Philosophy of self

The philosophy of self examines t he idea of t he self at a concept ual level. Many different
ideas on what const it ut es self have been proposed, including t he self being an act ivit y, t he self
being independent of t he senses, t he bundle t heory of t he self, t he self as a narrat ive cent er of
gravit y, and t he self as a linguist ic or social const ruct rat her t han a physical ent it y. The self (or
it s non-exist ence) is also an import ant concept in East ern philosophy, including Buddhist
philosophy.

Definitions of the self

Most philosophical definit ions of self—per Descart es, Locke, Hume, and William James—are
expressed in t he first person.[1] A t hird person definit ion does not refer t o specific ment al qualia
but inst ead st rives for object ivit y and operat ionalism.

To anot her person, t he way an individual behaves and speaks reflect s t heir t rue inner self and can
be used t o gain insight int o who t hey really are. Therefore, t he int ent ions of anot her individual can
only be inferred from somet hing t hat emanat es from t hat individual. The part icular
charact erist ics of t he self det ermine it s ident it y.
Concepts of self

Self as an activity
Arist ot le, following Plat o, defined t he psyche as t he core essence of a living being, and while
claiming t hat it did not exist apart from t he body,[2] he considered it s so-called "int ellect " part t o
be immort al and perpet ual,[3][4] in cont rast t o it s organism-dependent veget at ive/nut rit ive and
percept ual funct ions. In his t heory of causes and of act and pot ency, Arist ot le emphasizes
beings in relat ion t o t heir act ual manifest at ion, and in t urn t he soul was also defined by it s act ual
effect s. For inst ance, if a knife had a soul, t he act of cut t ing would be t hat soul, because
'cut t ing' is part of t he essence of what it is t o be a knife. More precisely, t he soul is t he "first
act ivit y" of a living body. This is a st at e, or a pot ent ial for act ual, or 'second', act ivit y. "The axe
has an edge for cut t ing" was, for Arist ot le, analogous t o "humans have bodies for rat ional
act ivit y," and t he pot ent ial for rat ional act ivit y t hus const it ut ed t he essence of a human soul. He
st at es: "Soul is an act ualit y or formulable essence of somet hing t hat possesses a pot ent ialit y of
being besouled",[5][6] and also "When mind is set free from it s present condit ions it appears as
just what it is and not hing more: t his alone is immort al and et ernal".[7] Arist ot le used his concept
of t he soul in many of his works; his main work on t he subject is De Anima (On t he Soul).[8][6]

Arist ot le also believed t hat t here were four sect ions of t he soul: t he calculat ive and scient ific
part s on t he rat ional side used for making decisions, and t he desiderat ive and veget at ive part s on
t he irrat ional side responsible for ident ifying our needs. A division of t he soul's funct ions and
act ivit ies is also found in Plat o's t ripart it e t heory. The problem of one in many is also
remembered by Arist ot le, nonet heless:

If then the soul is of its very nature divisible, what holds it together?
Not the body, certainly: much rather the contrary seems to be true,
that the soul holds the body together; for when it departs, the body
expires and decomposes. If there is some other thing which makes it
one, this other is rather the soul. One would then have to ask,
concerning this other, whether it be one or of many parts. If it is one,
 why not call it the soul straightway? But if it is divisible, reason again
demands, what it is that holds this together? And so on ad infinitum.[9]

Self independent of the senses

While he was imprisoned in a cast le, Avicenna wrot e his famous "float ing man" t hought
experiment t o demonst rat e human self-awareness and t he subst ant ialit y of t he soul. His
t hought experiment t ells it s readers t o imagine t hemselves suspended in t he air, isolat ed from all
sensat ions, which includes no sensory cont act wit h even t heir own bodies. He argues t hat , in t his
scenario, one would st ill have self-consciousness. He t hus concludes t hat t he idea of t he self is
not dependent on any physical t hing, and t hat t he soul should not be seen in relat ive t erms, but
as a primary given, a subst ance. This argument was lat er refined and simplified by René
Descart es in epist emic t erms when he st at ed: "I can abst ract from t he supposit ion of all
ext ernal t hings, but not from t he supposit ion of my own consciousness."[10]

