Denial, Negation,

and the Forces of the Negative

SU N Y s e r ie s in H e g e l ia n S t u d ie s

William Desmond, editor

 DENIAL, NEGATION,

AND THE FORCES

OF T H E N E G A T I V E

Freud, Hegel, Lacan, Spitz, and Sophocles

W ILFR IE D V ER E E C K E

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Ver Eecke, Wilfried.
Denial, negation, and the forces of the negative : Freud, Hegel, Lacan, Spitz, and
Sophocles / Wilfried Ver Eecke.
p. cm. — (SU N Y series in Hegelian studies)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7914-6599-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) — ISBN 0-7914-6600-0 (pbk. : alk. paper)
1. Freud, Sigmund, 1856-1939. 2. Psychoanalysis. 3. Denial (Psychology) 4. N egation
(Logic) 5. Negativity (Philosophy) 6. Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, 1770-1831. I.
Title. II. Series.

BF175.V465 2005
121'.5— dc22
2004029291

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 F o r Josian e,
with whom I crossed an ocean
to start a fam ily in the prom ised land.
 Contents

A ckn o w led g m en ts ix

In t r o d u c t i o n 1

O ne The Complex Phenomenon of Denial 7

Two The Epistemological Problem of Self-description

in Freudian Psychoanalysis 25

T hree Denial and Hegel’s Philosophical Anthropology 37

Fo u r Denial and Hegel’s Theory of the Will 47

F iv e A Child’s No-Saying: A Step toward Independence 61

Six Oedipus, the King: How and How Not to Undo

a Denial 91

S even Denial, Metaphor, the Symbolic, and Freedom:

The Ontological Dimensions of Denial 101

C o n c l u s io n 123

N o tes 127

B ib l io g r a p h y 155

A u t h o r In d e x 167

S u b j e c t In d e x 173
 Acknowledgments

T his book would not have been possible without the editorial assistance of
Lynn Poss and David O ’M ara, supported by a Georgetow n University U nder­
graduate Research Opportunity grant, and Lacy Baugher and Eupil Muhn,
supported by the Departm ent o f Philosophy. I want to give special thanks to
D evra Sim iu for helping to improve the style of the whole manuscript.
Several chapters have appeared before as separate articles. A ll have been
adapted to the interdisciplinary nature of this book. Often, I have added
extensive references to the treatm ent of the problem in other disciplines, in
particular, psychoanalysis, psychology, linguistics, and philosophy. I wish to
thank the following publishers for their permission to use articles in writing
some o f the chapters o f this book.
I made use of: Ver Eecke, W. “Ontology o f D enial.” Rereading Freud: Psy­
choanalysis through Philosophy. Ed. J. M ills (Albany, NY: State U niversity of
N ew York Press, 2004). 103-25, in writing chapter 1, “T h e C om plex Phe­
nom enon o f D enial,” with the kind permission o f State U niversity o f N ew
York Press.
I made use of: Ver Eecke, W. “Epistem ological Consequences o f Freud’s
Theory o f N egation.” M an and World 14 (1981): 111-25, in writing chapter
2, “T he Epistem ological Problem of Self-description in Freudian Psycho­
analysis,” with the kind permission of Kluwer A cadem ic Publishers, copyright
owner of M an and World.
I made use of: Ver Eecke, W. “N egation and Desire in Freud and H egel.”
Owi of Minerva 15 (1983): 11-22, in writing chapter 3, “D enial and H egel’s
Philosophical Anthropology,” with the kind permission of Owl o f Minerva.
I made use of: Ver Eecke, W. “Seein g and Saying ‘N o ’ W ithin the T h e o ­
ries o f Spitz and Lacan ,” Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought 12:3
(1989): 383-431, in writing chapter 5, “A C h ild ’s N o-Saying: A Step towards
Independence,” with the kind permission o f International U niversities Press,
based upon: Copyright 1989 Psychoanalysis and Contemporary Thought, pub­
lished by International U niversities Press, Inc., M adison, CT.

ix
 Introduction

T h is is a book about denial, negation, and the forces of the negative. A denial
is a paradoxical phenom enon. In a denial, such as “this woman in my dream
is not my mother,” a truth is revealed, but the revelation is done in such a way
that the revelation is explicitly denied. A denial thus appears as a m isleading
statem ent. A s presented, it is not true, but false. N evertheless, the falsity o f a
denial does not make it worthless. A denial reveals two things to a good lis­
tener. It reveals a truth that the patient him or herself cannot yet accept. S e c ­
ondly, it reveals that the patient is caught in a conflict and thus cannot see
reality truthfully. O ne can say, therefore, that a denial is much more reveal­
ing than a sim ple affirmative statem ent. It labels the truth, while in its denial
o f what it labels, it gives a hint o f the paralysis o f the speaking subject.
Freud’s therapeutic attitude towards denials and his intellectual conclu­
sions about them give us two entirely different paths on which to evaluate the
phenom enon of denial. From a therapeutic perspective, Freud suggests steps to
help the patient overcome the lim itations resulting from his or her conflicted
situation. These steps should help the patient become a more free individual.
T he first step, the easiest, is the one which consists o f helping the patient to
intellectually accept the true revelation hidden in the denial. T he therapist
can let the patient reveal information which accumulatively provides evi­
dence for the truth of what was previously denied. T h e patient is then forced,
often reluctantly, to confess that that which was previously denied is true.
Freud points out that such an intellectual acceptance of the truth, hidden in
a denial, does not mean that the truth is emotionally accepted. Freud writes,
“T h e outcom e o f this is a kind o f intellectual acceptance o f the repressed,
while at the same time what is essential to the repression persists” (Freud,
S .E ., XIX, 236). Therefore, a second therapeutic step needs to be undertaken.
The therapist must help the patient emotionally accept the truth hidden in
the denial. To accept som ething em otionally m eans to accept the conse­
quences o f that truth and to undertake the rational actions implied by the

1
2 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

accepted truth. Overcom ing the negative forces hidden behind the formation
of a denial can thus be expected to be an arduous process.
In his theoretical reflections on denial, Freud follows a different line of
reasoning. Indeed, Freud accepts the conflicted nature o f a hum an being. He
then takes this acceptance a step further by affirming that a conflicted being
must have at its disposal m echanism s to bridge the conflict. M astering a con ­
flict requires that one first expresses the conflict. Freud points to the linguis­
tic expression of negation as such a m echanism . Indeed, Freud writes, “But
the performance o f the function o f judgm ent [acknowledging the truth] is not
m ade possible until the creation o f the symbol o f negation has endowed
thinking with a first measure o f freedom from the consequences of repression
and, with it, from the com pulsion of the pleasure principle” (Ibid. 239).
T he above-m entioned puzzling dim ensions o f a denial are presented in
detail in the first chapter o f this book. O ne im portant im plication o f the phe­
nom enon o f denial is then analyzed in chapter 2. There I argue that it is not
possible to classify all false self-descriptions as lies, because such a move
locates a denial in the moral dom ain. Classifying a statem ent as a lie supposes
that the speaker has achieved a level of agency that is simply not achieved by
som eone who utters a denial. Such a person is in conflict and is thus not m as­
ter in her own home. She is subject to negative forces that she does not con ­
trol. A denial can therefore be better classified as a sign o f deficiency in
agency. It shows an anthropological weakness and not a moral failure. T his
ends the first part o f the book, in which the text o f Freud is clarified.
In chapters 3 and 4 o f the book, I exam ine the conflicted forces that are
behind the creation o f negations and denials. I do so by employing H egel’s
philosophy. In chapter 3, I make use o f H egel’s anthropology in order to the­
orize about denial, making philosophical generalizations where Freud makes
astute observations. In H egel’s analysis o f the master-slave dialectic, Hegel
demonstrates that the relationship between the body and the mind involves
contradictory requirements which unavoidably lead to denial. I make that
argument more general by using H egel’s claim that the road to truth is not
solely a path o f doubt, but more properly a highway o f despair. T h e road
towards truth changes doubt into despair whenever doubt involves on e’s self­
conception. If doubt undermines one’s self-conception, it destroys the possi­
bility of being a desiring subject. Such a doubt makes one lose on e’s bearings
and creates despair. Denial can thus be understood as a desiring being’s
defense against despair.
In chapter 4, I start from the view that a denial is a misguided effort to
sustain life by avoiding despair. I try to clarify the misguided effort to sustain
life, present in a denial, by appealing to H egel’s analysis of the hum an will.
T h e appeal to H egel is prom ising in that H egel defines the free will as a will
that relates negatively to the object o f its own willing. T h e student, whose
summer job consists of washing dishes, rem ains free in so far as he relates neg­
 IN T R O D U C T IO N 3

atively to what he does by saying that he is earning his college tuition. Thus,
the student is able to m aintain that washing dishes is only a byproduct o f his
effort to earn his tuition. I then argue that in uttering a denial, a person tries
to exercise the negativity, required for the will to be free, by denying an epis-
tem ological connection rather than by putting distance between the ob jec­
tively given and the volition o f the will.
Hegel calls the eudemonic will the will which is able to create distance
between itself and the objectively given without denying epistem ologically
that given. It succeeds in doing so because it is able to create a norm, h appi­
ness, to which it subjects any thing that is objectively given. A ll that is objec­
tively given is epistem ologically recognized, but no given is allowed to make
a decisive influence on what the will intends to decide. T h e given that is ch o­
sen as object of the will is the given that contributes to the goal of the will,
say, happiness. T h e eudemonic will thus succeeds both in being open to the
given and keeping its distance from the given when making a decision.
W here the eudem onic will succeeds, the arbitrary will fails. It is a will
which exercises the necessary distance dem anded by a free will by not giving
enough consideration to the given. Instead, the arbitrary will is a will that
reserves for itself the right to decide without having to give a reason beyond
the claim: I so decided. For the arbitrary will, the given is disregarded as a
legitim ate input in the decision.
It looks as if som eone who utters a denial tries to create the distance to
the given, required to be a free will, by disregarding the epistem ologically
given, as does the arbitrary will, instead o f creating that distance by evalu ­
ating the given in terms of its contribution to a personal goal, as does the
eudem onic will. S uch a H egelian interpretation o f denial allows us to
understand why the therapeutic effort of patients uttering a denial consists
o f two steps. First, it must address the epistem ological error used m istakenly
to create the illusionary distance required by the logic o f the will. Secondly,
it must provide the will with the ability to accept the objectively given
while m ain tain ing the possibility o f evaluating th at given in light o f on e’s
chosen goals.
In chapters 5, 6, and 7 o f the book, I address three im plications of
Freud’s theory o f denial. In chapter 5, I exam ine Freud’s claim that the
acquisition o f the linguistic symbol o f negation is the prerequisite for free­
dom of the will. I find Spitz’s work to be a useful framework in which to
address that question. Spitz argues that hum an beings, particularly children,
do not show a linear developm ent. Rather, he argues, multiple parallel
developm ents lead to the creation o f new possibilities. A s exam ples he gives
the appearance o f the social sm ile at about two m onths, the eight-m onth
anxiety— som etim es also called separation anxiety, and the no-saying at
about fifteen m onths o f age. T h ese phenom ena are indicators of the new
psychic possibilities o f the child. Thus, the eight-m onth anxiety indicates
4 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

that the child establishes a deeper relationship with its caregivers. I argue
that the anxiety indicates that the child is dealing with the alienating
dim ensions o f having appropriated its body in the mirror stage. T h e no-say­
ing is, according to Spitz, the first unequivocal concept used by the child. I
argue that the no-saying o f the child shows an irrational dim ension in that
the child seems to refuse that which it manifestly wants. T h at irrational
dim ension becom es supremely rational if one understands that the no-say­
ing aims at cutting the em otional ties with the caregiver. I interpret the n o ­
saying of the fifteen-m onth-old infant as her effort to establish the right to
decide on her own, even if th at m eans losing what she wants. I also argue
that the use o f the linguistic symbol of negation (no-saying), by itself, affirms
the right to autonomy. It is not only an indicator o f the autonom y of the
child, it is the organizer of that autonomy. I argue that the eight-m onth an x ­
iety is only an indicator, and not an organizer, of the new psychic achieve­
ments o f the child at eight m onths. T h e new psychic achievem ent is the
establishm ent o f a deeper attachm ent to caregivers in order to overcom e the
alienating dim ension of having appropriated the body.
In chapter 6, I analyze more closely the process of undoing a denial as it
happens in Sophocles’ tragedy Oedipus, the King. Freud warned us that such
a process is difficult and arduous. Sop h ocles’ tragedy allows us to illustrate
the idea that a denial is connected with situations in which the self-image
o f a person is threatened in such a way that the possibility o f desire is
destroyed. Oedipus, the King shows how and how not to help som eone undo
a denial.
In chapter 7 , 1 analyze the autobiography of A ntony M oore in which the
author reveals the many com plex psychic acts he has undertaken to over­
com e a profound denial. Indeed, M oore, who lost his father in the Second
W orld War when he was only two m onths old, developed unconsciously a
deep identification with his dead and idealized father. A t the same time,
when asked if he missed his father, he replied, when growing up: “O ne can­
not miss what one never had.” H e com bined this primary denial with the idea
that he had learned to be his own father and thus needed no substitute father,
certainly not in the figure o f his m aternal grandfather. Finally, in his childish
grandiosity, he made him self unconsciously responsible for the death of his
father by the argument that his father died shortly after he was born. T h ere­
fore, there was no room in the world for both of them. Moore thus felt that
in fathering a son, his father wrote his own death warrant and that if he were
to father a child it would m ean his own death as well. In the autobiography
o f M oore, more than in the article by Freud, we see that a denial is, as it were,
the tip o f an iceberg, covering deep tragic experiences. In that same autobi­
ography we find a description o f all the psychic work that is required to undo,
not just intellectually but also emotionally, a denial. I will dem onstrate that
it is by m eans of appropriate help from others and by m eans of m etaphoric
 IN T R O D U C T IO N 5

work by him self that M oore was able to acknowledge that he deeply missed
his father but could also start feeling that he was not responsible for the death
of his father. Furthermore, he could start experiencing him self as the fulfill­
m ent o f the promise of life, which did not com e to fruition in his father but
which did come to fruition in the son.
 ONE

The Complex
Phenomenon of Denial

abstract: Freud drew attention to the puzzling phenom enon o f denial in many
passages of his work. He focused on some o f the contradictory aspects o f the
phenom enon in an article published in 1925. In that same article Freud theo­
rized about a num ber o f characteristics in hum an beings that one must postu­
late in order to do justice to these many puzzling and contradictory aspects of
denial. O ne o f the strongest conclusions that Freud made was the claim that
n egation is a precondition for hum an freedom. I will present Freud’s ideas, but
I will also dem onstrate that his analysis is incom plete. In particular, Freud, in
his crucial article on denial (“N egatio n ” 1925), did not analyze the arduous
work required to undo fully a denial and its consequences. In particular Freud
did not draw atten tion to the need for acts o f separation from primary care
givers and for the creation o f m etaphoric m oves in order to free oneself from
the contradictions inherent in denials.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

In this chapter I will present Freud’s analysis o f the puzzling phenom enon of
denial, which consists o f simultaneously denying and revealing the truth.
Thus, when a patient answers that the female figure in his dream is not his
mother, Freud interprets the answer as revealing that it really is his mother
(Freud, S .E ., XIX , 2 3 5 ).1 Or when a patient boasts that it is pleasant not to
have had her headaches for so long, Freud interprets this as signaling that the
attack is not far off (Ibid. 236).
I will start by delineating the problem as Freud treated it. N ext, I will
show that the phenom enon o f denial is part of a larger process. I will also

7
8 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

point out that Freud refrains from fully analyzing that whole process, leaving
a prom ising task for readers of this chapter. Third, I will describe and elabo­
rate on three m etapsychological insights of Freud, one of which, I will show,
implies that realizing the truth hidden in a denial is more than an epistemo-
logical problem: it involves hard em otional work. Fourth, I will show some
lim itations in Freud’s analysis of the phenom enon o f denial. In particular, I
will show that realizing the truth hidden in a denial requires more than epis-
tem ological work; it requires also acts o f separation from intim ate others and
the mobilization o f powerful aspects o f language. Finally, I will briefly present
and analyze an autobiography in which the author describes the undoing of a
profound denial related to the death of his father on the battlefield when the
author was a two-month old infant. T h is case will illustrate my theoretical
claim that undoing a denial requires acts o f separation and skillful usages of
m etaphors.2

1. D E M A R C A T I O N O F T H E P R O B L E M

By the exam ples he gives, Freud demarcates the problem he intends to dis­
cuss by m eans of the concept o f Vememung, translated in the the Standard
Edition of Freud’s works as “negation,” but which I prefer to translate as
“denial.”’ Freud’s dem arcation is at the same time restrictive and expansive.
Let us first look at the restrictions imposed by Freud’s exam ples on the
dom ain of the concept Vemeinung. In the first exam ple, a patient rejects an
em otion that might be imputed to her, given what she intends to say. Freud
presents the case in this way: “N ow you’ll think I m ean to say som ething
insulting, but really I’ve no such intention” (Ibid. 235). Freud continues by
presenting what he thinks goes on in the patient: “We realize that this is a
rejection, by projection, o f an idea that has just com e up” (Ibid.). Typical for
a denial is the fact that the patient labels a phenom enon— in this case an
em otion— but that the labeling is incorrectly rejected as untrue.
T he second exam ple concerns a patient who has told Freud about a
dream in which there is a female figure. Freud reports the case as follows:
‘“You ask who this person in the dream can be. It is not my mother.’” Freud
then continues: “We emend this to: ‘S o it is his m other.’ In our interpreta­
tion, we take the liberty o f disregarding the negation and o f picking out the
subject-m atter alone o f the association. It is as though the patient had said:
‘It’s true that my mother cam e into my mind as I thought of this person, but
I don’t feel inclined to let the association count’” (Ibid.). In his com m ents on
this second exam ple Freud is very explicit about the two dim ensions he seems
to consider constitutive o f the phenom enon o f denial. O n the one hand,
there is an activity of labeling. Freud describes it as an act o f associating a
known figure (m other) with the unknown figure in the dream. Describing
what happens in the first constitutive m om ent o f denial as an association
 TH E COM PLEX PH ENO M EN O N OF D EN IA L 9

seems to me to underplay the role o f linguistically identifying the unknown

phenom enon. In a denial, one does not so m uch associate two images— the
unknown figure in the dream and the figure o f the m other— as one labels a
previously unknown phenom enon. T he other constitutive elem ent of a
denial is the negation o f the labeling activity performed by the patient. Freud
interprets the negation in a denial to mean, in the first exam ple, a rejection
o f an idea that has com e up, and, in the second exam ple, a disinclination “to
let the association count” (Ibid.).
Freud’s third exam ple is of a neurotic who has already been informed by
Freud of the workings o f unconscious processes. Freud describes his patient as
telling him: ‘“ I’ve got a new obsessive id e a ,. . . and it occurred to me at once
that it might m ean so and so. But no; that can ’t be true, or it couldn’t have
occurred to m e.’” Freud interprets the statem ents o f his patient as follows:
“W hat he is repudiating, on grounds picked up from his treatment, is, of
course, the correct m eaning of the obsessive idea” (Ibid.). In this exam ple we
have again two m oments: 1) what Freud calls “the repudiation” and 2) the
description o f the m eaning o f a new obsessive idea.
In the third paragraph of his article, Freud starts to conceptualize what
he thinks to be the phenom enon he wants to study. H e writes: “Thus the co n ­
tent o f a repressed image or idea can make its way into consciousness, on co n ­
dition that it is negated. N egation is a way of taking cognizance o f what is
repressed” (Ibid.). Freud here introduces explicitly a third constitutive ele­
m ent o f denial: repression.4 T h e first constitutive m om ent was the correct
labeling o f the repressed. T h e second constitutive m om ent was the refusal of
the revealed truth. A denial is then understood as a m echanism whereby an
unknown repressed phenom enon “m akes its way into consciousness” (Ibid.).
Freud finds the m echanism of negating so essential for the result o f a denial—
letting the repressed make its way to consciousness— that he proposes a new
technique for treating patients who have difficulty in revealing a piece of
inform ation about som ething that is repressed and thus unconscious. Freud
writes: “‘W hat,’ we ask, ‘would you consider the most unlikely imaginable
thing in that situation? W hat do you think was furthest from your mind at
that tim e?’ If the patient falls into the trap and says what he thinks is most
incredible, he alm ost always makes the right adm ission” (Ibid.). In order for
Freud to invent this new technique and, even more, for this technique to be
effective, it must be the case both that there are two centers o f m eaning cre­
ation and that the m eanings created by these two centers are not com patible.
Freud addresses this incom patibility between the two systems o f m eaning cre­
ation by giving consciousness a face-saving device. Freud asks what the most
unlikely im aginable thing is or what was furthest from the patient’s thought.
Freud provides consciousness with a form of distance from the truth it is
invited to discover or, formulated differently, he provides consciousness with
the opportunity to deny what it sees. Freud observes that when a patient
10 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

accepts the face-saving device and describes what he thinks is furthest from
his mind, he almost always describes the unconscious correctly. In one o f the
next paragraphs, Freud calls the negation in a denial “the hall-mark o f repres­
sion, a certificate o f origin— like, let us say, ‘Made in G erm any’” (Ibid. 23 6 ).5
Som e authors have expanded the m eaning o f denial to include non-ver­
bal activities.6 Thus Edith Jacobson uses the label ‘denial’ for such phenom ­
ena as am nesia (Jacobson 63, 64), disavowal or undoing of castration (Ibid.
74, 77, 83), avoidance (Ibid. 75), and wishful fantasies distorting reality when
they are a m eans o f defending against fearful objects (Ibid. 78). Such an
expansion o f the concept o f denial omits, in my opinion, a crucial elem ent in
the phenom enon Freud wants to study: that is, a denial correctly labels the
repressed phenomenon, even though a denial denies the correctness o f the
labeling. Labeling and correctly labeling that which is repressed are crucial
aspects o f the puzzle which Freud wants to study under the phenom enon
called ‘denial.’7
T here is, however, an expanded m eaning of denial which does corre­
spond to Freud’s interpretation of denial. I believe that I can argue for that
expansion because Freud provided a fourth exam ple o f the kind o f ph e­
nom ena he was going to study. T h e fact that the exam ple is m entioned not
in the m ain text, but in a footnote, m ight indicate th at Freud, too, felt that
this exam ple is a form o f extension o f the core phenom enon. H e actually
claim s that the fourth exam ple is using the sam e process; he does not claim
that the process is identical with the process at work in the first three exam ­
ples. Here is how Freud describes the new exam ple, which he calls boasting:
“‘How nice n ot to have had one o f my headaches for so long.’ But this is in
fact the first announcem ent o f an attack, o f whose approach the subject is
already sensible, although he is as yet unwilling to believe it” (Freud, S .E .,
X IX , 236). A t first, one could argue th at the patient in this new exam ple
does not make a false statem ent. It seems to be correct for the patient to say
that he has not had the headaches for a long time. Therefore, this exam ple
could be said to be a misfit. It is not a proper exam ple o f the phenom enon
Freud is studying, for in it nothing is falsely denied. However, when one
looks in the rest o f Freud’s oeuvre one can notice additional sim ilar exam ­
ples.8 Freud’s explanation o f these exam ples provides argum ents for seeing
the sim ilarity between the fourth exam ple and the other three. In the
process, Freud also forces us to accept a fourth not-so-visible constituent
elem ent in the phenom enon o f denial.
Freud discusses the danger o f boasting in his study o f Frau Emmy von N .
H e does so in a long footnote, having warned his readers at the beginning of
his study that he will reproduce the notes that he made at night during the
beginning o f the treatm ent and will put insights acquired later in footnotes
(Freud, S .E ., II, 48). Emmy von N . regularly had “neck-cram ps.” Freud
describes them as consisting “in an ‘icy grip’ on the back o f the neck, together
 TH E COM PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D ENIA L 11

with an onset o f rigidity and a painful coldness in all her extrem ities, an in ca­
pacity to speak and com plete prostration. They last from six to twelve hours”
(Ibid. 71). In the evening session o f May 17, 1889,9 Emmy von N . “expressed
her astonishm ent that it was such a long time since she had had any neck-
cramps, though they usually cam e on before every thunderstorm ” (Ibid. 75).
T h e morning o f M ay 18, Emmy von N . “com plained o f cold at the back of
her neck, tightness and pains in the face, hands and feet. Her features were
strained and her hands clenched” (Ibid. 7 5-76). In a footnote which may
have been written up to five years after the treatment, Freud writes that
Emmy von N .’s “astonishm ent the evening before at its being so long since
she had had a neck-cramp . . . [can be understood as] a prem onition o f an
approaching condition which was already in preparation at the time and was
perceived in the unconscious” (Ibid. 76, n. 1). T he patient disregards the true
premonition.
Freud describes a second patient, Frau C acilie M ., who regularly had sim ­
ilar premonitions. Thus, Freud writes, “while she was in the best of health,
she said to me ‘It’s a long time since I’ve been frightened of witches at night,’
or, ‘how glad I am that I’ve not had pains in my eyes for such a long tim e,’ I
could feel sure that the following night a severe onset of her fear o f witches
would be making extra work for her nurse or that her next attack o f pains in
the eyes was on the point of beginning” (Ibid. 76, n. 1). Freud provides a
beginning o f a conceptualization of these phenom ena. H e says it this way:
“O n each occasion what was already present as a finished product in the
unconscious was beginning to show through indistinctly. T h is idea, which
emerged as a sudden notion, was worked over by the unsuspecting ‘official’
consciousness (to use C h arcot’s term ) into a feeling of satisfaction, which
swiftly and invariably turned out to be unjustified” (Ibid. 76, n. 1). These
exam ples o f boasting are therefore not, strictly speaking, like the other three
exam ples o f denial. In boasting the patient does not utter a falsity. It is indeed
true that the patient has not had neck-cramp, been frightened o f witches, or
had pain in the eyes. However, what the patient is reporting is naive because
it does not report the most interesting thing that could be reported. T he
patient does not say that he feels that an attack, or witches, or pain in the
eyes is coming. Here we com e to the essence o f Freud’s new insight. Freud
claim s that the unconscious has a wisdom that consciousness does not have.
Freud claim s that the cause for the boasting o f his patients is the wisdom of
the unconscious which feels that the attack or the painful crisis is coming.
Consciousness, in its limited inform ation capabilities, does not see the attack
on the horizon. A ll that consciousness can report is that it is aware that these
attacks have not occurred for some time. Freud thus tells us, on the one hand,
that the unconscious takes the initiative and formulates the truth, but that,
on the other hand, consciousness does not know what the unconscious
already knows. Freud says as much when he explains the popular warning
12 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

against boasting: “We do not boast of our happiness until unhappiness is in

the offing and we becom e aware of our anticipation in the form of a boast”
(Ibid. 76, n. I ) .10
In boasting, as in the other exam ples o f denials, an all too real but
frightening truth is denied. T h e real truth is that the unconscious is aware
o f a com ing attack. T hus, things are bad. Consciousness, on the other hand,
looking only to the past, says that things are good. But notice, boasting is
not without epistem ological value. Just as with the other exam ples, boasting
hits the nail on the head by correctly labeling the problem . Only, as in the
other exam ples, boasting wrongly evaluates the problem. O n e can therefore
form ulate the similarity o f boasting to exam ples o f clear-cut denial as fol­
lows: an unknown unpleasant truth has been correctly labeled but wrongly
evaluated.
Let us make a further observation about Freud’s explanation o f boasting.
In a last attem pt to clarify the superstition that boasting is bad, Freud writes:
“ [In boasting] the subject-m atter o f what we are recollecting emerges before
the feeling that belongs to it— that is to say, because an agreeable contrasting
idea is present in consciousness” (Ibid. 76, n. 1). We have here in Freud’s
analysis o f boasting the first hint that the unconscious and consciousness sys­
tems obey different logics in creating statem ents. T he unconscious is able to
present som ething to which unpleasant feelings are attached. Consciousness
seems inclined to turn to pleasant feelings. Freud will explain later in the arti­
cle that the ego, as the seat o f consciousness, is, at some point in its develop­
ment, unable to accept anything unpleasant associated with itself. H e writes:
“the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself everything that is good
and to eject from itself everything that is bad” (Ibid. 237). T h e ego is thus at
that point o f its developm ent a narcissistic, imaginary construction.11

2. P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L A N A L Y S I S
O F T H E P R O C E S S O F D E N IA L

H aving delineated the phenom enon that he wants to analyze (verbal denial),
Freud then proceeds to unpack the background o f that phenom enon. Freud
teaches us that a verbal denial is part of a larger process.
First, there is a postulated prior phase: repression. Freud points out that
a Vemeinung (den ial) has the effect o f “taking cognizance o f what is
repressed” (Ibid. 235). T h is idea is so im portant to Freud th at he form ulates
it three more tim es. H e writes: “T hus the conten t o f a repressed im age or
idea can m ake its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated"
(Ibid.). Or: “ it [Vemeinung (a denial)] is already a lifting o f the repression”
(Ibid.). O r finally: “ [by Vemeinung (a denial)] one consequence o f the
process of repression is undone— the fact, namely, o f the ideational content
o f what is repressed not reaching consciousness” (Ibid.). A s already pointed
 TH E CO M PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D EN IA L 13

out in the analysis of the exam ples given by Freud, a necessary precondition
for a denial thus seem s to be the existence o f repression. W hen the m ech ­
anism o f repression is successful then consciousness is faced with a blank.
For the patient who dream ed about a fem ale figure, a successful repression
would have resulted in her saying: “You ask me who that figure is in my
dream ? I do not know.” We have an exam ple in Freud’s patien t Emmy von
N ., when Freud asks her “what the stam m er cam e from ” ( S .E ., II, 61).
Freud reports th at the patient reacted by silence, by giving no reply. W hen
Freud insisted and asked: “D on’t you know?” she replied “N o .” W hen Freud
pressed her by asking “W hy not?” the patient angrily replied: “Because I
mayn’t” (Ibid.).
Second, there is the actual phase o f denial. By contrasting the phenom ­
enon o f denial with the postulated state that preceded it, Freud is able to
emphasize the novelty in the phenom enon o f denial. T h e novelty is that
consciousness is now aware of a phenom enon that it was not aware o f before.
Further on in his reflections, Freud describes denial as contributing to free­
dom o f thinking because it provides consciousness with conten t that it
lacked, insofar as consciousness is now aware of that which it previously was
not. Furthermore, repressed thoughts are im portant— Freud even claim s that
they are indispensable— to the patient. Freud puts it this way: “W ith the
help o f the symbol of negation [in a denial], thinking frees itself from the
restrictions o f repression and enriches itself with m aterial that is indispens­
able for its proper functioning” (S .E ., X IX , 236). A gain: “But the perfor­
m ance o f the function o f judgm ent is not m ade possible until the creation of
the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first measure o f free­
dom from the consequences o f repression and, with it, from the com pulsion
of the pleasure principle” (Ibid. 239).
Freud, however, points out that one should not be too enthusiastic about
the presumed victory o f denial over repression. H e describes that victory in a
variety o f ways. He writes that a denial is “a way o f taking cognizance o f what
is repressed . . . though not, o f course an acceptance of what is repressed”
(Ibid. 23 5 -3 6 ). Or: “W ith the help o f negation only one consequence of
repression is undone” (Ibid. 236). O r finally: “T h e outcom e o f this is a kind
o f intellectual acceptance of the repressed, while at the same time what is
essential to the repression persists” (Ibid.). A denial is thus a very ambiguous
perform ance.12 It undoes one crucial aspect o f repression in that a denial
labels the repressed. A denial lets a careful listener know precisely what the
object of an effort o f repression is. O n the other hand, a denial makes it clear
to any listener that the patient does not accept the truth as it is labeled and
thus revealed in a denial. Freud knows that the female figure represented—
let us suppose as dom ineering— in the patient’s dream is in truth the patient’s
mother. But the patien t’s denial states the contrary: that female figure is not
my mother. Freud describes the ambiguity o f this denial quite well when he
14 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

writes: “It is as though the patient had said: ‘It’s true that my mother cam e
into my mind as I thought o f this person, but I don ’t feel inclined to let the
association count’” (Ibid. 235). In a denial, a patient thus rejects or refuses to
accept a true proposition.
Third, Freud informs us that therapy can prom ote further progress. Freud
reports that it is possible to conquer “the negation as well and [bring] about
a full intellectual acceptance o f the repressed” (Ibid. 236). He adds, however,
that in this new phase “the repressive process itself is not yet rem oved”
(Ibid.). O ne can im agine that Freud asked the patient who dreamt about the
female figure what eyes the female figure had, what hair, what clothes, what
shoes, and so forth. If the patient was forced to recognize each time that the
eyes, the hair, the clothes and the shoes o f the figure all resembled those of
his mother, he m ight then have concluded: “I guess it then must be my
mother.” Such an intellectual acknowledgm ent is clearly not a full em otional
acknow ledgm ent.13 A s in the case of denial, here too there is a split between
the intellectual and the affective processes.14
Clearly, this latter situation suggests the expected existence o f a fourth
stage in the process of denial wherein that which is repressed is overcome
both intellectually and affectively.15 O ne can imagine that the patient who
dreamt about a dom ineering lady and who subsequently identified her as his
mother is now able to solve the em otional conflict arising from the fact that
the female figure is simultaneously a dom ineering figure and his mother.
Freud does not provide us, in his article, with any hints o f the steps that will
have to be taken to achieve that fourth stage.16 In the rest o f this chapter I
will articulate insights derived from studying that fourth stage.17

3. F R E U D ’S M E T A -P S Y C H O L O G IC A L R E F L E C T IO N S

H aving observed a difference between the em otional reaction and the intel­
lectual attitude towards a repressed phenom enon as revealed in a denial, one
would have expected that Freud would have reflected on that difference.
Instead, Freud uses m ost o f the rest o f the article on denial to explain how the
intellectual function, that is, judging, is similar to and possibly emerges out of
the affective life.18 He makes use of the generally accepted distinction
between an attributive and an existential judgm ent. In an attributive judg­
m ent one is concerned with whether an object— in Freud’s exam ples, the
ego— has a particular quality. A m I a person who insults people, has bad ideas
about my mother, and so forth? A n existential judgm ent must decide whether
a representation exists only in my memory or in my mind or, on the contrary,
also exists in reality. Freud gives as exam ple the child who imagines the
m other’s breast. A n existential judgm ent must make the distinction between
a representation to which nothing corresponds in reality and a representation
that fits the reality.
 TH E COM PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D ENIA L 15

In the process of reflecting on attributive judgm ents, Freud reminds us of

a first m eta-psychological thesis which will be very useful to explain a puz­
zling aspect of denial. It will also give us a hint of the difficult road that must
be traveled to undo a denial. T h e piece o f psychoanalytic theory that Freud
reminds us o f is the thesis that the ego is a narcissistic construction whose
judgm ents, at first, follow the pleasure principle and not the reality principle.
Freud writes that “the original pleasure-ego wants to introject into itself
everything that is good and to eject from itself everything that is bad. W hat
is bad, what is alien to the ego and what is external are, to begin with, iden-
d e al” (Ibid. 237).
If we apply this piece of psychoanalytic theory to the person who makes
a denial, one must accept the proposition that the ego of that person does not
follow the logic o f the reality principle in which truth is recognized even if it
is unpleasant. Rather, the ego in that case follows the logic of what Freud
calls the pleasure principle.19 T h at logic is described as introjecting into on e­
self anything that is good and rejecting from oneself all that is bad. Such an
explanation fits the exam ples given by Freud. Insulting thoughts about som e­
one one depends upon, a negative image o f on e’s mother, headaches: all are
undesirable things and the logic o f the pleasure principle demands that each
o f them be rejected from the original pleasure-ego. U nder the logic o f the
pleasure principle, only elements having the narcissistically pleasing charac­
teristics o f being good and nothing else but good can be admitted.
Enlightened by this Freudian idea, one is able to predict that fully undo­
ing a denial will involve much more than epistem ological work. It will
involve addressing the ego’s love o f a narcissistic self-image. G iving up such
a narcissistic image is for the ego to accept that it is less than what it thought
it was and loved thinking itself to be. T h e great question is then: How will
the person react to such a demand? Will he react with aggression? W ill he
mourn? W ill he look for a creative way to somehow recover that which he
denied? O r finally, will he select a com bination o f these techniques?20
W hen reflecting on the judgm ent of existence, Freud develops a second
meta-psychological idea. He starts by pointing out that a judgm ent of exis­
tence is necessary when a person has developed a more realistic ego, an ego
that obeys the reality principle. Freud him self gives the exam ple o f the infant
who must be interested in distinguishing an imagined breast from an imagined
breast which also exists (Project for a Scientific Psychology, S .E ., I, 32 7 -3 0 ). A n
imagined breast or, more generally, a representation o f som ething is by itself
already a warrant of the existence of the represented thing because “The
antithesis between subjective and objective does not exist from the first”
(S .E ., X IX , 237). Freud then continues his argument by claim ing that the
opposition between the subjective and the objective is the result o f the activ­
ities o f the mind. T h e mind can bring before itself “once more som ething that
has once been perceived, by reproducing it as a presentation without the
16 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

external object having still to be there” (Ibid.). A lso “the reproduction of a

perception as a presentation is not always a faithful one; it may be modified by
omissions, or changed by the merging of various elements” (Ibid. 238). T he
judgm ent of existence must then verify if the object that is presented by the
mind is still there in reality. Freud is now ready to make his second meta-psy­
chological com m ent while reflecting on the process o f denial. Freud writes:
“T he first and immediate aim, therefore, o f reality-testing is, not to find an
object in real perception which corresponds to the one presented, but to refind
such an object, to convince oneself that it is still there” (Ibid. 2 37-38). O r “it
is evident that a precondition for the setting up o f reality-testing is that objects
shall have been lost which once brought real satisfaction” (Ibid. 238). T his
line of thinking by Freud suggests that truth telling as it is conditioned by
judgm ents of existence requires more than the acquisition o f the linguistic
function o f negation. It also requires a non-linguistic form of negativity.2' It
requires that som ething that once provided real satisfaction has been lost. But
such a loss cannot just be passively undergone. It will also have to be actively
created. Som e act of separation will have to be made.
Freud presents a third m eta-psychological idea when he concludes his
reflections on judgm ents. H e argues that he has been able to show the psy­
chological origin of judgm ents because they make m oves similar to those of
the primary instincts. In attributive judgm ents— so Freud tell us— a charac­
teristic of a thing is to be accepted and thus affirmed or is to be rejected and
thus denied. In judgm ents o f existence one wants to know whether a presen­
tation of a thing is only a presentation and is thus to be considered worthless
or whether, on the contrary, som ething real corresponds to the presentation
and thus the presentation is valuable because it corresponds to som ething
that exists. Freud writes: “T h e polarity of judgm ents appears to correspond to
the opposition o f the two groups o f instincts which we have supposed to exist.
Affirm ation— as a substitute for uniting— belongs to Eros; negation— the
successor to expulsion— belongs to the instinct of destruction” (Ibid. 239).
Freud thus makes the connection between judgm ents and em otions by means
o f three pairs o f concepts. T h e first pair is affirmation and negation. T h e sec­
ond pair is substitute for uniting and successor to expulsion. T h e third pair is Eros
and instinct of destruction.
T h e last pair, Eros and instinct of destruction, expresses the polarity of
hum an affectivity as Freud sees it. From early on Freud explained neurosis by
m eans of the notion that a hum an being is a battlefield for different em o­
tional forces. Originally, he thought that the basic opposition was between
sexuality and ego-forces. Sexuality assured reproduction. T h e ego-forces
assured self-preservation and expressed them selves m ost strongly in hunger.
Freud called the sexual energy libido.”
W hen Freud analyzed the problem o f narcissism he noticed that the
libido was directed not only towards the sexual object but also towards the
 TH E CO M PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D ENIA L 17

ego itself. T h is insight destroyed the opposition between the libido (a force
for reproduction) and the “ego-force.” In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud
explicitly accepts this conclusion and therefore reduces both the ego-
instincts and the libido to one force, Eros (Freud, S .E ., XV III, 4 4 -6 1 ). T h e
force opposing the libido (or love-force) is the instinct of destruction (which
in its ultim ate form is the death-instinct). Thus, Freud reintroduces psycho­
logical duality.
T h e second pair, substitute for uniting and successor to expulsion, is a
strange one. T h e way Freud labels them indicates that the two elements of
the pair are not co-equal; there is no symmetry between the two. T h e G er­
man word Nachfolge (successor) indicates that a prior action has taken
place— referred to as expulsion. Freud’s understanding of the way the original
narcissistic ego constructs itself is consonant with the idea that it is a “suc­
cessor.” Indeed, Freud claim s that the narcissistic ego is the result of—
m etaphorically— ‘spitting out o f itself’ what is considered bad (Freud, S .E .,
X IX , 237). T he G erm an word Ersatz (substitute), on the other hand, is used
for an object or a situation. T he idea that som ething is a substitute presup­
poses that som ething precedes the substitute either in time or in thought.
T he idea o f unity does not include that same suggestion of a prior state as sug­
gested by the idea o f substitute. C ould this m ean that, according to Freud,
unity is the primary situation o f the child, whereas rejection (spitting out) is
a secondary reaction?23
T h e asymmetry signaled in the choice of labels for the second of the
three pairs o f words relating judgm ents and affective forces can be clarified
further by reflecting on the central problem of this article: negation-denial.
A denial presupposes, first, a connection between two facts, that is, a form of
unity. A denial also presupposes that this connection was repressed. A nega­
tive judgm ent— particularly a denial— is then the expression of an original
connection and of a trace of a prior repression, that is, a negation. A n affir­
m ative judgm ent expresses only a relation between the two contents.
W hether or not there was a split between them is not expressed in an affir­
m ative judgm ent. Thus, an affirmative judgm ent has less expressive potential
than a negative judgm ent. In an affirmative judgm ent one only affirms a con ­
nection or a unity. W hat preceded the connection cannot be expressed by an
affirmative judgment.
T h is leads us to the first pair m entioned by Freud: the affirmative and the
negative judgm ent. T his pair too must consist o f parts that are not equally
important. T h e negative judgm ent has more expressive potential. Thus, it is
understandable that Freud finishes the paragraph by underlining the central
function o f the symbol o f negation. N egation expresses both a connection
between two concepts and a rejection of that connection. W hen the n ega­
tive sentence is a denial, then the negation is a sign o f a repression which is
sim ultaneously overcome and m aintained at a new level.
18 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

Freud uses his m eta-psychological speculation on the connection

between affective forces and judgm ents and the primacy of Eros to explain a
clinical fact: the negativism of many psychotics.24 Freud thinks the negative
attitude of this type of psychotic results from a withdrawal of the libidinal
com ponents o f the instincts such that too much destructivity remains. A nor­
mal person seems to need a quantity of libido. T h is type of psychotic is then
one who lives in a degenerated situation because o f a lack of sufficient libido.
Psychosis is here explained as degeneration. In The Ego and the Id (Freud,
S .E ., X IX , 4 0 -4 7 , especially 4 0 -4 2 ), Freud talks about the m ixing o f the
libido and the aggressive tendencies. Here, Freud takes a developm ental
point of view. T h e child’s libido develops from an oral to a genital phase. T his
happens, says Freud, through the addition of erotic com ponents. T h e regres­
sion from a genital to an anal-sadistic libido is the result of the disappearance
o f the erotic elements. In these reflections Freud m oves from his epistemo-
logical problem of denial to anthropological concerns about the developm ent
o f libidinal and aggressive tendencies. It is a connection that will prove very
valuable for exploring an aspect o f denial that Freud did not explicitly
address: the full undoing o f a denial.

4. S P E C I F I C A T I O N S A N D C O R R E C T I O N S
O F F R E U D ’S R E F L E C T IO N S

However influential this short paper o f Freud’s has been, it is im portant to

show its lim itations. First, Freud seems to have a m isconception of his own
analysis. Freud claim s to be analyzing the function of judgments. In fact Freud
is not analyzing judgm ents but rather is analyzing the prehistory o f judg­
ments. U sing M erleau-Ponty’s terminology, one could say that Freud is
sketching the preverbal history of the judgm ent. In that preverbal history
Freud emphasizes the great im portance o f the acquisition o f the linguistic
symbol o f negation. In doing so he either overlooks or fails to emphasize two
other dim ensions in a person’s preverbal history.25 Both dim ensions remain
hidden behind Freud’s emphasis on the im portance o f acquiring the linguis­
tic symbol o f negation. T his dim ension has to do with the hum an require­
m ent to elevate thoughts and feelings to the level o f language. A cceding to
this requirement is not restricted to the act of repressing or negating; Lacan
understood this when he interpreted Freud’s concept o f Bejahung (affirma­
tion) in the pair Bejahung-Vemeinung as a “saying yes” to the whole symbolic
system in general.
Independent of the psychoanalytic tradition, H egel also seems to have
understood the requirement for hum an beings to elevate needs and feeling to
the level of language. H egel does not use the word language but points to a
requirement that must produce two characteristics consonant with elevating
things to the level o f language. Thus, Hegel writes: “as the feeling too is itself
 TH E CO M PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D EN IA L 19

particular and bound up with a special corporeal form, it follows t h a t . . . the

subject . . . is still susceptible o f disease, so far as to rem ain fast in a special
phase o f its self-feeling, unable to refine it to ‘ideality’ and get the better of
it” (H egel, Philosophy of Mind, 122-23). Bringing feelings (and needs) to the
level of ‘ideality’ allows free subjectivity to assign feelings and needs the rel­
ative places that subjectivity wants and needs to assign them. By elevating
feelings and needs to ‘ideality,’ consciousness acquires a form of fluidity (Ibid.
124) com patible with the requirement of freedom. Such a consciousness can
then proscribe to itself “behaviour which follows from its individual position
and its connection with the external world, which is no less a world of laws”
(Ibid. 123). If consciousness is unable to elevate a particular feeling to ‘ideal­
ity,’ then consciousness “is engrossed with a single phase of feeling, it fails to
assign that phase its proper place and due subordination in the individual sys­
tem of the world which a conscious subject is” (Ibid. 123). Consequently,
such “a feeling with a fixed corporeal em bodim ent sets [itself] up against the
whole mass of adjustm ents forming the concrete consciousness” (Ibid. 124).26
I interpret H egel’s claim that human beings must elevate feelings and
needs to ‘ideality’ as similar to the Lacanian claim that hum an beings need to
insert them selves with all their needs and wishes into the world o f language
so as to make all and each of these needs and wishes interconnected and thus
relative. Failing to do so leads, according to both Lacan and to Hegel, to m en­
tal illness.27 By overemphasizing the im portance o f replacing repression by a
linguistic negation, Freud neglects to bring out the important point that the
whole of life needs to be elevated to a linguistic world.
T h e second dim ension hidden behind Freud’s emphasis on the im por­
tance o f acquiring the linguistic form of negation is the individual’s prehis­
tory o f negation, with its effort at separation and the aggression involved in
it. Freud does m ention that the “the original pleasure-ego wants . . . to eject
from itself everything that is bad. W hat is bad, what is alien to the ego and
what is external are, to begin with, identical” (Freud, S .E ., X IX , 237). Spitz
does not just m ention that prehistory o f negation, he also analyzes it. In par­
ticular, he analyzes the function o f aggression related to saying “n o” (Spitz
1957, 51-52, 56-59, 130-33).
Spitz starts by pointing to the fact that prior to the acquisition of saying
“no,” at about fifteen m onths o f age, the child’s relation to its mother under­
goes a drastic change. A s the child begins to crawl and/or walk, the child
moves away from the mother and does things that might endanger it. T h e
mother, acting as the external ego o f the child, constantly issues prohibitions
in word and gesture. These prohibitions force the child into passivity and are
experienced as frustrations. A m ong the m ost frequently returning means for
the m other’s expression o f prohibitions is the use of the word “no.” A ccord­
ing to Spitz, the child responds to the frustrations resulting from the prohibi­
tions in progressively more com plicated ways. First, the child sides with the
20 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

adult who prohibits and does what the adult wants— for exam ple, not touch­
ing an electric outlet (Ibid. 56). However, such a reaction leads to unaccept­
able frustrations for the child. Furthermore, the passivity forced upon the
child provokes an aggressive reaction from the unconscious. T h e child is thus
put in a paradoxical situation: he/she is still in a very dependent relation with
the m aternal figure while also feeling aggression towards that same figure.
Spitz believes that the child resolves this tension by identifying with its
m other as an aggressor (Ibid. 56, 133).28 By such a m ove the child dynam i­
cally satisfies both contradictory feelings. In consequence, the child acquires
no-saying and is now able to use the word or gesture with all the frustration
and aggression attached to it. Finally, the child can make use of the newly
acquired word (or gesture) either against him or herself or against the mother.
In using the no-saying against him or herself the child creates a cleavage
within between him or herself as an object observed and as an observer (Ibid.
130, 133). In using the no-saying against a person with whom the child has
“primary narcissistic dependent relations” (Ibid. 56), the child severs his/her
dependency relations with that person (Ibid. 52) and establishes separateness
(Ibid. 57). From then on the child will have to establish new kinds of rela­
tions with that person. Spitz calls those new relations “highly enriched” (Ibid.
57, 129, 131).29 By means of a case I will study in the next section, I will
dem onstrate that the acts of separation and severing involved in no-saying
introduce a need for m etaphorical relations. T h e linguistic form o f negation
will thus lead us by m eans o f the idea o f separation and the idea of aggression
hidden in acts of separation to the appearance of the phenom enon of
metaphor.30

5. C O M P L E T IN G F R E U D ’S R E F L E C T I O N S

In his study on denial, Freud greatly stressed the im portance for the hum an
being of acquiring the linguistic symbol o f negation. However, I claim that,
in laying this stress, Freud was also undervaluing the many other functions
o f language, as well as undervaluing the act of separation, with its implied
aggression, that is behind the no-saying. I will now illustrate my claim with
a concrete case o f denial and the person’s successful efforts at overcom ing
the denial.
In Father, Son, and Healing Ghosts, the author, A nthony M oore, provides
us with an autobiographical account of dealing with his father’s death. W hen
M oore was two m onths old, his father died on a battlefield in the Second
World War. A s a young boy, M oore developed several strategies to deal with
this traum atic event. H e identified with his father, the dead marine officer, so
strongly and im itated him so much that the young M oore at one point felt
that “he was unable to be [himself] (M oore 4 ).31 A t the same time, when
asked about his feelings about the loss o f his father, M oore had the habit,
 TH E COM PLEX PH EN O M EN O N OF D EN IA L 21

from his childhood on, o f answering: “You can ’t miss what you never had”
(Ibid. 1). Clearly this is a denial. We can see the pain o f losing his father in
his attem pts to erase it via suffocating im itation and identification. We also
find traces o f young M oore’s pain— some o f it self-inflicted— in two fantasies
related to his father’s death. A s he was born A pril 16, 1944, and his father
died June 15, 1944, young M oore developed the fantasy that there must not
have been space enough in the world for both of them together and that thus
he was the cause o f his father’s death. H e further fantasized that if he were to
father a child that would be his own death warrant (Ibid. 3, 98).
W ith the help of a therapist, as in Freud’s own reported examples, Moore
was able to undo intellectually the denial that he did not miss his father. In
the case o f Moore, the therapist said: “You can also miss what you never had
but know you had every right to have” (Ibid. 4). Emotionally undoing the con ­
flict and healing the wound behind the denial is a more com plicated story.
M oore’s efforts at distancing him self from the idealization of his father
were crucial. A fter years as a dedicated and enthusiastic student in a military
high school, the young M oore avoided R O T C in college. H e gives as his rea­
son that he felt he “had had enough o f the military” (Ibid. 2). By his senior
year, M oore returned to his love for the M arines and took the entrance exam
for the M arine C orps Officer C andidate School (Ibid. 2). His first attem pt at
separating from his idealized father had not stuck. A second and new form of
separation was initiated when he told his m other and grandm other of his
plans to enroll in the M arine Officer School while the Vietnam War was tak ­
ing place. W hat the young M oore saw in their eyes was either their fear o f his
death or their disapproval o f his risking his life. His mother (and grand­
m other) had put a wedge between the young M oore and his father by appeal­
ing to his own wish to live (Ibid. 2). T h e young M oore accepted their invi­
tation to make the separation from his idealized father.
M oore him self tells us that once he had separated him self from his
father’s identity he felt the need “to reconnect to the energy and m eaning
that continued to flow from the image of [his] father” (Ibid. 5). M oore thus
found him self in the contradictory situation that he wanted to be both sepa­
rate from and rem ain connected with his father. He found a solution to this
challenge in what in Lacanian terminology is called a m etaphoric m ove.32
H aving refused to becom e a M arine because that might lead to death, the
young M oore lost an important connection with his father. M oore recovered
that connection with his father by becom ing a Jesuit. M oore writes about this
decision: “Being a Jesuit was like being a M arine. Som etim es the Jesuits were
even referred to as the Pope’s Marines. Furthermore, the idea o f joining a reli­
gious order carried with it an image of dying, dying to the world, particularly
the world o f m arital love” (Ibid. 3 ).33 By the m etaphorical power of the words
“M arine” and “dying” the younger M oore was able to reconnect with his
father after having separated him self from him .34
22 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

C O N C L U S IO N

T h e analysis o f M oore’s undoing of his denial can help us clarify the concept
o f self-deception. O ne is right in saying that the younger M oore deceived
him self when he was telling him self and others during his adolescence that
he could not miss his father since he never had one. O ne is also right in say­
ing that the younger M oore did not know that he was deceiving himself. He
only knew that he had been deceiving him self after he was helped by his psy-
chiatrist-psychoanalyst, who told him that one can also miss what one never
had but knows one had every right to have.35 A t that m om ent the younger
M oore knew that he had been deceiving himself; he knew that his claim that
one cannot miss a father one never had was a denial. O ne can therefore claim
that it is possible to deceive oneself without knowing that one is deceiving
oneself. Self-deception is thus, strictly speaking, not a lie.36 It becom es a lie
only after the m om ent in which a denial has been intellectually undone and
the person refuses to do the em otional work involved in taking the steps
implied by the intellectual undoing.
Freud praised the linguistic symbol o f negation as a great instrum ent of
freedom. It would be wrong, however, to attribute the healing o f Tony
M oore simply to the m agic power o f the symbol o f negation in his funda­
m ental denial. T h e healing was also based on several acts of cutting him self
loose from his father and on the great m etaphor o f being a Jesuit. I believe
th at I have been able to show that Freud’s analysis o f the function of n ega­
tion is but the tip o f an iceberg in the process of healing. T h e iceberg
includes at least the idea that one has to cut on eself loose from others with
all the aggression (and guilt) that this involves and the idea that the rich ­
ness o f language must be used in its many dim ensions, including the
m etaphoric dim ension m ade available by the cultural tradition in which
one lives. I was able to rely on Spitz for pointing out the negative acts
required for personal growth. I was able to rely on L acan and H egel to point
to the requirem ent that the totality o f hum an life needs to be elevated to
the level o f language. Clearly, correcting the epistem ological m istake pre­
sent in a denial requires addressing the great anthropological puzzle of
hum an growth with its dem and for aggressive separation from and creative
(m etaphorical) conn ection with our original caregivers. N o t properly d eal­
ing with the dem and for separation and conn ection with his father was for
M oore a form o f self-deception even before he form ulated a denial. W hen
M oore form ulated his denial, it was possible for others to see the self-decep­
tion at work. O nly when he was able to intellectually undo his denial was
M oore confronted with the choice o f lying to him self or being authentic.
A s I see it, M oore avoided lying to him self because he was w illing to face
the difficult em otional dem ands m ade on him self in order to deal in a dif­
 TH E COM PLEX PH ENO M EN O N OF D EN IA L 23

ferent way with the need to separate him self from his father while satisfy­
ing his need to rem ain connected with him . T hus, although the concepts
o f denial, self-deception, and lying about on eself partially overlap, they are
not identical and should be carefully distinguished. I will devote the next
chapter to this problem atic.
 TW O

The Epistemological Problem

of Self-description in
Freudian Psychoanalysis

abstract. Freud’s theory o f denial (negation ) implies several theses about hum an
self-knowledge. T h e first thesis is that self-knowledge is not identical to self­
revelation; hum an beings reveal more about the self than they are able to
acknowledge consciously. T h e second thesis is that self-knowledge can be con ­
tradicted by self-revelation and can therefore be proven false. T h e third thesis
is that unacknow ledged self-revelation can be used to correct or broaden one’s
self-knowledge. T h e fourth thesis is that hum an beings encounter lim its to self­
knowledge. Therefore errors in the description of the self are not necessarily
lies or expressions o f bad faith. T h e fifth thesis is that the lim its to self-knowl­
edge are n ot fixed; they can be changed. T h ese limits can be altered n ot only
by personal effort, but also by appropriate h elp from others. In this chapter I
concentrate on the ethical im plications of Freud’s theory o f self-knowledge as
implied by his study on denial (negation): m istakes in self-description, when
put into the terms o f ethical language, should n ot always be called lies.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

In this chapter, I will develop five points. First, I will briefly map out the
Freudian concepts that point to erroneous self-expressions or self-descriptions
such as: lies, hypocrisy, mistakes, illusions, and disavowals. Second, I will draw
attention to the phenom ena (the use of denial and negation as first revelations
of painful truths) that Freud wants to explain with his theory of negation.
Third, I will demonstrate that these phenom ena are crucial in psychotherapy

25
26 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

and that Freud gradually cam e to perceive their central function. In Freud’s
oeuvre, one can find vestiges of his emerging awareness of the importance of
facts and events. Fourth, I will show the far-reaching epistem ological im plica­
tions of Freud’s theory of negation for a theory of self-knowledge. Fifth, I will
ponder about some apparent contradictions.

