BEHAVIOR

Cervone / THINKING
MODIFICATION
ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY
/ January 2000

People’s perceptions of their capabilities for performance, or self-efficacy perceptions, are a

cognitive mechanism underlying behavioral change. This article addresses three questions in the
study of perceived self-efficacy: Do self-efficacy perceptions generalize across situations? Do
affective states influence perceived self-efficacy? Do people have a singular level of perceived
self-efficacy in any domain, or are there multiple aspects to self-efficacy perception? These
questions are answered by analyzing the cognitive processes through which people appraise
their efficacy for performance. The research reviewed indicates that (a) self-efficacy perceptions
generalize across idiosyncratic sets of situations relating to schematic personal attributes;
(b) induced negative mood does not reliably influence perceived self-efficacy but does raise
performance standards, creating efficacy-standards discrepancies; (c) distinct aspects of self-
efficacy appraisal can be organized by distinguishing between perceived self-efficacy for exe-
cuting strategies and for attaining goals.

Thinking About Self-Efficacy

DANIEL CERVONE
University of Illinois at Chicago

Two themes emerge from recent advances in the study of psychologi-

cal factors that contribute to mental and physical health. The first is the
importance of perceived control in health outcomes. Although our
field harbors a multiplicity of control constructs (Skinner, 1996) and
witnesses occasional controversies regarding control beliefs (cf.
Shedler, Mayman, & Manis, 1993; Taylor & Brown, 1988), there
nonetheless is much consensus. The belief that important life events
are controllable reduces stress and increases motivation to confront
life’s challenges (Shapiro, Schwartz, & Astin, 1996; Skinner, 1995).
A second theme is the importance to health-related behavior of self-
concept and self-referent thinking. To modify their behavior, people
require not only knowledge and skills but beliefs in their own agency,
that is, that they have the capacity to change their behavior and

AUTHOR’S NOTE: I thank Audrey Ruderman for her helpful suggestions on an earlier version
of this article. Please address correspondence to: Daniel Cervone, Department of Psychology
(mc 285), University of Illinois at Chicago, 1007 W. Harrison St., Chicago, IL 60607-7137;
e-mail: [email protected].
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION, Vol. 24 No. 1, January 2000 30-56
© 2000 Sage Publications, Inc.

30

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 31

improve themselves (Karoly, 1993; Kuhl, 1984; Markus & Nurius,

1986; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996).
The study of psychological control and of self-referent thinking
converge in research on perceived self-efficacy (Bandura, 1977, 1997;
Cervone & Scott, 1995). Self-efficacy theory argues that self-referent
thinking is the core element of perceived control. Despite what one
believes about the causes of past outcomes (Anderson & Weiner,
1992; Peterson & Seligman, 1984) or the contingencies between
responses and outcomes in the environment (Alloy & Abramson,
1979; Matute, 1996; Rotter, 1966), people are unlikely to take action
to control events if they doubt their own capability to execute requisite
behaviors. Self-efficacy theory analyzes the causes and consequences
of these beliefs in personal agency.
Self-efficacy theory has generated a voluminous empirical litera-
ture (Bandura, 1997). The majority of this research has explored
issues of behavioral change, yielding much support for the hypothesis
that changes in perceived self-efficacy mediate the changes brought
about by psychosocial interventions. Perceived self-efficacy, then, is a
cognitive mechanism underlying behavioral change (Bandura,
Adams, & Beyer, 1977; see also Scott, 1995a). These empirical find-
ings, which are reviewed in detail elsewhere (Bandura, 1997; Cervone
& Scott, 1995; Maddux, 1995), serve as a background to the present
article. Rather than looking back to this existing literature, the present
article looks ahead to a set of questions that have received relatively
little attention thus far, but deserve greater scrutiny in the future. Spe-
cifically, we consider three questions that should be of concern not
only to the self-efficacy researcher but, more generally, to psycholo-
gists interested in self-referent thinking, psychological control, and
cognitive processes in behavioral change. These questions are: (a) Do
self-efficacy perceptions generalize across situations? (b) Do affec-
tive states influence perceived self-efficacy and related self-regulatory
processes? (c) Do people have a singular level of self-efficacy in any
given setting, or might there be distinct, systematically interrelated
efficacy beliefs in any given domain?
Answers to these seemingly diverse questions can be reached
through a common route. Satisfactory answers require careful scru-
tiny of the psychological construct “perceived self-efficacy.” Per-

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32 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

ceived self-efficacy should not be thought of as a static entity that peo-

ple “have” but as a dynamic cognitive process that people “do” (cf.
Cantor, 1990). People actively weigh the relation between their per-
ceived skills and the demands of tasks when thinking about their capa-
bilities for performance. The thesis of this article is that analyzing the
dynamic cognitive processes involved in thinking about self-efficacy
is a key to answering the questions above and, more generally, to
understanding fully the role of self-referent processes in psychologi-
cal functioning.
The upcoming discussion of contemporary research must be placed
in historical context. Bandura (1977) first proposed self-efficacy the-
ory two decades ago. The vast empirical literature that has arisen since
serves to answer many of the questions about perceived self-efficacy
that arose at that time (Rachman, 1978). The contemporary investiga-
tor, then, has the luxury of considering new issues in light of this well-
established empirical base. In the following paragraphs, we briefly
review the development of self-efficacy research as a background to
subsequent discussions.

