodhini,
and a Laghuêabdakaustubha.
 57
ASADHARA BHATTA

Âsâdhara was a pupil of Dharanïdhara and should be dated to about

1770. U. P. Shah has published a note on his life and works.1 His ( Sabda)
Trivenikä, a short treatise on the three powers of a word, has been edited
twice. In addition, he wrote a Padasamjnavicâra, as well as work known
under various titles, such as Pürvapaksaprasnottari or manjüsä or manjari.
He also seems to have composed an Advaita work, Advaitaviveka (cf.
volume 1 of this encyclopedia [2d ed.], p. 471).
 58
RAMASEVAKA

This writer is the author of a Vyakhyâ on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa.

He was the father of Krsnamitrâcârya (or Durbaläcärya), a prolific
grammatical writer of various commentaries (cf. below, number 60).
 59
INDRADATTA UPÄDHYÄYA

The New Catalogus Catalogorum tells us that Indradatta of the Garga

gotra (lineage) was the son of Lälamani Upädhyäya and Ksemavati
Devï, the grandson of Mohana Läla, and the great-grandson of Muralï-
dhara. A manuscript of Indradatta's Sabdatattvaprakâsa exists that was
copied in 1820. The work is based on Nägesa.
 60
KRSNAMITRACARYA or
DURBALÄCARYA

One of the most prolific writers on Indian philosophy that ever lived,
Krsnamiträcärya contributed extensively to the literature on Nyâya,
Sämkhya, and Grammar. His father was Rämasevaka of Laksmapura
(see above, number 58), his grandfather Devidatta. Only two of his
works to my knowledge have been published so far, the Tattvamïmamsâ,
a Sämkhya treatise, and a Kuücikä on Nâgesa Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranalaghu-
maftjüsä. In Grammar he also wrote a commentary on the Paribhäsendu-
sekhara, Bhâvapradipa on Bhattoji's Sabdakaustubha, Kalpalatä on the
Praudhamanoramâ, Ratnarnava on Siddhântakaumudi, and a commentary
on the Vaiyâkaranabhïèsana. He must have flourished at the beginning of
the nineteenth century.
 61
HARIBHATTA

Haribhatta flourished in 1801, and was the author of Darbana on the

Vaiyâkaranabhûsanasâra.
 62
DHARANÏDHARA (II)

This Dharanxdhara was patronized by Thomas Henry of Calcutta,

and he wrote his Vaiyäkaranasarvasva in 1809.
 63
MANNUDEVA or MANYUDEVA
or GOPALADEVA

Mannudeva was the son of Durgä and âambhu, the younger brother of
Krsnadeva, and a pupil of Payagunda Balakrsna, who was in turn the
son of Vaidyanätha Päyagurida (see above, summary 49), a direct
disciple of Nâgesa Bhatta. He wrote Laghubhüsanasärakänti on the
Vaiyâkaranabhusanasâra, Dosoddhära on the Laghusabdendusekhara. The
New Catalogus Catalogorum also attributes to him an Arthavatsütraväda.
 64
BHAIRAVA MISRA

Bhairava was the son of Bhavadeva Misra of the Agastya family, who
wrote a commentary on Hari Dîksita's Sabdaratna, M.S. Bhat dates
Bhairava "circa 1780-1840.'51 He wrote the following works, all of
which are in p r i n t : Sphotapariksa, Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära-Pariksä,
Gandrakalä on the Laghusabdendusekhara, a commentary on ParibhM&ndu-
sekhara, and a commentary on the Sabdaratna (which appears not to be
the same as his father's).
 65
KUMARA TATAYA

This writer composed a Pârijâtam Nâtokam on the Mahäbhäsya. He

appears to have lived in the early nineteenth century, about 1825.
 66
SATÄRA RAGHAVENDRACARYA
(GAJENDRAGADKAR)

Author of several grammatical works, this Maharashtrian was the

pupil of Nïlakantha Vyäsa, who died in 1853, according to B.N.K.
Sharma, following Theodor Aufrecht.1 His works are Candrikâ on
Nâgesa's Laghutabdendusekhara, Tripathagâ on Nâgesa's Paribhäsendu-
sekhara, Prabhä on Bhattoji's Sabdakaustubha, Sabdaratnaprabhä, a n d
Tipäthaga on Patanjali's Mahabhäsya (uncertain attribution).
 67
GANGADHARA KAVIRÂJA

Gangädhara was a Vaidya of Bengal, born at Jessore. His life covered

the period from 1798 to 1885. Some of his works are partly published
in Gangadharamanisä (Calcutta, 1911). Two works are on Grammar:
Trikändasabdasäsana and Trisütravyakaranay both in verse.
 68
TÄRÄNATHA TARKAVACASPATI

A well-known master pandit, whose expertise led him to contribute

works in Nyäya, Sâmkhya, and Advaita as well as in grammar (listed in
volume 1 of this encyclopedia, 2d ed.). He lived from about 1840 to
1900. His works on Grammar included Tarkaratnamâlâ and a Saralâ on
the Siddhäntakaumudi.
 69
KHUDDI JHA (SARMAN)

A widely celebrated pandit who flourished at the beginning of the

twentieth century. He was a Maithila of Varanasi. His notes on the
LaghuSabdenduÊekhara, titled Nägesoktiprakä§a> were published at Varanasi
in 1899. He also wrote a Tinarihavâdasâra on the Vaiyakaranabhüsanasära.
 70
NITYÄNANDA PANTA PARVATIYA

Nityänanda flourished about 1925. Two works of his are published, a

commentary on the Paramalaghumanjüsä, and Dipikä on Laghuêabden-
dusekhara.
 71
DRAVYESA JHA

This writer's Pratyekärthaprakäsikä on the first book of Bhartrhari's

Vâkyapadlya or Trikändi was published at Vrindavan in 1926.
 72
SURYANARAYANA SUKLA

Another commentary on book 1 of the Väkyapadiya, entitled Bhavapradipa,

was composed by this author and published initially in 1937. He also
wrote on other systems.
 73
GOPALA SASTRI NENË

This scholar was active during the first half of the twentieth century«
He has written a Saralä on the Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära.
 74
P.S. ANANTANARAYANA SÄSTRI

A recognized scholar who wrote a work on Grammar titled Vâkyatattva,

His dates are 1885-1947.
 75
BRAHMADEVA

Brahmadeva wrote his Vaiyäkaranasiddhäntamanjüsä in 1943

 76
V. KRSNAMACARYA

Master savant, leader in many scholarly activities in and around

Madras, Krsnamàcârya composed a Sphotavâda-Upodghâta, which was
published as Adyar Library Series 55 in 1946.
 77
— e r —

SADASIVA SASTRI (SARMAN)

Sadâsiva Sâstrï wrote an Arthadipikä on the Paramalaghumanjüsä, publi-

shed in 1946.
 78
BALA KRSNA PANCOLI

His Prabhä on Vaiyâkaranabhûsanasâra was printed in 194?.

 79
RAMA PRASADA TRIPATHI

A Subodhini on the Vaiyakaranabhüsanasära was published in 1952.

 80
RUDRADHARA JHA SARMAN

Rudradhara Jhä âarmau published a Tattvaloka on Patanjali's Mahabhä-

 81
KALIKA PRASADA SUKLA

He published a Jyotsnä on the Paralaghumanjüsä ( 1961 ).

 82
SABHAPATI SARMAN UPADHYAYA

Sabhâpati âarman Upâdhyâya wrote a Ratnaprabhä on Paramalaghuman-

jusâ, published in 1963.
 83
RAGHUNÄTHA SARMAN

His extensive commentary, Ambäkartri, on the Vâkyapadiya, was published

at Varanasi between 1963 and 1974. He also published Vyâkaranadar-
sanabindu, Varanasi, 1971.
 84
SATYAKAMA VARMA

He published a commentary on the first book of the Vakyapadiya in 1970.

 85
RAMAJNA PANDEYA

His Vyâkaranadarsanapratimâwas published at Varanasi in 1979.

 BIBLIOGRAPHY ON GRAMMAR
(VYÄKARANA)

No bibliography is entirely exhaustive. ïn the present case it is important to understand

what the list is intended to cover and what it is not. Nyäya, Mimamsä, Vedänta and
the writings of other darsanas on grammatical philosophy are listed in volume 1 of this
encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, and are not to be found here. The
present bibliography is an effort to list publications that deal with the Indian science of
vyäkarana, but not in all languages. While the primary sources, Sanskrit texts, are
covered, secondary materials in Indian languages, including Sanskrit, are not. Secon-
dary materials in European languages that pertain to vyäkarana should be listed here,
but closely related sciences, such as nirukta, are not covered. Furthermore, papers and
monographs on Indian linguistics that concentrate on specific words or syllables have
not been listed here. The primary literature in Sanskrit is exclusively dealt with; Pali
writers are omitted.
The general plan followed resembles that utilized in volume 1 of the encyclopedia.
Part 1 deals in chronological order with the Sanskrit authors whose dates are roughly
known. Part 2 lists classical writers on vyäkarana (grammar) and others whose dates
are not known. Part 3 lists secondary materials that are not specifically related to a
particular work or author. This bibliography was prepared by the general editor of
the encyclopedia, Karl H. Potter.

ABBREVIATIONS FOR GRAMMAR BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABORI—Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute (Poona)

AGIL—seePiCL
Ada Asiatica—Ada Asiatica (Tokyo)
ActOD—Ada Orientalia (Copenhagen)
ActOP—Ada Orientalia (Bucharest)
AGUT—Ada et Communicationes Universitatis Taruensis (Finland)
Adyar D—A Descriptive Catalogue of Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Adyar Library, compiled
by V. Krishnamacharya, Adyar, Madras
AG—Acyuta Granthamala (Varanasi)
AiK—Aus Indiens Kultur : Festschrift Richard von Garbe, Erlangen, 1927
AïONSL—Annali, Istituto Orientale di Napoli, sezione linguistica
AIPHOS—Annuaire de V Institut de Philologie et d'Histoire Orientales et Slaves (Brussels)
Ajp—American Journal of Philology (Baltimore)
AKM—Abhandlungen für die Kunde des Morgenlandes
ALB — Adyar Library Bulletin (— Brahmavidya )
ALS — Adyar Library Series
AMGG — Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft
434 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Anvïksâ — Anvïksâ \ Research Journal of the Department of Sanskrit, Jadavpur University

AO—Archiv Orientalni (Prague)
AOR — Annals of Oriental Research (Madras)
AOSE — American Oriental Series Essay
AP—Aryan Path (Bombay)
A s P — Asian Profile (Hong Kong)
ASS — Änandäsrama Sanskrit Series (Poona)
ASVOI — Annals of the Sri Venkateiwara Oriental Institute (Tirupati )
AUJ — Annamalai University Journal (Annamalainagar)
AUSS — Allahabad University Sanskrit Series
AUSt — Allahabad University Studies
BB — (Bezzenbergers) Beitrage zur Kunde der indogermanischen Sprachen (Göttingen)
BGLV — D. R. Bhandarkar et al., eds., B. Ç. Law Volume, 2 volumes, Calcutta, 1945
BDGRi —Bulletin of the Deccan College Research Institute (Poona)
BEFEO — Bulletin de V École Française d'Extrême- Orient (Paris )
Belvalkar — Shripad Krishna Belvalkar, An Account of the Different Existing Systems of
Sanskrit Grammar, being the Vishwanath Narayan Mandlik Gold Medal Prize Essay for
1909, (Poona, 1915)
BEPHE — Bulletin de V École Pratique des Hautes Études (Paris )
BenSS — Benares Sanskrit Series
BGWL — Berichte über die Verhandlungen der königlichen sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaf-
ten zu Leipzig
Bh —Bhärati : Bulletin of the College of Indology, Banaras Hindu University
BhaKau—Bhärata-Kaumudi: Studies in Indology in Honor of Dr. Radhakamal Mookerji,
Allahabad, 1945
BHUSS — Benares Hindu University Sanskrit Series
BhV —Bharatiya Vidyä (Bombay)
Bi — Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta)
BNKSarma — B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, A History of the Dvaita School ofVedânta and
Its Literatutre, revised edition, Delhi, 1981
BonnOS — Bonner Orientalischen Studien
BORIS — Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute Post-graduate and Research Series
BPsc — Bulletin of the Philological Society of Calcutta
BSOAS —Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London
BSPS — Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series
Budruss — Georg Budruss, ed., Paul Thieme; Kleine Schriften, 2 volumes, Wiesbaden, 1971
Cardona — George Cardona, Pänini: A Survey of Research, Delhi, 1976
CAss-St — Center of Advanced Study in Sanskrit (Poonä), Studies
GDSFV — Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume, volume I, Delhi, 1974
GHI — The Cultural Heritage of India, 4 volumes, Calcutta, 1937; revised edition 1952-
1953; second edition 1958
ChSS — Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series
ChSSt — Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Studies
GiDO — Proceedings of the International Congress of Orientalists
GLTA —- Cahiers de linguistique théorique et appliquée (Bucharest)
GOJ — Calcutta Oriental Journal
CR — Calcutta Review
csGRS — Calcutta Sanskrit College Research Series
CWRGB — Collected Works of Sri R. G. Bhandarkar, 4 volumes, GOSBORI, Class B, 1-4,
Poona, 1933
DAwio — Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin, Institut für Orient forschung
PCBCSJS — Deccan College Building Centenary and Silver Jubilee Series
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 435"

DGBs — Deccan College Building Centenary Series

DGDs •— Deccan College Dissertation Series
DCMS — Deccan College Monograph Series
DKRPV — D. C. Kunhan Raja Presentation Volume, Madras, 1946
DNSFV — Dr. D. N. Shastri Felicitation Volume, Keshav Ram Pal, ed., Ghaziabad, 1982
DRBGV — D. R. Bhandarkar Volume, ed. B. C. Law, Calcutta, 1940
EOi — Satya Vrat Sastri, Essays on Indology, Delhi, 1963
ERE — Hastings, Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics
EW — East and West (Rome)
Festschrift Aditya Natha Jha — Samskrti : däktar Äditya Nâtha Jhä abhinandana-grantha,
Gopinath Kaviraj, ed., 3 volumes, Delhi, 1969
Festschrift Bochenski — Contributions to Logic and Methodology in Honor of J. M. Bochenski,
Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, ed., with Charles Parsons, Amsterdam, 1965
Festschrift Bohtlingk — Festgrüss an Otto von Böhtlingk zum Doktor-Jubiläum 3 Februar 1888
von seinen Freunden, Stuttgart, 188 8
Festschrift Gharudeva Shastri — Charudeva Shastri Felicitation Volume : Presented to Prof
Charudeva Shastri on the Occasion of His Seventy-fifth Anniversary by his Friends and
Admirers, S. K. Chatterji et al., eds., Delhi, 1974 '
Festschrift Emeneau — Studies in Indian Linguistics [Professor M. B. Emeneau Sastipürti
Volume, B. Krishnamurti, ed., Poona, Annamalainagar, 1968
Festschrift F.B .J. Kuiper— Pratidänam: Indian, Iranian and Indo-European Studies Presented
to Franciscus Bernardus Jacobus Kuiper on His Sixtieth Birthday, J. C. Heesterman et al.,
eds., The Hague, 1968
Festschrift Kahane — Issues in Linguistics : Papers in Honor of Henry and Renée Kahane, B. B.
Kachru et al., eds., Urbana, 1973
Festschrift Morgenstierne — Indo-iranica; melanges présentés a Georg Morgenstierne à Voccasio
de son soixante-dixième anniversaire, G. Redard, ed., Wiesbaden, 1964
Festschrift Rajeswar Sastri Dravid — Rsikalpanyäsah, Devadatta Sastri, ed., Allahabad,
1971
Festschrift Roth — Festgrüss an Rudolf von Roth zum Doktor-Jubiläum, Stuttgart, 1893
Festschrift Siddeshwar Varma — Siddha-bhärati, 2 volumes, Hoshiarpur, 1950
Festschrift Turner —• Sir R. L. Turner Jubilee Volume Presented on the Occasion of His Seventieth
Birthday (5th October, 1958), Sukumar Sen, ed., 1958-1959
Festschrift Weber— Gurupüjakaumudi; Festgabe zum fünfzigjährigen Doctor-Jubiläum Albrecht
Weber von seinen Freunden und Schülern dargebracht, Leipzig, 1896
Festschrift Whatmough — Studies Presented to Joshua Whatmough on His Sixtieth Birthday, E.
Pulgram, ed., The Hague, 1957
Festschrift Ernst Windisch — Festschrift für Ernst Windisch zum siebzigsten Geburtstag am 4.
September 1914 dargebracht von Freunden und Schülern, Leipzig, 1914
.-FL — Foundations of Language
FLSs — Foundations of Language, supplementary series
FRSD — see Festschrift Rajeswar Sastri Dravid
FVSKB — Felicitation Volume Presented to Professor Sripad Krishna Belvalkar, Varanasi, 1957
Gaurinath Sastri Festschrift— A Corpus of Indian Studies: Essays in Honor of Professor Gaurinath
Sastri, G. M. Bhattacharya et al., eds., Calcutta, 1980
GBS — Govind Book Series
GOS — Gaekwad's Oriental Series
GOSBORI — Government Oriental Series, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute,
classes A to C
GSAIF — Giornale délia Società Asiatica Italiana (Florence)
GSPM — Grantha -samsodhana-prakäsana-mandala,
Gss — Gurukula Sanskrit Series
436 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

HDVGV — H. D. Velankar Commemoration Volume, S. N. Gajendragadkar and S. A.

Upadhyaya, eds., Bombay, 1965
HKNMM — Hari-krsna-nibandha-mani-mäla
Hockett— Charles Francis Hockett, ed., A Leonard Bloomfield Anthology, Bloomington,
1970
Hss — Haridas Sanskrit Series (Varanasi)
HTCMR —• Edward Byles Cowell, ed., Miscellaneous Essays ofH. T. Colebrooke, 2 volumes,
London, 1873
HTR —Jose Pereira, ed., Hindu Theology: A Reader, New York, 1976
HVNRSS — Hindi-Visvavidyalayiya-Nepalarajya-Samskrita-Granthalayah Kusumar
IA — Indian Antiquary
ic — Indian Culture
IF—Indogermanische Forschungen (Berlin)
IHQ, — Indian Historical Quarterly
nj — Indo-Iranian Journal
IJDL — International Journal of Dravidian Linguistics (Trivandrum)
IL — Indian Linguistics : Journal of the Linguistics Society of India
IndF — Indische Forschungen (Breslau)
IndPQ,— Indian Philosophical Quarterly
IPR — Indian Philosophical Review (Bombay)
is — Indische Studien (Berlin)
ITaur — Indologica Taurinensia (Torino)
IZAS — International Zeitschriftfür allgemeine Sprachwissenschaft (Heilbronn )
JA — Journal Asiatique
JAHRS — Journal of the Andhra Historical Research Society (Hyderabad)
JainJ — Jain Journal
JAOS — Journal of the American Oriental Society
JASBe —Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta)
JASL —Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal (Calcutta), Letters
JASP — Journal of the Asiatic Society of Pakistan
JAU — Journal of the Annamalai University (Annamalainagar )
JBBRAS — Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society
JBRS — Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society (Patna)
JDL —- Journal of the Department of Letters, University of Calcutta
JDSUD — Journal of the Dépriment of Sanskrit, University of Delhi
JGJKSV —Journal of the Ganganätha Jhä Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyâpifh (Allahabad)
JGJRI — Journal of the Ganganätha Jhä Research Institute (Allahabad )
JIBSt — Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies (— Indobukkyogakyu Kenkyu) (Tokyo)
jiH — Journal of Indian History
JIP—Journal of Indian Philosophy (Dordrecht)
JKU—Journal of the Karnatak University
JLSP—Janua Linguarum, series practica
JMU — Journal of the Madras University
JMysoreU-—The Half-Tearly Journal of the Mysore University
joi — Journal of the Oriental Institute (Baroda) ;
JOR -*- Journal of Oriental Research (Madras)
JPMJG —Jnânapïtha Mûrtidevï Jaina Grantha-mälä
JRAS—Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London)
JSVOI —Journal of the Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute
JSML — Journal of the Tanjore Sarasvatï Mahal Library
jUB — Journal of the University of Baroda
JUP —Journal of the University qfPoona (Humanities)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 43?

KAG — Kaviraja-abhinandana-grantha (Lucknow)

KSS—Kashi Sanskrit Series (Varanasi)
KSVS — Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha Series (Allahabad)
KUDSP — Kerala University Department of Sanskrit Publications (Trivandrum)
Kuj —Kurukshetra University Journal (Arts and Humanities)
KVRAGV — Prof. K. V. Rangaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, Madras, 1940
KZ —- {Kuhns) Zeitschriftfür vergleichende Sprachforschung auf dem Gebiete der indogermanische
Sprachen (Göttingen) ..
LDS — Laibhai Dalpatbhai Series (Ahmedabad)
Lg — Language (Baltimore)
LiPR ;— Harold G. Coward, ed., Language in Indian Philosophy and Religion, Calgary, 1978
LM — Le Muséon (Paris)
MAPS — Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society
MGOML — Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Library
MGOMS — Madras Government Oriental Manuscripts Series
MIR — Miscellanea IndologicaKiotensia (Kyoto)
MO — The Mysore Orientalist
MSL — Mémoires de la Société Linguistique de Paris \
MSS — Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft (Munich)
Msuos — Maharaja Sayajirao University Oriental Series
MSURS — M. S. University of Baroda Research Series
MT — A Triennial Catalogue of Manuscripts Collected for the Government Oriental Manuscripts
Library, Madras, M. Rangacarya, S. Kuppuswami Sastri, and Z. A. Sankaran,
eds., 9 volumes, Madras, 1913-1943
MUSS — Madras University Sanskrit Series
NCat — New Catalogus Catalogorum, V. Raghaven, K. Kunjunni Raja, et al., eds.,
Madras, 1949 to present.
NGGW — Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen
NIA — New Indian Antiquary (Bombay)
NTS — Norsk Tidsskrift for Sprogvidenskap (Oslo )
NUJ—Nagpur University Journal
OH — Our Heritage (Calcutta)
OLZ — Orientalistische Literaturzeitung (Leipzig)
Oriens — Oriens; Journal of the International Society for Oriental Research (Leiden )
os — Orientalia Suecara (Uppsala)
OT — Oriental Thought (Nasik)
ou—Occident und Orient (Göttingen)
PAICL — Proceedings of the All-India Conference of Linguists
PAioc — Proceedings and Transactions of the. .All-India Oriental Conference
Pan — The Pandit (Varanasi)
Paribhäsäsamgraha — Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, ed., Paribhäsäsamgraha, BORIS 7,
Popna, 1967
PB — PrabuddhaBhärata (Calcutta)
PBS—Prachya Bharati Series
PGASS — Publications of the Centre of Advanced Study in Sanskrit, University ofPoona
PEFEO — Publications de VEcole Française d'Extrême-Orient (Hanoi, Paris)
PEW — Philosophy East and West (Honolulu)
pici — Publications de VInstitut de Civilisation Indienne, (Paris)
PIGL--Proceedings of the...International Congress of Linguists
PiGP — Proceedings of the International Congress of Philosophy
piFi — Publications de l'Institut français d'Indologie (Pondicherry)
pise—Proceedings of the... International Sanskrit Conference
438 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

po — Poona Orientalist
POWSBST — Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Studies (Varanasi)
POWSBT — Princess of Wales Saraswati Bhavana Texts (Varanasi)
PQ, — Philosophical Quarterly (amalner)
PVKF —• A Volume of Studies in Indology Presented to P. V. Kane, Poona, 1941
QJMS—• Quarterly Journal of the Mythic Society (Bangalore)
Rau — Wilhelm R a u ; ed., Franz Kielhorn: Kleine Schriften, mit einer Asswahl der epigra-
phischen Aufsätze, 2 volumes, Wiesbaden, 1969
RDSO — Rivista degli studi orientali (Rome)
Renou and Filliozat — Louis Renou and Jean Filliozat, L'Inde classique; manuel des
études indiennes, volume 2, with Paul Demiéville, Olivier Lacombe, and Peirre
Meile, Paris, 1953
RPG — Rajasthan Puratan Gfanthamala (Jodhpur )
RSGG — Shri Rajasthan Sanskrit College Granthamala
Rtam —Iltam; Akhila Bharatiya Sanskrit Parishad (Lucknow)
RUB — Revue de V Université de Bruxelles
Sambodhi — Sambodhi (Ahmedabad)
SAMV — Sir Asutosh Memorial Volume, Patna, 1926
SAS — Sanskrit Academy Series
SB — Siddha Bharatî, Hoshiarpur, 1950
SBAW — Sitzungsberichte der Berliner Akademie der Wissenschaften
SBGM — Sarasvati Bhavana Granthamälä
SHAW — Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften
siAL — Sources of Indo-Aryan Lexicography
siBSY — Studies in Indology and Buddhology Presented in Honour of Susumu Tamaguchi, Kyoto,
1955
su — Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik (Germany)
siL — Studies in Linguistics
siLH — P. K. Gode, Studies in Indian Literary History, volume 1, sjs 37, Bombay 1953
Silverstein — Michael Silverstein, ed., Whitney on Language: Selected Writings of William
Dwight Whitney, Cambridge, Mass., 1971
sjs — Singhi Jain Series
SKAGV—Dr. S. Krishnaswami Aiyangar Commemoration Volume, Madras, 1936
SPAIOG — Summaries of Papers of[the...the All-India Oriental Conference
spisc — Summaries of Papers of the.. »International Sanskrit Conference
SPP — Särada Pltha Pradïpa (Dwarka^
SSGM — Savitaräya-smrti-raksana-grantha-mäla
SSPS — Sanskrit Sahitya Parishad Series (Calcutta)
Staal — A Reader on the Sanskrit Grammarians, J . F. Staal, ed., Studies in Linguistics 1 ,
Cambridge, Mass., 1972
svos — Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Series (Tirupati)
svsi — Satyakam Varma, Studies in Indology, New Delhi, 1976
svuoj — Sri Venkatesvara University Oriental Journal (Tirupati)
SWAW — Sitzungsberichte der kaiserlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Wien
swsc— World Sanskrit Conference; Summaries of Papers
TAPA — Transactions of the American Philological Association (Hartford/Cleveland)
TD — P.P.S. Sastri, Descriptive Catalogue of the Sanskrit Manuscripts in the Sarasvati Mahal
Library, Tanjore, Srirangam, 1943
TPS — Transactions of the Philological Society (London)
TSS — Trivandrum Sanskrit Series
UGR — University of Ceylon Review
ULBTFPL — Université Libtre de Bruxelles, Travaux de la faculté de philosophie et lettres
BIBLIOGRAPHY 439

UMS — Usha Memorial Series

UPHSJ — Uttar Pradesh Historical Society Journal
UPSPS — University of Poona Sanskrit and Prakrit Series
Väk — Väk (Poona)
VBGSM — Vidyäbhavana Sanskrit Granthamälä
VGPGV — V. G. Paranjpe Commemoration Volume : Some Aspects of Indo-Iranian Cultural
Traditions, Delhi, 1977
viDK — Verhandlungen de...internationalen Dialektologenkongresses
VIJ -—Vishveshvarananda Indological Journal (Hoshiarpur)
VJPSG — V. S. Joshi, Papers on Sanskrit Grammar. 1980
VKAWA — Verhandelingen der koninklijke Akademie van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam;, Nieuwe
Reeks
VRFV — Sanskrit and Indological Studies: Dr. V. Raghauan Felicitation Volume, R. N. Dande-
kar, ed., Delhi 1975
VSMV — Vidarbha Samêodhana Mandala Vârsika (Nagpur)
Wackernagel —J. Wackernagel, Kleine Schriften, 2 volumes, Göttingen, 1953
WoolGV — Woolner Commemoration Volume, Lahore, 1940
WZKM — Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenlandes (Bombay/Vienna)
WZMLUH — Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift der Martin-Luther-Universität (Halle/Wittenberg)
WZKSOA — Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd-und Ostasiens
YJG — Yäsovijaya Jaina Granthamälä (Bombay)
YM — Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Samskrta Vyäkaranasästra ka Itihäsa, 3 volumes, Ajmer,
1950-1966
ZDMG —Zeitschrift der deutschen morgenlandischen Gesellschaft (Wiesbaden)
zu — Zeitschrift für Indologie und Iranistik

In cross — references :
a — article
b — book
d — dissertation
e — edition
t — translation

PART 1 : AUTHORS WHOSE DATES ARE

(MORE OR LESS) KNOWN

INDRA (GOMIN) {pre-Pänini?)

(Gardona, p. 150 ; Belvalkar, p. 9;
NCat3.90)
?Indravyäkarana
Gl : A. G. Burnell, On the Aindra School of Sanskrit Grammarians, Their Place in
the Sanskrit and Subordinate Literatures. Bangalore, 1875 ; reprinted Varanasi,
1976.
G2 : Franz Kielhorn, "Indragomin and Other Grammarians," IA 15, 1886,
181-183. Reprinted in Rau, pp. 244-246.
G3 : Edited by E. Sieg, SBAW 1907-1908.
G4 : B. N. Krishnamurti Sharma, "Indra and Pänini," IHQ,8, 1932, 380.
G5 : Varadaraja Umarji, "The Aindra School of Sanskrit Grammar," PO 19,
1954, 47-54.
440 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G6 :- , "The Aindra School of Sanskrit Grammar (Part — Two),"

pc-20, 1955,31-40. • '
G7 : , "Aindra School of Sanskrit Grammar (Its History and Geographic
Extent)," svuoj 1, 1958, 5-11.
SÄKALYA (pre-Pänini)
AUDUMBARÄYANA (pre-Pänini?)
G8 : John Brough, "Audumbaräyana's Theory of Language," TPS 1952, 73-77.
G9 : Nils Simonsson, "Audumbaräyana's Theory of Sound," os 10,1961,22-30.
ÄPlSÄLI (pre-Pänini?)
lÄpisälisiksä
G10 : Raghu Vira, «Apisäliiiksä," Journal ofVedic Studies I, 1934, 225-248.
Gil : VittorePisani, «ANote on Apisäli," joi5,1956, 272.
G12 : Edited and translated in B. A. Van Nooten, "The Structure of a Sanskrit
Phonetic Treatise," AGUT (1973), 408-436.
Gl 3 : George Gardona, " O n Äpiealasiksä" Gaurinath SastriFestschrift, pp. 245-256.
KÄSYAPA (pre-Pänini?)
(NCat4. 144; G1624, p. 84)
?Dhätuvrtti
(NCat4. 144)
GÄRGYA (pre-Pânini?)
. (NCat6. 17;G1624,p.8O)
GÄLAVA (pre-Pänini?)
(NGat 6. 19; G1624, P. 67; YM 1. 150)
GAKRAVARMAN (pre-Pänini?)
(G1624,p.99)
BHARADVÄJA (pre-Pänini?)
(G1624,p.95)
SAKATÄYANA (pre-Pänini? )
(the traditional author of the Upädisütras ; Gardona, p. 149; Belyalkar, P. 21;
G1624,pp. 69. 254)
G14 : F. Kielhorn, "On the Grammar of Sakatäyana," IA 16, 1888, 24ff.
G15 : Satyakam Varma, "Contribution of Sakatäyana to Sanskrit Grammar,"
spAioc 27, 1974, 229-230.
G16 : Mrityunjay Acharya, "This Unädisütras and Sakatäyana," SPAIOG 27,
1974,226-227.
G17 : Satyakam Varma, "Sakatäyana: The Great Gaammarian," svsi
pp. 133-143.
SENAKA (pre-Pänini?) (GI624,p. 101)
SPHOTÄYANA (pre-Pänini?) (G1624, p. 100)
PAUSKARASÄDI (pre-Pänini?) (Belvalkar, p. 26; G1624, p. 135)
G18 : M.S. Bhat, "Äcärya Pauskarasädi and the Date of Pänini," JOI 8 1959,
385-388.
AUDAVRAJI (pre-Pänini?)
. (NGat 3. 98)
KÄSAKRTSNA (pre-Pänini?)
(Belvalkar, p. 8; Gardona, p. 151 ; G1624, p. 135; YM 1.106, 504, NGat4.115)
IKäsakrtsnaeabdakaläpadadhätupäjha
G19 : Kshitish Chandra Chatterji, "Käsakrtsna," IHQ, 8, 1932, 224-227.
G20 : Edited in Kannada script, with Cannavirakavi's Kannada commentary.
Sources of Indo-Aryan Lexicography 5. Poona, 1952. Roman translitera-
tion in BDCRI 19, 1958-1959, 154-235, 330-414. Sanskrit translation by
Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. Ajmer, 1965.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 441

G21 : Gajanan Balakrishna Palsule, A Concordance of Sanskrit Dhätupäthas. DGDS 14.

Poona, 1955. •
G22 : G. B. Palsule, "A Glimpse into the Käs'akrtsna School of Sanskrit Gram-
mar," PAIOG 17, 1953, 349-355.
G23: Edited, with editor's commentary, by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. Ajmer,
1965.
KÄUTSA (pre-Pänini?)
(NCat 5.106)
G24 : Sadashiv Lakshmidhar Katre, "Kautsavyâkarana: A Detailed Notice,"
NIA 1,1938,383-396.
G25 : Madhav Deshpande, "New Material on the Kautsa-Vyäkarana," joi 26,
1976-1977, 131-144.
PÄI^INI (350 B.C.?)
(Belvalkar, p. 10; Gardona, p. 260; G1624, p. 104)
Astädhyäyl ~ ' •
(NGat 1.468) (includes Dhätupätha, Ganapäfha)
G26 : Edited, with Dharanidhara's and Käsinätha's commentaries. Calcutta,
1809.
G27 : Edited in Otto Böhtlingk, Pâyini's acht Bücher grammatischer Regeln. 2 volumes.
Bonn,1839-1840.
G28 : Edited Varanasi, 1852, 1869.
G29 : Theodor Aufrecht, "Zwei Pänini zugeteilte Strophen," ZDMG 14, 1860,
581-583.
G30 : Edited, with Bhaftoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi, by Taranatha Tarkava-
caspati. Calcutta, 1863-1864. Without Siddhäntakaumudi, Calcutta, 1871.
G31 : Edited, withJayäditya and Vämana's iTäÄz, by Bala Sastri, Pan 8 (1873-
1874)-n.s. 3 (1878-1879). Reprinted , 2 volumes, Varanasi, 1876-1878.
G32 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "Dr. Goldstücker's Theory About Pänini's Technical
Terms," IA 6,1877,107-113. Reprinted GWRGB 1.496-510.
G33 : Edited in Telugu script. Madras, 1881, 1894.
G34 : Chapter 1. 1-5 edited and translated in W. Goonatilleke, PâninVs Eight
Books oj^Grammatical Sütras•, Bombay, 1882.
G35 : Dhätupätha edited, with Mädhava's Vrtti, by Damodara Sastri and Ganga-
dhara Sastri. Pöwn.s. 4 (1382)—19 (1897). Reprinted Varanasi, 1897.
G36 : Edited Bombay, 1883,1886,1888.
G37 : Edited, with Bha#oji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi9 and Hemacandra's
Lingänusäsana, by Sivarama Sarmän. Bombay, 1887.
r
G38 : Edited and translated into German by Otto Böhtlingk. Leipzig, 1887.
Reprinted Hildesheim, 1964.
G39 : F. Max Müller, "On the dhätupätha," IZAS, 3, 1887, 1-26.
G40 : Edited, with Jayäditya's and Vämana's Käsika, by Bhagwatprasada
Tripathi. 2 volumes. Varanasi, 1890.
G41 : Edited and translated, with translation of Jayäditya and Vämana's Kätikä,
by Srisa Chandra Vasu. 2 volumes. Allahabad, 1891. Reprinted Delhi,
1962.
G42 : Otto Franke, "Pâli marine (skr. manye, Pänini 1.4.106)," ZDMG 46, 1892,
311-312.
G43 : Pänini1's Grammatical Aphorisms Allahabad, 1892.
G44 : Georg Bühler, "The Rdbts of the Dhätupätha Not Found in Literature,"
WZKM 8,1894:17-42,122-136.
G45 : Otto Franke, "Miscellen; 1. a-pacasi, etc. 2. Pan. 6.3.57 (uda fwudaka),
Z.paksa — räjakuhjara94. iti — «etc.,' "ZDMG48,1894,84-88.
442 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G46 : F. Kielhorn "Pänini i' 3,11 svaritenädhikärah," in Festschrift Weber, pp. 29-32
Reprinted in Rau, pp. 290-293.
G47 : O. Böhtlingk, "Neue Miscellen: 4. Pänini's adhikàra," BGWL 1897, 46-48.
G48 : Sylvain Lévi, "Des Préverbes chez Pänini (sütra I, 4, 80-82)," MSL 14,
1906-1908,276-278.
G49 : Edited, with Jayäditya and Vämana's Käsikä, by Gangadhara Sastri. KSS
37. Varanasi, 1908.
G50 : George Abraham Grierson, "Väsudeva of Pänini IV, iii, 98," JRAS 1909,
1-22.
G50A : Selections from Asfädhyäyi and Käsikä translated into German by Richard
Garbe in O. Böhtlingk, ed., Sanskrit Chrestomathie, 3d part, Leipzig, 1909,
251-278.
G51 : Edited in grantha script. Cidambaram, 1910.
G52 : B. G. Mazumdar, "Väsudeva of Pänini," JRAS 1910, 170-171.
G53 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "Väsudeva of Pänini IV. 3.98," JRAS 1910, 168-170.
Reprinted in CWRGB 1.214-216.
G54 : Edited, with Bhatfoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudl, Trichinopoly, 1911-1912.
Published separately as Balamanorama Series 2, 1912.
G55 : Edited Arsagranthavali Series 8.6-7. Lahore, 1912.
G56 : Edited with Päniniyasiksä and Bhaftoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudl. Bombay,
1913.
G57 : Bruno Liebich, Zur Einführung in die indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft,
volume 2, Historische Einführung und Dhätupätha. SHAW 15. Heidelberg, 1919.
G58 : Dhätupätha edited by Bruno Liebich, vol. 3 of G57. Heidelberg, 1920.
G59 : Bruno Liebich, Materialen zum Dhätupätha. SHAW 7. Heidelberg, 1921.
G60 : Umesh Chandra Bhattacharjee, "The Evidence of Pänini on Väsudeva-
worship,"iHQ,l, 1925,483-489; 2,1926,409-410, 865.
G61 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "A Note on the Evidence of Päninian Väsudeva-
worship," IHQ,2, 1926,186-188, 864-865.
G62 : R. M. Bhusari, "A Short Note on the Term bhakti in Pänini's Sütras,"
ABORI 8,1926-1927, 198-199.
G63 : Edited, with editor's commentary, by Dayananda Sarasvati, 2 volumes.
Ajmer, 1927-1961.
G64 : Leonard Bloomfield, "On Some Rules of Pänini," JAOS 47, 1927, 61-70.
Reprinted in Hockett, pp. 157-165; Staal, pp. 266-272.
G65 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "On the Fourteen mahehara sütras," PAIOG 4,1927,
133-143.
G66 : Barend Faddegon, "The Mnemotechnics of Pänini's Grammar," PIGL 1,
Leiden, 1928. Also ActOD 7,1929,48-65. Reprinted G1625, pp. 275-285.
G67 : Bruno Liebich, Konkordanz Pänini-Candra. IndF 6. Breslau, 1928.
G68 : Edited, with Pänimyaiiksä and Kätyäyana's Värttikas, by S. Ghandrasekhara,
Sastrigal. Madras, 1928.
G69 : W. Galand, "A Rhythmic Law in Language," ActOD 9,1931, 59-68.
G70 : Raghu Vira, "Discovery of the Lost Phonetic Sutras of Pänini," JRAS 1931,
653-670.
G71 : Vidhusekhar Bhattacharya, "Pänini's Grammar and the Influence of
Prakrit on Sanskrit," IL 2, 1932,439-441.
G72 : K. G. Ghatterji, The anubandhas of Pänini," coj 1,1933,100-116.
G73 :' Hermann Buiskool, Püruatrasiddham: *Analytisch onderzoek aangaande het sys-
teem der Tripädi van PäninVs Astädhyäyi. Amsterdam, Paris, 1934. Translated
into English, Leiden, 1939.
G74 : K. G. Chatterji, "The Hoa sütras," JDL 24,1934,1-10.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 443

G75 : Vittore Pisani, "Pänini 1, 2, 23," RDSO 14,1934,84.

G76 : B. Breloer, "Die 14 pratyähära-sütras des Pänini", zu 10, 1935-1936, 133-
191.
G77 : K. G. Ghatterji, "A Rule of Pänini," coj 3,1935,17-28. .
G78 : —, "The Astädhyäyi and the Siddhäntakaumudi," coj3, 1935, 1-2.
G79 : S. P. Ghaturvedi, "Homogeneity of Letters in the Päninian System,"
PAIOG7, 1935,165-174.
G80 : Saraswati Prasad Chaturvedi, "Need for Rewriting Pänini's Grammar,"
NUJ 1,1935, 5-10.
G81 : Prabodh Chandra Lahiri, Concordance Pänini-Patanjali {Mahäbhäsya). IndF
10. Breslau, 1935.
G82 : Shridhar Shastri Pathak and Siddheshvar Shastri Chitrao, Word Index to
Pänini-sütrapätha andParisistas. GOSBORI, Series G-2. Poona, 1935.
G83 : I. S. Pawte, The Structure ojthe Astädhyäyi. Hubli, 1935.
G84 : Paul Thieme, "Bhäsya zu värttika 5 zu Pänini 1.1.9 und seine einheimischen
Erklärer; ein Beitrag zur Geschichte und Würdigung der indischen gram-
matischen Scholastik," NGGW 1935,171-216. Reprinted Staal, 299-332.
G85 : Barend Faddegon, Studies on PäninVs Grammar, VKAWA 38.1,1936.
G86 : Mangala Deva Shastri, Appendix III (A Comparison of the Rgvedapräti-
êâkhya with the Päninian Grammar), pp. 329-344 of his edition and trans-
lation of the Rgveda-prätisäkhya with the commentary of Uvata. Lahore,
1937.
G87 : Krishnadeva Upadhyaya, "New Verses of Pänini,"IHQ, 13, 1937, 167-171.
G88 : Edited with Kätyäyana's Värttikas and Paninïyasïksa by Sankara Rama
Sastri. Sri Balamanorama Series 2. Madras, 1937.
G89 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "On the Original Text of the Âstadhyâyl" NIA l, 1938,
562-569.
G90 : Pierre Boudon, "Une Application du raisonnement per l'absurde dans
l'interprétation de Pänini (lesjnäpakasiddhaparibhäsä) " JA 230,1938,65-121
Reprinted Gl 625, pp. 358-391.
G91 : Edited by Harisankara Pandeya. Patnâ, 1938.
G92 : P. E. Pavolini, "La Grammaticadi Pänini," Asiatica (Rome) 3.1,1938,1-9.
G93 : Jakob Wackernagel, "Eine Wortstellungsregel des Pänini and Winkers
Aleph-Beth-Regel," IF 56, 1938, 161-170. Reprinted Wackernagel, pp.
434-443.
G94 : V. N. Gokhale, "Studies in Pänini," PO 4, 1939, 97-120; 5,1940, 109-122.
G95 : V. S. Agrawala, "Pürväcärya samjnäsfor lakäras," NIA 3,1940-1941, 39-40.
G96 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "Technical Terms of the Astädhyäyi" PAIOG 9, 1940,
1191-1208.
G97 : , "Scholastic Disquisitions in the Päninian System of Grammar,"
BhV 2, 1940,59-63.
G98 : , "Pänini's Vocabulary—Its Bearing on His Date," WoolCV, pp.
46-50.
G99 : K. Madhava Krishna Sharma, "Technical Terms in the Astädhyäyi" JOR
14,1940, 259-267. Reprintedin G485, pp. 15-23.
GlOO : 9 "The Text ofïhe Astädhyäyi," UPHSJ13, 1940.
G101 : , "Some Problems in Pänini," JMU 13, 1941,203-225.
G102 : B. K. Ghosh, "Pürväcäryasin Pänini," DRBCV.pp.
G103 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "On References to Earlier Grammarians in the Astädhyäyi
and the Forms Sanctioned by Them," NUJ 7,1941,46-53.
G104 : y "On Pänini's sütra VI. 1.90—Wrong Wording or Corrupt Rea-
ding?" ABORI 23,-1942, 77-79.
444 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G105 : - -, "Significance of Pänirii's sütra VI. 1.92," NUJ 9,1943,68-69.

G106 :StenKonow, "The Authorship of the Sivasütras," ActOD 19, 1943,
291-328.
G107 : K. M. Shembavnekar, "Sanghasm Pänini," ABORI 25,1944,137-140.
G108 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "On the Arrangement of the taddhita sütras in the Astä-
dhyâyi;' BharKau 1945, 209-214.
G109 : B. K. Ghosh, "Aspect of pre-Päninian Sanskrit Grammar," BGLV 1, 334-
345.
s
Gl 10 - : A. B. Keith, "Pänini's Vocabulary," BharKau 1945,343-345.
G i l l : K. G. Chatterji, "Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammar," NIA 8, 1946,
51-53.
G112 : Vasudev Sharan Agrawala, "Current Proper Names (manusyanäma) in
Pänini," BharKau 1947,1049-1063.
Gl 13 : Translated into French by Louis Renou, La Grammaire de Pänini. 2 volumes
Paris, 1948-1954. Revised edition, including Sanskrit text, Paris, 1966.
Gl 14 : S. P. Chaturvedi', "On the Technique of Anticipation in the Application of
the Pâninian Sutras," SPAIOG 15,1949,189.
Gl 15 : P. C. Divanji, "BhagavadgM and Astadhyâyï^ ABORI 30,1949,263-276.
Gl 16 : Gajanan Balakrishna Palsule, "An Interpolated Passage in the Astfdhyayi"
ABORI30, 1949,135-144.
Gl 17 : Siddhesvar Varma, "The Vedic Accent and the Interpretations of Pänini,"
SPAIOG 15,1949, 17.
Gil8 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Päninian Principles of Determining the
Desired Import ofWords," JAHRS 21,1950-52,133-141.
G119 : Edited, with editor's Tattvaprakäeikä, by Gangadatta Sastri, 2 volumes, GSS
8. Hardwar, 1950-1962.
G120 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "Some Aspects of the Technique of the anuvrtti Procedure
i n t h e ^ / M ^ f / ' P A i o c 13.2,1951,109-112.
G121 : Suddhir Kumar Gupta, "Authorship of the Phonetic sütras edited by Dayä-
nanda,"SPAIOG 16,1951,174-176 (summary);po 16,1952,66-69.
G122 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Kinds of Agents (kartä) as depicted by
Pänini," Vâk 3,1953,129-133.
G123 : Shrisrshna Sakharam Bhawe, "Pänini'sRules and Vedic Interpretation,"
PAIOG 17,1953,231-240. Also IL 16,1955,237-249.
G124 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "A Study into the Principles of Preference m the Appli-
cation of Päninian sütras and Their Working," SPAIOG 17, 1953,91-92.
G12 5 : S. K. Gupta, ' 'Nature and Authorship of the Grammatical Works Attribu-
ted to Maharsi Dayänanda Sarasvati," SPAIOG 17,1953, 93-94.
G126 : G. B. Palsule, "A Concordance of the Sanskrit dhatupäthas" BDGRI 15.1-2,
1953,1-203. Reprinted as DCDS 14, Poona, 1955.
Gl27 : Louis Renou, "Études pâninéennes, I : Les Transitions dans la grammaire
de Pänini," JA 241,1953,412-427.
G128 : Subhadra Jha, "Unjustifiability of the Principle of jüäpana on the Basis
of the Astadhyâyï of Pänini," PAIOG 17,1953, 240.
G129 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Importance of the First Words of the gana-
päfha-s," BhV 15,1954, 29-34.
G130 : — , "Some Unknown Senses of the Plural Number as Shown by
Pänini," JUB 23.2,1954,45-48.
G131 : , "On the Original Reading of a Päninian sütra," joi 4, 1954-1955,
268-269.
G132 : William Sidney Allen, "Zero and Pänini," IL 16,1955,106-113.
G133 : Priyatosh Banerji, "Some Observations on the Interpretation of the Pänini
BIBLIOGRAPHY 445

sütra Väsudevarjunäbhyäm vun and the antiquity offthe Bhägavatas," JBRS 40.1,
1955,74-79. ,
Gl 34 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Some Characteristics of the Ancient vrttis on
the Astâdhyâyî," IHQ, 31,1955,168-174.
G135 : Robert Birwé, "Interpolations in Pänini's Astädhyäyi" BonnOS 3, 1955,
27-52.
G136 : S. K. Ghatterji, "On the Interpretation of a Rule of Pänini," IL 16, 1955,
194-195.
Gl 37 : Edited with editor's Malayalam commentary by I. G. Ghacko. Ernakulam,
1955.
G138 : Louis Renou, "Les nipatana-sütra de Pänini et questions* diverses," PIGI 1,
1955,103-130.
G139 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Some Objections on the Textual Order of
the Astädhyäyi and Their Refutation," JGJRI 13,1956,119-129.
G140 : , "Some Anomalies in the Astädhyäyi and Their Justifications," BhV
15,1956,110-119.
G141 : Rajendra Chandra Hazra, "Some Observations on the Repetition {anu-
vrtti) of'sesa' from Pânini's Rules sas thi Sese," JASL 22, 1956, 99-131.
G142 : Sergiu Ai-George, "Le Sujet grammatical chez Pänini," ActOP 1, 1957,
39-47.
G143 : G. B. Palsule, "The Sanskrit Dhätupäßas: A Critical Study." Ph.D. diss.,
Poona University, 1957. Published Poona, 1961.
G144 : Vinayak W. Paranjpe, ''Analysis of Gase Suffixes with Special Reference to
Pânini's Grammar," ciDO 24,1957, 574-577.
G145 : G. Kunhan Raja, «'The siva sätras of Pänini (an Analysis)," AOR 13, 1957,
65-81.
G146 : Th. Simenscly, Grammatica lui Pänini. Bucharest, 1957.
G147 : Robert Birwe, "Variae Lectiones in Adhyäya IV and V der Astädhyäyi,"
ZDMG108, 1958,133-154. . >. •
G148 : Yutaka Ojihara, "Causeries vyäkaranique (I) : 1.1.62 vis-à-vis de 1.1.56,"
JIBSt6,1958,302-305;8,1960, 369-370.
G149 : G. B. Palsule, "Groupings, anubandhas and Other Technical Devices Used
in the dhätupäthas," BDGRI 19.1-2, 1958, 1-30. Reprinted in G143, pp. 59-
88.
G150 : —, "A Brief Account of the Different dhätupäßas," Festschrift Turner,
pp. 103-133. Reprinted in G143, pp. 27-56.
G151 : S. M. Ayachit, «Ganapätha—A Critical Study." Ph.D. diss., Poona Uni-
versity, 1959.
Gl 52 : Kapil Deo, "A Critical Edition of Ganapätha of Pänini." Ph.D. diss., Banaras
Hindu University, 1959.
G153 : G. T. Deshpande, "Extended Application of Some ¥än\m-sütras" SPAIOG
21, 1959, 144. Full paper in one of the annual numbers of the Vidarbha
Samsodham Mandai, Nagpur.
G154 : Yutaka Ojihara, "Causeries vyäkaranique (II) : Antériorité du ganapätha
par rapport au sütrapätha", jiBSt 7, 1959, 785-797.
G155 : G. M. Patil, "The visarga-sandhi in Pânini's Grammar," SPAIOG 21, 1959,
143.
G156 : S. M. Ayachit, <(Ganapätha: A Critical Study," IL 22,1961,1-63.
G157 : Robert Birwé, Der Ganapätha zu den Adhyäya IV und V der Grammatik
Pänini : Versuch einer Rekonstruktion. Wiesbaden, 1961.
G158 : Yutaka Ojihara, "Causeries vyäkaranique (II): Addenda et corrigenda:
La Nécessité ultime cje suf LL34-36 ? "JIBSt9,1961-62,749-753.
446 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G159 : Käraka section edited, with related section of Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhänta-
kaumudï, by Umesh Chandra Pandeya. Vidyabhavana Samskrta Grantha-
mala 60. Varanasi, 1961.
G160 : Ludo Rocher, "Geschiedenis en achtergrond van de Pänini-interpretatie,"
in Handelingen can hetxxive Vlaams Filologen-congres (Lernen, 6-8 April 1961 ),
pp.112-119.
G161 : S. Sengupta, "Contribution Towards a Critical Edition of the Ganapätha"
JASBe 3.3-4, 1961,89-186. /
G162 : Betty Shefts, Grammatical Method in Pänini: His Treatment of Sanskrit Present
Stems, AOSE 1. New Haven, 1961.
G163 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "The Accentuation of arya- in Pänini and in
theVeda,"BDCRi23,1962-1963, 94-100. Reprinted in Gl 596.
G164 : Vaidikaprakrlya section edited, with related section of Bhattoji Diksita's
Siddhântakaumudï, by Uma Shankara Sharma. Vidyabhavana Samskrta
Granthamala 80. Varanasi, 1962.
G165 ; M. D, Pandit, "Zero in Pänini," JOI 11.1,1962, 53-66.
G166 : Sukumar Sen, "The Names of the samäsas in Pänini's Grammar," BPSC 3,
1962,90-92.
G167 : Johan Frederick Staal, "A Method of Linguistic Description: The Order
of Consonants According to Pänini," Lg 38, 1962, 1-10.
G168 : Edited, with Päniniyasiksä, Säntanava's (?) Phitsütras, Bhattoji Diksita's
Siddhantakaumudi and editor's Sugandha, by Acyutananda Sastri, Kasi, 1963.
G169 : E. A. Grantovskij, "Plemennoe ob edinenie parSu-parfava u Pänini," in
W. Ruben et al., eds., Istorija i kuFtura drevnej Indii (kxxvi Mazdunarödnomu
kongressu vostokovedov). Moscow, 1963, pp. 68—100.
G170 : A. N. Jani, "An Emendation of a sütra of Pänini," joi 12,1963, 71-73.
G171 : Kapil Deva, "Significance of the Word prakära in the sütras of the Asfädh-
yayï," VIJ 1,1963, 239-246.
G172 : S. D.Joshi, "The Two Methods of Pänini's Interpretations," summarized
inspAioc22,1963,40-41. PCASS-A 5,1965 (JUP 23), 53-61.
Gl 73 : Chandra Kant Pandey, Pänini and His Astâdhyâyî. Patna, 1963.
G174 : M. D. Pandit, "Some Linguistic Principles in Pänini's Grammar," IL 24,
1963,50-69.
G175 , "Päninr—A Study in Noncompounded Word Structures," VIJ 1,
1963,224-238.
G176 : Bommakanti Ramalinga Sastri, "Pänini's Method of Morphemic Analy-
sis," sPAioc 22,1963,128.
G177 : Edited with analysis and translated into Hindi by Brahmadatta Jijnasu
(vols. 1-2) and Prajna Devi (vol.3) as Astâdhyayïbhasyaprathamavrtti.T&.am.
Lai Kapur Trust Series 32,1964-1968.
G178 : George Cardona, "On Translating and Formalizing Päninian Rules," JOI
14,1964-1965,306-314.
G179 , "The Formulation of Pänini 7.3.73," joi 14,1964,38-41.
G180 : Sureshachandra Dhyaneshwar Laddu, "Pänini and the 'akalakam vyäka-
ranam,'" IL 25,1964,187-199. Reprinted CIDO 26.3,1969, 99-104!
G181 : Vidya Niwas Misra, •'Pänini's Grammar as a Mathematical Model," IL
25,1964,157-178. Reprinted in G206.
G182 : , "The Structural Framework of Pänini's Linguistic Analysis of
Sanskrit," PICL 9 (Janua Linguarum, series main 12), 1964, 743-747.
G183 : Rosane Rocher, " «Agent' etcobjet' chez Pänini," JAOS 84,1964,44-54.
G184 : , "The Technical Term hetu in Pänini's Astädkyäyi, VIJ 2, 1964?
31~40f
BIBLIOGRAPHY 447

G185 M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "An Accentual Note on vikata-in Pänini and

the Veda", IL 26,1965, 18-26.
G186 : Saroja Sadashiv Chitari, "Pänini and the Pâninîyas on the Concept of
g!Hw,"pAioG 22.2,1965,88-92.
G187 ; G. T. Deshpande, «Päninian Concept oîpada," NUJ 16.1, 1965, 62-69.
G188 : George Cardona, "On Pânini'sMorphophonemicPrinciples," Lg41, 1965,
225-238.
G189 : do, «On Translating and Formalizing Päninian Rules," JOI 14, 1965,
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G190 : Murray Fowler, "How Ordered are Pänini's Rules?" JAOS 85, 1965, 44-47.
G191 : K. Kunjunni Raja, «Pänini's Attitude Towards laksanä" ALB 29, 1965,
177-187. Summarized in SPAIOG 22,1963, 247.
G192 : Y. Ojihara, "Ä la Recherche de la motivation ultérieure du Pänini-
^ r a 1.1.62," MIK 6-7,1967, 69-85.
Gl 93 : Edited by D. P. S. Patanjal as Astädhyäyiprakaiikä. New Delhi, 1965.
G194 : Rosane Rocher, "La Formation due futur périphrastique sanskrit selon
Pänini: Un Example de description linguistique," AIONSL 6, 1965, 15-22.
G195 :J. Frits Staal, "Context-sensitive Rules in Pänini," FL 1, 1965, 63-72.
Reprinted in Festschrift Emeneau, pp. 332-339.
G196 : , "Euclid and Pänini," PEW 15,1965, 99-116.
G197 : Bhagiratha Prasada Tripathi, Päninlyadhätupäthasamiksä. ' POWSBST 14.
Varanasi, 1965.
G198 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "The Three Päninian Suffixes JSfac, inUjy, and
iftn,"PCASS-A6,1966. Also JUP 23,1966,133-138.
G199 : , "An Accentuai Problem in Pänini and the Veda à Propos of the
Word häyana-," BDCRI 25,1966,43—58. Also Vedasamiksä (Proceedings of the
Vedic Seminar). Tirupati, 1967.
G200 : M.S.Bhat, "The Vedic Stem râtrï- and Pänini,"JBBRAS 41-42, 1966-1967,
8-11.
G201 : Robert Birwé, Studien zu Adhyäya IIIder AstädhyäylPäninis. Wiesbaden, 1966.
G202 : G. T. Deshpande, "Päninian Treatment of krama-samädhi" SPAIOG 23.1,
1966,136.
G203 : A. N.Jani, "Thetivasütrasand Music," JOI 15, 1966,400-402.
G204 : Bimal Krishna Matilal, "Indian Theorist on the Nature of the Sentence,"
FL 2, 1966,377-393.
G205 : V. P. Limaye, "Necessity for New värttikas to Pänjni 1.1.27 and 5.2.39,"
VIJ 4,1966,228-229.
G206 : Vidya Niwas Mishra, The Descriptive Technique of Pänini: An Introduction.
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G207 : G. B. Palsule, " iSamjnäyam'> in Pänini," PCASS-A 10,1966. Also JUP 25,1967,
31-75. '
G208 : M. D. Pandit, "Mathematical Representation of Some Päninian sütras,"
PGASS-A 7, 1966. Also JUP 23, 1966, 139-152.
G209 : —-, "Päninian IT-samjnä—a Symbolic Zero," BDCRI 25, 1966, 77-94.
G210 : Sailendranath Senguptà, "Contribution Towards a Critical Edition of the
dhatupafia," JASBe 8, 1966, 191-217.
G211 :J. Frits Staal, "Pänini Tested by Fowler's Automaton," JAOS 86, 1966,
206-209.
G212 : Sergiu Al-George, "The Semiosis of Zero According to Pänini," EW 17,
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G213 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "The System of ÄH-Accentuation in Panini
and Veda." Ph.D. diss., Poona University, 1967.
448 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G214 : George Gardona, "Negations in Päninian Rules," Lg 43,1967, 34-56.

G215 : , "Pânini's Syntactic Categories," JOI 16,1967, 201-215.
G216 : G. T. Deshpande, "Pänini : sütras VII.1.9 and 10," NUJ 18, 1967, 192-200.
G217 : G. V. Devasthali, Anubandhas of Pänini. PGASS-B 2. Poona, 1967.
G218 : Kapil Deva, The Ganapätha Ascribed to Pänini. Kurukshetra, 1967.
G219 :S. M. Katre, Päninian Studies I. BCBCSJS 52. Poona, 1967.
G220 : S. D. Laddu, Evolution of the Sanskrit Language from Pänini to Patanjali
with Reference to the Primary Formations. Ph.D. diss., Poona University,
1967.
G221 : V. P. Limaye, "Pänini 6.1.121 : avapathäsi ca or apavathäsi ca?" VIJ 5, 1967,
193-195.
G222 : -, "The Basis of Pänini (8.1.59 and 65) in Rgveda," KAG 1967,
282-288.
G223 : B. A. Van Nooten, "Pänini's Replacement Technique and the Active
Finite Verb," Lg43 ? 1967, 883-902.
G224 : Buddha Prakash, "On Pänini's sütraTV. 3.98, väsudevärjunäbhyam vun,"
Kuj 1, 1967, 1-19.
G225 : M. S. Narayana Murti, "Ekasamjnädhikära in the Asîadhyayî" svuoj 10,
1967,11-22.
G226 : Y. Ojihara, "Causeries vyäkaranique (IV):jäti «genus' et deu definitions
pré-patanjaliennes," JIBSt 16, 1967, 451-459. Reprinted G1625, pp.
425-431.
G227 :— , "Sur l'Énoncé paniniéen astrïvisaya (IV. 1.63): Deux Interpréta-
tions et leur rapport avec le ganapätha" ALB 31-32 {Festschrift V. Raghavan)
1967-1968,125-143.
G228 : Sergiu Ai-George, "The Extra-linguistic Origin of Pänini's Syntactic
Categories and Their Linguistic Accuracy," JOI Î8, 1968, 1-7.
G229 : George Cardona, "Pänini's Definition, Description and Uses of suarita"
Festschrift F.B.J. Kuiper, pp. 448-461.
G230 : Amrit Madhav Ghatge, "Pänini I.4.32," IL 29,9,1968,150-154.
G231 : S.M. Katre, Pâninian Studies II-IV: Dictionary of Pänini. 3 volumes.
DGBcsjs 53, 62, 63. Poona, 1968-1969.
G232 : G.B. Palsule, "Some Primary Nominal Formations Missing in Pänini,"
PGASS-A 18. Poona, 1968. Also JUP 27,1968,145-151.
G233 : —, "The Role of kr in the Sanskrit Grammatical Terms," PGASS-A 24.
Poona, 1968. Also JUP 29, 1969, 11-29.
G234 : C. Ramachari, "Taksan and Similar Artisans in the Astädhyäyi," MO 1,
1968,105-114.
G235 : Rosane Rocher, La Théorie des voix du verbe dans Vécole Paninéenne (le 14e
ähnikä). ULBTFPL 35. Brussels, 1968.
G236 : , "Dhätupätha et dialectologie indienne," VIDK 2.II, 1968, 699-707.
G237 : Kapil Muni Tiwari, "Pänini's Description of Nominal Compounds."
Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1968.
G238 : H.S. Ananthanarayana, "The Feminine Formation in Pänini's Grammar,"
IL 30.2,1969, 1-12. ,
G239 : Dhätupätha edited by Kanakalala Sarma. HSS 281. Varanasi, 1969.
G240 : Dhätupätha edited Amritsar, 1969.
G241 : Part 2, including Lingänusäsana, edited by Dayananda Sarasvati with
editor's commentary. Ajmer, 1969-1970.
G242 : K. V. Abhyankar, "A Brief Note on the Chronological Order of the Phi*-
- Sutras, the Unädisütras and the Açtadhyayï," JOI 19? 1969-1970, 331-332,
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G243 : Sergiu Al-George, "Sign (laksanâ) and Propositional Logic in Pänini," EW
19, 1969, 176-193.
G244 : George Cardona, Studies in Indian Grammarians, volume 1, The Method of
Description Reflected in the Sivasütras. Transactions of the American Philologi-
cal Society 59.1. Philadelphia, 1969.
G245 : Dayashankar Madhusudan Joshi, Pänini's Taddhita Affixation Rules.
Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1969.
G246 : S. D. Joshi, "Sentence Structure According to Pänini," IA 3d series 3, 1969,
14-26.
G247 : Paul Kiparsky and J. Frits Staal, "Syntactic and Semantic Relations in
Päninij" FL 5, 1969, 83-117.
G248 :B.A.Van Nooten, "Pänjni's Theory of Verbal Meaning," FL 5, 1969,
242-255.
G249 : M. S. Narayana Murti, "Two Versions of the ekasamjnädhikära" svuoj 12,
1969,75-84.
G250 : Edited, with Jayäditya's and Vämana's Kâêikâ, by^iSri Narayana Misra.
2 volumes, KSS 37. Varanasi, 1969-1972^
G251 : Narendra Chandra Nath, Päninian Interpretation of the Sanskrit Language.
BHUSS 2. Varanasi, 1969.
G252 : M. D. Pandit, "Pänini: A Statistical Picture of Sanskrit Sounds," IA 3d
series 3, 1969, 128-138.
G253 : Buddha Prakash, "On Pänini's sätra V.3.99," Festschrift Aditya JVatha Jha
3,394-404.
G254 : Rosane Rocher, "The Concept of Verbal Root in Indian Grammar (à
Propos of Pänini 1.3.1 )," FL 5,1969, 73-82.
G255 : David Ellis Rogers, "A Study on the Gontext of Pänini's Kärakas," Ph.D.
diss., University of Michigan, 1969.
G256 : Albercht Wezler, Paribhäsä IV, V and SV; Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der
einheimischen indischen grammatischen Scholastik. Berlin, Zurich, 1969.
G257 : Laidslav Zgusta, "Pänini—Descriptivist or Transformationalist?" AO 37,
1969,404-415.
G258 : Saroja V. Bhate, 'Pre-Päninian Grammatical- Elements in Pänini's
AstädhyäyV Ph.D. diss., University of Poona, 1970.
G259 : George Cardona,<(The Päninian View Regarding Agency and Animation,''
Atom 2-6,1970-1975,135-146.
G260 : S "Some Principles of Pänini's Grammar," JIP 1,1970,40-74.
G261 : , "A Note on Pänini's Technical Vocabulary," JOI 19, 1970, 195-
212.
G262 : Sadashiv Ambadas Dange, "Some Peculiarities of the Eastern Dialect
According to Pänini," VSMV 1970,173-198.
G263 : Madhav Deshpande, "Pänini and Pâninïyas on Dialectical Variation in
Sanskrit," JOR 40-41, 1970-1972, 49-74.
G264 : S. D. Laddu, "A Linguistic Phenomenon from the Mahäbhärata," R.tam
2-6,1970-1975,69-72.
G265 : Narendra Chandra Nath, (iAre Feminine Bases prätipadikäs According to
Pänini?" VIJ 8, 1970, 82-85.
G266 : G. B. Palsule, "Some Views of Pänini and His Followers on Object-lan-
guage and Metalanguage," PGASS-A 36. Poona, 1970. Also JUP 33, 1971,
, 1-7. Reprinted in AGUT 2.2,. 1973, 310-320.
G267 : Sukumar Sen, Päninica, CSCRS 74. Calcutta, 1970.
G268 : B. A. Van Nooten, "The Vocalic Declensions in Pänini's Grammar," Lg
46,1970,13-32,
450 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G269 : Edited, with Purusottamadeva's Bhäsävrtti. PBS 9. Varanasi, 1971.

