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Abstract. Considering the importance of the 11th Sustainable Development Goal on sustainable
cities and communities and the New Urban Agenda, it is imperative to address one of today’s
crucial urban planning challenges, which concerns overexploitation, mismanagement, and
quality issues related to public parks and state-owned public open space (POS). Selecting an
appropriate methodological framework to formulate a solution to cope with the encountered
challenges is necessary; however, finding a suitable one is difficult as there is a lack of research,
particularly on the step-by-step development of a conceptual countermeasure (solution). Against
this background, we adopted the revised design science research (DSR) framework and its
procedural methodology to formulate a conceptual solution, represented as an artifact, within the
institutional-social-ecological context of Sabah, Malaysia. The data obtained for the development
and validation of the solution were secondary, based on a review via content analysis of prior
studies. The proposed conceptual artifact (self-governing collective action) based on the root
causes (i.e. property rights and transaction costs issues) from the ‘why’ analysis was then
validated via the institutional analysis and development (IAD) framework using its social-
ecological system (SES) criteria. The main contribution of this study is to showcase the
application and relevancy of the DSR framework for urban and environmental planning research
through a problem-solution analysis by demonstrating the process of how the artifact was
systematically constructed, validated and standardised. It was found that the proposed conceptual
solution can be considered valid and appropriate to address the local governance issues of POS.
Keywords. Public open space, revised design science research, self-governing system, new
institutional economics, conceptual solution.
[Diterima: 15 Juni 2020; diperbaiki: 1 Agustus 2020; diterima dalam bentuk akhir: 27 Agustus
2020]
1
Department of Urban and Regional Planning, Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: [email protected]
2
Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: [email protected]
3
Faculty of Built Environment and Surveying, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia. E-mail: [email protected]
4
Faculty of Engineering, Universiti Teknologi Malaysia, E-mail: [email protected]
ISSN 2502-6429 online © 2021 ITB Institute for Research and Community Services
16 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
kerangka kerja Penelitian Ilmu Desain (DSR) yang telah direvisi dan metodologi proseduralnya
untuk merumuskan solusi konseptual yang direpresentasikan sebagai artefak. Data yang
diperoleh untuk pengembangan dan validasi solusi adalah data sekunder, berdasarkan tinjauan
melalui analisis konten dari studi sebelumnya. Artefak konseptual yang diusulkan (tindakan
kolektif yang mengatur diri sendiri) berdasarkan akar penyebab (yaitu, masalah hak milik dan
biaya transaksi) dari analisis 'mengapa'yang kemudian divalidasi melalui kerangka Analisis dan
Pengembangan Kelembagaan (IAD) dengan menggunakan kriteria social-ecological system
(SES). Kontribusi utama studi ini adalah penerapan dan relevansi kerangka DSR dalam
penelitian perencanaan kota dan lingkungan melalui analisis solusi masalah, dengan
menunjukkan proses bagaimana artefak dibangun, divalidasi, dan distandarisasi secara
sistematis. Akhirnya, artikel ini menunjukkan bahwa solusi konseptual yang diusulkan dianggap
valid dan sesuai untuk mengatasi masalah tata kelola lokal POS.
Kata kunci. Ruang terbuka publik, design science research, sistem tata-kelola mandiri, ekonomi
kelembagaan baru, solusi konseptual.
Introduction
Creating a liveable and sustainable environment for a better quality of life is challenging, as it
involves multifaceted perspectives and undertakings. One of the means is via green open space
provision; adequate and good quality spaces are proven to play a vital role in providing ecosystem
services and benefits to communities. However, despite a raft of studies on the protection of public
open space (hereinafter POS) – predominately from the fields of landscape/architectural design
and spatial planning – and on how to provide sufficient attractive spaces (in terms of location,
shape, size, design), such shared spaces (i.e. commons or common pool resources, CPR), mainly
owned and managed by governments, are still subject to overexploitation (overconsumption),
mismanagement and quality issues (Ling et al. 2019a). For example, due to government/state
failures in some developing countries, issues of vandalism, unkempt, unaccessible and dangerous
public spaces, and land conversion to private use (e.g. through the misuse of space) are common
(Ling et al. 2019a). These negative externalities related to POS/commons, especially associated
with governance and management issues in the residential neighbourhood context, have also been
occurring within the study area, i.e. Sabah, Malaysia. As such, to address the institutional-related
issues, which influence POS governance and management effectiveness as well as the POS
consumption patterns of individuals, an interdisciplinary approach that covers the social-
ecological system is necessary. This would essentially look into institutional effects on human-
environmental behaviours. Therefore, a solution to address the above POS issues is required. Prior
to solely and directly focusing on the solution itself, selecting a suitable methodology and design
framework incorporating institutional-social-ecological considerations to formulate such a
solution is a crucial concern, which should take precedence.
