STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

FINALS REVIEWER
BLOCK G03

Statutory Construction is the Soc Sci of law subjects. On its face, it is painful, heavy on
memory, and looks back more than it looks ahead, like law is supposed to do. However, if one
thing can be said about the interpretation of both statutes and history, it is that it helps us fill in
the blanks. History allows us to make sense of the times that define us, and construction allows
us to make sense of the laws that govern us.

I. CONSTRUCTION – HOW DEFINED

Caltex v. Palomar: Construction, verily, is the ART OR PROCESS OF

DISCOVERING and EXPOUNDING THE MEANING and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to A GIVEN CASE, where that intention is
rendered doubtful, amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is NOT
EXPLICITLY PROVIDED for in the law (Black, Interpretation of Laws, p. 1).

II. EFFECTIVITY OF LAWS

S18, EO 292 and A2, Civil Code

Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is
otherwise provided. (As amended by E.O. No. 200; the Civil Code provision
originally did not provide for the need for a newspaper of general circulation)

WHAT IS A NEWSPAPER OF GENERAL CIRCULATION?

To be a newspaper of general circulation, it is enough that "it is published for the
DISSEMINATION of local news and general information; that it has a BONA
FIDE SUBSCRIPTION LIST OF PAYING SUBSCRIBERS; that it is
PUBLISHED AT REGULAR INTERVALS." (Basa v. Mercado)

Tabloids like Abante Tonite and Bulgar, as well as regional tabloids like The Davao
Star and The Ilocos Times, are newspapers of general circulation.

Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985

Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel public officials to publish or cause
publication in the Official Gazette various PDs, LOIs, GOs, proclamations, Eos, and
AOs. Respondents said that the petitioners have no legal personality to bring about
the petition as they are not aggrieved by the non-publication of the presidential
issuances. Petitioners responded that it is in their interests as citizens to know the
presidential issuances.

The Court ruled that Article 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude requirement of
publication in the Official Gazette and that publication of presidential issuances of a
public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of due process. Before a

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 person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of
its contents. Unpublished presidential issuances have no force and effect.

Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986

Petitioners filed for a writ of mandamus to compel respondents to publish in the
Official Gazette various laws such as presidential decrees, letters of instruction,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of implementation, and
administrative orders. Respondents contend that “otherwise provided” of Art. 2
allows the dispensation of publication.

Does the phrase “unless it is otherwise provided” of Article 2 apply to the publication
requirement or the effectivity date?

The phrase applies to the EFFECTIVITY DATE. Publication is indispensable in

every case. This ensures the right to due process and the right to information on
matters of public concern. "Unless it is otherwise provided" gives the legislature the
discretion to shorten or extend the fifteen-day standard. An example would be the
Civil Code; it did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication but a
year from its publication.

Publication must be in full. There should be substantial compliance. The mere

mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, and its
whereabouts is not substantial compliance.

Publication requirements do not apply only to “laws of general application.” All

statutes, including laws of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition of their effectivity.

The only exemptions to the rule cited by the Court are letters of instructions,
internal regulations, and municipal ordinances. (Internal in nature or is ruled by a
different code.)

People v. Que Po Lay, G.R. No. L-6791, March 29, 1954

In November 1951, Que Po Lay had some US$7000 in bills, checks, and money
orders. However, he failed to sell the same to the Central Bank within one day as
required by Circular No. 20. Que Po Lay claimed in his defense that Circular No. 20
was not yet published in the Official Gazette when he was charged of its violation.
He cited Commonwealth Act No. 638 and Act No. 2930 which similarly state that
“circulars should be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order of general
applicability.” Nonetheless, he was convicted for its violation.

Is Que Po Lay then liable for violating an unpublished Circular No. 20? Nooooo.

The Court holds that publication is necessary for circulars, regulations, and notices to
become effective but Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code holds that
statutes passed by Congress shall, in absence of special provision, take effect on the

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 beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in
the Official Gazette.

Although Circular No. 20 was issued in 1949, it was not published until November
1951, 3 months after appellant’s conviction and violation. It thus has no legal effect,
and Que Po Lay is not liable for it was not binding at the time he was found to have
failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession.

Supplements: Yaokasin v. Commissioner on Customs (The Commissioner of

Customs has power of automatic review over the decisions of the Collector of
Customs in protest and seizure cases.) Pesigan v. Angeles, Umali v. Estanislao

III. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, INTERPRETATION, AND JUDICIAL

LEGISLATION

A. DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION

Interpretation – Art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words
Construction – Drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct
expressions, or determining the application of words to facts in litigation.

B. LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE

Power to construe - The duty and power to interpret or construe a statute or the
Constitution belongs to the judiciary (Article VIII, Section 4(2), 1987 Constitution). It
is the Court which has the final say as to what the law means.

Limitations: The Court can only construe an applicable law in controversies which are
ripe for judicial resolution, and not those that are either moot or academic (purpose
has become stale or where no practical relief can be granted or which can have no
practical effect; see Falcis).

Exception: If the issue is “capable of repetition yet evading review” especially where
public interest requires its resolutions. (Pimentel v. Ermita)

C. AIDS IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

1. INTRINSIC or INTERNAL AIDS in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1. Title
2. Preamble – “Whereas” clauses; although not an essential part of the statute, it is
important if there is ambiguity in the meaning since it states the purpose, reason or
justification for the enactment of the law. Congress has its explanatory notes before
the dispositive portion.

3. Context of the whole text – Best source to ascertain legislative intent is the statute
itself – words, phrases, sentences, sections, clauses, provisions. Statute ought to be

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 taken as a whole and in relation to another; not from an isolated part or particular
provision.

4. Punctuation marks
5. Capitalization of letters
6. Headnotes or epigraphs
7. Language/ lingual text

2. EXTRINSIC or EXTERNAL AIDS in STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

1. Intent or spirit of law – Ratio legis est anima. The leading star and guiding light in
the interpretation of a statute.

2. Policy of law – A construction which would promote the policy of the law should
be favored than that would defeat it.

3. Purpose of law – The purpose of the law or the mischief intended to be removed
or suppressed are important factors to consider in construction of statutes. While
the purpose is more important than the rules of grammar and logic, courts cannot
assume some purpose not expressed.

4. Dictionaries - Lawmakers, ordinarily untrained philologists and lexicographers,

use words in their common meaning

Exception: When the statute has defined the words used and/or the legislature has
intended a technical or special legal meaning to these words.

5. Consequences of various constructions – Construction that will lead to injustice or

hardship or result in absurdity should be rejected or avoided.
Presumption: The legislature did not intend to cause injustice in enacting statutes.
Exception: When the law is clear and unambiguous.

6. Presumptions
7. Legislative history
8. Contemporaneous construction

D. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION VIS-A-VIS JUDICIAL LEGISLATION

Statutory construction is about discovering or expounding the meaning of the law.

Judicial legislation is defined as the move of a court to step in to craft missing parts,
to fill in the gaps in laws, or when it oversteps its discretional boundaries and goes
beyond the law to coin doctrines or principles which are not previously established.

E. LIBERAL vs. STRICT CONSTRUCTION

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 LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION
- Equitable construction as will enlarge the letter of the statute to accomplish its
intended purpose, carry out its intent, and promote justice
- Expand the meaning of the statute to meet cases which are clearly within the
spirit or reason of it
- Exceptions: If the statute is plain, clear and unambiguous, enlargement of the
provision is prohibited. Nor does it mean that the words be forced out of their
natural meaning.

STATUTES GENERALLY LIBERALLY CONSTRUED

1. General social legislation
2. Grant of power to local governments
a. General welfare clause
b. Statutes granting taxing power to local government
3. Statutes prescribing prescriptive period to collect taxes
4. Statutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of taxes
5. Election laws
6. Amnesty proclamations
7. Statutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes
8. Adoption statutes
9. Veteran and pension laws
10. Rules of Court
11. Other statutes
a. Curative statutes
b. Redemption law
c. Warehouse receipt laws
d. Probation law
e. Statutes granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution

STRICT CONSTRUCTION
- Scope of the statute shall not be enlarged or extended by implication, intendment,
or equitable consideration beyond the literal meaning
- Close and conservative adherence to the literal or textual interpretation
- Exceptions: It does not mean that the statute should be given its narrowest
meaning, nor does it mean that words should be restricted as not to have their full
meaning.

