RESOURCE FILES

Managing LNG Risks

From the campaign to prevent LNG terminals in Passamaquoddy Bay
Documents and references used to explain LNG

Compiled by Arthur MacKay

Bocabec, NB, Canada
September, 2012
 RESOURCE FILES

WHAT ARE RESOURCEFILES?

Resource files are created from the contents of the working reference and publication files of Art MacKay and
are made available for reference purposes. They contain documents, drawings, photographs and other resources
accumulated over a 50 year period, including public domain materials as well as materials with copyrights held
by Arthur MacKay and others.

Since online resources come and go, they have been converted to PDFs and archived to preserve their contents.
They can be accessed directly where the links are still active. Live links and copyright requirements are speci-
fied for each item if still available. Art MacKay can be contacted at art@bayof fundy.ca to clarify availability for
further publication.

Entire files composed of physical documents, books, photos, cds, etc. are available and sold separately.
 St. Andrews Citizens Will be Burning!
© Art MacKay, 2009, St. Andrews, New Brunswick, Canada, January 10, 2008

The US Coast Guard’s recently released Waterway Suitability Report, prepared for the Federal Energy Regula-
tory Commission’s (FERC) Downeast LNG application, will have the residents of New Brunswick’s premier
resort area burning again.

When, on the heels of Quoddy Bay LLC’s earlier proposal at Sipyik, Downeast LNG first introduced their plan
to construct an LNG terminal and storage facility directly across the St. Croix River from St. Andrews at Rob-
binston, Maine, the citizens of that resort town and the greater Quoddy Region rose as one to denounce these
developments and made their position clear with submissions to FERC and government officials in both Canada
and the United States, Impressive, passionate, packed public meetings and protests were held. Subsequently, Ca-
nadian opponents to the LNG plans have been supported at every political level in Canada. Conservative Prime
Minister Harper and local Member of Parliament Hon. Greg Thompson have publicly and in closed session with
President George Bush, expressed their firm position that tankers will not be allowed through Head Harbour
Passage, the essential waterway that they consider to be internal Canadian waters and, in the long term, too
valuable and hazardous a waterway to be used by supertankers. This was a similar position to that taken about
30 years ago when the Pittston Company of Greenwich, Conn. applied to turn Eastport and Moose Island into
a gigantic oil refinery and tank farm, threatening fishing, tourism, marine life, and whales including the endan-
gered north Atlantic right whale.

In previous responses to Quoddy Bay LLC, the US Coast Guard stated that the participation of the Canadian
government was paramount to their release of a similar report for Quoddy Bay LLC and it was withheld. This is
not the case with the Downeast LNG proposal. In this case, while the report requires Canadian consultation by
Downeast LNG, the USCC has chosen to assess Canadian waters without the approval of Canada, an interest-
ing move that causes great concern in a contest that, more and more, seems to revolve around testing Canadian
sovereignty and, not incidentally, Canadian resolve.

As can be seen in the accompanying chart taken from the USCC Waterway Suitability Study, St. Andrews
citizens can now see that they are within the hazard zone for this development. A similar study for Calais LNG
will, undoubtedly, duplicate this scenario, but will move Zone 3 more deeply into the town as tankers move up
the St. Croix River.

The USCC defines these zones as:

• Zone 1 (red) - 500 meter radius with resultant fire and severe thermal radiation hazards. By definition these
are areas in which LNG shipments occur in relatively narrow harbors or channels, or ships pass under major
bridges or over tunnels, or come in within 500 meters of major infrastructure such as military installations,
commercial/business centers, or national icons.
• Zone 2 (yellow with black line) - from 500 to 1600 meters with less severe thermal radiation hazards to pub-
lic safety and property. These are areas of broader channel widths, larger open harbors, or over 500 meters
from major critical infrastructure elements.
• Zone 3 (yellow) – from 1600 to 3500 meters with potential pockets of flammable vapor. These are areas
where LNG traffic and deliveries occur approximately 1.6 kilometers from major infrastructure or in large
bays or open water. The thermal radiation risks to public safety and property are significantly reduced.

While thermal risks may be reduced with distance, MIT Professor Emeritus James Fay , points out that the
actual zone of impact, the area were fires are ignited and people suffer serious burns, may be greater than the
distance used in the report. He states that, “for all credible spills, including terrorist attacks on the storage tank
and LNG tanker, the danger zone for humans extends almost 4 miles from the terminal site” or about 2.5 kilo-
meters, and life and property will be lost from so-called collatera impacts. This greater distance envelopes all of
St. Andrews and the ability of fire departments may be non-existent since their facilities are within the real zone
of impact and these professionals may well be immobilized by an event itself. the nearest assistance would be
St. Stephen and St. George.

As for bringing tankers through Head Harbour Passage, this is a red herring. Of course it can be done. It’s risk
analysis and the real question is for how long will it take to have an accident and at what cost? Since LNG
tankers can only enter and leave during the day, at slack tide (if that truly exists in some areas along the route),
when the visibility is more than 2 miles, and the wind is less than 25 mph, then the number of days when access
is available will be severely limited. In fact, these data are available and it is a wonder that they have not been
required for the USCC report and company submissions to FERC. Imagine the financial impacts to Downeast
LNG and its leader Dean Girdis during those delightful years like the one when fog held to the West Isles for
more than 30 days and 30 nights. At $100,000 a day, layovers adds up! Passamaquoddy Bay and key fishing
areas of Campobello Island
could well see numerous gigantic tankers stacked up waiting to move.

Foget the hazardous passage and the old sow whirlpool, layovers will be substantial and local boats will be
unable to pursue fishing, whale watching, and recreational activities during passage and while at anchor or at
the terminal. The eco-economy of Quoddy will be effectively shut down. Since the arrival of tankers is “secret”
due to fears of terrorism, local operators will have little time to respond and will be forced to the side by armed
gunboats, as the are in Boston Harbour. What a delightful vision.

Unless the new administration in the United States recognizes the folly of agitating their neighbours, best
friends, and largest trading partner, the first LNG explosion may be coming soon, much sooner, than antici-
pated by the LNG promoters. A once interesting and functional “international community” that drews upon the
abundant natural resources of this unique Quoddy ecosystem, has been split asunder by these LNG develop-
ment proposals. In spite of the plethora of carpetbaggers who have wandered through Charlotte and Washington
Counties, some folks have never stopped looking for the knight on a white steed; the saviour who will bring
economic salvation to an area of perceived poverty. The sad truth is that the wealth required to provide a truly
sustainable future for all of the citizens of Quoddy has always been here for those with eyes to see.

They will forget their old laws; they will barter their country for baubels. Then will disease eat the life
from their blood. (Hanisse’ono. The Evil One from Iroquois legend.)

Art MacKay is a biologist, writer, and artists with over 40 years professional experience in the Bay of
Fundy and northern Gulf of Maine. He is the author of many reports and articles about these
ecosystems.

******************************************************************************************
Are we safe
around this industry?
”Algeria Blast Has Officials
Rethinking LNG Safety”
Jan 19th, 2004, 30 dead - 74 injured

(LNG liquifaction trains)

Duke
Energy
Moss Bluff
Texas
gas storage site,

Aug.20th, 2004

AP photo

3 mile radius
evacuated, could
not extinguish
blaze for days
Belgian Gas Explosion Kills 14
Workers Had Reported Piercing Underground Pipeline
Associated Press
Saturday, July 31, 2004

18 dead
200 injured
“Society has a way of ignoring the
Low Probability-High Consequence accident.
This is exactly what terrorists look for.”

Richard Wilson, Harvard, giving a talk at the high security

Los Alamos Labs in New Mexico after 9/11
How Does FERC Define Worst
Case Accident Scenario?

“A break in one LNG transfer arm that lasts

for 10 minutes. Total spill is ~550,000 gallons.
This represents less than 1.5% of the capacity
of one LNG storage tank. “

Bill Powers, Border Power Plant Working Group, Calif.

 James A Fay
Professor Emeritus, Senior Lecturer, MIT

• Acknowledged world
wide expert on fluid
mechanics and spread
of hazardous materials
on the ocean

• Education, honors,
textbooks too lengthy
and numerous to list
here.
See: www.JamesFay.com
James Fay’s argument in a nutshell:

The FERC regulations do not prevent people living here

from getting 2nd degree burns in 30 seconds
if a bad accident occurs.

Fay’s limits of exposure by distance ( see circles on

next slide) DO prevent these people from getting burned
if a bad accident happens.

If Fay’s limits were observed, the LNG tankers could not be

allowed in here because of safety reasons.
Safe
Distances
from Terminal:
Small circle for
spill with fire
from one hold of tanker

Large red circle for

spill from storage tank

Large blue circle for

safe distance
from tanker spill
for flammable vapor

James Fay report

Safe
Distance
from
tanker path
for heat
radiation
from spill
with fire

James Fay
Green line is the tanker path
• The potential for retarding a pool fire is
nonexistent
• A gasoline fire is only 8% of the intensity
of an LNG fire
James Fay

“Its too hot to get near and you

can’t put it out until it runs out of fuel”.
 ABS Consulting Report for
FERC- 2004
For unconfined spills on water:

1.It is impossible to predict with certainty what would happen

2.A pool fire is possible that would burn people and property
a mile away
3.This could cause 2nd degree burns in 30 seconds and 3rd
degree burns in 50 seconds
4.A flammable vapor cloud could travel several thousand
feet
5.Until we understand more we should use the high end of
the scale of prediction

www.soundenergysolutions.com
The U.S. and FERC with
respect to LNG
-Reckless behavior
-No public conscience
-No vision
-No planning
-No responsibility
-Unacceptable risk
The U.S. and FERC with
respect to LNG
-Reckless behavior
-No public conscience
-No vision
-No planning
-No responsibility
-Unacceptable risk
Tim Riley, California lawyer
who opposes LNG says it very well:

A sound, safe energy policy requires solutions

that make America stronger not weaker,
make America more self sufficient
not more dependent,
make America safer not more vulnerable,
make America fossil free not more polluted.

Prepared by Joyce Morrell

Campobello, Oct.2004
Public Safety Issues at the Proposed
Pleasant Point LNG Terminal

James A. Fay
77 Massachusetts Avenue, Rm. 3-258

Cambridge, MA 02139

August 5, 2004
1 Introduction
Quoddy Bay L.L.C.1 has proposed to construct and operate a liquefied natural gas (LNG) import
terminal on the Sipayik tribal land at Pleasant Point, near Eastport, ME. To reach this terminal,
ocean-going LNG tankers must move through Canadian waters between Campobello and Deer is-
lands (Canada) as well as U.S. and Canadian waters between Eastport and Deer Island. A tanker
spill at any location along this route would have serious consequences for persons and property on
the shore adjacent to the stricken vessel, whether that be on Campobello or Deer I. or Eastport and
the Sipayik Reservation.
Natural gas, a hydrocarbon fuel, is usually piped directly from a gas well to the end consumer,
never being stored locally in large amounts. When cooled to liquid form, however, as much as
50,000 tons can be stored in insulated tanks on land or aboard ship. In this form it is especially
hazardous if it escapes by accident from its container, spilling onto ground or water and turning
very rapidly into gaseous form, whereupon it will mix with air and then burn if ignited. By its very
nature, an LNG import terminal is a hazardous industrial facility which could experience accidental
fires that might harm surrounding populations and property.
To build and operate an LNG terminal at the Pleasant Point site, Quoddy Bay must obtain per-
mission from the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)2 , an independent agency that
regulates interstate commerce in natural gas and electricity. Although primarily an economic regu-
lator, FERC has asserted jurisdiction over the safety aspects of the LNG facilities it permits. FERC
requires facility owners to meet certain technical standards in site selection and equipment design
and operation before it awards the right to import LNG and to connect the facility to an interstate nat-
ural gas transmission line. FERC’s jurisdiction does not extend to safety aspects of marine tankers;
they are regulated by the U.S. Coast Guard.3
FERC’s objective in safety regulation is to limit, but not necessarily prevent, harm to persons
and property outside the confines of the terminal site, should there be an accidental release of LNG
at the site. The principal harmful effects are two: vapor plumes or clouds that can be ignited outside
the site boundaries and harmful thermal radiation from on-site fires that extends across the site
borders. But FERC’s safety rules do not consider all credible spills on the site or any from the LNG
tankers while in transit to the terminal or being unloaded.
This report explains the safety requirements that will likely be applied by federal regulators to
the proposed LNG terminal in Pleasant Point. It delineates the geographic extent of harmful effects
that could be expected from LNG spills at the site, including those that are excluded from FERC
and U.S. Coast Guard safety regulations.

2 FERC site selection criteria

FERC rules4 require the LNG terminal owner to install extensive technological features that will
limit the harmful consequences of an accidental spill of LNG to within the property line enclosing
the terminal. The harmful effects are twofold: combustible mixtures of vapor and air, such as might
be driven by the wind blowing over an evaporating pool of spilled LNG, and thermal radiation from
a fire burning above a liquid spill on the site. The types of spills to be considered are also twofold: a
1 Quoddy Bay L.L.C. is owned by Smith Cogeneration (www.smithcogeneration.com).
2 Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (www.ferc.gov).
3 The safety of the natural gas pipeline connecting the terminal to the interstate transmission line is regulated by the
Office of Pipeline Safety of the U.S. Department of Transportation, but the FERC permit for the LNG terminal confers
on the terminal owner the right to seek seizure of private land to construct the connecting pipeline, if necessary.
4 Code of Federal Regulations, 49 CFR 193.

1
Figure 1: The primary and secondary containment tanks for a ”full containment” storage tank of the
type to be used at the proposed Harpswell LNG terminal.

spill from transfer piping connecting the storage tanks and the regasification or unloading facilities,
and the failure of the primary storage tank enclosure.
Limiting these effects at a terminal requires the construction of impounding areas surrounding
potential spill sources so as to collect the spilled liquid and slow its vaporization or burning rate. If
the spills are sufficiently small, harmful effects will not extend beyond the site line. For transfer line
spills, the LNG is collected in a central impounding area. For storage tank spills, the inner storage
container is surrounded by a secondary containment tank of slightly larger size, as shown in Figure
2, which can contain all the LNG that might spill from the inner primary container.
The potential for harmful effects to humans from a given spill decreases with distance from the
spill site. The harmful effect of ignitable natural gas vapor is measured by the flammability distance,
a distance down wind from the spill site at which the vapor has been so diluted by mixing with air
that it cannot be ignited. Any ignition at a closer distance can propagate a flame, but that flame will
not propagate beyond the flammability distance. If the latter distance lies within the site boundary,
no flame can extend beyond that boundary.
Thermal radiation from on-site LNG fires fed by an evaporating pool of spilled LNG can cause
first, second or third degree burns to the skin of humans exposed to the radiation, depending upon the
intensity of radiation. For a given fire, this intensity decreases with distance from the fire. The least
intense thermal radiation that FERC rules allow humans outside the site boundary to be exposed
to is 5 kilowatts per square meter, an amount that produces second degree burns after only thirty
seconds exposure.5
The FERC requirements for the proposed Quoddy Bay terminal can be estimated from the Fi-
nal Environmental Impact Statement for the Hackberry LNG project in Louisiana.6 This project,
consisting of three storage tanks and two unloading piers, employs the technology likely to be used
at the Pleasant Point facility. Values from this report of the flammability and thermal radiation dis-
5 More intense and thereby more damaging exposure is permitted depending upon land use characteristics at the site
boundary.
6 Final Environmental Impact Statement, Hackberry LNG Project, Cameron LNG, LLC. FERC/EIS-0156. Office of
Energy Projects, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20426. August 2003.

2
 Table 1: Flammability and radiation distances for FERC-defined spills

Spill source Size (ton) Flammability (ft) 5 kW/m2 Radiation (ft)

Transfer piping 840 770 320

Storage tank (primary) 74,000 929

tances for a transfer line spill, and the thermal radiation distance for a primary containment spill, are
listed in Table 1, together with the amounts of the respective spill volumes. It would appear that for
these FERC-defined spills neither radiation nor flammability will exceed the FERC limits beyond
the site boundary.

3 Risks that FERC ignores

There are several important public safety risks that are not considered in the FERC regulations
discussed above.

1. First of all, FERC allows damaging thermal radiation beyond the site boundary as long as its
level is below 5 kilowatts per square meter. However, it is not until the thermal radiation in-
tensity falls below 1.6 kilowatts per square meter that there is no damage to exposed humans.
A safe radiation distance for fires would be that for which the thermal radiation level does
not exceed 1.6 kilowatts per square meter. Distances at which the radiation exceeds this value
would lie within a thermal radiation danger zone.

2. Secondly, FERC’s regulations ignore the greatest risks of all, that foreign or domestic terror-
ists could destroy the storage tank primary and secondary containment systems, or the LNG
tanker cargo hold, allowing LNG to spill unhindered onto ground or water, where it would
most likely burn. Because the lateral extent of such spills would be so much greater than
those considered in the FERC regulations, it is to be expected that their harmful effects would
exist very far beyond the site boundaries.

To show how public safety can be adversely affected by credible spills that have been overlooked
by FERC, we have extended Table 1 to include the effects listed above.7 This expanded assessment
is listed in Table 2. Two additional spills are considered, those from the secondary storage tank
containment system and a single hold of a marine tanker (last two rows of Table 2). For these and
the previous spills of Table 1, the safe radiation distance defining the outer boundary of the thermal
radiation danger zone, mentioned in item 1 above, has been calculated for all spills (last column
of Table 2). Also, the flammability distance for the FERC primary containment failure accident is
shown in the flammability column.
7 The methods used for this assessment are identical to those contained in ”Consequence assessment methods for
incidents involving releases from liquefied natural gas carriers”, Report 131-04 GEMS 1288209, ABS Consulting, Inc.,
May 13, 2004, (available on FERC web site at www.ferc.gov/industries/gas/indus-act.asp) and its Attachment 1 of June
29, 2004, as listed on the FERC site at http://ferris.ferc.gov/idmws/search/fercgensearch.asp under docket AD04-6.

3
 Table 2: Flammability and radiation distances for all credible spills

Spill source Size (ton) Flammability (ft) 1.6 kW/m2 Radiation (ft)
Danger zone Danger zone

Transfer piping 840 770 1,230

Storage tank (primary) 74,000 1,490

Storage tank (secondary) 74,000 19,685

Tanker hold 5,250 19,360 7,870

3.1 Thermal danger zones

The thermal radiation danger zones for the largest credible spills listed in Table 2 are shown in
Figure 2. All of these extend beyond the site boundaries, especially so for the tanker and secondary
tank spill with fire. But even the FERC spills with fire from transfer piping and primary containment
send damaging radiation beyond the site boundaries. Altogether, about 20 square miles of U.S. shore
land in the Pleasant Point area and 3 square miles on Deer Island are at risk for damage to humans
from on-site spills at the proposed LNG terminal.

3.2 Tanker danger zones

Spills from a fully loaded LNG tanker can occur not only at the unloading dock, as shown in Figure
2, but also at any point along the ship channel while approaching the terminal. Figure 3 shows the
proposed path to be followed by an LNG tanker heading for the terminal. Thermal radiation danger
zones for spills at four locations along the path are shown. At any location, about 2 square miles on
the U.S. shoreline and an equal amount on the Canada shoreline (Campobello and Deer Islands) lie
within the thermal danger zone.

3.3 Flammable vapor danger zones

The blue circle in Figure 2 depicts the flammability danger zone for a spill, without fire, from the
tanker while located at the terminal pier. For any such spill, the flammable vapor plume or cloud
would extend from the tanker in the downwind direction, encompassing an area of about a square
mile. Winds from the northwest, and clockwise to the southeast, would send the vapor plume to
U.S. land area from Eastport to the Passamaquoddy shoreline, while winds from the southwest, and
clockwise to the northwest, would send the vapor over land areas of Deer Island.
The spills described in Tables 1 and 2 do not include spills without fire from the secondary
containment of the land storage tank. Because such a spill would be more than ten times the tanker
spill in volume, the corresponding flammability distance would be considerably greater than the
blue circle shown in Figure 2.

4
 X
X

Figure 2: The thermal radiation and flammable vapor danger zones for spills listed in Table 2. Red
circles are distances to radiation intensities of 1.6 kW/m2 for a spill with fire; larger for loss of
secondary containment of land storage tank, smaller for spill from one hold of LNG tanker. Blue
circle is flammable vapor distance for a tanker spill.

5
Figure 3: The path of a tanker approaching the proposed LNG terminal (green dashed line) and the
radiation danger zones for a spill at four locations along this path.

6
4 Conclusions
1. The federal safety requirements for the proposed Pleasant Point LNG terminal will not
prevent harm to humans outside the site boundary for the spill scenarios that FERC
considers.

2. For all credible spills, including terrorist attacks on the storage tank and LNG tanker,
the danger zone for humans extends almost 4 miles from the terminal site, encompassing
20 square miles of land in the Pleasant Point area.

3. For a tanker spill anywhere along the route leading to the LNG terminal, the thermal
radiation danger zone for humans extends 1.5 miles from the tanker route, encompass-
ing up to 4 square miles of land along U.S. and Canada shores in Eastport, Campobello
Island and Deer Island, depending upon the spill location along the tanker track.

7
REFERENCE ARCHIVE
SANDIA REPORT
SAND2008-3153
Unlimited Release
Printed May 2008

Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills

Over Water from Large Liquefied Natural
Gas Carriers

Anay Luketa, M. Michael Hightower, Steve Attaway

Prepared by
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

Sandia is a multiprogram laboratory operated by Sandia Corporation,

a Lockheed Martin Company, for the United States Department of Energy’s
National Nuclear Security Administration under Contract DE-AC04-94AL85000.

Approved for public release; further dissemination unlimited.

Issued by Sandia National Laboratories, operated for the United States Department of Energy by Sandia Corporation.
NOTICE: This report was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the
United States Government, nor any agency thereof, nor any of their employees, nor any of their contractors, subcontractors, or
their employees, make any warranty, express or implied, or assume any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy,
completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represent that its use would not
infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name,
trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by
the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their contractors or subcontractors. The views and opinions
expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government, any agency thereof, or any of their
contractors.

Printed in the United States of America. This report has been reproduced directly from the best available copy.

Available to DOE and DOE contractors from

U.S. Department of Energy
Office of Scientific and Technical Information
P.O. Box 62
Oak Ridge, TN 37831

Telephone: (865)576-8401
Facsimile: (865)576-5728
E-Mail: [email protected]
Online ordering: http://www.osti.gov/bridge

Available to the public from

U.S. Department of Commerce
National Technical Information Service
5285 Port Royal Rd
Springfield, VA 22161

Telephone: (800)553-6847
Facsimile: (703)605-6900
E-Mail: [email protected]
Online order: http://www.ntis.gov/help/ordermethods.asp?loc=7-4-0#online
 SAND2008-3153
Unlimited Release
Printed May 2008

Breach and Safety Analysis of Spills Over Water from

Large Liquefied Natural Gas Carriers

Anay Luketa
Fire and Aerosol Sciences Department

Mike Hightower
Energy Systems Analysis Department

Steve Attaway
Mechanical Environments Department

Sandia National Laboratories

P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185

Abstract

In 2004, at the request of the Department of Energy, Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia)
prepared a report, “Guidance on the Risk and Safety Analysis of Large Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) Spills Over Water”. That report provided a framework for assessing hazards and
identifying approaches to minimize the consequences to people and property from an LNG spill
over water. The report also presented the general scale of possible hazards from a spill from
125,000 m3 to 150,000 m3 class LNG carriers, at the time the most common LNG carrier
capacity.

Because of the increasing size and capacity of many new LNG carriers, the Department of
Energy requested that Sandia assess the general scale of possible hazards for a breach and spill
from newer LNG carriers with capacities up to 265,000 m3. Building on the research and
analyses presented in the 2004 report, Sandia reassessed emerging accidental and intentional
threats and then conducted detailed breach analyses for the new large LNG carrier designs.
Based on the estimated breach sizes, breach locations, and LNG carrier configurations, we
estimated LNG spill rates and volumes and conducted thermal hazard and vapor dispersion
analyses. This report summarizes the different analyses conducted, the expected range of
potential hazards from a large LNG carrier spill over water, and risk management approaches to
minimize consequences to people and property from such a spill.

3
 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The authors received technical, programmatic, and editorial support on this project from a
number of individuals and organizations both inside and outside Sandia National Laboratories.
We would particularly like to express our thanks for their support and guidance in the technical
evaluations and development of this report. The authors would also like to thank Marcus
Epperson and Benjamin Taylor at Sandia for providing exceptional support in ensuring
successful computations on the Razor cluster.
The U.S. Department of Energy was instrumental in providing coordination, management, and
technical direction. Special thanks go to DOE personnel in the Office of Oil and Natural Gas,
Office of Fossil Energy, for their help in supporting the modeling, analysis, and technical
evaluations.
To support the technical analysis required for this project, the authors worked with many
organizations, including maritime agencies, LNG industry, and government agencies to collect
background information on ship and LNG cargo tank designs and accident and threat scenarios
needed to assess emerging large LNG carrier breach and spill safety hazard implications. The
following individuals were especially helpful in supporting our efforts by providing information
and data, coordinating industry and governmental agency interactions, and reviewing technical
evaluations.
Robert Corbin – Department of Energy
John Cushing – US Coast Guard
Ray Martin – US Coast Guard
Ken Smith – US Coast Guard
Pavagada Vasanth – US Coast Guard
Terry Turpin – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
Chris Zerby – Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
David Weimer – Det Norske Veritas
Patricia Outtrim – Cheniere LNG

4
 CONTENTS

LIST OF ACRONYMS ...................................................................................................................6

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................7
2. BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................9
2.1 Overview of LNG Carriers ..............................................................................................10
2.2 Size and Capacity of Emerging LNG Carrier Designs ....................................................11
3. THREAT AND BREACH ANALYSES ..................................................................................13
3.1 Analysis of Intentional Threat Scenarios for Large LNG Carriers..................................13
3.2 Analysis of Intentional Breaching of Large LNG Carriers..............................................13
4. LNG SPILL HAZARD EVALUATIONS AND RISK REDUCTION....................................16
4.1 Pool Fire Hazard Analyses...............................................................................................16
4.2 Vapor Dispersion Analyses..............................................................................................20
4.3 Hazard and Risk Reduction Considerations ....................................................................22
5. CONCLUSIONS.......................................................................................................................23
APPENDIX....................................................................................................................................25
A1. Surface Emissive Power..........................................................................................................25
A2. Fuel Volatilization Rate ..........................................................................................................25
A3. Flame Height...........................................................................................................................27
A4. Flame Tilt and Drag ................................................................................................................29
A5. Atmospheric Attenuation ........................................................................................................29

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. Typical Containment Systems for LNG Carriers ..........................................................10

Figure 2. Example of a 205,000 m3 Membrane Regasification LNG Carrier ..............................12
Figure 3: Example of Large Capacity LNG Carrier Structural Model .........................................14

LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Emerging LNG Carrier Size and Capacity .....................................................................11

Table 2. Thermal hazard distances from a pool fire for near-shore operations ............................19
Table 3. Thermal hazard distances from a pool fire for offshore operations................................20
Table 4. Distance to the LFL for vapor dispersion for near-shore operations..............................21
Table 5. Distance to the LFL for vapor dispersion for offshore operations .................................21

5
 LIST OF ACRONYMS

CFD Computational fluid dynamics

CTH Hydrodynamics Code 3-D
DOE Department of Energy
DWP Deep Water Ports
GAO Government Accountability Office
FERC Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
kW/m2 kilowatts per square meter
km kilometer – 1000 meter
Knts Knots – 0.514 m/s
L/D Height to diameter ratio
LFL Lower flammability limit
LNG Liquefied natural gas
LNGC LNG Carrier
m meters
m2 square meter (area)
m3 cubic meter (volume)
m/s meters per second
psi pounds per square inch
RLNGC Regasification LNG Carrier
SRV Storage and Regasification Vessel
USCG United States Coast Guard
°C degrees Celsius
°F degrees Fahrenheit
°K degrees Kelvin

6
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The demand for natural gas in the U.S. could significantly increase the number and frequency of
marine liquefied natural gas (LNG) imports [EIA, 2003]. Because of the increased demand for
natural gas, many LNG import terminals around the world are being designed to handle and
operate with larger capacity LNG carriers. While studies have been conducted to assess the
consequences and risks of potential spills from the current size and capacity of LNG carriers, no
hazard studies have been conducted for the emerging larger capacity LNG carriers. Most current
LNG carriers transport 125,000 m3 - 145,000 m3 of LNG in either four or five cargo tanks. Many
new LNG carriers are being designed to carry up to 265,000 m3 of LNG.

The increasing importance of LNG imports suggests that consistent methods and approaches be
used to identify the hazards and protect the public and property from a potential LNG spill. For
that reason, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Fossil Energy, requested that
Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) assess and quantify the potential hazards and
consequences of a large spill from these emerging larger capacity LNG carriers. The effort
undertaken for these larger LNG carriers was similar to that presented in the 2004 Sandia report
“Guidance on Risk and Safety Assessment of Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spills Over
Water” [Hightower, et.al., 2004]. For this new effort, DOE specifically requested that Sandia:

Reassess current threat considerations and recommendations from intelligence agencies for
marine energy imports,

Evaluate the potential breaching sizes and LNG spill rates and volumes for the larger
capacity LNG carriers for both near-shore and offshore operations, and

Assess the range of potential hazards from a spill from these larger capacity LNG carriers,
and risk management considerations needed to improve public safety.

To support these efforts, Sandia worked with the U.S. DOE, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG), LNG
industry representatives, and government intelligence agencies to collect background information
on ship and LNG cargo tank designs and the most recent credible breach scenarios. The
information gathered was used to conduct detailed three-dimensional, dynamic, structural
analyses of cargo tank breaching for various scenarios. These results were then used to calculate
possible spill rates and volumes, and to model the associated hazards and consequences of the
potential spills.

While a discussion of the specific threats and expected consequences is beyond the scope of this
report, we do discuss the range of breaches that were calculated for these events. A detailed
summary of the structural modeling conducted to calculate the potential breaches from various
intentional events is presented in an associated report [Luketa, et al., 2008].

The hazard results developed were based on a range of nominal, or most likely, spill conditions
and are not site-specific. Site-specific hazard distances will change depending upon the location
of the facility, number, size, and type of LNG carriers or regasification vessels used, as well as
environmental conditions. Therefore, the hazard results presented are intended to convey the
scale of possible hazard distances for a large spill over water from emerging large capacity LNG
carriers. While the major hazards expected from an LNG spill for the intentional events

7
considered are thermal hazards from a fire, vapor dispersion distances for potential spills were
also calculated. Dispersion is significantly influenced by environmental conditions and potential
ignition sources, and the information presented should again be used for identifying the scale of
hazards, not necessarily be used for defining hazard distances for a specific site.

As noted in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, scenarios could include breaching of more than one
LNG cargo tank during intentional events and was considered in these evaluations. Also,
cascading damage to an adjacent LNG cargo tank from initial damage to one LNG cargo tank
may be possible, based on current experimental data and modeling evaluations, and was
considered. As discussed in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, while not considered the most likely
LNG spill events, consideration of up to three tanks spilling at any one time is expected to
provide a conservative analysis of possible cascading damage concerns and associated hazards.

Near-shore Operations
Based on these detailed analyses for emerging LNG tanker designs up to 265,000 m3, the range
of breach sizes calculated for credible intentional scenarios appropriate for near-shore operations,
where there is waterway surveillance, monitoring and control, ranged between 2 – 12 m2. Our
analysis suggests that in these near-shore operations, the most likely or nominal intentional
events would result in an LNG cargo tank breach of approximately 5 m2. For this size breach in
the larger LNG carriers, the spill rates and spill volumes increase slightly and therefore the
thermal hazard distances are approximately 7–8% greater than the previous results presented in
the 2004 Sandia LNG study for similar event considerations. This is due to the greater amount of
LNG above the waterline, or hydrostatic head, and the larger LNG volumes per cargo tank for
the larger LNG carriers. Even with the increase in thermal hazard distances from pool fires for
the larger ships, the most significant impacts to public safety and property are still within
approximately 500 m of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances beyond
approximately 1600 m for near-shore operations.

Offshore Operations
For offshore operations, where there is less control and surveillance of ship operations, credible
intentional scenarios can be larger and the calculated breach sizes can range from 5 – 16 m2, with
the most likely or nominal intentional breaching scenario resulting in an LNG cargo tank breach
of approximately 12 m2. For offshore LNG facilities where consideration of a breach size of 12
m2 is appropriate, the most significant impacts to public safety and property are within
approximately 700 m of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances beyond
approximately 2000 m. Given the location of many proposed offshore facilities, these hazard
distances suggest the potential for minimal impact to public safety or property from even a large
spill from these larger capacity LNG carriers.

8
2. BACKGROUND
The increasing demand for natural gas in the U.S. could significantly increase the number and
frequency of marine LNG imports. Net imports of natural gas into the U.S. are expected to grow
from 0.5 trillion cubic feet in 2006 to 2.9 trillion cubic feet in 2030 [EIA, 2008]. Currently there
are five operational LNG marine terminals. Four to eight new LNG terminals are expected to be
constructed in the next four to five years and more than 40 new terminal sites are under
consideration and investigation. A factor in the siting of LNG receiving terminals is the
proximity to market. Therefore, terminals are being considered in areas with high natural gas
demands, which include locations on all three U.S. coasts. Most are being planned to handle one
to two LNG tanker shipments per week. A fleet of over 250 specially designed LNG ships is
currently being used to transport natural gas around the globe. Worldwide, there are over 20
LNG export (liquefaction) terminals and over 50 import (re-gasification) terminals. This
commercial network handles approximately 120 million tons of LNG every year. LNG carriers
often travel through areas of dense traffic. In 2000, for example, Tokyo Bay averaged one LNG
cargo every 20 hours and one cargo per week entered Boston harbor. Estimates are that world
wide LNG trade will increase 35% by 2020. The major areas for increased LNG imports are
Europe, North America, and Asia [EIA, 2008].