G270 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "Vedic starya- and Pänini 3.1.123," JGJKSV
27-28, 1971-1972, 21-28.
G271 : G. T. Deshpande, "Import of the Term deva-vanV in his Indological Papers I.
Nagpur 1971, pp. 29-48.
G272 : , "Päninian Concept of pada" in his Indological Papers I. Nagpur,
1971, pp. 49-57.
G273 : , "Päninian Concept of pragrhya" in his Indological Papers I. Nagpur,
1971, pp. 58-65.
G274 : j"Päninian Treatment of krama-sandhi" in his Indological Papers I.
Nagpur, 1971, pp. 66-77.
G275 : — , "Ärsa prayogas and Päninian Rules" in his Indological Papers I.
Nagpur, 1971, pp. 78-89.
G276 : A. N. Jani, "Fresh Light on Pänini's sütra 'tasyädita udättam ardhahras-
vara' (1.2.32)," JGJKSV 27-28, 1971-1972, 261-264. Also PAIOG 24, 1972,
257-259.
G277 : D.M.Joshi,"OnExpressingA;ûrato,àProposofPanini2.3.1,"'iL32,1971,
107-112.
G278 : S . M. Katre, Päninian Studies V-VII: Dictionary of Pänini: Ganapätha.
DCBCSJS 72-74. Poona, 1971.
G279 : S. C. Laddu, "Vedic Forms and Pänini—a Glance," Festschrift Rajeshwar
Shastri Dravid, English section, pp. 54-68.
G280 : George Cardona, "Cause and Causal Agent: The Päninian View," joi 21,
1971, 22-40. Reprinted in AGUT 2.2,1973, 354-381.
G281 : Y. Ojihara, "Un Chapitre de la Saddaniti compare aux données pâninee-
nnes," JA 259, 1971,83-97.
G282 : Rama Nath Sharma, i(Padavidhi m Pänini." Ph.D. diss., University of
Rochester, 1971.
G283 : M. D. Pandit, "Pänini : Statistical Study of Sanskrit Formations," ABORI
52,1971,175-209.
G284 : G. M. Patil "Päninian Formation of Sanskrit and English Sandhis" (abs-
tract), PAIGLI, 1971,212.
G285 : Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Samskrtadhätukosa. Delhi, 1971.
G286 : Hartmut Scharfe, Pänini's Metalanguage, MAPS 89. Philadelphia, 1971. "
G287 : Jag Dev Singh, "Pänini's Theory of Language," KUJ 5, 1971, 73-86. Also
PAIGL 1, 1971, 257-270. AISOIJDL 1, 1972, 80-96.
G288 : K. M. Tiwari, "Asiddham bahirangam antarange : A Metarule of Ruleordering
in Pänini," IL 32,1971,241-257.
G289 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "Pänini 5.2.28-29," JGJKSV 28.3-4, 1972, 79-
100.
G290 : H. S. Ananthanarayana, "A Syntactic Classification of Verbs in Pänini's
Grammar," AiCL 3, 1972, 30.
G291 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "Vedic sriyase and Pänini 3.4.9," vij 10, 1972,
7-10.
G292 : ———, "Päninian System of &r£-suffixation and Accentuation," in Pänini
Seminar. Kurukshetra, 1972, 10 pp.
G293 : Saudamini Bahulikar, 'Some Criteria for Determining the Insertions in
the AstädhyäyV Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1972.
G294 : S. L. Athalekar, "Pänini's Way of Mentioning Roots," in Pänini Seminar,
Kurukshetra, 1972, 6 pp.
G295 : George Cardona, "Pänini's Use of the Term upadeèa and the ekänta and
anekänta Views Regarding anubandhas," SPISG 4, 1972, 23-25,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 451

G296 : Karunasindhu Das, "On Indicatory Letters and Symbols (anubandhas) in

Päninian Pronouncements (upadesas)," SPAIOC 26, 1972, 101-102.
G297 : Madhav Murlidhar Deshpande, "Päninian Procedure of taparakarana: A
Historical Investigation," KZ 86,1972, 207-254.
G298 : Sukheswar Jha, "A Study of the Päninian System of Accent." Ph.D. diss.,
Darbhanga University, 1972.
G299 : S. D. Laddu, "The Device of Contiguity as a Key to Interpreting Pänini's
Rules," GASS-St 1, 1972, 157-171.
G300 : P. D. Nawathe, "Ritualistic Prolation and Its Treatment in Pänini's
Grammar," GASS-St 1, 1972, 55-64.
G301 :G. B. Palsule, "Pänini 3.4.87-88 vis-à-vis Vedic Imperatives in -si,"
JGJKSV 27-28,1971-1972, 443-453.
G302 : /"Pänini's Treatment of Tense and Mood Formations," CASS-St 1,
1972,173-183.
G303 : M. D. Pandit, "Pänini—a Study in Abbreviations," Vimarsa (Delhi) 1
(English section), 1972, 21-30.
G304 : J. D. Singh, "Pänini's Technique of Description," KUJ 6, 1972, 137-150.
Also Festschrift Charudeva Shastri, p p 279-293.
G305 : and K. Doraswamy, "The Case: Tolkappiyam and Pänini, a
Comparative Study," KUJ 4, 1972, 119-129.
G306 : P. S. Subrahmanyam, "Deep Structure and Surface Structure in Pänini,"
(abstract), AICL 3, 1972,20-21. Fullpaper IL 36, 1975,346-366.
G307 : Ram Nath Sharma, "Referential Indices in Pänini," AICL 3, 1972, 19-20.
G308 : Vishva Bandhu, New'Värttikas to Pänini's Grammar. Hoshiarpur, 1972.
G309 : Albrecht Wezler, "Marginalien zu Pänini's Astâdhyayï. I: sthänin" KZ 86,
,1972,7-20.
G310 . : Saudamini Bahulikar, "Concerning the Structure of Pänini's Astâdhyayî"
IL 34,1973,75-99.
G311 : George Cardona, "On the Interpretation of Pänini 1.4.105-8," ALB 37,
1973, 1-47.
G312 : Murray Fowler, "Pänini's Primary Accent-rules," AGUT 2.2,1973,322-335.
G313 : B. S. Godse, "Concept of vipratisedha in Päninian Grammar," ABORI 54,
1973,250-256.
G314 : Jan Gonda, "Pänini and Modern Linguistics," AGUT 2.2, 1973, 335-352.
G315 : Edited by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Bahalgarh, Haryana, 1973.
G316 : T. S. Paik, "Pänini's Treatment of the Augment i in Sanskrit." Ph. D. diss.,
University of California, 1973.
G317 : M. D. Pandit, "Formal and Non-formal in Pänini," ABORI 54, 1973,
179-192.
G318 : Anil C. Sinha, "Generative Semantics and Pänini's kärakas" joi 23, 1973,
27-39.
G319 : S. Bahulikar, "Use of the Particle ca in the Astädhyäyf," CASS-St 2, 1974,
67-82.
G320 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "Pänini 6.1 209-210," GDSFV 1974, 189-193.
G321 : Käraka section edited, with related section of Bhattoji Dîksita's Siddhânta-
kaumudî and English explanation, by Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Calcutta,
1974.
G322 : K. V. Abhyankar, "Upalekhasütram," ABORI 54, 1974, 45-76.
G323 : George Cardona, "On Pänini's Metalinguistic Use of Cases," in Festschrift
Charudeva Sastri, 305-326.
G324 : , "Pänini's Kärakas: Agency, Animation and Identity," JIP 2, 1974,
231-306. •
452 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G325 K. G. Chattopadhyaya, "Did Pänini Envisage ''A' as a Close (samvrta)

Vowel?" in Festschrift Charudeva Sastri, pp. 194-205.
G326 G. V. Devasthali, "A propos ardhamätraläghava ßaribhäsa," vij 12, 1974,
96-102.
G327 , "Väkya According to the munitraya of Sanskrit Grammar," in
Festschrift Charudeva Shastri, pp. 206-215.
G328 Karl Hoffman, "Pänini VII.2.69 sanim sasanivamsam," MSS 32, 1974, 73-80.
G329 , "Pänini V.4, 61 ativyathane," MSS 33, 1975, 45-50.
G330 S. D. Joshi, "Pänini's Rules 1.4.49-51," SPAIOG 27, 1974,442-443.
G331 "Pänini's Treatment of kâraka-rdations," in Festschrift Charudeva
Sastri, pp. 258-270.
G332 : Sudesh Kumari, "A Study of Anubandhas in Päninian Grammar," Ph. D.
diss., University of Delhi, 1974.
G333 : Mahavir, "Some Anomalies Regarding Astädhyäyi" SPAIOG 27, 1974, 392.
G334 : N. V. Rajagopalan, "Käraka in Paninian Grammar" (abstract). PAIGL2,
1974,173.
G335 : Aleka Chandra Sarangi, "An Enquiry into Pänini's Placement of the
tacchilika Suffixes Within the Present Suffixes Section," SPAIOG 27, 1974, 239.
Full paper in PCASs-E 4 (cAss-St.3), 1976, 121-129.
G336 : Krishna Kumar Sharma, "Päninian Concepts of Morphophonemics,"
SPAIOG 27, 1974,392.
G337 : J. D. Singh, "Phonologic Component in Pänini," PAICL 2, 1974, 7-46.
G338 : — , "Pänini's Theory of kârakas," IJDL 3, 1974 287-320,
G339 : Kailas Pati Tripathi, "Presupposition of Pänini," SPAIOC 27, 1974, 232-233.
G340 : Satyakam Varma, "Technical Terms of Pänini," SPAIOG 27, 1974, 230.
G341 : , "Importance of Mahesvara-sütras," SPAIOG 27, 1974, 229.
G342 : George Cardona, "On Rules of Pänini's Grammar Said to Expatiate on
Other Rules," JOI 25, 1975-76, 241-251.
G343 : George Cardona, "A Note on the Formulation of Pänini 6-1-67," AOR
Silver Jubilee Volume, 1975, 11-20.
G344 : Madhav Deshpande, "The Scope of Homogeneous Representation in
Pänini," AOR Silver Jubilee Volume, 1975, 271-291.
G345 : , "Phonetics of Fin Pänini," ABORI 56, 1975,45-65*.
G346 : Venkatesha Shastri Joshi, "The Significance of the Word 'Bhäsä' in the
Astädhyäyl" ABORI 56, 1975, 212-218.
G347 : H. P. Dvivedi, "The svärthika Secondary Affixes in Sanskrit According to
Pänini," IL 36, 1975, 152-156.
G348 : RamNathSharma,*cReferéntialIndicesinPânini,"nj 17.1-2, 1975,31-39.
G349 : Albrecht Wezler, Bestimmung und Angabe der Funktion von Sekundär-Suffixen
durch Pänini. Wiesbaden, 1975.
G350 : H. S. Ananthanarayana, Four Lectures of Pänini3 s Asfadhyâyï. Annamalainagar,
1976.
G351 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, "Pänini III.iv.10 and the Vedic Facts,"
svuojl9, 1976, 5-10.
G352 : Pratibha P. Gokhale, «A Note on the paribhäsä 'stipa sapanubandhana,"
PAioG 27, 1976, 377-378.
G353 : , "Various. Ways of Naming a Verbal Root in the Astädhyäyf,"
PGASS-E4 (CASS-St3), 1976, 101-111.
G354 : S. D. Joshi, ««Pänini's Rules: 1.4.49, 1.4.50 and 1.4.51," PCASS-E 4 (cASS-St
3), 1976, 59-71.
G355 : K . Kunjunni Raja, "Pänini's Concept of a Sentence," ALB 40? 1976,
1.65-171,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 453

G356 : J. L. Shaw, "Subject and Predicate," JIP 4, 1976, 155-180.

G357 : K. A. Sivaramakrishna Sastri, "Some Anomalous Sütras in the Astädhyäyi,"
BDCRI35.3-4,J976, 132-136.
G358 : Satyakam Varma, "Technical Terms of Pänini," svsi 1976, 8-102.
G359 : , "Phonetic Arrangement of Pänini," svsi 1976, 62-79.
G360 : Indu Bala, "A Study of Phonetic Theories in the Light of Ancient Indian
Grammarians (with special reference to Pänini)." Ph.D. diss., Kurukshe-
tra University, 1977.
G361 : G. V. Devasthali, "Vedic Hiatus Nasalization and Pänini," VGPCV 1977,
38-46.
G362 : R. B. Diksitulu, "A Study of Pratyayas in Pänini's Astädhyäy" Ph.D. diss.,
Andhra University, 1977.
G363 : H . P. Dvivedi, Studies in Pänini: Technical Terms of the Astädhyäyi. Delhi, 1977.
G364 : P. B. Junnankar, An Introduction to Pänini. Baroda, 1977.
G365 : Edited, with Lingänusäsana and Säntanava's (?) Phitsütras, by Virajananda
Daivakarana, Haryana Sahitya Samsthan, 1977.
G366 : K. G. Acharya, "The Etymology of Rävana à Propos Pänini IV.1.112"
(abstract), PAIGL 4, 1978, 299.
G367 : Sergiu AI-George, "Are Pänini's sütras Descriptive or Prescriptive Senten-
ces?" ABORi 58-59,1978,27-36.
G368 : Biswanath Bhattacharya, "A Proposed Emendation on the Tibetan Trans-
lation of Pänini's Astädhyäyi 1/1/7," ABORI 58-59, 1978, 511-512. '
G369 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "Import of the Word 'sisukrandaya' in Astädhyäyi
IV.3.88," Rtam 10, 1978-79, 21-22.
G370 : S. D. Joshi, "The Ordering of the Rules in Pänini's Grammar," ABORI
58-59,1978,667-674.
G371 : V. K. Kshirsagar, "Pänini Explained and Defended." Ph.D. diss., Univer-,
sity of Bombay, 1978.
G372 : V. P. Limaye, <(Akumäramyasah Pänineh Corrupt for akumäriyaêah Pänineh?"
ABORI 58-59, 1978, 727-732.
G373 : Mahavir, Pänini as a Grammarian {with Special Reference to Compound Forma-
tions). Delhi, 1978.
G374 : Siddhesvara Varma, Pänini and Elision. Panjab University Indological
Series 12. Hoshiarpur, 1978.
G375 : M. D. Balàsubrahmanyam, "Ase-words in Pänini and the Veda," ITaur 7,
1979,65-74.
G376 : J. Bronkhorst, "The Role of Meanings in Pänini's Grammar," IL 40, 1979,
146-157. .
G377 : Paul Kiparsky, Pänini as a Variationist, PGASS-B 6. Poona, Cambridge, Mass,
London, 1979.
G378 : Uma C. Vaidya, "Aphorisms Indicative of Option in the Astädhyäyi."
Ph. D. diss., University of Bombay, 1979.
G379 : M. D. Balàsubrahmanyam, ««Accent It's in the krt Suffixes," ALB 44-45,
1980-1981,543-555.
G380 : George Gardona, "On the Donkin of Pänini's Metarule 1.3.10:yathäsam-
khyam anudeêah samänam" ALB 44-45, 1980-1981, 394-409.
G381 : Johannes Bronkhorst, ((Asiddha in the Astädhyäyi: A Misunderstanding
Among the Traditional Commentators?" JIP 8, 1980, 69-86.
G382 : Alaka Hejib and Aravind Sharma, "A Note on Pänini 6.1.87," ALB 44-45,
1980-1981,635-638.
G383 : V. S. Joshi, "Pänini and the Pâninîyas on Samhitä^ VJSPG 1980, 20-26.
G384 : , "Pänini and the Päniniyas on parasavarna" VJSPG 1980, 27-28.
454 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of1 INDÎAN PHILOSOPHIES

G385 : , "Some Historical Observations in the Descriptive Grammar of

Pänini," VJSPG 1980, 49-59.
P386 : —, "The Ten Predecessors Mentioned in the Asßdhyäyi" VJSPG 1980,
60-65.
G387 : , "Reduplicated Forms Treated as Basic Roots (dhätu) in the
Asßdhyäyi" VJSPG 1980, 66-69.
G388 : , " 'Even Homer Nods' : The Fault of 'anyonyäsraya' in the Asßdh-
yäyi and a New Suggestion to Avoid It," VJSPG 1980, 70-78.
G389 : , "The Word sanghatitha and Pänini," VJSPG 1980, 102-106.
G390 : Vir Bhadra Misra, "Meaning oîïpsita in Pänini's kärakas" PAIOC 29, 1980,
422-423.
G391 : Hartmut Scharfe, "Overinterpretation Versus Redundancy," ALB 44-45,
1980-1981,352-357.
G392 : Johannes Bronkhorst, "Meaning Entries in Pänini's Dhätupätha" JIP 9,
1981,335-358.
G393 :— , "Nirukta and Asßdhyäyi: Their Shared Presuppositions," IIJ 23,
1981,1-14.
G394 : George Gardona, " O n the paribhäsä anirdisßrthah pratyayah svärthe" (Sum-
mary). swsG 5. Delhi, 1981, pp. 14-15.
G395 : Karuna Sindhu Das, "On Concept of Loss as a Grammatical Phenomenon
in Pänini" (summary). swsG 5, Delhi, 1981, p. 21.
G396 : H. P. Dvivedi, "A Rethinking into the Meaning-character of Some of the
Secondary Affixes of the Asßdhyäyi" (summary ). swsc 5. Delhi, 1981, p. 29.
G397 . S. Venkatasubramania Iyer, "Variants in Pänini-sütras Affecting accent"
(summary). swsG 5, Delhi, 1981, p. 115.
G398 : S. D. Joshi, "The siddha Theory and Its Implications in Interpreting the
Asßdhyäyi (summary), swsc 5, Delhi, 1981, p. 42.
G399 : Avanindra Kumar (Satya Vrat Shastri?), Archaic Words in Pänini9s As ta-
dhyayî. Delhi, 1981.
G400 : Mahavir, "Definition ofapasargas in Pänmi," PISG 4,1981, 45-48.
G401 : , "Concept of 'Sabda' in Pänini" (summary), swsc, 5, Delhi, 1981,
pp.48-49.
G402 : Hari Mohan Mishra, "Non-Aryan Words in the Asßdhyäyi" (summary),
swsc 5. Delhi, 1981, p. 54.
G403 : Dipti Sharma, "Pänini's Grammar and Contemporary Language," PISG 4,
1981,35-42.
G404 : Mahesh Dutt Sharma, "Simhävalokitanyäya in Explaining Pänini" (sum-
mary). swsG 5, Delhi, 1981, pp. 92-93.
G405 : Yajan Veer, "ATale of 3 Terms (vä, vibhäsä, and anyatarasyam)" (summary).
swsG 5, Delhi, 1981, pp. 116-118. .
G406 : Mahavir, "Concept of sabda in Pänini," vij 20,1982, 58-62.
G407 : Saroja Bhate, "The Place of P. 1.2.22 and P. 7.2.51 in the Asßdhyäyi"1,
ABORi63,1983, 227-232.
G408 : M. A. Mehendale, "On Pänini 1.3.41," ABORI 63, 1983, 225-226.
G409 : Paul Thieme, "Missverstandenen Pänini," ZDMG Supplements, 1983,
280-289.
Unädisütras
G410 : Edited by Otto Böhtlingk. St. Petersburg, 1844.
G411 : K. B. Pathak, "Pänini and the Authorship of the Unädisütras," ABORI 4,
1922-1923,111-136.
G412 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "The Authorship of the Uriädisütras," JOR 1, 1927,
53-66.
BÎBLIOGRAfHV 455

G413 : T. R. Chintamani, "A Note on the Authorship of the Unädisütras" JOR

1,1927, 181-183.
G414 : K. B. Pathak, "Further Remarks on the Unädi Sütras of Pänini," ABORI 11,
1930,90-93.
Seeb 82.
G415 : K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Authorship of the Unädisütras" PVKF, pp.
395-404.
G416 : Edited with editor's commentary by Dayananda Sarasvati. Ajmer, 1949-
1950.
G417 : Louis Renou, "Études paninéennes, III: Les Unädisütra," JA 244, 1956,
155-165.
G418 : Ram Awadh Pandey, "A Comparative Study of Unädisütras" Ph.D. diss.,
Banaras Hindu University, 1963.
, G4Ï9 : Kanshi Ram, "A Study of Sanskrit Unädisütras." Ph.D. diss., University of
Delhi, 1971.
See a242.
G420 : Edited, with Dayananda Sarasvati's Vaidikalaukikakoia as Unädikosa, by
Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. Ba,halgarji, Haryana, 1974.
G421 : S. Venkitasubromania Iyer, "On the Unädisütra 'mithune manih,' " svuoj
18,1975,45-50.
G422 :Nomita Dutt, "Yâska's Nirukta and Unädisütras," svuoj 19, 1976, 1-4.
Lingänueäsana
See b82.
G423 : D. G. Koparkar, "The Päniniya-lingänusäsana: Its Date and Authorship,"
SPAIOG15, 1949,49-50. (
See e241 ; e365.
tPaninïyaêiksâ
G424 : Edited and translated into German, is 4, 1858, 345-371.
G425 : F. Kielhorn, "Remarks on the sikshäs," IA 5, 1867, 141-144. Reprinted
Rau, pp. 158-169.
See e56;e68.
G426 : Edited and translated by Raghu Vira, JRAS 1931, 653-670.
See b82.
G427 : Edited and translated, with edition and translation of Gandragomin's
varnasütras, editions of the (anonymous) Vedängasiksäpanjikä and a Éiksa-
prakäsa, by Manomohan Ghosh. Calcutta, 1938.
<G428 : Edited with editor's Pradipa, by Rudra Prasacfe Sarma. HSS 59, Varanasi,
1947-1948.
G429 : Edited with editor's commentary by Dayananda Sarasvati. Ajmer, 1950-
1951.
See el68.
General
G430 : Theodor Goldstücker, Pänini. London, 1861 ; Allahabad, 1914 ; Osnabrück,
1966. Abridged version ChSSt 48, 1965.
G431 : Albrecht Weber, "Zur Frage über das Zeitalter Päninis, mit specieller
Beziehung auf Th. Goldstückers 'preface' zum 'Mänavakalpasütra' ",
is 5, 1862, 1-176.
G432 : T. Aufrecht, "Pänini," IA 4, 1875, 281.
G433 : Leopold von Schroeder, "Ueber die Maitrâyanî Samhitä," ZDMG 33,1879,
177-207.
G434 : T. Aufrecht, "Beiträge zur Kenntnis indischer Dichter," ZDMG 36, 1882,
361-383.
456 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G435 : F. Kielhorn, "Der Grammatiker Pänini," NGGW 1885,185-199. Reprinted

in Rau, pp. 188-202. Partially reprinted in Staal, pp. 103-105.
G436 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Versuch, eine jungst angefochtene Lehre Pänini's in
Schutz zu nehmen," BGWL 42, 1890, 79-82.
G437 : Otto Franke, "Die Kasuslehre des Pänini vergleichen mit dem Gebrauch
der Kasus im Pali und in den Asoka-inschriften," BB 16, 1890, 64-120.
G438 : Bruno Liebich, Pänini'. Ein Beitrag zur Kenntnis der Indischen Literature und
Grammatik. Leipzig, 1891. Chapter 5 reprinted in G1625, pp. 159-165.
G439 : P. Peterson, "Pänini, Poet and Grammarian," JRAS 1891, 311-335.
G440 : William Dwight Whitney, "The Veda in Pänini," GSAIF 7, 1893, 243-254.
G441 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Neue Miscellen : 4. Pänini's adhikära," BGWL 1897,
46-48.
G442 : A. Foucher, "Pänini," La Grande Encyclopédie. Paris, 1900, pp. 945-946.
G443 : Johannes Hertel "Von Pänini zu Phaedrus " ZDMG 62, 1908, 113-118.
G444 : Kashi Prasad Jayaswal, "Dates of Pänini and Kätyäyana," IA 47, 1918,
138.
G445 : K. V. Lakshmana Rao, "Did Pänini Know Buddhist Nuns?" IA 50, 1921,
82-84.
G446 : Radhakumud Mookerji, "Ancient Hindu Education as Revealed in the
Worksof Pänini, Kätyäyana and Patanjali," QJMS 12, 1921-1922, 156-170.
G447 : , "History of Sanskrit Literature from the Works of Pänini, Kätyä-
yana and Patanjali," IA 52,1923, 21-24.
G448 : Hannes Sköld, Papers on Pänini and Indian Grammar in General. Lund, 1926.
G449 : , "The Relative Chronology of Pänini and the Prätisäkhyas," IA
55,1926,181-185.
G450 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "Pänini and Yäska—a Rejoinder," JOR 1, 1927,
380-384.
G451 : K. B. Pathak, "The Age of Pänini and Sanskrit as a Spoken Language,"
ABORI11, 1930, 59-83.
G452 : , "Were the Väjasaneyi Samhitä and Satapatha Brähmana Un-
known to Pänini?" ABROI 11,1930,84-89.
G453 : Raghu Vira, "The Author of the Siva-sütras," JRAS 1930, 400-402.
See a4.
G454 : K. C. Chatterji, "Pänini as a Poet," coj 1, 1933, 1-24, 135.
G455 :Bata Krishna Ghosh, "Pänini and the Rkprätisäkhya," IHQ, 10, 1934,
665-670.
G456 : Nali Nath Das Gupta, "Pänini and the Yävanas," ic 2, 1935, 356-358.
G457 : Paul Thieme, Pänini and the Veda. Allahabad, 1935.
G458 : - , "Zur Datierung des Pänini," ZDMG 89, 1935, 21-24. Reprinted
Budruss, pp. 528-531.
G459 : A. Berriedale Keith, "Pänini and the Veda," IG 2, 1936, 735-748.
G460 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "History of an Important Historical Word in the
Päninian School of Grammar," PAIOG 8, 1937, 739-744.
G461 : Kshetresh Chandra Chattopadhyaya, "Pänini and the Rkprätisäkhya II,"
IHQ, 13, 1937, 343-349.
G462 : Paul Thieme, "Pänini and the Rkprätisäkhya, I," IHQ 13, 1937, 329-343.
Reprinted Budruss, pp. 537-571.
G463 :S. P. Chaturvedi, "Pänini and the Rkprätisäkhya," NIA 1, 1938, 450^459 j
2, 1940-1942,723-726.
G464 : Mangal Deva Shastri, "A Comparison of the Rgvedäprätisäkhya with the
Päninian Grammar," POWSBSt 10, 1938, 143-161.
G465 : K. C. Chattopadhyaya, "Thieme and Pänini," ic 5,1938,95-98.
ÉIBLIOGRÀPHY 457

G466 : Bâta Krishna Ghosh, "Mr. Chaturvedi on Pänini and the Rkprätisäkhya,"
NIA 2, 1939, 59-61.
G467 : K. Madhava Krishna Shàrma, "The Pâninian School and the Prätisä-
khyas: Post-Pâninian Reciprocity of Influence," BhV 2, 1941, 230-238; 4,
1942,46-53.
G468 : V. S. Agrawala, "Pânini, His Life and Works," JGJRI 2, 1945, 81-144.
G469 : , "Pânini," JOR 19, 1949, 124-134.
G470 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Some Principles of Tracing pre-Päninian
Portions in Pâninian Works," JGJRI 8, 1951, 407-418.
G471 : S . P. Chaturvedi, '"Pänini's Vocabulary and His Date," in Festschrift
Siddheshwar Varma 2. 144-147.
G472 : V. S. Agrawala, "Some Chronological Considerations About Pânini's
Date," IH£ 27, 1951, 269-286.
G473 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "Pânini's Notion of the Authoritativeness of the
Views of his Predecessors," JGJRI 9, 1952, 163-1Ô2.
G474 : 9 «Some Chief Characteristics of Pänini in Comparison to His
Predecessors," JOI 2, 1952, 165-173; 5, 1955, 10-18.
G475 : Carlo Delia Casa, "Uddhya e bhidya in Pänini e Kälidäsa," RDSO 26,1952,
67-70.
G476 : Vasudeva Sharana Agrawala, India as Known to Pänini. Lucknow, 1953; 2d
edition, Varanasi, 1963,
, G477 : K. C. Chatterji, "Pänini and Whitney," CR 125, 1952, 55-58; 126, 1953,
49-52.
G478 : Siddheshwar Varma, "A Plan for the Evaluation of Pänini on the Vedic
Languages," SPAIOG 17, 1953, 104-105.
G479 : Paul Thieme, «Pänini and the Päniniyas," JAOS 76, 1956, 1-23. Reprinted
Budruss, pp. 573-595
G480 : , "Pänini and the Pronunciation of Sanskrit," in Festschrift What-
mough, 1957, pp. 263-270. Reprinted Budruss, pp. 612-618. % '
G481 : Parasaram Gopalakrishna Murty, "Pänini and the Earlier Grammarians,"
SPAIOG 20, 1957, 71.
G482 : S. K. Ramächandra Rao, "Specimens of Pânini's Poetry," QJMS 50, 1959,
115-127.
See al7.
G483 : Hartmut Scharfe, "Pânini's Kunstsprache" (summary), WZMLUH 10.6,
1961,1396.
G484 : S. Bhattacharya, "A Note on Pänini," Bh 6.2, 1962-1963, 76-80.
G485 : V . S. Agrawala, Gotras in Pänini. Va.ra.nasi,1963.
G486 : D e o Prakas Shastri Patanjal, A Critical Study of Bigveda ( 1 . 137-163),
Particularlyfrom the Point of View of Pâninian Grammar. New Delhi, 1963.
G487 : G. V. Devasthali, "Säyana Utilising Pänini in His Rg-Veda-Bhäsya,"
JBBRAS38, 1963, 165-173.
G488 : — , "Pânini as an Aid to Rgvedic Interpretation," HDVCV, pp. 20-26.
G489 : Venkatesh Laxman Joshi, "Pänini and the Pänjniyas on samhita" IL 26,
1965,66-71.
G490 : Paul Thieme, "Die Kobra bei Pänini," KZ 79, 1965, 55-68. Reprinted
Budruss, pp. 239-246.
G481a : G. V. Devasthali, "Pänini and Rgvedic exegesis," IA 3d series 2.3, 1967,
1-8. Also ABORI 48-49, 1968, 75-81. Also PCASS-A 22, 1968, 1-8. Also
JOR 40-41, 1970-1972, 41-48. Also VRFV, pp. 97-104.
G482a : S. D. Laddu, "Pänini and the Veda." Ph.D. diss., University of Poona,
1967.
458 ËNÔYÔLOPÉOIA ÔF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G483a : SumitraMcingeshKa.tre)Päriinian Studies. Poona, 1967-. :

G484a : D. N. Shastri, "A Reappraisal of Pänini," KAG 1967, 296-301.
-. G485a : K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, Päriini, Kätyäyana and Patanjali. Delhi, 1968.
G486a : Louis Renou, "Pänini," Current Trends in Linguistics, volume 5, Linguistics
in South Asia, ed. T. A. Sebeok. The Hague, 1969, pp. 481-498.
G487a : S. D. Laddu, "The laukika, vaidika and yäjnika Accentuation with the
munitraya of Sanskrit Grammar/* IA 3d series 3,1969, 93-111.
G488a : M. D. Pandit, "Pänini and the Vedic Interpretation," in Festschrift
Rajeshwar Shastri Dravid, English section, pp. 49-53.
G489a : Peter H. Salus, Pänini to Postal: A Bibliography in the History of Linguistics.
Edmonton, 1971.
G490 : Hari Mohan Mishra, "A Reappraisal of Pänini," ITaur 3r-4, 1975-1976,
317-320.
G491 : Sergiu AI-George, ."Pänini and Modern Thought," PISG 2.2, 1976, 82.
G492 : S. D. Laddu, Evolution of the Sanskrit Language from Pänini to Patanjali. Poona,
1974. •.
G493 : Mavelikara Achyathan, Educational Practices in Manu, Pänini and Kautilya.
Trivandrum, 1974-1975.
G494 : Bishnupada Bhattacharya, "The Impress of Päninian Grammar on Sans-
krit Poetics," OH 27.2, 1979, 35-50.
G495 : Johannes Bronkhorst, "The Orthoepie Diaskeuasis of the Rgveda and the
Date of Pänini," IIJ 23, 1981,83-95. ;
G496 : K. G. Varma, "Date of Pänini," vij 20,1982, 29-57.
VADAVA (pre-Patanjali) i
KUNI (pre-Patanjali) NCat4. 176)
KUNARABADAVA (pre-Patanjali) :
GOJVHKAPUTRA (pre-Patanjali)
G497 : Rajendralal Mitra, "On Gonikaputra and Gonärdiya as Names of Patan-
jali," JASBe 52, 1883, 261-269.
GONÄRDIYA (pre-Patanjali) :
See 497.
G498 : Sylvain Lévi, "Gonärda, le berceau du Gonärdiya," SAMV 3.2, 1925,
197-205.
VYÄDI (pre-Kätyäyana)
.'. (G1624, pp. 130, 216; Belvalkar, p. 9)
Samgraha
G499 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "A New Verse of the Samgraha (by Vyädi),"
:
po 19, 1954,4-5. • ' • . : '
Paribhäsä ' '••
G500 : Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, 31 -43.
General ' '
G501 : Mysore Hiriyanna, "Vyädi and Vajapyâyana," IH^ 14, 1938, 261-266.
VÄJAPYÄYANA (pre-Kätyäyana) • . :
(G1624, pp. 134-135) •;
See a501.
KÄTYA or BHÄVAN (pre-Kätyäyana)
Mahävarttika (lost)
KÄTYÄYANA or VARARÜGI (250 B.C.) ;
(Gardona, pp. 247,250, 267; Belvalkar, pp. 9,23; Gl 624, p. 136) "-
Värttika (s) on Pänini's Astädhyäyl
G502 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Kätyäyana oder Patanjali im Mahäbhäsya," ZDMG 29,
1875,183-190.
BlBLlOGRÀÎ>liV 459

G503 : F. Kielhorn, Kätyäyana and Patanjali'. Their Relation to Each Other and to
Pânini. Bombay, 1876. Reprinted Varanasi, 1963; Osnabrück, 1965, Rau,
pp. 1—64.
See e871.
G504 : Sylvain Lévi, "Notes de chronologie indienne: devanärnpriya, Asoka et
Kätyäyana," JA 1891, 549-553. ' :
G505 : Edited (?) with Näräyaria's Dïpaprabha by T. Ganapati Sastti. TSS 33.
Trivandrum, 1913.
G506 : Kashi Prasad Jayaswàl, "Kätyäyana and Pärthiva," iA 48, 1919, 12.
See a444;a446
G507 : Vasudeva Gopala Paranjpe, Le värtika de Kätyäyana: Une étude, du style, du
vocabularie et des postulats philosophiques. Heidelberg, 1922. :
See a447;e68. '-
G508 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "The Värttikas," JOR 2,1928, 25-33.
See a84.
G509 : V. R. Ramachandra Dikshitar, "Kätyäyana—the grammarian," IHQ, 11,
1935,316-320.
G510 : Vasudeva S. Agrawala, "Pürväcärya samjnäs for lakäras" NIA 3, 1940,
39-40.
G511 :K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Kätyäyana," PO 5.2-3, 1941, 126-132;
6.1-2,1942,74-92.
G512 : G. V. Devasthali, "The Aim of the Värtika of Kätyäyana," BhV 20-21, s
v
1960-1961,52-63. ;
G513 : S. D. Laddu, "The Sphere of Reference of the Technical Term Trjàdi
according to Kätyäyana and Patanjali," PGASS-A 23, 1968 (—JUP 29),
1-10. . •- : ;
See b485.
G514 : B. A. Van Nooten, "The Grammarian Kätyäyana and the White Yäjur-
veda School," IL 29.1, 1968, 43-46.
G515 : S. D. Laddu, "Authorship of a Värttika from the Mahäbhäsya" PCASS-A
38,1970 (-JUP33), 13-22.
G516 : A. M. Ghatage, "Kätyäyana and the Transformational Approach," PAICL
1,1971,31-35, :
G517 : G. V. Devasthali, "Kätyäyana's Use ofyogavibhäga" BDGRI 35,1975,42-48.
G518 : Y. Ojihara, "Qu'on ne confonde pas un värttika avec un sûtra!" ITaur
7, 1979,333-338.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (100 B.C. ) :
Laghubhäsya on Pänini's Asfâdhyâyï :
G519 : K. V. Abhyankar, "Laghubhäsya and Its Author," SPAIOC 14.1, 1948, 23.
PATANJALI (150 B.C.)
(Gardona, pp. 243, 256; Belvalkar, p. 26)
Mahäbhäsya on Pänini's Asfädhäyf
(Gardona, p. 256; NCat 11.89)
G520 : Friedrich Max Müller, "Das Mahäbhäsya," ZDMG 7, 1853, 162-171.
G521 : Volume 1 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa's Uddyota, by J. R.
Ballantyne and the pandits of the Benares college. Mirzapore, 1855; with
translation of text, 1856.
G522 . Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, Nägesa Bhatta's Uddyota, and editor's
Tippani, by Bala Sastrin. Varanasi, 1870, 1886,1906.
G523 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "On the Date of Patanjali and the King in Whose
Reign He Lived," IA 1, 1872, 299-302; 2, 1873, 59-61. Reprinted CWRGB
2. 108-114; G1625, pp. 78-81.
460 ËJSfCYÔLOPÊDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G524 'On the Interpretation of Patanjali," IA 2, 1873, 94-96.

G525 "Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya," IA 2, 1873, 69-71. Reprinted GWRGB 1,
121-124.
G526 : Albrecht Weber, "On the Date of Patanjali" (trans. D. G. Boyd), IA 2,
1873,61-64.
G527 : , "On Patanjali, etc.," IA 2, 1873, 206-221.
G528 : — : , <eBas Mahäbhäsya des Patanjali, Benares 1872," is 13, 1873, 293-
496. Portion translated in IA 6, 1877, 301-307.
G529 : Photolithographed, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa Bhatta's Uddyota,
by T. Goldstücker. 6 volumes. London, 1874.
G530 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, by T. Goldstücker. London, 1874.
G531 : Kashinath Trimbak Telang, "The Rämäyana Older than Patanjali," IA
3,1874,124.
G532 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "Allusions to Krsna in Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya," IA 3,
1874, 14-16. Reprinted GWRGB 1.209-213.
See a502.
G533 : Albrecht Weber, "On the Yävanas, Mahäbhäsya, Rämäyana, and Krish-
najanmästami," IA 4, 1875, 244-251.
See b503.
G534 : F. Kielhorn, "On the Mahäbhäsya" IA 5, 1876, 241-251. Reprinted in Rau,
pp.169-179.
G535 : J. G. Buhler, "Mss. of the Mahäbhäsya from Kashmir," IA 7, 1878, 54ff.
G536 : Edited by F. Kielhorn. 3 volumes, BSPS 18-22, 28-30. Bombay, 1878-1885,
1892, 1906, 1909, 3d revised edition by K. V. Abhyankar, Poona, 1962-
1972.
G537 : Partly edited, with editor's Mariiratnaprabhä, by Viprarajendra, 1880.
G538 : Peter Peterson, "Note on the Date of Patanjali," JBBRAS 16, 1883-1885,
181-189. Reprinted in his The Auchityalamkara ofKshemendra. Bombay, 1885.
G539 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "The Date of Patanjali : A Reply to Professor
Peterson/'jBBRAS 16,1883-1885,199-222. Reprinted in GWRBGB 1.157-185.
G540 :-P. A. Danielsson, "Die Einleitung des Mahäbhäsya, übersetzt," ZDMG 37,
1883,20-53.
G541 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "Date of Patanjali, no. 2: Being a Second Reply to
Professor Peterson," GWRGB 1.186-207.
G542 : F. Kielhorn, "Quotations in the Mahäbhäsya and the KäHkävrtti" IA 14,
1885,326-327.
G543 : - , "Präkrtwörte im Mahäbhäsya," ZDMG 39, 1885, 327.
G544 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, Nägesa'a Uddyota, and Guruwara Bäla
Sästri's Tippanî, by Dämodara Sastri Bharadvaja, Gangadhara Sastri
Manavalli and Tatya Sastri Pattavardhana. 3 volumes. Varanasi, 1886.
G545 : F. Kielhorn, "Notes on th& Mahäbhäsya," IA 15, 1886, 80-81, 203-211; 16,
1887, 101-106,178-184, 228-233. 244-252, Reprinted Rau, pp. 202-206,
220-241. Partially reprinted in Staal, pp. 150-151, 107-114, 115-123.
G546 : R. G. Bhandarkar, "The Maurya-passage in the Mahäbhäsya" IA 16, 1887,
156-158, 172-173. Reprinted GWRGB 1.148-156.
G547 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Bäla Sästrin's Tippanî. Poona, 1887.
G548 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Noch ein Wort zur Maurya-Frage im Mahäbhäsya,"
ZDMG 41, 1887,175-178.
G549 : Govinda Das, "Prof. Kielhorn's edition of the Mahäbhäsya" IA 18, 1889,
128.
G550 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa Bhatta's Uddyota, by Bahuvalla-
bha Sastri. BI 142. Calcutta, 1899ff.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 461

G551 : Bernhard Geiger, "Mahäbhäsya zu P. VI.4.22 und 132 nebst Kaiyata's

Kommentar, übersetzt, erläutert und mit einem Anhang," SWAW 160.8.
Vienna, 1908, pp. I-76. Reprinted Staal, pp. 209-259.
G552 : Adhyäyas 1.2 through 2 edited* with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesas
Uddyota, by S.D. Kudala. Bombay, 1908, 1912.
G553 : K. B. Pathak, "The Divine Väsudeva Different from the kshätriya
Väsudeva in Patanjali's Opinion," JBBRAS 23, 1909-1914, 96-103.
G554 : Ghandradhar Guleri, "On 'Siva-bhägavata' in Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya"
iA 41, 1912,272.
G555 : Edited, with Bhattoji Diksita's Sütravrtü, by Syamacarana Kaviratna.
Calcutta, 1914.
G556 : Edited Bombay, 1917.
See a446;a447. . :
G557 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "Patanjali and kävya Literature Presumed by
Him," PAIOG 3, 1924, 96-99.
G558 : 1.1.1 translated by Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti. IHQ, 1, 1925, 703-739.
G559 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "Some Notes on Mr. Keith's Interpretation of a
Mahäbhäsya Passage," JRAS 1925, 502-505.
G560 : , "A Short Note on Mr. Jayaswal's Interpretation of a Mahäbhäsya
Passage in His'Hindu Polity' (p. 122)," m^2,1926,416-418.
G561 : Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti, "Patanjali as He Reveals Himself in the
Mahäbhäsya;' IHQ, 2, 1926, 67 -76, 262-289,464-494, 738-760.
G562 : Kshetresh Chandra Chattopadhyaya, "Patanjali and His Knowledge of
Science," IHQ3, 1927, 181-182.
G563 : Otto Strauss, "Mahäbhäsya ad Pänini 4.1.3 und seine Bedeutung für die
Geschichte der indischen Logik," AIK 1927, 84-94.
G564 : Shridhar Shastri Pathak and Siddheshvar Sastri Chitrao, Word Index to
Patanjali's Vyäkarana-mahäbhäsya {Mahäbhäsya-Eabdakoiah). GOSBORI series C.
Poona, 1927.
G565 : Ähnikas 1-2 edited by Madhava Sastri Bhandari. Lahore, 1929.
G566 : Edited with editor's Kuncikä, by Harisamkara Jha. Bareilly, 1929.
G567 : Edited Calcutta, 1930.
G568 : K. B, Pathak, "On the Text and Interpretation of Some Passages in the
Mahäbhäsya of Patanjali," ABORI 13, 1932, 17-24.
G569 : Ähnikas 1-5 translated into German by Valentin Trapp. Leipzig, 1933,
352-380.
See a84;b81.
G570 : Amalananda Ghosh, "A Study of the smrti Passages in the Mahäbhäsya,*'
IHQ, 11, 1935, 70-90.
G571 : K. C. Chatterji, "Some Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammar," coj 3,
1936,105-132.
G572 : V. S. Agrawala, "Patanjali on the ksudraka-mälavas" PO 1.4, 1937, 1-7.
G573 : Edited with Marathi translation by V. S. Abhyankar and K. V. Abhyankar.
7 volumes. Poona, 1938-1954.
G574 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa's Uddyota, by Samkara Sastri
Marulkar. 2 volumes, ASS 108. Poona, 1938.
G575 : Edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa's Uddyota, by Guruprasada
Sastri. 9 volumes. RSGG. Varanasi, 1938.
G576 : Dinesh Chandra Sircar, "Date of Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya," IHQ 15, 1939,
633-638.
Q577 ? V. S. Agrawala, "Patanjali and the vähika-grämas" IG 6, 1939, 129-136,
462 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G578 : Louis Renou, "On the Identity of the Two Patanjalis," IHQ, 16, 1940,
586-591.
G579 : D. G. Bhave, "A Note on the 'Abhiras' in Patanjali," BDGRI 2, 1940,
137-138. . . • , - . .
G580 : K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Patanjali, a laksyaikacaksus: His Lofty
Realism,"JOR 14, 1940,204-209. . .j
G581 : S. P. Chaturvedi, "Notes on avärtika (?) and Its Misplaced Occurrence in
the Mahäbhäsya "PVKF 1941, 82-83.
G582 : 1.1, 4.4-5, and 5.6 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa's Uddyota,
. byBhargavasastriBhikajiJosi. Bombay, 1942, 1945, 1951.
G583 : K. Madhava Kirshna Sarma, "Patanjali and His Relations to Some
Authors and Works," IG 11.2, 1944.
G584 : P. V. Kane, "The Mahäbhäsya and the Bhäsya of Sabara," BhV 6, 1945,
43-45. '. :
G585 : S. Vaiyapuri Pillai, "Tolkappiyar and Patanjali," in C. K. Raja Commemo-
ration Volume. Madras, 1946, pp. 134-138. .
G586 : Mangal Deva Sharma, "The Traditional Basis of the udäharanas in the
Käiikä and the Mahäbhäsya and the Mutual Relation of the Two Works
Regarding the Same," PAIOC 12,1947,333-339. ,. -
G587 : 1.1.4 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Annambhatta's Uddyotana thereon,
by P.P.S. Sastri and A. Sankaran. MGOMS 7, 1948.
G588 : G. V. Devasthali, "Sabara and Patanjali," JUB 20.2, 1951, 101-106.
G589 : P. S. Subrahmanya Sastri, Lectures on the Mahäbhäsya. 6 volumes. Auss 11.
Annamalainagar, 1951-1962.
G590 : 2.5-9 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Annambhatta's Uddyotana there-
on, by T. Ghandrasekharan. MGOMS 13, 1952.
G591 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "Significance of the Examples in the Mahäbhäsya^
JGJRI 10,1952-1953, 39-48.
G592 : Sukumar Sen, "The Story of Devadatta in the Mahäbhäsya^ IL 12, 1952
1953,189-196. Also PAIOG 16,1953, 268-275. :
G593 : M. G. Gaidhani, "The Attitude of Patanjali Towards Kätyäyana," PAIOG
16.2,1953,95-104.
G594 : Louis Renou, "Études paninéennes, II: Le Veda chez Patanjali," JA 241,
1953,427-464.
G595 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "One Corrupt Reading of the Mahäbhäsya, PO 19,
1954,2-3.
G596 : , "The Mahäbhäsya vs. the Käs'ikä," JSVOI 15, 1954, 61-70.
G597 : :—-, "Some Characteristic Expressions of Patanjali," jsvoi 15, 1954,
139-146.
G598 : 1.1 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, Nägesa's Uddyota and editor's Tattväloka,
by Rudradatta Jha Sarman. KSS 153. Varanasi, 1954.
G599 : Bishnupada Bhattacarya, "Philosophical Data in Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya"
OH 4, 1956, 51-65.
G600 : K. G. Ghatterji, "How Patanjali Has Been Misunderstood," IL 17, 1956,
• 100-102.
G601 : Introductory chapter edited and translated by K. G. Ghatterji. UMS 7,
1957.
G602 : E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, "The Words äkrti zxiajäti in the Mahäbhäsya,"
ALB 21,1957, 54-65.
G603 : Adoft Janacek, "Two Texts of Patanjali and Statistical Comparison of
Their Vocabularies," AO 26, 1958, 88-100.
Q604 : C . K. Pandey, "Patanjali," JBRS44 ? 3-4, 1959, 220fF?
BIBLIOGRAPHY 463

G605 : V. Swaminathan, "Patanjali and the Nirukta" (summary), SPAIOC 21,

1959, 143. Full paper PAIOG 21, 1966,185-209.
, G606 : Ram Suresh Tripathi, "Conception ofjätiin.the Mahäbhäsya of Patanjali,"
SPAIOG21,1959, 196.
G607 : Erich Frauwallner, "Sprachtheorie und Philosophie im Mahäbhäsya des
Patanjali," WZKSOA 4, 1960, 92-118. >
G608 : Hari Deo Mishra, "A Critical Study of Some Aspects of Sanskrit Grammar
with special reference to the Mahäbhäsya of Patanjali," Ph.D. diss.,
University of Poona, 1961.
, G609 : Y. Ojihara, "Le Mahäbhäsya, adhyäya I, ähnika8: Un Essai de Traduction,"
MIK2, 1961,9-22.
G610 : Hartmut Scharfe, Die Logik im Mahäbhäsya. DAWIO 50. Berlin, 1961.
G61Ï : Partially edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa Bhatta's Uddyota, by
Vedavrata. 4 volumes. Rohtak, 1961-1963.
G612 : First adhyäya edited, with editor's Hindi commentary, by Charudeva
Sastri. Varanasi, 1962.
G613 : Stanley Insler, "Verbal Paradigms in Patanjali: 250 Roots and Their
Paradigmatic Derivations as Used and Discussed by Patanjali in the
Mahäbhäsya." Ph. D. diss,, Yale University, 1963.
G614 : S. D. Joshi, "Patanjali on Two Methods of Interpreting the Asfadhyayi,"
SPAIOC 22, 1963, 120. .
G615 : Y. Ojihara, (lMahäbhäsya ad Pänini 1.1.56: Un Essai de traduction," Ada
Asiatica^, 1963,43-69.
G616 : Siddheshwar Varma, "Scientific and Technical Presentation of Patanjali
as Reflected in the Mahäbhäsya," vij 1, 1963, 1-36.
G617 : PaulThieme, "Patanjali über Varuna und die sieben Ströme," in Festschrift
Morgenstieme pp. 168-173. Reprinted Budruss, pp. 620-625.
G618 : Sudarshan Arora, "Patanjali's Criticism of Kätyäyana," SPAIOG 23.1, 1966,
151.
G619 : M. D. Balasubrahmanyam, '«Patanjali and the pre-Päninian anubandhas n
and c," PCASs-A 11. Poona, 1966. Also JUP 25, 1967, 77-82.
G620 : S. D. Joshi, "Patanjali's Definition of a Word—a Reinterpretation,"
BDCRI 25, 1966, 65-70. Reprinted ciDO 27.3., 94-95.
* G621 : S. D. Laddu, A Possible Light on the Relative Age of Yäska and Patan-
jali," SPAIOG 23.1, 1966, 156.
G622 : Adhyäyas 1-3 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, Näges'a's Uddyota and Vaidya-
nätha's Chäyä. 3 volumes. Delhi, 1967.
See d220.
G623 : E. de Guzman Orara, "An Account of Ancient Grammatical Studies down
to Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya: Two Traditions," Asian Studies {Quezon City,
- Philippines) 5, 1967, 369-376.
G624 : Satya Vrat, «Conception of Time in the Mahäbhäsya," MO 1, 1967-1968,
19-21,88-91. :
See b485; a513.
G625 : 2.1.1 edited and translated by S. D. Joshi. PGASS-C 3. Poona, 1968.
G626 : Baij Nath Puri, India in the Time of Patanjali. Bombay, 1968.
See a487.
G627 : 2.1.2-49 edited and translated, with Kaiyata's Pradipa and Nägesa 's
Uddyota, by S. D.. Joshi and J. A. F. Roodbergen. PCASS-C 5. Poona, 1969.
G628 : G. B. Palsule, "Patanjali's Interpretation of RV 10.71.2/' IA 3d series 3?
1969,27-29,
464 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G629 : Sudarshan Kumari Arora, "Patanjali as a Critic of Kätyäyana and

Pänini." Ph. D. diss., Delhi University, 1969.
G630 : Y. Ojihara, "Les Discussions patanjaliennes afferntes au remaniement du
Ganapätha," iij 12, 1969-1970. 81-115/
See a515.
G631 : J . A. F. Roodbergen, 'Patanjali's Vyäkarana-Mahäbhäsya-Bahuvrihi-
dvandvähnika.' Ph. D. diss., University of Poona, 1971.
G632 : 2.1.51-72 edited and translated, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, by S. D. Joshi and
J. A. F. Roodbergen. PCASS-C 6. Poona, 1971.
G633 : 2.2.2-23 edited, with Kaiyata's Pradipa, by S. D. Joshi and J.A.F. Rood-
bergen. PCASs-c 7. Poona, 1973.
See a327;b492.
G634 : 2.2.23-38 edited and translated by J.AF. Roodbergen and S. D. Joshi.
pcAss-c 9. Poona, 1974.
G635 : V. P. Limaye, Critical Studies on the Mahäbhäsya. Hoshiarpur, 1974.
G636 ; Alekhacandra Sarangi, "Authorship of a Line from the Mahäbhäsya" BhV
35,1975,13-17.
G637 : George Cardona, "Still Again on the History of the Mahäbhäsya" ABORI
58-59, 1977-1978,79-99.
G638 : Y. Ojihara, "Sur une Formule patanjalienne: nacedänim äcäryäh süträni
krtvä nivartayanti," ITaur 6, 1978, 219-234.
G639 : 1.2 edited, with Madhava Sastri Bhandari's Spho(avimarsini, by Veda
Prakasa Vidyavacaspati. New Delhi, 1979.
G640 : S. D. Laddu, "A Reconsideration of the History of the Mahäbhäsya"
(summary), swsc 5. Delhi, 1981, pp. 46-47.
éARVAVARMAN (1stcentury A.D.)
(NGat 3. 306; Belvalkar, p. 69)
Kâtantrasutras
(NGat 3. 307, 9. 288)
G641 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, by Navakumara Tarkapancanana. Cal-
cutta, 1870.
G642 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, by Julius Eggeling. BI 81, Calcutta,
1874-1878.
G643 : Edited, with Trilocanadäsa's Vrttipanjikä, by Madhavacandra Tarkacudar
mani Bhattacarya. Calcutta, 1878.
G644 : Edited, with editor's Panjikäiikä, by Candrakanta Tarkalamkara. Barasol,
1880.
G645 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, by Jivananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta,
1884.
G646 : Edited Calcutta, 1885.
G647 : Edited, with âivarama barman's Krnmanjarl, by Candrakanta Nyayalam-
kara. Dacca, 1886.
G648 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Über die Grammatik Kätantra," ZDMG 41,1886, 657-
666.
G649 : Edited with Sripatidatta's Pöm'w/ö. Dacca, 1886; Calcutta, 1910.
G650 : Edited, with Bhavasena Traividyadeva's Rüpamälä, by Lallurama Jiva-
rama Sastrin. Bombay, 1895.
G651 : Edited, with Candrakanta Tarkälamkära's Chandahpraknyä, by Gurunatha
Vidyanidhi Bhattacarya. Calcutta, 1896.
G652 : Edited, with editor's Tïka, by Mahendranatha Bhattacarya. Dacca, 1900.
G653 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, Sripatidatta's Parisista, Vidyäsägara's
Äkkpätafikä? Trilocanadäsa's Paüjikä, Rämakisora Sarman's Astamangala?
BIBLIOGRAPHY 465

Bilvesvara's Kaläpacandra, Raghunandana Äcärya's Tattvärnava, and Hari-

räma Bhattäcärya's Sära, by Gurunatha Vidyanidhi Bhattacarya. Cal-
cutta, 1905.
G654 : Dhätupätha edited with Rämanätha's Manoramä. Calcutta, 1905.
G655 : Dhätupätha edited with ârinâtha éiromani's Manoräma. Calcutta, 1905.
G656 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, Trilocanadäsa's Panjikä, Pïtâmbara
Vidyäbhüsana's Dhätusütriya, Susena Kaviräja Misra's Kaläpacandra,
Pundarika Vidyäsägara's Pradïpa, and Kulacandra's Durgäväkyaprabodha,
by Gurunatha Vidyanidhi Bhattacarya. Calcutta, 1908, 1910.
G657 : Edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, Trilocanadäsa's PÖW;7£Ö, Bilvesvara's Tikä,
and Kulacandra's Prabodha, by Prasannakumara Bhattacarya. Calcutta,
1910.
G658 : Äkhyäta section edited, with Durgäsimha's Vrtti, Trilocanadäsa's Panjika,
Bilvesvara's Tikä, and Sitänätha Sastrin's Samjivani, by Sitanatha Siddhan-
tavagisa Bhattacarya. Calcutta, 1910, 1912.
G659 : Edited in L. Finot, "Fragmente du Kätantra, provenant de Koutche."
LM1911.
G660 : Edited and translated into German in Bruno Liebich, Zur Einführung in die
indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft: Das Kätantra. SHAW 10. Heidelberg,
1919.
.G661 : Edited by NaradaBhiksu. Calcutta, 1927.
G662 : A. Venkatasubbiah, "On the Grammatical Work Si-T'An-Chang," JOR
10,1936,11-26.
G663 : Edited, with Samgramasimha's Bàlaêïksa, by Maniraja Jinavijaya. RPG 3.
Jodhpur, 1968.
KUMÄRALABDHA or KUMÄRALÄTA ( 2d-3d century? )
Commentary on the Kashmiri recension of the Kätantra.
G664 : Fragments edited in H. Lüders, Kätantra und Kaumäraläta. SBAW 25. Berlin
1930, pp. 483-538.
aÄNTANAVA ÄCÄRYA (350?)
(Cardona, p. 22 ; Belvalkar, p. 22)
?Phijsütras
G665 : Edited and translated into German by F. Kielhorn. AKM 4.2. Leipzig,
1866. Reprinted 1966.
G666 : A. N. Choudhari, "Notes on the Phitsütra eäntanava," PAIOC 11. Hydera-
bad, 1941.
See el 68.
G667 : Edited and translated by Govind Vinayak Devasthali. PCASS-C 1. Poona,
1967.
Seea242.
G668 : Edited, with Sudarsanadeva's Pradïpa, by Vedananda Vedavagisa. Jhajjar,
Haryana, 1969.
Seee365.
SAUBHAVA (350?)
(G1624,p. 165)
HARYAKSA (350?)
(G1624, p. 165)
DHYÄNAKÄRA (pre-Bhartrhari)
G669 : V. P. Limaye, "Dhyänagräha-Kära or Dhyäna-kära: A pre-Bhartrhari
Grammarian," VIJ 4, 1966, 228-229.
G670 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Some Lost Works on Vyâkarana" VRFV 1975?
137-144,
466 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

PÜJYAPÄDA or DEVANANDIN (500?)

(Belvalkar, p. 53)
Jainendravyäkarana (there are two versions)
G671 : F. Kielhorn, "On the Jainendra-Vyâkarana," IA 10, 1882, 75ff.
G672 : K. B. Pathak, "Püjyapäda and the Authorship of the Jainendra-Vyâkarana"
IA12, 1884, 19ff.
G673 : Edited, with Abhayanandin's Mahâvrtti, by V. P. Dvivedin. Pan n.s. 31ff.,
1909-1922.
G674 : Edited, with Gunanandin's commentary, sjs 5,1914.
G675 : K. B. Pathak, "The Text of the Jainendra-Vyäkarana and the Priority of
Gandra to Püjyapäda," ABORI 13,1931-1932, 25-36.
G676 : Edited, with Abhayanandin's Mahävrtti. JPMJG 17, 1956.
BHARTRHARI (450? 530?)
(G1624,p. 167)
Väkyapadiya or Trikändl, and Vrtti thereon
G677 : F. Kielhorn, "The Concluding Verses of the Second or Väkyakända of
Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya," IA 3, 1874, 285-287. Reprinted in Rau, pp.
156-157.
G678 : G. Bühler, "Über die Erlklärung des Wortes ägama in Väkyapadiya III.6,"
ZDMG 36, f882, 653-654.
G679 : F. Kielhorn, "On the Grammarian Bhartrhari," IA 12, 1883, 226-227. Re-
printed in Rau, pp. 185-186.
G680 : Edited, with Heläräja's Prakirnaprakäea on book 3 and Punyarâja's Prakâia
on books 1 and 2, by Ramakrishna Sastri Patavardhana, Gangadhara
Sastri Manavalli, Ramachandra Sastri Kotbhaskara and Gosavami
Damodara Sastri. BenSS 5, 6, 11, 19, 24, 95, 102, 103, 160, 161, 162, 163,
164. Varanasi, 1884-1937.
G681 : Ermenegildo La Tersa, "Su Bhartrhari," CIDO 12. Rome, 1899. Volume 1,
Section Inde et Iran, pp. 201-206.
G682 : K. B. Pathak, "Bhartrhari and Kumarila," JBBRAS 18,1890-1894,213-238.
G683 : Edited, with Dravyesa Jhâ Parma's Pratyekärthaprakäsikä, by Sitaramacari
Sastri. Vrndavana 1926-1927.
G684 : K. G. Subrahmanyam, "A Note on the Väkyapadiya Tikä," JOR 1, 1927,
185-187.
G685 : Gharudeva Shastri, "Bhartrhari : A Critical Study with Special Reference
to the Väkyapadiya and Its Commentaries," PAIOG 5, 1930, 630-655.
G686 : M. Ramakrishna Kavi, "The Discovery of the Author's Vrtti on the Väkya-
padiya," JAHRS 4, 1930, 235-241.
G687 : Brahmakända edited, with the Vrtti and Vrsabhadeva's commentary thereon,
by Charudeva Sastri. Lahore, 1934.
G688 : Third kända edited, with Heläräja's Praklrnakaprakäfa, by K. Sambasiva
Sastri and L. A. Ravi Varma. TSS 116, 148. Trivandrum, 1935, 1942.
G689 : G. Kunhan Raja, "I-tsing and Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya" SKAGV 1936,
282-298.
G690 : Brahmakända edited, with Narain Datta Tripathi's Prakäia, by Avadh
Bihari Mishra. GBS 1. Varanasi, 1937.
G691 : Brahmakända edited by S. Suryanarayana with editor's commentary, KSS
124. Varanasi, 1937, 1961.
G692 : Book 2, part 2, section 1 edited, with the Vrtti and Punyaräja's Tikä, by
Charudeva Sastri. Lahore, 1939-1940.
G693 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Pratjbhä as the Meaning of a, Sentence^" PAIOC 10?
1941,326-332*
BIBLIOGRAPHY 467

G694 : N. Gopala Pillai, "The Conception of Time According to Bhartrhari," Sri

Citra (The Sanskrit College Magazine: Trivandrum) 2.2,1942,1-6.
G695 : K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Gleanings from the Commentaries on the
Vâkyapadïya^ ABOKI 23,1942,405-412.
G696 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Yâska's Definition of the Verb and the Noun in the
Light of Bhartrhari's Explanations" (summary), SPAIOG 18, 1953, 97. Full
article at AOR 13, 1957, 86-88.
G697 : Hajime Nakamura, "Tibetan Citations of Bhartrhari's Verses and the
Problem of His Date," siBSY, pp. 122-136.
G698 : V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, "Bhartrhari's Interpretation of 'graham
sammärsti* and 'pasunä yäjeta,'" JOR 25,1955-1956, 74-78. Also PAIOG 18,
1958, 185-188.
G699 : Gaurinath Sastri "Absolute Consciousness as Bhartrhari Views It," SPAIOG
19,1955,144-145.
G700 : C. T. Kenghe "Bhartrhari's Commentary on the Vakyapadïyakârikâs: Its
Nature and Extent," SPAIOG 19, 1955, 47-48.
G701 : Gaurinath Sastri, "Philosophy of Bhartrhari," JASBe 22, 1956, 71-74.
G702 : Sadhu Ram, "Authorship of Some kärikäs and Fragments Ascribed to
Bhartrhari," JGJRI 13, 1956, 51-80.
G703 : Satya Vrat, "Conception of Space (dik) in the Vâkyapadïya" JASBe 23,
1957, 21-26. Revised version in EOI pp. 205-215.
G704 : , "The Conception of Time According to Bhartrhari," ABORI 39,
1958, 68-78. Revised EOI, pp. 165-190.
G705 : C. Ramachari, "Renunciation, the Final Import of the Satakatraya of
Bhartrhari," JMysoreU 18, 1958-1959,13-20.
G706 : Gaurinath Sastri, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning. Calcutta, 1959.
G707 : Wilhelm Rau, "Über sechs Handschriften des Vâkyapadïya" Oriens 15,
1962,374-398.
G708 : E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, "Some Aspects of Bhartrhari's Philosophy,"
svuoj5,1962, 37-42.
G709 : Book 3, part 1 edited, with Heläräja's commentary, by K. A. Subramania
Iyer, DGMS 21. Poona, 1963.
G710 : Brahmakända edited, with Vrtti and editor's commentary, by K. A. Subra-
mania Iyer. Varanasi, 1963.
G711 : Edited, with editor's Ambakartrï, by Raghunatha Sarma. 3 volumes, SBGM
91. Varanasi, 1963, 1968, 1974.
G712 : E. R. Sreekrishna Sarma, "The Philosophy of Sanskrit Gender," SPAIOG
22,1963,127.
G713 : Hemanta Kumar Ganguli, Philosophy of Logical Construction. Calcutta, 1963.
G714 : Santi Bhiksu Sastri, "Ägamasamuccaya Alias Väkyapadiya-brahmäkända
of Bhartrhari, translated and annotated," WZKM 12.1,1963, 191-228.
G715 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Bhartrhari's List of Sentence-definitions," ALB 28,
1964, 206-210. Summarized in SPAIOG 21,1959,197-198.
G716 : Wilhelm Rau, "Handschriften des Vâkyapadïya. Zweiter Teil," Oriens 17,
1964,182-198.
G717 : Kapil Deva Shastri, "Bhartrhari's Discussion on sämänädhikaranya" ALB 28,
1964,41-54.
G718 : , "Bhartrhari's Discussion on the Relation Between the upamâna and
the upameyainmsVâkyapadïya." 11,25,1964,229-233. Alsovij2,1964,87-92.
G719 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on vyäkarana as a Means of Attaining
moksa," ALB 28, 1964? 112-131, Summary in GiPO 26, summaries 1964,
129,
468 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G720 : Madeleine Biardeau, Théorie de la conaissance et philosophie de la parole dans le

brahmanisme classique. Paris, La Haye, 1964.
G721 : Brahmakända translated, with the Vrtti, by K. A. Subramania Iyer, DGBCSJS
26. Poona, 1965.
G722 î Brahmakända edited and translated into French, with the Vrtti, by Madeleine
Biardeau. Paris, 1965.
G723 : Kapil Deva, <(Upamäna, upameya and sämänyavacana According to the
Väkyapadiya of Bhartrhari," vij 3, 1965, 19-28.
G724 : V. Anjaneya Sarman, "The sabdabrahman and the prasthänatrayi" svuoj 8,
1965,31-36.
G725 : Edited and translated into Marathi by Vamana Balakrishna Bhagavat.
GSPM. Poona, 1965.
G726 : Edited by K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye. UPSPS 2. Poona, 1965.
G727 : Edited, with Vrtti and Vrsabhadeva'.« ^addhati, by K. A. Subramania Iyer.
DGMS32. Poona, 1966.
G728 ; K. A. Subramania îyer, "Bhartrhari on dhvani," ABORI 46,1966,49-65.
G729 : Hemanta Kumar Ganguly, "Metaphysics of Meaning," Anviksa 2.1,1967,
38-48; 2.2., 1967, 13-24; 3.1, 1968, 61-72; 3.2, 1969, 71-84.
G730 :Gaurinath Sastri, "Monism of Bhartrhari," WZKSOA 12-13, 1968-1969,
319-323.
G731 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Two Textual Studies of Bhartrhari," JAOS 89, 1969,
547-562.
See a487
G732 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on the Primary and Secondary
Meanings of Words," IL 29.1, 1968, 97-112.
See a487.
G733 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Two Textual Studies of Bhartrhari," JAOS 89, 1969,
547-562.
G734 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, Bhartrhari'. A Study of the Väkyapadiya. DGBGSJS 68.
Poona, 1969.
G735 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Philosophy of Bhartrhari's Trikändi." Ph. D. diss.,
Harvard University, 1970.
G736 : , "Ancient Indian Semantics," ABORI 51, 1970, 11-29.
G737 : Brahmakända edited by Satyakama Varma. New Delhi, 1970.
G738 : Kälasamuddeea section of book 3, translated, with Heläräja's commentary,
by Peri Sarveswara Sharma. Delhi, 1970.
G739 : Books 1 and 2 edited and translated by K. Raghavan Pillai. Delhi, 1971.
G740 : Wilhelm Rau, Die handschriftliche Überlieferung des Väkyapadiya und seiner
Kommentare, AMGG 1971. 1. Munich, 1971.
G741 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Number of kärikäs in Trikändi, Bk. I," JAOS 9, 1971,
510-513.
G742 : Book 3, part I translated by K. A. Subramania Iyer. DGBCSJS 71. Poona,
1971.
G743 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Authorship of the Väkyapadiya-Vrtti," WZKSOA 16,
1972,181-198.
G744 : M. S. Bhat, "Two Passages from the Väkyapadiya," JUB 42, 1973, 45-58.
G745 : Hajime Nakamura, "Buddhist Influence upon the Väkyapadiya," JGjRi 29,
1973,367-388.
G746 : Mithilesh Ghaturvedi, "Notes on a karikâ Ascribed to Bhartrhari," JGJRI 29,
1973,203-210.
G747 : Book 3, part 2 edited, with Heläräja's Prakïrnaprakaêa, by K. A. Subramania.
Iyer. Poona, '.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 469

See 327.
G748 : Peri Sarveswar Sharma, "What Is the atyadbhutavrtti (Miraculous Course
of Action), in the Vakyapadiya?" vij 12, 1974, 351-360.
G748A: Book 3, part 2 translated, with Helârâja's Prakirnaprakäto, by K. A. Subra-
mania Iyer. Delhi, 1974.
G749 : Albrecht Wezler, "Ein bisher missverstandener Vers in der Väkyapadiyavrt-
*2,"MSS 32, 1974,159-164.
G750 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Authorship of the Vakya-kanda-fika" CDSFV 165-188.
G751 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on taddhita Formations Involving
Comparison," CDSFV, 241-257.
G752 : Virendra Shastri, "Critical Study of Samhandha Samuddesa of Vakyapadiya
in the Light of Heläräja's Commentary." Ph. D. diss., Kurukshetra Uni-
versity, 1975.
G753 : Virendra Sharma, "Is the Eternal Verbum of Bhartrhari a Dynamic
Principle?" VIJ 13, 1975, 337-350.
G754 : Selections translated in HTR, pp. 224-237.
G755 : Satyakam Varma, "Sabdapürvayoga," svsi 1976, 238-247.
G756 : , "Linguistic Contents in Vakyapadiya," svsi 1976, 224-237.
G757 : Harold G. Coward, "Language as Revelation," IndPÇ> 3, 1976, 447-472.
G758 : Book 2 translated by K. A. Subramania Iyer. Delhi, 1977.
G759 i-Edited, with word index, by Wilhelm Rau. AKM 42.4, 1977.
G760 : Wilhelm Rau, "Zwei neue Väkyapadiya-H&nd&chriften" sn 3, 1977, 114-
123.
G761 : , "Metrical Peculiarities in Bhartrhari's Vakyapadiya" ABORI 58-59,
1977-1978, 263-269.
G762 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Concluding Verses of Bhartrhari's Väkya-Kända,"
ABORI 58-59, 1977-1978, 9-26.
G763 : S. D. Joshi, "Bhartrhari's Concept ofpratibhä: A Theory on the Nature of
Language Acquisition," VGPGV 1977, 71-76.
G764 : Ashok Aklujkar, "The Number of Verses in Trikändi, Bk. II," ALB 42,1978,
142-167.
G765 : —, "Emendation of Some Verses in Bhartrhari's Trikänfi", WZKSOA
23,1979,63-74.
G766 : Mithilesh Chaturvedi, "Upamäsamuddeia—a Part of Vxttisamuddeêa of
Vakyapadiya," }oi 31, 1980-1981,195-197.
G767 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on Grammatical Analysis {apod-
dhära)," VIJ 18, 1980, 69-79.
G768 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on the Sentence," ALB 44-45, 1980-
1981, 15-49.
G769 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part I ) , "
ALB 44-45,1980-1981, 581-601.
G770 : M. Srimannarayana Murty, "Bhartrhari on svatp rüparri eabdasyaeabdasarri-
jnä," ALB 44-45, 1980-1981, 602-613.
G771 : P. Sriramamurti, "Grammarians and Literary Critics on pratibhä in
Sanskrit," PAIOG 29,1980, 301-305.
G772 : M. Srimannarayana Murti, "Time According to Plxartrhari," VTJ 19,1981,
140-146.
G773 : Hans G. Herzberger and Radhika Herzberger, "Bhartrhari's Paradox,"
JIP 9, 1981,1-18.
G774 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Interpreting Vakyapadiya 2.486 Historically (Part 2),"
in Indological and Buddhist Studies: Festschrift J. W. de Jong. Canberra, 1982,
pp.1-10.
 ÈNÔYCLOPËDiA OF INbiAft PHÏLÔSOt»HI ES

G775 : Alex Wayman, "The Citations of Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadiya in the Tattvasam-

graha of Säntaraksita and Kamalasila" (summary), swsc 5. Delhi, 1981,
185-186.
G776 : Giovanni Bandini, "Die Erörterung der Person. Bhartrhari's Purusasamu-
ddeêa und Heläräjas Prakäsa zum ersten Male übersetzt mit einem Kommen-
tar versehen" ZDMG 132, 1982, 150-173.
G777 : Harold Coward, "Time {Kalo) in Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadiya," JIP 10,
1982,277-288.
Dipikâ on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
G778 : Mysore Hîriyanna, "The First Commentary on the Mahäbhäsya" IHQ, 2,
1926,415-416.
G779 ;V. Swaminathan, "Bhartrhari's Authorship of the Commentary on the
Mahäbhäsya," ALB 27,1963, 59-70.
G780 : Ähnikas 1-4 edited by V. Swaminathan. HVNRSS 11. Varanasi, 1965.
G781 : Ähnikas 1-7 edited by K. V. Abhyankar and V. P. Limaye. 2 volumes.
Supplements to ABORI 43-47, 50. BORIS 8. Poona, 1967,1969. Reprinted
Poona, 1970.
G782 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Mahäbhäsya-Dipikä or Tripädi," ALB 35, 1971, 159-171.
G783 ; M. S. Narayanamurti, "Bhartrhari on 'vieesanänämcäjäteh' of Pänini,"
svuoj 15,1972,49-62.
Sabdadhätusamiksä
G784 ; K . Madhava Sarma, "Sabdadhätusamiksä: A Lost Work of Bhartrhari,"
ASVOI 1.3,1940,65-70.
General
G785 : F. Kielhorn, "On the Grammarian Bhartrhari," IA 12, 1884, 226ff.
G786 : K. B. Pathak, "Bhartrhari and Kumärila," JBBRAS 18,1890-1894,213-238.
G787 ; — , "Was Bhartrhari a Buddhist?" JBBRAS 18,1890-1894, 341-349.
G788 ; Ermenegildo La Terza, "Su Bhartrhari," CIDO 12. Rome, 1899. Volume 1,
Section Inde at Iran, pp. 201-206.
G789 : V, A. Ramaswami Sastri, "Bhartrhari a Bauddha?" JAU 6, 1936-1937,
65-69. Also PAIOG 7,1937, 254-257.
G790 : , "Bhartrhari, a pre-Samkara Advaitin," JAU 8, 1938, 42-53. Also
PAIOG 9, 1937, 548-562.
G791 : O. P. Rangaswami, "Bhartrhari and Bhägavrtti," JOR 11, 1937, 45-50.
G792 : K. Madhava Krishna Sharma, "Bhartrhari: A Great post-Upanishadic
Intuitionist," AP 11, 1940, 538-539.
G793 : , "Bhartrhari Not a Buddhist: Evidence from Nearer Home," PO 5,
1940, 1-5.
G794 : Jambuvijaya Muni, "On the Date of Bhartrhari* the Author of the
Vâkyapadiya" SPAIOG 14, 1948,50-51.
G795 : H. R. Rangaswami Iyengar, "Bhartrhari and Dinnäga," JBBRAS 26, 1951,
147-149.
G796 : Sadhu Ram, "Bhartrhari's Date," JGJRI 9, 1952, 135-152.
G797 : V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, "Bhartrhari as a Mïmâmsaka," BDCRI 14, 1952,
1-16.
G798 : J. M. Shukla, "The Concept of Time According to Bhartrhari," SPAIOC 17,
1953,379-384.
G799 : Satya Vrat Shastri, "Bhartrhari's Conception of Time," SPAIOG 17, 1953,
244. ABORI 39,1958, 68-78. Revised version in EOI, pp. 165-190.
G800 : Jean Filliozat, "A Propos de la Religion der Bhartrhari,"in Silver Jubilee
Volume of the Z^^^Kagaku-Kenkyusyo, Kyoto University. Kyoto, 1954, pp.
116-120.
êiBLIÔGRAPllV 471

G801 : P . S. Rao, "Bhartrhari," PB 62,1957, 347-352.

