REVEL ™

Designed for the way today’s students

read, think, and learn
REVEL is Pearson’s newest way of delivering our respected content. Fully digital and highly
engaging, REVEL offers an immersive learning experience designed for the way today’s students
read, think, and learn. Enlivening course content with media interactives and assessments, REVEL
empowers educators to increase engagement with the course, and to better connect with
students.

Over the course of several years, we have worked with more than 23,000 educators
and students to develop REVEL. All of REVEL’s key aspects—from features to content to
performance dashboard reporting—were guided by interactions with our customers. We’ve
tested each REVEL prototype with educators and students from across the country to make sure
it accurately reflects their preferences and facilitates the achievement of their goals. The result
is a new approach to digital learning that gives educators and students precisely what they need,
and nothing more.

To request a demo of REVEL, or for more information, please contact your Pearson
representative and or visit www.pearsonhighered.com/REVEL

Dynamic content
REVEL engages students in course material, while giving them the flexibility to learn their way.

Integrated within the author’s

narrative, interactives and videos
empower students to engage with
concepts and take an active role in
learning. REVEL’s media interactives
have been designed using best
practices in learning theory to keep
students focused and to increase
knowledge retention..
This page intentionally left blank
Understanding
the Political
World
This page intentionally left blank
 Understanding
the Political
World
A Comparative Introduction
to Political Science
Twelfth Edition

James N. Danziger
University of California, Irvine

Charles Anthony Smith

University of California, Irvine

Boston Columbus Indianapolis New York San Francisco Amsterdam

Cape Town Dubai London Madrid Milan Munich Paris Montréal Toronto
Delhi Mexico City São Paulo Sydney Hong Kong Seoul Singapore Taipei Tokyo
Editorial Director: Dickson Musslewhite
Publisher: Charlyce Jones Owen
Editorial Assistant: Maureen Diana
Marketing Managers: Tricia Murphy, Brittany Pogue-Mohammed
Media Project Manager: Tina Gagliostro
Program Manager: Rob DeGeorge
Project Manager: Gail Cocker
Project Coordination, Text Design, and
Electronic Page Makeup: Integra
Cover Designer/Manager: Maria Lange
Cover Photo: wong yu liang/Shutterstock
Operations Specialist: Mary Ann Gloriande
Printer/Binder: Courier/Kendallville
Cover Printer: Courier/Kendallville

Acknowledgements of third party content appear here: page xv, which constitutes an extension of this
copyright page.

Copyright © 2016 by Pearson Education, Inc. or its affiliates. All Rights Reserved. Printed in the United
States of America. This publication is protected by copyright, and permission should be obtained from the
publisher prior to any prohibited reproduction, storage in a retrieval system, or transmission in any form
or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise. For information regard-
ing permissions, request forms and the appropriate contacts within the Pearson Education Global Rights &
Permissions department, please visit www.pearsoned.com/permissions/.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Danziger, James N.
Understanding the political world : a comparative introduction to political
science/James N. Danziger, University of California, Irvine, Charles Anthony Smith,
University of California, Irvine.
pages cm
ISBN 978-0-13-394147-0 (alk. paper)—ISBN 0-13-394147-7 (alk. paper)
1. Political science. 2. Comparative government. I. Title.
JA66.D36 2015
320—dc23
2014036594

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1—QGT—15 14 13 12

Student Edition
ISBN 13: 978-0-133-94147-0
ISBN 10: 0-133-94147-7

A la Carte Edition
ISBN 13: 978-0-134-12519-0
ISBN 10: 0-134-12519-3

Instructor’s Review Copy:

ISBN 13: 978-0-133-97903-9
ISBN 10: 0-133-97903-2
Detailed Contents
Preface xi Political Ideology 30
To the Reader xvii Conservatism 31
Maps xviii Classical Liberalism 33
Socialism 35
ParT I On Knowing the Political Some Further Points about “ISMS” 37
World Individual Political Beliefs 40
Types of Political Orientations 40
1 Politics and Knowledge 1 Identifying Specific Beliefs 41
Toward a Definition of Politics 3 Belief Systems 43
On Political Knowledge 4 Political Culture 45
Types of Political Knowledge 4 National Character Studies 46
Description 5 ■ The DebaTe in 2: Is There a Clash
Explanation 6 of Civilizations? 47
Prescription 6 Survey Research Analyses 48
■ Compare in 1: The acid Test I 8 ■ Compare in 2: Value Differences
across Countries 49
Sources of Political Knowledge 9
Looking Ahead 51
Authority 9
Key Concepts 52 • For Further Consideration 52
Personal Thought 12
• For Further Reading 52 • On the Web 54
Science 13
Political Science 14
Doing Comparative Analysis 15
Political Science and Political Knowledge 15 3 Political Actions 55
■ The DebaTe in 1: Is Political Science Individual Political Actions 58
Possible? 16 Modes of Political Activity 58
The Subfields of Political Science 17 Political Activists 59
Where Is This Book Going? 18 Political Participation Studies 61
■ FoCus in 1: The Political Knowledge of ■ Compare in 3: Extent of Political
Different age Groups in the United States 20 actions in Mexico and Poland 64
Key Concepts 22 • For Further Consideration 22
Group Political Actions 65
• For Further Reading 23 • On the Web 24
Political Interest Groups 67
Activities of Political Interest
ParT II Political Behavior Groups 67

2 Political Theory and

Constraints on a Group’s Behavior
■ The DebaTe in 3: How Interested are
69

Political Beliefs 25 Interest Groups in Democracy? 70

Normative Political Theory 27 Types of Interest Groups 72
■ FoCus in 2: Great Britain as a Context Political Parties 74
for Some Great Political Theorists 29 Activities of Political Parties 74
v
vi Detailed Contents

■ FoCus in 3: Let’s Party! The rise of The Nation 121

the Green Party in Germany 75 Nation and State 122
Doing Politics 77 The Political System 123
Key Concepts 78 • For Further Consideration 78 ■ FoCus in 5: State and Nations:
• For Further Reading 78 • On the Web 80
The Indian Subcontinent 124
Conceptualization of the Political
4 Influences on Beliefs and
■
System
Compare in 5: Power and authority
126
127
Actions 82
Three Major Concepts: A Reprise 131
The Environment 84 Key Concepts 131 • For Further Consideration 131
Agents of Political Socialization 86 • For Further Reading 132 • On the Web 134
The Family 87
Schools 87
■ FoCus in 4: Political Socialization 6 Political Institutions I:
in China 88 Institutional Structures 135
Social Networks 90
The Media 91 Executives 137
■ The DebaTe in 4: Do the New ICTs Roles of Executives 138
Substantially Change Our Political Structural Arrangements 139
Beliefs and actions? 93 The Age of the Executive? 141
Religion 94 Legislatures 142
Culture 95 Roles of the Legislature 142
Events 95 ■ FoCus in 6: Electoral Systems and
Demographic Characteristics 96 Legislative representation:
■ Compare in 4: You Go Your Way, I’ll Go South africa 144
Legislative Structures 148
Mine 99
The Decline of Legislatures 149
Political Psychology 101
Administrative Systems 150
Concluding Observations 105
Administrative Functions
Key Concepts 106 • For Further Consideration 107
and Power 150
• For Further Reading 107 • On the Web 109
Bureaucracy as One Form of
Administration 151
ParT III Political Systems ■ Compare in 6: Five Styles of
administration 152
5 Political Systems, States, and Judiciaries 154
Nations 111 Aspects of Adjudication 154
The State 113 Judicial Structures 155
A Legal Definition of the State 113 ■ The DebaTe in 6: Is Judicial review
A Structural–Functional Definition Democratic? 156
of the State 115 Styles of Adjudication 158
■ The DebaTe in 5: Does Humanitarian Concluding Observations 159
Intervention Violate State Sovereignty? 116 Key Concepts 160 • For Further Consideration 160
Major Goals 118 • For Further Reading 160 • On the Web 162
 Detailed Contents vii

7 Political Institutions II: Factors, Firms, and Households/Consumers

Getting and Spending
200
203
Institutional Arrangements 163
The State Joins In 204
Constitutions and Constitutional Regimes 165 The World Joins In 205
Constitutions 165 The Economy Strikes Back 206
Constitutional Regimes 167 Measuring Economic Prosperity 207
Nonconstitutional Regimes 167 ■ Compare in 8: Wealth Inequality 209
Democracies and Nondemocracies 168 Two Ideal-Type Political Economies 211
Defining Democracy 170 The Market Economy: Total Private
Defining Nondemocracies 173 Control 212
A Democracy–Nondemocracy Measure 175 The Command Economy: Total State
Areal Distribution of Power 176 Control 213
Unitary State 177 Key Problems of Each Ideal-Type Political
Federation 177 Economy 214
Confederation 178 Market Economy 215
Forms of Executive–Legislative Relations 179 Command Economy 216
Presidential Government 180 The Mixed Economy 216
Parliamentary Government 180 ■ FoCus in 8: Mexico’s Political Economy 218
Hybrid Systems 182 Politics and Political Economy: The Other
Council Systems 183 “ISMS” 220
■ FoCus in 7: a Hybrid System in action: The Three-Plus “Isms” 220
France 184 ■ The DebaTe in 8: Is Communism Dead? 222
Assembly Systems 185 The Real World 224
Which Form Is Optimal? 185 Concluding Observations 226
Political Party Systems 185 Key Concepts 227 • For Further Consideration 227
• For Further Reading 228 • On the Web 229
■ The DebaTe in 7: Which Form of
Government Is Preferable:
Parliamentary, Presidential, or Hybrid? 186
ParT IV Political Processes
Two-Party Systems 188
Multiparty Systems
Dominant-Party Systems
188
191
9 Public Policy, Power, and
Decision 231
One-Party Systems 191
No-Party Systems 191 Public Policy 234
■ Compare in 7: Party Systems in Four Types of Public Policies 234
Countries 192 ■ Compare in 9: Selected Public Policies
Classification and Clarity 193 in Seven Countries 236
Key Concepts 194 • For Further Consideration 194 Analysis of the Stages of the Policy Process 237
• For Further Reading 194 • On the Web 196 Policy Impact Analysis 239
Policy Prescription 239

8 Political Economy 197

Explaining Public Policy Decision Making
The Elite Approach
240
240
Politics and the Economy 199 Key Concepts 240
A Political-Economic Framework 200 Major Theorists 241
viii Detailed Contents

The Public Policy Process 242 Concluding Observations 284

The Prevalence of Elite-Based Political Key Concepts 285 • For Further Consideration 285
Systems 242 • For Further Reading 285 • On the Web 287
■ FoCus in 9: Elite Politics in Swaziland 243
The Class Approach 244
The Public Policy Process 246 11 Politics Across Borders 288
The Pluralist Approach 247 Perspectives on States’ Behavior 290
The Policymaking Process 248 States’ Motives from Alternative
■ The DebaTe in 9: Does Money Dominate Perspectives: Realism, Liberalism,
the Policymaking Process? 250 and Constructivism 290
The Three Approaches Compared 251 A Geopolitical Perspective 292
Which Approach Is Correct? 251 ■ Compare in 11: Geopolitics in Two
Essential Similarities and Differences 252 Countries 293
Key Concepts 254 • For Further Consideration 254 Mechanisms of Political Cooperation
• For Further Reading 254 • On the Web 256 Across Borders 295
Diplomacy and Interstate Agreements 296
International Law 298
10 Change and Political International Organizations 300
Development 257 Power Politics Across Borders 305
Transnational Systems of Power 307
Change 259
Domination and Dependence 308
Development 260
■ FoCus in 11: The Faces of Colonialism:
Characteristics of “More Developed”
Congo 310
Systems 260
Globalization? 311
The Process of Development 262
■ The DebaTe in 11: Is Globalization
A Development-Based Taxonomy of States 264
a Positive Development? 313
The Developed Countries of the
Global North 267 Competition in the Globalizing World 314
Key Concepts 316 • For Further Consideration 316
The Developing Countries of the
• For Further Reading 317 • On the Web 318
Global South 267
The Transitional Developed Countries 267
The Dynamics of Economic Development
Political Development
268
271
12 Political Violence 320
Characteristics of Political Development 272 Violence 322
The Process of Political Development 272 Political Society 323
■ FoCus in 10: Political Development Types of Political Violence 324
and Modernization in Turkey 274 State Violence against Individuals or Groups 324
Political Development as Individual Violence against an Individual 326
Democratization 276 Group Violence against an Individual 327
■ DebaTe in 10: Is Economic Development Group Violence against a Group 330
a Necessary Prerequisite for ■ The DebaTe in 12: Is Terrorism Ever
Democracy? 278 a Justifiable Form of Political
World of Changes 279 Violence? 331
■ Compare in 10: Six Political Systems Individual or Group Violence against
in Cambodia? 281 the State 333
 Detailed Contents ix

Use of Force Between States

War
340
340
14 The Developing Countries
of the Global South 379
What Causes War? 342
■ FoCus in 12: Ultraviolence among Grouping Countries in the Developing
the Children of abraham: Israelis World 382
and Palestinians 342 Developmental Classification 382
■ Compare in 12: Levels of War and Regional Classification 383
Peace 345 Achieving Development in the Global
Evaluating Political Violence: Means South: Some Obstacles 385
and Ends 347 ■ Compare in 14: Obstacles to Development:
Key Concepts 350 • For Further Consideration 350 Nigeria and the Philippines 389
• For Further Reading 351 • On the Web 353 Goal: Prosperity 390
The Quest for Prosperity: Strategic
Choices 391
ParT V Politics among States
■ FoCus in 14: Poor Women and

13 The Developed Countries

Development: Microcredit
in Bangladesh 396
of the Global North 355 Current Outcomes 397
The Developed Countries of the Goal: Security 400
Global North 357 Interstate Violence 400
Goal: Prosperity 358 Economic Security 402
Mixed Economy 358 Goal: Stability 403
■ Compare in 13: Sweden and Switzerland 360 Inadequate Political Development 403
Performance 362 The Decline of Order 404
Challenges to Prosperity 363 Democratization 405
■ The DebaTe in 13: are the Social The Rise of the Global South? 409
Democracies Dying? 365 ■ The DebaTe in 14: Will There always
Goal: Stability 366 Be a Global South? 411
Liberal Democracies 366 Key Concepts 412 • For Further Consideration 412
Political Institutionalization 367 • For Further Reading 413 • On the Web 415
Order Maintenance 368
■ FoCus in 13: Welcome to the Brave 15 The Transitional Developed
New World: Singapore 368 Countries 416
Challenges to Stability 370
The Postcommunist Developed Countries 418
Goal: Security 372
The Era of Colonialism 372
■ Compare in 15: acid Test II 420
The Cold War Period 373 Goal: Prosperity 422
The Post–Cold War Period 373 Strategy 422
Challenges to Security 374 Performance 422
The Developed Countries of the Global Challenges 425
North Overall 375 Goal: Stability 425
Key Concepts 376 • For Further Consideration 376 Strategies 425
• For Further Reading 377 • On the Web 378 Challenges 428
x Detailed Contents

Goal: Security 429 The Future of the Transitional Developed

The Latin American Transitionals 430 Countries 440
Goal: Prosperity 431 So... 441
■ FoCus in 15: Order and Progress ■ The Final DebaTe: What Time Is It? 442
in Brazil: Sometimes 432 Key Concepts 444 • For Further Consideration 444
• For Further Reading 444 • On the Web 446
Goal: Stability 434
Democratization? 434 Appendix: Political Analysis 447
Goal: Security 435 Glossary 461
The BRICS Countries 436
References 470
Goal: Prosperity 437
Goal: Stability 438 Credits 493
Goal: Security 439 Index 494
Preface

D
uring early 2014, opposition to Ukraini- some actions and outcomes are much more likely
an President Yanukovich escalated from than others.
demonstrations, to protests, to bloody A central goal of political scientists is to iden-
confrontations and more than 200 deaths. On a tify and communicate what happens and why it
February night in 2014, opposition leaders took happens and then to offer generalizations that
the stage in Kiev to announce triumphantly that capture the broad processes and underlying
a deal had been reached with the president to dynamics of politics. This is how political science
end the increasingly violent conflict. The deal, attempts to enhance our understanding of the
brokered by the European Union, called for political world: hence the title of this book.
elections in the fall. A 26-year-old protester named The book provides you with some of the
Volodymyr Parasiuk climbed onto the stage, tools—key concepts, research findings, expla-
took the microphone, and gave an impassioned nations—to help you better understand both
impromptu speech criticizing the peace deal and politics and how political science approaches its
chastising the opposition leaders for “shaking subject matter. It offers you a path. After a brief
hands with this killer.” The crowd of thousands, consideration of how we decide what we know,
and then many Ukrainians, turned against the the book explores what we do know about the
peace accord, and that night President Yanukov- political beliefs and actions of individuals. It then
ich fled the capital. After several days, the legis- advances to the country level of analysis, exam-
lature stripped him of his power. One young man ining political institutions and political processes.
had commandeered a microphone and altered the This is followed by a consideration of politics at
course of Ukrainian, Crimean, Russian, and even the level of the global system. The final chapters
interstate politics, despite the extensive efforts draw together all the themes of the book while
and agreements of high-ranking diplomats in the examining the politics of three broad clusters of
European Union and the Ukraine. countries around the world.
Our theories and research findings in politi- We hope the events that are unfolding in the
cal science cannot predict this sort of event. Yet political world have persuaded you that it is essen-
that does not frustrate or embarrass us on behalf tial to understand it and to act sensibly within
of political scientists everywhere. One endlessly it, because politics is arguably the most critical
fascinating aspect of the study of politics is that domain in which our futures are being shaped.
there are always new challenges to our expla- In this book, you will be encouraged to consider
nations. This makes politics intriguing. Albert whether the information, insights, and concepts
Einstein commented that politics is more difficult of political science are useful. Can they help us
than physics. The political phenomena that we understand the political world? Can they inform
attempt to study and explain include many vari- our value choices and normative judgments about
ables and can spin in unexpected directions, espe- public policies? Can they guide our policies and
cially while unpredictable humans try to control actions in ways that improve the quality of our
them. Yet all is not chaos. There are patterns, and lives, individually and collectively?

xi
xii Preface

New To This Edition • Chapter 10 now incorporates and updates the

analytic framework (previously in Chapter 13)
Given the extraordinary rate of change in the
employed to classify the world’s countries into
political world, there is a systematic and thor-
the groupings examined in Chapters 13–15.
ough update of the quantitative data in almost
every figure and table and extensive updates to • Chapter 11 brings in current debates and ap-
most of the in-depth examples that are embedded proaches in international relations, including
throughout the text. Professor Tony Smith is the revised sections on international law, global-
most notable addition in this edition. He brings ization, and transnational systems.
broad political science knowledge, with particular
• Chapter 12, on political violence, reflects the
strengths in international relations, political insti-
evolving role of terrorism and its causes and
tutions, and judicial politics (he was a practicing
lawyer before he returned to academia). Here are consequences and expands the discussion of
some additional significant differences from the separatist violence.
previous edition: • Chapters 13 and 14 have been revised to re-
flect the emerging challenges to both the
• Among the vignettes that open every chapter
Global North and the Global South, includ-
by introducing a major theme of that chapter
ing such topics as the impact of the global
are new ones. One explores the financial crisis
economic crisis and the apparent “rise of the
associated with the euro and the European
South.”
Union, with particular attention to Greece,
and another discusses Canada as an exam- • Chapter 15, on the transitional developed
ple of the complexity of the contemporary countries, has been significantly revised to em-
developed countries of the Global North. phasize the recent evolution in both the post-
communist developed countries and the newly
• Chapter 4 has been revised substantially
industrialized countries in Latin America, and
to include an extensive new discussion of
it includes a completely new discussion of the
explanatory approaches associated with po-
five BRICS countries.
litical psychology, including rational choice,
cognitive psychology, intergroup relations, • New data and graphical analyses are presented
personality approaches, and biopolitics. to illuminate such issues as the crossnational
measurement of the level of democracy, the
• Chapters 6 and 7 contain an expanded discus-
comparative rates of economic growth in transi-
sion of institutionalism and revised sections
tional developed countries across two decades,
on judicial politics, constitutions, and regime
and the relationship between level of democ-
types.
racy and level of economic development.
• Chapter 8 reworks the analysis of political
• On the Web, a list of useful and relevant
economy, with a new section on state capital-
Internet sites, and For Further Reading sug-
ism, significant revision of the discussion of
gestions at the end of each chapter have been
statism and corporatism, and a pared down
updated and expanded.
treatment of communism.
REVELTM
Educational technology designed for the
way today’s students read, think, and learn
When students are engaged deeply, they learn more effectively and perform
better in their courses. This simple fact inspired the creation of REVEL :
an immersive learning experience designed for the way today’s students
read, think, and learn. Built in collaboration with educators and students
nationwide, REVEL is the newest, fully digital way to deliver respected
Pearson content.

REVEL enlivens course content with media interactives and assessments—

integrated directly within the authors’ narrative—that provide opportunities
for students to read about and practice course material in tandem. This
immersive educational technology boosts student engagement, which leads
to better understanding of concepts and improved performance throughout
the course.

Learn more about REVEL

www.pearsonhighered.com/revel/
xiv Preface

Features three sets of transitional developed countries—

the postcommunist developed countries, the
The twelfth edition of Understanding the Political
newly industrializing countries in Latin America,
World retains the conceptual framework of previ-
and the BRICS countries.
ous editions, focusing on politics at every level,
from the individual person to the global system. In addition, the twelfth edition retains most
To enrich the reader’s understanding, it employs key features of the previous edition:
a comparative perspective, considering evidence
• Many discussions and debates provide
and examples from many countries in all regions
memorable applications of key concepts,
of the world. This approach is guided both by
Aristotle’s wise observation that all thinking such as power, democracy, political violence,
begins in comparison and by a recognition that equality, and globalization, and key issues,
the political world is now truly global. such as whether terrorism is ever justifiable
As noted above, the book is organized to pro- and whether interest groups are good for
vide the reader with a brief characterization of how democracy.
political scientists study politics in a comparative • Continual use of country-based examples
framework. It then uses such a framework to focus grounds every topic in relevant, specific realities.
on how to understand politics at the level of the indi- • Numerous presentations of current data, often
vidual and the group, the different ways in which in graphical form, facilitate analysis and com-
political institutions are organized, the dynamics of parisons on many topics.
important political processes, and the key patterns
• Captioned photographs illuminate themes in a
of politics in major clusters of countries.
way that complements the textual discussions.
Chapter 1 and the Appendix introduce the
logic of political science and the methods of com- • A recurring focus on political economy empha-
parative political analysis. sizes the significance of linkages between the
Chapters 2–4 examine both normative politi- political system and the economic system.
cal theory and the empirical study of politi- • Eight excellent, full-color maps display the
cal behavior at the individual and group levels, geographic relations of countries in all areas
describing and explaining the causes of political of the world.
beliefs and actions. • An engaging, readable style draws in the
Chapters 5–8 emphasize the structural and reader.
institutional elements of political systems, offer-
ing concepts and examples that characterize the
different ways in which people organize them- Supplements
selves politically. Pearson is pleased to offer several resources to
Chapters 9–12 analyze crucial political qualified adopters of Understanding the Political
processes, such as public policymaking and World and their students that will make teaching
the exercise of power, political and economic and learning from this book even more effective
and enjoyable. Several of the supplements for
development, politics across national borders,
this book are available at the Instructor Resource
and political violence.
Center (IRC), an online hub that allows instruc-
Chapters 13–15 explain in detail how impor-
tors to quickly download book-specific supple-
tant groups of countries try to achieve their broad ments. Please visit the IRC welcome page at www.
goals of prosperity, stability, and security within pearsonhighered.com/irc to register for access.
the complex international environment. These
chapters provide specific analyses of the devel- INSTRuCTOR’S MANuAL/TEST BANk This
oped countries, the developing countries, and resource includes learning objectives, chapter
 Preface xv

overview and lecture suggestions, multiple-choice I have circumnavigated the globe twice as part
questions, essay questions, and discussion of five global voyages on Semester at Sea. The
questions for each chapter. Available exclusively people I met and the events I experienced in all
on the IRC. these places certainly have influenced my per-
ceptions about politics.
PEARSON MyTEST This powerful assessment More direct contributions to this book have
generation program includes all of the items in come from the work of my colleagues in political
the instructor’s manual/test bank. Questions and science and from the many students and others in
tests can be easily created, customized, saved the political world with whom I have interacted.
online, and then printed, allowing flexibility to I have drawn deeply and often from the ideas of
manage assessments anytime and anywhere. these groups. By the publication of the twelfth
Available exclusively on the IRC. edition, the layers of contributions and ideas to
POwERPOINT PRESENTATIONS Organized the construction of this book are deep, rich, and
around a lecture outline, these multimedia pre- indescribable. In every edition, there is a list of
sentations include photos, figures, and tables from people who added positively to that edition, and
each chapter. Available exclusively on the IRC. I continue to be grateful to them all. Explicit guid-
ance and advice regarding the writing of this par-
LONgMAN ATLAS Of wORLD ISSuES ticular edition have come from several valuable
(0-205-78020-2) From population and political sources: scholarly colleagues who have offered
systems to energy use and women’s rights, the useful suggestions, especially Richard Coldwell,
Longman Atlas of World Issues features full-color C.B.E., and students who have provided feedback
thematic maps that examine the forces shaping on the book, including Sanaa Khan and Aaron
the world. Featuring maps from the latest edition McCullough. The reviewers, who offered very
of The Penguin State of the World Atlas, this excerpt thoughtful and constructive commentaries for
includes critical thinking exercises to promote a this edition, include Charles Ellison, University
deeper understanding of how geography affects of Cincinnati; Daniel Masters, University of
many global issues. North Carolina, Wilmington; Brian Anderson,
gOODE’S wORLD ATLAS (0-321-65200-2) First Mississippi University for Women; and Kurt
published by Rand McNally in 1923, Goode’s World Messick, Ivy Tech Community College.
Atlas has set the standard for college reference I am very grateful for the help provided by
atlases. It features hundreds of physical, political, all these (and many unnamed) sources. Regarding
and thematic maps as well as graphs, tables, and a the roads not taken and the missteps in this book,
pronouncing index. the responsibility is mine.

James N. Danziger
Acknowledgments The privilege of using the earlier editions of this
Many sources of ideas and information book to bring political science and the world to
constitute the basis of my understanding about thousands of students has been a true joy. I am
politics. Broadly, you should know that I was now honored to join Professor Danziger in his
born and have been educated primarily in the quest to bring the next edition to fruition. I echo
United States. I have also studied, lived, and/ his gratitude to the many colleagues, friends,
or spent significant periods of time in more than
family, and students who provided feedback and
70 countries in Western and Eastern Europe,
support along the way.
Central and South America, Asia, the Middle
East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Charles Anthony Smith
From the Reviews: “Danziger and Smith bring a fresh and exciting
pedagogical approach. Their terrific book pres-
“Danziger and Smith have written the perfect ents cutting-edge topics with current data in a
book for an introduction to political science. compelling narrative.”
Presenting a full range of domestic and inter-
national issues plus detailed scenarios that —Heather Smith-Cannoy, Lewis & Clark College,
make students think critically, they balance the Portland, Oregon
academic approach to political science with the
practical need to be fluent in real world politics.” “Danziger and Smith have written a current and
impressive textbook. It is empirically rich, but
—Krista Wiegand, University of Tennessee, still accessible and engaging.”
Knoxville, Tennessee
—Royce Carroll, Rice University,
“This book remains the gold standard for intro- Houston, Texas
duction to the breadth of topics that animate
political science. Encompassing topics such as “This is an innovative approach to teaching
political ideology, democracy, protest, domestic introductory level political science. It challenges
and interstate politics, and newly industrializing the students with up-to-date information pre-
countries as well as developed, the book takes the sented in an analytical framework that helps lay
student on a journey through the discipline itself the foundation for a comprehensive understand-
as well as its subject matter. Because it is accessi- ing of how the political world actually works.”
ble to beginning undergraduates and because of —Shawn Schulenberg, Marshall University,
its explicit application of comparative methods Huntington, West Virginia
of inquiry, this book remains the key recommen-
dation I always offer to my colleagues.”
—Matthew Shugart, University of California-Davis,
Davis, California

xvi
To the Reader

T
he aim of this book is revealed by its title: regarding what we can actually know about the
It is meant to help you understand the political world. Here also there are major dis-
political world. It assumes that you are agreements about the appropriate methods for
willing to think about politics. It does not assume describing and understanding politics.
that you have substantial knowledge about poli- Although this book cannot resolve the under-
tics or political science or even that you know the lying disputes, it offers you the basis for making
difference between politics and political science. sense of politics at all three levels. As the authors,
We hope that when you complete the book and we make some basic assumptions: that you can
any course in which you are reading it, you will think systematically about politics and make gen-
feel that you have increased your knowledge eral statements about how politics works; that
about the contemporary political world. you will learn more about politics by considering
The study of politics is full of fascinating the politics of many different places; that every
questions. First are the questions about what is, observer of politics (certainly including you and
such as: Who exercises political power, and what us) has biases, only some of which can be under-
values and purposes guide them? Why do people stood; that you need a variety of sources of ideas
accept political authority? How do people orga- and information before you can make informed
nize themselves politically? What factors are and sensible decisions about the value disagree-
associated with political violence? A second set of ments pervading politics; and that this book is one
questions concerns what ought to be: Who should such source that can be helpful to you. Our efforts
exercise political power, and what values should will be successful to the extent that you ultimately
they pursue? Why should people accept politi- judge our assumptions to be correct (especially
cal authority? How should political structures be the last one).
organized? When is political violence justifiable? It is inevitable that you will be frustrated with
People disagree sharply about answers to the treatment of politics at some (many?) points in
both these descriptive (what is) and normative this book. We would say: Reader, be merciful! The
(what ought to be) questions. In addition, the study of politics is very complex. Gather bits of
study of politics provokes a third set of questions understanding where you can find them.

xvii
Maps

xviii
 W O R L D M A P
ARCTIC OCEAN

75˚N GREENLAND 75˚N

Alaska
(U. S. A.) ICELAND
SWEDEN

NORWAY RUSSIA
FINLAND
60˚N
DENMARK ESTONIA 60˚N
CANADA LATVIA
LITHUANIA
NETH. BELARUS
IRELAND U. K. POLAND
BELGIUM CZECH
LUX. UKRAINE
GERMANY HUNGARY KAZAKHSTAN
SLOVAKIA CROATIA MOLDOVA
45˚N PAC I F I C MONGOLIA 45˚N
AUSTRIA SLOVENIA ROMANIA GEORGIA NORTH
SWITZ. BOSNIA SERBIA KYRGYZSTAN
HERZE- BULGARIA SOUTH KOREA
FRANCE MACEDONIA UZBEKISTAN KOREA PAC I F I C
GOVINA
OCEAN ATLANTIC SPAIN MONTENEGRO ARMENIA TURKMENISTAN
KOSOVO TURKEY
PORTUGAL ITALY TAJIKISTAN
U. S. A. ALBANIA
GREECE SYRIA AZERBAIJAN
TUNISIA CHINA OCEAN
MOROCCO IRAQ AFGHANISTAN BANGLADESH JAPAN
30˚N OCEAN LEBANON IRAN 30˚N
NEPAL BHUTAN
ISRAEL
THE JORDAN PAKISTAN
23.5˚N Tr o p i c o f MEXICO BAHAMAS WESTERN ALGERIA LIBYA LAOS Tr o p i c o f 23.5˚N
EGYPT KUWAIT
SAHARA
HAITI SAUDI QATAR TAIWAN
Cancer CUBA INDIA MYANMAR Cancer
DOM. REP. ARABIA U. A. E.
MAURITANIA MALI
15˚N BELIZE NIGER CHAD 15˚N
HONDURAS JAMAICA SENEGAL YEMEN OMAN VIETNAM
GUATEMALA SUDAN PHILIPPINES
THE GAMBIA BURKINA
EL SALVADOR FASO ERITREA
VENEZUELA GUINEA BISSAU NIGERIA
NICARAGUA DJIBOUTI THAILAND
COSTA RICA GUYANA GUINEA SOUTH
SOMALIA KAMPUCHEA
PANAMA SURINAME SIERRA LEONE SUDAN
LIBERIA ETHIOPIA SRI
COLOMBIA FRENCH GUIANA GHANA BENIN MALAYSIA BRUNEI
0˚ CÔTE D’IVOIRE UGANDA LANKA 0˚
(France) TOGO KENYA
DEM. REP.
ECUADOR CAMEROON OF THE RWANDA
PAC I F I C GABON CONGO
INDIAN N EW GU I N EA
BURUNDI
PERU CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC I N D O N E S I A
TANZANIA
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
COMOROS
15˚S BRAZIL ANGOLA OCEAN PAPUA 15˚S
OCEAN ZAMBIA MALAWI NEW GUINEA
FIJI
BOLIVIA ZIMBABWE
23.5˚S Tr o p i c o f PARAGUAY
ATLANTIC BOTSWANA
MADAGASCAR Tr o p i c o f 23.5˚S
NEW
NAMIBIA AUSTRALIA CALEDONIA
Capricorn CHILE MOZAMBIQUE
Capricorn
30˚S (France)
OCEAN SWAZILAND
30˚S
SOUTH
AFRICA LESOTHO
URUGUAY

ARGENTINA NEW
ZEALAND
45˚S
45˚S
0 1000 miles

0 1000 km
165˚W 150˚W 135˚W 120˚W 105˚W 90˚W 75˚W 60˚W 45˚W 30˚W 15˚W 0˚ 15˚E 30˚E 45˚E 60˚E 75˚E 90˚E 105˚E 120˚E 135˚E 150˚E 165˚E

xix
 N O R T H A M E R I C A
180˚W Chukchi 165˚W 75˚N 90˚N 15˚W 0˚
Bering Sea ARCTIC Greenland
Norwegian
Sea

60˚N
Sea
Bering Strait OCEAN Sea

60˚N
Beaufort Sea
Bro GREENLAND Denmark
oks Strait
Yukon
R.
Ra
ng
Yuko
e
n R. 15˚W
Mt Mckinley Baffin Bay

Mac

kenzie R.
Great Bear
Mack
Yukon R.

Lake
Davis Strait
enzie Mountains
Gulf Mt Logan Nuuk
of R. (Godthab)
Mackenzie
Alaska
150˚W 30˚W

Hudso
n Stra
Great Slave it
Lake
Rock

Lake Ungava L a b r a d o r S e a
Peace River Athabasca Hudson Bay Bay
y Moun

Chu
ca River rch er
bas ill n Riv
135˚W At
ha
R
Nelso
45˚W
tains

Vancouver Lake
ia R.

hewan
katc
Calgary Sas Winnipeg
mb
olu

45˚N
Olympic
Mts. Seattle
C
C A N A D A 45˚N
Gulf of
Spokane St. Lawrence
Portland Vancouver
Colum
bia R.
R

Mis
Lake sou
oc

. ri R
eR Sakakawea
.
ak L. Superior
Sn
ky

Montreal

R.
Lake Oahe

ce
en
L. Huron Ottawa

wr
a
Mo

L
St
n

Minneapolis
higa
unt

rio
G

L. Onta
L. Mic

Great Rochester
U. S. A.
r e

Salt Milwaukee
Buffalo

.
A T L A N T I C
Mts
San Francisco Pla
rie
ain

Oakland Lake tte

Riv Detroit L. E
a t

er
Omaha i Chicago Cleveland New York
an
pp
Boulder
i
s

Philadelphia
iss

hi

Death
O C E A N
Miss

ado R.
ac

l
P l a i n s

Color Baltimore
Valley pa Washington D. C.
Ap
Missouri Ohi
o R.
Mojave Arkan
sas R
Kansas Louisville
. St.
Los Angeles Desert City Norfolk
s.

Louis
R.

Mt

30˚N 30˚N
ado
Color

San Diego
an

hi Charlotte
Memphis
ac
.
pi R

Arkans l
pa
as R
sip

.
Ap
sis
Mis
Ba

Dallas Birmingham
Rio
ja

Gr
an
de

Jacksonville
Ca
Gulf

San
Si

23.5˚N Houston New 23.5˚N

Antonio
er
of C

Orleans
lif

Orlando
MEXICO
Sie
ra
ali

Tampa West Palm

forn
or

Tr
Ma

op Beach THE er
ia

ic G u l f
rr

nc
ni

of BAHAMAS Ca
dr

o f Miami
Ca of
a
a

nce M e x i c o
e

ic
rop
r Nassau
M
Oc

T 60˚W
ad
ci

Havana
de

re

CUBA HAITI San Juan

nt

Santo
15˚N 15˚N
O
al

Domingo
ri

Si Mexico City
Yucatan
en

er Kingston
P A C I F I C ra
M Peninsula Port-au-Prince DOM. REP.
ta

ad
re Belize City JAMAICA
l

D el BELIZE C a r i b b e a n S e a
O C E A N Su
r Belmopan
Gulf of HONDURAS Willemstad
Tehuantepec Guatemala
Tegucigalpa 75˚W
GUATEMALA
NICARAGUA
0 500 miles San Salvador
EL SALVADOR
Managua
L. Nicaragua PANAMA
San Jose
0 500 km Panama

COSTA
120˚W
RICA
0˚ 105˚W 90˚W

xx
S O U T H A M E R I C A
80˚W 70˚W 60˚W 50˚W 40˚W 30˚W
C a r i b b e a n S e a

Barranquilla
Maracaibo 10˚N
Valencia
Barquisimeto

V E N E Z U E L A G U YA N A A T L A N T I C
Rio Orinoco
SURINAME
Medellin lena Georgetown Paramaribo O C E A N
Cayenne
Rio Magda

Bogotá
FRENCH
Cali Rio GUIANA
C O L O M B I A (France)

Or
noc
o

i
0˚ 0˚
Rio Negro
Quito
Marajo
Island
E C U A D O R A m a z o n Amazon
R . Belém
Guayaquil

Rio
B a s i n

Xing
Gulf of Manaus

Rio Tocant
Guayaquil

u
Ama
Amaz
on R
zon R. Fortaleza
.
ira

ins
de Teresina

s
Ma

ajo
Rio

ap
oT
Ri
a
A

Juru
Rio
s
n

ru
Pu
Rio B R A Z I L

ia
Recife
d

ua
Rio

ag
e s

Tele
P E R U

Ar

Rio Tocantins
sP
10˚S o
10˚S

Rio
ire isc
s nc

a
u

Fr
Xing
M

ao
oS
Rio
Ri o M

Ri
o u

Lima re
ad

d e Dios

M a t o G r o s s o
n

Salvador
P l a t e a u
t

i
a

n
s
Lake
Titicaca
B O L I V I A

ia
Brasília
g ua
ra
oA

La Paz Goiania
Ri

Sucre
At acam a

20˚S Belo Horizonte 20˚S

Rio Paraguay

a
an

C H I L E Rio de
ar
oP

Janeiro
Ri

Campinas
23.5˚S Tr o p i c o f P A R A G U AY Tr o p i c o f 23.5˚S
Capricorn São Paulo Cabo Fr io Capricorn
Deser t

Asunción Curitiba

P A C I F I C Rio Parana

ay
gu
ru

30˚S
O C E A N Ri
o
U
Porto 30˚S
A R G E N T I N A Alegre

C e r r o
A c o n c a g u a Rosario
Santiago Rio
Para
ná U RU GUAY
s

Buenos Aires
a

Montevideo
p
m
a
P
tains

40˚S 40˚S
Moun

Gulf of
Isla Grande San Matias A T L A N T I C
de Chiloe
a

Va l d e s
s

O C E A N
n i

Pe n n i n s u l a
Ande

Gulf of
g

San Jorge
Ta i t a o
t a

Pe n n i n s u l a
a
P

50˚S F A L K L A N D 50˚S
I S L A N D S
S O U T H
Strait of Port G E O R G I A
Magellan Stanley
I S L A N D
Tierra Del Fuego

0 500 miles

0 500 km 70˚W 60˚W 50˚W 40˚W 30˚W

xxi
A F R I C A
10˚W 0˚ 10˚E 20˚E 50˚E
Caspi an
Algiers Tunis Sea
Strait of Valletta
Madeira Gibraltar MALTA
Island
Casablanca Rabat n s M e d i t e r r a n e a n S e a
(Portugal) a i Tripoli
MOROCCO u n t TUNISIA
o Alexandria
M
s
30˚N l a
Canary Islands A t Cairo
(Spain) A L G E R I A

L I B YA

Ni
Tr o p i c o f

le
WESTERN

Lib
E G Y P T Persian

R.
Cancer Gulf
SAHARA Ahaggar Mtns.

yan
23.5˚N Lake
S a h a r a D e s e r t Nasser

De

R
Tibesti Mtns. Nubian

e d
20˚N

ser
M AU R I TA N I A Desert
R.
le
Ni

S
C H A D

t
M A L I

e a
Nouakchott
N I G E R S U D A N
Senegal R.
ERITREA
S u d a n D e s e r t Khartoum Asmara
Dakar SENEGAL .
er R
THE GAMBIA
Ni

Banjul Nig Niamey L. Chad

ge
r
R.

Bamako Ouagadougou Gulf of

Blue
White Nile
Bissau
N’Djamena DJIBOUTI Aden
BURKINA FASO

Nile
Djibouti
GUINEA N I G E R I A
10˚N BENIN Ch
ar
iR
10˚N
GUINEA Conakry CÔTE TOGO
.
Ethiopian SOMALIA
Abuja Addis Ababa
BISSAU Freetown D’IVOIRE Lake ue
R.
Highlands
Ben
Ibadan CENTRAL S O U T H ETH IOPI A
SIERRA Volta
Niger R.

LEONE GHANA AFRICAN REPUBLIC S U D A N

Porto
Lomé Novo CAMEROON Ub
an
Monrovia Douala Bangui gi
R.
Accra
LIBERIA Yamoussoukro
Gulf of Yaoundé
Guinea D E M . R E P. Lake
i R.

Turkana
EQUATORIAL Bata O F T H E Lake Albert UGANDA
Ubang

o R.
ng Mogadishu
REP. OF Co CONGO
0˚ GUINEA Libreville Kampala K E N YA 0˚
THE Mbandaka
Lake
Sao Tome
RWANDA
Con
GABON CONGO C o n g o Victoria
g
Nairobi
o R.
L. Kivu
B a s i n Kigali Mt. Kilimanjaro
Kasa Bujumbura
Brazzaville
R .
i R.
BURUNDI
go Kinshasa
C on

Matadi as
TA N Z A N I A Zanzibar
K

ai
L. Tanganyika Dar es Salaam
R.

Lake
Luanda Mweru
10˚S L. Malawi 10˚S
A N G O L A Likasi
Katanga Comoros
Lubumbashi
Plateau MALAWI
Huambo
Z A M B I A Lilongwe MOZAMBIQUE
A T L A N T I C Lusaka
Mozambique
Zamb

Lake Kariba Channel

ezi

O C E A N Za
MADAGASCAR
R .

mb
Harare ez
iR
Antananarivo
N AM IBIA
.
ZIMBABWE
N

20˚S 20˚S
B O T S W A N A Bulawayo
a
m
i b

Windhoek K a l a h a r i Lim
Tr o p i c o f Walvis Bay D e s e r t
po
po
D e s

23'm.5˚S Capricorn Gaborone 23.5˚S

R.

Pretoria
Maputo
Johannesburg Mbabane
e r

l R.
Vaa
SWAZILAND
t

Orange R.
Bloemfontein
30˚S Maseru Durban 30˚S

SOUTH AFRICA Umtata LESOTHO I N D I A N

Cape Town
O C E A N
0 500 miles

0 500 km
10˚W 0˚ 10˚E 20˚E 30˚E 40˚E 50˚E

xxii
E U R O P E
20˚W 10˚W 0˚ 10˚E 20˚E 30˚E 40˚E 50˚E
Greenland Barents Sea
Sea

Ob
Jan Mayen
40˚W Denmark Strait
Kolgujev

70˚N

Ur
al
M
ou
nt
Reykjavik
Norwegian

ain
ICELAND

s
60˚N Sea
White Sea

Gulf of
30˚W Bothnia
Faroe Islands
Ka
(Denmark) ma

Torshavn SW ED E N Perm
F IN L A N D
Shetland N ORWAY L. Ladoga Izevsk
Islands
Helsinki
Gulf of
Finland St. Petersburg lga
Orkney Oslo Vo Kazan
Stockholm Tallinn
Hebrides Islands Jaroslavl Volga
ES TON IA Rostov
Gorkiy
U. K. North Sea
Volga
Tol Yatti
Glasgow Riga Moscow
Goteborg
D EN M A R K L AT VI A
IRE LAND Belfast
Edinburgh
Baltic R U S S I A
Sunderland Copenhagen Sea L IT HUA N IA

Do
Dublin Vilnius
20˚W

n
Saratov

Dnieper
Limerick Leeds
Kaliningrad
Cork Liverpool Manchester NETH . ´
Gdansk Minsk
Amsterdam Hamburg
Birmingham Elb
e
P O L A N D BELARUS
The Warsaw Voronez
Hague Berlin Poznan´
London Rotterdam
Volgograd Volg
GERM ANY
Rhin

a
´ ´
Lodz Kharkov
Brussels Kiev
e

English Channel Leipzig

BELGIUM
A T L A N T I C Luxembourg
Bonn
Prague ´
Krakow L’viv
LUX. U K R A I N E

Dniep
Se Frankfurt Donetsk Do
n
in
e
Paris C Z EC H Carpa
thia
Dn
estr

er
Nurnberg
O C E A N Nantes F R A N Strasbourg
C E Dan
ube
Brno
SLOVAKIA n M
ou M OL D OVA
Krivoy Rog
Bratislava n Frunze
Loire LIECHTENSTEIN Vienna Sea of
Chisinau
Zurich Vaduz Budapest

ta
Bern Azov Krasnodar

i
A U S T R I A H U N G A R Y Cluj-Napoca

ns
Bay
of Odessa Caucasus Mts.
SWITZERLAND
Danube

Biscay Geneva SLOVENIA R O M A N I A

Bordeaux Lyon Zagreb
Mont Blanc Ljubljana Timisoara
Ga
r
P o Milano CROATIA Belgrade Bucharest
e
Rhon

Bayonne I TA LY
on

BOSNIA Black Sea

n

Genova Ad
e

SERBIA
40˚N Monaco Ap ria HERZE- Sarajevo Danube
p tic Varna
Porto Valladolid Se GOVINA KOSOVO BULGARIA
Firenze a
en

Rio Douro ANDORRA Marseille Podgorcia Sofia Burgas

n

Pristina
in

PORTUGAL MONTENEGRO
es

Madrid Barcelona Skopje

Corsica Rome MACEDONIA
Lisbon Tagus River Tirana
S PA I N Vesuvius ALBANIA Thessaloniki
Sardinia Naples
Valencia
Cordoba Majorca Tyrrhenian G R E E C Lesbos
E
Sea
Agrinion Aegean
Palermo
Gibraltar Mediterranean Sea Ionian Sea
Athens Sea
Monte Etna Peloponnesus
Sicily
Rhodes

Crete

Mediterranean Sea

0 500 miles

0 500 km Red
Sea

xxiii
T H E M I D D L E E A S T
30˚E 35˚E A r a l 60˚E
K A Z A K H S T A N S e a
Cau
cas
B l a c k S e a us 50˚E
Mo U Z B E K I S T A N
un
40˚E ta
GEORGIA in C a s p i a n
s
Tbilisi S e a
Istanbul
Pontic M ARMENIA
ountains Yerevan
Bursa Ankara
AZERBAIJAN Baku
T U R K E Y T U R K M E N I S T A N
L. Van
Izmir L. Tuz
Tigris R. Tabriz Ashgabat

Adana

Mosul Elbur
Aleppo z Mountains Mashhad
Eu
p Tehran
Nicosia
S Y R I A

hr
ate
CYPRUS Za

sR
.
35˚N
Beirut
gr
os
I R A N
M
M e d i t e r r a n e a n LEBANON Damascus
Baghdad
ou
nt
S e a ai _
ISRAEL ns Esfahan AFGHANISTAN
West Bank
Tel Aviv I R A Q

Ti
Amman

gr
Jerusalem

is
Dead

R
Alexandria

.
Sea
JORDAN Basra
Qattara
Depression Cairo Shiraz
Sinai Kuwait
Pen. KUWAIT
Persian
Gulf
BAHRAIN
Ri
ve
rN

S A U D I Manama Str. of
ile

Hormuz
QATAR
E G Y P T A R A B I A Doha
25˚N Abu Dhabi Gulf of Oman 25˚N
Riyadh
Muscat
Lake Nasser
U. A. E.
R e d T r o p i c o f 23.5˚N
S e a Arabian Cancer
Peninsula
O M A N
Nubian
Desert
i
al
20˚N l Kh 20˚N
ile ’ A
ve
rN Rub
Ri
A r a b i a n S e a

S U D A N Y E M E N
Khartoum
Sanaa
Blu
eN

15˚N 15˚N
ile

Socotra
Gulf of Aden (Yemen) 0 500 miles
50˚E
DJIBOUTI
White Nile

Djibouti
45˚E 0 500 km
S O M A L I A 55˚E 60˚E

xxiv
 E A S T A N D S O U T H A S I A
Sea of 150˚E 165˚E
Okhotsk

Amur

Ulaanbaatar
Irty Qiqihar
sh

Harbin
MONGOLIA Jixi 45˚N
Urumqi Changchun Jilin
Bishkek Sapporo
Liaoyuan
Fuxin
KYRGYZSTAN Jinzhou Fushun NORTH
Baotou Sea of
Huang Beijing Dandong KOREA Japan
Pyongyang (East Sea)
Dushanbe TAJIKISTAN Yinchuan Tianjin P a c i f i c
Taiyuan Dalian
Seoul Sendai
Xining Handan Incheon SOUTH
Jinan Taejeon KOREA J A PA N
CHINA Lanzhou Luoyang Kaifeng Qingdao _ Tokyo
Kabul Pusan Kyoto
Islamabad Xi’an Yellow Nagoya
Xuzhou Sea Fukuoka Hiroshima
AFGHANISTAN Huainan
Rawalpindi Gujranwala Nanjing
Mianyang
Faisalabad Lahore Yangtze
Chengdu Wuhan Shanghai
Hangzhou East 30˚N
New Mt. Everest
Multan Zigong Ningbo China
us Chongqing
Ind Delhi BHUTAN Yueyang Jingdezhen Sea
PA K I S T A N N E PA L Changsha
Agra Kathmandu
Ganges Lucknow Thimphu Dukou Pingxiang Wenzhou
Jaipur
Hyderabad Kanpur Patna Guiyang Fuzhou
Taipei
– INDIA AllahabadBANGLADESH Kunming Xiamen
Karachi Shaoguan
– –
Ahmadabad Bhopal Jabalpur Dhaka Shantou
Dhanbad Khulna Nanning
Arabian Indore Chittagong TA I WA N
Kolkata Hong Kong Kao-hsiung
Sea MYANMAR Hanoi
– (Calcutta)
Surat Nagpur LAOS Hai Zhanjiang
Bay
Mumbai Pune of Bengal Phong

Salween
Vientiane South China
(Bombay)
Rangoon Sea

Me
– –
Hyderabad Vishakhapatnam

ko
ng
THAILAND VIETNAM Quezon City 15˚N
Bangkok Manila
Bangalore Chennai (Madras) CAMBODIA PHILIPPINES G UA M
Phnom Penh
Coimbatore Tiruchchirappalli O c e a n Marshall
Cochin Madurai Ho Chi Minh City Islands

Davao
SRI Bandar Seri
Colombo Begawan
PA L A U
LANKA BRUNEI MICRONESIA
Medan Kuala Lumpur
M A L AY S I A
I n d i a n Singapore
Gilbert 0˚
Islands

O c e a n Palembang
N E W G U I N E A
Ujungpandang SOLOMON
Jakarta I N D O N E S I A PA P U A
Semarang ISLANDS
Bandung NEW
Surabaya Dili
GUINEA
EAST TIMOR Port Moresby Honiara
135˚E
0 1000 miles
120˚E 15˚S
0 1000 km
60˚E 75˚E 90˚E 105˚E 150˚E 165˚E

xxv
xxvi
A U S T R A L I A A N D O C E A N I A
J a v a S e a Bougainville
Aru PA P U A N E W S O L O M O N
New Britain
GUINEA I S L A N D S
S o l o m o n S e a
N E W G U I N E A
A r a f u r a S e a Torres Str. Port Honiara
Moresby Guadalcanal
10˚S 10˚S
T i m o r S e a

Darwin Gulf G r e a t
Arnhem Land
of
I n d i a n Carpentaria
New Hebrides

Wellesley B a r r i e r
F I G I
Islands C o r a l S e a V A N U A T U Vanua
O c e a n Kimberley
Levu
Plateau
R e e f Efate I. Viti
King Leopold Levu
Port-vila Suva
Range

M
Great

ac
Tanami

d
Great Sandy on
20˚S Desert ne Loyalty 20˚S
Desert ll Islands

Div
Ra N E W
nge
Ha s C A L E D O N I A

idi
mm

n
(France) Nouméa
Tr o p i c o f

g
Ra ersle
ng
e y Capricorn
23.5˚S Simpson 23.5˚S
Fraser

Ra
Gibson Desert Great Artesian
Mu Desert Basin

ng
sgr

e
ave
Range
P a c i f i c
A U S T R A L I A Brisbane Norfolk
Island
Great Victoria Desert
Kingston O c e a n

Da
r

r
ive
gR

lin
30˚S n 30˚S
ge

Nullarbor Plain Darli

gR
an

an
Perth
R

ge
e r
G r e a t Riv
l an
ng

er ch
i

A u s t r a l i a n B i g h t Murray Riv La Sydney

id

Adelaide
iv

Great Barrier
Murray River DCanberra Island
a t
Kangaroo Mt. Kosciuszko T a s m a n S e a
Island G re Auckland
Melbourne

North Island

40˚S 40˚S
Wellington

S o u t h e r n Tasmania
Hobart N E W
Z E A L A N D
O c e a n South Island

0 500 miles
Stewart
Island
0 500 km
120˚E 130˚E 140˚E 150˚E 160˚E 170˚E
Chapter 1
Politics and Knowledge

Learning Objectives
1.1 Define politics within a public context.
1.2 Analyze three types of political knowledge.
1.3 Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different sources of political
knowledge.
1.4 Identify techniques and approaches used to gain political knowledge and
assess whether they constitute a science.

Imagine you have a 13-year-old sister in eighth grade. She has quite the day at school:
The vice principal comes into her math class unexpectedly and asks her to bring her
backpack and accompany him to his office. In his office, she sees a planner, a knife,
a lighter, and some white pills on his desk. The vice principal lectures her about the
importance of telling the truth, then asks which of the items belong to her. She tells
him that she had lent the planner to another girl a few days earlier but that the other
items are not hers. The vice principal responds that the other girl had reported your
sister for giving her the pills, which students are not allowed to possess at school.
The vice principal asks if he can look through your sister’s backpack, and she
agrees. A female secretary enters the office and searches the backpack. Your sister is
then told to follow the secretary to the nurse’s office, where she is asked to remove her
jacket, socks, and shoes. She follows their directions. They next ask her to take off her
pants and shirt, and again she follows their directions. These clothes are searched, and
when nothing incriminating is found, they order your sister to stand up, pull her bra
away from her body and shake it, then pull her underwear loose and shake it. No pills
drop out when she complies. She is allowed to put her clothes back on and sits outside
the principal’s office for several hours. Finally, she is sent back to class.
What do you think of the events just described? Is this situation political? Do the
actions of the vice principal seem appropriate? What about the actions of the school’s
secretary and nurse? Did your sister do the right thing by complying with each of their
requests? Did she have a choice? What would you do in a similar situation?

1
2 Chapter 1

Stop and think about these

questions briefly before you con-
tinue reading. You will be asked
many such “reflection questions”
as you read this book. Your attempt
to answer them, either with a quick
note in the margin or at least a men-
tal note, will help you better grasp
your own understanding of issues
that are raised. As E. M. Forster
commented: “How do I know what
I think until I see what I say?”
So, what do you think about this
situation?
Of course, this did not hap-
Search me? Are there fundamental political issues when a school searches its pen to your little sister (if you
students? When is a search legal?
have one), but it did happen to
13-year-old Savana Redding of Safford, Arizona, in 2003. Here are some additional
facts in this case. This public school has a responsibility to ensure the safety and
health of all its students. The previous year, a student nearly died from drugs taken
without permission at the school. The school district has a zero-tolerance policy for
all drugs—no student is allowed to possess any drugs at school, whether over-the-
counter, prescription, or illegal. The vice principal acted on information from another
girl who reported that Savana had given her pills that day. It was not really a “strip
search” because Savana never took off her underwear. All of these considerations
seem to justify the actions that occurred.
However, there are valid points on the other side of the issue. The Fourth
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution seems to protect Savana from this kind of search
unless significant evidence indicates that something illegal is occurring (probable cause).
The vice principal’s actions were taken based on questionable information from another
girl who was already in trouble for possessing the pills. And the search occurred despite
Savana’s claim that she had no pills, without parental approval, and before any further
investigation of the situation was attempted. Then there is common sense: The pills are
merely extra-strength ibuprofen (pain killers). Is this really a legitimate reason for adults
in authority positions to force a 13-year-old girl to submit to a humiliating strip search?
Savana’s mother was outraged. With the assistance of a lawyer from the American
Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), she sued the school officials on the grounds that they had
subjected her daughter to an “unreasonable search.” Savana’s lawyer argued that, while
a search of her backpack might be reasonable, a strip search was not, given the flimsy
evidence of guilt and the minimal threat associated with ibuprofen. The school district’s
officials responded that the vice principal’s actions were justified and consistent with
numerous court cases that uphold the rights and responsibilities of schools to prevent
dangerous behavior among their students, including searches for drugs or weapons.
Initially, a judge in Tucson ruled in favor of the actions by the school officials;
however, on appeal, the circuit court reversed the decision by the narrowest of
 Politics and Knowledge 3

margins (6–5). The court concluded that the strip search of an eighth grader while
looking for prescription drugs was a violation of her constitutional rights, and it held
that the family could sue the school officials for damages. The school’s lawyers then
appealed the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. In 2009, the court majority (8–1) held
that the search of Savana was unconstitutional. The majority reasoned that the par-
ticular drugs suspected in this case were not sufficiently threatening to justify the
search. However, the court did not allow the family to sue school officials, leaving
open the question of how it might rule if school officials suspected a student of pos-
sessing something more dangerous than ibuprofen.

Toward a Definition of Politics

1.1 Define politics within a public context.
The first step in our journey toward a better understanding of the political world is to
establish what we mean by politics. The Savana Redding search captures some of the
crucial themes related to politics:

Politics is the competition among individuals and groups pursuing their own
interests.
Politics is the exercise of power and influence to allocate things that are valued.
Politics is the determination of who gets what, when, and how.
Politics is the resolution of conflict.

All of these definitions share the central idea that politics is the process through
which power and influence are used in the promotion of certain values and interests. (The
bold type indicates a Key Concept; these terms are listed at the end of the chapter and
are included in the Glossary beginning on page 461.) Competing values and interests
are clearly at the heart of the search of Savana Redding. The values that guide a zero-
tolerance policy regarding drugs at the school are balanced against values that protect
a student against an illegal search. Other groups might have a stake in this conflict, as
did the ACLU, which intervened to promote its views about individual liberty, and the
courts, which asserted their responsibility to interpret the laws.
As individuals, groups, and governmental actors make decisions about what is
good or bad for society, and as they try to implement their decisions, politics occurs.
Every individual holds an array of preferred values and interests, and that individual
cares more about some of those values than others. What values is each individual will-
ing to promote or yield on? If the values of different individuals come into conflict,
whose values and rights should prevail? And, if people cannot work out their conflict-
ing values privately through discussion and compromise, must the government inter-
vene? How does the government exercise its power to resolve the conflict? Who benefits
and who is burdened by the policies of government? These are all political questions.
For our purposes, politics is associated with those aspects of life that have pub-
lic significance. Other aspects of life, in contrast, are understood to be private and
thus are beyond the domain of politics. However, what is considered “private” in
4 Chapter 1

one country may be considered “public” in another. It is relevant that the search of
Savana occurred in the United States. There are many other countries (e.g., Cuba,
Iran, Zimbabwe) where the kind of search conducted on Savana would be well
within the standard practices of government authorities and few, if any, citizens
would publicly challenge the action.
In the political context of the United States, the school board—a political body
elected by the citizens—has the right to establish policies regarding which behaviors
will be unacceptable by the students (e.g., possessing drugs, using profane language)
and by its employees (e.g., using corporal punishment, teaching creation science).
The vice principal, as a public employee, exercises power when he implements those
policies. The courts—another political institution—are active in the case as its judges,
also public employees, attempt to resolve the conflict in values and interests between
Savana’s family and the school’s employees. The court’s judgments are based on inter-
pretations of politically created rules, including the U.S. Constitution, which ensures
each citizen of certain rights but also grants government certain powers.
Even your choice about the job you take, the religion you practice, or what you
read on the Internet can be either a private choice or one within the public domain.
Can you see why a government might conclude that each of these choices has public
significance and is thus political? Within each country, there is a constant debate about
the appropriate areas for governmental action and the domains of life that should
remain private and unrestrained by political action. Sometimes the term politics is used
even more broadly than in this book to refer to competition over values in domains
that are not truly public, such as the “politics of the family” or “office politics.”
In almost every contemporary society, the domains that are subject to politics are
very large. Politics, usually via government, determines how much education you
must have and what its content will be. Politics establishes the words you cannot utter
in a public place, how much of your hard-earned income you must give to govern-
ment, and how various governments spend that money to provide different groups
with a vast range of benefits (e.g., education, roads, fire protection, subsidized health
care, safe food, national defense, and aid to another country). Politics determines
whether you are allowed to use a certain drug; the amount of pollutants that your
car can emit; how secure you feel against violence by others within your neighbor-
hood and within the global system; and whether you receive unequal treatment in the
allocation of benefits because of your ethnicity, gender, ideology, or some other factor.

On Political Knowledge
1.2 Analyze three types of political knowledge.

Types of Political Knowledge

Clearly, politics can affect your life in many ways. Yet people differ greatly in their
understandings about the nature of politics, the uses of political power, and the
distribution of political benefits and burdens. If you have discussed politics with
 Politics and Knowledge 5

your friends, you probably have noticed that they differ, both in how much they
know about politics and in their opinions about what constitute good and bad polit-
ical actions. Your understandings about politics and your decisions about whether
to undertake specific political actions are grounded in your knowledge of politics.
Every individual’s understanding of politics is composed of three general types of
political knowledge: (1) descriptions of political facts; (2) explanations of how and
why politics occurs as it does; and (3) prescriptions of what should happen in the
political world.

Description
Many bits of political knowledge offer a description, which focuses on what ques-
tions and is usually based on one or more “facts.” (The bold and italic type indi-
cates a Key Concept; these terms are listed at the end of the chapter but are not in
the Glossary at the back of the book.) Descriptive political knowledge is mostly
composed of relatively straightforward political facts such as these:

The date Hosni Mubarak resigned as President of Egypt: February 11, 2011
The number of states in Nigeria: 36
The country with the highest GDP (gross domestic product) per capita (PPP) in
the world in 2014: Qatar at $102,100

But on many questions about the political world, there are no indisputable answers.
On some questions, it is difficult to get precise information. Suppose you want to know
which countries have operational nuclear weapons. Six countries acknowledge having
operational nuclear devices: France, India, Pakistan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. However, the precise number of such weapons in each country is a
state secret. China clearly has nuclear weapons but claims that none are operational.
Experts conclude that Israel has nuclear weapons, although Israel does not confirm
this. North Korea claims to have operational nuclear weapons, but there is no pub-
licly available evidence about this capability, and Iran is suspected of having a secret
nuclear weapons program. Twenty other countries, including Algeria, Argentina,
Belarus, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Libya, South Africa, and Ukraine, are “potential prolifera-
tors” that had or were close to having nuclear weapons but are now assumed to have
backed away from nuclear ambitions (Federation of American Scientists 2014). Thus,
even the experts cannot reach consensus on the straightforward issue of which coun-
tries belong to the so-called nuclear club.
On other questions about politics, description requires assessments that raise
complicated issues about power, interests, and values, making it difficult to reach
agreement about the facts. Here are two examples:

Do nonwhites and whites in the United States experience equal treatment before
the law?
Can a country legally invade another country that has not used military force
against it?
6 Chapter 1

This discussion on “Description” briefly refers to 21 countries on five continents.

Do you have a clear sense of where they are? There will be detailed discussions of
many countries in this book. Knowing the location of a country and its geographic
relationship to other countries in its region is sometimes extremely important for
understanding its political choices and actions. When a country is discussed and you
are not sure where it is, you are strongly encouraged to locate the country on a map.
For this purpose, a set of maps is included in this book. Several recent studies have
shown that students in the United States are more ignorant of world geography than
students in most other countries. If that applies to you, help change the situation by
referring frequently to the maps.

Explanation
A lot of political knowledge is more complicated than just description because it is in
the form of explanation, which attempts to specify why something happens and to provide
the reason or process by which the phenomenon occurs.
Why is one in seven people “poor” in the wealthy United States? What causes a
country (e.g., Zimbabwe) to have inflation higher than 10,000 percent in a single year?
Why does a popular uprising rapidly overthrow the government in one country (e.g.,
Tunisia) but not in another (e.g., its neighbor, Syria)? Responses to these kinds of ques-
tions require explanation, not just descriptive facts. Such questions can be among the
most fascinating in politics, but adequate explanation is often difficult because patterns
of cause and effect can be extremely complex.

Prescription
Statements about politics often include claims or assumptions that certain choices and
actions are more desirable than others. These represent a third form of political knowl-
edge: prescription. A prescription is a value judgment that indicates what should occur
and should be done. Thus, a prescription deals with answers to questions about what
ought to be, not merely description and explanation of what is.
For example, there are many possible prescriptive responses to this question:
What should be the government’s role in the provision of health care? Answers vary
from the viewpoint that government should take absolutely no action that interferes
with the private provision of health care to the viewpoint that government should
meet the full range of health care needs at no direct cost to patients. You can probably
think of many positions between these two extremes.
The prescriptive position that you select on a political issue is an element of your
normative political knowledge—your value judgments. Notice that normative political
knowledge combines three types of understanding: (1) your descriptive knowledge of
certain facts (e.g., the alternative ways that health care could be provided in a particu-
lar society); (2) your explanatory knowledge about why certain outcomes occur (e.g.,
the reasons why people don’t receive equal health care); and most important, (3) your
priorities among competing values (e.g., your preferences regarding equality, lower
taxes, and limited government).
 Politics and Knowledge 7

Throughout this book, you will be encouraged to clarify your own understand-
ings about politics. You will be offered a variety of descriptive, explanatory, and
prescriptive knowledge claims. It is hoped that as you absorb more of this informa-
tion, you will become more knowledgeable about politics! Let’s explore some of your
views about politics by means of a thought experiment we term “the acid test”.
Assume you were born 20 years ago in either the country of Gamma or the coun-
try of Delta. You do not know about your personal situation: whether you are male or
female; your ethnicity, education level, and social class; your parents’ wealth; whether
you reside in a city or a rural area; your religion; your mental or physical skills; and so
on. Table 1.1 provides a variety of indicators of some current conditions in Gamma and
Delta with regard to each country’s prosperity, security, and stability. Here is the “acid
test” question: Now that you know the current conditions in Gamma and Delta, into which
country would you prefer to have been born 20 years ago? The Compare in 1 (there will be
a Compare box in each chapter) considers some of the issues regarding this acid test.
Make your choice from the data in Table 1.1 before you read the Compare in 1!

Table 1.1 The Acid Test I

Gamma Delta
Governmental type Nondemocracy Liberal democracy
Democracy index (148 countries) 142nd 38th
Political rights (1–7; 1 = most extensive) 7 (very low) 2 (high)
Civil liberties (1–7; 1 = most extensive) 6 (low) 3 (moderately high)
Press freedom (among 194 countries) 181st: Not free 72nd: Partly free
Economic freedom (among 177 countries) 136th: Partly free 119th: Partly free
Government restrictions on religion Very high Low
Social hostilities involving religion High Very high
% women in national legislature 21% 11%
Gender Equality (186 countries) 35th 132nd
Political stability High Medium
Rate of crimes against the person Low Medium
Life expectancy 74 years 66 years
Literacy rate (adults) 94% 63%
Infant mortality/1,000 16 48
% population with access to essential drugs 85% 35%
Internet users/100 28.8 5.0
% below the national poverty line 2.8% 22.9%
Unemployment rate 6.5% 8.5%
Wealth (GDP: gross domestic product) per capita $9,300 $3,800
GDP per capita annual growth: 2000–2012 10.6% 7.7%
Inflation rate 2.3% 9.3%
Public debt as % of GDP 31.7% 49.6%
8 Chapter 1

Compare in 1
The Acid Test I
As you examined the indicators in Table 1.1, you was very dominant. Eventually, both experiments
perhaps noticed significant differences between evolved in India as the economy shifted much more
Gamma and Delta. The economic prosperity (indi- to private firms and the political system became
cated by measures such as the country’s wealth per more competitive with multiple parties.
capita and its economic growth rate) is noticeably Some results of these two different approaches
higher in one country. The probability you would be to government and policy are reflected in the mea-
poor, uneducated, and live a shorter life is higher sures in Table 1.1. The strong commitment under Mao
in one country. Your likely freedom of action, in to egalitarianism and providing benefits to all citizens
domains such as politics, religion, and access to led to public policies that reduced inequalities based
information, varies considerably. There also seem to on gender and social class with broad improvements
be differences in gender equality between the two in literacy and health for most of the population. The
countries. What differences are most striking to you? Indian government did not provide extensive poli-
The acid test asks you to decide, after consid- cies to address inequalities based on caste, gender,
ering all the data provided about Gamma and Delta, and urban–rural differences; thus, these inequalities
into which country you would prefer to be born. have lessened much more slowly in India, resulting in
Which one did you choose? continued disparities in domains such as literacy and
Gamma and Delta are pseudonyms for two real health. China has sustained remarkable levels of eco-
countries, and the data are recent. Both countries nomic growth for several decades as it has become
have a variety of broad similarities—population, cli- a global power, while India’s growth has been more
mate variability, social history, period of time since sporadic but high since 2000. India proudly pro-
independence, violent interactions with neighboring claims itself the “world’s largest democracy” with
countries, and so on. These are arguably the two a rough-and-tumble political system characterized
most important countries in the developing world. by broad political rights, a relatively free media, a
Each country has a rich history, including a remark- professional apolitical military, and an independent
able ancient culture; extensive colonial exploitation; judiciary. In contrast, China’s leadership continues
a fickle climate; deep social cleavages, especially to use a combination of state military and security
those based on religion, gender, and class/caste; forces, political socialization, severe censorship, and
and each has more than 1 billion people. rewards to those who conform to sustain its oppres-
However, since the independence of India in sive Communist Party domination of political and
1947 and the communist victory in China in 1949, social life.
the two countries have followed very different Despite many similarities in their resources and
paths. Under the long and tumultuous rule of Mao history, China and India have significantly different
Zedong (in power from 1949–1976), China (Gamma) current profiles. While many explanations can be
attempted to implement a pervasive system of com- offered for these differences, it is reasonable to claim
munism with a command political economy and that the most powerful explanation is politics—the
totalitarian one-party government. The Chinese decisions and actions taken by those with political
leadership after Mao engaged in a steady introduc- power and authority in each country. As you develop
tion of market economics, transforming China into your understandings of politics in this book, some of
a global economic power while still retaining tight the key points underlying this acid test will be per-
Communist Party rule over the government. Initially, sistent themes.
India (Delta) attempted to implement strong govern- First, a people and its government can pursue
ment control of key sectors of the economy, and it numerous desirable goals. While every country (and
introduced democratic politics, although one party you) might like to have very positive scores on every
 Politics and Knowledge 9

indicator in Table 1.1, you will discover that the reality mixes of approaches and values that are part of the
is starker: Most countries cannot have it all. Various debate about how government can help individuals
trade-offs must be made due to limited resources, and societies pursue a variety of desirable life con-
the incapacity of people and their institutions to con- ditions such as security, prosperity, stability, free-
trol their environment fully, and other factors related dom, equality, justice, democracy, and well-being.
to human failures and impacts of the global system. Disagreements about ends and means are at the
Second, the acid test challenges you to decide heart of politics in every country.
what aspects of political, social, economic, and
personal life are more important to you. The book
Further Questions
will assist you in clarifying your own thinking about
1. Which broad value seemed to most influence
what you value and what role you think government
your choice between Gamma and Delta?
should play in helping you achieve those values.
And third, your choices and your values will not 2. Did your knowledge of the identities of Gamma
be the same as everyone else’s—even among your and Delta change your evaluation at all?
peers and certainly among people around the globe. 3. What assessment(s) might cause another person
You will gain greater awareness of the different to select the country that you did not select?

Sources of Political Knowledge

1.3 Evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of different sources of political
knowledge.
This chapter has already made many knowledge claims—statements about what is
accurate or correct. Table 1.1 and the Compare in 1 are loaded with such claims. When
you are confronted by such claims, how do you decide what you know and what you
believe? That is, where does your political knowledge—your unique combination of
descriptive facts, explanations, and prescriptions about politics—come from? This sec-
tion describes three important sources of your knowledge: (1) authority; (2) personal
thought; and (3) science.

Authority
The method of authority involves the appeal to any document, tradition, or person believed
to possess the controlling explanation regarding a particular issue. Knowledge about politics
can be based on three kinds of authority sources: (1) a specific authority; (2) a general
authority; or (3) “everyone.”

SpEcific Authority SourcES A particular individual (but few others) might

place great confidence in the knowledge he derives about politics from a specific
authority source such as a parent, teacher, friend, or famous person. Young people
and those minimally interested in politics are especially likely to rely on specific
authorities for much of their political knowledge. Chapter 4 will argue that
specific authority sources powerfully influence some important political beliefs
of most individuals. Can you think of a significant piece of your own political
10 Chapter 1

knowledge that you derived primarily from a parent, an influential teacher, or a

public figure you admire?

GEnErAl Authority SourcES A general authority source is one that has

substantial influence on a large proportion of people in a society. Examples include
constitutions, revered leaders, widely respected media or books, and religious teach-
ings. General authorities are especially evident as a basis for normative political
knowledge. Consider, for example, the issue of the role of women in politics. While
this can be a descriptive issue, how do we determine the normative question of what
the role of women should be? In some societies, there is disagreement about this ques-
tion, and many look to an authority source to provide the answer.

• In the United States, the crucial source of authority for such questions is a legal
document—the Constitution. Despite the claim that “all men . . . are endowed by
their creator with certain inalienable rights . . . ” not every citizen was allowed to
vote in 1787. Indeed, women were not granted this fundamental political right
until the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution in 1920—130 years into the
American Republic. Advocates of women’s rights argue that women still do not
have full and equal political rights and proposed another constitutional amend-
ment, the Equal Rights Amendment; but it was never ratified by the 38 states
necessary for its passage.
• In Iran, the key source of authority on wom-
en’s political rights is also a document, but it
is a religious document, the Koran. During the
political regime of Shah Reza Pahlavi (1941–
1979), women were encouraged to participate
much more fully in politics than what Iran’s
religious conservatives thought was consistent
with the Koran. When the Ayatollah Khomeini
(in power 1979–1989) replaced the shah, he
insisted on a strict interpretation of the Koran
that significantly limited the political roles of
women. The political rights and activities of
Iranian women remain a contentious issue be-
tween those who advocate an expanded role
and those, like the current top leader Ayatollah
Khamenei, who insist on enforcing a more
conservative interpretation of the Koran.
• In contemporary China, the political rights of
women were established by the authoritative
pronouncements of a person, Mao Zedong (in
power 1949–1976). Prior to the revolution of
My Little Red Book: Young girls recite and memorize say-
ings from Chairman Mao Zedong during China’s Cultural 1949, the role of women in China was defined
Revolution (circa 1968). by the traditions of Confucianism. Most
 Politics and Knowledge 11

women were essentially the property of men, and they had few political rights.
As part of Chairman Mao’s efforts to transform Confucian tradition, he granted
women full equality under the law, and women were encouraged to participate
actively in all aspects of political life. (The conflict between Mao’s views and those
of Confucianism are explored further in the Focus in 4.)

“EvEryonE” AS Authority Sometimes we are convinced that something is true

because it is a belief strongly held by many other people. If almost everyone (i.e., the
reference group to which you look for information and knowledge) seems to agree on
a “fact” about politics, there is little reason for you to disagree with or challenge that
fact. One reason to place confidence in a belief that is strongly held by many people is
the assumption that it is unlikely so many people could be incorrect. Such knowledge
has stood the test of time because it could have been challenged and repudiated in the
marketplace of ideas. For example, you will probably find that almost everyone you
know agrees that political terrorism is bad.

problEmS with Authority AS A SourcE of KnowlEDGE There are fun-

damental problems with using authority as a way of knowing. This should be most
obvious with specific authorities. You might think that your parent or best teacher or
favorite celebrity has the correct view on an important political issue, but few of the
other 7.2 billion people in the world have any confidence in this source of your politi-
cal knowledge.
And even though “everyone knows that X is true,” there is no guarantee that
everyone is correct. First, as “Honest Abe” Lincoln observed, you can fool all of the
people some of the time. Indeed, a political belief that is widely held might be par-
ticularly immune to careful assessment. Experiments in psychology have revealed
that some of a person’s beliefs can be altered by the beliefs of others. For example, if a
subject hears several respondents (collaborating with the experimenter) all give iden-
tical wrong answers to a question, the subject can usually be persuaded to change
his mind about what he knows—even when he is correct. Second, “everyone” often
consists mainly of people whose cultural background we share. If you reexamine the
above example about terrorism with a different “everyone,” it is unlikely that almost
everyone living under an oppressive political regime believes that political terrorism
is bad. It is common for citizens in most political systems to believe that the citizens
of rival political systems have been brainwashed. We know that some beliefs of our
rivals are incorrect. Isn’t it likely that they are equally convinced that some of our
strongly held beliefs are wrong?
There are even problems with general authorities. Sometimes even the most com-
petent general authorities might not have access to crucial information or might rely
on inaccurate data, as when they list the countries with nuclear weapons. And some-
times, despite a group’s acceptance of a single authority, there are still ambiguities and
problems of interpretation.
Consider again the normative issue of the political role of women. In interpreting
gender equality, all branches of government in the United States continually debate and
interpret the rather limited framework outlined in the Constitution. The appropriate
12 Chapter 1

role of women in Iran’s politics

remains a highly contested issue,
despite the Koran. Indeed, there
is considerable difference of opin-
ion within the broader Muslim
world regarding how to inter-
pret the Koran’s authoritative
prescriptions regarding women’s
roles in political life. In some
Muslim countries, such as Saudi
Arabia and Sudan, women’s
roles are greatly restricted. Yet
Bangladesh, Indonesia, Pakistan,
and Turkey are Muslim-majority
countries that recently selected
Powerful women: A chat between former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton female heads of government
and Supreme Court Justices Elena Kagan (right) and Sonia Sotomayor (center),
(prime ministers). And in China,
who are among those with key roles in defining the evolving role of women in
American politics. Mao Zedong’s pronouncements
on many topics, especially on economic matters, are now rejected by the leadership,
even as his general views about gender equality remain a key authority source.
In short, it is common, and perhaps inevitable, for authority sources to offer incon-
sistent or conflicting knowledge claims about the political world. It is extremely difficult
to differentiate among alternative authorities or even to establish widespread agree-
ment on precisely what political knowledge a particular authority source provides.

Personal Thought
Have you ever insisted that some fact is correct because it seemed so obvious to you?
It is possible to feel confident that you know something on the basis of personal
thought—your own reason, feelings, or experiences. This second source of knowledge
does not rely on outside authorities; rather, it assumes that the individual can use his
own rationality, intuition, or personal experience to assess a knowledge claim.

rAtionAlity On occasion, you probably have decided that a certain claim is true
because it is logical or obvious—it “just makes sense.” The available information fits
together in a coherent framework that, it seems, would lead to agreement among all
people who think clearly. Or it is assumed that the knowledge claim is verified because
it is self-evident to reasonable people and needs no further justification. For example,
the Preamble to the U.S. Declaration of Independence claims that there are “self-evi-
dent” truths—that all men are created equal and that they have inalienable rights to
life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

intuition Another form of personal thought is intuition. Here, one’s knowledge

is based on feeling, on a sense of understanding or empathy, rather than on reason.
You have probably been convinced that something is correct because it feels right. For
 Politics and Knowledge 13

example, the key slogan of Barry Goldwater, the Republican presidential candidate in
1964, was an explicit appeal to intuition: “In your heart, you know he’s right!” And
Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign incantation “Change we can believe in!” was essen-
tially an appeal to feeling and hope.

pErSonAl ExpEriEncE You can also be convinced that something is true because
of your personal experiences. For example, you might be convinced that govern-
ment bureaucracies are inefficient because a specific agency handled your inquiries
so ineptly. Or you might believe that different ethnic groups can live together in
harmony based on your own positive experience in a multiethnic setting. Personal
involvement in a dramatic event, such as witnessing a handgun murder or being
physically harassed by the police, can have a particularly powerful impact on one’s
political beliefs.

problEmS with pErSonAl thouGht AS A SourcE of KnowlEDGE There

is a major problem with all three forms of personal thought as a source of knowl-
edge: There is no method for resolving “thoughtful” differences of opinion among
individuals. This is most obvious with personal experience: Because people have dif-
ferent personal experiences, they are unlikely to reach the same conclusions about
what is true. Similarly, there is no reason to assume that different people will share
the same intuitive feelings regarding what is true. Goldwater’s poor electoral show-
ing (he received only 39 percent of the vote) suggests that many people concluded
(intuitively?) that he was not right, or perhaps they decided (rationally?) that he was
too far right—too conservative ideologically. And, after a few years of Washington’s
rough-and-tumble politics, many of Obama’s supporters had lost confidence in
“change you can believe in.”
Even rational thought will not necessarily enable people to agree on political facts.
We do not all employ the same logic, and it is rare to find a knowledge claim that
everyone agrees is obviously correct. Consider again the key knowledge claim cited
earlier: “We hold these truths to be self-evident—that all men are created equal.” This
seems a clear appeal to rationality, a political fact that is self-evident to all thinking
people. But what exactly does this claim mean? Do all men have equal physical or men-
tal traits at birth? Do they grow up with equal opportunities? Are they equal before
the law, regardless of the quality of legal help they can purchase? We have noted the
historical disagreement about how women’s equality is to be interpreted. Many legal
and political struggles in the United States during the more than two centuries since
this “self-evident” truth was proclaimed have concerned precisely what equal rights
are assured to every person in the U.S. political system, with particular regard to race,
gender, and age.

Science
In contrast to the two other sources of knowledge, science uses explicit methods that
attempt to enable different people to agree about what they know. The goal of any
14 Chapter 1

science is to describe and explain—to answer what, why, and how questions. There are
four essential characteristics of the scientific method:

1. Science is empirical in the sense that it is concerned with phenomena that can be
observed or at least measured.
2. Science entails a search for regularities in the relationships among phenomena.
3. Science is cumulative because it tentatively accepts previously established knowl-
edge on a subject as the foundation for development of further knowledge. One
can challenge existing knowledge, but it is not necessary to reestablish the knowl-
edge base every time.
4. The method of science is testable. Its practitioners, scientists, specify the assump-
tions, data, analytic techniques, and inference patterns that support their
knowledge claim. Other scientists look for some analysis or evidence that would
invalidate (falsify) the claim. They evaluate all aspects of the claim and can repeat
the analysis to ensure that the claim should be part of the accumulated knowledge.

These four characteristics are supposed to give the scientific method some major
advantages over the methods of authority and personal thought in determining
whether we can agree on a knowledge claim. This can be helpful because you are sur-
rounded by competing claims regarding the political world. There are many sources
of statements about politics—family, friends, television, books, newspapers, teachers,
politicians. When you hear or read any claim about politics, you might take one of the
following actions:

Ignore it.
Accept that it is correct.
Reject it.
Try to assess it.

If you decide to assess it, you would probably ask questions such as: Is it based on
accurate information? Is it consistent with other things I know about politics? Does
it influence any political actions I might take? When you begin to ask assessment
questions, and especially when you try to answer them, you are engaged in politi-
cal analysis. At its core, political analysis is the attempt to describe (to answer the what
questions) and then to explain politics (to answer the why and how questions). This book
attempts to enhance your ability to engage in political analysis—to answer the what,
why, and how questions about politics.

Political Science
1.4 identify techniques and approaches used to gain political knowledge and
assess whether they constitute a science.
Political science is one approach to political analysis. As you will discover in reading
this book, political science applies a set of techniques, concepts, and approaches whose
objective is to increase the clarity and accuracy of our understandings about the political world.
 Politics and Knowledge 15

That is, it is an attempt to apply the logic of the scientific method to political analysis.
You will learn how some political scientists try to think systematically about political
phenomena to describe “political reality” and to explain how politics works. You will
also be introduced to some of the findings about politics that have emerged from the
work of political scientists and other social scientists.

Doing Comparative Analysis

Aristotle observed: All thinking begins in comparison. This book is called “a compara-
tive introduction to political science” because it emphasizes how to utilize comparative
thinking to enhance our understanding of politics. Comparisons will guide many of
the discussions throughout the book, and each chapter will also have a specific feature
called “Compare in…” to illuminate the comparative method in action. You were intro-
duced to some aspects of the comparative method in the “acid test” that was the focus
of the Compare in 1.

Political Science and Political Knowledge

Not everyone agrees that it is appropriate and desirable to apply the scientific method
to politics. Some insist that a “real” science must utilize strong applications of the four
elements set out in Thomas Kuhn’s book The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1996): (1)
central concepts, which identify and name crucial phenomena (specifically, such as “the Iraq
War,” or generally, such as “war”); (2) theories, which are sets of systematically related
generalizations that provide explanations and predictions about the linkages between certain con-
cepts (in the form “If A, then B under conditions C and D”); (3) rules of interpretation,
which indicate the methods that will establish whether the explanations and predictions
posited by the theory are right or wrong; and (4) a list of questions or issues that are
worth solving within the area of inquiry.
Few would claim that political science is fully developed on any of these four ele-
ments. Thus, is it possible to engage in political science? Each chapter in this book will
offer you a debate about an issue relevant to the attempt to understand the political
world. Where better to start than with the Debate in 1: Is political science possible?
The discussion about the value of political science raises important questions that
you should assess throughout this book. In general, this book will make the case that,
despite the complexity of politics, generalizations are possible—each political phe-
nomenon is not unique. If political science means the attempt to apply the scientific
method to understand the political world better, it seems desirable to use such sys-
tematic and analytic thinking. And, if we are to share any knowledge about the politi-
cal world, we need methods to reach some interpersonal agreement about political
facts. Although political science lacks precise concepts and theories, it does enable
us to develop better concepts, improved methods, and sounder generalizations, and
thereby it makes the study of the political world an exciting intellectual challenge.
This book assumes that understanding politics is extremely important. As Austrian
philosopher of science Karl Popper (1963: 227) suggests, “We must not expect too
much from reason; argument rarely settles a [political] question, although it is the only
16 Chapter 1

means for learning—not to see clearly, but to see more clearly than before.” In the face
of fundamental value conflicts and the potential for massive political violence among
individuals, groups, and countries, enhanced political knowledge might reduce our
misunderstandings and misconceptions. It can also be the grounds for greater toler-
ance and wiser value judgments about normative political issues. Enhancing what we
know about politics and what we value should make us more effective in knowing how
to behave politically—as voters, political activists, and political decision makers. The
study of the political world is of crucial importance to the creation of humane social
life. Ultimately it is up to you, as you read this book, to decide what can be known
about politics and whether you think political science is feasible.

The Debate in 1
Is Political Science Possible?
Science and Politics Do Not Go Together Well the research communities of every natural and
applied science. In contrast, researchers in polit-
• The analysis of politics cannot be objective and
ical science (and other social sciences) have not
unbiased in the way assumed by the scientific
agreed on a coherent set of concepts, theories,
method. The issues chosen for study and the
and rules of interpretation. As you will discover
manner in which variables are defined, mea-
throughout this book, many different methods
sured, and analyzed are all powerfully influenced
are used in political science. There is disagree-
by the analyst’s social reality (e.g., by the ana-
ment regarding the important issues that ought
lyst’s own culture, ideas, and life experiences).
to be solved, little consensus on what theories
In this view, no person—whether Sunni Muslim
or generalizations have been proven, and even
or agnostic, rural Nigerian or cosmopolitan
great difficulty in operationalizing key concepts
Parisian, international lawyer or migrant farm
such as power or democracy.
worker—can be totally objective and unbiased in
the way he tries to analyze political phenomena. • The “scientific” study of politics cannot ade-
quately address the most crucial questions
• The subject matter of politics defies generaliza-
about politics, which are normative. Since the
tion. The political world is far too complex and
time of Aristotle (384–322 b.c.e.), classical politi-
unpredictable for systematic generalizations.
cal theorists have insisted that the ultimate aim
Politics is based on the actions and interactions
of political analysis is to discover “the highest
of many individuals, groups, and even countries.
good attainable by action.” In this view, political
Politics occurs in the midst of many changing
analysis is a noble endeavor because it helps
conditions that can influence those actions. The
determine what government and individuals
range of variation in what people might do and
should do so that valued goals (e.g., democratic
in the conditions that might exist is so vast that
politics, a good life, a just society) can be
clear “if A, then B” statements about politics are
achieved. Max Weber (1864–1920), the influen-
impossible.
tial German social scientist, approvingly quoted
• Political science is not a “real” science, in com- Russian novelist Leo Tolstoy’s assertion that
parison to natural and applied sciences (e.g., science can provide no answer to the essential
chemistry, physics, engineering). The four key question, “What shall we do, and how shall we
elements described by Kuhn (as listed above) arrange our lives?” (1958a: 152–153).
are well developed and widely shared within
 Politics and Knowledge 17

Political Science Is Possible and Worthwhile • Although some sciences come closer to Kuhn’s
ideal than others, no science is pure. Scholars
• Every person, including those who study politics,
who study the way in which a scientific commu-
has biases. But the scientific method encour-
nity operates conclude that every scientific dis-
ages individuals to be very aware of their biases
cipline can be characterized by disagreements
and to counteract those biases by making their
over concepts, methods, and theories and that
assumptions as transparent as possible. The
the theories of every science include subjec-
method of science requires the analyst to be
tive elements. It is certainly true that political
extremely clear in describing his assumptions, in
science is less scientifically pure than astron-
characterizing how evidence is gathered, in dis-
omy or chemistry, but this does not negate the
playing the techniques used to analyze the data,
value of applying the scientific method to make
and in exploring threats to the validity of the
our thinking more precise and our knowledge
knowledge claims that are made. This transpar-
claims more transparent, testable, and reliable.
ency limits bias and exposes the analyst’s think-
ing to scrutiny. (As authors, we have attempted • Even those who use the scientific method to
to be aware of our own biases—as Americans, study politics do not assume it can provide a
men, baby boomers, etc.—that influence every compelling answer to every important norma-
aspect of this book. As you read, try to become tive question. However, if it does provide more
more conscious of your biases, which will affect reliable knowledge, it enhances our capacity to
your assessments of claims about the political reason about the questions of what should be
world.) done. Whether at the individual level or at the
national government level, decisions about what
• While the political world is complex, few events
actions should be taken in the political world will
are truly random—there are patterns and link-
be improved if they are informed by empirical
ages among political phenomena. The chal-
evidence and sound knowledge claims that are
lenge for the political scientist is to specify
based on the scientific method.
these patterns. Rather than assuming that all is
chaos and nothing is related, the political sci-
entist assumes that, by employing systematic
More questions…
techniques of gathering and analyzing empiri- 1. Can you identify any of your own biases about
cal data, it is possible to present knowledge political issues? What might be the main
claims that help clarify that complex reality. sources of those biases?
Tendency statements—“if A, then a tendency to 2. Can you think of examples where you have
B”—might seem imperfect, but they can signifi- gained useful political knowledge from nonscien-
cantly increase our confidence regarding what tific sources such as literature, music, personal
we know to be true or untrue about politics. experience, or general authorities?

The Subfields of Political Science

Political science is composed of certain subfields that are usually defined by their spe-
cific subject matter rather than by their mode of analysis. While there are different
ways to categorize the subfields, four are prominent:

1. comparative politics. This subfield focuses on similarities and differences in political

processes and structures. As noted above, much of empirical political science is com-
parative. Thus, comparative politics covers a huge domain within political analy-
sis, and it has many sub-subfields (e.g., public administration, political parties,
18 Chapter 1

development, individual political behavior, and public policy). Comparison

might be crossnational (e.g., comparing the legal systems of Iran and Italy or com-
paring the voting patterns in 40 countries), or it might compare actors within a
single country (e.g., comparing the political beliefs about democracy among dif-
ferent religious groups in Nigeria).
2. American politics. To the rest of the world, the study of American politics is
merely a subfield of comparative politics. While this is quite sensible (and appro-
priate), American politics is treated as a separate subfield in the United States. In
terms of issues and approaches, American politics covers the same types of topics
as comparative politics.
3. international relations. The focus is on the political relations among countries, the
behavior of transnational actors, and the dynamics within the worldwide system of
states and groups. Subjects within international relations include war, interstate
conflict resolution, international law, globalization, neocolonialism, regional
alliances (e.g., the European Union), international organizations (e.g., the United
Nations), and transborder political organizations (e.g., Amnesty International).
The study of foreign policy is also within this subfield.
4. political theory. More precisely called political philosophy, this subfield focuses
on the ideas and debates dealing with important political questions. Some of this work
attempts to characterize and interpret the writings of major political theorists
(e.g., Plato, Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, John Rawls), whereas other work is origi-
nal explorations of the political questions themselves (e.g., What is the nature
of a just society? What is the appropriate relationship between the citizen and
the government?). Political theory is the source of many of the normative knowledge
claims made by political scientists. Much of the work in political theory is based on
the methods of rationality or authority or on an appeal to moral truths rather than
on the scientific method.

bounDAry-SpAnninG hybriDS Political science is an eclectic field that often links

with other fields of inquiry or at least borrows and adapts ideas from other disciplines.
Some work actually spans the boundary between political science and another disci-
pline. While the subject matter of this work fits within one of the preceding four major
subfields, these hybrids include political anthropology, political economy, political
psychology, political sociology, and biopolitics.

Where Is This Book Going?

Just as there are different approaches to political science, there are different ways to
introduce you to the political world. This book is organized to lead you along one
route to understanding. It uses a comparative approach; it builds from the politics
of the individual to the politics of countries and the international system and con-
cludes with chapters that bring all the topics together for each of three large groups
of countries. Fundamentally, the book aims to help you create an increasingly
 Politics and Knowledge 19

sophisticated analytic framework for the study and analysis of the political world
that surrounds you.
The book is organized in five parts, each with its own chapters. You have nearly
completed Part One, which offers an initial discussion of the nature of political knowl-
edge and the approach political scientists take to understanding, analyzing, and evalu-
ating that knowledge. Each chapter includes a Debate on a political topic, a Compare
analyzing two or more political actors, and a Focus on a chapter-relevant topic for a
single country. Since this chapter has focused on political knowledge, the Focus in 1
shows you how the scientific method has been applied to explore whether political
knowledge varies across age groups within the United States.
The remaining four parts of the book build from studying the individual in the
political world to analyzing countries in the global system. “Man is the measure of all
things,” observed ancient Greek philosopher Protagoras (ca. 490–421 b.c.e.). In that
spirit, Part Two begins its exploration of the political world at the most personal and
individual level. It initially examines what individual men and women think about
politics and how they act politically. After Part Two, the book moves on to the politics
of large collectivities of people that we call states and that are organized politically as
governments. Thus, Parts Three, Four, and Five offer perspectives and explanations
from political science regarding how states and governments are organized for politi-
cal action, how political processes occur, and how countries are attempting to fulfill
their political goals in the challenging conditions of the global system.
Part Two, “Political Behavior,” begins in Chapter 2 with an assessment of the kinds
of political beliefs that people hold and a description of normative political theories.
It continues in Chapter 3 with a consideration of the political actions that people and
groups undertake. Chapter 4 moves from description to explanation: Can we explain
why people think and act politically in certain ways?
Part Three, “Political Systems,” is about the politics of large numbers of people—
how the political world is organized and the structures of government. Chapters 5
through 8 address questions such as: What is a state? How are the political system
and the economic system linked? What features distinguish democracies from dictator-
ships? What are the responsibilities of political structures such as the judiciary or the
legislature?
Part Four, “Political Processes,” emphasizes the key dynamics of politics. Chapter 9
characterizes the public policy process and details three major explanations for how
political power is distributed and how policy decisions are made. Chapter 10 explores
the processes of political change and development. The vital issues of politics across
borders and the manner in which states and other transnational actors cooperate and
compete are central to Chapter 11. The various forms and causes of political violence
are analyzed in Chapter 12.
Part Five, “Politics among States,” focuses on the actions and challenges facing
countries in the contemporary political world. Chapters 13 through 15 consider countries
at different levels of development as they pursue the general goals of prosperity, secu-
rity, and stability in the complicated global system. Finally, the Appendix explains
20 Chapter 1

some major concepts in political science, including four important frameworks for
engaging in political analysis: taxonomic, formal, functional, and relational.
Our hope is that, by the time you complete reading and studying this text, you
will think more like a political scientist in the sense that you will have more confidence
in your knowledge about politics and you will have developed a more informed and systematic
approach to understanding the political world.

Focus in 1
The Political Knowledge of Different Age Groups in the United States
You might have heard the claim that younger adults Specifically, Pew examines people’s
are less knowledgeable about politics than older knowledge of the names of key political leaders
adults. The Pew Research Center for the People and and the central facts in current political issues.
the Press uses sophisticated social science methods While cross-national comparisons are interest-
to regularly assess what the people know about a ing, this analysis looks only at people in the
host of issues. To illustrate how the scientific method United States and only at a single point in time
is used to explore a political question, this Focus (2010). Another key concept in this research is
very briefly describes the steps the researchers uti- age. Pew uses a simple taxonomy of four age
lize as well as a few of their results and conclusions. groups among adults, as listed in Table 1.2. (If
you don’t know what a taxonomy is, consult the
1. Examine existing evidence that is relevant. discussion of this concept in the Appendix.)
Initially, you should look at existing research In any scientific research, you should con-
by political scientists or other social scientists sider whether there might be problems with the
that offers evidence and conclusions on the validity of the data. In this case, for example:
topic. Pew used the available research on age Was the set of individuals selected for study a
and political knowledge as the foundation for reasonable one? Were the questions well-con-
designing and conducting the study. structed, minimally biased, properly asked, and
2. With this background, state the issue in a pre- accurately recorded? Was sufficient data gath-
cise manner. This particular issue can be stated ered to explore the core question?
in the form of a hypothesis (i.e., a proposition 4. Gather appropriate data. You need a strategy
about a political fact): Younger people have less for collecting evidence that is valid (i.e., it mea-
political knowledge than older people. sures what it is supposed to measure) and reli-
3. Operationalize key concepts by specifying exactly able (i.e., it is accurate). You also decide what
what each concept means and how it will be mea- specific cases you are going to examine. In the
sured. In this study, operationalizing the concept empirical work by Pew, the data were collected
of political knowledge begins with the recognition from a U.S. national sample of 1001 adults,
that it could cover many things. Political knowl- selected randomly and interviewed by means
edge could be defined in terms of descriptive, of a telephone survey using numbers from
explanatory, and/or prescriptive information about both cell phones and landlines. Respondents
various aspects of politics such as policies, insti- were asked eleven multiple choice questions
tutions, events, or people. It could also include about their political knowledge and about cer-
how-to knowledge, such as how to vote or how to tain personal characteristics (including age).
circulate a petition. For simplicity, the Pew analysis You can take Pew’s most recent News IQ Quiz
focuses on a few descriptive political facts. at: http://www.pewresearch.org/politicalquiz/
 Politics and Knowledge 21

5. Analyze the evidence. The data in Table 1.2 age and political knowledge in the United States
simply report the percentage in each age group based on only these questions in a single study
who correctly answered the question. A more at one point in time? Defensible conclusions often
thorough analysis might use computer-based require extensive data, thorough analysis, and
statistical techniques to assess the explanatory consideration of several alternative explanations.
power of multiple variables, rather than just age, Sometimes the phenomena are so complicated or
or it might combine multiple responses into an the evidence is so mixed that no generalization is
index score of knowledge. possible. Any conclusion based only on Table 1.2
6. Decide what, if any, inferences and conclusions would be very tentative.
can be made about the issue on the basis of Other research on this topic contains more
your evidence. This is where your analytic skills extensive data analyses. For example, a book-length
become especially important. The Appendix study by Cliff Zukin and his colleagues (2006) ana-
in this book discusses some of statistical tech- lyzed a large database with sophisticated tech-
niques that can be utilized to help you judge niques. They concluded that there is a positive
whether the age-group differences in the data relationship between higher age and greater politi-
are greater than might be expected by chance. cal knowledge in the United States. Their study,
Without engaging in these statistical tests, what like most good research, attempts to address the
do you think from assessing Table 1.2? Do these deeper questions and the ultimate goal of the scien-
data indicate differences in political knowledge tific method, explanation and broader generalization
across the age groups? The data do seem to (theory). Does increased age cause increased politi-
suggest that the youngest group knows less cal knowledge? If so, why and how does this occur?
about most of the questions asked. However, In trying to explain the relationship between age and
notice the results for the last question. Are there political knowledge, has some other important vari-
issues on which younger people may be just as able been overlooked?
aware or even more informed than older people? To deal with this possibility, Zukin’s group iden-
tify and analyze factors other than age that might
Is this evidence sufficient to conclude whether affect political knowledge. Among other explana-
younger adults are less politically knowledgeable? tory factors that seem relevant are the individual’s:
Can you have confidence in a generalization about income level; education level; gender; political

Table 1.2 Political Knowledge among Adults in the United States, by Age
Old-Young
Age Group 18–29 30–49 50–64 65+ Difference
New House Speaker? (Boehner) 14% 39% 48% 51% +37%
Republicans have majority in? (House) 27 45 55 57 +30
India-Pakistan relations? (Unfriendly) 27 42 46 46 +19
Current unemployment rate? (10%) 43 52 57 60 +17
Int’l trade: U.S. buys/sells more? (Buys) 54 63 74 68 +14
Prime Minister of Great Britain is? (Cameron) 10 14 16 19 +9
U.S. gov’t spends most on…? (Defense) 45 41 35 33 –12

Each column contains the percentage providing the correct answer in the age group identified at the top. These are abbreviated versions of the
multiple choice questions asked, with the correct answers in parentheses after the question.
SOurCe: Pew Research Center (2010). http://www.pewresearch.org/2010/11/18/
public-knows-basic-facts-about-politics-economics-but-struggles-with-specifics/
22 Chapter 1

party affiliation; the political issues that matter most conclusions stand only as long as other analysts
to each age group; and the political climate at the are unable to challenge successfully any aspect
time of the study. Do you understand why these of stages 1–6 in this process. In exploring political
types of factors might provide a better explanation questions, further analyses are always appropriate
than age does for the cause of variations in political to strengthen our knowledge claims.
knowledge? Zukin’s group did conclude that age
mattered, even when considering other variables.
Political phenomena are rarely straightforward
Further Focus
and they can change—sometimes quite rapidly. 1. What political knowledge would you measure if
These are among the reasons that the study of poli- you did a comparative analysis across different
tics is so fascinating (and perhaps frustrating). For age groups? Why? (Always assume there is an
the political analyst, this means that generalizations implicit “why” question when these questions
must be made with care. If you wanted to establish a are raised in the book.)
broad generalization about age and political knowl- 2. What do you think is the most compelling
edge, you would want data on more measures of explanation for the apparent differences in
political knowledge, from several time periods, and political knowledge across age groups in the
probably not just from the United States. In the spirit United States? Would this differ in another
of the scientific method, every aspect of the analy- country? What countries come to mind?
sis is open to criticism by other analysts. And the

Key Concepts
authority (as a knowledge normative political knowledge, prescription, p. 6
source), p. 9 p. 6 scientific method, p. 14
concept, p. 15 political analysis, p. 14 theories, p. 15
description, p. 5 political science, p. 14 theory, p. 18
explanation, p. 6 politics, p. 3

For Further Consideration

1. What do you think is the most serious 4. Many people insist that most of their politi-
obstacle to a “science” of politics? cal knowledge is based on their own rational
2. Which authority have you relied on most thought processes. What might be wrong
extensively as a source of your knowledge with this claim?
about politics? What is the biggest shortcom- 5. Do you think political scientists can play an
ing of this source? important role in government, or are they
3. What is the most important question that just intellectuals who should only stand on
political science should attempt to answer? the sidelines and analyze politics?
What might prevent political scientists from
answering this question adequately?
 Politics and Knowledge 23

For Further Reading

Almond, Gabriel. (1989). A Discipline Divided: by distinguished political scientists, which
Schools and Sects in Political Science. explore a broad array of interesting questions
newbury park, cA: Sage. One of the major about politics and political science.
scholars of comparative politics assesses the Kuhn, thomas. (1996). The Structure of Scientific
diversity of approaches to political science and Revolutions. 3rd ed. chicago: university of
the possibility of a science of politics. chicago press. A short, understandable, and
brians, craig, lars willnat, richard rich, and enormously influential discussion of how sci-
Jarol b. manheim. (2011). Empirical Political ences develop and overturn paradigms; first
Analysis: Research Methods in Political published in 1962.
Science. 8th ed. new york: pearson. A very Kurian, George, James E. Alt, Simone chambers,
effective and understandable presentation of Geoffrey Garrett, margaret levi, and paula
the primary methods that political scientists D. mcclain, eds. (2011). The Encyclopedia of
utilize in the attempt to understand politics Political Science. washington, Dc: cQ press.
and develop defensible generalizations, focus- This five-volume reference resource provides
ing on a full range of qualitative and quantita- helpful essays on more than 1,200 concepts that
tive approaches. are significant in the study of politics as well as
Goodin, robert E., ed. (2011). The Oxford hundreds of valuable overview essays.
Handbook of Political Science. new york: monroe, Kristen renwick, ed. (2005). Perestroika:
oxford university press. Almost seventy The Raucous Rebellion in Political Science.
top political scientists contribute articles new haven, ct: yale university press. These
summarizing the key issues, findings, and essays reflect on a strong reform movement
emerging developments in all the subfields of that emerged among some political scientists
political science, selected from the ten Oxford who demanded a broader and more meth-
Handbooks focusing on each subfield of politi- odologically diverse discipline, a democra-
cal science. tization of the profession’s governance and
Katznelson, ira, and helen miller, eds. (2004). journals, and a broadening of graduate student
Political Science: State of the Discipline. education.
centennial ed. new york: w. w. norton. In pollack, philip h. (2011). The Essentials of Political
only(!) 993 pages, a diverse group of politi- Analysis. 4th ed. washington, Dc: cQ press.
cal scientists offers essays (sponsored by the Using many interesting examples, the book
American Political Science Association) on the explains how to use empirical data and quanti-
current insights and debates on central issues tative analysis (especially the Statistical Package
related to core concepts in the discipline such for Social Sciences—SPSS) in the study of politi-
as the state, democracy, political institutions, cal phenomena.
participation, and modes of political analysis. popper, Karl r. (2002). The Logic of Scientific
King, Gary, Kay l. Schlozman, and norman Discovery. london: hutchinson. A major and
nie, eds. (2009). The Future of Political widely respected statement of the philosophy
Science: 100 Perspectives. london: routledge. and application of the scientific method; first
One hundred mini-essays (in 304 pages), many published in 1959.
24 Chapter 1

On the Web
http://www.apsanet.org for each region as well as links to many key
This Web site for the American Political Science international topics as varied as international
Association, the major organization for politi- organizations, environmental issues, world
cal scientists in the United States, provides religions, media resources, health, and human
links to a variety of activities and opportunities rights.
associated with political science professionals,
http://www.realclearpolitics.com
including online papers from the national con-
This Web site is a daily compendium of many
ference and articles from PS: Political Science
of the most interesting stories about politics
and Politics.
available on the Internet, including blogs, with
http://www.psqonline.org a primary focus on U.S. politics.
Political Science Quarterly is the United States’
http://www.politicsresources.net
oldest, continuously published political science
Richard Kimber’s Political Science Resources
journal and brings you the world of politics.
page includes an extensive listing of sites on
http://www.etown.edu/vl topics such as political theory, political thought,
The rich and extensive set of links on this Web constitutions, elections, political parties, inter-
site, “WWW Virtual Library: International national relations, and British politics.
Affairs Resources,” includes numerous sites
Chapter 2
Political Theory
and Political Beliefs

Learning Objectives
2.1 Compare conservatism, classical liberalism, and socialism.
2.2 Distinguish cognitive, affective, and evaluative beliefs.
2.3 Compare belief systems of the mass and the elite.
2.4 Determine the extent to which political culture explains political behavior.

On your way to campus one day, you stop by Burger King for lunch. As you get your
food, you notice a group of your classmates engaged in a very heated debate over the
recent war in Afghanistan, a topic that hasn’t interested you much. You decide to sit
with them.
As you eat, Julie says, “The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan was totally immoral. The
United States has no right to cause all that suffering, and it has cost America $80 billion
a year that should be spent dealing with issues at home, like poverty and education!
This is even worse than what we did in Iraq! Don’t you agree?”
She looks directly at you, searching for support. As you stare at your cheeseburger,
you realize you are in the hot seat. You think: Do I support the U.S. action? Did the
United States “invade”? Is it costing $80 billion?
When you do not respond, Glen interjects, telling Julie, “You have no right to say
that. Those in power are our most politically knowledgeable decision makers and have
information we don’t know about. As citizens, we shouldn’t question their authority
on complex issues such as deciding when to use our military!”
Julie replies, “It is not fair that I work so hard every day of the week so that the
government can funnel my tax dollars into buying more tanks, guns, and airplanes to
fight a war I do not support. Our government should focus on our own poor people
and should do more to create jobs for us. I have every right to protest government
action.” You see Julie’s point when you think about problems at home while your
family’s tax money is being used for a costly, distant war.
25
26 Chapter 2

What march would you join? These college students express their strong political beliefs on an
important issue.

“I sort of agree,” says Byron. “The United States is in a huge budget crisis. Our
government is way too big. We should be cutting way back on spending on every-
thing. Cut taxes. Give the money back to people who earned it!”
Frustrated with Julie’s challenges to the government, Glen says, “By not supporting
our leaders and criticizing their actions, you are threatening our country’s political stabil-
ity with your lack of patriotism. For your information, that money has not been wasted.
By expanding our military power, we make our country more secure from people who
threaten our way of life, and we are able to promote positive values such as democracy and
freedom.” Supporting democracy and U.S. military strength do seem worthwhile to you.
Then Elene joins in: “You both miss the point. The real reason the United States went
to war is because of the men who led the countries in the conflict. Obama decided to risk
many lives in Afghanistan, just like Bush did in Iraq, because he wanted to demonstrate
his manliness and power. If women had more authority in these countries, they might
have figured out a solution without so much violence and death. I’m not saying it’s all
about gender, but a lot of women do see things differently than many men do, and if
women had more political authority, they might come up with less violent approaches.”
Amir, whose family is from the Middle East, cannot resist speaking. He says,
“I agree with Julie. American leadership has caused great pain and suffering for many
innocent Muslim families. In Iraq the reports of weapons of mass destruction were just
a sham to allow the United States to force its values upon the Iraqis. George Bush even
called the war a crusade! Then Obama caused more mass destruction in Afghanistan!
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 27

What’s next? Syria? Iraq again? We are marching tonight on campus to protest any
more U.S. military involvement in the region. Join us!”
You decide that everyone has made some good points. You wonder if you should
spend more time gathering knowledge about political issues like the conflicts in the
Middle East. This discussion has made you reflect on your own values: When are war and
violence acceptable? What should the government spend money on? Should your coun-
try push other countries to adopt American values? Should you attend the protest rally?
How would you (the real you!) react to this conversation? What are your views on
these questions?
This conversation is richly political—full of many knowledge claims. Some of the
comments seem factual, while others mix fact, feeling, and evaluation. Some include
strong prescriptive statements about what should be. There is a call for action. Your
responses to this incident and to the questions it raises offer interesting evidence
about your reactions to the political world. Some of your responses might involve
what you think (your political beliefs and your political ideology), and others might
involve what you do (your political actions). This combination of an individual’s beliefs
and actions is the essence of the domain of political science called political behavior.
It is also sometimes called micropolitics because the key object of study is the smallest
political unit—the individual as a thinker and actor in the political world. Micropolitics
can also include the study of the political beliefs and actions of small groups such as
families, committees, and juries.
Part Two of this book develops your understanding of the political world by exam-
ining major themes in the study of political behavior. This chapter explores individuals’
political views, ranging from core values to specific beliefs. Initially, it examines normative
political theory—the assumptions and broad beliefs that guide political ideologies. The
primary focus is on three political ideologies prevalent in Western political thought:
conservatism, classical liberalism, and socialism. The chapter then details what empiri-
cal analyses reveal about the basic elements of an individual’s political beliefs. Third,
the chapter considers the configuration of beliefs held by an individual—a cluster of
beliefs called a political belief system. The final section attempts to characterize the domi-
nant patterns of political behavior for an entire society—its political culture. The two
other chapters in Part Two will extend our exploration of political behavior. Chapter
3 examines the political actions taken by individuals and groups. Chapter 4 assesses
alternative explanations for the sources of people’s political beliefs and actions.

Normative Political Theory

2.1 Compare conservatism, classical liberalism, and socialism.
Should an individual resist a government policy on drug use with which she dis-
agrees? Why? By what means? With what goals? Should government provide for the
poor? Why? By what means? With what goals? As each of us attempts to answer such
questions, we must grapple not only with the facts and realities of the situation, as
28 Chapter 2

we understand them, but also with our underlying beliefs about topics such as the
appropriate role of government and the rights and duties of the individual in society.
Political questions are often very difficult to resolve because they can be embedded in
underlying values and core beliefs that are subject to deep disagreement.
Notice that the preceding questions are essentially should questions. The subfield of
political science called normative political theory offers explicit arguments and proposes
answers to the significant “should” questions in the political world, based on fundamental
claims about the individual, the society, and the state. Normative political theorists
develop their ideas about the “should” questions by blending their observations about
the world with the detailed articulation and defense of one or more basic values, prin-
ciples, or norms that shape their viewpoint. So, for example, a normative theorist’s
response to whether the government should provide for the poor would require an
elaboration on several key issues, such as whether society has a political or moral
obligation to assist individuals, how this applies to the particular case of poverty, and
how government is implicated in any such obligation. Such theorizing usually invokes
fundamental themes like justice, fairness, equality, and freedom.
Although there are overlaps between the two general approaches, normative polit-
ical theory can be broadly contrasted with empirical political theory, which relies upon
observation and analysis of real-world data as it attempts to apply the methods of science in
order to develop descriptive and explanatory knowledge claims about the political world. Later
sections of this chapter offer information and generalizations about people’s cognitive,
affective, and evaluative beliefs based explicitly in an empirical approach. But the for-
mulation of an evaluative belief or a prescriptive knowledge claim will also draw upon
normative thinking. Thus this chapter about political beliefs initially explores some key
themes in normative political theory and describes several major political ideologies.
Some of the core issues of normative political theory are associated with the
basic question: Why do we need a government? Theorizing about this can provoke
further questions about human nature, about why and how people associate with
one another, about how government should function, and about how people and gov-
ernment should interact. Plato, Aristotle, Confucius, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Karl
Marx, and John Stuart Mill are among the many important thinkers who have offered
profound, provocative, and influential ideas about these basic normative questions
regarding the relationships among individuals, the state, and society. Such political
questions remain important and fascinating. This section describes some of these
questions and a few of the many answers that are proposed.
You will notice that many of the knowledge claims made by normative politi-
cal theorists are based on more than their values. Most political theorists include
descriptive statements (claims of how things actually are) as part of their arguments
regarding what should be and why it should be. As they articulate their normative
claims about the political world, they are influenced by the same factors that surround
those engaged in empirical political analysis—their personal experiences and educa-
tion, the nature of the time and place in which they live, and other key forces in their
lives. Focus in 2 briefly considers how the socioeconomic context contributed to the
hugely influential writings of three major political theorists.
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 29

Focus in 2
Great Britain as a Context for Some Great Political Theorists
What influences the thinking of the great political “voice of the people” should be heard through rep-
theorists? Of course, the answer is complex and resentatives of the business class. However, no one
variable. Chapter 4 will suggest that most people’s has any right to challenge the complete power of the
political beliefs are influenced by an array of factors, monarch to make and enforce laws, as long as the
including their personal experiences and upbring- monarch preserves social order.
ing, their teachers and other individuals whose ideas Adam Smith. Adam Smith (1723–1790) left his
engage them, and the sociopolitical contexts that small village in Scotland to study in Edinburgh and
provide evidence guiding their assumptions and then Oxford, where he focused on philosophy and
inferences about human nature, the role of the state, European literature. Smith served as chair in logic
and other key topics. It is probably not surprising and moral philosophy in Glasgow and then traveled
that most of the great political theorists of the last in Europe as tutor to a wealthy English duke. Smith
four centuries selected for major English-language had developed a strong opposition to the British
anthologies were substantially influenced by their government’s interventions in its economy—a view
lives in the sociopolitical context of Great Britain (see, reinforced when he saw similar problems in France.
for example, Goodin and Pettit 2006; Love 2010; He retired to Scotland to write his classic An Inquiry
Ryan 2012). Even many modern thinkers who did not into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations
live in the British Isles were substantially influenced (1776). Shaped by his training as a philosopher, his
by Britain’s unique institutional innovations and politi- work explored how humans could best interact to
cal culture in the seventeenth through nineteenth produce the most efficient economic system. He
centuries. Here are very brief examples of three major emphasized the benefits of a division of labor, in
theorists directly affected by their lives in Britain. which economic actors—generally unhindered by
Thomas Hobbes. Englishman Thomas Hobbes government—pursue their own rational self-interest
(1588–1679) studied classics in school and at while the “invisible hand” of the market guides the
Oxford. After traveling in Europe, Hobbes became economy (see Chapter 8 of this book). However,
embroiled in the social turmoil, civil war, and serious Smith’s life in Britain and his work as a customs
succession problems in England after the death of agent persuaded him that there were some limita-
Queen Elizabeth, as several different hereditary lines tions to the free market, and he began to advocate
claimed the throne. One king (Charles I) attempted to certain important roles for government in the econ-
reign absolutely over a resistant parliament through omy, such as enforcing contracts, protecting intel-
two civil wars and then was executed for high lectual property rights, and acting in areas where the
treason in 1649 as Cromwell’s Puritans took over decisions of private economic actors would not pro-
government. The chaos in England certainly influ- duce necessary goods (e.g., roads and bridges). He
enced Hobbes’s ideas about the brutal behavior of also entered a contemporary policy debate, arguing
humans in the “state of nature.” In 1640, Hobbes had that Britain should abandon its American colonies
written a tract to lawmakers urging that the sovereign due to the high costs of sustaining imperialism.
(king) must exercise absolute power to reduce such Karl Marx. Although Karl Marx (1818–1883)
disorder. He then fled England, fearing that he would was born in Germany, he lived the second half of
be executed for his support of the monarchy. While his life (34 years) in England, where he researched
abroad, Hobbes wrote his masterpiece, Leviathan and wrote his major work, died, and was buried.
(1651), in which he elaborated on his ideas, arguing The moral and philosophical bases of his theories
that a powerful monarch should be established and (especially French socialism and German philoso-
obeyed. Recognizing the growing political influence phy) were established during his time as a student,
of business in England, he also suggested that the journalist, and political agitator in Germany, France,
30 Chapter 2

and Belgium. His activism led to his expulsion from stated by his disciple, Wilhelm Liebknecht, “[I]n
all three countries, and thus in 1849 he moved to England Marx found what he was looking for, what
England and found refuge in London. His earlier he needed: the bricks and mortar for his work.
ideas were blended with his experiences in England: Capital could only have been written in London.
a detailed study of English corporate records and Marx could only become what he did become in
other research in the British Museum; his projections England” (Mclellan 1983).
of the future of capitalism based on his analysis of
English capitalism, the world’s most sophisticated
economic system; and his observations of the hard-
Further Focus
ships of the English working class. Indeed, Marx’s 1. Based on these brief discussions, which of the
own life was substantially shaped by the severe three theorists seems to have been most influ-
hardships suffered in London by his own family, enced by the context of life in Britain?
which lived in poverty and disease and included 2. Could you make a case that most major political
the painful deaths of three of his children. His writ- theorists would probably have developed their
ing in England culminated in his monumental work, ideas regardless of the country in which they
Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (1867). As lived?

Political Ideology
The political theories of Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, and Karl Marx are among the
several dozen most famous and widely studied in the Western world. Some would
describe the work of each of them as a political ideology. We can define a political
ideology as a comprehensive set of beliefs about the political world—about desirable political
goals and the best ways to achieve those goals. Thus, a political ideology characterizes
what is and what should be in the political world, and it might also offer strategic
ideas about how to make changes in the direction of that preferred situation. Many
relatively coherent belief systems in the contemporary world might be classified as
political ideologies.
This section characterizes three of the fundamental concerns that are addressed by
most political ideologies and help us distinguish analytically among them. These three
fundamental concerns are their assumptions and value judgments about: (1) indi-
vidual human nature; (2) the proper relationship among the individual, state, and
society; and (3) the desirability of establishing equality among individuals. Then it
details three broad ideologies that are widely discussed in contemporary Western soci-
eties: conservatism, classical liberalism, and socialism. There are short explanations of
the ideologies of fascism and political Islam as well as brief characterizations of some
other “isms.”

The IndIvIdual The “nature versus nurture” debate centers on disagreements

about whether a person’s fundamental beliefs and behaviors are determined primar-
ily by innate needs and values with which she is born or are mainly a product of her
environment and experiences. Chapter 4 provides an empirical assessment of the
implications of nature and nurture for political beliefs and actions. Here, our focus
is on key assumptions that a political ideology makes about an individual’s innate
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 31

nature (e.g., the extent to which individuals are selfish or sharing, violent or nonvio-
lent, emotional or rational) and about the adaptability of individuals (the extent to
which they can be taught or induced to act and think in a way that is against their
innate nature). For example, Thomas Hobbes grounds his theories in the assumption
that people are essentially motivated to serve their own interests and that they will use
whatever means necessary, including violence, to protect themselves.

IndIvIdual, STaTe, and SoCIeTy What is the proper relationship among the
individual, the state, and society? One view is that the highest value in social arrange-
ments is to maximize individual liberty and freedom of action. A different view is
that the collective good of society is most important and individual freedom must
be constrained by the state (the government, broadly understood—see Chapter 5) to
achieve the results that most benefit the overall society. For example, Adam Smith
emphasizes the benefits both to individuals and to the “wealth of the nation” from
allowing economic actors to operate with a very high level of freedom from govern-
ment controls, because their pursuit of enlightened self-interest will result in a good
society with an efficient and effective economy.

equalITy To what extent should there be equality in terms of what individuals do

and the benefits they acquire? One position is that there should be legal equality—
that every person should be equal before the law, have equal political rights, and
enjoy equality of opportunity. An alternative position is that there should be material
equality—that every person should enjoy a comparable level of benefits and goods.
This second position places a high value on equality of conditions, adding social and
economic equality to legal equality. A third position posits that people and situations
are intrinsically unequal and that it is neither possible nor desirable to legislate any
kind of equality. Karl Marx is among those who argue most fervently that a good
society is achieved only when there is substantial equality in the material conditions
of all individuals.
Three major Western ideologies are described below—conservatism, classical
liberalism, and socialism. Although there is broad agreement about the core beliefs
within an ideology, it is subject to varying interpretations across individuals and
across cultures. And an ideology can have distinct versions, such as the differences
within socialism between its Marxist–Leninist form and its democratic socialist form.

Conservatism
Conservatism attempts to prevent or slow the transition away from a society based on
traditional values and the existing social hierarchy. As the word suggests, the essence of
conservative ideology is to conserve the many valued elements of the system that
already exists. What the conservative wishes to preserve depends on the time and
place, but certain underlying elements are highly valued. Particular importance is
placed on stability, tradition, and loyalty to God and country. The relationship of the
individual to society and an antipathy to egalitarianism (i.e., equality of conditions)
are at the core of conservatism.
32 Chapter 2

The IndIvIdual Conservatism makes two key assumptions about human nature.
First, individuals are not consistently rational. In many situations, people are emo-
tional and are unable to reason clearly. Thus, tradition and religion, rather than reason,
are viewed as the most reliable sources for guiding society because they support
stability and moderate change. In the words of one British conservative, “The accumu-
lated wisdom and experience of countless generations gone is more likely to be right
than the passing fashion of the moment” (Hearnshaw 1933: 22). Second, individuals
are inherently unequal in intelligence, skills, and status. Some individuals and groups
are superior to others, and those who are superior should be in positions of power in
society and in government.

IndIvIdual, STaTe, and SoCIeTy Individuals have a basic need for order and
stability in society. They belong to different groups that are unequal in power, status,
and material possessions. Social harmony is maintained when these various groups
cooperate. Traditional values and ethics provide the guidelines for group cooperation
as well as individual behavior. And it is the role of societal institutions such as the
family and the church, as well as government (the state), to communicate and enforce
these values.
Individual liberty is valued and individual rights should be protected, but only
within a framework of mutual responsibility. No individual or group has absolute
freedom to do whatever it wants; rather, each should behave in a manner consistent
with society’s traditional values. The superior groups should be allowed to enjoy
the benefits and exercise the responsibilities associated with their position, but they
should also protect the weak from severe hardships, a responsibility that the French
call noblesse oblige—“the obligations of the nobility.” And government should use its
power to maintain social order; to preserve traditional values, especially regarding
family life, religion, and culture; and to protect private property rights. State military
and economic power should also promote the country’s interests abroad and defend
against intervention by other states.

equalITy Because inequality is a natural aspect of society, it is foolish and even

dangerous to seek egalitarianism. Forced equality is unwise because it disrupts the
natural, cooperative hierarchy among groups, causes social conflict, and endan-
gers the fundamental goal of order and stability. Attempts to force equality are also
unacceptable because they directly undermine individual liberty, which is of greater
importance than equality.
Thomas Hobbes, Plato (427–347 b.c.e., who proposed rule by philosopher kings),
and Confucius (551–479 b.c.e., who celebrated rigid social hierarchy; see Focus in 4), all
reflect core values of conservatism. Other important advocates of conservatism include
Edmund Burke, a British member of Parliament; British prime ministers Benjamin
Disraeli and Winston Churchill; and, to a lesser extent, American Founding Fathers
James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. In the conversation at Burger King at the
beginning of this chapter, Glen’s views were generally consistent with conservatism.
Most contemporary conservatives are pragmatic. They are less concerned about
the form of government than about the use of government to promote order and
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 33

stability. The conservative perspective is sympathetic to government intervention

when the objective of the policy is to maintain or return to traditional values such as
patriotism, family, morality, piety, and individual responsibility. In every era, conser-
vatives resist current threats to the traditions they value. Today, those threats often
include multiculturalism; expansion of the welfare state; and forced equality across
class, race, and gender. A conservative government might actively support a state
religion, expand its military power to influence other countries, suppress disorderly
protest, provide minimal relief to those in poverty, or make abortion illegal. Some new
policies are supported, but the rationale is always “to change in order to preserve,” as
the British Conservative Party has put it. Many of the contemporary political leaders
who come closest to the spirit of conservatism are in certain countries in Asia and the
Middle East (e.g., Brunei, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia) where social hierarchy, order,
and traditional values are celebrated.

Classical Liberalism
The ideology of classical liberalism places the highest value on individual freedom and
posits that the role of government should be quite limited. In part, this ideology emerged in
the sixteenth through eighteenth centuries as a response to rigid, hierarchical societies,
such as those in feudal Europe. Intellectuals and those in commerce, among others,
desired to be free from the constraints imposed by the dominant political, economic,
and religious institutions in their society. They posited that each person should live
responsibly but also should be allowed to live in the manner dictated by her beliefs
and to enjoy fully the benefits of her efforts with minimal limitations from these
stifling, conservative institutions.

The IndIvIdual John Locke (1632–1704), a primary theorist of classical liberalism,

describes individuals in a “state of nature” prior to the existence of government
(see his Second Treatise of Government, 1690). Each person enjoys natural rights to
life, liberty, and property. Each person is rational and has the ability to use reason to
determine the sensible rules (the “laws of nature”) that shape how she should live in
pursuit of her own needs and without harming others. Classical liberalism contrasts
with conservatism in several important ways: (1) the freedom of each individual to
pursue her natural rights is the highest value; and (2) each individual is rational and
responsible and is the best judge of what is in her self-interest. (Notice also that the
classical liberal’s view of the state of nature is far more benign than the one described
by conservative Hobbes as “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”)

IndIvIdual, STaTe, and SoCIeTy A person’s full capabilities can be realized only
if she is not limited by a conservative social order in which tradition and hierarchy are
dominant. The social order celebrated in conservatism not only restricts individual
freedom but also stifles progressive change and growth. In the classical liberal view,
no one is forced to accept the authority of the state (government). Individuals can con-
sent to be governed—choosing to “contract” with a minimal government, the main
roles of which are limited to clarifying the laws of nature and enforcing the occasional
34 Chapter 2

violations of those laws. The state should mainly be a night watchman, a low-profile
police officer who ensures the basic safety and freedom of every individual. Thomas
Paine’s (1737–1809) slogan captures this perspective: “That government is best which
governs least.”
For similar reasons, classical liberals celebrate a laissez-faire economy, a view par-
ticularly associated with the writings of Adam Smith noted briefly in Focus in 2. Each
person should be free to pursue her economic goals by any legal activity and to amass
as much property and wealth as possible. Individual actors are guided by enlightened
self-interest, and the overall economy is structured by the “invisible hand” of the mar-
ket and free trade. There are only a few circumstances in which the state should act to
constrain this freedom of economic action. This vision of a market political economy
will be further explored in Chapter 8.

equalITy Equality before the law (equality of opportunity) is important, but gov-
ernment should not attempt to create material equality (equality of outcomes). People
pursue their interests in different ways and with different levels of success. Even in
situations of hardship, government action is undesirable because it undermines indi-
vidual initiative and independence. Thus, government should have no significant role
in addressing inequalities.
Among the many political thinkers associated with classical liberalism, in addi-
tion to John Locke and Adam Smith, are Jeremy Bentham (1748–1831) and John Stuart
Mill (1806–1873). More contemporary advocates of classical liberalism (some of whom
are labeled neoconservatives) include economists F. A. Hayek (1899–1992) and Milton
Friedman (1912–2006) and political commentator William F. Buckley (1925–2008). At
Burger King, Byron was most aligned with this perspective. Part Five of this book
will reveal that many contemporary political regimes are powerfully influenced by
classical liberalism. Its emphases on limited government, individual liberty, and lais-
sez-faire economics are among the central themes in many ongoing debates about
public policy and government action.
A brief aside: If you are an American, you might be confused by these character-
istics of liberalism because, in the United States, a liberal is someone who supports
substantial government intervention and public policies that increase equality of out-
comes. This confusion of terminology emerged during Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s
tenure as U.S. president (1933–1945). Faced with a devastating economic depression,
Roosevelt argued for a “New Deal” in which the national government had a clear
duty and responsibility to assist actively in economic recovery and in social action.
This expanded government would regulate business, create jobs, and distribute exten-
sive welfare services to the citizens, including cash payments and increased public
provision of education, housing, health care, and so on. Roosevelt’s political oppo-
nents labeled his policies “socialism.” He knew this was a very negative label in the
United States, so he called himself and his policies “liberal,” contrasting them with the
“conservative” policies of others (mainly Republicans, such as the previous president
Herbert Hoover) who emphasized limited government, laissez-faire economics, and
individual freedom. Notice that, in the general language of political ideologies, what
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 35

Roosevelt was calling conservatism was mostly classical liberalism, and what he was
proposing as liberalism was a very modest version of democratic socialism (described
below). Roosevelt’s meanings of liberals versus conservatives were adopted in the
United States, but not in most other countries. In this book, the traditional ideology of
liberalism will be called classical liberalism to distinguish it from the American under-
standing of liberalism as an ideology of extensive government and reduced inequality.

Socialism
For socialism, the most important goal is to provide high-quality, relatively equal conditions
of life for everyone, with an active state assisting in the achievement of this goal. Many people
were still impoverished and exploited in the nineteenth-century world, despite the
emergence of industrialization and democracy. Socialism evolved as a distinctive ide-
ology among theorists concerned about the plight of people who had relatively little
economic, social, or political power. They were dissatisfied that neither conservatism
nor classical liberalism revealed much concern for improving the conditions of these
groups. Socialism articulated a vision through which economic and political power
could be directed to benefit all groups in society.

The IndIvIdual In the socialist perspective, people are social and caring by nature.
They are not innately selfish and aggressive, although negative social conditions can
produce such behavior. Every individual’s attitudes and behaviors are largely deter-
mined by the environment of family, community, and work. Thus, it is crucial to create
an environment that encourages individuals to place the highest value on cooperation
and sharing and to act in ways that increase the collective good.

IndIvIdual, STaTe, and SoCIeTy Because the good of the society as a whole is
the most important goal, some of an individual’s interests must be subordinated to,
or at least coordinated with, the overall interests and needs of everyone in the society.
All groups, from national organizations (e.g., trade unions) to local organizations (e.g.,
workplaces, social clubs) to the family, must encourage everyone to act in ways that
result in cooperation and service to the common good. The state has a crucial role, both
through policies that provide every citizen with good material living conditions and
through education and civic training. Thus, government must take an expansive role in
society, ensuring that every citizen has access to high-quality education, shelter, health
care, and jobs, as well as financial security against economic uncertainty. The state is
also much more active in controlling powerful actors and self-interested groups whose
behavior will harm the collective good of the society, and thus it engages in extensive
regulation of both the economic sphere and the social sphere. When everyone enjoys
comfortable material conditions, there is much greater willingness to work for the
common good and to subordinate one’s acquisitiveness and greed.

equalITy Both the organic, hierarchical world of conservatism and the individual-
istic, self-serving world of classical liberalism result in societies with huge disparities
of material conditions, wealth, status, and power. From the socialist perspective, these
disparities and inequalities cause misery, deep alienation, and pervasive conflict in the
36 Chapter 2

society. Thus, the ideology of socialism centers in a deep commitment to use the power
and policies of the state to increase the material, social, and political equality of all
its members. It is assumed that such equality transforms people into fulfilled, happy
citizens and creates a society in which alienation and conflict are greatly reduced.
There are significant variations within the ideology of socialism. Among these,
two major variations should be distinguished: Marxist–Leninist socialism and demo-
cratic socialism.

MarxIST–lenInIST SoCIalISM Marxist–leninist socialism is a variant of social-

ist ideology that begins with three assumptions regarding the forceful actions necessary
to produce equality and social justice. First, the entrenched socioeconomic elite, sup-
ported by the state that it controls, will resist change by every means available, and
thus change will require violent overthrow of the existing order. Second, the transfor-
mation to socialism will be complex and face many obstacles in the existing system.
Thus, a powerful government must be established and allowed total control of the
process of change. Among the government’s most important tasks is the restructuring
of the economic system, with public ownership of all the major resources in the society
and the production and distribution of goods and services for human need. Third, a
small, dictatorial leadership group must be empowered to manage the government
and to effect the complex changes in the economy and society. Once relative equality
is achieved, both this leadership group and the powerful government supporting it
can be eliminated. They will, in the words of Marx, “wither away” and be replaced
by decentralized, citizen-run politics and an efficient administration. (See Chapter 9
on the class approach and Chapter 8 on the command political economy for a more
complete discussion of these points.)
The core elements of this version of socialism are the theories of Karl Marx and its
modified practical applications by V. I. Lenin in the Soviet Union and by Mao Zedong
in China. These variations of socialism are often called communism, Marxism, or
revolutionary socialism as well as Marxist–Leninist socialism. In the last 70 years, this
version of socialism has been attempted in more than 60 countries, ranging from A
(Albania, Angola, Algeria) to Z (Zimbabwe). Most of the major regimes that imple-
mented Marxist–Leninist socialism have since abandoned it (see especially Chapter 15
on postcommunist developed countries). Some conclude that the Marxist ideology of
communism has been totally discredited. Debate in 8 will consider whether commu-
nism is, in fact, dead.

deMoCraTIC SoCIalISM The other major variation within socialist ideology is

democratic socialism. This variant also has egalitarianism as its primary goal, and it
assumes that the changes can be effected by a government that comes to power and
rules by democratic means. It rejects the idea that a society based on justice and equality
can be created only through violence and repression. This government’s authority
is democratic, derived from consent of the governed in fair elections. In democratic
socialism, the state’s policies emphasize the substantial reduction of inequalities
in material conditions, power, and status, but the state does not attempt to achieve
complete equality of material conditions. The approach to change is gradual, placing
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 37

continued importance on the protection of individual rights and freedoms even as it

transforms the socioeconomic order. The government might own some of the major
economic resources in the society and it strongly regulates much of the economy, but
it does not attempt to plan and control all aspects of the economic system (Przeworski
1985, 1993).
The ideology of democratic socialism is rooted in utopian socialists such as Thomas
More (1478–1535), Robert Owen (1771–1856), and Claude-Henri St. Simon (1760–1825),
who envisioned voluntaristic communities based on cooperation. Twentieth-century
variations include the Fabian socialists such as George Bernard Shaw, Sydney Webb,
and Beatrice Webb, who were convinced that the people would elect democratic gov-
ernments that gradually created socialist societies, and the revisionist Marxists such
as Karl Kautsky, who argued that violence and repression by the state was not a
legitimate means for achieving lasting change. At Burger King, Julie was probably the
person closest to this ideology.
One vision of democratic socialism was articulated by the British economist Sir
William Beveridge in a major policy statement commissioned by the British government
in 1941. This statement was prompted by the dismay among British leaders regarding
the very poor education and health of many young British working-class men who
were drafted for World War II (this is another British example of political ideas shaped
by socioeconomic conditions). In response to these circumstances, Beveridge argued
that in a society operating according to the tenets of classical liberalism, there are five
tragic effects on some people. Thus, the government should act as a “welfare state”
(Castles et al., 2010), implementing policies to overcome each of these five effects:

1. disease: to be combated by public provision of subsidized or free health care

services, including doctors, treatment, hospitals, and medicines.
2. Want: to be eliminated by public provision of sufficient money and other services
to raise people above poverty.
3. Squalor: to be reduced by state provision of publicly owned and subsidized
housing affordable to all.
4. Ignorance: to be eliminated by universal, free public education.
5. Idleness: to be overcome by government policies that ensure meaningful work
for every person.

The principles of democratic socialism have substantially shaped the current gover-
nance, social life, and material conditions in some contemporary social market systems
present in countries such as Denmark, Germany, and Sweden (see Compare in 13).
This socialist ideology is also advocated by some of the political elites in the postcom-
munist countries of Central and Eastern Europe (see Chapter 15).

Some Further Points About “ISMS”

To advance your knowledge regarding particular belief systems, you might take a
course in political theory, political ideology, or world cultures, or you might pursue the
“ism” of interest at the library or via the Internet. The preceding section identified three
38 Chapter 2

major political ideologies that influence the political belief systems of many citizens in
Western countries. There are many other significant political ideologies in the contem-
porary political world, at least some of which are “isms.” Table 2.1 briefly characterizes
the essence of some of the political “isms” that you might encounter. Broader systems
of religious-social beliefs also have great political importance, including Christian fun-
damentalism, Islamic fundamentalism, Confucianism, and Hinduism. Chapter 4 will
indicate that it is almost impossible to understand politics in the contemporary world
without considering the influence of these religious “isms” on beliefs and actions.
Some “true believers” adhere almost totally to a particular ideology, and these
people are the genuine ideologues. But only a few individuals have a complete grasp
of the details and subtleties of any ideology, and even fewer are prepared to accept
without reservation every element of an ideology. A larger set of people is substan-
tially influenced by one or more ideologies. They have developed their own system
of political beliefs, in which they combine basic principles from particular ideologies
with ideas from other sources. It will be suggested later in this chapter that many
people have only rudimentary and inconsistent political beliefs.
Yet a particular “ism” can be a powerful force influencing people and shaping
history. In the twentieth century, for example, both communism and fascism had
particularly strong impacts. The role of communism will be explored later, espe-
cially in Chapters 8 and 15. Table 2.1 provides a basic definition of fascism. Fascism
is antisocialist—it emphasizes an organic social order and thus opposes the idea of
class struggle among groups. And it is antidemocratic—it views competitive, multi-
party politics as divisive and destabilizing. While several twentieth-century regimes
included strong elements of fascism, it is most closely associated with Italy under
Benito Mussolini (1922–1943) and Germany under Adolf Hitler (1932–1945). In
Germany, Hitler’s particular version of fascism was driven by several key ideologi-
cal elements. First, it held that the top leader is the embodiment of the national will
and must be obeyed. Second, it inspired nationalistic fervor with powerful loyalty
to the homeland. The German leadership combined these ideas with a celebration of
the superiority of the German race. This produced a virulent racism that became a
justification for the brutal treatment of Jews, gypsies, gays, and other “undesirable”
groups, including the extermination of more than 6 million in the concentration camps
of Europe. All of these ideological elements, under Hitler’s charismatic leadership,
resulted in Germany’s expansion beyond its borders, provoking a war (World War II)
that spread across three continents and caused more than 51 million deaths. Groups or
political parties that embrace core ideas of fascism, especially nationalism and ethnic
purity, continue to be active in many contemporary societies.
In the early twenty-first century, considerable attention has focused on the rising
political importance of Islamism, also known as “political Islam” (and less accu-
rately characterized as Islamic fundamentalism). Islam is one of the world’s great
religions, with more than 1.3 billion adherents across its many variations. Chapter 1
noted that there are deep disagreements within dar al Islam (the world of Islam) about
how to interpret its crucial authority sources, especially the Koran, the teachings of
Mohammed, and the analyses of Islam by venerated scholars of an earlier era. Islamic
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 39

Table 2.1 A Brief Primer on Political “Isms”

In politics and political theory, there are many “isms”—systems of beliefs that address how societies should
function, how people should live and what they should value, and how political systems should operate.
Entire books are devoted to each of the “isms” below, but here they are characterized in 40 words or less to
give you an orienting (dangerously simplified?) idea about the core vision regarding any “ism” with which you
are unfamiliar. The references in parentheses indicate the chapters in this book where some of these “isms”
receive greater attention.
Anarchism—a moral–political ideal of a society that is untouched by relationships of power and domination
among human beings; there is an absence of organized government.
Authoritarianism—a system in which the political rights and interests of individuals are subordinated,
usually by coercion, to the interests of the state (see Chapter 7).
Capitalism—linking politics to the political economy, it is a system dominated by a (laissez-faire) market
economy in which economic actors are generally free from state interference (see Chapter 8).
Collectivism—a doctrine holding that the individual’s actions should benefit some kind of collective organi-
zation such as the state, a tribe, or the like, rather than the individual.
Communism—based on the theories of Karl Marx, the essential goal of this system is the socialization
of societal resources with the state owning land, labor, and capital and using them to promote the equal
welfare of all citizens (see Chapters 8 and 15).
Conservatism—a belief in the virtue of preserving traditional values and social institutions and of promoting
loyalty to country, reliance on family, and adherence to religion.
Corporatism—a political economy in which there is extensive economic cooperation between an activist
state and a few groups that represent major economic actors such as large industry, organized labor, and
farmers (see Chapter 8).
Environmentalism—advocacy of the planned management of a natural resource or of the total environ-
ment of a particular ecosystem to prevent exploitation, pollution, destruction, or depletion of valuable natural
resources.
Fascism—a system in which the unity and harmony of government and society are of central importance
and forces that might weaken that unity are repressed; a top leader is usually viewed as the embodiment of
the natural will, and all individuals are expected to obey the leader’s will.
Feminism—a diverse social movement promoting equal rights and opportunities for women and men in
their personal lives, economic activities, and politics; it is also an influential analytic perspective on political
science topics from the perspective of feminist theory.
Islamism—guided by a rigid and conservative interpretation of Islam, this “political Islam” encourages active,
even violent, opposition against any who undermine its beliefs about the appropriate way of living, both
public and private.
(Classical) Liberalism—an emphasis on the primacy of the freedom and rights of the individual, relative to
any constraints imposed by the state.
Libertarianism—an extreme version of classical liberalism, advocating the right of individuals to act freely
and unconstrained by the state as long as they do not harm other people.
Marxism—a set of ideas based on the writings of Karl Marx, who argued that society is composed of
competing classes based on economic power, that class struggle and change are inevitable, and that the
desired goal is the equal distribution of welfare in the society (see Chapter 8).
Nationalism—a deep commitment to the advancement of the interests and welfare of the core group
(based on location, ethnicity, or some other crucial factor) with which an individual identifies powerfully
(see Chapter 5).
Pacifism—a belief that the highest political and social value is peace and the absence of violence.
Socialism—a system committed to utilizing the state, the economy, and public policy to provide a high-
quality, relatively equal standard of living for all and, usually, to support democratic political processes
(see Chapters 8 and 13).
Totalitarianism—a system in which the state possesses total control over all aspects of people’s lives,
including their economic, social, political, and personal spheres (see Chapter 7).
40 Chapter 2

fundamentalists tend to embrace

the most rigid and assertive
beliefs regarding the interpre-
tation of their holy authorities
and the guidelines for their way
of life, both personal and pub-
lic. The political implications of
this perspective can include an
intolerance for what is viewed
as deviant behavior by other
Muslims, antagonism among
different sects of Islam (e.g.,
Shi’a and Sunni), and hostility
Sieg heil! Fascism under Adolf Hitler, with its extreme nationalism, antisocial- toward those non-Muslims who
ism, and leader veneration, became one of the most effective and destructive appear to challenge Islamic rule
mass mobilization ideologies in modern history. Here, Hitler prepares to speak
or to practice other religions
to 700,000 followers in 1934.
within Muslim countries. Most
Islamic fundamentalists participate in personal, social, and political activities to fur-
ther their beliefs. However, a minority of this population (the Islamists) believes it
is necessary to engage in violent struggle against those other groups to protect the
Umma, the community of all Muslims. Some of these Islamists have gained consider-
able notoriety for their violent actions and terrorism (see Chapter 12), including such
groups as al-Qaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), and
the Taliban. The death and suffering associated with communism, fascism, Islamism,
and other extreme ideologies during the last 100 years are compelling evidence that
political ideologies can be much more than bundles of ideas debated by intellectuals.

Individual Political Beliefs

2.2 distinguish cognitive, affective, and evaluative beliefs.

Types of Political Orientations

Can you describe your thought process when you were asked how you would respond
to the issues raised at Burger King? Your reaction might have been determined by fun-
damental and consistent principles you have about society and government—what
has been characterized above as a political ideology. But if you are like most people,
your thought processes in reaction to such political phenomena are probably best
described in terms of a less structured combination of your factual knowledge, your
feelings, and your assessments. These components of your political beliefs are termed
cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations.
Cognitive orientations are an individual’s knowledge about the political world—what
the person believes are political “facts.” Cognitive orientations include descriptive
knowledge such as: the names of political leaders; the policies supported by particular
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 41

politicians, political groups, or countries; events in political history; the features of

a constitution; or the procedures and actions of a governmental agency. They also
include explanatory ideas, such as why the United States’ military is in Afghanistan or
why the stability of the eurozone is linked to the Greek economy. A person’s cognitive
orientations might be correct and accurate, or they might be totally wrong. (Recall the
survey questions about facts in Compare in 1.)
Affective orientations include any feelings or emotions evoked in a person by political
phenomena. For example, what (if any) feelings are stimulated in you when you come
across the following?

You see someone burning your national flag.

You read about a deadly terrorist attack in an area where you have friends.
You are faced with the option of voting in an election, and you don’t like any of
the candidates.
You are present at a political demonstration supporting a policy you strongly
support.

The nature and intensity of your feelings in reaction to each of these situations are
instances of your affective orientations.
Finally, an evaluative orientation involves your synthesis of facts and feelings into a
judgment about some political phenomenon. For example, you might decide whether to vote
for a candidate. You might determine whether an individual has a free speech right to
make negative comments on the Internet about a racial group. You might assess whether
Palestine should be granted full member status in the United Nations General Assembly.
A particular situation might generate a variety of political beliefs. For example, if
your government has proposed a policy that restricts the right of a woman to have an
abortion, this might stimulate many different thoughts and feelings—your knowledge
about the constitutional rights of an individual to freedom of action and of the state to
limit those rights; your religious, moral, or scientific beliefs about the status of a fetus;
your personal knowledge of the experiences of people who have made decisions about
abortions; your emotional response to the idea of abortion; and your judgment of what
you conclude should be government policy on abortion. In short, on any topic you can
hold a variety of cognitive, affective, and evaluative political beliefs. It is likely that
many of the attitudes that you might identify as your fundamental political beliefs
are based on evaluative orientations grounded in cognitive and affective orientations.

Identifying Specific Beliefs

When employing the methods and assumptions of empirical political theory, we
build our conceptual understanding of political beliefs in several stages. If we want to
understand one person’s political orientations, we might begin by collecting empirical
data by means of an interview or questionnaire. A telephone interview was the basis
for the data in Table 1.2, for example. There are hundreds of politically relevant ques-
tions that enable us to identify some of the specific beliefs that a person holds: Does
she know the name of the country’s chief executive? How does she react to news that
42 Chapter 2

her state’s governor has just prevented the execution

of a convicted murderer? Does she support the use of
foreign troops in Afghanistan?
A similar analytic strategy can be used to deter-
mine what many people think about a specific issue.
When the attitudes of many people are gathered, aggre-
gated, and summarized, they constitute the most
widely available data about people’s political orien-
tations: public opinion polls (also known as survey
research). Almost every day, the media provide
data on the percentage of people who hold a certain
opinion regarding a political issue. For example, a
public opinion poll might report data about how
Canadians respond to the question, “On the whole,
should your government be responsible to reduce
income differences between the rich and poor?” On
the basis of this survey research data, you might
decide you know what Canadians think about the
issue. This information seems to be a stronger basis
for a knowledge claim than a discussion with a few
Canadian friends or even a statement by a Canadian
political leader. Table 2.2 provides examples of the
On every issue involving government policy, there are types of political questions that appear on such polls,
individuals who hold strong political beliefs. offering comparative data on the responses from

Table 2.2 Selected Political Beliefs of People in Six Countries*

Suppose your govern-
ment suspected a
On the whole, should terrorist act was about
your government be How successful to happen. Do you think
responsible to reduce is the govern- the authorities should How often do
income differences ment in your have the right to stop public officials
between the rich and country in con- and search people in the deal fairly with
Country poor? trolling crime? street? people like you?
Definitely Probably Very Quite Definitely Probably Always Often
Canada 36% 31% 4% 30% 13% 26% 11% 34%
Japan 34 32 2 16 11 36 2 22
Russia 53 33 2 9 6 21 3 10
South Africa 41 43 4 12 30 28 5 21
Sweden 37 31 1 11 26 32 25 36
United States 27 24 5 31 17 24 11 22
*Only the two most positive of the four or five possible responses are indicated in this table, so the totals do not equal 100 percent.
SOURCE: World Values Survey (2006).
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 43

Canadians, Japanese, Russians, South Africans, Swedes, and Americans (from a major
comparative survey research project conducted by political scientists in more than
80 countries). According to these data, about 67 percent of Canadians say that govern-
ment should reduce income differences.
Public opinion polls should be interpreted with care. In assessing the information,
you should consider questions such as these: Did those who conducted the poll have
a bias toward a particular result? Were the questions or the possible responses worded
in a way that might distort people’s opinions? Did those who responded seem a repre-
sentative sample of the entire group to whom the opinion is attributed? Are different
interpretations of the data possible? Even when the survey researchers are unbiased,
there are numerous reasons why their findings might be somewhat inaccurate. For
example, there can be errors in their predictions, based on public opinion polls, of how
the population will vote in an election. Why might this happen?

Belief Systems
2.3 Compare belief systems of the mass and the elite.
Beyond the identification of specific beliefs of individuals, other interesting analyses
can focus on the array of their political beliefs. The term political belief system refers
to the configuration of an individual’s political orientations. This network of cognitive,
affective, and evaluative beliefs serves as a basic framework (also termed an opinion
schema), guiding a person as she organizes her existing political knowledge and pro-
cesses new information to establish a viewpoint on a particular subject (Dalton 2013;
Niemi, Weisberg, and Kimball 2011).
To examine a person’s belief system, you can ask a series of analytical questions:

1. What is the content of the beliefs—that is, the subject matter and the nature of the
beliefs?
2. What is the salience of the beliefs—that is, the importance or significance the per-
son attaches to the beliefs?
3. What is the level of complexity of the beliefs?
4. Is there a consistency among subsets of beliefs that suggests a series of general
principles from which specific beliefs are derived?
5. How stable are the beliefs over time?
6. Do the beliefs motivate the person to undertake any political action(s)?

The early empirical research on the nature of belief systems was particularly influ-
enced by the analyses of Philip Converse (1964), who focused on people in the United
States. In general, Converse argues that a belief system has two levels of informa-
tion. One level includes relatively straightforward facts or opinions such as a person’s
opinion about whether American public schools should allow Christian prayer dur-
ing class time. The second level is constraint knowledge, in which more abstract and
overarching concepts (such as one’s ideological or religious values) operate to shape
44 Chapter 2

and link ideas. In the school prayer example, a person might base her opinion on con-
straint knowledge about the constitutional separation of church and state or about free
speech issues.
Studying the beliefs of individual Americans in the 1950s, Converse concluded
that only about 15 percent of the population had a sophisticated, “elite belief system”
characterized by extensive political knowledge and abstract ideas that were well
organized by constraint knowledge. The rest of the population lacked detailed politi-
cal knowledge, operated with minimal constraint knowledge, and thus had a belief
system that lacked coherence. He termed this the belief system of the “mass public.”
Converse reported that almost half of the U.S. public revealed either a set of “simplis-
tic political beliefs” or “political ignorance.”
More recent research has challenged some of Converse’s conclusions, particularly
the distinction between belief systems of a mass public and an elite. Many empiri-
cal studies reveal that the extent of individuals’ political knowledge ranges in a more
normal curve from the highly informed to the uninformed (Delli Carpini and Keeter
1996). Other studies conclude that even those with a modest level of political knowl-
edge are able to fashion reasonable political opinions and make good judgments about
politics (Sniderman, Brody, and Tetlock 1993; Zaller 1992). In this view, members of the
mass public use simple rules of thumb to make sense of issues, particularly in issue
areas that interest them (Dalton 2013; Lupia and McCubbins 1998; see also Chapter 4).
Another perspective argues that individuals develop structured ways of thinking
about the world but that these ways are not similar for everyone. Thus, if the analyst
studies how a particular person structures her thoughts—rather than merely asking
questions about specific beliefs—her political attitudes might be generally consistent
and coherent within this structure (Rosenberg 1988, 2002).
Despite continuing debate regarding the precise nature of political belief
systems across the full range of people, most researchers agree on certain gener-
alizations that are broadly accurate for most people in most countries. Like nearly
every generalization about politics, these are subject to many qualifications and
some exceptions.

1. Political issues have low salience compared with other concerns in people’s
lives. Although Aristotle called the citizen homo politicus, or “political man,”
most people do not locate political issues in the center of their interest and atten-
tion space.
2. People tend to focus attention on concrete issues and have minimal grasp of the
abstract political concepts that serve as constraint knowledge.
3. Interest and knowledge are greater on immediate, short-term issues than on
longer-term ones.
4. While people’s fundamental beliefs are relatively stable, there can be considerable
volatility in their short-term political opinions, which tend to shift when subjected
to modest changes in political information. This volatility might be due to lim-
ited interest or to the sheer difficulty of trying to understand complicated political
questions.
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 45

5. Significant inconsistencies can exist across political beliefs, in the sense that a
person can hold contradictory positions. For example, an American might express
support for the First Amendment right to free speech but deny the right of an
Islamic fundamentalist to speak at a public meeting or the right of the Knights
of the Ku Klux Klan to hold a public rally in a predominantly African American
community.
6. The content of beliefs is often inaccurate. In one survey, for example, half the
Americans questioned did not know how many U.S. senators serve their state.

Individuals with more sophisticated belief systems tend to differ on all six of these
factors. Their belief systems are generally characterized by high levels of salience,
abstraction, breadth, stability, consistency, and accuracy. While they employ constraint
knowledge extensively to inform their beliefs, they do not all share the same core
beliefs (Higley and Burton 2006). For example, some people might have a coherent
system of beliefs that supports the protection of an individual’s civil liberties, while
other people’s constraint knowledge and specific opinions consistently support the
right of the government to limit individual liberties substantially in the protection of
social order (Sniderman et al. 1991).
While the political beliefs of every person can affect the political world, those
who have more sophisticated belief systems are particularly significant. First, the most
sophisticated and active political thinkers can influence the views of many others.
They absorb and analyze complex events and issues in the political world and then
communicate them to a broader audience. This “two-step communication flow” is
viewed by some to be crucial in shaping the understandings of many people. Second,
many of those with more sophisticated belief systems hold positions of power and
authority in society, and thus the actions they take on the basis of their political views
can have substantial impact.