Finding a suitable and relevant design framework is difficult, as there is limited research,
especially on how to step-by-step (procedurally) and systematically construct and validate a
conceptual countermeasure (solution) within the complex context of a social-ecological system.
A conceptual solution formulation with qualitative descriptions was particularly emphasised in
this study, rather than a detailed practical one with accurate quantitative measures. Given that, a
question related to the contribution of this study was posed, i.e. does the conceptual solution
offer any originality/novelty and values if there are existing practical solutions addressing
them? The latter, which are not mainstream, can be confined to a specific, unique case study.
A valid and effective conceptual solution helps to develop more advanced solutions and
provide rationalisations for current practices/practical solutions (see Hanid, 2014). Besides,
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 17
Governance
developing a detailed practical solution is time-consuming and costly, acknowledging the scarcity
of resources in terms of technical know-how and the complex nature of the POS issues, which
require prompt action. Therefore, a conceptual version is preferable, at this point in time, to serve
as a preliminary model. It provides a pragmatic baseline for subsequent detailed design decisions
and solutions and allows the concepts of the solution to be first evaluated via a cost-and-benefit
analysis.
Based on a brief literature search, design frameworks such as Roadway’s practical solution
concept (Stamatiadis et al. 2010), the practical problem-solving methodology of Toyota (Liker,
2004), constructive research (Lukka, 2003), and design science research (DSR) (Vaishnavi and
Kuechler, 2007) have been adopted in developing solutions to remedy emergent issues.
However, most of them are more about designing practical solutions, which may not be relevant
to this study. As for constructive research, although it has much resemblance (as a good
validation) to DSR, the former is not as robust and comprehensive as the revised version of DSR
(Hanid, 2014). Hence, the revised DSR was chosen as sole methodological framework with the
following rationale. DSR, which emphasises practical problem-based solutions, also involves
solution-based knowledge and concepts, in which the outcome of a phenomenon from systematic
reasoning (via prediction and explanation) can be useful for formulating solutions to address
complex practical problems (see Lukka, 2003 on theory building). Similarly, related to the theory-
building aspect, Carstensen and Bernhard (2019) posited that DSR is “…a qualitative research
approach… it simultaneously generates knowledge about the method used to design an artifact
and the design or the artifact itself.”
Furthermore, Hevner (2007) asserts that the DSR framework, incorporating multiple methods and
knowledge bases, can potentially address existing real problems in a more innovative manner,
which is in line with this study’s intention. Besides, since DSR is popular in engineering and
architecture, focusing on creation, and to a certain extent in accounting information systems
(Geerts, 2011) and education engineering research (Carstensen and Bernhard, 2019) it is found
that there is a DSR application gap in the urban and environmental planning fields. Thus,
exploration of DSR is worth to be undertaken, particularly in this predominantly qualitative study
so that it may offer a different approach towards finding solutions or model formulation in the
planning field, which also methodologically adds value to the DSR framework in terms of its
application validity and flexibility. Moreover, DSR is very similar to the long-established and
renowned constructive research approach and Toyota’s practical problem solving model, which
can serve as a basis for the former (Hanid, 2014). And lastly, various DSR models for different
research areas (e.g. management and economics) (see Peffers et al. 2007; Hevner, 2007) have
been published in highly prestigious journals.
Against this background, this paper explores the applicability and relevancy of the revised DSR
framework in developing a solution in the context of environmental planning. More precisely, it
demonstrates how the revised DSR can be employed in a local context encompassing institutional-
social-POS dimensions. This study focused on existing issues of neighbourhood POSs that are
governed by the local property system, primarily referencing and sourcing from prior studies’
empirical data and findings. This means that we succinctly describe the key findings and relevant
data that are required for identification of the problems and root causes as well as for solution
development and validation, instead of explaining the methodology in detail, e.g. covering what
factors and variables are involved and how they were obtained. The study’s methodological
approach is consistent with the reporting method by Robson et al. (2008) (see also Ling and Leng,
2018).
18 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
The rest of this paper presents the folllowing: (i) a methodology covering the study area against
the background of its POS property rights system as well as the DSR framework, focusing on the
steps and processes involved in the analysis of problems and root causes, and solution design,
construction and validation; (ii) results and discussion based on the DSR process; and finally (v)
the conclusion, including a summary of the key findings, the research’s significance and policy
implications as well as research limitations and suggestions of future research.
Methodology
Study Area
Focusing on institutional-commons (POS) issues, the Kota Kinabalu district and the Penampang
district of Sabah state, Malaysia, with a heterogeneous property rights structure governing country
lease (CL) and native title (NT) POS use and management (Ling et al. 2019b), were chosen as the
areas of research. Figure 1 shows the two study areas’ geographical locations and territorial
coverage and boundaries. Based on the residential land use data for 2014, there were
approximately 350 CL POS and 22 NT POS in Kota Kinabalu and Penampang (Ling et al. 2019b).