1. A M A P O F F R E U D ’ S C O N C E P T S O F
E R R O N E O U S FO R M S O F SE L F -D E S C R IP T IO N S

In this section, I want to prepare the analysis of Freud’s approach to negation

(denial)— a form o f self-interpretation— by taking a look at a number of
other Freudian concepts related to different forms o f self-expression and self­
interpretation. I propose to classify these concepts in four categories: the
morally negative, the morally neutral, the morally am bivalent, and the
morally positive. C andidates for the first category, the morally negative, are:
Luge (lies); Heuchelei (hypocrisy); and Selbstverrat (self-betrayal). Candidates
for the second category, the morally neutral, are: Fehlleistung (parapraxis);
Irrtum (m istake); Illusion (illusion); and Täuschung (error). C andidates for the
third category, the morally am bivalent, are: Leugnung (disavowal); Verleug­
nung (disavowal); and Verneinung (denial). T h e candidate for the fourth c at­
egory, the morally positive, is: Glaubwürdigkeit (credibility).
A look at the cross-references between these concepts, however, provides
arguments to call into question the validity of the above classification. Thus,
the morally negative concepts (lies or hypocrisy) refer respectively to a morally
ambiguous concept (disavowal) and a morally neutral one (mistake). The
morally neutral concept (error) refers to two other morally neutral concepts
(illusion and mistake) and to two morally negative concepts (hypocrisy and
self-betrayal). A closer look at the meaning that these concepts had for Freud
is thus advisable. In the morally-negative concepts category, a closer exam ina­
tion reveals that the typical psychoanalytic use of these concepts is not clearly
morally negative. Although Freud uses the “lie” concept at least once in the
com monplace meaning of a morally negative act, where it is used in an enu­
meration with such other morally-negative concepts as “fraud” and “calumny,”1
more often Freud uses the concept “lie” in a specifically psychoanalytic way
where the concept of lie is explained as a sign of emotional impotence. T his is
the case when Freud talks about “the lying poetic fancies of prehistoric times,”
(S .E ., XVIII, 136) or the lies of children (S .E ., XII, 305ff; or S .E ., X, 102-103).
In his article “Two Lies Told by Children,” (S .E ., XII, 303—309) Freud
presents and analyzes the case o f a girl who denied stealing fifty “pfennigs”
from her father and the case o f another girl who denied to her teacher using
a pair of com passes for what was supposed to be a freehand drawing.
In the first case, Freud discovered that the father’s anger over the theft
was a turning point in the girl’s life. Before the incident, she had been “wild,
 SE LF-D E SC R IPT IO N IN FREU D IA N PSY C H O A N A LY SIS 27

self-confident” (Ibid. 305). Afterwards, she was “shy and tim id” (Ibid.). Freud
discovered that, for the girl, taking money from her father was associated with
an incident in which the nursemaid gave the girl money to remain silent
about the nursem aid’s erotic relations with a doctor. Through this associa­
tion, taking money was unconsciously associated with an offer o f tenderness,
with “a declaration o f love” (Ibid. 307). T h e anger o f the father m eant that
her offer was rejected.
In the second case, Freud discovered that, when his patient was a young
girl, she could not deal with the fact that her father was less powerful than
she had thought. She adored and identified with her idealized father. O ne of
the talents the girl admired very much in her father was his drawing talent.
Her attem pt to draw a perfect circle was thus an attem pt to show not only
how she could draw, but also how well her father could. Sh e could therefore
not acknowledge anything that would dim inish the achievem ent.
In his introductory and concluding remarks, Freud writes that such lies
should not be interpreted morally; rather, educators should becom e con ­
cerned about the child’s unconscious problems. In the m ain text, Freud links
children’s lies to the lie’s hidden m eaning. A bout the first case, Freud writes:
“She could not admit, however, that she had appropriated the money; she
was obliged to disavow it, because her m otive for the deed which was uncon­
scious to herself, could not be adm itted” (Ibid. 307). T h e reason why it could
not be adm itted becom es clear when Freud summarizes the two cases at the
end o f his paper: “an adm ission was impossible for the same reason that was
given in the first o f the observations: it would inevitably have been an adm is­
sion o f her hidden incestuous love” (Ibid. 3 0 8 -309).
Clearly, Freud intends to argue in this article that a lie is to be inter­
preted in some cases as the impossibility of self-knowledge when self-knowl­
edge would be incom patible with self-love based on identification with an
idealized person.
Hypocrisy too is interpreted not so much as a conscious lie as it is a fail­
ure to live up to an ideal. Freud infers such a failure from mistakes that patients
often unconsciously make. Thus, in his article “Thoughts for the Times on
War and D eath,” (S .E ., XIV, 273-300) Freud defines hypocrisy as that attitude
which tries to follow cultural prescriptions even if one’s own drives are really
desiring som ething different. Hypocrisy is then described as follows:

A nyone . . . com pelled to act continually in accordance with precepts which

are n ot the expression o f his instinctual inclinations, is living, psychologi­
cally speaking, beyond his means, and may objectively be described as a hyp­
ocrite, w hether he is clearly aware o f the incongruity or not. (Ibid. 284)

T h e sign th at a person is living beyond his m eans is “the perpetual readi­

ness o f the inhibited instincts to break through to satisfaction at any su it­
able opportunity” (Ibid.). Clearly, failure to live up to an ideal is not so
28 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

m uch an act o f d eceit as it is an indication o f a person’s inability to realize

fully an ideal.
O n the other side o f the spectrum, a word used for a morally positive
attitude, “Glaubwiirdigkeh” (credibility), is not so unequivocally positive in
the psychoanalytic vision o f the person. Indeed, Freud derives his certainty
about the truth or correctness o f his patients’ answers, not from the patients’
explicit statem ents, but from a series o f side phenom ena such as the diffi­
culty o f resistance that had to be overcom e or the indirectness o f confirm a­
tion techniques that had to be used. Thus, credibility is not connected with
the p atien t’s m oral use o f freedom but with the indirectness o f the revelation
o f truth.
Nevertheless, if lies, hypocrisy, and credibility are non-m oral categories
and if self-expressions or statem ents about the self often fail, then the habit
of regularly interpreting these non-m oral categories as moral categories is
problem atic. Freud’s theory o f negation is a crucial contribution for clarifying
the problems encountered in this problem atic confusion o f moral and n on ­
moral m eanings o f categories.

2. F R E U D ’ S E M E R G I N G A W A R E N E S S
O F T H E F U N C T IO N O F N E G A T IO N

Freud’s theory o f negation first attem pts to explain the appearance of a lin­
guistic expression (i.e., a negation) which fallaciously changes the meaning
o f statem ents. Freud already observed this phenom enon in the treatm ent of
Emmy v. N . (1 8 88-89) (1 893).2 Thus, Freud suggests, in a footnote, a rela­
tionship between a negative statem ent and repression. (S .E ., II, 57, n. 2)
In his analysis o f the Rat-m an (1907) (1909), and again in a footnote,
Freud shows that he is already fam iliar with the curious phenom enon of
denial. Indeed, he writes: “T h is is a com m on type o f reaction to repressed
m aterial which has becom e conscious: the ‘N o ’ with which the fact is first
denied is immediately followed by a confirm ation o f it, though, to begin with,
only an indirect on e” (S .E ., X , 183, n. 2). T h is leads Freud to make, some ten
pages later, a distinction between two forms of knowing:

It m ust therefore be adm itted that . . . there are two kinds o f knowledge,
and it is reasonable to hold that the patien t ‘know s’ his traum as as that he
does not ‘know ’ them . For he knows them in that he has not forgotten
them , and he does n ot know them in that he is unaware of their sign ifi­
cance. (Ibid. 196, n. 1)

In his study of Judge Schreber (1911), Freud mentions the use of negation
as one of the techniques by which the patient indirectly reveals the truth.
Finally, Freud again discusses the problem o f negation twelve years after
his article on “N egation ,” in his study “Construction in A nalysis” (1937).
Here Freud adds a further idea: A denial is an indication that the labor of
 SE LF-D E SC R IPT IO N IN FREU D IA N P SY C H O A N A LY SIS 29

uncovering the truth is incomplete; a negation is not to be interpreted as an

indication that the proposed statem ent is false.
T h e idea that obfuscation is helpful for truth’s emergence and the insight
that obfuscation techniques and negation are related, are already expressed in
Freud’s case study o f the Ratm an (1909). There Freud m entions that the R at'
m an explicitly denied having had death-wishes towards his father. T he
patient then remembers a scene in Suderm ann’s novel in which one person
wishes another person’s death in order to be able to marry. T h en, suddenly,
the R atm an says: “H e [the Ratm an] could understand this [other person’s
death'w ish].” T h e R atm an then continues, saying that: “it would be only
right if his thoughts were the death o f him, for he deserved nothing less”
(S .E ., X, 183). In a footnote, Freud writes: “T h is sense of guilt involves the
most glaring contradiction of his opening denial that he had ever entertained
such an evil wish against his father. T h is is a com m on type o f reaction to
repressed m aterial which has becom e conscious: the ‘N o ’ with which the fact
is first denied is immediately followed by a confirm ation o f it, though, to
begin with, only an indirect on e” (S .E ., X, 183, n. 2). Freud explicitly m en­
tions the obfuscation necessary for the emergence o f unconscious truth: “I am
in the habit of regarding associations such as this, which bring forward som e­
thing that agrees with the content of an assertion o f mine, as a confirm ation
from the unconscious o f what I have said. N o other kind of ‘Yes' can be extracted
from the unconscious” (Italics added) (S .E ., VII, 57).
T h e later Freud is so familiar with with his patients’ need for obfuscation
that he remarks, alm ost casually, in a prelude to his interpretation o f the
Schreber case (1911):

. . . we have only to follow our usual psychoanalytic technique— to strip his

sentence of its negative form, to take his exam ple as being the actual thing,
or his quotation or gloss as being the original source— and we find ourselves
in possession o f what we are looking for. . . . (S .E ., X II, 35)

In his 1915 publication “T he U nconscious” Freud m entions this idea in

a broader context:

T h ere are in this system no negation, no doubt, no degrees o f certainty: all

this is only introduced by the work of the censorship betw een the Ucs
(unconscious) and the Pcs (preconscious). N egation is a substitute, at a
higher level, for repression. In the Ucs, there are only contents, connected
with greater or lesser strength. (S .E ., XIV, 186)

Finally, in his 1915 publication “Thoughts for the Times on War and
D eath,” Freud writes:
W h at we call our ‘unconscious’— the deepest strata o f our minds, m ade up
o f instinctual impulses— knows n othin g that is negative, and no negation;
in it, contradictions coincide. For that reason it does not know its own
death, for to that we can give only a negative content. (S .E ., XIV, 296)
30 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

A nother source o f arguments in favor o f the thesis that negation is not

present in the unconsciousness can be built from the fact that dreams— the
royal road to the unconsciousness— contain no negatives. Thus, in a som e­
what guarded way, Freud writes in two places: “‘N o ’ seems not to exist so far
as dreams are concerned” (S .E ., IV, 318; S .E ., V, 661). He will point out,
however, that there are roundabout m ethods of expressing negatives and co n ­
tradictions such as failing to achieve som ething notw ithstanding serious
attem pts (S .E ., IV, 337). Ten years later Freud writes about his remark con ­
cerning negations and contradictory elements in dreams:

I did not succeed in understanding the dream-work’s singular tendency to

disregard negation and to em ploy the same m eans o f representation for
expressing contraries. . . . (S .E ., XI, 155)

In 1916 Freud writes more precisely: “T h is connects with the further fact
that a representation o f ‘N o ’— or at any rate an unambiguous one— is not to
be found in dream s” (S .E ., XV, 178).

3. FR O M E P IS T E M O L O G Y T O
AN TH RO PO LO G Y AN D O N TO LO GY

Freud’s theory o f negation stresses the fact that negation can only be
explained within a dual framework: an archeology and a teleology.
T he archeological aspect comes through clearly in the following sentence:

To negate som ething in a judgm ent is, at bottom , to say: ‘T h is is som ething
which I should prefer to repress.’ A negative judgm ent is the intellectual
substitute for repression; its ‘n o’ is the hall-m ark of repression, a certificate
of origin— like, let us say, ‘M ade in G erm any.’ (Freud, S .E ., X IX , 236)

Thus, without a prior repression, negation would be deprived o f its func­

tion as a subsitute, a hallmark, and a certificate of origin. Therefore, negation
cannot be fully understood without an appreciation o f repression.
T he teleological aspect com es through when Freud writes, “W ith the
help of the symbol of negation, thinking frees itself from the restrictions of
repression and enriches itself with m aterial that is indispensable for its proper
functioning” (Ibid. 236), and again when, later in the essay, he writes:

But the perform ance of the function of judgm ent is n ot made possible until
the creation of the symbol of negation has endowed thinking with a first
measure o f freedom from the consequences of repression and, with it, from
the com pulsion o f the pleasure principle. (Ibid. 239)

A ccording to this line o f reasoning, negation is a creation that has the pur­
pose o f freeing thought or, alternatively, the purpose of enriching thought
with previously repressed unconscious content.
 SE LF-D E SC R IPT IO N IN FR EU D IA N PSY C H O A N A LY SIS 31

T he linguistic signifier “negation” is thereby interpreted as a pivotal

instrument whereby a “telos” can becom e the partial victor over an undesir­
able “arche.” T h e rest o f Freud’s article on negation presents the reader with
several unexpected turns in the argum entation. A very abrupt turn com es
when Freud attempts to dem onstrate that his negation theory is valid for both
attributive and existential judgm ents. In the course of his argument, Freud
ties his epistem ological argument to an anthropological one. T h e anthropo­
logical view, presented as a com panion thesis, is that the self constitutes itself
even in its epistem ological capacities. C oncerning the epistem ological task of
m aking attributive judgm ents, this anthropological thesis claim s that the self
successively develops three attitudes toward attributes. T he key text for our
interpretation o f Freud’s claim is: “W hat is bad, what is alien to the ego and
what is external are, to begin with, identical” (Ibid. 237).
We interpret this text to m ean that, in the historical developm ent of the
individual, there is a period in which the self creates a fictitious distinction
between the outside world and the self (i.e., the inside). T h e self classifies
som ething as being inside or outside by using the criterion o f whether it is
good or bad for the ego. It is a purely narcissistic criterion in so far as the self
imaginarily identifies all bad things with the outside world and all good
things with itself. O ne must think of this m ove by the self as having been pre­
ceded by a period in which the ego did not make the distinction between
inside and outside on the basis o f the aforem entioned narcissistic criterion.
(In his article on negation, Freud claim s that the self bases the distinction on
the pleasure principle.) W hen the self is not yet using a narcissistic criterion
to establish a distinction between inside and outside, it lives in the feeling of
oceanic unity with everything.
O ne must also conclude that, after the self makes the narcissistic dis­
tinction between inside— as all good— and outside— as all bad, the self still
needs to develop the capability o f recognizing good elements in the outside
world and bad elements in itself. Concerning the epistem ological task of
making existential judgm ents, the anthropological thesis claim s “that a pre­
condition for the setting up o f reality-testing is that objects shall have been
lost which once brought real satisfaction” (Ibid. 238). Freud arrives at this
anthropological thesis by way o f two intermediate epistem ological claims.
T he first claim is that the problem o f existential judgm ents related to finding
an object is a kind o f dialogue between a perception and a representation.
T h e second epistem ological claim is that finding an object is thus always a
m atter not o f finding the object but o f refinding it (Ibid. 237). G iven this anti-
Kantian epistemology, where the constitution of an object is not explained by
the use of a priori categories, Freud is forced to interpret finding as refinding
an object. T h is epistem ological vision therefore requires a particular anthro­
pology: that is, that there was such a thing as a primal object which was avail­
able to the subject from the beginning. Put in a more positive way, the
32 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

anthropological thesis is that the self experiences unity with the world prior
to experiencing differences with the world. W ithin such a view, the anthro­
pological prerequisites for the epistem ological possibility o f existential judg­
ments are that “objects shall have been lost,” and that the self has the
strength and tools to overcome the dictates of the pleasure principle. In the
second period o f the self's self-constitution, the pleasure principle demands
that all good objects— be they lost or not— be im aginatively classified as part
o f the ego. In this period— the period o f the pleasure-ego’s pre-dom inance—
the loss of an object is countered by an effort to create an illusionary presence
o f the object and furthermore by an effort to identify with that object. In that
period, objects can not subjectively be experienced as lost.
Towards the end of his paper, Freud complements his epistemological and
anthropological claims with an ontological one. He uses three parallel pairs of
concepts to present his argument for an ontology of the human person. (Ibid.
239). The three pairs o f concepts are: the epistemological actions o f affirmation
and negation; the ontological entities Eros and the instinct of destruction; and
the concepts serving to relate the epistemological pair to the ontological pair.
I would like to make the tentative claim that in the asymmetry o f the
concepts Freud uses to relate the epistem ological pair to the ontological pair,
we may find a possible key to Freud’s ontology. Indeed, Freud says that affir­
m ation is a substitute for unity, whereas negation is a successor to expulsion.
T h e word expulsion presupposes a prior unity, and an action that breaks this
unity. N egation is a successor to that action. T he word substitute (Ersatz) is
more often used to point to a thing replacing another thing than to an action
following another action. Therefore, affirmation is said to be a substitute for
another non-action, that is, the primal situation o f unity. U nity must, there­
fore, be thought o f as ontologically primary.
T his tentative claim regarding Freud’s ontology is supported by its abil­
ity to explain the sentence immediately following the introduction o f the
parallelism o f the three pairs of concepts. T he sentence it helps explain is:

T h e general w ish to n egate, the negativism w hich is displayed by some

psychotics, is probably to be regarded as a sign o f a defusion o f instincts
th at h as taken place through the w ithdraw al o f the libidinal com ponents.
(Ibid. 239)

A ccording to my reading, this would mean that the psychotic has

becom e psychotic because o f a fatal developm ental move. T h e fatal m ove is
the withdrawal of libidinal com ponents. W ithin Freudian terminology, this
m eans that, whereas the self was originally psychologically united with som e­
body because o f the self’s libidinal investm ent in him or her, the self now sep­
arates itself from that other by m eans of withdrawal. N ow that the forces of
Eros (libidinal investm ents) are neutralized, the only effective force that
remains is the instinct o f destruction. Freud claim ed that negation is one of
 SE LF-D E SC R IPT IO N IN FR EU D IA N PSY C H O A N A LY SIS 33

the products o f that instinct. T he psychotic’s overproduction o f negative sen ­

tences therefore becom es intelligible.
In order to make our understanding o f Freud’s theory o f negation com ­
plete, we need to reflect further on two more points: the loss of the original
object and the relationship between negation and repression.
Let us start with the relationship between negation and repression. A ccord­
ing to Freud, negation in a denial is a substitute for repression. W ithin the
Freudian oeuvre, the concept of repression has a central function. It involves a
double aspect. T he already repressed refuses the newly repressed material access
to consciousness while at the same time attracting and connecting this newly
repressed material to the already repressed. Freud argued for this view of repres­
sion because the self seemed unable to undo what it had suppressed. But this
interpretation of the concept o f repression required Freud to postulate some first-
repressed material, which, although not attracted to prior-repressed material,
nevertheless remained out of reach of the conscious self. Therefore, Freud
coined the concept of primal repression. This concept was originally only a the­
oretical term (De W aelhens 1978, 49-56). Later, Freud linked the concept of
primal repression to the idea of fixating instincts to a representation. Freud did
so by connecting the concept of primal repression with the idea of the original
object’s loss and by his analysis of the “fort-da” game of his grandchild (Beyond
the Pleasure Principle, S .E ., XVIII, 14-17; also S .E ., XIX, 239).3
T h e explanation runs as follows: T he child is very much in need o f the
first love object— the mother. T h e absence o f the m other creates unrest, an x ­
iety, and tears. T his was not the case, however, in one of Freud’s grandchil­
dren. T h is child had succeeded in substituting first a toy and then words for
the real disappearing mother. T he child was able to master its “ instinctual
need” for the mother, its first object, by libidinally investing in its toys. T h is
libido inscription entails a libido fixation. Such a libidinal inscription means
a fixation o f that libido. A t the same time, this inscription is a repression of
the libido’s immediately desired gratification and an accepted— albeit subli­
mated— loss of the first love object.
Clearly, this act o f primal repression sets the child on its way to the con ­
stitution o f itself as a self, that is, as independent of others. T his act of primal
repression is not conscious. It is an act that makes awareness of som eone
other than the self possible. A s such, the self emerges out of an act of the sub­
ject which is logically prior to consciousness. A ll that falls under the power
o f prim al repression shares this inaccessibility to consciousness. C on scious­
ness can and should attem pt to recover contents from repression, even from
prim al repression. T h e act o f recovering such content is a challenge. Failure
in the task o f recovering this content, however, should be interpreted as
absence o f acts of recovery, or as absence of successful acts o f recovery, not as
a morally wrong activity. Thus, a denial is not a lie; it is a testimony to the
uncom pleted task of recovering contents from the repressed.4
34 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

4. IM P L IC A T IO N S

a) Freud’s epistem ological view o f negation is linked with an anthropol­

ogy o f the self as self-constituting. It is further linked with the idea that con ­
sciousness must labor in order to make available for itself contents which it
does not possess naturally, but which the unconscious possesses.
It is worthwhile to draw attention to the fact that Freud’s theory is rele­
vant first o f all to the dom ain o f self-knowledge, even though Freud does not
explicitly say so. Freud’s theory of negation implies that the self does not n ec­
essarily possess true knowledge about itself. Logically wrong statem ents about
the self, therefore, are not necessarily lies. They are only a testimony to the
fact that this concrete self has not yet advanced far enough in the labor of
self-possession to know its own self. A conscious lie is an act of deceit. A
denial is an act o f im potence.5
b) In the following statem ent Freud him self provides an argument that
real self-knowledge (knowledge wrested from the unconscious) is a victorious
achievem ent: “There is no stronger evidence that we have been successful in
our effort to uncover the unconscious than when the patient reacts to it with
the words: ‘I didn’t think th at’ or ‘I didn’t (ever) think of th at.’” Thus, self­
knowledge, which previously was not available to consciousness, can, with
effort, be obtained.
T he above interpretation of Freud’s theory o f knowledge faces two prob­
lems, one theoretical and one practical. Sartre m ost sharply formulated the
theoretical problem: If a content is really unconscious, how can on e’s co n ­
sciousness know that a particular content is precisely that one which the
individual was looking to uncover? Sartre’s solution is his general theory of
bad faith. T h e unconscious is only that which one refuses to know, and is
therefore not really out o f consciousness’s sight. A lie, in this Sartrian view,
remains a lie.
T he practical problem is that my interpretation of Freud’s theory of nega­
tion m ight not square with some o f Freud’s other statements. Indeed, Freud
also wrote: “It happens particularly often that, after we have laboriously forced
some piece of knowledge on a patient, he will declare: ‘I’ve always known that,
I could have told you that before’” (S .E ., II, 299). Clearly, this statem ent fal­
sifies my whole interpretation o f Freud’s theory of negation and would allow
us to come close to equating Freud’s concept of repression with Sartre’s con ­
cept of bad faith: T h e unconscious is not hidden from consciousness.
c) W hat are we to do with these objections to my view o f Freud’s theory
o f negation? First of all, I would like to stress that the equation of Freud’s con­
cept o f repression with Sartre’s concept o f bad faith is unacceptable because
it would make it impossible to incorporate other parts o f Freud’s oeuvre.
Second, I have a direct statem ent from Freud to help us. Indeed, Freud
says that the proposition, “I’ve always known that. I could have told you that
 SE LF-D E SC R IPT IO N IN FR EU D IA N P SY C H O A N A LY SIS 35

before” is an act o f ungratefulness and is recognized as such by some patients:

“T hose with some degree o f insight recognize afterwards that this is a piece of
self-deception and blam e them selves for being ungrateful” (Ibid. 299).
Interestingly enough, Freud later explores the way in which an ego,
enriched by ideas that were previously unconscious, relates itself to its previ­
ous self. He notices that patients say about these new ideas: “ But I can ’t
remember having thought it” (S .E ., II, 300).
Freud continues by asking the theoretical question o f how this nonavail­
ability o f thought content (ideas) must be interpreted. Freud proposes two
possibilities. T he first is that the patient is simply withholding recognition of
his own thought. (H e would then be in bad faith). T he second possibility is
the following: “. . . are we to suppose that we are really dealing with thoughts
which never cam e about, which merely have a possibility o f existing, so that
the treatm ent would lie in the accom plishm ent o f a psychical act which did
not take place at the tim e?” (Ibid. 300)
In a text written prior to 1898, Freud addresses this question by writing:
“It is clearly impossible to say anything about this— that is, about the state
which the pathogenic m aterial was in before the analysis— until we have
arrived at a thorough clarification o f our basic psychological views, especially
on the nature o f consciousness.” (Ibid. 300)
I believe that I have succeeded in dem onstrating that the later writings
o f Freud allow us to conclude that the repressed and consciousness are two
different things. If the self succeeds in the task o f conquering the contents of
the unconscious, it establishes a unity which it did not have for itself before.
T he self then inscribes an unconscious thought in a new register, that is, in
consciousness. Thus, the later Freud provides evidence that his second
hypothesis is the correct one; a thought merely had the possibility o f existing
as conscious thought. Thus, the psychotherapeutic treatm ent lies in the
accom plishm ent o f a psychical act which did not exist before.6
In the same year that Freud wrote his article “N egation,” he wrote
another article: “A note upon the ‘M ystic W riting-Pad’” (1924/1925). In that
article Freud explicitly confirms my interpretation. Indeed, Freud compares
the unconscious and consciousness with two m ethods of writing down ideas.
O ne m ethod achieves perm anence— writing in ink on a piece of paper.
A nother method allows people to always write down new ideas as long as
they erase the previous ones— the blackboard. A t this point, Freud draws
attention to a new device that achieves the two m ethods at once: the “M ys­
tic W riting-Pad.” T h is device has three layers. T h e lower layer is a slab of
dark brown resin or wax. T he middle layer is a translucent waxed paper. T he
upper layer is a transparent piece o f celluloid. T h e function of the upper layer
is to protect the translucent waxed paper. For purposes o f clarifying m ethods
o f writing down ideas, it can be overlooked. W riting occurs when one uses a
stylus to press the translucent waxed paper down on the dark brown slab. T he
36 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

points of contact provide the letters. T h is “M ystic W riting-Pad” can be used

over and over again. O ne simply has to lift the translucent waxed paper away
from the dark brown slab, in order to write down a new message. T h e “Mys­
tic W riting-Pad” is thus like the blackboard. However, if we look at the dark
brown slab, the first message remains inscribed in it, although we now need
special light to see it.
Freud now com pares the system o f perception with the translucent
waxed paper and the protective celluloid. H e compares the unconscious with
the dark brown slab. A ccording to Freud, consciousness occurs when the
translucent waxed paper and the dark brown slab touch each other.
Freud adds one further correction which addresses the Sartrean ob jec­
tion. T he correction is that one must see the writing in the consciousness -
unconciousness system as resulting, not from an external hand, but from
internal energy em anating from the dark brown slab which makes the
translucent waxed paper receptive to the external stimuli. Interruption o f the
energy em anating from the unconscious (i.e., libidinal withdrawal) is similar
to separating the translucent waxed paper from the dark brown slab. T his
leads to the destruction of the writing in consciousness without the writing
being destroyed in the unconscious. Therapeutic efforts can thus be under­
stood as efforts to bring the two layers together. O ne had preserved the writ­
ing, but in an invisible way. T h e other is the layer by which the writing alone
can becom e visible. U nconscious thoughts are thus only potentially available
for the conscious self. Thus, labeling all mistakes about one’s self-description
as lies is a categorical error. To do so m eans that one considers these mistakes
to be the result o f an act, whereas they are actually the result of the lack of
an act. M istakes about one’s self-description need not be the result o f an act
o f deceit; they can also be the result of lack o f self-possession.7
 TH REE

Denial and Hegel’s

Philosophical Anthropology

abstract. In this chapter I dem onstrate th at the applicability o f Freud’s theory

o f n egation (denial) is n ot restricted to therapeutic situations w ith m entally ill
persons, but in fact applies generally to h um an beings. First, I provide descrip­
tive proof by show ing that den ials occur as a crucial part of the plot in two
great tragedies: S o p h o cle s’ Oedipus, the King and Ibsen’s The Ghosts. Secon d, I
construct a general proof o f my claim by m eans o f H egel’s d ialectical an th ro­
pology. Here again I start by using, firstly, H egel’s concrete analyses that reveal
universal structures: i.e., H egel’s analyses o f self-consciousness (m aster-slave
d ialectic) and o f the hum an will. Secondly, I use a general anthropological
claim by H egel to make my m ain argum ent, nam ely his claim that the road to
truth is not just a path o f doubt, but more accurately, a highway of despair. If
the road to truth is as painful as H egel describes it, I h ave discovered a ph ilo­
soph ical reason why h um an beings m ight w ant to avoid the truth and fall into
the trap o f denial.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

Freud’s theory o f negation and denial implies a concept of a person in whom

there are two centers of thought: the center o f “conscious thought” and the
center o f “unconscious thought.” Freud’s theory further implies that in cases
of denial— including boasting— the unconscious knows, whereas conscious
thought misunderstands. Freud gradually cam e to the conviction that con ­
scious thought uses linguistic negation as the instrument to formulate its m is­
understandings and to hide em otionally difficult insights. In the following
chapter I will study whether Freud’s claim that denial in self-knowledge is

37
38 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

universal is indeed true, and if it is universal, why?1 I will rely on H egel’s

anthropology to dem onstrate the necessity and unavoidability of the forces of
the negative implied by denial.2

1. D E N I A L ’ S P E R V A S I V E P R E S E N C E IN S E L F - K N O W L E D G E

O utside the psychoanalytic tradition, do we find a similar view o f the person:

that is, a view that holds that a human being, at some obscure level, under­
stands, whereas, at the conscious level, he misunderstands? I believe that
many literary m asterpieces present such a view. Let us recall Oedipus, the King
by Sophocles3, and Ghosts by Ibsen. Both tragedies present a person forced to
change his or her conscious self-understanding. In the process, the first con ­
scious self-understanding is dem onstrated to be a misunderstanding. Thus,
early in the play, Oedipus angrily rejects (lines 3 0 0 -4 6 1 ) Teiresias’s accusa­
tions: “I say you are the murderer o f the king whose murderer you seek” (362)
and “He shall be proved father and brother both to his own children in his
house; to her that gave him birth, a son and husband both; a fellow sower in
his father’s bed with that sam e father that he murdered.” (457—5 9 ).4 A t the
end o f the play, however, Oedipus exclaim s in self-accusation: “A ccursed is
my living with them I lived with, cursed in my killing.” (1 1 8 4 -8 5 ).
Similarly, in Ghosts, Mrs. A lving com pletely changes her self-under­
standing. A t the beginning o f the play, she views herself as the betrayed wife
who carries the burden o f her female duty of staying with her husband and
protecting her child from evil exam ples. Thus, she says:

I had to bear it for my little boy’s sake. But when the last insult was added;
when my own servant m aid— ; then I swore to myself: this shall com e to an
end! A n d so I took the reins into my own h and— the w hole control— over
him and everything else. For now I had a weapon against him, you see; he
dared not oppose me. It was then 1 sent Osw ald [her child] away from hom e.
He was nearly seven years old, and was beginning to observe and ask ques­
tions, as children do. T h at I could not bear. It seem ed to me the child must
be poisoned by merely breathing the air o f this polluted house. T h a t was
why I sent him away. A n d now you can see, too, why he was never allowed
to set foot inside his hom e so long as his father lived. N o one knows what
that cost me. (Ibsen 1908, 2 0 9 -1 0 )

W hen her grown-up son returns in despair from Paris and com plains that
“the joy o f life, M other— th at’s a thing you don’t know much about in these
parts o f the world” (Ibid. 259), Mrs. A lvin g changes her self-understanding
and says:
A little while ago you spoke o f the joy of life; and at that word a new light
burst for me over my life and everything connected with it. . . . You ought
to have known your father w hen he was a young lieutenant. He was brim ­
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S P H ILO SO P H IC A L A N TH R O P O LO G Y 39

m ing over w ith the joy of life. . . . It was like a breezy day only to look at
him . A n d w hat exuberant strength and vitality there was in him . . . . W ell
then, child o f joy as he was— for he was like a child in those days— he had
to live at hom e here in a half-grown town, w hich had no joys to offer him —
only dissipations. H e had no o b ject in life— only an official position. H e had
n o work into w hich he could throw h im self heart and soul; he had only busi­
ness. H e had not a single com rade that could realize what the joy o f life
m eant— only loungers and b oon -com p an io n s.. . . Your poor father found no
outlet for the overpow ering joy o f life that was in him. And I brought no
brightness into his home. (Ibid.; em phasis m ine)

A n d then Mrs. A lvin g continues with a remarkable self-confession:

T h ey had taught me a great deal about duties and so forth, w hich I went on
obstinately believing in. Everything was marked out into duties— into my
duties, and his duties, and— I am afraid I made h is hom e intolerable for your
poor father, Osw ald. (Ibid. 277 -7 8 )

Both Sophocles and Ibsen present tragedies in which the m ain character
(Oedipus/M rs. A lving) radically change their self-conception. These charac­
ters may help prove the general validity of Freud’s theory; both Oedipus and
Mrs. A lving knew, on some level, the truth about them selves before they
cam e to pronounce that truth.
T h e novelty of Freud’s thesis is that a change of self-conception is based
on an unconscious and true self-understanding and that the change o f con ­
scious self-conception begins with a denial. M ore precisely, Freud writes that
the ego’s recognition o f the unconscious is expressed in a negative formula.
T he force o f the article’s argument, however, is that the ego’s recognition of
the unconscious must be expressed in a negative formula. T h is is evident from
the following sentence in Freud’s article:

But the perform ance o f the function o f judgm ent is not made possible until
the creation o f the symbol o f n egation has endowed thinking with the first
measure of freedom from the consequences o f repression and, with it, from
the com pulsion o f the pleasure principle. (S .E ., X IX , 239)

A ccording to Freud, freedom o f thought depends upon the creation of

the linguistic symbol o f negation. Is there any way in which we can clarify
why negation must play such a crucial function in an individual’s attem pt to
reach the truth about him or herself?

2. T H E F O R C E S O F T H E N E G A T IO N IM P L IE D BY D E N IA L S

It is useful to restrict the domain of the puzzle. Indeed, Freud’s exam ples all
refer to knowledge about the self. Perhaps the same thesis holds for knowledge
40 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

of the external world.5 However, here I will address only the puzzle o f knowl­
edge about the self.
A t the beginning o f our analysis it is useful to remember that Freud’s the­
sis about self-knowledge is diam etrically opposed to the C artesian tradition,
which stresses the them e o f the self-presence of consciousness. Several 19th-
century philosophers presented a view of mankind, that radically departed
from this C artesian tradition. A m ong them are Hegel, M arx, and Nietzsche.
It might be useful to rely on H egel to elucidate Freud’s thesis.
I hope to make progress by analyzing a famous passage of H egel’s Phe­
nomenology; “Lordship and Bondage” (H egel 1977 b, 229—40). In that pas­
sage, H egel describes the emergence of self-consciousness. Consciousness is
ready to becom e self-consciousness when it discovers its essential contribu­
tion to perception. Perception is not just passive registration o f the outside
world. Perception involves activity on the subject’s part. A t first, however,
consciousness is not aware o f its active participation in perception, and there­
fore does not know itself. H egel claim s that it is the encounter with another
consciousness that allows it to becom e aware of itself and to differentiate
itself from the object of perception.6 W hen becom ing self-aware, conscious­
ness first experiences that it is different from objectivity (self-consciousness is
not one’s knowledge o f one’s own weight, height, grades, etc.). T h is experi­
ence, however, is a subjective conviction, not a proven truth. T he proof that
a particular consciousness is not som ething objective lies in the fact that this
consciousness is willing to risk its very objectivity, that is, its life.7 There must
be another consciousness, however, for whom one can prove one’s conviction
and who can then recognize the truth of this conviction. T his other con ­
sciousness must have the same purpose. Jointly, these two consciousnesses
can now prove to each other that they are as consciousnesses som ething
other than objectivity because in a life and death struggle both are risking
their lives.
Only if one consciousness experiences the fear of death shall this strug­
gle end in som ething other than actual death. A ctual death must be avoided
because the death of either consciousness prevents the other consciousness
from recognizing the truth of what consciousness is. Fear o f death, however,
implies that one consciousness is changing its self-conception. Fear o f death
entails em otionally accepting that life, the body, food, shelter, and so on, are
all essential for consciousness. T h e life and death struggle, however, does not
allow for one consciousness to affirm the two characteristics that conscious­
ness discovered to be essential for consciousness: that is, on the one hand,
that consciousness is not objectivity and thus that objectivity is worthless to
it while, on the other hand, that objectivity (life, the body, etc.) is essential
for consciousness.
T he two characteristics cannot be affirmed simultaneously, because in a
life and death struggle, one either continues the struggle— thereby dem on­
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S P H ILO SP H IC A L A N TH R O P O LO G Y 41

strating that life is a secondary value— or gives up the struggle— thus indi­
cating that life is crucial to consciousness. O ne cannot do both at the same
time. We thus discover that consciousness cannot make the transition to self­
consciousness alone.8 It needs another consciousness. Two consciousnesses
can make that transition because each can prove one o f the two necessary but
contradictory or m utually exclusive features o f consciousness. T h e conscious­
ness that is willing to continue to fight proves that objectivity is secondary
for consciousness. T h e consciousness that fears death proves that objectivity
is essential for consciousness. T h e first is called the master. T he second is
called the slave.
Both the master and the slave have opted for a specific self-conception.
Both hope to realize a self by m eans o f a self-image. In his analysis, Hegel
explains the disappointm ent of the master by showing how his self-image
cannot possibly be a reliable guide towards self-fulfillment. Hegel offers two
arguments as to why the m aster’s self-image is or will be a disappointm ent.
T he first argument is a general, and thus an abstract, argument: the m aster’s
ultim ate desire, H egel reminds us, was the will to be recognized as a co n ­
sciousness that is beyond objectivity and is thus unique. T h e master must
receive that recognition from the slave. T he master, however, is not able to
value the slave because the slave has opted to identify him self with life and
objectivity— the very things that the master considered secondary. Thus, by
looking down on the slave, the master has deprived him self o f the possibility
o f receiving worthwhile recognition, even though the slave may hasten to
give the master recognition.
T h e second argument that H egel gives is based on the m aster’s descrip­
tion o f the actual experience of pursuing the realization o f his self-concep­
tion. T he master in effect acts according to his self-conception and lets the
slave fulfill his objective needs. H e also reserves for him self the right to think
when he and the slave are together. Thus, he can give orders9 while the slave
is supposed to execute them. In both cases, though, the slave is forced to work
and to transform the external world; he thus develops skills10 that the master
does not possess. T he master, however, needs the slave’s skills to pursue the
actualization of his self-conception. T h e master therefore becom es dependent
on the slave. T h is part o f H egel’s dialectic shows that the master actualizes
the opposite of his self-conception in the process o f pursuing his self-concep­
tion. Indeed, the m aster’s self-conception denied the validity of one o f the
two basic principles of consciousness: that is, the fact that life and objectiv­
ity are essential for consciousness. T h e realization o f the m aster’s self-con­
ception is therefore possible only if som eone else (the slave) takes care o f this
neglected (or repressed) principle. Thus, the m aster must becom e the slave of
the slave. T his outcom e is not at all what the m aster had intended.
T h e analysis of “Lordship and Bondage” teaches us a crucial lesson about
the becom ing o f self-consciousness. A n individual must discover who he or
42 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

she is and then try to becom e that person. In “Lordship and Bondage,” how­
ever, Hegel dem onstrated that hum an consciousness possesses contradictory
characteristics. O nly one o f them can be affirmed at any one time by con ­
sciousness. T h e other aspect must then be affirmed by another conscious­
n ess." H egel writes in his Philosophy of Right (#7):

It [the will] is the self-determ ination of the ego, w hich m eans that at one
and the same tim e the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e., as restricted
and determ inate, and yet rem ains by itself, i.e., in its self-identity and uni­
versality. It determ ines itself and yet at the sam e tim e binds itself together
with itself. T h e ego determ ines itself in so far as it is the relating o f n ega­
tivity to itself.

T h is text summarizes H egel’s view on the problem of the w ill.12 Hegel

sees an individual’s will as caught between two imperatives. T he first imper­
ative of the will is to be directed towards the universal. T h at is to say that no
particular object of the will is capable o f satisfying the will directly. T h e sec­
ond imperative of an individual’s will is that, in order for the will to function,
it must will som ething determ inate and particular. T h e experience of the will
is therefore that, in willing anything, it posits itself as som ething it is not. A
concrete exam ple helps illustrate H egel’s general thesis. A student who earns
his college tuition by washing dishes in a restaurant is not willing to be iden­
tified as a kitchen-helper. A t the same time, this student actually does wash
dishes. H egel’s theory further suggests that hum an beings have a m ethod of
overcom ing this impossible situation. They can relate negatively to what
they are willing while at the same time willing it. In our exam ple, the student
can deny that he is a kitchen-helper, while at the same time, he continues to
clean dishes in a restaurant. H e can say that he is not a kitchen-helper but
that he is earning tuition by cleaning dishes. T h e statem ent: “I am earning
tuition” allows the student to relate negatively to what he is doing while also
allowing him to continue to do what he is doing. T h e linguistic expression “I
am earning tuition” thus relocates cleaning dishes into another space— the
m otivational space of preparing for a career in a society where social m obil­
ity depends on individualistic, marketable skills. A particular activity (wash­
ing dishes) is thereby given a more universal m eaning. It allows the student
to relate negatively to his activity of washing dishes, for he is not washing
dishes; he is earning tuition.
Let us rem em ber th at H egel’s general thesis can be understood as a les­
son learned from the m aster-slave d ialectic. O n e consciousness chose the
role o f m aster for itself. T h a t consciousness, however, experienced the
m aster’s role as different— and practically opposite— from w hat it had
im agined the role to be. B eing a m aster does n ot entail becom ing inde­
pendent as was hoped, but rather involves becom ing dependent on the
slave, who had accepted the role o f dependency. C on sciou sness is th ere­
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S P H ILO SP H IC A L A N T H R O P O LO G Y 43

fore n ot w hat it chose to b e.13 C on sciou sness will therefore have to relate
negatively to what it decided to be.
It m ight be useful to draw attention to the fact that this process is closely
related to Freud’s description o f what happens in the process o f denial. Freud
writes about denial: “W ith the help o f negation only one consequence of the
process o f repression is u n d o n e .. . . T h e outcom e o f this is a kind o f intellec­
tual acceptance o f the repressed, while at the sam e time what is essential to
the repression persists” (S .E ., X IX , 236). R elating negatively to the repressed
through denial allows an unacceptable state of affairs to continue, similar to
the case of the student who continues to do what he does not want to be
identified with (i.e. dishwashing), or to the case o f emperor M arcus Aurelius
who continued to reign even though being on the throne had become
unessential for him as a stoic.
There is, however, a crucial difference between the master-slave situa­
tion analyzed by H egel and the process o f denial described by Freud. In the
case of the situation analyzed by Hegel, one has a desirable and constructive
outcom e. In the process described by Freud, one has an undesirable and
regressive outcome. We do not yet have the conceptual framework to under­
stand the difference.
H egel’s second general statem ent applicable to our problem can be found
in the introduction to the Phenomenology:

Because o f that, the road can be looked on as a path o f doubt, or more prop­
erly a highway o f despair. For what happens there is not w hat is usually
understood by doubting, a jostling against this or that supposed truth, the
outcom e of w hich is again a disappearance in due course o f the doubt and a
return to the former truth, so th at at the end the m atter is taken as it was
before. O n the contrary, the pathw ay is the conscious insight in the untruth
o f the phenom enal knowledge. (1977 b, 135-36)

T h is text is a com m ent upon H egel’s analysis of phenom enal knowledge

and the ego’s conception o f its own function within phenom enal knowledge.
T he com m ent is applicable though to many dialectical turns in the Phenom­
enology. It states that the road to truth will involve a change in self-concep­
tion. It further claim s that such a change requires more than doubting; it
involves despair. Doubt is questioning a particular truth, whereas despair is
experiencing the untruth of on e’s self-conception. O ne could ask, however,
why doubt about on e’s self-conception is not simply doubt, but despair.14
H egel does not elaborate upon this question. A dictionary definition, how ­
ever, m ight offer some possible clues to an answer. T h e Standard College Dic­
tionary defines doubt as “to hold the truth, validity, or reliability o f as uncer­
tain; hesitate to believe or accept.” T h e same dictionary defines despair as “to
lose or abandon hope; be or becom e hopeless” (Funk and W agnalls, Standard
College Dictionary). Thus, a crucial definitional difference between doubt and
44 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

despair is that despair involves a loss o f hope. H ope is defined in the same dic­
tionary as “to desire with expectation o f fulfillm ent.”15
T he dictionary definition allows us to point to some precise differences
between doubt and despair. A lthough both states question a previously held
truth, despair also involves elim inating the possibility of desire, for despair is
losing the expectation of desire’s fulfillment.
W hen we now returns to the m aster-slave dialectic, we must rem ember
that in th at passage, H egel describes a m om ent in the self-constitution of
consciousness. T h is m om ent requires that desire find an ego-m odel (ego­
ideal) by which it hopes to be recognized. T h e first consciousness’s hope
was to find self-fulfillm ent and recognition in the role o f master. T h e sec­
ond consciousness’s hope was to retain its essence in the role o f the slave.
A n im portant step in consciousness’s developm ent is thus the m om ent of
choosing the ego-m odel (ego-ideal) by which consciousness hopes to real­
ize itself. T h at choice indeed determ ines what consciousness will take as a
valid object o f desire. T h at choice determ ines to what consciousness, as
desire, will attach itself in order to find itself back in th at object or that
ego-m odel.
Hegel, however, stresses the fact that consciousness is not guiding the
choice o f ego-model (ego-ideal). T he choice is determ ined by the state of
desire. T h at state is radically different for the two consciousnesses. Indeed,
the desire o f the consciousness that will accept the role of the slave is a desire
that has been radically transformed. T h e desire of the consciousness that will
choose the role o f master is non-transformed desire. T h e transform ation of
the desire of the future slave is the result o f a fear of death. Hegel describes
that transform ation as follows: “It (consciousness) has been in that experi­
ence (fear o f death) melted to its inmost soul, has trembled throughout its
every fiber, and all that was fixed and steadfast has quaked within it” (Ibid.
237). G iven that the desire of the consciousness that will choose the role of
the master has not been transformed because that consciousness does not
know the fear o f death, one must therefore conclude that the m aster cannot
find a true object for its desire in the slave’s role.
We are now ready to discover the full consequence o f the m aster’s expe­
rience and life project. H egel makes it clear that it will not be the m aster’s
consciousness that discovers the falsehood o f its own ego-model. If that were
the case, the master would have knowledge o f his falsehood. T he falsehood
o f the m aster’s role will be dem onstrated for the reader who is willing to fol­
low H egel’s description and reasoning. Through Hegel, the falsehood o f the
m aster’s ego-model becom es evident for the outsider.
Informed by Hegel, we know that it is logically impossible for desire to
find recognition by m eans of the m aster’s ego-model. Like all desires, the m as­
ter’s desire is intentional. It must have an object. Furthermore, that object
must be found to be a valid or true object for desire. G iven, however, that the
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S P H ILO SP H IC A L A N T H R O P O LO G Y 45

desire o f the master is not a transformed desire, the master cannot accept an
ego-model other than its own as a true or valid object o f its desire. If the m as­
ter recognizes his ego-model’s falsehood, he will be without an object of
desire. H egel calls this state despair. If the state o f being without an object of
desire must be avoided, the figure o f the m aster has no other choice but to try
to justify the truth and validity o f the only object his desire can choose. The
master must therefore try to defend the validity o f the role of master, even
though Hegel has taught us the falsity of that role.16 Clearly, this is a defen­
sive and incorrect strategy. Freud’s case studies reveal similar faulty strategies.
These strategies lead to Freud’s exam ples o f denials. Rem ember Freud saying
that the statem ent: “It is not my mother,” m eans “It is my mother.” Freud
gave us em pirical exam ples o f denials.17 A close reading o f H egel gives us an
insight into the inevitability o f such denials.
T he constructive solution for the master is to becom e a stoic. A stoic
integrates the truth o f the role o f both the m aster and the slave by modifying
or negating some aspect o f each role. T his is precisely what Hegel says when
he writes:

T h is consciousness in consequence takes a negative attitude towards the

relation o f lordship and bondage. Its action in the case o f the m aster results
in his n ot simply h avin g his truth in and through the bondsm an; and, in
that of the bondsm an, in not finding his truth in the will o f his m aster and
in service. T h e essence of this consciousness is to be free, on the throne as
well as in fetters, throughout all the dependence that attach es to its indi­
vidual existence, and to m ain tain that stolid lifeless unconcern w hich per­
sistently withdraws from the m ovem ent o f existence, from effective activ ­
ity as well as from passive endurance, into the sim ple essentiality of
thought. (Ibid. 244)

A constructive approach for the m aster would be to accept work (the

contribution of the slave) as essential for the self-realization o f consciousness.
Let us, however, not forget that the ability to recognize the value o f the
slave’s contribution requires, as we saw, a radical transform ation o f the desire
o f the master. If that radical transform ation is present, then the master can
relate positively to the contribution o f the slave and negatively to his own
role. In relating negatively to his role of master, the m aster has becom e truth­
ful to himself. Indeed, earlier in this chapter, we learned that the will is neg­
ativity relating to itself. T h e m aster as stoic relates negatively to his role as
master. T h is is the true solution for the master because— as we saw— the role
o f the master could not possibly realize what the desire o f the master hoped
to realize. In order for the master to be able to reach a true relationship within
himself, he needs to undergo a radical transform ation of his desire.
From an analysis o f the role o f the master the following conclusions can
be drawn:
46 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

1. C onsciousness as desire to be a master will be unsatisfied with its own self,

because that ego-model cannot provide the recognition hoped for by
desire.
2. Consciousness as non-transform ed desire (as m aster) cannot see another
ego-model as a valid object of desire.
3. Such a consciousness (the master) can thus only act out these two
m oments. It can act out its despair and thereby dem onstrate that, in fact,
it has no valid object of its desire. It also can refuse to accept that another
ego-model is a valid object o f its desire. It thereby dem onstrates that the
required transform ation o f its desire has not yet taken place.

These m oments, outlined in H egel’s philosophy, are essentially present

in the case studies of Freud. For a patient to com e to psychotherapy is to con­
fess, at least implicitly, the despair of a consciousness without true object. In
denials, the patient refuses to acknowledge m eaningful relations presented by
unconscious material. Acknow ledging such relations would am ount to
accepting a new ego-model (ego-ideal) as valid. Freud teaches us that
patients can do so only after the labor o f the transference has radically
changed the structure o f their desire. In Freudian terminology, the repressed
must have been undone.

C O N C L U S IO N

1. We started with a problem in Freud: Is negation or denial necessary for

consciousness?
2. From H egel we learn that the constitution of self-consciousness requires a
transform ation of desire and that the will must relate negatively to itself
because no object or ego-model is the realization of the universal longed
for by the will. T his shows that negation is, in fact, necessary to con ­
sciousness. T h is negation can take place, however, in two manners, a con ­
structive one and a defensive one.
3. A constructive solution occurs when consciousness, having been radically
transformed in its desire, relates negatively to its own ego-model by situ­
ating it verbally or in thought as a contributing factor (i.e., as a particular)
to a higher synthesis (i.e., a more universal mode o f existence).
4- A defensive solution acts out the negativity without synthesis. It expresses
the despair of a consciousness without a true object of desire. It expresses
in negative sentences the refusal or the inability to see the truth in alter­
native ego-models. It is this latter phenom enon that we witness in denials.
 FO U R

Denial and Hegel’s

Theory of the Will

abstract. In his analysis o f the will, H egel teaches us th at hum an beings can
solve the paradox of the hum an will in different ways. A will that is true to its
essential form must negate the objectively given. Instead, the w ill informed by
consciousness m ust take responsibility for its decisions. T h is is H egel’s arbi­
trary will. However, in order to be true to its con ten t, the will can n ot simply
disregard the objectively given, it m ust evaluate the given and subm it it to its
ow n chosen norm . T h is is H egel’s eudem onic will. Clearly, the eudem onic will
is a more subtle form o f negating the authority o f the objectively given than
the one used in arbitrary will. I will argue th at a denial can be understood as
a m isapplication o f the forces o f the negative necessary for freedom — a m isap­
plication borrowed from the arbitrary will. T h erapeutic intervention, 1 will
argue, seem s to aim to bring the patien t to a position in w hich the strategy of
the eudem onic will can be used. T h e ob jective conn ection s can n ot be denied
by the patient. Instead, these con n ection s need to be intellectually recognized.
T h e force o f the negative must then be introduced as the power to evaluate
the objectively recognized facts and con n ection s in light of a freely chosen
norm o f consciousness.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

For Hegel, freedom is connected with negativity. Thus, in his Philosophy of

Right' H egel describes the solution to the paradox of the will as “relating neg­
ativity to itself’ (#7) and he describes freedom as a will that is free “not only
in itself but for itself also, i.e. it determines itself as self-related negativity”
(#104). T h e study o f H egel’s concept o f free will therefore provides valuable

47
48 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

insights for understanding the puzzling phenom enon of denial.2 In his Philos­
ophy of Right, H egel provides the key to understanding his theory o f freedom
by analyzing the concept of the will. T he kernel of that analysis is to be found
in ##5, 6, and 7 of that book.3 Pedagogically, the best approach to explain
these difficult and poorly written paragraphs is to start with three exam ples
from everyday life. T he first two exam ples allow us to see that the will is
caught in a paradox. Typical of Hegel, the paradox is formulated in dialecti­
cal form. T h e will is said to aim at one thing (thesis, # 5 ). T h e will must, how­
ever, also aim at the opposite (antithesis, # 6 ). T h e third exam ple attem pts to
illustrate the way out o f the paradox. It tries to illustrate the path o f synthe­
sis (#7).4 These exam ples and their explanations will take up the first part of
this chapter. In the second part, I will show how H egel uses his idea o f the
will as free will to classify and to criticize conceptions of the will offered by
the philosophical tradition. A s these conceptions o f the will imply necessar­
ily specific views of morality, H egel’s criticism can also be read as a criticism
o f alternative views of morality. In the conclusion I will clarify the phenom ­
enon of denial by m eans o f insights derived from H egel’s study of freedom and
the will.