Political Culture
2.4 determine the extent to which political culture explains political behavior.
Some analysts attempt to identify broadly shared patterns of political orientations that
characterize a large group of people. The objective is to develop generalizations about
the political culture of the group. Political culture is normally defined as the configura-
tion of a particular people’s political orientations—that is, the generalized belief system of
many. For this reason, political culture is not precisely a topic in micropolitics, but it is
examined here because it is embedded in individual-level analyses.
The composition of the group whose political culture is studied depends on the
interests of the researcher. It might be the people of a geographic community (e.g.,
Londoners, English, British, or Europeans) or of a community of shared identity (e.g.,
Sikhs in the Indian state of Punjab, Sikhs in the Indian subcontinent, or all Sikhs in the
world) or of a community of shared meaning (e.g., French Canadians or all French-
speaking peoples). Most studies have focused on the political culture of a country or of
a major (ethnic or religious) community within a country.
46 Chapter 2

National Character Studies

Some research, generally termed national character studies, attempts to capture the
essence of a people’s political culture in terms of broad adjectives (Inkeles 1997). When
someone is described as being “soooo French,” you might think of her as sophis-
ticated, romantic, and volatile. At one level, we recognize immediately that such a
characterization is a stereotype that does not fit the majority of individual subjects. Yet
most of us, including people in the political world, use these kinds of labels (at least
occasionally) as a shorthand method of describing groups or nations. Indeed, Franklin
Delano Roosevelt (U.S. president from 1933 to 1945) observed that “the all-important
factor in national greatness is national character.”
Some political analysts have tried to specify the national character of a certain
country and then to predict or explain the population’s political behavior on the
basis of such characteristics. Typically, these studies do not claim that everyone fits
the national character profile, but they maintain that the profile significantly affects
many politically-relevant actions. For example, Jorge Castaneda (2011: xi) analyzes
how “the very national character that helped forge Mexico as a nation now dramati-
cally hinders its search for a future and modernity.” He defines a bundle of traits
that includes a mistrust of others, fear of outsiders, and resistance to change. These
combine with an unwillingness to engage in a vigorous debate on current political
and economic issues, especially among the more powerful groups in Mexican soci-
ety. Most importantly, the Mexican national character is dominated by “a premodern
individualism” that, he argues, results in a fundamental rejection of collective action
and collective solutions that must occur for Mexico to evolve into a vigorous democ-
racy and respond effectively to the challenges of the global economy (Castaneda
2011: 32).
A controversial analysis based on a very broad notion of supranational character
is Samuel Huntington’s (1998) description of nine global “civilizations.” These civili-
zations are the highest level of cultural identity among humans, with the nine groups
differing in history, language, culture, and especially religion. The groups, which are
also somewhat regionally based, are African, Buddhist, Confucian, Hindu, Islamic,
Japanese, Latin American, Orthodox (Russian), and Western. Huntington predicts that
clashes among these civilizations are now the fundamental source of international
political conflict and are the most likely cause of the next global war. The Debate in 2
considers Huntington’s claims.
Many analysts criticize national character studies as impressionistic and loaded
with gross generalizations that greatly oversimplify political reality. Consequently,
most scholars dismiss national character studies as caricatures with little capacity
to account for the complex actual political behaviors within a country. However, the
more thoughtful analyses of national character, based on dominant patterns of beliefs
and behaviors, can provide fascinating insights into both the political culture and the
political actions taken in a society, and such culture-based explanations are evident in
recent research (Moisi 2009; Wiarda 2013).
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 47

The Debate in 2
Is There a Clash of Civilizations?
Although national character studies are no longer (Buddhists) and the Chinese; and Israelis (Jews)
in vogue, Samuel Huntington’s (1998) controver- and regional Muslim groups.
sial analysis is based on the concept of broad dif- • The humiliation and lack of respect experienced
ferences across supranational character types. by many in the Islamic culture and the fears of
Huntington defines nine distinct civilizations. He danger and decline experienced by many in the
then predicts that tensions and conflict are more Western culture have resulted in increasing hos-
likely to occur among these nine civilizations rather tilities between these two civilizations, which
than within them, and he specifies which civiliza- generally blame each other for these conditions
tions are most opposed. Huntington’s claims about (Moisi 2009).
the crucial impact of these supranational character • As Huntington predicted, there have been
groups on current global affairs have been a source particularly extensive and intensive clashes
of heated debate among policymakers and academ- between the Islamic civilization and adjacent
ics. Is there a clash of civilizations? civilizations in recent decades, such as Russian
Orthodox (Chechnya, Kazakhstan), African
A Clash of Civilizations Exists (Sudan, Nigeria), Sinic (Western China), and
• There is considerable empirical evidence that Hindu (India).
fundamental differences exist among civiliza- • Leaders of many Latin American countries have
tions. For example, analyses from the World expressed open opposition to the ideology, poli-
Values Survey indicate that Muslims and cies, and values that guide the United States,
Westerners disagree profoundly on numerous as the leader of the Western bloc of developed
social issues like gender equality and homosex- countries. While major conflict is unlikely, there
uality (Norris and Inglehart 2012). is clearly a volatile clash between the West and
• While ideologies and political regimes may Latin American opinion leaders such as Evo
change, underlying civilization identities are the Morales in Bolivia.
product of centuries and will not disappear.
Most people can choose to embrace or shed a There Is No Clash of Civilizations
particular political ideology, but few reject the
fundamental ethnoreligious identity of their birth. • Like other discredited national character studies,
These broad ethnic and religious identities have “civilizations” as an organizing principle vastly
a major and growing significance in a global oversimplifies reality. Each category collapses
society in which violent conflicts over ideas and countless cultures, languages, and histories
resources are unavoidable. (Said 2001). For example, there are substantial
• The empirical evidence also reveals that since differences within the Islamic civilization, like
the end of World War II, there has been a con- those between Shi’a and Sunni; among Saudi,
tinual rise in the number of ethnoreligious Indonesian, and Turk; and so on. Such differ-
conflicts within states in which the cleavages ences are also clear among the many ethnic
are related to the civilizations described by groups within the African civilization’s Congo,
Huntington (Eriksson et al. 2003). Examples Ghana, South Africa, and so on. Overall, there
include the struggles between: the United is as much variation within each civilization as
States’ Western alliance and Muslim groups in there is among civilizations.
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran; Tamils (Hindus) and • The argument of value differences among
Sinhalese (Buddhists) in Sri Lanka; the Tibetans civilizations on issues like gender ignores the
48 Chapter 2

compelling empirical evidence of deep divisions identities that crosscut Huntington’s civilizations
within Western countries; for example, on issues can also create powerful ties that bind. Indians’
such as gay marriage, abortion, and the need for national pride, for example, is a strong coun-
an equal (gender) rights amendment. terbalance to Hindu–Muslim distinctions within
• More broadly, the empirical facts show no India.
evidence of a systemic clash of civilizations. • Stephen Walt (1997) argues that the clash of civi-
Statistical analyses demonstrate that “pairs of lizations argument is merely an attempt by some
states split across civilizational boundaries are in the West to build up a new “bogeyman”—to
no more likely to become engaged in disputes find a new set of enemies after the fall of the
than are other states” (Russett et al. 2000). Even Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. If
disputes arising between the West and Islam (a policymakers behave as if civilizations will inevi-
friction point predicted by Huntington) are no tably clash, it will provide political leaders on both
more likely than conflicts between any other two sides with justifications for certain military and
states, ceteris paribus. foreign policy actions and might even result in an
• For civilizations to exist as Huntington describes artificially induced civilizational conflict.
them, they must resist the penetration and influ-
ence of other civilizations. Yet globalization has
dramatically increased the penetration across More questions…
cultures, the convergence in values and behav- 1. Which of Huntington’s nine civilizations seems
iors, and the blurring of differences. most plausible to you? Which seems least
• Individuals and thus societies are not solely plausible?
defined and motivated by their religious and eth- 2. What empirical evidence would you find suf-
nic identities (Sen 2006). National and regional ficient to resolve the question of this debate?

Survey Research Analyses

The section above described how survey research is used to gather empirical data
about individuals’ political beliefs, as in Table 2.2. Thus, a more systematic and scien-
tifically acceptable method for establishing the nature of a political culture is the use
of carefully gathered empirical data on individuals’ political beliefs and actions. Such
survey research analyses then aggregates these empirical data, searching for patterns or config-
urations that profile the political culture of the sample and, by inference, that characterize
the political culture of the population from which the sample is taken.
The first major study of this type is The Civic Culture by Gabriel Almond and
Sidney Verba (1963). Lengthy interviews were conducted with a large sample
of citizens in each of five countries. The data were then aggregated and analyzed
in diverse ways to provide rich descriptions, as the study contrasted the different
political cultures of Italy (“alienated”), Mexico (“alienated but aspiring”), the United
States (“participant”), the United Kingdom (“deferential”), and (West) Germany
(“detached”). Another of the notable early studies found widespread similarities
in the social and political concerns among citizens in many democratic countries.
Personal desires for a happy family life, a decent standard of living, and good health
were most important, and political concerns centered on fears about war and political
instability (Cantril 1965).
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 49

The most comprehensive recent comparative surveys of political culture are the
World Values Survey (WVS). Ronald Inglehart and collaborating scholars have con-
ducted six “waves” of this survey (in 1981, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2006, and 2014), and the
survey now includes individuals from more than 80 countries that contain more than
85 percent of the world’s population. Large samples of adults in each country are
asked many questions about their opinions regarding politics, societal needs, personal
values, and so on. Table 2.2 presented a few examples of the questions on the survey.
Do you think the data in Table 2.2 are evidence that there are differences in the citizens’
political beliefs across the selected countries? Compare in 2 describes recent research
from the WVS that attempts broad crossnational comparisons of political orientations.

Compare in 2
Value Differences across Countries
The World Values Survey is a major attempt to values. The Swiss value personal freedom and
compare social and political values in more than independence, with minimal state control over their
80 countries. The survey attempts to measure an actions and lives. Theirs is one of the most orderly
extensive array of each individual’s political orienta- and nonconflictual societies in the world. It is a
tions. The researchers then aggregate those beliefs wealthy country that has generally avoided many
for the respondents in each country to specify “peo- of the economic fluctuations that have plagued
ple’s prevailing value orientations” (Inglehart and many other advanced countries, and most of its
Welzel 2005). The result of one of their most ambi- citizens enjoy considerable prosperity and have less
tious efforts to map the values across countries is immediate concerns about economic insecurity.
shown in Figure 2.1. The responses to numerous Religion’s lack of influence on Switzerland is also
questions were combined to create individual-level a factor regarding the views of the Swiss on indi-
and then country-level values on two broad dimen- vidual rights, including homosexuality and divorce.
sions. The self-expression versus survival value Although some in Switzerland disapprove of homo-
dimension measures the priority placed on subjec- sexuality, the general population is tolerant of the
tive well-being values such as tolerance versus secu- gay community. In fact, Switzerland remains one
rity values. The secular-rational versus traditional of the most progressive countries regarding gay
value dimension reflects how strongly individuals rights. Homosexuality was decriminalized as early
embrace the norms associated with religion, family, as 1942, and in 2007 Switzerland began recogniz-
and country. Figure 2.1 is one of the comparisons ing same-sex partnerships with the Partnership Act.
that can be made using the country-level scores on Switzerland actively encourages its gay citizens to
these two dimensions. A brief look at several coun- reveal their homosexuality with the annual “Coming
tries suggests how these collective value scores Out Day.”
seem reflected in each country’s actual politics. We Uganda, in contrast, has been torn apart by
focus in particular on the issues of homosexual- political instability, poverty, and conflict among
ity and obedience to authority, which, according to social groups. These conditions are consistent with
Inglehart’s group, are especially significant reflec- a political culture characterized by survival values
tions of the level of tolerance and propensity to and a very clear orientation to traditional values.
democracy in a society (Norris and Inglehart 2012; Traditional values and a low level of tolerance are
Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2010). evident in Uganda’s approach to gays and lesbians.
Switzerland’s population scores very high on Since its colonial era, Uganda has outlawed homo-
both secular-rational values and self-expression sexuality and conviction currently carries a 14-year
50 Chapter 2

Figure 2.1 Dimensions of Human Values at the Collective Level

SOURCE: Inglehart and Welzel 2010.

2.0
Japan
Secular-Rational Values Sweden
Protestant
1.5 Confucian Europe
Germany

Taiwan Hong Kong Norway

Czech Rep.
1.0 Denmark
Bulgaria Finland
Belarus Slovenia Netherlands Switzerland
China Slovakia
Belgium Iceland
S. Korea Catholic
0.5 Russia France
Europe
Moldova Luxembourg
Ukraine Serbia Italy
Australia
Orthodox Croatia
0.0 Macedonia Britain
Spain N. Zealand
South Canada
Romania
Asia N. Ireland
Vietnam
India Cyprus
Uruguay English
–0.5 Iraq
Indonesia Thailand Argentina Speaking
Ethiopia Poland
Malaysia Ireland
Zambia Brazil U.S.
Islamic Turkey
–1.0 Chile
Bangladesh Iran Latin
Traditional Values

Uganda
Pakistan Burkina Mali America
Rwanda Nigeria Peru
–1.5 Jordan S. Africa Mexico
Zimbabwe Algeria Venezuela
Guatemala
Morocco Egypt Colombia
Tanzania Puerto Rico
Africa Ghana El Salvador
–2.0
–2.0 –1.5 –1.0 –0.5 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5
Survival Values Self Expression Values

prison sentence. In 2014, a new law specified that most Moroccans. It is perhaps not surprising that
certain forms of homosexual behavior are punish- the country was not among the first or the second
able by life imprisonment, a sentence reduced from wave of countries in rebellion against their leaders
the death penalty only in response to harsh criticism during the “Arab Awakening” that began in the sum-
from the global community. Also, a person can even mer of 2011.
be imprisoned for counseling gays or lesbians. In contrast, the citizens of the Czech Republic
In another example, Morocco has a population are particularly high on secular-rational values.
that generally exhibits strong traditional and survival Nearly 60 percent of the Czechs report they are
values. Most Moroccans live in tight-knit extended atheists—one of the world’s highest proportions.
families and identify strongly with their kin group. The Both their break with religion and the harsh experi-
emphasis on obedience and acceptance of author- ences under communism from the late 1940s to
ity seems linked both to the power of the hereditary the late 1980s seem associated with their skepti-
king and a somewhat repressive regime and also to cism regarding those in authority and the value of
the influence of the Muslim religion over the lives of obedience. While there is some Czech nationalism,
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 51

their identities are diluted by regional ties and and political orientations that can be measured and
residual links to the Czechoslovakia prior to 1989 compared.
as well as their growing identity as Europeans
within the EU. Further Questions
While you might find the blobs of countries in
1. The location of which country in Figure 2.1 most
Figure 2.1 a bit odd, the researchers claim that most
surprises you? Why?
countries can be grouped, based especially on
region and/or religion, into the nine political cultures 2. Do the clusters in Figure 2.1 make sense to
that are labeled in Figure 2.1 (Inglehart and Welzel you? Can you suggest a different way to cat-
2010). This is an admirable attempt to use solid egorize the countries?
empirical data to compare the broad value systems 3. Where do you think you might be located in
of people in many countries. While the analyses Figure 2.1?
are more sweeping than many other studies, most 4. Does the analysis in Figure 2.1 seem to provide
scholars of political behavior conclude that the any support for Huntington’s ideas about a
citizens of different nationality groups have social clash of civilizations?

The extensive empirical research on political culture—as it has become more

precise in its methods and more cautious about cultural biases—has revealed the
considerable variability in political culture within a country, across individuals,
among groups, and over time. Chapter 4 will examine some of the factors that might
account for differences in the political beliefs of individuals within a society. But it
is also evident from the survey research that many countries have a political culture
that can be distinguished from the political cultures in some, perhaps most, other
countries.

Looking Ahead
Chapter 2 has introduced you to the systematic analysis of political behavior. This
chapter has described key topics in the empirical study of political beliefs—what indi-
viduals know, feel, and think about politics. Analysis can focus on a single person, a
group, or even a culture, and it can assess a single belief or an array of beliefs across
many issues. The chapter has also examined normative political theory—the explora-
tion of how individuals, government, and society should operate. Normative theory is
arguably the oldest subfield in the study of politics, and its perennial questions about
the good society and the appropriate role of government remain as intriguing and as
contested as they were during the time of Plato.
The next step in the analysis of political behavior is to move our focus from politi-
cal beliefs to political actions. Thus, Chapter 3 explores the array of political actions in
which an individual or group can engage.
52 Chapter 2

Key Concepts
affective orientation, p. 41 Islamism, p. 38 political behavior, p. 27
classical liberalism, p. 33 Marxist–Leninist socialism, political belief system, p. 43
cognitive orientation, p. 40 p. 36 political culture, p. 45
conservatism, p. 31 micropolitics, p. 27 political ideology, p. 30
democratic socialism, p. 36 national character studies, public opinion polls, p. 42
empirical political theory, p. 28 p. 46 socialism, p. 35
evaluative orientation, p. 41 normative political theory, survey research, p. 42
fascism, p. 38 p. 28 welfare state, p. 37

For Further Consideration

1. What are your general beliefs about human 3. Can you characterize your own political
nature? Are these beliefs consistent with your belief system? For example, what are your
most important beliefs about how people three to five most salient political beliefs?
ought to behave and do behave politically? Do they deal with the same general content
area?
2. What do you think is the most sensible
assumption and the most questionable 4. If you were to analyze the political belief
assumption of conservatism? Of classical system of another person on the basis of five
liberalism? Of socialism? questions, what questions would you ask?

For Further Reading

almond, Gabriel, and Sidney verba. (1963). liberal perspectives) contains more than 450
The Civic Culture. Princeton, nJ: Princeton readable and interesting articles that concentrate
university Press. This is a landmark empiri- on the “isms” and many, many other interesting
cal, comparative study of the political cultures themes, as elaborated by historical and contem-
of different countries. porary thinkers from many parts of the world.
Bryson, valerie. (2003). Feminist Political Fromm, erich, ed. (1965). Socialist Humanism.
Theory: An Introduction. 2nd ed. new york: new york: doubleday. Prominent social sci-
Palgrave Macmillan. This provides an acces- entists and political philosophers expound the
sible introduction to some of the variations in virtues of socialism.
the complex set of theoretical approaches and Griffin, roger, ed. (1998). International Fascism:
debates in this increasingly influential set of Theories, Causes, and the New Consensus.
perspectives on analyzing politics at all levels. london: Bloomsbury academic. A diverse
Carlisle, rodney, ed. (2005). Encyclopedia of and thorough selection of writings on fascism,
Politics: The Left and the Right. newbury by both fascists and antifascists, exploring the
Park, Ca: Sage. This clever and comprehensive strong appeal of this ideology to many indi-
(1,100 pages) two-volume set (the “left” volume viduals and groups during the mid-twentieth
examines progressive/socialist thinking and century and also at the beginning of the twenty-
the “right” examines conservative and classical first century.
 Political Theory and Political Beliefs 53

huntington, Samuel P. (1998). Clash of substantially from it in both their attitudes and
Civilizations and the Remaking of the World their political styles.
Order. new york: Simon and Schuster. As Mclellan, david, ed. (2007). Marxism after Marx.
described in this chapter (see Debate in 2), the 4th ed. new york: Palgrave. An excellent set
author offers a sweeping and controversial of readings exploring the many versions of
analysis of major cultural groupings at the Marxism that have continued to wield great
global level, where identity, especially reli- significance in the field of political theory.
gious and cultural, is the dominant force shap- Moisi, dominique. (2009). The Geopolitics of
ing both the beliefs and actions of individuals Emotion: How Fear, Humiliation and Hope
and also the patterns of world politics. are Reshaping the World. new york: random
Inglehart, ronald, and Christian Welzel house. In a variation on the clash of civiliza-
(2005). Modernization, Cultural Change tions perspective, Moisi argues that there are
and Democracy: The Human Development broad, regionally based cultures that differ. He
Sequence. new york: Cambridge university claims that the driving emotion of the Western
Press. Building on his important earlier work cultures is fear, of the Islamic cultures is
(Inglehart 1989, 1997), the author and his co- humiliation, and of the Asian cultures is hope,
author further develop detailed analyses based and that the evolution and interplay of these
on the World Values Survey that characterize patterns will have critical impacts on global
the nature of and shifts in political culture across society.
more than 75 countries (see Compare in 2). Murray, Charles. (1997). What It Means to Be
lebow, richard ned. (2012). The Politics and a Libertarian. new york: Broadway Books.
Ethics of Identity: In Search of Ourselves. new A brief, readable application of libertarian
york: Cambridge university Press. An explo- ideology to many contemporary issues (e.g.,
ration of how an individual establishes per- abortion, education, drugs, economic regula-
sonal identity, showing that such identities are tion, free speech), written by one of America’s
fluid and fragmented, and how distinct politi- most controversial social critics.
cal orientations emerge that are associated nisbet, robert. (2001). Conservatism: Dream and
with conservatism, totalitarianism, liberalism Reality. Piscataway, nJ: Transaction. A short,
and anarchism. illuminating discussion that traces the devel-
love, nancy S., ed. (2010). Dogmas and Dreams: opment of conservative thought and its signifi-
A Reader in Modern Political Ideologies. 4th cance in contemporary politics.
ed. Washington, dC: Cq Press. A solid reader Putnam, robert d. (1993). Making Democracy
that includes important writings by many key Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy.
theorists of the three major “isms” as well Princeton, nJ: Princeton university Press.
as others including anarchism, fascism, and Using communities in northern and southern
feminism. Italy as his cases, the author develops a signifi-
Mayer, lawrence, and erol Kaymak. (1998). The cant and widely cited argument about the role
Crisis of Conservatism and the Rise of the New of political culture in sustaining democracy,
Right in Western Democracies: Populist Revolt and especially about the crucial importance of
in the Late Twentieth Century. armonk, ny: “social capital”—the citizens’ willingness to
M. e. Sharpe. An interesting exploration of engage and interact with each other.
the activities of ideologically driven and rather ryan, alan. (2012). On Politics: A History of
alienated populist groups that have their roots Political Thought: From Herodotus to the
in traditional conservatism but have diverged Present. new york: liveright. A long (1, 150
54 Chapter 2

page) but readable and exceptional explora- perspective of Islam and to compare those
tion of the great political thinkers and the views to political theories dominant in Europe
continuing importance and insights they and the United States.
provide. Tucker, robert, ed. (1978). The Marx–Engels
Sabet, amr G. e. (2008). Islam and the Political: Reader. 2nd ed. new york: norton. An exten-
Theory, Governance and International sive selection of the important writings, with
Relations. london: Pluto Press. A serious commentaries, from the major theorists of rev-
attempt to explore ideas such as develop- olutionary socialism, Karl Marx and Friedrich
ment, human rights, and democracy from the Engels.

On the Web
http://www.nationalgeographic.com of the Socialist Worker newspaper and the
National Geographic has offered rich informa- International Socialist Review journal.
tion and photographs from locations around http://socialistinternational.org
the world for nearly a century. Some of this The site of the international democratic social-
material is informative about culture and soci- ist movement, it contains information about
ety in many places, including insights about the people, ideas, and events important to the
political culture. movement.
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/ http://www.keele.ac.uk/depts/por/ptbase.htm
2009/03/progressive_quiz.html This rich website hosted by Keele University
One of several Web sites where you can in England provides many links to key politi-
respond to a series of questions about your cal theorists and political theories.
political beliefs and receive an analysis of your http://www.independent.org
political ideology. Try it! The Independent Institute, a libertarian orga-
http://turnabout.ath.cx:8000 nization, provides access to a comprehensive
This site offers an interesting, quirky, and very list of various online opinion articles, policy
diverse array of links to materials associated analyses, and book reviews tied to political
with “traditionalist conservatism worldwide.” ideology.
Links range across political perspectives from http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/
various countries, from conservatism in many modsbook.html
of the world’s religions to extreme-right fringe The Internet Modern History Sourcebook
groups. includes numerous links related to important
http://www.intellectualtakeout.com works on major political philosophies as well
This site promotes individual freedom and lim- as key historical documents.
ited government and targets college students. http://www.liberal-international.org
http://www.libertarianism.com This Web site serves as the electronic home of
This portal for the libertarian belief system Liberal International, a worldwide federation
provides clear policy positions and many of liberal and progressive political parties.
sources guided by this ideology. http://www.feminist.com
http://internationalsocialist.org Feminist.com is an online community designed
The site of the International Socialist to promote feminism and women’s rights. The
Organization, an association promulgating the site contains a number of articles and speeches
Marxist–Leninist perspective, and publisher related to feminist thought.
Chapter 3
Political Actions

Learning Objectives
3.1 Classify the modes of conventional and less conventional individual
political action.
3.2 Distinguish between interest groups and political parties.
3.3 Summarize interest group strategies.
3.4 Identify the types of interest groups and the constraints under which
they operate.
3.5 Analyze the roles of political parties.

Imagine that you are walking in a crowd of peaceful protesters. Your group is ask-
ing for the basic political right to vote for the candidate of your choice for national
office. Ahead of you is a line of heavily armed troops who are blocking your march.
Although you are engaged in a nonviolent protest, you know that brutal force has
been used against groups like yours in similar situations. What is your next step?
In this politically charged instant, one tiny woman moves forward. She walks
alone up to the armed troops who aim their weapons directly at her and warn they
will shoot. But no one fires or seizes her, and she walks through the troops. You and
the others are emboldened to follow her. Do you step forward now?
In a country with a repressive and abusive military regime, one person stands tall,
although she is only 5 feet 4 inches and weighs less than 100 pounds. Aung San Suu
Kyi is a powerful voice for human rights and democratic freedom in Myanmar (some,
including the United States, still call it Burma), a country of 56 million in Southeast
Asia. This woman has been classified as a national security threat by the military junta
that has controlled the government of Myanmar since 1962. How can one woman stir
up so much anxiety within a military leadership that seems all-powerful and uses
extensive violence to subjugate its citizens?
Suu Kyi’s first major public speech occurred in 1988 when she addressed nearly
500,000 protesting citizens who had begun a prodemocracy movement that year.
Thousands of students participated in these protests, and many citizens risked their

55
56 Chapter 3

Fearless activist. Aung San Suu Kyi has consistently been a strong voice promoting democracy and
opposing the repressive regime in Myanmar. Here, she addresses a rally shortly before one of her
lengthy periods under house arrest.

jobs and personal security to join her party, the National League for Democracy. When
the party won control of the legislature in a 1990 election, Suu Kyi was designated
as the prime minister–elect. However, the military dictatorship refused to turn over
power to her and the democratically elected representatives. Suu Kyi was awarded the
1991 Nobel Peace Prize for her efforts, although the government would not allow her
to travel from Myanmar to accept it.
To intimidate and weaken the members of the opposition movement, the military
placed Suu Kyi under house arrest. For 16 of 21 years, she was confined to her own
house and prevented from making public speeches or meeting other political leaders.
Suu Kyi has been attacked by a mob of government goons and accused of tax evasion,
leading to brief imprisonment. But she refused to give up the struggle for political and
human rights. Even the prime minister was arrested in 2004 after proposing a “road
map to democracy” and allowing Suu Kyi to speak in public.
Many citizens in Myanmar lived quietly, intimidated by the ruthless actions of
the military, and hoped to go unnoticed. But some did engage in courageous actions.
The Karen people, an ethnic minority, have resisted violently for 60 years, demand-
ing autonomy in eastern Myanmar. Opposition politicians speak out for change
and call for fair elections. Massive demonstrations for democracy were held again
throughout the country in 2007, drawing more than 100,000 peaceful protesters,
which included large numbers of Buddhist monks. The government responded with
 Political Actions 57

troops who arrested, beat, and bullied those who were demonstrating, even raiding
pagodas to arrest monks. Some protesters were sentenced to 65 years in prison. In
response to the continuing resistance and international pressure, the regime finally
began to open the political system in 2010. Thousands of political prisoners were
freed and legislative elections were held in 2012 with multiple parties competing.
Suu Kyi was elected to the legislature and now leads the major opposition party
group in government.
Most political actions by individuals and groups have complicated and complex
motivations. The political actions of the military junta, Aung Sun Suu Kyi, and other
prodemocracy protesters in Myanmar are prime examples of attempts to control or
shape agendas and events in a society. If you were a citizen of Myanmar, would you
have the commitment and courage to stand up against a repressive system? More real-
istically, have you taken any meaningful political actions within the last year? What is
the most risky political action you have ever taken?
In Chapter 2, we began our analysis of political behavior by examining the
political beliefs of individuals and groups. The next step in our understanding of polit-
ical behavior is to consider what people do politically—not merely what they think.
For those people opposed to the regime in Myanmar, political beliefs must be con-
verted into action before they will have any meaningful effect. And in the discussion
at Burger King described at the beginning of Chapter 2, the most relevant questions
from the perspective of the political world, even more than what you knew or what
you thought, are: What did you say? What did you do?
In this chapter, we examine political participation—all of the political actions by
individuals and groups. The explicit objective of most political participation is to influ-
ence the actions or selection of political rulers. We focus on the prominent modes of actual
political behavior in which people engage, and we consider groups as well as indi-
viduals because many individuals, such as Aung San Suu Kyi, realize that they can
be more effective politically if they act with others rather than alone. Thus, instead of
engaging in a lone act of protest, a person could join a huge demonstration; instead of
writing a letter requesting a change in public policy, a person could join an organiza-
tion that speaks for thousands of people.
What is the range of behaviors that a person might undertake in the political
world? At one extreme are people who are obsessed with politics, see political implica-
tions in most of life’s actions, are constantly involved in political discussion and action,
and want to make political decisions for others. At the other extreme are people who
have absolutely no interest in politics, pay no attention to political phenomena, and
engage in no politically relevant actions. (In some instances, such as not voting in an
election to indicate dissatisfaction, not doing something can also be a type of political
participation.)
In the first half of this chapter, we examine this full range of individual political
actions. In the second half, we analyze the nature and activities of two major forms
of political groups: interest groups and political parties. Both individuals and groups
share some modes of activity, but the actions of groups can also be analyzed in some
additional dimensions because of their size and structure.
58 Chapter 3

Individual Political Actions

3.1 Classify the modes of conventional and less conventional individual political
action.

Modes of Political Activity

There are various ways to classify the modes of individual political action. Empirical
studies of political participation consider both the more conventional forms of activity,
such as voting, campaigning, contacting officials, and participating in civic groups,
and the less conventional actions, such as protesting and even terrorism (Dalton 2013;
Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978).
Figure 3.1 classifies the modes of individual political action in terms of two
dimensions. The first (vertical) dimension reflects the extent to which the individual
engages in the political action, ranging from never to occasional to frequent to perva-
sive engagement. The second (horizontal) dimension considers the extent to which the
political action is more or less conventional. While there are differences in what vari-
ous people would consider conventional, there is clearly variation across an array of
actions. Figure 3.1 suggests labels for those associated with certain domains of politi-
cal actions. At the four extremes (corners) are those who are totally apathetic about
politics, those who have made a full-time vocation of politics as elected officials, those
revolutionaries who are passionately committed to transforming the existing political
system, and those who are provoked into a rare but highly unconventional action.
While we will explore some of these types of political actors and actions throughout
this book, we can characterize a few of the main types here. Although most individu-
als can be labeled by their dominant activity, a particular individual might operate in
different action domains at various times (Dalton 2013; Schlozman, Verba, and Brady

Figure 3.1 Some Modes of Individual Political Action

ary
Very High Lead
ersh lu tion
ip R evo

Foot Soldier
Extent of Activism

Single-Issue
Activism
m
Polit ivis
Enga al
ic t Act
gem re mis
ent Ext

Votin ime
g e-T
Low On mism
re
Apathy Ext
None

Conventional Unconventional

Conventionality of Action
 Political Actions 59

2013). For example, an elected official will almost certainly vote, while a revolutionary
might vote; and a conventional voter might at some point be mobilized to participate
in an unconventional action such as a violent demonstration.
The categories in Figure 3.1 are elements of a taxonomy. When you attempt to
classify units by some criteria, you are engaged in taxonomic analysis (as discussed
in the Appendix). Recall Aristotle’s comment that all thinking begins in comparison.
In political science, many comparisons begin in taxonomies. Developing a taxonomy
is often the first stage in political analysis because it sorts cases into a small number
of groups to reduce complexity, facilitate comparative analysis, and aid the develop-
ment of generalizations. Because the categories in a strong taxonomy do not overlap,
Figure 3.1 is only a loose taxonomy. You will find numerous taxonomies in this book
(e.g., the types of party systems, democracies versus nondemocracies, the Global
North and Global South). No single taxonomy is used in all political analyses because
each taxonomy emphasizes different aspects of the political world. It will be your deci-
sion whether any particular taxonomy seems useful.

Political Activists
Although the more routine modes of political action (listed in the middle and bottom
of the left side of Figure 3.1) constitute the vast majority of actual political behavior,
many of us are particularly interested in the extraordinary actions of the political
activists, who seem to “live politics.” Political activists might hold government office,
or spend many hours furthering a political goal or leader, or even risk their freedom
and life in the pursuit of a political objective. At least four different types of political
activists can be identified: foot soldiers, single-issue activists, extremist-activists, and
political leaders.

Foot SoldierS Foot soldiers are activists who do the basic work of politics. They link
the masses to the government and the top political leadership by performing tasks
such as communicating with citizens to promote an issue or a political leader, volun-
teering in a campaign, or regularly attending political rallies. In most countries, many
foot soldiers are members of political parties or groups with a political mission. Most
political organizations could not function effectively without foot soldiers.

Single-iSSue ACtiviStS Another group of political actors engage in political

behavior more sporadically than foot soldiers. These people normally do not partici-
pate very actively in the political world, but an issue emerges that mobilizes them
into a period of high-level action. For example, some residents in a neighborhood
might become agitated when they oppose a plan for a new development that will
have negative impacts on their community. They might spearhead a petition drive
or organize a disruptive activity such as picketing or a protest march. The new social
media, such as the Internet, Facebook, and the blogosphere, have provided individ-
uals with an extraordinarily rich new array of tools for engaging in political activ-
ism, enabling them to communicate their viewpoints and network with others who
share their interests (Loader and Mercea 2012). Also, people who are dissatisfied with
60 Chapter 3

the existing leaders or regime gather in public spaces for what are initially peaceful
protests. However, if the regime responds with repression rather than policy change,
these individuals can become more mobilized and more aggressive in their demands
and their own actions, transforming them into political activists. In recent years,
these “people power” movements, primarily composed of individuals who normally
engage only in very conventional political behaviors, have become more frequent. As
in the Myanmar example, many individuals in such countries as Egypt, Peru, Syria,
Tunisia, and Ukraine have recently “taken it to the streets” in modes of political action
that, for most of them, are exceptional. Such actions often last for only a short period,
and then most return to more conventional modes of political action.

extremiSt-ACtiviStS Extremist-activists are those who are willing to engage in

extensive, unconventional political action in pursuit of their vision of an ideal political outcome
that is substantially different from the existing situation. “Extremism” is a subjective
and relative concept—a person is politically extreme only in comparison with some
standard position, typically the broad center of the existing political order. Like foot
soldiers and single-issue activists, extremist-activists might participate in conventional
political activities. However, what distinguishes them is their willingness to engage in
very intensive modes of unconventional political action and to sustain their actions
over a long period of time. Some individuals can be classified as extremist-activists
if their political goals or tactics locate them on the margins of the existing political
culture. For example, members of the Earth Liberation Front are linked to violent acts
promoting environmentalism in almost 20 countries. Another example is the Libyans
who mobilized to fight for the overthrow of Muammar Gadaffi—during their armed
insurrection, fewer than 1,000 of the thousands who fought Gadaffi’s regime had ever
fired a weapon before they participated in the armed rebellion.
Political analysts have focused considerable attention on individual extremist-
activists who are the most unconventional and fully engaged: the revolutionaries.
A revolutionary is a person who attempts to overthrow the existing political order
and to replace it with a very different one, using political violence if necessary (see
Chapter 12). Some well-known revolutionaries, such as Mao Zedong (China), Fidel
Castro (Cuba), Ayatollah Khomeini (Iran), and Nelson Mandela (South Africa), even-
tually attained leadership roles in their political system after years or even decades of
struggle. Others, including Che Guevara (Cuba, then Bolivia) and Steve Biko (South
Africa), died in the struggle and became martyrs to those committed to revolutionary
change. (Two other examples are featured in Compare in 4.)
Many extremist-activists are radical versions of foot soldiers, serving as the mem-
bers of organizations such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC);
the worldwide al-Qaeda (“the Base”) network; and ETA, the Basque separatist group
in Spain and France. But an increasing proportion of the extremist-activists operate as
members of small, relatively independent groups, and occasionally as a “lone wolf”
extremist who acts almost completely alone (Sageman 2008). There is strong contem-
porary interest in extremist-activists who are willing to use any tactics and any level
of violence to achieve their goals. These individuals are often labeled as terrorists
 Political Actions 61

because of their extreme tactics,

particularly their willingness
to direct violence against those
who are not actively engaged
in political struggle (for more
details, see Chapters 4 and 12).
Most extremist-activists operate
in relative obscurity. Eventually,
they burn out and drop out, are
captured by the state, or die as a
result of political violence.

PolitiCAl leAderS Many of

us are fascinated with ultimate
political activists such as Angela
Merkel, Robert Mugabe, Barack
Obama, and Vladimir Putin. A youthful and charismatic Enrique Peña Nieto campaigns successfully for a
These top political leaders are Mexican state governorship in 2004. He was elected President, Mexico’s top
distinctive because they suc- leadership position, in 2012.
ceed in capturing supreme polit-
ical power within a government and using it with extraordinary energy and effect
(whether good or bad). Their titles vary by country and level of government and
include chairman, chancellor, dictator, governor, king, mayor, president, prime minis-
ter, and supreme leader, among others. A top political leader might put his substantial
political power and position to admirable purposes, might implement reprehensible
policies, or might accomplish almost nothing. These political leaders have been the
subject of more descriptions, analyses, and evaluations than any other type of actors in
the political world. They will frequently be the subjects in this book.

Political Participation Studies

After categories of political action are established, a basic research question is: How
many people participate in each category, both within and across various national
political contexts?
The most reliable comparative empirical data on political participation across
many countries measure voting in national elections. Table 3.1 provides these data
for selected countries. A striking observation about these figures is the huge variation
in voting levels, ranging from a reported 99 percent in Vietnam to only 29 percent in
Nigeria. Notice the very high voter turnout in countries such as Vietnam and Cuba. In
such countries, voting is primarily a symbolic act that is supposed to express support
for the existing political leadership, not an action in which citizens select their leaders.
In some countries, voting is mandatory (e.g., Australia, Singapore, and Uruguay). In
some, those in power either engage in election fraud to ensure victory (Afghanistan,
Zimbabwe) or repudiate the vote if the outcome is not favorable (as in Myanmar
when Aung San Suu Kyi won in 1990). These variations in voting alert us to a general
62 Chapter 3

Table 3.1 Voting Participation in Selected Countries: Percentage of Eligible Adults

Voting in Most Recent National Legislative Election

Percentage Turnout Countries

95–100 Vietnam
90–94 Australia, Cuba, Singapore, Uruguay
85–89 Denmark, Turkey
80–84 Brazil, France, Ghana, Malaysia, Sweden
75–79 Argentina, Italy, Myanmar, Palestine (territory), Taiwan
70–74 Belarus, Germany, South Africa
65–69 Cambodia, Costa Rica, Finland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mongolia, Spain,
United Kingdom, United States
60–64 Canada, Egypt, Hungary, Iran, Iraq, Mexico, Philippines, Russia
55–59 France, Japan, Portugal, Uganda, Ukraine
50–54 Bangladesh, Pakistan, South Korea, Syria
45–49 Chile, Morocco, Poland, Switzerland
40–44 Algeria, Colombia, Romania, Zimbabwe
35–39
30–34
25–29 Nigeria
0-24
SourCe: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, www.idea.int/vt

problem in crossnational analyses of individual-level political data—the same action

or belief might have quite different meaning and significance in different settings.
It is even more difficult to do empirical, crossnational comparisons for modes of
individual political participation other than voting. The same act can vary in mean-
ing in different political and cultural environments. For example, the significance and
potential personal risk of a public political protest are far greater for a person in North
Korea than in South Korea and greater in both those countries than for someone in
Sweden.
The most consistent finding in recent comparative research on participation is
clear: Apart from voting, which is a political act done by many/most citizens, high
levels of persistent political activity tend to be uncommon in most political sys-
tems. Research reveals that political activists who engage in a high level of the more
demanding forms of political action such as top leadership, protest, or extensive
partisan political work make up less than 10 percent of the population (and in many
countries, considerably less) (Dalton 2013; World Values Survey 2006). In contrast to
these political “gladiators,” even in an open democracy like the United States, about
one-fifth of the adult population engages in no political activity and another one-fifth
does little more than vote (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995: 50–54, 72–74).
A second broad finding is that some citizens are willing to engage occasionally in
more activist modes of political participation. While very few citizens participate in
 Political Actions 63

violent protests against people or property, there is evidence that a significant number
of people do perform certain less conventional political acts, including some actions
that require considerable effort or risk. For example, in about half of the countries
for which World Values Survey (2006) data are available, 15 percent or more of the
citizens have engaged in at least one “challenging act” (e.g., a lawful demonstration,
boycott, or building occupation). Compare in 3 and Table 3.2 examine the levels at
which the citizens of 10 countries engage in a range of more and less conventional
forms of political participation. The empirical evidence is still unclear on whether the
new communications technologies, such as social media, have drawn new individu-
als into political activity in democratic countries (Anduiza, Jensen, and Jorba 2012;
Loader and Mercea 2012).
Although systematic, comparative data on less democratic and nondemocratic
countries are limited, it seems that the reliance on nongovernmental channels and
the incidence of unconventional political behavior are greater (and vary more sub-
stantially) in those countries than in democratic systems. In some less democratic
countries, state repression deters the great majority of citizens from participation.
And there are also countries characterized by “de-participation” because the political
leadership has weakened or even eliminated the mechanisms that enable citizens to
engage in political actions (Nelson 1987: 116–120). However, the dramatic expansion
of new media and social networking capacities noted above have introduced a new
avenue for political participation and lowered the costs of organizing group activities,

Table 3.2 Recent Political Actions by Citizens in 10 Countries

often Contact a Boycott or
Attempt to Politician “Buycott”
Convince or Civil Donate Products Attend
Country Discuss Friends on Servant to Money to for Political Political
(Number of Politics Political express Politician or ethical Meeting Took Part in a
respondents) often Issues Views* or Issue* reasons* or rally* Demonstration*
Brazil (2,000) 8.0% 17.3% 3.7% 2.3% 3.2% 7.3% 3.6%
Canada (1,211) 10.7 6.7 19.0 27.5 32.4 11.2 5.6
Chile (1,505) 7.0 5.5 6.1 17.0 3.2 2.5 2.9
Mexico (1,201) 10.4 11.3 10.6 23.3 8.5 12.6 7.4
Philippines 11.3 9.8 6.5 3.5 2.4 14.3 3.0
(1,200)
Poland (1,277) 9.0 6.3 2.5 12.2 3.0 1.0 0.8
Russia (1,789) 13.0 8.1 3.7 3.9 3.0 3.3 2.8
South Africa 5.0 4.5 3.0 5.2 2.8 10.9 4.0
(2,784)
Sweden (1,295) 9.6 7.4 7.2 24.6 36.1 8.2 6.7
United States 15.6 12.3 21.9 30.8 24.1 12.5 5.3
(1,472)
*Respondent reports behavior within the last 12 months.
SourCe: International Social Survey Programme (2004).
64 Chapter 3

Compare in 3
Extent of Political Actions in Mexico and Poland
An individual might engage in a variety of political (PRI), and the other two major parties are called the
actions, and Figure 3.1 suggests that these actions Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and the
range in frequency and conventionality. How much National Action Party (PAN).
do individuals engage in various political actions? While Poland also had a tradition of regime
Are there differences in levels of participation across change in the twentieth century, the situation is dif-
different countries? Table 3.2 presents comparative ferent from Mexico. Despite recurrent resistance
data on such questions from the International Social movements, most Polish regimes were established
Survey Programme, in which 1,200–2,800 individuals by outside powers that, especially after 1930, did
in each of 37 countries reported their recent political not allow the Poles much freedom of political action
actions to survey researchers. What observations or dissent. The borders of Poland were drawn by
do you think are supported by the data? Let’s briefly the great powers after World War I and substantially
assess the political actions of people in Mexico and redrawn by the victors of World War II. Germany and
Poland. Russia (and then the Soviet Union) were particularly
The proportion of individuals engaging in politics repressive in controlling the Polish government’s
in Mexico is greater than the proportion in Poland for policies and ensuring that any serious political oppo-
every type of political action in the table. Compared sition by citizens was crushed. After the Communists
to the Poles, Mexicans are 9 times more likely to take took control in 1944, political dissent and any forms
part in a political demonstration, 12 times more likely of antigovernment activism were dealt with harshly
to attend a political rally, and 4 times more likely by the Polish regime. There was a notable three-
to contact a politician to express their views. Voter day protest in Poznan in 1956, but it was quickly
turnout is higher in Mexico (Table 3.1). It seems clear crushed by authorities, with support from the Soviet
that Mexicans engage in political actions at substan- Union. When an independent trade union movement
tially higher levels than Poles. Why do you think this (Solidarity) emerged, martial law was declared in
is? While the data in the table cannot explain differ- 1981, thousands were jailed, and the extent of activ-
ences, might this be a reflection of the countries’ ism was limited considerably. In general, the citizens’
recent histories? calculus for anti-regime activism through this period
Even before the Mexican Revolution that began was high costs with minimal benefits.
in 1910, Mexicans had a history of political uprisings As noted above, these data cannot prove the
against their rulers. In the years following 1910, there reasons for higher or lower levels of participation.
was a complex set of armed struggles for control However, it is notable that the three countries in
of the government. Under activist leaders such as Table 3.2 that seem least participatory (Russia,
Pancho Villa and Emiliano Zapata, ordinary citizens South Africa, and Poland) all have recent histo-
were encouraged to take part in demonstrations ries as highly repressive regimes that ruthlessly
and political violence, with a promise of social and punished political dissent. In contrast, the three
economic justice. Political action was widespread, countries that seem the most participatory (United
with civil war and force replacing six governments in States, Canada, and Mexico) all have a strong tra-
just the period from 1911 to 1928. These uprisings dition of rebellion, protests, and activism. It is also
mobilized diverse social classes from both rural and interesting that the data suggest that Americans are
urban areas. The ideas of resistance and revolution more politically active than might be expected from
became a powerful part of most Mexicans’ under- recent discussions of the low level of political par-
standings about governance. Indeed, the dominant ticipation in the United States. The United States is
political party for seven decades—and still a major one of the top three countries on the level of partici-
party—is called the Institutional Revolutionary Party pation for six of the seven modes of political activity
 Political Actions 65

in Table 3.2. These data about the United States analysis? The analyst makes a variety of decisions
recall a conclusion in the classic book, The Civic about how data like these are selected, presented,
Culture (Almond and Verba 1963), which termed the and interpreted. This does not mean that the data
United States the most “participatory political cul- can be manipulated to produce any conclusion you
ture” in the study. want, but it should caution you that it is important to
Like many studies using comparative political evaluate the data and consider multiple alternative
data, the data in Table 3.2 can be analyzed in differ- interpretations.
ent ways and can lead to somewhat different knowl-
edge claims. For example, Table 3.2 only reports
those who often discuss politics, but it might also
Further Questions
consider those who occasionally discuss politics. In 1. Do the data in Table 3.2 seem to support the
another example, the table focuses on a single year generalization that most people in these coun-
instead of several years or another year in which the tries are not very active in politics?
political dynamics in certain countries might be dif- 2. What types of political actions seem to be the
ferent. Also, might the crossnational differences be best measures of the level of political participa-
greater or smaller if other countries were selected for tion by average citizens?

even in countries with more repressive regimes (Siegal 2011). In recent years, a combi-
nation of encouragement from the actions in other countries, use of social networking
technologies, and coverage by global media has increased the willingness of individu-
als to join in public protests against unpopular regimes, leaders, and policies (Schmidt
and Cohen 2010). From Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya to China and Brazil, social networks
like Facebook have allowed individuals to become aware of, and thereby choose to
participate in, protests and other activities even when state-run media have attempted
to hide these citizen-level activities.

Group Political Actions

3.2 distinguish between interest groups and political parties.
The actions of Aung San Suu Kyi offer a compelling example of the impact that one
extraordinary person can have on the political world. However, even this totally
dedicated political activist understood that there is power in numbers. Thus, she
worked with many other citizens to establish and build the National League for
Democracy, a movement that steadily gained supporters and organized into a politi-
cal party that stands up against the military dictatorship. College students and
Buddhist monks have been among the other individuals in Myanmar demanding
change, emboldened by the willingness of their peers to join them in the streets. In
almost every situation, a political agenda is furthered most effectively when many
people form a group.
As an analytic concept, a group can be defined as an aggregation of individuals
who interact in order to pursue a common interest (see also Chapter 9). It is the pursuit
66 Chapter 3

of a common interest that is most crucial to this definition because the individuals
do not necessarily interact directly with one another. The factor that distinguishes a
political interest group from other groups is that the common interest the group pursues
is a political objective—an interest in a particular area of public policy where action
might be taken. A political interest group can be any coalition that forms and inter-
acts politically. The members of a political interest group might agree on an action
even if they disagree about why they choose that action. For instance, a group which
advocates that government should purchase and distribute food to the poor might be
made up not only of people who are concerned about the well-being of the poor but
also of people who want to promote the economic benefits to farmers and others in
the agricultural sector.
A distinction is usually made between political interest groups and political
parties, although both types fit our general definition of political group. A political
group enters the special category of political party when the group seeks not only to
influence political decisions but also to place its members in the actual roles of govern-
ment such as chief executives and legislators. Although this distinction can become
rather fuzzy among the most politically active groups, we shall treat political parties
as a category different from other types of political interest groups. Winning elections,
building the party, and actually altering policy may be among the cluster of goals of
a political party; but a political party may also have more modest goals like bringing
a topic into the public agenda or a broad goal such as challenging the existing power
structure.
Most people tend to feel that they are relatively powerless in politics when acting
alone. But if a person joins with many others in a political group, it is possible that the
group can exercise influence in the political world because of the group’s numbers,
organization, and capabilities. This chapter has provided examples of the impacts on
a country’s politics when many individuals join in unconventional political behavior,
as in the recent populist uprisings in Egypt and Syria. And extremist groups, such as
ISIL, might have few members but can generate major effects as they pursue extensive,
radical agendas. Group political action in more conventional modes can also have sig-
nificant consequences. The mobilization of individuals into the Tea Party movement
in the United States has enabled this loosely structured array of groups to use the
ballot box to elect many new members to national and state office and to pressure
many elected officials to shift their policy positions in the directions advocated by the
movement.
Groups are also extremely important in politics because they are often the major
mechanism through which individuals are linked to the political system—hence their
label as “linkage institutions.” Some political groups, such as Mothers Against Drunk
Driving (MADD) or the German Farmers Association, are narrowly focused in their
objectives and have limited membership. Other groups, such as a major political party
like Myanmar’s National League for Democracy, have wide-ranging goals and a huge
membership. The rest of this chapter describes the nature and activities of various
kinds of political groups and political parties.
 Political Actions 67

Political Interest Groups

3.3 Summarize interest group strategies.

Activities of Political Interest Groups

All political interest groups share the common objective of attempting to influence
the allocation of public values. But such groups can employ a variety of strategies to
achieve this purpose (Cigler and Loomis 2013; Grossman 2012).

PolitiCAl ACtion The most direct methods to achieve political objectives involve
some form of political action. Such action might be taken by all group members or
by some members who formally or informally represent the entire group. Depending
on the political system, this might entail voting and campaign activities to influence
the selection and action of political authorities. Or the group might attempt to com-
municate its interest to political actors by techniques such as letters, personal contacts,
petitions, rallies, or political violence. Groups often raise money from their members or
provide other resources, like volunteers, to help politicians who support their causes.

ProviSion oF mAteriAl reSourCeS Political interest groups can also provide

goods or services to political actors. Such a strategy assumes that providing goods
and services will influence decision makers to be more favorably disposed toward the
interests of a group or that providing goods and services to policymakers who share
the values of the group makes it more likely those values will be taken into account
as policy is made. Each political system develops its own rules about the amounts of
money or goods that can be given legitimately to political actors and the legal meth-
ods for giving these resources. The line between legal and illegal provision of money
and goods varies dramatically across political cultures. In some political systems, all it
takes to shock people is the revelation that an interest group has given a political actor
a small gift, but in many political systems, it requires a multimillion-dollar kickback to
a politician to upset citizens and provoke action. In other words, what might be judged
an improper act of bribery in one political system might be an expected and perfectly
acceptable payment in others.
In most countries where there is some transparency in political contributions by
private groups, the amount of money involved is substantial. From 2008 to 2013, for
example, interest groups spent $19.4 billion on direct lobbying of government offi-
cials and candidates in the United States (Center for Responsive Politics 2013). Most
such contributions are legal, although some are problematic; for example, in 1997 the
Democratic Party returned more than $1 million to questionable donors, and President
Clinton was widely criticized for “renting the Lincoln Bedroom” for overnight visits
in the White House by big contributors. In South Korea, it is estimated that legislative
candidates in contested seats spend 10 times more money on their campaigns than is
allowable under the law (Plasser 2002: 149).
The ethics of a system in which political interest groups can make huge contri-
butions is increasingly questioned. It is obvious that interest groups give money in
68 Chapter 3

the expectation of influencing public policies. Although cause-and-effect relationships

are hard to establish, there are striking linkages between groups’ campaign contribu-
tions and beneficial legislation (Phillips 2003). In the 1996 election in the United States,
for example, tobacco companies contributed $11.3 million; soon after, legislation was
passed directing a 15-cent-per-pack cigarette tax to a fund offsetting lawsuits—a
$50 billion benefit to the tobacco companies. The broadcasting industry contrib-
uted $5 million to members of Congress and soon gained digital TV licensing rights
worth $70 billion (Parenti 2010: 200–203). Oil, energy, and natural resource firms
contributed $18.3 million and then gained $18 billion in exemptions from the passage
of an alternative minimum tax law (O’Connor and Sabato 2007: Figure 16.3).
No one knows the amount of illegal resources that are distributed, although in most
countries, scandals regarding bribes and kickbacks seem to be reported with increas-
ing frequency (Johnson 2006). In 2007, for example, former Philippine president Joseph
Estrada was found guilty of taking more than $85 million in bribes during his presidency.
Among other recent top leaders linked to corruption are Alberto Fujimori, former presi-
dent of Peru, in prison for (among other crimes) embezzling $600 million, and Hosni
Mubarak, former president of Egypt, accused of accumulating as much as $30 billion
in illegal wealth during his administration. Evidence surfaced that Samsung executives
distributed $205 million in payoffs to South Korean government officials and journal-
ists in 2008 (Bloomberg.com 2009). Halliburton executives were imprisoned for pay-
ing more than $180 million in bribes to Nigerian officials for oil and gas contracts (U.S.
Department of Justice 2008). As China’s president declared a war on corruption, power-
ful politician Bo Xilai was given a life sentence in 2013 for accepting bribes and embez-
zling millions of dollars of state funds. One estimate reports that the total annual cost of
corruption in China is more than $800 billion (Hayoun 2013). This is not a new phenom-
enon. Indeed, it is hard to imagine a system in which those with substantial stakes in the
policies implemented by a government do not try to influence that government.

exChAnge oF inFormAtion Providing data and information to those within the

government is another activity performed by some interest groups. The interest group
may have specialized or expert information that policymakers would find difficult or
impossible to collect themselves or obtain from other sources. These private groups
are stakeholders with a vested interest in the public policies that emerge, so they most
actively provide data that support their own interests. For example, in the early 1980s,
the U.S. Congress began considering a law requiring mandatory air bags as a safety
restraint in automobiles. In determining whether to pass such a law, legislators were
particularly influenced by information provided by automobile manufacturers (whose
data indicated that air bags were costly, would reduce fuel economy, and would not
substantially reduce overall injury levels in automobile collisions). This critical infor-
mation, from a highly interested party to the decision, was an important reason behind
the refusal of Congress to require air bags (Reppy 1984). Later in the decade, a barrage
of counterinformation from another powerful interest group, the insurance industry,
persuaded Congress and the public that air bags could save lives and lower insurance
premiums. This resulted in laws requiring air bags.
 Political Actions 69

In many countries, as the scale of government and the reach of public policy have
expanded, many organizations in society need detailed, inside information about what
the government is doing or intends to do that might affect their organization. Thus,
Salisbury (1990; Salisbury et al. 1991) has concluded that American interest groups in
Washington, DC, now spend more time gathering information from the government
that is relevant to their organizations’ interests (e.g., changes in rules or laws) than
they do providing information to the government that might influence its policies.

CooPerAtion Major interest groups can also exert influence through their com-
pliance or noncompliance with the government policy process. In many countries,
government actors understand that policy is implemented more successfully when
it is acceptable to the affected interest groups. There are many countries (especially
industrial democracies such as France, Japan, South Korea, and Sweden) in which
government cultivates a special relationship with the interest group representatives of
major economic organizations such as business, labor, and farmers. When such inter-
est groups interact directly with the government to formulate and implement policy,
they enjoy a privileged position. Governance based on close cooperation between govern-
ment agencies and these major sectoral interest groups is called corporatism. For example,
the shortcomings regarding the 2011 Fukushima (Japan) nuclear plant meltdown have
been linked to the fact that the government regulatory agencies allowed the nuclear
industry to establish and monitor its own safety procedures. Obviously, an organiza-
tion benefits greatly when its interest group persuades the government to allow the
organization to regulate itself. On the one hand, the industry would have the most
complete information about how best to regulate; but on the other hand, the interests
of the industry might be in conflict with the interests of society—for example, addi-
tional product safety might be sacrificed for additional profit.

Constraints on a Group’s Behavior

3.4 identify the types of interest groups and the constraints under which they
operate.
Each interest group must decide what mix of activities is most likely to serve its politi-
cal agenda. This mix depends on many factors, including the nature of the group’s
political resources, the objectives it pursues, and the political environment in which it
operates.

PolitiCAl reSourCeS A group’s political resources are those elements, controlled

by the group, which can influence the decisions and actions of political actors. The political
resources that are most effective differ according to the situation and the political sys-
tem. The preceding section emphasized the potential impact of financial resources and
information, but certain other political resources can also be influential: control of fac-
tors of production, social status, legality, special knowledge or skills, ability to mobilize
large numbers of people who pressure the government, capacity for social disruption,
and access to decision makers. Various groups usually have dramatically different
70 Chapter 3

levels of all these political resources. An interest group’s behavior depends on the
kinds of resources it has available and its decision to use a particular mix of resources.

objeCtiveS The objectives that interest groups pursue in the political world are as
diverse as the different policy issues on which the government might act. One group
might want one specific goal, such as a subsidy for growing wheat, while another
group might have very broad objectives, such as a set of policies to eliminate poverty.
An interest group’s strategies and the probability that it will be successful are related
to the group’s political objectives. In general, an interest group has an advantage to
the extent that its objective (1) is similar to existing policy and (2) is a decision that the
political system has the capacity and motivation to make. For example, the Greenpeace
groups in France and Poland are more likely to influence government policies on safer
disposal of nuclear wastes than on stopping the development of new nuclear power
stations, and these groups have little chance of achieving their broader goal of world-
wide nuclear disarmament.

PolitiCAl environment At the most basic level, the demands that groups can
make and the actions they can take depend on the boundaries of acceptable political
action within the particular political environment. Every example of interest group
action given thus far in this chapter has focused on a group operating in a democratic
political system. An essential feature of democratic systems is that interest groups
have extensive rights to make political demands and engage in political actions. Yet
there is some disagreement about the extent to which interest groups contribute to
healthy democratic processes (see Debate in 3).

The Debate in 3
How Interested Are Interest Groups in Democracy?
For as long as democratic governments have existed, enable citizens to organize into groups of suf-
there has been ambivalence about political inter- ficient size to communicate their concerns and
est groups. On the one hand, democratic theory is demands in a clearer, more amplified voice to
grounded in the idea that individuals can and should policymakers (Baumgartner and Leech 1998).
form political interest groups to influence the selection • Interest groups are especially valuable in rep-
of officials and to promote public policies that serve resenting and supporting those groups whose
their goals. On the other hand, the press, the public, views are not effectively represented by any of
and even some governmental officials are often heard the political parties (Berry 2000).
blaming a country’s problems on “special interests,” • In a single country, thousands of interest groups
which are effective in influencing government to enact can operate at the same time, representing the
policies that serve the interests of specific groups but interests of different groups of people. Because
are not in the public interest. Do interest groups hin- there are so many groups whose voices are
der the democratic process or facilitate it? heard, no one interest group will go unchecked
and become too powerful and influential relative
Interest Groups Facilitate Democracy to the others (Dahl 1971).
• Interest groups are fundamentally important • Financial contributions from interest groups
actors in a democratic system because they enable candidates to purchase the expensive
 Political Actions 71

media that allow them to communicate their • Interest groups have specialized information and
ideas to many citizens and thus enhance the citi- data that they provide to government officials.
zens’ capacity to participate knowledgeably in Such information can be influential in the policy
the democratic process. process, but it also tends to be heavily biased in
• Interest groups play a beneficial role in the pub- favor of the interest group’s position on issues
lic policy process. They provide public officials (Baumgartner et al. 2009).
with an enormous amount of relevant, special- • Interest groups are the major supplier of personal
ized information that public agencies might not resources to many political actors. Campaign
be able to gather efficiently and that supports contributions and other “goodies” can be the
improved policymaking. source of considerable corruption because they
• Interest groups serve as an expert watchdog purchase special access to and influence with
over legislation or policies that public officials public officials (Cigler 2013; Johnson 2006).
might try to implement but that are based on • Interest groups form an unnecessary layer that
error or are self-serving. By articulating such insulates citizens from their government and
concerns, interest groups add a valuable level of discourages citizens from engaging in direct
accountability and monitoring to the process of democracy (Barber 2004).
democratic governance (Berry 2000).
More questions…
Interest Groups Hinder the Democratic Process 1. Can you think of any effective interest groups
• Most interest groups work to garner support whose actions are a positive force in making
for a single or narrow set of goals, often at the your government work in a more democratic
expense of the interests of the broader society manner? Can you think of any effective interest
(Parenti 2010). groups that actually undermine democracy? Are
• Many interest groups have large professional staffs your choices of interest groups closely linked to
that work 24/7 to promote their goals. Ordinary your own interests and values?
citizens rarely have this level of expertise and 2. Does a system of strong and active interest
time commitment for political action, and thus the groups increase or decrease the effectiveness
interests of these ordinary citizens are not as well of political parties?
promoted in the policy process as those of special 3. Can you imagine an effective political system
interests (Schlozman, Verba, and Brady 2013). that has no organized interest groups?

In democracies such as Great Britain, Italy, and Japan, professional representatives

of interest groups (lobbyists) are as much a part of the accepted set of governmental
actors as elected legislators and their staffs. In Japan, it is common for a senior gov-
ernment official to “descend from heaven” (amakudari), leaving his position for a
high-paying lobbyist’s job for a major corporate interest. In the United States, over
12,000 full-time professional lobbyists are registered in Washington, DC, and one
analyst contends that the total number of people engaged primarily in lobbying activi-
ties is more than 80,000—that is, more than 140 lobbyists per member of Congress
(Birnbaum 2005; Center for Responsive Politics 2013).
In contrast, repressive political systems tolerate only a very narrow range of interest
group activities that are in opposition to the leadership. In general, one of the key fac-
tors ensuring the survival of a repressive political system is its capacity to stifle or crush
opposition interest groups. In these environments, such groups operate on the margins
72 Chapter 3

of the political system, and they range from small revolutionary cells such as FARC in
Columbia to organized groups such as the Buddhist monks in Myanmar to mass move-
ments such as the recent democracy demonstrations in Hong Kong and Syria. Such
groups, and especially their leaders, usually face extensive harassment and punish-
ment from the authorities, especially when they “go public.” From 2011 through the
beginning of 2014, for example, the Syrian government killed more than 100,000 people,
arrested tens of thousands more who publicly protested against or opposed the Assad
regime, and caused over one million people to flee the country (Genocide Watch 2014).
Nonetheless, groups periodically emerge to articulate demands for political,
social, and economic changes. Sometimes, the state responds positively to these
demands, and occasionally the group protests become so extensive that they drive
the regime from power as occurred in the “velvet revolutions” in Europe in 1989 and
the uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt in 2011 (see Chapter 12 for more examples). Some
interest groups are eventually granted a major role in the political process. This hap-
pened in South Africa to the African National Congress, which began in 1912 as an
interest group to promote the human rights of black South Africans, was later a gov-
ernment opposition movement, was then an outlawed violent protest group (in 1961),
and finally became the country’s major political party whose leaders (from Nelson
Mandela to Jacob Zuma) have become presidents of the country.

Types of Interest Groups

A relatively simple taxonomy distinguishes four types of political interest groups: (1)
associational; (2) institutional; (3) nonassociational; and (4) anomic (Powell et al. 2012).

ASSoCiAtionAl intereSt grouPS The first type, the associational interest

group, is organized specifically to further the political objectives of its members. One example
is the British Medical Association (BMA), a professional organization promoting pub-
lic policies that support the goals of its members, 151,000 doctors. The BMA makes
major contributions to political parties, provides expert information to government
agencies, and guides the doctors’ willingness to cooperate with government health
policies. Another example is MADD, a primarily volunteer organization whose central
goals are to stop drunk driving and underage drinking and to support the victims of
drunk drivers. It utilizes its Web site, its network of more than 3 million members in
five countries, and a professional lobbying staff to persuade policymakers and judges
to impose stringent laws and harsh penalties on drunk drivers. It has trained 1,400
victim-advocates to provide counseling and legal support to victims of drunk drivers.

inStitutionAl intereSt grouPS These groups have been formed to achieve

goals other than affecting the political system, but they also pursue political objec-
tives. Most occupational and organizational groups recognize that the decisions of
the political system sometimes have major impacts on their own interests. Thus,
they have a formal or informal subunit whose primary purpose is to represent the
group’s interests to the political system. For example, the University of California is
a large institution of higher education, but its interests are strongly affected by local,
 Political Actions 73

state, and national policies on educational funding, research funding, regulation

of research, discrimination in admissions and hiring, tax law, patent law, collective
bargaining, and many other policies. Consequently, the university has full-time pro-
fessional and student lobbyists on each campus, in Sacramento (the state capital), and
in Washington, DC.

nonASSoCiAtionAl intereSt grouPS These groups are fluid aggregates of

individuals who are not explicitly associated with a permanent organizational entity
but who share some common interest regarding certain issues and become politically
active on an issue. A loosely structured organization might temporarily emerge to plan
and coordinate political activities, but the group is temporary and relatively informal
and, once the issue has lost its immediate salience, the group disappears. If an interest
group emerges in your community to stop a building development, to recall a pub-
lic official, or to promote a particular law, it can be categorized as a nonassociational
interest group. Such an interest group can be also termed a social movement when
its activities on an issue of social change become more sustained, its supporters increase in
number and loyalty, and its form becomes more of an organized campaign spread over
a broader geographic area. Examples include the women’s rights movement, the civil
rights movement, the indigenous peoples movements, the pro-choice and antiabor-
tion movements, and the U.S. Tea Party movement (Castells 2012; Givan, Soule, and
Roberts 2010; Smith 2007).

AnomiC intereSt grouPS These groups are short-lived, spontaneous aggre-

gations of people who share a political concern. These people participate in a group
political action that emerges with little or no planning and then quickly stops after the
action is completed. A riot is the clearest example of an anomic interest group—the par-
ticipants tend to share common
political interests or grievances
that they express through a gen-
erally disorganized outpouring
of emotion, energy, and violence.
A political demonstration is a
somewhat more organized ver-
sion of this type of interest group
activity, and this characterizes
the initial period of many of the
recent “people power” actions
described above.
Many taxonomies, like these
four types of interest groups,
present what Max Weber called
ideal types. An ideal type is a
No GMO! Greenpeace activists demonstrate against genetically modified
set of distinctive forms of a phe- papaya outside the Thai Ministry of Agriculture. In most countries, thousands
nomenon defined in order to reveal of interest groups engage in political action in the attempt to influence public
the different ways in which key policy decisions.
74 Chapter 3

characteristics can be combined. There are usually no actual cases that are precisely like
one of the ideal types, and most actual cases blend elements of the different ideal
types. Ideal types are analytic constructs that are pure forms meant to facilitate our
comparative thinking and our understanding. There will be many sets of ideal types
offered in this book in addition to the four ideal types of interest groups, including
types of legislative-executive relations, administrative systems, party systems, politi-
cal economies, public policies, and political violence.

Political Parties
3.5 Analyze the roles of political parties.
An interest group is transformed into a political party when the group attempts to cap-
ture political power directly by placing its members in governmental office. The political party
is the broadest linkage institution in most political systems because most parties are
overarching organizations that incorporate many different interests and groups. While
countries can have thousands of political interest groups, most have only a handful of
political parties.

Activities of Political Parties

Political parties in most countries engage in six broad activities, functioning to:
(1) broker policy ideas; (2) engage in political socialization; (3) link individuals and
the political system; (4) mobilize and recruit activists; (5) coordinate governmental
activities; and (6) organize opposition to the governing group.

brokerS oF ideAS The first, most central activity of political parties is to serve as
major brokers of political ideas. Many individuals and political groups have interests
and demands regarding the policies of government. A crucial function of political par-
ties is to aggregate and simplify these many demands into a few packages of clear
policy alternatives. To the extent that political parties are effective in this activity, they
dramatically reduce the complexity and scale of the political process for the decision
maker, who must perceive and respond to the individual and group demands, and for
the voter, who must select political leaders whose overall policy preferences are closest
to his own.
While all political parties are brokers of ideas, parties can be differentiated into
two broad categories—ideological and pragmatic—on the basis of their intensity of
commitment to those ideas. Ideological parties hold major programmatic goals (e.g.,
egalitarianism, ethnic solidarity, Islamic fundamentalism) and are deeply committed
to the full implementation of these goals. Ideological parties are usually extreme within
the context of their particular political culture. The German Green Party, described in
Focus in 3, is an example of an ideological party. Others include the Islamic Salvation
Front (FIS) in Algeria, the North Korean Communist Party, Sínn Fein in Northern
Ireland, and the American Libertarian Party.
 Political Actions 75

In contrast, pragmatic parties hold more flexible goals and are oriented toward
moderate or incremental policy change. To achieve electoral success, pragmatic parties
might shift their position or expand the range of viewpoints they encompass. Parties
of the center are characteristically pragmatic parties. Examples include the Christian
Democrats in Germany, the Congress Party in India, the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) in Mexico, and the Democratic Party in the United States.

Focus in 3
Let’s Party! The Rise of the Green Party in Germany
Few political interest groups transform into suc- preserving the environment. In Europe, the Greens
cessful, modern political parties. The Green Party in became the first important party representing the
Germany has achieved this transformation. It began “self-expressive, postmaterialist values” discussed
as a diverse set of loosely affiliated interest groups in Chapter 2.
in the 1960s and declared itself a political party in The Green Party remains an ideological party,
1980. Its electoral fortunes in the national legislature and its party platform includes strong antiestab-
have gone up and down (starting with 3.7 percent of lishment elements. The party ideology emphasizes
the seats in 1983, dropping as low as 0 percent of the transformation of Germany: from a leading
the seats in 1990, and currently holding 10 percent postindustrial society to one that uses only those
of the seats). technologies that do not damage the environment;
Where did the Green Party come from? Like all from elite domination to broad democratic participa-
political groups, it began with people who wanted tion; from capitalism to a system in which workers
to influence politics. In the late 1960s, some West own and control industry; from a militaristic, NATO-
Germans were displeased with their government’s based country to one that becomes neutral, elimi-
support of U.S. actions in Vietnam and Southeast nates nuclear weapons, and stops preparing for war.
Asia. Some believed that their government, and the The Green Party had a substantial impact on
entire “establishment” in their society, had been cor- German politics in the 1980s but struggled for elec-
rupted in its quest for ever-expanding power and toral support in the early 1990s. In 1993, it merged
wealth. And some had other policy concerns, includ- with three East German progressive parties and is
ing the huge inequalities in wealth and welfare within now called Alliance 90/The Greens. This merged
their society and among countries, the discrimina- party was a somewhat uneasy junior partner in a
tion against certain groups such as women and governing coalition with the large Social Democratic
ethnic minorities, the frightful build-up of nuclear Party (1998–2005). It did not participate in either of
weapons by the superpowers, and the degradation the conservative-led “grand coalitions” of parties
of the environment. (2005–2009 and currently) or the previous govern-
People with these various political beliefs, ener- ment, all three under Chancellor Angela Merkel.
gized mainly by young countercultural Germans, The future of the Alliance 90/Green Party at
demonstrated, marched, and formed local protest the national level remains uncertain. Germany is
groups. These groups began to elect some of their both the largest economy and the political leader
members to local office, especially in larger cities. The within the European Union. Although the country is
most dynamic people in these local groups devel- still attempting to improve the economic conditions
oped a national network, and in 1980 they formed a in the formerly communist East Germany, which
national political party, Die Grünen (the Greens). merged with West Germany in 1990, the German
The common concern that attracted many indi- population is generally prosperous and enjoys a
viduals to the Green Party was its commitment to high standard of living. Recent economic problems
76 Chapter 3

associated with the global economic slowdown and strong ideological differences among its moderate
hostility toward the large immigrant population are and more radical factions? Some analysts suggest
among the policy issues that have created electoral that this party is too wild to last much longer.
swings toward more conservative political parties.
However, the German citizenry is one of the world’s
most secular and self-expressive in terms of political
Further Focus
culture (recall Figure 2.1), and thus a portion of the 1. What condition(s) might substantially increase
electorate might continue to support the progressive or decrease the support for Germany’s Green
policies of the Alliance 90/Green Party. Will it be out- Party?
flanked by the more radical Left Party or absorbed 2. What policy positions are most likely to benefit
by the large Social Democratic Party in the left cen- and harm electoral support for “green” parties in
ter? Can it avoid self-destruction caused by the most countries?

AgentS oF PolitiCAl SoCiAlizAtion A related activity of political parties is

their socialization of people into the political culture (see Chapter 4). In some coun-
tries, most people develop a clear party identification, which means that a person has
a strong attachment to one political party he trusts to represent his political interests.
The person’s political beliefs and actions are influenced by information that a political
party provides or by the person’s perceptions of what the party supports. Even if a
person does not have a strong party identification, political parties can be an important
source of his political knowledge because they provide easily understood reference
points regarding politically relevant information.

linkS between individuAlS And the SyStem In its role as a linkage institu-
tion, a political party connects individuals and the political system. Most individuals
rely on political groups to represent their interests within the political system. More
than other groups, political parties function to formulate, aggregate, and communicate
a coherent package of demands and supports. If the party gains political power, it can
attempt to implement those demands on behalf of the individuals whose interests it
serves. Thus political parties greatly facilitate the individual’s sense of integration into
the political process.

mobilizAtion And reCruitment oF PolitiCAl ACtiviStS The political

party offers a well-organized and obvious structure within which a person can direct
his political interests. It is a source of political information, of contact with other politi-
cally relevant individuals and groups, and of effective access to the political system.
In many political systems, involvement with a political party is the primary mecha-
nism through which individuals are drawn into roles as political foot soldiers and,
ultimately, as political leaders. Often, political parties select the candidates for political
positions or have the power to place people directly in positions within the political
system. Whether one is considering a highly democratic polity such as Great Britain or
an extremely nondemocratic one such as China, most individuals in key executive and
legislative positions have achieved these positions through recruitment and selection
by a political party.
 Political Actions 77

CoordinAtion oF governmentAl oPerAtionS The fifth major activity of

political parties is coordinating the actions of the government. The political party can
encourage or require its members to work together to achieve shared policy goals. It
can establish an internal hierarchy, with party leaders (e.g., in the U.S. Senate, majority
and minority leaders, whips, and committee chairs) controlling the actions of party
members in the conduct of government. The parties can also provide mechanisms
for facilitating cooperation and regulating conflict among different parties. Leaders
of several parties might form a coalition to secure majority support for certain poli-
cies. Such coalitions are especially important in legislatures in which no single party
commands a majority. Political parties can also establish forms of power sharing in
the conduct of government business. For example, the parties can agree to formulate
executive or legislative committees in a manner that reflects the political strength of
the various parties.

orgAnized SourCeS oF oPPoSition Finally, in a political system that has more

than one party, the parties not participating in the governing group can serve as an
explicit and organized source of opposition. The function is fully institutionalized
in Great Britain, where the major out-of-power party in parliament is explicitly des-
ignated as “Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition.” This party should oppose, but never
obstruct, the actions of the governing party because the opposition party remains loyal
to crown and country. In Britain, the opposition party is guaranteed control of a speci-
fied amount of time during legislative sessions. The opposition leaders receive salaries
to serve as a “shadow government,” with a member of the opposition serving as the
alternative and potential future replacement for each top official in the government.
Hence, there is a shadow prime minister, a shadow minister of defense, and so on, who
articulate what they would do if they held ministerial positions as the governing party.

Doing Politics
Politics comes alive when people engage in political action. Participation in a protest
march, the attempt to persuade a friend to share your political perspective, and even
the act of voting can be a moment of heightened experience. Acting alone or with oth-
ers, the individual who takes political action might seek to serve his own interests, a
national goal such as democratic governance, or an altruistic goal such as global peace.
This chapter should increase your awareness of the diverse modes of political
action as well as the rather modest levels of such actions usually reported by most
people. Some people are shocked that so many citizens do not even bother to vote in a
country such as the United States. Others are surprised that anyone really thinks that
one person’s involvement in politics, whatever the level of commitment, will make
any difference in the grander scheme of things. Yet events, such as recent ones in the
Middle East, might challenge some assumptions about the limited impact of group
political action. Political participation is a crucial topic in our developing understand-
ing of the nature of the political world because people’s actions are at the heart of the
political process.
78 Chapter 3

In this chapter, you have been introduced to methods and findings from the
study of individual and group political actions. To this point, our treatment of politi-
cal behavior has focused mainly on description and taxonomy—what people believe
about politics and what political actions people undertake. For a richer analysis, how-
ever, we must at least attempt to answer the why questions: Why do people engage in
a particular political action? Can we explain the apparent differences in people’s politi-
cal beliefs? Explaining political beliefs and actions is the central topic in Chapter 4.

Key Concepts
associational interest group, ideal type, p. 73 political party, p. 74
p. 72 ideological party, p. 74 political resource, p. 69
corporatism, p. 69 political interest group, p. 66 pragmatic party, p. 75
extremist-activists, p. 60 political activists, p. 59 social movement, p. 73
foot soldiers, p. 59 political environment, p. 70 taxonomic analysis, p. 59
group, p. 65 political participation, p. 57

For Further Consideration

1. Why might the absence of a political 4. Should there be any limits on a group’s
action be viewed as an act of political actions to influence political decision
participation? makers? What principles can you offer to
2. Apart from voting, what political action do justify any such limitations?
you think is most important? 5. What is the most unconventional political
3. Imagine that you could engage in a conversa- action in which you have engaged? If the
tion with the political activist—contemporary same circumstances arose now, would you
or historical—who most fascinates you. behave any differently? Why?
Whom would you choose? Why? What
would you ask him or her?

For Further Reading

Ackerman, Peter, and jack duvall. (2001). A Ahmed, Shamima, and david Potter. (2006).
Force More Powerful: A Century of Non- NGOs in International Politics. bloomfield,
Violent Conflict. new york: Palgrave. A series Ct: kumarian Press. A sensible description of
of engaging case studies set in many countries the actions and impacts of major NGOs (nongov-
(e.g., Chile, Denmark, Poland, Serbia) reveals ernmental organizations) that operate as global
how political activism grounded in strategies citizen activists and service providers as they
of nonviolence (e.g., strikes, protests, boycotts) work with and around national governments.
has achieved major political change in the face Aung San Suu kyi and Alan Clements. (2008).
of repressive regimes and dictatorial leaders. Aung San Suu Kyi: The Voice of Hope:
 Political Actions 79

Conversations. updated and rev. ed. new givan, rebecca kolins, Sarah Anne Soule, and
york: Seven Stories Press. Former Buddhist kenneth roberts, eds. (2010). The Diffusion
monk Clements presents moving conversa- of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms,
tions secretly recorded in Myanmar with Aung and Political Effects. new york: Cambridge
San Suu Kyi (recall the chapter opener). Her university Press. A series of studies explore
extraordinary blend of spirituality, love, cour- how social movements regarding such issues
age, and defiance are reflected in her approach as creationism science, human rights, and
of activist Buddhism. genetically modified foods emerge, spread,
baumgartner, Frank, jeffrey berry, marie and affect the public policy domain.
hojnacki, david kimball, and beth l. greenwood, justin. (2011). Interest Repre-
leech. (2009). Lobbying and Policy Change: sentation in the European Union. 3rd ed.
Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why. Chicago: basingstoke, england: Palgrave macmillan.
university of Chicago Press. Based on an An exploration of the roles, behaviors, and
extensive study of cases, the authors argue impacts of various types of interest groups (e.g.,
that most lobbies, even well-funded ones, tend business, “the public,” professional groups,
to be less effective in shifting U.S. policy than and labor) in the context of the European
most people assume. Union (EU) as a supranational policymaking
beah, ishmael. (2008). A Long Way Gone. new body that also must link with national govern-
york: Farrar, Straus and giroux. A dramatic ments and a multitude of interest groups.
and remarkable autobiography of a Sierra Leone hoffman, Abbie. (1989). The Best of Abbie
boy who is captured and trained as a child sol- Hoffman. new york: Four walls, eight
dier. He describes his violent world and how he windows. A selection of the funny, irreverent
escapes it and establishes a new life for himself. writings on radicalism and revolution by one
bohlen, j. (2000). Making Waves: The Origins of the key leaders (now deceased) of the stu-
and Future of Greenpeace. montreal: black dent radical movement of the late 1960s and a
rose. The fascinating history, written by one of member of the Chicago 7, tried for conspiracy
its founders, of an international interest group after the riots at the 1968 Democratic Party
committed to fighting governments and huge convention in Chicago.
corporations to protect the environment. jensen, jane. (2008). Women Political Leaders:
Chan, Stephen. (2011). Southern Africa: Old Breaking the Highest Glass Ceiling. new
Treacheries and New Deceits. new haven, york: Palgrave macmillan. An exploration of
Ct: yale university Press. Richly textured the pathways to power and the challenges fac-
analyses are offered for five men who have ing 60 women (e.g., Benazir Bhutto in Pakistan,
dominated the politics of South Africa and Michelle Bachelet in Chile, Kim Campbell in
Zimbabwe in recent decades: Mandela, Mbeki, Canada, and Ellen Johnson Sirleaf in Liberia)
Mugabe, Tsvangirai, and Zuma. who have achieved the highest positions in
Cigler, Allan j., and burdett loomis, eds. (2013). their governments.
Interest Group Politics. 8th ed. washington, loader, brian d., and dan mercea, eds. (2012).
dC: CQ Press. Thoughtful essays on how Social Media and Democracy: Innovations in
interest groups operate in the American politi- Participatory Politics. new york: routledge.
cal context during an era characterized by a Focusing primarily on Europe and North
huge infusion of money into the policy pro- America, these essays explore how the new
cess, single-interest politics, social movements, social media platforms, such as Facebook,
and the Internet. YouTube, and Twitter, provide powerful
80 Chapter 3

means of political communication and mobili- nj: Princeton university Press. Based on
zation and how these media interact with tra- extensive interviews and survey data, the
ditional media. See also: Loader, Brian D., Paul authors argue that the actions of organized
G. Nixon, Dieter Rucht, and Wim van de Donk, interest groups and the more affluent indi-
eds. (2004). Cyberprotest: New Media, Citizens, viduals have substantially more influence on
and Social Movements. London: Routledge. American politics that the less advantaged.
lowi, theodore. (2009). The End of Liberalism: till, brian michael. (2011). Conversations with
The Second Republic in the United States. 40th Power: What Great Presidents and Prime
anniversary ed. new york: norton. An inci- Ministers Can Teach Us about Leadership.
sive critique of the shortcomings of politics new york: Palgrave macmillan. Till, a recent
dominated by interest groups. U.S. college graduate, manages to interview
ma bo. (1995). Blood Red Sunset: A Memoir of many of the most fascinating top leaders
the Chinese Cultural Revolution. new york: of our era, including Gorbachev, de Klerk,
viking. A harsh, gripping autobiography of Carter, Musharraf, Barak, Havel, and Clinton.
a young person drawn into the fervor of Mao The book includes his narratives about each
Zedong’s Cultural Revolution. A Red Guard leader and their answers to his pointed
working on a hopeless program to create farm- questions.
land in Mongolia, Ma Bo is transformed from volgy, thomas j. (1999). Politics in the Trenches:
a true believer into an embittered man fight- Citizens, Politicians, and the Fate of
ing to clear himself from charges that he is a Democracy. tucson: university of Arizona
reactionary. Press. A political science professor offers a
meisner, maurice, and gareth Schott. (2006). brief, highly readable, and revealing descrip-
Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual tion of the challenges and actual experiences of
Portrait. london: Polity Press. An illuminat- political leaders in U.S. local politics, based on
ing biography of one of the most remarkable his many years as a local government elected
leaders of the twentieth century, emphasizing official and his interviews with more than 300
both his personal qualities and his enormous elected officials.
impact on the evolution of politics and eco- zaeef, Salam. (2010). My Life with the Taliban.
nomics in China. new york: Columbia university Press. A fas-
Schlozman, kay, Sidney verba, and henry cinating inside look at the thinking and actions
brady. (2013). The Unheavenly Chorus: of the leadership in the Taliban through the
Unequal Political Voice and the Broken eyes of an Afghan who became a top official in
Promise of American Democracy. Princeton, the movement.

On the Web
http://www.politics1.com/parties.htm rights and civil liberties and describes current
This site offers a directory and description of situations of concern.
U.S. political parties. http://www.idea.int
http://www.ifex.org The International Institute for Democracy and
The International Freedom of Expression Electoral Assistance (IDEA) provides infor-
Exchange represents more than 80 organiza- mation about current democratic practices
tions in 50 countries committed to human and various relevant databases for more than
 Political Actions 81

100 countries, including comparative data on and antiracism groups, providing information
voter turnout for both presidential and parlia- about movements taking place throughout the
mentary elections since 1945. international community.
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa http://www.sociosite.net/topics/activism.php
Greenpeace’s U.S. Web site describes some of This site, developed by Washington State
the key initiatives taken by this global, action- University, provides a number of links and
oriented interest group. articles related to both U.S. and global social
http://www.uschamber.com/default movements.
This Web site of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, http://www.amnesty.org
the world’s largest business federation, rep- Amnesty International has been dedicated to
resenting more than 3 million large and small human rights causes for more than 40 years,
businesses and, according to some, the most with 2.2 million members in 150 countries. The
powerful lobby group in the United States. site provides information on a variety of topics
http://pol.moveon.org ranging from refugees to arms control.
The site for a progressive citizen action group http://civicyouth.org
in the United States that mobilizes its 3.3 mil- The Center for Information and Research on
lion members to engage in political activism. Civic Learning and Engagement (CIRCLE)
http://www.protest.net promotes research on the civic and political
This Web site provides a comprehensive calen- engagement of Americans between the ages of
dar of upcoming protests and political rallies 15 and 25. The organization’s Web site offers a
taking place around the world. The site lists variety of interesting data and studies on this
upcoming protests by both geographic region topic, including research papers on youth par-
and political issue. ticipation and strategies for mobilizing young
http://www.internationalanswer.org adults into political participation.
This Web site serves as the electronic home of
International ANSWER, a coalition of antiwar
 Chapter 4
Influences on Beliefs
and Actions

Learning Objectives
4.1 Assess how the context in which individuals live impacts their political
beliefs and actions.
4.2 Characterize the different agents of political socialization.
4.3 Illustrate how demographic characteristics are linked to political beliefs
and actions.
4.4 Consider how approaches from political psychology help us understand
politics and political processes.

The following five excerpts are from school textbooks used in different countries. In
each, what subject is being taught, and from what country might each textbook come?

1. Add “not” to the following sentence: “The Iranians are brave.”

2. Our forefathers believed, and we still believe today, that God himself made the
diversity of peoples on earth. . . . Interracial residence and intermarriage are not
only a disgrace but also forbidden by law. It is, however, not only the skin of the
Betas that differs from the Alphas. The Beta stands on a much higher plane of civi-
lization and is more developed. Betas must so live, learn, and work that we shall
not sink to the cultural level of the Alphas. Only thus can the government of our
country remain in the hands of the Betas.
3. Imperialism knows no other type of relations between States except domination
and subjugation, the oppression of the weak by the strong. It bases international
relations on abuse and threat, on violence and arbitrariness. Between January 3
and June 10, 1961, Gamma military airplanes violated Delta airspace 3 times in the
month of January, 15 in February, 17 in March, 9 in April, 8 in May, and 10 in June.
What was the average monthly number of violations of Delta airspace by Gamma
military airplanes?

82
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 83

Our hero! Belarus children (literally) sing the praises of their President. Schools provide the state
with a powerful setting in which to teach (indoctrinate?) children about the state’s version of
appropriate political beliefs and actions.

4. Which of the following descriptions of the United States is incorrect?

(a) The world’s leading arms-exporting country.
(b) The world’s most heavily nuclear-armed country.
(c) The world’s leader in chemical weapons research.
(d) The world’s most peace-loving country that never once was at war with other
countries.
5. The instinctual state of the ants corresponds to the leadership state among man-
kind . . . the principles of a perfect insect state give people cause to think. They
have preserved bees and ants in the struggle for survival and thereby proved their
validity. We earlier noted the following truths . . . :
• The work of the individual has only one purpose: to serve the whole group.
• Major accomplishments are possible only by the division of labor.
• Each . . . risks its life without hesitation for the whole.
• Individuals who are not useful or are harmful to the whole are eliminated.
• The species is maintained by producing a large number of offspring.
It is not difficult for us to see the application of these principles to mankind: . . . The
ethnic state must demand of each individual citizen that he does everything for
the good of the whole, each in his place and with his abilities. And if a person acts
against the general interest, he is an enemy of the people and will be punished by
the law. A look at our history proves that we as a people must defend our territory
to preserve our existence.
84 Chapter 4

Many factors can influence an individual’s political beliefs and political actions.
The educational system certainly can be one of those influences. To most observers,
each of the examples above might be characterized as a crude form of indoctrination.
In each case, those controlling the state also controlled the content of the educational
system. And that content is created and taught in certain ways in the attempt to shape
the behavior of the people raised in that society.
Do you have an idea of the source of any of the textbook excerpts above? Example 1
is from an Arabic language arts textbook for sixth-grade Iraqi students (Robinson
2003). Example 2 is from a South African high school textbook on race relations during
the era of apartheid (1948–1988, substitute “whites” for “Betas” and “nonwhites” for
“Alphas”) (Thompson 1966: 100). Example 3 is mathematics as it is framed for Cuban
middle school students (substitute “Cuban” for “Delta” and “North American” for
“Gamma”) (Fagen 1964: 68). Example 4 is an item on a history test for South Korean
eighth graders (Demick 2003). And Example 5 is from a biology text for fifth-grade
German girls during World War II (Harm and Wiehle 1942).
The textbook examples above lack subtlety. Even as a young child, you would have
recognized and resisted such manipulation…right? Is it possible that your own educa-
tion presented you with ideas that manipulated your thinking about politics—perhaps
in much more subtle ways? Who or what shaped your ideas and actions in the political
world? The attempt to answer that question is the central theme of this chapter and the
next step in our journey toward becoming more informed political thinkers.
In analyzing political behavior in Chapters 2 and 3, we focused on describing the
political beliefs and political actions of individuals and groups. In this chapter, we
explore some of the interesting why questions in this analysis of political behavior and
political identity. Can we explain why individuals hold particular political beliefs and
why they engage in certain political actions? Figure 4.1 indicates four broad types of
explanatory factors that might account for individual political behavior: (1) the envi-
ronment; (2) agents of political socialization; (3) demographic characteristics; and
(4) personality and human nature. This chapter considers these four types of influ-
ences on the political beliefs and actions of individuals, from apathetics to activists.

The Environment
4.1 Assess how the context in which individuals live impacts their political
beliefs and actions.
In the 2011 national election in Vietnam, it was reported that 99.5 percent of the adults
voted, whereas in the United States, 54.6 percent of the voting-age population voted in
the 2012 national election. What best accounts for this difference? In Vietnam, voting
is an obligatory act, a required gesture of support for the current political leadership
rather than a genuine selection among candidates—indeed, there is no choice. Most
Vietnamese vote because someone who does not vote risks unwanted scrutiny by
Communist Party authorities. In the United States, voting has always been a voluntary
act, and there are no sanctions for not voting. Thus, the citizen decides whether her
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 85

Figure 4.1 A Framework for Explaining Individual Political Behavior

Characteris
rs onal tics
Pe
Beliefs
Personality
Agents of Human Nature
political socialization

Actions

Environment

sense of civic responsibility or her desire to affect the outcome on ballot choices merits
the effort of going to vote.
The example of voting in Vietnam and the United States is suggestive of how a
person’s environment—the broad context in which an individual lives—can powerfully
influence her political behavior. In its most comprehensive form, the environment
includes everything outside the individual. It obviously includes political elements
(e.g., governmental procedures, political and governmental institutions, public poli-
cies, specific political events, and political actors), but it also includes elements of the
social and cultural system (e.g., religious foundations and attitudes toward ethnicity,
gender, and class), elements of the economic order (e.g., level of economic prosperity
and development), and the physical features of the environment (e.g., topography and
natural resources).
For any particular political belief or action, there are various possible effects from
an environmental stimulus. An element of the environment might activate, repress,
transform, or amplify a person’s political behavior. Most elements of the environment
are likely to have little or no effect at any given moment, so the task of the political
analyst is to identify those few environmental elements that do have especially signifi-
cant effects on political belief or action and to explain how these effects occur. Because
the environmental context is—at least in theory—of enormous scope, it is helpful to
consider different ways in which the environment might affect behavior. Here are two
examples regarding the political environment:

1. Effects on information about politics. In Myanmar, the government strictly lim-

its the information available about politics so many citizens have minimal knowl-
edge of the current politics—even of their own country. In the United States, the
interested citizen has access each day to information about worldwide political
events from hundreds of hours of television and radio programming and almost
unlimited access to information through Internet sites and other reading materials.
86 Chapter 4

2. Effects on individuals’ political party involvement. From the late 1940s to the
late 1980s, Romania had only one legal political party, the Communist Party. Party
membership, open to only about 10 percent of the population, was essential for
any citizen who wanted to hold political office or gain major advantages in the
society, such as quality housing (see Chapter 15). Currently, Romania has 17 active
political parties, and 8 parties hold seats in the parliament. Party membership and
opportunities to run for public office are now open to all Romanians. However,
party membership no longer provides the advantages that it did during the com-
munist period, and thus the proportion of Romanian adults who are active party
members of all political parties is actually lower now under multiparty democracy
than it was during one-party communism.

The broader cultural, social, economic, and physical environments can have indirect
but no less powerful influences on a person’s political behavior than the political
environment. For example, if the dominant religion in the cultural environment has
traditionally relegated women to a secondary role—as in countries such as Saudi
Arabia that adhere to the sharia laws of Islam—it is likely that few women will be
political activists. If the social environment has an undercurrent of racism, this will
affect the voting behavior and political participation of both the majority and minority
racial groups. If the economy has very high unemployment, this will influence policy
decisions about job creation. Can you think of ways in which even a country’s physical
environment could influence politics? (Read the Compare in 11 if you cannot).
The impact of the environment on political behavior is sometimes hard to predict.
If poverty is widespread in an economic system, will this influence the probability of
political rebellion? On the one hand, such poverty might produce a frustrated popula-
tion that will be responsive to a revolutionary movement promising future prosperity,
and it might inspire a particular person to become very active in such a movement.
On the other hand, the people might be too concerned about basic survival to have the
time and/or energy to engage in political action.
It should be evident from these examples that many aspects of the environment
might influence political beliefs and actions. The analyst must be sensitive to possible
environmental effects when attempting to provide an adequate explanation for a par-
ticular political behavior.

Agents of Political Socialization

4.2 Characterize the different agents of political socialization.
Each person has a complex blend of political beliefs—cognitive, affective, and evalu-
ative orientations regarding political phenomena. (These three kinds of orientations
were defined in Chapter 2.) Even individuals who live in the same environment can
hold very different political beliefs. Political socialization research attempts to explain
the sources of individuals’ political beliefs.
Political socialization can be defined as the processes through which individuals
acquire their beliefs and values about the political world. An understanding of how this
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 87

process works is of importance not only to political analysts but also to those who
wish to influence people’s political beliefs and actions, especially political leaders.
Plato (ca. 428–347 b.c.e.) observed that society’s most important function is civic
training and instructing citizens regarding the nature of their social and political
world and their proper roles in that world. The appropriate content and style of such
political socialization are subject to debate because one person’s vision of proper civic
training might be viewed by another person as indoctrination and brainwashing.
Political scientists attempt to analyze the agents of political socialization—the
major sources of political training and indoctrination shaping an individual’s political beliefs
and values. The main focus has been to explain the processes through which the key
agents of socialization affect political beliefs. There has been considerably less atten-
tion paid to, and very limited empirical success in, demonstrating a link between the
activities of a specific agent of socialization and individuals’ actual political actions. In
this section, we discuss some of the most important agents of political socialization:
the family, schools, social networks, the media, religion, culture, and events.

The Family
The family is the first—and often most powerful and lasting—agent of political social-
ization. The political orientations of most individuals are deeply influenced by the
behaviors and beliefs they experience in the family environment. Before individuals are
capable of making judgments for themselves, they have absorbed perceptions about
the political world from conversations overheard within the family. For example, most
seven-year-old children in the United States already identify with one political party
and have affective orientations toward both major parties. Children are very likely to
adopt the same political orientation as their parents if the families are very interested
in politics and provide consistent cues over time (Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers 2009).
Even the pattern of interactions between parents and children can have political
implications. If the family is very hierarchical—with the father or mother ruling with
an iron hand, preventing discussion, and using strong sanctions for disobedience—the
child might conclude that this is the appropriate pattern of authority relationships in
the society. If the family tends to discuss issues before it makes rules or decisions, the
child might feel more strongly that she has the right to participate actively in deci-
sions, even in the political world. The political leadership usually has minimal control
over the political socialization that occurs in the family. Indeed, the family can trans-
mit values that are at variance with those preferred by the state and its leaders. The
Focus in 4 describes how Mao Zedong used the other agents of political socialization
to counteract the influence of the family in China.

Schools
The excerpts from textbooks that opened this chapter are extreme examples of the
use of schools for political socialization. From the perspective of political authori-
ties, schools can be the state’s most valuable agent for political socialization. Schools
offer the opportunity for sustained and highly controlled contact with youth at the
88 Chapter 4

Focus in 4
Political Socialization in China
Contemporary Chinese political culture is shaped other agents of political socialization to shift cultural
by many forces. Historically, the most critical influ- norms from Confucianism to communism.
ence on the cultural norms in China is Confucianism. He utilized the schools as the primary agent of
Based on the teachings of a fifth-century b.c.e. socialization. Students were relentlessly drilled on
Chinese intellectual, Confucian culture stresses that the values of the new communist social order and
individual action must be based on what is best for taught that the norms of Confucianism constituted
the group and for society as a whole. Harmony and reactionary, unacceptable thinking that would be
cooperation are always to be sought, and disunity harshly punished. Every aspect of the curriculum
and conflict must be avoided. Confucianism places and textbooks were grounded in Marxist think-
the highest value on order, stability, and discipline ing, whether it was history, literature, or science.
within a framework of hierarchical authority. Society Students were also given a book of Mao’s political
is shaped by a series of superior–subordinate rela- comments, The Little Red Book, which many memo-
tionships in which obedience must be offered: by rized completely and recited at school, at home, and
subject to ruler, by child to parent, by younger to in public marches.
elder, and by female to male. Mao altered peer relations. He promoted gen-
Such principles powerfully support a political sys- der equality, placing women in positions of author-
tem in which authoritarianism is natural and accept- ity within the Communist Party, major organizations,
able. The political elite is justified in taking any action and government councils. He enacted the Marriage
that maintains harmony and order or that serves the Law of 1950, which gave a woman rights to take
broader interests of the society—regardless of the legal recourse against bodily harm by her husband,
costs to individuals or groups (e.g., political parties, to initiate a divorce, and to own property. These
unions, and students). rules were a direct repudiation of Confucian norms,
When Mao Zedong came to power in China in in which a wife was the property of her husband,
1949, his commitment to egalitarianism and a revo- who could exploit or dispose of her as he wished.
lutionary restructuring of Chinese society placed him He outlawed foot binding, a practice in which many
in direct conflict with Confucian values. He deeply young girls had their feet wrapped tightly with cloth
opposed the Confucian ideals valuing tradition over every day so that their toes did not develop properly,
change, males over females, and older people over preventing them from walking freely (and making
younger people. To transform China into a new soci- them more dependent on males).
ety associated with his interpretation of Marxism, Mao also mobilized young people as active par-
Mao dealt aggressively with all the key agents of ticipants in the revolution. They were encouraged to
political socialization. report any counterrevolutionary action, even by their
Mao attacked all forms of religion—including parents or friends, and many did so. He established
Confucianism—and used the power of the state to the Red Guards, a grassroots organization composed
suppress religious practices and to force all the peo- primarily of teenagers. The Red Guards were empow-
ple to embrace atheism. He viewed the family as the ered to attack “the four olds” of society—old ideas,
most important agent of socialization in Confucian cultures, manners, and customs. For example, the
norms. He tried to eliminate the nuclear family Red Guards destroyed 5,000 of China’s 7,000 tem-
through collective child-rearing. When that failed, he ples. They would parade “capitalist roaders” (anyone
demanded that the family must “revolutionize itself,” accused of lacking enthusiasm for the revolutionary
but he soon concluded that families would continue changes in society) through the streets, ridicule them,
to be a “citadel of oppression.” Thus, he emphasized and beat or kill them.
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 89

Mao used Communist Party membership to Few modern societies have controlled the
grant power and authority to those loyal to his ideol- agents of political socialization with such intensity
ogy. At every level in society—whether a large collec- and pervasiveness as in Mao’s China. In the face
tive farm, a factory, a school, or a village—real power of extensive coercion and socialization, very few
was held by members of the party who enforced the were willing to challenge the new norms publicly.
“mass line” on all others. Those who deviated from Most behaved in accordance with those norms and
Mao’s vision were subjected to intense criticism from some became true believers—political activists
their peers and, if peer pressure and “re-education” in support of the revolution. However, there was
failed to make them recant and behave properly, they always some resistance to the new values, espe-
would lose privileges (like good jobs and housing), be cially in villages, and Confucian values were never
tortured and imprisoned, or even be executed. fully extinguished. Indeed, one of the dominant
Also, the media and modes of cultural expres- explanations for the recent explosion of economic
sion became instruments of absolute support for development and productivity in China—as well as
Communist Party viewpoints. Television, newspa- in other East Asian countries such as Singapore,
pers, and other media were all owned by the state. South Korea, and Taiwan—is the norms of order,
No independent perspectives were allowed. Plays, hard work, education, and financial acquisitiveness
music, artworks, and all other forms of culture were associated with Confucianism (Compton 2000;
required to reflect “socialist realism”—a celebration Meisner 2006).
of the glorious revolution, the heroic struggle of the
workers and peasants in overthrowing the feudal
regime under the emperor and the privileged classes,
Further Focus
and the new utopia of communist egalitarianism 1. What can a state do to try to counter the influ-
and abundance shared by all. The state engaged in ence of the family or religion as an agent of
extensive censorship, destroyed counterrevolution- political socialization?
ary cultural works, and punished any who used artis- 2. Which agent of political socialization has had
tic expression to criticize the party or the state. the biggest influence on you? Why?

extremely impressionable age when many political beliefs can still be molded. Apart
from the family, the classroom is the most important microcosm of society that most
young people experience. The teacher is the authority figure who rewards thinking
and behavior that conform to what is deemed desirable by the society and who sanc-
tions or withholds rewards from those who fail to conform. In most societies, stu-
dents are taught to accept the authority of the teacher, to control their behavior, and
to value the symbolic rewards offered by the education system. Every school sys-
tem has rituals that support the political system. These might include songs, chants,
or activities that express allegiance to political leaders or symbols. The photo on
page 83 shows students in Belarus singing a daily song that celebrates the virtues of
their country’s president.
The school curriculum can be extremely powerful in shaping the students’ under-
standing of the political world. Educational authorities control what subjects are taught,
what textbooks contain, what content is tested, who teaches, and even what teachers say
and do. An extreme form of this central control over education was achieved during the
French Fourth Republic (1946–1958). It was said that the minister of education in Paris
could look at her watch and specify exactly what chapter in what textbook the children
of a certain age were studying at that moment all over France. While most subject matter
90 Chapter 4

in the schools of most countries is not openly political, school systems in every country
present materials that are supportive of that country’s politics and dominant cultural
norms. All textbooks and all lessons in school are selective and thus contain biases in
what is emphasized, what is ignored, and how meaning and value are established.
Have you noticed anything unusual about the use of the pronouns he and she in
this book? To counter the male dominance in the language of many American text-
books, we alternate masculine and feminine pronouns in odd and even chapters,
respectively. If you were aware of the gender pronouns in Chapter 2 and this chapter,
your reaction may be indicative of the subtle ways in which you have been affected by
cultural norms that are reinforced by language and education.

Social Networks
Persistence is the rule for the political attitudes and behaviors an individual learns
from parents and schooling–that is, what you learn early tends to have deep and
long-lasting effects. However, according to the life cycle interpretation of political
socialization, learning never stops. As the importance of parents and formal school-
ing diminishes, social networks become an increasingly significant influence on many
people’s political socialization. Social networks include friends and colleagues from
peer groups such as work, school, church, and clubs. A social network can also emerge
from a person’s interactions on social media, such as Facebook. A person tends to be
influenced by what “people like me” think. People bring their ideas and values into
closer conformity with those of their social networks since this makes the relationship
more comfortable (Agnew 2003; Campbell 2013).
In many cases, peers and others influence a person’s political views via a two-step
communication flow (Bennett 2012; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955). People with greater inter-
est in and knowledge of politics absorb new information from various sources (step
one). Then they relay what they have learned to others (step two), especially those in the
mass public whose political beliefs are less salient and developed (recall Chapter 2).
Direct communications from peers allow for a rich exchange of political information
because such political messages have the immediacy, credibility, and power of per-
sonal interaction. Focus in 4 describes how China has used the peer group as a major
mechanism for political socialization, especially during the period under Mao Zedong.
The influence of social networks can also be a powerful factor in the radicalization
of the “homegrown” terrorists who are becoming a significant threat in many coun-
tries. There is considerable evidence that individuals, especially young adult males
who feel alone and alienated as part of a cultural and religious minority, find encour-
agement and direction from a small group of peers who gather informally. As they
share their ideas and frustrations, they begin to radicalize one another and to discuss
how they could strike out at those in their country who antagonize them (King and
Taylor 2011). In some cases, these ideas move from imagination to action, usually in
the form of violent acts. Often, these acts are the result of small social networks rather
than a central plan directed by the leadership of a large organization (Sageman 2008).
These small peer groups, which usually have no direct connection with the larger,
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 91

known terrorist organizations such as al-Qaeda, are emerging in many countries, from
Europe and North America to Asia, North Africa, and the Middle East. An example of
this type of small-group terrorism is the September 2014 suicide car bombing in Anbar
Province, Iraq in which 37 were killed and individuals affiliated with no known group
were the suspects.

The Media
Very few of us directly experience most of political phenomena about which we claim
knowledge. For most adults, the media—especially television, radio, the press, and
the Internet—are the major sources of political information. Dan Nimmo and James
Combs (1990: xiii) argue: “Few people learn about politics through direct experience.
For most persons, political realities are mediated through mass and group communi-
cation, a process that results as much in the creation, transmission, and adoption of
political fantasies as it results in independently validated views of what happens.”
They claim that each of us creates a personal vision (a “fantasy”) of political reality
based mainly on what is communicated to us by information sources such as other
people, the mass media, and popular culture. Regardless of how fantastic our political
visions are, it is important to understand that the media can be a crucial agent of politi-
cal socialization for either stability or change.
These information sources really do mediate between the individual and most
political reality. While most media content is not explicitly political, much of it does
contain subtle information that influences how one thinks about politics and society.
Exposure to television and radio is extensive in most countries. Thus, the individual is
bombarded with messages about values, lifestyles, and so on. While sweeping gener-
alizations about the impacts of the media on people’s political beliefs and actions are
not possible, two broad observations can be offered.
First, there is considerable evidence that the media are especially significant in
drawing people’s attention to some political phenomena rather than to others—an impact
called agenda setting. The media signal what is important by their selection of what
topics to cover and the depth of coverage, and the media influence the individual’s
interpretation of political phenomena by the manner in which information is pre-
sented. In general, the media (over?) simplify political topics by personalizing stories,
focusing on single events, and glossing over the complex nature of most political issues
(Bennett 2012; Iyengar 2011).
Second, however, the research concludes that few people absorb media information
in a way that significantly changes most of their political attitudes or actions. Rather,
people interpret and retain media information selectively to reinforce their existing
attitudes. Many people, especially those with less sophisticated political belief systems
and minimal political knowledge (see Chapter 2), do not pay much attention to the
media that provide explicit political information. Moreover, with the proliferation of
media outlets through cable and Internet sources, people can easily select news outlets
that they perceive share their views (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). The media-based infor-
mation for such people often comes indirectly from a politically knowledgeable peer
92 Chapter 4

or their broader social network through the two-step communication flow described
on page 90.
Newspapers are still credited with having the greatest effect on knowledge about
politicians and issues among the most educated people (Graber 2009; Johnson and
Kellstedt 2013). However, television is now regarded as the most important source of
political information for the largest number of people in Western democracies (Dalton
2014). In the more technologically developed societies, the many forms of Internet
content—which includes not only online television and news media but also search
engines, blogs, and online videos—have become a key source of political information
(Chadwick 2013; Loader and Mercea 2012). An increasing amount of this digitized
political information is actually transmitted through peer-to-peer networks, enhanc-
ing its power. There is some debate whether the shift from broadcasting to narrow-
casting, especially via the Internet, social media, and partisan media sites, will enable
individuals to focus almost exclusively on sources that reinforce their existing political
viewpoints, and whether this selective exposure is dangerous for a healthy democ-
racy (Iyengar and Hahn 2009; Sunstein 2009). The Debate in 4 assesses whether the
new ICTs (information and communications technologies) are dramatically altering
the impact of media on political beliefs and political actions.
Much of what you know about the political world from the mainstream media is
contingent on what topics the media choose to cover and what content the media select
to report. Like textbooks, the media are not neutral; someone has selected the subjects
and content. In many countries, the major media are owned and controlled by the
government or by members of the wealthy, dominant class in that society (Bagdikian
2004). Even in democratic countries, most media are not free of ideological bias. Most
media are owned by private interests, and those owners have biases—the broad con-
servatism of News Corp.’s media mogul Rupert Murdoch is one example (Folkenflik
2013). At least, most media in free societies are oriented to please those who advertise
with them and their core audience and thus have a profit-based bias.
The print and broadcast media are free of substantial government censorship
in less than one-third (32 percent) of all countries, and these countries include only
15 percent of the world’s population. Governments severely censor the media for 43
percent of the world’s people (Freedom House 2013). Through their ability to control
the media, most governments have a significant resource for political socialization,
exposing people to news and information that reinforce the government’s view of the
political world. And there is empirical evidence of a global decline in freedom of the
press the last decade (Freedom House 2013). Moreover, an analysis of freedom on the
Internet concludes that such freedom has recently declined in 34 of the 60 countries
examined (Freedom House 2013). Google has also identified a dramatic increase in
governmental efforts to censor the Internet around the world (Malcolm 2013).
Of course, you are not completely passive in the process. In most countries, people
can choose among alternative media sources and can attempt to evaluate the truth of
what they read, hear, and see in the media. And the recent explosion of telecommu-
nications technologies (such as satellite television transmissions and the Internet) has
made it increasingly difficult for a government to control all the sources of information
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 93

The Debate in 4
Do the New ICTs Substantially Change Our Political Beliefs and Actions?
With the enhanced global communication through • Information is power. ICTs such as search
cell phones, satellites, peer-to-peer networks, and engines, online news, and political Web sites
the Internet, many societies have become informa- allow individuals to access far more information
tion-rich and communication intensive (Chadwick than in the past. Access is easier and less costly,
and Howard 2009). From the globalized 24/7 news and the user can rapidly explore multiple sources
to the extensive political blogging to the tweets and control her analysis of information and knowl-
reporting revolution in the streets of repressive edge claims about politics (Brookings 2011).
regimes, the impacts of all these information and • Social media ICTs such as YouTube and blogs
communications technologies (ICTs) seem extraor- enable those with minimal resources to reach a
dinary (Cropf and Krummenacher 2011). Thus, large, possibly global audience, giving expres-
some argue that these ICTs are dramatically chang- sion and potential influence to those who pre-
ing the nature of individual political beliefs and viously had no capacity to communicate their
actions. Others insist that these ICTs are important political messages to a broad audience (Loader
but merely add incrementally to the existing array of and Mercea 2012).
agents of political socialization that influence politi-
• These social media and digital technologies such
cal behavior. Are these new social media truly game
as cell phones have become critical tools provid-
changers?
ing political activists with new modes for coop-
eration, mobilization, and coordination of their
New ICTs Are Powerfully Shaping Political
political actions, as in the Arab Spring 2011 upris-
Beliefs and Political Actions
ings in Egypt and Tunisia (Ritter and Trechsel 2011).
• As the impacts of parents and schools as agents
of political socialization fade by an individual’s
New ICTs Have Not Dramatically Changed Politi-
teenage years, the media often become the criti-
cal Beliefs and Political Actions
cal agent. For younger generations, the Internet
is increasingly the primary platform for acquir- • While the utilization of online sources of politi-
ing and sharing knowledge about the political cal information has increased dramatically, most
world. The diversity, speed, anonymity, and shrill people primarily seek this information from online
nature of political information circulated on these modes of traditional, dominant news sources
ICTs have substantially altered the content and (e.g., CNN, BBC, Al Jazeera). The mere digitizing
impacts of this information on both citizens and of information from conventional sources will not
political officials (Chadwick 2013; Graham and result in major changes in the content or even the
Dutton 2014; Pew 2011). impact of these agents of political socialization
• While collective norms might still be shaped (Chadwick 2013; Garrett and Danziger 2011).
by mainstream broadcast media outlets, the • More broadly, most empirical research has con-
Internet and new social media are critical in the cluded that ICTs in the political world are essen-
creation of the individual’s identity. Through the tially power-reinforcing. Those elites and groups
Web, people rely on themselves and their own who already exercise substantial political power
resources to solidify an identity and self-aware- and influence have been able to capture a dis-
ness, including the formation of their cognitive, proportionate share of the power and benefits
affective, and evaluative political beliefs (Anduiza associated with the use of ICTs (Bimber 2003;
et al. 2012; Papacharissi 2010). Schmidt and Cohen 2010).
94 Chapter 4

• Despite the presence of all these ICTs, most modest strengthening of those views (Sunstein
citizens exhibit no greater knowledge about or 2009). Those who expose themselves to the
interest in the political world, and political par- multiplicity of perspectives and the huge num-
ticipation has not increased significantly as a ber of contradictory knowledge claims about
result of these technologies. Most research on politics from the nonmainstream ICTs tend to be
participation has not yet found a positive cor- overwhelmed. As with other agents of social-
relation between the greater use of ICTs and ization in conflict, the dominant effects are to
increased levels of citizen engagement in politics increase uncertainty and reduce political action.
(Boulianne 2009; Garrett and Danziger 2011).
• Social media seem mainly to facilitate “slacktiv-
ism” instead of activism (Gladwell 2010). That More Questions…
is, many casual participants and bandwagon- 1. As governments are increasingly unable to con-
ers seek social change through low-cost activi- trol the information that citizens access through
ties such as joining a digital social movement the new ICTs, will there be generally positive
(e.g., a “Save Darfur” Facebook group). Such changes in pursuit of the goals of democracy,
forms of virtual political action translate into tolerance, and a shared community of meaning
minimal effects in the real world of political action in a society?
(Shirky 2011). 2. Are you persuaded that the content of political
• Those who use ICTs to focus and narrow their information that most individuals are influenced
exposure to sources consistent with their exist- by will change as they become more reliant on
ing political views experience little more than a ICTs as a crucial source?

reaching its citizens. Consequently, most governments are becoming less effective in
shaping people’s political beliefs through the media, even as the media are an increas-
ingly important source of people’s political “reality.”

Religion
For some individuals, religion is a powerful agent of political socialization. First, politi-
cal beliefs and actions can be influenced by religious beliefs that individuals should act
to correct the failures of secular society and should promote religious views on issues on
which the government has enacted unacceptable public policies, such as abortion, school
curriculum, gender relations, and even policy choices about economic development
(McDuie-Ra and Rees 2010). Second, people in some environments are so disillusioned
with the conditions of their society that they look to religion for a framework of beliefs
and actions to improve those conditions. This is especially the case in societies in which
people perceive substantial negative effects due to the shift from traditional to modern
life (Haynes 2007, 2010). And third, some religious belief systems make no distinction
between religious life and public life, and thus it is natural that religious values—not
public policies—always have precedence. This acceptance of the dominance of religious
prescriptions over secular authority is evident in certain fundamentalist groups within
all the major religions, particularly Christianity, Judaism, and Islam.
In all these situations, religious authorities—whether texts or the pronouncements
of religious figures—can guide and motivate their followers. Arguably more than any
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 95

of the other agents of political socialization, it is possible to link the content communi-
cated by religion as a socializing agent with both political beliefs and political actions.
Even the impact of family socialization, as discussed above, can be shaped by and rein-
force religious beliefs if the family is devout. In many instances, one person’s piety can
be another person’s intolerance and bigotry. The current era is one in which there are
huge differences in the impacts of religion as an agent of political socialization on those
who are generally unaffected by religious beliefs, those who separate their religious
beliefs from their political beliefs, and those whose political views are substantially
shaped by their religious values (Putnam and Campbell 2012).

Culture
In every country, most mainstream culture, which ranges from product advertisements
to cinema to music to public monuments, is supportive of the society’s dominant
values, including its political values. (Consider, for example, whether there is varia-
tion in the main ethnicities of villains in films produced in your country over the past
70 years.) Moreover, culture—like the media—can be extensively controlled by the
dominant political order in a society and can be used to reinforce the state’s view of
the political world. Cuba, like many of the communist states in the past, has gener-
ally insisted that culture must meet the standards of socialist realism, which means
that no art, theater, or cinema should be allowed if it fails to celebrate the virtues of
socialism—Cuban style.
However, culture does not necessarily reinforce the dominant order. Culture can
inform and criticize subtly, by means of metaphor and symbol, in ways less likely to be
interpreted as a direct challenge to the established authorities. This is especially true
in societies in which there is considerable censorship of the media and state control
of most sources of public information. During the 1980s, for example, an extensive
body of fiction, cinema, poetry, theater, art, and music emerged with political content
critical of the state’s views in countries such as East Germany and Poland that were
still communist (Larkey 1990). Culture can also be openly subversive, directly attack-
ing mainstream values or advocating opposing values. For example, Jamaican reggae
music offers a revolutionary vision of an alternative social and political world for its
people. While most contemporary American music has little explicit political content,
overt political content can be found across a spectrum of music in songs by performers
such as the Dixie Chicks, Green Day, Kanye West, Macklemore & Ryan Lewis, Toby
Keith, and Bruce Springsteen (Coles 2003; Fisher and Flota 2013).

Events
The general effects of the environment on political beliefs and action have already
been discussed. While the context of everyday life has slow, evolutionary effects on
a person’s political behavior, a specific event can act as a sudden and powerful agent
of political socialization. For example, Sarah Brady shifted from being a politician’s
wife to being a tireless political activist on behalf of gun control legislation after her
husband, James Brady, President Reagan’s press secretary, was shot and paralyzed in
96 Chapter 4

a 1981 assassination attempt on the president. Another example of mobilization after

a dramatic event is the transformation of Sonia Gandhi, an apolitical spouse, into the
leader of the Congress Party in India after the assassination of her husband, Prime
Minister Rajiv Gandhi, in 1991. It is also suggested that many recruits for extremist
movements such as political Islam are motivated to avenge a traumatic experience
in which a family member or close friend was injured or killed by the domestic or
foreign military.

Demographic Characteristics
4.3 Illustrate how an individual’s demographic characteristics are linked to
political beliefs and actions.
In our explanation of political beliefs and actions, we should also analyze the influence
of an individual’s demographic characteristics. Sometimes called personal characteris-
tics, these include both visible characteristics, such as age, gender, and ethnicity, and
less visible ones, such as education, income, social class, and occupation. These char-
acteristics, when taken together, might be thought of as an individual’s identity. What
underlying dynamic might link these personal characteristics and an individual’s
identity with political behavior?
Demographic characteristics can be thought of as filters that influence how the
environment and the agents of political socialization affect an individual’s political
behavior. For example, the current impact of parents as agents of political social-
ization is likely to be far greater for their offspring of age 4 than those of age 44.
Similarly, an environmental context of Islamic fundamentalism in Saudi Arabia
will have very different effects on the political beliefs and behaviors of Saudi men
and women.
Much of the empirical research on political behavior attempts to establish and
clarify the relationships between demographic characteristics and specific political
beliefs or actions. Recent scholarship embraces the idea that these characteristics
combine to create the identity of the individual. No single demographic characteris-
tic is a certain predictor of political behavior, but empirical research (based on rela-
tional analysis) in many countries indicates that some demographic characteristics
are associated with certain political beliefs and actions. Often, a person’s identity can
provide insights into her political behavior. And when key demographic character-
istics seem to reinforce one another or be especially critical for the formation of an
identity, you might have greater confidence in a correct prediction about a particular
political behavior.
For example, can you think of any demographic characteristics that might
inform your prediction of whether a particular person voted for Barack Obama or
Mitt Romney in the 2012 U.S. presidential election? Table 4.1 uses relational analy-
sis (like Table A.4 in the Appendix) to explore those linkages. Do any demographic
characteristics seem to be associated with a tendency to vote for either candidate?
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 97

Table 4.1 Voting Choices in the 2012 U.S. Presidential Election, by Demographic
Characteristics

Obama 51% Romney 47%

Gender Male 47%* 48% 52%
Female 53 55 45
Ethnicity Caucasian 74 39 59
African American 13 93 6
Latino 10 71 27
Asian American 3 73 26
Age 18–29 19 60 37
30–44 27 52 45
45–64 38 47 51
65+ 16 44 54
Family Income Less than $50K 41 60 38
$50–100K 31 46 52
More than $100K 28 44 54
Education Not high school grad 3 64 35
High school grad 21 51 48
Some college 29 49 48
College grad 29 47 51
Postgraduate 18 55 42
Religion Protestant 53 42 57
Catholic 25 50 48
Other 7 74 23
None 12 70 26
*Percentage of total electorate
Note: Due to rounding, not all categories total 100 percent.
SOuRCe: Based on data from Roper Center 2012

In addition to comparing the overall percentage of voters in a category (e.g., high

school graduates) for each candidate, another useful technique for answering this
question is to determine whether there are instances in which the candidate’s per-
centage for a category is noticeably different from the candidate’s percentage of the
total vote.
While most of the differences are not dramatic, some demographic characteris-
tics do seem to correlate with support for Obama or Romney. Notice, for example,
that the probability of voting for Obama was substantially higher among those who
had any of the following characteristics: 18 to 29 years old; African American, Latino,
or Asian American; “other” religion; not a high school graduate; and family income
below $50,000. People’s probability of voting for Romney was especially high among
Caucasians, Protestants, and those over age 65.
98 Chapter 4

Although there are some clear associations among variables, we cannot conclude
that any demographic characteristic actually caused a person to vote for a particular can-
didate (see the distinction between correlational and causal analysis in the Appendix).
And when several demographic characteristics are associated with voting choice, we
cannot determine which of them are the most powerful predictors of candidate choice
without statistical analysis (such as regression analysis, a statistical technique that
identifies how much variance in the dependent variable—vote choice, in this case—can
be attributed to each subject’s level on various independent variables). Nonetheless,
Table 4.1 provides reasonable support for our assumption that demographic character-
istics are sometimes associated with political behavior.
While generalizations are always difficult, there is some consistency in the
empirical research on the demographic characteristics of those who do vote (in
political systems in which there are genuine voting choices). In general, a higher
probability of voting is correlated with characteristics such as membership in orga-
nizations that have explicit interests in politics (e.g., political parties and unions),
higher education, higher income, higher social class, greater age, and male gender.
Incidence of voting is also associated with the person’s political beliefs, especially a
strong identification with a party; a greater sense of personal capacity to influence
the political world (political efficacy); and deeper knowledge about the available
political choices.
Research findings on other modes of political behavior are less extensive and less
consistent. As in the taxonomies of participation, the crossnational studies by Verba
and his colleagues (Verba, Nie, and Kim 1978) remain among the most influential
in identifying the individual characteristics that correlate with each mode of con-
ventional political action. Participation in campaign activities is especially linked
with higher education, higher income, and male gender. Communal activities are
generally associated with higher socioeconomic characteristics and with identifica-
tion with a particular social group (religious, ethnic, or linguistic) that has a politi-
cal perspective. Contacting government officials personally is least clearly related
to demographic characteristics, and some research suggests that the decision to
engage in personal contacts depends more on whether the person has an effective
private means to gain her objective or must rely on contacting public officials to
achieve this objective. Contacting officials might be the type of political action that
has increased most during recent decades and it is increasingly facilitated by e-mail
and other digital communications innovations (Anduiza, Jensen, and Jorba 2013;
Marien et al. 2010).
In studying extremist-activists, many analyses attempt to specify the demographic
characteristics that typify a particular type of activist relative to the general popula-
tion. For example, many of the Muslims who have engaged in terrorist acts are young
adult males who are well educated, married with children, and come from middle-
class families (Berrebi 2007; Sageman 2008). The rural extremist-activists engaged in
a struggle for control over land in Asia and Latin America tend to be male, poor, and
have limited education. Urban activists who promote leftist ideologies (e.g., Marxism,
environmentalism) are generally characterized as well educated, middle class, young,
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 99

Compare in 4
You Go Your Way, I’ll Go Mine
The two young men have some common roots. foreign rule. Members of his network commit many
Both are born into societies grounded in traditional acts of international terrorism, including a massacre
social systems of hierarchy and male domination of tourists in Luxor, Egypt, in 1995 and the bombings
and strong, fundamentalist religion. Both are sons of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.
of prosperous professional fathers who are deeply Many plots are unsuccessful, including an attempt to
religious. Each young man displays high intelligence fly a hijacked airplane into the Eiffel Tower and assas-
and receives an excellent education. sination attempts on the leaders of Egypt, Jordan,
As young adults, each trains successfully for a and Pakistan. His network commits the most brutal
professional career and enters that career. Each is terrorist attack ever undertaken in the United States,
shocked when he witnesses religious or racial dis- with two hijacked passenger airplanes crashing into
crimination and the severe deprivation that character- the twin towers of the World Trade Center and another
izes the lives of the substantial majority of people in into the Pentagon on September 11, 2001. These
his society. Each becomes a deeply devout follower attacks resulted in more than 3,000 deaths as well as
of his religion. Each develops a powerful commit- worldwide fear and disruption of both travel and finan-
ment to the independence of his people from foreign cial markets. In response to criticism that he targets
powers, which are seen as the source of oppression innocents and supports terrorism, he comments:
and injustice. Each chooses a life of political activism
American history does not distinguish between
and decides to engage in extreme political acts, as
civilians and military, and not even women and
necessary, to achieve his vision of social justice. But
children. Americans are the ones who used the
the two men follow very different paths.
bombs against Nagasaki. Can these bombs dis-
The first man travels to another country to join the
tinguish between infants and military? . . . Your
revolutionary struggle against a major colonial power.
situation with Muslims in Palestine is shame-
He is trained and supported in guerrilla warfare tac-
ful.…[T]he American-led sanctions resulted in
tics (see Chapter 11) by the U.S. Central Intelligence
the death of over 1 million Iraqi children. All of
Agency and becomes an effective leader. After suc-
this was done in the name of American interests.
cessfully defeating the foreign power, he returns
We believe that the biggest thieves in the world
home to Saudi Arabia to work in the family business.
and the terrorists are the Americans. The only
However, he is deeply offended by the presence and
way for us to fend off these assaults is to use
influence of foreigners in his religion’s holiest lands. His
similar means. We do not differentiate between
open demands to expel the foreigners and establish a
those dressed in military uniforms and civilians;
pure religious state result in conflict with the authori-
they are all targets in this fatwa [death decree].
tarian regime in his homeland. He is harassed by the
(Source: http://abcnews.go.com/sections/world/
regime, his citizenship is revoked, and he is forced to
dailynews/terror_980609.html)
leave the country. He eventually returns to the country
where he had fought on behalf of the revolution. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) labels his
By this time, he is convinced that his righteous al-Qaeda organization “the most dangerous terror-
cause can be advanced only by extreme acts of vio- ist organization in the world,” and he becomes the
lence. He uses his considerable personal wealth ($300 prime target in the “war on international terrorism”
million) to organize a loosely connected international initiated by then–U.S. president George W. Bush.
network of highly trained extremist-activists living in He is hunted relentlessly for nearly a decade and is
more than 60 countries. He calls on all his followers finally killed in 2011 by U.S. Special Forces in a raid
to use any means necessary to free their lands from of the home in Pakistan where he had been hiding.
100 Chapter 4

Osama bin Laden and Mohandas Gandhi are two extraordinary extremist-
activists who had similar backgrounds but chose fundamentally different
paths of political action.

The second man witnesses the whites’ racism expand to the tens of thousands. His supporters call
against Indians while serving as a lawyer in South him Mahatma—great soul. His tireless political activ-
Africa. To resist such injustice, he develops a strategy ism over three decades contributes greatly to Britain
of civil disobedience inspired by Henry David Thoreau granting independence to India. His life of struggle is
as well as by his own religious beliefs. His funda- not a complete success, however. He fails to prevent
mental principle is ahimsa—nonviolence in thought the division of India into separate countries domi-
as well as in action. He advises his followers: “Not to nated by Hindus and Muslims, a struggle bloodied
submit; to suffer.” He is repeatedly jailed for his non- by 1 million deaths. He fails to persuade Hindus to
violent resistance to laws that he believes are unjust. repudiate the divisive and unjust social caste sys-
He assumes that the opposition will discredit itself by tem, and he is assassinated by a Hindu extremist
its repressive responses to nonviolent protest. within months of India’s independence.
Returning to his native India, he begins to orga- Despite their early similarities, Osama bin Laden
nize protests demanding independence from the (1957–2011) and Mohandas K. Gandhi (1869–1948)
British imperialists. His protest techniques continue diverged onto nearly opposite paths of extreme
to be based on nonviolence and satyagraha—soul political activism in the pursuit of their personal
force. In contrast to brute force, soul force produces visions of social justice and human liberation.
constructive change through positive action and
reconciliation, not through harming and angering Further Questions
the enemy. He observes, “My experience has shown
1. Given the similar upbringings of bin Laden and
me that we win justice quickest by rendering justice
Gandhi, how might you explain their different
to the other party.” He becomes an extraordinarily
paths of activism?
powerful and inspirational leader through his theatri-
cal acts of civil disobedience and his personal sac- 2. Is it ironic that both died violently?
rifices, including extended fasts, lengthy marches, 3. Which of your demographic characteristics has
and sexual abstinence. His nonviolent activism had the biggest impact on your political beliefs
captures world attention, and his Indian followers and actions?
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 101

and only slightly more likely to be male than female. Right-wing urban activists are
more varied. Those promoting an ethnic or racist position (e.g., neo-Nazism) tend to
be young, male, working or lower class, and somewhat lower in education (Schain,
Zolberg, and Hossay 2002). Those promoting conservative causes such as the anti-
abortion movement tend to be middle aged, female, middle class, and relatively well
educated (Dalton 2013).
Overall, what do you expect to be the demographic characteristics most likely
among top political leaders in a given society? Perhaps the broadest generalization is
that leaders’ demographic characteristics tend to be consistent with the characteristics
of the socially dominant groups within their society. Why do you think this occurs?
Among the most common shared characteristics across many societies are high edu-
cation, upper-middle-class or upper-class background, association with the society’s
dominant religion and ethnicity, and male gender.
Given our general fascination with extraordinary political actors such as pres-
idents, charismatic leaders, and revolutionaries, it is interesting to assess whether
particular environments, socialization experiences, or demographic characteristics
seem to account for the political behavior of these individuals. Compare in 4 briefly
describes the environment, socialization, and demographic characteristics of two
remarkable political activists. Do these factors seem relatively similar for the two
men? Do these factors seem to produce similar political behavior?

Political Psychology
4.4 Consider how approaches from political psychology help us understand
politics and political processes.
Why does one person vote and another abstain? Why does one ethnic group engage
in a killing rampage against another group? Why does a political activist follow the
path of bin Laden rather than Gandhi? These are examples of the modes of political
behavior that political science attempts to explain. The three types of explanatory fac-
tors we have discussed to this point are either outside the person (the environment
and agents of political socialization) or are surface characteristics (e.g., age, ethnicity,
wealth). However, you might find yourself agreeing with those political scientists who
insist that an adequate explanation of political behavior requires analysis that probes
inside a person. This is broadly understood as the field of political psychology—study
of the deeper psychological dynamics within the individual that affect that person’s response to
political stimuli.
Political psychology uses the theories and tools that have been developed in psychol-
ogy to explain political behavior. It draws on such fields as neuroscience, evolutionary
psychology, social psychology, cognitive psychology, and biopsychology, among oth-
ers. Political psychology brings emotions, cognitive processes, and social interactions
into our attempts to understand the politically relevant thoughts and actions of indi-
viduals and groups (Huddie, Sears, and Levy 2013). It includes the study of political
orientations (Chapter 2) and of social network relations (discussed above as an agent
102 Chapter 4

of socialization). The subject of study might be an ordinary citizen—for example, why

does a person vote for a particular candidate or hold anti-immigration sentiments? The
focus might be members of the political elite—why does a leadership group make a
decision like starting a war? Or the subject might be mass political behavior—what
causes many people to join a huge public protest against a regime? (Tesler and Sears
2010; Sniderman and Hagendoorn 2007; Crenshaw 2000; Lerner et al. 2003).
There are several alternative (and sometimes complementary) frameworks of
analysis that guide the work in political psychology. Here are brief descriptions of five
of these approaches.

• Rational choice approaches base an explanation of individual or group political

actions on the claim that people have relatively stable preferences and that they
will try to think through how to achieve outcomes consistent with those prefer-
ences. There is no presumption that a person will be totally rational or will choose
the “correct” decision and action. But the approach does assume that a person will
attempt to make an assessment of the costs and benefits of alternative choices,
estimate the probability of different outcomes, and then act on the choice with the
most favorable expected outcome. The Appendix details a classic example of a
paradox tackled by the rational choice approach: Why should a person put in all
the effort (costs) associated with voting in a national election when her vote has so
little probability of affecting the outcome and producing direct benefits? (Downs
1957; Green and Shapiro 1994; Shepsle 2010).
• Cognitive and affective psychology approaches suggest that the brain often
makes decisions more rapidly than deliberative rational thought can manage. In
essence, individuals use shortcuts based on their cognitive and affective orienta-
tions (recall these orientations from Chapter 2) to make many decisions quickly
and with very little information. Analyses attempt to specify the content of these
shortcuts regarding what a person knows and feels about a particular situation,
and then this content is applied to explain how it shapes political behavior. For
example, in many countries one of the key shortcuts that guides political behavior
is party identification, which helps voters interpret policy positions by candidates
and informs their voting decisions (Sniderman and Stiglitz 2012). Interestingly,
research has demonstrated that rapid, low-information decision making on elec-
toral choices (e.g., Should I vote for or against this ballot proposition?) can result
in mass political outcomes that are no worse than those resulting from reasoned
political deliberation (Lau and Redlawsk 1997).
• Intergroup relations analyses offer an explanation of group dynamics and collective
behavior. Such group-based behavior has a central role in politics. For example, an
understanding of intergroup dynamics provides insights about how groups com-
promise (e.g., how countries negotiate a peace treaty) and how people cooperate
in groups to enhance their situation (e.g., forming an effective social movement)
(Aguilar and Galluccio 2010; Sullivan, Snyder, and Sullivan 2008). This approach
can also explain how groups end up in conflict. One group’s sense of psychological
threat and hostility toward another group might be based on perceived or actual
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 103

competition over resources (e.g., jobs or goods), on conflict over values, beliefs, and
identity (e.g., religion), or on a sense of different levels of status (Kinder and Sears
1981; Plant and Devine 2003; Pratto et al. 1994; Rick, Mania, and Gaertner 2006). Once
a group is identified as constituting a threat, having undesirable values, or being
of lower status, political elites could exploit these elements to persuade a group’s
members to join in violent actions against the targeted group. This might help ex-
plain such intergroup conflicts as the brutal interethnic violence in the 1990s in the
Balkans or Rwanda (see Chapter 12) (Green et al. 2009; Staub 2011; Smith 2012).
• Personality and psychodynamics approaches explore aspects of the forma-
tion and effects of personality. Work in psychobiography explains adult political
behavior on the basis of formative childhood experiences or critical life experiences
(Erikson 1969; Schultz 2005). An interesting recent example from the political world
is the contrasting psychobiographies of former U.S. President Bill Clinton (Fick
2000; Gartner 2009). Other analyses emphasize important needs, drives, and expe-
riences embedded in a person’s psyche to explain political thoughts and actions
(George and George 1956; Post 2004). A related group of studies explains the signif-
icance for political behavior of certain personality characteristics, such as openness
to experience, extraversion, need for security, desire for praise, conscientiousness,
narcissism, and so on (Feldman and Stenner 1997; Woshinsky 1995).
• Biopolitics focuses on biological processes to explain decision making, informa-
tion processing, and preference formation that have implications for political
behavior. It builds on important work that has considered the essential elements of
human nature and how human behavior has evolved over time within its social and
environmental contexts (Wilson 1978). Neuroscience, which considers the neural
processes of individuals, is the basis for explanations ranging from the reduction
of intergroup violence over generations to the rulings about individual respon-
sibility for human rights violations by the International Criminal Court (Pinker
2011; Shniderman and Smith 2014). John Hibbing and his colleagues present
experimental evidence that individual genetic factors and brain biology are con-
nected with a person’s predisposition to certain ideological orientations (Hibbing,
Smith, and Alford 2013; see also Fowler and Dawes 2009). Other research sug-
gests that one’s willingness to cooperate is “hard-wired” into our psychological
processes, as are the tendencies to define groups to which we belong and groups
we see as rivals (Kurzban, DeScioli, and Fenn 2012).
It should be evident that political psychology approaches offer explanations for
many aspects of people’s political beliefs and actions. Some of these explanations blend
aspects of various approaches to political psychology. For example, Steven Pinker (2011),
a distinguished neuroscientist, has offered a wide-ranging explanation of why violence
has declined over many generations. Starting with our hunter-gatherer ancestors, Pinker
blends the long evolution of our human nature with social history, the emergence of
modern social institutions, the rise of science and rationality, and advances in individu-
als’ cognitive content. He identifies the ways in which “the better angels of our nature”
(the title of his book), such as empathy, reason, and a heightened moral sense, have
104 Chapter 4

slowly prevailed over sources of violence in human nature, such as sadism, dominance,
and vengeance. He explores how “groupthink” has enticed people to accept ideolo-
gies and engage in actions that are repugnant to those outside the group. But he also
describes social advances that have mitigated humans’ violent tendencies, such as the
emergence of controlling states and social institutions, the constructive interdependen-
cies from commerce, and the increased reliance on secular reasoning.
Among the intriguing questions raised by political psychology is whether citizens
are equipped to carry out their duties under a democratic system (Le Cheminant and
Parrish 2010). For some people, the array of cognitive and affective biases that under-
pin political preferences may distort collective reasoning and deliberation. Resistance
to new information that conflicts with partisan predispositions, negative reactions to
immigrants, and positive reactions by voters to biological characteristics of candidates
(like facial features or height) are all examples of psychological mechanisms that can
override rational deliberation (Lenz et al. 2010). If citizens and leaders process political
stimuli through such psychological mechanisms, stable democracy is at risk because
it functions best with open dialogue, reasoned contestation over ideas, tolerance, and
trust in political institutions (Pharr and Putnam 2000).
Recently, there has been particular interest in analyzing the psychology of those
who engage in terrorist acts. While the backgrounds and even the personalities of ter-
rorists vary, it has been suggested that many share some traits. They can be troubled
by high levels of loneliness, alienation, and isolation and a sense that their identity
group is not respected. As noted above regarding the impact of social networks, they
can seek to overcome this through the sense of belonging provided by a small, strong
network of friends. These individuals can also be very frustrated because they feel that
the political and social conditions they value have been denied them by others whose
actions are illegitimate and against whom they are willing to retaliate with violence.
Some recent terrorists also have very strong religious convictions and are prepared
to engage in any necessary actions to protect and promote their religion (Post 2008;
Sageman 2008; Smelser 2007; Staub 2011; Victoroff 2005).
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 105

Concluding Observations
Our exploration of political behavior has continued with a consideration of primary
explanations for individuals’ political beliefs and political actions. The research and
theories that attempt to answer the why questions about political behavior emphasize
four types of explanatory factors: environmental context, agents of political social-
ization, demographic characteristics, and political psychology. The basic assumption
is that some combination of these factors influences the kinds of political stimuli to
which people are exposed, the manner in which they interpret these stimuli, and their
responses to the stimuli.
The environment presents the individual with stimuli and opportunities as well as
obstacles to certain political beliefs and actions. While a person can ignore or misper-
ceive these broad environmental constraints, they do constitute a framework that
guides, and to some extent determines, political behavior. In most political behav-
ior research, the analyst can (and should) identify the major features of the environ-
ment that might affect the probability that an individual will manifest certain political
beliefs or actions.
In a similar manner, an individual’s demographic characteristics, such as age, gender,
social class, and education, can have a powerful cumulative influence. First, they can
serve as a set of filters that influence the kinds of political phenomena to which the per-
son is exposed. Second, they can influence the expectations that others have regarding
how the person ought to think and act politically. The empirical evidence is sometimes
quite clear (as are the data on voting in the 2012 U.S. presidential election) that certain
demographic characteristics (in a given environmental context) correlate significantly
with particular political beliefs and actions. Demographic characteristics, rather like
the environment, are best understood as a set of forces that influence the nature and
intensity of individual political behavior but do not determine that behavior.
The inadequacy of either the environment or demographic characteristics as a
complete explanation for most individual political behavior is reflected in the fact
that people with comparable demographic characteristics or people who operate in a
similar environment do not necessarily manifest identical political beliefs or actions.
For example, of two sisters, one might be an activist deeply involved in Democratic
Party politics and the other might be politically apathetic. Similarly, consider the
divergent paths of political activism pursued by Mohandas Gandhi and Osama bin
Laden, despite notable similarities in their characteristics and environments. While the
environment and demographic characteristics might not provide a total explanation,
a strong case can be made that these factors tend to set the boundaries within which
much political behavior occurs.
The attempt to build an empirically validated causal theory of the effects of polit-
ical socialization on political behavior is intriguing. A major analytic shortcoming in
most of the political socialization research has been the difficulty of demonstrating
empirically that there is a clear causal linkage from a specific agent of socialization to
a particular belief and then to a politically relevant action. In most instances, research-
ers lack the methodologies and the data-gathering instruments to measure how the
106 Chapter 4

messages of various agents of political socialization are absorbed, interpreted, and

responded to by people. Rather, the researchers must attempt to infer what socializa-
tion agents have been important by asking individuals to recall the major sources of
their own political beliefs.
Despite these empirical difficulties, the study of political socialization is a use-
ful tool/strategy in increasing our understanding of the major forces that influence
how people learn about and evaluate political phenomena. In their attempt to use the
agents of political socialization, political regimes display their own belief that these
socialization processes can either create and preserve popular support for the existing
political order or create a new political consciousness. Research suggests that where
the agents of political socialization are ineffective or provide contradictory messages, a
person’s political behavior will tend toward apathy or, in a few cases, toward produc-
ing the totally committed political activist. While the precise linkages among agents
of political socialization, political beliefs, and political behavior have yet to be empiri-
cally verified, this area of inquiry remains an important one for political scientists.
The explanation of political behavior by political psychology is perhaps the most
intriguing of the four sets of factors. The psychology-based work examines the
mechanisms for decision making that lead to both individual and group actions. The
emerging work on the biological bases of political psychology focuses primarily on
the political beliefs and political actions of the mass public. Some aspects of political
psychology approaches are difficult to isolate from the other forces—the environment,
demographic characteristics, and political socialization and learning—that inter-
vene between human nature and political behavior and that shape psychological
responses. The recent research linking political beliefs and actions to biological mech-
anisms is mainly based on laboratory experiments whose results are interesting but
far from conclusive.
We began this chapter by asking whether it is possible to explain political beliefs
and actions. In general, analyses can rarely prove that any of the four types of explan-
atory factors we examined is almost always the basic causal factor for a particular
individual’s political belief or action. Nonetheless, the evidence we explored in this
chapter suggests that relevant knowledge about each of these four sets of explanatory
factors can provide significant insights that can further your understanding of politi-
cal behavior.

Key Concepts
agenda setting, p. 91 Confucian culture, p. 88 political psychology, p. 101
agents of political demographic personality and
socialization, p. 87 characteristics, p. 96 psychodynamics, p. 103
biopolitics, p. 103 environment, p. 85 rational choice, p. 102
cognitive and affective human nature, p. 103 political socialization, p. 86
psychology, p. 102 intergroup relations, p. 102 social networks, p. 90
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 107

For Further Consideration

1. Which agent of political socialization has written (“nurture”) or genetically deter-
been strongest in influencing your key politi- mined actors (“nature”)? In what ways is
cal beliefs? Which of your key beliefs have this overall assessment valid for you?
been least influenced by this agent? What 4. Can you identify any examples in which
accounts for the agent’s minimal influence your own schooling might be viewed as
on these beliefs? politically biased by someone from another
culture?
2. Under what conditions are demographic
characteristics likely to have particularly 5. Can you predict the political behavior of a
powerful effects on an individual’s political friend or family member based on what you
beliefs or actions? know about the individual’s demographic
3. To what extent are people either a blank characteristics or identity? Try it and then
page on which political beliefs can be check to see if your predictions are correct!

For Further Reading

Calderisi, Robert. (2007). The Trouble with Africa: social class on party choice and the extent to
Why Foreign Aid Isn’t Working. London: which secularization has reduced the impact of
Palgrave. A controversial explanation, which religious beliefs on political positions, especially
focuses particularly on a national character analy- for many Europeans.
sis, for the difficulties that most African countries Gobodo-Madikizela, Pumla. (2003). A Human
have faced in achieving economic development. Being Died That Night: A South African Story
Campbell, David E. (2008). Why We Vote: How of Forgiveness. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. A
Schools and Communities Shape Our Civic psychologist who was a member of the Truth
Life. Princeton: Princeton University Press. and Reconciliation Commission in South
This demonstrates the connection between Africa explains the importance of this public
the fostering of strong civic norms and sub- acknowledgment process in creating a new
sequent civic and political engagement. The peace and reducing the likelihood of future
early influence on civic engagement can be ethnic and racial atrocities.
seen decades later. Hancock, Ange-Marie. (2013). Solidarity
Erikson, Erik. (1969). Gandhi’s Truth. New York: Politics for Millennials. New York: Palgrave-
Norton. Applying his rich psychobiographical Macmillan. This is a current and provocative
approach, Erikson explains the crucial points look at intersectionality (how several differ-
of development shaping the personality and ent systems of identity, especially systems of
political style of Mohandas Gandhi. oppression) can reinforce one another, influ-
Evans, Geoffrey and Nan Dirk de Graaf, eds. encing behavior.
(2013). Political Matters: Explaining the Hayhoe, Ruth. (1992). Education and
Strength of Class and Religious Cleavages in Modernization: The Chinese Experience. New
Cross-National Perspective. New York: Oxford York: Pergamon. A classic, insightful analy-
University Press. The analyses document the sis of the effects of education on the politi-
continuing (although declining) influence of cal socialization process and on culture and
108 Chapter 4

modernization in China, from Confucianism Mearsheimer, John J. (2011). Why Leaders Lie: The
to Marxism. Truth about Lying in International Politics.
Hibbing, John, Kevin Smith, and John Alford. New York: Oxford University Press. This
(2013). Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives, always-controversial political scientist exam-
and the Biology of Political Differences. New ines the different strategies and motivations
York: Routledge. Based on a series of experi- when top leaders lie about the reasons for their
ments, the authors attempt, in an engaging foreign policy actions.
read, to utilize biological, genetic, and brain Monroe, Kristen. (2011). Ethics in an Age of Terror
behavior approaches to explain political beliefs and Genocide: Identity and Moral Choice.
and actions related to topics such as leadership Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. In
styles, tolerance, aggression, and racial attitudes. studying why people engage in altruistic acts
Huddy, Leonie, David O. Sears, and Jack C. Levy, (e.g., putting oneself at risk by harboring Jews
eds. (2013). Oxford Handbook of Political from persecution in Nazi Germany), this book
Psychology. New York: Oxford University links the power of identity, the role of basic
Press. This award-winning book employs the values, and problems with the rational choice
insights of psychology to examine issues in the explanation.
political world such as the impact of personal- Nixon, Richard M. (1962). Six Crises. New
ity, political socialization, information process- York: Doubleday. Richard Nixon, one of the
ing in opinion formation, emotion and politics, most controversial U.S. presidents, provides a
gender and political behavior, and styles of con- revealing self-assessment of his reactions to six
flict resolution. critical events in his early political career.
Huxley, Aldous. (1932). Brave New World. Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. (2011).
London: Chatto and Windus. A chilling vision Sacred and Secular, Religion and Politics
of a society in which the state effectively uses Worldwide. Second ed. Cambridge:
socialization and material conditions to con- Cambridge University Press. Using evidence
trol the thoughts and actions of citizens. generated by the World Values Survey, the vol-
Khadra, Yasmina. (2007). Sirens of Baghdad. ume considers the role of religiosity and reli-
Trans. John Cullen. London: Heinemann. A gion for political behavior in the contemporary
compelling novel that describes the conversion political world.
of a gentle, idealistic Iraqi college student into Pinker, Steven. (2011). The Better Angels of Our
a disillusioned survivor in war-torn contempo- Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New
rary Iraq and then into a violent, nonreligious York: Viking. A readable, widely discussed
radical activist. book by a neuroscientist who claims that
Lawrence, Bruce, ed. (2005). Messages to the violence, including political violence, has
World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden. declined because humans have evolved over
London: Verso. The known commentaries by many centuries into a less violent species, in
the late leader of al-Qaeda provide insights part due to the role of state institutions, inter-
into his worldview and strategies. dependency, and education, as well as human
Mandela, Nelson. (1995). Long Walk to Freedom. reason.
Boston: Little, Brown. In his autobiography, Post, Jerrold. (2004). Leaders and Their Followers
the late Nelson Mandela provides a compel- in a Dangerous World: The Psychology of
ling narrative of his extraordinary life of politi- Political Behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell
cal activism against racial injustice and apart- University Press. A distinguished psychiatrist
heid, culminating in his election as president analyzes the crucial role of personality and
of South Africa. the psychological bases of political behavior,
 Influences on Beliefs and Actions 109

focusing on both top leaders such as Saddam psychologist presents his conception of a set-
Hussein and radical political activists. See also ting in which socialization is used to create
Post’s 2008 book, The Mind of the Terrorist. a benign and cooperative community. An
Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. intriguing counterpoint to Huxley’s Brave New
(2012). American Grace: How Religion Divides World.
and Unites Us. New York: Simon & Schuster. Wattenberg, Martin. (2011). Is Voting for Young
A rich (and very readable, if lengthy) study, People? 3rd ed. New York: Pearson. This short
based on extensive survey data, of the power of book uses empirical data from the United
both religion and secularization on the think- States in comparison to other democracies
ing and actions (including political) of different to assess the political inactivity of young
generations of citizens of the United States. Americans, relative to their European peers
Rolfe, Meredith. (2013). Voter Turnout: A Social and older Americans, and to argue for more
Theory of Political Participation. New York: political activism.
Cambridge University Press. The case is made Wolfenstein, E. Victor. (1967). The Revolutionary
that standard demographic variables are not Personality: Lenin, Trotsky, Gandhi.
sufficient explanators of variation in political Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
participation. Instead, systematic variation in A classic study of three major revolutionary
social ties among potential voters explains why leaders from a psychoanalytic perspective.
some choose to participate while others do not. Zuckerman, Alan S., Josip Dasovic, and Jennifer
Sinclair, Betsy. (2012). The Social Citizen. Fitzgerald. (2007). Partisan Families: The So-
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. cial Logic of Bounded Partisanship in Germany
Evidence is provided to show that politi- and Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
cal choices are shaped by social interactions. sity Press. Using longitudinal data, the authors
Political behavior is shaped and altered by the demonstrate the impact of family on partisan
political opinions and actions of our peers. political attitudes. The comparative analysis
Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden Two. New presents generalizable evidence about the per-
York: Macmillan. A renowned behavioral sistence of family in the shaping of attitudes.

On the Web
http://america.aljazeera.com http://www.electionstudies.org
A somewhat alternative perspective of a net- Data (that can be downloaded) and analyses
work based in Qatar, Al Jazeera claims that it from the American National Election Study,
offers “unbiased, fact-based stories of U.S. and the major survey of U.S. political opinions and
international news.” behavior (1948–2008). The material on the Web
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/ site addresses topics such as the role of demo-
informationindex.htm graphic characteristics, ideology, and partisan-
The News and Information Index from ship in relation to political beliefs and actions.
American Rhetoric is an extremely rich set of http://www.cddc.vt.edu/feminism
links to newspapers from around the world and The Feminist Theory Web site, hosted by the
other online news sources, magazines, search Center for Digital Discourse and Culture at
engines, polling databases, and legal databases. Virginia Tech University, provides a large
110 Chapter 4

number of links to information on beliefs as http://www.nytimes.com

well as groups and movements inspired by This is the site for key articles and informa-
a feminist perspective on political and social tion from one of the premier newspapers in the
issues in many countries. United States.
http://culturalpolitics.net http://wn.com
This site offers numerous links that explore WorldNews provides an extensive electronic
the role of culture in shaping our political, eco- news portal with international sites in multiple
nomic, and social lives. languages categorized by geographic region,
http://www.cnn.com/WORLD country, and subject.
The site for CNN, the 24-hour, U.S.-based inter- http://news.bbc.co.uk
national news organization. The Internet home of the British Broadcasting
www.google.com/transparencyreport/ Company, this site offers world political, busi-
This is a comprehensive report containing data ness, scientific, and entertainment news from a
about governments related to the search engine British perspective.
company, including requests to remove content http://news.google.com
and information about users. Using the same technology as in the Google
http://www.itn.co.uk Internet search engine, this site provides access
World news and British news from Independent to thousands of different news sources.
Television News, based in London, are provided.
Chapter 5
Political Systems,
States, and Nations

Learning Objectives
5.1 Characterize the alternative definitions and goals of the state.
5.2 Contrast the concept of nation from that of the state.
5.3 Outline the key components of the political system.

They inhabit a region of 74,000 square miles, most living inside the current borders
of Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. But they are not Turks, not Arabs, not Persians (Iranians).
These kin-based, mountain nomads have always had their own language, a distinc-
tive culture, and a powerful sense of shared identity. They want to be recognized as
their own country; instead, they have experienced centuries of discrimination, cultural
destruction, massive violence, and even genocide.
They continue to dream of Kurdistan—the land of the Kurds. Kurdistan was
briefly recognized by a few other countries (e.g., the former Soviet Union) after World
War I, but the Kurds’ land was successfully claimed by other countries. Great Britain
held colonial control of some of the area, where substantial oil deposits were discov-
ered in 1920. The British gave most of the oil-rich areas inhabited by the Kurds to Iraq,
whose new leaders the British installed and assumed they could control. At the same
time, Atatürk was establishing the modern state of Turkey (see Focus in 10). Atatürk
launched a major military and cultural offensive against the 19 million Kurds inside
Turkey. He insisted they were not Kurds, but “mountain Turks.” Kurdish language,
names, schools, and cultural traditions were forbidden, and when the Kurds resisted,
the Turkish military killed 250,000 of them.
In Iran, Shia Muslims took power after the Iranian Revolution of 1979. They have
extensively persecuted the Kurds within Iran’s borders because the Kurds are Sunni
Muslims. Then, Iraq’s Saddam Hussein—frustrated by the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988)
turned his wrath on the Iraqi Kurds. In the military campaign known as Al Anfal, mean-
ing “The Spoils,” the Iraqi military were given orders to kill every Kurdish male between
111
112 Chapter 5

A stateless nation. Kurds in Iraq protested in 2011, demanding greater autonomy. They now employ
political and military power to promote their larger goal, a state of Kurdistan.

the ages of 18 and 55. Between 1986 and 1989, Al Anfal included mass executions of tens
of thousands of noncombatants; the destruction of more than 4,000 villages; the use of
chemical weapons, such as mustard gas, in more than 60 villages; the destruction of
civilian buildings like schools and mosques; and the arbitrary jailing of tens of thou-
sands, including women, children, and elderly people accused only of sympathizing
with the Kurdish cause. More than 180,000 Iraqi Kurds were killed during this genocide.
Although as many as 35 percent of the Kurds fled the area to escape the violence,
about 36 million Kurds still live in the region, including about 19 million in Turkey,
9 million in Iran, 6.5 million in Iraq, and 1.5 million in Syria. The granting of partial
autonomy to the Kurdish region in Iraq after the fall of Saddam Hussein has raised the
hopes of Kurds throughout the region that—through negotiation, political activism,
and armed resistance—Kurdistan will one day become a reality.
The desire of the 36 million Kurds for a state of their own highlights one of the
most significant causes of conflict in the modern world: the existence of nations—
groups of people with a powerful, shared sense of identity—who live in areas that are
not coterminous with the boundaries of states, which are the legal political entities in
the international system. Sometimes, as in the case of the Kurds, the Masai in Kenya
and Tanzania, and the Palestinians in Israel and Jordan, the nation spills over across
the boundaries of two or more states. Other times, the nation is a subgroup that exists
within a single state but wants autonomy or independence. This is the situation of
groups such as the Quebecois in Canada, the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and the Catalans in
Spain, among many others.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 113

In Part Two (Chapters 2–4), we focused on improving our understanding of the

political beliefs and actions of individuals. In Part Three, we substantially expand our
analysis, examining the politics and political behavior of very large collectivities of
people. This chapter explains and distinguishes two crucial concepts characterizing
these large groupings: state and nation. States are arguably the most important actors
in the international system. However, nation-based identities are powerful, and the
disjunction between state boundaries and peoples with shared identities might be the
greatest cause of violence and death in the contemporary political world. The chapter
concludes with a focus on a more abstract model that can help us grasp how these
large groups operate as a political entity—the concept of the political system.

The State
5.1 Characterize the alternative definitions and goals of the state.
In discussing the politics of large groups of individuals, one of the core concepts is
the state. Anthropological evidence suggests that early social organization among
humans was probably based on small groups. As suggested by humanistic psychol-
ogist Abraham Maslow (1954), human groupings formed so that people were better
able to meet their physiological, safety, love, and belonging needs. As groupings
became larger, tribes or bands were formed on the basis of more extensive kinship
and economic ties. It might be argued that the “state” emerged in ancient times,
when a large collectivity had distinctive leadership roles, accepted rules for social
interaction, and a set of organizational arrangements that identified and served
collective needs.

A Legal Definition of the State

However, the social scientific concept of the state is a relatively modern one. It is based
on the legal notion that the state is a territorially bound sovereign entity. The idea of
sovereignty emerged in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In current interpreta-
tions, sovereignty is the premise that each state has complete authority and is the ultimate
source of law within its own boundaries. Sovereignty is the key element in the legal con-
cept of the state. It is a basic assumption of international politics and is reflected in a
fundamental principle of the United Nations—the sovereign equality of all member
states. This means that, before the law, Cambodia is equal to China, Bolivia is equal
to Brazil. While sovereignty has legal standing and moral force in international law,
the reality of international politics is that a state’s sovereign rights depend ultimately
on whether the state has sufficient power to enforce its position (Sassen 1996; 2008).
Thus, it is not likely that, when major national interests are at stake, China will yield to
Cambodia merely on the basis of Cambodia’s sovereign rights.
State is among the most extensively used concepts in political science, and it has
various meanings. Notice that in the general language of political science, the word
state usually refers to the set of organizational units and people that performs the
114 Chapter 5

political functions for an entire national territorial entity, such as France, Indonesia, or
Nigeria. In some countries, including the United States, the concept of state also refers
to subnational governmental units (e.g., the State of Alabama). In this chapter and
throughout this book, the term state will normally denote the full array of governmen-
tal units that act on behalf of a sovereign country.
You should also be aware that the language of political science often treats the
state as though it were a single actor. For example, consider the statement that “each
state has complete authority. . . .” In reality, the state is composed of many people who
behave as individuals but whose combined behaviors are characterized as if they were
performed by a single actor. This book also examines other collectivities of individu-
als (e.g., the group, the political party, the judiciary) that are discussed as though they
operate as a single actor.
Associated with the idea of sovereignty in the legal definition of the state is the
doctrine of territorial integrity, which holds that a state has the right to resist and reject
any aggression, invasion, or intervention within its territorial borders. As with the more gen-
eral notion of sovereignty, a state’s actual protection of its territorial integrity depends
on the state’s capacity and political power.
It might seem that there are many relatively clear examples of a state’s territo-
rial integrity being violated, such as the Iraqi army’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990,
but there is often considerable disagreement over claimed violations of territorial
integrity. First, territorial integrity is a fuzzy concept when there is a dispute over
borders. There are numerous current disputes among countries regarding owner-
ship of offshore waters and their resources (e.g., Canada, Denmark, Russia, and
the United States regarding the Arctic). Such disputes are sometimes settled by
adjudication by an international agency. But border disputes can precipitate fight-
ing, as did an ongoing land border dispute between Cambodia and Thailand that
began in 2008.
Second, attempts to exercise sovereignty can be disputed when there is disagree-
ment about who the legitimate rulers are. In Angola, for example, three contending
groups each claimed to be the legitimate ruling group of the resource-rich country
at independence in 1975. Each group controlled parts of the country, and each had
outside assistance (money, arms, troops) from actors such as Cuba, South Africa, the
former Soviet Union, the United States, and the United Nations. This struggle over
sovereignty resulted in a devastating civil war that ravaged the country for more than
25 years (1975–2002). The toll included complete collapse of the economy, 4.5 million
refugees, tens of thousands who lost limbs to millions of land mines, and the death
of more than 1.5 million Angolans. Similar conflicts over sovereignty have arisen
recently in Ivory Coast, Somalia, and the Spanish Sahara.
Third, the international community has become less sensitive to the protection of
sovereignty when there is strong evidence that the government is committing serious
human rights violations against its own citizens. This can lead to intense controversies
about whether sovereignty has been violated. One recent example is Libya. After sub-
stantial numbers of Libyans openly protested against the rule of Muammar Gaddafi in
2011, opposition groups seized control of considerable territory, especially in Eastern
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 115

Libya. Gaddafi responded aggressively, sending his military forces against the reb-
els. Some major actors in the international community, including the United Nations,
Britain, France, and the United States, insisted that Gaddafi stop the violence against
his own people. A NATO-led coalition then intervened, claiming its goal was a human-
itarian intervention to prevent Libya from using its troops to engage in widespread,
deadly violence against the regime’s opponents. Airplanes and missiles destroyed
some of Libya’s military capabilities but also attacked Libyan troops and other sites,
including Gadaffi’s residence. Gaddafi claimed that these actions were a clear viola-
tion of Libya’s sovereignty. Whose claim is most compelling? By late 2011, the external
and internal opposition forces overthrew Gaddafi’s government. Gaddafi was found
hiding and was brutally executed by rebels. Similar disputes over sovereignty versus
intervention are becoming more common as the international community embraces
the doctrine of R2P—the “responsibility to protect.” This issue is explored in the
Debate in 5.