These CL and NT spaces are governed and managed by the city hall of Kota Kinabalu and the
district council of Penampang, respectively. Rather than relying only on the capital city-level
district, i.e. Kota Kinabalu, Penampang was selected concurrently in this study to offer a more
holistic view of how the local property rights system results in POS governance and management
issues. Besides, due to the inadequate sample size of NT POS from Kota Kinabalu, the NT POS
data samples and related data were primarily elicited from relevant private and public
organisations of the Penampang district.
Figure 1. Kota Kinabalu and Penampang districts of Sabah, Malaysia as study areas
(Ling et al. 2019b).
Public environmental goods (in this case POS) are provisioned through the land development
process, more precisely land subdivision or partition. Sections 25(2)(q), 28D, and the Third
Schedule of Part 4 (1) of the Town and Country Planning Ordinance Cap 141 state that when land
subdivision is undertaken at least 10% of the land acreage should be reserved for open space for
public purposes. The subdivision process and related procedures related to the surrender of land
are also based on the Sabah Land Ordinance (SLO) Cap 68, specifically Sections 38 and 40.
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 19
Governance
Rather than covering the general land subdivision of various types of land use, this study is set
within the context of landed, open and unexclusive residential and housing property. More
specifically, we looked at how the current formal and legal institutions (law, land policies and
practice) influence the system of POS provision, management, and consumption in terms of its
property rights. There are two categories of land for alienation and leasing purposes, namely
Country Land and Native Land. For the Country Land subdivision, according to Section 48 of the
SLO, a title deed/leasehold with a lease not exceeding 99 years will be granted to (CL) POS,
whereas for native title (NT) POS, no title deed issuance is involved.
The ownership of NT POS can only be held by local natives, pursuant to the SLO under Sections
17 and 64, and following the same ordinance under Section 66, highlighting the permanency and
security of NT rights, its customary tenure is in perpetuity (Ling et al. 2019b). Moreover,
according to Sections 4 and 5, NT POS, which is deemed state land governed by the state
government, serves a public purpose. In addition to the above provisions of the primary land and
planning laws, a local judicial decision/case law in line with Section 88 of the SLO on the
importance of land registration for validity, emphasises the concept of bare trusteeship of the
Modified Torrens System. To better understand POS management and consumption, Sections
38(1), 49(1)(53), and 49A of the Local Government Ordinance 1961, statutory local plans,
development and landscape plans, the Housing Development Enactment 1978, and the offer letter
were also reviewed (see more in Ling et al. 2019b).
* Only certain neighbourhood communities may adopt the co-management regime, on a voluntary basis.
** Subdividers/owners will become bare trustees, i.e. a person who is deprived of his/her equitable management rights
on POS, after satisfying the owner’s covenant in terms of temporary and transitional (18-month) POS maintenance
duty. The bare trustee still owns a non-active duty, i.e. to undertake the registration of POS title conveyance, where the
local government ultimately becomes the legal owner of the POS.
The above land titling practice concerning local POS (i.e. titled CL POS and untitled NT POS) is
considered to be consistent with the mixed institutions concept, which means that a self-enforced
(de facto convention) and a formal-but-not-necessarily-legal system co-exist (see Ling et al.
2019b). Based on the above institutions, both CL POS and NT POS have their specific rules and
conditions pertaining to ownership, management, access, exclusion, and consumption rights.
20 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
However, more complex ones are imposed on the former. Table 1 shows the diversity and
heterogeneity of the property rights distribution of local CL POS and NT POS. For the untitled
NT POS system, since they are surrendered to the state government, the POS is de jure deemed
state or government property, where management rights and duties (i.e. POS maintenance) should
in principle and formally be vested in the local government (Ling et al. 2016). Nevertheless, due
to the issue of nonvested management rights by the state, the local government does not own and
may not effectively exercise any duties regarding the legal management of NT POS. Therefore,
NT POS is subject to an open-access resource regime (i.e. no man’s land); such spaces are likely
to be ungoverned, unmanaged, and exploited/degraded (see Ling et al. 2019b). This has led to a
reality that the local government, similar to other users, only owns active use and access rights.