STATUTES GENERALLY STRICTLY CONSTRUED

1. Penal statutes – strictly against the state and liberally in favor of the accused

Limitations to construction in favor of the accused

a. Not to be construed as to defeat the obvious purpose of the legislature
b. Only when the law is ambiguous and there is doubt in its meaning

2. Statutes in derogation of rights

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 a. Statutes authorizing expropriations – Strictly construed against the
expropriating authority and liberally in favor of the property owners
b. Statutes imposing taxes and custom duties
c. Statutory grounds for removing officials

3. Statutes granting privileges - Strict construction requires that those who invoke
the grant should strictly comply with the provisions (hence the League of Cities’
apprehension towards the 16 Cities)
a. Legislative grants to local government units
b. Naturalization laws
c. Statutes granting tax exemptions
d. Statutes prescribing formalities of will

4. Statutes concerning the sovereign

a. Statutes authorizing suits against the government

5. Exceptions and provisos

IV. BASIC PRINCIPLES USED IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

These contain the salient points only.

1. Plain Meaning Rule

Chavez v. JBC (“a” Representative of Congress)

RELEVANT LAW: Article 8, Section 8, 1987 Constitution – 1) A Judicial and
Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.

Does Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution allow for more than one member of
Congress to sit on the JBC?

The provision provided for the creation of the JBC to rid the appointments of the
Judiciary of political pressure and partisan activities, with it being composed of the
Chief Justice as its ex officio Chair, the Secretary of Justice, one retired Supreme
Court Justice, one law professor, one IBP rep, and a Representative of Congress
sitting as ex officio member. However, two members of Congress began to sit in the
JBC, with each member having a half-vote that later became a full vote seven years
later.

The Court held that use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of
Congress" is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction.

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 The use of “a” was indicative of the CONCOM intention: Congress may designate
only 1 representative to the JBC. Had it been the intention that more than 1
representative from legislatures, the Framers could have provided for this in no
uncertain terms. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the
language employed in the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed.

Verba legis non est recedendum — from the words of a statute there should be no
departure.

2. Ratio Legis est Anima

League of Cities v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 176951, December 21, 2009

RELEVANT LAW: R.A. No. 9009

In the Eleventh Congress, 57 bills seeking the conversion of municipalities into

component cities were filed before the House of Representatives. However, Congress
did not act on the 24 out of the 57 municipalities. In the Twelfth Congress, RA No.
9009 was enacted revising the Local Government Code (LGC) by increasing the
income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from ₱20 million annual
income to ₱100 million locally generated income. In the thirteenth Congress, 16 of
the 24 municipalities filed their individual cityhood bills. Each of the cityhood
bills contained a common provision exempting the particular municipality from
the ₱100 million income requirement imposed by RA No. 9009.

16 muncipalities were going to become cities when the petitioners argued that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing
cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities would partake of
the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the Local Government
Code (LGC) of 1991. The slice of the pie would become smaller. The Court in its
first decision nullified the cityhood laws because RA 9009 did not provide any
exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to the 16 municipalities
whose cityhood bills were then pending.

The Court reversed its first decision here as it was not the legislative intent to subject
the 16 municipalities turned cities to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009.
Applying verba legis or strict literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To prevent
this, the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter should be resorted to.

The rationale behind the increase to Php100 million was to prevent the mad
rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, but the deliberations on
RA 9009 revealed that it was intended that bills already pending would not be
affected by RA 9009.

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 RA 9009 would also not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are
concerned. To impose on them the much higher income requirement would appear to
be indeed unfair. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictated, in the eyes of the Court,
that they should be given a legal remedy by which they should be allowed to prove
that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set
forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009.

3. Pari Materia Rule

Gatchalian v. Ombudsman
RELEVANT LAW: Section 27, RA 6770: Decisions of the Ombudsman may be
appealed to the SC, was unconstitutional for increasing the SC’s jurisdiction without
its advice or concurrence.

The Field Investigation Office (FIO) of the Ombudsman filed 6 different criminal
complaints, one of which involves Sherwin Gatchalian and a sale of shares of
Express Savings Bank (ESBI) to the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA),
which Gatchalian was a shareholder in. Thus, Gatchalian profited from the sale.
ESBI’s position at that time gave an unwarranted benefit to Gatchalian under RA
3019.

The Ombudsman found probable cause that the petitioner violated Section 3(e) of
RA 3019, Art. 217 of RPC (Malversation of public funds), and sections of the
Manual of Regulations of Banks.

Gatchalian filed a motion for reconsideration; the Ombudsman dismissed it.

Gatchalian then filed a petition for certiorari to the CA under Rule 65, and he claims
that following Morales v CA, the CA has jurisdiction over the appeal, not the
SC. The SC having jurisdiction would mean that the Court would abandon the
doctrine in Morales. However, the CA held that Morales only applies in
administrative cases.

Was the CA correct in applying Morales? Yes, it was.

The Court looked into the history of the arguments of Gatchalian and the OSG.
Fabian v Desierto cited that Sec. 27 of RA 6770, which states that decisions of the
Ombudsman may be appealed to the SC, was unconstitutional for increasing the SC’s
jurisdiction without its advice or concurrence. Therefore, appeals from
Ombudsman’s decisions in administrative cases go to the CA. Kuizon v. Desierto
likewise upheld Fabian, holding that in a criminal case, it goes to the SC. Conversely,
in Golangco v. Fung, the Court held CA cannot review orders, directives, or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in non-administrative cases.

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 In Morales, respondent Binay was issued a preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman. Binay questioned the order to the CA. Ombudsman questioned the CA
order as it violated Section 14 of R.A. 6770, which provided among others that “no
court shall hear any appeal or application for a remedy against the decision or
findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure question of law.”
The SC declared Sec. 14 unconstitutional as it increased the SC’s jurisdiction
without its advice or concurrence.

The court stated that it is similar to Fabian since the above-stated Ombudsman Act
provisions are in pari materia in that they "cover the same specific or particular
subject matter," that is, the manner of judicial review over issuances of the
Ombudsman.

Jurisprudence has consistently provided appeals from Ombudsman’s decisions in

administrative cases go to the CA and those in non-administrative cases go to the
SC. Morales only alluded to administrative cases, it did not allude to non-
administrative cases. Thus, it is limited in application only to administrative cases.

4. Verba Legis

La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc v. Ramos (Involving as including)

RELEVANT LAW: Article XII, Section 4(2), 1987 Constitution: "The President
may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either
technical or financial assistance for largescale exploration, development, and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according to the general
terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country.”

La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association Inc. assails the constitutionality of RA 7942

Philippine Mining Act. Along with the IRR issue by the DENR, the Philippine
Mining Act governs the exploration development, utilization, and processing of all
mineral resources.

Before the passing of the Philippine Mining Act, then President Fidel V. Ramos
entered into a Financial & Technical Assistance Agreement with Western Mining
Corp. Phils. covering 99,000 hectares of land in Cotabato Sultan Kudarat Davao Del
Sur. Certain provisions of the Philippine Mining Law (RA 7942), its IRR, and the
FTAA between the government and Western Mining Corporation were found to be
unconstitutional on the ground that the FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the
1987 Constitution.

What, then, is the proper interpretation of the phrase “agreements involving either
technical or financial assistance” contained in paragraph 4 of Section 2 of Article
XII of the Constitution?

The word "involving," when understood in the sense of "including," as in including

technical or financial assistance, necessarily implies that there are activities other

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 than those that are being included. In other words, if an agreement includes
technical or financial assistance, there is apart from such assistance —” something
else already in and covered or may be covered, by the said agreement.

In short, it allows for the possibility that matters, other than those explicitly
mentioned, could be made part of the agreement. Thus, we are now led to the
conclusion that the use of the word "involving" implies that these agreements with
foreign corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical assistance. The
difference in sense becomes very apparent when we juxtapose "agreements for
technical or financial assistance" against "agreements including technical or
financial assistance." This much is unalterably clear in a verba legis approach.

Second, if the real intention of the drafters was to confine foreign corporations
to financial or technical assistance and nothing more, their language would have
certainly been so unmistakably restrictive and stringent as to leave no doubt in
anyone's mind about their true intent. For example, they would have used the
sentence foreign corporations are absolutely prohibited from involvement in the
management or operation of mining or similar ventures or words of similar import.

Lagman v. Pimentel (Congress’ power to extend?)

These are consolidated petitions assailing the constitutionality of the extension of the
proclamation of martial law and suspension of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year from January 1 to December 31, 2018.

President Duterte declared Martial Law over Mindanao first for a 60-day period from
May to July 2017, and a second time from July 2017 to December 2017. In a letter to
the president, AFP Chief of Staff Guerrero recommended the further extension of
martial law and suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire
Mindanao for one year “for compelling reasons based on current security
assessment.”

President Duterte then asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to
further extend the proclamation of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year, from January 1, 2018,
to December 31, 2018, or for such period as the Congress may determine. The
Senate did so by adopting in joint session Resolution of Both Houses No. 4,
which was filed for the purpose.