As LNG imports have increased in the U.S., safety and security concerns have been raised. In
response to these concerns, background information on LNG properties, siting processes, and
safety and security operations have been developed [FERC, 2004; DOE, 2005; USCG, 2005;
Parfomak, 2003 and 2007]. While many studies have been conducted to assess the consequences
and risks of potential LNG spills for the current class of LNG carrier, none has been conducted
for the newer and larger capacity LNG carriers. Many of the current LNG carriers are designed
to carry approximately 125,000 m3 - 145,000 m3 of LNG in either four or five cargo tanks.
Because of the increased demand for LNG, many LNG import terminals around the world are
being designed to handle and operate with LNG carriers with capacities up to 265,000 m3.

The increasing importance of LNG imports suggests that consistent methods and approaches be
identified and implemented to help ensure protection of public safety and property from a
potential LNG spill. For that reason, the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), Office of Fossil
Energy, requested that Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) assess and quantify the potential
hazards and consequences of a large spill from these larger LNG carrier designs. The effort was
similar to what was presented in the 2004 Sandia report “Guidance on Risk and Safety
Assessment of Large Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Spills Over Water”, for the current class of
LNG carriers [Hightower et.al, 2004]. Specifically, DOE requested:

An assessment of the current threat recommendations from intelligence agencies for marine
energy imports,

An evaluation of the potential breaching sizes for controlling intentional events against
emerging large LNG carriers and potential spill rates and volumes, and

An assessment of the potential range of hazards from an LNG spill over water from these
larger capacity LNG carrier designs and potential risk management needs and
considerations.

9
To support this effort, Sandia worked with the U.S. DOE, the U.S. Coast Guard, LNG industry
groups, and government intelligence agencies to collect background information on ship and
LNG cargo tank designs and breach scenarios. The information gathered was used to model
potential breach sizes, associated spill rates and volumes, and the extent and severity of hazards
to the public and property.

2.1 Overview of LNG Carriers

Specially designed ships are used to transport LNG to U.S. import terminals. Some of the
special features of LNG ships include:

Construction of specialized materials and equipped with systems designed to safely store
LNG at temperatures of -260°F (-162.2°C).

Constructed with double hulls. This construction method not only increases the integrity
of the hull system but also provides additional protection for the cargo tanks in the event
of accidents.

Coast Guard regulations and the "International Code for the Construction and Equipment
of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk" (International Gas Carrier Code) require that
LNG ships meet a Type IIG standard, which is an intermediate-level safety design
standard for hazardous cargoes that includes requirements on double-hull designs and
materials, subdivision, damage stability, and cargo tank location.

In general, LNG ships are classified according to the type of system that contains the LNG,
either a Moss system or a membrane/prismatic system shown in Figure 1.

(a) (b)
Figure 1. Typical Containment Systems for LNG Carriers
(a) Moss Spherical Design (b) Membrane/Prismatic Design
The difference between the two designs is that the Moss system use spheres built from aluminum
that contain the LNG and have a structural integrity independent of the ship. For the membrane
systems, the LNG is contained within thin, stainless steel membranes directly supported by the
hull structure.

10
2.2 Size and Capacity of Emerging LNG Carrier Designs
Many new LNG carriers are being designed to carry as much as 265,000 m3 of LNG. The new
215,000 m3 membrane carriers are often referred to as Q-flex designs, and the 265,000 m3
membrane carriers are often referred to as Q-max designs. Table 1 provides an overview of the
general size and dimensions of current and emerging LNG carriers for both membrane and
Moss-type cargo tank configurations.

Table 1. Emerging LNG Carrier Size and Capacity

(Poten and Partners, 2006)
CLASS MEMBRANE DESIGNS
3 3 3 3
145,000 m 155,000 m 215,000 m 265,000 m
Tanks 4 4 5 5
Length (m) 283 288 315 345
Width (m) 44 44 50 55
Draft (m) 11.4 11.5 12 12
MOSS DESIGNS
CLASS 3 3 3 3
138,000 m 145,000 m 200,000 m 255,000 m
Tanks 5 4 5 5
Length (m) 287 290 315 345
Width (m) 46 49 50 55
Draft (m) 11 11.4 12 12.5

From the data presented in Table 1, a couple of key points should be noted. One is that the new
larger LNG carrier designs are becoming longer and wider, not necessarily deeper. Because of
channel depth limitations in many ports, the new ships are designed to have similar drafts as
current LNG carriers. The overall heights are slightly greater with the tank height above the
waterline about 20 m versus 15 m for current LNG carriers. Another point is that the volume of
LNG per cargo tank is increasing from nominally 30,000 – 40,000 m3 for the current fleet of
carriers to as much as 53,000 m3 for the larger LNG carriers. This means that spill rates and the
spill volumes from the new large capacity LNG carriers could be larger.

There are several variations of the new larger capacity LNG carriers being developed. For
example, several new LNG carriers are being designed to include regasification capabilities.
With the advent of flexible pipeline and unloading buoy systems, gasification of LNG on the
LNG carrier can now be conducted offshore and the natural gas pumped through a flexible riser
system down to a sea floor natural gas pipeline and then onto shore. This enables LNG
unloading to occur many miles offshore. In some cases this can provide alternatives to on-shore
import terminals, which are being considered by the U.S. Coast Guard in several LNG
DeepWater Port (DWP) applications.

The regasification configured carriers are commonly referred to as Regasification LNG Carriers
(RLNGCs). Figure 2 provides a drawing of a planned 205,000 m3 LNG regasification carrier.
The main difference between an RLNG carrier and an LNG carrier is that the front cargo storage
tanks are often reduced in size to accommodate regasification equipment in the bow, which
reduces overall LNG storage capacity. This change in the size of the forward cargo tank can be

11
seen in Figure 2. The regasification equipment and buoy docking system reduce the average
LNG cargo capacity by about 10,000 m 3 for both the 215,000 m3 and the 265,000 m3 membrane
carriers. While an RLNG carrier contains less LNG, the overall structural design, size, and
dimensions are very similar to the emerging large capacity LNG carrier designs, especially the
membrane carriers noted in Table 1. Therefore, the results presented in this report are applicable
to many of the large regasification LNG carriers being considered and proposed for use at many
locations.

Figure 2. Example of a 205,000 m3 Membrane Regasification LNG Carrier

A second variation of emerging, large-capacity LNG carriers are vessels commonly called
Storage and Regasification Vessels or SRV’s. These vessels often are designed to remain
offshore and act as a floating LNG terminal. They are connected through a buoy and riser
system, similar to the RLNGC system discussed above, to a sea floor natural gas pipeline that
goes onto shore. The SRV’s store LNG supplied and transferred from smaller LNG carriers,
regasify the LNG on-board, and then pump the natural gas through the buoy and flexible riser
system down to a sea floor natural gas pipeline. While many proposed SRV designs are similar
to the emerging large capacity LNG carrier designs that were evaluated, some SRV’s have
unique designs, configurations, and operational characteristics developed for specific sites and
needs. Therefore, while the results presented in this report may be applicable and representative
of some SRV designs and configurations, they may not be applicable to others and site-specific
assessments will be required to determine if the results presented in this report would be
applicable to a specific SRV.

12
3. THREAT AND BREACH ANALYSES

The LNG shipping industry has an exemplary safety record, with only eight accidents over the
past 40 years. None of these accidents have led to a loss of life or a breach of the vessel’s cargo
containment system. Even with this excellent safety record, consideration should be given to
what might be a potential LNG cargo tank breach based on a possible accidental collision with
another ship, grounding, or ramming. Based on the previous work on breach sizes for accidental
events in the 2004 Sandia LNG study, it is clear that accidental events in near-shore LNG
operations are smaller and much easier to mitigate through operational safety improvements than
spills caused by intentional events. Therefore, for this report, DOE requested that Sandia focus
on assessing the potential breach sizes, spills, and associated hazard distances for credible
intentional events against emerging larger capacity LNG carriers carrying up to 265,000 m3 of
LNG.

3.1 Analysis of Intentional Threat Scenarios for Large LNG Carriers

For the 2004 Sandia LNG report, Sandia worked with intelligence groups and agencies and used
historical data to establish a range of potential intentional LNG cargo tank breaches that could be
considered credible and possible. This included evaluating information on insider and hijacking
attacks on ships, as well as information on external attacks on ships. The level of knowledge,
materials, and planning needed to create these types of intentional breaching events was also
considered.

For this report, Sandia again contacted intelligence agencies and reviewed recent threat
information in order to identify the most current estimate by the intelligence agencies of the
credible intentional threats to consider in modeling breaching events against the larger capacity
LNG carriers. The threats identified and considered included attacks with hand held munitions,
attacks with explosives by a team of hijackers or attackers, attacks by boats and airplanes with
and without explosives, underwater mines and explosives, as well as consideration of more
sophisticated techniques. Additionally, with the development of LNG deepwater ports, threats
against both near-shore and offshore operations and facilities were considered.

3.2 Analysis of Intentional Breaching of Large LNG Carriers

Based on the credible intentional threats identified, a series of scoping evaluations were
conducted to identify the controlling threat scenarios that provide the highest spill rates and
largest spill volumes and therefore create the largest hazard zones. For those scenarios and
events identified, a series of very detailed, three-dimensional, shock physics-based analyses were
conducted. Structural drawings of the large capacity LNG carriers obtained through LNG
industry contacts were used to develop detailed three-dimensional models of the LNG carriers.
The structural models included all major vessel structural elements including the inner and outer
hull thicknesses and materials, all stiffeners and their dimensions and materials, and the frame
and web dimensions, spacing, and materials. Figure 3 shows the type of structural elements
included in the breach analyses.

13
 Figure 3. Example of Large Capacity LNG Carrier Structural Elements Modeled

Also included in the analytical model along with the inner and outer hull structural elements
were the LNG cargo tanks, insulation, the LNG, and the sea water next to the outer hull. The
breach analyses were conducted using a three-dimension shock physics code developed at Sandia
called CTH. This computer code is capable of modeling multi-dimensional, multi-material,
strong shock-wave controlled physics problems. This type of analysis approach is necessary to
accurately model large-scale structural deformations and material responses under the very high
strain rates that occur during many intentional threats such as high velocity penetration or
explosion scenarios. The detailed three-dimensional breach analyses conducted required a
massively parallel computing platform using 920 processors. Each analysis required
approximately 2 to 3 weeks of computational time.

A number of different threats and threat locations were analyzed based on the controlling threat
scenarios identified from the scoping studies. A summary of the detailed structural models and
specific analysis results for each of the threat scenarios evaluated is presented in an associated
report [Luketa et al, 2008].

Near-shore Operations Breaching Analysis Summary

Based on these detailed analyses for the emerging large capacity LNG tanker designs, the range
of hole sizes calculated for credible intentional threats appropriate for near-shore operations,
where there is waterway surveillance and control, ranged from 2 – 12 m2. Our analysis suggests
that in these near-shore operations, the most likely or nominal intentional breaching scenarios
would result in an LNG cargo tank breach of approximately 5 m2. The overall results obtained
were not significantly different from the breach results identified in the 2004 Sandia LNG report.
This is for two reasons. First, the controlling intentional threats since 2004 have not increased
significantly, and the general design of the larger LNG carriers are similar to current LNG carrier
designs. While there are differences in the general size, dimensions, and thicknesses of many of
the structural elements in the larger capacity LNG carriers, these structural differences only have

14
a minor impact on the breach size of the inner hull, which controls the rate of the LNG spilling
onto the water.

Offshore Operations Breaching Analysis Summary

For offshore operations, where there is less waterway control and surveillance of ship operations,
credible intentional threats can be larger and the calculated breach sizes can range from 5 – 16
m2, with a most likely or nominal intentional breaching scenario resulting in an LNG cargo tank
breach of approximately 12 m2. This range of breach sizes should be considered for facilities or
operations about 5 or more miles offshore, where surveillance, control, and risk management of
both intentional and accidental events can be much more difficult.

Cascading Damage Spill Considerations

As noted in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, threats could include breaching of more than one LNG
cargo tank during intentional events, and these types of multiple events were considered and the
impact of the hazard results discussed in the following chapter. Damage to an adjacent LNG
cargo tank from the initial damage to one LNG cargo tank could be possible, based on current
experimental data and modeling evaluations, and was considered in our analyses. As discussed
in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, multiple tank spills are not considered the most likely or nominal
LNG spill event, but should be a consideration in developing risk management and mitigation
approaches to LNG spills and associated hazards. Consideration of up to three tanks spilling at
any one time is expected to provide a conservative analysis of possible multi-tank damage
concerns and associated hazards.

15
4. LNG SPILL HAZARD EVALUATIONS AND RISK REDUCTION
The intent of the fire and dispersion analyses is to provide an understanding of the general scale
of possible public safety hazards from larger capacity LNG carrier spills. It should be
understood that this is not a site-specific analysis which takes into account environmental and
surrounding conditions for a particular site. Thus, the results presented are not to be used
prescriptively, that is, applied generally to any given site. For a given facility, an analysis which
incorporates the particular environmental and facility conditions for that site should be
performed as recommended in the 2004 Sandia report. The following discussions provide a
general description of the models and assumptions used for the fire and dispersion hazard
calculations presented in this report. A more detailed description of the models and approaches
can be found in the 2004 Sandia LNG report.

Note that the experimental data for several parameters used in these analyses vary considerably.
Due to the complexity of the physics involved and the lack of experimental data for an LNG spill
and subsequent fire or dispersion event for the large spills expected, a parametric analysis of the
sensitivity of different values over the range of applicable experimental data was considered.
The various factors that contribute to the variation in LNG hazard analyses has been previously
discussed [Hightower, et al., 2004, Luketa, 2006]. As additional experimental data is obtained,
the conservatism in the approach used in this report could be reduced. The parametric approach
and associated analyses though are useful in providing the scale and range of possible public
safety hazards from spills from larger capacity LNG carriers. The analysis results presented can
be used by government officials to identify the scale of potential hazards for LNG marine import
operations.

4.1 Pool Fire Hazard Analyses

As discussed in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, a pool fire is the most likely outcome from the
breach of an LNG tanker due to the high probability of immediate ignition of the LNG during the
event. The extent of thermal damage to populations and structures from the radiated heat from a
pool fire is a function of the total amount of energy received, which depends not only on the
magnitude of the heat flux, but also on the area and the orientation of the receiving object
relative to the fire, exposure duration, and material properties of the object. Thus, an assessment
of the thermal hazards from a pool fire requires evaluating heat flux levels in terms of energy per
unit time per unit area (or power per unit area) as a function of distance away from the fire and
the fire’s duration and the exposed surface area of a receiving object and its properties. The
consideration of these quantities will allow for assessment of the total energy received and hence
the extent of thermal damage.

For this analysis a solid flame model was used to predict thermal hazard distances at levels that
would severely impact populations. A solid flame model represents the surface of the flame with
a simple, usually cylindrical geometry. The thermal radiation is uniformly emitted from this
surface and the average radiant surface emissive power is based upon empirical correlations with
pool diameter. The geometric view factor is modeled, which is the fraction of radiant energy that
is received by an object’s field of view. The attenuation of the thermal radiation by water vapor
and carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is included in the analysis.

16
The disadvantage of solid flame models is their inability to model more complex flame shapes
such as those arising from irregular shaped pools or object interaction with the flame. Therefore,
solid flame models are most appropriately used for sites where pool formation is not restricted,
such as in wide or open waterways, harbors, bays, or open water. For sites where there are
nearby shorelines or structures that can alter the nature of the pool spread and fire, such as
modifying pool geometry or through fire interaction with structures, these models have
diminished capability to predict hazards.

In contrast to an open waterway, the numerous structures comprising an urban environment can
affect the distribution of thermal energy or radiated to people and structures. In some cases
increased shielding can occur, thereby reducing the thermal energy received, or ‘hot spots’ from
recirculation zones or reflecting surfaces can occur, thereby increasing the amount of thermal
energy received. Additionally, the presence of obstacles can affect overall thermal hazards by
providing additional fuel for latent fire propagation. For those cases where solid flame models
are not appropriate for use, many computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based codes have the
ability to model irregular pool geometries as well as fire and smoke propagation. However, to be
used accurately, a CFD model should be validated for use in the specific application proposed.

It should also be noted that thermal damage is only one aspect of assessing the hazards arising
from a LNG pool fire, especially in an urban environment. Smoke propagation can become a
visibility hazard or a hazard when drafted in through ventilation systems of buildings. Human
behavior during fire evacuations can influence the number of casualties/injuries and hence risks
to the public since large populations and complicated pathways for exit can restrict effective
evacuation efforts. All these factors are considerations in understanding the overall risks from an
LNG pool fire in an urban environment, and therefore risk analysis and risk management should
be coordinated with local public safety and emergency response organizations to reduce overall
risks to the public and property for specific sites.

To determine the size of a pool fire, the amount of LNG draining over time from a breached
tank, as well as the spreading of LNG on water must be calculated. The spilling and spreading of
LNG onto water can be classified as a multi-phase, multi-component problem. In the event of a
breach not only will there be LNG flowing out, but there can also be water entering the tank, the
degree to which will depend upon the breach size and location. It is expected that any water
entering the tank would be turned to ice and in the process would cause the LNG to vaporize.
The amount of LNG spilled between the hulls will depend upon the breach size and location, as
well as the framing design. The ability of the tank to maintain atmospheric pressure above the
height of the LNG is also a consideration. Below we summarize our approach for analyzing
each of these different elements of a spill and an associated sensitivity analysis to identify the
scale and range of the potential hazards.

Most simplified models for the draining of LNG from a tank apply the Bernoulli’s equation
which neglects the effect of viscosity. Bernoulli’s equation is a good approximation for large
ratios of tank cross sectional to orifice areas (~100 or greater) since viscous effects will be
negligible. There are free surface CFD-based codes that can model, using simplifying
assumptions, the spilling and spreading of LNG onto water. However the Bernoulli’s equation
which was used for this analysis can provide a reasonable approximation for the rate of LNG

17
flowing out of a tank that is in accord with the intent of providing the general scale of the range
of hazards from these events.

Once spilled onto the water, the shape and size of a spreading LNG pool can be affected by
several factors: wind, waves, currents, confinement, composition, rapid phase transitions, and
object interaction. Despite these complexities, in order to obtain an estimate of pool size, a
steady mass balance can be utilized in which the mass flux of LNG flowing into the pool is
balanced by the mass flux being evaporated. The results presented in this analysis used such an
approximation. The pool will grow and then eventually shrink and break up after reaching a
maximum diameter. The results presented pertain to the maximum pool diameter during
spreading assuming an average flow rate from the tank.

It should be noted that the hydrostatic head and cargo tank volumes differ between the current
and emerging larger LNG carriers. While the nominal LNG level in the cargo tanks extends
approximately 15 m above the waterline for current LNG carriers, the LNG level for the larger
LNG carriers is approximately 20 m above the waterline. Spill volumes for the larger LNG
carriers are about 41,000 m3. These result in slightly higher spill rates and larger spill volumes,
which result in estimated pool diameters and associated hazards for the larger LNG carriers that
are slightly larger than for the current class of LNG carriers.

As was done in the 2004 Sandia LNG report, nominal fire modeling parameters along with
variations around the nominal case were used to calculate the thermal hazards. The justification
for the range of values used can be found in the Appendix. Due to the non-site specific nature of
the analysis, the affect of wind tilting the flame was not included. It should be noted that a minor
modification to the calculation procedure from the 2004 Sandia LNG report has been made by
way of incorporating an average among several flame height correlations instead of using a
single flame height correlation. This approach was used because of the lack of large-scale data to
identify the best correlation and results in about a 2% decrease in the average thermal hazard
distance relative to past analyses. The flame height correlations considered and the approach is
presented in the Appendix.

Tables 2 and 3 provide the results for thermal hazards from a pool fire for near-shore breach
events and for offshore breach events respectively. The analyses present hazard distances for
heat flux levels of 37.5 kW/m2 and 5 kW/m2. The 37.5 kW/m2 value is a level at which process
equipment is damaged after 10 minutes of exposure, and is currently considered to represent the
extent of hazards to structures and equipment. The 5 kW/m2 value is a level at which second-
degree burns occur on bare skin after 30 seconds of exposure, and is currently considered to
represent the extent of hazards to people in an open area.

The time and length scales for cascading cryogenic or thermal damage to additional LNG cargo
tanks is unknown at this time because rapid multi-tank failures involve very complex physical
process that will be an area of ongoing research for some time to come. In order to address the
potential for cascading damage and possible hazard distances, an analysis of the breach and spill
from three LNG cargo tanks at one time was conducted. Each tank breach assumes a similar
hole-size with simple orifice flow. The assumption is that all tanks could possibly fail, which
would affect the fire duration, but in the short timescales that it takes to reach a maximum fire

18
size from a large spill, only three tanks were considered to be contributing to the maximum size
of the pool fire.

Near-shore Operations Pool Fire Hazard Analysis Results

For near-shore operations, the intentional breach cases considered for the emerging larger
capacity LNG carriers are presented in Table 2. The average thermal hazard distance for the
nominal or most likely breach size of 5 m2 for a 41,000 m3 spill is about 450 m for the 37.5
kW/m2 level and 1400 m for the 5 kW/m2 level. For comparison, the nominal hazard distance
results presented in the 2004 Sandia LNG report for the smaller size LNG carriers for similar
breach sizes at the 5 kW/m2 level was about 1300 m. Thus, the increase in hydrostatic head and
tank volumes for the larger capacity LNG carriers results in an approximately 7 – 8 % increase in
the thermal hazard distances, and increased fire durations.

The results though indicate that the thermal hazard distances for the 37.5 kW/m2 and 5 kW/m2
heat flux levels for the larger LNG ships for near-shore locations are still expected to be within
the 500 m and 1600 m hazard zones suggested in the 2004 Sandia LNG report. In Tables 2 and
3, “τ” is the atmospheric transmissivity, which is discussed in the Appendix.

Table 2. Thermal hazard distances from a pool fire for near-shore operations

SURFACE DISTANCE TO
HOLE BURN EMISSIVE POOL BURN 37.5 5
SIZE TANKS DISCHARGE RATE POWER DIAMETER TIME kW/m2 kW/m2
(m2) BREACHED COEFFICIENT (m/s) (kW/m2) τ (m) (min) (m) (m)
INTENTIONAL EVENTS
2 3 0.6 3 x 10-4 220 0.8 225 57 282 881
-4
5 3 0.6 3 x 10 220 0.8 615 23 774 2197
-4
5* 1 0.6 3 x 10 220 0.8 355 23 446 1344
5 1 0.3 3 x 10-4 220 0.8 251 46 315 975
-4
5 1 0.6 2 x 10 220 0.8 435 23 547 1487
-4
5 1 0.6 8 x 10 220 0.8 217 23 273 1042
5 1 0.6 3 x 10-4 220 0.5 355 23 305 1050
-4
5 1 0.6 3 x 10 175 0.8 355 23 373 1188
5 1 0.6 3 x 10-4 350 0.8 355 23 617 1683
-4
12 1 0.6 3 x 10 220 0.8 550 10 692 1981
*nominal case

Offshore Operations Pool Fire Hazard Analysis Results

For offshore operations, generally 5 of more miles offshore, intentional threats can be larger and
as noted in Section 3 result in a larger nominal or most likely breach size of 12 m2. The hazard
distance results calculated for a 41,000 m3 spill and a range of possible breach sizes for offshore
operations for the larger LNG carriers are shown in Table 3. The results suggest that for
offshore operations and associated breach events, the thermal hazard distance at the 37.5 kW/m2
and 5 kW/m2 heat flux levels are approximately 700 m and 2000 m, respectively.

19
 Table 3. Thermal hazard distances from a pool fire for offshore operations

SURFACE DISTANCE TO
HOLE BURN EMISSIVE POOL BURN 37.5 5
SIZE TANKS DISCHARGE RATE POWER DIAMETER TIME kW/m2 kW/m2
(m2) BREACHED COEFFICIENT (m/s) (kW/m2) τ (m) (min) (m) (m)
INTENTIONAL EVENTS
5 3 0.6 3 x 10-4 220 0.8 615 23 774 2196
12 3 0.6 3 x 10-4 220 0.8 953 9.6 1090 3168
-4
12* 1 0.6 3 x 10 220 0.8 550 9.6 692 1980
-4
12 1 0.3 3 x 10 220 0.8 389 19 466 1429
12 1 0.6 2 x 10-4 220 0.8 674 9.6 786 2335
12 1 0.6 8 x 10-4 220 0.8 337 9.6 407 1261
-4
12 1 0.6 3 x 10 220 0.5 550 9.6 462 1539
12 1 0.6 3 x 10-4 175 0.8 550 9.6 553 1738
-4
12 1 0.6 3 x 10 350 0.8 550 9.6 864 2452
16 1 0.6 3 x 10-4 220 0.8 635 7.2 741 2202
*nominal case

4.2 Vapor Dispersion Analyses

For the controlling intentional breach events identified in this study, which cause the biggest
breaches and largest spills, there is a high expectation that the events will provide secondary
ignition sources that will provide ignition of any spilled LNG. Additionally, if a dispersion event
does occur, the vapor cloud could ignite from ignition sources on the ship itself. Thus, the
probability of a natural gas cloud fully extending, especially in a near-shore populated area
where many ignition sources exist, and then igniting is very low. The cloud will most likely
ignite when it comes in contact with the first available ignition source.

Since the possibility of a dispersion event though cannot be ruled out, dispersion calculations
were performed to determine the distance to the lower flammability limit (LFL) for a vapor
cloud from an un-ignited LNG spill from these emerging larger capacity LNG carriers. The LFL
for natural gas can change slightly depending on the experimental conditions and measurement
techniques used. For this analysis it is defined as a 5% concentration of methane in air by
volume for ambient conditions [Liao, et al, 2005]. These calculations were performed using
Vulcan [Nicolette, 1996, Holen, et al, 1990], a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) based code.

It should also be realized that the hazard zone area is elongated in the downwind direction from
the spill point, rather than spread over a uniform circle, for a dispersion event. Therefore,
dispersion distances and associated hazards are significantly influenced by site-specific
environmental and operational conditions. For the analyses and information presented in this
report, nominal environmental and atmospheric conditions were assumed. Therefore, the
information presented should be used to identify the scale of possible dispersion hazards from a
potential spill from the larger capacity LNG carriers, not necessarily for defining hazard
distances for a specific site. For a site where dispersion issues may be a concern, a site-specific
dispersion calculation should be conducted using wind, topography, and environmental
conditions for that location to assess potential impacts on public safety and property. Guidance

20
on performing vapor dispersion calculations using CFD codes have been discussed by Luketa, et
al., 2007.

Near-shore Operations Vapor Dispersion Analysis Results

The information presented is based on calculations performed for stable atmospheric conditions
with a wind speed of 2.33 m/s for the near-shore intentional events that nominally cause a 5 m2
breach of 1 tank spilling 41,000 m3 of LNG, or approximately 70% of its contents. Dispersion
analyses are more appropriate for the nominal single tank spill events. Multiple tank spills and
large vapor dispersions are more unlikely due to the multiple ignition sources available for these
events and the fact that cascading multiple tank spill scenarios are often from fire damage, such
that an ignition source for most cascading spill scenarios is present. For the given spill volume
and head, an LNG pool will be created that lasts for about 1380 seconds. The vapor generation
and vapor flow conditions from the LNG pool were calculated using a liquid density of 450
kg/m3 and a vapor density of 1.74 kg/m3. Two values for evaporative mass flux were evaluated
that span the range of experimental values reported in the literature, which vary by an order of
magnitude. Table 4 indicates that the distance to the LFL ranges from 2800 to 3300 m with an
average of 3050 m.
Table 4. Distance to the LFL for vapor dispersion for near-shore operations
POOL HOLE DISTANCE TO LFL
NUMBER MASS FLUX
DIAMETER SIZE (m)*
OF TANKS (m/s)
(m) (m2)
-4
290 5 1 4.5 x 10 2800
-5
917 5 1 4.5 x 10 3300
*Assumes no Ignition source along path

Offshore Operations Vapor Dispersion Analysis Results

The information presented is based on calculations performed for stable atmospheric conditions
with a wind speed of 2.33 m/s for the offshore intentional threat scenarios that nominally cause a
12 m2 breach of 1 tank spilling 41,000 m3 of LNG. Again, dispersion analyses are more
appropriate to consider for the nominal single tank events. The larger spill rate will create a
larger LNG pool but will last for only about 576 seconds. Again, the vapor generation and flow
conditions from the LNG pool were based on a liquid density of 450 kg/m3 and a vapor density
of 1.74 kg/m3, and two values of evaporative mass flux were used that span the range of
experimental values noted above. Table 5 indicates that the distance to the LFL ranges from
4000 to 5200 m with an average of 4600 m. As noted, this distance will change depending upon
the offshore facility design, operations, environmental conditions, and the number of ships that
might be involved in an event. The analyses presented should be used as a guide on the scale of
potential hazards, but site-specific analyses may have to be considered for many offshore
operations because of the variability in operational scenarios.
Table 5. Distance to the LFL for vapor dispersion for offshore operations
POOL HOLE DISTANCE TO LFL
NUMBER MASS FLUX
DIAMETER SIZE (m)*
OF TANKS (m/s)
(m) (m2)
-4
450 12 1 4.5 x 10 4000
-5
1420 12 1 4.5 x 10 5200
*Assumes no Ignition source along path

21
4.3 Hazard and Risk Reduction Considerations

Risk prevention and mitigation techniques can be important tools in reducing both the potential
for a spill and the hazards from a spill, especially in zones where the potential impact on public
safety and property can be high. However, what might be applicable for cost-effective risk
reduction in one location might not be appropriate at another. Therefore, coordination of risk
prevention and management approaches with local and regional emergency response and public
safety officials is important in providing a comprehensive, efficient, and cost-effective approach
to protecting public safety and property at a specific site.

Near-shore Operations
The analyses presented suggest that for near-shore operations, a nominal intentional event would
result in an LNG cargo tank breach of approximately 5 m2. For this size breach in the larger
capacity LNG carriers, the spill rates and spill volumes increase slightly and therefore the
thermal hazard distances are approximately 7–8% greater than the results presented in the 2004
Sandia LNG study for current LNG carrier designs. With this modest increase in thermal hazard
distances, the most significant impacts to public safety and property for near-shore operations are
still approximately 500 m of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances
beyond approximately 1600 m. Also, potential vapor dispersion distances for near-shore
operations are similar to those suggested in the 2004 Sandia report.

As such, the risk mitigation and risk management approaches suggested in the 2004 report are
still appropriate for use with the larger capacity ships. Proactive risk management approaches
can reduce both the potential and the hazards of such events. The approaches could include:

Improvements in ship and terminal safety/security systems,

Modifications to improve effectiveness of LNG tanker escorts, vessel movement control
zones, and safety operations near ports and terminals,

Improved surveillance and searches, and

Improved emergency response coordination and communications with first responders and
public safety officials.

Offshore Operations
For offshore operations, where there might be less surveillance or control, credible intentional
threats could be larger, with a nominal breach size of about 12 m2. From the analyses presented,
the most significant impacts to public safety and property from an LNG spill and fire are within
approximately 700 m of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances beyond
approximately 2000 m. Vapor dispersion distances for a spill for these offshore operations for
the larger capacity LNG carriers or regasification carriers could extend up to nominally 5000 m.
Given the location of many of these proposed offshore facilities, the hazard distances suggest
that there might be minimal impact to public safety or property from even a large spill. As such,
risk management might best be directed at providing approaches, measures, or systems to ensure
that the offshore facilities and operations are maintained sufficiently offshore such that they do
not inadvertently or inappropriately impact near-shore public safety and property.

22
5. CONCLUSIONS
Because of the increasing size and capacity of many new LNG carriers, the Department of
Energy requested that Sandia assess the general scale of possible hazards for a breach and spill
from newer LNG carriers with capacities ranging up to 265,000 m3. Building on the research
and analyses presented in Sandia’s 2004 LNG report, we reassessed emerging accidental and
intentional threats and then conducted detailed three-dimensional breach analyses for several
new large capacity (up to 265,000 m3) LNG carrier designs. Based on the estimated breach
sizes, breach locations, and LNG carrier configurations, we estimated LNG spill rates and
volumes and conducted thermal hazard and vapor dispersion analyses.

The results include analysis of the hazards of potential LNG spills at both near-shore and
offshore facilities and operations, which should help improve the understanding of the range of
hazards for different marine LNG import options. The results can be summarized as follows:

Near-shore Operations
• For the identified breach scenarios for near-shore LNG marine import operations, the
calculated breach sizes to the inner hull range between 2 – 12 m2. Our analysis suggests
that intentional breaching scenarios would result in a nominal tank breach of 5 m2.
• The estimated thermal hazard distances from a pool fire for the larger capacity LNG
carriers are approximately 7–8% greater than the distances presented in the 2004 Sandia
LNG study for near-shore operations. This is due to the greater amount of LNG above the
waterline, or hydrostatic head, for the larger capacity LNG carriers versus current LNG
carrier designs.
• Even with the increase in thermal hazard distances from pool fires for the larger ships, the
most significant impacts to public safety and property are still within approximately 500 m
of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances beyond approximately
1600 m.
• Based on current threats, it is possible that more than one LNG cargo tank could be
breached. This includes cascading failure to adjacent cargo tanks from the initial damage.
This type of damage is possible and should be considered as a variation of the nominal case
in site-specific evaluations.
• While the most likely outcome of a large spill from an intentional event is expected to be a
pool fire, a vapor dispersion analysis was conducted. The average distance to the vapor
dispersion LFL from an LNG spill over water for a nominal 5 m2 breach would be about
3,050 m. This result was obtained from the range of 2800 m - 3300 m obtained when
considering a range of mass flux values.
• The likelihood of a natural gas cloud fully extending, especially in a near-shore urban area,
and then igniting is very low. The cloud will most likely ignite from the first available
ignition source and progress to a pool fire. For a dispersion event, the hazard zone area is
elongated in the downwind direction from the spill point, rather than spread over a uniform
circle.
• Pool fire and vapor dispersion hazard distances are significantly influenced by site-specific
environmental, topographical, and operational conditions. The results presented use
nominal environmental and operational conditions and can be used to identify the general

23
 scale of possible hazards from a potential spill, but should not be used to define hazard
distances for a specific site.
• For near-shore operations, risk prevention and risk management should be considered as
ways to reduce the hazards to public safety and property, especially for near-shore
operations.