A Structural–Functional Definition of the State

As an alternative to the legal definition, the state can be defined by the key organiza-
tional structures that operate as “the government” and the key functions that the state
performs. In this structural–functional perspective, the state is defined as a country’s
organized institutional machinery for making and carrying out political decisions and for
enforcing the laws and rules of the government. Chapters 6 and 7 take a more in-depth look
at institutions and consider how variations in institutional design can affect politics
and policy.
Max Weber (1864–1920), the great political sociologist, emphasizes one specific
function that distinguishes the state from all other organizations: The state has a
monopoly on the legitimate use of force and coercion in the society. That is, only the
state has the right to use violence to enforce the society’s laws and decisions.
In the broader state-centered definition, the state is an autonomous actor,
composed of public officials making decisions. The state’s essential functions are to
maintain order and to compete with other actual or potential states (Levi 2002). In this
view, the state pursues “the national interest,” which it attempts to achieve against
resistance or competition from both domestic and international actors (Morgenthau
2005; Kahler 2003). The particular way in which a state’s structures are configured
is crucial in shaping the content of public officials’ policy preferences and the state’s
effectiveness in implementing those policy preferences in the society.
A widely used structural–functional approach, based on the work of the late
Gabriel Almond and his colleagues (e.g., Powell, Strom, and Dalton 2012), centers on
two questions:

1. What functions must be performed if the state is to persist?

2. What structures perform these necessary functions within a given state?

Chapters 6 and 7 will detail many of the major political structures and institutional
arrangements (e.g., legislatures, judiciaries, and electoral systems) that handle the
116 Chapter 5

The Debate in 5
Does Humanitarian Intervention Violate State Sovereignty?
A controversial issue in recent years is whether it is obligations, by virtue of the Universal Human
acceptable for states and international actors to use Rights Declaration (adopted by the United
force (or the threat of force) against a state that is sus- Nations in 1948) and other treaties. Thus, a state
pected of or is abusing the human rights of its own that inflicts gross and widespread atrocities on its
citizens. This is sometimes justified as humanitarian own population has forfeited some of its rights,
intervention by those taking the actions (Holzgrefe including its claim that humanitarian intervention
and Keohane 2003). However, the state that is the violates its sovereignty (Pattison 2012).
target of such an intervention can object that this • The United Nations General Assembly (in 2005)
is a clear violation of its sovereignty and hence of and Security Council (in 2011) explicitly asserted
international law (Jackson 2007). Indeed, this policy a collective “responsibility to protect” (R2P) people
has been termed “the most significant adjustment to by humanitarian intervention when a government
national sovereignty in 360 years” (Gilbert, quoted in does not safeguard its own peoples’ lives, particu-
Pattison 2012: 4). Disputes over the clash between larly in cases of large-scale state violence against
these principles have recently been serious issues its population such as ethnic cleansing, violent
regarding countries such as China, Congo, Libya, repression of peaceful protest, or extensive use of
and Syria. Is humanitarian intervention an accept- imprisonment without due process (Evans 2009).
able action if it violates a state’s sovereignty? • The global community of states has a clear
responsibility to “take all necessary measures”
Protecting Human Rights Takes Precedence
to prevent any state from abusing individu-
over State Sovereignty
als’ human rights because this demonstrates
• The international society of states now defines the states’ responsibility and willingness to act
sovereignty in terms of a bundle of both rights beyond national self-interest (Weiss 2012).
and obligations. Respect for human rights to “life, • Outside states, acting in concert, also have
liberty, and security of person” is among those a responsibility to intervene in situations of a

When a political system

breaks down in violence
and political decay, thou-
sands die and even more
seek food, shelter and to
escape their state. These
refugees in the Central
African Republic seek such
humanitarian intervention
in 2014.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 117

severe humanitarian crisis, including actions to Even more important, there are no universally
prevent a deepening of the crisis, to direct reac- accepted standards regarding the level at which
tions to it, and to engage in rebuilding efforts in human rights violations become so gross (that
the aftermath, regardless of objections from the is, so extensive, severe, and persistent) that out-
“sovereign” state (Pattison 2012). side intervention is justified (Evans 2009).
• If no outside group intervenes to stop a state • States accept the principle that, in the absence
from serious violations of human rights, the state of full procedural support from the UN, exter-
might engage in even more extensive and unac- nal actors cannot intervene within a state that
ceptable acts of violence against its own citi- opposes such an action. Yet such interventions
zens. Similarly, in the absence of such action by do occur (e.g., NATO in Kosovo and Libya).
interveners, other states might be emboldened Such actions are often better understood as an
to violate the human rights of their own citizens. assertion by powerful states of the right to inter-
vene (R2I) in the affairs of weaker states that
State Sovereignty Takes Precedence over they wish to control—even if under the cover of
Outsiders’ Concerns about Human Rights UN support (Bajoria and McMahon 2013).
• State sovereignty and territorial integrity are a • Humanitarian intervention, when associated with
central premise of international law and have severe economic sanctions and military inva-
been repeatedly restated by the United Nations. sion, can cause more harm to the population
This core principle provides a state with almost than the human rights violations that prompted
complete authority to implement policy deci- these actions. Military intervention can produce
sions within its own borders. A state’s right to disproportionate levels of violence, and the situ-
this exclusive internal jurisdiction is violated if ation after intervention can be highly unstable
another state or group intervenes within its bor- and dangerous (Pattison 2012).
ders without its consent. In accordance with
international law, the state can respond by any
means necessary to defend its territory (Bajoria
More questions…
and McMahon 2013; Jackson 2007). 1. How severe and extensive must a violation of
• Despite the idealized notion of universal human human rights be to justify the intervention of
rights, different cultures have significantly dif- other countries in the internal affairs of a sover-
ferent interpretations of individual rights and eign state? Who can legitimately judge the level
the conditions under which such rights have of violation?
been violated. It is not appropriate that a pre- 2. Is R2P more compelling if there appear to be
dominantly Western conception of human rights human rights violations by several groups within
should necessarily take precedence over a a country, not just the government?
country’s own standards. 3. Is it acceptable for external interveners to cause
• It can be very difficult for outside actors to deter- widespread suffering and destruction within a
mine the precise level of the purported viola- country in the attempt to end the perceived
tions of human rights within another country. human rights abuses?

various political functions. The classic version of Almond’s structural–functional

approach identifies eight functions that must be performed in every state:

1. Political socialization is the processes through which individuals acquire their

cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations toward the political world.
2. Political recruitment is the processes through which people are drawn into roles
as political actors.
118 Chapter 5

3. Political communication is the mechanisms by which political information flows

through society.
4. Interest articulation is the low-level communication by individuals and groups
of what they need or want from the state.
5. Interest aggregation is the transformation of all these political needs and wants
into a smaller number of coherent alternatives.
6. Policymaking is the process by which the state establishes laws, policy decisions,
and value allocations.
7. Policy implementation is the actual application of such laws and policy decisions.
8. Policy adjudication is the interpretation and resolution of disagreements regard-
ing what the policies mean and how they should be implemented.

While it might seem obvious at first glance that a certain structure always per-
forms a particular function, more reflection (and later chapters) will suggest that the
situation is usually more complex. In most contemporary societies, almost every polit-
ical function is performed by a variety of structures. Many of these structures are part
of the state, but others are nonstate actors such as interest groups, religious organiza-
tions, media, social groups, private businesses, and international organizations. For
example, it is not the case that only Congress performs the policymaking function in
the United States. Many policy decisions are also formulated by the president, by cabi-
net departments, by the bureaucracy, by the courts as they both interpret and reshape
laws, by structures at the local levels of government, by special interest groups, and by
citizens through electoral initiatives. Thus, the central focus in structural–functional
research is to illuminate the key processes performed by each important structure and
the subtle relationships among structures as they contribute to a given function.

Major Goals
Another core question is: What major goals does a state pursue? Each state assigns different
levels of relative importance to a wide variety of goals; however, most can be subsumed
under three overarching goals: security, stability, and prosperity. Each of these goals
includes component goals that the political system might act to serve. The significance of
each component goal and the capacity of the state to achieve each goal depend on many
factors such as the state’s resources, strategic location, history, political culture, leaders,
political structures, and the behavior of actors outside the political system. While many of
these factors depend primarily on dynamics inside the state’s borders, others are substan-
tially affected by the actions of other global actors. Figure 5.1 illustrates this framework of
basic goals. In the descriptions that follow, the major components of each overarching goal
are presented in the general order of their priority for most states.

Security
1. Survival is the fundamental element of security. It entails the very existence of the
state, such that other states do not conquer it and that internal forces do not destroy it.
2. Autonomy refers to the capacity of the state to act within its own boundaries
without intervention in or control of its affairs by external actors.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 119

Figure 5.1 Basic Goals of States

PR
ILITY OS
PE
AB RIT
ST Y
SECURITY

D O P P I S A D W E E
E R O R N U U O E C C
M D L E F R T M L O O
O E I S L V O I F N N
C R T T U I N N A O O
R I I E V O A R M M
A M C G N A M N E I I
T A A E C L Y C C C
I I L E E D
Z N I D G
A T D S E R
T E E T V O
I N V R E W
O A E I L T
N N L B O H
C O U P
E P T M
M I E
E O N
N N T
T

3. Influence involves the state’s ability to alter the actions of external actors in
desired ways by means of persuasion or inducements.
4. Prestige is the desirable situation wherein external actors admire and respect the
state.
5. Dominance is the use of power or violence to enable the state to impose direct
control over external actors.

Stability
1. Order maintenance is the capacity of the state to ensure social peace for its citi-
zens through the prevention of individual and group violation of societal norms,
especially those involving violence.
2. Political development refers to the concentration of political authority in a state
that has strong capabilities to make and enforce effective policies and to gain sup-
port from its citizens.
3. Democratization is the process of institutionalizing a democratic system of gov-
ernance, which is achieved by allowing free elections, limiting the actions of the
rulers, and guaranteeing civil and political rights.

Prosperity
1. Economic growth refers to the increasing scale, complexity, and specialization of
the productive system and of the goods produced.
120 Chapter 5

2. Economic development is the capacity of the political economy to obtain, man-

age, and transform resources into valued goods.
3. Welfare distribution refers to the private or public allocation of adequate and
increasing levels of valued goods to enhance the quality of life of the citizenry.

Notice that, in Figure 5.1, stability and prosperity rest on the foundation of
security because survival must be an essential goal of every country. In most states,
certain prosperity goals and stability goals are more important than some of the other
security goals, such as dominance. No state can fully achieve its desired level on all
of these 11 major goals. Thus, a state must make difficult trade-offs when pursu-
ing multiple goals. For example, when a state makes a costly increase in the welfare
goods and services allocated to its citizens, it uses resources that it might otherwise
have reinvested in its economic system to facilitate economic growth. This trade-off is
often referred to as the fundamental policy choice of growth versus welfare. In another
example, resources that the state allocates to the military for major security goals are
not available for either welfare or the production of consumer goods. This policy
trade-off is characterized by the phrase guns versus butter (Norpoth 1987). Of the 11
major goals listed in Figure 5.1, which ones do you think are most complementary?
Most incompatible?
Throughout this text, we will frequently examine the pursuit of the goals of
security, stability, and prosperity through the state’s actions within its own bound-
aries and the state’s interactions with actors outside its borders. There are crucial
normative questions that each state confronts regarding how much priority to give
to each goal, what strategies it should employ in the pursuit of its goals, and how
extensive state action should be. Moreover, there are strong disagreements within
each state regarding how expansive its domain of action should be. Everyone agrees
that the boundaries of state activity should be limited to res publica, a Latin phrase
meaning “things of the people.” But what things should be included? And how expan-
sive should the state’s involvement with these things be? For example, each of the
major “isms” outlined in Chapter 2—conservatism, classical liberalism, socialism,
fascism, Islamism, and so on—has a fundamentally different prescription for the
extent of legitimate state action. A central topic in Chapter 8 is the role of the state in
the economic system.
We shall see throughout this book, and especially in Part Five, that some states
are active in almost every aspect of their citizens’ lives, while other states inter-
vene in only limited spheres and to a limited extent. One state might provide a
total health care delivery system to all citizens, with no direct charges for doctors,
hospitals, or treatment, whereas another state might subsidize only hospitaliza-
tion for the very poor. One state might require schools to provide daily religious
instruction, while another state might forbid schools from engaging in even the
general discussion of religious philosophies. In every society, there are persistent,
and sometimes very contentious, political debates about the appropriate boundar-
ies of state action and about the best means to achieve a particular aspect of one of
the 11 major goals.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 121

The Nation
5.2 Contrast the concept of nation from that of the state.
In the political world, the concept of the nation has a psychological and emotional
basis rather than a legal or functional basis (as the concept of the state does). A nation
is defined as a set of people with a deeply shared fundamental identification. Different factors
might be the basis of such identification: shared descent (belief in a common kinship
or history), shared culture, shared geographic space, shared religion, shared language,
or shared economic order. The nation is a community of understanding, of communi-
cation, and of trust (Smith 2010). The Kurds are an example of a nation that fulfills all
these conditions.
Most people identify with a variety of different reference groups or communi-
ties such as a religion, local community, ethnic group, social club, or sports team. A
person’s self-described identity might be based on one or more of the factors, such
as shared culture, and it might also be shaped by some combination of the demo-
graphic characteristics described in Chapter 4. In the usage here, what distinguishes
a nation from other reference groups is that the nation is a major group, beyond the
family group, with which a person identifies very powerfully. It is an essential division
between “us” and “them.”
A related concept is identity politics. This means that some key shared trait(s)
lead a significant group of people to see themselves as being distinctive, with a shared
political agenda that might shape their political beliefs or motivate their actions
(Hoover, Marcia, and Parris 1997; Parker 2005). Identity politics characterizes a group
defined by one of the major nation-based factors described above, such as ethnicity
or religion. Some suggest that the concept of identity politics particularly applies to
groups that perceive themselves to be marginalized or oppressed within their social
order. In this sense, it has been applied to groups based on markers such as ethnic
minority status, caste, gender, or sexual orientation.
Another broad class of nation-based groups that is sometimes given special con-
sideration is indigenous peoples—a term for more than 370 million people in about
70 countries. Each of these 5,000 distinct nations is understood to be a “first people”
who originally inhabited a geographic area as “natives,” but who were then subju-
gated by an invading nation. In nearly every case, these nations have almost no politi-
cal or social power and their culture is marginalized or suppressed by the dominant
culture. Since the early 1970s and most recently with the Declaration on the Rights
of Indigenous Peoples (2007), the United Nations has been concerned about protect-
ing such groups against discrimination and against efforts to destroy their national
identity and culture. Some of these nations have become more politically assertive,
demanding autonomy, although most countries resist providing their indigenous
peoples with special political rights.
The strength of a person’s primary nation-based identity depends on the relative
importance he places on various identities and the extent to which the most impor-
tant identities reinforce the basic conception of “us” versus “them.” When there is a
122 Chapter 5

strong identity with a large group, it can be termed nationalism—a powerful commit-
ment to the advancement of the interests and welfare of an individual’s own nation, usually
with minimal concern about benefitting the conditions of those outside the nation.
Nationalism can be a positive force when it brings people together to cooperate and
achieve collective benefits, or it can be negative when it mobilizes a population to
oppress or do violence to others outside the nation.

Nation and State

The best situation for effective governance is a nation–state, which is an area that has
both the territorial borders of a single state and a citizenry who all share the same primary
national identity. Only a few modern states have the combination of common culture,
history, ethnicity, religion, and language that results in a strong sense of shared nation-
ality among nearly all the citizens governed by the state. Japan is an example of a
relatively homogeneous nation–state.
However, the most common situations are what might be termed stateless nations.
Occasionally, one nation is split into two states, such as North and South Korea. In
such cases, the citizens often dream of reunification, even when their governments and
ideologies differ fundamentally. This occurred in Germany, which was split into com-
munist East Germany and capitalist West Germany after World War II. In 1990, citizens
of the German nation were reunited in a single country after nearly half a century of
antagonistic separation into two very different states. The example of the Kurds at the
beginning of the chapter illuminates the more severe form of a stateless nation, with
one nation distributed across multiple states.
The reality of the contemporary world is that most countries are multinational
states, which include significant groups whose fundamental identities are associated with
different nations. While it can be difficult to define when a state is truly multinational,
it is evident that the great majority of current states contain nation-based groups with
distinctive identities (Stojanovic 2010). When identity and region are relatively simi-
lar, it is possible to provide greater autonomy to major groups or to reorganize states
and borders. For example, substantial political autonomy has been granted to nation-
based regions such as Catalonia within Spain, the Kurds in Iraq, and the Scots in the
United Kingdom, whose vote for sovereign independence failed in 2014. When the
former Soviet Union—the world’s most multinational state—collapsed in 1991, it was
replaced by 15 sovereign states that were generally organized on nationality grounds.
The 2011 split into Sudan and South Sudan is another recent attempt to better align
borders and national identities.
However, there are far more instances in which the problems in multinational states
persist. When these nation-based identities are very strong, they can produce intense
animosity and violence between groups within (and among) states (Laitin 2007; Miller
2007; Taras and Ganguly 2010). Russia acted illegally in 2014 to reclaim the Crimea, a
region in Ukraine whose majority population has strong nation-based identity with
Russia. The agitation by the Quebecois in Canada, the Basques in Spain, and the Irish
Catholics in Northern Ireland is testimony to the possibility that even centuries-old
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 123

states can struggle with nationality conflict. The bloody nationality violence in Eastern
Europe during the 1990s was based on devastating ethnic battles among the Bosnians,
Croatians, Serbs, and others in the former Yugoslavia. These types of conflicts are con-
sidered in more detail in Chapter 12, Political Violence.
These problems have been particularly evident in many of the states that gained
independence after 1945 with borders that were based on the arbitrary administrative
decisions of colonial powers, not nationality differences. The horrendous ethnic con-
flict in Rwanda and Burundi between the Hutus and the Tutsis resulted in the slaugh-
ter of more than 100,000 (mostly Tutsis) in Rwanda in only 100 days in 1994, and more
than 300,000 Hutus and Tutsis were killed in ethnic conflict in Burundi between 1994
and 2006. There are reports every day of struggles within countries by groups that
do not share the nation–state’s dominant identity, such as the Palestinians in Israel,
the Tibetans and Uighurs in China, the Nuer in South Sudan, and the pro-Russians in
eastern Ukraine. Thus some scholars predict that the current reorganization of states
based on national identities will produce more than 50 new states and that nation-
based conflicts might remain the world’s major cause of violence and instability
(Barber 1996; Miller 2007). The example of the Indian subcontinent in Focus in 5 illus-
trates many of these issues regarding the challenges of balancing states and nations.

The Political System

5.3 Outline the key components of the political system.
As the Appendix explains, formal models are abstractions that can sometimes be very
helpful in enabling us to better visualize how something works. A formal model that
has influenced the way many political scientists (including us) understand the dynam-
ics of politics is based on a concept called “the political system.” You might also find it
useful, perhaps as a metaphor for thinking about politics.
The political system concept was developed in the work of David Easton (1965),
whose idea was to adapt general systems theory from biology. Any system is a series
of components that operate together and are interrelated, such that change in any one
component can affect other components. For example, an engine is a mechanical sys-
tem composed of such interrelated components as pistons, carburetor, spark plugs,
and so on. A jazz band is an example of a human system whose components can be
more improvisational but no less interrelated. A political system is also a system of
human behavior with multiple components. The political system model identifies
these components and the linkages among them as they perform certain activities.
For Easton, the unique nature of the political system is that it performs a par-
ticular function: the authoritative allocation of values for the collectivity. This means that
the political system makes policy decisions (allocations) that are binding (based on its
authority) with regard to things that have importance (values) to the people it serves
(the collectivity). Each part of this definition is important for our general understand-
ing of politics, so the next few paragraphs elaborate on each.
124 Chapter 5

Focus in 5
State and Nations: The Indian Subcontinent
The problem of discontinuities between nations and region of Jammu and Kashmir. At independence,
states is often most severe in states that have gained India was given control of the region, although the
independence since 1945. The Indian subcontinent majority of the population was and remains Muslim.
exemplifies these problems. The vast Indian subcon- Disputes over control of the region have resulted in
tinent was a feudal society divided into many small more than 60 years of military conflicts and intermit-
kingdoms ruled by kings (maharajahs). Starting in tent guerrilla war, despite persistent United Nations
the sixteenth century, the riches of India were pur- involvement.
sued—and often exploited—by many traders, includ- The situation was further complicated by the
ing the British, Dutch, French, and Arabs. The states concentration of Muslims in two geographically dis-
from which these traders came began to struggle tinct areas in the northeast and northwest regions of
for dominance over the Indian trade, and the British the subcontinent. As a consequence, Pakistan was
gained hegemony in the eighteenth century after composed of two parts at independence, separated
defeating the French. From that time until 1947, the by more than 1,500 miles of rival India’s territory. The
Indian subcontinent was the major jewel in the British two parts of the country engaged in a protracted
imperial crown, treated as a single territory under nationality dispute between the two major ethnic
colonial rule. groups, the Punjabis, who were dominant in West
After a lengthy and often violent campaign of Pakistan, and the Bengalis, who were dominant
political and social action by Indian nationalists, in East Pakistan. The Bengalis felt discriminated
the British granted the subcontinent independence against both economically and culturally by the
in 1947. Despite the desires of the British and the Punjabis, who controlled the government and the
efforts of some Indian leaders, such as Mohandas military. When the Bengalis won a national election
Gandhi (recall Compare in 4), the subcontinent was in 1970, the Punjabis in West Pakistan attempted to
deeply split on the basis of religion between Hindus retain political power and refused to allow the elected
and Muslims. Because it seemed impossible to Bengali leaders to take the reins of government. The
fashion a single state out of these two nations, two Punjabis launched a brutal military operation to sup-
states were formed in 1947: India, which was pre- press the Bengalis, who decided that victory in the
dominantly (82 percent) Hindu; and Pakistan, which struggle would enable them to form their own inde-
was predominantly (90 percent) Muslim. pendent nation–state. After a brutal civil war in 1971,
Many Hindus in Pakistan and Muslims in India which resulted in 3 million deaths from violence and
were forced to leave their homelands and migrate to starvation and 10 million refugees fleeing Pakistan,
the new state sharing their religion. The hostility and the Bengalis of East Pakistan won the civil war and
bloodshed associated with the partition resulted in created a new sovereign state, Bangladesh.
1 million deaths. There have been periodic violent Major nation-based cleavages continue to
boundary conflicts ever since. The ownership of plague India, creating substantial barriers to forg-
nuclear weapons by India and Pakistan since 1998 ing a single identity as a nation–state. There are 21
accentuates the need to resolve the conflicts between official languages in addition to the two national lan-
the two states. guages, Hindi and English, each understood by only
While the major religious difference on the about one-third of the population. In all, there are
Indian subcontinent was generally resolved by this about 1,650 different dialects spoken in India, most
partition, many other nationality problems remained. of which are mutually unintelligible.
For example, since 1947 India and Pakistan have India has at least five major religious group-
disagreed about which country should control the ings: Hindu, Muslim, Sikh, Christian, and Buddhist.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 125

Hindu nationalism has increasingly been expressed Rajiv Gandhi succeeded his mother as prime
through a political movement, resulting in the grow- minister, only to be the victim of another nation-
ing power at the regional and national levels of based dispute. The Indian army had intervened
Hindu parties, particularly the Bharatiya Janata Party on the neighboring island-country of Sri Lanka in
(BJP). The BJP, which dominated the government an attempt to limit the extremely violent, ethnically
from 1998 to 2004 and rules as the majority since based civil war between the native Sinhalese and
2014, is the most serious threat to a secular Indian the Tamils, who had migrated to Sri Lanka from
government since independence. With the increase southern India. Tamils in Sri Lanka were angry that
in Hindu nationalism, violence against Christians and India did not support their independence struggles
Muslims has risen significantly. and by the treatment they received from the Indian
Another religion-based nation that has been a army. In 1991, Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a
source of political unrest in India is the Sikhs, who Tamil woman who had strapped a bomb to her body.
are concentrated in the northwest part of India called In sum, the many deep cleavages on the Indian
the Punjab. The Sikhs have a very strong identity as subcontinent, based on religion, ethnicity, culture,
a religious community and an ethnic group. Their and region, have exposed the (now five) states to per-
sense of nationality is heightened by their belief sistent instability, conflict, and nation-based carnage.
that they are discriminated against politically by the
Hindus. The Sikhs have occasionally been militant Further Focus
in demanding greater political autonomy, and since
1. What strategies can a state like India use to
the early 1980s some have insisted on full indepen-
overcome the many nation-based cleavages?
dence to create the nation–state of Khalistan. Prime
Minister Indira Gandhi was assassinated in 1984 by 2. Might the current problems in the region have
two Sikhs among her private guard in retaliation for been even greater if Gandhi’s vision of a single
an Indian army attack on rebels inside the Sikhs’ state had been fulfilled, rather than the split into
holiest shrine. Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan?

ValueS Values are those things that have great significance and importance to people.
Political values, those within the domain of res publica, have a variety of other forms.
They can be broad ideals like liberty, equality, freedom, and justice. They can be material
goods, such as a decent house or road system; they can be services, such as quality health
care or a good education; or they can be conditions, such as clean air or security from
national enemies. Values can also be symbolic goods, such as status. In addition to positive
values, there are negative values such as coercion or imprisonment, polluted water, epi-
demic disease, and so on. (Notice that this social scientific concept of values is broader
than the notion of values as moral judgments that people use to guide their actions.)
Most values are scarce resources—either there is an insufficient amount of a given
value to satisfy everyone or the enjoyment of one value by some requires a loss of
value to others. For example, a state’s vast arsenal of nuclear weapons may make one
person feel secure and at the same time make another person feel extremely insecure.
One person might favor more government expenditures to fight global terrorism,
while another would prefer the government to spend more resources on providing
quality health care, and a third might prefer lower taxes rather than either of these
forms of government spending. Every possible value distribution entails trade-offs
among different values as well as some inequality in the benefits and burdens linked
126 Chapter 5

to each person. Thus, there are always disagreements, competition, and even violent
conflict over whose values will be served and whose will not. What are your top two
values for your society? For yourself?

allOCatIOn Pierre Mendes-France, a distinguished French premier (1954–1955),

observed that “to govern is to make choices.” Allocation refers to such choice making—
the process by which decisions and actions are taken to grant values to some and deny
values to others. Value allocations occur at every moment when decisions are made to
alter or even to sustain the existing distribution of values. Making these decisions and
actions in the face of competition and conflict over values is a central aspect of politics.

authOrItatIVe Value allocations are authoritative when the decisions are accepted as
binding by those people affected by the decisions. One of the most fascinating questions
in political analysis is: Why do people accept the authority of the political system to
allocate values in a manner that is not to their direct advantage? That is, why do people
accept the imposition of taxes, policies, and laws that they judge to be undesirable for
themselves? Compare in 5 suggests some of the reasons people accept the decisions of
the political system, comparing authority relations with the exercise of power.

FOr a COlleCtIVIty The domain of activity for the political system is all those
areas in which it makes authoritative decisions that affect people’s lives. In Easton’s
classic definition, a political system functions “for a society.” His definition serves the
purposes of this book well because the book focuses primarily on states—country-level
political systems. But a political system can exist at any level. This concept could cer-
tainly apply to subnational political systems (including such U.S. examples as states,
counties, and municipalities). It could also apply to a supranational political system
that encompasses more than one country (e.g., the European Union, which includes 28
separate countries). Thus, this book offers a more generalized definition of the political
system as “the authoritative allocation of values for a collectivity.”

Conceptualization of the Political System

In Easton’s (1965) conceptualization, the political system can be viewed as a gigantic pro-
cessing mechanism that converts inputs into outputs (Figure 5.2). The political system
exists within a larger environment that includes other systems, such as the economic sys-
tem, the cultural system, the physical resource system, and many others. This broader
environment generates many inputs, called demands and supports, which the actors in
the political system consider. The political actors then produce outputs, the decisions and
actions that allocate values. If these outputs have an effect on the environment, this might
produce new demands and supports. This processing system becomes a continuing cycle.
The environment of the political system is the name given to all those activities that
are not part of the political system’s activity domain. Do not think of the environment as a
separate physical area, but rather as those things that occur around the political system
and provide both opportunities and constraints on its functioning. This environment
could include anything anywhere in the world, although most of the global environ-
ment has little direct relevance to any action by a particular political system. So, for
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 127

Compare in 5
Power and Authority
Few discussions about politics can occur without 1962; Boulding 1989; Dahl and Stinebrickner 2003;
direct or indirect reference to power or authority. Lukes 2005; and Wrong 1996.)
Both concepts imply the capacity of A (one actor) to Authority. B’s compliance in an authority rela-
control the behavior of B (another actor). What is the tionship with A is not based on power. B behaves
difference between power and authority? in the manner consistent with A’s demands on the
Power. Coercive power is exercised when A basis of authority when B willingly accedes to what
induces B to behave in a manner in which B would A wants because of B’s belief that A has a legitimate
not otherwise behave, based on the use of force or right to demand compliance. Authority is voluntaris-
the threat of force. In some cases, A actually inflicts tic. B accepts the decision or demand of A because
direct bodily harm on B using an instrument of force it is “the right thing to do,” not because of coercive,
(e.g., guns, bombs, or torture) or A imposes undesir- economic, or soft power. The judgment of B that A’s
able conditions on B (e.g., imprisonment or discrimi- authority is legitimate might be grounded in one or
natory treatment). However, there are many cases of more of the following (see Weber 1958a: 295–301):
power exercise in which B’s behavior is controlled Law. B believes that the laws or rules enforced
when B believes there is a credible threat that A will by A are rationally established, purposeful, and
administer coercive power. enacted by a legitimate process, and thus compli-
Some scholars distinguish a second form of ance with those laws is proper behavior.
power, economic power (Boulding 1993). In eco- Tradition. B is influenced by a long-standing
nomic power, A alters B’s behavior by manipulating habit among most people to accept patterns of
resources that B wants or needs. A might refuse to authoritative action by A. Socialization is typically an
sell or give to B an important resource (e.g., oil, eco- element in this form of convincing (indoctrinating?) B
nomic aid, or military protection) that B wants unless to accept the authority of A.
B meets A’s demands. Alternatively, A might promise Charisma. B accepts the actions of a dynamic
to provide B with a resource (e.g., a trade agreement leader whose personal qualities are so extraordinary
or a bribe) only if B does what A desires. that the leader wins B’s trust and unquestioning sup-
Of course, A is not necessarily successful in port. This seems an extreme form of soft power.
the threat or use of coercion or the manipulation of Contract. Acceptance of A’s authority is based
economic resources. B could decide not to alter its on B’s belief that there is a contract between A and
behavior in the way that A wants by ignoring a threat, B in which A enforces a social order that protects
by refusing the economic resources offered by A, or by B’s interests. When actor A is the state, a broad ver-
responding with its own coercive power, which could sion of this is the concept of the social contract pro-
result in violence between A and B. When actors have posed by classical political theorists such as Thomas
competing values, the option of employing coercive Hobbes (1588–1679; recall Chapter 2) and John Locke
power or economic power is always a possibility. (1632–1704).
A third form of power is “soft power” (Nye Notice that the dynamics of power and author-
2009). Soft power is evident when B is persuaded ity relationships cover a vast number of situations
to accept what A wants because B greatly admires that involve competing values and agendas and
A’s virtue and qualities and because B believes that thus are political. There are many instances in which
it shares important values with A. Thus A exercises the behaviors of both actors A and B are a complex
its soft power when B accepts A’s demand, even if it mix of power and authority patterns. As with other
is not in B’s evident self-interest, without any explicit actors, even the power and authority of the state can
threat or the promise of the provision of a resource. be challenged. Consider: Antigone, in Sophocles’
(For other views of power, see Bachrach and Baratz (496–406 b.c.e.) classic play, who challenges a law
128 Chapter 5

SOuRCe: © The New Yorker Collection 1977 George Booth from cartoonbank
.com. All Rights Reserved.

by the king, her uncle Creon; Mohandas Gandhi’s Further Questions

campaign of resistance to British rule in India; the
1. In general, is it more sensible for the state to
civil rights movements in South Africa and in the
rely on power or authority to achieve its goals of
United States; and the citizens’ resistance to tainted
security, stability, and prosperity?
political leadership in many countries, such as the
challenge to Syria’s Bashar al-Assad. Of course, not 2. Consider Lord Acton’s cynical aphorism that “all
all challenges to a state’s power and authority are power corrupts.” Do you agree with this gloomy
legitimate and desirable. Creon tries to persuade appraisal?
Antigone that a danger of defiance is social disor- 3. American philosopher Henry David Thoreau
der: “He whom the State appoints must be obeyed (1817–1862) writes: “If [the law of the state] is
to the smallest matter, be it right or wrong.…There is of such a nature that it requires you to be the
no more deadly peril than disobedience” (Sophocles agent of injustice to another, then I say, break
1967: 144). The balance between compliance and the law” (Thoreau 1849: 92). What injustice
resistance to power and authority is at the heart would persuade you to break the law? What law
of politics. would you be willing to break?
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 129

Figure 5.2 Conceptualization of the Political System

SOuRCe: Based on Easton 1965: 31.

Extrasocietal Environment

Fe
Political Intrasocietal Environment Fe

e
dback Loo
ed
Economic

back Lo
Economic Political
Social system

p
Demands

o
Social
p
Ecological INPUTS CONVERSION OUTPUTS
Ecological Supports
Other

Other

example, if the physical resources environment inside the country (or the relevant
parts of the physical resources environment outside the country) contains few energy
resources, that has an effect on the challenges facing those making political decisions.
If the internal cultural environment is permeated by religious conflict, that matters. If
a neighboring country is taking actions perceived as a threat to security, that will affect
the demands and supports that the political system must deal with. You can see that
many aspects of the environment can shape the inputs to the political system’s actions.
Demands are wants or desires for particular value allocations. Demands might come
from individuals, groups, or systems either within or outside the society. For example,
when a citizen or interest group expresses a preference for lower taxes, more expendi-
ture on health care, or greater regulation of corporations, this becomes a demand on the
political system.
Supports are actions by individuals or groups that indicate either favorable or unfavorable
orientations toward the political system. These actions can be directed toward any actor in
the political system, from a major figure like the president to a low-level bureaucrat to
a governmental body like the legislature to a political symbol like the country’s flag.
Support can be positive, as when a person pays taxes, serves in the state’s military,
salutes the flag, or votes. Support can also be negative, through actions that criticize or
oppose the political system such as when a person refuses to pay taxes, avoids military
service, burns the flag, or defaces a ballot.
At the heart of the political system framework is conversion—the process by which
political actors assess demands and supports within the context of the relevant envi-
ronmental forces and then determine what values will be allocated to whom. Many
political analysts have been especially interested in studying this process. Chapter 9
will describe an analytic model of the public policy process that defines a series of
key stages, from problem definition to implementation and evaluation. Chapter 9 also
compares three general explanations of how the political system makes policy deci-
sions: the class approach, the elite approach, and the pluralist approach.You will find that in
130 Chapter 5

each of these three approaches, a different mix of groups wields power and influence
as the political system converts demands and supports into policy decisions.
Once policy decisions have been made and implemented, they become outputs
of the political system. Some outputs are visible and obvious, as when the political
system authorizes the building of a new nuclear power plant, spends the money to
build it, and then puts it online producing energy. But it is sometimes difficult to iden-
tify the decisions (outputs) because they might involve subtle actions, secret policies,
or even “nondecisions” that perpetuate the existing value distribution or bury issues.
For example, if some people demand new government subsidies for small farmers and
the government does nothing, there has been an allocation decision—even though no
visible policy action can be identified. A policy might also be implemented in mul-
tiple ways, making it difficult to specify the exact policy output. For example, the state
might have a law that a person cannot kill another person, yet the state does not mete
out identical punishment to all those who do kill.
Most analysts distinguish outputs from outcomes—the impacts of the decisions taken
and implemented by the political system. Ultimately, it is the impacts of the political sys-
tem’s policy choices that really affect people’s lives. The essential question is: What
difference did that policy choice (that value allocation) make? That is, how does the
implemented policy affect people’s health, welfare, security, freedom, knowledge, self-
worth, or other values? Even more than in the analysis of outputs, it can be extremely
difficult to identify with precision the overall outcomes of a policy and its effects on
particular individuals and groups.
The final component in the systems approach is the feedback loop. Decision out-
puts result in outcomes that alter aspects of the environment and thus affect the next
round of demands and supports reaching the political system. Feedback is the dynam-
ics through which information about those changes in the environment are monitored
by the political system. As changes alter both the environment and the demands and
supports, political actors might decide to revise the value allocations they have previ-
ously made. As Figure 5.2 indicates, feedback is drawn as a loop to emphasize the
continuous circular process among components in the system.
For Easton (1965), a crucial question is: How does a political system persist in
a world of challenges and change? Political decision makers must maintain a del-
icate balance of forces: The environments must be prevented from constraining or
overwhelming the political system and must be exploited for the resources and
opportunities they present; political actors must be sensitive and accurate in their
perceptions and policy decisions; demands must be managed so that they are not
irreconcilable and do not overload the resources available; and positive support must
be nurtured and negative support discouraged or suppressed. In short, the actors in
the political system must operate with political skill and political will. If the political
system’s performance is poor, there can be serious consequences: a substantial decline
in the quality of citizens’ lives; major social disorder, as in Syria since 2013; a “failed
state” such as Somalia; even the “death” of the political system, as occurred in the
Sudan in 2011 (when it broke into two countries). Later chapters, especially Chapters
10 and 12, will develop these themes more fully.
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 131

Three Major Concepts: A Reprise

This chapter has furthered our understanding of the political world by exploring three
major concepts that characterize large political entities: state, nation, and political sys-
tem. First, state emphasizes the legal standing and power of sovereign entities, the
necessary functions that they perform, and the domain of their actions. The discussion
also identified an array of goals that most states pursue, centering on the core goals of
security, stability, and prosperity.
Second, nation indicates a mental state characterized by a sense of shared identity
among a set of people, distinguishing “us” from “them” in the sociopolitical world.
Multinational states face particularly strong challenges from the instability that can
result from different nation-based identities. The Indian subcontinent is among the
many examples of the problem of disjunction between state and nation.
Third, political system attempts to provide political scientists with a basic analytic
concept for building a general theory of political entities and processes. It is useful as a
metaphor for thinking about the dynamic processes among the crucial components in
an open, dynamic, and adaptive system whose essential function is the authoritative
allocation of values for its collectivity. In Chapters 6 and 7, our discussion of political
units will become more concrete as we examine the actual political institutions and
structures in contemporary states.

Key Concepts
authority, p. 127 nation, p. 121 res publica, p. 120
demands, p. 129 nationalism, p. 122 security, p. 118
environment of the political nation–state, p. 122 soft power, p. 127
system, p. 126 outcomes, p. 130 sovereignty, p. 113
feedback, p. 130 outputs, p. 130 stability, p. 118
identity politics, p. 121 political system, p. 123 state, p. 115
indigenous peoples, p. 121 political values, p. 125 supports, p. 129
inputs, p. 126 power, p. 127 territorial integrity, p. 114
multinational state, p. 122 prosperity, p. 118 values, p. 125

For Further Consideration

1. Do you think there are circumstances in identities? Under what types of circum-
which a country’s sovereignty should be stances might a person’s multiple national
violated? What is the most serious problem identities produce serious internal conflicts?
with your position on this question? 3. To what extent is it possible to align states
2. Do you identify with more than one and nations in the contemporary world?
nation? Is there any conflict between these Would doing this be desirable?
132 Chapter 5

4. Develop a dialogue between person A, who 5. Describe several situations in which the
believes that the authority of the state must decision-making capacity of the most
be obeyed under almost all conditions, and powerful actors in the political system
person B, who believes that the authority is almost completely constrained by fac-
of the state can be disputed in any situation tors in the extrasocietal or the intrasocietal
in which B substantially disagrees with the
environment.
state’s decision.

For Further Reading

Barber, Benjamin r. (1996). Jihad vs. McWorld. Institution Press. Linked to the Debate in 5,
new york: random house. An incisive analy- this is a vigorous justification of the obliga-
sis of current world trends, in which there is tion of a state to protect its own citizens from
a simultaneous globalization of culture and atrocities and, if it fails, the necessity (R2P) of
economics and a breakdown of peoples into international intervention.
distinct and hostile nationality groups. hutchinson, John, and anthony Smith, eds.
Bell, Stephen, and andrew hindmoor. (2009). (1995). Nationalism. new york: Oxford
Rethinking Governance: The Centrality of university Press. hutchinson, John, and
the State in Modern Society. Cambridge: anthony Smith, eds. (1995). Ethnicity. new
Cambridge university Press. Challenges argu- york: Oxford university Press. These two
ments that the state has been undermined by Oxford Readers offer an exceptional selection of
globalization and presents empirical support short excerpts relevant to understanding each
connecting the role of the state to governance concept. Each book includes perspectives from
and civil society. a wide variety of social scientists, historians,
Connor, Walker. (1994). Ethnonationalism: The social theorists, and others.
Quest for Understanding. Princeton, nJ: Jackson, robert. (2007). Sovereignty: The
Princeton university Press. A detailed analy- Evolution of an Idea. Malden, Ma: Polity
sis of the nature of and the imperatives driv- Press. A thoughtful exploration of the concept
ing a people’s strong identity with nation as of sovereignty, including its historical devel-
opposed to state, enriched by many illuminat- opment and its contemporary implications for
ing examples. interstate relations, human rights, and global
el Ouali, abdelhamid. (2012). Territorial society.
Integrity in a Globalizing World. Berlin: Kaufman, Stuart J. (2001). Modern Hatreds: The
Springer Berlin heidelberg. A reimagin- Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War. Ithaca, ny:
ing of the bounds of territorial integrity as a Cornell university Press. The manipulation
cornerstone of international law in light of of ethnonationalist sentiments to serve the
globalization. political goals of leaders is described in a set of
evans, Gareth. (2009). The Responsibility to intriguing case studies.
Protect: Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once Kesey, Ken. (1962). One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s
and for All. Washington, DC: Brookings Nest. new york: new american library. A
 Political Systems, States, and Nations 133

funny, gripping novel (also made into a film) rashid, ahmed. (2002). Jihad: The Rise of Militant
that, at its core, considers the virtues and costs Islam in Central Asia. new haven, Ct: yale
of defying institutional authority. university Press. Author of the widely dis-
Marx, anthony W. (2003). Faith in Nation: cussed Taliban (2010, Yale University Press),
Exclusionary Origins of Nationalism. new Rashid offers a rich account of the rapid emer-
york: Oxford university Press. This study gence of religious nationalism in the “stans” of
emphasizes the way in which nation-based Central Asia (e.g., Tajikistan and Kazakhstan),
identity is created mainly by excluding groups, driven particularly by poverty, corruption, and
especially based on religious differences, as an a reaction to the suppression of Islam in the
intentional strategy to establish nationalism region.
and consolidate governmental power. Snyder, Jack. (2000). From Voting to Violence:
Miller, Benjamin. (2007). States, Nations, and the Democratization and Nationalist Conflict.
Great Powers: The Sources of Regional War new york: W. W. norton. In exploring four dif-
and Peace. new york: Cambridge university ferent types of nationalism (civic, ethnic, revo-
Press. An explanation of why some regions are lutionary, and counterrevolutionary), the author
peaceful and others are war prone based on dif- examines the relationship between nationalism
ferent patterns of balance or imbalance between and other dynamic forces, especially democ-
nations and states in the region, using case stud- ratization, political leadership, and political
ies from Europe, South America, and the Middle violence.
East. Sorensen, Georg. (2001). Changes in Statehood:
Pattison, James. (2010). Humanitarian Inter- The Transformation of International
vention and the Responsibility to Protect: Relations. new york: Palgrave. A useful tax-
Who Should Intervene? new york: Oxford onomy of states (modern, postmodern, and
university Press. Based on the conventions postcolonial) is the basis for an exploration of
of international law and an analysis of recent how states attempt to achieve their security
examples, the author offers an argument for goals as they respond to pressures from exter-
the conditions under which intervention by nal and internal forces.
those outside a sovereign state is legitimate and taras, raymond, and rajat Ganguly. (2010).
likely to be beneficial. Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The
Paul, t. V., John Ikenberry, and John hall, International Dimension. 4th ed. new york:
eds. (2003). The Nation–State in Question. longman. In addition to a helpful concep-
Princeton, nJ: Princeton university Press. tualization of the nature of ethnic conflict,
These essays explore the continuing power revealing case studies discuss the problems
and central importance of the state, despite the of nation and state in settings such as Canada,
enormous forces undermining the state from Eritrea and Ethiopia, Sri Lanka, and the former
both nation-based identities and globalization. Yugoslavia.
Pierson, Christopher. (2011). The Modern State. thoreau, henry David. (1849/1981). Walden and
3rd ed. new york: routledge. What defines a Other Writings. ed. J. W. Krutch. new york:
state and what role does the state play in mod- Bantam. These essays, especially “Civil Disobe-
ern times? The author attempts to answer these dience,” constitute one of the most influential
questions while also placing the evolution of arguments in English for resisting authority.
the state in the context of a globalizing world.
134 Chapter 5

On the Web
http://www.atlapedia.com http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii
Atlapedia provides diverse statistical informa- The official site of the United Nations Perma-
tion and various maps for each country as well nent Forum on Indigenous Issues.
as recent political history. http://www.state.gov
http://cwis.org Operated by the U.S. Department of State,
The Web page of the Center for World this site has country reports and information
Indigenous Studies, an independent, nonprofit on international organizations, human rights,
organization emphasizing the distribution and numerous other topics related to foreign
of knowledge about the issues and status of policy and international relations.
indigenous peoples (nations not coterminous http://www.countryreports.org
with states) and promoting greater autonomy Country Reports provides comprehensive
of power to such peoples. reports for most countries and includes access
http://www.ipl.org to international news and reference maps.
The Internet Public Library provides links to http://www.nationsonline.org
numerous reference books, newspapers, and This site offers an encyclopedic array of por-
magazines about various countries. tals with details of states and many aspects of
https://www.cia.gov/index.html their governmental, cultural, and economic
The Web site of the U.S. Central Intelligence forms.
Agency includes the CIA World Factbook, a http://www.economist.com/countries
detailed and relatively up-to-date compilation This site, produced by the publishers of The
of information about the political, economic, Economist, a respected British newsmagazine,
geographic, and demographic characteristics contains detailed country profiles and links to
of every country. international news resources.
Chapter 6
Political Institutions I:
Institutional Structures

Learning Objectives
6.1 Analyze the structure and roles of political executives.
6.2 Summarize the roles of the legislature.
6.3 Compare the functions and powers of political administrative systems.
6.4 Outline the major elements within judicial systems.

There was trouble on the Korean peninsula. Troops from communist North Korea
had invaded noncommunist South Korea in 1950. U.S. President Truman authorized
a “police action” and sent U.S. troops to South Korea to stop the invasion. As the con-
flict escalated into a major war, the Truman administration concluded that a stable
U.S. economy was important for the war effort. However, a wage dispute resulted
in a major strike by the steelworkers’ union against the steel mill industry. Truman
feared this strike would seriously disrupt the steel supply and war-related production
of many defense contractors and harm the U.S. economy as a whole.
Given these concerns, Truman seized the steel mill industry, placed it under
the control of federal administrative agencies, and ordered the workers to end their
strike. However, President Truman’s bold steps to control the industry did not fol-
low the proper procedures outlined in acts of Congress. The president argued, with
the support of the steelworkers, that he had inherent powers to seize the steel mills,
especially in a time of crisis. The steel companies, led by Youngstown Sheet and Tube
Company, challenged Truman’s justification and filed suit against President Truman
and Secretary of Commerce Charles Sawyer. The companies claimed that the president
did not have the authority to seize the steel mills without following the procedures
that were specified in the legislation.
After hearing the case, the United States Supreme Court supported the position
of the steel companies by a vote of 6 to 3. In the majority opinion, Justice Black wrote

135
136 Chapter 6

On strike! Union members of the United Steelworkers of America picket outside a U.S. steel plant in
support of their goals of higher wages and improved working conditions.

that the inherent power to order seizure of the steel mills would need to be based on
either executive authority provided for in the U.S. Constitution or a statute passed by
Congress. The court majority ruled that there was no such constitutional provision or
statute. Chief Justice Vinson disagreed. In a dissenting opinion, Vinson argued that
President Truman’s actions were justified because Congress had not passed legisla-
tion expressly prohibiting this kind of action by the president and because previous
presidents, including Abraham Lincoln, had taken similar actions in the past. Faced
with the Supreme Court decision, Truman’s administration withdrew its control of
the steel mills, and the workers went back on strike. At that point, Congress became
very concerned about the impacts of the strike on the Korean War effort. Congress then
quickly passed legislation specifically providing the president with the power to seize
the steel mills. In response, the workers ended their strike.
In this famous case, all the major political institutions of the U.S. national govern-
ment were actively involved: the executive (the president), the legislature (Congress),
the judiciary (the Supreme Court), and the administration (federal agencies). These
four political institutions exist in every modern state. And every political system has
grappled with serious questions regarding how to design, modify, and manage its set
of political institutions and political arrangements to maintain an effective govern-
ment that can achieve valued goals. As James Madison noted during the writing of the
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 137

U.S. Constitution: “In framing a government which is to be administered by men over

men, the great difficulty is this: You must first enable the government to control the
governed; and in the next place, oblige it to control itself.”
Political institutions are the established roles, rules, procedures, and structures
through which government operates. Political systems with well-developed institu-
tions are more likely to be stable over time. To the extent that the institutions in any
given country are easily replaced or ignored, the government will be more vulnerable
to political, social, or economic upheaval.
Studying the institutional structures of the state raises questions such as: Which
institution dominates a given policy sphere? How independent are the different insti-
tutions? How are the preferences of the citizens represented in the institutions? How
are these roles allocated to specific people? What are the relationships among the
executive, the judiciary, the administration, and the legislature? How powerful is the
legislature? Are the courts independent of the other branches of government? How do
the political system and the economic system intersect? What is the role of the consti-
tution? How does the national government interact with sub-national governments?
Exploring these kinds of questions in Chapters 6 , 7, and 8 helps us identify and
compare the government structures and processes of political systems around the
world. Initially, Chapter 6 provides an analysis of the four major institutional structures
that are the basic components of contemporary political systems: executives, legislatures,
administrative systems, and judiciaries. Chapter 7 will compare different institutional
arrangements regarding matters such as executive–legislative relationships, the party
system, and citizen democracy. Chapter 8 will analyze the ways in which the political
system and the economic system are linked. The discussions in these chapters will
emphasize broad patterns and generalizations. The usual qualifications apply: There
are exceptions and variations across political systems and even within each political
system as it is influenced by many factors such as forces in the environment, personali-
ties, political culture, policy area, and so on. Let’s begin with a discussion of executives.

Executives
6.1 Analyze the structure and roles of political executives.
The historical evidence indicates that as long as there have been political systems,
there have been individuals or small groups who assume top leadership roles. Such
leaders have the responsibility to formulate and especially to implement public policy,
and they can be broadly called the executive structure. The word executive comes from
the Latin ex sequi, meaning “to follow out” or “to carry out.” Thus, the particular role
of the executive is to carry out the political system’s policies, laws, and directives.
One might be tempted to assume that a few individuals generally emerge as the
leadership cadre in every political order. But there are some historical counterexam-
ples, especially from Africa and Asia, of societies that are acephalous—that is, “with-
out a head.” In such systems, many people in the community share power somewhat
138 Chapter 6

equally as a collective leadership. Nonetheless, in most systems, a few people do

assume the positions of executive power.
At the apex of the executive structure, there is usually an actor who can be called
the chief executive. In a national political system, this might be a single person with
a title such as president, prime minister, chief, premier, supreme leader, or queen. Or
the top executive leader can be a role filled by two or more people. In this case, there
might be a president and a prime minister (as in the French example described in
Compare in 7) or a group exercising shared executive leadership (e.g., a junta).
A broader definition of the executive includes not only the chief executive but
also the entire administrative system. Such a definition derives from the notion that
the policy implementation function (the execution of policy) is shared by the chief
executive and the administration. The top executive group cannot survive without the
continuing support of an extensive system of people who interpret, administer, and
enforce its policy directives. However, we examine the chief executive and the admin-
istration in separate sections of this chapter so that we can differentiate analytically
among the major structures in most political systems.

Roles of Executives
LeAdershiP roLes In the contemporary political world, political leadership is
almost always associated with chief executives. The leadership role entails taking
the initiative in formulating, articulating, and implementing the goals of the political
system. The effective chief executive becomes the spokesperson for the aspirations of
the people, attempts to galvanize the people’s support for these goals, and develops
strategies that facilitate their accomplishment.
To a large extent, the chief executive takes the initiative in policy formation.
Executive policy leadership is especially crucial during times of crisis because the
executive structure has the potential for a level of coherence and unanimity of action
that is often lacking in the legislature. The basic logic is that the top executive is
usually one person or a very small group that can make a decision and implement a
plan of action more easily and rapidly than a large group. In most political systems,
the chief executive also has the capacity to veto, either directly or indirectly, the bills
that the legislature initiates. Increasingly, even the drafting of legislation is a function
dominated by the executive because many major bills require the expertise and policy
direction of the chief executive and its staff.

symboLic And ceremoniAL roLes The actors in the executive role usually
function as the unifying symbol of the entire society, becoming the ultimate mother/
father figures for the people. This is especially true when the chief executive has a
strong image, such as Thailand’s King Bhumibol and King Mswati III in Swaziland
(see Focus in 9). The executive’s presence becomes central to many of the society’s
rituals and ceremonies, whether it is the Japanese emperor’s wedding, the Kenyan
president’s official send-off of the national team to the Olympic Games, or the British
queen’s Christmas Day televised message to her subjects. The executive is often the
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 139

mourner-in-chief in times of sorrow, the primary cheerleader in times of triumph, and

the one who articulates the hopes and dreams of the country.

suPervision of the AdministrAtion In almost all contemporary political sys-

tems, the executive has primary responsibility for implementing the policies and laws
of the political order. At the apex of this administrative hierarchy, which might include
millions of public employees in the state’s departments, bureaus, and agencies, is the
top group of the executive structure. Most systems have an executive cabinet, with
each member directly and personally responsible for some major area of administra-
tion. Given the scale and complexity of the activities in each area, these top executive
actors can neither know nor control all of the actions that occur within their domain.
Nonetheless, they are supposed to set the broad guidelines for policy implementation,
and in many political systems, they are accountable for any major failures that occur.
In parliamentary systems, for example, the minister of a department will probably
resign if there is a serious shortcoming or blunder in her area of responsibility.

suPervision of the miLitAry And foreign AffAirs Given the state’s

monopoly of the legitimate use of force, the top political executive usually has direct
control over the military (including internal security forces). In such cases, the top
executive is the commander in chief of the entire military system of the state, including
personnel and other resources (aircraft, nuclear weapons, military intelligence, and so
on). The chief executive must set policy and supervise the organization and utilization
of the state’s military capabilities, a task that can have the most serious consequences
for the security and well-being of the country.
Associated with control of the military is the executive’s responsibility for foreign
affairs—the state’s relations with other states. As Chapter 12 will describe more fully,
the relations among states involve complex patterns of cooperation and conflict as
each state attempts to accomplish its goals in the international environment. The chief
executive (or the chief executive’s delegates) represents the state in its dealings with
other countries. Particular significance is often attached to situations in which the
chief executives of different states meet directly, as in a state visit or a summit confer-
ence. In reality, such meetings among heads of state typically are symbolic gestures of
cooperation or occasions for ratifying agreements that have been reached by the chief
executives’ representatives. But the concentration of the states’ political power in the
chief executives is so great that such meetings can provide opportunities for major
breakthroughs in the relations among the states.

Structural Arrangements
fused versus duAL executive Many political systems have a dual executive.
One actor, the head of state, performs the more ceremonial aspects of top leadership, while
another actor, the head of government, is responsible for the more political aspects of gover-
nance. The main advantage of the dual executive is that citizens can be angry or hostile
toward the head of government while remaining loyal to the nation and to the political
system through their affection and support for the more ceremonial head of state.
140 Chapter 6

Constitutional monarchies are obvious examples of political systems with a dual

executive. In these systems, there is a ruling king or queen (e.g., Queen Elizabeth II in
Britain, Queen Margrethe II in Denmark, or Emperor Akihito in Japan) and a prime
minister or other head of government. The monarch has little or no power to make
authoritative policy decisions and serves mainly symbolic or ceremonial functions, as
an embodiment of the nation and the people. Monarchs with limited powers also oper-
ate in some less democratic countries, such as King Norodom Sihamoni in Cambodia
where the king is head of state but Prime Minister Hun Sen commands dominant
political power as head of government.
Some countries have attempted to create a dual executive without a monarch, estab-
lishing a second executive office as head of state (such as the presidency in Germany,
India, and Ireland) that is typically insulated from
the daily struggles of politics and thus can be a
symbol of national unity. In countries where the
culture is deeply grounded in a religious belief
system, the head of the religion can function like
a head of state, as in Iran, where the president
(Hassan Rouhani) and legislature lead the politi-
cal system, but the religious leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei (the Leader of the Islamic Republic and
of the Nation), has formidable power over most
aspects of political life.
Most political systems have a fused execu-
tive. Here, a single actor fulfills both the ceremonial
roles associated with the head of state and the political
functions associated with the head of the government.
In such cases, it can be difficult or impossible
to distinguish (dis)loyalty to a partisan politi-
cal leader from (dis)loyalty to the nation. Clever
chief executives use this fusion of roles to their
advantage, “wrapping themselves in the flag.”
Such executives criticize or even punish their
opponents by claiming that they are traitors to
the political society (even though the opponents
are usually criticizing only the political actions of
Queen Elizabeth II, the head of state, opens Parliament each
the leader). For example, Zimbabwe’s President
year by delivering a speech written by the prime minister, Robert Mugabe used this tactic very effectively to
the head of government. The speech outlines the legisla- intimidate and eliminate his rivals and to justify
tion the prime minister’s government will introduce. The using violence against political opponents.
queen comes to Britain’s House of Lords, whose members Some political systems have two actors who
sit behind the Law Lords (the highest judiciary group,
perform parts of the chief executive role but are
wearing the wigs). By tradition, the now powerful House of
Commons members, including the prime minister, symboli- not really dual executives in the sense described
cally “demand” entry into the chamber and stand in the in the preceding paragraphs. For example, there
back (not visible in the photo). are countries (e.g., France and Russia) where
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 141

both a prime minister and a president perform essentially political functions, although
one usually has a stronger claim to the head-of-state role (see Focus in 7). Some politi-
cal systems have both a political executive and a monarch who, in addition to serving
as head of state, is a powerful political actor. Bhutan, Kuwait, Morocco, and Swaziland
are examples where the monarch is the head of state and has greater political power
than the prime minister.

the executive While the term chief executive refers to the one person or small
group at the top of the executive structure, the executive is a broader term, including
all the people and organizational machinery that are below the chief executive in the execu-
tive structure. Thus, the executive encompasses high-level decision makers in all the
departments, agencies, and other administrative units that are in the chief executive’s
chain of command. As was noted earlier, a definition of the executive far broader than
the one in this book might include the entire administrative system.
In theory, and usually in practice, this is a hierarchical system of political control, in
the sense that the actors in the executive structure are supposed to follow the directives
of the chief executive. But the chief executive’s power over the rest of the executive is
rarely absolute. There are many reasons why the chief executive’s directives might not
be carried out:

• Units within the executive might be too disorganized or corrupt to act effectively.
• Units within the executive might lack the resources to carry out policies in the
manner desired by the chief executive.
• Some units might be more involved in competing against other units than in coor-
dinating their actions to meet the chief executive’s policies.
• Units might misunderstand, resist, or defy the chief executive.
• Can you think of other reasons?

The Age of the Executive?

Although chief executives have nearly always been evident, and usually ascendant, in
political systems, some analysts call the twentieth century the “age of the executive.”
This label reflects the apparent concentration of power in executives and the relative
decline of legislatures’ powers. What might account for this concentration of power?
To some extent, this is a chicken-and-egg issue: The reduced capacity of many legis-
latures to take coherent and decisive state action is linked to the emergence of more
coherent and decisive executives.
In comparison with legislatures, the executive structure tends to be more stream-
lined and less prone to stalemate and inaction. Also, the executive, centered in a
single person or small group, can offer a unified focus for a mass public that either
desires simplicity and clarity in an age of great complexity or wants a form of heroic
leadership. The chief executive typically speaks with one voice and, when effective,
can assure the people that political power will be exercised with purpose and effi-
ciency to respond to the pressures and demands in the society and in the international
142 Chapter 6

environment. Even if a chief executive cannot deliver, she can at least promise decisive
leadership in a manner that no other political structure can.
Can you suggest any conditions under which a state might be dominated by a
structure other than the political executive?

Legislatures
6.2 summarize the roles of the legislature.
Nearly every country has a legislature as one of its basic structures of governance
(Derbyshire 2000). Legislatures might have one or two “houses.” Examples include the
Senate and the House of Representatives (United States), the Senate and the Chamber
of Deputies (Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela, among others), the Legislative Assembly
(Costa Rica), the National People’s Congress (China), the Majlis (Iran), the National
Assembly (Egypt and Tanzania, among others), the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha
(India), the Knesset (Israel), the House of Representatives and the House of Councillors
(Japan), and the House of Commons and the House of Lords (United Kingdom). The
names differ, but most perform the same essential functions.

Roles of the Legislature

Legislatures are structures in which representatives of the people discuss, assess, and
enact public policies. Indeed, the root of the name of the first modern legislature, the
British Parliament, suggests this crucial function—the French word parler means “to
talk.” Most early legislatures were created to provide advice to the political execu-
tive, typically a monarch, and to represent politically relevant groups. Legislatures
also became responsible for enacting public policies. The roots of the word legislature
are the Latin words legis, meaning “law,” and latio, “bringing or proposing.” Some of
the earliest legislatures, such as the Roman Senate (ca. 500 b.c.e.–100 c.e.), had great
power to discuss and enact laws. Thus, most modern legislatures have three broad roles:
(1) enacting legislation; (2) representing the citizenry; and (3) overseeing the executive.

enActment of LegisLAtion It might seem obvious that legislatures draft, mod-

ify, and then ratify public policy in the form of legislation. In some political systems,
many laws are initiated and written by the legislature. However, most contemporary
legislatures do not play the dominant role in policymaking; this role has passed to
the executive and the administration. Although executives often set the policy course,
most legislatures retain the right to investigate, legislate, and appropriate. They need
the authority to investigate in order to determine what they ought to legislate about,
and they need the power to appropriate to ensure that what they legislate can be
implemented. Indeed, appropriation, the power to enact laws that raise revenue and
authorize its expenditure, is one of the most significant responsibilities a legislature has.
The source of the legislature’s power in the policymaking process is, in most
political systems, a constitutional provision that a majority vote of the members of
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 143

the legislature is required to authorize the passage of any law (legislative enactment).
In some systems, legislatures have special committees that thoroughly assess and can
amend all proposed legislation under the committees’ jurisdiction. Each step of the
legislative process provides an opportunity for those opposed to legislation to derail
it. Although citizens might feel their legislature moves too slowly, legislatures are slow
by design. Collective decision making usually takes more time than the decision of
one person, and legislatures are designed as institutions of collective decision making.
There are many members of the legislature, and each member can face complicated
issues of representation.

rePresentAtion of the citizenry The second major role of the legislature is to

represent the opinions and interests of the citizenry. One of the many institutional puz-
zles for every political system is how to convert the votes of citizens into a legislature
that reflects the voters’ preferences. Focus in 6 explores these issues of the electoral
system and legislative representation with a case study of South Africa.
Another complicated issue is how the legislator determines whose interests she
represents. The concept of representation is not straightforward because there are at
least six different views of the broad interests that a legislator might represent: (1)
all of the citizens in the legislator’s constituency (geographic area); (2) the people
within her constituency who voted for her; (3) the group that is most dominant in
the legislator’s constituency, possibly a social class, religious group, or ethnic group;
(4) the political party to which the legislator owes loyalty; (5) the country as a whole,
whose broad interests might transcend those of any area, group or party; or (6) the
legislator’s own conscience, which provides moral and intellectual judgment about
appropriate political action (a position made famous in a brilliant justification by
British parliamentarian Edmund Burke in his 1774 “Address to the Electors of Bristol”
[1790/1955: 219–222]).
Is it possible for a legislator to represent all six interests simultaneously? Most
contemporary legislators do not do so, for reasons such as these:

• In the Burkean ideal, a legislator could act against the views of her constituents,
those who voted for her, or her party to follow a policy she believes is in the coun-
try’s best interest.
• A legislator could deliver specific benefits to her own constituents (e.g., “pork bar-
rel politics”), even though these are not the best use of resources to meet the needs
of the country as a whole.
• The legislator could vote for a policy that is not the preference of her constituents
but is part of a vote trade with other legislators to gain support for another policy
she prioritizes.
• A legislator could vote on an issue primarily in exchange for financial or other
support from a particular interest group.
• A legislator holding office in some systems must follow the dictates of the political
leadership and acts as little more than a “rubber stamp.” This is the position of a
legislator in an undemocratic regime like North Korea, for example.
144 Chapter 6

• Some legislators are deeply committed to adhering to their political party’s line, or
they must obey the party to survive politically. Such party discipline is usually the
situation for members of the British House of Commons, for instance.
• Some legislators have such deep loyalty to a particular ideology or group that they
rarely feel obligated to consider how they might represent other groups among
the electorate. Members of religious parties, such as Shas in Israel, can have this
perspective, as do members of extremely ideological factions, including some Tea
Party Republicans in the United States.

Focus in 6
Electoral Systems and Legislative Representation: South Africa
Even before South Africa began dismantling the The PR system requires that legislative districts
system of apartheid in 1990, there were extensive be multimember, meaning that two or more legisla-
discussions about how to transform the politi- tors are elected to represent a region. South Africa
cal system into an effective democracy. Given is divided into nine multimember regions, which
the deep social cleavages and widespread citizen each sends between 4 and 46 representatives to the
mistrust of the government, one critical issue was National Assembly. Two hundred (of the 400) seats
how to establish an electoral system that trans- are distributed proportionately, based on the votes
lates the citizens’ votes into a fair and representa- in each of these nine regions. The other 200 seats
tive legislature. During apartheid, South Africa had are filled with candidates elected for the entire coun-
elected its legislature by a form of plurality voting: try. For both these groupings of seats, the South
the candidate who receives the largest number of African electorate chooses from “closed lists.” This
votes is elected in each constituency. The plurality means that each party determines its own priority list
system is most often used in single-member dis- of candidates, indicating to voters the order in which
tricts, where just one legislator is elected to repre- candidates will be elected if the party wins seats.
sent each region. South Africa differs from most PR countries that
To ensure that each nation-based group in have large districts because there is no minimum
South Africa received legislative seats that approxi- threshold of votes that a party must win nationally to
mated the group’s electoral strength, the 1994 win seats in the legislature. Thus, South Africa cur-
constitution implemented a system of proportional rently has seven small parties that received less than
representation (PR): The seats are allocated to a 1 percent of the national vote but have one to three
party’s candidates in close proportion to a party’s members in the National Assembly. In other PR sys-
share of the total votes. Thus, when the African tems, minimum electoral thresholds are implemented
National Congress Party received 62.1 percent of (for instance, a party gets no seats unless it receives
the votes in 2014, it was allocated 249 (62.0 percent) at least 5 percent of the national vote in Germany).
of the 400 seats in the National Assembly. Although The higher the minimum threshold requirement, the
there are nearly 50 countries that utilize plurality vot- more difficult it is for smaller parties to obtain seats
ing for their legislatures (including Great Britain and (Klingemann 2009).
the United States), the majority of countries now There is an active debate in South Africa about
utilize some form of PR (Reynolds, Reilly, and Ellis whether to modify this electoral system. Some argue
2005: 31). The box (on page 145) offers a simple that the problem with PR in general, and especially
example of how plurality and PR would work in the with closed lists, is that the parties have too much
mythical countries of Zeta and Theta. control over the specific candidates who will be
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 145

elected because the parties produce candidate electoral system that blends several goals. Plurality
lists. Some countries (e.g., Finland) utilize an “open systems have the virtue of increasing the elector-
list” PR system, which allows the voters to select ate’s control over the legislator who serves them,
(from the parties’ lists) the specific candidates they increasing accountability. In contrast, PR systems
want to elect. Others object to the multimember generally produce a distribution of seats across par-
districts, arguing that there is very little connection ties that closely approximates the overall distribution
between the individual voter in a particular district of votes, increasing fair representation. Regarding
and the numerous legislators who represent the effective governance, plurality systems tend to
district. For instance, South Africa averages more reduce the number of significant parties in the legis-
than 20 legislators per district. This limits the direct lature, resulting in a more adversarial democracy—a
representational link between a legislator and a system of majority government and minority oppo-
specific constituency of people to whom she pro- sition. In contrast, PR produces multiple successful
vides services. Thus, some South Africans propose parties, encouraging a more consensual democracy
that some or all of the members of the National because more parties usually must cooperate to
Assembly should be elected in single-member dis- produce a legislative majority (Norris 2004: Ch. 2).
tricts with plurality voting. South Africans continue to debate changes in their
The debate in South Africa mirrors the discus- electoral system to increase its effectiveness for
sion in many countries about how to establish an both representation and governance.

Zeta and Theta each have a 250-member national legislature. Zeta uses a plurality electoral system. Assume that in each of the
20 individual legislative seats in one region of Zeta, the candidate for Party A garners 31 percent of the votes, more votes than the
candidate of any other party. Party A wins all 20 seats. In Theta, the same region utilizes PR and has the same 20 seats. Here,
Parties A and B would each send six legislators, D would send four, B would send three, and E would send one. While the example
for Zeta is probably unrealistic (some other party might get the plurality of votes in some of the individual seats), it is not uncommon
that, in a plurality system, the largest parties win far more seats than their share of votes in the election, and small parties tend to get
few or no seats.

Percentage Zeta: Plurality Theta: PR (of 20 seats

of Votes (of 20 single seats) in district)
Party A 31% 20 (wins in every 6
constituency)
Party B 15% 0 3
Party C 29% 0 6
Party D 19% 0 4
Party E 6% 0 1

Further Focus 2. What would guide your decision about whether

to implement a plurality or PR electoral system
1. Which aspect of the South African electoral
in a particular country (given your specification
systems seems least desirable? How would you
of conditions relevant to that decision)?
alter it?

Most legislators are elected by a set of voters, and it is generally assumed that a
key responsibility of a legislator is both to reflect and to serve the interests of those vot-
ers. But the different interests that are described above can sometimes place a legislator
under serious cross pressures. Even the attempt to reflect the views of one’s constitu-
ents can be complicated. Some groups in the district might express their views loudly,
146 Chapter 6

Voting matters. In a township near Johannesburg, South Africans wait for hours to cast votes for
their representatives to the national legislature.

because they care passionately about the issue or because they have the resources to
amplify their voices, while there is a “silent majority” whose views are different or
unclear. And in a multimember electoral system like the one in South Africa, it can be
difficult to determine exactly who one’s constituents are. For the conscientious legisla-
tor, the challenges of representation can be daunting.

oversight of the executive And AdministrAtion The third major role

of legislators concerns their interactions with the executive and the administration. In
general, the legislature is responsible for overseeing the political executive’s actions.
Legislative powers to investigate, legislate, and appropriate are also the mechanisms
for oversight. The legislature might have the constitutional right to select the execu-
tive, to approve the chief executive’s selection of key appointments, and to authorize
major policy decisions by the executive. In the steel industry case, for example, the
U.S. Congress resisted presidential action that went beyond executive powers they
had authorized but then authorized the actions the president had taken for those
circumstances only. In parliamentary systems, the cabinet and prime minister hold
office and make policy only if they have the “confidence” of the majority of the
members of the legislature (see Chapter 7 ). In some systems, such as in India, the
president is actually chosen by the legislature (although it is the prime minister, not
the president, who is the most powerful executive officer).
Many legislatures have the right to approve the executive’s selection of major
appointments. The Israeli legislature must approve the cabinet as a whole. The
U.S. Senate has the right to “advise and consent” on presidential appointments
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 147

such as cabinet members, ambassadors, and Supreme Court justices. The Senate’s
1987 rejection of Judge Robert Bork, President Reagan’s nominee for the Supreme
Court, is an example of a legislature asserting its power over a top-level executive
appointment.
The right of the legislature to scrutinize executive performance might include
regular procedures by which the legislature can question and investigate whether
the executive has acted properly in implementing public policies. At a minimum,
the legislature serves as a discussion and debating chamber. Subjecting the political
executive’s plans and actions to public debate serves as a modest check on execu-
tive power. This investigative function can also shape the public debate about policy.
Many legislatures have a regular opportunity, during their legislative sessions, to
question the specific plans and actions of key members of the executive. In Britain,
Italy, and South Africa, for example, ministers in the executive cabinet must appear
before the legislature and respond to legislators’ questions or criticisms about any
actions taken by their department.
Most legislatures also have formal investigatory powers on a continuing or a case-
by-case basis. The 2003 parliamentary investigation of British Prime Minister Tony
Blair regarding the basis of his claims that Iraq had weapons of mass destruction and
whether this justified Britain’s military intervention is an example of such oversight.
In addition, some legislatures have followed Sweden’s innovative idea, setting up an
ombudsman—an independent agency that investigates complaints regarding the actions of
the executive branch and its administrative units. If legislative questioning, committees,
or the ombudsman discovers inappropriate behavior by an administrative unit, the
legislature can usually oblige the unit to alter its behavior. If the problem is with the
executive, significant political pressure is exerted on the executive to correct it. Of
course, if the executive resists such pressure, the ultimate resolution of the dispute
entails either resolution through the courts or, in most cases, a power struggle between
the executive and the legislature (DiPaolo 2010).
The most fundamental power of oversight held by some legislatures is their capac-
ity to overturn the government. In a parliamentary system, the legislature can require
or pressure the executive to resign from office by a vote of censure or of no confidence
or by defeating a major bill put forth by the executive (see Chapter 7 ). In Italy, for
example, the legislature forced the executive to resign about once a year—on average—
between 1951 and 1994. Even in presidential systems, the legislature has the power to
overturn the executive by means of extraordinary processes like impeachment or recall
elections (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). In 1992, Brazilian President Fernando
Collor de Mello resigned after being impeached by the National Congress on corrup-
tion charges. And in 2008, Pakistan’s President Musharraf resigned as the legislature
began impeachment proceedings for treason. In the United States, no president has
been removed from office because of impeachment and conviction. However, in 1868,
President Andrew Johnson was acquitted on the House of Representatives’ impeach-
ment charge by only one vote in the Senate, Richard Nixon avoided an impeachment
trial in 1974 only by resigning, and Bill Clinton was acquitted by the Senate on two
articles of impeachment brought by the House in 1998.
148 Chapter 6

Legislative Structures
number of houses There is one very visible difference in the structural arrange-
ments of various legislatures—the number of houses (often called chambers). There
are unicameral (one-chamber) legislatures in more than half of the countries that have
legislatures (Derbyshire 2000). The presumed advantages of a unicameral system are
that political responsibility is clearly located in one legislative body and that risks of
duplication or stalemate between parallel bodies are eliminated. More than two-thirds
of the countries with a strong central government (see Chapter 7 on these “unitary
states”) have unicameral legislatures, including Algeria, Bulgaria, China, Costa Rica,
Denmark, Finland, Greece, Hungary, Israel, Kenya, New Zealand, South Korea,
Sweden, Taiwan, and Tanzania.
Since 1990, there has been a considerable increase in the proportion of countries
that have bicameral legislatures—those with two separate chambers. Bicameral sys-
tems are especially prevalent in countries that are federations (states in which a central
government and regional governments share power). Bicameral federations include
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, India, Mexico, and the United States. There are
bicameral systems in one-third of the unitary states, including France, Great Britain,
Italy, and Japan (Derbyshire 2000).
Although passing laws is generally easier in a unicameral system, a bicameral sys-
tem can be defended on several grounds. First, two legislative houses provide more
careful deliberation on issues and laws. One body can act as a check on the other to
ensure more broadly acceptable policy is implemented. Second, the two houses make it
easier to accommodate different desirable models of representation. In about two-fifths
of the bicameral legislatures (e.g., Germany and the United States), one house represents
the regional governments and the other house more directly represents the numerical
and geographic distribution of citizens. A few upper houses also represent functional
groups in the society, as in the Republic of Ireland, where members are appointed as rep-
resentatives of sectors such as agriculture, labor, industry, culture, and public services.
Over time, some bicameral systems have evolved toward unicameral systems,
especially in cases in which the need for extensive checks and balances within the
legislative branch has not seemed compelling and in which the problems of overlap
and stalemate between the two chambers have become severe. Some political systems,
such as those of Sweden and Costa Rica, have constitutionally abolished one chamber.
In others, such as Norway, Japan, and Britain, the powers of one chamber have been so
reduced that it can delay, but cannot veto, the decisions of the more powerful chamber.
In fact, the United States is now the only bicameral political system in which the
regional upper chamber (the Senate) is more powerful than the popularly based lower
chamber (the House of Representatives) (Derbyshire 2000).

size of LegisLAtures The number of members in legislatures varies enormously,

with some houses having fewer than 10 members and others having thousands of
members (e.g., the National People’s Congress in China has 2,987 members). The
single house, or the lower house, typically represents “the people.” Each legis-
lator is elected from a constituency of roughly the same size. In general, there is a
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 149

positive correlation between a country’s population and its number of legislators (a

ratio defined mathematically as a “cube root law” by Taagepera and Shugart 1989:
174–179). Among the more populous countries, however, there is no obvious prin-
ciple for determining the optimal number of legislators. In the U.S. House of
Representatives, 435 members are elected, a ratio of 1 member per 729,000 people.
Of the 165 countries with a legislature, only India has a higher ratio of population
to members than the United States. The United Kingdom, with less than one-third
the U.S. population, has 650 elected members in its House of Commons, a ratio of
1 member per 97,000 citizens. More than half of all countries have a ratio of fewer than
65,000 people per representative (Derbyshire 2000).
Can you think of an appropriate criterion for deciding the number of members in a
country’s legislature? For example, are there good reasons why the upper house in the
United States (the Senate) has two rather than three—or four or more—representatives
from each state?

The Decline of Legislatures

Many observers claim that for more than 100 years, there has been a general decline
in the power of legislatures relative to executives and administrations. While it is
very difficult to measure power relations over time with precision, several types of
circumstantial evidence suggest legislative weakness. First, national budgets are often
structured by the executive rather than the legislature (Schick 2012). Controlling the
finances is one of the most powerful aspects of governance.
Second, most legislatures do not provide a coherent structure within which power
can be concentrated and exercised effectively. Many legislatures have relatively slow
and cumbersome procedures for the lawmaking function, especially when there are
regular legislative committees that amend legislation. This complexity in the legislative
process is even more evident in bicameral systems because there is often disagreement
between the two chambers.
Third, most legislatures react to policy initiatives from the executive more than
they create policy. The legislatures almost never have the level of support services
that is available to the executive. Their budgets, facilities, staff sizes, and even the
legislators’ own salaries are significantly lower than those of top members of the exec-
utive and administrative structures. Similarly, the technical expertise and knowledge
resources available to legislatures are far less than those available to the executive and
administrative structures, a major liability when legislators attempt to deal with the
complex subjects facing governments in modern societies.
Fourth, some analysts also suggest a social–psychological weakness of
legislatures: Most citizens desire clear, dynamic, identifiable, and singular political
leadership, but legislatures are composed of many people, and most citizens feel the
legislators are either indistinguishable (when party discipline is very strong) or offer
too many different identities. In the United States, for example, it is usually possi-
ble to answer this question: What does the president think about issue Y? But there
is no easy answer to the question: What does the legislature think about issue Y?
150 Chapter 6

Not only are there two chambers and two parties, there also is a great diversity of
opinions among the individuals and factions within the legislature. As discussed in
Chapters 2 and 4, even the parties, which send cues to voters about their views on
issues, sometimes have open disagreement in their ranks. Thus, although legislatures
usually have spokespersons and leaders, no one can truly speak for all the individual
members of the legislature. One might conclude that the legislature in a democratic
society tends to fulfill one of its roles too well: Its members too accurately represent
the diversity of political beliefs among the society’s population, and thus they speak
with many voices.
Although the power of legislatures has not kept pace with that of other institu-
tions, especially the executive and the administration, not all legislatures are weak
or diminished institutions. Certain national legislatures remain extremely power-
ful political structures, such as those in Italy, Japan, Sweden, and the United States.
In most other relatively democratic political systems, legislatures have significant
impacts on the governing process through their roles in enacting legislation, in rep-
resentation, in framing the issues for the public, and in oversight. And in almost all
societies that have a legislature, its members can exercise political power in many
subtle ways. At the least, members of the legislature have much more political power
than most other citizens.

Administrative Systems
6.3 compare the functions and powers of political administration systems.
Administration is the general term used to describe the machinery and the processes
through which the state’s rules and policies are applied and implemented. While the executive
(discussed above) denotes the top managers of the policy implementation function, the
administrative system consists of the thousands, or even millions, of public employees
who do the ongoing business of interpreting and implementing the policies enacted by
the state. These employees are divided into organizational units called departments,
ministries, agencies, and bureaus. Administrative units perform important activities
such as providing publicly provided goods and services (e.g., national security, roads,
education, solid-waste disposal, health care, monetary aid for the needy), maintaining
order, collecting revenues, keeping records, and regulating or controlling aspects of
the economy (e.g., the power grid, provision of transportation, finance system, growth
and distribution of food).

Administrative Functions and Power

The scale of activity of a state’s administrative structure depends on the political
system’s definition of res publica (recall page 119). In political systems that penetrate
a larger sphere of the society and economy, there is a corresponding need for more
extensive administrative structures because the administration is the basic apparatus
through which the state interprets, implements, and monitors all of its policies and
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 151

activities. The administrative structures in contemporary political systems perform

five broad functions:

1. Provision of public goods and services. The essential work of the actors in the
administrative structure is the constant interpretation and application of policies
that provide public goods and services to individuals and groups.
2. regulation and enforcement of behavior. Administrators are also responsible
for interpreting and applying many public policies that set guidelines for the
behavior of individuals or groups. These can vary greatly, from monitoring collu-
sion among corporations to enforcing traffic laws to protecting the civil rights of
ethnic minorities.
3. Provision of knowledge. Many administrators develop great expertise within
their specialized areas. This knowledge can be of enormous utility for almost
every decision and action undertaken in that area by the political system.
4. information management. Administrators are responsible for the collection,
storage, and analysis of huge amounts of information about the people and pro-
cesses in the society. This information provides a crucial database—for recording
activities and conditions in the society and for providing information relevant to
every stage of the policy process (see Chapter 9 ).
5. resource management. In roles such as collector of revenues from citizens and
businesses or operator of state-owned companies producing goods and services,
the administrative structure is in charge of many tasks that extract and utilize
resources for the political system.

This brief list of functions suggests the enormous breadth and depth of the
administrative structure and its activities. Some observers argue that in the complex,
extensive, and knowledge-based political systems of the early twenty-first century, the
power of administrative institutions is supreme. Although the administrators are, in
theory, “servants” of their political masters and their clients, in reality these roles might
be reversed. Civil servants have such unmatched knowledge and experience in their
specialized domains that generalist politicians rarely have sufficient expertise to ques-
tion their information, recommendations, or actions (Weber 1958a). Also, their power to
grant or withhold benefits provides them with considerable leverage over clients. And
most administrators are career employees who have quasi-permanent tenure, while
politicians and clients come and go. The modern administrative structure has such
wide-ranging power and competence that it is typically credited with keeping the politi-
cal system functioning when executives and legislatures are ineffective, as in the Third
and Fourth Republics in France and in many modernizing states in Africa and Asia.
Indeed, Max Weber, the great German sociologist, observed that “in the modern state,
the actual ruler is necessarily and unavoidably the bureaucracy” (Weber 1958a: 211).

Bureaucracy as One Form of Administration

Weber’s quote about bureaucracy is a reminder that administration and bureaucracy
are often treated as synonymous concepts; but in the attempt to clarify our language
of political analysis, it is helpful to distinguish them. Weber provided the definitive
152 Chapter 6

definition of bureaucracy: a particular structure and set of processes through which

the administration can operate. Structurally, bureaucracy is an organization that is
hierarchical and specialized, by means of an elaborate division of labor. Weber also defined
the concept of bureaucracy by a key process: its members (1) apply specific rules of
action to each case; therefore, the resulting treatment of each case is (2) rational; (3) non-
discretionary; (4) predictable; and (5) impersonal (Weber 1958a: 196–244).
In some countries, governments have deeply incorporated this rational bureaucratic
style of administration. A well-structured bureaucracy can help citizens navigate their
government and can act as a deterrent to corruption (Dahlstrom et al. 2012). But there are
also many contemporary political systems, and even more examples historically, in which
public administrators treat people unpredictably or with clear biases. Compare in 6 char-
acterizes five different forms of administration.
In complex societies, calling an organization “bureaucratic” is not usually
intended to be a compliment. Some criticisms of bureaucracy are really directed at
all large administrative structures that exercise increasing control over people’s lives
and that seem too large and too powerful. Fundamentally, the bureaucracy label has
come to connote a system that is too inflexible and impersonal. And the bureaucrats
themselves are seen to be relatively free of political accountability because they are
protected by professional norms and employment rules that give them job security
and insulate them from political pressure. Despite criticisms of its occasional excesses
in practice, most people conclude that they would prefer a Weberian bureaucracy to
one that is arbitrary, discriminatory, or corrupt. Every country is a mix of the five styles
described in the Compare in 6, but the variations in that mix are huge. Personal con-
tacts and bribes (in various societies called chai, baksheesh, mordida, or dash) are still
essential for success in dealing with the administrative system in many countries.

Compare in 6
Five Styles of Administration
For many people in the most advanced democra- rental car, you are sorry, and you are a friendly tour-
cies, the words bureaucracy and bureaucratic have a ist! What happens next? Here are five alternatives:
negative connotation, as in “that is so bureaucratic!”
Bureaucracy is only one style of the administrative 1. The officer listens patiently. Your pleading makes
function. While its rigid, rule-following approach can no difference. She explains that Rule 3.207 of the
seem mechanical and inefficient, let’s compare it to Vehicle Code governs this case—you are traveling
four alternative styles of administration by exploring more than 10 kph over the posted limit. The rules
variations on a single scenario: state that you must follow her to the local judge’s
You are driving in another country and are given office, pay a fine of 125 rupesas, and you will then
a ticket for speeding—driving 80 kilometers per hour be free to continue your journey. The judge is also
(kph) in a 40 kph zone. You plead your case to the unmoved by your arguments, repeating that the
traffic officer: You are unfamiliar with the metric sys- law is clear. You pay the 125 rupesa fine and you
tem, you don’t understand how to read the traffic leave. This is a classic case of Weberian bureau-
signs, you can’t figure out the speedometer in this cracy in action: There are explicit rules, and you
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 153

are merely a case in which all the representatives 4. When you try your arguments on the traffic
of the organization apply the rules exactly and with officer, she notices your foreign accent. Where
no consideration of your personal circumstances. are you from, she asks? You say, I am from the
2. When you plead your case, the officer seems United States! She frowns and mutters that
sympathetic. She says that she understands Americans need to be taught a lesson. In front of
how tourists might be confused by the rules in the judge, you are asked your religion, and reply
her country and that she will reduce the reported that you are a Protestant. The judge responds:
speed on the ticket from 80 kph to 60 kph, which “Do you know this is a Catholic country and we
will result in only a 50 rupesa fine. You try your believe in following the rules? Your fine is 175
pleas again with the judge, promising to obey rupesas.” You have a sense that if you had been
the all the country’s laws. The judge senses your from a different country or were Catholic, you
contrition and suspends the fine, after giving you might have gotten off easier. In this situation of
a stern warning. You leave quickly, before any- discriminatory administration, you might be right.
one reconsiders. This is humane administration In cases of discriminatory administration, the
because those with authority do not merely apply authorities treat people differently on the basis
the rules—they try to understand your personal of their ethnicity, religion, gender, social class,
circumstances and adjust their actions to be or some other marker that distinguishes among
responsive to your particular situation. Humane groups. Unfortunately, in this situation, you are
administration seems preferable to the bureau- in groups that are not favored.
cratic style; however, once the rules are no lon- 5. After the officer listens impassively to your plead-
ger applied impersonally and predictably, other ings, she tells you that things will not go well with
styles (numbers 3–5 below) are much more likely. the judge. You will pay a very big fine of about 250
3. When none of your arguments work with the rupesas and might go to jail because you were
officer, you point out that other cars were pass- traveling over 150 kph. You are stunned by these
ing you just before you were stopped. Why you? “facts” and scared, but decide to take a risk. As
The officer just shrugs. At the judge’s office, your you hand your license to the officer, you also fold
arguments again are ineffective. The judge then a 50 rupesa note underneath the license. The
announces your fine is 200 rupesas. You are officer examines your license and hands it back
shocked and say that the traffic officer said that to you, but the 50 rupesa note is gone. She says
the fine would be about 125 rupesas. The judge if you pay a 60 rupesa fine on the spot, you will
looks sternly at you, and responds that the fine is not need to go before the judge. You hand over
whatever she decides it should be. Did you want another 60 rupesas. She returns to her motor-
to question her decision? If so, she might have to cycle and rides off. This is corrupt administration.
increase the fine even further. Or perhaps you’d There are many ways in which bribes are solicited,
like to spend the night in jail, thinking about your collected, and distributed in such systems. If you
dangerous driving? You flinch, pay, and get out are lucky, you’ll handle the bribe transaction suc-
of the building as fast as you can. This is arbitrary cessfully and not end up in jail.
administration. You are singled out for ticketing
among others who are equally guilty. Why? You
are given a higher fine than stated in the rules.
Further Questions
Why? The answer is that those with authority can 1. How could a non-Weberian bureaucracy
use their discretion to decide when and how to operate like number 2 above without significant
administer the rules. Discretion worked in your risk of becoming one of the less desirable
favor under humane administration, but in arbi- approaches (3, 4, or 5)?
trary administration, you are just as likely to be 2. Why is corrupt administration probable in many
placed at a disadvantage by flexible, unpredict- countries, especially those with lower levels of
able and non-rule-following actions. individual wealth?
154 Chapter 6

Judiciaries
6.4 outline the major elements within judicial systems.
In a Hobbesian state of nature (see Chapter 2), disputes among people would normally
be resolved by force or the threat of force. In such a setting, “might makes right.” Thus,
a primary reason for the social contract is to authorize the state to intervene in the
potential and actual disputes among individuals and groups by creating and enforcing
rules regarding proper forms of behavior. Every society holds that those who violate
its rules and laws (i.e., its policies) must be sanctioned. The specific rules in a given
society emerge from its unique culture, history, and politics. However, in all legal
systems there are usually ambiguities regarding the rules:

What does the rule mean?

Has a rule been violated?
Who are the “guilty” actors?
How serious is the offense?
What sanctions are appropriate?

These kinds of ambiguities are resolved through the adjudication function in every
political system. Most political systems have established judicial structures whose pri-
mary role is adjudication.

Aspects of Adjudication
The adjudication function attempts to interpret and apply the relevant rules or laws to a
given situation, addressing the five questions above. There are several different types
of laws. When the issue involves civil law—the rules regarding relations between
private actors (individuals or groups)—the main objective of adjudication is to settle
the dispute. Examples include the rules dealing with divorce, contracts, and personal
liability litigation.
The situation involves criminal law when an individual or group behaves in a
manner interpreted as an offense against the social order. Here, adjudication can be
an important mechanism of social control. Examples of offenses are murder, substance
abuse, theft, bribery, extortion, and environmental pollution. The state represents the
public interest and enforces the social contract, ensuring that the relations among
actors are within the boundaries of acceptable social behavior. Just as the definition
and scope of res publica differ greatly across political systems, the definition of accept-
able social behavior varies dramatically. In some countries, social control entails little
more than regulation of violent behavior among people. In contrast, other countries
might enforce rules that prohibit spanking one’s child or wearing certain clothing.
Adjudication can also consider cases involving constitutional, administrative, or
statutory law. Here, the activities center on arbitration regarding the behavior of the political
system itself. The main issues for adjudication involve questions about the legitimate
domain of action by a governmental actor in its relations with other governmental
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 155

units or private actors. Such a dispute might concern a highly technical disagreement
over the implementation of a specific policy (e.g., is a person with vision correctable
to 20/400 qualified to receive state-subsidized services intended for the “visually
impaired”?), or it might raise fundamental constitutional questions about the distribu-
tion of political power (e.g., can the chief executive seize control of an industry in the
absence of authorization from the constitution or legislature?).
Finally, international law is comprised of the rules that attempt to prevent and resolve
disputes between states or other global actors. Adjudication entails interpreting written
agreements about interactions that cross state borders or laws formulated by interna-
tional legal bodies such as the International Court of Justice within the United Nations.
As Chapter 11 will detail, there are substantial difficulties in enforcing international
law, especially when a state determines that the law is not in its national interest.

Judicial Structures
Most political systems have specialized structures of the judiciary—the system of courts
and personnel that determines whether the rules of the society have been transgressed and, if so,
whether sanctions ought to be imposed on the transgressor. (Some broad definitions of judi-
cial structures even include agencies of law enforcement, such as police and security
forces, as well as agencies that apply sanctions against rule breakers, such as prisons,
although in this book these are considered administrative structures.)
While there are significant crossnational variations, most political systems have a
hierarchical system of judicial structures, with appeal processes possible from lower-
to higher-level courts. The United States has one of the world’s most complex judicial
structures, with its Supreme Court and extensive system of federal, state, and local
courts, including judges, prosecuting attorneys, defense attorneys for the indigent, court
clerks, and so on. Most judicial systems also have subsystems that are responsible for
different aspects of adjudication. For example, the French judicial structure separates the
criminal and civil law system from a second system that handles administrative law. In
Ukraine, one major system handles criminal and civil law, and a second major system
is composed of special prosecutors who monitor actions in all types of cases and who
can challenge, retry, or even withdraw cases from the regular courts. In Great Britain,
one major judicial system is responsible for criminal law and a second handles civil law.
Among the contemporary countries that do not have judicial structures as part
of the government are the Islamic countries that adhere to sharia law. Sharia is the
divine law, detailed in the Koran and further elaborated in the hadith, the teachings of
Muhammad. It is sharia, not the laws of humans, that is the dominant judicial frame-
work in countries such as Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Sudan. The Koran prescribes all
aspects of social, spiritual, and moral life. As part of that prescription, the sections
on law provide the details of what in Western jurisprudence includes criminal law,
civil law, and administrative law. Sharia is applied by religious courts, and the punish-
ments for many violations of the law are specified in the Koran.
The constitutions of many states include provisions meant to create an indepen-
dent judiciary. The notion that a judicial system is independent means that the judicial
156 Chapter 6

actors are not under the direct control of any other political structure. It does not mean
that the judiciary is apolitical. The legal system and the set of judicial structures in every
political system are political. Adjudication, by its very nature, entails crucial decisions
that distribute values and shape meanings for a society. Also, the judicial officials in
most systems are either appointed by those with political power or elected in a politi-
cal process by the voters.
The judiciary in some political systems has the substantial power to exercise
judicial review, whereby judicial structures establish the final interpretation of what the
constitution and the laws mean, including the right to reinterpret, revoke, or overrule the
policy decisions of the other political structures, including the executive, the legislature,
and the administrative branches. About 1 in 10 states has a strong system of judicial
review, including Canada, Colombia, Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Mexico, Norway,
Switzerland, and the United States. Research has revealed that judicial structures in
many advanced democracies have exercised increasing power to redefine and overturn
the actions of the other branches (Koopmans 2003: Ch. 4). Increasingly, international
courts, like the European Court of Justice, are also exercising this type of institutional
power and growth (Stone Sweet 2004; Stone Sweet and Brunell 2012). The Debate in 6
questions whether such judicial review is consistent with democratic premises.
However, even when judicial structures do strive to maintain some politi-
cal independence, they still might respond to external pressure. First, the judicia-
ries in nearly all contemporary states are ultimately dependent on other political

The Debate in 6
Is Judicial Review Democratic?
In essence, judicial review means that the judiciary Judicial Review Is Undemocratic
has the right not only to interpret what a particular rule
• The hallmark of representative democracy is that
means but also to assess the constitutional legitimacy
those who have great power over the laws of the
of any law enacted by the legislature or any policy
society should have a direct mandate from the
action implemented by the executive or the adminis-
people by means of election. Yet in most coun-
tration. The judiciary can uphold the authority of the
tries, the judges who exercise the extraordinary
government regarding the policy, or it can rule that the
power of judicial review are not elected by the
government’s action violates fundamental laws, espe-
people. Thus, Alexander Bickel (1962), a distin-
cially the constitution. Currently, more than half the
guished professor at Yale Law School, argues
world’s democratic countries have some form of broad
that judicial review is undemocratic because “it
judicial review. It can be a key method of ensuring
thwarts the will of representatives of the actual
there is a strong countervailing power that prevents the
people of the here and now; it exercises con-
legislature, executive, and administration from over-
trol, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but
stepping their authority. However, some critics argue
against it.”
that essential features of judicial review are actually
inconsistent with the basic values and principles of a • High court judges making these decisions cannot
democratic society. Is judicial review democratic? be held accountable because they usually serve
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 157

for life and cannot be removed from office except officials, whose power is based on popular con-
in extraordinary circumstances (i.e., impeach- sent. Thus, empowering appointed judges is
ment). Thus citizens have almost no capacity to fully consistent with democratic principles.
replace the judges who make fundamental deci- • Once appointed, high court judges are indepen-
sions about the restraints on the rulers or the rights dent of those in other powerful roles in the politi-
of the ruled, a hallmark element of democracy cal system. Unlike most other political actors in
(see Chapter 7). Indeed, “the people” have no sig- a democracy, judges engaged in judicial review
nificant influence on either what cases the judges do not need to curry favor to raise money for
consider or the decisions that the judges make. reelection and they have no need to compromise
• Crucial interpretations and decisions can hinge their positions to make deals with others in the
on a bare majority vote by a tiny number of political system. Thus, they are able to make
people. The highest constitutional court in most reasoned interpretations of the fundamental
countries makes decisions by simple majority, laws of the land and rule on specific actions by
with fewer than 15 judges. In the United States, the other branches of government, based solely
for example, fundamental judicial rulings are on the constitutional merits of the case.
made by only five members of the Supreme • A just democracy must be guided not only by
Court, even when four of their colleagues on the majority rule but also by a commitment to protect
court completely disagree with them. the rights of the individual and minorities against
• Even if the judges truly are independent (which a “tyranny of the majority.” An independent judi-
is questionable), the grounds for a decision in ciary, including judicial review, is a key element in
cases of judicial review can be highly subjective. such protection. In making decisions on consti-
There can be deep disagreements among the tutional rights of the weak as well as the strong,
judges about how the basic legal documents of these judges are not pressured or constrained
the society should be interpreted and applied to by the current whims of the electoral majority
specific cases. because they do not need to stand for reelection.
• In short, crucial rulings about actions by the gov- • In Federalist Paper No. 78, Alexander Hamilton
ernment are made when a handful of unelected (2007) explains that judicial power does not “by
and unaccountable individuals use their subjec- any means suppose a superiority of the judicial
tive reasoning to offer a contested interpretation to the legislative power. It only supposes that
of documents and statutes that can be genera- the power of the people is superior to both; and
tions old. And “the people,” the elected chief that where the will of the legislature, declared in
executive, and the elected national legislature its statutes, stands in opposition to that of the
have no recourse but to accept this judgment people, declared in the Constitution, the judges
(Waldron 2006). What could be more undemo- ought to be governed by the latter rather than
cratic in a democratic society? the former. They ought to regulate their deci-
sions by the fundamental laws.”
Judicial Review Supports Democratic • In most democracies, the judges engaged in
Processes judicial review are highly qualified legal experts.
• In representative democracies, supreme power They generally have years of experience in the
rests with the citizens, who then exercise that legal system, and their judicial decisions are
power to elect officials to serve them. Those bound by the statutes and by precedent. While
officials, in turn, appoint many others to play they might occasionally disagree on the inter-
important roles in governance. Even in coun- pretation of a constitutional issue, most of their
tries where top judicial officials are appointed, decisions are by clear and unambiguous majori-
their authority is derived directly from the elected ties and reflect shared analyses.
158 Chapter 6

More questions… 3. If courts could not engage in judicial review,

would judges simply become the agents of the
1. In a democracy, is it acceptable to have power-
other political actors in the system?
ful decision makers who are neither elected by
4. How does the considerable distance between
nor directly accountable to the citizens?
the people and the highest judges in the
2. Might there be any serious problems if the bind-
judicial branch serve as an advantage?
ing interpretation of the constitution is made by
A disadvantage?
elected officials?

structures, especially the executive and the administration, to enforce their deci-
sions. Second, when judicial officials displease the dominant power group, they
can often be ignored, replaced, diluted, or even eliminated. In an extreme example,
more than 150 high-level Argentine judges “disappeared” during the 1970s, and it
is speculated that the Argentine government ordered their executions. In the United
States, President Franklin D. Roosevelt became frustrated with decisions by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1930s when it blocked his New Deal legislation expanding gov-
ernment policies in response to the Great Depression. He threatened to add members
to the nine-member Supreme Court to get favorable decisions, but Congress did not
support his threat. However, the Court did begin to rule favorably on his legislation.
While it cannot be proven empirically that Roosevelt’s threat to increase the size of
the Court changed the judicial reasoning of the justices, it was punned at the time
that “a switch in time saved nine.”
Third, because the people in top judicial positions have usually been socialized
by those in the culture’s dominant socioeconomic groups, they are likely to share
the values of those groups when they make judgments. Thus, one key consideration
regarding an independent judiciary is assessing the extent to which the judicial struc-
tures make decisions and take actions that are not substantially influenced by their
shared political orientations with and dependence on other powerful social, economic,
and political structures in the society. While the rituals of the judicial structures offer
the appearance of protecting impartial justice, the reality is that the judicial structures
in many, perhaps most, countries serve the interests of the political and economic elite
and that a truly independent judiciary is a rarity.

Styles of Adjudication
Among the many styles of adjudicating disputes, several are prevalent. The common
law tradition is grounded in the general laws and rules that have been enacted by
legislatures and have evolved over time. The key goal of the legal system is to interpret
existing precedents from previous judicial rulings. Innocence is presumed until evi-
dence indicates guilt. The court system is adversarial, with the disputing sides making
their points and the judge acting as a referee to ensure that the proceedings are fair.
The common law style emerged in England and was generally adopted in countries
strongly influenced by Britain or the United States.
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 159

In the civil law tradition, the key goal is the precise application of extremely
detailed legal documents to the specific case. The court system is more inquisitional,
with the judge asking critical questions under the assumption that the party on trial is
guilty of violating the law unless innocence can be proven. This system is associated
with the legal approaches of ancient Rome and also France, with its development of
the Napoleonic code. It is generally adopted in Continental Europe and the countries
emerging from its colonial influence as well as many former communist countries. It is
arguable that Sharia law is similar to civil law in its style of adjudication, although the
laws of Sharia, as noted above, were promulgated by religious authorities, not legisla-
tures and administrations as in civil law.
A third style of adjudication might be termed dispute resolution. Here, the goal
is to find a ruling that is generally acceptable to all sides. Such an outcome might be
based on negotiations led by a third-party arbitrator who works to develop a satisfac-
tory compromise between the disputants. This third party might be appointed by the
political system or might be respected members of the community. This style has been
especially effective in some Arab and sub-Saharan African societies, and many coun-
tries attempt to handle some legal cases through dispute resolution approaches.

Concluding Observations
Traditional political science assumed that a detailed description of political structures
is the best way to explain how politics works. But empirical research revealed consid-
erable diversity in the roles of particular political structures. Key political functions
might occur in a wide variety of structures inside and outside the formal governmen-
tal arrangements. In response, there was a period during which political structures
were viewed as so malleable that most analyses treated them as secondary elements,
merely forming one of the contexts in which various political, economic, and social
groups maneuver as they pursue their interests. More recently, many scholars have
reemphasized the importance of institutional arrangements. For these “new institu-
tionalists,” the particular configuration of political structures and rules can powerfully
shape political actions and outcomes (March 2006; Bell 2011). And for the “neostat-
ists,” the structures of the state—its institutional arrangements, the actors who have
major roles in its institutions, and its policy activities—are autonomous and have
fundamental impacts on political, economic, and social processes.
Thus, precise, behaviorally oriented and process-based analyses of politics now
treat political structures more richly. In brief, institutions matter because they set
the rules and roles of political behavior and interaction. A full understanding of the
political world requires a clear grasp of the essential features of executive, legisla-
tive, administrative, and judicial structures. Institutional structures are the skeleton
and organs of the body politic. Just as one could explain certain biological functions
and processes of the body without explicit reference to the skeleton and organs, one
could explain certain functions and processes of the political system without refer-
ence to structures. But such an abstract description of a biological organism would be
160 Chapter 6

incomplete without indicating the way in which the structures constrain and shape
the functions. Similarly, attempts to describe or explain politics, especially in actual
settings, are much richer and more complete if they include a characterization of how
key political institutions constrain and shape the political process (March and Olsen
1989; Lewis and Steinmo 2012). The next chapter will take us further in understanding
political institutions as it analyzes how some of the key institutional structures interact
to produce different forms of the body politic.

Key Concepts
adjudication, p. 154 executive, p. 137 ombudsman, p. 147
administration, p. 150 fused executive, p. 140 plurality voting, p. 144
bicameral legislature, p. 148 head of government, p. 139 political institutions, p. 137
bureaucracy, p. 152 head of state, p. 139 proportional representation, PR,
civil law, p. 159 international law, p. 155 p. 144
common law, p. 158 judicial review, p. 156 representation, p. 143
dispute resolution, p. 159 judiciary, p. 155 unicameral legislature,
dual executive, p. 139 legislature, p. 142 p. 148

For Further Consideration

1. Whom should a legislator represent on that is flexible and is sensitive to unique,
policy decisions? Develop an argument individual circumstances in the handling of
justifying the order of importance you attri- each case (that is, does not follow the prin-
bute to representing the following entities: ciples of a Weberian bureaucracy).
those groups who voted for the legislator, 3. The discussion of the judiciary asserts that
the constituency, the legislative coalition, the every set of judicial structures is political.
political party, the party leader, the national- Is the notion of an independent judiciary a
sham?
ity group, the country, the legislator’s own
best judgment. 4. What are the benefits and shortcomings of a
2. Evaluate whether, on balance, it would be political system that has a weak chief execu-
desirable to have an administrative system tive? A fused chief executive?

For Further Reading

bishin, benjamin g. (2009). Tyranny of the sophisticated book presents a vigorous explo-
Minority: The Subconstituency Politics ration of the logic of representation.
Theory of Representation. Philadelphia: derbyshire, denis, with ian derbyshire. (2000).
temple university Press. Why do minorities Encyclopedia of World Political Systems. new
sometimes get their way over majority pref- york: m. e. sharpe. A useful inventory (circa
erences? This careful and methodologically 2000) of the forms of contemporary political
 Political Institutions I: Institutional Structures 161

institutions, as well as detailed descriptions of Koopmans, tim. (2003). Courts and Political
each national political system. Institutions: A Comparative View. cambridge:
ginsburg, tom, and rosalind dixon. eds. cambridge university Press. Koopmans, a for-
(2013). Comparative Constitutional Law. mer law professor and judge in the European
northampton, mA: edward elgar. This com- Union, offers a persuasive analysis of the
prehensive (780 pages) and costly volume increasing power of the courts to engage in
offers thoughtful essays on the nature of judicial decision making and to exercise influ-
constitutional law, including current debates ence and control over the actions of other
regarding such topics as constitutional design, political structures. The cases of Britain, France,
human rights, and judicial review. Germany, and the United States are at the center
gormley, William t., and steven J. balla. (2012). of the study, but other constitutional court sys-
Bureaucracy and Democracy: Accountability tems are also examined.
and Performance. Washington, dc: sage. How martin, shane, thomas saalfeld, and Kaare
can you evaluate the accountability of the bureau- strøm, eds. (2013). The Oxford Handbook
cracy? The authors explore how democracies of Legislative Studies. oxford: oxford
ensure proper administration, using approaches university Press. A comprehensive set of
such as bounded rationality, principal–agent recent analyses of legislative systems and
theory, interest group mobilization, and network processes with comparative and case study
theory. examples from many countries.
helmke, gretchen. (2012). Courts under norris, Pippa. (2004). Electoral Engineering:
Constraints: Judges, Generals, and Presidents Voting Rules and Political Behavior.
in Argentina. cambridge: cambridge cambridge: cambridge university Press. A
university Press. This case study asks: When creative scholar considers the impacts of the
a democracy is unstable or collapsing, how various electoral systems with survey data and
do courts secure their institutional capacity to other empirical evidence from 32 countries.
sustain the rule of law? She assesses whether, given political culture,
Jackson, donald W., michael c. tolley, and such engineering of institutional arrange-
mary L. volcansek, eds. (2010). Globalizing ments can influence such political behaviors
Justice: Critical Perspectives on Transnational as voting, the building of social capital, and
Law and the Cross-Border Migration of Legal democratic accountability
Norms. Albany, ny: suny Press. This edited osborne, david, and ted gaebler. (1993).
volume examines the effect of globalization on Reinventing Government. new york: Penguin.
judicial systems and courts in both the Global An influential critique of large, bureaucratic
North and Global South. government and a framework (using exam-
Kelleman, r. daniel. (2011). Eurolegalism: The ples from the United States) of how to make
Transformation of Law and Regulation in government (and especially the administrative
the European Union. cambridge: harvard system) more responsive and entrepreneurial.
university Press. The EU’s fragmented insti- Peters, b. guy. (2015). The Politics of Bureaucracy:
tutional structure and prioritization of market A Comparative Perspective. 7th ed. new york:
integration has led to political incentives and Routledge. A rich, analytic comparison of the
functional pressures to enact transparent and behavior and power of bureaucracies in many
judicially enforceable rules. This has opened a countries.
floodgate of public and private litigation as the Pitkin, hannah f. (1972). The Concept of
rules are framed as rights. Representation. berkeley: university of
162 Chapter 6

california Press. A thorough descrip- of the U.S. Supreme Court during the recent
tive and normative exploration of political period.
representation. von mettenheim, Kurt, and bert rockman,
sparrow, malcolm K. (2000). The Regulatory eds. (1997). Presidential Institutions and
Craft: Controlling Risks, Solving Problems, Democratic Politics: Comparing Regional and
and Managing Compliance. Washington, National Contexts. baltimore: Johns hopkins
dc: brookings institution. Writing as much university Press. A collection of essays,
for those who work in the public service as some written from a comparative perspec-
for scholars, Sparrow offers a positive and tive and others focused on a single country,
persuasive argument in support of administra- that examines the behaviors and institutional
tive regulation, detailing the role of regulators frameworks of top executives.
as important innovators and protectors of the Wilson, James Q. (1991). Bureaucracy: What
public interest within the policy process. Government Agencies Do and Why They Do
toobin, Jeffrey. (2008). The Nine: Inside the It. new york: basic books. An interesting
Secret World of the Supreme Court. new york: analysis of the performance of the U.S. nation-
Anchor. A readable and fascinating description al administration, identifying both the values
of the inner workings, politics, and personalities and the flaws of the system.

On the Web
http://www.gksoft.com/govt/en and judicial branches of the U.S. government,
Governments on the Web provides a compre- respectively.
hensive database of governmental institutions http://www.fedworld.ntis.gov
on the Internet. The site contains 17,000 entries This site provides a huge central informa-
from 220 different countries. Most of the infor- tion network of the U.S. federal government,
mation is accurate, although there have been with searchable access to agencies and depart-
no updates for a decade. ments, documents, databases, and so on. It is a
http://www.gov.uk/en/index.htm comprehensive site for searching for, locating,
Directgov is the official Web portal of the ordering, and acquiring government and busi-
government of the United Kingdom, and it ness information.
provides extensive details about all the major http://www.thisnation.com
political institutions and government agen- This electronic textbook provides an in-depth
cies. The majority of the world’s countries now look at U.S. politics and includes links to other
have an official Web portal like this. They can U.S. government–related Internet resources.
usually be located by entering “Countryname” http://www.usa.gov
and “government portal” on a search engine. The U.S. government’s official Web portal pro-
(For example, Canada is: http://www.canada. vides a wealth of government-related material,
gc.ca/home.html.) including access to the Internet sites of every
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/legbranch/cis.html major U.S. government agency.
http://www.loc.gov/rr/news/fedgov.html http://lcweb.loc.gov/rr/news/extgovd.html
http://www.uscourts.gov This site allows you to browse through
These three Library of Congress sites provide Library of Congress electronic government
information about the legislative, executive, resources.
Chapter 7
Political Institutions II:
Institutional
Arrangements

Learning Objectives
7.1 Assess the impact of written constitutions on regimes.
7.2 Distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic political systems.
7.3 Compare and contrast unitary, federal, and confederal systems.
7.4 Differentiate between parliamentary, presidential, and other types of
executive-legislative systems.
7.5 Characterize the different types of political party systems.

Thomas Jefferson once observed that true democracy can only grow on fertile soil. The
“soil” needs to be enriched with certain elements. There needs to be tolerance (and
ideally cooperation) among different factions in the country; there needs to be an effec-
tive structure of authority and governance; and perhaps most importantly, the people
need to trust in government and in one another. It might be that a reasonable level of
economic prosperity is also an important nutrient. Without these elements—without
a fertile soil—a democracy cannot thrive. Iraq is among the countries currently strug-
gling to find that mix of elements.
Iraq was fashioned out of parts of Mesopotamia and Kurdistan by the British,
who faced an immediate rebellion and installed an outsider from Mecca to be king in
1921. Deeply split into three nations (the Shias, the Sunnis, and the Kurds), Iraq was
the first Arab state to overthrow its leader by a military coup, in 1936. Despotic politi-
cal leadership continued during the brutal rule of President Saddam Hussein, from
1979 to 2003. When the United States led an invasion into Iraq searching for weapons
of mass destruction and overthrew Hussein, Iraq was left without a government. The

163
164 Chapter 7

The family that votes together…Iraqis show their inked fingers signifying they have voted in the
parliamentary elections in April 2014.

United States insisted that the Iraqis establish a democratic government. But could a
country with a history of nationality differences and tyranny be rapidly transformed
into a democracy?
Having no recent experience with government transparency, free elections,
competitive political parties, or peaceful turnovers of power, the Iraqis had no foun-
dation upon which to build a Western-style democracy. The democratic institutions
like those discussed in Chapter 6 were not in place. The United States established
a transitional government in 2003 and pressured the Iraqis to move forward with a
version of democracy envisioned by the foreign power by offering substantial aid
and military support. Despite continued violence and volatile relations among dif-
ferent groups in Iraq, a constitution was ratified by a national vote in October 2005.
The new Iraqi government is defined in the constitution as a parliamentary democ-
racy, with a legislature elected by proportional representation. The executive branch
is a hybrid headed by a prime minister, a president, and a presidency council. Iraq is
a federation with 18 provinces and a system of local governments. There is a national
judiciary guided by both civil law and sharia law (since Islam is the state religion).
In the 2010 election for the 325-member legislature, more than 450 candidates were
not allowed to run because they were linked to the banned Ba’athist (Sunni) Party
and the election was tainted by considerable voter fraud. It then took eight months to
fashion a governing coalition due to continued disagreements among the major par-
ties. That government was controlled by the Shias, who used their majority status to
marginalize the Sunnis, the group who had dominated and repressed them during the
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 165

Saddam Hussein regime. But the new national government could not deliver on secu-
rity or economic growth. In the face of continuing violence and political instability, the
Kurds successfully pushed for regional autonomy.
The violence was further complicated by the emergence of Islamic State, a brutal
insurgency group whose goal is to establish a fundamentalist state (a caliphate) in
Iraq, Syria, and beyond. Armed resistance to IS comes from the Iraqi army, Shia mili-
tias, and Kurdish militias.
In the 2014 elections, nearly 400 candidates were prevented from running and
more than 250 political groups ran candidates. After the election, the politicians did
produce an inclusive coalition government that includes Shias, Sunnis and Kurds. Yet
Iraq remains a troubled land of guerrilla warfare, suicide bombings, executions, and
other forms of brutality.
Most see a half-full, half-empty glass of democracy in Iraq. On the one hand, the
Iraqis have a sound constitution and have implemented all the appropriate political
institutions for democratic governance, including elections. On the other hand, the
government lacks credibility with many citizens and has not been particularly effective
in enacting and implementing policies, and intergroup violence continues to (literally)
explode in Iraq on almost a daily basis. This complex “soil” of instability, ongoing group
strife, difficult living conditions, economic stress, and poor government performance
has not resulted in the levels of trust, tolerance, and well-being that seem necessary to
nurture the young democracy in the near future.
Chapter 6 provided us with a clearer grasp of each of the four major institutional
structures in political systems. While all are in place now in Iraq, they have not yet
delivered prosperity, stability, or security. It is evident that it is valuable to seek
a deeper understanding of how these institutions and other structural elements
interact in the pursuit of fundamental goals. Thus, this chapter takes us further in
exploring the various ways in which these institutional structures and other key ele-
ments of governance are arranged across different countries. We will examine the
role of the constitution, the continuum from democratic to nondemocratic regimes,
the distribution of power between central and peripheral governments, the various
patterns of executive–legislative relations, and the types of party systems.

Constitutions and Constitutional

Regimes
7.1 Assess the impact of written constitutions on regimes.

Constitutions
In Iraq, a central element in framing the government’s institutional arrangements is
a constitution, a set of statements describing the fundamental rules of the political system.
The constitution declares the existence of the state, and it expresses three crucial sets
166 Chapter 7

of rules. First, the constitution allocates governmental activities, defining what actions
are within the domain of res publica and what political structures will perform these
various functions. Second, it establishes the formal power relationships among the
major political institutions, indicating the conditions under which each is independent
of or dependent on the actions of the others. Third, the constitution limits the power
of the rulers and guarantees the rights of the ruled by defining the maximum extent
of the state’s authority over its citizens and by enumerating citizens’ freedoms and
benefits from the state.
The drafting of every constitution is either directly or indirectly controlled by
those with political power in the society. Constitutions reflect the political bargains
that are struck at the time of their drafting. Many groups in a society—leaders, courts,
political parties, interest groups—might offer interpretations of what the constitution
means and how it ought to be applied to particular circumstances. Ultimately, the
force of the constitution depends on the will of those with political power to enforce
its provisions and the willingness of the citizenry to accept it as a legitimate blueprint
for governance.
Most constitutions are a single written document, like the Iraq Constitution.
However, a few political systems do not have such a document; their fundamental
rules are embedded in major statutes, precedents, and legal decisions, as in Great
Britain’s “unwritten constitution” or in Israel’s “basic laws.” While early constitu-
tions tended to be relatively short and general, some postcolonial constitutions are
quite detailed. The Nigerian Constitution has 320 articles, and the Indian Constitution
has 395 articles. The language of constitutions is also becoming increasingly simi-
lar because drafters liberally borrow ideas and even specific language from other
countries. For example, more than three dozen countries have borrowed Abraham
Lincoln’s felicitous phrasing regarding government “of the people, by the people, and
for the people.”
Although the idea of a constitution has a certain timeless quality, the constitu-
tions of political systems are always changeable. Most countries periodically alter
their constitutions. For example, India has added more than 100 amendments to its
constitution since 1950. And at some point, many countries have abandoned their
existing constitutions and ratified new ones in an attempt to rejuvenate their political
systems. In a typical year, between three and seven countries ratify a new constitu-
tion. In 2013, it was Fiji, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. The process does not always suc-
ceed. In 2005, Kenyan citizens rejected a new constitution proposed by then-President
Mwai Kibaki. In 2007, Venezuelans rejected a bundle of 33 major amendments to the
constitution proposed by then President Hugo Chavez. And, although the parliament
of the European Union adopted a new constitution in 2004, some key member states
(e.g., France and the Netherlands) have subsequently voted against ratification.
A country’s constitution does not necessarily provide a description of how the
political system actually works. As you will read below, the reality of politics in many
countries is dramatically at odds with the vision in their constitutions. Yet a constitu-
tion can be a very significant document. Even if the state makes major diversions from
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 167

its constitution’s provisions, the constitution remains a moral yardstick against which
to measure actual performance, and it is a persistent reminder of the high ideals and
goals that have been set for the political system.

Constitutional Regimes
It is useful to analyze the extent to which a political system generally abides by the
provisions in its constitution. A constitutional regime operates in terms of the rule of
law and ensures effective restraints on the power holders, as defined within the constitu-
tion. The defining feature of a constitutional regime is that the state attempts to fulfill
the provisions of its constitution. A political system becomes more fully a constitu-
tional regime to the extent that it abides by the three sets of crucial rules described
above. In the short run, at least, those who have political power in the society greatly
influence the interpretation of the constitution and how the constitution’s provisions
will be implemented (Law and Versteeg 2011). In constitutional regimes, these inter-
pretations are generally reasonable and judicious, and the implementation is fair
(Sunstein 2001).
Among constitutional regimes, it is not always the case that compliance with
the rules is complete. Disagreements over interpretation of the constitution occur,
practice and precedent can result in a gap between the rules and standard practice,
and political actors sometimes willfully bend the rules to serve their agendas. Even
the limits on the rulers and the rights of the citizens are not absolute and are not
absolutely implemented. For example, Article 10 of the French Constitution guaran-
tees freedom of religious practice, but the courts have ruled that current legislation
preventing French (Muslim) women from wearing a burqa in public is an accept-
able limit on their rights. Also, some states implement a “temporary” suspension of
major constitutional provisions in response to circumstances that seriously threaten
the stability of the society.
Thus, regimes range on a continuum and are less constitutional when the dispar-
ity becomes larger between the provisions in the constitution and the actual politics
of the society. In theory, at least, a state could scrupulously follow a repressive and
undemocratic constitution imposed by the political leadership and be labeled a con-
stitutional regime. Saudi Arabia might be an example of this, given its adherence to
authoritarian “basic laws” and sharia.

Nonconstitutional Regimes
Hence, in a nonconstitutional regime, the structural arrangements of the constitution are
not generally upheld and there are few restraints on those with political power. Almost every
political system occasionally violates or ignores some principle in its constitution. But
the regime can be called nonconstitutional when there is persistent nonenforcement
or disregard of constitutional provisions, especially those regarding the rights of the
ruled or crucial limits on the rulers.
168 Chapter 7

Various sets of conditions can result in a nonconstitutional regime. First, leaders

in some political systems simply ignore with impunity the basic rules in the constitu-
tion (e.g., Myanmar, Vietnam). Second, in some countries (e.g., Congo, Somalia), the
rule of law collapses because the social order disintegrates through severe political
violence or natural catastrophe. And third, there are instances when either the entire
constitution or major constitutional rights are suspended “temporarily” but then are
not restored for a lengthy period. In Israel, for example, this temporary suspension of
constitutional rights (there is no written constitution) has persisted since its indepen-
dence in 1948.

Democracies and Nondemocracies

7.2 Distinguish between democratic and nondemocratic political systems.
Another taxonomy for classifying political systems is to specify the extent to which
their institutional arrangements are democratic. “Democracy” is arguably the most
ideologically loaded concept in any discussion about politics and governance. How do
we define democracy? Here is a multiple-choice question version:
We know that all political systems are not democracies. But what does con-
stitute a democracy? From our education, as well as from our other socialization
and experiences, most of us have an intuitive sense about which countries are
democracies and which are not. However, the concept can become slippery when
we try to apply it. North Korea calls itself the Democratic People’s Republic. Is it?
Sri Lanka calls itself the Democratic Socialist Republic. Is it? Egypt, France, Kenya,
and Venezuela also consider themselves democracies. Are they? Democracy has
become such a highly valued label that most states, except a few systems ruled by a

Democracy is:

(a) an agreeable, lawless . . . commonwealth, dealing with all alike on a footing of equality,
whether they be really equal or not.
—(Plato, ca. 427–347 b.c.e., Greek philosopher)
(b) the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good
and hard.
—(H. L. Mencken, 1880–1956, U.S. journalist [Mencken 1916: 19])
(c) a system where no man is good enough to govern another man without that other’s
consent.
—(Abraham Lincoln, 1809–1865, U.S. president)
(d) the substitution of election by the incompetent many for appointment by the corrupt few.
—(George Bernard Shaw [1903/2001], 1856–1950, Anglo-Irish playwright)
(e) all of the above.
(f) none of the above.
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 169

hereditary monarch, claim that they are democratic. Is almost every contemporary
political system to be called a democracy? If not, what general label do you give
to countries that are not democratic? Dictatorship? Tyranny? Totalitarian regime?
Authoritarian system?
Suppose you were to determine which of a group of countries were democracies.
How would you proceed?
One approach is to distinguish democracies from nondemocracies. While we
work toward acceptable definitions and labels, let’s start by considering dictator-
ship as the opposite of democracy. To begin to clarify your thinking, use your current
understanding of democracy and dictatorship to classify these seven political systems:
Algeria, Cuba, Japan, Kuwait, Singapore, the United States, and Zimbabwe. If you
have been raised in the United States or Western Europe, you might view Japan, the
United States, and possibly Kuwait and Singapore as democracies and Algeria, Cuba,
and Zimbabwe as run by dictators. Why might it matter where you were raised? Recall
that Chapter 4 attempted to persuade you that how one understands and uses political
labels depends on one’s own political socialization and political environment. It might
be argued that this problem regarding interpersonal differences in assessments under-
scores the virtue of the scientific method. The scientific method requires the analyst
to specify what a particular concept means with great precision and in an empirically
measurable manner. This method might be the only way in which people with funda-
mentally different ideological views could agree on which states are democracies and
which are dictatorships. The discussion in this chapter will proceed in the spirit of the
scientific method, although the authors acknowledge their own lifetime socializations,
which are grounded in the political conceptions of the American and Western world.
How might individuals with dramatically different political worldviews attempt
to agree on the accuracy of the classifications suggested earlier? For example, consider
these issues:

• In Cuba, a far greater proportion of the citizens vote in elections than in either
Japan or the United States. The government provides far more extensive social
benefits to all its citizens than either Japan or the United States. Aren’t those the
best features of a democracy?
• Algeria calls itself the Peoples’ Democratic Republic. Elections for the president
were held in 2004, 2009, and 2014.. Abdelaziz Bouteflika was elected each time
by substantial majorities and, despite his failing health, led the ruling National
Liberation Front party in the 2014 election with 82% of the vote. Elections for
the national bicameral legislature occurred in 2002 and 2007, with 22 different
parties winning seats. Under these conditions, is Algeria a dictatorship?
• By what criteria is Zimbabwe not a democracy when President Robert Mugabe
defeated other candidates in five straight elections (in 1990, 1996, 2002, 2008, and
2013) and his party won 160 of the 210 seats in a 2013 legislative election?
• By what criteria is Singapore a democracy when almost every member of the
national legislature and every prime minister has, in every election since its
independence in 1959, been from a single political party?
170 Chapter 7

In asking and responding to such questions, you begin to establish the standards
that must be applied when you attempt to distinguish between democracy and dic-
tatorship. These kinds of questions also underscore the importance of defining with
precision the concepts that we use in political analysis.

Defining Democracy
What are the necessary and sufficient conditions for democracy? In its classic
sense, true direct democracy (also known as participatory democracy) is gov-
ernment of and by the people—all the citizens are active, direct participants in mak-
ing public policy decisions. Realistically, there is no such political system; indeed,
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778) claimed that only a society of gods could be a true
democracy. If our definition is less stringent, democracy might entail the relatively
equal capacity of every citizen to influence the policy process. It would be difficult to
make a persuasive case that this condition holds in any political system, including
Japan or the United States. In every political system, “some are more equal than
others.” In every political system, some make public policy decisions and others
observe them.
An alternative concept is representative democracy, a system in which the citizens
periodically elect people who represent them in the political process and make policy decisions
on their behalf. Another general term used to describe a representative democracy is
a republic. In fact, the majority of the countries in the world, in their formal title, call
themselves republics (examples, from the As: Republic of Albania, People’s Democratic
Republic of Algeria, People’s Republic of Angola, Argentine Republic, Republic of
Armenia, Republic of Austria, and Republic of Azerbaijan). You might think some of
these A “republics” are not particularly democratic.
Kuwait seems to meet this criterion for representative democracy because its
citizens periodically elect representatives. Yet few would classify it as a democracy
because about half of its resident adult population (those who cannot trace their
Kuwaiti ancestry to 1920) are not allowed to vote in legislative elections, and the chief
executive, the emir, is appointed from the ruling Al-Sabah family. Thus, the definition
needs to be refined to specify that the elections for representatives must be held under
conditions of universal (adult) suffrage.
Cuba meets all these conditions, but few would consider it a democracy because,
among other reasons, there are very limited choices for governmental office. There is
only one candidate per district, and this person is chosen by a local committee based
on “patriotism” and “revolutionary history” as well as merit. In practice, nearly
every candidate is a member of the single (Communist) party. Thus, an adequate
definition of democracy should also stipulate that the elections provide voters with
alternative choices.
Even with this clarification, there are cases, such as Singapore, where numerous
parties offer candidates but more than 90 percent of legislators are always elected
from one party. Thus, even the notion of a contest among alternative candidates can
be ambiguous. However, these conditions do seem to define an electoral democracy:
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 171

a political system in which virtually all citizens have the right to periodically vote to select
political leaders from among alternative contenders.
Additional conditions might seem appropriate in refining our definition of democ-
racy. It is also important that the people have the genuine capacity to retain or reject
those serving as their political leaders. This additional condition, called the limited
mandate, means that the electorate grants the authority to govern (the mandate) for
only a short, fixed (limited) period of time, and then the electorate has the opportu-
nity to select representatives again. And it means that if political leaders do not gain
sufficient votes (that is, if they lose), they relinquish office voluntarily and peacefully.
This condition can be harder to demonstrate because it is not clear if the top leaders
in several of these countries would peacefully step down if they lost an election. This
is problematic in Singapore, and there are instances in both Algeria and Zimbabwe
in which an election that would have turned out the leaders was ignored. It is hard
to imagine that the leaders in Cuba or Kuwait would step down even in the unlikely
situation they were outvoted.
Are we there yet? Perhaps. But shouldn’t a full democracy not only ensure voting
rights among alternative choices and a limited mandate but also allow the citizens
and the media to exercise freedoms such as freedom of speech, assembly, the right
to petition government for action, and political opposition at all times? Zimbabwe,
for example, loosely meets the conditions for electoral democracy, but opposition
groups and media are harassed, arrested, and subjected to violence by those loyal to
President Robert Mugabe. Thus, scholars classify a political system as a liberal democ-
racy when citizens enjoy not only electoral democracy but also substantial political rights and
civil liberties regarding participation, personal freedoms, and opposition. And if a country
is an electoral democracy, but its citizens’ political rights and civil liberties are significantly
limited, some analysts describe that country with yet another term, illiberal democracy
(Zakaria 2007; Rhoden 2013).
Now we have established one possible set of sufficient, as well as necessary,
conditions for a democracy: governance by leaders whose authority is based on a limited
mandate from a universal electorate that selects among genuine alternatives and has some rights
to political participation and opposition. This is a modest notion of democracy because it
guarantees the people little more than political rights and the occasional opportunity
to select among the competing elites who govern them. Some scholars include even
more elements, such as an electoral system that does not substantially skew the con-
version of votes to seats (recall Focus in 6 on electoral systems), an independent and
neutral judiciary, and civilian control of the military (Diamond and Plattner 2009).
Our definition is clearly less than a full participatory democracy, in which there
would be active, direct rule by all the people, who would be empowered to make
policy decisions themselves by referenda or some other means (see Barber 2004; Dahl
1971, 2006; Schumpeter 1950). Even with our modest definition, only two (Japan and
the United States) among the seven political systems are clearly classified as democ-
racies. Singapore is more problematic because the extent to which there is genuine
contestation is unclear. Not only does one party win nearly all the legislative seats and
control the government, but also the last several presidents of Singapore have been
172 Chapter 7

Zimbabwe’s President Robert Mugabe is very popular with his supporters, whom he rewards; but
most observers inside and outside the country judge him to be a ruthless and corrupt dictator who
suppresses opposition and rigs the elections.

elected by default because a governing panel declared that only one candidate was
qualified to run. While all seven systems encourage some forms of political participa-
tion and allow some political opposition, the authority of the political leadership in
Cuba and Kuwait is not based on its electoral selection, by universal suffrage, among
genuine alternatives, or for a fixed period of time. And the leaders in Algeria and
Zimbabwe have so manipulated the electoral process (harassing and arresting oppo-
nents, controlling the media, engaging in electoral fraud) that neither country meets
the spirit of the definition.
Most definitions of democracy focus on the process, as discussed above. However,
some analysts go even further, arguing that a genuine democracy not only must
guarantee appropriate processes of empowering and replacing leaders but also must
deliver desirable policy outputs. In such a process-plus-output conception of genuine
democracy, the political system might ensure that all citizens have access to quality
education, employment, good health care, and decent housing and enjoy such condi-
tions of life as a sense of personal safety and a healthy environment. While it might
seem reasonable that a democracy should “deliver the goods,” there is substantial
disagreement about the nature of this package of goods, and thus the policy deci-
sions about these goods are part of the political process but do not define democracy
(see Chapter 9).
This extensive discussion might help you identify the criteria that you think are
necessary for an adequate definition of democracy. (It is certainly possible that your
definition will differ from any of those suggested here. You should, however, be able to
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 173

justify your criteria.) Could you now articulate a conceptual definition of democracy
and use it to classify a set of political systems? Do you think your friends will accept
your definition and classifications? Would a Singaporean or Cuban student accept it?
You might be surprised by how difficult it is to develop a generally accepted definition
of this most widely used political concept.

Defining Nondemocracy
How about nondemocracies? What concepts can be used to characterize those political
regimes that are not democratic? Several are widely employed.

AutocrAcy One conventional concept for some nondemocracies is autocracy.

A stringent definition might be that a single ruler exercises absolute power and author-
ity without any legal constraints or citizen mandate. An autocrat would likely acquire
power through birth or force. Some might classify North Korea under Kim Jong-un or
Swaziland under King Mswati III (see Focus in 9) as autocracies. However, you might
consider whether any one person could successfully exercise absolute power in any
country in the contemporary political world. It might be that even in an autocracy, at
least some sectors of the country must support the ruler.

DictAtorship Related to autocracy is the concept of dictatorship. A dictator might

be a single individual or small group that has nearly absolute power and authority.
Dictatorship might be better defined in terms of rulers who hold power in the absence of a
limited mandate—a critical factor in our definition of democracy. That is, if the citizens
have no regular and realistic opportunity to replace the political leadership, then the
political system is a dictatorship. This applied to the military dictatorship in Myanmar
that ruled from 1989 through 2011. However, even a political leadership that has
popular support from the majority but does not provide genuine opportunities for the
population to renew the mandate for governance in competition with alternative lead-
ers could be defined as dictatorial (Escriba-Folch 2013). This conception of dictatorship
might characterize the situation in Cuba under Raul Castro and perhaps the situation
under some hereditary rulers, such as Bashar al-Assad in Syria.

AuthoritAriAn regime A concept that political scientists often apply to a

nondemocratic system is authoritarian regime. Many authoritarian regimes, like
dictatorships, lack a limited mandate. But what distinguishes authoritarianism is another
dimension: The political actions and decisions of the ruler are not constrained, while
the political rights and freedoms of the citizens are significantly limited. In other words,
an authoritarian regime places severe restrictions on the activities of individuals and
groups who desire to understand and influence the political system. The flow of politi-
cal information is strictly controlled by the government. And the great majority of the
population is not allowed to participate in any political activities except those expressly
encouraged by the regime, such as mass rallies and voting in support of the leaders (Linz
1993; Wiarda 2004). Citizens are not permitted to question the political institutions, pro-
cedures, or public policies of an authoritarian regime. However, the nonpolitical aspects
of people’s lives, such as their occupation, religion, and social life, are not generally under
174 Chapter 7

the direct control of the political system. Many current nondemocratic regimes, ranging
from Algeria to Zimbabwe, could be characterized as authoritarian regimes.

totAlitAriAn regime In a totalitarian regime, the definition of res publica

becomes total. Thus, under totalitarianism, the political system’s decisions and its
control penetrate into almost every aspect of its people’s lives. The totalitarian regime
demands complete obedience to its extensive rules regarding culture, economics, reli-
gion, and morality. The state attempts to dictate the behavior and even the thoughts of
its population in almost every domain of existence. Every political system intervenes
occasionally in such domains, but the defining characteristic of the totalitarian regime
is its constant and pervasive efforts to totally control the lives of its population. All
organizations are subordinated to the totalitarian state. Every activity of the individual
citizen is subject to scrutiny by the state, which claims it is protecting what is best for
the society as a whole. The state might define the acceptability of films and plays,
determine what job each individual will have, prohibit the activities of organized
churches, prevent families from moving without approval, and so on.
Totalitarian regimes, even more than authoritarian regimes, depend on the use of
extensive coercion for their survival. The state employs its military, internal security
forces, and other instruments of violence to suppress any citizen or group that chal-
lenges its authority. To sustain its pervasive control, the totalitarian regime also makes
extensive use of the agents of political socialization, especially the media, educational
system, and cultural forms. Often the totalitarian state is dominated by a single leader,
venerated in a cult of personality, and by a single political party. The people have no
control over the policies or the mandate of the leadership. George Orwell’s novel 1984
(1949/1967) is a literary vision of the totalitarian state, and recent examples include
Afghanistan under the Taliban (1996–2001), Cambodia under Pol Pot (1975–1979; see
Compare in 10), and North Korea (since 1948).
Most nondemocracies can be located on a continuum between totalitarianism and
authoritarianism. That is, some regimes extend their control beyond basic authoritari-
anism into important nonpolitical domains but do not exercise the totality of control
associated with absolute totalitarianism. Belarus, Congo under Mobutu Sese Seko
(1965–1997; see Focus in 11), Indonesia under Suharto (1966–1998), Iran, and Saudi
Arabia are examples along this continuum of countries that are not totalitarian regimes
but do assert extensive control over culture, religious practice, and social life.
Not all political analysts are consistent in how they employ these concepts.
In this book, autocracy, dictatorship, authoritarianism, and totalitarianism will all be
treated as modes of politics that contrast with democratic regimes. Autocracy will be
applied if there is near-absolute one-person rule. Dictatorship will especially empha-
size the absence of a limited mandate for the political leaders. Authoritarianism will
connote a more encompassing array of nondemocratic practices and significant
controls over citizens’ political behavior. And totalitarianism will be used to describe
systems whose oppressive control goes far beyond the political sphere into personal
and social life. Many authoritarian or totalitarian regimes are dictatorships. However,
there are instances in which people elect their leaders (electoral democracies) but the
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 175

political system substantially limits the people’s personal and political freedoms, as in
Singapore and Iran.

A Democracy–Nondemocracy Measure
This discussion of democracy suggests that there are gradations along a democ-
racy–nondemocracy continuum. Can we measure how democratic national political
systems are? Can we identify the number of countries that are democratic? The precise
number of countries in the current “wave of democracy” (a key theme in Chapter 10
and in Part Five of this book) ebbs and flows yearly as some countries establish demo-
cratic systems while others retreat or revert to nondemocratic systems (Diamond 2009;
Schedler 2013; Smith 2013).
Freedom House (2014) is an international organization that analyzes these questions.
First, Freedom House identifies those countries that meet the minimal conditions for an
electoral democracy. Second, those countries that do not meet these conditions can be
classified as nondemocracies. Third, Freedom House analyzes the extent to which each
country grants its citizens the political rights (e.g., to form political parties that promote
genuine alternatives, to campaign and vote in free and fair elections) and civil liberties
(e.g., religious and ethnic freedom, press freedom) that define a liberal democracy.
Freedom House has developed a widely cited scale, with each country scoring
from 1 to 7 points on political rights and from 1 to 7 points on civil liberties. A coun-
try’s combined average score on the two measures can range from 1.0 points, the
most extensive liberal democracies, to 7.0 points, the world’s most repressive regimes.
Based on actual conditions, a country is classified as “free” (1.0–2.5 points), “partly
free” (3.0–5.0), or “not free” (5.5–7.0) (Freedom House 2014).
According to the analysis of Freedom House, 45 percent of all countries (and just
over 40 percent of the world’s population) are “free.” However, 30 percent of the coun-
tries are only “partly free,” and 25 percent of the countries are “not free.” Even more
striking, 35 percent of the world’s population is not free, living under highly repres-
sive political regimes. There are clear regional variations, ranging from 88 percent of
European countries being classified as free, compared to only 6 percent in the Middle
East and North Africa, where 66 percent of countries are not free. Table 7.1 reports the
Freedom House classifications of selected countries on both political rights and civil lib-
erties, circa 2014.
There are other useful measures of the level of democracy in countries. For
example, the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013) calculates a yearly Democracy Index
for each country. It measures such factors as the nature of the electoral process, the
level of genuine political participation, the extent of civil liberties, and the effective
functioning of government. It calculates an index score for nearly 170 countries on a
scale from 10.0 (most democratic) to zero. Currently, 25 countries are “full democra-
cies,” 54 are “flawed democracies,” 37 are “hybrid regimes,” and 51 are “authoritar-
ian regimes.” Norway is the highest ranked country, with a score of 9.93, and North
Korea is lowest, with a score of 1.08. Figure 14.4 reports the Democracy Index scores of
selected countries of the Global South.
176 Chapter 7

Table 7.1 Classification of Selected Countries by Level of Freedom and Regime Type,
circa 2014

Freedom Electoral
Score Liberal Democracy Democracy Nondemocracy
Free 1.0 Costa Rica 1,1*
Sweden 1,1
Poland 1,1
United States 1,1
Japan 1,1
2.0 South Korea 2,2
South Africa 2,2 Argentina 2,2
Brazil 2,2
Serbia 2,2
2.5 India 2,3 Indonesia 2,4
Partly Free 3.0 Indonesia 2,4
3.5 Mexico 3,3
Sierra Leone 3,3
Turkey 3,4
4.0 Thailand 4,4
4.5 Singapore 4,4
Nigeria 4,4
5.0 Venezuela 5,5
Not Free 5.5 Cambodia 6,5
Egypt 6,5
Myanmar 6,5
Russia 6,5
6.0 Congo 6,6
Swaziland, 7,5
Vietnam 7,5
6.5 China 7,6
7.0 Saudi Arabia 7,7
Syria 7,7
North Korea 7,7

*Scores: The first score is political rights, the second score is civil liberties, with 1 = the highest score and 7 = the lowest score.
A country’s Freedom Score is the average of these two component scores.
SourcE: Freedom House 2014.

Areal Distribution of Power

7.3 compare and contrast unitary, federal, and confederal systems.
With the exception of small political systems serving only a few thousand citizens,
most political systems have found it desirable or necessary to create governmental
structures at several levels. Thus, another type of institutional arrangement is the
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 177

areal distribution of power—the allocation of power and functions across the levels of
government. National political systems are organized into one of three major forms:
(1) unitary states; (2) federations; and (3) confederations.

Unitary State
In a unitary state, a central government holds all legitimate power. The central govern-
ment has indivisible sovereignty, although it usually delegates some power to regional
units such as provinces, departments, or counties. These subnational governments
serve at the convenience of the central government, which can revoke their power
or functions at any time. Currently, more than 70 percent of the countries are unitary
states. Examples include most African, Asian, and Latin American countries, as well
as China, France, Japan, South Africa, and the United Kingdom.
Why are most contemporary states unitary? The major advantage is that there is
clear, hierarchical authority—all power is controlled by the central government. Even
if there were a disagreement between the central government and the peripheral
governments, the center’s superior constitutional power is clear, and center–periphery
stalemates are uncommon. Also, control from the center should provide a more uni-
form implementation of policy throughout the country. And primary citizen loyalty
tends to be mainly attached to the national political system, reducing the risk of divisive
regionalism.

Federation
A federation has a constitutional division of power and functions between a central gov-
ernment and the set of regional governments. In contrast to a unitary state, the cen-
tral government and the regional governments share power in a federation. Each
level has primary control of certain functions, and neither level has legal power to
dominate the other level in all policy domains. The central government usually con-
trols policy in at least such areas as national defense, finance, commerce, and for-
eign affairs. The essence of a federation is coordination, not hierarchy. Federations
require a complex balancing of the power between the central government and the
regional governments and thus are more prone to disagreements, power struggles,
and stalemates than a unitary state. Nonetheless, there are five major rationales for
a federation:

1. large size. Many states become federations to distribute governmental power

where there is a huge area to be governed. Currently, 25 states are federations and
Iraq and Sudan are in transition to federal systems. This group includes nearly
half the land area of the world and about 40 percent of the global population.
Most of the largest states are federations, including Brazil, Canada, India, Mexico,
Nigeria, Russia, and the United States. During the constitutional debate in the
United States, Thomas Jefferson observed, “Our country is too large to have all its
affairs directed by a single government.”
178 Chapter 7

2. the prior existence of strong states. A federation can be an acceptable

compromise when strong peripheral governments create a central government.
In the formation of the United States, for example, the already strong state
governments were unwilling to give up all of their power to a central govern-
ment, as in a unitary state. Rather, they agreed to delegate certain functions to
the new central government while retaining all other “residual” powers for
themselves.
3. the attempt to create unity or accommodate diversity. Chapter 5 described the
serious problems of conflict between states and nations, especially in the newer
states. Federations attempt to bond diverse nations into a unified state while still
recognizing the different nations’ diversity and desire for power at the regional
level. The regional governments can represent a major ethnic, linguistic, religious,
or other nation-based characteristic dominant in the region. India is a federa-
tion with 28 states, most of which are related to the linguistic, ethnic, or religious
majority in the area.
4. the desire to disperse political power. A federation can be established to pre-
vent the overconcentration of power in the central government. After the trauma
of Hitler’s rule, West Germans formed a federation to prevent the emergence of
another overly powerful central government. The bulk of legislative power was
granted to the central government, but most power to administer and adjudicate
the laws is held by the Länder (regional) governments.
5. the desire to concentrate power and resources. In contrast to the preceding
rationale, a federation can be created to combine several states into a stronger
political system. For example, in the effort to create Arab unity and to expand the
political and economic power of the state, Egypt has several times formed federa-
tions with its neighbors: Syria, Yemen, Iraq, and Jordan.

Confederation
A confederation is an association in which states delegate some power to a supranational
central government but retain primary power. It is a loose grouping of states in
which each state’s membership, participation, and compliance with the suprana-
tional central government are conditional, depending on the state’s perception of
its own national interest. Confederations are usually created when states decide
that the performance of certain functions is enhanced by structured cooperation
with other states. To facilitate such cooperation, the states establish permanent
supranational machinery. The United Arab Emirates is a confederation of mini-
states, and the United Nations is a confederal structure containing more than 190
member states. Confederations can emphasize economic cooperation, such as the
European Union (EU), or military cooperation, such as the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
Although confederations can serve many useful functions for member states,
their activities and even their very survival are always contingent on the members’
continuing support. A member state might refuse to comply with confederation
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 179

Table 7.2 Relative Strengths and Weaknesses of Areal Distributions of Power

Form of Areal Distribution Strengths Weaknesses
Unitary state Clear authority Hyperconcentration of power
Decisive control Weak representation of diversity
No stalemates between center and minorities
and periphery
Federation Representation of diversity Duplication and overlap of power
Checks on center’s power Conflicts over ultimate power
Creates unity Sluggishness; compromises
Confederation Facilitates cooperation Conditional compliance
Power retained by subunits Instability

policies that conflict directly with the state’s definition of its own national interest.
Disagreements among the members can necessitate negotiation and compromise,
as in the periodic adjustments within the EU regarding issues such as farm subsi-
dies to member states and a common monetary policy. A confederation can wither if
the supragovernment is ineffective, as in the case of the Articles of Confederation in
colonial America, or if members refuse to support its directives, as in the League of
Nations after World War I.
Table 7.2 summarizes some of the major advantages and shortcomings of each
approach to the areal distribution of power. While each has relative advantages under
certain conditions, none is without considerable drawbacks, and none can ensure the
effective functioning or even the survival of a political system. Due to the general trend
toward the centralization of political power within states, the distinctions between
unitary states and federations are less clear than in the past and confederations have
become particularly fragile.

Forms of Executive–Legislative
Relations
7.4 Differentiate between parliamentary, presidential, and other types of
executive–legislative systems.
Another conventional method of classifying and especially of describing political
systems is by defining the pattern of power and interaction between the executive and
legislative structures. The taxonomy in this section emphasizes the three most com-
mon patterns through which these two structures interact to perform the functions of
policymaking and policy implementation: the presidential, parliamentary, and hybrid
forms of government. Two other types of executive–legislative arrangements are also
briefly examined: the council and assembly systems.
180 Chapter 7

Presidential Government
The crucial feature of presidential government is the separation of executive and legisla-
tive structures. Figure 7.1 portrays the electoral chain of command that is supposed
to define the relationships between citizens and these major political structures. In
separate electoral decisions, the citizens select the chief executive (usually called the
president) and the members of the national legislature. This electoral process provides
both the president and the legislature with independent mandates to represent the
citizens in the governing process. The term length of each is predetermined, and thus
the tenure in office of each is not dependent on the other (except in the rare case of
impeachment of the chief executive).
The separation of executive and legislative powers is explicit and intentional to
ensure a system of checks and balances in the policymaking and policy-implementation
processes. Primary responsibility for policymaking (debating, modifying, and enacting
policies as law) resides in the legislature. Although the chief executive can veto legisla-
tion, the legislature can override that veto. Primary responsibility for the implementa-
tion of policy is with the president, who has control of the government’s administrative
departments. The president also appoints and manages a cabinet, and its members are
responsible for overseeing policy in the government’s administrative departments.
In practice, it is common to find considerable interdependence and blurring of
functions between the executive and legislative structures and especially for the presi-
dent to have substantial involvement in policymaking. The United States is the model
example of presidential government, which is also found in many Latin American
and some African and Asian states, including Brazil, Ivory Coast, Kenya, Mexico, Sri
Lanka, Venezuela, and the Philippines.

Parliamentary Government
In contrast to the presidential system, the crucial element of parliamentary govern-
ment is the fusion of executive and legislative functions and structures. As is indicated in
Figure 7.1 , the people elect the legislature (the parliament), whose majority empowers
a cabinet, which then empowers one of its members to be the chief executive, typically
called a prime minister or premier. The maximum length of the legislature’s mandate

Figure 7.1 Presidential and Parliamentary Systems of Government

Presidential System
elect
Eligible Legislature
citizens selects
elect President Cabinet

Parliamentary System

Eligible can “dissolve”

elect selects
citizens Legislature Cabinet Prime Minister
Majority has
“confidence” in selects
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 181

is often five years, but its term can be shorter under the circumstances described
next. The complex relationships among cabinet, legislature, and prime minister merit
further detail.

cAbinet AnD legislAture The cabinet is a collective leadership group of 6 to

30 people who are, in most systems, also members of the legislature. The cabinet is
“responsible” to the legislature. This means that the cabinet serves only as long as it
can retain the confidence of the majority of the members in the legislature. The cabi-
net has primary responsibility for both the policymaking and policy-implementation
functions. Although policies must be voted into laws by the legislative majority, it is
the cabinet that devises, drafts, and implements most policies.
In an intriguing manner, the cabinet and the legislature are at each other’s mercy.
At any time, the legislative majority can pressure the cabinet to resign, either by a
negative vote on a major piece of legislation proposed by the cabinet or by a general
motion of “no confidence” in the cabinet. Also at any time, the cabinet can dissolve
the legislature, requiring immediate new elections. In the subsequent election, vot-
ers select a new legislature, whose majority then identifies a cabinet it will support,
and the process begins anew. Thus, the cabinet and the legislature are rather like two
gunfighters standing gun-to-gun in an old Western movie: Each has the power to elim-
inate the other, but each might also be destroyed in the exchange. In 2013, the govern-
ments of Greece and Thailand survived no-confidence votes, but the Lebanese cabinet
resigned due to the loss of legislative support.

legislAture AnD prime minister In the parliamentary system, the prime min-
ister (or premier or chancellor or whatever the chief executive is called) is not directly
elected by the citizens. The prime minister is the member of the legislature who is
supported as chief executive by the majority of the legislature. The prime minister can
be removed at any time by a no-confidence vote of the legislature, and he might also
be obliged to resign if the legislature defeats a major legislative initiative he proposes.
In 2013, the prime ministers of the Czech Republic, Libya, Slovenia, and Somalia lost
no-confidence votes and were removed from office.

cAbinet AnD prime minister The balance of power between the cabinet and
the prime minister can be subtle, although both depend on majority support of the
legislature. Traditionally, a cabinet that had legislative support could select one of its
members to serve as prime minister. The prime minister was primus inter pares—“first
among equals”—in the cabinet. The prime minister exercised broad policy leadership
within a collective decision-making body. If a cabinet majority no longer supported
a prime minister, the prime minister either resigned or attempted to reconstitute a
cabinet that did support him and was supported by the legislative majority.
In many contemporary parliamentary systems, however, there has been a sub-
stantial shift of power from the cabinet to the prime minister. In these systems, the
electorate selects legislative candidates from a party committed to support a particu-
lar prime minister. If a legislative majority can be formed, its leader becomes prime
minister. The prime minister then appoints the members of the cabinet and clearly
182 Chapter 7

dominates the cabinet in the governmental process. In Figure 7.1, the two-headed
arrow between cabinet and prime minister indicates these alternative patterns of
power.
Thus, the parliamentary system is characterized by the fusion of executive and
legislative functions because the cabinet and prime minister formulate policies, guide
their passage through a legislature that they control, and administer policy through
the administrative departments. However, the actual policy process in a parliamentary
system depends on whether there is a coherent majority group in the legislature. There
are both “stable” and “unstable” parliamentary systems.
In a stable parliamentary system, there is a clear majority in the legislature. Such a
majority could be composed of either one party or a coalition. This majority provides
the prime minister and cabinet with sufficient legislative support to enact their policy
program, without the problems of stalemate and confusion of accountability that can
result from the separation of powers in the presidential system. Australia, Denmark,
Great Britain, and Japan are examples of parliamentary government systems that are
usually stable.
In contrast, an unstable parliamentary system often emerges when there is no
coherent legislative majority. Instead, policymaking requires agreement within a
coalition composed of multiple parties that tend to disagree on some important policy
issues. If the legislature votes no confidence in the cabinet or defeats it on a major bill,
the cabinet usually resigns. Then the media report that a parliamentary government
has “fallen” or that there are efforts to form a new government (actually, a new cabinet).
The new cabinet might have almost all the same people as members, or it might have a
different set of people from the legislature. In general, prime ministers in unstable par-
liamentary systems are weaker than those in stable parliamentary systems. Unstable
parliamentary systems have been prevalent in contemporary legislatures that have
strong ideological differences and multiple political parties, such as Israel and Poland.
Great Britain currently has a somewhat unstable government due to the uneasy coali-
tion between the Conservatives and the Liberal Democrats.

Hybrid Systems
An increasing number of political systems attempt to blend desirable aspects of the
presidential and parliamentary systems. These hybrid systems have a prime minister and
an elected legislature that can both enact and implement policies, but they also have an indepen-
dent president, who is elected for a fixed term, has some executive functions, and can act
with decisiveness (Elgie 2004; Shugart and Carey 1992; Samuels and Shugart 2013).
Some hybrid systems function more like parliamentary systems: The president
has limited power, and the prime minister and cabinet exercise most of the control.
In India, for example, the president is elected by the legislature for a five-year term
and has notable responsibilities, including the appointment of state governors and the
right to take over governance of the states during emergencies. However, the prime
minister is the dominant political power in the system, while the president performs
mainly ceremonial roles, such as appearances on national holidays. Germany, Austria,
Iraq, and Ireland are other examples of this style of the hybrid.
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 183

Who’s on first? Vladimir Putin (right) has dominated Russia’s hybrid political system since 2000,
moving from president to prime minister to president again, while Dmitry Medvedev is second in
command, holding the other position.

In other hybrid systems, there is a more balanced sharing of power between the
president and the parliament. In Finland, for example, the president controls the
administration, has oversight powers, and must cosign legislation. However, the
prime minister, cabinet, and legislature are in charge of most policymaking. Finally,
there are some hybrids in which the president is the most powerful political actor.
While the prime minister and the cabinet have primary responsibility for day-to-day
policymaking and administration, the president tends to dominate the policy process
when he chooses to do so, and he is the main focus of public attention and expecta-
tions regarding the leadership function. Focus in 7 describes the French hybrid system,
in which the president is the key actor. Hybrids with a strong president have been
implemented in almost all the postcommunist countries that emerged from the Soviet
Union and in Central and Eastern Europe.