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SELF-EFFICACY THEORY:

ESTABLISHED FINDINGS AND RESOLVED QUESTIONS

Self-efficacy theory originally was a framework “for analyzing

changes achieved in fearful and avoidant behavior” (Bandura, 1977, p.
193). Psychotherapeutic treatments were posited to reduce avoidant
behavior by increasing people’s perceptions of their capabilities for
coping with threats. This simple theoretical proposal proved powerful
because it provided a common mechanism for understanding the
benefits of diverse treatments. Desensitization techniques, symbolic
modeling, and first-hand mastery experiences were shown to change
behavior through the common pathway of perceived self-efficacy.
When analyzed at the level of between-group differences resulting
from alternative treatments, within-group variations among people
who differentially benefit from the same treatment, and within-person
variations from one act and situational context to another (Cervone,
1985), variations in perceived self-efficacy predict subsequent per-
formance success (Bandura, 1977, 1997; Cervone & Scott, 1995;
Cervone & Williams, 1992; Williams, 1995).

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 33

The scope of self-efficacy research quickly broadened beyond the

domain of clinical behavior change. Investigators recognized that
self-efficacy appraisals contribute to achievement in numerous
endeavors. In most social and professional activities, success requires
the persistent application of effort despite occasional setbacks.
Performance-related anxiety and preoccupation with potential
calamities interfere with performance (Sarason, Pierce, & Sarason,
1996). By increasing effort and reducing anxiety and anxiety-related
cognitions, robust perceptions of self-efficacy foster success.
Research involving the promotion of health and recovery from physi-
cal setbacks (Bandura, 1991; Ewart, 1995; O’Leary, 1992), perform-
ance in work settings (Locke & Latham, 1990; Wood & Bandura,
1989), the control of eating (Glynn & Ruderman, 1986), resistance to
addictive substances (DiClemente, Fairhurst, & Piotrowski, 1995;
Haaga & Stewart, 1992; Shadel & Mermelstein, 1996), educational
achievement (Bandura, Barbaranelli, Caprara, & Pastorelli, 1996;
Schunk, 1994), and success in athletic pursuits (Feltz, 1982) attests to the
pervasive impact of self-efficacy appraisal on human achievement.
Across these diverse domains, psychosocial influences change behav-
ior by increasing perceptions of personal efficacy (Bandura, 1997).
Self-efficacy theory not only analyzes mechanisms underlying the
power of existing interventions, it also provides guidelines for design-
ing maximally effective treatments. The fundamental message of
self-efficacy theory for those seeking to modify maladaptive behavior
is that clients should experience first-hand, enactive performance
mastery. Mastery experiences are the most reliable source of efficacy
information (Bandura, 1977). As Williams (1995) emphasizes, this
message contrasts with strategies for fear reduction that exclusively
rely upon gradual stimulus exposure. In the mastery-based interven-
tions suggested by self-efficacy theory (Williams, 1995), clients are
encouraged, with the therapists’ aid, to actively confront their fears.
The experience of success—even if it is accompanied by temporary
increases in anxious arousal—increases beliefs in one’s capabilities.
These enhanced efficacy perceptions boost subsequent coping efforts
and reduce anxiety. A predominance of research supports the utility of
efficacy-based mastery treatments in contrast to prolonged stimulus
exposure (Williams, 1995).

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34 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

SELF-EFFICACY AS DISTINCT
CAUSAL CONTRIBUTOR TO CHANGE

When data linking self-efficacy perception to behavioral change

were first presented, two questions arose: Do self-efficacy perceptions
causally contribute to behavioral change or are they mere reflections
of other change processes (Borkovec, 1978; Eysenck, 1978; Wolpe,
1978)? Is self-efficacy the critical cognitive mechanism of change or
are other cognitions, such as expectations of danger or anticipated
anxiety (e.g., Reiss, 1991), more important? Both questions have
received much attention. Thanks to consistent empirical findings,
both can reasonably be considered to have been resolved.
The causal contribution of self-efficacy appraisal to behavior has
been addressed through various research strategies. One relates effi-
cacy to action while controlling for past performance and other poten-
tially confounding variables. Efficacy perceptions significantly pre-
dict future performance after controlling for prior behavior or anxiety
arousal on skilled motor activities (Feltz, 1982; McAuley, 1985) and
cognitively complex tasks (Bandura & Wood, 1989; Cervone, Jiwani, &
Wood, 1991; Cervone & Wood, 1995). In educational attainment,
self-efficacy perceptions predict performance after controlling for the
effects of assessed mathematical aptitude (Collins, 1982) and past
experience in math (Sexton & Tuckman, 1991).
An alternative strategy experimentally manipulates self-efficacy
perceptions while holding all other performance-related factors con-
stant. To this end, perceived self-efficacy can be influenced by subtle
contextual cues that bias the process of forming efficacy judgments.
Because these cues affect perceived self-efficacy without exposing
research participants to differential information or experience in the
domain of functioning, they enable an unconfounded test of the causal
contribution of efficacy judgment to behavior. Apparently random
“anchor” values representing high or low levels of performance (Cer-
vone & Palmer, 1990; Cervone & Peake, 1986), variations in the order
in which people consider hypothetical levels of future performance
(Berry, West, & Dennehey, 1989; Peake & Cervone, 1989), and the
brief contemplation of positive or negative performance-related fac-
tors (Cervone, 1989) reliably influence self-efficacy perceptions.
These variations in self-efficacy govern subsequent motivation (Cer-