Offshore Operations
• For the identified breach scenarios for offshore LNG marine import operations, the
calculated breach sizes to the inner hull range between 5-16 m2. Our analysis suggests that
intentional breaching scenarios would results in a nominal tank breach of 12 m2.
• The most significant impacts to public safety and property from pool fires are within
approximately 700 m of a spill, with lower public health and safety impacts at distances
beyond approximately 2000 m. The 2004 Sandia LNG study did not conduct threat,
breach, and hazard analyses for offshore facilities, such as LNG deepwater ports or other
offshore facilities, since these facilities were not in operation at that time.
• Based on current threats, it is possible that more than one LNG cargo tank could be
breached. This includes cascading failure to adjacent cargo tanks from the initial damage.
This type of damage is possible and should be considered as a variation of the nominal case
in site-specific evaluations.
• While the most likely outcome of a potential LNG spill would be a pool fire, a vapor
dispersion analysis was conducted. The average distance to vapor dispersion LFL from an
LNG spill over water for a nominal 12 m2 breach would be about 4,600 m. This result was
obtained from the range of 4000 m - 5200 m obtained when considering a range of mass
flux values.
• As noted above, the hazard zone area for a vapor dispersion event is elongated in the
downwind direction from the spill point, rather than spread over a uniform circle and will
likely ignite when it encounters the first ignition source. For offshore operations, there
may be fewer ignition sources relative to near-shore operations.
• Pool fire and vapor dispersion hazard distances are significantly influenced by site-specific
environmental and operational conditions. The results presented use nominal
environmental and operational conditions and can be used to identify the general scale of
possible hazards from a potential spill, but the wide variety of offshore facility designs,
operations, and number of LNG ships and designs being considered suggest that the results
presented should not be used to define hazard distances for a specific offshore facility.
• For offshore operations, risk prevention and risk management may have a different focus
than near-shore operations, since many spills and associated hazards might not impact the
on-shore public and property.

Overall, the results obtained from the more detailed analyses conducted and presented in this
report for the emerging larger capacity LNG carriers are similar to the previous conclusions,
recommendations, and guidance presented in the 2004 Sandia LNG report concerning the
general scale of hazards to the public and property from a large LNG spill over water and
approaches to reduce those risks and consequences.

24
 APPENDIX
The following provides a discussion of the parameter values used to predict the thermal hazard
distances from a large-scale LNG pool fire on water. It is recommended that the range of
parameter values provided be incorporated into site specific analyses that use a solid flame
model.

A1. Surface Emissive Power

The surface emissive power has been shown to initially increase with increasing pool diameter as
indicated by the Montoir experiments on land for pool fires up to 35 m [Nedelka,1989; British
Gas, 1988; Tucker, 1988]. There is indication that the surface emissive power asymptotes to a
maximum value somewhere between 257 – 273 kW/m2 when plotted as a function of pool
diameter. The limit appeared to be reached near a pool diameter of 35 m, and thus the surface
emissive power would not be expected to significantly increase for larger diameters. Beyond this
maximum value, the surface emissive power would expect to decrease with increasing diameter
due to greater smoke production. Smoke is made up of a mixture of gases, vapors, and
particulate matter from a fire. Carbon particulates, or soot, is included as a particulate matter of
smoke and is responsible for the luminosity of the fire. Smoke will absorb a significant portion
of the radiation to result in much lower emission to the surroundings. Soot and smoke is a result
of incomplete combustion which is affected by radiative losses and limited oxygen supply.

In the Montoir experiments, smoke shielding was observed in the upper half of the 35 m
diameter LNG fires, while the lower half was highly emissive and essentially smoke free. This
behavior is observed with heavier hydrocarbon fuels, but with smoke shielding occurring much
closer to the fuel surface in an equivalent sized fire. The emissive power of black smoke is
approximately 20 kW/m2. Periodically the flame will break through the smoke, revealing areas
of higher surface emissive power around 120 kW/m2. Thus, for heavier hydrocarbons the time-
averaged, area-weighted surface emissive power asymptotes to a value of about 40 kW/m2. Thus,
it would be expected that LNG, at some pool diameter, would display similar behavior, but the
diameter at which this occurs is unknown due to lack of data at very large scales and cannot be
predicted analytically based upon existing data sets.

Although it’s expected that the average surface emissive power will drop below 200 kW/m2 for
pool diameters 100 m and greater, it is unknown by how much it will decrease. It is
recommended that until additional data is obtained, due to safety considerations, a conservative
value for surface emissive power should be used when applying a solid flame model by the range
of values of ±50 kW/m2 around 220 kW/m2 based on existing data for LNG pool fires on water
[Raj, 1979]. The maximum value of 350 kW/m2 obtained from narrow-angle radiometer
measurements from the Montoir tests could also be included as a data point for uncertainty
analysis.

A2. Fuel Volatilization Rate

The fuel volatilization rate, herein called the burn rate, will affect the size of pool, with higher
burn rates resulting in smaller pools. Higher burn rates also increase flame height, hence there is

25
a trade-off in the effect that burn rate has on thermal hazard distances. While a decrease in pool
area will tend to reduce hazard distances, the increase in flame height will tend to increase
hazard distances. However, the overall affect will be to decrease thermal hazard distances for
increasing burn rates.

The only experiment able to obtain burn rate data for LNG pool fires on water are the tests
funded by the USCG which reported calculated burn rates ranging from 4x10-4 to 11x10-4 m/s
[Raj, 1979]. The calculations use the total quantity spilled divided by the approximate pool area
and time of ‘intense’ burning to derive the burn rate. The volume spilled during steady state
burning was less than the total volume of LNG spilled. By using the total volume of LNG spilled
rather than the volume spilled during steady burning, higher burn rates are calculated. If burn
rates are calculated based upon dividing the reported values for spill rate by the pool area, then
burn rates vary from 2.6 x10-4 to 9x10-4 m/s.

Since the burn rate is a function of the heat transfer from the flame and from the water, the range
of burn rates for LNG pool fires on water can be estimated by combining data from pool fire
experiments on land and un-ignited spill tests on water. The Montoir tests report an average mass
burn rate of 0.14 kg/m2s performed in wind speeds that ranged from about 3 – 10 m/s. The mass
burn rate was calculated from dip tube measurements assuming a liquid density of 500 kg/m3.
This indicates a burn rate of 2.8 x 10-4 m/s for an LNG pool fire on land. It should be noted that
uncertainties in the burn rate measurements were not provided. The range of values for mass flux
derived from un-ignited LNG pools on water range from 0.64 x 10-4 to 4.3 x 10-4 m/s with no
uncertainty values reported [Boyle, 1973; Burgess, 1970; Feldbaur, 1972; Koopman, 1978]. If
these values are added to the Montoir data, the range of burn rate values for pool fires on water
would be 3.4 x 10-4 to 7.1 x 10-4 m/s. The higher values in this range, above what was calculated
from the LNG pool fire tests on water, could be due to inadequate measurements, differences in
LNG composition, and different wind conditions. Pool fire tests conducted at China Lake and
Sandia National Laboratories have indicated that wind speeds can significantly affect burn rate
as shown in Figure A-1 [Blanchat, 2006 and 2002]. Thus, there is significant uncertainty
concerning current burn rate data for LNG, and it is unknown what burn rates would result for
pool diameters 100 m or greater.

7 7

6
6
regression (mm/min)

5
regression (mm/min)

5
4
4
3 DP Fuel Regression (mm/min)
3 Rake Fuel Regression (mm/min)
2
Linear (Rake Fuel Regression (mm/min))
2 1 Linear (DP Fuel Regression (mm/min))

1 0
0 2 4 6 8 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
wind speed (m/s) wind speed (m/s)

Figure A-1: Regression rates as a function of wind speed for (a) 18.9 m JP-8 pool fire, 4000 gallons,
China Lake [Blanchat, 2006] and (b) 7.9 m JP-8 pool fire, 2200 gallons, Sandi[Blanchat, 2002].

26
It is recommended that a range of burn rates be used when applying a solid flame model by
considering the range of 2 x 10-4 to 8 x 10-4 m/s.

A3. Flame Height

There is great uncertainty in predicting flame height for large pool diameters for coherent fire
plumes. Time-averaged flame height is usually defined as the height at which the intermittency
reaches a value of 0.5, while maximum height is defined at an intermittency level of 0.05.
Intermittency is defined as the fraction of time the flame is at a certain height. It has been
demonstrated that the flame height of pool fires decreases for increasing pool diameters. It does
become increasingly difficult to determine flame height for increasing pool diameters due to the
obscuration of smoke and the periodic appearance of much higher temperature luminous zones.

Several flame height correlations based upon pool fires much smaller than the diameters
presently considered have been developed. The majority of flame height correlations are based
on a combination of flame height measurements and dimensional arguments such as the model
by Thomas [Thomas, 1963], or experimental measurement combined with theoretical
mathematical models such as the model by Steward [Steward, 1970]. Several correlations such
as Moorhouse [Moorhouse, 1982] have based their correlation on Thomas’s dimensional form.
That is,
b
L  m&¢¢ 
= a  (1)
D  ra gD 

where L is flame height, D pool diameter, m&¢¢ burn rate (kg/m2 s), and ρa atmospheric air
density.

The best fitting coefficients, a and b, for LNG fires from 29 tests ranging from 6.9 m to 15.4 m
of equivalent pool diameters were identified by Moorhouse, while Thomas determined the
coefficients with experimental data from wood crib fires up to 2 meters. It should be noted that
LNG is very different than other hydrocarbons in its propensity to not produce as much smoke.
Thus, correlations developed for hydrocarbons other than LNG may have significant error for
predicted flame heights. In spite of similarities in fundamental approaches, a fascinating feature
of these correlations is that they all predict different flame heights for any given hydrocarbon at a
specified pool diameter. Predicted flame height to pool diameter ratios (L/D) for LNG can vary
by a factor of 2 to 3 for a given pool diameter as shown in Figure A-2.

27
 3.5
Zukoski
3 Thomas 1
Thomas 2
Heskestad
2.5

height/diameter (L/D)
Moorhouse (LNG tests)
Pritchard & Binding (LNG tests)
2

1.5

0.5

0
0 100 200 300 400 500
diameter (m)

Figure A-2: Flame height correlations as a function of pool diameter for LNG.

There are at least twenty correlations, but only a few are plotted in Figure A-2 to indicate the
range of disagreement. The variation among the correlations may be due to differences in the
pool geometry tested and environmental conditions, as well as differences in the measurement
technique and definition of flame height. It should also be noted that these correlations assume
that the flame is characterized by a single temperature and gas composition regardless of the
flame size or soot concentration in the flame. They also do not take into account fuel radiation
properties, or turbulent mixing either from the mechanisms due to the fire or induced by the
atmosphere. Thus, this justifies their classification of ‘correlation’ as well as their associated
uncertainty.

Table A-1 shows a comparison among several flame height correlations and the largest LNG
pool fire data sets. The burn rates reported from the experiments were used. From this
comparison it would indicate that the correlation by Pritchard and Binding [Pritchard, 1992] is
most appropriate for LNG, even at very large diameters, but caution should be used in coming to
this conclusion since all of the correlations have been developed for a limited range of diameters
and a large extrapolation could have significant error.

Table A-1: Comparison of several flame height predictions for LNG pool fire tests
Experiment L/D predicted
Diameter (m) (L/D)AVERAGE Pritchard Moorhouse Thomas Zukoski* Steward* Heskestad*
8.5
2.8 2.8 2.0 3.0 4.7 4.1 3.6
(test 1 china lake)
9
(test 4 china lake) 2.8 2.6 1.9 2.5 3.9 3.7 3.1
(2.2 m/s)
20
(Mizner, Eyre - land) 2.15 2.2 1.6 1.6 2.9 3.1 2.4
(6.2 m/s)
35
2.2 2.2 1.6 1.5 2.9 3.1 2.4
(Montoir) (9 m/s)
*no correction term for wind conditions

28
Since most correlations predict a flame height to diameter ratio between 1 and 2 for pool
diameters 100 m and greater, it is recommended that when applying a solid flame model a range
of L/D values of 1-2 be used. In this analysis, the correlations specified in Figure A-2 were used
to obtain an average flame height as a function of pool diameter and burn rate.

A4. Flame Tilt and Drag

When pool fires are subject to wind they will tilt in the down wind direction and the base
dimension of the flame will extend in the downwind dimension, also termed flame drag, while
the upwind and crosswind dimensions remain unchanged. The affect of flame tilt and drag is to
create an elliptical pool and increase the thermal hazard distances in the downwind direction.

Flame tilt and drag have been observed in both the Maplin Sands and Montoir LNG land tests, as
well as the tests performed by Moorhouse [Moorhouse, 1982]. LNG pool fire land tests reported
flame drag to be between 5 m and 10 m for a 20 m diameter pool in a wind speed of 6.16 m/s,
with a flame tilt of 54 degree from vertical [Mizner, 1982]. The Montoir tests reported flame
drag to be 10 m for a 35 m diameter pool in wind speed of 9-10 m/s, and 7 m for wind speeds of
around 2 m/s [Nedelka, 1989;British Gas, 1988; Tucker, 1988]. The tilt decreased with
increasing height, so that the tilt was about 50 degrees from vertical in the bottom portion of the
flame (up to L/D ~ 0.5), and 35 degree from vertical for the remaining height. Thus, a single
flame tilt value could not be used to describe the flame. From the China Lake tests on water, a
flame tilt of 26.5 degrees from vertical was reported for test 4 in a 2.2 m/s wind [Raj, 1979]. For
many tests the shape of the pool was observed to become elliptical. The correlations developed
by American Gas Association [AGA, 1974], and Moorhouse [Moorhouse, 1982] to predict flame
tilt and drag for integral models have been developed from LNG pool fire land tests.

It is recommended that an integral model include the flame drag and tilt for facility locations in
which non-calm wind conditions exist. A variability of ± 30% of calculated values for flame tilt
and drag should be included to account for the variability demonstrated from test data.

A5. Atmospheric Attenuation

The radiation that is emitted from a flame to the surroundings will be attenuated principally by
absorption from CO2 and H2O in the atmosphere. Transmissivity is a measure of this attenuation
and is a function of temperature and humidity since water vapor in the atmosphere depends upon
temperature and relative humidity. It is very difficult to obtain accurate data on transmissivity
because it depends upon knowledge of radiative spectral emission over the surface of the flame,
as well as the absorption through the atmosphere to a receiving object. Thus, there is great
uncertainty associated with transmissivity. Transmissivity curves are calculated based on LNG
pool fires on water from the tests performed at China Lake and range from 0.4 to 0.9 for different
humidity levels over a path length of 10,000 m [Raj, 1979]. The uncertainty associated with this
calculation was not reported.

To account for experimental uncertainty, integral models should account for the variability of
transmissivity by considering a range of values. Note that the transmissivity is a function of
humidity and distance. Even though the level of uncertainty to incorporate is not known
precisely, experiments conducted in outdoor environment will commonly have uncertainties

29
around ±30%. Thus, given a transmissivity function for a particular humidity level, a variability
of ±30% should be considered. The upper bound value should not exceed the value of 1.

30
 REFERENCES

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Blanchat, T.K., et al. (2006) Well-characterized open pool experiment data and analysis for
model validation and development, SAND2006-7508, 2006.

Blanchat, T.K., Manning L. (2002) Mock B52 bomb bay fire experiment data and analysis for
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on water. Evaporation, spreading and vapor dispersion, Shell Research Ltd., Thornton
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British Gas (1988) Results of detailed measurements made on a 35m diameter LNG pool fire
experiment conducted at Montoir, France, 3 volumes, British Gas, August 1988.

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Bureau of Mines, Pittsburgh, PA.

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Department of Energy, Office of Fossil Energy, Washington, D.C., August 2005

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combustible mixtures, API Report EE61E-72, 1972.

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www.ferc.gov/industries/lng.asp, 2004.

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Liquefied Natural Gas Need Clarification,” GAO-07-316, United States Government
Accountability Office, March 2007.

Hightower, M. Michael, Gritzo, Louis A., Luketa-Hanlin, Anay, Covan. John M., et. al.,
“Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large Liquefied Natural Gas
(LNG) Spill Over Water”, SAND2004-6258, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque,
NM, December 2004.

31
Hightower, M. Michael, Kaneshige, Michael J., “Threat and Breach Analysis of an LNG Ship
Spill Over Water”, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM, May 2005.

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Fires, Twenty-Third Symposium (International) on Combustion, The Combustion
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Koopman, R.P., et al. (1978) Data and calculations on 5 m3 LNG spill tests, Lawrence
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of Hazardous Materials, B119, 81-84.

Luketa-Hanlin, A. (2006) A review of large-scale LNG spills: experiments and modeling, J.

Hazardous Materials, A132, 199-140.

Luketa, A., Attaway, S., Hightower, M. (2008) Evaluation of Intentional Breaches of the Larger
Class of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Carriers, Draft report.

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fluid dynamics codes for liquefied natural gas dispersion, J. Hazardous Materials, Invited
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Moorhouse, J., (1982) Scaling criteria for pool fires derived from large scale experiments, I.
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Nedelka, D., et al., (1989) The Montoir 35 m diameter LNG pool fire experiments, Int. Conf.
Liq. Nat. Gas, v. 2, 9th, 17-20 Oct 1989, Nice, France.

Nicolette, Vernon F., (1996) “Computational Fire Modeling for Aircraft Fire Research”,
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Parfomak, P., (2003) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Infrastructure Security: Background and
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RL32073, September 2003.

Parfomak, P., Vann A., (2007) Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) Import Terminals: Siting, Safety,
and Regulation, Congressional Research Service, The Library of Congress, RL32205,
May 2007.

Pritchard, M.J., Binding T.M. (1992) FIRE2: A new approach for predicting thermal radiation
levels for hydrocarbon pool fires, Sym. major hazards onshore and offshore, 491-505.

32
Poten & Partners, (2006) LNG Shipping Reference Tables, www.poten.com, Copyright 2006.

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13-41.

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33
DISTRIBUTION:

1 MS0899 Technical Library, 9536 (electronic copy)

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50 Robert Corbin
United States Department of Energy
Office of Natural Gas and Petroleum Technology
1000 Independence Avenue, SW
Washington, DC 20585

34
tories:
9/27/12
Sandia Study Shows Large LNG Fires Hotter but Smaller Than Expected

Sandia Study Shows Large LNG Fires Hotter but

Smaller Than Expected (http://energy.sandia.gov/?p=7716)

New research shows that large-scale liquefied

natural gas fires are hotter but smaller than
anticipated, which means regulators can assume
that a slightly smaller area would be at risk in the
case of an LNG incident, an official from Sandia
National Laboratory said Sunday at a meeting of
the National Association of Regulatory Utility
Commissioners.

However, the study showed that extreme cold

from spilling LNG combined with extreme heat
from an LNG fire would severely damage a tanker,
(http://energy.sandia.gov/?attachment_id=7715)
making it difficult to quickly move the vessel,
Sandia’s Michael Hightower, told a gas panel at Sandia conducts large-scale experiments that provide data
for and verification of high-performance computing
NARUC’s annual meeting in St. Louis, Missouri.
simulations concerning the vulnerabilities of our vital
infrastructure.
Sandia conducted the study for the US
Department of Energy, after a 2007 report by the
Government Accountability Office recommended more research on the potential for cascading failure of
LNG tanks, Hightower said.

Read the full article (http://www.platts.com/RSSFeedDetailedNews/RSSFeed/NaturalGas/6676493) at platts.com.

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SANDIA REPORT
SAND2011-3342
Unlimited Release
Printed December 2011

LNG Cascading Damage Study Volume I:

Fracture Testing Report
Robert J. Kalan, Jason P. Petti

Prepared by
Sandia National Laboratories
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87185 and Livermore, California 94550

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ii
 SAND2011-3342
Unlimited Release
Printed December 2011

LNG Cascading Damage Fracture Testing

Report

Robert J. Kalan
Mechanical Environments, Org. 01534
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, NM 87185

Jason P. Petti
Structural & Thermal Analysis, Org. 06233
Sandia National Laboratories
P.O. Box 5800
Albuquerque, NM 87185

Abstract

As part of the LNG Cascading Damage Study, a series of structural tests were conducted to investigate
the thermal induced fracture of steel plate structures. The thermal stresses were achieved by applying
liquid nitrogen (LN2) onto sections of each steel plate. In addition to inducing large thermal stresses, the
lowering of the steel temperature simultaneously reduced the fracture toughness. Liquid nitrogen was
used as a surrogate for LNG due to safety concerns and since the temperature of LN2 is similar (-190oC)
to LNG (-161oC). The use of LN2 ensured that the tests could achieve cryogenic temperatures in the
range an actual vessel would encounter during a LNG spill. There were four phases to this test series.
Phase I was the initial exploratory stage, which was used to develop the testing process. In the Phase II
series of tests, larger plates were used and tested until fracture. The plate sizes ranged from 4 ft square
pieces to 6 ft square sections with thicknesses from ¼ inches to ¾ inches. This phase investigated the
cooling rates on larger plates and the effect of different notch geometries (stress concentrations used to
initiate brittle fracture). Phase II was divided into two sections, Phase II-A and Phase II-B. Phase II-A
used standard A36 steel, while Phase II-B used marine grade steels. In Phase III, the test structures were
significantly larger, in the range of 12 ft by 12 ft by 3 ft high. These structures were designed with more
complex geometries to include features similar to those on LNG vessels. The final test phase, Phase IV,
investigated differences in the heat transfer (cooling rates) between LNG and LN2. All of the tests
conducted in this study are used in subsequent parts of the LNG Cascading Damage Study, specifically
the computational analyses.

iii
 CONTENTS
FIGURES ....................................................................................................................................... vi

TABLES ....................................................................................................................................... xii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ........................................................................................................... xiii

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ......................................................................................................... xiv

1. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 1

2. Testing Purpose ..................................................................................................................... 1

3. Testing Overview .................................................................................................................. 2

4. Fracture Testing .................................................................................................................... 3

4.1 Phase I Exploratory Tests ......................................................................................................3

4.2 Phase II-A Moderate-Scale Fracture Testing – A36 Steel .....................................................9

4.3 Phase II-B Moderate-Scale Fracture Testing – Marine Grade Steels ..................................22

4.4 Phase III Large-Scale Fracture Testing................................................................................30

4.4.1 Large-Scale Tests without Water .....................................................................................32

4.4.2 Large-Scale Tests with Water...........................................................................................45

5. Heat Transfer Testing ......................................................................................................... 49

6. Summary and Conclusions ................................................................................................. 61

References ..................................................................................................................................... 62

Appendix A – Stress Concentrations ............................................................................................ 63

Appendix B – Test Data ................................................................................................................ 67

v
 FIGURES
Figure 1. Phase I test plate and trough ............................................................................................ 4

Figure 2. Thermocouple locations for Phase I test plates ............................................................... 4

Figure 3. Filler tube......................................................................................................................... 5

Figure 4. Thermocouple data from initial test ................................................................................ 5

Figure 5. Spray manifold ................................................................................................................ 6

Figure 6. Thermocouple test after painting ..................................................................................... 6

Figure 7. Layout of the thermocouples ........................................................................................... 7

Figure 8. Temperature data from the thermocouple test plate ........................................................ 8

Figure 9. 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. plate and beam test configuration .............................................. 10

Figure 10. Welded 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. Phase II test plate ........................................................ 10

Figure 11. Location of the thermocouples for 48 in plates ........................................................... 11

Figure 12. Test configuration for the 48 in. x 48 in. Phase II plates ............................................. 12

Figure 13. Phase II Test 1 upper surface temperature profile ....................................................... 14

Figure 14. Phase II Test 1 lower surface temperature profile ....................................................... 14

Figure 15. Drilled hole locations Tests 3 and 4 ............................................................................ 16

Figure 16. Notched holes for Tests 5 and 6, center hole (hole 2) shown...................................... 16

Figure 17. Thermocouple data for Test 5...................................................................................... 17

Figure 18. Crack generated in Test 5, 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. plate with notched holes ................ 17

Figure 19. Crack generated in Test 6, 48 in. x 48in. x ¼ in. welded plate with notched holes .... 18

Figure 20. Phase II test plate 72 in. x 72 in. x ¾ in. ..................................................................... 19

Figure 21. Thermocouple data for Test 7...................................................................................... 19

Figure 22. Surface notches cut into 72 in x 72 in plate for (a) Tests 8, (b) Test 9 and (c) Test 10
................................................................................................................................................ 20

vi
Figure 23. Thermocouple data for Test 10.................................................................................... 21

Figure 24. Cracked formed in 72 in. x 72 in. plate during Test 10 ............................................... 21

Figure 25. The extension of the crack formed in Test 10 beyond the outside of the cooling trough
................................................................................................................................................ 22

Figure 26. Test layout for the Phase II ABS steel plate tests ........................................................ 23

Figure 27. Trough dimensions and thermocouple layout for Phase II ABS steel plate tests ........ 23

Figure 28. Notches used in Tests 11 and 12 ................................................................................. 25

Figure 29. Crack generated in Test 12 ......................................................................................... 26

Figure 30. Thermocouple data for Test 12.................................................................................. 26

Figure 31. Notch geometry used for ABS Grade steel Phase II tests ........................................... 27

Figure 32. Cracking pattern for Test 19 ........................................................................................ 28

Figure 33. Thermocouple data for Test 19.................................................................................... 28

Figure 34. Thermocouple data for Test 20.................................................................................... 29

Figure 35. Cracking pattern for Test 21 ........................................................................................ 29

Figure 36. Thermocouple data for Test 21.................................................................................... 30

Figure 37. Large Phase III structure layout and materials ............................................................ 31

Figure 38. Phase III Test 13 and 14 trough layout, inside the structure (left) and outside the 3 ft
vertical Gr. EH plate (right) ................................................................................................... 33

Figure 39. Trough and thermocouple layout for Phase III Test 13 and 14. .................................. 34

Figure 40. Layout of the Phase III tests (Test 13 and 14) ............................................................. 34

Figure 41. Notch added for use in Test 14 .................................................................................... 36

Figure 42. Trough with added notches and paint repair prior to Test 14...................................... 36

Figure 43. Pipe layouts and Bay/Valve locations for Test 13 and 14 (2 ¾ in. star Test 1
designates in Test 13, 4 in. Cross Test 2 added for Test 14) .................................................. 37

Figure 44. Crack formation during Test 14 .................................................................................. 37

Figure 45. Thermocouple data for Test 14.................................................................................... 38

vii
Figure 46. Trough and thermocouple configuration for Test 16 .................................................. 39

Figure 47. Trough and pipe layout for Test 16 ............................................................................. 39

Figure 48. Trough layout outside vertical Gr. EH plate for Test 16 ............................................. 40

Figure 49. Interior crack formation during Test 16 ...................................................................... 41

Figure 50. Thermocouple data for Test 16.................................................................................... 42

Figure 51. Close-up of likely initiation site for Test 16 ................................................................ 42

Figure 52. Fractures caused by LNG spills on actual LNG vessels (Roue, 2011) ....................... 43

Figure 53. Close-up stiffening rib fracture for Test 16 ................................................................. 44

Figure 54. Outside through-cracks for Test 16 ............................................................................. 44

Figure 55. Outside cracking with turning for Test 16 ................................................................... 45

Figure 56. Schematic of the large structure pool tests .................................................................. 46

Figure 57. Polyurethane foam applied to the bottom of the large structure ................................. 46

Figure 58. Test setup for the large structure pool test................................................................... 47

Figure 59. Test 23 notch increased to 8 in. ................................................................................... 48

Figure 60. Crack progression for Test 23 ..................................................................................... 48

Figure 61. Thermocouple data for Test 23.................................................................................... 49

Figure 62. Plate setup used in heat transfer tests .......................................................................... 49

Figure 63. Heat transfer tests dimensions and thermocouple layout ............................................ 50

Figure 64. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Bare ................................ 51

Figure 65. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy ............................. 51

Figure 66. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple tata – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy Urethane .............. 52

Figure 67. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple fata – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Bare ................................. 52

Figure 68. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Epoxy ............................. 53

Figure 69. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy ......................... 53

Figure 70. Schematic of the LNG heat transfer tests .................................................................... 54

viii
Figure 71. LNG heat transfer test configuration ........................................................................... 55

Figure 72. Test plate and flow deflector ....................................................................................... 55

Figure 73. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Bare .............................. 56

Figure 74. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy............................ 56

Figure 75. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy Urethane ............ 57

Figure 76. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Bare .............................. 57

Figure 77. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Epoxy............................ 58

Figure 78. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy........................ 58

Figure 79. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy (zoom) ........... 59

Figure 80. LNG vs. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data for TC1 – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Bare .... 60

Figure 81. LNG vs. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data for TC1 – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy
Urethane ................................................................................................................................. 60

Figure 82. Stress Concentration at Circular and Elliptical holes in Plates ................................... 64

Figure 83. Crack Tip Stresses in Plates ........................................................................................ 66

Figure 84. Test 1 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 67

Figure 85. Test 1 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 67

Figure 86. Test 2 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 68

Figure 87. Test 2 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 68

Figure 88. Test 3 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 69

Figure 89. Test 3 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 69

Figure 90. Test 4 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 70

Figure 91. Test 4 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 70

Figure 92. Test 5 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 71

Figure 93. Test 5 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 71

Figure 94. Test 6 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 72

Figure 95. Test 6 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 72

ix
Figure 96. Test 7 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 73

Figure 97. Test 7 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 73

Figure 98. Test 8 – TCs 1-11 ........................................................................................................ 74

Figure 99. Test 8 – TCs 12-22 ...................................................................................................... 74

Figure 100. Test 9 – TCs 1-11 ...................................................................................................... 75

Figure 101. Test 9 – TCs 12-22 .................................................................................................... 75

Figure 102. Test 10 – TCs 1-11 .................................................................................................... 76

Figure 103. Test 10 – TCs 12-22 .................................................................................................. 76

Figure 104. Test 11 – TCs 1-11 .................................................................................................... 77

Figure 105. Test 11 – TCs 12-22 .................................................................................................. 77

Figure 106. Test 12 – TCs 1-11 .................................................................................................... 78

Figure 107. Test 12 – TCs 12-22 .................................................................................................. 78

Figure 108. Test 17 – TCs 1-10 .................................................................................................... 79

Figure 109. Test 17 – TCs 11-20 .................................................................................................. 79

Figure 110. Test 18 – TCs 1-10 .................................................................................................... 80

Figure 111. Test 18 – TCs 11-20 .................................................................................................. 80

Figure 112. Test 19 – TCs 1-10 .................................................................................................... 81

Figure 113. Test 19 – TCs 11-20 .................................................................................................. 81

Figure 114. Test 20 – TCs 1-10 .................................................................................................... 82

Figure 115. Test 20 – TCs 11-20 .................................................................................................. 82

Figure 116. Test 21 – TCs 1-10 .................................................................................................... 83

Figure 117. Test 21 – TCs 11-20 .................................................................................................. 83

Figure 118. Test 13 – TCs 1-19 .................................................................................................... 84

Figure 119. Test 13 – TCs 36-54 .................................................................................................. 84

Figure 120. Test 13 – TCs 20-35 (TC 25 not used) ...................................................................... 85

x
Figure 121. Test 14 – TCs 1-19 .................................................................................................... 85

Figure 122. Test 14 – TCs 36-54 .................................................................................................. 86

Figure 123. Test 14 – TCs 20-35 (TC 25 not used) ...................................................................... 86

Figure 124. Test 16 – TCs 1-18 .................................................................................................... 87

Figure 125. Test 16 – TCs 27-44 .................................................................................................. 87

Figure 126. Test 16 – TCs 19-26 .................................................................................................. 88

Figure 127. Test 22 – TCs 1-18 .................................................................................................... 88

Figure 128. Test 22 – TCs 27-44 .................................................................................................. 89

Figure 129. Test 22 – TCs 19-26 .................................................................................................. 89

Figure 130. Test 23 – TCs 1-18 .................................................................................................... 90

Figure 131. Test 23 – TCs 27-44 .................................................................................................. 90

Figure 132. Test 23 – TCs 19-26 .................................................................................................. 91

xi
 TABLES
Table 1. List of thermocouples and mounting methods .................................................................. 7

Table 2 Phase II-A Testing ........................................................................................................... 13

Table 3. Phase II-B Tests with ABS Grade Steel, all with I-Beams ............................................. 24

Table 4. Large Phase III Structure Tests ....................................................................................... 32

xii
 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors would like to acknowledge the following Sandia, DOE, and expert panel members.