Does Congress have the power to extend and determine the period of martial law and
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus?

Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution is indisputably silent as to how many
times the Congress, upon the initiative of the President, may extend the proclamation
of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of habeas corpus.

What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of the congressional
authority to extend such proclamation or suspension are:

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 1. That the extension should be upon the President’s initiative;
2. That it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and
the demands of public safety; and
3. That it is subject to the Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis
upon the petition of any citizen.

Section 18, Article VII did not also fix the period of the extension of the
proclamation and suspension. However, it clearly gave the Congress the authority
to decide on its duration; thus, the provision states that that the extension shall be
“for a period to be determined by the Congress.”

The framers evidently gave enough flexibility on the part of the Congress to
determine the duration of the extension. Plain textual reading of Section 18, Article
VII and the records of the deliberation of the Constitutional Commission buttress the
view that as regards the frequency and duration of the extension, the determinative
factor is as long as “the invasion or rebellion persists and public safety requires”
such extension.

Supplement: Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines (The Congress has no

mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s proclamation of martial
law/the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, but it must vote
jointly to revoke the President's declaration or suspension of martial law. The two
houses of Congress do not need to convene to vote a la SONA to revoke.)

5. Stare Decisis

Umali v. Judicial Bar Council, July 25, 2017, G.R. No. 228628
Is the doctrine in Chavez v JBC unconstitutional? Nooooo.

The arguments of the petitioner are a mere rehash of the arguments in Chavez. They
must be rejected due to the principle of stare decisis. The petitioner failed to present
strong and compelling reasons to deviate from the ruling in Chavez. It proceeds from
the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing considerations,
like cases ought to be decided alike. Abandonment thereof must be based only on
strong and compelling reasons.

6. Casus omissus pro omisso habendus est – A person, object or thing omitted from
an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally, except when the
legislature did not intend to exclude the person, thing, or object from the
enumeration.

Municipality of Nueva Era, Ilocos Norte V. Municipality of Marcos, Ilocos

Norte, G.R. No. 169435, February 27, 2008
The municipalities of Marcos and Nueva Era were in a boundary dispute when the
Marcos municipality claimed the middle and isolated northern portions of the Nueva
Era’s territory, pursuant to RA 3753 which created the Marcos town in the Province

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 of Ilocos Norte, contending that the law requires that the land area of a municipality
must be compact and contiguous.

Nueva Era, on the other hand, argued that its entire land area has always been an
ancestral domain of the "tinguians," an indigenous cultural community, and thus the
land being claimed by Marcos must be protected and preserved as part of Nueva Era.
On March 2000, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Ilocos Norte declared the disputed
portions as part of Nueva Era’s territory since none of Nueva Era’s barangays were
mentioned to comprise the municipality of Marcos in RA 3753.

Given unfavorable decisions in the RTC and CA, Nueva Era raised the issue to the
Supreme Court. In addition, Nueva Era additionaly contends that the claim of Marcos
to its territory should be denied due to lack of the required plebiscite.

Since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of
barangays out of which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be
held to have been done intentionally. This conclusion finds support in the rule of
casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person, object or thing
omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally.

7. Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance

Gios-Samar, Inc. v. DOTC, G.R. No. 217158, March 12, 2019

RELEVANT LAW: Article XII, Section 11, 1987 Constitution: No franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility
shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens, nor shall such franchise, certificate, or
authorization be exclusive in character or for a longer period than fifty years. Neither
shall any such franchise or right be granted except under the condition that it shall be
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress when the common good
so requires. The State shall encourage equity participation in public utilities by the
general public. The participation of foreign investors in the governing body of any
public utility enterprise shall be limited to their proportionate share in its capital, and
all the executive and managing officers of such corporation or association must be
citizens of the Philippines.

Petitioner GIOS-SAMAR represented by its Chairperson, Gerardo Malinao, assailed

the “bundling” of government projects under the DOTC and CAAP regarding the
construction of airports in Bacolod, Davao, Palawan, Laguindigan, Iloilo, and Bohol.
These projects were bundled into Bundle 1 (Bacolod and Ilolo) and Bundle 2 (Davao,
Laguindigan, Bohol). The Puerto Princesa airport was not included in the bundling.

Petitioner assails the bundling of these projects for being violative of Section 11,
Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution as the bundling would allow companies with
questionable backgrounds to participate in the projects by joining a consortium. This

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 would also violate provisions that prevent “dummies” and the grant of opportunity to
the public to invest in public utilities.

Petitioner likewise assails the bundling as it violates the constitutional prohibition on

monopolies under Section 19, Article 12 of the 1987 Constitution. They allege that
the winning bidder would have control and supervision over multiple airports, which
constitutes a monopoly.

The Court dismissed the petition, and ruled that the Constitution does not prohibit
monopolies per se. If the public interest is served by allowing a monopoly such as
those businesses operating in public utilities, they must be granted exclusive
franchises by Congress. (RA 10667, or the Philippine Competition Act, does not
define what a monopoly is. Instead, it prohibits entities to acquire a dominant
position that is prone to abuse and anti-competitive practices)

Petitioner failed to show how the bundling would violate any provision of the Anti-
Dummy Law (Commonwealth Act 108) and Section 11 of Article 12. They did not
present any evidence of violations of the 60% ownership requirement of companies
engaged in public utilities.

They also did not show any proof of any corporation or association that falsely
simulated the existence of the required percentage of Filipino ownership

The Court likewise DISMISSED the Petition for being violative of the hierarchy
of courts. Although the issue of the Petition is within the Court’s jurisdiction,
the factual issues surrounding the petition could be resolved without assailing its
constitutionality. The petition must first be brought before the trial courts and Court
of Appeals.

8. Expresium facit cessare tacitum - Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly

limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be
extended to other matters.

Ifurung v. Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018

RELEVANT LAW: Article XI, Section 11, 1987 Constitution
Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez resigned to avoid impeachment trial in the
Senate. Her successor Conchita Carpio-Morales was appointed to a seven (7) year
term. Petitioner claiming to have a locus standi on the case, sought the correction
of a recurring statutory wrong and declaration from the Court that the positions
held by the respondents are vacant.

He also insists that the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies have been
overstaying in the position and that the current Ombudsman and the deputies
should have only served for the unexpired term of the predecessor.

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 Sec. 11, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provided among other things
that:
 The Ombudsman and the deputies shall serve the term of seven years;
 That the Ombudsman and the deputies shall not be reappointed; and
 The Ombudsman and the deputies shall not run for any office in the
election immediately succeeding their cessation from office.

The Court pointed out that the argument of the Petitioner: “the position of
Ombudsman and the deputies shall be only for the unexpired term of the
predecessor cannot be seen in the Constitution.” Hence, it must only be taken into
consideration that the Ombudsman and his deputies will serve a full term of seven
years because it was explicitly stated in the Constitution rather than the provision
raised by the petitioner in his petition.

9. Last Antecedent Rule – Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless the
context otherwise requires.

Caydona v. Court of Appeals, G. R. No. 128772 - February 3, 2000

Petitioner was suspended by the Civil Service Commission. As a result, he filed a
motion for reconsideration with the CA. The latter dismissed it because three
annexes were not certified true copies.

The Court here held that the doctrine of last antecedent cannot be applied
qualifying “other supporting papers” with “certified true copies.” Only the
judgment, final order or resolution are required to be certified true copies. The
court cited several provisions showing that only the three need be certified true
copies. To rule otherwise would be too harsh and would not promote a just,
speedy and underlying disposition of the case.

10. Statute construed as a whole – A statute is passed as a whole and not in parts or
sections and is animated by one general purpose and intent. Hence, it should be
construed as a harmonious whole.

Pimentel v. Legal Education Board, G.R. Nos 230642 & 242954, September 10,
2019
LEB's power to prescribe minimum standards for "law admission" pertain
to admission to legal education and not to the practice of law

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part must be read together
with the other parts, to the end that the general intent of the law is given primacy.
As such, a law's clauses and phrases cannot be interpreted as isolated expressions
nor read in truncated parts, but must be considered to form a harmonious whole

Construing the LEB's power to prescribe the standards for law admission together
with the LEB's other powers to administer, supervise, and accredit law schools,

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 leads to the logical interpretation that the law circumscribes the LEB's power to
prescribe admission requirements only to those seeking enrollment to a school or
college of law and not to the practice of law.

CONSTI: The PhilSAT is administered as an aptitude test to help law schools

determine applicant fitness for legal education. Such would be legal had it not
been for the pass or fail aspect, which in effect unnecessarily limits institutional
academic freedom.

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 V. SPECIFIC RULES IN STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
The cases contain the salient points only.