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 35

vone, 1989; Cervone & Peake, 1986; Peake & Cervone, 1989). In
other words, even when people’s high or low self-efficacy beliefs stem
from trivial factors, such as their having received a high or low anchor
value by chance (Cervone & Peake, 1986), variations in perceived
self-efficacy still affect subsequent behavior. Related strategies
involving the presentation of bogus performance feedback (e.g., Hol-
royd et al., 1984; Litt, 1988; Weinberg, Gould, & Jackson, 1979) fur-
ther attest to the causal impact of self-efficacy appraisal.
Note that judgmental cues such as anchor values (Cervone &
Peake, 1986) should not be construed as a separate source of efficacy
information that is distinct from the informational sources discussed
by Bandura (1977). Bandura differentiated among enactive, vicari-
ous, persuasory, and affective sources of information. This is a taxon-
omy of informational origins. The study of judgmental heuristics, in
contrast, involves questions of cognitive processes. A given process,
such as anchoring (Cervone & Peake, 1986) or availability processes
(Cervone, 1989), may come into play as individuals weigh informa-
tion from any source.
The question of whether self-efficacy perceptions or other cogni-
tions are the critical mechanisms of behavioral change has been
addressed by gauging the impact of efficacy perception while control-
ling for these other factors. Cognitive processes involving expecta-
tions of harm, negative social evaluation, or physical distress may
underlie chronic phobic behavior (Beck, 1976; Chambless & Grace-
ley, 1989; Reiss, 1991). Numerous studies have compared the predic-
tive power of self-efficacy perception to these negative outcome
expectations (reviewed in Bandura, 1997; Cervone & Scott, 1995;
Cervone & Williams, 1992; Williams, 1995). Perceived self-efficacy
consistently predicts behavior after controlling for outcome beliefs,
whereas outcome expectations often lose much of their predictive
power after controlling for perceived self-efficacy (e.g., Lee, 1984a,
1984b; Manning & Wright, 1983; Williams, Dooseman, & Kleifield,
1984; Williams, Kinney, & Falbo, 1989). Self-efficacy, then, gener-
1
ally proves to be the superior predictor of behavior.
In summary, research that experimentally manipulates self-
efficacy beliefs and that statistically controls for alternative explana-
tory variables provides converging evidence that perceived self-

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36 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

efficacy is a central mechanism of behavioral change. The basic

hypotheses of self-efficacy theory have been supported, and funda-
mental questions about the role of self-efficacy appraisal in achieve-
ment and behavioral change have been resolved. With this back-
ground, one can address new questions.
Before moving to these questions, however, a point of clarification
is needed. Although perceived self-efficacy uniquely contributes to
behavioral change, it is not the only psychological mechanism of
importance. Efficacy beliefs are one component of a much broader
social cognitive theory of personality (Bandura, 1986, 1999). In
social-cognitive approaches, behavior and psychological experience
reflect multiple underlying psychological processes (Cervone, 1996,
1997; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; see also Cervone & Shoda, 1999).
Interactions among these underlying mechanisms and the reciprocal
relations between personal determinants and the social environment
contribute to chronic behavioral patterns and behavioral change.
Much social-cognitive research investigates self-efficacy perception
in the broader context of multiple cognitive and affective processes
underlying motivation and achievement (e.g., Cervone & Wood,
1995).

CROSS-SITUATIONAL GENERALIZATION
IN PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY

A basic question in the study of behavior change is whether inter-

ventions produce changes that generalize across multiple aspects of a
person’s life. Change efforts inevitably are conducted within only a
limited range of social contexts. It is hoped, however, that benefits will
be felt across a wide range of life domains. Given the influential role of
self-referent beliefs in the change process, understanding the psycho-
logical processes that cause self-efficacy appraisals to generalize may
further our understanding of how to design treatments that have both
enduring and highly generalized benefits.
Bandura (1977) recognized that the degree of generalization in
self-perceptions is an important dimension of perceived self-efficacy.
Early research demonstrated that changes in self-efficacy and behav-
ior with regard to one phobic stimulus may generalize significantly to
another (Bandura et al., 1977; see also Williams et al., 1989). How-