Mike Hightower, Sandia National Laboratories, Overall LNG Project Manager

Luis Abeyta, Sandia National Laboratories, Testing Support and Data Acquisition

Amarante Martinez, Sandia National Laboratories, Testing Support and Photometrics

Carlos Lopez, Sandia National Laboratories, LNG Cascading Damage Thermal Lead

Gerald Wellman, Sandia National Laboratories, Test Planning and Design

Frank Dempsey, Sandia National Laboratories, Test Planning and Design

Doug Ammerman, Sandia National Laboratories, Internal Sandia Review

Robert Corbin, DOE Project Manager

Christopher Freitas, DOE

Commander Nick Caron, U.S. Coast Guard, Expert Review Panel

Charles Rawson, U.S. Coast Guard, Expert Review Panel

Professor Stan Rolfe, Kansas University, Expert Review Panel

Dr. James Rawers, DOE, Expert Review Panel

Dr. John Moorhouse, British Gas (formerly of), Expert Review Panel

John Dasch, DNV, Expert Review Panel

Chris Zerby, FERC, Expert Review Panel

Tony Galt, Freeport LNG, Expert Review Panel

xiii
 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The combination of recent and expected future growth of imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
with the increased safety and security concerns resulting from the incidents of September 11,
2001, have led to an exploration of possible impacts that an attack on potentially hazardous
cargos would have on the public and other assets. A number of studies (Hightower, et al., 2004,
Hightower et al., 2006) have been performed at Sandia National Laboratories in the aftermath of
September 11, 2001, in order to examine the potential hazards from LNG vessels experiencing
an unintended release of LNG cargo. An unintended release of LNG has two significant
components: 1) the effects of the cryogenic LNG contacting the steel structure of the tanker
vessel, and 2) the flammable nature of LNG and the potential fire hazards to the tanker and to the
public if in a harbor location. Stored LNG has a temperature of approximately -161oC which is
well below the brittle transition for the marine steels that comprise LNG tankers. Rupture of the
LNG containment vessel will results in the LNG flowing out and coming into contact with the
tankers steel structures. Due to the complex nature of this type of event, the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has studied the current state of knowledge of the relevant
issues/phenomenon (GAO, 2007). This report was compiled in order to identify the areas of
additional research required in order to gain an improved understanding of these events. The top
two areas recommended for further study were related to improving the understanding of large
LNG fire physics and to improving the state of knowledge surrounding the potential for
cascading damage to LNG vessels. Under two separate projects, Sandia National Laboratories is
examining both areas of concern. This report summarizes one component, the large-scale
fracture testing, performed under LNG Cascading Damage Study. An understanding of the
potential for fracture of the steel that comprises the LNG vessels is potentially critical in
assessing the likelihood of cascading failure of the vessel. Here, cascading failure is defined as
damage that causes the spread of sufficient LNG cargo and/or LNG fires that then lead to
additional damage or breaches to the vessel beyond the damage that produced the initial spill.
This report summarizes the testing performed to better understand the brittle fracture of steel
structures subjected to cryogenic liquids.

The types and method of testing performed here for the LNG Cascading Damage Study are
directly related to how the testing information will be used in the computational analysis
component of the project. The goal of the project is to provide an assessment of LNG vessels
subjected to unintended LNG spills. This will be accomplished through a series of
computational finite element analysis of the vessels. The models created for these analyses are
relatively large, but even so, the smallest elements are approximately 4 inches by 4 inches.
While this resolution provides sufficient stress/strain resolution to capture the global behavior of
the vessel, this resolution is several orders of magnitude too large to capture the stress/strain
fields that are generated at the tip of a crack in the steel that comprises the hulls of LNG tankers.
The progression of brittle cracks in steel plates depends on a number of factors including the
specific geometry, the material properties, the temperature state caused by contact with
cryogenic liquids, and the microstructure of the material. Specifically, the dependence on the
microstructure of the steel plating from point to point makes the tracking of individual brittle
cracks using continuum mechanics in finite element models impossible. However, this level of
detail is not necessary to assess the global behavior of the vessel. What is necessary is an
estimate of the general crack path and directionality. The “damage” caused by crack initiation
and crack propagation will be represented in the finite element models by the removal or “death”

xiv
of 4 inch by 4 inch elements along the crack propagation path. The “death” of a finite element is
achieved by removing that element from the analysis after a defined criteria has been reached in
that element causing material separation. For these analyses, a strain/temperature locus is
employed. Due to the transition from ductile to brittle behavior as the temperature drops, the
strain required to “kill” a finite element drops drastically as the temperature falls. The
temperature at which the strain drops most dramatically varies from steel to steel; however, all of
the marine steels used in LNG tanker construction enter the brittle regime at temperature well
above LNG temperatures. The initial strain/temperature locus was developed using basic
material tests (stress-strain tests at multiple temperatures). These test results are not presented in
this report, but are described in the analysis report when discussing the strain/temperature locus
calibration. The fracture tests presented here were used in the secondary calibration and
validation of the strain/temperature locus. The goal of the large-scale fracture tests was therefore
to provide examples of fractured steel plates and structures. Finite element models were created
for the relevant fracture structures to test the ability of the finite element code, element death
modeling, and the strain/temperature locus to reproduce the general crack path and directionality.
These finite element analyses also used 4 inch by 4 inch elements in order to have the same
stress/strain resolution as the models of the full vessel. The analyses of the test structures and the
full vessel have the temperatures of the finite elements reduced at an appropriate rate to induce
thermal strains. The temperature fields were generated with either a heat transfer analysis or by
ramping the temperatures down manually. Since the stresses and strains generated in the 4 inch
element in the analysis would not match the resolution of the strain obtained with strain gauges,
only temperature data was taken for each test. The temperature data was then used to link the
tests with the finite element analyses. The details of the test analyses and the locus calibration
are provided in a separate report on the computational analyses (Volume III, Petti, et al., 2011).
This report focuses on the fracture testing structures, procedures, and results.

As part of the LNG Cascading Damage Study, the series of structural tests conducted here were
used to investigate thermally induced fracture of steel plate structures. The thermal stresses were
achieved by applying liquid nitrogen (LN2) onto sections of each steel plate causing differential
thermal contraction. In addition to inducing large thermal stresses, the lowering of the steel
temperature simultaneously reduced the fracture toughness. Liquid nitrogen was used as a
surrogate for LNG due to safety concerns and since the temperature of LN2 is slightly colder (-
190oC) than LNG (-161oC). This ensured that the tests could achieve temperatures in the range
an actual vessel would see during a spill.

There were four phases to this test series. Phase I was the initial exploratory stage, which was
used to develop the testing process. The first several tests studied the cooling of steel plates
subjected to LN2. In addition, tests were conducted on various thermocouple types. Finally, to
better represent the typical condition of steel, the plates were coated with paints typically used in
commercial vessels, painting of the steel surface in contact with the LN2 was shown to
significantly increase the cooling rate. Since both the interior and exterior surfaces of LNG
vessel hulls have surface coatings, all subsequent test phases used surface coatings.

In the Phase II series of tests, larger plates were used and tested until fracture. Phase II was
divided into two sections, Phase II-A and Phase II-B. Phase II-A used standard A36 steel, while
Phase II-B used marine grade steels. The three test structure in Phase II-A included plate sizes
ranging from 4 ft square pieces to 6 ft square sections with thicknesses from ¼ inches to ¾

xv
inches. This phase investigated the cooling rates on larger plates and the effect of different notch
geometries (stress concentrations used to initiate brittle fracture). Each of the three Phase II-A
test structures were tested multiple times. For each subsequent test, stress concentrations were
introduced and then made more severe until a fracture was initiated in the plate. Phase II-B used
similar test structures and techniques but with marine grade steels. Specifically, ABS Grade A
and ABS Grade EH were used in construction of the test articles. Two Gr. A plate and two Gr.
EH plate structures were tested.

In Phase III, the three test structures were significantly larger than for Phase II. Each of the
structures was built with a main plate spanning 12 ft by 12 ft and then a height of 3 ft. These
structures were designed with more complex geometries to include features similar to those on
LNG vessels. They included multiple material, intersecting plates, and stiffening elements.
However, they were not scaled versions of any specific section of an LNG vessel. The Phase III
tests showed that stiffening elements and intersecting plates did not arrest brittle cracks. The
cracking that occurred in these test followed the extent of the cooled region and propagated, in
general, in the direction perpendicular to the maximum stress.

The final test phase, Phase IV, investigated differences in the heat transfer (cooling rates)
between LNG and LN2.

xvi
1. Introduction

The combination of the expected future growth of imports of liquefied natural gas (LNG)
with the increased safety and security concerns resulting from the incidents of September 11,
2001, have led to an exploration of possible impacts that an attack on potentially hazardous
cargos would have on the public and other assets. A number of studies (Hightower, et al.,
2004, Hightower et al., 2006) have been performed at Sandia National Laboratories in the
aftermath of September 11, 2001, in order to examine the potential hazards from a LNG
tanker vessel experiencing an unintended release of LNG cargo. An unintended release of
LNG has two significant components: 1) the effects of the cryogenic LNG contacting the
steel structure of the tanker vessel, and 2) the flammable nature of LNG and the potential fire
hazards to the tanker and to the public if in a harbor location. Stored LNG has a temperature
of approximately -161oC which is well below the brittle transition for the marine steels that
comprise LNG tankers. Due to the complex nature of this type of event, the US Government
Accountability Office (GAO) commissioned a study on the current state of knowledge of the
relevant issues/phenomenon (GAO, 2007). This previous report was compiled in order to
identify the areas of additional research required in order to gain an improved understanding
of these events. The top two areas recommended for further study were related to improving
the understanding of large LNG fire physics and to improving the state of knowledge
surrounding the potential for cascading damage to LNG vessels. Under two separate projects,
Sandia National Laboratories is examining both areas of concern. This report summarizes
one component, the large-scale fracture testing, performed under the LNG Cascading Damage
Study. An understanding of the potential for the fracture of the steel that comprises the LNG
tankers is critical in assessing the likelihood of cascading failure of the vessel. Here,
cascading failure is defined as damage that causes the spread of sufficient LNG cargo and/or
LNG fires that then lead to additional damage or breaches to the vessel beyond that produced
during the initial spill. This report summarizes the testing performed to better understand the
brittle fracture of steel structures subjected to cryogenic liquids. An explanation of why these
specific tests were performed and how the results of these tests are used in computational
analyses is provided in the next section. The computational analysis portions of the LNG
Cascading Damage Study are contained within additional reports (Figueroa and Lopez, 2011,
Petti et al., 2011).

2. Testing Purpose

The types and methods of testing performed for the LNG Cascading Damage Study are
directly related to the information needed and used in the computational analysis component
of the project. The goal of the project is to provide an assessment of LNG vessels
susceptibility to damage and possibly failure when subjected to unintended LNG spills. This
will be accomplished through a series of computational finite element analysis of models of
the two most common commercial LNG vessels. The models created for these analyses are
relatively large. However, the analysis will be capable of characterizing the materials
response on elements, the smallest of which are approximately 4 inches by 4 inches. While
this level of resolution provides sufficient stress/strain analysis to capture the global behavior
of the vessel, this scale is several orders of magnitude too large to capture the stress/strain
fields that may be generated at the tip of a crack in the steel that comprises the hulls of LNG
tankers when subjected to thermal stresses resulting from contact with the LNG. In addition,

1
the progression of brittle cracks in steel plates depends on a number of factors including the
specific geometry, the material properties, the temperature state caused by contact with
cryogenic liquids, and the microstructure of the material. Specifically, the dependence on the
microstructure of the steel plating from point-to-point makes it impossible to predict the
individual brittle crack behavior using continuum mechanics in finite element models.
However, specific knowledge at the microscopic level of detail is not necessary to assess the
global behavior of the vessel. What is necessary is an approximate estimate of the general
crack path and directionality. The “damage” caused by cracks will be represented in the
finite element models by the failure or “death” of a path of 4 inch by 4 inch elements. The
“death” of a finite element is achieved by removing that element from the analysis after a
defined criteria has been reached for that element, causing material separation. For these
analyses, a strain/temperature locus is employed as the failure criterion. Due to the transition
from ductile to brittle behavior as the temperature drops, the strain required to “kill” a finite
element drops drastically as the temperature falls. The temperature at which the strain drops
most dramatically varies from steel to steel; however, all of the marine steels used in LNG
tanker construction enter the brittle regime at temperatures well above LNG temperatures.
The initial strain/temperature locus was developed using basic material tests (stress-strain
tests at multiple temperatures). These test results are not presented in this report, but are
described in the analysis report when discussing the strain/temperature locus calibration. The
fracture test results presented here were used in the secondary calibration and validation of
the strain/temperature locus. The goal of the large-scale fracture tests was therefore to
provide examples of fractured steel plates and structures. Finite element models were created
for a selected number of the fractured structures to test the ability of the finite element code,
element death modeling, and the strain/temperature locus to reproduce the general crack path
and directionality observed experimentally. These finite element analyses also used 4 inch by
4 inch elements in order to reflect the same stress/strain resolution as the models of the full
vessels. The analyses of the test structures and the full vessel have the temperatures of the
finite elements in the cooled regions reduced at an appropriate rate to induce thermal strains.
The temperature fields were generated with either a heat transfer analysis or by ramping
element temperatures down manually. Since the stresses and strains generated in the 4 inch
element in the analysis would not match the resolution of the strain obtained from
experimental strain measurements, the temperature data was then used to link the tests with
the finite element analyses. The details of the test analyses and the locus calibration are
located in Volume III of this study (Petti et al., 2011). This report focuses on the fracture
testing structures, procedures, and results.

3. Testing Overview

As part of the LNG Cascading Damage Study, a series of structural fracture tests were
conducted to investigate the effect of liquid natural gas (LNG) flowing on steel structures.
These tests were designed to induce large thermal stresses in the test plates due to differential
thermal contraction while simultaneously lowering their ductility. Liquid nitrogen (LN2) was
chosen as the cryogenic fluid to use in place of LNG. It is significantly safer to work with and
the temperature of LN2 is slightly colder (-190oC) than LNG (-161oC). The use of LN2
ensures that the tests could achieve temperatures in the range an actual vessel would see
during a LNG spill. There were four phases in this test series. Phase I was the initial
exploratory stage that provided preliminary data to the material's response to LN2 (LNG) and

2
the insight and direction for the series of larger scale tests. In the Phase II series of tests,
larger plates were used than for Phase I. The plate sizes ranged from 4 ft square pieces to 6 ft
square sections. This phase investigated the cooling rates on these plates and the effect of
different notch geometries (stress concentrations used to initiate brittle fracture) from which
the crack would initiate. Phase II was broken in to two sections, Phase II-A and Phase II-B.
Phase II-A used standard A36 structural steel, while Phase II-B used marine grade steels. In
Phase III, significantly larger 12 ft square structures with more complex geometries were
tested. The final test phase, Phase IV, investigated the heat transfer (cooling) rate differences
between LNG and LN2. Not including the initial exploratory tests conducted as part of Phase
I, twenty two tests were conducted in Phases II and III. Cracking was only achieved in a
fraction of the tests. The same test article could then be retested using a different, more severe
test conditions. Two additional series of the tests were performed for Phase IV. Each of
those series included 6 individual tests.

This report presents the details of the testing described above. Due to the large number of
thermocouples used and the large number of tests conducted, only a small portion of the
temperature data is presented within the main report. The complete set of data can be found in
the Appendix B.

4. Fracture Testing

4.1 Phase I Exploratory Tests

Initial tests conducted for the LNG study were exploratory in nature. The tests used small
plates to develop the basic test methods and procedures using a low pressure dewar to supply
the LN2. These tests explored methods to cool steel plates, flow distribution, surface coatings,
and thermocouple types.

The initial test used ¾ inch thick carbon steel plates (standard A36), which was sectioned into
a 24 in. x 24 in. square as shown in Figure 1. The trough used to hold the LNG was made
from polyurethane foam. It is sealed to the plate with silicone caulk and held in place with 1
inch angles and studs. The inner trough dimensions were 2 in. wide and 5 in. high. The
thermocouples were Type T 30 gauge Teflon and were held in place using Kapton tape (Type
T thermocouples are copper-Constantan). They have an operating temperature range of -
250°C to 350°C. The location of the thermocouples is shown in Figure 2. There were ten
thermocouples (1-10) on the top surface and ten thermocouples (11-20) directly below them
on the bottom surface.

3
 Figure 1. Phase I test plate and trough

3/4" Plate 2.00 in

3.50 in Foam Tro ugh

2 8.00 in (typ)

2.00 in 3 4.00 in (typ)

10 9
24.00 in
4 2.00 in (typ)
8
5
6.00 in
6
Located Top and Bottom
4.00 in

24.00 in

Figure 2. Thermocouple locations for Phase I test plates

The trough was filled with LN2 using a low-pressure dewar and a ½ in. filler tube which was
placed centered on top of the trough (above TC 4). The filler tube is shown in Figure 3. The
temperature data was recording using a National Instrument SCXI-1000 Data Acquisition
Unit (DAQ) and a TC-2095 Thermocouple Connector Module. Temperature data from the
test is shown in Figure 4. The data shows a large spread in the temperature of the top
thermocouples and slow cooling of the plate through the thickness.

4
 Figure 3. Filler tube

Figure 4. Thermocouple data from initial test

The differences observed in the temperatures along the top thermocouples led to an attempt to
distribute the flow of the nitrogen along the length of the trough more evenly. The nozzle was
modified as shown in Figure 5 to include a pipe ½ in. diameter pipe with 16 – 7/64 in.
diameter holes. The nozzle had a minimal effect in normalizing the temperature distribution
along the length of the trough and was not used in future tests.

5
 Figure 5. Spray manifold

The next exploratory test was conducted to determine whether the Type T Teflon
thermocouples fastened with Kapton tape were the most appropriate thermocouples for
determining the plate temperature. A test plate shown in Figure 6 was developed to examine
alternate fastening methods along with type E thermocouples. Type E thermocouples leads
are made of Nickle-Chromium and Copper-nickel. Type E is recommended for use at
temperature above 40K. The Seebeck coefficient for Type E is greater than all other standard
thermocouples, which along with its low thermal conductivity make it ideally suited for low
temperature applications (ASTM, 1993). A complete list of the thermocouples tested is
shown in Table 1. The location of the thermocouples is presented in Figure 7. The
thermocouples were mounted 1 in. from the center of the plate in a radial pattern every 45° as
shown in Figure 7. The test plate was a 12 in. x 12 in. x ¼ in. thick. A dam was made from a
12 in. x 12 in. x 2 in. thick Styrofoam board with a 4 in. diameter hole in the middle. The
Styrofoam was attached to the plate with a bead of room temperature vulcanizing (RTV)
sealant around the hole.

Figure 6. Thermocouple test after painting

6
 Table 1. List of thermocouples and mounting methods

Type Material Type Mounting Technique

T 30 ga. Teflon Insulated Kapton Tape
E 30 ga. Teflon Insulated Kapton Tape

Epoxy embedded in 0.020 in. deep by .040 in. wide

T 30 ga. Teflon Insulated slot
Epoxy embedded in 0.020 in. deep by .040 in. wide
T 0.020 in. Sheathed slot
Epoxy embedded in 0.020 in. deep by .040 in. wide
E 30 ga. Teflon Insulated slot
Epoxy embedded in 0.020 in. deep by .040 in. wide
E 0.020 in. Sheathed slot

Capicity Discharge (CD )weld using 0.003 in x 0.250

T 0.020 in. Sheathed in. NiCr Strap
Capacity Discharge (CD) weld using 0.003 in. x
E 0.020 in. Sheathed 0.250 in. NiCr Strap

Epoxy embedded in 0.040 in. hole hole

From back side to within 0.020 in. of
T 30 ga. Teflon Insulated Surface
Epoxy embedded in 0.040 in. hole
from back side to within 0.020 in. of
E 30 ga. Teflon Insulated surface

E 30 ga. Teflon Insulated Intrinsic (CD welded) Front surface

Type TTeflon
Kapton Tape

Type ESheath Type TSheath Ø4.00 in

Welded Groove
Kapton Tape
Ø2.00 in
Ø2.00 in
Ø4.00 in

E T
Type TSheath Type ESheath
Groove Groove
Epoxy Epoxy
Type EIntrinsic
Type TTeflon
Type ESheath Type TSheath Kapton Tape
Groove Welded
Kapton Tape Type ETeflon
Kapton Tape Bottom Surface
Type ETeflon w/Epoxy and Type TTeflon w/Epoxy
Top Surface Hole to with 0.020 inches of upper surface

Figure 7. Layout of the thermocouples

7
Two tests were run, one with the plate as received (bare steel surface), and one with the
exposed surface painted with a spray-on enamel paint (painted version shown in Figure 6).
The intrinsic CD welded Type E thermocouple provided the best measurement of the plate
temperature. A critical, though not unexpected, observation from these tests is apparent in
temperature data presented in Figure 8. The graph shows the temperature of the intrinsic
thermocouple on the top surface and the Kapton taped thermocouple on the back surface. The
graph clearly shows that there is a higher cooling rate for the painted plate than for the bare
plate. The paint layer acts as an insulation layer that affects the boiling behavior of the
cryogenic liquid when in contact with the paint relative to bare steel. This change in behavior
due to the paint enhances the contact between the surface and the liquid which results in an
increased cooling of the steel plate. Therefore, all subsequent tests were conducted using a
single flow nozzles, intrinsic Type E thermocouples with a National Instrument DAQ, and
paint applied to the wetted plate surfaces. Since both the interior and exterior hull surfaces of
LNG vessels are all painted with epoxy primer and/or polyurethane, painting the surfaces in
this testing program is the most appropriate choice.

Painted vs Bare Steel for Intrinsic TCs

50

0
Temperature (C)

-50

Bare Steel Backside

Bare Steel Topside
-100 Painted Steel Backside
Painted Steel Topside

-150

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 8. Temperature data from the thermocouple test plate

8
4.2 Phase II-A Moderate-Scale Fracture Testing – A36 Steel

The initial tests on the exploratory 24 in. x 24 in. x ¾ in. plates showed a very slow cooling
rate through the thickness of the plate. In addition to the lack of paint in those tests, the slow
cooling was believed to be due to the large mass of the plate and the relatively small size of
the cooling trough. In order to more quickly cool the plate and to provide addition constraint
to generate thermal stresses, the second phase of testing includes of a series of 48 in. x 48 in.
x ¼ in. thick plates. These A36 carbon steel plates also had W8x40 I-beams welded around
their circumference. The induction of thermal strain is caused by a region of material
becoming cold while the surrounding material remains warm. The cold material tries to
contract while the warm surrounding material holds the cold material from contracting freely.
This constraint provided by the warm surrounding material causes the generation of a large
amount of tension within the cold material. As the temperature drops, the tension increases in
addition to the continued decrease in the fracture toughness of the steel. Once the stress
increases sufficiently to cause a flaw in the steel microstructure to reach a critical stress level,
a brittle crack initiates and propagates outward with a velocity near that of the speed of sound.
The propagation is based on the structure geometry, the loading on the structure, the
distribution of the cold region, and the material microstructure. Thus, the I-beams welded to
the outer edges of the plate provide additional constraint to the structure helping to induce
larger stresses in the cool regions.

A diagram of a 48 in. plate with the support welded I-beams and the trough location is show
in Figure 9. A foam trough 12 in. wide by 42 in. long and 5 in. deep (inside dimensions) runs
along the center of the plate. The trough was filled with LN2 using a 160 liter low-pressure
dewar with a single ½ in. fill pipe locate in the center of the top trough cover. The surface of
the plate inside the trough was painted with Krylon spray enamel. As describes earlier, the
paint increases the heat transfer between the nitrogen and the plate, resulting in more rapid
cooling. The trough was fastened to the plate using silicone caulk and two 1 in. steel angles.
The bottom surface of the plate beneath the trough was insulated with Styrofoam (14 in. x 48
in. x 3 in. thick) in order to enhance the heat transfer. The bottom surface foam was also held
in place by the steel angles.

Two plate configurations were initially tested with 48 in. size plates. The first is just a plain ¼
in. thick plate welded to I-beams around the perimeter. The second plate consists of two half
sections (24 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in.) welded to each other along the center. The weld runs through
the centerline of the long trough dimension axis. Welding changes the local microstructure
and thus the overall material's response to the stress loadings. The purpose of the weld is to
provide a region of increased stress due to the residual stress in the weld and to provide flaws
for possible crack ignition sites. The plates are also welded to I-beams around the perimeter.
The welded test plate is shown in Figure 10.

In addition to the 48 in. plates with I-beams, one 72 in. x 72 in. plate was also tested as part of
Phase II-A tests. The larger plate used the same size trough and therefore employs the extra
surrounding warm plate material to provide the constraint in place of the I-beams.

9
For all tests in Phase II-A, eleven type E intrinsic thermocouples were attached to the top and
bottom surface of the plate using a CD welder. The location of the thermocouples is shown in
Figure 11. The same test configuration for all of the Phase II-A test is shown in Figure 12.

Figure 9. 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. plate and beam test configuration

Figure 10. Welded 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. Phase II test plate

10
 23.00 in

44.00 in

16.00 in

8.00 in

0.50 in

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
48.00 in 12.00 in
12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

1.00 in
8.00 in

20 9
1.00 in
21 10

2.00 in
22 11

Thermocouple Loca tion 2.00 in

48" Pla te Te s t
12/17/08
1 - 11 Top Surfa ce
12 -22 B ottom Surfa ce

48.00 in

Figure 11. Location of the thermocouples for 48 in plates

11
 Figure 12. Test configuration for the 48 in. x 48 in. Phase II plates

A list of all of the Phase II-A tests using the three test articles described above is summarized
in Table 2. As described, each of the three test articles was tested multiple times. Each
subsequent test included the addition or slight modification to a stress concentration. These
stress concentration include changing the number of holes, the hole geometry, the shape of
the holes, and the addition of notches and varying the notch geometry (shape and depth).
These holes/notches were increased in severity from test to test until the hole/notch
configuration was sufficient to initiate a brittle fracture. The test numbers in Table 2 represent
the order in which the test were conducted. Tests 1, 3, and 5 used the 48 in. plain plate. Tests
2, 4, and 6 used the 48 in. welded plate. Finally, Tests 7 through 10 used the 72 in. plate.

12
 Table 2 Phase II-A Testing
Test Note Material Plate Size Notch Type Test Results

Number

1 A36 Steel 48” x 48” x ¼” No notch Did not crack

thick w/ I-beams

2 A36 Steel 48” x 48” x ¼” No notch, weld Did not crack

thick w/ I-beams seam along
center of plate

3 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 48” x 48” x ¼” Three 3/8” holes Did not crack
Test 1 thick w/ I-beams drilled along
centerline

4 Same Plate tested in A36 steel 48” x 48” x ¼” Three 3/8” holes Did not crack
Test 2 thick w/ I-beams drilled along
centerline

5 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 48” x 48” x ¼” Three 3/8” holes Cracked
Test 1 & 3 thick w/ I-beams drilled along
centerline with
notch

6 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 48” x 48” x ¼” Three 3/8” holes Cracked
Test 2 & 4 thick w/ I-beams drilled along
centerline with
notch

7 A36 Steel 72”x 72” x ¾” No notch Did not crack

thick

8 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 72”x 72” x ¾” Small groove 2 Did not crack
Test 7 thick 1/8” x ¼” deep
cut using circular
saw

9 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 72”x 72” x ¾” Small groove 2 Did not crack
Test 7 & 8 thick 7/8” x 5/8” deep
x 5/16” wide cut
using die grinder

10 Same Plate tested in A36 Steel 72”x 72” x ¾” 4.75” Groove in Cracked
Test 7, 8 & 9 thick Test 9 notched
with jig saw

Each of the Phase II-A tests ran for approximately 10 minutes. The temperature profiles for
the Test 1 upper and lower thermocouples are presented in Figure 13 and Figure 14,
respectively. With the large trough and a thinner plate, the temperature on the upper and
lower surface dropped quickly and in a similar manner. The temperature time histories for
Test 2 were similar to Test 1. However, as reported in Table 2, the Test 1 and Test 2 plates
did not crack.

13
Figure 13. Phase II Test 1 upper surface temperature profile

Figure 14. Phase II Test 1 lower surface temperature profile

14
Since the plane plate and welded plate did not contain a flaw large enough to initiate a brittle
fracture given the stress state induced by the cooling applied, stress concentrations were
introduced. This was accomplished by drilling three 3/8 in. diameter holes spaced along the
long dimension of the trough. The locations of the holes are presented in Figure 15. The holes
were sealed with cork material and silicone caulk in order to prevent LN2 from leaking
through the plates. This cork and silicone material adds relatively no strength back to the
steel plate. The holes act as a stress concentration since the material directly adjacent to the
holes will theoretically experience a stress three times that of the test without holes. If the
material in the stress concentrated zone contains a microstructural flaw large enough, and the
stress level is sufficiently high, and the material is in the brittle failure regime, brittle fracture
will occur. The Appendix at the end of this report provides additional discussion on stress
concentrations and fracture mechanics.

These re-tests (Test 3 and 4) were run for approximately 5 minutes, and again, the plates did
not crack. The cooling rates for Tests 3 and 4 were similar to Tests 1 and 2. In order to
further increase the stress, notches were introduced to the sides of the 3/8 in. holes using a
jigsaw. The notches were between 3/4 in. and 7/8 in. long (total length from notch tip to
notch tip). Each notch had a width of approximately 1/16 in. The introduction of the notches
increased the stress significantly more than the three times achieved by the holes alone. The
center holes for Test 5 and Test 6 are shown in Figure 16. These severe notches did lead to
fractures initiating approximately 1.5 minutes in to the cooling of each plate. The temperature
data from Test 5 is given in Figure 17. The cooling rates for Test 5 were very close to the
previous tests (Tests 1 through 4). The cooling rates for Test 6 were also similar to that of
Test 5 and the previous tests. The cracks run in Figure 18 and Figure 19 from the edge of the
center hole (hole 2 in each plate, and the location of maximum stress) perpendicular to the
long dimension of the trough (this happens to also be perpendicular to the direction of
maximum stress). The crack was arrested by the material just under the foam trough where
the plate temperature increased sharply since it was not cooled directly during the test. As
shown in Figure 19, there was a bifurcation of the crack in the plate with the center weld.
This type of bifurcation is typical in brittle fracturing of steel plates.

As explained earlier, the goal of this testing program is to explore the propagation of brittle
cracks in steel plate structures, and not to determine the exact conditions required for crack
initiation. LNG vessels are large complex structures that have sufficient stress concentration
to initiate a brittle cracking when subjected to thermal stresses due to contact with LNG.
These tests are being used to provide example fractured structures to calibrate/validate a
computation failure model as discussed in Section 2.

The tests performed on the two 48 in. plates do not appear to differ significantly. The
introduction of the weld does not appear to have affected the test outcome. However, this
does not in any way demonstrate that welds on LNG vessels will not contain likely sites for
flaws and stress concentrations. The welded plate test was one single test on a simple, non-
fatigued, geometry. As later tests in this report will demonstrate, combining welds with more
complex geometries increases the likelihood of inherent flaws falling within any spill region.

15
 44.00 in

0.375 (Three Plac es )

48.00 in 12.00 in

9.00 in 9.00 in
1.00 in

1.00 in

Drille d Hole Size and Loca tion

Pla in Plate A s s embly

1/15/09
B ob Ka la n

48.00 in

Figure 15. Drilled hole locations Tests 3 and 4

Figure 16. Notched holes for Tests 5 and 6, center hole (hole 2) shown.

16
 50

0
tc 2
tc 3
tc 4
-50
tc 5
Temperature (C)

tc 6
-100 tc 7
tc 13
tc 14
-150
tc 15
tc 16
-200 tc 17
tc 18

-250
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Time (sec)

Figure 17. Thermocouple data for Test 5

Figure 18. Crack generated in Test 5, 48 in. x 48 in. x ¼ in. plate with notched holes

17
 Figure 19. Crack generated in Test 6, 48 in. x 48in. x ¼ in. welded plate with notched
holes

After testing the 48 in. plates, the A36 carbon steel plate with slightly different dimensions,
72 in. x 72 in. x ¾ in. thick, was tested. The thickness of ¾ in. is much closer to the average
hull thickness used in most LNG vessels. The plate and trough are shown in Figure 20. The
trough dimensions are the same as those used on the 48 in. x 48 in. plates. In place of the steel
beams welded around the perimeter of the plate, the extra material and thickness of the plate
provided the warm constraining material.

As noted in Table 2, four successive tests were conducted on this plate in order to generate a
crack. The plate was first tested with no machining to the plate. Part of this experiment was to
investigate the cooling of a thick (¾ in.) plate compared to the 48 in. x 48 in. plates which
were only ¼ in. thick. The thermocouple locations for these tests are the same as those for the
48 in. x 48 in. plates. The temperature distribution for the plate (Test 7) is shown in Figure
21. The ¾ in. thick plate used for Test 7 cooled significantly slower than the ¼ in. thick plates
in Tests 1 through 6. In addition, the lack of I-beams welded around the perimeter did not
prevent the out-of-plane buckling deformation of the plate. The 72 in. plate deformed in a
warping, or saddle shape. There was approximately a 1 1/8 in. warping of the plate along the
long dimension axis of the trough and approximate 7/8 in. along the short dimension axis of
the trough.