1. T H E P A R A D O X O F T H E W I L L

A s our first exam ple let us imagine a person who is in personal difficulties
and who wants to talk. Suppose I have am ple time and I start the conversa­
tion by asking my visitor how old he is, how tall, and how much he weighs.
A fter listening to the answers I say, “N ow I understand you” (in the sense of:
I am able to grasp your essential identity). My visitor would be accurate in
saying, “N o you do not.” Suppose I continue my quest for objective infor­
m ation about my visitor by asking him how many brothers and sisters he has,
whether he is married, if he has children, and how many he has. A fter h ear­
ing the answers, I restate my conviction, “But surely I now understand you.”
My visitor would be right in again saying, “N o you do n o t.” Suppose that I
once again continue my inquiry and ask my visitor whether he went to co l­
lege and if he did, where and what grades he obtained. Would my visitor not
be right every time he rejected my claim that I understood him based on
objective inform ation? C ould we then not say that my visitor declines to be
identified with an objective content? T h is is precisely H egel’s statem ent
about the will: “T h e w ill. . . involves the dissipation o f every restriction and
every content . . .” (# 5 ).5 O n e can call this dissipation the first m om ent in
the drama o f the will. It is the thesis.6
Let us now turn to a second exam ple. Consider the situation o f late ado­
lescents and early adults. Students at that age face a difficulty inherent in
the act o f willing. Students at that age have to make many choices. They
have to m ake decisions about careers and relationships, am ong other things.
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S TH EO RY OF TH E WILL 49

Let us concentrate on the choice o f a future job. Clearly, there are many
things one desires from a job. O n e expects a job to be interesting and ful­
filling. O ne expects a job to be socially useful, so that one can contribute to
society. O n e expects the job to pay well, so that one can provide for oneself
and for on e’s family. A fter one is clear about all the desirable characteristics
o f a potential job, it is necessary to take a look at the available jobs. Som e
jobs pay well but are boring or morally com prom ising, other jobs are inter­
esting (for exam ple, artistic careers) but are low-paying. So, late adolescents
or young adults som etim es adopt the attitude that there is no job good
enough for them. S uch an attitude lacks an essential m om ent o f willing
according to H egel. T h e lacking m om ent in such an attitude is that such
persons are unable to decide. To will, however, is to be able to decide. To
decide is to becom e som ething specific, som ething determ inate. In H egel’s
words: “the ego is also the transition from undifferentiated indeterm inacy to
the differentiation, determ ination, and positing o f a determ inacy as a co n ­
tent and ob ject” (# 6 ).7 O ne can call this the second m om ent in the dram a
of the will. It is the antithesis, because it requires the will to do the opposite
of the first requirem ent (which required the will to refuse to identify itself
with anything o b jective.)8 T he will is thus caught in a paradox because it has
to satisfy two opposite demands.
Let us now turn to our third exam ple in which I will illustrate how Hegel
tries to solve the paradox of the will. During the summer, one can m eet stu­
dents who are working in hotels, in offices, on construction jobs, and in many
other places. Suppose one talks to a student who does typing work in an office
and asks, “are you a secretary?” It is very likely one will hear the following
answer, “N o, I am earning money to pay for college.” T h is student has been
able to decide. H e has accepted a position as an office secretary. His reply that
he is not an office secretary, however, m eans that he relates negatively to his
own choice.
T h e above negation could be thought of as a denial. It is not a denial,
however, because the negation, unlike a denial, does not prevent action.
Rather, the student’s negation prom otes action, that is, com m itm ent to a
task. T h e negation prom otes action because it is a negation o f an unaccept­
able aspect of a situation, which would have undermined the student’s com ­
m itm ent to his task. T h is negation transforms a hum ble task into a prom is­
ing endeavor. H egel calls this negation a “negation of a negation” (#104).
In H egelian language, the student who denies being an office secretary
has becom e other than he wishes to be by accepting to becom e an office sec­
retary. T he solution to this predicam ent is not for the student to give up his
job. If the student were to do so, he would end up without a job and he would
not be a will because to be a will m eans to settle upon some content. T he real
solution is for the student to find a m otivation for performing his job that
transcends the particularity o f the job itself. Such a solution could be the
50 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

claim that the student is earning tuition money by m eans o f his summer job.
Clearly such a m otivation does not specify that the student must take an
office job; such a m otivation only says that the student has to take some job.
Let us now reflect upon the consequences o f sticking it out with the
summer job and justifying it with the m otivation o f earning tuition money.
T h e first consequence is th at the student denies that he is stuck with the
secretarial job. Indeed, he does not take the job because o f the job itself but
because o f some other goal. T h e student can claim that perform ing secre­
tarial tasks is incidental, while earning tuition is essential. T h e student can
say that while perform ing secretarial services, he is not really performing
secretarial services but earning tuition. H e can thus deny that he is doing
secretarial work. Instead, he is really earning tuition (in the sense o f ex is­
tentially intending that aspect o f his act to be the essential aspect o f the
act). T h e second consequence is that the student can continue to do his
job, because it earns m oney for tuition. T h e third consequence is that the
student can sim ultaneously deny that he is doing a secretarial job and c o n ­
tinue to work at the job in actuality. H e distances h im self from the p artic­
ular job, while accepting the job as a particular instance to reach a (m ore)
general goal.
Denying that he is doing the particular job is holding on to the moment
described in #5. Continuing to do the job is obeying the imperative of #6.
U sing the m otivation to do the job while at the same time claim ing that per­
forming the job is not what one is doing is achieving the synthesis described
in #7. In that synthesis the student accepts doing som ething which is deter­
m inate (being an office secretary) and does som ething that the will as such
cannot will, because it does not fulfill the will. Thus, the will of the student
accepts becom ing other than itself; it accepts externalizing itself. I take this
to be an illustration o f the will as negativity, as a force com pelled and cap a­
ble o f transcending itself, o f going outside itself. T h e student does not, how ­
ever, surrender to this alienating situation.
T h e student, as it were, recaptures his own loss. H e takes back his deci­
sion, but he does so in an ideal way, not in a m aterial way. Thus, while m ate­
rially continuing to perform the office secretary job, he says that he does not
perform this job, but rather, that he earns tuition. Clearly, this m ove involves
a negation (not a denial). It is by this negation that the student undoes that
alienating aspect of accepting and performing a particular job. H egel calls
that undoing, that act of negation, an act o f negativity. We are now ready to
understand the crucial part o f #7: “it [the will] is the relating of negativity to
itself.”9 O ne can call this the synthesis. Indeed, in negating the particular that
the will has accepted, the will preserves the demand o f #5. However, the
demand o f #5 is not preserved in its unm ediated form. It is preserved in a
transformed way in the synthesis. Hegel specifies this act of transform ation as
“idealizing” the determ ination dem anded in #6 (remark to #7).
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S TH EO RY OF TH E WILL 51

I take H egel’s use o f the word “idealization” to be a confirmation of my

interpretation o f #1 as illustrated by my example. Indeed, the student’s ability
to give m eaning to his summer job through the motive of earning tuition can
be called an act o f idealizing his job. I wish to stress that this is a successful ide­
alization because holding a summer job as an office secretary is a generally
accepted m otivation in an A m erican student. Holding that job for more than
a summer or beyond on e’s early twenties requires a different idealization and
another kind o f m otivation, such as: it provides for a living, it is a job, it gives
me great opportunities to meet people. Rather than providing a sociological
study o f the idealization involved in creatively solving the paradox of the will,
Hegel gives us a dialectical analysis of progressively more “true” idealizations.
T h e three m ovem ents o f the will, described in ##5, 6, and 7 as pure
negation, acceptance o f determ ination, and negative relation to an accepted
determ ination (negation o f negation or self-related negativity) are also pre­
sent in the three m om ents o f self-consciousness described in the Phenome­
nology as the m aster who relates negatively to all objectivity, including life
(H egel 1966, 231); as the slave who in his fear o f death identifies with his
body and his life (Ibid. 234); and as the stoic who relates negatively to his
acceptance o f objectivity by thinking and working (Ibid. 2 4 2 -4 3 ). H egel
gives these three m om ents ontological status in his Logic when he describes
them as three m om ents o f the notion: the n otion as universality (self-iden­
tity is achieved by exclusion of all differentiation), as particularity (the
notion accepts conten t and becom es a particular notion ), and as individual­
ity (the notion as self-relating despite being a particular n o tio n ).10

2. C L A S S IF IC A T IO N OF
D IF F E R E N T C O N C E P T I O N S O F T H E W IL L

In his Introduction to the Philosophy of Right, Hegel further analyzes four gen­
eral strategies that m ankind has developed to deal with the paradox of the
will. H egel labels the four strategies: the natural will, the arbitrary will, the
search for happiness (the eudem onic will), and the free will. Let us analyze
each of these strategies in turn. I will try to reconstruct these four strategies
in a dialectic fashion.
T h e first strategy is the one referred to as the strategy o f “the natural will”
(# # 1 1 -1 4 ). T h is will needs to be determined. It allows itself to be determined
by inclination— by whatever it happens to feel an impulse or a passion for
doing. It thus abandons the need to decide by allowing itself to be determined
by what nature happens to make attractive to it. Thus, when such a will feels
an impulse to drink, it is bound to look for a drink. O ne can call this the th e­
sis in the dram a o f the experience o f the natural will (#11).
T he difficulty with such a will is that there could be many impulses
which emerge at the same time. T h e will could simultaneously feel inclined
52 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

to drink, eat, read K ant, and listen to C hopin. In such a situation the natural
will does not know what to do. In addition, when one is thirsty, one can drink
coffee, tea, coke, or milk, am ong other beverages. T h e principle adopted by
the natural will does not provide a guideline to solve this second impasse
either. T his failure is the antithesis in the dram a of the natural will (#12).
More abstractly, H egel summarizes the impasse o f the natural will as fol­
lows: the natural will acts as if it has rules for deciding and thus has the for­
mal characteristic o f being a free will. However, the natural will allows the
content of its decisions to be determ ined by som ething other than its own
will. T he content o f the will’s decision will be decided by the emerging incli­
nations or impulses. T he form and content of the natural will are therefore
not identical (#13). A person accepting the strategy o f the natural will can
say, “ I decided” or, “It is my decision.” T he “m ineness” of the decision is
rather superficial; it does not reach into the decision’s content. Rather, it
resembles the act o f som eone who receives a gift and stam ps his nam e on the
gift. It is his gift, but som eone else selected it.
One may say that the natural will does not possess enough negativity. It
is not able or not willing to deny natural desires the right to autom atically
decide the will’s actions. T h e natural will is not free because it does not exer­
cise the power to negate the right o f natural desires to autom atically deter­
mine the will.
T h e second strategy is the one o f the “arbitrary will” (# # 1 5 -1 9 ). T h is
will appears as the synthesis that solves the problem o f the natural will.
Indeed, the natural will’s im passe occurs because it does not possess a rule on
how to decide when faced with the presence o f m ultiple impulses or with the
m ultiplicity o f objects th at could satisfy one impulse. A noth er way of for­
m ulating a criticism of the natural will is to recall that this will does not
itself decide the conten t o f its decisions. It does not have the capability to
negate natural desires’ autom atic push to determ ine the outcom e o f the will’s
decision. T h e arbitrary w ill’s strategy is to accept the duty o f having to
decide, as well as to decide the specific conten t o f available choices. T he
arbitrary will accepts as rule for its decisions: I have to decide and I have to
decide in all m atters. I do not surrender the right and the duty to decide to
my natural inclinations. Furthermore, it has a second rule: one does not need
to follow rules when deciding; one simply has to decide. T h is form of the will
is the arbitrary will (#15). C onfronted by two or three impulses, or two or
more possibilities to satisfy an impulse, the arbitrary will is not immobilized.
It will decide this way one time and that way another time. W hen asked
why, the arbitrary will can answer, “because I will it so.” 11 T h e arbitrary will
is not required under its own strategy to give a reason. T h is is the m om ent
o f the thesis.
T he antithesis emerges when one realizes that decisions have conse­
quences. If a student decides in the beginning of the year to use his pocket
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S TH EO RY OF TH E WILL 53

money to visit France, he m ight not have future opportunities to make finan­
cial decisions (# # 1 6 -1 7 ). Thus, the strategy of the arbitrary will finds its lim­
its in the restrictions that reality imposes on the acting will.
Philosophically, H egel puts his criticism as follows: the arbitrary will
decides without binding itself to its decisions. Because they are arbitrary they
could have been replaced by other decisions. Thus, the content o f the arbi­
trary will’s decisions is not worth defending because it could have been dif­
ferent (#16). T h e content of the arbitrary will’s decisions is thus always con ­
tingent; it is never necessary.
T h e third strategy is the one used by the “eudemonic will,” or the will in
search of happiness (#20). T h is strategy emerges as a solution to the difficul­
ties of the arbitrary will. T h e eudem onic will has accepted that the will needs
to coordinate its decisions. For that purpose it needs a norm. Particular d eci­
sions of the will which are made in accordance with a norm cease to be con ­
tingent. They receive the form o f necessity and are coordinated with other
particular decisions.
Happiness is a norm which has often been proposed in the history of
mankind. T h e strategy o f the eudem onic will is that it sees the need to eval­
uate all possible decisions in light o f one norm: what decisions will bring the
most happiness? T he great contribution of this strategy is that it accepts the
interconnection o f thought and will in order to bring about freedom of the
w ill.12 A further contribution of this strategy is that it introduces the need to
coordinate and thus the need to to refine, to transform, and to educate the
different hum an impulses.
Freud points to two im portant achievem ents in the therapeutic work
with som eone who has uttered a denial (Ver Eecke 1984, 14). Both seem
related to the positive contribution made by the eudemonic will.
T h e first achievem ent is that the person uttering a denial becom es able
to undo the intellectual negation embedded in a denial. T h e symbolic con ­
nections are intellectually acknowledged and respected. T h is first achieve­
m ent parallels the achievem ent o f the eudem onic will which, in its decision
procedure, respects connections between, for exam ple, decisions and
expected results. T h is is progress com pared to the arbitrary will, which
decided on its own authority without necessarily having recourse to ob jec­
tively observed (or expected) connections.
T h e second achievem ent in the work with a person uttering a denial is
that such a person also accepts the im plications for action dem anded by the
intellectual acknow ledgm ent. A ccep tin g im plications for action often
requires dealing with em otional wishes and fears. It requires th at the
p atien t be capable o f becom ing m aster o f his or her em otions. T h is is a
dem and sim ilar to the one faced by the eudem onic will, which, for its exer­
cise, requires the refinem ent and education (i.e., rational control) of
wishes, impulses, and em otions.
54 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

T he fatal flaw in the eudem onic strateg, which will allow the emergence
o f its antithesis, is the fact that the eudem onic will pursues a strategy it can ­
not guarantee. Indeed, a person can do many things in order to make h appi­
ness possible. H e cannot, however, guarantee his own happiness by what he
does. Suppose, for exam ple, that one has worked on e’s whole life for good
grades, in order to go to a good school, in order to have a good job, in order
to have a good income, in order to be able to provide for on e’s family. S u p ­
pose one has succeeded in accom plishing all o f the above but then discovers
that one has cancer. T h is would undoubtedly make one very unhappy. T h e
purpose of on e’s whole life would thus be lost. A strategy which leaves open
the possibility that the m eaning o f on e’s life project could be destroyed is a
strategy that is rationally defective.
T h e fourth strategy, the one used by the free will, is a successful and
open-ended strategy (#-#21-28). T h is fourth strategy is the solution to the
previous strategy’s problem . T h e problem was th at the eudem onic will was
pursuing a goal it could not guarantee. T h e strategy o f the free will is to
will its own freedom (# 2 1 ). T h e free will has to involve thinking to a
higher degree than even the eudem onic will is prepared to d o .13 T h e free
will has to ask from thought w hat is required to be and to rem ain free. S u p ­
pose th at an adolescent plans to have a family, but decides that he does not
like school. If he drops out o f school, he will not acquire the skills n eces­
sary to earn a d ecen t salary in today’s society. W hen he later starts a fam ­
ily, he m ight realize th at he can n ot afford what he w anted to provide for
his family. H e becom es disillusioned and thus, in som e sense, unfree. To
aim at freedom m eans one is required to think what one has to do in order
to be, as well as to rem ain, free. In addition, one m ust accept w hat one has
thought.
T hinking has a crucial function for the free will. It tells a person what
choices to make. Philosophy, in particular H egel’s The Philosophy of Right,
presents us with a rough sketch o f what is required to m aintain freedom.
H egel writes that what thinking discovers as freedom ’s requirem ents are:
“the principle o f right, morality, and all ethical life” (# 2 1 ). N ow these three
principles are the three parts o f The Philosophy of Right. Ethical life itself c o n ­
tains three substrata: the family, civil society, and the state. I understand
H egel to be saying that in order to be and to rem ain free one needs property
rights, morality, and the ethical institutions of the family, the free market,
and the state. T hese different dom ains are not just preconditions for free­
dom; they are em bodim ents o f freedom as well. By willing all the em bodi­
ments o f freedom, the will makes its existence correspond to its concept
(#23). In other words, for H egel, to be free m eans that two totally different
requirem ents need to be fulfilled. First, “freedom shall be the rational system
o f m ind” (#27). Second, “the rational system o f m ind . . . shall be the world
o f im m ediate actuality” (#27).
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S THEORY OF TH E WILL 55

T hese two requirements am ount to saying that there must be a certain

m entality and a number of objective conditions that are fulfilled. We can
understand this double requirement if we reflect on some other traditions and
thinkers. T h e C hristian tradition is a good place to look for an illustration of
the first requirem ent because Christianity has always stressed that the incli­
nation of the heart (the presence o f a m entality) is crucial. For an illustration
o f the im portance o f objective conditions, one can go to the G reek philoso­
phers, who affirmed that the good hum an life is only possible in a good soci­
ety. Hegel approvingly quotes the following story: “W hen a father inquired
about the best m ethod of educating his son in ethical conduct, a Pythagorean
replied: ‘M ake him a citizen o f a state with good laws’” (#153).
T he logic of these four forms o f solving the paradox of the will is similar
to the logic o f judgm ents (H egel 1989, 62 2 -6 3 ). T he natural will corresponds
to the judgm ent o f existence (also called judgm ent o f inherence). Hegel gives
as exam ples: “G aius is learned, or the rose is red” (Ibid. 632). In such a judg­
ment, the predicate affirms som ething that happens to be immediately visi­
ble. It describes this rose here and now as red. A nother rose could be yellow
or orange. Tomorrow the original red rose could become orange. T h e predi­
cate attributed in a judgm ent of existence depends upon what one happens
to see (Léonard 1974, 355). T h e natural will also lacks a necessary connec­
tion between itself and what it wills. T h e natural will wills that which hap­
pens to present itself to the will as an inclination at that particular moment.
T h e arbitrary will corresponds to the judgm ent o f reflection. H egel
gives as exam ples: “m an is m ortal, things are perishable, this thing is useful,
harm ful” (H egel 1989, 643). In this judgm ent the predicate captures an
essential relationship between the subject and its environm ent. T h e subject
is no longer a ‘determ inate being’ but rather an ‘existence.’ T h e subject is
no longer part o f the logic o f being but is now part of the logic o f essence.
In so far as the judgm ent o f reflection captures som ething essential, one is
able to affirm th at the predicate belongs to the subject in some necessary
way. C ontrary to the rose which could be red or not, it is n ot perm issible to
claim that a m an is n ot m ortal. T h e com parison o f the arbitrary will with
the judgm ent o f reflection thus invites us to look for the essential dim en­
sion that the will reached in becom ing arbitrary. T h at essential dim ension
consists o f the fact that the will as arbitrary accepts as its duty the fact that
it has to decide. T h e will as natural will avoided th at task by allowing n a t­
ural in clination to have a decisive influence on what the will decided.
W hereas the natural will avoids the task o f deciding in its own right, the
arbitrary will accepts such a task and thus becom es phenom enologically
that which it essentially has to becom e.
If we are now more accurately aware o f an aspect o f the arbitrary will,
this is due to com paring the arbitrary will to the judgm ent o f reflection,
rather than considering the arbitrary will alone. H egel teaches us that, with
56 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

the arbitrary will, hum an beings have reached a developm ent in which some
essential characteristic o f the will is realized. T h at characteristic is the fact
that the will has the power to refuse any objective datum the capability to
determ ine its decision.
A denial has a progressive and a regressive aspect. It is progressive in
that it reveals a content. It is regressive in that the revealed content is not
acknowledged. Rem em ber Freud’s exam ple o f a p atien t’s reply to his ques­
tion as to the identity o f a woman in her dream: “T h at (dom ineering)
woman in my dream is not my mother.” U nderstanding the nature o f the
arbitrary will gives us an additional way o f presenting the progressive aspect
o f a denial. It looks as if, in the negation o f a denial, the will tries to realize
the essential achievem ent o f the arbitrary will: I do not grant anything the
power to decide for me; I decide and in this case I decide that I am not a per­
son who would present such a negative picture o f my mother. Unfortunately,
as I argue later, this is a m isapplication o f the progressive dim ension of the
arbitrary will.
T he eudemonie will corresponds to the judgm ent o f necessity. Hegel
gives as exam ples: “the rose is a plant,” (H egel 1989, 651) “ If A is, then B is;
or the being of A is not its own being, but the being o f another, B ” (Ibid. 652)
or “Colour is either violet, indigo, blue, green, yellow, orange or red” (Ibid.
656). In a judgm ent of necessity the subject and the predicate are connected
by m eans of a thoughtful understanding of a conceptual connection. T h e
eudemonie will too is characterized by the use of thoughtful understanding of
conceptual connections. T h e eudemonie will must relate a concrete option
with the conceptual norm it has chosen for judging the desirability o f alter­
natives. U tility or happiness are such norms. T h e eudemonie will does not
deny the given; it does subject it, though, to a norm. T h is is a more con ­
structive use of the negative than the m ethod used by the arbitrary will.
I will argue that therapeutic intervention with a person uttering a
denial can be understood as aim ing at the constructive usage o f the n eg a­
tive’s force as it is present in the eudem onie will. R eal freedom is n ot the
intellectual negation o f what is given; it is the subm ission o f the given to a
reasonable norm.
T he fourth form o f the will, the free will, corresponds to the judgm ent of
the notion. H egel gives the following exam ples: “T h is house is bad, this
action is good” (H egel 1989, 659). H e stresses that the essential characteris­
tic of a predicate in a judgm ent of the notion is that it includes an “ought-to-
be,” that is, how the house ought to be (Ibid.657). T h e will which corre­
sponds to the judgm ent o f the notion therefore must include an
“ought-to-be,” that is, the idea o f having to be free and to be able to remain
free. A s this interpretation o f the will includes an “ought-to-be,” there is
room for philosophy to try to determine what the will “ought-to-be” in order
to be a free will. H egel schem atically announces what this “ought-to-be”
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S TH EO RY OF TH E WILL 57

needs to include: “the principle o f right, o f morality, and o f all ethical life”
(H egel 1967b, #21 ). H egel then uses these three principles to structure his
The Philosophy of Right into three parts. These three principles correspond log­
ically to the three forms o f syllogism discussed in the Logic.14

C O N C L U S IO N

I now want to use H egel’s analyses o f the will, in particular his analyses o f the
arbitrary will and the eudemonic will, to better understand both the progres­
sive and the regressive aspects of a denial.
1. In order to proceed, we first need to understand the difference and
similarity between an act o f the will and a denial. T h e difference between the
two is that the will relates to deciding whereas denial relates to acknow ledg­
ing or, more precisely, refusing to acknowledge symbolic connections as they
are presented to consciousness (e.g., in dreams or slips o f the tongue). Thus,
the will operates in the dom ain o f doing whereas a denial takes place in the
dom ain o f knowledge. Therefore we can conclude that the performance o f an
act of the will and a denial take place in two different ontological domains.
T h e similarity between an act o f the will and the performance of a denial
consists in the fact that they both ultimately aim to be operative in the same
ontological dom ain. A s already stated, the will explicitly relates to deciding.
I will now dem onstrate that a denial is implicitly about deciding as well. Take
our classic exam ple of the statem ent: “T his (domineering) woman in my
dream is not my mother.” T h at statem ent does not just intend to deny a sym­
bolic connection. It is also about avoiding having to make certain decisions.
Indeed, the sem iotic statem ent that the person in the dream is dom ineering
demands certain actions, for exam ple: avoiding such a person or standing up
to him or her. H aving denied the connection, the reason for such action is
nullified. A denial can thus be understood as grounds for avoiding certain
actions.
2. We are now in a position to use H egel’s analysis o f the will for the
purpose o f clarifying the process o f denial. M y thesis will be that, in a denial,
a hum an being tries to exercise freedom by incorrectly applying som ething
to the dom ain o f knowledge that can be applied legitim ately only to the
dom ain o f action. If my thesis is accurate then correction of the m istake will
have to address errors in the two dom ains. T hus changes will have to occur
in both the dom ain o f symbolic connections (epistem ology) and the dom ain
o f action.

A D e n ia l a s a C a t e g o r y M ist a k e o f t h e U r g e t o F reedo m

A denial typically concerns symbolic connections presented by the uncon­

scious. W ith reference to such unconscious symbolic connections, a person is
58 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

not normally in a position to formulate a conscious decision to act. N ev er­

theless, notw ithstanding such unconscious connections, a hum an being still
remains at least partially free. T h e first form of the will which is phenom e­
nologically true to its essence is the arbitrary will. We can therefore assume
that hum an beings subject to unconscious symbolic connections m ight affirm
their freedom by relying on that first form of the will which expresses its true
essence: the arbitrary will. T he freedom o f a hum an being exercising his will
as arbitrary will consist in refusing to grant any objective datum the power to
decide upon a course of action. In a denial, a hum an being exercises his or
her freedom by wrongly applying to the dom ain o f knowledge what can be
applied legitimately to the dom ain o f action.
Essential for hum an freedom is the ability and the willingness to deny
any objective datum the right or the authority to decide a course o f action.
T h at right belongs to the individual. T h at right is affirmed by the strategy of
the arbitrary will. Prior to denial, however, a person is burdened with a given
unconscious sym bolic connection. It is as if, in a denial, the person makes
the m ove typical of the arbitrary will: T h e subject denies being tied to an
unconscious sym bolic connection. However, in doing so, the person uttering
a denial m isapplies the principle of the arbitrary will. T h e arbitrary will has
the right to appropriate to itself the right to authorize an action. T he arbi­
trary will, however, does not have the right to appropriate to itself the
authority to accept or refuse as true a given unconscious sym bolic con n ec­
tion. Rather, the challenging task for consciousness is to recognize and
accept the given as it reveals itself. It is as if a hum an being, in producing a
denial, m akes a category m istake. H e does not use the negative force o f free­
dom to deny som ething objective as the autom atic m otive or reason for an
action— which is legitim ate. Instead, the subject uses the negative force to
deny the truth o f an objective datum. In a denial, one m istakenly uses the
negative force o f freedom.
A denial can thus be understood as an illusionary affirmation o f the will
as arbitrary will: an unconscious connection is gratuitously denied.

C o r r e c t in g t h e C a te g o r y M ist a k e in D en ia l

A ccording to Freud, the therapeutic process dealing with denials consists of

two steps. It consists o f both an intellectual and an em otional m ove (Ver
Eecke 1984, 14, 25-27, 144—45). T h e intellectual m ove consists in helping
the patient undo the intellectual negation o f a denial. T h at process requires
many subsidiary moves. In his exam ple o f the woman dream ing about a lady,
not acknowledged as her mother, Freud perhaps elicited a description o f the
lady. Perhaps he then pointed out the sim ilarities between the female figure
in the dream and the patient’s mother. T h e patient m ight then com e to the
conclusion: the woman in the dream wears a dress, shoes, and a w atch sim i­
 D EN IA L A N D HEGEL’S TH EO RY OF TH E WILL 59

lar to those of my mother; she has the hair and the eyes o f my mother. Thus,
it must be my mother. Freud states that such a recognition on the patient’s
part does not m ean that the unconscious connection has been em otionally
accepted. If that is the case then therapy needs to prom ote a second move:
the em otional acceptance o f the unconscious connection.
T h e first task o f the therapist dealing with a denial is to correct the ille­
gitim ate m ove at the epistem ological level using the force for freedom in the
subject. T he second task is to search for a correct expression o f freedom.
I now wish to describe that double therapeutic task, described by Freud,
as helping the patient to m ove from an arbitrary form o f the will to a eude-
m onic form o f the will.
T h e great difference between the arbitrary and the eudem onic forms of
the will is the fact that the eudem onic will gives great weight to thought
whereas the arbitrary will does not. Indeed, the arbitrary will affirmed its
freedom without paying attention to intellectual arguments. O bjective
givens did not matter. T he eudem onic will, on the other hand, pays atten ­
tion to the objectively given without allowing the given to becom e author­
itative for decisions o f the will. Instead, the eudem onic will acknowledges
the objectively given and submits it to a calculation aim ed at achieving a
freely chosen goal (happiness). A s the essential m ove o f the eudem onic will
is subm ission o f the objectively given to a calculation, the eudem onic will
can use the force of the negative, not to deny the objective data, but to sub­
mit them to a goal. T h e eudem onic will thus gives the forces o f the negative,
inherent in freedom, a new object. Instead o f falsely denying objective con ­
nections, the goal is now to evaluate truthfully those connections (weigh
their relative im portance; put them in a hierarchical order; etc.) in order to
justify concrete actions.
H egel hints at the great efforts required to succeed in subm itting ob jec­
tive givens to a goal. He points out that this requires education in the double
sense o f having formal education (prom oting the exercise o f thought) and in
the sense o f personality form ation (reaching the maturity to be able to sub­
mit impulses to thought) (H egel 1967b, ##20, 187). N o wonder Freud
laments the difficulty o f the therapeutic process dealing with a person utter­
ing a denial. H e writes: “We succeed . . . in bringing about the full intellec­
tual acceptance o f the repressed; but the repressive process itself is not yet
removed by this” (Freud, S .E ., XIX, 236). Indeed, the therapeutic process
must both enlighten the patient about true objective givens and educate her
towards em otional maturity. T h is is a tall order.
3. A fter com paring the process o f denial with H egel’s analysis o f the will
and its freedom we can now formulate the progressive and regressive moments
in the act o f denial.15 T he progressive dim ension in a denial is the negation, a
sign o f the presence of the force of the negative required in the exercise o f free­
dom. T h e regressive dimension in a denial is the m isapplication of the force of
60 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

the negative. Instead of being properly used in the dom ain of action, it is
improperly used in the epistem ological domain. We can therefore first expect
therapeutic work to make a correction in the epistem ological attitude o f the
patient. Second, we can expect the work to lead the patient towards the em o­
tional maturity required to take the reasonable action that was avoided, by
defective means, in the denial. T h at is exactly what Freud describes the ther­
apeutic work as consisting of in the case of a denial.
 FIVE

A Child’s N oSaying
A Step toward Independence

abstract. Spitz uses the two concepts of indicator and organizer to point to a
new behavior in the child’s developm ent. I distinguish betw een a weak and a
strong sense of organizer. T h e weak sense of organizer m eans that the indicator
o f a new behavior is not a necessary condition for the new and higher level of
activity reached by the child. T h e new and higher level o f activity can be
assumed to be present even if the specifically studied indicator does not appear.
T h e strong sense of organizer m eans that the indicator o f the new behavior cre­
ates the new and higher level o f activity reached by the child. I argue that
stranger anxiety at eight m onths is a weak organizer for a deeper form o f the
ch ild’s attachm ent to fam iliar persons. A bsence o f m anifest signs o f that an xi­
ety does not m ean that this deeper form of attachm ent is n ot taking place. I
argue that the no-saying, w hich occurs around 15 m onths o f age, is a strong
organizer. By its mere presence, it creates a higher level o f activity in the child.
Spitz argues that it creates the first unequivocal concept. I argue th at it creates
a new degree of em otional independence for the child. M y thesis can thus be
taken as a confirm ation o f the Freudian claim th at the acquisition (and effec­
tive usage) of the linguistic form o f negation is a precondition for freedom.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

A ccording to Spitz, it is incorrect to look upon the first few years of the child’s
developm ent as a simple linear development. Instead, Spitz believes that there
are multiple lines of developm ent which come together to make a new form
of behavior possible for the child. T his new behavior is so different from the
child’s previous behavior that Spitz claim s the new behavior indicates a higher

61
62 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

level of psychic structure. He calls the moment when such new behavior
appears a critical period. Since these critical periods function to synthesize
several developments into a new form of behavior that is in turn the begin­
ning of a new psychological development, Spitz also calls these indicators
organizers o f psychic structures (Spitz 1965, 177).
Spitz lists three such critical periods during the first twenty m onths of
the child’s life. T h e indicators o f these critical periods are: the smile at about
three m onths of age; stranger anxiety at about eight m onths; and the no-say­
ing after about fifteen m onths (Ibid. VI, VIII, XI).
T he first two critical periods are related in a special way to the function
o f seeing. T h e child smiles at about three m onths of age in response to see­
ing the hum an face. A nxiety at eight m onths is a reaction triggered by see­
ing a stranger— or, correcting Spitz, I will argue that anxiety at eight m onths
is a reaction to being seen by a stranger.1 T h e third critical period concerns
the child’s no-saying. It is this latter phenom enon that interests us, but its
subtle m eaning can only be understood after understanding the two chrono­
logically prior phenom ena.
In this chapter, I will present Spitz’s theory of these three critical periods
and dem onstrate that, in several crucial areas, Spitz’s description o f these
periods is richer than his theory. I will com plem ent or correct Spitz’s theory
with my own theory, often relying on a Lacanian framework. I will distinguish
between weak and strong organizers. T his will help to prevent inaccurate pre­
dictions about the future m ental health o f a child in whom an organizer is
absent.2 In my conclusion, finally, I will appeal to H egel in order to dem on­
strate that my strategy o f giving no-saying and negativity such a central role
in philosophical anthropology falls well in line with what we know about
hum an beings from speculative philosophy.

1. T H E F I R S T O R G A N I Z E R : T H E S M I L E

A new behavior can be observed in children at about three m onths o f age.

T he child smiles when she sees a hum an face.3 Three m onths is only a statis­
tical average, but the sm iling response is definitively tied to a specific age
period. Thus, according to Spitz, only two percent of children under two
m onths o f age smile at the sight of a face and only five percent o f children
continue to smile indiscriminately, including at strangers, after six m onths of
age (Ibid. 88). Spitz’s em pirical results are still valid, as can be confirmed by
the survey article by M elvin Konner for the now classic volum e on The Devel­
opment of Attachment and Affiliative Systems. Summ arizing the work of
A m brose; Emde, Gaensbauer, and Harmon; Emde and Harmon; Spitz and
W olf; Sroufe and Waters; and Gewirth; Konner writes:
For practical purposes this behavior [the social smile] is absent at birth and
emerges during the first few m onths of postnatal life. Incidence o f smiling
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 63

in naturalistic social contexts (Figure 2 A ) or in experim ental settings in

w hich the infant is presented w ith a face (Figure 2B) is two orders o f m ag­
nitude higher at four m onths o f age than at term, and the response cann ot
be indisputably identified until som e time in the second m onth. . . . C o n ­
siderable quantitative variation attributable to learning occurs after four
m onths o f age, but variation in early incidence and in rate o f emergence
am ong sam ples in different environm ents, although statistically significant,
is quantitatively minor.4 (1982, 145)

Typically, between the ages o f two and six m onths, the child smiles even
at strangers. Aptly, Spitz calls it “indiscrim inate sm iling” (Ibid. 88), implying
that the sm iling response cannot be interpreted as a sign that the child has
already established em otional ties with a particular person. In psychoanalytic
language, this m eans that the sm iling response is not a sign that true object
relations have been established. A gain, Spitz’s view is generally confirmed by
K onner’s survey article on the m other-infant bonds. Thus Konner, summariz­
ing the existing research, writes:
social sm iling is well established but relatively undiscriminating. It appears to
the observer to be associated w ith positive em otion, but the em otion seems
impersonal; alm ost anyone can elicit it and, despite subtle signs o f discrim i­
nation o f primary caretakers, strong emotional bonds do not appear to exist
[em phasis mine]. (149)

Spitz’s claim about the absence o f true object relations or o f the absence
of em otional ties to a particular person runs counter to the view o f a group
o f authors (e.g., the H ungarian school o f psychoanalysis; the attachm ent
theorists)5 who argue that the child is attached to a specific person from very
early on. Even Konner, in the text just quoted, writes that there are, “subtle
signs o f discrim ination o f primary caretakers.” To add support to Spitz’s
detractors, let us present a case from a psychoanalyst’s consultation. T his
psychoanalyst was consulted because an infant refused the bottle after her
m other had died. T h e psychoanalyst asked if any o f the deceased m other’s
unwashed undergarm ents rem ained. Sh e further advised winding this under­
wear around the bottle before giving the bottle to the infant. W hen this
m ethod was followed, the infant accepted the bottle. Such a case does
indeed confirm the attachm ent theorists’ theoretical claim and seem s to
invalidate Spitz’s conclusion that the infant cannot be said to have true
object relations.
My position is that the attachm ent theorists are correct and that Spitz
overstated his conclusion. I believe, however, that there is a truth to Spitz’s
claim. T he challenge is to acknowledge Spitz’s observation about indiscrim i­
nate sm iling without overstating the conclusion drawn from the observation.
T he fact that, at first, the child smiles at everybody— and even smiles at
masks— whereas, at eight m onths o f age, the child starts to show anxiety
64 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

towards strangers, must have significance. T h e significance cannot be, as

Spitz claim s, that the infant does not develop attachm ents to particular per­
sons prior to showing anxiety toward strangers. Rather, it means, according
to my understanding, that the particular person to whom the child is
attached gains a new significance, m eaning, and function at around the age
of eight m onths.6
Psychoanalytic authors m ight be right in claim ing that only the acquisi­
tion of that new function allows one to call the relations between child and
m other true object relations. Konner writes that attachm ent theorists agree
with the view that a fear o f strangers is a sign of deepening em otional rela­
tionships. Bowlby gives a nice overview of the new em otional relations that
develop during the period o f the child’s life when the eight-m onth-anxiety
emerges (Bowlby 1982, 670 -7 1 ). We will therefore use the expression “true
object relations” in the sense that a deepening of em otional relations occurs
with particular persons (the primary caretaker[s]), while refusing to go as far
as Spitz does when he claim s that, before this phase, the infant does not
attach herself to a particular person. T h is is the correction that attachm ent
research requires us to make.
Returning to Spitz, we notice that he clarifies the indiscrim inate sm iling
response by arguing that it is a behavioral act triggered by a G estalt. T h e cru­
cial elements of the G estalt are the forehead, eyes, nose, and m ovem ent of
the whole head— for exam ple, nodding (Spitz 1965, 89). T h e child does not
respond if one or two eyes are covered, if the face is not moving, or if the face
is presented in profile (Ibid. 94).
Spitz m aintains that the child’s failure to smile at a face in profile is proof
that the child’s smile is not a smile in recognition of a hum an partner. Spitz
replaces the hum an face with a mask in order to enable him to study the
essential elements of the G estalt which provide stim uli for the ch ild’s
response. Spitz found that a mask was as effective in triggering the smiling
response as the hum an face, provided that it consisted of a forehead, eyes,
nose, and m ovem ent of the whole head. G iven that the smile of a three-
month-old child can be triggered as easily by a m ask as by a hum an face, Spitz
draws his conclusion: T h e child smiles, not at the G estalt o f a face, but at a
sign G estalt o f it (the m ask being the symbol of a face) (Ibid. 91). Spitz calls
this new relation o f which the three-month-old child is capable a pre-object
relation. H e considers it a transition from the perception of “things” to the
establishm ent o f the libidinal object (Ibid. 91). In somewhat behavioristic
language, Spitz then claim s that seeing a “sign G estalt”— forehead-eyes-nose-
head in m otion— is “the key stimulus of an IRM (innate releasing m echa­
nism )” (Ibid. 94). In less reductionist terms, we can say that the hum an face
is a privileged visual object for the infant.
It m ight be useful here to introduce L acan ’s unique perspective on this
phenom enon. I will use Spitz’s own terminology to specify the difference
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 65

between their respective theories. Spitz talks about indicators and organizers
(Ibid. 117). H e explicitly calls the sm iling response an indicator, and, in order
not to be misunderstood, he writes:

I repeat: the sm iling response as such is merely the visible sym ptom o f the
convergence o f several different developm ental currents w ithin the psychic
apparatus. T h e establishm ent o f the sm iling response signals that these
trends have now been integrated, organized, and will thenceforward operate
as a discrete unit w ithin the psychic system. T h e em ergence o f the smiling
response marks a new era in the ch ild’s way o f life; a new way o f being has
begun, basically different from the previous one. (Ibid. 119)

Lacan concentrates on seeing and talks about the recognition that occurs
in the mirror image. H e too points to the joy and the smile that is produced
in the child when recognizing her image, her G estalt, in the mirror or in the
figure o f a real person, mostly the mother. In contrast to Spitz, Lacan does not
describe the child’s sm iling response to seeing her G estalt as an indicator for
marking the child’s new level o f psychic organization. Rather, Lacan will
intepret seeing as a psychological faculty which must be called an organizer
o f the child’s psychic life.7 For Lacan, seeing at this age will be understood as
producing an effect rather than merely indicating an effect’s presence. Lacan
will go so far as to claim that seeing is a faculty that bridges the physiological
and the psychological dim ensions in hum an beings, so that he will be able to
claim that there may even be physiological effects produced by the psycho­
logical act o f seeing. (Ver Eecke 198 a, 115-16) Spitz, on the other hand,
only claim s that seeing a specific sign G estalt triggers an innate mechanism.
Interestingly enough, in Spitz one can find a number o f remarks which
show that the sm iling response o f the three-month-old baby has more m yste­
rious aspects to it than Spitz’s theory explains. We can use these remarks to
justify the Lacanian radicalization o f the interpretation o f the baby’s seeing
and smiling.
Indeed, Spitz reports that the child does not only smile, but also becomes
active and starts wriggling when she sees a hum an face (Spitz 1965, 89). The
smile is thus but one o f the reactions a child has to seeing a hum an face. The
full reaction spreads over the whole body.
Spitz cautions the reader against m isunderstanding his theory of “sign
G estalten, releaser m echanism triggering innate responses,” warning us not
to conclude from the theory that “a m echanical doll, fitted with the sign
G estalt can rear our children . . .” (Ibid. 95).
Spitz further explains this warning by elaborating on his theoretical
interpretation o f the infant’s smile. He argues that “although the innate
equipment is available to the baby from the first m inute o f life, it (the innate
equipm ent) has to be quickened” (Ibid. 95). T his could m ean that a certain
time is required for the innate m echanism to becom e operative. Such an
66 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

interpretation would rem ain consonant with the theory o f innate m echa­
nisms. However, Spitz interprets the need to quicken the innate equipment
by saying:

T h e vital spark has to be conferred on the equipm ent through exchanges

with another hum an being, with a partner, with the mother. N oth in g less
than a reciprocal relation will do so. O nly a reciprocal relation can provide
the experiential factor in the infant’s developm ent, consisting as it does of
an ongoing circular exchange, in w hich affects play a m ajor role. (Ibid. 95)

My reaction to Spitz’s warning is rather com plex. My sense is that Spitz

is an astute observer and I am therefore prepared to accept his insight as true.
However, there is a large discrepancy between the theory Spitz uses to
explain the sm iling response as an innate m echanism and the theory one
would need to construct in order to understand Spitz’s warning that seeing is
not sufficient and that a “vital spark has to be conferred on the equipment
through exchanges with another hum an being.” Indeed, a theory that can
explain such a warning would have to explain how intersubjective relations
are a necessary factor for the sm iling response. T h e theory that Spitz actually
uses to explain the sm iling response is a theory o f innate m echanisms. Such
a theory is not rich enough to justify the crucial “spark” that Spitz warns us is
necessary.
N evertheless, Spitz’s warning will be very useful in helping to build my
own theory about both the fear o f strangers and the child’s no-saying. Let us
therefore make full use o f Spitz’s warning and quote his explanation o f why a
“relation between a m echanical, autom atic doll and the baby would be on e­
sided” (Ibid. 96). Spitz writes:

It is the m utual give and take, its single elem ents constantly changing and
shifting (though its sum total rem ains the dyadic relation), w hich represents
the essence of what we are trying to describe and to convey to the reader.
T h e reciprocal feedback w ithin the dyad betw een m other and baby, and
baby and mother, is in continuous flux. T h e dyad, however, is basically
asymmetric. W hat the m other contributes to the relation is com pletely dif­
ferent from what the baby contributes. E ach of them is the com plem ent of
the other, and while the m other provides w hat the baby needs, in h[er] turn
(though this is less generally acknow ledged) the baby provides w hat the
m other needs. (Ibid. 96)

A full understanding o f the three-m onth-old’s sm iling response when

seeing the sign G estalt o f the hum an face therefore requires an understand­
ing o f the role o f the mother-child relationship. Spitz him self made a crucial
contribution to this problem through his study of hospitalism .
Thus, the proper reaction to Spitz’s warning is to not ignore the need for
a m utual relation between m other and child as a necessary condition for the
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 67

sm iling response. I take this to be a warning about the broad context neces­
sary for the sm iling response to take place. In order to explain the sm iling
response, Spitz uses a theory where a sign G estalt functions as a releaser
m echanism triggering an innate response (Ibid. 95). My difficulty with Spitz’s
theory is that he, in effect, uses a two-part theory to explain the sm iling
response. H e has a theory proper: releaser m echanism triggering an innate
response. H e also has a requirement about the context necessary for the sm il­
ing response. In Spitz’s writings, the connection between the explanation of
the event and the requirem ent about context is only an observed connection.
Spitz in no way presents a theoretical frame that would make the connection
between his theory of innate m echanism and his requirement about the gen­
eral context a necessary connection. O ne purpose I have will be to work
towards a theoretical framework that will make it possible to see the above
connection as a necessary connection. I will work out this claim for the two
other indicators.

2. T H E S E C O N D O R G A N I Z E R : E I G H T - M O N T H - A N X I E T Y

A nother remarkable change in behavior takes place in children between the

ages of six and eight months. Before that age, the child smiles any time she
sees som eone approaching and shows signs o f displeasure any time an adult
leaves (Ibid. 150, 155). Between six and eight m onths, the child begins to dif­
ferentiate between a familiar figure, in particular the mother, and a stranger.
T he child continues to smile at fam iliar figures but m anifests apprehension or
anxiety when a stranger approaches. T h e child expresses her apprehension or
anxiety in a variety o f ways. She m ight lower her eyes shyly, cover her eyes
with her hands, lift her clothes to cover her face, throw herself down on her
bed, hide her face with her blanket, or even weep or scream. Spitz interprets
this behavior as “a refusal of contact, a turning away, with a shading o f an xi­
ety” (Ibid. 150).
In general, Konner confirms Spitz’s empirical claims. Konner reviews the
m ajor publications on social fears in the previously m entioned survey article
about the mother-infant bond. Thus, referring to the research of M organ and
R icciuti; Tennes and Lam pl; Lewis and Rosenblum ; Ainsw orth, Blehar,
Waters, and W all; Bretherton and Ainsworth; Bowlby; and Ainsworth, et al.;
Konner writes:

Strangers begin to be discrim inated in social responding, often negatively,

and increasingly so through the course of the second six m onths; . . . crying
w hen left by the m other in a strange situation, with or w ithout a strange
person, becom es com m on, although it is certainly n ot universal; . . . vul­
nerability to the adverse effects o f separations of substantial duration from
prim ary caretakers becom e dem onstrably more marked . . . and “attachm ent
68 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

behaviors” such as follow ing, clinging, and cuddling becom e frequent in dis­
tinctive relation to the primary caretaker(s), especially in strange situations
or in the presence o f strange persons. . . . (149)

Konner continues by referring to K agan’s and Super’s research:

A ll the above m easures have been made in at least som e non-W estern cul­
tures, with the result that the underlying con cepts now have considerable
cross-cultural validity. . . . T h e growth of the social fears and the concom -
m ittan t growth o f attachm ent, as defined by these and related measures, is
a putative universal o f the second half-year o f hum an life (with m uch indi­
vidual variation in the degree of overt expression). (149)

Konner reports that children are not only showing anxiety with
strangers, but are “crying when left by the m other in a strange situation, with
or without a strange person.” Second, Konner reports that ‘“ attachm ent
behaviors’ such as following, clinging, and cuddling becom e frequent in dis­
tinctive relation to the primary caretaker(s), especially . . . in the presence of
strange persons” (Ibid. 149). Third, there is great variability in the age of
onset of the fear o f strangers, but m ost researchers put the onset after the first
six m onths. However, in a graph Konner borrowed from Kagan, it looks as if
fear o f strangers— the so-called eight-m onth-anxiety— could start as early as
the age of five m onths in some children.
My theoretical explanation of the eight-month-anxiety will not explain a
child’s fear o f strange situations. N either will it try to explain a fear o f strangers
in general. My explanation will apply only to a child’s fear of a stranger who
looks at the child. A s I now see it, my theory would be falsified if the child’s
fear o f a stranger’s look were to occur prior to the child’s jubilation before the
mirror. However, I was unable to find any empirical studies about the relative
timing o f these two phenom ena. My theory would not be falsified if a child
feared strangers who did not look at the child or if a child feared strange situ­
ations. T he child’s fear in these two situations involves matters beyond the
scope of my theory. In particular, it is possible to argue that seeing is a privi­
leged sense in humans even though other senses can at least partially replace
some of seeing’s functions. T his line of reasoning might find support in
Fraiberg’s and Freedman’s research as reported by Konner: “blind infants
develop social smiling . . . a m onth or two later than sighted infants.” Konner
may overstate his interpretation of this research when he writes: “a crucial role
for visual perception in the growth o f the behavior can be ruled out” (Ibid.
146). If the social smile, on average, starts between two and three m onths of
age and blind children need one or two months more to begin smiling socially,
then blind children need between thirty percent and fifty percent more time
to achieve the social smile. I consider that a significant difference. Still, it does
m ean that, at least for some functions, seeing can be replaced by other senses.
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 69

Returning to Spitz, I agree that the eight-m onth-anxiety is an indicator

of the child’s new psychic achievem ent. T he child is now able to distinguish
between friend and stranger. Moreover, the child’s attachm ent to the fam il­
iar figure and his anxiety in the presence o f strangers dem onstrates that the
child has developed special or deeper bonds with the familiar figure (usually
the m other). Based on these observations, Spitz concludes that this new
behavior, which occurs at about eight m onths o f age, indicates that the child
has succeeded in creating true object relations. Her mother has becom e her
libidinal object, her love object (Spitz 1965, 146).
Because the eight-m onth-anxiety indicates that the child succeeded in
achieving true— or deeper— object relations, I prefer to call the eight-month-
anxiety an indicator o f a new achievem ent. I would hesitate to call it an orga­
nizer o f new behavior except in a weak sense. By the weak sense of organizer,
I m ean that the behavior indicates that the child has reached a new level of
developm ent and can therefore be expected to be able to perform several new
tasks which it was unable to perform before. By the strong sense o f organizer,
I m ean that, not only is the child’s new behavior an indicator o f a new level
of psychic developm ent, it (the behavior labeled as an indicator) is also the
cause o f the child’s reaching a higher level o f psychic development. T h is dif­
ference between a weak and a strong organizer becom es im portant in inter­
preting a case in which a behavior deemed an indicator o f a higher level of
psychic activity is absent in a particular child. If the absent indicator is only
an organizer in the weak sense, one would not rule out the presence o f a
higher level of psychic organization and would look for other indicators of the
presence of this higher level of psychic developm ent.8 If the absent indicator
is an organizer in the strong sense, then one must accept that its absence
m eans that the child has not reached the higher level o f psychic develop­
ment. I take the eight-m onth-anxiety to be an indicator that is an organizer
in the weak sense. I will interpret no-saying as an indicator which is an orga­
nizer in the strong sense. Publications and research centered around the
hypothesis that the absence o f eight-m onth-anxiety is indicative of defective
object relations all make the m istake o f interpreting the eight-m onth-anxi-
ety as an organizer in the strong sense.9
Spitz also interprets the new behavior that occurs at about eight months
of age as a sign that the child can experience a new affect: anxiety. Spitz dif­
ferentiates anxiety from fear. Fear occurs because there are “memory traces
related to certain recurrent and to the child particularly unpleasant situa­
tions.” T he reactivation of these memory traces “elicits a specific unpleasure
affect” (Ibid. 154). Fear, for exam ple, is experienced by children who are
repeatedly innoculated. A nxiety differs in that it is a reaction “to som ething
or somebody with whom [s]he [the child] never had an unpleasure experience
before” (Ibid. 155). Indeed, she likely has never m et the strangers whose
looks trigger such anxiety.
70 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

Clearly, Spitz has good arguments to back his claim that the child’s eight-
m onth-anxiety reaction is an indicator o f a higher level of psychic structure,
but this new affect still remains to be explained. Spitz explicitly rejects the
hypothesis o f Szekely, which supposes that the G estalt “eyes-forehead” acts as
an innate “releaser stimulus” representing the phylogenetic survivor o f the
enemy in the anim al world. T h e infant’s smile at three m onths would be,
according to that theory, an indication o f an early attem pt at m astering this
archaic anxiety (Ibid. 157). T h e eight-m onth-anxiety would be an indication
that the child has regressed and that the “eyes-forehead” G estalt again func­
tions as a stimulus for the archaic fear.
Spitz rejects Szekely’s hypothesis because the eye configuration does not
function as an innate releaser. Som e m aturation o f the ch ild’s nervous system
is required. Furthermore, the eyes do not provoke fear but rather a smile, as
we saw in the analysis of the three-month-old infant’s smile. Finally, if eyes
actually provoke fear, the child should be relieved when the observer’s face is
changed to a profile. O n the contrary, however, in such circum stances the
infant shows bewilderment and it becom es quite difficult to reestablish em o­
tional contact with the child so as to calm him down (Ibid. 159).
Spitz’s own explanation is based upon the following interpretation of
anxiety: “W hat he reacts to when confronted with a stranger is that this is
not his mother; his m other ‘has left’ him ” (Ibid. 155). W hen form ulating his
explanation, though, Spitz can only explain the affect disappointm ent:

However, w hen a stranger approaches the eight-m onth-old, [sjhe is disap-

pointed in h[er] wish to have h[er] mother. T h e anxiety [sjhe displays is not
in response to the memory o f a disagreeable experience w ith a stranger; it is
a response to h[er] perception that the stranger’s face is not identical with
the memory traces o f the m other’s face. (Ibid. 155, em phasis m ine)

Spitz later puts this explanation in psychoanalytic terms: T h e eight-

m onth-anxiety is a “response to the intrapsychic perception o f the reacti­
vated wishful tension and the ensuing disappointm ent” (Ibid. 156). Spitz
interprets the disappointm ent as the cause o f separation anxiety.
My summary objection to Spitz’s theory is that it explains disappoint­
ment; it does not explain anxiety. A closer look at Spitz’s writings, however,
invites a more sym pathetic presentation of his theory and thus also a more
detailed criticism.
A careful reading o f Spitz shows that Spitz argues for disappointm ent as
a cause of anxiety. Still, the concept o f disappointm ent remains crucial for
Spitz’s explanation. Indeed, in each o f his three m ajor publications on a
child’s first year o f life, Spitz explicitly uses the word ‘disappointm ent’ or its
French equivalent: “l’enfant se trouve deçu dans son désir de revoir la m ère.”10
In order to explain his argument that disappointm ent leads to anxiety, Spitz
refers to a passage from Freud in his article “N egation ”:
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 71

T h e child produces first a scanning behavior, nam ely the seeking for the lost
love object, the mother. A decision is now made by the function o f judg­
m ent “w hether som ething w hich is present in the ego as an image, can also
be re-discovered in perception.” (Freud 1925 [N egation]) (Spitz 1957, 54)

T he connection between the postulated disappointm ent o f the child and

anxiety is made again by Spitz on the basis o f a reference to Freud (1926,
“ Inhibitions, Sym ptom s and A nxiety” ). O f particular interest is what Freud
writes in part C o f the A ddenda: “A nxiety, Pain and M ourning”:

. . . the situation o f the infant w hen it is presented with a stranger instead

o f its mother. It will exhibit the anxiety w hich we have attributed to the
danger o f loss o f object. (Freud., S .E ., X X , 169)

A n d one page later:

In consequence o f the infant’s m isunderstanding of the facts, the situation

o f m issing its m other is not a danger-situation but a traum atic one. Or, to
put it more correctly, it is a traum atic situation if the infant h appen s at the
tim e to be feeling a need w hich the m other should be the one to satisfy. It
turns into a danger-situation if this need is n ot present at the m om ent.
Th us, the first determ inant of anxiety, w hich the ego itself introduces, is
loss o f perception o f the ob ject (w hich is equated w ith loss of the object
itself). (Ibid. 170)

Thus, Spitz’s argument am ounts to claim ing that the child at eight
m onths is unable to see the face o f a stranger without feeling a strong long­
ing for the mother. Furthermore, the stranger not only provokes that longing
(because the child m ight have been happily playing before), but she also fails
to fulfill the longing that she provoked in the child. T h e resulting disap­
pointm ent, finally, is said to produce the so-called eight-month-anxiety.
I have two m ain objections to this more detailed reading o f Spitz’s text.
First, Spitz’s theory is incom plete inasm uch as he does not talk about the dan­
ger that appears to be present at eight m onths but not at six months, when
most babies smile at any human person approaching them. My theory could
then be seen as com plem entary to Spitz’s, in that it dem onstrates the specific
danger with which an eight-m onth-old has to deal, which has not yet pre­
sented itself to the typical six-m onth-old child.
Second, Spitz’s theory can be said to be wrong in that his theory would
have to predict a behavior different from what is actually observed. Spitz
observes: “. . . the child looks back at the stranger again and again. [S]he
peeks between h[er] fingers, [s]he lifts h[er] face from the blanket-and hides it
again” (Spitz 1957, 55). Now, even if the child is in the arms of her mother,
the child continues to look, from time to time, at the stranger. It is this last
behavior which I believe Spitz’s theory cannot explain and would probably
72 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

predict differently. If the face of the stranger provokes a longing for the
mother and disappoints that longing, why would the child continue to peek
at the stranger while she is still in the arms of her mother? Spitz suggests that
the actions of the baby (covering eyes, hiding his head in the pillow, pulling
his shirt over his eyes, etc.) are actions intended to make the stranger disap­
pear. H e writes: “ [the child] tries in a wishful way to make the stranger dis­
appear” (Ibid. 55). But if the child’s wish for the mother is satisfied because
the child is in the arms o f the mother, why would the child still want to peek
at the stranger? My theory will suggest that the stranger’s look is a m ajor cause
o f the child’s anxiety.11 T h at cause remains even if the mother is present.
However, the presence o f the mother helps the child to deal with the look of
the stranger. My objection to Spitz’s disappointm ent theory thus stands even
after a close reading of Spitz’s argument.
W ith the help o f L acan’s theory o f “the mirror stage” and Sartre’s theory
o f “the look,” the eight-m onth-anxiety shall be explained without recourse to
the concept of disappointm ent. T h e explanation will, however, claim that
being seen, rather than seeing, is the cause o f the anxiety o f the eight-month-
old baby.12 Furthermore, the explanation will specify the new danger that the
child faces at about eight m onths of age.
Sartre’s analysis of the look can be found in Being and Nothingness. In the
French edition it covers 58 pages out o f a total of 722. T h e passage on the
look is, therefore, not unimportant, and its im portance increases once one
understands its crucial function within Sartre’s philosophical anthropology.
By analyzing the function of the look, Sartre wants to clarify two problems at
the same time: the existence of others and on e’s own bodily existence. (This
purpose is reinforced by the titles o f the three chapters of Part T h ree). In
Sartre’s theory, the close relationship between the existence o f others and
on e’s own bodily existence culm inates in his concept o f the body as being-
for-others. It is that concept that Sartre has chosen as the title o f Part Three
which contains the section on the look.
C rucial to an understanding o f Sartre’s insights about the look is his
description o f a person who hears footsteps as he is looking through a key­
hole in a hall (Sartre 1966, 317). If I were in such circum stances I can eas­
ily im agine, so Sartre argues, that I would becom e asham ed. I becom e
asham ed about m yself for another when I think that another m ight be look­
ing at me. T h e thought th at another m ight be looking at me is the occasion
for my sham e. In th at sham e I becom e aware of a dim ension o f m yself of
which, w ithout sham e, I am not aware. For Sartre, the sham e I experience
at the im agined look o f the other “reveals to me th at I am this being . . .
[that] I have an outside, [that] I have a nature” (Ibid. 3 2 1 -2 2 ). H e goes on
to claim that “ Sham e . . . is the apprehension o f m yself as a nature although
that very nature escapes me and is unknowable as such” (Ibid. 3 2 2 ). O r fur­
ther, “T h us in the shock which seizes me when I apprehend the O th er’s
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 73

look, this happens— that suddenly I experience a subtle alien ation of all my
possibilities . . (Ibid. 324). O r “T h e appearance o f the Other, on the c o n ­
trary, causes the appearance in the situation o f an aspect which I did not
wish, o f w hich I am not master, and which on principle escapes me since it
is for the O th er” (Ibid. 325). O r “For in sham e . . . I do n ot cease to assume
m yself as such. Yet I assume m yself in blindness since I do not know w hat I
assum e. I simply am it” (Ibid. 325). In his rhetorical style Sartre calls this
assum ption o f o n e’s determ inate character, o f o n e’s bodily being, “my orig­
inal fall” (Ibid. 322).
Interpreting Sartre, one can say that, for Sartre, consciousness becomes
aware o f its bodily dim ension by im agining the look of the other. C on scious­
ness thus becom es aware that as body it is determ inate and for-others. T he
fact that I am determ inate accounts for the possibility that I might be som e­
thing I do not wish to be. I take this to be the source o f what Sartre calls the
“alienation of myself, which is the act of being-looked-at” (Ibid. 323). T he
fact that I am this determ inate being for-others before I am aware o f it makes
me vulnerable to the look of the other. For Sartre, this is an ontological alien­
ation and an ontological vulnerability. I believe that Sartre has discovered an
im portant aspect o f the hum an condition and of the look o f others. Indeed,
people report that they feel very uncom fortable when, for instance, while sit­
ting in a train, they sense that they are being looked at.
T h at which is an ontological alienation or an ontological vulnerability
is o f course a perm anent problem for a hum an being. It is my general hypoth­
esis that there is a m om ent in the child’s developm ent when the child is
explicitly confronting each of the ontological problems o f the hum an condi­
tion. Freud’s theory o f the Oedipus com plex illustrates my general hypothesis
insofar as, during the Oedipus com plex, according to Freud, the child con ­
fronts the problem o f sexual differentiation in an acute way.
My claim then is that, at around eight m onths of age, the child confronts
the ontological problems Sartre described as being connected with the body.
My claim has the advantage o f supplying the specific problem that is
addressed in the eight-month-anxiety.
My specific hypothesis is thus both consistent with and com plem entary
to the genetic view typical for psychoanalysis. It is consistent with the
framework Freud assumed in presenting his theory o f the O edipus com plex
(a perm anent problem in hum an psychology, such as sexual difference, is
specifically confronted at a definite point in a child’s developm ent). My spe­
cific hypothesis is com plem entary to the existing body of psychoanalytic lit­
erature in that I claim that there is an additional problem that hum an beings
must face. T h at additional problem is the assum ption, the appropriation, of
the body. Logically, I need to then also postulate that every child explicitly
faces that problem at some point in her developm ent. A lso, I logically must
accept that the problem o f appropriating the body should be prior to the
74 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

problem o f facing sexual difference, because sexual difference is, am ong other
things, a m atter o f bodily differentiation. These two logical requirements are
satisfied in my specific hypothesis that the child faces the problem o f appro­
priating, of assuming, his body at about eight m onths o f age. My hypothesis
therefore locates the problem of appropriating the body prior to the problem
o f facing sexual difference.
In applying Sartre’s insights to the interpretation o f children’s behavior,
I will criticize his interpretation o f the look. I will argue that the look can be
supportive (the m other’s look) as well as alienating (the look o f the stranger).
T h e look has either one of these roles, depending upon the em otional con ­
text (Ver Eecke 1975, 241 -4 3 ). T h e supportive look requires a m aternal em o­
tional context, as Spitz’s study on hospitalism demonstrated.