1. General and specific words, taken from Agpalo (page 144, Agpalo PDF)

General words – those with their plain meaning unless intended to be given different
meaning. What is generally spoken shall be generally understood.
 Exception: If the word is given a different or restricted meaning

Specific words – dictated by context. A word is to be understood in the context in

which it is used. A specific word is usually followed by the phrase “as used in this
Act” which is meant to restrict the meaning of the word as it is used within the statute
to the statute only.
 Example: “Overthrow” in Anti-Subversion Act.

2. Associated words (page 161, Agpalo PDF)

Noscitur a sociis – where most of the word in an enumeration of words in a statute are
used in their generic and ordinary sense, the rest of the words should similarly be
construed.
 Example: People v. Delantar
Defendant Delantar was charged because of facilitating and inducing his
stepdaughter to sexual servitude. Because of their relationship, it was claimed
that the crime was attended with an aggravating circumstance of relationship.

Held: His relationship with the victim is not included in those enumerated. It
was not proven that he was the real or biological father. At the most, he
was said to be the guardian. But the word “guardian” envisaged by the
law is that of having a legal relationship considering the other words in the
list

3. Technical terms (page 149, Agpalo PDF)

Technical terms - construed to have a certain meaning, should be interpreted in the

sense in which they were previously used.

Lagman v. Medialdea, December 5, 2017, G.R. No. 231658, G.R. No.231658,

G.R. No. 231771, G.R. No. 231774 (Sufficiency not accuracy)
The Court is only mandated to determine the sufficiency and not the accuracy of
the factual basis of the declaration of martial law (Art. VII, Section 18, 1987
Constitution). Accuracy is not the same as sufficiency since the former requires a
higher degree of standard. It just gives leeway and flexibility to the executive due
to the urgency of the situation and also because martial law in itself is a flexible
concept which cannot be confined in specific metes and bounds.

Parameters for Determining the Sufficiency of Factual Basis:

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  Actual rebellion or invasion;
 Public safety requires it;
 The first two requirements must concur; and
 There is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual
rebellion or invasion.

4. Ejusdem generis (page 164, Agpalo PDF)

Ejusdem generis - where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of

particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former,
the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to persons,
things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically
mentioned

Ocampo et al v. Enriquez G.R. No. 225973, 8 November 2016 (LMNB not one of
the National Shrines contemplated)
RELEVANT LAW: P.D. No. 105

PD No. 105 described national shrines as those sites or structures hallowed and
revered for their history or association with the birth, exile, imprisonment, and
death of the leaders of the nation (e.g. Fort Santiago, Corregidor, Bataan,
Limasawa, Aguinaldo Shrine, Fort San Antonio in Malate, Red Beach in Leyte,
Tirad Pass.)

The Libingan ng mga Bayani was not included in the list of national shrines in PD
No. 105. The Libingan ng mga Bayani has instead been a military shrine under
the PVAO through Proclamation No. 208 filed in 1968.

Lara's Gifts & Decors, Inc., vs. Midtown Industrial Sales, Inc., G.R. No. 225433,
August 28, 2019
Lara’s Gifts ordered construction materials from Midtown Sales with a stipulation
in their contract that an additional payment of interest amounting to 24% would be
applied for overdue balances. The interest rate was valid because the Court did not
find the rate to be unconscionable as there was lack of proof showing a
disadvantage to the parties subjected, and the contract remains the law between
the parties. J. Caguioa’s opinion applied ejusdem generis in the interpretation of
the BSP Circular, holding that ‘judgment’ should be interpreted as only those
judgments involving loans or forbearance of money, goods, or credits.

5. Conjunctive and disjunctive words (page 159, Agpalo PDF)

The conjunctive word ‘and’ signifies union or joinder of terms; the disjunctive word
‘or’ signifies independence or disassociation.

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 People v. Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018
Lim was charged with illegal possession of shabu. The Court held that the chain
of custody was broken because there was no witness from the DOJ or the media
during physical inventory of the seized items. The former law states that there
must be a representative from the media and the DOJ, but the amendment states
that there must be a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the
media.

Microsoft Corp. v. Manansala, G.R. No. 166391, October 21, 2015

This case was about the sale and distribution of pirated Microsoft programs
amounting to copyright infringement. Mere sale is enough because to construe
‘and’ in the statute would result in obscurity because it would mean requiring
‘photographs’ prior to copyright infringement.

6. Expressio unius est exclusion alterius (page 169, Agpalo PDF)

An express mention is an implied exclusion.

Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016

Poe was a foundling and her status as a natural-born citizen was being questioned
when she filed a COC. Despite the exclusion of the term ‘foundling’ in the 1935
Constitution, foundlings are still considered natural-born citizens because the
framers’ intent as shown in the deliberations show that the term was only
excluded due to an insufficient number of foundlings to merit any specific
mention.

7. Negative, prohibitory, exclusive words (page 246, Agpalo PDF)

Negative words like “only”, “shall not”, and “cannot” are used to make a statute
mandatory. Example: The school released a guideline that says that students cannot
smoke outside the lobby.

They may also grant power. Example: Only the Supreme Court can hear cases on this
kind of matter.

They may also grant benefits. Example: Only the husband may impugn the
legitimacy of the child.

They may also provide for procedural requirements. Example: The non-fraternity
contract must be a certified true copy and cannot be a photocopy.

8. May, must, and shall

May implies an opportunity, possibility, or permisiveness. Example: I may go to La

Union. Example in law: The Marcos administration may import Php 200 million in
galunggong to combat food shortages.

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 Must and shall imply imperativeness.

However, “shall” may be construed as “may” when necessary to give effect to the
intention of the legislature. Example:

Interpretation of the word "may" in the first sentence of Section 2, Article XI of

the Constitution

The "'may' is permissive/'shall' is mandatory" rule is an established rule in statutory

construction. Nonetheless, not every use of either of these words should automatically
be interpreted as a permissive or mandatory directive, especially when statutory intent
shows otherwise. Proof of this is the two provisions on impeachment in the 1935
Constitution, to wit:

Article IX Impeachment Article X Commission on Elections

Section 1. The President, the Vice- Article X, Section 1. There shall be an

President, the Justices of the Supreme independent Commission on Elections
Court, and the Auditor General, shall be composed of a Chairman and two other
removed from office on impeachment Members x x x The Chairman and the
for any conviction of, culpable violation other Members of the Commission on
of the Constitution, treason, bribery, or Elections may be removed from office
other high crimes. only by impeachment in the manner
provided in this Constitution.

Although Article X, Section 1 used the word "may," the inclusion of the qualifying
phrase "only by impeachment" erased any doubt that the intent was to restrict solely
to impeachment the removal from office of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC ) Chairman and Commissioners. On the other hand, it is debatable if
same intent can be inferred from the language of Article IX, Section that used "shall"
but clearly omitted a qualifying phrase similar to that in Article X, Section 1.

This ambiguity certainly could be settled by the mere application of the "may/shall"
rule, necessitating resort to other rules of constitutional construction. Indeed, the
variance in the language of the two provisions above renders doubtful any inference
that the shift from "shall" in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions to "may" in the 1987
Constitution reflected a corresponding shift in the framers' intent from a mandatory to
permissive directive as to the exclusiveness of impeachment as a mode of removal.

The 1973 Constitution declared that: Article XIII, Section 2. The President, the
Members of the Supreme Court, and the Members of the Constitutional Commissions
shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable

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 violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, other high crimes, or graft and
corruption.

Article XIII, Section 2 of the 1973 Constitution is effectively a consolidation of the

two provisions on impeachment in the 1935 Constitution. Since the 1935 Constitution
had two related but differently-worded provisions on impeachment, it is unclear
which of the two possible interpretations that the framers of the 1973 Constitution had
in mind when they drafted Article XIII, Section 2. Given this ambiguity, it would be
foolish to read too much in the change from "shall" in the previous Constitutions to
"may" in the present one.

In determining the real meaning of "may" in Article XI, Section 2, the better rule to
follow is the one which states that "a word used on the statute in a given sense is
presumed to be used in the same sense throughout the law." This rule finds
application in the present case because of the similarity in manner in which the first
and second sentences of the provision are couched, and the fact that both sentences
use the modal verb "may." Both sentences merely provide for the modes by which
public officers can be removed from office: for the enumerated officers, by
impeachment; for all others, by other means provided by law except by impeachment.
The use of the word "may" was not meant to indicate exclusivity (or lack thereof) in
the mode of removal of the enumerated public officers. This is the context in which
the word "may" in the provision should be understood; nothing more, nothing less.