As for the governance of CL POS, such titled POS involves a 3-phase process. In the 1st phase,
since the POS title is yet to be issued by the land office it involves a not yet handed over POS
site5 and a not transferred POS title deed, where the legal and equitable private developer/owner
is liable to fulfilling the owner covenants. The owner covenants entail that the owners/private
subdividers are required to carry out the POS management duties effectively to the satisfaction of
the local government, stipulated and agreed in the letter of offer prior to the approval of
subdivision (Ling et al., 2019b). Next, the interim or intermediate phase involves both handed
over POS and not yet transferred POS. Only after the satisfaction of the owner covenants, handing
over of the POS and a registrable memorandum of transfer to the local government are allowable;
implicitly, the owner (title holder), becoming a bare trustee, formally relinquishes his/her active
POS ownership and management rights and duties to the new equitable owner, namely the local
authority. That said, the bare trustee, who is the titleholder, is still a legitimate owner because the
transfer of the POS title deed is yet to be undertaken or effectuated (registered). Furthermore, in
this stage, some residential neighbourhoods’ communities and residents are endowed with
management rights by the local government, where they can be involved and participate in the
management task together with the local authority (i.e. co-management). Lastly, as for the 3rd
(final) phase, once the handed over POS title deed has been issued and the transfer of the POS
title is executed, the equitable local government will be the formal, de jure owner and manager of
the POS (with active claimant rights), where the same rules imposed on the private owner during
the 1st phase of the CL POS process are applied to the authority (Ling et al. 2016). For example,
alienation or transfer of POS (change of ownership) is not allowed, as the local government will
be the ultimate manager/steward of the POS. Also, the CL POS must remain shared, unexclusive
and open to the public, and in terms of POS use and function, no land conversion and development
are permissible for both CL POS and NT POS.
5
A mechanism ensuring continued, efficient POS maintenance and management by subdividers due to the
long and time-consuming process of title issuance and transfer, i.e. if the POS title is still to be issued and
transferred but the 18-month owner’s covenants have been fulfilled, the handing over of the site should be
executed while awaiting the title deed issuance. In this case, since the covenant in terms of the time period
of 18 months and maintenance of POS is yet to be fulfilled, POS site handing over is not allowed.
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 21
Governance
Generally speaking, DSR covers the following three steps: (i) establishing awareness of critical
issues or problems; (ii) design science (countermeasure) development and evaluation; and (iii)
theory building, despite the differences in terms of the elements involved in each step (see more
in Ling, 2017). For instance, in March and Smith’s (1995) idiosyncratic DSR process, there is no
problem identification and Peffers et al. (2007) have argued that the sequence of steps of the DSR
process is flexible. In this study, building on the conventional and general DSR process, the
revised version was adopted (see Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007; Hevner, 2007) (see Figure 3
below). The reasons are that the former (i.e. general DSR) faced several criticisms related to the
unclearness of how the root causes of a problem are identified, while the second one is about the
derivation or origination of the solution (artifact), i.e. a series of questions is posed: how is a
solution constructed? More precisely, is developing the solution based on any concept or theory?
And next, how is the concept/theory used formulated towards the artifact (solution) (see Hanid,
2014). More specifically, Figure 2 which shows the three design cycles –the relevance cycle
(problem and root cause identification), the design cycle (countermeasure formulation), and the
rigor cycle (knowledge bases: theories and concepts) – are only found and embedded in the
revised DSR process but not in the general methodology.
Similar to the general DSR, the first stage of the revised DSR focuses on the awareness and
establishment of practical problems based on anomalies. Subsequently, the focus is on the root-
cause examination. The primary idea is that inductive and deductive (abductive) reasoning and a
multi-tier ‘why’ analysis (an enquiry technique engaging in a series of questions on why the
problem occurred) are required to discover the real, in-depth and systemic root causes of the
problems, so that a valid countermeasure can be developed to respond effectively (see causal
effect theory) (Hanid, 2014; see also Sondalini, 2009 Toyota’s 5-level ‘why’ analysis). As
Liker (2004) argued: “identifying ‘root cause’ rather than ‘source’; the Root Cause lies
hidden beyond the source”. There are three types of causes in determining the root causes
(Hanid, 2014): (a) physical causes; (b) human causes; and (c) organisational causes involving
22 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
a system, process, or policy. However, only the organisational factors were primarily
emphasised in this study, as they are the inherent parts of the institutional-social-ecological
(physical) system. More specifically, due to issues with the local property right system it
influences social behaviours, which therefore impact the physical/ecological system (i.e.
POS). Next, a conceptual solution (artifact) design and development was carried out through:
(i) deduction (theories and concepts) and induction (evidence); and (ii) observation of
practical, initial ideas and solutions forwarded by empirical subjects. Last but not least, the
solution requires validation and standardisation. The conceptual solution needs to undergo
validation in terms of the feasibility/viability of the development of the solution as well as
potentiality and effectiveness in ameliorating the problems (against the set objective of the
artifacts). The validated solution will be standardised against and compared with existing
theoretical or methodological knowledge bases to verify whether the validated conceptual
solution confirms or extends any theories.
Figure 3. The revised DSR framework (Vaishnavi and Kuechler, 2007; Hevner, 2007).
