Section 1:

Summary and recommendations –

Volumes 5–7
In these last three Volumes of our Report, we make a number of
recommendations for changes to the legislation, policies and
practices for the prevention or minimisation of the failure of buildings
in earthquakes, on the legal and best- practice requirements for the
management of buildings after earthquakes and for the design of
new buildings. The numbering of the recommendations we make
continues sequentially from the recommendations made in Volumes
1 to 4 of our Report
Volume 5: Christchurch, the City and Our Terms of Reference directed us to inquire into:

approach to this Inquiry • whether the building as originally designed and

Section 2 of Volume 5 provides a brief history of the city constructed, and as altered and maintained,
of Christchurch, its buildings and its economy. It also complied with legal and best practice requirements;
describes the impact the Canterbury earthquakes have
• whether the building was identified as earthquake-
had on the city and its population.
prone or was subject to any measures to make it
In section 3 of this Volume we have set out our less susceptible to earthquake-risk before
approach to this Inquiry, including communications 4 September 2010;
with the families of those who lost their lives in building • the nature of the land associated with the building;
failures in the 22 February 2011 earthquake, the public
hearings we conducted and the other ways in which we • the nature and effectiveness of assessments and
gathered information, investigated matters and received remedial work after the earthquakes on
submissions. We have also described the way in which 4 September and 26 December 2010;
we managed the thousands of documents we received • why the building failed on 22 February 2011;
in the course of our Inquiry, and the reporting structure
• why the failure caused extensive injury and death;
we have followed.
• why it differed from other buildings in the extent to
Volume 6: CTV building which it failed; and

The CTV building, designed and constructed in the • whether any particular features of the building
mid-1980s, collapsed during the earthquake that struck contributed to the failure.
Christchurch at 12:51pm on 22 February 2011. The
The Terms of Reference precluded any inquiry into
collapse resulted in the death of 115 people and others
questions of liability. However, this did not prevent
suffered serious injuries.
consideration of errors or failings in design, permitting,
construction, inspection or any other matter that might
explain why the CTV building failed and why the failure
caused such extensive injury and death.
In Volume 6 we have set out our findings on these

Recommendation
matters. The collapse of the CTV building caused
much more injury and death than any of the other
building failures on 22 February 2011. Even though it
was designed under relatively recent building codes,
its failure was severe and resulted in the floor slabs We recommend that:
collapsing on top of one another, leaving most of 107.Where holes are required to be drilled in
those inside the building with no chance of survival. concrete, critical reinforcing should be
avoided. If it cannot be avoided, then specific
We do not summarise our conclusions here. Readers
mention should be made on the drawings and
wanting to see a summary of those findings are directed
specifications of the process to be followed if
to section 9 of Volume 6, where we set out the principal
steel is encountered, and inspection by the
conclusions we have reached. That section was also
engineer at this critical stage should be required.
written with a view to it being translated into the
languages spoken by many of the bereaved. Unusually
for a New Zealand tragedy, many of those who died Following the earthquake, Urban Search and Rescue
were foreign nationals. Resources have not permitted engineers working on the CTV site, Mr Graham Frost,
the full report to be translated. However, section 9 of Dr Robert Heywood and Mr John Trowsdale, took
Volume 6 has been translated into Japanese, simplified extensive photographs and labelled building elements.
Chinese, Thai and Korean. Their public-spirited initiative created an excellent
record of the state of the building and individual
The engineering design of the building was deficient
elements following collapse. There was no formal
in a number of respects. While there were elements of
system whereby this information was collected and the
the applicable codes that were confusing, a building
Royal Commission commends these engineers for their
permit should not have been issued for the building as
very thorough documentation and assessment of the
designed. There were also inadequacies in the
collapse debris.
construction of the building. The post-earthquake
inspections of the CTV building also illustrated areas Overall, we consider that the evidence provided an
in which building assessment processes could be adequate basis to make findings about the state of
improved. As noted above, a summary of all our the building after its collapse and to draw conclusions
findings in respect of the CTV building is set out in about possible collapse scenarios. However,
section 9 of Volume 6 of this Report. implementation of practice guidelines for forensic
engineering is warranted to ensure that high quality
We mention here matters that are the subject of specific
forensic work is guaranteed for future investigations.
recommendations arising from our inquiry into the CTV
building.