18
 Figure 20. Phase II test plate 72 in. x 72 in. x ¾ in.

50

tc 2
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 3
tc 4
tc 5
-100
tc 6
tc 7

-150 tc 13
tc 14

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 21. Thermocouple data for Test 7

19
After the initial test (Test 7) with the 72 in. plate, several additional tests were conducted to
study different field techniques for introducing stress concentrations for future tests. All
stress concentrations were centered in the trough area with orientations parallel to the short
trough dimension. The first attempt introduced a notch cut into the plate using a die grinder.
The notch for Test 8 was approximately 2 1/8 in. long by ¼ in. deep at the center as shown in
Figure 22(a). This configuration was tested with no crack initiation. Using the die grinder, the
notch size was increased to 2 7/8 in. long by 5/8 in. deep by 5/16 in. wide for Test 9 as shown
in Figure 22(b). However, the slightly longer and deeper surface notch did not lead to crack
initiation for Test 9. From Tests 8 and 9, it was concluded that use of the die grinder to
introduce shallow surface notches did not produce sharp enough regions to produce the stress
required for fracture. For Test 10, the notch length was increased to 4 inches using the die
grinder in addition to cutting completely through the thickness of the plate. In addition, two
¼ in. long thin notches were cut into the ends of the larger die ground notch using a jigsaw.
The resulting notch is shown in Figure 22(c). The cooling rates for Test 10 are illustrated in
Figure 23. This test resulted in a crack initiated and propagating perpendicular to the long
trough dimension as shown in Figure 24. The fracture occurred approximately 4.5 minutes
into the test. The crack extended approximately 1.5 inches beyond the outside surface of the
trough. This is illustrated in Figure 25. As with Tests 5 and 6, the crack arrested when
entering the steep thermal gradient that transitions into warm material. Due to the longer
cooling time to fracture, the cooling, and therefore the crack, extended slightly beyond the
trough.

Figure 22. Surface notches cut into 72 in x 72 in plate for (a) Tests 8, (b) Test 9 and (c)
Test 10

20
 50

tc 2
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 3
tc 4
tc 5
-100 tc 6
tc 7
tc 13
-150 tc 14

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 23. Thermocouple data for Test 10

Figure 24. Cracked formed in 72 in. x 72 in. plate during Test 10

21
 Figure 25. The extension of the crack formed in Test 10 beyond the outside of the
cooling trough

4.3 Phase II-B Moderate-Scale Fracture Testing – Marine Grade Steels

Following the initial Phase II-A tests, the Phase II-B series of seven tests were conducted on 4
different test articles using same dimensions and I-beam general configuration as employed in
Tests 1 through 6 (48 in. x 48 in.). However, the plate thickness was increased to ¾ in. in
addition to the use of marine grade steels. ABS Grade A and ABS Grade EH steels were the
two steels chosen for the Phase II-B testing. The ABS Gr. A steel has the lowest stress-strain
curve and lowest fracture toughness of the marine grades, while ABS Gr. EH has the highest
stress-strain curve and the highest fracture toughness. Therefore, testing of these two
materials bounds the different marine grade steels. As with Tests 1 through 6, the test plates
were constructed with the W8x40 steel I-beams welded around the perimeter. One test used a
40 in. x 12 in. trough, ABS Gr. A steel, and the same thermal couple layout as in previous
tests and shown in Figure 11. The remaining three test articles (one Gr. A and two Gr. EH)
employed more significantly modified trough dimensions (24 in. wide by 30 in. long) and a
new thermocouple layout. These new trough dimensions cause a significant change to the
stress field generated during cooling. The trough dimensions and thermocouple layout are
shown in Figure 26 and Figure 27. The wetted area of the trough for this test series was
painted using Blue Water Marine AC 70 primer and Marine Urethane.

The Phase II-B tests are listed in Table 3. The initial two tests (Test 11 and 12) were
conducted using the same Gr. A test plate with a 40 in. x 12 in. trough. A second Gr. A plate
with the 30 in. x 24 in. trough was used in Tests 18 and 19. Finally, two identical Gr EH test
plates (both with 30 in. x 24 in. troughs) were constructed for Tests 17 and 20 and Test 21.
Tests 13 through 16 identify tests in Phase III and Phase IV conducted in parallel with Phase
II-B.

22
 Figure 26. Test layout for the Phase II ABS steel plate tests

Figure 27. Trough dimensions and thermocouple layout for Phase II ABS steel plate
tests

23
 Table 3. Phase II-B Tests with ABS Grade Steel, all with I-Beams

Test Note Material Plate Size Notch Test Results

Type
Number

11 Grade A 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Did not crack

with 1” star
40” x 12” slot
trough

12 Same Plate as 11 Grade A 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Plate cracked

with 2¾”
40”x 12” star slot
trough

17 Grade EH 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Did not crack

with 2 ½”
30” x 24” slot
trough

18 Grade A 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Did not crack

with 2 ½”
30” x 24” slot
trough

19 Same Plate as 18 Grade A 48” x 48” x 3/8” hole Plate cracked

¾” with 3 7/8”
slot
30” x 24”
trough

20 Same Plate as 17 Grade EH 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Did not crack
with 3 7/8”
30” x 24” slot
trough

21 Second EH plate Grade EH 48” x 48”x ¾” 3/8” hole Plate cracked

with 3 7/8”
30” x 24” slot
trough

24
The plate used in Test 11 was tested using Gr. A steel and a stress concentration machined
into the center of the trough. The stress concentration was started with a 3/8 in. diameter hole
and then extended with 8 notches cut in a 1 in. diameter “star” pattern as shown in Figure
28(a). The 40 in. x 12 in. trough dimensions used for Test 11 is very similar to the dimensions
used in the Phase II-A tests. This long but narrow trough severely biases the tensile stress
fields within the cooled region of the plate. The stress generated in the direction of the long
trough dimension is approximated twice the stress generated in the short dimension of the
trough. This would theoretically lead to initiations and crack propagation in direction of the
short trough dimension. The star pattern was introduced to determine whether or not a crack
would initiate in the direction of the long dimension of the trough in addition to the short
dimension, or potentially along the diagonal. The first test (Test 11) on this plate did not
generate any cracking. Therefore, the notch length was extended to 2 ¾” in only two
directions forming a “cross” shape as shown in Figure 28(b). The test with this configuration
resulted in a crack (Test 12) across the trough short dimension as shown in Figure 29
approximately 4 minutes and 45 seconds into the test, but no cracking was generated in the
long dimension of the trough. The temperature time histories for Test 12 are illustrated in
Figure 30.

Figure 28. Notches used in Tests 11 and 12

25
 Figure 29. Crack generated in Test 12

50

TC2
Temperature (C)

-50 TC3
TC4
TC5
-100
TC6
TC7

-150 TC15
TC16

-200
0 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400

Time (sec)

Figure 30. Thermocouple data for Test 12

26
Tests 17 through 21 were conducted using three tests articles, one Gr. A plate and two Gr. EH
plates. Each was tested with a 30 in. x 24 in. trough. Initially, Tests 17 and 18 used 2 ½ in.
long notches parallel to the short tough dimension with Gr. EH and Gr. A plates, respectively.
Neither of the plates fractured. The notch lengths were increased to 3 7/8 in. as shown in
Figure 31. In addition, a second Gr. EH plate was added with the same notch length and is
labeled Gr. EH 2 in Figure 31. The Gr. A plate cracked (Test 19) approximately 8 minutes
into the test with the resulting crack shown in Figure 32. Note that there were two cracks
generated immediately from the one side of the notch. The use of the 30 in. x 24 in. trough
dimensions reduces the level of domination of the maximum stress field and enables a higher
likelihood of diagonal crack propagation as seen here. The thermocouple data from Test 19 is
illustrated in Figure 33. The Gr. EH plate used in Test 17 was retested for Test 20 using the
longer notch but no fracture initiated. The thermocouple data for Test 20 is illustrated in
Figure 34. A nearly identical Gr. EH plate was tested (Test 21) with a crack initiating
approximately 8 minutes into the test and is shown in Figure 35. A second crack propagation
was observed in Test 21 approximately 1 minute after the initial cracking due to a slight
extension of the first cracks as the cooling in the plate extended outward. The thermocouple
data from Test 21 is illustrated in Figure 36. The Gr. EH plate used in Test 20 was not tested
again. Since the two Gr. EH test articles were nearly identical, the conclusion was reached
that the EH plate that did not fail was extremely close to failing. Slight differences in the
material, the construction, and the notch shape could all have contributed to one failing and
the other not failing. This very close threshold of failure was taken into account in the
computational strain/temperature failure locus calibration process and is described in the
computational analysis report in more detail.

Figure 31. Notch geometry used for ABS Grade steel Phase II tests

27
 Figure 32. Cracking pattern for Test 19

Figure 33. Thermocouple data for Test 19

28
Figure 34. Thermocouple data for Test 20

cracks

Figure 35. Cracking pattern for Test 21

29
 Figure 36. Thermocouple data for Test 21

4.4 Phase III Large-Scale Fracture Testing

In parallel with the construction of the Phase II-B test articles, the Phase III test structures
were also assembled. For Phase III of the LNG fracture testing, a larger structure was
designed as shown in Figure 37. The structure consists of a combination of ABS Gr. A and
EH steel plates. The structure was designed with some of the general features found within a
LNG vessel (e.g., intersecting plates, welds, stiffening ribs, etc). The Phase III test structure
was not designed as scaled versions of a section of any existing LNG vessel, but rather to
study the behavior and general features found in LNG vessels (e.g., intersecting plates, welds,
stiffening elements, etc). Referring to Figure 37, the lower plate (blue) is ¾ in. ABS Gr A
steel. The vertical walls are ½ in. ABS Gr. EH steel and extend three feet from the surface of
the ¾ in. thick Gr. A plate. Three ¼ in. thick by 4 in. high ABS Gr. A stiffening ribs are
placed at 2 ft spacings. The ribs were welded perpendicular to the ¾ in. thick Gr. A base
plate. Finally, structural W8X40 I-beams were welded to the edges of the plate to add
additional constraint. Structural W8X40 I-beams were added (welded) to the bottom of the
structure to act as supports. These supports also allowed access to the back surface of the
lower plate for attaching thermocouples and insulation material. Three of these large
structures were constructed for Phase III testing. A list of the five Phase III tests using those
three large test articles is given in Table 4. The first two test structures (Tests 13 and 14 and
Test 16) were cooled using multiple dewars of LN2. This was necessary due to the increased
size of the structures and the surface area being cooled. The third large structure (Tests 22

30
and 23) was identical to the first two, but the test was conducted with water in contact with
some of the steel structure. This test was of interest due to the scenarios in actual LNG
vessels were a portion of the steel hull may have LNG on one side and have water on the
adjacent side. The presence of the water may affect the cooling of the steel plates. The details
of all three tests are provided below. Note that Tests 17 through 21 were part of Phase II-B.
In addition, Test 15 was part of Phase IV.

Figure 37. Large Phase III structure layout and materials

31
 Table 4. Large Phase III Structure Tests

Test Note Steel Notch Type Test Result

Number

13 5 valves See Figure 37 2 ¾” star Did not

notch in Bay crack
Dewars open A
same time

14 Same See Figure 37 New Notch Cracked

structure used 4” cross in
in Test 13 Frame B

Dewars
staged

16 6 values See Figure 37 T-slot 2 ¾” Cracked

Second
structure
tested

22 6 values See Figure 37 2 ¾”notch Did not

crack
First Pool
Test

23 Same See Figure 37 8” notch Cracked

structure as (after
Test 22 turning off
dewars)
Second Pool
Test

4.4.1 Large-Scale Tests without Water

The tests conducted (Test 13 and 14) on the first Phase III structure used a 30 inch wide
trough constructed perpendicular to the 4 in. stiffening ribs. The layout of the trough is shown
in Figure 39. The trough is separated into two sections. The first section is within the 3 ft
vertical Gr. EH plates and is approximately 74 in. long and spans three rib compartments
within the structure. The other trough section is approximately 24 in. long and is located

32
outside of the vertical Gr. EH plate. Photos of the trough are shown in Figure 38. The trough
also extends up the first 18 in. of the inside and outside surface of the 3 ft vertical Gr. EH
plate.

Fifty-four thermocouples were used during the tests to record temperature data. The layout of
the thermocouples is presented in Figure 39. Five low-pressure dewars were used in the two
tests (Test 13 and 14) performed on the first large structure. The dewars were connected to
five Magnatrol F25M21 solenoid valves to enable remote operation. The layout of the dewar
pipes is also shown in Figure 39. One vertical pipe flows into the center of the three inside
chambers created by the 4 in. ribs and the foam trough. The other two pipes spray the inside
and outside surface of the 3 ft vertical Gr. EH side wall. The flow strikes the 3 ft wall
approximately 1 ft above the Gr. A base plate. An eight segment star notch which measure 2
¾ in. in diameter was machined into the third chamber from the wall (see dark gray spot in
Figure 38(a)). This configuration of notches was machined into the structure after the initial
painting of the trough area. Therefore, the dark gray spot shows the repainting performed in
the notch area. A 4 ft x 8 ft x 2 in. piece of Styrofoam was placed on the underside of the ¾
in. Gr. A plate trough region to act as additional insulation.

The layout of the test structure for Tests 13 and 14 is illustrated in Figure 40. During Tests 13
all five solenoid valves were open simultaneously. The test ran for approximately 30 minutes
and no fracturing was generated.

Figure 38. Phase III Test 13 and 14 trough layout, inside the structure (left) and outside
the 3 ft vertical Gr. EH plate (right)

33
 Th ermcou ple and Test Lay out for First Phase III Test

TC on both side of floor

(top and Bottomnumberdifferby 35) N otc h

TC on Both side of vertical gusset orwall

D e w ar Pipe
Loc a tion of Loc a tion
TC 's on R ibs Dewa r Flow Dewar Flow
Dewar Flow on bottom
on Wall on Wall
19 15
4.00 in 10.00 in
18 12.00 in
16.00 in 14
8.00 in
6.00 in
12.00 in 17 4.00 in 13 26.00 in
10.00 in 20.00 in
29 A 16 12
35 32 1.00 in
28 30.00 in
14.00 in 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
34 31 A
27
33 30 26 1.0 in
3.00 in
V iew A- A
Th ermo co u p les o n o n e sid e o f w all 23/24 20/21
22/23
38

16

54 Total Foa m Trough The rmoc ouple s on e ac h one s ide of gus s e t

Figure 39. Trough and thermocouple layout for Phase III Test 13 and 14.

Figure 40. Layout of the Phase III tests (Test 13 and 14)

34
As with many of the Phase II tests, a second Phase III test (Test 14) was performed using the
same structure that was used in the first test (Test 13). However, the second test on this
structure included a redesign of the notch, notch location, and dewar timing. For Test 14, a 4
in. long cross shaped notch was machined into the middle chamber of the trough as shown in
Figure 41 and Figure 42 (brown tape covering cross notches). The dark grey areas in Figure
42 show the repainting performed in areas that experienced paint flaking after Test 13. The
original star notches in the far bay remained unrepaired (see Figure 43). Longer notches lead
to higher stress concentrations and therefore failure was predicted to occur at the 4 in. cross
notches and not to original star notches. Also, timing of the 5 dewar values was introduced so
that the entire trough region was not cooled simultaneously. During Test 14, the valves were
opened at different times. Referring to Figure 43, valve 2 (Bay B) was opened initially. After
10 minutes and 55 seconds, a crack initiated (audible evidence). Within approximated 15
seconds from this audible sound, valve 3 (Bay C) was opened. At a time of 12 minutes and 23
seconds into the test, a second crack initiation/propagation was heard. Again, within
approximately 15 seconds from this sound, valves 1, 4, and 5 were opened. At 15 minutes and
45 seconds into the test, a third crack initiation/propagation occurred. As the test continued,
significant quantities of leaking LN2 fluid was observed passing through the cracked
structure. Finally at 16 minutes and 26 seconds into the test, the final crack
initiation/propagation occurred. The valves were close 18 minutes and 35 seconds into the
test. The fractures that formed during Test 14 are shown in Figure 44 with the thermocouple
data illustrated in Figure 45. Note that the thermocouple data for TC7 increases rapidly
around 650 seconds. This was due to the thermocouple losing contact with the plate and/or
malfunctioning.

The goal of the timed value openings was to learn how it affected the cracks propagated after
initiation. The initial region, Bay B, has dimensions 30 in. wide and 24 in. long in the
direction of the full trough. As also observed during the Phase II tests, the crack initially
propagated in the direction of the short dimension (24 in.), which is the direction of the other
sections of the trough (see Figure 44). The second fracture most likely included cracks
propagating into Bay C after value 3 was opened. These cracks immediately turned toward
the sides of the trough. Note that after the second valve was turned on, the cooling region
dimensions were now 48 in. x 30 in. The cooled region now includes Bay C and Bay B, thus
the geometry of the cooled region now has the long axis rotated 90 degrees. This rotation of
the long dimension therefore rotated the maximum stress direction causing the cracks to turn
during propagation. The third observed cracking was most likely the cracks propagating into
Bay A and turning toward the sides of the trough after the remaining valves were opened.
The final observed crack propagation was likely the extension of multiple existing cracks into
material located slightly beyond the borders of the trough. This was observed in the Phase II
tests when the cooling continues for some time. Here, the material outside of the direct
trough cooling region also begins to cool to the point where crack extension is favorable.
Also note that the stiffening ribs were fractured through completely. Since they were nearly
as cold as the base plate, they did not provide any type of crack arrestment.

35
 Figure 41. Notch added for use in Test 14

Figure 42. Trough with added notches and paint repair prior to Test 14

36
 3' wall
3' wall Trough

3 2 1

C B A
D

2 3/4" star
4" Cross
Test 1
Test 2

5 4

Rib Rib Rib

Figure 43. Pipe layouts and Bay/Valve locations for Test 13 and 14 (2 ¾ in. star Test 1
designates in Test 13, 4 in. Cross Test 2 added for Test 14)

Figure 44. Crack formation during Test 14

37
 50

tc 2
0 tc 5
tc 6
tc 7
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 8
tc 9
tc 10
-100 tc 37
tc 40
tc 41
-150 tc 42
tc 43
tc 44
-200 tc 45
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200

Time (sec)

Figure 45. Thermocouple data for Test 14

The next Phase III test (Test 16) used the trough configuration shown in Figure 46, Figure 47,
and Figure 48. The trough extended the full width (8 ft.) of the region within the vertical Gr.
EH plates and spanned the other direction across two rib sections. The trough ran up the side
of the 3 ft vertical Gr. EH wall approximately 18 inches. For the outer region of the structure,
the trough extended only approximately 4 in. along the entire 8 ft. span, but also extended up
the vertical Gr. EH plate 18 inches along the entire 8 ft. span.

There were filler tubes attached to six low-pressure dewars for Test 16. Four of the tubes
filled the inner trough regions. The two remaining tubes sprayed the inside and outside
surface of the 3 ft. side wall. Similar to Tests 13 and 14, the tubes spray the side wall
approximately 12 in. above the ¾ in. thick Gr. A base plate and centered along the 8 ft. span.
The five filler tubes that supplied the inner regions of the structure are clearly show in Figure
47. The wetted surfaces were painted with marine primer that was used in the Phase II-B
tests.

Forty–four thermocouples were attached to the structure. The thermocouple layout is

presented in Figure 46.

38
Thermcouple and Test Layout for second Phase III Test

TC on both sides of floor (black numbers top surface,

green numbers bottom surface)
8 34
TC on side of the vertical guss et or wall (Blue numbers )

D e w a r P ipe
Loca tion of Loca tion
13 4.00 in TC 's on Ribs
3 9
29 39
35

30.00 in
2.00 in
6.00 in 30 4 12.00 in 12.0 in
A
10 36 14 16 15.00 in
6.00 in
1 19 5 20 2.00 in
31 A 40 42 21 22 23
27
24 25 26

2 11 37 15 17 View A-A
54.00 in
6 32
Thermocouples on one side of wall
28 41 43
36
18 8
12 38
7 33 44 44 Total
6.00 in
Foam Trough

Figure 46. Trough and thermocouple configuration for Test 16

Figure 47. Trough and pipe layout for Test 16

39
 Figure 48. Trough layout outside vertical Gr. EH plate for Test 16

The stress concentration machined into the structure for Test 16 was started with a 3/8 in.
diameter hole with notches then extended away from the hole creating a total notch length of
2 ¾ in. The notch was perpendicular to the ribs and was in the second rib chamber as shown
in Figure 49. Due the large number of cracks, red dye penetrate was used to highlight the
fracture progression. Again, the long dimension of the cooling region for this test was 96 in.
(8 ft.) with the short dimension 48 in. (~52 in. if the section outside of the vertical Gr. EH
plates is added). This configuration would lead to a crack initiation and propagation mainly in
the short cooling dimension; therefore, the notch was machined only in that direction. All six
of the valves were open simultaneously at the beginning of the test. At just over 14 minutes
into the test, a crack initiated (audible detection). The resulting cracks are shown in Figure 49
and with the thermocouple data provided in Figure 50. The uniform drop in all of the
temperature data at about 850 seconds was caused by the vibration that occurred during the
fracture. The data after that point is not considered valid.

Examination of the crack pattern suggested there is a high likelihood that the initial crack
initiation occurred at the weld “toe” attaching one of the stiffening ribs to the ¾ in. thick Gr.
A plate. This rib weld is located adjacent to the “rat hole” near the vertical Gr. EH plate as
illustrated in Figure 51. This spot is the intersection of three different plate and weldments
resulting in a highly stressed geometry. The resulting stress shock wave propagated through
the structure to the machined notches. This was then followed by the subsequent initiation of
two additional sites in the weld region between the ¾ in. Gr. A base plate and the vertical Gr.
EH plate (upper left of Figure 49). This sequence of initiations is based on a study of the
crack propagation and termination pattern. Since only one audible cracking event was
observed, all of the initiations occurred nearly instantaneously. It is also clear from Figure 49

40
that the cracks, for the most part, run in the direction of the short dimension of the cooling
region. However, with largest cooling region in terms of area of any test performed in this
study, Test 16 exhibited many of the features observed in actual cases of large-scale brittle
fracture in steel plating as shown in Figure 52. These include crack branching and semi-
random propagation. This semi-random nature is based on the stress wave and the
microstructure of the material. Though as mentioned earlier, the direction of the gross path of
the cracks was dominated by the maximum stress direction which propagated them in the
short cooling dimension. A significant outcome of the test was the propagation of the cracks
not only through the stiffening ribs (Figure 53), but also through and up the vertical Gr. EH
plate (Figure 54). The larger vertical wall with the higher fracture toughness Gr. EH plate had
no effect in arresting a propagating brittle crack since the 3 ft. Gr. EH plate was also cold.
Finally, the cracks that propagated through the vertical Gr. EH plate and into the horizontal ¾
in. Gr. A plate turned 90 degrees and joined together to form a crack parallel to the vertical
Gr. EH plate. Part of this turning and joining is illustrated in Figure 55. The reason for the
crack turning lies in the rotation of the maximum stress direction along the narrow cooled
region just outside of the vertical Gr. EH plate. It should also be noted that this crack ran
through the base Gr. A plate and not along the weldment joining the Gr. A plate and the Gr.
EH plate.

Figure 49. Interior crack formation during Test 16

41
 50

tc 4
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 5
tc 10
tc 14
-100
tc 30
tc 31
tc 36
-150
tc 40

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000

Time (sec)

Figure 50. Thermocouple data for Test 16

Figure 51. Close-up of likely initiation site for Test 16

42
Figure 52. Fractures caused by LNG spills on actual LNG vessels (Roue, 2011)

43
Figure 53. Close-up stiffening rib fracture for Test 16

Figure 54. Outside through-cracks for Test 16

44
 Figure 55. Outside cracking with turning for Test 16

4.4.2 Large-Scale Tests with Water

The last set of tests (Test 22 and 23) conducted using the third and final large structure placed
the structure inside a 24 ft diameter pool. The purpose of the tests was to investigate cooling a
structure that was in partial contact with water. A schematic of the test configuration is shown
in Figure 56. Only a 48 in. wide plate section was in contact with the water as pointed to in
Figure 56. Polyurethane foam was used to insulate the remaining portion of the structure from
the pool water. The bottom surface was sprayed until forming a 3 in. foam layer as shown in
Figure 57. The wetted surfaces were painted with marine paint.

For Test 22, the trough layout, notch dimensions, and the dewar layout were the same as for
Test 16. A 2 3/4 in slot was cut perpendicular to the ribs in the second chamber. The backside
of this area was insulated from the water by the urethane foam. As with Test 16, six dewars
were used during the test and all of the dewar valves were open at the start of the test. The
pretest setup of the large structure pool test is shown in Figure 58. Several small holes were
drilled into the horizontal plate. Plastic tubes were then attached to the top surface of the
holes so that water could be seen rising above the surface of the horizontal plate. These
holes/tubes were used to attempt to ensure that water was in contact with the bottom surface
of the ¾ in. thick Gr. A plate. The only differences from Test 16 were the water and the
Polyurethane foam preventing water from contacting a portion of the ¾ in. Gr. A base plate.

45
 Figure 56. Schematic of the large structure pool tests

Figure 57. Polyurethane foam applied to the bottom of the large structure

46
 Figure 58. Test setup for the large structure pool test

Test 22 ran for approximately 30 minutes (exhausted the supply of LN2) without cracking the
structure. The notch was subsequently enlarged to 8 in. as shown in Figure 59. Using an
identical test setup as for Test 22, the second pool test, Test 23, was run for thirty minute and
again no cracking was observed. The valves were closed at 30 minutes, the instrumentation
was turned off around 42 minutes, and the disassembly of the test setup was then initiated.
However, draining of the pool had not been initiated. Approximately 46 minutes after
beginning the test (4 minutes after turning off the data acquisition), a crack initiated. The
resulting cracks are shown in Figure 60. The crack initiated from the 8 in. long notches and
then formed an “X” pattern. The cracks propagated through and up the vertical Gr. EH plate.
In addition, the long cooling time caused significant cooling outside of the direct trough
region. This led to a propagation of crack well outside of the trough region (right side of
Figure 60). Since the crack initiated at a time when no physical contact with the structure
was occurring by the test administrators, the most likely reason for crack initiation is that the
structure warmed up through a different path than the structure cooled down through. This
slightly different path of warming caused the stresses nearest the tips of the machined notches
to increase to a level higher than that experienced earlier in the test. Since the data
acquisition system was not collecting data, the exact temperature distribution in the structure
at crack initiation is not known. However, Figure 61 illustrated the thermocouple data up to
approximately 4 minute before fracture. The temperatures are clearly starting to increase at
42 minutes, but the structure was still extremely cold. The warming trend would have
continued for the additional 4 minutes until fracture, but not significantly.

47
Figure 59. Test 23 notch increased to 8 in.

Figure 60. Crack progression for Test 23

48
 50

tc 4
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 5
tc 10
tc 14
-100 tc 30
tc 31
tc 36
-150 tc 40

-200
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000

Time (sec)

Figure 61. Thermocouple data for Test 23

5. Heat Transfer Testing

The final test series were conducted to collect heat transfer data and to compare cooling rates
with LN2 and LNG. The test plates were 6 in. x 6 in. plates with a 5 in. foam trough caulked
around the perimeter as shown in Figure 62. There was also one 18 in x 18 in plate with a
centered 6 in. x 6 in. trough caulked in the center. The plate thickness varied from ¼ in. to ¾
in. and the plates were tested bare, painted with a marine epoxy primer, or painted with an
epoxy primer and urethane top coat. There were twelve thermocouples on the 6 in. plates and
24 thermocouples on the 18 in. plate. The layout of the thermocouples and the description of
the six tests conducted with LNG and LN2 are presented in Figure 63.

Figure 62. Plate setup used in heat transfer tests

49
 6.00 in 2.00 in 18.00 in

7
8.00 in
2 3 Foam Trough
6.00 in 8 9 2.00 in
4 5
1.00 in
6

10 12
2.00 in
11

Small Te s t Pla te
1
13
1.00 in

Plates for Test 2 3 7 8

18.00 in 8.00 in 14 19
15 20
1. 6" x 6" x 3/4" Bare
4 5 6
2.00 in
2. 6" x 6" x 3/4" Epoxy Primer 16 17 18

3. 6" x 6" x 3/4" Epoxy Primer and Urethane

9 10
4. 6" x 6" x 1/4" Bare 1.00 in 21 22
1.00 in
5. 6" x 6" x 1/4" Epoxy Primer 11 12

23 24
6. 18" x 18" x 3/4" Epoxy Primer 2.00 in

Large Tes t Plate

Figure 63. Heat transfer tests dimensions and thermocouple layout

For the LN2 tests (all six tests collectively designated Test 15), the test plates were filled by
pouring in the LN2 from a small 5 liter dewar. The test plates were placed on a Mettler
PC8000 precision balance scale and the trough was filled in about 10 seconds. Hand readings
were taken and recorded every 15 seconds as the LN2 evaporated. The thermocouple data for
the six LN2 heat transfer tests is provided in Figure 64 through Figure 69. A number of
thermocouples lost plate contact or malfunctioned and were not plotted. For the ¾ in. thick
plates, the surface coatings allow for more efficient cooling as observed in the Phase I tests.
However, the differences between the epoxy primer only and epoxy primer with urethane are
minimal. The thinner ¼ in. plates cooled much more efficiently than the ¾ in. plates. The
addition of the surface coating to the ¼ in. plate did have a noticeable effect, but less than of
the ¾ in. plate. For the 18 in. x 18 in. plate tests, only about 200 seconds of data was
collected. Due to the increased mass of the plate, the cooling rate to that point was
considerably slower than for the 6 in. plates.

50
 50

0 tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 4
tc 5
tc 6
-100 tc 7
tc 8
tc 9
-150 tc 10
tc 11
tc 12
-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 64. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Bare

50

0
tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
-50
Temperature (C)

tc 4
tc 5
tc 6
-100 tc 7
tc 8
tc 9
tc 10
-150
tc 11
tc 12

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 65. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy

51
 50

tc 1
tc 3
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 4
tc 5
tc 6
-100 tc 7
tc 8
tc 10

-150 tc 11
tc 12

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 66. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple tata – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy Urethane

50

0
tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
Temperature (C)

-50
tc 4
tc 6
tc 7
-100
tc 8
tc 9
tc 10
-150
tc 11
tc 12

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 67. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple fata – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Bare

52
 50

0 tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
Temperature (C)

-50 tc 4
tc 5
tc 6
-100 tc 7
tc 8
tc 9
-150
tc 10
tc 11
tc 12
-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 68. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Epoxy

50

tc 1
tc 2
tc 3

0 tc 4
tc 5
tc 6
tc 7
tc 8
-50
tc 9
Temperature (C)

tc 10
tc 11
tc 12
-100 tc 13
tc 14
tc 15
tc 16
tc 17
-150
tc 18
tc 19
tc 20
tc 21
-200 tc 22
0 100 200 300 400 500 600
tc 23
Time (sec) tc 24

Figure 69. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy

53
The LNG heat transfer coefficient tests (all six tests collectively designated Test 24) were
conducted remotely as illustrated with the schematic in Figure 70. The low pressure CRYO-
CYL 180 dewar in Figure 71 was purchased from Chart Industries. The dewar was filled
using an LNG tanker brought on site for the LNG fire tests, using a standard truck hose
coupling mounted to the dewar support rack. A Magnatrol F25M21 solenoid valve was used
to control the flow from the dewar during the test plate filling process.

During the tests, the trough filling was monitored by remote camera. A flow deflector, shown
in Figure 72 was use to keep the flow from impinging directly on the bottom surface of the
plate during filling. The fill pipe and deflector were held approximately 1” above the bottom
surface of the test plate.

An Interface SM-25 load cell was used to measure the weight of the LNG as a function of
time. The thermocouple data and the load cell data were coupled in time by using the timing
of the Magnatrol solenoid valve actuation. The thermocouple data for the six LNG heat
transfer tests is provided in Figure 73 through Figure 79. For the ¾ in. thick plates, the
surface coatings allow for only slightly more efficient cooling. As with the LN2, the
differences between the epoxy primer only and epoxy primer with urethane are minimal. The
thinner ¼ in. plates cooled much more efficiently than the ¾ in. plates. The addition of the
surface coating to the ¼ in. plate again did have a slight effect. For the 18 in. x 18 in. plate
tests, approximately 1 hour of data was collected. Due to the increased mass of the plate, the
cooling rate to that point was considerably slower than for the 6 in. plates. Figure 79 provides
the cooling for the 18 in. plate over the first 600 seconds (10 minutes) only.

Test Plate
Fill Hose Assembly Liquid Fill &
(approximate 6 ft) Withdrawal Valve Vent valve Cryo-Cyl

Solenoid Valve Burst Disk , PRV and

Foam Trough Pressure guage
Pressure Relief
Surrounding Plate Valve
(volume 0.6 gallons)
Test Plate
Bonding Cable
TC Wires
Foam Insulation Under Test Plate

Test Plate Support

Figure 70. Schematic of the LNG heat transfer tests

54
Figure 71. LNG heat transfer test configuration

Figure 72. Test plate and flow deflector

55
Figure 73. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Bare

Figure 74. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy

56
Figure 75. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy Urethane

Figure 76. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Bare

57
 Figure 77. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¼ in. Epoxy
50

tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
tc 4
0
tc 5
tc 6
tc 7
tc 8
-50 tc 9
Temperature (C)

tc 10
tc 11
tc 12
tc 13
-100
tc 14
tc 15
tc 16
tc 17
tc 18
-150
tc 19
tc 20
tc 21
tc 22
-200 tc 23
0 500 1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 tc 24
Time (sec)

Figure 78. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy

58
 50

tc 1
tc 2
tc 3
tc 4
0
tc 5
tc 6
tc 7
tc 8
-50 tc 9
Temperature (C)

tc 10
tc 11
tc 12
tc 13
-100
tc 14
tc 15
tc 16
tc 17
tc 18
-150
tc 19
tc 20
tc 21
tc 22
-200 tc 23
0 100 200 300 400 500 600 tc 24
Time (sec)

Figure 79. LNG heat transfer thermocouple data – 18 in. x 18 in. x ¾ in. Epoxy (zoom)

Comparisons of the LNG and the LN2 cooling rates in Figure 82 and Figure 83 show more
efficient cooling for the LNG for the ¾ in. bare and epoxy urethane plates, respectively. The
LNG tests were conducted with an initial temperature approximately 20oC cooler than the
LN2 tests. However, even when adjusting for this difference, the LNG cooling rates are still
higher than the LN2 rates. Finally, the lowest achieved temperatures in the plates are lower
for the LN2 since it is -191oC and LNG is only -161oC. This difference is not significant since
the steel will enter the lower shelf fracture toughness regime well above either of these
temperatures. The fracture toughness of the materials used in these tests is discussed in
Volume III (Petti et al., 2011) of this study.