G802 : V. Swaminathan, "Bhartrhari and Mïmâmsâ," PAIOG 20, 1961, 309-317.
G803 : Hajime Nakamura, "Bhartrhari the Scholar," iij 4,1960, 282-305.
G804 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Bhartrhari on apabhramia" WZKM 2, 1964, 242-
246.
G805 : Kapil Dev, "Bhartrhari on samanâdhikarana taddhitavrtti" SPAIOG 23.1,1966,
62-65.
G806 : Ashok Aklujkar, "Nakamura on Bhartrhari," nj 13, 1971, 161-175.
G807 : Hajime Nakamura, "Bhartrhari and Buddhism," JGJRI 22, 1972, 395-406.
G808 : John Brough, "I-Ching on the Sanskrit Grammarians," BSOAS 36, 1973,
248-260.
G809 : Karunesha Shukla, "Bhartrhari and Advaitism," SPAIOG 27, 1974, 319.
G810 : Mithilesh Ghaturvedi, "Bhartrhari on the Number of Words to be com-
pounded Simultaneously," JDSUD 3, 1974, 31-38. Also JGJRI 35.1-2, 1979,
115-130.
G811 : —, "Kakataliya—a. Grammatical Analysis by Bhartrhari," svuoj 17,
1974, 93-100.
G812 : , "On Some Formations Involving M-elision," VIJ 13,1975, 42-49.
Also JGJRI 33.4,1977, 19-30.
G813 : Harold G. Coward, Bhartrhari. Boston, 1976.
G814 : Mithilesh Ghaturvedi, "Tugapadadhikarapavacana in dvandva—a Critical
Appraisal," VIJ 14, 1976, 82-92.
G815 : , "The Negative Compound in Sanskrit—a Semantic Analysis by
Bhartrhari," ALB 40,1976,1-40.
G816 : Satyakam Varma, "Tradition and Bhartrhari," svsi 1976, 185-200.
G817 : , "Bhartrhari: Works and Achievements," svsi 1976, 201-223.
G818 : Johannes Bronkhorst, "On Some Vedic Quotations in Bhartrhari's Works,"
su 7, 1981,173-175.
G819 : Whilhelm Rau, "Bhartrhari und der Veda," su 7, 1981, 167-180.
DURVINÏTA or AVINÏTA (Western Gangä king of 6th century)
(NCat 1.427)
Sabdävatära (lost)
(cf. JRAS 1883, 298; 1911, 187; 1913, 389)
CANDRA (GOMIN) (470)
(Belvalkar, pp. 29, 48; G1624, p. 165; NCat 6.349)
Candravyäkararia or Candrasüträni and VftH (incl. Unädi and Lingänueäsana)
G82Ö : Sütras edited, with Käsyapa's Bälävabodhana, by William Goonetilleke, The
Orientalist 1 (1884) 2 (1885). Incomplete.
G821 : F. Kielhorn, "The Chandra-vyäkarana and the Käeikä-vrtti," IA 15, 1886,
183-185. Reprinted in Rau, pp. 244-246.
G822 : Bruno Liebich, Das Candravyäkararia. Gottingen, 1895.
G823 ; , "The Chandra-Vyâkarana," IA 25,1896,103ff.
G824 : , "Das Datum des Candragomin," WZKM 13, 1899, 308-315.
G825 : Edited by Bruno Liebich. AKM 11.4. Leipzig, 1902.
G826 : Sylvain Lévi, "Notes chinoises sur l'Inde: III. La Date de Candragomin,"
BEFEO 3,1903, 38-53.
G827 : Edited with Fr#* by Bruno Liebich. AKM 14. Leipzig, 1918.
G828 : Bruno Liebich, Zur Einführung in die indische einheimische Sprachwissenschaft,
volume 4. Analyse der Candra-Vrtti. SHAW 13. Heidelberg, 1920.
Seeb67. -
G829 : S . K . De, "Candragomin," IH£ 14, 1938, 256-260.
G830 : Edited by K. C. Chatterji. 2 volumes, SISL 13. Poona, 1953-1961.
472 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G831 : Louis Renou, "Remarkable Words in the Candra-Vyâkarana" Vâk 3, 1953,

84-101.
G832 : Edited by Bechardas JoshL RPG 39. Jodhpur, 1967.
G833 : Robert Birwe, "Ist Candragomin der Verfasser der Candra-Vrtti?" Pici 28,
1968,127-142.
G834 : M. Hahn, "Der Autor Candragomin und sein Werk," ZDMG Supplement 2,
1974,331-355.
G835 : , "Strophen des Candragomin in der indischen Sprachliteratur,"
IIJ 19, 1977,21-30.
G836 iMadhav Deshpande, "Candragomin's Syntactic Rules," IL 40, 1979,
133-145.
G837 : Anna Radicchi, "On Candravyäkarana" (summary), swsc 5. Delhi, 1981,
pp. 72-73.
G838 : Prafulla Chandra Dash, "Chandra and the 'asarnjüakarri vyâkarana,' "
DNSFV, Ghaziabad 1982, pp. 43-52.
BHÏMASENA (550)
G839 : P. K. Gode, "Date of the Grammarian Bhimasena—Before A. D. 600 "
NIA 2,1939,108-110.
DHARMAPÄLA (625)
Vrtti on book 3 of Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadlya (lost)
HÀRSAVARDHANA (630?)
(Belvalkar, pp.44; YM2.263)
Commentary on Pänini's (?) Lingânuêasana
G840 : Edited, with Sabarasvâmin's commentary and the Lingänuiäsanas of
éâkatâyana and Vararuci andYaksavarman's commentary on Säkatäyana,
by R. Otto Franke. Kiel, 1890.
G841 : Edited, with Prthivisvara's Sarvalaksana, by V. Venkatarama Sharma
Vidyabhusana. MUSS 4. Madras, 1931.
VIMALAMATI (648)
(Cardona, p. 284)
Bhägavrtti on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (lost)
G842 : Kshitish Chandra Chatterji, "The Bhägavrtti," IHQ, 7, 1931,413-418.
Seea791.
G843 : S. P. Bhattacharya, "The Bhägavrtti and Its Author," PAIOC 12, 1947,
273-287.
G844 : Citations collected by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. 3 parts. The first appeared
in the Panjab University Oriental Magazine. Part 2, in ss 8.1, 1953-1954,
1-16; 8.2, 1953-1954,83-106. Part 3, in Ajmer, 1964-1965.
(HARI) VRSABHADEVA (650)
Paddhati on Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadlya
Seee683;e727.
KSAPAISTAKA of Kashmir (7th century? )
' (NCat 5.146)
Commentary on Unädisütras (lost?)
(NCat 2.295)
JAYÄDITYAandVÄMANA (ÄCÄRYA) (650?)
(NCat 4.116; Cardona, p. 278; G1624, p. 172; Belvalkar, p. 29; YM 1.423, 462)
Käsikä (vrtti) on Pänini's Asßdhyäyi
Seee3L
G845 : F. Max Müller, "The Kätikä," IA 9, 1880, 305-308.
Seea542;a821;e40;et41.
G846 : Edited, with editor's Tippani, by Bhagavatprasada Sarman. Varanasi, 189Ö,
BIBLIOGRAPH^ 473

G847 : 2.1—2 translated into German by Bruno Liebich. Breslau, 1892.

G848 : F. Kielhorn, (tPausha Samvatsara in the Kätikä Vrtti on P. 4.2.21," IA 22,
1893, 83ff.
G849 : Edited, with Haradatta'ù Padamaujarï, by Bharadvaja Damodara Sastri.
Varanasi, 1895.
See e49;t50A.
G850 : Surendra Nath Mazumdar, ««A Note on Kätikä," jASBe 8, 1912, 57.
G851 : Edited, with Jinendrabuddhi's Nyäsa, by S. G. Ghakravarti in Gaudagran-
thamälä. 3 volumes. Rajshahi, 1913, 1919-1924, 1925.
G852 :Malati Sen, ««The Käsikä and the Kävyälankärasütravrtti" coj 1, 1934,
229-240.
Seea586.
G853 : Edited by Sobhita Misra. 2 parts, KSS 37. Varanasi, 1952.
Seea596.
G854 : 1.1 translated into French by Y. Ojihara and L. Renou. 3 volumes, PEFO
48. Paris, 1960-1967.
G855 : Yutaka Ojihara, ««Causerie vyäkaranique (III) : Incoherence interne chez
laKäsikä," JIBSt 9,1961, 749-753; 10,1962, 766-776; 12,1964,847-855.
G856 : Vinayak Wasudeo Paranjpe, "A discrepancy in Kätikä," SPAIOG 22,1963,55.
G857 : Edited, with Jinendrabuddhi's Nyäsa and Haradatta's Padamanjarï, by
Dwarikadas Shastri and Kalika Prasad Shukla. 4 volumes. Prachya Bharati
Series 2. Varanasi, 1965.
G858 : K. V. Abhyankar, "A Dissertation on a Doubtful Passage in the Käeikävrtti
on P. 1.1.4 and Two Passages in the Taittiriya Äranyaka prapäthaka 4," ABORI
47, 1967, 101-103.
G859 : Y. Ojihara, "Read lparnam na veïï : Käsikä ad. P. 1.1.4: A Notice," ABORI
48-49,1968,403-409.
G860 : Ram Gopal, «'Vedic Quotations in the Käsikä and Siddhäntakaumudi"
ABORI 48-49,1968, 227-230.
G861 : Edited by Aryendra Sharma, Handerao Deshpande, and D. G. Padhye. 2
volumes, SAS 17, 20. Hyderabad, 1969-1970.
G862 : Edited with editor's Hindi commentary by Narayana Misra. 2 volumes.
KSS 37. Varanasi, 1969-1972.
G863 : M . D. Sharma, ««The Käeikävrtti and Vaiyäkarana Siddhäntakaumudi : A
Comparative Study." Ph.D. diss., University of Poona 1971.
G864 : Mahesadatta Sharma, A Comparative Study of Kätikä Vrtti and Siddhänta-
kaumudi. Poona, 1974.
G865 : Krishna Deo Jha, ««A Critical Analysis of the Examples Used in the Käsikä."
Ph.D. diss., University of Bihar, 1976.
G866 : Govinda Jha, "A Comparative Study of the Kätikä and Siddhänta Kaumudï"
Ph.D. diss., University of Bihar, 1976.
G867 : P. Visalakshy, "The Influence of Candra and Kätantra Grammars on
Kâtikâvrtti," vij 19, 1981, 45-49.
îLingânusasana and commentary thereon (attributed to VÄMANA)
G868 : Edited by Chimanlal D. Dalai, GOS 6. Baroda, 1918.
G869 : Edited by Vyakaranopadhyaya Vedavati. Ajmer, 1964-1965.
MAI^DANA MISRA (690)
Sphotasiddhi
G870 : Edited, with Rsiputra Paramesvara's Gopälikä, by S. K. Ramanatha
Sastri. MUSS 6. Madras, 1931.
. G871 : Edited and translated into French by Madeleine Biardeau. PIFI 13.
Pondicherry, 1958.
474 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF itfDlAtf PHILOSOPHIES

G872 : Edited and translated by K. A. Subramania Iyer, DGBS 25. Poona, 1966.
JINENDRABUDDHI (725?)
(Cardona, p. 281 ; G1624, p. 181 ; Belvalkar, p. 32)
Nyäsa or Paüjikä or Vrtti on Jayäditya and Vämana's Käsikä
(NGat4.118)
G873 : Pandurang Vaman Kane, "Bhâmaha, the Nyäsa and Mägha," JBBRAS 23,
1909-1914,91-95.
G874 : K. B. Pathak, "Bhämaha's Attack on the Buddhist Grammarian Jinen-
drabuddhi," JBBRAS 23, 1909-1914,18-31.
G875 : , "Dandin, Nyâsakâra and Bhâmaha," IA 41,1912, 232-236.
Seee85l.
G876 : K. B. Pathak, "The Nyâsakâra and the Jaina ââkatâyàna," IA 43, 1914,
205; 15, 1915, 275-279.
G877 : , "Jinendrabuddhi, Kaiyaja and Haradatta," ABORI 12, 1931,
246-251.
Seee831.
G878 : Bhim Sen Shastri, A Study of Nyäsa. Delhi, 1979.
ABHAYANANDIN (750?)
(Belvalkar, p. 55; NCat 1.278)
Mahävrtti on Püjyapäda's Jainendravyakaraya
(NCat 7.307)
Seee673;e676.
(ABHINAVA) SÄKATÄYANA (850?)
(Gardona, p. 149; Belvalkar, p. 57; NGat 1.307)
Sabdänuiäsana and Amoghavrtti thereon
G879 : Georg Bühler, "Notiz über die Grammatik des Säkatäyana," ou 2, 1864,
691-706.
G880 : F. Kielhorn, « O n the Grammar of ââkatâyana," IA 16, 1887, 24-28.
Reprinted in Rau, pp. 246-250.
Seee840.
G881 : Edited, with Abhayacandra Süri's Prakriyäsaqigraha, by Gustav Oppert.
Madras, 1893.
G882 : F. Kielhorn, "Die eäkatäyana-Grammatik," NGGW 1894, 1-14.
Seea876.
G883 : K. B. Pathak, "Jain éâkatâyana Contemporary with Amoghavarsha I , "
I A 4 3 , 1914,205ff.
G884 : —•• , "ââkatâyana and the Authorship of the Amoghavrtti," ABORI 1,
1918-1919,7-12.
G885 : Edited, with Yaksavarman's commentary, by Ramasakala Mishra. Pan 34,
1912-1942,1920.
G886 : Edited, with Yaksavarman's Cintamaçi, and translated by Vishnu S.
Sukhthankar. Leipzig, 1921.
Seee882.
G887 : K. B. Pathak, " O n the Date of ââkatâyana Cintämani," JBBRAS n.s. 6,
1930,239-240.
G888 : -, " O n the Unâdi Sutras of Jain ââkatâyana," ABORI 13,1931-1932,
154-156.
G889 : Sailendranath Sengupta, «Unädi Suffixes and Words Derived with Such
Suffixes (a Concordance Based on the Works of ââkatâyana, Bhoja and
Hemacandra)," JASP 6,1964, 123-206.
G890 : Edited with Amoghavrtti by Shambhu Nath Tripathi. JPMJG 39. Delhi, 1971.
BIBLIOGRAPH^ 475

G891 : J. M. Shukla, "Grammatical paribhäsä of the Jaina Grammarians," joi 24,

1974-1975,128-138.
JAYANTABHATTA (870?)
Vrtti on Pänini's Asfädhyäyi (lost)
'(NGat 7! 180)
GUI^ANANDIN (890)
(YM 1.588)
Commentary on Püjyapäda's Jainendravyäkararia
(NGat 7.307)
Seee650, e674.
PÜRI^ACANDRA (950)
(NCat9.290)
Panjikä on Gandragomin's Candravyäkararia
(cf. jBRs 22.1,1936,43)
RABHASANANDIN or VALLABHÄCÄRYA (950?)
(Saf) Käraka (väda) or Kärakasambandhoddyota
(NGat 3.377)
G892 : Edited by H. P. Shastri. RPG 6. Jodhpur.
DURGÄ (SIMHA) orDURGÄDÄSA (950?)
(Belvalkar,p.73)
Vxtti on (iSarvavarman's?) Kätantra
(NGat 2.295; 3.224,309; 9.76)
Seee641;e642;e645.
G893 : Uyàdipâtha edited Dacca, 1886.
See e653; e656; e657; e658.
G894 : Uriädipätha edited MUSS 7.6, 2. Madras, 1934. .
G895 : Lingânuêasana edited by D. G. Koparkar. SIAL 10. Poona, 1952.
G896 : Paribhäsä section edited in Panbhâsâsarjfigraha, pp. 49-66.
HELÄRÄJA (980?)
Prakiryaprakäia on book 3 of Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya
See e679; e688; e709; t738; e747; t748A; d752.
Sabdaprabhä on book 1 of Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya (lost)
(AdyarD,vol.6,p.208)
Seea670. •
Värttikonmesa on Kätyäyana's Astädhyäyi-Värttikas (lost)
(YM 1.328)
Seea670.
Aduayasiddhi (lost)
Seea670.
Kriyäviveka (lost)
Seea670.
General
G897 i K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Helârâja, Not a Disciple of Bhartrhari,"
mçi 19,1943,79-82.
G898 : V. Swaminathan, «On the Date of Heläräja," svuoj 10,1967, 23-36.
G899 : V. Raghavan, "The Dates of Heläräja and Kaiyata," Çtam 2-6, 1970-
1975,105-110.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1000?)
Prameyasanigraha on book 2 of Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya
G900 : Edited by Wilhelm Rau. Munich, 1981.
TRILOGANADÄSA (1000?)
PanjikäonDwcgä'sKätantravrtti
476 ÈNOYÛLOPËDÎA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

See e643 ; e653 ; e656 ; e657 ; e658.

UGRABHÜTI (1000)
(NCat 3.317)
Sisyahitanyäsa in five hundred verses in Äryä metre; known in Tibet
PUJNJYARÄJA (1000?)
Tikä on book 2 of Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadïya
Seee679;e692;a750.
DHARMAKÏRTI (1000?)
(Cardona, p. 285; G1624, pp. 186,262; NGat 9.241 )
Rüpävatära on Pänini's Atfädhyäyl
(NGat 3.374)
G901 : Edited by M. Rangacharya and M. B. Varadarajiengar. 2 volumes.
Bangalore, 1916-1917, 1927.
G902 : K. A. Nilakantha Sastri, "A Note on the Rüpävatära;' JOR 8, 1934, 277-
280.
Commentary on Vararuci's Kärakacakra or Prqyogamukha
G903 : Edited by M. Rangacarya. Madras, 1927.
ABHINAVAGUPTA (1014)
Prakïrpakavivaraya on Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadïya (lost)
BUDDHISÄGARA SÜRI (1024)
Pancagranthi or Sabdalaksaya
(NGat 11.12)
G904 ; N. M. Kansara, "The Lingänusäsana of Buddhisägarasüri," JGJRI 35.1-2,
1979,97-100.
DAYAPÄLA (MUNI) (1025)
Rüpasiddhi (an abridgment of Säkatäyana's Sabdänusäsana)
(Belvalkar, p. 60; GOS 134, 1961, 196; YM 1.60.3)
KAIYATA (1030)
(Belvalkar, p. 34; G1624, p. 181 )
Pradipa on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
See e521 ; e522; e529; e530; e544;e547; e550; ct551 ; e552; a877; e575; e582; e587.
G905 : V. Raghavan, "Chronological Notes: Kaiyata and Dhananjaya," JOR 19,
1949,223-224.
See e590; e598; e611 ; e622.
G906 ; Edited by M. P. Misra. Varanasi, 1967.
See a899; e632.
G907 : Peri Sarveswara Sharma, "Kaiyata and His Worli," BhV 39, 1979, 5-13.
PRABHÄCANDRA (ÄCÄRYA) (1040)
(Belvalkar, p. 60; GOS 134,1961, 269)
Nyäsa on ââkatâyana's Amoghavftti
YAKÇAVARMAN (1050?)
(Belvalkar, p. 60; YM 1.603)
Cintâmayi^on ââkatâyana's Sabdànusâsana
See e840 ; e885; e886; e887.
KÇÏRASVAMIN (1050?)
(Belvalkar, p. 43 ; Gardona, p. 288 ; NGat 5.152)
Kslratarangirfi on Pänini's A§tädhyäyi-Dhätupätha
G908 : Edited, with Sarvavarman's and Säkatäyana's Dhätupäfhas, by Bruno
Liebich. IndF 8/9. Breslau, 1930.
G909 : Edited by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. BLKTS 25. Amritsar, 1957-1958.
(Karmayoga) Amrtatarangini (lost)
(NGat 1.347; 3.205)
 BIBLIOGRAPHY 477

Nipâtâvyayopasargavrtti
G910 : Edited svos 28. Tirupati, 1951.
DURGÄSIMHA (1050?)
(Belvalkar,p.75;YMl.564)
Tîka on Durgâ'a Kätantravrtti
(NCat 3.310)
G911 : Edited Bhowanipore, 1881.
KRAMADÏéVARA (1050?)
Saniksiptasära (revised by Jumaranandin)
G912 : Edited with Rasavati and Goyîcandra's and Jumaranandin's commentary.
Calcutta, 1886, 1888, 1901, 1904, 1911.
G913 : Edited with Nyäyapancänana's Dlpikâ, Calcutta, 1920.
G914 : Präkrta chapter edited by Satya Ranjan Benaraji. Ahmedabad, 1980.
UriädipariHsta
(NCat 2.296)
BHOJA (DEVA) or BHOJARÄJA (1055)
(G1624,p. 187)
Sarasuatikapthâbhararia
G915 : Edited by Anandaram Barua. Calcutta, London, 1883, 1884; Gauhati,
1969.
G916 : Partly edited, Varanasi, 1888.
G917 : Edited, with Ratnesvara's commentary and editor's commentary, by
Jivananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta, 1894.
G918 : Edited, with Rämasimha's commentary on chapters 1-3, Jagaddhära's
commentary on chapter 4, and Ratnesvara's commentary on chapter 5,
L by Kedarnath Durgaprasad and V. L. S. Pansikar. in Kavyamala 94.
Bombay, 1925.
G919 : Uriädisütras edited MUSS 7.6, 1. Madras, 1934.
Seea889.
G920 : Paribhäsäs edited in Paribhäßsamgraha, pp. 105-107.
G921 : Edited, with Jagaddhara's Tïka, by Visvanatha Bhattacarya. Kasi, 1979.
HARADATTA (1059)
(Belvalkar, p. 32; Cardona, p. 281 ; G1624, p. 196; NCat 4.119)
Padamaüjarl on Jayäditya/Vämana's Kätikä
G922 : Edited by Damodara Sastri in Pan 10 (1888)-21 (1899).
G923 : Book 2, chapters 1-2 translated into German by Bruno Liebich. Breslau,
1892.
Seee849.
G924 : S. S. Süryanarayana Sastri, "Haradatta Misra and Haradatta Sivâcârya,"
PAioc 6,1930,607-612.
Seea877;e857.
- G925 : D. K. Kharwandikar, "Haradatta: A Critical Study." Ph.D. diss., Uni-
versity of Poona, 1973.
G926 : , "Mnemonic Verses in the Padamanjari of Haradattamisra,"
JGJRI 29,1973,285-294.
G927 : , "Date of Haradatta: the Author of the Padamanjarï," SPAIOG 27,
1974,234-235.
JYESTHAKALÄSA (1060?)
(YM 1.367)
Jikä on Patanjali's Mahäbhasya (lost)
INDU (MITRA) (1070?)
(YM 1.479 ; NCat 1.203, 2.248)
478 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Anunyäsa on Jinendrabuddhi's Paftjikä

G928 : Kshitish Chandra Ghatterji, "The Authorship of the Anunyäsa" IHQ, 7,
1931,418-419.
G929 : K. Madhava Krishna Sarma, "Author of the Anunyäsa," JOR 15, 1941,
25-27.
G930 : V. Raghavan, "Indu, the author of the Anunyäsa," JOR 15, 1941, 78.
VARDHAMÄNA (1088)
(Belvalkar, p. 74)
Kätantravistara
(NCat 3.313)
GOVARDHANA (1100?)
(YM 2.204)
Commentary on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
(NCat 6.182)
DHANAPÄLA (1100?)
G931 :Neelanjana S. Shah, "About a Forgotten Grammarian Dhanapäla,"
Sambodhi 4.3-4, 1975-1976, 63-78.
NÄRÄYANADANDANÄTHA (1100)
Hrdayaharinï on Bhoja's Sarasvatikanthâbharana
G932 : Robert Birwe, "Näräyana Dandanâtha's Commentary on Rules III.2.
106-121 of Bhoja's Sarasvatïkanthabharana," JAOS 84,1964,150-162.
MAITREYA RAKSITA (1109)
(G1624, pp. 206*, 221 ; YM 1.398)
Tikä on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (lost)
Tantrapradlpa on Jinendrabuddhi's Nyâsa
(NCat 9.291)
Dhätupradipa
G933 : Edited by Madhavacandra Tarkacudamani. Dacca, 1886.
G934 : Edited by Srish Chandra Chakravarti. SSGM 2. Rajshahi, 1919.
Durghatavrtti
General
G935 : Kali Charan Shastri, "Maitreya-raksita (a Bengali Grammarian of the
Pâninian System)", BharKau 1947, 887-903.
G936 : , "Maitreyaraksita," OH 4,1956, 89-98.
TRIVIKRAMA (1118)
Uddyota on Trilocanadäsa's Kätantravrttipanjikä
(NCat 3.311)
VIJAYÄNANDAorVIDYÄNANDA (1140)
Kätantrottara (siddhänanda)
(NCat 3.313, 5.130)
G937 : Edited in Rupamala 3. Bombay, 1871.
VARDHAMÄNA (1140 )
(Cardona, p. 361 ; G1624, pp. 80, 191 )
Ganaratnamahodadhi and Vrtti thereon
(NCat 5.257)
G938 : Edited by Julius Eggeling. London, 1879-1881. Reprinted Delhi, 1963.
G939 : Edited Allahabad, 1894.
HARIYOGIN SAILÄVÄCÄRYA, alias PROLANÄCÄRYA (1150?)
(YM 2.98; NCat 9.291)
Säbdikäbharana or Dhätupratyayapanjikä on Pänini's Astädhyäyi-Dhätupätha
(NCat 9,291)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 479
HEMACANDRA (1150)
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Sabdänutäsana andBrhadvrtti thereon, with (abridgment) Laghuvrtti
(NCat 9.289)
G940 : LingänuBsana and Vrtti edited and translated by R. Otto Franke. Göttingen,
1886.
Seee37.
G941 :F. Kielhorn, "A Brief Account of Hemachandra's Sanskrit Grammar,"
WZKM2, 1888, 18-24.
G942 : Unädisütras and Vrtti edited in J . Kirste, Sources of Sanskrit Lexicography,
Vienna, Bombay, 1895, volume 2.
G943 : Lingänufäsana^dited by Sivadatta and K. P. Parab. Bombay, 1896.
G944 : Dhätupätha and Vrtti edited by J . Kirste, Sources of Sanskrit Lexicography.
Vienna, Bombay, 1901, volume 4.
G945 : Lingânuêâsana edited YJG 2. Varanäsi, 1905.
G946 : Edited, with Laghuvrtti YJG 3. Varanasi, 1905.
G947 : Sûtras only edited YJG 6. Varanasi, 1906.
G948 : Sütras only edited in alphabetical order, YJG 11. Varanasi, 1909.
G949 : Edited Varanasi, 1910. Index Varanasi, 1909.
G950 : Vinaya Vijaya Gani, Haimalaghuprakrïya. Bombay, 1918,1949.
G951 : Edited With. Brhadvxtti. Firstpäda only. Ahmedabad, 1921.
G952 : Edited with Meghavijaya Gani's Candraprabhä. Bombay, 1928.
G953 : Edited by Chandra Sagara Suri. Ujjain, 1950.
G954 : Krtpratyaya section edited by Vijayalvanyasuri. Botad, Saurashtra, 1963.
G955 : Edited by Ratnalal Sanghvi. 2 volumes. Vyavar, Rajasthan, 1963.
G956 : Paribhäsäs edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha pp. 108-111.
G957 : Unädi and Gana sütras edited by Manohara Vijaya. Botad, Saurashtra, 1967.
G958 : S. Sengupta, "Hemacandra and Siddha Hema-&abdänusäsana," JainJ 2,
1968,200-206.
G959 : Dhätuparäyana edited by Muni Yasovijaya and Municandravijaya. Ahme-
dabad, 1973.
G960 : J. M. Shukla, "Dhätupäräyanam—a. Review Note," Sambodhi 4.3-4, 1975-
1976, 40-43.
General
G961 : Hermann Jacobi,"Hemachandra," ERE 6.684-686.
G962 :G. Bühler,"Über das Leben desjaina Mönches Hemachandra, as Schülers
des Devachandra aus der Vajrasäkhä," Denkschriften der phil.-hist. Klasse
der Kaiserliche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna 37, 1889, 171-258. Transla-
ted into English by Manual Patel as The Life of Hemachandra. sjs 11. Bombay,
1936.
G963 : Jagdish P. Sharma, "Hemacandra : The Life and Scholarship of a Jaina
Monk," AsP 3, 1975, 195-216.
G964 : G. N. Basavaraju, «Hemcandra," MO 11,1978, 60-64.
SÄRIPUTTA or SÄGARAMATI of Polonnaruva (12th century)
Commentary on Ratnamati's Tikä on Gandragomin's Sütras
(NCat 7.19)
UTPÄLA (1170?)
(Belvalkar, p. 64 ; GOS 134,1961, 80 ; NCat 2.316)
ILingänueäsanavrtti
(NCat 2.316)
(MUNI ) PRADYUMNA SÜRI (1170?)
480 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Daurgäsimhakätantravrttitikä
(NCat 9.76)
§ARANADEVA (1172)
(Gardona, p. 282; Gl624, p. 209)
Durghatavrtti on Pänini's Asfädhyäyi (revised by Sarvaraksita)
G965 : Edited by T. Ganapati Sastri. TSS 6. Trivandrum, 1909.
G966 : Edited and translated into French by Louis Renou. 3 volumes. Paris, 1940,
1941,1956.
G967 : L^puis Renou, "Index of Remarkable Words and Forms in the Durghala-
vrtti of Saranadeva," Väk 1, 1951, 19-37.
PURUSOTTAMADEVA (1175)
(Gardona, p. 282; G1624, p. 209)
Pränäpana or Laghuvrtti on Patafijali's Mahäbhäsya
G968 : Dinesh Chandra Bhattacharya, "Purusottamadeva's Commentary on the
Mahäbhäsya;' IHQ, 19, 1943, 201-213.
Bhäsävrtti on Pänini's Astâdhyâyï
G969 : Edited, with Srs^idharacarya's Commentary, by Girisacandra Vedanta-
tirtha. BI 209. Calcutta, 1912.
G970 : Edited by Srish Chandra Chakravarti. SSGM 1. Rajshahi, 1918.
G971 : Paribhäsä section edited by D. C. Bhattacharya. Rajshahi, 1946.
G972 : Louis Renou, "List of Remarkable Words (or Meanings) from Paribhä-
sendusekhara, Paribhäsävrtti of Purusottamadeva, and Paribhäsävrtti of
Siradeva," Väk 2, 1952, 117-129.
G973 : , "Words from the Bhâsâvrtti of Purusottamadeva," Väk 3, 1953,
1-36.
G974 : Paribhäsä section edited in Paribhäsäsarflgraha, pp. 112-160.
Seee269.
G975 : V. S. Joshi, "Some Words from the Bhäsävrtti of Purusottama Deva trans-
lated by Prof. L. Renou," VJSPG 1980, 91-94.
Jftäpakasamuccayabhäsya
(NCat 7.350)
UDAYAGANDRA (1180)
(Belvalkar,p.66)
Nyäsa on Hemacandra's Brhadvrtti
(NCat 2.326)
KUSALA (1200?)
(Belvalkar, p. 74)
Pradïpa on Trilocanadäsa's Paftjikä
(NCat 3.311,4.256)
KÄSYAPA (1200)
(a Cândra writer)
Bälävabodha
DEVA (1200?)
(NCat 9.100,169)
Daiva (on Sanskrit roots)
G976 : Edited with Krsnaliläsukamuni's Purusakära, by T. Ganapati Sastri. TSS 1.
Trivandrum, 1905.
G977 : Edited, with Krsnaliläsukä's Purusakära, by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka.
Ajmer, 1962-1963.
G978 : Satya Pal Narang, "A Critique of the Grammatical Work Daiva by Deva?"
sPAioc 27, 1974,228-229,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 481

DEVENDRASÜRI (1210)
(Belvalkar, p. 66)
Laghunyäsa on Hemacandra's Sabdânuêâsana
, (NGat 9.160)
GUNACANDRA (1210)
(NGat 3.318)
Tattvaprakäsikä on the Kätantravibhrama (sütras)
G979 : Edited by Shravak Pandit Hargovinddas and Shravak Pandit Bechardas.
YJG 34. Varanasi, 1913.
KANAKAPRABHÄ (1240)
Nyäsasära on Hemacandra's Eabdänueäsana
(NGat 3.142)
AMARAGANDRA (1250)
(Belvalkar, p. 67)
Syädisamuccaya
G980 : Edited, Varanasi, 1915.
?Satkärakalaksaria or Kärakanirüparia
' (NGat 1.332, 3.375)
BHAVASENA TRAIVIDYEâA (1250)
Kätantrarüpamälä
Seee650.
Laghuvrtti on Kätantrasütras
(NGat 3.313-314)
DHANEâVARA (1250)
Cintämarii on Patafijali's Mahäbhäsya
Prakriyäratnamani
(MS at Adyar)
SÏRADEVA (1250)
(G1624, p. 226; NGat 11.223)
Paribhäsävrtti
G981 : Edited by Harinatha Dube. BenSS 8. Varanasi, 1885-1887,
See a972.
G982 : Louis Renou, "Études paninéennes: La Liste desparibhäsä chez Siradeva,"
pici 2,1956,132-136.
G983 : Kali Gharan Shastri, "Sïradeva," OH 5,1957,103-117.
G984 i Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, pp. 161-272.
SOMADEVA (1250)
(Belvalkar, p. 55; NGat 8.307)
Sabdärriavacandrikä on Püjyapäda's Jainendravyäkararia '• :
Q985 '.Edited Pan n.s. 31-34,1908-1911.
VAI^GASENA (1250)
(NGat 2.10) :
Äkhyätavyäkarana or Dhäturüpa
ANUBHÜTI SVARÜPÄGÄRYA ( 1270 )
(Belvalkar, p. 80; NGat 1.208)
Särasvataprakriyä
G986 : Edited Varanasi, 1852.
G987 : Edited in MS form by Bapu Hara Set Devalekara. Bombay, 1861.
G988 : Edited, with Rämacandräsrama's Siddhäntacandrikä and Sädänanda's
Subodhinî. Varanasi, 1864, 1885; Lahore, 1869; Bombay, 1881, 1885, 1888.
G989 -.Edited, with Väsudeva Bhatta's 8ära$vataprasä4a, Meerut, 1867, 1874,
1876; Calcutta, 1882.
482 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G990 : Edited Amritsar, 1867.

G991 : Edited with Väsudeva Bhatta's Särasvataprasäda by Jivananda Vidyasagara.
Calcutta, 1874.
G992 : Edited with Rämacandräsrama's Siddhäntacandrikä. Lucknow, 1875;
Bombay, 1884, 1888, 1914.
G993 : Edited Calcutta, 1882.
G994 : Edited Patna, 1882.
G995 ; Edited Bombay, 1883, 1885, 1886, 1887,1888, 1889, 1890, 1891, 1898.
G996 : Edited with Mädhava Bhatta's Siddhäntaratnävall and editor's Mädhavl, by
Madhava. Varanasi, 1887, 1911.
G997 : Edited with editor's Tippanï by Govinda Parasurama Bhatta. Bombay,
1888.
G998 : Edited with Lokesvara Sarman Sukla's Siddhäntaratnävall. Lucknow, 1890,
1894.
G999 : Edited with Candrakirti's Subodhikä. Bombay, 1890.
G1000 : Edited by Sagaracandra Kaviratna. Calcutta, 1905-1915.
G1001 : Edited, with Candrakirti's Subodhikä, by Vasudev Laxman Shastri Pansikar.
Bombay, 1907.
G1002 : Partly edited, with editor's Tippanï, by Visnuprasada Sarman. Varanasi,
1910,1920.
G1003 : Edited by Sulavatanka Kalyana Sunvambasamkara Sastri. Bombay, 1914.
G1004 : Edited, with Rämanäräyana barman's Bhäsya, by Vipinacandra Vidya-
nidhi. Calcutta, 1915.
G1005 : Edited Varanasi, 1925, 1928.
Gl 006 : Edited by Narahari Shastri Pendse. HSS 4. Varanasi, 1927.
G1007 : R. O. Meisezahl, "Über jflim in der Tibetischen Version der Regel m
chandasi der âârasvata- Grammatik," iij 9,1965,139-146.
MAHÄDEVA (1270)
(Belvalkar, p. 74) (a Kâtantra author)
Sabdasiddhi
(NCat 3.312)
VOPADEVA GOSV ÄMIN (1275)
(Belvalkar, p. 87)
Mugdhabodha (of which the Dhätupäfha is called Kavikalpadruma)
G1008 : Edited Shrirampore, 1807.
G1009 : Edited Calcutta, 1826,1845,1866,1868,1876,1884.
G1010 : Kavikalpadruma edited in Bengali characters, with Durgädäsa's Dhätudfpikä.
Calcutta, 1831,1904.
G1011 ; Edited Kashipur, 1841,1853.
G1012 : Edited with Nandakisora's ParUisfa and Gangädhara's Setusamgraha.
Calcutta, 1843.
G1013 : Edited by Otto Böhtlingk. St. Petersburg, 1847.
G1014 : Kavikalpadruma edited, with Durgädäsa's Paribhäsäfikä, by Madana Mohana
Tarkalamkara. Calcutta, 1848.
G1015 : Edited with Durgädäsa Vidyävägisa Bhattäcärya's Subodhä. Shrirampore,
1857.
G1016 : Edited by Govindacandra Vidyaratna. Calcutta, 1861-1862,1880.
G1017 : Edited with Durgädäsa's Subodhä and Räma Tarkavägisa's Käraka, Samäsa,
and Taddhita sections of'his Pramodajananû Calcutta, 1861.
G1018 : Selections edited by Loharam Shiroratna. Calcutta, 1868.
Q1019 ; Edited with Girisacancira Vidyäratna's Tippanl. Calcutta^ 1871,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 483
G1020 : Kavikalpadruma edited, with Durgädäsa's Paribhäsäfikä, by Jaranatha
Tarkavacaspati. Calcutta, 1872.
G1021 : Kavikalpadruma edited, with Durgàdâsa's Paribhäsätikä, by Baradaprasada
Majumdra. Calcutta, 1876, 1879.
G1022 : Edited, with Durgàdâsa's Subodhä and Râma Tarkayâgisa's Pramodajananï,
by Rajanikanta Gupta. Calcutta, 1888.
G1023 : Kavikalpadruma edited, with Durgàdâsa's Paribhäsäfikä, by Jivananda
Vidyasagara. Calcutta, 1888.
G1024 : Edited, with Durgàdâsa's Subodhä, Nandakisora Bhattàcârya Cakravartin's
Parisisfa, and editor's Tikä, by Durgadasa Vidyavagisa Srirama Tarkava-
gisa. Calcutta, 1908.
G1025 : Edited, with editor's Tippanï, by Syamacarana Kaviratna. Calcutta, 1910.
G1026 : Edited, with Rama Tarkavâgïsa's Pramodajananï, by Siva Narayana
Siromani. BI 201. Calcutta, 1911-1913.
G1027 '.Kavikalpadruma edited, with Durgädäsa's Dhätudipikä, by Gurunatha
Vidyanidhi Bhattacarya. Calcutta, 1912.
G1028 : Edited, with Râma Tarkavâgïsa's Pramodajananï and editor's Parimala, by
Harendranarayana Devasarman. Berhampur,1912.
G1029 iKrdanta section edited with Râma Tarkavâgïsa's Pramodajananï thereon.
Varanasi, 1914.
G1030 : Edited with Durgädäsa's Subodhä and Rama Tarkavâgïsa's Pramodajananï.
Calcutta, 1914.
G1031 : Edited, with Durgädäsa's Subodhä, Räma Tarkavâgïsa's Pramodajananï, and
Sivanäräyana âiromani's Tippanï, by Devendranatha Sengupta and
Upendranatha Sengupta. Calcutta, 1916.
G1032 : Edited by Syamacarana Kaviratna Vidyavaridhi. Calcutta, 1927.
G1033 '.Kavikalpadruma edited by G. B. Palsule. SIAL 15. Poona, 1954.
SAMGRÄMASIMHA (1279)
Bälaüksä on Sarvavarman's Kâtantrasûtras
Seee663.
JINAPRABHÄ (SURI) or L E S A P R A B O D H A (1280)
(NCat 7.259)
Durga(pada)prabodhä on Trilocana3's Kätantravrttipahjikä
(NCat 3.311,7.259)
KRSNALÏLASUKA (1280)
(NCat 9.100,169)
Purusakära on Deva's Daiva
Seee976;e977.
MALAYAGIRI (1280)
(Belvalkar, p. 67)
Vrtti on Hemacandra's Sabdanutàsana
(NCat 9.290)
G1034 : Edited with autocommentary by Bechardas Jivaraj Doshi. LDS 13. Ahmeda-
bad, 1967.
VIMALA SARASVATÏ (1300)
(Belvalkar, pp. 22, 36; G1624, p. 267)
Rüpamälä
G1035 -.Edited with Hindi paraphrase by Kesava Deva Pandeya. 4 volumes.
Delhi, 1973.
NARENDRAPURI or PRAJRÄNASVARÜPA (1300)
Dhätupäfha, 2L Sârasvata work ^
(NCat 9.370)
484 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

ABHAYACANDRA (ÄCÄRYA) (1329)

(Belvalkar, p. 60 ; NGat Ï .273 ) (a Säkatäyana author )
Prakriyâsamgraha
Seee881.
MAISTDANA, pupil of Narendrapuri (1330)
(Belvalkar, p. 82)
Samdhiprakararia on Anubhùti's Sarasvataprakrïyâ
(NGat 2.374)
ÄNANDAPÜRNA VIDYÄSÄGARA (1350 )
(NGat 3.118)
Prakrïyamafijari on Vämana/Jayäditya's Kaükä
(NGat 2.108, 3.118)
BHÏMASENA (ÄGÄRYA) (14th century)
(G1624,p.255)
Commentary on a Dhätupätha
(NGat 9.288)
JAGADDHARA of Kashmir (last half of 14th century)
(NGat 7.317)
Bälabodhinion the Kashmiri recension of the Kätantrasütras
(NGat 3.317)
Apaeabdaniräkarana
(NGat 7.131)
Tikä on Bhojadeva's Sarasvatîkanfhabhararia
Seee918;e92î.
SÄYAI^A or MÄDHAVA (?) (14th century)
(Cardona, p. 288; Belvalkar, p. 43; G1624; pp. 240, 255)
Mädhaviyadhätuvrtti on Pänini's Asfadhyayï-Dhâtupâfha
Seee35.
G1036 : Edited by A. Mahadeva Sastri and K. Rangacaryal. 2 volumes. Govern-
ment Oriental Series, Bibliotheca Sanskritica. Mysore, 1894-1903.
G1037 : Nämadhätuvrtti (an appendix) edited by Damodara Sastri. Pan n. s. 19,
1897.
G1038 : Edited by Ananta Sastri Phadke and Sadasiva Sarma Sastri Joshi. KSS 103.
Varanasi, 1934.
G1039 : Edited by Dwarikadas Shastri. PBS 1. Varanasi, 1964.
MOKSEâVARA (1350?)
Commentary on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
(NGat 3.313,4.281)
JUMARANANDIN (1350?)
(Belvalkar, p. 91 ; GOS 134,1961, 162; YM 1.625)
(Revision of Kramadïsvara's) Samksiptasâra and Rasävati thereon
Seee912.
UJJVALADATTA, alias JÄJALI (14th century? but NGat 2.257 says 1250)
(G1624,p.233)
Uriädisütravrtti
(NGat 2.294)
G1040 : Edited by T. Aufrecht. Bonn, London, 1859.
G1041 : Edited by Jivananda Vidyasagara. Calcutta, 18.
PADMANÄBHADATTA (1375)
(Belvalkar, p. 93 ; NGat 11.128 )
Supadma
G1042 ; Uviâdi section published in Vidyodayà (Calcutta) 26-27 (1874? e t c ) .
BIBLIOGRAPHY 485

G1043 : Edited, with Visnumisra's Makaranda, by Trailokyanatha Bhattacarya.

Calcutta, 1887.
G1044 : Edited, with Visnumisra's Makaranda, by Upendranatha Bhattacarya.
Calcutta, 1900.
G1045 : Edited with a Viuarariapancikä. Calcutta, 1903.
G1046 : Edited with editor's Tippani by Trailokyanatha Bhattacarya. Calcutta,
1910.
KAVIDARPANARÄGHAVA (1375?)
Payiriïyamatadarpana
G1047 : V. Swaminathan, "Päniniyamatadarpana—a Forgotten Work on Gra-
mmar," svuoj 14,1971, 61-76.
MERUTUNGA (1388)
Bälävabodha on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
(NCat 3.31)
KULAMAINTDANA SÜRI ( 1394 )
(NCat 4.238)
Auktika or Mugdhabälävabodha
(NCat 3.97, 4.238)
DHARAÏ^ÏDHARA (1397)
(NCat 9.237)
Panjikâ on Pänini's (?) Pätymiyasiksä
G1048 : Edited by Gopala Sastri Nene and Sudama Sarman Misra. HSS 10.
Vàranasi, 1929.
NANDAKlâORA BARMAN BHATTACARYA CAKRAVARTIN (1398)
(Belvalkar, p. 90; NCat 9.326)
ParUisfa to Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
SeeelO12;elO24.
MAI^DANAKAVI (1400?)
KavikalpadrumaskandhaUpasargamatiLdana
(NCat 2.374, 3.270)
MEGHARATNA (1400?)
(Belvalkar, p. 83)
Särasvata-Vyäkarariadhuridhikä or Dipikä
GOYÏCANDRA or GOJPICANDA (1400?)
(Belvalkar, p. 92; GOS 134, 1961, 145)
Viuaraya on Kramadisvara's Samkfiptasära
(NCat 6.158, 159)
G1049 : Edited in two parts. Calcutta, 1888.
Commentary on Jumaranandin's TaddhitapariHsfa
(NCat 6.158)
RÄMACANDRA (1400)
(Cardona, p. 286; Belvalkar, p. 37; G1624, p. 268)
Prakriyäkaumudi on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
G1050 : Edited, with Vitfhala's Prasäda, by Kamalasankara Pranasankara Trivedi.
BSPS 78, 82. Poona, 1925-1931.
G1051 : Surjit Kumar Mukhopadhyaya, "Tibetan Translations of Prakrïyâkaumudî
and the mention of Siddhänta-kaumudlTherein," mq 20,1944,63-69.
G1052 : Adya Prasada Misra, Prakriyâkaumudïvimarêah. SBS 15. Varanasi, 1966.
G1053 : Edited, with ârîkrsna's Prakàéa and editor's Raimi, by Muralidhara Misra.
SBGM 111-112. 1977-1980.
(RSIPUTRA) PARAMESVARA II (1410)
(NCat 11.191)
486 ËNÔYÔLOPÈDÎA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Gopälikä on Mandana Misra's Sphotasiddhi

Seee870.
GUISTARATNA SÜRI (1411)
(Belvalkar, p. 67 ; NCat 6.51) (Hemacandra writer)
Kriyäratnasamuccaya
G1054 : Edited YJG 10. Varanasi, 1908.
NARAPATI MAHÄMIeRA (1425)
(YM 1.510)
(Vyäkararid) Prakäsa onjinendrabuddhi's JVyäsa
(NCat 4.119)
SUBHAâlLA GAI^I (1425)
Unädinämamälä
(NCat 2.293)
KRSISTÄCÄRYAII (1430)
Upasargärthasamgraha and autocommentary
(NGat 2.376)
(ARRA or ERRA) MÄDHAVA BHATTA (1450)
Tripâdoddyotinï
(NGat 1.393,8.235)
SRÎPATIDATTA (1450?)
(Belvalkar, p. 75; Abhyankar, p. 396)
Parisis$a to the Kätantrasütras
Seee649;e653.
JONARÄJAorJOGARÄJA (1450)
Padaprakarayasamgati, topical analysis of the Kätantrasütras
G1055 : Edited in Belvalkar, pp. 99-101.
SlTIKA^THA (15th century)
JVyäsa on Jagaddhara's Kätantrabälabodhini
(NGat 3.317)
UDAYADHARMA or DHARMASÜRI (1451 )
(NGat 3.97)
Auktika or Väkyaprakäea
(NGat 2.326,3.97, 9.274)
HEMAHAMSAVIJAYAGAINTI (1457)
(Belvalkar, p. 67)
Nyäyasarflgraha with Nyäyärthamafijüsä thereon (Hemacandra work)
G1056 : Edited Varanasi, 1911.
JINASÄGARA (1460?)
(Belvalkar, p. 65)
Dipikâ (or Dhuridhikä?) on Hemacandra's Sabdänusäsana,
(NGat 7.272)
VITTHALA (1460)
'(Gardona, p. 285 ; Belvalkar, p. 37 ; Gl 624, p. 270 )
Prakriyäprasäda on Rämacandra's Prakriyäkaumudi
SeeelO5O.
KUMÄRAPÄLA (1461)
Gayadarpaya
(cf. YM 2.404)
PUNJARÄJA (1485)
(Belvalkar, p. 81)
Commentary on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
BIBLIOGRAPHY 487

G1057 : P. K. Gode, "Oldest Dated ms. of Punjarâja's Commentary on the

Särasvataprakriyä" ALB 5, 1941, 120-124.
RÄMAKÄNTA or RÄMAGANDRA or KAVIGANDRA (1489)
Dhätusädhanä
(NCat 9.295) ~
AMR.TABHARATÏ (1490)
(Belvalkar, p. 81 ; NGat 1.350)
Subodhikä on AnubhCUi's Särasvataprakriyä
(NGat 1.350)
ABHIRÄMA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA ( 1500? )
(GOS 134,1961,37)
Kaumudi on Goyicandra's Sarriksiptasaratikä-Kärakapada
(NGat 1.310, 5.110)
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1500)
Mukhabhüsana
G1058 : Edited by K. Kunjunni Raja, ALB 37, 1973, 89-172.
KÄalNÄTHA BHAJTA (1500?)
(Belvalkar, p. 83 ; YM 1.633 )
Bhäsya on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
(NGat 4.127)
SATYÄNANDA or RÄMAGANDRA SARASVATÏ (1500)
(YM 1.420)
Laghuuivaraw on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
G1059 : 1.1.8-1.2 edited, with ïsvarânanda's Brhadvivararia, Ôivarâmendra Saras-
vatî Yôgîndra's Ratnaprakäsa, Näräyana !§ästri's JVäräyaniya, and Annam-
bhatta's Uddyotana, by M. S. Narasimhacarya. PIFI 51-55. Pondicherry
1973-1980.
DHANE&VARA BHATTA (1510)
(Belvalkar, p. 83)
Pradipa on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
(NGat 9.226)
G1060 : P. K. Gode, '«Date of Särasvataprakriyä of Bhatta Dhanesvara," PO 1.4,1936,
30-33.
APPAN NAINÄRYA (1510 )
(YM 1.485)
Prakriyädipikä
(NGat 1.258)
KARMADHARA (1510)
Prakäea on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
(NGat 3.310)
MÄDHAVA BHATTA ( 1520? )
(Belvalkar, p. 82)
Siddhäntaratnävali on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee996.
PUI^PARÏKAKSA VIDYÄSÄGARA BHATTÄGÄRYA (1520)
Pradipa on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
Seee656.
Vaktavyaviveka on a Katantrapariêista
(NGat 3.316)
Tikä on Jayäditya/Vämana's Käsikä (lost)
KSEMENDRA (1525)
488 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(Belvalkar, p. 81 ; NCat 5.169)

Commentary on Rämacandra's Särasvataprakriyä
Commentary on Narendrapuri's (Särasvata) Dhätupätha
(NCat 5.169, 9.289)
DHANACANDRA or JINASÄGARA or NANDASUNDARA and UDAYA-
SAUBHÄGYA (1533)
(Belvalkar, p . 65)
Dhuydhikâ on Hemacandra's Brhadvxtti
Avacürikä on Hemacandra's Laghuvxtti
(NCat 9.216)
S E Ç A K R S I ^ A (1540)
(NCat 4.365)
SphofatattvanirüpaijLa
G1061 : Edited in Mahadevâ Sarma Gangadhara, ed., Vadarthasamgraha. Bombay,
1913-1914.
Sabdahamqa or Sabdälankäm (lost)
Padacandrikä with Efs^akautühula thereon
(NCat 4.365)
Güdhabhävavivrti or Prakäsa on Rämacandra's Prakriyàkaumudï
(NCat 4.365)
(SESA) NÄRÄYAI^A (BHATTA) (1546)
(YM 1.40.5)
Süktiratnäkara on Patanjali's Mahäbhä§ya
. (NCat 10.89)
RÄMANÄTHA SARMAN (RÄYI) (1546)
(NCat 3.315)
Manoramä on Kätantra-Dhätupäfha
See e654.
VIS^UMITRA (1547)
(YM 1.410)
Ksirodara on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (lost)
BHARATA MiSRA (16th century)
Sphofasiddhi
G1062 : Edited by K. Sambasiva Sastri. TSS 89. Trivandrum, 1927.
VIMALAKÏRTI (1550?)
(GOS 134,1961,359)
Padavyavasthä(sütra)kärikä
(NCat 11.102)
GOPINÄTHA TARKÄCÄRYA (1550)
(Belvalkar, p. 75; NCat 3.316)
Prabodha on a Katantrapariêisfa
G1063 : Edited Calcutta, 1890.
Paribhäsävxtti
(NCat 6.163)
ISVARANANDA or ÎSVARÏDATTA: (1550)
(NCat 2.280)
Vivaraya on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
SeeelO59.
Sâbdabodhatarangiriï
(NCat2.280) '
NÄRÄYAI^ANYÄYAPANCÄNANA (1550)
(NCat 10.74)
BIÈLIOGRÀPHY 48Ô

Commentary on Krdanta section of Goylçandra's commentary on Samksiptasära

(NCat 4.281, 10.74).
Gariaprakäsa on Samksiptasära-Ganapätha
(NCat 5.256, 10.74)
See e913.
RÄMA TARKAVAGÏSA (1550?)
(Belvalkar, p. 90; GOS 134,1961,324)
Pramodajanani on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
(NCat 2.203)
See elO17;elO22;elO26;elO28;elO29;e!030;elO31.
Commentary on the Kätantrasütras
(NCat 3.314)
KULACANDRA (1550?)
, (Belvalkar, p. 75)
Durgaväkyaprabodha on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
Seee656;e657.
KASÏSVARA BHATTÄCÄRYA ( 1550?)
(Belvalkar, p. 90 • YM 1.637-638)
Commentary on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
(NCat 4.141)
Mugdhabodhaparisisfa
(NCat 4.141)
Éabdaratnâkara
(NCat 4.141)
MADHAVA SARASVATÏ (1550?)
Prakriyäsudhä on Râmacandra's Prakriyâkaumudi
Gl064 : M. S. Bhat, "An Incomplete Manuscript of Mädhavasarasvaü's Prakriyä-
sudhä, a Commentary on Prakriyakaumudî" JIH 37, 1959, 153-155.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (16th century?)
Sphofasiddhinyayavicara
G1065 : Edited by T. Ganapati Sastri. TSS 54. Trivandrum, 1917.
SARVESVARA or SOMAYÄJIN DÏKSITA ( 1555 )
(YM 2.416)
Sphürft on Kaiyafä's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
(MS listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, nos. 107-109)
CINTÄMAISI (1557)
(NCat 7.58; YM 2.418)
Prakäia on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
(NCat 7.58) •
HARSAKULAGAI^I (1557)
(NCat 3.97)
Commentary on Udayadharma's Aüktika
(NCat 3.97)
Versification of Hemacandra's Kavikalpadruma-Dhätupätha
G1066 : Edited YJG 12. Bombay, 1909.
ANNAMBHATTA (1540? 1560?)
(NCat 1.237)
Uddyotana on Kaiyatavs Mahäbhäsyapradipa
Seee587;e590;el059.
Mitäksara on Pänini's Asßdhyäyi
G1067 : Edited by S. P. S. Jagannathaswamy Aryavaraguru and Acharya Bhalta-
nathaswamy. BenSS 20. Varanasi, 1903-1906.
490 ENCYCLOPEDIA OP INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

VÄSUDEVA BHATTA ( 1567)

(Belvalkar, p. 82)
Sârasvataprasâda on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee989;e991.
PURUSOTTAMA VIDYAVAGÏ&A BHATTÄCÄRYA or NARANÄRÄYANA (1568 )
Prayoga(uttama)ratnamälä
(NCat6.94)
G1068 : Edited Kuch Bihar, 1890-1903.
G1069 : Padamahjari section edited by Taranatha Gosvami Smrtiratna. Calcutta,
1907.
G1070 : Biswanarayana Shastri, "The Kämarüpa School of Sanskrit Grammar,"
in Gaurinath Shastri Festschrift, pp. 236-244.
CARITRASIMHA (GAtfl) (1569)
Avacûrï on Kätantra (uibhrama ) sütras
(NGat 3.318; 7.23)
APPAYYA DÏKSITA I ( 1580 )
Vädanaksatramälä on Pänini's Asfädhyäyi
(NGat 1.265)
G1071 : Edited by V. Krishnamachariar. Kumbhakonam, 1910.
GUNARATNA (1585)
Commentary on Narendrapuri's Särasvataprakriyä-Dhätupätha
HARSAKIRTI (1586)
(Belvalkar, pp. 82, 86 ; NCat 1.197 )
Dhätupätha and Târangiriï thereon
(NCat 9.289)
CIDRÜPÄSRAMA or CIDRÜPÄSRAMIN (1587) .
Vyâkarariadîpa or Dïpavyâkaratta
(NCat 7.55, 9.66)
?Visamï on a Paribhâsenduêekhara
(NCat 7.55, 11.226)
GOPÄLA BHATTA ( 1590 )
(GOS 134,1961)
Visamapadarthadîpikâ or Gopâlabhatflon Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
(NCat 6.146)
BHATTOJI DÏKSITA ( 1590 )
(G1624, p. 273; Cardona, p. 283)
Siddhântakaumudi on Pânini's Asfadhyâyï
G1072 : Edited by Babu Rama in MS form. Kidderpur, 1811.
G1073 : Edited Madras, 1858, 1866,1882,1886, 1887.
G1074 .-Edited with Jfiänendra Sarasvatï's Tattvabodhinï. Varanasi, .1862, 1885,
1887, 1888.
G1075 : Edited with editor's Saralä by Taranatha Tarkavacaspati. 2 volumes.
Calcutta, 1863-1864.
Seee30.
G1076 : Lingänuiäsana section edited Calcutta; 1868.
G1077 : Edited with editor's commentary by Taranatha Tarkavacaspati. Calcutta,
1870-1871.
G1078 : Edited Varanasi, 1873,1880.
G1079 : First stabaka edited by Rämacandra Sarman Gunjikâra. Bombay, 1880.
G1080 : Edited with Vâsudeva Dîksita's Bälamanoramä. Tiruvadi, 1885; Nandu-
kaveri, 1901. >
Seee37.
BIBLIOÖRAPttY 491
G1081 : Edited with Näges'a Bhatta's Laghusqbdenduiekhara, Varanasi, 1888.
G1082 : Edited, with Jnänendra Sarasvati's Tattvabodhinî, by Patavardhana
Narayana Sastri. Varanasi, 1897.
G1083 : Edited, with Jnänendra Sarasvati's Tattvabodhini and Jayakrsna's Subodhim,
by Dinkar Keshava Shastri Gadgil and Vasudev Lakshmana Shastri
Pansikar. Bombay, 1899, 1915.
G1084 : Edited, with Nâgeéa Bhafta's Laghuêabdenduêekhara, by Karnataka Krsna
Sastri. Varanasi, 1903.
G1085: Edited and translated by Srisa Chandra Vasu and Vaman Das Vasu. 3
volumes. Allahabad, 1905-1907. Reprinted Delhi, 1962.
G1086 : Edited with editor's Bälacandn, by Balacandra Sastri. Meerut, 1908.
G1087 : Edited, with Väsudeva Diksita's Bälamanoramä, by S. Ghandrasekhara
Sastrigal. Trichinopoly, 1910-1911 ; Madras, 1927.
G1088 : Edited with Bhairava Mis^a's ifatoß^raHftfoz. Varanasi, 1910.
Seee54;e56.
G1089 : Partly edited, with editor's Pankticandrikâ, byGangaprasada Sastrin.
Brndäban, 1914; Bharatpur, 1931.
G1090 : Edited with editor's Sâradarêini, by Sivadatta. Bombay, 1914.
G1091 : 1.1 edited, with editor's Mitabhäsini, and translated by Saradaranjan Ray
Vidyavinod. Calcutta, 1920.
G1092 : Edited, with editor's Panktipradlpa, by Nanakarama Sastri. Varanasi,
1924-1925.
G1093 : Edited, with editor's Bhävabodhini, by Karaputugala Dharma Sri. Part 1.
Varanasi, 1925.
G1094 : Edited by Gopal Sastri Nene. HSS 11. Varanasi, 1929.
G1095 : Edited, with Väsudeva Diksita's Bälamanoramä, by C. Sankara Rama
Sastrin and R. V. Krishnamachariar. 2d edition. Madras, 1929.
Seea78.
G1096 : Edited, with editor's Viéesauivrti, by Somanatha Sarman. Varanasi, 1952.
G1097 : Bhadanta Shanti Bhikshu, "An Incorrect Reading Existing from a Long
Time in Siddhäntakaumudi," SPAIOG 17, 1953, 100-101. Full paper IL 14,
1954, 553-556.
G1098 : Siddheshwar Varma, "The Vedic Limitations of the Siddhantakaumudï"
SPAIOG 17,1953,105-106.
G1099 : G. B. Palsule, "Discussion of a Reading in the Siddhantakaumudï,^ SPAIOG 20,
1957,72.
G1100 : Edited, with Väsudeva Diksita's Bälamanoramä and Jnänendra Sarasvati's
Tattvabodhini) by Giridhara Sarma Caturveda and Paramesvayananda
Sarma Bhaskara. 4 volumes. Varanasi, 1958-1961.
G1101 : Edited, with Väsudeva Diksita's Bälamanoramä, by Gopala Shastri Nene.
2 parts, KSS 136, Varanasi, 1958-1961.
Gl 102 : Edited by Somanatha Sarma. Kasthamandapa, Nepal, 1959.
See el 59; el 68.
G11Ö3 : Vibhaktyartha {Käraka) section edited, with editor's commentary, by
Sridharananda Sharma Ghildiyal. Delhi, 1962.
G1104 : Partially edited, with Sabhâpati Sarma Upâdhyâya's Lakçmî, by Bala
Krishna Pancholi. 2 volumes. Delhi, 1966.
Seea860 (1968).
G1105 : Edited with Hindi commentary by Bala Krishna Pancholi. 3 volumes, KSS
191. Varanasi, 1969-1971.
G1106 : Käraka section edited by Dinesh Chandra Guha. Varanasi, 1970.
G1107 : S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, "The Difference Between Bhattqji Diksita and
492 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INÖIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Nârâyana Bhafta with Regard to Certain Phonetic Observations," VIJ 8,

1970,86-102.
See d863 (1971).
Gl 108 : Mahesh Dutt Sharma, "A Note on the Siddhäntakaumudi 2882 and 2940,"
MO 4, 1971, 35-37. Also PAIOG 25, 1972, 317-319.
Gl 109 : M. S. Narayana Murti, "Bhattqji Dïksita and Kondubhatta on the Primary
Denotation," svuoj 15,1972, 87-98.
Seee321;b864.
Gil 10 : P. C. Naganatha Sastry, Sri Bhatfoji Dïkshita? s Vaiyäkarana Siddhäntakaumudi.
The Standard Sanskrit Grammar. An Analysis in English. 2 volumes. Delhi, 1974,
1983.
Gl 111 : Pratibha P. Gokhale, "A Note on the paribhäsä 'stipa sapanubandhana"
sPAioc 27, 1974, 246-247.
Seed866
Gl 112 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "A So-called Värttika: maturmatac puträrthamarhate,"
: PAIOG 27, 1976,383-384.
Praudhamanoramä on his own Siddhäntakaumudi
Gl 113 : Edited Varanasi, 1868, 1886, 1888.
Gl 114 : Edited with Hari Diksita's (?) Laghuéabdaratna, by Rama Sastri Manavalli
and Gangadhara Sastri. Varanasi, 1874-1888.
G1115 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's (?) Laghuéabdaratna, by Ratnagopala Bhatta.
Varanasi, 1906-1910.
Gl 116 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's (?) Laghuéabdaratna, by Balakrsna Sastri.
Varanasi, 1910.
G1117 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's (?) Laghusabdaratna and editor's Prabhä, by
Madhava Sastri Bhandarin. Varanasi, 1920.
G1118 : Partially edited, with Hari Diksita's Laghuéabdaratna and Bhairava Misra's
Sabdaratna Bhairavï, by Sadasiva Sarma Sastri. KSS 58. Varanasi, 1928.
Gil 19 : Partially edited, with Hari Dïkçita's Laghuéabdaratna, by Sadasiva Sastri
Joshi. HSS 23. Varanasi, 1933.
G1120 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's Laghuéabdaratna, Bhairava Misra's Bhairavi>
Vaidyanätha Payagunde's Bhavaprakâéa, and editor's Saralä, by Gopala
Sastri Nene. KSS 125, Varanasi, 1939.
G1121 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's Sabdaratna, by Narayana Dadaji Wadegaong-
kar. 7 volumes. Nagpur, 1945-1964.
Gil22 : Edited, with Hari Diksita's Sabdaratna, by Venkatesh Laxman Joshi.
Volume 1: DGMS 31, Poona, 1966. Appendixes published as DCMS 31 A,
Poona, 1964.
Gl 123 : Edited, with Hari Dik§ita's BxhaUabdaratna and Näges'a Bhafta's Laghuéabda-
ratna, by Sitaram Sastri. Volume 1. HVNRSS 8. Varansi, 1964.
Sabdakaustubha
Gl 124 : Edited Varanasi, 1876.
Gl 125 : Edited, with Jayakrsna's Sphotacandrikä, by Vindhye^vari Prasada Dvivedin
and Ganapati Sastri Mokate. ChSS 2. Varanasi, 1898-1917. 2.5-10
reprinted with Sphotacandrikä, Varanasi, 1929. 1.1 reprinted Varanasi,
1933.
?fCriyänighantu
Gl 126 : Edited in Telugu script. Mysore, 1905.
Vaiyäkaranamatonmajjana or Vaiyäkaranasiddhäntakarikäs Printed in many editions of
Kotidabhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsana and sära.
Seee555.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 493

General
Gl 127 : K. G. Chatterji, "Jagannätha and Bhaftoji," coj 3, 1935,41-51.
G1128 : P. K. Gode, "A New Approach to the Date of Bhattoji Dikshita," ASVOI
1.2, 1940, 117-127.
G1129 : Surya Kant Bali, "Contribution of Bhattoji Diksita to Sanskrit Grammar".
Ph.D. diss., University of Delhi, 1971.
:
Gl 130 : —, Bhattoji Dïksita: His Contribution to Sanskrit Grammar. Delhi, 1976.
(âESA) GAKRAPANI (1595)' *
(NCat 6.255)
(Paramata)Khandana on BhattojïsPraudhamanoramâ
Gl 131 : Edited by V. P. Dvivedin. Pan 32,1910; 2,1-60; 33,1911, 61-76; 34,1912,
77-120; 35, 1913,121-134; 36, 1914, title page.
Kârakatattva or Kärakavicära
(NGat 3.375)
Prakriyapradïpa (lost) .- ,
TRILOGANA (1600?) J
(Belvalkar,p.75)
UttarapariHsta on Kätantrasütras
(NGat 3.316, 8.262)
BHÄRATA MALLIKA ( 1600? )
Ekavarnärthasamgraha
Gl 132 : Edited by Suresh Chandra Banerji, IHQ, 36, Î960, 29-34.
SIVARÄMA CAKRAVARTIN (1600?)
(Belvalkar, p. 75)
Siddhäntaratnäkara on Kätantraparisista
(NGat 3.316)
RÄMADÄSA CAKRAVARTIN (1600?)
Vyäkhyäsära or Candrikä on Kätantra
(NGat 3.314)
Candrikä on a Kätantraparitista
(NGat 3.316) (see e632 for extracts)
RÄMAGANDRÄSRAMA (1600?)
(Belvalkar, p. 85; YM 2.249)
{Vaiyäkarana) Siddhäntacandrikä on Särasvatasütras
(NGat 6.379)
Seee988;e992.
Gl 133 : Edited, with editor's commentary, by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. HSS 17.
Varanasi, 1931.
Gil34 : Edited, with Sadänanda's Subodhinï, Lokesakära's Tattvadipikä, and editor's
Aüyayärthamälä, byNavkishore Jha. 2 volumes, KSS 91. Varanasi, 1931-1933.
KAVICANDRA (DATTA) (1600)
(NCat 3.274)
Dhätucandrikä
Dhätusädhana
(NCat 3.274)
Säralahari (of Samksiptasära school )
(NCat 3.274)',
NÏLAKANTHA VÄJAPEYIN (1605)
(YM 2.411-412)
Pâninîyadïpikâ
§ukhabodhinï on Bhattoji's Siddhäntakaumudl
494 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

SESAVISINTU (1605)
Prakäsikä on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
Dhäturatnaprakäia or -manjari *
(NCat 9.292)
GANDRAKÏRTI (1607)
(Belvalkar, p. 82)
Subodhikä or Dïpikâ on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee960;e999;el001.
Gl 135 : Edited KSS, 2 volumes. Varanasi, 1935-1936.
SRIVALLABHAVAGANA ÄCÄRYA ( 1607 )
(Belvalkar, p. 67)
Durgäpadaprabodha on Hemacandra's Lingänusäsana
ACYUTAPISAROTI (1610)
Praveêaka
Gl 136 : Edited in Cochin Sanskrit Series 2. Cochin.
TARKATILAKA BHATTÄCÄRYA (1614)
(Belvalkar p. 85)
Vrtti on Särasvatasütras
(NCat 8.114)
Sabdabhäskara
(NCat 8.114)
GANGÄDHARA DÎKSITA (1617)
Prabhâ on Cidrüpäsrama's Vyäkarariadipa
(NCat 5.203, 9.66)"
VARADARÄJA (1620)
(Belvalkar, p. 42 ; Cardona, p. 287 )
Särasiddhäntakaumudi
Gl 137 : Edited and translated by Govind Vinayak Devasthali. PCASS-G 4. Poona,
1968.
Madhyasiddhântakaumudi
Gl 138 : LingänuSasana section edited by Visvanatha Sarman. Varanasi, 1884.
Gl 139 : Edited with editor's commentary by Balakrsna Sarma Yogi with Jivarama
Sastri Raikva. Bombay, 1895.
Gl 140 : Edited by Ganesha Datta Sastri. Lahore, 1899.
G1141 : Edited with editor's Visamasthalatipparia by Govindasimha. Bombay, 1900.
Gl 142 : Edited by Narayana Ram Acarya. Bombay, 1950.
Gl 143 : Edited by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi and Rama Candra Jha, with the former's
Sudhä. Hss 213. Varanasi, 1960.
Gl 144 : Edited, with Visvanätha Sästri's Prabhäkara, by Nigamananda Sastri.
Delhi, 1964.
Laghusiddhântakaumudï
Gl 145 : Edited Calcutta, 1827,1874,1877,1883.
Gl 146 : Edited Agra, 1848.
Gl 147 : Edited Delhi, 1849, 1869.
Gl 148 : Edited and translated by James R. Ballantyne. Mirzapore, 1849; Varanasi,
* 1867,1881. Reprinted Delhi, 1961. Edition and Hindi translation published
Varanasi, 1856.
Gl 149 : Edited with editor's Tïka by Rupacandra. Lahore, 1853.
Gl 150 : Edited Allahabad, 1873.
G1151 : Edited Varanasi, 1879, 1889, 1890.
Gl 152 : Edited Madras, 1880.
Gl 153 : Edited Bombay, 1881, 1890?
BIBLIOGRAPHY 495

Gl 154 : Edited Lucknow, 1882.