Council Systems
In council systems, a small group shares collective leadership and is responsible for both
executive and legislative functions. Although one member of the group might be deemed
the leader for symbolic reasons, all members of the council are equal in constitutional
terms, and they make decisions and actions based on the will of the council majority
or, ideally, on council consensus. In U.S. local government, the weak-mayor–council
system and the boards of commissioners/supervisors (prevalent in many counties,
school districts, and special districts) are council systems. Also, many tribal societies in
Africa were traditionally ruled by a council of elders who collectively made decisions
that were binding on the members of the tribe.
184 Chapter 7

Focus in 7
A Hybrid System in Action: France
Many recent constitutions establish a hybrid model with a legislative majority dominated by conserva-
in which both a president and a prime minister have tives. But Mitterrand accepted the situation, appoint-
significant political power. A central issue for hybrids ing the conservatives’ leader, Jacques Chirac, as
is whether two independent executives can share premier. Despite strong ideological differences
power effectively. An early example of this system between the president and the premier–cabinet–leg-
is the French Fifth Republic, established by the “de islature majority, there was a reasonable sharing of
Gaulle Constitution” of 1962. France created this power and authority, which the French call cohabita-
hybrid to overcome the highly unstable parliamen- tion. President Mitterrand continued to be very active
tary system of the Fourth Republic, in which govern- in foreign policy but allowed the premier to control
ments averaged less than one year. In the hybrid, the the domestic policy agenda. From 1993 to 1995, a
premier (prime minister) and cabinet are responsible conservative legislative majority produced a sec-
for the day-to-day functioning of the government, ond period of cohabitation. A weakened Mitterrand
as in a parliamentary system, but the president (an acknowledged that “it is not the task of the president
office Charles de Gaulle fashioned for himself as a of the Republic to govern” (Safran 2008).
condition for his return to government) has extensive In 2000, the French shortened the presiden-
power and the freedom to exercise it. The president tial term from seven years to five years, ostensibly
is elected popularly for a fixed term, and he selects a to increase the political accountability of the presi-
premier, who selects a cabinet. The cabinet controls dent. The shorter term also makes it considerably
the budget and legislative agenda as in a normal more likely that the elected president will be from the
parliamentary system; however, the president can same part of the political spectrum as the legislative
dissolve the legislature while retaining the cabinet. majority that empowers the premier and cabinet.
And Article 16 in the constitution provides that the Since 2002, there has been no cohabitation.
sweeping powers of the presidency may be exer- From 2002 until 2011, both the president and the
cised whenever the president alone deems the polit- prime minister were from the coalition of conserva-
ical situation to be dangerous for the country. tive parties. In 2012, Francois Hollande was elected
De Gaulle served as the first president of president as a member of the Socialist Party and
the Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1969. He was an fellow socialist Manuel Valls is prime minister. After
extraordinarily powerful man, and he demanded several periods of cohabitation, the power relation-
extraordinary power. He established a precedent that ships between the president and the premier in
the president can act far more extensively than the the French hybrid system seem to be sufficiently
constitution allows. He dominated every premier who limited and institutionalized to survive the conflict
served during his presidency. The presidents after de inherent in dyarchy and in a future situation where
Gaulle (from Pompidou to Hollande) have continued strong ideological differences exist between the two
to follow the de Gaulle precedent, exercising con- executives.
siderable power. The president is so strong that the
French hybrid is also termed a “semi-presidential”
system.
Further Focus
Many people felt that the French “dyarchy” (dual 1. What seems to be the greatest benefit of the
rule) would lead to a constitutional crisis as soon as French hybrid, in comparison to a parliamentary
a premier and cabinet challenged the president’s system?
extensive power. The first strong test of the French 2. If the president and prime minister are from
hybrid occurred between 1986 and 1988, when opposing parties in a hybrid, would this usually
Socialist President François Mitterrand was faced be a desirable check-and-balance feature?
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 185

In many situations in which a small collective group forcefully removes the top
leader, the group initially shares power. When the group that has taken power is from
the military, this council-type group is called a junta. There were numerous juntas in
Latin America and Africa in the latter half of the twentieth century (e.g., in Algeria
from 1992 to 1999; in Argentina from 1976 to 1983), and Egypt was briefly ruled by a
junta after the ouster of President Mubarak in 2011. In most cases, council rule evolves
into more dictatorial rule as a single political leader increasingly dominates the others.

Assembly Systems
In assembly systems, collective leadership is exercised by a large group, usually consti-
tuted as a legislature. There might be an executive officer, but the legislature is clearly
dominant. Switzerland has an assembly system in which the legislature dominates
the collective seven-member executive council that it elects. Most confederations, such
as the United Nations and the European Parliament (the elected legislative wing of
the EU), are assembly systems in which legislatures delegate administrative power to
an appointed executive. The New England town meeting, a form of U.S. local govern-
ment, is an extreme version of the assembly system because all citizens can directly
participate in key decisions and oversee the administration of policy.
In theory, most communist states are assembly systems because the constitution
grants most power for policymaking to the legislative body. In reality, however, the
legislatures in such states have traditionally rubber-stamped the policies and adminis-
tration of a single leader or a small collective leadership group, as in China and North
Korea. In fact, few, if any, national political systems operate as true assembly systems
because power for policymaking and policy implementation rarely remains dispersed
among a large group of relatively equal rulers.

Which Form Is Optimal?

Which form of executive–legislative relations is best? If there were agreement on this
question, we might reasonably expect most states to have adopted the same form of
government. In fact, each form has its strengths and weaknesses, as reflected in the
Debate in 7.

Political Party Systems

7.5 characterize the different types of political party systems.
The system of political parties is another institutional arrangement that can be
explored. party systems are generally classified according to the number of political
parties and the interactions among the parties in the governing process. In the comparative
study of political parties, there are usually four main types of party systems: (1) two-
party systems; (2) multiparty systems; (3) dominant-party systems; and (4) one-party
systems. The distinguishing features of each type are described in this section, and
representative examples are identified in Figure 7.2 and discussed in Compare in 7.
186 Chapter 7

The Debate in 7
Which Form of Government Is Preferable: Parliamentary, Presidential, or Hybrid?
A central normative question regarding government the support of the governing majority, he can
institutions is: Which arrangement of executive– be replaced at any time and in a relatively rapid
legislative relations is preferable? Countries vary political process that does not require a national
in the manner in which they organize executive– election or the trauma of an impeachment trial.
legislative relations. Initially, most modern coun-
tries established either the parliamentary form or The Parliamentary Form Has Serious Problems
the presidential form, yet many of the countries that
have dramatically transformed their governmental • A coherently organized majority exercises great,
structures in the last several decades have opted unchecked power: It can steamroll policy through
for a hybrid. The current diversity suggests that no almost all opposition because it controls both
one form is clearly preferred in all cases. Moreover, the legislative process and the agencies that
other factors such as the nature of the party system administer policy. Even in its most benign form,
and the electoral system can be crucial in shap- the system is not well structured to encour-
ing the effectiveness of any of the forms (Cheibub age compromise, to protect against a tyranni-
2007; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997; Svolik 2013). cal majority, or to ensure that minority concerns
Nonetheless, it is useful to consider the key argu- are represented in the public policy process
ments regarding the strengths and weaknesses (Horowitz 1990).
associated with each of the three major forms of • The electorate does not directly choose the
executive–legislative relations. chief executive because he can be selected and
changed by a vote of the legislature at almost
The Parliamentary Form Is the Most Effective any time, without any direct input from the
Institutional Arrangement citizens. It is possible for the citizens to be stuck
with a chief executive for whom they did not vote
• The fusion of executive and legislative powers and whom the majority does not support.
eliminates potential executive–legislative conflicts
• Parliamentary systems are often plagued by
that can result in deadlock in presidential or hybrid
uncertainty and instability, which stems from the
systems. This singular authority structure ensures
chief executive’s capacity to dissolve the legis-
that, as long as the governing majority (party or
lature at any time and the legislature’s ability to
coalition) maintains its cohesiveness, this group is
vote no confidence in the executive at any time.
responsible for every stage of the policy process
This perpetual vulnerability of the executive and
and there are few roadblocks to the passage and
the legislature can result in extensive strategic
implementation of any policy (Strøm 2004).
game-playing, despite the apparent fusion of
• This concentration of political control also ensures executive and legislative actors (Tsebelis 2002).
that there is a clear system of accountability. The
successes or failures of policy can be associated
The Presidential Form Is the Most Effective
directly with those who are part of the governing
Institutional Arrangement
coalition. If citizens are dissatisfied, they know
which parties to vote against in the next election, • In presidential systems, citizens have the power
and citizens know whom to reelect if they are sat- to elect their top executive leader directly. The
isfied (Linz 1994). voters explicitly choose a president, who serves
• The chief executive position does not concentrate for a fixed term in office without legislative inter-
such a dangerous level of power as in the presi- vention (except in the extraordinary circum-
dential system. And if the chief executive loses stances of impeachment).
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 187

• This directly elected president can act as a sin- until the end of its term. And, short of a traumatic
gular leader and an embodiment of the political impeachment, a highly unpopular chief execu-
will of the national majority; he is not someone tive cannot be replaced before the end of his
who emerged from a backroom deal in the lengthy, fixed term and can hold onto power with
legislature. And the president can take strong minimal support from either the legislature or the
positions, even in the face of short-term disfavor citizenry (Linz 1994).
in public opinion.
• Presidential systems are more stable because The Hybrid Form Is the Most Effective
presidential and legislative elections occur in Institutional Arrangement
regular, fixed intervals, so everyone knows
• The hybrid combines the best of both the par-
exactly when the next election will occur and
liamentary and presidential systems. It takes
new mandates for power will be given.
advantage of the parliamentary form’s fusion of
• The separation of executive and legislative executive and legislative power to ensure greater
power provides a healthy system of checks and policy coherence, from conception to adoption
balances, preventing abuse of power and ensur- to implementation.
ing more careful consideration of policy before
• The hybrid also provides an independently
it is adopted and implemented (Horowitz 1990).
elected presidential-type executive who can
represent the national will and can act decisively
The Presidential Form Has Serious Problems
when the cabinet and legislature fail to respond
• Presidential systems often obscure which poli- to a critical situation (Elgie 2004).
cymaking structure is responsible for the impact
of a particular policy. Executive and legislative The Hybrid Form Has Serious Problems
power can be exercised by different groups
• As with presidential systems, a significant risk
that can, rightly or wrongly, accuse each other
with hybrids is the potential for major power
of policy failures. Thus, accountability is often
struggles, especially between the cabinet and
unclear, even if the executive and legislative
prime minister on one side and the president on
majorities are from the same political party and
the other side. The situation is made worse by
especially when there is a partisan split between
the fact that the constitution is usually ambigu-
the two branches.
ous about the conditions in which one or the
• The separation of power enables the legislature other is dominant in the policy process.
and the executive to block each other’s actions
• The hovering presence of the president does
if they do not fully share a political agenda. The
not usually reduce the inherent problems of the
legislature can refuse to pass executive-sup-
parliamentary form, such as excessive concen-
ported legislation, while the executive can veto
tration of power in the majority and the uncer-
policies adopted by the legislative majority and
tainty and instability due to the constant threat
can use its control over all administrative agen-
of dissolution.
cies to distort or even block the intent of legis-
lative policy. Such circumstances can produce
And in case You Were Wondering…
interbranch conflicts, policy stalemates, and
governmental paralysis (Tsebelis 2002). A council system has the virtue of distributing
• The fixed terms of both the executive and the power among a manageable number of people,
legislature provide predictability at the cost of but there is a strong tendency for collective leader-
flexibility and responsiveness. An ineffective leg- ship to result in persistent internal power struggles
islature cannot be forced to face the electorate as one or a few members attempt to assert their
188 Chapter 7

dominance. And while assembly systems are the More questions…

best approximation of a genuine representative de-
1. Which system makes most sense to you?
mocracy, they lack the clear and decisive executive
leadership that people in most contemporary states 2. Can you think of any conditions (e.g., the party
seem to want and that complex modern political system, aspects of the political culture, and so
systems seem to need. on) that might make different forms preferable?

Two-Party Systems
A two-party system is characterized by two major political parties that alternate in
governmental power. Each party has a realistic possibility of forming a governing
majority, although the electoral success of each party varies over time. Minor third
parties exist in a classic two-party system like Honduras, but these parties have lim-
ited power. At the moment, there are only a few countries, such as Jamaica and the
United States (Figure 7.2), where only two parties hold virtually all of the seats in
the national legislature. Although either the Conservative or Labour Party had been a
majority party in Great Britain for many decades, neither won a legislative majority in
the 2010 election. Regional parties (e.g., the Scottish Nationalist Party) won some seats,
and the Liberal Democratic Party held enough seats to become a necessary coalition
partner, aligning with the Conservatives to achieve a parliamentary majority. When a
country has two large parties, but third parties consistently prevent either party from
achieving an outright majority, it is termed a “two-plus” party system.

Multiparty Systems
As you might expect, a multiparty system has more than two parties that can win enough
seats to be potential partners in creating a legislative majority and enacting legislation.
In parliamentary systems, this means that a coalition of two or more parties might
be necessary to form a government. Most contemporary political systems have some
form of multiparty system.

Working multipArty systems In some “working” multiparty systems, a cluster

of parties usually cooperates to form a governing majority. For example, several center-
and right-oriented parties might form one group, with social democratic and socialist
left parties constituting another. This is the case in Sweden, which has a relatively stable
system of eight major parties which form coalitions. Currently, the Social Democratic
Party leads a multiparty center-left coalition (Figure 7.2).
There are also some multiparty systems in which parties have organized them-
selves into two blocs that compete for power. Citizens are reasonably confident that,
even when they vote for a party that cannot win a majority of seats, their party is
committed to cooperating with particular parties to form a governing group. Italy,
which had experienced decades of highly volatile multiparty government, introduced
a new electoral system in 1996 in an attempt to create more party coherence. After
some initial turbulence (a total of 251 parties put forth candidates in the 1996 election),
the system seemed to stabilize with two major alliances, each led by the major party in
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 189

Figure 7.2 Examples of Party Systems (Governing Parties in Bold)

One-Party System Two-Party System
Cuba, National Assembly (2013), 614 seats United States, House of Representatives (2015),
435 seats
Communist
100%

Republican
Democrat 57%
43%

Multiparty Systems
Sweden, Riksdag (2014) 349 seats Germany, Bundestag (2013), 622 seats
Centre Christian Christian
6% Democrat 5% Social Social Union
Democratic 9%
Social 30%
Democrat Moderate
32% 24%
Christian
Liberal Democrat
People’s 5% Green 40%
Green 10%
Environment
7% Sweden
Democrat 14% Left
Left 6% 10%

Mexico, Chamber of Deputies (2012), 500 seats Canada, House of Commons (2011), 308 seats
Institutional Bloc
New Alliance
Revolutionary Quebecois
Ecologist 2% Liberal 1%
(PRI) 42%
Green 6% 11%
Citizen’s Conservative
Movement 3% 54%
New
Democratic National Democrat
Revolution Action (PAN) 33%
(PRD) 21% 23%

Labour 3%

Dominant Party Systems

Singapore, Parliament (2011), 87 seats South Africa, Parliament (2014), 400 seats

African National
Democratic
Congress
Alliance
People’s Action 62%
22%
93%
Economic Freedom
Fighters 6%
Inkatha Freedom
Worker’s 2%
7% National Freedom
2%

the bloc: the People of Freedom group (victors in the 2008 election) and the Democratic
Party group (victors in the 2013 election). Chile is another example, where six parties
each have a substantial proportion of seats but these parties have formed two domi-
nant coalitions, meaning that this multiparty system currently operates almost like a
two-party system.
190 Chapter 7

It is also possible, although uncommon, to have a working multiparty system in

which parties across the ideological spectrum cooperate in a long-standing governing
coalition. A notable example of this situation is Switzerland, where four major parties,
ranging from right wing to center left, have shared governing power in every election
since 1959, and the general viewpoint is that it is undesirable for any one of the parties
to govern independently. A more distinctive form of this broad array of parties was
Germany’s “grand coalition” from 2006 to 2009. When neither multiparty coalition
gained a majority of seats, the leading parties of the two blocs agreed to create a govern-
ing cabinet including nearly all the major rival parties (the two leftist parties refused to
participate) under the leadership of Angela Merkel, leader of the Christian Democrats.
Merkel’s conservative coalition ruled with a majority in the legislature from 2009 to
2013. However, when her coalition did not win a majority of the seats in 2013, she forged
another broad center-left coalition between her Christian Democratic Union/Christian
Social Union and the main opposition party, the Social Democrats (Figure 7.2).

unstAble multipArty systems Multiparty systems are often unstable. In these

cases, no party is close to a majority and differences in party ideology prevent tempo-
rary coalitions from forming long-term blocs. In such party systems, there is usually
a point at which the government’s policy on an issue induces a coalition partner to
withdraw its support, in turn causing a crisis for the government. In parliamentary
systems, such a crisis often leads to the resignation of the government or the dissolu-
tion of the legislature. In presidential or assembly systems, this situation tends to pro-
duce paralysis in the legislature. Clearly, the difficulty of forming a governing majority
among multiple parties increases because different parties are more firmly committed
to their unique ideological orientations. Smaller parties often demand more influence
than their vote total merits if they are crucial to the coalition majority. Instability is
especially high in multiparty systems with a minority governing coalition that controls
less than half the seats.
Israel presents an extreme example of the challenges in some multiparty systems.
In the 2013 election, the 120 seats in the Knesset were shared among 12 parties, and
only 1 party had more than 20 seats. The largest party, Likud Yisrael Beiteinu, is a
center-right party that won 31 seats, was able to form a governing majority—a com-
plex coalition of parties including an ultrareligious party, a centrist secular party, and
a progressive party. Any of these parties might bolt at any point if their views are not
supported by the government. The largest party in the previous government, Kadima,
dropped from 28 seats to 2, an example of the dramatic loss of power by one party that
does occasionally occur in multiparty systems.
New democracies seem especially prone to a proliferation of political parties.
In 2005, more than 300 parties competed for votes in Iraq. And in the initial years
(after 1989) of democratic politics in the postcommunist states of Central and Eastern
Europe, as many as 200 parties ran candidates. While there has usually been a signifi-
cant reduction in the number of effective parties in the postcommunist states (Hungary,
for example, now has only four), many are still dealing with somewhat unstable
multiparty systems. When many parties win representation, it has been difficult to
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 191

form the stable coalitions necessary for coherent policymaking. Even more established
political systems grapple with the challenges of achieving stability in situations with
multiple competing parties. Canada has had multiple parties and minority govern-
ments in four of the prior five elections, but elected a Conservative Party majority in
2011 (Figure 7.2).

Dominant-Party Systems
In a dominant-party system, the same party repeatedly captures enough votes and seats
to form the government, although other parties are free to compete. In Figure 7.2,
South Africa and Singapore are clear-cut examples of a dominant party. In Singapore,
the People’s Action Party wins nearly all the contested seats in the legislature in every
election (since the first full general elections in 1959), although as many as 20 other
parties put up candidates. Typically, a dominant party eventually loses support and
becomes a competitor in a multiparty system. This happened to the Congress Party
in India and to the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) in Mexico. Japan’s Liberal
Democratic Party (LDP) was a dominant party in Japan from 1947 to 1993. Due to
scandals, leader defections, and changing voter attitudes, LDP has been voted out of
power several times since then, although it regained a strong majority in 2012.

One-Party Systems
In a one-party system, a single party is controlled and protected by the government
elite. Some authoritarian regimes do not tolerate the existence of any political parties
other than the single party that represents the state and its vision of political order,
as in North Korea. Any party that expresses opposition to the ruling party is viewed
not as the “loyal opposition” but as disloyal or even seditious (in other words, it is
seen as stirring up resistance or rebellion against the government). There are cur-
rently few absolute one-party systems in a technical sense, given the high ideological
premium associated with the appearance of democratic processes. Thus, some form
of party competition is introduced, although the ruling party maintains near-total
control. In Cuba (Figure 7.2) and China, for example, the Communist Party allows
other parties to elect a few representatives.

No-Party Systems
The taxonomy should have a category for those political systems that have no politi-
cal parties. Historically, many political systems had no organized parties, but only a
few contemporary political systems do not allow political parties. Countries such as
Kuwait, Oman, and Swaziland have banned political parties, either because the rulers
do not want any organized bases of opposition to their authority or on the grounds
that parties divide people’s loyalty and do not focus on what is best for everyone. The
latter argument is a primary justification given for the nonpartisanship (lack of politi-
cal party affiliations or organization) of candidates for public office in many U.S. local
governments.
192 Chapter 7

compare in 7
Party Systems in Four Countries
As indicated in this chapter, party systems can range 69 percent in 2009—it is still the dominant party,
from multiparty systems to one-party systems. with the Democratic Alliance coming in at a weak
Figure 7.2 displays the distribution of parties in eight second with 22 percent of the vote.
countries, reflecting the various types of party sys- The United States is a clear example of a two-
tems. While each country’s situation is unique, this party system. While candidates from other parties
comparison focuses on four of the examples to are usually on the ballot in most districts, it is rare
reflect how different party systems function. that the individual winner by plurality will be from
The political elite in Cuba, a one-party sys- any party other than the Democratic or Republican
tem, attempts to sustain the total domination of parties. This produces a legislature in which
the Cuban Communist Party. Unlike some one- only the two parties have a major role. In 2012,
party states, candidates can run for the National the Republicans won 234 seats in the House of
Assembly without the direct approval and support Representatives, the Democrats won 201 seats, and
of the party. The party was created under Fidel not a single member was from any other party. Only
Castro’s leadership in 1965 through the merger of 2 of 100 Senate seats are held by Independents. Why
several revolutionary groups. Although other politi- are other parties unsuccessful? It is partly a tradition
cal parties are banned, some of the members of among the large majority of voters to select either a
the Cuban legislature are not members of the party Democrat or a Republican. Even more importantly,
when they are elected. But because all candidates the electoral system is based on plurality voting in
are selected by bodies (e.g., trade unions, women’s single-seat districts, making it extremely hard for a
groups) dominated by the party, all candidates are third-party candidate to win. This leads many voters
approved by the party. To offer at least the appear- to conclude that a vote for a third party is either a
ance of popular control, if the proposed candidate wasted vote or serves only as a protest vote because
in a district does not win a majority of votes (almost such a vote will not influence the outcome.
everyone 16 or older votes), a new candidate must Like almost all multiparty systems, Mexico has
be proposed. a proportional representation (PR) electoral system
South Africa is a dominant-party system. with more than one member elected from each dis-
Numerous parties put up candidates for the par- trict. The Mexican system is similar to the mixed
liament, and seats are distributed through a mix PR system in South Africa, which was described in
of single-member and multimember PR districts Focus in 6. There are 300 single-member districts,
(Focus in 6). Since the end of apartheid, the African which elect the person with the highest vote total,
National Congress (ANC) has won a clear major- and 200 PR seats based on party lists. To prevent
ity of seats in every election. Other parties try to a proliferation of small parties in the legislature,
challenge the dominance of the ANC, but no com- a party must get at least 2 percent of the national
bination of parties has yet made a serious dent in vote to get any seats from the PR lists. Only in the
the ANC’s huge majority of parliamentary seats. 1990s did Mexico’s Chamber of Deputies become
However, the first serious split within the ANC a true multiparty system. Two parties (PAN, a con-
occurred before the 2009 election, over a rancorous servative party, and PRD, a leftist party) began to
conflict between current President Jacob Zuma and garner enough votes to prevent the centrist PRI (the
the man he outmaneuvered within the ANC, former Institutional Revolutionary Party) from winning the
President Thabo Mbeki, whose followers have cre- majority of seats, as it had done for five decades.
ated a breakaway party. Although the 2014 election Since the 2000 election, there has been active com-
brought a continuation of the erosion in the strength petition among the three major parties and consid-
of the ANC—down to 62 percent of the vote from erable change in the composition of the legislature
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 193

in each election. During this period, no single party Further Questions

has come close to a majority in the Chamber of
1. If multiparty systems are more prone to instabil-
Deputies, although PRI won 212 of the 500 seats in
ity, why are they present in so many countries?
2012. Because the three major parties are always
competing with one another and do not share a 2. Can you explain why PR electoral systems tend
common political agenda, it is often difficult to fash- to produce multiparty systems?
ion a majority to pass legislation.

Classification and Clarity

Most theorizing about political systems begins with some classification scheme.
Classifying political systems into a taxonomy can be straightforward, especially
when the categories are based on clear institutional characteristics (e.g., federations,
confederations, and unitary states). But many of the most interesting classifications
(e.g., democracies and dictatorships) are challenging because political systems tend
to be complex mixtures of characteristics that do not fit tidily into any category.
In addition, any classification is time-specific because evolutionary and revolutionary
processes can change the nature of a political system.
There are at least three important reasons for classifying political systems. First,
such classification can provide us with useful descriptive information about political
systems. Most people have a vague sense that other political systems are different from
their own, and by describing how various political systems are organized between
central and peripheral units or between the executive and legislative functions, we
expand our grasp of alternative forms of governmental structures.
Second, the classification of political systems helps us undertake political
analysis—to identify patterns of similarities and differences among the political sys-
tems of the world. Rather than positing that every political system is unique, the
analyses in Chapters 6–8, as well as throughout this book, assume that some gener-
alizations can emerge from comparative analysis. Sets of political systems that share
important characteristics can be compared with one another or compared with sets
that do not share those characteristics. Such comparisons provide us with a basis for
thinking more clearly about the kinds of generalizations that we can articulate and can
then increase our confidence regarding what we know about the political world.
Third, the taxonomies in this chapter might encourage us to specify with greater
precision what we mean by value-laden terms such as democracy and dictatorship. In
this manner, the analytic study of political institutions improves our understanding of
how these terms are most appropriately used as thoughtful descriptors rather than as
mere rhetorical labels.
Ultimately, developing greater precision in our use of key political concepts and
increasing our knowledge about the political world can do more than clarify our
thinking. They can also enhance our ability to evaluate the nature and desirability of
the political structures in our own nation and in other countries and to decide whether
there is a “best” form of government.
194 Chapter 7

Would you argue that one form of areal division of power, one form of executive–
legislative relations, and the same constitution are best for all states? Or might the best
institutional arrangements be contingent on the major goals and key characteristics of
the particular political society? As a closing puzzle, if your country were to convene a
constitutional convention now, would you argue in favor of retaining all of the govern-
mental forms that currently exist in your political system? Why or why not?

Key Concepts
assembly system, p. 185 dictatorship, p. 173 nondemocracy, p. 173
authoritarian regime, p. 173 direct democracy, p. 170 parliamentary government, p. 180
authoritarianism, p. 173 electoral democracy, p. 170 participatory democracy, p. 170
autocracy, p. 173 federation, p. 177 party system, p. 185
confederation, p. 178 hybrid system, p. 182 presidential government, p. 180
constitution, p. 165 illiberal democracy, p. 171 representative democracy, p. 170
constitutional regime, p. 167 liberal democracy, p. 171 totalitarianism, p. 174
council system, p. 183 limited mandate, p. 171 totalitarian regime, p. 174
democracy, p. 171 nonconstitutional regime, p. 167 unitary state, p. 177

For Further Consideration

1. What is your definition of a democratic Speculate what politics in the United States
political system? What are the minimal might be like if the country became a
conditions necessary for a country to be unitary state with a parliamentary gov-
classified as a democracy? If you opt for ernment or a multiparty system based on
the definition used in this chapter, explain proportional representation.
which elements of the definition are the 3. Some analysts argue that democracy is not
most essential and the least essential for possible unless there are at least two politi-
democracy. cal parties. Provide a critical evaluation of
2. In the late eighteenth century, the United this viewpoint. In theory, might we expect
States opted for a federal, presidential, any relationship between the number of
bicameral, two-party system with plurality parties and the extent to which the political
elections. Given the situation in the early system is democratic?
twenty-first century, what are the major
shortcomings of each of these decisions?

For Further Reading

Arendt, hannah. (1973). The Origins of chhibber, pradeep, and ken kollman. (2004).
Totalitarianism. new york: harcourt. The The Formation of National Party Systems:
classic study of the forces underlying totalitar- Federalism and Party Competition in Canada,
ian regimes. Great Britain, India, and the United States.
 Political Institutions II: Institutional Arrangements 195

princeton, nJ: princeton university press. The elgie, robert, (2011). Semi-Presidentialism. new
evolution of party systems in the four countries york: oxford university press. An exploration
are examined over three centuries to illuminate of the strengths and weaknesses of hybrids,
the importance of the areal distribution of gov- based on numerous case studies.
ernmental power in shaping the party systems, kollman, ken. (2013). Perils of Centralization:
despite similar electoral systems. Lessons from Church, State, and Corporation.
cheibub, Jose Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism, new york: cambridge university press.
Parliamentarianism, and Democracy. new Using the United States, the European Union,
york: cambridge university press. Using General Motors, and the Roman Catholic
many cases over several decades, the author Church as cases, the author examines the
analyzes whether the presidential or parlia- dynamics of federal systems. Critical issues of
mentary form is more likely to be success- governance and centralization are explored on
ful in achieving stability and in sustaining the basis of these examples.
democracy. lawson, kay, ed. (2010). Political Parties and
collier, paul. (2010). Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy. santa barbara, cA: Abc-clio.
Democracy in Dangerous Places. new york: Lawson is the general editor of a series of
harper. The always-controversial Collier five volumes, each of which offers illuminat-
argues that democracy has been pushed ing case studies of political parties in spe-
with the wrong incentives in many of the cific countries from a region of the world
developing countries, generating more vio- (Americas, Europe, Post-Soviet and Asian,
lence and instability. He suggests that the Africa, Arab World).
key promises given to countries engaging mainwaring, scott, and Anibel perez-linan.
in democratization should be security from (2013). Democracies and Dictatorships in
coups and aid that goes to NGOs, not gov- Latin America: Emergence, Survival, and Fall.
ernment agencies. new york: cambridge university press. Why
Dahl, robert, ian shapiro, and Jose Antonio do some democracies and dictatorships per-
cheibub, eds. (2003). The Democracy severe while others fail? This book uses a rich
Sourcebook. boston: mit press. This very theoretical and rigorous empirical approach to
strong collection of readings covers critical top- answer those questions.
ics, from the definition of democracy to issues rosenfeld, michel, and Adras sajo, eds. (2012).
of representation, constitutional regimes, The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Con-
and the impacts of democracy on individual stitutional Law. oxford: oxford university
countries and the global system. The (gener- press. This edited volume provides the theo-
ally short) excerpts include both major histori- ries and tools necessary to conduct compara-
cal thinkers (Locke, Rousseau, Madison) and tive constitutional analysis. It presents current
important contemporary scholars (Dworkin, debates, concepts, and developments in the
Pzeworski, Sen). field of comparative constitutional law.
Diamond, larry. (2009). The Spirit of Democracy: schrad, mark lawrence. (2014). Vodka Politics:
How to Build Free Societies Throughout the Alcohol, Autocracy, and the Secret History of
World. new york: holt. A compelling, highly the Russian State. oxford: oxford university
readable (and optimistic) exploration, full of press. Alcohol has long been used as a means
engaging examples, of the strategies that can of social control by the Russian government.
help countries in all areas of the world estab- This volume tells the intertwined history of
lish and sustain democracy. Russia and vodka and demonstrates that the
196 Chapter 7

politics of vodka have helped ensure auto- Pakistan. cambridge: cambridge university
cratic rule. press. Why did India institutionalize democ-
sorensen, georg. (2008). Democracy and racy while Pakistan institutionalized an autoc-
Democratization: Processes and Prospects. racy? The author demonstrates how two of
3rd ed. boulder, co: Westview press. A use- the world’s most populous countries emerged
ful exploration of central issues associated with from a similar colonial legacy in radically dif-
the diffusion of democracy to many countries, ferent ways.
including the attempts at promotion by outside Wheare, k. c. (1980). Modern Constitutions. 2nd
powers, the rise of electoral authoritarianism, rev. ed. london: oxford university press.
and the consequences for the international sys- Although first written in 1951, this description
tem of the trends toward democratization. of the content and impacts of constitutions is
tudor, maya. (2013). The Promise of Power: The still insightful.
Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in

On the Web
http://confinder.richmond.edu for each country, which is classified along a
Constitution Finder at the University of 21-point continuum ranging from “consoli-
Richmond provides links to the constitutions dated democracy” to “hereditary monarchy.”
and other key documents for most countries. http://mirror.undp.org/magnet/Docs/parliaments
http://portal.clinecenter.illinois.edu/cgi-bin// This site explores a variety of issues regard-
rview?reposiD=1 ing the functioning of legislatures and their
This site provides the texts of more than 720 relations with other branches of government
national constitutions written since 1789 as and covers governing systems and executive–
well as rich discussions of many of the issues legislative relations within presidential, par-
and themes addressed in constitutions. liamentary, and hybrid systems, along with
http://www.servat.unibe.ch/law/icl information about political parties.
The International Constitutional Law (ICL) http://www.politicalresources.net
project provides English translations of consti- This is a very useful and accessible site with
tutions as well as other textual material related information on many countries, including
to constitutions from more than 90 countries. current data on party systems and links to the
It also cross-references those documents for Web sites of most parties from each country.
quick comparison of constitutional provisions. https://www.cia.gov/index.html
http://freedomhouse.org This part of the U.S. Central Intelligence
The site of Freedom House, which includes Agency Web site presents the World Leaders
current ratings for every country and topical database that lists the chiefs of state and
discussions regarding the levels of political cabinet members of all foreign governments.
and civil rights and press and religious free- http://m.state.gov/mc36886.htm
dom in those countries. A site sponsored by the U.S. State Department
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4. that provides basic details of the governments
htm of every country.
The Polity IV Project provides current and
longitudinal trend data and generates scores
Chapter 8
Political Economy

Learning Objectives
8.1 Explain the role of the state in a nation’s economy.
8.2 Determine the relationship among the separate elements that make up the
political economy.
8.3 Assess the different measures of economic prosperity.
8.4 Compare the ideal-type political economies.
8.5 Identify the challenges faced by market, command, and mixed economies.
8.6 Contrast political economy “isms”, real-world examples and ideal-type
political economies.

Eleven countries in the European Union (EU) officially replaced their national currencies
with the euro—a common EU currency—on January 1, 1999. By 2002, euro paper money
and coins replaced the national currencies in all 11 countries: French francs, German
Deutschmarks, and so on, were eliminated. Although Greece had joined the EU in 1981,
it was not allowed to join the first wave of countries adopting the euro because Greece
did not qualify under the Maastricht criteria: An EU country could participate in the
eurozone (the area that would share the common euro currency) only if its government
maintained low inflation, low government debt, and low government deficits. However,
by the time the paper euros were circulated in 2002, Greece had qualified to join the
eurozone because the Greek government had imposed a series of tough economic poli-
cies that cut spending and reduced both its overall debt and its annual deficit.
After Greece joined the eurozone, the international business community assumed
Greece was a safer place to invest than previously. One result of this new confi-
dence was that the interest rate the Greek government had to pay to borrow money
dropped significantly, from as high as 25 percent in the early 1990s to as low as
4 percent in 2006. Greece was now able to borrow a lot more money at a much lower
interest rate. Extensive borrowing between 2002 and 2007 helped generate substan-
tial annual economic growth. The borrowed money helped build infrastructure and
stimulate business development. Greece also spent billions to host the 2004 Summer
Olympics, which brought tourism but left a generally unused Olympics complex. The
197
198 Chapter 8

Supply and demand: Dockworkers in Athens strike and protest their government’s extensive privati-
zation and spending cuts in response to the severe economic crisis in Greece.

government also hired many more employees and promised them generous pensions
when they retired at age 55.
The Greek government’s borrowing led to an explosion of its level of debt, which
nearly doubled between 2001 and 2011, reaching 1.7 times the total annual output of the
entire Greek economy. The public sector now employed one out of every four workers
in the country. Unfortunately, toward the end of this period, there was a severe slow-
down in the world economy, and a global financial crisis emerged in 2008. Economic
growth in Greece fell sharply. Unemployment rose, tax revenues shrank, many more
Greeks needed government assistance, and the government had big debts to repay.
Lenders insisted that the Greek government reduce its spending and pay off its
debts. No one would loan the Greek government additional money except at pro-
hibitively high interest rates. Under these pressures, the government introduced
austerity policies. It drastically cut spending on social programs, fired many govern-
ment workers and cut the pay of others, cut pensions, and raised the retirement age.
These policies generated a firestorm of anger among Greeks and widespread protests
against the government. But the policy measures that the beleaguered government
implemented were not sufficient to get the debt under control. As the financial crisis
deepened, there was fear that Greece would default on its debt, plunging the world
economy into greater peril. Thus there were several rounds of major “bailout” loans
from the EU, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund to help
Greece pay its bills. In exchange for more than 220 billion euros (nearly $275 billion)
in loans, the Greek government was required to deepen its austerity programs and
 Political Economy 199

sell off many government-run corporations. Most Greeks were angry at their politi-
cal leaders, at the EU, and at the lenders. Protests and pressure on the Greek govern-
ment continued to grow, resulting in political turmoil. And the populations of other
EU countries such as Germany were also angry—at the Greeks for their overspending
and underachievement and at their own governments for bailing out Greece with their
money. Currently, Greece continues to struggle despite the bailouts.
If one needed evidence that the economic system and the political system are
intertwined in a modern society, the recent history of Greece offers a compelling case.
Government policies in Greece and the EU determined the conditions under which
Greece: joined the eurozone; borrowed and spent huge amounts of money; achieved
economic growth and then suffered a debt crisis; and introduced austerity programs
that caused suffering, protest, and government instability.
Indeed, both the economic difficulties and the economic policy challenges cur-
rently facing most countries in the EU, including Great Britain, Ireland, Portugal, and
Spain, and many other countries around the world, are directly associated with their
governments’ policies. Thus, the distinguished scholar Charles Lindblom (1977: 8)
observes: “In all the political systems of the world, much of politics is economics and
most of economics is also politics… For many good reasons, politics and economics
have to be held together in the analysis of basic social mechanisms and systems.”
This book is about the political world. But if Lindblom is correct, your understand-
ing of contemporary politics requires an understanding of its pervasive linkages with
economics. This combination of politics and the economy is called political economy. This
chapter explains this concept. First, it describes the connections between the economic
system and the political system. Then it characterizes three different types of political
economies: (1) the market economy; (2) the command economy; and (3) the mixed economy.
Finally, it examines how these political economies are related to major “isms” in the
political world, especially capitalism, state capitalism, socialism, communism, and
corporatism.

Politics and the Economy

8.1 Explain the role of the state in a nation’s economy.
Many decisions made by the political system have significant impacts on the economy.
Can you think of how the following government policies might affect the economy?

• The government does not construct or repair any highways or roads.

• The government bans the sale of any automobile with gasoline fuel efficiency less
than 45 miles per gallon.
• The government collects very high taxes on the profits of businesses.
• The government fully finances the provision of all medical services for all citizens.
• The government places no restrictions on the right of foreigners to enter and work
in the country.
• The government controls the prices of all basic foods.
200 Chapter 8

Similarly, the actions of major economic actors and the performance of the
economic system can have major impacts on the political system, which depends on
the economic system to generate income, goods, and services for the survival and
prosperity of its citizens. For example, what policy responses might you predict from
the U.S. government to the following economic situations?

• A lengthy nationwide strike by air traffic controllers

• Exceptionally high unemployment over many months
• The proposed sale of the country’s largest automaker to a Chinese corporation
• The discovery that there is less than five years’ worth of petroleum reserves within
the country’s boundaries
• Bankruptcy filings by two of the country’s largest financial institutions

The more one reflects on modern societies, the clearer it becomes that “much of
politics is economics and most of economics is also politics.”
Understanding political economy requires a grasp of some basic economic con-
cepts. This chapter describes a conceptual framework for the economic system that
is similar in spirit to Easton’s framework for a political system (see Chapter 5). The
framework presents only some core ideas that have been simplified considerably.
However, this discussion does involve complicated abstractions, so hang in there! (If
you want the full treatment, take an introductory economics course or read an intro-
ductory economics book such as Heyne, Boettke, and Prychitko [2013]. For a political
science perspective, see Wilensky [2002: Ch. 2]).

A Political-Economic Framework
8.2 Determine the relationship among the separate elements that make up the
political economy.
The abstract model of an economic system presented in Figure 8.1 is our starting point
for understanding the idea of a political economy. The figure offers an extremely sim-
ple characterization of the way in which extraordinarily complex systems of produc-
tion and exchange operate (see Baumol and Blinder 2012: Ch. 8; Miller 2014: Part II).

Factors, Firms, and Households/Consumers

In the beginning (according to this model), there are three kinds of important pro-
ductive resources—the three major factors of production (A) (see Figure 8.1). Land
means the ground plus any raw materials (commodities such as coal and bananas)
on or in the ground. Labor is human productive input (our common understanding
of “work”). Capital is the nonhuman productive input from other resources (espe-
cially financial resources, machinery, and technology). Each factor of production
is controlled by an owner who, in the language of economics, is referred to as a
household (B).
 Political Economy 201

Figure 8.1 An Economic System Framework: The Income-Expenditures Model

or, and Capital Reso
d , Lab urce
Lan Income (Payments) s
E 1.

B. Households (Consumers) C. Firms D2. Intermediate

A. Land, Labor, Capital D1. Goods Goods

E2.
Expen nts)
ditu res (Payme
Final Goods

Some actor called a firm (C) attempts to acquire a combination of these productive
resources (factors of production) to produce a good (D1). A good can be a product (e.g.,
a pencil, a nuclear missile) or a service (e.g., a lawyer defending you in court, transpor-
tation on an airplane).
A firm (in this book, the terms firm and producer are used interchangeably) might
be a single person who produces a good from her own resources. For example, a
lawyer represents you in traffic court through her own labor skills. Or a firm might
be a large organization that uses many productive resources (of land and commodi-
ties, labor, and capital). For example, a firm that produces something as simple as
pencils needs productive resources such as wood, graphite, rubber, machines, and
workers. The firm transforms these factors of production into the final good—here,
pencils. Often some intermediate goods (D2) are acquired to make more compli-
cated goods. The pencil firm, for example, has probably acquired intermediate
goods such as graphite (which it acquires from another firm that has mined and
refined this chemical element) and wood (which has come from a firm that owns,
cuts, and mills trees).
A household has a second role, as a consumer, when it wants to acquire a final good
(e.g., a pencil, a legal defense, whatever). A consumer offers something of value to the
firm in exchange for the good that the consumer wants. What emerges between the
household/consumer and the firm is a system of payments (E1 and E2 in the figure).
A firm must pay something to a household that controls a productive resource neces-
sary for the firm to produce goods. And a household, in its role as a consumer, must
pay something to the firm to get a final good that it wants. Notice that any individual
or group can act as a household, a consumer, or a firm, depending on whether the
individual or group is selling a factor, transforming productive resources into goods,
or acquiring a final good. Of course, many actors both produce and consume goods
and services.
202 Chapter 8

The size of a payment (the price) is established when there is an agreement

between a consumer who is willing to exchange (give up) something to get the good
and a firm who is willing to give up the good for what the consumer offers. In the
language of economics, each actor increases her utility (her overall happiness) in
such an exchange because each has higher utility after the exchange than before it.
So, for example, the actor who has grown a dozen tomatoes might exchange them
for a shirt. Both the tomato grower and the shirt maker have a higher utility after the
exchange because each values the other’s good enough to give up her own good for
the trade.
In every system, there are some good-for-good exchanges, called barter trading
(e.g., the dozen tomatoes are traded for a shirt). But most economies are dominated by
good-for-money exchanges, in which the consumer gives the producer some amount
of money in exchange for the final good (e.g., a tomato might be exchanged for $1, or
the shirt might be exchanged for $20).
If firms want to sell more shirts than customers want to buy, the price of a shirt is
likely to come down. This is how supply and demand operates: If demand is low rela-
tive to supply, the price comes down; if demand is high relative to supply, the price
goes up. In theory, with enough producers and consumers making exchanges, the
price of a good reaches a perfect balance point between supply and demand, known as
the equilibrium point (see Figure 8.2).
The payment by a consumer to a firm (E2) is usually a different amount from the
payments by the firm for the productive resources used to produce that good (E1 in
Figure 8.1). A firm is successful if it can sell the good for more than it paid to produce
the good. This excess of payments over costs is profit. If the firm must sell the good for
less than the cost of producing it, the firm suffers a loss. Obviously, firms normally try
to increase their profit and to avoid loss.

Figure 8.2 The Relationship Between the Supply of a Good and the Demand for the Good
Higher

Equilibrium
Point Supply
Price

Demand

Lower
Lower Higher
Quantity
 Political Economy 203

Getting and Spending

This system of exchanges goes around and around.
Households expend their resources on goods, and firms
provide the households with income as they pay for pro-
ductive resources. Ideally, everyone is exchanging things
of value for other things that they value even more. As
the system becomes more complex, many actors are
involved in the production and distribution of goods.
Some additional actors operate as brokers, organizing
and facilitating exchanges. For example, the grower of
tomatoes might sell them to a broker, who then sells them
to a market that sells them to the ultimate consumer. If
more and more goods are produced, bought, sold, and
consumed by all the actors in the economic system, there
is economic growth.
The complexity of the actual exchanges in most eco-
nomic systems is beyond comprehension. As an example,
see how long a list you can quickly develop of the dif-
ferent people who contributed some fraction of the value
(the one dollar) that you pay for a can of tomatoes at the
supermarket. Think about all the actors involved in the The richest merchant in a Bedouin market in
production and distribution to you of that can of toma- Morocco displays the goods she is selling, proudly
toes. The chain of production includes the labor and wearing the chains of gold coins that attest to
materials to grow the tomatoes, manufacture the can and her entrepreneurial skills as a “firm” in a market
economy.
label, process the tomatoes, ship the finished product,
manufacture the truck and containers in which the prod-
uct was shipped, pay store employees, and so on. You could easily identify hundreds
of people involved in the process who then share the dollar you paid.
Presumably, you (like every other actor) attempt to pursue a strategy that
maximizes your utility (i.e., that results in your most preferred mix of goods and
resources) and hence enhances your life. Individuals (and groups) have very differ-
ent sets of preferences. One person might want to hoard money, food, or precious
metals; another might want to spend everything on consumption for personal plea-
sure. One person might work hard to gain the resources to own a mansion and a
Mercedes-Benz, while another person might be happiest with minimal work and no
possessions other than the bare necessities she carries in a backpack.
Of course, it is a tough world, and all people are not equally capable of maxi-
mizing their value preferences. A person’s success in getting her preferred mix of
goods and resources can be affected by realities such as the types and amounts of
resources she already controls, her skills in producing goods, the demand for her
goods, the actions of other producers, and even luck. Over time, there are likely to
be huge differences in the mix of goods and resources controlled by different indi-
viduals and groups.
204 Chapter 8

The State Joins In

We now have our first approximation of an abstract model of the economic system.
One very important addition to this simplified model is the political system. As noted
at the beginning of the chapter, the modern economic system is inextricably connected
to the political system. Why might the state decide to intervene in the economy? Here
are a few of the most important reasons:

• there is a certain good that is socially important but no firm can produce it for a
profit (e.g., a clean water supply);
• there is a good that requires a scale of production beyond any firm’s capacity
(e.g., national defense);
• the state is needed to enforce legal behavior by households and firms (e.g., contracts);
• the state must protect people from dangerous or illegal goods or production
techniques;
• the state has a policy goal of providing a good to some individuals who cannot
afford it (e.g., health care);
• the state’s goal is to redistribute goods and wealth from some individuals to others.

Notice that each subsequent rationale for state intervention on the previous list is
driven more fully by a political value relative to an economic necessity (Lindblom 2003).
When the state (F) is added in Figure 8.3, the interactions between the economy
and the state result in the dynamic processes we call the political economy. The state can
powerfully affect the economic system in the six general ways, labeled F1 through F6
in Figure 8.3. The state can

• be a consumer, purchasing any good from a firm. (F1)

• replace (that is, be) a household, in the sense that it controls certain factors of pro-
duction. (F2)
• replace (that is, be) a firm, producing a good. (F3)

Figure 8.3 A Political Economy Framework

me (Payments) (E1)
Inco

Transfers
(F6) Taxes (F5)
Regulate (F4) Regulate (F4)
B. Households F. State C. Firms
Replace (F2) Replace (F3)
GDP
Payments
Taxes (F5) Purchases (F1) +Exports
–Imports
Exp Rest of the
endit 2)
ures (Payments) (E World
 Political Economy 205

• regulate the manner in which either households or firms operate by enacting poli-
cies that encourage or prevent certain behaviors by those economic actors. (F4)
• tax (extract resources from) the payments to any actor. (F5)
• transfer payments or goods to any actor. (F6)

The state’s patterns of action on these six dimensions distinguish different types
of political economies.

The World Joins In

The second important addition to our simplified model of political economy is noth-
ing less than “the rest of the world.” While Figure 8.3 could represent an economy at
any level (e.g., a city), it is most commonly understood as the national economy of
a state. Many exchanges of goods and factors of production cross the boundaries of
the state. All those goods and factors of production that are sold to actors outside the state’s
boundaries can be considered exports. Thus, if the tomatoes or automobiles produced
in the United States are sold to households in Mexico, these exports generate revenue
for U.S. firms (hence the plus sign in Figure 8.3). Exports are generally viewed as a
positive for the economy, assuming the goods are sold for a profit, because they inject
additional money into the system. Conversely, the goods that a country’s actors purchase
from firms in another country are imports. Thus, if the United States imports tomatoes
or automobiles produced in Mexico, these imports result in money leaving the U.S.
economy (although the U.S. households and firms do get the goods).
Each country has major policy choices as it decides whether to influence the eco-
nomic transactions that cross its borders. The state might be genuinely committed to
free trade and thus make no effort to influence import and export activity. However,
many countries do intervene in economic transactions that cross their borders in
an attempt to serve their own national interests. The state can discourage imports
by taxing them on entry (tariffs) or by limiting how much of an import is allowed
(quotas). In some cases, the state might even encourage certain imports. Similarly,
the state can implement policies that either facilitate or obstruct exports by its own
firms. Can you think of reasons why a state might restrict certain exports or encour-
age certain imports?
There have always been economic exchanges that cross state borders. In the last
few decades, however, the scale and complexity of interstate exchanges have become
extraordinary. There is now a vast “global economy,” and 60 percent of world eco-
nomic value is now international trade—exchanges that cross state borders (UNDP
2013: 2). Chapter 11 will detail the forces of globalization, but the key point here is
that states find it increasingly difficult to control their own economy. First, many
firms now operate multinationally—that is, they operate in multiple countries and
can move their production from country to country, often very rapidly. Second, even
more firms utilize factors of production and intermediate goods they have acquired
from other countries. And third, most large firms now sell their goods in multiple
countries. Thus, many consumers purchase goods whose productive factors are
206 Chapter 8

not primarily from their home country and, conversely, many firms do not produce
goods with an expectation that they will be consumed in the country of production.
For example, consider whether the clothes you are wearing or your electronics gear
are goods in which the majority of components were produced by firms inside your
country. Probably not.
The global economy has many consequences for the national political economy.
States have much less capacity to regulate the behavior of firms, to control the balance
of imports and exports, and even to tax many economic transactions. Thus, for most
countries, the actions of firms and households outside the state’s borders are very sig-
nificant for the functioning of their political economy. The key impacts of such external
actors will be emphasized in Chapters 13– 15.

The Economy Strikes Back

The previous discussion described how the state can implement a variety of policies
that affect the economy. It is equally important to consider how the economy affects
the state. A fundamental goal of every country is prosperity, and a healthy economy
is the essential provider of resources to serve that goal. The state depends on the eco-
nomic system to generate the goods and revenue that enable the state to function and
its citizens to prosper. More than any other policy domain, governments flounder and
fall when there are serious problems with the economy, because the economy has a
direct impact on the quality of life for most of the citizens in a country.
In most political economies, a substantial proportion of the activity in the eco-
nomic system is not under the direct control of the state. Rather, there are many eco-
nomic actors whose behaviors are of fundamental importance to economic health.
The political economy is in trouble if unemployment is high, or a major firm is strug-
gling, or state regulation is stifling economic growth, or high taxes are discouraging
investment or consumption. Thus, those private sector actors with economic power
can wield substantial, sometimes massive, influence on the decisions and actions of
the state. Moreover, some of those actors are among the most active and well-funded
political groups, and they contribute money and employ lobbyists to shape public pol-
icies in ways that benefit their operations (Parenti 2010).
Who are the major sets of economic actors? First, there are the large corporations
operating in the country. These firms are especially concerned about such policies as
taxation, regulations on business practices and labor relations, and investment incen-
tives. This group includes the flagship companies in the national economy, and their
prosperity is directly linked to the prosperity of the country, psychologically as well
as financially. There are also the multinational corporations with significant activ-
ity in the country. They have particular leverage with government officials because
they can threaten to shift their productive activities outside the country if policies
do not favor their operations. A second group is the country’s small businesses. In
most economies, these firms are the source of most job growth and are the heart of
the overall functioning of the economic system because they produce and distribute
the bulk of the goods. A third set of actors is the interest groups that represent these
 Political Economy 207

various business communities and engage in substantial lobbying on their behalf.

These interest groups are well funded and highly influential with government in
almost every country, and in some countries (described below as corporatist political
economies), the representatives of these organizations are actually direct participants
in the policy process.
A fourth group of economic actors that are very powerful is composed of orga-
nizations in the global financial community. Some operate within a country—the banks
and a broad array of institutions that have been termed the “shadow banking system”
and that control financial capital (Lanchester 2010). Others are international financial
institutions like the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank, and the
World Bank, which can force major policy decisions on many governments, particu-
larly those in the developing world and in countries that are struggling financially, like
Greece. During the recent global recession and the financial crises in countries from
Greece to the United States, these global financial actors, in concert with the banks,
insurance companies, and brokerage houses, have been increasingly visible as the
players whom governments placate and protect. In analyzing the collapse of bubble
economies, the extent to which governments have allowed these actors to operate in
dangerous ways and the willingness of governments to offer them protection (e.g.,
bailouts) has become much more evident than in the past (Roubini and Mihm 2011).
Some critics argue that in almost every country, some combination of these powerful
economic actors dominates governments far more than they are controlled by govern-
ments and its economic policies (Blustein 2006; Ritholtz 2009). At least, the deep inter-
twining of the economic system and the political system is indisputable.

Measuring Economic Prosperity

8.3 Assess the different measures of economic prosperity.
How can you determine if the economy in a country is doing well? How can you mea-
sure the economic prosperity of a country? The most widely used indicators are based
on one of two monetary figures that summarize “gross product”—the total value of
all the final goods produced by a state’s economic actors during a certain time period,
adjusted for exports minus imports. Gross domestic product (GDP) is the total value
of all final goods produced by all people within a state’s boundaries, whether or not
they are citizens (see Figure 8.3). The gross national income (GNI) includes the pro-
duction of all citizens of the state, whether or not they are inside the state’s boundaries.
For crossnational comparisons, these amounts are typically measured in U.S. dollars.
International economic actors have mainly utilized GDP as the primary indicator of a
country’s economic vitality, but in recent years some have begun to emphasize GNI.
Each has certain strengths as a measure of a country’s prosperity in a global economy
in which there are increasing numbers of noncitizen workers and multinational firms.
Because both measures are greatly influenced by the size of the country, attempts
to compare the relative prosperity of the people in different countries typically divide
208 Chapter 8

the productive total by the number of citizens (per capita). However, as measures of
a country’s prosperity, both GDP per capita and GNI per capita have at least three
important flaws:

1. They do not measure how the prosperity is distributed among the country’s eco-
nomic actors, and thus many citizens have an individual level of prosperity that
is sharply different from their country’s average production per capita. The level
of wealth inequality within countries is a perennial hot topic, with some analysts
claiming that it is a critical problem and others viewing it as an inevitable condi-
tion of a vibrant economic system. Compare in 8 and Figure 8.4 examine the level
of inequality in selected countries.
2. Only the goods that actually enter the society’s monetary sector are measured,
while many other valued goods are ignored. These unmeasured goods include
both household work and goods in the “underground economy,” particularly
trade in illegal goods, barter trade, and the black market. In some countries, GDP
and GNI are particularly misleading because such unmeasured goods are a sig-
nificant proportion of total economic activity.
3. GDP per capita and GNI per capita are often used to compare the prosperity of
one country to that of another. However, there are huge between-country dispari-
ties in the exchange value of money. In two different countries, the same amount
of money (converting local currencies into an international exchange currency,
usually U.S. dollars) can buy much more or much less of the same specific goods
(e.g., a pound of rice in Japan might cost 20 times as much as in India).

Due to these crossnational disparities in the value of money, there is increasing

use of a third prosperity measure that attempts to establish equivalent value across
countries, an index based on purchasing power parity (PPP)—that is, correcting
monetary indicators to reflect the amount of currency required in that country to buy certain
standard goods.
An understanding of the average wealth of citizens in a country, especially in
comparisons between richer and poorer countries, is somewhat different depending
on which measure is presented. If we use PPP indexing, Cambodia’s GDP per capita of
only $946 per year equates to $2,360 per capita in purchasing power, more than two and
a half times higher (World Bank 2013). In some countries, PPP lowers the wealth mea-
sure because the cost of living is high. Norway’s GDP per capita based on purchasing
power parity ($65,639), for example, is only two-thirds of its GDP per capita ($99,600).
In purchasing power dollars, the economic gap between the wealthier countries and
the poorer countries usually decreases. Thus in the case of Norway and Cambodia,
the ratio drops from about 105:1 to 28:1 when corrected for PPP. Indeed, for many of
the poorer countries, GDP per capita (PPP) dollars are more than double the GDP per
capita dollars because of the low cost of living in the poorer countries. However, it is
important to note that when a country attempts to participate in the global economy,
and especially when it attempts to import goods, the purchasing power of its currency
is directly tied to international exchange rates, not to the price of rice at home (or PPP
dollars), and its relative wealth or poverty remains.
 Political Economy 209

More broadly, is there a better measure of the general prosperity in a society

than GDP (or GNI) per capita (PPP)? Some scholars now argue that GDP-type mea-
sures give value to many economic activities in our collective lives that should not
be valued, such as the cost of cleaning up environmental damage (e.g., oil spills) or
expenditures on crime (e.g., maintaining prisons), and also that GDP does not account
for many things that do provide us with a higher quality life, such as volunteer ser-
vice and environmentally sustainable activities. They also cite the recent findings
of economists and other social scientists who conclude that beyond a limited level
of wealth, human well-being correlates more with conditions such as physical and
mental health, quality of social life, and level of education rather than with increases
in GDP per capita and material consumption (Easterlin 2006; Layard 2011; but see
Wolfers and Stevenson 2013).
Thus, some propose an alternative measure, such as the Genuine Progress
Indicator (GPI). The GPI adds the economic value of those things that enhance our
quality of life and increase environmental sustainability and subtracts the costs of
those economic activities that reduce quality of life. While GDP per capita in the
United States rose about 240 percent during the period from 1950 to 2005, the
Genuine Progress Indicator per capita rose only about 25 percent (Costanza 2008;
Redefining Progress 2007). Another group proposes the Happy Planet Index (HPI),
a measure for each country that combines individuals’ reported satisfaction with
their lives, longevity, and the country’s ecological footprint (to protect resources for
future generations) (Abdallah et al. 2011). Do you think there is a case for a different
measure of prosperity instead of GDP? What approach do you find better for com-
paring two societies?

Compare in 8
Wealth Inequality
Chapter 2 identified the normative disagreements, a score in which a perfectly equal distribution of
especially between conservatives and socialists, wealth in the population would have an index score
about the desirability of equality. Many discussions of 0.00 and a completely unequal distribution would
focus on the inequalities in wealth between the have an index score of 100. Higher Gini index scores,
“rich” countries and the “poor” countries. However, especially those greater than about 45, indicate very
others focus on the wealth inequalities within coun- unequal wealth distribution. The index also provides
tries. These can be masked by general measures of a way to compare the relative inequality across
national economic prosperity per capita, such as countries. Another form of measuring wealth within a
GDP per capita (PPP). Are there significant inequali- country is the ratio of the country’s personal income
ties within many countries? How are we to make that is held by the top X percent of the population
sense of this? relative to the lowest Y percent.
Economic inequality (or equality) can be mea- Figure 8.4 provides Gini index scores for
sured in various ways. One widely used measure is a selected countries among the 136 countries for
statistic called the Gini index. When used as a mea- which there are data. Inequality in the distribution of
sure of income inequality, the Gini index computes family income ranges from the most unequal country,
210 Chapter 8

Figure 8.4 Wealth Inequality/Equality in Selected Countries (Gini Index)

SourCe: CIA World Factbook 2013
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html

South Africa 63.1

Botswana 63
Sierra Leone 62.9
Central African Rep. 61.3
Namibia 59.7
Haiti 59.2
Colombia 58.5
Thailand 53.6
Paraguay 53.2
Bolivia 53
Chile 52.1
Brazil 51.9
Panama 51.9
Swaziland 50.4
Costa Rica 50.3
Zimbabwe 50.1
Sri Lanka 49
Mexico 48.3
Singapore 47.8
China 47.4
Malaysia 46.2
Peru 46
Argentina 45.8
United States 45
Iran 44.5
Nigeria 43.7
Kenya 42.5 GINI INDEX
South Korea 41.9
Russia 41.7
Turkey 40.2
United Kingdom 40
Ghana 39.4
Israel 39.2
Venezuela 39
Cambodia 37.9
Japan 37.6
Vietnam 37.6
Indonesia 36.8
India 36.8
Egypt 34.4
Poland 34.1
France 32.7
Canada 32.1
Czech Republic 31
Pakistan 30.6
Switzerland 29.6
Belgium 28
Germany 27
Austria 26.3
Norway 25
Denmark 24.8
Hungary 24.7
Sweden 23
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
 Political Economy 211

Lesotho, with a Gini index score of 63.2, to the most in wealth distribution are countries that are either
equal, Sweden, at 23.0. There are considerable cross- European social democracies or European countries
national differences in the extent of wealth inequality. that were under communism until 1989. There are
About 28 percent of the countries have Gini indices exceptions to this general pattern. Two rich coun-
of 45 or higher. Less than 4 percent of the countries tries (Singapore and the United States) have rather
have scores above 60.0, 13 percent score in the 50s, high inequality scores, while some poor countries
28 percent are in the 40s, 40 percent are in the 30s, (e.g., Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, and Pakistan) do have
and 15 percent are below 30 (CIA 2013). Of the 10 substantial equality in income distribution. Two
most unequal income distributions, 6 are in sub- important issues to be addressed in later chapters
Saharan Africa and 4 are countries in Latin America. are what general factors might account for greater
Of the 10 countries with the most equal distributions, or less equality in income distributions and why
6 are in Europe and 4 are in Scandinavia. inequality might be politically significant.
In general, the rich countries (discussed as
the “developed countries of the Global North” in
Chapter 13) have relatively less inequality in the dis- Further Questions
tribution of wealth than most of the poorer countries 1. Does the location of any country in Figure 8.4
(the “developing countries of the Global South” in surprise you? Why?
Chapter 14). Most of the countries with the great- 2. Why might there generally be more wealth
est wealth inequalities are extremely poor countries. inequality in poorer countries than in richer
And most of the countries with the greatest equality countries?

Two Ideal-Type Political Economies

8.4 Compare the ideal-type political economies.
Based on the framework in Figure 8.3, we can distinguish two ideal-type political
economies: market economy and command economy. Remember that an ideal type is a
description of what a certain phenomenon might be like in its pure form, but it does
not necessarily correspond exactly to any real-world example.
In distinguishing the market economy from the command economy, it’s useful to
consider five fundamental questions:

1. Who controls the factors of production?

2. Who determines what goods are produced?
3. Who establishes the value attached to different resources and goods?
4. Who decides how resources and goods will be distributed?
5. What is the role of the state?

The next two sections consider these questions for each ideal-type political econ-
omy. Table 8.1 summarizes the responses to each of these key questions. The table also
provides answers for a “mixed” economy, which is less an ideal type than a real-world
compromise between the two. (For other approaches that explain political economy,
see Heyne, Boettke, and Prychitko [2013] and Lindblom [1977, 2003].)
212 Chapter 8

Table 8.1 Comparing Command, Market, and Mixed Political Economies

Command Market Mixed
Who controls the factors of The state owns all significant Every private actor (house- The state and private actors
production? factors (land, labor, and hold) controls her own each control some factors.
capital). factors.
Who determines what goods The state devises a detailed All actors (firms) make their Some firms are under direct
are produced? economic plan that specifies own separate decisions about state control, but most make
what level of each good will production in an attempt to decisions in the market.
be produced. maximize their own utilities. The state regulates some
actions of many firms and
households.
The system is The system is The system is mainly
supply-oriented. demand-oriented. demand-oriented.
Who establishes the value The state sets the value The market (via the “invisible The market sets the value.
attached to different produc- (price) in all exchanges. hand”) sets the value, based The state regulates some
tive factors and goods? on the equilibrium of supply prices to serve national
and demand. priorities.
Who decides how factors and The state’s plan indicates Distribution is based on a The market is the main
goods will be distributed? who will receive which goods summation of the actions of decision maker. The state
and in what amounts. all consumers and producers intervenes in some cases to
in the market. ensure that certain actors have
access to particular goods.
What is the role of the state? The state is dominant, con- The state plays a minimal The state attempts to strike a
trolling almost all aspects of role in the political economy. balance between:
the political economy. The state enforces the “social (1) state control and
contract,” protecting all from competition; and
violence and lawbreakers. (2) private profit and a sharing
of societal resources.

The Market Economy: Total Private Control

1. Who controls the factors of production? In the ideal-type market economy,
there is total private control. The state has almost no significant role in the politi-
cal economy. Thus, every actor has direct, personal control over the use of all the
factors of production that she owns. The laborer, the landowner, or the owner of
capital decides with whom, if anyone, she will exchange her resources and the
amount of resources she will accept in that exchange. And each firm acts to maxi-
mize its profits through acquiring productive resources and then producing goods
that can be sold to consumers.
2. Who determines what goods are produced? All the firms’ decisions about what
goods to produce are based on their own assessments of how they can achieve
maximum profit. If one thinks of an economy in terms of the supply and demand
for goods, the market economy is demand-oriented. The most important consider-
ation for a firm that is deciding what to produce is this: What good can I offer that
others will demand and that will generate the highest profit for me? Overall, pro-
duction is guided by what the famous Scottish economist Adam Smith (1723–1790,
Compare in 2) called the “invisible hand” of the market. This invisible hand is a
summation of the self-serving actions of every household and every firm regard-
ing their uses of the factors of production.
 Political Economy 213

3. Who establishes the value attached to different factors and goods? Similarly,
the invisible hand of the market establishes value. Every factor of production and
every good that is produced is valued at its opportunity cost—the resources that
someone will give to acquire it. Value is determined in the competitive market of
supply and demand (recall Figure 8.2) as every household and firm tries to gain
the maximum payment from others in exchange for its productive factor or good.
Competition is particularly intense where supply and demand are very unequal.
For example, if a firm needs five workers who can program in Python (demand)
and only two workers are available with this skill (supply), the workers can bid
up the resources that the firm will offer (this is usually a wage rate, but it can also
include other resources such as work conditions, benefits [e.g., housing, health
care], or shares of the firm’s profits). Conversely, if five workers offer the skill and
the firm needs only two workers with this productive factor, the firm can lower
the resources it must pay for the work.
A basic economic assumption in a market economy is the continual adjustment
of supply and demand toward an equilibrium point. For example, some workers
might move to a different place or offer a different labor skill if the wages for pro-
gramming get too low or there are too few jobs. And a firm might find a substitute
for the labor it needs if the labor is too expensive or too scarce to enable the firm to
make a profit (e.g., outsourcing). Can you think of other supply–demand adjust-
ments that the workers or the firm might make?
4. Who decides how productive factors and goods will be distributed? Again,
it is the invisible hand of the market, rather than anyone in particular, that
determines who gets which factors and goods. As each person pursues her own
individual utility, economic actors accumulate dramatically different bundles of
factors and goods, depending on their preferences, the resources they control,
and their skill and luck in exchanging and transforming resources in the market.
5. What is the role of the state? The state is passive in the productive system, allow-
ing private actors to operate in a relatively unconstrained manner. The state’s
primary obligations, under the social contract, are to prevent private actors from
doing violence to one another, protect private property rights, enforce contracts,
and defend the state’s sovereignty. In meeting these responsibilities, the state
might purchase some goods and productive factors, might levy minimal taxes,
and might affect firms’ import and export activities. Otherwise, state intervention
in the economy is extremely limited.

The Command Economy: Total State Control

1. Who controls the factors of production? In the ideal-type command economy,
the state assumes total control of almost all the significant factors of production. The state
eliminates private ownership of labor, land, and capital. The state owns the land,
the natural resources, the factories, the machines, and so on. The state even owns
labor, in the sense that the state decides the form in which all individuals will
provide their labor.
2. Who determines what goods are produced? The state devises a detailed eco-
nomic plan that specifies what goods will be produced, in what quantity, and
from what combination of productive factors. The production decisions in the
214 Chapter 8

state’s plan are supply-oriented (in contrast to the demand orientation of the
market economy). The state-as-firm attempts to use all productive factors opti-
mally to maximize the supply of goods that it has determined are most appro-
priate to produce.
3. Who establishes the value attached to different factors and goods? Because the
state controls all the factors of production and is the firm producing all the goods,
it can also set the values (i.e., establish the payments) for all exchanges within its
boundaries. Competition is eliminated because the state, rather than the market,
establishes the payments for every factor of production and every good in the
society. Thus, the state tells a group of farmers to produce 1 million tomatoes and
then sets the exchange value (i.e., the price) of those tomatoes. Similarly, the state
decides which individuals will have jobs programming Python, and it establishes
the wages and benefits they receive for their work.
4. Who decides how productive factors and goods will be distributed? The state
is particularly active in the decisions about the distribution of goods to the popu-
lation. The state’s plan aims to distribute an optimal bundle of goods to every
citizen, given the resources available. Thus, the plan indicates who will receive
which goods in what amounts. The plan could specify, for example, that automo-
bile-producing factory X will receive 46 tons of steel each month and that town A
will receive three tomatoes per family per week. The plan can even indicate where
these goods will come from (i.e., steel from factory Y and tomatoes from farm B).
5. What is the role of the state? Clearly, the answers to the preceding four ques-
tions indicate that the state has a dominant—even an overwhelming—role in this
ideal-type political economy. The state controls almost all the important factors of
production, plans the manner in which they will be utilized in the production of
goods, establishes the official value of all resources and goods, and decides how the
resources of the society will be distributed among individuals. In the command econ-
omy, profit is accumulated by the state, not by individuals. The state then determines
how this profit will be used to serve its objectives of prosperity, security, and stability.

Key Problems of Each Ideal-Type

Political Economy
8.5 Identify the challenges faced by market, command, and mixed economies.
Table 8.2 lists several important virtues for each of the two types of political economy.
These benefits stem from the logic of each approach. In theory, the market economy is
efficient and dynamic because profit-driven, self-serving behavior in a highly competi-
tive environment encourages high levels of productivity and innovation. In theory, the
command economy is effective and humane because society’s resources are managed
and distributed so that everyone benefits from the most desirable set of goods and
services possible. These virtues are valid, at least in theory. However, there are signifi-
cant potential shortcomings in the functioning of both the market economy and the
command economy. These problems are also summarized in Table 8.2 and are charac-
terized below.
 Political Economy 215

Table 8.2 Benefits and Problems of Market and Command Economies

Benefits Problems
Market economy
Competition Energetic and efficient production Ruthless interactions; huge inequalities in
wealth and resources
Demand orientation Goods’ cost and quality responsive to Creation of demand for and proliferation
consumers’ desires of goods that have limited social value
No central plan Local decision and “invisible hand” Economic cycles of boom and bust,
stimulate innovation, facilitate freedom inflation and recession
Command
economy
No competition Work for common good; relative equality Little initiative; shoddy products; low
of wealth and income; minimal conflict productivity; limited innovation
Supply orientation Production and distribution for social and Oversupply and shortages; lack of
individual needs coordination
Central plan Rational use of societal resources Overcentralized control; lack of respon-
siveness to changing circumstances

Market Economy
REsouRCE InEquAlIty AnD HARDsHIp Substantial resource inequalities tend
to emerge in a market economy. Competition is everywhere, and it tends to become
ruthless. In the economic marketplace, some are extremely successful and others are
complete failures, and the market system is indifferent to the hardships of those who
do not succeed. Neither the successful actors nor the state intervenes to protect those
who have minimal success. Over time, the rich tend to get richer (especially if they
cooperate with one another), while the less successful increasingly lack the resources
for a secure and decent life.

pRoDuCtIon foR pRofIt, not nEED A demand-oriented system of private

production does not necessarily produce goods that best meet human needs. Rather,
production decisions are dominated by actors who produce those goods that they
believe will result in maximum profit. Such goods might be inessential or extravagant
or even dangerous. The state does little to regulate the economic actors or to provide for
those who cannot afford important goods, like health care. More broadly, the aggres-
sive pursuit of profit in the absence of state regulation can result in economic behavior
that is unethical or dangerous. And short-term profitability (“greed is good”) trumps
longer-term considerations of societal benefits, such as environmental sustainability.

sEvERE EConomIC CyClEs A third problem is that a market economy can expe-
rience major economic cycles. There is no guarantee that the very large number of
private decisions about production and consumption (the “invisible hand”) will
mesh in a manner that ensures steady growth and prosperity for the economic sys-
tem as a whole. The economy is prone to large swings toward either hyperactivity
216 Chapter 8

(causing inflation and scarcity) or serious economic slowdown (causing recession or

depression), and the state does not intervene to counteract these swings. Fluctuations
between boom and bust, even if infrequent, can be deeply disruptive to the productive
system, and the bad times can result in substantial hardship.

Command Economy
lImItED InCEntIvEs foR EffICIEnCy The absence of competition in the com-
mand political economy can result in problems as serious as those resulting from
excessive competition. First, if the state controls wages and prices, there are no major
economic incentives for firms to be efficient, for managers to be innovative, or for indi-
vidual workers to work hard. Second, if there is no competitive market of alternative
goods, there is minimal incentive to produce goods of high quality. People are obliged
to accept goods that are unexciting or poorly made.

unREsponsIvE pRoDuCtIon The state’s

emphasis on a supply orientation means that
production decisions are not directly respon-
sive to consumer demand. The central planners’
ideas of what people should want are not nec-
essarily what consumers actually want and will
purchase. Thus, the plan typically results in sub-
stantial oversupply of some goods and severe
shortages of others.

ovERCEntRAlIzAtIon AnD InflExIbIlIty

Command economies are so centralized that
they lose touch with the differences and com-
plexities of individual firms and consumers. The
central planners usually do not receive and react
effectively to information regarding miscalcula-
tions and mistakes in either the development or
the implementation of the state’s overall plan.
Such rigidity and unresponsiveness make the
efficient use of productive resources unlikely. In
short, the political economy that combines mini-
mal competition, a weak demand mechanism,
and inflexibility is prone to low productivity,
inferior goods, and inefficient use of resources.

The Mixed Economy

Cubans rally in Havana’s Revolution Square in support
In reality, no economy is actually identical to
of one of the few remaining communist, command either ideal type. Rather, economies develop
economies. somewhere along the continuum between the
 Political Economy 217

command and market types, and most shift somewhat over time to respond to particu-
lar challenges and political agendas. For example, in response to the Great Depression
of the 1930s, the United States moved further from the market economy end and closer
to the command end of the ideal-type continuum. An expansive set of new govern-
ment policies provided many new social welfare benefits to less-advantaged citizens,
implemented vast public works programs, and introduced extensive new regula-
tions on many aspects of the economy, such as agricultural prices. An example of the
opposite shift occurred during the 1990s in most previously communist countries that
had been in the Soviet bloc. These countries shifted substantially from the command
economy end of the continuum, allowing many features associated with a market
economy. These changes included privatizing most factors of production, enabling
firms to pursue maximum profitability, and allowing the market to determine the
prices of goods. Some, like Poland, flourished. Others, like Russia, had trouble break-
ing away from elite control of the economy (See Chapter 15 for a discussion of the
postcommunist states).
Because almost every contemporary political economy lies somewhere between
a market economy and a command economy, it might be helpful to describe a politi-
cal economy that is in the middle of the continuum as a mixed economy, which
can be understood as an attempt to blend the strengths of the two ideal-type economies
while minimizing their shortcomings. As a hybrid, the mixed economy is not a “pure”
ideal type. It compromises on each of the five major issues considered earlier (see
Table 8.1).

1. Who controls the factors of production? Control of the means of production is

shared between the state and private actors. The state owns or directly controls
some of the major factors of production, such as those relating to key commodities
(e.g., coal, oil, steel), key infrastructure systems (e.g., transportation, telecommuni-
cations), and key financial resources (e.g., banks). Sometimes the state determines
who will control key factors of production, even when the state itself does not.
However, many firms are private and private actors (households) control a sub-
stantial share of the factors of production.
2. Who determines what goods are produced? Production decisions are primarily
demand-oriented, driven by the market mechanism. Half or more of all production
is done by private firms. Most public-sector firms (those owned and managed by
the state) must interact and even compete with many private firms when acquir-
ing productive resources and when selling goods to consumers. However, private
firms and households are constrained by the state, which regulates the behavior
of private actors and can implement an economic plan that specifies broad guide-
lines for all actors in the economic system.
3. Who establishes the value attached to different productive factors and goods?
The value of most goods is established, as in a market economy, through the pro-
cesses of supply and demand. But the state does intervene to ensure that national
priorities are protected. For example, the state might set guidelines to control the
prices of key goods (e.g., basic foods, energy) and of certain factors of produc-
tion (e.g., wages); it might regulate the manner in which firms and households
218 Chapter 8

collaborate and compete; and it might employ taxing and expenditures (purchases
[F1] in Figure 8.3) to influence the economic system.
4. Who decides how factors and goods will be distributed? Decisions on the dis-
tribution of productive factors and goods are the most complicated element of
the mixed economy. Private actors are allowed to take actions that maximize their
profits. The state then intervenes through taxation mechanisms (F5 in Figure 8.3),
extracting resources from firms and households. The state uses these taxes to
purchase goods (F1) or to provide transfer payments (F6), both of which the state
redistributes to certain actors in the social order. The state undertakes only a par-
tial redistribution of resources, leaving private actors with considerable resources
and freedom to make their own decisions about production and consumption.
5. What is the role of the state? The state is far more active than in the market econ-
omy but far less in control than in the command economy. The system blends
a demand orientation and a supply orientation. The state acts to facilitate some
competition while mitigating the effects of ruthless competition. It allows private
actors and the economy to benefit from their skillful use of resources while ensur-
ing a certain level of material well-being for the less successful actors. The great
challenges for the state in a mixed economy concern striking a proper balance
between competition and control, between a free market and a managed economy,
and between private property and a sharing of society’s resources.
All real-world political economies are mixed in the sense that each country is
constantly attempting to find the best balance of market forces and state interven-
tions. The process is contentious because those with different ideologies disagree on
answers to all five of the questions above. Moreover, the state’s economy not only
is subject to all the complexity and change within its borders but also is nested in
the economies of the region and the world. Thus the state’s capacity to manage the
economic health of the country at any given moment might be limited, whatever its
policies regarding the political economy. Focus in 8 describes some of the challenges
facing the Mexican political economy.

Focus in 8
Mexico’s Political Economy
Since the Mexican Revolution of 1917, the econ- is shaped by many forces, but two have been most
omy of Mexico has experienced dramatic highs critical.
and lows as it has transformed from an agrarian The first force is Mexico’s geopolitical
system to a more diversified economy. Currently, situation—its natural resources and its geographic
about 62 percent of the Mexican labor force is location (on geopolitics, see Compare in 11). Mexico
engaged in the provision of services, 24 percent has discovered abundant oil and other minerals,
is in manufacturing, and 13 percent is in agricul- has considerable land suitable for farming, and
ture. The economy now generates about $15,600 has a long coastline on two oceans. Also, Mexico’s
per person (in PPP), ranking eighty-eigth among all economy operates under the looming presence of
countries (CIA 2014). The evolution of the economy the United States, which is the largest and most
 Political Economy 219

influential economic system in the world as well as The Mexican economy has grown in most recent
a political and military superpower. And to Mexico’s years, with increasing rates of job creation, home
south are the small countries of Central America, ownership, and business start-ups, and with many
which have lower GDP per capita than Mexico and families rising to the middle class. Greater prosper-
more commodity-based economies. ity has been associated with reduced birth rates and
The second critical force shaping the economy improved tax collection by the government.
has been the policies of the Mexican national govern- NAFTA has also resulted in some negative effects
ment. Policy was dominated by a single party (PRI, in Mexico. For example, many agricultural products
recall Chapter 7) from the Revolution of 1917 until are now imported from the United States because
the 2000 election of Vicente Fox. PRI policies shifted they are cheaper (due to more efficient technology and
the Mexican economy from a reliance on agriculture U.S. government subsidies to its producers). This has
toward more balance and diversification first through increased unemployment and poverty among Mexican
industrialization and then through provision of ser- farmers. Also, the Mexican economy has become so
vices. State control and intervention in the economy dependent on the health of the U.S. economy that the
were relatively high. The government owned large recent economic problems in the United States have
shares in major industries (e.g., energy, telecommu- generated even deeper problems in Mexico, in areas
nications) and regulated most key economic sectors. such as job losses, difficulty obtaining financial capi-
Its policies of high tariffs and subsidies to domestic tal, and decreasing currency value.
firms protected both agriculture and industry from Illegal immigration, high levels of violent
external competition. Labor was controlled to keep crime, and a burgeoning drug trade are also linked
wages low, although some PRI leaders did promote to Mexico’s stronger economic ties to the United
state spending on social programs for the poor as States. And while the areas close to the U.S. border
well as some redistribution of land to the peasants. have enjoyed most of the benefits from trade within
PRI was accused of extensive corruption that fun- NAFTA, many people in central and southern Mexico
neled considerable wealth from the economy to its have experienced a decline in their living standards.
members and to wealthy Mexicans. Inequality has grown in Mexico with the market-based
During the 1980s and 1990s, the government economy of the NAFTA period. But the recent national
shifted away from state control and ownership of the governments led by fiscally conservative presidents
economy and toward more market-based policies, Fox (2000–2006) and Calderon (2006–2012) did not
encouraging private entrepreneurs and opening the promote increases in government aid to the poor and
economy to foreign capital and imported goods. These others affected by the economic decline. PRI might
policy changes were driven by severe economic crises direct more resources to the less-advantaged groups
in Mexico, including the near collapse of the peso, and now that the party has regained the presidency (Pena
by the general trends in the global economy. Nieto 2012–) and power in the Chamber of Deputies
The evolution of the Mexican political economy (recall Figure 7.2). However, his government has also
was accelerated when Mexico joined Canada and privatized oil resources and limited the control of
the United States in the North American Free Trade powerful unions. The evolution of Mexico’s political
Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. Mexico gained much economy will be a key factor in its progress as a tran-
greater access to the huge market for goods in the sitional developed country (see Chapter 15).
United States. More than 80 percent of its exports
go to the United States. This includes oil, vegetables Further Focus
and fruits, and manufactured goods, many of which
1. What seems to be the most serious problem for
are produced in plants (maquiladoras) located near
the Mexican political economy? How might it be
the U.S. border. Most of these plants import com-
dealt with?
ponents (intermediate goods) from the United States
and then complete the assembly of final goods that 2. Does it seem more beneficial or harmful for
are exported, such as automobiles and televisions. Mexico to have the United States as its neighbor?
220 Chapter 8

Politics and Political Economy:

The Other “ISMS”
8.6 Contrast political economy “isms”, real-world examples and ideal-type
political economies.

The Three-Plus “Isms”

One set of great “isms” in political analysis includes the Western ideologies of con-
servatism, classical liberalism, and socialism (see Chapter 2). Another set of “isms”
explicitly links politics to political economy: capitalism, communism, and socialism. In
twentieth-century politics, these were extremely emotive labels, endowed with power-
ful ideological content. In their most straightforward form, capitalism, communism,
and socialism correspond loosely to market economy, command economy, and mixed
economy, respectively. These three classic “isms,” along with three others in some con-
temporary societies—state capitalism, statism, and corporatism—are described below.
Capitalism is a system in which private economic actors are quite free from state constraints,
private property rights are fundamental, and the state engages in few actions that might shift
resources among private actors. It is founded on the philosophy of laissez-faire econom-
ics celebrated by Adam Smith, and it imposes the severe limitations on government
activity that are associated with classical liberalism and the market political economy.
The freedom of private economic actors is paramount, and the state should not inter-
vene to benefit either winners or losers in the economic competition. It is praised for its
economic dynamism, innovativeness, and responsiveness to market demand. There is
no assumption that capitalism requires any particular form of political processes (e.g.,
on the democracy–nondemocracy continuum) to function efficiently (Thurow 1997).
Chile, Switzerland, and Uganda are examples of mainly capitalist systems. Capitalism
is maligned by its critics as a system of self-interested individualism that denies the
need for collective action to protect the disadvantaged, to nurture society as a whole, to
promote social values and culture, or to protect the ecology (Heilbroner 1994).
Communism has as its centerpiece the socialization of resources—the notion that the
state must actively control society’s land, labor, and capital to achieve substantial equality for
all citizens. Consistent with the command political economy model, the state guides
the utilization of all these major means of production with a central plan so that the
production and distribution of goods serve the best interests of the entire population.
However, communism also emphasizes a strong ideological commitment to economic
and social equality among all its citizens. And it typically posits that government and
politics, like the economic system, must be guided powerfully by a unified leader-
ship, at least until equality is achieved. Communism is generally associated with the
theories of Karl Marx and with the economic systems that were developed in coun-
tries such as China (1949 to about 1990), Cuba (since 1959), North Korea (since the
early 1950s), and the former Soviet Union (1917–1991). Its critics disparage commu-
nism as an inefficient economic system with a nondemocratic government that denies
 Political Economy 221

individual freedoms and rights. In recent decades, most countries have abandoned the
command economy that is central to communist principles, leading some to suggest
that communism is dead. The Debate in 8 considers this proposition.
socialism is in the middle of the three “isms,” and thus it is not precisely differen-
tiated from the other two. It seeks a complex balance between state involvement and private
control of the economy, and a key policy goal is a relatively equitable distribution of benefits to all
citizens. As in the mixed political economy, some major productive resources are owned
or controlled by the state, and the state actively intervenes in planning and regulat-
ing the economy; but most production decisions are private, and value is established
primarily by supply and demand (Przeworski 1985). Socialism is distinguishable from
communism because the state only controls a few important factors of production in
the society, allows private actors considerable freedom of action, and does not aim to
achieve total economic equality among all citizens. Finland and Denmark are examples
of what are known as democratic socialist systems (or “social market” systems; see
Chapter 13) because they blend socialist economics with democratic politics.
state capitalism is a political economy in which the leaders of the political system assert
extensive control over who is allowed to compete in the key sectors of the economy, and the primary
goal of the economy is to serve state power. State capitalism is also referred to as “political
capitalism.” The state is a very active participant in the political economy, supporting
and controlling major firms in a marketplace that is based on competition. Although
economic activity seems to resemble laissez-faire capitalism, the core principle guiding
economic decisions is not to maximize profit but to ensure that major firms and critical
assets enhance the power of the state and its leaders. Political leaders allocate manage-
ment of those firms and assets either to “friends of the government” or to government
officials themselves. Most small firms are allowed to operate relatively freely in pursuit of
private profit within a strong regulatory framework. The politics of most state capitalist
countries tends to be nondemocratic. This includes some countries that shifted away from
a command political economy but retained centralized political power, such as China,
Russia, and Vietnam (see Chapter 15). Numerous other authoritarian regimes, such as
Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, have also adopted forms of state capitalism (Bremmer 2010).
Statism is a political economy variation of state capitalism. statism also has a
highly active state, which manages the system of production and distribution of goods, with
a primary goal of economic growth and development. Firms compete in the marketplace,
although the state attempts to nurture and protect them from external competition.
The main distinction between statism and state capitalism is that in a statist political
economy the primary motivation for state involvement is to develop the economy as
rapidly and strategically as possible. Economic growth and economic vitality, guided
strongly by the profit motive, drive the policy choices. The state extensively regulates
the actions of firms and households. Many important areas of production (e.g., trans-
portation, power, banking) might be publicly owned and operated as state enterprises.
The state also controls the prices of certain basic goods (e.g., foods, fuel). State policies
support the firms that are targeted for success in the domestic and global market, but
there is far less concern than in state capitalism with exploiting the economy to pro-
tect the power of a particular political elite or to benefit “friends of the government.”
222 Chapter 8

Statist systems have tended to be authoritarian or somewhat democratic. Japan was an

early innovator of the contemporary form of statism, which was then adopted in many
developing countries, including Brazil, India, Mexico, Singapore, and South Korea
(Johnson 1995; Woo-Cumings 1999).
Corporatism is a system characterized by a political arrangement that facilitates
extensive economic cooperation between an activist state and large organizations representing
major sectors of economic actors. The corporatist state attempts to consult, cooperate, and
coordinate with the representatives of several key groups that control major productive
resources in the society. These “peak associations” (organizations that represent these
big groups) usually include large industries, organized labor, farmers, major financial
institutions, and the military. The peak associations have some autonomy from the state,
but they are supposed to work together for common national interests. Thus, corporat-
ism blends features of capitalism (e.g., private ownership, private profit), state capital-
ism (e.g., selecting and supporting key economic actors), and socialism (e.g., extensive
state economic planning, coordination of major factors of production with the state’s
conception of the national interest). While the boundaries between corporatism and the
other isms can be blurry, some scholars would include Japan, the Netherlands, Peru,
Portugal, and Sweden among the contemporary states that have significant corporatist
tendencies (Crouch and Streeck 2006; Molina and Rhodes 2002; Schmitter 1989).

The Debate in 8
Is Communism Dead?
In the decades after World War II, many thought that innovation, and flexibility in every country that
Marx’s prediction of the inevitable success of com- has implemented it. These fundamental weak-
munism was correct because more and more coun- nesses resulted in failure and abandonment of
tries adopted its main guidelines for their political this approach almost everywhere, from the Soviet
economies. Soviet Union leader Nikita Khrushchev Union and Eastern Europe to wherever it was
famously announced in 1956 that communism would attempted in Africa, Asia, or Latin America.
bury capitalism. However, the Cold War between the • Even most countries that are still nominally com-
communist Soviet bloc and the capitalist bloc led munist actually practice capitalism. For example,
by the United States ended in the late 1980s with although China protects its one-party political sys-
almost every country abandoning the command tem, it has freed its markets and many of its firms
political economy, even the Soviet Union. While to benefit economically from global trade. In a
many note the triumph of capitalism over commu- radical departure from Marxist ideas, the Chinese
nism (Fukuyama 1992; Heilbroner 1994), the global “Communist” Party protects property rights and
economic meltdown has revitalized the Marxist per- promotes wealth accumulation. Of more than
spective (Panitch 2009). Is communism, as a model 180 countries, the only countries that still practice
for a political economy and a society, dead? something close to communism in political-eco-
nomic terms are a very few small, economically
Communism Is Dead… backward states like Laos and North Korea.
• The command political economy that drives com- • The attempt to create a population that truly
munism has stifled the incentives for productivity, believes in the communist ideology of collective
 Political Economy 223

sharing of societal resources and the equal dis- some of China’s rural population not only oppose
tribution of benefits has repeatedly failed. Despite the effects of state capitalism in their country but
massive efforts at political socialization and sub- also support the communist principle of equal
stantial use of coercion by the state, human nature property distribution (Nadiri 2007).
seems to prevent people from genuinely embrac- • Democracy and communism are not incom-
ing the ideals of collectivism and egalitarianism. patible. In fact, several democratic countries
• In retrospect, it is clear that the viability and spread have or recently had majority communist party
of communism during the Cold War (1945–1990) governments—Cyprus, Moldova, and Nepal. In
occurred primarily because communist countries democratic India, three states have recently been
could wield extensive coercion against their own dominated by the communist party, including
populations and possessed formidable military West Bengal for 34 straight years (Williams 2008).
power to promote communism abroad. • The key principles of communism, especially the
• Consider the well-known European aphorism: If collectivization of major societal resources and
you are not a communist at 20, you have no heart; redistribution of wealth toward the less advan-
if you are still a communist at 40, you have no taged, are very evident in the political philoso-
brain (an observation even repeated by Russia’s phies of leaders such as Evo Morales in Bolivia,
top leader Vladimir Putin in 2007). Political and Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, Jacob Zuma in South
economic power in the world is clearly dominated Africa, and Nicolas Maduro in Venezuela, as well
by older and wiser people who, almost without as some European leftist parties with solid elec-
exception, completely reject communist ideas. toral support.
• Insurgency movements inspired by Neo-Marxist
Communism Is Alive and Well… communist ideals are still active in some countries
that suffer from economic underdevelopment and
• Numerous countries still operate under the gen- severe inequalities. This includes movements in
eral principles of a command political economy Colombia, India, Peru, the Philippines, and Turkey.
or state capitalism. While they might not call • Reconsider: If you are not a communist at 20,
themselves “communist,” they have retained a you have no heart.…The majority of the world’s
strong, one-party state that controls the politi- population is young, poor, and suffering from the
cal economy and opens it to the market only to severe inequalities in their own societies. It is not
the extent that the market furthers the key com- surprising that many of them are attracted to the
munist aims of using society’s key resources to fundamental values of an ideology that promises
increase the broad sharing of benefits. This is the economic and social justice.
case in countries in European Central Asia (e.g.,
Belarus, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan),
Asia (e.g., Cambodia, Nepal, North Korea, Laos, More questions…
Vietnam), and Latin America (e.g., Cuba). 1. Is it possible that the ideals of communism will
• In countries that have “abandoned” communism, always appeal to at least a minority of people
a substantial proportion of the population still in countries experiencing high levels of poverty
prefers their circumstances under communism and inequality?
to those in the postcommunist period. In Russia, 2. Is the repeated failure of the command political
for example, two-thirds of those surveyed in 2013 economy due to clumsy implementation or its
still view communism favorably and a major- inherent flaws?
ity have a positive attitude toward life under the 3. Is a relatively classless society possible, or will
old communist system (Carden 2013). Similarly, there always be inequality?
224 Chapter 8

The Real World

As noted above, because they are ideal types, no contemporary country has a politi-
cal economy that corresponds exactly to either the market economy or the command
economy. While it is possible to place countries generally along a continuum from a
“pure” market economy to a “pure” command economy, all actual political economies
are mixed and move on that continuum depending on political fortunes and economic
necessities. This does not mean that all political economies are basically the same—the
mix of elements varies a great deal from country to country. Every state engages in
some activities as a firm, some regulation of economic actors, and some redistribution
of resources. Every state favors some economic actors over others. Politics and values
play a powerful role in establishing exactly what kinds of interventions the state will
undertake and what values and interests the state will serve.
Thus, understanding the mixed nature of actual political economies entails more
than simply comparing the proportion of the GDP controlled by private actors with
that owned by the state or even assessing the bundle of state-provided goods and
services. The five examples that follow—Switzerland, South Korea, Denmark, Cuba,
and Russia—briefly suggest some of the features of actual political economies relative
to the ideal types grounded in the major “isms” presented above (data sources are CIA
2014; Heritage Foundation 2014; Transparency International 2013; UNDP 2013).

GEnERAlly mARkEt AnD CApItAlIst: sWItzERlAnD The fourth wealthiest

major country in the world (measured as GDP per capita in purchasing power parity),
Switzerland has a relatively weak central government. This decentralization of politi-
cal power is linked to a political economy that strongly emphasizes private control and
limited government involvement. Switzerland is ranked third among 176 countries on a
measure of freedom of the economy from state regulation. Nearly all factors of production
are privately owned, and most decisions and actions regarding the use of those resources
are in private hands. Apart from defense expenditures and education, relatively few
resources are allocated to the provision of public goods, given the wealth of the society.
Central government spending is less than 15 percent of GDP, and total expenditure by all
levels of government is 34 percent of GDP, among the lowest of all developed countries.

GEnERAlly mIxED AnD CApItAlIst: soutH koREA In South Korea, the state
has little commitment to use the political economy for direct improvement of its citi-
zens’ quality of life. Apart from education, the state does not provide many welfare
goods and services to its citizens. Government expenditures (by all levels) are only
about 27 percent of GDP, the lowest among all relatively developed countries. It is
not a purely capitalist system, however, because the state is extremely interventionist
in promoting economic development. The state bureaucracy works very closely with
firms to implement a comprehensive, collaborative strategy for economic growth,
helping it rise to twenty-ninth in the world on GDP per capita. This strategy has par-
ticularly favored the development of a few major Korean companies. Government
loans, tax credits, and other subsidies are channeled to these companies, which are
expected to operate and diversify in directions suggested by the government. In turn,
 Political Economy 225

the government has assured the companies that they will enjoy high profits and a
labor force that is well educated, disciplined, and unable to organize effectively for
higher wages. The state has also used many hidden subsidies and import restrictions
to provide competitive advantages in the international market to its export-oriented
firms. Thus, South Korea ranks twenty-ninth on the measure of economic freedom.
(This “developmental state” approach, a variation of statism, will be discussed further
in Chapter 10.)

GEnERAlly mIxED AnD soCIAlIst: DEnmARk Denmark is ranked twenty-

second in terms of GDP per capita (PPP). The great majority of productive resources in
Denmark are privately owned, and the state allows entrepreneurs considerable free-
dom of action, with a ranking of ninth on the economic freedom measure. However,
the state is very active in guiding the Danish political economy. First, it enforces strong
policies that regulate private economic actors in a generally corporatist approach,
especially policies that control working conditions and environmental quality.
Second, the state provides an extensive array of welfare services to the population,
including: income supplement programs; a comprehensive, free health care system;
state-subsidized housing for the elderly and for low-income groups; free child care;
free education from infancy through university; and an extensive public transporta-
tion system. Third, it has one of the world’s most equal income distributions and is
ranked the world’s least corrupt country. More than 58 percent of GDP is spent by
all levels of government, the second highest among developed countries. To finance
these programs, the government collects various forms of taxes equal to more than
50 percent of the GDP.

GEnERAlly CommAnD AnD CommunIst: CubA In response to the global

movement toward more market-oriented systems, Cuba has reduced its level of cen-
tralized state control over the economy. People can now buy and sell houses and cars
and run small, for-profit businesses. However, the state still owns and controls Cuba’s
major means of production, and there is a detailed central economic plan. Cuba is
ranked 175 among the 176 countries on economic freedom. Agriculture and manufac-
turing operations remain collectivized, and the state controls many prices. The state
promises work for all (although there is unemployment), and it sets workers’ wages.
Consistent with the ideals of communism, the state retains a fundamental commit-
ment to control and allocate societal resources to serve human needs. There has been
a strong emphasis on state spending on education and health care and on policies to
equalize the distribution of land and income and to increase equality among races,
between genders, and between urban and rural citizens. Despite its modest GDP per
capita (it ranks ninety-fourth in the world), government policies result in Cuba rank-
ing in the top 25 countries in the world on the UN’s non-income measure of quality of
life that emphasizes health and education (see Chapter 13).

GEnERAlly stAtE CApItAlIst: RussIA Most of the key principles of the com-
mand political economy and the communist redistribution of resources to create
greater equality have been abandoned in Russia since 1989. The political leadership
226 Chapter 8

controls major economic assets and firms, either through state-run enterprises or
through its control of the owners and managers of large privately owned firms. Russia
has replaced central planning with market-based pricing and production decisions as
firms compete in the global market environment, and it has joined the World Trade
Organization. But the decisions of all major economic actors must support the goals
and power of the authoritarian political leadership headed by Vladimir Putin. The
greatest economic gains are reserved for those associated with the political elite.
Strong state control and regulation result in an economy that ranks only one hundred
thirty-ninth in economic freedom. But by exploiting its vast natural resources (e.g., oil,
natural gas, minerals) and its educated labor force, Russia’s annual economic growth
since 2000 has averaged a healthy 4.8 percent, the current GDP/capita/PPP has risen
to $18,100, and real disposable incomes of Russians have doubled. Entrepreneurs who
are successful in marketing goods and serving the agenda of the state can become very
wealthy, and inequality of income in Russia has increased substantially since 1990. The
state has cut back dramatically on its provision of social goods, such as subsidies for
housing, food, education, and health care, resulting in considerable hardship for those
who are unsuccessful in the state capitalist system.

Concluding Observations
This chapter has introduced you to an approach to political analysis that classifies
and characterizes countries in terms of their political economies. These concepts are
abstract and require the fusion of political science and economics. They are important
concepts because the linkages between the political system and the economic system
are fundamental and pervasive in the contemporary world. Indeed, the two systems
have become so interrelated in most states that it is difficult to separate them except in
an analytic sense. There is substantial variation in the extent to which the state inter-
venes in the economy. In some countries, the state’s role is limited, while in others the
state is deeply involved in most aspects of the production and distribution of goods.
Regardless of the form of the political economy, the health of its economy is crucial to
every state and the impacts of the economy and economic interests on government and
politics are enormous.
In considering variations in economic systems, you might find it difficult to
avoid strong normative judgments due both to your political socialization and to
your tendency to identify an “ism” with particular states for which you have definite
positive or negative feelings. In the United States, Tea Party activists are outraged by
the “socialist” policies of President Obama. In Bolivia, President Morales claims that
“(t)he worst enemy of humanity is U.S. capitalism.” It is certainly reasonable that you
will make both analytical and normative judgments about the virtues and shortcom-
ings of every form of political economy and every “ism.”
Indeed, assessing the appropriateness of a country’s political economy might be
the most crucial issue in understanding its effectiveness in the contemporary politi-
cal world. In recent years, the support for communism and the command political
economy has substantially declined among the leaders and citizens in many countries.
 Political Economy 227

As you will see in Part Five, however, the rejection of communism has not led to a
complete embrace or full implementation of a market economy. It has not even meant
that most political leaders and most citizens have abandoned their support for all of
the principles associated with a more command-oriented political economy or more
extensive redistribution of wealth.
Despite your own political socialization, you might reflect on a fundamental
question: Is every state, regardless of its current economic and political development,
best served by exactly the same political economy? If you allow for variations in the
most appropriate form of political economy for countries in the current global system,
you leave open many challenging and important questions about political choices,
questions that will be considered from a variety of perspectives in the remainder of
this book. This exploration will begin in Part Four, with chapters that examine cru-
cial issues associated with political decision making; political, social, and economic
change; and political violence.

Key Concepts
capitalism, p. 220 gross domestic product political economy, p. 199
command economy, p. 213 (GDP), p. 207 profit, p. 202
communism, p. 220 gross national income purchasing power parity
corporatism, p. 222 (GNI), p. 207 (PPP), p. 208
economic growth, p. 203 household (consumer), state capitalism, p. 221
exports, p. 205 p. 200 statism, p. 221
factors of production, p. 200 imports, p. 205 socialism, p. 221
firm (producer), p. 201 market economy, p. 212 supply and demand, p. 202
good, p. 201 mixed economy, p. 217 utility, p. 202

For Further Consideration

1. The economic productivity of command 3. Are there measures, other than the growth
political economies has always been inferior in GDP per capita, that might indicate the
to that of market political economies in com- success of a political economy? Why are
parable countries. What, then, might have leaders in most states so worried if there is
been the attraction of this approach to many no growth in GDP per capita?
groups and to many countries between the 4. Do you agree with those who contend that
1950s and 1970s? capitalism is so individualistic that it fails to
protect the collective good?
2. What would be the greatest benefit to indi-
viduals if the state played almost no role in 5. Why might some analysts argue that state cap-
its political economy? What would be the italist systems have competitive advantages
most serious problem with such a system? over more purely market-based systems?
228 Chapter 8

For Further Reading

Courtois, stephane, nicholas Werth, Jean- most prosperous countries and is, he argues,
louis panne, Adrzej paczkowski, karel dangerous and destructive.
bartooek, and Jean-louis margolin. (1999). van kersbergen, kees, and barbara vis.
The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, (2013). Comparative Welfare State Politics:
Terror, Repression. trans. Jonathan murphy Development, Opportunities, and Reform.
and mark Cramer. Cambridge, mA: Harvard new york: Cambridge university press. The
university press. A detailed and profoundly authors consider how capitalist democracies
critical analysis of the history of communism have chosen to reform their welfare state struc-
in the twentieth century. Its core argument is tures and provide insight into the variations
that a series of regimes and ruthless dictators and challenges of economic planning.
(e.g., Lenin and Stalin in the Soviet Union, kristol, Irving. (1978). Two Cheers for Capitalism.
Mao Zedong in China, Pol Pot in Cambodia, new york: basic books. A leading U.S. neo-
Kim Il Sung in North Korea) have led commu- conservative argues that capitalism is superior
nist regimes that engaged in brutal “class gen- to alternative forms of political economy.
ocide” in their societies, resulting in as many levitt, steven D., and stephen J. Dubner. (2010).
as 100 million deaths. Super Freakonomics: Global Cooling, Patriotic
friedman, milton. (1981). Capitalism and Prostitutes, and Why Suicide Bombers Should
Freedom. Chicago: university of Chicago Buy Life Insurance. new york: William morrow.
press. The major contemporary explication of And now for something completely different:
the classical liberal preference for a strong mar- Like the earlier Freakonomics (2008), this book
ket economy with limited state intervention. offers a playful and interesting wander through
Garson, barbara. (2003). Money Makes the World microeconomics, revealing how economic think-
Go Around. new york: penguin. The contro- ing can explain the impacts of incentives and
versial social critic offers a wonderfully read- public policy on individual and group behavior
able exploration of the global economy by and (often) generates unexpected outcomes.
tracking the money in two small investments lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets:
and revealing how that money has various The World’s Political-Economic Systems. new
effects on people around the world. york: basic books. A rich, comparative analysis
Heilbroner, Robert. (1994). Twenty-First Century of the relative merits of the political economies
Capitalism. new york: W. W. norton. An of modern socialism and capitalism.
economist and social critic outlines the chal- Reisman, George. (1998). Capitalism: A Treatise
lenges facing capitalism and the continuing on Economics. A lengthy (1,100 pages) but
need for the state to guide the market economy powerful and readable defense of laissez-faire
and serve the social good. capitalism, debunking myths about its weak-
Judt, tony. (2011). Ill Fares the Land. new york: nesses and critiquing rival theories, from
penguin press. Writing to young people, this Keynesianism to communism. Available free
major scholar of social history offers an elo- online at www.capitalism.net/Capitalism/
quent argument for the values of social democ- CAPITALISM_Internet.pdf.
racy—collective action for collective good—in Ritholtz, barry. (2010). Bailout Nation: How
contrast to the ideology of capitalism and self- Greed and Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street
interest that dominates current thinking in the and Shook the World Economy. new york:
 Political Economy 229

Wiley. Blogger and money manager Ritholtz citizens, especially the less advantaged, can be
offers a scathing and highly controversial protected in a globalized world by enlightened
indictment of both government policy and the economic and social policies.
behavior of profit-driven financial actors that Walter, stephanie. (2013). Financial Crisis and
led to the recent global economic crisis. the Politics of Macroeconomic Adjustments.
Roubini, nouriel, and stephen mihm. (2011). new york: Cambridge university press. This
Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the book demonstrates the connection between
Future of Economics. new york: penguin. A economic policy and the preferences and risks
reasoned analysis of the interplay between the of the electorate. The options available to poli-
economic system and the political system that cymakers are limited by the economic and
explains how problematic behavior of actors in social vulnerabilities of the population.
both domains caused recent financial crises in Wallerstein, Immanuel, Randall Collins,
many countries and must be altered or there michael mann, Georgi Derluguian, and
will be an even bigger crisis soon. Craig Calhoun. (2013). Does Capitalism Have
Royo, sebastian. (2002). “A New Century of a Future? new york: oxford university press.
Corporatism?” Corporatism in Southern Five progressive scholars each present a pro-
Europe—Spain and Portugal in a Comparative vocative argument about how capitalism’s
Perspective. Westport, Ct: praeger. Detailed shortcomings are likely to result in substantial
case studies of the last three decades in Spain changes in the political economies of individ-
and Portugal are the basis of an exploration of ual states and the global system.
how technological and postindustrial changes yunus, mohammed. (2011). Building Social
have created the conditions for a resurgence of Business: The New Kind of Capitalism that
corporatism in European settings. Serves Humanity’s Most Pressing Needs. new
stiglitz, Joseph E., and mary kaldor, eds. (2013). york: publicAffairs. Nobel Prize winner for
The Quest For Security: Protection Without his innovative microcredit strategy (see Focus
Protectionism and the Challenge of Global in 14), Yunus offers his vision of a model of
Governance. new york: Columbia university “social business” that blends free market
press. This collection presents a series of anal- entrepreneurialism with a focus on meeting
yses about how the well-being and security of social needs.

On the Web
http://imf.org researchers “committed to bringing economic
The key documents and agreements among freedom and growth to all the countries of the
all states and for particular members of the world.”
International Monetary Fund (IMF), an orga- http://www.marxists.org
nization that includes more than 180 countries The Marxists Internet Archive offers links to
that cooperate to sustain a smoothly function- numerous sources that make the case against
ing system of interstate trade and to provide capitalism as an economic system.
loans and other financial assistance to countries. http://worldbank.org
http://freetheworld.com The official site of the World Bank, an inter-
A site containing reports and data from the national consortium of banks and other major
Economic Freedom Network, a congeries of financial institutions, includes extensive
230 Chapter 8

economic data regarding the structure and data and graphics, as well as links to other
performance of the economies of more than sites.
180 countries. http://www.weforum.org
http://www.wto.org The site of the World Economic Forum, an
The World Trade Organization (WTO), which organization designed to allow world leaders
coordinates trade policy for about 150 coun- to address global issues, contains a substantial
tries, offers this Web site to provide key docu- amount of information on a variety of interna-
ments and agreements as well as sections that tional economic issues (e.g., sustainable devel-
articulate and justify the WTO philosophy of opment, globalization).
open trade relations among countries. http://www.capitalism.org
http://globalexchange.org This libertarian-inspired site describes the core
Dedicated to a progressive agenda, this Web principles of a system of unconstrained, free
site includes links to articles and a section on market capitalism, including a useful glossary,
the global economy that emphasizes fair trade, links to articles, a newsletter, banners, and the
fair loan practices, and greater equality among unique “Capitalism Tour.”
countries and people. http://www.economist.com
http://www.cato.org The electronic home of The Economist, a lead-
From the Cato Institute, this site offers evi- ing British-based news magazine, provides
dence, including various online studies and access to economic data and selected articles
articles, for the benefits of free trade and the examining issues of political economy and
costs of protectionism. world finance.
www.economywatch.com
Brief characterizations of many national
economic systems are provided, including
Chapter 9
Public Policy, Power,
and Decision

Learning Objectives
9.1 Differentiate among the types of public policy and outline the stages of
public policy.
9.2 Identify three major approaches that explain public policymaking.
9.3 Characterize the elite approach.
9.4 Characterize the class approach.
9.5 Characterize the pluralist approach.
9.6 Evaluate the similarities, differences, and usefulness of the three major
approaches to public policymaking.

“Mapuche”—their name means “people of the land.” This indigenous people of

Chile has sustained its nation-based identity for many centuries. They fought the Inca
Empire to a standstill in the 1400s, and drove back the Spanish conquistadores from
their land in the 1500s. But in the late nineteenth century, a substantial part of the land
claimed by the Mapuche in southern Chile was acquired by outsiders, especially large
agricultural barons, small farmers, and multinational logging companies.
Since the middle of the twentieth century, the Mapuche have persistently urged
the Chilean government to enact policies that respond to their claims regarding
their land rights, the protection of their cultural identity, and their desire for greater
political autonomy. The Mapuche do have some resources for influencing govern-
ment policy. With 800,000 people, they hold some electoral clout. Chile is one of
only 22 countries that have ratified the United Nations’ Indigenous and Tribal
Peoples Convention (1989), which pledges to promote the rights of groups like the
Mapuche. Also, the center-left coalition that dominated Chilean politics from 1988 to
2010 expressed some sympathy for the Mapuche claims. And in 1998, the Mapuche

231
232 Chapter 9

Outside Chile’s Supreme Court, police arrest a Mapuche woman protesting the long sentences imposed
on four Mapuche activists who had attacked police while asserting their land rights on a settler’s farm.

established Coordinadora Arauco-Malleco (CAM), an interest group to coordinate

their political actions.
However, the political forces lined up against the goals of the Mapuche are formi-
dable. There are some elites in Chile who are directly opposed to the Mapuche’s land
claims. In particular, the wealthy landowners and multinational logging interests who
currently hold Mapuche lands have considerable influence with key elected political
leaders in the executive and legislative branches and with senior appointed officials in
the administration. More broadly, the general Chilean population is not particularly
sympathetic to the Mapuche claims that the national government should grant them
political autonomy. Although they are a sizeable subgroup, the Mapuche constitute
only 5 percent of the Chilean population, and most of them are poor, landless peasants
who lack political skills or the will to mobilize into political action.
Thus, proposed legislation to expropriate land and return it to the Mapuche
generated substantial opposition and was defeated in the legislature. Chile’s
president, who initially supported their claim, dropped his advocacy. As a conces-
sion, the government did purchase a small amount of land (20,000 acres), which was
distributed to the Mapuche, but not the one million acres the Mapuche claim as their
native lands. And the redistribution program was very limited, because most land-
owners demanded high prices to sell their land to the Mapuche and the government
was unwilling to pay that amount or to force them to lower their price. Similarly, the
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 233

government allocated only a modest amount of funds to support the maintenance of

Mapuche cultural traditions.
Then in 2010, the coalition that gained a majority of the seats in the national leg-
islature shifted to include several conservative groups, including Alianza por Chile,
that promote a single national identity for all Chileans and insist that the government
should aggressively punish the illegal activities of the Mapuche. Thus, the Mapuche
remained frustrated by their lack of success in persuading government to respond
favorably to their policy agenda. Since their policy demands have not been achieved
through normal political channels, some of their activists continue to engage in uncon-
ventional political actions (Carruthers and Rodriguez 2009). This has included hunger
strikes, demonstrations, and some violence. For example, a group of Mapuche occupied
a farm that was being minimally used. When they refused to leave, the government
was pressured by local landowners to intervene, and its security forces were dispatched
to reclaim the property. The confrontation became violent, and an unarmed 22-year-
old Mapuche student was shot in the back by the police. Between 2009 and 2013, the
reported acts of violence in this conflict have increased tenfold (Henao 2013).
The center-left Chilean government elected in 2013 has attempted to calm the vola-
tile situation. It has appointed special commissions to investigate the issues, proposed
new policy initiatives, and returned a small amount of land. The government has
made such decisions to satisfy the policy agendas of both the Mapuche and those who
oppose their demands. But the Mapuche simply do not have as much political clout as
their opponents. Thus, the political goals pursued by the “people of the land” remain
largely unfulfilled and unpromising.
Recall from Chapter 1 that the core definitions of politics focus on the competition
among individuals and groups who utilize power and influence to pursue their interests
on issues controlled by public authorities. The attempts by the Mapuche to regain their
lands and preserve their cultural autonomy are clearly within the domain of res publica
in Chile. As the Mapuche engaged in politics, other groups that had a competing agenda
also mobilized. Policy decisions were made by the government. The Mapuche got some
of what they sought, but not much. Other groups seem to have been more successful.
Considering the story of the Mapuche raises one of the most obvious yet fascinat-
ing general questions in political science: How does politics actually work? That is, how
does a political system handle the incredibly difficult and complicated issues and the
competing demands that are the stuff of politics? How and why do actors in the politi-
cal system decide to deal in one way or another on issues like these? Who has political
power and influence, and how are they exercised?
If someone from another country asked you how major public policy decisions are
made in your country, what would you say? What key points would you emphasize?
Presumably, your response would include a discussion of certain important actors and
how they utilize power and influence within the context of the key political institu-
tions that make such public policy decisions.
Earlier chapters introduced many of these actors and institutions—political
activists, interest groups, executives, legislatures, legal systems, and so on. And they
characterized concepts such as power and analytic models such as the political system
234 Chapter 9

framework. This chapter expands the discussion by focusing explicitly on several

fundamental approaches for analyzing public policy and the exercise of political
power. Initially, the chapter explicates the concept of public policy, with a consideration
of taxonomies and frameworks that characterize the public policy process. It then
describes three basic theories (elite, class, and pluralist) that provide alternative expla-
nations of how public policy decisions are made and how the distribution of power
shapes that decision process.

Public Policy
9.1 Differentiate among the types of public policy and outline the stages of
public policy.
A public policy is any decision or action by a governmental authority that results in the
allocation of something that is valued. Earlier chapters indicated that each political system
establishes how extensively and in what forms its public policies will define res publica
and impact its environment. These public policy decisions range enormously: in
substantive area, in scale, in significance, in the number of people affected, and in the
role of the policymakers. A national government can decide to declare war on a rival
country or to commend a victorious sports team. A local government employee can
decide to fill a pothole or to issue a building permit to a homeowner. The government
representatives of many countries can hammer out a joint treaty to limit greenhouse
gases. A security unit can arrest a suspected terrorist. A government can pass a law
making sex between certain consenting adults illegal. The Chilean government can
decide to allocate some land to the Mapuche or to use force to drive them off some-
one’s private property. Each of these actions is an example of a public policy.
Table 9.1 and Compare in 9 offer some representative examples of current public
policy decisions made by seven national political systems. The Compare claims that
there is considerable policy variation across these countries. Do you agree? Beyond
these kinds of direct comparisons of public policies, there are several other approaches
to the study of public policy. One approach is to classify and compare various types
of public policies by means of a taxonomy. A second approach analyzes the various
stages of the policy process and attempts to explain the dynamics at each stage. A third
approach studies the impacts of a particular public policy because what matters, ulti-
mately, is how (if at all) the policy makes a difference in the lives of individuals and
groups. Finally, a fourth general approach is more prescriptive, evaluating what public
policy ought to be implemented, given existing goals, conditions, and resources. We
can start by considering the types of public policies.

Types of Public Policies

Several criteria are used to classify different types of public policies. For example, a
straightforward classification of policies is based on the functional area that is served,
such as education, health, transportation, trade, public safety, the environment, or
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 235

Table 9.1 Selected Public Policies in Seven National Political Systems

30
26.9

25
21.9
20.6
20
Percentage

17.3
16.4
15.7
15.0
15 13.7
13.1
12.5
11.8
10.5 10.4 10.1
10
8.2
7.6
7.0
5.8 5.6
4.7
5 3.9 3.3 3.9 4.1 3.7
2.5 2.5 2.9 2.9
2.0 1.5 1.9
1.4 1.3 1.2

0
General Government Tax revenue to Public spending on Public spending on Public spending
Spending, % GDP government, % GDP military, % GDP education, % GDP on health, % of GDP
Brazil China D.R. Congo India Russia Sweden United States
Countries

United
Brazil China D.R. Congo India Russia Sweden States
Policy on Only to save Yes, on mul- Only to save Yes, on Yes, on Yes, on Yes, on
abortion life or after tiple grounds life multiple multiple multiple multiple
rape grounds grounds grounds grounds;
varies by
state
Policy on No, since Yes, for Yes, but only Yes, but Yes, for 30 No, since Yes, in 32 of
death penalty 1889 60 crimes, 2 since 1995 only 3 since crimes, 1921 50 states,
~2,000/year 1995 ~10/year ~16/year
Mandatory Yes Yes, but not No No Yes No No
military enforced
service

Sources: World Bank (2013);

http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/doc/unitedstates.doc;
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicdeclarations.htm.
http://blog.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/01/03/india_is_a_death_penalty_country_again

defense. Alternatively, policies can be distinguished by the broad objective of the policy:
(1) Distributive policies provide particular goods and services (e.g., the building and
maintenance of a system of streets and highways); (2) redistributive policies explicitly
transfer values from one group to another group (e.g., a policy that provides subsi-
dized housing to those with limited financial resources); (3) regulatory policies limit
actions (e.g., a policy that prohibits a woman from having an abortion); (4) extractive
policies take resources from some actors (e.g., a sales tax on purchases); and (5) symbolic
policies confer honor or disrepute on certain actors (e.g., a medal awarded to a soldier
for bravery).
236 Chapter 9

Compare in 9
Selected Public Policies in Seven Countries
Over time, do different political systems make choices vary. Russia, which aims to reassert its
substantially different public policy decisions? To military might, allocates far more of its total societal
explore this briefly, Table 9.1 provides examples wealth to the military than the others. Brazil’s gov-
of broad public policy decisions made by seven ernment, in contrast, has decided to direct more
national political systems. The expenditure data national wealth to education and health spending
are reported as the percentage of each coun- than the other three countries.
try’s total GDP (gross domestic product) that is The level of funds allocated is one way to
allocated to a policy domain by all levels of govern- compare policy decisions. It is also important to
ment. This is an indicator of policy effort, given the consider how the money is spent. For example,
country’s overall wealth. The tax revenue measure what are the key targets of health care spending
is an extractive policy, while the other expenditure (e.g., disease prevention, infant health, medical
measures are distributive policies. The three non- training, care for HIV-positive people, hospitals)? Is
monetary policies are regulatory, regarding certain public spending on education emphasizing teach-
rights and freedoms of individuals relative to state ers’ salaries or student-teacher ratios or educa-
power. tional technologies or . . . ? The manner in which a
The broadest conclusion from these data is that public policy is implemented is also significant for
there are considerable differences in public policy policies that are not primarily measurable in terms
decisions across the seven countries. On every of money. For instance, the Chinese government
specific policy domain, the country with the high- not only allows abortion, it has also aggressively
est proportion allocates at least three times as much encouraged and facilitated abortion in an attempt
as the lowest. Each country has developed its own to control population growth. In contrast, legal
distinctive pattern of public policies, which are par- abortion is severely limited in nominally Catholic
ticularly grounded in the country’s needs, wealth, Brazil and is a deeply controversial policy domain
and dominant political ideologies. For example, in the United States.
Sweden is a wealthy country that has a long tradi- And while comparing policy outputs is mean-
tion of democratic socialism and the provision of ingful, the most important comparisons might be of
social welfare goods to its population (see Compare the impacts of policies. That is, what is the effect
in 13). Thus, Sweden allocates a substantially higher of public spending on health care on indicators
proportion of its societal wealth through govern- such as life expectancy and infant mortality rates?
ment spending than any of the other countries, with Does an increased level of military spending seem
a particular focus on education and health care. To to increase a country’s security? Which groups
pay for all these public services, Sweden also col- carry the burden of taxes and which do not? Does
lects the highest proportion of taxes. Sweden has spending in one policy area (e.g., health care)
progressive policies on abortion and capital punish- provide indirect benefits to another policy area
ment and stopped requiring military (or community) (e.g., education)? What is the effect of the policy
service in 2010. of capital punishment on crime if it is rarely used
It is also interesting to compare Brazil, Russia, (as in India)? Table 9.1 and these kinds of ques-
India, and China, four of the five BRICS countries tions should help you to see the rich and complex
that are advancing toward global power status (see considerations that are relevant when you attempt
Chapter 15). Although each is attempting to project to compare public policies within and across politi-
its power within its region and globally, the policy cal systems.
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 237

Further Questions
1. On what public policy do you think it would be 2. Which two countries in Table 9.1 seem to
most interesting to study crossnational differ- have the most similar configuration of policy
ences in policy implementation? Why? What allocations?
might you learn?

Analysis of the Stages of the Policy Process

A different approach to policy analysis examines the stages of the policy process—the
sequence of actions from the inception of an idea for policy to the point at which the policy
ceases to exist. A policy can be analyzed at each stage: what actors participate, how they
interact, how the policy is defined, and so on. Such an analysis might emphasize the
generally rational weighing of evidence and arguments to reach a reasoned decision,
or it might focus on the complex interactions among different actors who engage in a
process of competition and compromise to reach a more political decision (Stone 2011).
Many public policy analyses focus on one specific stage and explore the dynamics of
that stage of policymaking in detail (Andersen 2011; Bardach 2011). Six stages are usu-
ally distinguished, as characterized in Figure 9.1 and described below. And to provide

Figure 9.1 The Stages of the Public Policy Process

Problem Problem
identification definition

Policy
continuation/ Specification
modification/ of alternative
termination responses
(based on evaluation)

Policy
Policy
selection and
evaluation
enactment
Policy
implementation
238 Chapter 9

Table 9.2 An Example of Each Stage of the Policy Process: Reading Skills of Children
Stage Action
Problem identification Data indicate reading scores of children are too low.
Problem definition Set goal: Raise mean reading scores of sixth-grade children by 10 percent in three years.
Reading scores decline steadily from national average in grades 2–5.
Low reading scores are especially associated with families in which English is not the first language.
Lowest average reading scores are in seven schools where more than 20 percent of students come
from such families.
Specification of Target seven lowest-scoring schools or apply programs to all schools?
alternatives Policy options:
• Intensive reading instruction in grades 3–5.
• Provide teachers with training in reading pedagogy.
• Provide reading specialist teachers.
• Provide computer-aided learning software.
• Require an extra 30 minutes of reading instruction per day.
• Or . . .
Policy selection Local school board decides:
• Focus only on seven lowest-scoring schools.
• Provide three new reading specialists to work with students.
• Allocate funds to seven target schools for computer-based reading instruction software.
Implementation School superintendent meets with principals of target schools and they decide how to distribute the time
of the reading specialists across the schools and classrooms.
Committee of principals will select and hire specialists.
Interschool technology committee trains teachers to use reading software, principals require teachers to
develop a plan for its use, and teachers implement it in the classrooms.
Evaluation Changes in reading scores will be analyzed by district staff in each of the next three years.
Teachers will provide written report on the effects of the new initiatives on the classroom.
Continuation of the two policies will be reevaluated at end of year 3.

a concrete example of the policy process, Table 9.2 indicates how the issue of poor
reading scores in a school district might evolve during the policy process.

1. Issue identification. Some actor decides that a condition in the environment

requires a public policy response. For example, the national legislature decides
that personal income taxes are too high, a group of residents complains to the
county board of supervisors that traffic congestion has become a serious problem
in their neighborhood, or the defense department gets secret intelligence that a
rival state is developing a new nuclear weapons system. If important policymakers
push forward the policy issue at this point, it becomes part of the agenda for possi-
ble action. Alternatively, policymakers might decide to drop the issue at this stage.
2. Problem definition. Next, there is an attempt to explain why the problem exists,
to determine what seem to be the causes of the problem, and to define desired out-
comes. Expert staff as well as interested stakeholders with knowledge of the policy
domain can have a major role at this stage, which emphasizes research and analysis.
3. Specification of alternatives. Policy analysts develop policy proposals that
seem to respond to the problem, given the causes, the preferred outcome, and
the likely obstacles. In addition, the resources necessary to implement each policy
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 239

alternative are identified. The costs (e.g., financial, political, organizational) of

each alternative policy must be estimated, as well as the level of expected benefits.
4. Policy selection. Decision makers study the alternatives, trying to assess the
possible costs and benefits from the options. At this stage, the process will be some
mix of political, financial, and technical considerations. The decision might be
to enact a particular policy, to delay, or to do nothing and see if the policy issue
disappears from the public agenda. Considerable negotiations, lobbying, compro-
mises, and adjustments to the proposed policy might occur during this stage.
5. Implementation. The policy is now interpreted and applied in specific contexts.
Those in relevant administrative positions typically take the lead role, determin-
ing how to translate the new policy into actual programs and activities, organize
the necessary resources, and then deliver those programs.
6. Evaluation. After some period of time (or never), new information is gathered to
ascertain whether the policy has had any of the anticipated impacts, whether con-
ditions (related to the policy domain or the political situation) have changed, and
whether any unintended effects of the policy must be considered.

At any stage, but especially after implementation or evaluation, the policy might
be continued, modified, or terminated. This is best understood as a variation of stage
4, since it is a version of policy enactment rather than a distinct stage. It is also pos-
sible that the circumstances might trigger another cycle of the policy process outlined
above, possibly beginning with a new stage of problem identification.

Policy Impact Analysis

The last stage of the policy process described above, evaluation, is an especially signifi-
cant mode of policy analysis. As noted in the Compare in 9, a crucial question is: What
difference did the policy make? This can be considered in different ways. What have
been the direct effects of the policy? Have there also been notable indirect effects? Who
benefits and who experiences negative effects from this policy? What are the nature and
extent of those benefits and burdens? What have been the actual costs compared with the
anticipated costs? On balance, has the policy improved the overall situation? These ques-
tions about the impacts of a policy might be addressed by policymakers and their staffs
or by various other actors, such as interest groups, affected publics, and political rivals.

Policy Prescription
Every public policy affects someone’s interests. Thus, there are always actors (stake-
holders) trying to influence and shape public policy decisions at every stage and to
influence policymakers to make some decisions and not others. As actors define and
then pursue a policy goal, they are also engaged in policy prescription. Their policy goal
might be based on careful policy analysis and policy impact studies, derived from
ideological principles, or influenced by an agent of political socialization or an author-
ity source such as a political party or political leader (recall Chapters 2– 4). Whatever
the basis of their policy prescriptions, policy advocates propose what public policies
should be adopted and how policy should be implemented: The Chilean government
240 Chapter 9

should respond to the land claims of the Mapuche by policy A; the U.S. government
should implement policy B to respond to job losses; the government of India should
adopt policy C to improve the health of its millions of rural poor.
A key analytic question regarding the public policy process is: How does the process
lead to certain decisions and not others? The next section explores this question from
three very different perspectives that attempt to explain how political power is distrib-
uted and wielded by various groups who participate in the policymaking process.

Explaining Public Policy

Decision Making
9.2 Identify three major approaches that explain public policymaking.
The first part of this chapter described analytic concepts that specify the stages in
the public policy process. This section details three political explanations of the pub-
lic policy process: (1) the elite approach; (2) the class approach; and (3) the pluralist
approach. Each approach provides a different explanation of how politics works, how
influence is exercised, and what forces seem to shape the decisions that result in pub-
lic policy. Each focuses on the interactions among aggregations of individuals who
use the political system to pursue their own particular interests. No actual country or
political system is likely to operate exactly like any of these three approaches. Rather,
each approach is a rich illustration of a pattern of power and decision making that is
prevalent in some systems. Our discussion begins with the elite approach.

The Elite Approach

9.3 Characterize the elite approach.

Key Concepts
Two key concepts are central to the elite approach. First, politics is defined as the strug-
gle for power to control policy. Second, the political world is characterized by political
stratification; that is, the population is segmented into separate groups that are in layers (or
“strata”) with higher or lower amounts of power. In the elite approach, there are only two
major strata. The stratum that does more of what there is to do (in the public policy pro-
cess) and that gets more of what there is to get (in valued impacts from policy decisions)
is called the political elite. The stratum that does less and gets less is called the mass.
Elite theory can be visually represented by a power pyramid, as shown in
Figure 9.2. Such a depiction emphasizes that the elite is composed of a relatively
small number of individuals who are in a dominant position on top of the large
mass. Notice that there is a third stratum between the elite and the mass. This is the
political understructure, composed of political officials and administrators who carry
out the elite’s policy directives.
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 241

Figure 9.2 Characterization of an Elite System

Ruling
elite

Understructure
(government)

Mass

Major Theorists
The elite approach is particularly grounded in the writings of European political
theorists of the late nineteenth century, especially the Italians Roberto Michels, Wilfredo
Pareto, and Gaetano Mosca. In The Ruling Class (1896/2011), Mosca analyzes the
political histories of a variety of political systems and concludes that they all have two
strata: the political class (the elite) and the nonpolitical class (the mass). The political
class controls all political functions, holds almost all political power, and dominates
the public policy process. The basis of elite power has varied across time and location,
but Mosca identifies broad historical stages during which the primary basis of elite
domination has been military power, then religious control, then economic power, and
most recently, technical knowledge. According to Mosca, the major role of the political
system is as an instrument of the political class, serving the elite’s interests in making
and implementing public policies.
A well-known U.S. application of the elite approach is The Power Elite (2000) by
C. Wright Mills. Mills concludes that the power elite in U.S. society is composed
of those who control society’s most powerful institutions: (1) the “warlords” in the
military establishment; (2) the “corporation chieftains” in the economic sector; and
(3) the “political directorate” in the top positions in the political system. Mills observes
that the members of the elite share crucial values about how society in general, and the
political system in particular, ought to operate. The members of the elite tend to come
from similar social and educational backgrounds, to circulate among major positions
in each of the three key institutional structures, and to have long-standing personal
relationships with one another. Like other elite theorists, Mills does not claim that
242 Chapter 9

the elite operates as a conspiracy that continually plots to retain control. But some of
its active members do meet periodically to discuss common interests, and most of its
members act in concert to protect their shared interests during times of crisis (see also
Domhoff 2005, 2013).
Most elite theorists focus on the elite itself—the identity and socialization of
elite members—and on how the elite maintains its domination through a variety of
techniques, such as the manipulation of symbols, the strategic distribution of resources
to various groups, the control of the state, and the use of force. There is a normative
element in the discussions of many elite theorists, indicating their disapproval of a
system in which there is such a high concentration of political power serving only
a small minority within society. But others respond that elite theory merely reveals
the inevitable tendency for a few people to take control of and dominate the political
order, while those in the mass willingly subordinate themselves to the few who are
capable of giving coherence to political society.

The Public Policy Process

The process through which values are allocated is explained primarily in terms of
the elite’s actions. Some members of the elite decide that a particular public policy
decision is in the elite’s interest. They then discuss whether this policy should be
enacted and how it should be implemented. When there is general consensus among
those members of the elite who are concerned about the decision, representatives of
the elite instruct the relevant members of the understructure (the government) to
perform the policymaking and policy-implementation activities that serve the elite’s
interests.
In the elite explanation of the policy process, the active elites are subject to very
little direct influence from the mass or even from the understructure of governmental
officials. The mass is politically apathetic and impotent, and this large proportion of
the population passively accepts whatever policies are imposed upon them. The mem-
bers of the understructure follow the elite’s directives because they believe that their
survival in positions of authority depends on the power and support of the elite.

The Prevalence of Elite-Based Political Systems

How many countries have elitist political systems? More than half of the countries
have nondemocratic systems (Economist Intelligence Unit 2013, and recall Chapter 7).
It seems reasonable to infer that most of these systems are dominated by an elite in the
manner described by the elite approach.
However, the issue might be more complicated. Is it true that all the key condi-
tions of elitism are met in every nondemocratic country? This empirical question could
be examined in specific political systems (e.g., Cuba, Saudi Arabia, and Zimbabwe) by
assessing these kinds of analytic questions:

• Does the political leadership act with unanimity on all major issues?
• Is there active and effective political participation by nonelite groups?
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 243

Focus in 9
Elite Politics in Swaziland
A contemporary example of elite politics is Swaziland,
a small African country between Mozambique and
South Africa. While Swaziland was a British colonial
protectorate (1902–1968), a local king (Sobhuza II)
became a hero of his people by leading the move-
ment for independence (starting in 1921). After
independence in 1968, Sobhuza became the ruling
monarch of the new country. A British-style parlia-
ment with competing parties was installed. Parties
competed in three parliamentary elections, although
the king’s party dominated in each election.
In 1973, the king banned all opposition groups
and declared that European government forms were
“un-Swazi.” The king personally appoints two-thirds
of the members of the Senate and one-fourth of
the members of the House. Indeed, according to
Swaziland’s official publications, even the method
for selecting the next king is “a secret,” except it
is stipulated that he must be a young, unmarried A day after being called back from high school in
prince. When Sobhuza II died in 1982, the private England and being crowned as the ruler of Swaziland,
power struggle among members of the royal fam- King Mswati III attends a party in the palace. The
ily and the king’s council resulted in the selection of 18-year-old king moved quickly to establish rule under
King Mswati III. He has been termed “the world’s last his personal control.
absolute monarch,” and although a few concessions Most of the benefits of policy are enjoyed by
to opposition activities were made in recent years, this elite, a second key criterion of an elite system.
political parties are still essentially banned and the The richest 10 percent of the Swazi population have
nonpartisan parliament essentially affirms the king’s one of the world’s highest shares of total income (40
decisions. percent), and the country has a high level of income
Everyone in Swaziland (population 1.4 million) inequality (recall Figure 8.4). In contrast, 69 percent
has always understood that real political power of the Swazi population is below the poverty line and
is concentrated in the king and his elite group of 40 percent of adults are unemployed. Swaziland has
advisers, known as the National Council. Young the world’s highest incidence (one in four) of adults
King Mswati III quickly removed many of his rivals with HIV/AIDS, and the average life expectancy
from positions of authority and elevated his own is only 50 years, among the bottom five among all
set of trusted advisers to positions of decision- countries (CIA 2014).
making power. Under King Mswati III, as under King
Sobhuza, both policymaking and the major sectors
of the economy (the mines and most farmlands) are
Further Focus
directly controlled by a king’s council. Thus, one key 1. Is inequality or nondemocracy likely to be a
criterion of elite politics is clearly met: Almost all more serious problem for maintaining stability in
major political decisions are made by a small group, Swaziland?
and the mass of people in Swaziland have little 2. Are there any reasons why a country might be
direct impact on the policies or politics of the state. better off if it is governed by a small elite?
244 Chapter 9

• Are some major political decisions responsive to nonelite demands, even when
the decisions are contrary to the elite’s interests?
• Is there dramatic inequality in the distribution of resources between the elite and
the mass?

While definitive answers to these questions are difficult, our knowledge of politi-
cal systems suggests that many contemporary states are generally characterized by
elite rule. (Consider the brief description of Swaziland in Focus in 9). The power to
make crucial political decisions and most of the benefits from those decisions seem
predominantly concentrated in the hands of a small elite.
It is also possible to ask whether a country classified as a democracy is actually
run by an elite. That is, even if a political system meets the basic criteria of democracy
such as a limited mandate and freedom to criticize and oppose the leadership (recall
Chapter 7), does this necessarily mean that the system is not elitist?
This question underlies a fierce debate among analysts regarding whether the elite
approach best describes politics, even in many democratic political systems. Some, such
as C. Wright Mills (2000; see also Parenti 2010), provide arguments and evidence that
there is elite rule even in most democracies. In this view, a small proportion of the popula-
tion dominates most significant political decisions and enjoys a hugely disproportionate
share of the benefits from the truly important policy decisions made by the government.
Such empirical assessments of the elite approach, whether for a single city or an
entire country, are highly controversial and ideologically charged because they repre-
sent a direct attack on whether the place is a democracy. Conclusive verification of the
elite approach in most political systems would be a massive undertaking, requiring
the documentation of systematic elite dominance on a large number of key decisions
across a variety of issue areas.

The Class Approach

9.4 Characterize the class approach.
The class approach shares certain fundamental concepts with the elite approach, but it
offers a very different explanation of the continuing dynamic processes of politics. The
most important shared concept is stratification, the basic fact of structured inequality in
the distribution of values in society.
The strata identified in the class approach are called classes, the second key concept.
Class denotes a large group of individuals who are similar in their possession of or control over
some fundamental value. The most fundamental value that distinguishes classes differs
for different class theorists. Karl Marx (1818–1883), the best-known class theorist, dif-
ferentiates classes primarily on the basis of a group’s relationship to the major factors of
production in the economic system (Marx 1867/1981: Ch. 52). At the simplest level, Marx
divides society into two classes: (1) the capitalist class, which includes those who own
significant amounts of the major factors of production (especially financial resources,
raw materials, and capital—the elements to produce goods and accumulate wealth); and
(2) the proletariat class, which includes those who own little more than their own labor.
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 245

Some contemporary analysts suggest various modifications to Marx’s ideas about

class. First, most class theorists identify more than two major class strata, with each
class characterized by its particular levels of social, political, and economic power.
Second, some argue that it is control (rather than ownership) of the means of produc-
tion that is most important. Third, others observe that in certain social systems, the key
elements that distinguish different class strata are status, kinship, ethnicity, religion,
or tradition-based authority (rather than ownership of the means of production). And
fourth, still others posit that possession of information resources and knowledge has
become the crucial resource distinguishing classes in postindustrial, high-tech soci-
eties (Castells 2009). In general, these analysts assert that there is strong empirical
evidence for the continuing prevalence of class politics, even in developed countries
and even in the twenty-first century (see, for example, Poulantzas 1973; Wright 2005;
Wright and Rogers 2010).
Figure 9.3 provides two models characterizing class systems. Part A shows a char-
acterization similar to the elite approach in its hierarchical and pyramidal form, and
it emphasizes a clear separation between multiple classes. Alternatively, part B high-
lights the overlap among classes. Here the boundaries between classes are permeable
rather than distinct, there is more interdependence among classes, and some members
of a “lower” class have as much or even more political power than those in the class

Figure 9.3 Two Different Characterizations of Class Structures

SoURCe: Based on Bill and Hardgrave 1981: 181.

Upper class

Middle class

Lower middle class

Lower class

Poverty class

A. Hierarchical Class Structure

Upper class

Middle class

Lower class

Poverty class
B. Overlapping Class Structure
246 Chapter 9

above them. However, class domination continues to be the basic form of political and
social relations (see Lenski 1984).
The third crucial concept of the class approach is class conflict. It is assumed that
classes lower in the class system can increase their share of key values only at the
expense of the classes above them. Given the fundamental inequalities in the distribu-
tion of values, struggle between classes is inevitable. The higher classes employ vari-
ous strategies, and ultimately coercion, to prevent a significant loss of values (and of
relative advantage) to the classes below them. Lower classes find that only violence
enables their class to increase its relative share of values. Thus, class conflict is sys-
tematic and ubiquitous, although its most visible and violent manifestations (such
as strikes, riots, and rebellion) might be suppressed for periods of time if the higher
classes are effective in the ways they distribute benefits and use coercion.

The Public Policy Process

Most class analysts do not explain in detail how policy decisions are actually made.
They assume that the common interests shared by members of a class will result in
general consensus within that class regarding what public policy decisions should be
enacted. Like elite theorists, class analysts view the political system as a set of struc-
tures that are subordinate to the dominant class. Thus, members of this dominant class
either hold key positions of governing authority or directly control those who do.
The interests of this class are well understood by those who can enact public policy.
Consequently, the policies and actions of the state serve the interests of the dominant
class, which attempts to maintain its domination and preserve the existing distribution
of values.
Rather than focusing on the policy process, the class approach centers its analytic
attention on the tactics of class domination and the dynamics of the class struggle.
Not every public policy decision by the state is coercive or of direct benefit to only
the dominant class. The state might implement policies to shorten the length of the
working day or to increase health care benefits to the middle classes. Such policies
either ameliorate the worst conditions that might provoke violence or provide certain
classes with advantages over classes below them. The goals of such public policies are
strategic: to provide benefits to some classes in an effort to buy their support or their
acquiescence, or at least to dampen their propensity for conflict.
Despite such strategies, the systematic inequalities in fundamental values gen-
erate continuing conflict between classes in the society. Periodically, this conflict
explodes into class violence. In one of these episodes of class war, a lower class suc-
ceeds in overthrowing the highest class. At this point, a new class gains dominance in
the system, including control over the government and most of the benefits from pub-
lic policies. In the view of Marx and many other class theorists, major class conflict
will end only when the elimination of dominant classes reduces the system to a single
class, and hence society becomes classless. The state’s policies then serve everyone
equally, and in the absence of class inequalities, there is no cause for further conflict
among groups.
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 247

The Pluralist Approach

9.5 Characterize the pluralist approach.
Pluralism offers a very different account of the political process, in which multiple
groups compete actively in the pursuit of their political interests. The pluralist approach is
grounded in the concept of the group, which is defined as any aggregate of individuals
who interact to pursue a common interest. A political group, as an analytic concept, exists
whenever individuals have a shared interest regarding some allocation of values by
the political system.
The pluralist explanation of politics as a complex web of group interactions has
many historical roots but is particularly identified with American social scientists, espe-
cially political scientists Arthur Bentley (1908/1967), David Truman (1951), and Robert
Dahl (1961, 1971, 1991), who is most strongly associated with the development and
defense of pluralism (which is also sometimes termed polyarchy or the group approach).
Pluralism begins with the assumption that an individual’s group memberships are
multiple and nonoverlapping. That is, any particular individual can belong to many dif-
ferent groups. Individuals are not stratified into large, permanent groups as described
by the elite and class approaches because the aggregation of people who share a com-
mon identity on one political interest is not the same as the people who are part of
groups formed for other political interests. Table 9.3 shows six hypothetical people
whose group memberships overlap in different ways, depending on the issue.
The second important assumption is that many different political resources might
influence those who make public policy decisions. As discussed in Chapter 3, the kinds
of resources that might be used to influence political stratification include money,
numbers of supporters/voters, monopoly of expertise, political skill, access to infor-
mation, legal rights, and status. It is also assumed that every individual (and hence
every political group) has some political resources with which he can attempt to influ-
ence policy decisions.

Table 9.3 Group Memberships of Six Hypothetical Individuals in the United States*
Individuals

Groups Person 1 Person 2 Person 3 Person 4 Person 5 Person 6

Democratic Party ✓ ✓
Republican Party ✓ ✓
AFL-CIO union ✓
Family Research Council ✓ ✓
Mothers Against Drunk Driving ✓ ✓ ✓
NARAL Pro-Choice America ✓ ✓
National Rifle Association ✓ ✓
Parent-Teacher Association ✓ ✓
*Each checkmark indicates a group with which the individual is affiliated. This distribution supports the concept of nonoverlapping (nonreinforcing) group
memberships. An individual shares membership with different people across various groups and policy domains.
248 Chapter 9

In pluralism, politics can be understood as the interaction among groups that are
pursuing their political interests. The role of the government is to manage the interac-
tions within this giant system of interacting groups. Thus, public policy is defined as
the balance point of the competition among groups on an issue at the time when government
makes a policy decision.

The Policymaking Process

Figure 9.4 provides a visual model of how a policy decision is made according to
pluralism, using health care policy in a country such as the United States as the exam-
ple. There is a continuum of possible policies, ranging from free state provision of all
health care services to every citizen at one extreme to total private provision based on
fee-for-service to each recipient of health care at the other extreme.
The analytic framework of the policy process in pluralism can be summarized in
five major steps:

1. Identify the key groups that have an active interest in decisions in this policy area.
2. On a continuum of possible policy outcomes, locate the preferred policy decision
of each group.
3. Estimate the level of political resources each group employs to influence the deci-
sion regarding this policy (represented as a “weight” on the continuum, based on
the total impact of the political resources that the group utilizes).
4. The government establishes the equilibrium point that balances the “weights” of
the political resources mobilized by all groups.
5. This equilibrium point on the policy continuum is authorized by government as a
public policy decision.

Figure 9.4 A Group Approach Model of the Policy Process: A Hypothetical Policy
Decision
Managed care
providers
Health insurance
providers Private doctors

Medical supplies
The elderly industry
The Conservative
poor “think tanks”

TOTAL TOTAL
STATE PRIVATE
PROVISION PROVISION,
Public policy NO REGULATION

Government

Symbols:
= Continuum of possible public policies regarding health care policy
= Interest group mobilized on this issue, with volume of triangle representing the group's
political resources applied to the issue
= Government, which determines the equilibrium point and ratifies that point as public policy
= Public policy position, which is the equilibrium point in the competition among groups, given
each group's political resources
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 249

In the pluralist model, the

particular functions of the gov-
ernment are to (1) establish rules
of the game for the group strug-
gle; (2) determine the interests of
competing groups and the levels
of political resources mobilized
by those groups; (3) find a public
policy that approximately bal-
ances the positions of all active
groups in terms of their interests
and resources; (4) enact these
balance points as public policy
decisions; and (5) implement the
resulting policy. Government,
as an analytic construct in plu-
ralism, is best understood as a
referee (a neutral arbiter) in the
Can we talk?: In many societies, local policy decisions are made through
competition among groups. discussion and group voting, as in this jirga (tribal meeting) in southeastern
In a more realistic interpreta- Afghanistan.
tion, however, government is not
merely an automatic weighing machine that totals the value of each group’s influ-
ence resources. The government might have an ideological position and thus place
greater emphasis on some objectives rather than others. For example, the government
might enforce rules that help or hinder some groups in using their political resources,
it might value some political resources more substantially than others, it might allow
certain groups greater access to important information, or it might be more or less
willing to find the financial resources necessary to implement a certain policy. In
addition, certain elected and career governmental actors have their own personal and
institutional interests (e.g., for political support, growth of their unit’s power, personal
wealth). When such interests are relevant, these actors can become active as groups
that participate in the decision process (with obvious advantages because they are
inside “the system”).
Like all models, Figure 9.4 substantially simplifies reality. But it should help you
understand the logic of pluralism. A policy decision can change at any time if a different
distribution of group interests is mobilized and the issue is taken up by policymakers.
Pluralism explicitly rejects the notion that a small elite or a single class dominates the
public policy process. Rather, many different groups become active in politics, but only
on the narrow range of issues relevant to their interests. Mobilized groups use their
political resources to affect the decision. While a group might not always win, its par-
ticipation can affect the policy decisions on which it is active. In the case that opened
the chapter, for example, it seems that although the Mapuche only got a small part of
what they wanted, they did utilize their political resources and the Chilean government
did grant them some land rights. And, pluralist theorists would argue, the Mapuche
250 Chapter 9

achieved some success against strong opponents (including major political parties) and
will have more opportunities to pursue their goals at the next round of policymaking.
Critics of pluralism argue that some groups are likely to win almost every time
they play the game of politics because they have a huge advantage in their political
resources, such as wealth, access to decision makers, and political skill. Further, some
challenge the pluralist assumption that no one resource always dominates, arguing
that money trumps all other resources. This argument is the subject of the Debate in 9.
The critics also claim that the government/state, far from being neutral, is guided by
a strong ideology and is almost always responsive to those upper-strata groups with
most economic and social power in the society. Thus, even though “the little people”
might occasionally win a particular episode, the powerful groups in the system are
persistent winners, and big winners, and the system perpetuates very substantial
inequalities in the distribution of benefits (Bachrach and Baratz 1962; Parenti 2010).
While the relatively poor Mapuche were appeased with a small amount of land, the big
winners were the rich and powerful landowners and logging companies, who contin-
ued to profit from land that should have been returned to its original owners.

The Debate in 9
Does Money Dominate the Policymaking Process?
Some are convinced that money dominates poli- legislative or judicial branch, are among the
tics, even in the most properly run democracies. wealthiest 3 percent of the society. Government
Class theory is particularly pointed in its arguments cannot be understood as a neutral referee in the
that the power and actions of the dominant eco- policy process when so many of those who make
nomic class ensure that government and policy policy decisions are from and share the interests
decisions serve its interests (Domhoff 2013). In of the monied class (Parenti 2010: 197–200).
contrast, pluralist theory argues that while money • Politicians at all levels depend on increasingly
is one important resource that can influence the large amounts of money to finance their (re)elec-
policy process, no one resource dominates. Other tion campaigns. Those who contribute signifi-
key political resources that can shape policy deci- cant funds to elected officials have the greatest
sions include large numbers of people who can access to elected officials and can make suc-
use their votes, the media, and the legal system. cessful demands on their decisions.
Everyone can form interest groups to promote their • Corporations and wealthy individuals far out-
political goals. Everyone can win in the competition spend others in society in hiring lobbyists,
over policy decisions (at least some of the time), funding policy advocates, sponsoring think
and the wealthy do not get everything they want tanks, and purchasing media content that both
(Dahl 1961, 1991). If we consider the country cel- promote their interests and influence the beliefs
ebrated as the inspiration and model of pluralist and actions of government officials and voters
democracy, the United States, does money domi- (Bagdikian 2004; Phillips 2003).
nate policymaking?
• The ultimate test of public policy is: Who benefits
most? Whenever financial considerations are a
Money Dominates Policymaking
key factor in a policy debate, it is almost always
• Most of those in positions of substantial power the wealthy who enjoy the greatest benefits from
in the government, whether in the executive, the enacted policy. For example, between 1979
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 251

and 2007, the richest 10 percent of Americans not part of the wealthiest 10–20 percent. But
gained 91 percent of all income growth, and these groups organize, aggregate their political
favorable government tax policies are a key to resources, and prevail on policy issues of major
this disproportionate distribution of benefits importance (e.g., education, equality, abortion,
(Economic Policy Institute 2011). immigration, workers’ rights, and social welfare
• Justice might seem blind, but seeking justice is programs) (Dahl 1991).
not free. Most legal disputes on matters of public • Many powerful elected and appointed policymak-
policy involve interpretation of laws and discre- ers, including seven of the last nine U.S. presi-
tionary decision making. The balance is typically dents, are from modest backgrounds. Some of
weighted in favor of those who can afford the them, as well as some political leaders with con-
best legal representation (Parenti 2010: Ch. 9). siderable wealth, have been powerful advocates
for those with limited wealth and social standing
Money Does Not Dominate Policymaking (e.g., Bill Clinton, L. B. Johnson, the Kennedys,
• In a pluralist democracy, votes and elections Barack Obama).
count (Dahl 1961). As median voter theory posits, • In the U.S. legal system, justice is “money blind.”
the policies of government officials will generally The interpretation of law is based on the princi-
be responsive to the interests of those with suf- ples of justice and fairness. If an actor has legality
ficient votes to determine their electoral success. on his side, he will usually prevail in protecting his
And it is voting coalitions of the numerous citizens interests, regardless of his economic situation.
from the middle and lower classes that determine Litigation often protects the less advantaged
the outcome of elections, not the votes of the rel- against those with “deep pockets” in numerous
atively small number of rich people (Stone 1989). policy domains (e.g., civil rights, environmental
• Prolific spending in a campaign or in lobbying the protection) (Robinson 2009; Schmalleger 2011).
government does not guarantee victory. There
are a significant number of instances in every
electoral cycle in which a candidate or a ballot
More questions…
proposition is victorious despite being outspent 1. Can you think of compelling examples of policy
during the campaign. Similarly, heavy spend- decisions in which, as pluralist theory posits,
ing by interest groups is not always correlated groups utilize other political resources to defeat
with policy success (Baumgartner et al. 2009; groups who deploy substantially more financial
Edwards, Wattenberg, and Lineberry 2014). resources?

• There are many political interest groups that 2. Is there any potent political resource that money
are composed largely of members who are can’t buy?

The Three Approaches Compared

9.6 Evaluate the similarities, differences, and usefulness of the three major
approaches to public policymaking.

Which Approach Is Correct?

The three approaches offer compelling answers to the basic political questions of who
gets what, why, when, and how. Which of these three approaches is correct? Is one
the most accurate explanation of politics for all political systems? For most political
252 Chapter 9

systems at a given historical moment? Do different approaches best account for the
politics of particular systems? For particular types of issues?
Advocates of each position offer both theoretical and empirical evidence to show
that the politics of actual systems correspond to the description provided in their
approach. As an indirect method of providing support for their approach, advocates also
cite considerable evidence indicating the inaccuracies and contradictions of the other
approaches. As you might suspect, the debate has been most acrimonious between sup-
porters of pluralism and supporters of the elite and class approaches, which both assume
persistent stratification and deep inequality. Some scholars contend that almost all politi-
cal systems, even democratic ones, are elitist in the sense that the policy process is guided
by and generally supports the interests of a dominant elite (Domhoff 2013). In the United
States, the debate has been most intense among those who study power at the local level,
prompted by the dispute five decades ago between “elitists” such as sociologist Floyd
Hunter (1953) and “pluralists” such as political scientist Robert Dahl (1961).
Political scientists and other social scientists have yet to establish a critical test that
reveals which of the approaches best describes or explains politics. After hundreds
of studies in various political systems at the local, regional, and national levels, the
disagreements among the advocates of the three approaches remain as deep as ever.
To decide which approach provides the greatest insight into the politics of a particular
political system, you might consider numerous conceptual and empirical questions, a
few of which follow:

• For the elite approach, look for: evidence of actual collaboration among the elite in the
formulation of public policy; the frequency with which the elite seems to lose on pol-
icy decisions of significance to its members; whether there really is a mass of citizens
who are uninformed, politically inactive, and impotent regarding policy choices.
• For the class approach, analyze: whether the state almost always operates to serve
the interests of one dominant class group; whether most people’s interests and
behaviors can be defined in class terms; whether most significant social changes
are attributable to violence grounded in class conflict.
• And for pluralism, assess: whether there are persistent winners and persistent
losers on policy decisions; whether the state applies rules and policies fairly and
equally to all groups; whether competition among groups can be fair if there are
huge inequalities in the levels of political resources available to different individu-
als and groups.

Essential Similarities and Differences

The elite and class approaches share certain crucial premises. For both approaches,
the fundamental feature of society is stratification—the unequal distribution of values
across distinct groups. Also in both approaches, the government is one of the key
mechanisms controlled by the dominant group, and the government’s policy decisions
are intended to maintain that group’s domination.
But the elite and class approaches differ in their conceptions of the nature of the
groups and of group interactions. For the elite approach, there are two broad groups:
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 253

the elite and the mass. Elite theorists mainly focus on the elite—its membership, the
basis of elite domination, and the strategies employed by the elite to maintain its
control. The mass is assumed to be inactive politically and is rarely analyzed in detail.
In contrast, most class theorists identify more than two distinct class groups and
emphasize the dynamic interactions among the classes. There is substantial politi-
cal energy inherent in the lower classes, who are the active agents of major political
change. The class approach attempts to explain why class conflict is inevitable, how
it manifests itself, and how it produces transformations in the sociopolitical system.
In short, the elite approach tends to provide a top-down perspective in a two-group
system, whereas the class approach often takes a bottom-up perspective that empha-
sizes the dynamic processes of conflict and change among multiple groups.
Pluralism differs fundamentally from both the elite and class approaches,
beginning with its rejection of the notion of social stratification. It conceptualizes a
sociopolitical world composed of many groups, with each individual belonging to
a variety of groups. Different groups emerge on each particular political issue, and
each group has an array of resources that it can organize to influence decisions on that
issue. As groups compete to shape a public policy decision, the government is a rela-
tively neutral referee that ensures the competition is fair; it is not the instrument of any
particular group or class. There is a dispersion of power, resources, and benefits from
policy decisions, not a pattern of structured inequality. Everyone wins some and loses
some, but the losers can always win on the next issue.
Vigorous and often hostile debate has persisted among the advocates of these three
conceptions of how politics works. This debate is deep and serious because it reflects
fundamental disagreements about the very nature of society and politics. The elite and
class approaches are based on a coercive view of society. Conflict is a fundamental fea-
ture of the relations among groups. Social coherence is maintained by means of power
and constraint, evident in domination by the most powerful class and its agent, the
state. In contrast, pluralism reflects an integrative view of society. Society is essentially
stable and harmonious in the sense that there is a moving equilibrium maintained by a
“fair” competitive game, refereed by the state and played by many groups who accept
the rules and the outcomes. Social coherence is grounded in cooperation and consen-
sus (see Dahrendorf 1959).
The analytic taxonomies and stage model presented in the first part of this chapter
offer a different way of understanding the public policy process. Those approaches
tend to focus on providing an in-depth, empirical account of the dynamics during
a particular stage of the process (e.g., implementation of health care policy) or the
analysis of a specific policy domain (e.g., the impacts of tax policy, the case for
military action in a particular setting). There is an attempt to define how political
institutions shape the process and to explore the behavior and interactions among
various stakeholders.
The various approaches to public policy analysis presented in this chapter
provide you with a rich set of alternatives for responding to Harold Lasswell’s (1960)
classic question about politics: Who gets what, when, how, (and why)? Public policy
analysis provides some additional useful tools in the political science quest to better
254 Chapter 9

understand the actions of any particular political system, its power structure, and its
decision-making processes. Policy analysis can also be employed to determine the
most desirable response to a given problem, providing a prescriptive policy recom-
mendation. These descriptive, explanatory, and prescriptive insights about the public
policy process will be helpful as we consider countries’ pursuit of prosperity, stability,
and security in the remaining chapters of this book.