Bundle theory of self

David Hume point ed out t hat we t end t o t hink t hat we are t he same person we were five years
ago. Alt hough we have changed in many respect s, t he same person appears present as was
present t hen. We might st art t hinking about which feat ures can be changed wit hout changing t he
underlying self. Hume, however, denies t hat t here is a dist inct ion bet ween t he various feat ures of
a person and t he myst erious self t hat supposedly bears t hose feat ures. When we st art
int rospect ing, "we are never int imat ely conscious of anyt hing but a part icular percept ion; man is a
bundle or collect ion of different percept ions which succeed one anot her wit h an inconceivable
rapidit y and are in perpet ual flux and movement ".[11]

It is plain, that in the course of our thinking, and in the constant

revolution of our ideas, our imagination runs easily from one idea to
any other that resembles it, and that this quality alone is to the fancy a
sufficient bond and association. It is likewise evident that as the
senses, in changing their objects, are necessitated to change them
 regularly, and take them as they lie contiguous to each other, the
imagination must by long custom acquire the same method of
thinking, and run along the parts of space and time in conceiving its
objects."[12]

In Hume's view, t hese percept ions do not belong t o anyt hing. Rat her, Hume compares t he soul t o
a commonwealt h, which ret ains it s ident it y not by virt ue of some enduring core subst ance, but
by being composed of many different , relat ed, and yet const ant ly changing element s. The
quest ion of personal ident it y t hen becomes a mat t er of charact erizing t he loose cohesion of
one's personal experience. (Not e t hat in t he Appendix t o t he Treatise, Hume said wit hout
elaborat ion t hat he was dissat isfied wit h his account of t he self, yet he never ret urned t o t he
issue.)

The paradox of t he Ship of Theseus can be used as an analogy of t he self as a bundle of part s in
flux.

Self as a narrative center of gravity

Daniel Dennet t has a deflat ionary t heory of t he "self". Selves are not physically det ect able.
Inst ead, t hey are a kind of convenient fict ion, like a cent er of gravit y, which is convenient as a
way of solving physics problems, alt hough t hey need not correspond t o anyt hing t angible — t he
cent er of gravit y of a hoop is a point in t hin air. People const ant ly t ell t hemselves st ories t o
make sense of t heir world, and t hey feat ure in t he st ories as a charact er, and t hat convenient but
fict ional charact er is t he self.[13]

Self as merely syntactic

Aaron Sloman has proposed t hat words like self, selves , herself, itself, themselves , myself, et c. do
not refer t o a special t ype of ent it y, but provide powerful synt act ical mechanisms for
const ruct ing ut t erances t hat repeat edly refer t o t he same t hing wit hout t edious and obscure
repet it ion of names or ot her referring expressions.[14]
Self in Eastern spirituality
and philosophy
The spirit ual goal of many t radit ions involves t he dissolving of t he ego, in cont rast t o t he
essent ial Self,[15] allowing self-knowledge of one's own t rue nat ure t o become experienced and
enact ed in t he world. This is variously known as enlight enment , nirvana, presence, and t he "here
and now".

Buddhism
Hume's posit ion is similar t o Indian Buddhist s’ t heories and debat es about t he self, which
generally considers a bundle t heory t o describe t he mind phenomena grouped in aggregat es
(skandhas ), such as sense-percept ions, int ellect ive discriminat ion (saṃjñā ), emot ions and
volit ion. Since t he beginning of Buddhist philosophy, several schools of int erpret at ion assumed
t hat a self cannot be ident ified wit h t he t ransient aggregat es, as t hey are non-self, but some
t radit ions quest ioned furt her whet her t here can be an unchanging ground which defines a real and
permanent individual ident it y, sust aining t he impermanent phenomena; concept s such as Buddha-
nat ure are found in t he Mahayana lineage, and of an ult imat e realit y in dzogchen t radit ion, for
inst ance in Dolpopa[16] and Longchenpa.[17] Alt hough Buddhist s crit icize t he immut able āt man of
Hinduism, some Buddhist schools problemat ized t he not ion of an individual personhood; even
among early ones, such as t he Pudgala view, it was approached implicit ly in quest ions such as
"who is t he bearer of t he bundle?", "what carries t he aggregat es?", "what t ransmigrat es from one
rebirt h t o anot her?" or "what is t he subject of self-improvement and enlight enment ?".[18]