3. L A C A N 'S T H E O R Y O F T H E M IR R O R S T A G E

Lacan first presented his theory of the mirror stage in 1936 and published a
revised version o f it in 1949 (Lacan 1977, 7ff.). In that paper, Lacan makes
seeing, not just an indicator o f a higher psychic structure, but the organizer
and creator of that higher structure. Lacan depends on Hegel and two em pir­
ical studies to support his basic claim about the function of seeing.
From K ojève’s interpretation o f H egel (1969), Lacan borrows the idea
that an ego needs another ego in order to exist as an ego. Kojève puts it
roughly this way: an ego is what it desires. A n ego who desires only food is
not really an ego but a stom ach. Only an ego who desires another ego is an
ego in the full sense of the word. O f course, desiring another ego involves the
risk o f conflict, even deadly conflict. T h is H egelian conclusion gave Lacan
the opportunity to see the close connection between the mirror stage and
narcissism on the one hand and aggressivity on the other hand.
Later in his career, Lacan argued that such a deadly conflict— w hich is
present in H egel’s text o f the m aster-slave dialectic (H egel 1977 b,
1 1 1 -1 9 )— can be avoided if the sym bolic order m ediates the relation
between the egos. T h e power and efficacy o f the sym bolic order, in partic­
ular o f words, was brought hom e to L acan by L évi-Strau ss’s text on the effi­
cacy o f rituals, words, and symbols for difficult childbirths in prim itive cu l­
tures (Lévi-Strauss 1949). L acan then turned to de Saussure (1959) and
Jakobson (Jakobson and H alle, 1956) in order to discover what m echanism s
language m akes available for m ediating interpersonal relations and for
structuring our desires. From de Saussure L acan borrowed the idea o f the
opposition between signifier and signified. From Jak obson L acan learned
that language’s two crucial m echanism s are m etonym y and metaphor.
Jakobson him self docum ented that deficiencies in each of these two func­
tions lead to different deficits in the linguistic ability of the speaker. A t the
tim e that L acan first presented his theory o f the mirror stage he had n ot yet
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 75

created his linguistic theory o f the unconscious nor had he introduced the
concept o f the sym bolic.13
From L.H . M atthew s’s em pirical study o f pigeons and C h au vin’s study of
locusts, Lacan learned that the visual faculty performs a pivotal function in
connecting the psychological and physiological dim ensions (Ver Eecke
1983a, 113-26).
M atthews concludes: “the stimulus which causes ovulation in the pigeon
is a visual one” (1938-39, 558, my em phasis). For ovulation to take place, the
presence of a male pigeon is not necessary; the female pigeon need only see
herself in a mirror. T h e sexual activity o f ovulation thus requires a psychic act
which is not obviously sexual: seeing on e’s own body. From this study of cer­
tain physiological functions activated only through seeing, Lacan derives the
insight that seeing on e’s own body transforms the body.
T h e crucial result of C h au v in ’s study o f locusts is that transition from a
solitary to a gregarious form is possible if nymphs o f the solitary locust have
contact with members o f their own species during early phases o f their
developm ent. T h e gregarious and the solitary form o f locust differ in beh av­
ior, color, m etabolic activity (oxygen and food intake), and physiology
(C h auvin 258). Thus, again, contact— be it visual or tactile— has physio­
logical consequences.
Lacan uses the ontological function of the other ego, learned from Hegel,
and the pivotal function o f seeing, learned from the experim ental research of
M atthews and C hauvin, to correlate two totally different phenom ena. T he
first phenom enon deals with a hum an being’s im agination and fantasy life, in
particular a fascination with dism emberment as evidenced in such cultural
habits as “tattooing, incision, and circum cision” or dreams about “castration,
m utilation, dismemberment, dislocation, evisceration, devouring and burst­
ing open o f the body,” or in the historically docum ented preoccupation “with
the cruel refinement o f weapons” and torture-tools, or finally, the im agina­
tion of an individual as it is objectified in the painting of dismembered bod­
ies, particularly those o f Hieronymus Bosch (Lacan 1977, 11, 12, 4; Ver Eecke
1983a, 117). T he second phenom enon is what embryologists have called the
foetalization of a hum an being at birth. T h is refers to the anatom ical incom ­
pleteness o f the hum an brain and neurological system that results in “signs of
uneasiness and m otor uncoordination o f the neo-natal m onths” (Lacan 1977,
4; Ver Eecke 1983a, 117).
L acan’s mirror stage theory claim s that in seeing him self in the mirror or
in recognizing his own G estalt in the G estalt o f another person at about six
months of age the child discovers a (bodily) unity and a com pleteness he did
not experience before. Prior to the mirror stage, Lacan postulates that the
child’s image of him self is one of separate body parts: a hand, an arm, a foot, a
leg, a thumb. If for any reason the child or, for that matter, an adult, must give
up his attachm ent to that image, Lacan claims that fear of dismemberment
76 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

and/or body disintegration will be experienced. Thus, one’s own image dis­
covered in another is the protection against the hallucinatory experience of
dismemberment and/or bodily disintegration.
A s proof o f his m irror stage theory, which is uniquely applicable to
hum ans, L acan points to the difference in the behaviors o f a hum an baby
and a baby chim panzee at about six to eight m onths o f age. O n the one
hand, the chim panzee has a greater problem -solving ability than the hum an
baby. O n the other hand, the chim panzee does not grasp the m eaning o f the
mirror im age, while the hum an baby can. W hen the chim panzee sees h im ­
self in the mirror, he tries to look behind it in order to locate the “other
chim p.” W hen he realizes that there is nothing behind the image, he loses
interest in it. Either the chim panzee does not recognize him self in the m ir­
ror or he has no interest in a mere reflection. T h e hum an baby’s reaction is
totally different. H e responds with great interest, even excitem ent, to see­
ing his own image. In L acan ’s words, the excitem ent is so intense that it
m anifests itself in: “a flutter o f jubilan t activity” (L acan 1977, 1; Ver Eecke
1983a, 115).
There is a second advantage that the child gains from the mirror stage.
In the mirror stage, the baby discovers him self as a possible object o f his own
libido. Therefore, in L acan ’s theory, the mirror stage is the beginning o f nar­
cissism (Lacan 1984, 44). Lacan summarizes the gains that the baby experi­
ences in the mirror stage as follows:

W hat the subject welcom es in it is its inherent m ental unity. W hat he rec­
ognizes in it is the ideal o f the imago o f the double. W h at he acclaim s in it
is the trium ph o f a tendency towards salvation. (L acan 1984, 44) [transla­
tion mine]

There is, however, a negative aspect to L acan ’s mirror stage theory. T he

hum an baby finds satisfaction in being or wanting to be a whole, a com ­
pleteness, an image that he is not. Lacan calls this the ontological origin of
hum an alienation (Lacan 1977, 4; Ver Eecke 1983a, 119-20).
Clearly, seeing makes a more radical contribution in L acan’s theory than
in Spitz’s. In L acan ’s theory, it transforms the psychic structure. For Lacan,
seeing, at about six m onths of age, is an organizer in the strongest sense o f the
word. For Spitz, the different behavioral reactions of the child when he sees
a hum an being are interpreted as indicators of his new psychic structure, or
as organizers in the weak sense of the word.
R eading Spitz, however, can help us better understand Lacan. Indeed,
in his book Les Complexes Familiaux, L acan analyzes the mirror stage theory
in a subsection o f his chapter on “T h e Intrusion C om p lex.” “1 T h is suggests
that the mirror stage must be understood as a m om ent in the baby’s struggle
to m aintain his exclusive relationship with his mother. Lacan stresses this
struggle by emphasizing jealousy o f siblings as the crucial feeling o f that
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA YIN G 77

period. L acan ’s analysis, however, lacks any description o f the m other’s pos­
itive contribution as it relates to the intrusion com plex or the mirror stage.
Spitz writes:

[I]t [the innate equipment] has to be quickened; the vital spark has to be
conferred on the equipm ent through exchanges with another hum an being,
with a partner, with the mother. N oth in g less than a reciprocal relation will
do. O nly a reciprocal relation can provide the experiential factor in the
infant’s developm ent, consisting as it does o f an ongoing circular exchange,
in w hich affects play a m ajor role. (Spitz 1965, 95)

It is the m utual give and take, its single elem ents constantly ch an gin g and
shifting (though its sum total rem ains the dyadic relation ), w hich repre­
sents the essence o f w hat we are trying to describe and to convey to the
reader. (Ibid. 96)

W h at the m other contributes to the relation is com pletely different from

w hat the baby contributes. E ach o f them is the com plem ent o f the other,
and w hile the m other provides w hat the baby needs, in his turn (though
this is less generally acknow ledged) the baby provides w hat the m other
needs. (Ibid.)

W hat exactly does the child get from this mutual, dyadic relation?
A gain, Spitz’s study o f hospitalism is helpful in providing an answer (Ibid.
277). Briefly, hospitalism is a symptom present in young children who are
brought to a hospital and given hygienic and physical care that is better than
the care they received at home. Spitz’s amazing discovery was that these ch il­
dren— separated for three m onths or more from their mothers at the age of
three m onths— did not develop as well as children who stayed home with
their mothers. In som e cases, their developm ent regressed or even stopped.
Sym ptom s o f increasingly serious deterioration appeared and were at least
partially irreversible (Ibid. 277). Som e o f the results observed were retarda­
tion in m otor developm ent and progressive passivity. These children would
lie supine in their beds and would not achieve the m otor control necessary to
turn into the prone position. T heir faces would becom e vacuous, their eye
coordination defective, and their expressions often imbecilic. Som e would
show bizarre finger m ovem ents rem iniscent o f decerebrate or athetotic m ove­
m ents (Ibid. 278). Finally, these children had a shockingly high mortality
rate. By the end of the second year, thirty-four of the ninety-one children
observed had died. Spitz summarizes:

A b sen ce of m othering equals em otional starvation. W e have seen that this

leads to a progressive deterioration engulfing the ch ild’s w hole person. Such
deterioration is m anifested first in an arrest o f the child’s psychological
developm ent, then psychological dysfunctions set in, paralleled by som atic
78 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

changes. In the next stage this leads to increased infection liability and
eventually, when the em otional deprivation continues into the second year
o f life, to a spectacularly increased rate of mortality. (Ibid. 281)

T he question arises as to why the absence of mothering or m aternal em o­

tional deprivation leads to such negative developm ental consequences for
the infant. M any psychoanalysts (Erikson, Sullivan, Klein, W innicot,
Bowlby, Mahler, Kohut, and M. M annoni, to nam e only a few) have made
extensive com m ents on the im portance o f the mother in a child’s develop­
m ent. W hile there is no one theoretical explanation of why m othering is
im portant or which aspects o f mothering m atter most, there is no disagree­
m ent about the im portance of the m aternal role. D epending on whether the
author accepts a drive m odel or an object-relations m odel, the argument is
either that the m other satisfies a need or that the m other allows the child to
experience trust in others.15
L acan ’s student, M. M annoni, indicates that, even though Lacan did not
explicitly analyze the m other’s role, his theory still points to that role’s cen ­
trality (M annoni 1972). Furthermore, my reading of Spitz’s work convinced
me o f the im portance o f the m other’s role in the developm ent of the child.
L acan ’s theory of the mirror stage, as I make use of it, will be a theory that
stresses the m other’s em otional role. I prefer L acan’s theory because he
emphasizes the crucial role of seeing in child developm ent and because of his
explanation o f the origin o f primary narcissism .16
L acan ’s use o f his theory o f the mirror stage to explain the origin o f nar­
cissism o f course raises the question as to how his view o f narcissim compares
to those o f two im portant A m erican psychoanalysts who have also written on
this subject: Kernberg and Kohut. A study of their views on narcissism and
their respective relations to Freud’s changing views on this m atter deserves a
separate article.
Returning to L acan’s theory o f the mirror stage, let us recall that Lacan
makes this stage responsible for the emergence of primary narcissism or self­
love. Informed by Spitz, I put forward the claim that the quality o f the child’s
self-love depends on the em otional quality o f the mother-child relationship.
O ne can therefore say that the child takes possession o f and appropriates
itself in the mirror stage as a bodily unity by m eans o f the m aternal em otions
invested in it.17
T h e ideal-ego or the image of bodily unity incorporated in the mirror
stage at about six m onths o f age is not identical with the infant’s subjectivity
or his “inner self.” T h e child thus becom es, in some sense, alienated from
itself. Therefore, according to this theory, the way the child experiences itself
prior to the mirror stage is entirely different from the way he experiences
him self after the mirror stage. Prior to and even during the process o f bodily
appropriation, as it takes place in the mirror stage, the child continues to pro­
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 79

duce a “social sm ile,” defined as the child sm iling to anybody approaching

him, because he has no reason to be apprehensive o f other people. However,
after the process o f bodily appropriation that occurs in the mirror stage, the
baby is an alienated subject. H ence, the m other and the stranger will from
now on have a different effect upon the child because the child experiences
the m other and the stranger in relation to him self— now split between an
interiority and an appropriated exteriority— in a different way. T h e baby
experiences the mother or the fam iliar person as relating to it as subject, as
“inner self,” and not as relating exclusively to its exterior, bodily appearance.
Therefore, the m other or the familiar figure do not assume the role of alien­
ating onlooker as described by Sartre. T he mother remains reassuring.
T h e baby experiences the stranger, however, as relating not to his sub­
jectivity, but to his alienating imaginary bodily unity. Lacan granted seeing
the power to achieve this imaginary bodily unity in the mirror stage. Could
it be that the baby experiences the look of the other as focusing on and thus
as a reminder o f its alienating imaginary bodily unity?
I, therefore, prefer to explain the child’s anxiety at eight m onths by say­
ing that the look o f the stranger reminds the baby o f the split in his own per­
sonality as he created it in the mirror stage. Sartre called the look alienating
because it makes consciousness aware o f its determ inate character as bodily
being and because of the fact that as bodily being consciousness is for-the-
other before it is for-itself. I believe that L acan ’s theory allows us to better
specify the cause o f the anxiety produced in the child by the look o f the
stranger. A t eight m onths (roughly two m onths after the mirror stage), the
look of a stranger reminds the child, not just o f its bodily dim ension, but of
the split in his personality that resulted from the mirror stage. Or, to put it
another way, the look reminds the child o f the alienating aspect resulting
from the imaginary bodily unity achieved in the mirror stage. A lienation, for
Sartre, is the mere fact of em bodim ent, which makes us beings-for-others.
A lienation, for Lacan, is that the child assumes and appropriates his body
imaginarily— in the mode of an image that is more perfect than the existen­
tially experienced body. T he difference between the image and the existen­
tial experience is the split in the personality o f the eight-m onth-old, which I
consider to be a potential cause o f the eight-month-anxiety. T h e look of a
stranger, which reminds the child o f this split, is then the occasion or the
proxim ate cause for the eight-month-anxiety.
T h is explanation has the advantage o f accounting for anxiety, whereas
Spitz’s theory explains only disappointm ent. Even the young child’s extreme
joy at the game o f peek-a-boo can hereby be explained as an attem pt to
actively master the anxiety-producing look o f another person.
In his Presidential Address o f 4 A pril 1975, later reworked as an article
entitled “Emergent Them es in H um an D evelopm ent,” Jerom e Kagan pre­
sented what appears to be a com peting theory of separation anxiety (this is
80 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

the new nam e for Spitz’s eight-m onth-anxiety). I will first present K agan’s
theory and then argue that his theory does not necessarily com pete with
mine. Rather, my theory is com plem entary to K agan’s, which in fact requires
such a com plem entary specification.
K agan’s theory is based upon a general view o f child developm ent in
which the author argues that the nine-to twelve-month-old child has the
com petence to activate relational structures. By that com petence Kagan
m eans that the roughly one-year-old is “capable of actively generating rep­
resentations o f previously experienced absent events . . . and com paring
these representations with the perceptions generated by the situation he is
in at the m om ent” (K agan 1976, 188). Kagan further states that: “T h e one-
year-old shows prolonged attention to events that are discrepant transfor­
m ations o f his knowledge, com pared with the m inim al attentiveness at
seven m onths” (Ibid.)
K agan’s explanation of separation anxiety then takes the following form:
“distress to [sic] separation is the result of the new ability to generate a ques­
tion or representation concerning the discrepant quality o f the separation
experience coupled with the temporary inability to resolve it” (Ibid. 189). A s
em pirical confirm ation for his theory, Kagan reports several cross-sectional
and cross-cultural experim ents that drew the following conclusions:

T h e m ain result was that there was no significant decrease in play, a sensi­
tive sign o f apprehension, or occurrence o f crying follow ing the departure of
either parent until the child was about nine to twelve m onths old. T h ese
two signs of apprehension or distress increased linearly until eighteen
m onths and then declined at twenty-one months. (Ibid. 188)

It is worth noting that the variations in em pirical results related to the

anxiety’s peak and decline. For exam ple, in one experim ent, the result is:
“occurrence o f crying following m aternal departure when left with a
stranger . . . increased to a peak value between twelve and fifteen m onths,
and then declined” (Ibid. 189-90). In another study one finds: “separation
fear . . . peaked during the second year” (Ibid.). Kagan reports the separation
anxiety data that supports his theory: “the latency to distress was greater
than five seconds for about one-third o f those who cried, which suggests that
the child was thinking about the separation event before he began to fret”
(Ibid. 190).
I now want to turn to my claim that K agan’s theory com plem ents my
own. First, there is K agan’s attem pt to buttress his theory with results from
studies o f children whose mothers had unobtrusively rubbed a little rouge on
their child’s nose and who were then brought before a mirror. Kagan writes:

T h e probability that the child would touch his nose was very low at 9
m onths but increased linearly through the second year— paralleling the
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 81

grow th curve for separation protest. . . . We believe that the older but not
the younger children were relating the discrepant inform ation in the mirror
to their schema of selfhood. (Ibid. 190, em phasis mine)

Second, Kagan claim s that m aturational factors play a role in separation

anxiety:

T h e com plete corpus o f data suggests th at ‘separation anxiety’ is being m on­

itored closely by m aturational factors, for it does n ot emerge until the last
third o f the first year, peaks during the m iddle o f the second, and then
declines in sam ples differing widely in rearing conditions. (Ibid.)

Third, in his explanation o f separation anxiety, Kagan overemphasizes,

in my opinion, the cognitive factor in the m aturation process. H e writes: “We
suggest that the m aturation event that m ediates the separation response is
primarily but not solely cognitive in nature” (Ibid. 190).
For Kagan, the cause o f anxiety is not so much a new danger experienced
by the child as it is the child’s ability to ask questions about his situation. In
my view, the cause o f the child’s anxiety is a change in his own situation: the
child has becom e a split person because of the mirror stage. Kagan does not
feel that there is an im portant change in the child’s situation. Only, the child
is now able to evaluate his situation because he can ask questions. T h e one-
sideness o f K agan’s viewpoint is obvious when he writes:

Separation distress occurs when the child is m ature enough to ask questions
about the parental departure and his response to it— W here is mother? W ill
she return? W h at should I do? W h at will the stranger do?— but not mature
enough to answer those queries. . . . W hen he is mature enough to resolve
those questions, his distress disappears. (Ibid. 190)

C ould it be instead that the child has failed to mature in noncognitive

areas so that the child needs the m other now— around nine m onths o f age—
more than before, but will not need her as much later on— around fifteen
m onths o f age, when he has m atured in those noncognitive areas? My theory
finds support in the fact that the separation anxiety peaks in the middle of
the second year and then declines, because that is also the precise time dur­
ing which the child’s no-saying to the m other emerges, accom panied by a
feeling o f autonomy. Furthermore, K agan’s explanation does not address the
fact that seeing and being seen by a stranger play an im portant role in the
kind of reaction the child displays. Spitz writes:

He [the child] may lower his eyes “shyly,” he may cover them with his
hands, lift his dress to cover his face, throw him self prone on his cot and
hide his face in the blankets, he may weep or scream. T h e com m on denom ­
inator is a refusal o f contact, a turning away, w ith a shading, more or less
pronounced, of anxiety. (Spitz 1965, 150)
82 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

Kagan is right in claim ing that there is a specific m aturational factor play­
ing a role in separation anxiety. Separation anxiety requires what Kagan calls
the capability of activating relational structures. But the capability is not
exclusively used to create comparisons about others; it can also be used to cre­
ate, in Kagan’s words, “a schema of selfhood.” Even if Kagan does not inter­
pret “schema of selfhood” the same way I do, I believe that nothing in K agan’s
theory prevents me from claim ing that the child’s m aturation includes the use
of his “capability o f activating relational structures” for the creation of a body
image that allows him to actively inhabit his body. T h is is what I claim hap­
pens in the mirror stage, creating an unforeseen vulnerability for the child that
becomes manifest as separation anxiety. My claim gains plausibility when one
considers the crucial results reported by Selm a Fraiberg and Edna A delson
(1973). These authors claim that: “A m ong children blind from birth there is
typically a delay in the acquisition o f ‘I’ as a stable pronoun” (Fraiberg et al.
1973,539). They further claim “that the acquisition o f personal pronouns goes
beyond practice with gram matical tools” and that “T h e blind child’s delay in
the acquisition o f ‘I’ as a concept and a stable form appears to be related to the
extraordinary problems o f constructing a self-image in the absence of vision”
(Ibid. 559). Or: “ It is vision that gives unity to the disparate forms and aspects
of hands and brings about an elementary sense of ‘me-ness’ for hands. Body
image is constructed by means of the discovery o f parts, and a progressive orga­
nization of these parts into coherent pictures” (Ibid.). A nd finally: “K athie’s
[the blind child] achievem ent o f a stable T at the age of four years, ten months
corresponds exactly with her capacity to represent herself in doll play and to
invent an imaginary com panion” (Ibid. 561). Thus, seeing can be said to be
crucial for the construction of a self-image, which in turn is required for being
able to consistently use the pronoun ‘I.’ Seeing can thus be credited with a spe­
cial function in the achievem ent of what one could vaguely call ‘selfhood.’

4. T H IR D O R G A N IZ E R : S A Y IN G “N O ”

In his analyses o f “saying “n o”” Spitz gives equal consideration to shaking the
head in a refusal gesture and using a verbal “no.” His thesis is that, from the
point o f view of the adult com m unicating with the child, no-saying is the first
sem antic sign or gesture (Spitz 1965, 182). Saying “no,” according to Spitz,
implies that the child possesses a concept o f refusal; saying “n o” is not just a
signal, it is a sign. T his distinguishes “n o” from other words already used at
that age, such as “m am a” and “dada.” Children use these words to represent
different wishes at different times. They could m ean “mother,” “father,” “
food,” “I am bored,” or “I am happy” (Ibid. 183). Therefore, the child uses
these words more as a signal than as a linguistic sign. Spitz clearly expresses
this theory in the title o f one o f his books: N o and Yes. On the Genesis of
Human Communication.
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 83

Spitz proves his thesis by showing how the child uses no-saying to extri­
cate him self from situations that pose a dilem m a. O n the one hand, the
child has created a libidinal bond with his mother. Spitz dem onstrates this
through his analysis o f the second organizer: the eight-m onth-anxiety at see­
ing strangers. I believe that his study o f hospitalism shows the ch ild’s depen­
dence on its m other in even greater depth. L acan ’s mirror stage theory can
be used to explain the specific problem for which m aternal support is h elp­
ful for the child.
O n the other hand, the child is pushed towards aggressivity, provoked by
the many frustrations imposed upon him. These include, am ong others, those
the child’s mother imposes when the child’s surges o f activity start to replace
the passivity of the previous stage.
Since the reader is already fam iliar with Spitz’s theory of the child’s libid­
inal bond to his mother, I will now concentrate on the frustration in the
mother-child relationship. A s the child starts to walk, the relationship
between mother and child changes drastically. Prior to that event, “infantile
passivity and m aternal endearm ent and supportive action constituted the
m ajor part o f ’ (Ibid. 181) their relationship. Now, “the exchanges between
mother and child wi l l . . . center around bursts of infantile activity and m ater­
nal com m ands and prohibition” (Ibid.). T he child, however, does not realize
that his activity often damages things or that he is doing som ething danger­
ous. Therefore, mother is “forced to curb and to prevent the child’s in itia­
tives” (Ibid. 181). Furthermore, the child’s locom otion puts distance between
the mother and the child. T h e mother, therefore, must increasingly rely on
“gesture and word” (Ibid.).
In explaining why the mother does this, Spitz advances the proposition:

that the m other is the child’s external ego. U n til an organized structural ego
is developed by the child the m other takes over the function o f the child’s
ego. Sh e controls the child’s access to directed motility. Sh e cares for the
child and protects him , she provides food, hygiene, entertainm ent, the sat­
isfaction of the ch ild’s curiosity; she determ ines the choice o f avenues lead­
ing into the various sectors o f developm ent; . . . the m other must act as the
representative o f the child both in respect to the outer world and to the
c h ild’s inner world. (Ibid. 181-82)

T h e child, according to Spitz, does not understand all that is involved in

m aternal prohibitions. A t about fifteen m onths of age, the child is able to
perceive the gestures or the words used to impose prohibition. He does not
understand the conscious m otivation behind the prohibitions. H e also only
vaguely understands the affective relation o f the m other towards the child.
He does not understand the difference between a prohibition issued out of
anger and one issued out of fear. T h e m other’s gestures and words used to
impose prohibitions are experienced as negative feelings. A ccording to Spitz,
84 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

this negative affective cathexis ensures the perm anence o f the memory trace
o f both the gesture and of the word “n o” (Ibid. 185).
Furthermore, the frustration imposed by the m aternal prohibitions forces
the child back towards passivity. A ccording to Spitz, this provokes, “an
aggressive thrust from the id” (Ibid. 183).
Thus, the child’s dilem m a is that he experiences aggressive impulses
toward his mother to whom he also has libidinal ties. Spitz suggests that the
child solves this dilemm a by a well-known defense m echanism discussed by
A n n a Freud: identification with the aggressor. Aggressivity thus becom es the
em otional force which makes the refusal gesture available to the child.
A ccording to Spitz, his explanation o f the m echanism by which the
refusal gesture (or the word “n o” ) becom es available to the child proves that
the child has access to the abstract concept o f refusal. T h e child is not just
im itating the mother. Indeed, the m other’s “n o” is mostly, if not always, a pro­
hibition o f an action the child initiated on his own. T h e child, however, uses
his newly acquired “n o ,” not only to impose a prohibition upon his mother,
but also, to refuse demands or even to refuse offers made by the mother.
“Johnny, do you want a piece o f cake; do you want candy?”— ”N o ” is often
the reply.
Spitz believes that the child has acquired the capacity to com m unicate
because he can now, by m eans of a linguistic sign, convey an unequivocal
meaning: the m eaning defined by the concept of refusal.18 Let me quote
Spitz’s com ments regarding his own explanation:

W ith the acquisition of the gesture o f negation, action is replaced by m es­

sages, and distance com m unication is inaugurated. T h is is perhaps the most
im portant turning poin t in evolution, both o f the individual and o f the
species. Here begins the hum anization o f the species; here begins the Zoon
Politikon; here begins society. For this is the inception o f reciprocal
exchanges of messages, intentional, directed; with the advent of sem antic
symbols, it becom es the origin o f verbal com m unication. (Ibid. 189)

A careful reading o f Spitz’s explanation of the acquisition o f no-saying

suggests that there is more to this achievem ent than the beginning o f lan­
guage as com m unication. Indeed, Spitz argues that the child acquires no-say­
ing by means o f an identification with the aggressor (the m other) (Ibid. 187).
But, following A n n a Freud, he adds that this identification “will be fol­
lowed . . . by an attack against the external world” (Ibid.). Spitz then writes
the following remarkable passage:

In the fifteen-m onth-old infant, this attack takes the form of the “n o” (ges­
ture first, and word later), w hich the child has taken over from the libidinal
object. Because o f numerous unpleasurable experiences, the “no” is invested
with aggressive cathexis. T h is makes the “n o ” suitable for expressing aggres­
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 85

sion, and this is the reason why the “n o” is used in the defense m echanism
o f identification w ith the aggressor and turned against the libidinal object.
O n ce this step has been accom plished, the phase o f stubbornness (with
w hich we are so fam iliar in the second year o f life) can begin. (Ibid. 187)

But what is the aggressivity and the stubbornness supposed to achieve?

Psychologists have reported that the child says “n o” more often to the mother
than to any other person. T h is evidence is sufficient to suggest a second func­
tion o f no-saying that takes this aggressive com ponent into account. O ne can
explain that function either in terms of Spitz’s or L acan ’s theory.
In a text that I have already quoted, Spitz described the dyadic relation
between mother and child, from the point o f view o f the mother, as follows:

the m other is the ch ild’s external ego. U n til an organized structural ego is
developed by the child the m other takes over the functions o f the child’s
ego . . . the m other must act as the representative of the child both in
respect to the outer world and to the child’s inner world. (Ibid. 181-82)

T h e child’s no-saying, particularly irrational no-saying, therefore

becom es the m eans by which the child affirms his will and right to a point of
view within the dyad.19 It is the beginning o f autonomy.20
Lacan taught that in the mirror stage the child appropriates his body.
One could emend this Lacanian insight by claim ing that the child appropri­
ates his body by, am ong other means, using the m aternal em otions invested
in him. Spitz’s study o f hospitalism clearly dem onstrated the im portance of
m aternal affections. A nxiety at eight m onths can be interpreted as a child’s
confession that he needs a m aternal figure to be able to live with his appro­
priated body.21 T h e aggressive and irrational no-saying after about fifteen
m onths o f age can therefore be interpreted as the child’s way o f dem onstrat­
ing to his mother that he has learned to live with his appropriated body and
does not need his m other’s support any more.
T h is second function is different from but not contrary to the first func­
tion. Spitz stresses the first function. It is possible to argue that Spitz, in
describing the significance o f the first function o f saying “n o ,” includes ele­
m ents that remind us of the second function. Thus, in explaining the great
achievem ent of the acquisition o f saying ‘n o ,’ Spitz writes: “distance commu­
nication is inaugurated . . . here begins the “zoon politikon” (Spitz 1965, 189;
em phasis m ine). Indeed, one could argue that where there is distance com ­
m unication or political life there must be separation between participants.
My point, however, is that saying “n o” created that distance and brings
about a rupture from the mother. Saying “n o” as a m eans o f separating from
the m other is an act o f aggression. It makes sense then that one sees signs of
guilt in the child after such no-saying.22 Furthermore, if the primary purpose
of no-saying is com m unication, then it is not clear why the child would use
86 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

no-saying in an irrational way, such as saying no to a m other’s offer which

the child obviously wants to accept. If one o f the purposes of no-saying is to
separate from the mother, then aggression and irrationality make sense.
In order for the child to be able to learn to say “n o,” som eone must first
say “n o” to the child; som eone must be able to impose prohibitions and
refusals. G iven the closeness o f the mother-child relationship, that task must
first be the m other’s. T he symbiotic relationship between mother and child
makes it difficult for the m other to perform that task. T h at task is easier for
the m other if, besides the relationship she has with her child, she also has an
em otionally significant relationship with some third person, say, her husband.
In Lacanian terms, the m other’s respect for the word or the name-of-the-
Father allows her to transcend the symbiotic mother-child relationship. Her
saying “no” to the child places the child within the triadic structure of child-
mother-father. T h e child’s “n o” can then be interpreted as the child’s accep­
tance of his introduction into that triadic structure, or saying “yes” to that tri­
adic structure (Ver Eecke 1984, 7 8 -8 4 ). Such yes-saying is what Lacan
interprets Freud to m ean by “ Bejahung” (affirm ation) in his article “N e g a­
tion.” A n absence of this process would m ean “retranchm ent” (later rela­
belled “forelusion” ), that is, foreclosure of the N am e of the Father. No-saying
therefore also means that the symbolic order and its triadic structure gets hold
of the child. In other words, one could say that the third function o f no-say­
ing is allowing language to get hold of the child.23
Two exam ples illustrate my thesis. Som e years ago, as a foreign student,
I was invited to an A m erican home. A t the dinner table the following
occurred: T he dinner was com ing to an end. T h e mother was cutting the cake
and, before serving anybody else, she addressed her two-year-old child sitting
next to her and asked if he wanted a piece o f cake. T he child said “no.” I
could see the amazement on the m other’s face. She repeated the question a
second time. T h e child again said “no.” T he mother, still incredulous,
repeated her question a third time. T he child again said “n o ,” took his
m other’s hand and kissed it. T his elegant solution allowed the mother to
serve the cake. A fter everybody had finished their cake, the hostess asked,
addressing my side o f the table, as I was the guest, who wanted another piece
o f cake. I did not have a quick com m and o f English at that time. T h e cake
had been delicious. I was trying to find a way to express in polite terms that
I would like another piece. But, before I could speak, I heard the child say, “I
want one.” Clearly, the child understood the intellectual m eaning of the
word “no.” T he child, however, sensed that the refusal of the cake was not
the only thing at stake. If the refusal of the cake had been the only thing at
stake why would he have asked for a piece the next chance he had? A nd,
above all, why would he have kissed his m other’s hand after the third refusal?
T h e no-saying was a necessary act o f aggression against the mother, in which
the child affirmed his sense o f autonomy and his will to differentiate him self
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 87

from her by essentially telling her: If you think you know what I want, you
are wrong; I want what I want, even if that means that I need to forego the
cake I want.24
T h e second exam ple concerns a three-year-old who had fully mastered
the use of “n o” as the victorious battle cry Spitz described. In the late after­
noon the child saw that his siblings had eaten several bags o f Doritos. He
asked one of his parents if he could have some Doritos. T h e parent first said
“no,” but, after the child repeatedly requested chips, the parent acceded to
the request and said, “If your brothers have eaten some, we cannot refuse your
request.” T he child went to the cabinet where the chips were and com ­
mented to him self in a self-satisfied manner, “I asked and they said yes.”
A bout two hours later, five minutes before dinner was to start, the same child
took two more bags o f chips out o f the kitchen cabinet. T he father asked the
child to put them back and explained that he had to eat dinner. T h e child
said “n o” he would not put them back and “n o” he would not eat dinner. T he
m other reinforced the prohibition and added that the chips were needed the
next day as snacks for lunch and that he could put one in his lunchbox. A t
first, the child said “n o” and com m ented that he was not going to put one in
his lunchbox. Suddenly, the child put one bag o f chips back in the kitchen
cabinet and said that only one bag o f chips was needed for his snack the next
day and asked if he could eat the one rem aining bag. T h e mother and father
repeated their prohibition and their various arguments, to which the child
replied each time with a forceful “n o .” A fter some mild coaching, the child
took his seat . . . and suddenly produced a contented face, put the one
rem aining bag o f chips next to his soup plate and said, more to him self than
to anybody else, “I did not open the bag.” (W hen he finished his soup, the
child asked if he could now eat his chips. A fter a second’s hesitation the par­
ents let him have them .)
A gain, it was clear that the child understood the intellectual context of
no-saying. It was also clear that there was an aggressive com ponent to the
child’s ‘‘nos.” But twice the child’s own com m ents illustrated that no-saying
was a process by which he resisted but also slowly and partially allowed lan­
guage to interfere with his demand for im m ediate gratification.

C O N C L U S IO N

1. I agree with Spitz’s m ethod of using the concept o f indicator, critical

time, or organizer of the developm ent o f the child. I like the three indicators
used by Spitz: the smile at two to three m onths, the eight-m onth-anxiety and
no-saying after fifteen months. However, in contrast to Spitz’s, my interpre­
tation o f the eight-m onth-anxiety relates it to the appropriation of the body
and not so exclusively to the establishm ent o f a love object. L acan ’s theory of
the mirror stage can be used to explain appropriation of the body, provided
88 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C E S OF TH E N EG A TIV E

that one supplem ents his theory with the insight that the m other’s em otional
relation to the child is crucial for that appropriation. Thus, the eight-month-
anxiety, as I understand it, includes the mirror stage as one of its moments.
2. In interpreting the three indicators, Spitz has a reductionist ten ­
dency which he corrects by including a richer contextu al description o f the
three indicators than his own explanation and theory incorporate. Each
tim e, his corrections concern the em otional significance o f the m other fig­
ure for the child. T h is leads m e to argue that Spitz’s explanation o f the
function o f seeing in the period of the eight-m onth-anxiety is unsatisfac­
tory because it can only explain disappointm ent and not anxiety. L acan ’s
mirror stage theory leads me to argue that the eight-m onth-anxiety is
caused by the look o f a stranger who rem inds the child o f the alienating
aspect of his appropriated body.
W hen it com es to no-saying, I disagree with Spitz’s interpretation o f this
achievem ent as being, at most, the acquisition of language as a m ethod of
intellectual com m unication. A gain, I find in Spitz’s own descriptions ele­
m ents which go beyond the explanatory power of Spitz’s theory. I argue
instead that saying “n o” is a victorious slogan for the child because it estab­
lishes the child’s will for his own point o f view, even if that point of view is
irrational. It is this irrational aspect o f the child’s no-saying which is the deci­
sive elem ent in my argument that no-saying is more than a beginning o f com ­
m unication, as Spitz claims. Furthermore, I argue that no-saying also func­
tions as a tool through which the child uses language to control his needs for
immediate gratification. W hile these two interpretations are not to be found
in Lacan, I am indebted to the Lacanian framework in formulating them.
3. Spitz makes no clear differentiation between the concepts o f indica­
tor and organizer. By calling the social smile, the eight-m onth-anxiety, and
no-saying indicators and organizers, Spitz stresses that those three ph enom ­
ena organize past achievem ents and prepare the child for a higher level of
future psychic activity. I argued that these are organizers in the weak form.
T h e strong form o f organizer would be one in which a behavior is not just an
indicator o f a higher psychic activity but one in which it is, by itself, the
cause of that higher activity. It is, in my opinion, wrong to argue that a child
who does not show eight-m onth-anxiety has not established true object rela­
tions and is thus em otionally deficient. Eight-m onth-anxiety is but an indi­
cator o f true object relations. It is not that alone by which object relations
are established. T h e real organizer behind the eight-m onth-anxiety is,
according to my theory, the creation o f the body image (in the mirror stage)
by which the child appropriates its body. O f Spitz’s three indicators, only n o ­
saying would qualify as an organizer in the strong sense. A m ong other
things, the no-saying by itself creates the separation o f m other and child.
W ithout the aggressive act o f no-saying the separation of m other and child
is not achieved. T his conclusion clarifies and justifies the Freudian claim in
 A C H IL D ’S N O -SA Y IN G 89

“N egatio n ,” to which this study is devoted: the creation o f the symbol of

negation creates a measure o f freedom that will make the function of judg­
m ent possible (Freud, S .E ., X IX, L.39).
4. Clearly, I have not fully explained the relationship between negation
and freedom, but I hope I have made a contribution.25 In order to put this
problem within a philosophical perspective, I wish to end with a quote from
H egel about free will: “ it determ ines itself as self-related negativity” (Hegel
1952, #104). T his occurs within the moral point o f view. T h e no-saying child
is not yet there, but H egel’s speculative form ulation allows us to glimpse the
child on its way.26
 SIX

Oedipus, the King

How and How Not to Undo a Denial

abstract: In this chapter I make use o f Sop h ocles’ piece Oedipus, the King in
order to answer a num ber o f questions about denials such as: can undoing a
denial avoid the tragedy experienced by O edipus? W hy was Teiresias’ inter­
ven tion unhelpful? W hy was O edipus able to make use o f the inform ation
given by Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd? I will further argue that
Sop h ocles’ Oedipus, the King invites us to make a distinction betw een truth and
m eaning. For truth to becom e m eaningful, a person must integrate actively the
forgotten and repressed events. It is no help for others to tell som eone the truth
about him self. Truth about on eself thus possesses a characteristic w hich is dif­
ferent from truth about the objective world, where telling the truth and pre­
senting argum ents for it are effective ways to prom ote the truth.

IN T R O D U C T IO N

Psychotherapy teaches us that the emergence o f true self-knowledge meets

with resistance. It is futile for somebody (e.g., the therapist) to tell the patient
what she thinks about the patient. Such an approach leads only to the rejec­
tion or the denial o f the truth. O nly a search conducted by the person her or
him self can lead to the discovery o f the truth about the self. Soph ocles’ drama
Oedipus, the King can serve as a valid exam ple of the psychotherapeutic expe­
rience o f looking for true self-knowledge. G enerations o f people have seen in
that dram a a true expression o f many aspects o f the hum an condition.
Sophocles starts the drama at a point in time when Oedipus adheres to a
self-image that is incom plete, if not wrong. T h en Sophocles lets Teiresias
reveal the truth to Oedipus. Oedipus, however, cannot accept this truth.

91
92 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C E S OF TH E N EG A TIV E

Sophocles ends the drama when Oedipus has accepted the truth and thus sees
his life in a totally new light. T h e whole dram a is nothing but the description
o f the path leading to O edipus’s discovery and acceptance of the truth. I will
pursue two questions: Why does Oedipus deny the truth about him self when
Teiresias presents it? A nd how is he ultim ately able to overcom e his denial of
the truth? T he answers to these two questions will first necessitate an analy­
sis o f O edipus’s self-image at the beginning of the drama.

1. O E D I P U S ’ S E L F - I M A G E A T T H E
B E G IN N IN G O F T H E T R A G E D Y

In the prologue, Oedipus appears as a m agnanim ous king and a concerned

m onarch who cares for a city afflicted by the plague (verses 6 3 -6 4 ).1 O nce
already he had saved the city from misfortune when he solved the riddle of
the sphinx (3 5 -3 7 ). Now, possibly suffering from hubris, he promises, almost
recklessly, to find and to avenge the injustice (1 0 5 -1 0 8 ) that caused the
plague (137). H e promises to do everything that is necessary and to spare no
one. O edipus’s confident self-image is based upon and justified by one im por­
tant past event: solving the sphinx’s riddle.
Oedipus and the Thebans considered the events before Oedipus solved
the sphinx’s riddle to be prehistory. It could be and was, in fact, forgotten.
N evertheless, events took place in that prehistory. These events are not inte­
grated into O edipus’s current self-image; therefore, one cannot call the king’s
self-image com plete. If these events are also denied, one would have to say
that the king holds a false self-image. A s the dram a progresses, it reveals the
forgotten or repressed events. They include: O edipus’s killing o f a group of
people (8 1 0 -1 3 ) and his marriage to Jocasta, notw ithstanding the warning
from Delphi that he would kill his father and marry his mother (791—94)-
T here is also the reproach from a C orinthian that Polybus and M erope are
not his real parents (7 7 9 -8 1 ). Finally, there is the fact o f O edipus’s scarred
ankles, testifying to their having been pierced when Oedipus was still an
infant (1033).
T he relation between all these facts or events is not clear to Oedipus.
T his, however, does not put Oedipus in an exceptional situation. Indeed, it is
typical of the hum an situation that one has to reckon with unclear and
incomprehensible facts. It is true that Oedipus encounters facts that have
profound significance, but this is only a difference in degree, not in substance.
Faced with these threatening facts, particularly the frightening warning
o f the oracle of Delphi, Oedipus runs away from Polybus and M erope. T his
act o f running away does not solve at all the problems or mysteries raised by
events or facts in O edipus’s past. Indeed, the scars on O edipus’s ankles remain
and the warning of the oracle that O edipus will kill his father and marry his
mother has not been invalidated.
 O ED IPU S, TH E KIN G 93

O ne could object to the value of using this tragedy for m aking general con ­
clusions about people, by pointing out that the tragedy is based on an oracle,
and the oracle almost seems to be a contingent event, a kind o f deus ex machina,
which dominates the life of Oedipus, not from the inside, but from the outside.
For the Greeks, however, an oracle was no more contingent and no more exter­
nal than, for example, the sudden death of a child in our civilization. Indeed,
the sudden death of a child from an incurable disease is, in our civilization, an
event that often promotes soul searching and self-accusations. T h e mourning
parents almost naturally look for events in the past which could have been
warnings about the illness. In both Greece and our own civilization an event
that is external to a person— an oracle in Greece, the biologically caused death
of a child— can set in motion a process of self-interrogation. Thus, even from
this angle, the case of Oedipus is not exceptional.
O edipus’s attitude towards the prehistorical events is one o f flight. He
runs away from C orinth. These prehistorical events are left out or repressed
in O edipus’s self-image as king. They have no m eaning for the present.

2. D E N IA L A N D R E JE C T IO N O F T H E E M E R G IN G T R U T H

In order to fulfill his royal promise of purifying the city o f injustice, Oedipus
calls upon the divinely-endowed prophet Teiresias. A fter m uch prevaricating,
O edipus forces Teiresias to tell him what caused the plague and who the mur­
derer of Laius is. In verse 353, the prophet answers: “You are the land’s pol­
lution.” In verse 362, Teiresias explains him self by bluntly affirming: “I say
you are the murderer o f the king whose murderer you seek.” A n d in verses
366—67 Teiresias adds: “I say that with those you love best you live in foulest
shame unconsciously and do not see where you are in calam ity.” Shortly
before he leaves, the prophet speaks without hesitation in clear and non-
m etaphorical terms:

H e shall be proved a father and a brother both to his own children and in
his house; to her that gave him birth, a son and husband both; a fellow
sower in his father’s bed with that sam e father that he murdered. (4 5 7 -5 9 )

Teiresias presents an interpretation of the plague which implicates O edi­

pus. T h e interpretation is put forward categorically. Oedipus, the accused,
regards Teiresias’s statem ent as an untruth. H e must therefore reject it.2 In
order to augm ent the plausibility of O edipus’s rejection of and his resistance
to Teiresias’s interpretation, Sophocles precedes Teiresias’s intervention with
a quarrel between Oedipus and Teiresias, but this is only a theatrical artifice
to prepare the audience. Oedipus cannot accept any interpretation of events
which categorically contradicts his self-image. T he truth o f this self-image
depends on O edipus’s forgetting a number o f events, or at least on his deny­
ing their relevance. By giving an om inous and crucial im portance to these
94 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

past events, Teiresias undermines and attacks O edipus’s self-image. Oedipus

interprets Teiresias’s intervention as a personal attack and begins to look
upon Teiresias as a waylayer.
Viewing Teiresias as a liar is a logical position for Oedipus to take,
because it is the easiest solution to the challenge. Indeed, if Teiresias’s accu­
sation is an invention and not founded on truth, then Oedipus can retain his
peace of mind. He does not have to change his self-image, his view o f the
world, or his way o f life. Teiresias started a difficult and dangerous task: that
is, making a person aware o f the precariousness o f his self-image and o f his
way of life. Furthermore, he did it unskillfully. He presented his view as a
truth which contradicted O edipus’s view. Sophocles presents the two views as
radical alternatives without indicating any possible transition for Oedipus
from the incom plete view he is holding to the more com plete view that
Teiresias is presenting.

3. F R O M D E N IA L T O A C C E P T A N C E O F T H E T R U T H

A lthough he furiously rejected Teiresias’s opinion (4 4 5 -4 7 ), and, in addition,

accused his brother-in-law o f plotting against him (3 7 8 -7 9 ; 534-35;
618 -1 9 ), at the end o f the play Oedipus exclaim s in self-accusation:
“A ccursed in my living with them I lived with, cursed in my killing”
(1 1 84-85). How is this change possible? W hat are the forces propelling this
change?
T he event at the origin o f the change in O edipus’s views is the plague in
Thebes. In the play, the plague represents the return of the forgotten or
repressed events. For these forgotten events to return, however, they must
emerge in a form or dom ain in which they are significant for O edipus’s self­
consciousness. W hen the forgotten events becom e events that must be pun­
ished because he thinks, by doing so, the plague will end, Oedipus can no
longer deny their relevance. Faced with a plague, Oedipus, as king of Thebes,
cannot but investigate its causes. He therefore unknowingly puts in m otion
the effort which will lead to the rediscovery o f the forgotten events. A t this
point in Sophocles’ tragedy it is not clear what will result from O edipus’s
effort, but there is a prem onition of som ething ominous.
T h e event that turns O edipus’s search definitively in the direction of
rediscovering the forgotten events is a conversation between Oedipus and
Jocasta. In an attem pt to save Oedipus by giving him a scrap o f information
that could be used to discard the validity o f oracles and prophesies, Jocasta
recalls a painful detail about King Laius’s death:3

T h ere was an oracle that once cam e to Laius, . . . and it told him that it was
fate that he should die a victim at the h ands o f his own son, a son to be born
of Laius and me. But, see now, he the king, was killed by foreign highway
 O ED IPU S, TH E KIN G 95

robbers at a place where three roads m eet— so goes the story: and for the
son— before three days were out after his birth K ing Laius pierced his
ankles. . . . (711 ff.)

T h is inform ation about King Laius’s death reminds Oedipus of the mur­
der he com m itted. It too occurred at the crossing of three roads. O edipus’s
questioning reveals that the two murderers— first thought of as different peo­
ple— are in fact one and the sam e murderer. Verses 82 1 -2 2 formulate this
insight dram atically: “A n d I pollute the bed o f him I killed by the hands that
killed him . . .”
These verses indicate that O edipus’s former self-image has eroded. It will
be further eroded as a consequence o f a second attem pt to free Oedipus from
his anxieties. T he oracle not only predicted that Oedipus would kill his
father, but also that he would marry his mother. A s long as Oedipus believes
that his parents are the King and Q ueen o f C orinth, he is protected against
this prediction of the oracle. A messenger from Corinth, however, shatters
this belief when he announces the death o f Polybus, asks Oedipus to return
to C orinth as king, and in an attem pt to brush aside an objection, tells O edi­
pus that Polybus and M erope are not his parents (1016). T h is radically
changes O edipus’s horizon. W hat Oedipus formerly feared as only a distant
possibility, he must now consider as highly probable. T h e truth of his self­
image is severely shaken once more.
T h e definitive turning point com es with the revelations o f the shepherd
o f Thebes. Oedipus has questions about his pierced ankles and about being
rejected at birth. H aving been told by the messenger from C orinth that he
received the young Oedipus from a T heban shepherd, Oedipus orders to bring
him that shepherd and he forces the shepherd to reveal who his parents were.
T he elem ent that links all of the inform ation into a coherent whole are the
wounds on O edipus’s ankles. Thus, Oedipus com es to recognize him self as
responsible for the plague in the city.
In the three steps that brought about the total decom position o f his self­
image, O edipus played an active role. In each case, it is O edipus who puts
his self-image to a test. T h e circum stances in which the facts and events
emerged prevent O edipus from denying them , as he had with Teiresias’s
assertions. O edipus was able to deny Teiresias’s interpretation o f the events
by accusing him o f inventing the interpretation for the purpose o f plotting
against him. T h is form o f self-defense— aggressive accusation o f the oppo­
nent— is made extrem ely plausible in the play because a dispute between
O edipus and Teiresias precedes Teiresias’s devastating interpretation. Such
an aggressive self-defense, however, prevented O edipus from facing the issue
on its own merit and honestly asking the question o f whether he could be
responsible for the plague in Thebes. O edipus cannot use the sam e tech ­
nique o f aggressive accusation to falsify the inform ation uncovered in the
96 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

dialogues with Jocasta or the m essenger or the shepherd, since they give
their inform ation in order to help him. O edipus does not reject the ques­
tions about his past that emerge from the inform ation they give him.
Instead, he transforms these questions into self-interrogation. In his
encounter with the messenger, O edipus is so possessed by the process o f self­
interrogation that he forces the m essenger to speak.
W hen the self-interrogation leads to insight, O edipus turns his aggres­
siveness against himself. In an act of self-condem nation Oedipus pokes his
eyes out. Instead of a regal Oedipus, there is a broken m an (1360ff.). T h e for­
gotten and neglected events have done their job. They have forced their way
into O edipus’s field of consciousness. Oedipus accepts them painfully, but
actively, as part of his new self-image.

4. C O U L D T H E U N D O IN G O F T H E
D E N IA L H A V E U N F O L D E D D IF F E R E N T L Y ?

I want to address two questions. T he first is: Could Oedipus have done any­
thing to avoid the tragedy that forced the change in his self-image? T h e sec­
ond is: W hy did Oedipus refuse to believe Teiresias? Put more positively:
C ould Teiresias have told the truth in a way that would have warded off
O edipus’s angry rejection? Both questions intend to clarify one concern: How
can denial be more effectively overcome?
A s to the first question, O edipus’s original self-image did not integrate
certain facts or events. Such non-integration is typical in cases o f denial.
Reality, however, is harsh and demanding. Unrecognized events do even­
tually avenge themselves. King Oedipus finds his city afflicted by the plague.
In Sophocles’ drama, the unrecognized events are not yet powerful enough to
avenge them selves. T h e consequences o f the prehistoric events do not
emerge autom atically or independently; they get the support o f angry gods.
However, I wish to stress that in Greek culture, as in many ancient cultures,
people saw a close connection between affliction (e.g., the plague) and moral
evil. H aving com m itted evil— even if unconsciously— Oedipus had to be
punished according to the Greek vision o f the world. O ne can translate this
Greek m oralistic view into the secular vision o f contem porary psychoanalytic
theory which asserts that “the repressed necessarily returns.”4
This secular interpretation o f the king’s fall gives us a clue as to how
Oedipus could have dim inished the tragic results of the reemergence o f the
repressed events. Indeed, psychoanalysis sees the restoration of a healthy per­
sonality in the undoing o f am nesia. Thus, the only creative solution available
for Oedipus would have been to actively search for the significance o f the
prehistoric events in an effort to give them a place in his conscious self­
image, instead of trying to forget them .5 H ad he then found the penitence
necessary to expiate his personal guilt, he could have accepted it. Such a
 O ED IPU S, TH E KIN G 97

course o f action would have given the dram a a totally different turn. T he city
would have been spared the plague and Oedipus would not have been forced
to publicize his crime. T h e tragedy thus illustrates one of life’s demands: A
hum an being must broaden his self-image so that as few events as possible are
repressed, forgotten, or considered unimportant. A n individual must regularly
recreate his or her self-image and integrate the past with the present instead
o f forgetting the past and allowing it to becom e a perm anent part of prehis­
tory. In O edipus’s refusal to com ply with this hum an “duty” lies the origin of
the tragedy accom panying his change o f self-image.
The second point concerns Teiresias’s role. It contains something of a gen­
eral application. Many people— similar to Teiresias— have little difficulty in
perceiving the one-sidedness and narrowness of others’ self-images. The tem p­
tation, then, to present this insight as a logical and thus a necessary conclusion
is great. Such a move represents an aggressive intervention in the life of
another, who in turn must experience it as an untruth. Teiresias followed this
course exactly. Oedipus’s response was, understandably, an explosion of rage.
Was another outcome possible, given the imperious intervention of Teiresias?
T he role of king was a crucial part of O edipus’s self-image. T h e aware­
ness of his royalty was the pillar of his life.6 It determ ined his attitudes and his
efforts towards other people. O ne could therefore say that O edipus’s identifi­
cation with the role o f king was a primary way by which he supported and
directed his existence. Oedipus dedicated all of his energy to this role. How
could Oedipus have tolerated the underm ining o f his identification with this
regal role? It would have m eant the annihilation of the m eaning he pursued
in his life. N o one can tolerate such annihilation.
N evertheless, Oedipus had to change his self-image. Teiresias did not
bring this change about, whereas Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd,
unwittingly but effectively, contributed to O edipus’s transformation. They
did it unknowingly because their primary purpose was to reassure Oedipus
and thus to prevent him from looking further. In contrast, Teiresias, by trying
to broaden the king’s self-image, forced Oedipus to reaffirm his narrow self­
image. T h is ironic relationship between intentions and results brought about
by the execution of those intentions requires further analysis.
C an we find in the attitudes o f Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd
som ething positive that we do not find in that o f Teiresias? T h e crucial dif­
ference seems to be that Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd accepted
and supported O edipus’s initial self-image, whereas Teiresias the prophet was
concerned primarily with the truth, without considering whether this truth
would be psychologically destructive.7 Indeed, Jocasta, the messenger, and the
shepherd present O edipus with facts unknown to him in the hope that these
will confirm his self-image. Oedipus begins to broaden his views. T h is expan­
sion becom es tragic for him only because the new awareness progressively
confronts him with his m assive guilt.
98 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

Accordingly, a change in self-image cannot be forced upon another per­

son; the individual has to discover it for himself. G enuine reorientation can ­
not be arbitrarily imposed ab extra. Fortunately, a person searching for a new
self-image usually has vague presentiments, which naturally have to be clari­
fied. Such clarification calls for the techniques o f listening and interrogation
on the part of a sym pathetic outsider. In this respect, Sophocles’ dram a fore­
shadows a basic principle of contemporary psychoanalysis: A n outsider does
not have the right to intervene imperiously in the life o f another. T h e ther­
apist must listen and support the search for a new self-image. Truthfulness is
o f only secondary im portance. O f primary im portance is the creation o f a self­
image that can be appropriated by the patient and that can give m eaning to
his life.
O ne can com pare this interpretation o f Sop h ocles’ dram a with an
aspect o f H egelianism as well. A t any m om ent, the conscious self-im age of
O edipus appeared partial, just as the W eltanschauung o f any particular fig­
ure or culture is shown to be partial in H egel’s Phenomenology. W hen unrec­
ognized events succeed in requiring attention, then the self-image or the
W eltanschauung has to change. People and cultures must continuously
search for a broader view. A bsolute and fixed truths are useless. Only histor­
ically-anchored truths are relevant: that is, truths in which history and indi­
viduals believe.
Freud and Hegel, each in his own way, reacted against absolute and fixed
truths. T h e basic principles justifying such a position were presumably already
intuitively understood in G reek culture. T h is insight, implicit in Sophocles’
Oedipus, was developed into a philosophical system by Hegel, and into a ther­
apeutic technique by Freud.