Key Concepts
class, p. 244 mass, p. 240 political understructure, p. 240
class approach, p. 244 pluralism, p. 247 politics, p. 248
class conflict, p. 246 political elite, p. 240 public policy, p. 248
elite approach, p. 240 political resources, p. 247 stages of the policy process,
group, p. 247 political stratification, p. 240 p. 237

For Further Consideration

1. What do you think is the single most impor- governed. Does this observation seem accu-
tant flaw in the assumptions or knowledge rate? Is it a persuasive basis for confirming
claims of the elite approach? The class the validity of the elite approach?
approach? Pluralism? 4. List six groups that have a political agenda
2. How might someone who embraces the and with which you have a membership or
class approach and someone who accepts a strong identity. Ask a variety of friends to
the pluralist approach debate the pub- provide you with a similar list. How much
lic policy decisions associated with the overlap is there in your group affiliations?
Mapuche presented in the chapter-opening Does this seem to support the pluralist tenet
case? How might the pluralist approach of nonoverlapping memberships? (To under-
account for a case like Swaziland, described
take a more complete test, you would need
in Focus in 9?
to survey many individuals from a variety
3. In a sense, all political systems are elit-
of backgrounds.)
ist because a few govern and many are

For Further Reading

Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. (1999). models emphasize: (1) “rational choice” by
The Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban decision makers who engage in a dispassion-
Missile Crisis. 2nd ed. New York: Longman. ate cost–benefit analysis of the expected utili-
This revised edition of Allison’s seminal case ties of different actions (see the Appendix);
study of the Cuban missile crisis in 1961 offers (2) “organizational processes” by which insti-
a superb presentation of three important mod- tutional routines shape policy due to actors’
els of the policy decision process that differ adherence to simple problem-solving strate-
from those described in this chapter. These gies and standard operating procedures; and
 Public Policy, Power, and Decision 255

(3) “bureaucratic politics,” whereby stakehold- 7th ed. Boston: McGraw-Hill. The author
ers’ behaviors and choices are based on their updates Mills’s The Power Elite, using more
personal values and the imperatives of their data and an elaborated theoretical base and
particular roles. reaching similar conclusions that an elite
Anderson, James E. (2015). Public Policymaking: governs the United States. See also his inter-
An Introduction. 8th ed. Kentucky: Cengage. A esting Web site at http://sociology.ucsc.edu/
solid text introducing the field of public policy whorulesamerica/power/wealth.html
analysis, with chapters focusing on the stages Evans, Geoffrey, ed. (1999). The End of Class
of the policy analysis framework presented in Politics?: Class Voting in Comparative
the first part of this chapter. Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Balulis, Joseph, and Vickie Sullivan, eds. (1996). In a series of revealing country-based studies,
Shakespeare’s Political Pageant: Essays the contributors to this volume present a data-
in Politics and Literature. Lanham, MD: based case, grounded particularly in analyses
Rowman & Littlefield. These articles offer of elections, that class politics continues to be a
a rich exploration of how the interplay of powerful force in certain developed countries
politics, power, and human nature is illumi- and postcommunist developed countries.
nated in the extraordinary plays of William Glazer, Amihai, and Lawrence S. Rothenberg.
Shakespeare. (2005). Why Government Succeeds and Why
Burki, Shahid J. (1991). Pakistan Under the It Fails. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Military: Eleven Years of Zia ul-Haq. Boulder, Press. This readable analysis emphasizes the
CO: Westview. A detailed description of elite economic conditions that influence public
rule in Pakistan under an authoritarian regime. policy in domains such as the regulation of
Castles, Francis. (1999). Comparative Public personal behavior, welfare policy, and eco-
Policy: Patterns of Post-war Transformation. nomic growth.
Northampton, MA: Edward Elgar Publishers. Ibsen, Henrik. (1882/1964). Enemy of the
A careful comparison of the development of People. In Six Plays by Ibsen. Trans. Eva Le
12 key public policy domains in many of the Gallienne. New York: Random House. A
advanced democracies, spanning 30 years. classic Norwegian play revealing the politi-
Chadwick, Andrew, and Philip Howard, eds. cal processes by which self-interest and greed
(2008). The Routledge Handbook of Internet overwhelm the efforts of a good citizen to
Politics. New York: Routledge. An excellent prevent his town from making a policy deci-
selection of analyses regarding the interplay sion that will result in grave environmental
between politics and the Internet, considering damage and a risk to public health.
the links of the Internet to political behavior, Kingdon, John. (2010). Agendas, Alternatives,
government institutions, public policy, and and Public Policies. Update edition with
the law. Epilogue on Health Care. 2nd ed. New York:
Dahl, Robert. (1961). Who Governs?: Democracy Pearson. The classic work that most fully
in an American City. New Haven, CT: Yale explains the idea of agenda setting: how an
University Press. This remains the classic issue emerges from many and becomes an
theoretical and empirical statement of plural- important item drawing attention and action
ism as an explanation of politics and the policy in the policy process.
process. Moran, Michael, Martin Rein, and Robert
Domhoff, G. William. (2013). Who Rules Goodin, eds. (2006). The Oxford Handbook of
America?: The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. Public Policy. New York: Oxford University
256 Chapter 9

Press. A comprehensive (780 pages) treatment perspectives and agendas, in combination with
of public policy analysis, including all the a more analytic approach, in the policymaking
major analytic approaches and all stages of the process, using the United States as context.
policy process. Wildavsky, Aaron. (1979). Speaking Truth to
Rothkopf, David. (2009). Superclass: The Global Power. Boston: Little, Brown. One of the most
Power Elite and the World They Are Making. perceptive scholars of the public policy process,
New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux. In a the late Aaron Wildavsky offers many insights
supercharged version of elite theory, this lively in this exploration of policymaking and policy
book identifies the 6,000 members of the global analysis.
elite and explains how they exercise enormous Yang, Benjamin. (1997). Deng: A Political Biogra-
power and control over the economic and phy. Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe. A compelling
political systems of the contemporary world. characterization of Deng Xiaoping, the shrewd
Stone, Deborah. (2011). Policy Paradox: The Art of leader who followed Mao Zedong to power in
Political Decision Making. 3rd ed. New York: China. This book also provides an intriguing
Norton. A readable and insightful description of and illuminating account of an elite political
the nuances and complex interaction of multiple system in action.

On the Web
http://www.trinity.edu/mkearl/strat.html organization that focuses on policy analyses in
This site provides a comprehensive look at the domains such as education, health, crime, the
study of social inequality and contains links to economy, and international affairs.
many lively Web sites on inequality as well as http://www.care2.com/causes/politics
information on related topics such as gender The Care 2 Make a Difference Policy Network
stratification and homelessness. offers numerous links to ideologically pro-
www.mapuche-nation.org gressive material, think tanks, and blogs that
This site highlights the culture, history, and address current policy issues.
political plight of the Mapuche Nation. http://www.angelfire.com/or/sociologyshop/
http://www.marxist.com CWM.html
In Defense of Marxism is a comprehensive site This site offers a variety of links that explore
that argues for the relevance of class theory the works and theories of elite theorist
and Marxism in the contemporary world, with C. Wright Mills.
essays and research on many political topics. http://www.publicpolicypolling.com
http://www.ncpa.org Details of current public policy issues in the
The conservative National Center for Policy United States, including current polls regard-
Analysis provides material, blogs, and links to ing proposed legislation and candidates.
many current policy issues on its Web site. http://www.ifpa.org
http://www.urban.org From the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis,
The Urban Institute describes itself as a non- a nonpartisan group, this site focuses on for-
partisan economic and social policy research eign policy issues.
Chapter 10
Change and Political
Development

Learning Objectives
10.1 Compare alternative perspectives on social, political, and economic
change.
10.2 Identify the attributes of development and summarize economic
development strategies.
10.3 Classify states by developmental characteristics.
10.4 Outline the characteristics and stages of political development.
10.5 Analyze how political systems respond to environmental challenges
through political institutionalization and system transformation.

As you sail up the Huangpu River into Shanghai, you are struck by many things.
The huge cranes loading container ships along both sides of the river seem to go on
for miles. You enter a city of massive, modern skyscrapers and more construction
cranes than any other city in the world. The roads suffer from such pervasive grid-
lock and the air is so thick with pollution and noise that you wonder why so many
people stay in this huge metropolis. But what is perhaps most noteworthy is what
this city represents—the rapid and extensive development of a country that was, until
only three generations ago, weakened for centuries by internal conflicts, famines,
corruption, and foreign intervention. And that this country, whose recent develop-
ment occurred under the iron hand of communism, has become the world’s largest
manufacturing economy and a global economic powerhouse. What accounts for these
remarkable changes in such a relatively brief period?
The transformation began in 1949, when communist forces under Mao Zedong
gained power in China after a lengthy civil war. The next three decades under
Chairman Mao were a blend of chaos and rapid development. Mao wanted to revolu-
tionize the country by destroying the burdens of its feudal, rural, impoverished, and
disorganized past. He established a strong, centralized political system between 1949
257
258 Chapter 10

The New China: Shanghai is dominated by a skyline of skyscrapers and construction cranes and a river
full of commercial shipping traffic.

and his death in 1976, using harsh totalitarian controls over political and cultural life
under the guardianship of the oppressive Communist Party. Mao directed his political
power to transform China’s economic and social systems. His regime implemented an
extensive command political economy, with state ownership of almost all productive
means. Population growth was aggressively limited, and there was a shift from rural
to urban areas. The Focus in 4 described some of Mao’s attempts to use the agents of
socialization to undermine Confucian values.
Mao’s time in power was also wracked by chaos and conflict. Mao’s policies led
to more than 30 million state-caused deaths through brutal treatment of opponents,
“permanent revolution” movements, and recurrent famines. Despite the turbulence of
Mao’s rule, this period also laid the foundations for economic development. Among
the many important changes were the establishment of an effective central govern-
ment; land reform; weakening of the rigid Confucian hierarchy of gender, age, and
class; great improvements in health, education, and infrastructure; and the transfor-
mation from an agrarian to an industrial nation.
Under Deng Xiaoping, Mao’s successor (and China’s top leader from 1978 to the
1990s), the political system remained authoritarian, firmly under the control of the
Communist Party. However, Deng abandoned the command economy and quietly
embraced many aspects of the free market. Chided that he had adopted capitalism,
 Change and Political Development 259

the pragmatic Deng mused: “It doesn’t matter if a cat is black or white, so long as
it catches mice.” Profit became not only an acceptable motivation but also a highly
desirable one (another of Deng’s famous comments is “to get rich is glorious”). Under
Deng, the share of industrial output under state ownership dropped from 78 percent to
26 percent, and almost the entire agricultural system shifted from state communes to
private control. China moved aggressively into the global economy, including a rapid
shift to manufacturing for export and to more sophisticated goods. China’s total GDP
and foreign trade each rose more than twelvefold, and both rural and urban income
per capita increased more than tenfold.
Since Deng stepped down in the early 1990s, the political leadership has continued
to actively manage the Chinese economy, and it has sustained a very high growth rate,
due particularly to strong gains in labor productivity and great success in exporting
goods. Overall, GDP has steadily increased, at an annual rate of 8 percent since 1978.
China now accounts for one-fourth of all global economic growth. A larger proportion
of Chinese enjoy a high standard of material living than at any point in the history
of the country. Yet millions of Chinese still live in relative poverty, especially in rural
areas, and increasing urban–rural inequalities in the distribution of wealth are creat-
ing substantial tension. Citizen dissatisfaction with corruption is rising. Environmental
degradation has been severe, especially in urban areas. As China has become “the
world’s largest…”—in terms of exports, industrial output, holder of foreign currencies,
and purchaser of commodities (e.g., energy, food)—many believe that the continuing
path of development in China is the most significant factor in the evolution of the
world’s economy in the near future (CIA 2014; Meisner 1999, 2006).

Change
10.1 Compare alternative perspectives on social, political, and economic change.
The recent history of China is a dramatic example of social, economic, and political change,
the processes of becoming different occurring in every contemporary society. Chapter 15
takes a closer look at China, among other countries that are in rapid transition. For now,
China illustrates how the political system can be a major source of change. Exploring the
links between the processes of change and the political world is the focus of this chapter.
There is typically a tension between continuity and change. Even with the strong
forces of globalization, some cultures are changing more slowly than others. For exam-
ple, many of the Masai on the Serengeti Plain in East Africa live in a manner that is
similar to the ways of their ancestors of 50 generations ago. They continue to raise
their cattle, ignoring the Kenya–Tanzania border and resisting the attempts of the
Kenyan government to alter their long-standing cultural patterns of family and tribal
life. But even the Masai have been affected by the modernization surrounding them. It
has brought health care and disease; money from tourists and reduced land for graz-
ing herds; education and cultural confusion.
There seems nowhere to hide from the forces of change. The Greek philosopher
Heraclitus articulated this view in the fifth century b.c.e. His famous dictum, “You can
260 Chapter 10

never step in the same river twice, for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you,” is
an extreme version of the viewpoint that everything is in constant flux, that change is
inevitable. Just as individuals move through a developmental process of birth, growth,
maturity, decline, and death, social organisms (groups, organizations, and societies)
also have some form of evolutionary development.
On the opposite side of the debate about the inevitability of change is the wry
French observation: Plus ça change, plus c’est la même chose. This translates loosely as
“The more things change, the more they remain the same.” This view suggests that
even if the specifics in a society alter, the fundamental human dynamics and the
challenges that any state faces remain relatively constant. Do you believe this? Is this a
wise commentary about the human condition? An erroneous cliché?
There are also ongoing disagreements about the desirability of change as well as
its inevitability. One normative position, most aligned with modern rationalism, is that
change is generally a positive force in human society. Change is the mechanism of
growth, development, and progress, all of which are assumed to increase knowledge,
extend control over the environment, and thus improve the human condition. Change
is the result of the rejection of the status quo in favor of a preferred status. This view
is reflected in the ideas of thinkers such as Isaac Newton (1642–1727), Immanuel Kant
(1724–1804), and Charles Darwin (1809–1882). In the contemporary world, it is espe-
cially prevalent among those who believe in the benefits of science and technology.
A contrasting position is that change and development have significant negative
effects, perhaps so many negatives that change is undesirable. Plato (ca. 428–347 b.c.e.),
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778), and Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) are among those
who argue that knowledge, civilization, and excessive control over the environment
result in a loss of innocence, goodness, and happiness and create the capacity for great
harm and destruction. In this view, humans have achieved material progress at the cost
of moral and spiritual decline. Moreover, our capacity to increase our supply of food and
material goods cannot be separated from our development of harmful behaviors and
technologies (e.g., weapons, chemicals) that degrade the environment and eliminate cer-
tain species of life—including, possibly, human beings. Most people now recognize the
paradox that change and development simultaneously increase and reduce the quality of
life. Change can be good, bad, or, most often, both. And most accept the serious problems
and dangers associated with progress to enjoy the material benefits that change brings.

Development
10.2 Identify the attributes of development and summarize economic
development strategies.

Characteristics of “More Developed” Systems

Contemporary changes of social, economic, and political systems are usually dis-
cussed in terms of development or modernization. While both of these concepts can be
slippery, social scientific research often avoids the concept of modernization because it
 Change and Political Development 261

is particularly fuzzy. What is “modern” depends very much on the particular histori-
cal moment and even on the values and culture of the analyst. Beethoven, the Beatles,
and Avicii all created “modern” music. In the world of rapid social and technological
change, what seemed modern in the United States 40 years ago, before the Internet,
social media, smartphones, and GPS, does not seem so modern today.
The concept of development is also fluid, but it is more measurable. Development
refers to the processes through which certain key dimensions become more pronounced. There
are no agreed-upon measures for distinguishing sharply between systems that are
developed/modern and those that are not. Broadly, a more developed human system
exhibits relatively high levels on three key dimensions that tap social, cultural, eco-
nomic, political, and personal characteristics (Bill and Hardgrave 1981: 63):

1. The organizational dimension: behaviors and actions by groups, institutions, and

societies that are based on specialization, interdependency, and differentiation of
roles and functions
2. The technological dimension: the use of increasingly complex and sophisticated
artifacts to produce useful goods and services and to control the environment
3. The attitudinal dimension: cognitive, affective, and evaluative orientations that are
dominated by scientific knowledge, rationality, secular values, and individualism

The technological dimension is the core driver of economic development, an

increase in the amount, complexity, and value of the goods produced by an economic system,
a goal of great importance to every state (recall Figure 5.1). Thus, states attempt to
identify and implement strategies that facilitate economic development, which they
usually define by some measure of national economic production such as GDP per
capita or the rate of growth in GDP (described in Chapter 8). The expansion of avail-
able goods and services in the society offers the promise of a life that is more secure
and more comfortable for at least some citizens.
Advances on the organizational and attitudinal dimensions are reflected by social
indicators such as greater urbanization, expanded communications, more extensive
social networks, improved efficiency, higher education levels, higher literacy rates, and
greater social mobility. Most people assume that there are societal benefits associated
with increases on each of these dimensions, but there are some individuals and groups
that argue that increases on these dimensions are not necessarily desirable (Kenny et
al. 2013). They believe that such changes can have negative effects on deeply revered
social and cultural values. In some countries, these negative changes are referred to as
Westernization and are evident in attitudinal changes that shift toward greater secular-
ism, individualism, and materialism. Groups that are strongly committed to sustaining
traditional cultural and religious values, such as those of Islam or Hinduism, can be
very concerned about these types of changes within their countries.
Indeed, even economic development is questioned by those alarmed about the
negative effects on the environment of unrestricted economic growth. Concerns for
the environment center on both the depletion of Earth’s resources (e.g., the destruction
of the forests, shortages of water, overfishing, and the overcultivation of the land to
increase food production) and the degradation of the environment (e.g., climate change,
262 Chapter 10

air pollution, soil erosion, and solid waste associated with industrial processes and
consumerism) (Meadowcraft 2013).

The Process of Development

Stage typologIeS Scholars have attempted to define the process(es) through
which development and modernization occur. One approach is to define a series of
stages or phases through which each society passes (Rostow 1960). Best known are the
simple typologies, many of which have only two stages, such as traditional and modern,
less developed and more developed, or mechanical and organic. These labels are so broad
that they do not provide much conceptual clarity.
Karl Marx proposed a more complex typology in which most societies pass
through six stages of development, each based on how its major productive resources
are controlled. Marx posited that there is an initial stage of primitive communism, in
which all individuals jointly share control over any available productive resources.
The development process then continues through a series of stages in which there
are increasingly subtle forms of domination by some classes over others: slavery, then
feudalism, and then capitalism. Marx claimed that capitalist systems are eventually
transformed into socialist and finally to communist systems, the ultimate stage of devel-
opment in which all citizens blend into a single class that shares control of resources
(recall Chapters 2, 8, and 9 on communism and class theory).

ReSponSe to Key ChallengeS Most explanations of the process of development

do not assume, as Marx does, that there is a single, inevitable sequence of stages. Rather,
analysts identify a series of key challenges in the development process (Black 1966).
These challenges include the tension between traditional values and modern ones; the
transition from a rural, agrarian society to an urban, industrial society; the transfer of
social and political power from traditional elites to modernizing ones; and the conver-
gence of geographical territory, nation-based identities, and state boundaries.
A country’s development process depends on the sequence in which the chal-
lenges occur, how the society responds to the challenges, and crucial features of the
society and its environment. For example, Barrington Moore (1966) uses detailed
historical analyses of eight countries to define four different models of development
based on how relationships evolved among key social groups, especially the landed
aristocrats and peasants in the rural areas and the entrepreneurs and government
employees in the urban areas. One of Moore’s most powerful conclusions is that all
forms of development are essentially revolutions from above, implemented by a ruth-
less minority and causing great hardship to the large majority of the population, which
does not want these changes.

IndIvIdual-level Change Most analyses of development focus on the macro

level—that is, on the organizational and technological dimensions of systems such as
economic and political systems. But attention to the attitudinal dimension shifts the
analysis to the social-psychological characteristics of individuals that might account
for variations in rates and patterns of development (Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 2010;
 Change and Political Development 263

Inkeles and Smith 1999). You might understand individual-level change intuitively if
you think about what happens to people when their existing values are challenged by
education, other religions, or different cultures. The Koran recognizes the importance of
personal values in shaping society, noting, “Lo! Allah changeth not the condition of a
people until they first change what is in their hearts.” These analyses of individual atti-
tudes and change are related to the political behavior studies described in Chapters 2–4,
although the focus here is on a broader array of beliefs (not just political beliefs).
In the attempt to establish the attitudinal traits associated with modernity, the work
of Alex Inkeles and his colleagues (Inkeles and Smith 1999) is noteworthy. This group
gathered extensive survey data from men in six developing countries (Argentina,
Bangladesh, Chile, India, Israel, and Nigeria). Statistical analyses produced a set of
seven qualities that the researchers believe constitute a “syndrome of modernity”—
that is, the general attitudinal traits of a modern person in a developing society:

1. Openness to new experiences regarding both people and behaviors

2. A shift in allegiance from those individuals in traditional authority structures
(e.g., parents, religious leaders) to those representing modern institutions (e.g.,
government leaders)
3. Confidence in modern technologies (e.g., science, medicine) and a less fatalistic
attitude about life
4. Desire for social mobility for oneself and one’s children
5. Belief in the value of planning and punctuality
6. Interest in local politics and community affairs
7. Interest in news, especially national and international affairs

Inkeles and his colleagues conclude that there is remarkable similarity in these
clusters of beliefs among the modern men in all six societies they studied and perhaps
among modern individuals in almost all cultures. Some posit that such an emerging
commonality of beliefs is part of a broader set of forces that are homogenizing everyone
into a global culture, a global information network, and a global economy (Barber 1996;
Friedman 2007). However, it is unclear whether most people are equally exposed to
and changed by global culture. In most developing societies, some people and groups
enthusiastically embrace the new beliefs and new behaviors, while others cling tena-
ciously to the old ones. Indeed, in some cases of religious fundamentalism, it seems that
leaders who display the activist and outward-oriented psychological traits associated
with the syndrome of modernity are actually working to return the society to more
traditional patterns of attitudes and actions (Hansen and Postmes 2013; Sahoo 2013).

emeRgenCe of CIvIl SoCIety The attitudinal changes in individuals are espe-

cially important when they result in new patterns of social interaction. Thus, one
key consideration in assessing development is the extent to which a civil society has
emerged. Attitudes particularly associated with the existence of civil society include
tolerance of differences in opinions and behaviors, social trust, willingness to negoti-
ate and to avoid violence in resolving differences, and a sense of shared identity with
others. Some analysts conclude that, while a society can be “developed” without being
264 Chapter 10

a civil society, these values of civility are crucial for sustaining effective community
and democracy (Diamond 2009; Linz and Stepan 1996; Putnam 1993, 2001).

CultuRe and Change Some studies of development emphasize the importance of

the culture in the processes of change (Hall and Lamont 2013). Since Max Weber’s classic
study (1958a) of the link between the culture of Protestant religions and the rise of capi-
talist political economies, there have been continuing efforts to clarify the relationship
between broad cultural systems and economic development. Some, like Weber, argue
that Protestantism motivated people to make substantial, even irrational, sacrifices of
material consumption and the pleasures of life, inciting them to work extraordinarily
hard and accumulate wealth rather than spend it. A society infused with such values is
associated with the transformation to a modern society and economy.
Weber (1951, 1958b) also applied an analysis of culture and religion to India and
China to explain the absence of development there. But since the 1980s, there has been
a dramatic surge of economic development among the newly industrializing Asian
countries (to be discussed later in this chapter). Because these Asian countries have
had substantially higher levels of development than most other countries employing
similar development strategies, more recent explanations have emphasized how Asian
culture has facilitated development (Fukuyama 2009; Huntington 1991; Wiarda 2013).

A Development-Based Taxonomy of States

10.3 Classify states by developmental characteristics.
As you discovered in Part One, a central goal of political analysis is to develop general
descriptions and explanations of political phenomena. To attempt the near-impossible
task of generalizing about more than 180 countries, it seems that comparative analysis
would be more manageable if it is based on an appropriate taxonomy that distin-
guishes only a few groups of countries. What categories would you suggest to create
just a few distinct groups of countries? Given your categories, how, for example, would
you classify Malaysia?
If you tried to classify Malaysia using social statistics, many alternatives could
emerge. You might economically classify Malaysia as an upper-middle-income
country—given its GDP per capita (PPP) of $17,500. You might classify it in a regional
group as one of the countries in East Asia. Or you could utilize a cultural taxonomy in
which it is a predominantly Muslim country, although it has substantial Buddhist and
Christian minorities. Ethnically, it is majority Malay, but there is tension with the large
number of ethnic Chinese. Historically, it is a postcolonial country, after nearly two
centuries of British rule ended in 1963. Geopolitically, it is a significant country, rich in
commodities and in a strategic location between the Strait of Malacca and the South
China Sea. You might use a political criterion, such as classifying Malaysia as a parlia-
mentary system, or as a multiparty system (with a governing coalition of 13 parties),
or as a flawed democracy in transition after 22 years under a single leader. The list of
possible taxonomies is long.
 Change and Political Development 265

However, if you put your boots on the ground in Malaysia, you might be per-
plexed about how to classify Malaysia in terms of its development. Flying into KL
(Kuala Lumpur), you would be dazzled by arguably the most architecturally cutting-
edge, high-tech airport in the world. Every aspect of your arrival, baggage handling,
and customs would be facilitated by the most advanced technologies, as would your
ride into the center of the capital on a sleek train. The skyline of KL and its shopping
center, the fancy cars, and the elegantly dressed people would suggest you were in the
most advanced city in the world. But when you continued your journey on a rickety
bus to a rural village, you’d find bad roads, dilapidated buildings, risky-looking street
food, and many people living without reliable electricity, plumbing, or sanitation—
conditions that might be more consistent with your ideas about life in a “Third World”
country. Where would Malaysia fit?
This brief consideration of Malaysia suggests that no taxonomy is fully satisfac-
tory, given the complexity of countries. The most common approach for classifying
all the world’s countries distinguishes between “developed countries” and “devel-
oping countries,” often based on a single measure of economic development such
as GDP per capita. If there is a second dimension, it is often region. For example,
the World Bank utilizes four economic categories (high income, high middle income,
low middle income, and low income) as its main taxonomy and sometimes adds a
regional dimension.
This chapter proposes a taxonomy of countries with only three categories, but it is
based on a more nuanced measurement of a country’s level of development. This alter-
native taxonomy begins with a measure of economic development. It then adds a second,
social development dimension, guided by the broader conception of the dimensions of
development suggested earlier in this chapter.

• economic development. Like many classificatory schemes, the taxonomy created

here uses a standard measure of the total value of goods produced in a country
divided by the population of the country: GDP per capita, correcting for purchas-
ing power parity (PPP). As noted in Chapter 8, PPP seems useful for comparing
the relative levels of economic development in a manner that reflects domestic
purchasing power in each country.
• Social development. To enrich the classification, this book employs a second di-
mension, grounded in the types of organizational, technological, and attitudinal
development discussed above. Like Malaysia, each country is a unique mix, in
terms of the complexity of its organizations, the pervasiveness of high technology,
and the blend of traditional and modern attitudes. To measure this mix, an index
has been calculated for each country to reflect the levels of

• knowledge (measured as the adult literacy rate);

• urban lifestyle (measured as percent of population in urban areas);
• health (measured as longevity and mortality rates to age five); and
• communication capabilities (measured as cell phones per capita and computers
per capita).
266 Chapter 10

Each country’s values on these four components are weighted equally (on 10-point
scales) to generate a social development index score from 0 to 40. As you assess this
social development index, consider whether these four dimensions seem appropriate,
whether the operational indicators used to measure each one seem valid, and whether
equally weighting the four dimensions seems defensible.
Figure 10.1 displays a selection of countries plotted on the economic develop-
ment and social development dimensions. The figure also suggests a taxonomy for
our analyses, by highlighting three clusters of countries. Examine these clusters to
see if they seem a reasonable way to classify countries. We offer names for each
of the three clusters: the developed countries of the Global North; the developing
countries of the Global South; and the transitional developed countries. The follow-
ing paragraphs briefly characterize the countries in each category. Each cluster will
be the focus of a later chapter (Chapters 13–15), which will offer generalizations
about the quest for prosperity, stability, and security by the states in that group.

Figure 10.1 Classification of Selected Countries Based on Economic and Social Development
SourceS: World Bank 2013; UNDP 2013.

$70,000

Norway
Singapore
$60,000

Developed
Switzerland
$50,000 United States
GDP per capita (PPP in U.S. $)

Canada Australia
Austria Sweden
Germany Denmark
$40,000 Taiwan
France
Japan United Kingdom
Italy
South Korea
$30,000 Israel
Slovenia
Czech Republic
Transitional Saudi Arabia Slovakia
Estonia
Russia Chile
Hungary Poland
$20,000
Libya Turkey Malaysia
Mexico
Uruguay
Iran Costa Rica Venezuela
South Africa Thailand Brazil Argentina
$10,000 Algeria Albania Cuba
Swaziland China
Cambodia Jamaica Ukraine
Egypt Indonesia
Developing India
Ghana
Pakistan Uzbekistan
Georgia
Philippines
Uganda Vietnam
Ethiopia Nigeria
$0 Kenya
Zimbabwe
Tajikistan

Dem. Rep. Congo Bangladesh

0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
Social Development Index
 Change and Political Development 267

The Developed Countries of the Global North

The countries in the upper-right corner of Figure 10.1 are mainly in Western Europe,
plus Canada, Japan, the United States. But the cluster also includes a few others, such
as Australia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan. Most of these countries are usually
referred to as the developed countries or the Global North, and occasionally most are
still called the “First World.” This group includes most of the countries with the world’s
highest levels of GDP per capita, but these states also rank very high on the social
dimensions of development. Their populations generally enjoy relatively high levels
of literacy, health, and welfare; their technological infrastructure is advanced; and most
have a high material standard of living. Do any countries that are in this group or their
relative location in Figure 10.1 surprise you? Chapter 13 provides a more in-depth look
at the strategies and obstacles to development for the countries in the Global North.

The Developing Countries of the Global South

You will notice that the lower cluster in Figure 10.1 includes a diverse set of countries in
terms of size, region, culture, geopolitical significance, and so on. As you would expect,
these countries have lower levels of economic development and are also less developed
on the technological, organizational, and attitudinal dimensions than the developed
countries. They tend to spread more broadly across the social development index because
some of them are more advanced than others in areas such as literacy, urbanization, and
longevity. Are you surprised by any countries that are or are not in this group?
Social scientists, political actors, and the media often refer to most of this group of
about 140 countries as the developing countries. Since the 1950s, many developing coun-
tries were also called the “Third World.” Initially, this term was applied in the context
of the Cold War to those states that claimed they were “nonaligned”: not in the camp of
either the United States and its allies (the First World) or the Soviet Union and its allies
(the Second World). Soon, the term was used to refer to almost all developing countries. In
the post–Cold War era, the concept of a Third World is used less frequently, and another
term has emerged: the Global South. Nearly all of the developing countries are located
geographically south of the developed countries (the Global North). This large and diverse
cluster of developing countries of the Global South will be explored in Chapter 14.

The Transitional Developed Countries

The developed countries and the developing countries are standard categories in
analyses by governmental agencies and social scientists. But there are countries in
Figure 10.1, like Malaysia, that seem especially difficult to classify. Currently, the levels
of economic and/or social development in these countries put them “in the middle.”
In Figure 10.1, these countries are called transitional developed countries to reflect
their middle range on one or both dimensions of development and, in some cases,
their high rate of change.
Although all the countries in the world are always in transition, Chapter 15
will distinguish and examine three subsets of transitional countries. Each of these
268 Chapter 10

subsets is made up of countries with some important commonalities in their economic

situation or political culture. These countries also face particularly interesting devel-
opment challenges, and their approaches to achieving their goals are worth studying.
One subset of countries that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union and its
former Eastern and Central European allies, such as Hungary and Poland, is termed
the postcommunist developed countries. A second subset is called the Latin American
Transitionals, and it includes such countries as Argentina, Chile, and Mexico. The
third group, which is not a cluster in Figure 10.1 but has been widely cited as a group
of key countries with growing importance for the global economy, is the BRICS (com-
posed of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). Chapter 15 will provide details
about each of these three groups.
Like any taxonomy (see the Appendix), Figure 10.1 is an attempt to create groups
that can be distinguished analytically, are based on some specifiable criteria, and seem
to make sense. However, not every country fits neatly into a category. Examples of this
in the framework in Figure 10.1 include some resource-rich (oil) states in the Middle
East and Africa (e.g., Libya) and some postcommunist countries that have high social
development but have not prospered economically (e.g., Ukraine). The categories pro-
posed from the analysis in Figure 10.1 are acceptable if their use provides clarification
and insight and, ideally, if they facilitate the development of generalizations and theory.
As a political analyst, you should assess the utility of this taxonomy relative to alternative
ways of grouping countries for analysis. The remainder of this chapter focuses broadly on
the dynamics and challenges of economic and political development facing all countries.

The Dynamics of Economic Development

geneRal StRategIeS The actual economic development of a country is the prod-
uct of a complex set of actions by both major players (e.g., the government, large
corporations, and international banks) and small players (e.g., small businesses and
individuals as consumers and workers) that is staggering in scale and almost incom-
prehensible in nature.
In the abstract, the discussion of political economy in Chapter 8 (look again at
Figure 8.3) provides the key to understanding what is happening. Economic develop-
ment occurs as more and more households and firms are engaged in ever-higher levels
of production and consumption. More goods (and, ideally, more diverse and complex
goods) are produced, more income and expenditures are exchanged, and thus the GDP
gets larger relative to the number of people sharing in the carnival of production and
consumption. And a political economy is normally healthier if it is not only growing
but also bringing more income into the country by selling exports than it sends out of
the country to pay for imports.
Chapter 8 explored some of the general challenges facing every political econ-
omy in the quest for economic development. From a public policy perspective, the
underlying puzzle is: How can the state facilitate economic development? Recall from
Chapter 8 that in recent decades, three competing visions have guided the answer to
this question in most political economies: statism, state capitalism, and neoliberalism.
 Change and Political Development 269

As Chapter 8 indicated, both statism and state capitalism are characterized by very
intensive state intervention in the political economy. Statism is a political economy
in which the state, to serve the primary goal of national economic growth and development,
actively manages the system of production and distribution of goods, including ownership of
major assets. State capitalism is a political economy in which the leaders of the political
system own and manage many major assets or assert extensive control over who is allowed
to control key sectors of the economy, and the primary goal of the economy is to increase the
leaders’ resources. Thus statism is oriented more toward enhancing the country’s power
and serving the national interest through maximizing development, and it is less con-
cerned than state capitalism about increasing the political and economic power of the
elite (Bremmer 2010). Many developing countries of the Global South and transitional
developed countries have been strongly oriented to one of these two approaches for
part or all of the last 60 years.
neoliberalism is grounded in the market political economy model (see Chapter 8),
and its guiding principle is to maximize the economic freedom of firms, households, and indi-
viduals. The state’s interventions in the economy must be severely limited because they
undermine and distort the efficiency of the free market. Public expenditure is minimal,
there is limited government regulation of the economy, and direct foreign investment
and free trade across state boundaries are encouraged. The state is mainly concerned
with maintaining fiscal and monetary discipline (not taxing or spending much, keep-
ing the currency stable) and facilitating the activities of firms in the national and
global marketplaces. This approach has generally been dominant among countries in
the Global North, particularly the market economies described in Chapter 13. And
since the mid-1970s, many other countries have adopted versions of the neoliberal
approach, especially due to two factors: the disappointing levels of economic growth
achieved with the statist and state capitalist approaches and strong pressures from the
international financial community and the global economy to embrace neoliberalism
(Rodrik 2003; Linz and Stepan 1996).
Of course, like many aspects of politics, these strict categories do not tell the
whole story. Most countries blend elements of all three approaches, and some states
created a hybrid approach that attempts to combine the strengths of the statist and
neoliberal approaches. The developmental state hybrid blends an emphasis on a private,
market-based system of firms with a state that actively intervenes to promote and protect the
country’s firms in the global economy. Generally, as in neoliberalism, aggressive capital-
ism is favored and there are minimal governmental constraints on firms. However, as
in statism, the state is very interventionist in enacting taxing, spending, and regulatory
policies that promote the export of goods, encourage savings and investment, discour-
age high levels of domestic consumption, and provide a productive, docile labor force.
The state also works cooperatively with firms to identify and then produce particular
goods that can be successfully sold in the international marketplace. Government sub-
sidies enable firms to sell goods at low or no profit while the firm captures a share of
the market and gains consumer support. The state’s policies (e.g., tariffs) also protect
firms against imported goods. Japan is an early innovator shaping the developmental
state approach, which has been copied with varying success by other countries.
270 Chapter 10

Chapter 14, on the Global South, and Chapter 15, on the transitional developed
countries, will explain in more detail the policies and challenges associated with these
countries’ quest for economic development and prosperity. In general, countries have
tried variations of all of the approaches described above. Overall, no approach has proven
successful for all countries that have implemented it. Many Global South countries, such
as those near the bottom of Figure 10.1, have languished regardless of approach. The
developmental state approach has arguably been the most successful because it has
enabled some countries to grow their economies substantially over multiple years. It has
been particularly effective in some countries in Asia, such as Singapore, South Korea,
and Taiwan, but far less successful in other regions (Simone 2001; Woo-Cumings 1999).
Many countries have embraced statism or state capitalism for periods of time,
assuming that strong management by the state is necessary to achieve growth in the
complex global economy and/or to maintain the existing power elite. Most of these
attempts have been sporadically successful, at best, in countries like Brazil, Russia,
and South Africa. China, and more recently Vietnam, are among the few examples in
which state capitalism has generated sustained high growth. State capitalism as an
economic development strategy has not fared well in many countries in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America where it was implemented.
As noted above, neoliberalism has been adopted in many Global South and transi-
tional developed countries, at least in part due to pressure from the Global North. Solid
growth for multiple years has been the result in certain countries, such as Chile and Peru
in Latin America, Estonia and Poland among the former Soviet allies in Europe, and India.
Others, such as Brazil, Mexico, and Hungary, have had periods of high growth followed
by low or negative growth. Some analysts credit neoliberalism with the economic “rise of
the South” since 2000 (see Chapter 14), but critics counter that overall economic growth
associated with neoliberalism has been coupled with increased poverty and inequality
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Huber and Solt 2004; Rodrik 2003).
The globalized economy has increased the complexity and pressures of achiev-
ing economic growth in every country attempting to sustain it. In the late 1990s and
since 2008, in particular, economic difficulties in some economies have quickly spread
to many other countries, given the increasingly global economic interdependency.
In every country, the debate continues about the best strategy for broad and stable
economic development (Scherer, Palazzo, and Seidl 2013; Stein 2006).

dependenCy wIthIn the InteRnatIonal polItICal eConomy Why

have so many developing countries been unable to achieve high, sustained economic
growth during the postcolonial period (since about 1960)? Some analysts offer a per-
spective known generally as the dependency approach, which argues that the “late
developers” face specific challenges because of their subordination to and dependence on the
more developed countries and the transnational institutions they control in the current world.
According to the ideological framing of the dependency approach, the key problem
for current developers is a long history of exploitation by the more developed capi-
talist/imperialist states. The developed countries have manipulated and controlled
the political economies of the developing countries for decades or even centuries
 Change and Political Development 271

by means of their economic, military, and political domination of the world system.
Indeed, a major reason the developed countries have sustained their prosperity since
the mid-twentieth century is that they still exploit and reap benefits from the develop-
ing countries, especially through their broad control of capital, markets and prices, and
multinational corporations. In this view, the activities of the developed countries have
not merely inhibited the progress of the late developers—they have actually deformed
(distorted and ruined) the efforts of the developing countries.
The descriptive version of the dependency approach provides a similar analysis
but without heaping blame exclusively on the advanced states. It posits an economic
hierarchy in which economic actors at every level take advantage of those below them
in the global economic system. At the top of the heap is a core, composed of the power-
ful states, large firms (especially multinational corporations such as JPMorganChase,
General Electric, and Exxon Mobil), and financial institutions controlled by the most
developed countries. At the bottom of the heap on the periphery are the villages of the
developing countries (Isbister 2006; Wallerstein, Lemert, and Rojas 2013; Wiarda 2003).
In this version, many actors engage in exploitation. The resources of villages and the
urban poor (raw materials, cheap labor) are exploited by local and regional economic
actors, who are in turn exploited by national economic actors, who are exploited by the
powerful core actors in the global economy.

ContInuIng dependenCy? It is clear that the process of development is inter-

twined with the global economy. However, three arguments are offered by analysts
who dispute the validity of the dependency approach. First, serious internal problems
in many developing countries, especially extensive corruption and conflicts among
nationality groups, are major limitations on development (Calderisi 2007; Isbister 2006;
Johnston 2006). Second, the economic success of some Asian developing countries,
relative to those in Africa and Latin America, suggests that cultural and institutional
factors are more crucial to development than is the level of dependence on foreign
capital or foreign companies (Fallows 1995; Fallows 1995; Stevens and Cooper 2010).
Third, the low- and middle-income countries of the Global South, measured either as
a group or by region, have actually achieved higher average annual rates of economic
(GDP) growth since the early 1990s than the developed countries (World Bank 2013).
In response, dependency theorists note that when income inequality continues to rise
worldwide—the disparity between the top and bottom 20 percent has nearly doubled
in the last three decades to a ratio of 50:1—the systematic subordination of those on the
periphery cannot be dismissed (UNDP 2006).

Political Development
10.4 outline the characteristics and stages of political development.
To this point, this chapter has broadly considered development in all spheres of
human activity, particularly in the economic and attitudinal spheres. Let us now turn
to the specifically political aspects of development. political development refers to
272 Chapter 10

the emergence of more extensive capabilities in the political system, especially in the sense
that political structures and processes become more specialized and more effective in
managing internal operations and in responding to the environment.

Characteristics of Political Development

Political development is typically measured by the extent to which a political system
exhibits relatively high levels on the following four dimensions:

1. Concentration of power in the state. Most power and authority are centralized
in a single state-level governmental system, and traditional sources of political
authority weaken. The citizens agree that the state has the right to make and
enforce public policies, and they accept those decisions as authoritative. The for-
mal–legal aspects of government (e.g., constitutions and laws) are well established.
2. Specialized political structures. Most key political functions are fulfilled by
complex, organized political institutions such as legislatures, executives, political
parties, and political interest groups. The actions of these institutions are gener-
ally guided by bureaucratic principles such as rationality and efficiency (recall
Chapters 6 and 7).
3. political institutionalization. The citizens value and support the political struc-
tures and processes, which become more stable, and the citizens fulfill their roles
of conventional political participation as voters, foot soldiers, and so on (recall
Chapter 3).
4. extensive capabilities of the state. The political system becomes better able to
generate support, to respond to demands from its population, and to control the
environment. Overall, its organization is more stable and coherent, its structures
are more efficient, and its actions more effectively serve its goals and objectives. In
a capabilities analysis, a political system achieves a higher level of political devel-
opment when it improves its effectiveness on any of five key capabilities (Powell,
Strom, and Dalton 2012):

extractive: using human and material resources from the environment

Regulative: controlling individual and group actions
distributive: allocating values through institutionalized structures and
procedures
Responsive: making decisions and policies that react to demands for value
allocations
Symbolic: manipulating images and meanings and distributing nonmaterial
rewards and values

The Process of Political Development

Figure 10.2 presents one model of the process through which political development
occurs. From this perspective, the elements of modernization (in the figure) provide
the material and human resources that lead to the emergence of a developed political
 Change and Political Development 273

Figure 10.2 Model of Development I

Urbanization
M
O
D
E
R
Economic Social N Political
I
development mobilization Z development
A
T
I
O
N

system. Greater economic capability produces goods that the political system can
distribute. An urban population with increasingly modern beliefs is more willing to
accept the authority of government and to participate meaningfully in politics. In
essence, the political system develops more complex and specialized structures as a
response to changes that are occurring in the society and the economy.
Conceptualizing political development as primarily a response to economic and
social change is based on the historical analyses of political systems that developed in
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. However, the power and impact of the politi-
cal system itself, as a causal force for change, are more evident when one analyzes
the societies that have undergone substantial development during the last 50 years
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Wiarda 2003).
This leads to a second perspective in which the political system is the crucial force
that causes development of the social and economic systems. Thus, Figure 10.3 empha-
sizes the central importance of the political system as an agent of change in relation to
other societal characteristics. As Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972), the first president of
Ghana, observed: “Seek ye first the political kingdom, and all else shall be added unto
you.” This nearly religious invocation asserts that if the political system is developed
first, it can then serve as the instrument through which social and economic develop-
ment is achieved. Of course, if wrong choices are made about the political system, it
can inhibit change and development. Public policy decisions by an assertive political
leadership can establish specialized political structures, expand the capabilities of the
political system, and mobilize certain groups into the political process. The political
leadership can then deploy these more developed political structures to enact public
policies that empower governmental officials to perform new functions, assert state

Figure 10.3 Model of Development II

Economic development

Political
Urbanization MODERNIZATION
development

Social mobilization
274 Chapter 10

control over key human and natural resources, and allocate those resources in ways
that result in social and economic development in domains such as the political econ-
omy, the educational system, the culture, national identity, the media, and religious
practices (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012).
Obviously, change and development in the political, social, economic, and other
domains are interdependent; that is, they affect one another. But Figure 10.3 empha-
sizes the central role of politics and political choice as drivers of development. In
this conception, overall development is shaped by the ideology, will, and actions of
political actors rather than being driven primarily by economic growth. This was the
case for China under Mao Zedong, the example that opened this chapter. Another
compelling example of a leader’s explicit use of the political system as a power-
ful instrument to change many aspects of the society is Kemal Atatürk’s efforts to
modernize Turkey, described in Focus in 10.

Focus in 10
Political Development and Modernization in Turkey
The modernization effort in Turkey is an example was established. Atatürk thus created a political
of “seeking the political kingdom first.” Historically, system with modern structures of governance and
the area of the Turkish nation was part of the large modern forms of political participation. This politi-
Ottoman Empire ruled by a sultan. After World War cal system then became the instrument for Atatürk’s
I, an army commander named Mustafa Kemal led a broader efforts to reform Turkey.
fierce military struggle for national independence. From 1925 until his death in 1938, Atatürk
Victory resulted in the creation of the sovereign employed his great political power to imple-
state of Turkey in 1922. Mustafa Kemal, who seized ment three major sets of public policies that were
political power in the new republic, was committed meant to modernize Turkey and to separate it from
to rapid modernization. At the time, Turkey had very the traditional Muslim world. First, he enacted
traditional political, economic, and social systems, laws that prohibited the wearing of religious gar-
with Islamic law dominating the actions of the 98 ments in everyday life, abolished religious schools,
percent Muslim population. The new leader decided and closed religious tombs as places of wor-
that the key to modernization was to lessen the hold ship. Second, he encouraged the emergence and
of Islam on the people. empowerment of a nationalist elite by steps such
In a stroke of symbolic politics, Kemal began as creating a new Turkish language and banning the
his modernization drive at the personal level. He public use of other languages (recall his suppres-
changed his name to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the sion of the Kurds described in Chapter 5); replac-
addition meaning “father of the Turks.” (Kemal was ing the Ottoman script with the Latin alphabet; and
also a fortunate name because it means “perfect establishing Turkish literacy programs, especially in
one.”) Atatürk initially focused on political devel- urban areas. Third, he established a new civil code
opment, establishing a new state based on the (copied from Switzerland) to govern the legal rela-
principles of independence and democracy. A con- tions between individuals and collectivities, relegat-
stitution was approved in 1924, executive power ing sharia law and the Koran to peripheral status in
was granted to a president, the sultan was exiled, a guiding public life. For example, he tried to eliminate
legislature was elected, and a single political party the subordinate role of women, encouraging them
 Change and Political Development 275

to work, providing them with rights of divorce and

inheritance, allowing them to vote and hold public
office, and banning polygamy.
The effects of Atatürk’s changes are evident in
contemporary Turkey, whose 81 million people are
99.8 percent Muslim. While 70 percent of the pop-
ulation lived in villages in 1964, Turkey is now 72
percent urban. The economy, 75 percent agrarian
in 1978, is 91 percent industrial and service-based
(CIA 2013). Turkey now has the most educated and
modern women in the Muslim world, and Tansu Çiller
was Turkey’s first female prime minister (1993–1996).
A 2004 constitutional amendment says: “women
and men have equal rights,” and about one-fourth
of Turkish professionals are women; yet substantial
gender inequality remains due to a continuing gap
between legal standing and social realities.
Politically, the attempt to create an effective
multiparty democracy in Turkey remains unfinished.
There have been periods of serious social instabil-
ity and governmental corruption and three periods
of military rule since 1960, although the military
returned the reins of government to civilians in each
case after order was restored. For the first time since
Atatürk, an Islamist party (the Welfare Party) came Students carrying a portrait of Atatürk, founder of
to power in 1996. When the government began to modern Turkey, chant slogans to protest the attempts
promote numerous policy changes based on Islamic by the government to reduce the secular orientation of
principles and practices, the military responded with education policies.
warnings and then forced the party from office in a
“soft coup” that revealed the continuing power of Thus, Atatürk’s strong policies have not totally
the military in what is perhaps best characterized as transformed Turkey. However, his legacy is an illu-
an illiberal democracy (see Chapter 7). minating example of how a committed political
A reformulated Islamist party (the Justice and leader can reform the political system and then use
Development [AK] Party) has dominated the last four political power to achieve considerable social and
elections (2002 to 2014). Recep Erdogan, AK’s three- economic development within a society, consistent
time prime minister and Turkey’s first ever popularly with Figure 10.3.
elected president (in 2014), has attempted to reas-
sure the military of his support for Atatürk’s secular
society. However, he now very actively implements
Further Focus
public policies that protect and expand the role of 1. Which of Atatürk’s policies do you think was
Islam in the public realm. This combination of political the most important for overall development in
power and religious orientation has heightened the Turkey?
uneasiness within Turkey’s military and secular ele- 2. As the leader of a developing country, if you had
ments, increasing tensions over the drift away from to emphasize economic development or political
secularism. development, which would you choose?
276 Chapter 10

Political Development as Democratization

In contrast to the capabilities analysis described above, some scholars (e.g., Cutright
1963) define political development as the establishment of the rule of law, legitimate
elections, and representative institutions. Others object that this conception of a devel-
oped political system is extremely biased. Can you see why? What concept do such
characteristics seem to measure?
You might answer that the preceding paragraph describes a democratic political
system (recall Chapter 7). If you agree that the essence of political development is the
capability of the political system to handle basic functions, it is possible to have a polit-
ical system that is quite developed but nondemocratic (e.g., China, Cuba, Swaziland,
and Saudi Arabia). However, it is certainly valid to conclude that one highly desirable
outcome of political development is a system that is democratic. democratization can
be understood as those changes that deepen and consolidate democratic processes (Diamond
2008; Schneider 2011). Democratization was proposed as one of the pillars of the stabil-
ity goal of states in Figure 5.1, although not every political system aspires to this goal.
Samuel Huntington (1991) suggests that there have been three long waves of
democratization among modern states. The first occurred between the 1820s and 1926,
when about 30 countries established liberal democracies. Some of these then “reversed”
(democracy was abandoned), until a second wave produced 36 democratic govern-
ments between 1945 and 1962. After another period of reversal, the third wave began
in 1974. In the early 1990s, the push toward democratization was strong in some of
the postcommunist states that emerged from the former Soviet Union, in Central and
Eastern Europe, and in some former military regimes in Latin America, Asia, and
Africa (e.g., Chile, Ghana, Panama, South Korea, Taiwan, and Uruguay). Then the Arab
Spring of 2011 appeared to move some countries in the Middle East (e.g., Egypt and
Tunisia) toward democratic practices. While there are currently 118 electoral democra-
cies, Freedom House notes “a decline in global freedom” for eight consecutive years
(Freedom House 2014). It is unclear at this point whether the third wave of democratiza-
tion will be sustained by more popular uprisings or is now in reversal.
What might account for the broad expansion of democracies since the 1970s?
Consider the following six explanations.
First, the level of economic development has long been presented as a crucial factor.
As suggested by Figure 10.2, economic development can cause changes in the social
system that facilitate democratization. Greater wealth and a credible commitment
to distribute it with reasonable fairness reassures both citizens and leaders that the
increased participation and demands associated with democratization can be handled
with less risk of instability (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Huntington 1991; Stevens
and Cooper 2010). Notice that some might turn the argument on its head and claim
that greater democracy generates the conditions of freedom and opportunity that
result in a more robust and productive economic system. The empirical data seem to
support the claim that there is at least a correlation between economic development
and democracy. This relationship is evident in Figure 10.4, which examines the EIU
Democracy Index scores (2013) and GDP per capita (PPP) for selected countries. There
is a visible correlation between higher and lower scores on these two measures. The
 Change and Political Development 277

correlation statistic is quite high: +.688. However, remember that correlation does not
in itself demonstrate directionality: Either of these variables could influence the level
of the other, and over time, they could influence each other’s value. More fundamen-
tally, correlation does not prove that there is a causal relationship between the two
variables, since both could be associated with another variable (see the discussion in
the Appendix). The Debate in 10 takes the analysis to a more challenging level, explor-
ing whether economic development is a necessary prerequisite for democracy. And
there are other ways for you to assess Figure 10.4. For example: Do you see any clus-
ters of countries in Figure 10.4 that might suggest an alternative taxonomy to the one
in Figure 10.1? Do the outliers suggest any qualifications in the relationship between
economic development and democracy?
Second, external actors have been an important force in the shift toward democracy.
Global actors, such as the World Bank, the EU, and the United Nations, among others,
have insisted that countries introduce democratic reforms as a condition for economic
assistance. Countries have sometimes withdrawn their support for authoritarian lead-
ership, as the Soviet Union did in Central and Eastern Europe during the late 1980s.
And external actors sometimes intervene directly in another country with the stated
purpose of promoting democracy, as the United States and its allies did in Iraq and
Afghanistan (Pickering and Peceny 2006; Robinson 1998).
Third, the breakdown of authoritarian and totalitarian regimes has provided a window
of opportunity for democratization. In such cases, nondemocratic political systems
have lost their capabilities to suppress the pressure for change. This seems to have been
a particularly important factor in the states of the former Soviet Union and Central and

Figure 10.4 Association of Economic Development and Level of Democracy

SourceS: World Bank 2013; Economist Intelligence Unit 2013

12

10 Sweden Norway
Denmark
Australia
Czech South Switzerland
Costa Canada
Uruguay Republic Korea United Kingdom Austria
Rica
Germany
Japan United States
8 India South Africa
Estonia
Slovenia Italy
Level of Democracy

Brazil Chile Israel France Taiwan

Jamaica Slovakia
Mexico Poland
Ghana Indonesia Argentina Hungary
Philippines Thailand Malaysia
6 Ukraine
Turkey Singapore
Bangladesh Albania
Uganda Georgia
Cambodia Libya
Venezuela
Egypt
Kenya Pakistan
4 Iraq
Nigeria Algeria Russia
Cuba
Ethiopia
Zimbabwe Vietnam China
Afghanistan
Tajikistan
2 Iran
Uzbekistan Saudi Arabia
Dem. Rep. Congo

0
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000
GDP Per Capita (PPP) in $US
278 Chapter 10

Debate in 10
Is Economic Development a Necessary Prerequisite for Democracy?
Currently, few research questions in political science for active democratic participation. Conversely,
attract more interest than the attempt to identify the in a society that lacks economic development,
conditions that are most conducive to establishing a substantial proportion of the population is so
democracy. Over 50 years ago, the distinguished concerned with survival and economic advance-
social scientist Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) argued ment that people have little time or motivation
that economic development is the crucial prereq- to participate extensively in democratic life
uisite for democracy. Supported by the fact that (Spagnoli 2003).
all the most developed countries at the time were • The effects of economic development in raising
democracies, Lipset’s thesis became conventional education levels also promote greater political
wisdom. However, as a much more diverse set of knowledge and awareness among the popu-
countries has attempted to introduce democracy lation, encouraging more extensive political
during the third wave of democratization, there has participation and greater political tolerance.
been considerable debate about whether economic • No democratic country with a GDP per capita
development really is a necessary precondition for of greater than $6,000 has ever abandoned
establishing and maintaining a democratic regime. democracy (Przeworski 2004). Thus, the pros-
perity that results from economic development
economic Development Is a Necessary Prereq- is a crucial element in sustaining democracy.
uisite for Democracy
• Economic development leads to greater access
to a broader range of political information and
• The empirical facts support this linkage.
more openness to global society. Such inputs
Numerous comparative analyses, such as Fig-
reduce a nondemocratic government’s ability
ure 10.4, indicate that there is a strong correla-
to limit its citizens’ exposure to ideas that pro-
tion between a higher level of economic devel-
mote the concept of democracy and undermine
opment and stronger democracy (Acemoglu
authoritarian control.
and Robinson 2009; Richards 2007). Most eco-
nomically developed countries are democracies,
while very few poor countries are democracies. economic Development Is Not a Necessary
Precondition for Democracy
• As indicated in Figure 10.2, economic develop-
ment typically results in greater urbanization, • The empirical facts support this conclusion. A
higher levels of education, and the development reasonable generalization from the hundreds of
of a political culture with more trust and toler- comparative empirical studies is that the condi-
ance of diversity, all factors that are conducive tions associated with the emergence of democ-
to the emergence and maintenance of democ- racy are complex, multiple, and varied. No single
racy (Spagnoli 2003). condition, including a high level of economic
• Economic development directly fosters the development, must always be present for the
emergence of an educated and entrepreneur- successful transition to democracy (Przeworski
ial middle class, whose members demand 2010; Tilly 2007).
greater political voice and form the social–struc- • Economic development is not essential for
tural basis for effective democracy (Bueno de establishing many of the critical preconditions
Mesquita and Downs 2005). for democracy in developing countries: effec-
• Economic development results in more wide- tive political institutions, a working political party
spread prosperity, creating a larger proportion system, and a civil society in which groups share
of the population that has the time necessary trust and tolerance (Schneider 2011).
 Change and Political Development 279

• Many countries with high economic growth facilitating key preconditions of democracy such
remain authoritarian regimes and have been very as mechanisms for interest aggregation, shared
effective at resisting the demands for democ- cultural identity, and a community of communi-
racy, as cases such as China and Singapore cation (Papacharrisi 2010).
clearly demonstrate. Indeed, high-income coun- • Some of the most durable democracies in the
tries that are nondemocracies are less likely to developing world maintained their high levels
transition to democracy than middle-income of political rights and civil liberties during long
countries that are nondemocracies (Bueno de periods of limited economic development and
Mesquita and Downs 2005). negligible economic growth. Examples include
• Many relatively poor countries have successfully Botswana, Costa Rica, and India.
implemented democracy. In fact, the proportion
of countries that are democracies is substantially More questions…
higher than the proportion that is at high levels of 1. Which argument (bullet point) on each side of
economic development (Freedom House 2013). the debate is least persuasive? Why?
• The spread of information and communications 2. What is your evaluation of the argument that
technologies (ICTs) and the Internet has reduced every wealthy country will eventually become a
the significance of economic development in democracy?

Eastern Europe, as well as in countries such as Argentina, Egypt, and Tunisia (Linz
and Stepan 1996).
Fourth, changing norms favoring democracy is often a factor. As citizens perceive
that democracy is a positive value and that other countries are making the transition
to democracy, they become more insistent that their leaders implement democratic
reforms (Diamond 2008).
Fifth, nonviolent “people power” movements have become a crucial force for change
in almost three-fourths of the countries that have democratized. There is a clear rela-
tionship between the strength of such movements and the level of democratic free-
dom that is achieved and maintained (Karatnycky and Ackerman 2006). Recently, such
movements have been significantly facilitated by the Internet and social media, as in
the Arab Spring of 2011 (Farrell 2012; Ritter and Trechsel 2011).
Sixth, the presence of political leadership committed to democracy can be impor-
tant. In many countries, new leaders attained power based on their promise to pur-
sue democratization as a central goal (as with Vicente Fox in Mexico, South Africa’s
Nelson Mandela, and Ukraine’s Viktor Yushchenko). Indeed, most current leaders
declare allegiance to democratization, if only to maintain domestic and international
support (Sorensen 2008).

World of Changes
10.5 analyze how political systems respond to environmental challenges through
political institutionalization and system transformation.
Easton’s model in Chapter 5 emphasized that the political system must attempt to
respond to constant changes in its internal and external environments. Thus, Easton
280 Chapter 10

(1965) asked: How can a political system persist in a world of changes? His answer is
that the political system must produce decisions and actions that increase the support
for the political institutions and the authorities and that manage the complex demands
and challenges from the environment.
Thus political systems, like the global environment in which they function, are
constantly engaged in both system maintenance and adaptive change. Most political
change is modest, resulting from the effects of (1) new policy decisions, (2) alterations
in the way existing policy is implemented, or (3) variations in the inputs from the inter-
nal or external environments. We could probably identify thousands of small changes
in a single week. Although political change usually results from the gradual accumula-
tion of minor adjustments, it is more noticeable when there is a substantial shift. For
example, there could be a major change from a dominant party to a multiparty system,
from authoritarianism to electoral democracy, from social order to widespread rioting,
from a statist political economy to a neoliberal one, from male-only to gender-neutral
political rights, or from an elected leader to a military dictatorship.
Even more fundamental change in the nature of the political system or the political
economy can be called a system transformation. The emergence of a secular regime in
Turkey under Atatürk, the destruction of the Saddam Hussein regime in Iraq, the aban-
donment of state socialism in Russia (see Compare in 15), and the dramatic alterations
in Cambodia’s political system that are the subject of the Compare in 10 are examples
of system transformation. One striking feature of the political world in the last sev-
eral decades has been the substantial number of such transformations. Chapter 15 will
focus on systems in which political and economic transformations have been particu-
larly extensive in the past several decades: two groups of transitional developed coun-
tries from within the middle cluster in Figure 10.1 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India,
China, and South Africa). In addition, coming chapters explore major transformations
that seem to be occurring at the international level and are generally associated with
globalization. System transformation is rare. Incremental change is the norm.
Change, when incremental and certainly when more dramatic, can generate both
optimism and concern in any society. It might seem that key actors in most political
systems would value political development as one desirable mode of change. This
is probably the case if such development is understood as an increase in political
institutionalization—the depth of capabilities, stability, and citizen support for the existing
political system. And greater economic growth and development—the increased capac-
ity to produce and distribute a broad array of goods—is a second change goal valued
in almost all countries (Chapter 8).
However, change can be destabilizing. Thus there is more caution about what, if
any, political and economic development will be encouraged in countries where the
existing elites fear a loss of their advantaged position. For example, there are nondem-
ocracies, such as Belarus, China, Oman, and Vietnam, in which leaders aim to increase
the capabilities of the economic system and the political system without substantially
expanding the processes and institutions of democracy. And there are some countries,
such as Iran, Sudan, and Saudi Arabia, in which the current leaders have a very spe-
cific vision of what forms of political and economic development they will facilitate,
 Change and Political Development 281

compare in 10
Six Political Systems in Cambodia?
The case of Cambodia illuminates a political system came to power in April 1975 and created yet another
that has undergone six major changes in the span of political system, renaming the country Kampuchea.
less than 50 years. Under the communist regime of Pol Pot, Kampuchea
Cambodia I. The Cambodia of 1962 was a small, experienced one of the most dramatic transfor-
beautiful state in Indochina that had been granted mations in a political system during the twentieth
its independence by France in 1953. It has been century. The new government immediately relocated
said that the most important activities in the lives of everyone from urban areas to the countryside, orga-
Cambodians were to dance, make love, and watch nized the entire population into collective farms that
the grass grow. They were ruled under an authoritar- were really forced labor camps, and implemented a
ian political system by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, massive reeducation (indoctrination) program. In a
a hereditary leader who attempted to balance the brutal reign of terror, about one-third of Cambodia’s
forces of the left and the right within Cambodia and population of 7 million was either killed or died dur-
to keep Cambodia on a neutral course. However, ing a total restructuring of the society.
in the late 1960s, Sihanouk was unable to prevent Cambodia IV. The Vietnamese exploited this
Cambodia from being drawn into the increasingly time of disruption by invading and conquering
widespread and intense war in neighboring Vietnam. the Cambodians, their centuries-old enemies. In
Some Vietcong (the leftist guerrillas attempting to January 1979, the Vietnamese army installed a pup-
overthrow the South Vietnamese state) took sanc- pet Cambodian government under Prime Minister
tuary in Cambodia, but Sihanouk insisted that Hun Sen (a dissident member of the Khmer Rouge).
Cambodian sovereignty prevented the U.S. and Thus, Pol Pot’s barbaric regime was replaced with a
South Vietnamese armies from invading Cambodia new political system that operated as a satellite of
to attack these Vietcong. Sihanouk also attempted Vietnam’s communist government.
to direct international attention to the secret bombing Cambodia V. After 13 years of guerrilla warfare
raids in Cambodia conducted by the U.S. military but against Hun Sen’s government by groups loyal to
denied by the political leadership in the United States. the Khmer Rouge and Sihanouk, a treaty in Paris
Cambodia II. Because of Sihanouk’s resistance led to United Nations–supervised elections for a
to their military objectives, the U.S. leaders sup- national legislature in 1993. The election and subse-
ported (and perhaps directed) a March 1970 coup in quent constitution created a fifth political system, an
which Cambodian army leaders overthrew Sihanouk odd combination bringing together many of the old
and replaced him with General Lon Nol, a rightist adversaries. Sihanouk became king, a constitutional
dictator who was generally viewed as a puppet of monarch with mainly symbolic power. His anticom-
the United States. There were dramatic changes in munist son, Prince Ranariddh, as “first” prime minis-
Cambodia’s political structure and foreign policy ter, shared political power with communist Hun Sen,
under the new Lon Nol government (1970–1975), the “second” prime minister. The Khmer Rouge,
which was kept in power by the United States. which refused to participate in the election, contin-
In turn, the Cambodian government and military ued a punishing guerrilla war and controlled large
assisted the U.S. military in fighting the Vietcong parts of the countryside.
and battling an expanding internal civil war led by Cambodia VI. After another civil war, Hun
the Khmer Rouge, Cambodian communists who Sen’s forces were victorious in a 1997 coup that
opposed Lon Nol and his U.S. allies. deposed Prince Ranariddh, who was exiled. Key
Cambodia III. With the collapse of the U.S. mili- supporters of the prince’s political party either fled
tary effort in Southeast Asia, Lon Nol’s government the country or were executed. Meanwhile, rival
was among the casualties. Thus, the Khmer Rouge forces within the Khmer Rouge captured Pol Pot,
282 Chapter 10

who was imprisoned and soon died. In four sub- plain.” It is unusual for a political system to undergo
sequent national elections, most recently in 2013, six dramatic changes in about 50 years, several of
Hun Sen has continued as prime minister and his which were system transformations. Has the fragile
party controls 55 percent of the seats in the lower state of Cambodia, and its 15 million people, now
house. Another son of Sihanouk (Sihamoni) is now stabilized sufficiently for the existing political system
king, but his duties are mainly ceremonial. Despite to persist, at least for a while?
a multiparty system with open elections and some
freedom of opposition, Cambodia is not an elec-
toral democracy according to Freedom House.
Further Questions
Corruption, abuse of power, and political vio- 1. If you were to do a detailed comparative analysis
lence are still so severe that the World Bank terms of two of the six political systems in Cambodia,
Cambodia a “fragile state.” which two would you compare? Why?
A phrase in the Cambodian national anthem 2. How might a small country like Cambodia avoid
aptly describes the country’s recent history: “The being drawn into an intense conflict among
bright red blood…spilled over the towns and over the major powers that spills over into its territory?

Skulls of the victims of the brutal Khmer Rouge reign of terror (1975–1979) are on display
in many villages around Cambodia as memorials to honor the dead and strengthen
Cambodians’ resolve to prevent a reoccurrence of such state violence against its own people.

since any change must serve religious and social values that might be undermined by
the type of twenty-first-century development described above.
Regardless of the form of development envisioned by the political leadership,
the elites in most countries recognize that it is very difficult to control the directions
of change with precision. The recent economic turmoil in many countries is an omi-
nous indicator of the extent to which economic systems are vulnerable to decline and
disarray. Their extraordinary complexity, both internally and as part of the global
 Change and Political Development 283

economy, makes it increasingly difficult to understand how they are changing and
how to control them.
Political systems are arguably even more vulnerable to decline and disarray.
Samuel Huntington (1968) has described how some political systems that appear to
have achieved a reasonable level of political development then experience a substan-
tial deterioration of political structures, processes, and roles. He calls this situation
political decay—a significant decline in the capabilities of the political system and its level
of political institutionalization, especially in its capacity to maintain order. Political decay
is evident in high levels of civil disorder—strikes, violent crime, riots, nation-based
conflict, and rebellion.
Political decay can have multiple causes, many of which are associated with the
change processes discussed in this chapter. The development process is inherently
destabilizing. Economic growth produces new resources over which to compete;
urbanization concentrates heterogeneous groups into large, densely packed, and
volatile masses; expanded, globalized communications make the people aware of the
many resources and values that they do not currently enjoy. Most people expect their
political system to provide stability, prosperity, and security. If the political system
does not adequately meet these expectations and if it lacks solid political institution-
alization, citizen support and social order can decline. In response to political decay,
several scenarios can evolve:
• The political system cracks down on disorder, limiting the rights of protest groups,
opposition parties, the free press, and so on and deploying its security forces (e.g.,
the police, the military) to suppress any antiregime activities.
• A charismatic leader emerges. The leader gains the support and obedience of the
people but only by personalizing power and thus weakening the overall processes
through which power and political structures are institutionalized.
• The military—the one organization in most societies that is institutionalized—
forcibly takes over political power under the justification of restoring order.
• A popular uprising, typically supported by external actors, drives out the old
leadership; but if the active groups are fragmented and do not rapidly provide a
coherent governing alternative, extensive, widespread disorder is likely.
In each of the first three scenarios, there is usually a shift toward greater authori-
tarianism. If the country had been deepening its democratic practices, these scenarios
of political decay can lead to democratic breakdown and illiberal democracy. Such
trends are evident in most regions in recent years (Freedom House 2014; Schedler
2013; Wiarda 2004; Zakaria 2007). If the situation approaches the fourth scenario of
widespread disorder, even the fundamental goal of state survival is under threat.
Almost 60 countries are currently under such severe pressures, relative to their
level of political institutionalization, that they are classified as at least “seriously frag-
ile states” (Marshall and Cole 2011). When a political system completely loses its capacity
to maintain basic order, it can be characterized as a failed state. Recent examples include
Afghanistan, Congo (DR), Haiti, Somalia, Sudan, and Zimbabwe (Fund for Peace 2013;
Rotberg 2003). Such widespread disorder can be almost akin to Hobbes’s notion of the
284 Chapter 10

“state of nature.” Life for most citizens truly is nasty, violent, and short, and many peo-
ple engage in behaviors that are brutish. A failed state also creates dangers for other
states in its region, due to disruptions caused by displaced populations and economic
hardships. And in some cases, a state actually does cease to exist, as occurred several
times in the recent history of Cambodia described in Compare in 10.

Concluding Observations
Ultimately, all political systems aim to increase their capabilities and thus achieve
greater political and economic development. In general, most people assume that
development in other countries should result in political systems and political econo-
mies that resemble those in their own country. It is debatable, however, whether all
states should or even can follow the same developmental path. Some, perhaps most,
developing countries might have characteristics that are not compatible with the
patterns of development or the political structures and processes that worked in other
countries, especially those that developed in earlier eras.
The leaders in most countries try to assess whether the prior experiences and
strategies of some other state provide a model for their own change and development.
Even if leaders do select and properly implement a model that seems compatible with
the goals and unique characteristics of their countries, achieving political development
and political institutionalization as well as sustaining economic growth are extremely
difficult for many countries in the contemporary world. The remainder of this book
will continue to illustrate the extent to which the choices and actions of states are influ-
enced and sometimes controlled by other actors in the global system and by limits on
their own resources. This is a particular problem for states with low capabilities and
minimal stability—that is, states that lack political institutionalization. You will see
these states in the lower-left sector of Figure 10.4.
Huntington is certainly correct that the challenges to political development are
great. There have been periods of major political instability even in some European and
Latin American countries—and these countries had the advantage of a long period in
which the structures of a modern state could evolve into more complex and effective
forms and in which the citizens could come to accept and value their political system. In
contrast to those countries, most other states began creating their own modern political
systems in the last 60 years. While these systems have the appearance of modernity—
specialized political structures, widespread political participation, and so on—many
lack the stability and value that come with a long evolutionary development.
The political elites in these states face many fundamental dilemmas in a world of
changes. How much political participation and opposition should be allowed? Into
what aspects of people’s lives should res publica be extended? In what ways should the
state intervene in the political economy? What benefits and what burdens should the
state allocate to particular groups? What should government do to nurture civil soci-
ety and social order? In essence, can the political system shape political, economic, and
social change? All states continually deal with these challenging issues, which will be
recurrent themes in the remainder of this book.
 Change and Political Development 285

Key Concepts
BRICS, p. 268 failed state, p. 283 postcommunist developed
change, p. 259 Global North, p. 267 countries, p. 268
civil society, p. 263 Global South, p. 267 social development, p. 265
democratization, p. 276 Latin American Transitionals, statism, p. 269
dependency approach, p. 270 p. 268 state capitalism, p. 269
developing countries, p. 267 modernization, p. 260 system transformation,
developed countries, p. 267 neoliberalism, p. 269 p. 280
development, p. 261 political decay, p. 283 transitional developed
developmental state, p. 269 political development, p. 271 countries, p. 267
economic development, political institutionalization, Westernization, p. 261
p. 261 p. 280

For Further Consideration

1. Most people in Western societies have been might affect a country’s capacity for rapid
socialized to believe that change is associ- development?
ated with progress and is generally a good 3. Many countries have recently established
thing. However, the ideology of conser- democratic political processes. Is political
vatism (as outlined in Chapter 2) does not decay inevitable in most of these coun-
make this assumption. What are the conser- tries? Why or why not? What strategies,
vative’s views about change? More broadly, general and specific, seem most promising
in the attempt to avoid serious political
can you specify types of change that would
decay?
not necessarily be positive for a given politi-
cal system? 4. Write a dialogue between two analysts: One
contends that the dependency approach
2. The success or failure of the developmental
state strategy in certain developing coun- offers the best explanation for the failure of
tries is sometimes attributed to elements of many countries to achieve development,
culture. How important do you think a soci- while the second argues that other factors
ety’s culture might be in shaping develop- best explain why some countries have
ment? Why? What factors other than culture limited development.

For Further Reading

acemoglu, daron, and James a. Robinson. countries develop economically and others do
(2012). Why Nations Fail: The Origins of not. See also the more technically grounded
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. new york: analysis by these two economists, Economic
Random house. A fascinating read and a Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New
compelling, sweeping (and controversial) York: Cambridge University Press, 2009).
analysis across the centuries (with emphasis achebe, Chinua. (1959). Things Fall Apart. new
on the most recent period) exploring the rea- york: doubleday. In this highly acclaimed
sons, grounded in political choices, why some and moving novel, Achebe describes how the
286 Chapter 10

beliefs and lives of a virtuous leader and oth- elliott, Jennifer. (2012). An Introduction to
ers in his Nigerian village are undermined by Sustainable Development. 4th ed. new york:
missionaries and the colonial administration, Routledge. A solid textbook exploring the vari-
as modernization results in the disintegration ous meanings of “sustainable development,”
of their cultural traditions. including an examination of the contested nature
Becker, elizabeth. (1986). When the War Was of its realization and the key actors involved.
Over: The Voices of Cambodia’s Revolution and huntington, Samuel p. (1991). The Third Wave:
Its People. new york: Simon and Schuster. A Democratization in the Late Twentieth
gut-wrenching description of Cambodia under Century. norman, oK: university of
the Pol Pot regime (Compare in 10). oklahoma press. A wide-ranging assessment
Collier, paul. (2008). The Bottom Billion: Why of transitions to democracy by one of the major
the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What scholars of comparative development. The
Can Be Done about It. new york: oxford general argument about political institution-
university press. The author elaborates on alization and political decay discussed in this
four key reasons for the development failures chapter is fully elaborated in his earlier sweep-
of the world’s poorest countries: civil wars, ing study Political Order in Changing Societies
abundant resources that others covet, poor (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968).
geography, and bad governance. Johnson, Chalmers. (1996). Japan: Who Governs?
Cornwall, andrea, elizabeth harrison, and The Rise of the Developmental State. new
ann whitehead, eds. (2007). Feminisms in york: w. w. norton. This book provides a
Development: Contradictions, Contestations, broad framework characterizing the govern-
and Challenges. london: ZedBooks. Case ment–industry cooperation that produced
studies and broader analyses examine devel- the “Japanese miracle” and became the basis
opment theory from a feminist perspective and of the development approach taken by other
provide strong examples regarding both the countries, especially in Asia.
crucial roles and the marginalization of women lipset, Seymour martin. (1988). Revolution and
in development. Counterrevolution: Change and Persistence
diamond, larry. (2008). The Spirit of Democracy: in Social Structures. Rev. ed. Rutgers, nJ:
The Struggle to Build Free Societies throughout transaction Books. Provocative essays on the
the World. new york: holt. A leading scholar processes of change and development, with a
of democratization offers an analysis of how particular emphasis on the effects of culture.
countries can deepen their democracies, how Rotberg, Robert I., ed. (2003). When States Fail:
other countries can help, and the strategies Causes and Consequences. princeton, nJ:
necessary to avoid the “democracy recessions” princeton university press. The first part of
recently evident in a number of countries. the book is a series of essays examining the
dubash, navroz K., and Bronwen morgan. (2013). conditions under which states deteriorate to
The Rise of the Regulatory State of the South: the point of collapse; the second part offers
Infrastucture and Development in Emerging analyses of what can be done to prevent failed
Economies. oxford: oxford university press. states and how to rebuild such states.
This interdisciplinary book considers how Schneider, Carsten. (2009). The Consolidation
development choices and approaches to insti- of Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin
tutional design have long-range political, America. london: Routledge. A careful analy-
economic, and social consequences. sis of the conditions under which democratic
 Change and Political Development 287

consolidation (institutionalization) is more under which democracy is viable and the likely
likely, placing particular importance on the fit evolution of various democratic systems.
between the political institutional arrangements wiarda, howard J. (2004). Political Development in
and the dispersion of power in the society. Emerging Countries. Belmont, Ca: wadsworth.
Sorensen, georg. (2007). Democracy and A sensible description of the major theories of
Democratization: Processes and Prospects development in the developing countries (see
in a Changing World. 3rd ed. Boulder, Co: Chapter 14). It indicates how frameworks such
westview. A wide-ranging discussion of the as dependency theory, neoliberalism, global-
spread of democratic processes in many coun- ization, and the developmental state approach
tries, defining the patterns and conditions apply to the situation in such countries.

On the Web
http://hdr.undp.org/en/reports issues, such as aid, economic growth, environ-
This is the site for the United Nations mental impacts, and human rights.
Development Programme office, the source http://www.sustainabledevelopment.un.org
of the yearly Human Development Report, The home page of the United Nations Division
which provides an exceptionally comprehen- for Sustainable Development, this site pro-
sive set of social and economic data about vides access to a wide variety of relevant UN
every country as well as detailed thematic resolutions and publications.
explorations of topics regarding environment, http://www.ulb.ac.be/ceese/meta/sustvl.html
health, human rights, economic development, This section of the very comprehensive
and so on. World Wide Web Virtual Library (http://vlib.
http://worldbank.org org/) contains an extensive listing of Internet
At the official site of the World Bank, an inter- resources related to sustainable development
national consortium of banks and other major and political change.
financial institutions, extensive economic http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/06/22/
data are available, including selections from the_2009_failed_states_index
the annual World Development Report and The Fund for Peace, an independent research
information on issues of development and organization, and the journal Foreign Policy
trade. use 12 indicators of state cohesion and per-
http://www.iisd.ca formance to compute an annual Failed State
The Web site of the International Institute for Index for all countries and provide details of
Sustainable Development offers information the challenges facing the 60 countries most at
and essays on this topic, ranging from policy risk of failure.
statements and economic data to book-length http://www.crisisgroup.org
studies. This is the International Crisis Group’s “Crisis
http://www.acdi-cida.gc.ca/home Web,” which details the current crises within
This site from the Canadian International countries with serious levels of political decay
Development Agency provides links to many and offers policy suggestions for conflict man-
sources of information about development agement and a return to political order.
 Chapter 11
Politics Across Borders

Learning Objectives
11.1 Compare realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives of the state.
11.2 Classify the main actors in the global system and characterize the
mechanisms of cooperation between states.
11.3 Analyze the types of power politics between actors in the international
system and evaluate the impact of globalization.

After being ravaged by the two bloodiest and most costly wars in modern history
(World War I and World War II), bitter rivals France, Germany, and Italy, along with
Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands, decided to create political and economic
ties that would ensure their countries would cooperate rather than fight. In 1952, the
six countries established an economic union and then, with the Treaty of Rome (1957),
created the European Economic Community (the “Common Market”). Countries
that had periodically fought began an era of cooperation. Cultures that had clashed
attempted to blend and share common goals.
In 60 years, this competitive group of states has evolved into the European
Union (EU) and grown to 28 member states and 504 million citizens, operating with
24 official languages. Greater economic integration has led to an efficient sharing of
markets and labor across borders and the elimination of most tariff fights. The econ-
omy of the EU is currently the world’s largest, characterized by diversity, growth,
and prosperity.
The EU is governed by effective legislative, executive, administrative, and judicial
branches, which operate on democratic principles and exhibit strong political institu-
tionalization. The Lisbon Treaty of 2009, approved by all members, increased coherence
in collective policymaking by implementing a more integrated, majority-based politi-
cal framework under a strong president. The EU has established a collective security
pact that not only prevents these states from going to war against each other but also
makes the EU a formidable military power, such that no country in the world is likely
to challenge one of its members.

288
 Politics Across Borders 289

Yes to the EU!: Tens of thousands of Ukrainian demonstrators march through central
Kiev in November 2013, demanding that their government reverse its position and sign a
major agreement with the European Union, whose flag is displayed. The government was
overthrown within weeks of its refusal to sign the agreement.

However, all is not perfect in the EU (Webber 2013). While several countries, especially
France and Germany, advocate increased integration and seek to create “pooled sover-
eignty” by establishing a federation, the EU is still a rather loosely connected confed-
eration. Long-held cultural and national identities remain a major obstacle to complete
integration. The broad voting consensus required for EU policymaking can be difficult
to achieve when some of the 28 countries disagree or act on their own national interests.
There are substantial challenges in sustaining a single economic policy; for example,
while 17 countries in the EU have joined the eurozone, other countries like the United
Kingdom and Sweden continue to use their own national currencies (Moravcsik 2012).
And weaknesses, just like strengths, become a shared problem for all member states, as
the eurozone crises in Greece, Ireland, and Portugal during the recent global recession
have revealed. The fiscally sound countries have been obliged to bail out the countries
running high deficits, fostering distrust and resentment.
Critics argue that the EU does not have a coherent military policy or even a standing
military. Some members have refused to provide military forces to support EU security
initiatives outside the EU countries. Moreover, the EU’s open borders allow unrestricted
movement of people across all EU countries, including individuals who have entered
any EU country illegally from elsewhere in the world. Thus, the native population of
every EU country is attempting to adapt to the influx of many new cultures. This has
generated considerable tension and a rise in popularity of nationalistic (and increasingly
anti-EU) political parties and social movements. Some countries are now considering a
return to controlled borders—a serious retreat from the vision of an integrated Europe.
290 Chapter 11

Clearly, the European Union has a long way to go in terms of integrating and estab-
lishing a unified Europe, but the countries that make up the EU generally are more suc-
cessful working together than they ever were as competing, independent states. The
EU is one of the most remarkable recent efforts by states to establish institutions that
overcome historical conflict and facilitate cooperation (McCormick and Olsen 2013).
The states in the EU are among the millions of political actors whose interests
and actions cross national borders. Many of the most important aspects of contempo-
rary politics occur across borders. Mexico and the United States attempt to cooperate
to reduce the flow of guns, drugs, and people across their shared border. India and
Pakistan argue about who should control Jammu and Kashmir. UN peacekeeping
forces are active in the Central African Republic to provide humanitarian assistance and
promote security in the region. Multinational corporations such as Toyota work with
and around government regulations to produce goods in many countries and then sell
them in other countries. More than 100 countries discuss how to reduce carbon emis-
sions in response to climate change. One billion people live in countries in which they
are not citizens. Almost everyone now recognizes that no country can function within
its own borders without extensive engagement with actors beyond those borders.
Understanding how these kinds of political behaviors and institutions function across
borders is the focus of this chapter. Some of the many important nonstate actors are high-
lighted in the discussions, although states are central to most of the topics because they
are still crucial actors in the politics across borders. Globalization (discussed later in this
chapter) is dramatically increasing the extent to which outside forces influence states, and
many states expend much—and, in some cases most—of their political energy on their
relations with other states and with transborder actors. One state’s decisions and actions
in its relations with all actors operating outside the state’s borders are called foreign policy.
The politically relevant interactions among two or more actors from different states are called
international relations. Initially, this chapter details key perspectives and certain con-
straints that might guide states as they pursue their goals in the politics that occurs across
borders. Second, it discusses the means by which states and transborder actors attempt to
facilitate cooperation and resolve conflict. Third, it examines key forms of power politics
across borders, such as balance of power and colonial domination. The causes and use of
force and violence across state borders will be considered in Chapter 12.

Perspectives on States’ Behavior

11.1 Compare realist, liberal, and constructivist perspectives of the state.

States’ Motives from Alternative Perspectives:

Realism, Liberalism, and Constructivism
Chapter 5 identified three core goals that all states pursue—prosperity, stability, and
security—as well as an array of key subgoals. All of these goals, but especially security,
can be influenced powerfully by the politics that occurs across states’ borders—politics
 Politics Across Borders 291

in which states remain critical actors. While a state has sovereign rights to control what
occurs within its territorial borders, every state faces a security dilemma in the global
system because the politics between and among states occurs in an international sys-
tem that is generally assumed to be anarchic. This does not mean that the system is
chaotic; rather, it means that a state’s security is always at risk because there is no overarch-
ing authority that can consistently impose order and “good behavior” on all the states in their
relations with one another and with other actors in the global system.
Scholars attempt to explain how and why states behave in certain ways, given the
absence of such an authority. This raises questions about a state’s primary motives,
its key values, and the context within which it acts. Three perspectives have espe-
cially influenced international relations theory on these issues: realism, liberalism, and
constructivism. While there are variations and overlaps, distinctions among the three
perspectives can be drawn.
Realism assumes that states, like people, are naturally disposed to base their behavior
on self-interest, and the core of this interest is survival. Realism focuses on the security
dilemma: There is no supreme authority, no transborder institution, and no interna-
tional rules that will necessarily protect the state from predatory behavior by other
actors in the international system. Thus, to ensure its own security and survival, the
key motivation of a state is to maximize its military (coercive) power in order to protect
itself. A broader version of realism, neorealism, adds the idea that a state’s capacity
to survive and prevail can also be based on other forms of power, such as economic
power, knowledge power, and diplomatic power. Neorealism also attaches signifi-
cance to the structure of the international system, such as how many other powerful
states exist. According to neorealists, the state makes calculated decisions based on
its power capacities, its internal and external environments, and its assessments of its
best chances at security. From the realist perspective, states are in constant competition
for power, especially because power is a zero-sum commodity—an increase in power
for one actor results in an equivalent decrease for others. There is no expectation that
another state can be trusted, will avoid violence, or will act ethically. A state makes
treaties or breaks them, makes war, or cooperates with other countries for only one
reason: to maximize its security goals and serve its national interest (Mearshimer 2001;
Walt 2006).
In contrast, the crucial assumption of liberalism is that each state will make decisions
and act in the international system based on its own mix of principles, and these might encour-
age cooperation. From the perspective of liberalism, and its variations termed neoliber­
alism, states can have multiple goals, and aggressive, power-maximizing behavior is
not inevitable. While every state wants to survive, states might also take actions in the
politics across borders that support other values such as economic prosperity, politi-
cal stability, peace, or the spread of democracy. Liberalism also diverges from realism
in emphasizing that key groups within the state can influence the array of prefer-
ences that lead to action in the international system. Neoliberalism further holds that
it is possible to establish well-designed transnational institutions that can harmonize
the mixed motives of multiple states, facilitate cooperative behavior among states,
establish rules of behavior that are somewhat stable, and create situations that are
292 Chapter 11

positive sum—some gain, no one loses (Glanville 2013; Ikenberry 2011; Keohane and
Nye 2011).
Constructivism, a third perspective, assumes that analysis of the politics across
borders must recognize that each state and the key actors who influence the state’s actions
develop unique understandings of the relevant events and institutions based on their particular
knowledge, experiences, norms, and habits (Weber 2013). From the constructivist perspec-
tive, neither realism nor liberalism is adequately sensitive to the “socially constructed”
nature of the identities and norms that shape beliefs and guide actions taken by indi-
viduals, groups, and states in the international system. A condition (e.g., anarchy in
the international system) or an institution (e.g., the United Nations) can have very
different meanings for different actors, and these meanings determine its influence
on actions by a state. Nonstate actors, both domestic and transnational, can have a
significant role in influencing the value preferences that result in a state’s actions. For
example, key actors in Canada, Cuba, and the global system would have very differ-
ent interpretations of a substantial increase in military spending by the United States.
Thus any adequate analysis of the reactions of Canada and Cuba to the U.S. military
buildup must include the effects on each state of the viewpoints of some of these other
actors (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; O’Farcheallaigh 2013; Wendt 1995, 1999).
While variations of realism, liberalism, and constructivism are prominent in the
current theories of international relations scholars, among the interesting alterna-
tives is feminist IR. As you might expect, feminist IR analyzes topics from the frames
of reference and assumptions of feminist theory and gender studies. Feminist IR critiques
theories that focus on the anarchy of the international system or simply on the behav-
ior of current state and transnational institutions. Rather, it posits that, in general, IR
theory has neglected to consider the role in international relations of half the popula-
tion or the effects on state behavior of predominantly male leadership. Whether due
to socialization, social construction, biology, or gender roles, women and men might
engage politics and problem solving in different ways. Some suggest that women are
more inclined toward cooperative interactions and nonviolent solutions and that if
more such women were in positions of power, states would interact somewhat less
aggressively (Basu 2013; Enloe 2001; Steans 2013; Tickner 2001).
As you read the discussion of politics across borders in this chapter, consider
how the different assumptions of realism, liberalism, constructivism, or feminism can
alter one’s interpretations of the topics and also one’s prescriptive ideas of how actors
should behave in the international system. Your understanding of the political world
will be influenced by the extent to which you share elements of each of these perspec-
tives. Does any one of these four seem most compelling to you?

A Geopolitical Perspective
As we begin an empirical analysis of how states behave in the global system, it is
worth noting that a state’s pursuit of its goals is always constrained by many factors,
both within and outside its borders. The political system model outlined in Chapter 5
reminds us that a state’s actions can be influenced substantially by many aspects of
 Politics Across Borders 293

the extrasocietal environment, including the actions of other state and nonstate actors.
There are also influential factors within a state’s intrasocietal environment, such as its
history and political culture, the style of its major political leaders, and the nature of
its political structures.
Geopolitical analysis emphasizes one set of critical factors that might constrain
a state’s behavior, especially in its relations with other actors in the international sys-
tem. Geopolitics assumes that the geography of a state—that is, its physical characteristics
(e.g., strategic location, topography) and its natural and human resources (e.g., population
size, fossil fuel resources, arable land, water)—might significantly affect both the internal and
external politics of the state (Cohen 2008). Few argue that geography is destiny. However,
it is reasonable to assume that a state’s geography can be a significant source of both
opportunities for and constraints on its political actions in the international system
(Dalby 2008; Dwyer 2013; Kaplan 2009; Montgomery 2013). Compare in 11 proposes
how a geopolitical analysis might offer insights into the foreign policies of two states.

Compare in 11
Geopolitics in Two Countries
Imagine two island countries, Sigma and Theta. produce more sophisticated value-added goods and
Each lies just off a (different) large landmass that services to gain trading partners. Both would need
is dominated by one of the world’s most power- to secure energy resources.
ful countries. Unfortunately, this powerful neighbor Sigma could be Cuba. Cuba achieved indepen-
is a major enemy and a threat. Each island nation dence from its colonial master, Spain, in 1902. After
has a well-educated, mainly urban population. Each nearly 50 years of corrupt, authoritarian regimes that
has a fickle, tropical climate, and one-fourth of the left most of the population minimally educated and
land is arable. Sigma has relatively abundant natural economically exploited, a successful guerrilla war
resources while Theta has far fewer such resources, led by Fidel Castro installed a communist regime in
but both need to import sources of energy. 1959. This antagonized Cuba’s powerful neighbor
If you knew nothing more about either country, and former best friend, the United States. As Cuba
could you make any educated guesses about how perceived numerous attempts by the United States
these countries might pursue key political and eco- to undermine its regime (some real, some imagined),
nomic goals and about the relations these countries its leadership increased Cuba’s military readiness,
might develop with other actors in the international with universal military service and constant politi-
system? This is the core of geopolitical analysis. For cal socialization regarding the threat from the United
example, to enhance their security, each might look States (recall the Cuban math problem at the begin-
for an alliance with another country that is a pow- ning of Chapter 4).
erful enemy of their neighbor. Each would probably Castro and the Communist Party became
establish a strong military. So that the hostile neigh- increasingly authoritarian politically, suppressing
bor does not sense instability and weakness, the almost all opposition voices. While its command
political system might be somewhat authoritarian to political economy resulted in low productivity, the
control its population and minimize internal conflict. system did manage to provide good health care,
Sigma might be able to rely on its fertile land and universal literacy, greater social and economic
natural resources as a solid basis for exports. Theta equality, and social security for all citizens. Cuba
might need to rely more heavily on its workforce to forged a strong alliance with the major Cold War
294 Chapter 11

enemy of the United States, the Soviet Union, which state approach described in Chapter 10. Because
served as Cuba’s military protector and which pro- it had limited natural resources, Taiwan became a
vided it with $4 to $6 billion in subsidies each year, manufacturing economy, importing materials and
including energy resources. After the Soviets unsuc- moving from the production of toys, textiles, and
cessfully tried to install missiles on Cuba pointing at other less sophisticated goods to the export of
the United States (the Cuban missile crisis in 1961), goods such as electronics components, arma-
the United States intensified its pressure for an ments, chemicals, iron, and steel. It relied on the
extensive trade embargo that has undermined the United States as its main target for exports and
Cuban economy. imports, including energy.
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union (1989) In 1971, the United Nations voted to deny Taiwan
and the loss of Soviet subsidies, Cuba has struggled recognition as an independent sovereign state. Given
even more because only limited trade bypasses the concerns that instability in Taiwan would encourage
embargo. More recently, Cuba developed strong ties China to intervene or invade, Taiwan’s government
with Venezuela’s late Hugo Chavez, who exported was highly authoritarian, with strict limits on political
energy resources to Cuba in exchange for skilled opposition, and full democratization has emerged
Cuban professionals who work in Venezuela, espe- only since 2000. Over time, Taiwan has managed
cially in health care and education. its human resources very effectively and created a
Theta could be Taiwan. An island extension of strong economy within the global system. Because
China, it was conquered by Japan in 1895 and sub- Japan and China are such juggernaut regional econ-
jected to harsh colonization until Japan’s defeat in omies, Taiwan has slowly built trade relations with
World War II. When the Nationalists under Chiang these historical enemies, and they are now its main
Kai-shek lost to Mao Zedong in the civil war on trading partners. Tensions with China remain high,
mainland China in 1949, the Nationalists fled to however, with China continuing to claim sovereignty
Taiwan and took control of its political and economic over Taiwan and Taiwan relying on its substantial
systems. The Nationalists were in fundamental military and the ongoing protection from the United
opposition to Mao Zedong’s government, insisting States to retain its independence (CIA 2014).
that they were the rightful rulers of China and would While geography is not destiny, it is evident that
one day regain control of the mainland. In response, the domestic and foreign policies of both Cuba and
Mao’s government insisted that Taiwan was a “ren- Taiwan have been influenced significantly by their
egade province” that would ultimately be reunited geopolitical circumstances.
with China. The United States, deeply threatened
by China’s communist government, stepped in to
become Taiwan’s protector.
Further Questions
Taiwan took advantage of extensive military 1. How might Cuba and Taiwan have acted
and economic support from the United States. It differently if their powerful neighbor was a
established a strong military presence, backed by strong ally instead of an intransigent enemy?
U.S. arms. And it developed an aggressively capi- 2. What are other countries for which a geopoliti-
talist political economy, following the developmental cal analysis might be especially insightful?

Compare in 11 also reveals how politics across state borders is usually character-
ized by a mix of cooperation and competition. For example, Taiwan interacts with
the United States as a cooperative partner on security issues, and it both cooperates
and competes with the United States regarding imports and exports. Taiwan strongly
resists China’s goal of reunification, yet China has become Taiwan’s main investor
 Politics Across Borders 295

and trading partner. The rest of this chapter explores cooperation and competition
as the two dominant patterns in international relations. In most instances, a state
realizes more benefits and fewer costs if it pursues its goals by strategies of coopera-
tion with other states and with transborder actors. However, competition is always
a possibility as states come into conflict with other actors as they pursue their goals.
The final section in Chapter 12 will examine those crucial situations in which conflict
resolution fails and the competition escalates into violence across borders and even
into war.

Mechanisms of Political Cooperation

Across Borders
11.2 Classify the main actors in the global system and characterize the
mechanisms of cooperation between states.
Do you agree with the proposition that, under most circumstances, a state is likely
to accomplish more of its goals at lower costs if it can develop mutually advanta-
geous cooperative arrangements with other states? This section will consider the
various ways in which states can cooperate. From the neoliberal (contemporary ideal-
ist) perspective, a state has an inherent preference to establish arrangements through
which such cooperation can be nurtured. Realists are likely to be more cynical about
such cooperation, viewing such arrangements as strategic actions to be made or broken
as they serve the state’s national interest.
Even in the absence of any formalized mechanisms of cooperation, a state might
adopt several patterns of behavior that are noteworthy for their nonconflictual
approach:

1. Altruism: A state acts in accordance with moral principles, not its national inter-
est. Thus, the state might provide humanitarian aid to the population of another
country with no expectation of direct benefits, or it might make a unilateral deci-
sion to reduce its military capabilities or its carbon emissions to improve the
global environment.
2. Accommodation: A state willingly makes concessions on one or more values of
importance in order to promote an acceptable outcome or a nonviolent resolu-
tion of a dispute with another actor. This might involve a compromise in which
several states find common ground, or one state might make a disproportionate
level of concessions in an attempt to improve its relations or avoid conflict with
another actor (e.g., a state, a multinational financial institution, or an international
judicial body).
3. Neutrality: A state claims its right to be impartial among competing states and to
refrain from supporting any states in a conflict. A key goal of a neutral state is to
avoid being drawn into a dispute among other states. In recent decades, countries
such as Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Switzerland have defined themselves as
neutral states.
296 Chapter 11

Diplomacy and Interstate Agreements

One of the most widely used mechanisms through which states communicate to
enhance cooperation is diplomacy. Diplomatic practices enable a state’s skilled
representatives to engage in regular discussions and negotiations with the representa-
tives of other states. Thus, most states maintain an array of actors (e.g., ambassadors,
cultural attachés) and institutions (e.g., embassies, trade delegations) that attempt
to further their state’s interests and resolve potential problems with other states by
means of “normal diplomatic channels” and informal communications. The essence
of traditional diplomacy is strategic, face-to-face discussions between diplomats on
behalf of their countries. However, modern communications technologies (e.g., video-
conferencing) have provided new ways for leaders and diplomats to interact, allowing
them to deal with one another directly, even if not in person. In the world of 24/7 news
media, political officials are aware that every public utterance is being recorded and is
accessible around the world to other political actors via some medium, ranging from
Al-Jazeera to YouTube.
A special form of diplomacy is when the top leaders of countries meet to share
views and seek common policy ground. In any given week, there are one-on-one
meetings, such as when chief executives or foreign ministers travel to meet their
counterparts. During a single week in September 2013, for example, U.S. president
Barack Obama held private meetings with Brazil’s president Dilma Rousseff, China’s
president Xi Jinping, Germany’s chancellor Angela Merkel, and India’s prime minister
Manmohan Singh, among others.
So many private meetings in such a short time were possible because the leaders
of major countries (the G20) were holding a summit meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia.
The G20 is a global group of key industrial and emerging-market countries (plus a
representative from the European Union) that focuses on financial issues. The leaders
of an even more elite group of powerful industrialized countries, the G8, also meet
periodically to discuss shared policy concerns. Table 11.1 lists the members of these
two groups. There are numerous other regional groups that hold recurrent meetings

Table 11.1 Major Diplomatic Groupings of States

G8 G20 (adds to G8)
Canada Argentina Mexico
France Australia Saudi Arabia
Germany Brazil South Africa
Italy China South Korea
Japan India Turkey
Russia* Indonesia European Union
United Kingdom
United States
*Russia was suspended from the G8 in 2014 due to its actions in Ukraine.
 Politics Across Borders 297

in an attempt to cooperate on policy (e.g., Association of Southeast Asian Nations

[ASEAN] in South Asia, MERCOSUR in Latin America, the Organization of African
States [OAS]).
More explicit cooperation among states is usually established by bilateral
(between two states) or multilateral (among three or more states) agreements. The
two most prominent forms of these agreements are treaties and regimes. Treaties are
formal agreements between states that they will cooperate or assist one another, usually in the
domains of military, economic, or political interactions. A treaty is a contract between
states (or with an international organization), and there is an expectation that the
agreement is binding on all signatories. Most treaties involve a limited set of countries.
For example, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a treaty among
three states (Canada, Mexico, and the United States) to cooperate on a complex set of
trade arrangements. The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (e.g., START II, 1993) are
weapons-limitation pacts between the United States and Russia. The European Union
(EU), described at the beginning of this chapter, is an example of a major multistate,
multipurpose confederation based on treaties for economic, political, cultural, and
military cooperation among its 28 member countries.
Some multistate agreements are called international regimes to signify a set of
norms, rules, and procedures accepted by many countries that guide their behavior regard-
ing a particular issue area. There are only a limited number of international regimes.
They are like treaties, but typically have a very large number of signatories, and
compliance is less rigorously enforced. Current examples are in the area of arms con-
trol (e.g., the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty [1968], now including 189 countries)
and environmental protection (e.g., the 1997 Kyoto Protocol on climate change and
greenhouse gas emissions, accepted by 191 countries and the EU). Many international
regimes establish a permanent organization through which the member states can
enact, modify, and implement the agreements and facilitate crossnational cooperation
(Drezner 2008; Keohane 2005).
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is one of the most powerful and controver-
sial international regimes. Established in 1995, the WTO emerged from an international
trading regime that had evolved over the prior 50 years. The WTO, which currently
has 159 member countries, states that its main goal is “to enable trade, to the extent
possible, to flow freely in a predictable and smooth manner” among all countries.
It works with member countries to establish and enforce policies that eliminate all
barriers to global free trade (e.g., tariffs on imports, subsidies to producers, “dumping”
strategies [selling goods abroad at below cost to cripple competitors]). Hence, the
WTO claims that the primary result of its actions is “a world economy which is more
prosperous, has less conflict, and is more transparent” (WTO 2013).
However, critics assert that, as elite theory posits (recall Chapter 9), WTO rules
and agreements primarily benefit the financial elites and multinational corporations
that dominate global trade (Meckled-Garcia 2013). They claim that the free trade
agreements implemented by the WTO increase the profits of multinational corpora-
tions (MNCs) but reduce the power of workers, are indifferent to violations of human
rights, fail to protect the environment, and undermine the sovereignty of national
298 Chapter 11

governments, which must accept WTO regulations. To its detractors, the WTO is “one
of the most powerful, secretive and antidemocratic bodies on Earth,” and the main
results of its actions are to “preside over the greatest transfer in history, of real eco-
nomic and political power away from nation-states to global corporations” and to
“run roughshod over the rights of people and nations, causing all manner of environ-
mental and social harms” (Global Exchange 2009; Mander 1999).
The direct, day-to-day interactions among most states are substantially governed
by a variety of formal and informal agreements, of which treaties and regimes are
among the most important. Like other forms of international cooperation, such agree-
ments are binding only as long as the participating states are willing to abide by the
conditions of the agreement or are willing to submit disputes to some form of resolu-
tion. But such agreements can collapse for various reasons:

• Some participants might find that their national goals are not well served, so
they ignore or violate the agreement. For example, countries sometimes conclude
that their own national economic needs justify subsidies to their producers (e.g.,
farmers, steel producers), even if other countries object that such subsidies violate
WTO agreements.
• Participants might have different interpretations of what actions are deemed
acceptable under the agreement. For example, Iran is among the 190 countries that
have signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, but there is considerable dispute
over whether Iran’s ongoing uranium enrichment programs are in violation of the
treaty. Iran insists its actions are within its rights to develop nuclear energy for
peaceful purposes. As agencies of the UN continue to investigate, some countries
such as the United States argue for stronger sanctions against Iran, while others
such as China and India have opposed additional sanctions.
• Fulfillment of the key objectives in an agreement might be impossible. For example,
the Treaty of Locarno (1925) between Britain and Italy failed to deter Germany
from violating the borders of France and Belgium because Britain and Italy were
not strong enough to counteract Germany’s military power and Italy’s government
eventually concluded that Italy’s national interests were better served by becoming
more pro-German.

International Law
The broadest attempt to formalize and constrain the interactions among states is interna-
tional law. In 1625, Hugo Grotius, the “father of international law,” published De jure
belli et pacis (On the Laws of War and Peace) (Grotius 1625/1957). This document empha-
sized that natural law—universal principles of behavior that are recognizable through
human reason and human nature and that direct us to act with goodness—should guide the
relations among states and restrain hostile or destructive interactions. Unfortunately,
states often define reasonable behavior according to their own political interests
rather than shared abstract moral rules. Thus, by the nineteenth century, natural law
had been supplanted by positivist law—explicit written agreements that define both
appropriate and unacceptable behaviors among states, in the form of international treaties
 Politics Across Borders 299

or conventions. Positivist laws have attempted to adjudicate geographic boundaries

(e.g., the 12-mile limit on the territorial waters of states), to regulate states’ use of
environmental resources (e.g., laws limiting whale hunting in international waters),
and to establish states’ rights and limits over non-national resources (e.g., the law of
outer space).
The treaties and conventions of positivist law even attempt to distinguish accept-
able from unacceptable behavior during conflicts among states. For example, the
Helsinki Agreement binds combatants to use no glass-filled projectiles or other forms
of violence that produce “unnecessary suffering.” The Geneva Convention on “fair”
war prohibits the use of poison gases and insists that captured soldiers be treated with
dignity, although it does not preclude most of the terrible forms of suffering or death
that a soldier can experience before he becomes a prisoner.
While positivist law has the great advantage of being formulated in explicit
written agreements, the effectiveness of such agreements ultimately depends on the
willingness of states to comply with them. Even if states sign a particular agreement,
they sometimes openly violate the agreement and later deny accusations of such a
violation. The International Court of Justice (also known as the ICJ or the World Court)
at The Hague was established in 1946 to adjudicate violations of positivist interna-
tional law and to offer advisory opinions on issues of international law.
Part of the United Nations, the International Court of Justice has occasionally
served as a valuable mechanism for conflict resolution between states. However, the
court has jurisdiction and binding authority only if both parties to the dispute accept
its ruling. Less than one-third of the member states of the United Nations have agreed
to accept automatically the ICJ’s jurisdiction in matters affecting them. When the polit-
ical or economic stakes are high or even when emotional elements of the disagreement
are intense, states have often refused to accept the court’s jurisdiction or to be bound
by its judgments. The United States has taken cases to the court, but it is among the
majority of states that rejects the court’s automatic jurisdiction, as it did in a 1984 case
brought by the Nicaraguan government that objected to covert U.S. actions against it
(such as mining Nicaraguan harbors).
Prior to the 1990s, the ICJ was not particularly active. Between 1946 and 1991, it
considered only 64 cases, gave advisory opinions in 19 cases, and handled very few
cases that actually concerned violent conflicts between states. However, the ICJ has
averaged 14 cases per year since the mid-1990s, is dealing with more disputes involving
political violence, and is now issuing numerous advisory opinions each year (http://
www.icj-cij.org). Another important recent development is the expanded use of inter-
national law to arrest and prosecute political leaders and other individuals accused of
extensive human rights violations. Such trials can be handled by the relevant coun-
try, like the trial of Saddam Hussein in Iraq. Since 2002, a permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC) at The Hague is a “court of last resort” that can take up cases
of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes if any of the 122 countries that
support the court is not prepared to handle such a case in its national court system.
The role of the ICC in international affairs is still evolving (Shniderman and Smith
2014). In its early years, the ICC has tried cases of human rights violations involving
300 Chapter 11

top government leaders from Ivory Coast (Laurent Gbagbo) and rebel leaders from
the Democratic Republic of Congo and Uganda. It has also pursued international
criminal justice in other ways, such as the indictment of a sitting leader, Omar Bashir
of the Sudan (Smith and Gonzalez 2013).
The increased activities of these international courts reflect a growing interest in
using international law more aggressively, not only to adjudicate disputes between
states but also to hold individuals accountable for the ultraviolence perpetrated by
their states. Do you think political leaders should be legally responsible before an inter-
national court system for the actions of their soldiers? More broadly, is it acceptable for
a state to refuse the court’s jurisdiction? What do you think would happen to interna-
tional politics if all states automatically accepted the jurisdiction of the International
Court of Justice and the ICC?

International Organizations
INTeRNATIoNAl oRGANIzATIoNs is a broad term for many of the transnational
institutions whose core objectives include actions to influence the behavior and policies
of states and other transborder actors. (Transnationalism describes institutions or actors
who engage in a significant array of activities that cross state borders.) A few international
organizations attempt to prevent or resolve conflict among states. Most such organiza-
tions focus on specific issue areas that are of global significance in the economic, social,
environmental, cultural, or political domain and, in their actions, tend to facilitate
cooperation across borders. There are three major types of international organizations:
intergovernmental organizations (IGOs); international nongovernmental organiza-
tions (NGOs); and multinational corporations (MNCs).

IGos Intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) are political institutions whose

members are states, not private groups or individuals. Although there are currently
fewer than 300 permanent IGOs, they have vast potential to shape the politics across
borders. States jointly establish IGOs for a variety of different purposes: to provide a
forum for communication among states; to implement policies that respond to political,
social, or economic problems transcending national boundaries; to enact international
laws and treaties; and to intervene in disputes between states. Most IGOs are regional,
such as the EU, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and the Arab League. Others have a global mem-
bership and focus, such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Health Organization (WHO).
The most powerful and wide-ranging IGOs in the twentieth century were two
major international organizations: the League of Nations and the United Nations. The
League of Nations was formed in 1921 (after World War I) as a mechanism for col-
lective security against aggression. But Italian aggression in Ethiopia and Japanese
aggression in Manchuria in the 1930s revealed that the League lacked the diplomatic,
political, or military power to achieve its goal.
 Politics Across Borders 301

The United Nations (UN) was created in 1945 (after World War II) as an inter-
national organization dedicated to managing international security. In pursuit of this
objective, the UN has five principal organs with specific functions:

1. The Security Council is the body within the UN that has the authority to directly
manage international conflicts because it can pass binding resolutions that
authorize the use of force, peacekeeping missions, and sanctions. Its member-
ship includes 5 permanent members with veto power (China, France, Russia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States) and 10 rotating members.
2. The General Assembly has representatives from all 193 member states of the
UN and serves as a forum for discussion of global issues. Although the General
Assembly lacks the legal authority to pass binding resolutions, it oversees the
entire UN budget as well as many specialized bodies.
3. The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) promotes economic and social coop-
eration and development. To achieve this goal, ECOSOC works with the General
Assembly to coordinate and oversee most UN committees.
4. The Secretariat is the central bureaucracy, responsible for the UN’s day-to-day
operations. It is headed by the UN’s most visible representative, the secretary-
general (currently, Ban Ki-moon).
5. The International Court of Justice is the UN’s primary judicial body. It is responsible
for interpreting international law (described in the previous section).

Figure 11.1 shows a number of the special units that function within the principal divi-
sions of the UN.
While the United Nations has a mixed record of success and failure in its central
objective of maintaining global peace, it has improved the international political climate.
At the least, the United Nations has been a highly effective setting within which rivals
can engage in continuing diplomacy. Particularly within the Security Council and the
General Assembly, UN officials and representatives from various countries can attempt
to mediate conflicts and prevent escalation to war. The UN can also pass resolutions
that might constrain certain countries from acting in opposition to the moral force of
international public opinion (Kennedy 2006; Weiss and Daws 2009).
Most directly, a UN peacekeeping operation can intervene between combatants.
This is an impartial, multinational military and civilian force authorized by the UN
Security Council with the consent of the disputing parties. The peacekeeping force
literally stands between the combatants in an attempt to ease tensions, and it uses
force only in defense. The United States and the Soviet Union used their veto power
in the Security Council to block many potential peacekeeping initiatives during the
Cold War. In the post–Cold War period (beginning in the late 1980s), the use of UN
peacekeeping forces has expanded. Thus, 50 UN peacekeeping operations have been
deployed since 1990, compared with only 18 in the preceding 42 years (United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations 2013). By its various actions, the UN has contributed to
what former UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold (1953–1961) called “preven-
tive diplomacy”—limiting the extensive political and military involvement of major
302 Chapter 11

Figure 11.1 United Nations Organization: Principal Organs and Selected Units
Security Secretary–General International
General Assembly
Council Secretariat Court of Justice

Staff, Departments, Economic and Social

and Offices Council (ECOSOC)

Programs Regional
and Funds Specialized and Functional
Agencies Commissions
Military Staff ITC: Intl. Trade FAO: Food and Commission on
Comm. Center Agricultural Org. Narcotic Drugs

Peacekeeping UNCTAD: Conference IDA: Intl. Development Commission on

Operations on Trade and Assoc. Sustainable
Development Development

Intl. Criminal UNDCP: Drug Control IFC: Intl. Finance Commission on the
Tribunals Program Corp. Status of Women
UNDP: Development ECA: Economic
ILO: Intl. Labor Org.
Program Commission for Africa
UNDRO: Office of IMF: Intl. Monetary ECE: Economic
Disaster Relief Fund Commission for Europe
Coordinator
UNEP: Environment IPU: Intl. Postal ESCAP: Economic and
Program Union Social Commission for
Asia and the Pacific

UNFPA: Population UNESCO: Educational,

Fund Scientific and Cultural Related
Org. Organizations

UNHCR: High WIPO: World WTO: World Trade

Commissioner for Intellectual Property Org.
Refugees Org.
IAEA: Intl. Atomic
UNIFEM: World Bank Group Energy Agency
Development
Fund for Women
WHO: World Health
UNICEF: Children’s Org.
Fund

WFC: World Food

Council

WFP: World Food

Program

powers during conflicts between other countries. In 1988, the UN peacekeeping opera-
tions were awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
Significantly, most of the post–Cold War operations differ from earlier operations
in that their central objective is to establish internal peace among factions within a
country. Of 15 peacekeeping missions active in 2013, for example, the primary objec-
tive in 13 (including the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Ivory Coast, Kosovo,
 Politics Across Borders 303

and Lebanon) was to prevent politi-

cal violence among groups within
the country. It has been difficult
for UN forces to end the violence
in these internal conflicts in which
both the borders and the iden-
tity of combatants are ambiguous.
However, a study of 124 UN peace-
keeping actions in internal conflicts
concludes that they generally have
been successful in ending the vio-
lence and increasing the likelihood
of greater democratization (Doyle
and Sambanis 2000). Recent concern
has focused on the unintended con-
sequences of UN intervention, such
as an increase in human trafficking Haitians line up to receive water from soldiers in a UN operation in the
associated with the peacekeeping Cite Soliel slum of Port-Au-Prince as part of the UN’s humanitarian aid
efforts (Smith and Smith 2011; Smith function.
and Miller-de la Cuesta 2011).
The UN’s other main goals concern improving the relations among states and helping
countries improve the health, welfare, and human rights of their people. Coordinated by
both the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, committees, agencies,
and commissions, such as the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations
Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), attempt to mitigate global problems
and enhance the quality of human life in areas such as human rights, agricultural devel-
opment, environmental protection, refugees, children’s health, and disaster relief.
The continuing level of political violence in the international system underscores
the fact that the United Nations lacks the power to prevent all interstate conflict. Many
states threaten to withdraw their support (financial and political) when UN actions are
at variance with the states’ perceptions of their national interest. However, through
its agencies, its debates and resolutions, its continuous open forum for formal and
informal communications among states, and its peacekeeping operations, the UN
does contribute to greater cooperation, reduced human suffering, and reduced conflict
among states. For such contributions, Nobel Peace Prizes have been awarded to the
UN six times, including the UN and then Secretary-General Kofi Annan in 2001, the
UN International Atomic Energy Agency and its then head Mohammed Elbaradei in
2005, and the UN Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons in 2013.

NGos The second type of international organization is nongovernmental organiza-

tions. NGOs are composed of nonstate actors (private individuals and groups) who work
actively in a particular issue area to provide information, promote public policies, and
even provide services that might otherwise be provided by governments. International
304 Chapter 11

NGOs work with one another, with governments, and with IGOs to address problems
that cross state borders. Between 1960 and 2000, the number of NGOs active in at least
three countries rose from 1,000 to more than 30,000 and currently is more than 50,000.
This includes about 5,000 major NGOs that are very active in a large number of coun-
tries (Union of International Associations 2011; Weiss 1996).
International NGOs are committed to furthering political and social issues with
transnational dimensions. Although their issues tend to be regional or global, the
actions and effectiveness of these NGOs can be analyzed in the same framework
applied to the analysis of national interest groups (see Chapter 3). These groups
encourage concerned individuals, groups, and even the governments of other states
to write letters, organize demonstrations or boycotts, or engage in other politi-
cal actions to pressure a government or transnational actor to change its practices
(Smith 2007).
For example, you might be aware—from media, mailings, or other information
sources—of the environmental protection actions of Greenpeace, the animal preserva-
tion goals of the World Wildlife Federation, or the lobbying by the Union of Concerned
Scientists to limit destructive technologies. Amnesty International, another well-
known NGO, is concerned with protecting human rights and is engaged in campaigns
to focus attention and pressure on governments that are violating the rights of their
citizens. It is one of the leading NGOs among an expanding group of transborder
organizations that promote the protection of human rights. Often, local movements of
human rights activists coalesce with others outside their state’s boundaries to promote
this issue.
The actions of some NGOs extend far beyond lobbying because they generate
resources and actually deliver goods and services, such as the humanitarian medical
services provided by Médecins sans Frontières, winner of the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize.
With the globalization of communications and greater mobility, many other groups,
advocacy networks, and social movements are able to engage in a mix of persuasion
and action, although most operate in a limited set of countries. Overall, transnational
NGOs enjoy higher public trust than either governments or business, and they have
a growing economic base (more than $1 trillion). They are “increasingly important in
shaping national and international politics, governance processes and markets” and
are “amongst the most influential institutions of the twenty-first century” (Elkington
and Beloe 2003).

MNCs It is also clear that the actions of many multinational corporations (MNCs,
also referred to as TNCs—transnational corporations) have significant impacts on the
politics within and between states. From a political economy perspective, MNCs are
powerful firms that produce and sell a diversity of goods in many countries in pur-
suit of private profit (e.g., Exxon, British Petroleum, Samsung, CITIC Group-China,
Sumitomo). The global impacts of major MNCs are based on their sheer economic
weight as some of the richest institutions in the world. In terms of comparative eco-
nomic power (measured as gross economic product), only 63 (42 percent) of the top
150 economic units in the world are countries and 87 (58 percent) are multinational
corporations (White 2012).
 Politics Across Borders 305

Three other crucial features of MNCs add to their importance in the global system.
These features enhance an MNC’s flexibility and bargaining power in dealing with
the governmental institutions and the political economy in any state. First, a major
MNC functions as a globalized network. Because its operations are spread across
many countries, an MNC can rapidly move its activities to exploit opportunities and
avoid problems in any host country and even in its home country. This enables the
MNC to pressure governments into competing for a share of its operations by provid-
ing the MNC with large financial inducements (e.g., tax breaks, enhanced government
services, bribes) and by minimizing the state’s regulatory constraints on the MNC’s
undesirable activities (e.g., negative environmental impacts, labor practices, product
safety). Second, the MNC’s capacity for product diversification enables it to shift its
balance of production among a variety of different goods, further reducing its depen-
dence on any single country or any particular source of land, labor, or capital. And
third, an MNC can transform itself, breaking off units into independent companies,
engaging in mergers, launching completely new areas of activity, or even shutting
down entire divisions. These three strategic elements increase the MNC’s autonomy,
influence, and profitability at the expense of the host country’s political economy and
its government, which must continue to make costly concessions to compete for a
share of the MNC’s operation and are constantly vulnerable to the MNC’s decisions.
Moreover, those MNCs that engage in financial services can shift assets in nano-
seconds, since they operate primarily in the virtual world. When globalized financial
institutions suddenly move in similar directions, such as speculating in a country’s
currency or dumping its bonds, the country’s overall financial stability and strength
can be altered quickly. Such actions by financial MNCs can result in a rapid credit
crunch or a run on the currency. With all of this leverage, these financial MNCs are
able to exert tremendous influence on government policy in ways that serve the goals
of the MNC.
For all these reasons, some critics claim that MNCs challenge the very sovereignty
and autonomy of the state because they can avoid most of the laws and taxes of any
state and can pressure the state to enact favorable policies. Critics also argue that
MNCs monopolize the production and distribution of important goods in the world
marketplace, squeeze out many small firms, and widen the economic gap between
the rich and poor countries (Keohane and Nye 2011; Russett, Starr, and Kinsella 2009).
Hence, “the MNC remains one of the most controversial actors in the international
political economy” (Jenkins 1993: 606).

Power Politics Across Borders

11.3 Analyze the types of power politics between actors in the international
system and evaluate the impact of globalization.
Actors operating across state borders often attempt to engage in mutually beneficial
interactions. But when the divergent interests of states and other transborder actors
are stronger than their mutual interests, competitive or conflictual behavior is more
306 Chapter 11

likely than cooperation. From the realist perspective in particular, such power politics
and conflict are a central feature of interactions in the international system.
In politics across borders, there are frequent examples of power politics. Recall that
power is exercised when one actor (A) uses its actions or resources to cause another
actor (B) to do something that B otherwise would not do (see Compare in 5). In most
of the examples in this section, both A and B will be states. However, in current global
society, many instances of power politics across state borders now involve nonstate
actors in the role of A, B, or both A and B. As described earlier in this chapter, these non-
state actors are often IGOs, NGOs, or MNCs. In some situations, power politics results
in the resort to violence. Chapter 12 will examine the uses of violence across borders.
When cooperative approaches do not succeed, a state or other transborder actor
can attempt to persuade the other actor to behave in a manner that the other actor does
not view as in its best interests. The argument might be that such behavior does serve
the actor’s goals in ways it does not realize or that the behavior is morally or ethically
the right thing to do, as neoliberal theory might suggest. Usually, however, it takes
more than persuasion to cause a state or other transborder actor to behave against
what it perceives to be its self-interest. This is when power politics is a likely strategy.
Some analysts suggest that states can successfully use “soft power” (Fraser 2005;
Nye 2009, 2011). This is a variation on the power/influence theme, positing that one state
so admires another state’s values, its policies, or even its culture that the first state agrees
to go along with the demands of the admired state. For example, it is argued that the soft
power of the United States (e.g., its political institutions, music, values, Barack Obama)
has penetrated some other countries so deeply that it gives the United States leverage in
interstate dealings with those countries. The concept has been applied to other countries
like China (Ikeda and Tago 2014; Shambaugh 2013), although not all scholars are per-
suaded about the strength of soft power (Berenskoetter and Williams 2007).
Compare in 5 also described “exchange power.” This means a state (or nonstate
actor) can offer something of value to another state to cause the other state to do some-
thing it would not otherwise do. Or the state can threaten or actually act to withhold
something of considerable value to another state in an attempt to induce compliance.
States use such exchange power in many ways. If another state needs a good (a few of
the thousands of examples are oil, military protection, a trade agreement, a UN vote, a
useful technology, a loan, sensitive information), the power-exercising state might be in
a position to provide this good, thus forcing the needy state to comply with its wishes.
When a group of states combine to withhold a desired good to pressure a state,
the strategy can be called sanctions. To avoid using violence, states or an IGO such as
the United Nations apply sanctions to a country whose behavior they want to alter.
They might withhold food, loans, replacement parts, or any other good. Recently,
there have been more attempts to apply comprehensive sanctions, in which many
important restrictions are placed on a state’s acquisition or sale of goods. Sanctions, or
even the threat of sanctions, can be an effective mechanism of coercion (Whang et al.
2013). During the 1990s, for example, there were 20 cases in which the United Nations
successfully applied comprehensive sanctions to drive a country’s leader from power
or to force regime change (Cortright and Lopez 2002).
 Politics Across Borders 307

Transnational Systems of Power

If soft power and exchange power approaches do not resolve the differences, a transna-
tional system of power politics might still prevent major, direct conflict between com-
peting states. One important system is a balance of power. This occurs when there is
a rough equality in the power resources (political, economic, and especially military) that can be
exercised by sets of competing states. An actor is prevented from taking advantage of others
because of the power of other actors to retaliate. The term balance of power is widely
used and has many meanings. In the broadest sense, it implies that there is a rough
equilibrium of power between competing states, and this discourages any state from
taking aggressive action against rivals because the state fears effective retaliation. This
concept often refers to a regional or global balance of power that involves a number of
states. Six key elements in this classic notion of balance of power, listed below, are espe-
cially associated with the political realist perspective (Morgenthau 2005; Little 2007).

1. It is an attempt to maintain a general stability in the relations among states and to

preserve the status quo.
2. It assumes that peace can be maintained if potential aggressor states are deterred
by overwhelming opposing power.
3. There are typically a few (usually four to six) major power states that are decisive
in ensuring that the balance is sustained.
4. These states, and others, create shifting alliances based only on self-interest and
system equilibrium, not on friendship or ideology.
5. One or more power states must intervene if the behavior of other actors threatens
the overall balance of the system.
6. There will be periodic political violence and war because states must use force to
preserve themselves and because the system is not always in such good balance
that all conflict between states is deterred.

A relatively effective balance of power system functioned in Europe for about

250 years, until World War I in 1914. In describing Britain’s role in this system, Winston
Churchill (1948) observed, “For 400 years the foreign policy of England has been to
oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the continent, in
joining the weaker states.” However, the growing importance of both ideology and
nationalism and the permanent hostility among certain major powers undermined the
logic of the balance of power approach after 1914.
After World War II, the classic balance-of-power system was replaced by a bipolar
balance-of-power system, in which the United States and its allies were generally
balanced against the Soviet Union and its allies. The groups associated with each
superpower were rigid in their ideological antipathy to the other bloc and were inflex-
ible in their alliance formation. Each bloc attempted to achieve hegemony—sustained
domination of the international system. However, the formidable military power on each
side deterred them from fighting each other directly during a 40-year “cold” war (see
page 370 in Chapter 13).
From the early 1970s until the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, the international
system of power became increasingly multipolar. The coherence of the U.S. bloc and the
308 Chapter 11

Soviet bloc declined, as powerful actors such as China, Japan, Western Europe, and
groupings of nonaligned states began to act with greater independence. At the same
time, the United States and the Soviet Union continued to be the preeminent global
powers and to engage in a massive buildup of military capability and nuclear weap-
ons. Each side attempted to gain an advantage in weaponry and feared that its rival
would gain some form of technological superiority. The result was an arms race that
produced nuclear arsenals capable of massive, even total, annihilation of humankind.
At the highest point, there were more than 60,000 operational nuclear weapons in the
world. Even now, there are more than 17,000 such weapons (Federation of American
Scientists 2013). In this situation of mutually assured destruction (MAD), a form of
balance-of-power politics evolved that was, and still is, a dangerous and possibly irra-
tional mechanism for regulating the relations among powerful states in the nuclear age.
In the post–Cold War era (since the early 1990s), the state system continues to have
multipolar elements, especially through the United Nations. However, the military
and economic dominance of the United States has provided some characteristics of a
unipolar period, in which the international system is generally controlled by a single
hegemon. The United States has often taken the lead in spearheading collective mili-
tary action through the United Nations (e.g., the 1991 Persian Gulf War) or through
NATO (e.g., the 1999 actions against the Serbs in Kosovo; the opposition to Gaddafi’s
forces in Libya in 2011). In some cases, the United States has operated somewhat uni-
laterally (e.g., the military campaign against Afghanistan beginning in late 2001) or
dominated a military “coalition of the willing” (the war against Iraq in 2003).

Domination and Dependence

While all states enjoy sovereign equality, it is obvious that some states are far more
powerful than others. Students of the contemporary, and increasingly globalized,
political world must understand how and in what situations one state exercises sub-
stantial power over another. The capacity of one state to alter the actions of another
state can be based on different forms of leverage; the primary three are:

1. economic leverage, based on the advantageous trade relations, financial interac-

tions, or economic aid that the state can provide to (or withhold from) another state.
2. Military leverage, which can be applied either negatively, via the use or threat of
military action against a state, or positively, via military assistance in the form of
protection, provision of military resources, or training.
3. Political leverage, derived from the ability of a state to affect the actions of another
state through the use of its political resources, such as its negotiating skills, its
effective political institutions, or its influence in interstate relations.

ColoNIAlIsM During the twentieth century, particular attention focused on

colonialism, which is characterized by one state having extensive dominance over another
state, including manipulation or control of key economic and military structures for the benefit
of the dominant state. A state might have a variety of reasons for attaining mastery over
another state. First, the subordinate state can provide resources, both human and
physical, for the dominant state. Second, the subordinate state can be a controlled
 Politics Across Borders 309

market for the products of the dominant state. Third, the subordinate state can serve
important strategic functions, either as a buffer between the dominant state and its
rivals or as a staging area for the dominant state’s political or military objectives.
Fourth, a state with a missionary zeal might dominate another state to ensure that its
values (usually political or religious) guide the subordinate state. Fifth, a state might
want to dominate another state to gain international prestige.
While all forms of colonial domination entail a mix of economic, military, and
political control, dominant states have employed three different styles:

1. In the segregationist style of colonialism, the interaction is pure exploitation. The

dominant state makes little or no attempt to improve the economic, political, or
social systems in the subordinate state. This style generally characterized the rela-
tions of Belgium, Germany, and Portugal with their African and Asian colonial
territories.
2. In the assimilationist style, the dominant state makes some attempt to transform
the subordinate state into an external extension of itself. While the subordinate
state is still being exploited, the institutions, knowledge, and culture of the domi-
nant state are introduced to the elite of the subordinate state and become a basis
for political, economic, and cultural development. This style is particularly associ-
ated with French colonialism in Africa and Asia and the extensive colonialism of
the former Soviet Union.
3. In the style of indirect rule, the dominant state works with the traditional leaders
and institutions of governance and culture in the subordinate state as intermedi-
aries in its control, but it also introduces the modern forms of the dominant state
that will eventually supplant traditional forms. The British approach to its vast
empire is the classic example of indirect rule, and this mode of colonialism also
characterizes the style of the United States in some Latin American and Pacific
Rim states.

NeoColoNIAlIsM In the decades after World War II, most states willingly or
reluctantly granted independence to their colonial holdings. But political indepen-
dence does not necessarily end a state’s subordination to a strong state. The label
neocolonialism is given to new, more indirect forms of domination and dependence that are
nearly as powerful as those under colonialism. Although the dominant state may officially
withdraw its direct political and military presence, it can maintain domination, pri-
marily by economic leverage. Through foreign aid, loans, technology transfer, military
support, and economic intervention, the dominant state can continue to control many
actions of a supposedly independent state. The dominant state’s manipulations
become relatively invisible, and its interests are served by a subtle alliance among a
small elite within the subordinate country, MNCs, and other transnational actors (such
as the IMF) (Maxfield 1997). These new forms of domination were described in the
discussion in Chapter 10 of the dependency approach, which posits that the patterns
established under colonialism have evolved into a world system of dominance and
dependence that is global and systemic (Wallerstein, Lemert, and Rojas 2013). The
recent history of the Democratic Republic of Congo, described in Focus in 11, exem-
plifies how colonialism and neocolonialism can contribute to the plight of vulnerable
states on the periphery.
310 Chapter 11

Focus in 11
The Faces of Colonialism: Congo
The Democratic Republic of Congo is a large, technology transfer, and military support he received
resource-rich state (one-fourth the size of the United from Western countries, especially the United States
States) located in the center of the African continent. (which appreciated his staunch anticommunism).
It encompasses 75 million people and 250 ethnic Zaire relied heavily on foreign corporations to build
groups. King Leopold of Belgium claimed the area and maintain its mines, factories, and infrastructure.
as his own private kingdom in 1879 and placed it The IMF (the consortium of Western banking institu-
under Belgian colonial administration in 1908. As tions) loaned Zaire enormous amounts and repeat-
they extracted the Congo’s natural resources with edly restructured Zaire’s debt (the largest in Africa).
ruthless efficiency, King Leopold’s companies and In return, the IMF demanded conditionality—that
Belgian-led military forces treated the local people Zaire implement strong economic policies, includ-
with brutality, forcing the men into virtual slavery as ing devaluing the currency, lowering real wages, and
workers in the mines and on the plantations. The drastically reducing social welfare programs. There
colonial regime provided only minimal education to were extended periods during which the IMF sent in
the people and encouraged Catholic missionaries to European citizens to directly manage Zaire’s national
teach the great virtue of obedience to authority. banking system.
The Belgians exploited the resources of the The combination of internal corruption, exploi-
Congo until internal resistance and the widespread tation by foreign corporations, and IMF’s condition-
liberation of African colonies made it clear that ality left few resources for the people of Zaire. The
continued colonial rule was not acceptable. The level of education declined, the country could no
Congo was granted its independence on June 30, longer feed itself, and the infrastructure (e.g., roads,
1960, and Belgium rapidly withdrew its military and water supply, telecommunications) was in sham-
administrative personnel and most of its financial bles. The real wages of urban workers fell to less
and technical support. than one-tenth of what they were at independence.
Unprepared for self-rule, the Congolese elite Surrounded by the appalling poverty of most of the
broke into competing factions, and the country population, Mobutu was rumored to be the wealthi-
collapsed into political decay and civil war. A fac- est person in sub-Saharan Africa, with holdings of
tion under soldier Joseph Mobutu and assisted by more than $10 billion.
Western countries (and the U.S. Central Intelligence When the Cold War ended, the United States
Agency) was victorious in the civil war and then found Mobutu to be an embarrassment and tried to
assassinated the pro-Soviet prime minister. pressure him to make democratic reforms. Mobutu
In 1965, Mobutu, now army chief of staff, led a finally allowed elections in 1993, but when his own
coup that overthrew the civilian government. Mobutu candidate for prime minister was defeated, he
installed himself as the leader of a one-party, ordered the armed forces to prevent the winning
authoritarian regime. He “Africanized” his society, candidate from taking office and installed a puppet
changing the country’s name to Zaire and his own government. Multinational corporations continued to
name to Mobutu Sese Seko (“all powerful one”). exploit Zaire’s resources.
Despite Mobutu’s repressive rule, several civil wars, After years of political decay, Mobutu’s demise
the persistent failure of the economy, widespread came suddenly in 1997. After a Zairean guerrilla
corruption, and the massive diversion of funds to group (composed mainly of Tutsis) expelled 1.2
Mobutu and his cronies from state-owned mines, he million Hutu refugees who had escaped the eth-
remained in power for more than three decades. nic chaos in Burundi and Rwanda, they turned on
Mobuto’s long tenure in office was completely Mobuto. When Mobuto’s army deserted him, he fled.
dependent on neocolonialism—the foreign aid, loans, The guerrilla army’s leader, Laurent Kabila, declared
 Politics Across Borders 311

himself president and renamed the country the After 90 years under a brutal and exploitative colo-
Democratic Republic of Congo. Not all Congolese nial system, 55 years of “independence” have brought
accepted Kabila’s rule, and there was a destructive no blossoming of democratic politics, no sharing of
civil war. When Kabila was assassinated in 2001, his the Congo’s abundant resources among its people,
son, Joseph Kabila, took power. and no economic development. Rather, contemporary
From 1998 to 2003, military groups from eight Congo is a tragic product of colonialism and neoco-
countries engaged in vicious fighting in Congo in lonialism, as well as its own internal failings—a state
what became known as Africa’s World War. This characterized by poverty, corruption, oppression, eco-
complex mix of civil war, ethnic conflicts, refugee nomic chaos, political decay, and continuing depen-
issues, and exploitation of Congo’s resources by dence on foreign states and foreign economic actors.
all groups was the bloodiest conflict since World
War II, with at least 4 million deaths and millions of
refugees. Joseph Kabila has manipulated the elec-
Further Focus
toral system to win elections in 2006 and 2011; but 1. Which of the specific foreign interventions in the
there have been coup attempts in 2003, 2004, and Congo described above might have done the
2011, and turmoil continues (Turner 2011). Congo greatest long-term damage?
ranks second highest among “failed states” world- 2. Are there any benefits that a developing country
wide and has the world’s lowest score on the Human might gain from a lengthy period under colonial-
Development Index. ism or neocolonialism?

Globalization?
According to Thomas Friedman, “[a] new international system has now clearly
replaced the Cold War: globalization. That’s right, globalization—the integration of
markets, finance and technologies in a way that is shrinking the world from a size
medium to a size small and enabling each of us to reach around the world farther,
faster and cheaper than ever” (Friedman 1999: 110). The new conventional wisdom is
that the forces of globalization are reshaping everything, from international politics to
national economies to our individual values.
What is globalization? As a working definition, globalization can be viewed as the
increasing integration of diverse economic, social, cultural, military, and environmental phe-
nomena by means of dense networks of action and information that rapidly span vast distances
around the world. This definition is guided by the suggestion of Keohane and Nye
(2000: 105) that we first define globalism as “a state of the world involving networks
of interdependence at multicontinental distances.” Two defining characteristics of
such networks affect globalism: (1) The networks are increasingly dense and (2) they
involve extremely rapid transmission of phenomena across substantial distances.
These networks allow the movement of people, goods, ideas, information, financial
capital, and even biological substances. Globalization refers to an increase in the level of
globalism (Keohane and Nye 2000).
What aspects of human existence are affected by globalization? It is particularly
associated with economic factors: a worldwide market political economy with pri-
vate economic actors minimally constrained by states or borders, open capital mar-
kets, vigorous competition, and a reduction of state control over the economy (Starrs
312 Chapter 11

2013). However, the linkages associated with globalization can affect many important
aspects of our world. Thus, Keohane and Nye (2000) suggest four major domains of
globalism: (1) economic globalism: the long-distance flows of goods, services, capital,
and information that shape market exchanges (e.g., less costly imports, instantaneous
transfers of financial capital); (2) social and cultural globalism: the movement of people,
ideas, information, and images, which then influence the individuals, societies, and
cultures into which they flow (e.g., MTV, international tourism); (3) military globalism:
the long-distance networks of interdependence, in which the threat or exercise of force
is employed (e.g., mutually assured destruction, international terrorist networks); and
(4) environmental globalism: the long-distance transport of materials and biological sub-
stances via natural movement (e.g., ozone depletion, bird flu) or via human agency
(e.g., HIV-AIDS, Ebola).
There is heated debate about the overall impacts of globalization on individuals,
countries, and the international system. The Debate in 11 summarizes a few of the
central claims. As is often the case, there is considerable truth as well as substantial
hyperbole associated with the assertions of both the advocates and the foes of global-
ization. It is clear that the extraordinary increases in the speed, distance, and density
of networking have altered the global economic and sociocultural systems, facilitating
capitalism and markets and richly connecting some peoples and groups. Yet most of
the world’s population continues to live, work, and experience life on the margins
of those systems. There are powerful and contradictory forces at work. Some forces
create enhanced interactions and shared identities across vast spatial and political
boundaries, while other forces, reacting against globalization, intensify the importance
of local activities and particularistic identities.
Even as states are increasingly penetrated by outside forces, the states remain formi-
dable actors in the international system. Thus, it is possible that globalization could be
substantially limited by the policy actions of the most powerful states. This might occur
if such states conclude that their
national interest (especially their
prosperity and stability) is being
undermined by globalization or if
states enact policies that support
resistance by powerful, well-orga-
nized domestic actors harmed by
globalization. Alternatively, states
might cooperate with one another
to coordinate their national poli-
cies in ways that limit the most
negative effects of globalization.
In this case, the calculus of the
states would be, as in other forms
of interstate cooperation, that col-
Protesters in Manila, unhappy with the impacts of globalization, demand the laborative approaches are the best
Philippines withdraw from the WTO. means to serve their goals.
 Politics Across Borders 313

The Debate in 11
Is Globalization a Positive Development?
Human society has evolved from small groups kinds of nation-based differences that cause
of self-sufficient hunter-gatherers to huge urban conflict (Fukuyama 1999).
populations that rely on others for almost every • Global communication enables individuals who
aspect of existence. Many observers suggest that share political interests but are dispersed geo-
globalization—with its powerful forces that integrate graphically to engage in effective cooperation
economies, spread knowledge, and mix cultures—is and mobilization, thus enhancing their political
shifting us to a new stage of human development. power (Shirky 2011).
The global availability of more diverse goods and • As trade and economic interdependency incre-
services, the vast worldwide communications net- ase in a global system, powerful economic and
work, and the widespread sharing of technological political actors view war and major armed con-
capabilities are presented as evidence that global- flict as disruptive and undesirable, and thus they
ization is a positive force enhancing the quality of life will act to prevent them. Even more positively,
for nearly all countries and peoples. However, others these powerful actors have strong incentives for
argue that the current forms of global integration crossnational cooperation (Mandelbaum 2004;
have had extensive negative impacts on many coun- Dafoe et al. 2013).
tries and individuals. On balance, is globalization a
positive development?
Globalization Results in Many Negative Effects
on Societies and Individuals
Globalization Benefits Most Societies
and Individuals • Globalization encourages production, capital,
and jobs to move wherever costs are lowest
• A unified global market and free trade create
and profits are highest, resulting in considerable
a more efficient system for the production and
economic instability from country to country and
distribution of goods that results in lower prices
hardship for many workers whose jobs are out-
and improved product quality. Financial capital
sourced (Smick 2008).
flows quickly to the places where it will produce
the highest, most effective return on investment • Similarly, as production shifts to countries with
(Malloch-Brown 2012). the fewest regulations on labor and the least
restrictive environmental standards, the results
• Greater integration increases the transfer of tech-
include a “race to the bottom” characterized by
nology and expertise across borders, resulting in
hazardous working conditions, dangerous prod-
the diffusion of best practices, more extensive
ucts, and environmental degradation.
innovation, and increased global productivity
(Friedman and Friedman 2013). • A large share of the benefits of globalization are
captured by the most powerful economic actors
• Higher productivity, higher-quality goods, and
in the world (Stiglitz 2006), and thus the sys-
lower prices will generally “raise all boats.”
tem is best understood as the newest form of
That is, these improvements will raise the level
neocolonialism.
of material living standards and the prosperity
enjoyed by large numbers of people in many • With globalization, the distribution of wealth
countries (Baghwati 2007; Wolf 2004). grows even more unequal between core coun-
tries in the Global North and most countries in
• Globalization results in greater sharing and
the Global South that are at the periphery of the
homogenization of culture and values across
international system (Klein 2008) (recall depen-
borders, creating a world with more shared
dency theory in Chapter 10).
understandings. This leads to a reduction in the
314 Chapter 11

• As globalization produces more interdepen- • As national governments lose control of MNCs

dency and mobility of goods, local problems and economic activities, they will be weakened
spread quickly and can have global conse- and less able to respond effectively to the grow-
quences, whether they are economic problems ing negative impacts on their people and their
(e.g., the global economic crisis that spread economy. This will expose each country to more
from East Asia to many countries in the late social turbulence and increase hostilities and
1990s) or dangerous pathogens (e.g., the H1N1 conflicts between states (Rodrik 2011).
virus).
• In response to the destruction of their culture More questions…
and their economic stability from globaliza- 1. On balance, is globalization a positive develop-
tion, many groups (e.g., nation-based, religious) ment for you personally? For your country? For
become mobilized, resulting in political disorder most people in the world?
and violence as groups attempt to protect their
2. If globalization is the current general stage in
identities and economic interests. Thus, there is
human development, is it the final stage? If not,
greater local and global instability.
what might be the next stage after globalization?

Most analysts conclude that state policies will not stop current globalizing trends.
They emphasize that states have less and less capacity to control their participation in
or insulation from the globalizing international system as borders become more per-
meable to goods, people, capital, and ideas. There is also considerable skepticism that
states can sustain sufficient cooperation with other states in the brutally competitive
system. Indeed, almost all analysts assume that the forces of globalization are trans-
forming the international system in ways that are probably not controllable and are
certainly not understood (Baghwati 2007; Bremmer 2013; Friedman 2007; Rodrik 2011;
Stiglitz 2003, 2006).

Competition in the Globalizing World

The disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991 is regarded as the crucial event ending
the bipolar, Cold War era. The nature of the current era is subject to debate (Betts 2010).
One conception is that the United States will continue to dominate as a hegemon in a
generally unipolar international system (Posen 2003). Another conception anticipates
that the rising power of China or perhaps of all the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China,
South Africa; see Chapter 15) countries as well as the EU will generate a multipolar sys-
tem (Ikenberry 2011). A third scenario anticipates that the United States has punched
itself out by overextending its global military activities and that the emerging system
will have features of international anarchy that have always been a core assumption
of the realists (Szabo 2011). Or perhaps a variety of global actors will create effective
transnational institutions that will fulfill the idealists’ conception of a world in which
cooperation is the dominant style. Or…??? Three major trends are likely to be particu-
larly important in shaping the near-term evolution of politics across borders in the
globalizing world.
First, military power remains a significant factor in the relations among states.
The lessening of Cold War tensions has been balanced by the rise of new forms of
 Politics Across Borders 315

militarism in every region and continuing militarism by Russia and the United States.
Military spending is now more than $1.74 trillion per year worldwide, an increase of
35 percent in just the last decade (SIPRI 2014). Despite the presence of multilateral
military forces and multistate alliances, most military power remains under the con-
trol of individual states. If powerful and politically effective groups are increasingly
threatened by globalization, it is possible that they will pressure their governments
to be more active in protecting their citizens, their economies, and even their cultures.
And leaders might become more assertive in response to the breakdown of borders
and challenges to state sovereignty.
This might produce protectionist and isolationist policies toward other states
and the use of the state’s military to protect and project the state’s interests. It is likely
that conflicts will be more frequent if globalization and ethnonationalism are ram-
pant. Empirical research suggests that in the twentieth century, unlike the nineteenth
century, aggressive competition and military conflict became more likely as the inter-
national system became highly diffuse and multipolar—rather like the system that
seems to be emerging (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 2000; Mearsheimer 2001; Russett,
Starr, and Kinsella 2009). As was discussed earlier in the chapter, it is not obvious
that the United Nations or any other actors have the will and capacity to prevent
such conflicts.
Second, intense economic competition could split the countries that were allies dur-
ing the Cold War. In fact, competition among the major powers will pivot more on
economic issues than on military or ideological issues (Rodrik 2011). In the global
economy, regional groupings have formed as states coordinate their policies with sim-
ilar states (“harmonization”) to protect their group of states from outside pressures.
The EU might become this type of coordinating mechanism for its member states.
The major economic competition might be among three groups: North America under
leadership from the United States, the European Union, and an East Asian group under
Chinese leadership. Other regional economic groups have formed around Russia, in
South America, and among the Muslim states of Central Asia. As the competition for
increasingly scarce goods like energy resources, minerals, water, and food becomes
ever more intense, how will states organize to gain more than their fair share?
Third, the state-centered system is evolving toward one in which transnational
entities are extremely important. The dynamics of globalization seem to be generally
beyond state control, as does the extensive and growing power of the MNCs, described
above. States might actually be willing accomplices of these transborder actors because
the most powerful elites controlling these states could reap substantial benefits from a
globalized international order structured by the MNCs. IGOs such as the WTO and the
IMF could facilitate further globalization (Sassen 1996).
Alternatively, states might continue to lose power to transborder, global actors
and, as a consequence, lose their central role in structuring the international system.
State borders have little significance for transnational actors. IGOs and NGOs pursue
international agendas that are not shaped by the goals of individual states or negated
by state sovereignty. MNCs can shift their resources and their operations from country
to country in single-minded pursuit of profit maximization within the global economy.
316 Chapter 11

Although located in a home country, MNCs have operations in other host countries as
well. The MNC’s loyalty to the prosperity and security goals of its home country can
become limited or nonexistent.
Thus it might be that the emerging international order will soon be dominated by
“imperial corporations,” whose globalized systems of production and distribution of
goods, finance, technologies, and communications enable them to transcend sovereign
states and shape the global system (Barnet and Cavanagh 1994). For these reasons,
some predict that a key conflict in the early twenty-first century will be among the
MNCs or between MNCs and states (Heilbroner 1993). Do you think it would be desir-
able to have an international system dominated by transnational actors rather than by
states? Would the relentless pursuit of profit produce a more peaceful or a more just
world than the relentless pursuit of national interest and state power? Will there be a
decrease or an increase in international political violence? This last question is among
those that are addressed in Chapter 12.

Key Concepts
balance of power, p. 307 international regime, p. 297 peacekeeping operation,
colonialism, p. 308 international relations, p. 290 p. 301
constructivism, p. 292 liberalism, p. 291 positivist law, p. 298
diplomacy, p. 296 multinational corporations power politics, p. 306
feminist IR theory, p. 292 (MNCs), p. 304 realism, p. 291
foreign policy, p. 290 mutually assured destruction sanctions, p. 306
geopolitics, p. 293 (MAD), p. 308 security dilemma, p. 291
globalization, p. 311 natural law, p. 298 soft power, p. 306
hegemony, p. 307 neocolonialism, p. 309 transnationalism, p. 300
intergovernmental neoliberalism, p. 291 treaties, p. 297
organizations (IGOs), p. 300 neorealism, p. 291 world system, p. 309
international law, p. 298 nongovernmental organizations
international organizations, p. 300 (NGOs), p. 303

For Further Consideration

1. The chapter suggests that a new pattern conflict between states becomes highly
will emerge to structure politics across unlikely?
borders. What is the most desirable pattern 3. What is the most effective strategy to
for the international system in the early produce increased cooperation among key
decades of the twenty-first century? What actors in the international system?
is the least desirable? What seems most 4. Is globalization likely to change the
likely? distribution of power among states and
2. Can the United Nations, or any multi- other transnational actors in significant
national body, be so effective in impos- ways? Who is likely to benefit most from
ing an international order that major globalization?
 Politics Across Borders 317

For Further Reading

Baghwati, Jagdish. (2007). In Defense of Globali­ straus and Giroux. The author offers his second
zation. New York: oxford University Press. engaging exposition of globalization (following
An elegant argument for the benefits of glo- The Lexus and the Olive Tree, published in 1999).
balization, in developing countries as well as He argues that new technologies, especially
developed countries, and thoughtful rebuttals information and communications technologies
of the main critiques. (e.g., the Internet, wireless mobile communica-
Barnet, Richard J., and John Cavanagh. (1995). tion, integration software), are reducing both
Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and global productive inequalities and the obstacles
the New World Order. New York: simon and to transborder activities in ways that are trans-
schuster. A rich, insightful, and often scathing forming the global political economy as well as
analysis of the enormous power and impacts political, social, and individual power.
of major multinational corporations on the Fukuyama, Francis. (2004). State­Building: Gov­
international system and the lives of citizens ernance and World Order in the 21st Century.
in many countries. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. The scholar
Bremmer, Ian. (2013). Every Nation for Itself: famous for predicting “the end of history” due to
What Happens When No One Leads the the triumph of global capitalism revises his views
World. New York: Portfolio Penguin. An to focus on how it is legitimate for the interna-
interesting argument that there is an emerg- tional community to intervene in an attempt
ing new world order in which no country or to establish viable political institutions in weak
group of countries (such as the UN or the G20) and failed states where the emergence of liberal
can control the global system. In the absence of democracy is not occurring naturally.
strong leadership, there will be incapacity to Goldstein, Joshua, and Jon Pevehouse. (2013).
deal with global disarray, including the many International Relations. 10th ed. New York:
“problems without borders.” Pearson. A readable and comprehensible expla-
Cohen, saul Bernard. (2008). Geopolitics: The nation and assessment of the major theories of
Geography of International Relations. 2nd international relations; of key topics such as con-
ed. Washington, DC: Rowman & littlefield. flict, international organization and violence;
A thorough explanation of the geopolitical per- and of international political economy.
spective on analysis (the subject of the Compare Gruber, lloyd. (2000). Ruling the World: Power
in 11), grounded in numerous examples of all Politics and the Rise of Supranational
regions in the current globalized world. Institutions. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Drezner, Daniel. (2008). All Politics Is Global: Press. The author argues that, although countries
Explaining International Regulatory Regimes. voluntarily decide to transfer power to suprana-
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. A tional institutions such as the EU and NAFTA,
persuasive argument that strong states remain many of the countries, and perhaps the inter-
the most powerful actors in the international national system itself, do not benefit from the
system, despite globalization, through their increasing power of these supranationals.
leadership in international regulatory regimes. Ikenberry, G. John. (2012). Liberal Leviathan:
Friedman, Thomas. (2007). The World Is Flat: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of
A Brief History of the Twenty­First Century: the American World Order. Princeton, NJ:
Release 3.0. 2nd revised ed. New York: Farrar, Princeton University Press. An argument that
318 Chapter 11

the international system will continue to build description of the most significant regional
on the rules, norms, and power relations in the alliance in the global system.
current liberal regime led by the United States, Pastor, Robert A., ed. (2000). A Century’s Journey:
even as new powers emerge. How the Great Powers Shape the World. New
Joseph, sarah. (2011). Blame It on the WTO? York: Basic Books. Noted scholars explore the
A Human Rights Critique. oxford: oxford twentieth-century foreign policy behavior and
University Press. A thorough vetting of the resulting international impacts of each of seven
negative consequences for human rights that major powers—China, France, Germany, Great
arise from adherence to WTO rules. Britain, Japan, Russia, and the United States.
Kelemen, Daniel R. (2011). Eurolegalism: The The authors illuminate the pervasive influence
Transformation of Law and Regulation in the of these powers on the relations among states,
European Union. Cambridge, MA: Harvard the international political economy, and the
University Press. Economic and judicial inte- international system.
gration in the EU has transformed the relations Rodrik, Dani. (2011). The Globalization Paradox:
among the member states, as both public and Democracy and the Future of the World
private litigation are increasingly the mode of Economy. New York: W. W. Norton. An econo-
state interaction. mist’s readable argument that democracy cannot
Malloch-Brown, Mark. (2012). The Unfinished be sustained in a world of “hyperglobalization,”
Global Revolution: The Road to International particularly given its reshaping of financial insti-
Cooperation. New York: Penguin. The for- tutions, plus suggestions of policy remedies.
mer Deputy Secretary General of the United steans, Jill. (2013). Gender and International
Nations offers a fascinating rendering of his Relations. 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
experiences promoting international develop- A comprehensible and thoughtful explanation
ment and his arguments about why interna- of feminist perspectives on international rela-
tional cooperation must trump nationalistic tions theory, an important approach that par-
obstacles in the era of globalization. ticularly challenges the key assumptions and
McCormick, John, and Jonathan olsen. (2013). interpretations of realist theory on core topics
The European Union: Politics and Policies. 5th such as war and peace, international political
ed. Boulder, Co: Westview Press. A thorough economy, development, and human rights.

On the Web
http://www.unsceb.org workings of the EU and its major institutional
The official Web site for the United Nations, elements.
including detailed information about many of http://www.icj-cij.org/homepage/
its major agencies and programs. index.php?lang=en
http://www.smartbrief.com/un_wire The official Web site of the International Court
The UN Wire, an independent news service of Justice provides details of current cases as
partnered by the United Nations focusing on well as a history of the court.
issues of global political concern. http://www.people.virginia.edu/~rjb3v/rjb.
http://europa.eu/index_en.htm html
The official Web site of the European Union, This wide-ranging Foreign Affairs Online Web
with extensive information about the site provides many links regarding matters of
 Politics Across Borders 319

international relations, international law, and with representatives from the major developed
foreign policy. countries—the G7 plus Russia = G8), ranging
http://www.aseansec.org/index.asp from academic journal articles to recent sum-
The official Web site of the Association of mit information.
Southeast Asian Nations includes information http://osce.org
and documents relevant to ASEAN and news The official Web site of the Organization for
about countries in the region as well as some- Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE),
what self-serving Web pages constructed by the largest regional security organization in
each member state. the world, with 55 participating states from
http://www.nato.int/ Europe, Central Asia, and North America
This Web site focuses on military, strategic, active in conflict prevention, crisis manage-
and policy issues of importance to the North ment, and postconflict rehabilitation.
Atlantic Treaty Organization, a collective http://www.apecsec.org
security association of 28 partner countries The electronic home of Asia-Pacific Economic
dominated by the United States and West Cooperation (APEC), an organization focus-
European powers. ing on economic growth, cooperation, trade,
http://www.theglobalist.com and investment among 21 governments in the
The Globalist, a “daily online magazine on the Asia-Pacific region, including Canada, China,
global economy, politics, and culture,” offers Japan, Russia, and the United States.
a strong set of links to think pieces by many http://www.oas.org/en
interesting commentators as well as relevant The home page of the Organization of
articles on issues in the global society. American States provides a comprehensive
http://www.globalissues.org database of information regarding the group’s
This site explores a variety of global issues, activities and policies.
including globalization, environmental issues, http://www.coha.org
international law, and population. The Council on Hemispheric Affairs is a pro-
http://www.globalpolicy.org gressive NGO that monitors and provides
Global Policy Forum is an independent policy analyses of events in the Western Hemisphere.
watchdog that monitors the work of the United http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/home
Nations and scrutinizes global policymak- The United Nations High Commissioner for
ing, especially in such areas as the UN Security Refugees is the agency that attempts to docu-
Council, the food and hunger crisis, and the ment the scale and details of the movement
global economy. of populations across borders and to suggest
http://www.g7.utoronto.ca appropriate policy responses to deal with the
The G8 Information Centre, developed by the challenges of coping with the large numbers of
University of Toronto, provides a wealth of dislocated people.
information on the G8 (a cooperative institution
 Chapter 12
Political Violence

Learning Objectives
12.1 Define political violence.
12.2 Relate the use of violence to the formation and maintenance of political
society.
12.3 Classify the major types of political and nonpolitical violence.
12.4 Analyze the nature and causes of war.
12.5 Evaluate the normative implications of political violence.