The Buddha in part icular at t acked all at t empt s t o conceive of a fixed self, while st at ing t hat
holding t he view "I have no self" is also mist aken. This is an example of t he Middle Way chart ed
by t he Buddha and t he Madhyamaka school of Buddhism. That absence of a self definit ion is
direct ed t o avoid clinging t o t he "I", seek realit y and at t ain det achment ,[19] and it is found in many
passages of t he oldest Buddha sut ras, recorded in t he Pali Canon, such as t his:
 "Bhikkhus, form is not-self. Were form self, then this form would not
lead to affliction, and one could have it of form: 'Let my form be thus,
let my form be not thus.' And since form is not-self, so it leads to
affliction, and none can have it of form: 'Let my form be thus, let my
form be not thus.'... Bhikkhus, feeling is not-self... Bhikkhus, perception
is not-self... Bhikkhus, determinations are not-self... Bhikkhus,
consciousness (vijñāna) is not self.... is form permanent or
impermanent?..."[20]

Self-knowledge
Bot h West ern and East ern civilizat ions have been occupied wit h self-knowledge and
underscored it s import ance part icularly cit ing t he paradoxical combinat ion of immediat e
availabilit y and profound obscurit y involved in it s pursuit .[21] For Socrat es, t he goal of philosophy
was t o "know t hyself". Lao Tzu, in his Tao Te Ching, says "Knowing ot hers is wisdom. Knowing t he
self is enlight enment . Mast ering ot hers requires force. Mast ering t he self requires st rengt h."[22]
The case is t he same for t he seers of Upanishads, who maint ained t hat t he ult imat e real
knowledge involves an underst anding of t he essence of t he self and t he nat ure of God.[23] Adi
Shankaracharya, in his comment ary on Bhagavad Git a says "Self-knowledge alone eradicat es
misery".[24] "Self-knowledge alone is t he means t o t he highest bliss."[25] Absolut e perfect ion is
t he consummat ion of Self-knowledge."[26]

A t heory about self-knowledge describes t he concept as t he capacit y t o det ect t hat t he

sensat ions, t hought s, ment al st at es, and at t it udes as one's own.[27] It is linked t o ot her concept s
such as self-awareness and self-concept ion. The rat ionalist t heory, which Immanuel Kant has
inspired, also claims t hat our abilit y t o achieve self-knowledge t hrough rat ional reflect ion is part ly
derived from t he fact t hat we view ourselves as rat ional agent s.[27] This school reject s t hat self-
knowledge is merely derived from observat ion as it acknowledges t he subject as aut horit at ive
on account of his abilit y as an agent t o shape his own st at es.[28]

See also

Ātman (Buddhism) – Buddhist concept

Ātman (Buddhism) Buddhist concept
of self Wikiquote
has
Being and Time – 1927 quotations
book by Martin related to
Self
Heidegger (philosophy).

Centered world –
Metaphysical concept
Gnosis – Common
Greek noun for
knowledge
John Locke's view of
the self
Mirror stage –
Psychoanalytic
concept
Open individualism – Philosophical view
that a single subject embodies all
individuals
Other (philosophy) – Concept in
philosophy and psychology
Personal horizon
Psychology of self – Study of the
representation of one's identity
Religious views on the self
Self-realization – Fulfillment of one's
character or personality
Self-schema – in psychology and
cognitive science, a pattern that
organizes information about one's self
 Subject (philosophy) – Philosophy terms
referring to an observer versus the thing
observed
Vertiginous question – Philosophical
argument by Benj Hellie

Notes

1. Gaynesford, M. de I: The Meaning of the

First Person Term, Oxford, Oxford University
Press, 2006.

2. De Anima 414a20ff
3. "For whereas the sensitive faculty is not
found apart from the body, the intellect is
separate." Aristotle, De Anima III, 4, 429b3

4. De Anima III, 4
5. De Anima 414a27
6. Olshewsky, Thomas M. (1976). "On the
Relations of Soul to Body in Plato and
Aristotle" (https://web.stanford.edu/~mvr2
j/ucsccourse/soulolshewsky.pdf) (PDF).
Journal of the History of Philosophy. 14 (4):
391–404. doi:10.1353/hph.2008.0163 (http
s://doi.org/10.1353%2Fhph.2008.0163) .
S2CID 170184114 (https://api.semanticsch
olar.org/CorpusID:170184114) .