The CCC issued a number of permits and consents

(including resource consents) for work on the CTV
Recommendation
building between the time of its original construction
and the September earthquake. In most cases, the We recommend that:
approved work would have had no impact on the
108. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
structural performance of the building in an earthquake.
Employment should consider developing
A penetration was cut in the floor of level 2 for
guidelines for structural failure investigations,
installation of an internal staircase during a fit-out in
including circumstances in which sites should
2000. We are satisfied that the penetration would not
be preserved for formal forensic examination.
have affected the seismic performance of the building.
However, in our view particular care should be takento
ensure that damage to critical reinforcing does not It is important to identify other buildings in New Zealand
occur when buildings are altered. that have characteristics that might lead to their
collapse in a major earthquake, so that appropriate
steps can be taken to reduce the potential hazard
posed by these structures.
 Recommendation • sophisticated analyses such as inelastic
time history analyses may be carried out
to further assess potential seismic
performance. However, in interpreting the
We recommend that:
results of such an analysis, it is essential
109. In the assessment of buildings for their to allow for the approximations inherent
potential seismic performance: in the analytical models of members and
• the individual structural elements should interactions between structural members,
such as elongation, that are not analytically
be examined to see if they have capacity
modelled.
to resist seismic and gravity load actions
in an acceptably ductile manner; 110. Arising from our study of the CTV building, it
is important that the following, in particular,
• relatively simple methods of analysis
should be examined:
such as the equivalent static method and/
or pushover analyses may be used to • the beam-column joint details and the
identify load paths through the structure connection of beams to structural walls;
and the individual structural elements for
• the connection between floors acting as
first mode type actions. The significance
diaphragms and lateral force resisting
of local load paths associated with higher
elements; and
mode actions should be considered.
These actions are important for the • the level of confinement of columns to
stability of parts and portions of structures ensure that they have adequate ductility
and for the connection of floors to the to sustain the maximum inter-storey
lateral force resisting elements; drifts that may be induced in a major
earthquake.
• the load path assessment should be
carried out to identify the load paths
through the different structural In sections 8 and 9 of Volume 2 and section 6.2.5 of
elements and zones where strains Volume 4 of our report we discuss other issues related
may be concentrated, or where a load to the assessment of the potential seismic performance
path depends on non-ductile material of existing buildings.
characteristics, such as the tensile strength
of concrete or a fillet weld where the weld
Volume 7: Roles and responsibilities
is the weak element;