The only "exclusivity" that may be reasonably read from the wording of Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution is the list of impeachable officers and the grounds for
which they may be impeached. This "exclusivity" is deductible, not from the use of
the word "may," but from the enumeration of the officers and the grounds, following
the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius in statutory construction.

The respondent presents another interpretation of the word "may." She claims it refers
to the imposable penalty at the conclusion of an impeachment trial. She argues that
this interpretation is consistent with Section 3 (7), Article XI of the Constitution
which provides in part that "judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and disqualification to hold any office under the
Republic of the Philippines." Although plausible, nowhere from the respondent's
interpretation can it be read that impeachment was contemplated as the sole mode of
removing from office the enumerated officials.

Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 18, 2018; June 19, 2018
This case was on the impeachment of C.J. Sereno. The use of ‘shall’ refers to the
list of impeachable officers and ‘may’ refers to the grounds for which they may be
impeached.

9. Construction of particular statutes

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 Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, G.R. No. 178552
RELEVANT LAW: Section 3, Human Security Act of 2007 –
Sec. 3 Terrorism - Any person who commits an act punishable under any of the
following provisions of the Revised Penal Code: (Piracy in General and Mutiny in
the High Seas or in the Philippine Waters, Rebellion, Insurrection, Coup d’ Etat,
Murder, Kidnapping, Serious Illegal Detention, Crimes involving destruction)
thereby sowing and creating a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear
and panic among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to
an unlawful demand.

The petitioners, who were human rights organizations, challenge the

constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of
2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.

They argue that the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that
terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and
“coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness

and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these doctrines apply
only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

The Court ruled here that a facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free
speech cases, wherein certain rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

Criminal statutes have a general in terrorem (legal threat – if you don’t comply
you will be punished) effect resulting from their very existence, and, if the facial
challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the
law cannot take chances as in free speech.

The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to
free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. The
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-
speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
Since the Human Security Act is a penal law because it provides penal sanctions
for acts of terrorism, the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines are inapplicable.
 at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was
charged, is not vague

A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks

comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.

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  it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid;
 and it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
 In Estrada, the Court ruled that "statutes found vague as a matter of due
process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant."

The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to

control or prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be
achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms
 The overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a
statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that behavior, even
though some of it is protected
 The application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of
challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable
only to free speech cases.

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to
petitioners, a limited vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA
9372 is legally impermissible absent an actual or imminent charge against them.

People v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019

Two criminal cases were filed against Tulagan: (1) Rape by Sexual Assault for
inserting his finger into the vagina of a 9-year-old after approaching her while she
was peeling corn with her cousin, and spreading her legs; and (2) Statutory Rape
for having sexual intercourse with the 9-year-old victim after bringing her into his
house and removing her and his clothes before inserting his penis into her vagina.

The Court observed that despite the clear intent of R.A. No. 7610 to provide
for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse, the penalty
for violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 [reclusion temporal medium] when
the victim is under 12 years old is lower compared to the penalty [reclusion
temporal medium to reclusion perpetua] when the victim is 12 years old and
below 18.

What courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intent of the legislature
are only those which are clerical errors, not those due to oversight. A corrective
legislation is the proper remedy to address incongruent penalties.

VI. OTHER CASES DISCUSSED

De Lima v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 229781 October 10, 2017 (De Lima claims the
Sandiganbayan should try her case because she is a public officer)

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 Based on a reading of the information, it is clear that the offense charged is for a
violation of RA 9165. While there may be some elements of Direct Bribery in the
information, the totality of facts indicate a bigger picture of Illegal Drug Trading.
The information goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery.

RA 9165 expressly vests jurisdiction with the RTC and no other. The RTC is
expressly mentioned in different sections of the law (20, 61, 62, 90). No other
court was mentioned. This implies that jurisdiction for all drug-related cases is
strictly with the RTC.

Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction, for violations of RA 3019

(Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), for executive officials, congress members,
other officials with w/ SG 27+, members of judiciary, and members of the
constitutional commissions. The legislative intent of RA 10660, the law
providing the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, is for the Sandiganbayan to
be an "anti-graft court."

The Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over drug-related cases. RA

9165 expressly includes liability for government officials. In S27 of RA 9165,
the penalty is aggravated to life imprisonment to death if the violation is
committed by government officials and employees.

The provisions of RA 9165, bestowing jurisdiction to the RTC, should be

constructed as an exception to PD 1606 (Sandiganbayan Law) as amended by RA
10660.

RA 10660 (2015) was passed after RA 9165 (2002). But this does not mean that
the provisions on jurisdiction were repealed. RA 10660 contains no express repeal
of RA 9165. It is a well-entrenched rule that implied repeals are not favored, and
are only accepted upon clear proof of inconsistency between the two laws.

Another principle of statutory construction is that a special law prevails over

a general law. Here, the SC interpreted the Sandiganbayan law as the general
law of the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. RA 9165 is the special law,
which excludes drug offenses from the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In the new Sandiganbayan law, the RTC has jurisdiction for cases where there is
no allegation to damage to the government, or the amounts do not exceed Php 1
million. This shows that the legislative intent of the amended Sandiganbayan law
is to defer jurisdiction to the RTC, in order to declutter the high volume of cases
in the Sandiganbayan.

Hence, it is the RTC, not the Sandiganbayan, who has jurisdiction over the case.

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 DECS v. San Diego, G.R. No. 89572 December 21, 1989 (Three flunk rule)
(Possible difference in ruling with Pimentel v. LEB is that the PhiLSAT imposed a
pass or fail policy while the NMAT had percentile scores)
Private respondent is a UE graduate with a degree of BS Zoology. DECS claims
that he took and flunked the NMAT thrice. DECS rejected his application for a
retake on the basis of their rule that allows students 3 chances to take the NMAT
and disallows a fourth try after 3 successive failures. Private respondent went to
the RTC to compel admission to the test, first invoking his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. He and DECS agreed to allow him to
take the April 16, 1989 NMAT.

Private respondent amended his petition challenging the constitutionality of the

MECS Order containing the “three-flunk rule”, claiming issues of due process and
equal protection. The respondent judge rendered a decision declaring the
challenged Order invalid and granting private respondent’s petition to compel
admission to the test, holding that private respondent was deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.

The challenged regulation is within the ambit of police power as it is the

State’s responsibility to ensure the medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents upon whom public lives and health are entrusted.

The three-flunk rule is neither arbitrary nor oppressive as it merely insulates

medical schools and ultimately the medical profession from intrusion of those
not qualified to be doctors.

While every person is entitled to aspire to be a doctor, he does not have a

constitutional right to be one.

Gamboa v. Teves, G.R. No. 176579 June 28, 2011 and October 9, 2012
2011 ruling:
On 28 November 1928, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 3436 which
granted PLDT a franchise and the right to engage in telecommunications business.
In 1969, General Telephone and Electronics Corporation (GTE), an American
company and a major PLDT stockholder, sold 26 percent of the outstanding
common shares of PLDT to PTIC.

In 1977, Prime Holdings, Inc. (PHI) was incorporated by several persons,

including Roland Gapud and Jose Campos, Jr. Subsequently, PHI became the
owner of 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC by virtue of three Deeds of Assignment
executed by PTIC stockholders Ramon Cojuangco and Luis Tirso Rivilla.

In 1986, the 111,415 shares of stock of PTIC held by PHI were sequestered by the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG). The 111,415 PTIC
shares, which represent about 46.125 percent of the outstanding capital stock of

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 PTIC, were later declared by this Court to be owned by the Republic of the
Philippines. Since PTIC is a stockholder of PLDT, the sale by the Philippine
Government of 46.125 percent of PTIC shares is actually an indirect sale of 12
million shares or about 6.3 percent of the outstanding common shares of PLDT.

With the sale, First Pacific’s common shareholdings in PLDT increased from 30.7
percent to 37 percent, thereby increasing the common shareholdings of foreigners
in PLDT to about 81.47 percent. This violates Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Philippine Constitution which limits foreign ownership of the capital of a public
utility to not more than 40 percent.

Does the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
to the common shares of PLDT, a public utility?

Article XII, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution mandates the Filipinization of

public utilities. Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public utility
must therefore meet the minimum nationality requirement prescribed in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted
authority to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital must be
owned by Filipino citizens.

Thus, the 40% foreign ownership limitation should be interpreted to apply to

both the beneficial ownership and the controlling interest.

Clearly, therefore, the forty percent (40%) foreign equity limitation in public
utilities prescribed by the Constitution refers to ownership of shares of stock
entitled to vote, i.e., common shares. Furthermore, ownership of record of shares
will not suffice but it must be shown that the legal and beneficial ownership rests
in the hands of Filipino citizens. Consequently, in the case of petitioner PLDT,
since it is already admitted that the voting interests of foreigners which would
gain entry to petitioner PLDT by the acquisition of SMART shares through the
Questioned Transactions is equivalent to 82.99%, and the nominee arrangements
between the foreign principals and the Filipino owners is likewise admitted, there
is, therefore, a violation of Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution.