G1155 : Edited by Vitthala Narayana Sarma Gore and Ramacandra Sarma
Gunjikara. Bombay, 1885.
Gl 156 : Edited by Jivarama Sastri and Sitarama Sastri. Bombay, 1903.
Gil57 : Edited, with editor's Särabodhini, by Shastri Rancchodji Odhavji. Bombay,
1905.
Gl 158 : Edited with editor's Tinantapradîpikâ by Kalavati Devi. Lucknow, 1909.
G1159 : Edited with editor's Saralä by Jivarama Sarman. Moradabad, 1911;
Vrindavan, 1918-1919.
Gl 160 : Edited with editor's Tippaxß by Sivadatta Sarman. Bombay, 1915.
G1161 : Edited with editor's Tikä by U. K. Venkatanarasimha Acarya. Madras,
1916.
Gl 162 : Edited by Kanakalal Thakur. HSS 2. Varanasi, 1924.
G1163 : Edited with editor's Tipparii by Jivanatha Raya. Moradabad, Varanasi,
1925.
Gl 164 : Edited Darbhanga, 1925.
G1165 : Part 1 edited and translated, with editor's Bälabodhini, by Vasudev Visnu
Mirashi. 1928. Reprinted Delhi, 1967.
Gl 166 : Edited, with Kanakaläla barman's Samksiptabälabodhini, by Sadasiva Sarma
Joshi. Varanasi, 1930.
Gl 167 : Edited by Narayana Ram Acharya. Bombay, 1948.
G1168 : Edited, with editor's Bhaimi, by Bhimasena Sastri. 3 volumes. Delhi, 1950-
1980.
Gl 169 : Edited and translated by Kumudranjan Roy. Calcutta, 1957.
G1170 : Edited with Hindi commentary by Shridharananda Sarma Ghildiyal.
Delhi, 1961.
Gl 171 : Edited with Hindi commentary by Taranisa Jha. 3 volumes. Allahabad,
1962-1965.
G1172 : Edited with Hindi commentary by Mahesh Singh Kushwaha. 2 volumes.
Vidyabhavan Sanskrit Granthamala 1-31. Varanasi, 1965-1977.
G1173 : Edited, with Girija's Tikä and editor's Hindi commentary, by Rajendra
Chaudhuri. Allahabad, 1969.
Gl 174 : Edited with Hindi commentary by Sadasiva Sastri. HSS 119. Varanasi, 1977.
Ghirvarnapadamanjan
G1175 : Edited by Umakant Premanand Shah. Supplement to JOI 7.4, 1958, 1-18.
Reprinted as MSUOS 4. Baroda,i960.
Dhätukärikävali
Gl 176 : Edited in Grantharatnamala 3. Bombay, 1889.
General
Gil77 : P. K. Gode, "Varadarâja, a Pupil of BhatÇoji Diksita, and His Works—
Between 1600 and 1650," PVKF, pp. 188-199.
RAGHUNÄTHA (1620)
(Belvalkar, p. 86)
Laghubhäsya on the Särasvatasütras
SAHAJAKÏRTI (1623)
Särasvataprakriyävärttika
SÄDHUSUNDARA GA1NFI (1624)
Dhâturatnâkara
(NGat, 9.293)
K O N D A or K A U N D A BHATTA (1630)
(NGat 5.92; Gl624, p. 285)
Vaiyäkarayabhüsaya on Bhaftoji Diksita's Vaiyäkaranamatonmqjjana, and -sära thereon ,
496 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Gil78 : Edited by Taranatha Tarkavacaspati and Madana Mohana Tarkalam-

kara. Calcutta, 1849, 1872.
Gl 179 : Edited with Harivallabha's Darpana, Varanasi, 1866.
Gl 180 : Edited Varanasi, 1890.
G1181 : Text only edited^ with Konda Bhatta's Padärthadipikä, by Ramakrsna
Sastri Patavardhana. BenSS 15. Varanasi, 1899-1900.
G1182 : Edited, with ârïkrsna's Sphotacandrikä and Bhairava Misra's Sphofapanksä
by the Anandasrama pandits, ASS 43, Poona, 1901.
G1183 : Edited with editor's Visamasthalatippanï by Ramakrsna Sarma Tripathi.
Varanasi, 1907.
G1184 : Edited, with Harivallabha's Darpana, by Ratnagopaia Bhatta. Varanasi,
1908.
G1185 :Text only edited, with Harirâma's Kâtikà by K.P. Trivedi. BSPS 70.
Bombay, 1915.
G1186 : Edited with editor's Saralâ by Gopala Sastri Nene. Varanasi, 1919.
G1187 : Edited, with Harivallabha's Darpana, by Ananta Sastri Phadke. KSS 23.
Varanasi, 1924.
G1188 : Edited, with Harivallabha's Darpana, Bhairava Misra's Pariksä and Krsna
Mitra's commentary, with Khuddi Jhâ âarmâ's Tinarthauädasära, by
Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. KSS 133. Varanasi, 1939.
G1189 : Edited, with Bäla Krsna Pancoli's Prabhä and Harivallabha's Darpana,
by Tarakesvara Sastri, Caturvedi. AG 2. Varanasi, 1947.
G1190 : Edited, with Gopäla Sästri Nene's Saralä and editor's Subodhinï, by Rama
Prasada Tripathi HKNMM 7. Varanasi, 1952.
G1191 :P.K. Gode, "The Chronology of the Works of Kondabhatta (a Nephew
of Bhattoji Diksita), Between A.D. 1610 and 1660," ALB 18, 1954, 62-67.
Reprinted in SILH 6.2, 237-241.
G1192 : Edited, with editor's Samkan, by Samkara éastri Marulkara. ASS 135.
Poona, 1957.
G1193 : Shivaram Dattatray Joshi, "Kondabhatta on the Meaning of Sanskrit
Verbs." Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1960.
G1194 : Sphotanirriaya (chapter 14) edited and translated by S.D. Joshi. PCASS-G 2.
Poona, 1967.
G1195 : Partially edited/with editor's Bhaimi, by Bhimasena Sastri. Delhi, 1969.
See al 109. -
G1196 : NämarthaniriTLaya edited and translated in Madhav Murlidhar Deshpande,
"Kaundabhatta on the Philosophy of Nominal Meanings." Ph.D. diss.,
University of Pennsylvania, 1972.
G1197 : Lakärärthanirriaya edited and translated in Jayashri Achyut Gune, Kaunda-
bhatta on the Meaning of Verbal Endings. Poona, 1978. :
G1198 : S.D. Josh^ "Kaunda Bhatta on the Meaning of Case-endings," VIJ 18,
1980, 88-95.
G1199 : -, "Kaundabhatta on sphota" in Gaurinath Sastri Festschrift, pp. 221-23,
G1200 -, "Kaunda Bhatta on the Meaning of Compounds," ALB 44-45,
1980-1981, 369-389.
ABHINAVA NRSIMHÄSRAMA, pupil of Rämacandräsrama (1630?)
(NCat 1.304)
Nämakärthaprakäs'asamgraha, a Särasvata work
(NCat 1.304)
MALLAYA YAJVAN, father of Tirumala Yajvan (1630)
(YM 2.419-420)
Tippanf on Kaiyata's Mahäbhctsyapradipa
BIBLIOGRAPHY 497

JINAVIJAYA, pupil of Kïrtivijaya (1637)

Väkyaprakäeavärta on Udayadharma's Auktika
(NCat3.97)
NÏLAKANTHA SUKLA (1637) (pupil of Bhattoji Diksita)
Éabdaêobhà
(NCat 7.152; 10.173, 177)
RÄMAKRSI^A DÏKSITA, son of Govardhana Dïksita (1638)
Ganapäfha
(NCat 5.255)
CANDRASEKHARA (1638?)
Commentary on Purusottama's Prayogaratnarnälä
(NCat 6.368)
DURGÄDÄSA VIDYAVAGÏS A or VÄCASPATI (1639)
Dhätudipikä or Paribhäsatikä on Vopadeva's Kavikalpadruma
See elOlO; el014; e!020; elO21; el023; el027.
Subodhä on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
(NCat 9.78)
See elO15; el017; elO22; elO24; el030; cl031.
NÄRÄYANA BHATTATIRI or VAINATEYA of Kerala (1640)
(NCat 10.72)
Apäninlyapramänatä or Parapaksakharidana
G1201 : Edited by E.V. Raman Namputri. Trivandrum, 1942.
G1202 : Edited and translated by E.R. Sreekrishna Sharma. svuoj 8, Supplement
1965.
Prakriyäsarvasva
G1203 : Edited by K. Sambasiva Sastri. TSS 106. Trivandrum, 1931.
G1204 : Uriädisütras published MUSS 7.2. Madras, 1933.
G1205 : Part 3 edited by V.A. Ramaswami with an English introduction by
S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, TSS 152. Trivandrum, 1947.
G1206 : S. Venkitasubramonia Iyer, Näräyariabhattcüs Prakriyäsarvasva'. A Critical
Study, KUDSP 7. Trivandrum, 1972.
G1207 : K.V. Sarma, "A Vindication of non-Päninian Systems of Sanskrit Gram-
mar," viz. 13, 1975, 275-283.
Dhätukävya
G1208 : Edited with the Krsrtärpana and Rämapanivada's Vivararia. KUDSP 6.
Trivandrum, 1970.
General
G1209 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Students of Melputtur Näräyaria Bhatta," SPAIOG 15,
1949,61-62.
G1210 : , "The Date of Nârâyana Bhatta," PAIOG 13, 1951, 183-186.
See all07.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN (1640)
Bhoja Vyäkarana
G1211 : P.K. Gode, "Chronology of Dharmapradipa and Bhoja Vyäkararia, Composed
Under the Patronage of Rao Bhojaräja of Kaccha (A.D. 1631 to 1645),"
po 16, 1952, 40-47.
KAMALÄKARA BHATTA (1640?)
(NCat 3.165)
?Commentary on Rämacandra's Prakriyäkaumudf
(NCat 3.160) .
Vibhaktyarthaprakäea
(NCat 3.165)
498 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Vyäkhyädarsa on Patanjali's Mahabhäsya

(NCat 3.165)
NÄRÄYANA (SÄSTRIN) (1640) (disciple of Dharmarâjàdhvarin, father of Räma-
krsna Yajvan
(NGat 10.87)
Vyäkhyä or Kathinaprakäsika on Kaiyata's Mahabhäsyapradipa
SeeelO59.
Commentary on Haradatta's Padamanjarï
Dïpaprabha on Praisa
(NGat 10.87)
Dïpaprabha on Kätyäyana's Vârttikas or Vararucasamgraha
Seee505.
KRSNA (1645)
Laghubodha, an elementary grammar
(NGat 4.294)
jftÄNATILAKA (1646)
(Belvalkar, p. 86)
Siddhäntacandrikä on the Särasvatasütras
BHAVADEVA (1649)
Taddhitakoia
(NGat 8.85)
TÄRAKA BRAHMÄNANDA SARASVATÏ (1650)
Vyäkarariakrodapattra
(NGat 8.151)
?Citprabhâ on a Paribhasenduéekhara
(NGat 8.151)
RANGANÄTHA DÏKSITA (1650)
(NGat 4.120)
Makaranda or Parimala on Hàradatta's Padamanjarï
(NGat 4.120) .
RÄMABHATTA (1650)
(Belvalkar, p. 84)
Vidvatprabodhini or Rämabhaffi
NRSIMHA (1650)
Prakriyäkalpavallari on Dharmakïrti's Rüpävatara
(NGat 10.190)
KEâAVA (1650)
(NGat 5.60)
Manoramäkharidana (vs. Bhaftoji Dikstta)
(NGat 5.60)
RÄMANÄTHA VIDYÄVÄGASPATI (1650?)
(GOS 134, 1961, 324)
Rahasya or Tïkâ on Kâtantra
(NGat 3.314, 318)
JAYANTÄ (1650)
(Belvalkar, p. 51)
Tattvacandra on Rämacandra's Prakriyäkaumudi
(NGat 7.18,0)
GOKKANÄTHA DÏKSITA (1650)
(NGat 7.85)
Sabdakaumudi
(NGat 7.85)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 499

Ratnâvalï on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya

(NCat 7.85, 9.293)
G1212 : Dhätu section edited JSML 27, 1975, 1-16.
ÄPADEVA (1650)
Sphotanirüpana
(NCat 2.125) «
HAMSAVIJAYAGANI (1650)
(Belvalkar, p. 84)
Sabdärthacandrikä on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
JAGANNÄTHA PANDITARÄJ A TAILIIsTGA ( 1650 )
(NCat 7.137; G1624, p . 280)
Praudhamanoramäkucamardana (vs. Bhattoji Dïksita)
(NCat 7.138)
Sabdakaustubhakhandana (vs. Bhattoji; löst?)
General
Seeall27
VINAYAVIJAYAGANI (1652)
(Belvalkar, p . 66)
Haimalaghuprakriyä
KSEMANKARA (1653)
(Belvalkar, p . 85)
Pratyayodbhedapaddhati
(NCat 5.162)
UDAYAKÏRTI, pupil of Sädhusundara (1654)
Vivrti on Vimalakïrti's Padavyavasthäkärikä
(NCat 11.102)
LAKSMÏNRSIMHA (1660)
Viläsa on Bhattoji's Siddhäntakaumudi
(MS listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 353)
TIRUMALA YAJVAN or DVÄDAaAHÄDHVARIN (1660)
(NCat 8.182; YM 2.413)
Sumanoramâ on Bhattoji's Siddhäntakaumudi
(MS listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 355 )
lAnupäta on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (cf. ALB 3.1, 1939, 28)
âlVARAMENDRA SARASVATÏ (1660)
Siddhäntaratnaprakäea on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
SeeelO59.
G1213 : Pierre Filliozat, "Sivarämendra Sarasvati's Interpretation of 'sthänivad
ädesah,' Pänini 1.1.56," ABORI 58-59, 1978, 619-626.
Ratnakaratïkâ on Bhattoji's Siddhäntakaumudi
(RÄMA) NÄRÄYANA (&ARMAN) (VANDYOPÄDHYÄYA) (1664)
(NCat 10.85)
Suddhi(tattva)kärikä
(NCat 10.85) •
Särävali and Vrtti thereon
(NCat 10.94)
Dhäturatnäkara
(NCat 10.85)
Kärikävali
(NCat 3.384)
VIDYÄVÄGläA BHATTÄCÄRYA (1665)
500 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES'

Vivrti on Vararuci's ( = Kätyäyana's? ) Krdâkhyâtavrtti

'(NGat 4.281)
NÄRÄYANA (SÄDHU ) of Didvana in Marwar (1667 )
Nirnaya or Anuvrttyavabodhaka on the Särasvatasütras
(NGat 10.94)
G1214 : K.M.K. Sarma, "Särasvatasütranirnaya of Näräyana Sädhu," IHQ, 23, 1947,
334-335.
APPAYYA DÏKSITA III or CINNA APPAYYA ( 1670 )
Prasiddhaêabdasamskâra
(NGat 1.267)
HARI DÏKSITA, grandson of Bhattqji, teacher of Näges'a ( 1670 )
(Gl 624, p. 284; Gardona, p. 287)
Brhat Sabdaratna on Bhaftoji Dïksita's Praudhamanoramä
See el 118; el 129.
G1215 : Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar, "Date and Authorship of the Sabdaratna
and ÛizBrhaUabdaratna" ABORI 32,1951, 258-262.
See el 122; el 123.
(?) Laghu Sabdaratna on Bhattqji Dïksita's Praudhamanoramä (authorship disputed; may
be by Nagera Bhatta)
See el 114; el 115; el 116; el 117; el 118.
G1216 : Edited, with Bhâgavata Hari ââstri's Citraprabhâ, by Tata Subbaraya
Sastri. Andh University Series 6. Waltair, 1932.
See el 119; el 120.
G1217 : K. V. Abhyankar, "Authorship of the LaghuSabdaratna," ABORI 45, 1964,
152-158.
G1218 : M. S. Bhat, "Authorship of the Laghu§abdaratna," HDVGV 1965, 203-206.
G1219 : V. S. Joshi, "Authorship of the Laghuêabdaratna," VJSPG, pp. 107-161.
General
G1220 : G. H. Khare, "Hari Dïksita and His Works," PO 9.1-2, 1944, 62-67.
JAGAN MOHANA PANDITA ( 1670? )
(NGat 7.144; JBRS 4, 1918, 14ff.)
Prabodhacandrikä *
(NGat 7.144)
SADÄalVA (1670?)
(YM 2.416)
Gûdharthadipanï on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
(NGat 6.96)
SUDHÄNANDASÜRlalSYA ( 1671 )
Jalpamahjarï
(NGat 7.206)
GOPÄLA GAKRAVARTIN (BÄNARJI) (1672)
Arthadîpikâ on Kramadisvara's Samksiptasära
(NGat 6.137)
Vasudhätukärika
(NGat 6.137)
NÏLAKA^THA DÏKSITA [cf. N. Ramesan, Sri Appayya Diksita (Hyderabad, 1972),
pp.137-139] (1675)
Prakaêa on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
(NGat 10.172)
HARI BHÄSKARA AGNIHOTRA ( 1677 )
(YM 2.295) (NGat 11.221)
Paribhasabhäskn
BIBLIOGRAPHY 501

G1221 : Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, pp. 317-324.

D V Ä D A S Ä H A Y Ä J I N BÄLAPATAftjALI (1680)
Éâbdikarakm on Cokkanätha's Éabdakaumudï
(NCat9.20)
LOKESAKÄRA (1683)
(Belvalkar,p.86)
Tattuadïpikâ on Râmâsrama's Siddhântacandrika
See el133.
RÄMACANDRAVIDYÄBHÜSAItfA (1688)
(Belvalkar, p. 90)
Paribhâsâvftti, a. Mugdhabodha work
(NGat 2.294)
RÄMAGANDRA PANDITA (1690)
Svaraprakriyâ and autocommentary
Gl 222 : Edited by K. V, Abhyankar. ASS 138. Poona, 1974.
RÄMAKRSI^A BHATTA ( 1690 )
Siddhäntaratnäkara on Bhaftoji's Siddhântakaumudî
(NGat 1.430)
RÄMABHADRA DÏKSITA (1692)
Uijâdimarjidipikâ
G1223 : Edited by K. Kunjunni Raja, AOR 21-23,1966-1971. Reprinted Madras,
1972.
Saddariinisiddhäntasamgrahä (grammar section)
(MS listed in TD no. 7631 )
G1224 : Edited by A. Thiruvengadathan as part of his doctoral dissertation.
Sabdabhedanirüparia
(MS listed in TD no. 5301 )
See el224.
Vyâkhyâ on Siradeva's ParibhasavftH
(NGat 11.224)
Prabhâvalî
G1225 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Prabhâvalî, a Rare Work Dealing with Sanskrit
Roots," JOR 19, 1949, 289-290.
"Tarapatamapau gha" sütravicära
(NGat 8.110)
MAHÄDEVAVEDÄNTIN (1694)
(NGat 2.292)
Uyâdikoêa
G1226 : Edited by K. Kunjunni Raja, MUSS 21. Madras, 1956.
RÄMAPRASÄDA (1694)
Tikä on Rämanäräyana's Kârikâvalï
DHWPIRÄJA (1700)
Gîrvâyapadamanjarï
G1227 : Edited, with Dhundiräja's Giruärtavanmanjari, by Umakant Premanand
Shah, JOI Supplement to volumes, 7-9. Reprinted MSUOS 4. Baroda, 1960^
Gïrvâyavanmafijarï
Seeel227.
DHARMASÜRI (1700)
(YM 2.311; NGat 2.387)
Paribhäsärthaprakäiikä
(NGat 9.221, 274)
RÄMAGANDRA (1700?)
50£, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PH ILO SOPHIES

(NGat 3. 312; Belvalkar, pp. 74, 75) -

Kalâpatattvabodhinî on Trilocana's Kätantravarttikapanjikä
(NGat 3.312, 316)
MEGHAVIJAYA (1700)
(NGat 6.362) (Belvalkar, p. 66)
Hairnakaumudi or Candraprabhävyäkarana
Seee921.
Sabdacandrikä on Hemacandra's Sabdânuêâsana
(NGat 4.283)
VAIDYANÄTHA DÏKSITA or SÄSTRIN (1705)
Vyäkhyä on Cokkanâtha's Éabdàkaumudi (MS
listed in Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 177)
Paribhäsärthasamgraha or Paribhâsïvrttivyâkhya
(NGat 11.222)
Paribhäsopanyasa (lost)
NÄGESA or NÄGOJI BHATTA (1714)
(Gardona, p. 287; Gl 624, p. 290)
(Brhat) Sabdenduêekhara on Bhaftoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
G1228 : Edited by Sitaram Shastri. 3 volumes, SBGM 87. Varanasi, 1960.
Laghu Sabdendusekhara on Bhaftoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
G1229 : Edited, with Bhairava Misra's Candrakalä, by Ganesadatta Sarma Misra.
Varanasi, 1866. ^
G1230 : Edited by Ramasastri Manavalli and Narayana Sastri Bharadvaja.
Varanasi, 1887.
G1231 : Edited, with Bhairava Mis'ra's Candrakalä, by Sita Rama Sastri Sendiy.
Varanasi, 1911.
G1232 : Edited with editor's Dipaka by Nityananda Panta Parvatiya. Varanasi,
1918.
G1233 : Edited, with Bhairava Misra's Candrakalä, by Narahari Sastri Pendse.
2 volumes, KSS 5. Varanasi, 1922, 1927.
G1234 : Edited up to Avyayi section, with Nityananda Panta Parvatiya's Dipaka,
by Gopal Shastri Nene. KSS 27. Varanasi, 1925.
G1235 : Edited with editor's Guruprasâda by Tata Subrahmanya Sastrin. Madras,
1926.
G1236 : Edited, with an Abhinavacandrikâ, Vaidyanâtha Paiyagunda's Cidasthimälä,
Sadäsiva Bhatta's Sadasivabhatfi, a Visamapadavivrti, Udayankar Nänapä-
thaka's Jyotsnä, a Vijayä and a Varnini, by Guru Prasad Shastri. RSCG 14.
Varanasi, 1936.
G1237 : Edited, with Khuddi Jhä Parma's Nâgeêoktiprakâsa, by Sudama Mis'ra
Sastri and Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. KSS 128. Varanasi, 1938.
Vaiyäkarana (laghu) siddhäntamanjüsä
G1238 : Edited, with Durbala's Kunjikä and Balambhatta's Kalâ, by Madhava
Sastri Bhandari, Madan Mohan Pathak and Nityananda Panta Parvatiya.
CHSS 44. Varanasi, 1913-1926.
G1239 : Edited up to the end of the Tätparyanirüpana section, with editor's Ratna-
prabhä, by Sabhapati Sarma Upadhyaya. KSS 163. Varanasi, 1963.
G1240 : Edited by Kalika Prasada Shukla. Varanasi, 1977.
Paramalaghumanjüsä
Gl241 : Edited Varanasi, 1887.
G1242 : Edited by Nityananda Panta Parvatiya. Varanasi, 1913.
G1243 : Edited, with Sivänanda Pändeya's Ratnadipikä. Varanasi, 1933.
BÎBLlOG&APHY 5Ö3

G1244 : Edited, with editor's Arthadipikä and notes by Nityananda Pant Parvatiya,
by Sadasiva Sarma Sastri (Joshi). HSS 43. Varanasi, 1946, 1974.
G1245 : Edited, with editor's Jyotsna, by KalikaPrasad Shukla. MSURS 7. Baroda,
1961.
G1246 : Kapil Deva Shastri, "On the Authenticity of Parama-laghu-manjüsä," CDSFV
1974,299-304.
G1247 : Edited in Kapil Deva Shastri, A Critical Study of the Paramalaghumanjüsä.
Kuruksetra, 1975.
Uddyota on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
Seee521.
See e524; e529; e550.
G1248 : Edited by Bahuvallabha Sastri. 4 volumes, BI 142. Calcutta, 1901-1910*
See e552; e574; e575; e582; e598; e611 ; e622.
Paribhäsendueekhara
G1249 : Edited Varanasi, 1854.
G1250 : Edited by F. Kielhorn. BSPS 2, 7, 9, 12. Bombay, 1868, 1874. Revised
edition by K.V. Abhyankar, with V.S. Abhyankar's Tattvadarsa. Poona,
1962.
G1251 : Edited by Taranatha Tarkavacaspati. Calcutta, 1872.
G1252 : Edited, with editor's Tippariisärasäraviveka, by Balasastrin Ranade.
Varanasi, 1885.
G1252A : Edited, with editor's Ambäkartri, by Govinda Bharadvaja Sastri. Poona,
1885.
G1253 : Edited, with Bhairava Mis'ra's VivrtL Varanasi, 1886.
G1254 : Edited with editor's Bhüti by Ramakrsna (Tatyasastri). Varanasi, 1897,
1912,1926.
G1255 : Edited with Visvanätha Bhatta's commentary. Tanjore, 1910-1915,
G1256 : Partly edited by Balakrsna Sastri. Varanasi, 1912.
G1257 : Edited, with Vaidyanâtha Payagunde's Gadâ, by Ganesa Sastri Gokhale.
ASS 72. Poona, 1913.
G1258 : Edited, with Bhairava Misra's Bhairavî and editor's Tattvaprakäsikä, by
Lakshmana Tripathi. KSS 31. Varanasi, 1915, 1931.
G1259 : Edited, with Jayadeva Misra's Vijaya, by Madhusudana Sarma Misra.
Varanasi, 1915.
G1260 : Edited, with Raghunätha Sästri Vyäkaranäcärya's Laghutlkä, by Ananta
Sastri Phadke. KSS 19. Varanasi, 1924.
G1261 : Edited, with Venimädhava's Brhadasästrärthakalä, by Rajanarayana Sastri,
KSS 137. Varanasi, 1943.
See a972.
G1262 : Hartmut Scharfe, "Kleine Nachlese zu Kielhorns Übersetzung von
Nagojibhatta's Paribhasenduhkhara" Asiatica 1954, 570-574.
G1263 : Louis Renou, "Etudes paninéennes : Le Paribhasenduêekhara... L'arrange-
ment des paribhäsä chez Nagojibhafta," PIGI 2. Paris, 1956, pp. 132-149.
G1264 : Edited, with Jayadeva Sarma Misra's Jayä, by Umesa Misra Sarma.
Allahabad, 1968.
Visamapadi on Bhattoji Diksita's Sabdakaustubha
(NCat 10.21)
Vaiyäkara^akärikä
(NCat 10.22)
Sabdänantasägarasamuccaya
(NCat 10.22)
SÔ4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OÈ INDIAN

Suptinantasägarasamuccaya
(NGat 10.22)
Prabhâkaracandra on a Tattvadipikâ
(NGat 8.48)
Sphotavâda *
G1265 : Edited, with editor's Subodhinï, by V.Krsnamacarya.ALs55. Madras, 1946.
Jnäpakasamgraha
G1266 : Edited, with editor's Vivfti, by N.S. Ramanuja Tatacarya. KSVS 18.
Tirupati, 1972.
General
G1267 : M.V. Mahashabde, "The Penetrating Style of Nâgoji Bhatta," SPAIOG 15,
1949, 53-54.
G1268 : P.K. Gode, "The Relative Chronology of Some Works of Nägojibhafta
Between c. A.D. 1670 and 1750," OT 1.2, 1955, 45-52. Reprinted in sjs 38,
1956, 212-219.
G1269 :Paul Thieme, "The Interpretation of the Learned," FVSKB pp. 47-62.
Reprinted in Budruss, pp. 596-611.
G127Ö : S.D. Joshi, "Nâgesa on the Guiding Principles of Constructional Mean-
ing," SPAIOC 21, 1959, 198-199.
G1271 : Ludo Rocher and Rosane Debels, "La Valeur des termes et formules
techniques dans la grammaire indienne, d'après Nägesabhatta," AIPHOS
1.5, 1960, 129-151.
G1272 : Uma Sankar Sarman, "Nâges'a's treatment of laksanävrtti" SPÀIOC 23.1,
1966,57.
G1273 : Vidyadhar Dharmadhikar, "Nâgesa: His Life arid Works and Contribu-
tion to Sanskrit Grammar." Ph.D. diss., Allahabad University, 1966.
éRÏVALLABHAVACAKA or S R I V A L L A B H A V Ä C Ä R Y A (1718)
(GOS 134, 1961, 198; NCat 9.75; Belvalkar, p. 66)
Durgaprabodha on Hemacandra's Linganueäsana
(NCat 9.75)
(MAHÄBHÄSYA) GOPÄLA KRSNA SÄSTRIN (1720)
(NCat 6.136, 1.259) • •.
Säbdikacintämani on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya (MSS available)
Commentary on Uriädisütras
Laiita on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhàntakaumudï, completed by his son Anantanârâyana
(NCat 6.136)
TIRUMALA BUKKAPATTANAM SRÏNIVASACARYA (1720)
Gajâsutravâda
. (NCat 5.231)
VENKATEâVARA (1722)
UnädighayLtu
(NCat 2.293)
KÄSINÄTHA (1725)
Dhatumaiïjarî
G1274 : Edited by Charles Wilkins. 1815.
APPA SÜRI or SUDHI (1730)
(NCat 1.270)
Sabdaratnavalï
Vyäkhyä on Vaidyanätha Sästrin's Paribhäsärthasamgraha.
(NCat 11.222)
Paribhäsäratna
(Adyar D, vol. 6, no. 480)
ÈÏBLIOGRAÊIÎY 505

JNÄNENDRA SARASVATl (1730?)

(Gardona, p. 286; G1624, p. 278)
Tattvabodhini on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhantakaumudï, completed by Jayakrsna Maunin
as Subodhinï
See elO74; elO82; elO83; ellOO.
DHARANÏDHARA (1730)
(NCat 9,237)
BodhapaddhatîMSS (available)
K^SïSVARA SARMAN (1739)
Jnänämrta
(NGat 4.142)
SVAYAMPRAKÄSÄNANDA (1740)
Candrikä on Vaidyanâtha ââstrin's Paribhäsärthasamgraha
(NGat 6.378, 11.222)
VAIDYANÂTHA PAIYAGUNDA or BALAMBHATTA ( 1740 )
(NGat 1.389)
Arthasamgraha
(NGat 1.389)
Prabhâ on Bhattoji Dïksita's Sabdakaustubha
Bhävaprakaiikä on Nâgesa Bhatta's Brhacchabdenduêekhara
Çidasthimâla on Nàgesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdendusekhara
See el 236.
Kâtika or Gadä on Nagesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhdra
See el 257. ,
Bhâvaprakâêika on Hari Diksita's Sabdaratna
Chäyä on Nâgesa's Mahâbhâsyapwdîpoddyota
Seee622.
Kalâ on Nâgesa Bhatta's Valyâkarayasiddhântamanjusà
See el 238.
Bhävaprakäea on Bhattoji Dïksita's Praudhamanoramâ
Seeell20.
RÄMACANDRA (1744)
(GOS 134, 1961, 323)
Vrttisamgrdha on Pänini's Asßdhyäyt
(NGat 1.472)
SATYAPRIYA TÏRTHA SVÄMIN (1745)
Vivaraya on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya (MSS available)
JAYAKRSNA MAUNIN (1745)
Sâramaftjarï or Sabdabodhaprakaêa
(NGat 7.169)
Sabdärthatarkämrta
(NGat 7.160)
Subodhini, completion of Jfiânendra Sarasvatï's Tattvabodhini on Bhattqji Dïksita's
Siddhantakaumudï
Seeel074;eï082;el083.
Tikä on Varadaräja's Madhyasiddhäntakaumudi
(NGat 7.169)
Tïka on Varadarâja's Laghusiddhäntahaumudi
(NGat 7.169)
(Sphofacandrikâ: this work actually by Jayakrsna's brother êrïkrsna. See below.)
HARI VALLABHA (1747)
Darpaya on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyakarayabhüsariasära
50é ÈNOYâLOPËÎDIA Ôf INDIAN ÊH î LÖSO ÊOIEË

Seeell79;ell87;ell88;ell89.
SlVARÄMA TRIPÄTHIN ( 1750 )
Vidyâvïlâsa on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhâniakaumudî
G1275 : P.K. Gode, "Vidyâuilâsa, a Commentary on the Siddhänta-kaumudl by
Sivaräma Tripathin (Between A.D. 1700 and 1775)," ALB 15, 1951, 62-67.
Reprinted in sjs 37, 1953, 237-241.
Unädikoia or Laksmînivâsâbhidhâna
Gl 276 : Edited Varanasi, 1873.
SRÏKRSNA (BHATTA) (MAUNIN) (1750)
Sphofacandrikä
Seeell25;ell82.
Tarkacandrikä
(NGat8.112)
Vrttidipikä
G1277 : Edited by Gangadhara Sastri Bharadvaja. POWSBT 29. Varanasi, 1930.
G1278 : Edited RPG 7. Jodhpur, 1956.
Akhyâtârthacandrikâ (nirriaya)
(NCat2.11)
Kârakavâda or Vibhaktyarthanirriaya
Gl 279 : Edited Bombay.
Lakârârthanirnaya
(NGat 4.292)
Prakâêa on Rämacandra's Prakriyäkaumudi
SeeelO53.
(VARKHEDI) TIMMAI^ÄGÄRYA (1750)
Pratyähärasütravicära
(NGat 8.180)
VÄSUDEVA DÏKSITA (1750)
(Cardona, p . 286; G1624, p . 279)
Bälamanoramä on Bhattqji Dîksita's Siddhântakaumudî
' Seeel080;el087;el095;G1100;GH01.
(RÄJA éRÏ) VEI^ÏMADHAVA (âDKLA) (1750)
Kaumudikalpalatikä
G1280 : Edited by Sri Rajanarayana Sukla. HSS 28. Varanasi, 1934.
Brhadaêâstrârthakala on Nägesa Bhafta's Paribhasenduêekhara
Seeel261.
NÏLAKANTHA DÏKSITA (1750?)
(NGat 10.173)
Paribhâsâvrtti
G1281 : Edited by T. Ganapati Sastri. TSS 46. Trivandrum, 1915.
G1282 : Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, p p . 293-316.
Tattvavivéka on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
(NGàt 10.173)
Gudhârthadïpikâ on Jnânendra's Tattvabodhinï
(Adyar D, vol. 6, p . 117)
Laghusabdakaustubha
(Adyar D, vol. 6, p . 117)
Krtprakâêa
(NGat 4.273)
Vyàkhyâ on Râmacandra's Prakriyâsarvasva • • '
(NGat 10.373)
ÈIÊLÏOGRAPHV

ABHINAVA KÄLIDÄSA or UMÄMAHESVARA (1750)

Pâriinïyavâdanaksatramala • ' ,
(NCat 1.298, 9.317)
6ESÄDRISUDHI (1750)
(GOS 134, 1961, 394; NCat 11.22)
Paribhäsäbhäskara
G1283 : Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, pp. 378-465.
KUPPU SÄSTRIN (1750)
(GOS 134, 1961, 126)
C r i t i q u e of a Paribhäsäbhäskara
(NCat 4.197)
ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRIN (1750)
Continuation of Gopälakrsna Sästrin's Mahabhäsya-Sabdikacintämani
(NCat 6.136)
Continuation of Gopälakrsna ââstrin's Siddhäntakaumudi-Lalita
(NCat 6.136)
LAKSMINRSIMHA (1750)
Triäkhä o n N ä g e s a B h a t t a ' s Paribhäsenduiekhara
(NCat 11.227)
NÄRÄYANA (SUDHI) (1750)
Pradïpa or Säbdabhüsana o n P ä n i n i ' s Astâdhyàyî
(NCat 10.75)
eabdabhedanirüparjLa
(NCat 10.75)
èabdamaiïjari
(NCat 10.75)
PERUSÜRI (1755)
(NCat 3.98)
Auriädikapadärriava o n Uriâdisûtras
G1284 : Edited by T.R. Chintamani. MUSS 7.4. Madras, 1939.
APPAYYA DIKSITA, pupil of Gopälakrsna Sästrin ( 1760 )
(NCat 1.259, 269)
Pâriinïyasutraprakas'a
(NCat 1.471)
RÄDHÄKRSNA SARMAN (1764) (probably of the Jumara school)
(NCat 9.293)
Dhaturatnävali
(NCat 9.293)
ÄSÄDHARA BHATTA (1770?)
(NCat 2.19; 8.268)
Pürvapaksapraenottari or -maiïjarï
(NCat 2.19; 8.268)
Padasamjnävicära
Éabdatrivetyikâ
G1285 : Edited by Batuka Natha Sarma. POWSBT 14. Varanasi, 1925.
G1286 : Edited by Kaliprasad Sukla. Varanasi, 1957.
General
G1287 : Umakant P. Shah, "A Note on Äsädhara Bhatta and His Works," VRFV
1975,351-359.
RÄMASEVAKA (1770)
(YM 2.423)' •
Vyäkhyä on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa (mss. available)
508 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

âAMKARA BHATTA (1770)

Tikä on Nage sa Bhatta's Laghuêabdenduêekhara
(AdyarD, vol. 6, no. 347)
Vyäkhyä or Éamkari on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsenduiekhara
(NGat 11.228)
NÄGOBA PANDITA (1775)
Sadbhäsäsubantaräpadariä ,
(NGat 10.23)
SADÄalVA BHATTA (1780)
(GOS134, 1961,412)
Commentary on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsenduiekhara
(NGat 11.228)
Sadaiivabhatfi on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuiabdenduiekhara
See el 236.
KRSISfAMlâRA (1780)
(NGat 4.344)
Kfsriamifraprakriyä
(NGat 4.344)
SlVARÄMENDRA YATI (1780)
Commentary on Pânini's Astâdhyayï 1.3.67 ( = Gajâsutra)
(NGat 5.231)
VENKATADÄSA or VEftKATÄCÄRYA III ( 1780 )
Gajäsütraväda or Neranävatisütravyäkhyä
G1288 : Edited by R.V. Krishnamachariar. 1909.
KALYÄNA SARASVATÏ (1790)
(Belvalkar, p. 86)
Laghusärasvata
(NGat 3.259)
BHIMÄGÄRYA GALAGALI (1796)
Arthamaüjari on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsenduiekhara
(NGat 110.222, 227)
HARIRÄMAKALÄ (1797)
(NCat4.116)
KäHkä on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsariasära
See el 185.
BHAVADEVA MlSRA (1799)
Commentary on Hari Dîksita's Sabdaratna (lost?)
KULAMUNI (1800)
SamäsariTLava
(NCat 4.239)
INDRADATTA UPÄDHYÄYA (1800)
(NGat 2.251-252)
Sabdatattvaprakâêa (MSS available)
Sabdakaustubhaguria (lost)
Güdhaphakkikaprakäia on Bhattqji Dîksita's Siddhantakaumudî
G1289 : Edited by Indra Dutt Sharma. KSS 47. Varanasi, 1906.
GOPÄLÄGÄRYAor SRIRÄMÄGÄRYA or GOPÄLADEVA VIDYAVAGÏSA(1800)
Käntimälä on Purusottama Vidyävägisa's Prayogaratnamälä
(NGat 6.155)
DURBALÄGÄRYA or KRSNA MITRA (ÄGÄRYA) (1800)
KuHcikä on Nägesa Bhatta's Vaiyakarayasiddhäntamanjüsä
See el 238.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 509

Tikä on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsana

See el 188. .
Commentary on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhâsendukkhara (MSS available)
Bhäuapradipa on BhattojlDiksita's Sabdakaustubha
(Adyar D, vol. 6, nos! 133-136)
Kalpalatä on Bhaftoji Dïksita's Praudhamanoramä
G1290 : Edited in Vyakaranagrantharatnavali 7-12. Tanjore, 1910-1915.
Ratnärnava on Bhaftoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudl
(NGat 4.344)
Tuktiratnäkara
(NGat 4.343)
Vädacüdamarii
(NGat 4.344)
KÄRTTIKEYA SIDDHÄNTA BHATTÄGÄRYA (1800?)
Subodhä on the Mugdhabodha
(NCat4.7)
GAttGÄDHARA (1800?)
(NGat 5.198)
Induprakäea on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdenduhkhara
(NGat 5.198)
. Induprakäea on Nâgesa Bhatta's Paribhâsendukkhara
(NGat 5.198)
DHARAISflDHARA (1809)
(NGat 1.472,9.237)
Vaiyâkaranasarvasva on Pänini's Astädhyäyi, completed by Käsinätha
Seee26.
SIVABHÀTTA (1810)
(GOS 134, 1961,391)
Kusumavikäsa on Haradatta's Padamahjarï
(NGat 4.120)
MANNU or MANYU or GOPÄLA DEVA (1815)
(NGat 6.142)
- Laghubhüsanasärakänti on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyakaranabhüsanasära
(NGat.6.142)
Dosoddhära on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuéabdendukkhara
(NGat 6.142)
Arthavatsütraväda
(NGat 1.386)
Gqjâsutravâdârtha or -vicära
(NGat 5.231)
Kânfakoddhâra or Dosoddhära on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhâsendukkhara
(NGat 5.231, 6.142, 11.227)
UDAYÄftKARA NÄNAPÄTHAKA (1800)
(NGat 8.377)
Jyotsnä on Nägesa Bhatta's Éabdenduêekhara
See el 236.
Anekamanyapadàrthasutravicâra
(NCatZ326)
Mitävrttyarthasamgraha on Pänini's Asfadhyayl
(NGat 2.326)
Paribhäsäpradiparcis
(NGat 2.326; 11.220)
510 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Bahuvnhyarthavicära
(NCat 2.326)
KÄSINÄTHA (1820?)
Completion of Dharanïdhara's Vaiyâkaranasaruasva
Seee26.
BHAIRAVA MISRA (1824)
Sphotaparïksâ on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasara
See el 182; el 188.
Candrakalä on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdenduiekhara
Seeel229;el231;el233.
Gadä on Nâgesa Bhatta's Paribhasenduêekhara
Seeel253;el258.
Bhairavï on H a d Dlksita's Sabdaratna
See el 118; el 120.
General
G1291 : M.S. Bhat, "Bhairava Misra Circa 1780-1840 A.D.," I H £ 35, 1959, 76-78
DHARÄNANDA (1825)
Phakkikadarparia
(NCat 9.239)
KOCCA SANKARAN SUSAD (1825)
Dhätupäthakarikä
Arthaprakâsikâ on Bhaftoji Dïksita's Siddhâtâakaumudi
KUMÄRATATÄYA (1825)
(YM 2.415)
Pärijätam Nätakam on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (MSS available)
GOVINDA BHÄRADVÄJA SÄSTRIN ( 1835 )
Ambâkartrï on Nâgesa Bhatfa's Paribhasenduêekhara
Seeel252A.
BHÄRATA MALLIKA or BHÄRATASENA MALLISENA (1836? But NCat 3.379
says 1750)
Upasargavrtti
(NCat 2.375)
Kärakolläsa
G1292 : Edited by Janakinatha Sahityasastri. SSPS 8. Calcutta, 1924.
Ekavarnàrthasamgraha
G1293 : Edited by Suresh Chandra Banerji. ISH 36, 1960, 29, 34.
Ganapâtha (according to Mugdhabodha principles) .
(NCat 5.256)
Drutabodha and Drutabodhinï thereon
(NCat 9.187)
GOKULACANDRA (1839)
(YM 1.496)
Vrtti on Pänini's Astädhyäyl
(NCat 1.472,6.110)
SATÄRÄ RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA (GAJENDRAGADKAR) (1840)
(YM 2.417; BNK Sarma 2.358; NCat 3.379, 10.166)
Candrikä on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdendukkhara
(MS at 594) .
Tripathagâ on Nägesa Bhatta's, Paribhasenduêekhara
(NCat 11.227)
Prabhä on Bhattoji Diksita's Sabdakaustubha
Tripathagâ on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (MSS available)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 511

Prabhä ori the Kâraka section of Hari Diksita's Sabdaratna

G1294 : Edited by R.V. Krishnamachariar in Vyakaranagrantharatnavali „19-21.
Tanjore, 1912.
VIPRARÄJENDRA (1845)
Maniratnaprabhä on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
Seee537.
VISVANÄTHA DAI^piBHATTA ( 1850? )
(GOS134, 1961,363) .
Candrikä on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhâsenduêekhara
(NCat 6.178, 11.228)
LÄLÄVIHÄRIN (1850)
(Abhyankar, p. 332)
Commentary on Nägesa Bhatta's ParibhâsenduÊekhara
(NCat 11.227)
HARIRÄMA (1850?)
Candrikä or Vyäkhyäsära
G1295 : Edited Calcutta, 1905.
Taddhitacandrikä
(NCat 13.85)
Commentary on Haribhäskara's Paribhäsäbhäskara
(NCat 11.221)
HARINÄTHA DVIVEDIN (1850)
(Abhyankar, p. 444)
Akä^tdatävidava on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
DAYÄNANDA (SVÄMIN) SARASVATÏ (1850)
(GOS 134, 1961, 196)
Bhâsya on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
Seee63.
G1296 : Edited by Raghuvira JijnasuandBrahmadattaJijnasu. 2 volumes. Ajmer,
1940-1962.
Seeal21,al25, e241.
Bhâsya on Pänini's Uriadisütras
Seee416, e420.
Commentary on Pänini's (?) Päniniyaeiksä
Seee429.
Avyayärtha
G1297 : Edited Ajmer, 1919.
Kârakiya *
G1298 : Published in Vedangaprakasa 6. Allahabad, 1891.
General
G1299 : S.K. Gupta, "A Study of Dayänanda," PO 13.1-2, 1948, 30-33; 13.3-4,
1948,3-9.
G1300 : , "Nature and Authorship of the Grammatical Work Attributed to
Maharsi Dayânanda Sarasvatï," PAIOG17, 1953, 93-94.
Tipparä on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
Seee522;e547.
BÄLA SÄSTRIN RÄNADE (1850)
(Abhyankar, p. 427)
Särasäraviveka on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
See el885 el252.
GANGÄDHARA KAVIRÄJA (VAIDYA) (1850)
(NCat 5.202-203)
512 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Trikâtidaéabdaéâsana
G1301 : Published.
Trisütravyäkararia
G1302 : Published.
Setusamgraha on the Mugdhabodha
SeeelO12.
Commentary on Kätyäyana's Värttika
ChandaprakâSa on Pânini's Astadhyâyî
(NCat 5.206)
RÜPACANDRA (1853)
Tikä on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhantakaumudï
See el 149.
SUBRAHMANYAM NAMBUTTIRIPAD (I860)
Prasäda on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdenduiekhara
Dhätusamgraha
(NCat 7.92)
TÄRÄNÄTHA TARKAVÄCASPATI (1867)
Ätubodhavyäkararia
G1303 : Published Calcutta, 1867, 1873.
(Tarka)Ratnamälä
(NCat 8.123)
Saralä on Bhatjoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
See elO75.
Dhäturüpädarea
G1304 : Published Calcutta, 1869.
JARANÄTHA TARKAVÄCASPATI (1870)
Commentary on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
See el077.
RAGHURÄMA 1871
(NCat 3.62)
Ekadaeakärikä
Gl305 .-Published Bombay, 1871.
YAjftEâVARA BHATTA (1874)
. (YM 2.139)
Gariaratnävali
G1306 : Published Baroda, 1874.
DEVÏDIN (1875)
Commentary on Pänini's Astadhyâyî
(NCat 1.472)
CANDRAKÄNTA TARKÄLAMKÄRA ( 1880 )
Tïkà on Trilocanadâsa's Kätantrapanjikä
Seee644.
Chandahprakriyä on l^arvavarman's Kätantrasütras
Seee651.
IKaumudîsudhâkara
G1307 : Published Calcutta, 1888.
RÄMATARAl^A élROMAIïtt (1883)
Käracakra
Gl 308 : PubUshed 1883-1886, 1888.
KÂLÏCARANA VIDYOPÄDHYÄYA (1887)
Pärtirnyatattvadarpaya (with Sürya Prasäda Misra)
Gl309 : Published Varanasi, 1887,
BIBLIOGRAPHY 513

MÄDHAVA (1887)
Mädhavi on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee996.
GOVINDA PARASURÄMA BHATTA ( 1888)
Tippani on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee997.
SRÏDHARA SARMAN ( 1889)
Vyäkhyä on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghuêabdendusekhara
Gl 310 : Published Varanasi, 1889.
BHAGAVAT PRASÄDA S ARM AN (1890)
Tippana on Jayäditya/Vämana's Kâêikâ
See e846.
BÄLAKRSNA SARMAN YOGI ( 1895 )
Commentary on Varadaräja's Madhyasiddhäntakaumudi
See eil39.
SETUMÄDHAVÄGÄRYA NADITIRAM ( 1895 )
Bhävabodhinl on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghusabdendusekhara
(Adyar D, vol. 6, p. 107)
RÄMAKRSNA (TÄTYÄSÄSTRIN) (1897)
Bhüti on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
See el 254.
DVÄRAKÄNÄTHA NYÄYABHÜ SANA ( 1899 )
Avyayakoéa
G1311 : Published Calcutta, 1899.
RÄMA PANDITAVARA (SÄHIBHA) (1900?)
Commentary on Kashmiri recension of Kâtantra
(NCat 3.317)
YÄGEaVARA (1900)
Haimavatï on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
MAHENDRANÄTHA BHATTÄCÄRYA (1900)
Tïka on Sarvavarman's Kätantrasütras
Seee652.
HARI SARMAN (1900)
(NCat 2.98)
Väkyärthacandrikä on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
(NCat 4.128, 11.228)
Citraprabhä on Hari Diksita's Sabdaratna
Gl 312 : Edited by Tata Subbaraya Sastri. Andhra University Series 6. Waltair, 1932*
GAI^APATI SASTRÏ (1900)
(NCat 5.248)
Gajäsütrauädärtha
(NCat 5.231)
ANANTÄCÄRYA (1900)
(NCat 1.186)
Commentary on the Tinanta portion of Nägesa Bhatta's Sabdendusekhara
(NCat 1.286)
GOVINDASIMHA (1900)
Visamasthalatippana on Varadaräja's Madhyasiddhäntakaumudi
See el 141.
RÄMAKISORA SARMAN ( 1905 )
Astamangala on Sarvavarman's Kätantrasütras
Seee653.
514 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

NAVACANDRA NYÄYARATNA (1905)

Päninisära
G1313 : Published Dacca, 1910, 1925; Calcutta, 1915, 1918.
RANCCHODJI ODHAVJI (1905)
Sârabodhini on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhäntakaumudi
Seeell57.
ANANTÄCÄRYAofMusarapakkam (1906?)
Saranaêabdârthavicâra
Gl314 : Published in Srivaisnava Grantha Mudrapaka Sabda Series. Madras,
1906.
RÂMAKRSNA &ARMÄ TRIPATHÏ (1907)
Visamasthalatippani on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkarariabhüsanasära
See el 183.
DURGÄDÄSA VIDYÄVÄGlSA âRÏRAMA TARKAVÄGISA (1908)
Tikä on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
SeeelO24.
BÄLACANDRA SÄSTRIN (1908)
Bälacandri on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhântakaumudï
See elO86.
KALÂVATÎ DEVÏ (1909)
Tinantapradîpika on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhäntakaumudi
See el 159.
VISNUPRASÄDA SARMAN (1910)
Tippani on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seeel002.
SYÄMÄGARANA KAVIRATNA (1910)
Tippani on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
Seeel025.
KHUDDIJHÄ (SARMAN) (1910)
Nägesöktiprakäsa on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghusabdendusekhara -
Gl 315 : Published Varanasi, 1899.
See el 237.
Tinarthavâdasâra on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkarariabhüsanasära
See el 188.
KÄLÜRÄMA SÄSTRIN (1910)
Avyayärthamimamsä
G1316 : Published Allahabad, 1910.
HARENDRANÄRÄYANA DEVAâARMAN (1912)
Parimala on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
See elO28.
BRAHMADATTA (1914)
Avyayavrtti
G1317 : Published Lahore, 1914.
SIVADATTA SARMAN (1914)
Saradarêinï on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhântakaumudï
Seeel090.
Tippani^on Varadaräja''s Laghusiddhäntakaumudi
See el 160.
GANGÄPRASÄDA SÄSTRIN (1914)
Pankticandrikä on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhântakaumudï
SeeelO89.
BRAHMÄNANDA SARASVATÏ (1915?)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 515

Citprabhä on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhâsendusekhara

(NCat 11.226) •
DEVENDRAKUMÄRA VIDYÄRÄTNA (1915)
Paniniparisistavyäkarana
G1318 : Dacca, 1915; Calcutta, 1916.
LAKSMANA TRLPÄTHIN (1915)
Tattvaprakäsikä on Nâgesa Bhatta's Paribhâsendusekhara
Seeel258.
U.K. VENKATANARASIMHA (1916)
Tïkà on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhäntakaumudi
Seeel916.
NITYÄN AND A PANTA PARVATÏ YA (1918)
Dipikä on Nägesa Bhatta's LaghuÊabdendusekhara
Seeel232; e!234.
Commentary on Nägesa Bhatta's Paramalaghumanjüsä
See el 242; el 244.
GOPÄLA SASTRÎ NENE (1919)
Saralä on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyâkaranabhusanasâra
See el 186; el 190.
Vyäkaranapürvapaksavali
G1319 : Edited in HSS 5. Varanasi, 1927.
Vyäkarana Uttarapaksävall
G1320 : Edited by Brahmashankar Misra. HSS 16. Varanasi, 1931.
SÄRADÄRANJAN RAY VIDYÄVINODA ( 1920 )
Mitabhâsinï on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhântakaumudï
SeeelO91.
MÄDHAVA SÄSTRIN BHANDÄRI (1920)
Prabhä on Bhattoji Diksita's Praudhamanoramä
Seeelll7.
Sphotavimarsini
Seee639.
NÄNAKARÄMA SÄSTRIN (1924)
Panktipradïpa on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhântakaumudï
See elO92.
JÏVANÂTHA RAYA (1925)
Tippanï on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhäntakaumudi -
Seeell63.
KARAPUTUGALA DHARMA SRI (1925)
Bhâvabodhini on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhântakaumudï
SeeelO93.
TÄTA SUBRAHMANYA SÄSTRIN (1926)
Guruprasâda on Nâgesa Bhatta's Laghusabdenduêekhara
Seeel235.
VASUDEVA VISNU MIRASHÏ (1928)
Bâlabodhinï on Varadaräja's Laghusiddhäntakaumudi
See el 165.
JÏVARAMA SARMAN (1928)
Commentary on Pânini's Astâdhyâyï , • .
G1321 : Published Moradabad, 1928.
HARI SAMKARA JHÄ (1929)
Kuncikä on Patanjali's Mahâbhâsya
Seee566.
516 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

VÄSUDEVA SÄSTRI ABHYAlSjKAR (1929)

Tattvadarêa on Nàgesa Bhatta's Paribhasendukkhara
Seeël250.
Vrtti on (Jainendra) Paribhäsä, based on Abhayanandin's commentary
G1322 : Edited in Paribhämsamgraha
NAVKISHOREJHÄ (1931)
Avyayârthamalâ on Rämacandräsrama's Siddhäntacandrikä
See el 133.
RÄMA SARANA SASTRÏ (1931)
Kaumudïkathakallolini
G1323 : Edited by Gayacarana Tripathi. VBGSM 54. Varanasi, 1961.
SÜRYANÄRÄYANA SUKLA (1937)
Bhâvapradïpa on book 1 of Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya
See e648.
Vàdaratna
G1324 : Edited by R.G. Sukla. 2 volumes, KSS 80. Varanasi, 1932-1949.
P.S. ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRI (1940)
Väkyatattva
G1325 : Published Trichur, 1940.
SADÄSIVA SÄSTRI (SARMAN) JOSHÏ (1946)
Arthadïpikâ on Nägesa Bhatta's Paramalaghumanjüsä
See el244.
Sudhä on Varadarâja's Madhyasiddhântakaumudï
See el 143.
Commentary on Rämacandräsrama's Siddhäntacandrikä
See el 133.
BRAHMADEVA (1943)
Vaiyäkaranasiddhantamanjüsä
V. KRSNAMÄGÄRYA (1944)
Sphotavada Upodghäta
Seeel265.
BÄLA KRSNA PANGOLÏ (1947)
Prabhä on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära •
See el 189.
RUDRA PRASÄDA SARMÄ (1948)
Pradipa on Pänini's (? ) Pâninïyaêiksa
Seee428.
GANGÄDATTA SÄSTRI (1950)
Tattvaprakäsikä on Pänini's Astâdhyâyl
Seeell9.
MADHUKÄNTA SARMÄ JHÄ ( 1950 )
Prakäea on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
G1326 : Published HSS 199. Varanasi, 1950.
SOMANÄTHA SARMAN (1952)
Visesavivrti on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhäntakaumudl
SeeelO96.
RÄMA PRASÄDA TRIPÄTHIN (1952)
Subodhini on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära
See el 190.
RUDRADHARAJHÄ SARMAN (1954)
Tattväloka on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
See e598.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 517

SAMKARA SÄSTRIN MARULAKÄRA (1957)

Samkarï on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära
See el 192.
KÄLIKÄ PRASÄDA &UKLA (1961 )
Jyotsnä on Nagé sa Bhatta's Paramalaghumanjüsä
See el245.
SRÏDHARENDRA SHARMÄ GHILDAYÄL (1962)
Commentary on Vibhaktyartha section of Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
See el 103.
K. A. SUBRAMANIA IYER (1963)
Commentary on the Brahmakända of Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadïya
Seee710.
ACYUTÂNANDA SÄSTRIN (1963)
Sugandha on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
See el 68.
RAGHUNÄTHA SHARMÄ (1963)
Ambäkartri on Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadïya
Seee711.
Vyäkaranadars'anabindu
Gl 327 : Published Varanasi, 1971.
SABHÄPATI SARMAN UPÄDHYÄYA (1963)
Ratnaprabhä on Nägesa Bhatta's Paramalaghumanjüsä
See el239.
BRAHMADATTAJIjMSU (1964)
Astädhyäyibhäsyaprathamavrtti
G1328 : Edited by Yudhisthira Mimamsaka. 3 volumes. Amritsar, 1964-1968.
BHÏMASENA SASTRÏ ( 1969 )
Bhaimi on Konda Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranabhüsanasära
See el 195.
SATYAKÄMA VARMÄ (1970)
Commentary on Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadïya, book 1
Seee737.
N. S. RÄMÄNUJA TÄTÄCÄRYA (1972)
Vivrti on Nägesa Bhatta's Jnäpakasamgraha
Seeel266.
MURALÏDHARA MÏSRA (1977)
Raêmï on Rämacandra's Prakrïyakaumudî
Seeel053.