• while the initial lateral strength of a building Section 2: Building management after
may be acceptable, critical non-ductile earthquakes
weak links in load paths may result in
This section considers the management of buildings
rapid degradation in strength during
after an earthquake, both during and after a state of
an earthquake. It is essential to identify
emergency. We briefly outline New Zealand’s civil
these characteristics and allow for this
defence and emergency management framework
degradation in assessing potential seismic
and give an overview of the building safety evaluation
performance. The ability of a building to
process used to assess buildings after an earthquake.
deform in a ductile mode and sustain its
lateral strength is more important than its We consider that, overall, New Zealand was very well
initial lateral strength; and served by the engineers, building control officials and
others who volunteered in the building safety evaluation
process carried out after the Canterbury earthquakes.
We appreciate the valuable evidence many of these
volunteers gave the Royal Commission to assist us to
make recommendations for improvements to the
management of buildings after earthquakes.
The Royal Commission considers that life safety As well as considering the process of building safety
should be the main objective for managing buildings evaluation, we have discussed and made
after earthquakes. We consider that current legislation recommendations about the way in which engineers
provides for New Zealand’s building safety evaluation evaluate buildings when carrying out rapid assessments
process, but we recognise that proposals to introduce and detailed engineering evaluations after earthquakes.
new emergency management provisions into the We also make recommendations about the way that
Building Act 2004 may address some of the problems building safety evaluators should be identified and trained.
that occurred when the process transitioned from
civil defence to normal building control arrangements
controlled by territorial authorities.
Recommendations
Recommendations We recommend that:
How evaluators assess buildings after
earthquakes
We recommend that:
116. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
111. Life safety should be the overarching
Employment, the Ministry of Civil Defence
objective of building management after
and Emergency Management, GNS Science,
earthquakes as communities both respond to
the New Zealand Society for Earthquake
and recover from the disaster.
Engineering and other engineering technical
112. The building safety evaluation process should groups should research how and when
be used following a range of disasters. building safety evaluators should account
113. Legislation should provide that a building for aftershocks.
safety evaluation operation should only be 117. The building safety evaluation process should
commenced during a state of emergency. set out the factors evaluators need to take into
114. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and account when considering how a building will
Employment should progress its proposals to respond in an aftershock, including:
incorporate new emergency risk management • how close the main shock was to an
provisions into the Building Act 2004 to: urban centre that could be affected by
• make the Ministry of Business, Innovation an aftershock;
and Employment responsible for the • the direction of the main shock and any
development and maintenance of likely aftershocks; and
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation
process; • how soil, ground conditions and any other
relevant factors may affect the intensity of
• make territorial authorities responsible for the ground motions in an aftershock.
delivering a building safety evaluation
Mobilising a sufficient number of skilled
operation; and
building safety evaluators
• give the Ministry of Business, Innovation
118. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
and Employment a formal role within
Employment should progress their proposal
national civil defence and emergency
to establish a core team of building safety
planning arrangements.
evaluators that the Ministry could call on.
115. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
119. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should continue working with
Employment should carefully consider the
the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency
merits and detail of any proposals about
Management on the detail of the above
the size of this group of building safety
proposals.
evaluators.
120. The ability to supplement this team with more
evaluators who have received basic training
should be maintained.
121. Legislation should continue to provide for a 131. This training programme should be
waiver of liability for building safety developed using the New Zealand Society for
evaluators carrying out rapid assessments. Earthquake Engineering’s building evaluation
122. The liability waiver for building safety resource and training capability objectives
evaluators should be aligned with the building framework, in which building safety evaluators
safety evaluation process instead of being are split into three different groups and each
restricted to an operation carried out in a group receives a different level of training.
state of emergency. 132. The core group of building safety evaluators
Guidelines for building safety evaluators who are a national resource capable of
leading a building safety evaluation operation,
123. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
and those Chartered Professional Engineers,
Employment should work with the New
structural engineers and senior building
Zealand Society for Earthquake
officials who wish to be building safety
Engineering, the Structural Engineering
evaluators, should be required to attend
Society New Zealand and others with
compulsory training.
appropriate experience and expertise to
finalise guidelines for Detailed Engineering 133. Only trained building safety evaluators should
Evaluations as soon as possible. be authorised to participate in a building
safety evaluation operation unless the
124. Guidelines should be developed that assist
circumstances of a particular disaster make
building safety evaluators to assess when
this impractical.
and how to enter a damaged building.
134. If the scale of the emergency requires the
125. These guidelines should be based on the
mobilisation of the largest group of potential
Urban Search and Rescue training on
building safety evaluators, who have not
when and how to assess entry to a
received the compulsory training, these
damaged building.
evaluators should work, wherever practicable,
126. These guidelines should be attached to the under the supervision of those evaluators
guidelines that the Ministry of Business, who have attended the compulsory training.
Innovation and Employment is developing