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 37

ever, until recently, there has been no theoretical framework within

which to explore the questions of how and why self-appraisals gener-
alize across contexts. The issue has received relatively little empirical
attention. Thus, the question remains: Are self-efficacy perceptions
narrow, situation-specific expectations, or do people’s beliefs in their
capabilities generalize broadly across contexts?
We have addressed this question by asking the central questions of
this article: How do people think about their efficacy for performance?
What cognitive processes and structures might foster cross-situational
coherence in self-efficacy appraisal?
A useful heuristic here is to distinguish between two aspects of cog-
nition: knowledge and appraisal (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus,
1990). As Lazarus (1991) discusses in his cognitive treatment of emo-
tions, “appraisal” refers to evaluations of a particular encounter.
Appraisals in any given setting may be shaped by knowledge people
bring into that setting, where “knowledge” refers to general beliefs
about one’s characteristics or characteristics of the environment
(Lazarus, 1991).
Within this framework, perceived self-efficacy is an appraisal.
Self-efficacy perceptions are appraisals of the level or type of per-
formance one can achieve in a given encounter. Self-efficacy apprais-
als may be shaped by underlying knowledge, particularly knowledge
of one’s enduring personal characteristics. If, for example, a student is
contemplating an upcoming exam, her knowledge that she is an “anx-
ious” person might come to mind and lower her appraisals of self-
efficacy for exam performance. A given aspect of self-knowledge may
come to mind and shape self-efficacy appraisals in any of a variety of
contexts. The student in our example might also dwell upon her ten-
dency to be anxious when thinking about social settings, such as hav-
ing to introduce herself at a party, or professional activities, such as
interviewing for a job. This element of self-knowledge may foster
consistently low appraisals of self-efficacy across these diverse
settings.
Stated more formally, cross-situational generalization in self-
efficacy appraisal may derive from highly developed and accessible
self-knowledge structures, or “self-schemas” (Markus, 1977). A
given self-schema may come to mind in numerous settings and foster

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38 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

relatively broad patterns of cross-situational coherence in self-

efficacy appraisal. A wealth of research documents that people
quickly interpret new information in terms of existing self-schemas,
which thereby serve to organize information about oneself and the
world (Basic Behavioral Science Task Force of the National Advisory
Mental Health Council, 1996; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Elements of
self-knowledge that are particularly salient, or “chronically accessi-
ble” (Higgins, 1990), may guide interpretations even of vague stimuli
whose features seem to bear little relation to the given cognitive ele-
ment (Higgins & Brendl, 1995). As Bargh, Bond, Lombardi, and Tota
(1986) suggest, highly accessible, schematic aspects of personal
knowledge are “always there, across situations, contexts, and interac-
tion partners” (p. 877).
Specific patterns of generalization in self-efficacy appraisal may
reflect not only knowledge about oneself, but beliefs about social
situations. People may hold idiosyncratic beliefs about the situations
in which a given personal attribute is relevant. Even if two people see
themselves as highly “determined,” for example (i.e., even if they
both have schematic self-knowledge organized around the notion of
being “determined”), they may see distinct sets of circumstances as
relevant to “determination.” One person may see these characteristics
as relevant to achievement settings, whereas the other may believe
that “determination” is critical to social pursuits, such as getting a
date.
Working from these premises, recent research (Cervone, 1997,
1999) has investigated cross-situational coherence in perceived self-
efficacy by examining self-schemas and situational beliefs that under-
lie cross-situational generalization in self-efficacy appraisal. Experi-
mental procedures are sensitive to the potential idiosyncracy of
situational knowledge and self-knowledge. An initial experimental
session identifies three personal attributes for which each individual is
schematic. Two attributes are identified by having participants write
brief narratives about their personal strengths and personal weak-
nesses. A third attribute is derived from self-ratings of one’s level on
various personality trait dimensions and the centrality of each dimen-
sion to one’s self-concept (cf. Markus, 1977). A second experimental
session assesses participants’ situational beliefs. During this session,

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 39

we judge the degree to which each of the participants’ three schematic

attributes is relevant to each of a wide variety of social, interpersonal,
and achievement situations. We also assess their situational beliefs
regarding two generic attributes for which they are not schematic;
these “experimenter-provided attributes” provide an internal experi-
mental control. Finally, 2 weeks later, participants complete a multi-
domain self-efficacy questionnaire. They indicate their confidence in
their ability to perform specific behaviors in concrete settings. Items
span a diversity of acts and circumstance; example items include, “If
you’re on a job interview and want to demonstrate that you’re good at
dealing with the public, tell the interviewer a lively personal anecdote,
story, or joke”; “If your dentist tells you to cut back on sugary foods,
reduce the amount of candy, cake, and/or cookies you eat by 50% over
the coming 6 months”; and, “If you’re in a class that has weekly dis-
cussion sections, actively participate in the discussion by making at
least three or four comments in class every week.”
We find considerable idiosyncracy in individuals’self-schemas and
situational beliefs. Among the first 25 participants in this line of
research (Cervone, 1997), there was virtually no overlap in self-
identified personal strengths and weaknesses. Different individuals
saw themselves as being “fearless,” “self-centered,” “good listeners,”
“easily hurt,” “determined,” “insecure,” “honest,” “undisciplined,”
and so on. Furthermore, even in the rare instances in which people
shared the same attribute, their beliefs about the situations in which
the attribute is relevant varied considerably. Two participants saw
themselves as “shy.” They saw only partially overlapping situations as
relevant to shyness. Whereas one person thought that shyness inter-
feres with intellectual pursuits in group settings (e.g., participating in
classroom discussions), the other saw shyness as relevant only to
social encounters (e.g., keeping a conversation going).
Our primary question is whether self-efficacy perceptions general-
ize across idiographically identified sets of situations. Do people have
consistently higher and lower perceptions of self-efficacy across
situations that they themselves see as relevant to positive and negative
schematic attributes? The results displayed in Figure 1 address this
issue. As predicted, participants appraised themselves as having con-
sistently higher and lower efficacy for performance across sets of