The Balkans is a small area in Central Europe. The troubled history of the area has
resulted in the terms balkanization and to balkanize, which describe an area that has
broken down into small units, often associated with violence.
Given its geopolitical location at the crossroads of Western and Eastern Europe,
the Balkans have historically been a site of conflict, and its peoples had been conquered
by imperial powers such as the Romans, the Austrian Hapsburgs, and the Ottoman
Turks. When not engaged in resistance to the imperial invaders, the multiple ethnic
groups lived in uneasy tension and occasional fighting with one another. Even during
World War II, when the Germans invaded, more members of these ethnic groups were
killed by one another than by the Nazis. A powerful communist leader, Josip Broz Tito,
held these groups together as a single country (Yugoslavia) between the end of World
War II and the late 1980s.
However, the breakup of the Soviet empire in Central and Eastern Europe after
Tito’s death reopened old nation-based animosities as emerging states each attempted
to maximize their borders and eliminate all those with a different ethnic identity.
During the 1990s, the Balkans was again the site of brutal violence among its major
ethnic groups. More than 250,000 were killed, often in house-to-house fighting and in
cold-blooded executions of men, women, and children, and more than 700,000 were
displaced from their homes. The key protagonists were military and paramilitary
forces drawn from the 9 million Serbs (generally Greek Orthodox, procommunist),
600,000 Montenegrans (Greek Orthodox, pro-Serbian), 4.5 million Croats (Catholic,

320
 Political Violence 321

Balkan violence: Serbian paramilitary gunmen shoot three Bosnian Muslims (a man and two women)
and then kick one of the women in the head as she lays dying.

noncommunist), 4.5 million Bosnians (Muslim), and 2 million Slovenes (Catholic,

noncommunist).
When the Croats declared independence in the early 1990s, the dominant Serbs
resisted the breakup of Yugoslavia and the Serbian military engaged in a bloody, if
sporadic, conflict with Croatian forces until 1995, despite international recognition of
Croatia and a United Nations–arranged cease-fire. Bosnia also declared independence
but did not gain immediate recognition. Serbs, about one-third of the population within
Bosnia, launched a civil war to secure as much of the region of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
possible for Serbia. In devastating town-to-town fighting, Serbian and Bosnian para-
military groups murdered and brutalized civilians as well as one another. Eventually,
the United Nations and the European Union (EU) imposed a settlement in Bosnia,
based on a complex federation representing all key ethnic groups.
The next explosion of violence was in Kosovo, an impoverished southern province
in Serbia. About 90 percent of the Kosovo population is ethnic Albanians, whose desire
for autonomy resulted in a separatist guerrilla war in the late 1990s. While the United
Nations attempted to intervene, Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic encouraged the
local Serbs to engage in ethnic cleansing. Within months, the Serbs had either killed
or exiled the majority of ethnic Albanians. In response, massive North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) airstrikes against Serbian forces enabled the ethnic Albanians to
return to their homes in Kosovo. The Kosovars than executed many local Serbs and
drove most of them from their homes and communities. In 2010, two years after Kosovo
322 Chapter 12

declared its independence, the International Court of Justice ruled its declaration was
legal, although Serbia and Russia are among about eighty countries that still do not
recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty.
The recent history of the Balkans is an example of the complex forms of political
violence that occur in the contemporary political world. The people have experienced
extensive and brutal civil war, nation-based violence, terrorism, war, foreign military
intervention, systematic rape, arson, and their own government’s violence against
them. Our awareness of such violence is usually high. On a given day, the media are
likely to report on the few regions that experience armed conflict, riots, assassinations,
terrorist incidents, and so on rather than on the great majority of regions worldwide
that do not experience such violence.
In part, this selective reporting reflects our general fascination with the horror
of violence. It also indicates our underlying sense that such political violence is
extraordinary—an aberration from politics as usual. Unfortunately, there is consid-
erably more political violence in the world than most of us recognize, violence that
occurs below the few headlines that grab our attention.
Violence is excluded from some definitions of politics, such as the pluralist
approach, because violence is viewed as a breakdown of politics, which is understood
in terms of consensus building, compromise, and conflict resolution. However, other
definitions treat conflict and violence as one possible, and perhaps inevitable, form of
politics or as the politics of last resort. Indeed, in some approaches, including the class
approach, some political violence is portrayed as a positive force, producing necessary
change and constructive outcomes. Given its omnipresence, description and analysis
of the nature and dynamics of political violence will help us gain a better understand-
ing of the political world.

Violence
12.1 Define political violence.
Initially, we need to consider the concept of violence itself. The most common notion is
that violence entails the use of physical force, usually with the purpose of injuring or damag-
ing the target of the violence. In the political world, the tools of such violence can range
from flying fists and bullets to weapons of mass destruction.
But some analysts take a much broader view of violence. First, the threat of violence
might be understood as a form of violence, even if the violent act is not committed. If
someone points a gun in your face and you hand over your money, you will probably
view this interaction as a violent one, even if the person does not fire the gun. Similarly,
if a state points nuclear missiles at the state across its border but does not launch any,
would you classify this as an act of violence? Is it a violent act if a group threatens to
blow up a public building unless its demands are met? Is it a violent act if a group shouts
down a speaker at a public rally? Do you think that such acts of intimidation and threat
of force have a violent element, even if there is no actual physical injury or damage?
 Political Violence 323

Second, an even broader view of violence includes various forms of subjugation

and manipulation that do not involve even the threat of direct physical harm. For
example, consider a group that is an underclass within a society. The group is subjected
to discrimination in education, in health care, in jobs, and in housing. This intentional
pattern of systematic deprivation continues over time. The group is not targeted for any
specific physical violence, but the economic and cultural systems provide the group
with minimal opportunities to gain a significant share of the values in the society.
Some would classify such oppression as a form of violence by the dominant group(s)
against the fundamental rights of the deprived group to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness.
This chapter defines political violence as the use of actual physical violence or very
serious threats of such violence to achieve political goals. As you assess the role of violence
in politics, however, consider the other ways in which the world of politics generates
actions and impacts that “do violence” to many people. Although the use of physical
force is evident in politics, the more subtle forms of coercion and manipulation are
more extensive, if less visible.

Political Society
12.2 Relate the use of violence to the formation and maintenance of political
society.
Chapter 2 described the claim by Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) that the formation of
political society is an attempt to overcome the frequent reliance on force and violence
in human interactions. As individuals use whatever means necessary to pursue their
self-serving interests, interpersonal violence is inevitable. To overcome such violence,
Hobbes observes, individuals accept the social contract in an attempt to submit force to
reason—to ensure that force becomes the ultima ratio (final resort), not the prima ratio
(first resort). In political society, individuals accept the authority of the state and cede to
the state a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, sacrificing their own right to use
violence in exchange for a similar sacrifice from others (recall Chapter 5).
Even if most people accept the social contract, some individuals and groups do
not, arguing that the existing political society and its social contract have no author-
ity over their actions. They may claim a right to engage in justifiable violence based
on motives such as self-defense, the restoration of order, the promotion of fundamen-
tal values, or retribution. They might claim they have never accepted the authority
of the current government or that the political system is illegitimate (because it lacks
a democratic mandate or because it has failed to deliver security, stability, and pros-
perity). International law, as embodied in the United Nations Charter, recognizes a
people’s right to self-determination but also recognizes the state’s sovereignty and
right to territorial integrity. Much of the political violence we see today is the result
of tension between these principles, particularly when actors do not recognize a
state’s authority.
324 Chapter 12

Types of Political Violence

12.3 Classify the major types of political and nonpolitical violence.
A simple taxonomy of political violence can be based on specifying the source of the
violence and the target of that violence. Either actor may be a state or an individual/
group. Figure 12.1 distinguishes four categories of political violence. Although these
categories help organize and clarify our discussion, this taxonomy is imperfect and
the boundaries between categories are imprecise (hence the dashed lines) because the
states, groups, or individuals who engage in political violence are usually motivated
by multiple objectives, can operate in fluid groupings, employ complex strategies, and
focus on multiple targets.

State Violence against Individuals or Groups

Given the state’s monopoly of the legitimate use of violence, there are many instances
in which the state’s application of political violence seems justifiable. The state typi-
cally characterizes its own use of violence as an order-maintenance activity. The state’s
agents act as security forces, judges, and executors of punishment when individuals or
groups seem to have violated the society’s legal system. Thus, the state might arrest,
try, and punish an actor who breaks a criminal law, as in actions such as robbery, or
a civil law, as in actions such as tax fraud. In such matters, most citizens are likely to
support the state’s efforts to create and maintain public order.
But some state uses of violence are more problematic. V. I. Lenin (1870–1924) defined
the state as “a body of armed men, weapons, and prisons.” Because the state has the
capacity to define the nature, severity, and punishment of all crimes, it is possible for the
state to be highly repressive and discriminatory in its use of violence. The state’s exces-
sive reliance on force and oppressive laws can be called establishment violence and can be
contrasted with the state’s legitimate use of violence to maintain public order.
The boundary between a crime against society and a crime against the existing
political order can blur. In some countries, political actions that oppose the current
political leadership are treated as crimes. Thus, political opponents become “enemies

Figure 12.1 Types of Political Violence

Target
Source Individual/Group State

Crime Riots/Rebellion
Individual/ Terrorism Separatist violence
Group Nation-based conflict Coup
Class conflict Revolution

State Order maintenance War

Establishment violence
 Political Violence 325

of the people” and are subject to constraints on their behavior, deprivation of resources,
imprisonment, and death. The state can also institute systematic policies of violence
against certain groups that are not overt opponents of the regime but are blamed for
problems faced by the state and thus are made scapegoats.
A key instrument of a state’s power against its enemies is its security forces. These
include official groups like the regular military and police (e.g., those recently using
violence against antigovernment demonstrators in Egypt, Syria, and Russia) as well
as unofficial armed groups (e.g., Colombian paramilitary forces). Judicial systems and
prison systems are another form of state power that can be used to punish those whose
behaviors displease the state. According to Amnesty International (2014), a nongovern-
mental organization (NGO) that monitors violations of individual civil rights by agents
of the state, political opponents are subjected to establishment violence in two-thirds of
all countries. In addition, the state can cause great suffering or even death to individuals
through its power to withhold access to rewards such as good jobs, shelter, and welfare
services.
In the contemporary world, extensive attention is paid to certain forms of politi-
cal violence, especially violence between states (war) and individual/group violence
(such as terrorism). This attention is understandable because such violence is dramatic
and terrifying. Yet an extensive analysis by political scientist R. J. Rummel (2014) of
democide—“murder by government”—concludes that the death toll from establish-
ment violence far outweighs the deaths from war during the twentieth century. These
data are summarized in Table 12.1.
According to Rummel, the deaths of more than 300 million people in the twentieth
century are directly attributable to government violence and war. The most staggering
aspect of these data is that fully 86 percent of those deaths are the result of establish-
ment violence. While about 41 million people were killed in wars, it is estimated that
governments killed more than 260 million of their own citizens (including their colo-
nial subjects)—the people they are supposed to serve. Rummel includes any murder
committed by agents of the government, including genocides, politically motivated

Table 12.1 Death by Government and War in the Twentieth Century

Total Deaths (millions)

Domestic Foreign All Percentage of Total Deaths

Establishment violence 173 90 262 86%
By communist governments 145 8 153 50
By other totalitarian governments 1 26 28 9
By authoritarian governments 26 53 79 26
By democratic governments 0.2 2 2 1
War 10 31 41 14
TOTAL 182 120 303 100.0%
Note: The totals are rounded to the nearest million.
Source: Adapted from Rummel (2014), 20th Century Mortacracies Table.
326 Chapter 12

executions, massacres, and intentional famines. Most deaths through establishment

violence have been the work of nondemocratic governments. Half of the deaths
(50 percent) are attributable to communist regimes, about 9 percent are the responsibil-
ity of other totalitarian governments, and 26 percent are by authoritarian governments
(Rummel 2014: 20th Century Mortacracies Table).
Rummel particularly emphasizes the massive death totals attributable to the twen-
tieth century’s bloodiest dictators: Mao Zedong’s regime in China killed 76.7 million
between 1923 and 1976; Joseph Stalin’s Soviet regime killed 42.6 million between 1929
and 1953; more than 20.9 million were eliminated by Hitler and the German Nazi
regime (1933–1945); 10 million were killed by King Leopold in his colony of Congo
(Focus in 11); and 2.4 million Cambodians died by execution and starvation under Pol
Pot’s regime (Compare in 10). If you need evidence of the fundamental importance of
the state in determining the quality of citizens’ lives, the 262 million deaths attributable
to the citizens’ own governments should be compelling.

Individual Violence against an Individual

When an individual is the source of violence and another individual is the target,
the violence is usually not explicitly political. Most such violence (e.g., murder, rob-
bery, rape, assault, and certain crimes against property, such as burglary and arson)
is best characterized as ordinary crime. Because only the state (and its agents) has a
legitimate right to use violence (this is one definition of the state in Chapter 5 as well
as in Hobbes’s social contract notion), an individual who does violence without the
approval of the state is normally in violation of the law. Even these ordinary crimes
have a political element in the sense that the state is usually involved in determining
what behaviors are criminal and then in apprehending violators, judging them, and
punishing them on behalf of “the people.” Notice also that in most societies, mem-
bers of deprived or subordinate groups tend to engage in violent crimes far more
frequently than members of the more advantaged classes. Do you think this pattern
might suggest that the commission of some violent crimes and even the nature of the
punishment have, in part, a subtle political element?
There are instances in which one individual engages in an act of political violence
against another individual. For example, U.S. presidents James A. Garfield in 1881
and William McKinley in 1901 were assassinated by individuals who seemed to be
acting alone, primarily on political motives. Occasionally, a person’s motivation for
violence against a political actor is more personal than political. In a famous example
from 1804, U.S. Vice President Aaron Burr shot and killed distinguished Founding
Father Alexander Hamilton in a duel. The two were bitter political enemies from rival
political parties, but Burr was also offended by disparaging personal comments that
he thought Hamilton had made about him. Burr challenged Hamilton to a duel, and
after Hamilton shot in the air as gentlemen normally did, Burr mortally wounded
Hamilton. In 2001, the king and queen of Nepal and six other members of the royal
family were shot to death by the king’s son, the crown prince, who had quarreled with
his mother over his choice of a bride.
 Political Violence 327

Group Violence against an Individual

Most violence in which a person is targeted for political reasons, including assassina-
tions, is committed on behalf of a group, even if the act is performed by an individual.
Focus in 5 noted the assassinations of two Indian prime ministers, Indira Gandhi and
her son Rajiv Gandhi seven years later. Although Indira Gandhi was killed by two
guards and Rajiv Gandhi by one woman, in each case the assassins believed they were
acting to further the political interests of their nationality group (the Sikhs and the
Sri Lankan Tamils, respectively). U.S. president Abraham Lincoln was assassinated in
1865 by one man who was part of a broader group attack on the American political
leadership, and some believe that President John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963
can be attributed to more than one person. And the murders of former Lebanese prime
minister Rafik Hariri (in 2005) and former Pakistani prime minister Benazir Bhutto
(in 2007) were each the work of a suicide bomber, although organized groups or per-
haps even governments were behind the attacks. It could also be argued that Libya’s
Muammar Gaddafi was assassinated by the rebels who captured him (2011).

TeRRoRism An act is usually called terrorism when there is premeditated, politically

motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clan-
destine agents (U.S. State Department 2014). In other words, terrorism is a violent crimi-
nal act with a political motive. Note that terrorism now takes many forms and is argu-
ably the most difficult form of violence to classify in Figure 12.1. Both the source and
the target could be individuals, groups, or the state. Bombs can be planted in public
places such as markets or airplanes; civilians can be kidnapped or murdered; harmful
chemicals can be placed in food, water, or air; a country’s embassy can be attacked. In
2013, there were more than 9,700 terrorist attacks, more than 17,000 deaths, and 32,500
serious injuries. The number and severity of terrorist acts in each country changes over
time. In the recent past, terrorism has tended to occur more frequently in countries
with modest levels of political freedom, in comparison to countries with substantial
freedom or minimal freedom (Abadie 2004).
Figure 12.2 reports on the 9 countries with the most terrorist attacks in 2013.
Terrorist attacks were documented in 93 different countries, although the incidence
was very high in just a few countries. Over half of the fatalities (57 percent) and most
injuries (73 percent) occurred in only three countries: Iraq, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.
In addition to these three, only two other countries, Nigeria and Syria, had more than
1,000 deaths. In recent years, about two-thirds of the terrorist acts were bombings and
one-fourth were armed assaults (U.S. State Department 2014).
Some peoples, such as the Pakistanis, Iraqis, and Afghanis, despair of the
recurrent terrorist attacks that make their lives feel like Hobbes’ state of nature.
In other countries, people are scarred by a particularly traumatic terrorist act. For
Norwegians, it is the massacre of 77 people, mostly teenagers, at a political camp
in 2011. For Indonesians, it is the death of 202 people, mostly foreign tourists, in the
2002 bombings of two nightclubs in Bali by Indonesian militants. In Spain, it is the
coordinated backpack bombings of Madrid commuter trains in 2004, killing 191 and
wounding more than 2,000. And in the United States, it is the most massive terrorist
328 Chapter 12

Figure 12.2 Terrorist Attacks and Victims, by Country, 2013

Source: U.S. State Department 2014.

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000

0
n

ia

nd

en

ria
ne
a

Ira

ta

di

er
st

la

Sy
In
is

pi
ig
ki

ai

Ye
an

ilip
N
Pa

Th
gh

Ph
Af

Total attacks Total killed Total wounded

attack in modern history on September 11, 2001. A well-organized group, composed

mainly of Saudi Arabians, hijacked four transcontinental passenger airplanes. Two
of the planes were flown into the towers of the World Trade Center in New York, one
crashed into the Pentagon near Washington, DC, and the fourth crashed in a field in
Pennsylvania after passengers struggled with the hijackers. The carnage was stag-
gering, with almost 3,000 deaths, and the costs of the attack have been estimated at
more than $600 billion.
For some, the central question regarding those who engage in terrorism is: Why
use violence to harm noncombatants? The motives of political terrorists vary, but some
combination of five rationales guide most such acts. First, the terrorists can attempt to
punish an existing state (their own or another) for perceived grievances, even when non-
combatants are the victims of their actions. From the terrorists’ perspective, no citizens
of the targeted state are innocent of their state’s misdeeds. (Recall the views of Osama
bin Laden in Compare in 4.) Second, terrorists can attack a domestic group that they
wish to subordinate or retaliate against for previous offenses. This characterizes much
of the recent violence in Iraq between Shia and Sunnis as well as Sunni attacks on police
recruits. Third, the terrorist act can be a means to gain international publicity for the
group’s claims and grievances. Unlike those committing ordinary crimes, terrorists
often take credit for their violent actions and hope for extensive media coverage. Fourth,
terrorists may seek to secure financial resources for the group’s political activities or may
demand the release of imprisoned members. Many acts of violence that involve hostages
and ransom demands are of this type. And fifth, an objective of terrorist violence may be
to promote revolution—a strategy discussed later in this chapter.
 Political Violence 329

Different approaches are used to study terrorism. Some studies search for pat-
terns and correlations in the nature of terrorist acts (U.S. State Department 2014).
Some explore the psychology of the terrorists in terms of their personal and social
traits (Bongar et al. 2006). Some apply rational choice theory to explain the calculations
terrorists make regarding such decisions as which target to attack (a weakly defended
site), when to allocate the scarce resources that they hold, how to alter strategies in
response to the various counterterrorist mechanisms in place, and how to utilize tradi-
tional and new technologies (Enders and Sandler 2012).
The research suggests that terrorism is undergoing at least three ominous changes
in the early twenty-first century. First and most important, terrorists have an increased
capacity to inflict massive damage and disruption. The terrorists’ ability to move people,
information, and weapons is enhanced by globalization, with its permeable national
borders, extensive cross-border travel, and growing immigrant populations. Terrorists
also benefit from the rapid expansion of technologies that provide them with far greater
destructive capabilities, ranging from digital networks (cyberterrorism), to chemical and
biological weapons (bioterrorism), to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).
A second change is that many terrorists are now operating in very small cells
(3 to 10 people) that are only loosely connected with one another, making penetra-
tion and destruction of terrorist networks almost impossible. While there is some
broad collaboration in training and provision of materials, most terrorist acts are
carried out by small, isolated cells (Sageman 2008; recall the discussion in Chapter 4).
However, the rich environment of global information enables the groups to learn from
the successes and failures of other terrorist groups and refine their decisions regard-
ing tactics, venues, and targets
(Enders and Sandler 2012).
A third change is that some
groups, especially religiously moti-
vated terrorists, now seem less
constrained regarding the scale
of death and destruction they are
willing to inflict, even on those
who are noncombatants. And an
increasing proportion of terrorist
acts are committed by individuals
who are not only willing to die for
the cause but also intend to die in
a suicide act (Council on Foreign
Relations 2005; Smelser 2007).
There are ambiguities in the
assessment of terrorism. One issue
is defining “noncombatants.” One
attempt to identify combatants People flee from the collapsing towers of the World Trade Center in New
states that they are “personnel in York shortly after the shocking terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, that
the military, paramilitary, militia, killed almost 3,000 people.
330 Chapter 12

and police under military command and control who are [on duty] in . . . areas . . . where
war zones or war-like conditions exist” (NCTC 2011). Even some who are not terrorists
argue that this definition of combatants is too narrow. Are military personnel who are
not on duty at the moment really noncombatants? What about attacks on other poten-
tially “repressive agents” of the state, such as police, security guards, judges, or civilians
working for the military? While there is agreement about the sheer terror associated with
acts of political violence, it is not always clear whether such acts are best understood as
terrorism or just brutal violence against “the enemy” in the service of some political goal.
With the proliferation of groups employing terrorist tactics, it is wryly observed
that “one person’s terrorist is another person’s freedom fighter.” The root problem
with using terrorism as an analytic concept is that it has become a powerful and nega-
tive label in the manipulative language of politics. It is sometimes used regardless
of the innocence of the victim, the identity of the actual sponsor of the violence, the
justifiability of the goal, or the validity of the grievances. The label communicates a
disgust for extreme political violence against innocent individuals, but it can also be
used to discredit any group that uses violent means to achieve its political ends or
to condemn a group whose political ends, as much as its means, are unacceptable.
Ultimately, the issue centers on moral and political values: Are there any circumstances
in which group political violence against any individuals is justifiable? If so, when is
violence acceptable, and what are the limits on violence? The Debate in 12 considers
whether terrorism is ever justifiable.

Group Violence against a Group

NaTioN-BaseD VioleNCe Nationality groups are increasingly mobilized to
demand political autonomy, a process grounded in a deep attachment to the group’s
identity, described in Chapter 5 as nationalism or ethnonationalism. When these
groups clash directly, the use of force between identity groups is termed nation-based
violence. Many of the major armed conflicts during the last several decades have been
between nation-based groups within countries, not between countries (Laitin 2007;
SIPRI 2014; Taras and Ganguly 2010).
In some cases, groups attempt to establish their own sovereign state based on
national identity, a situation discussed later in the chapter as separatist violence. In
many instances, however, the nation-based groups are struggling against each other
for political, cultural, or economic domination or autonomy rather than for separa-
tion. The continuing violence between Hindus and Muslims in India (recall the Focus
in 5) demonstrates how the antipathy between nationality groups can poison their
relations as they attempt to share a country or even a remote village. In the southern
African country of Angola, more than 1.5 million people died in the prolonged civil
war (1975–2002) among three rival groups, each representing a different linguistic/
ethnic region, that struggled for control of the entire country. Less than two months
after violence began in early 2014, more than 10,000 were killed among the Dinka and
Nuer tribal nations in South Sudan. And the ongoing violence in Iraq reveals the deep
antagonisms among groups within the Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish nations.
 Political Violence 331

The Debate in 12
Is Terrorism Ever a Justifiable Form of Political Violence?
Throughout history, some individuals and groups have and violence of the oppressors, even if they do
engaged in political violence to achieve their goals. not wear the uniforms of combatants. They are
Few would argue that political violence is never justi- certainly not “innocents.”
fied. Most political theorists specify conditions under • Ultimately, there are no true innocents: Those
which people can legitimately engage in political who acquiesce to and enjoy benefits from the
violence to achieve justice and define what constitutes policies of the oppressors are also responsible
a “just war” (Walzer 2006). However, there are also for the harm caused to those who suffer. Those
circumstances in which either the ends to which vio- who gain life’s advantages while accepting
lence has been used or the means that are employed injustice and violence directed against the less
are unacceptable. In the contemporary world, some advantaged cannot also claim immunity from
of the most serious concerns about political violence responsibility and harm.
relate to attacks labeled “terrorism” because they
victimize people who some claim are innocent non-
combatants. Is such terrorism ever justified? All Terrorism Is Indefensible

• The destruction of innocent lives for political

Some Terrorism is Justified gain is morally unacceptable, without exception.
• Individuals who engage in terrorist acts believe • Only the state has the right to use violence under
they are acting to defend many people, almost the conditions of the social contract. Thus, any
all of whom are “innocents” and “noncom- act of extreme political violence that is not com-
batants.” These innocents are themselves a mitted by the representatives of the state is ille-
violated group that has been the victim of estab- gitimate, regardless of the targeted victim or
lishment violence or has experienced severe and motivation.
prolonged oppression, which is also understood • Terrorism is tactically unwise because it pushes
to be a form of violence. the existing regime to become even more
• Terrorist tactics are employed as a last resort, aggressive and less willing to engage in dialogue
but such actions are necessary because the and compromise (e.g., consider the response of
oppressed group is prevented, by establishment the Israeli government to Hamas in Gaza, which
violence or by its exclusion from resources, from is described in Focus in 12).
using nonviolent political means to displace the • From a pragmatic perspective, terrorism is also
oppressors. John Locke, in his Second Treatise of tactically unwise because its ultraviolence alien-
Government (1690), is among the many theorists ates potential supporters, both within and out-
who vigorously defend the right of an oppressed side the country. Eventually the terrorist group is
people to use violence against unjust governance. isolated and without allies.
• Innocent people might be harmed by terrorist acts • There are considerably more cases in which rel-
in some instances, but they are the unlucky peo- atively powerless groups were able to replace an
ple who are in the wrong place at the wrong time. oppressive regime with persistent political mobi-
They are no different from the individuals that lization than with terrorism.
those with power call “collateral damage” when • If the goal is to achieve social justice, there
they are killed during state-sponsored violence. are effective nonviolent alternatives to terror-
• Many of the targets of terrorism are individuals ism, even for those who lack extensive politi-
who sustain and actively support the domination cal resources (e.g., nonviolent resistance to
332 Chapter 12

colonialism by India’s Mohandas Gandhi; the More questions …

use of the electoral process, as in many post-
1. Are those noncombatants who gain consider-
communist countries).
able benefits from an unfair political regime truly
• History reveals that terrorism rarely succeeds
innocents who should not suffer from the con-
in achieving the goals desired by the terrorists.
sequences of political violence directed against
Those who do gain power by such brutal vio-
the regime?
lence typically become as oppressive as those
2. Do the conditions, motivation, and political
they have overthrown. Moreover, they are usu-
goals of the terrorists have any relevance in
ally driven from power by further violence before
determining the acceptability of the action, or is
they attain any idealistic outcomes they sought.
terrorism always wrong, regardless of condi-
• The use of unrestrained violence for political
tions, motivation, and goals?
ends becomes an ethical slippery slope into
3. Is it possible to make a precise distinction be-
chaos. It establishes the right of every unhappy
tween terrorists and those who fight for freedom
group to use any means necessary in an attempt
and justice?
to achieve its political ends.

When group political violence results in the murder of many members of one ethnic
group by its rival, it can be called genocide (Weitz 2005). The political system is often a
partner in such situations when its machinery of violence is employed by the domi-
nant group. When the state organizes the campaign against an ethnic group, such
genocide can also be classified as establishment violence (see Figure 12.1). Examples
of genocide in the twentieth century include the killing of Armenians by the Turks
(in 1915), six million Jews in Hitler’s Germany (1933–1945), the Tutsis by the Hutus
in Rwanda (1963–1964), and the Hutus by the Tutsis in neighboring Burundi (1972).
Since 1990, the killing of nearly one million Tutsis in Rwanda; the Serbs’ “ethnic
cleansing” of civilian populations, including Bosnians and ethnic Albanians (in
Kosovo); and the systematic violence against ethnic groups in Myanmar and Sudan
have renewed international concern about preventing genocide and punishing those
who are responsible for it.
Many recent conflicts grounded in nation-based hostility can also be a blur of
class conflict, separatist violence, revolutionary struggle, and conflict between states,
topics addressed below. What is clear is the massive toll that these conflicts levy on
their populations. Table 12.2 provides data on just a few conflicts and some of the
most visible indicators of human devastation. It lists the number of deaths attribut-
able to political violence. In addition, the toll in disrupted lives is revealed by the
number of people who have been forced by the violence to leave their homes and
communities—there are currently 26.4 million internally displaced persons world-
wide. An additional 15.2 million people have actually fled their country, crossing the
border in an attempt to escape the violence. The large majority of these 42.7 million
people, more than 70 percent of whom are women and children, live in squalor and
unremitting hardship; they are homeless or are surviving in miserable refugee camps
(UNHCR 2013).
 Political Violence 333

Table 12.2 Human Devastation from Recent Internal Violence and Ethnic Conflict
Internally Displaced
country Deaths a refugees b Personsc
Congo, D. R. 3,956,941 509,200 2,669,000
Sudan 3,037,015 569,000 1,873,000
Afghanistan 1,777,964 2,585,600 486,000
Rwanda 846,800 97,500 na
Iraq 567,321 746,400 1,132,000
Myanmar 268,916 415,000 430,000
Syria 115,000 1,900,000 6,500,000
Burundi 108,068 73,600 79,000
Colombia 67,271 394,100 3,943,500
Uganda 32,850 5,580 30,000d
Nigeria na 18,000 1,210,000d
Serbia (and Kosovo) na 158,000 228,000
a Deaths attributable to political violence (recent period).
b Refugees and asylum seekers who have left their country of origin (as of January 1, 2013).
c People driven from their home location due to persecution, armed conflict, or widespread violence (as of January 1, 2013).
d End of 2011 data.

DATA SourceS: Deaths: http://siteresources.worldbank.org; Refugees: UNHCR (2013); Internally Displaced Persons: IDMC (2013).

Class CoNfliCT In some cases, intergroup violence might be attributable to an

underlying class conflict (see Chapter 9), which is often linked to an ethnic or reli-
gious cleavage. In recent conflicts in Rwanda, Sudan, and Sri Lanka, for example, one
of the groups in the conflict has dominant social, economic, and political power over
the others. Thus, class theorists argue that the conflict in many settings is not actu-
ally due to religion, language, or ethnicity; rather, it is a result of the inevitable class
struggle that emerges from stratification and inequality. Of course, class conflict can
occur between any strata, such as the peasant class against the landlord class or the
capitalist class against the worker class, independent of any nation-based cleavage
that might reinforce the class distinctions. The group-based political violence in some
Latin American countries, such as Colombia and Guatemala, seems best interpreted as
a struggle between deeply unequal classes.

Individual or Group Violence against the State

Individual or group political violence directed against the political system can have
several causes. The motivation underlying many acts of terrorism is actually to direct
violence against a state, even if the immediate targets are noncombatants. In this
section, we examine other forms of violence in which the state is the target. At one
extreme, such violence might be a person’s or a group’s spontaneous outburst of frus-
tration with life conditions. At the other extreme, the individual or group might have
such deep-seated hostility toward the existing political system that it undertakes a
lengthy series of violent actions to overthrow the system.
334 Chapter 12

Coup A coup occurs when the top leader or part of the leadership group is replaced by vio-
lent means or the explicit threat of violence. Those carrying out the coup have no intention
of overthrowing the entire political-economic order, although their opposition to the
existing leadership can be based on differences in policy as well as on personal rivalry.
Coups are most common in political systems that have no institutionalized procedures
for leadership succession. Political violence against the top leadership group is typi-
cally organized by other members of the political leadership, by a rival political group,
or by the military. An extreme example is Bolivia, where 190 coups occurred over a
156-year period ending in the 1980s. Bangladesh had 21 coups or attempted coups in
its first 36 years of existence.
Most coup attempts fail, and the number of successful coups per year has dropped
from about 12 to 6 in the last two decades. The coup is typically followed by a period
of extremely autocratic rule, but the period until there is a turnover to competitive
elections has shortened, particularly due to international pressure for democratic pro-
cesses (Marinov and Goemans 2008). In Egypt, the military led a coup in June 2013,
arresting the country’s first democratically elected president, Mohammed Morsi. The
new constitution was suspended, Morsi’s government was temporarily replaced by
leaders supported by the military, and a former military leader was elected president
with no serious opposition in May 2014. Among other states in which coups have
recently ousted leaders are the Central African Republic, Fiji, Guinea, Haiti, Honduras,
Madagascar, Mauritania, and Thailand.

RioTs aND ReBellioN When people find their political, social, or economic condi-
tions intolerable, their frustration can escalate from demonstrations and civil disobedi-
ence to riots. Riots historically have been spontaneous and relatively disorganized group
violence against property, agents of the political system, perceived opponents in the
society, or random targets. Riots are often triggered by a specific incident, such as a
police shooting or an economic problem such as a sudden large increase in the price
of basic foodstuffs. The emergence of social networking technologies, like Facebook
and Twitter, has allowed individuals to communicate en masse to many people at
once. These technologies have lowered the barriers to organization—riots can now be
planned. Once riots start, they can spread or become more organized into violent dem-
onstrations as others are motivated to express their dissatisfaction with the political
system or social conditions. And new communications technologies make it far more
likely that others within the country and around the world will be aware of both the
political action and the often brutal response by the state.
Riots are expressions of frustration in which there is an implicit or explicit demand
for redress of grievances. The basic grievances might involve opposition to or support
for certain public policies or political leaders. Black South Africans engaged in many
riots in their ultimately successful opposition to apartheid during the 1980s. Mass pro-
tests and riots have forced many unpopular leaders from power in recent years (e.g., in
Bolivia, Egypt, Haiti, Indonesia, Lebanon, Tunisia, and Ukraine).
Such political violence turns into rebellion when there is more frequent, pre-
meditated, and widespread violence involving more people. At this point, many of those
 Political Violence 335

engaged in violence no longer believe the system will respond to their problems. This
deterioration of citizen support and escalation of political action to more intense politi-
cal violence are at the heart of Samuel Huntington’s description of political decay (in
Chapter 10).
The violence during some of the Arab Spring uprisings directed against their
country’s leaders since 2010 provides examples of rebellions. Inspired by a Tunisian
fruit vendor who burned himself to death in protest against his government, pro-
tests and riots expanded to rebellion in Tunisia, then in Libya, and twice in Egypt,
resulting in the overthrow of the leaders. In Libya, groups of citizens engaged in
peaceful protests calling for Muammar Gaddafi to step down after 42 years of repres-
sive rule. These protests were met with violent response from the regime’s security
forces. As arrests and deaths escalated among the protestors, they begin to increase
the violence of their opposition. Groups of rebels took control of some regions, espe-
cially in Eastern Libya. The rebellion escalated into a full-scale conflict between forces
loyal to Gaddafi and those committed to ending his rule, which resulted in exten-
sive casualties. The situation was further complicated as other countries, primarily
from NATO, entered into an air war against Gaddafi’s forces under the rationale of
humanitarian intervention (recall the Debate in 5) to protect rebellious Libyans (and
to force Gaddafi out of power). By Gaddafi’s overthrow and death, between 25,000
and 35,000 had been killed.

sepaRaTisT VioleNCe At the heart of some nation-based violence is the national-

ity group’s struggle for autonomy—for the right to control its own political, economic,
and cultural destiny. Some groups engage in separatist violence to achieve substantial or
total political autonomy from the existing political system. If the separatist group is small
and lacks political resources, it usually turns to acts of terrorism or attacks against spe-
cific individuals within the political system. This characterized the actions of the Irish
Republican Army (IRA) throughout much of the twentieth century as it attempted to
separate Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom and merge it with the Republic
of Ireland. Targets of the IRA’s bombs and murders were usually the British “occupy-
ing army” and members of the Protestant paramilitary groups in Northern Ireland.
Separatist violence characterizes recent activities by the Kurds against Turkey, South
Ossetians against Georgia, Kashmiris against India, and pro-Russian groups against
Ukraine.
Violent uprisings against colonial power were often one element in native people’s
political struggle for independence. Sometimes separatist violence is weak or poorly
organized, but other times separatist violence has been coordinated by an organized
group, such as the Mau Mau versus the British in Kenya (1950s) and the Vietminh/
Vietcong versus the French and then the Americans in Vietnam (1940s–1970s). The
violent resistance (after 2003) to the U.S. military and its allies in postwar Iraq is also
characterized by some as native opposition to foreign occupation. Moreover, group
cleavages within Iraq mean that the violent resistance to the U.S. military simultane-
ously occurs with violent opposition to the central government. Accordingly, for Iraq,
group political violence against the state occurs for more than one reason.
336 Chapter 12

A civil war results when a significant proportion of the population in a region actively
supports a separatist movement and political violence emerges on a large scale. In the early
1860s, the political leaders of the slaveholding southern states decided that they no
longer wished to be part of the United States federation, and they announced that
their states were seceding (withdrawing formal membership). The central govern-
ment rejected their request to secede, forcing 11 southern states to declare their inde-
pendence, create a confederation, and initiate a military struggle against the central
government. In the bloody U.S. Civil War (1861–1865), the Union forces of the central
government ultimately defeated the army of the Confederacy and forced the southern
states to remain in the federation.
A similar civil war occurred in Nigeria in 1967–1970. The Igbo tribe, which dif-
fered from other major tribes in religion, language, and political traditions, attempted
to secede from the Nigerian federation and create a separate state called Biafra. After
four years of civil war and nearly a million deaths, the central government’s army
was victorious, and Biafra was never established as a state. In contrast, the Bengalis
were successful in their separatist civil war against the central government of Pakistan
(recall the Focus in 4), and the new state of Bangladesh was created in 1971.
The opening of this chapter described an example of the complex nature of
contemporary political violence. It centered on separatist violence—the devastating
struggle among the Serbs, Bosnians, Croatians, Kosovars, and other nationality groups
after the breakup of Yugoslavia in 1991. It also included extensive interpersonal vio-
lence, terrorism, civil war, and genocide. These groups’ differences in ethnicity, history,
language, and religion all reinforced their separate national identities. Widespread
separatist violence resulted from the groups’ antipathy toward one another and
their efforts to determine precisely what states would emerge and where the borders
between the states would be. The conflict in Syria can also be classified as both a rebel-
lion and a civil war. There is widespread resistance to the authoritarian rule of Bashar
al-Assad. In addition, he and the ruling class are from the Alawite religious minority,
which is in violent conflict with the Sunni majority. However, the numerous nation-
based internal divisions among those opposing al-Assad have also contributed to a
death toll of more than 115,000 Syrians, 6.5 million internally displaced people, and
1.9 million refugees since 2011 (Table 12.2).

ReVoluTioN A revolution is a rapid and fundamental transformation of the state orga-

nization and the class structure (Skocpol 1979). In contrast to the other forms of political
violence against the state, the explicit objective of a revolution is to destroy the existing
political system and establish a new one with a fundamentally different distribution of
power and value allocations. After a revolution, new leadership takes power, claiming
that it will reorganize the state, serve a new ideology, and allocate power and resources
to different groups.
Although some of the most famous revolutions had occurred earlier (e.g., the
American Revolution in 1776, the French Revolution in 1789, the Russian Revolution
in 1917), there were many revolutionary movements and revolutions in the period
when many colonial territories transitioned to independent countries (especially from
 Political Violence 337

about 1950 to 1980). When Fidel Castro and his forces drove out the Batista govern-
ment in Cuba in 1959, he launched a complete restructuring of the state, society, and
economy. In Libya, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi overthrew a hereditary king and cre-
ated a revolutionary “state of the masses” built on egalitarianism (1969). Similarly,
when Shah Reza Pahlavi and his “White Revolution” were overthrown and replaced
by an Islamic theocracy (in 1979), there was a fundamental transformation in Iran’s
politics and society.
However, it can be difficult to specify the precise extent of system transforma-
tion that must occur to achieve “revolutionary” changes in the state organization,
class structure, or distribution of values (recall the discussion in Chapter 10). In many
instances, it is not clear whether the essential features of the political system have
dramatically changed. This situation can occur either because the attempt to trans-
form the political system is a charade or because it falls far short of its objectives. For
example, since Gaddafi’s regime was destroyed in 2011, his system of governance
and political economy has been eliminated, but there is now widespread violence
and substantial disorder in the attempt to transform the government and society. In
Egypt, the Morsi government appeared to be introducing revolutionary changes, but
the current regime under the control of the military has much in common with the
period under Mubarak.
Can you currently determine whether any of the recent violent replacement of
governments in the Arab Spring that began in 2011 (e.g., in Tunisia, Yemen, Egypt, and
Libya) should be characterized as revolutions?

sTRaTegies foR ReVoluTioN Four broad strategies can be employed to achieve

a revolution.
Strategy 1: Terrorism. As a revolutionary strategy, terrorism involves selective acts
of violence, usually by small, organized cells of political activists that lack sufficient
membership and resources to sustain a direct struggle against the existing state.
Violence is used to disrupt public life and to provoke repressive responses from the
state, and thus to foster political decay and undermine support for the state. The
anticolonial resistance in Algeria is a clear example of the successful use of terror-
ism. A mixture of random public bombings, disruptions of infrastructure services,
and violence against the agents of the colonial French led to a dramatic decline in
the quality of life and provoked repressive responses from the French political and
military authorities. As conditions deteriorated, France decided to abandon the
ungovernable country, and the anticolonial/terrorist leadership, under Ben Bella,
formed a new political system in 1962. (Gillo Pontecorvo’s powerful film The Battle of
Algiers documents this period.)
Obviously, terrorism, like other revolutionary strategies, does not always produce
the expected results. Sometimes the terrorists are crushed without achieving any of
their objectives, like the terrorist groups in the United States in the 1960s. And some-
times the repression evoked by terrorism merely makes things worse. In Iran, left-
ist terrorists were successful in destabilizing Shah Reza Pahlavi’s regime, but it was
the conservative Islamic fundamentalists supporting the Ayatollah Khomeini who
338 Chapter 12

succeeded in grasping political

power (1979) and forming a new
political system even more unap-
pealing to the leftists than the
shah’s. Nonetheless, terrorism con-
tinues to be the preferred strategy
for certain revolutionary groups
that lack popular support or signif-
icant resources, such as Abu Sayyaf
in the Philippines.
Strategy 2: Revolution from
above. In a revolution from above
(Johnson 1983), violent resistance
to the regime occurs primarily in
the urban centers, especially the
Militarization, extensive violence, death and destruction are recurring
capital city. Usually, the rural areas
conditions for those in many countries, as for these commandos during the
regionalized civil war in the Democratic Republic of Congo. have minimal involvement in the
revolutionary struggle. At least
some parts of the political elite and the military are sympathetic to or even supportive
of the goals of the revolution. Typically, the final collapse of the old regime is rapid
because its leaders are killed or flee. The new political system then penetrates the coun-
tryside in an attempt to control the entire country. Examples of revolution from above
in the twentieth century include Gamal Abdel Nasser’s replacement of King Farouk in
Egypt (1952), Muammar Gaddafi’s victory over King Idris in Libya (1969) and then his
violent overthrow (2011), the execution of communist Premier Nicholae Ceauçescu in
Romania (1989), and the flight of socialist leaders Mengistu Mariam from Ethiopia and
Said Barre from Somalia (1991).
Strategy 3: Guerrilla war. The essence of guerrilla war is a long, protracted
campaign of political violence against the state from rural bases, although the fighting
can be in both rural and urban areas. It is a direct struggle against the military
because the guerrilla forces persistently harass the regime’s military and authori-
ties by fighting in a hit-and-run style, suddenly attacking an exposed point and
then disappearing into the population and the countryside. There is an effort to
win the loyalty of the rural population by mixing intimidation and promises of
reform. Eventually, the guerrillas gain control of the countryside and then march
into the collapsing capital city.
The Chinese revolution, culminating in victory in 1949, is the classic example.
Mao Zedong observed that success in the revolution depended on the support
of the rural peasants, for “without the poor peasants, there can be no revolu-
tion.” Many of the successful Third World revolutions after 1950 employed guer-
rilla warfare, including Cuba under Fidel Castro (1959), Vietnam under Ho Chi
Minh (1975), and Zimbabwe (formerly Rhodesia) under Robert Mugabe (1980).
This strategy is evident in recent struggles in Afghanistan by the Taliban, Algeria,
Colombia, and Congo.
 Political Violence 339

Strategy 4: Democratic revolution. Democratic revolution occurs when legal, gener-

ally nonviolent political action is effectively mounted to achieve a fundamental transformation
of the political system. In one form, the population uses the democratic electoral process
to select a new leadership elite, which then dismantles the existing political system
and creates a new one. Examples of this form are the rise of Hitler and establishment
of the Third Reich in Germany (1933) and the election of the anti-Sandinista coalition
in Nicaragua (1990).
In a second form, widespread but generally nonviolent citizen resistance to a
regime forces the elite to resign (Sharp 2010; Thompson 2003). The new leadership,
though not initially elected, implements fundamental transformations in the politi-
cal system. This occurred in the negotiated “Velvet Revolutions” in Soviet bloc states
such as Czechoslovakia, East Germany, and Poland in the late 1980s. More recently,
there have been numerous instances of a third form that falls short of revolution but
does involve extensive, generally peaceful demonstrations against a leader that result
in the leader’s resignation and the rapid installation of a significantly different politi-
cal regime. Among the many examples are the Philippines (2001), Georgia’s “Rose
Revolution” (2003), Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” (2004), and Kyrgyzstan’s “Tulip
Revolution” (2005). As noted above, the recent “revolutions” in Egypt and Tunisia
drove out the old regime leadership through predominantly nonviolent action in the
hope of political transformation, but it is not yet clear whether fundamental change
will be established.

CoNDiTioNs foR ReVoluTioN The conditions under which political revolution

occurs is an issue that has fascinated many people, especially those who want to ana-
lyze revolution and those who want to lead a successful revolution. The most widely
cited studies of major historical revolutions include those by Hannah Arendt (1963),
Crane Brinton (1957), Chalmers Johnson (1983), Barrington Moore (1966), and Theda
Skocpol (1979).
One long-standing explanation of revolution is substantial inequality, a factor empha-
sized in analyses from Aristotle to Karl Marx to contemporary theorists. A second general
approach is the theory of rising expectations, associated with Alexis de Tocqueville
(1835/1945), James Davies (1971), and others. In this view, the key cause of revolution is a
sudden increase in the disparity between the values the population expects to enjoy from
the government and the actual value distribution the population receives. It is also called
the J-curve theory because, as indicated in Figure 12.3, the disparity resembles an inverted J,
and revolutionary violence occurs when the disparity becomes substantial.
Empirical analyses have defined certain conditions that are associated with
countries in which revolutions occur: (1) conflicting elites; (2) deep ethnic divisions;
(3) rapid economic growth, especially when it is followed by a sharp decline in pros-
perity; (4) a relatively short history as an autonomous state; (5) divisive interventions
by actors in the international system; (6) rapid population growth, especially a high
proportion of younger people; and (7) social mobilization. None of these is a necessary
condition for revolution, and unique events are critical, but the probability of revolu-
tion increases as more of these conditions are present.
340 Chapter 12

Figure 12.3 J-curve Description of Revolution

Source: Derived from Davies 1971.

High Expected values

Values Distributed
Intolerable gap

Actual values

Low
Time Revolutionary
violence emerges

Use of Force Between States

12.4 analyze the nature and causes of war.
The final box in Figure 12.1 includes those cases in which both the source and target
of violence are states. While this form is primarily referred to as a war, there are some
situations in which the use of violence between states is more limited (Gochman and
Maoz 1984):

• In a blockade, the military (e.g., ships, troops, munitions) of one state is used to seal off
territory (e.g., border crossings, harbors), preventing entry or exit by the rival state.
• In state-sponsored terrorism, the state provides financial or material support to
groups committing occasional acts of political violence within the rival state.
• A state can engage in a brief, single use of force, such as a bombing raid, firing
munitions into the enemy state, or rapid invasion for a specific purpose (e.g., the
sabotage of a facility).
• In a clash, there is a brief engagement between the armed forces of two states, as
in a border skirmish.
• In a low-intensity conflict (LIC), contending groups engage in armed struggle that is
usually sporadic and prolonged but does not involve full-scale military conflict, with the
goal of inflicting maximum harm while suffering few or no casualties.

War
War is interstate violence that is sustained and organized and (usually) involves hostilities
between the regular military forces of the states. Such violence is the ultimate mechanism
for resolving conflict between states. For those who define politics as conflict resolu-
tion, war represents the utter failure of politics. But many probably agree with Karl
von Clausewitz’s famous dictum: “War is regarded as nothing but a continuation of
 Political Violence 341

political activity by other means” (Clausewitz 1833/1967: 87). Thus, war is the use of
violence by one state to achieve its political goals at the expense of another state.
Robert Ardrey (1966: 27), a well-known ethologist (a person who studies animal
behavior to better understand human behavior), wryly observed that “human war has
been the most successful of all our cultural traditions.” Indeed, the study of world
history is usually dominated by wars and recurrent episodes of organized violence
among states.
The elimination of war is not among the accomplishments of the modern world.
The comprehensive analysis of major interstate wars between 1816 and 1980 found
some good news: Wars are less frequent, are considerably shorter, and involve fewer
states. But the bad news is that the number of wars in progress at any given time
has increased substantially since 1900, and the total number of deaths from war has
risen astronomically (Sivard 1996). The post–Cold War context has possibly reduced
the number of interstate wars (Russett 2010). Yet since 1990, nearly half of the world’s
countries have suffered the enormous costs of a major armed conflict (SIPRI 2014).
Few of the recent major conflicts are conventional wars—that is, wars that entail
the direct, sustained confrontation of the military forces of two or more states within a
defined space on the soil of one of the combatants. Conflicts that do fit the definition
of a conventional war include the Argentina–United Kingdom War (Falklands War,
1982), the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988), the Iraq–Kuwait War (Persian Gulf War, 1990),
the Ecuador–Peru War (1995), the Ethiopia–Eritrea War (1998–2000), the Iraq–U.S.-led-
coalition War (2003), and the brief Georgia–Russia War (2008).
Many contemporary conflicts are complicated mixes of internal, regional, and
transborder combatants. While most are not classic wars, analysts combine them with
war into a broader category: major armed conflicts. Major armed conflicts have three
defining characteristics: (1) the use of armed force between two or more governments
or one government and at least one organized, armed group; (2) at least 1,000 battle-
related deaths in a year; and (3) conflict over control of the government or territory. In
the last two decades, between 10 and 30 major armed conflicts were being waged per
year. All 10 such conflicts in 2012 (e.g., in Afghanistan and Colombia) were intrastate—
that is, sustained violence within the borders of a country (although combatants from
other countries might be participants). And there were about 100 instances of “orga-
nized violence” with at least 25 deaths in 2012 (Uppsala 2013).
Africa’s “world war” in Congo (1998–2003, but the fighting continues; recall the
Focus in 11) seems a prototype of the contemporary unconventional war. At one level,
it is an internal civil war between the military forces loyal to President Kabila and sev-
eral large paramilitary groups that rejected his authority to rule. Some of the cleavages
underlying the conflict are regional, some are nation-based, and some are based on
merely personal animosity and ambition. Other motivations include greed to capture
Congo’s valuable resources. At its height, the war involved militaries and paramili-
taries from eight countries and UN peacekeeping forces, and as many as 5.4 million
deaths are attributable to the war (Prunier 2008). Another striking example of this type
of complex “war” is the bloody conflict in Israel and Palestine, where all forms of
political violence collide, as discussed in the Focus in 12.
342 Chapter 12

The changing nature of many contemporary wars is evident in the enormous

increase in the proportion of civilian deaths. Whereas in World War I there was only
one civilian death for every eight military deaths, in World War II there were two civil-
ian deaths for every military death. In the 1990s, 9 out of every 10 war deaths were
civilians, and the major armed conflicts going on since 1990 have been killing more
than half a million civilians each year. And the remarkable and efficient technologies
of modern war are dramatically increasing the casualties. In the twentieth century,
there were six times as many deaths per war as in the nineteenth century and four
more times as many war deaths as in the preceding 400 years (Sivard 1996: 7, 17).
Worldwide, the nearly $2 trillion per year that states spend directly on the military to
support their security goals could, if reallocated to their prosperity goals, greatly enhance
their citizens’ quality of life. Total world military spending has increased by 50 percent
between 2000 and 2013 (SIPRI 2014). The problem is that many policymakers believe that
security goals have the highest priority and that without security, no other goals can be
achieved. Yet in an era of high-tech warfare, almost no one feels truly secure. This inse-
curity leads every state to push itself and its rivals into an accelerating, unending, and
potentially devastating expansion of the capacity for massive political violence.
Do you think some states are more warlike than others? That is, do some states
have a much more extensive history of interstate conflict than others? This issue is
explored in Compare in 12.

What Causes War?

Can we explain why states go to war? As a partial answer, scholars have attempted
to determine whether some states or their populations have particular attributes that
result in a greater propensity to engage in war. The findings are inconclusive, since
there are always unique contingencies associated with particular wars. However,

Focus in 12
Ultraviolence among the Children of Abraham: Israelis and Palestinians
Israelis and Palestinians share a common under- Canaan, near what is now Hebron, Israel, in about
standing of their beginnings, yet they split into two 2000 b.c.e. Abraham developed the foundational
nations whose recent history is marked by ultra- principles of a new religion, Judaism. The offspring
violence. Perhaps more than anywhere else in the of one of his two wives (son Isaac and grandson
world, almost every type of political violence in Israel) followed this new religion. The line descend-
Figure 12.1 occurs with depressing regularity in this ing from Abraham’s other wife continued to live in
region. Helicopter gunships fire missiles at cars to the area and did not embrace Judaism. Most fam-
assassinate leaders, suicide bombers kill and maim ily members in this second line were later attracted
scores of innocents, bulldozers destroy residential to the teachings of Mohammed (born in Mecca in
neighborhoods, and bloody wars wreak havoc in 570 c.e.) and another new religion, Islam. Arab mili-
several countries. How did things get so bad? tary conquests in the seventh to tenth centuries
According to legend, the patriarch Abraham added to the near-total religious domination of Islam
settled in and was eventually buried in the land of in the region.
 Political Violence 343

“The children of Israel” (the Jews) lived in the recently founded United Nations proposed a plan to
Canaan area from about 1300 to 700 b.c.e. but ulti- split Palestine into two states, maintaining Jerusalem
mately migrated to many countries. Almost every- as a shared city under UN trusteeship. The Jews
where they went, the Jews felt themselves to be a accepted this plan in 1947, but the Arabs rejected it,
target of discrimination and described themselves angry that the Jews, who constituted only one-third
as part of a dispersed (diaspora) nation with no of the population, would receive the majority (55 per-
homeland. Thus, in 1897, European Jewish leaders cent) of the land. Two hours before the British man-
founded the World Zionist Movement, the central date in Palestine ended in 1947, the Jewish leaders
goal of which was to establish a Jewish homeland declared a new sovereign state, Israel. The next day,
and a sanctuary from anti-Semitism. After a debate the armies of the surrounding Arab states (Egypt,
in which locations in Europe, Africa, Latin America, Lebanon, Syria, and Transjordan) declared war on
and the Near East were considered, the Zionists con- Israel. The defeat of these armies by the Israeli army
cluded that their homeland should be the “Promised resulted in 800,000 homeless Palestinians, many of
Land” of Abraham’s birth, Palestine. They began whom fled to neighboring lands.
purchasing land and establishing colonies of Jewish Full-scale war erupted three more times
settlers in Palestine. By the outbreak of World War I between Israel and its Arab neighbors (in 1956, 1967,
(1914), they owned 100,000 acres, and 70,000 Jews and 1973). Each time, Israel defeated the Arab armies
had migrated to Palestine, living alongside more and conquered more land, the Occupied Territories
than 800,000 Arab Muslims (see Figure 12.4). (especially the West Bank and Gaza). By the late
After the war, the British government, which 1960s, these territories were inhabited by 1.2 million
had a mandate to govern Palestine, agreed under Palestinians, who were now an unwelcome nation
pressure from European Jews that it would assist in subjugated within the Israeli state. More than 1 million
establishing a Jewish “home” in Palestine. As dis- additional Palestinians were exiles living in Jordan
crimination against the Jews in Europe reached hor- and other Arab states. Jewish settlements continued
rendous levels with the rise of Nazism, the flow of to expand in the Occupied Territories, establishing
Jewish immigrants to Palestine became a flood. By new outposts of Jewish control on the best land.
the outbreak of World War II, the number of Jews in Frustrated Palestinians formed active resis-
Palestine had increased sixfold. tance groups, most notably the Palestine Liberation
The Muslim Arabs in the Palestine area were Organization (1964) and Hamas (1987). These
increasingly distressed by this massive invasion of groups were convinced that only political violence
Jewish “foreigners.” There was violence and guerrilla and the destruction of the state of Israel would
war between extreme groups of Arabs and Jews. The enable them to regain control of their lands. The

Figure 12.4 Population in Palestine/Israel at Key Dates

7
Jews/Israelis 6.0
6 Arabs/Palestinians
Population (Millions)

5 *Includes the West Bank and Gaza Strip

5.2
4

0
1914 1937 1947 1957 1967 1977 1987 1993* 2005* 2013*
344 Chapter 12

combination of civil disobedience, armed resistance, Beneath this basic story line there are extraordi-
and terrorist acts by Palestinian groups, on the one narily complex subplots: factional struggles among
hand, and the strong and often brutal responses by the Jews and among the Palestinians, disagree-
the Israeli military and Jewish militant groups, on ments about the legitimacy of violence by each
the other hand, has resulted in an endless cycle of group, and the complicated agendas of external
violence and retaliation. The more militant groups on actors (e.g., other Arab states, the United States,
each side are willing to engage in “whatever means MNCs) regarding Islam, oil, terrorism, and so on. The
necessary” to protect their land. land of Abraham is the cauldron in which this volatile
The United Nations, the United States, and stew of violence boils furiously.
others have promoted a two-state solution based
broadly on the pre-1967 borders to achieve stabil-
ity and peace in the region, but all agreements have Further Focus
collapsed. Some Palestinian groups have renounced 1. Should the UN have proposed a land split in
terrorism and accepted the continued existence of 1947 that closely reflected the size of the two
Israel, and some Israelis agree that there should be populations?
a Palestinian state. But since the 2006 election of 2. If one accepts the idea that “to the victor go
Hamas as the dominant party in Gaza, there have the spoils” after a war, do both the Israelis and
been new rounds of devastating violence between the Arab states have a good reason to reject a
the Israelis and Palestinians. compromise settlement at this point?

empirical research does suggest seven state characteristics that are generally corre-
lated with the likelihood of war (Kegley and Wittkopf 2004: 411–418):

1. Newer nations are more likely to initiate war than are mature states.
2. War is more likely in states that have effectively socialized their citizens to accept the
government’s actions on national security.
3. The most warlike states have rising prosperity but are relatively poor, though they
are not the very poorest states.
4. Countries with desirable geopolitical features (i.e., resources and location—recall
Chapter 11) have a higher probability of warfare.
5. Countries not well linked to the global economy are more likely to engage in war.
6. States that are most highly militarized, and especially those that are rapidly expand-
ing their military power, are more warlike.
7. Countries whose political culture reflects a high degree of nationalism are more
warlike.
The contemporary global system has conditions that make many analysts
(particularly those with the political idealist perspective described in Chapter 11) opti-
mistic that war is declining. Several forces seem to encourage this optimism. First,
democracy has spread to many major countries, and established democracies rarely fight
one another (the so-called democratic peace). In particular, there is a growing “security
community” of countries, mainly among the Global North countries in the EU and
NATO, among whom an interstate war seems inconceivable. Second, globalization
has substantially increased countries’ economic interdependence. And third, transnational
organizations, ranging from the UN to NGOS to MNCs, have become more significant
 Political Violence 345

compare in 12
Levels of War and Peace
How can we compare the extent to which particu- of which averaged more than one dispute per year
lar countries are more war-prone or more peace- (Gochman and Maoz 1984).
ful? One comprehensive study determined the A recent empirical study takes a different
frequency with which more than 100 countries approach. It calculates a yearly Global Peace Index
engaged in interstate conflict between 1816 and for 162 countries, using 22 indicators such as exter-
1976. The analysis focused on empirical data mea- nal and internal conflicts, military expenditures,
suring 14 types of militarized interstate disputes, and relations with neighboring countries (Institute
including major displays of force and uses of force. for Economics and Peace 2014). In contrast to the
A state is considered to be in a dispute whether it earlier study, this index attempts to measure and
is the initiator or the target of the conflict. Because compare countries’ level of peacefulness and non-
some countries have considerably longer histories violence, although most of the measures in the
as states, the analysis measured disputes per year index do relate to the level of preparation for and
of the state’s existence. The study concluded that engagement in violent activities, both domestic and
less than one-third of the states, primarily major international. Table 12.3 lists the 10 most peaceful
powers, initiated more than 70 percent of all dis- countries, led by Iceland and Denmark. Other rank-
putes, were the primary targets of more than 60 per- ings in the top half of all countries on peacefulness
cent of the disputes, and were also most likely to include Germany (17), Singapore (25), Spain (26),
enter disputes in which other countries were already Vietnam (45), the United Kingdom (47), and Ghana
engaged. Table 12.3 lists the 10 most dispute-prone (61). The index can also be examined from the bot-
states in the analysis. Notice that the list of most tom up to identify the least peaceful countries in the
conflict-prone states is topped by Israel, the United contemporary world. Table 12.3 indicates that the
Kingdom, India, the United States, and Pakistan, all three least peaceful countries are Syria, Afghanistan,

Table 12.3 Most Dispute-Prone and Most Peaceful Countries

A. Most Dispute-Prone B. Least Peaceful c. Most Peaceful
(1816–1976)* (current) (current)
Israel Syria Iceland
United Kingdom Afghanistan Denmark
India South Sudan Austria
United States Iraq New Zealand
Pakistan Somalia Switzerland
Germany Sudan Finland
Russia/Soviet Union Central African Republic Canada
France Democratic Republic of Congo Japan
China Pakistan Belgium
Italy North Korea Norway
*Other highly dispute-prone countries are Zambia, Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, North Vietnam, and Uganda; but these states were inde-
pendent for only a short amount of the analysis period, thus causing potential measurement error.
SourceS: A = Gochman and Maoz 1984: Table 8; B and C = Institute for Economics and Peace 2014.
346 Chapter 12

and South Sudan (160–162). Other countries ranking the three or four most important variables you
in the lower half on peacefulness include the United would include in your index?
States (101), China (108), Egypt (143), South Africa 2. Is it reasonable that the comparative index for
(122), Mexico (138), and India (143). dispute-prone countries makes no distinction
among the following three situations: whether a
Further Questions country started a dispute, whether it responded
to a violent challenge, or whether it joined a
1. If you were creating a comparative index of
dispute in progress?
how peaceful various countries are, what are

and more powerful. Both the second and third factors force countries to recognize their
shared interests, create strong inducements for cooperation, and provide institutional
support for conflict resolution. Thus, the optimists point to a decrease in the number of
interstate wars in recent years and the growing sense that major powers will not fight
one another (Goldstein 2012; Rasler and Thompson 2005; Russett 2010).
However, others, especially the realists, see the glass as half empty. First, if one con-
siders the broader definition of political violence, the Global Peace Index study concludes
that 110 countries are more conflictual and more militarized than in 2008 and only 48 coun-
tries have become more peaceful (Institute for Economics and Peace 2013). And while
there are fewer major armed conflicts, there has been an increase in the number of intrastate
conflicts that are internationalized—conflicts in which another state supports one side or the
other and the danger of escalation is greater (SIPRI 2014). And democracies are as likely
as nondemocracies to be involved in these conflicts. Even if the democracies rarely fight
one another, there are plenty of potential opponents. Second, globalization and devel-
opment have dramatically intensified the competition for resources, which will provoke
more conflict and resource wars. And third, global wars are most likely when a dominant
power (a hegemon) weakens and new challengers rise, and the current hegemon (the
United States) seems to be in decline. Even before that occurs, the emerging multipolar sys-
tem is more conflict prone than either the unipolar system or bipolar system that preceded
it (Gowa 2000; Klare 2002, 2012; Mearsheimer 2001; Nye 2011; Organski 1968).
At the highest level of abstraction, there are three broad alternative explanations
for the causes of war:

1. War can be attributed to scarcity in nature. Because the consumption goals of

states are greater than the natural resources available, states undertake war to pro-
tect or capture resources from other states. Thus, states struggle with one another
for the control of resources such as energy, food, minerals, and strategic locations
(CNA 2007; Klare 2012).
2. War can be attributed to the inadequacy of institutions. In this view, neither the
existing sociopolitical structure nor the rules governing the conduct among states
are adequate to prevent states from using force to achieve their objectives. Thus,
states are guided by self-interest, and there are no conflict-resolution mechanisms
that prevent the occasional eruption of large-scale interstate violence.
3. War can be explained by human nature. From this perspective, humans are
innately aggressive as a biological species. Humans are nearly the only species
 Political Violence 347

that engages in widespread killing of its own kind. And humans, it is claimed,
are acquisitive, competitive, and selfish by nature rather than by nurture. Thus,
war becomes a predictable group-level manifestation of these inherent qualities. A
variation on this explanation emphasizes the importance of an aggressive leader
who draws her country into war (Stoessinger 2010). The gender reference in the
previous sentence, while consistent with the alternate chapters referencing in this
book, prompts a reminder of the discussion in Chapter 11 of the subfield of inter-
national relations theory that asserts female leaders are far less likely than males
to resort to violence in interstate disputes (Steans 2013).

Each of the preceding “ultimate” explanations of war also suggests possible solu-
tions that might eliminate war:

1. If the problem is scarcity of natural resources, one might look to technological

solutions as states develop new techniques to use natural resources more effi-
ciently and to develop abundant substitutes for scarce resources.
2. If the problem is inadequate institutions, the need is for social engineering—the
creation of organizational arrangements that more effectively structure the rela-
tions among individuals and states. In the political domain, this might ultimately
entail the creation of a viable world government.
3. If the problem is human nature, the solution is found in human engineering by
means of comprehensive political socialization or perhaps even genetic manipula-
tion to create a population with nonaggressive, “peace-loving” qualities.

There is some evidence to support each of these three general explanations of the
causes of war. But there is also sufficient counterevidence so that none of the three posi-
tions is compelling as a complete explanation. Neither an abundance of natural resources
nor an advanced technology has stopped intergroup violence. And while there are societ-
ies whose members have not been driven by human nature into warlike behavior against
their neighbors, no set of human institutions or patterns of human learning have been
shown inevitably to generate war or perpetuate peace among states.
While the complete elimination of war might be impossible, it does seem that a
combination of material abundance, effective institutions, and thorough socialization
might reduce the incidence of war. This leads to more questions: Can an effective com-
bination be identified and implemented by political actors? Might the solution pro-
duce human conditions nearly as unpalatable as occasional wars?

Evaluating Political Violence:

Means and Ends
12.5 evaluate the normative implications of political violence.
Political violence can be understood as a failure of institutionalized political action. A
strong and persuasive normative perspective contends that political violence, espe-
cially within a country, is unacceptable, deviant behavior. Conservative ideology
348 Chapter 12

provides the most explicit condemnation of such violence, concluding that the only
legacy of violence is to undermine order in the society. The resort to violence is part
of an erroneous belief that radical social change can lead to lasting improvements. As
Englishman Edmund Burke (1729–1797) observed: “Time is required to produce that
union of minds which alone can produce all the good we aim at. Our patience will
achieve more than our force” (Burke 1790/1955: 197).
A contrary perspective argues that political violence is often the best or even
the only mechanism for liberation from oppression and tyranny. This view con-
tends that many societies are controlled by dominant elites who manipulate the
state to serve their interests, not the collective good. If a government and its leaders
refuse to be constrained by a limited mandate and are not responsive to the legiti-
mate rights of citizens, then the people have the right to overthrow them by any
available means. Although this perspective is mainly associated with class theorists
and Marxist ideology, the counterpoint to Burke is provided by another English
political thinker, classical liberal John Locke (1632–1704), who argued that citizens
create government to protect their rights to life, liberty, and property. If the exist-
ing government does not serve these purposes well, argued Locke, the people can
and must revolt to replace tyranny and create a new and better government (Locke
1690/1963: 466).
Political violence can be a source of either desirable progress or nearly univer-
sal suffering and chaos. Clearly, fundamental issues about means and ends are tied
up with any assessment of political violence. On the one hand, if the maintenance
of public order and political institutionalization are valued goals, you must consider
whether resorting to political violence undermines long-term prospects for peaceful,
orderly governance. Many cynics would share Italian novelist Ignazio Silone’s (1937)
assessment: “Every revolution begins as a movement of liberation but ends as tyr-
anny.” On the other hand, if you value social and political justice, it is important to
consider whether the processes of political violence can be a legitimate means of last
resort to ensure such justice. Those who justify some forms of political violence might
sympathize with African American Eldridge Cleaver’s claim that “a slave who dies of
natural causes will not balance two dead flies on the scale of eternity.”
There are no tidy answers to the question of whether or when political violence is
justifiable. Perhaps one way to organize your own assessment of political violence is to
reflect on three basic questions:

1. Is political violence unacceptable under every possible circumstance?

2. If you answered no to question 1, could an outcome emerge from the use of politi-
cal violence that is so preferable to the existing situation that establishing the
precedent of using political violence is justifiable?
3. If you answered yes to question 2, what specific circumstances would be neces-
sary to justify the resort to political violence?

These issues about the conditions under which political violence might be legiti-
mate are germane on an even larger scale regarding the justification of war. Despite
the massive human and financial costs of war, few would support the proposition
 Political Violence 349

that there are absolutely no conditions under which war is justified. But what are the
circumstances that justify war?
A classic justification is the doctrine of self-defense, a position associated with
Augustine (354–430 c.e.). A victim of an unprovoked attack has the right to use
violence as a means of protection. Apart from total pacifists, few would reject the
principle of self-defense as a legitimate rationale for violence. But the application
of this principle, whether group versus group or state versus state, might be a sub-
ject of considerable disagreement. Here are some examples in the relations between
states: Might state A engage in nonviolent actions that are so provocative that state
B is justified in responding with violence? What if the initial violence against state B
is by an actor from state A who does not have the explicit support of state A? What
if the violence by state A was unintentional? What if the initial violence is within
the territory of state A but is perceived as directly harmful to citizens or interests
of state B? What if state B uses violence to prevent state A from the (expected) use
of far more substantial violence? What if the violent response of state B is of far
greater magnitude than the violence by state A? Wars sometimes develop because
of such patterns of misperception, accident, preemption, and incremental escalation
(Schelling 1960).
Frequently, however, violence and war are justified on a more ambiguous ratio-
nale associated with Ambrose (339–397 c.e.), the defense of universal principles. In this
view, “man has a moral duty to employ force to resist active wickedness, for to refrain
from hindering evil when possible is tantamount to promoting it.” In accepting the
2009 Nobel Peace Prize, U.S. president Obama cited “just war” principles. Yet the
interpretations of “active wickedness” and “evil” are not shared across all cultures. For
example, many citizens in most countries believed that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein was an
evil ruler. However, most did not find this an adequate justification for U.S. president
George W. Bush’s insistence on a “preemptive war,” especially in the absence of com-
pelling evidence that Iraq endangered other countries with weapons of mass destruc-
tion that could not be eliminated except by war. Similarly, what level of evil by a ruling
group justifies the resort to violence against that group?
In most cases of political violence, a justification based on universal principles is
invoked. Violence is used against others in the name of principles such as freedom,
social justice, human rights, self-determination, territorial integrity, egalitarianism,
religious freedom, religious orthodoxy, anticommunism, communism, and so on. But
all political actors do not accept a single vision of natural law that provides universal
principles to govern the relations among states and groups.
When the major actors are states, a core problem is that the international system
has not implemented powerful and effective institutional mechanisms that eliminate
conflict. Thus, occasional outbreaks of interstate conflict and war are inevitable. The
context of international politics is essentially amoral. Recognizing this fact is the key
to understanding most politics across borders, whether diplomatic activities, alli-
ances, or war. In some instances, a state’s actions in the international environment
are constrained by the state’s views of morality and universal principles. But in
other instances, a state’s decision makers might conclude that almost any action is
350 Chapter 12

acceptable if the action seems to further the state’s security, stability, and prosperity
goals. What are the chances that contemporary states will ever meet the requirement
of the UN Charter to “settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a
manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered”?
In the current technological era, the mechanisms for committing violence are
more efficient, powerful, and horrifying than at any other time in human history. The
implications of this fact are especially evident in the relations among states. But even
subnational political groups can now inflict massive and destructive political violence.
Thus, in understanding the political world, questions about the use of force and the
balance between liberation and destruction are more pressing now than at any other
time in human history.

Key Concepts
civil war, p. 336 guerrilla war, p. 338 revolution, p. 336
class conflict, p. 333 J-curve theory, p. 339 riot, p. 334
coup, p. 334 low-intensity conflict, p. 340 separatist violence,
democratic peace, p. 344 nation-based violence, p. 330 p. 335
democratic revolution, p. 339 political society, p. 323 terrorism, p. 327
establishment violence, p. 324 political violence, p. 323 violence, p. 322
genocide, p. 332 rebellion, p. 334 war, p. 340

For Further Consideration

1. Is the state more to be feared than its nationality groups due to differences in
enemies? Assess the implications of the ethnicity, religion, language, and so on?
prevalence during the twentieth century of Which one seems most prominent? Or is
“murder by government,” in which the state the violence primarily motivated by other
is the actor committing violence and the issues, such as inequality and class conflict,
quest for power, geopolitics, or some other
state’s citizens are its target.
cause?
2. Summarize the key elements of a three-way
4. Must every revolution end in tyranny (as
debate among an absolute pacifist, a com-
suggested by Ignazio Silone)? Can you
mitted revolutionary, and yourself regarding
identify a modern revolution that, by the
the conditions under which political vio-
criteria you establish, can be viewed as a
lence is justifiable.
success?
3. It is suggested that much contemporary
political violence is nation-based. Analyze 5. Which of the characteristics of warlike states
the nation-based conflicts of which you on pages 338–339 is most surprising to you?
are aware. Is most of the violence caused Why? What characteristic did you expect
by fundamental antipathy between two that is not among those listed?
 Political Violence 351

For Further Reading

Brecher, michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. are combined to make the controversial argu-
(1997). A Study of Crisis. ann arbor: ment that democracies are as likely as other
university of michigan press. A comprehen- forms of government to target noncombatants
sive, usable database from the International in interstate conflicts.
Crisis Behavior project that provides valuable Dworkin, anthony, Roy gutman, and David
information on 412 crises between 1929 and Rieff, eds. (2007). Crimes of War 2.0: What the
1992, following the authors’ thoughtful analy- Public Should Know. Rev. ed. New York: W. W.
ses of and generalizations about the patterns of Norton. Diverse and enlightening discussions on
interstate crises. the legal and ethical issues regarding war crimes
Brownlee, Nathan, Tarek masoud, and andrew and international humanitarian law, with power-
Reynolds (2013). “Tracking the ‘Arab Spring’: ful commentaries on cases such as Afghanistan,
Why The Modest Harvest?” Journal of Cambodia, Chechnya, and Rwanda, and dra-
Democracy Vol. 24/4. A clear assessment of the matic illustrations by photojournalists.
limited success in achieving positive change enders, Walter, and Todd sandler. (2012). The
from the Arab Spring, three years after its Political Economy of Terrorism. 2nd ed. New
beginnings. York: Cambridge university press. A compre-
Cimbala, stephen J. (2012). Nuclear Weapons in hensive database on terrorism is analyzed using
the Information Age. New York: Continuum the methods of the rational choice approach
international publishing group. The author (see Chapter 4 and the Appendix) to illumi-
analyses how nuclear weapons, combined with nate the choices terrorists make, such as shift-
advanced conventional weapons and new infor- ing to weak link targets, allocating their scarce
mation-age weaponry, have created an extremely resources to the best available target, shifting
dangerous mix and new forms of global risk and attack modes, and utilizing the new ICTs.
instability that must be addressed. freedman, lawrence, ed. (1994). War. New York:
Cinema of War. Film, in addition to literature, has oxford university press. A splendid collec-
often been a compelling visual and visceral tion of readings, ranging from the greatest
medium for evoking the heroism and absurd- classical treatments of the reasons for and the
ity of war. Among the films that are especially nature of war to significant recent (but slightly
effective are The Hurt Locker (Kathryn Bigelow, dated) analyses.
2008), Apocalypse Now (Francis Ford Coppola, goldstein, Joshua s. (2003). War and Gender:
1979, 2001); The Sands of Iwo Jima (Allan Dwan, How Gender Shapes the War System and
1949); The Big Red One (Samuel Fuller, 1980); Vice Versa. Cambridge, england: Cambridge
Full Metal Jacket (Stanley Kubrick, 1987); In university press. This book explores why war-
Which We Serve (David Lean, 1942); All Quiet fare is dominated by men and concludes that it
on the Western Front and Pork Chop Hill (Lewis is primarily due to culturally constructed male
Milestone, 1930, 1959); The Grand Illusion (Jean domination and “militarized masculine stereo-
Renoir, 1937); Saving Private Ryan (Steven types” rather than genetic differences.
Spielberg, 1998); and Platoon (Oliver Stone, goldstein, Joshua s. (2012). Winning the War
1986). on War: The Decline of Armed Conflict
Downes, alexander B. (2008). Targeting Civilians Worldwide. New York: Dutton. A detailed
in War. ithaca, NY: Cornell university press. account of how the recent reduction in major
A blend of case studies and quantitative data armed conflicts in the Global South can be
352 Chapter 12

explained by the interventions of interna- persuasive books (see also The Race for What’s
tional actors, especially UN peacekeepers and Left, 2012; and Resource Wars, 2002) about the
a variety of IGOs. “new geography of conflict,” driven by compe-
goldstone, Jack a., ed. (2003). Revolutions: tition for scarce resources, among states in the
Theoretical, Comparative, and Historical early twenty-first century.
Studies. 3rd ed. florence, KY: Wadsworth moghadam, assaf. (2008). The Globalization
Cengage. A readable set of articles that includes of Martyrdom. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
both detailed case studies of revolutions and university press. The role of al Qaeda and the
more analytic work that attempts to develop ideology of Salafi Jihad in almost 1,300 suicide
generalizations about revolutionary violence. attacks during the past 30 years are analyzed,
See also Goldstone’s 2014 Revolutions: A Very and suggestions for combating such attacks are
Short Introduction. offered.
gourevitch, philip. (1999). We Wish to Inform o’Brien, Tim. (1990). The Things They Carried.
You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with New York: Doubleday Broadway Books. In
Our Families: Stories from Rwanda. New 22 fictional short stories about a U.S. military
York: farrar, straus and giroux. A powerful platoon in the Vietnam War, the author pow-
account of the ways in which ethnonationalist erfully conveys universal themes regarding
rhetoric was used to mobilize the Hutu people the horror of war from the perspective of the
to massacre almost one million Tutsis and Hutu individual soldier.
moderates in Rwanda in the mid-1990s, while parker, geoffrey, ed. (2005). The Cambridge
the international community was unwilling to History of Warfare. 2nd ed. london:
intervene to prevent the genocide. Cambridge university press. An ambitious
gurr, Ted Robert. (2000). Peoples Versus States: series of essays examining many aspects of
Minorities at Risk in the New Century. war in the Western world, from ancient Greece
Washington, DC: united states institute of through recent wars in the Middle East. A key
peace press. Based on the valuable Minorities theme is that Western technology and prosper-
at Risk Project database, the book is an excep- ity produced a dominant military that ensured
tionally rich blend of data-based analyses and Western global supremacy.
case studies of nation-based conflict. pinker, steven. (2011). The Better Angels of Our
Hoffman, Bruce. (2006). Inside Terrorism. Revised Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New
and expanded ed. New York: Columbia York: Viking. A readable, widely discussed
university press. A broad-ranging and trou- book by a neuroscientist who claims that vio-
bling exploration of terrorism, with particular lence, including political violence, has declined
attention to the recent evolution of strategies because humans have evolved over many cen-
and goals of terrorists. turies into a less violent species, in part due to
Jenkins, philip. (2003). Images of Terror: What the role of the state and of education.
We Can and Can’t Know About Terrorism. prunier, gerard. (2008). Darfur: A 21st Century
New York: aldine de gruyter. A fascinating Genocide. 3rd ed. ithaca, NY: Cornell
array of examples is provided to examine how university press. A gripping exploration of
stories about terrorism are transformed in pub- the causes and nature of the brutal conflict in
lic discussion, especially by the media. Sudan, including a critique of the failure of
Klare, michael. (2008). Rising Powers, Shrinking the international community to prevent the
Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy. New genocide. Equally powerful is his 2008 Africa’s
York: Henry Holt. This is among Klare’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and
 Political Violence 353

the Making of a Continental Disaster (New York: on thoughtful case studies of the civil wars
Oxford University Press). in Bosnia, Cambodia, Somalia, and Rwanda,
Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. (2005). important scholars analyze why the interna-
Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, tional community has not been particularly
Geopolitics, and the Transformation of World effective in either preventing the outbreak of or
Politics. New York: palgrave macmillan. resolving civil wars.
A thorough examination of the theories and Walzer, michael. (2006). Just and Unjust War. 4th
data regarding the “democratic peace” debate, ed. New York: Basic Books. A political phi-
refining and supporting the concept. losopher presents a careful argument about
sassoon, siegfried. (1968). Collected Poems: the morality of war, grounded in the context of
1908–1956. london: faber and faber. The numerous actual wars.
deeply moving poems about war by a young Weiss, peter. (1965). Marat/Sade: The Persecution
British intellectual who suffered the horrific and Assassination of Jean-Paul Marat as
experiences of European trench warfare during Performed by the Inmates of the Asylum at
World War I. Charenton Under the Direction of the Marquis
sharp, gene. (2011). From Dictatorship to de Sade. New York: atheneum. A brilliant
Democracy: A Conceptual Framework for play (and a dazzling film with the same title
Liberation. london: serpent’s Tail. http:// directed by Peter Brooks) that offers a debate
www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/FDTD. about a revolution between Jean-Paul Marat, a
pdf. First written to help the democracy move- leader of the French Revolution who attempts
ment in Myanmar, this remarkable little book to retain his idealism about revolutionary
provides guidelines for overthrowing a dicta- change despite having become a victim of
torial regime. Leaders of recent people’s revo- extremists, and the Marquis de Sade, the ulti-
lutions indicate they found it very helpful. mate cynic.
stoessinger, John g. (2010). Why Nations Go to Weitz, eric D. (2005). A Century of Genocide:
War. 11th ed. Boston: Bedford. A readable set Utopias of Race and Nation. princeton, NJ:
of descriptive case studies of modern wars, princeton university press. A historian of-
emphasizing individual behavior and motives, fers a compelling and readable comparison of
including World War I, Korea, Vietnam, India– the way in which four major genocides in the
Pakistan, Israel–Arabs, Iran–Iraq, the Balkans, twentieth century (under Stalin, Hitler, and Pol
and the U.S. wars in the Middle East. Pot and in the former Yugoslavia) drew pop-
Walter, Barbara f., and Jack snyder, eds. (1999). ular support through the strategic mixture of
Civil Wars, Insecurity, and Intervention. New nationalism and racial identity.
York: Columbia university press. Centering

On the Web
http://www.amnesty.org http://wps.cfc.forces.gc.ca/en/index.php
Amnesty International is the world’s leading The Information Resource Centre of the
NGO monitoring establishment violence and Canadian Forces College provides links to
human rights abuses and attempting to mobi- numerous sites detailing current major inter-
lize citizen support to pressure governments national conflicts.
to end such actions.
354 Chapter 12

http://www.sipri.org including many position papers and briefings,

The site of the Stockholm International Peace regarding current and emerging security con-
Research Institute, which conducts research on cerns in all regions of the world.
questions of conflict and cooperation relevant http://www.pvtr.org
to international peace and security, includes Centered in Singapore, the International
rich databases and significant articles on topics Center for Political Violence and Terrorism
of peace and violence. offer details and commentaries on current situ-
http://www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/welcome. ations of political violence.
html http://www.visionofhumanity.org
This site, managed by Professor Rudolf The Institute for Economics and Peace’s
Rummel, an avowed “freedomist,” is an excep- Global Peace Index details the components of
tionally rich resource of information and links its yearly rating of the peacefulness of every
regarding themes of war and peace. country.
http://www.usip.org http://www.hrw.org
This site for the U.S. Institute of Peace was The electronic home of Human Rights Watch
established and is funded by the U.S. Congress provides access to an extensive database
with the goal of preventing conflict, ending regarding human rights violations taking place
current conflicts, and aiding in reconstruction throughout the international community.
after the hostilities. http://www.sfcg.org
http://www.nctc.gov The site of Search for Common Ground, the
The National Counterterrorism Center has world’s largest NGO working on conflict res-
become the major source of information and olution, is an excellent source for material on
data from the U.S. government regarding this topic.
global terrorism. http://www.historyguy.com
http://www.un.org/terrorism The electronic home of the “History Guy”
On the official site of the United Nations, one provides a number of links to detailed informa-
can access information on terrorism and both tion, articles, and news reports related to politi-
Security Council and General Assembly resolu- cal conflicts.
tions related to political violence. http://www.pcr.uu.se
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si The Conflict Data Project at Uppsala University
The Center for Contemporary Conflict is (Sweden) maintains a rich and current data-
hosted by the Naval Postgraduate School in base on armed conflicts in the world.
California. The site provides information,
Chapter 13
The Developed
Countries of
the Global North

Learning Objectives
13.1 Characterize the types of markets in the Global North and assess their
challenges and achievements regarding the goal of prosperity.
13.2 Identify the obstacles to the political stability of the Global North.
13.3 Trace the development of security challenges to the Global North.

“O, Canada! Our home and native land! True patriot love in all thy sons command . . .”
Voices fill Toronto’s Maple Leaf Gardens as the singing of the national anthem precedes
the Maple Leaf hockey game. But then as the vocalist intones, “O Canada! Terre de
nos aieux, ton front est ceint de fleurons glorieux!” there are boos and catcalls. The
Canadian national anthem continues to glorify the same native land of brave forefa-
thers and heroic exploits. What has happened?
The lyrics are now a symbol of the conflict and disagreement within Canada.
Canada is a single territorial space with one government that is attempting to rule
a population in which “all thy sons” (and daughters) are split into two groups that
share neither culture nor identity. The English-speaking Canadians and the French-
speaking Canadians struggle to establish harmonious coexistence within the same
state. A referendum in 1995 narrowly defeated independence for Quebec, and in 2006,
the Quebecois became an official “nation” within Canada. Although the majority of
Canadians prefer a single country, some continue to argue vehemently that the only
solution to the conflict is the separation of Canada into two countries. The Quebec
separatist party, Parti Quebecois, won the most seats in the 2012 election and, for the
first time, claimed the office of Premier of Quebec.

355
356 Chapter 13

Canada is a complicated place. Although it is the second largest country in the

world, it has a population of only 35 million. It has a skilled labor force and the twelfth
highest GDP (PPP) in the world; yet its economy is dwarfed by its NAFTA partner and
number one export market, the United States, and more than half its assets are foreign
owned. Its annual GDP per capita growth has been a modest 1.9 percent from 2000 to
2012, but it remains extraordinarily rich in natural resources and contains the world’s
third highest level of untapped energy resources.
Canada’s bicameral, parliamentary system has earned the world’s eighth highest
score on the EIU’s Democracy Index as well as top scores on press freedom and reli-
gious freedom. However, there has been significant political instability in the recent
period. The multiparty system experienced a government overthrown by a contempt
(no confidence) vote in 2011. There have been several highly controversial episodes
of “prorogation,” a procedure in which the prime minister dismisses the House of
Commons for a fixed period to prevent the opposition from taking an action viewed as
detrimental to government functioning. Despite a plurality electoral system, there are
multiple parties. In the last two decades, electoral support for some parties has risen
and fallen dramatically and there have been several minority governments.
On balance, Canadians have much to celebrate. Canada is among the “Top Ten”
countries in the world on many measures of quality of life: fourth highest on average
years of schooling, seventh on the Global Peace Index, fifth on economic freedom,

O, Canada! Canada attempts to sustain its national identity, despite the internal split between
Anglophones and Francophones and its long border with the world’s superpower.
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 357

seventh on the Social Progress Index, eighth on average life expectancy, fifth on clean
energy investment, and among the ten lowest on corruption. Canada has one of the
world’s most equal income distributions and a relatively low rate of absolute poverty.
Like Canadians, most citizens of Global North countries live somewhat in the
shadows of the big three: the United States, Germany in Europe, and Japan in Asia.
In these other Global North countries, the average citizen has a high standard of mate-
rial well-being, access to a vast array of high technologies, and full integration into
global society. This Global North citizen enjoys levels of prosperity, stability, and secu-
rity that are the envy (and the goal) of most of the people in the rest of the world. How
the countries of the Global North attempt to meet challenges to their continued high
levels on these elements is the focus of this chapter (CIA 2014; EIU 2013; Freedom
House 2014; Transparency International 2013; World Bank 2013).

The Developed Countries of the Global North

In the classificatory scheme presented in Chapter 10 (Figure 10.1), the countries in the
upper-right corner were identified as the developed countries of the Global North.
These countries are also sometimes referred to as postindustrial societies because of the
growing dominance of the knowledge-based and service-based sectors of their econo-
mies. Figure 10.1 indicates that this group of countries includes Canada, all the countries
of Scandinavia and Western Europe, Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Singapore, South
Korea, Singapore, and the United States, among others. The countries in this group not
only have the highest levels of average wealth in the world, as measured by GDP per
capita (PPP), but also have the world’s highest levels of overall social development,
as measured by the index created for Figure 10.1. Thus these countries are generally
urbanized and secularized, with highly specialized and institutionalized organiza-
tional systems. Their populations are generally characterized by very high rates of adult
literacy, extensive use of information and communications technologies, the world’s
highest-quality health care, and a relatively high standard of material living.
Chapter 13 examines these developed countries of the Global North, and
Chapters 14 and 15 focus on the developing countries of the Global South and the
transitional developed countries, as defined in Chapter 10. Each chapter describes
critical issues for countries in the group. The country clusters are meant to allow for
broad generalizations about their quest for the key goals of prosperity, stability, and
security. General patterns and similarities within each group are emphasized, but you
should keep the following points in mind:

• There are substantial differences among states within each group, especially
among the large number of states lumped together as the developing countries of
the Global South.
• Each state has unique features that are lost in such generalized discussion.
• In some instances, a trait is more similar among certain states across groups than
among all the states within one group.

As these qualifications suggest, this method of grouping countries for analysis

and generalizations is not perfect. Chapter 10 noted that a taxonomy is valuable to the
358 Chapter 13

extent it facilitates comparative thinking and greater understanding of the topics of

interest. You must decide whether the analyses of the country clusters in these three
chapters achieve those objectives. The remainder of this chapter focuses explicitly on
the developed countries of the Global North and their pursuit of prosperity, stability,
and security within the context of the global system.

Goal: Prosperity
13.1 Characterize the types of markets in the Global North and assess their
challenges and achievements regarding the goal of prosperity.
The Global North countries pursue the goal of prosperity (and its components of
economic development, economic growth, and welfare distribution) with great
energy. Based on our classification, these are already the most economically developed
countries in the world. Thus, the emphasis in these countries is on sustaining a high
level of economic growth under the assumption that this will generate an expanding
economic base that provides more material benefits to the population and also enables
government to distribute greater welfare to the citizens.

Mixed Economy
To achieve prosperity, these countries have relied on a mixed political economy, which
includes considerable private ownership and control of productive resources (land,
labor, and capital). Private actors (firms and households) are encouraged to use their
resources aggressively to acquire desired goods, to produce goods, and to maximize
their profit. Chapter 8 characterized the state’s key roles in the mixed political econ-
omy: regulating the free market, providing guidance and incentives for production
decisions, and redistributing some money and goods, mainly to less-advantaged
individuals in the society.
A central policy debate in most of the Global North countries is the appropriate
level of state activity in the political economy. Should the state reduce the taxes and
regulations imposed on private actors under the assumption that the market economy
is more likely to stimulate greater production and higher economic growth, thus ben-
efiting all? Or should the state capture more resources and redistribute them as welfare
to its citizens? This debate is sometimes characterized as “growth versus welfare.”
The countries vary considerably in the extent to which the free market dominates
in the political economy. Each country’s political economy is slowly adjusted as the
balance of political power among key policymakers shifts between those supporting
greater economic freedom and limited government, consistent with classical liberal
ideology, and those supporting a more active state committed to redistributive and
regulatory public policies, consistent with the ideology of democratic socialism. One
broad comparative measure of the public–private mix is the percentage of produc-
tive capacity (measured as GDP) that is in the public sector. Figure 13.1 indicates that
this varies substantially, from more than 50 percent in Denmark, France, Finland, and
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 359

Figure 13.1 General Government Expenditures as a Proportion of GDP

Source: OECD (2013): Table 25.

Switzerland 33.8
Australia 36.9
Japan 40.8
United States 42.5
Canada 44.1
Germany 45.3
United Kingdom 48.7
Ireland 48.7
Italy 49.9
Greece 50.1
Austria 50.6
Sweden 51.3
Finland 54.8
France 56
Denmark 58

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Percent

Sweden to less than 40 percent in Switzerland and Australia. While all of the devel-
oped countries have mixed political economies, the break between a more capitalist
system and a more democratic-socialist system might be defined loosely as about
45 percent of total GDP.
The more democratic-socialist regimes are usually evident in the Scandinavian
countries as well as Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, and the Netherlands. These Global
North countries with mixed economies are called social market systems because the state
encourages an extensive free market economy but is also committed to social welfare distribution
and economic regulation. They are more commonly termed social democracies because the
social market system operates within a highly democratic political society. Compared
with the more free market–oriented countries discussed below, taxation is higher in these
systems and more revenue is reallocated either as transfer payments or as subsidized
goods and services (e.g., health care, housing, educational and cultural opportunities,
public transportation) to the citizens. The state is also more active in regulatory policy,
protecting individuals and society from the undesirable actions of firms (e.g., price fix-
ing, unsafe working conditions, environmental degradation). In some of these social
market systems, the public sector retains control or ownership of some major productive
resources (e.g., energy, transportation) that have strategic importance for the country.
The developed countries in which most economic activity is in the private sector and
the government has a limited role in regulatory and redistributive policies, designated as
market economies, currently include Australia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, and the
360 Chapter 13

United States. Social welfare services are limited toward a basic “safety net” with
which the state protects individuals from only the harshest consequences of poverty.
Government also limits its constraints on private economic activity (e.g., deregulation,
fewer antitrust actions, less protection of unions). Private control of the productive
system is extended through privatization (i.e., the selling off of state-owned firms and con-
tracts to private firms that provide public goods and services). Even in market economies,
most of which are full democracies, certain domains, such as basic education, public
safety, core infrastructure (e.g., roads, sewers), and national defense, are primarily
the responsibility of the public sector. And the state has increased its involvement
with the private sector to improve the country’s competitiveness in the global econ-
omy. Compare in 13 describes key features of the political economies of Sweden and
Switzerland, examples of a social market system and a market economy.

compare in 13
Sweden and Switzerland
Sweden and Switzerland have a lot in common 2014). Yet they differ notably on their approach to
besides the first two letters in the Anglicized versions political economy and their political institutions.
of their names. Relatively small countries with popu- Political Economy. Sweden is a social market
lations between 8 and 10 million, they are among the system. With more than 90 percent of the economy
world’s most developed countries on almost every in private hands, the Swedish state is commit-
measure. Both are very prosperous, with among ted to market capitalism. Sweden is ranked sixth
the world’s best Human Development Index scores in the world on economic competitiveness (World
(ranking seventh and ninth, respectively) and very Economic Forum 2013); yet Sweden has one of the
high levels of GDP per capita (PPP). Both are export- most expansive welfare states in the world. About
oriented economies, with about 70 percent of the one-third of the national economic output is spent
workforce engaged in services and about 30 percent on social programs. Among the benefits available
in industry jobs. Most citizens in each country enjoy to all citizens at little or no direct cost are compre-
a long life (averaging 82 years) filled with high-quality hensive health care, higher education, child care,
material possessions, and the countries rank sixth maternity/paternity leave, job training, and public
and second globally on the Social Progress Index transportation. Those suffering economic hardship
reflecting quality of life and ecosystem sustainability receive substantial income supplements and sup-
(CIA 2014; Social Progress Imperative 2014). port for amenities such as housing. Sweden has the
Public services and the infrastructure of roads world’s most equal distribution of wealth and income
and telecommunications are excellent. Nearly the (ranking first on the Gini index). It also has one of
entire adult population is literate and multilingual. the world’s highest scores on gender equality, with
The incidence of violent crime is very low. Each polit- many women in positions of power and authority in
ical system is a stable, highly institutionalized multi- both the public and private sectors (ranking fourth in
party democracy with an efficient administration and the world, for example, on the percentage [45 percent]
independent judiciary. They have a long history of of women in the national legislature).
neutrality in international affairs, spend among the Systems like Sweden’s are sometimes termed
world’s lowest amounts on the military (as a percent- “cradle to grave” socialism. As one example, the state
age of GDP), and rank in the top 7 on the Global provides complete nursing home care to any elderly
Peace Index (Institute for Economics and Peace citizen for less than 5 percent of the actual costs. The
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 361

regulatory policies of the state are also extensive in of GDP) among all the developed countries. The
both economic life (e.g., environmental protection, Swiss state generally expects citizens to take care of
working conditions, product safety) and social life themselves through the private market, with minimal
(e.g., the state has even banned parental spanking to provision of most public services, except education.
protect children against physical abuse). This exten- Recently, there has been considerable opposition
sive social welfare is financed by high taxes. Total among the citizens to increases in the modest level
taxes paid by citizens and firms are about 57 per- of welfare support that government provides to the
cent of GDP. While this tax burden reduces Swedes’ least advantaged Swiss.
disposable income, most citizens are supportive and Political Institutions. Sweden is a constitutional
proud of their social market system. monarchy with a king. A unitary state, all power
In Switzerland, the state follows a model of lim- emanates from the central government. It is a clas-
ited government with regard to the political economy. sic multiparty parliamentary system, with political
The state exercises very little regulatory control over power centering on the prime minister and cabinet,
its free market economy, which is one of only six who control a unicameral legislature elected by pro-
countries providing full economic freedom according portional representation. It is ranked number two in
to the Heritage Foundation (2014), and the country is the world on the EIU Democracy Index and is the
ranked as the most competitive economy in the world world’s third least corrupt country. The progressive
(World Economic Forum 2013). The constitution Social Democratic Party has held a majority or led
explicitly emphasizes the role of the private sector in a majority coalition for more than 80 percent of the
setting economic policy. Switzerland has one of the period since 1932. Sweden joined the European
lowest rates of taxation and the lowest proportion Union in 1995, but rejected participation in the euro
of overall government spending (about 34.7 percent (currency) zone.

Team Switzerland. The unique Federal Council, a collective executive of seven equal members, poses
with Federal Chancellor Corina Casanova (front row, far right). Each councillor is responsible for one
major department.
362 Chapter 13

Switzerland’s political institutions are unique. a country with complex nation-based distinctions,
The executive (Federal Council) is a collective group including four official languages (German, French,
of seven equal members who each run one major Italian, and Romansch). Switzerland ranks sev-
department and cannot veto legislation, with the enth globally on both the Democracy Index and the
president of the executive changing yearly. The (least) Corruption Perceptions Index. Given its long-
national legislature has two houses, one elected by standing desire for neutrality, Switzerland delayed
proportional representation (PR) and the second by joining the United Nations until 2002 and does not
majority vote. There is no judicial review of the laws. belong to the European Union.
Another aspect of Switzerland’s limited government
is the substantial use of popular voting on policies, Further Questions
based on the view that the people should hold ulti-
1. Which of Switzerland’s rather unique political
mate power. Thus, citizens can use the referendum
institutions do you find most appealing?
process to hold a national vote on any piece of
legislation passed by the legislature. Switzerland is a 2. Is it surprising that two countries with such dif-
confederation composed of 26 cantons (states) with ferent political and economic systems could be
substantial local power and autonomy. This reflects so similar in prosperity and quality of life?

Performance
The developed countries assess their prosperity primarily in terms of economic activ-
ity, usually measured as GDP per capita. Figure 13.2 provides comparative data on
GDP per capita (adjusted for PPP) for many developed countries. Measured on this
indicator, all of the countries in the Global North enjoy considerable prosperity. Only
a few oil-rich ministates (e.g., Qatar, Kuwait) have higher GDP per capita than most
of the developed countries. Most of these countries have been very concerned about
their low rates of growth in GDP per capita, especially in the recent period of global
recession, because there is an assumption that economic growth is critical to the
vitality of the society. Some critics accuse the developed countries of “growthmania”
and suggest that quality of life and citizen satisfaction are better measures of perfor-
mance than an increasing GDP and should be the focus of public policy (Luke 2013).
The Human Development Index (HDI), the second measure in Figure 13.2, is com-
puted by the UN Development Programme (2013) to reflect the quality of life enjoyed by
citizens in a country. It is a composite index that gives equal weight to three indicators: “a
long and healthy life, as measured by life expectancy at birth; knowledge, as measured
by the adult literacy rate and . . . [school] enrollment levels; and a decent standard of liv-
ing, as measured by GDP per capita (PPP)” (UNDP 2008: 394). HDI scores range from
1.00 to 0.0. A score of 1.00 would indicate that all the country’s citizens have attained
the most desirable levels of health, education, and living standards. Broadly, a score of
.800 or above currently represents a “very high” level of human development (47 coun-
tries), scores in the .799–.711 range are “high” levels (47 countries), .710–.535 constitutes a
“medium” level of human development (46 countries), and a score below .535 indicates
a “low” level (45 countries) (UNDP 2013).
Every developed country achieves an HDI score in the “very high” range. Norway
currently has the highest HDI score in the world (.955), followed closely by Australia.
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 363

Figure 13.2 Prosperity Measures for Selected Developed Countries

Source: World Bank 2013; UNDP 2013.

GDP Per Capita (PPP current international $)

( ) Human Development Index
Norway $62,767 (.955)
Singapore $61,803 (.895)
Switzerland $52,063 (.913)
United States $49,965 (.937)
Australia $44,462 (.938)
Austria $43,324 (.895)
Netherlands $42,938 (.921)
Canada $42,693 (.911)
Ireland $42,662 (.916)
Sweden $42,217 (.916)
Denmark $41,388 (.901)
Germany $40,394 (.920)
France $35,845 (.893)
United Kingdom $35,819 (.875)
Japan $35,204 (.912)
South Korea $33,200 (.909)
Italy $32,512 (.881)
Spain $32,129 (.885)
Greece $24,667 (.860)
0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000
GDP per capita ($PPP)

Thus, on both a basic measure of economic production and a quality-of-life index that
adds measures of literacy and health, the developed countries seem relatively success-
ful in achieving their overall prosperity goals. A more comprehensive quality-of-life
index might include many other indicators in addition to the three employed by the
United Nations. If you were attempting to create a comparative measure of the quality
of life across many countries, what indicators would you include?

Challenges to Prosperity
ErratiC ECoNomiC Growth Most Global North countries have periods of solid
economic growth (about 4 percent or higher per year). However, there are also extended
periods, such as in the early years of the decades of the 1980s, 1990s, 2000s, and 2010s,
when many have not sustained the high levels of economic growth that are the basis
of their own definition of prosperity. These countries averaged only 1.7 percent annual
GDP growth from 2000 to 2012 (World Bank 2013). And, more seriously, there are peri-
ods of recession (a negative change in a key economic growth measure). The worldwide
economic decline that began in 2008 has been the most significant period of low or
negative growth that developed countries have suffered in more than 70 years. Almost
364 Chapter 13

every developed country has struggled with weak economic growth in the period since
2008, and some, such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland, and Greece (recall the opening discus-
sion in Chapter 8), have experienced a deep financial crisis. Analysts disagree on all of
the causes of this crisis, but they include risky and often illegal practices in the financial
industry, the dramatic deterioration of overinflated stock markets and housing markets,
government debt, shrinking consumer demand, and high unemployment. All of these
caused huge losses in asset wealth and interacted negatively with one another and with
poor economic growth.

thE CompEtitivE GlobalizEd ECoNomiC SyStEm The economic crisis that

began in 2008 is a powerful example of the vulnerability that all economies face in the
highly interdependent global system. Serious problems in only a few Global North
economies can quickly infect the economies of many other countries, especially among
those in the EU. Moreover, with the increasing power of multinational corporations
and the spread of global markets, a government has less direct control over its own
political economy (Chapter 11). As globalization increases the productive capabilities
of many countries, every Global North country faces increasing competition from the
developing countries, newly industrializing economies, and postcommunist countries,
all of which tend to have lower production costs. As more jobs are outsourced and
more goods are imported, a developed country must struggle with more structural
unemployment and declining economic vitality (Zakaria 2009).

thE EuropEaN uNioN (Eu) aNd thE othErS The developed countries face not
only the complexities of international competition and globalization but also the mul-
tiple challenges of sorting out their economic relations with one another. The competition
for markets and resources has become very intense between the EU and those Global
North countries that are not members of the EU (especially the United States and Japan).
While the 28 member states within the European Union enjoy substantial economic
advantages, some members have resisted its uniform policies (e.g., on agriculture, on
government debt, on contributions) and have continued to protect their national eco-
nomic prerogatives. Moreover, the less prosperous EU members (many of which are not
yet Global North countries in Figure 10.1) drain resources from the wealthier members.
And the fragile interdependencies among the stronger and weaker member states in the
eurozone have been highlighted by the economic crises in countries such as Greece and
Ireland, which required major bailouts to protect the value of the euro (McCormick 2006).

thE diStributioN of proSpErity The governments of the developed countries

have a substantial list of goods and services that they want to distribute to their citi-
zens. However, extensive public spending combined with low economic growth results
in serious fiscal challenges. An increasing proportion of the population does not work
due to unemployment or aging. Despite the high GDP per capita, the proportion of
people in poverty is between 10 and 20 percent in the majority of these countries and
inequality in the distribution of prosperity among the citizens is growing (CIA 2013).
In the market economies, persistent poverty and inequality are especially problem-
atic issues because the state is not very generous in alleviating these hardships. This
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 365

situation can produce an “underclass” of citizens who are permanently disadvantaged

in education, job skills, housing, health care, and most broadly, quality of life (Wilson
1997). The current situation is also a problem for the social democracies, given their
commitment to an extensive role for government in the redistribution of prosperity to
all their citizens (Castles 2004; Castles et al. 2010).
Twelve of these countries, mostly the social democracies, are still among the
20 major countries with the world’s most equal income distributions (the others
are postcommunist developed countries discussed in Chapter 15). As the costs of
government continue to rise, there are larger budget deficits and growing resistance
to higher taxes. The Debate in 13 considers whether the costly commitments of the
social democratic model can be sustained. In the brutally competitive global econ-
omy, no developed country has resolved the public policy issues related to sustain-
ing economic growth and distributing prosperity, and the debate over these issues is
intense. Nevertheless, the current bottom line is that the developed countries of the
Global North have a better overall record than any other set of countries in the world
in delivering higher absolute levels of prosperity to most citizens.

The Debate in 13
Are the Social Democracies Dying?
Surveys often identify most of Europe’s social undermines the country’s credit rating, currency
democracies as among the happiest places on Earth, strength, and overall fiscal health (Laquer 2009).
where citizens enjoy a high level of services provided • The social democratic model puts an enormous
by the state (Levy 2010). These services include burden on economic growth by aggressively
deeply subsidized or free health care, education, and taxing wages and profits. Those funds should
public transportation, as well as unemployment pro- be left in the hands of wage earners and entre-
tection, care for the elderly, and many other publicly preneurs where they will stimulate innovation,
provided benefits (an example of a social democ- encourage investment, and create more incen-
racy is Sweden, described in the Compare in 13). tives for people to work hard.
However, critics suggest that these social welfare • The citizens’ votes tell the story: There has been
states are unsustainable because this vast array of a significant decline in voter support for par-
government services is too expensive for the public ties (e.g., the Social Democrats in Denmark,
sector to afford. Particularly during the global reces- Germany, and Sweden; Spain’s Socialist Workers
sion, an animated policy debate in the countries in Party; and Britain’s Labour Party) that are asso-
Scandinavia and Western Europe is: Are the social ciated with higher taxes and extensive public
democracies dying? spending on social welfare. And the anti–social
welfare, anti-tax parties and movements have
The Social Democracies Are Dying gained substantial strength in the social democra-
• The governments of most European social cies (Castles et al. 2010).
democracies (e.g., Greece, Spain) are running • Many citizens agree that generous provision of
very large deficits as they attempt to provide welfare services produces a significant number of
extensive welfare services. Social welfare goods people who become dependent on government
substantially drain government resources relative support and who lose the initiative to work and
to the revenue they generate. This overspending take responsibility for themselves (Murray 1984).
366 Chapter 13

• The government can no longer afford the exces- in demand when the economy improves and rev-
sive salaries and generous pension plans that enues increase (Cronin, Ross, and Shoch 2011).
have historically supported the large and over- • The political and social costs of severe reduc-
staffed public employee unions that provide tions in social welfare programs, such as health
most of the state’s social welfare services. care or poverty assistance, would be dramatic.
Even citizens who support long-term cuts in
The Social Democracies Are Alive and Well social welfare services will reconsider their views
• Citizens of most social democracies enjoy a when they see the actual impacts of such reduc-
combination of the world’s highest standard of tions, resulting in a substantial decline in the
living, greatest prosperity, greatest income equal- support for extreme fiscal restraint and anti-tax
ity, and strong democracy. The social democratic movements (Castles et al. 2010).
model is sustainable because its citizens recog- • The political parties most closely aligned with
nize that that they are generally more satisfied the social democratic ideology have been
with their lives than the citizens in any other sys- extremely successful in elections during the
tem in the world (Brandal, Bratberg, and Thorsen past three decades, reflecting broad, long-term
2013; Levy 2010). citizen support for their policies. As economic
• The current revenue and deficit problems affect conditions improve, a resurgence of support for
the governments of all developed countries, these parties will occur (Hill 2010).
not just the social democracies. It is the global
recession and financial crisis, not social welfare More questions …
programs, that are the root cause of current fis-
1. Will the strong, sometimes violent, resistance to
cal problems in the Global North (Rajan 2010).
reductions in social welfare programs (e.g., in
• The majority of citizens in social democracies do Greece, Spain, and others) enhance or reduce
not support severe and permanent cuts in their the overall support for social democracy?
governments’ policies that provide social welfare
2. What reductions in the social welfare programs
services. Even if social democracies reduce some
do you think are most defensible? Which are
programs to balance budgets during the reces-
least desirable?
sion, reinstatement of those program levels will be

Goal: Stability
13.2 identify the obstacles to the political stability of the Global North.
The developed countries of the Global North have been generally successful in achiev-
ing their stability goals of democratization, political institutionalization, and order
maintenance.

Liberal Democracies
All the Global North countries are constitutional democracies, and thus leaders and
policies are constrained by the rule of law. Extensive political rights and civil liberties
are enjoyed by the citizens, as reflected in the world’s highest scores from Freedom
House (2014), except for Singapore, which is only “partly free.” Individuals and groups
have substantial freedom to criticize and oppose the government and to engage in a
wide variety of nonviolent political actions to change leaders and policies. Leaders
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 367

operate with a limited mandate, leadership succession is regularized, and the selec-
tion of many public officials is based on citizen elections with genuine alternatives.
Chapter 3 indicated that most Global North countries have moderately high political
involvement, at least with regard to elections and interest in politics.
Chapters 6 and 7 described the variation in the political structures and institu-
tions of these liberal democracies. Most are stable parliamentary governments,
with multiparty systems based on coalitions (e.g., Denmark, Germany, Sweden). A
few experience instability due to the fragmented nature of the party system (Italy).
Many countries have dual executives, often with a constitutional monarch (e.g., the
United Kingdom, Japan, Sweden). There are a few hybrids with an elected president
in addition to the cabinet and prime minister (e.g., Austria, France [recall Focus in
7]). The United States is an exception as a presidential government with a two-party
system, and Switzerland is an exception as a council system.
Political power is distributed rather than concentrated in a single governmental
structure. Most are unitary states, although there are several federations (e.g., Canada,
Germany, the United States). Even in the unitary states, policy implementation for many
human and welfare services is decentralized to local governments. The national legisla-
tures are important actors in the policy process, with about half being unicameral. These
countries generally have the world’s lowest levels of corruption, and their governments
operate with large, efficient bureaucracies and relatively independent judiciaries.

Political Institutionalization
The developed countries have high levels of political institutionalization; that is,
substantial capabilities, value, and stability support political structures and processes. Some
developed countries have restructured their political system in the last 70 years. Many
created new constitutional systems after World War II had undermined the legitimacy
of their previous political regimes, as in Austria, France, Italy, Japan, and Germany.
One goal of the restructuring was to distribute power more broadly within the politi-
cal system and to increase the participation and influence of the citizens. Democratic
political processes are now firmly established throughout the Global North.
The governments in many of the developed countries evolved over centuries
by means of gradual and generally nonviolent mechanisms of political change. This
pattern applies to states such as Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Sweden, Switzerland, the
United Kingdom, and the United States. The distribution and uses of political power
have changed as new groups gain admission to and influence in the political system,
extending participation steadily until mass representative democracy is created. This
“politics of inclusion” has drawn important groups into the political process and built
their support for the political system, reducing their need to use mechanisms such as
violence to achieve their political goals.
In the United Kingdom, for example, evolving political inclusion for more than
800 years has ensured the stability of the regime. The basic story line is that the political
system has slowly drawn new groups into the political process, penetrating downward
from the most powerful to the least powerful citizens. Starting in 1215, the substantial
368 Chapter 13

political powers of the hereditary monarch were limited and the power of the national
legislature was increased. Equally significant, the British electorate expanded steadily,
as new classes of the population were granted political rights by lowering barriers
based on wealth, gender, and age. Political inclusion also affected the political party
system, which adapted to the social and economic composition of the citizenry. For
example, at the beginning of the twentieth century, a new Labour Party was formed
to represent the British working class. In 1945, the Labour Party gained enough seats
in the House of Commons to form a government majority and enact significant new
public policies that established “the welfare state” and greatly benefited the working
class and the poor. Further adaptations in the party system have accommodated the
growing national identity in Northern Ireland, Wales, and especially Scotland. While
there are occasional outbreaks of political instability in Britain, the politics of inclu-
sion have been effective in incorporating new political forces into the institutionalized
political regime and sustaining a highly stable political system.

Order Maintenance
The developed countries have had varying levels of success in meeting the stability
goal of order maintenance. This goal can be interpreted as the absence of disorder in the
political, social, and personal domains. Disorder includes political violence (e.g., illegal
demonstrations, riots, rebellions, coups, and revolutions), social disorders (e.g., murder,
rape, robbery, white-collar crime, and organized crime), and personal disorders (e.g.,
suicide and substance abuse). While a few Global North countries have exceptionally
high levels of order maintenance, such as Switzerland and Singapore (see Focus in 13),
most are neither the most orderly nor the most disorderly in the political world.

Focus in 13
Welcome to the Brave New World: Singapore
Singapore has used government policy more expan- decades. For example, to deal with traffic congestion,
sively to achieve order maintenance than any other the government maintains a strict quota on the num-
developed country. A small island of 5.5 million ber of cars imported. An individual who purchases a
people located off Malaysia, Singapore gained inde- new car must pay import duties and registration taxes
pendence from Britain in 1963 and became a repub- that triple the car’s market price. To reduce the mas-
lic in 1965. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew exercised sive yearly automobile registration fee, the driver can
singular power for 31 years (until 1990) and guided save $10,000 per year by purchasing a special red
the country to remarkable economic success. Lee still license that allows only nighttime and weekend driv-
plays a powerful role, with his son as prime minister. ing. The high toll road charges and other auto fees
Its annual economic growth rate has averaged more are used to subsidize an efficient mass transit system.
than 7 percent since 1965. Its GDP per capita (PPP) To promote financial responsibility and per-
has risen dramatically, placing it fourth in the world in sonal savings by its citizens, the government places
terms of its overall prosperity. 34 percent of each worker’s wages in a special fund.
Singapore is also notable for the remarkable The worker can use these forced savings only to
social control policies first instituted by Prime Minister buy government stocks, to purchase a house, or for
Lee and the parliament he dominated for three retirement.
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 369

The state uses the media and the schools to government-subsidized home mortgage, but they
support extensive campaigns to discourage certain lose the subsidy if they have a third child. To increase
behaviors, such as spitting in public, long hair on men, the low childbearing rate among college graduates,
and littering. The stiff penalties imposed to enforce its the government’s Social Development Unit offers a
social control policies received worldwide attention in computer-matching service for educated singles.
1994 with the caning of visiting U.S. teenager Michael One program, eventually discontinued, offered these
Faye for painting graffiti on automobiles. For many smart singles a government-funded vacation at a
offenses, there are heavy on-the-spot fines: in U.S. romantic seaside holiday camp.
dollar equivalents, $400 for jaywalking, $800 for litter- Because of such extensive policies of social
ing, $400 for eating on public transit, $800 for smoking control, Singapore has been subjected to jokes and
in a public place, $800 for dropping chewing gum, and serious criticism about its limitations on civil liber-
$400 for feeding birds in the park. To prevent speed- ties. But no one denies that the country is exception-
ing, all taxicabs are equipped with a bell that begins to ally orderly, clean, and efficient.
ring loudly as soon as the taxi exceeds the legal speed
limit, and there is a yellow light on top of trucks that Further Focus
flashes when the driver goes too fast. Technological
1. Would you accept Singapore’s substantial
surveillance includes computerized camera systems
restrictions on personal freedom in exchange
that record the license plates of cars that violate traf-
for an exceptionally high level of order,
fic laws and odor-activated video cameras in elevators
cleanliness, and efficiency in your society?
that record anyone who urinates in the elevator (the
person is also locked in). There is even a law against 2. Does Singapore demonstrate that a country
failing to flush after using a public urinal. with minimal democracy (recall Chapter 7) can
Singapore also instituted a set of unsubtle sustain high prosperity (a GDP per capita [PPP]
eugenics/population control policies. Women greater than every major developed country
with less than a high school education are given a except Norway)?

Source: By permission of Mike Luckovich and Creators Syndicate, Inc.

370 Chapter 13

The politics of these states is characterized by pluralism (see Chapter 9), with
multiple competing elites and groups. The vigorous group politics and the broad
opportunities for political action allow for some political turbulence, which does occur,
especially during periods of citizen dissatisfaction with economic or social conditions.
Although there are occasional outbursts of significant political violence, these states
enjoy relatively high levels of political order.
The level and nature of social and personal disorder varies considerably among
the states and among different populations within states, and thus it is difficult to
generalize. The Netherlands, Norway, and Japan, for example, have relatively low
levels of social disorder such as violent crime. Yet Japan has one of the highest suicide
rates in the world, alcohol abuse is high in Norway, and drug abuse is high in the
Netherlands. France, Italy, and the United States, in contrast, are relatively high on
most measures of social and personal disorder and are among the increasing number
of developed countries with substantial problems related to substance abuse and
drug-related crime, especially among the lower classes. What explanations do you
think best account for the fact that some of the developed countries seem to have such
high levels of social and personal disorder?

Challenges to Stability
valuE CoNfliCtS aNd diSputES Because the Global North countries allow
open group politics, the active disagreements about specific policies and even about
fundamental values can produce instability. The political ideologies of classical liberal-
ism, conservatism, and democratic socialism are each embraced by some citizens and,
along with numerous other “isms” (e.g., feminism, environmentalism, and religious
fundamentalism), shape complex political cultures. There is strong support for the
fundamental principles of democracy. However, during the last several decades, most
developed countries have experienced a substantial decline in citizens’ trust and
confidence in political leaders and in key political institutions, including legislatures,
political parties, and bureaucracies (Dalton 2013; Pharr and Putnam 2000).
There are ongoing political debates, sometimes intense, regarding the degree to
which the state should have an active role in the political economy and should distribute
generous welfare benefits to various groups in the society. This is related to other policy
disagreements on the level of taxation and the extent of government regulation of the
economy. Both the Compare in 13 on Sweden and Switzerland and the Debate in 13 on
social democracy reflect some of these differences.
Another area of enduring value conflicts centers on disputes about the circum-
stances in which state regulation of individual behavior is legitimate. Such regulation
might be justified to preserve social peace, promote the collective good, protect the
rights and freedom of others, or protect the individual from himself and others. In the
United States, for example, state constraints on private behavior generate controversy,
political disorder, and occasional violence regarding such areas of public policy as
abortion, free speech (media, Internet), gay rights, control of firearms, and marijuana
legalization.
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 371

multiCulturaliSm aNd immiGratioN Most developed countries are strug-

gling with issues arising from their cultural diversity. The desire for regional autonomy
has been a source of occasional instability in some countries with a long history of mul-
tiple nationalities (e.g., the Quebecois in Canada, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the
Walloons and Flemish in Belgium). And some of the instability is due to clashes between
the majority ethnic group and native-born minorities, especially people of Afro-Caribbean
or Arabic descent. For example, the concern about “home-grown terrorists” in England
has soured relations between the Anglo majority and Britain’s Muslims (Leiken 2009).
However, the main source of recent instability is due to intensifying conflicts related to
immigration. Legal immigration within the EU, for example, has resulted in large enclaves
of “foreigners” from Southern and Eastern Europe whose languages and customs grate
on some in the ethnic majority in Western and Northern European countries. And illegal
immigration is an even more disruptive issue in some Global North countries such as the
United States, where the treatment of nearly 12 million individuals who have entered the
country without permission is a major public policy puzzle.
Every country faces policy debates about cultural diversity: The French banned
full-face-hiding veils in public and the wearing of head scarves and other “religious
symbols” in schools; the Danes reversed their open-door policy and place stringent
restrictions on immigration; Italy called for revision of the EU’s open internal borders
policy. These kinds of responses have generated counterdemands for policies sup-
porting multiculturalism and protecting minority rights (e.g., bilingualism in Canada,
a citizenship process for illegal immigrants in the United States). At this point, the
conflicts associated with diverse cultures and nonnative populations are an issue in
almost every developed country.

politiCal polarizatioN The political elites and governments are committed

to working within the framework of representative democracy and group politics
as they attempt to resolve value conflicts. They are generally successful in establish-
ing compromises on issues that might become highly politicized. However, pluralism
is not well suited to situations in which there is substantial political polarization as
politics becomes a battleground between large, mobilized groups with conflicting and deeply
held values and centrist policies and center parties are only weakly supported by the
citizens. In such situations of “hyperpluralism,” it is extremely difficult for policymakers
to make decisions and resolve conflicts because it is often impossible to satisfy the
opposing viewpoints. If key groups become dissatisfied with government paraly-
sis and unresponsiveness, they can make increasingly strident political demands,
engage in aggressive political actions in support of their policy preferences, and pro-
duce high levels of political instability. Some states, such as the Netherlands, Norway,
and Switzerland, have limited these problems by nurturing a cultural style of social
tolerance or by developing political institutions that accommodate competing groups
(Lijphart 2007). However, the governments of most Global North countries currently are
challenged by increasing polarization and intolerance among political groups.

domiNatioN aNd CoNtrol? Some analysts offer a far more critical description
of how many of the developed countries maintain order. They describe societies in
372 Chapter 13

which the state controls its citizens by coercion rather than consensus, combining lim-
ited welfare distribution, extensive political socialization, and effective restraints on
public life by the state’s agents (e.g., the police, the bureaucracy, the judicial system).
Some class and elite theorists also argue that most developed countries are controlled
by a “hegemonic elite”—a network of extraordinarily powerful, overlapping groups
that sustain their domination over a long period of time (Domhoff 2005, 2013; Esping-
Andersen 1990; Poulantzas 1973). These theorists insist that politics in the Global
North countries is not a fair competition among groups, that the state is not a neutral
referee, and that most public policies enable certain groups to maintain their advan-
taged position in society. Thus, privileged groups reap huge benefits from public
policy, and most citizens derive minimal gains in the quality of their lives (Chapter 9).
It is clear that the developed countries do have powerful and effective institutions
that can shape the political process, control groups, and contain instability. Even the
pluralist explanation acknowledges that there are huge inequalities in the political
resources available to different groups (Dahl 1961; Lundberg 2013). There is no doubt
that certain institutions and individuals have extraordinary powers to shape politi-
cal life in Global North countries (Johnson 2009). Yet most analysts and most citizens
see no compelling evidence that these political systems are dominated by self-serving,
nondemocratic elites. In response, radical (Marxist) theorists interpret such citizen
views as evidence that the state can fool most of the people all of the time. One of
the great (and perhaps impossible) challenges for political scientists is to develop an
indisputable empirical analysis of how political power is exercised, how values are
allocated, and how order is maintained in the developed countries.

Goal: Security
13.3 trace the development of security challenges to the Global North.
The first half of the twentieth century was a period with substantial insecurity, marked
by two massive multistate wars among Global North countries. The borders of most
of the states survived intact (there are notable exceptions, including Austria-Hungary
after World War I and Germany after World War II), but many states were devastated in
human, material, and political terms by these wars. Since the end of World War II in 1945,
the developed countries have generally enjoyed success in the pursuit of their basic secu-
rity goals, especially survival and freedom. Arguably, the greatest security victory during
the recent period is the collapse in 1990 of the communist state in the Soviet Union, which
had been a significant threat to the countries of the Global North. Global North countries
are still establishing new arrangements for security in the post–Cold War global system.

The Era of Colonialism

Some Global North countries have been extremely successful at extending their
influence or control over other states to enhance their own security goals. Belgium,
France, Germany, Japan, Portugal, Spain, and the United States dominated substantial
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 373

colonial territories until the mid-twentieth century. In 1945, Great Britain was the
leading colonial power, controlling more than one-fourth of the world’s population
in its worldwide empire. Colonialism was a means by which many of these countries
furthered their security goals. Although their colonial holdings are now independent
states, some developed countries continue to exert their power through neocolonial-
ism, as described in Chapter 11.

The Cold War Period

From World War II until the late 1980s, the security-oriented actions of most developed
countries were powerfully influenced by the international struggle between the United
States and the Soviet Union, generally called the Cold War. During the Cold War period,
both U.S. and Soviet policies were based on the assumption that the main threat to the
security of the world was the other superpower. Each country maintained an exten-
sive military, including a large nuclear arsenal, and a collective security group in an
attempt to protect its own territory and allies. Each also applied considerable military,
economic, and political power in competitive and costly efforts to influence or control
the actions of many developing countries and deter its rival from gaining advantage
in those countries.
Not all political elites in the Global North countries shared the perception of a
bipolar struggle between the forces of good and evil. Some states (e.g., Austria,
Finland, Switzerland) maintained a position of neutrality during the Cold War. Others
(e.g., Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden) emphasized a more con-
ciliatory policy of détente (relaxation of tensions) between the United States and Soviet
Bloc, based on the view that both blocs had common interests in maintaining their
superior position internationally and preventing a global nuclear war. This latter view
became more widespread by the late 1980s due to the conflict-reducing initiatives of
Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The Post–Cold War Period

By 1990, with a speed that stunned the world, the Soviet Bloc countries and even the
Soviet Union were transformed (see Chapter 15). These countries moved away from
communism and toward democratic politics and market economies. They sought
economic cooperation rather than military conflict with the United States and Western
Europe. The Cold War seemed to end with the unification of East and West Germany
(1990) and even more with the breakup of the Soviet Union (1991) into 15 countries.
Currently, 8 of the world’s 13 highest spenders on military are Global North coun-
tries, whose combined military spending is more than $970 billion per year. The United
States alone accounts for 37 percent of this total (SIPRI 2014). The global military power
of the United States is unmatched, and it projects this power extensively in some cases,
as in Iraq and Afghanistan. However, the developed countries now generally emphasize
collective security arrangements through the United Nations and NATO (Walt 2006).
Most are not conflict oriented. For example, 16 of the Global North countries are among
374 Chapter 13

the 18 countries with the highest scores on the Global Peace Index (IEP 2013). While
there is a general assumption that a major military conflict among any Global North
countries is inconceivable, the evolving international system does pose at least four
major security challenges, which are described next.

Challenges to Security
diSordEr iN thE rESt of thE world Most major political violence occurs in
the Global South, as it did during the Cold War period. In Afghanistan, Colombia,
Congo, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, and Tibet, among others, complex patterns of disorder
persist, despite various strategies of intervention by the developed countries and
international organizations. In each situation, governments of the Global North must
weigh the security benefits from stabilizing a distant part of the international system
against the substantial costs of intervening and the difficulty (impossibility?) of main-
taining stability in many of those countries (Brzezinski 2004). And Russia has recom-
mitted itself to a strong military presence and a sphere of influence along its very long
borders, which can result in disorder and conflict affecting the Global North, as in the
recent turmoil related to Ukraine.

GlobalizatioN of tErroriSm The individuals perceived to represent Global

North institutions in the rest of the world are attractive targets for terrorist violence.
As recent beheadings by Islamic State reveal, protecting them is difficult. And while
the great majority of terrorist acts are committed in developing countries, globaliza-
tion has facilitated the extensive movement of people and information that has placed
cells of terrorists in every country in the Global North. The Global North countries
have never been more vulnerable to terrorist attacks by “home-grown terrorists” and
individuals from the Global South. Such groups committed the deadly attacks on the
U.S. World Trade Center and the Pentagon in September 2001 and on the mass transit
systems in Madrid (2004) and London (2005).

prolifEratioN of wEapoNS The heavy armaments of Russia and the United

States have been significantly reduced by agreements during the post–Cold War
period (e.g., START II). However, this period is also characterized by the expansion of
military power in many states, the ease with which chemical and biological weapons
can be acquired, and the spread of nuclear capabilities. Equally serious is the wide-
spread distribution of light weapons (e.g., guns, shoulder-fired missiles, land mines)
to irregular forces in countries everywhere, because such weapons cause most of the
casualties from political violence (Klare 1997). The developed countries, which lead
the world in the production and sales of military hardware, have failed to implement
effective strategies to prevent the further proliferation of weapons. Indeed, more than
half of the weapons sold in the global market are supplied by Global North countries,
led by the United States, Germany, and France (SIPRI 2014).

CompEtitioN for markEtS aNd rESourCES Earlier discussion emphasized

that the global economic competition for markets and resources has become a source
of increasing conflict (Chapter 11). The countries of the Global North compete not only
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 375

with one another but also with an increasing number of other countries. China has led
the way among many Global South countries and transitional economies whose lower
labor costs and increasing ability to purchase worldwide resources have been a net
negative for economic health of the most developed countries. Global North countries
can no longer dictate to their advantage where the desirable jobs are, who gets scarce
resources (e.g., energy, food), and who garners the maximum benefits and profits in
the global marketplace. Fierce economic competition among states, regions, and mul-
tinational corporations could be the greatest source of insecurity for the developed
countries in the era of globalization (Zakaria 2009).

The Developed Countries

of the Global North Overall
In terms of pursuing the broad goals of prosperity, stability, and security, the devel-
oped countries of the Global North generally have the highest levels of success in the
world. These states have the most advanced systems of economic production, with
evolved political economies based on a mix of capitalism and democratic socialism.
The majority of productive resources remain under private control, and most states
have established a substantial program of welfare distribution to the citizenry. Most
of their citizens enjoy a higher standard of living than is available to the majority of
people in any other part of the world.
By exercising their considerable economic, military, and political power in the
global system, the developed countries have also met their security goals. They have a
strong record of survival, influence, and some domination of countries outside the
Global North. In their pursuit of security goals, they achieved “victory” in the Cold
War against the Soviet Union. The leading developed countries still exercise their
power energetically to maintain their advantages in the international system.
The developed countries, perhaps because of their prosperity and security, have
been able to maintain relatively open, fair, and stable politics. There are tensions
between the commitment to individual freedom and limited government, on the one
hand, and state intervention to increase equality of outcomes, on the other. Although
pluralism is occasionally strained, a wide range of political beliefs and actions is
tolerated. Many individuals and groups are able to mobilize their political resources
to influence the processes of government and decision making, and citizens have the
right to select among leadership elites at regular intervals. In comparison with other
countries during the past 60 years, the developed countries of the Global North receive
high marks for maintaining constitutional, participatory politics.
The success of the Global North countries in achieving prosperity, stability, and
security is not unqualified. Some of their citizens live in relative poverty and despair,
and increasing inequalities in wealth and income might be the Achilles’ heel of their
prosperity. The recent economic turbulence has resulted in reduced economic vitality,
cuts in the distribution of welfare, and lowered confidence that there is greater
376 Chapter 13

prosperity in the future. Also, critics, especially in developing countries, argue that
the developed countries have maintained their prosperity by exploitation—of the
poor within their own societies and of the populations and resources of other states
by means of neocolonialism and military intervention. The countries of the Global
North have not reached the top by being passive or generous, but globalization and
the emergence of new economic powers might undermine some of their advantages
in access to resources and markets. Chapters 14 and 15 identify some of the emerging
issues that the Global North will face from the Global South and the transitional devel-
oped countries.
Security issues have become more complex as the Soviet threat, which encouraged
cooperation among the developed countries, has been replaced by more diverse and
complex threats. These include increasingly violent regional instabilities in the Global
South; the insecurities associated with the current forms of terrorism; the intensify-
ing competition for diminishing resources; and the complex destabilizing impacts of
globalization on relations with allies, competitors, and adversaries. All of these pres-
sures present important challenges to Global North countries in their effort to remain
dominant in the global system.

Key Concepts
Cold War, p. 373 Human Development Index postindustrial societies, p. 357
Global North, p. 357 (HDI), p. 362 privatization, p. 360
Global South, p. 357 political institutionalization, social democracies, p. 359
mixed political economy, p. 367 social market system, p. 359
p. 358 political polarization, p. 371 underclass, p. 365

For Further Consideration

1. How would you further classify the coun- by the state are appropriate and might be
tries of the Global North into two or more effective?
subsets? What criteria would you use? 4. Write a script or role-play (with others)
2. In the current period, what is the greatest a situation in which a classical liberal, a
threat to the stability of the Global North? conservative, and a democratic socialist dis-
What is the most appropriate strategy to cuss the virtues and failings of a particular
reduce that threat? developed country.
3. How should the desirable level of distribu- 5. If you were to create a quality of life index,
tion of prosperity among citizens in a society what measures would you include? Rank
be determined? Should the state do anything the importance you would attach to the
to ensure that prosperity is distributed more various measures and explain why you
equally among its citizens? What actions have given those rankings.
 The Developed Countries of the Global North 377

For Further Reading

burgess, anthony. (1970). A Clockwork Orange. laquer, walter. (2009). The Last Days of Europe:
harmondsworth, uk: penguin. A dystopian Epitaph for an Old Continent. New york: St.
novel describing a near-future Britain in which martin’s Griffin. A strong critique of the cur-
youth gangs rule the mean streets of a divided rent directions of European social democracies,
and amoral society. Stanley Kubrick’s chilling especially due to the problems with sustaining
film of the same title was based on this book. the welfare state, difficulties within the EU
Castles, francis G., Stephan leibfried, Jane framework, and the challenges of immigration.
lewis, herbert obinger, and Christopher marmor, theodore, richard freeman, and kieke
pierson, eds. (2010). The Oxford Handbook okma, eds. (2009). Comparative Studies and
of the Welfare State. New york: oxford the Politics of Modern Medical Care. New
university press. A comprehensive set of more haven, Ct: yale university press. A series of
than 50 essays exploring many topics regarding thoughtful essays by experts on the key policy
the philosophy, implementation, challenges, issues facing health care reform in the devel-
and future of the modern welfare state. oped countries, including Canada, Germany,
Cini, michelle, and Nieves pereze-Slorzano the United Kingdom, and the United States.
borragan, eds. (2013). European Union Nye, Joseph S. (2011). The Future of Power. New
Politics. 4th ed. oxford: oxford university york: publicaffairs. Nye extends his ideas
press. A comprehensive overview of the theo- about military, economic, and soft power
ries, policies, institutions, and issues that make through a rich analysis of how the United States
up the politics of the EU in a data-rich and can combine these with “smart power” to limit
current volume. its decline as the dominant power in the world.
hill, Stephen. (2010). Europe’s Promise: Why the pharr, Susan J., and robert d. putnam, eds.
European Way Is the Best Hope for an Insecure (2000). Disaffected Democracies: What’s
Age. berkeley: university of California press. Troubling the Trilateral Countries? princeton,
A detailed argument that the social democra- NJ: princeton university press. A strong and
cies of Western Europe provide the most desir- diverse set of essays exploring the extent to
able future course, based on such virtues as which citizens in the advanced democracies
their approaches to health care, environmental have lost confidence and trust in their political
sustainability, pluralist democracy, trade net- leaders and political institutions, and even in
work, and social market economies democratic processes.
hubbard, Glenn, and tim kane. (2013). Balance: powell, G. bingham, kaare Strom, and russell
The Economics of Great Powers from Ancient J. dalton, eds. (2012). Comparative Politics
Rome to Modern America. New york: Simon Today: A World View. 10th ed. New york:
and Schuster. Written by two economists, this longman. Solid case-by-case studies of
book demonstrates how economic imbalances selected developed countries (England, France,
within a state can lead to civil collapse. Germany, Japan, and the United States) as well
kennedy, paul. (1989). The Rise and Fall of the as Brazil, China, Egypt, India, Mexico, Nigeria,
Great Powers. New york: random house. A and Russia, employing structural-functional
sweeping analysis of how countries such as the concepts (recall Chapter 5).
United Kingdom and the United States become rawnsley, andrew. (2010). The End of the Party:
the strongest in the world and then decline. The Rise and Fall of New Labour. london:
378 Chapter 13

penguin. A spellbinding account of the politi- Using case studies, interviews, and quantita-
cal machinations among the leaders of the tive data, a distinguished political scientist
British Labour Party (especially Tony Blair offers a comprehensive (at 900+ pages) and
and Gordon Brown) from 2001 to 2010 by an compelling perspective on how the 19 “rich
acclaimed journalist. For a hilarious, rude sat- democracies” have evolved over the last half-
ire of British politicians in the same era, see the century, with particular attention to social
film In the Loop (2009). policy and a focus on the interplay among the
tsoukalis, loukas, and Janis Emmanouilidis, form of political economy, political institu-
eds. (2011). The Delphic Oracle on Europe: Is tions, and key political actors.
There a Future for the European Union? New zakaria, fareed. (2009). The Post-American
york: oxford university press. The current World. New york: basic books. This provides
debates over the challenges facing the EU dur- a readable exploration of the likely reduc-
ing a period of internal disagreements, evolv- tion in dominance, but also the continuing
ing institutions, and global complexity are strengths, of the United States in the emerg-
explored by scholars and policymakers. ing global system characterized by “the rise
wilensky, harold. (2002). Rich Democracies. of rest” and especially countries like China,
berkeley: university of California press. India, and Russia.

On the Web
http://europa.eu/index_en.htm world’s largest regional security organization,
The official Web site of the European Union which is centered in Europe but now includes
provides detailed information about each EU 56 member states, provides extensive infor-
member state. mation regarding issues related to the goal of
http://www.oecd.org security.
The Organization for Economic Cooperation http://www.usa.gov
and Development is a cooperative association of The official Web portal for the U.S. govern-
30 member countries, primarily the developed ment, the site offers many links to the agencies
countries plus a few of the most economically and information associated with the various
advanced countries in Eastern Europe and Asia. governmental institutions in the United States.
The OECD site provides information about its http://www.canada.gc.ca
activities as well as data on member states. The official Web site of the Canadian govern-
http://www.coldwar.org ment, with links to the agencies of the central
The home page of the Cold War Museum con- and provincial governments.
tains a number of fascinating online exhibits http://gov.uk
and an online discussion forum regarding this The Web site for the government of the United
important period. Kingdom, with multiple links to government
http://www.osce.org agencies, services, and information.
The electronic home of the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, the
Chapter 14
The Developing
Countries of the
Global South

Learning Objectives
14.1 Group the Global South into distinct geographical and political regions.
14.2 Identify the main obstacles to development faced by those in the Global
South.
14.3 Outline the strategies the Global South has used to achieve economic
development.
14.4 Assess the level of interstate violence and economic security within the
Global South.
14.5 Identify factors that lead to political stability in the Global South.
14.6 Evaluate the reported “rise of the South.”

In ancient times, the Gold Coast of West Africa was home to several flourishing king-
doms and many linguistic groups. The area had sufficient food, rich resources, and
land for all. From about the sixteenth century, the peoples of the Gold Coast devel-
oped trade with several European powers, exporting commodities, especially gold
and cocoa, and serving as a key location in the extensive slave trade in West Africa.
The British conquered the area in the 1870s and ruled it as a colony for 90 years. Then,
in 1957, the Gold Coast became the first colonial territory in sub-Saharan Africa to gain
its independence, as a country called Ghana.
At independence, there was widespread optimism that Ghana would be the model
of political and economic development for many countries emerging from colonialism.
Its leader, Dr. Kwame Nkrumah (in photo on page 380), became an effective spokes-
person for African freedom and development in the postcolonial era. Ghana’s first fair

379
380 Chapter 14

Giants of the postcolonial era: President Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana greets President Sukarno of
Indonesia (right) and Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (center) of India at the United Nations in
1960. All three were leaders in their countries’ independence movements and then the first elected
political leader, for 14, 22, and 17 years, respectively.

and contested election was an active multiparty competition won by Nkrumah and his
Convention Peoples Party (CPP). GDP per capita was about $1,200 in a predominantly
agricultural economy that was also successful in exporting major raw materials, and
most Ghanaians had a decent material life.
However, significant problems emerged soon after the election, including eco-
nomic shortfalls associated with a decline in world cocoa prices and widespread
corruption and inefficiency within the CPP and the government administration.
Opposition groups vehemently criticized both the failures of the CPP, calling it “a party
of incompetents,” and the extensive powers exercised by Nkrumah, whom they labeled
a dictator. Angered by these criticisms, Nkrumah and the CPP passed laws restricting
opposition activities. When these restrictions caused opponents to protest verbally and
then violently, the government responded with even more repressive measures.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 381

The government became increasingly autocratic. An election in 1960 and a

referendum of support for the government in 1964 were rigged by the CPP. By the
1965 election, legal opposition was nearly eliminated and all CPP candidates were
declared elected. With the economy and the social order collapsing, an army-led coup
in 1966 overthrew Nkrumah and installed a “temporary” military junta. From 1966
to 1981, Ghana alternated between civilian governments and military regimes that
seized control by further coups in 1972, 1978, 1979, and 1981, with each successive
coup of civilian governance justified on the grounds of incompetence and corruption.
A young air force officer, Jerry Rawlings, led the last two coups. By 1981, Rawlings
concluded that he was Ghana’s best hope and that he should lead the government.
Despite several assassination and coup attempts, Rawlings ruled continuously from
1981 until 2000.
Nkrumah had attempted to install a command economy with strong state owner-
ship and control, but there had been minimal economic growth, a declining standard
of living for most people, and increasing reliance on neocolonial assistance. Rawlings
used his consolidated political power to shift Ghana to a market economy. He
collaborated with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to secure loans, privatized
most public enterprises, and radically cut public services. After GDP per capita growth
of only about 2 percent per year during the 1990s, Ghana’s growth rate has improved
to 7.9 percent in 2012, and inflation has been held under 10 percent in recent years
(World Bank 2013).
Under international pressure, Rawlings allowed an open and fair election for the
presidency and parliament in 2000, the first peaceful, democratic transition of power
in Ghana’s history. Since then, candidates from opposing political parties have alter-
nated in power in a series of close, contested elections. Even in 2012, when the sitting
president died only a few months before his expected reelection, there was a vigor-
ous but peaceful campaign and broad acceptance of John Mahama’s narrow victory.
Freedom House classifies Ghana as a “free” electoral democracy. However, with GDP
per capita (PPP) of only $1,684, life expectancy at 64 years, and almost 30 percent of the
population living beneath the national poverty line, the overall level of development
for such a promising, resource-rich country remains disappointing (World Bank 2013;
CIA 2014; UNDP 2013).
The history of Ghana reveals some of the patterns of political, economic, and
social development relevant for many of the countries in the Global South. After
exploitation during colonial domination, an independent state formed with high
hopes of economic and political progress. However, the country has struggled with
long periods of low or negative economic growth, political authoritarianism, social
disorder, and violence, and it still has a low overall standard of living and economic
dependence on developed countries and multinational corporations. Given the
improvements in the political system, will the optimism about Ghana’s development
trajectory finally be realized?
This chapter will explore more fully how the countries of the developing
world have attempted to make progress in the pursuit of prosperity, security, and
382 Chapter 14

stability, given such challenges. These challenges can be huge. As the United Nations
(UNDP 2007: 68) observed:

Many people are poor because they live in countries that are poor. Because
they are poor, these countries do not have the resources—finance, technology,
and skills—they need to extricate themselves from their predicament. This
vicious circle has become more pronounced with globalization. Because they
lack the human, financial, physical, and institutional resources required to take
advantage of globalization, these countries are unable to reap its benefits and
are becoming marginalized in the world economy. Like certain individuals or
regions within a country, the countries themselves are, in a sense, caught in a
“poverty trap.” They therefore require special help to change the conditions in
which they find themselves.

Grouping Countries
in the Developing World
14.1 Group the Global South into distinct geographical and political regions.
Understanding the developing countries of the Global South is challenging because
of their diversity. Developing countries contain dusty villages where poor and
uneducated people scrape out a subsistence diet from their small farms and large
cities where some people are exceptionally rich. Some live and work in modern,
technologically advanced settings; yet many others live in poverty and squalor.
Some developing countries are huge states with a billion people, while others are
small islands with a population of fewer than 50,000. Some developing countries
are successfully adopting European political forms of representative democracy,
popular participation, and freedom of opposition. Others are run by small govern-
ing cliques that ruthlessly eliminate all opposition, and changes in leadership occur
through brute force.

Developmental Classification
All of these characteristics fit some of the 140+ developing countries that can be
considered part of the Global South, with their combined population of more than
5.2 billion people. While there are a variety of ways in which particular countries
can be classified as “developing,” this book uses the classificatory scheme described
in Chapter 10 and illustrated in Figure 10.1. Rather than just using a gross national
income (GNI) per capita figure as the World Bank does (where any country below
$12,616 per capita is a developing country), Figure 10.1 adjusts the income figure for
purchasing power parity and then utilizes a second multifaceted dimension measuring
the country’s overall level of social development, based on key indicators of literacy,
urbanization, health, and communications.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 383

Developing countries, Global South, Third World, low-income countries, least

developed countries, and similar labels are a useful shorthand for a set of traits
attributed to states that, relative to the developed countries (and even to most of the
transitional countries discussed in Chapter 15), are generally less advanced economically,
have lower levels of competitive and representative politics, have a lower proportion in the mid-
dle class, and have a lower overall standard of living. Most also have high birthrates (some-
times higher than their economic growth rates) and youthful populations (in more
than 40 developing countries, at least 45 percent of the population is below age 15).
For some of these countries, it is not clear when, if ever, they will reach the levels
of political, economic, and social development currently enjoyed by the developed
countries of the Global North. However, some developing countries will certainly
achieve these levels.
This chapter helps you identify dominant patterns and general trends among the
developing countries, although generalizations oversimplify political reality and are
subject to qualifications. The countries of the Global South encompass many differ-
ent histories, traditions, religions, and political ideologies, and they do not share a
single political culture. They also have different approaches to politics and strategies
of development.
As you read this chapter, and especially as you formulate your own under-
standing about the developing countries, be sensitive to the variation across these
states and, in many cases, within each state. Just as the most developed countries
have some people living in abject poverty and primitive conditions, even the poorest
developing countries have advanced technology, and some citizens enjoy enormous
wealth and an exceptionally high standard of living. The discussion will be broad,
and it will offer examples from many countries that can be considered part of the
Global South.

Regional Classification
Although this chapter generalizes across all developing countries in the Global South,
it sometimes uses region as a second element of classification. Before this chapter
presents generalizations regarding the pursuit of prosperity, security, and stability, it is
illuminating to note some broad regional differences.

EaSt aSia and thE Pacific One regional group includes East Asian developing
countries as well as the few Pacific island states with a population of at least 300,000.
Most of these countries have been traditional, village-based agrarian societies until
recently, and most cope with the challenges of multiple ethnicities. China dominates
this group in human and historical-cultural terms, given its huge size (1.3 billion
people), the dispersion of ethnic Chinese to many of the other countries, the diffusion
of Confucian culture, and China’s attempts to dominate many of its neighbors. As
discussed in Chapter 15, China is now the second largest economy in the world. Most
of these countries had a late experience with colonialism, which never penetrated
too deeply into the societies. China and some of the other East Asian countries (e.g.,
Cambodia, North Korea, Vietnam) have a recent history of communist political regimes
384 Chapter 14

that have been brutal and repressive. This region is also the site of some of the devel-
oping world’s most successful emerging economies, including several “Asian Tigers”
that have advanced to developed-country status in recent decades (e.g., Singapore,
South Korea, Taiwan) and newly industrialized countries such as the “Little Dragons”
(e.g., Malaysia and Thailand).

South aSia and cEntral aSia The Central Asian group is primarily composed
of the “Stans”—countries with nomadic, kin- and clan-based social organization,
localized power bases and weak central authority, and cultures that have been dom-
inated by Islam for hundreds of years. The primary colonial experience for most of
the “Stans” (with the exception of Pakistan) occurred late, when they were annexed
by the Soviet Union in the early twentieth century and were socialized in its totali-
tarian social order, if not its command economy model. The South Asian group,
composed mainly of the multistate, multiethnic Indian subcontinent (recall Focus
in 5), did have considerable colonial penetration from the late seventeenth century
as part of the British Empire. India, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka differ from most other
developing countries in the region because of their Hindu culture. While similar to
the Islamic societies in reinforcing a rigid, traditional, male-dominated social order,
these Hindu cultures are also highly stratified on the basis of caste. Huge India (over
1.2 billion people) is arguably the only institutionalized democracy in the region.
While India’s villages remain traditional, some of its urban areas have evolved into
sites of substantial economic growth and development, driven by its large sector of
well-educated, technology-savvy, English-speaking men and women.

MiddlE EaSt and north africa This region, sometimes referred to as MENA,
includes the dozen states and ministates of Southwest Asia (e.g., Iraq, Iran, Saudi
Arabia) as well as the five North African states that are on the Mediterranean Sea and
are dominated by the Sahara Desert (Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia). Most of
the peoples of North Africa and the Middle East are Islamic in religion and culture and
mainly Arabic in ethnicity and language (Persian Iran is an exception). The area has
major geopolitical importance because of its petroleum resources as well as its strate-
gic location for petroleum supply lines and proximity to oceanic shipping lanes. Much
of the region was controlled by the Ottoman Empire between 1453 and 1918. In the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Europe exercised colonial power mainly through
indirect economic and military involvement, but European values and structures did
not penetrate deeply into most of these states. Many remain socially conservative and
somewhat tribal-feudal, and it is a region currently experiencing considerable politi-
cal turmoil. Economically, most of these countries are in the middle-income group,
although several of the small oil-rich states are very wealthy (e.g., Bahrain, Qatar,
United Arab Emirates).

Sub-Saharan africa Despite its substantial natural resources, sub-Saharan

Africa (the African continent excluding the states of North Africa listed above) is the
poorest and least economically developed region in the world. About two-thirds of the
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 385

world’s poorest countries (as measured by GDP per capita) are in this region. After the
abolition of the slave trade, the experiences with colonialism in most of these states
were late, occurring between the 1880s and the 1950s, and were extremely intensive
and exploitative. Many of these countries are still characterized by aspects of neoco-
lonialism, with limited control over their own resources and a dependency on foreign
financial and technological assistance. A strong sense of national unity is rare because
colonial powers created states that arbitrarily merged many nationality groups that
had no historical commonality. More than two-thirds of the population in these coun-
tries is rural, although increasing numbers of people are migrating to cities. In many
countries, political and social stability are problematic and political structures still lack
institutionalization.

latin aMErica There are two subsets of countries in Latin America. One subset
includes countries that tend to be relatively advanced in both economic and social
development, with a substantial technological sector. This relatively developed group
(most will be discussed as transitional developed countries in Chapter 15) includes
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Uruguay. After long periods of colo-
nial control, most of these states were granted independence before the mid-nineteenth
century. In most, there is a strong national identity corresponding to the country’s
geographic boundaries, and the state has considerable political institutionalization.
Most of these states are highly urbanized with more than 80 percent of the population
throughout Latin America now living in cities.
A second subset of Latin American countries is composed primarily of the small
states of Central America and the Caribbean. These small states (e.g., Honduras,
Nicaragua) and hundreds of Caribbean islands (e.g., Jamaica, Haiti) are extremely
diverse in culture and geography. Compared with the rest of the region, these states
tend to have longer colonial legacies and to be less developed and less urban. Their
political systems have less stability, and democratic practices are not deeply institu-
tionalized. The Caribbean states have an ethnic-cultural heritage that is African and
Asian (and, secondarily, English and French) more than Indian and Hispanic (the heri-
tages that predominate in the rest of Latin America).

Achieving Development in the Global

South: Some Obstacles
14.2 identify the main obstacles to development faced by those in the
Global South.
All developing countries strive for the benefits of prosperity, security, and stability.
Each country has its own unique bundle of reasons why it has not yet achieved a
high level of economic, political, and social development. These include its history,
geopolitical situation, leadership, culture, and many other factors. When analysts
attempt to generalize about some of the most common obstacles to development in the
386 Chapter 14

Global South, there are several that seem to be identified most frequently. It is helpful
to briefly consider some of these obstacles.

ovErPoPulation On average, each woman in the Global South has more than
three children, ranging from an average of about five children in Africa to about
two children in Latin America (Population Reference Bureau 2012). In comparison,
the average range is one to two children in the Global North. The population of the
developing countries more than doubled from 1950 to 2005 and is estimated to grow
from 5 billion to about 9 billion by the mid-twenty-first century. Today, 97 out of
every 100 births are in countries that cannot meet the needs of their existing popula-
tion. More people results in even greater demands on existing resources, such as land,
fuel, and water, and the poorest countries do not fare well in global competition for
these finite resources. The additional people will require 2 billion new jobs, hundreds
of millions of new schools and houses, and a significant expansion in health care just
to maintain the current low standard of living (UNDP 2012). A high birth rate also
means a high proportion of young people who, especially if they are frustrated with
their conditions, increase the potential volatility of social order. Development can only
occur when resources expand faster than the people to whom they are distributed.

corruPtion and inEfficiEncy Many countries in the Global South are char-
acterized by high levels of corruption, inefficiency, or both (Bates 2008; Isbister
2006). Inefficiency has many sources, including poor management, the ineffective
use of modern technologies, and the absence of Weberian bureaucracies (as defined

Pervasive corruption undermines the processes of development. Nigerians protest the removal of oil
subsidies in their oil-rich country and criticize President Goodluck’s “Badluck Oil” policies.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 387

in Chapter 6), in which organizational actors behave in predictable, rule-following

ways. And corruption is an even more serious obstacle—in the Middle East and
South Asia the terms baksheesh (“something given”) or chai (“tea”) and in Mexico the
term mordida (“the bite”) describe the private payoffs that organizational personnel
(from high-ranking leaders to low-level functionaries) expect to receive before they
will assist citizens. Widespread corruption demoralizes the population and drains
productive energy from the political economy. Corruption exists in every society, yet
it seems especially pervasive in public and private organizations in the Global South.
According to Transparency International (2013), a nongovernmental organization that
measures levels of corruption in 177 countries, 57 of the 60 most corrupt countries are
in the Global South. Among the world’s 25 least corrupt countries, not one is a Global
South country, although the list does include two middle-income transitional devel-
oped countries (Chile and Uruguay).

GEoPolitical vulnErability A developing country’s resource base and

its strategic location can substantially influence its development trajectory (recall
Compare in 11 on geopolitics). Each country’s geopolitical situation is different. Some
countries are heavily reliant on only one or a few primary commodities (e.g., copper,
bananas), and their economic health can be closely tied to how much wealth those
commodities generate in the global economy. At least 50 percent of exports are still
from primary commodities in two-thirds of all developing countries, especially the
least developed countries, where 80 percent of exports are primary commodities
(UNCTAD 2013). Some countries are located at strategically important nodes or have
such desirable resources (e.g., oil, diamonds) that both internal actors and external
actors are motivated to engage in behaviors that are very damaging to the country,
such as political corruption or violence, to secure control of the benefits. And some
developing countries are so impoverished of basic resources that they struggle to
provide their own population with food or water, have few resources to trade in the
international marketplace, and have so little strategic importance that they tend to
be ignored by the rest of the world, even if their circumstances are dire (Collier 2010;
Klare 2012).

intErnal diSordEr Many countries in the Global South struggle with various
forms of internal disorder, especially due to political violence and insufficient politi-
cal institutionalization. All of the bottom 40 countries on the Failed State Index are
developing countries that are wracked by some combination of civil war, nation-based
conflict, terrorism, and high crime rates (Fund for Peace 2014). Many countries in the
Global South suffer from limited citizen support for their government institutions,
including the absence of any mechanism for the legitimate transfer of government
authority. Development is hampered by the absence of a governmental system that
functions effectively and has solid capabilities (recall Chapter 5). Moreover, extensive
violations of human rights are common in Global South countries where governments
either fail to protect those rights or actually violate them. An associated effect of such
internal disorder is a substantial increase in IDPs (internally displaced people who
388 Chapter 14

have been forced to flee their communities but remain inside their own country) and
refugees who have fled their country. The refugees often add burdens and disorder
in the neighboring Global South countries to which they flee. As noted in Chapter 12,
there were nearly 27 million IDPs and more than 15 million refugees at the beginning
of 2013 (UNHCR 2013).

nEocolonialiSM The discussions of the dependency approach in Chapter 10 and

of colonialism and neocolonialism in Chapter 11 (including Focus in 11, on Congo)
reveal that a developing country’s official independence does not necessarily end
its subordination to the developed countries and global institutions. The developed
countries, international financial institutions, and multinational corporations are the
major sources of the financial capital, advanced technologies, and even the security
that many actors in developing countries need to survive in the global system. With
this can come neocolonialism—informal and indirect, but still significant, control of the
resources, the economic system, and even the political system of a developing country by power-
ful external actors (Wallerstein 2004; Weatherby 2011).
The Compare in 14 briefly considers how some of these obstacles have affected
development in two countries. However, before you read the Compare, consider the
“acid test” types of indicators in Table 14.1. Which country would you prefer to have
been born into 20 years ago, knowing nothing of your personal circumstances? (Recall
Compare in 1.) You will probably think this choice is clear.

Table 14.1 Select indicators for Nigeria and the Philippines

Nigeria Philippines
Population 177 m 108 m
Democracy index (148 countries) 120th 69th
Political rights (1–7, 1 = best) 4 3
Civil liberties (1–7, 1 = best)) 4 3
GDP/capita (PPP) $2,800 $4,700
Human Development Index .471 .654
Average annual GDP growth, 2000–2012 6.8% 4.9%
Literacy rate 61% 95%
Economic freedom index (177 countries) 128th 88th
% in poverty 70% 27%
Life expectancy (years) 52.6 72.5
Population growth rate (annual) 2.5% 1.7%
Corruption (175 countries) (1st = least corrupt) 144th 94th
Internet users/100 24.5 7.8
Failed State Index (178 countries) (1st = most failed) 17th 52nd
Global Peace Index (161 countries) (1st = most peaceful) 148th 129th
Income inequality (136 countries) (1st = most unequal) 47th 42nd
Gender inequality index (186 countries) (1st = most equal) 142nd 77th
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 389

Compare In 14
Obstacles to Development: Nigeria and the Philippines
When you examine the indicators for Nigeria and the corruption (PERC 2011). The corruption of top gov-
Philippines in Table 14.1, it is evident that each of ernment officials in the Philippines became legend-
these countries has achieved only a modest level of ary during the rule of President Ferdinand Marcos,
development. These indicators, as well as Figure 10.1, from 1965 to 1986. He, his infamous wife Imelda,
place both countries in the Global South. Each coun- and his political cronies drained the country of an
try has a long and rich history, and each was viewed estimated $10 billion. Subsequent President Joseph
as having great potential for successful development Estrada was convicted of corruption valued at more
at the time of independence. Yet many decades than $85 million. Estrada was pardoned by his suc-
later, each still has a relatively low GDP per capita, cessor, Gloria Arroyo, who is now under investigation
a medium or low score on the Human Development for corruption. Arroyo’s replacement in 2010, Ninoy
Index, limited political rights and civil liberties, sub- Aquino, ran on the slogan: “If there is no corrup-
stantial poverty, and so on. Among the many factors tion, there is no poverty” and made the usual prom-
that might offer partial explanations for their develop- ise: “I will not only not steal, but I’ll have the corrupt
ment trajectories, let’s briefly consider the five obsta- arrested.”
cles to development listed in the previous section. The Dependence on primary commodities is a key
differences in the scale of some of these obstacles geopolitical problem for Nigeria, which gets 95 per-
might also help account for the high probability that cent of its foreign exchange capital and 80 percent
you selected the Philippines in the acid test. of its federal government revenue from oil. The heavy
Population growth has placed significant reliance on oil has benefitted Nigeria when oil prices
strains on both countries. In each country, the are high but leaves the economy vulnerable to price
population has quadrupled since 1950. Just since changes. The huge wealth associated with the oil
1990, the populations have increased by 57 per- resources provokes unscrupulous behavior among
cent in the Philippines (adding 46 million) and by many who want to capture a piece of the action.
56 percent in Nigeria (adding 77.5 million). And it is Although 70 percent of the labor force is still in agri-
estimated that by 2050, the Philippines will add 40 culture, Nigeria suffers periodic food shortages due
million and Nigeria will add more than 180 million to inefficiencies and drought. The Philippines ben-
(UNDP 2011; UNDP 2013). The many extra people efits from a more favorable geopolitical situation.
and increasingly youthful population in each coun- The country is a successful producer of foods for
try during recent decades has created the need for domestic consumption and export. As an island with
extensive new infrastructure, generated more social strategic importance in its region, the Philippines
disorder, and caused any increases in economic receives benefits from the United States, which has
resources to be distributed among far more people. located military operations there. These conditions
Corruption is a serious problem in both coun- have helped the country diversify its economy, with
tries. In Nigeria, much of the considerable wealth the service sector generating 57 percent of GDP and
generated by oil revenues that does not leak out to the industrial sector adding nearly one-third.
the MNCs seems to remain in the pockets of the In the 50 years since independence, Nigeria
power elite and does not benefit the general popu- has experienced persistent political disorder, due to
lation or facilitate economic growth. Nigeria has an deep nation-based divisions among regional groups.
entrenched culture of corruption in which those with The struggle to control oil resources and the reins of
control over almost any action expect a payoff to do government are at the base of most of these con-
their job, whether it is providing a license, recording flicts. There have been at least six successful coups
a document, dealing with a legal infraction, and so by military officers who then led oppressive regimes
on. The Philippines is “the Asian country that has that target opponents with establishment violence.
been most hurt by corruption” in a region known for Among the recurrent episodes of violence, the
390 Chapter 14

bloodiest (with at least 300,000 deaths) was a civil governments asserted increasing control over oil
war from 1966 to 1970, in which the Igbos failed in resources. However, the elite collaborates with mul-
the attempt to create an independent state (Biafra). tinational companies similar to those that exploited
In the Philippines, President Marcos used increas- Nigeria’s oil during colonialism. Nigeria remains very
ingly repressive tactics to retain power during his dependent on financial aid, technological support,
20-year rule. He declared martial law in 1972, and his and business capabilities from the Global North. The
security forces ruthlessly punished opponents. When Philippines had a considerably longer experience under
Marcos attempted to steal another election in 1986, Spanish (1521–1892) and U.S. (1892–1946) colonial
the citizens had enough of his corrupt and autocratic control. But in recent decades, it has established sub-
rule, and through a “people power” mass movement, stantially more autonomy over its economy and is more
they forced him to flee the country. His successor as capable of pursuing its own goals in the global system.
president, Cory Aquino, survived at least nine coup
attempts. Aquino’s successor, Joseph Estrada, was
driven from power in 2001 by another populist move-
Further Questions
ment that was orchestrated by the country’s power 1. Which obstacle to development is likely to be
elite. Continuing political violence by communists the most difficult to overcome in each country?
and political Islamists in the populous south under- 2. If you were the top leader in Nigeria or the
mines order maintenance (CIA 2014). Philippines, what one policy might you push
Neocolonialism is more evident in Nigeria. hardest to improve the country’s overall devel-
After independence from Britain in 1960, Nigerian opment trajectory?