As highlighted earlier, this study’s data elicitation process solely involved secondary data and an
extensive literature review of both theoretical and empirical works. Next, a qualitative content
analysis was performed in which several deductive themes (based on a priori/theoretical concepts)
for each stage of DSR were identified. The social-ecological impacts of the property rights system
(including collective action/common property) via transaction costs and incentive distribution,
and social behavioural issues of POS management and consumption that act as mediating
factors, were analysed based on the seminal theoretical works of Coase (1960), North (1990),
Hanna et al. (1996), Barzel (1997), Ostrom (1990), Hardin (1968), Colding et al. (2013), and
Webster (2007). Apart from that, a number of empirical works were consulted, particularly on
Sabah, by Ling et al. (2016), Ling (2017), Ling and Leng (2018), Ling (2019), Ling et al. (2019a)
and Ling et al. (2019b). Table 2 shows a summary, describing the literature, data collection and
analysis sources, areas of concerns, and deductive themes involved in each step of DSR.
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 23
Governance
This section summarises the key practical or real problems of the social dilemmas related to CL
POS and NT POS triggered by institutional (property-rights structure) issues. The findings are
tabulated in a three-column table (Table 3): interrelated institutional root causes, key issues,
anomalies, and grasping of problems/effects.
24 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
Figure 4. Interrelationships between property rights issues (root causes) and POS dilemmas
(Adapted from Ling et al. 2019b).
This study discovered four key interrelated property rights tragedies under the state-private
property rights regime, i.e. rights attenuation, incomplete rights, maladaptation of rights, and
insecure and self-enforced rights. From an institutional lens, the property rights issues
rudimentarily associated with high transaction costs and perverse incentives are deemed to be the
root cause because they incentivise individuals’ self-interest and opportunistic behaviour, thus
resulting in the above commons dilemmas, namely overexploitation, free riding and shirking. The
outcomes also suggest that the local property rights tragedies and POS dilemmas caused or are
26 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
associated with other rights issues and commons dilemmas, and such interrelationships lead to a
property-rights-POS dilemmas nexus. For example, the overexploitation of POS is due to shirking
(i.e. a POS dilemma) as well as incomplete and attenuated property rights. See Figure 4 for the
expanded version (i.e. more details of codes) of interrelationships between property rights issues
and POS dilemmas as well as the simplified version of the right-dilemmas nexus with two
abstraction levels in Figure 5. The current local institutional arrangement is indeed adversarial as
it externalises POS common dilemmas; thus, an institutional change (as a solution) via an efficient
adaptation or re-distribution of property-rights over such state-owned public-domain POSs is
required (see Webster and Lai, 2003; Webster, 2007).
Figure 5. Simplified nexus illustrating property rights issues (root causes) and POS dilemma
linkages (Adapted from Ling et al. 2019b).
Based on the above inferences of POS dilemmas, issues and institutional root causes, it is
necessary to propose the adaptive realignment (reallocation) of the property rights regime from
state property to common property via Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom’s eight design principles in
governing and managing common resources (or CPR) as the solution (Ostrom, 1990). More
precisely, Ostrom’s self-governing collective action system offers the following features,
advocating the idea of few perverse incentives and low enforcement costs to help disincentivise
opportunistic, defective behaviours in POS management and consumption: (i) more effective
governance and enforcement of operational duties (e.g. maintenance) by better positioned
stakeholders (see the subsidiarity principle) to address the issue of a maladaptive property regime;
(ii) providing an incentive system as a motivator so that the POS managers will be more willing
to enforce their management rights and impose sanctions on violators (both users and managers),
i.e. shirkers and overusers, to address both insecure and attenuated rights issues; (iii) a more
comprehensive contract (as comprehensive as possible, as these are better than simple and general
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 27
Governance
ones) to curb the issue of incomplete rights; (iv) an exclusionary right should be assigned to the
community, i.e. the POS still remains public but for members only, e.g. via a payment system (i.e.
it becomes club good POS instead of CPR-based POS) (see Buchanan (1965) on the efficiency of
club goods in effectively governing resource overconsumption or the free-rider issue via an
exclusionary mechanism); and lastly (v) the government recognises the community co-
management right and act as a monitor, providing assistance to the community; a contract between
managers, users and the government is agreed, which can help address the insecure rights and
maladaptive allocation (high enforcement costs) of the state regime.
The following is to illuminate how the modified common property-based eight principles of
Ostrom with the above features can be conceptually adapted and realised in Sabah’s current CL
POS and NT POS governance.
The rights to use resource units from CPR-based POS must be clearly specified and allocated, as
must be the boundaries of the POS itself. Both titled CL POS and untitled NT POS have well
defined physical boundaries and spatial attributes; the spaces are immovable and tangible, in
which category of use, location, size/area, and shape are predetermined during land subdivision.