59
 50

-50
Temperature (C)

LNG TC1
-100 LN2 TC1

-150

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 80. LNG vs. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data for TC1 – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in.
Bare

50

0
Temperature (C)

-50

LNG TC1
-100 LN2 TC1

-150

-200
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

Time (sec)

Figure 81. LNG vs. LN2 heat transfer thermocouple data for TC1 – 6 in. x 6 in. x ¾ in.
Epoxy Urethane

60
6. Summary and Conclusions

This report summarizes the four phases of large-scale testing conducted as part of the
Cascading Damage Study to investigate the effect of cryogenic liquids contacting steel plates.
The purpose of these tests were to investigate the cooling of steel plates subjected to
cryogenic liquids and to study the development and propagation of cracks in the plates due to
the induced thermal stresses and lowering fracture toughness. The plate sizes ranged from
simple 4 ft square plates in Phase II to 12 ft x 3ft structures with more complex geometry in
Phase III. Twenty-two structural tests were conducted in Phases II and III, nine of which
resulted in cracking. In order to generate thermally induced fracturing, stress concentration
were introduced with varying degrees of severity and typically in stages. In one instance (Test
16), the crack initiated from the weld toe near the connection of a stiffening plate to the main
base plate and vertical intersecting plate. Two tests (Test 15 and 24) were each a collection of
6 individual heat transfer tests.

The tests performed in the study are used in the validation of the failure model applied in the
computational analysis portion of the project. The details of those analyses are provided in a
separate report. Beyond their use in the computational analyses, the test results have provided
the following observations and insights:

The steel plate cracking observed in these tests is representative of brittle cracking
observed in steel hull sections of commercial LNG tankers subjected to accidental
LNG spills.
Crack initiation requires a sufficient stress concentration given the temperature of the
steel; however, LNG vessels are complex and aged structures containing a large
population of crack initiators.
Fracture propagation generally follows the flow path with the stress fields and
microstructure influencing the local fracture patterns.
Intersecting plates and stiffening elements do not restrict crack propagation along with
the larger base plates if also subjected to the cryogenic temperatures.
Crack propagation is arrested when the crack leaves the low-temperature material
region and propagates into the warmer region where the metal is ductile. At this point,
load redistribution of the structure/tanker could cause the brittle cracks to extend
under ductile tearing. However, since these structures only experienced initial
gravitational loads, no noticeable ductile tearing extension was observed in these tests.
In actual structures, including LNG tankers, other stresses will be imposed that could
theoretically lead to further crack extension by ductile tearing.
Cooling rates on steel plate sections rely on many factors including the size of the
structure, the size of the spill (trough), the plate thickness, the specific cryogenic
liquid (LNG vs. LN2), the presence of water at or near the spill, and the presence of a
surface coating. The cooling rate observations and data from these tests are used in
the computational analyses.

61
 References

American Society of Testing and Materials (ASTM), (1993) Manual on the Use of
Thermocouples in Temperature Measurement: 4th Edition, Manual Series MNL 12.

Anderson, T.L., (1995), Fracture Mechanics Fundamentals and Applications, Second Edition.

Figueroa, V.G., Lopez, C., O’Rourke, K.K., (2011), LNG Cascading Damage Study Volume
II: Flow Analysis for Spills from Moss and Membrane LNG Cargo Tanks, SAND2011-9464,
Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico.

Hightower, M., et al. (2004). Guidance on Risk Analysis and Safety Implications of a Large
Liquefied Natural (LNG) Spill Over Water, SAND2004-6258. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia
National Laboratories.

Hightower, M., Luketa-Hanlin, A., Gritzo, L.A., Covan, J.M. (2006). Review of Independent
Risk Assessment of the Proposed Cabrillo Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port Project,
SAND2005-7339. Albuquerque, NM: Sandia National Laboratories.

Hertzburg, R.W., (1996), Deformation and Fracture Mechanics of Engineering Materials,

Fourth Edition.

Petti, J.P., Wellman, G.W., Villa, D., Lopex, C., Figueroa, V.G., Heinstein, M., (2011), LNG
Cascading Damage Study Volume III: Vessel Structural and Thermal Analysis Report,
SAND2011-6226, Sandia National Laboratories, New Mexico.

Roue, Roger, (2011), Personal communication between Roger Roue, SIGTTO (Society of
International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators Ltd) and M. Hightower (Sandia National
Laboratories).

62
 Appendix A – Stress Concentrations

In order to explain the effects of stress concentrations, a simple example is provided here.
Equation 1 and 2 along with Figure 82 illustrate a stress concentration at the edge of a
circular or elliptical hole in a plate (Hertzberg, 1996). For a circular hole, the major (a) and
minor (b) axes are equal, a = b, and therefore, max = 3 applied. For an elliptical flaw, Eq. 1
can be modified to be a function of the radius of curvature ( ) of the end of the ellipse
resulting in Eq. 2. Equation 2 also includes the assumption that the length of the ellipse is
much larger than the radius of curvature. Equation 2 illustrates that as the length of the
ellipse increases, or notch in our cases, the stress at the edge of the ellipse also increases. In
addition, a reduction of also increases the edge stress. The introduction of the machined
notches to the drilled holes in our tests increased the stress significantly.

Eq. 1

Eq.2

63
Figure 82. Stress Concentration at Circular and Elliptical holes in Plates

64
As continues to decrease toward 0, the ellipse transitions into a “crack” in which the tip
theoretically becomes perfectly sharp. Cracks of prefect sharpness, = 0, do not actually
exist, some small blunting is always present. In addition, material yielding prevents the
stresses from increasing beyond the material strength. Using Linear Elastic Fracture
Mechanics (LEFM) (Anderson, 1995), this mathematically sharp crack tip region is
commonly referred to as a “singularity”. The amplitude of the singularity is defined with the
stress intensity factor, KI-applied. Equation 3 is used to compute the stress intensity factor for a
through crack in an infinite plate as show in Figure 83. The fracture toughness of the
structural steels used in LNG construction decreases with temperature. At LNG temperature
(-161oC), these steels are extremely brittle and have reached their “lower shelf” fracture
toughness. This makes LEFM appropriate in predicting fracture when the applied stress
intensity, KI-applied, exceeds the fracture toughness of the material for a given temperature and
flaw size (a).

Eq. 3

65
 singularity

Figure 83. Crack Tip Stresses in Plates

66
 Appendix B – Test Data

The complete set of thermocouple data are provided in this Appendix for the Phase II and III
tests. For Tests 1 through 12, Figure 11 shows the thermocouple locations. For Tests 17
through 21, Figure 27 illustrates the thermocouple locations, For Tests 13 and 14, Figure 39
shows the thermocouple locations. Finally, for Tests 16, 22, and 23, Figure 46 provides the
thermocouple locations.

Figure 84. Test 1 – TCs 1-11

Figure 85. Test 1 – TCs 12-22

67
Figure 86. Test 2 – TCs 1-11

Figure 87. Test 2 – TCs 12-22

68
Figure 88. Test 3 – TCs 1-11

Figure 89. Test 3 – TCs 12-22

69
Figure 90. Test 4 – TCs 1-11

Figure 91. Test 4 – TCs 12-22

70
Figure 92. Test 5 – TCs 1-11

Figure 93. Test 5 – TCs 12-22

71
Figure 94. Test 6 – TCs 1-11

Figure 95. Test 6 – TCs 12-22

72
Figure 96. Test 7 – TCs 1-11

Figure 97. Test 7 – TCs 12-22

73
Figure 98. Test 8 – TCs 1-11

Figure 99. Test 8 – TCs 12-22

74
Figure 100. Test 9 – TCs 1-11

Figure 101. Test 9 – TCs 12-22

75
Figure 102. Test 10 – TCs 1-11

Figure 103. Test 10 – TCs 12-22

76
Figure 104. Test 11 – TCs 1-11

Figure 105. Test 11 – TCs 12-22

77
Figure 106. Test 12 – TCs 1-11

Figure 107. Test 12 – TCs 12-22

78
Figure 108. Test 17 – TCs 1-10

Figure 109. Test 17 – TCs 11-20

79
Figure 110. Test 18 – TCs 1-10

Figure 111. Test 18 – TCs 11-20

80
Figure 112. Test 19 – TCs 1-10

Figure 113. Test 19 – TCs 11-20

81
Figure 114. Test 20 – TCs 1-10

Figure 115. Test 20 – TCs 11-20

82
Figure 116. Test 21 – TCs 1-10

Figure 117. Test 21 – TCs 11-20

83
Figure 118. Test 13 – TCs 1-19

Figure 119. Test 13 – TCs 36-54

84
Figure 120. Test 13 – TCs 20-35 (TC 25 not used)

Figure 121. Test 14 – TCs 1-19

85
 Figure 122. Test 14 – TCs 36-54

Figure 123. Test 14 – TCs 20-35 (TC 25 not used)

86
Figure 124. Test 16 – TCs 1-18

Figure 125. Test 16 – TCs 27-44

87
Figure 126. Test 16 – TCs 19-26

Figure 127. Test 22 – TCs 1-18

88
Figure 128. Test 22 – TCs 27-44

Figure 129. Test 22 – TCs 19-26

89
Figure 130. Test 23 – TCs 1-18

Figure 131. Test 23 – TCs 27-44

90
Figure 132. Test 23 – TCs 19-26

91
DISTRIBUTION

EXTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

Bob Corbin
Director, Oil and Gas Global Security and Supply
United States Department of Energy
Office of Oil and Natural Gas FE32
Forrestal Building
1000 Independence Ave SW
Washington DC 20585

SANDIA INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

MS1135 R. Kalan, 1534

MS1108 M. Hightower, 6111
MS0744 J. Petti, 6233
MS0899 RIM - Reports Mgmt, 9532

92
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9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

List of pipeline accidents in the United States

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Contents
1 1890s
2 1920s
3 1930s
4 1940s
5 1950s
6 1960s
7 1970s
8 1980s
9 1990s
10 2000s
11 References

1890s
1890 On January 24, a gas explosion destroyed a home in Columbus, Ohio, attracting a crowd of
onlookers. While people were still gathered to look at the ruins of the home, a second gas explosion
happened in a nearby home. The second explosion caused 4 deaths, and there were 32 injuries from both
explosions.[1]

1895 On April 25, a woman in Wilkinsburg, Pennsylvania was investigating the smell of gas in a basement,
while using a portable lantern. A series of explosions and followed, injuring that woman, and another woman,
and damaging 4 homes. The gas leak was caused by gas being diverted into an older, defective gas main in
the area.[2]

1920s
1929 On July 22, two oil company patrolmen were killed by an explosion of a gas pipeline near Castaic,
California.[3]

1930s
1930 On April 4, gas leaked into the sewer system in New York City, New York, and later exploded. 6
people were injured, 5,000 were evacuated from nearby buildings, and telephone cables were damaged. [4]
1930 A runaway horse smashed a wagon of lumber against a crude oil pipeline in Ripon, Wisconsin on May
24. The oil ignited and spread to nearby oil tanks, causing a blaze that destroyed a number of buildings. [5]
1930 Excavation in Fairport, New York caused a major gas explosion on July 30. 3 people were killed, 10

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9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

were injured, and a 4 family house was damaged by the blast and following fire.[6]
1931 4 campers near Kilgore, Texas were burned to death when they were surrounded by gas from a
pipeline leak that caught fire on April 17. The flames also spread to brush and timber in the area, preventing
rescuers from reaching the bodies for 3 hours.[7]
1936 On February 19, a worker inside a sewer in Utica, New York ignited natural gas that had leaked into
the sewer system. An explosion was triggered, and the following fire burned for more than 24 hours. 4,000
people were evacuated.[8]
1936 On November 21, a pipeline serving a loading dock in Port Arthur, Texas, ruptured and ignited. The
burning oil killed 3 people, and injured 6 others.[9]
1937 An oil pipeline being repaired by gas welding exploded near Pryor, Oklahoma on January 26. 2 of the
repair crew, and 4 wives of the repairmen were killed by the explosion and following fire. [10]
1939 On December 12, a pipeline being tested ruptured for 40 miles (64 km), near Wichita Falls, Texas,
injuring one person.[11]

1940s
1940 A gas compressor plant exploded in Braintree, Massachusetts on April 4, killing four people and
injuring 12 others.[12]
1940 On August 29, a newly hired crew of repairmen were working on fixing a pipeline leak near Buffalo,
Oklahoma, when the pipeline exploded and started a fire. Five of the crew were killed, 10 others were
burned, and 10 horses burned to death.[13][14]
1943 On January 18, a grass fire near Tyler, Texas spread to a leak in an 8 inch diameter natural gas
pipeline. The gas leak was initially small, but grew quickly, until the gas flames were about 200 feet (61 m)
high. Gas service was cut to 28,000 people.[15]
1944 The "Big Inch" crude oil pipeline ruptured in Connellsville, Pennsylvania, with the crude spill killing fish
along a 12-mile (19 km) stretch of the Laurel Hill creek.[16]\
1946 A crew working to connect a new gas main in Peru, Illinois on July 4, when the old gas main exploded,
killing 5 of the work crew, and injuring 7 others.[17]
1948 On February 28, crude oil spilled from a ruptured pipeline leading to storage tank in Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma. Some teen boys in the area saw crude oil bubbling out of manhole covers, and thought that
igniting the oil would be a good idea. This caused a string of sewer explosions, causing manhole covers to fly
10 feet (3.0 m) into the air.[18]
1948 On March 18, the 20 inch diameter "Little Big Inch" natural gas pipeline near Petersburg, Indiana,
exploded and burned, throwing pieces of the pipe as far as 300 feet (91 m) away from the blast point. 3
homes were destroyed by the fire.[19][20]
1948 October 18: Vapors from a leaking butane pipeline at a refinery in Texas City, Texas spread out along
a nearby highway, causing a number of cars to stall. The gas then exploded, killing 4 people, and seriously
burning 17 others.[21][22]
1948 On November 19, a "Big Inch" pipeline pumping station exploded and caught fire near Seymour,
Indiana, causing $3,000,000 in damage, and injuring 17 workers at the station.[23][24]
1949 A section of the "Little Big Inch" exploded and burned in North Vernon, Indiana on March 4, burning
a mother and her infant. It was the fourth explosion on that pipeline in Indiana that year.[25]
1949 A road grader operator was seriously burned when his grader hit a 6-inch gas pipeline west of

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9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

Mankato, Kansas on November 17.[26]

1949 On December 8, an explosion and fire occurred at a compressor station for a 24-inch natural gas
pipeline in Centralia, Missouri. Flames could be seen for 150 miles (240 km) away.[27]
1949 A leaking gas line caused an explosion at a packing plant in Sioux City, Iowa on December 14.
Eighteen workers were killed, and almost 100 inured.[28]
1949 On December 15, a 22-inch natural gas pipeline exploded and burned near Carthage, Tennessee,
injuring two people. Flames shot 1,000 feet (300 m) into the air.[29]

1950s
1950 On March 13, an overhead pipeline at a refinery in Martinez, California leaked, causing flammable
fumes to spread onto a highway. An automobile ignited the fumes, killed a woman, and injuring 2 other in
vehicle. 3 auto were also burned.[30]

1950 The "Big Inch" gas pipeline exploded and burned on July 1, near Beallsville, Ohio. A house and a barn
were destroyed by the fire.[31]

1950 Three workers were killed in an underground vault in Los Angeles, California on August 22, when a
gas main exploded. There was no fire.[32]

1950 On September 7, a new natural gas pipeline exploded near Big Rapids, Michigan. Two barns were
destroyed by the following fire, that was seen for 50 miles.[33]

1950 On November 24, a newly built 30 inch natural gas pipeline ruptured for nearly 3,000 feet (910 m),
causing a fire that destroyed 2 homes under construction near King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.[34]

1951 Two men welding on a crude oil pipeline at an oil Terminal in Kansas City, Kansas were severely
burned on January 7, when a nearby valve failed, spraying them with crude oil that ignited. Both later died of
their burns.[35]

1951 On January 10, two gas explosions, 3 hours apart, hit McKees Rock, Pennsylvania, injuring 8 people,
igniting a fire, and causing widespread damage.[36]

1951 A gas main pressure regulator failed in Rochester, New York on September 21, causing a series of
explosion that last for 4 hours. 3 people were killed, and 30 homes were destroyed.[37]

1951 A Halloween Parade on October 31 in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania was interrupted by 4 gas main
explosions. 29 people were injured.[38]

1951 A 12 inch diameter temporary gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned near Cranberry,
Pennsylvania on November 27, causing a 200-foot (61 m) high flame that could be seen for a number of
miles away. The explosion was heard for 10 miles around. A pipeline compressor station under construction
at the site was destroyed. A nearby Elementary school was relocated following the failure. [39][40]

1952 Four men working on an 8 inch gas pipeline near Mount Pleasant, Michigan were burned when that

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pipeline ruptured as they raised it for reconditioning on September 26.[41]

1952 On December 29, twelve persons were injured in a blast that shook the Lawndale district of Los
Angeles, California, when a ditching machine broke a gasoline-carrying pipeline and touched off a fiery
explosion.[42]

1953 Five square miles of east Boston, Massachusetts was evacuated on September 9 from a pipeline
leaking about 1,000,000 US gallons (3,800,000 L) of gasoline.[43]

1953 On September 10, a gas explosion in Cleveland, Ohio killed one person and injured 50 others.[44]

1953 A US Air Force T-33 trainer jet crashed into a natural gas pipeline bridge over the Mississippi River
on November 24 near Greenville, Mississippi, rupturing and igniting the pipeline.[45]

1954 A 40 to 50-year old LP gas distribution line was blamed for causing an explosion in Goldsboro, North
Carolina on April 12 that killed 5 people, injured 15 others, and demolished 3 buildings.[46]

1955 The "Big Inch" gas pipeline exploded and burned near Roseville, Ohio on March 7. Flames reached
400 feet (120 m) high, and 8 acres (32,000 m2) of brush & timber burned.[47]

1955 On March 9, a pipeline construction crew of 4 were killed while trying to move a pipeline for the
building of a Toll road in Chesterton, Indiana. Two other pipeline workers were injured, and a school a
quarter mile away was evacuated.[48]

1955 A burst pipeline at a Refinery in Sunburst, Montana contaminated groundwater and soil in the area.
Despite pumping out over 182,000 US gallons (690,000 L) of gasoline, pollution from the accident
remained. In 2004, local residents and a school district won a Lawsuit for payments for damages.[49][50]

1955 A bulldozer ruptured and ignited a gas pipeline in Brookshire, Texas. Flames reached 250 feet (76 m),
and the bulldozer operator was killed.[51]

1955 On August 10, a gas leak in Ashtabula, Ohio was ignited by electrical equipment or lightning, causing a
restaurant to explode. 21 people were killed, 15 more were injured, and 6 buildings destroyed.[52]

1955 A gas pipeline being tested in Detroit, Michigan exploded and burned on September 7, injuring one
person, and destroying 50 cars.[53]

1955 On October 10, a crew cleaning the outside of a natural gas pipeline with a heavy rubber ball ruptured
a coupler, causing an explosion and fire east of Orleans, Indiana. Two members of the crew ere killed, and 3
others were injured.[54]

1955 A drag line operation in a gravel pit in Irving, Texas ruptured an 8 inch diameter gasoline pipeline on
November 30. Gasoline spread out over about 10 acres (40,000 m2), then exploded and burned. 1 home
was destroyed, but the family living there was away at the time of the explosion.[55]

1956 On February 11, a corroded gas line from a gas main leaked, causing an explosion that killed 3 people
at a meat packing plant in Toledo, Ohio.[56]
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1956 A trench digging machine being used in building a freeway cut into a gasoline pipeline in West Los
Angeles, California on February 27. At least 3 people were burned, with 9 homes, a warehouse, and a
laundry catching on fire.[57]

1957 On January 16, an explosion and fire occurred at a natural gas compressor station in Liberal, Kansas,
killing 3 workers at that station. 11 other workers were injured, and the fire burned for 2 hours. The shut
down of this gas pipeline from the explosion affected customers as far away as Ohio in sub-zero weather
conditions.[58][59]

1957 Two explosion from a natural gas main killed 3 people in Peoria, Illinois on January 17. 7 others were
injured, and a home and a 2 story building were leveled.[60]

1957 A leaking gas main in Reno, Nevada led to three explosions on February 6. 2 people were killed, 42
others injured, and 5 buildings were destroyed.[61]

1957 On June 3, a 26 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned near Ellinwood,
Kansas, destroying a farm house. One person was injured.[62]

1957 On December 5, a gas line in the basement of a store that was being worked on in Villa Rica, Georgia,
exploded. 13 people were killed in the explosion and following fire. At least 6 stores were destroyed.[63]

1958 A natural gas metering station in Kimberly, Idaho exploded on February 17, killing two pipeline
company workers, injuring another worker, and destroyed the metering building. There was no fire. [64][65]

1958 On June 1, gas leaking from a pipeline near Big Spring, Texas was ignited and exploded, killing 3
fishermen and seriously burning another fisherman.[66]

1958 A truck missed a curve on a road and crashed into a gas transmission pipeline compressor station near
Kings Mountain, North Carolina on September 16. There was an explosion and fire, and the 2 men in the
truck were killed.[67]

1958 On October 4, a gasoline pipeline was ruptured by a bulldozer in Hobbs, New Mexico. The gasoline
ignited, injuring 3 people, damaging 6 homes, and threatened a number of other homes for a time. [68][69]

1958 On November 9, a jet fuel pipeline ruptured near the Blue Creek in Idaho. Fuel flowed down the
creek, and later ignited, damaging one home and destroying 6 bridges. Several were sicked by the fumes
from incident.[70][71]

1958 A leaking and burning gasline under a street lead to several explosions at a Hotel in Allentown,
Pennsylvania, on December 14. 7 people were killed and 23 others injured.[72]

1959 A worker on gas transmission pipeline was closing a valve, when it exploded near Newton,
Pennsylvania on September 25. The worker was killed, and another worker was injured.[73]

1960s
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1960 An estimated 125,000 persons in southwest Missouri were without gas in subfreezing temperatures for
several days due to a ditch-digging machine rupturing a pipeline.[74]
1960 In July, excavation work in Merrill, Wisconsin causes a gas leak and gas explosion that killed 10
people.[75]
1960 A ditching machine used in laying a water main hit an 8 inch diameter natural gas pipeline in Sarasota,
Florida on October 5. 9 People were injured in the following explosion and fire.[76]
1960 On October 27, a 16 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline near Checotah, Oklahoma exploded
while it was being worked on to repair a leak. 2 of the repair crew died, and 4 others were injured. [77]
1960 A 30 inch gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned at a gas sub station in Huntington, West
Virginia on December 19. Windows were broken, 1 homes was damaged, and brush burned, but there were
no injuries.[78]
1961 On January 4, a gas pipeline failure near Waynesburg, Pennsylvania ignited, causing a fire that was
widely seen in the area. There were no injuries.[79]
1961 On February 22, a pipeline exploded and burned in a refinery in Borger, Texas, killing 9 members of a
construction crew, and burning another crewman.[80]
1961 The main City of Miami, Florida Garage was destroyed by a gas explosion on February 23. The blast
was caused by a ditch digging machine being used in the garage hitting and rupturing a 2 inch gas pipe. One
person was seriously burned by the blast, and 2 fire fighters were injured fight the fire that followed the
blast.[81]
1961 A 36 inch gas transmission pipeline exploded near Laurel, Mississippi on June 18. 10 people were
injured, and one home was destroyed from flames that went hundreds of feet in the air. A crater 30 feet
(9.1 m) long and 20 feet (6.1 m) deep was created by the failure.[82]
1961 A 26 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned near Winchester, Kentucky on
September 11. 22 people suffered various burn injuries.[83]
1961 On October 9, vapors from a leaking pipeline on an oil storage tank exploded and burned in
Bridgeport, Illinois. 4 oil company workers were killed, and 3 others injured.[84]
1961 On November 19, a gas pipeline exploded and burned near Warrenton, Virginia. The blast created a
crater 40 feet (12 m) long, 10 feet (3.0 m) wide, and 6 feet (1.8 m) deep. There were no injuries.[85]
1961 An 18 inch diameter natural gas pipeline exploded and burned near Cadiz, Ohio on November 25.
There were no injuries or damage.[86]
1962 Gas leaking from a 10 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline exploded on February 20 in
Portage, Ohio, injuring 6 people and destroying a home.[87]
1962 On June 14, a backhoe ruptured a gas transmission pipeline near Idaho Falls, Idaho. The escaping gas
exploded and ignited later on while a crew was trying to repair the line. One of the crew was killed, and 5
others injured in the fire.[88]
1962 On August 2, a natural gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned in Clearwater, Florida, next to
US Highway 19, forcing that road's closure for a time. There were no injuries reported. Investigators found
the line had previous mechanical damage as a cause of the failure.[89][90]
1962 A 30 inch diameter gas transmission failed on August 2 in Kansas City, Kansas. The gas flowed for 10
minutes before exploding and igniting. An 8 inch gas distribution pipeline was also ruptured, 11 homes were
destroyed, and 23 others were damaged. At least one person was injured.[91]
1962 On September 11, an 8 inch propane/LPG pipeline was ruptured by road building equipment near
Eatonton, Georgia. One of the road workers was overcome and asphyxiated by the propane fumes.
Propane fumes followed the Oconee River for 10 miles (16 km) into Lake Sinclair.[92]
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1963 On January 2, a gas transmission pipeline ruptured due to a defective weld in San Francisco,
California. The gas ignited, one firefighter died from a heart attack, and 9 other firefighters were injured
fighting the resulting inferno.[93][94]
1963 An explosion and fire spread through a gas pipeline compressor station in Montezuma, Indiana on
March 12, injuring 16 workers.[95]
1963 A crude oil pipeline was hit and ruptured by an earth mover near Fostoria, Ohio, on October 30. The
earth mover operator was seriously burned in the resulting fire.[96]
1963 On October 31, a 6 inch diameter butane pipeline was ruptured by an earth mover near West
Millgrove, Ohio. The equipment operator was critically burned by the following explosion and fire. [97]
1963 On November 17, flammable liquids leaking from a pipeline disposal pit were accidentally ignited,
killing a teen planning to cook alongside a creek in South Carolina.[98]
1964 A Santa Fe Railroad Freight Train apparently ignited fumes from a leaking propane pipeline near
Bosworth, Missouri on February 4. The explosion and fire ignited 4 diesel locomotives and some box cars,
and derailed other box cars. One member of the Rail Crew was injured.[99]
1964 On February 7, 2 workers installing insulation on a valve in a manhole in Richardson, Texas were
overcome by gas when an 8 inch pipeline in the vault ruptured, and were killed.[100]
1964 A front loader ruptured a gas pipeline in Fort Worth, Texas on February 28, seriously burning the
loader operator.[101]
1964 On May 12, a bulldozer hit and broke a valve on an LPG pipeline near Demopolis, Alabama while
grading land. The resulting fire caused fears of flames spreading to an underground storage facility, but the
fire was later controlled. There were no injuries.[102]
1964 A crude oil pipeline ruptured in Gilbertown, Alabama on October 29. More than 72,000 US gallons
(270,000 L) of oil were spilled.[103]
1964 A gas line being moved in Miami, Florida exploded and burned on November 18. 4 people were
injured.[104]
1964 On November 25, a recently replace natural gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned in Saint
Francisville, Louisiana, killing 5 workers of the pipeline, and injuring at least 23 others. [105]
1965 On January 6, a house in Garnett, Kansas was destroyed by an explosion, and later on gas was found
leaking from a 2 inch gasline in the street front of it, and was suspected as the cause. A young boy was
killed. The leak may have also caused another nearby house explosion the previous November. [106]
1965 On January 21, an 8 inch diameter propane transmission pipeline 15 miles (24 km) east of Jefferson
City, Missouri leaked. The propane spread along the ground, and exploded several hours later, scorching an
area over a mile wide. A girl being dropped off at a school bus stop was severely burned and later died, and
2 other people were burned.[107]
1965 A 32 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline, north of Natchitoches, Louisiana, belonging to the
Tennessee Gas Pipeline exploded and burned from Stress corrosion cracking(SCC) on March 4, killing 17
people. At least 9 others were injured, and 7 homes 450 feet from the rupture were destroyed. This
accident, and others of the era, led then-President Lyndon B. Johnson to call for the formation of a national
pipeline safety agency in 1967. The same pipeline had also had an explosion on May 9, 1955, just 930 feet
(280 m) from the 1965 failure.[108][109][110][111][112]
1965 A crude oil pipeline ruptured east of Blanding, Utah on April 3, spilling about 5,000 barrels (790 m3)
of crude oil into the San Juan River. The ruptured pipeline was reported to flow "wide open" for over an
hour.[113]
1965 On July 24, a natural gas pipeline exploded and burned when workers were welding on a tie-in
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pipeline onto it near Tescott, Kansas. One of the workers died, and 15 others were injured.[114]
1965 On August 21, a 9-year-old girl was killed and eight people were injured in a pipeline explosion in
western Van Wert County, Ohio. The explosion threw up flames that could be seen from 40 miles (64 km)
away and scorched a 100-acre (0.40 km2) area of farmland. Nancy Anna May Rigdon was killed in her bed
in a house 300 yards from the blast site. The rest of her family was injured but survived. Investigators said
the explosion was caused by gas leaking from an eight-inch pipeline apparently ignited by a spark from a
passing train.[115][116]
1965 A 8 inch diameter gasoline pipeline ruptured in Sylvania, Ohio on August 23. The danger of fire or
explosion forced evacuations of residents in a 2-square-mile (5.2 km2) area. There was no fire.[117]
1965 On October 25, a ruptured pipeline spilled naphtha in Mount Cory, Ohio, forcing evacuations until the
naphtha evaporated.[118]
1966 A 6 inch diameter natural gas pipeline ruptured in Norfolk, Nebraska on January 28, shutting off gas to
20,000 people in 10 communities on January 28.[119]
1966 On December 14, a leaking propane pipeline near Swedenborg, Missouri made a car stall. Other
came to aid the stalled car, and someone lit a cigarette, igniting the fumes. 8 people were burned and
hospitalized.[120]
1967 A leaking gas main in the Jamaica section of New York City, New York caught fire on January 13. 2
pieces of FDNY equipment responding to the gas leak report were burned, as well as numerous buildings.
The fire spread to 13 alarm size, with 63 fire companies being used to control the situation. The cause of the
leak was the failure of a moisture scrubbing "drip pot" on the pipeline.[121][122]
1967 A 6 inch diameter propane pipeline exploded and burned while it was being worked on in Meeker,
Oklahoma on January 10. One of the workers was killed, and another injured.[123]
1967 Manufacturers Light and Heat Company announced they were requesting to the Federal Power
Commission permission to allow a new pipeline to replace 73.5 miles of older pipeline, which was having
200 to 450 leaks a year in Eastern Pennsylvania.[124]
1967 On May 16, a pile driver ruptured a propane pipeline in Dearborn, Michigan. The escaping gas caught
fire, with 2 construction workers being killed, and 4 others seriously burned.[125]
1967 A leaking pipeline released 30,000 barrels (4,800 m3) of JP-4 grade jet fuel in Wilmington, California
on June 30. There was no fire.[126]
1968 A petroleum products pipeline was discovered to be leaking on January 27, near Kokomo,
Mississippi. Damage to cotton crops and water wells was discovered soon afterward.[127]
1968 On April 6, natural gas leaking from a pipeline in Richmond, Indiana built up in a sporting goods store
and exploded. Gunpowder in the that store exploded later on. 41 people were killed, 150 were injured, and
15 buildings destroyed.[128][129][130]
1968 On April 15, gasoline odor was detected at a drinking fountain in Glendale, California. The source of
the water well that fed the fountain was determined to be a 8 inch pipeline that was leaking. Between
100,000 and 250,000 US gallons (950,000 L) of gasoline were leaked into the local groundwater.[131]
1968 On May 29, a bulldozer ruptured a 1-inch gas service line at a children's nursery in Hapeville, Georgia,
causing an explosion and fire. Seven children and two adults were killed, and three children were seriously
injured in the accident.[132][133]
1968 An 8 inch diameter propane pipeline rupture in a landslide ruptured near Plainfield, Ohio on June 2. 2
people were killed, 3 others injured by burns, and 7 buildings and 7 vehicles were destroyed.[134]
1968 A contractor laying a new pipeline broke an old pipeline in Norwalk, Ohio on August 7, spilling

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gasoline for 4 hours into the Huron River.[135]