135. Territorial authority staff with civil defence
on the way in which engineers should carry
and emergency management responsibilities
out Detailed Engineering Evaluations after
should be required to attend the compulsory
earthquakes.
building safety evaluator training as part of
127. New Zealand’s building safety evaluation their job training.
guidelines should incorporate detailed
Indicating that evaluators have the right skills
guidance to engineers about the way they
should assess the damage to particular 136. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
building types. Employment should keep a list of the people
who complete the compulsory training for
128. The field guide for building safety evaluators
building safety evaluators and should make
should be finalised.
this list available to all territorial authorities.
Training for building safety evaluators 137. Where available, only Chartered Professional
129. The building safety evaluation process should Engineers should carry out Level 2 Rapid
incorporate a training programme for all Assessments.
building safety evaluators.
130. Such training should cover: Despite some problems, we consider that, overall, the
building safety evaluation operations after the
• what the building safety evaluation
Canterbury earthquakes were well delivered. We
process is and how it works; and
recommend that a number of changes are made to
• how to identify and assess the damage improve the delivery of New Zealand’s building safety
evaluators observe in buildings after evaluation process, which follows current international
an earthquake. best-practice.
Recommendations 147. Information management systems should
be developed as part of planning for
New Zealand’s building safety evaluation
process.
We recommend that:
148. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
138. The Indicator Building model should be Employment should work with territorial
incorporated into New Zealand’s building authorities and other relevant agencies to
safety evaluation process. develop a way for territorial authority building
139. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and records to be electronically recorded and
Employment should provide guidance to stored off-site.
territorial authorities to support their plans to 149. A clear system for identifying individual
carry out a building safety evaluation process. buildings should be developed and included in
140. Territorial authorities should be required to the
plan their building safety evaluation process plans for a building safety evaluation process.
as part of their civil defence and emergency
150. Land Information New Zealand should
management plans.
continue to work on initiatives that develop
141. Only official building safety evaluators should consistent national addressing protocols
be authorised to place, change or remove and make this information available to the
placards, and to carry out rapid assessments general public.
for this purpose.
Recommendations related to the placards The Royal Commission heard evidence that there were
142. The placards placed as a result of the significant issues in the transition of responsibility for
building safety evaluation process should the building safety evaluation process from civil
be rewritten in a plain English format. defence to normal building management arrangements
governed by territorial authorities. We discuss and
143. In principle, the colour of the green placard
make recommendations about the need for transition
should be changed to white. The Ministry of
mechanisms and about the way in which territorial
Business, Innovation and Employment should
authorities should manage buildings after earthquakes.
consult with the international building safety
We consider that all buildings should be assessed
evaluation community about the merits and
further after the rapid assessment phase of the building
detail of the change before deciding whether
safety evaluation operation. This assessment should be
or not to do this.
based on the nature of the event, the type of structure
144. Formal procedures should be developed that and the level of damage observed. The Royal
set out when and how the status of a building Commission has heard evidence regarding the barriers
could be changed. The placard on a building faced by some building owners motivated to address
should only be changed if the formal the damage to their building after the September
procedures are followed. earthquake. We consider that some of these barriers
are indicative of issues with the management of
Communication and information management earthquake-prone buildings and we make
145. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and recommendations about these specific issues in
Employment should be responsible for Volume 4 of our Report.
developing and releasing public communication
materials about building management after
earthquakes and other disasters during and
after the state of emergency.
146. GNS Science should develop protocols and
plans to ensure that it is ready to advise the
Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment, other government agencies,
local authorities and the wider public after
an earthquake.
Recommendations d legislation should require territorial
authorities to classify buildings in their
districts in accordance with the preceding
Recommendation within the timeframes
We recommend that: established under Recommendation 82 in
151. After an earthquake that has given rise to the Volume 4 of our Report (Recommendation
declaration of a state of emergency, buildings 82 requires the assessment of earthquake-
should be assessed in accordance with the prone and potentially earthquake-prone
following process: buildings);
a all buildings should be subject to a rapid e where the rapid assessment process had
assessment process; identified the need for further evaluation of
a building in one of these defined Groups,
b for the purposes of subsequent steps,
the building should not be occupied
buildings should be placed in the following
until the Civil Defence Controller or the
categories:
territorial authority (as appropriate) has
i) Group 1: non-unreinforced masonry approved the occupancy of the building
buildings that do not have a known after the following assessments:
critical structural weakness, and either,
i) for Group 1 buildings:
• in the case of concrete buildings,
• where no significant structural
were designed to NZS 3101:1995 or
damage was seen, a Level 2 Rapid
later editions of that Standard;
Assessment;
• in the case of structural steel
• where significant structural damage was
buildings, were designed to NZS
seen, a Plans-Based Assessment for
3404:1992 (informed by the Heavy
Engineering Research Association lower levels of structural damage and
guidelines published in 1994) or later a Detailed Engineering Evaluation for
editions of that Standard; higher levels of structural damage;