C O N C L U S IO N

Sophocles’ dram a makes use of m ythical material. T h e insights that I have

underlined in this drama are the aggressive resistance against true self-knowl­
edge and the peculiar position required for an interlocutor to be helpful in a
hum an dialogue. T he aggressive resistance to true self-knowledge is most
clearly visible in O edipus’s reaction to Teiresias’s prophetic revelation of the
truth. In his search for truth, Oedipus is not willing to consider all possible
leads with equal zeal. H e is particularly inhibited in following a lead to truth
that would destroy his self-image. I explained this by showing how on e’s self­
image is the primary instrument for giving m eaning to one’s life. Thus, the
Oedipus tragedy illustrates the fundam ental distinction between truth and
meaning. T h is distinction alone can explain the aggressive resistance to
entertaining negative inform ation related to on e’s self-image.
However, m eaning derived from on e’s self-image is not independent
from the truth o f on e’s self-image. Therefore, m eaning and truth, even
 O ED IPU S, TH E KIN G 99

though they are distinct, cannot be opposites. T h e distinction between truth

and m eaning and their relationship to one another is what creates the space
for subjectivity. Indeed, to be a subject, that is, to be a conscious ego, means
that one has the reflective capability to affirm the position one takes. In turn,
this m eans one has the capability o f reflectively questioning and/or confirm '
ing the truth or falsity of one’s self-image. A hum an being cannot escape such
a confirm ation nor can he let somebody else make this confirm ation for him.
T he former condition takes away the possibility of living happily and undis­
turbed by a discrepancy between truth and significance; the latter condition
elim inates everything but the ego as the potential realizer o f this confirm a­
tion. It is this last condition which explains why Teireisias’s direct presenta­
tion of the truth fails and why the indirect approaches of Jocasta, the m es­
senger, and the shepherd succeed.8 Teireisias’s approach— presenting a truth
contrary to the one held by Oedipus— allows Oedipus only one way to create
distance between him self and Teiresias with respect to his own self-image:
rejection o f Teiresias’s interpretation. T he intentions of Jocasta, the m essen­
ger, and the shepherd are different from O edipus’s intention. N on e of these
three presents Oedipus with a truth about O edipus’s life that contradicts
O edipus’s self-image. Rather, Jocasta wants to alleviate O edipus’s worries; the
messenger wants Oedipus to accept becom ing King o f C orinth; and the shep­
herd wants to avoid a calam ity he sees com ing. T his difference in intention
by itself creates the distance between Oedipus and his interlocutors needed
to allow Oedipus the personal involvem ent in the search and discovery o f the
truth about his life. T his allows the objective truth to becom e m eaningful.9
T he myth of Oedipus as used in Sophocles’ drama thus makes us intu­
itively aware o f aspects o f hum an subjectivity for which we only recently
have developed a theory. Indeed, psychoanalytic theory argues for a number
o f therapeutic directives which m aintain the distance between patient and
therapist: for exam ple, the analyst’s first task is to listen;10 the analytic situa­
tion is not a m ethod for m aking im portant decisions;11 and the influence of
the countertransference must be neutralized as much as possible (Laplanche
and Pontalis 93).
Myths and dramas based on myths can provide intuitive insights which
are theoretically explicated only centuries later. We have not argued in this
paper the more radical claim: that is, that myths give us access to insights that
are theoretically unattainable.12
 SE V E N

Denial, Metaphor,
the Symbolic, and Freedom

The Ontological Dimensions of Denial

abstract. In the previous chapter, I analyzed the case o f Oedipus. O edipus, until
forced to do so by circum stances, did not actively seek to broaden his view of
him self to include such denied facts as his pierced ankles. O edipus’ failure to
actively search out his truth led to tragic consequences. In this chapter, I will
analyze the autobiographical account of A nth ony Moore, who describes one
profound denial and the many steps, he undertook voluntarily, to undo such a
denial and its consequences.1 I will first present a careful phenom enological
description of that profound denial. I will then draw a number o f philosophical
(ontological) conclusions that I intend as correctives to the claim that hum an
beings are autonom ous creatures. T h e conclusions include the thesis that denial
is an unconscious form o f self-deception, that the achievem ent of personal free­
dom depends upon the creation o f m etaphors, the usage of m etonym ic sim ilari­
ties, the availability of a cultural system rich in symbols, and the ability of em o­
tionally im portant persons to say “n o” to deep forms of identification.

1. P H E N O M E N O L O G I C A L D E S C R I P T I O N
O F A D E N IA L A N D IT S U N D O IN G

A n O verview

In Father, Son, and Healing Ghosts, the author, A nthony M oore, provides us
with an autobiographical account o f dealing with his father’s death, which
occurred during the author’s infancy and his fatherless childhood.1 T h e book

101
102 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

is the story of undoing a fundam ental denial. It is much more detailed than
Freud’s exam ples of denial. In particular, Freud does not tell us how denials
are undone. W hat he does tell us is that merely acknowledging the truth
behind a denial— the intellectual undoing o f a denial— is but a meager begin­
ning to the work o f a com plete undoing.2 T h e m ajor work involves em otion­
ally incorporating the denied truth and the world hidden behind that denial
into one’s daily life. T he book by M oore fills this gap in the Freudian litera­
ture. M oore describes the many steps he took to undo the fundam ental denial
o f his formative years, which had consisted in denying that he missed his
father while at the same time deeply identifying with him.
In chapter 1 of this book I argued that Freud helps us to distinguish four
steps in the history of denial and its undoing. Denial— so Freud reasons— is a
partial lifting of the repression.3 H ence, I postulated a first m oment in which
repression was not lifted but was, on the contrary, successful. In that stage a
patient typically answers her therapist’s question by saying that she does not
know. T h e patien t’s consciousness is confronted by a blank. A second step
announces itself when the patient answers the therapist’s question with a
negative sentence. Freud claim s that such negative answers include the per­
tinent inform ation in the form of a denial. T he truth thus appears but as
denied. In a third step, the therapist can help the patient see that her denial
contains the truth. T he recognition o f the truth is done reluctantly or purely
intellectually, as in the statem ent: “I guess that figure in my dream must be
my mother.” In the fourth step, the therapist helps the patient accept em o­
tionally the im plications o f the denied truth, for instance: “If that bossy fig­
ure in my dream is my mother, then I have to learn to stand up to her or to
avoid m eeting her.”
In my presentation o f M oore’s autobiographical description o f his
denial and its undoing I will follow the four steps discovered in Freud’s
analysis. M oore’s first step was the m om ent o f repressing his painful experi­
ence, a process Freud postulated. In M oore’s case we see an unusually deep
attachm ent to his dead father. T here are indications o f deep pain and evi­
dence o f sem i or unconscious m otives influencing his life decisions. M oore’s
second step was to deal with the pain o f losing his father with a well-crafted
denial. T h at denial was operative in spite o f his deep attachm ent to his
father. He needed the help o f a psychiatrist to m ove to the next phase.
Through his psychiatrist’s effective response to his well-formulated denial,
M oore took the third step, making the intellectual m ove o f undoing the
denial. M oore’s fourth step, dealing em otionally with the truth hidden in the
denial, had two stages. T h e first stage can be described as a gift to the young
M oore for his willingness to acknowledge the truth. Indeed, the acknow l­
edged truth allowed M oore to recognize im portant dim ensions o f life that his
original denial prevented him from appreciating. T h e second stage consisted
o f the work that M oore performed to undo several unconscious interpreta­
 D EN IA L, M ETAPH OR, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 103

tions o f his father’s death: his unconscious over-idealization o f his father and
his unconscious belief that his birth was the cause of his father’s death.
T h e first step in all denial is, according to Freud, a deep pain that the
subject deals with by repressing and not accepting it. Because of the repres­
sion, the pain that will be the cause o f the denial is not visible. A ll we can
expect from the reports o f a subject performing a repression are indications of
a paradox and a form o f self-deception used to deal with that paradox. In
M oore’s case we have reports that indicate his deep attachm ent to his father.
T h e attachm ent to his dead father seems to have been deeply established in
his unconscious from early infancy and leads M oore, as an adolescent, to
claim that “Som e separation from my father’s identity was necessary . . . to be
free to lead my own life” (M oore 5). T h e paradox in M oore’s life thus seems
to be connected with the young M oore’s will to over-identify with his dead
father to the point where he is unable to live his own life. I thus take the
over-identification to be the young M oore’s m ethod o f covering over an
unacceptable pain. I will describe that over-identification in its unconscious
depths and its overarching effects.
Let us first take a look at the depth of unconscious m otives present in
M oore’s over-identification with his father. M oore knows the story his
m other told him about how he threw up the first time she breastfed him after
she received the telegram announcing her husband’s death (Ibid. 1). He also
remembers, as a young child, the sad whispers o f grown-up voices creeping
into his safe haven under the table and the deep sense of sadness that would
com e over him (Ibid.). Furthermore, he writes that sharing his father’s first
nam e and his middle initial increased his identification with him (Ibid. 3)
Reverence for his dead father was silently reinforced by his mother not
remarrying. W hen M oore read with his mother, fifty years or so after the
death o f the husband/father, the love letters to his mother, both were sur­
prised at the intensity o f the feelings expressed. Through her tears, M oore’s
m other said, “N ow you know why I never remarried” (Ibid. 104). In addition,
M oore’s m other had placed a portrait o f the dead father in a M arine’s green
uniform on her dresser; this must have nourished M oore’s attachm ent to his
absent father. M oore stresses that his father’s portrait was on his m other’s
dresser throughout his childhood. He even calls the portrait “a sacred icon
w atching over [his] childhood” (Ibid. 1). Furthermore, his mother encour­
aged his “wearing tie clasps and carrying handkerchiefs that bore his [father’s
and his own] initials” (Ibid. 4), increasing his identification with his father to
the point that A nthony felt he had to live his life “in a way that was worthy
o f being the continuation of his” (Ibid. 4).
Second, let us look at M oore’s behaviors in which we can see the far-
reaching effects o f his identification with his father. A s a child, he was fasci­
nated with Marines: uniforms, movies, even the M arine C orps Hymn. W hen
he had nothing else to do, the young M oore dressed up “wearing [the] green
104 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C E S OF TH E N EG A TIV E

garrison cap with a bronze 2nd lieutenant’s bar on it” (Ibid. 1). Later,
A nthony M oore describes him self at that time in his life as being fascinated
by “anything that reminded [him] of [his] father” (Ibid. 1). T he young Moore
“went to military high school in part to im itate [his] father’s life in uniform”
(Ibid.2). Introspectively, M oore writes, “I wanted to do it as well as my father,
so o f course I had to be an officer” (Ibid.). M oore lets us glimpse the degree
o f enthusiasm required to m aintain the denial (or repression) when he
describes that, “I com pletely immersed myself in the spit and polish o f a
cadet’s life” (Ibid.). A s a senior in college he took the entrance exam for the
M arine Corps Officer C andidate School, just as his father had. C om m enting
further on his decision to take the entrance exam , M oore writes: “Joinin g the
M arines was also one more way to im itate my father who had enlisted in the
spring o f his senior year in college, 1942” (Ibid.).
We can also see how images o f his father influenced important decisions.
Let me elaborate on the brief analysis I made in chapter one. A fter giving up
his dream o f becom ing a M arine, M oore decided to enter the N ovitiate o f the
Society of Jesus. M oore explains the decision to becom e a Jesuit on multiple
levels. H e recounts that his decision to becom e a Jesuit was connected with
the image o f his dying father. T h e young M oore “wanted to be worthy o f the
sacrifice [his] father had m ade” (Ibid. 3). H e felt that joining the Jesuits was
“dying to the world, particularly the world o f m arital love” (Ibid.). Moore
summarizes his motives to becom e a Jesuit priest as follows: “I believed that
becom ing a priest was a debt I owed my father for the sacrifice he made in
giving up his life for m e” (Ibid. 3).
W ith the images o f becom ing a Jesuit and thus “dying to the world of
m arital love” and of “sacrifice,” we enter the dom ain of the unconscious
processes that tie M oore’s conscious decision to becom e a Jesuit priest to his
father’s death. M oore informs us o f two more unconscious motives connected
with his father’s death. M oore’s awareness that his father’s death closely fol­
lowed his own birth led him to the unconscious belief that the world had no
place for both o f them and that, in some way, he was responsible for his
father’s death. T h is irrational belief led to another irrational belief: that, just
as his father induced his death by fathering a child, so the young Moore
would induce his death by fathering a child (Ibid. 3). M oore developed a fur­
ther unconscious fantasy when relating to his m aternal grandfather, who de
facto played the role o f a substitute father. A ffection for this substitute father
was tempered by negative feelings because his grandfather was not an intel­
lectual and was tem peramentally unpredictable. Furthermore, the young
M oore’s whole affective relationship with his m aternal grandfather was
infected by denial of the pain connected with his father’s death. If M oore did
not miss his father, how could he feel that he had a substitute father in his
grandfather? Instead, M oore writes that “he preferred to pretend that [he] did
not need a father, that he had learned to be his own father” (Ibid. 4).
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 105

M oore’s decision to becom e a Jesuit priest allowed him to begin to real­

ize the paradox in which he found himself. M oore felt that his father had not
had the opportunity to live his life fully. Therefore, the young M oore had to
live for both him self and his father. W asting his own life on som ething m ean­
ingless would m ean wasting his father’s life and sacrifice (Ibid. 3). However,
such an over-identification with his father made it impossible for the young
M oore to carve out his own identity (Ibid. 4). Clearly, we are here in the pres­
ence o f a puzzling situation in the life o f the young Moore.
Evidence that M oore had taken the second step in the process of denial
appears in a train of thoughts that are totally different from those expressing
his over-identification with his father. M oore reports responding to any
inquiry about his dead and missing father by saying, “You can ’t miss what you
never had” (Ibid. 1). H e also reports thinking that he “did not really need a
father [because he] had learned to be his own father” (Ibid. 4). Clearly, these
thoughts form the young M oore’s basic denial o f the pain connected with
m issing a father, who had died in battle for his country. For a long time, the
deep identification with his father and the denial o f em otional pain about his
loss co-existed. Nevertheless, the turmoil o f the inner conflicts led A nthony
M oore to seek the help o f a psychiatrist.
T he third step in the process o f denial occurred when M oore’s psychia­
trist said the words that would enable M oore to undo his denial of missing his
father. M oore’s denial took the form: “You can ’t miss what you never had,” to
which his psychiatrist answered: “You can also miss what you never had but
know you had every right to have” (Ibid. 4).
T h e third step almost autom atically resulted in the start o f the fourth
step in the process o f denial. In a first stage, M oore was, as it were, the recip­
ient o f a gift of life because he had acknowledged the truth. Indeed, as a result
o f truthfully acknowledging, after his psychiatrist’s intervention, his feeling of
loss over his dead father, M oore “began to realize how much the presence of
[his] Italian grandfather had m anaged to fill the vacuum ” (Ibid. 4). It is true
that his grandfather’s character made the young M oore am bivalent towards
him. H is grandfather was not an intellectual, having com pleted only two
years o f school in Italy (Ibid. 4). H e also had an unpredictable temper. But
these two characteristics o f his grandfather did not prevent A nthony M oore
from eventually accepting that his grandfather had played a “powerful role . . .
in [his] developm ent as a m an” (Ibid. 4). Three years after his grandfather’s
death, A nthony M oore allowed “him [to] be the father he had always been”
(Ibid. 4). In turn, this acknowledgm ent o f his grandfather’s paternal role
“loosened the paralyzing grip o f [M oore’s] over-identification with [his]
father” (Ibid. 4). A llow ing his grandfather “a role within [his] conscious iden­
tity” (Ibid. 4) resulted in A nthony M oore being “able to establish some sense
of identity distinct from [his] father” (Ibid. 5). M oore’s intellectual undoing
o f his own denial o f pain over the loss o f his father thus resulted in his quick
106 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

recognition o f another denied truth: his grandfather’s paternal function. T he

undoing of this secondary denial gave M oore the possibility to experience an
identity distinct from his father which, he felt, gave him the freedom “to lead
his own life” (Ibid. 5). Still, intellectually undoing the denial of the pain is
not the sam e as undoing fantasies that were unconsciously created to deal
with the pain.
Thus, for M oore there was a second stage of dealing with the em otional
consequences of the truth behind the denial. In this stage, Moore did the psy­
chic work to make undoing his denial more than just an intellectual act. In
particular, M oore had to deal with the illusionary fantasies that had formed
in his unconscious in connection with the denied im portance o f his father’s
death and his absence in the young M oore’s life. T h at work gave M oore a
greater degree o f freedom. However, in conformity with a basic psychoana­
lytic insight, work towards freedom takes place on different levels of person­
ality and over different periods of on e’s life. In my opinion, it also takes place
unconsciously and thus need not wait until the m om ent of intellectual undo­
ing o f a denial.4 I interpret the psychic work M oore did in his relationship
with his father as steps he took towards greater freedom. Som e of these steps
took place before M oore him self becam e aware of his denial.5 1 will therefore
now describe the work M oore did in advance of unm asking his denial that
helped him free him self from his defective relationship with his father.

W o r k T o w a r d s In c r e a s in g F reedo m
B efo r e t h e U n m a s k in g o f D e n ia l

A first indication of the young M oore’s lim ited freedom from com plete iden­
tification with his father was his decision to avoid R O T C in college. Moore
describes the m otivation for this decision in the following sim ple terms: “A t
the end of four years [of military high school], I felt I had had enough o f the
m ilitary” (Ibid. 2). T h is decision to avoid the military in college had been
preceded and followed by intense em otional com m itm ent to the military.
A bout his decision to go to military high school, M oore writes: “I went to a
military high school in part to imitate my father’s life in uniform ---- I wanted
to do it as well as my father, so of course I had to be an officer” (Ibid. 2). A nd
at the end o f his senior year in college, M oore again becam e interested in the
military. H e writes: “I took the entrance exam for the M arine C orps Officer
C andidate School, just as my father h ad ---- Joining the M arines was also one
more way to imitate my father who had enlisted in the spring o f his senior
year in college, 1942” (Ibid. 2). W hat m otivated M oore to interrupt his love
of the M arines and the military for three years in college? M oore gives us the
laconic answer: “I felt I had had enough o f the military” (Ibid. 2). T h is is a
reasonable enough m otivation when we remember that just prior he had
com pletely immersed him self “in the spit and polish o f a cadet’s life” (Ibid. 2).
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 107

But the m otivation to say “n o” to the military had no depth. For, at that time,
M oore had not yet created a positive alternative, such as dream ing o f becom ­
ing a teacher, a lawyer, or a doctor. Still, we do see that the young M oore is
more than the ego created by a deep identification and attachm ent to his
father. M oore is also a subject, who can allow him self to feel that he has had
enough of trying to be an ideal ego.
A second indication that M oore was not totally imprisoned in his
attachm ent to his father was his decision not to becom e a M arine after co l­
lege. M oore describes the context o f his decision this way: “But when I told
my mother and grandm other w hat I was contem plating [becoming a Marine],
I realized that the sim ilarities to my father’s situation, which inspired me,
were more than they could handle. A s I looked into their eyes, I realized that
I could also be killed just as my father had been” (Ibid. 2). M oore transformed
his m other’s and grandm other’s wishes into his own by the following consid­
eration: “ I wanted to do som ething significant with my life, dedicate myself
com pletely to a worthy cause [like his father], but I also wanted to live” (Ibid.
2). T h is second “n o” to the military and the M arines stuck. T h is “n o” origi­
nated in his m other’s “n o .” U nlike the case of his first “n o ,” M oore went in
search of an alternative course o f action. H e transformed his m other’s m oti­
vation into one o f his own by the statem ent: “but I also wanted to live” (Ibid.
2). However, that “n o” required further work.
In 1966, during the Vietnam War, becom ing a M arine carried the risk of
death. M oore made his m other’s fear his own m otivation by realizing that he
wanted to live. N o t becom ing a M arine and being unwilling to die entailed
that the young M oore cut two im portant ties with his father. T h e young
M oore’s psychic work consisted o f finding a way to cut yet preserve these two
im portant ties. A realistic solution seemed impossible given his decision not
to becom e a M arine and thereby avoid the risk o f death. Nevertheless, what
cannot be done realistically can be done in im agination or, better, in the
technical language of Lacanian psychoanalysis, via m etaphorical moves.
T h e young M oore re-established psychic contact with his father, the
M arine who died for his country, through a m etaphorical move in two steps.
First, M oore reports his fascination with the priesthood. O ne point stands out
for the young M oore: the prayer for the dead. T he rubrics request the faithful
to m ention the nam e o f any dead person they want to be remembered. W hen
he whispered “my father,” M oore reports that he was with his father and his
father with him (Ibid. 3). T he young M oore reports “that in the liturgy o f the
M ass I experienced a unique m om ent o f contact with my father. A t M ass I
discovered a mystery that transcended the power o f death. Being a priest was
a way to enter more fully into the power o f that mystery” (Ibid. 3).
Second, M oore enriched his adm iration for the priesthood, developed in
his childhood, by a number of m etaphors. We already saw that becom ing a
Jesuit was, for the young Moore, becom ing like his father because it entailed
108 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

a deadly sacrifice in the form o f “dying to the world o f m arital love” (Ibid. 3)
and because Jesuits were som etim es called “the Pope’s M arines” (Ibid. 3).
T h at the m etaphorical work done by the young M oore was not purely ratio­
nal is evident in the inform ation M oore provided, inform ation which M oore
discovered only years after his decision to becom e a Jesuit. “W hen I entered
the Jesuits, I was twenty-three years old . . . the same age my father was when
he died” (Ibid, 3). A t age twenty-three, M oore’s father died physically; M oore
“died” metaphorically.
T h e young Moore, in refusing to be a M arine who would be in danger of
being killed in Vietnam , cut two im portant ties with his father. In becom ing
a Jesuit he m etaphorically reconnected with these two em inent characteris­
tics o f his father: he becam e a M arine o f the Pope and he was prepared to die
to the world of m arital love.
A s M oore reports it, the m etaphorical m ove of becom ing a Jesuit, not a
M arine, was helpful, but ultim ately deficient. It was helpful insofar as the
Spiritual Exercises of Sain t Ignatius teach a m ethod of reflection and prayer
that engages the im agination in an inner dialogue with the characters o f on e’s
own life and the life o f Christ (Ibid. 3). M oore reports that this form o f prayer
and reflection initiated a healing process which stalled, however, around
issues related to his father (Ibid. 3). A s M oore describes it: “A key m editation
involves an intim ate dialogue with G o d the Father. Surprisingly, I was unable
to develop any real feeling around this conversation except one of frustration.
For all my fascination with things pertaining to my father, he remained som e­
how affectively unreal and em otionally unavailable to me. These spiritual
exercises clarified areas of my inner life in which I needed healing” (Ibid. 3).
M oore provides a description of the difficulty in his life that needed h eal­
ing. He writes that psychoanalysis, in particular analysis o f his dreams, clari­
fied “many o f the psychological distortions that inhibited my freedom. I real­
ized that I identified with my father so com pletely that I was unable to be
m yself’ (Ibid. 4). T h is self-description accords with L acan’s and De Wael-
hens’s theoretical claim that distance in an identificatory relation is required
in order to have the feeling of being a self. These two authors make their
claim with reference to the identification with the mother (De W aelhens
1978, 81, 90,126; Lacan 1984, 57). But their claim , I wish to argue, is made
with reference to identification in general, so that it can clarify the vicissi­
tudes of the identification with either the m other or the father.

W o r k T o w a r d s In c r e a s in g F r eed o m A f t e r U n m a s k in g D e n ia l

A s described before, the young M oore was given the opportunity to psycho­
logically separate him self from his father after his psychoanalyst helped him
to acknowledge the pain o f not having a father. Indeed, acknowledging the
pain of being fatherless allowed A nthony M oore to accept that his grandfa­
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SYM BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 109

ther had been an unacknowledged substitute father. T h en, acknowledging

the role his grandfather had played in the form ation o f his identity gave
young M oore the ability to create “some sense o f identity distinct from [his]
father” (M oore 5). M oore thereby felt free enough to proceed to ordination
as deacon in 1979 and priest in 1980.
M oore describes his ordination and the celebration of his first M ass as
marked by a pull to the death o f his father. H e writes: “Lying prostate in
prayer on the sanctuary floor, I could vividly sense my father’s presence in the
ordination ritual. . . . In my im agination, I saw him at the m om ent of death
consoled by a vision o f his son’s o rd in atio n .. . . T he next day, I celebrated my
First Mass. O n June 15, the 36th anniversary o f my father’s death, I led my
family in prayer: ‘Remember, Lord, those who have died and have gone
before us marked with the sign o f faith, especially those for whom we now
pray.’ A s I voiced the words o f this prayer, I again felt my father’s presence----
By being ordained a priest I was com pleting a m ission entrusted to me at my
father’s death” (Ibid. 5).
For A nthony M oore, becom ing a priest had not been guided by a future
mission, for exam ple, helping the poor, teaching in the inner city, or m inis­
tering in far away places. Instead, his ordination was overwhelmingly tied to
the past: the death of his father. A nthony M oore created a future for him self
as a priest by seeing him self as “com pleting a mission entrusted to [him] at his
father’s death” (Ibid. 5). “T he coincidence o f the anniversary of his [father’s]
death with [his] first ritual action as a priest intensified [his] feeling of des­
tiny . . . [he] believed [he] was doing what [he] was destined to do” (Ibid. 5).
T h e m etaphor o f destiny or m ission to be com pleted turned out not to be
powerful enough to carry the weight of the decision to rem ain a priest.
Indeed, A nthony M oore writes that as priest he was “aware o f a longing deep
in [his] soul that remained unfulfilled. . . . [He] felt a hole inside o f [himself]
which, no m atter how hard [he] tried [he] could not fill. . . . It was . . . as
though som ething were missing at the core o f [his] being and needed to be
found” (Ibid. 5).

Im p o r t a n c e o f H elp fro m O t h e r s in M o o r e ’s P s y c h ic W o r k

M oore’s further work towards freedom required the help of others. First, four
women played an im portant role in the steps that A nthony M oore took
towards freedom. They were: his mother and grandmother, who helped him
break away from his com plete and unconscious identification with his father;
his fem ale psychiatrist, who helped him acknowledge the pain of missing a
father; and finally M ichelle, who becam e his wife and who made it possible
for him to em otionally break down at his father’s grave (M oore 6 -7 ).
T h e Jungian-inspired movie Field of Dreams also had a role in helping
A nthony Moore. It provided the conviction that recovering a lost father is
110 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

possible. It also provided him with guideposts for such a recovery. It taught
A nthony M oore that one needs to listen to calls from within; that one needs
to respond to those calls with symbolic action; that one needs to wait atten­
tively; that one needs to make an inward journey; and that, at the appropri­
ate time, a connection with ancestors is possible. In accepting the need to lis­
ten to an inner voice, M oore was aware that his personal identity was broader
than his current conscious ego or the “I” that is “presently organizing and
directing [his] life” (Ibid. 40). He now conceived o f his personal identity as
involving an inner dialogue with an “I” other than his current conscious ego.
H e accepted that his current conscious ego is not “the center o f all experi­
ence and the source of all knowledge” (Ibid. 40). Som ething in him tran­
scended his conscious ego. M oore called it a mystery. He personally believed
it to be an encounter with G od, but m ade it clear that this was his subjective
interpretation o f the experienced transcendence of the inner voice (Ibid. 40).
To connect em otionally with the journey prescribed for him by his trust
in the story o f Field of Dreams, M oore, at several turns, used metonymic
m oves supported by others’ words. Thus, whereas the protagonist o f Field of
Dreams heard the call to make a baseball field, A nthony M oore heard the call
to write a book about his search for his father. However, he entertained two
other possibilities: visiting the M arine C orps A rchives in Suitland, Maryland
to study his father’s military career or traveling to Saipan where his father
died. M oore wondered whether writing a book would require sufficient phys­
ical activity to satisfy his conscious wish to take the call seriously. Recalling
Seam us H eaney’s poem com paring “the symbolic action of writing with the
physical labor o f digging” (Ibid. 41), M oore was able to accept the call to
write a book about his search for his father. Still, the work o f writing was slow.
It is true that Field of Dreams recom mended patience and attentive waiting;
but doubts arose in Moore. He repeatedly dealt with these doubts by rem em ­
bering a letter Teilhard de Chardin wrote to his im patient niece Marguerite
when he was a stretcher-bearer in the French army during World War I.
M oore felt that his father was using a condensed form of de C hardin’s letter
to adm onish his son: “Trust in the slow work o f G od. Your ideas mature grad­
ually. Let them grow. Let them shape them selves. D on’t try to force them on”
(Ibid. 43). T h e m etonymic connection between the message o f Field of
Dreams, the words o f Theilhard de Chardin, and his own father made M oore
feel that the “unconscious would not fail to do its part” (Ibid. 44) in the heal­
ing work o f writing his book.
M oore’s inner journey took a step forward when he and M ichelle visited
a replica o f the labyrinth in the C athedral at Chartres. Both, but A nthony in
particular, took several m editative walks through the labyrinth. During the
third day’s m editative walk, M oore “found [himself] thinking about [his]
mother and her difficulties with the early stages of Alzheim er’s disease” (Ibid.
46). M oore felt “a deep sense o f sadness well up inside [himself]” (Ibid. 46).
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 111

M oore was puzzled because he had always felt happy when thinking about his
mother. She “symbolizes all the security and love I knew as a child” and “pro­
vided the safe container within which I was able to weather the loss o f my
father” (Ibid. 46). T h e feelings o f sadness he now felt were normally associ­
ated with “those rare moments when [he] allowed [himself] to feel the sorrow
o f [his] father’s absence” (Ibid. 46). M oore discerned sadness for “the suffer­
ing [his] mother would encounter as she moved through the various stages of
this cruel disease” (Ibid. 46), but also his “father’s sadness as he experienced
[his] m other’s illness. [He] could feel inside o f [himself his] father’s abiding
love and solicitude for the once-young bride he left so long ago” (Ibid. 46).
In his sadness, M oore “realized that [his] father and [he] were joined together
in [their] concern for [his] m other” (Ibid. 46).
In Field of Dreams, the protagonist, Ray Kinsella, ultimately meets and
bonds with his father. R ecalling the passage from Virgil’s Aeneid when A eneas
meets his father A nchises, M oore experiences “the yearning o f mortals down
through the ages to rem ain connected to those from whom they receive life
and those to whom they give life” (Ibid. 48). M oore sees in both Field of
Dreams and the Aeneid the same message: “this world and the next are more
closely woven together than usually imagined. T he separation between these
two realm s is less real than the continuity between them. Therefore, the
longing o f the hum an heart for connection between the generations is not a
futile yearning based on illusion, but a consoling truth grounded in reality”
(Ibid. 49). T his time it is the metonym ic fusion o f the m ovie and a passage
from the Aeneid that allows M oore to take his next step: “ [He] decided to fol­
low the path o f [his] own ‘filial devotion’” (Ibid. 49). M oore started to collect
photographs of his father in his “dress green lieutenant’s uniform” and placed
them on his desk and the shelves o f the room where he was writing his book.
M oore followed up on a memory that his father’s uniform was in an old trunk
in the basem ent o f his m other’s house. In the trunk, he found his father’s uni­
form next to his m other’s wedding gown. H e brought his father’s uniform to
his study and felt that his father “was actually in the room with [him]” (Ibid.
51). Som e weeks later, driving back from Richm ond to W ashington, M oore
followed the exit sign for Q uantico M arine Base, where his father had done
his officer’s training. H e walked around the one building that was old enough
to have been there in the 1940s. W hen he cam e hom e he confirmed from his
father’s graduation book that the building he had toured was indeed the
Reserve Officers’ Barracks, where his father had been trained. T hese two
encounters gave A nthony M oore the trust that “there was a realm beyond the
barriers o f time and death where [his] father and [he] could m eet” (Ibid. 52).
He even “felt his healing touch” (Ibid. 52).
M oore was also helped by soldiers who knew his father. A t this point in
his life, M oore was ready to leave what he calls “the inner soul work” and
make the pilgrimage to find people who knew his father. Following leads,
112 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C E S OF TH E N EG A TIV E

M oore m et seven or eight m en who revealed progressively more details

about his father as a person and about the circum stances of his death. In a
reunion o f the Fourth M arines, an old soldier, C arl Dearborn, recognized
M oore as Lt. A nthony M oore’s son. A nthony M oore was struck because “N o
one outside [his] family had ever recognized [him] as [his] father’s son” (Ibid.
57). Dearborn sent A nthony M oore a poem about a soldier falling, a woman
becom ing a widow, and an infant becom ing an orphan. T h is m ade M oore
realize that he wanted to go back to the m om ent when his father died. D ear­
born put him in contact with G unny H art and C huck Landmesser, both of
whom were with his father when he died. G unny H art told A nthony M oore:
“Your father never knew what hit him .” . . . “H e didn’t suffer at all.” . . . “You
can be proud of your father. H e was a good marine. N obody can say anything
against him ” (Ibid. 58).
A fter a prolonged introduction, C huck Landm esser told A nthony
Moore: “There is som ething I will always remember about your dad, and that
is the way he felt about your mother, Palma. O ther guys might talk about
their wives in a way that was not respectful, but ‘A .T .’ would never do that.
There was only one love for your father and that was your mother” (Ibid. 63).
A nthony M oore, overwhelmed with em otions could only say: “My mother
returned his love; she never remarried.” To which C huck nodded: “I know”
(Ibid. 63). T he younger M oore heard his father speak in the words o f C huck
and telling him “how much he loved [the younger M oore’s] mother and by
im plication how much he loved him, the fruit o f their love” (Ibid. 63). Moore
felt that his father had this message for him: “ [his] parents’ love for each other
and for [him] was the one truth to remember and live by, that [he] should live
[his] life in the same way, letting all else in [his] life be shaped by [his] love
for M ichelle and the boys [his step-children]” (Ibid. 63). M oore was hereby
transforming an idealized father into a goal for his own life, an ego ideal, something
he had not done as a Jesuit priest.
M oore’s journey to S an A nton io for an annual m eeting o f the Fourth
M arine Division, provided further im portant metonymic connections. In San
A ntonio, M oore was confronted with the life-size statue o f the city’s patron
saint. His mother held a special devotion to St. A nthony because her hus­
band had been born on that saint’s feast day and also nam ed after him. St.
A nthony’s statue in S an A nton io “held a sm all boy in his arms” (Ibid. 66).
A nthony M oore writes that he let the symbol speak to him. He alm ost felt
his “father’s protective arms wrapped around him ” (Ibid. 6 6 -6 7 ).
Three further pieces o f information, given by his father’s buddies and
found in publications about the war in the M arshalls, were particularly useful
for A nthony Moore. T h e first concerned a peccadillo com m itted by his
father. T h e second provided details about his father’s character which
A nthony M oore could identify as his own ideals. T h e third furnished details
about his father’s concerns and the actions during the last m onths o f his life.
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SYM BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 113

In fo r m a t io n A b o u t H is F a t h er

T h e first piece o f inform ation was provided by a close friend o f A nthony

M oore’s parents during the war. His nam e was W alter Ridlon. M oore’s father
had gambled with W alt and lost all his money. M oore’s mother, meeting
W alt’s wife, had explained how her husband had lost what remained o f his
m onth’s pay to W alt. W alt’s wife returned the money and later explained the
situation to her husband. W alt offered to return the money and let A nthony
M oore, Sr. pay his debts when he could. His wife retorted— so W alter Ridlon
told the young A nthony M oore— that she had already returned the money to
the M oores and that W alt would never see any of it (Ibid. 67). A fter telling
the story, both W alt and the younger M oore broke into laughter. T h e story of
how M oore had gambled away his family’s funds had been told with such
warmth by his father’s close friend that the younger M oore could make use of
the story for further healing. M oore tells it this way:

I could feel my father com ing to life. H is h um an shortcom ings made him
more alive, more real for me. H e was no longer a perfect, idealized hero, but
a m an o f flesh and blood who could be foolish, make m istakes and get into
the kind of trouble from w hich his wife had to rescue him.
Learning about my father’s peccadillos was a liberating experience. Try­
ing to be the perfect son o f an ideal father was a burden that often got in the
way of my being myself. I w ondered w hether I inherited my incom petence
as a gam bler from my father. T h en I thought about some o f my other short­
com ings and w ondered w hether they m ight also be a gift from him , and
therefore som ething to be prized. Just thinking about my father in this way
created a more balanced hero archetype for me to follow. A n oth er gap in my
fatherless childhood was being filled. (Ibid. 6 7 -6 8 )

For Moore, the effect of learning about his father’s gam bling was totally
different than it had been for Freud’s patient the “R atm an.” For the Ratm an,
his father’s gam bling was one more reason for great am bivalence towards his
father, as it was connected with stealing money from friends to pay off gam ­
bling debts (Freud, S .E ., X, 151-319). For the younger M oore, his father’s
gam bling led to a family embarrassment which was relieved by family friends.
Furthermore, the story had been lovingly told by his father’s friend, trans­
forming a gam bling fiasco into a charm ing peccadillo. T h is story allowed
A nthony M oore to deidealize his father, without losing respect for him. W al­
ter R idlon’s story was an exceptional gift to A nthony M oore who successfully
used it to reconstruct his psychic world.
Speaking with some o f his father’s fellow soldiers, M oore gathered a sec­
ond kind o f inform ation consisting o f a series o f revelations about his father’s
character and his interactions with other people. From C harlie Eaton, a
member of his father’s platoon, A nthony M oore learned that his father could
114 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

joke with his friends. Eaton, who could barely speak because of his strokes,
told the younger Moore: “Your father was a real m an” (Ibid. 69). Burke
Dixon, another soldier friend, told A nthony M oore that his “father was his
favorite officer” (Ibid. 72). Burke continued by telling the younger Moore:
“Your father was a great listener. . . . You could always go to him with your
problem. We were just young kids away from home for the first time so you
can imagine how many problems we had. Your father would always listen and
try to help. A fter he was killed things were never quite the same for me.
W hen the war was over, I told my wife if we ever had a son I wanted to name
him A nthony after Lt. M oore” (Ibid. 72). T h e younger M oore felt “proud of
his father. H e was the kind o f m an other men respected and even loved. He
was down-to-earth, a regular guy, som eone who cared about his men and tried
to help them. He was a role m odel who could have inspired [Anthony]” (Ibid.
73). A nthony M oore felt sad that he had missed such a father to whom he
could have gone for counsel. However, at a deeper level the younger Moore
recognized som ething. H e wrote:

I recognized in my father the kind of m an that I tried to be. S o m uch o f what

com es naturally to me seemed also to h ave been a part o f him . W hen I heard
Burke [Dixon] describe my father as a good listener, som eone you could
always go to w ith your problem s, I recalled how as a new teacher at G eorge­
town, I would sit and listen to college freshm en as they described their strug­
gles to adjust to college and to find a direction for their lives. I also recalled
how I loved to give retreats and spiritual direction because they gave me an
opportunity to con nect w ith other people on such a deep and intim ate
level. I now recognized how m uch this natural ability that had so shaped my
life was a gift from my father. I could feel him living and breathing in me as
I did the work 1 most like to do. M ore importantly, I could see my father in
my relationship w ith my sons. A s I recalled sitting w ith my eighteen-year-
old son at two in the m orning discussing his problem s, I realized that I had
becom e the father my father never had a chance to be. (Ibid. 74)

Som e m onths later, discovering an Indian belief that when a father dies, his
vitality is carried over into the son, A nthony M oore made a further step in
creating a dialogical identity when he writes: “I recognized in my own unique
personality the secret vitality of my father’s ongoing life within me. W hat
others loved in me and what I m ost enjoyed about m yself were gifts of his
presence. If I wanted to be with my father, I only needed to live the life I had
been given and to do it with enthusiasm and gratitude” (Ibid. 74).
T h e third type of inform ation concerned the worries and actions taken
by Lt. M oore during the last m onths o f his life. T h e younger M oore becam e
deeply engaged in his father’s experience of the battle of Roi-Namur, the bat­
tle he survived. O ne o f the facts that stood out in Lt. M oore’s Roi-N am ur
experience was how the battle ended. Lt. M oore’s m ortar platoon was posi­
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 115

tioned 125 yards from the end of the island with the rem aining enemy force
in between (Ibid. 94). M oore possessed a firing table for the 60 mm mortar
guns indicating the angle of elevation for shooting various distances. U nfor­
tunately, the firing table did not provide the angles for distances less than two
hundred yards and thus was com pletely useless in the final hours o f the bat­
tle for Roi-N am ur (Ibid. 94). T h is fact must have been very disturbing to Lt.
M oore, as it put his men in m ortal danger. W hen resting in M aui after the
battle of Roi-Namur, Lt. M oore took corrective action. “Lt. M oore and Burke
D ixon spent the afternoon o f Easter Sunday firing a m ortar and calculating
the approxim ate angle o f elevation for distances o f 100, 125, 150, and 175
yards. T h e lieutenant then wrote the corresponding ranges and settings in
blue ink at the top o f the firing table” (Ibid. 97). Easter Sunday was the last
day about which the younger M oore was able to get inform ation about his
father before he was killed in the first day o f attack on Saipan. Consulting his
calendar, the younger M oore dated Easter in 1944 as A pril 9. M oore him self
was b o m the next Sunday, A pril 16, 1944- Lt. M oore died June 15, 1944. T h e
younger M oore had always known the dates o f his birth and his father’s death.
We know that he unconsciously interpreted the closeness o f the two dates as
m eaning that there was no room in the world for both him and his father.
T h e younger M oore also “felt [unconsciously] that [his] birth had caused his
[father’s] death” (Ibid. 98). M oore furthermore confessed that he believed
fathering a child would lead to his own death (Ibid. 3). T he younger M oore
thus says that “the temporal sequence of A pril 16 and June 15, the dates
respectively of my birth and my father’s death [was] an inevitability that held
me captive” (Ibid. 98). T h at tem poral sequence made the younger M oore feel
guilty about his existence and fear that fatherhood, for him, would entail an
unconsciously announced death sentence. T he younger M oore was able to
use the inform ation about his father’s activity on Easter 1944, a week before
his own birth, to undo the deadly grip of his own unconscious beliefs about
the relationship between his birth and his father’s death. M oore describes the
transform ation o f his unconscious beliefs as follows:

T h e new date, A pril 9, opened the possibility o f an alternative temporal

sequence, A p ril 9 and A pril 16, a sequence that suggested a different p at­
tern o f m eaning: two Sundays bracketing the First W eek o f Easter. Instead
o f associating my birth (A pril 16) with my father’s death (June 15), I could
now link my birth with a day in my father’s life (A pril 9), an Easter Sunday
celebrating our birth to new life in C h rist’s Resurrection. By join ing our two
lives together at the beginning and end o f Easter W eek, the dates of A pril
9 and A pril 16 provided a life-giving sequence to counterbalance the deadly
sequence of A pril 16 and June 15. (Ibid. 98)

M oore confesses: “Learning what my father was doing on A pril 9 changed

my attitude towards my own birth. Previously, I had viewed my birth as the
116 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C E S OF TH E N EG A TIV E

prelude to my father’s death. Now, I could relate my birth to a week in my

father’s life and, more importantly, a week that celebrated the mystery o f the
resurrection o f the dead” (Ibid. 98). M oore gives us a description o f how he
made the change. H e writes:

T h e symbolism o f the two Sundays bracketing the First W eek of Easter

focused my atten tion on the m eaning o f the liturgical seasons. Easter is the
central feast o f the C h ristian liturgical year, a ritual calendar of seasons that
transforms secular time into sacred tim e by recapitulating the story of
C h rist’s life, death and resurrection. T h e firing table that I held in my hand
becam e a tangible symbol, a sacram ent, that my father’s life and mine were
united in sacred time, a time that transcends the lim itations of secular time,
the First W eek o f Easter. By recapitulating the story o f the final m onths of
my father’s journey to w holeness, I entered into sacred tim e where my own
journey o f h ealing cam e to a close. (Ibid. 9 8 -9 9 )

T h e sacred time o f Easter calls upon Christians to have hope. W hat was the
hope that the younger M oore experienced and created that could counter­
balance the deadly belief that his birth caused his father’s death? M oore him ­
self gives us the answer. M editating on his father’s love letters to his mother,
the younger M oore writes: “Reading about his hopes and dreams for the
future— dreams that had appeared to die on the beach o f Saipan— I saw
clearly that the heart o f those dreams had come true in my own life. I had
been privileged and blessed to live the life he had dreamed of living” (Ibid.
105). T h e younger M oore was now able to experience him self as the realiza­
tion o f his father’s dreams, not the cause of their destruction. He thereby lib­
erated him self from the tyranny of the unconscious fantasy that his birth had
caused the death o f his father whom he missed so much.
Reflecting on the psychic work he did, M oore writes: “Telling my father’s
story healed the fracture that ran through my psyche at my father’s death. I
have now com e to understand how, with simple fragments like a cardboard
firing table . . . we can weave together a pattern of m eaning to heal our psy­
chic wounds. Following the guidance of the deeper self, I have learned how
to re-weave the fabric o f my soul and ‘com e hom e’ to the wholeness I lost at
my father’s death” (Ibid. 101). T he younger M oore understood that his deep­
est gifts and com m itm ents were both his own attributes and the fulfilment of
his father’s dreams. M oore understood him self to be both him self and him self
as a gift for his father. By the m etaphor o f being a gift to his father, the
younger M oore was able to overcom e the unconscious feeling that he had
killed his father because there wasn’t room in the world for the two o f them.
Now he feels that he is his father’s dream com e true. H e has, at the same time,
overcome the unconscious identification that was at work during his denial
o f the pain caused by his father’s absence. M oore is now able to appreciate
and com m it him self to the talents and values that he feels are uniquely his
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 117

own. U ndoing the denial allowed the younger M oore to make the
m etaphoric m ove that set him free. From M oore’s story, we learn that the
tragedy o f denial is that it blocks the m etaphoric work necessary to becom e
an individuated self.

2. P H I L O S O P H I C A L C O N C L U S I O N S

B u il d in g B l o c k s T o w a r d s E m o t io n a lly
O v e r c o m in g t h e E f fe c t s o f D e n ia l

Overcoming the effects of denial is an intersubjective enterprise. M oore is only able

to overcome the effects of his denial with the assistance of others. T h e four
women who helped him created a form of com munion that made painful
acknowledgments possible. First, there was his mother and grandmother
whose “n o” allowed the younger M oore to put limitations on his identification
with his father. M oore wanted to be like his father but did not want to die. His
psychiatrist-psychoanalyst was also instrumental in M oore’s recognition and
acknowledgment o f his denial. Finally, there was M ichelle, whose presence
allowed M oore to break down near the grave of his father (M oore 6).
T h e six or seven soldier friends o f Lt. M oore were also o f invaluable help.
They provided M oore with testimony about his father's characteristics. T he
soldiers’ stories allowed the younger M oore to recognize Lt. M oore’s capacity
to listen, the care he took of his soldiers, and his ability to elicit his soldiers’
caring. In these stories Moore found an ideal he could admire in his father
and in himself.
T h e poem s and classic pieces o f literature that M oore remembered at
crucial turns of his journey provided help o f a more subtle kind. M oore used
the writings of the prophets Elijah and Ezekiel to aid in following the advice
in Field of Dreams that one must pay attention to the “sm all voice” in on e’s
self (Ibid. 38, 39). H e made use o f a poem by Seam us H eaney com paring “the
symbolic action o f writing with the physical labor o f digging” (Ibid. 41). T h at
poetic com parison allowed M oore to accept that his call to write a book was
as im portant as the physical labor undertaken by Ray Kinsella, who dug a
baseball field in Field of Dreams. M oore made use o f Teilhard de C h ardin’s let­
ter to his im patient niece to accept the patient waiting required in what
M oore calls “soul work” (Ibid. 43). M oore makes use of Virgil’s description of
his m eeting with his father, A nchises, in order to inspire confidence that
m eeting between generations is possible (Ibid. 4 7 -4 9 ). M oore makes use of
Gerard M anley H opkin’s poem “H eaven-H aven” to interpret his father par­
ticipation in the battle o f Roi-N am ur as a preparation for his death in the
next battle at Saipan.
Moore received various kinds of help from a variety of sources. For exam ­
ple, the writer/director of Field of Dreams provided Moore with milestones for his
118 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

inner journey. The writings o f Saint Ignatius provided Moore with, among other
things, the techniques for using imagination to make progress in one’s inner soul
work. Jung provided Moore with a psychological frame for his journey.
T he symbolic system that M oore inhabited provided yet another form of
help. His experience with the Jesuits gave him the opportunity to separate
him self from his father by declining to becom e a M arine and instead to
m etaphorically unite him self with his father. Becom ing a Jesuit was, in the
symbolic system o f Catholicism , becom ing a “M arine of the Pope” and was
also dying to “worldly life,” in particularly to “m arital love.” T he symbolic
system of Catholicism provided M oore great help in another effort. Indeed,
success in undoing his deadly interpretation o f a causal relationship between
his birth and his father’s death depended heavily upon the younger M oore’s
belief in the symbolic system o f Christianity, in particular: the hope em pha­
sized by the them e o f Easter .

The crucial importance of saying “n o.” M oore does not delineate the pain he
experienced growing up without a father. But he does describe the suffocating
identification with his father to the point that he felt he was not himself. I
therefore take his over-identification to be closely connected to the pain cov­
ered over by his denial. A t first glance, it is puzzling that A nthony Moore
would find a solution to his unconscious belief about the cause of his father’s
death by way o f closely identifying his life with that of his father. Indeed, the
younger Moore ends his journey when he sees his life as more similar to his
father’s than he had realized. Why would such a realization bring healing
rather than alienation? T his question can be answered if we provide a more
detailed phenom enological description o f the end of young M oore’s journey.
M oore writes: “I was amazed to discover how much of my father lives in me.
It felt as though the core of his soul lived on in my soul. We were so alike in
the things that really m attered to us” (M oore 104); or “if I ever want to be
with my father, all I have to do is look deeply in my own soul” (Ibid. 105); or
“I realized that the resemblance ran down to the depth of my being” (Ibid.
104-105). I interpret these statem ents to m ean that the younger M oore expe­
rienced a self o f his own that he then discovered bore a great resemblance to
his father. Rather than feeling alienated, the younger M oore feels that he
received a gift. H e feels that he is the fulfillment o f the dreams of his father.
He is that by being himself. I wish to call the double identity that M oore cre­
ates at the end o f his journey a metaphor. T he younger Moore experiences
him self as his own person but at the same time as the gift to his father with
whom he discovers that he has so many similarities. T h e younger Moore is
him self and he is also som ething other than himself. He is both at the same
time. It is this identity in nonidentity that provides M oore the healing he
sought. For this healing to take place there must be a nonidentity in the iden­
tity with his father. W hen Moore describes his adolescent experience, he
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 119

writes that he identified so deeply with his father that he felt he was not him ­
self. Between his adolescence and the healing end of his journey we have a
great similarity and a great difference. T he similarity is that in both cases the
younger M oore deeply identifies with his father. T h e obvious difference is that
in his adolescence M oore felt threatened and alienated by the close identifi­
cation, whereas at the end o f his journey the similarity he discovers with his
father is experienced as a welcome gift. A less obvious difference is that
Moore, as an adolescent, feels that he identifies too deeply with his father,
whereas the mature M oore discovers that his deeper self is surprisingly similar
to that of his father. T h e mature M oore thus has lived a life o f his own that he
discovers resembles his father’s life. In the mature M oore we do not have a felt
identity between the younger M oore and his father, we have a discovered sim ­
ilarity. Between M oore’s youth and maturity som ething happened that allowed
M oore to feel that his life was his own, not his father’s. I think that the mature
M oore’s belief that he has lived his own life goes back to the two “no”s that
he expressed toward the identification with his father. The first “n o ” did not
stick. It was the time when he did not join the R O T C in college because he
had had enough of the military. T h is “n o” had no foundation and in time was
overruled by M oore’s desire to becom e a M arine officer. A t that point a sec­
ond “n o” appeared. It was a “n o” introduced by M oore’s mother and grand­
mother who feared that in becom ing a M arine, he might also die. Som ehow
the younger Moore made the “n o” of his mother and grandmother his own by
m eans of his own wish to live; he did not want to die. From then on, the young
M oore had to make his own life. A s we saw, the younger M oore created a life
for him self in which he metaphorically incorporated the image o f his father.
He became a Jesuit. Even if a Jesuit is a “M arine of the Pope” and dies to mar­
ital love, it is also true that a Jesuit is not a real M arine and does not take the
risk o f real death. In becom ing a Jesuit, the younger M oore took distance from
total identification with his father and started the process o f finding an iden­
tity for him self which was not a total identification with his father.

The role of metaphor in creating freedom. Identification is a powerful m otive for

self-worth. It is also a great source o f self-alienation. T he solution to this
problem seems to be an unsolvable paradox. To avoid alienation one needs to
give up identification. To have self-respect one needs identification with an
admired model. Realistically, however, one cannot, at the same time, identify
with som eone and not identify with that person. A lthough one cannot do
that realistically, one can do it metaphorically. M oore made two very impor­
tant m etaphoric m oves in his life. T h e first one was his substitution o f being
a Jesuit for being a M arine. T h e second was feeling that he was a gift to his
father rather than the unconsciously felt cause o f his father’s death.
T h e first m etaphor proved not to be definitive. T h e second m etaphor
succeeded, according to M oore’s testimony in overruling and neutralizing the
120 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

deadly unconscious belief that he— the younger M oore— was the cause of his
father’s death. M oore was able to do so by recognizing that there was a secu­
lar time with two im portant dates: his birth and his father’s death. There was
also a sacred time with a new date: Easter Sunday, the last day o f his father’s
life, about which the younger M oore had information. His own birthday
becam e associated with Easter, because it was the Sunday after Easter. T he
sacred time connection— between Easter Sunday, when Lt. M oore used his
free time to act to protect his soldiers’ futures, and the Sunday after Easter,
when the younger M oore was bom — is at first only a new connection in time
without real weight. However, in the C hristian calendar, the eight days
between Easter Sunday and the Sunday after Easter comprise a week in which
the dom inant them e is one o f hope, whereby life overcom es death. W hen the
younger M oore started to realize that his father had made an effort on Easter
Sunday to better protect his soldiers, he could then begin to understand his
birth as a sign o f hope as well. T h e younger M oore began to realize that what
he liked in his life, such as listening to others and loving his wife, were also
the things that his father was good at. Slowly, the younger M oore was able to
realize that he was the gift to his father in which the “hopes and the dreams
for the future— dreams that had appeared to die on the beach of Saipan —
. . . had com e true in [his] own life” (M oore 105). T h e m etaphor of gift and
o f hope, based around the them e o f Easter hope, is the m etaphor by which
the younger M oore was able to override his unconscious belief that he was
the cause o f his father’s death. T he work of healing his soul ended when
M oore could experience himself, not just as the son of Lt. M oore, but also as
the gift to the dead Lt. M oore, a gift by which the dead father could com plete
his own life. It is worth noticing that the healing work relied heavily upon
the younger M oore’s deep belief in the symbolic system o f his C hristian cul­
ture. M oore did not create his m etaphoric solution out of nothing. H e cre­
ated it with the help of and in continuity with his culture.

P h il o s o p h ic a l I m p l ic a t io n s

The idea of a rational autonomous individual. Som e authors argue that human
beings are rational and autonom ous. T h e analysis o f denial and its overcom ­
ing in the case of A nthony M oore teaches us that we need to am end this th e­
ory o f hum an beings.
Part o f the denial in A nthony M oore’s early life was his belief that he did
not miss his father and, furthermore, that his grandfather did not have an
im portant role, because he felt he was his own father. Rather than being a
sign of autonom y in the face o f a great loss, this affirmation of autonom y was
an instance of self-deceit. It prevented M oore from psychological growth.
Real growth depended upon M oore being able to acknowledge the truth of
his deep hurt that he missed a father while growing up. A s we have shown
 D EN IA L, M ETA PH O R, TH E SY M BO LIC, A N D FREEDOM 121

before, healing the wound o f the lost father, including healing the uncon­
scious guilt about the loss o f his father, cam e about when the young Moore
was able to feel that he was not just his father’s son but also a gift to his father.
T h e young M oore healed him self by accepting that he was not only an
autonom ous being but also connected with som eone. T he young M oore fur­
ther healed him self by learning to live his life as a gift to his dead father.
R ational arguments could not override M oore’s unconscious belief in
him self as the cause o f his father’s death. N o rational argument could undo
his feeling that the short time between his birth and his father’s death m eant
that there was no room for both o f them. T h e younger M oore was able to
neutralize his dam aging unconscious belief but not by m eans o f clever ratio­
nal arguments. T h e younger M oore’s healing work was not the work of ratio­
nal analysis and argument; it was m etaphoric work, the patient work o f m ak­
ing a m etaphor stick. Intergenerational connection and m etaphoric work are
therefore ideas that must com plem ent the claim that hum an beings are ratio­
nal and autonom ous.