PART 2 : AUTHORS AND WORKS WHOSE

DATES ARE UNKNOWN

ÄDENNA
(YM 1.428)
Sphürti on Kaiyata's Mahabhâsyapradïpa
(YM 1.428)
AJITASENA ÄCÄRYA
(Belvalkar, p. 60; YM 1.603; NCat 1.86)
518 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(Mani)Prakäsikä on Yaksavarman's Cintämarii

(NCatl.86)
ÄNANDADATTA . •,
(Abhyankar, p. 60)
Cändravyäkaraftapaddhati
(NCat 2.105; 7.18)
ÄNANDA SIDDHÄNTAVÄGISA
Kärakänanda or Kärakädyarthanirriay a
(NGat 2.96; 3.378)
ANANTA (perhaps more than one)
Kärakacakra
(NGat 1.159)
Väkyamanjan
(NGat 1.169) • ' • • • . .
ANANTA BHATTA (perhaps more than one )
Jâtiêaktivàda
(NGat 1.176)
Sabdasudhä
ANANTASÜRI
Prayogasiksä :
(NGat 1.184)
Linganirxtayacandrikä
(NGat 1.184)
APPAYYA DÏKSITA
Vrttivärttika on the Vyanjananirriaya of Nägesa Bhatta's Vaiyäkaranasiddhantamanjüsä
G1329 : Edited by Sivadatta and K. P. Parab. Kavyamala 38. Bombay, 1893.
BALARÄMA
Dhätuprakasa (samgraha) and Tippanl thereon
(NGat 9.291)
BETARÄYA
Dhâtumâlika
(NGat 9.292) . •
BHAGAVATBHAKTA
Bhäsya on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
G1330 : (Mrs.) Saroj Gune, "Bhäshä Siddhänta Kaumudî of Bhagavatbhakta,"
sPAioc 27, 1974, 248-249.
BHÄSKARA (perhaps more than one)
Viläsa on Bhattoji Diksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
(NGat 5.111)
Dhätupäfha
(NGat 9.288)
BHATTA SIROMAI^I (or SIROMANI BHATTA or SIVÄNANDAYOGASVÄMIN)
Taddhitakoêa
(NGat 8.85)
BHÄVA MISRA or SARMAN
Vrtti on (Kätantra) Paribhasä
Gl 331 : Edited by K. V. Abhyankar in Paribhäsäsamgraha, pp. 67-75.
BHAVANÄTHA
Dhâtupallava
(NGat 9.286)
BILVESVARA or VILVESVARA
Kaläpacandra on Sarvavarman's Kâtantrasutras
Seee653;e657;e658.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 519

(PEDDINTI) BRAHMADEVA
Vyakhyä on Varadaräja's Madhyasiddhäntakaumudi (completed by his pupil Agnihotra)
(NCatl.45)
GAKRIN
(A.bhyankar, p. 160 )
Jâgrahitetivâda (defending Mâdhava against Bhattoji Diksita)
(NGat 6.290)
GANDRAD ATTA JHÄ
Paribhâsâmanimàlâ
(NGat 6.354)
GANDRAKÄNTA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA of Gamerimuri
Dhätumanjari
(NGat 6.346; 9.292)
GANDRASEKHARA
Paribhäsenduiekhara (or commentary on it? )
(NGat 6.368)
CANDRASEKHARA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA
(YM 1.626)
Arthabodhinï on Goyïcandra's Samksiptasäratikä
(NGat 6.370) .
CANGADÄSA or CAKADÄSA or CÄRCÄDÄSA
(GOS134,1961, 151)
Sambandhoddesa or Sambandhopadeia
(NGat 7.1; 6.402)
Vaiyakaranqjïvatu or Cangasütra
(NGat 7.2)
GHIGGHU or GHUGGHU or GHUGHUKE BHATTA
(GOS 134,1961, 158)
Laghuvrtti on Kashmiri recension oîKâtantra
(NGat 3.317)
GUDÄMISRA
Päninisütrasüci or Astâdhyayïsûtrasucï
(NGat 7.70)
DÄMODARA
Dhätuvrtti on the Mugdhabodha
(NGat 9.19)
DÄMODARA DEVASARMAN
Commentary on Jumara's Samksiptasära
NGat 9.19)
DÄMODARA SARMAN
Pratyayamauktikamalä
(NGat 9.23)
Bälabodha or Bälabodhini
(NGat 9.23)
DANO(KÄGÄRYA)
Dhätulakana or Dasadhätusädhana
(NGat 8.320)
DASABÄLA
(Abhyankar, p. 197, NGat 8.346)
Dasabalakärikä (of Samksiptasära or Jaumara school)
Gl 332 : Edited Katantraganmala, Calcutta, 1924.
520 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIE

DATTA RÄMA BHATTA

Vrtti on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
(NCat 1.472; 2.294)
DAYÄSAMKARA
Anubandhakhandanaväda
(NCat 8.324)
DEVADATTA
Kätantravrtti
(NCat 3.313; 9.107)
DEVADATTA
Anvayadipikä (Jain work)
(NCat 1.241)
DEVAKÎNANDANA
Avyayärthalahari
(NCat 1.431)
Kärakädibodhini
(NCat 3.378)
DEVASAHÄYA
(YM 1.502)
Laghu(vrtti) vivrti on Pânini's Astädhyäyi
(NCat 1.472)
DEVASARMAN
(GOS 134, 1961,200)
Samanvayapradipasamketa, metrical recast of Kudaka's work
(NCat 4.176)
DEVÏDATTA SÄSTRIN
Ekagotra sutraparâmarêa
(NCat 9.135)
DEVÏDASA
Pariinisüträrthasarngraha
(NCat 9.135)
DEVÏDASA GAKRAVARTIN
(YM 1.637)
Commentary on the Mugdhàbodha
(NCat 9.135)
DHANAJIT
(Abhyankar, p. 206)
Dhätukalpalatikä
(NCat 9.284)
DHANAftjAYA
Kramakaumudl on a Sanskrit Dhätupätha
(NCat 9.216)
DHANANjAYA BHATTÄCÄRYA
Paryâyasabdaratna
(NCat 9.218)
DHANAPRABHÄ SÜRI, a Jain
Dhuydhika on Durgasimha''s Kätantravrtti
(NCat 3.312)
Dhundhikä on Trilocanadäsa's Kätantrapanjikä
(NCat 9.222)
DHARMADÄSA
BIBLIOGRAPHY 521

Commentary on Gandra's Cândravyâkarana

(NCat 9.248)
DHARMADEVA
Panjikä on Anubhütisvarüpa's Särasvataprakriyä
(NGat 9.248)
(RÄJAKUMÄRA) DHARMASÄSTRIN
Laghuvrtti on Püjyapäda's Jainendravyäkarana
G1333 : Edited Varanasi, 1924.
DIVYASIMHA MISRA
Kärikäbhäsya
(NGat 9.51)
DRAVYESAJHÄ
Pratyekârthaprakâtikâ on Bhartrhari's Vâkyapadiya
Seee656.
ELESVARÄGNIHOTRA
Laksyamälä
(NCat 3.77-78)
GADÄDHARA
Tîka on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendukkhara
(NGat 11.226)
GANESA
Vrtti on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
(NGat 5.267)
GANGÄDÄSA (PANDITA)
(YM 2.410)
Vâkyapadi
(NGat 5.195)
GANGÄDÄSÄGÄRYA
Katantra Vyäkhyälekha
(NGat 3.309)
GAMGÄDATTA
Nyàsasamgraha
(NGat 5.194)
GAMGÄDATTA SÄSTRIN
Commentary on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
Gl 334 : Edited Jullundur, 1905, 1962.
G1335 : Edited Hardwar, 1950.
GA&GÄDHARA (YM 2.181 )
Commentary on Vardhamäna's Gariaratnamahodadhi
(NGat 5.200,257)
GAKlGÄDHARA NÄTHA
Vâgïsâmata
(NGat 5.203)
GAMGÄDHARA BARMAN
Vyäkarariasamgraha (of the Vopadeva system)
(NGat 5.206)
GANGÄRAMITRA PÄTHIN (MÄLAVA)
Sabdasudhänidhi
(NGat 5.213)
GANGESA MISRA UPÄDHYÄYA
Sumanoramä
(NGat 5.226)
 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

GANGESA SARMAN
Katantrakaumudï
(NGat 3.317)
GAURAMOHANA BHATTA (VIDYÄRATNA)
Ratnâvali (of Samksiptasàra school)
(NGat 6.234)
GAUTAMA
Kâtantradîpikâ
(NGat 3.309; 6.223)
GEYADEVA
{Prâtipadika) Ganapathasamgraha
(NGat 5.256)
GHANASYÄMA
Varnaprakäsa
(NGat 6.2.75)
Dhätukosa
Gl 336 : Edited JTSML 26.2-3, 1974.
GIRIJA
Tlkä on Varadarâja's Laghusiddhântakaumudï
' SeeelO62, G1173.
GOLHÄI^A
Tippanikâ on Haimacatuskavrtti
(NGat 6.182)
GOPÄLA
Gommentary on Nägesa Bhatta's Sabdendusekhara
(NGat 6.133)
GOPÄLÄGÄRYA
Sthemadarparia
(NGat 6.155)
GOPINÄTHA
Sabdavyakhyä
(NGat 6.161)
GOPINÄTHA BHATTA
Kârakavyutpattirahasya
(NGat 3.378)
GOSVÄMI SRI SIVÄNANDABHATTA
Padavyavasthäkosa
(NGat 11.102) -
GOVARDHANA BHATTA
(GOS 134,1961,145)
Katantrakaumudï
(NGat 3.317)
Gommentary on Vardhamäna's Ganaratnamahodadhi
(NGat 5.257)
GOVINDA BHATTA
Commentary on Kätantra Dhätupätha
(NGat 3.315; 6.190)
Sisyaprabodhikä on Kätantra
(NGat 6.201)
GOVINDAMISRA
Gommentary on Sïradeva's Paribhâsâvrtti
(NGat 6.203)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 523

GOVINDA PANDITA
KätantraparUista
(NCat 6.200)
GOVINDARÄMA VIDYÄSIROMANI
Sabdadîpika on Mugdhabodha
.(NCat 6.205)
GOVINDA SENA
Paribhâsapradïpa
G1337 : Edited (3d edition), Calcutta, 1906.
(SIDDHA) GUNAKÄRA
Vyäkaranatikä
(NCat 6.58)
GURUWARA BÄLA SASTRÎ
Tippanïon Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (?)
Seee542.
HARAGOVINDA VIDYÄVÄCASPATI
Jnâpakâvali (Samksipta work)
(NCat 7.350)'
HARANÄTHA VIDYÄRATNA
Dhatupradîpa on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
G1338 : Edited by Madhavacandra Tarkacudamani.
HARIDATTA (DAIVAJNA?)
Unâdisûtra
(NCat-2.294)
Upasargärthadipikä
(NCat 2.376)
HARIKRSNA
Avyayärtha
(NCat 1.431)
HARI PANDITA
Commentary on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
(NCat 1.472)
HARIRÄMA BHATTÄCÄRYA
Sära on Sarvavarman's Kätantrasütras
Seee663.
(BHAGAVAT) HARI SÄSTRI
Citraprabhä on Hari Diksita's? Laghusabdaratna
See el 100.
HARSAKÏRTI SÜRI
(YM 2.129)
Vivararia on Hemacandra's Sabdänueäsana-Dhätupäräyaria
(NCat 9.290)
HAYAGRIVÄCÄRYA
Candrikä or Ârthamanjari on Nâgesa Bhat^a's Sabdendusekhara
(NCat 6.379, 11.222)
Arthamaüjari on Näges'a Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
(NCat 11.228)
ISVARAKANTHA
Dhätumälä
(NCat 2.273, 9.292)
ÏSVARAMISRA
524 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Rüpatarangirii
(NCat 2.277)
ïSVARÏPRASADA
Sabdakaustubha
(NCat 2.280)
JAGADDHARA
Commentary on Haradatta's Padamanjarï
Seee918.
JAGADÏSA
Päniniyasära
(NCat7.126)
JAGANNÄTHA
(GOS 134, 1961, 159; YM 1.633-634)
Sârapradïpika on Anubhüti Svarüpäcärya's Sarasvatiprakriyä
(NCat 7.134)
(MAHÄMAHOPÄDHYÄYA) JAGANNÄTHA
Siddhäntatattva
(NCat 7.134)
JANÄRDANA SARMAN
Sabdaratna (of Kätantra school )
(NCat 7.153)
JAYANTA BHATTA
Vädighatamudgara on Anubhütisvarüpäcärya's Särasvataprakriyä
(NCat 7.181) .
JINADEVASÜRI
Kriyäkaläpa
(NCat 5.130; 7.256)
JNÄNESVARA
Sabdabhäsä
(NCat 7.349)
KÄLADHARA
Saktisphufa
(NCat 3.223)
KALÏDÂSA CAKRAVARTIN
Dhätuprabodha
(NCat 9.291)
KÄU KUMÄRA SARMAN
Vyäkarawiädaria
Gl 339 : Published.
KALYÄNAMALA
(GOS 134, 1961, 113)
Dlpa on Hari Dïksita's Sabdaratna
(NCat 3.256)
KÄMADEVA GHOSA
Sabdaratnäkara
(NCat 3.349)
KANAKALÄLA SARMAN
Samksiptabälabodhini on Varadaràja's Laghusiddhântakaumiidï
See el 166.
KÄNTANÄTHA
Sabdärtharatnävali
(NCat 3.340)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 525

KAâïNATHA (perhaps several different)

Krdvivararia
(NCat 4.126)
Dhatuprayogâvalï
(NGat 4.127)
Viêesyavâda
(NGat 4.127)
Èiêubodha
(NGat 4.127)
Prakriyäsära on Ramacandra's Prakriyäkaumudi
(NGat 4.527)
KÄSINÄTHA DEVASARMAN
Pradîpa
(NGat 4.133)
KÄSINÄTHA MISRA
Dhâtusamgraha
(NGat 4.133)
KAâïRÂJA
Gommentary on Kätantra
(cf. YM 1.519)
KA&ïâVARA
(Belvalkar, p. 94; YM 1.639)
Dhâtupâtha (of Saupadma school )
(NGat 4.141)
KAâYAPA
Bâlâvabodhana on Cändravyäkararia
See e797.
KAVI KANTHAHÄRA
?(Kaläpa) Carkaritarahasya
G1340 : Edited Calcutta, 1905.
KAVÎNDRANANDANA
Vrtti on Krdvrtti
(NCat 4.281)
KAVISÄRANGA
Prayuktäkhyätamanjari . .
(NGat 3.287)
KAVIVALLABHA
Aparavisayapramänäni
(NGat 3.285)
KEDÄREaVARA SARMAN
Dhätvävali
(NGat 9.296)

Rapratyaharamaydana
(NGat 5.75)
KEâAVA
(YM 2.417)
Sphofapratisthä
(NGat 5.61)
KEâAVADEVA TARKAPAl^GÄNANA BHATTÄGÄRYA
(Belvalkar, p. 92)
526 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Vyäkarariadurghatodghäta on Goyïcandra's Samksiptasâravivarana

(NCat 5.64>
KHANANRPATI
Sabdaprakâsa
(NCat 5.184)
KODANDARÄMA
(Abhyankar, p. 129)
Sabdasiddhantamanjarî
(NCat 5.93)
KOLÄHALA
Paribhâsâpradïpa
(NCat 5.95)
KRPÄLA PANDITA
Kâtantrakaumudî
(NCat 9.317; 4.283)
KRPÄRÄMA
Karakärtha
(NCat 4.282)
Commentary on a Satpadi
(NCat 4.282)
KRSNA BHATTA
Commentary on Nage sa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
(NCat 4.335)
KRSNA BHATTÄCÄRYA or SARMAN
Prabhävati on the Särasvata Vrttipanjikä
(NCat 4.340)
KRSNÄCÄRYA (more than one?)
Çandrikâ .
(NCat 4.9) "
Yuktiratnäkara
(NCat 4.9)
KRSNA DVIVEDIN
Sphotatattva
(NCat 4.324)
KRSNA PANDITA
Gudhabhâvavivrti on Râmacandra's Prakriyâkaumudi
(NCat 6.95) -
KRSI^A SÄSTRIN
(NCat 4.364)
Sudhäkara on Bhattoji Dïksita's Siddhantakaumudï
(NCat 4.364) "
Subantaprakäsa
(NCat 4.364)
KRSNASUDHI or KRSNAMÄCÄRIAR
Tärävali on Pänini's Astadhyäyl 7.2.115
(NCat 8.159)
KRSNÄVADHÜTA
Kärakanirüpana
(NCat 3.375) ;.; ; ' '
KUDAKÄCÄRYA
Samanvayapradipa
(NCat 4.176)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 527

KULLUKABHATTA
Rüpaprakäia following Dhâtupradïpa
(NCat 4.248)
LAKSMANA DVIVEDIN
Dvikarmaväda
(NCat 9.205)
LAKSMÏDATTA, son of Krsnamitra
Padärthadipikä
(NCat 11.108)
LAKSMÏDHARA, son of Nrsimhodgätr, lived in Puri
Nämanirmaladarpana
(NCat 10.44)
L AKSMÏKÂRA or L AKSMÏSRÏ of Nepal
(Candra) Tinanta
(Cordier 3.460)
LAKSMINÄRÄYANA VYÄSA
Astâdhyayïsûtrakosa •
(NCat 1.471)
LOKESVARA SARMAN SUKLA
Siddhantaratnavalï on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seee998.
MAHÄLINGA aÄSTRIN
Unädirüpävali
(NCat 2.293)
MAHESAJHÄ
Dhatuparyayamanimâlâ
(NCat 9.286)
MÄNALUR VIRARÄGHAVÄCÄRYA
Commentary on Pänini's Astädhyäyi
G1341 : Edited MGOML 33 (1954), 47 (1955)
(SRI) MÄNASARMAN of Campahatti, son of Laksmipati
Vijaya on Sïradeva's Paribhäsävrtti
Gl 342 : Edited in Paribhäsäsamgraha, pp. 273-292.
MAiSlGARASA
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Pratipadä on Yaksavarman's Cintämani
MÄISflKYADEVA
(Belvalkar, p. 45; Qos 134, 1961, 306)
Vrtti or DaÉapadi on (Jain) Unädisütras ,
(NCat 8.345)
MAUNISEKHARA, pupil of Râjas'ekhara
Commentary on Kâtantra
(NCat 3.224)
NANDAKIRTI
Tyadyantasya praknyâpadâroharta
(NCat 8.227 ) .
NANDANA MISRA or NYÄYAVÄGI^A, son of Bänesvara Misra
Tantrapradlpoddlpana on Jinendrabuddhi's Nyäsa
(NCat 4.119, 9.327)
NARAHARI
Prabodha on Trilocana's Katantravrttipanjikä
(NCat 3.311, 9.367)
528 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

NARAHARI, disciple of Näräyana Tïrtha

( Belvalkar, p. 97 ; YM 1.639 )
Bäla(ka)bodha
(NCat 9.368)
NARAIN DATTA TRIPÄTHIN
Prakàêa on Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya, Book 1
Seee662.
NARASIMHA SÜRI, son of Rudräcärya of Kaundinya gotra
Saptasvarasindhu or Svaramanjan
(NCat 9.364)
NÄRÄYANA BHARATÏ
(Belvalkar, p. 85)
Särasvatasärasamgraha
(NGat 10.94)
NÄRÄYANA
(NGat 3.374)
Kârakacakra-Dïpaprabhâ
G1343 : Edited TSS 33, 1913.
NÄRÄYANA of Kerala
Prakriyäsära
(NGat 10.86)
NÄRÄYANA of Govindapura
Pradipa or Éabdabhusana on Pänini's Astadhyäyi
(NGat 1.472)
NAROTTAMA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA BHATTÄGÄRYA
Samksiptasârakarika
(NGat 9.372)
NAYASUNDARA, pupil of Dhanaratna
Rûparatnamâla or Särasvatavyäkararia
(NGat 9.350)
NÎLAMBARA MISRA
Manoramäcandrikä
(NGat 10.184)
NRSIMHA ( more than one? )
Sûktiratnâkara on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya
(NGat 10.190)
Rüpamälä
(NGat 10.190)
NRSIMHA T A R K A P A N G Ä N A N A
Gariamärtarida on Samksiptasâra-Dhâtupâtha
(NGat 9!290, 10.195)
ORAMBHATTA
Vyäkarariadipikä on VknxnYs Astâdhyâyï
G1344 : Edited by Ganapati Sastri MokatevParc n. s. 29 (1907)-37(1915). Re-
printed Varanasi, 1916.
PADMADHARA
Indira
(NGatll.153)
(RÄJA) PADMANÄRÄYANA
BIBLIOGRAPHY 529

Éisubodha
(NCat 11.131)
PADMASUNDARA
Uriädisädhana or Sundaraprakäsatobdärnava
(NCat 2.293)
PANCÄNANA KANDALÎ
Chandraka Bhäsya on Ratnamalä
(NCat 11.72)
IVarnaviyeka
(NCat 11.72)
PASUPATÏ of Rädhä
Kärakapanksä
(NCat 3.375)
PlTÄMBARA VIDYÄBHÜSAT^A
Kâtantra-Dhâtusutrapatrikâ or Kavirqjapatrikä
See e656.
PRAVARTAKOPÄDHYÄYA
(Abhyankar, p. 271; YM 1.428)
Prakäsa or Prakäükä on Kaiyata's Mahäbhäsyapradipa
(NCat 5.76)
PRAYOGAVEftKATÄDRI
(YM 1.415)
Vidvanmukhabhüsana or -Mandana on Patanjali's Mahäbhäsya (MS at Adyar Library)
PRTHVÎCANDRA or PRTHVÏDHARA
Daurgasimhavrtti on Durgasimha's Kätantravrtti
(NCat 3.313)
PRTHVÏSVARA
Sarvalaksaria on Harsavardhana's Lingänusäsana
Seee818.
PUNYASUNDARAGANI
(Belvalkar, p. 66)
Dhätupätha (Hemacandra school) ,
(NCat 9.290)
PURT^ACANDRA
Dhätupätha ~ .
G1345 : Biswanath Bhattacharya, "On the Sanskrit Restoration of PürnacandraY
Dhatu-Pätha from Tibetan Base," JBBRAS 521-53, 1977-1978, 88-91.
RÄDHÄKRSNA GOSVÄMIN
Avyayärtha
(NCat 1.431)
RÄGHAVAJHÄ
Kârakârthavicâra
(NCat 3.379) .
Dvandvaikaêesavâda
(NCat 9.189)
RÄGHAVASÜRI (YM 2.329)
Arthaprakäsikä on Kätyäyana's Vârttika (MS in Madras)
RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA
Çandrikâ on Nägesa Bhatta's LaghuSabdenduhkhara
(NCat 6.379)
RAGHUNANDA SIROMANI
530 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(Belvalkar, p. 71)
Kätantratattvärriava or Kaläpatattväryava
See e653.
RAGHUNÄTHA SASTRÏ VAIYÄKARANA
Laghufïkâ on Näges'a Bhatta's Paribhäsenduhkhara
See el 134.
RÄJARÄMA DÏKSITA
Commentary on Hari Bhäskara's Paribhäsäbhäskara
(NCat 11.22)
RAJÏVA SARMAN or VISVANÄTHA GAKRAVARTIN or RÄMADEVA
SARMAN
lAcaksanaviveka
(NCat 2.21)
RÄMAGANDRA, son of Visvanatha and disciple of Krsna Pandita
Kriyâkofa, abridgment of Bhattamalla's Äkhyätacandrikä
G1346 : Edited Varanasi, 1876.
RÄMAGANDRA
Kärakacandrikä ,
•(NCat 3.374)
RÄMAGARANA
Kartrsiddhäntamanjari
(NCat 3.187)
RÄMACARITRA TRIPÄTHIN
Phakkikä Saralärtha
G1347 : Edited by Sadasiva Sastri Joshi. HSS 21. Varanasi, 1932.
Pahcasamâsïya
(NCat 11.60)
RÄMAJNA PÄNDEYA
VyàkaravLadarêanapratvmâ
G1348 : Edited by Ramagovind Sukla. POWSBst. Varanasi, 1979.
RÄMA KINKARA SARASVATÎ
(GOS 134, 1961, 323; YM 1.639)
Âéubodha
.(NCat 2.198)
RÄMAKUMÄRA NYÄYABHÜSANA, son of Rämagati Väcaspati
(NCat 3.225)
Kaläpasära (based on Mugdabodha, Särasvata, and Kätantra systems)
(NCat 3.225)
RÄMADEVA MISRA
Vrttipradipa on Jayäditya/Vämana's Käsikä
(NCat 4.119)
RÄMÄNANDA TÏRTHA
Kaläpasamgraha, a brief exposition of Kätantra
(NCat 3.225)
RÄMANÄRÄYAT^A SARMAN
Bhäsya on Anubhüti's Särasvataprakriyä
Seeel004.
RÄMANÄTHA GAKRAVARTIN
Sabdaratnävali or Kätantravrttiprabodha or Sabdasädhyaprabodhini
(NCat 3.314)
RÄMAPANIVÄDA
BIBLIOGRAPHY 531

Vivarana on Näräyana Bhattari's Dhâtukâvya

Seeel002.
RÄMARSI
Avyayarthamanjarï on an Avyayärthakosa
(NCat 1.431)
RÄMASIMHA (more than one?)
Commentary on Haradatta's Padamanjari
Seee918.
Dhaturatnamahjarï
.(NCat 9.292)
RAMEâVARA TARKAVÄGASPATI BHATTÄCÄRYA
Kärakamälätikä on a Ratn imälä
(NCat 3.376)
RATIDEVA SIDDHANTAVAGÏSA, son of Gangädharäcärya of the Gatta family of
Bengal
Krtparitistä
'(NCat 4.273)
RATNAMATI
Tïkâ on Gandragomin's sütras
(NGat'7.19)
RATNAPÄNI
(Sat)Kärakavivararia
/ (NCat 3.377)'
G1349 : Edited by H.V. Nagaraja Rao. MO 9, 1976, 49-62.
RATNESVARA
Commentary on Haradatta's Padamanjari
Seee917;e918.
RÜPARÄMA NYÄYAPAl^GÄNANA
Kärakarahasya, a Saupadma work
(NCat 3.376)
SABARASVÄMIN
(Belvalkar, p. 44; GOS 134, 1961, 383; YM 2.264)
Sarvärthalaksaria on Harsavardhana's commentary on Hemacandra's Lingänuiasana
Seee817.
SABHÄPATI SARMÄ UPÄDHYÄYA
Laksmi on Bhattoji Dîksita's Siddhântakaumudï
Seeel017;G1104.
SAGGIDÄNANDA
Taddhitaguyadipikä
(NGat8.85) :
SADÄNÄNDA
Subodhinï on Anubhüti's Sarasvatiprakriyä
Seee988;ell34.
Subodhinï on Rämacandräsrama's Siddhântacandrikâ
SeeelO41.
SAMANTABHADRA
(Belvalkar, p. 60)
Tippanl on Yaksavarman's Cintâmani
^AMKARA
Tïkâ on Purusottamadeva's Mahâbhâsyalaghuvrtti
(YM 2.403)
éAMKARA âARMAN
532 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Kâtantrapariêistaprabodhaprakâtikâ
(NCat 3.316)
SANÄTANA TARKÄGÄRYA
(YM 1.509)
Tippanï on Pänini's Astâdhyâyï
(NCat 1.472)
Prabhä on ?Jinendrabuddhi's Nyäsa (or ?Maitreyaraksita's Tantrapradlpa)
(NCat 4.119, 8.90)
SARVADHARA UPÄDHYÄYA
Commentary on (Kätantra)Unädisütras
(NCat 2.295)
Vanmayapradipa on Durgasimha's Kâtantravrtti
(NCat 3.313)
Tyadayantasyaprakriyä or Kaläpatyadivrtti
(NCat 8.227)
SASTHÏDASA, son of Jayakrsna Tarkavâgïsa
Dhätumälä
(NCat 9.292)
SATYAVARYÄRYA
Commentary on some Unädisütras
(NCat 2.295)
(KASï) SESA SARMAN, patronized by King Krsnaräja III of Mysore
(Belvalkar, p. 45; YM 2.299)
Sarvamangala on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsenduiekhara
(NCat 4.141, 11.228)
SIDDHANÄTHA VIDYÄVÄGl^A
Commentary on Purusottamadeva's Prayogaratnamälä
G1350 : Edited. Kuch Bihar, 1890-1903.
SITÄNÄTHA SÄSTRIN
Samjïvanï on Äkhyäta section of &arvavarman's Kätantrasütras
Seee658.
SIVADÄSA or SlVARÄMA SARMAN (VÄCASPATI)
Krnmanjarï with autocommentary ^
G1351 : Edited Dacca, 1886.
G1352 : Edited Calcutta, 1905-1906.
Seee647
&IVADÄSA CAKRAVARTIN
Commentary on Samksiptasâra Uriädisütras
(NCat 2.296)
SIVÄNANDA GOSVÄMIN or SlROMAISl BHATTA, a southerner who visited
Bikaner during the reign of Anupsingh
Kârakakoêa or Vibhaktyarthavivararia
(NCat 3.372) (See DKRPV, p. 363.)
SIVÄNANDA PÄNDEYA
Ratnadipikä on Nägesa Bhafta's Paramalaghumaüjüsä
See el 122.
SIVANÄRÄYANA âlROMAI^I
Tippanï on Vopadeva's Mugdhabodha
' Seeel916.
SIVA PANDITA
Kusumavikäsa on Haradatta's Padamanjart
(NCat 4.120)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 533

SOMANÄTHA
Brhati Candrikä
(NGat 6.380)
SOMAPRABHÄ, a Jain
Auktika
(NGat 3.97)
SRÏDEVA PANDITA
Arthasamgraha
(NGat 1.389)
SRÏKANTA MISRA
Candrikä
(NGat 6.380)
SRÏKRSI^A SARMAN
Tinam Saktih or Tiniuicära?
(NGat 8.166)
SRÏNATHA SIROMAIVJI
Manoramä on Sarvavärman's Kätantrasütras
See e655.
SRÏNIVASA
Commentary on Haribhäskara's Paribhäsäbhäskara
(NGat 11.22 )_
&RIPRABHÄ SÜRI
Kârakoktisamuccaya
:
(NGat 3.379)
SRSTIDHARÄGÄRYA
Commentary on Purusottamadeva's Bhäsävrtti
Seee938.
SRUTASÄGARA, pupil of Vidyänanda
Dhätupäräyaria
(NGat 9.290)
SUDARÖANÄGÄRYA
Kärakärthapradipikä
(NGat 3.379)
SUDARS ANA DEVA
Pradïpa on Santänava's Phitsütras
See e644.
SUSENA KAVIRÄJA MI^RA, son of Misra Mahïdhara
Gandra or Vyäkhyäsära ön Trilocana's Kätantravrttipanjikä
G1353 : "Akhyätaviräja" portion edited Dacca, 1890.
See e656.
SVETAVANAVÄSIN, son of Äryahhafta of Gärgya gotra
(NGat 2.172, 294-295)
Vrtti on Unädisütras
G1354 : Edited by T.R. Ghintamani, MUSS 7.1, 1933.
TALADEVASUDHI
Dhätupratyayapancikä
(NGat 9.291)
TÄRÄNÄTHA, son of Kälidäsa of Vatsa family
Sabdärtharatna
G1355 : Edited Calcutta, 1951.
TÄRÄPADA NYÄYARATNA
534 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Kärakacandnkä
G1356 : Edited Calcutta, 1902.
TARKÄLAMKÄRA BHATTÄGÄRYA
Dhätucandrikä
(NCat 8.13.5)
TEKNÄTHA (?)
Paribhasärthadipikä
(NCat 8.3)
THAKKURADÄSA NYÄYAPAINfCÄNANA, son of Mrtyunjaya Sarasvatï
Dhätucandrikä
(NCat 8.5)
TILAKA
Tikä on Ksirasvämin's Nipätävyayopasargavrtti
G1357 : Edited svos 28, 1951.
TRILOCANA (more than one?)
Avyayasabdavrtti
(NCat 8.261)
Dhätupäräyana
(NCat 8.261)
Vaiyäkaranakofipättra
(NCat 8.262)
TRILOKANÄTHA, son of Vaidyanätha
Kärakärthanirnaya or Satkärakanirüpana
(NCat 3. 378, 8.259)
UTSAVAKÎRTI, SÄRAftGA UPÄDHYÄYA
Padasüryaprakriyä (Kätantra work)
(NCat 2.322, 3.309, 11.103)
VAIJALADEVA
Prabodhacandrikä
G1358 : G.V. Tagare, "Vaijadeva's Prabodhacandrikä;' SPAIOG 19, 1956, 36-37.
VÄLÄBHIDATTA
Commentary on Nägesa Bhatta's Paribhäsendusekhara
(NCat 11.227)
VAIsfGADÄSA
Taddhitopadesa
(NGat8.86)
VARENDRA GAMPAHATTIYA MÄNASARMAN, son of Laksmïpati
Commentary on Sïradeva's Paribhasävrtti
(NCat 1.203)
Anuhyasasära?
(NCat 1.203)
VÄSUDEVA
Kasikävrttisära
(NCat 4.120)
VEDÄNTÄCÄRYA
Kaumudisärasamgraha, summary of Bhat{oji Dîksita's Siddhäntakaumudi
(NCat 5.111)
VIDYÄGAKRAVARTIN
Commentary on Bhartrhari's Väkyapadiya (lost)
VIJAYAVIMALA
Avacurï on Harsakulagani's Kavikalpadruma
(NCat 3.270)
BIBLIOGRAPHY 535

VINÄSVARANANDIN
Kärakasamhandhoddyota
(NCat 3.378)
(King) VlRAPÄI^DYA
Tihantaparyäyasamgraha (? )
(NCat 8.166)'
VlRARÄGHAVÄCÄRYA
(Cardona, p. 36)
Päninisütravyäkhyä
G1359 : Edited by T. Ghandrasekharan. 2 volumes, MGOMS 33 (1954), 47 (1955).
VISVANÄTHA NYÄYÄLAMKÄRA
Dhâtucintâmani (Päniniya work)
(NCat 9.285)
VISVANÄTHA SÄSTRI
Prabhäkan on Varadaräja's Mädhyasiddhäntakaumudi
SeeelO48.
VISVESVARA SÜRI
(Vyäkarana)Siddhäntasudhänidhi
G1360 : Edited by Dadhi Ram Sarma, Si ta Rama Sastri Shende, and Madhava
Sastri Bhandare. GhSS 45. Varanasi, 1924.
VISVESVARA TARKÄGÄRYA, a Kätantra writer
(NCat 2.10)
Äkhyätavyäkhyäna or -bodha (MSS available)
Commentary on Trilocana's Kätantravrttipanjikä
(NCat 3.312)
VRAJARÄJA
Uriädisütra
(NCat 2.294)
VURAMISRA, son of Harighala
Dhâtudarpaça, composed in the city of Amritsar
(NCat 9.285)
YAaOBHÜTI
Laghuvrtti or Sisyahita on Kashmiri recension of Kätantra (Tibetan translation exists
in Tanjur; see JASP 1907, 125.)
YATÏSA
Avyayàrthapradïpika
(NCat 1.431)
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Sädhutvädinirvacana (MS notice in Adyar D, vol. 6, p. 245)
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Sphotasiddhi (MS notice in Adyar D, vol. 6. no. 655)
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Varavarriinï on Nâgesa Bhatta's Laghusabdenduêekhara
See el 116.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Vijaya on Nagesa Bhatta's Laghusabdenduêekhara
See el 116.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Visamapadavivrti on Nagesa Bhatta's Laghutabdendusekhara
See el 116.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
536 ENCYCLOPEDIA Of INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Abhinavacandrikä on Nägesa Bhatta's Laghusabdendusekhara

See el 116.
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Sabdarüpävall
G1361 : Edited by Kanaka Lai Sharma. HSS 3. Varanasi, 1925,
AUTHOR UNKNOWN
Samäsasamkhä
G1362 : Edited by H.V. Nagaraja Rao. MO 12, 1979, 45-46.

PART 3 : SECONDARY LITERATURE ON Vyakarana

G1363 : Henry T. Golebrooke, "On the Sanskrit and Prakrit Languages," Asiatic
Researches 7, 1803, 199-231. Reprinted HTCMR 2.1-32; 'Steal, pp. 33-45.
G1364 : Theodor Aufrecht, De Accentu Compositorum Sanskritorum. Bonn, 1847.
G1365 : N.L. Westergaard, Radices linguae sanscritae ad décréta grammaticorum deßnivit
atque copia exemplorum exquisitorum illustravit. Bonn, 1841.
G1366': Theodor Benfey, Vollständige Grammatik der Sanskritsprache zum Gebrauch für
Vorlesungen und zum Selbststudium. Leipzig, 1852.
G1367 : William Dwight Whitney, "On the Nature and Designation of the Accent
in Sanskrit," TAPA 1869-1870, 20-45.
G1368 : Otto Böhtlingk, "Das Verhalten der drei kanonischen Grammatiker in
Indian zu den im Würzelverzeichniss mit s und n anläutenden Würzein,"
ZDMG 29, 1875, 483-490.
G1369 : Fr-anz Kielhorn, Grammatik der Sanskrit-Sprache. Ist edition 1870, translated
1881. Wiesbaden, 1965.
G1370 : R.G. Bhandarkar, "Wilson Lectureship: Development of Language and
of Sanskrit," JBBRAS 16, 1883-1885, 245-274.
G1371 : Hjalmar Edgren, "On the Verbal Roots of the Sanskrit Language and of
the Sanskrit Grammarians," JAOS 11, 1885, 1-55.
G1372 : William Dwight Whitney, "The Study of Hindu Grammar and the Study
of Sanskrit," AJP 5, 1884; IA 14,1885, 33ff.; Silverstein, pp. 287-305; Staal,
pp. 142-154.
G1373 : O. Böhtlingk, "Haben iti und ca bisweilen die Bedeutung von ädi?" ZDMG
41,1887,516-520.
G1374 : Georg Bühler, "A Disputed Meaning of the Particles iti and ca" WZKM 1,
1887, 13-20.
G1375 : Bruno Liebich, "Die Kasuslehre der indischen Grammatiker verglichen
mit dem Gebrauch der Kasus im Aitareya-Brähmana (ein Beitrag zur
Syntax der Sanskrit-Sprache)," BB 10, 1886, 205-234; 11,1887, 274-315;
G1376 : J.S. Peijer, Sanskrit Syntax. Leiden, 1886; reprinted Kyoto, 1968.
G1377 : Friedrich Knauer, "Zu iti und ca" Festchrift Böhtlingk, pp. 62-67.
G1378 : F. Kielhorn, "Scheinbare Cita te von Autoritäten in grammatischen
Werken," Festschrift Böhtlingk, pp. 52-53; reprinted Rau, pp. 256-257.
G1379 : William Dwight Whitney, Sanskrit Grammar. Cambridge, Mass., 1889,
G1380 : R. Otto Franke, "Was ist Sanskrit?" BB 17, 1891, 54-90.
G1381 : Ferdinand Kittel, "Dravidische Elements in den Sanskrit-Dhätupäthas,"
Festschrift Roth, William Dwight pp. 21 -24.
Gl 382 ; William Dwight Whitney, "On Recent Studies in Hindu Grammar,"
AJP 14,1893, 171-197.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 537

G1383 : G. Buhler, "The Roots of the dhätupätha not Found in Literature," WZKM 8,
1894, 122-136. Reprinted IA 23, 1894, 141-154, 250-255; G1625, pp.
194-204.
G1384 : F. Kittel, "On Some Sanskrit Verbs," IA 24, 1895, 81-82.
G1385 : Jakob Wackernagel, Altindische Grammatik, Volume 1, Lautlehre. Gottingen,
1896. Reprinted Wackernagel.
G1386 : F. Kielhorn, "The Jätakas and Sanskrit Grammarians," JRAS 1898, 17-21.
Reprinted Rau, pp. 294-298.
G1387 : Otto Wecker, "Der Gebrauch der Kasus in der älteren Upanisad-literature
Vergleichen mit der Kasuslehre der indischen Grammatiker," BB 30, 1906,
1-61, 177-207. *'
G1388 : Satischandra Vidyabhusana, "Sanskrit Works on Literature, Grammar,
Rhetoric and Lexicography as Preserved in Tibet," JASBe 3, 1907,
121-132; 4, 1908, 593ff.
G1389 : Hermann Jacobi, "Was ist Sanskrit?" Scientia 14, 1911, 251-274.
G1390 : V.l. Kalyanov, "Classification of the Compound Words in Sanskrit"
(in Russian), Izvestiya of Academia of Sciences, USSR 6.1, 1912, 77-84.
G1391 : Emil Abegg, "Die Lehre vom sphota im Sarvadarsanasamgraha,"
Festschrift Ernst Wondisch, pp. 188-195.
G1392 : Jakob Wackernagel, "Indo-Iranica 15. Zur Bildung des 7. Aorists im
Altindischen", KZ 46, 1914, 273-275. Reprinted in Wackernagel.
G1393 : V.S. Sowani, "The History and Significance oîupama," ABORI 1, 1918-1920
87-98.
G1394 : Gopinath Kaviraj, "The Doctrine of pratibhä in Indian Philosophy,"
ABORI 5, 1923-1924, 1-18, 113-132.
G1395 : Bruno Liebich, "Über den sphota (ein Kapitel über die Sprachphilosophie
der Inder)," ZDMG 77, 1923, 208-219.
G1396 : Siddhesvar Varma, "Analysis of Meaning in Indian Semantics," JDL 13,
1926, Ï-38.
G1397 : Umesh Mishra, "Physical Theory of Sound and Its Origin in Indian
Thought," AUSt 2, 1926, 239-290.
G1398 : Otto Strauss, "Altindische Spekulationen über die Sprache und ihrer
Probleme," ZDMG 81, 1927, 99-151.
G1399 ; Vittore Pisani, Grammatica deWanticoindiano. 3 parts. Rome, 1929-1933.
G1400 :N.H. Purandhare, "A Few Thoughts on Semantics," ABORI 10, 1929,
127-146.
G1401 : Siddheshwar Varma, Critical Studies in the Phonetic Observations of Indian
Grammarians. London, 1929. Reprinted New Delhi, 1961.
G1402 : Prabhat Chandra Chakravarti, The Philosophy of Sanskrit Grammar. Calcutta,
1930.
G140 3 : Louis Renou, Grammaire Sanscrite. Paris, 1930.
G1404 : Albert Thumb, Handbuch der Sanskrit. 2d edition. Heidelberg, 1930.
G1405 : Jakob Wackernagel und Albert Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik, volume
3, Nominalflexion-Zahlwort Pronomen. Göttingen, 1930.
G1406 : Willem Caland, "A Rhythmic Law in Language," AO 9, 1931, 59-68.
G1407 : J. Mansion, Esquisse d'une histoire de la language sanscrite. Paris, 1931.
G1408 : A.M. Ipzzagalli, Elementi di grammatica sanscrita. Milan, 1931.
G1409 : P.S. Subrahmanya Sastri, "History of Grammatical Theories in Tamil and
Their Relations to the Grammatical Literature in Sanskrit," JOR 5, 1931,
183, 271; 6, 1932, 30, 130, 236, 371; 7, 1933, 113, 255, 376. Reprinted
Madras, 1934.
53Ô E N C Y C L O P E D I A OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G1410 : Paul Thieme, "Grammatik und Sprache, ein Problem der altindischen
Sprachwissenschaft," zn 8, 1931, 23-32. Reprinted Budruss, pp. 514-523.
G1411 : A. Gawronski, Podrecznik Sanskrytu. Krakow, 1932.
G1412 : V.A. Ramaswami Sastri, "The Doctrine oîsphota", AUJ 1, 1932, 231-240;
2,1933,109-120.
G1413 : Paul Thieme, "Zur Geschichte der einheimischen indischen Grammatik,"
OLZ 35, 1932, 236-242. Reprinted Budruss, pp. 524-527.
G1414 : S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, "Vacaspati's Criticism of the sphofa Theory,"
JOR 6, 1932, 311-321.
G1415 : P.C. Ghakravarti, The Linguistic Speculations of the Hindus. Calcutta, 1933.
G1416 : K.C. Ghatterji, "Some Technical Terms of Sanskrit Grammar," IHQ, 9,
1933, 279-281; coj 3, 1936, 105-132.
G1417 : , "The Critics of Sanskrit Grammar," JDL 24, 1934, 1-21.
G1418 : P.C. Chakravarti, "Spiritual Outlook of Sanskrit Grammar," JDL 25.1,
1934, 1-11.
G1419 : Kurt F. Leidecker, Sanskrit: Essentials of Grammar and Language. New York,
1934.
G1420 : C.R. Sankaran, "Five Stages of pre-Vedic Determinative-compound-
accentuation as Surmised by the Historical Survivals of Their Represen-
tatives in Sanskrit," JOR 8, 1934, 335-351 ; 9, 1935, 119-133.
G1421 :K.C. Chatterji, "Some Rules of sandki," coj 2, 1935, 261-268; 3, 1935,
9-16.
G1422 : , Phonetics in the Study of Classical and Sacred Languages in the East.
Calcutta, 1935.
G142 3 : Thomas Burrow, "Indian Theories on the Nature of Meaning" (summary),
TPS 1936, 92-93.
G1424 : S.K. Chatterji, *'A History of Aryan Speech in India," GR 60, 1936.
G1425 : Barend Faddegon, Grammar of the Indéclinables. Amsterdam, 1936.
G1426 : B.K. Ghosh, "Sanskrit Noun Inflexion," IHQ, 12, 1936, 53-66.
G1427 : S.M. Katre, "New Lines of Investigation in Indian Linguistics," ABORI
20, 1936.
G1428 : Gaurinath Sastri Bhattacharya, "A Study in the Dialectics of sphota," JDL
29.4, 1937, 1-115, Reprinted Delhi, 1980.
G1429 : A. Carnoy, Grammaire élémentaire de la langue sanscrite comparée avec celle des
langues indo-européennes. 2d edition. Paris, 1937.
v
G1430 : B.K. Ghosh, Linguistic Introduction to Sanskrit. Calcutta, 1937.
G1431 : Sten Konow, "Future Forms Denoting Past Time in Sanskrit and Prakrit,"
NTs 9, 1937-1938, 231-239.
G1432 : Louis Renou, Monographie sanskrites: I: La Decadence et la disparition du
subjonctif Paris, 1937.
G1433 : Johann Schropfer, "Ein Werk über die Philosophie der Sanskrit-Gramma-
tik", AO 9, 1937, 417-429.
G1434 : K.A. Subramania Iyer, "Who Are the anityasphotavädinah?" PAIOG 8, 1937,
258-263.
G1435 : Isidore Dyen,. The Sanskrit Indéclinables of the Hindu Grammarians and Lexico-
graphers. Baltimore, 1939.
G1436 : S.P. Chaturvedi, "Scholastic Disquisition in the Päninian System of
Grammar," Bhv 2.1, 1940, 59-63.
G1437 : K.M.K. Sharma, "The Doctrine of the sphota," KVRAGV, pp. 509-516.
G1438 : Betty Heimann, iCSphota and artha" PVKF, pp. 221-227.
G1439 : Louis Renou, "Les Connexions entre le rituel et la grammaire en Sans-
krit", JA 233, 1941-1942, 105-165. Reprinted G1625, pp. 435-469.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 539
G1440 : K.M.K. Sarma, "The Pàninian School and the Prätisäkhyas: Post-
Pâninian Reciprocity of Influence," Bhv 2.2, 1941, 230-238.
G1441 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "Pratibhä as the Meaning of a Sentence," PAIOC 10,
1941,326-332.
G1442 : J. R. Ballantyne, First Lessons in Sanskrit Grammar. Point Loma, Calif.,
1942 ; San Francisco, 1951.
G1443 : Louis Renou, Terminologie grammaticale du sanskrit. 3 volumes, BEPHE 280-
282, Paris, 1942. Reprinted in 1 volume, Paris, 1957.
G1444 : J. P. Vogel, "De eerste 'grammatica' van het Hindoestansch," Mededelin-
gen der Koniklijke nederlandse Akademie van Wetenschappen (Amsterdam) 4(15),
1942.
G1445 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Conception of guna among the vaiyäkaranas"
NIA 5, 1942, 121-130.
G1446 : S. Suryanarayana Sastri, "Word and Sense," ABORI 23, 1942, 424-430.
G1447 : Jan Gonda, Kurze Elementargrammatik der Sanskritsprache. Leiden, 1943.
G1448 : S. M. Katre, Some Problems of Historical Linguistics in Indo-Aryan. Bombay,
1943.
G1449 : Vittore Pisani, Grammatica Sanscrita. Milan, 1943-1944.
G1450 : K.M.K. Sarma, "Väk Before Bhartrhari," PO 8.1-2, 1943, 21-36.
G1451 : Jan Gonda, "Quelques Observations sur l'emploi du verbe simple' au
lieu d'un compose', etc. dans la langue sanscrite," ActOD 20, 1944,
167-205.
G1452 : Alain Daniélou, "L'Alphabet Sanskrit et la langue universelle," France-
Orient 5 (48), 1945; Lotus bleu 61.2, 51-68.
G1453 : Batakrishna Ghosh, "Aspects of pre-Pàninean Sanskrit Grammar", BCLV
1.344-345.
G1454 : T. V. Kapali Sastry, "Sphota and the Spoken Word," Sri Aurobindo Mandir
Annual 4, 1945.
G1455 : Gopinath Kaviraj, "JVMz, bindu and kalâ," JGJRI 3, 1945-1946, 47-62.
Also Festschrift Rajeswar Sastri Dravid, pp. 174-182.
G1456 : Adrian Schärpe, Précis de grammaire du sanscrit classique I. Louvain, 1945.
G1457 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The vaiyäkarana Conception of 'Gender,' "
BharKau 1945, 291-307.
G1458 : William Dwight Whitney, Roots, Verb-Forms, and Primary Derivatives of the
Sanskrit Language. New Haven, 1945.
G1459 : Franklin Edgerton, Sanskrit Historical Phonology, AOS Offprint Series 19,
1946,31.
G1460 : Louis Renou, Grammaire sanscrite élémentaire. Paris, 1946.
G1461 : M. Scheller, "Ein weiterer Beleg für Accusitavus com Infinitive in Sans-
krit?" AO 18, 1946, 248-250.
G.1462 :1.J.S. Taraporewala, "Some Considerations of Sanskrit Syntax," NIA 9,
1946,2-63.
G1463 : Betty Heimann, "Form Not 'Apart' but 'a Part' of Meaning as Exemplified
in Sanskrit Literature," UGR 6, 1947, 23-28.
G1464 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Doctrine of sphota," JGJRI 5,1947,121-147.
G1465 : R. B. Athavale, "Säbdabodha—a. Study," SPAIOG 14.1, 1948, 111-113.
G1466 : K. C. Chatterji, Technical Terms and Techniques of Sanskrit Grammar. Usha
Memorial Series 1, Calcutta, 1948, 1964.
G1467 : Barend Faddegon, "The Semitic and Sanskrit Alphabets," Orientalia
Nederlandica 1948, 261-272.
G1468 : O. Nazzari, Elementi de Grammatica Sanscrita. Torino, 1948.
540 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

G1469 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Point of View of the vaiyäkaranas," JOR 18,
1948, 84-96. Reprinted in G1625, pp. 393-400.
G1470 : Jan Gonda, "Dissimilation de mots entiers," AO 21, 1949, 267-279,
G1471 : Calvin Kephart, Sanskrit, Its Origin, Composition, and Diffusion. Strasburg,
Va., 1949.
G1472 : Siddhesvar Varma, "Sanskrit as a Medium of Conveying the Concept of
Abstraction," IL 11, 1949-1950, 138-141.
G1473 : V. S. Agrawala, "Pre-Päninian Technical Terms," SB 2, 1950, 135-137.
G1474 : Vidhusekhara Bhattacharya, "Some Composite Roots in Sanskrit," SB 1,
1950,21-22.
G1475 : K. C. Chatterji, "On the Cases Governed by Some Sanskrit Particles,"
SB 1, 1950,23-30.
G1476 : Jan Gonda, "Ca," Lingua 4, 1950, Iff.
G1477 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Conception of Action Among the vaiyäkara-
law," JGJR18, 1950-1951,165-188.
G1478 :John Brough, "Theories of General Linguistics in the Sanskrit Gramma-
rians," TPS 1951, 27-46. Reprinted G1625, pp. 402-414.
G1479 :J. Lehman, "Randbemerkungen zu den grammatischen 'kategorien,'"
IF61, 1951, 17-28.
G1480 : Murray B. Emeneau, Sanskrit Sandhi and Exercises. Berkeley, 1952.
G1481 :Jan Gonda, "Professor Burrow and the Pre-history of Sanskrit," Lingua 6,
1952,297-300.
G1482 : , "A Critical Survey of the Publications on the Periphrastic Future
in Sanskrit," Lingua 6, 1952, 158-179.
G1483 : , "On Nominative Joining or Replacing' Vocatives," Lingua 6,
1952,89-104.
G1484 : V. A. Ramaswami Sastri, "Mukhya and gauna Words in Language," BDCRI
14,1952,1-15.
G1485 : A. F. Stenzler, Elementarbuch der Sanskrit-Sprache. Berlin, 1952.
G I486: F. R. Adredos, Vedico y sanscrito classico. Madrid, 1963.
G1487 : William Sidney Allen, Phonetics in Ancient India. London, 1953, 1963.
G1488 : Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, "Senses of ca," PO 18, 1953, 1-18.
G1489 : John Brough, "Some Indian Theories of Meaning," TPS 1953, 161-176.
Reprinted Staal, pp. 414-423.
G1490 : Thomas Burrow, "Some Remarks on the Formation of Nouns in Sanskrit,"
ABORI32, 1953, 19-33.
G1491 : M. Mayrhofer, Sanskrit-Grammatik. Berlin, 1953.
G1492 : Louis Renou, "Les Grammariens sanskrits," in Renou and Filliozat, pp.
86-94.
G1493 : , "Les Speculations sur le language," in Renou and Filliozat, pp.
79-84.
G1494 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "On the Concept of upagraha Among the vaiyä-
karanas;' JOR 23, 1953-1954, 79-88.
G1495 : Rulon Wells, "Secondary Derivation from Sanskrit i-Stems," Lg 29, 1953,
237-241.
G1496 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "Importance of the First Words of the ganapäthas"
BhV 15, 1954,29-34.
G1497 : Thomas Burrow, "The Sanskrit Precative," Asiatica 1954, 35-42.
G1498 : A. Debrunner, Altindische Grammatik, volume 2, Die Nominalsuffixe. Göttin-
gen, 1954.
G1499 : Reingold F. G. Muller, "Über ein Neutrum im Sanskrit," Die Sprache 6.1,
1954,39-45.
BIBLIOGRAPHY 541

G1500 : A. Schropfer, Geistiger Wortsatz des Indischen und seine Geschichte. Heidelberg,
1954.
G1501 : E. R. Sreekrishna Sharma, "The Theories of the Ancient Indian Philoso-
phers about Word, Meaning, Their Mutual Relationships and Syntactical
Connection," Ph. D. diss., Philipps-Universität Marburg, 1954.
G1502 :K. V. Abhyankar, "A Short Note on Paribhäsä Works in Sanskrit Gra-
mmar," ABORI 36, 1955, 157^162.
G1503 : Franklin Edgerton, "An Often Neglected Aspect of Word Composition in
Sanskrit and Indo-European," JAOS 75, 1955, 279.
G1504 : M. B. Emeneau, "India and Linguistics," JAOS 75, 1955, 145-153.
G1505 : Jan Gonda, "Use of the Particle eca,"' Vâk 5, 1955, 1-73.
G1506:P. Hartmann, Nominale Ausdrucksformen im wissenschaftlichen Sanskrit.
Heidelberg, 1955.
G1507 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Indian Theories on Homophones and Homonyms,"
ALB 19, 1955, 193-222.
G1508 : —, "The Theory of Suggestion in Indian Semantics," ALB 19, 1955,
20-26.
G1509 : K. A. Subramania Iyer, "The Concept of dravya among the vaiyäkaranas"
sPAioc 18, 1955, 54-56.
G1510 : Bishnupada Bhattacharya, "Contribution of Words: sphofa Theory and
Its Opponents", OH 4, 1956, 217-226.
G1511 : Betty Heimann, "Why Study Sanskrit?" ABORI 28, 1956, 294-300.
G1512 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Sphota: The Theory of Lingusitic Symbols," ALB 20,
1956,84-116.
G1513 : M. Mayrhofer, "Altindische Nominalbildung: Zum neuen Band der
'Altindischen Grammatik," OLZ 1956, 5-15.
G1514 : Louis Renou, "Sur P Evolution des composés nominaux en Sanskrit,"
Bulletin de la Société de Linguistique de Paris 52.1, 1956, 96—116.
G1515 , Histoire de la langue sanskrite. Paris, 1956.
G1516. : P. S. Sastri, "Meaning and the Word," OT 2.1, 1956, 99-130.
G1517 : K. V. Abhyankar, "Short e {ardha ekara) and Short o (ardha okära) in
Sanskrit," ABORI 36, 1957, 154-157.
G1518 : R. S. Bhattacharya, "Some Broad Aspects on Indian Grammar and the
Theory of sphota," JGJRI 15, 1957-1958, 83-92.
G1519 :Jan Gonda, "A Note on the Functions of the Accusative as Described in
the Handbooks," in FVSKB, pp. 72-80.
G1520 : —, "The Character of the Sanskrit Accusative," in Martinet Comme-
moration Volume. Tenerife, 1957.
G1521 : Chandra Bhan Gupta, "Vyanjanä as Suggestive Power," PAIOC 19.2, 1957,
59-62.
G1522 : Betty Heimann, Terminology: Significance of Prefixes. London, 1957.
G1523 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "Diachronie Linguistics in Ancient India," JMU 29,
1957, 127-130.
G1524 : — , "Äkänksä: The Main Basis of Syntactic Unity," ALB 21, 1957,
282-295.
G1525 : Louis Renou, "Grammaire et Vedânta," JA 245, 1957, 121-132.
Gl 526 : Bishnupada Bhattacharya, "Connotation of Words (a Comparative
Study of the Viewpoints of Grammarians, Mimämsakas and Naiyäyikas),"
OH 5, 1958, 147-167.
G1527 :Trilokanath Jha, "The Concept of the Fivefold sabdänaucitya in Earlier
Grammarians," JBRS 44.3-4, 1958, 164-168.
G1528 : V. I. Kalyanov, "The Means of Expression of the Past Tense in Epic
542 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Sanskrit, According to the Materials of the Mahäbhärata" (in Russian).

Scientific Paper.no. 13 of the Oriental Institute of the Academy of Sciences, USSR,
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G1529 : K. Kunjunni Raja, "The Indian Influence on Linguistics," JMU 30, 1958,
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G.1530 : , "The Elliptic Sentence—Indian Theories," ALB 22, 1958, 25-31.
G1531 : David Seyfort Ruegg, "On the Term buddhiviparinäma and the Problem of
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G1540 :K. Kunjunni Raja, "Tätparya as a Separate vrtti," PAIOG 20.2, 1959,
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G1543 : Kalika Gharan Pandeya, "The Theory of iabdabrahman and sphota,"
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G1544 : Louis Renou, "La Theorie des temps du verbe d'après grammariens
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11,1962,260-268.
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G1693 : Johannes Bronkhorst "Yäska's Classification of nipâtas" ABORI 60, 1979

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G1711 : S.D. Laddu, "On the Earliest Handbooks on Derivation (prakriyâ) in
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G1712 : V.N. Jha, "The Structure of a Mbdabodha," DNSFV 1982, 77-82.
G1713 : M.S. Narayana Murti, "Divisions of Time According to Indian Gram-
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 NOTES
" G " references are to the Bibliography in this Volume, "RB" refers to Volume I:
Bibliography (Revised Edition) of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. Other abbre-
viations are identified in the Bibliography.

1 : HISTORICAL RESUME

1. Kumärila, Tantravärttika, translated by Ganganatha Jha (RBI55), p. 306.

2. Brhaddevatä, ed. A.A. Macdonneil, Harvard Oriental Series 5 (Cambridge,
Mass., 1904), 2.117.
3. Leonard Bloomfield, Language (New York, 1933), p. 5.
4. See, part two, summary 4.
5. Gautama, Nyäyasütra 2.2.65.
,6. Pänini, Astädhyayi 2.1.1: "samarthah padavidhih." See Kunjunni Raja
(G1556), pp. 154-156.
7. Yäska, Mrukta 1.1: "indriyanityam vacanam audumbaräyanah." See also
Brough (G8).
8. Yäska, Mrukta 1.2. The six stages are "a thing comes into existence, exists,
changes, grows, decays, and ceases to exist."
9. Krsna Tajurveda 6A.7.
10. Patanjali, Mahâbhâsya 1.1.1.
11. Bhartrhari, Väkyapadiya 2.347.
12. Nägesa Bhafta, Sphotaväda> concluding verse. See part two, summary, 45 on
Sphotaväda.
13. Thieme (G458), pp. 23-24.
14. Gardona, p. 273 (cf. abbreviation list in the bibliography).
15. See part two, summary 13.
16. See Gode (G1128).
17. Also called Vaiyâkaranamatonmajjinï. It is quoted under that title in Nägesa
Bhattà's Sphotaväda.
18. Ganganatha Jha (RB9473), p. 189.
19. Bhartrhari, Väkyapadiya 2.3. See also Kunjunni Raja (G355), pp. 165-170.
20. See Jagadisa's Sabdaiaktiprakäsikä.
21. This subsection was written by Shoryu Katsura.
22. For Dignäga's theory of anyäpoha and references to previous studies of the sub-
ject, see S. Katsura, "The Apoha Theory of Dignäga," Journal of Indian and Buddhist
Studies. 28.1 (1979): 16-20.
23. Masaaki Hattori, "The Sauträntika Background of the Apoha Theory," in
Buddhist Thought and Civilization: Essays in Honor of Herbert V. Guenther on His Sixtieth
Birthday (Emeryville, Calif., 1977), pp. 50-52.
24. Dignäga, Pramänasamuccayavrtti (Vasudharaksita's version) 70b8; M. Hattori,
"A Study of the Chapter on Apoha of the Mimämsäslokavärttika (II)" (in Japanese),
Memoirs of the Faculty ofLettersy Kyoto University 15, 1975: 25, n. 20.
25. Pramänasamuccayavrtti 169a2-4=83a6-8; See also Iyéngar (G795), pp. 147-149.
550 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

26. Apoddhäre padasyäyäm väkyäd artho vivecitah / Väkyärthah pratibhäkyo

yam tenädäv upajanyate."
27. John Ruskin, Sesame and Lilies unto This Last (London, 1952).

2: METAPHYSICS

1. Hiriyanna (RBI 1464), pp. 182-183.

2. Staal (G1662), p. 319.
3.. See, for example, the critique of modern language theories by Klaus Kloster-
maier in "Man Carries the Power of All Things in His Mouth," in Revelation in Indian
Thought, ed. H. Coward and K. Sivaraman (Emeryville, Calif., 1977), p. 8.
4. Hans-Georg Gadamer, "Man and Language," in Philosophical Hermeneutics,
trans. D.E. Linge (Berkeley, 1976), pp. 59-68.
5. Vak I (1958): 10-14.
6. Ibid., pp. 1-2.
7. Rg Veda 1.164.35 "brahmäyam väcah paramam vyomah."
8. As translated by K.A. Subramania Iyer (G721 ), p. 14.
9. See Murti (G1643), pp. 321-331.
10. Sri Aurobindo, The Secret of the Veda (Pondicherry, 1971 ), p. 8..
11. Bhartrhari, Vakyapadiya 1.11. .
12. See Frauwallner (RB12160).
13. See part two, summary 3, of Pänini's Astâdhyâyï, sütras 1.1.21, 1.1.65.
14. See, for example, the fine critical survey of modern biblical scholarship present-
ed by Harvey McArthur in his introduction to In Search of the Historical Jesus (New
York, 1969). The survey of form criticism is found on pp. 6-7. Although this analysis
focuses on biblical studies, the same points would generally apply to all modern
western literary criticism.
15. The Vedas also offer their own speculations regarding time. Time is described
in one hymn as the first god, existing in many forms. Time generates the sky and the
earth and sets in motion the past, the present, and the future. Time is the lord of all
and thevfather of Prajäpati. The universe is set in motion and sustained by time. Indeed,
in the Atharva Veda 19: 53 and 54, time {kâla) is celebrated as the primordial power
and unifying principle of the universe. In kâla lie the worlds and the sun. By. käla was
the universe urged forth. Käla is Brahman. "Time contains and conquers all, and still
continues onward" (W. Norman Brown, "Veda and Religion," in India and Indology,
ed. R. Rocher [Delhi, 1978] , p. 45). But the high place accorded kâla in the Atharva
Veda is seldom repeated in the Upanisads, and in the Svetâsvatara the view that every-
thing came out of time is regarded as a heretical doctrine (S.N. Dasgupta [RBI 1488, ]
66). In the Maitrl Upanisad, though, time is given the same high status as in the Atharva
Veda. In Maitri 6 : 15 we read :

There are, assuredly, two forms of Brahma: Time and the Timeless. That which
is prior to the sun is the Timeless (akäla), without parts (akâla). But that which
begins with the sun is Time, which has parts. Verily, the form of that which
has parts is the year. From the year, in truth, are these creatures produced.
Through the year, verily, after having been produced, do they grow. In the
year they disappear. Therefore the year, verily, is Prajäpati, is Time, is food,
is the Brahma-abode, and is Ätman. For thus has it been said :

Tis Time that cooks created things,

All things, indeed, in the Great Soul (mahätman)
In what, however, Time is cooked—
Who knows that, he the Veda knows.
NOTES 551

(Translation by R.E. Hume, The Thirteen Principal Upanisads [Oxford, 1968] , p. 434.)
As in the Atharva Veda, time is here given the highest status of being identified with
Prajâpati, but now also with Brahman and Atman. Verse sixteen goes on to describe
embodied Time as the great ocean of creatures, planets, and all things.
16. As translated by Peri Sarveswara Sharma (G738), p. 42.
17. Sastri (G706).
18. Subramania Iyer (G734).
19. G738, p. 50.
20. See Mahadevan (RB5466), pp. 236-251.
21. See Samkara, introduction to Brahmasütrabhäsya, trans. G. Thibaut (RB243),
3ff.
22. RB5466, p. 2.29.
23. An English translation of Heläräja's Tikä has been included by Peri Sarvesvara
Sharma in G738. The date indicated is the one proposed by Sharma, p. 12.
24. Bhartrhari, Väkyapadiya 3.9.62. See the translations in G738 and G748A.
25. K.A. Subramania Iyer's paraphrase of Heläräja's commentary on Väkyapadiya
3.9.62. See G748A, p. 54.
26. Väkyapadiya 1.142.
27. Ibid. 3.9.4. Translated by Subramania Iyer (G748A).
28. Ibid. 3.9.5.
29. Ibid. 3.9.23.
30. Ibid. 3.9.24. This balance, says Heläraja in his comment on 3.26, is Bhartrhari's
meaning of the term vivarta, which appears in Väkyapadiya 1.1 and 3.3.81.
31. Ibid. 3.9.74.
32. Ibid. 3.9.37.
33. Ibid. 3.9.41.
34. Ibid. 3.9.45, and Tika thereon.
35. Ibid. 3.9.46.
36. Ibid. 3.9.52.
37. Patanjali, Togasütra 3.13, translated by Rama Prasada (New Delhi, 1978), pp.
190ff.
38. Väkyapadiya 3.9.52.
39. Ibid. 3.9.53.
40. Ibid. 3.9.74.
41. Patanjali, Mahäbhäsya 4.2.3.
42. See introduction to G738, p. 37.
43. Potter (RB9446), pp. 91-93.
44. Ibid. .
45. See introduction to G738, p. 19.
46. See Subramania Iyer (G719), pp. 112-113.
47. svsi, p. 242.
48. Subramania Iyer, (G734), p. 58.
49. Sastri (G1428), 1980 ed., p. 82.
50. Väkyapadiya 3.9.46.
51. Ibid. 3.9.4.
52. Ibid. 3.9.74.
53. For a full analysis of the function of time see Coward (G777).
54. Gf. Klaus Klostermaier, cited in n. 3 above.
55. Subramania Iyer (G721), p. 119.
56. T.S. Eliot, Murder in the Cathedral (London, 1955), p. 44.
57. Väkyapadiya 1.142 with vrtti.
58. Ibid. 1.143, vrtti. See also ibid. 1.14.
552 ENCYCLOPEDIA OÊ INDIAN PÜILOSÖPHIES

59. Ibid. 1.14.

60. Sastri (G1428), 1980 ed., p. 85.
61. Väkyapadiya 1.120 and vrtti.
62. Ibid. 1.120 and vrtti.
63. Ibid. 1.5 and 1.14.
64. Ibid. 1.137.
65. Ibid. 1.89.
66. Subramania Iyer (G872), kärikäs 19-20.

3. EPISTEMOLOGY

1. See, for example, Russell Fraser, The Language of Adam (New York, 1977),
especially chapt. 4, "Mysticism and the Scientific Doom."
2. Ernst Gassirer, Language and Myth, trans. S.K. Langer (New York, 1953), pp.
8-9.
3. Väkyapadiya 1.123 as translated by T.R.V. Murti in his foreword to Coward
(G1700A), p. vii.
4. Murti, (G1643), p. 321.
5. Ibid., p. 322.
6. Datta (RB10134), pp. 27-28.
7. See Sämkhyakärikä 4, Sämkhyasutras 1.88, and Togasütras 1.7.
8. See Ganganatha Jha (RB9473), p. 80. Prabh^kara accepts only five pramänas.
9. See Dharmaräjädhvarindra, Vedäntaparibhäsä, trans. S. Suryanarayana Sastri
(RB6306), chaps. 1-6.
10. In Subramania Iyer (G721 ), p. 45.
11. Translation in Murti (G1643), p. 325.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid., p. 326.:,
14. Ibid.
15. The following discussion regarding the Platonic parallel with vyäkarana is based
on Murti (G1643), p. 327.
16. Saruadarsanasamgraha of Mädhava trans. E.B. Gowell and A.E. Gough, (London,
1892-1894), p. 219.
17. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 163.
18. Subramania Iyer (G872), karikä 19. Similar arguments are offered to show
how the progressively clearer perception cannot be attributed to defects of the senses
or memory through resemblance, p. 49.
19. Mahadevan (RB5466), p. 62.
20. Sastri (G706), p. 50.
21. Pandy (RB4131), pp. 400-427.
22. G872, sütra 20, pp. 51-52; and Väkyapadiya 1.88 and vrtti.
23. Ibid.
24. G872, sütra 24, p. 64. See also Subramania Iyer (G1445), in which he makes
clear that from the sphota viewpoint whatever distinction of degree or part is made in
an object must be done through a guna (quality or particular). For the grammarians
it is the guna and never the universal that serves to express degrees in objects. It should
also be noted that of the many possible ways of interpreting the universal, Bhartrhari
prefers the following. A movement like lifting the hand consists of a series of move-
ments. As these movements are transitory they cannot coexist and form a whole of
which they would be the parts and in which the universal of the movement of lifting
the hand would inhere. Now such a universal is more specific than the wider universal
 553
of movement in general. Although it inheres in each moment of movement, it is not
cognizable in them alone due to too much similarity between moments of lifting and
those of the moments of each movement, such as turning the hand. The moments of
each movement are the result of a special effort to make that movement, and they
are the substrata of the universal of that movement. But that universal cannot be
cognized until a series of moments has been cognized. One or two moments of move-
ment are not enough, but after a series of moments is cognized the cognition of the
universal inherent in each movement becomes clear. Lifting, for example, may be
identified, and other movements such as turning excluded. The process is similar in
the manifestation^ of sphofas. Each is manifested by a series of special efforts to utter
letters. One or two utterances of the series are not enough to eliminate other words
with similar sounds. But as the complete series of letters is cognized, the cognition of
the sphota or universal of the particular word is clearly perceived, and meaningful
usage of it in speech becomes possible. {Väkyapadlya 2.20-21 as interpreted by
Subramania Iyer [ G734] , pp. 168-169.)
25. Ibid.
26. Väkyapadlya, 1.52.
27. Moving beyond Sanskrit itself and into the world of languages, I would take
the universal error as referring to the necessity of going from the differentiated letters
(the error) to the whole sphota (meaning or ultimate reality). The fixed sequence
and form of differentiation for a particular word-sphota would only be a constant error
within each language (such as Sanskrit).
28. Väkyapadlya 1.85.
29. Sphotasiddhi, sütra 22.
30. Kaviraj (G1394), pp. 1-18 and 113-132.
31. K.A. Subramania Iyer's introduction to G872, p. 26.
32. Väkyapadlya 1.78-84. Among the analogies offered to explain the process,
Bhartrhari's favorite seems to be that the sounds leave impression seeds {samskära,
bhävanä, or by a), which, as they mature in the mind, are conducive to an increasingly
clear perception of the sphota—to which they finally offer a perfect "fitness" or identity.
A literal rendering oîyogyata could be "to fit in a frame"—the "fit" of the "matured'
series of letters into the "frame" of the sphota. See also the vrtti on Väkyapadlya 3.I.8.
33. The phrase "function of the mind" here is intended to indicate that pratibhä
is not a function of the ordinary senses of the buddhi stage of consciousness, but is
characteristic of the pre-buddhi or sabdatattva stage.
34. It should be clearly understood here that perfect perception of pratibhä, how-
ever valid in itself, remains outside the realm of pramäna (which is characterized by
sensory perception and discursive cognition). With regard to language, therefore, it is
sphota when manifested as speech that is-pramäna (and not sphota at the unified level
of pratibhä). The point made above, however, still stands. The cognition of sphota at
the level of either sabda pramäna or pratibhä is via direct perception, not via inference.
35. Sphotasiddhi, sütra 23, as translated by Subramania Iyer (G872), p. 60.
36. Samkara, Brahmasutrabhâsya, as translated in Thibaut (RB243), vol. 1, p. 210.
37. Väkyapadlya 1.142.
38. Ibid., 1,123.
39. The following summary depends mainly on Subramania Iyer's presentation
of Bhartrhari's position in G734, pp. 144-146.
40. Patanjali, Togasütra 2.53.
41. There is considerable debate in current scholarship over whether there should
or should not be a fourth level of language, para vàk. Bhartrhari himself seems to leave
open that possibility. The vrtti on Väkyapadiya 1.142 does quote among numerous other
passages Rg Veda 1.164.45, which refers to four levels of vac. Cardona, p. 302, seems to
554 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

contradict himself, suggesting four levels in the main text—pasyantl being divided into
two aspects-—but in the footnote observing "that Bhartrhri did not recognize an
absolute fourth level called para vac. 'supreme speech,' which was recognized by later
thinkers, especially in the Kashmir Saiva school of thought" (p. 369).

4: WORD MEANING

Î. See K. Kunjunni Raja, "Panini's Attitude Towards Laksanä," Adyar Library

Bulletin (1965) : 177-187.
2. Sawadarsanasamgraha of Mädhava, trans. E.B. Gowell and A.E. Gough (London
1892-1894, pp. 21 Off.
3. See Ghakravarti (G1402).
4. Patanjali, Mahâbhâsya 1.1.
5. Kumärila, Slokavarttika, sphotaväda section, verse 5.
6. Patanjali, Mahâbhâsya 1.4.109.
7. Ibid.
8. See Ghakravarti (G1402), p. 100.
9. Vâkyapadïya 1.44.
10. Ibid. 1.45-46.
11. Ibid. 1.47.
12. Ibid. 1.49.
13. Subramania Iyer (G721), p. 58.
14. Vâkyapadïya 1.1 and vrtti.
15. Subramania Iyer (G872), p. 2.
16. Ibid., p. 3.
17. Subramania Iyer (G1464), p. 124.
18. A summary of part of Mandana's answer to Kumärila in Mandana's Sphota-
siddhi, kärikä 3, as presented by Gaurinath Sastri in G706, p. 105.
19. Sphotasiddhi, kärikä 4.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Unlike the subsequent discussion, the preceding debate assumes no invisible
trace or samskafa. Kumärila holds that the last phoneme, helped by the more visible
going before of the other phonemes in the word, causes the understanding of meaning.
23. Subramania Iyer (G872), p. 14.
24. Sphotasiddhi, kârikâ 5, G872, p. 16.
25. Ibid.
26. Ibid., kärikä 6, G872, p. 16.
27. Ibid., G872, pp. 17-18.
28. Ibid., kârikâ 10, G872, p. 30.
29. Ibid., G872, p. 31.
30. Ibid., kärikä 11,G872, p. 34.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid., kärikä 18, G872, p. 44.
33. Subramania Iyer (G1464), p. 136.
34. Subramania Iyer's introduction to G872, p. 13.
35. Ibid., kärikä 20, and Vâkyapadïya 1.88 with vrtti.
36. It should be noted that no less a person than Samkara argued against the sphota
theory (in Brahmasütrabhäsya 1.3.28). See also the recent analysis of Samkara's objection
sphota in Herman (G1549). Samkara and Kumärila both base their criticism on
äcärya Upavarsa, and their objections are somewhat different from the debate between
Yacaspati and Mandana.
 555
37. This passage and the following ones are taken from the translation by S.S.
Suryanarayana Sâstri in G1414, reprinted in Collected Papers of S.S Suryanarayana Saslri
(Madras, 1961 ), p. 296.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid., p. 301.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid., p. 293.
43. See Subramania Iyer's introduction to G872, p. 17.
44. Sphotasiddhi, kärikä 24, G872, p. 64. See also Subramania Iyer (G1445), in
which he makes clear that from the sphota viewpoint whatever distinction of degree
or part is made in an object must be done through a guna (quality of particular).
45. Väkyapadiya 1.85. For more on this topic see chapter 3 part 2 of this introduction.

5. SENTENCE MEANING

1. See Sphotasiddhi, kärikä 23.

2. For detailed discussion see Kunjunni Raja (G355).
3. See Kunjunni Raja (G1556), pp. 154-156.
4. Kumärila, Slokavârttika.
5. See K. Kunjunni Raja, "The Role of Tätparya in Understanding the Sentence,"
in Ancient Indian Theories on Sentence Meaning (Poona, 1980 ).
6. Noan Chomsky, Language and Mind (New York, 1968), chap. 3.