Indisputably, one of the rights of a stockholder is the right to participate in the

control or management of the corporation. This is exercised through his vote in
the election of directors because it is the board of directors that controls or
manages the corporation. In the absence of provisions in the articles of
incorporation denying voting rights to preferred shares, preferred shares have the
same voting rights as common shares. However, preferred shareholders are often
excluded from any control, that is, deprived of the right to vote in the election of
directors and on other matters, on the theory that the preferred shareholders are
merely investors in the corporation for income in the same manner as
bondholders. In fact, under the Corporation Code only preferred or redeemable
shares can be deprived of the right to vote. Common shares cannot be deprived of

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 the right to vote in any corporate meeting, and any provision in the articles of
incorporation restricting the right of common shareholders to vote is invalid.

Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term capital
in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election of
directors, then the term capital shall include such preferred shares because the
right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the election of directors. In short, the term capital in
Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to shares of stock that can
vote in the election of directors.

This interpretation is consistent with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the control and management of public
utilities.

As shown in PLDTs 2010 GIS, as submitted to the SEC, the par value of PLDT
common shares is P5.00 per share, whereas the par value of preferred shares is
P10.00 per share. In other words, preferred shares have twice the par value of
common shares but cannot elect directors and have only 1/70 of the dividends of
common shares. Moreover, 99.44% of the preferred shares are owned by Filipinos
while foreigners own only a minuscule 0.56% of the preferred shares. Worse,
preferred shares constitute 77.85% of the authorized capital stock of PLDT while
common shares constitute only 22.15%. This undeniably shows that beneficial
interest in PLDT is not with the non-voting preferred shares but with the
common shares, blatantly violating the constitutional requirement of 60
percent Filipino control and Filipino beneficial ownership in a public utility.

2012 ruling
A motion for reconsideration was filed questioning whether or not the Court made
an erroneous interpretation of the term ‘capital’ in its 2011 decision.

The Court said that the Constitution is clear in expressing its State policy of
developing an economy ‘effectively controlled’ by Filipinos. Asserting the ideals
that our Constitution’s Preamble want to achieve, that is – to conserve and
develop our patrimon , hence, the State should fortify a Filipino-controlled
economy. In the 2011 decision, the Court finds no wrong in the construction of
the term ‘capital’ which refers to the ‘shares with voting rights, as well as with
full beneficial ownership’ (Art. 12, sec. 10) which implies that the right to vote in
the election of directors, coupled with benefits, is tantamount to an effective
control. Therefore, the Court’s interpretation of the term ‘capital’ was not
erroneous. Thus, the motion for reconsideration is denied.

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 Roy v. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246 November 22, 2016

The Supreme Court issued the

Gamboa Decision ruling that the
term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and
thus only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and
nonvoting preferred shares). On
October 18, 2012, the Gamboa
decision attained finality.
Pursuant to the Court’s directive in
the Gamboa Decision, the SEC
issued SEC-MC No.

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entitled “Guidelines on
Compliance with the Filipino-
Foreign Ownership Requirements
Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws by
Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized
and Partly Nationalized
Activities.”
The Supreme Court issued the
Gamboa Decision ruling that the
term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock entitled to vote

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

in the election of directors, and
thus only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and
nonvoting preferred shares). On
October 18, 2012, the Gamboa
decision attained finality.
Pursuant to the Court’s directive in
the Gamboa Decision, the SEC
issued SEC-MC No.
entitled “Guidelines on
Compliance with the Filipino-
Foreign Ownership Requirements
Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws by
Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized
JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03
and Partly Nationalized
Activities.”
The Supreme Court issued the
Gamboa Decision ruling that the
term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and
thus only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and
nonvoting preferred shares). On
October 18, 2012, the Gamboa
decision attained finality.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

Pursuant to the Court’s directive in
the Gamboa Decision, the SEC
issued SEC-MC No.
entitled “Guidelines on
Compliance with the Filipino-
Foreign Ownership Requirements
Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws by
Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized
and Partly Nationalized
Activities.”
The Supreme Court issued the
Gamboa Decision ruling that the
term “capital” in

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock entitled to vote
in the election of directors, and
thus only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding
capital stock (common and
nonvoting preferred shares). On
October 18, 2012, the Gamboa
decision attained finality.
Pursuant to the Court’s directive in
the Gamboa Decision, the SEC
issued SEC-MC No.
entitled “Guidelines on
Compliance with the Filipino-
Foreign Ownership Requirements

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

Prescribed in the Constitution
and/or Existing Laws by
Corporations Engaged in
Nationalized
and Partly Nationalized
Activities.”
The Supreme Court issued the Gamboa Decision ruling that the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus only to common shares, and
not to the total outstanding capital stock (common and nonvoting preferred
shares). On October 18, 2012, the Gamboa decision attained finality.

Pursuant to the Court’s directive in the Gamboa Decision, the SEC issued SEC-
MC No. entitled “Guidelines on Compliance with the Filipino-Foreign Ownership
Requirements Prescribed in the Constitution and/or Existing Laws by
Corporations Engaged in Nationalized and Partly Nationalized Activities.”

Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8

provides:
Section 2. All covered corporations
shall, at all times, observe the
constitutional or

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

statutory ownership requirement. For
purposes of determining compliance
therewith, the
required percentage of Filipino
ownership shall be applied to BOTH
(a) the total number of
outstanding shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors; AND
(b) the total
number of outstanding shares of stock,
whether or not entitled to vote in the
election of
directors.
Corporations covered by special laws
which provide specific citizenship
requirements
shall comply with the provisions of
said law
Section 2 of SEC-MC No. 8 provides:

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 Section 2. All covered corporations shall, at all times, observe the
constitutional or statutory ownership requirement. For purposes of determining
compliance therewith, the required percentage of Filipino ownership shall be
applied to BOTH (a) the total number of outstanding shares of stock entitled to
vote in the election of directors; AND (b) the total number of outstanding
shares of stock, whether or not entitled to vote in the election of directors.
Corporations covered by special laws which provide specific citizenship
requirements shall comply with the provisions of said law

Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and

taxpayer, filed the Petition,
assailing the validity of
SEC-MC No. 8. He seeks to apply
the 60-40 Filipino ownership
requirement separately to each
class of shares of a public utility
corporation, whether common,
preferred non-voting,
preferred voting or any other class
of shares.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and
taxpayer, filed the Petition,
assailing the validity of
SEC-MC No. 8. He seeks to apply
the 60-40 Filipino ownership
requirement separately to each
class of shares of a public utility
corporation, whether common,
preferred non-voting,
preferred voting or any other class
of shares.
Petitioner Roy, as a lawyer and taxpayer, filed the Petition, assailing the validity
of SEC-MC No. 8. He seeks to apply the 60-40 Filipino ownership requirement
separately to eachclass of shares of a public utility corporation, whether common,
preferred non-voting, preferred voting or any other class of shares.

Does the term ‘capital’ in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers to
the total common shares only or to the total outstanding capital stock
(combined total of common and nonvoting preferred shares)?

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

The Court rules that SEC-MC No.
8 is not contrary to the Court’s
definition
and interpretation of the term
“capital.”
The Court rules that SEC-MC No. 8 is not contrary to the Court’s definition and
interpretation of the term “capital.”

Ruling: The Court rules that SEC-

MC No. 8 is not contrary to the
Court’s definition
and interpretation of the term
“capital.”
(Pronouncement in Gamboa)
Considering that common shares
have voting rights which translate
to control, as

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the
term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the
term “capital” shall
include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in
the control or management
of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the
election of directors.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

In short, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock that can vote in the
election of directors.
The evident purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to
prevent aliens from assuming
control of public utilities, which
may be inimical to the national
interest. The Court noted that
the foregoing interpretation is
consistent with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino
citizens the control and

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

management of public utilities;
and, as
revealed in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission,
“capital” refers to the voting
stock or controlling interest of a
corporation
Ruling: The Court rules that SEC-
MC No. 8 is not contrary to the
Court’s definition
and interpretation of the term
“capital.”
(Pronouncement in Gamboa)
Considering that common shares
have voting rights which translate
to control, as

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

opposed to preferred shares which
usually have no voting rights, the
term “capital” in Section
11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to common shares.
However, if the preferred
shares also have the right to vote in
the election of directors, then the
term “capital” shall
include such preferred shares
because the right to participate in
the control or management
of the corporation is exercised
through the right to vote in the
election of directors.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

In short, the term “capital” in
Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refers only to shares
of stock that can vote in the
election of directors.
The evident purpose of the
citizenship requirement is to
prevent aliens from assuming
control of public utilities, which
may be inimical to the national
interest. The Court noted that
the foregoing interpretation is
consistent with the intent of the
framers of the Constitution to
place in the hands of Filipino
citizens the control and

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

management of public utilities;
and, as
revealed in the deliberations of the
Constitutional Commission,
“capital” refers to the voting
stock or controlling interest of a
corporation
Considering that common shares have voting rights which translate to control, as
opposed to preferred shares which usually have no voting rights, the term
“capital” in Section11, Article XII of the Constitution refers only to common
shares. However, if the preferred shares also have the right to vote in the election
of directors, then the term “capital” shall include such preferred shares because
the right to participate in the control or management of the corporation is
exercised through the right to vote in the election of directors.