or have been subject to an evaluation ii) for Group 2 buildings:

that has shown that the building has • where no significant structural
67% ULS or greater (we discuss the damage was seen, a Plans-Based
term “ULS” in section 6.2.4 of Volume Assessment;
4);
• where significant structural damage
ii) Group 2: buildings designed between was seen, a Detailed Engineering
1976 and the mid-1990s, but not Evaluation;
included in Group 1;
iii) for Group 3 buildings:
iii) Group 3: buildings designed before
1976, but not included in Group 1; and • for all levels of damage, a Detailed
Engineering Evaluation;
iv) Group 4: unreinforced masonry
buildings; iv) for Group 4 buildings:

c buildings used for residential purposes that • where no significant structural

are three or less storeys in height should damage was seen and the building
be excluded from Groups 2 and 3. In the has been retrofitted to 67% ULS or
case of those buildings, a pragmatic greater, a Plans-Based Assessment;
approach needs to be taken to assessment • where significant structural damage
and occupancy, which balances the need is apparent and where the building
for shelter with safety considerations. Other has not been retrofitted to 67% ULS
commercial and residential buildings or greater, a Detailed Engineering
should not be occupied unless approved
Evaluation;
for occupancy in accordance with the
process outlined below;
 f arranging for the Plans-Based 159. The roles and responsibilities of decision
Assessments and Detailed Engineering makers should be described in the building
Evaluations should be the responsibility of safety evaluation process. The roles and
the owner of the buildings concerned; and responsibilities should allow for flexibility of
g the Ministry of Business, Innovation and operation according to the circumstances
Employment should further develop and scale of the event.
the Plans-Based Assessment concept, Buildings that act as one structure in an
in consultation with the New Zealand earthquake
Society for Earthquake Engineering and
160. The building safety evaluation process should
the Structural Engineering Society New
direct evaluators to assess properties that
Zealand, and set out the Plans-Based
act as one structure in an earthquake as one
Assessment in published guidelines.
structure, rather than as separate buildings.
152. Plans-Based Assessments and Detailed
Transition mechanism
Engineering Evaluations should include
checking the vulnerabilities observed after 161. The building safety evaluation and wider
the Canterbury earthquakes that the Royal building management after earthquakes
Commission describes in Volume 2, section (and other disasters) framework should be
6.2.5 of Volume 4, and section 6.3.8 of developed and provided for in legislation.
Volume 6 of this Report.
153. Any Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
Engineering Evaluation of a building after
an earthquake should begin with a careful
examination of the building’s plans.
154. The Plans-Based Assessment and Detailed
Engineering Evaluation should confirm
that all known falling hazards and other
vulnerabilities have been assessed and
secured or removed.
155. A copy of the Plans-Based Assessment and
the Detailed Engineering Evaluation should
be given to the relevant authorities.
Cordon management
156. Civil defence and emergency management
should be responsible for setting up and
maintaining cordons during the state of
emergency.
157. Territorial authorities should be responsible
for maintaining any cordons that are in place
at the end of the state of emergency until
the public space or building they surround is
made safe.
158. Territorial authorities should be able to
recover the costs of maintaining any
necessary cordons from the building owner
after three months.
Section 3: Roles and responsibilities
Through the course of our Inquiry, we identified some
systemic issues relating to the regulatory framework for
Recommendations
buildings, such as misunderstanding of the framework, a
complex and confusing suite of regulatory documents,
We recommend that:
and quality assurance issues. These issues relate to the
design and construction of complex, new buildings. 162.Building consent applications for:

• buildings in importance levels 3, 4 and 5

Quality assurance is vital in the structural design
in Table 3.2 of AS/NZS 1170.0:2002;
of complex buildings. Quality assurance occurs
at a number of levels throughout the design and • commercial buildings comprising three
construction of such buildings. The currently or more storeys; and
large number of building consent authorities
• residential buildings comprising three or
results in inconsistent application requirements
more storeys with three or more
and consent decisions around the country, and
household units
varying levels of capability within these
authorities. should be accompanied by a Structural
Design Features Report, which describes
The experience and skill of structural engineers the key elements of the design, including
designing such structures also may vary, with reliance the foundations and gravity and lateral load
placed on the building consent authority to provide a resisting elements.
check.
163. A structural Chartered Professional Engineer
This poses risks for the quality of our buildings. We should be engaged at the same time as the
have concluded that the design of complex buildings architect for the design of a complex building.
(as defined in section 3.3.8.2 of Volume 7 of this Report) 164. After consideration of the Structural Design
requires a higher level of competence. We consider Features Report, the building consent
the appropriate regulatory procedure to ensure this authority should decide whether or not the
occurs is through the preparation and submission of structure should be regarded as complex.
a Structural Design Features Report at the start of the
165. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
building consent authority’s assessment of a building
Employment should develop criteria to be
consent application. The building consent authority
applied in determining whether a structure is
would, on the basis of this report and criteria to be
complex, in consultation with the Structural
developed, determine if the structure is a complex
Engineering Society New Zealand, the New
one. If it is determined to be a complex structure, a
Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering,
“Recognised Structural Engineer” would be required
the New Zealand Geotechnical Society and
to certify the structural integrity of the design. The
other relevant groups, including building
building consent authority would then determine
consent authorities. When developed, the
whether it has the staff with the appropriate
criteria should be given regulatory force.
competency to process the consent application in-
house (and whether any additional peer review 166. If the structure is determined to be not
certified by a Recognised Structural Engineer is complex, the engineer who provided the
required), or whether it needs to refer the application Structural Design Features Report should
to another building consent authority that has the staff certify the structural integrity of the
with the appropriate competency to process the building’s design.
application. If the structure is determined to be not 167. If the structure is determined to be complex,
complex, the engineer who provided the Structural a Recognised Structural Engineer should be
Design Features Report would certify the structural required to certify the structural integrity of
integrity of the building’s design. These the design.
recommendations would give further assurance of
building quality and reduce reliance on the building
consent authority.
 168. On receipt of the building consent 172. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
application, the building consent authority Employment should consult with learned societies, such
should decide: as the New Zealand Society for Earthquake
Engineering, the New Zealand Geotechnical Society and
a whether it has the staff with the the Structural Engineering Society New Zealand, about
appropriate competency (qualifications the ongoing membership of the Engineering Advisory
and experience) to process the application Group. The membership of the Group should always
in-house (including any decision as to include senior practising structural engineers.
whether the structure is complex and
whether any additional peer review
certified by a Recognised Structural
Engineer should be required); or
b whether it needs to refer the application to We discuss the role of Standards in New Zealand’s
another building consent authority that has “performance-based” regulatory system and note that
the staff with the appropriate competency the suite of Standards supporting the Building Code
(qualifications and experience) to process plays a vital role in ensuring our buildings are designed
the application. well and built well. We have concluded that these
Standards should be regularly reviewed and updated.