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40 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

Figure 1.
Mean strength of perceived self-efficacy as a function of individual’s judgments
of the relevance of situations to schematic and experimenter-provided person-
ality attributes.
SOURCE: Cervone, 1997.

situations that related to personal characteristics of importance to

them. Situational knowledge and self-knowledge, then, jointly cre-
ated cross-situational generalization in self-efficacy perception. Also
as predicted, generalization was not found with respect to the
experimenter-provided traits (see Figure 1). In accord with our model
of how thinking about self-efficacy can cause self-appraisals to gener-
alize, null results were obtained with attributes that participants did
not commonly think about.

ALTERNATIVE STRATEGIES FOR INVESTIGATING

GENERALIZATION IN PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY

In the research described above, we chose one of two possible

strategies for investigating generalization in self-efficacy. We
assessed perceived self-efficacy with respect to a wide range of spe-
cific actions and situations, and plotted generalization across these
distinct contexts. An alternative strategy is to ignore situations alto-
gether by characterizing individuals via a single score on a transsitua-
tional dimension of “generalized self-efficacy” (e.g., Sherer et al.,

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 41

1982). Although assessing generalized self-efficacy through this tra-

ditional nomothetic individual-differences strategy can shed light on
some issues (e.g., Smith, 1989; Weitlauf, Smith, & Cervone, in press),
it nonetheless has substantial limitations. By describing people with a
single score, the generalized self-efficacy strategy overlooks distinc-
tive patternings of high and low self-appraisal that uniquely character-
ize the individual (see also Mischel & Shoda, 1995). It treats general-
ized self-efficacy as an abstract “essence” (see Kagan, 1988, 1996).
That is, it implicitly assumes that generalized self-efficacy beliefs
have a form and content that is relatively fixed across individuals.
Making this assumption enables researchers to rank people on a com-
mon linear dimension. This assumption, however, is inconsistent with
the highly variable form and content of self-efficacy beliefs revealed
in our research (Cervone, 1997). Even if two people both say they are
highly “confident” persons, the meaning of the term—the feelings,
actions, and contexts to which it refers—may differ significantly from
one person to the next. Finally, the strategy of positing a generalized
construct begs two critical questions: (a) Do self-efficacy perceptions,
in fact, generalize from one specific situation to another? (b) What
psychological mechanisms cause self-efficacy perceptions to general-
ize? By simply positing and assessing a generalized construct, the
generalized self-efficacy strategy provides little insight into either of
these questions. In contrast, investigating knowledge structures
underlying self-efficacy appraisal (Cervone, 1997) enables one both
to plot and to explain generalization in people’s self-appraisals.
These alternative strategies for studying generalization in self-
efficacy exemplify the distinction between “sign” and “sample”
assessment strategies (Mischel, 1999). Studies of “generalized self-
efficacy” treat each of a series of self-report statements as signs of a
unitary personality trait. In contrast, we treat each situation-specific
self-efficacy item as a sample of the person’s self-appraisals in the
designated situation. The latter strategy is, of course, congruent with
the general logic of behavioral and cognitive-behavioral assessment
(Mischel, 1999).
A common misconception in this research area is that self-efficacy
theory and the broader social-cognitive theory of personality of which
it is a part (Bandura, 1986, 1999; Cervone & Williams, 1992) predict

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42 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

little or no cross-situational generalization in psychological processes.

It is true that Bandura (1977, 1997) champions the use of domain-
specific self-efficacy measures. This, however, does not imply that
social-cognitive theory predicts little cross-domain generalization.
The use of situation-specific measures is a strategy, not a hypothesis.
The strategy is to employ measures that are sensitive to cross-
situational variation in self-appraisal and that gain predictive power
by taking social context into account. The exact degree and type of
generalization across contexts is left as an empirical question. Our
model of knowledge structures underlying self-efficacy appraisal
(Cervone, 1997) provides a means of predicting these generalizations.