Satisfying the homeownership association institution’s procedural requirements by Nelson
(2004), with the elements of the coerciveness of such institution formation (Chen and Webster,
2006), all residents living within the community neighbourhood with POS are obliged to become
members who have access and consumption rights on POS. Some of them who are elected or
voted as committee members are to take up the rights and duties of governing and managing
(including monitoring) the POS. In terms of communal property rights, the POS ownership regime
should be held by the community, so that the proprietors (members) have the incentive and
28 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
interest to invest in, govern and manage the resource (see the rights attenuation theory). A hybrid
management regime is proposed: co-management and assistance rendered by a government are
essential to ensure more efficient POS governance. As for the POS exclusion of free riders or
shirkers/violators, such an exclusionary right promotes and incentivises the willingness of the
community for better resource investment and protection. It is not just a legal enclosure right
conferred upon the community. Rather, more physical signs of exclusion involving verbal
exclusion are crucial to provide an explicit notification to others on such exclusivity, e.g.
barricading the compound of POS and posting a signboard. In sum, Table 4 illustrates the self-
organising common property system for CL POS and NT POS governance.
2nd principle: congruity of operational rules with local conditions, and costs and benefits should
be proportionate
POS operational rules specifying the access and consumption time (i.e. when), place (i.e. where),
and quantity of resource units (i.e. how long can the POS be occupied) should correspond to local
social-ecological conditions. This is a means to specify more complete rights for users, curbing
potential opportunistic behaviours and commons dilemmas due to uncertainties of duties and
rights. Devising appropriate and equitable POS operational rules is essential, and POS
management costs (investment) and consumption benefits (enjoyment) must be somewhat
proportionate. The latter must at least be more significant by reasonably exceeding the former so
it incentivises individuals to appreciate and invest in the POS. However, if the benefits
substantially transcend the costs, this may connote that overexploitation or overuse of POS by
certain users, or the rules in use, are not equitable because some individuals’ interests are being
favoured while others’ are being infringed.
A community comprising both committee members and resident members can participate in
modifying and devising the operational rules about its management and consumption of the POS,
particularly in a changing social-ecological environment, as community and POS characteristics
may vary over time. Via periodical community meetings, any members who have interests within
the neighbourhood can voice their ideas, suggestions, preferences and dissatisfaction about the
issues of the existing operational rules of access, consumption, exclusion, management and
alienation of the POS so that necessary improvements and adjustments can be carried out to
address specific issues of the rules in use. Consensus building via effective communication
between the committee and the members is crucial in devising and modifying the rules.
Effective monitoring of (i) POS users (residents or non-residents with permission to use) by
ensuring they will not behave opportunistically or selfishly to overuse/vandalise the space; (ii)
managers (committee members) managing and maintaining POS so that they may not shirk their
management duties; and (iii) POS condition and quality. The monitoring task can be executed
voluntarily (with existing POS non-pecuniary benefits) or mandatorily (with a sanction and
incentive system) or local government assistance. Routine policing activities involving residents
who live nearby the POS with the assistance of the local government and informal-mutual
surveillance via resident cooperation are vital, not only to reduce the costs of monitoring
compared to hiring a private guard for each neighbourhood, ultimately to ensure the good
condition and quality of the POS. Pecuniary incentives, e.g. management fee reduction or
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 29
Governance
payment, can be provided to the residents involved in order to incentivise and sustain their
positive behaviour in running the monitoring duties.
Based on the types and severity of violations, anyone/users violating the POS operational rules
(e.g. POS overexploitation, free riding and duty shirking) are liable to graduated
sanctions/penalties. The sanctions must be carried out impartially and are based on a good or
reasonable basis; issues of dissatisfaction and complaints due to unfair treatment/sanctions should
not occur. For example, a first-time rule breaker causing mild vandalism at the POS either
accidentally or purposely should lightly be fined compared to more severe cases done by the same
individual, where they need to face heavier sanctions. Penalties imposed can vary (either in a
pecuniary or non-pecuniary form), including increased management fee, the involvement of
violators in maintenance tasks within a specified time frame, and temporary banning of POS use.
Local governments can intervene in the local sanctioning process, in case more severe violations
transcend the community level. At times, coercive punishment can ensure better cooperation
among community members.
Both the POS community and users should have access to a low-cost platform to resolve conflicts.
Conflicts or disagreements over certain POS issues between users or members are sometimes
inevitable; however, they should be detected early on and efficiently resolved via a possible range
of options. This is to avoid unnecessary transaction costs, which may contribute to complicated
and more significant unsolvable issues. Additionally, if conflicts are efficiently addressed, it
reduces cooperation costs and misunderstanding among the stakeholders (users and committees)
and thus social capital (e.g. trust and mutuality) is promoted. Aside from litigation, which is a
costly and time-consuming avenue and hence less preferable, there are various informal means
and low-cost conflict management platforms, such as negotiation, mediation, public hearings and
forums, that can be used to resolve local conflicts. Local government assistance can be necessary
if there are more severe conflicts and issues that are not resolvable at the local level.
The communal rights to devise their self-organising institutions/rules in governing POS are not
disputed by external governmental authorities or formal and legal institutions, such as land and
planning laws. Having the formal government recognition and endorsement via legal land title
registration of POS (see the 1st principle) provides secure tenure of the common property regime.
Such assurance and certainty incentivise the members to manage, protect and invest in the POS.