In short, the term “capital” in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution
refers only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.

The evident purpose of the citizenship requirement is to prevent aliens from

assuming control of public utilities, which may be inimical to the national interest.
The Court noted that the foregoing interpretation is consistent with the intent of
the framers of the Constitution to place in the hands of Filipino citizens the
control and management of public utilities; and, as revealed in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission, “capital” refers to the voting stock or controlling
interest of a corporation.

The Court rules that SEC-MC No.

8 is not contrary to the Court’s
definition
JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03
and interpretation of the term
“capital.”
However, mere legal title is
insufficient to meet the 60 percent
Filipino -owned “capital”
required in the Constitution. Full
beneficial ownership of 60 percent
of the outstanding
capital stock, coupled with 60
percent of the voting rights, is
required. The legal and
However, mere legal title is insufficient to meet the 60 percent Filipino -owned
“capital” required in the Constitution. Full beneficial ownership of 60 percent of
the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60 percent of the voting rights, is
required. The legal and beneficial ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding
capital stock must rest in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate. Otherwise, the corporation is “considered as non-
Philippine national.

Both the Voting Control Test and the Beneficial Ownership Test must be applied
to determine whether a corporation is a “Philippine national” and that a
“Philippine national” is “a Filipino citizen, or a domestic corporation “at least
sixty percent (60%) of the capital stock outstanding and entitled to vote,” is
owned by Filipino citizens. A domestic corporation is a “Philippine national”
only if at least 60% of its voting stock is owned by Filipino citizens.” (Foreign
Investments Act of 1991)

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 The right to vote in the election of directors, coupled with full beneficial
ownership of stocks, translates to effective control of a corporation.

If the voting right of a share held in the name of a Filipino citizen or national is
assigned or transferred to an alien, that share is not to be counted in the
determination of the required Filipino equity. In the same vein, if the dividends
and other fruits and accessions of the share do not accrue to a Filipino citizen or
national, then that share is also to be excluded or not counted.

Genuino v. De Lima, G.R. No. 197930 April 17, 2018

When GMA’s term expired, criminal complaints were filed against her. Pursuant
to the complaints former DOJ Sec. De Lima issued a Watch List Order pursuant to
her authority under DOJ Circular 41. These expired after 60 days.

Two more criminal complaints for Electoral Sabotage and violation of the
Omnibus Election Code (OEC) against GMA and her husband Miguel Arroyo
were filed with the DOJ-COMELEC.

De Lima issued another Watch List Order against GMA and Miguel Arroyo
which was valid for 60 days.

GMA sent letters to De Lima requesting for an Allow Departure Orders (ADO) to
be allowed to seek medical attention abroad. While the application was pending,
GMA filed a Petition for Certiorari assailing the validity of DOJ Circular 41 as
unconstitutional.

A TRO against the Watch List Order against GMA and Miguel Arroyo was
issued. However, when petitioners tried to leave the country, they were stopped at
NAIA. NAIA officials refused to process GMA’s travel documents, making them
miss their flight.

The court then issued a resolution requiring De Lima to show cause why she
should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt of court.

Did the DOJ have the authority to issue DOJ Circular 41?

The Court held that DOJ Circular 41 is not a law passed by congress but a mere
administrative issuance.

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule making powers. It is the

power to make rules and regulations which is delegated by legislation.
The rule is that there must be a valid delegation of legislative power for an
administrative issuance to be valid. The delegation is valid if it conforms to the
following standards:

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 1. Complete in itself
2. Fixes a standard which are determinate and determinable to which
the delegate must conform

In the exercise of such powers, the administrative agency must act within the
scope of the authority granted by law. Such administrative rules must be germane
to the objects and purposes of the law and not contradict the same.

The DOJ does not have the power to issue the subject circular. It simply
grants the DOJ the power to investigate the commission of and prosecution of
crimes. But it does not carry with it the power to devise any means proper in
performing its function without regard to the Constitution.

The secretary indeed has the power to issue rules and regulations that will
aid in the performance of their functions, but this is adjunct to the power of
admin agencies to execute laws and does not require the authority of a law.
This is different from delegated legislative power to promulgate rules.

The circular does not come within the power of the executive to adopt rules and
regulations. The issuance of the Hold Departure Order and Watch List Order is
not the DOJ’s business. There must be an existing law. On its own, the DOJ
cannot make rules because its authority is confined to the execution of laws.

Mandanas v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 199802 July 3, 2018

Petitioners here are assailing the LGC insofar as it limits the share of the LGUs
from the national taxes to national internal revenue taxes. The petitioners are
assailing this provision as unconstitutional because it contradicts Sec. 6, Art. X of
the Constitution which provides that the LGUs shall have a just share in the
national taxes.
As such, the petitioners are arguing that certain collections of NIRTs by the
Bureau of Customs (BOC) - specifically: excise taxes, value added taxes (VATs)
and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs) should be included in the base amounts. for
the computation of the internal revenue allotment (IRA). To consider these taxes
as included in the computation of the just share of the LGU would result in the
release of an additional ₱60,750,000,000.00 and ₱438,103,906,675.73 to the
LGUs for the years 2012 and 1992 to 2011, respectively.
Is the exclusion of certain national taxes from the base amount for the
computation of the just share of the LGUs in the national taxes constitutional?
The Court ruled here that it is unconstitutional.
Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution textually commands the allocation to
the LGUs of a just share in the national taxes.
Section 6, when parsed, embodies three mandates, namely:

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 1. The LGUs shall have a just share in the national taxes;
2. The just share shall be determined by law; and
3. The just share shall be automatically released to the LGUs.
Congress has sought to carry out the second mandate of Section 6 by enacting
Section 284,Title III (Shares of Local Government Units in the Proceeds of
National Taxes), of the LGC.
There is no issue as to what constitutes the LGUs' just share expressed in
percentages of the national taxes (i.e., 30%, 35% and 40% stipulated in
subparagraphs (a), (b), and (c) of Section 284). Yet, Section 6, supra, mentions
national taxes as the source of the just share of the LGUs while Section 284
ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from national internal revenue taxes
instead.
Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional
lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution. The
phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is undoubtedly
more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such,
Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that
national taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes.
Such departure is impermissible.
Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should be
no departure).
Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of
fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution. In view of the
foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes, Section
284 has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other
national taxes, like the customs duties.
The exclusion of other national taxes like customs duties from the base for
determining the just share of the LGUs contravened the express constitutional
edict in Section 6, Article X the 1987 Constitution.
Although it has the primary discretion to determine and fix the just share of the
LGUs in the national taxes (e.g., Section 284 of the LGC), Congress cannot
disobey the express mandate of Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution for
the just share of the LGUs to be derived from the national taxes.
Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875 / 239483 / 240954 March 16, 2021
The Rome Statute entered into force in 2002 and the Philippines signed its intent
to be bound by the provisions of the treaty, subject to domestic requirements for
its validity and enforceability. It also passed RA 9851 in 2009 which broadened
definition of torture and added conscription of child soldiers as a war crime, and
the Rome Statute entered into force in the Philippines in November 2011
following the passage of Senate Resolution No. 546, enabling Philippine
consummation and accession to the Senate.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 Then, the Philippines withdrew from the ICC just as it begins to examine
atrocities allegedly committed in the Duterte administration’s War on Drugs by
depositing a Note Verbale to the International Criminal Court, which it accepted.