NOTES TO SURVEY

1. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN VEDIC LITERATURE

1. Nägesa Bhatta has interpreted this verse as referring to the fourfold mani-
festation of väc into para, pasyantl, madhyamä, and vaikhari.

2. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENT IN YÄSKA'S Nirukta

1. See B. Bhattacharya, Tâska's Nirukta and the Science of Etymology (Calcutta,

1952) ; Siddheswar Varma, The Etymology ofTâska (Hoshiarpur, 1953) ; Kunjunni Raja
, (G696).
2. Thieme (G458), pp. 23-24.
3. Cardona, pp. 270-273.
4. "Bhävapradhänam äkhyätam, sattvapradhänäni nämäni.'5
5. "Sad bhävavikära, bhavantïti värsäyam'r jäyate 'sti viparinamate vardhate
paksîyate vinasyatîti."
6. "Präptakrama vis'esesu kriyä saiväbhidhiyate kramarüpasya samhäre tat
sattvam iti kathyate," Väkyapadiya 3.1.35.
7. "Pürväparibhütam bhävam äkhyätenäcaste."
8. "Krdabhihito bhäva dravyavad bhavati."
9. "Indriyanityam vacanam audumbaräyanah," Väkyapadiya 2.347.
10. Cf. Brough (G8).
11. "Nämänyäkhyätajäniti s'äkatäyano nairuktasamayas'ca; na sarväniti gärgyo
vaiyäkaranänäm caike," Nirukta 1.12.
12. "Bhävapradhänam äkhyätam, sattvapradhänäni nämäni."
556 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

3. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PÄNINI'S Astädhyäyi

1. Generally taken to be later than Yâska; but Thieme takes him to be earlier.
See the extended discussion summarized in Cardona.
2. "Sistah sabdesu pramänam."
3. "Lokavijfiänät siddham," see sutras 1.1.21, 1.1.65.
4. "Tad asisyam samjnäpramänatvät," sütra 1.2.53. "Siddhe sabdärthasam-
bandhe lokatah," Värttika.
5. "Avyutpanna prätipadika." See also the discussion in Yäska's Nirukta.
6. "Prätipadikavijfiänäcca Pänineh siddham / Unädayo vyutpannäni pràti-
padikäni."
7. "Arthaikatväd ekam väkyam säkänksam ced vibhäge syäd," Patanjali,
Mahäbhäsya 3.2AI.
8. See Kunjunni Raja (G355); also Devasthali (G327), pp. 206-215.
9. JSfyâsa on Käsikä, edited by S.G. Ghakravarti in G851, p. 423. See Brough
(G1478), pp. 28-29; also Staal (G1566), pp. 164-167. Näräyana Bhattatiri elucidates
this point in his Prakriyäsarvasva.
x10. Nägesa Bhatta discusses laksanä at length in his Manjüsä and says in the Parama-
laghumanjüsä that according to the grammarians there is no necessity to accept laksariä
as a separate function of words.

4. PHILOSOPHICAL ELEMENTS IN PATANJALI'S Mahäbhäsya

1. The Mlmämsakas take sabda to be the sound only, while to the grammarians
meaningfulness is an essential feature of a linguistic sign. See Mandana Mis'ra's
Sphotasiddhi, verse 3: "a sabda is the cause for creating the understanding of the
meaning" ("arthävasäyaprasavanimittam sabda isyate").
2. Mahäbhäsya 1.1.
3. Kumärila, Slokavärttika, sphotavâda section, verse 5.
4. See the discussion in chapter 5 of Bhartrhari. Among the followers of Pänini,
Väjapyäyana considered the meaning to be akrti or jäti, while Vyädi took it to be the
individual or dravya. Among other scholars of philosophy, the Mimämsakas took äkrti
to be synonymous With jäti, while the Nyäya school took it to be the structural form,
as distinct from the universal. Gf. Gautama, Nyäyasütra, "Jätyäkrtivyaktaas tu
padärthah."
5. Värttika 1 : "siddhe sabdärthasambandhe lokatah. . . . "
6. Mahäbhäsya 1 : "arthavanto varnäh. . . ."
7. Kätyäyana's värttika on 1.2.64: "dravyäbhidhänam vyädih" and "äkrtya-
bhidhänäd vaikam vibhaktau Väjapyäyanah."
8. "Jätyäkhyäyäm akasmin bahuvacanam anyatarasyam."
9. "Sarüpänäm ekasesa ekavibhaktau."
10. Mahäbhäsya 1.
11. "Pä.ninidarsane jätidravyau sabdenâbhidhîyete."
12. "Yasya gunäntaresvapi prädurbhavatsu tattvam na vihanyate tad dravyam"
(on 5.1.119).
13. On Pänini's sutra 1.4.109.
14. Mahäbhäsya 1.35.5.
15. Buddhau krtvä sarvas cestäh kartä dhiras tanvannitih. Sabdenärthänvacyän
drstvä buddhau kuryät paurväparyam."
16. "Dhvanih sphotas' ca sabdänäm dhvanis tu khalu laksyate Alpo mahäms' ca
kesämcid ubhayam tat svabhävatah." Also: "sphotah sabdah dhvanih sabdagunah."
NOTES 557

17. "Varnasya grahane hetuh prâkrto dhvanir isyate. Vrttibhede nimittatvam

vaikrtah samapadyate."
18. "Avasthitä varnä yaktus ciräciravacäd vrttayo visisyante."
19. Mqhäbhäsya 1.181.
20. "Krpo ro Iah," Pânini's sutra 8.2.18.
21. "Stanakesavatï strï syâl lomasah purusah smrtah. Ubhayor antaram yacca
tadabhâve napumsakam."
22. "Na vaiyâkaranais sakyam laukikam lifigam ästhätum."
23. "Samstyänavivaksäyäm strï, prasavavivaksäyäm pumän ubhayavivaksäyäm
napumsakam."

5. BHARTRHARI

1. Cf. Frauwallner (RB12599), pp. 134-135.

2. The title Vakyapadlya could have referred originally to the second of the three
kändas (chapters or books) that make up the work. It is definite that about A.D. 1000
yäkyapadlya was generally regarded as applying only to the first two books; Trikändi
was the term that included all three books. The use of the title Vakyapadlya to speak
of even the third book, the Padakända or the Praklrnaka (Miscellany) seems to be no
older than the sixteenth century (cf. Aklujkar [ G733] , pp. 547-555). It is this use
that is most common at present. The first two books, according to one manuscript
tradition, consist of verses (kärikäs) as well as a prose commentary (vrtti). The other
manuscript traditions have only the kärikäs, or kärikäs accompanied by a prose commen-
tary (tlkä) evidently authored by someone other than the kärikä author. A long line
of writers in the Sanskrit tradition has consistently held that the Vrtti too is Bhartrhari's
work and is an integral part of the Vakyapadlya (cf. Aklujkar [ G743] . In their under-
standing the reference of the title Vakyapadlya is not confined to the kärikäs. For many
modern students of Bhartrhari's works, however, that title stands for the kärikäs,
primarily as well as exclusively. The Vrtti is not generally viewed as included when
references such as "Vakyapadlya 1.5" are made.
3. The word nitya is not intended here in the sense "eternal" (as in "God is
eternal"). Even as signifying "permanent" it has two or three shades of meaning,
depending on the theoretical context. See'Aklujkar (G735), p. 82.
4. See the preceding note.
5. Gf. Aklujkar (G762), p. 12, n. 12.
6. When an expression is mentioned, as distinct from when it is used, it is thought
to convey its own form as meaning. A theoretical distinction is made between an
expression and its own form in cases of mention, and the former is said to be the
signifier and the latter the signified; that is, when self-referring or quoted expressions
are compared with the expressions having an external reference, the distinction is not
seen in the mode of employment ("use-mention") of the two, but in what they
convey—what the outcome is.
7. The concept varnasphota, as understood by the Päniniyas, differs from "pho-
neme" as generally understood by linguists in one important respect. A, a, and a—that
is, short (hrasva), long (dlrgha), and prolonged (pluta) a—are regarded as different
realizations of varnasphota a; in other words, the vamasphota here is an abstracted or
generalized common factor form.
8. The implication is that linguistic units are assumed to be individuals or parti-
culars in the discussion summarized in the preceding paragraph. One of Bhartrhari's
commentators (Punyaräja/Heläräja, at 2.1-2, 19, 39-40) systematizes the sphota view
of linguistic expressions as follows: (a) bähya sphota: individuals (vyakti) and universals
558 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

(jäti); (b) abhyantara sphota: sabdatattva. This systematization is confirmed by the

sequence of statements in 1.84—97.
9. The foregoing interpretation of 1.148-154 is conjectural, for the passages
do not contain an explicit statement to this effect: "The following/preceding is the
justification of the claim that knowledge or sästra-hased use of grammatical expressions
can lead to merit." I have assumed that such a statement was intended by Bhartrhari,
because the context (1.144-147 and 1.158-174) is one of pointing out the importance
of grammar and because the immediately following verses (1.155-157) are concerned
with the relation between sädhu sabda and dharma. It is, however, possible that 1.148-157
are not at their original place in the Brahmakärida.
10. Anvitäbhidhäna-vädins of the later works.
11. The last three correspond, respectively, to madhyamä, pasyantï, and parapasyantï-
rüpa. Speech (vaikharî) is marked by an observable presence of breath and sequence
in both its upämsu and non-upämsu varieties.
12. As will be apparent from this summary, the link among verses 112-115 is not
clear.
13. There is some overlap in the list that follows by the very nature of the matter
involved and because the list evolved through the efforts of generations of thinkers.
For the latter reason, there is also an element of variation in the understanding or
definition of terms involved. For example, prakarana and sämarthya obviously had wider
meanings in addition to their specific meanings determined on the basis of other factors
included in the list(s).
14. The Vaiyäkaranas understand dravya in two senses: first, the everlasting sub-
stance that underlies all transient physical shapes; and, second, what a demonstrative
pronoun (equivalent to "variable" of modern logic) can refer to. The second chapter,
a summary of which begins at this point, expands on the first sense. The second sense
is given in chapter 4.
15. In the first chapter of the third book, all expressions are said to refer, in the
final analysis, to Existence. This Existence is then viewed as a universal pervading
everything. Here in the second chapter a similar conclusion is reached, but the Exis-
tence is said to be a particular. Thus, there are two currents of thought, roughly
corresponding to ontological reduction (a) to classes or (b) to individuals in recent
western philosophy.
16. Most, if not all, common sentences would be logically problematic (internally
inconsistent) if the words in them were viewed as referring to actually existing entities
(for example, in the case of "sprout is born," one could ask: How is the sprout said
to be born when it existed? ). Explanations of how these sentences are possible vary.
One involves distinction between reference and sense (or meaning). Another advocates
acceptance of another kind of (verbal or linguistic) existence. The third rests on the
observation that words cannot refer to entities in their entirety—in all of their aspects—
or purely in themselves. The following summary alludes to this variety of explanations.
17. The intention behind calling the arising of an effect a miracle could be of two
sorts: either the becoming of the effect cannot be expressed without giving rise to
unintended implications—-without realizing the inadequacy of language, as in the
description of a miracle—or we cannot determine the point of transition—the exact
moment or phase in which the cause ceases to exist and the effect comes into being.
The transition seems to take place in a flash like a miracle. Heläräja (3.3.81 ) is aware
of both interpretations, and there is contextual support for both. Verses 3.3.78-80 and
82-86 suggest that Bhartrhari located the logical problems of cause-and-effect relation-
ship in the expression of that relationship and in being not aware of general truths
about language's relation to reality in understanding that expression. In other words,
he seems to have dissolved the problems rather than solved them. Thus, the first
NOTES 559

interpretation is contextually justified. Support for the second interpretation can be

seen in the adjectives abhägam, "partless," and akramam "sequenceless," which are
used in 3.3.81.
18. The entity need not be explicity qualified. All that is necessary is a presupposi-
tion that x can be qualified if necessary (bhedyatvena vivaksita). Second, qualification
is to be understood as including predication, even of the simple type such as "x is/
exists." The present definition allows us to view universals and the like as particulars
and permits characterization of all word meanings as particulars or individuals. Thus,
all words are said to refer to dravya in two ways: the one stated in chapter 3.2 (see the
preceding note) and the one stated here in chapter 3.4.
19. This excelling can also be in such negative respects as being disliked, being
despised, and so on (for example, kutsitatara, "more censured of the two").
20. The intended characterization of sädhana or käraka should be clear from the
summary of the following chapter. The important points to remember are, first, that
they are viewed as supports of the action as expressed in the sentence', second, that their
actual relation to the action as seen in the physical world does not matter—what
matters is the capacities in which the speaker places them—and, third, that the action
mentioned in this context is not necessarily physical, observable action characterized
by a series of moments; even the meaning of "is" or "exists" is action.
21. As Heläräja (p. 209.12-13) observes here, while the definitions of sädhana,
kriyä, and so on, like those of the preceding dravya and guna, are established by studying
Päninian rules, the characterization of space, time, and so on is a result of a direct
attempt to understand their nature; the rules do not provide clues as in the other
cases. For Bhartrhari, äkäsa does not seem to be any positive, physical entity. It is
nowhere distinguished from dis in his writings. He seems to have used the word con-
ventionally in the sense "visible, perceptible space," which, in view of his final rejection
of space as an actually existent entity, ultimately comes to mean "space that is generally
thought to be perceptible."
22. Vaisesikas, according to Heläräja, pp. 239.3-4, 243.9.
23. (a). Heläräja (p. 315.18) labels this view in. verse 107 as svasiddMnta,
"Bhartrhari's own thesis," according to the available editions. But the view in verse
109 is also svasiddhânta, according to Heläräja (p. 316.12). (b) There are no words
such as atha vä, kesämcit, or anyesäm, indicating paksäntara, in verses 108 and 109. That
these verses express views different from the one contained in 106-107 is something
one has to accept on the authority of Heläräja, who, in turn, seems to have (rightly)
noticed that the wording of 108-109 indicates different philosophical assumptions.
24. The assumption here is that an agent must really exist to appear as an agent
in a sentence. In the view expressed in verse 105, real existence is not held to be neces-
sary; a tentative, imagined existence is held to be sufficient. Among the thinkers
advocating necessity of "real existence" there are two groups: one (probably Sämkhya)
locates such real existence in the cause, maintaining that cause and effect are essen-
tially identical; the second explains real existence as existence as a universal, clearly
implying that the universals are real (as in the Nyäya view) and beyond question
(which, of course, is not the case, as the questions of Buddhist logicians show). Although
Bhartrhari can accommodate these views (three in all: buddhyavasthänibandhana or
vivaksänibandhana, existence; satkärya; and jätivyakti) as well as the upacärasattä (secon-
dary, derivative existence) view expressed in 3.3.45, his first preference is the sabdärtho
9
rtha view, expressed in 3.7.109 110. Meaning {sabdärtha) and reference {vastvartha or
bähyärtha) are to be distinguished. In understanding usage, attention to what is reflected
in language is sufficient. Whether the entity spoken of actually exists (a worthwhile
concern if the purpose of inquiry is something else ) need not be considered to account
for usage, such as "As sprout comes into being." For words carrying out denotation in
 560 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

sentences like this, all existent entities are no different from nonexistent entities. To
put the point differently, it is improper to see contradictions in a sentence by asking
questions like: "Did the sprout exist before coming into being? If it did, how can it
newly come into being? If it did not, how can it perform the action of coming into
being?" The use of the word "sprout" is in no way predicated on there being an actual
sprout or a referent. The sentence with "sprout" as the subject can proceed as long as
there is meaning or sense (sabdärtha) for "sprout."
25. In the original, verses 109-110, the observation about language (specifically,
denotation) is said to hold good also in the case of prajnä or buddhi, "intellect" (speci-
fically, a cognition reflecting an entity). Just as denotation implies acceptance of (some
kind of) existence, cognition implies conceding (some kind of) existence. I have left
out this mention of intellect and cognition here in order not to obscure the present
discussion and also because language and intellect turn out to be ultimately identical
in Bhartrhari's philosophy.
26. (a) Actions such as putting the pot on the stove, pouring water into the pot,
adding rice to the water, lighting the stove, and more, are subsumed under the one
action denoted by "cooks." See summary of the eighth chapter (Kriyäsamuddesa), (b)
Heläräja points out that this way of accounting for "A sprout comes into being" differs
from the first way (a), in that here the identity of cause and effect is based on a feature
of usage called upacära ("extended application" of a verbal root like "cook" to cover
subsidiary actions leading to cooking), while in (a) the identity of cause and effect
is held to be factual (västaua).
27. The examples indicated by Bhartrhari are: "yavägü müträya sampadyate,"
. "suvarnapindah kundale bhavatah," "brähmanäh samgho bhavati," "brähmanäh
samghibhavanti," "tvad-bhavasi," and "räjan aräjä sampadyase/bhavasi." To them
Heläräja adds: "ksiram dadhi Sampadyate," "bïjad ankuro jäyate," "yavägvä mütram
jäyate," "mahadbhütas candramäh," and "mahadbhüta brähmani." The discussion
of these examples is determined to some extent by the peculiarities of the Sanskrit
language. For this reason, as well as to indicate the relationship of the point here with
the preceding, I have preferred simpler examples.
28. At the beginning of this section, a verse giving the definition of apädäna is
expected, as in the case of sections on other kärakas in this Samuddesa. But the first
statement we see at present in it deals with the varieties of apädäna. It seems, therefore,
that at least one verse has been lost in the known manuscripts. The form of the lost
verse is likely to have been "apâye yad udâsînam calam vä yadi väcalam / dhruvam
evatadävesät tad apädänam ucyate," that is, essentially the same as the verse quoted
by Bhoja (Srngäraprakäsa, chapter 4), Haradatta (Padamanjan 1.4.24), Bhattoji Diksita
(Sabdakaustubha 1.4.24), and others.
29. As the last example indicates, the action of moving away associated with the
concept of apädäna is not necessarily the actual or physical action of moving away. In
conformity with the Vaiyäkaranas säbda (conceptual or semantic, as distinct from
artha, actual, physical) concept of action (see summary of the Kriyäsamuddesa, book 3,
section 8 instances in which the movement is only imagined or intellectually entertained
are also relevant here.
30. Cf. Joshi (G1194) pp. 29, 39-40, etc.
31. Swaminathan (G780), pp. 3-4.
32. "Dvau sabdätmanau nityah karyas ceti kaiseid nityä iti drstah kaiscid anitya
iti. Athavä jätir vyaktis ceti athavä sphoto dhvanis ca," ibid. p. 13.
33. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 171.
. 34. Swaminathan (G780), p. 28; also Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 74,
35, "Säksät pratipatter anumânapratipattir gariyasï,"
NOTES 561

9. MANDANA MISRA

1. In this logical argument, it seems clear that Kumärila's attempt to identify

§abda with the uttered phonemes is effectively discredited by the reasoning of Mandana,
who at the same time has vindicated the identification of Sabda with sphota. Although
the logical groundwork has largely been completed, Mandana still has to describe in
detail exactly how sabda as sphota may be comprehended using only ordinary memory
traces of the phonemes to reveal the sphota. He must also show the sphota to be not a
mere postulation but a perceivable reality, otherwise much of his logical argument
simply collapses. These tasks he undertakes in kärikäs 18-19 of the Sphotasiddhi.

10. HELÄRÄJA

1. See Subramania Iyer (G734), pp. 39-40.

2. Gf. G709, G747.
3. Aklujkar (G750), pp. 165-188.
4. Ibid.
5. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 38.

12. PUNYARÂJA

1. Subramania Iyer (G734), p. 41.

13. KAIYATA

1. Cf. Sarma (G907).

2. "Yathottaram muninäm prämänyam" sütra 1.1.29.
3. "Munitraya matenädyatva sädhvasädhu pravibhägah," sütra 5.1.21.
4. Kaiya^a's views on different problems connected with language are found
scattered in different parts of the commentary. Many of them have been noted and
discussed in Konda Bhatta's Bhüsana(sära).

21. SES A CINTÄMANI

1. Gf. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Samskrta vyâkarana-Mstra kà itihäsa (Sonipat,

1973), vol. 1, pp. 418-419.

28. ANNAMBHATTA

1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyäkarana-eästra kä itihäsa {Sonipat, 1973),

vol. 1, p. 422.
2. P.P.S. Sastri's introduction to G587.

32. &IVARÄMENDRA SARASVATÏ

1. Theodor Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit

Works and Authors, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, pp. 718, 440?
562 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

33. (SESA) GAKRAPÄNI (DATTA)

1. Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyakarana-Mstra kä itihäsa (Sonipat, 1973),

vol. l , p p . 540-541.
2. Gf. New Catalogus Catalogorum, vol. 3, p. 275a, and Mimamsaka, Sanskrta
vyäkarana-£ästra, pp. 487-495.

35. NÏLAKANTHA SUKLA

1. See New Indian Antiquary 5 (1942) : 177-183; also Journal of the Tanjore Sarasvati
Mahal Library (1955 1956).

37. KONDA (OR KAUNDA) BHATTA

1. See volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed.,

p. 387.
2. Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts of the Adyar Library, vol. 9, no. 575.
3. Volume 1 of this encyclopedia, Bibliography of Indian Philosophies, 2d ed., p. 422.
4. The summary of this section was prepared through consultation of the disserta-
tion of Gune ( G i l 97).
5. The summary of this section is based on the unpublished dissertation of
Deshpande (G1196).

40. TlRUMALA YAJVAN

1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyäkarana-iastra ka itihäsa (Sonipat,

1973), vol. 1, pp. 413ff.

42. SADÄSIVA

1. See Yudhisthira Mimamsaka, Sanskrta vyakarana-Mstra kä itihäsa (Sonipat,

1973), vol. 1, pp. 416-417.

45. NÄGES*A (OR NÄGOJI BHATTA)

1. For a relative chronology of his works see Gode, (RB6813); also P.V. Kane,
History of Dharmaeästra Volume One (Poona 1930), 453-456.

57. ÄSÄDHARA BHATTA

1. Shah, RB4735.

66. SATÄRÄ RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA GAJENDRAGADAKAR

1. B.N.K. Sharma, A History of the Dvaita School of Vedänta and Its Literature (Bombay,
1961 ), vol. 2, p . 358; Theodor Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register
of Sanskrit Works and Authors, 3 pts. (Wiesbaden, 1962), pt. 1, p. 500.
 CUMULATIVE INDEX

References are to pages unless preceded by "G", in which case the reference is to
numerical entries in the Bibliography. This cumulative index combines indices
of names, titles, and topics into one alphabetized guide. Abbreviations used are the
following:

a = article
b = book]j
d = dissertation
e = edition
t = translation

Abegg, Ernst a: G1391 —consciousness. See consciousness

äbhäsa. See reflection —eternality. See eternal, absolute
abhäva. See absence Acaksariaviveka (of Ràjiva âarman) 530
ABHAYAGANDRA (ÄGÄRYA) (1329) ÄGÄRYA DÏKSITA 239
484 AGGÄN DÏKSITA 239
ABHAYANANDIN (750) 17-18, 474 accent (svara) 15, 149, G185, G199,
abhidhä. See primary meaning G298, G324, G397, G457A, G1367,
abhihitänvaya (verbal comprehensive theo- G1580, G1584, G1594
ry) 9-10, 66, 92, 98 VedicG117, G1420
ABHINAVAGUPTA (1014) 28, 91, 193, accomplisher (uddesya) 330
476 accusative case 259, 272, G1461, G1519,
ABHINAVA KALIDÄSA (1750) 371, G1520
507 Acharya, K. G. a: G366
ABHINAVA NRSIMHÄSRAMA (1630) Acharya, Mrityunjay a: G16
496 Acharya, Narayana Ram e : Gl 167
abhinnarüpa. See adjective Acharya, Ramananda a: G1611
ABHIRÄMA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA (1500) Achyatan, Mavelikara b : G493
487 action {kriyâ) 168-70, 196-97, 256-58,
abhivyakti. See revelation 261-62, 264, 268, 337, 559, G1477
Abhyankar, Kashinath Vasudev 128. means to (sädhana) 25, 163-68, 262
a: G242, G322, G519, G573, G726, miraculous course of (atadbhütavrtti)
G1215, G1217, G1502, G1517, G1563, 161, G748
G1594, e: G536, G781, G858, G1331, activity [pravrtti) 169
b:G1546 activity {rajas) 44-45, 120, 275
abhyanujnâ. See permission .activity (spanda) 328
abhyasa. See practice AGYUTÄNANDA SÄSTRI (1963) 517,
ablative (apädäna) 168, 270, 337, 338, 560 e: G168
absence {abhäva) 54, 127, 149, 288, 334, AGYUTA PISHAROTI (1610)494
G1683 ÄDENNA517
absolute G1532. See also Brahman adhikarana. See locative
564 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

adhisthâna. See basis Aklujkar, Ashok 123-73, 179, 193, 201,

adhiyajna. See ritualistic interpretation of 559, 563, a: G731, G733, G736, G741,
the Veda G743, G750, G762, G764, G765, G769,
ädhunika. See technical term G774, G782, G806, G1607, G1665,
adhyqsa. See superimposition d: G735
adhvan. See path of being äkrti. See configuration
Ädityas 104 aksara. See syllable
adjective (abhinnarüpa) 292, G1571 AKSAYASÜRI 371
Adredos, F. R. fr: G1486 âlambana. See supporting object
adrsta 146, 186 Alamkära literature 239
Advaita Vedänta 20, 41-43, 54, 56-57, 59- Alamkärasarvasva (of Ruyyaka) 203
60, 82, 2.16, 239-40, 255, 287, 305, 341, alamkärasöstra, Älamkärikäs 31, 83, 91-2,
369-71, 375, 397, G790, G809 240
Aduaitaviveka (of Asädhara Bhatta) 375 älätacakra. See fire-wheel
Advayasiddhi (ofHeläräja) 193,475 Al-George, Sergiu a: G142, G212, G228,
adverb G1632 G243, G367, G491, G1567, G1608,
Adyar Library 211, 240 G1612
aesthetic experience 32-33 Allen, William Sidney a: G132,b: G1478,
ägama. See scripture, tradition G1547
agent (kâraka) 269-70, 336-37 alphabet G1467
(kartr) 98, 16-167, 255-60, 268,- 559, AMARAGANDRA (1250) 481
G259, G324, G1627 Amoghavarsa I G883
prompting agent, see prompter (Sabdänusäsana) Amoghavrtti (by &akat-
reflexive agent 268 äyana) 17, 474, G884, G890, 476
Agni 104-5 —Nyäsa (of Prabhäcandra) 476
Agrawala, Vasudev Sharan a: G95, Gl 12, Amrtatarangini (of Ksirasvämin) 476
G468, G469, G472, G572, G577, G1473, analogy. See comparison
b : G476, G485 ÄNANDADATTA 518
agreement [anvaya) G1579 ÄNANDAPÜRNA VIDYÄSÄGARA
and difference (anvayavyatireka) 146, _ (1350) 484
275,290 ANANDA SIDDHÄNTAVÄGISA 518
agriculture 12 ÄNANDAVARDHANA 8, 12, 28-32, 66,
Aindraschool 13, Gl, G5, G6, G7 83, 91
Aitareya Brähmana 234, G1375 ANANTA518
ajahaisvärtha 279-80 ANANTA BHATTA 518
äjänika. See permanence of word ANANTÄGÄRYA (1900) 23, 518
AJITASENA ÄGÄRYA 518 ANANTÄGÄRYA of Musarapakkam
äkänksä. See expectancy (1906) 514
äkära. See form ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRIN
•ökäia 162, 168 (1750)507
akhandapada. See sphota ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRI, P. S.,
akhandavâkya. See sphota See P. S. ANANTANÄRÄYANA SÄS-
äkhyäta. See verb TRI
Äkhyätacandrikä (of BhattaWlla ) 530 ANANTA SÜRI 518
—Kriyàkoêa (of Rämacandra) 530 Ananthanarayana, H. S. a: G238, G1609,
Äkhyätarthacandrikänirriaya (of ârîkrçna Bha- b : G350
tta Maunin) 506 änantya. See infinity
Äkhyataväda (of Raghunätha Siromani) Andhra G1635
—Arthanirriaya (of Jayakrsna Maunin) Artekamanyapadärthasütravicära (of Udayan-
361,367 karaNänapäthaka) 509
Äkhyätavyäkarana (of Vangasena) 481 Anekärthasamgraha (of Hemacandra ) 203
Äkhyätavyäkhyäna (of Visvesvara Tarkä- angädhikära G1687
cärya) 534 angirasa 30
INDEX 565
anipsitakarman 269 Arapura, John G. 103, a: G1629
aniwacaniya. See indescribable architecture 12
anityasphotavâda G1434 Arora, Sudarshan Kumari a: G618,
ANNAMBHATTA (1540) 22, 223, 237, d:G629
249, 313, 489, 561 artha. See meaning; See also purpose
antaryämin. See inner controller arthaikatva. See unity of purpose
anubandha G149, G417, G296, G619 arthâpûtti. See presumption
Anubandhakharidanavâda (of Dayäsamkara)Arthasamgraha (of Srideva Pandita) 533
520 Arthasamgraha (of Vaidyanätha Paiya-
ANUBHÜTI SVARÜPÄGÄRYA (1270) gunda) 505
20, 481-82 arthaväda. See supplementary description
Anuhyasara (of Varendra Gampahattiya Arthavatsütraväda (of Manyudeva) 387,
Mänasarman) 534 509
anumäna. See inference artisans G234
anuvâda 25 Aryavaraguru, S.P.S. Jagannathaswamy
wuvrtti G\20 e: G1067
Anvayadîpikâ (of Devadatta) 520 ÄSÄDHARA BHATTA (1770) 23, 375,
anvayavyatireka. See agreement and diffe- 507, 562
rence äsatti. See continuity
anvitäbhidharta(väda) 9-10, 91-2, 98, 558 asatya. See unreal
aoristG1392 Asiatic Society Library of Calcutta 207
apabhramêa G804 Asoka G504
apadâna. See ablative aspect (upagraha) 173, G1494
ÄPADEVA (1650) 499 äerayäsiddhi. See fallacy of unestablished
Apäriiniyapramäriatä (of Näräyana Bhatta- locus
tiri) 22, 497 association of word meanings {samsarga-
Aparavisayapramänäni (of Kavi Vallabha)525 maryädä) 10, 98, 125, 161, 284, 304, 330,
apasabda 321-22 333,340,344
Apaêabdanirâkarana (of Jagaddhara ) 484 Aslàdhyâyï (of Pänini) 4, 14, 16, 38, 86,
apaväda. See exception 113-17, 257, 322, 441-54, 550, 556
äpeksabuddhu See enumerative cognition —Mitäksara (of Annambhatta) 237,489
APISÄLI 440 —Prakâsa (of Appayya Diksita) 240,
Apisälisiksä (pf Apisäli) 440 507
apoddhàra. See meaning, abstracted Commentary (of Sivarämendra Saras-
apoha (exclusion of others) 6, 27, 66, 125, vatï) 245, 508
549 —Värttikas (of Kätyäyana). See Varttikas
—pariccheda 28 —Laghubhasya (author unknown) 459
APPAN NAINÄRYA (1510) 487 —Mahâbhâsya (of Patanjali). See Mahâ-
APPASÜRI (1730) 504 bhâsya
APPAYYA DIKSITA 518 —Vrtti G542
Appayya Diksita, grandfather of Nilakan- —Kâsikâ (of Jayâditya and Vamana ).
tha Diksita 373 See Käsikä
Appayya Diksita, author of Päninisütra- Commentary (of Dharanîdhara) 509
prakasa 353, 507 Commentary (of Käsinätha) G26
APPAYYA DIKSITA I (1585) 239-40, —Vrtti (of Mädhava) G35
397 —TattvaprakâHkâ (of Gangädatta Säs-
APPAYYA DÏKSITÀ III (1670) 500 tri) 516, 521
appearance (vivarta). See manifestation —Vrtti (of Jayanta Bhatta) 475
application (pravrttinimitta) 294 —Prakirçaprakâsa (of Heläräja) 475, 551
apposition 185 —Rüpävatära (ofDharmakïrti). SeeRupâ-
aprasastya. See impropriety vatära
apürva 74-9, 164, 184, 213, 265-67, 300, Commentary (of Govardhana) 478
344 —Durghatävrtti (of Saranadeva) 480
566 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

—Bhäsävrtti 480 / Athalekar, S. L. a: G294

Commentary (of Srstidharäcärya) Atharva Veda 40, 105-6, 550
G969 Athavale, R.B. a: G1465
—Prakriyâkaumudï (of Rämacandra). atidesasütra. See extension rule
See Prakriyâkaumudï ätman. See seif
—Siddhântakaumudl (of Bhattqji Dïk- atom 148
sita). See Siddhântakaumudl aucitya. See suitability ,
—Vrttisamgraha (of Rämacandra) 505 AUDAMBARÄYANA 10, 13, 68, 110,
—Pradïpa or Eabdabhüsaria (of Näräyana 123, 342, 440
Sudhi) 507 AUDAVRAJI 440
—Mitävrttyarthasamgraha (of Udayan-Aufrecht, Theodor 393, 561. a:G29, G432,
kara Nänapäthaka) 509 G434, G1040, b:G364
—Vrtti (of Gokulacandra) 510 Auktika (of Kulamandana Süri) 485
—Bhâsya (of Dayänanda Sarasvatï) 511 Auktika (of Somaprabhä) 533
—Ghandaprakâêa (of Gangädhara Kavi- Auktika (of Udayadharma or Dharma-
râja) 512 süri) 486
Commentary (of Devïdin) 512 —Commentary (of Harsakülagani)
Commentary (of Jïvarâma Sarman) 489
512 —Väkyaprakäsavarta 497
—Bhäsyaprathamavrtti (of Brahmadatta aum 37, 68, 106
Jijfiasu) 517 (Sri) Aurobindo (Ghose) 37-8, 550
—Süd (of Cudämisra) 519 autpattika. See original relation of word to
—Vnti (of Datta Räma Bhatta) 520 meaning
—Laghu {vrtti ) vivrti (of Devasahäya ) avadhi. See limit
520 (King) Avantivarman 28
Commentary (of Hari Pandita) 523 ävararta. See mâyâ, obscuring
Commentary (of Mânalur Vïrarâgha- avasthâ. See phase
väcärya) 527 avidyâ. See ignorance
•—Pradïpa or' Sabdabhüsaya (of Närä- Avinlta. See Durvinita
yana) 528 Avyayakosa (of Dvärakanätha Nyäyabhü«
—Vyâkarariadipikâ (of Oram Bhatta) 528 sana) 513
—Tippanï (of Sana tana Tarkäcärya) Avyayärtha (of Dayänanda Sarasvati) 511
532 Avyayârtha (of Harikrsna) 523
—-Pâijinisutravyâkhyâ (of Vîrarâghavâ- Avyayärtha (ofRädhakrsnaGosvämin) 529
cârya) 535 Avyayärthakosa
Astâdhyâyï-Dhâtupâtha (of Pänini) 14, 19, —Manjarï (of Rämarsi ) 531
113, G58, G59, G210, G236, G239, Avyayärthalahan (of Devakïnandana) 520
G240, G392 Avyayârthanirriaya (of Käluräma Sästrin)
—Ksïrataranginï (of Ksirasvämin) 476 514
—Sabdïkàbharaua (of Hariyogin Sailâ- Avyayärthapradipikä (of Yatïs'a) 535
väcärya) 478 Avyayasabdavrtti (of Trilocana) 534
—Madhavïyadhâtuvrtti (of Sayana) 484 Avyayavrtti (of Brahmadatta) 514
—Târàvalî (of Krsnasudhi) 526 Ayachit, S. M. a:Gl51, G156
Astadhyäyisütrakosa (of Laksmanârâyana
Vyäsa) 527 Bahulikar, . Saudamin a:G310, G319,
ästika. See orthodox G1568, d:G293
astronomy (jyotisa) 12, 107 Bahuvrihyarthavicära (of Udayankara Näna-
Asubodha (of Räma Kihkära Sarasvatï) päthaka) 510
530 bâhyârtha. See reference
Asubodhavyäkararia (of Täränätha Tarkavä-Bakre, M. Gangadhara 216, 268
caspati) 512 Bala, Indud:G360
AsVins 104 Bala (ka) bodha (of'Narahari) 528
Asyavämiya hymn 37, 103-4 BÄLACANDRA SÄSTRI 514, e:G1086
ÎNDEX 567

BÄLA KRSNA PANCOLI 24, 417, 516 Bhänuji Dïksita 241, 319
BÄLAKRSNA &ARMÄ YOGI 513 BHARADVÄJA 440
BÄLAMBHATTA. See VAIDYANÄTHA Bharadvaja, Damodara Sastri e:G433,
PAIYAGUNDA G849
BÄLARÄMA 518 Bharadvaja, Gangadhara Sastri e:Gl 277
Bälasarman, son of Nägesa Bhatta 323 Bharadvaja lineage 239
BÄLASÄSTRIN RÄNADE 511 Bhärata28, 30-31
Balasubrahmanyam, M. D. a:G163, BHÄRATA MALLIKA (1836) 493, 510
G185, G198, G199, G270, G291, G292, BHÄRATA MISRA (1550) 22, 231-35,
G320, G351, G375, G379, G619, 488
G1584, G1595, G1596, d:G213 BHARTRHARI (530) 6-7, 10-13, 17-18,
Bälävabodha (of Dämodara Sarman ) 519 22, 26-29, 36, 38, 40-62, 68-70, 77, *82-
Bälavahodha (ofKäsyapa) 18,480 87, 93-95, 107, 110, 118-76, 181-82,
Bali, Surya Kant b:G1130, d:G1129 193-97, 203, 231, 242, 270, 286-89, 293,
Ballantyne, James R. b:G1442, e:G521, 295, 297, 307, 323-31, 334, 342, 476-81,
et:G1148 557-60 . * •
Banaras 215, 237, 241, 247, 255, 357, 399 {Astâdhyâyî) Bhäsäurtti (of Purusottama-
Bandhu, Visva b:G308 deva) 203-9, 480 •
Bandini, Giovanni a:G776 —Commentary (of Srs^idharacarya)
Bandyopadhyay, Pratap a:G1637 533
Banerji, Priyatosh a:G133 BHÄSKARA 518
Banerji, Suresh Chandra e:Gl 132, G1293 Bhaskara, Paramesvarananda Sarma
Bannerji, S. R. 203-4 e:G1100
Barlingay, S. S. a:Gl559 Bhat, M. S. 389. a:G18, G200, G744,
Barua, Anandaram e:G9l5 G1064, G1218, G1291
Basavaraju, G. N. a:G964 Bhate, Saroja V. a:G407, d:G258
basis {prakrti, garia) 15, 113 Bhatnagar, Veena d:G1630
{adhisthäna) 216 Bhatta, Govinda Parasürama e:G997
nominal (pratipädika). See nominal stem Bhätta Mimämsä 6, 25-26, 66, 89-93,
verbal. See roots 97-98, 181, 213, 255, 273, 301, 336
Bechardas, Shravak Pandit e:G979 Bhatta, Ratnagopala e:G1115, G1184
becoming (bhava) 12, 109-10, 169 Bhattacharjee, Umesha Chandra e:G60
modification of (vikära) 169 ? Bhattacharya, Bishnupada 557 ; a :G 1510,
Belvalkar. Shripad Krishna 17 G1526. b:Gl548
Benaraji, Satya Ranjan e:G914 Bhattacharya, Biswanath a:G1345
Benfey, Theodor b :G1366 Bhattacharya, Dinesh Chandra a:G968,
Bengal 19,207 209,211 e:G971
BETARÄYA 518 Bhattacharya, Gaurinath Sastri 551-52,
BhagalO5 ï
Bhagavadgita G i l 5 Bhattacharya, Gurunatha Vidyanidhi
Bhagavat, Vamana Balakrishna e:G725 e:G651, G653, G656, G1027
BHAGAVATBHAKTA 518 Bhattacharya, Madhavacandra Tarkacu-
BHAGAVATPRASÄDA BARMAN damani e:G643
(1890) 513, e:G846 Bhattacharya, Prasanna Kumara e:G657
BHAIRAVA MISRA (1824) 12, 389, Bhattacharya, Ram Shankar a:G118,
510 G1088 G122, G129, G130-31, G134, G139-40,
bhakti G62 G369, G470, G473-74, G499, G591,
BHÄMAHA G873, G874, G875 G595-96, G1488, G1496, G1518
Bhâmatî (of Väcaspati Mis'ra I) 302 Bhattacharya, Siddheswar a:G484
Bhandare, Madhava Sastri e:G1360 Bhattacharya, Sitanatha Siddhantavagisa
Bhandarkar, R. G. a:G32, G53, G523, e:G658
G524, G525, G532, G539, G541, G546, Bhattacharya, Siva Prasad a:G843
G1370 Bhattacharya, Trilokyanatha G1046
568 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Bhattacharya, Vidhusekhara a : G71, Birwe, Robert a:G135, G147, G157, G201,

G1474 G833, G932
Bhattacharya, Visvanatha e:G921 bliss 32
BHATTAMALLA 530 Bloomfield, Leonard 4, 549. a:G64
Bhattanathaswamy, Acharya e:G1067 Bodhapaddhati (of Dharanidhara) 23, 355,
Bhattanayaka 32, 66-67 505
BHATTA SIROMANI 518 Bohtlingk, Otto a:G47, G436, G441,
BHATTOJIDÎKSITA (1590) 17,20-22, G502, G548, G648, G1368, G1373,
227, 240-42, 247, 251, 280, 319, 323, e:G50A, G410, G1013, eb:G27, et:G38
335, 490-93, 560, G555 BOPADEVA. See VOPADEVA
bhäva. See becoming Bopp, Franz a:G1620
BHAVADEVA (1649) 498 Boudon, Pierre a :G90
Bhavadeva Misra 389 BRAHMADATTA (1914) 514
BHAVADEVA MISRA ( 1799 ) 508 BRAHMADATTA JIjNASU (1964)
bhâvakatva 65, 67 e:G511
BHÄVA MISRA (or SARMAN) 518 BRAHMADEVA (1943) 24,411, 516
BHÄVAN458 (PEDDINTI) BRAHMADEVA 519.
bhävanä 67, 98, 336, 553 Brahman (Absolute) 31-33, 36-37, 41-43,
arthï- and sâbdi- 25, 98 45, 47, 56, 60, 68, 93, 99, 106-7, 128-30,
BHAVANÄTHA 518 148, 194-97, 216,308,328,341,348-49,
Bhävanäviveka (of Mandana Misra) 98 551
BHAVASENA TRAIVIDYESA (1250) BRAHMÄNANDA SARASVATÏ (1915)
481 514-15
Bhave, D. G. a:G579 Brähmanas 13, 24, 104-5, 107-9, 234
Bhawe, Shrikrshna a:G123 Brahmasiddhi (of Mandana Misra) 181
bheda. See difference Brahmasütrabhäsya (of Samkara) 60, 551,
Bhikshu, Bhadanta Shanti a:G1097 553
Bhikshu, Narada e:G661 Brahmasütramitaksara (of Annambhatta)
BHlMÄGÄRYAGALAGALI (1796) 508 237
BHÏMASENA (550) 113,472 Brahmins 39
BHÏMASENA (ÄGÄRYA) (1350) 484 breath (präria) 39, 43, 49-50, 62, 197, 558
BHÏMASENA SÄSTRI 517, G1168, Breloer, B. a:G76
e:G1195 Brhadäranyaka Upanisad 37, 105-6
bhoga. See experience Brhaddevatä (of Saunaka) 4, 82-83, 86, 108,
Bhoja 560, G889 549
BHOJADEVA or BHOJARÂJA (1055) Brhaspati 13, 104
477 Brhaticandrikä (of Somanätha) 533
bhojakatva 65, 67 Brhatmanjusâ (of Nägesa Bha«a) 23
(Rao) Bhojaräja Gl211 Bronkhorst, Johannes a:G376, G381,
Bhoja Vyäkarava 497 G392-93, G495, G818, G1693, G1710
Bhusari, R. M. a:G62 Brough, John 557-58, a:G8, G809, G1478,
bhütärthaväda 25 G1489, G1631
Bhütiräja 193 Brown, W. Norman 550
Biardeau, Madeleine b.G720, et:G722, buddhi. See intellect
G871, G1558 BUDDHISÄGARA SÜRI 476
Bible 39 Buddhism 3, 6, 45, 55, 66, 190-91, 209,
bïja. See seed G445, G787, G789, G793, G807
Bikaner 243 Buddhist Logic 27-28, 65, 559
Bilhana 205 Bühler, J. George a :G44, G535, G678,
BILVESVARA 519 G879, G962, G1374, G1383, b:G962
bindu 328, G1455 Buiskool, Hermann b:G73
Bira, Sh. a:G1692 Burnell, A. G. b:Gl
birth 46, 127, 129, 169, 196
INDEX 569
Burrow, Thomas a :G 1423, G1481, G1490, G338, G1375, G1387, G1609
G1497, G1535, G1597 accusative case. See accusative case
dative case 270
caitanya. See consciousness genitive case. See genitive case
GAKADÄSA. See CANGADÄSA case-inflected words 276-77
(SESA) GAKRAPANI (DATTA) (1595) Gassirer, Ernst 53, 552
247, 493, 562 category (padàrtha) 213
GAKRAVARMAN 440 Gaturveda, Giridhara Sarma e:G1100
CAKRIN 519 < catuskoti. See negation, fourfold
Galand, Willem a:G69, G14Q6 cause (hetu) 164-67, G1611
Gandra (school) 17, G1624 (käraria) 65, 90, 125, 131, 161, 559,
GANDRA (GOMIN) (470) 17,471-72 G260, G1709
GANDRADATTA JHÄ 519 auxiliary (sahakärikäracia) 129
CANDRAKÄNTA TARKÄLAMKÄRA material {prakrti) 167, 170, 196
(1880) 512 Chacko, I. G. e:G137
GANDRAKÄNTA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA Ghakravarti, Prabhat Gandra 554,
519 ' a:G561, G1418, b:G1402, G1415,
GANDRAKÎRTI ( 1607 ) 494 t:G558
Candraprabhävyäkararia (of Meghavijaya) Chakravarti, Srish Chandra 556, e:G851,
502 G934, G970
GANDRASEKHARA (1638) 497 Chandamâruta 239
GANDRASEKHARA 519 chandas. &£ metrics
GANDRA^EKHARA VIDYÄLAM- Chändogya Upanisad 106
KÄRA 519 Ghandrasekhara, S. e:668
Candrasütras or -vyäkarana (of Gandrago- Ghandrasékharan, T. e:G590, G1359
min) 18,471-72 change, illusory G1531
—Panjikâ (of Pürnacandra) 475 Ghatterji, Kshitish Chandra a:G19, G72,
—Tikä (of Ratnamati) G74, G77-78, Gl 11, G454, G477, G571,
—Commentary (of Sariputta) 479 G600, G842, G928, G1127, G1416,
—Paddhati (of Änandadatta) 518 b:G1466, e:G830, et:G601
Commentary (of Dharmadäsa) 520 Ghatterji, S, K. a:G136, G1424
—Bälävabodhana (of Käs'yapa) 525 Chattopadhyaya, Kshetresh Chandra
GANDRIKÄ (of Hariräma) 511 a:G325, G461, G465, G562
Candrikâ (of Krsnäcärya) 526 Ghaturvedi, Mithilesh a:G746, G766,
Candrikä (of Srikânta Misra) 533 G810-12, G814
GANGADÄSA519 Ghaturvedi, Saraswati Prasad G466,
Cangasütra. See Vaiyakarariajïvatu a:G79-80, G89, G96-98, G103-5, G108,
GANNAVÏRAKAVI 440 G114, G120, G124, G460, G463, G471,
capacity {sâmarthya) of words 8-9, 86, 149, G581, G1436
329 Ghaudhuri, Rajendra e : G1173
=Mti 127 GHICGHU BHATTA 519
CÄRGÄDÄSA. See CANGADÄSA Chidambara 239
Gardona, George 14-16, 20, 109, 549, 553- Ghinna Bomma 239
55, a:G13, G259-61, G280, G311, Ghinna Timma 239
G323-24, G342-43, G380, G394, G637, Chintamani, T. R. a:G413, e:G1354
G1579, G1632, G1651, G1678 Chi tari, Saroja Sadashiv a:G186
CARITRASIMHA (GANI) (1569) 490 Chitrao, Siddhesvar Shastri b:G82,
(Kaläpa) Carkaritarahasya (of Kavi Kan- G564
thahära) 525 Chomsky, Noan 96, 555
Garnoy, A. b:G1429 Choudhari, A. N. a:G666
Gärväka 55 GHUGCHU BHATTA. See CHIGCHU
case-ending (käraka) 115, 267-72, 559, BHATTA
G277, G318, G323-24, G331, G334, GIDRÜPÄSRAMA 494
570 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INÜIAN PHILOSOPHIES

GINNA APPAYYA. See APPAYYA contradiction (virodha) 149, 288, G1544

DÏKSITA III convention, conventional (samketa, samke-
cit. See consciousness tika) 7, 26, 55-56, 65, 77, 90, 163, 194,
coalescence, rules oî(samdhi)A, 39, G1421, 286, 292
G1480, G1547, G1630 conventional (rädhi) power of words
= samsarga. See association of word 325, 368-69
meanings - conventional-derivative (yogarüdhi )
cognition (jnâaa) 54 power 325-26, 368-69
extraordinary 126 corrupt word (melcchasabda) 263, 287, 325
final 216 cosignified (dyotya) 125
GOKKANÄTHA DÏKSITA (1650) 22, cosmic order (rta) 37, 105
311,321,498-99. Goulson, Michael b :G1666
Golebrooke, Henry T. a:G1363 Coward, Harold G. 182-91, 550,
collection (samndaya) of words 145,185 a:G757, G777, b:G813, G1700A
(samüha) of parts 169 Gowell, E. B. 552, 554
communication 263 creation of the world 3, 40
comparison (upamäna) 54, 170, 213, G178, creativity 48
G723, G751 GUDAMISRA519
complexity. See fallacy of complexity
composition, nominal. See nominal Com- Daiva (ofDeva) 480
position —Purusakära (of Krsnaliläsukamuni)
compound {samasa) word 4, 125, 173, 483
276-86, 292, 334, 339-40, Gl66, G810, Daivakarana, Virajananda e:G365
G1390, G1503, G1617, G1654 daim vàk. See language
(dvandva) 283, G814 Dalai, Ghimanlal D. e:G368
genitive. See genitive case, compound DÄMODARA519
conceptual construction (vikalpa) 6, 27, DÄMODARA DEVASARMAN 519
66, 128, 147, 325 DÄMODARA SARMAN 519
concomitance (anvayavyatireka). &é? agree- DandinlO7, 177, G875
ment and difference Dange, Sadashiv Ambadas a:G262
condition (nimitta) 128. See also upädhi Danielou, Alain a:G1452
configuration (äkrti) 6, 26, 131, 553 Danielson, P.A. a:540
conjunction or contact (samyoga) 195 DANO (KÄCÄRYA) 519
connection (sämarthya). See capacity darkness. See inertia (tamas)
syntactic. See syntactic connection darsana. See (Indian) philosophy
connotation G1526 Darêapûrriamâsamantrabhâsya (of Mallaya
consciousness («7, caitanya, samvid) 33, 35, Yajvan) 249
43,57,93,126,128,163. Das, Govinda a:G549
consistency (yogyatä) 5, 7-9, 14, 27, 59, 67, Das, Karuna Sindhu a:G296, G395
83, 88, 125, 131, 195, 286-88, 329, 553 DASABÄLA 520
capacity restricted by convention {yog- DaSabalakärikä (of Das'abäla) 520
yatänityatä) 7 Dasadhätusädhana [of Dano (käcärya)] 520
consonants, order of G167 Dasgupta, Surendra Nath 550
construction, mental 171 Dash, Prafulla Chandra a:G838
construction-free (nirvikalpaka) perception Datta, Dhirendra Mohan 552
27-8. DATTA RÄMA BHATTA 520
context (prakaraw) 149, 175, 268, 322 Dattâtreya 317
contextual factors 7, 26, 30, 82-3, Dave, T. N. a:G1560, G1569
326-27 DAYÄNANDA SAR ASVATÎ 511,
sensitive features, rules G195 e:G63, G241, G416, G429
contiguity (äsatti, samnidhi) 5, 8-9, 27, 88- DAYÄPÄLA (MUNI) (1025) 476
89, 114, 329-30 DAYÄäAMKARA 520
continuity 46, 196 De, Sushil Kumar a:G829
INDEX 571
death 45, 127 DEVIDÄSA CAKRAVARTIN 520
Debels,Rosanea:Gl271 Devidatta, grandfather of Krsnamiträcä-
Debrunner, Albert b:G1405, G1498 rya 381
decay (jam) 43-44,47, 171 DEVÎDATTA SÄSTRIN 520
definition (samjnäsütra) 15 DEVÎDIN (1875) 512
deity (deuatä) 42, 294-95, 302 DHANACANDRA (1533) 488
Delia Casa, Carlo a:G745 DHANAJIT 520
demon (räksasa) 132, 146 DHANANJAYA 520
denotation (êakti) 263,274,285,287-88 DHANANJAYA BHATTÄCÄRYA 520
direct 271-72 DHANAPÄLA (1100 ) 478
(väcya) 125, 147 DHANAPRABHÄ SÜRI 520
denotative {väcaka) 146, 289, 301, 343 DHANESVARA (1250) 211, 481
Deo, Kapil d:G152 Dhanika 91
dependence, mutual (vyâpeksa) 277-84, DHARÄNANDA (1825) 510
329 DHARANÏDHARA (1397) 485
derivation (vyutpatti) DHARANÏDHARA (1730) 505
of words 7, 146 DHARANÏDHARA (1809) 23, 355, 375,
derivative power of words (yogayaugika) 385, 485, 505, 509
325-26, 368-69 dharma 54, 175, 234, 342. See also merit
{prakriya) G1711 literature 239
deéa. See place = truth. See truth
Deshpande, Gangesh Tryambak a:G153, DHARMADÄSA 520
G187, G202, G216, G271-75, G1580 DHARMADEVA 521
Deshpande, Handerao e:G861 Dharmadhikar, Vidyadhar d:G1273
Deshpande, Madhav Muralidhar 562, DHARMAKÏRTI (640) 18, 203, 476
a:G25, G263, G297, G344-45, G836, DHARMAPÄLA (625) 177, 472
Gl 652-53, Gl 684, G1705, b:G1697, Dharmapradipa G1211
etd:G1196 DHARMARÄJÄDHVARINDRA (1615)
designative. See denotative 87, 253, 552
De Smet, Richard V. a:G1541 (RÄJAKUMÄRA) DHARMASÄST-
destruction 169, 196 RIN 521
of the world 40 DHARMASÜRI (1700) 501
deva. See god (s ) DHARMASÜRI. See UDAYADHA-
DEVA (1200) 480 RMA
Deva, Kapil a:G171, G805, b:G218 Dharmottarapradipa (of Durveka Misra)
DEVADATTA520 177
DEVAKÏNANDANA 520 dhätu. See (verbal) root
Devalekara, Bapu Hara Set a:G987 Dhâtucandrikâ (ofKavicandraDatta) 493
DEVANANDIN. See PUJYAPÄDA Dhâtucandrikâ (of Tarkälamkära Bhattä-
DEVASAHÄYA 520 cârya) 534
DEVASARMAN 520 Dhâtucandrikâ (of Thakkuradâsa Nyäya-
Devasthali, Govind Vinayak 556, a :G326- pancänana) 534
27, G361, G481A, G487-88, G512, Dhätuäntamayi (of Visvanâtha Nyâyâlam-
G517, G588, G1598, G1639, b:G217, kâra) 535
et:G667, G1137 Dhâtudarpana (of Vuramis'ra) 535
devatä. See deity Dhatukalpalatikä (of Dhanajit) 520
Devayasas, father of Vrsabhadeva 179 Dhâtukàrikavalï (of Varadaräja) 495
DEVENDRAKUMÄRA VIDYÄRA- Dhätukaya (of Näräyana Bhatfatiri) 497
TNA (1915) 515 —Krsnärpana 497
DEVENDRASÜRI (1210) 481 —Vivarav-a (of Rämapaniväda ) 530 -
Devi, Prajna e:Gl 77 Dhatukosa (of Ghanasyäma) 522
deviation. See false, deviation Dhatulaksaya (ofDano (käcärya)) 519
DEVÏDASA 520
572 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Dhâtumâlâ (of îs'varakantha) 523 Dhâtuvrtti (of Kâsyapa) 440

Dhätumälä (of Sasthidäsa) 532 Dhâtvàvall (of Kedaresvara Sarman) 525
Dhätumähkä (of Betaräya) 518 DHUNDIRÄJA (1700) 501
Dhätumanjarl (of Gandrakänta Vidyâlam- .dhvahi. See sound
kâra) 519 Dhvanikära 92
Dhâtumanjari (of Kâsïnâtha) 504 Dhvanyäloka (of Änandavardhana) 28, 32
Dhätupallava (of Bhavanätha) 518 DHYÄNAKÄRA 465
Dhätuparayaria (of Srutasägara) 533 difference (bheda) 6, 125, 145, 149, 197,
Dhätuparayaria (of Trilocana) 534 278
Dhâtuparyayamanvmàlâ (of Mahesajhä) 527 DIGNÄGA (480) 6, 27-28, 66,123, G794,
dhätupätha G126, G143, G149, G150, 549
G1383 dik. See space
Dhätupätha (of Bhäskara) 518 Dikshitar, V. R. Ramachandra a:G509
Dhätupätha (of Candra school ) 18 Dikshitulu, R. B. d:G362
Dhätupätha (of Kâsïsvara) 525 Dïrghatamas 103-4
Dhätupätha (of Narendrapüri ) 483 disjunction (vibhäga) 268
Commentary (by Ksemendra) 488 dispositional tendency (samskâra, väsanö),
Dhätupätha (of Pänini). See Astädhyayi- or latent disposition. See trace
Dhätupätha distortion. See false: deviation (viparyâsa)
Dhätupätha (of Punyasundaragani ) 529 Divanji, Prahlad C. a:G115
Dhätupätha (of Pürnacandra) 52ß diversity 42-43
Dhätupäthakärikä (of Kocca Sankaran DIVYASIMHA MISRA 521
Susad) 510 Doraswamy, K. a:G305, G1599
Dhätupäthakramakaumudi (of Dhananjaya)Doshi, Bechardas Jivaraj e:G1034
520 Dravidian G1381
Dhätuprabodha (of Kälidäsa Gakravartin) dravya. See substance
524 DRAVYESA JHÄ 403, 521
Dhätupradipa (of Maitreya Raksita) 207, Drutabodha with Drutabodhini thereon (of
478 Bhärata Mallika) 510
Dhätuprakäsa {samgraha) and Tippanl (of Dube, Harinatha e:G981
Bälaräma) 518 duration (sthiti) 304
Dhätupratyayapancikä (of Taladevasudhi)DURBÄLÄGÄRYA. See KRSNAMI-
533 TRÄGÄRYA
Dhätupratyayapanjikä (of Hariyogin Saila-DURGÄ(SIMHA) or DURGÄDÄSA
väcärya). See Astädhyäyi-Dhätu-Sabdi- (950-1050) 17, 19, 475, 477, G641-42,
käbhararia G645, G656-58
Dhätuprayogävall (of Käsinätha) 525 DURGÄDÄSA VIDYÄVÄGlSA (1639)
Dhäturatnäkara (ofNäräyana) 315,499 497
Dhäturatnäkara (of Sädhusundara Gani) DURGÄDÄSA VIDYÄVÄGlSA SRÏ-
495 RÄMA TARKAVÄGISA (1908) 514
Dhâturatnamanjarï (of Rämasimha) 531 Durgaprasad, Kedarnath e:G918
Dhäturatnaprakäsa (of &esa Visnu) 494 Durghatavrtti (of Maitreya Raksita) 207,
Dhäturatnavall (of Rädhakrsna Sarman) 478
507 DURVEKA MISRA (1020) 177
Dhäturüpa (of Vangasena). See Äkhyätav- DURVINÏTA (550) 177, 471
yäkararia Dutt, Nomita a :G422
Dhäturüpadariä (of Täränätha Tarkavä- DVÄDASAHÄDHVARIN. See TIRU-
caspati) 512 MALYAJVAN
Dhatusädhanä (of Kavicandra [Datta ] ) 493 (BÄLAPATAI^JALI ) D VÄD ASÄHA-
Dhâtusâdhanâ (of Rämakänta) 487 YAJIN (1680) 311, 501
Dhâtusamgraha (of Kâsïnâtha Misra) 525 Dvaita Vedänta 240
Dhâtusamgraha (of Sübrahmanyam Nam- dvandva, See compound, dvandva
buttiripad) 512 Dvandvaikase§aväda (of Räghava J h ä ) 529
INDEX 573

DVÄRAKANÄTHA NYÄYABHUSANA eulogy 83

(1899)513 excellence imparted by phonemes 235
Dvikarmaväda (of Laksmana Dvivedin) exception (apavâda) 150
527 exclusion. See apoha
Dvivedi, H. P. a:G347, G396, b:G363 existence (sattä) 127, 169, 183, 234^330-
Dvivedin, Vindhyesvari Prasada e:G673, 31,558
G1125, G1131 (mutual) expectancy (âkâmksâ) 5, 8-9,27,
Dyen, Isidore b:G1435 85-88, 114, 124, 149, 300, 329, 343-44,
dyotaka. See suggestive meaning G1524
dyotya 125 experience (bhoga) 129
expressional (samvyavahärika) 194
Ecklund, G. Green b:Gl 686 extension rule (atideeasütra ) 15
economy, principle of 76
Edgerton, Franklin a:G1503, b:G1459 Faddegon, Barend a:G66, G1467, b:G85,
Edgren, Hjalmar a :G1371 G1425
effort, speaker's (yatna) 187, 258, 330, 332fallacy, of complexity 93
Eggeling, Julius e:G642, G938 of interdependence 93
Ekadaiakankä (of Raghuräma) 512 of unestablished locus (äsrayasiddha)
Ekagolrasütraparämarsa (of Devîdatta &äs- 189-90
trin) 520 of unknown qualificandness 189
ekärthlbhäva. See meaning, single "pathetic" 31
ekaêesa. See reduction of two verbs to one false, falsity, error 5, 54, 59, 187-89, 213,
ekaväkyatä. See syntactic analysis 217, 233, 236, 553
Ekavarnärthasamgraha (of Bhärata Mallika) theory of error 56-60
493, 510 —deviation (viparyäsa, vyabhicära) 149,
ELESVARÄGNIHOTRA 521 - 273
Eliot, T. S. 49, 551 feasibility (krtisädhyatva) 265-66
elite, spiritual {êisfa) 132 feature. See configuration (âkrti)
elliptical sentence 149, G530 feminine bases G265
Emeneau, Murray B. a:Gl504, G1585, function G238
b:G1480 figurative meaning. See meaning, figura-
emotion, emotive meaning 12, 28-30, 67 tive
(case-) ending (vibhakti) 163-64 Filliozat,Jeana:G800
personal 257-58, 263-64 Filliozat, Pierre-Sylvain a:G1213, G1654,
primary 260 G1685
verbal 255, 262 Finot, L. ae:G659
energy, inner (kratu) 70 fire-wheel (älätacakra) 169
enumerative cognition (äpeksabuddhi) 173 fitness. See consistency
epic Sanskrit Gl 630 form (âkâra) 129
epistemology. See knowledge, theory of (linguistic) (complex) formation (vrtti)
error.- See false 173,295-96,329
essence (rasa) 28-33, 130 Form Criticism 39
(svarüpa) 188 Foucher, A. a:G442
eternal (nitya) 169, 175, 216 Fowler, Murray a:G190, G312 , J
absolute (kutastha) 7, 118 Franke, R. Otto a:G42, G45, G437,
as preserved by speakers (pravähanityatä) G1380, e:G840, et:G940
7, 118, 130-31 Fraser, Russell 552
etymology (nirukta) 3, 8, 14, 38, 107-9, Frauwallner, Erich 123, 550, 559, a:G607,
111,555 G1536
etymological meaning (samäkhya) 83, function, operation (vyâpara) 11, 67, 75-
175 76, 98, 165, 169, 255-56, 258-61, 266,
etymological words (yaugika) 368-69 330-31,336
Euclid G196
574 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Gadadhara (1660) 521 GAURAMOHÄNA BHATTA (VrDYÄ-

Gadamer, Hans-Georg 36, 550 RATNA) 522
Gadgil, Dinkar Keshava Shastri e:G1083 GAUTAMA (150) 97, 522, 549,556
Gaidani, M. G. a:G593 Gawronski, A. b:G1411
Gajäsütraväda (of Tirumala Bukkapatta- Geiger, Bernhard a:G551
nam Srïnivasâcârya) 504 gender (linga) 12, 15, 83, 115, 120, 149,
Gajäsütraväda (of Venkatadâsa) 508 173, 196, 262, 273-75, 339, G712,
Gajäsütravädärtha (of Ganapati Sastri) 513 G1457, G1707. See also person
Gajäsütravädärtha (of Mannu Deva) 509 genitive case 271, 339
GALAVA440 compound 285
Ganadarpana (of Kumârapâla) 486 gerund G1705
ganapâtha 14, G1496 GEYADEVA 522
Ganapâtha (of Bhârata Mallika) 510 G H A N A S Y Ä M A 522
Ganapâtha (of Gandra school) 18 Ghat(a)ge, Amrit Madhav a:G230,
Ganapâtha (ofPänini) 113, G129, G151-52, G516
G156-57, G161, G227, G278, G630 Ghosh, Amalananda a:G570
Ganapâtha (ofRämakrsnaDiksita) 497 Ghosh, Batakrishna a:G102, G109, G455,
Ganapäthasamgraha (of Geyadeva) 522 G466, G1426, G1453; b:G1430
GANAPATI SÄSTRI (1900) 513 Ghosh, Manumohan et:G427
Ganaratnamahodadhi and Vrtti (Vardha-GIRIJA522
mäna) 478 GIRÏâACANDRA VIDYÄRATNA
Commentary (of Gangädhara) 521 G1019
Commentary (of Govardhana Bhatta) Gïrvarnapadamanjan (of Dundhiräja) 501
522 Girvarnapadamahjari (of Varadarâja) 495
Ganaratnàvall (of Yajfîesvara Bhatta) 512 Gitäsundara (of Sadäsiva Diksita) 311
Ganavrtti (of Purusottamadeva) 209 God (Uoara) 26, 32, 52, 55, 65, 90, 237,
GANESA521 286-87, 324, 330, 334-45, 557
GANGÄDÄSA (PANDITA) 521 god.{%) {deva) 108, 132
GANGÄDÄSÄCÄRYA 521 Gode, P. K. a:G839, G1057, G1Ö60,
CANGÄDATTA 521 G1128, G1177, G1191, G1211, G1268,
GANGÄDATTA SÄSTRI 521, e :G119 G1275
GANGÄDHARA (1800) 509 Godes, B. S. a:G313
GANGÄDHARA 521 Gokhale, Pratibha P. a:G352-53, Gl 111
GANGÄDHARA DÎKSITA (1617) 494 Gokhale, V. N. a:G94
GANGÄDHARA KAVIRÄJA (1850) GOKULACANDRA (1839) 510
23, 395, 511-12 Goldstucker, Theodor a:G32, G430-31,
Gangädhara, Mahadeva Sarma e:Gl061 e:G529-30
GANGÄDHARA NÄTHA 521 GOLHÄNA 522
GANGÄDHARA SARMAN 521 Gombrich, Richard a:G1694
GANGÄPRASÄDA SÄSTRIN 514, GONÄRDIYA 458
e:G1089 Gonda, Jan a:G314, G1451, G1470,
GANGÄRAMITRA PÄTHIN (MÄLA- G1476, G1481-83, Ô1505, G1519-20,
VA) 521 G1686, G1640, b:G1447
GANGESA (1350) 91, 96, 273 GONIKAPUTRA 458
GANGESA MISRA UPÄDHYÄYA Goonatilleke, William e:G820, etb:G34
521 Gopal, Rama:G860
GANGESA' SARMAN 521 GOPÄLA 522
Ganguli, Hemanta Kumar a:G729, GOPÄLA BHATTA (1590) 490
b:G713 GOPÄLA CAKRAVARTIN (BANER-
Gani, Vinaya Vijaya b:G950 JI) (1672) 500
Garbe, Richard t:G50A GOPÄLÄCÄRYA 522. See also GOPÄ-
GÄRGYA Iß, 110, 112, 114, 140 LADEVA VIDYAVAGÏSA
gauna, gauni words 65-66, 326, G1484 GOPÄLADEVA. See MANYUDEVA
INDEX 575