Self-deception and denial. T he analysis o f M oore’s autobiography about the

undoing o f his denial can also help us clarify the concept of self-deception. In
particular, the case o f M oore illustrates the idea that a self-deception can be
made in good faith and must therefore be distinguished from a lie.
T h e younger M oore deceived him self when he was telling him self and
others during his adolescence that he could not miss his father since he had
never had one. However, M oore made an effort to develop a form o f self-con­
ception that was in accord with this denial. First, he imagined that he was
able to be his own father. Second, he refused to acknowledge the paternal
function played by his grandfather. A s long as M oore was able to m aintain
these two beliefs, he could be said to have possessed im portant evidence for
taking as true what others were interpreting to be a self-deception. M oore
knew that he had been deceiving him self only after his psychiatrist-psycho-
analyst addressed his denial and told him that you can also miss what you
never had but know that you had every right to have.6 A t that m om ent the
younger M oore knew that he had been deceiving himself; he knew that his
claim to have not missed a father because he had never had one was a denial.
Therefore, persons can deceive them selves without knowing that they are
doing so. Self-deception is thus, strictly speaking, not a lie.
T he study o f M oore’s autobiography allows us to pinpoint the moment
when self-deception can becom e a lie. It becom es a lie after the denial has
been intellectually undone and the person refuses to do the em otional work
involved in taking the steps implied by the intellectual undoing. A s Moore
was willing to do that em otional work, his self-deception never becam e a lie.
Explaining self-deception and denial requires that one accept at least
two layers o f intentionality. In M oore’s case we are able to clearly see these
122 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

two layers at work. There is first the ego which ostensibly organizes M oore’s
life. M oore’s ego decides to go to the military school, not to enter R O T C in
college, and to take the entrance exam for the M arine C orps Officer C an d i­
date School. However, another layer of M oore— let us use the Freudian label,
the unconscious— performed its own intentional acts. Long before the con ­
scious ego made its adolescent decisions, M oore’s unconscious had already
interpreted the death of his father and had deeply identified with his dead
father. T h is unconscious layer makes interpretations with a logic which is
referred to by Freud as primary process. O ne crucial feature o f the logic of
unconscious interpretation is that the child gives itself a form of om nipo­
tence. In an illusionary way, the child feels that it causes all im portant events
around himself. Thus, when M oore’s father dies a short time after he is born,
the younger M oore feels, unconsciously, that he caused the death o f his
father. He also feels that fathering a child will guarantee im m inent death for
himself. Similarly, the younger M oore unconsciously idealizes and identifies
with the dead father, who was so beloved by his wife. M oore’s conscious ego
deals with the paradox o f unconscious ideations (unconscious guilt for the
father’s death and idealization and identification with the dead father) by, on
the one hand, making decisions that allow him to be like his father and, on
the other hand, by publicly denying that he misses his dead father. T h e heal­
ing work M oore performed starts the m om ent when M oore accepts that he is
a multi-layered person in whom the conscious ego needs to listen to a voice
beyond the ego. Furthermore, the conscious ego accepts the humility entailed
in listening to that other voice. T he conscious ego thereby accepts that it has
to change.
A n outsider may correctly ascribe self-deception to a person when he can
see several forms o f interpretation at work that contradict each other. A scrib­
ing self-deception to a person at a m om ent when that person is not aware of
self-deception is a teleological move. T h e expectation is that a person with
multiple layers is also called upon to act as a unified person.7 A idin g that
teleological m ove requires that one be artful. To accuse another of self-deceit
is not helpful. Rather, one should say the appropriate words so that the other
can intellectually undo his own denial and thereby accept an invitation to
differently address the paradox behind the self-deceit. A s we have seen, that
requires psychic work and the creation o f appropriate metaphors.
 Conclusion

1. A person who utters a denial reveals m uch to som eone who can listen.
In a denial, one reveals som ething that one also tries to hide. A denial is thus
not just any kind o f self-revelation. It is a revelation about a fault or a frac­
ture in on e’s own personality. A person “in denial” is unable to deal with an
emerging truth. A denial, thus, reveals not only content, but also personality
structure, a kind o f fracture in the person in question.
2. The revelation that occurs in a denial testifies to the fact that the per­
son is growing in ability to name and face the truth. T he need to hide what has
been revealed in a denial points to a weakness in the individual. He has not
been able to face the truth he is in the process of revealing. T h e inability to
have faced the truth is not trickery. It indicates a deficiency in agency. But
where there is a deficiency in agency, one needs to be careful in assigning moral
blame. I argue that Freudian forms of denials should not be called lies. They
should not be classified as moral failures, but rather as human deficiencies.
3. Freud teaches us that denials are frequently occurring phenom ena.
A ppealing to H egel’s thought, I dem onstrated that denials do not just occur
frequently, but are unavoidable, even necessary. For Hegel, truth is not just
an epistem ological task. It is also an anthropological adventure. T h e anthro­
pological adventure is such that em otions becom e involved because truth is
about the m eaning o f on e’s own existence. Doubt, therefore, can become
despair. Hegel also teaches us that hum an beings face paradoxes that can be
solved only by several hum an beings acting jointly. In some cases the
approach o f no one person is satisfactory, even though it appears to the per­
son acting that his/her approach is the only possible solution to a given prob­
lem. Facing the deficiency of on e’s own solution is not just a m atter of doubt.
It is also a m atter o f despair. Denials are a defensive, and thus defective way,
to deal with truths that may cause one despair.
4. Even though denials are defensive moves, they are also m oves towards
greater freedom. Towards the end o f his article on negation, Freud explicitly

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124 D EN IA L, N E G A T IO N , A N D TH E FO R C ES OF TH E N EG A TIV E

connects the use o f denial with the quest for freedom. H e credits the use of
negation with the ability to create “a first measure of freedom from . . . the
com pulsion o f the pleasure principle” (S .E ., X IX , 239). H egel’s study o f the
will in his Philosophy of Right provides a view o f the different m ethods used by
the will to create distance, and thus a degree of freedom from desires and
impulses— that is, from the given. T he arbitrary will creates distance from the
given by denying it any importance. T h e arbitrary will takes as its grounds for
deciding simply: “I decide.” T h e eudem onic will, according to Hegel, creates
distance and freedom from the given by subm itting any given to the calculus
of its contribution to a self-chosen goal, for exam ple, happiness. H egel argues
that the m ethod used by the eudemonic will is superior to the one used by the
arbitrary will. H egel forcefully dem onstrates the deficiency of the m ethod
used by the arbitrary will. I argue that a denial can be understood as an
attem pt to establish distance and freedom from a given by the deficient
m ethod of the arbitrary will, that is, by an epistem ological m ove that denies
the objectively given. From Hegel, one can learn that denying the objective
is not the only way to affirm one’s freedom. A better and more constructive
way to demonstrate one’s freedom from the objectively given is to acknow l­
edge the truth o f the given, but submit the given to a calculation. M oving
beyond a denial will therefore involve the two steps of, firstly, epistemologi-
cally acknowledging the given and, secondly, acquiring the em otional and
intellectual capacity to submit the given to a rational evaluation o f its possi­
ble contribution to on e’s goals. These two steps, which Freud observed and
described in his article, are hereby given a logical necessity.
5. Freud describes the acquisition o f the linguistic symbol of negation as
the mastery of a miraculous tool. It produces the necessary distance and neg­
ativity to create freedom. T h e idea that hum an developm ent is not linear, but
proceeds by sudden spurts, is defended by Spitz. Children reach new plateaus
o f developm ent because several developing areas suddenly allow the child to
perform a series o f previously impossible tasks. T h e social smile, the eight-
month-anxiety, and the no-saying at fifteen m onths are indicators o f such
new spurts in developm ent. I argue that no-saying is more than simply an
indicator o f that higher level of developm ent. No-saying is the organizer, the
creator o f that higher level of developm ent. Spitz recognized that no-saying
creates the first unequivocal concept. I argue that no-saying creates, by itself,
the distance from the caretaker required for the child’s affirmation o f its
emerging autonomy, affirming the right to the child’s own point o f view, even
if that point o f view appears som etim es to be manifestly irrational.
6. Freud points out that undoing a denial is often a com plicated and
arduous task. In his article on denial he did not specify the contribution that
an interlocutor can make in the overcom ing o f a denial. By analyzing O edi­
pus, we learn that Teiresias fails, while Jocasta, the messenger, and the shep­
herd succeed in helping Oedipus find the truth. I argue that in order to be
 C O N C L U SIO N 125

helpful, the interlocutor must accept that establishing the other’s subjective
truth is different from establishing the truth about som ething with which the
other is not or is only marginally involved, that is, objective truth. In help­
ing another find the truth about himself, the interlocutor must rem ain aware
that it is the other as discourse partner who creates the m eaning of his life.
T he interlocutor must accept that he, therefore, cannot impose a new m ean­
ing upon another. A ll the interlocutor can do is provide evidence that the
other will be able to use in order to create a new m eaning for himself. To be
helpful in undoing a denial, the interlocutor must first accept the fact that
truth cannot be provided to his discourse partner. T h e truth about oneself
can only be discovered by the self. T h e life stories o f O edipus and A nthony
M oore vividly illustrate this claim.
 Notes

C H A P T E R O N E . T H E C O M P L E X P H E N O M E N O N O F D E N IA L

1. Freud’s text does allow one to identify the gender of the patient.

2. C h apter 1 will therefore analyze territory n ot covered by the classic co m ­

m entators on Freud’s “N egation (D e n ial)” (Freud, S .E ., X IX , 2 3 5 -3 9 ) such as Lacan,
Spitz, Hyppolite, and R icoeur (1970, 3 1 4 -1 8 ), to nam e a few. For a survey o f the com ­
m entaries on Freud’s article see W. Ver Eecke 1984: Saying ‘N o ,’ 2 -1 1 . A very im por­
tant recent publication is the special issue of the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale
(A pril-June 2001 [2]), with articles by A li Benm akhlouf, Joceleyn Benoist, A n ton ia
Soulez, and M onique D avid-M énard. T h e above-m entioned com m entators con cen ­
trate upon the crucial Freudian claim that hum an beings discover unpleasant truths
about them selves by m eans o f a denial. By analyzing new territory, for exam ple, of the
effort o f undoing a denial, I will be able to establish a con nection betw een the psy­
choanalytic con cept o f denial and the philosophical con cept o f self-deception. C u ri­
ously enough, the analytic philosophers exam ining the problem o f self-deception do
not pay attention to the function of den ial as the crucial interface betw een un con ­
scious self-deception and facing the truth by undoing o n e’s self-deception as it appears
in a denial. S ee the anthology by Brian P. M cLaughlin and A m élie O . Rorty.

3. A s I see it the term ‘n egation ’ refers both to the linguistic sign o f negation
and to the negative judgm ent that uses the linguistic sign o f negation. T h e term
‘den ial’ refers to a negative judgm ent that wrongly denies the truth presented in a n eg­
ative judgm ent. A sim ilar distin ction is made in the French translation o f Verneinung
as négation and dénégation. See H yppolite (L acan 1988, 290), and L aplanche & Pon-
talis, 262.
A s the m eaning o f the two terms “n egation ’ and ‘den ial’ is different in psycho­
analytic theory, in contem porary linguistics, in sociology, and in logic I w ant to give
a brief overview o f the different m eanings o f these two terms in the different sciences.
In psychoanalysis, negation refers to the logical operation in a proposition whereby
one affirms that a con n ection in the proposition “He is not tall” does not hold. A
denial refers to the use o f a linguistic negation in order to affirm that a con nection
does n ot hold, whereas in fact the con n ection exists: “T h is figure in my dream is not

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128 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R ONE

my m other” (W urmser 1989, 177). By extension, in psychoanalytic theory (Fenichel,

D eutsch, Lewin, Jacob son ) the term ‘den ial’ is also used for nonlinguistic attitudes in
w hich the person disregards and thus denies affects such as anxiety or guilt (W angh
11). In a further extension o f the applicability o f the concept, the term denial is also
used for action s of persons who behave as if a fact has no consequences, such as m ak­
ing plans beyond on e’s expected lifespan w hen one has term inal cancer. By such
extensions, the difference betw een the Freudian con cepts o f denial (refusal to
acknowledge factual reality) and disavow al (refusal to acknowledge the em otional sig­
nificance o f a perceived fact) is blurred (for a conceptual distinction, see Wurmser
1989, 177-78).
In contem porary linguistics the term negation is used w hen the assertion o f the
sentence is reversed (M ary is not tall). T h e term denial is used “if negation is directed
at presuppositions, im plicatures or even form al aspects o f a senten ce” (G eurts 274) as
in “T h e classroom was not warm, it was b oilin g.” Th us, in linguistics, a d en ial not only
leaves the original affirmed con nection untouched; in some cases it m agnifies that
connection. In the study of children’s language, one makes the distinction betw een
the acquisition o f negation— ”n o” as refusal— and denial negation— denying that
som ething is true. In children’s language one uses the term negation for the ch ild’s
“n o” w hen it expresses refusal and denial negation w hen the “n o” expresses an intel­
lectual judgm ent th at som ething is not the case (H um m er at al.).
T h e concept o f denial is used also in sociology. It is used both to refer to a soci­
etal attitude and to an objective social result. Th us, there are articles that describe the
social denial of death and sex in the elderly (G ussaroff), hom elessness (Baum &
Burnes), H IV (H ein et al.), and responsibility to disadvantaged populations such as
the elderly, the handicapped, and Third W orld citizens (Sch m itt et al.). T h ere are also
articles describing the objective fact of lack o f access (denial) of, am ong others, Chi-
can os to higher education (C ortese), and o f people of color to child welfare (C lose).
Finally, at least some logicians point to negation as a logical operator and point
to denial as an act of everyday discourse by w hich we “ indicate that som ething is
wrong with a proposition . . . w ithout it being a contrary to som e proposition. . . . ‘N o,
it is not like this; rather, it is like th at’” (G abbay and M oravcsik 1978, 251).

4. Wurmser, using the research o f Basch and D orpat provides useful distinctions
betw een denial (Verneinung), repression (Verdrängung), and a third term closely
related to the previous two: disavow al (Verleugnung). He writes that denial deals with
a factual reality that m ight evoke painful m eanings; repression with instincts whose
dem ands are unacceptable, and disavow al with unacceptable m eanings o f the per­
ceived reality. Th us, denial refuses to acknow ledge factual reality; repression refuses to
acknowledge instinctual dem ands; disavow al refuses to acknowledge em otional m ean­
ings (W urmser 1989, 17 7 -7 8 ). A th anassiou m akes a sim ilar distin ction between
repression and denial (1988).

5. T h e authors o f the special issue o f the Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale

(A pril-June 2001 [2]), point out that Freud was unique am ong the G erm an authors
who studied negation in seeing the con n ection betw een negation and repression. In
her article, M onique D avid-M énard argues th at the primary function o f a n egation is,
for Freud, not the description o f reality. Rather, its primary function is to deal with
desired objects that are not available or disappointm ents and threats that are present.
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER ONE 129

By negating, a hum an being is able to articulate and thus to know som ething that is
undesirable. T h is is m uch better than simply turning away from the danger. In a n ega­
tion, one takes sym bolic distance from disappointed desires while taking cognisance
o f them. Two other techniques to deal w ith disappointm ents are that o f the pervert
who uses a fetish to deny the absence o f the phallus in the m other and that of the psy­
chotic who can believe th at as a m an he is becom ing a w om an (Sch reber). A n ega­
tion is thus a creative (sym bolic) way of dealing with disappointed desire. A different
view was held by Frege.
In his article, Benm akhlouf points out that for Frege a negation is only a m ethod
o f creating anoth er thought. O ne can have the idea: red. A negation is nothing but
the creation o f another idea: non-red. Frege tries to elim inate the judgm ent present
in negative sentences.
In her article, Joseleyn Benoist dem onstrates th at Husserl sees that som ething
unique is happenin g in a negation. H usserl claim s th at in n egation we express a
deception, a deceit, even a disappointm ent. We expected som ething but it is n ot so.
In his later years, Husserl refers to perception as the positive basis for both a positive
and a negative judgm ent. I can expect the color o f a ball to be the same on its back
as it is on its front. T h is expected perception can be either confirm ed or denied.
Ben oist points out th at by grounding the act o f n egation in perception H usserl is
unable to understand the con tribution o f the symbol o f n egation to the act o f n ega­
tion. Freud, on the contrary, saw very clearly the sym bolic elem ent in the negative
judgm ent.
Finally, in her article, A n ton ia Soulez points out that W ittgenstein is puzzled
about the m eaning o f a negation. W ittgenstein refuses to relate the m eaning o f a
n egation to an object because he denies the existence of negative facts. W ittgenstein
then points out th at the m eaning of language and thus also of a negation is that it is
a sym bolic game. O n e can then claim that Freud understood, as W ittgenstein did, that
n egation is a linguistic gam e; he understood, as Husserl did, that negation is dealing
w ith a disappointm ent. C om b in ing the insights o f W ittgenstein and Husserl, one
could claim that, for Freud, negation offers the opportunity to use deceit to deal sym­
bolically with a disappointm ent. It is a creative repression.
Less relevant for our study o f Freud’s theory o f negation but still con tain in g inter­
esting studies about the phenom enon of negation is the special issue of Argumentation,
6, 1992, no. 1, 1-130, resulting from a research project at the C entre de Recherches
Sém iologiques de l’U niversité de N euch âtel (D enis M iéville, G u est Editor).

6. In my opinion, Freud’s trick to let patients label the repressed and his later
exam ple about boasting show that Freud’s usage o f the con cept o f denial is restricted
to linguistic denials. T h is is also observed by Litowitz (1998, 123). In G erm an the
label for denial is “Vemeinung," w hich m eans both denial and negation. T h e G erm an
label for den ial thus explicitly ties denial to a linguistic act.
By com paring Freud with Frege, G . M yerson too affirms that Freud’s concern
was with negation in its linguistic form. H e does poin t out correctly, however, that
Freud tries to link n egation “to the fundam ental dynam ics of the psyche” (M yerson
1995, 10).
Edith Jacobson , on the other hand, expands the m eaning of denial to include
nonlinguistic forms of denying the reality, such as the cancer patien t who starts pro­
130 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R ONE

jects that m anifestly will last beyond his expected survival time. Jacobson seem s to
look for nonlinguistic forms of behavior expressing the fundam ental dynam ics o f the
hum an psyche.

7. Freud’s artifice and his exam ples show that his usage of the concept o f denial
is restricted to linguistic denials. In G erm an the word for denial is “Vemeinung,” which
m eans both denial and negation. T h e G erm an word for denial thus explicitly ties
denial to a linguistic act. However, Jacobson is not alone in expanding the m eaning of
the concept of denial. In the current psychological literature, denial is used both for
linguistic and nonlinguistic forms o f denial. Th us, a cancer patien t who starts projects
that are expected to last beyond his expected survival time is said to deny his com ing
death, not by a linguistic statem ent, but by his acts (W eism an). Dorpat, on the other
hand, in his im portant book on denial, considers denial to be a “defensive process [that]
occurs at a presymbolic or prelinguistic level” (D orpat 1985, 3). O ne crucial contribu­
tion of D orpat’s work is his thesis that a presymbolic denial “prevents the form ation of
verbal ideas” (Ibid; also 42, 247, 251, 253, 265, 267) about the denied reality. H e calls
this the “cognitive arrest theory o f denial” (Ibid. chapter 1). D orpat objects to Freud’s
usage of the word "Vemeinung” for the defense m echanism o f denial (117) because Dor­
pat wants to distinguish sharply between negation as a logical or gram m atical concept
and denial or disavowal as a defense m echanism . N otw ithstanding his disagreem ent
with Freud, I see D orpat as providing a crucial insight for clarifying the puzzle that
Freud saw in linguistic denials. T h e puzzle for Freud was that a linguistic denial labels
that w hich it denies. T h e creative contribution of a linguistic denial is not the telling
o f a truth. Its creative contribution is the preparatory step o f labeling the problem. Dor­
p at’s insight is that a presymbolic denial prevents the subject from paying enough
attention to the denied reality to be in a position to form the concepts necessary to
properly label the denied reality. In a linguistic denial, the patient succeeds, at least
partially, in overcom ing the deficit pointed to by Dorpat: what was previously
unknown has now been labeled (Ibid. 48, 236). G iven D orpat’s clarification of the
defense m echanism o f denial, it makes sense that Freud pays attention to the difficulty
that patients have in giving inform ation about the unconscious. Rem em ber that Freud
reports with some pride that he invented a trap to help them describe a portion o f the
unconscious material (Freud, “N egation ,” S .E ., X IX , 133).
8. Further exam ples of boasting can be found in Freud’s study o f Emmy v. N . and
o f C acilie M . (S .E ., II, 76).

9. T h e correctness of this date is in doubt.

10. In discussing boasting Freud com es close to saying that the activity o f the
unconscious which is constitutive for a denial is the linguistic activity of labeling
som ething unknown. Let me again quote the relevant text from Freud: “w hat was
already present as a finished product in the unconscious was beginning to show
through indistinctly [to consciousness]” (Freud, S .E ., II, 76, n. 1). I take the expres­
sion “finished product” to m ean that the unknown was labeled.

11. For an exam ple see Ver Eecke (1984, 145). T h e patient deeply desires to be
hom e when her son visits town. Yet she does not dare to ask from the nun who is
director o f the asylum for the perm ission to leave— a perm ission regularly granted—
because: “W h at would that nun think o f m e?”
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER ONE 131

12. Som e authors go further and argue that a denial dem onstrates that the hum an
being is split (Ver Eecke 1984, 19; W urmser 1985; W urmser 1989, 177ff).
13. C urrent literature often explicitly distinguishes these two phases. A uthors
distinguish betw een denial o f facts or o f cognition and denial o f affects, responsibility,
or blam e (Jackson & Thom as-Peter; Levine at al.; H oke et al.; Brenitz; K ennedy &
G rubin; W inn; W ool & G oldberg). T h a t distinction is often referred to as the dis­
tin ction betw een a denial o f the facts and the denial o f the m eaning of the facts. O ne
author points to several layers hidden behind the denial of the m eaning o f facts. He
distinguishes betw een the im plications of facts, changes dem anded if the facts are
faced, and feelings related to the facts (Kearney 1996, 13-14, 4 3 -4 4 ). Finally, another
author distinguishes three forms o f intensity of denial, w hich he labels disbelief, defer­
ral, and dism issal (Lubinsky).
14. Freud writes that this intellectual acknow ledgm ent w ithout em otional accep ­
tance is “a very im portant and som ew hat strange variant” of that sam e split in a denial
(Freud, S .E ., X IX , 236). I understand the rest of the article to be an attem pt by Freud
to ponder the relation and the split betw een the intellectual and the affective. H is
m ain argum ent and contribution is the claim that, notw ithstanding the split betw een
the intellectual and the affective, it is possible to dem onstrate the dependence o f the
intellectual upon the affective.
15. T h e crucial work that needs to be done in the fourth phase is well described
by Dorpat: “W h at is denied is disavowed, whereas working through some denied c o n ­
tent includes an avowal as part of the self o f what has previously been rejected” (D or­
p at 1985, 238).
16. T h e third and fourth phases o f denial illustrate the fact th at there is an inter­
subjective dim ension to denial. G iven the appropriate attitude of a partner, denial
becom es unnecessary. Th us, several authors argue that a safe and accepting environ­
m ent is helpful for alcoholics (Rugel & Barry), incestuous fathers (G eller et al.) and
other sexual offenders to overcom e their denial (Laflen & Sturm ; M arshall;). T h e
same argum ent is presented for overcom ing denial of death (de H ennezel 1989). A t
the sam e time, certain attitudes of others prom ote denial. Thus, one researcher found
that “T h e patien t’s need for denial . . . was in direct proportion to the doctor’s need
for den ial” (D orpat 1989, 19). D orpat calls this the “interactional perspective” of
denial. I will explicitly address this puzzle in chapter 6 w hen I ask the question o f why
Teiresias provokes a denial in O edipus, whereas Jo casta, the shepherd, and the m es­
senger h elp O edipus undo his previous denial. I will address the problem of helping
others undo a denial in my analysis o f A . M oore autobiography, in w hich he describes
overcom ing a profound denial.
17. H yppolite indicates the com plexity o f such undoing by using H egel’s con cept
o f aufheben, ‘to overcom e,’ as a m atrix for such undoing (Ver Eecke 1984, 2 5 -2 7 ).
L ater on I will be able to do more than indicate the com plexity o f undoing a denial.
I will provide a careful phenom enological description o f that process as a basis for a
number o f anthropological conclusions.
18. In cognitive science, one would call that an em ergent property.
19. I therefore agree with A .O . Rorty w hen she stresses that hum an beings orga­
nize their psychic life at different levels. Sh e makes that claim a precondition for the
132 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER ONE

possibility of self-deception: “R elying on the details of m odular theories of all kinds,

the second picture (o f m ultiple layers o f self-organization) explains our h ospitality to
self-deception and other forms of irrationality” (Rorty 23). Freud’s thesis is one step
stronger than R orty’s in that Freud argues that the different layers in a h um an being
follow a different logic in their interpretation o f events: the logic o f primary processes
and o f the pleasure-ego (as in dreams, jokes, or fantasies) or, on the contrary, the logic
o f secondary processes and o f the reality-ego (rational argum ents). O ne can therefore
expect that the effort of unification in a person will not be achieved solely by the logic
used in secondary processes. T h e secondary process logic m ight be able to recognize a
self-deception (Rorty 25). However, one can not expect th at the secondary processes
will have the resources to undo a self-deception or a denial since these phenom ena
are also controlled by the logic o f primary processes. In fact, A nth ony M oore’s case
will teach us that undoing self-deception or denial owes a lot, am ong other factors
that m ight be m entioned, to m etaphoric work.
O ne can make a sim ilar argum ent in the tech nical language o f Lacan when he
argues that the challenge to hum an beings is that they must m aster the experience of
the real. T h ey can do so by the totally different logics o f the imaginary or the sym­
bolic. T h e im aginary is not identical to Freud’s prim ary processes, nor is the symbolic
identical to Freud’s secondary processes or the philosophical con cept o f the rational.
Sin ce the sym bolic is closely connected with language, we can understand L acan ’s
sym bolic to subsume the rational or secondary processes o f Freud. I have argued else­
where (Ver Eecke 2001), th at therapeutic interventions w ith m entally ill people, such
as schizophrenics, must take into accoun t the fact that the schizophrenic has defi­
ciencies in both the imaginary and the sym bolic register. Furthermore, a different
logic applies to the two registers. Failure to respect the distinction betw een these two
registers or failure to respect the difference in logic betw een them makes the thera­
peutic intervention ineffective or counterproductive. T h e L acan ian framework, just
like the Freudian, confirm s R orty’s idea that hum an beings have different layers of
interpretation while m aking the stronger claim that these interpretations obey differ­
ent logics.
20. O edipus becom es aggressive towards Teiresias w hen the latter tells him an
unpleasant truth. Forced to recognize, at the end of the play, the unpleasant truth
announced by Teiresias, O edipus mourns even his existence. In Ibsen’s Ghosts, at the
end o f the play, Mrs. A lv in g mourns the fact that she brought no brightness into the
hom e of her husband and child but instead believed obstinately in duty and thus con ­
tributed to the despair o f her ow n son (Ibsen, Collected Works, V II, 2 7 7 -7 8 ). S ee ch ap­
ters 3 and 6 in this book for further com m ents on how these tragedies can clarify the
problem atic of denial.

21. It is curious th at Freud draws e x p licit atte n tio n to the great im portance of
the acq u isitio n o f the linguistic fu n ction o f n egatio n but does n ot further c o n c e p ­
tualize the n egative m om en t postulated by h is claim that the o b ject o f a judgm en t
o f existen ce m ust first h ave b een lost. In the follow in g pages, I w ill argue th a t acts
o f separation and the ob vious or h id den form s o f aggression accom p an y ing such
acts o f separation w ill h ave to play an im portan t role in the developm en t o f a p er­
son and thus also in un doin g a d en ial and thereby restorin g w h olesom eness in that
person.
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER ONE 133

22. Freud h im self has given a survey of the developm ent o f his theory about this
problem (Freud, S .E ., X X I, 117-22). For an extensive discussion o f this same prob­
lem, see S .E ., XIV, 113-16.

23. O ne can find in the writings of D onald W innicott (1971, 8 6 -9 4 ) confirm a­

tion o f such a psychoanalytic interpretation o f the developm ent o f the child. W inni-
cott argues that the child has the need to have the illusion or the experience o f fusion
w ith the mother. He also argues th at the aggression o f the child against the m other is
necessary for the child to have confidence in the mother. T h e child, so W innicott
argues, believes in the om nipotence o f its aggression. T h e child thus fears th at its
aggression will kill the mother. If the m other responds to the aggression o f the child
with rejection then the child will feel that its aggression is able to destroy the good
object. If the m other continues to relate warmly to the child, the child feels that its
aggression is n ot effective. T h e good object, the good mother, survives the aggression
o f the child. Su ch a m other is not the product o f the im agination. Su ch a m other
really exists. In such a view o f child developm ent, fusion precedes separation.
Betw een the two stands aggression. T h is aggression can take many forms such as b it­
ing when nursing, or saying “n o” to the m other’s offer of som ething the child o b v i­
ously likes.

24. Elsewhere Freud refers to two authors who studied this phenom enon: Bleuler
and G ross (Freud, S .E ., V III, 175, n .2).

25. O ne can find texts in Freud’s “N egatio n ” where Freud seem s to touch on the
two dim ensions I discuss below. But touching on a subject m atter is n ot the sam e as
highlighting its im portance.

26. T h ese and other o f H egel’s ideas will be used in chapters 3 and 4 to further
clarify the phenom enon o f denial.

27. I am , o f course, not arguing that H egel already discovered the L acanian
understanding that all m ental illnesses can be articulated in their structure by their
relative success or failure with respect to the paternal metaphor. I am arguing that
H egel’s requirem ent o f elevating feelings and needs to ‘ideality’ has great sim ilarities
with L acan ’s requirem ent that hum an beings must accept their insertion into the
world o f language or into the sym bolic system. H egel gives us an exam ple of a m en ­
tally derailed person who was not able to elevate his desire to ‘ideality’; “an English­
m an who had hanged him self, on being cut down by his servant n ot only regained the
desire to live but also the disease of avarice; for w hen discharging the servant, he
deducted twopence from his wages because the m an had acted w ithout instructions in
cutting the rope w ith w hich his m aster had h anged h im se lf’ (H egel, Philosophy of
Mind, 134).

28. Spitz acknow ledges his debt to A n n a Freud’s work, The Ego and the Mecha­
nisms of Defense, for this idea (Spitz, 4 5 -4 8 ).

29. I will use Spitz’s ideas more abundantly in chapter 5 to clarify the liberating
function o f negation.

30. A uthors other than Spitz have made us aware o f the constitutive function of
aggression in the developm ent of hum an infants. For instance, M elanie Klein makes
the paranoid-schizoid position a necessary phase in the ch ild’s developm ent (H an n a
134 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R TW O

Segal, Klein, 112-21) . W innicott, on the other hand, points to the function of aggres­
sion in establishing the trustworthiness o f the caring person. A s m entioned before,
W innicott argues that the experience of on e’s ow n aggression and the experience of
the benign reaction of the m other allows the child to establish that the caring m other
is not subject to the effects o f its own aggression, w hich the child feels to be all-pow ­
erful. T h e child feels that its aggression is n ot able to destroy the good mother. Su ch
a m other acquires the status o f an independent and thus trustworthy object (i.e., a per­
son) (W innicott 1971, 90).

31. T h e im portance o f this idea for the young M oore is obvious since w ithin the
space o f two pages he repeats it several times. Th us, he writes: “I needed to distinguish
my own identity from my father’s so I could live my own life” (M oore 4) and “By
allow ing my grandfather to assum e a role w ithin my conscious identity, I was able to
establish some sense o f identity distinct from my father” (Ibid. 4 - 5 ) and finally “Som e
separation from my father’s identity was necessary for me to be free to lead my own
life” (Ibid. 5).

32. A m etaphoric m ove is a move whereby a subject accepts a different identity

while still feeling him self to be the same person, because a word is able to express the
great sim ilarity betw een the two identities (E vans 111-13).

33. M oore seems to understand that unconscious forces were at work in h is deci­
sion to becom e a Jesuit w hen he writes: “W hen I entered the Jesuits, I was twenty-
three years old. O nly years later did I realize that was the same age my father was when
he died” (M oore 3).

34. T h e m etaphorical power hidden in being a Jesuit was insufficient to unify the
life of the young M oore. H e left the Jesuits and spent more than a decade creatin g a
new metaphor. I will analyze that effort in chapter 7.
35. Rorty proposes a sim ilar thesis when she writes: “We certainly think we can
recognize self-deception in others, and we strongly suspect it in ourselves, even retro­
spectively attributing it to our past selves” (R orty 22, italics m ine).
36. T h e claim that self-deception and den ial are n ot lies will be further argued
for in chapters 2 and 7.

C H A P T E R T W O . T H E E P IS T E M O L O G IC A L P R O BLEM
O F S E L F - D E S C R I P T I O N IN F R E U D I A N P S Y C H O A N A L Y S I S

1. S .E ., X X I, 12. A n o th er such colloquial usage can be found in S .E ., V I, 221:

“my being scarcely able to tell lies anymore . . .”
2. T h e first date is the date of analysis. T h e second is the publication date.
3. Laplanche and Pontalis (1973, 333ff) and De W aelhens (1978, 53ff) further
clarified this concept.
4. T h is will be one of the them es o f chapter 6 where I analyze Sop h ocles’ Oedi­
pus, the King. T h e same distinction betw een immorality and im potence is aptly made
by Berthold-Bond when he discusses H egel’s analysis o f the G reek tragedy. T h e first
leads to m oral guilt. T h e second leads to ontological guilt, w hich has nothing to do
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER TW O 135

w ith m oral responsibility. Still, ontological guilt poin ts to a deficiency, an incom ­

pleteness (Berthold-Bond, 171; A pplied to C reon and A ja x , Ibid. 159).
5. Surveying cognitive psychology studies, G reenw ald presents two models to
explain apparent self-deceptions. Both m odels allow for apparent self-deceptions that
are quite different from lies. H is first m odel is the hierarchical m odel o f inform ation
processing. Inform ation is processed at a lower level. T h ere one decides w hether or
not to process the inform ation in greater depth. Greenw ald illustrates that m odel by
using the exam ple o f a person processing mail. W hat looks like junk m ail is thrown
away w ithout analyzing w hether it is im portant. O ne guesses that the inform ation
m ight not be worth the trouble. Similarly, a cancer patien t might detect som e symp­
tom s and feel that studying the symptoms will only provide unpleasant inform ation.
Therefore, the patient m ight decide to treat it as som eone treats junk m ail (G re en ­
wald, 5 7 -5 8 ). G reenw ald’s second m odel is the neural network m odel w hich argues
that one single piece o f inform ation can be processed in two or more parallel ways
w ithout the one being related to the other. H e illustrates th at m odel w ith C lap ared e’s
observation of a memory deficiency in a Korsakoff-syndrome patient. C lap ared e’s
patien t “was unable to recognize C laparede from one visit to the next. During one
visit, C laparede deliberately pricked the patien t’s finger w ith a hatpin when they were
shaking hands. O n the next visit, the patient h esitated to shake h ands with C la ­
parede— whom, as usual, the patient did n ot recognize as a fam iliar figure” (Ibid. 65).
Even though G reenw ald’s theory agrees w ith my position that not all apparent forms
o f self-deception are active lies, his theory abandons some essential features o f the
Freudian con cept o f denial. Freud m aintains the possibility o f some form o f the per­
son ’s unification: Freud’s patient, by saying that the figure in her dream was not her
mother, sim ultaneously labels the figure in her dream and confesses that there are
unconscious forces in her objecting to such labeling. G reenw ald’s neural network
m odel o f picturing apparent forms of self-deception allows for one part o f the person
not knowing what the other part knows. Freud, however, m aintains that conscious­
ness can label the unconscious. In G reenw ald’s hierarchical m odel it is possible for a
lower-level inform ation process to decide n ot to learn about the phenom enon beyond
the superficial inform ation, thereby creating the m otivation for refusing to invest
more energy in inform ation processing. O n ce the junk m ail is thrown away, it m ight
not be possible to know w hat had been written. Freud poin ts out that a denial labels
the unknown repressed. Th us, it is difficult to see how G reenw ald’s m odels could
explain Freud’s cases o f denial. However, G reenw ald’s m odels show us that apparent
self-deception is different from a lie in many more cases than Freud’s denials.
6. D orpat expands on the Freudian notion th at denial involves a lack o f inscrip­
tion at a higher level of consciousness. He argues that “denial reactions prevent the
subject from fully and accurately symbolizing in words w hatever it is that he has
defensively negated” (D orpat 1983, 229; D orpat 1988).
7. O ur thesis should not be construed as m eaning that psychoanalysis would
make the m oral dim ension superfluous. T h e psychoanalytic point o f view is valid only
when responsibility for the real is som ehow taken into account. T h is is the case with
children who are protected and guarded by their parents. T h is is also the case with
psychoanalytic patients who promise the therapist that they will n ot make im portant
decisions during therapy.
136 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R TH REE

C H A P T E R T H R E E . D E N IA L A N D
H E G E L ’S P H IL O S O P H IC A L A N T H R O P O L O G Y

1. For Freud’s claim regarding the universality of den ial to be true, denials must
appear in m any circum stances. R esearch has in fact docum ented denial as an attitude
or as a linguistic expression in terminally ill patients reacting to their im pending
deaths (de H ennezel 1991; M orita et al.; Baider &. Edelstein; Beilin; Strelzer et al.;
C on n or); in cancer patients (W ool; Jelicic et al.; M orita et al.; W eism an); in patients
w ith Alzheim ers disease (W einstein et al.; Sevush & L eve); in patients w ith m ultiple
sclerosis (Finger); in patients with a heart disease such as m yocardinal infarction
(Fukiniski et al.; Pruneti et a l ) , or angina pectoris (Levenson et al.) and in candidates
for heart transplants (Young et al.); in patients w ith disabling diseases (Stew art); in
persons w ith eating disorders (Jackson & D avidson; Vitousek et al.); in cases o f trans­
plan t failures (Streltzer et al.); in infertility resulting from H odgkin's disease (C elia &
N ajav its); in m others of children and adolescents with m alignant and term inal can ­
cer (Freitas); in sex offenders (Steven son et al; K ennedy & Grubin; W inn; M arshall)
and in incestuous fam ilies (H oke et al.); in drug and alcohol addiction (K restan &
Bepko; W ing; A m odea & Liftik; Liebeskind; W isem an et a l ; Kearney); in pregnant
m others (V an der H art et al.; M iller; G reen & M anohar; B em s; Finnegan et al.;
M ilden et al.; A tk in s et al.; M oyer &. Levine). W e further have descriptions o f fathers
w hose wives are in the last three m onths o f their first pregnancy who are in denial in
order to deal with their am bivalent feelings (Gerzi et al.); in w hole cultures when they
are dealing w ith a nation al defeat such as the Japanese after W W II (G ran d jean ); in
those dealing with genocide, as was the case with the H olocaust (K lein & Kogan;
D avidson; Solom on ; V idal-N aquet) or the A rm enian genocide (Boyajian & G rigo­
rian). T here is thus em pirical evidence for the plausibility of denial being a wide­
spread, or perhaps universal, phenom enon. To analyze that claim o f universality is a
philosophical task.
2. Philosophical theories have been helpful for the clarification o f psychody­
nam ic processes. Th us, Louis Sass uses W ittgenstein’s criticism o f the solipsist and the
solipsist’s unavoidable contradictions to explain a curious phenom enon observed in
schizophrenics: Th ey experience them selves as the absolute source of their experi­
ences, thereby denying the independence o f the world and the existence of other
minds. Th ey sim ultaneously experience their thoughts as being controlled by others,
sim ilar to the solipsist who needs to create another consciousness who can take his
own consciousness as an ob ject so as to give existence to his own ego (S a ss 1994,
6 7 -7 3 ; 5 1 -8 5 ). Jo h n M uller uses Peirce’s sem iotic to dem onstrate the im portance of
sem iotic activity betw een m other and child and the failure o f sem iotic activity in psy­
chotics (For an analysis o f M uller’s argum ent see Ver Eecke 1997).
Several authors have used H egel specifically to clarify unconscious processes.
L acan relied on H egel’s Phenomenobgy to construct his mirror stage theory and to cre­
ate the logical con n ection betw een the im aginary and aggressivity (For an exposition
o f the H egel-Lacan connection, see Ver Eecke 1983a). O patow uses H egel’s ideas
about the transition from consciousness to self-consciousness to clarify the psychoan­
alytic claim that the infant needs to make a transition from h allucinating the world
to accepting reality. From H egel, O patow borrows the idea that consciousness and
self-consciousness are characterized by some form o f negativity. For Opatow, a child
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER TH REE 137

overcom es hallucin ation as a m ethod of creating the world by negating the notion
that, as consciousness, it is tied to this form o f awareness. Instead, reacting to the pain
and displeasure resulting from the lack o f satisfaction provided by hallucination, the
infant has the option to leave h allucin ation behind and accept that, first, there is an
independent reality; and second th at it— the infant— is in need of that independent
reality (O patow 1988, 6 2 2 -2 4 , 626, 6 2 8 -2 9 , 635; 1989, 6 5 1 -5 5 ; 1993, 4 4 3 -4 6 ).
A ndré G reen , in his book The Work of the Negative, devotes a whole chapter to the
fruitfulness of conn ectin g the ideas o f H egel and Freud (G reen 1999, 2 6 -4 9 ). In par­
ticular, so G reen argues, both thinkers understand “the work of the negative. (Ibid. 4).
U sin g two previously published articles (G reen 1997; 1998), G reen reinterprets Win-
n ico tt’s ideas about the function o f transitional objects (G reen 1999, 7) and B ion ’s
reflections on the “fundam ental intolerance of frustration” (Ibid. 7 -1 0 ). H e sees in
the work o f these two psychoanalysts a deep understanding of the work o f the n ega­
tive. Several reasons justify using H egel to clarify the logical structure o f Freudian
insights. First, there are sim ilarities in H egel’s and Freud’s conception s of m adness
(Berthold-Bond, 2 6 -2 8 , 39,54). Freud o f course provides multiple detailed analyses,
where H egel offers one general on tological structure. But H egel’s general ontological
structure is useful in preventing us from losing sight o f the overall structure o f m ental
illness. A second reason to rely on H egel for insights into psychodynam ic processes is
H egel’s insight into the sim ilarity betw een some o f consciousness’s structures and
madness. Thus, Berthold-Bond poin ts out that, for Hegel, “the healthy mind is still
grappling with the same sorts of contradictions and feelings o f alienation, the same
‘infinite pain ’ . . . w hich characterizes insanity” (Ibid. 3; see also Ibid. 5 1 -5 4 ). A third
reason to consult H egel is to deepen our understanding o f the structure of denial.
Indeed, H egel insists, as Freud does, that both the insane person and the norm al per­
son have two psychic centers: the life o f feelings and the life o f rationality (Ibid. 34,
41). H aving two psychic centers in a person is the ontological con dition for the pos­
sibility o f a denial. Finally, both H egel and Freud recognize the im portance o f the n eg­
ative (stressed by L acan 1988, 5 2 -6 1 ; Hyppolyte 1988, 2 8 9-99; O patow op.cit). O ne
way Freud does so is through his theory of overcom ing hallucination. A n o th er way is
by introducing the con cept of the death drive, H egel stresses the n egative’s im por­
tance by m aking the negative the m otor o f his ph ilosophical system and by stressing
negative experiences such as despair, contradiction, and disappointm ent (Berthold-
Bond 4 5 - 4 8 ). A s a denial is— in Freud’s mind— a defective form o f negating, it m ight
clarify m atters to look at H egel’s theory for con ceptual explanations of the expressive
form the negative takes in a denial.

3. T h e case o f O edipus will be exam ined in detail in chapter 6.

4. Here and throughout this chapter we are using G rene and Lattim ore, 1959.

5. O n e could argue that L acan holds such a view w hen he writes that the
hum an world has an ontological structure sim ilar to that of paranoiac knowledge
(L acan 1977, 2)

6. W hen two people look at a m odern painting, it is possible for one to be

greatly impressed by it, while the other is com pletely indifferent. Tine first person
might encourage the second one and say: look closely and you will like it. T h e second
person might respond: the more I look at the painting, the more I feel that it is a stu­
138 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R TH REE

pid painting. In this conversation these two persons discover that looking more
closely does not lead to agreem ent. T h e ob ject is not w hat divides these two persons.
It is the way they perceive the object. T h us, both people becom e aware of being dif­
ferent from the other. Th ey becom e self-aware.
7. D ouglass describes his w illingness to face death and to fight Mr. Covey, the
slave breaker, as the turning poin t in his life as a slave: “Mr. C ovey entered the stable
w ith a long rope; and just as I was h alf out o f the loft, he caught hold o f my legs, and
was about tying me. . . . I resolved to fight; and, suiting my action to the resolution, I
seized C ovey hard by the throat; and as I did so, I rose. He held on to me, and I to
him . M y resistance was so entirely unexpected, that C ovey seem ed taken all aback.
He trem bled like a leaf. T h is gave me assurance, and I h eld him uneasy, causing the
blood to run where I touched with the ends o f my fingers. . . . H e asked me if I m eant
to persist in my resistance. I told him 1 did, com e what m ight; that he had used me
like a brute for six m onths, and that I was determ ined to be used so no lo n g e r.. . . This
battle with Mr. C ovey was the turning-point in my career as a slave. It rekindled the
few expiring embers of freedom, and revived w ithin me a sense o f my own m anhood.
It recalled the departed self-confidence, and inspired me again w ith a determ ination
to be free. . . . It was a glorious resurrection, from the tom b of slavery, to the heaven
o f freedom. My long-crushed spirit rose, cow ardice departed, bold defiance took its
place; and I now resolved that, however long I m ight rem ain a slave in form, the day
had passed forever when I could be a slave in fact. I did n ot hesitate to let it be known
o f me, that the white m an who expected to succeed in whipping, must also succeed in
killing me” (D ouglass 7 9 -8 1 ).
8. W hen deliberating as to w hether they would try to escape, Frederick D ou­
glass and his com panions saw the alternative. Som e chose to risk death. O n e at least
is reported to have feared death too m uch to risk freedom: “Here were the difficulties,
real or im agined— the good to be sought, and the evil to be shunned. O n the one
hand, there stood slavery, a stern reality, glaring frightfully upon us,— its robes already
crim soned with the blood o f m illions, and even now feasting itself greedily upon our
own flesh. O n the other hand, away back in the dim distance, under the flickering
light of the north star, behind some craggy hill or snow-covered m ountain, stood a
doubtful freedom— h alf frozen— beckoning us to com e and share its hospitality. T h is
in itself was som etim es enough to stagger us; but when we perm itted ourselves to sur­
vey the road, we were frequently appalled. U p on either side we saw grim death, assum ­
ing the m ost horrid shapes. N ow it was starvation, carving us to eat our own flesh;—
now we were contending with the waves, and were drowned;— now we were
overtaken, and torn to pieces by the fangs of the terrible bloodhound. . . . W ith us it
was a doubtful liberty at most, and alm ost certain death if we failed. For my part, I
should prefer death to hopeless bondage. Sandy, one of our number, gave up the
notion, but still encouraged us” (D ouglass 9 0 -9 1 ).
9. In the Narrative of the Life of Fredrick Douglass we find a beautiful description
of how far the slaveholder will go in order to enforce his right to give orders and to
m ake his slaves obey. “Very near Mr. Freeland lived the Rev. D aniel W eeden, and in
the same neighborhood lived the Rev. Rigby H opkins. T h ese were m embers and m in­
isters in the Reform ed M ethodist C hurch. Mr. W eeden owned, am ong others, a
w om an slave, whose nam e I have forgotten. T h is w om an’s back, for weeks, was kept
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER TH REE 139

literally raw, made so by the lash o f this m erciless, religious wretch. He used to hire
hands. H is m axim was, behave well or behave ill, it is the duty o f a m aster occasion ­
ally to whip a slave, to rem ind him o f his m aster’s authority. Su ch was his theory, and
such his practice. Mr. H opkins was even worse than Mr. W eeden. H is ch ief boast was
his ability to m anage slaves. T h e peculiar feature of his governm ent was that o f w hip­
ping slaves in advance o f deserving it. H e always m anaged to have one or more o f his
slaves to whip every M onday morning. H e did this to alarm their fears, and strike ter­
ror into those who escaped. H is plan was to whip for the sm allest offences, to prevent
the com m ission o f large ones. Mr. H opkins could always find some excuse for w hip­
ping a slave. It would astonish one, unaccustom ed to a slaveholding life, to see with
what wonderful ease a slaveholder can find things, of w hich to make occasion to whip
a slave. A mere look, a word, or m otion,— a m istake, accident, or w ant o f power,— are
all m atters for which a slave may be whipped at any time. Does a slave look dissatis­
fied? It is said, he has the devil in him , and it must be whipped out. Does he speak
loudly when spoken to by his master? T h e n he is getting high-m inded, and should be
taken down a button-hole lower. D oes he forget to pull off his h at at the approach of
a white person? T h en he is w anting in reverence, and should be w hipped for it. Does
he venture to vindicate his conduct w hen censured for it? T h en he is guilty o f im pu­
dence,— one o f the greatest crim es o f w hich a slave can be guilty. D oes he ever v e n ­
ture to suggest a different m ode o f doing things from that pointed out by his master?
He is indeed presumptuous, and getting above him self; and nothin g less than a flog­
ging will do for h im ” (D ouglass 8 5 -8 6 ).

10. W hen Frerick D ouglass describes how he becom es an experienced caulker,

one can feel his great pride: “He [the M aster] then took me into the ship-yard of
w hich he was forem an, in the em ploym ent o f Mr. W alter Price. T here I was im m edi­
ately set to calking, and very soon learned the art o f using my m allet and irons. In the
course of one year from the time I left Mr. G ardn er’s, I was able to com m and the high­
est wages given to the m ost experienced calkers [sic]. I was now o f som e im portance
to my master. I was bringing hom e from six to seven dollars per week. I som etim es
brought him nine dollars per week: my wages were a dollar and a h alf a day. A fter
learning how to caulk, I sought my own em ploym ent, made my own contracts, and
collected the money w hich I earned” (D ouglass 101).

11. In other passages, too, H egel dem onstrates that a hum an being needs another
person to embody a contrary point o f view in order for him or her to discover the full
m eaning o f existence. T h is is beautifully elaborated in at least two other passages:
“T h e Law o f the H eart” and “T h e Beautiful So u l.” (H egel 1966, 3 9 0 -6 0 0 , 6 4 2 -7 9 ).
For K risteva’s rejection o f H egel’s m aster/slave paradigm and its use of binary opposi­
tion see V an Buren, 1995.

12. H egel’s con cept of the will is more thoroughly analyzed in chapter 4 ­

13. We find an indirect confirm ation for this H egelian thought in the memoirs
o f Frederick D ouglass when he points out that the life of the m aster shows puzzling
aspects. Slaveholders becom e m onsters (D ouglass 2 2 -2 3 , 27, 3 2 -3 3 , 3 6 -3 8 , 8 5 -8 6 ); a
kind-hearted w oman who marries a slaveholder becom es vicious; religious slave h old­
ers turn into hypocrites (D ouglass 65, 8 4 -8 5 ). A H egelian explan ation for these
observations by D ouglass could be: slaveholders lead a life that is not giving them
140 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R TH REE

w hat they had hoped for. H ence, slaveholders becom e hum an m onsters and cann ot
but distort profound truths, including religious truths. L et me quote the description
D ouglass gives o f a decent w om an’s transform ation: “ It was at least necessary for her
to h ave some training in the exercise o f irresponsible power, to make her equal to the
task o f treating me as though I were a brute. My mistress was, as I have said, a kind
and tender-hearted w oman; and in the sim plicity o f her soul she com m enced, when I
first went to live w ith her, to treat me as she supposed one h um an being ought to treat
another. In entering upon the duties of a slaveholder, she did not seem to perceive
that I sustained to her the relation o f a mere chattel, and that for her to treat me as
hum an being was not only wrong, but dangerously so. Slavery proved as injurious to
her as it did to me. W hen I w ent there, she was a pious, warm, and tender-hearted
woman. T h ere was no sorrow or suffering for w hich she did not have a tear. Sh e had
bread for the hungry, clothes for the naked, and com fort for every mourner that cam e
w ithin her reach. Slavery soon proved its ability to divest her o f these heavenly qual­
ities. U nder its influence, the tender heart becam e stone, and the lam blike disposition
gave way to one of tiger-like fierceness. T h e first step in her downward course was in
her ceasing to instruct me. Sh e now com m enced to practice her husband’s precepts.
Sh e finally becam e even more violent in her opposition than her husband him self.
Sh e was n ot satisfied with simply doing as well as he had com m anded; she seemed
anxious to do better. N oth in g seemed to make her more angry than to see me with a
newspaper. Sh e seemed to think that here lay the danger. I have had her rush at me
with a face m ade all up of fury, and snatch from me a newspaper, in a m anner that fully
revealed her apprehension. Sh e was an apt w oman; and a little experience soon
dem onstrated, to her satisfaction, that education and slavery were incom patible with
each other” (D ouglass 5 0 -5 1 ).

14. M ich ael R oth wrote a beautiful book Psycho-Analysis as History: Negation
and Freedom in Freud. T h e subtitle m akes it clear th at the book is addressing the
problem atic addressed in this book. O n e, if not the m ost im portant, thesis o f R o th ’s
b ook is closely conn ected to the idea in the text just m entioned by H egel: when
h um an beings discover the truth about them selves it is painful; it involves despair.
T h us, about transference, R oth writes: “N o t th at transference love is in itself a qual­
itatively new way o f being: it certainly does n ot m anifest a radically changed way of
life. In fact, it is the very opposite of such a life, since it displays the repetitions,
defenses, and frustrations that characterize the ‘path ological’ facets of ‘n orm al’ liv­
ing. It is by being this m anifestation, though, that the transference offers the
analysand the prospects of negation, that is o f freedom through the creative acknow l­
edging o f o n e ’s history” (R oth 1987, 26). H e further specifies that im provem ent,
higher freedom , and greater truth dem and the acceptan ce o f sacrifice: “T h e degree of
con tradiction betw een the person ’s desires and the world th at confronts them is the
key to w hether the opportunity for negation found in the transference is to be real­
ized. In o ther words, radical activity is initiated as the result o f struggle, and this only
when the person sees that the sacrifice necessary to m ake the radical chan ge is o u t­
weighed by the poten tial gratification o f the change” (Ibid. 100). Finally, R oth
m akes a direct com parison betw een H egel and Freud by m eans o f the idea o f pain.
“For H egel, as for Freud, the m ind preserving itself in con tradiction is in pain. T h e
psycho-analytic in vestigation o f the con tradiction o f ‘know ing yet not know ing’ is an
 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R TH REE 141

investigation of a m ind in pain and an attem pt to understand th at pain. T h e mind

in this im m ediate (unreflective) state o f con tradiction is free only implicitly, accord­
ing to H egel. T h e reading o f Freud th at has b een presented here has no difficulty
w ith this n otio n ” (Ibid. 125).

15. If change in self-conception is unavoidable and if such a change involves a

loss o f hope, we have discovered a theoretical possibility that den ial som etim es has a
positive and constructive function. Jo el Sh an an argues that h um an developm ent
dem ands a con stan t change in engagem ent and disengagem ent. W ithout using my
con cept o f self-conception, but instead using the con cept o f ego-structure, Sh an an
argues that denial allows the ego to withdraw and reinvest energy in new objects with
less conflict. H e thus points to the great use of denial in m om ents of developm ental
change (S h an an 114-15; Lazarus). T h is is precisely the argum ent I derive from my
reading o f H egel: change requires the force of the negative. D enial is one path open
to the forces o f the negative.

16. T h e proof that the m aster needs to defend a role that H egel has shown to be
false presents us w ith a deduction o f the unavoidability o f self-deception w ithin a
H egelian ph ilosoph ical anthropology. I will prove that denial follow s self-deception.
In a survey article, A gassi dem onstrates that classical rationalism also unavoidably
leads to self-deception. C lassical ration alism rejected the idea, com ing out of various
religious traditions, that self-deception is unavoidable, and th at therefore tradition
and authority are necessary as guides to a good life. Rather, classical rationalism
argues that self-deception should be avoided and can be avoided if one is self-reliant.
Su ch self-reliance requires n ot acceptin g any proposition except those proven by the
facts as they show them selves to a m ind w ithout preconceptions. For B acon, the
father o f classical rationalism , this m eant that science rests on “the rejection o f all
preconceived opinion s and [that] the accum u lation o f a vast collection o f item s of
factual inform ation [would] lead rapidly to the full grow th o f theoretical scien ce”
(A gassi 3 5 ). A gassi then points out th at belief in such a view is a self-deception for
two reasons. First, scientific theory requires the form ulation o f hypotheses for the
developm ent o f theories. Secon d, the G od el theorem dem onstrates th at “all effective
proof procedures are lim ited” (Ibid. 4 1 ). T h us, classical rationalism , w hich rejected
the religious idea that h um an beings are subject to self-deception, shows itself to be
a self-deception. A gassi thus dem onstrates ph ilosoph ically th at self-deception is
unavoidable, even outside a H egelian anthropology. T h e argum ent for self-deception
derived from H egel therefore seems to h ave broad general validity. We need to keep
in m ind, though, th at den ial is more than just self-deception. It is a form o f self­
deception that also reveals truth.

17. Psychologists also provide us w ith such exam ples. In one case they use a co n ­
ceptualization close to my own to report their findings. Th ey com pare perceived risk
for con tractin g a sexually transm itted disease or becom ing pregnant with reported sex­
ual behavior and divide the group into people with realistic low risk, realistic high
risk, and illusionary low risk. T h is latter group tended to avoid exposure to risk infor­
m ation, deny its relevance, and experienced no increase in negative em otions when
facing contraceptive inform ation. T h e authors interpret such denial as “ego-protec­
tive” (W iebe & Black).
142 N O T E S TO C H A P T E R FO UR

C H A P T E R F O U R . D E N IA L A N D
H E G E L ’ S T H E O R Y O F T H E W IL L

1. References to the Philosophy of Right will alm ost always be by numbered para­
graphs (H egel 1967b; or H egel 1991).
2. I will make use o f H egel in a different way than the four authors referenced
in chapter 3. Berthold-Bond emphasizes that H egel’s theory o f consciousness has a
sim ilar structure to his theory o f mad consciousness. R ather than arguing that sim i­
larity, I will presuppose such a sim ilarity and search for an explanation o f the ph e­
nom enon o f denial by understanding it as a deficient solution to structural challenges
to the hum an will as articulated by H egel. Hyppolyte concentrates on overcom ing a
denial and uses H egel’s con cept o f “aufheben ” (to deny, to suppress, and to conserve)
(Hyppolyte 1988, 291) in order to clarify the process of overcom ing a denial and to
stress the presence o f negation in “the fundam ental attitude o f symbolicity rendered
explicit” (Ibid. 296). I will not concentrate, in this chapter, on explaining the over­
com ing o f negation. Rather, I will try to understand why a denial itself is created.
L acan and O patow focus on the distin ction betw een perception and hallucin ation
and the function o f negativity in the em ergence o f one or the other. For Opatow, per­
ception requires the force of the negative capable of rejecting h allucination (see foot­
note 1 in chapter 3 ). For Lacan, adult hallucination results from a different form of
n egativity than negation and denial. It involves a rejection o f the sym bolic system
(L acan 1988, 58). M y reflections concern the function of the negative after h alluci­
n ation has been overcom e and after the symbolic system has been accepted. I w ant to
clarify the difficulties faced by a person who utters a denial because he is already able
to face the reality or is already w illing to accept the sym bolic system. I further want
to clarify the deficiencies in the way such a person confronts these difficulties.
3. O ne can find a brief com m entary on these three paragraphs using H egel’s
concepts of universality, particularity, and individuality in W estphal 1992, 5 -7 . For a
book-length com m entary on the Preface of the Philosophy of Right see Peperzak 1987.
T h ere are a num ber o f useful publications on H egel’s concept of freedom or the im pli­
cations of his con cept o f freedom for his views on property, morality, and different eth ­
ical institutions: A n g eh m 1977; Avineri 1972; C h am ley 1963; C ullen 1979; D enis
1984; D ubouchet 1995; Fleischm ann 1964; H arada 1989; H ardim on 1994; H enrich &
H orstm ann 1982; Jarczyk &. Labarrière 1986; Jerm ann 1987; Kainz 1974: Kraus
1931/1932; Lucas & Pôggeler 1986; Lukács 1973; M aker 1987; M arx 1977; Pelczynski
1984; Reyburn 1967; R iedel 1974; R oth 1989; Seeberger 1961; Sm ith 1989; S te in ­
berger 1988; W aszek 1988; W estphal 1992; W hitebook 1977; W infield 1988; W in­
field 1990; W ood 1990.
4. I am aware that some excellent H egel scholars reject the idea th at H egel’s
thought can be m olded in a thesis-antithesis-synthesis schem a. Thus, A llen W ood
writes: “Som e of those who discourse on H egel w ith the greatest soph istication know
him only through warped, inaccurate or bowdlerized second-hand accounts (for
instance, accounts o f the H egelian dialectic as ‘thesis-antithesis-synthesis’” (H egel
1991, xxvii) or “T h is particular triadic piece of jargon was actually used by both Fichte
and Sch ellin g (each for his ow n purposes), but to my knowledge it was never used, not
even once, by H egel. We owe this way of presenting the H egelian dialectic to H ein ­
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER FO UR 143

rich Moritz Chalybaus, a bowdlerizer o f G erm an idealist philosophy. . . . To use this

jargon in expounding H egel is alm ost always an unw itting confession that the expos­
itor has little or no first-hand knowledge o f H egel” (Ibid. xxx ii). M y view is that a
philosopher som etim es uses a m ethod without reflectively discussing it or without
labeling it in a scholarly fashion. N evertheless, in the electronic version o f Bailley’s
translation o f the Phenomenology there were 17 hits for the word 'anti-thesis,’ 2 hits
for ‘synthesis,’ 1 for ‘synthesizing,’ and 10 for ‘synth etic.’ A lso, H egel frequently uses
the word ‘aber’ (but) to signal a turn in the argum ent. Furthermore, the word ‘aber’
signals an upward spiral in the argum entation because it introduces facets of reality
not taken into accoun t by the view under discussion or because it introduces a new
way o f looking at the world w hich em braces previously overlooked facets of reality.
(H egel 1952, 147). I therefore feel justified in trying to put H egel’s argum ent, at least
for pedagogical purposes, in the form o f theses, anti-theses, and syntheses. It will be
up to the reader to judge w hether or n ot my effort creates clarity.