This principle opens up the opportunity for a co-management regime (co-existence of top-down
and bottom-up approaches) comprising both the community and the government, as adopted in
the 4th, 5th, and 6th principles above. As described, assistance and empowerment of governments
minimise transaction costs, i.e. it helps facilitate the community’s operational and managerial
activities and decision-making.
For a larger, complex social-ecological system (e.g. there are many POSs in a district), polycentric
(multiple centres) governance with all of the above design principles is required. Similar to the
concept of subsidiarity or devolution/nesting (see the concept of vertical linkages), it is essential
30 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
Next, after the phase of development of the artifact, it is vital to identify whether the proposed
self-organising solution is valid and effective to address the current issues with state-owned POSs
and is institutionally and operationally feasible. Hence, validation of the developed solution was
executed based on the IAD framework and local stakeholders’ (residents, local governments, and
land officers) views. This is crucial to determine the adaptation and modification likelihood of
the current local SES to the collective action system; questions of how many complex attributes
of the existing local SES resemble the DPs or how many DPs are present in the local SES, and to
what extent, have been addressed. High similarity and a large number of DPs means lower
transaction costs (adaptation and modification costs) and therefore leads to potential and feasible
institutional property regime reallocation to self-organising collective action and vice versa (see
Ostrom, 2011). The IAD framework emphasising governance (institutional), social and ecological
components has a total of 21 SES sub-attributes. Based on a coding system, there are five options
used to express the degree of existence of DPs, namely Present (P), Mostly Present (MP),
Sometimes Present (P), Rarely Present (RP), and Absent (A). Table 5 presents the result of local
NT POS and CL POS attributes, benchmarked and assessed with the modified collective action
DPs that serve as ideal, standard conditions. In general, based on the assessments cutting across
the three aspects of SES, relative to NT POS scoring 0 (P), 3 (MP), 6 (SP), 4 (RP), and 8 (A), CL
POS, with 1 (P), 12 (SP), 3 (MP), and 5 (RP), and 0 (A) (see more details in Table 5) is more
likely or potentially feasible to be shifted or realigned to a common-property self-organising
regime. This is because the transaction costs of adaptation and modification for CL SES are not
very high compared to NT SES deviating much from the collective action DPs.
The IAD-validated results below suggesting the institutional and operational feasibility of local
POSs to adapt collective action were triangulated using the pilot survey of multi-stakeholders. It
can be seen that over 95% of respondents showed an interest and intention to shift from the current
adversarial centralised state-owned POS regime to a self-organising regime. The same
respondents believed that such a self-organising system for POS provides better governance and
quality of CPR-based POS after experiencing the advantages of communal management in other
common/shared resources contexts, e.g. parks, lifts, swimming pools in closed access apartments
or gated and guarded residential property. The above high consensus in terms of interest and
common goals can be associated with Olson’s (1965) concept of homogeneity of a community,
which is a vital component for incentivising the formation and success of collective action within
a neighbourhood.
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 31
Governance
Table 5. Validation of the SES attributes of local NT POS and CL POS with the modified DPs.
Successful Collective
IAD-based SES Attributes CL POS NT POS Action DPs
(as a Standard)
Community Attributes
i) Small number of actors or size of Moderate Moderate
(P)
the group (DP 2) (SP) (SP)
ii) Low growth of actors/community Slow growth Slow growth
(P)
(DP 2) (MP) (MP)
POS with the head of
iii) Local leadership (DP 2, DP 3) With co-management villages, referred to as
(P)
(SP) (Ketua Kampong)
(ancestral land) (SP)
iv) Homogeneity (norms, belief, Fairly heterogeneous,
Fairly homogeneous
cultural, interest, goal, values, more homogeneous (P)
(RP)
background) (DP 2) than CL POS (SP)
v) Trust and reciprocity (DP 2) Unlikely (RP) Occasionally (RP) (P)
vi) Local management knowledge and With co-management
(RP) (P)
experience (DP 2) (SP)
vii) High dependability on NPOS
(SP) (RP) (P)
functionality/benefits (DP 2)
POS Spatial/Physical System Attributes
i) Small and appropriate size/area Small/moderate
Small/moderate (MP) (P)
(DP 2) (MP)
ii) High predictability of production:
Productivity (availability and
(SP) (RP) (P)
recoverability based on its quality)
(DP 2)
iii) Low mobility (facilities and
(MP) (SP) (P)
amenities) (DP 2)
iv) Demarcability of boundary (DP 1,
(P) (P) (P)
DP 7)
v) Good location (accessibility,
(SP) (SP) (P)
proximity, centrality) (DP 2)
vi) Regular shape (flexibility) (DP 2) (SP) (SP) (P)
With co-management
vii) Club good features (DP 1, DP 7) (A) (P)
(SP)
Governance/Institution Attributes
i) Formal common property-
With co-management
rights recognised by the (A) (P)
(SP)
government (DP 1, DP 7)
ii) Operational rules (e.g.,
monitoring, consumption, With co-management
(A) (P)
management and monitoring (SP)
rules) (DP 3, DP 4)
iii) Collective-choice rules With co-management
(A) (P)
(DP 3) (SP)
iv) Co-management by
With co-management
government (A) (P)
(SP)
(DP 1, DP 4, DP 7)
Penalty involves exclusion
v) Graduated sanction (DP 5) (A) (P)
(RP)