1968 On August 22, a 16 inch diameter gasoline pipeline ruptured at General Mitchell Field, spilling almost
200,000 US gallons (760,000 L) of gasoline, and forcing closure of one runway. Previous damage to the
pipeline by heavy equipment working in the area was identified as the cause of the rupture. [136][137]
1968 A coal company digging machine hit an 8 inch LPG pipeline in Fulton County, Illinois on September 3,
killing one person and injuring 4 others.[138]
1968 2 teen boys shooting a rifle ignited gasoline leaking from a petroleum pipeline pumping station near
Midland, Pennsylvania on November 3. A large brush fire ensued. Both boys had moderate burns. A stuck
relief valve on the pipeline was the cause of the leakge.[139][140]
1968 An LPG pipeline, near Yutan, Nebraska ruptured on December 5. Repair crews responded to the
pipeline rupture, and thought LPG vapors were dispersed, but ignited the vapor cloud by driving into it. Five
repairmen were killed. After the accident, the Nebraska State Fire Marshal ordered MAPCO to reduce its
operating pressure, and to hydrostatic retest 52 miles (84 km) of that pipeline. During the tests, 195
longitudinal seams failed.[141][142]
1968 On December 18, a 30 inch diameter gas pipeline exploded and burned at a gas processing plant in
Gibson, Louisiana. One plant worker was injured.[143]
1969 On January 13, a 22 inch diameter crude oil pipeline ruptured in Lima, Ohio, spilling over 2,000 US
gallons (7,600 L) of oil into the sewer system. Cracks from welding were blamed for the failure.[144]
1969 A leaking crude oil pipeline caused a slick 35 miles (56 km) long in the Dry Creek near Greybull,
Wyoming on February 24.[145]
1969 A 10 inch pipeline carrying aviation gasoline was ruptured by explosives on March 17 in Canyon,
California The fuel caught fire short after that.[146]
1969 On May 6, a gas pipeline in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, that had been moved, was undergoing pressure
testing when a cap on it blew off, hitting and rupturing another nearby gas pipeline. That pipeline exploded
and burned, killing 1 worker, injuring 9 other workers, and damaging 3 homes.[147]
1969 Overpressure of a low pressure natural gas distribution system in Gary, Indiana caused numerous small
fires and explosions. A gas company worker's errors allowed much higher than normal gas pressure in a gas
distribution system. 56 square blocks were evacuated, 7 people were injured, 6 homes destroyed, and 19
other homes damaged.(June 3, 1969)[148][149]
1969 On September 9, a converted natural gas pipeline running at 789 psi near Houston, Texas ruptured,
causing a massive fire. Construction work downstream of the accident led to a pressure build up that caused
the rupture. 7 people were injured, 13 homes were destroyed, and many others damaged.[150][151]
1969 On December 25, a land leveler ruptured a 22 inch natural gas transmission pipeline in Hermiston,
Oregon. Gas at 600 psi sprayed from the pipeline. A warning sign about the existence of the gas pipeline
was 10 feet (3.0 m) away from the rupture site.[152]

1970s
1970 A leak natural gas pipeline exploded in Houma, Louisiana on January 24, killing 3 people, and
demolishing half a block of downtown buildings.[153]
1970 Early on September 2, residents of Jacksonville, Maryland, detected gasoline odors and noticed
gasoline in a small creek flowing beneath a nearby road. Because fumes were still present in the late
afternoon of September 2, a resident notified Colonial Pipeline at 6:19 p.m. about the situation. About 12
hours later, on the morning of September 3, an explosion and fire occurred in a ditch in which contractor
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personnel for Colonial were manually digging to further expose the pipeline & catch gasoline trickling from
the ground. Five persons were injured, none fatally. The NTSB later pointed out that workers had failed to
use a flammable vapor percent detector during the work. The leak point was found 4 days later. The failure
resulted in a release of 30,186 gallons (718 barrels) of gasoline and kerosene.[154][155][156]
1970 On September 7, a pipeline leaked thousands of gallons of gasoline onto farmland near Ontario,
Oregon. Roads were closed in the area until the gasoline was removed.[157]
1970 The 1970 Propane vapor cloud explosion in Port Hudson, Phillips Pipeline Company on December 9,
1970. propane gas explosion, Franklin County, Missouri. A leak led to propane cloud explosion with a force
estimated up to 50 tons of TNT. The NTSB cited past external and internal corrosion issues, and poor
welds on the uncoated pipeline as concerns.[158][159][160]
1970 Explosion of a 30-inch diameter 1100 psi inlet natural gas pipeline, bringing offshore natural gas into a
gas drying plant in southern Louisiana. Two plant personnel were killed. Rupture was at a junction of a 12-
inch gas line to the 30-inch main line. (December 1970)
1970 A restaurant owner opened a gas line valve in New York, New York, not knowing that part of the gas
line was open and unconnected. The gas in the building exploded, killing 15 people, & injuring more than 60
others. (December 11, 1970)[161]
1970 On December 28, a 12 inch diameter pipeline ruptured in Jackson, Wisconsin, spilling 200 barrels
(32 m3) of fuel oil into a wildlife sanctuary.[162]
1971 A faulty valve on a 3 inch diameter natural gas pipeline was suspected of causing a gas leak that
resulted in 3 separate explosions, including a house explosion in Lambertville, New Jersey that killed 7
people.[163]
1971 On June 5, an ammonia pipeline failed near Floral, Arkansas, releasing 80 tons of ammonia.[164]
1971 2 gas explosions in North Richland Hills, Texas on October 4. Gas migrated into 2 homes from leaking
gas pipes.[165]
1971 A gas company repair crew was overcome in a service vault on November 17, in Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. 2 workmen were overcome initially, and 4 others attempting to rescue them were also
overcome by gas asphyxiation. All 6 died.[166]
1972 The second pipeline leak in a month into the Tippecanoe River in Indiana on a Buckeye Pipeline
company (now Buckeye Partners ) line hit on January 12. The Buckeye Pipeline was owned by the bankrupt
Penn Central Railroad, preventing money from being spent on repairs. One EPA official stated "they know
they have a leaky system".[167]
1972 On January 11, a 10 inch diameter pipeline ruptured in Clinton, Montana, spilling 3,000 barrels
(480 m3) of diesel fuel, with some of it reaching the Clark Fork River.[168][169]
1972 During the blowdown of a pipeline dehydrator, LPG fumes caught fire at Conway, Kansas on January
29.
1972 On February 12, a pipeline rupture spilled 16,000 US gallons (61,000 L) of diesel fuel into the
Spokane River.[170][171]
1972 A Natural gas explosion at Annandale, Virginia, on March 24.[172]
1972 On June 15, a crew was welding on a gas main in Bryan, Ohio that had been shut off, when someone
inadvertently openned a valve that fed gas into that main. The gas ignited, and exploded, serious injuring 2
workers.[173]
1972 A 12 inch diameter high pressure propane pipeline, near Butler, Alabama, was ruptured by a road
grader. A short time after the line was ruptured, a car drove into the vapor cloud. The car stalled, and trying
to restart it was suspected to have ignited the vapor cloud, killing four people. (June 20, 1972)[174][175]
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1972 A gasoline pipeline ruptured and ignited at a Plantation Pipeline Terminal in Bremen, Georgia on
September 6. For a time, there were fears the fire might spread to nearby fuel storage tanks, but the fire was
limited to the pipeline.[176]
1972 In October, a crude oil pipeline ruptures near Shiprock, New Mexico, spilling 285,000 US gallons
(1,080,000 L) of crude oil into the San Juan River, polluting it for 200 miles.[177][178]
1972 On October 30, a bulldozer working on a power company construction project ruptured a gas main in
Lake City, Minnesota. Leaking gas accumulated in, then exploded in a nearby variety store, killing 6 and
injuring 9.[179]
1972 A leak in a weld on a 36 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline on November 18 in Bend, Oregon
forced the shutdown of gas service to 3,000 customers.[180]
1973 A cracked gas main leaked in Adamsville, Alabama, on February 7. The escaping gas exploded, killing
3 people and injuring 2 others. A string of other gas main cracking incidents occurred in this city, killing one
other person, and injuring t2 others.[181]
1973 Installation of a sewer was suspected of damaging a gas line in Coopersburg, Pennsylvania on
February 21. Leaking gas later exploded in an apartment building, killing 5 people, injuring 22 others, and
destroying the building.[182]
1973 In Austin, Texas, a natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline ruptured due to an improper weld. A passing car
or truck set off a vapor cloud explosion and fire. Six people were killed, and 2 others injured. (February 22,
1973)[183][184]
1973 On May 2, a 10 inch diameter pipeline ruptured in Murray, Idaho, causing a mist of diesel fuel to cover
homes and trailers. Between 7,000 and 10,000 US gallons (38,000 L) of fuel were lost. Some of the fuel
reached a nearby creek. There was no fire.[185][186]
1973 Improper sampling procedures on an LPG pipeline killed one worker and injured another from freezing
at Dayton, Ohio on May 3.
1973 In the summer, a pipeline ruptured in Diamond, Louisiana. The escaping gas fumes were ignited by a
lawnmower, killing 2 people.[187]
1973 A pipeline failed near Findlay, Ohio on June 27, spill about 150,000 US gallons (570,000 L) of jet
aviation fuel into the Ottawa Creek. A failed gasket caused the spill.[188][189][190]
1973 A crude oil pipeline ruptured in Los Angeles, California on October 18. Crude flowed along several
streets for a time.[191]
1973 On December 4, a pipeline break releases 31,000 barrels (4,900 m3) of oil near Argyle,
Minnesota.[192]
1973 On December 6, a pump station on an ammonia pipeline near Conway, Kansas, was started against a
closed valve, and the pipeline failed in a previously damaged section. Two persons who drove through the
ammonia vapors were hospitalized; several rural residents were evacuated from the area; and 89,796 US
gallons (339,910 L) of anhydrous ammonia were lost.[193]
1974 A 22 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline failed in Prairie du Rocher, Illinois on January 2.
The resulting fire caused no serious damage, but 7,000 people in the area were left without gas heating for
several subfreezing days.[194]
1974 On March 2, a 30 inch diameter gas pipeline failed at 797 pounds pressure inside a 34-inch diameter
casing pipe under a road near Monroe, Louisiana. 10 acres of forest were burned, but there were no injuries
or deaths. A substandard girth weld was the cause. The failure of automatic valves on the pipeline to close
upon a pressure drop were also cited in contributing to the size of the accident.[195][196]
1974 A gas transmission pipeline ruptured near Farmington, New Mexico on March 15, killing a family of 3
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in a truck driving nearby when the gas ignited. Corrosion along the longitudinal seem weld of the pipe section
caused the failure.[197][198]
1974 A gas line in a commercial building in New York, New York, was ruptured by falling equipment in a
basement on April 22. The escaping gas later exploded, injuring more than 70 people.[199]
1974 A previously damaged gas main ruptured in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on May 3, causing an explosion
that killed 2, and caused extensive damage to 4 row homes. Earlier plumbing work was suspect to have
caused the gas line damage.[200]
1974 On May 21, a 6 inch gas-gathering pipeline, ruptured at the edge of a rural road south of Meridian,
Mississippi. Three vehicles entered the area which contained the escaping gas, and stalled near the rupture.
The gas ignited at 10:05 p.m., and five persons died as a result. The 3 vehicles were destroyed and 40 acres
(160,000 m2) of woodland were burned. Although less than 4 years old, the 6-inch pipe had corroded
internally and had been embrittled by hydrogen.[201]
1974 A 30 inch gas transmission pipeline failed and gas ignited near Bealeton, Virginia, on June 9, from
hydrogen stress cracking. Failure alarms at the nearest upstream gas compressor station did not activate, and
the pipeline failure was first notice by a compressor station employee happening to see the large fire from the
pipeline rupture.[202][203][204]
1974 On August 13, an ammonia pipeline failed near Hutchinson, Kansas after a pump station was started
against a closed valve. 3 police officers were treated for ammonia inhalation; approximately 200 persons
were evacuated from the area of the vapors; trees, lawns, shrubbery, and crops were burned; and an
estimated 11,000 fish were killed.[205]
1974 On September 14, a propane pipeline to an underground storage cavern failed in Griffith, Indiana. The
propane later caught fire. 1,000 residents were evacuated during the incident.[206]
1974 A 12 inch diameter gas gathering pipeline exploded and burned near Meta, Kentucky on November
24. There were no injuries reported. Acts of previous vandalism against the pipeline company had happened
before.[207][208]
1974 A crew repairing a leaking crude oil pipeline near Abilene, Texas, were overcome by sour crude oil
fumes on December 1. Six of the repair crew died. The leak was cause by improper welding.[209]
1975 A crude oil pipeline at Lima, Ohio ruptured after a valve was accidentally closed against a pumping
pipeline on January 17. The spraying crude oil ignited, killing a Terminal Operator. [210]
1975 On January 23, a propane chiller exploded violently during maintenance work on it near Iowa City,
Iowa. 2 workers were killed and 3 others injured by the failure.[211]
1975 In March, a leak was discovered in a 14 inch diameter petroleum products pipeline in Mecklenburg
County, North Carolina. Plantation Pipeline repaired the pipeline immediately, and began efforts to recover
the spilled petroleum. From that time through June 1983, approximately 2,022 barrels of spilled petroleum
products were recovered from standpipes at the leak site. Remediation efforts stopped in October 1984.
Later tests raised questions on the possibility of not all of the spill products were recovered.[212]
1975 A 12 inch diameter crude oil pipeline ruptured near Harwood, Missouri, on March 26. Heavy rain
slowed the cleanup.[213]
1975 A natural gas liquids (NGL) pipeline ruptured due to previous mechanical damage at Devers, Texas. 4
people were killed in a following vapor cloud fire. The pipeline had been damaged when a valve was
installed on the pipeline. (May 12, 1975)[214]
1975 An explosion in June 1975 at a home in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania, was caused by natural gas
leaking into the home from an open main in the middle of the street. One person was killed. In 1973,
workers hired by the gas company had falsified records showing the main had been closed.[215]
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1975 An LPG pipeline ruptured near Romulus, Michigan, due to previous mechanical damage to the
pipeline, and over pressurization from operator error, caused by closing a valve against a pumping pipeline,
at a storage facility. Nine people were injured in the following vapor cloud fire. Flames 500 feet (150 m) high
engulfed a 600-foot (180 m)-diameter area, destroyed four houses and damaged three others, burned 12
vehicles, and consumed 2,389 barrels (379.8 m3) of propane. (August 2, 1975)[216][217]
1975 On October 13, employees at a gas processing plant at Goldsmith, Texas heard leak gas, and
investigated. Before the leak could be found, a 12 inch diameter pipeline there exploded, killing 3 of the
crew, injuring 2 others, and causing extensive plant damage.[218]
1976 A repair crew working on natural gas gathering compressor station at Cedardale, Oklahoma on
January 7, opened the wrong valve in an attempt to increase gas flow. Natural gas & Natural Gas Liquids
flow out of an open 12 inch pipeline, and were ignited by an open flame heater. 5 of the crew were killed,
and 2 seriously burned.[219]
1976 A gas leak at the Pathfinder Hotel in Fremont, Nebraska, exploded, killing 23 people on January 10.
A compression coupling had pulled apart, causing gas to leak into the Hotel's basement.[220]
1976 An LPG/NGL pipeline ruptured near Whitharral, Texas, leading to vapor cloud fire that killed one,
severely burning 4 others who later died, destroyed two homes, and burned an area about 400 yards wide.
Electrical resistance weld (ERW) seam failure is suspected for the failure. From January 1968 to the date of
the Whitharral accident, 14 longitudinal pipe seam failures had occurred on that pipeline system, which
resulted in 6 other fatalities, and the loss of over 60,000 barrels (9,500 m3) of LPG.(February 25, 1976)
[221][222][223]
1976 An improperly assembled compression coupling failed on a gas distribution line in Phoenix, Arizona on
February 8, causing a house explosion that killed 2 people.[224]
1976 On March 27, a two-story building in Phenix City, Alabama, exploded and burned from a gas leak.
The explosion and fire killed the six persons in the building. The NTSB found that gas at 20-psig pressure
had leaked from a cracked, 3-inch cast iron gas main.[225]
1976 A front loader hit an 8 inch petroleum products pipeline in Los Angeles, California, during a road
widening project along Venice Boulevard. 9 people were killed, a plastic factory was destroyed, and other
serious property damage occurred. (June 16, 1976)[226][227]
1976 A road grader hit a 20 inch gas transmission pipeline near Calhoun, Louisiana. Six people were killed
in the ensuing fire, 6 families were left homeless, and a mobile home and 2 houses were destroyed. (August
9, 1976)[228][229]
1976 On August 13, a flash fire in the basement of a house in Bangor, Maine, occurred while a gas company
crew was checking for the cause of low gas pressure at the home. The fire killed one gas company
employee, burned two other employees, and caused minor damage to the house. One of the crew was using
a match to light the basement of the home, and another crew member was smoking when the fire started. [230]
1976 On August 29, an explosion and fire destroyed a house at Kenosha, Wisconsin. Two persons were
killed, four persons were injured, and two adjacent houses were damaged. The destroyed house was not
served by natural gas. However, natural gas, which was escaping at 58 psig pressure from a punctured 2-
inch plastic main located 39 feet (12 m) away, had entered the house through a 6 inch sewer lateral that had
been bored through to install the gas line.[231][232]
1976 An explosion and fire at a gas pipeline compressor station in Orange Grove, Texas killed one plant
worker, and injured another on December 7.[233]
1977 On January 2, a gas pipeline ruptured and burned near Nursery, Texas. Some power poles were
destroyed, but there were no injuries.[234]
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1977 A gas pipeline exploded and burned in Stockton, California on February 4. Another gas pipeline fire
had occurred nearby 4 days earlier. There were no injuries.[235]
1977 An explosion on July 8 at Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. Pump Station No. 8 kills one worker, injures 5
others, and destroys the pump station. A US House of Representatives Committee later announced the
cause was workers not following the proper procedures, causing crude oil to flow into a pump under repair
at the time.[236][237][238][239]
1977 On July 20, the Trans-Alaskan Pipeline was shut down for the 4th time in a month, when it was hit in a
valve by a front loader. More than 40,000 US gallons (150,000 L) of crude oil was spilled.[237]
1977 A 12 inch diameter propane pipeline ruptured near Ruff Creek, in Greene County, Pennsylvania, from
stress corrosion cracking. The resulting propane vapor cloud ignited when a truck driven into the cloud
stalled, then created a spark when it was restarted. Subsidence of underground coal mines in the area may
have hastened the failure. (July 20, 1977)[240]
1977 A cast iron gas main broke in Cherokee, Alabama on July 30. Gas migrated into a home through a
recently back filled sewer line trench, and exploded 5 days later.[241]
1977 In August, a car drove through the leaking liquid from a petroleum pipeline in Lakewood, California.
The pooled liquid appeared to be mud, but it exploded and burned, injuring a woman in the car.[242]
1977 On August 15, crude oil spilled at Alyeska Pipeline Pump Station No. 9. There was no fire, but a fire
or explosion at that station could have shut down that pipeline, since Pump Station No. 8 was out of service
from the previous month's accident there. This was the seventh accident on this pipeline since the start up of
the Alaska pipeline on June 20, 1977. The NTSB released three recommendations on September 9, 1977,
to correct certain design and operating deficiencies in the pump rooms of each station of the Alyeska
system.[243][244]
1977 On September 5, 2 brothers in a moving truck drove into a vapor cloud from a leak at a gas
compressor plant in New Cuyama, California, igniting the cloud. One was killed immediately, and the other
died 11 days later.[245]
1977 On September 10, a pipeline rupture spilled 69,000 US gallons (260,000 L) of gasoline into a creek in
Toledo, Ohio. Corrosion of the pipeline caused the failure.[246][247]
1977 A gasline inside a building in San Francisco, California leaked and exploded, injuring 7 and heavily
damaging that building. Gas repair crews were working on the line at the time.[248]
1977 On October 12, a bulldozer ruptured a propane pipeline near Albany, Georgia, causing nearby train
traffic to be halted. The bulldozer engine was left running, nearly igniting the vapors. [249]
1977 A backhoe being used to install a pipeline hit an adjacent 6 inch diameter propane pipeline on
November 21 in Hutchison, Kansas. Fire broke out, but there were no injuries.[250]
1977 Construction workers punctured a 12 inch gas pipeline in Atlanta, Georgia, with an I-beam on
December 1. No fire or explosion followed, but thousands of people were evacuated from nearby
buildings.[251]
1977 A compression coupling joint between a plastic and a steel gas line pulled apart in Lawrence, Kansas
on December 15. The gas migrated into 2 buildings, and exploded, killing 2 people, and injuring 3
others.[252][253]
1978 Earth movement was suspected in causing a gas transmission pipeline to rupture and burn near
Stevenson, Washington on January 23. There were no injuries.[254]
1978 On February 15, a gas pipeline being tested with compressed air exploded at a seam on the pipe in
Cincinnati, Ohio on February 15, injuring 8.[255]
1978 A portion of the Alyeska Pipeline east of Fairbanks, Alaska was ruptured by an explosive device on
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February 15. Crude oil spilled in a 600-foot (180 m) diameter spot.[256]

1978 An improperly plugged gas line leaked into service vault in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma at a shopping
center, overcoming 5 gas company workers on April 28. Four of the repairmen died of asphyxiation. None
of the repair crew had respirators at the job site.[257]
1978 A gas company crew in Mansfield, Ohio accidentally tied a high pressure gas main into a low pressure
gas main on May 17. Much higher gas flames in gas appliances caused damage in 16 homes, and about
2,000 gas meters were shut off during the incident.[258]
1978 An LPG pipeline at Donnellson, Iowa, ruptured from past mechanical damage and improper lowering
for road improvements. The vapor cloud ignited several minutes after the rupture. Three people were killed
and 2 others severely burned. (August 4, 1978)[259][260][261]
1978 On August 7, in Lafayette, Louisiana, natural gas at 15 psig pressure escaped from a corrosion leak in
an inactive 1-inch steel service line and migrated beneath a concrete slab and into a building where it ignited.
The resulting explosion and fire injured six persons and destroyed the building and its contents.[262]
1978 On August 28, natural gas, which had escaped from a circumferential fracture in a socket heat-fusion
coupling on a 2-in. polyethylene (PE) main, operating at 40-psig pressure, migrated beneath a one-story
house in Grand Island, Nebraska, exploded, and then burned. One person was injured; the house was
destroyed; and three adjacent houses were damaged.[263]
1978 About 7,600 US gallons (29,000 L) of gasoline were spilled in Hampton, Pennsylvania on August 30.
Workers boring for a sewer line had hit the fuel pipeline. Later, the 2 construction firms responsible were
fined only $500 each.[264][265]
1978 A gas pipeline in Brookside Village, Texas ruptured and exploded, killing five people, and injuring 43
others. Seven mobile homes were also destroyed, (October 24, 1978)[266]
1978 A crude oil pipeline leaks into the Farmington Bay Waterfowl Management Area west of Farmington,
Utah on November 8. About 42,000 US gallons (160,000 L) of crude were spilled. The rupture was caused
by pumping against a valve that had been closed for earlier pipeline maintenance. [267]
1978 A ruptured 2 inch diameter gasline leaking caused a home to explode in Spokane, Washington on
January 6, killing the homeowner.[268]
1979 On January 16, an explosion and fire destroyed five commercial buildings and damaged several other
buildings in London, Kentucky. Two persons were injured. External corrosion was suspected as the cause.
A prearranged pressure increase in the pipeline was also a factor.[269][270]
1979 An 18 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline failed underneath the Florida Turnpike in West
Palm Beach, Florida, resulting in a 2 hour road closure.[271]
1979 On April 18, a 24-inch natural gas transmission pipeline pulled out of a compression coupling during a
line-lowering project under Iowa State Highway 181 in a rural area near Dallas, Iowa. Within seconds, the
natural gas ignited and burned a 900-foot (270 m) by 400-foot (120 m) area. Two cars, a pickup truck, and
a trailer housing construction equipment were destroyed. A backhoe was damaged and windows were
broken in a nearby farmhouse. Five of the eight injured workers were hospitalized. The gas company's
accident records indicated that this 24-inch pipeline had experienced 12 previous failures since it was
constructed.[272]
1979 On May 11, 2 explosions and a following fire killed 7 people, injured 19 others, and destroyed 3
buildings in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Soil erosion under an 8 inch cast iron gas main caused the main to
break and release gas.[273]
1979 On May 13, a 36 inch diameter Colonial Pipeline rupture released 336,000 US gallons (1,270,000 L)
of fuel oil that damaged vegetation and killed fish near Spartanburg, South Carolina. Cracks made in the
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railroad shipping of the pipe before installation were the cause.[274]

1979 A "spud" dropped by a pile driving barge in the Gulf of Mexico near Pilottown, Louisiana ruptured a
4 inch diameter natural gas pipeline on June 5. The escaping gas ignited, and seriously burned the barge. 4
crew members went missing and were presumed dead.[275]
1979 On June 10, the pilot of a helicopter reported sighting oil on the surface of the Atigun River near the
route of the Alyeska Pipeline Service Company's 48-inch crude oil pipeline. Repair crews found a 7 inch
crack which passed through a longitudinal weld. Five days after the first leak, at 3:15 p.m. on June 15, the
pilot of an Alyeska helicopter on a routine surveillance flight reported a leak north of pump station No. 12
near the Little Tonsina River. A crack near a wrinkle in the pipe was found there. The June 10 spill resulted
in a release of approximately 1,500 barrels (240 m3) of crude oil; the June 15 leak resulted in a release of
approximately 300 barrels (48 m3) of crude oil; these losses were estimated by Alyeska personnel at the
leak site. The spills were too small to be verified by the Alyeska metering system.[276]
1979 On June 16, operator error at Colonial Pipeline causes a rail shipping induced crack section of 36 inch
diameter pipeline to rupture in Greenville County, South Carolina. 395,000 gallons of fuel oil were spilled,
causing vegetation, fish, & wildlife kills.[277][278]
1979 A leaking pipeline releasing gasoline in Granger, Indiana caused the evacuation of 400 people on July
3.[279]
1979 An anchor handling boat, PETE TIDE II, damaged an unmarked gas pipeline with a grappling hook
offshore from New Orleans, Louisiana. Two of the crew were missing and presumed dead in the fire that
followed. (July 15, 1979)[280]
1979 On July 25, an explosion and fire destroyed a duplex apartment house in Albuquerque, New Mexico.
Two persons were killed, and two persons were hospitalized for burns; adjacent houses were damaged.
Earlier in the day, a crew from Mountain Bell Telephone Company (Mountain Bell) had been using a
backhoe at the intersection of Bridge Boulevard and Atrisco Road to locate a telephone cable. The backhoe
snagged a gas service line but the fact that it was pulled from a 1-inch coupling under the house was not
discovered at that time.[281]
1979 A 34 inch diameter Lakehead (now Enbridge) pipeline ruptured near Bemidji, Minnesota, leaking
10,700 barrels (1,700 m3) of crude oil on August 20. The pipeline company initially recovers 60 percent of
the spilled oil. Later in 1988, the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency required Lakehead to extract more oil
using new technology; removal continued on, with studies still underway in the area.[192][282][283][284]
1979 On August 20, a bulldozer operating near Orange, Texas, began to clean a farm drainage ditch. The
corner of the blade cut into a propane line, which crossed beneath the ditch. Propane at 350 psig escaped
and was ignited within seconds. The resulting fire killed one person and injured another, and caused
considerable property damage.[285]
1979 A crude oil pipeline ruptured and spilled oil into a creek new Walnut Grove, Missouri on August 25. 2
miles (3.2 km) of the creek were contaminated, and 32,000 fish killed.[286]
1979 On September 4, the M/V WHITEFACE struck a high-pressure gas pipeline in Lake Verret,
Louisiana. A resulting explosion killed a crewman aboard the vessel.[287]
1979 On October 6, an explosion caused by liquefied natural gas (LNG) vapors destroyed a transformer
building at the reception facility of the Columbia LNG Corporation, Cove Point, Maryland. Odorless
liquefied natural gas leaked through an inadequately tightened LNG pump seal, vaporized, passed through
approximately 210 feet (64 m) of underground electrical conduit and entered the substation building. One
person was killed, and one person was seriously injured. Damage to the facility was estimated at about $3
million. The fire hydrants and deluge water spray system were inoperable after the explosion because the
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water main that supplied the system was broken at a flange above ground inside the substation.[288]
1979 On October 24, an explosion and fire destroyed the county clerk's office building and the adjoining
courthouse building, gutted a connecting building which was under construction, and damaged the adjacent
houses in Stanardsville, Virginia. Thirteen persons were injured and property was damaged extensively. The
following NTSB investigation revealed that natural gas had leaked from a break in a 1 1/4-inch coated steel
service line, which had been snagged by a backhoe which was being used to dig a footing for an addition to
the county clerk's office building.[289]
1979 On October 30, a natural gas explosion and fire demolished a townhouse in Washington, D.C., and
damaged nearby buildings and cars. No one was inside the townhouse at the time, but three persons in a
stopped car were injured when debris from the explosion shattered a car window. After the accident, an
inspection of the gas service line that served the townhouse revealed that it had been struck by excavating
equipment.[290]
1979 A natural gas transmission pipeline exploded in West Monroe, Louisiana on November 11, causing 3
subdivisions to be evacuated. A gas pipeline explosion had taken place nearby 8 years before.[291]

1980s
1980 On January 2, crude oil leaked from a fractured 22-inch pipeline at a levee crossing at Berwick,
Louisiana. At 9:54 a.m., the crude oil ignited. One person was killed, one person was injured, and six homes
were either destroyed or damaged. The pipeline's monitoring system failed to detect a loss of over 1,800
barrels (290 m3) of oil. A defective sleeve weld cause the pipeline to fail.[292]
1980 On January 30, an 8-inch-diameter, refined petroleum products pipeline owned by The Pipelines of
Puerto Rico, Inc., was struck and ruptured by a bulldozer during maintenance work on a nearby waterline in
the Sector Cana of Bayamon, Puerto Rico, about 10 miles (16 km) southwest of San Juan. Gasoline from
the rupture sprayed downhill and ran off into a small creek. About 1 1/2 hours later, the gasoline vapors
were ignited by an undetermined source and exploded; the subsequent fire killed one person and extensively
damaged 25 houses and other property.[293]
1980 On February 21, an explosion and fire destroyed four stores in a shopping complex and severely
damaged an adjoining restaurant in Cordele, Georgia. Of the eight persons who were injured, three died later
as a result of their injuries. Property damage was extensive. The NTSB investigation of the accident has
revealed that natural gas leaked from a 1-inch steel service line, which had been pulled from a 1-inch
compression coupling from a backhoe working in the area, and migrated under a concrete slab floor and into
a jewelry store where it was ignited by an unknown source.[294]
1980 A Colonial Pipeline Dispatcher ignored established procedures for dealing with a pressure surge,
causing a double rupture of a 32 inch steel petroleum products pipeline on March 6. One break, where the
pipe had been thinned by corrosion in a casing under a road, caused the release of 8,000 barrels (1,300 m3)
of aviation-grade kerosene adjacent to route 234 near Manassas, Virginia. Before being fully contained, the
kerosene had flowed into Bull Run River, and had entered the Occoquan Reservoir, a source of drinking
water for several northern Virginia communities. The other break, where a crack in the pipe wall initiated
during rail shipment of the pipe from the steel mill finally propagated to failure, caused the release of 2,190
barrels (348 m3) of No. 2 fuel oil near Locust Grove, a rural area in Orange County, near Fredericksburg,
Virginia. Before being fully contained, the fuel oil had flowed into the Rapidan River and then into the
Rappahannock River, a source of drinking water for the City of Fredericksburg.[295][296]
1980 Sabotage during a labor strike was suspected in a gasoline pipeline explosion in Marcus Hook,
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Pennsylvania on March 7. The following fire burned for about 17 hours.[297][298]