We have also reviewed the leadership structures

within the building sector, as they relate to the
matters we are concerned with, and consider that Recommendations
the role of Chief
Engineer within the Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should be strengthened and supported
with additional capability. We recommend that:
173. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and
Employment should develop, lead and fund

Recommendations a Policy and Regulatory Work Programme

in consultation with the Institution of
Professional Engineers New Zealand, the
We recommend that: New Zealand Construction Industry Council,
Standards New Zealand, the Building
169. The role of Chief Engineer should be
Research Association of New Zealand, the
renamed Chief Structural Engineer to reflect a
New Zealand Geotechnical Society, the
greater focus on the structure of complex
New Zealand Society for Earthquake
buildings and should be further strengthened
Engineering and the Structural Engineering
and supported with additional capability.
Society New Zealand.
170. The Chief Structural Engineer should have
174. The Policy and Regulatory Work
the statutory power to collect consent
Programme should identify the priorities
applications for complex structures (as
for the development, review and update of
part of the Policy and Regulatory Work
compliance documents and Standards, and
Programme in Recommendations 173 and
define the status of compliance documents
174 below) for the purpose of analysing
and guidance material. Work relating to
trends, identifying issues and risks, and
Standards prioritised for update as part of
sharing knowledge with the building and
the Policy and Regulatory Work Programme
construction sector.
should be funded as part of the work
171. The Engineering Advisory Group should programme.
continue as an ongoing function to provide
expert advice to the Chief Structural Engineer.
 We have also reviewed the competence requirements
175. Standards referenced in the Building Code against which engineers are assessed for registration
should be available online, free of charge. as a Chartered Professional Engineer (CPEng).
We recommend the introduction of an additional
176. The Policy and Regulatory Work Programme
competence measure against which every structural
should be the responsibility of the Chief
engineer must be assessed – “a good knowledge of
Structural Engineer.
the fundamental requirements of structural design and
177. A communications plan should be developed of the fundamental behaviour of structural elements
by the Ministry of Business, Innovation subjected to seismic actions”.
and Employment to communicate the
Policy and Regulatory Work Programme
and ensure information is effective, and
targeted for different participants in the Recommendations
sector. There should be clarity about the
status of information provided to the sector;
We recommend that:
for example, whether it is a compliance
document, Standard or guidance. 178. The Institution of Professional Engineers
New Zealand (as the Registration Authority)
should publish on the Chartered Professional
Engineer register information about a
Section 4: Training and education of
Chartered Professional Engineer’s area of
civil engineers and organisation of the
practice, and any other information that may
civil engineering profession
further inform consumers of engineering
In this section of our Report, we have reviewed the services of the competence of individual
training and education of civil engineers and the engineers, under section 18(1)(d) of the
organisation of the civil engineering profession. Chartered Professional Engineers of
New Zealand Act 2002.
International agreements underpin the nature and
content of engineering education in New Zealand. 179. There should be ongoing provision of post-
The Royal Commission has heard nothing that suggests graduate continuing education for engineers
there should be a change in the structure of the through the provision of block courses,
Bachelor of Engineering degree. Rather, key matters for mentoring within engineering firms and
further consideration are in post-degree training and courses suitable for those who are working.
continuing education through provision of tailored block 180. The universities of Auckland and Canterbury
courses for those who are working, and mentoring should pursue ways of increasing the
within engineering firms. structural and geotechnical knowledge of civil
engineers entering the profession.
Life safety is and should remain the paramount
objective in the design and construction of buildings 181. Legislation should provide for Recognised
to resist earthquake motions. This is best achieved Structural Engineers to be responsible for the