The petition questioning the Philippines’ exit from the ICC was dismissed for
among other reasons, the absence of express mechanism concerning withdrawal
from treaties or international agreements in the Constitution or any statute, or the
power to the president. Additionally, when an international agreement is entered
into upon Congress’ express will, the president may not unilaterally abrogate that
that international agreements where the Senate concurred and expressly declared
any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence. The Senate failed to
expressly declare that its concurrence was necessary for withdrawal from the
Rome Statute.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 WORKSHEET

I. MULTIPLE CHOICE
Let’s just jog back our memory a bit.

4. What is meant by construction?

A. Improvements to the family home
B. The process by which the family home is constructed
C. Interpreting the law to fill the gaps with respect to its application in a given case
D. Expounding the meaning of the law with respect to its application in a given case

5. When do laws take effect?

A. Fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette,
or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
B. Fifteen days following the commencement of their publication either in the Official
Gazette, or in a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
C. Fifteen days during the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in
a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.
D. Fifteen days before the completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette, or in
a newspaper of general circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.

6. What is not a newspaper of general circulation?

A. GMA News TV
B. The Manila Times
C. Abante Tonite
D. Manila Bulletin

7. The following are true about intrinsic aids EXCEPT for one:
A. They are found in the statute
B. They are mostly pedantic in nature, dealing with punctuation marks and linguistics
C. They include the whereas clauses
D. They deal with the intent of the law, thus dealing with its intrinsic value

8. What is NOT true about National Shrines?

A. They are birth places of the leaders of the nation.
B. They include the shrines for the burial of our soldiers and veterans.
C. They include historical sites deemed fit by the National Historical Commission.
D. They exclude shrines like Libingan ng mga Bayani.

9. The following are TRUE about Presidential Issuances (Two answers possible)
A. Proclamations are an exercise of the president’s lawmaking power.
B. Executive orders are acts of the President providing for rules of a general or permanent
character in implementation or execution of constitutional or statutory powers shall be
promulgated in executive orders.
C. Even if President Marcos stepped down in 1986, Presidential Decrees remain in force and
in effect until expressly repealed.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 D. General Orders can no longer be issued as these can only be issued during a state of
invasion, rebellion, or martial law pursuant to the President’s commander-in-chief powers.

7. Can the Court construe a law if there is no case or controversy?

A. Absolutely yes
B. Absolutely no
C. Generally yes
D. Generally no

8. If the language of the law is clear, ________________.

A. Apply the law
B. Interpret the law
C. Construe the law
D. Create the law

9. If the language of the law is ambiguous, ________________.

A. Apply the law
B. Use the intrinsic aids of the law
C. Use the extrinsic aids of the law
D. Construe the law

10. If the intent of the law cannot be ascertained by the use of intrinsic aids,
________________. (Two answers acceptable)
A. Apply the law
B. Use the intrinsic aids of the law
C. Use the extrinsic aids of the law
D. Construe the law

II. MODIFIED TRUE OR FALSE

If true, write T. If false, write F and explain why false.

11. True or False: Congress does not need to vote jointly to revoke the President’s declaration or
suspension of martial law or the privilege of the writ of the habeas corpus.
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

12. True or False: Stare decisis applies in cases decided in any level of court but final stare
decisis is attained when the Supreme Court decides.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

III. ESSAY

13. The following is the dispositive portion of Proclamation No. 1081 which proclaimed a state
of martial law throughout the Philippines on September 21, 1972:

“NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by

virtue of the powers vested upon me by Article VII, Section 10, Paragraph (2) of the
Constitution, do hereby place the entire Philippines as defined in Article I, Section 1 of the
Constitution under martial law and, in my capacity as their commander-in-chief, do hereby
command the armed forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout the
Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of
insurrection or rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and decrees, orders and
regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction.

In addition, I do hereby order that all persons presently detained, as well as all others who
may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, and all other
crimes and offenses committed in furtherance or on the occasion thereof, or incident
thereto, or in connection therewith, for crimes against national security and the law of
nations, crimes against public order, crimes involving usurpation of authority, rank, title
and improper use of names, uniforms and insignia, crimes committed by public officers,
and for such other crimes as will be enumerated in Orders that I shall subsequently
promulgate, as well as crimes as a consequence of any violation of any decree, order or
regulation promulgated by me personally or promulgated upon my direction shall be kept
under detention until otherwise ordered re- leased by me or by my duly designated
representative.” (Emphasis provided)

Assuming that Martial Law’s broad powers were still in effect in the present, would the
provision in bold be valid if Marcos declared Martial Law today? Why or why not? (5 points)

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

14. Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides:
“A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the
Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office,
grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the
admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without
authority so to do.”

Does this statement apply exclusively to infractions that reflect to the unfitness of the lawyer to
practice law? Why or why not?

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

15. Explain ratio legis est anima.

______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________
______________________________________________________________________________

IV. PARTS OF A STATUTE

16-20. Below is a mock resolution. Identify as many parts as you can.
Title / Clauses / Context of the law / Purpose of the law / Enacting clause

S.K. ISSUANCE NO. 1

CREATING AN EXPLORATORY COMMITTEE FOR THE

BOLA HINDI DROGA SPORTS PROGRAM EXCLUSIVELY FOR
THE PEOPLE OF BARANGAY MARIANA

WHEREAS, Section 426b, Book III of the Local Government Code of the Philippines regarding
the powers and functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan provides that the Sangguniang Kabataan shall
“initiate programs designed to enhance the social, political, economic, cultural, intellectual, moral,
spiritual, and physical development of the members”;

WHEREAS, Section 426d, Book III of the Local Government Code of the Philippines regarding
the powers and functions of the Sangguniang Kabataan provides that the Sangguniang Kabataan shall

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

“create such bodies or committees as it may deem necessary to effectively carry out its programs and
activities”;

WHEREAS, Section 431b, Book III of the Local Government Code of the Philippines provides
that the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman shall “implement policies, programs, and projects within his
jurisdiction in coordination with the Sangguniang Barangay”;

WHEREAS, Section 431d, Book III of the Local Government Code of the Philippines provides
that the Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman “with the concurrence of the Sangguniang Kabataan”, the
Chairman may “appoint from among the members of the Sangguniang Kabataan, the secretary and
treasurer, and such other officers as may be deemed necessary”;

WHEREAS, the concerns regarding the lack of youth involvement in the community need to be
addressed;

WHEREAS, sport has continually served as an avenue for youth involvement, whether for either
political or apolitical purposes;

WHEREAS, the spirit of sport, camaraderie, and teamwork are necessary qualities in order to
foster the communal spirit and sense of community that is demanded for a new movement and
reformation of society;

WHEREAS, the enactment of sport comprehensive and wide-ranging sports program exclusive
to the citizens of Barangay Mariana is an oft-repeated yet oft-broken campaign promise of multiple
candidates and previous SK Chairpersons;

WHEREAS, the enactment of a comprehensive and wide-ranging sports program will provide a
chance for positive interaction and a new experience among men and women, irregardless of age, belief,
and religion;

WHEREAS, action needs to be taken to address the concerns regarding the concerns and
revisions pursuant to the approval of the plan, as well as the implementations, initiatives, fundraisers,
programs and allocations of funds in connection therewith;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, JEREMY MARTIN C. ASIS, Sangguniang Kabataan Chairman of

Barangay Mariana, Quezon City, by virtue of the powers vested in me by law and the Local Government
Code, do hereby call for the following and thereunto lawfully:

1. Proclaim the creation and commission of an exploratory committee composed of one (1)
Committee President, one (1) finance manager, two (2) secretaries, and seven (7) board members for the
Bola Hindi Droga Sports Program which will be of exclusive benefit and use for the people of Barangay
Mariana.

2. Open the availability of slots for the Bola Hindi Droga Sports Exploratory Committee to all
citizens of Barangay Mariana aged 15 years old and above to encourage involvement in barangay affairs
and the decentralization of the office of the executive.

This Resolution shall take effect on the 15th of July, 2018.

DONE in the City of Quezon, this 30th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, Two Thousand and
Eighteen.

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03

 SIGNED:

BY THE SECRETARY: JEREMY MARTIN C. ASIS

Chairman
Sangguniang Kabataan

JUSTINE PAUL CASTILLO

Secretary
Sangguniang Kabataan

“The study of law is best had if enjoyed. These notes are intended to be both
informative and entertaining. Reviewees are also entitled to have fun even while
preparing to take on the Final exams. As had been writ: “A judicial decision does
not have to be a bore.” Neither must a Finals review material be. It need not be a
bland presentation of what has been. It might as well pick brains and prick some
civic conscience in preparation for eventual practice as a responsible and
respectable particle of sovereignty.
So, here’s to humoring the Final exams. There’s nothing as unnerving as
approaching a problem from a perspective of trepidation. March on with
confidence, head up high, a smile on your face and faith in yourself. The Final
exercise is just a good opportunity to prove and improve yourself. It is not an
adversary but an ally, and even if it were, it is one that you can persuade and
convince to become a worthwhile friend.”
- Rene B. Gorospe
Quote adopted for Final exams

JEREMY MARTIN ASIS BLOCK G03