5. T h e full paragraph reads as follows: “T h e will contains ( a ) the elem ent of

pure indeterm inacy or that pure reflection o f the ego into itself w hich involves the
dissipation o f every restriction and every conten t either im m ediately presented by
nature, by needs, desires, and impulses, or given and determ ined by any m eans w hat­
ever. T h is is the unrestricted infinity o f absolute abstraction or universality, the pure
thought o f oneself.”

6 . H egel defends a sim ilar idea in his Phenomenology when he defines self-con­
sciousness as: “prim arily simple existence for self, self-identity by exclusion of every
other from itself. It takes its essential nature and absolute object to be Ego; and in this
immediacy, in this bare fact o f its self-existence, it is individual. T h a t w hich for it is
other stands as unessential object, as object w ith the impress and character o f n ega­
tion ” (H egel 1 9 6 7 ,2 3 1 ).

7. T h e full text o f the paragraph reads: “ (P) A t the same time, the ego is also
the transition from undifferentiated indeterm inacy to differentiation, determ ination,
and positing o f a determ inacy as a con ten t and object. N ow further, this con tent may
either be given by nature or engendered by the con cept o f mind. Through this posit­
ing o f itself as som ething determ inate, the ego steps in principle into determ inate exis­
tence. T h is is the absolute m om ent, the finitude or particularization o f the ego.”

8 . A gain , H egel m akes a sim ilar claim in his Phenomenology w hen he argues that
life is essential for the life o f self-consciousness. Self-consciousness discovers that in
the fear o f death. H egel writes it this way:”In this experience [the life-and-death strug­
gle w hich produces fear o f death] self-consciousness becom es aware that life is as
essential to it as pure self-consciousness. In im m ediate self-consciousness the simple
ego is absolute object, which, however, is for us or in itself absolute m ediation, and
h as as its essential m om ent substantial and solid independence” (H egel 1967, 234).
9. T h e full text of this paragraph reads: “ (y) T h e will is the unity of b oth these
mom ents. It is particularity reflected into itself and so brought back to universality, i.e.
it is individuality. It is the self-determ ination o f the ego, w hich m eans that at one and
the same time the ego posits itself as its own negative, i.e. as restricted and determ i­
nate, and yet rem ains by itself, i.e. in its self-identity and universality. It determ ines
itself yet at the same time binds itself together w ith itself. T h e ego determ ines itself
144 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R FO UR

in so far as it is the relating o f negativity to itself. A s this self-relation, it is indifferent

to this determ inacy: it knows it as som ething w hich is its own, som ething w hich is
only ideal, a mere possibility by w hich it is n ot constrained and in w hich it is confined
only because it has put itself in it.— T h is is the freedom of the will and it constitutes
the con cept or substantiality of the will, its w eight, so to speak, just as w eight con sti­
tutes the substantiality o f a body.”
10. Se e H egel 1975, 226 ff, # 1 6 3 -6 5 ; H egel 1989, 6 0 0 -2 2 ; Léonard 1974,
3 2 4 -3 1 . Several authors have reflected on the relation of H egel’s Philosophy of Right
and his Logic. T h e definitive article, surveying also previous research is Richardson
1989.
11. A t a certain age, children present a nice illustration o f this developm ent of
the will. If one asks them the question: “why did you do that?,” they answer:
“because.” To the further question: “because w hat?,” they answer again: “because.”
W ith the help of H egel’s categories we can paraphrase the ch ild’s statem ents as fol­
lows: there is a because, nam ely the fact that the child decided. T here is no object of
the ‘because,’ since the child is not bound to have reasons, it is satisfactory that it so
decided.
12. T h e great dem ands m ade upon thought for satisfying the strategy o f h app i­
ness are clearly present in act utilitarianism . T h us, according to B entham the pursuit
o f happiness requires one to calculate the value of each pleasure and each pain. T h e
extent of calculation required becom es im aginable when one quotes the circum ­
stances that must be taken into account to calculate an a c t’s value. T h ey are: its in ten ­
sity, its duration, its certainty or uncertainty, its propinquity or rem oteness, its fecun­
dity, its purity, and its extent. T h ese calculation s have to be repeated for each person
affected by the act under consideration (J. Bentham . A n Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation. Q uoted in Introductory Readings in Ethics. W. K. Frankena and
]. T. Granrose, eds. 134-37). T h e reference in this and the next footnote com es from
my colleague T.L.Beaucham p.
13. O ne could see in rule utilitarianism an attem pt to reach this level. Th us, in
his article “Towards a C redible Form o f U tilitarian ism ” R. B. Brandt’s first proposal
reads: “A n act is right if and only if it conform s with that learnable set o f rules, the
adoption of w hich by everyone would m axim ize intrinsic value.” (Q uoted from Intro-
ductory Readings in Ethics, edited by W. K. Frankena and J. T. G ranrose 160.) C o m ­
m enting on his ow n principle he writes: “Presumably, then, it would con tain rules
rather sim ilar to W. D. R oss’s list of prim a facie obligations” (Ibid. 160). Clearly,
B ran dt’s thinking is different from H egel’s. T h e results too are different. However,
both require from thought that it be able to specify a sm all number of things that
have, unconditionally, to be done. Specifying w hat has to be done in order to reach
freedom is the task that H egel sets him self in his Phibsophy of Right.

14. Ethical life in turn has three subdivisions which correspond to the three sub­
divisions o f the third syllogism: the syllogism of necessity. T h e state is the third form of
ethical life and thus corresponds to the third and last form o f the syllogism of necessity:
the disjunctive syllogism. H egel’s m ethod is such that every level of the dialectic pre­
pares the n ext step or that the n ext step relates to the problem s o f the previous step.
Th us, the analysis of the disjunctive syllogism ends with the concept “objectivity”
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER FIVE 145

(H egel 1989, 704), w hich is the topic of analysis in the n ext section o f H egel’s Logic,
whose first chapter is “M echanism .” Richardson uses this consideration for his m apping
o f the Logic on to the Phibsophy of Right (Richardson 1989, 65), which includes the
state relating to both the disjunctive syllogism o f necessity and m echanism .

15. T h e 1985 symposium in Jerusalem “D enial: A clarification o f T h eoretical

Issues and R esearch ” was very m uch concerned w ith this double possibility of denial.
O n the one hand, denial is potentially a m aladaptive reaction as in the case o f the
W arsaw G h e tto where the Jews denied that they were in im m inent danger o f exter­
m ination by the Nazis. “Th ey convinced them selves that only those Jew s who had
been com m unists were murdered in revenge by the N azis” (W angh 14). O n the other
hand, some who saw the danger and did not deny it com m itted suicide such “as the
chairm an o f the Juden rat (Jewish C ou n cil) A d am C herniakow ” (Ibid. 14; K lein &
Kogan; D avidson).

C H A P T E R F IV E . A C H I L D ’S N O -S A Y IN G :
A S T E P T O W A R D IN D E P E N D E N C E

1. In stressing that anxiety is caused by seeing a stranger, Spitz emphasizes the

function of attachm en t to a fam iliar figure who was expected but turns out not to be
there. In stressing th at anxiety is caused by being seen by a stranger, I will argue that
being seen, particularly by a stranger, has a disorganizing effect on the child. I will be
using Sartre’s theory to articulate the disorganizing effect o f being seen.

2. Th us, the absence o f eight-m onth-anxiety would not by itself justify the pre­
diction o f a later deficiency in interpersonal relations, because eight-m onth-anxiety is
an organizer in the weak sense. T h e absence of no-saying would justify the prediction
o f later em otional deficiencies, because no-saying is, in my theory, an organizer in the
strong sense.

3. In the first part of the chapter I will refer to the child as she and in the sec­
ond part as he. However, for the purpose of the argum ent, sexual difference can be
overlooked. I am simply follow ing recom m endations for gender neutral description.
4. It is worthwhile to look at the two figures m entioned in the quotation, pp. 146
and 147.

5. For a relevant survey article see Jo h n Bowlby, 1982, particularly 6 6 7-70.

6 . T h is is also the interpretation K onner attributed to the attachm en t theorists,

referring to Bowlby and A insw orth, writing that fear o f strangers indicates “a deepen­
ing o f the em otional bon d” or “signalling the onset o f the capacity for attachm en t”
(K onner 1982, 149).

7. T h e concepts o f indicator and organizer are concepts used by Spitz. Lacan

uses the expressions: “T h e mirror stage as form ative o f the function o f the I” (L acan
1977, 1); “We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transform ation that takes place in
the subject when he assum es an im age” (Ibid. 2). Both expressions indicate that, for
Lacan, the mirror stage is creating som ething new. It is thus more than an indicator;
it is an organizer.
146 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R FIVE

8 . In philosophical language, one can call a weak organizer a sufficient con di­
tion for the presence o f a new and higher function in the child. It is n ot a necessary
condition, however. O n the contrary, a strong organizer is both a sufficient and a n ec­
essary condition for the new and higher function.

9. In D écarie et al.,1974, in the conclusion, one finds the following: “T h e find­

ings of G ou let and Brossard raise serious doubts about the universality o f the negative
response” (192). In another study o f the M ontréal group (Solom on and D écarie) one
finds the statem ent: “ It would also cast doubt upon theories w hich hold that stranger
fear is an essential phase in norm al developm ent, and that the absence of stranger fear
is path ogenic” (352).

10. T h e three publications and the relevant quotation s are: “However, w hen a
stranger approaches the eight-m onth-old, he is disappointed in his wish to have his
mother. T h e anxiety he displays [. . .] is a response to his perception that the
stranger’s face is n ot identical w ith the m emory traces o f the m other’s face” (Spitz
1965, 155). “ In psychoanalytic terms we say: this is a response to the intrapsychic
perception o f the reactivated wishful tension and the ensuing disappoin tm en t” (Ibid.
1 5 5 -5 6 ). A lso, “T h e realization that it can n ot be rediscovered in the given instance
provokes a response of unpleasure. In terms o f the eight-m onth anxiety, w hat we
observe can be understood as follows: the stran ger’s face is com pared to the memory
traces of the m other’s face and found w anting. T h is is not mother, she is still lost.
U npleasure is experienced and m anifested” (Spitz 1957, 55). A n d third, “W hen a
stranger approaches an infant, then the infant finds itself disappointed in its desire
to see again the mother. A n d thus the anxiety w hich the infant m anifests is not a
reaction to a perception w hich revives a memory o f a painful experience w ith the
stranger. T h e infant is concerned w ith the n on iden tity o f the stranger w ith the
mother, w hich the infant misses. H ence, we are here in the presence o f a response to
an intra-psychic perception, o f a reactivation o f a desire” (Spitz 1963, 155 [transla­
tion m ine]).
11. Elsewhere, I form ulate the new problem faced by the eight-m onth-old child
as one of living with the body that he has appropriated. T h a t body has an interiority
and an exteriority. T h e child has the task of unifying those two aspects. Seein g seems
to be the privileged sense w ith w hich to do so. But hearing and touching might be
able to do so too. A s these three senses synthesize the interiority and the exteriority
of the body in different ways one could predict that persons who lack one of these
senses will literally have to live with another body in as m uch as the lived body is not
the physical body but the body as synthesized and as psychologically appropriated.
Th us, children born blind or deaf can be expected to relate differently to their bodies.
A n d indeed, deaf persons show a higher incidence of paranoic characteristics (Ver
Eecke 1984, 61ff).
12. It is im portant to reflect on the relation betw een an indicator and an organizer
and to keep in m ind the distinction betw een a weak and a strong organizer.
For Spitz, the eight-m onth-anxiety is both an indicator and an organizer. First,
the eight-m onth-anxiety is an indicator o f a higher psychic structure because it indi­
cates that the child has created libidinal ob ject relations (she differentiates betw een
the mother and a stranger), that she has the capability of experiencing a new affect
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER FIVE 147

(anxiety), and that she has achieved a higher integration o f the ego (she can make
judgm ents about the external world and take, if she so decides, defensive m easures).
T h e eight-m onth-anxiety is also an organizer of developments in several areas. T h e
eight-m onth-anxiety requires a psychic developm ent w hich permits the child to dis­
charge affective tensions in an intentional, directed, and volitional manner. T h e child
must also possess a m ental apparatus in w hich a number of memory traces can be
stored such that she can distinguish betw een m other and stranger. Finally, m any o f the
child’s psychic and m ental achievem ents require a som atic developm ent w hich
includes myelinization o f the neural pathways such that the diacritic function o f the
sensory apparatus and the control of groups of skeletal muscles w hich perm it directed
action are possible.
A n achievem ent in a critical period does not just organize developm ents o f the
past, it also m akes the child ready for new achievem ents. A n xiety induced by the pres­
ence o f a stranger dem onstrates that the child has endowed the fam iliar person (the
mother) with unique object attributes (Spitz 1957, 161-62). T h is allows the child to
establish a kind o f secure and exclusive relation w ith the mother. A ccordin g to Spitz,
this process requires differentiation and integration or a fusion o f aggressive and libid­
inal drives. Seen in this way, the anxiety at eight m onths is an indicator of a highly
com plex em otional process that leads to the creation o f a love object. T h is in turn,
Spitz claim s, will perm it the developm ent o f identification as a defense m echanism .
M ore precisely: the eight-m onth-anxiety can be seen as the organizer of a future
achievem ent: identification.
But as the eight-m onth-anxiety does n ot by itself create future achievem ent, but
only points to the presence o f the necessary preconditions for that achievem ent, it is
evident that one can call the eight-m onth-anxiety an organizer only in the weak sense
o f the term as defined above.

13. A som ew hat longer summary o f the developm ent o f L acan ’s thought can be
found in Jo h n P. M uller and W illiam J. R ichardson, Lacan and Language, 1-25.

14. By the concept o f intrusion com plex L acan refers to the fact that siblings
have difficulty tolerating other siblings. Lacan interprets sibling rivalry as a defensive
reaction of one sibling to another sibling who is experienced as intruding into the cozy
relation he or she has with the m other figure.

15. T h e difference betw een the drive m odel and the ob ject relations m odel is the
m ain concern o f Jay R. G reenberg and Stephen A . M itchell in their superb book,
Object Relations in Psychoanalytic Theory. O n e can find references to their summaries
on the mother-child relationship in various psychoanalytic theories by looking in the
index under the concepts: attachm ent; deprivation, m aternal; mother; m othering;
symbiosis; separation-individuation.

16. L acan ’s theory o f the function o f vision will allow me to explain eight-
m onth-anxiety in a more satisfactory way. O f course, that makes my explanation
dependent upon the validity o f L acan ’s theory. However, I will introduce a correction
to L acan ’s theory w hich should make my explan ation not totally dependent upon
Lacan. T h e correction I will introduce is that the child, in my reading, needs to appro­
priate his body as a totality. To use other language, one could say that the child needs
to conquer his body by the construction o f a body image. Seein g is an im portant sense
148 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R FIVE

for such an image construction, but other senses can make a contribution too. W hen
seeing is not available, as in children born blind, other senses can be thought o f as
capable of replacing the function o f seeing to some extent. It is my hypothesis that the
final result for the child will be different if he constructed his body image m ainly by
the sense o f seeing, or used other senses as well, or constructed his body image by
senses other than seeing. M y hypothesis would find a tentative confirm ation in the
fact that d eaf mutes tend statistically to have more paranoiac traits than the average
population. My theory would also possibly provide a theoretical framework to think
about the fact that hyperactive children interact more physically w ith people than the
average child and thus must use the sense o f touch more than other children, even for
the construction o f their own body image.

17. T h e expressions: “to appropriate o n e’s body” or “the appropriation of on e’s

body” have been coined to refer to a psychological act postulated in the ch ild’s devel­
opm ent as a genetic counterpart to a philosophical idea. T h e philosophical idea is that
the will and the body are not identical, yet are closely related. O ne way o f under­
standing the com ing to be o f that close relation is to say that the will takes possession
of the body. L et me quote the original ph ilosophical text from w hich I took the idea:
“In so far as the body is an im m ediate existent, it is not in conform ity w ith mind. If it
is to be the willing organ and soul-endowed instrum ent o f m ind, it must first be taken
into possession by m ind” (H egel 1952, # 4 8 ). T h e expressions “ to appropriate o n e’s
body” or “the appropriation o f o n e’s body” are identical w ith the expressions: “to take
possession o f on e’s body” or “the taking possession of on e’s body.” It is my under­
standing that the child takes possession o f h is body in many steps. Learning to walk is
an exam ple o f such a step. I understand the mirror stage to be such a step as well. If
my understanding o f the mirror stage theory is correct, then it provides the child for
the first tim e with the psychological sense of the unity o f its body. For this reason I
understand the mirror stage to be a crucial step in the psychological process o f taking
possession of o n e’s body, of appropriating o n e ’s body.
Clearly such an interpretation of the concept “appropriation of on e’s body” is
akin to the process other authors capture when they talk about the im portance o f the
body image. In anorexia nervosa, for exam ple, the body image is distorted. In the lan ­
guage I propose, one would say that the appropriation of the body is defective.

18. Specialists in child language distinguish betw een two forms o f using “n o” :
rejection and denial. R ejection refers to what we have called refusal. “N o ” as denial is
the intellectual activity o f disagreeing w ith the truth of a statem ent: “ Is this a picture
o f a dog?” “N o , it is a picture of a c a t” (H um m er et al. 607). Specialists in child lan ­
guage observe that the capability to perform the rejection or refusal “n o” emerges first.
A t least one group o f authors argues for the so-called continuity thesis such that cap a­
bility for using the denial “no” both benefits and depends upon the capability for using
the rejection “no” (Ibid. 616). A s a consequence, the child is better positioned to
learn to correctly use the pair yes/no than to use the pair m ore/less or the pair
before/after, and so on (Ibid. 608). Th us, one can claim that, for correctly using pairs
o f opposite terms, the child is initially helped by the em otional developm ent which
allowed him to use the refusal “no.” T h e linguistic spill-over effects of the acquisition
o f “n o” m ight therefore be greater than Spitz expected. It lays the groundwork for
intellectually understanding opposite terms just as it also lays the groundwork for the
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER FIVE 149

correct use o f the pronouns (Ver Eecke 1984, 7 7 -7 8 ). T h is foundational function of

“n o” as a rejection (refusal) is cross-culturally validated by a developm ental study in
child language w hich distinguishes nine forms o f n egation w hich emerge in three
phases across three languages (English, French, and K orean). R ejection, judgm ent of
nonexistence, prohibition, and indication o f failure emerge in the first phase. D enial
negation, epistem ic negation, and expression o f inability emerge in the second phase.
Inferential and norm ative negation emerge in the third phase (C h o i 525, 529). In
some cases an old form o f negation was used to express a new function— thus rejec­
tion n egation (the refusal “no” discussed by Spitz) was used later as denial negation
(intellectual judgm ent) (Ibid. 529). Bonnie Litowitz, in a rem arkable survey article,
defends the thesis th at there are developm entally three forms o f taking distance, each
form dependant upon the prior form: rejection, refusal, and denial. Litowitz uses the
vocabulary o f object relations theory to define them: “w hat is rejected are ‘bad’ parts
o f others or oneself; w hat is refused is the im pingem ent of an other’s dem and; w hat is
denied is a statem ent from a separate other. N evertheless, in all cases self and other
are intrapsychic representation” (Litow itz 1998, 143).
19. T h is form o f no-saying has an obvious dialogical character. It is then also not
surprising that several studies noticed that negations occur more frequently in spoken
language than in writing (Tottie; Stenstrom ).
20. If the exercise of no-saying creates the beginning of autonomy, then we have a
psychological argument for Freud’s thesis that the acquisition— in the sense of mastery
and usage— of the linguistic symbol o f negation is a precondition o f human freedom. Two
linguists present arguments that are different from mine but do not contradict my thesis.
Rather, their arguments reinforce the claim o f negation’s importance for hum an beings.
Thus, Horn points out the opportunities that linguistic negation makes available to
hum an beings. He writes: “A ll human systems of com m unication contain a representa­
tion of negation. N o animal com m unication system includes negative utterances, and
consequently none possesses a means for assigning truth utterances, and consequently
none possesses a means for assigning truth value, for lying, for irony, or for coping with
false or contradictory statements. T h e distinction between the largely digital nature of
linguistic representation in hum an language and the purely analog m echanisms o f animal
com m unication can be argued to result directly from the essential use humans make of
negation and opposition” (Horn xiii). Another linguist, Falkenberg, analyzes the three
attempts to define a negation: the syntactic-morphological, the semantic-logical, and the
pragmatic or action-theoretic one. H e concludes that none succeeds in satisfactorily
defining the negation. H e then infers that negation is fundamental for the hum an world:
“Reality cannot be created completely by affirmation alone, reality is really constituted
in speech, in affirmative and negative speech” (Falkenberg, 148; my translation).
21. A more obvious exam ple o f the im portance o f em otional relations in helping
the child live with his hurting body is the case o f children who have teething pains.
Som etim es their crying dim inishes or even stops when they are cuddled by the m other
or by a fam iliar figure. In my conceptual framework I would say that the child learns
to live and to accept his hurting and thus unacceptable body when and because he is
cuddled and thus loved or cared for. L ivin g w ith on e’s body thus requires specific em o­
tional relations w ith others. A s historical sedim entation, others can therefore be pre­
sumed to be present in the relation I h ave developed to my body.
150 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER SIX

In my view, the ch ild’s em otional relations to others are crucial for accepting his
body around the age o f the mirror stage (about six m onths). It is an age that is
included in the ages of the children studied by Spitz in his study on hospitalism .

22. A n exam ple (Ver Eecke 1984, 7 9 -8 0 ) will be summarized in the n ext page.

23. T h is happy form ula was coined after reading M uller and R ichardson ’s sum ­
mary statem en t about the function of language (1982, 9ff).
24- E va Brann stresses several o f the ideas developed above w hen she writes: “But
meanw hile, in the terrible twos, there is also the no that is a mere m anifesto o f inde­
pendence. It shows a cleavage in the child’s ego, for while the child is saying no, it is,
as was observed, often doing w hat the adult dem ands. T h e naysaying does n ot con ­
cern the objective issue but the ow nership o f the will: 'I have a will of my own and
even when it is the same as yours, it is different because it is won. I am doing this
because I w ant it and I am not doing w hat you w ant’” (B ran n 13).

25. For a more com plete treatm ent o f the problem see Ver Eecke 1984.

26. T h e parallelism betw een H egel and Freud m ight seem surprising at first.
However, H egel, as m uch as Freud and m uch more than, for instance, K ant, insisted
on the fact that desires, wishes, and even vices are forces contributing to hum an
action. In his theory o f morality, H egel will n ot insist on obedience to a universal law
as K an t did, but to the need for m utual forgiving betw een h um an beings. Freud too is
m odest with reference to the m oral dem ands he makes o f h um an beings. Th us, Freud
wrote in a letter to Putnam : “ It is therefore more hum ane to establish this principle:
‘Be as m oral as you can honestly be and do not strive for an ethical perfection for
w hich you are not destined’” (H ale 1971a, 122).

C H A P T E R S IX . O E D IP U S , T H E K IN G :
H O W A N D H O W N O T T O U N D O A D E N IA L

1. T h e translated verses throughout this chapter are from G ren e and Lattim ore
1959.
2. Telling the truth, like w arning people about preventable disasters, is often
met, not with gratitude, but w ith irritation or denial. Thus, a study, dealing with the
problem o f how to overcom e denial and n egation o f death, explicitly argues that one
must avoid taking an opposite attitude as Teiresias did (de H ennezel 1989). A noth er
author shows how argum ents betw een a helper and a denier (called a ”help ee” ) trans­
form an intrapersonal struggle of denial into an interpersonal one of accusation and
rejection. T h is happens because the denier is pushed by the helper to face frightening
facts; the denier then defends herself against the threatening facts by denying them.
T h e helper robs the denier o f this defense. W h at a helper should do is provide support
so that the denier can slowly learn to face frightening facts (Kearney 1996, 9 -1 0 ). T h e
helper should join the denier “ (client) w ithin the wall o f den ial" (Ibid. 114 ff). In
short, the failure o f Teiresias w as his inability to understand th at “denial does not yield
to truth; it is a protection against it” (Ibid.).
3. M arie Kurrik prefers to underline a different role played by Jocasta. Sh e lets
the queen be the voice of w arning that a tragic hero cann ot listen to (Kurrik 1979,
 N O T E S TO C H A PT ER SIX 151

243). Sh e then also describes the cruel self-punishm ent o f O edipus as an act of free­
dom (Ibid. 2 5 9 -6 0 ).

4. O n e might say that O edipus repressed nothing, but simply did not know the
real m eaning of certain events. (For exam ple, he knew he com m itted a murder, but he
did not know the identity of the victim .) T h is observation could then support the
claim that w hat was needed was not “ the return o f the repressed” but a “revelation of
the truth.” I prefer to m ain tain my usage o f the idea o f repression and to counter this
objection by referring to the definition o f ‘repression’ in Je a n Laplanche and J.B. Pon-
talis 1973, 2. T h e authors claim that repression can be considered a universal ph e­
nom enon in so far as it constitutes the unconscious as a dom ain that is separated from
consciousness, and that am nesia is to be understood as the result o f “the incapability
to register m eaningfully certain experiences.” U n doin g repression and am nesia would
therefore always involve an effort of interpretation in the sense o f a search for the
“real m eaning” o f past events. A ccordin g to psychoanalytic theory, the therapist is the
person who must present possible interpretative schem as and fulfill the role of revealer
o f truth. Th us, the con cept of repression still allows for “revelation o f truth.” I am
grateful to Dr. Jam es T h om asson for h aving brought this ob jection to my attention,
and for the reference to Kierkegaard (see note 7).

5. A s my colleague R. Curtis Bristol, M D pointed out to me, the stage directions

at the beginning o f the play alm ost pictorially support this interpretation. T h e stage
directions dem and that “O edipus com es forward, majestic but for a telltale limp”
(em phasis m ine). How can the audience not expect the story of this telltale limp?

6 . Rem em ber the stage instructions at the beginning o f the play: “Oedipus
com es forward, m ajestic but for a telltale limp, and slowly views the condition of his peo-
pie” (em phasis m ine).

7. T here is a succinct way to form ulate this difference w ithin a L acan ian fram e­
work. In order to help som eone else— for exam ple, a patient in analysis— it is n ec­
essary to allow imaginary projection prior to introducing a discordant elem ent. Fur­
thermore, the discordant remark must be introduced in such a way as not to
com pletely break the imaginary relationship. Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd
perm itted O edipus’s imaginary identification. Teiresias makes such identification
impossible (Sch em a L in L acan 1977). A non-L acan ian analyst, D orpat, h as described
two o f his interventions w hich illustrate the difference. H is first intervention was a
failure. T h e patien t threatened to stop psychotherapy in order to go to an alcohol
counselor. Dorpat, just as Teiresias, lectured his dialogue partner. H e lectured his
patien t “about the differences betw een psychoanalytic psychotherapy and alcoholism
counseling” (D orpat 1985, 232). D orpat confessed that he acted out. A n d indeed, in
the n ext session the patien t said: “you really did m anipulate me last time by the way
you talked to me about psychotherapy” (Ibid.). W ith anoth er patient, D orpat inter­
vened successfully. T h e patient presented herself as helpless and asked D orpat what
she should do about her infant son: Sh ould she give up work in order to stay at hom e
with her infant or not? D orpat answered: “You are turning over to me your own abil­
ities for thinking and deciding” (Ibid. 233). T h e patient answered that, as a child, she
felt that she only received attention w hen she presented a problem . H er father then
eagerly gave her advice. A fter the intervention,’’T h e patien t was relieved and grati­
152 N O T E S T O C H A P T E R SIX

fied that she could use her own mind in her relations with [Dorpat] and that she did
not have to turn over the ‘good’ parts o f herself to [Dorpat] (Ibid. 233). D orpat here
did n ot position him self as opposed to the patient. Rather, he provided the patient
w ith words by w hich the patien t could redescribe to herself her own situation. Sh e
thus was given the m eans to recreate herself.
Sim ilar ideas are found in the psychological literature when addressing the ques­
tion o f how to help people in denial. T h e idea that people in denial must first be allowed
imaginary identification with the interlocutor is formulated by several authors. Indeed,
we find arguments to the effect that the interlocutor should avoid adopting an attitude
opposite to that of the patient (de Hennezel 1989)— as Teiresias did; or that approaches
other than direct confrontation are needed (Forchuk & W estwell); or that a degree of
nurturance is required that creates a safe and accepting environm ent in the therapeutic
relationship (Laflen & Sturm ); or that acceptance in group therapy decreases denial
because it allows identification (Rugel & Barry); or that avoidance of rejection and
assurance o f continued support and help improves the process of overcom ing denial
(M arshall); or that em pathic understanding and a noncondem natory attitude are cru­
cial for m oving from denial to acknowledgment o f the denied facts (G eller et al.).
Finally, in reviewing three m ethods for overcom ing denial, Kearney stresses that in each
method a positive clim ate has to be created. Thus, he writes that, when using the
method of “Bursting the Bubble,” “Participants must be willing and able to state their
affection for the abuser” (Kearney 1996, 119); when using the method of “Peeling the
D enial O n ion ,” “a relationship with the user behind the wall of denial” (Ibid.) needs to
be established which can become “a force of growth from w ithin” (Ibid.). Kearney calls
his third m ethod for overcom ing denial E N U F: “Empathizing N on-judgm entally and
Unconditionally, and Focusing on feelings” (Ibid. 155).
Current authors are also aware that the interlocutor must not collude with
denials and that the introduction o f a discordant note is unavoidable. Identification
and sympathy should therefore, not be the last step in o n e ’s relationship w ith deniers.
Som e argue that the underlying problem should be nam ed (Berenson & Sch rier);
another author argues that the severity of the underlying problem should not be m in­
imized; rather, in the case of patients denying death, the caregivers should acknow l­
edge the patien t’s situation and the tragic violence of death (de Hennezel 1989). In
the three m ethods surveyed to deal w ith denial, Kearney argues that the patient
should be confronted either forcefully (bursting the bubble), step by step (peeling the
onion ), or should be refused the false com fort of merger (Kearney 1996, 1 5 2 -5 3 ). O ne
could argue that Jocasta, the messenger, and the shepherd— by their reluctance to
speak— indirectly acknow ledged the difficulty that O edipus found him self in.
8 . T h e thesis that truth can only be com m unicated indirectly can also be found
in S 0 ren Kierkegaard (1941), particularly in the section “T h eses Possibly or A ctually
A ttributable to Lessing,” 6 7-113.
9. In L acan ian term inology one can say that the positions of Jo casta, the m es­
senger, and the shepherd avoid imaginary identification w ith the discourse partner
(L acan 1977, 3 3 2 -3 3 ). A voidance o f im aginary identification with o n e ’s discourse
partner is necessary in order to be helpful to th at partner.
10. T h e therapist is not supposed to talk to the relatives o f the patient to con­
firm the truth of the inform ation provided by the patient.
 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER SEV EN 153

11. T h e patien t is not supposed to m ake decisions that would fundam entally alter
his/her life.
12. T h e psychoan alyst’s task is to help a p atien t find the truth about him self.
In the dram a o f Oedipus, however, we learn that Jo c asta is more helpful than Teire-
sias in bringing about O edipu s’s true self-know ledge. Sh e is m ore helpful even
though she was deceitful. D oes this suggest th at the psychoanalyst, in order to per­
form h is task, m ust be deceitful? T h e answ er seem s to be affirm ative; even the tec h ­
n ical rules o f the therapeutic discourse suggest this answer. T h e psychoanalyst is for­
bidden to gather in form ation about the real-life situation of the patien t. O n e could
argue that such a rule forces the psychoanalyst in to the p osition o f h avin g to do as
if the accou n t given by the patien t ab out his life is true. But actin g as if is the
essence o f deceitfulness.
A more constructive interpretation of the psychoanalyst’s role is that the refusal
to search for inform ation beyond the discourse of the patient is the psychoanalyst’s
expression that he trusts the word o f the patient as a tool towards discovery o f the
truth. Looking for evidence beyond the discourse would indicate that the therapist
does not believe. T h e dram a of O edipus dem onstrates that O edipus h im self must dis­
cover the truth about him self. His word must bring it about.
T h is interpretation o f the role o f the psychoanalyst finds confirm ation in another
rule of the therapeutic situation: that is, the psychoanalyst should not confirm the
false beliefs of the patient. Instead, he should respond to the patien t’s story about h im ­
self by silence or by questions for further interpretation.
T h us we are in the presence of a crucial elem ent in the discovery o f truth about
oneself: it is that one’s own word must be respected as being capable o f finding the
truth about oneself. Sop h ocles gets this idea across by putting into opposition the atti­
tudes of Teiresias and Jo casta towards O edipus’s own discourse. In telling the truth,
Teiresias shows disrespect for O edipus’s own search. Jo c asta’s m ethod of encouraging
O edipus to hold to false beliefs is a m ethod w hich repects the capability o f O edipus to
discover the truth about him self. In hindsight— th at is, by means o f a com parison with
psychoanalysis— one can argue that it is not Jo casta’s deceitfulness, but her respect for
the power o f O edipus’s own discourse, that helps O edipus discover the truth about
himself.

C H A P T E R S E V E N . D E N IA L , M E T A P H O R ,
T H E S Y M B O L IC , A N D FR E E D O M :
T H E O N T O L O G IC A L D IM E N S IO N S O F D E N IA L

1. In this chapter I will start by summarizing the analyses m ade in chapter 1 of

this book and then proceed with a m uch more detailed analysis o f the steps and
processes involved in overcom ing a denial. I will pay close attention to the steps that
lead to a constructive outcom e, com pared with the tragic outcom e portrayed in the
case of O edipus.

2. Freud, S .E ., 236: “ In the course of analytic work we often produce a further,

very im portant and som ew hat strange variant o f this situation. We succeed in co n ­
quering the negation as well, and in bringing about a full intellectual acceptan ce of
the repressed; but the repressive process itself is not yet removed by this" (em phasis m ine).
154 N O T E S T O C H A PT ER SEV EN

3. Freud, S .E ., X IX , 2 3 5 -3 6 : “T h us the con ten t of a repressed image or idea can

make its way into consciousness, on condition that it is negated. N egation is a way of
taking cognizance o f what is repressed; indeed it is already a lifting o f the repression,
though not, o f course, an acceptan ce of w hat is repressed.”
4. In footnote 9 of chapter 1 o f this book I explain how the just m entioned
observation can be used to show my agreem ent and my disagreem ent with A .O .
R orty’s interpretation of self-deception. A lth ough con cepts o f self-deception and
denial are not identical they are obviously related.
5. It is my conten tion that young M oore could understand the significance of
his not participating in R O T C in college only after he h ad intellectually unm asked
the denial of the im portance o f losing his father.
6 . Rorty proposes a sim ilar thesis when she writes: “W e certainly think we can
recognize self-deception in others, and we strongly suspect it in ourselves, even retro­
spectively attributing it to our past selves” (Rorty 22, em phasis m ine).

7. C ontrary to Rorty, I see self-deception as the result o f a person h avin g at least

two layers of intentionality and these layers follow ing each a different logic in their
interpretation of experience. Rorty proposes a further con dition for self-deception
w hen she writes: “N o t everyone has the special talents and capacities for self-decep­
tion. It is a disease only the presum ptively strong minded can suffer” (Rorty 25). Rorty
interprets strong-m indedness as the capability to superimpose on a m ultilayered in ten ­
tionality the will to rational unity. I want to argue that the will to rational unity leads
to a denial, not a self-deception. Furthermore, M oore’s case, as I analyzed it, dem on­
strates that the ability to form ulate a denial as opposed to simply living in self-decep­
tion should n ot be called strong-m indedness. Rather, it is the result o f the help of
another, who in this case spoke the proper words so that M oore could accept the pain
that had necessitated the self-deception. By relating the con cept of denial to that of
self-deception, I am forced to disagree twice w ith Rorty’s understanding o f self-decep­
tion. To put it in a different way: for me it seems that many people can and do deceive
them selves; fewer are able to articulate the deception in the form of a denial; fewer
still are able to intellectually undo such denials and com e to understand that they
denied som ething and were thus subject to self-deception; fewer still are able to do the
psychic work dem anded to face up to the im plications of the discovery o f their denial
or self-deception.
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 Author Index

A delson , E., 82, 157 Blair, J. F., 159

A en eas, 111 Blehar, M. C ., 67
A gassi, J., 141, 155 Bleuler, E., 133
A insw orth, M ., 67, 145 Bonke, B., 160
A llison , D. B., 163 Bosch, J., 75
A lvin g, 38, 39, 132 Bowlby, J., 64, 67, 78, 145, 156
A m adeo, M ., 155 Boyajian, L. Z., 136, 156
A m brose, 62 Brandt, R., 144
A ngehrn, E., 142, 155 Brann, E., 150, 156
A n tes, G ., 159 Brenitz, S., 131, 156
A ristotle, 166
Brossard, M. D., 146, 156
A th an assiou, C ., 128, 155
Burnes, D .W ., 128, 155
A tkins, E. L „ 136, 155
Aurelius, M ., 43
C astillo, E., 164
Avineri, S., 142, 155
C ella, D. F. 156
Baider, L., 136, 155 Chalybäus, H . M ., 143
Barry, D., 131, 152, 163 Cham ley, P., 142, 156
Basch, M. F., 128 C h arcot, J. M ., 11
Baugher, L., ix Chartres, 110
Baum, A . S ., 128, 155 C h auvin , R., 75, 156
Beaucham p, T., 144 Cherniakow , A ., 145
Beilin, R ., 136, 155 C h ih ara, S., 162
Beitzinger, J., 166 C h oi, S., 159, 156
Benm akhlouf, A ., 127, 129, 155 C h opin , F., 52
Benoist, J., 127, 129, 155 C lose, M. M ., 156
Bentham , J., 144 C octeau, J., 165
Bepko, C ., 136, 160 C olem an, P., 161
Berenson, D., 152 Connor, S. R., 136, 156
Berm an, E., 158 C orin th, 93, 95, 99
Berns, J., 136, 155 Cortese, A . J., 128, 156
B erth old'B on d, D., 137 C reon , 135
Black, D „ 141, 160, 166 C ullen , B „ 142, 156

167
168 A U T H O R INDEX

D albert, C ., 163 5 3 ,5 6 ,5 8 , 5 9 ,6 0 , 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 3 , 7 8 ,8 6 ,
Daly, ]., 165 89, 98, 102, 103, 113, 122, 123, 124,
D avid-M énard, M ., 127, 128, 156 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133,
D avidson, G . P., 136, 159 135, 136, 137, 140, 141, 149, 150,
D avidson, S., 145, 156 153, 154, 157, 158, 159, 161, 163,
de C h ardin , T h ., 110, 117 165
de H ennezel, M ., 131, 136, 150, 152, Freud, A ., 84, 133
156 Friedland, R.P., 165
de Saussure, F., 74, 156 Fukunishi, I., 157
De W aelhens, A ., 33, 108, 134, 157
D écarie, T. G ., 146, 156 Gabbay, D „ 128, 157
Defares, P., 156 G eller, M ., 131, 152, 158
Delphi, 92 Gerzi, S., 136, 158
D enis, H ., 129, 142, 156 G eurts, B., 128, 158
D eutsch, H ., 128 G ew irth, A ., 62
D evlin, M ., 158 G ôd el, K., 141
D iam anti, ]., 156 Goldberg, R .J ., 131, 166
Dorpat, T. L., 128, 129, 130, 131, 135, G oodw in, J., 165
151, 152, 157 G ou let, ]., 146, 156
Douglass, F., 138, 139, 140, 157 G ranrose, J. T., 144, 157
D ubouchet, P., 56, 157 G reen, A ., 137, 158
G reen, C . M ., 136, 158
Edelstein, E., 136, 154, 156, 157, 160, Greenberg, J. R ., 147, 158
164, 165, 166 Greenw ald, A . G ., 135, 158
Elijah, 117 Gregory, W., 155
Emde, R., 62, 160 G rene, D., 137, 150, 158, 164
Erikson, E., 78 Grigorian, H. M ., 136, 156
Evans, D., 134, 157 Grim es, J. P., 155
Ezekiel, 117 G rubin, D., 131, 136, 160
G uenther, F., 157
Falkenberg, G ., 149, 157 Gussaroff, E., 128, 158
Faure, H., 165
Fenichel, O ., 128 H ale, N . G ., 150, 158
Fichte, J., 142, 158 H alle, M ., 74, 159
Finger, S., 136, 157 H arada, T., 142, 158
Flynn, T., 158 H ardim on, M. D., 142, 158
Forchuk, C ., 152, 157 H arm on, R ., 62, 160
Forrester, J., 157, 159, 161 H attori, M ., 157
Fraiberg, S., 68 , 82, 157 Heaney, S., 110, 117
Frankena, W., 144, 157 H egel, G ., i, iii, vii, ix, 2, 3, 18, 19, 22,
Freedm an, D. G ., 68 3 7 , 3 8 , 4 0 , 4 1 , 4 2 , 4 3 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 47,
Frege, G ., 129, 155 4 8 ,4 9 , 5 0 ,5 1 ,5 2 , 5 3 ,5 4 ,5 5 , 5 6 ,5 7 ,
Freitas, N . K., 136, 157 5 9 ,6 2 , 74, 7 5 ,8 9 , 98, 123, 124, 131,
Freud, S., i, iii, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8 , 9, 10, 133, 134, 136, 137, 139, 140, 141,
11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 142, 143, 144, 145, 148, 150, 155,
2 1 ,2 2 , 2 5 ,2 6 , 27, 28, 29, 3 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 , 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162,
33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 43, 45, 46, 163, 164, 165, 166
 A U T H O R INDEX 169

H ein, K. K., 128, 142, 159 Kraus, J. B., 142, 160

Heiser, C ., 165 Krestan, J., 136, 160
H enrich, D., 142, 159 Kristeva, J., 139, 165
H erm an, M. V., 161 Kurrik, M. J., 150, 160
H oke, S. L., 131, 136, 159
Horn, L. R., 149, 159 Labarrière, R, 142, 160
H orstm ann, R ., 142, 159 L A b b a te , A ., 163
Hummer, R, 128, 148, 159 Lacan, J., i, iii, ix, 18, 19, 22, 64, 65, 72,
Husserl, E., 129 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 85, 86 , 87,
Hyppolite, J., 127, 131, 159, 161 88 , 108, 127, 132, 133, 136, 137,
142, 145, 147, 151, 152, 157, 159,
Ibsen, H ., 37, 38, 39, 132, 159 160, 161, 162, 163, 165
Ignatius, 108, 117, 118 Lacoue-Labarthe, R, 161
Ihde, D., 165 Laflen, B., 131, 152, 161
Inoue, S., 162 Laius, 93, 94, 95
Iokaste, 91, 92, 99, 131, 150, 152 Lakoff, G ., 161
Irigaray, L., 165 Laplanche, J., 32, 99, 127, 134, 151, 161
Lattim ore, R., 137, 150, 158, 164
Jackson, C ., 131, 136, 159 Lazarus, 141
Jacobson , E., 10, 159 Leclaire, S., 134, 161
Jakobson , R ., 74, 159 Léonard, A ., 55, 144, 161
Jam es, W., 151 Leve, N ., 136, 164
Jarczyk, G ., 142, 160 Levenson, J. L., 136, 161
Jelicic, M ., 136, 160 Levine, E .G ., 136, 162
Jerm ann, C ., 142, 160 Levine, J., 131, 161
Jocasta, Jokasta, 94, 96, 97, 99, 124, Lévi-Strauss, C ., 74, 161
151, 152, 153 Lewin, B. D., 128
Johnson, M ., 161 Lewis, M ., 67
Jung, C ., 117, 118 Liebeskind, A . S., 136, 161
Liebm an, J., 155
K a g a n J ., 68 , 79, 80, 81, 82, 160 Liftik, J „ 136, 155
Kainz, H . R, 142, 160 Litowitz, B. E., 129, 149, 161
K aliski, J., 158 Lowrie, W., 160
K ant, I., 52, 150, 166 Lubinsky, M. S., 131, 161
Kay, R., 161 Lucas, H ., 142, 161
Kearney, R.J., 131, 136, 150, 152, 160 Lukács, G ., 142, 162
Kennedy, H ., 131, 136, 160
Kernberg, O . F., 78, 160, 163 M ahler, M ., 78
Kerns, R ., 161 Maker, W., 142, 162
Kerrigan, W., 165 M annoni, M ., 78, 162
Kierkegaard, S., 151, 152, 160 M anohar, S. V., 136, 158
Klein, H ., 136, 145, 160 M arshall, W., 131, 136, 152, 162
K lein, M ., 78, 133, 160 M arx, K., 40, 142, 155, 160, 162
K nox, T., 158, 159 M atthew s, L., 75, 162
K ogan, I., 136, 145, 160 M cLaughlin, B. R, 127, 162, 163
K ojève, A ., 74, 160 M cM anus, R., 166
Konner, M ., 62, 63, 64, 67, 68 , 145, 160 Merleau-Ponty, M ., 18
170 A U T H O R INDEX

M ichelle, 109, 110, 112, 117 Price, N ., 139

M iéville, D., 129, 162 Pruneti, C ., 136, 163
M ilden, R ., 136, 162 Putnam , J. J., 150
Millar, K., 160
Miller, L .] ., 136, 158, 159, 161, 162
Ratzan, S. C ., 159
M ills, J., ix, 165
Reyburn, H . A ., 142, 163
M itchell, S. A ., 147, 158
R icciuti, Fl. N ., 67
M oe, M ., 164
R ichardson, H ., 144, 145, 163
M oeschler, ]., 162
R ichardson, W. J., 147, 150, 162, 163
M ontada, L., 163
Ricoeur, P., 127
M onteferrante, J., 161
R iedel, M ., 142, 163
M oore, A ., 4, 5, 20, 21, 22, 1 0 1 ,1 0 2 ,
Roberts, M. S ., 163
103, 104, 105, 106,107, 108,109,
Roher, C ., 157
110, 111, 112, 113,114, 115,116,
Rorty, A . O ., 127, 131, 132, 134, 154,
117, 118, 119, 120,121, 122,125,
162, 163
131, 132, 134, 154,162
R osenthal, M ., 162
M oravsick, J 157
R oth, K., 140, 142, 163
M orita, T., 136, 162
R oth, M. S ., 140, 163
Moyer, A ., 136, 162
Rudy, T., 161
M uhn, E., ix Rugel, R. P., 131, 152, 163
M u ller,]. P., 136, 147, 150, 158, 162
M yerson, G ., 129, 162
Myslobodsky, M. S., 155, 158 Saip an , 110, 115, 116, 117, 120
Sartre, J. P., 79
N ajav its, L., 136, 156 Sass, L., 136, 163
N ancy, J. L., 161 Sch elling, F., 142
N athan son , D. L., 155, 156, 157, 160, Sch m itt, M ., 128, 163
164, 165, 166 Schreber, D. P., 28, 29, 129, 163
N ichols, J., 160 Schrier, E. W., 152
N ietzsche, F., 40 Schweiger, J., 166
N isbet, N ., 159 Sechehaye, A ., 156
N um atas, Y., 157 Seeberger, S., 142, 164
Sefarbi, R., 164
O liveira, P. de, 163 Segal, H ., 133, 134, 164
Opatow, B., 136, 137, 142, 162 Sevush, S., 136, 164
O rnstein, P., 78, 163 Shaffran, R ., 156
Orpheus, 165 Sh an an , J., 141, 164
O 'Su llivan , P., 166 Siem sen, A ., 164
Sm aldino, A ., 161
Peirce, C ., 136 Sm ith, D., 162
Pelczynski, Z., 142, 163 Sm ith, S. B „ 142, 164
Peperzak, A ., 142, 163 Solom on , Z., 136, 146, 164
Pettigrew, D., 161 Sophocles., 158, 164
Pöggeler, O ., 142, 161 Souder, E., 166
Polybus, 92, 95 Soulez, A ., 127, 129, 164
Pontalis, J. B., 127, 151, 161 Spitz, R. A ., i, iii, ix, 3, 4, 19, 20, 22,
 A U T H O R INDEX

6 1 ,6 2 ,6 3 ,6 4 , 6 5 ,6 6 , 67, 69, 7 0 ,7 1 , V itousek, K. B., 136, 165

72, 74, 7 6 ,7 7 , 78, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 2 , 83, Vogt, R., 157
84, 8 5 ,8 7 ,8 8 , 124, 127, 133, 145,
146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 164, 165 Wagner, E. E., 165
Steinberger, P. J., 142, 164 W allace, W., 158
Stenstrom , A . B., 149, 164 W angh, M ., 128, 145, 165
Steptoe, A ., 163 Waszek, N ., 142, 165
Stevenson , H .C ., 136, 164 W einstein, E .A ., 136, 165
Stew art, J. R., 136, 164 W eisman, A .D ., 130, 136, 165
Strelzer, J., 136, 164 Weiss, A . S., 163
Sturm , W. R., 131, 152, 161 W estphal, K., 166
Suderm ann, H ., 29 W estphal, M ., 142, 166
Sullivan , H. S., 78, 166 W estwell, J., 152, 157
Sw enson, D. F., 160 W hitebook, J., 142, 166
Sykes, C ., 159 W iebe, D., 141, 166
Szekely, L., 70 Wimmer, H ., 159
W inegardner, J., 162
Tennes, K. H ., 67 W infield, R. D., 142, 166
Th ebes, 94, 95 W ing, D. M ., 136, 166
Thom as-Peter, B. A ., 131, 159 W inn, 131, M. E „ 136, 159, 166
T h om asson , J., 151 W isem an, E. ]., 136, 166
Tottie, G ., 149, 164 W ittgenstein, L., 129, 136, 163, 164
Tsakiridou, C ., 165 Wolf, K. M ., 62
W ood, A ., 142, 159, 166
Van Buren, J., 139, 165 W ool, M. S., 131, 136, 166
Van der Hart, O ., 136, 165 Wurmser, L., 128, 131, 166
Van G erven , M ., 165
Ver Eecke, W., i, iii, ix, 53, 58, 59, 65, Yanagida, E., 164
74, 75, 76, 86 , 127, 130, 131, 132, Young, L. D., 166
136, 146, 149, 150, 157, 165
V idal-N aquet, P., 136, 165 Zaner, R. M ., 165
 Subject Index

abandon, 43, 51, 135 act, 8 , 16, 18, 19, 20, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34,
absence, 33, 63, 69, 78, 82, 86 , 106, 3 5 ,3 6 , 46, 48, 5 0 ,5 1 ,5 2 , 53, 5 7 ,5 8 ,
111, 116, 129, 145, 146 59, 64, 65, 73, 75, 83, 85, 86 , 88 , 92,
absent, 62, 69, 80, 103, 118 96, 106, 122, 123, 128, 129, 130,
absolute, 98, 136, 143 133, 144, 148, 151, 153
abuser, 152 action, xi, 17, 32, 45, 49, 52, 53, 56, 57,
acceded, 87 58, 59, 60, 72, 83, 84, 97, 107, 109,
accept, xi, 2, 3, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 110, 112, 114, 115, 117, 120, 128,
1 7 ,2 1 ,3 3 ,4 0 , 4 2 ,4 3 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,4 6 , 49, 138, 147, 149, 150
5 0 , 5 1 ,5 2 , 5 3 ,5 4 , 5 5 ,5 8 , 59, 6 3 ,6 6 , activate, 80, 82
69, 7 3 ,7 8 , 8 6 ,9 1 ,9 2 , 9 3 ,9 6 , 9 7 ,9 9 , active, 16, 40, 65, 75, 79, 80, 82, 91, 95,
102, 103, 105, 108, 110, 117, 121, 96, 101, 135
122, 125, 131, 133, 134, 136, 137, activity, 8 , 9, 10, 15, 33, 40, 42, 45, 61,
142, 149, 150, 152, 154 69, 75, 76, 83, 88 , 110, 115, 130,
acceptance, xi, 2, 13, 14, 43, 51, 59, 86 , 136, 140, 148
92, 94, 131, 140, 152, 153, 154 actors, 123
accom plish, 35, 54, 85 acts, 4, 7 ,8 , 20, 2 2 , 3 3 ,4 1 , 4 6 ,5 2 , 70,
accord, 108, 121 122, 129, 130, 132
accusation, 38, 94, 95, 150 actualize, 41
accuse, 93, 94, 95, 122 adapted, ix
achieve, 2, 14, 30, 35, 50, 51, 59, 68 , addiction, 136
69, 77, 79, 85, 88 , 132, 147 address, 3, 9, 15, 18, 22, 35, 36, 40, 57,
achievem ent, 4, 27, 34, 53, 56, 69, 82, 7 3 ,8 1 ,8 6 , 96, 121, 122, 131, 140,
84, 8 5 ,8 8 , 101, 147 152
acknowledge, 2, 5, 25, 27, 46, 53, 56, 57, adjust, 19, 114
58, 59, 63, 66 , 77, 102, 105, 108, 109, admire, 27, 107, 117, 119
120, 121, 124, 128, 133, 140, 152 adm ission, 9, 27
acknow ledgm ent, 14, 53, 105, 117, 131, adm it, 15, 27, 28
152 adm onish, 110
acquire, 10, 18, 19, 20, 54, 84, 124, 134 adored, 27
acquisition, 3, 16, 18, 19, 61, 64, 82, 84, advice, advise, 26, 63, 117, 151
85, 88 , 124, 128, 132, 148, 149 affect, 66 , 69, 70, 77, 128, 131, 146