GOPÄLADEVA VIDYÄVÄGISA(1800) GUNACANDRA (1210) 481

508 (SIDDHA) GUNAKÄRA 523
GOPÄLAKRSNA SÄSTRIN (1720) 23, GUNANANDIN (890) 475
353, 504 GUNARATNA SÜRI (1411) 486
GOPÄLÄNÄNDA YATI 309 Gune, Jayashri Achyut 564, etb:G1197
GOPÄLA SÄSTRI NENE (1919) 24, Gune, Saroj a:G1330
407, 515, e:G1048, G1094, G1101, Gunjikara, Ramacandra Sarman G1079,
G1120, G1186 e:G1155
GOPÏCAiypA. See GOYÏGANDRA Gupta, Chandra Bhan a:Gl521
GOPÎNATHA 522 Gupta, Rajanikanta e:G1022
GOPlNÄTHA BHATTA 522 Gupta, Suddhir Kumar a:G121, G125,
GOPINÄTHA TARKÄCÄRYA (1550) G1299, G1300
488 GURUWARA BÄLA ^ASTRI 523
Gore, Vitthala Narayana Sarma e:G1155
(Christian) gospels 39 Hahn, Michael a:G834-35
GOSVÄMI SRI SlVÄNANDABHATTA Haimacatuskavrttitippanikâ (of Golhana ) 522
522 Haimalaghuprakrïya (of Vinayavijayagani )
Gough, A.E. 552, 554 499
GOVARDHANA (1100) 478 HAMSAVIJAYAGANI (1650) 499
GOVARDHANA BHATTA 522 HARADATTA (1059) 19, 203, 279-80,-
Govardhana Bhatfa, grandfather of Jaya- . 477, 560, G849, G857, G877
krsna Maunin 361 HARAGOVINDA VIDYÄVÄCASPATI
GOVINDA BHARADVÄJA SÄSTRI 523
(1335) 510 HARANÄTHA VIDYÄRATNA 523
GOVINDA BHATTA 522 HARENDRANÄRÄYANA DEVA^A-
GOVINDA MISRA 522 RMAN (1912) 514, e:G1028
GOVINDA PANDITA 523 hare's horn 325
GOVINDA PARASURÄMA BHATTA Hargovindass, Shravak Pandit e:G979
(1888) 513 HARI BHÄSKARA AGNIHOTRA
GOVINDARÄMA VIDYÄSlROMANI (1677) 500-01
523 HARIBHATTA (1801) 383
Govindârnava (of âesaNrsimha) 215 HARIDATTÀ (DAIVAjNA) 523
GOVINDA SENÂ 523 HARI DÏKSITA (1270) 21-22, 241, 319,
GOVINDASIMHA (1900) 513 500
GOYÏGANDRA (1400) 19, G912, 485 HARIKRSNA 523
grammar (vyâkararia) 3-4, 6-7, 12-14, 35, HARINÄTHA DVIVEDIN (1850) 511
128, 161, 163, 170, 196, 233, 323 HARI PANDITA 523
grammatical analysis G767 HARIRAMÀ (1850) 511
grammatical derivation (pratipâdaka). See HARIRÄMA BHATTÄCÄRYA 523
nominal stem HARIRÄMA KALÄ (1797) 508
grammatically (sädhutva) 161 HARI SAMKARA JHÄ (1929) 515,
Grantovskij, E. A. a:G169 e:G566
Greece Gl 599 HARI SARMAN or SÄSTRI (1900) 513,
Grierson, George a:G50 523
grouping [sähitya, sâmagri, samüha) 127 HARISIDDHÄNTAVÄGISA 91
growth (krama) 43-44 HARIVALLABHA (1747) 4, 23, 363,
Guha, Dinesh Chandra e:G1106 505-6, Gl 18
Guha, Manjulika a:G!655 • HARIVRSABHA. See VRSABHADEVA
Guleri, Chandradhar a:G554 HARIYOGIN SAILÄVÄCÄRYA^
guna G1445, 120 (1150)478
in Pänini G186 HARSAKÏRTI SURI 523
inSâmkhya443 120, 173 • HARSAKULAGANI (1557) 489
quality (in Vaisêsika, etc.). See quality HARSAVARDHANA (630) 472
576 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Hartman, G.G. b:G1570 Indira (of Padmadhara) 528

Hartmann, P. b:Gl506 indirect object (of dative) (sampradäna)
HARYAKSA (350) 465 167, 270-71, 337-38
Hattori, Masaaki 27, 549 individual. See particular
Hauschild, Richard b:G!561 Indra 13, 17, 104,295
HAYAGRÏVÂCÂRYA 523 INDRA (GOMIN) 439-40
Hazra, Rajendra Chandra a:GÎ4î INDRADATTA UPÄDHYÄYA (1800)
hearing (sravana) 106 23, 379, 508
heaven (svarga) 46-47, 342 Indravyakarana (of Indra) 439-40
Heimann, Betty a:G1438, G1463, G1511, indriya. See sense-organ
b:G1522 INDU (MITRA) (1070) 477-78
Hejib, Alakaa:G382 Induräja 193
HELÄRAJA (980) 11, 40-44, 193-97, inertia (tamas) 44-45, 120, 275
203, 292, 475, 551, 557-61, G776 inference (anumäna) 27, 51, 54, 59-60, 126,
HEMACANDRA (1150) 203, 479, G889 132, 175, 213, 273
HEMAHAMSAVIJ AYAGANI ( 1457 ) infinitive 262
486 infinity (änantya) 273
Henry, Thomas 385 inflection G1426
Herman, Arthur L. 5545 a:G1549 inherence (samaväya) 195, 268
Her tel, Johannes a:G443 injunction. See prescription
Herzberger, Hans G. a:G773 inner controller (antaryämin) 129, 132
Herzbcrger, Radhika a:G773 inseparable existence (svarûpasat) 274
hetu. See cause insight. See intuition
in grammar G184 Insler, Stanley a:G613
Hiriyanna, Mysore 550, a:G501, G778 instigation (pravartanâ) 265, 336-37
Hoffman, Karl a:G328-29 instrument of knowledge (pramäna) 25,
homogeneity G1653 54-56, 59-60, 175, 553
Hume, R. E. t:55J instrumental case-ending. See means
integration (vrtti) 278-79
icchä. See will intellect {prajM, buddhi) 62, 146, 551, 560
I-ching. See I-tsing intention of the speaker (tätparya) 9, 27,
identity {tädätmya) 129, G324 65-66, 89-93, 145, 165, 300, 322, 327,
syntactic identity 271 329-30, 344-46, 557, G1540, G1657
ignorance (avidyä) 42, 51, 54, 58, 61, 128, interdependence. See fallacy of interde-
147, 197. See also falsity pendence
imitation word 276 intuition (pratibhä) 10, 28, 31-32, 49-50,
imperative, Vedic G301 59, 62-66, 94-95, 125, 130, 146,327,
imperceptibility (paroksatva) 264 553, G763, G771, G1394, G1441
implication 273 îpsitakarman 268-69
impropriety (aprasastya) 288 Ipzzagalli, A. M. b:G1408
incompatibility or inconsistency of mea- istasädhanatva, See means to a desired result
ning 66-67, 148, 346 isvara. See God
indeclinable particle. See particle ISVARAKANTHA 523
independence (svätantrya) 167 ÎSVARAMISRA 523
indescribable, inexpressible (anirvacaniya ) ÏSVARÂNANDA or ÏSVARÏDATTA
42, 60, 147-48 SARASVATÏ (1550) 22, 219, 229, 488
India, nation of 39 ÏSVARÏPRASADA 524
indication (linga) 149 itihâsa 108
indicator (upalaksana) 115, 183, 186, 273, itikarlavyatâ 25, 87
339 I-tsing 177, G689, G803, G1631
dyotaka. See suggestive meaning lyengar, H. R. Rangaswami a:G795
jnâpaka 186 Iyer, K. A. Subramania 41, 59, 79, 128,
indices, referential G307, G348 182, 201, 213-14, 517, 550-55, 56Î,
INDEX 577

a:G65, G670, G693, G728, G732, JAYADEVA MISRA G1259, G1264

G751, G767-68, G804, G1434, G1441, JINADEVASÜRI 524
G1445, G1457, G1464, G1469, G1477, JAYÄDITYA (650) 18, 203, 472-73
G1494, G1509, G1673, b:G734, JAYAKRSNA MAUNIN (1745) 23,
e:G709-10, G721, G727, G747, et:G 351, 361, 367, 505
872, t:G742, G748A, G758 JAYANTA (1650) 498
Iyer, S. Venkatasubramania a:G397, JAYANTA BHATTA (870) 66, 91, 93=
G*21,G1107,G1205,G1664,b:G1205 94, 97, 475
JAYANTA BHATTA 524
Jacobi, Hermann a:G961, G1389 Jayaswal, Kashi Prasad a:G444, G506,
JAGADDHARA (1325) 484 G560
JAGADDHARA 524 Jesus 39, 550
J A G A D I S A 524, 549 Jha, Ganganatha 549, 552
JAGAN MOHÄNA PANDXTA. (1670) Jha, Govindad:G866
500 Jha, Krishna Deo d:864
JAGANNÄTHA 524 Jha, Subhadraa:G128
(MAHÄMAHOPÄDHYÄYA) JAGAN- Jha, Sukheswar a:G298
NÄTHA 524 Jha, Taranisae:G1171
JAGANNÄTHA PANDITARÄJA TAI- Jha, Triloknath a:G1527
LANGA (1650) 23, 32, 83, 215, 241, Jha, V. N. a:G1712
370, 499 Jhajjar, Vedananda Vedavagisa e:G668
Jägrahitetiväda (of Gakrin) 519 Jijnasu, Brahmadatta e:G177
jahatsvärtha 279 Jijnasu, Raghuvira e:G1296
JAIMINI (25 A.D.?) 25, 114 JINAPRABHÄ SÜRI (1280) 483
Jain, Jainism—3, 17-19, 54, 123, G1647 JINASÄGARA. See DHANAGANDRA
Jainendravyäkarana 17, 466 JINAVIJAYA (1637) 497
—-Mahävrtti (of Abhayanandin) G673, Jinavijaya, Muniraja e:G663
G676 JINENDRABUDDHI (725) 18, 115,474
—Sahdärnavacandrikä (of Somadeva ) JÏVANANDA VIDYÄSÄGARA (1894)
G985 G917Le:G645, G991, G1023, G1041
—Vrtti (of Väsudeva Sästri Abhyankar) JÏVANATHA RÄYA (1925) 515
516 JÎVARAMAN SARMAN (1928) 515
—Laghuvrtti (of Dharmasästrin) 521 jhäna. See cognition
Commentary (of Gunanandin) G674 Jnänämrta (of Kâsîsvara Sarman) 23, 505
Jaiyata Upädhyäya 203 J&ÄNATILAKA (1646) 498
JÄJALI. See UJJVALADATTA JNÄNENDRA SARASVATÏ (1730) 351,
Jalpamanjarï (of Sudhänandasürisisya) 373, Gl 100, 505
500 JNÄNESVARA 524
Janacek, Adolf a:G603 jnäpaka. See indicator
Janaklparinayananätaka (of RämabhadraJhäpakasamgraha (of Nage sa Bhatta) 504
Diksita) 311, 321 —Vivrti (of N. S. Rämänuja Tätäcärya)
JANÄRDANA SARMAN 524 517
Jani, A. N. a:G170, G203, G276 Jnäpakasamuccaya {hhäsya) (of Purusotta-
jarä. See decay madeva) 209, 480
JARANÄTHA TARKAVÄGASPATI Jnäpakäuali (of Haragovinda Vidyäväcas-
(1870) 512, G1020 pati) 523
Jätakas G13S6 jnäpana G128
jäti. See universal JONARÄJA or JOGARÄJA (1450) 486
Jätisaktiväda (of Ananta Bhatta ) 518 Joshi, Bechardas e:G832
jätisphota. See sphota^ jäti Joshi, Bhargavasastri Bhikaji e:G582
jätivisistavyakti, see particular qualified by Joshi, Dayashankar Madhusudan a:G277,
a universal d:G245
Jaumara school 19 Joshij Shivarama Dattatreya 174 255-
578 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

308 340, 560, a:G172, G246, G330-31, käraka. See agent; case-ending; syntactic
G354, G370, G398, G614, G620, G763, function
G1198, G1200, G1270, G1550, G1571- Kärakacakra 528
72, G1656, G1667, G1679. d:G1193, —Dlpaprabhä (of Näräyana) 528
et:G625, G627, G632-34, Gl 192 Kärakacakra (of Ananta) 518
Joshi, Venkatesha Laxman G1122 Kärakacakra (of Dharmakïrti ) 476
Joshi, Venkatesha Shastri a:G346, G383- Kärakacakra (of Rämatarana Siromani)
89, G975, G1219, G1699-1700 512
JUMARANANDIN (1350) 19,488,484, Kärakacandrikä (of Rämacandra ) 530
G912 Karakacandrikä (of Târapada Nyäyaratna )
Junankar, P. B. b:G364 533-34
Jvalananda of Tiksnajnatiya 355 Kârakâdibodhinï (of Devakînandana) 520
JYESTHAKALÄSA (1060) 205, 477 Kärakakosa (of Sivänanda Gosvämin) 532
jyotisa. See astronomy Kärakänanda (of Änanda Siddhäntavägisa)
518
KAIYATA (1030) 19, 21-22, 86, 174, Kärakanirüpana (of Amaracandra ). See
203-4, 278-80, 289, 293-94, 304,339-42, Satkarakalaksana
476, 561,G551,G877 Kärakanirüpana (of Krsnävadhuta ) 526
käla. See time Kärakaparlksä (ofPasupati) 529
KÄLADHARA 524 Kärakarahasya (of Rüparäma Nyäyapan-
Kaläpasamgraha (of Rämänanda Tirtha) cänana) 531
530 Kärakärtha (of Krpärama) 526
Kaläpasära (of Rämakumära Nyäyabhüsa- {Sat) Kärakärthanirnaya (of Trilokanätha)
na) 530 534
Kalâpatyâdivrtti (of Sarvadhara Upädhyä- Kärakärthapradipikä (of Sudarsanäcärya)
ya) 532 533
KALÄVATI DEVI (1909) 514 Kärakärthavicära (of Räghava Jhä) 529
KÄLICARANA VIDYOPÄDHYÄYA Kärakasambandhoddyota (of Rabhasanan-
(1887) 512 din) 475
Kälidäsa G475 Kärakasambandhoddyota (of Vinäsvaranan-
KÄLIDÄSA GAKRAVARTIN 524 din) 535
KÄLIKA PRASÄDA SUKLA (1961) Kärakatattva or Kârakavicâra (of [Sesa]
24, 324, 423, 517, e:G857, G1245, Cakrapani) 247,493
G1286 Kärakaväda (of Srïkrsna Bhatta Maunin)
KÄLl KUMÄRA âARMAN 524 506 .,
Kalpa (a Vedanga) 107 {Sat) Kärakavivarana (of Ratnapäni) 531
KÄLURÄMA SÄSTRIN (1910) 514 Kärakavyutpattirahasya (of Gopinätha Bha-
KALYÄNAMÄLA SARMAN 524 «a) 522
KALYÄNA SARASVATÏ (1790) 508 Kärakiya (of Dayänanda Sarasvati) 511
Kalyanov, V. I. a:G1390, G1528 Kärakoktisamuccaya (of &riprabhä Süri ) 533
KÄMADEVA GHOSA 524 Kärakolläsa (of Bharata Mallika) 510
KAMALÄKARA BHATTA (1640) 497- karana. See means
98 kärana. See cause
Kamalâkara Dîksita 317 KARAPUTUGALA DHARMA &RÏ
KAMALA&ÏLA (770) G775 x . (1925) 515, e:G1093
Kämarüpa school G1070 Kärikäbhäsya (of Divyasimha Misra) 521
Kamsa 196 Kärikävali (of Näräyana) 499
KANAKALÄLÄ &ARMAN 524 —Tikä (of Rämaprasäda) 501
KANAKAPRABHÄ (1240) 481 KARMADHARA (1501) 487
Kane, Pandurang Varman a:G584, G873 karman. »SVe object (of action)
Kansara, N. M. a:G904 karmapravacanïya. See postposition
KÄNTA NÄTHA 524 kartr. See agent
Kantawala, S. G. a:G1668 kartrsiddhântamanjarï (of Rämacarana) 530
INDEX 579

KÄRTTIKEYA SIDDHÄNTA BHAT- Kâtantraparisista (of Srîpatidatta) 486

TÄCÄRYA (1800) 509 —Vaktavyaviveka (of Pundarikäksa Vid-
KÄ&AKRTSNA 440-41 yäsägara Bhattäcärya) 487
Kashmir, 28, 203, 205, G535 —Prabodha (of Gopinätha Tarkäcärya)
Kashmir Saivism 57, 124, 324, 342, 554 488
Kâsï. See Banaras —Prakäsikä (of Samkara Sarman)
{Astädhyäyi) Kâsïka {vrtti) (of Jayäditya 532
and Vamana) 18, 271, 472-73, G586, —Siddhäntaratnäkara (of Sivaräma Ca-
G596, G821, G863 kravartin) 493
—Tippani (of Bhagavatprasäda bar- —Candrikä (of Rämadäsa Cakravartin)
man) 513 493
—Padamanjari (of Haradatta) 477, 560 Kätantrasütras (of Sarvavarman ) 17, 464-
—Kusumavikäsa (of Siva Pandita) 551 65
—Nyäsa (of Jinendrabuddhi ). See Kâêi- —Vrtti (of Durghasimha). See Kätantra-
känyäsa vrtti
—Prakriyamanjari (of Änandapürna —Krnmanjari (of Sivaräma Sarman)
Vidyäsägara) 484 G647
—Tikä (of Pundarikäksa Vidyäsägara —Parisista (of Sripattidatta). See Kätan-
Bhattäcärya) 487 traparUista
—Vrttipradipa (of Rämadeva Misra) —Tikä (of Mahendranätha Bhattäcär-
531 ya) 513
—Sära (of Väsudeva) 534 —Astamangala (ofRämakisora Sarman)
KäHkänyäsa (of Jinendrabuddhi) 474 513
—Anunyâsa (of Indu) 478 —Kaläpacandra (of Bilvesvara) 518
—Tantradipa (of Maitreya Raksita) —Sära (ofHariräma Bhattäcärya) 523
207, 478 Kätantravrtti (of Durghasimha) 475, 477,
— (Vyäkarana) Prakäea (of Narapati G641, G642, G645, G653
Mahämisra) 486 —-Paüjikä (of Trilocanadäsa). See
—Prabhä (ofSanätanaTarkäcärya) 532 TRILOCANADÄSA
KÄSINÄTHA (1725) 504 —Tikä (of Durghasimha) 477
KÄSlNÄTHA (1810) 510 —Vistara (of Vardhamäna) 478
KÄSINÄTHA 525 —Tikä (of Pradyumna Süri) 480
KÄSlNÄTHA BHATTA (1500) 487 —Tattvaprakäsikä (of Gunacandra) 481
KÄSINÄTHA DEVASARMAN 525 —Rüpamälä (of Bhavasena Traividyesa)
KÄSlNÄTHA MISRA 525 481
KÄSlRÄJA 525 —BälaHksä (of Samgramasimha) 483
KÄSISVARA 525 Commentary (of Moksesvara) 484
KÄSlSVARA BHATTÄCÄRYA (1550) —Bälä(va)bodhini (ofjagaddhara) 484
489 —Nyäsa (of Sitikantha) 486
KÄSlSVARA SARMAN (1739) 23, 505 —Bälävabodha (of Merutunga) 485
KÄSYAPA 18, 440 —PariHsta (of Sripattidatta ). See SRÏ-
KÄ&YAPA (1200)480 PATTIDATTA
KÄSYAPA 525 —Padaprakaranasamgati (of Jonaräja)
Kätantra commentary (of Kumäralabdha ) 486
465 —Prakäsa (of Karmadhara ) 487
Commentary (of Räma Panditavara) —Pradipa (of Pundarikäksa Vidyäsäga-
513 ra Bhattäcärya) 487
Kätantra system 17, 19-20, G664 —Manoramä (of Rämanätha Sarman)
Kätantrakaumudi (of Gangesa âarman) 522 488
Kätantrakaumudi (of Govardhana Bhatta) Commentary (of Räma Tarkavägisa)
522 489
Kätantrakaumudi (of Krpala Pandita) 526 —Durgäväkyaprabodha (of Kulacandra)
Kätantraparitista (of Govinda Pandita) 523 489
580 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

—Avacüri (of Caritrasimha) 490 Kätantrottara (of Vijayänanda) 478

—Uttafaparitista (of Trilocana) 493 Katre, Sadashiv Lakshmidhar a:G24
—Vyäkhyasära (of Rämadäsa Cakravar- Katre, Sumitra Mangesh a:G1427,
•tin) 493 b:G219, G231, G278, G483A, G1448
—Rahasya or Tïka (of Rämanätha Katsura, Shoryu 549
Vidyäväcaspati) 498 KATYA 458
—Ghandahprakriyâ (of Gandrakänta Tar- KÄTYÄYANA (250 B.G.) 6? 16, 18, 26,
kâlamkâra) 512 85-86, 97, 114, 117, 119-20, 193,204,
—-Paribhäsavrtti (of Bhäva Misra) 518 261, 277, 283, 293, 322, 558, G444,
—Laghuvrtti (of Ghicchu Bhatta) 519 G446-47, 458-59, G593, G618
—Vftti (of Devadatta) 520 Kaumudisudhäkara (of Gandrakänta Tarkä-
—Dhuridika (of Durgäsimha) 520 lamkära) 512
—Vyâkhyalekha (ofGangädäsäcärya) 521 KAWDA BHATTA. See KOI^DA
—Dïpikâ (of Gautama) 522 BHATTA
—Dhätupätha (of Govinda Bhatta) 522 KAUTILYA G1493
—Sisyaprabodhikä (of Govinda Bhatta) KAUTSA 441
522 Kavi, M. Ramakrishna a:G686
—Sära (of Hariräma Bhattäcärya) 523 KAVIGANDRÀ (DATTA) (1600) 493
Commentary (of Käsiräja) 525 KAVIDARPANA RÄGHAVA (1375)
Commentary (of Maunisekhara) 527 485
—Dhätusütriya (of Pitambara Vidyä- Kavikalpadruma (of Hèmacandra )
bhüsana) G656 versification (of Harsakulagani ) 489
—Daurgäsimhavrtti (of Prthvïcandra) —Avacùrï (of Vijayamala) 534
529 Kavikalpadrumaskandha Upasargamandana (of
—Tattvämava (of Raghunanda Äcärya) Mandana Kavi) 485
529 | KAVI KANTHAHÄRA 525
—Prabodha (of Rämanätha Cakravar- | K A V I K U Ä J A R A 3 7 1
tin) 530 IKAVÏNDRANANDANA 525
—Vanmayapradlpa (of Sarvadhara Upä- 'Kaviraj, Gopinatha 553, a:G1394, G1455
dhyäya) 532 Kaviräjapätrikä (of Pitambara Vidyäbhü-
—Samjïvanï (of Sîtânâtha Sästrin) 532 sana) 529
—Manoramä (of Srinätha âiromani) 533 Kaviratna, Syamacarana G1025, e:G555
—Kaläpacandra (of Susena Kaviräja KAVISÄRANGA 525
Misra) G656 KAVI VALLABHA 525
—Äkhyätafikä (of Vidyäsägara) G653 Kävyadarsa (ofDandin) 107
—Laghuvrtti or Sisyahita (of Yasobhüti) Kävyälamkärasütravrtti G852
535 Kävya literature G557 '
Kätantra(sütra)vrtti-Panjikä (of TrilocanaKEDAREâVARA SARMAN 525
däsa) GB43,*G656-58, 475-76 Keith, Arthur Berriedale G559, a:G110,
—Uddyota (of Trivikrama ) 478 G459
—Pradipa (of Kusala) 480 Kenghe, G.T. a:G700
—Durgâ (pada )prabodha (of Jinaprabhä ) Kephart, Calvin b:G1471
483 KESARI MISRA 525.
—Kalâpatattvabodhini (of Rämacandra) KESAVA (1650) 498
502 KESAVA525
—Tïka (of Gandrakänta Tarkälam- KEâAVADEVA TARKAPATSÏCANANA
kära) 512 BHATTÄGÄRYA 525
—Dhundikä (of Dhanaprabhä Süri) 520 KHANA NRPATI 526
—Prabodha (of Narahari) 528 Kharbas, S. Datta b:G1638
—Candra or Vyäkhyäsara (of Susena Khare, G. H. a:G1220
Kaviräja Misra) 533 Kharwandikar, D. K. a.:G926-27, d:G925
Commentary (of Visvesvara Tarkäcä- KHUDDIJHÄ (SARMAN) (191(T) 23-
rya) 535 24,399,514
INDEX 581

Kielhorn, Franz G549, a:G14, G46, G425, KRSNAMÄGHARIAR. See KRSJNTA-

G434, G535, G542-43, G545, G671, SUDHI
G677, G679, G7B5, G821, G848, G880, KRSI^A MlâRA (1780) 508
G882, G941, G1378, G13Ô6, b:G2, Krsriamisraprakriyä (of Krsna Misra) 508
G503, G1369, e:G536, et:G665 • KRSNAMITRÄGÄRYA or DURBA-
Kiparsky, Paul a:G247, G377 i LÄGÄRYA (1800) 23, 377, 381, 508-9
Kirätärjuniya (ofBhâravi) 175 KRSISfA PANDITA 526
Kiurste,J. e:G942, G944 KRSI^A SÄSTRIN 526
Kiuttel, F. a:G1381, G1384 KRSIsFASUDHI 525
Klostermaier, Klaus 550-51 KRS^ÄVADHÜTA 526
Knauer, Friedrich a:G1377 Krsna Yajurveda 549
knowledge, theory of 5, 43, 53-63, 68-69, krti. See volition
126, G720, G1558, G1615. See also krtisädhyatva. See feasibility
cognition *• Krtparisisfa (of Ratideva Siddhänta Vägi-
—pramâ 54 sa) 531
= vidyä 128, 147 Krtprakäsa (of Nilakantha Dïksita) 506
KOGGA SANKARAN SUSUD (1825) KSAPANAKA (1650) 472
510 KSEMANKARA (1653) 499
KOLAHALA526 KSEMENDRA (1525) 487-88
KODANDARÄMA 526 Kshirsagar, V. K. a:G370
KOI^DA BHATTA (1630) 21-22, 241, KSIRASVÄMIN (1050) 19,476
255-308, 324, 369, 495-96, 562 Kudala, S.D. e:G552
Konow, Sten a:G106, G1431 KULAGANDRA (1550) 489
Koparkar, D. G. a:G423, G895 KULAKÄGÄRYA 526
Kotbhaskara, Ramachandra Sastri KULAMAI^DANA SÜRI (1394) 485
e:G680 KULAMUNI (1800) 508
krama. See growth; sequence KULLUKA BHATTA 527
KRAMADÏSVARA (1050) 19,.477 Kumar, Avanindra b:G399
kratu. See energy, inner KUMÄRALABDHA or KUMÄRALÄ-
krdanta, See primary derivative TA (200) 465
Krdvivaraw (of Käsinätha) 525 KUMÄRAPÄLA (1461) 486
Krdvrtti (of Kavïndranandana) 525 KUMÄRATATÄYA (1825) 23,391, 510
Kfishnamachariar, R.V. e:G1095, GÏ294 Kumari, Sudesh d:G332
Krishnamacharya, V. 342, 363 KUMÄRILA BHATTA (660) 4, 18, 25-
Krishnamoorthy, K. a:G1657 26, 71-77, 81, 88-89, 97, 181, 189-190,
kriyä. See action; verb 213, 237, 282, 549, 554-56, 561, G682,
Kriyäkaläpa (of Jinadevasüri) 524 G786
Kriyânigharitu (of Bhaftoji Dïksita) 492 KUNÄRABADAVA 458
Kriyâratnasamuccaya (of Gunaratna Süri)kundalini 328
486 KUNI458
Kriyaviveka (ofHeläräja) 193,475 KUPPU SÄSTRIN (1750) 507
Krnmanjari (of Sivadäsa) 532 KUSALA (1200)480
KRPÄLA PAI^DITA 526 Kushwaha, Mahesh Singh e:G1172 "
KRJPÄRÄMA 526 kufasthanityata. See eternal
(God) Krsna 195, G532
KRS^A (1645) 498 Laddu, Sueshacandra Dhyaneshwar
526 a:G180, G220, G264, G279, G299,
BHATTÄGÄRYA 526 G482A, G487A, G492, G513, G515,
KRSIJJÄCÄRYA 526 G621, G640, G1581, G1614, G1711
KRSI^ÄGÄRYA II (1430) 486 Laghubodha (of Krsna) 498
KRSI^ADVAIPÄYANA 146 Laghumanjusä (of Nägesa Bhafta) 23
KRSI^A DVIVEDIN 526 —Kalo, (of Vaidyanätha Paiyagunda)
â (1280) 483 23, 357
582 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Laghusabdakaustubha (of Nilakantha Dik- daivl vak 37

sita) 373,506 —learning 93
Laghuiabdaratna (of Nage sa Bhatta)323, levels of 61-63
367 para vàk 63
Laghusärasvata (of Kalyâna Sarasvatï) 508 philosophy of 27, 36, G720
Laghusiddhäntakaumudl (of Varadaräja) —principle (sabdatattva) 95, 128, 553
494-95 Lanka 322
—Tikâ (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 505 LÄTÄ VIHÄRIN (1850) 511
—Tikä (of Rüpacandra) 512 La Terza, Ermanagilda a:G681, G788
—Sarabodhinï (of Rancchodji Odhavji) Lehman, J. a :G1479
514 Leidecker, Kurt F. b:G1419
—Tinantapradïpikâ (of Kalävati Devi) LESAPRABODHA. See JINAPRABHÄ
514 (SÜRI)
—Tippani (of Sivadatta Sarman) 514 letter. &£ phoneme
—Tikâ (of U. K. Venkatanarasimha) Levi, Sylvain a:G48, G498, G504, G826
515 lexicography G1388
—Tippani (of Jivanätha Raya) 515 liar's paradox. See paradox
—Bàlabodhinï (of Väsudev Visnu Mirä- liberation (moksa) 18, 46-47, 49, 51, 99,
shi) 515 130, 342, G719
—Tikä (ofGirija) 522 Liebich, Bruno a:G823-24,G1375,G1395,
—Samksiptabälabodhini (of Kanakaläla b:G57, G59, G67, G438, G822, G828,
Sarman) 524 e:G58, G825, G827, et:G660, t:G847,
—Säralä (of Jivaräma Sarman) G1159 G923
—Bhaiml (of Bhimasena Sästri) G1168 Lienhard, Siegfried a:G1587
Laghusiddhäntamanjusä (of Nage sa Bhatta)Limaye, V. P. 128, a:G205, G221-22,
323 G372, G669, b:G635, e:G726, G781
—Kuncikä (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381 limit (avadhi) 132
Lahiri, Prabodh Chandra b:G81 linga. See gender; indication
Lakarärthanirnaya (of Srîkrsna BhattaLinganirriayacandrikä (of Anantasüri ) 518
Maunin) 367, 506 Lingänusäsana
Laksana (=King Muktapida of Kashmir ) of Gandra school 18
193 Commentary (by Harsavardhana)
Laksanä. See secondary meaning 472
Laksmana, 12th cent, ruler in Bengal 209 —Sarvalaksaria (of Prthivisvara) 529
LAKSMAI^A DVIVEDIN 527 ofVämana473
LAKÇMANA TRIPÄTHI (1915) 515 rules 15
Laksmï 341 Lingänusäsana (of Hemacandra) 504
LAKSMÏDATTA 527 —Durgäprabodha (of Srivallabhaväcärya )
Laksmidhara 241 504
LAKSMIKÄRA 527 —Sawärthalaksana (of &abarasvämin)
LAKSMINÄRÄYANA VYÄSA 527 531
Laksminiväsäbhidhä (of Sivaräma Tripä-Lingänusäsanavrtti (of Utpâla) 479
thin). See Unädikosa Linge, D. E. 550
DAKSMÏNR.SIMHA (1660) 499 linguistic element {sabda) 5-6, 182-85
Laksyamälä (of Elesvarägnihotra) 521 linguistic monism (sabdädvaitd) 193
Lalamani Upadhyaya 379 linguistics, diachronic G1523
Lambert, F. a:G1600 • linguistics, modern G314
Langer, Susan K. 554 literary criticism (sähitya) 3-5, ,28-33, 67.
(spoken) language {sabda) (väc) 3-4, 37, See also alamkärasästra
94, 103-7, 114, 118, 124-25 loan words G1613
—acquisition G763 Locana (of Abhinavagupta ) 91
as means of release {ßabdapüwayoga)locative (case-ending) (adhikarana) 168,
46-47, 49-50, G755 270, G1664, 337-39
INDEX 583

absolute 262 —Tîkâ (of Samkara) 531

logic G563, Gl545, Gl559 —Cintämayi (of Dhanesvara ) 211, 481
propositional G243 —Ratnaprakäsa (of Sivarämendra Saras-
logos 37, 105-6 ' vati) 22,245,487
LOKESAKÄRA (1683) 501 —Süktiratnäkära (of [Sesa] Näräyana
LOKESVARA SARMAN SUKLA 527 Bhatta) 22, 225, 488
Lüders, 3 . e:G664 —Sphürti (of Sarvesvara) 489
—Prakäsikä (of Sesa Visnu) 22, 243,
Macdonnell, A. A. 549 494
MÄDHAVA or SAYANA (1350) 56, 68, —Vyâkhyâdarsa (ofKamalâkara Bhafta)
484, 554, 556 498
MÄDHAVA (1887) 513 —Siddhäntaratnaprakäsa (of &ivarämen-
(ARRA or ERRA) MÄDHAVA BHA- dra Sarasvatî) 499
TTA (1450) 486 —Ratnâvali (of Cokkanätha Diksita)
MÄDHAVA BHATTA (1520) 487 22,311,499
MÄDHAVA SARÀSVATÏ (1550)489 —Anüpäta (of Tirumala Yajvan) 277,
MÄDHAVA SASTRÏ BHANDARÏ 499
(1920) 515, e:G565, GM17 —Güdhärthadipani (of Sadäsiva) 22, 317,
MADHUKÄNTA SARMÄ JHÄ (1950) 500
24,516 —Prakäsa (of Nilakantha Diksita) 500
MADHVA (1280) 266 —Säbdikacintämapi (of Gopâla Krsna
Mädhyamaka Buddhism 45, 60 Sästrin) 23, 353, 504
madhyamâ väc 43, 47, 49-50, 52, 61-62, 95, —Viuararia (of Satyapriya Tïrtha Svâ-
99, 121, 124, 328-29, 342, 555, 558 min) 23, 359, 505
Madhyasiddhäntakaumudi (of Varadaräja) —Tattvaviveka (of Nilakantha Diksita)
494 373, 506
—Tikä (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 505 —Parijâtam Nätakam (of Kumära Tatä-
Commentary (of Bälakrsna Sarmä ya) 23, 391, 510
Yogi) 513 —Tripäfhaga (of Satärä Räghavendrä-
—Visamasthalafippani (of Govindasimha ) cärya) 23, 393, 510
513 —Mariiratnaprabhä (of Viprarajendra )
•—Sudhä (of Sadäsiva Sästri Joshî) 516 511, G37
—Vyäkhyä (of Brahmadeva) 519 —Tippani (of Dayänanda Sarasvatî)
—-Prabhäkara (of Visvanätha Sästri) 535 511
Magha G873 —Prakäsa (of Madhukänta Sarmä Jhä )
Mahäbharata 146, G264, G1568 214, 516
Mahabhäsya (of Patanjali) 16-17, 19-22, —Kuncikä (of Hari Samkara Jhä) 515,
38, 45-47, 55, 68, 117-21, 124, 165, 167, G566
182-83, 196, 242, 264, 267, 271, 278, —Tattväloka (of Rudhradhara Jhä
325, 327, 334-35, 340-42, 345, 459-64, Sarman) 24, 421, 516
549, 553, 551, 556-57, G181, G502, —Tippani (of Guruwara Bäla Sästri)
G515, G586 523
—Dïpika or —Tripâdi or Tika (of —Süktiratnäkära (of Nrsimha) 528
Bhartrhari) 18, 22, 54, 124, 174-76, —Vidvanmukhabhüsana (of Prayogaven-
470 katädri) 529
—Bhâgavrtti (of Vimalamati) 472, G791 Mahäbhasyapradipa (of Kaiyata) 19, 22,
—Pradipa (of Kaiyata). See Mahâbhâs- 174, 203-4, 476
yapradipa —Laghuvivarana (of Satyänanda or
Commentary (of Jyesthakaläsa) 205, Rämacandra Sarasvatî) 219, 487
477 — (Brhad)Vivarana (of ïsvarânanda)
—Tika (of Maitreya Raksita) 207, 478 22,219,229,488
—Prunâpana or —Laghuvrtti (of Puruso- —-Uddyotana (of Annambhatta) 22, 237,
ttamadeva) 209, 480 489
584 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

—Sphûrtï (of Sarvesvara) 489 MANDANA (1330) 484

—Tippanl (of Mallaya Yajvan) 249, MANDANA KAVI (1400) 485
496 MANDANA MISRA (690) 5, 11, 18, 22,
—Vyakhya (of Näräyana [Sästrin] 22, 51, 56-59, 70-80, 82, 98, 181-91, 231
353,498 233-35, 266, 331, 473-74, 554, 556, 561
—Prakäsa (of Nilakantha Diksita) 500 Mändükya Upanisad 37\ 106
—Uddyota (of Nàges'a Bhatta) 23, 340- MANGARASA 527
42, 503 manifestation (vivarta, vyanjaka) 93, 129,'
—Chäyä (of Vaidyanâtha Paiyagu- 216, 236, Gl 587
nda) 23, 357, 505 MÄISFIKYADEVA 527
—Tippanl (of Bäla Sästrin) G522, Manjusä (of Nägesa Bhatta) 323
G547 Manoramäcandrikä (of Nilämbara Misra)
—Vyakhya (of Rämasevaka) 23, 377, 528
507 Manoramäkharidana (of Kesava) 498
—Sphûrtï (of Ädenna) 517 Mansion, J. b:G1407
—Prakäsa (ofPravartakopädhyäya) 529 mantra 24, 51-52, 107-8, 148, 188, 234
—Prakäsa (of Sesa Gintämani) 22, 221 —samädhi 52
Mahäcärya 239 Manu G493
MAHÄDEVA ( 1270 ) 482 MANYUDEVA or MANADEVA (1815)
Mahädeva, father of Vaidyanâtha Paiya- 23, 387, 509
gunda 357 Marathi 287
Mahädeva Diksita, father of Väsudeva marker (it) 16
Diksita 365 Marulasiddaiah, G. b:G1573
Mahadevan, T. M. P. 551-52 Mätarisvara 104
MAHÄDEVA VEDÄNTIN (1694) 501 mathematics G208, G1689,
MAHÄLINGA SÄSTRIN 527 Matilal, Bimal Krishna a:G204, G1542,
Maharashtra 20, 241, 323, G1685 G1574, G1633, b:G1615
Mahashabda, M. V. a:G1267 matter, material thing (mürti) 162
Mahävärttika (of Kätya or Bhävan) 458 MUNISEKHARA 527
Mahavir a:G333, G400-01, G406, Maurya G548
b:G373 mäyä 41-43, 60, 105
Mahävira 17 obscuring (ävarana) 42
MAHENDRANÄTHA BHATTÄCÄR- projective (viksepa) 42
YA (1900) 513, e:G652 Mayrhofer, M. a:G1513, g:G1491
MAHESAJHÄ527 Mazumdar, B. G. a:G52
Mahesvara, teacher of Kaiyata 203 Mazumdar, Pradip Kumar a:G1621,
Mahes'vara Süri 203 b:G1680
Mazumdar, Surendra Nath a:G850
Mahesvarasütras of Pänini's Astädhyäyi 14,
G65, G341. See also Astädhyäyi McArthur, Harvey 550
Maitrayanl Samhita a:G433 meaning, theory of 5, 8-10, 18, 27-30, 90,
MAITREYA RAKSITA (1109) 19,207, 145, 186, 232-34, 324, G1396, G1555-
478 56.. See also connotation, sphofa
Maitrl Upanisad 40, 45, 550 abstracted (apoddhära) 13
Majumdar, Baradaprasada e:G1021 =artha 5-6, 26, 94, 114, 118-19, 149,
MALAYAGIRI (1280) 483 559
MALLAYA YAJVAN (1630) 34, 496 figurative G5, 370
Mammata 83, 203, 370 nominal. See nominal meaning
MÄNALUR VIRARÄGHAVÄGÄRYA relation of word to 7-8
527 secondary. See secondary meaning
manana. See thinking sentence. See sentence meaning
(SRI) MÄNASARMAN 527 single (ekärthlbhava) 277-84, 340
Manavalli, Gangadhara Sastri e:G680 stable 131
Manavalli, Rama Sastri e:G1114 verbal. See verbal meaning
INDEX 585
word-meaning. See word Mishra, Avadh Bihari e:G690
means or instrument (kararia) 25, 87, 163, Misra, Brahrnashankara e:G1320
165, 168, 270, 337-38, Gl 542 Mishra, Hari Deo a:G608
=sädhana 145, 162-68, 195-96 Mishra, Hari Mohan a:G402, G490A,
G1669
to a desired result {istasädhanatva) 265-Misra, M. P. e:G906
66 Misra, Narayana e:G862
measure (parimäria) 115 Mishra, Ramasakala e:G885
Meenakshi, K. a:G1706 Mishra, Satya S vamp a:G1670
MEGHARATNA (1400) 485 Misra, Sobita e:G853
MEGHAVIJAYA (1700) G952, 502 Misra, Sri Narayana a:G250
Mehendale, M. A. a:G408 Misra, Sudama Sarman e:G1048
Meisezahl, R. O. a:G1007 Mishra, Umesh a:G1397
memory, recollection (smrti) 30, 184, 216, Mishra, Vidhata b:G1622
235,303, 321, 324 Misra, Vidya Niwas a:G181-82, G1610,
—traces (samskara) 43-44, 48, 74-78, b:G206
81. See also dispositional tendency Misra, Vir Bhadra a:G390
(inner) mental word 231, 234 Mitäksaravrtti (of Balambhatta ) 357
merit (dharma) 121, 132 Mitra 104
MERUTUNGA (1388) 485 Mitra, Rajendralal a:G497
metalanguage G266, G286, G323, G1662 mlecchasabda. See corrupt word
metaphor (upacära) 5, 8, 11, 29-30, 67-68, Moghe, R. G. a:G1616
91, 194, 258 Mohana Lala, grandfather of Indradatta
faded 66 Upadhyaya 379
metaphoric transfer 26, G1704 Mokate, Ganapati Sastri e:G1125, G1344
metaphysics 35-52 moksa. See liberation
metarule {paribhäsä) 14-15, G326, G352, MOKSESVARA (1350) 484
G1502, G1598, G1616, G1647, G1682 Mongolian G1692
metrics (chattdas) 3, 39, 107 monism 61, G730
Millonig, Harald a :G1601 mood 263-67, 335-37
(Pürva) Mimämsä 3-6, 9, 12, 21, 25-28, different permanent moods {sthayïbhâva )
54-55, 60, 66, 69, 71, 73, 76, 79, 83, 85- 33
91, 95-98, 118-19, 181, 184, 186, 190, Mookerji, Radhakumud a:G446-47
213, 233, 237, 240-41, 255-57, 260-63, moral power 47-48
271-72, 282, 284-87, 292-93, 295-96, morpheme 4, 6, G1537
324, 328, 331, 334, 339-40, 344, 346, analysis G176
556, G797, G802, G1526, G1616, morphophonemics G336, G1678
G1680. See also Bhäfta; Prabhäkara Morretta, Angelo a:G1659
Mimamsaka, Yudhisthira 205, 207, 211, motion, movement 552-53
225, 241, 247, 249, 313, 359, 373, 561- motivating force (prayojana) 204
62, a:G844, b:G285, ce:G23, e:G315, Mugdhabälävabodha (of Kulamandana
G420, G909, G977, G1328, t:G20 Süri). See Auktika
Mimämsäsütras(of Jaimini) 25,86,92,114, Mugdhabodha (of Vopadeva) 20, 482-83
213,230 233 >—Parisista (of Nandakisora Bhattâcàrya
—Slokavärttika (of Kumärila). See Slok- Gakravartin) 485
avarttika —Pramodajanani or —Käraka (of Räma
—Tantravärttikä (of Kumärila). See Tarkavägisa) 489
Tantravarttika Commentary (of Käsisvara) 489
—Kutühalavrtti (of Vasudeva Diksita) —Subodha (of Durgädäsa Vidyäväisa)
365 497
miracle (atadbhüta). See action, miraculous — (Kavikalpadruma) Dhatudïpikâ or —Pa-
course of ribhasätikä (of Durgädäsa Vidyävä-
Misra, Adya Prasada G1052 gïsa) 497
586 ENCYCLOPEDIA OP INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

—Subodha (of Kârttikeya Siddhânta Nakamura, Hajime a:G697, G745, G803,

Bhattäcärya) 509 G807
—Setusamgraha (of Gangädhara) 512 Nalla Perumal Diksita 311
—Tippani (of Syämacarana Kaviratna) nämadhätu. See verb, nominal
514 Nämakarthaprakäsasamgraha (of Abhinava
—Parimala (of Harendranäräyana Nrsimhäs'rama) 496
Devasarman) 514 näman. See noun
—Dhätuvrtti (of Dâmodara) 519 Nämanirmaladarpana (of Laksmïdhara)
Commentary (of Devidäsa Cakravar- 527
tin) 520 name and form (nämarüpa) 107
—Tippani (of Girîsacandra Vidyâra- Namputiri, E. V. Raman e:G1201
tna) G1019 na ft. See negation, negative particle
—Sabdadipikä (of Govindaräma Vidyä- NÄNAKARÄMA SÄSTRIN (1924) 515,
siromani) 523 e:G1092
—Dhätupradipa (of Haranätha Vidyära- NANDAKÏRTI 527
tna) 523 NANDAKISORA SARMAN BHATTÄ-
«—Tippani (of Sivanäräyana Siromani ) CÄRYA CAKRAVARTIN (1398) 485
532 \ NANDASUNDARA. See DHANACAN-
Mugdhabodha school 19 ) DRA
Mugdhaparisisfa (ofKâsîsvara Bhattäcär- NANDASUNDARA GANI 528
ya) 489 Nandi, T. S. a:G1588
Mukhabhüsana 487 NARAHARI 528
Mukhopadhyaya, Sunjit Kumar a:G1051 NARAIN DATTA TRIPÄTHIN 528
mukhya words G1484 NARANÄRÄYANA. *&* PURUSOTTA-
Muktikaläsa, grandfather of Jyesthaka- MA VIDYÄVÄGlSA BHATTÄCÄR-
läs'a 205 YA
(King) Muktipâda of Kashmir. See Narang, Satya Pal a:G978
Laksana NARAPATI MAHÄMISRA (1425) 486
Müller, F. Max a:G39, G520, G845 Narasimhacarya, M. S. e:G1059
Müller, Reingold F. G. a:G1499 NARASIMHA SÜRI 528
Muni, Jambuvijaya a:G794 NÄRÄYAJ^A 528
Municandravijaya e:G959 NÄRÄYANA BHARATÏ 528
Muralïdhara, greatgrandfather of Indra- (SESA) NÄRÄYANA (BHATTA)
datta Upädhyäya 379 (1546) 22, 215, 225, 243, 488, G1107
MURLÏDHARA MISRA (1977) 517, NÄRÄYANA BHATTATIRI (1640) 22,
e:G1053 497
Murder in the Cathedral (of T. S. Eliot) 49 NÄRÄYANA DANDANÄTHA (1100)
mürta. See matter 478
Murti, M. S. Narayana a-.G225, G249, NÄRÄYANA NYÄYAPAfiCÄNANA
G770, G772, G783, G1109, G1602, (1550) 488-89
G1634, G1709, G1713, d:G1617 NÄRÄYANA (SADHU) (1667) 500
Murty, Parasuram Gopala Krishna (RÄMA) NÄRÄYANA (SARMAN)
a:G481 (VANDYOPÄDHYÄYA) (1664) 315,
Murti, T.R.V. 53, 55, 550, 552, a:G1643 499
music G203 NÄRÄYANA (SÄSTRIN) (1640) 498
mystical experience 32, 47 NARAYANA (SÄSTRIN) 22, 253,
mysticism 65 G1059
NÄRÄYANA SUDHI (1750) 507
näda 69-70, G1455 NÄRENDRAPURI (1300)483
NÄGESA BHATTA (1714) 21, 23, 68, NÄROTTAMA VIDYÄLAMKÄRA
83, 87, 203, 319, 323-49, 357, 379, 387, BHATTÄCÄRYA 528
G1081, G1084, 502-4, 549, 555-56, 562 Nath, Narendra Candra a:G265, b:G251
NÄGOBA PALPITA (1775) 508 natural (svabhäva) intuition 146
INDEX 587

Mtyaéàstra (of Bharata) 28 sentence. See sentence, nominal

NAVACANDRA NYÄYARATNA verb (nämadhätu). See verb, nominal
(1905) 514 nominalization G1566
NAVKISHOREJHÄ (1931) 516 nominative case 257, G1483
Nawathe, P. D. a:G300 nonapprehension. See absence
NAYASUNDARA 528 noun (näman) 110, 112, 114, 121, 149-50,
Nazzeri, O. b:G1468 256-57, 339, G696, G1550
negation 262, 288-89, 291-92, 334, G124, abstract 292
G1554 formation of G1490
fourfold (catuskoti) 60 novelty 83. See also apürva
negative compound G815 NRSIMHA (1650) 498
negative particle G815 NRSIMHA 528
paryudâsa 334 NRSIMHÄSRAMA (1559) 237
prasajyapratisedha 60, 334 NRSIMHA TARKAPAHCÄNANA 528
Neranävatisütravyäkhyä. See Gajäsütraväda number (samkhyä) 115, 127, 149, 172-73,
(ofVenkatadäsa) 188, 213, 273, 275, 284, 335, G130
neuter G1499 singular/plural 163, 257, 261-62, 295-97,
New Catalogus Catalogorum 215 G1593
nididhyäsana 106 nuns G445
Nighantu (list of words ) 4, 109 Nyäya 3, 5-6, 9-11, 21, 26-29, 45, 55, 60,
NÏLAKANTHA DÏKSITA (1675) 500 65-66, 85, 87-88, 90-93, 96-98, 237,
NÏLAKANTHA DÏKSITA (1750) 239, 255, 258-59, 263, 265, 268, 272, 274,
317, 321, 351, 373, 506 282-92, 298-301, 303, 306, 324-40, 344«
NÏLAKANTHA SUKLA (1637) 251, 45, 368-69, 381, 397, 556, G1526
497, 562 Nyäyabhüsaria (of Bhäsarvajfia) 262, 264-
NÏLAKANTHA VÄJAPEYIN (1605) 65, 296, 369
373, 493 ' Nyàyamanjarï (of Jayanta Bhatta) 91, 97
NÏLAKANTHA VYÄSA 393 Nyäyasamgraha (of Gangâdatta) 521
NÏLAMBARA MISRA 528 Nyâyasamgraha (of Hemahamsavijayagani )
nimitta. See condition; occasion 486
nipäta. See particle —Nyäyärthamanjusä (autocommentary)
Nipätavyayopasargavrtti (of Ksirasvämin ) 486
• 477 Nyäyasudhä (of Somesvara Bhatta)
—Tîkâ (of Tilaka) 534 Commentary (of Annambhatta) 237
nirukta. See etymology Nyayasütras (of Gautama) 85, 97, 549, 556
Nirukta (of Yäska) 4, 10, 14, 108-12, 234, (grammatical) object (of action) {karman)
258, 330-31, 549, 556, G393, G422, 164-65, 255, 257-62, 267, G1606
G605 . —käraka 337-38
nirvikalpaka (pratyaksa) 27-28
nisedha. See prohibition occasion {nimitta) 147
Nitisataka section of Subhasitatrîsatï 124 Ojihara, Yutaka a:G148, G154, G158,
nitya. See eternal G192, G226-27, G281, G518, G609,
NITYÄNANDA PANTA PARVATÏYA G615, G630, G638, G855, G859,
(1918) 24, 401, 515 G1582, t:G854
niyojya (person enjoined to act) 25 old age (jam). See decay
nominal onomatapoeia {ßabdänukrti ) 111
composition G1577, G1586 ontology 127
formations G232, G1590 operation. See function (vyäpära)
meaning (nämärtha) 272-76 operational rule (vidhisütra) 15
stem or suffix (pratipädika) 15, 115, 131, Oppert, Gustav e:G881
258, 275-76, 284, 291, 325, 339, 343, opposition. See contradiction
G1513-14, G1578 option G378
quotative G1641 ORAM BHATTA 528
588 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Orara, E. de Guzman a:G623 Pandeya, Harisankara e:G91

original relation of word to meaning Pandeya, Kalika Charan a:G1543
(autpattika) 7, 90 Pandeya, Kesava Deva a:G1035
orthodox (ästika) 37 Pandeya, Kshitish Chandra 552
Ousaparampil, J. a:G1707 Pandeya, Ram Chandra b:G1555
Pandeya, Umesh Chandra e:G159
pada. See word Pandit, M. D. a:G165, G174-5, G208-9,
Padacandrikä (of Sesa Krsna) 488 G252, G283, G303, G317, G488A,
—Krsriakautuhula (autocommentary) d:G1623
488 Pandye, Ram Awadh d:G418
Padamanjari (of Haradatta) / PÄNINI (350 B. C?) 4, 6, 9, 13-21, 36,
Commentary (of Näräyana) 498 38,45, 55, 66-68, 85-86,97,108-19,165,
—Makaranda or —Parimala (of Ranga- 167, 194, 204, 261-64, 267-72, 276-77,
nâtha Dïksita) 498 284, 293-97, 322, 331-45, 441-58, 549-
—Kusumavikäsa (of Sivabhatta) 509 50, 554, 556-57, G4, G503
Commentary (of Jagaddhara) 524 PärtiniparisisfavyäkaraijLa (of Devendraku-
Commentary (of Rämasimha) 531 mära Vidyäratna) 515
Commentary (of Ratnesvara) 531 Pàriinipradïpa (of Sundaresvara Yajyan)
Padapâtha (of Säkalya) 4, 13 373
padärtha. See category Pâriinisâra (of Navacandra Nyäyaratna)
Padârthadipikâ (of Konda Bhatta) 255, 514
G1181 Pärtinisüträrthasamgraha (of Devidasa) 520
Padârthadipikâ (of Nage s'a Bhatta) 323 Päniniyadipikä (of Nïlakantha Vâjapeyin)
Padasamjnâvicara (of Äsädhara Bhatta) 493
375,507 Pàriinipradïpa (of Sundaresvara Yajvan)
padasphota. See sphota : pada 373
Padasüryapvakriya (of Utsavakîrti) 534 PärjLiniyamatadarpana (of Kavidarpana
Padavyavasthä (sütra ) kârikâ (of Vimalakirti ) Räghava) 485
488 Pätiimyasära (of Jagadisa) 524
—Vivrti (of Udayakirti) 499 Päriiniyaüksa 15, 455
Padavyavasthäkosa (of Gosvämi Sri Sivä- —Panjikä (of Dharanïdhara ) 485
nandabhatta) 522 Commentary (of Dayänanda Saras-
Padhye, D. G. e:G861 vati)511
PADMADHARA 528 —Pradïpa (of Rudra Prasäda Sarmä )
PADMANÄBHADATTA (1375)484-85 516
(RÄJA) PADMANÄRÄYAI^A 528 Pâyiniyatattvadarpana (of Kâlïcarana Vid-
PADMASUNDARA 529 yopädhyäya and Sürya Prasäda Misra)
Paik, T. S. d:G316 512
painting 58 Payimyavädanaksatramälä (of Umämahes-
Palsule, Gajanan Balkrishna 182-91,215- vara) 371, 507
17, 231-36, 367-70, a:G21-22, G116, Pansikar, Vasudev Laxman Shastri
G149-50, G207, G232-33, G266, G301- e:G918, G1001, G1083
02, G1589, G1590, G1099, G1644, Par ab, Kashinath Pandurang e:G943
d:G143, e:G1033 paradox 60-61, G773
Pancagranthl (of Buddhisägara Süri) 476 paragraph 61
Pancamatabhanjana (of Sri Tätäcärya) 239Paramalaghumanjusà (of Nägesa Bhatta)
PAftCÄNANA KANDALÏ 529 21, 23, 323-40, 342, 502-3, 556
Pancapädikävivaraya (of Prakäsätman) 287 —Arthadïpikà (of Sadäsiva Sästri Joshi )
Pancasamaslya (of Rämacaritra Tripäthin) 24,415,503
530 Commentary (of Nityänanda Panta
Pancholi, Bala Krishna 417, G1189, Parvatïya) 24,401, 515
e:Gl 104-5 —Jyotsna (of Kalika Prasäda Öukla) 24,
Pandey, Chandra Kant a:G604, b:G173 324, 423, 517
INDEX 589

—Ratnaprabhä (of Sabhäpati âarman —Vijaya (of Mânas'arman) 527, 535

Upädhyäya) 24, 425, 517 Paribhäsendukkhara (author unknown) 503,
—Ratnadïpika (of Sivänanda Pandeya) 519
503,532 Visami (of Cidrüpäsrama) 490
päramärthika. See real Citprabhä (of Täraka Brahmänanda
Paramatakhandana (of Cakrapani ) 247 Sarasvati) 498
(R.SIPUTRA) PARAME&VARA IÏ Paribhäsendusekhara (of Nägesa Bhatta)
(1410) 22, 213-14, 485-86 323, 503, G972
Paranjpe, Vasudeva Gopala b:G507 —Käsikä or —Gadä (of Vaidyanätha
Paranjpe, Vinayak Wasudeo a:G144, Paiyagunda) 357, 505
G856 —BrhadaBsträrthakalä (of Venimädha-
Parapaksakharidana (of Näräyana Bhatta- va) 506'
tiri). See Apänimyapramänatä —Trisikhä (of Laksminrsimha ) 507
paraphrase G1651 —Vyäkhya or —Éamkari (of Samkara
parä väk. See language Bhatta) 508
paribhäsä. See metarule —Arthamahjari (of Bhimäcärya Gala-
Paribhäsä (of Vyädi) 458 gali) 508
Paribhasäbhäskara (of Hari Bhäskara Agni- Commentary (of Krsnamiträcärya)
hotra.) 500-01 381,509
Commentary (of Sriniväsa) 533 —Induprakäsa (of Gangädhara) 509
Paribhasäbhäskara (of Sesädrisudhi ) 507 —Bhairavï or —Vivrti (of Bhairava
—Paribhasäbhäskara (of Kuppu Sästrin) Misra) 510
507 —Tippanlsârasâraviveka (of Bälasastrin
Commentary (ofHariräma) 511 Ränade) 511
Commentary (of Räjaräma Diksita) —Candrikä (of Visvanätha Dondi-
530 bhatta) 511
Paribhäsämariimälä (of Candradatta Jhä) Commentary (of Lälä Vidärin) 511
519 —Akhandatändava (of Harinätha Dvive-
Paribhäsäpradipa (of Govinda Sena ) 523 din) 511
Paribhäsäpradipa (of Kolähala) 526 —Bhüti (of Rämakrsna Tätyasästrin)
Paribhäsäpradipärcis (of Udayankara Näna- 513 •
päthaka) 509 —Haimavatî (of Yägesvara) 513
Paribhäsaratna (of Appa Süri) 504 —Väkyärthacandrikä (of Hari Sarman)
Paribhäsärthadipika (of Teknätha) 534 513
Paribhäsärthaprakäsikä (of Dharmasüri) —Citprabhä (of Brahmänanda Saras-
501 vati) 514-15
Paribhäsärthasamgraha (of Vaidyanätha —Tattvaprakäsikä (of Laksmana Tri-
Diksita) 502 päthi) 515
—Vyakhyä (of Appa Süri) 504 —Tikä (of Gadädhara) 521
—Candrikä (of Svayamprakäsänanda) —Vrtti (of Ganesa) 521
505 —Arthamanjari (of Hayagriväcärya)
Paribhäsävrtti (of Gopinätha Tarkäcärya) 522
488 Commentary (of Krsna Bhatta) 526
Paribhäsävrtti (of Purusottamadeva) 209, —Laghutikä (of Raghunätha Sästri
480 Vaiyäkaranä) 530
Paribhäsävrtti (of Nïlakantha Diksita) 373, —Sarvamangalä (of Sesa Sarman) 532
506 Commentary (of Väläbhidatta) 534
Paribhäsävrtti (of Ramacandra Vidya- Commentary (of Visvanätha Bhatta}
bhusana) 501 G1255
Paribhäsävrtti (of Siradeva) 480-81 -—Vijaya (of Jayadeva Misra) G1259,
—Vyäkhya (of Ramacandra Diksita) G1264
501 —Tattvadarsa (of Vasudeva ââstrï Abh-
Commentary (of Govinda Misra) 522 yankar) 516
590 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Paribhäsopanyäsa (of Vaidyanätha Diksita)Pawte, I. S. b:G83

502 Pàyagunde Balakrsna 387
{Vedantakalpataru) Parimala (of AppayyaPayyur family 213
Diksita I) 297, 304 PEDDINTI BRAHMADEVA. See BRA-
parimâria. See measure HMADEVA
parinäma. See transformation Peijer,J. S. b:G1376
paroksatva. See imperceptibility Pendse, Narahari Shastri e:G1006
PÄRTHIVAG506 perception (pratyaksa) 59, 126, 175, 188,
particle (nipäta) 110, 112, 118, 121, 147, 196, 213, 232-333 236
289-92, 337, 333-35, G319, G1425, erroneous 56-57
G1435, G1570 G1585, G1621, G1637 valid 54
G1663 Peri, N. 203
particular or individual (vyakti) 6, 10, 26, periphrastic future G1482
82, 118-19, 145, 161, 185, 194, 231-36, permanence of linguistic units 125-26
273,334,556 permanence of word (äjänika) 118
qualified by a universal {jätivisistavya- permanence of word-meaning relation
kti) 6, 27, 92 (pravähanityatä). See eternal, as preser-
sabda-vyakti 126 ved by speakers
unique (svalaksana) 27 persmission (abhyanujna) 43, 47
parts and wholes 131,215, 235, 552 person (purusa) 172
parts of a sentence 191 personal ending. See ending, personal
Paryayasabdaratna (of Dhananjaya Bhatta-PERUSÜRI (1755) 507
cärya) 520 Peterson, Peter G532, G539, a:G439,
paryudäsa. See negation G538
PAâUPATI 529 Phadke, Ananta Sastri e:G1038, G1187
pasyanti vac 43, 47, 49-52, 61-63, 95, 99, Phakkikadarpana (of Dharänanda ) 510
121, 124, 197,328, 554-55,558 Phakkika Saralärtha (of Rämacaritra Tri-
parä väc 5, 121, 124, 558 päthin) 530
Patanjal, Deo Prakas Shastri b:G486, phala. See result
e:G193 phaläsraya. See Substratum of the result
PATAftjALI (150 B.C.) 5-6, 12-13, 16- phase (avasthä) 127
22, 36, 38, 45-47, 55, 66, 69, 71, 110, (Indian) philosophy (dariana) 3-4, 18, 31,
114-21, 124, 174-75, 182, 204, 261, 272, 35-37
275, 277-80, 283, 289, 297, 321-22, 329, Phirinda, King. See Pirinda
338-42,459-64, 549, 551, 554, 556, G81, Phitsütras (of Santänava Äcärya) 14,465,
G220, G446-47, G502-3, G513 G242 "'
PATANjALI (author of Togasütras) 551, —Pradlpa (of Sudarsanadeva) 533
553 phoneme or letter (varrta) 4-5, 10-11, 57-
Pataiïjalicarita (of Rämabhadra Diksita) 61, 69-81, 94-95, 99, 108, 118-19, 124-
321 - 25, 147, 182-91, 213-14, 216-17, 232-36,
Patavardhan, Ramakrishna Shastri 242, 302, 304-8, 329, 347-48, 367-68,
e:G680, G1181 561, G1676
path of being (adhvan) 44, 171 phonetics (siksä) 107, 275, G337, G345,
Pathak, K. B. a:G411, G414, G451-52, G359, G1401, G1422, G1487, G1591,
G553, G568, G672, G675, G682, G786- G1599, G1622, G1652, G1678
87, G874-77, G883-84, G887-88 Pillai, K. Raghavan 128, a:G1671, et:
Pathak, Ram Adhar d :G1532 G739
Pathak, Shridhar Shastri b:G82, G564 Pillai, N. Gopala a:G694
"pathetic" fallacy. See fallacy, "pathetic" Pillai, S. Vaiyapuri.a:G585
Patil, Gajanan Moreshwar a:G155, G284, Pinatelli, Mario a :G1688
G1537 Pirinda, King 225
PAUSKARASÄDI 16, 440 Pisani, Vittore a:Gll, G75, b:G1399,
Pavolini, P. E. a:G692 G1449 •
INDEX 591

PlTÄMBARA VIDYÄBHÜSATSfA 529 —VimaHa (of Ädya Prasäda Misra)

place ideia) 83 G1052
Plato, Platonic 55 —SiddhäntakaumudiGlO5l
poetry 30-32, 35, 65-67 Prakriyäpradlpa (of Gakrapani ) 493
polysemy 7-8 Prakriyäratnamani (of Dhanesvara) 211,
position (sthäna), a means of proof 83 481
Post, Kenneth H. a:G1660 Prakriyäsamgraha (of Abhayacandra ) 484
Postal G489A Prakriyäsära (of Näräyana) 528
postposition (karmapravacanïya) 147 Prakriyäsawasva (of Näräyana Bhattatiri)
Potter, Karl H. 128-73, 182-91, 551 497, 556
power (sakti) 128, 162-64, 195, 233, 286- prakrtl 128-30, 146 See also basis; cause,
88, 324-26, 369 material
of complete freedom {svatantryaeakti) prarhä. See knowledge
42, 196 pramäna. See instrument of knowledge
sentence-power (väkyasakti) 344 Pramariasamuccaya and = Vrtti (of Dignä-
PRABHACANDRA (ÄGÄRYA) (1040) ga) 27, 123, 549
476 präria. See breath
PRABHÄKARA (700) 25-26, 87, 92, 554 Prasada, Rama t:G553
Prabhäkara Mimämsä 6, 25-26, 87-93, prasajyapratisedha. See negation
97-98, 265-67, 273-74, 300-01, 336, 346 Prasiddhaêabdasamskâra (of Appayya Dik-
Prabhävall (of Rämabhadra Diksita) 50 lr sita I I I ) 500
Prabodhacandrika (of Jagannatha Panpita) prasthänatrayl G724, G1565
23, 500 '* pratibandha. See prevention
Prabodhacandrika (of Vaijaladeva) 534 pratibhä. See intuition
practice (abhyäsa) 54, 132, 146 prätipadika. See nominal stem
pradhäna. See principal element Prätisäkhyas 17, 39, 107, G86, G449,
Pradïpa (of Käsinätha Devas'arman) 525 G461-64
PRADYUMNA SÜRI (1170) 479-80 pratisedha. See prohibition
Praisadïpaprabha (of Näräyana ) 498 pratyähära sütras of Asfêdhyâyï 14, 204
Prajäpati 551-52 Pratyäharasütravicära (of Timmanäcärya )
prajnä. See intellect 506
PRAjftÄNASVARÜPA. See NAREN- pratyaksa. See perception
DRAPURI pratyaya. See suffix
prakära 98 Pratyayamaukikamälä (of Dämodara Sar-
prakarana. See context; subject-matter man) 519
Prakash, Buddha a:G224, G253 Pratyayodbhedapaddhatï (of Ksemankara)
Prakrit language 19-20, G71, G543, G1431 499
prakriyä. See derivation {Siddhäntakaumudi) Praudhamanoräftia (of
Prakriyädipikä (of Àppan Nainârya) 487 Bhattoji Diksita) 20, 247, 367, 492
(Astàdhyâyï) Prakriyàkaumudi (of Räma- — (Paramata) Khandana (of Gakrapani)
candra) 19-20, 485 247,493
—Prasäda (of Vitthala) 486 —Kucamardana. (of Jagannatha Pandita-
—Güdhabhävavivrti or —Prakäsa (of räja Tailanga) 499
Sesa Krsna) 448 — {Brhat)$abdaratna (of Hari Diksita)
—Sudhä (of Mädhava Sarasvati) 489 21, 23, 323, 500
Commentary (of Kamalâkara Bhatta) —BhävaprakäHkä (of Vaidyanätha
497 Paiyagunda) 357, 505
—Tattvacandra (of Jayanta) 498 Commentary (of Bhavadeva Misra )v
—Prakäsa (of Srïkrsna Bhafta Maunin) 389, 508
506 —Bhairavi (of Bhairava Misra) 389,
—Vyäkhyä (of Nilakantha Diksita) 506 510
—Rasmï (of Muralïdhara Misra ) 517 —Dipa (of Kalyänamala) 524
—Prakriyäsära (of Kâsînâtha) 525
592 ENQYGLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

— (Laghu) Sabdaratna (of Hari Diksita) principal element (pradhâna) 162

319,500 probability (sämarthya). ^capacity
—Prabhä (of Sätära Räghavendrä- product (vikära) 167
cärya) 511 production (utpatti) 302, 304
—Citraprahhä (of Hari Sarman) 513, prohibition (nisedha,pratisedha) 15,24, 150
523 PROLANÄCÄRYA. See HARTYOGIN
—Bhävaprakäsa (of Vaidyanätha Paiya- SAILÄVÄCÄRYA
gunda) 357, 505 prolation, ritualistic G300
—Kalpalatä (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381, prompter {prayojaka) 268-69
509 prompting (pravartana). See instigation
•—(Sabdaratna)Bhairavi (of Bhairava pronoun {sawanäman) 112
Misra) 510 prose passages of the Vedas. See Brähmartas
—-Prabhä (ofMädhava Sästrin Bhandäri) PRTHVÏCANDRA 529
515 PRTHVÎâVARA 529
—Säralä (of Gopäla Sästri Nene) 515 P. S. AJNANTANÄRÄYANA SÄSTRI
pravähanityatä. See eternal, as preserved by (1940) 24,409, 516
speakers PUJYAPÄDA or DEVANANDIN (500)
PRAVARTAKOPÄDHYÄYA 529 17,466
pravartaria. See instigation PUNDARÏKA VIDYÄSÄGARA BHA-
Pravesaka (of Acyuta Pisharoti) 494 TTÄCÄRYA (1520) 487
pravrtti. See activity PUNJARÄJA (485) 486-87
pravrttinimitta. See application PUJ^YARÄJA (1000) 22, 193, 201, 476,
prayoga. See use 557,561
Prayogamukha (of Dharmakirti ). See Kära- PUJNFYASUNDARAGANI 529
kacakra Purandhara, N. H. a:G1400
Prayoga (uttama) ratnamälä (of Purusot- Puratam Tirumal Devanarayana of Am-
tama Vidyâvâgîsa Bhattäcärya) 490 balappuzha 373
Commentary (by Candrasekhara ) 497 PÜRNACANDRA (950) 475
—Kantimälä (of Gopäladeva Vidyävä- PÜRNACANDRA 529-30
gïs'a) 508 purpose (artha) 26, 82, 108, G1628
Commentary (of Siddhanätha Vidyävä- purusa. See person
gîs'a) 532 PURUSOTTAMADEVA (1175) 19,
Prayogasiksä (of Anantasüri) 518 203, 209, 480
PRAYOGAVEftKATÄDRl 529 PURUSOTTAMA VIDYÄVÄGlSA
prayojaka. See prompter BHATTÄCÄRYA ( 1560 ) 490
prayojana. See motivating force Pürvapaksaprasnottan or =manjusä or
Prayuktäkhyätamanjan (of Kavisaranga) =manjarî (of Äsädhara Bhatta) 375,
525 507
precative G149 7 Püsän 105
predicate G356
prefix or preposition (upasarga) 110, 112, qualificandness, fallacy of unknown. See
121, 146, G400, G1522, G1637 fallacy of unknown qualificandness
prescription or injunction {vidhï) 24, 26, quality (guria) 127, 161-62, 171, 195, 213,
265, 336 552 555, G1633
Vedic 96 quotation G1566
present time 45, 336
presumption (arthâpatti) 54, 213, 235, 273 RABHASANANDIN (950) 475
prevention (pratibandha) 43, 47 RÄDHAKRSNA GOSVÄMIN 529
preverb4, 11, 289-90, 333 RÄDHAKRSNA SARMAN (1764) 507
primary derivative (krdanta) 173, 292 Radicchi, Anna a:G837
primary meaning or denotative power RÄGHAVAJHÄ529
(abhidhä) 27, 65, 91-92, 273-74, 301, Raghavan, V. a:G899, G905, G930,
322,G732 G1645
INDEX 593