by having highly experienced people performing certification of the design of complex buildings
the highest risk activities. In this regard, the Royal as described in Recommendations 162–168.
Commission has heard proposals and views from
interested parties as to the merits, issues and risks of
implementing a two-tier certification system that would
raise the level of training and experience required of
a structural engineer who certifies engineering design
plans for complex structures. We consider there is merit
in this concept and recommend the creation of the role
of ”Recognised Structural Engineer” for these purposes
(see also section 3 of Volume 7 of this Report).
 182. The Ministry of Business, Innovation and b each clause in the codes of ethics stands
Employment should develop prescribed alone and no one clause can override
qualifications and competencies for another. In the case of a perceived conflict
“Recognised Structural Engineers” in between two or more clauses, the question
consultation with the Chartered Professional as to which clause should carry most
Engineers Council, the Institution of weight in the circumstances presented
Professional Engineers New Zealand, the should be a carefully considered matter of
Structural Engineering Society New Zealand judgement; and
and the New Zealand Society for Earthquake
c reporting obligations of engineers when a
Engineering. These prescribed qualifications
structure has been identified that presents
and competencies should be a more
a risk to health and safety. There should
specific prescription of the qualifications and
be clarity as to the point at which an
competencies of the role, and require more
obligation of a reviewing engineer to
extensive design experience of the type
report is extinguished, and where the
required for the design of complex
accountability for addressing the matter
structures than that required for a Chartered
and rectifying any weaknesses rests.
Professional Engineer. These should be
included in an appropriate regulation. 184. Part 3, clause 6 of the Institution of
Professional Engineers New Zealand Code
of Ethics and Rule 48 of the Chartered
Members of the Institution of Professional Engineers
Professional Engineers Rules of New Zealand
New Zealand (IPENZ) are required to act in accordance
(No 2) 2002 should be amended to provide
with the IPENZ Code of Ethics, and Chartered
for an obligation to advise the relevant
Professional Engineers (CPEng) are bound to a Code
territorial authority and the Institution of
of Ethical Conduct. Both codes are identical in the
Professional Engineers New Zealand in
obligations they impose on the registered engineers.
circumstances where a structural weakness
The key matters of interest to the Royal Commission
has been discovered that gives rise to a risk
have been the clauses governing the requirement not
to health and safety.
to misrepresent competence (IPENZ clause 4 and
CPEng rule 46) and the obligations to report buildings
and structures that place the public’s health and safety A particular feature of the engineering profession is
at risk (IPENZ clause 11 and CPEng rule 53). We the existence of learned societies dedicated to
consider that reviewing structural engineers should particular fields of engineering practice. Membership
have a clearly expressed ethical duty to disclose the of the individual societies largely consists of engineers
existence of a critical structural weakness, in a process practising within the society’s particular field, although
which protects them from any liability where they have many engineers are multi-disciplinary and are therefore
acted in good faith. members of more than one society.

These learned societies include the Structural

Recommendation Engineering Society New Zealand (SESOC), New

Zealand Society for Earthquake Engineering (NZSEE),
New Zealand Concrete Society (NZCS), New Zealand
Geotechnical Society (NZGS), New Zealand Timber
We recommend that: Design Society Incorporated, Cement and Concrete
183. The Institution of Professional Engineers Association of New Zealand (CCANZ), the Heavy
New Zealand should provide clarification Engineering Research Association (HERA) and others.
of its codes of ethics, in respect of the
The work undertaken by the societies’ members
following matters:
includes both contributing to formal processes
a the test for taking action should be well for reviewing and updating New Zealand Building
understood by engineers – i.e. ensuring Standards, and issuing guidance on best-practice for
public health and safety; the profession and industry, some of which is paid
work but much of which is not. Society members also
contribute technical papers for conference proceedings
and provide guidance on best-practice to industry.