Goal: Prosperity
14.3 outline the strategies the Global South has used to achieve economic
development.
All developing countries in the Global South strive for the benefits of prosperity asso-
ciated with economic growth and development and welfare distribution. While these
countries often employ the same economic strategies as the more developed countries,
many of them have had only limited success in achieving prosperity. Indeed, a low level
of overall economic performance is the most conventional indicator of a developing
country. These countries range from the lowest current GDP per capita (PPP) average
of only $415 per year (Democratic Republic of Congo) to the upper limit defined in
Figure 10.1 at about $10,000 (countries such as Cuba and Tunisia). The average income
per person for all 40 low-income countries is only $1,387 per year; and even those in the
103 middle-income countries average only $7,194 per year, in comparison to $36,868 for
the high-income, developed countries (World Bank 2013).
A very low level of income per capita suggests limited resources within the
society, but it does not reveal the additional fact that these resources are often very
unequally distributed and that even the most basic goods are minimally available
to many people. More than 1.2 billion people in the Global South live on less than
$1 per day, and 2.8 billion, almost half the world’s population, live on less than
$2 per day, under conditions of severe poverty. Nearly 1 billion adults are illiterate,
more than 1 billion have no access to clean water, and about one-third of children
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 391

under five years old suffer from malnutrition (UNDP 2013). At a minimum, devel-
oping countries need to feed their own populations. Over 827 million people in the
Global South do not have daily access to enough food (UNWFP 2013). Consider that
every year, more people die from hunger than from AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis
combined (UNWFP 2013).
These stark statistics might be hard to grasp, but they are graphic illustrations of
the difficult life conditions that are the daily reality of millions in the Global South.
What can be done to improve the conditions of all these people? It is clear that political
choices (such as decisions regarding the organization of the political economy, the dis-
tribution of prosperity, the education of women, and the form of government) can have
a powerful impact on the quality of citizens’ lives. Let’s explore some of the choices
that governments must make in the quest for prosperity.

The Quest for Prosperity: Strategic Choices

Each developing country must make choices in at least five key strategic areas in its
broad approach to economic development, given the obstacles to prosperity described
above, its conditions, and its vulnerability to the many stronger actors in the global
system: (1) the balance between state control and the market; (2) the balance between
import substitution and export promotion; (3) the mix of manufacturing, services,
and commodities; (4) the role of agriculture; and (5) the extent of collaboration with
foreign capital.

StatiSM vErSuS nEolibEraliSM A basic policy decision for a developing country

is whether to foster economic growth by means of greater state control of the political
economy or a more market-oriented approach (see Chapter 8). After independence, many
developing countries opted for statism—extensive state control of the political economy, as
described in Chapter 10. Leaders assumed that economic dependency and underdevel-
opment could best be overcome by a strong centralized effort to plan and control the
production and distribution of goods in the society. In this approach, the state’s role is
expansive—it owns major industries and natural resources (via nationalization), controls
production decisions, regulates prices and wages, protects domestic producers from
foreign competition, and encourages import substitution. In some Global South coun-
tries, especially many of the more authoritarian regimes, the political economy more
resembled state capitalism, with those in political power controlling the economy to add
to their wealth and the wealth of their friends and to retain political power.
By the late 1980s, many Global South countries had rejected statism and state
capitalism because of the disappointing results and the emerging realities of the glo-
balized economy. The states shifted in varying degrees to a strategy of neoliberal-
ism (the market-oriented approach described in Chapters 8 and 10). With neoliberalism,
the state plays a very limited role in owning, controlling, or regulating economic
resources; it supports globalized free trade; it facilitates foreign direct investment;
and it holds down taxes and public spending to keep more money in the hands of
private entrepreneurs. Some Global South countries have fully embraced neoliberal
principles.
392 Chapter 14

However, numerous countries that abandoned the more extreme forms of state
control of the economy still exercise substantial control over which firms are allowed
to prosper in the marketplace. That is, some states still select and nurture certain
firms and certain entrepreneurs who are given greater financial support from the
state (e.g., subsidies, lower taxes) and experience less negative interference from state
actors. These countries, often characterized by a highly authoritarian political system,
continue to function with political economies that most closely resemble either state
capitalism or statism.

ProducinG for doMEStic conSuMPtion or ExPort Every political econ-

omy produces some goods and services for its own population and some for export
to other countries. And some products are imported from other countries because of
cost and quality considerations. Ideally, a developing country will export goods with
greater value than the goods it imports to avoid a “balance of payments” deficit and
increased borrowing and debt.
A developing country can use public policy to influence its mix of imports and
exports. One policy option is import substitution—a country decreases the share of
goods that are imported by producing more of those goods domestically. The government
can exhort its citizens to buy domestically produced goods (e.g., “Buy Nigerian!”), or
it can provide subsidies to its firms or consumers to lower the prices of those goods.
A common tactic is trade protectionism—the use of tariffs and other procedures to dis-
courage imports or make imports more expensive than goods produced in the country.
In the current globalized economic system, powerful economic actors (e.g., the World
Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund) apply considerable pressure on
developing countries to eliminate such protectionism and allow free trade.
A second policy option is export promotion—firms are encouraged to produce goods
and services that can be exported and sold at a profit in the global economy. The government
can implement policies that provide its domestic firms with an advantage over global
competitors. The effect of such policies could be lower taxes on domestic firms, a well-
trained labor force, less restrictive environmental policies, subsidized materials, less
costly regulations on business practices, and so on. In recent decades, almost all devel-
oping countries have enacted policies intended to facilitate export promotion. This
strategy has been used very effectively by many countries in Asia and Latin America
but less successfully across sub-Saharan Africa.

thE rolE of aGriculturE Food is a crucial good in all economies. Globally,

30 percent of all workers are still engaged in agriculture, and the percentage is
considerably higher in most developing countries. More than 70 percent of the world’s
poor live in rural areas, where most small farms produce little more than is necessary
for family subsistence (World Bank 2013). Some political regimes attempted to achieve
food surpluses through statist control over agriculture. The state organized most
arable land into large farms and developed a plan for production based on shared
labor and technology. This approach was most fully implemented in command econo-
mies, such as Cambodia, China, Cuba, and Tanzania. State-controlled agriculture was
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 393

The shift from subsistence farming to cash crops for the domestic market and for export is one
key to rural development, as in this field of broccoli in Ecuador.

not successful because most rural people resisted social restructuring and were not
motivated to work as hard for the general welfare as for their own profit.
Consequently, nearly all Global South countries now encourage market-based
production of cash crops by private farmers or local collectives (Isbister 2006). In gen-
eral, the vision is to implement public policies that facilitate: (1) stable and attractive
prices within a reliable market, (2) an efficient system of distribution, and (3) increased
crop yields. One key strategy is to transition from subsistence farming to commercial
agriculture, a system in which people produce a surplus of food that can be sold in a
market. This generates cash for rural people, food to support a growing urban popu-
lation, and financial capital from food exports. This strategy is especially effective on
large farms. However, small farms still produce half of the food grown in developing
countries and are especially vulnerable to the complex global food market. Ironically,
some of the most successful small farmers are those producing lucrative but illegal
cash crops such as coca and opium rather than legal crops, which are less profitable.
Governments have encouraged some agricultural self-help programs through the use
of natural farming techniques, have provided loans to small farmers for irrigation
projects and soil protection, and have attempted to stabilize market prices, at least in
the domestic food market.
Government policies have also facilitated the green revolution, which employs
new farming technologies, including hybrid grains, chemical fertilizers, and pesticides.
394 Chapter 14

These technologies doubled average yields for rice, corn, and wheat in the Global
South between 1960 and 1996. However, the costs of purchasing fertilizers and
pesticides have risen dramatically, making profitability more challenging. And
unanticipated negative consequences from high-tech farming sometimes emerged.
In Indonesia, for example, the green revolution initially increased rice yields dra-
matically. But yields soon dropped because pesticides were killing off many good
insects and the new hybrid rice breeds were less resistant to the bad insects. So
the government implemented policies by the mid-1980s that limited pesticide use
and required farmers to return to traditional crop rotation techniques and natural
fertilizers.
Despite advances in agriculture, the pressures to provide food and fuel remain
intense in many of the least developed countries, especially due to the growing popu-
lation, social disorder, and impacts of climate change (Klare 2009; von Braun 2008).
Many rural people engage in extensive deforestation, overgrazing, and aggres-
sive farming techniques that exhaust the soil, destroy forests, and harm ecologically
sensitive areas. Since 1960, for example, mainly in the Global South, one-third of all
the world’s arable land has been lost, more than the total amount of land currently
producing food. And 29 million acres of land are lost each year to desertification. As a
result, Global South countries are destroying an additional 300 million acres of forest
and natural habitat to grow crops (World Wildlife Federation 2013).
An additional challenge is that governments of the Global North pay their own
farmers agricultural subsidies (on key crops such as sugar, rice, and cotton) that
enable their farmers to make a profit even when selling (below cost) at prices lower
than the prices of crops imported from the Global South. The Global North’s protec-
tionist trade policies and $360 billion per year spent subsidizing farmers in the Global
North distort the world markets for food and lead to many billions of dollars per
year in lost revenue for the countries in the Global South (International Food Policy
Research Institute 2013).

thE Mix of ManufacturEd GoodS, SErvicES, and coMModitiES A politi-

cal economy is developed most effectively by diversifying its goods. This entails pro-
ducing and profitably marketing a balanced mix of commodities, manufactured goods,
and services. Industrialization is a classic strategy for increasing economic development
and hence prosperity via manufacturing. The aim is to use labor and capital to transform
commodities into intermediate goods (e.g., cotton to cloth, trees to lumber, ore to steel,
water to electricity) and then into more refined and valuable goods (e.g., clothing, furni-
ture, televisions, trucks). For example, Bangladesh and Indonesia produce an increasing
share of the shoes and clothing that are exported. More electronic equipment, furniture,
cars, and other relatively sophisticated goods in the global marketplace are now being
manufactured in countries such as China, Brazil, and the Philippines.
And in the postindustrial period, there is increasing emphasis on produc-
ing services (e.g., data entry, tourism) and knowledge-based goods (e.g., banking
services, computer software) instead of manufactured goods. For example, India’s
large population of well-educated, English-speaking technical workers has made it
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 395

an international center for activities such as writing computer software and staffing
call centers. While greater prosperity is a key driver of more service jobs, a govern-
ment can also stimulate its service sector by improving its educational system and its
technological infrastructure.
Diversification can be most difficult for those countries that are particularly rich
in primary commodities such as energy resources (e.g., oil), foods (e.g., coffee), or min-
erals (e.g., cobalt, copper). Under colonialism and neocolonialism, much of the profit
from such commodities was exported to other countries or multinational corporations.
Governments can take control of their commodities through nationalization or by
awarding contracts to domestic entrepreneurs. But it can be difficult to ensure that the
profits are captured by the state and then invested in national development, rather than
being accumulated by a small elite. Some analysts conclude that developing countries
with rich commodities are particularly vulnerable to instability because external and
domestic actors attempt to exploit those resources, as in Bolivia (mining) and Nigeria
(petroleum) (Collier and Venables 2010).

collaboration with forEiGn caPital Economic growth in any country

requires a stable political and economic environment, a trained and disciplined work-
force, effective use of technologies, an efficient infrastructure for distributing goods,
and the infusion of financial capital. Most developing countries are challenged on all
these dimensions and especially suffer from the absence of sufficient capital to invest
in the production system, to purchase imports, and to distribute welfare benefits to
a needy population. Because their internal financial resources are often too limited
to serve all these needs, many developing countries look to the Global North and
its major national and multinational corporations and financial institutions for three
types of financial capital: foreign aid, foreign direct investment, and loans.
Foreign aid. Most aid from the Global North has been in the forms of shared tech-
nology, grants and loans (with no expectation of repayment), and debt forgiveness on
existing loans. Many developing countries argue that the Global North owes them
such aid as compensation for decades or even centuries of colonial and neocolonial
exploitation that left the developing countries with depleted resources and severe
underdevelopment. While the provision of aid is sometimes altruistic, Global North
countries usually offer such aid with strings attached that serve their own self-interest:
economic (to obtain resources, to open markets for their own goods and services);
political (to establish alliances or a political sphere of influence, to exclude ideological
rivals); or military (to deploy strategic military power in Global South territory).
Foreign direct investment. Consistent with the ideology of neoliberalism described
above, most Global North countries, MNCs, and financial institutions offer foreign
direct investment (FDI), not aid. That is, they invest in the developing country’s firms
or set up their own firms within the country. Such investment is provided by those who
expect substantial profits due to the rich resources, cheap labor, tax advantages, and
minimal regulation in the developing country. Many developing countries accept such
foreign involvement in their economy on the assumption that capital, jobs, and other
economic benefits will “trickle down” to their population.
396 Chapter 14

Loans. The simplest approach to acquiring financial resources is to borrow funds

from the international financial community, composed primarily of major banks and
coordinated by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Loans offer
an enticing short-term solution for securing funds to finance economic growth and
distribute welfare benefits to the population. Eventually, however, resources must be
found to repay both the loans and the interest on those loans and many Global South
countries are burdened with huge debt service costs.
Microcredit. One reaction to the reliance on foreign capital is an innovative approach
to investment that has emerged in the Global South. This strategy recognizes that effec-
tive entrepreneurial activities often begin with small, local firms. However, billions of
people in developing countries have no capital with which to start their own small
enterprises. Therefore, energetic but poor individuals are provided with microcredit—
tiny loans to enable them to launch such ventures. Women, who perform a substantial
portion of all work in the developing countries, have been the recipients of 83 percent
of this financial assistance. Microcredit approaches are now utilized in more than half
of all developing countries, and loans have been extended to more than 195 million cli-
ents, including 125 million of the world’s very poorest (Microcredit Summit Campaign
2013). Focus in 14 describes how this program emerged and has evolved in Bangladesh.
Many governments and NGOs are actively expanding their efforts to provide such
small-scale, local financial support due to the success of this strategy. However, some
analysts present considerable data that microfinance does not enable many to escape
poverty (Roodman 2012). And, of course, this modest level of internal capital is not a
substitute for a large-scale infusion of capital from the international community.

Focus in 14
Poor Women and Development: Microcredit in Bangladesh
Each economic development project requires finan- In 1976, Yunus and his associates established the
cial capital. Such funds are typically provided by Grameen Bank to test their faith in the untapped entre-
national or global banking institutions to compa- preneurial abilities of ordinary women and men. The
nies and other major economic actors who have a bank makes small loans to those Bangladeshis who
record of business success. However, a very dif- present promising ideas and show willingness to work
ferent approach was crafted by some innovative hard to implement them. These small loans, averaging
thinkers in the Third World. Professor Muhammad $160, are extended to people without land or assets—
Yunus in Bangladesh began with a bold and vision- people too poor to qualify for traditional bank loans.
ary assumption: that “millions of small people with Before microcredit, most of these people had no
their millions of small pursuits can add up to cre- option for borrowing except from intermediaries who
ate the biggest development wonder.” Yunus built charged extremely high interest rates, thus worsen-
on the novel concept of microcredit. That is, he ing their economic situation. In contrast, the Grameen
assumed that if motivated individuals in humble cir- Bank offers these small loans at a reasonable interest
cumstances were given access to a small amount of rate and allows an extended time for repayment.
financial capital, they would use their creativity and A notable feature of the Grameen Bank’s micro-
energy to establish successful small firms. credit program is that 96 percent of the 8.5 million
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 397

borrowers are women. Prior to receiving a loan from their dependency on their husbands, and improve
the bank, the typical female borrower had never con- their homes and the nutritional standards of their
trolled much money. Most of the women have used children.”
these loans effectively, establishing diverse small Microcredit has now spread to nearly all of the vil-
businesses in their communities: enterprises such lages in Bangladesh. More than $14.3 billion has been
as paddy husking and lime making; services such as lent, and more than 10 percent of the Bangladeshi
storage, marketing, and transport; and manufactur- population has benefited directly from microcredit.
ing activities such as pottery making, weaving, and About 70 other developing countries (and even some
garment sewing. developed countries) have replicated the methods
Overall, the women have been reliable borrow- of the Grameen Bank, and these microloans have
ers and prudent entrepreneurs. Kept on track by assisted more than 195 million clients and more than
peer pressure and peer support, the women repay 500 million family members worldwide. The Grameen
their loans in tiny weekly payments and use their Bank remains a remarkable and inspiring model of the
businesses to move themselves and their fami- capacity of poor women and microcredit to be a pow-
lies out of poverty. Surprising many in the global erful source of economic development. In recogni-
financial community, more than 98 percent of the tion, Yunus and the Grameen Bank were awarded the
borrowers fully repay their loans from the Grameen Nobel Peace Prize in 2006. (This discussion is based
Bank. Eventually, many of the women reapply for on Grameen Bank 2013.)
larger loans as they expand their business enter-
prises. These loans have provided a rich base of Further Focus
small businesses and economic growth for the
1. What is your assessment of the granting of
country. The program has extended into such areas
microcredit almost exclusively to women?
as loans for higher education and the provision of
mobile phones. According to the bank, microcredit 2. Are there limits to extending microcredit to
has “enabled women to raise their status, lessen billions of poor people in developing countries?

Current Outcomes
Figure 14.1 presents two prosperity measures for selected developing countries.
Although GDP per capita (PPP) is not a perfect measure of prosperity (recall Chapter 8),
it is one reasonable indicator for comparative purposes. A striking aspect of Figure 14.1
(as well as Figure 10.1) is the low yearly GDP per capita in many countries, especially
in comparison with the developed countries. Many Global South countries average less
than $5,000 per year (in PPP), and some of the poorest are less than $700 per year.
The limited prosperity is also evident in the low Human Development Index
(HDI) scores of many Global South countries (Figure 14.1), with the very lowest scores
predominantly in Africa. Niger and the Democratic Republic of Congo have the lowest
HDI score among these countries, at only .304, and Cuba is the highest at .780. There
is a broad correlation between GDP per capita (in PPP) and quality of life scores, but
the relationship is far from perfect. In a striking example, Vietnam and South Africa
have similar HDI scores, but Vietnam’s GNI per capita is less than one-fifth of South
Africa’s. The variation between the two measures reinforces the point that quality of
life can be based on more than the average current economic product of the coun-
try and that the policies of government do matter. As the United Nations notes, in
398 Chapter 14

Figure 14.1 Prosperity Measures for Selected Developing Countries of the Global
South
SourCeS: World Bank 2013; UNDP 2013: Table 1

GDP Per Capita (PPP current international $)

( ) Human Development Index
South Africa $11440 (.629)
Iran $11395 (.742)
Peru $10940 (.741)
Colombia $10587 (.719)
Cuba $10200 (.780)
China $9233 (.699)
Algeria $8515 (.713)
Egypt $6723 (.662)
Angola $6105 (.508)
Swaziland $5246 (.536)
Morocco $5193 (.591)
Indonesia $4956 (.629)
Philippines $4413 (.654)
India $3876 (.554)
Vietnam $3635 (.617)
Pakistan $2891 (.515)
Nigeria $2661 (.471)
Cambodia $2494 (.543)
Sudan $2195 (.414)
Ghana $2048 (.558)
Bangladesh $1883 (.515)
Kenya $1761 (.519)
Myanmar $1400 (.498)
Ethiopia $1139 (.396)
Zimbabwe $600 (.397)
Congo, D.R. $422 (.304)
0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000
GDP per capita ($PPP)

considering such differences: “So, with the right policies, countries can advance faster
in human development than in economic growth. And if they ensure that growth
favors the poor, they can do much more with that growth to promote human develop-
ment” (UNDP 2001: 13).
Figure 14.2 offers another way to think about countries’ varied success in achiev-
ing prosperity by comparing the rate of recent economic growth (2000–2012) with
the proportion of the population that survives on less that $2 per day. Most of the
countries in the figure achieved good average rates of economic growth, with the
majority in the 4–8 percent per year range. However, most also have a large proportion
of very poor people, with the majority of these countries having more than 40 percent
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 399

Figure 14.2 GDP Growth Rate and Severe Poverty Rate (Less that $2 per day)
for Selected Developing and Transitional Developed Countries
SourCe: World Bank (2013)

12

11
China
10
Annual GDP growth rate (2000–2012)

8 Cambodia Rwanda
Armenia India
7 Vietnam
Nigeria
Georgia Ghana
6 Malaysia Bangladesh
Indonesia Congo, DR
Iran
5 Egypt Philippines
Turkey Morocco Pakistan
Kyrgyzstan Kenya
4 Thailand
Russia Brazil South Africa
Nicaragua
3

2 Mexico Swaziland
Iraq
1 Ivory Coast

0
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Percent of population in severe poverty

of their population in severe poverty. Notice the extremes from China, which has very
high growth and relatively high poverty; to Ivory Coast, which has very low growth
and substantial poverty; to Rwanda, which has high growth but a very high incidence
of poverty. Most of the transitional developed countries to be explored more fully in
Chapter 15 have achieved moderate growth with low levels of severe poverty.
Regional data provide a different perspective on varying rates of growth. The aver-
age annual GDP growth rate between 2000 and 2012 is highest in East Asia (9.3 percent),
led by China. The annual growth in South Asia is 7.2 percent, followed by sub-Saharan
Africa (5.0 percent), Eurasia (4.7 percent), the Middle East and North Africa (4.5 percent),
and Latin America and the Caribbean (3.5 percent) (World Bank 2013).
The differences among countries and regions are one aspect of “uneven develop-
ment.” The distribution of prosperity at the individual level is also uneven. Most of the
countries with huge inequalities in the distribution of prosperity, as measured by the Gini
index, are in the Global South (recall Compare in 8). Of the 20 countries with the world’s
most unequal distributions of income, 18 are in the Global South. These countries have
extremely high Gini index scores, ranging from 63.2 in Lesotho to 50.2 in The Gambia.
Nineteen of twenty are in either sub-Saharan Africa (9) or Latin America and the Caribbean
(10). Less than one in five of the quartile of the world’s countries with the most equal distri-
butions of wealth are in the Global South (e.g., Armenia, Ethiopia, and Pakistan).
400 Chapter 14

In many developing countries, both the decisions of the political system and the
actions of the international financial community have resulted in an array of policies
that have generally increased the economic advantages of the wealthier groups and
reduced welfare benefits to the less advantaged sectors of the population. The result
is that more than a billion people in the Global South have experienced a substantial
decline in their standard of living since the late 1980s.
As many developing countries experience decreases in real wages, rising unem-
ployment, and greater income inequality, some leaders, particularly in Latin America
(e.g., the late Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Evo Morales in Bolivia), have reacted against
neoliberalism. Their strategy allows participation in the global economy but shelters
the country’s economy from global free trade. It also emphasizes public policies that
aim to provide substantially more welfare distribution, social services, and jobs for
the poor. President Morales (2006) of Bolivia, with the seventh most unequal income
distribution in the world, is clear in his condemnation of the neoliberal model: “The
worst enemy of humanity is U.S. capitalism. That is what provokes uprisings like our
own, a rebellion against a system, against a neoliberal model, which is the representa-
tion of a savage capitalism. If the entire world doesn’t acknowledge this reality, that
the national states are not providing even minimally for health, education and nour-
ishment, then each day the most fundamental human rights are being violated.”

Goal: Security
14.4 assess the level of interstate violence and economic security within
the Global South.
The developing countries search for security in the face of pervasive insecurity. Their prob-
lems are grounded in low levels of political and economic development, which reduce
their capacity to control their own population and resources and make them vulnerable
to intervention by other states. Paradoxically, this relative weakness can also lead a state
to be more aggressive in its interstate relations, both as a defensive reaction against per-
ceived threats and as a means to divert its citizens’ attention from internal problems. Only
2 of the top 25 countries on the Global Peace Index are Global South countries (Bhutan
and Mauritius). However, all 10 (Table 12.3) and 22 of 25 states with the lowest scores on
the Global Peace Index are developing countries (Institute for Economics and Peace 2014).

Interstate Violence
At any given time, most developing countries are not involved in violent interstate
disputes. However, most wars since 1950 and most major armed conflicts occur in the
Global South, often between neighboring states (SIPRI 2013). The following list offers
five reasons for the frequent interstate violence between adjacent developing countries:

• The geographic boundaries between some states do not correspond to the boundar-
ies of historically established nations, so conflict develops in an attempt to realign
states with nations.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 401

• Differences in the cultures of two states, especially differences grounded in nation-

ality, political ideology, or religious belief, can produce animosities so strong that
violence erupts.
• States look covetously at valuable resources in neighboring states and sometimes
attempt to gain control of those resources by force.
• States with severe internal problems can use neighboring states as scapegoats,
redirecting internal frustration into violence against those states.
• Conflict between states can be encouraged by the actions of other states that are
attempting to serve their own national interests.

Most interstate conflicts between adjacent developing countries happen for a

combination of reasons. For example, the Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988, with an estimated
one million dead) is an example of a conflict resulting from the complex, interrelated
impacts of nationality (Persian versus Arab), competition for resources (especially
oil in Kurdish areas), religious ideology (Shia versus Sunni), personal animosity
between leaders (Saddam Hussein versus Ayatollah Khomeini), internal problems in
each country, and external influences from global superpowers with interests in the
region. As noted in Chapter 12, interstate conflicts in the Global South only occa-
sionally expand into a war (e.g., Cambodia–Vietnam, China–India, Eritrea–Ethiopia,
India–Pakistan). It is more common for the conflict to take the form of a more limited
“militarized dispute” short of war (e.g., Cambodia–Thailand, Colombia–Ecuador,
India–Pakistan).
Occasionally, there are interstate conflicts between a developing country and
a more developed country on its border. Most notable have been the five wars and
many militarized disputes since 1948 between Israel and the neighboring Arab
states, especially Syria, Egypt, and Jordan. In another example, the Soviet Union was
concerned about the political decay in neighboring Afghanistan. It dispatched more
than 115,000 troops to set up and defend Afghanistan’s Marxist government, but it
became entrenched in a long guerrilla war (1979–1987) in which one million Afghans
died and the Soviets retreated in defeat.
When a developing country has been involved in interstate conflict with a
non-adjoining state during the postcolonial period, the other combatant is usually a
country from the Global North that uses force to serve its strategic, economic, or ideo-
logical interests. This can involve intervention in an internal war within the developing
country (e.g., the United States in Vietnam in the 1960s, France in the Central African
Republic in 1996, the NATO-led coalition in Afghanistan since 2001) or a somewhat
more conventional war (e.g., between the United Kingdom and Argentina in 1982 and
between the U.S.-led coalition and Iraq in 2003).
Some argue that the entire period of colonialism and neocolonialism should be
understood as the sustained use of military, economic, and psychological violence by
the developed countries against the developing countries. Certain actors in the Global
South use this claim to justify their use of political violence against those representing
the Global North or its allies in the Global South—as exemplified by the sponsorship
of terrorist activities by actors from the Global South (e.g., al-Qaeda, Islamic State).
402 Chapter 14

The search for security can be extremely costly. Although some Global North coun-
tries have slightly reduced their overall military spending in the last several years, many
countries in the Global South continue to increase their spending levels (SIPRI 2013).
Obviously, these huge military expenditures can enhance security and stability. But
empirical analyses suggest that greater military might is actually associated with a higher
probability that a state will be involved in interstate conflict (Bremer 1980; Collier and
Hoeffler 2007). And expenditures on the military are resources that are not available for
economic development, education, health care, and other forms of welfare distribution.

Economic Security
The fact that many developing countries have such fragile economic systems is also
a crucial element in their quest for security because a state’s goal of autonomy—
controlling its own destiny—depends in part on its capacity to resist external manipulation
of its political economy. When the developed countries and multinational corporations
provide economic and technological assistance, they expect to exert substantial influ-
ence and to receive generous benefits such as favorable regulations and advantageous
trade relations. And because Global South countries owe more than $2 trillion to the
financial institutions of the Global North, those institutions expect some control over
each country’s internal affairs.
This economic intervention has come most explicitly from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF), a consortium of financial institutions that sets economic policy
and monitors the behavior of global lenders and debtors. To grant additional loans
or to reschedule payments on existing loans, the IMF requires “conditionalities”—the
debtor state must fulfill specific conditions that the IMF sets. The IMF’s conditions
(sometimes called “the Washington Consensus”) often include requirements that the
state implement a structural adjustment program (SAP), which increases the debtor
state’s openness to the global economy by facilitating free trade and foreign direct
investment. Often, the SAPs also require the state to reduce public spending, with
particularly severe reductions in the distribution of welfare services to its population,
tax cuts, and privatization of state-owned firms (Petrik 2009).
Leaders in some of the major developing countries have recently become more
vocal in their opposition to this external manipulation of their internal affairs, especially
to the economic and trade policies associated with conditionality. Some developing
countries have organized their own regional free-trade zones to increase their autonomy
from the developed countries. For example, Mercosur is comprised of Argentina, Brazil,
Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela, representing more than half of Latin America’s
population (plus five associate members), and there is a trade group of Islamic states
with 300 million people, including Iran, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and Turkey.
However, the political and financial elites in nearly all developing countries seem
to believe that their interests are currently best served by cooperation with the devel-
oped countries and the international financial community and that loss of some control
over their political economy and even over their policy processes is an acceptable cost.
This continuing need for support is captured in a paradoxical comment by Kenya’s
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 403

former president Daniel arap Moi: “No country can maintain its independence with-
out assistance from outside.” In the contemporary political world, no state can survive
as an independent entity. But the developing countries are particularly dependent on
outside assistance in many forms, especially economic and technological. This depen-
dency makes them susceptible to influence, manipulation, or even control by other
states. Thus, few of them can escape this economic component of their insecurity.

Goal: Stability
14.5 identify factors that lead to political stability in the Global South.
Many countries in the Global South find that achieving stability is as elusive as achiev-
ing prosperity and security. They have not been able to establish and institutionalize
structures that maintain social order and ensure effective functioning of the political
system through time. This reduces their capacity to govern, raises the probability of
political decay, and increases their vulnerability to outside actors.

Inadequate Political Development

Recall from Chapter 10 Kwame Nkrumah’s credo: “Seek ye first the political kingdom
and all else shall be added unto you.” This perspective identifies the political system
as the crucial instrument for achieving the developing country’s major goals. Often,
the people who staff the various positions within governmental institutions have
good intentions and attempt to perform their responsibilities in a manner that serves
the public interest. However, in many developing countries, the political system is a
flawed instrument for achieving those goals. And good intentions can be swamped by
harsh political realities.
Political development is one of the three pillars in the stability goal of states (recall
Figure 5.1). In its essence, this is achieved as the government’s capabilities increase and
it has greater political institutionalization (Chapter 10). Modern political institutions
in many developing countries (South American states are the general exception) have
existed for fewer than 60 years. The governments in most countries have increased their
political capabilities in that period; but the effective functioning of the various politi-
cal institutions described in Chapters 6, 7, and 8 such as political parties, judiciaries,
center–periphery relations, and so on is still a work in progress. Indeed, many coun-
tries have already significantly altered their institutional arrangements and even their
constitutions one or more times, making political institutionalization more challenging.
Capabilities analysis emphasizes the state’s control of the environment, but from
climate change to global economic recessions to the price of oil, there is so much that
the government in these countries simply cannot control, especially in the external
environment. Globalization has made the difficulties in dealing with the world outside
the country’s borders even more complex. And within their border, these political
institutions are faced with strong and often competing demands from citizens. There
are conflicting values and agendas among different groups, based on differences
404 Chapter 14

in economic well-being, nation-based identity, region, and many other cleavages.

Their political economies do not provide an adequate level of material well-being
for many within their population, and marked inequality in the distribution of the
existing resources can make the situation even more volatile (Collier 2008). Given all
these circumstances, it is unsurprising that many citizens have not yet invested the
confidence and trust in their political institutions that are among the key elements of
political development. Thus these political institutions, when subjected to the (inevi-
table) internal and external pressures, function ineffectively or break down in political
decay (Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Sorensen 2008).

The Decline of Order

Political dEcay Order maintenance is another pillar of the stability goal in Figure
5.1. Samuel Huntington’s (1968) model of political decay, described in detail in Chapter
10, is based on the problems of achieving political order in developing countries.
The postcolonial history of Ghana that opened this chapter, like the case studies of
Cambodia, Congo, and India examined in other sections in this book, includes episodes
of serious political decay. As the citizens’ dissatisfaction with the political system rises,
in the absence of political institutionalization, the result is usually an increase in political
decay—noncompliance with political authority, protests, strikes, riots, terrorism, and
nation-based violence. In some cases, authoritarian leadership reestablishes order
through repression. In other cases, new leaders are installed who attempt to implement
democratic processes but fail. In yet other cases, order requires external intervention
(e.g., by the United Nations or another country). And there are also cases in which there
is a failed state, a lengthy period of chaos during which no group is able to maintain
political and social order. Basic order maintenance and protection from violence are too
often missing from many people’s lives in the Global South (Bates 2008; Sorensen 2008).

Military rEGiMES Until recently, the new political leadership that restored order
in many developing countries often came from the military. There are three reasons
the military emerges under conditions of political decay. First, a key norm within
the military is a commitment to order, a norm that induces the military to act when
the existing leadership has failed to maintain social order. Second, the military has
the capabilities to function effectively because it is the most highly institutionalized and
disciplined organizational structure in most developing countries. Third, the military
has the capacity to subdue disorder because it usually controls the greatest concentration
of force and violence in the society.
As in the examples of Ghana, Nigeria, and Congo, the emergence of strong mili-
tary leadership has been a recurrent pattern in numerous Global South countries.
In the early 1980s, for example, military regimes were in power in 15 of the 22 major
Latin American states, 20 of the 26 major sub-Saharan African states, and many of the
MENA states. The military in most developing countries now accepts the professional
norm that it should support the civilian regime and prevent political decay but should
not seize power. In “protected democracies,” the military does not take direct politi-
cal control but protects the political leadership in exchange for public policies that the
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 405

military supports, such as maintaining social stability and the military’s privileged
status in society (Colburn 2002). There are still cases in which members of the military
take political power in countries experiencing political decay (as in Honduras in 2009,
Guinea-Bissau and Mali in 2012, Egypt in 2013, and Thailand in 2014). The military
actors typically claim that they are restoring order, honesty, and democracy, but they
usually establish an authoritarian regime.

intErnal war When political decay becomes so extensive that no groups, not even
the military, can maintain order, a country is likely to become embroiled in internal
war—either civil or revolutionary. Conflict is often shaped by identity politics—some
combination of ethnonationalist, class, religious, and regional cleavages (Laitin 2007).
In the past decade, rival groups competing for power and control of resources reduced
numerous countries to near anarchy, including Afghanistan, Central African Republic,
Chad, Colombia, Congo, Georgia, Iraq, Ivory Coast, Libya, Mali, Myanmar, Sudan,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Syria, and Yemen. In a few countries (e.g., Cambodia, Colombia,
India, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines), variations of Marxism continue to inspire violence
from frustrated groups that are persuaded their situation fits Marx’s revolutionary call
that the people have nothing to lose but their chains (recall the Debate in 8).
Major internal violence in Global South countries is almost always supported by
other states. While different rationales are offered for intervention, these other states
are usually pursuing their own national interests while providing financial or mili-
tary assistance to combatants. Indeed, a key element in the pervasive insecurity and
instability of developing countries is the ease with which other states can pursue their
own policy goals within the context of internal violence in these states. Syria and Israel
invade Lebanon; Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and then the UN send troops into Congo’s
civil war; the Soviet Union and then the United States are major participants in the
internal war in Afghanistan; NATO enters the internal war in Libya. Almost all recent
uses of UN peacekeeping forces (14 of 16 active operations in 2013) have been attempts
to maintain internal stability in a developing country (United Nations Peacekeeping
2013). From the peacekeeping operations in the Western Sahara and Darfur to those in
Haiti and Kosovo, the UN efforts have focused on limiting internal conflict—both its
domestic intensity and its risk of spreading across borders.

Democratization
The trend toward democratization, the third pillar of the stability goal, is evident in
the Global South (Chapter 10). Most developing countries are under considerable pres-
sure to shift away from authoritarian and military regimes toward regimes with an
elected leadership; a multiparty system; and open, pluralist politics. Two key sources
of this pressure are citizen groups demanding political rights and the governments
and financial institutions of the Global North.
Figure 14.3 summarizes the levels of freedom in Global South countries, accord-
ing to Freedom House (2014). A “free” country grants its citizens extensive political
rights (e.g., to form political parties that represent a significant range of voter choice, to
engage in vigorous political opposition) and civil liberties (e.g., protection of religious,
406 Chapter 14

Figure 14.3 Levels of Freedom in the Developing Countries, by Region, Circa 2013
SourCe: Freedom House (2014)

Asia Middle East and North Africa

Partly Free
38%
Partly free
28%

Free Not free

41% Free 66%
6%
Not free
21%

Latin America and the Caribbean Sub-Saharan Africa

Free
Partly free
68%
39%

Not free
Partly Free
41%
29% Free
20%

Not free
3%

Eurasia

Partly Free Not free

42% 58%

ethnic, economic, linguistic, and other rights). A country that is “not free” substan-
tially limits these rights and liberties. “Partly free” means that there are significant
political restrictions and violations of civil liberties, even though the country might be
an electoral democracy (recall pages 170–176). To focus on some individual countries,
Figure 14.3 reports the broad range of scores for selected Global South countries on
the Democracy Index computed by the Economist Intelligence Unit (2013). This index
combines scores on measures of the electoral process, the functioning of government,
political participation, the political culture, and civil liberties.
The spread of democratization is most extensive in Latin America and the Caribbean.
In 2014, across the entire Western Hemisphere, only Cuba was categorized as “not
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 407

free” (Freedom House 2014). Recently, some countries, such as Bolivia and Ecuador,
weathered serious episodes of political decay that earlier would almost certainly have
resulted in a military coup. Some, including Argentina, Haiti, and Venezuela, defeated
coup attempts. Freedom House (2014) classifies over two-thirds of the Latin American
countries as fully “free” democracies (including Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica,
Panama, and Uruguay). Among the 10 “partly free” countries are Colombia, Honduras,
Mexico, and Venezuela.
In the Asia-Pacific region, the spread of democratization is mixed. China emphati-
cally crushed the prodemocracy movement in Tiananmen Square in 1989 and has
strongly resisted citizen demands for increased political rights and civil liberties.
Cambodia, Myanmar, North Korea, and Vietnam are also among the eight countries

Figure 14.4 Democracy Index Scores for Selected Global South Countries
SourCe: Economist Intelligence Unit (2013)
Higher Score (10.0-0.0) denotes higher level of democracy
Notes: Egypt score prior to 2013 coup; Myanmar score prior to 2013 elections

North Korea 1.08

Uzbekistan 1.72
D.R. Congo 1.92
Iran 1.98
Myanmar 2.35
Afghanistan 2.48
Zimbabwe 2.67
Vietnam 2.89
China 3.0
Swaziland 3.2
Cuba 3.52
Nigeria 3.77
Morocco 4.07
Iraq 4.1
Egypt 4.56
Pakistan 4.57
Kenya 4.71
Cambodia 4.96
Libya 5.15
Bangladesh 5.86
Ukraine 5.91
Ghana 6.02
Philippines 6.3
Indonesia 6.76
Jamaica 7.39
India 7.52
South Africa 7.79
Botswana 7.85

0 2 4 6 8 10
408 Chapter 14

that are classified as “not free.” Fifteen more (including Bangladesh, Malaysia, Pakistan,
and the Philippines) are only “partly free.” The 16 “free” countries include Indonesia
and India, still the world’s largest democracy, although it has been battered occasion-
ally by political decay, including parliamentary deadlock, assassination, and extensive
violence among Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. Electoral democracies are functioning in
59 percent of the Asian countries, although some are fragile and under persistent pres-
sure from dissatisfied groups.
Freedom House concludes that Eurasia, composed of 12 countries, is currently
the least free region in the world. It describes the “year-by-year assault on democratic
freedoms through much of Eurasia,” attributable to the actions of authoritarian leaders
and pressures from Russia (Freedom House 2014). Fifty-eight percent of the countries,
including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia are “not free.” The remaining
42 percent of countries, such as Armenia, Georgia, and Moldova, are only “partially free.”
Although less than two-fifths of the countries in sub-Saharan Africa are electoral
democracies, this is the region’s highest level on this measure since independence.
Freedom House (2014) classifies 20 percent of the countries as “free,” including
Botswana, Ghana, Lesotho, Senegal, and South Africa, while 39 percent are “partly free”
(e.g., Kenya, Nigeria) and 41 percent are “not free” (e.g., Angola, Congo, Zimbabwe).
Many developing countries in the Middle East and North Africa have introduced
elements of democratic politics, especially in response to the Arab Spring of 2011
although democratic gains have so far been modest. Morocco and Tunisia are among
the five countries classified as “partly free.” Sixty-six percent of the countries are still
classified as “not free,” although some now have multiple political parties competing
in relatively open elections (e.g., Algeria, Iraq). The region is in considerable flux, as
are the Freedom House classifications.
The recent wave of democracy (discussed in Chapter 10) seems to be moving in both
directions in the Global South. On the one hand, increases in overall prosperity and in
education levels in many countries have improved the conditions for the consolidation
of democracy. Most regimes have granted some political rights to individuals and groups
and have raised the level of elite accountability through elections. The percentage of elec-
toral democracies is at an all-time high. Also, in the aftermath of questionable elections,
leaders have been driven from power by popular uprisings. Such “soft coups” demand-
ing greater democracy removed leaders from power recently in Bolivia, Egypt, Georgia,
Haiti, Kyrgyzstan, Paraguay, Peru, Ukraine, and Yemen and forced concessions in coun-
tries such as Morocco and Myanmar. While such “people power” has some virtues, it
offers citizens a mixed message about the range of legitimate tactics for replacing leaders.
On the other hand, Freedom House describes “authoritarian resistance,” recent
setbacks, and a global pushback against democracy and groups advocating political
freedom and human rights (Freedom House 2014). Some regimes have increased their
repression in response to popular uprisings. There are still occasional military coups.
And many recent elections lack legitimacy. For example, in 2014 Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad insisted on holding a sham election, despite widespread violence and the coun-
try’s inability to mount a fair election. He retained the presidency without a legitimate
mandate in an election many other countries described as a mockery of democracy.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 409

The Rise of the Global South?

14.6 Evaluate the reported “rise of the South.”
From 2008 forward, the countries in the Global North hit a rough patch in which their
economies stopped growing or grew at sluggish rates. To the surprise of many, the
economies of many Global South countries continued to expand during the global
financial crisis. Thus the 2013 United Nations Human Development report is titled
“The Rise of the South” and opens with the claim that the current period is character-
ized by “the striking transformation of a large number of developing countries into
dynamic major economies” (UNDP 2013: iv).
Although some of the growth statistics are especially strengthened by the perfor-
mance of countries highlighted in Chapter 15—the transitional developed countries,
including four of the BRICS countries (Brazil, India, China, and South Africa)—more
than 40 countries across the Global South have recently made significantly stronger
gains on the Human Development Index (HDI) than expected, based on their previ-
ous performance. And the Global South countries have achieved a higher economic
growth rate than the Global North countries for more than a decade. How can the
Global South sustain this unexpected progress? The UN identifies three major drivers
that facilitate effective development of Global South countries.
First, a successful strategy must be grounded in a strong, active, and responsible state.
The UN terms this a “proactive development state.” The policies of such a state must be
guided by a long-range vision based on shared norms and values as well as rules and
institutions that build societal and political trust and cohesion. While there are multiple
paths to success, it is essential that the government’s policies support the growth of
key sectors of the economy, expand the number of quality jobs, and invest in “people-
friendly” policies in education, health, and public services (UNDP 2013: 4).
The second driver of development is success in tapping into global markets. A Global
South country can generate positive growth when it imports skills and knowledge from
the rest of the world and then produces and exports the goods and services the rest of
the world would like to purchase. This requires both private firms and the state to take
actions that further the country’s gradual and strategic integration into the global mar-
ket. The state must also implement policies that minimize any shocks to the domestic
economy that might occur as a result of global engagement (UNDP 2013: 4).
The third driver of the rise of the Global South is a commitment to social policy inno-
vation. The state must make substantial investments in education, healthcare, social
protection, legal empowerment, and a reduction of inequality. According to the UN,
these state policies will support long-term, sustained economic growth and create a
population that is both capable of contributing to that economy and supportive of
political and social institutions that are fair and stable (UNDP 2013: 5).
Despite the UN’s optimistic assessment and prescription, the current overall
balance sheet of the Global South seems complicated in terms of the pursuit of pros-
perity, security, and stability. In the pursuit of prosperity, the positives include greater
economic diversification, with manufactured goods now accounting for two-thirds of
410 Chapter 14

exports (excluding oil). The annual economic growth rate for the low-income countries
has averaged 5.5 percent since 2000, which is more than triple the rate of growth of the
world’s high-income countries (World Bank 2013). The average person in the develop-
ing world is living longer (on average, 16 years longer than in 1960), is healthier, is
better educated, and has more material possessions than at any prior time.
However, most Global South economies are still net importers of capital, tech-
nology, manufactured goods, oil, and even food, and there is considerable continued
dependency on the developed countries and multinational corporations. Prosperity is
very uneven, with some countries enjoying substantial economic growth while many
other developing countries languish. Moreover, inequality in the distribution of pros-
perity is increasing within most Global South countries, particularly those with rapid
growth. There are serious shortcomings in the pursuit of prosperity when 2.4 billion
Global South people live on less than $2 per day.
Developing countries are spending more each year to achieve greater security, but
there is little evidence that most citizens in the Global South feel more secure from
violence than in the past. The spread of more deadly weapons, the increasing move-
ments of populations across borders and within countries, the disruptive aspects of
globalization, and the propensity of external actors to intervene within the borders of
many Global South countries have altered the nature of insecurity but certainly have
not fundamentally reduced it.
Economic underdevelopment is the main factor distinguishing the countries of the
Global South from those of the Global North. But political underdevelopment is a pivotal
problem if the political system is the crucial instrument for social and economic change,
as suggested by the UN’s drivers of development. Regardless of their political approach,
nearly all developing countries face challenges as they attempt to use the political sys-
tem to achieve prosperity, security, and stability. Most countries have valuable natural
resources and a population that is willing to apply its energies to achieve these goals.
However, the depth of the peoples’ patience and support of specific political leaders
or even of the country’s current political institutions is not strong. And it is repeatedly
tested in a turbulent world when there are recurrent episodes of disappointment with
policy outcomes, corruption, and evident gaps between aspirations and realities.
For the leaders of many Global South countries, determining the best strategy for
achieving desired outcomes might seem baffling. At every turn, the underlying politi-
cal choices are fundamental: freedom versus security, economic development versus
social welfare, political equality versus economic equality, democracy versus efficiency,
aid versus independence, neoliberalism versus state capitalism, guns versus butter. It
does seem possible that for some Global South countries, especially the low-income
developing countries, no political approach and no form of political economy can
simultaneously achieve all their major goals (a possibility this book first put forth in the
Compare in 1 “acid test”). The leaders of any developing country might need to make
very difficult decisions about how to gain even partial success on some of their goals.
This view suggests that some objectives will have to be sacrificed in the quest for oth-
ers, and there is no assurance that any objective can be fully attained. Thus the Debate
in 14 asks whether there will always be a group of poor, underdeveloped countries.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 411

The Debate in 14
Will There Always Be a Global South?
For many decades, some countries have been have grown at 6.2 percent, compared with only
described as “least developed countries,” “Third 1.7 percent annual growth in the high-income
World,” and “Global South.” Such terms are meant to countries (World Bank 2013).
characterize a large number of countries that have a • The mobility of capital, the transfer of technology
relatively low level of economic development, mea- across borders, and the extensive outsourcing
sured as GDP per capita. The label might encompass of economic activity associated with globaliza-
as many as 150 countries that are not yet “devel- tion are producing substantial and increasing
oped” to the level of countries in the Global North; economic and social benefits for most citizens in
but a more limited classification might include the 36 the developing countries (Baghwati 2007; Wolf
“low-income countries” and some or most of the 48 2004).
“lower-middle-income” countries (World Bank 2013). • The Global South has increased its share of world
Some analysts predict that these less developed merchandise trade from 25 percent to 47 percent
countries will close the gap with the more devel- between 1980 and 2010, and its share of world
oped countries, given the homogenizing dynamics of output is also now 47 percent (UNDP 2013: 2).
globalization (see Chapter 11). Others claim that sub- The external debt service (as a percentage of
stantial inequality among countries is a fundamen- exports) that burdened most developing coun-
tal feature of the global system and that continuing tries has been reduced from 16 percent in 1990 to
economic inequality is inevitable in a world of limited only 3 percent in 2011 (UNMDG 2013).
resources, free trade, disparities in technology, and
• If “Global South” is merely the newest label for
hegemonic power relations. The poor countries,
those countries that are relatively poor, even
it might be said, will always be with us. Will there
while the absolute standard of living rises to
always be a Global South?
a reasonable level for most of the population
in most developing countries, then there will
The Global South Is on a Path to Development always be a group of “least developed coun-
• Numerous social indicators reveal significant tries,” but only because some countries will con-
recent improvement in the life conditions of those tinue to be less rich than others.
living in the Global South. Life expectancy in low-
income countries has increased from 53 years The Global South Will Never Disappear
to 61 years (1990–2011); the literacy rate has • It is likely to take generations for the “average
increased from 69 percent to 80 percent (1990– person in the Global South” to catch up with
2005); the mortality rate for children under five (per even the current social statistics of the average
1,000) has decreased from 164 to 95 (1990–2011) Global Northerner. The Global Southerner lives
(UNDP 2008; WHO 2013; World Bank 2013). 18 fewer years, has one-twentieth the yearly
• The proportion of people living on less than income, and is 30 times more likely to be illit-
$1.25 per day in the Global South has decreased erate. In the last two decades, 1 billion people
from 47 percent in 1990 to 22 percent in 2010 have experienced a deterioration in their stan-
(UNMDG 2013). dard of living (UNDP 2010; World Bank 2013).
• Overall, the countries of the Global South achieve • There are more people in the Global South living
substantially higher economic growth rates than in extreme poverty today than there were in
the high-income countries. Since 2000, low- 1981. Education is critical, yet only 36 percent of
income countries have grown at an annual rate of children in low-income countries attend second-
5.5 percent and lower-middle-income countries ary school (UNWDG 2011; World Bank 2013).
412 Chapter 14

• Despite higher growth rates and claims of con- significantly more than for the Global South,
vergence, the absolute differences between the despite a population that is less than one-fifth
least developed countries and the developed as large. And the IMF reports that 40 of 62 low-
countries remain huge. For example, even if eco- income countries for which it has data are in high
nomic growth in the developed countries were or moderate risk of debt distress (IMF 2013).
to stop from this moment forward, it would take • A few developing countries will successfully
Latin America until 2177 and sub-Saharan Africa reach a high level of development. However,
until 2236 to catch up (World Bank 2005: 37). there are few data or trends to suggest that there
• The developed countries continue to enjoy enor- will be any dramatic reduction in the depen-
mous competitive advantages over the Global dency or increase in the overall quality of life
South countries, in terms of their control of capi- for the majority of people in most Global South
tal flows, their greater technological capacity and countries relative to developed countries.
innovativeness, and their military and political
power. These advantages helped generate the cur- More questions …
rent vast inequalities between rich and poor coun- 1. Might globalization generate some hardships
tries, and there is no reason to assume that the rich and greater inequalities for some Global South
countries will allow these advantages to wither. populations in the short run but ultimately have
• Powerful global institutions such as the WTO very positive impacts on productivity, trade, and
and multinational corporations generally operate prosperity in their countries?
in ways that favor the developed countries over 2. Is it a satisfactory situation if most people in the
the Global South. Globalization has resulted in less developed countries are increasingly better
increasing inequality between the world’s rich off in terms of life expectancy, literacy, caloric
and poor countries (Khor 2011). intake, and so forth, yet the relative disparities
• Since 1970, the value of international trade for in quality of life between people in the Global
countries in the Global North has increased South and in the Global North increase?

Key Concepts
democratization, p. 405 green revolution, p. 393 neocolonialism, p. 388
export promotion, p. 392 import substitution, p. 392 neoliberalism, p. 391
foreign direct investment International Monetary Fund statism, p. 391
(FDI), p. 395 (IMF), p. 402
Global South, p. 383 microcredit, p. 396

For Further Consideration

1. Assess the claim that broad labels like developed countries, or are they better
“Global South” have no meaning, either explained by domestic circumstances in
analytical or political, in the complicated, these countries?
globalized world. 3. Choose a real (or imaginary) developing
2. Are the problems in achieving economic country and specify its conditions. Given
development in the developing countries your country’s conditions, what arrange-
attributable primarily to the actions of the ments (especially political institutions and
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 413

political economy) make the most sense for 5. Other than greater economic prosperity,
progressing toward the key development what conditions seem most likely to sustain
goals you emphasize? the shift to democratization in many Global
4. How do you explain the fact that some states South countries? In particular, what forms or
in the Global South were able to grow even arrangements of political structures are most
as the states in the Global North struggled? important?

For Further Reading

andersen, roy, robert Seibert, and Jon wagner. dominguez, Jorge i., and anthony Jones, eds.
(2012). Politics and Change in the Middle East. (2007). The Construction of Democracy: Lessons
10th ed. new york: Pearson. A multidiscipli- from Practice and Research. baltimore: Johns
nary, comparative introduction to the political hopkins university Press. Scholars and major
systems in this important region, focusing on political officials from numerous countries,
current challenges. mainly in the developing world, explore the
arvidsson, adam, and nicolai Peitersen. (2013). necessary conditions for creating and sustain-
The Ethical Economy: Rebuilding Value After ing democracy, with particular emphasis on the
the Crisis. new york: columbia university fit between the sociocultural nature of the coun-
Press. The authors present the interwoven try and the fostering of associational behavior
relationship between economic development and trust among the citizens.
and positive social capital. They suggest paths isbister, John. (2006). Promises Not Kept: Poverty
to development that more thoroughly consider and the Betrayal of Third World Development.
citizen-centric policies. 7th ed. bloomfield, ct: Kumarian. A sensi-
barrientos, armando. (2013). Social Assistance in ble and balanced analysis of the difficulties
Developing Countries. cambridge: cambridge that have prevented most developing coun-
university Press. Provides an introduction to tries from achieving sustained development,
anti-poverty programs in the Global South, exploring both the external and the internal
including the historical and political context obstacles to prosperity.
behind the enormous growth of social assis- lomberg, bjorn, ed. (2013). Global Problems,
tance programs. Smart Solutions: Costs and Benefits. new
collier, Paul. (2008). The Bottom Billion: Why york: cambridge university Press. How
the Poorest Countries are Failing and What would you spend an additional $75 billion of
Can be Done about It. new york: oxford development assistance? Here, 50 experts offer
university Press. A compelling analysis their proposals for the best use of global devel-
and set of policy prescriptions regarding the opment dollars. The proposals are then ranked
severe problems, particularly grounded in by a panel of respected senior economists.
corruption, resource wealth, and subordina- Meadows, donella, Jurgen randers, and dennis
tion in the global economy, that cripple the Meadows. (2004). Limits to Growth: The
50 poorest, failing countries in the Global 30-Year Update. white river, vt: chelsea
South. Also see Collier’s Wars, Guns and Green Publishing company. Updating the
Votes (2010). earlier arguments in their Limits to Growth
414 Chapter 14

studies, the authors provide a powerful case Skidmore, thomas, Peter Smith, and James
that overpopulation, overuse of resources, and Green. (2009). Modern Latin America. 7th
the failure to respond effectively to these phe- ed. new york: oxford university Press. A
nomena are dangerous challenges to prosper- helpful comparative introduction to society,
ity and stability in all countries, with particular politics, and economic development in Latin
risks for those in the developing world. America, with numerous interesting case
Moyo, dambisa. (2009). Dead Aid: Why Aid Is studies.
Not Working and How There Is a Better Way weatherby, Joseph n., et al., eds. (2011).
for Africa. new york: farrar, Straus and The Other World: Issues and Politics of
Giroux. A controversial argument that devel- the Developing World. 9th ed. new york:
opment in many African countries has actually longman. Thoughtful general chapters on
been harmed by the more than $1 trillion in aid, neo/colonialism, women and development,
which has caused aid dependency and wors- and political economy precede informative
ened corruption, and that different approaches chapters focusing on each region of develop-
are necessary to facilitate development. ing countries.
nugent, Paul. (2004). Africa Since Independence: wiarda, howard J., ed. (2004). Authoritarianism
A Comparative History. new york: Palgrave and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited.
Macmillan. A richly comparative discussion of Gainesville: university Press of florida. This
the evolution of many important African coun- book argues that the apparent shift toward
tries, covering the entire postcolonial period. democratization in many Latin American
onwumechili, chuka. (1999). African Democra- countries is illusory. Rather, these countries
tization and Military Coups. westport, ct: still have strongly entrenched authoritarian
Praeger. A sobering and occasionally encour- and corporatist power structures.
aging characterization of 40 years of struggle world bank. (yearly). World Development
to establish democracy in African countries Report. new york: oxford university Press.
and to limit the tendency toward violent take- Systematic yearly statistics on the economic,
overs and authoritarian rule by the military. financial, and demographic aspects of devel-
Schedler, andreas, ed. (2013). The Politics of opment for more than 180 states. Each annual
Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting issue also emphasizes a key theme (e.g., 2009
Electoral Authoritarianism. new york: oxford on economic geography; 2010 on climate
university Press. This analysis examines how change; 2011 on conflict, security, and devel-
contemporary authoritarian leaders manipu- opment; 2012 on gender equality; 2013 on jobs)
late elections and offer a guise of democracy with a strong emphasis on the developing
while trying to retain their power in a context countries.
of high uncertainty. yunus, Muhammad. (2008). Creating a World
Simon, Julian. (1998). The Ultimate Resource 2. Without Poverty: Social Business and the
Princeton, nJ: Princeton university Press. Future of Capitalism. new york: Public
A powerful critique of those, like the Limits affairs Publishing. A remarkable vision
to Growth group, who predict disaster due to from the inspiring Nobel Prize winner who
overpopulation and environmental degrada- established the Grameen Bank (Focus in 14),
tion. It argues that the ultimate resource (people in which he sketches a business model that
producing knowledge and then applying it as would enable every family to live with dignity
technology) will outstrip problems. and security.
 The Developing Countries of the Global South 415

On the Web
http://allafrica.com http://www.aseansec.org
This site links to hundreds of current Africa- On the official Web site of the Association
focused newspaper articles as well as more of Southeast Asian Nations are information
than 900,000 articles in a searchable archive. and documents relevant to ASEAN, news
http://english.aljazeera.net about countries in the region, and somewhat
An Arab world perspective (in English) on self-serving Web pages constructed by each
the news from arguably the most influential member state.
regional news source in the Middle East. http://www.unctad.org
http://lanic.utexas.edu/index.html This part of the home page of the United
The Latin American Network Information Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Center, hosted at the University of Texas, focuses on issues regarding the world’s least
Austin, provides a vast number of Internet- developed countries.
based information sources about all countries http://www.un.org/womenwatch
in Latin America. This French-based bilingual site provides links
http://www.undp.org to various research, documents, organizations,
The Web site for the United Nations and activities that concern the role of women
Development Programme, a key unit of the in the development process.
United Nations that specializes in issues of http://www.twnside.org.sg
economic and political development. Based in Malaysia, the Third World Network
http://www.unohrlls.org/en/home provides a strong perspective through a
The site for the United Nations’ Office of diverse array of analyses, policy papers, and
the High Representative for the (48) “Least information on the full range of issues facing
Developed Countries,” (31) “Landlocked Dev- developing countries, including trade and
eloping Countries,” and (38) “Small Island development, environment, human rights,
Developing States” provides details of the and globalization.
challenges and opportunities for this almost
entirely Global South group.
 Chapter 15
The Transitional
Developed Countries

Learning Objectives
15.1 Trace the historical, political, and economic development of the
postcommunist states.
15.2 Evaluate the attempts by the postcommunist states to achieve prosperity
through a transition to market economies.
15.3 Assess the efforts by postcommunist states to balance democratic
freedoms and political stability.
15.4 Analyze the impact of the fall of the Soviet system on the security of
postcommunist states.
15.5 Analyze the pursuit of prosperity by the Latin American transitional
developed countries
15.6 Characterize the quest for stability in the Latin American Transitionals.
15.7 Describe the security goals of the Latin American Transitionals.
15.8 Explain the BRICS concept.
15.9 Analyze the pursuit of prosperity by the BRICS.
15.10 Characterize the quest for stability in the BRICS.
15.11 Describe the security goals of the BRICS.
15.12 Identify the factors associated with the prospects for further development
in the transitional developed countries

It was not easy being Hungary in the twentieth century. As a landlocked country in the
center of Europe, Hungary was drawn into every continental drama. It was the junior
partner in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but was on the losing side in World War I.
As a result of the war, Hungary lost two-thirds of its land, and more than 5 million
ethnic Hungarians found themselves living within the new borders of other countries.
Communists and right-wing fascists fought for Hungary’s soul between the wars.
416
 The Transitional Developed Countries 417

Hungary then sided with Germany during World War II, and by the end of the war
the country was physically and psychologically devastated. At this point, troops from
the Soviet Union helped the communist leaders take control of the Hungarian govern-
ment. By the late 1940s, Hungary was part of the Soviet Bloc of states and had one
of the most repressive communist regimes in Europe. Huge numbers of the regime’s
critics were killed or imprisoned, and there was minimal prosperity under the rigid
command political economy.
Frustrated citizens took to the streets in a 1956 rebellion and tried to set up a more
democratic government; but the Soviets invaded with more than 150,000 troops and
brutally crushed the “freedom fighters.” Although the near-totalitarian government
ruled firmly, there were experiments in the 1970s and 1980s with more private enter-
prise in the economy and expanded rights for workers, and Hungary was said to have
established “goulash communism” (that is, combining some of every approach into
the political economy pot).
Hungary was among the leading countries when the peoples of Eastern Europe
were able to throw off the communist yoke in 1989. Hungary shifted immediately to
democratic politics, holding its first open and competitive multiparty election in 1990.
It also abandoned the command political economy, quickly privatizing almost half of
the state-owned enterprises. Between 1990 and 1998, the share of GDP generated by
the private sector rose rapidly, from 25 percent to 80 percent. The state also withdrew
many of its communist-era human and social services to citizens.
This combination of changes resulted in a few difficult years of transition and
financial hardship for most people in the society. But foreign direct investment flowed
in, and Hungary became a poster child for the remarkably rapid transformation of
some former Communist Bloc countries into relatively prosperous, market-based
economies. It joined the European Union (EU) in 2004 and became a member of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Hungary’s 10 million citizens enjoy
strong political rights and civil liberties.
Unfortunately, extensive borrowing and the dead weight of the many state enter-
prises that were not sold off became a serious drag on the economy, especially when the
global economic meltdown occurred in 2007 and onward. It has averaged only 1.6 per-
cent per year economic growth since 2000. As economic conditions have again become
very difficult for many citizens, confidence in political leaders and political parties has
dropped significantly. A nationalist political party has dominated the last two elections,
and it has cut back on democratic practices and asserted more control over the political
economy. Nonetheless, Hungary has made a quite impressive transition from the oppres-
sive life and underachieving economy of the communist era to its current state. Freedom
House rates it as a free, liberal democracy with a high score (1.5). Hungary has a GDP
per capita (PPP) of $19,800, is in the “very high” group on the Human Development
Index (.831), and has the fourth most equal income distribution in the world. It seems
more promising to be Hungary in the twenty-first century (CIA 2014; World Bank 2013).
As suggested in the discussion of Figure 10.1, Hungary is among a group of coun-
tries termed transitional developed countries. They are characterized by levels of
economic and social development that are lower than those in the Global North but
418 Chapter 15

are notably higher than those of countries in the Global South. They also seem to be
transitioning toward higher levels of economic and political development at rates that
could result in their classification as developed countries relatively soon. Based on
Figure 10.1 and these characteristics, this chapter focuses on three subsets of countries
where the forces of positive development seem especially strong. These three groups
are termed the postcommunist developed countries (PCDCs), the Latin American
Transitionals, and the BRICS, a grouping of five special cases from the transitional and
developing country categories.
An analysis of such countries in this final chapter might be helpful for enhancing
our understanding of the ever-changing and dynamic world of contemporary politics.
Currently, they are revealing case studies of “countries in the middle” within our frame-
work of analysis. We consider their current situation as well as the conditions under
which we would expect the transitional countries to improve. Chapter 10 indicated that
positive development is not inevitable. Thus this chapter asks: What combination of fac-
tors is likely to lead to a successful transition to the Global North level of development?
What factors suggest a failure to transition? Hopefully, you will be able to apply the con-
cepts and political knowledge you have learned in earlier chapters to explore the broad
patterns of change these groups are encountering and make your own assessments of
how these transitional countries will cope with the challenges they face in their quest for
prosperity, stability, and security. Let’s examine postcommunist developed countries first.

The Postcommunist Developed

Countries
15.1 Trace the historical, political, and economic development of the postcommunist
developed countries.
After the Soviet Bloc broke up in the late 1980s and early 1990s, 29 new national politi-
cal systems emerged, including 15 states carved out of the former Soviet Union. Many
NGOs treat this set of 29 countries as a group. Freedom House (2013) clusters these
countries as “Nations in Transit,” and the World Bank (2011) referred to the entire
group as “Emerging Europe and Central Asia” (Western Europe is part of another
group of “high-income economies”). However, based on the classification scheme in
Figure 10.1, our analysis excludes from the transitional group those 11 postcommunist
countries that still have the characteristics of other developing countries (e.g., Albania,
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan).
Thus, this chapter focuses on the 18 countries from this group that are at moderate
levels on economic and social development in Figure 10.1. This group is designated
the postcommunist developed countries (PCDCs). These PCDCs include some of the
states that emerged from the Soviet Union (e.g., Belarus, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Latvia,
Lithuania, Russia) and most of the states that evolved from the Soviet Union’s previ-
ous allies in Central and Eastern Europe (e.g., Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic,
Hungary, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia). These countries have a com-
bined population of about 240 million.
 The Transitional Developed Countries 419

Post-communist St. Petersburg, Russia bustles with commerce and consumerism even in the
shadow of its Communist past.

Some of the PCDCs, particularly those in Central and Eastern Europe, have been
engaged in a process of substantial economic and political transformation similar to
that of Hungary described above. Until the late 1980s, these countries were communist
states and were trying to achieve prosperity, stability, and security under the structure
of a command political economy and totalitarianism (for 60 years in the Soviet Union
and 40 years in Central and Eastern Europe). Since about 1990, these states have aban-
doned their communist ideologies and attempted to transform themselves into more
market-oriented political economies and to implement democratic politics. These
sweeping changes were the watershed events in the shift in the international system to
the post–Cold War period (described in Chapter 13). However, a few of the PCDCs that
emerged from the former Soviet Union, most notably Russia, have resisted the stron-
gest currents of change. In these countries, the political regimes remain authoritarian
and the political economies have strong elements of state capitalism (as described in
Chapter 8).
Figure 10.1 reflects that these countries are relatively advanced on the social devel-
opment dimension. Their populations are well educated and mainly urban, and they
are incorporating advanced technologies into their economies and their private lives.
The states have adopted democratic political processes and are institutionalizing them
in varied degrees. The political economies in most states were significantly depressed
during the economic transitions in the 1990s, but their GDP per capita measures are now
increasing and nine have reached the level of high-income countries on the World Bank’s
420 Chapter 15

Table 15.1 Acid Test II

Kappa Lambda Mu
Governmental type Nondemocracy Electoral Democracy Nondemocracy
Political rights (1 [highest]–7, Freedom 7 4 6
House)
Civil liberties (1 [highest]–7, Freedom 6 4 5
House)
Press freedom Not free (15th percentile) Free (72nd percentile) Not free (19th percentile)
Significant political parties 1 54 7
% females in legislature 37% 12% 11%
Life expectancy 71 67 70
Human Development Index .912 .770 .788
Literacy rate 99% 98% 99%
% below poverty line 2% 44% 11%
Serious crimes/100,000 687 5,490 3,650
GDP/capita: 10 year average 2.7% –4.7% 4.8%
annual growth
Inflation 3% 68% 7%
Gini index of income inequality 21.5 48.7 42.0
Top:Bottom 20% of income distribution 5.4:1 12.6:1 7.6:1
GNI per capita (not PPP) $3,200 $1,600 $12,700

measure (2013). Some citizens in these countries support the shift to a market economy,
although others are dissatisfied with the effects of this change on themselves and on
their society. Thus, the next sections explore their current quest for prosperity, stability,
and security. But before you explore the details of these countries in transition, you are
invited to examine Table 15.1 and then take one more “acid test” in Compare in 15.

Compare in 15
Acid Test II
Here is another acid test. Before reading further, exam- are forced to make trade-offs. If you especially value
ine Table 15.1 closely. As in the Compare in 1, assume economic and social stability, safety, and equality,
that you were born in one of these three countries you might choose Kappa. Lambda might be your
20 years ago, but you do not know your life conditions choice if individual rights and freedoms are given
at birth (e.g., gender, ethnicity, family wealth, intelli- highest priority. And the economic vibrancy and
gence, and so on). Into which of these three countries potential of Mu might lead you to prefer to be a young
would you prefer to have been born? Why? adult there, despite its political and social negatives.
Each of the three countries seems to offer a dif- In this acid test, the three alternatives actu-
ferent bundle of virtues and shortcomings, and you ally characterize the same country at three recent
 The Transitional Developed Countries 421

time periods. Kappa is the Soviet Union in 1989, those assets ruthlessly. This crony capitalism—the
just before it broke into multiple countries; Lambda processes enabling members of the old (Communist
is Russia in 1999, after 10 years of postcommunist Party) elite to use their connections to prosper as the
adjustments; and Mu is Russia in 2013. Over this new economic elite—did produce a small proportion
brief period, Russians have experienced a roller- of very wealthy people.
coaster ride from a rigid and repressive totalitarian Mu: Since 2000, the political system has been
system that did provide basic economic and per- dominated by Vladimir Putin, a former KGB (secret
sonal security (Kappa) to a free but impoverished, police) officer who has changed many aspects of the
dangerous, and chaotic system of democracy and Russia of the 1990s. He has been popular among
free enterprise (Lambda), and then to an authoritar- many Russians for his aggressive attempts to reas-
ian system with greater economic prosperity (Mu). sert Russia’s power in regional politics. The politi-
Kappa: The Russian people lived for seven cal economy has generally been reformulated as a
decades under a system guided by the principles of system of state capitalism. Economic growth has
Marxism–Leninism, where a commitment to equality been mostly positive, benefitting from high prices
promised everyone a decent standard of living; access for oil and other commodities. Most Russians have
to affordable education, jobs, and health care; and experienced improvements in their material prosper-
a safe, secure life. The political system did generally ity, compared to the Kappa and Lambda periods.
deliver on these goals, although the level of prosper- Crime rates have dropped from the Lambda period
ity and the quality of goods were modest at best, and as law enforcement and security services have rees-
life was relatively dull under a repressive, one-party tablished their traditional, heavy-handed approach
state that substantially limited personal freedoms. toward crime. Corruption remains high, although
The Soviet Union was one of the world’s two great lower than during the Lambda period. Despite a
military superpowers and had substantial international multiparty system, Putin has reasserted very strong
influence. However, shortcomings in the envisioned authoritarian control of political life—jailing rivals,
prosperity and quality of life led (then) president stifling political opposition, and muffling the media—
Mikhail Gorbachev to begin loosening restrictions on and Russia is again “not free” according to Freedom
the political and economic systems in the late 1980s, House. The Russia-in-transition of 2013 seems to
facilitating the collapse of the Soviet Union by 1991. offer its citizens, especially those with entrepreneurial
Lambda: The 1990s was a period of complex zeal, the promise of substantial opportunities for eco-
transitions as the new state of Russia abandoned nomic advancement. However, many Russians who
communism. There were efforts to establish a com- valued the transition to democracy and increased
petitive, multiparty democracy, privatize the political civil liberties are deeply distressed by the restraints
economy, and severely cut the provision of commu- on their political and personal freedoms. And those
nist-era services by the state. These changes were who relied on state support or have been unable to
generally successful in producing a free society and adjust to the new political economy of state capi-
market economy; but the transition also resulted in a talism look back with some longing at the old days
negative growth rate, surging unemployment, hyper- under communism (CIA 2014; UNDP 2013; Goldman
inflation, (e.g., prices increased twenty-six-fold in 1992 2003, 2008; McFaul, Stoner-Weiss, and Bunce 2010).
alone), a drastic increase in poverty and hardship
(e.g., an increase from 2 percent in 1989 to 50 per-
cent in 2000), a vast and widening gap between the
Further questions
rich and the poor, and skyrocketing crime. Amid 1. What criteria guided your choice? Did they
pervasive corruption in the society, two-thirds of the seem similar to the priorities you applied on
lucrative enterprises moved into the hands of insiders Compare in 1 (Acid Test I)?
(especially powerful entrepreneurs called oligarchs), 2. Is it reasonable that many Russians now say
whose agenda was to acquire the society’s eco- they prefer the Russia of the 1980s (Kappa) to
nomic assets at bargain prices and then exploit the current conditions (Lambda)?
422 Chapter 15

Goal: Prosperity
15.2 Evaluate the attempts by the postcommunist states to achieve prosperity
through a transition to market economies.

Strategy
When they were communist regimes, the principal strategy for achieving the goal of
the equal distribution of abundant goods and material welfare to the entire popula-
tion was the command political economy, as detailed in Chapter 8. The state and the
Communist Party, guided by a comprehensive plan, attempted to control nearly all
of society’s valued resources. Most citizens had access to inexpensive or free health
care, education, food, and shelter, and most had economic security against such prob-
lems as illness and old age. Thus, like Kappa (in Compare in 15), these countries
did reach relatively high levels on most quality of life measures (such as the Human
Development Index). However, these countries’ economic performance (on measures
such as GDP per capita) was disappointing. As described in Chapter 8, the rigid plan-
ning and limited incentives in these command economies resulted in low productivity
and poor-quality products. This caused a serious mismatch between demand and sup-
ply. That is, there was persistently more demand by the people for quality goods, from
bread to housing, than there was available supply of these goods.
Since the early 1990s, most of the PCDCs have attempted to achieve a rapid tran-
sition to a market political economy. Private firms produce goods for profit, and the
prices of most goods are determined by supply and demand. Central planning has
been abandoned, and most state-owned enterprises have been sold to private actors
(privatized) or shut down. In 1990, the average proportion of GDP in the private sec-
tor in these countries was less than 15 percent. By 2006, GDP in nearly all PCDCs was
between 75 and 80 percent private (Estrin et al. 2009). Fourteen of the 18 PCDCs are
now among the top half of all (177) countries in economic freedom, led by Estonia
at tenth (Heritage Foundation 2014). The political economies of the others, including
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia, are best described as state capitalism.

Performance
During the initial years of transition, most PCDCs experienced a substantial decline
in GDP and hyperinflation (inflation averaged higher than 100 percent per year in
all but two of the PCDCs) (World Bank 1996: Table A3). The real income of most peo-
ple dropped substantially, cuts in welfare services were deep, and unemployment
soared. The number of people in absolute poverty increased enormously in less than
a decade—from about 14 million people just prior to the “fall of communism” in 1988
(4 percent of the region’s population) to 147 million in 1996 (40 percent of the popula-
tion). This is the period of Russia-as-Lambda in Compare in 15.
Since the late 1990s, the economies and the living standards of many people in the
PCDCs have improved. Eleven of the PCDCs are now among the 28 member states of
 The Transitional Developed Countries 423

Figure 15.1 Prosperity Measures for Selected Transitional Developed Countries

SourCe: UNDP (2013)

GDP Per Capita (PPP current international $)

( ) Human Development Index

Israel $28809 (.900)

Slovenia $26801 (.892)
Czech Republic $26426 (.873)
Russia $23549 (.788)
Estonia $23024 (.846)
Chile $22655 (.819)
Poland $21903 (.821)
Hungary $21570 (.831)
Latvia $21005 (.814)
Turkey $17651 (.722)
Malaysia $17143 (.769)
Mexico $16676 (.775)
Uruguay $16037 (.792)
Bulgaria $15933 (.782)
Venezuela $13475 (.748)
Costa Rica $12943 (.773)
Argentina $12034 (.811)
Brazil $11909 (.730)
Serbia $11544 (.769)
Thailand $9815 (.690)
Bosnia & Herzegovina $9235 (.735)

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

GDP per capita ($PPP)

the EU, and 6 others are in various stages of potential membership. As Figure 15.1 indi-
cates, there is a relatively high level of prosperity in some PCDCs, especially Russia
and most of the Central European countries, such as Slovenia, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, Hungary, and Poland. Nine of them now achieve “very high” Human
Development Index scores, placing them in the range of some Global North countries.
Figure 15.2 provides information on economic growth rates in the transitional
developed countries. Can you see why the most desirable location for a country in
Figure 15.2 would be in the upper-right corner? Why might upper left be less impres-
sive than it seems? Notice that for all the countries in Figure 15.2, the correlation is
negative: That is, countries that had higher growth in one period tended to have lower
growth in the other period. Looking more closely at Figure 15.2 reveals that most of
the PCDCs generally had relatively low or negative economic growth rates in the 1990s
424 Chapter 15

Figure 15.2 Comparative Economic Growth Rates in Selected Transitional Countries,

1990–2000 and 2000–2012
SourCe: World Bank 2013

8
Kazakhstan
Belarus
7

Peru
Saudi Arabia
GDP Growth 2000–2012

5 Slovakia Malaysia
Russia
Turkey Costa Rica
Bulgaria Uruguay
Venezuela Poland Chile
4
Romania Thailand Israel
Brazil Estonia
Czech Republic Argentina
3
Mexico
Croatia
2
Hungary
1

0
−6 −4 −2 0 2 4 6 8
GDP Growth 1990–2000

but have improved considerably since 2000, with many averaging more than 4 percent
per year (well above the Eurozone average of 1.1 percent).
Moreover, it appears that the main reason the overall pattern across the two
time periods for all the transitional countries is negative is because of the substantial
differences in growth among many of the PCDCs. Notice that one group of PCDCs,
including Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Russia, has negative average annual growth from
1990 to 2000 but high rates of positive growth since 2000. These countries experienced
substantial difficulties in adjusting their political economies to the global system in
the postcommunist period. However, they seem to have managed to at least stabilize
their economies more recently under state capitalist systems. Another group of the
PCDCs, including Estonia, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, have transitioned to a
free market economy more effectively and have sustained positive annual growth for
the entire period since 1990. In general, for all of the PCDCs, prosperity and optimism
about the economic future are more evident among the population living in major cit-
ies and among the younger cohorts; poverty and disillusionment are more common in
nonurban areas and among the older generations, who have lost nearly all the social
services and welfare they received under communism.
 The Transitional Developed Countries 425

Challenges
Because their political economies now function like other market systems in the global
economy, the postcommunist developed countries face all the formidable challenges
to sustaining prosperity that confront the developed countries of the Global North,
as detailed in Chapter 13. Competition for markets and resources is ruthless, flows of
capital and labor are difficult to manage, and nonstate actors are hard to control. Since
the global recession that began in 2008, most PCDC economies have struggled with
challenges such as low economic growth and high unemployment, although not as
much as the Global North.
Moreover, the ongoing transitions of their political economies generate
additional challenges for the PCDCs. First, the state and key economic actors must
continue to streamline their regulatory systems and institutionalize free market mecha-
nisms (e.g., capital markets, business contracts, business law), which did not exist
under the command economy. In some PCDCs, a combination of state capitalism,
business cartels, and corruption inhibit economic growth. Second, these states must
establish an appropriate level of welfare distribution for the many people whose material
living conditions have declined significantly. The older cohorts in these countries
were socialized to believe in their right to cradle-to-grave support from the state.
Now, many face the dual hardship caused by both economic transition and their
governments’ drastic reductions of the large state subsidies for food, shelter, health
care, education, transportation, and other benefits. Third, the PCDCs must ensure
that the vigorous new group politics does not undermine economic policymaking. In the
electoral democracies, many citizens have voted out each set of incumbent leaders
and parties, whom they blame for the negative impacts from economic transitions
and from the harsh effects of a turbulent global economy. This repeated turnover of
government control results in substantial political instability and makes it difficult
for any political leadership to implement tough economic policies and retain popu-
lar support (Bonker 2006).

Goal: Stability
15.3 Assess the efforts by postcommunist states to balance democratic freedoms
and political stability.

Strategies
As communist political regimes, a basic assumption in Soviet Bloc countries was:
prosperity + equality = stability. That is, social and political stability would result
because the people were satisfied with the relatively equal distribution of abundant
goods and services. Although these countries did have among the world’s most equal
distributions of wealth and did provide many inexpensive goods and services to all
citizens, the major shortcoming in the stability equation was that the systems were
unable to produce goods in abundance so there were chronic shortages of most goods.
426 Chapter 15

The failure of the economy to provide adequate goods was a major source of citizen
dissatisfaction and potential instability.
To create stability in the absence of prosperity, these authoritarian states utilized
four key instruments of social control over many aspects of people’s lives: (1) the
Communist Party, whose active members, about 10 percent of population, acted as a
watchdog against dissidents; (2) a huge governmental apparatus of administrators,
police, and others who enforced obedience; (3) rewards (e.g., desired jobs, better hous-
ing) were allocated to those who were obedient, and sanctions (e.g., loss of benefits,
prison) were imposed on those who resisted; and (4) extensive use of the agents of
political socialization (e.g., schools, mass social organizations, the media) to drill in com-
munist ideology. Overall, these social controls created a highly stable but also highly
oppressive environment for most people.
During the 1980s, opposition to the Communist Party became more open and
personal freedoms expanded significantly, with an enormous boost from Soviet pre-
mier Mikhail Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost—a tolerance of public discussion and
criticism of the political, economic, and social systems. Then, in 1989, the citizens in
every East European country filled the streets, demanding political, economic, and
human rights. After decades of repression, the Communist Party leadership capitu-
lated in country after country, lacking either the will or the capacity to retain power.
A signal moment was November 9, 1989, when the Berlin Wall, the most notorious
symbol of the Iron Curtain, was opened, allowing a joyous reunion of 1 million East
and West Berliners. Except in Romania (where events corresponded to a violent rev-
olution from above), the dramatic changes occurred in these countries with so little
violence that they are best described as “democratic revolutions” (see Chapter 12).
By December 1991, even the Soviet Union “died” and was replaced by 15 indepen-
dent countries.
These countries adopted new constitutions that established hybrid governments,
with a president and a legislature–plus–prime minister selected through (mixed-
member) proportional representation electoral systems (see Chapter 7). In most of
the hybrids, the cabinet handles day-to-day policymaking. But the president has sub-
stantial power, including the right to dismiss the prime minister and cabinet, a power
that has been exercised in response to citizen dissatisfaction with the governments’
handling of the major economic and political transitions. In countries where these
hybrid systems are still not fully institutionalized, there are situations in which the
power relationships between president and prime minister have become very strained
(Schleiter and Morgan-Jones 2009).
There is a freedom divide among these countries (Puddington 2011). Most of
the PCDCs have institutionalized the political structures and processes of democ-
racy. Elections are fair, open, and very competitive; multiple parties hold seats in the
legislature; and there are smooth leadership turnovers. The citizens’ political rights
and civil liberties are extensive, and there is a vigorous political discourse. Table 15.2
shows that 13 of the PCDCs are now classified as “free” by Freedom House (2013),
including 8 that have already been rated as “consolidated democracies.” Macedonia
is only “partly free” and is among the six PCDCs characterized as “semi-consolidated
 The Transitional Developed Countries 427

Table 15.2 Democracy Rankings of Postcommunist Developed Countries

Freedom House eIu Democracy Index
Country ranking and Score Classification and Scorea
Consolidated Democracies
Czech Republic Free: 1.0 Full democracy 8.19
Slovenia Free: 1.0 Flawed democracy 7.88
Estonia Free: 1.0 Flawed democracy 7.61
Slovakia Free: 1.0 Flawed democracy 7.35
Lithuania Free: 1.0 Flawed democracy 7.24
Poland Free: 1.0 Flawed democracy 7.12
Hungary Free: 1.5 Flawed democracy 6.96
Latvia Free: 2.0 Flawed democracy 7.05
Semi-Consolidated Democracies
Croatia Free: 1.5 Flawed democracy 6.93
Bulgaria Free: 2.0 Flawed democracy 6.72
Romania Free: 2.0 Flawed democracy 6.54
Serbia Free: 2.0 Flawed democracy 6.33
Montenegro Free: 2.5 Flawed democracy 6.05
Macedonia Partly Free: 3.0 Flawed democracy 6.16
Consolidated Authoritarian regimes
Russia Not Free: 5.5 Authoritarian regime 3.74
Kazakhstan Not Free: 5.5 Authoritarian regime 2.95
Azerbaijan Not Free: 6.0 Authoritarian regime 3.15
Belarus Not Free: 6.5 Authoritarian regime 3.04
a The EIU Democracy index ranges from high democracy (10.00) to low (0.00).
SourCe: Freedom House (2014); Economist Intelligence Unit (2013)

democracies” at this point. On the Democracy Index from the EIU (2013), only the
Czech Republic is rated as a full democracy, with most of the others ranked “free” by
Freedom House scoring only as “flawed democracies,” usually due to lower scores on
the level of political participation and the weakness of a democratic political culture,
despite relatively high scores on electoral process and pluralism.
In contrast, four (Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia) are “consolidated
authoritarian regimes” that have reverted to state repression and control mechanisms
similar to those of the communist era. All are classified as “not free.” Since Vladimir
Putin’s regime began in 2000, Russia has steadily reduced democratic practices, politi-
cal rights, and civil liberties. The three other authoritarian regimes have each had only
one or two entrenched leaders since 1990. Like Russia, they have reimposed Soviet-
era restrictions on democratic practices such as free speech, freedom of the press, and
political opposition, as well as strong state control of the economy (Freedom House
2014; Shkolnikov 2009).
428 Chapter 15

Challenges
Currently, most of the PCDCs face significant destabilizing forces related to social
disorder, nationality issues, and globalization. Many of these countries, including
Slovenia, Hungary, Slovakia, Belarus, the Czech Republic, and Kazakhstan, still have
among the highest levels of income equality in the world (measured by the Gini index
of inequality; recall Table 8.1). However, economic and social inequality have increased
since 1989 in most of these transitional countries in the absence of communist con-
trols, and the gaps between the rich and poor have become substantial and apparent to
everyone in these societies.

SociAl DiSorDEr The combination of freewheeling capitalism, the decline in com-

munist-era social controls, and increases in inequality has resulted in a rise in social
disorder. This is reflected in a decline in citizens’ obedience to laws and rules and is
particularly evident in the high incidence of crime. In Russia, more than 4,000 mafia
crime groups are engaged in widespread extortion, auto theft, drug peddling, burglary,
and other criminal activities. In the first five years of postcommunism, for example,
reported serious crimes increased 270 percent in Romania, 222 percent in Bulgaria, and
105 percent in Poland (Murphy 1995). While crime rates have now stabilized, coun-
tries that were accustomed to almost no violent crime under communism are now
attempting to cope with distressing levels of crimes against both people and prop-
erty. In the more authoritarian PCDCs, the police are either ineffective or corrupt, and
citizens live in fear of organized crime, random criminal violence, and even the police
(McFaul 1998).

NATioNAliTy coNflicTS A few nationality groups, such as the Poles and the East
Germans (who were reunited with their West German brothers and sisters in 1990),
now live in ethnically homogeneous states. In 1993, Czechoslovakia peacefully broke
into two states based on its two main ethnic groups (Czechs and Slovaks). However,
identity politics and ethnonationalism (recall Chapter 5) threaten the stability of many
PCDCs because they have significant minority populations. Marginalized national-
ity groups are increasingly active in demanding greater autonomy, and the majority
group has often responded by aggressively asserting its domination.
Thus, internal nation-based conflict has produced disorder in many PCDCs.
Yugoslavia, a complex multiethnic state under communism, became a brutal battle-
ground as different nation-based groups killed more than 250,000 of their neighbors
during the 1990s and still struggle with interethnic hostilities despite the breakup of
the Balkans into six countries (recall the opening section of Chapter 12). Current nation-
based hostility in several countries is particularly directed against the Roma (gypsies)
and against those of Russian heritage who live in other PCDCs (because Russians were
transplanted to control other parts of the Soviet Bloc during communism). Other con-
flicts that have exploded into separatist violence include several in highly multina-
tional Russia (e.g., Chechnya and Ingushetia). Russia also invaded Georgia in support
of the demands for autonomy by the South Ossetians and reannexed parts of Ukraine
(e.g., Crimea) where most people have Russian identity.
 The Transitional Developed Countries 429

ENTry iNTo EuropE AND GlobAl SociETy Until 1989, the Iron Curtain coun-
tries restricted their populations both physically and culturally. The people were kept
in, and the world, including the many complex cultural and economic changes that
were occurring, was kept out. After decades of relative isolation, most PCDCs are
now fully engaged with global society. Unrestricted travel, unlimited media exposure,
the huge expansion of communications technologies, and the effects of EU member-
ship on 11 of the PCDCs have exposed the people to a dizzying array of new experi-
ences, expectations, and cultural norms. If their political system does not deliver the
material life and good governance that the people now expect, the decline in support
for the country’s leaders and the political institutions undermines the stability of both
the state and the society. Most of the PCDCs that have attempted to institutional-
ize democracy and the market economy find that sustaining an effective response to
these destabilizing factors has been difficult. In response, governments in some of the
PCDCs have reverted to authoritarianism.

Goal: Security
15.4 Analyze the impact of the fall of the Soviet system on the security
of the postcommunist states.
In Halford John Mackinder’s (1996) famous nineteenth-century geopolitical analysis,
Eastern Europe and Western Russia were the essential “heartland”: Control of that
region would ensure world dominance. The region has been a battlefield for the last
200 years, including devastating invasions by the French under Napoleon, during
World War I, and by the Germans under Hitler during World War II.
Given this history, the Soviet Union perceived itself to be surrounded by hostile
threats to its survival after World War II. To the east was capitalist Japan, a historical
military adversary. To the southeast was China, with its huge population and alterna-
tive vision of communism. To the southwest, the militancy of Islamic fundamentalism
presented a clear danger, given its antipathy to communism and the large population
of Muslims in the Soviet Union’s southwestern regions. To the west were the major
capitalist powers, with their deep animosity to communist systems and with NATO’s
devastating military (including nuclear) capabilities stretched along almost half of the
Soviet Bloc’s border.
As a consequence, the Soviet Union placed exceptionally high importance on
security goals and aimed for unchallengeable military power. To create a buffer zone,
the Soviet Union gained control over territory on all sides, annexing some areas and
creating a bloc of subservient states in Central and Eastern Europe. The Soviet Bloc
built the world’s most powerful military for conventional warfare, and the Soviet
Union had near parity with NATO allies in air power and nuclear capabilities. From
the late 1940s until the late 1980s, the Cold War rivalry between the Soviet Union and
the United States dominated the bipolar international system and spawned a huge
military buildup on each side. Soviet leaders from Stalin to Gorbachev opted for guns
430 Chapter 15

over butter, spending 9 to 15 percent of national income on defense. This high military
expenditure substantially reduced the resources available for economic growth and
the distribution of welfare and is a key reason for the demise of the Soviet system.
In the postcommunist period, the Soviet security system changed dramatically.
Some of the countries in the bloc did not survive—either disappearing (East Germany)
or splitting up (Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and even the Soviet Union itself, which
was replaced by 15 countries in 1991). Ten former members of the Soviet Bloc joined
their old enemy NATO, despite strong opposition from Russia. For Russia under Putin,
the security response to the more multipolar global system has been to strengthen
ties with the enemies of its enemies (e.g., Iran, Syria, Venezuela) and to rebuild its
military. In 2012, Russia increased its military spending by 16 percent, and its military
budget for 2012–2015 includes a planned increase of more than 40 percent. Although
diminished from its Cold War strength, Russia’s military machine still includes a huge
standing army and more stockpiled (6,700) and deployed (1,800) nuclear weapons
than China (about 250 total) and the United States (about 5,550 stockpiled and 2,150
deployed) combined (SIPRI 2013).
While Russia, the United States, and the other major powers have undertaken
some reduction in nuclear weapons, the increasing presence of weapons of mass
destruction and terrorism around their borders results in significant security risks
for the PCDCs (Davenport and Taylor 2013). And Russia’s military resurgence, its
assertive foreign policy, its reconquest of part of Ukraine, and its nuclear arsenal are
viewed with alarm by most of its geopolitical neighbors, including many other PCDCs
(Aslund and Kuchins 2009; McFaul, Stoner-Weiss, and Bunce 2010). Some insecurity is
also associated with the decline of national identity for citizens in the PCDCs that have
joined the EU and NATO. All of the postcommunist developed countries are attempt-
ing to adapt to the new global security environment.

The Latin American Transitionals

As noted in Chapter 10, there is a set of Latin American countries within the tran-
sitional developed countries classification in Figure 10.1 that also seems to form a
grouping. This group includes Chile, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela, Costa Rica, Brazil,
and Argentina. These countries generally share many aspects of culture and language,
history, class structure, and, of course, region. They were colonized early, and most
have been independent for more than 150 years. They transitioned from rural and
agrarian systems to societies that are mainly urban, but considerable wealth is still
concentrated in natural resources and agriculture. Among the well-institutionalized
structures in these societies are the armed forces, the church, and an upper-class elite.
Their politics has generally been elite-dominated and historically was authoritarian,
often under a strong, singular leader. In recent decades, democratic practices are the
norm, although political instability is not uncommon. Our examination of these Latin
American Transitionals focuses on their contemporary quest for greater prosperity,
stability, and security.
 The Transitional Developed Countries 431

Goal: Prosperity
15.5 Analyze the pursuit of prosperity by the
latin American transitional developed
countries.
Unlike the PCDCs, the Latin American Transitionals
have not engaged in recent, rapid transformations
of their political economies. However, prior to the
1970s, many of these political economies did have
forms of statism, with substantial state ownership
and control of the economy. Beginning with Chile,
many of the Latin American Transitionals began
to shift toward market economies from the 1970s
forward. As the neoliberal model was embraced,
state enterprises were sold off, privatization of
government services was extensive, and foreign
investment was encouraged. GDP per capita has
risen, and nearly all have averaged annual eco-
nomic growth of more than 3.5 percent since 1990
(Figure 15.2).
However, this growth was not consistent;
it tended to occur in spurts, followed by periods Las presidentes: Presidents Cristina Fernandez de
of economic decline and inflation, rather like the Kirchner of Argentina, Michelle Bachelet of Chile, and
Latin American Transitionals’ less developed Dilma Rousseff of Brazil (left to right) consult in Chile
regional neighbors (recall Chapter 14). For exam- in 2014.
ple, Mexico suffered a “peso crisis” in 1994, Brazil’s
economy has been highly volatile (see Focus in 15), and the economies of Argentina
and Uruguay dropped precipitously in 2002. Argentina is indicative of the up-and-
down pattern. In 2002, Argentina was in a severe period of negative growth and
unemployment, defaulted on $130 billion in bonds, devalued its currency, and was in
deep economic crisis. After a bumpy decade, the economy exploded in 2010 and 2011,
driven by manufacturing and food exports, and averaged about 9 percent growth.
However, the economy has more recently struggled again, with very low growth and
high inflation (25 percent) (Kraul 2011). Thus the average economic growth rates for
the Latin American Transitionals, which seem generally positive in Figure 15.2, can
be understood as masking years of high growth and years of relatively low or nega-
tive growth.
On the one hand, some citizens in the Latin American Transitionals enjoy an
extremely high standard of living, many material possessions, and quality services
(e.g., health care, education). Argentina and Chile (and soon Uruguay) have HDI scores
above .800. On the other hand, many people across Latin American have suffered a
serious reduction in their standard of living over the last three decades. Those who
are very poor experience a life as harsh as that in many of the developing countries.
432 Chapter 15

In addition, Panama and Chile are among the 20 countries with the world’s highest
levels of wealth inequality, and every Latin American Transitional except Argentina
and Venezuela is among the world’s one-third most unequal countries (CIA 2014).
While the reasons for these features of the Latin American economies are disputed,
some analysts attribute the negative features to the same sorts of weaknesses listed
above for PCDCs. Privatization, corruption, international competition, and exploita-
tion by multinationals and “crony capitalists” within the countries have taken a severe
toll on their political economies (Weintraub 2009). As the Latin American transitional
economies have been buffeted by the forces of globalization and high economic vola-
tility, their governments have implemented structural adjustment programs required
by the International Monetary Fund. Cuts in government spending and restrictions
on the money supply have resulted in increased unemployment and reductions in
government services.
Some political elites have sought to turn frustration with these economic results of
neoliberalism and globalization into political advantage for populist parties, resulting
in electoral success in some countries like Bolivia and Venezuela and the implementa-
tion of extensive programs redistributing goods and money to the lower economic
groups (Handlin 2013). For example, Venezuela’s late president Hugo Chavez promoted
“twenty-first century socialism” as an alternative development path for Latin America.
The Venezuelan model emphasizes stronger state engagement in the political economy,
with increased state ownership of major resources, more extensive redistribution of ben-
efits to the less advantaged, and a resistance to key aspects of economic globalization. The
issues associated with economic liberalization policies pervade not only the strategies for
prosperity but also the dynamics of political stability and democratization in the Latin
American Transitionals (de Cordoba and Vyas 2012; Wiarda and Kline 2007).

Focus in 15
Order and Progress in Brazil: Sometimes
The motto on the Brazilian flag is “Order and emphasizing import substitution and promoting
Progress.” The vision of order and progress has exports. The involvement of international capi-
guided much of Brazilian policy since the founding of tal and foreign corporations was encouraged. The
the republic in 1889, but recent history has cast doubt results were impressive. Brazil’s economic devel-
on its ability to sustain this vision. Brazil is the fifth opment was praised worldwide as a “miracle,”
largest country (in area) in the world, is sixth largest in with yearly growth averaging 10 percent. Brazil’s
population (almost 203 million), and has vast natural economy is now larger than that of all the rest of
resources. In many ways, Brazil reflects the promise South America and is the eighth largest in the
of development in the twenty-first century—but it also world. Since 2000, its average annual growth has
epitomizes the troubles associated with that quest. been a respectable 3.7 percent, with strong perfor-
mance in recent years. It is a BRICS country due
to its increasing impact on the global economy. It
Progress
is a leader among the developing countries in the
From the mid-1960s to the mid-1970s, the state production of many goods, including agricultural
took the lead in guiding Brazil’s industrialization, exports such as coffee, sugar, and cocoa; minerals
 The Transitional Developed Countries 433

such as tin, gold, iron ore, and bauxite; and indus- of 2,864 percent in 1990). Brazil’s foreign debt is
trial goods such as textiles, cement, automobiles, the third largest among the transitional countries
weapons, and machinery. Since 1970, life expec- and Global South—more than $430 billion. Despite
tancy has increased 14 years (to age 74), infant government aid programs, one in five Brazilians
mortality has dropped to one-third its former level, lives in poverty. Brazil has the world’s sixteenth
and adult literacy has risen to 90 percent. Brazil won most unequal distribution of income, with wealth
the global competition to host the 2014 World Cup heavily concentrated in the urban upper and upper-
and the 2016 Summer Olympics. middle classes.

order order?
Politically, Brazil is a constitutional democracy. The Since 1930, the military has deposed six top political
government is a federal republic, with an elected leaders. The military, supported by the middle class,
president who has dominant power over the bicam- seized power most recently in a 1964 coup against
eral National Congress. It has a multiparty system, an elected government that was judged too sympa-
universal and compulsory voting, an independent thetic to the needs of the many rural and urban poor.
judiciary, and a partly free press. Its Freedom The military government was repressive and ruth-
House rating is “free,” and its citizens enjoy rela- less, crushing leftist opposition, censoring the press,
tively high levels of political rights and civil liber- and compiling one of South America’s worst records
ties. There have been two decades of competitive of human rights abuses. An elected president took
and fair elections, including the smooth transition to office in 1985 after 21 years of authoritarian military
the presidency of Dilma Rousseff in 2011 after 79 rule, and a new constitution was implemented in
percent voter turnout. The large state bureaucracy 1988. Since that time, the recurrent economic prob-
has maintained social and political order, with mini- lems have provoked a huge rise in social disorder.
mal class-based conflict, and Brazil is often cited Crime rates are extremely high; urban riots are fre-
as one of the world’s most successful multiracial quent, especially in the huge favelas located in the
societies. A strong military ensures Brazil’s security cosmopolitan cities; and there is violence between
and sovereignty. peasants and landholders, who are disputing the
government’s announced but unfulfilled promises of
Progress?
land reform.
The economic miracle in the 1970s was built on a One recent president (Collor de Mello) was
weak base of economic statism. It was fueled by forced to resign due to a massive corruption scan-
debt-led growth and deeply dependent on exter- dal. When the next president (Fernando Henrique
nal support for finance capital, technology, and Cardoso) was elected in 1995, the citizens reflected
markets. Much of the growth was in the 600 state- their disgust with government: One in three
owned companies, many of which were extremely Brazilians abstained from voting in the presidential
inefficient and eventually went bankrupt. The election, and blank (protest) votes outnumbered
emphasis on industrial development has had many votes cast for any senate candidate in 22 of the 26
negative consequences, including a decline of the states. Brazil scores only 42 on a 100-point cor-
agricultural sector resulting in 2 million landless ruption scale (where 100 is very clean). Like prior
peasants and the need to import basic foods. administrations, President Rousseff’s government
After years of miracle growth, the economy was immediately embroiled in corruption scandals,
came close to collapse in the early 1980s and again and five Cabinet ministers were among those fired in
in the mid-1990s. The average annual growth rate her first nine months.
is erratic, with the last four years being −0.3, 7.5, Policymaking is stymied by a fractious leg-
2.7, and 0.9 percent. During the 1990s, hyperinfla- islature composed of more than a dozen major
tion was also a problem (reaching a staggering high political parties, many of whose members actually
434 Chapter 15

change parties between elections and are pri- Further Focus

marily loyal to their regional political bosses. The
1. Based on this account, what might be the main
Brazilian flag’s proud announcement of “Order and
reason why less than one in three Brazilians is sat-
Progress” flaps ironically over the building where
isfied with how democracy works in their country?
these politicians attempt to govern (CIA 2014;
Goodwin 2008; Transparency International 2013; 2. What policies might help Brazil achieve the GDP
World Bank 2013). per capita and HDI score of a developed country?

Goal: Stability
15.6 characterize the quest for stability in the latin American Transitionals.
Strong political leaders and a hegemonic class elite were also characteristic of most Latin
American transitional countries in the second half of the twentieth century, apart from
consistently democratic Costa Rica. Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, and Venezuela alter-
nated between periods of rule by a civilian government and by authoritarian military
regimes that, in most cases, came to power by violence and ruled repressively. Mexico
was dominated nationally by a single, socially conservative political party, PRI, from
1929 until 2001.
Broadly, this political authoritarianism in Latin America has been linked with a tra-
ditional social structure that was based on hierarchical class strata and a dominant ruling
class whose members controlled the economic and political systems. Political–cultural
norms also included popular acceptance of leaders, often with a military background
(caudillos) in an earlier era, who exert extremely strict control over the political system.
Thus, the political cultures have typically assumed that there would be electoral democ-
racies but that the regime would be hegemonic, involving the alternation between elites
rather than open competition among truly opposing groups (Arias 2011; Castenada 2011).

Democratization?
By the late 1980s and early 1990s, most of these countries had begun a process of
democratization that is proceeding at varying rates in different countries. Vigorous and
competitive democratic politics reemerged in the 1990s in place of repressive regimes in
Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay. With the 2000 election of Vicente Fox, even PRI in Mexico
lost its one-party dominance of the national political system (recall Chapter 7). Freedom
House (2014) classifies all the Latin American Transitionals except Venezuela as “free.” On
the EIU (2013) Democracy Index, Uruguay and Costa Rica are classified as “full democra-
cies,” and the rest (except Venezuela) are classified as “flawed democracies,” with gener-
ally high scores on civil liberties and on electoral process and pluralism but more mixed
scores on the effective functioning of government and on political participation.
Along with positive effects, the combination of democratization, greater prosperity,
and economic volatility has generated forces of instability in many of these countries. One
specific source of instability is those groups that have been most negatively affected by
cutbacks in government welfare and by the recurring periods of economic crisis (Handlin
 The Transitional Developed Countries 435

2013). A second source is the minority ethnic groups in many of these countries, who also
tend to be among the poorest citizens. Thus frustration and political violence are evident
from the large numbers of poor and politically marginalized groups, such as the peasants
in the Chiapas region of Mexico and the Indian populations in Chile (recall the Maputo
in Chapter 9). Criminal groups have also created very high levels of violence. Instability
that occurs just outside the borders of a country can spill over into internal disruption
and violence; for example, in Venezuela (from Colombia). The mix of economic volatility,
inequality, and widespread political disillusionment continues to generate serious chal-
lenges to the stability of the Latin American Transitionals.
The probability of instability increases where the dissatisfaction of the poor
is not counteracted by the middle classes who, in many Latin American countries,
offer little support for their political systems (Arias 2011; Torcal and Montero 2006).
There are numerous examples of this instability: an attempted coup based on middle-
class unrest regarding the authoritarian style of President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela
(2002); two recent Costa Rican presidents who have been jailed for corruption; rioting
in Argentina (2002) resulting in the succession of five “presidents” in less than three
weeks; and the middle classes’ lack of enthusiasm for the political regime in countries
such as Mexico and Brazil (Focus in 15; Castenada 2010). Thus, in 2013, less than half of
those surveyed in Brazil, Chile, Mexico, and Venezuela indicated they were “satisfied”
with the way democracy was working in their country (Latinobarometro 2013).

Goal: Security
15.7 Describe the security goals of the latin American Transitionals.
The borders of Latin American states were established in the nineteenth century and
have been relatively stable for more than 150 years. While there have been occasional
border issues and political disagreements between these countries and their neighbors
in recent decades, these rarely reach the level of militarized disputes. Interstate war
involving these states was rare in the twentieth century. While the Latin American
Transitionals’ considerable military strength could be deployed for protection against
neighboring states, it has been more actively engaged in maintaining internal order,
either by supporting the political leadership or by overthrowing it and seizing politi-
cal power. Costa Rica and Panama are the exceptions in that they have no standing
military but rather rely on a national police force.
Some of the most significant external threats to security have been from the for-
mer colonial powers that limited the Latin American Transitionals’ autonomy and
freedom of action, particularly the United States, Spain, and Great Britain. Their rela-
tionships with the powerful United States, which has a strong economic and political
presence over the entire hemisphere, has dominated the security concerns of many of
these countries. Venezuela’s late president Chavez took the lead in promoting new
directions in foreign policy that involve ties with countries that are antagonistic to
the United States, such as Cuba and Iran. The most notable conventional war since
1950 that involved a Latin American country is the Falklands War between Argentina
436 Chapter 15

and Great Britain in 1982. This conflict resulted from the Argentine military govern-
ment’s attempt to seize islands off its coast that remained under the colonial dominion
of Britain. Argentina’s defeat in this short war, like the deep penetration into Latin
American economies by the Global North countries and their financial institutions,
was a reminder that dependency and subordination can persist in the postcolonial
period, even for relatively strong Latin American countries.

The BRICS Countries

15.8 Explain the bricS concept.
The discussion of the PCDCs and the Latin American Transitionals devoted consider-
able attention to Russia and Brazil. These two countries are also part of another group-
ing of five countries that do not cluster in Figure 10.1 or on any other concept in this
book. They do not have the same major political institutional arrangements, similar
political economies, a common culture, or a shared region. However, this set of five
countries is now widely referred to as the bricS. While only two of the five are part
of the transitional developed countries group in Figure 10.1, the BRICS group has
received so much attention that it is worthwhile to consider these countries explicitly
in terms of their pursuit of prosperity, stability, and security.
Whence came the BRICS? In the first few years of the twenty-first century, senior
analysts at Goldman Sachs, a global investment firm, attempted to predict the world-
wide distribution of power in 2050. They posited that a small set of countries outside
the Global North would have a huge impact on the global system. They termed these
countries the BRICs—standing for Brazil, Russia, India, and China.
The premise underlying the BRICs analysis was simple: If the BRIC countries,
with more than 2.5 billion people, embraced the modernizing economic principles
associated with global trade and globalization, their economies would become very
large and substantially shape the global economy by 2050. In 2003, the BRIC’s com-
bined GNP was only 15 percent of that of the largest economies of the Global North;
yet the BRICs could become the dominant force in shaping the global economy as
they developed, given their size, extensive resources, geostrategic locations, and the
changing conditions in Global North countries (Kowitt 2009; O’Neill 2001; Wilson and
Purushothaman 2003). In 2006, diplomats from each of the BRIC countries gathered in
New York for the first official BRIC meeting. And by 2010, the four BRICs became the
five BRICS, when they invited South Africa to join the group.
Earlier chapters in this book should alert you to the huge differences among the
BRICS. Recall, for example, the Compare in 1 that highlighted many differences between
India and China. Brazil is mostly tropical, while vast areas of Russia are covered by
permafrost. India and China each have 25 times more people than South Africa. India
is a parliamentary democracy, and Russia is an authoritarian nondemocracy. China is
a one-party state, and Brazil has more than a dozen parties competing for seats in the
legislature. Brazil has no serious military enemies on its continent, while India borders
on two major nuclear powers with which it has fought. Indeed, it might be argued that
 The Transitional Developed Countries 437

the main commonality among the BRICS is the goal of a future global system that is not
dominated by the Global North countries, especially the United States, Japan, and the
EU. What development strategies do the BRICS employ to achieve this shared goal?

Goal: Prosperity
15.9 Analyze the pursuit of prosperity by the bricS.
The BRICS have embraced a market- and trade-based economic strategy that enables
them to compete globally with the Global North. Trade with other countries has been a
crucial part of their economic development strategies. In China, this has been particu-
larly driven by the export of manufactured goods at prices that are highly competitive
in the global marketplace. Brazil and Russia have taken full advantage of exporting
their abundant natural resources as well as goods from an expanded manufacturing
base. South Africa and India have grown their knowledge sectors to serve clients both
inside and outside their countries.
As in the earlier developmental state strategy (recall Chapter 10), the government in
each of the BRICS has been an active partner with the firms that have been most effective
in the production of goods and services. Public policies have favored certain actors and
sectors in the attempt to facilitate export-oriented growth. Brazil is the only BRICS coun-
try that has been very supportive of production for domestic consumption, although the
domestic market is becoming very important in all of the BRICS. Each state’s economic
policies have facilitated the emergence of an elite class that is extraordinarily wealthy.

A full house of BRICS: Top leaders of the five BRICS countries meet in Brazil in 2014. From
left to right, Vladimir Putin (Russia); Narendra Modi (India); Dilma Rousseff (Brazil); Xi
Jinping (China); and Jacob Zuma (South Africa).
438 Chapter 15

One of the most interesting aspects of the BRICS’ cooperation is the formation of
the BRICS Development Bank in 2013. This bank will fund development projects in the
five member states to enhance infrastructure (e.g., roads, sewers, schools) and to pro-
mote the expansion of targeted manufacturing and service sectors. It will also pool the
currencies of the BRICS states to fend off any future currency or financial crisis. This bank
is envisioned as a means to provide the countries with greater independence regarding
monetary policy and the flow of investment and thus to limit the constraints and depen-
dency imposed on the BRICS’ economies by Global North financial institutions, especially
the World Bank and the IMF. Earlier information in this book has demonstrated that each
of the BRICS has enjoyed periods of notable economic growth. It has been most spectacu-
lar and sustained in China, which has averaged 10.6 percent growth per year from 1990 to
2012. India’s growth has been more sporadic, averaging 6.8 percent over the same period.
Years of high growth alternating with periods of low growth have been common in the
other BRICS, resulting in more modest average growth rates in Brazil (3.7 percent), Russia
(4.8 percent), and South Africa (3.6 percent). Analyses projecting strong, rapid growth
and development in the BRICS assume that each will continue to: (1) integrate success-
fully into the global economy; (2) diversify its mix of goods; (3) increase the levels of
prosperity and consumption for a large proportion of its population; (4) sustain a favor-
able balance between government revenues and government spending; and (5) maintain
political and social stability, the second major goal of the BRICS.

Goal: Stability
15.10 characterize the quest for stability in the bricS.
The core approaches for achieving stability differ among the BRICS. China has been
most aggressive in suppressing political freedoms, controlling the media and Internet,
and limiting antisocial behavior through its system of security forces and pris-
ons. Russia has pursued similar strategies, although at a less intensive level. While
China has prevented almost any cracks in its one-party government system, Russia
has allowed multiple parties, although it is an increasingly authoritarian illiberal
democracy at best. Both countries are rated “not free” with low scores from Freedom
House (2014). In contrast, India, Brazil, and South Africa operate “free” constitutional
democracies, with multiparty elections, limited mandates, and relatively high levels of
political, media, and personal freedoms.
Although each of the BRICS has a political system with strong capabilities, each
does face serious threats to stability. Corruption is pervasive among both public sector
and private sector actors, draining productive resources and undermining social and
economic relations. Anger and frustration with corruption exist in all five countries
and occasionally explode into protest, especially in China and India. Moreover, all
BRICS have high levels of wealth inequality that are increasing with greater prosper-
ity. This, along with ethnic, religious, and caste-based inequalities in each of the BRICS,
might be a central cause of the high levels of crime. All of these factors result in low
levels of support for public officials and political institutions and are potential sources
 The Transitional Developed Countries 439

of the kinds of political decay and internal political violence described in Chapters 10
and 12. The ultimate success of each of the BRICS might depend on the extent to which
it can limit or mitigate the destabilizing tendencies that are associated with both the
current conditions in each country and those exacerbated by development.

Goal: Security
15.11 Describe the security goals of the bricS.
Each BRICS country faces different security challenges. Only Brazil enjoys few secu-
rity risks from the other countries in its region. South Africa faces a persistent risk that
regional sectarian violence across sub-Saharan Africa will lead to an influx of refugees
that it cannot manage. Tribal identities within South Africa and across its borders add
to the potential risks. India is a nuclear power that has ongoing conflict with another
nuclear power, Pakistan; is in a volatile region drenched with violence; and could
even find itself fighting again with current BRICS buddy China. China, also a nuclear
power, might experience a reemergence of security issues and hostilities with either
India or Russia. China also must deal with both vast borders shared with numerous
countries and security threats from internal ethnic populations that militate for auton-
omy, particularly Tibetans and Uighurs. As noted earlier in this chapter, Russia still
has a massive military machine that it is rapidly expanding and an aggressive foreign
policy because it too perceives hostile countries along many of its lengthy borders.
Chapter 12 noted that countries with extensive military capability are more likely
to engage in interstate conflict. Each of the five BRICS is the most militarized country
in its region. Four of the five are among the world’s top twelve countries in total mili-
tary expenditure, led by China (second behind the United States) and Russia (third),
with India eighth and Brazil twelfth. Russia, India, and South Africa rank among the
lowest one-fourth of all the countries in the world on the Global Peace Index. Further,
the empirical analyses about power transitions in international relations suggest that
if the BRICS’ global power rise is as substantial as predicted, each will increasingly be
involved in open conflict with other states. The rise to the top of the global pecking
order is never gentle.
The future of the BRICS might be intertwined. An emerging power center that
is a rival to the economic and military might of the United States and the EU could
alter political and economic relationships around the world. However, if any of the
BRICS states is incapable of fully participating with the others at the international level
because of economic mismanagement or political instability, the coalition might not
survive. Similarly, if the BRICS cannot maintain their alliance in the face of a major
global crisis, if their incentives to cooperate are swamped by their individual national
interests, or if the BRICS Development Bank fails, the notion of their shared future
could dissipate. Yet even if they do not sustain their shared vision, the size of their
populations, the scale and complexity of their economies, and their role in the global
trade regime suggest that the economist from Goldman Sachs was correct. The BRICS
will be an economic and political force to reckon with for decades to come.
440 Chapter 15

The Future of the Transitional

Developed Countries
15.12 identify the factors associated with the prospects for further development
of the transitional developed countries.
While the three sets of countries in transition discussed in this chapter are quite differ-
ent from one another, most share both optimism and uncertainty about their futures.
They have experienced substantial, positive change in recent decades, yet these devel-
opment dynamics could disrupt their quest for prosperity, stability, and security.
In terms of Figure 10.1, in order to move up the scale of development a transitional
country needs to achieve further improvements in three dimensions: economic devel-
opment, social development, and the political system’s capabilities.
First, the economic development to move a country up the scale requires that more
value-added activity be introduced into the economy. The direct paths for upward
movement include both increasing profitable exports and growing a domestic mid-
dle class that purchases more consumer goods. Also, private sector firms and the
state must combine to create more jobs, especially jobs that are characterized by
greater profitability in the highly competitive international marketplace. And for
most of the transitional countries, the increasing global scarcity of many valued com-
modities and resources will present major challenges. Thus the state must respond
effectively to a complex set of choices regarding its political economy, including
policy decisions about how to incentivize and regulate private firms, the state’s
forms of involvement in the production and distribution of goods to its citizens, and
state actions to further the country’s economic interests in the global economy.
Second, improvements in social development can be difficult for the state to con-
trol. Social capital and community are created through culture and tradition as much
as through government policy. While culture is globalizing in many ways, resistance
to change and progress can be rooted in religious beliefs and traditional norms that
are not easily overcome. Overall social development will lag if women and ethnic, reli-
gious, or sexual minorities are treated as less than full citizens. Yet the governments in
some transitional countries will find it politically difficult to implement policies that
deliver greater equality. Social development can also be advanced or hindered by pub-
lic policies regarding the speed and trajectory of improvements in education, in the
technical and communications skills its population needs for many twenty-first century
jobs, and in the availability and framing of the Internet and the array of new informa-
tion and communications technologies. In addition, the increasing urbanization of these
countries will generate new demands in terms of the infrastructure—whether building
housing, delivering clean water, transporting food and goods, or limiting environmen-
tal degradation. Given the context of globalization and the conflicting political and
cultural norms among policymakers and the citizenry, the challenges to social develop-
ment might constitute obstacles that prevent the rise of some transitional countries.
Third, and most broadly, the transition to higher development will be contingent on
the political system’s capabilities to deliver prosperity, stability, and security. As described
 The Transitional Developed Countries 441

in Chapter 14, successful development is served by a strong, active, and responsible

state that is willing and able to tap into the opportunities in the global market and to
deliver improvements in education, health, and quality of life to most of its citizens.
Meeting the expectations of the citizens is critical. Some policies will face considerable
citizen resistance. Some dimensions of development pay off slowly—good elementary
schools, for instance, do not directly impact the economy until those students move
into the workforce and find suitable jobs. Policymakers will enact a mix of effective and
ineffective decisions. Most economies will have good years and bad years in the global
marketplace. Some foreign policy actions will succeed, but others will fail.
In the current era, it is often the case that a population quickly loses patience with
a government and its policies when there are few immediate benefits or a downturn in
material conditions. If a government lacks the popular support necessary to sustain its
development policies, its capacity to stay the course can be very limited, especially in
a complex world made even more challenging by unexpected natural or human-made
crises. The results can be government dysfunction and political instability. Yet there
are encouraging examples of countries that have moved up steadily on the develop-
ment scale. Singapore is a particularly striking case, along with others such as Chile,
the Czech Republic, and South Korea. Many transitional developed countries clearly
have the potential to achieve levels of political, economic, and social development
comparable to those of some Global North countries. And, ironically, globalization
might be a great equalizer because it could limit the capacity of Global North countries
to maintain their competitive advantage.
It is evident that no one fully understands how to sustain positive, balanced devel-
opment in the current international environment. The transitional countries are vulner-
able to many forces that the state and its leaders cannot control. Most of the countries
examined in this chapter are likely to confront periods when false steps, political decay,
disruptions from the external environment, or bad luck will significantly challenge their
pursuit of prosperity, security, and stability. Some will achieve the high levels of eco-
nomic and social development of the developed countries. Each of these transitional
countries strives to be in that group, sooner rather than later, later rather than never.

So …
We have explored complex questions about politics in this book, and sometimes,
despite our desire for clarity and closure, there is no straightforward answer. It is
possible that this is both the best and worst of times in the political world and that
there are grounds for both hope and despair. That is our Final Debate.
Many people look to their political system and its leaders to provide effective
solutions in a complex world. But many also seem to think that political actions are
a major source of obstacles preventing their achievement of goals. This book’s central
objective has been to increase your understanding of the political world through the
discussions and many examples that, hopefully, have helped you (to use Popper’s
expression from Chapter 1) “to see more clearly than before.”
442 Chapter 15

Voltaire observed, “If we believe absurdities, we shall commit atrocities.” The

political world is full of disagreement, hyperbole, and ruthless competition. Political sci-
ence cannot necessarily make the world a better place; its primary role is to increase
our understanding about how politics works. Such understanding can be the basis of
insights: about different conceptions of how politics should be organized, about the basis
of any real political disagreements that require response, about mechanisms for conflict
resolution, and about how to organize ourselves in the pursuit of specific (private, group,
national, or global) interests within a framework of the common good.
As individuals, we often feel powerless in the face of the massive power mobilized
in the political world. But every individual—even you!—can affect what happens. The
widely celebrated democratic ideals are based on the assumption that people, individ-
ually and collectively, can make a difference. First, if you approach political questions
with knowledge, insight, and sensitivity, you can better understand how to think and
act in the political world. Second, you can communicate your own political demands
and supports to influence the policies that are made by actors in the political system.
Third, you can become a political activist—as a shaper of public opinion, a leader of a
political group, or a public official.
What is your personal strategy to act in ways that increase the likelihood that
this really does become “the best of times”? The American novelist F. Scott Fitzgerald
observed: “One should be able to see that things are hopeless and yet be determined
to make them otherwise.” In the political world, things are not hopeless unless people
like you fail to think, to understand, and to act.

The Final Debate

What Time Is It?
Novelist Charles Dickens opens A Tale of Two Cities a few of the 4,300 operational nukes could end
with his famous observation: “It was the best of most life on Earth. There is not only a proliferation
times, it was the worst of times. It was the age of of governments that can deploy dangerous weap-
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness. . . . It was the ons but also other, more reckless actors, including
spring of hope, it was the winter of despair.” Many rogue states and terrorist groups, that are able to
people might consider this an apt description of the either steal or manufacture nuclear, chemical, or
political world in the second decade of the twenty- biological weapons that can do massive harm.
first century. As you reach the end of this book, it is • Our applications of technology are out of
reasonable for you to consider what you now think control. The development and uses of many
about the political world. How would you character- technologies are often driven by self-serving
ize the political world today? How does it affect you? motives, short-term thinking, and indifference to
their negative impacts. It is no coincidence that
It Is the Worst of Times the huge expansion of technological capacity
• There is now far greater possibility of the use of has occurred during a period in which humans
weapons of mass destruction than at any point have killed far more of their race than at any
in human history. Our weapons arsenals have far other time in history, environmental degrada-
more power and efficiency than ever before, and tion has reached frightening levels, the loss of
 The Transitional Developed Countries 443

community and social trust is severe, and global that democracies do not fight with one another is
inequalities are at their starkest levels. another positive factor as an increasing majority
• Many governments seem incapable of effec- of countries embrace democracy.
tive governance—that is, they seem unable to • Technology (i.e., applied knowledge) in its many
make and implement wise policy decisions that forms has vastly expanded human powers of con-
respond to the demands presented by diverse trol and production. With wise policies from our
groups with conflicting agendas and different governments to guide the development and appli-
ideologies. Governments are increasingly con- cation of technologies, we have the capacity to
strained by insufficient global resources to satisfy provide sufficient resources to ensure that every
all needs. While more countries are democra- human being has the food, health, knowledge,
cies, this situation has not led to increases in and material goods for a long and satisfying life.
political knowledge, participation, or commit- • Democracy and political institutionalization have
ment to democratic principles. And contempo- spread to more political systems than ever. As
rary political institutions have not changed the citizens experience the value of open political dis-
underlying reality that power corrupts. cussion and of selecting their leaders in fair and
• The complexity and interdependency of national competitive elections, they become more engaged
economic systems have created a volatility and and take more responsibility for dealing with the
fragility that have resulted in economic downturns political issues in their country and the world. They
that are more rapid, deeper, and more difficult to demand more effective governance from political
correct. The new global economy makes it almost actors, and they support leaders who further the
impossible for a government to manage its own goals of prosperity, stability, and security.
economy or to protect it from severe disruptions. • The new global economy has increased the
• Globalization has also undermined the capac- quality, affordability, and accessibility of almost
ity of governments to protect their economies every good and service that people need.
from manipulation by global capital and multi- Worldwide, today’s “average person” enjoys a
national corporations, to protect their workers material standard of living that far surpasses that
from the loss of jobs, or even to protect their of any previous era.
national cultural norms and values from being • Globalization has increased the richness and
undermined by outside influences that are alien breadth of our experiences and broadened our
and undesirable. Both the clash of civilizations identity as citizens of the world. We share infor-
between hostile worldviews and the intolerance mation and ideas, trade goods and services, and
among nation-based identity groups seem to be recognize that what happens everywhere has
generating more and more dangerous conflicts. consequences for our own welfare. The incen-
• The bottom line: We live in a world of uncer- tives and interdependency encouraging us all to
tainty and insecurity where the general welfare of get along have never been greater.
humankind is not nurtured or protected. • The bottom line: More people live longer and with
a higher quality of life than at any point in history.
It Is the Best of Times

• The danger of a catastrophic nuclear war between

More questions …
the United States and the Soviet Union, whether 1. If you were to judge this debate, what would be
intentional or accidental, is no longer a grave your decision on which side is more compelling?
risk. All the major nuclear powers have reduced 2. How about you? Given the political world
their stockpiles. Since the end of the Cold War, described in this Debate, throughout this book,
the United Nations has been much more active in and in your broader experience, do you expect
collective peacekeeping operations, and there are that things will be better or worse for you over
now comparatively few interstate wars. The fact the next several decades? Why?
444 Chapter 15

Key Concepts
BRICS, p. 436 Latin American Transitionals, transitional developed
crony capitalism, p. 421 p. 430 countries, p. 417
flawed democracies, p. 427 postcommunist developed
freedom divide, p. 426 countries (PCDCs), p. 418

For Further Consideration

1. Why has Russia not followed the path toward the group of more developed countries con-
democracy that seems successful in most of the sidered in Chapter 13.
other postcommunist developed countries? 4. What do the three categories of transitional
2. Under what, if any, conditions might the countries have in common? Are there special
Cold War be revived? challenges each category faces that the other
3. Develop an argument for which (if any) of categories do not?
the BRICS countries will be the first to reach

For Further Reading

Alexander, James. (2000). Political Culture in flynn, Norman. (2000). Miracle to Meltdown in
Post-Communist Russia: Formlessness and Asia. New york: oxford university press. The
Recreation in a Traumatic Transition. New rise and sudden crisis in the Asian countries
york: St. Martin’s. From detailed studies that have passed through the transitional stage
of two Russian towns, the author offers an are thoughtfully analyzed, with particular
illuminating explanation of the difficulties attention given to the balance of power among
associated with the “traumatic transition” the market, cronyism, and authoritarianism in
from authoritarianism to a more liberal dem- governing the state and guiding the political
ocratic political culture and the continuing economy.
impacts of broader Russian cultural traditions. freedom House. (2011). Nations in Transit 2011
beausang, francesca. (2012). Globalization and http://www.freedomhouse.org. A Freedom
the BRICs: Why the BRICs Will Not Rule House book with chapter-length descrip-
the World for Long. New york: palgrave tions of the politically relevant developments
Macmillan. As counterpoint to the arguments in each PCDC and the other countries that
that the BRIC countries will be the major force emerged from the Soviet Empire.
at mid-century, the author (an economist) Goldman, Marshall. (2008). Petrostate: Putin,
identifies many key limitations associated with Power, and the New Russia. oxford: oxford
these countries, especially regarding income university press. An analysis of the clever
inequality and lack of innovation. actions by Vladimir Putin and other Russian
 The Transitional Developed Countries 445

leaders to renew the country’s power and o’Neil, Jim. (2012). The Growth Map: Economic
global position, primarily by exploiting its oil Opportunity in the BRICs and Beyond.
resources. New york: penguin Group. An insightful
Kaplan, Stephen b. (2103). Globalization and guide to the prospects for economic growth
Austerity Politics in Latin America. New throughout the developing and developed
york: cambridge university press. Explores world written by the originator of the BRICs
the tension between global financial markets concept.
and the domestic politics of democracies in oppenheim, lois Hecht. (2007). Politics in
Latin America. Austerity measures may be Chile: Socialism, Authoritarianism and
pushed by the investment interests or may Market Democracy. 3rd ed. boulder, co:
arise as smart domestic politics. Westview press. The transitions in politics
Mahbubani, Kishore. (2008). The New Asian and political economy in Chile, arguably the
Hemisphere: the Irresistible Shift of Global most successful Latin American Transitional,
Power. New york: public Affairs. A carefully are described for the period since 1970,
developed and rather persuasive argument from Allende’s socialism through Pinochet’s
that the twenty-first century, like most earlier authoritarianism to the current rise toward
centuries before the last several, will be domi- developed country status.
nated by the countries of Asia. Thomas, robert. (1999). The Politics of Serbia in
Mankoff, Jeffrey. (2009). Russian Foreign Policy: the 1990s. New york: columbia university
The Return to Power Politics. lanham, MD: press. An interesting approach to understand-
rowman & littlefield. The author explores ing the political dynamics and power struggles
the evolving and increasingly aggressive strat- in Serbia, the key protagonist in the chaotic
egy of Putin and Russia to reassert itself in its Balkans, with an analysis of what was being
region and then globally through diplomacy, said (as well as done) by the key actors, espe-
trade, and military strength. cially the late Slobodan Milosevic.
Mcfaul, Michael, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, True, Jacqui. (2003). Gender, Globalization,
and Valerie bunce. (2010). Democracy and and Postsocialism: The Czech Republic After
Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World. Communism. New york: columbia university
New york: cambridge university press. Three press. A rich combination of the study of the
leading scholars of the region provide a rich dynamics of change in a postcommunist soci-
analysis of the patterns of political and social ety with the way in which gender roles are
transition in the PCDCs. affecting those changes and being changed by
North, Douglass c., John Joseph Wallis, Steven them, all within the context of globalization.
b. Webb, and barry r. Weingast, eds. (2013). Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey Kline, eds.
In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics (2014). Latin American Politics and Develop-
and the Problems of Development. New york: ment. 8th ed. boulder, co: Westview press.
cambridge university press. The articles A solid and current set of readings covering
explore such questions as: Can political control exactly what the title suggests, including gen-
of economic privileges be used to limit violence eral chapters on the region’s history, political
and build coalitions? How can countries best parties and interest groups, and democratiza-
minimize violence while supporting economic tion as well as individual chapters on a dozen
growth? countries.
446 Chapter 15

On the Web
http://lanic.utexas.edu http://www.themoscowtimes.com/index.php
The Latin American Network Information An online daily English-language newspa-
Center, hosted by the University of Texas, Austin, per published in Moscow that provides a
provides a vast number of Internet-based infor- perspective on the politics and society of
mation sources about the politics, economics, Russia.
culture, and other areas of the Latin American http://www.europeanforum.net
NICs and other countries in the region. The European Forum for Democracy and
http://www.tol.cz Solidarity offers country-by-country infor-
Transitions Online provides detailed informa- mation on politics and economics for various
tion regarding political and cultural issues rel- social democratic parties, including those in
evant to these postcommunist developed states. the postcommunist developed countries.
Appendix
Political Analysis
The mind rests in explanation.
—Aristotle

Chapter 1 suggested that you are often exposed to knowledge claims about the political
world. Focus in 1 explained how you might develop a political analysis to assess the
claim that younger adults have less political knowledge than older adults. Suppose
you heard the claim that “in a democracy, men are more likely to vote than women.”
If the 1976 data in Table 1 were presented as evidence, would you be satisfied that the
claim is correct?
The United States is a democracy, and a presidential election seems like a legiti-
mate instance of voting. The table indicates that a higher proportion of men than
women voted in the 1976 presidential election. But you would probably want more
data—for example, from more election years in the United States. So Table 1 provides a
second election for comparison. Now what do you think of the claim? Because the data
from 2012 are not consistent with the pattern from 1976, you would recognize that the
analysis of this knowledge claim is not straightforward. You might decide to analyze

Source: Frank & Earnest reprinted by permission of Newspaper Enterprise Association, Inc.
447
448 Appendix

Table 1 Participation of Eligible Voters in the 1976

and 2012 U.S. Presidential Elections, by Gender

1976

Men Women
Voted a. 77% b. 67%
Did not vote c. 23% d. 33%
Yule’s Q = +.24

2012

Men Women
Voted a. 60% b. 64%
Did not vote c. 40% d. 36%
Yule’s Q = –.08

data from more U.S. elections. You would discover that women voted at a lower rate
than men in every U.S. presidential election through 1976, and that women have
voted at a higher rate than men in every subsequent election. Now what? Perhaps you
would decide that, to better assess the claim, it would be appropriate to examine data
for other democracies. Or you might attempt to explain why the relationship between
gender and voting in the United States seems to have changed.
When you explore these kinds of issues, you are engaged in political analysis.
Chapter 1 defined political analysis as the attempt to describe and explain political
phenomena. This Appendix will introduce you to some of the basic tools political
scientists use for political analysis—that is, for conceptualizing, collecting, and analyz-
ing data about political phenomena. After a brief discussion of various types of data,
we shall consider how to read data like those in Table 1 and how to draw a tentative
inference based on those data. Most of the Appendix describes four broad approaches
used for political analysis: taxonomic analysis, formal analysis, functional analysis,
and relational analysis.

Data in Political Analysis

Many political analyses rely on data assessment. Data can be defined as any observa-
tions, facts, statistics, or other forms of information that attempt to measure or rep-
resent some aspect of reality. The data used in political analysis can be characterized
according to different dimensions, including the style of measurement, the level of
analysis, the composition, and the time dimension.

1. Style of measurement.
a. Nominal data measure by applying names to phenomena that have some common
characteristic. Examples: male voters or female voters; Conservative, Labour, or
Liberal Democrat parties in Britain; democratic, authoritarian, or totalitarian
governments.
 Political Analysis 449

b. Ordinal data rank phenomena, such as from higher to lower, bigger to small-
er, greater to lesser. Examples: developed countries or developing countries;
voters who are older than 64, voters between ages 35 and 64, or voters younger
than age 35; Canada ranked fifth in the world in 2013 on GDP per capita (PPP,
excluding ministates).
c. Interval data are like ordinal data, but they also have a numerically equal distance
between any two adjacent measures—the distance from 5 to 6 is the same as the
distance from 81 to 82. Example: The difference on an opinion scale between
1 (= strongly agree) and 2 (= agree) is the same as the difference between
4 (= disagree) and 5 (= strongly disagree).
d. Ratio data are like interval data, but they also have a real zero point. Examples:
Canada’s GDP per capita PPP is $42,693; the percentage of citizens participating
in boycotts for political or ethical reasons; the number of seats in the legislature
held by a particular political party.
2. Level of analysis. Political data can be measured at different levels of combination.
Examples: at the individual level, the strength of a particular individual’s loyalty to
a political party; at the group level, the percentage of Canadians who believe that
terrorism is never justifiable; the average number of correct political knowledge
answers for young adults; at the system level, the total number of operational
nuclear weapons worldwide. (In international relations theory, the three levels are
individual, state, and global system.)
3. Composition. Data can measure a single phenomenon, such as a political leader’s
age or a country’s rate of inflation in a particular year, or they can aggregate phe-
nomena, such as the percentage of total votes cast for all conservative political
parties in an election or a country’s average annual rate of inflation over 10 years.
4. Time dimension.
a. Cross-sectional data measure a single point in time. Example: a country’s GDP
per capita in 2014.
b. Longitudinal data measure several points through time. Example: a country’s GDP
per capita in 1970, 1990, and 2010.
The example of voting in the 1976 and 2012 presidential elections uses data that
are nominal (men versus women), ratio (percentages), and aggregated (for many
people) in a longitudinal analysis (two comparable elections). You might think of data
as dry statistics, but the data in political analysis are rooted in real-world events. If
properly analyzed, relevant data can increase our political knowledge on an endless
list of questions. Examples: Are countries that spend the greatest amount on military
preparedness more likely to avoid war? Is religion or social class a better predictor of
whether a Scot will vote for the Labour Party? What characteristics of a country are
most associated with the level of citizen support for democracy?

On Reading Tables
Does Table 1 help you clarify the relationship between gender and voting level in
democracies? Because political analysis often includes data presented in tables, it is
useful to know the basic steps for reading them. When you examine a table such as
450 Appendix

Table 1, you should first establish precisely what the data are about. The title of the
table and the names given to the variables (the key concepts measured in the table)
indicate what the analyst who created the table thinks it reveals. But the analyst can
be misleading or mistaken, so it is worthwhile to assess whether the phenomena mea-
sured by the data correspond to the labels given to the variables, whether the data
seem relevant to the analytic question, and whether the data seem accurate.
Next you should examine the data in the table. What do the data measure? Table 1
provides data on the percentage of men and women who did or did not vote in the
election of the U.S. president in 1976 and 2012. How are such tabular data read? Is
either of these two statements supported by the 2012 data in the table?
1. Forty percent of those who did not vote were men.
2. Thirty-six percent of the women did not vote.

It is useful, especially when there are percentages in a table, to examine how the
columns (up and down) and the rows (across) are formed. In the case of percentages,
find any direction(s) in which the data total 100 percent. In this table, the columns total
100 percent. Thus, statement 2 is supported by the table and statement 1 is not. Can
you see why this is so?
In many cases, the analyst uses more sophisticated techniques than tables to assess
the relationships among variables. Focus in the Appendix discusses the relational
modes of analysis and considers the use of statistical techniques to examine these rela-
tionships. It also helps you interpret a correlation statistic like the one in Table 1.
You can look at simple arrays of data, like those in Table 1, and draw your own
conclusions. Graphical representations (like the four scattergrams in Figure 1) are
another straightforward way to assess data. Each point in the figures represents one
case, located at its appropriate value on each of the two variables in the analysis. This
visual mapping of cases can provide useful insights about the nature of the relation-
ship between two variables.
As the data become more complex, statistics can help inform your judgment.
Table 1 indicates that the correlation between gender and voting in the 1976 election
data is ±.24, using a simple correlation statistic for 2 × 2 tables called Yule’s Q. The
correlation of ±.24 suggests that in these data, there is a moderate systematic rela-
tionship between male gender and higher probability of voting. In the 2012 data, the
relationship between gender and voting appears less pronounced, and this judgment
is supported by the Yule’s Q of −.08, which indicates that there is almost no systematic
relationship between gender and voter turnout rate.
While most statistics of association require a calculator or a computer, you can
calculate Yule’s Q yourself for any 2 × 2 table: (1) Multiply the values of the two cells
on each diagonal: a × d and b × c; (2) subtract the two products: ad − bc; (3) add the two
products: ad + bc; (4) divide ad − bc by ad + bc; (5) the result of this division should be
a correlation score, ranging between +1.00 and −1.00. The formula for Yule’s Q is thus
(ad − bc)/(ad + bc). (In contrast to most correlation statistics, a positive Yule’s Q means
that the ad diagonal is stronger than the bc diagonal.) This is a simpler statistic than
most analysts would use.
 Political Analysis 451

Focus in the Appendix

Assessing Relationships among Phenomena
To interpret most quantitative analyses in political significance level—an indication of how likely it is
science (and most other social sciences), you need that the observed relationship between the variables
to understand a bit about the meaning of the most might have occurred by chance. This is normally
commonly used statistics (e.g., Pearson’s r, regres- measured in terms of this chance probability: .05,
sion analysis, factor analysis). Ideally, you will take .01, .001. The smaller the probability of a chance
some statistics coursework so that you understand relationship, the greater the analyst’s confidence
the logic and assumptions of the statistics being that the variables are actually associated.
employed. In the case of two variables, a +1.00 correla-
The simplest relational statistics (e.g., tion would look like graph A in Figure 1: As one vari-
Pearson’s r, tau beta, Spearman’s rho) usually range able increases one unit in value, the other variable
in value between +1.00, which indicates a perfect increases at a corresponding rate. For example, you
positive relationship between the variables, and would find a +1.00 correlation if each $100,000 spent
–1.00, which indicates a perfect negative relation- on congressional political campaigns increased
ship between the variables. These simple statistics voter turnout by 1 percent. A –1.00 correlation would
(as well as more sophisticated ones) also have a look like graph B. Rarely do real-world phenomena

Figure 1 Correlation Relationships between Two Hypothetical Variables, X and Y

Y Y

0 0
X X

Perfect Positive Correlation: Perfect Negative Correlation:

r   1.0 r   1.0
A B

Y Y

0 0
X X

Virtually No Correlation: Mild Positive Correlation:

r~ .00 r~  .30

C D
452 Appendix

in political science even come close to a perfect and subject to many influences, so they typically
positive or negative correlation. have little or no systematic relationship with other
A correlation statistic close to .00 means that factors that you might consider. Thus, in many politi-
there is almost no linear relationship between the cal analyses, the statistical associations are low or
two variables, as in graph C. For example, you statistically insignificant. The strongest statistical
might find that campaign expenditure levels have relationships for interesting political data are usually
no consistent relationship with voter turnout rates. at moderate levels of correlation, in the range of ±.10
Political phenomena are often extremely complex to ±.35, as in graph D.

Beyond simple statistics and graphs, political scientists use an array of sophis-
ticated data analysis techniques to examine questions involving quantitative data.
Most of the techniques are elaborations on the basic idea of examining whether the
values on phenomena seem to be systematically related to each other, although the
techniques can involve extremely complex computations that analyze the interrelated
effects of many independent variables (the variables that in a cause-and-effect explanation
produce change in another variable) that account for changes in the value of the depen-
dent variable—the variable whose changing value the analysis is attempting to explain.
The use of statistics and other quantitative techniques can be helpful in political
analysis. The more demanding task for the analyst is to use careful judgment to decide
whether the relationship identified by such techniques has substantive significance.
The key question is: Do the tables, statistics, and other data provide useful insights
about political processes or about how political phenomena are associated?

Modes of Political Analysis

Chapter 1 indicated that political science has little theory in the strictest sense of the
term; that is, it does not have a set of precise, systematically related generalizations.
However, most contemporary political analysis strives to make our understanding of
politics more general, precise, and systematic by ordering empirical data using one of
these four modes of political analysis: taxonomic, formal, functional, or relational.

Taxonomic Analysis
Aristotle (384–322 b.c.e.), the father of political analysis, was interested in distinguish-
ing different types of Greek city–states. He classified them by using a concept derived
from earlier work by Herodotus (ca. 484–425 b.c.e.): the size of the ruling group.
Aristotle defined three categories: The city–state might be ruled by one person, by a
few people, or by many people.
This is an example of taxonomic analysis: the orderly arrangement of some political
phenomena by developing a set of distinct categories. Most political analysis begins with
a taxonomy—a set of categories that classify data into different types. The categories
within a taxonomy establish the crucial concepts that define the analysis. The criteria
 Political Analysis 453

Table 2 Aristotle’s Taxonomy of Political Systems

In Whose Interest?

How Many rule? General Self

One Monarchy Tyranny
A few Aristocracy Oligarchy
Many Polity Democracy

for naming the types and for classifying phenomena into each type are arbitrary in
the sense that they are established by the analyst on the basis of substantive concerns.
But the categories ought to be exhaustive (all cases are classified), mutually exclusive
(no case fits into more than one category), and comparable (all categories are distin-
guished by the same criteria). Relevant data might be of any type, although they are
usually nominal or ordinal.
Aristotle’s three categories of city–states are sufficient to create a taxonomy. But to
enrich his analysis, Aristotle employed a second concept: the group(s) whose interests
the ruler serves. His two categories were: (1) The ruler(s) could rule in the general
interest or (2) the ruler(s) could rule in self-interest. Thus, Aristotle’s taxonomy of
governments had two central concepts, each based on nominal data, resulting in the
six categories displayed in Table 2. Aristotle then provided names for each category
in the taxonomy. He labeled as a monarchy any city–state in which one person ruled
in the general interest; if a few ruled in their own interests, the system was called an
oligarchy. Notice that Aristotle labeled the most perverse case, in which many attempt
to rule in their self-interests, a democracy!
Aristotle used his taxonomy for political analysis by placing each Greek city–state
in one of the six categories. Athens, for example, was classified as an aristocracy. Notice
that a taxonomy organizes data, but it does not answer the how and why questions. To
explore such questions (e.g., Is a prosperous middle class more likely in an oligarchy?
Under what conditions does a polity transform into a democracy?), the analyst must
move beyond taxonomic analysis.

Formal Analysis
Suppose you want to travel around New York City on the subway. If you are unfamil-
iar with New York, you will probably use a subway map, which indicates the spatial
relationships among different subway stations and identifies the stations where one
subway line connects with another.
A subway map is an example of the product of formal analysis. A formal
analysis specifies abstract forms that correspond to the reality in which the analyst is inter-
ested. The analyst attempts to model reality by defining and relating concepts so
that the linkages among the concepts in the formal analysis reflect the dynamics
and interactions among the actual phenomena. Some formal analyses have the same
454 Appendix

physical form as the phenomena being modeled, such as a miniaturized version of

an automobile engine. But most formal analyses use symbol systems as abstract rep-
resentations of the phenomena, such as a subway map, a schematic drawing of the
circuitry in a radio, or a mathematical formula for the trajectory of an object moving
through space.
Most formal analyses of political phenomena are recent. Some political scien-
tists have attempted to devise schematic diagrams that represent how some aspect
of politics works. In one well-known example, David Easton (1965) developed an
abstract diagram, composed of boxes and arrows, that attempts to characterize the
flow of activities by which decision makers in the political system establish public
policies. Their decisions are influenced by the resources available in the environment
and the pressures they experience from various groups. This political system model is
explained in detail in Chapter 5.
An array of formal analyses called rational choice theory (or public choice theory)
has become an important approach in political science(recall Chapter 4). Applications
of rational choice theory can be complex, but they share two basic features. First, they
attempt to represent political processes primarily by means of mathematical formula-
tions or systems of symbolic notation. From the perspective of advancing a science of
politics, such formal theories are given prominence because they aim to be general,
systematic, abstract, and testable in actual settings.
Second, these applications assume that political actors (e.g., voters, legislators,
political parties) behave purposefully. The approach does not assume that all politi-
cal actors behave with complete rationality all the time, but it does assume that their
behavior is goal-oriented and calculating. Both their preferences for various outcomes
and their calculations of the costs, benefits, and likely success of different strategies to
achieve those outcomes can be formulated as quantified indicators or as systems of
symbols (Mueller 2003).
Rational choice theory is applied to a variety of topics in the study of politics. The
question of whether to vote in an election allows for a brief and simplified example.
The rational choice approach suggests that a person will/should calculate whether
to vote by the following sort of analysis: First, how much will it cost (in time, energy,
etc.) to figure out what each candidate will do, assess how it will affect outcomes
that I value, and then actually go vote? Second, how much will I benefit if a particu-
lar candidate wins? Third, what is the probability that my vote will determine if my
candidate wins? By comparing the costs and benefits outlined above, an individual
can decide whether it is worth it to vote. Rational choice theorists identify a “paradox
of voting”—in their analytic framework, it is almost never rational to vote because
the costs will far outweigh the benefits, particularly because of the extraordinarily
small chance that an individual vote will make the difference in who wins (Riker and
Ordeshook 1973). Of course, some might reply that there are good reasons to vote: If
everyone who supports a candidate follows the same logic and decides not to vote, the
candidate would lose; voting is an expression of citizenship and group solidarity; and
sometimes elections are close and a few votes do make a difference (ask Al Gore about
Florida in 2000).
 Political Analysis 455

Functional Analysis
Suppose someone asks you how a car works. You are likely to discuss the key struc-
tural components of a car’s engine and power train, such as its carburetor, pistons,
and driveshaft. You might then detail the processes of the internal combustion engine,
noting how an ignited fuel expands in an enclosed area, pushing a series of mecha-
nisms into directed motion. This style of description and explanation is the basis of
functional analysis. Functional analysis describes the contributions of a certain element
(process or structure) to the activities of the phenomenon under study.
In political science, one widely used form of functional analysis identifies certain
functions (i.e., processes) that occur within a political system, and it describes how and
by what structures the functions are performed. Some scholars (Powell, Dalton, and
Strom 2012) have defined certain functions, including political communication, rule
adjudication, and interest articulation, that must be performed in every political system.
Applications of functional analysis are described in Chapters 5, 10, and 11. As a
brief example here of applications of functional analysis, we can consider the inter-
est articulation function. Individuals might want their government to protect their
right to own handguns. The processes by which individuals communicate this spe-
cific interest to others in the political world are called interest articulation. According
to functional analysis, this communication of political needs and wants is a necessary
function in every effective political system. Most functional analysts also describe and
explain how structures perform these types of functions. Thus, interest groups emerge
to amplify the shared interests of many individuals. For example, the National Rifle
Association uses various strategies to promote many individuals’ concerns about gun
ownership to those who make and implement government policies on firearms.
Related to functional analysis is constitutive analysis. Constitutive analysis
assumes that political functions can be explained primarily in terms of one fundamental con-
cept. (Indeed, every scientific discipline ultimately strives to discover the fundamental
structure or process that accounts for more complex phenomena.) Among the con-
cepts that have been proposed as the central one to explain politics are the interactions
among groups, classes, or roles. Constitutive theories are discussed in various chapters,
especially in Chapter 9, which presents the elite, class, and pluralist approaches to
explaining politics. As an example, Karl Marx’s (1867) theory of politics pivots on one
key concept: class. In every historical period, society is divided into a set of classes
based on the distribution of economic power. The structure of classes determines
political and social relations as well as economic relations. In political terms, the class
structure determines who wields political power, for what purposes, and for whose
benefit. The role of the state and the dynamics of political change are also explained in
terms of class relations.

Relational Analysis
Table 1 considers the question of voting differences between men and women: Is there
some relationship between an individual’s gender and the likelihood that she or he
votes? This is typical of the kinds of questions addressed by relational analysis.
456 Appendix

The central goal of relational analysis is to discover and explicate the systematic
connections between phenomena. The basic question is always: Are political phenom-
ena linked? For example: Are democratic countries more stable than nondemocratic
countries? Are older people more politically knowledgeable than younger people?
Is Confucian culture more associated with higher national economic growth than
Muslim culture is? What characteristics are associated with states more likely to par-
ticipate in interstate wars?
Both formal analysis and functional analysis also assume connections, but rela-
tional analysis merely tries to identify the connections between phenomena. It does
not attempt to model or schematize the connections, as does formal analysis. And it
does not focus on crucial functions, as does functional analysis. There are two levels
of relational analysis: (1) correlational analysis and (2) causal analysis. To determine
whether there is a systematic association between variables, most correlational and
causal analyses use various statistical techniques. These statistics provide a mathe-
matical appraisal of the extent to which change in one phenomenon is systematically
related to changes in one or more other phenomena. Focus in the Appendix provided
further information about a few such statistics.

Correlational analysis. Correlational analysis determines whether there is a sta-

tistically probable relationship between two variables. It does not presume, as does causal
analysis (discussed in the next section), that one variable is the agent that causes
change to occur in another variable. It merely assesses the strength and direction of an
association between variables. Many empirical attempts to understand politics begin
with the establishment of a correlation between political phenomena.
Evaluating the linkage between gender and voting in Table 1 is an example
of correlational analysis. The table and the Yule’s Q statistic both seem to support
the tentative conclusion that, for 1976 at least, there is a modest correlation (i.e., a
systematic, statistically probable association) between gender and voting. However, the
correlation statistic for the 2012 election is considerably weaker (closer to .00), and
it is in the opposite direction (women’s participation is higher). Any generalization
could also take into account empirical comparative analyses of many countries that
do not find a strong correlation between gender and voting rates in most democra-
cies (Inglehart and Norris 2003). The need for more data and more subtle analyses
seems clear.

Causal analysis. Causal analysis goes beyond correlational analysis because it

explicitly identifies one phenomenon as the effective agent that brings about changes in another
phenomenon. Much of the language in political analysis is loosely causal, implying
that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between two variables. However, causal
analysis is the only approach that attempts an explicit empirical test of cause and
effect. Causal analysis presents the “If X, then Y” mode of explanation described in
Chapter 1. Here X is the independent variable that, given a certain value, actually causes
Y, the dependent variable, to change in a particular way.
An example of causal analysis links the electoral system and the number of politi-
cal parties. In his landmark book Political Parties, French political scientist Maurice
 Political Analysis 457

Table 3 Relationship between Number of Political Parties

and Type of Electoral System

electoral System*

Number of Parties† Plurality other

Two 23 4
More than two 7 73
Yule’s Q = +.97
Note: Based on data from 20 Western democracies in elections of legislative representa-
tives between 1945 and 1965.
*In plurality or “first-past-the-post” systems, the party/candidate with the largest number
of votes wins a seat in the legislature, and all other parties/candidates gain no seats. In
“other” systems, there is some form of proportional representation or vote transfer.
†Number of political parties with at least 5 percent of the seats in the legislature.

Source: Rae 1972.

Duverger (1954) contends that the type of electoral system causes the number of effec-
tive parties to increase or decrease. He offers two hypotheses:

1. Plurality electoral systems (in which the candidate who receives the most votes
wins) reduce the number of major political parties toward two.
2. Electoral systems with proportional representation (in which candidates are
elected to the legislature in proportion to their party’s share of the total vote) and
with multimember districts (more than one legislator per district) allow more than
two major parties(recall Focus in 6).

Political analysts (e.g., Riker 1982; Taagepera and Shugart 1989: Ch. 13) have tested
Duverger’s hypotheses using data from various electoral systems. Table 3 presents
data from 20 democratic countries for the period from 1945 to 1965 (Rae 1972). Do you
think the data in Table 3 support Duverger’s hypothesis? Why?

Drawing Conclusions from Empirical

Analyses
The purpose of empirical analysis is to increase our knowledge about politics. It is
especially important that the analyst draws appropriate conclusions. In political anal-
ysis, as in politics, things often are not what they seem. Let us consider some of the
potential problems, using the causal analysis of electoral systems and party systems
as an example. You probably concluded that the data in Table 3 support Duverger’s
hypothesis. The relationship seems very strong, and the correlation statistic (+.97) is
extremely high. Do we now know that the electoral system causes different types of
party systems? Yes, maybe.
458 Appendix

Yes: There is certainly some persuasive empirical evidence for such a conclusion,
such as this very high correlation. And, on logical grounds, it does seem reason-
able that the electoral system might cause variations in the number of parties that
survive over time.
Maybe: The political analyst must always be cautious in drawing conclusions and
making generalizations. Several questions should be considered:
1. Are the data and methods appropriate? Did the analysis use accurate,
relevant data and the correct analytic techniques? Are the sample of nations
and the time period examined typical? Does this generalization hold for non-
European nations? Were systems divided between “plurality” and “other” in
a manner consistent with Duverger’s hypothesis?
2. Are the analyst’s inferences about cause and effect persuasive? Might the
dependent variable (in this case, the number of political parties) actually
have a significant effect on the presumed independent variable (the electoral
system)? That is, because the parties in most legislatures have the power to
establish the electoral system, certain parties might try to implement an elec-
toral system that perpetuates their power via the existing party system.
3. Are there plausible rival hypotheses? Is there another independent variable,
not considered in this analysis, that might better account for the pattern of
values of the dependent variable? It is possible that both the number of parties
and the electoral system are related primarily because each is correlated with
the third variable? For example, the number of fundamental issues that divide
the electorate might have the greatest effect on the number of major parties
if one party emerges for each pattern of positions on the fundamental issues
(Taagepera and Shugart 1989).
When political scientists use the scientific method, other analysts might raise any
of these kinds of problems with a conclusion. The data, the methods, or the inferences
might not stand up to such scrutiny. In our examination of Duverger’s claims about
the causal relationship between electoral systems and the number of parties, none of
the three problems just listed seems to undermine the analysis. Until one of these types
of criticisms is supported persuasively, we can have some confidence that the gener-
alization about the causal relationship is correct—that electoral systems do seem to
cause certain types of party systems to evolve over time.
The gender and voting analysis based on the 1976 election data in Table 1 can
serve as an example of how an initial causal inference can be challenged. There is
clearly a correlation in 1976 between gender and voter turnout. The three potential
problems must be considered in an assessment of whether the data reveal that gender
differences do cause a different probability of voting:
1. The data and methods seem appropriate. However, a generalization (even limited
to the United States) certainly requires more than a single case.
2. The posited cause-and-effect relationship seems reasonable. This is the only pos-
sible direction of causality because voting certainly cannot “cause” gender. Also,
there are reasonable explanations for why men might vote at higher rates than
women. Can you think of at least one?
 Political Analysis 459

Table 4 Participation of Eligible Voters in the 1976 U.S.