Raghavan, V. K. S. N. 340-42 RÄMA KINKARA SARASVATÏ 530

RÄGHAVÄNANDA ÄGÄRYA 529 RÄMAKlaORA SARMAN (1905) 513
Raghava Somayaji 237 RÄMAKB.SI^AADHVARIN (1650) 351
RÄGHAVA SURI 529 RÄMAKR.SISTA BHATTA (1690) 501
RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA 530 RÄMAKR.SNA DÏKSITA (1638) 497
RAGHUNANDA âlROMAI^I 529-30 RÄMAKRSI^A aARIVlÄ TRIPATHÏ
RAGHUNÄTHA (1620) 495 (1907) 514
Raghunâtha BhatÇa 361 RÄMAKRSI^A TÄTYÄSÄSTRIN ( 1897 )
RAGHUNÄTHA gARMÄ (1963) 24, 513
427, 517, e:G711 Rämakrsna Yajvan 253
RAGHUNÄTHA SASTRÏ VYÄKARA- RÄMAKUMÄRA NYÄYABHUSANA
NÄGÄRYA530,G1260 530
RAGHURÄMA (1871) 512 Ramamurti, K. S. a:G1635
Raja, C. Kimhan 201, G145, a:G689 RÄMÄNANDA TÎRTHA 530
Raja, K. Kunjunni 103, 109, 203-4, 321- RÄMANÄRÄYANA SARMAN 530
22, 324-40, 342-49, 549, .554-56 G191, RÄMANÄTHA GAKRAVARTIN 530
G355, a:G696, G715, G1058, G1209-10, RÄMANÄTHASAkMANRÄYI (1546)
G1225, G1530, G1540, G1551, G1658, 488
b:G1556, e:G1223, G1226 RÄMANÄTHA VIDYÄVÄGASPATI
Rajagopalan, N. V. a:G334 (1650) 498
Rajakalasa, father of Jyesthakalasa 205 RÄMA PANDITAVARA (SÄHIBHA)
RÄJA KUMÄRA DHARMASÄSTR- (1900)513
IN. See (RÄJAKUMÄRA) DHARMA- RÄMAPANIVADA 530
SÄSTRIN RÄMAPRASÄDA (1694) 501
Rajapurohit, B. P. a:G1603 RÄMA PRASÄDA TRIPÄTHI (1952)
RÄJARÄMA DÎKSITA 530 24,419,516,e:G1190
rajas. See activity RÄMARSI531
RÄJIVA SARMAN 530 RÄMA PARANA SASTRÏ (1931) 516 •
raksasa. See demon RÄMASEVAKA (1770) 23, 377, 381,
Ram, Kanshi d:G419 507
Ram, Sadhu a:G702, G796 . RÄMASIMHA531
RÄMABHADRA DÏKSITA (1692) 23, RÄMÄ^RAMA. See BHÄNUJI DÏK-
311, 321-22, 373, 501 SITA
RÄMABHATTA (1650) 498- RÄMATARANA SIROMAI^I (1883)
RÄMACANDRA (1400) 19-20,485 512
RÄMAGANDRA (1700) 501-2 RÄMA TARKAVAGÏâA (1550) 489
RÄMAGANDRA (1744) 505 Rämavarman of iSrngaverapura 323
RÄMAGANDRA 530 4
RÄMAGANDRA PAI^DITA (1690) 501 RÄMEaVARA. See ÖESA VÏREÔVARA
RÄMAGANDRA SARASVATl. See SA- RÄME^VARA TARKAVÄGASPATI
TYÄNANDA BHATTÄGÄRYA 531
RÄMAGANDRÄaRAMA (1600) 493 Ranade, H. G. a:G1646
RÄMAGANDRA VIDYÄBHܧAI^A RANGGHODJI ODHAVJI (1905) 514
I (1688) 501 Rangacharya, Kandur e:G1036
RÄMAGARANA530 Rangacharya, M. e:G901, G903
RÄMAGA RITRA TRIPÄTHIN 530 RANGANÄTHA DÏKSITA (1650) 498
Ramachari, G. a:G234, G705 Rangarâjadhvarïndra 239
RÄMADÄSA GAKRAVARTIN (1600) Rangaswami, O. P. a:G791
493 Rangoji Bhatta 241, 255
RÄMADEVA MiSRA 530 Rao, H. V. Nagaraja a:G1687, e:G1349
RÄMADEVA BARMAN 530 Rao, K. V. Lakshmaria a:G445
RÄMAJl^ A PÄ3^DEYA 24, 431, 530 Rao, P. S. a:G801
RÄMAKÄNTA ( 1489 ) 487 Rao, 'S. K. Ramachandra a:G482
594 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Rao, Veluri Subba b:G1605 revelation (abkivyakti) 302

Rapratyähärakharidana (of Vaidyanâtha fg Veda 3-4, 14, 31-32, 35, 37, 50,103-6,
Payagunda) 357 108, 234, 341, 550, 553, G222, G486,
Rapratyäkäramaydana (of Kesari Misra) G481A
525 rhetoric, rhetoricians 3, G1388
rasa. See essence rhythm G1406
Rasagangâdhara (of Jagannätha Pandita- ritualistic interpretation of Vedas (adhiya-
râja) 32 jna) 108, G1439, G1714
Rasamaftjarîvyakhyâ (of Se?a Cintâmani)Rocher, Ludo a:G160, G1271
215 Rocher, Rosane a:G183-84, G236, G254,
RATIDEVA SIDDHANTAVAGÏSA G1553, G1564, b:G235
531 Rogers, David Ellis d:G255
(Tarka) Ratnamälä (of TâranâthaTarka- Roodbergen, J. A. F. a:G1679, d:G631,
väcaspati) 512 et:G627, G632-34
Ratnamälä (verbal) root (dhätu) 4 , 1 , 10-15, 19, 98,
—Chandraka Bhäsya (of Pancänana 113-14, 118, 146, 255-64, 268, 330-33,
Kandalï) 529 335, 337, G254, G294, G353, G387,
—Kärakamälättkä (of Râmesvara Tarka- G1458
väcaspati Bhaftäcärya) 531 Roy, Kumudranjan et :G 1167
RATNAMATI 479 fsi. See sage
RATNAPÄNI 531 E.SIPUTRA PARAMESVARA II. See
Ratnävali (of Gauramohana Bhattà ) 522 (RSIPUTRA) PARAME^VARA II
RATNESVARA 531 rta. See cosmic order
Rau, Wilhelm a :G707, G716, G760-61, rudhi. See conventional powers of words
G819, G1695, b:G740, e:G759, G900 Rudra 105
Rävana G366 RUDRADHÄRAJHÄ&ARMAN (1954)
real {päramärthika) 194-95 24, 421, 516
reality (sattä) 110, 195 RUDRAPRASÄDA§ARMÄ(1948) 516,
recognition (pratyabhijüä) 302, 306 e:G428*
reduction of two verbs to one {ekaiesa) 173 Rudras 104
reference (vastvartha, bâhyâriha) 115-16, Ruegg, David Seyfort a:G1531, G1689,
559-60 b:G1537
reflection {äbhäsa) 57 rule
reflexive passive 259 negative (nisedha). See prohibition
reification G1566 Paninian 559
relation (sambandha, samsarga) 125, 127,RÜPAGANDRA (1853)512
149, 195, 278, 328 Rupamâlâ (of Nrsirnha) 528
syntactic. See syntactic relation Rüpamälä (of Vimala Sarasvati) 483
relational seam (samsargamaryädä) 300 Rupaprakâêa (of Kulluka Bhafta) 527
relationship G1677 RÜPARÄMA NYÄYAPAJ^GÄNANA
remembered scripture (smrti) 54, 132 531
Renou, Louis G975, a:G127, G138, G417, Rüparatnamäla (of Nayasundara) 528
G486A, G578, G594, G831, G967, Rüpatarangini (of Isvaramisra) 523-24
G972-73, G982, G1439, G1492-93, Rüpavatära (of Dhârmàkirti) 203, 476
Gl 514-16, G1525, G1544, b:G1403, —Prakriyäkalpavällan (of Nrsimha) 498
G1432,G1443,G1460,et:G966,t:G113, Ruskin John 31, 550
G854 Ruyyaka 92, 203
renunciation G705
replacement technique in Pänini G223 Sabarabhàsya (on Mimämsäsütras) 73,
representation, simultaneous 283-84 G584, G588
result (phala) 11, 83 SABARASVÄMIN 531
revealed scripture (sruti) 54, 87, 98, 255- êabda. See language; linguistic element;
59, 262, 330 sound; (verbal) testimony
INDEX 595
Sabdabhäskara (of Tarkatilaka Bhattäcär- Sabdanueäsana (of Sakatäyana) 17, 19,
ya)494 474-75, G908
Sabdabhedanirüpana (of Näräyana Sudhi) —Amoghavrtti (of Sakatäyana). See
507 Amoghavrtti
Sabdabhedanirupana (of Ramabhadra Dik- —Cintämani (of Yaksavarman) 476
sita) 321-22, 501 —Prakâsikâ (of Ajitasena Äcärya)
sabdabodha. See verbal cognition 517-18
Sabdabodha (of Juane s var a) 524 —Pratipadà (of Mangarasa) 527
Sabdabodhaprakäsa (ofjayakrsna Maunin). —Tippani (of Samantabhadra ) 531
See Sâramanjarï —Rüpasiddhi (of Dayäpäla) 476
Sabdabodhataranginï (of ïsvarânanda) 23, Sabdänusäsanabrhadvrtti (of Hemacandra)
299, 488 19, 479
êabdabrahman 12, 36-43, 45-50, 54, 56, 95, —Laghuvrtti (of Hemacandra) 479,
99,132, 216, 341, 369-70, G724, G1543, G946
G1565, G1587, G1688 —Avacürikä (of Dhanacandra) 488
Sabdadhätusamfksä (ofBhartrhari) 124,470 —Nyäsa (of Udayacandra ) 480
êabdâdvaita. See linguistic monism —Laghuvyâkhyâ (of Devendrasüri ) 481
Sabdähärana (of Sesa Krsna) 215, 488 —Nyâsasâra (of Kanakaprabhä ) 481
eabdajnäna. See verbal knowledge —Vrtti (of Malayagiri) 483
Sabdakaumudï —Duridhika (of Dhanacandra ) 488
Commentary (of Nalla Perumal Dik- —Durgäprabodha (of ârïvallabhavacana
sita) 311 Äcärya) 494
Sabdakaumudï (of Gokkanâtha Diksita) —Haimakaumudi or Candraprabhävyä-
311,321,498 kararia (of Meghavijaya Gani) 502,
—Säbdikaraksä (of Dvädasahayäjin) G952
311, 501 —Vivarana (of Harsakïrti Süri) 523
—Vyàkhyâ (of Vaidyanätha Diksita) Sabdaprabhâ (Chapter one of Heläräja's
502 commentary on Trikaydï) 193
Sabdakaustubha (of Bhattoji Diksita) 21, Sabdaprakäta (of Khana NVpati) 526
240-42, 492, 560 sabdapüwayoga. See language as means of
—Visampadi (of Näges'a Bhatta) 323, release
503 Sabdaratna (of Janärdana Sarman) 524
—Prabhâ (of Vaidyanätha Paiyagunda) Sabdaratnâkara (of Kä si svara Bhattäcärya )
357, 505 489
—Bhâvapradipa (of Krsnamiträcärya) Sabdaratnâkara (of Kämadeva Ghosa) 524
381, 509 Sabdaratnaprabhâ (of Sätära Räghavendrä-
—Prabhâ (of Sätära Räghavendräcär- cärya) 393
ya) 393, 510 Sabdaratnâvali (of Appa Süri) 504
Sabdakaustubha (of ïsvarïprasada) 524 Sabdaratnâvalï (of Känta Nätha) 524
Éabdakaustubhagwjia (of Indradatta Upä- Sabdaratnâvali (of Rämanätha Cakravar-
dhyäya) 508 tin) 530
Sabdakaustubhamandana (of Jagannätha Sabdärtharatna (of Täränätha) 533
Panditaräja Tailànga ) 499 Sabdärthasäramanjari (ofjayakrsna Mau-
Sabdalaksana (of Buddhisägara Süri ). See nin) 23, 361, 505
Pancagranthï Sabdärthatarkämrta (ofjayakrsna Maunin)
Sabdälamkära (of Sesa Krsna) 215,488 23,361,505* "'
Sabdamanjari (of Näräyana Sudhi) 507 Sabdarüpavali 536
Sabdänantasägarasamuccaya (of Nägesa Bha-Sabdasädhyaprabodhim (of Rämanätha Cak-
tta) 503 ravartin) 530
êabdanaucitya G1527 Sabdasaktiprakäsikä (of Jagadisa) 549
Sabdanirüparia (of Ramabhadra Diksita) Sabdasiddhântamanjari (of Kodandaräma)
23 526
éabdânukrti. See onomatapoeia Sahdasiddhi (of Mahädeva) 482
596 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Sabdaiobhä (of Nilakantha Sukla) 251,497 SADAâlVA BHATTA (1780) 508

Sabdasudhä (of Ananta Bhatta) 518 Sadâsiva Dïksita 311
Sabdasudhänidhi (of Gangäramitra Päthin) SADAâlVA âASTRI JOSHI or S ARMA
521 (1946) 24, 415, 516, e:G1038, G1119,
iabdatatta. See language-principle G1166, G1188, G1347
Sabdatattvaprakäea (of Indradatta Upâ- Sadâ si vendra Brahmendra 351
dhyäya) 23, 379, 508 Sadbhäsäsubantaräpadaria (of Nägoba Pan-
Sabdatrivsriikä (of Äsädhara Bhatta) 23, dita) 508
375, 507 Saddarêinîsiddhantasamgraha (of Rämabha-
Sabdâvatâra (of Durvinïta) 177,471 dra Dïksita) 23, 321-22, 501
Sabdavrtti G1573 sâdhanâ. See means
Sabdavyâkhyâ (of Gopînâtha) 550 SÄDHUSUNDARA GANI (1624) 495
(Brhat)Éabdendusekhara (of Bhattoji Dïk- sâdhutva. See grammatically; nominal
sita) 343, 502 stem
—Bhävaprakaükä (of Vaidyanätha Pai- Sàdhutvâdinirvâcana 535
yagunda) 505 sädhya 25
(Laghu) Sabdendukkhara (of Nägesa Bha^ sädrsya. See similarity; simultaneity
tta) 323, 367, 502,G1081 SÄGARAMATTI. See SÄRIPUTTA
—Cidasthimälä (of Vaidyanätha Paiya- sage (rsi) 36, 38, 52, 54, 63, 103
gun^a) 505 SAHAJAKÏRTI ( 1623 ) 495
—Sadaêivabhattï (of Sadâsïva Bhatta) Sahäji, King of Tanjore 321
508 sahakärikararia. See cause, auxiliary
—Tîhâ (of éamkara Bhatta) 508 sâhitya. See grouping; literacy criticism
—Jyötsna (ofUdayankarNänapäthaka) Sâhityadarpana (of Harisiddhântavâgïsa)
509 91
—Induprakäsa (of Gafigädhara) 509 Sahityasastri, Janakinatha e:G1292
—Dosoddhara (of Mannu Deva) 509 sàhrdaya 31
—Çandrakala (of Bhairava Misra) 510 Saiva G1690
—Gandrikä (of Sätära Räghavendräcär- Kashmir âaivism. See Kashmir âaivism;
ya) 510 Trika
—Prasäda (of Subrahmanyam Nambu- SÄKALYA4, 440
ttiripad) 512 ÖAKATÄYANA (850) 14-16, 19, 110,
—Vyäkhyä (of ârïdhara Sarman) 513 112, 114,440, G876, 474-75
•>—Bhavabodhinî (of Setumädhaväcäryaêakti. See denotation; power; significative
Nadatiram) 513 power
Commentary (of Anantäcärya) 513 Saktisphuta (of Käladhara ) 524
SALIKANÄTHA M l â R A (925) 87
—-Nàgeêoktiprakàsa (of Khuddi J h ä
barman) 514 Salus, Peter H. b:G489A
—Guruprasäda (of Tâta Subrahmanyasamädhi 328
Sästrin) 515 sämagri. See grouping
Commentary (of Gopäla) 522 samâkhya. See etymology, etymological
—Candrikä (of Räghavendräcärya) 529meaning
—Varavarriinï 535 sämanädhikamnya G717
—Vijaya 535 SAMANTABHADRA (650) 531
—Visamapadavivrti 535 Samanvayapradlpa (of Kudakäcärya) 526
-—Abhinavacandrikâ 536 sämänya. See universal
SABHÄPATI âARMAN UPÄDHYÄYA sâmarthya. See capacity
(1963)24,425,517,531 samasa. See compound
SabharanjanaMaka (of Kavikunjana) 371 Samâsârriava (of Kulamuni) 508
SACCIDÄNANDA 532 Samâsasamkhâ 536
sacrifice 183, 267, 336-37 samavaya. See inherence
SADÄNANDA 531 Samaväyapradipasamketa (of Devasarman)
SADÂSIVA (1670) 22-23, 317, 500, 562 520
INDEX 597
sambandha. See relation samüha. See collection of parts; grouping
Sambandhoddeêa (of Cangadâsa) 519 samvid. See consciousness
Sambasiva Sastir, K. 232 sarnvyavaharika. See expressional
sambodhana. See vocative samyoga. See conjunction
Samgraha (ofVyâdi) 117, 119-20,458 • SANÄTANA TARKÄCÄRYA 532
SAMGRAMASIMHA (1279) 483 sartdhu See coalescence, rules of
sarnjnâ. See use Sanghvi, Ratnalal e:G955
samjhâsutra 15 Sanjaya 146
SAMKARA(ÄCÄRYA) (710) 41-43, Sankaran, A. e:G587
56, 59-60, 531, 551, 553-54, G1569, Sankaran, C. R. a:G1420
G1660, G1688, G1702 Sanskrit 237, 287, 321
âAMKARA BHATTA (1770) 241, 508 SANTÄNAVA ÄCÄRYA (350) 15, 465
SAMKARA SARMAN 531 SÄNTARAKSITA (750) G775
SAMKARA SÄSTRI MARULKÄR Saptasvarasindhu (of Närasimha Süri) 528
(1957), 517, e:G574, G1192 SARADARAÏÏJAN RAY VIDYÄVI-
samketa. See convention NODA (1920) 515, et:G1091
Sämkhya 21, 44-45, 54, 381, 397, 559 Säralähan (of Kavicandra ) 493
samkhya. See number Sâramanjarï (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 505
Samkhyäsütra (of Kapila) 552 âARANADEVA (1172) 480
—Laghuvrtti (of Näges'a Bhatta) 323 Sarariasabdärthavicära (of Anantäcärya)
Samksiptasam (of Kramadisvara) 19, 477 514
Commentary (of Jumaranandin) 484, Sarangi, Aneka Chandra a:G335, G636,
G912 G1708
Commentary (of Dämodara Deva- Särasiddhäntakaumudi (of Varadaräja) 494
särman) 519 Sârasvataprakriya (of Anubhüti Svarupäcä-
—Vivarana (of Goyicandra) 485 rya) 20, 481-82
—Kaumudl (of Abhiräma Vidyâlam- —Samdhiprakararia (of Mandana ) 484
kära) 487 Commentary (of Punjaräja) 486-87
Commentary (of Näräyana Nyâya- —Subodhika (of Amrtabhäva) 487
pancänana) 489 —Bhäsya (of Käsmätha Bhatta) 487
—Arthabodhinï (of Candrasekhara —Pradipa (of DhanesVara Bhatta) 487
Vidyâlamkàra) 519 —Särasvataprasäda (ofVasudeva Bhatta)
—Vyâkaranadurghatodghata (of Kesava- 490
deva Tarkapaficänana Bhattä- —Visamapadarthadïpika or Gopalabhatfï
cârya) 525 (of Gopâla Bhatta) 490
—Dïpikâ or —Prakâsa (of Nârâyana —• (Vaiyâkararia) Siddhäntacandrikä (of
Nyâyapaficânana) 489, 502 Rämacandräsrama) 493
—Arthadipikä (of Gopäla Cakravartin) Commentary (by Ksemendra) 488
500 —Tattvadipikä (of Lokes'akara) 501
—Dhätupätha-Sara (of Nrsimha Tarka- Commentary (of Sadäsiva Sästri
pancänana) 528 Josi) 516
—Uyädisütra—commentary (of Sivadäsa —Avyayärthamälä (of Navk ishore Jhä )
Cakravartin) 532 516
—Rasavatl G912 —Subodhinï (of Sadänanda ) 531
Sarnksiptasarakärika (of Närottama Vidyä- —Vrtti(oifTarkatilaka Bhattäcärya) 494
lamkära Bhattäcärya) 528 —Subodhika (of Candrakirti ) 494
samnidhi. See contiguity —Laghubhäsya (of Raghunätha) 495
sampradänakäraka. See indirect object (of —Värttika (of Sahâjakïrti ) 495
dative) Siddhäntacandrikä (of Jfiänatilaka) 498
samsargamaryâdâ. See association of word —-Eabdärthacandrikä (of Hamsavijaya-
meanings gani) 499
samskâra. See trace —Nirnaya or —Anuvrttyavabodhaka (of
samudaya. See collection of words Näräyana Sudhä) 500
598 ENGYGLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

—Mädhavi (of Mädhava) 513 Safkârakavâda (of Rabhasänandin) 475

—Siddhäntaratnävalt (of Mädhava Bha- Satpadî
tta) 513 Commentary (of Krpäräma) 526
—Tippanï (of Govinda Parasuräma sattä. See existence; reality
Bhatta) 513 sattva 120, 275 (See also serenity)
—Tippanï (of Visnuprasâda barman) satya. See truth
514 SATYAKÄMAVARMÄ (1970) 24,429,
—Paüjikä (of Dharmadeva) 521 517
—Särapradipikä (of Jagannätha) 524 SATYÄNANDA or RÄMACANDRA
—Vädighatamudgara (of Jayanta Bhatta) SARASVATI (1500) 22, 219, 229, 487
524 SATYAPRÏYA TÏRTHA SVÄMIN
—Bhäsya (of Rämanäräyana barman) (1745) 23, 359, 505
530 SATYAVARYÄRYÄ 532
—Subodhinï (of Sadänanda),531 SAUBHAVA (350)465
&AUNAKA 4, 108
Särasvatasärasamgraha (of Näräyana Bhära-
tï) 528 Sauträntika 549
Särasvata school 19 SAYANA. See MÄDHAVA
Sârasvatavyakarana (of Nayasundara) 528Scharfe, Hartmut a:G391, G483, G1672,
Särasvatavyakaranadhundhika or —Dlpikä b:G286, G610, G1681
(of Megharatna) 485 Schärpe, Adrian b :G1456
Sarasvati 105 Scheller, M. a:G1461
Sarasvatikanthäbharana (of Bhoja) 477 Schlerath, Bernfried b:G1701
—Hrdayaharini (of Näräyana Danda- Schroeder, Leopold Von a:G433
nätha) 478 Schropfer, A. b:G1500
—Tïkâ (of Jagaddhâra) 484 Schropfer, Johann a :G1433
Commentary (of Jivänanda Vidyäsä- science G616
gara) G917 scientific treatise (sästra) 132
Commentary (of Rämasimha) G918 scripture [agama] 235
Commentary (of Ratnesvara) G917, secondary derivative (taddhita) 111, 173,
G918 292, G1495
Sarasvati Makhin 313 secondary meaning (laksana) 6,8-12,26-28,
Sarasvati river 104 65-67, 89-92, 111-12, 115, 217, 272-73,
Särävali (of Näräyana) 315, 499 282-86, 322, 324, 326-27, 334, 343, 346,
—Vrtti 315, 499 554, 556, G191, G243, G732, G1612
SÄRIPUTTA (1150) 479 based on common quality (gaum). See
Sarma, see Sharma gaurii
Sarvadarêanasamgraha (of Mädhava) 56, pure 326
68, 552, 554, G1391 secondary nature 195
SARVADHÄRA UPÄDHYÄYA 532 secondary roots G1648
sarvanâma. See pronoun seed (bija) 555
SARVÄNANDA PÄI^DEYA G1243. self, soul (âtman) 42, 130, 550
e:G1243 Great Self (mahatma) 46-47
SARVARAKSITA 480 semantics 5, G1669
SARVAVARMAN (50) 17,464-65 generative G318
SARVESVARA (1555) 489 semantic relations G247
SASTHIDÄSA 532 Sen, Malati a:G852
êâstra. See scientific treatise Sen, Sukumar a:G166, G592. b:G267,
Sastri. See Shastri G1533
Éatapatha Brähmaria 108, G452 SENAKA440
SÄTÄRA RÄGHAVENDRÄCÄRYA Sengupta, Devendranatha e:G1031
GAJENDRAGADKAR (1840) 23, Sengupta, Sailendranath a:G171, G210,
393, 510-11, 562 G889, G958
Satkärakalaksaria (of Amaracandra) 481 Sengupta, Upendranatha e:G1031
INDEX 599

seme-organ (inâriya) 56, 189, 214, 286 G583, G695, G783, G792-93, G897,
sentence {vâkya) 4, 10, 26-29, 61, 65, 83, G929, G1214, G1437, G1440, G1450
85-99, 108, 114, 124-25, 149-50, 216, Sarma, K. V. a:G1207
233,304,348, G204, G246, G355, G768, Sharma, Mukund Madhava a:G1562
G1574 Sharma, Mahesh Dutt a:G404, G863,
definition of G715 G1108
—formation 163 Sharma, Mangal Deva a:G586
—meaning, {pâkyartha) 9-10, 28, 146, Sharma, Peri Sarvesvara 561, a:G748,
148, 191, 343, 346-47 G907, t:G738, 551
nominal G1686 Sarma, Ram Nath a:G307, G348,
parts of 233 , b:G1638, d:G282
—sphota 62, 95. See also sphota Sarman, Rudradatta Jha e:G598
separation G1650 Sharma, Uma Shankara a:G1272, e:G164
sequence (krama) 50, 94, 161, 169, 171, Sarman, V. Anjaneya a:G724, G1565
184-86, 191, 196-97, 216, 232, 235-36, Sarma, Virendra d:G752
303, 558 Sharma, V. Venkatarama e:G841
suppression of 49, 81 Sastri, A. Mahadeva e:G1036
serenity (sattva) 44-45 Sastri, Bahuvallabha e:G550, G1248
SESA GINTÄMAI^I 22, 215, 221 Sastri, Bala e:G31, G522
SESÄDRISUDHI (1750) 507 Sastri, Bala Krishna e:G1116
SESA GOPINÄTHA 247 Shastri, Bhim Sen b:G878
SESA KRSNA (1540) 22, 78, 215-17, Shastri, Biswanarayana a:G1070
221, 223, 237, 241, 247, 488 Sastri, Bommakanti Ramalinga a:G176
SESANÄRÄYAISTA. See (SESA) NÄRÄ- Shastri, Gharudeva a:G685, e:G611,
YAI^A (BHATTA) G687, G692
&esa Nrsimha 215 Sastrin, G. Samkara Rama e:G1095
Sesa Purusottama 247 Sastri, Damodara e:G35, G922, G1037
&e§a Rämacandra 215 Shastri, Dharmendra Nath a:G484A
(KA§Ï) SESA SARMAN 532 Shastri, Dwarikadas e:G1039
Sesa Viresvara 215, 223, 225, 237 Sastri, Gangadhara e:G35, G49, Gil 14
SESA V I S W (1605) 22, 243, 494 Sastri, Gaurinath 41, 57, 542, 552, 554,
Seshakumar, A. d :G 1682 a:G699, G701, G730, G1532, b:G706
SETUMÄDHAVÄGÄRYA NADITI- Sastri, Gosvami Damodara e:G680
RAM (1895) 513 Sastri, Guru Prasada e:G575
Shah, Neelanjana S. a:~G931 Shastri, Haraprasad 201, G892
Shah, Umakant Premananda 375, Sastri, Jivarama e:G1156
a:G1287, e:G1175, G1227 Sastri, K. A. Niläkantha a :G902
Sarma, Arvind a:G382 Sastri, K. A. Sivaramakrishna a:G357
Sharma, Aryendra e:G861 Shastri, Kali Gharan a:G935-36, G983,
Sarma, Batuka Natha e :G1285 b:G1624
Sharma, B. N. Krishnamurti 393, 562, Shastri, Kapil Deva a:G717-18, G1246,
a:G4 eb:G1247
Sarma, Dadhi Ram e:G1360 Sastri, Karnataka Krsna e:G1084
Sharma, Dipti a :G403 Sastri, K. Sambasiva e:G488, G497,
Sarma, E. R. Sreekrishna a:G602, G708, G688
G712, G1539, G1557, G1702, et:G1202, Shastri, Lallurama Jivarama e:G650
t:G1501 Shastri, Mangala Deva a:G464, et:G86
Sharma, Indra Datta e :G1289 Sastri, Patavardhana Narayana e:G1082
Sharma, Jagdish P. a:G963 Sastry, P. G. Naganatha b:G1110
Sharma, Krishna Kumar a:G336 Sastri, P. P. Subrahmanya 237, 561,
Sarma, Kanakalala e:G239 a:G1409, b:G589, e:G587
Sharma, K. Madhava Krishna a:G99- Sastri, P. S. a:G1516
101, G415, G467, G485A, G511, G580,
600 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Sastri, Sada Siva Sarma (Joshi) e:G1118, —Candrikä (of Sätära Räghavaven-
G1174, G1244 dräcärya) 393, 510
Sastri, Samkara Rama e :G88 Notes (of Khuddijhä) 399, 514
Sastri, Santi Bhiksu ta>G714 —Dîpikâ (of Nityänanda Pänta
Shastri, Satya Vrat a:G799, G1661, Parvatiya) 401, 515
b:G399 ~{Laghu)Sabdendusekhara (of Nägesa
Sastri, Sitarama e:G1123, Gil56, G1228 Bhatta). See {Laghu)Sabdendusekhara
Shastri, Sitaramacari e:G683 —Laiita (of Gopälakrsna Sastrin)
Sastri, S. K. Ramanatha e:G870 504, 507
Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana 80-82, 552, —Tattvabodhini (of Jnänendra Saras-
555, a:G924, G1414, G1446 vati) 351, 505
Sastri, Sulavatanka Kalyana Sunvamba- Subodhinl (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 3511
samkarae:G1003 361, 505
Sastri, Tarakesvara e:G1189 —Vidyäviläsa (of Sivaräma Tripäthin)
Sastri, T. Ganapati 235, e:G505, G965, 506
G976, G1065, G1281 —Kalpalätika (of Venimädhava) 506
Sastri, Tata Subbaraya e:G1216 —Bälamanoramä (of Väsudeva Diksita)
Sastry, T. S. Gourypathy a:G1641 365, 506
Sastry, T. V. Kapali a:G1454 —Güdhaphakkikaprakäsa (of Indradatta
Sastrio, V. A. Ramaswami a:G698, G789- Upädhyäya) 508
90, G1412, e:G1205 -^-Ratnàrnava (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381,
Sastrigal, S. Chandrasekhara e:G1087 509
Shaw,J. L. a:G356 —ArthaprakäHkä (of Kocca Sankaran
Shefts, Betty b:Gl62 Susad) 510
Shembavnakar, K. M. a:G107 —Ratnaprakâêika (of Bhairava Misra)
Shende, Sita Rama Sastri e :G1360 G1088
Shukla. See Sukla —Saralä (of Täränätha Tarkaväcas-
SIDDHANÄTHA VIDYÄVÄGISA 532 pati) 397, 512
siddhänta. See view —Bälacandn (of Bälacandra Sästri) 514
Siddhäntakaumudl (of Bhattoji Diksita) 17, —Pankticandrikä (of Gangaprasäda Säs-
20, 240, 319, 367, 490-92 trin) 514
—Praudhamanoräma (autocommentary) —Saradarêanl (of Sivadatta Sarman)
See {Siddhäntakaumudl) -Praudhamano- 514
räma —Mitäbhäsinl (of Saradaranjan Ray
•—Sukhabodhinî (of Nïlakantha Väjape- Vidyävinod) 515
yin) 493 —Panktipradipa (of Nänakaräma Sästri)
-—Vilâsa (of Laksmïnrsimha) 499 515
—Ratnakaratïkâ (of Sivarämendra Sara- —-Bhävabodhim (of Karaputugala Dhar-
svati) 499 ma Sri) 515
—Sunamanoramâ (of Tirumala Yajvan) —Kathakollolinï(of Räma Parana Sästri)
499 516
—Siddhântaratnakara (of Rämakrsna —VUesavivrti (of Somanätha Sarman)
Bhatta) 501 516
— (Brhat)Sabdendusekhara (of Nägesa —Sugandha (of Acyutananda Sästrin)
Bha«a) 323, 502 - 517
—Bhävaprakäeikä (of Vaidyanätha Pai- Commentary (of âhrïdharenda Sharmä
yagunda) 357 Ghildiyâl) 517
—Cidasthimälä (of Vaidyanätha Pair -—Bhäsya (of Bhagavatbhakta) 518
yagunda) 357, 505 —Vilâsa (of Bhäskara) 518
—Düsanoddhara (of Manyudeva) 387, —Sudhäkara (of Krsna Sästrin) 526
509 —Laksmï (of Sabhäpati Sarmä Upädh-
•—Candrakalä (of Bhairava Misra) yäya) 531
387, 509 —Sarasamgraha (of Vedäntäcärya) 534
INDEX 601
(Vyâkaraw) Siddhântasudhânidhi (of Vis- Sivasütras (of the Astadhyäyl) 14, 203-4,
vesvara Süri) 535 G74, G145, G203,G244, G453
Siddhäntatattva (of Jagannätha) 524 Skold, Hannes a:G449, b:G448
Sieg, E. e: significative power (sakti) 6-7, sleep, deep 37, 106
26, 42, 45, 65-68, 90-91, 330-31, 346 (Mïmâmsa)$lokavârttika (of Kumärila
svätantryaeakti. See power of complete Bhatfa) 181, 189-90, 213, 549, 554-56
freedom smallness (tadalpatä) 288
éiksâ. See phonetics smrti. See memory; remembered scripture
Siksäprakäsa G427 Smrtiratna, Taranatha Gosvami e:G1069
iilpasästm. See architecture SOKANÄTHA DÎKSITA. See GOKKA-
Silverstein, Michael e:G1618 ' NÄTHA DÏKSITÂ *
Simenscly,Th.b:G146 soma 105
Simhasuragani 123 SOMADEVA (1250) 17, 481
similarity (sâdrêya) 288. See also analogy; Somananda 124
comparison; simultaneity SOMANÄTHA 533 ,
Simhasürigani 123 SOMANÄTHA SARMAN (1952) 516,
Simonsson, Nils a:G9 e:G1096, G1102
simultaneity {sädrsya) 184-85, 289 SOMAPRABHÄ 533
Singh, Jag Deva a:G287, G304-5, G337- SOMAYÄJIN DÎKSITA. See SARVES-
38, G1591, G1636 VARA
Sinha, Anil G. a:G318 Somesvara Bhatta 237
SÏRADEVA (1250) 481 sound {dhvani) 28, 30, 37, 55, 69, 91,
Sircar, Dinesh Chandra a:G576 119-20, 132, 153, 187-88, 231, 303, 308,
SlROMAI^I BHATTA. See BHATTA 329, 342, G728, G1637
SIROMAI^I physical theory of G1397
âlROMAISfl BHATTA 532 prâkrta 94-95, 120, 174-75, 236, 329,
fiffa. See elite G1588
SUubodha (of Käsinätha) 525 vaïkrta 94-95, 120, 174-75, 236, 329
SUubodha (of Padmanäräyana) 528-29 sound {sabda) 183, 308, 558
Sisyahitanyâsa (of Ugrabhüti) 476. Sowani, V. S. a:G1393
SÏTIKAÏ^THA (1450) 486 space, spatial direction (dik or dis) 43, 45,
SITÄNÄTHA SÄSTRIN 532 127, 149, 162-63, 184, 195, 559 a:G703
SivaG554 spanda. See activity
âiva Bhatta, father of Näges'a 323 specification (visesavidhi) 150
^IVABHATTA (1810) 509 speech (väc or väk) 49, 93-94,103, 341, 555
SIVADÄSA 532 = bhâ§â 113
SIVADÄSA GAKRAVARTIN 532 daivi 37
SIVADATTA PÄI^DEYA 533 madhyamâ. See madhyamä väk
SIVADATTA SARMAN (1914) 514, para 63, 121, 328, 553-55
e:G943 —principle (Jabdatattva). See language
SIVÄNANDAYOGASVÄMIN. See principle
BHATTA SIROMANI —vaikhari. See vaikharï väk
SIVA J^ÄRÄYAI^A SIROMANI 532 sphofa, theory of 5, 10-11, 14, 18-21, 29,
SIVA PAl^DITA 532 42-43,49, 51, 56-62, 68-82, 110, 232-36,
SIVARÄMA GAKRAVARTIN (1600) 242, 298-99, 303-08, 324-29, 342-43,
493 347, 367-70, 552-55, G1391, G1394,
Sivaraman, Krishna 550, a:G1690 G1412, G1428, G1454, G1464, G1510,
SIVARÄMA SARMAN (VÄGASPATI) G1512, G1518, G1543, Gl 549, G1562,
532 G1569, G1655, G1688, G1700A, G1702,
SIVARÄMA TRIPÄTHIN ( 1750 ) 506 552-55
SIVARÄMENDRA SARASVATÎ akhaydasphota 242, 298, 305, 348-49
(1660) 22, 227, 245, 499, 561 jätisphota 306-8
SlVARÄMENDRA YATI (1780) 508 padasphofa 6, 242, 298-99,303,305,328
602 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

väkyasphota 6, 93-95, 242, 298-300, 305, SRIVALLABHAVAGANA ÄGÄRYA

328, 369-70 (1607) 494
varriasphota 242, 298, 308, 557 Srngäraprakäsa (of Bhoja) 560
vyaktisphota 306-7 Srngärasataka section of Subhäsitatnsatl 124
Sphotacandrikâ (of Srikrsna Bhatta, Mau« SRSTIDHARÄGÄRYA 533*
nin) 23, 36, 215, 367-70, 506 SRLJTASÄGARA 533
Sphotanirüpaya (of Apadeva) 499 sruti. See revealed scripture
Sphotanirüparta (of Sesa Krsna) 22,78, 215-Staal, J. Frederick (Frits) 550, 556,
17,488 a:G167,G195-96,G211, G247, G1545,
Sphotapariksä (of Bhairava Misra) 23, 389* G1554, G1566, G1576-77, G1604,
G1182 G1649, G1662, G1696, G1714,
Sphotapratistha (of Kesava) 526 b:G1583, G1625
Sphofasiddhi(of Bhärata Misra) 22, 231-36, state (bhäva) 129
489 statement, direct (êruti), a means of proof
Sphotasiddhi(ofMandana Misra) 5,18, 22, 83
56, 70-80, 82, 181-91, 213, 232-36, 473- stem 4,118,146,348. See also nominal stem
74, 553-56, 561 Stenzler, A. F. b:G1485
—Gopälika (of [Rsiputra ] Paramesvara sthäna. See position, a means of proof
II) 22, 213-14, 486 sthayïbhava. See mood
Sphotasiddhi (author unknown) 535 Sthemadarpana (of Gopäläcärya) 522
Sphotasiddhinyäyavicära 22, 231, 235-36,Sthiroratna, Loharam G1018
489 sthiti. See duration
Sphotatattva (of Krsna Dvivedin) 526 Strauss, Otto a:G563, G1398
Sphotatattvanirüpaya (of Sesa Krsna) 22,structure, deep/surface G306
78,215-17,488 Subantaprakäsa (of Krsna Sästrin) 526
Sphotaväda (of Nägesa Bhafta) 242, 342- SUBHASILA GANI (1425) 486
49, 504, 549 Subhäsitatnsatl (of Bhartrhari) 124
•—Subodhinî or —Upodghäta (of V. Krs- subject-matter (prakarana) 82-83, 108
namäcärya) 24, 413, 516 subjunctive G1432
Sphotavimarsinï (of Mädhava Sästrin Bhan- sublation (bädha) 188, 214
däri) 515 Subrahmanyam, K. G. a:G61, G412,
SPHOTÄYANA 13, 68, 349, 440 G450, G508, G557, G559-560, G684
êraoarj,a. See hearing Subrahmanyam, P. S. a:G306
SRÏDEVA PALPITA 533 SUBRAHMANYAM NAMBUTTIRI-
SRÏDHARANANDA SARMÄ GHIL- PAD (1860) 512
DÏYAL (1962) 517, e:G1103 substance (dravya) 6, 119, 161, 164, 170,
SRÎDHARA SARMAN (1889) 513 194-95, G1509, 558-59, G1633
SRÏKANTA MI^RA 533 substantive G1571
SRÏKRSNA BHATTA MAUNIN (1750 ) substratum of the result (phaläsraya) 267
23,361,367-70,506 of agency 269
SRÏKRSNA SARMAN 533 subtle body (suksmasarïra) 132
Sri Lanka 18 SUDARSANÄGÄRYA 533
SRÏNATHA SIROMANI 533 SUDARSANADEVA 533
SRÎNIVASA533 Suddhicandrikä (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 361
Srinivasacaryulu, Bommakanti a:G1575 Suddhi{tattva)kärikä (of Näräyana) 315,
SRÎPATIDATTA (1450) 486 499
SRÏPRABHA SURI 533 SUDHÄNANDASÜRISISYA (1671)
SRIRÄMÄGÄRYA. See GOPÄLADEVA 500
VIDYÄVÄGISA suffix (pratyaya) 4, 10, 12, 15, 98, 118,
Sriramamurti, P. a:G771, G1648 146, 257-58, 262, 266, 292-95, 335, 343,
SRI TÄTÄGÄRYA (1580) 239 348, G198, G292; G335
SRÎVALLABHAVAGAKA or =ÄGÄR- inflectional 276
YA (1718) 504 nominal. See nominal stem
INDEX 603

personal 331 svätantryasaktu See power of complete

primary 4, 261, 297-98 freedom
secondary 4, G347, G349, G396 SVAYAMPR AKÄSÄNANDA ( 1740 )
suggestion (vyanjanä) 11, 27-30, 65, 92, 505
287, 324, 327, 341, G1508, G1521, SVETANIVASIN 533
G1658 Svetäsvatara Upanisad 550
suggestive meaning {dyotaka) 112, 146-47, Swaminathan, V. 560, a:G605, G779,
289, 322, 333 G802, G1047, e:G780, G898
suitability (aucitya) 83, 149 Syadisamuccaya (of Amaracandra) 481
Sukhbeatar, O. a:G1692 SYÄMAGARANA KAVIRATNA
Sukhthankar, Vishnu S. e:G486 (1910) 514
Shukla, J. M. a:G798, G891, G960, syllable (aksara) 104, 128
G1647, G1663, G1683 syntactic analysis. See syntactic unity
Shukla, Karunesha a:G809 syntactic connection {parasparä vyäpeksä)
Sukla, Rama Govind e:G324,G1348 114,330
Sukla, Sri Rajanarayana e:G1280 a means of proof (väkya) 83
süksmasarira. See subtle body syntactic function (kâraka) 16, 87, 164,
Süktimtnäkara (of [Sesa] Näräyana 195, G215
[Bha«a])215 ' . syntactic identity. See identity
Sumanoramä (of Gangesa Misra Upädhyä- syntactic relation 8-9, G247, G257
ya) 521 syntactic unity {ekaväkyatä) 26, 29, 86,
Sundaraprakäsasabdärrjiava. See Uriädisädhana G1572
SUNDARESVARA YAJVAN 373 syntax 4, 114-15, G1539
sünyatä G1689
Supadma (of Padmanâbhadatta) 484-85 tädätmya. See identity
—Makararida (of Visnumisra) G1043, taddhita. See secondary meaning, derivative
G1044 ; Taddhitacandrikä (ofHariräma) 511
—Vivarariapancikä G1045 Taddhitakosa (of Bhafta Siromani) 518
—Tippanl (of Trilokyanätha Bhattäcär- Taddhitakosa (of Bhavadeva) 498
ya) G1046 Taddhitakosa (of Bhafta Siromani) 518
superimposition {adhyäsa) 42, 65, 126, Taddhitaungadipika (of Saccidananda ) 531
216-17, 306, 324 Taddhitopadesa (of Vangadâsa ) 534
supplementary description (arthaväda) 24 Tagare, G. V. a:G1358
supporting object (älambana) 189 Taittirïya Äravyaka G858
Suptinantasägarasamuccaya (of Nage s'a Bha- Taittirïya Brähmaxia 105
tta) 504 Taksan G234
Suri, Chandra Sagara e:G953 TALADEVASUDHI 533
Suri, Vijayalvani e:G954 tamas. See inertia
Suryanarayana, S. e:G691 Tamil (Nadu) 321, G1409, G1706
SÜRYANÄRÄYANA SUKLA (1937) Tantravärttika (of Kumärila) 213, 549
24, 405, 516 Commentary (of Annambhatta) 237
SÜRYA PRASÄDA MISRA (1887) 512 Tantric works 324
SUSENA KAVIRÄJA MISRA 533 Tantrism 342
svabhäva. See natural TÄRAKA BRAHMÄNANDA SARAS-
svara. See accent VATÎ (1650) 309, 498
Svaramanjarï. See Saptasvarasindhu (of TÄRANÄTHA 533
Närasimha Süri) TÄRANÄTHA TARKAVÄCASPATI
Svaraprakriyä and autocommentary (of (1867) 397, 512, e:G30, G1178
Rämacandra Pandita) 501 TÄRAPADA NYÄYARATNA 533-34
svarga. See heaven Taraporewala, I. J. S. a :G1462
svarüpa. See essence tarka 132
svarüpasat. See inseparable existence Tarkabhâsàyuktïmuktâvali (of Nage s'a Bha-
svätantrya, See independence «a) 323
604 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHIES

Tarkacandrikä (of Srikrsna Bhatta Mau- Thirujnanasambandham, P. a:G1619

nin) 23, 367, 506 Thumb, Albert b:G1404
Tarkacudamani, Madhavacandra e:G933 Tibet 18
TARKÄLAMKÄRA BHATTAGÄRYA Tibetan G368, G397, G1007, G1051,
534 G1692
Tarkalamkara, Madana Mohana e:Gl 178 TILAKA 534
G1014 time ikala) 12, 40-49, 83, 93-94, 119, 127,
Tarkapancanana, Navakumara e:G641 129, 149, 162, 164-65, 170-72, 196-97,
Tarkapradlpa (of Konda Bhatta ) 255 257-58, 261, 263-64, 335, 550, G624,
Tarkaratna (of Konda Bhatta) 255 G694, G704, G772, G777, G798-99,
Tarkaratnamälä (of Târanâtha Tarkavâ- G1455, G1544, G1713
caspati) 397 limiting function of time (kälaeakti) 45,
Tarkasamgraha and —Dipikä (of Annam- 129, 164
bhatta) 237 (VARKHEDI ) TIMMANÄGÄRYA
TARKATILAKA BHATTAGÄRYA (1750) 506
(1614) 494 Tinam Saktih (of Srikrsna Sarman) 533
Tarkavagisa, Durgadasa Vidyavagisa Sri- (Candra)Tinanta (of Laksmikära) 527
raraa e:GlO24 Tinantaparyayasamgraka (of Virapändya)
Tarkikas 369 535
Tarpatam apau gha sütracvicära (of Räma- Tinantasesasamgraha 240
bhadra Diksita) 501 Tinivicära (of Srikrsna Sarman) 533
TÄTÄGÄRYA, N. S. RÄMÄNUJA Tirumala Acärya 237
(1972) 517, e:G1266 TIRUMALA BUKKAPATTUNAM
TATA SUBRAHMANYA SÄSTRIN SRÏNIVASAGARYA (1720) 504
(192.6) 515 TIRUMALA YAJVAN (1660) 313,499,
tätparya. See intention of the speaker 562
Tattvabindu (of Vacaspati Mis'ra) 80 Tiwari, Kapil Muni a:G288, d:G237
Tattvabindu (ofjfiänendra) Tolkappiyam G305, G585
—Güdhärthadfpikä (of Nilakantha Dîk- trace {samskära) 184, 186-88, 213, 216,
sita) 373, 506 233, 235, G1679, 553-54
Tattvadipikäprabhäkaracandra (of Nägesa tradition [agama) 132
Bhatta) 323, 504 Traividyädeva, Bhavasena G650
Tattvamimämsä (of Krsnamiträcärya) 381 transformation (pariyäma) 129
Tattvasarngraha (of Säntaraksita) G775 transitive 259
Tattvaviveka (of Nrsimhäsrama) Trapp, Valentin t:G569
Commentary (of Annambhatta) 237 TrikändasabaMsana (of Gangâdhara Kavi-
technical terms (âdhunika) 118 räja) 23,395,512
TEKNÄTHA 534 Trikäridi (of Bhartrhari). See Väkyapadiya
Telang, Kashinath Trimbak a:G531 Trika system. See Kashmir Saivism
Telugu 237, 241 TRILOGANA (1600) 493
tense 149, 263-64, 331, 336, G302, G1528 TRILOCANA 534
termination 4 TRILOGANADÄSA (1000) 475-76
(verbal) testimony {sabda) 54-56, 126, TRILOKANÄTHA 534
175, 324 Tripâdoddyotinï (of Mädhava Bhatta) 486
THAKKURADÄSA NYÄYAPAftCÄ- Tripathi, Bhaviratprasada b:G197, e:G40
NANA534 Tripathi, Gayacarana e:G1323
Thakur, Kanakalal e:G1162 Tripathi, Kailas Patil a:G337
Thibaut, Georg 553 Tripathi, Ram Suresh a:G606
Thieme, Paul 14,109, 549, 555-56, a:G84, Tripathi, Shambhu Nath e:G890
G409, G458, G462, G465, G479-80, Trisïiïmvyâkararia (of Gangädhara Kavi-
G490, G617, G1269, G1410, G1413, räja) 23, 395, 512
G1592, G1626, b:G457 Trivedi, Kamalasankara Pranasankara
thinking (manana) 106 e:G1050, G1185
INDEX 605
TRIVIKRAMA (1118) 478 understanding. See knowledge
truth (satya) 5, 54, 106 unestablished locus. See fallacy of unesta-
= dkarma 51 blished locus
Tvastr 105 union {yoga) 138
Tyadyantasyapràkriyâ (of Sarvadhara Upä- unity of purpose (arthaikatva ) 86
dhyäya) 532 unity, syntactic. See syntactic unity
Tyadyantasyaprakriyäpadärohana (of Nanda-universal (jäti, sämänya) 6, 10, 26, 28, 82,
kîrti) 527 92, 118-19, 125-27, 131, 145, 148, 161,
169, 183, 185, 191, 194, 231-32, 234,
IL K. VEftKATANARASIMHA (1916) 236, 273-74, 339, 552-53, 556, 558,
515 G226, G602, G606, G723, G1582
UDAYACANDRA (1180) 480 great universal (mahäsämänya) 194
UDAYADHARMA (1451) 486 =sabdäkrti 125
UDAYAKÏRTI (1654) 499 ^Äo.fa-universal (jätisphofa) 349
UDAYANKARA NÄNAPÄTHAKA universal word (jätisabda). See word,
(1800) 509-10 universal
s
UDAYASAUBHAGYA. See DHANA- unnecessary assumption 216, 280
CANDRA unreal (asatya) 129
Uddälaka 106-7 upacära. See metaphor
uddesya. See accomplisher upädhi 145, 162, 171, 305
Udipi 240 Upadhyaya, Krishnadeva a:G87
UGRABHÜTI (1000) 476 upagraha. See aspect
UJJVALADATTA (1350) 484 upakrama-upasamhära G1560
UMÄMAHESVARA (1750) 371, 507 upalaksaq.a. See indicator
Umarji, Varadaraja a:G5-7 upamä. G1393
Uvädigantu (of Venkatesvara) 504 upamäna. See comparison
Uriädikoia (of Mahädeva Vedäntin ) 501 Upanisads 105-6,161, 342, 348, G1387, 550
Uriädikosa (of Sivaräma Tripäthin) 506 upasarga. See prefix
Uriädimamamälä (of âubhasïla Gani) 486 Upasargärihadipikä (of Haridatta) 523
Uriädimanidipikä (of Rämabhadra Diksita) Upasargärthasamgraha (of Krsnäcärya II)
501 486
Uriädiparisista (of Kramadïsvara) 477 Upasargavrtti (of Bhärata Mallika) 510
Uriädirüpävali (of Mahälinga Sästrin) 527 Upasargavrtti (of Candra school) 18
Uyädisädhana (of Padmasundara ) 529 UPAVARSA 234, 554
Unädisütras 4, 13-14, 16, 108, 110, 113-14, upaya. See means
434-35, G242 use, usage (prayoga) 145
Commentary (of Purusottamadeva) 209 (in) correct 47-48
—Uyädimariidipikä (of Rämabhadra Dik- =samjnä 114-15
sita) 321 UTPÄLA (1170)479
Commentary (of Gopälakrsna Sästrin) UTPÄLÄCÄRYA (930) 24
353,504 utpatti. See production
Commentary (of Ksapanaka) 472 UTSAVAKÏRTI SARATOGA UPÄDH-
—Vrtti (of Ujjvaladatta) 484 YÄYA 534
—Uriädikapadärriava (of Perusüri) 507 utthita. See expectancy : natural
—-Bhäsya (of Dayänanda Sarasvati) 511 UVATA G86
Commentary (of Sarvadhära, Upädhyä-
ya) 532 vac. See speech
Commentary (of Satyavaryärya) 532 pasyanti. See paêyantl väc
—Vrtti (of Svetaniväsin) 533 väcaka. See denotative
Unädisütras (of Haridatta) 523 VÄCASPATIMISRAI(960) 80-81,240,"
Urßdisütras (of Vrajaräja) 535 G1414, 554
Uvädisütras (Jain) väcya. See denotation
—Vrtti or Dasapadï (of Mänikyadeva ) 52 7 Vädacudämam (of Krsnamiträcärya) 509
606 E N C Y C L O P E D I A OF I N D I A N PHILOSOPHIES

Vädaratna (of Süryanäräyana Sukla) 516 —Vaiyäkarariabhüsa%a (of Konda Bhatta).

Vädärthasamgraha (of M. G. Bakre) 216 See Vaiyäkarariabhüsaria
VÄDAVA 458 Vaiyäkarariapürvapaksävali (of Gopäla Sästri
VÄDIRÄJA (1571) 240 Nene) 515
VÄGAMBHRNI 103 VmyäkaravLasamgraha (of Gangädhara
VägUämata (of Gangädhara Nätha ) 521 Sarman) 521
Vaidya, Uma C, d:G378 Vaiyäkarariasarvasava (of Dharanidhara)
Vaidyanätha, father of Gopälakrsna 385, 509
äästrin 353 Vaiyäkarafiasiddhäntadipikä or —kärikä (of
VAIDYANÄTHA DIKSITA (1705) 502 Bhattoji Diksita). See Vaiyäkaraqamaton-
VAIDYANÄTHA PAIYAGUNDA, majjana
(1740)23,323,327,387,505 Vaiyäkarariasiddhäntamanjusä (of Brahma-
VAIJALADEVA 534 deva) 24,411,516
vaikhan väk 43, 47, 49-51, 61-62, 95, 99, Vaiyäkarana (laghu )siddhäntamanjusä (of Nä-
121, 124, 328-29, 342, 555, 558 gesa Bhatta) 502
VAINATEYA. See NÄRÄYANA BHA- —Kalä (of Balambhatta) 505
TTATIRI —Kunjikä (of Durbäla) 508
Vairägyasataka section of Subhasitatrïsati 124 —Vrttivärttika (of Appayya Diksita) 518
Vaisesika 82, 163, 194, 196, 213, 559. See Vaiyäkararia Uttarapaksävali (of Gopäla
also Nyäya' Sästri Nene) 515
Vaiyäkarartabhüsa^a and ^—Sära (of Konda VÄJAPYÄYANA 6, 16, 119, 194, 273,
Bhatta ) 21 -22,255-308,324,367,495-96 458, 556
—Darpana (of Hari Vallabha) 23, 363, Väjasaneyi Samhitä G452
383, 505-06 vâkya. See sentence; syntactic connection
—Käsikä (of Hariräma Kalä) 508 väkyärtha. See sentence meaning
—Tïkà (of Krsnamiträcärya) 23, 381, vâkyaéakti 345. See also power
509 vàkyasphota. See sphota
—Känti (of Manyudeva) 23, 387, 509 Väkyakäntatikä (of Heläräja) 193
—Sphotapanksä (of Bhairava Misra) Vâkyamanjarï (of Ananta) 518
389, 510 Vakyapadl (of Gangadäsa) 521
—Tinarthavädasära (of Khuddi J h ä ) 23, Vâkyapadïya and— Vrtti (ofBhartrhari) 18,
399, 514 22, 27, 36, 38, 40-51, 54, 56, 60-61,
—Visamasthalatipparjx (of Rämakrsna 69-70, 77, 83, 95, 107, 120, 123-74, 242,
Sarmä Tripäthi) 514 270-271, 302, 307, 326, 341, 466-70,
—Säralä (of Gopäla Sästri Nene) 24, 549, 551-55, 557-60
407, 515 —Prakfrriavrtti (of Dharmapäla) 177,
—Prabhä (of Bäla Krsna Paficoli) 417, 472
516 —Paddhati (of Vrsabhadeva) 22, 178,
—Subodhim (of Räma Prasäda Tripä- * 472
thi) 419, 516 —Sabdaprabhä (of Heläräja) 475
—Sarnkan (of Samkara Sästrin Marula- — (Prakirna)Prakâsa (of Heläräja) 22,
cakära) 517 193-97, 203, 292, 475, G776
Vaiyäkarariadarea (of Kali Kumära Sar- —Prameyasamgraha 199, 475
man) 524 —Prakîmavivararia (of Abhinavagupta),
Vaiyäkarariadareanabindu (of Raghunätha 476
Sarmà) 24, 517 —Prakâêa or — Tikâ (of Punyaräja) 22,
Vaiyäkarayadarsanapratimä (of Rämajna 201, 476
Pändeya) 24, 530 —Bhävapradipa (of Süryanäräyana Suk-
Vaiyäkarariaßvatu (of Cangadäsa) 519 la) 24, 405, 516
Vaiyäkarariakärikä (of Nägesa Bhatta) 503 Commentary (of Satyakäma Varma)
Vaiyäkarariakotipättra (of Trilocana) 534 517
Vaiyäkarariamatonmajjana (of Bhattoji Dik- Commentary (of K. A. Subramania
sita) 21, 255, 492 Iyer) 517
INDEX 607
—Pratyekärthaprakäsikä (of Dravyesa Varuna 104
Jhä)403, 521 . * väsanä. See dispositional
—Prakäea (of Narain Datta Tripâthin) Vasisçha 146
528 vastvartha. See reference
Commentary (of Vidyäcakravartin) 534 Vasu, Srisa Chandra et:G41, G1085
Väkyapradlpa (ofHeläräja) 193 Vasu, Vaman Das et:G1085
Väkyaprakäsa (of Udayadharma ) 486 VASUBANDHU (360) 123
Väkyatattva (of P. S. Anantanäräyana Vasudeva G60, G553
Sästri) 24, 409, 516 VÄSUDEVA 534
VÄLÄBHIDATTA 534 VASUDEVA BHATTA (1567) 490
VALLABHÄCÄRYA. See RABHASÄ- VÄSUDEVA DÏKSITA (1750) 365, 506
NANDIN VÄSUDEVA SÄSTRY ABHYANKAR
Vallabha Utprabatiya 363 (1929) 516, e:G573
VÄMANA (650) 19^203,472-73 VÄSUDEVA VISNU MIRASHI (1928)
Vämendrasvämin 351 515
VANGADÄSA 534 Vasudhatukarika (of Goapala Gakravartin )
VAftGASENA (1250) 481 500
Van Nooten, Barend A. a:G223, G248, Vasuräta 123
G268, G514. et:G12 Vasus 104-8
VARADARÄJA-(1620) 494-95 Vätesvara 223
Varadarajiengar, M. B. e:G901 Veda, Vedic texts 5, 24, 26, 32, 35, 37-39,
Varadesvara Diksita 373 45, 48-51, 66, 68, 73, 82, 91, 111, 113,
Varanasi. See Banaras 121, 128-30, 146, 148, 175, 183-84, 188,
VARARÜGI. See KÄTYÄYANA 204, 231-32, 234, 265, 284, 321, 330,
VARDHAMÄNA (1088)478 336, 341-43, 346, 550, 555, G199, G213,
VARDHAMÄNA (1140) 478 G351, G361, G489A, G594, G817-18,
VARENDRA GAMPAHATTIYA MÄN- G860, G1098, G1486
ASARMAN 534 Vedic accent. See accent
VARKHEDI TIMMANÄGÄRYA. See Vedic language 321, G270, G279, G291
TIMMANÄCÄRYA Vedic prescription. See prescription
Varma, K. G. a:G496 Vedic sages. See sage
Varma, L. A. Ravi e:G688 Vedänga 3, 107-9, 188, 321, 343
Varma, Satyakarma 46, a:G15, G17, Vedängasiksäpanjikä G427
G340-41, G358-59, G755-56, G816-17, Vedäntabhäsyapradipoddyota (of Nage sa Bha-
Gl 674-76, e:G737 tta) 323
Varma, Siddheswar 555, a:G117, G478, VEDÄNTÄGÄRYA 534
G616, G1098, G1472, G1593, G1606, VEDÄNTADESIKA (1330) 239
Gl 627-28, G1650, G1677, b:G374, Vedäntaparibhäsä (of Dharmaräjadhvarün-
G1401 dra) 87, 552
varria. See p h o n e m e Vedantatirtha, Girisacandra e:G969
varriasphota. See sphota, varria Vedavati, Vyakaranopadhyaya e:G869
Varnaprakäsa (of Ghanasyäma) 522 Vedavrata 340, e :G611
Yarnasütras of Gandra school 18 Veer, Yajan a:G405
Varnaviveka (of Pancänana Kandalï) 529 Vele, R. N. a:G1578
VÄRSÄYANI 12, 110, 196 VENJMÄDHAVA (1750) 506
Värttäksa 110 Venkatacharya, T. a:G1703
(Astädhyäyi) Värttikas (of Kätyäyana) 16-VENKATADÄSA (1780) 508
17, 117, 297,458-59, 556 Venkatärya, father of Umämahesvara 37 lv
—Vrttikonmesa (ofHeläräja) 193,475 Venkatasubbiah, A. a:G662
—Dïpaprabha (of Näräyana) 498 Venkatesa, father of Tirumala Yajvan 313
—Vivrti (of Vidyävägisa Bhattäcärya) VENKATESVARA (1722) 504
500 verb (äkhyäta) 110, 112, 121, 149, 256-57,
«. —ArthaprakäUkä (ofRäghava Süri) 529 333, G223, G1384
608 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF INDIAN P H I L O S O P H I E S

verb (kriyä) 321, G696, G1549 VIPRAJENDRA (1845) 511, e:G537

nominal verb (nämadhätu) 173 Vira, Raghu a:G10, G70, G426, G453
verbal cognition (sabdabodha) 26, 89-90, VÏRAPANDYA 535
95-99, 300, 346, G1465, G1656, G1712 VIRARÄGHAVÄCÄRYA 535
verbal comprehension. See abhihitänvaya VÏRESVARA 241, 247, 319
verbal ending. See (case)-ending virodha. See contradiction
verbal knowledge (sabdajnäna) 27 Visalakshy, P.a:G867
verbal meaning G248 Visesyaväda (of Käsinätha) 525
verbal testimony (sabda, agama). See testi- visesavidhi. See specification
mony Visistädvaita 240
vibhäga. See disjunction (King) Visnugupta 179
vibhakti. See (case) -ending VISI^UMlâRA GÏ043-44
Vibhaktyarthanimaya (of Srikrsna Bhatta VISNUMITRA (1547) 227, 488
Maunin) 361, 506 VISNUPRASÄDA ÖARMAN 514, e:G
Vibhaktyarthaprakäsa (of Kamaläkara Bha- 1002
s
tta) 497 VISVANÄTHA BHATTA G1255
Vibhaktyarthavivarana (of Sivänanda Gos-VISVANÄTHA GAKRAVARTIN 530
vämin) 532 VISVANÄTHA DANDIBH ATTA (1850 )
vidhi. See prescription 511
vidhisütra. See operational rule VISVANÄTHA NYÄYÄLAMKÄRA
Vidhiviveka (of Mandana Misra) 266 535
Vidvatprabodhinl (of Rämabhatta) 498 VlSVANÄTHA NYÄYASIDDHÄNTA
vidyä. See knowledge PA^GÄNANA (1640) 91
Vidyabhusana, Satischandra a:G1388 VI^VANÄTHA SÄSTRI 535
VIDYÄGAKRAVARTIN 534 VisVedevas 104
VIDYÄNANDA. See VIJAYÄNANDA Vis'vesvara Diksita 365
Vidyanidhi, Vipinacandra e:G1004 VISVESVARA SÜRI 535
Vidyaratna, Govindacandra e:G1016 VISVESVARA TARKÄGÄRYA 535
Vidyavacaspati, Veda Prakasa e:G639 VITTHALA (1460) 486, G1050
VIDYAVÂGÏSA BHATTÄCÄRYA Vivarana school of Advaita 41-42
(1665) 499-500 vivarta. See manifestation
Vidyavaridhi, Syamacarana Kaviratna V. KRSNAMÄGÄRYA (1944) 24, 413,
e:G1032 516, e:G1265
view, final true (siddhänta ) 16 vocative (case) (sambadhana) 168, 262,
Vijaya, Manohara e:G957 337, G1483
VIJAYAMÄLÄ 534 Vogel, J. P. a:G1444
Vijayanagara empire 238 voice (active/passive) 258, G235
VIJAYÄNANDA (1140) 478 volition (kfti) 257-58, 332
Vijaya Raghunatha Tondaiian I, King of VOPADEVA (1275) 20, 211, 482-83
Pudukottah 353 VRAJARÄJA 534
VIJAYÏNDRA BHIKSU (165) 240 Vart, Satya a:G624, G703-4, G1534,
vikalpa. See conceptual construction G1691
vikära. See becoming; product (HARI) VRSABHADEVA (1650) 22,
Vikarmänkadevacarita (of Bilhana) 205 50, 179,201,472
viksepa. See mayä VrtaksalS
VIMALAKÎRTI (1550) 488 vrtti. See formation; integration
VIMALAMATI (648) 472 Vrttidïpikâ (of Jayakrsna Maunin) 361,
VIMALA SARASVATÏ (1300) 483 367
VINÄSVARANANDIN 535 Vrttidïpikâ (of Srikrsna Bhatta Maunin)
VINAYAVIJAYAGANI (1652) 499 23,506
Vinodamaftjarï (of Vallabha Utprabatiya) VrttipaHjikä
363 >—Prabhävati (of Krsna Bhat^acarya)
uiparyäsa. See false 526
INDEX 609

VURAMlâRA 535 303, 345-46, 348, 369, G187, G272

vyabhicära. See false, deviation compound word. See compound
VYÄDI 6,16, 117, 119-20, 194, 273, 458, word derivation. See derivation
556 divine word 46
vyäkararia. See grammar noncompound word 125
VyäkarariadarEanapratimä (of Rämajfia Pän-word-meaning (padärtha) 11-12, 65-83,
deya) 431 146, 161, 194, 343, G732
Vyäkaranadipa (of Gidrüpäsrama ) (inner) mental word. See mental
—Prabhä (of Gangädhara Diksita) 494 word-order 47, G1583
Vyäkaranakrodapättra (of Täraka Brahmä- universal word (jätifabda) 28
nanda Sarasvati) 309, 498 Tdaväbhyudaya (of Vedänta Desika) 239
Vyäkarariatlkä (of GunakarW) 523 YAGESVARA (1900) 513
Vyäkhyasära (of Hariräma). See Candrikä Yajnaräma Diksita 321
vyakti. See particular
YAJHESVARA BHATTA (1874) 512
vyaktisphota. See sphota
Täjuweda 86, G514
vyanjanä. See suggestion
Yâjusmantra 26
vyäpära. See function
YAKSAVARMAN (1050) 476, G840,
vyäpeksa. See dependence
G885-86
parasparävyäpeksa. See syntactic connec- Yäma 104
tion YÄSKA4, 7, 10-11, 13-14, 36, 68, 107-12,
VYÄSA44
169, 196, 333, 342, 549, 555-56, G422,
vyatireka G1579
G450, G621, G696, G1693
vyutpatti. See derivation
YAâOBHUTI 535
Vyutpattiväda (of<Gadädhara) 370
Yasovijaya, Muni e:G959
YATlSA 535
Wackernagel, Joseph a:G93, G1392, yatna. See effort
b:G1385, G1405 yaugika. See derivation; see also etymology
Wadegaonkar, Narayana Dadaji e:G1121 Yävanas 237, G533
Wayman, Alex a:G775, G1704 yoga. See derivation; see also union
Weber, Albrecht a:G431, G526-28, G533 yoga of the word {êabdayoga) 47, 50-52
Wecker, Otto a:G1387 Yoga 21, 44-45, 54
Wells, Rulon a:G1495 Yogäcära 177
Westergaard, N. L. b:G1365 yogarüdhi. See convention
Wezler, Albrecht a:G309, G749, b:G256, Togasütras (ofPataüjali) 16,44,46, 551-53
G749 —Vrtti (of Nâgesa Bhatta) 323
Whitney, William Dwight a :G440, Gl 367, yogic intuition 146
G1372, G1382, b:G379, G1458 yogin 31-32
whole. See part and whole yogyatä. See consistency
Willans, Charles e:Gl274 Tuktiratnäkara (of Krsnäcärya) 526
will (icchâ) 90 Tuktiratnäkara (of Krsnamiträcärya ) 509
word {pada) 5-6, 10, 26-27, 47, 55, 58, 61,
71-73, 94, 99, 108, 119, 124-25, 147, zero G143, G165, G209, G212
149, 183, 187, 189-90, 216, 232-34, 276, Zgusta, Ladislav a:G257