Recommendation
Processes in which guidance is given are informal, and
do not pass through the scrutiny of a regulatory review
process: the best-practice advice is not formalised as
legal requirements, and therefore may or may not be
utilised or taken into account by practitioners. We recommend that:
185. The Institution of Professional Engineers
There are risks in the informal component of this
New Zealand, the New Zealand Institute of
approach. These include whether the necessary
Architects, and the New Zealand Registered
expertise will remain available on a voluntary basis
Architects Board, supported by the Ministry
to enable the process to continue over time, and the
of Business, Innovation and Employment,
absence of an objective process that tests the
should work together to ensure greater
content and assesses the consequences of the
collaboration and information sharing
best-practice guidance by formal regulatory review.
between architects and structural engineers.
Assessment of consequences would include
examining the costs of the best-practice standards and
requirements to determine value in the context of the
risks being managed. In addition, without any formal
recognition, the adoption of the recommended best-
practices is difficult to monitor and cannot be enforced.
This makes it unlikely that they will be consistently
applied by practitioners.

As discussed above, we consider that the Ministry of

Business, Innovation and Employment (MBIE) should
develop a policy and regulatory work programme to
identify priorities and clarify roles. In doing this work,
MBIE should consult with the engineering profession’s
learned societies as to where best-practice guidance
is required, and the appropriate process for achieving
it, including the need to codify any parts of the advice
into regulations or Standards, and whether the issues
should be led by the regulator, or left to the societies.

The professional and learned societies play an

important role in facilitating information sharing, debate,
and problem resolution across the various disciplines
within the engineering profession. Of particular interest
to the Royal Commission is the need for collaboration
between structural and geotechnical engineers. The
societies also endeavour at times to bring engineers
together with other intersecting professions within
the construction industry (for example, constructors,
manufacturers and architects).

The Royal Commission considers there is a reasonable

level of constructive engagement between the different
branches of engineering. However, there is scope for
more constructive, and early, collaboration between
architects and engineers.
Section 5: Canterbury Regional Council and
Christchurch City Council – management of
earthquake risk Recommendations
As part of our Inquiry into the Canterbury earthquakes,
we considered it would be inappropriate to ignore We recommend that:
entirely the fact there has been unnecessary damage
and costs sustained as a result of the development 186. Sections 6 and 7 of the Resource
of land subject to a risk of liquefaction without duly Management Act 1991 should be amended
considering that risk. Apart from anything else, an to ensure that regional and district plans
understanding of how that has been possible under (including the zoning of new areas for urban
the existing regulatory system might enable better development) are prepared on a basis
outcomes in the future. that acknowledges the potential effects of
earthquakes and liquefaction, and to
As a result of our Inquiry into these matters, we ensure that those risks are considered in
conclude that there should be better provision for the the processing of resource and subdivision
acknowledgment of earthquake and liquefaction risk consents under the Act.
in the various planning instruments that are made 187. Regional councils and territorial authorities
under the Resource Management Act 1991. One way should ensure that they are adequately
of minimising the failure of buildings in the future is to informed about the seismicity of their regions
ensure that the land on which they are developed is and districts. Since seismicity should be
suitable for the purpose. Having said that, we need to considered and understood at a regional
emphasise that it is not possible to predict with any level, regional councils should take a lead role
certainty when an earthquake will occur and, in reality, in this respect, and provide policy guidance
the public and private investment in the country’s cities as to where and how liquefaction risk ought
is such that it is not realistic to redirect development to be avoided or mitigated. In Auckland,
from the existing central business districts. However, the Auckland Council should perform these
when zoning for new development areas is in functions.
contemplation, we consider that it would be appropriate
for the risks of liquefaction and lateral spreading to be 188. Applicants for resource and subdivision
taken into account. consents should be required to undertake
such geotechnical investigations as may
be appropriate to identify the potential
for liquefaction risk, lateral spreading or other
soil conditions that may contribute to building
failure in a significant earthquake. Where
appropriate, resource and subdivision
consents should be subject to conditions
requiring land improvement to mitigate
these risks.
189. The Ministry for the Environment should
give consideration to the development of
guidance for regional councils and territorial
authorities in relation to the matters referred
to in Recommendations 186–188.