PERSONALITY VARIABLES IN SOCIAL-COGNITIVE THEORY

A broader issue is the nature of personality variables in social-

cognitive theory and related cognitive-behavioral formulations. One
posits personality variables to account for patterns of psychological
response that (a) distinguish individuals from one another, (b) are
enduring across time, and (c) are evident across multiple contexts.
These distinctive, enduring, and cross-situationally coherent response
tendencies are the core phenomena of personality psychology.
Many investigators explain coherent patterns of response by posit-
ing personality “trait” variables, that is, individual-difference con-
structs that correspond to broad response patterns (e.g., Funder, 1991;
McCrae & Costa, 1996). Cognitive-behavioral investigators often are
chary of such explanations, and well they should be. The underlying
logic and metatheory of trait formulations conflict with cognitive-
behavioral and related social-cognitive theories, as discussed in detail
elsewhere (Caprara & Cervone, in press; Cervone, 1991, 1997; Cer-
vone & Shoda, 1999; Cervone & Williams, 1992; Shadel & Cervone,
1993; see also Bandura, 1991; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; Shaffer,
1996).
Our findings indicate that cross-situational coherence in psycho-
logical response can be explained without reference to traditional trait
constructs. We did not account for cross-situational coherence in
self-efficacy perception by positing a trait variable, but by identifying
knowledge-based mechanisms that interactively cause self-efficacy

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 43

appraisals to generalize (Cervone, 1997). Social-cognitive approaches

generally see personality coherence as arising from such interac-
tions among cognitive, as well as affective, variables (e.g., Cervone,
1991, 1996, 1997; Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Knowledge that under-
lies people’s self-appraisals, competencies, interpretations and
evaluations of encounters, and personal goals and plans fosters coher-
ent, distinctive patterns of experience and action (Bandura, 1986;
Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Dodge, 1993; Dweck & Leggett, 1988;
Higgins, 1990). In these approaches, the social-cognitive mechanisms
are the personality variables. They are, in other words, enduring per-
sonal characteristics that contribute to the coherent patterns of
response that distinguish individuals from one another. The cognitive
theorist need not abandon cognitive theory to account for individual
differences.
Shadel, Niaura, and Abrams’s (in press) and Shadel and Mermel-
stein’s (1996) recent conceptualization of individual differences in
smoking and smoking cessation also illustrates this point. Shadel
wished to investigate individual differences of significance in predict-
ing smoking outcomes within a cognitive-behavioral treatment pro-
gram. Rather than adopting trait constructs that conflict with the sur-
rounding cognitive-behavioral framework from which he was
working, Shadel adopted social-cognitive individual-difference con-
structs. Specifically, he examined individual differences in people’s
possession of “smoker schemas” and “abstainer schemas.” He exam-
ined, in other words, individual differences in the degree to which peo-
ple possess well-developed self-knowledge about themselves as
smokers and as potential quitters. As expected from the enduring
quality of schematic knowledge, schema measures were good predic-
tors of abstinence over time. Three months after treatment, the most
successful individuals were those who, at the outset of treatment, pos-
sessed a strong abstainer self-concept and did not have a well-
elaborated smoker schema (Shadel et al., in press; Shadel & Mermel-
stein, 1996). By identifying individual differences in knowledge
structures underlying treatment success, Shadel provides a personal-
ity analysis that pinpoints specific cognitive mechanisms that can be
the targets of change efforts. In contrast, characterizing personality in
terms of abstract dispositional tendencies that purportedly are imper-

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44 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

vious to environmental influence (McCrae & Costa, 1996) provides

relatively little guidance to those wishing to promote behavioral
change.

AFFECTIVE INFLUENCES ON PERCEIVED

SELF-EFFICACY AND STANDARDS FOR PERFORMANCE

Thinking and feeling have been conceived as distinct aspects of

human nature from the time of the ancient Greeks. A wealth of recent
research, however, demonstrates that affect and cognition are closely
interrelated, both at psychological and physiological levels of analysis
(Damasio, 1994). Affective states can influence thinking processes
through a number of different routes (Forgas, 1995).
In the present context, research on affect and cognition naturally
raises the question of whether emotional states systematically influ-
ence people’s thoughts about their capabilities for performance. Posi-
tive and negative moods may, respectively, enhance and diminish
self-efficacy beliefs. Although some work supports this notion
(Kavanagh & Bower, 1985; Salovey & Birnbaum, 1989), overall the
data are mixed (Cunningham, 1988; Kavanagh & Hausfeld, 1986).
Research conducted by Walter Scott, myself, and our colleagues
has examined the impact of experimentally induced emotional states
on self-efficacy perception and related self-regulatory processes, with
a focus on the effects of induced negative mood. Our findings are quite
robust. Across each of a series of studies that employed powerful
mood manipulations, we find absolutely no evidence that transient
moods influence self-efficacy judgments (Cervone, Kopp, Schau-
mann, & Scott, 1994; Scott, 1995b; Scott & Cervone, 1999). Neither
the absolute levels of performance people judge they can achieve nor
their confidence in attaining specified levels of performance has been
affected by our mood inductions.
Although it had no impact on self-efficacy judgment, induced nega-
tive mood has reliably influenced a different self-regulatory variable,
namely, people’s standards for evaluating their performance. We con-
sistently find that lower moods induce higher standards for perform-
ance. For example, Cervone and colleagues (1994) induced lower
moods by having people envision sad scenarios involving the illness
of a close friend. Participants then completed a survey of college

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 45

Figure 2. Mean levels of perceived self-efficacy and standards for performance in experi-
mental conditions that induced positive, neutral, and negative mood.
SOURCE: Cervone, Kopp, Schaumann, and Scott (1994).