32 Gabriel Hoh Teck Ling et al.
Successful Collective
IAD-based SES Attributes CL POS NT POS Action DPs
(as a Standard)
vi) Conflict resolution
(RP) (A) (P)
mechanism (DP 6)
vii) Polycentricity (DP 8) With co-management (RP) (A) (P)
Source: Adapted from Ling (2019)
Finally, there is a conceptual contribution for the standardisation of the countermeasure. The
developed and validated solution above not only confirms but also modifies and extends the
theoretical knowledge basis, mainly taking the comprehensive integration of Ostrom’s (1990)
eight common-property-regime-based-self-organising design principles for collective action,
which includes property-rights, transaction costs, commons, social dilemmas theories and other
scholars’ design principles, Nelson’s (2004) homeowner association concept, and Williamson’s
theory of opportunism (Williamson, 1993) into account. This is not only consistent with the DSR
framework’s assumption that a theory has to be used in designing the solution, but its
amalgamation of various concepts and theories is also deemed desirable (see Venable, 2006 that
such integration is meant for the purpose of triangulation).
Conclusion
Finding a suitable, valid model or design framework to step-by-step construct an urban planning
solution, in particular addressing POS governance, management and consumption issues, is
challenging as it has so far received little attention from both scholars and practitioners.
Nevertheless, a revised DSR framework serving as a common methodological platform in the
fields of management and information systems was adopted for developing and validating a
conceptual solution in the planning field. This paper reported how the DSR methodology was
applied in the context of a dynamic institutional-social POS system, in which the framework’s
applicability was explored. We discussed how the revised three-step iterative, systematic
framework using both theoretical knowledge and empirical data from the literature review was
applied in identifying issues and root causes, constructing and validating a conceptual solution,
and standardising the solution with an existing theory or concept.
In summary, the following were the key findings found in each stage. Firstly, via the in-depth
problem/issue analysis to distinguish symptoms and root causes, one can accurately define and
understand the real underlying causes contributing to POS issues. In this case, POS governance
and quality issues were due to the institutional factor. That is, the complex state-owned POS
regime, leading to for example maladaptive rights, attenuated rights, de facto rights and
incomplete rights, has triggered high transaction (enforcement) costs, which therefore externalise
opportunistic and self-interested behaviours of POS users and managers to mismanage,
underinvest in and overuse POSs. Secondly, based on the POS issues and root causes, a
conceptual institutional solution of self-organising collective action was developed, advocating
strong, secure communal rights, low enforcement costs and perverse incentives, more well-
defined exchange of rights and duties, and co-management. This is likely to be a valid, efficient
and suitable alternative to address the POS governance issues. Thirdly, in the validation stage, the
proposed conceptual solution drawing on different theories and concepts and possibly generating
new knowledge was deemed institutionally and operationally feasible, especially for local CL
POSs, with low adaptation or shifting costs from the state property regime to the common
property regime.
A DSR Methodology for Conceptual Solution Development of Public Open Space 33
Governance
Therefore, there are three main observations of the current application of DSR, suggesting that:
(i) the procedural framework is relevant and applicable in the urban planning (POS management)
context; (ii) it is a flexible approach allowing multiple methods and theories to be used to reach
the aim of this study; and (iii) adopting the DSR methodology in other social science and planning
fields would be a productive research endeavour. Aside from making conceptual contribution and
methodological innovation, there are policy implications. Not only does the developed artifact
provide insight into the institutional causes resulting in POS governance issues to policymakers
(e.g. land officers and local governments), it also offers potentials and the detailed institutional
formation and operational guides of self-organising collective action to neighbourhood residents.
The artifact offering successful institutional-social-ecological design principles helps to
incentivise and stimulate active participation as well as new collaborative work practices in the
community.
Nevertheless, this study is not without limitations. The analysis results presented are limited to
one state (i.e. two districts of Sabah) and can be strengthened and refined through similar
institutional POS issues in other states or districts. The design and analysis of the current study
were solely based on the available secondary sources. Additionally, the conceptually validated
solution was based on a pilot study and has not been field-tested. Therefore, we suggest future
studies to consider carrying out a more in-depth, holistic validation study and to test the
generalisability of our results to a broader CPR domain.
Acknowledgement
This work was financially supported by the Ministry of Education Malaysia and Universiti
Teknologi Malaysia through the Research University Grant (GUP) Q.J130000.2652.16J54.
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