7. De Anima, III, 5, 430a22

 8. Shields, Christopher (2016). Zalta, Edward
N. (ed.). "Aristotle's Psychology" (https://pla
to.stanford.edu/archives/win2016/entries/
aristotle-psychology/) . Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy Archive.
Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford
University.

9. De Anima I, 5
10. Seyyed Hossein Nasr and Oliver Leaman
(1996), History of Islamic Philosophy, p.
315, Routledge, ISBN 0-415-13159-6.

11. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature.

I, IV, vi

12. Hume, David. A Treatise of Human Nature.

4.1, 2
13. Dennett, Daniel (1986). "The Self as a
Center of Narrative Gravity" (http://cogprint
s.org/266/1/selfctr.htm) . Retrieved
2015-09-02.

14. Sloman, Aaron. " 'The Self' -- A bogus

concept? Yes and no!" (http://www.cs.bha
m.ac.uk/research/projects/cogaff/misc/th
e-self.html) . School of Computer Science,
University of Birmingham, UK. Retrieved
2019-06-16.

15. Cottingham, Jenny. From the self to the

Self: an exploration of the process of Self-
realisation in the context of Indian
psychology (https://pdfs.semanticscholar.o
rg/60b7/0a787bc77122ac7d975af8eb36f1
3ac7ea9c.pdf) . Auckland, New Zealand:
Auckland University of Technology. 2015.
16. Schaeffer, Kurtis R.; Kapstein, Matthew T.;
Tuttle, Gray (2013-03-26). Sources of
Tibetan Tradition (https://books.google.co
m/books?id=VmkMBcsXxdkC&pg=PA41
0) . Columbia University Press.
ISBN 9780231509787. p. 410

17. Germano, David Francis. Poetic thought, the

intelligent Universe, and the mystery of self:
The Tantric synthesis of rDzogs Chen in
fourteenth century Tibet. Madison: The
University of Wisconsin. 1992.
18. Priestley, Leonard C. D. C. (1999)
Pudgalavada Buddhism: The Reality of the
Indeterminate Self (https://web.archive.or
g/web/20150316083317/http://ahandfulof
leaves.org/documents/Pudgalavada%20B
uddhism_Priestely.pdf) . South Asian
Studies Papers, 12, monograph 1.
University of Toronto: Centre for South
Asian Studies.
19. Shiah, Yung-Jong (2016-02-04). "From Self
to Nonself: The Nonself Theory" (https://w
ww.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC474
0732) . Frontiers in Psychology. 7: 124.
doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2016.00124 (https://doi.
org/10.3389%2Ffpsyg.2016.00124) .
ISSN 1664-1078 (https://www.worldcat.or
g/issn/1664-1078) . PMC 4740732 (http
s://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PM
C4740732) . PMID 26869984 (https://pub
med.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/26869984) .

20. Anatta-lakkhana Sutta (Pali Canon).

Translation by Ñanamoli Thera (https://ww
w.accesstoinsight.org/tipitaka/sn/sn22/sn2
2.059.nymo.html) (1993).
21. Lambert, Richard (2007). Self Knowledge in
Thomas Aquinas: The Angelic Doctor on
the Soul's Knowledge of Itself.
Bloomington, IN: Author House. p. 1.
ISBN 9781420889659.

22. Laozi, Lao Tsu (1989). Tao Te Ching.

Vintage Books. p. 35. ISBN 978-0-679-
72434-6.

23. Mohapatra, Amulya; Mohapatra, Bijaya

(1993). Hinduism: Analytical Study. New
Delhi: Mittal Publications. p. 8.
ISBN 8170993881.

24. Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The

Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri
Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 22.
25. Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The
Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri
Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 500.

26. Alladi, Mahadeva Sastry (1992). The

Bhagavad Gita with the commentary of Sri
Sankaracharya. Samata Books. p. 484.

27. Gertler, Brie (2011). Self-Knowledge. Oxon:

Routledge. p. 9. ISBN 978-0203835678.

28. Gorgione, Luca (2018). Kant and the

Problem of Self-Knowledge. New York:
Routledge. ISBN 9781138385467.

References

Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Self-knowledge"

(https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/self-
 knowledge/) . Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.

Carsten Korfmacher, 'Personal Identity'

(http://www.iep.utm.edu/p/person-i.ht
m) , in "The Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy"

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