experiences that purportedly was part of another study. This survey

included measures of (a) perceived self-efficacy for various social and
academic tasks, and (b) minimal standards for performance on these
same activities; that is, the minimal levels of performance people felt
they would have to attain to be satisfied with themselves. As shown in
Figure 2, people in negative moods adopted relatively higher, “perfec-
tionistic” standards. Since mood did not influence self-efficacy, peo-
ple in a negative mood ended up adopting standards for performance
that exceeded the levels of performance they thought they actually
could achieve. These self-defeating patterns are a hallmark of chronic
depression (Beck, 1967; see also Wright & Mischel, 1982).
Why might mood influence personal standards but not perceived
self-efficacy? Again, an analysis of how people think about their effi-
cacy for performance, as well as their standards for performance, may
illuminate this issue. Different cognitive processes may be involved in
the adoption of performance standards versus the appraisal of per-
formance efficacy. Adopting performance standards, we suggest,
inherently involves an evaluative process. People evaluate the worth,
or personal value, of potential performance outcomes. If negative
mood causes a given outcome to be evaluated negatively, people may

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46 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

judge that only higher outcomes would be personally acceptable.

Consistent with this reasoning, we find that negative mood simultane-
ously lowers evaluations of prospective outcomes and raises perform-
ance standards (Cervone et al., 1994). In contrast, perceived self-
efficacy is not an evaluation of the goodness, or worth, of behavioral
outcomes (Bandura, 1997; Cervone & Scott, 1995). Perceived self-
efficacy refers to beliefs about one’s capability to perform behaviors,
whether or not they are valued. Self-efficacy appraisal, then, may pri-
marily reflect a relatively “cold” weighing of personal and situational
factors that bear upon one’s performance (Cervone, 1989).
Although motivational states may influence the way people search
and evaluate performance-related information (Banaji & Prentice,
1994; Kunda, 1990), and although efficacy appraisals may partially
govern the emotional states one subsequently experiences (cf. Laza-
rus, 1991), transient moods appear to not be a robust influence on
thoughts about self-efficacy.

ON THE VARIETIES OF SELF-EFFICACY PERCEPTION:

PERCEIVED SELF-EFFICACY FOR STRATEGIES AND GOALS

Many investigators have come to recognize that in complex behav-

ioral domains, there is utility to assessing more than one aspect, or
type, of self-efficacy perception (e.g., Bernier & Avard, 1986;
DiClemente, Prochaska, & Gilbertini, 1985; Schneider, O’Leary, &
Agras, 1987; Stotland & Zuroff, 1991). For example, in weight control
programs, one might assess perceived self-efficacy for performing
components of the treatment program, adhering to one’s diet, and
attaining overall weight loss goals (Stotland & Zuroff, 1991). In treat-
ing bulimics, one might assess self-efficacy for accepting the shape of
one’s body, replacing an urge to binge with other activities, and exe-
cuting stimulus control techniques (Schneider et al., 1987). Because
people may think about each of these aspects of self-efficacy at different
points in time, each may be a valuable predictor of target outcomes.
This multiplicity of assessments is quite reasonable. When there
are many distinct components to an overall activity, people may have
many distinct thoughts about their efficacy for performance. Indeed,
even when investigating a single action performed in a single context,

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 47

there still may be distinctly different aspects to self-efficacy judgment.

Any given act may be conceptualized, or “identified” (Vallacher &
Wegner, 1987) in different ways. When writing, I may see myself as
“trying to get some coherent sentences down on paper,” or as “contrib-
uting to psychology’s understanding of the human condition.” I corre-
spondingly may dwell upon my capabilities either for technical writ-
ing or for producing psychological theory and research.
Although a valuable research strategy, the assessment of multiple
aspects of perceived self-efficacy raises some analytical concerns. In
the absence of a theoretical framework for organizing different
aspects of self-efficacy perception, one may obtain an unordered col-
lection of efficacy measures, only some of which are significantly
related to target outcomes. Stotland and Zuroff (1991) assessed three
aspects of perceived self-efficacy in a weight control program: effi-
cacy for coping with specific diet-related situations, for executing
components of the treatment program, and for attaining treatment
goals. Only the goal-based self-efficacy measure significantly pre-
dicted changes in weight. Schneider and colleagues (1987) assessed
seven aspects of self-efficacy among a group of bulimic women. Only
three significantly predicted the target outcome, purging frequency.
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to evaluate the importance of
self-efficacy beliefs to behavioral change. Focusing solely on the sub-
set of statistically significant predictors and extolling the importance
of self-efficacy appraisal is unacceptable; doing so ignores negative
findings and may capitalize on chance results that stem from the use of
multiple tests.
An organizing framework for such multiple self-efficacy beliefs
can resolve these difficulties. One useful heuristic in this regard is to
distinguish between perceived self-efficacy for strategies and for
goals (Cervone, Henry, Ruderman, & Shadel, 1997; Cervone & Scott,
1995). Goals are the overall aim of a course of action (Locke &
Latham, 1990). Strategies (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987), or plans
(Miller, Galanter, & Pribram, 1960), refer to one’s tactics for achiev-
ing a goal. When thinking about their efficacy in any domain, people
may focus on either the attainment of overall goals or the execution of
specific strategies. Participants in smoking cessation programs, for
example, may dwell upon their capabilities either for reaching the