Presidential Election, by Gender and Education Level

Percentage Who Voted

education Level Men Women

Grade school 72 50
High school 69 64
College 86 84

3. However, to make a compelling argument that the data reveal causality, it

would be necessary to ensure that there is no other causal agent (i.e., no plau-
sible rival hypothesis) that better explains voting levels or that creates the
apparent relationship between gender and voting. While the analyst can never
disprove every competing hypothesis, it is important to examine and reject the
most plausible ones.

Let us reexamine the 1976 voter turnout data in Table 1. Can you propose another
explanation for the incidence of voting in the United States that is as plausible as
gender? Among those you might suggest are age, social class, occupation, interest
in politics, identification with a political party, and education level. Table 4 provides
the relevant data on one of these alternative explanations—education level—for our
analysis of voting in 1976. Do these data alter your judgment about the importance
of gender?
One reasonable interpretation of Table 4 is that the 1976 election revealed a con-
siderable difference between men and women in the incidence of voting among those
with minimal education, but almost no difference in the levels of voting between men
and women who have a college education. In the absence of further analysis (and
many further analyses could be attempted), these data about education seem to reduce
the power of gender as an adequate causal explanation of voting. One might infer,
at least on the basis of Table 4, that both education and gender were important in
1976 but that the impact of gender was powerfully altered by education level. Perhaps
the gender gap had shifted by 2012 because the proportion of men and women with
college educations had equalized. Perhaps. This closer look should suggest that if you
were developing a causal theory of voter turnout, you would need to consider many
variables and diverse data.
This example reveals a common challenge for most of the interesting questions
addressed by causal analyses of politics: There are almost always clusters of plausible
explanatory factors that seem interrelated. For example: What accounts for a person’s
decision to vote for the conservative National Action Party (PAN) in Mexico—class,
education, family experiences, occupation, wealth, beliefs about society, attitudes
toward governmental leaders, or something else? What factors lead a group to under-
take revolutionary violence—political oppression, poverty, corrupt government
officials, charismatic leadership, unequal distribution of wealth, foreign domination,
or something else? Working on these kinds of puzzles is the stuff of political analysis.
460 Appendix

Knowledge and Politics Revisited

Chapter 1 suggested a number of ways in which it is possible to know things about
the political world. Your understanding of politics does not need to be grounded in the
scientific method and in empirical analysis. Insight and understanding about politics
might be based on the method of authority or the method of personal thought, or they
might be derived from other sources such as literature, film, or art.
In the attempt to develop precise and valid generalizations about politics, how-
ever, most contemporary political scientists use some form of the scientific method
and some of the modes of political analysis described in preceding sections. Whatever
types of data and modes of analysis they use, political scientists generally accept the
notion that all aspects of their research should be subject to scrutiny and challenge by
other analysts. Most also agree that their hypotheses, inferences, generalizations, and
theories must be subject to some empirical test of validity. Although various sources
of knowledge can provide you with insights about politics, this book emphasizes the
modes of political analysis described in this Appendix as the best means for a broad
understanding of the political world.

Key Concepts
causal analysis, p. 456 longitudinal data, p. 449
constitutive analysis, p. 455 monarchy, p. 453
correlation, p. 456 nominal data, p. 448
correlational analysis, p. 456 oligarchy, p. 453
cross-sectional data, p. 449 ordinal data, p. 449
dependent variable, p. 452 political analysis, p. 448
formal analysis, p. 453 ratio data, p. 449
functional analysis, p. 455 rational choice theory, p. 454
independent variable, p. 452 relational analysis, p. 456
interval data, p. 449 taxonomic analysis, p. 452
Glossary
adjudication Every society creates and enforces rules able to achieve a preponderance of power. Thus, stability
and laws regarding the proper forms of behavior for and the status quo are usually sustained because states
individuals and groups. The adjudication function will intervene to prevent a serious imbalance that might
attempts to interpret and apply the relevant rules or laws lead to domination.
to a given situation. Most political systems have estab- BRICS An acronym for the countries Brazil, Russia,
lished judicial structures (e.g., criminal courts) whose India, China, and South Africa. These countries are
primary role is adjudication. projected to be major actors in the global system by 2015
administration The general term used to describe the and have entered into a comprehensive agreement to
machinery and processes through which rules and poli- cooperate in the economic sphere.
cies of an organization are applied and implemented. bureaucracy Though often used as a synonym for
It is a core function of political systems and is usually administration, bureaucracy has been defined, especially
one of the four basic institutional structures (along by Max Weber (1958a), as a particular structure and style
with executives, legislatures, and judiciaries). (See also through which administration can operate. Structurally,
bureaucracy.) bureaucracy is characterized by hierarchical organiza-
assembly system A form of collective leadership in tion and a highly specialized division of labor. Members
which a large group, usually constituted as a legislature, of the bureaucracy behave according to specific rules of
is clearly dominant over the executive. Examples: the action so that treatment of each case is relatively predict-
United Nations; the European Parliament. able and nondiscriminatory. (See also administration.)
associational interest group A type of political inter- capitalism One of the great “isms,” explicitly linking
est group organized specifically to further the political politics to political economy, capitalism is a system
objectives of its members. Examples: the British Medical that corresponds loosely to a market economy. In this
Association; Common Cause. (See also interest group.) system, private economic actors are generally free
from state constraints and the state engages in only
authoritarianism (1) A political system generally charac-
limited efforts to shift resources among private actors.
terized by little or no commitment to equality or demo-
Capitalism is founded on the philosophy of laissez-
cratic participation and by a strong emphasis on order
faire economics. There is no assumption that capitalism
and stability. The political behavior of the population is
requires a particular form of political processes to func-
severely constrained. In many countries, authoritarian
tion efficiently.
regimes are dominated by a military elite. (2) A personal-
ity syndrome, associated particularly with political and causal analysis A type of relational analysis, causal
social attitudes and behavior, in which the individual analysis goes beyond correlational analysis because it
tends to revere strong leadership, draw sharp boundaries explicitly identifies one phenomenon as the effective
between the identity group and all others, be intolerant agent that brings about changes in another phenomenon.
of unconventional behaviors, and exhibit considerable Causal analysis presents the “If X, then Y” mode of
hostility toward minority groups. explanation, where X is the independent variable that,
given a certain value, actually causes Y, the dependent
authority (1) A source of knowledge about the political
variable, to change in a particular way.
world. The method of authority involves the appeal to
any document, tradition, or person that is believed to civil law A system of law in which the central prin-
possess the controlling explanation regarding a particu- ciple is to apply a very precise, detailed set of exist-
lar issue. (2) The legitimacy attached to the decisions of ing legal codes to the current case. Sometimes termed
the political system, in the sense that people will will- “scholar-made law,” it evolved from Roman law and
ingly accept those decisions as binding, independent of the Napoleonic codes and is common in many countries
their self-interest. influenced by continental European legal forms.
balance of power A configuration of power among a set civil war A form of political violence that occurs when a
of states in which there is a broad equality in the power significant proportion of the population within a region
resources (political, economic, and especially military) actively supports a separatist movement and politi-
that can be exercised by competing states. Through a cal violence emerges on a large scale. Examples: Syria
system of shifting alliances, no state or group of states is (2011— ); U.S. Civil War (1861–1865).

461
462 Glossary

class approach An analytic explanation of the value such equality is achieved, government and politics must
allocation process (politics) based on a core notion of be guided powerfully by a unified leadership. Examples:
stratification—structured inequality in the distribution Cuba; the former Soviet Union.
of key values in society. The class approach centers on
confederation A loose association of states. In a
an examination of the tactics of class domination and the
confederation, each state delegates some power to a
dynamics of class struggle. Class theory is particularly
supranational central government but still retains pri-
associated with the writings of Karl Marx (1867/1981)
mary power, and its compliance is always conditional.
and later forms of Marxist theories.
Confederations are usually created when states decide
classical liberalism One of the major Western political that the performance of certain functions is enhanced by
ideologies. In classical liberalism, the highest value is structured cooperation with other states. Example: the
placed on each individual’s natural rights to life, liberty, United Nations.
and property and the freedom of the individual to pur-
conservatism One of the major Western political ideolo-
sue these rights as an independent actor. Government
gies, at the core of conservatism is the commitment to
plays a very limited role under classical liberalism,
sustain traditional values and forms of behavior and
which celebrates a laissez-faire economy and discour-
to maintain social order. Tradition and religion, rather
ages government attempts to create material equality
than reason, are viewed as the most reliable sources
(although equality of opportunity is important). Political
for guiding society. There is loyalty to the nation and
thinkers associated with classical liberal thought include
antipathy to egalitarianism. The writings of Edmund
John Locke (1632–1704), Adam Smith (1723–1790), and
Burke (1790/1955) provide a good example of conserva-
John Stuart Mill (1806–1873).
tive thought.
colonialism A situation of dominance and subordina-
constitution A set of statements that describes the funda-
tion in the relations between two states. One state asserts
mental rules of a political system, including a character-
substantial power and control over the other, based on
ization of the core activities of major political structures.
military, economic, and/or political power. The goals of
Most constitutions are a single, written document, such
the dominant state might include: to extract resources,
as the U.S. Constitution, but some are embedded primar-
to control a market for its products, to use the strategic
ily in major statutes, precedents, and legal decisions.
location, to instill its own values into members of the
subordinate state, or to obtain international prestige. constitutional regime A political system that operates
Most areas that were colonial holdings became indepen- in terms of the rule of law, as defined in the constitu-
dent in the decades after 1945. (See also neocolonialism.) tion, and that ensures effective restraints on the power
holders. The defining feature of a constitutional regime is
command economy An ideal-type political economy
that the state does attempt to fulfill the provisions of its
in which the state assumes total control of almost all
constitution.
significant factors of production. The state replaces or
eliminates the role of private owners of land, labor, and core Refers to the set of states, firms (especially mul-
capital; makes all production decisions; and determines tinational firms), and financial institutions that have
the value of all goods. The state owns, plans, controls, enormous power and influence in the global system and
and regulates all major economic activity. (Compare with the international political economy. The core, primar-
market economy.) ily located in the developed countries, dominates the
world’s “periphery,” composed of institutions and peo-
common law A legal system that is grounded in general
ples that have minimal power and are primarily located
laws that have been promulgated over time. It relies on
in the developing countries. Core is a crucial concept of
precedents, based on earlier judicial decisions, to guide
the dependency approach, which is an explanation of
current adjudication. Sometimes referred to as “judge-
both the relations between states and the development
made law,” it is the dominant form of jurisprudence in
process.
the United States, Great Britain, and numerous other
countries. corporatism A corporatist state is characterized by
extensive economic cooperation between an activist state
communism One of the major “isms” linking politics
and a set of large organizations that represent actors
and political economy, communism is a system that is
who control major productive resources. In the hope that
closely associated with the command political economy.
there will be cooperation and consultation (rather than
Based on the theories of Karl Marx (1867/1981) and
conflict) among the state, big capital, big owners, and big
others, the key to communism is the socialization of
labor, the leaders of these groups are given great influ-
resources—the notion that the state must maintain
ence in working with the state to make and implement
control of society’s land, labor, and capital. Although it is
policy on key political economy issues.
primarily an economic system, communism also empha-
sizes an ideological commitment to economic and social correlational analysis A form of relational analysis
equality among all of its citizens. It also posits that until that determines whether there is a statistically probable
 Glossary 463

relationship between two variables. The analysis does dependent variable The Y variable whose value changes
not conclude that one variable is actually the agent that as a result of changes in some other specified (indepen-
causes change to occur in another variable (as in causal dent) variables. Causal analysis presents the “If X, then
analysis) but merely assesses the strength and direc- Y” mode of explanation, where X is the independent
tion of the association between variables. Correlational variable that, given a certain value, actually causes Y, the
analysis is often a key step in any empirical attempt to dependent variable, to alter in value in a particular way.
understand politics.
dictatorship A political system in which political leaders
council system A political system in which a small are not subject to a limited mandate but have absolute
group shares collective leadership and is responsible for power and authority. The citizens have no regular and
both executive and legislative functions. All members realistic opportunity to replace such political leadership
of the council have relatively equal power, so decisions in a nonviolent manner.
and actions are based on the will of the council major-
dual executive A political system in which one actor, the
ity or council consensus. Examples: mayor–council
head of state, performs the more ceremonial aspects of
systems and boards of supervisors in many U.S. local
top leadership and embodies the nation, while another
governments; Switzerland.
actor, the head of government, is responsible for the
coup Occurs when the top political leader or leadership more political aspects of the executive role. (See also
group is replaced by violence or the explicit threat of vio- executive.) Example: The United Kingdom has Queen
lence. A coup is a common form of leadership turnover Elizabeth II (head of state) and Prime Minister David
in political systems that have no accepted and enforce- Cameron (head of government).
able procedures for leadership succession. Examples:
economic development This occurs as more and more
ouster of Morsi in Egypt (2013); elimination of Gaddafi
households and firms within a country are engaged
in Libya (2011).
in ever-higher levels of production and consump-
democracy A political system in which governance is tion. Based on greater control of the environment and
accomplished by leaders whose authority is based on resources, more (and more complex) goods are produced
a limited mandate and who are elected by a universal and exchanged, and the gross domestic product (GDP)
electorate. Such an “electoral” democracy becomes a gets larger relative to the number of people sharing in
“liberal” democracy when the population selects among the market.
genuine alternatives and also has significant rights to
political participation, expression, and opposition. electoral system The framework by which the votes of
citizens are converted to specific selections of candidates
democratic socialism A variation of socialist ideology who have a mandate to hold office. There are many
that treats greater egalitarianism as its primary goal but variations, some based on selection proportional to votes
also assumes that its goals can and should be imple- cast (forms of PR) and others based on the selection
mented by a government that comes to power and rules of the candidate with most (plurality) or at least half
by democratic means, not by violence and repression. (majority) of the votes.
Under democratic socialism, the government might
own some of the major economic resources and regulate elite approach An analytic explanation of the value
much of the economy, but it does not attempt to plan allocation process (politics) in which the political world
and control all aspects of the economic system. (See also is characterized by political stratification, the segmenta-
socialism.) tion of the population into separate groups with greater
or less power. There are only two major strata—those
democratization The effort to institutionalize democratic
that do more of what there is to do (in the policy process)
political regimes more fully and deeply, especially in
and that get more of the resources that are available,
countries with limited democratic processes. Analyses
and those that do less and get less. These two groups are
often try to measure the extent of democratic consolida-
called the political elite and the mass, respectively. Key
tion and to specify the political, economic, and social
elite theorists include Gaetano Mosca (1896/1939) and
conditions conducive to further democratization.
C. Wright Mills (1956).
dependency approach This claims that an economic
executive The branch of the political system composed
and political hierarchy exists in which many actors take
of a leader or group of leaders who are responsible for
advantage of those with less power and resources. At
defining and managing the implementation of public
the top are the most developed countries, and the poor
policy. A broad definition of the executive includes not
people and the villages of the developing countries are
only the chief executive (e.g., mayor, governor, prime
at the bottom. Some analysts claim that many of the
minister, president, queen) but also the entire adminis-
difficulties facing the less developed countries stem from
trative system.
their vulnerability to, and dependence on, the more
highly developed countries and the transnational institu- fascism A political ideology that places fundamental
tions they control. importance on the unity and harmony of government
464 Glossary

and society and is defined particularly by its opposi- hybrid system A political system that attempts to blend
tion to forces that might weaken that collective unity. It the desirable aspects of both the presidential and cabinet
further assumes that the top leader is the embodiment systems of government. Hybrid systems have a prime
of the natural will and that all individuals and groups minister and an elected legislature that can both enact
must obey the will of the leader. It is both antisocial- and implement policies, but they also have a president
ist and antidemocratic. Fascism had a major impact on who may have relatively equal power with the cabinet
twentieth-century history and is particularly associated or may have key specific, but limited, powers. Examples:
with regimes such as those of Adolf Hitler (“Nazism”) France; Russia.
in Germany (1932–1945) and Benito Mussolini in Italy ideal types An analytic construct that defines “pure
(1922–1943). forms” of a phenomenon (e.g., ideal types of political
federation A political system in which there is a constitu- economies). These forms are distinguished by the con-
tional division of power and functions between a central figuration of key characteristics. Few, if any, real-world
government and a set of regional governments, usually cases are identical to an ideal type, which is a means to
known as states, provinces, or cantons. Power is shared facilitate comparative analysis.
among the levels of government, and no level has legal independent variable The variable in a cause-and-effect
power to dominate any other level in all policy domains. hypothesis or explanation that produces change in
Examples: Brazil; Canada; Mexico; the United States. another variable. In the “If X, then Y” mode of explana-
formal analysis Specifies abstract forms that correspond tion, X is the independent variable that, given a certain
to the reality in which the analyst is interested. The value, actually causes Y, the dependent variable, to
formal analyst attempts to “model” reality. Most formal change in a particular way.
analyses use symbol systems as abstract representations interest group A group that directly attempts to influ-
of the phenomenon under study, such as a subway map ence the allocation of public values or other actions of
or David Easton’s (1965) political system model. those in the political system. It may undertake political
functional analysis Describes the contributions of a action, provide goods or services to political actors, or
certain element (process or structure) to the activities of provide data and information to those within the politi-
the phenomenon under study. For example, one form of cal system in its attempts to achieve its political objec-
functional analysis identifies certain functions or pro- tives. It may also exert influence through compliance or
cesses (e.g., political communication, rule adjudication) noncompliance with the government policy process.
that occur within a political system and describes how intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) Political
and by what structures the functions are performed. actors whose members are states, not private groups or
geopolitics An analytical method that assumes that individuals. IGOs can shape the cooperative relations
the geography of a state—its particular geographical among states, some or all of whom are their members.
location and also its physical characteristics, natural States form IGOs to provide a forum of communication
resources, and human resources—can significantly affect among states, to enact multinational laws and treaties,
the domestic and foreign policy actions of the state. and to intervene in disputes between states. Examples:
European Union; NAFTA; NATO.
globalization The increasing integration of diverse
economic, sociocultural, military, and environmental international law A broad attempt to establish principles
phenomena by means of dense networks of action and and rules that formalize and constrain the interactions
information that span vast distances around the world. among states. Positivist law, or written agreements
These networks dramatically increase interdependence between states in the form of international treaties or
among actors within the international system and within conventions, is the basis for international law.
environments such as the economic system and the international organization A broad term that refers to
environmental system. many of the crossnational institutions whose objectives
guerrilla war Violent opposition to an existing regime are to influence the behavior and policies of states. The
by means of a long, protracted campaign primarily from two primary forms are nongovernmental organizations
rural bases. Fighting is typically in a hit-and-run style, (NGOs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
with extensive efforts to win the support of the peas- Examples: Amnesty International; the United Nations.
ants and the creation of new political institutions prior international regime A set of norms, rules, and proce-
to collapse of the old regime. Example: FARC’s lengthy dures that are accepted by many countries and guide
campaign against the Colombian government. their behavior with one another in a particular issue
hegemony The existence of an extraordinarily power- domain. Examples: the World Trade Organization on
ful group (a “hegemonic elite”) or country (“hegemon”) trade relations; the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
that sustains its domination over other actors for a long international relations One of the four major subfields
period of time. within political science, “IR” examines the interactions
 Glossary 465

among states and other transnational actors as they to restructure the economic system; and (3) a small dic-
pursue political goals. Subjects of analysis include tatorial leadership group must manage the government
foreign policy, interstate conflict, globalization, and and effect the economic and social changes. This group
international law. will be unnecessary when equality is achieved and can
be replaced by decentralized citizen-run politics. (See also
judicial review In political systems where the judiciary
socialism.)
is relatively independent, the judiciary can interpret or
even revoke the policy decisions and actions taken by micropolitics An analytic focus on individual and small-
the other political structures, thus exercising the power group political processes, with a particular emphasis on
of judicial review. In the United States, for example, the how the individual understands the political world and
Supreme Court exercises the power of judicial review how the individual acts politically.
when it decides whether a law passed by Congress is mixed economy A political economy that attempts to
unconstitutional. combine the strengths of both market and command
judiciary An important branch of most political systems, economies while also minimizing their shortcomings.
the system of courts and personnel that determine Control of the means of production is shared between
whether the laws of the society have been transgressed, the state and private actors. The state’s rules, actions,
and if so, whether and what type of sanctions ought to and direct involvement in the economic system guide
be imposed on the transgressor. some production, distribution, and pricing decisions and
also moderate and limit the market behavior of private
legislature The political structure in which, typically,
households and firms.
policy issues are discussed and assessed and public
policies are enacted by a set of elected or appointed monarchy (1) A political system with a hereditary sover-
legislators. Although a particular legislature may not eign, often called a king or queen, as in United Kingdom
exercise these powers, most have three broad roles: (1) of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. (2) Analytically,
enacting legislation; (2) representing the citizenry; and a political system in which one person exercises a very
(3) overseeing the executive. large proportion of political control, which can also be
termed an “autocracy.”
liberal democracy A political system that not only is
an electoral democracy (periodic elections, limited nation A sociopolitical unit defined by a deeply shared
mandate) but also ensures extensive political rights (e.g., fundamental identification among a set of people based
parties promoting genuine alternatives, opposition) and on shared ethnicity, language, descent, culture, religion,
civil liberties (e.g., freedom of expression, religion, and and/or geographic space. The nation is a major group,
the media). beyond the family, with whom the individual identifies
very powerfully.
liberalism In international relations theory, liberalism
assumes that states can cooperate in mutually beneficial nationalism A strong affection and commitment to the
ways. Liberalism expects the state to make decisions well-being of the nation with which one identifies, in
and act in the international system based on its own mix comparison with minimal concern for those outside the
of normative principles that might encourage coopera- nation. Nationalism can become the underlying principle
tion. Conflict can be avoided through the construction of shaping people’s loyalty and willingness to make sacri-
international institutions based on mutually acceptable fices for the protection and enhancement of the nation
principles. and its collective interests.

market economy An ideal-type political economy in natural law Sensible, widely accepted (universal?) norms
which there is near-total private control of land, labor, of behavior that direct us to act with goodness and are
and capital. Every actor has direct control over his or recognizable through human reason. They should guide
her own factors of production, and production decisions the relations among states and individuals and should
are essentially the sum of all private actors’ decisions. restrain hostile or destructive interactions.
The exchange value of goods is decided by the market. neocolonialism New forms of domination and depen-
The state is generally quite passive in a market economy, dence between states that have emerged in the decades
simply enforcing rules and providing minimal protection since the end of colonialism (after World War II).
to economic actors. (Compare with command economy.) Although direct occupation by colonial powers was
Marxist–Leninist socialism A variant of socialist ideol- ended at independence, domination has been extended
ogy heavily influenced by the writings of Karl Marx in some cases by the manipulation of power resources
and the interpretations by V. I. Lenin. It begins with such as economic aid, technology transfer, military sup-
three assumptions regarding the changes necessary to port, and economic intervention. (See also colonialism.)
produce the key goals of equality and social justice: (1) it neoliberalism An approach to economic development
might be necessary to use violence to overthrow the old that emphasizes a reliance on a local and global free mar-
economic order; (2) a powerful government is necessary ket that is guided by entrepreneurs who shape decisions
466 Glossary

about the production and distribution of goods. The the group—any aggregate of individuals who interact to
state plays a minimal role in the political economy, and pursue a common interest. Within this approach, politics
public spending is focused on infrastructure support can be understood as the interaction among groups that
(e.g., transportation, education) rather than welfare are pursuing their political interests, and policy decisions
distribution. are the outcome of that group process. It is assumed that
nonconstitutional regime A political system in which any particular individual can belong to many different
there is persistent nonenforcement of crucial limits on groups and has some political resources that can be used
the rulers and/or protection of the rights of the ruled, in an attempt to influence policy decisions.
especially those limits and rights specified in a constitu- political analysis The attempt to describe and explain
tion and other key legal documents. Most authoritarian political phenomena that strives to make understanding
or totalitarian regimes are nonconstitutional. of politics more general, precise, and systematic, and
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) National ultimately to generate and test theories.
or transnational associations that are not part of the political belief system The configuration of an indi-
governmental/state apparatus but are committed to vidual’s political orientations across an array of political
the promotion of an issue with national or international issues. Many political beliefs are evaluative orientations,
policy dimensions. (In the latter case, the association is which synthesize facts (cognitive orientations) and feel-
called an international nongovernmental organization.) ings (affective orientations) into a judgment (evaluative
Members are groups and individuals who combine orientation) about some political phenomena.
their knowledge and financial and political resources political culture The general configuration of a par-
to pursue a shared objective. Examples: Amnesty ticular people’s (e.g., a nation’s or a country’s) political
International’s monitoring of human rights; Médecins beliefs. It characterizes those cognitive, affective, and
sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders) provisions of evaluative orientations that are dominant among those
medical assistance. people. Many explanations of political behavior and
normative political knowledge Answers questions political processes are grounded in interpretations of
about what ought to be rather than simply providing political culture.
descriptions and explanations of what is. Examples of political decay The phenomena that occur when there
normative questions: What are the appropriate domains is a decline in the capacity of the political system,
of state action? Should there be limits on free speech? especially its effectiveness in maintaining order. It can
How much and what types of health care should the be manifest in collective behavior such as demonstra-
state provide? tions, protests, rebellion, and other forms of political
oligarchy Literally, rule by the few. Hence, a political violence. It is often associated with extensive demands
system in which a small number of actors dominate the that the political system cannot meet and with the loss
resource allocation process, usually serving their own of citizen support for the political system. According to
interests. Samuel Huntington (1968), the probability of political
decay increases as a state has a lower level of political
parliamentary government A political system in which
institutionalization.
the executive and legislative functions and structures
are fused. The people elect the legislature (parliament), political development The specifically political aspects
whose majority empowers a cabinet, which then empow- of development and modernization. It can refer either
ers one of its members to be the chief executive, usually to a set of characteristics of the political system or to
called a prime minister or premier. The cabinet devises, the process through which those characteristics are
drafts, and implements most policies, although they increased. The key characteristics of more developed
must be enacted by the legislative majority. Examples: political systems can include: (1) the concentration of
Italy; the United Kingdom. power in the central state; (2) “modern” forms of politi-
cal organization, such as institutionalized party systems
participatory democracy Democracy in its classic
and effective bureaucracies; (3) complex and extensive
sense as government of and by all the people. There is
forms of individual and group political behavior; and
active, direct participation by all citizens in the policy
(4) expanded capabilities of the political system to main-
process.
tain order, manage the environment, meet the demands
party system The configuration of political parties in of the citizens, and so on.
a political system. Party systems are generally classi-
political economy The combination, in theory or in
fied according to the number of political parties and
practice, of politics and economics. The political system
the nature of the interactions among the parties in the
and the economic system are inextricably intertwined
governing process.
because many of the decisions made by the political
pluralism An analytic explanation of the value alloca- system have significant effects on the economy, and
tion process (politics) that is grounded in the concept of activities within the economic system have major effects
 Glossary 467

on the state. Two ideal-type political economies are the countries because most political scientists use the sci-
market economy and the command economy. entific method to establish shared knowledge about the
political world.
political elite A general term for those individuals who
have relatively high levels of power, influence, interest, political socialization The process through which indi-
knowledge, and involvement in political life. It is the viduals acquire their cognitive, affective, and evaluative
stratum of the population that does more of what there is orientations toward the political world. Some of the most
to do (in the policy process) and gets more of what there important agents (sources) are the family, the schools,
is to get (in the allocation of values). peer groups, the media, religion, and culture.
political ideology A comprehensive set of beliefs about political society Formed when individuals cede to the
the political world, including a specification of desirable state a monopoly over the legitimate use of violence,
political goals and the best way to achieve those goals, sacrificing their own right to do violence to others in
based on particular assumptions about human nature, exchange for a similar sacrifice from others. Thomas
the relation of the individual to the state and society, and Hobbes (1651) called this agreement among individuals
the desirability of equality. the social contract.
political institutions The established roles, rules, political system A (formal) theoretical concept that
procedures, and structures through which government attempts to model the fundamental structures, processes,
operates (e.g., the electoral college, parliament, the and institutions of politics. According to David Easton
bureaucracy, and the military). (1965), the defining feature is its authoritative allocation
political institutionalization The extent to which politi- of values for the collectivity.
cal organizations and procedures have acquired value in political violence The use of physical violence, or very
the eyes of the population and the stability to withstand serious threats of such violence, to achieve political
significant pressure. It is measured by the political goals. The modes range from nuclear war, to assassina-
system’s capacity to regulate its citizens, respond flex- tion, to riots. Some analysts define as political violence
ibly to citizen demands, extract and distribute resources other activities that do not entail physical violence, such
efficiently, and adapt to changing circumstances. as racial epithets or ethnic discrimination.
political participation The term applied to all modes politics The processes through which power and influ-
of the political actions by individuals and groups. The ence are used to promote certain values and interests and
broad goal is to influence the actions or selection of to determine who gets what, when, and how in a given
political rulers. Modes of political participation for an social system.
individual range from listening to political discourse,
to voting, to taking part in a demonstration, to holding positivist law Explicit written agreements, often enacted
political office. by legislatures and interpreted by judiciaries, that specify
appropriate and unlawful behaviors as well as the sanc-
political party An organized group that attempts to tions for the latter. In the form of treaties or conventions
capture political power directly by placing its members between states, positivist law is the basis of international
in government office. The political party is the broadest law.
institution in most political systems that links indi-
viduals and groups to the state, and it can organize the power Exercised when A (one actor) induces B (another
activities of those participating in government. It also actor) to behave in a manner in which B would not
aggregates political interests into a comprehensible set of otherwise behave. One taxonomy classifying the forms
policy goals. of power includes force (coercive power), exchange
(economic power), and mutuality (integrative power).
political resources Something that can influence the
actions and decisions of political actors, such as social presidential government A political system in which
status, money, legality, special knowledge or skills, abil- there is a separation of executive and legislative power
ity to mobilize large numbers of people, visibility in the and structures. This is meant to ensure a system of
media, and control of productive capabilities. According checks and balances in the policy process, with the leg-
to the pluralist approach, political resources are of many islature taking primary responsibility for policymaking
forms and widely distributed. According to the class and and the president (the executive) taking primary respon-
elite approaches, one or a few types of political resources sibility for policy implementation (although in practice
are critical, and control of those resources tends to be these distinctions may be blurred). The president and the
concentrated in a limited group. members of the legislature are elected independently, for
fixed terms. Examples: Mexico; the United States.
political science A set of techniques, concepts, and
approaches whose objective is to increase the clarity and privatization The selling off of state-owned firms to
accuracy of understandings about political phenomena. private actors and/or the use of private firms to provide
This academic discipline is labeled a “science” in many public goods and services.
468 Glossary

prosperity A fundamental goal for a state and its and regulation; and substantial policies of social welfare
citizens, with key subgoals including the capacity of distribution to all citizens. Examples: Belgium; Sweden.
the political economy to control resources in order to
social market system A political–economic system in
produce and distribute desired goods and to provide
which the state encourages the operation of an extensive
for adequate material well-being for its population (see
free-market economy but is also committed to social
Figure 5.1).
welfare distribution and some income redistribution,
public policy Any decision or action by a governmen- within the context of a democratic political process.
tal authority that results in the allocation of a value. Contemporary examples: Germany; Sweden.
A taxonomy of public policies could be based on the
social networks The group of people, including friends,
functional area of the policy (e.g., environmental, trade),
family members, peers, and colleagues from work,
the overall effects of the policy (e.g., redistributive,
school, clubs, churches, or other groups, that may
symbolic), or the stages of the policy process (e.g.,
exercise significant influence on a person’s attitudes and
problem definition, evaluation).
values.
rational choice theory An array of formal analyses that
socialism One of the major Western political ideologies,
share two basic features: (1) they are attempts to repre-
in which the most important goal is to provide a high-
sent political processes primarily by means of math-
quality, relatively equal standard of living for all. Each
ematical formulations or systems of symbolic notation;
individual is encouraged to enhance the collective good
and (2) it is assumed that the behavior of political actors
of all in an environment that encourages cooperation and
is goal-oriented, based on self-interest, and calculating.
sharing. Government plays a crucial role as it attempts
Examples: game theory; minimum winning coalition
to use its allocation of values and control of resources
theory.
to increase the material, social, and political equality of
realism A perspective, especially in international rela- all citizens. Two major variations are Marxist–Leninist
tions theory, that assumes that people are naturally socialism and democratic socialism.
disposed to behave selfishly and that this self-interested
soft power A form of power exercise in which actor B
orientation extends to the behavior of states. The fun-
is persuaded to agree to what another actor (A) wants
damental goal of each state is to ensure its own security
because B greatly admires A’s qualities, culture, or ideals,
and survival by maximizing its power. Interstate conflict
even if the agreement is not in B’s evident self-interest.
is likely to be a recurring event, and states sometimes
In this situation, there is no explicit use of either force or
use balance-of-power strategies to limit the frequency of
economic inducement, the “hard” forms of power.
major conflicts.
relational analysis Approaches to political analysis sovereignty The premise that each state has complete
that specify the systematic connections between sets authority and is the ultimate source of law within its
of phenomena, revealing either patterns of association own borders. It assumes that all states are equal before
(correlation) or causality. the law and that each state has the right to protect its
territory against any aggression or intervention.
representative democracy A form of electoral democracy
in which citizens elect people to represent them in the stability A fundamental goal of a government, with
governing process and to allocate values on their behalf key subgoals including the capacity to maintain public
for the collectivity. Also known as a republic. order and to manage public institutions with adequate
capabilities to function effectively in pursuing its policy
revolution A rapid and fundamental transformation of objectives (see Figure 5.1).
the state organization and of the allocation of values in a
society. A revolution often involves the use of force and state (1) The legal notion of the state is that it is a
violence to destroy the existing political system. “territorially bound sovereign entity.” (2) In the general
language of political science, the word state usually refers
security A fundamental goal of a government and soci- to the organizational units, institutions, and individu-
ety, with key subgoals including the capacity to survive als that perform the political functions for a national
and to protect its borders from unwanted external inter- territorial entity, such as France or Nigeria. (3) The state
vention (see Figure 5.1). can also be defined as the entity with a monopoly on the
security dilemma The situation in the politics across bor- legitimate use of violence to enforce the laws and deci-
ders in which every state is concerned about its security sions of the society.
goals because there is no overarching authority that can state capitalism A political economy in which the lead-
necessarily enforce a violation of a state’s sovereignty. ers of the political system assert extensive control over
social democracy A political system with strong, who is allowed to compete in key sectors of the economy
institutionalized democratic politics; a mixed political and in which the primary goal of the economy is to serve
economy with both considerable free market activity state power.
 Glossary 469

statism A state-centered strategy for facilitating eco- linked to any particular country. Many of these powerful
nomic development. The statist approach emphasizes the actors are multinational corporations (MNCs) such as
importance of strong state action to support and guide General Motors, Exxon, and Sony, and other important
the production and distribution of goods by the political transnational actors include the International Monetary
economy. The state typically plans and regulates major Fund, OPEC, NATO, and other IGOs and NGOs.
aspects of the political economy and might own and Increasingly, MNCs and other transnational actors hold
operate key economic sectors. international economic power, shape global culture and
communications, and operate outside the legal control
taxonomic analysis Approaches to political analysis that
of states.
establish the orderly arrangement of phenomena into
a set of categories that classify those phenomena/data treaty A formal agreement between states that they will
into different types. Categories should be exhaustive, cooperate or assist each other militarily, economically,
mutually exclusive, and differentiated by consistent cri- and/or politically. A treaty carries a stronger expecta-
teria. The categories of a taxonomy establish the crucial tion of compliance than an alliance. Examples: NATO;
concepts that structure the analysis. Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.

territorial integrity A concept closely associated with unitary state A political system in which the central
sovereignty, it is a premise of international law that government holds all legitimate power. The central
holds that a state has the right to resist and reject any government may delegate power or functional respon-
aggression, invasion, or intervention within its territorial sibilities to territorial units (often called departments,
borders. regions, or prefectures), but those delegated powers and
functions can be revoked at any time. Examples: China;
terrorism Premeditated violence serving an underly- France; Japan; Philippines.
ing political objective, in which the target of violence
is a “noncombatant.” Those engaged in terrorism can war Interstate violence that is sustained, organized, and
have a variety of political objectives, such as promo- usually involves hostilities between the regular military
tion of a cause, revenge, or extraction of resources. As a forces of the states. War is the ultimate mechanism
revolutionary strategy, terrorism involves selective acts for attempting to resolve power struggles and conflict
of violence, usually by small, organized cells of political between states. Examples: Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988);
activists. Korean War (1950–1953).
welfare state A system of state interventions in the politi-
totalitarianism A political regime that demands com-
cal economy whose goal is to implement public policies
plete obedience to its extensive rules regarding not only
that provide all citizens with an adequate quality of life
politics but also nearly all aspects of life, including cul-
in domains such as education, health care, housing, and
ture, economics, religion, and morality. It might prescribe
employment opportunities. Usually characterized by
and proscribe the behavior and thoughts of its popula-
relatively high taxes, more extensive resource allocations
tion in every domain of existence. Examples: contempo-
(e.g., transfer payments or subsidized goods and ser-
rary North Korea; the Soviet Union under Joseph Stalin.
vices), and more active state intervention to protect citi-
transnationalism A system of institutions and relation- zens against the behaviors of those firms or others whose
ships in which key actors’ loyalties and identities are not actions reduce the quality of life. Example: Sweden.
References
Abadie, Alberto. (2004). “Poverty, Political Freedom, Armijo, Leslie Elliott. (2007). “The BRICs Countries
and the Roots of Terrorism.” Cambridge, MA: (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) As Analytical
KSG Working Paper 04–043 (October). Category: Mirage or Insight?” Asian Perspectives
31(4): 7–42.
Abdallah, Saaman, Sam Thompson, Juliet
Michaelson, Nic Marks, and Nicole Steuer. Aslund, Anders, and Andrew Kuchins. (2009). The
(2011). The Happy Planet Index. http://www. Russia Balance Sheet. Washington, DC: Peterson
happyplanetindex.org/data/ Institute for International Economics.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. (2009). Bachrach, Peter, and Morton Baratz. (1962). “The
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Two Faces of Power.” American Political Science
New York: Cambridge University Press. Review 56 (December): 947–952.
Acemoglu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. (2012). Bagdikian, Ben. (2004). The New Media Monopoly.
Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, Boston: Beacon Press.
and Poverty. New York: Random House. Baghwati, Jagdish. (2007). In Defense of Globalization.
Agnew, John. (2003). Geopolitics: Re-Visioning World New York: Oxford University Press.
Politics. London: Routledge. Bajoria, Jayshree, and Robert McMahon. (2013).
Agnew, John. (2009). Globalization and Sovereignty. The Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention.
Rowman & Littlefield. Council on Foreign Relations. http://
www.cfr.org/humanitarian-intervention/
Aguilar, Francesco, and Mauro Galluccio, eds. dilemma-humanitarian-intervention/p16524
(2011). Psychological and Political Strategies for
Peace Negotiation: A Cognitive Approach. New Barber, Benjamin R. (1996). Jihad vs. McWorld. New
York: Springer. York: Random House.

Almond, Gabriel, and Sidney Verba. (1963). The Barber, Benjamin R. (2004). Strong Democracy:
Civic Culture. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Participatory Politics for a New Age. 20th anniv. ed.
Press. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Amnesty International. (2014). Amnesty International Bardach, Eugene. (2011). A Practical Guide for Policy
Report 2013, https://www.amnesty.org/en/ Analysis: The Eightfold Path to More Effective Problem
annual-report/2014 Solving. 4th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Barnet, Richard J., and John Cavanagh. (1994).
Anderson, James E. (2011). Public Policymaking: An
Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New
Introduction. 7th ed. Independence, KY: Cengage.
World Order. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Anduiza, Eva, Michael Jensen, and Laia Jorba, eds.
Barnett, Michael N., and Martha Finnemore. (2004).
(2012). Digital Media and Political Engagement
Rules for the World: International Organizations
Worldwide: A Comparative Study. New York:
in Global Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Cambridge University Press.
Press.
Ardrey, Robert. (1966). The Territorial Imperative.
Basic, Nedzad, David Goetze, and Charles Anthony
New York: Atheneum.
Smith. (2003). “Secession Crises, Human Welfare,
Arendt, Hannah. (1963). On Revolution. New York: and Conflict Resolution.” Conflict, Security, &
Viking Press. Development 3(2): 185–209.
Arias, Oscar. (2011). “Culture Matters: The Real Basu, Soumita. (2013). “Emancipatory Potential in
Obstacles to Latin American Development.” Feminist Security Studies.” International Studies
Foreign Affairs (February): 2–6. Perspectives 14: 455–458.

470
 References 471

Bates, Robert H. (2008). When Things Fell Apart: Relationships?” International Area Studies Review
State Failure in Late Twentieth Century Africa. 16(1): 89–112.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Birnbaum, David. (2005). “The Road to Riches
Baumol, William, and Alan Blinder. (2012). is Called K Street,” Washington Post (June 22,
Economics. 12th ed. Independence, KY: Cengage. 2005): A01. http://www.washingtonpost.
Baumgartner, Frank, Jeffrey Berry, Marie Hojnacki, com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/06/21/
David Kimball, and Beth L. Leech. (2009). AR2005062101632.html
Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, Black, Cyril. (1966). The Dynamics of Modernization.
and Why. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. New York: Harper and Row.
Baumgartner, Frank, and Beth Leech. (1998). Basic Blank, Grant, and William H. Dutton. (2014). “Next
Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics Generation Internet Users: Digital Divides,
and Political Science. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Choices, and Inequalities.” In Society and the
University Press. Internet: How Information and Social Networks are
Bell, Stephen. (2011). “Do We Really Need a New Changing Our Lives, edited by M. Graham and
‘Constructivist Institutionalism’ to Explain W. H. Dutton. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Institutional Change?” British Journal of Political Bloomberg.com (2009). http://www.bloomberg.
Science 41(4): 883–906. com/apps/ news?pid=20601109&refer=home&si
Bennett, W. Lance. (2012). News: The Politics of d=aH3aDwXXnvqc
Illusion. 9th ed. New York: Pearson. Blustein, Paul. (2006). And the Money Kept Rolling In
Bentley, Arthur. (1908/1967). The Process of (and Out): Wall Street, the IMF, and the Bankruptcy
Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard of Argentina. New York: Public Affairs.
University Press. Bongar, Bruce, Lisa Brown, Larry Beutler, James
Berenskoetter, Felix, and M. J. Williams, eds. (2007). Breckenridge, and Philip Zimbardo, eds. (2006).
Power in World Politics. New York: Routledge. Psychology of Terrorism. New York: Oxford
University Press.
Berrebi, Claude. (2007). “Evidence About the Link
Between Education, Poverty, and Terrorism Bonker, Frank. (2006). The Political Economy of Fiscal
Among Palestinians.” Peace Economics, Peace Reform in Central-Eastern Europe. Northampton,
Science, and Public Policy 13(1): article 2. MA: Edward Elgar Publishing.
Berry, Jeffrey. (2000). The New Liberalism: The Boulding, Kenneth E. (1989). Three Faces of Power.
Rising Power of Citizen Groups. Washington, DC: Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
Brookings Press. Boulding, Kenneth E. (1993). “Power.” In The Oxford
Betts, Richard K. (2010). “Conflict or Cooperation?: Companion to Politics of the World, edited by Joel
Three Visions Revisited.” Foreign Affairs 89 Krieger, 739–740. New York: Oxford University
(November/December): http://www. Press.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/66802/richard-k-betts/ Boulianne, S. (2009). “Does Internet Use Affect
conflict-or-cooperation?page=show Engagement? A Meta-Analysis of Research.”
Bickel, Alexander M. (1962). The Least Dangerous Political Communication, 26(2): 193–211.
Branch: The Supreme Court at the Bar of Politics. Brandal, Nik, Oivind Bratberg, and Dag Einar
New Haven: Yale University Press. Thorsen. (2013). The Nordic Model of Social
Bill, James, and Robert Hardgrave. (1981). Democracy. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Comparative Politics: Quest for Theory. Lanham, Bratton, Michael, and Nicholas Van de Walle.
MD: University Press of America. (1997). Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime
Bimber, Bruce. (2003). Information and American Transitions in Comparative Perspective. Cambridge:
Democracy: Technology and the Evolution of Political Cambridge University Press.
Power. New York: Cambridge University Press. Brecher, Michael, and Jonathan Wilkenfeld. (2000).
Binningsbo, Helga Malmin. (2013). “Power A Study of Crisis. Ann Arbor: University of
Sharing, Peace and Democracy: Any Obvious Michigan Press.
472 References

Bremmer, Ian. (2010). The End of the Free Market: Who Castells, Manuel. (2009). Communication Power. New
Wins the War Between States and Corporations? York: Oxford University Press.
New York: Portfolio Penguin. Castells, Manuel. (2012). Networks of Outrage and
Bremmer, Ian. (2013). Every Nation for Itself: What Hope: Social Movements in the Internet Age. New
Happens When No One Leads the World. New York: York: Polity Press.
Portfolio Penguin.
Castenada, Jorge G. (2011). Manana Forever?: Mexico
Bremer, Stuart. (1980). “National Capabilities and and the Mexicans. New York: Alfred Knopf.
War Proneness.” In Correlates of War II, edited by
Castles, Francis G. (2004). The Future of the Welfare
J. David Singer, 57–82. New York: Free Press.
State: Crisis Myths and Crisis Realities. New York:
Brinton, Crane. (1957). The Anatomy of Revolution. Oxford University Press.
Rev. ed. New York: Vintage.
Castles, Francis G., Stephan Leibfried, Jane Lewis,
The Brookings Institution. (2011). “How Social Herbert Obinger, and Christopher Pierson, eds.
Networking can Reinvigorate American (2010). The Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State.
Democracy and Civic Participation.” New York: Oxford University Press.
Washington, DC. (June 28, 2011). http://
Ceka, Besir. (2012). “The Perils of Political
www.pewinternet.org/Presentations/2011/
Competition: Explaining Participation and
Jun/~/media/Files/Presentations/2011/Jun/
Trust in Political Parties in Eastern Europe.”
Brookings_social_media.pdf
Comparative Political Studies 46(12): 1610–1635.
Brownlee, Jason, Tarek Masoud, and Andrew
Reynolds. (2013). “Why the Modest Harvest?” Center for Responsive Politics. (2013). http://www.
Journal of Democracy 24(4): 29–44. opensecrets.org.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew. (2004). The Choice: Global Central Intelligence Agency. (2013). World Factbook
Domination or Global Leadership. New York: Basic 2013. http://www.odci.gov/cia/ciahome.html
Books. Central Intelligence Agency. (2014). World
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and George Downs. Factbook 2014. https://www.cia.gov/library/
(2005). “Development and Democracy.” Foreign publications/the-world-factbook
Affairs 84 (September/October): 77–86. Chadwick, Andrew. (2013). The Hybrid Media System:
Burke, Edmund. (1790/1955). The Works of Edmund Politics and Power. New York: Oxford University
Burke. New York: Harper and Row. Press.
Calderisi, Robert. (2007). The Trouble with Africa: Why Chadwick, Andrew, and Philip Howard. (2009).
Foreign Aid Isn’t Working. New York: Palgrave. Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics. New York:
Routledge.
Campbell, Arthur. (2013). “Word-of-Mouth
Communication and Percolation in Social Chamie, Joseph. (2014). “Israeli Palestinian
Networks.” The American Economic Review, 103(6): Population Growth and Its Impact on Peace.”
2466–2498. PassBlue Covering the UN passblue.com/
2014/02/02israeli-palestinian-population-growth
Cantril, Hadley. (1965). The Pattern of Human
Concerns. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Cheibub, Jose Antonio. (2007). Presidentialism,
Press. Parliamentarianism, and Democracy. New York:
Cambridge University Press.
Carden, James W. (2013). “Why Russians
Still Don’t Hate Communism.” The Chin, Gregory T. (2010). “Remaking the
National Interest (October 23, 2013). http:// Architecture: The Emerging Powers, Self-
nationalinterest.org/commentary/ insuring, and Regional Insulation.” International
why-russians-still-dont-hate-communism-9294 Affairs 86(3): 693–715.
Carruthers, David and Patricia Rodriguez. (2009). Cigler, Allan. (2013). “Interest Group Money in the
“Mapuche Protest, Environmental Conflict and 2008 Federal Election.” In Interest Group Politics,
Social Movement Linkage in Chile.” Third World 8th ed., edited by Allan Cigler and Burdett
Quarterly 30(4): 743–760. Loomis. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
 References 473

Cigler, Allan, and Burdett A. Loomis, eds. (2013). Cortright, David, and George Lopez, eds. (2002).
Interest Group Politics. 8th ed. Washington, DC: Smart Sanctions: Toward Effective and Humane
CQ Press. Sanctions Reform. Lanham, MD: Rowan and
Clausewitz, Karl von. (1833/1967). On War. Edited Littlefield.
and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Costanza, Robert. (2008). “Stewardship for a ‘Full’
Paret. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. World.” Current History (January): 30–35.
Compton, Jr., Robert W. (2000). East Asian Council on Foreign Relations. (2005). What Is
Democratization: Impact of Globalization, Culture, Terrorism? http://cfrterrorism.org/terrorism/
and Economy. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers. introduction.html.
CNA Corporation. (2007). National Security and the Crenshaw, Martha. (2000). “An Agenda for the 21st
Threat of Climate Change. Alexandria, VA: CNA Century.” Political Psychology 21: 405–420.
Corporation.
Cropf, Robert A., and William S. Krummenacher,
Cronin, James, George Ross, and James Shoch, eds. eds. (2011). Information Communication
(2011). What’s Left of the Left: Social Democrats in Technologies and the Virtual Public Sphere: Impacts
Challenging Times. Durham, NC: Duke University of Network Structures on Civil Society. Hershey, PA:
Press. IGI Global.
Cohen, Saul Bernard. (2008). Geopolitics of the World
Crouch, Colin, and Wolfgang Streeck, eds. (2006).
System. 2nd ed. Rowan & Littlefield.
The Diversity of Democracy: Corporatism, Social
Colburn, Forrest. (2002). Latin America at the End Order and Political Conflict. Cheltenham, UK:
of Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Edward Elgar.
Press.
Cutright, Phillips. (1963). “National Political
Coles, Robert. (2003). Bruce Springsteen’s America: Development: Measurement and Analysis.”
The People Listening, a Poet Singing. New York: American Sociological Review 20: 253–264.
Random House.
Dafoe, Allan, John R. Oneal, and Bruce Russett.
Collier, Paul. (2008). The Bottom Billion: Why the (2013). “The Democratic Peace: Weighing the
Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done Evidence and Cautious Inference.” International
about It. New York: Oxford University Press. Studies Quarterly 57(1): 201–214.
Collier, Paul. (2010). Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy Dahl, Robert. (1961). Who Governs? Democracy in an
in Dangerous Places. New York: Harper. American City. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler. (2007). Press.
“Unintended Consequences: Does Aid Promote
Dahl, Robert. (1971). Polyarchy: Participation and
Arms Races?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University
Statistics 69(1): 1–27.
Press.
Collier, Paul and Anthony J. Venables. (2010).
Dahl, Robert. (1991). Democracy and Its Critics. New
Natural Resources and State Fragility. EUI Working
Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Paper RSCAS 2010/36
Compton, Robert W. (2000). East Asian Dahl, Robert. (2006). A Preface to Democratic Theory.
Democratization: The Impact of Globalization, Expanded ed. Chicago: University of Chicago
Culture, and Economy, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Publishing Group. Dahl, Robert, and Bruce Stinebrickner. (2003).
Connor, Walker. (1994). Ethnonationalism: The Quest Modern Political Analysis. 6th ed. New York:
for Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Pearson.
University Press. Dahlstrom, Carl, Victor Lapuente, and Jan Teorell.
Converse, Philip. (1964). “The Nature of Belief (2012). “The Merit of Meritocratization: Politics,
Systems in Mass Publics.” In Ideology and Bureaucracy, and the Institutional Deterrents of
Discontent, edited by David Apter, 224–240. Corruption.” Political Research Quarterly 65(3):
Glencoe, IL: Free Press. 656–668.
474 References

Dahrendorf, Ralf. (1959). Class and Class Conflict Diamond, Larry, Marc F. Plattner, and Daniel
in Industrial Society. Stanford, CA: Stanford Brumberg. (2003). Islam and Democracy in the Middle
University Press. East. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
Dalby, Simon. (2008). “Imperialism, Domination, Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner. (2009).
Culture: The Continued Relevance of Critical Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Geopolitics.” Geopolitics 13.3 http://www. University Press.
informaworld.com/10.1080/14650040802203679 DiPaolo, Amanda. (2010). Zones of Twilight: Wartime
Dalton, Russell. (2013). Citizen Politics: Public Presidential Powers and Federal Court Decision
Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Making. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
Democracies. 6th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press. Dolan, Julie Ann, Melissa Deckman, and Michele
Dalton, Russell. (2009). The Good Citizen. Swers. (2007). Women and Politics: Paths to Power
Washington, DC: CQ Press. and Influence. New York: Prentice Hall.
Davenport, Kelsey, and Marcus Taylor. (2013). Domhoff, G. William. (2005). “Social Cohesion &
Assessing Progress on Nuclear Nonproliferation and the Bohemian Grove: The Power Elite at
Disarmament Washington, DC: Arms Control Summer Camp.” http://sociology.ucsc.edu/
Association. whorulesamerica/power/bohemian_grove.html
Davies, James C. (1971). “Toward a Theory of Domhoff, G. William. (2013). Who Rules America?
Revolution.” In When Men Revolt and Why, edited The Triumph of the Corporate Rich. 7th ed. Boston:
by James C. Davies, 134–147. New York: Free McGraw-Hill.
Press. Downs, Anthony. (1957). An Economic Theory of
Davis, Winston. (1987). “Religion and Development: Voting. New York: Harper and Row.
Weber and the East Asian Experience.” In Doyle, Michael W., and Nicholas Sambanis. (2000).
Understanding Political Development, edited by “International Peacebuilding: A Theoretical and
Myron Weiner and Samuel Huntington, 221–280. Quantitative Analysis.” American Political Science
Boston: Little, Brown. Review 94 (December): 779–801.
De Cordoba, Jose, and Kejal Vyas. (2012). “Henrique Drezner, Daniel. (2008). All Politics Is Global:
Capriles Representa la Primera Gran Amenaza Explaining International Regulatory Regimes
Para Chavez.” Wall Street Journal Americas Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
(October 2, 2012).
Duverger, Maurice. (1954). Political Parties. New
Delli Carpini, Michael X., and Scott Keeter. (1996). York: Wiley.
What Americans Know about Politics and Why It
Dwyer, Michael B. (2013). “Micro-
Matters. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Geopolitics: Capitalising Security in Laos’s
Demick, Barbara. (2003). “U.S. Gets a Bad Name in Golden Quadrangle.” Geopolitics doi:
South Korea.” Los Angeles Times, July 12, A3. 10.1080/14650045.2013.780033
Deng, Kent G. (2010). “Globalisation, China’s Easterlin, Richard. (2006). “Building a Better Theory
Recent Miracle Growth and Its Limits.” In China’s of Well-Being.” In Economics and Happiness:
Globalization—Today, Tomorrow, edited by Kent Framing the Analysis, edited by Luigino Bruni
Deng, 139–160.. Rijeka: IntechOpen. and Pier Luigi Porta, 29–64. New York: Oxford
Derbyshire, Denis, and Ian Derbyshire. (2000). University Press.
Encyclopedia of World Political Systems. New York: Easton, David. (1965). A Framework for Political
M. E. Sharpe. Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Diamond, Larry. (2008). The Spirit of Democracy: Ebenstein, William, and Alan O. Ebenstein. (2001).
The Struggle to Build Free Societies Throughout the Introduction to Political Thinkers. 2nd ed. Florence,
World. New York: Holt. KY: Wadsworth.
Diamond, Larry, and Marc F. Plattner. (2001). The Eckstein, Harry. (1966). Division and Cohesion in
Global Divergence of Democracies. Baltimore: Johns Democracy: A Study of Norway. Princeton, NJ:
Hopkins University Press. Princeton University Press.
 References 475

Economic Policy Institute. (2011). The State of Working Fallows, James. (1995). Looking at the Sun: The Rise of
America. http://www.stateofworkingamerica.org/ the New East Asian Economic and Political System.
EIU. (2013). The Economist Intelligence Unit. New York: Random House.
Democracy Index 2013. www.academia. Farrell, Henry. (2012). “The Consequences of the
edu/3312471/The_Economist_Democracy_ Internet for Politics.” Annual Review of Politics
Index.html 15: 35–52.
Edwards, George, Martin Wattenberg, and Robert Federation of American Scientists. (2014). http://
Lineberry. (2014). Government in America. 16th ed. www.fas.org/.
New York: Pearson. Feldman, Stanley, and Karen Stenner. (1997).
Elgie, Robert. (2004). “Semi-presidentialism: “Perceived Threat and Authoritarianism.”
Concepts, Consequences and Contesting Political Psychology 18: 741–770.
Explanations.” Political Studies Review 2(3). Fendrich, James. (1993). Ideal Citizen: The Legacy of
Elkington, John, and Seb Beloe. (2003). The 21st the Civil Rights Movement. Albany, NY: SUNY
Century NGO: In the Market for Change. London: Press.
SustainAbility. Ferguson, Niall. (2012). “We Are All State Capitalists
Enders, Walter, and Todd Sandler. (2012). The Now.” Foreign Policy.(February 10, 2010).
Political Economy of Terrorism. 2nd ed. New York: Fick, Paul. (2000). The Dysfunctional President:
Cambridge University Press. Understanding the Compulsions of Bill Clinton. Rev.
Enloe, Cynthia. (2001). Bananas, Beaches and Bases: updated ed. New York: Citadel Press.
Making Feminist Sense of International Politics. Fisher, Joseph P., and Brian Flota (2013). The Politics
Berkeley: University of California Press. of Post-9/11 Music: Sound Trauma and the Music
Eriksson, Mikael, Peter Wallensteen, and Margareta Industry. Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing,
Sollenberg. (2003). “Armed Conflict, 1989–2002.” Ltd.
Journal of Peace Research 40: 593–607. Folkenflik, David. (2013). Murdoch’s World: The
Erikson, Erik. (1969). Gandhi’s Truth. New York: Last of the Old Media Empires. New York:
W. W. Norton. PublicAffairs.
Escriba-Folch, Abel. (2013). “Accountable for What? Fowler, James, and Christopher Dawes (2009).
Regime Types, Performance, and the Fate of “Partisanship, Voting, and the Dopamine D2
Outgoing Dictators, 1946–2004.” Democratization Receptor Gene.” Journal of Politics 71(3) (July
doi: 10.1080/13510347.2013.738866 2009): 1157–1171.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta. (1990). The Three Worlds Franko, Patrice. (2007). The Puzzle of Latin American
of Welfare Capitalism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Economic Development. 3rd ed. Lanham, MD:
University Press. Rowman & Littlefield.

Estrin, Saul, Jan Honousek, Evzen Kocenda, and Fraser, Matthew. (2005). Weapons of Mass Distraction:
Jan Svejnar. (2009). “Effects of Privatization and Soft Power and American Empire. New York: St.
Ownership in Transition Economies.” Policy Martin’s Press.
Research Working Paper 4811. New York: World Freedom House. (2013). Freedom of the World. http://
Bank. www.freedomhouse.org
Europa: Gateway to the European Union. (2011). http:// Freedom House. (2014). Freedom of the World
europa.eu.int/index_en.htm 2014. www.freedomhouse.org/repport/
Evans, Gareth. (2009). The Responsibility to Protect: freedom-world/freedom-world-2014
Ending Mass Atrocity Crimes Once and for All. Friedman, Thomas L. (1999). “DOScapital.” Foreign
Washington, DC: Brookings. Policy 113 (Fall): 110–127.
Fagen, Richard. (1964). Cuba: The Political Content Friedman, Thomas L. (2007). The World Is Flat:
of Adult Education. Stanford, CA: Hoover A Brief History of the Twenty-first Century. 2nd
Institute. revised ed. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
476 References

Friedman, Jonathan and Kajsa Friedman. (2013). Glosney, Michael A. (2010). “China and the BRICs:
“Globalization as a Discourse of Hegemonic A Real (but limited) Partnership in a Unipolar
Crisis: A Global Systemic Analysis.” American World.” Polity 42(1): 100–129.
Ethnologist 40(2): 244–257. Gochman, Charles S., and Zeev Maoz. (1984).
Fukuyama, Francis. (1992). The End of History and the “Militarized Interstate Disputes, 1816–1976.”
Last Man. New York: Free Press. Journal of Conflict Resolution 18 (December):
588–615.
Fukuyama, Francis. (1999). The Great Disruption:
Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Goldman, Marshall I. (2003). The Piratization of
Order. New York: Free Press. Russia. New York: Routledge.
Fukuyama, Francis. “Confucianism and Goldman, Marshall I. (2008). Petrostate: Putin, Power,
Democracy.” (2009). In Democracy: A Reader, and the New Russia. Oxford: Oxford University
edited by Robert Putnam and Marc Plattner. Press.
Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press. Goldstein, Joshua S. (2003). War and Gender: How
Fund for Peace. (2014). The Failed States Index 2014. Gender Shapes the War System and Vice Versa.
www.fundforpeace.org. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Garrett, R. Kelly, and James N. Danziger. (2011). Goldstein, Joshua S. (2012). Winning the War on War:
“The Internet Electorate.” Communications of the The Decline of Armed Conflict Worldwide. New
ACM 54(3) (March): 117–123. York: Dutton.
Goodin, Robert, and Philip Pettit, eds. (2006).
Gartner, John D. (2009). In Search of Bill Clinton: A
Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology.
Psychological Biography. New York: St. Martin’s
2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell.
Griffin.
Goodwin, Paul. (2008). Latin America. 13th ed. New
George, Alexander L., and Juliette L. George. (1956).
York: McGraw-Hill.
Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality
Study. New York: Dover. Gowa, Joanne. (2000). Ballots and Bullets: The Elusive
Democratic Peace. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Givan, Rebecca Kolins, Sarah Anne Soule, and
University Press.
Kenneth Roberts, eds. (2010). The Diffusion
of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, Graber, Doris A. (2009). Mass Media and American
and Political Effects. New York: Cambridge Politics. 8th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
University Press. Graham, Mark, and William H. Dutton, eds. (2014).
Gladwell, Malcolm. (2010). “Why the Revolution Society and the Internet: How Information and Social
Will Not Be.” The New Yorker. (October 4, 2010). Networks Are Changing Our Lives. Oxford: Oxford
Retrieved from http://www.newyorker.com/ University Press.
reporting/2010/10/04/ 101004fa_fact_gladwell Grameen Bank. (2011). http://www.grameen-info.org
Glanville, Luke. (2013). “The Myth of ‘Traditional’ Grameen Foundation. (2014). Microfinance: A Poverty
Sovereignty.” International Studies Quarterly 57: Lens on Financial Inclusion. Gurgaon, India:
79–90. Grameen Foundation.
Gledhill, John. (2013). “Assessing (In)security after Green, Donald P., and Ian Shapiro. (1994).
the Arab Spring.” PS: Political Science and Politics Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of
46(4): 709–720. Applications in Political Science. New Haven, CT:
Yale University Press.
Gleditsch, Nils Petter, Lene Siljeholm Christiansen,
and Håvard Hegre. (2007). Democratic Jihad? Green, Eva G. T., et al. (2009). “Reactions to Crime as
Military Intervention and Democracy. World Bank Hierarchy-regulating Strategy: The Moderating
Policy Research Working Paper 4242. Role of Social Dominance Orientation.” Social
Justice Research 22(4): 416–436.
Global Exchange. (2009). “Top Reasons to Oppose
the World Trade Organization.” http://www. Grossmann, Matt. (2012). The Not-So-Special
globalexchange.org Interests: Interest Groups, Public Representation,
 References 477

and American Governance. Stanford, CA: Stanford Politics in the World Arena, edited by Steven L.
University Press. Speigel, 338–352. New York: St. Martin’s Press.
Grotius, Hugo. (1625/1957). De Jure Belli et Pacis [On Heilbroner, Robert. (1994). Twenty-First Century
the Laws of War and Peace]. New York: Macmillan. Capitalism. New York: W. W. Norton.
Hall, Peter A., and Michele Lamont. (2013). Henao, Luis Andres. (2013). “Chile Mapuche
“Why Social Relations Matter for Politics and Conflict Fueled By Deadly Attacks Against Indian
Successful Societies.” Annual Review of Political Activists.” Huffington Post.com (May 30, 2013).
Science 16: 49–71. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/31/
Hamilton, Alexander, James Madison, and John Jay chile-mapuche-conflict_n_3366970.html
(2007). The Federalist Papers. Minneapolis, MN: Heritage Foundation. (2013). Index of Economic
Filiquarian Publishing, LLC. Freedom 2013. http://www.heritage.org/
Handlin, Samuel. (2012). “Social Protection and the research/features/index/countries.cfm
Politicization of Class Cleavages During Latin Heritage Foundation (2014). Economic Freedom
America’s Left Turn.” Comparative Political Studies Index 2014. http://www.heritage.org/index/
46(12): 1582–1609. ranking
Handlin, Samuel. (2013). “Survey Research and Herman, Dan, and Andrew F. Cooper. (2013).
Social Class in Venezuela: Evaluating Alternative “Between Collective Action and a Fragmented
Measures and Their Impact on Assessments of Political Economy: The G20 and the Return of
Class Voting.” Latin American Politics and Society Protectionist Impulses.” Contemporary Politics
55(1): 141–167. 19(4): 399–410.
Hansen, Nina, and Tom Postmes. (2013).
Heyne, Paul, Peter Boettke, and David Prychitko.
“Broadening the Scope of Societal Change
(2013). The Economic Way of Thinking. 13th ed.
Research: Psychological, Cultural, and Political
New York: Pearson.
Impacts of Development Aid.” Journal of Social
and Political Psychology 1(1): 273–292. Hibbing, John, and Kevin Smith, eds. (2007). The
Biology of Political Behavior. The Annals of the
Happy Planet Index. (2013). http://www.
American Academy of Political and Social
happyplanetindex.org/data/
Science, 614 (1).
Harm, Marie, and Hermann Wiehle. (1942).
Hibbing, John, Kevin Smith, and John Alford.
Lebenskunde für Mittelschulen. Fünfter Teil. Klasse 5
(2013). Predisposed: Liberals, Conservatives and
für Mädchen. (Halle: Hermann Schroedel Verlag),
the Biology of Political Differences. New York:
pp. 168–173. http://www.calvin.edu/academic/
Routledge.
cas/gpa/textbk01.htm
Haynes, Jeffrey, ed. (2010). Religion and Politics in Higley, John, and Michael Burton. (2006). Elite
Europe, the Middle East and North Africa. London: Foundations of Liberal Democracy. Lanham, MD:
Routledge/ECPR Studies in European Political Rowman & Littlefield.
Science. Hill, Stephen. (2010). Europe’s Promise: Why the
Haynes, Jeffrey, ed. (2007). An Introduction to European Way Is the Best Hope for an Insecure Age.
International Relations and Religion. Essex: Pearson. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Hayoun, Massoud. (2013). “Bo Xilai Trial May Shake Hobbes, Thomas. (1651/1958). Leviathan. Oxford,
China’s Economy for Years.” AlJazeera America. England: Clarendon.
(August 26, 2013). http://america.aljazeera. Hoffman, John, and Paul Graham. (2009). An
com/articles/2013/8/26/as-bo-xilai- Introduction to Political Theory. 2nd ed. Essex,
trialendsantigraftcampaignwillrearon.html England: Pearson Educational.
Hearnshaw, F. J. C. (1933). Conservatism in England. Holzgrefe, J. L., and Robert Keohane, eds. (2003).
London: Macmillan. Humanitarian Intervention: Ethical, Legal, and
Heilbroner, Robert. (1993). “The Multinational Political Dilemmas. New York: Cambridge
Corporation and the Nation-State.” In At Issue: University Press.
478 References

Hoover, Kenneth, James Marcia, and Kristen Parris. Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. (2010).
(1997). The Power of Identity: Politics in a New Key. “Changing Mass Priorities: The Link Between
Chatham, NJ: Chatham House. Modernization and Democracy.” Perspectives on
Horowitz, Donald L. (1990). “Comparing Politics 8(2) (June 2010): 554.
Democratic Systems.” Journal of Democracy 1(4): Inkeles, Alex. (1997). National Character: A
73–79. Psycho-Social Perspective. New Brunswick, NJ:
Huber, Evelyne, and Fred Solt. (2004). “Successes Transaction.
and Failures of Neoliberalism.” Latin American Inkeles, Alex, and David Smith. (1999). Becoming
Research Review 39: 150–164. Modern: Individual Change in Six Developing
Huddy, Leonie, David O. Sears, and Jack Levy, eds. Countries. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
(2013). The Oxford Handbook of Political Psychology. Press.
New York: Oxford University Press. Innes, Abby. (2014). “The Political Economy of State
Hunter, Floyd. (1953). Community Power Structure. Capture in Central Europe.” JCMS: Journal of
Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Comparative Market Studies 52(1): 88–104.

Huntington, Samuel P. (1968). Political Order Institute for Economics and Peace. (2014). Global Peace
in Changing Societies. New Haven, CT: Yale Index 2014. http://www.visionofhumanity.org/
University Press. pdf/gpi/2014_Global_Peace_Index_Report.pdf

Huntington, Samuel P. (1991). The Third Wave: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Assistance. (2014). www.idea.int/vt
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press. International Food Policy Research Institute. (2013).
Huntington, Samuel P. (1998). Clash of Civilizations www.ifpri.org/
and the Remaking of the World Order. New York: International Social Survey Program. (2004). http://
Simon and Schuster. www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/
Huxley, Aldous. (1932). Brave New World. London: issp/modules-study-overview/citizenship/
Chatto and Windus. Isbister, John. (2006). Promises Not Kept: Poverty and
IDMC (Internal Displacement Monitoring Center). the Betrayal of Third World Development. 7th ed.
(2011). http://www.internal-displacement.org Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.

Ikeda, Maki, and Atsushi Tago. (2014). “Winning Iyengar, Shanto, and Kyu S. Hahn. (2009). “Red
over Foreign Domestic Support for Use of Media, Blue Media: Evidence of Ideological
Force: Power of Diplomatic and Operational Selectivity in Media Use.” Journal of
Multilateralism.” International Relations of the Communication 59(1): 19–39.
Asia-Pacific. DOI: 10.1093/irap/lcu003. Iyengar, Shanto. (2011). Media Politics. 2nd ed. New
Ikenberry, G. John. (2011). Liberal Leviathan: The York: Norton.
Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American Jackson, Robert. (2007). Sovereignty: The Evolution of
World Order. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University an Idea. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Press. Jenkins, Barbara. (1993). “Multinational
IMF. (2013). International Monetary Fund List of Corporations.” In The Oxford Companion to Politics
LIC DSAs. (November 13, 2013). http://www. of the World, edited by Joel Krieger, 606–608. New
imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/dsalist.pdf York: Oxford University Press.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Pippa Norris. (2003). Rising Jennings, M. Kent, Gregory Markus, and Richard
Tide: Gender Equality and Cultural Change Around Niemi. (1991). Youth-Parent Socialization Panel
the World. New York: Cambridge University Study, 1965–1982. Ann Arbor, MI: Interuniversity
Press. Consortium for Political Research.
Inglehart, Ronald, and Christian Welzel. (2005). Jennings, M. Kent, Laura Stoker, and Jake Bowers.
Modernization, Cultural Change, and Democracy: (2009). “Politics Across Generations: Family
The Human Development Sequence. New York: Transmission Reexamined.” The Journal of Politics
Cambridge University Press. 71(3): 782–799.
 References 479

Jensen, Jane. (2008). Women Political Leaders: Breaking Kennedy, Paul. (2006). The Parliament of Man: The
the Glass Ceiling. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations.
Johnson, Chalmers. (1983). Revolutionary Change. New York: Random House.
2nd ed. London: Pearson. Kenny, Sue, Ismet Fanany, and Sutria Rahayu.
Johnson, Chalmers. (1995). Japan: Who Governs?: The (2012). “Community Development in Indonesia:
Rise of the Developmental State. New York: W. W. Westernization or Doing it Their Way?”
Norton. Community Development Journal 48(2): 280–297.
Johnson, Simon. (2009). “The Quiet Coup.” The Keohane, Robert O. (2005). After Hegemony: Cooperation
Atlantic. (May 2009). http://www.theatlantic. and Discord in the World Political Economy.
com/doc/200905/imf-advice Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Johnson, Tyler, and Paul M. Kellstedt. (2013). Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye. (2000).
“Media Consumption and the Dynamics of “Globalization: What’s New. And What’s
Policy Mood.” Political Behavior 36(2): 377–399. Not. (And So What?)” Foreign Affairs (Spring):
104–119.
Johnston, Michael. (2006). Syndromes of Corruption:
Wealth, Power, and Democracy. New York: Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph Nye. (2011). Power
Cambridge University Press. and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition,
4th ed. New York: Pearson.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2003). Terror in the Mind of
God: The Global Rise of Religious Violence. Rev. ed. Khor, Martin. (2011). “Developing a Global
Berkeley: University of California Press. Partnership for Development: Critical Issues and
Proposals for Trade and Finance.” http://www.
Juergensmeyer, Mark. (2008). Global Rebellion:
twnside.org.sg/crisis_2.htm
Religious Challenges to the Secular State. Berkeley:
University of California Press. Kinder, Donald R., and David O. Sears. (1981).
Jung, Jai Kwan, and Christopher Deering. (2013). “Prejudice and Politics: Symbolic Racism versus
“Constitutional Choices: Uncertainty and Racial Threats to the Good Life.” Journal of
Institutional Design in Democratizing Nations.” Personality and Social Psychology 40(3): 414–431.
International Political Science Review doi: King, Gary, Kay Scholzman, and Norman Nie,
10.1177/0192512113503929 eds. (2009). The Future of Political Science: 100
Kahler, Miles. (2003). “The State of the State in Perspectives. New York: Routledge.
World Politics.” In Political Science: State of the King, Michael, and Donald M. Taylor. (2011).
Discipline, edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen “The Radicalization of Homegrown Jihadists:
Milner, 56–83. New York: W. W. Norton. A Review of Theoretical Models of Social
Kaplan, Robert D. (2009). “The Revenge of Psychological Evidence.” Terrorism and Political
Geography.” Foreign Policy (May/June): 96–105. Violence 23(4): 602–622.
Karatnycky, Adrian, and Peter Ackerman. (2006). Klare, Michael T. (1997). “The New Arms Race:
“How Freedom Is Won: From Civic Struggle Light Weapons and International Security.”
to Durable Democracy.” http://www.freedom- Current History 96 (April): 173–178.
house.org/template.cfm?page=137 Klare, Michael. (2002). Resource Wars: The New
Karlekar, Karin. (2009). “Freedom of the Press.” Landscape of Global Conflict. New York: Henry
http://www.freedomhouse.org Holt.
Katz, E., and Paul Lazarsfeld. (1955). Personal Klare, Michael. (2007). “Global Warming
Influence. New York: Free Press. Battlefields: How Climate Change Threatens
Security.” Current History (November): 355–361.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr. (2011). World Politics:
Trend and Transformation. 13th ed. New York: Klare, Michael. (2009). Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet:
Thompson Wadsworth. The New Geopolitics of Energy. New York: Holt.
Kegley, Charles W., Jr., and Eugene Wittkopf. (2004). Klare, Michael. (2012). The Race for What’s Left: The
World Politics: Trend and Transformation. 9th ed. Global Scramble for the World’s Last Resources. New
New York: Thomson Wadsworth. York: Metropolitan Books.
480 References

Klein, Naomi. (2008). The Shock Doctrine: The Rise Lau, Richard, and David Redlawsk. (2008). “Older
of Disaster Capitalism. New York: Metropolitan but Wiser? Effects of Age on Political Cognition.”
Books. The Journal of Politics 70 (January): 168–185.
Klingemann, Hans Dieter. (2009). The Comparative Law, David S., and Mila Versteeg. (2011). “The
Study of Electoral Systems. New York: Oxford Evolution and Ideology of Global Constitutiona-
University Press. lism.” California Law Review 99(5): 1163–1259.
Koopmans, Tim. (2003). Courts and Political Layard, Richard. (2011). Happiness: Lessons from a
Institutions: A Comparative View. Cambridge: New Science. 2nd ed. New York: Penguin.
Cambridge University Press. Lebow, Richard Ned. (2012). The Politics and Ethics
Kowitt, Beth. (2009) “For Mr. BRIC, Nations Meeting of Identity: In Search of Ourselves. New York:
a Milestone.” CNNMoney.com 6/17/2009. Cambridge University Press.
Kraul, Chris. (2011). “Are Argentina’s Good Times Leiken, Robert S. (2009). “The Menace in Europe’s
an Illusion?” Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2011: Midst.” Current History 108(717): 186–188.
B1, B5. Lenski, Gerhard. (1984). Power and Privilege: A
Kuhn, Thomas. (1996). The Structure of Scientific Theory of Social Stratification. Chapel Hill, NC:
Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: University of University of North Carolina Press.
Chicago Press. Lenz, Gabriel, and Chappell Lawson. (2011).
Kurian, George, James E. Alt, Simone Chambers, “Looking the Part: Television Leads Less
Geoffrey Garrett, Margaret Levi, and Paula D. Informed Citizens to Vote Based on Candidates’
McClain, eds. (2011). The Encyclopedia of Political Appearance.” American Journal of Political Science
Science. Washington, DC: CQ Press. 55(3): 574–589.

Kurzban, Robert, Peter DeScioli, and Daniel Fenn. Lenz, Gabriel, Chappell Lawson, Andy Baker, and
(2012). “Hamilton v. Kant: Pitting Adaptations Michael Myers. (2010). “Looking Like a Winner:
for Altruism against Adaptations for Moral Candidate Appearance and Electoral Success in
Judgment.” Evolution and Human Behavior 33(4): New Democracies.” World Politics 64: 561–593.
323–333. Lerner, Jennifer, Roxana Gonzalez, Deborah Small,
Laitin, David D. (2007). Nations, States, and Violence. and Baruch Fischoff. (2003). “Effects of Fear
New York: Oxford University Press. and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: A
National Field Experiment.” Psychological Science
Lanchester, John. (2010). I. O. U.: Why Everyone Owes 14(2): 144–150.
Everyone and No One Can Pay. New York: Simon
& Schuster. Lewis, Orion A., and Sven Steinmo. (2012). “How
Institutions Evolve: Evolutionary theory and
Laquer, Walter. (2009). The Last Days of Europe: institutional change.” Polity 44(3): 314–339.
Epitaph for an Old Continent. New York: St.
Levi, Margaret. (2002). “The State of the Study of the
Martin’s Griffin.
State.” In Political Science: State of the Discipline,
Larkey, Edward. (1990). “Rock Music and Cultural edited by Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner. New
Theory in the German Democratic Republic.” In York: W. W. Norton.
Politics in Familiar Contexts, edited by Robert L.
Levy, Francesca. (2010). “The World’s
Savage and Dan Nimmo, 215–224. Norwood, NJ:
Happiest Places.” Forbes.com. http://
Ablex.
www.forbes.com/2010/07/14/
Lasswell, Harold. (1960). Psychopathology and world-happiest-countries-lifestyle
Politics. New York: Viking.
Levy, Jonah, ed. (2006). The State after Statism.
Latinobarometro. (2013). http://www. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
latinobarometro.org
Lijphart, Arend. (1984). Democracies: Patterns of
Lau, Richard R., and David P. Redlawsk. (1997). Majoritarian and Consensual Government in
“Voting Correctly.” The American Political Science Twenty-One Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale
Review 91(3): 585–598. University Press.
 References 481

Lijphart, Arend. (2007). Thinking about Democracy: Lukes, Steven. (2005). Power: A Radical Review. 2nd
Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and ed. London: Palgrave-Macmillan.
Practice. New York: Routledge. Lundberg, Erik. (2013). “Does the Government
Lindblom, Charles E. (1977). Politics and Markets: Selection Process Promote or Hinder Pluralism?
The World’s Political-Economic Systems. New York: Exploring the Characteristics of Voluntary
Basic Books. Organizations Invited to Public Consultations.”
Lindblom, Charles E. (2003). The Market System: Journal of Civil Society 9: 58–77.
What It Is, How It Works, and What to Make of It. Lupia, Arthur, and Mathew McCubbins. (1998).
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What
They Need to Know? Cambridge: Cambridge
Linz, Juan J. (1990a). “The Perils of Presidentialism.”
University Press.
Journal of Democracy 1(1): 51–69.
Machiavelli, Niccolò. (1517/1977). The Prince.
Linz, Juan J. (1990b). “The Virtues of
Translated and edited by Robert M. Adams. New
Parliamentarism.” Journal of Democracy 1(4):
York: W. W. Norton.
84–91.
Mackinder, Halford John. (1996). Democratic Ideals
Linz, Juan J. (1993). “Authoritarianism.” In The
and Reality. Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, edited
Printing Office.
by Joel Krieger, 60–64. New York: Oxford
University Press. Mahbubani, Kishore. (2008). The New Asian
Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power.
Linz, Juan J. (1994). “Presidential or Parliamentary
New York: PublicAffairs.
Democracy: Does it Make a Difference?” In The
Failure of Presidential Democracy, edited by Juan Mainwaring, Scott, and Matthew S. Shugart, eds.
J. Linz and Arturo Valenzuela, 3–87. Baltimore: (1997). Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin
Johns Hopkins University Press. America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Linz, Juan J., and Alfred Stepan. (1996). Problems of Malcolm, Jeremy. (2013). “Internet Freedom in a
Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern World of States.” Digital News Asia 18 (February).
Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Malloch-Brown, Mark. (2002). “The Millennium
Europe. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Development Goals and Africa: A New
Press. Framework.” Address at Makerere University,
Lipset, Seymour Martin. (1959). “Some Social Uganda. November 12, 2002. http://content.
Requisites of Democracy: Economic undp.org/go/newsroom/2002/november/
Development and Political Legitimacy.” American mmb-uganda
Political Science Review 53 (March): 69–105. .en;jsessionid=axbWzt8vXD9
Little, Richard. (2007). The Balance of Power in Malloch-Brown, Mark. (2012). The Unfinished
International Relations: Metaphors, Myths, and Revolution: The Road to International Cooperation.
Models. New York: Cambridge University Press. New York: Penguin Books.
Loader, Brian D., and Dan Mercea, eds. (2012). Social Mander, Jerry. (1999). “Regarding the WTO.”
Media and Democracy: Innovations in Participatory International Forum on Globalization. http://www.
Politics. New York: Routledge. ifg.org/media.html
Locke, John. (1690/1963). Two Treatises on Mandelbaum, Michael. (2004). The Ideas That
Government. New York: New American Library. Conquered the World: Peace, Democracy, and Free
Love, Nancy S., ed. (2010). Dogmas and Dreams: A Markets in the Twenty-first Century. New York:
Reader in Modern Political Ideologies. 4th ed. New PublicAffairs.
York: Seven Bridges Press. March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. (1989).
Luke, Timothy W. (2013). “Corporate Social Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis
Responsibility: An Uneasy Merger of of Politics. New York: Free Press.
Sustainability and Development.” Sustainable March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. (2006).
Development 21: 83–91. “Elaborating the ‘New Institutionalism.’” In The
482 References

Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions, edited McFaul, Michael. (1998). “Russia’s Summer of
by R. A. W. Rhodes, Sarah Binder, and Bert Discontent.” Current History 97 (October): 307–312.
Rockman. Oxford: Oxford University Press. McFaul, Michael. (2007). “New Russia, New
Marien, Sofie, Marc Hooghe, and Ellen Quintelier. Threat.” Los Angeles Times, September 2, M8.
(2010). “Inequalities in Non-institutionalised McFaul, Michael, Kathryn Stoner-Weiss, and Valerie
Forms of Political Participation: A Multi-level Bunce. (2010). Democracy and Authoritarianism in
Analysis of 25 Countries.” Political Studies 58(1): the Postcommunist World. New York: Cambridge
187–213. University Press.
Marinov, Nikolay, and Hein Goemans. (2008).“What
McLellan, David. (1983). “Marx in England.” History
Happened to the Coup d’Etat?: International
Today 33(3). http://www.historytoday.com/
Responses to the Seizure of Executive Power.”
MainArticle.aspx?m=12568&amid=12568
Paper presented at the Midwest Political Science
Association Annual Conference, Chicago, IL, McLellan, David., ed. (2007). Marxism after Marx. 4th
April 3, 2008. ed. New York: Palgrave.
Marshall, Monty G., and Benjamin Cole. (2011). Meadowcraft, James. (2013). “Reaching the
Global Report 2011: Conflict, Governance and Limits? Developed Country Engagement with
State Fragility. http://www.systemicpeace.org/ Sustainable Development in a Challenging
GlobalReport 2011 Juncture.” Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 31: 988–1002.
Martin, Shane, Thomas Saalfeld, and Kaare Strøm,
eds. (2013). The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Mearsheimer, John J. (2001). The Tragedy of Great
Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Power Politics. New York: W. W. Norton.
Marsteintredet, Leiv, and Einar Berntzen. (2008). Mearsheimer, John J. (2011). Why Leaders Lie: The
“Reducing the Perils of Presidentialism in Latin Truth about Lying in International Politics. New
America through Presidential Interruptions.” York: Oxford University Press.
Comparative Politics 41(1): 83–101. Meckled-Garcia, Saladin. (2013). “Does the
Marx, Karl. (1867/1981). Capital: A Critique of WTO Violate Human Rights (and Do I Help
Political Economy Translated by David Fernbach. It?): Beyond the Metaphor of Culpability for
New York: Vintage. Systemic Global Poverty.” Political Studies doi:
Marx, Karl, and Friedrich Engels. (1848/1978). “The 10.1111/1467–9248.12036.
Communist Manifesto.” In The Marx–Engels Meisner, Maurice. (1999). Mao’s China and After. 3rd
Reader, 2nd ed., edited by Robert Tucker, 482–500. ed. New York: Free Press.
New York: W. W. Norton. Meisner, Maurice. (2006). Mao Zedong: A Political and
Maslow, Abraham. (1954). Motivation and Personality. Intellectual Portrait. London: Polity Press.
New York: Harper and Row.
Mencken, Henry Louis. (1916). A Little Book in C
Maxfield, Sylvia. (1997). Gatekeepers of Growth: The Major. New York: John Lane Company.
International Political Economy of Central Banking
Meyer, Josh. (2007). “Small Groups Now a Large
in Developing Countries. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Threat.” Los Angeles Times, August 16, A1, A10.
University Press.
Microcredit Summit Conference. (2006). http://
McCormick, John. (2006). The European Superpower.
www.microcreditsummit.org
New York: Palgrave.
Microcredit Summit Conference. (2013).
McCormick, John, and Jonathan Olsen. (2013). The
Vulnerability: The State of Microcredit. http://www.
European Union. 5th ed. Boulder, CO: Westview
microcreditsummit.
Press.
McDuie-Ra, Duncan, and John A. Rees. (2010). Miller, Benjamin. (2007). States, Nations, and the Great
“Religious Actors, Civil Society, and the Powers: The Sources of Regional War and Peace.
Development Agenda: The Dynamics of New York: Cambridge University Press.
Inclusion and Exclusion.” Journal of International Miller, Roger LeRoy. (2014). Economics Today.
Development 22(1): 20–36. 17th ed. New York: Pearson.
 References 483

Mills, C. Wright. (1956/2000). The Power Elite. New NCTC (National Counterterrorism Center). (2011). A
York: Oxford University Press. Chronology of Significant International Terrorism for
Moisi, Dominique. (2009). The Geopolitics of Emotion: 2009. http://www.NCTC.gov
How Fear, Humiliation, and Hope are Reshaping the Niemi, Richard G., and Mary A. Hepburn. (1995).
World. New York: Random House. “The Rebirth of Political Socialization.”
Molina, Oscar, and Martin Rhodes. (2002). “Corporat- Perspectives on Political Science 24(1): 7–16.
ism: The Past, Present, and Future of a Concept.” Niemi, Richard G., Herbert Weissberg, and David
Annual Review of Political Science 5: 305–331. Kimball, eds. (2011). Controversies in Voting
Monroe, Kristen. (2011). Ethics in an Age of Terror and Behavior. 5th ed. Washington, DC: CQ Press.
Genocide: Identity and Moral Choice. Princeton, NJ: Nimmo, Dan, and James E. Combs. (1990). Mediated
Princeton University Press. Political Realities. 2nd ed. White Plains, NY:
Montgomery, Evan Braden. (2013). “Competitive Pearson.
Strategies against Continental Powers: Norpoth, Helmut. (1987). “Guns and Butter and
The Geopolitics of Sino-Indian-American Government Popularity in Britain.” American
Relations.” Journal of Strategic Studies doi: Political Science Review 81(3): 949–959.
10.1080/01402390.2012736383 Norris, Pippa. (2003). Institutions Matter. London:
Moore, Barrington. (1966). The Social Origins of Cambridge University Press.
Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge, MA: Norris, Pippa. (2004). Electoral Engineering:
Harvard University Press. Voting Rules and Political Behavior. Cambridge:
Morales, Evo. (2006). Quoted in La Prensa Cambridge University Press.
(September 10, 2006). http://en.wikipedia.org/ Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. (2012). Sacred
wiki/Domestic_policy_of_Evo_Morales and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. 2nd ed.
Moravcsik, Andrew. (2012). “Europe After the New York: Cambridge University Press.
Crisis: How to Sustain a Common Currency.” Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. (2009).
Foreign Affairs 91(3): 54–68. Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity
Morgenthau, Hans J. (2005). Politics among Nations. in a Globalized World. New York: Cambridge
7th brief ed. Revised by Kenneth W. Thompson University Press.
with David Clinton. New York: McGraw Hill. Nugent, Neill. (2008). The Government and Politics of
Mosca, Gaetano. (1896/2011). The Ruling Class. the European Union. 6th ed. Durham, NC: Duke
Translated by Hannah Kahn. Charleston, SC: University Press.
Nabu Press. Nye, Joseph S. (2009). Soft Power: The Means to Success
Mossberger, Karen, Caroline Tolbert, and Ramona in World Politics. Washington, DC: Public Affairs.
McNeal. (2008). Digital Citizenship: The Internet, Nye, Joseph S. (2011). The Future of Power. New York:
Society, and Participation. Cambridge, MA: MIT PublicAffairs.
Press.
O’Connor, Karen, and Larry Sabato. (2007). The
Moyo, Dambisa. (2012). Winner Take All: China’s Race Essentials of American Government. 8th ed. New
for Resources and What It Means for the World. New York: Pearson.
York: Basic Books.
OECD. (2011). Organization of Economic
Mueller, Dennis. (2003). Public Choice III. New York: Cooperation and Development. Main Economic
Cambridge University Press. Indicators. http://www.oecdilibrary.org/
Murphy, Dean. (1995). “East Europe P.D. Blues.” Los economics/main-economic-indicators_22195009
Angeles Times, February 28, H1, H4. O’Farcheallaigh, Ciaran. (2013). “IR Theory and
Murray, Charles. (1984). Losing Ground: American Domestic Adoption of International Norms.”
Social Policy, 1950–1980. New York: Basic Books. International Politics doi: 10.1057/ip.2013.23
Nadiri, Khalid. (2007). “Of Note: China’s Peasant O’Neill, Jim. (2001). Building Better Global Economic
Populism: A Look Inland.” SAIS Review 27(1) BRICs. Global Economics Paper No. 66. New
(Winter–Spring): 125–126. York: Goldman Sachs & Co.
484 References

Organski, A. F. K. (1968). World Politics. New York: Pharr, Susan J., and Robert D. Putnam, eds. (2000).
Alfred Knopf. Disaffected Democracies: What’s Troubling the
Orwell, George. (1945/1964). Animal Farm. Trilateral Countries? Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Middlesex, England: Penguin. University Press.

Orwell, George. (1949/1967). 1984. Middlesex, Phillips, Kevin. (2003). Wealth and Democracy: A
England: Penguin. Political History of the American Rich. New York:
Broadway Books.
Ozzano, Luca. (2013). “The Many Faces of the
Political God: A Typology of Religiously-oriented Pickering, Jeffrey, and Mark Peceny. (2006).
Parties.” Democratization 20(5): 807–830. “Forging Democracy at Gunpoint.” International
Studies Quarterly 50(3): 539–60.
Packenham, Robert. (1998). The Dependency Movement:
Scholarship and Politics in Development Studies. Pinker, Steven. (2011). The Better Angels of Our
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York:
Viking.
Panitch, Leo. (2009). Renewing Socialism: Democracy,
Strategy, and Imagination. London: Merlin Press. Plant, E. Ashby, and Patricia Devine. (2003). “The
Antecedents and Implications of Interracial
Papacharissi, Z. (2010). A Private Sphere: Democracy Anxiety.” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin
in a Digital Age. Cambridge: Polity Press. 29(6): 790–801.
Parenti, Michael. (2010). Democracy for the Few. 9th Plasser, Gunda. (2002). Global Political Campaigning.
ed. New York: Wadsworth. Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing.
Parker, Richard D. (2005). “Five Theses on Identity Popper, Karl. (1963). The Open Society and Its
Politics.” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy Enemies. Vol. 2. New York: Harper and Row.
29(1) (Fall): 53–59.
Population Reference Bureau. (2013). 2013 World
Pattison, James. (2012). Humanitarian Intervention Population Data Sheet. Washington, DC: PRB.
and the Responsibility to Protect: Who Should
Intervene? New York: Oxford University Press. Posen, Barry. (2003). “Command of the Commons:
The Military Foundation of U.S. Hegemony.”
PERC [Political and Economic Risk Consulting]. International Security 28 (Summer 2003): 5–46.
(2011). http://www.asiarisk.com/
Post, Jerrold. (2004). Leaders and their Followers in
Peterson, Scott. (2001). “Jaded Hope: Russia 10 Years a Dangerous World: The Psychology of Political
Later.” Christian Science Monitor, August 17, 1, 7–8. Behavior. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
Petrik, Will. (2009). “International Monetary Fund Post, Jerrold. (2008). The Mind of the Terrorist: The
and the Inter-American Development Bank: Psychology of Terrorism from the IRA to al-Qaeda.
A History of Limited Choices and Broken London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Promises.” Council on Hemispheric Affairs.
http://www.coha.org/2009/04/international- Poulantzas, Nicos. (1973). Political Power and Social
monetary-fund-and-the-inter-american-devel- Classes. London: Sheed and Ward.
opment-bank-a-history-of- limited-choices-and- Powell, G. Bingham, Kaare Strom, and Russell
broken-promises/ Dalton, eds. (2012). Comparative Politics Today: A
Pew. (2011). Pew Internet and American Life Project. Theoretical Framework. 6th ed. New York: Pearson.
http://www.pewinternet.org/ Pratto, Felicia, et al. (1994). “Social Dominance
Pew Foundation. (2009). Global Restrictions Orientation: A Personality Variable Predicting
on Religion. http://www.pewforum.org/ Social and Political Attitudes.” Journal of
files/2009/12/restrictions-fullreport.pdf Personality and Social Psychology 67(4): 741–763.

Pew Research Center. (2010). “Public Knows Basic Prior, Markus. (2010). “You’ve Either Got It Or You
Facts about Politics, Economics, but Struggles Don’t? The Stability of Political Interest over the
with Specifics.” http://www.pewresearch. Life Cycle.” The Journal of Politics 72(3): 747–766.
org/2010/11/18/public-knows-basic-facts-about- Prunier, Gerard. (2008). Africa’s World War:
politics-economics-but-struggles-with-specifics Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making
 References 485

of a Continental Disaster. New York: Oxford Rasler, Karen, and William R. Thompson. (2005).
University Press. Puzzles of the Democratic Peace: Theory, Geopolitics,
Przeworski, Adam. (1985). Capitalism and Social and the Transformation of World Politics. New York:
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Palgrave Macmillan.
Press. Redefining Progress. (2007). “Genuine Progress
Przeworski, Adam. (1993). “Socialism and Social Indicator.” www.rprogress.org.
Democracy.” In The Oxford Companion to Politics Reppy, Susan. (1984). “The Automobile Air Bag.” In
of the World, edited by Joel Krieger, 832–838. New Controversy, 2nd ed., edited by Dorothy Nelkin,
York: Oxford University Press. 161–174. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Przeworski, Adam. (2004). “Democracy and Reynolds, Andrew, Ben Reilly, and Andrew
Economic Development.” In The Evolution Ellis. (2005). Electoral System Design: The New
of Political Knowledge, edited by Edward D. International IDEA Handbook. http://www.idea.
Mansfield and Richard Sisson. Columbus: Ohio int/publications/esd/
State University Press. Rhoden, T. F. (2013). “The Liberal in Liberal
Przeworski, Adam. (2010). Democracy and the Democracy.” Democratization doi:
Limits of Self-Government. New York: Cambridge 10.1080/13510347.2013.851672
University Press. Richards, Andrew. (2007). “Economic Challenges
Przeworski, Adam, Michael Alvarez, Jose Antonio for New Democracies.” In The Construction of
Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. (2000). Democracy: Lessons from Practice and Research,
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions edited by Jorge Dominguez and Anthony Jones,
and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. New York: 45–76. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Cambridge University Press. Press.
Puddington, Arch. (2011). “Democracy under Riek, Blake M., Eric W. Mania, and Samuel L.
Duress.” Journal of Democracy 22(2): 17–31. Gaertner. (2006). “Intergroup Threat and Outgroup
Putnam, Robert. (1993). Making Democracy Work: Attitudes: A Meta-Analytic Review.” Personality
Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton, NJ: and Social Psychology Review 10(4): 336–353.
Princeton University Press. Riker, William. (1962). The Theory of Political
Putnam, Robert. (2001). Bowling Alone: The Collapse Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
and Revival of American Community. New York: Riker, William. (1982). “The Two Party System
Simon & Schuster. and Duverger’s Law.” American Political Science
Putnam, Robert D., and David E. Campbell. (2012). Review 76(4): 753–766.
American Grace: How Religion Divides and Unites Riker, William, and Peter Ordeshook. (1973). An
Us. New York: Simon & Schuster. Introduction to Positive Political Theory. Englewood
Putnam, Robert, and Marc Plattner, eds. (2009). Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Democracy: A Reader. Baltimore: John Hopkins Ritholtz, Barry. (2009). Bailout Nation: How Greed and
University Press. Easy Money Corrupted Wall Street and Shook the
Pye, Lucian W. (1962). Politics, Personality, and Nation- World Economy. New York: Wiley.
Building. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Ritter, Daniel, and Alex Trechsel. (2011).
Quaranta, Mario. (2013). “The Impact of “Revolutionary Cells: On the Role of Texts,
Institutional Decentralization on Protest in Tweets, and Status Updates in Nonviolent
Western Europe.” International Political Science Revolutions.” Paper presented at the Conference
Review 34(50): 502–518. on the Internet, Voting, and Democracy. Laguna
Beach, CA. May 15, 2011.
Rae, Douglas. (1972). The Political Consequences of
Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale University Robinson, Matthew (2009). Justice Blind? Ideals and
Press. Realities of American Criminal Justice. 3rd ed. Upper
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Rajan, Raghuram. (2010). Fault Lines: How Hidden
Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy. Robinson, Simon. (2003). “Iraqi Textbooks: X-ing
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. Out Saddam.” Time, July 21: 18.
486 References

Robinson, William I. (1998). Promoting Polyarchy: Ryan, Alan. (2012). On Politics: A History of Political
Globalization, U.S. Intervention, and Hegemony. Thought: From Herodotus to the Present. New York:
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Liveright.
Rodrik, Dani, ed. (2003). In Search of Prosperity: Safran, William. (2008). The French Polity. 7th ed.
Analytic Narratives on Economic Growth. Princeton, London: Pearson.
NJ: Princeton University Press. Sageman, Marc. (2008). Leaderless Jihad: Terror
Rodrik, Dani, ed. (2011). The Globalization Paradox: Networks in the Twenty-First Century.
Democracy and the Future of the World Economy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
New York: W. W. Norton. Sahoo, Sarbeswar. (2013). “Rethinking Secularism.”
Rolfe, Meredith. (2012). Voter Turnout: A Social Contemproary South Asia 21(3): 348–349.
Theory of Political Participation. Cambridge: Said, Edward. (2001). “The Clash of Ignorance.”
Cambridge University Press. Nation (October). http://www.thenation.com/
Roodman, David. (2012). “Think Again: doc/20011022/said
Microfinance.” Foreign Policy. foreignpolicy.com/ Salisbury, Robert H. (1990). “The Paradox of Interest
articles/2012/02/01/think_again_microfinance Groups in Washington, DC: More Groups and
Rosenberg, Shawn. (1988). Reason, Ideology, and Less Clout.” In The New American Political System,
Politics. Cambridge: Polity. rev. ed., edited by Anthony King. Washington,
Rosenberg, Shawn. (2002). The Not So Common Sense: DC: American Enterprise Institute.
Differences in How People Judge Social and Political Salisbury, Robert H., John P. Heinz, Robert L.
Life. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Nelson, and Edward O. Laumann. (1991).
Rostow, W. W. (1960). The Stages of Economic “Triangles, Networks, and Hollow Cores: The
Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: Complex Geometry of Washington Interest
Cambridge University Press. Representation.” In The Politics of Interests, edited
by Mark P. Petracca, 130–149. Boulder, CO:
Rotberg, Robert I., ed. (2003). When States Fail: Westview.
Causes and Consequences. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press. Samuels, David J., and Matthew S. Shugart. (2013).
“Party ‘Capacity’ in New Democracies: How
Roubini, Nouriel, and Stephen Mihm. (2011). Executive Format Affects the Recruitment of
Crisis Economics: A Crash Course in the Future of Presidents and Prime Ministers.” Democratization
Economics. New York: Penguin. doi: 10.1080/13510347.2012.757695
Rubenfeld, Samuel. (2011). “Egypt Requests Sassen, Saskia. (1996). Losing Control? Sovereignty
Freeze on Mubarak’s Assets.” Wall Street Journal in the Age of Globalization. New York: Columbia
(February 22, 2011). University Press.
Rummel, R. J. (2014). Death by Government. http:// Sassen, Saskia. (2008). Territory, Authority, Rights:
www.hawaii.edu/powerkills/20TH.HTM From Medieval to Global Assemblages. 2nd ed.
Russett, Bruce. (2010). “Peace in the Twenty-First Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Century.” Current History 109 (January 2010): Schain, Martin, Aristide Zolberg, and Patrick
11–16. Hossay, eds. (2002). Shadows Over Europe: The
Russett, Bruce, John R. Oneal, and Michaelene Cox. Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in
(2000). “Clash of Civilizations, or Realism and Europe. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Liberalism Déjá Vu?: Some Evidence.” Journal of Shambaugh, David. (2013). China Goes Global: The
Peace Research,37: 583–608. Partial Power. New York: Oxford University
Russett, Bruce, Harvey Starr, and David Kinsella. Press.
(2009). World Politics: The Menu for Choice. 9th ed. Schedler, Andreas, ed. (2006). Electoral
New York: Thomson Wadsworth. Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree
Rustow, Dankwart. (1967). A World of Nations: Competition. Boulder, CO: Lynne Reinner.
Problems of Political Modernization. Washington, Schedler, Andreas, ed. (2013). The Politics of
DC: Brookings Institution. Uncertainty: Sustaining and Subverting Electoral
 References 487

Authoritarianism. New York: Oxford University Sesser, Stan. (1992). “A Nation of Contradictions.”
Press. New Yorker, January 13, 37–68.
Schelling, Thomas. (1960). The Strategy of Conflict. Sharp, Gene. (2010). From Dictatorship to Democracy:
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. A Conceptual Framework for Liberation. 4th U.S. ed.
Scherer, Andreas Georg, Guido Palazzo, and David http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations/org/
Seidl. (2013). “Managing Legitimacy in Complex FDTD.pdf
and Heterogeneous Environments: Sustainable Shaw, George Bernard. (1903/2001). “Maxims for
Development in a Globalized World.” Journal of Revolutionists.” In Man and Superman. New York:
Management Studies 50(2): 259–284. Penguin Classics.
Schick, Allen. (2012). “Can National Legislatures Shepsle, Kenneth A. (2010). Analyzing Politics:
Regain an Effective Voice in Budget Policy?” Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions. 2nd ed. New
OECD Journal on Budgeting 1(3): 15–42. York: W. W. Norton.
Schleiter, Petra, and Edward Morgan-Jones. (2009). Shirky, C. (2011). “The Political Power of Social
“Constitutional Power and Competing Risks: Media.” Foreign Affairs (January/February).
Monarchs, Presidents, Prime Ministers, and http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67038/
the Termination of East and West European clay-shirky/the-political-power-of-social-media
Cabinets.” American Political Science Review 103(3) Shkolnikov, Vladimir. (2009). “Nations in Transit:
(August): 496–512. Democracy’s Dark Year.” In Nations in Transit,
Schlozman, Kay, Sidney Verba, and Henry 13th ed, 1–9. New York: Freedom House.
Brady. (2013). The Unheavenly Chorus: Unequal Shniderman, Adam, and Charles A. Smith. (2015).
Political Voice and the Broken Promise of American “Towards Justice: Neuroscience and Affirmative
Democracy. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Defenses at the ICC.” Studies in Law Politics and
Press. Society 66, pp.tbd.
Schmalleger, Frank J. (2011). Criminal Justice: A Shugart, Matthew, and John M. Carey. (1992).
Brief Introduction. 9th ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design
Prentice Hall. and Electoral Dynamics. New York: Cambridge
Schmidt, Eric, and Jared Cohen. (2010). “The Digital University Press.
Disruption: Connectivity and the Diffusion Siegal, David A. (2011). “When Does Repression
of Power.” Foreign Affairs 89 (November/ Work? Collective Action in Social Networks.”
December): 75–85. Journal of Politics 73(1): 232–247.
Schmitter, Phillippe C. (1989). “Corporatism is Silone, Ignazio. (1937). Bread and Wine. Translated by
Dead! Long Live Corporatism!” Government and Gwenda David. New York: Harper and Row.
Opposition 24(1) (January): 54–73.
Simone, Vera. (2001). The Asian Pacific: Political and
Schmitter, Phillippe C. (1993). “Corporatism.” In The Economic Development in a Global Context. 2nd ed.
Oxford Companion to Politics of the World, edited New York: Pearson.
by Joel Krieger, 195–198. New York: Oxford
University Press. Singh, Inderjit. “China and India: Comparative
Transition to Modernization.” Paper presented at
Schneider, Carsten. (2011). The Consolidation of the annual meeting of the International Studies
Democracy: Comparing Europe and Latin America. Association, Hilton Hawaiian Village, Honolulu,
London: Routledge. Hawaii, March 5, 2005, http://www.allacademic.
Schultz, William Todd, ed. (2005). Handbook of com/meta/p71394_index.html
Psychobiography. New York: Oxford University SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research
Press. Institute). (2013). The SIPRI Yearbook. http://
Schumpeter, Joseph. (1950). Capitalism, Socialism, and www.sipri.org
Democracy. 3rd ed. New York: Harper and Row. Sivard, Ruth Leger. (1996). World Military and Social
Sen, Amartya. (2006). Identity and Violence: The Expenditures 1996. Washington, DC: World
Illusion of Destiny. New York: W. W. Norton. Priorities.
488 References

Skinner, B. F. (1948). Walden Two. New York: Commitment to Civil Liberties.” British Journal of
Macmillan. Political Science 21 (August): 349–370.
Skocpol, Theda. (1979). States and Social Revolutions: Sniderman, Paul M., Louk Hagendoorn, and
A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and Markus Prior. (2004), “Predisposing Factors and
China. New York: Cambridge University Press. Situational Triggers: Exclusionary Reactions to
Smelser, Neil. (2007). The Faces of Terrorism: Social Immigrant Minorities.” American Political Science
and Psychological Dimensions. Princeton, NJ: Review 98(1): 35–49.
Princeton University Press. Sniderman, Paul M., and Louk Hagendoorn. (2009).
Smick, David. (2008). The World Is Curved: Hidden When Ways of Life Collide: Multiculturalism and
Dangers to the World Economy. New York: Penguin. Its Discontents in the Netherlands. Princeton, NJ:
Princeton University Press.
Smith, Adam. (1776/2009). An Inquiry into the Nature
and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. http://www. Sniderman, Paul, and Edward H. Stiglitz. (2012).
adamsmith.org/smith/won-intro.htm The Reputational Premium: A Theory of Party
Identification and Policy Reasoning. Princeton, NJ:
Smith, Anthony D. (2010). Nationalism. New York: Princeton University Press.
Polity Press.
Social Progress Imperative. (2014). Social Progress
Smith, Charles A. (2012). The Rise and Fall of War Index 2014. http://www.socialprogressimpera-
Crimes Trials: from Charles I to Bush the II. New tive.org/data/spi
York: Cambridge University Press
Sophocles. (1967). Antigone. Translated by E. F.
Smith, Charles A., and Antonio Gonzalez. (2013) Watling. Middlesex, England: Penguin.
“The Role of the International Court in
Globalizing Human Rights; Peace or Justice?” In Sorensen, Georg. (2008). Democracy and
The Politics of the Globalization of Law, Getting from Democratization: Processes and Prospects in a
Rights to Justice, edited by Alison Brysk, 47–62. Changing World. 3rd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview.
New York: Routledge. Spagnoli, Filip. (2003). Homo-Democraticus: On the
Smith, Charles A., and Brandon Miller-de la Universal Desirability and the Not So Universal
Cuesta. (2011). “The Role of Peacekeepers in the Possibility of Democracy and Human Rights.
Formation of Networks.” Human Rights Review Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars.
12(3): 287–299. Starrs, Sean. (2013). “American Economic Power
Smith, Charles A., and Heather M. Smith. Hasn’t Declined—It Globalized!: Summoning
(2011). “Human Trafficking: The Unintended the Data and Taking Globalization Seriously.”
Consequences of United Nations Intervention.” International Studies Quarterly 57: 817–830.
International Political Science Review 32(2): Staub, Ervin. (2011). Overcoming Evil: Genocide,
139–160. Violent Conflict, and Terrorism. New York: Oxford
Smith, Ian. (2013). “Election Boycotts and Hybrid University Press.
Regime Survival.” Comparative Political Studies Stein, Howard. (2006). “The World Bank and
doi: 10.1177/001040134885448 the Application of Asian Industrial Policy to
Smith, Jackie. (2007). Social Movements for Global Africa: Theoretical Considerations.” Journal of
Democracy. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University International Development 6(3): 287–305.
Press. Steans, Jill. (2013). Gender and International Relations.
Sniderman, Paul. (1975). Personality and Democratic 3rd ed. Malden, MA: Polity Press.
Politics. Berkeley: University of California Press. Stepan, Alfred. (2009). “Religion, Democracy, and the
Sniderman, Paul M., Richard Brody, and Phillip ‘Twin Tolerations.’” In Democracy: A Reader, edited
Tetlock. (1993). Reasoning and Choice: Explorations by Robert Putnam and Marc Plattner, 117–138.
in Political Psychology. New York: Cambridge Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
University Press. Stephan, Walter G., and Cookie W. Stephan. (1996).
Sniderman, Paul M., et al. (1991). “The Fallacy “Predicting Prejudice.” International Journal of
of Democratic Elitism: Elite Competition and Intercultural Relations 20(3–4): 409–426.
 References 489

Stevens, Charles E., and Joseph T. Cooper. (2010). Success of Democracy.” American Journal of
“A Behavioral Theory of Governments’ Ability to Political Science 57(3): 685–702.
Make Credible Commitments to Firms: The Case Szabo, Stephen. (2011). “Welcome to the Post-Western
of the East Asian Paradox.” Asia Pacific Journal of World.” Current History 110 (January 2011): 9–13.
Management 27: 587–610.
Taagepera, Rein, and Matthew S. Shugart. (1989).
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2006). Making Globalization Work. Seats and Votes. New Haven, CT: Yale University
New York: W. W. Norton. Press.
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2003) Globalization and Its Taras, Raymond, and Rajat Ganguly. (2010).
Discontents. New York: W. W. Norton. Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International
Stiglitz, Joseph. (2010). Free Fall: America, Free Dimension. 4th ed. New York: Pearson.
Markets, and the Sinking of the World Economy.
Tawney, R. H. (1938). Religion and the Rise of
New York: W. W. Norton.
Capitalism: A Historical Study. Middlesex,
Stoessinger, John G. (2010). Why Nations Go to War. England: Penguin.
11th ed. Boston: Wadsworth.
Tesler, Michael, and David O. Sears (2010). Obama’s
Stojanovic, Nenad. (2010). “Mononational and Race: the 2008 Election and the Dream of a Post-Racial
Multinational States: A Valid Dichotomy?” Paper America. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
presented at the European University Institute
Thompson, Leonard. (1966). Politics in the Republic of
(May 21, 2010). http://www.eui.eu/documents/
South Africa. Boston: Little, Brown.
mwp/conferences/neilmaccormick/
paperstojanovic.pdf Thompson, Mark R. (2003). Democratic Revolutions:
Asia and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge.
Stone, Clarence. (1989). Regime Politics. Lawrence,
KS: University Press of Kansas. Thoreau, Henry David. (1849/1981). Walden and
Other Writings. Edited by J. W. Krutch. New York:
Stone, Deborah. (2011). Policy Paradox: The Art of
Bantam.
Political Decision Making. 3rd ed. New York: Norton.
Thurow, Lester C. (1997). The Future of Capitalism.
Stone Sweet, Alec. (2004). The Judicial Construction of
New York: Penguin.
Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Tickner, J. Ann. (2001). Gendering World Politics. New
Strøm, Kaare. (2004). “Parliamentary Democracy
York: Columbia University Press.
and Delegation.” In Kaare Strøm, Wolfgang C.
Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman (eds.), Delegation Tilly, Charles. (2007). Democracy. New York:
and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge University Press.
Oxford: Oxford University Press: 55–106. Tocqueville, Alexis de. (1835/1945). Democracy in
Strauss, Leo. (1959). What Is Political Philosophy? America. New York: Knopf.
New York: Free Press. Torcal, Mariano, and Jose Ramon Montero. (2006).
Stone, Clarence. (1989). Regime Politics. University of Political Disaffection in Contemporary Democracies:
Kansas Press. Social Capital, Institutions, and Politics. London:
Routledge.
Sullivan, Brandon, Mark Snyder and John L.
Sullivan, eds. (2007). Cooperation: The Political Transparency International. (2013). http://www.
Psychology of Effective Human Interaction. New transparency.org
York: Wiley-Blackwell. Triesman, Daniel. (2004). “Stabilization Tactics in
Sunstein, Cass. (2001). Designing Democracy: What Latin America: Menem, Cardosa, and the Politics
Constitutions Do. New York: Oxford University of Low Inflation.” Comparative Politics 36 (July):
Press. 399–419.
Sunstein, Cass. (2009). On Rumors: How Falsehoods True, Jacqui, and Brooke Ackerly. (2010). Doing
Spread, Why We Believe Them, What Can be Done. Feminist Research in Political and Social Sciences.
New York: Farrar, Straus & Giroux. New York: Palgrave.
Svolik, Milan W. (2013). “Learning to Love Truman, David. (1951). The Governmental Process.
Democracy: Electoral Accountability and the New York: Knopf.
490 References

Tsebelis, George. (2002). Veto Players: How Political UNMDG. (2013). United Nations Millennium
Institutions Work. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Development Goals. http://www.un.org/
University Press. millenniumgoals/13_MDG%20Report_EN.pdf
Turner, Thomas. (2011). “Kabila’s Congo: Hardly United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. (2013).
‘Post-Conflict’.” Current History 110 (May 2011): http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/home.
196–201. shtml
Union of International Associations. (2011). http:// UNMDG. (2011). United Nations Millenium Goals.
www.uia.be/ http://www.un.org/milleniumgoals/
UNCTAD. (2011). Commodities at a Glance. http:// UNWFP. (2013). United Nations World Food
www.unctad.org/en/docs/1suc20112_en.pdf Programme. http://www.wfp.org
UNCTAD. (2013). UNCTAD Statistics UNCTAD. United States State Department (2014). National
org/en/pages/statistics.aspx Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses
UNDA. (2011). The United Nations Development to Terrorism: Annex of Statistical Information.
Agenda: Development for All—Goals, Commitments, http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2012/
and Strategies Agreed at the United Nations World 210017.htm
Conferences and Summits since 1990. New York: Uppsala. (2013). Uppsala Conflict Data Program.
United Nations. http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/UCDP/
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme).
USDOJ. (2008). “Former Officer and Director
(2001). Human Development Report 2001.
of Global Engineering and Construction
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Company Pleads Guilty to Foreign Bribery
(2005). Human Development Report 2006. http:// and Kickback Charges.” September 3, 2008
www.hdr.undp.org/reports www.justice.gov/archive/opa/pr/2008/
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). September/08-crm-772.htl
(2006). Human Development Report 2006. http:// Verba, Sidney, Norman Nie, and Jae-on Kim. (1978).
www.hdr.undp.org/reports Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University
(2007). Human Development Report 2007. http:// Press.
www.hdr.undp.org/reports Verba, Sidney, Kay Schlozman, and Henry Brady.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). (1995). Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in
(2008). Human Development Report 2008. http:// American Politics. Cambridge, MA: Harvard
www.hdr.undp.org/reports University Press.
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). Vision of Humanity (2011). http://www.
(2011). Human Development Report 2010/2011. visionofhumanity.org/gpi/home.php
http://www.hdr.undp.org/reports. Victoroff, Jeff. (2005). “The Mind of the Terrorist:
UNDP (United Nations Development Programme). A Review and Critique of Psychological
(2013). Human Development Report 2013. http:// Approaches.” Journal of Conflict Resolution 49
www.hdr.undp.org/reports. (February): 3–42.
UNHCR. (2011). United Nations High Commissioner von Braun, Joachim. (2008). “Food and Financial
for Refugees. www.unhcr.org Crises: Implications for Agriculture and the
UNHCR. (2013). United Nations High Poor.” International Food Policy Research
Commissioner for Refugees. Displacement: the Institute: Food Policy Report No. 20. http://www.
21st Century Challenge. http://www.unhcr.org. ifpri.org/pubs/fpr/pr20all.asp
uk/fileadmin/user_upload/pdf/UNHCR_ von Hau, Matthias, James Scott, and David
Global_Trends_2012.pdf Hulme. (2012). “Beyond the BRICs: Alternative
UNICEF. (2011). Global Inequality: Beyond the Bottom Strategies of Influence in the Global Politics of
Billion—A Rapid Review of Income Distribution in Development.” European Journal of Development
141 Countries. New York: UNICEF. Research 24(2): 187–204.
 References 491

Waldron, Jeremy. (2006). “The Core of the Case Weber, Max. (1958a). From Max Weber: Essays in
Against Judicial Review.” Yale Law Journal Sociology. Edited by Hans H. Gerth and C. Wright
115 (2006): 1346–1406. Mills. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1974). The Modern World Weber, Max. (1958b). The Religion of India: The
System. New York: Academic Press. Sociology of Hinduism and Buddhism. Translated
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (1980). The World System II. by Hans Gerth and Don Martindale. New York:
New York: Academic Press. Free Press.

Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2004). World-Systems Weintraub, Sidney. (2009). “An Economic Storm
Analysis: An Introduction. Raleigh, NC: Duke Hits Latin America.” Current History 108: 58–64.
University Press. Weiss, Thomas, ed. (1996). NGOs, the UN, and Global
Wallerstein, Immanuel. (2005). “After Governance. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
Developmentalism and Globalization, What?” Weiss, Thomas. (2012). Humanitarian Intervention.
Social Forces 83(3) (March): 1263–1278. 2nd ed. New York: Polity Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, Charles Lemert, and Carlos Weiss, Thomas, and Sam Daws, eds. (2009). The
Aguirre Rojas. (2013). Uncertain Worlds: World- Oxford Handbook on the United Nations. Oxford:
Systems Analysis in Changing Times. Boulder, CO: Oxford University Press.
Paradigm Publishers.
Weitz, Eric D. (2005). A Century of Genocide: Utopias
Walt, Stephen M. (1997). “Building Up a New of Race and Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
Bogeyman.” Foreign Policy 106: 176–89. University Press.
Walt, Stephen M. (2006). Taming American Power: The Welzel, Christian. (2007). “A Human Development
Global Response to U.S. Primacy. New York: W. W. View on Value Change.” http://margaux.
Norton. grandvinum.se/SebTest/wvs/articles/
Walzer, Michael. (2006). Just and Unjust Wars. 4th ed. folder_published/article_base_83
New York: Basic Books. Wendt, Alexander. (1995). “Constructing International
Weatherby, Joseph. (2011). “The Old and the New: Politics.” International Security 20(1): 71–81.
Colonialism, Neocolonialism, and Nationalism Wendt, Alexander. (1999). Social Theory of
and the War on Terror.” In The Other World: Issues International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge
and Politics of the Developing World, 9th ed., edited University Press.
by Joseph Weatherby et al., Ch. 2. New York:
Whang, Taehee, Elena V. McLean, and Douglas W.
Pearson.
Kuberski. (2013). “Coercion, Information, and the
Weatherby, Joseph, et al. (2011). The Other World: Success of Sanction Threats.” American Journal of
Issues and Politics of the Developing World. 9th ed. Political Science 57(1): 65–81.
New York: Pearson.
White, Stephen. (2012). The Top 175 Global Economic
Webber, Douglas. (2013). “How Likely Is It that Entities 2011. dstevenwhite.com/2012/08/11
the European Union Will Disintegrate? A
Wiarda, Howard J. (1997). Corporatism and
Critical Analysis of Competing Theoretical
Comparative Politics: The Other Great “Ism.”
Perspectives.” European Journal of International
Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.
Relations doi: 10.1177/1354066112461286
Weber, Martin. (2013). “Between ‘Isses’ and Wiarda, Howard J. (2003). Political Development in
‘Oughts’: IR Constructivism, Critical Theory, Emerging Countries. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.
and the Challenge of Political Philosophy.” Wiarda, Howard J. ed., (2004). Authoritarianism
European Journal of International Relations doi: and Corporatism in Latin America—Revisited.
10.1177/1354066112466573 Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
Weber, Max. (1951). The Religion of China: Wiarda, Howard J. (2013). Culture and Foreign Policy:
Confucianism and Taoism. Edited by Hans H. The Neglected Factor in International Relations.
Gerth. New York: Free Press. Ashgate Publishing Company.
492 References

Wiarda, Howard J., and Harvey Kline. (2007). A World Bank. (2005). World Development Report
Concise Introduction to Latin American Politics 2004–2005. New York: Oxford University Press.
and Development. 2nd ed. Boulder, CO: Westview World Bank. (2011). World Development Report 2011.
Press. New York: Oxford University Press.
Wilensky, Harold. (2002). Rich Democracies. Berkeley:
World Bank. (2013). World Development Report 2013.
University of California Press.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Michelle. (2008). The Roots of Participatory
World Trade Organization. (2011). What Is the World
Democracy: Democratic Communists in South Africa
Trade Organization? http://www.wto.org.
and Kerala, India. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
World Values Survey. (2006). http://www.
Wilson, Dominic, and Roopa Purushothaman.
worldvaluessurvey.org.
(2003). Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 2050.
Global Economics Paper No.: 99. New York: Woshinsky, Oliver. (1995). Culture and Politics.
Goldman Sachs & Co. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Wilson, Edward O. (1978). On Human Nature. Wright, Erik Olin, ed. (2005). Approaches to Class
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Wilson, William Julius. (1990). The Truly Press.
Disadvantaged. Chicago: University of Chicago Wright, Erik Olin, and Joel Rogers. (2010).
Press. American Society: How It Actually Works.
Wilson, William Julius. (1997). When Work New York: W. W. Norton.
Disappears. New York: Knopf. Wrong, Dennis. (1996). Power: Its Forms, Bases, and
Winters, Jeffrey A. (1998). “Asia and the ‘Magic’ of Uses. Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.
the Marketplace.” Current History 97 (December): Yan, Zhang. (2010). “Bribery Cases on Rise in
418–425. China.” China Daily (September 8, 2010). http://
Wolf, Martin. (2004). Why Globalization Works. New www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-09/08/
Haven, CT: Yale University Press. content_11271378.htm
Wolfers, Justin, and Betsey Stevenson. (2013). Yunus, Muhammad. (2011). Building Social Business:
“Subjective Well-Being and Income: Is There Any The New Kind of Capitalism that Serves Humanity’s
Evidence of Satiation?” American Economic Review Most Pressing Needs. New York: Public Affairs
101(3) (May 2013): 598–604. Publishing.
World Economic Forum. (2013). Global Zakaria, Fareed. (2007). The Future of Freedom:
Competitiveness Report 2013–2014. http://www. Illiberal Democracy at Home and Abroad. Rev. ed.
weforum.org/issues/global-competitiveness New York: W. W. Norton.
World Wildlife Federation (2013). “Farming Zakaria, Fareed. (2009). The Post-American World.
Impacts.” http://wwf.panda.org/what_we_do/ New York: W. W. Norton & Company.
footprint/agriculture/impacts/soil_erosion/ Zaller, John R. (1992). The Nature and Origins of Mass
Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. (1999). The Opinion. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Developmental State. New York: Cornell Zukin, Cliff, et al. (2006). A New Engagement?
University Press. Political Participation, Civic Life, and the Changing
World Bank. (1996). World Development Report 1996. American Citizen. New York: Oxford University
New York: Oxford University Press. Press.
Credits
Chapter 1 Page 2: Cindy Charles/Photoedit; Chapter 9 Page 232: Roberto Candia/Candr/
10: Hulton Archive/Getty Images; 12: Pablo Martinez AP Images; 243: AP Images; 249: NOREEN AHMED-
Monsivais/AFP/Getty Images/Newscom ULLAH/KRT/Newscom
Chapter 2 Page 26: David Grossman/Alamy; Chapter 10 Page 258: feiyuezhangjie/Shutterstock
40: akg-images/Newscom; 42: Matthew Chattle/ .com; 275: Sezayi Erken/AFP/Getty Images/
Alamy Newscom; 282: Chor Sokunthea/Reuters /Landov
Chapter 3 Page 56: Altsean-Burma/AFP/Getty Chapter 11 Page 289: Sergei Chuzavkov/AP
Images/Newscom; 61: Jose Luis Magana/AP Images; 303: THONY BELIZAIRE/Getty Images;
Images; 73: Sakchai Lalit/AP Images 312: Bullit Marquez/AP Images
Chapter 4 Page 83: Viktor Drachev/AFP/Getty Chapter 12 Page 321: Ron Haviv; 329: Suzanne
Images; 100 (left): AP Images; 100 (right): Time & Plunkett/AP Images; 338: peter jordan / Alamy
Life Pictures/Getty Images; 104: Anthony Taber/The
Chapter 13 Page 356: Jon-Pierre Lasseigne/AP
Cartoon Bank
Images; 361: Ulrich Liechti-VBS/Reuters; 369: Mike
Chapter 5 Page 112: STRINGER Iraq/Reuters; 116: Luckovich/Creators Syndicate, Inc
LEGNAN KOULA/EPA/Newscom; 128: George
Chapter 14 Page 380: The Granger Collection, NYC;
Booth The New Yorker Collection/The Cartoon Bank
386: AP Photo/Sunday Alamba; 393: U.S. Agency for
Chapter 6 Page 136: Francis Miller/Time & Life International Development
Pictures/Getty Images; 140: Max Nash/Pool/AP
Chapter 15 Page 419: James Dazinger; 431: Mario
Images; 146: Denis Farrell/AP Images
Ruiz/EPA/Newscom; 437: Kyodo Extra/AP Images
Chapter 7 Page 164: Karim Kadim/AP Images;
Appendix Page 447: Tom Thaves/Universal Uclick
172: Philimon Bulawayo /Reuters /Landov; 183:
Alexander Zemlianichenko/AP Images
Chapter 8 Page 198: AFP/Stringer/Getty Images;
203: Mimi Mann/AP Images; 216: Julio Etchart/
Alamy

493
Index
A Ataturk, Mustapha Kemal, creation of, 124, 336
Accommodation, 295 111, 274–275 Democracy Index Scores, 407
“Acid test”, 7–9, 388–389, 420–421 Attitudes. See Beliefs, political economic development, 277
Adjudication, 118, 154–155, 158, 461 Aung San Suu Kyi, 56–57 female heads in government, 12
Administration, 139, 150–153, 461 Australia manufacturing sector, 394
Affective orientations, 41 Bicameral federations, 148 microcredit, 396–397
Africa, North, 384, 407–408 as developed country of Global “partly free” democracy, 406
Africa, sub–Saharan, 341, 384, 408 North, 267, 356 poverty rate, 399
Agenda, policy, 238–239 GDP per capita, 362 prosperity measures, 397
Agents of political socialization, general government expendi- Social Development Index, 266
76, 86–95 tures, 359 voting participation, 61
Agriculture, 392–394. See also HDI score, 362 Behavior, political, 25–27, 40–51,
Development as market economy, 358 55–69
Aid, foreign, 395 parliamentary government explanations of 82–106
Algeria, 169, 172, 337–338 systems, 182 Belarus, 83
anticolonial resistance, 337 Social Development Index, 266 economic growth rates, 424
dictatorship, 169 voting participation, 61 nondemocracies, 280
GDP per capita, 397 Austria political beliefs, 83
multiple political parties, 407–408 democratic-socialist regimes, 359 as postcommunist developed
voting participation, 61 GDP per capita, 266, 277 countries (PCDCs),
Alliances, 293, 307. See also Treaties general government expendi- 419, 427–428
Almond, Gabriel, 48 tures, 359 as potential proliferators, 5
Altruism, 295 Gini index, 210 state capitalism, 223, 427
Analysis, political, 14–18, 20, hybrid system, 182 voting participation, 61
447–460, 466 as neutral state, 295 Belgium
Anarchism, 39 as peaceful country, 345 colonial power, 309–311,
Anomic interest group, 73 political institutionalization, 367 372–373
Antigone, 127–128 prosperity measures, 363 cultural diversity, 371
“Arab spring,” 279, 338, 408 security challenges, 372 democratic-socialist regimes, 359
Ardrey, Robert, 341 Social Development Index, 266 Gini index, 210
Areal distribution of power, 176 Authoritarianism, 39, 173–174, 279, as most peaceful countries, 345
Argentina 425–427, 461 political institutionalization, 367
coup attempts, 407 Authoritarian regime, 279, 293, Beliefs, political, 40–43
democratization process, 434 425–427, 434 Belief system, political, 43–45, 466.
GDP per capita, 423–424 Authority, 126, 461 See also Culture, political;
Gini index, 210 as a source of political knowl- Ideology
major conflict, 341, 401 edge, 9–11, 461 Beveridge, Sir William, 37
peso crisis, 431 Autocracy, 173 Bias, 16–17
trade group, 402 Autonomy, 112, 118, 122, 402 Bicameral legislature, 148
voting participation, 61 Bin Laden, Osama, 100–101
Aristotle, x, 15, 447, 452–453 B Biopolitics, 103
Asia, 406 Balance of power, 307–308, 461 Bipolar system of states, 307–308
Assassination, 125, 327 Balkans, 320–321 Bolivia
Assembly system, 185, 188, 461 Bangladesh, 124–125, 396–397 against neoliberalism, 400, 432
Associational interest group, 72, 461 coup attempts, 334 coup attempts, 334, 408

494
 Index 495

economic systems, 226 government expenditure, 359 state-controlled agriculture,

energy resources, 395 judiciary system, 156 392–393
episodes of political decay, 407 as market economy, 359 state sovereignty, 116, 270
Gini index, 210 as most peaceful country, 345 unicameral legislature, 148
Bosnia, 321 multiparty systems, 189 women’s political rights, 10
Botswana NAFTA member, 219, 297 Churchill, Winston, 307
Democracy Index Score, 407 offshore waters, ownership Civic Culture, The, 48
Gini index, 210 issues, 114 Civil disobedience, 127–128
political rights and civil party system, 189, 191 Civil liberties, 171, 175
liberties, 279 prosperity measurement, 362 Civil society, 263
Brazil, 267, 432–433 Quebecois in, 112, 122, 371 Civil war, 336, 405, 461. See also
Bicameral federations, 148 separation issues, 355–356 Separatist violence
Gini index, 210 social development index, 266 Clash of civilizations, 47–58
global market place, 394, 437 voting participation, 61 Class, 244–245
global power status, 236 Capabilities analysis, 272, 403 Class approach, 244–246, 248–254,
order and progress, 432–434 Capital, 200–201, 394–396, 411–412 455, 462
prosperity measures, 423 Capitalism, 39, 220, 224–225, Class conflict, 246, 333
public policies, 235 269, 461 Classical liberalism, 33–35, 462. See
security goals, 439 Caribbean, 385 also Neoliberalism
Social Development Index, 266 Castaneda, Jorge, 48 Clausewitz, Karl von, 340
spread of democratization, 405 Causal analysis, 456–457, 461 Cognitive and affective
stability goals, 438 Central African Republic, 210 psychology, 102
statist systems, 222, 270 Central Asia, 384 Cognitive orientations, 40–41
system transformation, 280 Change, 259–260. See also Cold war, 301, 307, 310, 314, 373
transitional developed countries, Development; Colombia, 61, 210
Global South, 409 Modernization Colonialism, 308–311, 372–373, 462.
voting participation, 61 Charisma, 127, 283 See also Neocolonialism
Bribery. See Corruption Chile, 61, 210, 232–234 Command economy, 211–212,
BRICS, 236, 268, 280, 314, 409, 418, China, 8–9, 10–11, 88–89, 257–258, 213–216, 462
432, 436, 437, 438, 439, 461 294–295 Commodities, primary, 394
prosperity, 437–438 civil war, 257 Communication, political, 91–94,
security, 439 communism, 8, 222 118, 422
stability, 438–439 comparison with other Communism, 39, 220–223, 225,
British Medical Association, 72 BRICS, 437 416–430, 462
Bulgaria, 148 corruption, 68 Communist Party, 417–427
Bureaucracy, 151–154, 461. See also cultural values, 264 Comparative politics, 17, 111
Administration Democracy Index Scores, 407 Competition across borders,
Burke, Edmund, 143, 348 foreign trade, 259 295–296, 369
Burr, Aaron, 326–327 GDP growth rate, 399 Computers. See Information
geopolitics, 294 and communications
C Gini index, 210 technology (ICTs)
Cabinet, 179–185 global power status, 236 Concept, 15
Cambodia, 61, 210, 281–282 MNCs, 304 Confederation, 178–179, 462
Canada, 42, 189, 355–357 nondemocracy, 280 Conflict. See Violence, political
bicameral legislatures, 148 nuclear weapons, 5, 430 Confucianism, 11, 88–89
bilingualism, 371 one-party system, 191 Congo, D.R., 310–311, 341
constructivists on, 292 political socialization, 88–89 Conservatism, 31–32, 39, 462
democracy level, 277 prosperity measures, 397, 437 Constitutional regime, 167, 462
diplomatic grouping, 296 public policies, 235 Constitutions, 2, 10, 165–168, 462
federation system, 177, 367 security goal, 429, 439 Constitutive analysis, 455
Gini index, 210 Social Development Index, 266 Constructivism, 292
in Global North, 267 stability goal, 438 Converse, Philip, 43
496 Index

Cooperation across borders, Developed countries, 355–376 Education, 88–89, 459

295–305 Global North, 267 Egalitarianism. See Equality;
Core (economic actors), 271, 462 prosperity, 357–366 Inequality
Corporatism, 39, 69, 222, 462 security, 372–375 Egypt, 61, 210
Correlational analysis, 456, 462 stability, 366–372 Electoral system, 456–457, 463
Corruption, 152, 386, 388–389, 435 Developing countries, 379–412 Elite, political, 240–244, 466
Costa Rica, 61, 210 Global South, 267 Elite approach, 240–244, 252–253, 463
Council system, 183–184, 187, 463 obstacles to development, 385–389 Empirical political theory, 28
Coup, 311, 334–335, 381, 408, 463 prosperity, 390–400 Environment, 260–261
Courts. See Judiciary regional classification, 383–385 of the political system, 70, 84–85,
Crime, 326 security, 402–403 105, 126–127, 272, 279
Croatia, 321–322 stability, 403–408 preservation/degradation of,
Crony capitalism, 421, 432. See also Development, 260–271 259, 261
Capitalism economic, 261, 268–271, 272–273, Environmentalism, 39
Cuba, 61, 170, 189, 191, 293–294 356–357, 463 Equality, 30–36, 210–211, 360–361,
Culture, 95–96, 264 market–oriented. See 364, 375, 399, 428. See also
Culture, political, 45–51, Neoliberalism Inequality
95–96, 466 political. See Political Establishment violence, 324–326.
Czech Republic, 50, 210 development See also Order maintenance
social, 261, 262–263, 356–357 Ethnonationalism. See Nationalism
D stages of, 262–263 European Union, 289–290, 364, 429
Data, 448–449 Developmental state strategy, 269, Evaluative orientations, 41
Death penalty, 235 357–358 Events, as agent of political social-
Debt, 198, 395–396, 411 Dickens, Charles, 442 ization, 95
de Gaulle, Charles, 184 Dictatorship, 173–174, 463 Executive, 137–142, 463. See also
Demand Diplomacy, 296–297 Administration
economic, 202, 212–213 Dispute resolution, 159 Executive–legislative relations,
political, 129 Dominant party system, 189, 191 179–185
Democracy, 156–157, 163–164, Dual executive, 139–141, 463 Experience, as a form of
168–172, 174–175, 426–427, Duverger, Maurice, 457–458 knowledge, 12–13
453, 463 Explanation, 6
direct, 170 E Exports, 205–206, 391
electoral, 170–171 East Asia, 383 Extremist–activists, 60–61, 99.
illiberal, 171 Easton, David, 123–124, 279 See also Political activists
liberal, 171, 366–367, 465 Economic development
participatory, 170, 466 as goal of state, 120 F
representative, 170, 468 general strategies, 268 Factors of production, 200–202,
Democratic peace, 344 level of democracy, 277 212–214
Democratic revolution, 339 prerequisites to democracy, 278 Family, as agent of political
Democratic socialism, 36–37, 221, standard measures, 265 socialization, 86–89
225, 360–361, 463 Economic growth, 203, 363, 365, Fascism, 39, 463
Democratization, 119–120, 276–277, 390–392, 411–412 Federation, 177–178, 464
405–408, Economic system Feedback, 129–130
434–435, 463 abstract model, 204 Feminist theory, 39, 292
Demographic characteristics, class approach, 244 Finland, 61
96–101 competitive globalized, 364 Firm (producer), 200–205
Deng Xiaoping, 258 growth versus welfare choice, 120 First World. See Developed
Denmark, 61, 210, 225 income-expenditure model, 201 countries
Dependency approach, 270–271, political system versus, 126, 137, Fitzgerald, F. Scott, 442
308–311, 463 199–200, 204, 226, 273 “Foot soldiers,” 59
Dependent variable, 452, 463 supply and demand Foreign direct investment. See
Description, 5–6 relationship, 202 Investment
 Index 497

Foreign policy, 139, 290 Global North, 267. See also markets and resources competi-
Formal analysis, 453–454, 464. See Developed countries tion, 375
also Rational choice approach agricultural subsidies, 393–394 military leadership, 404
France, 184–185 BRICS, comparison with, 436–438 neoliberalism, 391
Gini index, 210 challenges, 375–376, 425 overpopulation, 385
government expenditure, 359 Cold War period, 373–374 political stability, 402
hybrid system, 184 colonial era, 372–373 prosperity measures, 397
interest groups, 69–70 comparison with Global South, regional classification, 383
legislative structure, 148 409–412, 418 regional instabilities, 376
nuclear weapons, 5, 374 competitive advantages, 441 security challenges, 374, 399–401
political institutionalization, 367 competitive economic social development, 381
prosperity measures, 363 system, 364 terrorism, 374
value allocation, 126 democratization, 405 Goals, 16, 19, 89
voting participation, 61 developed countries of, 211, Goals, state’s, 118–120
Freedom, 32–35, 426 266–267, 383 Goldwater, Barry, 13
Freedom, economic, 301 disputes, 370 Goods, economic, 200–205
Freedom House, 175–176, 405–406, European Union (EU), 363–364 Grameen Bank, 396–397
427–428, 435–436 foreign capital collaboration, Great Britain. See United Kingdom
Friedman, Thomas, 311 394–395 Greece
Functional analysis, 455, 464 GDP per capita, 362 economic crisis, 198–199
Fused executive, 140 Human Development Index, global recession, impact on,
362–363, 423 207, 289
G immigration, 371 international financial institu-
G8, 296 interstate conflict, 401 tion’s role, 207
G20, 296 liberal democracies, 366–367 joining EU and eurozone, 197
Gadaffi, Muammar, 115 market and resource competition, Summer Olympics (2004, as
Gandhi, Indira, 125 374–375 host), 197
Gandhi, Mohandas, 100–101 mixed economy, 357–360 survival of no-confidence vote in
Gandhi, Rajiv, 125 multiculturalism, 371 2013, 181
Gender and politics, 9–12, 447–448, neoliberalism, 269–270 unicameral legislatures, 148
449, 455, 458 order maintenance, 368–370 Green Party, 74, 75–76
Genocide, 332 polarization of politics, 371 Green revolution, 393–394
Genuine Progress Indicator, 209 political institutionalization, Gross domestic product (GDP),
Geopolitics, 218, 292–295, 387, 367–368 207–210, 259, 356–357, 358,
389, 464 prosperity distribution, 364–365 361, 397–399, 422–423
Germany, 38, 75–77, 178, 185–191 state control, 371–372 Gross national income (GNI),
bicameral legislature, 148 terrorism, impact, 374 207–208, 382
dual executive, 140 value conflicts, 370 Gross national product. See Gross
Gini index, 210 weapons, proliferation of, 374 national income
Green Party, 75–76 Global Peace Index, 345–346, 400 Grotius, Hugo, 298
hybrid system, 182 Global South, 267, 379–412. See also Groups, 66, 246–250. See also
judicial review, 156 Developing countries Interest groups
multiparty system, 189 corruption and inefficiency, 386 Guerrilla war, 338, 464
political institutionalization, 367 democracy index scores, 407
prosperity measures, 363 developing countries, 267, H
security goal, 372 269–270, 357 Haiti, 210
voting participation, 61 developmental drivers, 409–410 Hamilton, Alexander, 157, 326–327
Ghana, 61, 210, 380–381 economic security, 401 “Happy Planet Index,” 209
Gini index of income inequality, foreign capital collaboration, 395 Head of government, 139–141
210–211 Gini index scores, 399 Head of state, 139–141
Globalization, 311–316, 364, globalization effect, 411–412 Hegemony, 307–308, 464
411–412, 443, 464 internal disorder, 387 Heraclitus, 260
498 Index

Hinduism, 124–125 Indigenous peoples, 121 general government

Hitler, Adolf, 38–39 Indonesia, 61, 210 expenditure, 358
Hobbes, Thomas, 29, 31, 323 Industrialization, 259 geopolitics, 293–294
Household, 200–201 Inequality, 30–36, 210–211, 215, 428, Gini index, 210
Human Development Index (HDI), 432. See also Equality interest group, 69, 71
362–363, 397–398, 431 Inflation, 215–216 political institutionalization, 367
Human nature, 30–35, 346 Influence, 3–4, 119 prosperity measures, 362
Human values, dimensions, 50 Information and communications security goal, 429
Humanitarian intervention, 116–117 technology (ICTs), 92–93 voting participation, 61
Hun Sen, 281–282 Information, political, 85 J–curve theory of violence, 339
Hungary, 61, 210, 416–417 Inglehart, Ron, 47–51 Judaism, 342–343
Huntington, Samuel, 46–48, 276, 283 Inkeles, Alex, 263 Judicial review, 156–158, 465
Hussein, Saddam, 163–164 Instability. See Stability Judiciary, 154–158, 465
Hybrid executive–legislative sys- Institutional interest group, 72 Junta, 185
tems, 182–188, 426, 464 Interest group, 66–74, 207, 464
Intergovernmental organization K
I (IGO), 304, 464 Kabila, Joseph, 310
Ideological parties, 74 Intergroup relations, 102–103 Kenya, 210
Ideal types, 73–74, 211–216, 464 International Court of Justice Keohane, Robert, 311
Identity politics, 121 (World Court), 299–300 Khmer Rouge, 281–282
Ideology, political, 30–31, 467 International Criminal Court, 299 Knowledge, political, 4–14, 20–22
Immigration, 371 International law. See Law, Koran, 10–12, 38–39, 155, 164, 263.
Imperialism. See Colonialism international See also Islam
Implementation, 239 International Monetary Fund Kosovo, 321
Imports, 205–206, 391 (IMF), 401 Kuhn, Thomas, 15–16
Independent variable, 452, 464 International organization, Kurds, 111–113
India, 8–9, 100, 124–125, 384 300–305, 465. See also United Kuwait, 170
amendments in constitution, 166 Nations
bicameral federation, 148 International political economy, L
comparison with China, 8 270–271, 305–306, 312–313 Labor, 200–201
as dispute-prone country, 345 International relations, Land, 200–201
dominant-party system, 191 18, 288–316, 464 Latin America, 385, 405–406
dual executive, 140 Internet, 91–94 Law, 126, 154–155
Gandhi’s personal vision, 100 Intuition as a source of civil, 154, 159, 461
Gini index, 210 knowledge, 13 common, 158, 462
global power status, 236 Investment, 395 international, 155, 298–300, 465
group violence, 330 Invisible hand of the market, natural, 298–299, 465
hybrid system, 182 212, 215 positivist, 298–299, 467
institutionalized democracy, 384 Iran, 10–12, 61, 210, 298, 337, 400 Shari’a, 155
interstate conflicts, 400 Iraq, 61, 111, 163–165, 400 Leaders, 58, 61, 64, 68, 77, 99, 279.
judiciary system, 156 Ireland, 197–199 See also Executive
nation-based cleavages, 124–125 Islam, 39–40, 124–125, 274–275, Leadership, 128, 279
prosperity goal, 437 342–343 League of Nations, 300
prosperity measures, 397 Islamism, 38 Legislature, 142–150, 179–185, 465
public policies, 235 Israel, 61, 190, 210, 342–344 Lenin, V.I., 324
ratio of population, 149 Italy, 61 Liberalism, 34–35, 39, 291–292. See
security goal, 439 also Classical liberalism
Social Development Index, 266 J Libertarianism, 39
stability goal, 438 Japan Liberty. See Freedom
“syndrome of modernity,” 263 bicameral legislature, 148, 150 Libya, 114, 335
terrorist attacks and victims, 328 corporatism, 222 Lincoln, Abraham, 11, 168
voting participation, 61 dominant-party system, 191 Lindblom, Charles E., 199
 Index 499

Lipset, Seymour Martin, 278 Modernization, 260–261, 274–275. Norway, 210

Loans, 394–395 See also Development Nuclear weapons, 5, 308–309,
Lobbyists, 71 Moi, Daniel Arap, 402 374–375, 430, 442–443
Locke, John, 33, 331, 348 Monarchy, 453, 465
Low intensity conflicts (LICs), 340 Money and politics, 250–251 O
Mongolia, 61 Obama, Barack, 13, 96–97
M Moore, Barrington, 262–263 Oligarchy, 453, 466
Mutually Assured Destruction Morales, Evo, 226, 399 Ombudsman, 147
(MAD), 308 Morocco, 50, 61 One–party system, 189, 191
Madison, James, 136 Mosca, Gaetano, 241–242 Opportunity costs, 213
Malaysia, 61, 210, 368–369 Mswati III, King, 243–244 Opposition, institutionalized 77
Mandate, limited electoral, 171–173 Mugabe, Robert, 169, 171 Order maintenance,
Mao Zedong, 8, 11–12, 88, 257–258 Multiculturalism, 371 119, 368–370, 389
Mapuche, 230–232 Multinational corporations Orientations, political, 40–43,
Market economy, 211–216, (MNCs), 206–207, 304–305, 49–51
359–360, 465 315–316 Outcomes, 130
Marx, Karl, 29, 36, 39, 220, 244, 262 Multinational state, 122–124 Outputs, 129–130
Marxism (–Leninism), 36–37, Multiparty system, 189–190, 192 Oversight, 146–147
39, 465 Multipolar system of states, 307,
Mass public, 240–241 308, 314–315 P
Media, 91–94 Muslims. See Islam Pacifism, 39
Mexico, 46, 64–65, 189, 192, 218–219 Myanmar, 55–57, 61 Pakistan, 61, 124–125, 210
Gini index, 210 Palestine, 61, 343–344
multiparty system, 189, 192–193 N Panama, 210
political actions, 64–65 NAFTA (North American Free Paraguay, 210
political economy, 218–219 Trade Agreement), 219–220 Parliamentary government,
prosperity measures, 423 Namibia, 210 180–182, 186–188, 466
stability goal, 434 Nation, 121–123, 131, 465 Party systems, 185–191,
transitional developed country, National character, 46–47 457–458, 466
385, 430–431 National interest, 115, 291 Canada, 189
voting participation, 61 Nationalism, 39, 122, 465 Cuba, 189, 192
Microcredit, 395–396 Nation–state, 122 Mexico, 189, 192–193
Micropolitics, 27, 465 Neocolonialism, 309–311, 387, 389, Singapore 189, 193
Middle East, 384, 406–407 465. See also Colonialism Sweden, 189
Military, 139, 373 Neoliberalism, 269, 391, 465 South Africa, 189, 192
expenditure, 401 Neutrality, 295 United States, 189, 192
in interstate conflict, 342, Newly industrializing Peace, 345–346
373–374, 429–430 countries, 264 Peacekeeping operations,
in interstate relations, 306–308, NGOs (nongovernmental organiza- 301–302
315–316, 373–374 tions), 303–304, 464 People power, 60, 279, 408
in order maintenance, 280, 283, NICs. See Newly industrializing Periphery, 271
403, 434 countries Personal characteristics, 105–106
as political leadership, 275, 281, Nigeria, 61, 210, 336, 388–389 Personal thought, as a way of
282, 403, 434 Nkrumah, Kwame, 273, 380–382 knowing, 12–13
Mills, C. Wright, 241 Nonassociational interest Personality approaches, 103
Mixed economy, 216–218, group, 73 Peru, 210
357–360, 465 Nonconstitutional regime, Philippines, 61, 388–389
MNCs. See Multinational 167–168, 465 Plato, 87, 168
corporations Nondemocracy, 173–175 Pluralism, 247–251, 370,
Mobuto, Joseph Sese Seko, No–party system, 191–192 375, 466
310–311 Normative knowledge, 6, 241, 466 Plurality electoral system,
Modernity, syndrome of, 263 Normative political theory, 27–40 144–145, 192
500 Index

Poland, 64–65 Political violence 281–282, 301–302, Public policy process

consolidated democracy, 427 311, 320–350, 374, 387–388, class approach, 244–246, 252–254
Gini index, 210 400–402, 405 elite approach, 240–244, 252–254
neoliberalism, 270 types, 324 pluralist approach, 247–250,
political actions, 64–65 Politics, 3–5, 247, 467 252–254
prosperity measures, 423 Pol Pot, 281–282 Purchasing power parity (PPP),
social disorder, 428 Popper, Karl, 15 208, 209
voting participation, 61 Population, 386, 388 Putin, Vladimir, 183, 223
Polarization, 371 Portugal, 61
Policy implementation, 118 Post–cold war era, 301, 308, 373–374 R
Policy making, 118, 142, Postcommunist Developed Rational choice approach, 102,
237–254 Countries (PCDCs), 267, 454–455, 468
Political action, 55–81 417–430 Rationality, as a source of knowl-
group, 65–74 Postindustrial societies, 356. See also edge, 12
individual, 58–64 Developed countries Rawlings, Jerry, 381
less conventional, 55–57, 62–64, Postmaterialist values, 75 Reagan, Ronald, 95, 147
231–232, 334 Poverty, 364–365, 390, 399, 422 Realism, political, 467
conventional, 58 Power, 127–128, 467 Rebellion, 334
in Mexico, 64–65 coercive, 127, 307–311 Regime, international, 297–298, 464
in Poland, 64–65 exchange, 127, 296 Regulation, 359, 361, 368–370
individual context, 85 soft, 127, 306, 468 Relational analysis, 450–452,
Political activists, 59–61 Pragmatic political parties, 74 455–457, 468
Political decay, 283–284, 403, 466 Prescription. See Normative Religion, 94
Political development, 119, 271–279, knowledge Representation, 143–146
402–403, 466. See also President, 179–180, 182–185 Repression. See Order maintenance
Development Presidential government, 180–181, Republic. See Democracy,
Political economy, 357–361, 186–188, 467 representative
422–424, 466 Prime minister, 180–185 Res publica, 120
Political institutionalization, Privatization, 360, 468 Revolution, 336–339, 404, 468
272–274, 280, 367–368, 467 Process, political 272–275 Revolutionary actor, 60
Political institutions, 135–196, 361 Profit, 202, 215 Rights, political, 171–173, 177
Political leaders, 61, 279. See also Proportional representation (PR) Riots, 334
Leaders electoral system, Romania, 61
Political participation, 57–58, 144–145, 192 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 34, 158
61–65, 467 Prosperity, 118–120, 207–211, 468 Rousseff, Dilma, 431, 433–434
Political parties, 65, 74–77, in developed countries, 357–366 Rummel, R. J., 325–326
189–192, 467 in developing countries, 390–399 Russia, 183, 225–226, 419–421. See
Political psychology, 101–104 in transitional developed coun- also Soviet Union
Political resources, tries, 267–268, 422–425 central planning, 226
69, 248–251, 467 Protagoras, 19 comparison with other
Political science, ix, 14–18, 467 Protestantism, 264 BRICS, 437
Political socialization, 96–97, 105, Psychodynamics approaches, 103 as emerging market country, 296
117, 466 Public choice approach. See Gini index, 210
Political society, 323, 467 Rational choice approach prosperity measures, 423
Political stratification, 240–244 Public opinion, 42–43 public policies, 235–236
Political system, 123–130, 467 Public policy, 234–252, 468. See also security challenges, 374
conceptualization, 129 Policy making security goal, 429, 439
development model, 273 impacts, 239 social disorder, 428
economic system, abstract prescription, 234, 239 stability goal, 438
model, 204 stages, 237–239 voting participation, 61
Political theory, 18 types, 234–235 weapons-limitation pacts, 297
 Index 501

S unitary state, 177 multiparty systems, 189

St. Ambrose, 349 voting participation, 61 voting participation, 61
St. Augustine, 349 South Asia, 384, 405 Switzerland, 49, 61, 224, 360–361
Sanctions, 306 South Korea, 61, 135–136, 210, Syria, 61, 328
Schools, as agent of political social- 224–225
ization, 88–89 Sovereignty, 113–117, 465 T
Scientific method, 13–14. See also Soviet Union, 373, 420–421. See also Taiwan, 61, 294
Political science Russia Taxes, 204–206, 218, 361
Security, 118–119, 468 Spain, 61 Taxonomic analysis, 59, 452–453, 469
in developed countries, 372–375 Sri Lanka Technology, 92–94, 261, 442–443
in developing countries, Gini index, 210 Television and politics, 91–92. See
399–402 Stability, 118–119, 468 also Media
in transitional developed coun- in developed countries, 366–372 Territorial integrity, 114, 469
tries, 429–430 in developing countries, 402–405 Terrorism, 90–91, 98, 327–330,
Security dilemma, 291, 468 in transitional developed coun- 337–338, 340, 344, 374, 469
Self defense, 349 tries, 387, 425–429, 434–435 Thailand, 210
Separatist violence, 335–336 State, 30–36, 113–120, 130, 468 Theory, 15
Serbia, 320–322 as actor in political economy, Third World, 267, 411–412. See also
Sierra Leone 204–205, 211–214 Developing countries
Gini index, 210 competition between, 291, 294, Thoreau, Henry David, 128
Sihanouk, Norodom, 281–282 305–308 Tolstoy, Leo, 16
Sikhs, 125 conflict between. See War Totalitarianism, 39, 174–175, 469
Silone, Ignazio, 348 failed, 286 Totalitarian regime, 174–175, 277
Singapore, 169–171, 189, 368–369 functional view, 115, 118 Transformation, system, 280–284.
dominant party system, 189 goals of, 118–120 See also Revolution
Gini index, 210 legal definition, 113–115 Transitional developed countries,
voting participation, 61 State capitalism, 199, 220–223, 354, 416–443.
Smith, Adam, 29–31 268–270, 391, 410, 419, 421, prosperity, 422–425, 431–432
Social contract, 127, 323 422, 425, 468 security, 429–430, 435–436
Social democracy, 221, 225, 359–360, elements of, 419 stability, 425–429, 434–435
365–366, 370, 468 vs. neoliberalism, 410 Transnational actors, 307 . See also
Social Development Index, 266. See vs. statism, 221 Multinational corporations
also individual countries State of nature, 28, 33–34 Transnationalism, 300–305,
Social networks, 65, 87, 90–91, 104, States, basic goals, 119 314–316, 469
261, 468 Statism, 269, 391, 469 Treaty, 297, 469
Socialism, 35–37, 221, 225, 463, 468. definition of, 221 Truman, Harry, 135–136
See also Marxism political capitalism, 221 Turkey, 61, 210, 274–275
Social market system, 359–361, 468 vs. state capitalism, 221 Two–party system, 187–188, 192
Social movements, 73 Structural adjustment program Two–step communication flow, 90
South Africa, 144–146, 192 (SAP), 401, 432
Democracy Index Scores, 407 Structural–functional approach, U
dominant party system, 189, 115–116 Uganda, 49, 61
191–192 Structures, political. See Political Ukraine, 61
electoral systems and legislative institutions Understructure, political, 240–242
representation, 144–145 Sudan, 122 Unicameral legislature, 148–149
Gini index, 210 Supply, economic, 202, 212–214 Unipolar system of states, 308, 314
prosperity goals, 437 Supports, political, 129–130 Unitary state, 177, 179, 469
prosperity measures, 397 Survey research, 48–51 United Kingdom, 29–30, 341–342,
security goals, 439 Swaziland, 210, 243–244 367–368
Social Development Index, 266 Sweden, 189, 236, 360–361 general government
stability goals, 438 Gini index, 210 expenditures, 358
502 Index

United Kingdom (continued) proliferation of weapons, 374, 430 nation–based, 330–333, 428
Gini index, 210 prosperity measures, 362 political, 324–350, 467
legislature, 142, 149 public policies, 235 separatist, 335–336
nuclear devices, 5 role of the legislature, 142, Voltaire, 442
political institutionalization, 367 148–150 Voting, 61–62, 97–98, 447–450,
prosperity measures, 362 technological changes, 261 454–458
separatist violence, 335 terrorism, 337
unitary state, 177 two-party system, 188–189, W
voting participation, 61 192, 367 War, 340–347, 466. See also Violence,
United Nations, 116–117, voting participation, 61, 85, political
300–303, 343 447–450 Weber, Max, 115, 151–153, 264
United States, 10, 20–21, 135–136, Universal principles, defense of, 349 Welfare distribution, 119–120,
146–147, 189, 192, 281, 336, Uruguay 365–366
373, 447– 448 voting participation, 61 Welfare state, 37–38, 469. See also
authority source, 10 Utility, 203 Democratic socialism
concept of state, 114 Westernization, 261
decline of hegemon, 346 V World system of states. See
economic and social develop- Value (economic), 203, 207–208, Dependency approach
ment, 266 209–213, 217 World Trade Organization (WTO),
general government expendi- Values, 2–4, 49–51, 123, 203, 215, 370 297–298
tures, 358 Venezuela World Values Survey, 47–51
Gini index, 210 Gini index, 210
judicial structure, 155–157 Verba, Sydney, 48 Y
liberalism, 34 Vietnam Yunus, Mohammad, 396–397
NAFTA membership, 297 Gini index, 210
open democracy, 62 voting participation, 61 Z
policy making functions, 118 Violence, See also War Zaire. See Congo
political actions, 63–65 establishment, 324–326 Zimbabwe, 61, 169, 171–172, 210,
political knowledge of different interstate, 340–342, 400–401. See 283
age groups, 20–22 also War Zukin, Cliff, 20–22