173
174 SU B JE C T INDEX

affected, 144 5 7 ,5 9 , 70, 7 2 , 7 7 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,9 2 , 97,

affection, 85, 104, 152 102, 104, 108, 120, 121, 134, 136,
affective, 14, 17, 18, 83, 84, 104, 108, 1 3 7 ,1 4 4 ,1 4 5 ,1 5 1 ,1 5 3 , 160
131, 147 analyst, 99, 151
affectivity, 16 analytic, 99, 127, 140, 153
affirm, 2, 4, 16, 17, 40, 42, 55, 58, 59, analyze, 2, 4, 7, 8 , 12, 16, 18, 19, 26, 40,
85, 86 , 93, 99, 124, 127, 128, 129 4 3 , 4 8 ,5 1 , 7 2 ,7 6 , 78, 101, 124, 127,
affirm ation, 16, 18, 32, 58, 86 , 120, 124, 1 3 1 ,1 3 4 , 1 3 5 ,1 3 6 ,1 3 9 , 149, 154
149 anger, 26, 27, 83
affirm ative, xi, 17, 149, 153 angry, 13, 38, 96, 140
affliction, 92, 96 annihilation, 97
afraid, 39 anorexia, 148
agency, 2, 123 anthropology, 2, 18, 22, 31, 32, 34, 37,
aggression, 15, 19, 20, 22, 85, 86 , 132, 38, 62, 72, 123, 131, 141
133, 134 an ticipation, 12
aggressive, 18, 20, 22, 84, 85, 87, 88 , 95, antithesis, 15, 48, 49, 52, 54, 142
9 7 ,9 8 , 132, 147 anxiety, 3, 4, 33, 61, 62, 63, 64, 67, 68 ,
aggressiveness, 96 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 79, 80, 81, 82, 83,
aggressivity, 74, 83, 85, 136 8 7 ,8 8 , 95, 124, 128, 145, 146, 147
aggressor, 20, 84, 85 anxious, 140
agree, 29, 6 4 ,6 9 , 87, 131, 135 appeal, 2 , 62
agreeable, 12 appear, xi, 16, 52, 61, 62, 63, 71, 79, 82,
agreem ent, 138, 154 92, 102, 105, 123, 124, 127, 136
alcohol, alcoholic, alcoholism , 131, 136, appearance, 3, 20, 28, 73, 79
151 appreciate, 30, 102
A lexithym ia, 157 apprehend, 67, 72, 79, 80, 140
alien, 15, 19, 31 appropriate, 4, 25, 58, 110, 122, 131,
alien ate, 4, 50, 74, 78, 79, 8 8 , 118, 147, 148
119 appropriated, 4, 27, 73, 74, 78, 79, 85,
alienation, 73, 76, 118, 119, 137 88 , 9 8 ,1 4 6 , 148
alike, 118 appropriation, 73, 78, 79, 87, 88 , 148
allow, 3, 4, 19, 35, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, arbitrary, 3, 47, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57,
4 8 , 5 1 ,5 2 , 5 4 ,5 5 , 59, 64, 78, 7 9 ,8 2 , 58, 59, 98, 124
86 , 87, 89, 97, 99, 102, 105, 107, asham ed, 72
108, 111, 113, 1 1 7 ,1 1 9 ,1 2 1 ,1 2 2 , assertion, 29, 95, 128
1 2 4 ,1 2 7 , 134, 135, 141, 147, 148, asserts, 96
151, 152 astonish, 11, 139
all-powerfulness, 133 asylum, 130
alone, 8 , 36, 41, 55, 88 , 98, 130, 149 attach, 12, 20, 44, 45, 63, 64
Alzheimer, 110, 136, 164, 165 attachm ent, 4, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68 , 69,
am biguous, 13, 26 7 5 ,1 0 2 , 103, 1 0 7 ,1 4 5 , 147
am bivalence, 26, 105, 113, 136 attack, 7 ,1 0 ,1 1 , 1 2 ,8 4 , 9 4 ,1 1 5
am nesia, 10, 96, 151 attention, 7, 25, 34, 35, 43, 53, 59, 80,
anal-sadistic, 18 98, 116, 117, 127, 129, 130, 132,
analysand, 140 151, 153
analysis, 2, 7, 8 , 12, 13, 18, 22, 26, 28, attentive, 80, 110
3 3 ,3 5 ,3 7 ,4 0 ,4 1 ,4 3 ,4 5 ,4 7 ,4 8 ,5 1 , attract, 33, 51
 S U B JE C T INDEX 175

attributable, 63 C acilie, 11, 130

attribute, 22, 31, 55, 71, 116, 134, 145, capability, 11, 31, 51, 52, 56, 82, 99,
147, 154 124, 146, 148, 153, 154
attributive, 14, 15, 16, 31 capacity, 31, 82, 84, 117, 145, 154
aufheben, 131 care, 4, 7, 2 2 , 4 1 ,7 7 , 8 3 ,9 2 , 1 1 4 ,1 1 7 ,
authentic, 22 120, 124, 134, 149, 152
autonom ous, 101 , 120 , 121 caretaker, 64, 68
autonomy, 4, 81, 85, 86 , 120, 124, 149 castration, 10, 75
avarice, 133 Cath olicism , 118
avenge, 92, 96 censorship, 29
avoid, 2, 21, 22, 37, 40, 45, 55, 57, 60, censured, 139
7 4 ,9 1 ,9 6 , 99, 102, 1 0 6 ,1 1 9 , 141, character, 39, 73, 79, 105, 112, 113,
150, 152 143, 149
avoidable, 115 child, 3, 4, 14, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 33,
avoidance, 10, 107, 152 38, 39, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66 , 67, 68 ,
avowal, 131 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78,
aware, 11, 12, 13, 27, 40, 55, 72, 73, 79, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,8 4 , 8 5 ,8 6 , 8 7 ,8 8 ,
94, 99, 106, 109, 110, 122, 125, 133, 89, 93, 103, 104, 111, 115, 122, 124,
138, 142, 143, 152 128, 132, 133, 134, 136, 144, 145,
awareness, 26, 33, 97, 104, 137 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151
childhood, 21, 101, 103, 107, 113
baby, 65, 66 , 71, 72, 76, 77, 79 childish, 4
barriers, 111 children, 3, 26, 27, 38, 48, 62, 65, 67,
becom e, xi, 4, 12, 21, 22, 27, 28, 29, 31, 68 , 69, 74, 7 7 ,8 0 ,8 1 , 8 2 ,9 3 , 1 2 8 ,
3 2 ,3 3 ,3 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 ,4 2 , 4 3 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,4 9 , 135, 136, 144, 146, 148, 149, 150,
5 0 ,5 1 ,5 3 , 54, 5 5 ,5 9 , 6 5 ,6 7 ,6 8 , 69, 157
70, 72, 73, 75, 77, 7 8 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,8 4 , 85, chim panzee, 76
91, 94, 97, 99, 104, 105, 106, 107, Christ, 108, 115, 116
1 0 8 ,1 0 9 , 112, 114, 1 1 6 ,1 1 7 , 118, C hristian, 55, 116, 120
119, 120, 121, 123, 129, 131, 132, Christianity, 55, 118
134, 138, 139, 140, 141, 1 4 3 ,1 4 4 , circum cision, 75
152 cleavage, 20 , 150
blind, 68 , 73, 82, 146, 148, 157 client, 150
boast, 7, 10, 11, 12, 37, 129, 130, 139 clinical, 18
body, 2, 4, 40, 51, 65, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, cognition, 131
78, 79, 82, 85, 87, 88 , 144, 146, 147, cognitive, 81, 129, 130, 131, 135
148, 149, 150 cognizance, 9, 12, 13, 129, 154
body-disintegration, 76 com m and, 83, 86 , 139, 140
bond, 63, 67, 69, 83, 111, 145 com m ent, 8 , 16, 43, 78, 84, 87, 132
bondage, 45, 138 commentary, 127, 142, 160
bondsm an, 45 com m entators, 127
boring, 49, 82 com m it, 49, 95, 96, 106, 116, 145,
bowdlerizer, 142, 143 151
breast, 14, 15, 103 com m unicate, 82, 84, 85, 88 , 149, 152
brother, 38, 93, 94 com plain, 11, 38
brute, 138, 140 com plem ent, 32, 62, 66 , 71, 73, 77, 80,
burden, 38, 58, 113 121
176 S U B JE C T INDEX

com prom ising, 49 deaf, 146, 148

com pulsion, 2, 13, 30, 39, 124 death, 4, 5, 8 , 17, 20, 21, 29, 40, 41, 44,
confess, xi, 46, 85, 115, 135, 143, 151 51, 93, 94, 95, 101, 103, 104, 105,
confirm , 35, 62, 63, 67, 97, 99, 129, 106, 107, 109, 111, 112, 115, 116,
132, 152, 153 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 128,
confirm ation, 28, 29, 51, 61, 80, 99, 129, 130, 131, 136, 137, 138, 143,
1 3 3 ,1 3 9 , 148, 153 150, 152
conflict, xi, 2, 14, 21, 74, 105, 141 death-drive, 137
conform , 144 death-instinct, 17
conformity, 106, 148 death-w ish, 29
confront, 22, 70, 73, 97, 102, 112, 140, debt, 104, 113, 133
142, 152 deceit, 28, 3 4 ,3 6 , 122, 129, 153
confrontation, 152 deceive, 22, 121, 129, 154
consciousness, 9, 11, 12, 13, 19, 33, 34, deception, 22, 121, 122, 127, 129, 132,
3 5 ,3 6 , 4 0 , 4 1 ,4 2 , 4 4 ,4 5 , 4 6 , 4 7 ,5 7 , 135, 141, 154, 155, 158
58, 73, 79, 96, 102, 130, 135, 136, deceptively, 141
137, 142, 143, 151, 154 degeneration, 18
consciousnesses, 40, 41, 44 de-idealize, 113
consoled, 109, 111 dem and, 3, 15, 22, 32, 49, 50, 53, 57,
constitutive, 8 , 9, 130, 133 84, 8 7 ,9 6 , 97, 128, 131, 140, 141,
contraceptive, 141 1 4 4 ,1 4 9 ,1 5 0 ,1 5 1 , 154
contract, 139 denial, xi, 2, 3, 4, 7 ,8 , 9 , 1 0 ,1 1 , 1 2 , 13,
contracting, 141 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25,
contradict, 25, 93, 94, 99, 122, 149 26, 28, 29, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 43, 45,
contradiction, 7, 26, 29, 30, 136, 137, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 58, 59,
140, 141 6 0 ,9 1 ,9 2 , 9 4 ,9 6 , 101, 102, 103,
contradictory, 2, 7, 20, 21, 30, 41, 42, 104, 105, 106, 108, 116, 117, 118,
149 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127,
contrary, 13, 14, 16, 30, 43, 70, 73, 85, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134,
99, 102, 128, 129, 132, 139, 146 135, 136, 137, 141, 142, 145, 148,
contrasting, 12, 13 149, 150, 152, 153, 154
counsel, 114, 151 denier, 150, 152
counselor, 151 deny, xi, 3, 7, 9, 1 0 ,1 2 ,1 5 , 16, 26, 28,
counter-transference, 99 29, 41, 42, 47, 49, 50, 52, 56, 57, 58,
cow ardice, 138 59, 9 2 ,9 3 , 94, 95, 1 0 1 ,1 0 2 , 106,
crime, 97, 139 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129, 130,
crisis, 11 131, 136, 141, 142, 145, 149, 150,
criterion, 31 152, 154
critical, 62, 87, 147 depend, 15, 39, 42, 55, 74, 78, 93, 101,
118, 120
dad, 112 dependant, 149
danger, 10, 71, 72, 81, 83, 94, 108, 115, dependence, 20, 42, 45, 83, 131
129, 140, 145 dependent, 20, 41, 42, 147, 148
danger-situation, 71 deprivation, 78, 147
dead, 4, 20, 102, 103, 105, 107, 116, deprived, 30, 41, 113
1 2 0 , 1 2 1 , 122 desirability, 56
deadly, 74, 108, 115, 116, 118, 120 desirable, 43, 49
 SU B JE C T INDEX 177

desire, 4, 4 1 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,4 6 , 1 1 9 ,1 2 9 , 133 disengagem ent, 141

desired, 33, 128 disillusioned, 54
desires, 44, 49, 52, 74, 124, 129, 130, disinclination, 9
140, 143, 150 disintegration, 76
desiring, 2, 27, 74 disjunctive, 144, 145
despair, 2, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 123, dislocation, 75
132, 137, 140 dismember, 75, 76
destroy, 2, 4, 17, 36, 54, 98, 133, 134 dismissal, 131
destruction, 16, 17, 32, 36, 116 disorders, 136
destructive, 97 displeasure, 67, 137
destructivity, 18 disregard, 3, 8 , 11, 30, 47, 128
dialectic, 2, 37, 41, 42, 44, 51, 74, 142, disrespect, 153
144 dissatisfied, 139
dialectical, 43, 48, 51 distance, 3, 9, 50, 83, 84, 85, 99, 108,
die, 4, 2 0 ,2 1 ,6 3 , 7 7 ,9 4 , 105, 107, 108, 115, 119, 1 2 4 ,1 2 9 ,1 3 8 ,1 4 9
109, 110, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117, distancing, 21
119, 120, 122, 134, 164 distant, 95
differ, 69, 81 distinct, 99, 105, 106, 109, 134
difference, 14, 32, 43, 44, 57, 59, 64, 66 , distinction, 14, 28, 31, 91, 98, 99, 127,
68 , 69, 73, 79, 8 3 , 9 2 ,9 7 , 9 9 , 119, 128, 131, 132, 134, 142, 146, 149
128, 132, 145, 147, 151 distinctive, 68
different, xi, 2, 12, 16, 26, 27, 35, 40, distinguish, 15, 23, 61, 62, 69, 82, 102,
42, 4 4 , 4 7 , 5 1 , 5 3 , 5 4 , 5 7 , 6 1 , 6 3 , 6 5 , 121, 129, 130, 131, 134, 147, 148,
66 , 71, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 8 2 ,8 5 , 149
9 1 ,9 5 ,9 7 ,9 9 , 105, 106, 113, 115, distort, 10, 140, 148
117, 118, 124,125, 127, 129, 131, distortions, 108
132, 134, 135,138, 139, 142, 144, distress, 80, 81
146, 148, 149,150, 152, 154 disturbing, 115
differentiate, 40, 67, 69, 86 , 146 divide, 138, 141
differentiation, 49, 51, 73, 74, 88 , 143, dom inant, 120
147 dom inates, 93
disabling, 136 dom ineering, 13, 14, 56, 57
disadvantaged, 128 double, 3 3 ,5 5 ,5 9 , 76, 118, 145
disagree, 88 , 154 doubt, 2, 29, 37, 43, 44, 123, 130, 146
disappoint, 70, 72, 129, 146 doubtful, 138
disappointm ent, 41, 70, 71, 72, 79, 88 , doubting, 43
128, 129, 137, 146 drama, 48, 49, 51, 52, 91, 92, 96, 97, 98,
disapproval, 21 99, 153
disavow, 27, 131 dramatically, 95
disavowal, 10, 25, 26, 128, 129, 130 dream, xi, 7, 8 , 9, 13, 14, 30, 56, 57, 58,
disbelief, 131 75, 1 0 2 ,1 0 4 , 107, 108, 116, 118,
discordant, 151, 152 120, 127, 132, 135
discrepancy, 99 drive, 27, 78, 147
discrepant, 80, 81 drive-m odel, 78
discrim ination, 63, 67 drug, 136
disease, 19, 93, 110, 111, 133, 136, 141, duality, 17
154 duties, 39, 140
178 SU B JE C T INDEX

duty, 38, 52, 55, 97, 132, 139 experience, 4, 5, 19, 32, 40, 41, 42, 43,
dyad, 66 , 77, 85 44, 51, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 76, 78, 79,
dying, 21 , 104, 108, 118 80, 81, 83, 84, 91, 97, 102, 106, 107,
dynamically, 20 110, 111, 113, 114, 116, 118, 119,
dynam ics, 129 120, 132, 133, 134, 1 3 6 ,1 3 7 , 139,
140, 141, 143, 1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ,1 5 1 , 154
eight (m onths of age), 3, 4, 40, 61, 62, experiential, 66 , 77
63, 64, 67, 68 , 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, expiate, 96
76, 79, 80, 83, 85, 87, 88 , 124, 145, express, 2, 11, 16, 17, 19, 29, 30, 39, 46,
146, 147 5 8 , 6 7 ,8 2 ,8 4 , 86 , 103, 119, 128,
elim inate, 44, 99, 129 129, 134, 149
em bodim ent, 19, 54, 79 expression, 2, 17, 25, 27, 28, 42, 59, 64,
embody, 139 68 , 7 7 ,9 1 , 130, 136, 145, 148, 149,
emerge, 11, 12, 14, 26, 33, 51, 52, 53, 153
6 2 ,6 4 ,8 1 , 9 3 ,9 4 , 9 5 ,9 6 , 123, 124, expressive, 17, 137
148, 149 expulsion, 16, 17, 32
em ergence, 29, 40, 54, 63, 65, 78, 91, exterior, 79
96, 142 exteriority, 79, 146
em ergent, 131 exterm ination, 145
em otion, 8 , 16, 53, 63, 78, 85, 112, 123, external, 15, 16, 19, 31, 36, 40, 41, 83,
141 84, 85, 93, 147
em otional, xi, 4, 8 , 14, 16, 22, 26, 37, externalize, 50
40, 53, 58, 59, 6 0 , 6 1 ,6 3 , 6 4 , 70, 74, extrem ities, 11
7 7 ,7 8 , 84, 86 , 88 , 101, 102, 105, extricate, 83
106, 108, 109, 110, 117, 121, 124, eye, 11, 1 4 ,2 1 ,5 8 , 59, 64, 67, 7 0 ,7 2 ,
1 2 8 ,1 3 1 , 145, 147, 1 4 8 ,1 4 9 , 150 7 7 ,8 1 ,9 6 , 107
em pathic, 152 eyes-forehead, 70
encourage, 137, 138, 153
endanger, 19 face, 9, 1 0 ,1 1 ,2 2 ,3 4 , 48, 6 2 ,6 3 ,6 4 ,
endearm ent, 83 6 5 ,6 6 , 67, 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 , 7 3 ,7 4 , 7 7 ,8 1 ,
endowed, 2, 13, 30, 39, 93, 147, 148 86 , 8 7 ,1 2 0 , 123, 1 3 8 ,1 4 0 , 142, 146,
endurance, 45 1 5 0 ,1 5 4
enemy, 70, 115 faced, 13, 52, 53, 131, 142, 146
epistem ic, 149 face-saving, 9, 10
epistem ological, 3, 8 , 12, 15, 18, 22, 26, fail, 3, 18, 19, 28, 3 0 ,7 1 ,8 1 ,9 9 , 110,
3 1 ,3 2 ,3 4 , 59, 60, 123, 124 124, 138
epistemology, 31, 57 failure, 2, 27, 28, 52, 64, 123, 132, 133,
equal, 1 7 ,9 8 , 140 136, 149, 150, 151
erotic, 18, 27 fallaciously, 28
ethical, 25, 54, 55, 57, 142, 144, 150 false, xi, 2, 10, 25, 29, 92, 141, 149, 152,
evisceration, 75 153
exclusion, 51, 143 falsehood, 44, 45
existential, 14, 31, 32, 50, 79 falsely, 10, 59
expect, 2, 14, 49, 5 3 ,6 0 ,6 9 , 1 0 3 ,1 2 2 , falsify, 35, 68 , 95
128, 129, 130, 132, 138, 145, 146, falsity, xi, 11, 45, 99
148, 151 family, v, 49, 54, 109, 112, 113, 136
expectation, 44 fantasized, 21
 S U B JE C T INDEX 179

fantasy, 10, 21, 75, 104, 106, 116, 132 for-others, 72, 73, 79
fascinate, 75, 103, 104, 107, 108 fort-da, 33
fatal, 32, 54 for-the-other, 79
father, 4, 5, 8, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 29, foundation, 119, 149
38, 39, 55, 82, 86, 87, 92, 93, 95, fraud, 26
101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, free, xi, 2 , 3 , 7 , 13, 19, 30, 4 5 ,4 7 ,4 8 ,
108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, 89, 95, 103, 106,
115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 109, 117, 120, 134, 138, 141
122, 131, 134, 136, 141, 151, 154 freedom, 2, 3, 7, 13, 19, 22, 28, 30, 39,
fatherhood, 115 4 7 ,4 8 , 5 3 , 5 4 ,5 6 , 5 7 ,5 8 , 5 9 , 6 0 ,6 1 ,
fathering, 4, 104, 115, 122 89, 101, 106, 107, 108, 109, 119,
fatherless, 101, 108, 113 123, 124, 1 3 8 ,1 4 0 , 142, 144, 149,
fear, 11, 21, 40, 41, 44, 51, 53, 64, 66, 151
67, 68, 69, 70, 75, 80, 83, 95, 107, freehand, 26
115, 119, 133, 138, 139, 143, 145, freely, 47, 59
146 friend, 69, 113, 114, 117
fearful, 10 frighten, 11, 12, 92, 138, 150
fecundity, 144 frustration, 19, 20, 83, 84, 108, 137, 140
feel, 8, 11, 1 4 ,5 1 , 7 3 ,8 1 , 104, 107, 110, fulfill, 5 , 4 1 ,4 4 , 49, 5 0 ,5 2 , 5 4 ,5 5 ,7 1 ,
111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 118, 119, 93, 116, 118, 151
121, 122, 133, 134, 135, 137, 139,
143 generate, 80
feeling, 5, 11, 12, 18, 19, 2 0 ,3 1 , 71, 76, genital, 18
81, 105, 108, 109, 116, 118, 119, genocide, 136
121, 134 gift, 52, 102, 105, 113, 114, 116, 118,
Fehlleistung, 26 119, 120, 121
fem ale, 7, 8, 13, 14, 38, 75, 109 giving, 3, 9, 13, 62, 63, 93, 94, 98, 104,
fetish, 129 129, 130, 139
fictitious, 31 goal, 3, 50, 54, 59, 112, 124
fifteen (m onths o f age), 3, 4, 19, 62, 80, gods, 96
83, 84, 85, 87, 124 good, xi, 12, 15, 31, 32, 49, 54, 55, 56,
fight, 41, 138 70, 112, 114, 120, 121, 133, 134,
filial, 111 138, 141, 152
fixation, 33 grandchild, 33
fixed, 19, 25, 44, 98 grandfather, 4, 104, 105, 106, 109, 120,
flesh, 113, 138 121, 134
flight, 93 grandiosity, 4
flogging, 139 gratification, 33, 87, 88, 140
foetalization, 75 gratitude, 114, 150
forbidden, 153 greedily, 138
forclusion, 86 grim, 138
foreclosure, 86 grow, 4, 110, 120, 123
forego, 87 grownup, 103
forever, 138 growth, 22, 68, 81, 120, 141, 152
forget, 28, 45, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, guilt, 2 2 ,2 9 , 8 5 ,9 6 ,9 7 , 121, 122, 128,
138, 139 134, 135
forgiving, 150 guilty, 115, 139
180 S U B JE C T INDEX

hallucinating, 136 illusion, 25, 26, 111, 133

h allucination, 137, 142 illusionary, 3, 32, 58, 106, 122, 141
hallucinatory, 76 image, 9, 12, 15, 21, 41, 65, 71, 75, 76,
handicapped, 128 78, 79, 82, 88, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, 98,
hanged, 133 99, 104, 119, 145, 147, 148, 154
happiness, 3, 12, 51, 53, 54, 56, 59, 124, im aginable, 9, 144
144 imaginarily, 31, 79
happy, 7 1 ,8 2 , 99, 1 1 1 ,1 5 0 imaginary, 12, 79, 82, 132, 136, 151, 152
harm ful, 55 im agination, 75, 107, 108, 109, 118, 133
heal, 21, 22, 108, 110, 111, 113, 116, imaginatively, 32
118, 119, 120, 121, 122 im agine, 14, 15, 42, 48, 72, 73, 111,
helpee, 150 114, 121, 138
H odgkin, 136, 156 im ago, 76
hom elessness, 128 im itate, 20, 84, 104, 106
hope, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 89, 97, im itation, 21
1 1 6 ,1 1 8 , 120, 140 ,1 4 1 immorality, 134
hopeless, 43, 138 im potence, 26, 34, 134
hospital, 77 incapability, 151
hospitalism , 66, 74, 77, 83, 85, 150 incapacity, 11
hubris, 92 incestuous, 27, 131, 136
hum anization, 84 incom petence, 113
humility, 122 incom plete, 7, 29, 71, 91, 94
hyperactive, 148 incom pleteness, 75, 135
hypocrisy, 25, 26, 27, 28 inner, 78, 79, 83, 85, 105, 108, 109,
hypocrite, 27, 139 110, 111, 117, 118
insult, 8, 38
id, 84, 96 integrate, 45, 65, 91, 92, 96, 97
ideal, 27, 28, 44, 46, 50, 76, 78, 107, integration, 147
1 1 2 ,1 1 3 , 117, 144 internal, 36
ideal-ego, 78 intim ate, 8, 108, 112, 114
idealist, 143 intolerable, 39
ideality, 19, 133 intolerance, 137
idealization, 21, 51, 122 introject, 12, 15
idealize, 4 , 2 1 ,2 7 , 5 0 ,5 1 , 112, 113, 122 intruding, 147
ideational, 12 intrusion, 77, 147
identification, 4, 21, 27, 84, 85, 97, 101, intuitive, 98, 99
103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 116,
117, 118, 119, 122, 145, 147, 151, lam ents, 59
152 language, 8, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 49, 63,
identifica to ry, 108 64 , 74 , 84, 86, 8 7 ,8 8 , 107, 128, 129,
identify, 9, 14, 20, 27, 31, 32, 41, 42, 43, 1 3 2 ,1 3 3 , 1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ,1 4 8 , 149, 150,
48, 4 9 ,5 1 ,6 3 , 1 0 2 ,1 0 8 , 112, 118, 157
119, 122, 127 latency, 80
identity, 21, 48, 51, 56, 103, 105, 106, laughter, 113
109, 110, 114, 118, 119, 134, 151 legitim ate, 3, 57, 58
illegitim ate, 59 Leugnung, 26
illness, 1 9 ,9 3 , 111, 133, 137 liar, 94
 S U B JE C T INDEX 181

liberate, 113, 116, 133 m eaning, 9, 10, 21, 26, 27, 28, 42, 51,
liberty, 8, 138 54, 62, 64, 76, 84, 86, 91, 93, 97, 98,
libidinal, 18, 32, 33, 36, 64, 69, 83, 84, 99, 115, 116, 123, 125, 127, 128,
85, 146, 147 129, 130, 131, 135, 139, 151
libido, 16, 17, 18, 33, 76 meaningful, 46, 91, 99, 151
lie, 2, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28, 33, 34, 35, 36, m eaningless, 105
40, 77, 97, 121, 123, 134, 135 m ediate, 74, 81
life, 2, 5, 14, 18, 19, 21, 22, 2 6 ,3 1 , 38, m ediation, 143
39, 4 0 ,4 1 ,4 4 , 4 8 ,5 1 ,5 4 , 5 5 ,5 7 ,6 2 , m editation, 108
64, 65, 68, 70, 75, 78, 85, 92, 93, 94, m editative, 110
97, 98, 9 9 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 3 ,1 0 4 , 105, 106, m ental, 1 9 ,3 7 ,6 2 , 76, 132, 133, 137,
107, 108, 110,111, 112, 113, 114, 147
115, 116, 118,119, 120, 121, 122, mentality, 55
125, 128, 131,134, 137, 138, 139, metaphor, 8, 20, 22, 74, 101, 107, 109,
140, 141, 143,144, 153 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 133,
life-and-death, 143 134
life-giving, 115 metaphoric, 4, 7, 17, 20, 21, 22, 107, 108,
lifeless, 45 117, 118,119, 120, 121, 132,134
life-size, 112 m etapsychological, 8
life-span, 128 metonymy, 74, 101, 110, 111, 112
mind, 2, 8, 9, 10, 14, 15, 16, 54, 94,
man, 2 9 ,5 5 ,9 6 , 105, 113, 114, 115, 137, 140, 141, 143, 146, 148, 152
129, 133, 1 3 8 ,1 4 6 minded, 139, 154
m ankind, 40, 51, 53 m indedness, 154
m arital, 21, 104, 108, 118, 119 minds, 29, 136
marriage, 92 mine, 29, 39, 70, 80, 81, 85, 116, 134,
marry, 29, 48, 92, 95, 139 149, 151
mask, 64 m ineness, 52
master, 2, 33, 37, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, mirror, 4, 65, 68, 72, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78,
51, 53, 73, 74, 7 9 ,1 3 2 , 133, 139, 141 79, 8 0 , 8 1 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,8 5 , 8 7 ,8 8 , 136,
mastered, 87 145, 148, 150
m astering, 70 mirror-image, 65
m aster-slave, 2, 37, 42, 43, 44, 74 mirror-stage, 4, 74, 78, 83, 85, 88
mastery, 124, 149 misfortune, 92
m aternal, 4, 20, 74, 78, 80, 83, 84, 85, moral, 2, 28, 89, 96, 123, 134, 135, 150
88, 104, 147 moralistic, 96
m aturation, 70, 81, 82 morality, 48, 54, 57, 142, 150
m aturational, 81, 82 morally, 26, 27, 28, 33, 49
mature, 81, 110, 119 m ortal, 55, 111
matured, 81 mortality, 77, 78
maturity, 59, 60, 119 mother, xi, 7, 8, 9, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21,
mean, xi, 4, 8, 9, 10, 16, 17, 19, 20, 27, 33, 45, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 65, 66,
3 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,3 3 ,3 6 ,3 7 ,3 9 ,4 1 ,4 2 , 44, 67, 68, 69, 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 , 74, 7 6 ,7 7 ,7 8 ,
4 5 ,4 8 , 49, 50, 54, 56, 59, 6 0 ,6 1 ,6 3 , 79, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88,
64, 65, 68, 69, 78, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 9 2 ,9 5 , 102, 1 0 3 ,1 0 7 ,1 0 8 , 109,110,
8 7 ,9 7 ,9 9 ,1 0 5 ,1 1 9 , 121, 127, 129, 111, 112, 113, 116,117, 119, 128,
130, 138, 1 4 0,141, 143, 149, 152, 153 129, 133, 134, 1 3 5,136, 146, 147, 149
182 S U B JE C T INDEX

M other-child, 66, 78, 83, 86, 147 neo-natal, 75

m other-infant, 63, 67 neurosis, 16
m otivated, 106 neurotic, 9
m otivation, 49, 50, 51, 83, 104, 106, nine (m onths of age), 80, 81
107, 135 no, 3, 4, 8, 9, 13, 17, 19, 20, 29, 30, 34,
m otivational, 42 39, 4 2 ,4 5 ,4 6 , 4 9 , 5 5 ,6 1 , 6 2 ,6 6 , 67,
m otive, 27, 51, 58, 102, 103, 104, 119 69, 78, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,8 4 , 8 5 ,8 6 ,
mourn, 15, 93, 132 8 7 ,8 8 , 8 9 , 9 1 ,9 2 , 9 3 ,9 4 , 101, 104,
mourner, 140 107, 109, 113, 115, 117, 118, 119,
murder, 38, 9 3 ,9 5 , 145, 151 121, 124, 128, 132, 133,138, 140,
murderer, 38, 93, 95 141, 143, 144, 145, 148, 149, 150
m utilation, 75 non-action, 32
m utual, 41, 66, 77, 150 non-availability, 35
m yelinization, 147 non-identity, 118
m yocardinal, 136 non-integration, 96
myself, 38, 72, 73, 104, 107, 108, 113, non-m etaphorical, 93
114 no-saying, 3, 4, 20, 61, 62, 81, 82, 83,
myth, 99 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 124, 145, 149.
m ythical, 98 See also saying
m ythom anias, 155, 158 not, vii, ix, xi, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,
12, 1 3 , 1 4 ,1 5 , 1 6 ,1 7 , 1 8 ,1 9 , 2 0 ,2 1 ,
nam e, 52, 78, 80, 86, 103, 107, 114, 22, 2 3 , 2 5 ,2 6 , 2 7 ,2 8 , 29, 3 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,
123, 127, 138 3 3 ,3 4 ,3 5 , 3 6 ,3 7 , 38, 3 9 ,4 0 ,4 1 ,4 2 ,
nam ed, 112, 152 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53,
nam e-of-the-father, 86 54, 5 5 ,5 6 ,5 7 ,5 8 , 5 9 ,6 1 ,6 2 , 6 3 ,6 4 ,
narcissism, 16, 74, 76, 78 6 5 ,6 6 , 6 7 ,6 8 , 69, 7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 , 7 3 ,7 4 ,
narcissistic, 12, 15, 17, 20, 31, 160, 163 7 5 ,7 6 ,7 7 , 78, 79, 8 0 , 8 1 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,8 4 ,
negate, 30, 32, 47, 52 8 5 ,8 6 ,8 7 ,8 8 ,8 9 ,9 1 ,9 2 ,9 3 ,9 4 , 95,
negated, 9, 12, 135, 154 96, 9 7 ,9 8 , 99, 101, 102, 103, 104,
negating, 9, 18, 45, 47, 50, 129, 137 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111,
negation, xi, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 13, 14, 112, 113, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127,
3 0 , 3 1 ,3 2 , 3 3 ,3 4 , 3 5 ,3 7 ,3 9 , 4 3 ,4 6 , 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135,
49, 50, 51, 53, 56, 58, 59, 61, 84, 89, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145,
124, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152,
140, 142, 143, 149, 150, 153 153, 154
negative, xi, 2, 15, 17, 18, 22, 26, 28, nothing, 10, 14, 15, 29, 76, 82, 92, 103,
29, 30, 3 3 ,3 8 ,3 9 , 4 2 ,4 5 ,4 6 , 4 7 ,5 1 , 120, 129, 134, 139, 151
56, 58, 59, 60, 76, 78, 83, 84, 98, not-recognized, 98
1 0 2 ,1 0 4 , 127, 1 2 9 ,1 3 2 , 1 3 7 ,1 4 1 , nullified, 57
1 4 2 ,1 4 3 , 1 4 6 ,1 4 9
negatively, 2, 42, 43, 45, 46, 49, 51, 67 obedience, 150
negatives, 30 obey, 12, 15, 50, 132, 138
negativism , 18, 32 obfuscation, 29
negativity, 3, 16, 42, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, object, 2, 3, 13, 14, 1 6 ,1 7 , 2 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,
52, 62, 8 9 ,1 2 4 ,1 3 6 , 142, 144 33, 39, 40, 42, 44, 45, 46, 49, 59, 63,
neglect, 19, 41, 96 64, 6 9 ,7 1 ,7 6 , 78, 84, 8 5 ,8 7 ,8 8 , 93,
 SU B JE C T INDEX 183

129, 132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 143, 76, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 4 , 8 7 ,8 8 , 9 3 ,9 4 , 95,
144, 146, 147, 149 98, 99, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,
objecting, 135 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 116, 117,
objection, 35, 36, 70, 71, 72, 95, 145, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124,
151 132, 134, 1 3 6 ,1 3 8 , 139, 141, 142,
object-relations, 78 143, 144, 1 4 7 ,1 4 8 , 150, 151, 152,
obligations, 144 153
obliged, 27 owner, ix
obsessive, 9 ownership, 150
obstinately, 39, 132
om inous, 93, 94 pain, 11, 21, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106,
om nipotence, 122 108, 109, 116, 118, 137, 140, 141,
one-sided, 66, 97 144, 149, 154
onlooker, 79 painful, 11, 25, 37, 94, 96, 102, 117,
ontological, 32, 51, 57, 73, 75, 76, 101, 128, 140
134, 135, 137 pair, 16, 17, 18, 26, 32, 148
ontology, 32 paradox, 47, 48, 49, 51, 55, 103, 105,
oppose, 17, 38, 40, 152, 153, 154 119, 122, 123
opposite, 41, 42, 48, 49, 99, 140, 148, paradoxical, xi, 20
150, 152 paralysis, xi
opposition, 15, 16, 17, 74, 139, 140, 149 paralyzing, 105
oracle, 92, 93, 94, 95 paranoiac, 137, 146, 148
oral, 18 paranoid-schizoid, 133
organ, 122, 148 parent, 80, 87, 92, 93, 95, 112, 113, 135
orphan, 112 parental, 81
other, ix, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 17, 18, 20, partner, 64, 66, 77, 125, 131, 151, 152
26, 28, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 42,
passion, 51
45, 48, 49, 50, 52, 53, 54, 55, 59, 65,
passive, 16, 40, 45
66, 67, 68, 69, 72, 73,74, 75, 76, 77,
passivity, 19, 20, 77, 83, 84
79, 8 2 , 8 3 ,8 5 , 8 6 , 88, 97, 98, 110, past, 12, 88, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 109,
112, 113, 114, 118, 122, 125, 129, 134, 147, 1 5 1 ,1 5 4
130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, paternal, 105, 106, 121, 133
137, 1 3 8 ,1 3 9 , 140, 142, 1 4 3 ,1 4 5 , pathogenic, 35, 146
147, 148, 149, 152 pathological, 140
others, 4, 8, 22, 25, 33, 72, 73, 78, 82, patient, xi, 3, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 27,
83, 91, 97, 109, 110, 114, 117, 118, 28, 29, 34, 35, 46, 47, 53, 56, 58, 59,
120, 121, 128, 131, 134, 136, 138, 6 0 ,9 1 ,9 8 ,9 9 , 102, 113, 117, 121,
149, 150, 154 127, 129, 130, 131, 135, 136, 151,
outside, 31, 40, 50, 72, 93, 112, 141 152, 153
over-idealization, 103 peccadillo, 112, 113
over-identification, 103, 105, 118 peek, 71, 72, 79
over-identify, 103 peek-a-boo, 79
ovulation, 75 penitence, 96
owe, 104, 132, 142 perceive, 11, 15, 26, 83, 97, 128, 138,
own, 2, 4, 18, 21, 27, 29, 34, 35, 38, 40, 140, 141
42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 52, 53, perception, 16, 31, 36, 40, 64, 68, 70,
54, 55, 56, 58, 62, 64, 66, 70,72,75, 7 1 ,8 0 , 129, 142, 146, 159
184 SU B JE C T INDEX

perfect, 27, 79, 113 preconceived, 141

perfection, 150 preconceptions, 141
perm issible, 55 precondition, 7, 13, 16, 31, 54, 61, 131,
perm ission, ix, 130 147, 149
perm it, 147 preconscious, 29
person, 2, 3, 4, 8, 14, 15, 18, 20, 22, 27, predicate, 55, 56
2 8 ,2 9 , 3 2 ,3 7 ,3 8 , 4 2 ,4 8 , 5 2 ,5 3 ,5 4 , pregnancy, 136
5 6 ,5 7 , 5 8 ,5 9 , 6 3 ,6 4 , 6 5 ,6 7 ,6 8 ,7 1 , pregnant, 136, 141
7 2 , 7 5 ,7 7 , 7 9 , 8 1 , 8 5 , 8 6 , 9 1 , 9 3 , 9 4 , pre-linguistic, 129, 130
98, 107, 1 1 2 ,1 1 8 ,1 1 9 , 121, 122, prem onition, 11, 94
123, 128, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, pre-object, 64
137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 144, 147, prerequisite, 3, 32
151, 154 presence, 32, 38, 52, 55, 59, 61, 65, 68,
personal, 3, 22, 25, 48, 82, 94, 96, 99, 69, 72, 75, 105, 109, 114, 117, 142,
101, 110 146, 147, 153
personalities, 160, 163 present, xi, 2, 7, 8, 11, 12, 16, 22, 26,
personality, 59, 79, 96, 106, 114, 123 3 0 ,3 1 ,3 2 , 3 8 ,3 9 , 40, 4 5 , 4 6 ,5 1 ,5 4 ,
personally, 110 5 5 ,5 6 ,5 7 , 6 1 ,6 2 , 6 3 ,6 4 , 6 7 ,7 1 ,7 2 ,
persons, 37, 49, 61, 64, 68, 101, 112, 73, 74, 77, 79, 80, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97,
121, 128, 136, 138, 146 98, 99, 101, 103, 106, 127, 128, 129,
phallus, 129 1 3 0 ,1 3 1 , 1 3 5 ,1 4 1 , 142, 143, 144,
phenom enal, 43 149, 151
phenom enological, 55, 58, 101, 118, presentation, 14, 15, 16, 70, 99, 102
131 presentim ents, 98
phenom enon, xi, 2, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, pre-symbolic, 129, 130
1 4 ,2 0 , 28, 46, 48, 6 2 ,6 4 , 7 5 ,1 2 9 , priest, 104, 105, 107, 109, 112
133, 135, 136, 142, 151 primacy, 18
philosopher, 40, 55, 127, 143 prim al, 31, 32, 33
philosophical, 2, 37, 48, 62, 72, 89, 98, primarily, 81, 97, 143
101, 127, 132, 136, 137, 141, 146, primary, 4, 7, 16, 17, 20, 32, 63, 64, 67,
148 68, 78, 8 5 , 9 7 ,9 8 ,1 2 2 ,1 2 8 ,1 3 2
philosophy, ix, 2, 46, 56, 62, 143 prim itive, 74
pierce, 92, 95, 101 prohibition, 19, 83, 84, 86, 87, 149
pigeon, 75 prohibits, 20
plague, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97 promise, v, 2, 5, 8, 49, 92, 93, 135
play, 38, 39, 6 6 , 7 1 ,7 7 , 8 0 ,8 1 , 8 2 , 94, prom ote, 14, 49, 59, 91, 93, 131
95, 104, 105, 109, 121, 132, 150, proposition, 14, 15, 35, 83, 127, 128, 141
151, 157 psyche, 116, 129
pleasant, 7, 12 psychiatrist, 22, 102, 105, 109, 117, 121
pleasing, 15 psychic, 3, 4, 62, 65, 69, 70, 74, 75, 76,
pleasure, 2, 12, 13, 15, 19, 30, 31, 32, 88, 106, 107, 113, 116, 122, 131,
39, 124, 132, 144 137, 1 4 6 ,1 4 7 ,1 5 4
pleasure-ego, 12, 15, 19, 32 psychical, 35
polarity, 16 psychoanalysis, ix, 63, 73, 96, 98, 106,
possess, 34, 41, 42, 52, 82, 91, 96, 115, 107, 108, 127, 135, 153
121, 147, 149 psychoanalyst, 22, 63, 78, 108, 117, 121,
possession, 29, 78, 148 137, 153
 S U B JE C T INDEX 185

psychoanalytic, 15, 18, 26, 28, 29, 38, regressed, 70, 77

63, 70, 7 3 ,9 6 , 99, 127, 128, 133, regression, 18
135, 136, 146, 147, 151 regressive, 43, 56, 57, 59, 60
psychodynam ic, 136, 137 reject, 8 , 1 4 ,1 5 , 16, 2 7 ,3 8 , 48, 70, 93,
psychological, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 27, 32, 94, 95, 96, 131, 141, 142, 149
3 5 ,6 2 , 6 5 ,7 5 , 7 7 ,9 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 0 , rejection, 8, 9, 17, 91, 93, 96, 99, 133,
129, 130, 146, 148, 149, 152 139, 141, 142, 148, 149, 150, 152
psychology, ix, 73, 135 relate, 2, 8, 17, 1 9 ,2 1 ,2 6 , 2 9 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,
psychotherapeutic, 35, 91 3 5 ,4 2 , 4 3 ,4 5 ,4 6 , 4 7 ,4 9 , 5 0 ,5 1 ,5 3 ,
psychotherapy, 25, 46, 151 5 6 ,5 7 ,6 2 ,6 8 , 69, 77, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 2 ,
psychotic, 18, 32, 33, 129, 136 8 7 ,9 8 , 104, 106, 108, 116, 128, 129,
131, 133, 135, 144, 145, 146, 148,
radicalization, 65 154
rational, xi, 4, 53, 54, 108, 120, 121, relation, 17, 19, 20, 27, 45, 46, 51, 63,
124, 132, 154 64, 66, 68, 69, 74, 77, 78, 83, 85, 88,
rationalism , 141 92, 108, 131, 140, 144, 145, 146,
rationality, 137 147, 148, 149, 150, 152
rationally, 54 relational, 80, 82
R at-m an, 28, 29, 113 relationship, 2, 4, 28, 33, 45, 48, 55, 64,
reaffirm, 97 66, 72, 76, 78, 83, 86, 89, 97, 99,
rear, 65, 81 104, 106, 113, 114, 115, 118, 147,
reason, 3, 21, 27, 29, 37, 52, 57, 58, 75, 151, 152
79, 85, 102, 108, 113, 137, 141, 144, relative, 19, 59, 63, 68, 133, 152
148 religion, 140
reasonable, 28, 56, 60, 106 religious, 21, 139, 141
reasoning, 2, 30, 44, 68 remarry, 103, 112
reassure, 79, 97 remember, 29, 35, 40, 42, 44, 103, 107,
recognition, 35, 39, 41, 44, 46, 59, 64, 110, 112, 117
65, 102, 106, 117 repetitions, 140
recognize, 3, 14, 15, 31, 35, 40, 41, 44, represent, 13, 15, 66, 70, 77, 82, 94, 97
4 5 ,4 7 , 58, 65, 75, 76, 95, 102, 112, representation, 15, 30, 31, 33, 80, 149,
114, 117, 120, 124, 132, 1 3 4 ,1 3 5 , 157
137, 154 representative, 83, 85
recollecting, 12 repress, xi, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 17, 18, 28,
recover, 15, 21, 33, 109 29, 30, 3 3 , 3 5 ,4 1 , 4 3 ,4 6 , 5 9 ,9 1 , 9 2 ,
rediscover, 94, 146 93, 94, 96, 97, 103, 129, 135, 151,
refind, 16, 31 153, 154
reflect, 1 4 , 1 5 ,1 6 , 1 7 ,3 3 , 5 0 , 55, 143, repression, xi, 2, 9, 10, 12, 13, 17, 19,
1 4 4 ,1 4 6 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 39, 43, 102, 103,
reflection, 2, 13, 14, 16, 18, 20, 55, 76, 128, 129, 151, 154
108, 137, 142, 143 repressive, 14, 59, 153
reflective, 99, 143 repudiate, 9
refusal, 9, 46, 67, 81, 82, 84, 86, 97, resistance, 28, 91, 93, 98, 138
128, 148, 149, 153 resisted, 87
refuse, 4, 14, 21, 22, 33, 34, 46, 49, 56, respect, 53, 83, 85, 86, 98, 99, 113, 132,
5 7 ,5 8 , 6 3 ,6 4 , 8 4 ,8 7 ,9 6 , 108, 121, 133, 153
128, 129, 135, 149, 152 respected, 53, 114, 153
186 S U B JE C T INDEX

respectful, 112 secure, 147

respond, 19, 64, 67, 105, 110, 133, 137, security, 111
153 see, 9, 16, 42, 5 3 ,6 2 ,6 5 , 6 7 ,7 1 , 7 2 , 75,
response, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 70, 81, 76, 7 7 , 8 1 ,8 5 , 9 1 ,9 2 , 96, 99, 111,
97, 102, 146 118, 122, 129, 137, 140, 145, 147
responsibility, 47, 128, 131, 135 seek, 38, 71, 93, 101, 105
responsible, 4, 5, 78, 95, 104 self, 2, 4, 15, 16, 19, 2 1 ,2 2 , 2 3 ,2 5 , 26,
restrict, 1 8 ,3 7 ,3 9 , 42, 129, 130, 143 2 7 ,2 8 ,3 1 ,3 2 ,3 3 ,3 4 ,3 5 ,3 6 ,3 7 ,3 8 ,
restriction, 8, 13, 30, 48, 53, 143 39, 4 0 , 4 1 ,4 2 , 4 3 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,4 6 , 4 7 ,5 1 ,
restrictive, 8 78, 7 9 , 8 2 , 8 7 , 8 9 , 9 1 , 9 2 , 9 3 , 9 4 , 95,
resurrection, 116, 138 96, 9 7 ,9 8 , 99, 101, 103, 108, 116,
retranchm ent, 86 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123,
reveal, xi, 4, 7, 9, 25, 26, 28, 37, 45, 56, 124, 125, 127, 131, 132, 134, 135,
58, 7 2 ,9 1 ,9 2 ,9 5 , 123, 141 136, 138, 141, 143, 144, 149, 151,
revealed, xi, 9, 13, 14, 56, 112, 140 153, 154
revealer, 151 self-accusation, 38, 93, 94
revelation, xi, 25, 28, 95, 98, 113, 123, self-alienation, 119
151 self-aware, 40, 138
revenge, 145 self-betrayal, 26
reworked, 79 self-chosen, 124
rhetorical, 73 self-conception, 2, 39, 40, 41, 43, 121,
right, 3, 4, 9 , 2 1 ,2 2 , 2 9 , 4 1 ,4 8 , 5 2 ,5 4 , 141
5 5 ,5 7 , 58, 64, 82, 8 5 ,9 8 , 1 0 5 ,1 2 1 , self-condem nation, 96
124, 138, 144 self-confession, 39
rigidity, 11 self-confidence, 138
rule, 52, 69, 144, 153 self-confident, 27
rupture, 85 self-consciousness, 37, 40, 41, 46, 51,
94, 136, 143
sacram ent, 116 self-constituting, 34
sacred, 103, 116, 120 self-constitution, 32, 44
sacrifice, 104, 105, 108, 140 self-deceit, 120, 122
sad, 103, 110, 111, 114 self-deception, 22, 23, 35, 101, 103, 121,
saint, 112 122, 127, 132, 134, 135, 141, 154
salvation, 76 self-defense, 95
satisfy, 20, 23, 42, 49, 52, 71, 72, 74, 78, self-description, 2, 25, 36, 108
140, 144 self-determ ination, 42, 143
say, xi, 3, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 18, 29, 30, 32, self-existence, 143
34, 35, 38, 42, 45, 48, 50, 52, 64, 73, self-expression, 25, 26, 28
78, 8 5 ,8 6 , 9 2 ,9 3 ,9 7 , 101, 107, 112, self-expressions, 25, 28
115, 122, 137, 146, 147, 148, 149, self-feeling, 19
151, 152 self-fulfillment, 41, 44
saying, ix, 3, 4, 13, 18, 19, 20, 22, 29, selfhood, 81, 82
45, 48, 54, 55, 61, 66, 69, 79, 82, 84, self-identity, 42, 143
8 5 ,8 6 , 87, 88, 102, 105, 118, 124, self-image, 4, 15, 41, 82, 91, 92, 93, 94,
130, 133, 135, 145, 150 95, 96, 97, 98, 99
schem a, 81, 82, 142, 151 self-inflicted, 21
schizophrenic, 132, 136 self-interpretation, 26
 S U B JE C T INDEX 187

self'interrogation, 93, 96 signal, 65, 82, 143

self-knowledge, 25, 26, 27, 34, 37, 38, signaled, 17
40, 91, 98, 153 signaling, 7, 145
self-love, 27, 78 signed, 104
self-organization, 132 significance, 28, 64, 85, 88, 92, 96, 99,
self-possession, 34, 36 128, 154
self-presence, 40 significant, 63, 68, 80, 86, 94, 107
self-preservation, 16 signified, 74
self-punishm ent, 151 signifier, 31, 74
self-realization, 45 signs, 61, 63, 67, 75, 80, 85
self-related, 47, 51, 89 silence, 13, 153
self-relating, 51 silent, 27, 103
self-relation, 144 similarity, 10, 12, 57, 101, 107, 118,
self-reliance, 141 119, 133, 134, 137, 142
self-reliant, 141 six (m onths o f age), 62, 67, 68, 71, 75,
self-respect, 119 76, 78, 138, 150
self-revelation, 25, 123 slave, 41, 42, 44, 45, 51, 138, 139, 140
self-satisfied, 87 slaveholder, 138, 139, 140
self-truth, 125 slaveholding, 139
self-understanding, 38, 39 slavery, 138, 140
self-worth, 119 smile, 3, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71,
sem antic, 82, 84, 149 79, 87, 88, 124
sem iotic, 57, 136 smiling, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68
separate, ix, 20, 21, 23, 32, 36, 75, 77, social, 3, 42, 49, 62, 63, 67, 68, 79, 88,
78, 85, 86, 108, 118, 149, 151 124, 128
separation, 3, 7, 8, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, societal, 128
67, 70, 79, 80, 81, 82, 85, 88, 103, society, 42, 49, 54, 55, 84
111, 132, 133, 134, 147 sociological, 51
separation-individuation, 147 sociology, 127, 128
servant, 38, 133 solicitude, 111
serve, 32, 86, 91 solipsist, 136
service, 45, 50 solitary, 75
severe, 11, 95 som atic, 77, 147
sex, 128, 136, 159 son, 4, 5, 38, 55, 70, 93, 94, 95, 109,
sexual, 16, 73, 74, 7 5 ,1 3 1 , 1 4 1 ,1 4 5 110, 112, 113, 114, 120, 121, 130,
sexuality, 16 132, 146, 151
shame, 72, 73, 93 sorrow, 111, 140
share, 33, 103, 118, 138 speak, xi, 11, 22, 27, 86, 93, 96, 112,
shepherd, 91, 95, 96, 97, 99, 124, 131, 114, 121, 139, 144, 152
151, 152 speaker, 2, 74, 125
shunned, 138 speculation, 18
sibling, 76, 87, 147 speculative, 62, 89
sight, 34, 62, 118, 137 speech, 149
sighted, 68 sphinx, 92
sign, 2, 17, 26, 27, 32, 59, 63, 64, 65, spirit, 138
66, 67, 69, 80, 82, 84, 104, 109, 111, spiritual, 108, 114
120, 127 spite, 102
188 S U B JE C T INDEX

split, 1 4 ,1 7 , 7 9 ,8 1 ,1 3 1 sym bolic, 18, 53, 57, 58, 74, 75, 86,
spoke, 38, 154 110, 117, 118, 120, 129, 132, 133,
spoken, 139, 149 142
starvation, 77, 138 symbolicity, 142
statem ent, xi, 2, 9, 10, 12, 28, 29, 34, symbolism, 116
3 5 , 4 2 ,4 3 , 4 5 ,4 8 , 5 7 ,9 3 , 102, 107, symbolize, 111, 135
129, 130, 144, 146, 1 4 8 ,1 4 9 , 150 symbols, 74, 84, 101
statue, 112 symptom, 65, 77, 135
steadfast, 44 syntactic-m orphological, 149
stealing, 26, 113 synthesis, 46, 48, 50, 52, 142, 143
step-children, 112 synthesize, 62, 143, 146
stimulus, 36, 64, 70, 75 synthetic, 143
stoic, 43, 45 system, 9, 12, 18, 19, 29, 36, 54, 65, 70,
strange, 17, 67, 68, 131, 153 7 5 ,9 8 , 101, 118, 120, 133, 137, 142,
stranger, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 149
7 0 ,7 1 ,7 2 , 74, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 3 ,8 8 ,
145, 146, 147 teleology, 30, 122
stress, 20, 30, 35, 40, 44, 51, 55, 56, 76, temporal, 115
7 8 ,8 5 ,8 8 , 96, 103, 131, 137, 142, temporary, 80
145, 150, 152 tem ptation, 97
structural, 83, 85, 142 tension, 20, 70, 146, 147
structure, 37, 46, 57, 62, 70, 74, 76, therapeutic, xi, 3, 37, 53, 56, 58, 59, 60,
80, 82, 86, 123, 133, 137, 141, 142, 98, 99, 132, 152, 153
146 therapist, xi, 21, 59, 91, 98, 99, 102,
structuring, 74 135, 151, 152, 153
struggle, 40, 41, 76, 114, 140, 143, 150 therapy, 14, 59, 135, 152
stubbornness, 85 thesis, 15, 25, 30, 31, 32, 39, 40, 42, 48,
studying, 10, 14, 135 5 1 , 5 2 ,5 7 , 6 1 ,8 2 , 8 3 ,8 6 , 1 0 1 ,1 2 9 ,
subject, xi, 2, 8, 10, 12, 19, 31, 33, 40, 130, 132, 134, 135, 140, 142, 143,
55, 56, 58, 59, 76, 78, 79, 99, 103, 148, 149, 152, 154
107, 129, 130, 133, 134, 135, 141, three (m onths o f age), 62, 64, 65, 66,
145, 154 68, 70, 77, 87, 95, 99
subjective, 15, 32, 40, 110, 125 truth, 25, 98, 123, 127, 140
subjectivity, 19, 78, 79, 99 two (m onths o f age), 3, 4, 8, 20, 62, 68,
subjects, 3 87, 117
substitute, 4, 16, 17, 29, 30, 32, 33, 104,
109 unconscious, 9, 10, 11, 12, 20, 27, 29,
substituting, 33, 119 30, 3 4 , 3 5 ,3 6 , 3 7 ,3 9 , 4 6 ,5 7 ,5 8 ,5 9 ,
suffer, 112, 154 75, 101, 102, 103, 104, 106, 109,
suffering, 92, 111, 140 110, 113, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121,
suffocating, 21, 118 122, 127, 129, 130, 134, 135, 136,
survival, 129, 130 151
survive, 114, 133 unconsciously, 4, 27, 93, 96, 104, 106,
survivor, 70 115, 119, 122
symbiosis, 86, 147 unconsciousness, 30
symbol, 2, 3, 4, 13, 17, 18, 20, 22, 30, undergo, 16, 19, 45, 96
3 9 ,6 4 , 8 9 ,1 1 2 ,1 1 6 , 124, 129, 149 underm ine, 2, 49, 94, 97
 S U B JE C T INDEX 189

understand, 2, 3, 4, 9, 11, 18, 29, 30, 36, untruth, 43, 93, 97

38, 42, 43, 47, 48, 50, 54, 55, 56, 57, unwilling, 10, 107
58, 62, 65, 66, 72, 76, 83, 86, 87, 88, utilitarianism , 144
98, 116, 120, 124, 129, 131, 132, utter, 2, 3, 11, 53, 56, 58, 59, 123, 142,
134, 137, 141, 142, 145, 146, 148, 149
150, 151, 154
understandable, 17, 97 validity, 26, 39, 41, 43, 45, 68, 94, 141,
understanding, 17, 30, 33, 38, 48, 55, 147
56, 62, 64, 66, 72, 133, 137, 142, value, 12, 41, 45, 80, 93, 116, 144,
148, 152, 154 149
undesirable, 15, 31, 43, 129 V erantw ortlichkeitsabw her, 163
undifferentiated, 49, 143 Verdrängung, 128
undo, 4, 7, 8, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 21, 22, verify, 16
3 3 ,4 3 ,4 6 , 50, 5 3 , 5 8 ,9 1 ,9 6 ,1 0 1 , Verleugnung, 26, 128
102, 105, 106, 115, 118, 121, 122, V erneinung, 8, 12, 18, 26, 127, 128,
124, 125, 127, 131, 132, 150, 154 129, 130, 157, 159, 161
unessential, 43, 143 vices, 150
unexpected, 31, 138 vicissitude, 108
unforeseen, 82 visible, 10, 36, 55, 65, 98, 103
un-free, 54 vision, 28, 31, 82, 96, 109
unfulfilled, 109 voice, 103, 109, 110, 117, 122, 150
ungrateful, 35 volition, 3
unhappy, 12, 54 volitional, 147
unhelpful, 91 voluntarily, 101
unification, 132, 135 vulnerability, 67, 73, 82
unify, 122, 134, 146 vulnerable, 73
unique, 41, 64, 76, 107, 114, 116, 128,
1 2 9 ,1 4 7 want, 4, 9, 10, 12, 15, 16, 19, 20, 25, 48,
unite, 16, 17, 32, 116, 118 72, 86, 99, 129, 130
unity, 17, 31, 32, 35, 75, 76, 78, 79, 82, w anted, 21, 54, 86, 104, 106, 107, 112,
143, 148, 154 114, 117, 119
universal, 37, 38, 42, 46, 67, 68, 136, w anting, 76, 139, 146
150, 151 wedding, 111
universality, 42, 51, 136, 142, 143, whole, 8, 18, 19, 35, 38, 54, 64, 65, 76,
146 77, 92, 95, 104, 136, 137
unjustified, 11 wholeness, 116
unknowable, 72 w holesom eness, 132
unknowingly, 94, 97 widow, 112
unknown, 8, 9, 12, 97, 129, 130, 135 wife, 38, 109, 112, 113, 114, 120, 122,
unmask, 106, 108, 154 136
unm ediated, 50 will, 2, 3 ,4 , 7 ,8 , 10, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18,
unpleasant, 12, 15, 69, 127, 132, 135 20, 23, 2 5 ,2 6 , 30, 3 4 ,3 7 ,3 8 , 4 0 ,4 1 ,
un-pleasurable, 84 4 2 , 4 3 ,4 4 , 4 5 ,4 6 , 4 7 ,4 8 , 49, 5 0 ,5 1 ,
un-pleasure, 69, 146 52, 5 3 , 5 4 ,5 5 , 5 6 ,5 7 , 5 8 , 59, 6 2 ,6 4 ,
unrecognized, 96 6 5 ,6 6 , 6 7 ,6 8 , 6 9 ,7 1 ,7 2 , 74, 7 6 ,7 7 ,
unreflective, 141 78, 79, 8 0 ,8 1 ,8 3 ,8 4 , 8 5 ,8 6 , 88, 89,
untrue, 8 9 1 ,9 2 , 94, 9 5 ,9 7 , 101, 102, 103,
190 S U B JE C T INDEX

will (continued) word, 17, 18, 19, 20, 2 8 , 3 2 ,3 8 , 5 1 ,7 0 ,

106, 112, 122, 124, 127, 129, 131, 74, 76, 83, 8 4 ,8 6 , 129, 130, 134,
132, 133, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 139, 143, 153
141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, work, 3 ,4 , 5, 7, 8 ,1 0 ,1 1 , 15,22, 29, 30,
1 4 8 ,1 5 0 , 153, 154 3 9 ,4 1 ,4 5 ,4 9 , 50, 5 3 ,5 4 ,6 0 , 6 2 ,6 7 ,
willing, 2, 22, 40, 41, 42, 44, 48, 49, 52, 7 8 ,1 0 2 ,1 0 6 ,1 0 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 0 9 ,1 1 0 ,1 1 1 ,
54, 98, 121, 142, 148, 152 1 1 4 ,1 1 6 ,1 1 7 ,1 1 8 ,1 2 0 ,1 2 1 , 122,130,
willingness, 58, 102, 138 1 3 1 ,1 3 2 ,1 3 3 , 1 3 4 ,1 3 7 ,1 5 1 , 153,154
wisdom, 11 worth, 53, 120, 135
wish, ix, 1 9 ,2 1 ,2 9 , 3 2 ,4 9 , 5 1 ,5 3 , 5 9 , worthless, xi, 16, 40
70, 72, 7 3 ,8 2 , 89, 9 6 ,1 0 7 ,1 0 8 ,1 1 8 , worthy, 103, 104, 107
119, 146, 150 wound, 21, 95, 116, 121
wishful, 10, 70, 72, 146 writing-pad, 35, 36
withdraw, 45, 141
withdrawal, 18, 32, 36 yes, 18, 86, 87, 148
w ithholding, 35 yes-saying, 86. See also saying
witness, 46 you, 8, 9, 13, 21, 34, 35, 38, 48, 49, 54,
w oman, xi, 56, 57, 58, 59, 109, 112, 84, 8 7 ,9 3 , 103, 105, 114, 121, 137,
117, 129, 138, 140 144, 150, 151