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48 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

Figure 3. Schematic representation of relations among perceived self-efficacy for strate-

gies, perceived self-efficacy for goal attainment, and overall goal-directed moti-
vation and achievement.

goal of permanently abstaining, or for executing specific strategies

(e.g., self-monitoring) that will help them reach this goal. As people
gain experience and confidence in executing treatment strategies,
their self-efficacy for achieving overall treatment goals should grow
(Borrelli & Mermelstein, 1994). Because people are unlikely to pur-
sue specific strategies unless they think they can reach long-term
goals, perceived self-efficacy for overall treatment goals should medi-
ate the behavioral effects of self-efficacy for the execution of strate-
gies (see Figure 3).
Research on eating disorders provides initial support for this for-
mulation. In a cognitive-behavioral treatment group for bulimics, per-
ceived self-efficacy for performance of treatment strategies (e.g.,
making a written record of all binge-eating/purging episodes) and for
achieving the treatment goal (controlling binge-eating episodes) was
assessed (Henry, Ruderman, & Cervone, 1993). Both self-efficacy
measures significantly predicted posttreatment binge eating. A
mediator-variable analysis (Baron & Kenny, 1986) revealed that, as
expected, efficacy perceptions for controlling binges mediated the
behavioral effects of self-efficacy for executing treatment strategies.
Similarly, an analysis of change in smoking cessation programs
(Mermelstein, Hedeker, Wong, Gruder, & Flay, 1994) supports this
conceptual framework (Cervone et al., 1997). In this program, han-
dling stress was viewed as an important strategy for facilitating the
goal of abstinence. Perceived self-efficacy for handling stress and for
the treatment goal of quitting smoking and abstaining permanently

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 Cervone / THINKING ABOUT SELF-EFFICACY 49

were assessed 2 weeks after a target quit day. Although both self-
efficacy measures were linked to eventual smoking status (abstinent
vs. smoking), logistic regression analyses revealed that self-efficacy
for coping strategies affected smoking status through its effects on
perceived self-efficacy for goal attainment. Greater efficacy for cop-
ing with stress enhanced efficacy for quitting that, in turn, increased
participants’ overall chances of being abstinent.
These results once again illustrate the value of conceptualizing
self-efficacy not as an abstract dispositional tendency, but as the prod-
uct of dynamic cognitive processes. Recognizing that people may
think about distinctly different components of an overall activity and
that thoughts about self-efficacy for these different components may
be systematically interrelated—with self-efficacy for strategy execu-
tion influencing self-efficacy for goal attainment—enabled us to
organize multiple aspects of self-efficacy perception.

CONCLUSIONS

Answers to our three questions were reached in a common manner,

namely, by analyzing the cognitive processes involved in thinking
about one’s efficacy to handle challenges. Do self-efficacy percep-
tions generalize across situations? Yes. Generalization occurs when
people think about the same personal attribute as they assess their
capabilities for handling different situations. Do moods influence per-
ceived self-efficacy? No (or at least not reliably). People’s thoughts
about self-efficacy do not appear to involve affect-based evaluations,
whereas the adoption of personal standards does involve such evalua-
tions. Personal standards, then, are reliably influenced by induced
affective states. Do people necessarily have a singular level of self-
efficacy in any given domain? No. People may think about multiple
components of an overall task or conceptualize a given behavior in a
number of different ways and, as a result, have distinct, interrelated
self-efficacy beliefs.
These three questions do not exhaust the set of issues deserving
greater attention in future research on personal agency and psycho-
logical change. As investigators turn their attention to these issues,
they would do well to think about how people think about themselves.

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50 BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION / January 2000

NOTE

1. A study of claustrophobia suggests that perceived coping self-efficacy is a superior pre-

dictor of subjective fear and autonomic arousal, whereas expectations of anxiety and danger are
better predictors of behavioral approach (Valentiner, Telch, Petruzzi, & Bolte, 1996). Unfortu-
nately, this study’s comparison of self-efficacy theory and outcome-expectancy formulations is
equivocal in that the investigators did not include any measure of perceived self-efficacy for per-
forming the target behavior of remaining in a claustrophobia chamber. (A self-report item meas-
uring perceived self-efficacy for behavioral performance was dropped on psychometric grounds
after a preliminary study.) When measures of perceived self-efficacy for behavioral performance
are included in phobia research, they routinely predict behavior more strongly than do measures
of anticipated anxiety or harm (Williams, 1995). This limitation of this study (Valentiner et al.,
1996) points to the importance of the assessment of multiple aspects of perceived self-efficacy
within a given domain.

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Daniel Cervone is an associate professor of psychology at the University of Illinois at

Chicago. He received his B.A. in Mathematics and Psychology from Oberlin College in
1981, and his Ph.D. in Psychology from Stanford University in 1985. From 1995 through
1996, he was a fellow at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. His
research interests are in social-cognitive models of personality, self-referent thinking,
goal setting and self-regulation, and affect and cognition.

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