1980 On April 16, gasoline at a pipeline terminal in Roseville, Minnesota, sprayed from the fractured cast-
iron base of a station booster pump at 72 psig pressure, vaporized, and exploded after it was ignited by the
spark of an electric switch in the mainline pump control room 50 feet (15 m) downwind of the booster pump.
One man was killed, 3 others injured, and extensive damage was done to the terminal. About 3,500 barrels
(560 m3) of petroleum products burned and property damage was estimated at $3 million.[299]
1980 On May 27, near Cartwright, Louisiana, an anhydrous ammonia pipeline was struck by a bulldozer,
which was being used to prepare a well site, and the pipeline ruptured. Over 100 people were evacuated
from the area.[300]
1980 A road grader ruptured an NGL pipeline in Aurora, Colorado on August 11. Firefighters had barely
evacuated residents in the area when the vapors exploded, burning one firefighter.[301]
1980 An oil pipeline ruptured and burned while it was being repaired at an oil storage Terminal in Piney
Point, Maryland on September 12, 1980. One worker was killed, and 5 others injured in the fire.[302]
1980 On October 9, a 2-inch-diameter compression coupling located on the upstream side of a gas meter
set assembly in the boiler room of the Simon Kenton High School in Independence, Kentucky, pulled out of
its connection with a 2-inch-diameter gas service line. Natural gas at 165-psig pressure escaped through the
2-inch-diameter opening and, seconds later, exploded and burned. A basement wall was blown down, an
adjacent classroom was damaged, and one student was killed. About 30 minutes later, a second explosion
occurred, which injured 37 persons and extensively damaged the school. The gas main was being uprated at
the time.[303]
1980 A bulldozer digging a ditch for a new pipeline hit a 16 inch crude oil pipeline near San Ysidro, New
Mexico on October 22. The operator was fatally burned.[304]
1980 A pipeline carrying naphtha ruptured under a street in Long Beach, California, causing a fire that
destroyed one home and damaged several others. Two people were injured. Lack of communication of
pipeline valve setups, and pressure relief valves set to open at too high a pressure were identified by the
NTSB as causes of the accident. (December 1, 1980)[305][306]
1980 A dirt pan machine being used for road construction hit a propane pipeline in Sumner, Georgia on
December 10, causing slight injuries to the dirt pan operator. US Highway 82 and a rail line were closed,
and several families evacuated until the vapors dispersed. There was no fire.[307]
1980 On December 22, a pipeline carrying jet fuel ruptured in Las Vegas, Nevada, spilling fuel for 2 hours.
Later, the fuel ignited, forcing road closures. One firefighters was overcome by fumes. Between 50,000 and
100,000 US gallons (380,000 L) of jet fuel were spilled. Prior construction in the area was suspected of
damaging the pipeline.[308]
1980 A natural gas pipeline exploded and burned at a gas plant in Ulysses, Kansas on December 28. There
were no injuries[309]
1981 An ammonia pipeline leaked near Hutchinson, Kansas on July 31, injuring 5 people, including 3
children at a Bible Camp. A 2-mile (3.2 km) radius from the leak was evacuated, including 90 from the Bible
Camp.[310]
1981 On August 25, in downtown San Francisco, California, a 16-inch natural gas main was punctured by a
drill that an excavation contractor was using. Escaping natural gas blew upward and carried into the
Embarcadero Complex and other nearby buildings. There was no ignition; however, the gas stream entrained
an oil containing polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB). Fall-out affected an eight-square-block area of the city's
financial district covering buildings, cars, trees, pedestrians, police, and firemen. Approximately 30,000
persons were safely evacuated from the area in 45 minutes. No one was killed or seriously injured, although
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many persons were sprayed with the PCB oil mist. There were delays in shutting down the gas, due to
inaccurate diagrams.[311]
1981 On September 15, during routine maintenance, a pipeline exploded and burned between a gas plant
and a petroleum plant in Goldsmith, Texas. While workers were fighting the fire, another part of the pipeline
burst and burned. 6 workers were burned, and another had other injuries. There were a total of 7 fires from
7 pipeline ruptures.[312][313]
1981 A 12 inch diameter pipeline near Ackerly, Texas, was hit by a rathole drill on September 27, releasing
an ethane-propane mix. There was then an explosion & fire that killed 4 people.[314]
1981 On November 30, at Flatwoods, West Virginia, gas, leaking into a test section of a 26-inch-diameter
gas transmission pipeline, ignited as a welder engaged in installing an end cap placed a tack weld on the east
end of a 180-foot (55 m)-long section of pipe. The resultant explosion blew off-the east end cap, which
struck and killed the welder's helper.[315]
1981 On December 5, hunters near Yutan, Nebraska tried out a new high power rifle by shooting what they
thought was a log in a creek bed. The log was actually an LPG pipeline, and 12 to 16 families needed to be
evacuated for their safety from the resulting vapor cloud. There was no fire.[316]
1981 On December 9, a pipeline carrying gasoline ruptured near Joliet, Illinois, spilling 30,000 US gallons
(110,000 L) of gasoline into the Des Plaines River.[317]
1981 A gas pipeline in Ottawa, Kansas caused 2 explosions and a raging fire that destroyed 2 mobile homes
on December 31. There were no injuries reported.[318]
1982 On January 28 at Centralia, Missouri, natural gas at 47 psig entered a low pressure distribution system
which normally operated at 0.40 psig after a backhoe bucket snagged, ruptured, and separated a 3/4-inch-
diameter steel pressure regulator control line at a regulator station. The backhoe, which was owned and
operated by the city of Centralia, was being used to clean a ditch located adjacent to the pressure regulator
station. The high-pressure gas entering customer piping systems in some cases resulted in high pilot light
flames which initiated fires in buildings; while in other cases, the pilot light flames were blown out, allowing
gas to escape within the buildings. Of the 167 buildings affected by the overpressure, 12 were destroyed and
32 sustained moderate to heavy damages. Five persons received minor injuries.[319]
1982 – An LPG pipeline was ruptured by road construction in North Richland Hills, Texas on April 16. 800
to 1,000 nearby residents were evacuated. There was no fire. The construction crew workers said the
pipeline was 5 feet (1.5 m) away from where it was shown on a map they were using.[320]
1982 A backhoe ruptured a 2 inch-diameter gas pipeline in three places in Tacoma, Washington, causing
evacuations. There was no fire or explosion.[321]
1982 On June 28, a natural gas explosion demolished a house, killed five persons, and critically injured one
person in Portales, New Mexico; the critically injured person died later at a burn treatment center. The gas
service line to the house had been damaged 37 days earlier when a contractor's backhoe pulled up the line
during conduit excavation work for the local telephone company.[322]
1982 On September 7, natural gas at 15 psig escaping from the open ends of a 2 1/4-inch cast-iron gas
main located in a deep, narrow excavation in Dublin, Georgia, was ignited by an unknown source. Four City
of Dublin gas department employees who were working in the excavation were critically burned. [323]
1982 – On October 1, a steel plate, which had been welded by a work crew to cap temporarily the open
end of a section of a 22-inch diameter gas transmission pipeline, blew off at an initial pressure of possibly
260 psig. Escaping natural gas from the pipeline, which had accumulated due to a leak in a nearby gate
valve, ignited almost immediately and the entire work area and a portion of U.S. Route 65 were momentarily
engulfed in flames. Seven persons who were working to replace a section of the pipeline under the road

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about 2 miles (3.2 km) south of Pine Bluff, Arkansas, were burned.[324]
1982 On October 29, a crew mechanic working on new gas service lines at Burke, Virginia, was overcome
by leaking gas and died.[325]
1982 On November 4, a tile plow installing field drainage tile on a farm located 4 miles (6.4 km) west of
Hudson, Iowa, struck and punctured a well-marked, 20-inch natural gas transmission pipeline. Natural gas
escaping at about 820 psig ignited immediately, and the ensuing fire killed five persons.[326][327]
1982 On December 8, a five-member crew was working on a gas compressor at Bonicord, Tennessee,
when a gas explosion occurred. All five crew members were injured seriously, but were able to evacuate the
building. One crew member died later that day, and two others died a few days later.[328]
1983 On February 1, a corroded gas service line caused a natural gas explosion and flash fire that destroyed
a house, killed two persons, and injured three persons in Pryor, Oklahoma, and damaged an adjacent
house.[329]
1983 A gas pipeline failed and caused a fire with flames 250 to 300 feet (91 m) tall near Marlow, Oklahoma
on February 15. There were no injuries.[330]
1983 An 8-inch-diameter LPG pipeline was hit by a rotating auger used for planting trees near West
Odessa, Texas. After several minutes, the escaping LPG at 1,060 psi ignited, killing 5 people and injuring 5
others. Flames went as high as 600 feet into the air.(March 15, 1983)[331][332][333]
1983 On March 27, a pump for a petroleum products pipeline broke, causing up to 420,000 gallons of
diesel fuel to spill into the Bowie River in Collins, Mississippi.[334][335]
1983 A 36-inch-diameter gas transmission pipeline exploded and burned in Caldwell, Ohio on May 21,
destroying two homes, burning 100 acres of vegetation, and closing nearby Interstate 77. There were three
minor injuries.[336]
1983 On June 4, a front loader accidentally dug into a 10-inch-diameter petroleum pipeline near Coeur
d'Alene, Idaho, spilling over 20,000 US gallons (76,000 L) of unleaded gasoline into a creek, killing
everything downstream for 3 miles.[337]
1983 A 16 inch diameter gas pipeline ruptures and burned near Athens, Texas, on July 19. A nearby section
of the same pipeline had ruptured the year before.[338]
1983 On September 23, gas service pressure surged up in a section of Boston, Massachusetts. 3 major
structure fires, numerous smaller fires, and an explosion at a restaurant followed. There was no serious
injuries. A flooded gas regulator vault was the cause.[339]
1983 A crude oil pipeline exploded and burned at an Oil Terminal in Lima, Ohio on December 26. [340]
1984 An 8 inch NGL pipeline near Hurst, Texas, was hit by a front loader, and the escaping gases ignited,
causing burns to the equipment operator. (February 28, 1984)[341]
1984 On June 19, six employees of a contractor working for Washington Gas Light Company (WGL) in
Rockville, Maryland, were using mechanical saws to cut a section of 22 inch diameter steel pipeline when
residual gas at atmospheric pressure in the isolated section of the pipeline was ignited. A flash fire ensued,
and four contractor employees who were operating the saws and a WGL superintendent were burned. [342]
1984 Two natural gas pipelines exploded and burned near Falls City, Texas.[343]
1984 On September 24, a failed gas main of ABS plastic caused an explosion and fire in Phoenix, Arizona.
5 people died and 7 others injured in the accident. Liquid in the pipe had caused it to break down.[344][345]
1984 A tugboat hit and ruptured a gas pipeline on the Houston Ship Channel on October 16. There were no
injuries, but the Channel was closed for a time.[346]
1984 Fast moving water in the Cado Creek near Durant, Oklahoma led to 2 pipelines being ruptured on

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October 27 & 28. About 1,500 barrels (240 m3) of petroleum were spilled.[347]
1984 On November 25, a 30-inch gas transmission pipeline, constructed in 1955 and operating at
1,000 psig pressure, ruptured at a location about three miles (5 km) west of Jackson, Louisiana. Gas
blowing from the rupture fractured the pipe into many pieces and created a hole in the earth about 90 feet
(27 m) long, 25 feet (7.6 m) wide, and 10 feet (3.0 m) deep. The escaping gas was quickly ignited by one of
several potential sources of ignition. The resulting fire incinerated an area extending from the rupture about
950 feet (290 m) north, 500 feet (150 m) south, and 180 feet (55 m) to the east and to the west. Within this
sparsely populated area, five persons involved with the pipeline construction work were killed, and 23
persons were injured. Additionally, several pieces of construction equipment were damaged extensively.
Lack of proper ground support under the pipeline when a nearby section of that pipeline was upgraded and
replaced was identified as a factor in the failure.[348][349][350]
1985 Natural gas from a leaking line traveled through soil and caused a massive gas explosion in El Paso,
Texas on January 8. Eleven people were injured, 2 homes were destroyed, and 88 other homes were
damaged by the blast.[351]
1985 On February 22, 1985, a police patrolman on routine patrol smelled strong natural gas odors in
Sharpsville, Pennsylvania. A gas serviceman was ordered to the scene. Before the serviceman arrived at the
site of the reported leak, the Sharpsville Inn and a connecting building exploded and burned, killing two
persons. Firefighters arriving on scene moments later encountered a second, smaller explosion, which injured
one firefighter. The delay in the gas serviceman getting to the incident was a contributing factor. [352]
1985 On April 5, a lightning caused computer malfunction resulted in a pipeline rupture that sent thousands
of gallons of gasoline into the Yellow Leaf Creek in Alabama.[353]
1985 A 30 inch diameter gas pipeline operating at about 960 psi, weakened by atmospheric corrosion,
ruptured, and tore out about 29 feet (8.8 m) of the carrier pipe, blew apart about 16 feet (4.9 m) of a 36-
inch-diameter casing pipe, blasted an opening across Kentucky State Highway 90, and cut out a pear-
shaped crater approximately 90 feet (27 m) long, 38 feet (12 m) wide, and 12 feet (3.7 m) deep near
Beaumont, Kentucky. 5 people were killed in one home, and 3 injured. The fireball from the incident could
be seen 20 miles away.(April 27, 1985)[354][355]
1985 Workers on the extension of the North Dallas Tollway ruptured a 12 inch gasoline pipeline on June 19,
causing a massive gasoline spill along a creek bed north of Dallas, Texas. The gasoline later ignited. One
person had moderate injuries, several office buildings were damaged by fire, and some automobiles were
damaged.[356]
1985 On July 23, in a rural area about 8 miles (13 km) south of Kaycee, Wyoming, a girth weld cracked
during a pipeline re-coating project on a 23-year-old, 8-inch-diameter pipeline. The cracked girth weld
allowed the release, atomization, and ignition of aircraft turbine fuel under 430 pounds pressure, killing one
person, burning six persons, destroying construction equipment.[357][358]
1985 A gasoline leak of up to 42,000 US gallons (160,000 L) from a ruptured 10 inch pipeline ignited on
August 2 in Indianapolis, Indiana, causing a 200-foot (61 m) high fireball that killed three people, and injured
3 others working to clean up the spill along a creek.[359][360]
1985 On September 23, a 12 inch diameter gasoline pipeline fitting was hit by a backhoe, and sprayed
about 35,000 US gallons (130,000 L) of gasoline 45 feet (14 m) into the air in Staten Island, New York.
There were evacuations, but no fire.[361]
1985 On December 6, a natural gas explosion and fire destroyed the River Restaurant in Derby,
Connecticut. Gas escaping from a broken gas main at a pressure of about 1 pound per square inch had
escaped, migrated into the restaurant basement, ignited, exploded, and burned. Of the 18 persons inside the

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restaurant at the time, 6 were killed and 12 were injured; 1 passerby and 1 firefighter were also injured.
After the accident the street adjacent to the restaurant was excavated where a 24 inch diameter sewer
system had just been installed; An 87-year-old, 3-inch diameter, cast-iron natural gas main was found
broken.[362]
1986 A 30 inch gas pipeline ruptured due to corrosion near Lancaster, Kentucky. 3 people had serious
burns, and 5 others had lesser injuries. External corrosion made worse by difficulties of Cathodic protection
in rocky soil was the cause. (February 21, 1986)[363][364]
1986 An 8 inch high-pressure petroleum pipeline ruptures in Muskegon County, Michigan on February 22,
spilling gasoline into creeks.[365]
1986 A backhoe snagged a natural gas distribution line in Fort Worth, TX, causing a break that leaked gas
into an unoccupied building. Later, that building exploded, injuring 22 people, destroying the unoccupied
building, and damaging 40 other buildings. 57 automobiles in the unoccupied building were damaged or
destroyed. (March 12, 1986)[366]
1986 A new water main was being installed in Chicago Heights, Illinois on March 13. While excavating, an
active gas service line was snagged. Gas company crews responded to the wrong site, causing delays in
getting the leaking gas line shut down. Just as crews finished closing the valve on the leaking line, the nearby
house exploded and began to burn; one of the two persons inside this house was killed, and the other was
injured. Two neighboring houses were damaged, and one gas company employee, two construction crew
members, and four persons in the general area were injured by the explosion and subsequent fire. Although
gas company personnel arrived on the scene approximately 10 minutes before the explosion and shut off the
gas at the meter, neither they nor the contractor's crew had made an effort to warn or evacuate the residents
of the house.[367]
1986 On June 28, a pipeline ruptured and spilled diesel fuel into Trail Creek in Michigan City, Indiana. The
fuel later ignited. Thousands of fish were killed.[368]
1986 Early on July 8, a Williams petroleum products pipeline ruptured in Mounds View, Minnesota.
Gasoline at 1,434 psi sprayed a residential area around 4:20 am local time, then ignited. A woman and her 7
year old daughter suffered fatal burns, at least two others were injured, and many homes damaged or
destroyed. Confusion by the pipeline company led to a delay in shutting down the pipeline. Electrical
resistance welded (ERW) seam failure caused the rupture. During a hydrostatic test of this pipeline following
the accident, 7 ERW seams failed. Studies of available data by OPS staff in early 1988 showed that ERW
seams have been involved in 145 service failures in both hazardous liquid and natural gas pipelines since
1970 to early 1988, and that of these failures, all but 2 occurred on pipe manufactured prior to
1970.[369][370][371][372][373][374]
1986 A gas transmission pipeline fails and burns in a compressor station near Prattville, Alabama, on July 12.
The fire spread by melting flange gaskets on 2 other gas transmission pipelines in the station. 4 homes and
several cars were destroyed in the following fire, with flames reaching 300 feet (91 m) high. There were no
injuries.[375]
1986 between 800 and 1200 residents were evacuated in East Chicago, Indiana after a gasoline tank at a
pipeline Terminal ruptured on September 4. 28 people were overcome by gasoline fumes. There was no
fire.[376]
1986 A petroleum products pipeline failed near Billings, Montana, causing the evacuation of nearby
businesses. There was no fire.[377]
1986 On September 8, a pipeline failed under the Red River near Gainesville, Texas. Fumes from the
pipeline sent 14 to hospitals for treatment.[378]

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1986 A 30 inch diameter natural gas pipe line under Pelahatchie Bay in Mississippi exploded near the
water's edge on the north shore of the bay on December 6.[379]
1986 On December 25, a pipeline ruptures and spills furnace oil into the Des Plaines River near Chicago,
Illinois. About 1,000 US gallons (3,800 L) of furnace oil was spilled. Corrosion seemed to cause the pipeline
failure.[380]
1987 A petroleum pipeline ruptured and burned near Corsicana, Texas on March 12, forcing the closure of
an Interstate highway, and cause some evacuations.[381]
1987 A work crew burning the remains of a house near Ladysmith, Virginia ruptured a nearby petroleum
products pipeline with a bulldozer on March 26, igniting diesel fuel from the line. 2 of the worker were
injured.[382]
1987 On April 4, an LPG pipeline exploded at a Terminal in Iowa City, Iowa. Due to the fire spreading to a
pipeline for nearby underground gas storage, residents within a 2 1/2 mile radius of the Terminal were
evacuated for a time. The fire burned until April 20. The cause was an ERW seam failure in a pipeline.
During a hydrostatic test of that pipeline, 20 more pipeline segment seams failed.[383][384][385]
1987 On June 11, a "rock ripper" at a construction site punctured a 32 inch petroleum products pipeline in
Centreville, Virginia. Gasoline sprayed from the rupture, but there was no fire. More than 15,500 US gallons
(59,000 L) of gasoline were released. Thirteen emergency response personnel suffered from exposure to the
gasoline fumes.[386]
1987 In July, a fishing vessel, working in shallow waters off Louisiana, the menhaden purse seiner Sea Chief,
struck and ruptured an 8" natural gas liquids pipeline operating at 480 psi. The resulting explosion killed two
crew members. Divers investigating found that the pipe, installed in 1968, was covered with only 6" of soft
mud, having lost its original 3-foot (0.91 m) cover of sediments.[387]
1987 On July 23, a construction crew working on an Interstate 90 project east of Coeur d'Alene, Idaho
struck the 10 inch diameter Yellowstone Pipeline, causing a leaking that sprayed out over 200 barrels
(32 m3) of gasoline. The pipeline was supposed to have 30 inches of soil cover, but had only 2 inches of
cover. There was no fire.[388]
1987 A gas leak on a busy road in Wilmington, North Carolina suddenly ignited while gas company workers
were trying to plug that leak, burning them and firefighters on standby nearby in August. 19 people were
burned, with a fire department Assistant Chief later dying from the burns he received.[389]
1988 On January 5, a Colonial Pipeline mainline ruptured, spilling about 100,000 gallons of home heating oil
in Deptford, New Jersey. The cause of the pipeline failure was corrosion.[390][391]
1988 The rupture of a large interstate gas line at Pocono Ridge development in Lehman Township,
Pennsylvania, left a crater about 8 feet (2.4 m) deep and ejected a 6-foot (1.8 m) section of pipe over the
treetops before it landed 50 yards away. One hundred thirty people were evacuated. No one was
injured.[215]
1988 On January 18, a natural gas explosion destroyed the building housing the K&W Cafeteria and the
lobby of the Sheraton Motor Inn at Winston-Salem, North Carolina. Two adjoining motel wings suffered
structural damage. Of the four persons in the lobby/cafeteria building at the time of the explosion, three
sustained minor injuries. The fourth person sustained a fractured ankle. One motel guest also sustained minor
cuts.[392]
1988 On February 8, an offshore pipeline near Galveston, Texas, that may have been damaged by an
anchor, ruptures, spilling about 15,576 barrels (2,476.4 m3) of crude oil into the Gulf.[393]
1988 On April 9, a 20 inch diameter crude oil pipeline failed in a Peoria County, Illinois subdivision. About
200,000 US gallons (760,000 L) of crude were spilled, contaminating 2 private lakes.[394]
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1988 A pair of MAPCO LPG/NGL pipelines failed in an explosion south of Topeka, Kansas on July 22.
200 nearby residents had to be evacuated, and there was serious damage to US Route 75 nearby from the
explosion & following fire. An ERW seam selective corrosion failure in one of the pipelines caused the
failure.[395][396]
1988 On August 31, a gas company crew struck and ruptured a fitting on a 4-inch plastic gas main in Green
Oaks, Illinois. While the crew was attempting to excavate a nearby valve to shut off the flow of gas, the
backhoe struck an unmarked power cable. The gas ignited and four gas company employees were
injured.[397]
1988 A crude oil pipeline ruptured, spilling about 132,000 gallons of crude oil in Encino, California on
September 10. The crude flowed into storm drains, and then into the Los Angeles River. Electrical
interference to Cathodic protection from other pipelines was suspected to have cause the corrosion that
caused the failure. The crude oil pipeline was on top of a steel water pipeline, which would directly interfere
with Cathodic protection efforts.[398][399][400][401][402]
1988 On September 16, a natural gas explosion in Overland Park, Kansas, involved gas leaking from
corrosion holes in the customer-owned line. Gas migrated underground to the house and was ignited. The
house was destroyed and the four residents were injured.[403]
1988 In November, corrosion of a 14-inch underground pipeline owned and operated by the Shell Oil
Company, a predecessor of Shell Pipeline Corporation (Shell), resulted in the release of an estimated
120,000 US gallons (450,000 L) of gasoline. A pool of gasoline about 450 feet (140 m) by 50 feet (15 m)
appeared among fields of corn and soybeans. The site of the release was in Limestone Township in
Kankakee County, about 4 miles (6.4 km) west of Kankakee, Illinois. Approximately 2,100 people live
within a 1-mile (1.6 km) radius of the November 1988 release point.[404]
1988 On November 25, natural gas explosion and fire in Kansas City, Missouri, involving a break in a
customer owned service line at a threaded joint that was affected by corrosion. One person was killed and
five persons injured in the explosion that severely damaged the residence.[403]
1988 A Koch Industries and Ashland Oil subsidiary 16 inch diameter crude oil pipeline failed near
Dellwood, Minnesota, spilling about 200,000 US gallons (760,000 L) of crude on a farm. Snow
complicated the cleanup. The leak occurred late December 1, but was not discovered until early December
2. An ERW seam fatigue crack caused the failure.[405][406][407]
1988 A 22 inch diameter crude oil pipeline ruptures near Vienna, Missouri on December 24, spilling more
than 860,000 US gallons (3,300,000 L) of crude oil into the Gasconade River. A pipeline worker in
Oklahoma failed to notice the pipeline's plummeting pressure gauges for at least two hours. An ERW seam
defect in the pipe was determined to be the cause of the failure.[408][409]
1989 A crude oil pipeline rupture on January 24 in Winkler County, Texas spills over 23,000 barrels
(3,700 m3) of oil. 6 acres (24,000 m2) of land were covered in oil, and groundwater was contaminated.[410]
1989 February 10, a natural gas explosion and fire in Oak Grove, Missouri, involved the failure of a
customer owned service line at a threaded joint. Two persons were killed and their house was destroyed in
the explosion.[403]
A leaking gas distribution line caused an explosion in Topeka, Kansas on March 25, killing one person. This
was the latest in a string of gas distribution line failures that lead to an NTSB investigation into the regional
gas company. 600,000 gas services lines were replaced as a result of the investigation.[411]
1989 On May 25, a petroleum products pipeline failed, after the San Bernardino train disaster, California.
Damage from a train derailment cleanup caused a CalNev petroleum products pipeline to rupture, spraying
nearby homes with gasoline. Three were killed, 31 were injured, and 15 homes were damaged or destroyed

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in following fire.[412][413][414]
1989 A crude oil gathering pipeline ruptures near Craig, Colorado on June 2, spilling 10,000 US gallons
(38,000 L) of crude into the Yampa River. Federal maintenance oversight of gathering pipelines ended in
1985.[415]
1989 On October 3, the United States menhaden' fishing vessel NORTHUMBERLAND, owned and
operated by the Zapata Haynie Corporation (vessel owner), was backing and maneuvering in 9 to 11 feet
(3.4 m) of water when the stern of the vessel struck and ruptured an offshore 16 inch natural gas
transmission pipeline. Natural gas under 835 pounds per square inch pressure was released. An
undetermined source on board the vessel ignited the gas, and within seconds, the entire vessel was engulfed
in flames. The fire on the vessel burned until 4:30 a.m. on October 4, when it burned itself out. Leaking gas
from the pipeline also continued to burn until the flow of gas subsided and the fire self-extinguished about
6 a.m. on October 4. Eleven of fourteen crew members died as a result of the accident.[416]
1989 An explosion at a valve in a natural gas processing station on October 25 near Evanston, Wyoming
kills one worker, and injures 4 others.[417]
1989 A farmer hit a propane pipeline near Butler, Illinois on December 8, forcing evacuation of that town.
There was no fire.[418]
1989 On December 18, a Colonial Pipeline petroleum pipeline failed near Locust Grove, Virginia. 212,000
US gallons (800,000 L) of kerosene spilled into the Rapidan and Rappahannock Rivers. On New Year's
Eve, following a rapid thaw and heavy rains, containment dams broke and kerosene flowed downstream
toward Fredericksburg, Virginia. Fish and game were killed, the City's water supply was cut off, and
drinking water had to be hauled from Stafford County for seven days. This was the seventh major leak from
Colonial Pipeline in Virginia since 1973.[419][420]
1989 New York City Con Edison Steam Pipe explosion, rupture killing three people in the 3rd
Ave./Gramercy Park area.

1990s
1990 On January 2, an Exxon underwater pipeline located at the mouth of Morse Creek discharged
approximately 13,500 barrels (2,150 m3) of No. 2 heating oil into the Arthur Kill waterway between New
Jersey and Staten Island, New York.[421][422]
1990 A propane pipeline ruptured and burned, near North Blenheim, New York, on March 13. Stress from
previous work done on the pipeline caused a pipeline rupture and vapor cloud that moved downhill into a
town. Two people were killed, seven persons injured, and more than $4 million in property damage and
other costs resulted when the cloud ignited.[423][424][425]
1990 on March 30, a 10-inch-diameter pipeline, ruptured from overstress due to a landslide in Freeport,
Pennsylvania, resulting in the release of approximately 1,300 barrels (210 m3) of mixed petroleum products.
Spilled petroleum products entered Knapp's Run, a small creek emptying into the Allegheny River and,
eventually, the Ohio River. The product release resulted in extensive ground and water pollution and
interrupted the use of the Allegheny River as a water supply for several communities. Damage to the pipeline
and environmental cleanup and restoration costs exceeded $12 million.[386]
1990 On May 6, a spool on a pipeline ruptured off of the Louisiana coast. 13,600 barrels (2,160 m3) of
crude oil were estimated to have spilled.[426]
1990 On August 29, a private contractor laying conduit for underground power lines ruptured a pipeline that
fouled a Western Branch creek with diesel fuel in Chesapeake, Virginia. Over 67,000 US gallons (250,000
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L) of fuel were spilled.[427]

1990 On August 29, a natural gas explosion and fire destroyed two row houses and damaged two adjacent
houses and three parked cars in Allentown, Pennsylvania. One person was killed, and nine people, including
two firefighters, were injured. A cracked gas main, that was stressed by soil erosion from a nearby broken
water line, was the cause of the gas leak.[428][429]
1990 On November 5, a crude oil pipeline ruptures near Ethel, Missouri, fouling over 35 miles (56 km) of
the Chariton River. 44,000 to 66,000 US gallons (250,000 L) of crude were spilled.[430]
1990 At least 3 leaks that spill over a thousand gallons of oil were found in a pipeline in Cerritos, California,
it was announced on November 23. One of the failed section of pipeline was 6 to 7 years old.[431]
1990 On December 9, a gas system valve between one of Fort Benjamin Harrison Indianapolis, Indiana gas
distribution systems and a discontinued steel gas system segment was inadvertently opened, allowing natural
gas to enter residential buildings that had previously received their gas from the discontinued segment. Gas
accumulating in Building 1025 of Harrison Village was ignited by one of many available sources, and the
resulting explosion killed 2 occupants and injured 24 other persons One building was destroyed, and two
were damaged,[432]
1991 On January 31, a Mobil Company crude oil pipeline ruptured near Valencia, California, spilling up to
75,000 gallons of crude oil. The same day, a report was released showing that particular pipeline had a
99.8% chance of a leak in the next 5 years.[433][434][435]
1991 A Lakehead (now Enbridge) crude oil pipeline near Grand Rapids, Minnesota ruptured on March 2.
More than 40,000 barrels of crude went into the Prairie River. About 4 million US gallons (15,000 m3) of oil
had spilled from that pipeline from the early 1970s to 1991, per Minnesota records. A resident in the area
noticed the smell of oil and alerted the local fire department. Approximately 300 people living in homes near
the site were evacuated for safety, but were allowed to return to their homes later in the
night.[192][436][437][438][439][440]
1991 A ruptured propane pipeline on March 2 forced the evacuation of 2,500 from several subdivisions in
Richland County, South Carolina for a time. There was no fire.[441]
1991 On June 29, over 60,000 US gallons (230,000 L) of fuel oil and gasoline leaked from a 10 inch
diameter Koch Industries pipeline in Carson, Wisconsin from a 3 inch crack. A previous significant leak had
occurred on this pipeline in that area the year before. Local officials urged Koch to upgrade it's leak
monitoring equipment. Koch later replaced 12 miles (19 km) of that pipeline in the area[442][443][444][445][446]
1991 On July 17, workers were removing a corroded segment of the Consumers Power Company’s (CP)
10-inch-diameter transmission line pipeline in Mapleton, Michigan. As a segment of the pipeline was being
removed, natural gas at 360-psig pressure exerted about 12 tons of force on an adjacent closed valve (H-
143), causing it and a short segment of connected pipe to move and separate from an unanchored
compression coupling. The force of the escaping gas killed one worker (a welder), injured five other
workers, and collapsed a steel pit that housed valve H-143.[447]
1991 About 42,000 US gallons (160,000 L) of crude oil spilled from a broken pipeline at a barge facility at
High Island, Texas on September 5.[448]
1991 On December 19, a 36-inch-diameter Colonial Pipeline ruptured from prior excavation damage about
2.8 miles (4.5 km) downstream of the pipeline's Simpsonville, South Carolina, pump station. The rupture
allowed more than 500,000 US gallons (1,900,000 L) of diesel fuel to flow into Durbin Creek, causing
environmental damage that affected 26 miles (42 km) of waterways, including the Enoree River, which flows
through Sumter National Forest. The spill also forced Clinton and Whitmire, South Carolina, to use
alternative water supplies.[386][449]
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1991 On December 28, two explosions in rapid succession occurred in apartment No. 3 of a two-story,
eight-apartment, wood-frame structure in Santa Rosa, California. Two people were killed and three others
were injured. Fire after the explosions destroyed that apartment and three other apartments in the front of the
building.[450]
1992 A pipeline offshore of Grand Island, Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico leaked thousands of gallons of
crude oil.[451]
1992 On January 17, while a gas company crew was doing routine annual maintenance work at a regulator
stations in Chicago, Illinois, high-pressure gas entered a low-pressure system. The gas—under as much as
10 psig of pressure—escaped through gas appliances into homes and other buildings, where it was ignited by
several unidentified sources. The resulting explosion and fires killed 4 people, injured 4, and damaged 14
houses and 3 commercial buildings.[452]
1992 On April 7, a salt dome cavern used to store LPG & similar products was overfilled, leading to an
uncontrolled release of highly volatile liquids (HVLs) from a salt dome storage cavern near Brenham, Texas,
formed a large, heavier-than-air gas cloud that later exploded. Three people died from injuries sustained
either from the blast or in the following fire. An additional 21 people were treated for injuries at area
hospitals. Damage from the accident exceeded $9 million.[453][454][455]
1992 A natural gas explosion destroyed a house in Catskill (town), New York, on November 6. The two-
story wood-frame house had not had active gas service since 1969. The explosion killed a woman in the
house, seriously injured her daughter, and slightly injured two children in a neighboring house. Gas had
escaped from a nearby cracked gas main.[456]
1992 On December 3, a ruptured natural gas liquid pipeline caused a vapor cloud to drift across I-70 near
Aurora, Colorado. The Cloud later ignited, burning 6 motorists.[457][458][459]
1993 On March 28, a pressurized 36-inch-diameter (910 mm) petroleum product pipeline owned and
operated by Colonial Pipeline Company ruptured near Hemdon, Virginia. The rupture created a geyser
which sprayed diesel fuel over 75 feet (23 m) into the air, coating overhead powerlines and adjacent trees,
and misting adjacent Virginia Electric Power Company buildings. The diesel fuel spewed from the rupture
into an adjacent storm water management pond and flowed overland and through a network of storm sewer
pipes before reaching Sugarland Run Creek, a tributary of the Potomac River. The cause was latent third
party damage.[460][461]
1993 On April 6, a crude oil pipeline ruptured & spill up to 125,000 gallons of crude oil into a stream bed in
Kern County, California, forcing a temporary closure of the nearby Golden State Freeway. [462]
1993 On June 9, a cinder block duplex at in Cliffwood Beach, New Jersey, exploded as a New Jersey
Natural Gas Company (NJNG) contractor was trenching in front of the building. The explosion killed 3
residents of the duplex, and seriously injured 3 others.[463]
1993 On July 22, a city of St. Paul Department of Public Works backhoe hooked and pulled apart a
Northern States Power Company (NSP) high-pressure gas service line in St. Paul, Minnesota. An explosion
and natural gas-fueled fire resulted about 20 minutes after the backhoe hooked the service line. The
explosion force caused part of the building to land on and flatten an automobile traveling southwest on East
Third Street, and the driver died instantly. The explosion and ensuing fire also killed an apartment occupant
and a person outside the building and injured 12 people.[464]
1993 On July 26, a 6-inch pipeline in Nebraska was exposed by scour in a creek bed and its banks, and
was struck by flood debris, which caused it to rupture. The rupture resulted in the release of 2,203 barrels
(350.2 m3) of anhydrous ammonia [465]
1993 An ammonia pipeline failed in Sperry, Oklahoma on August 20. 80 homes in the area were evacuated.

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Several people were treated for ammonia inhalation injuries.[466]

1993 On November 3, Amoco Pipeline was fined $12,500 for a 1971 pipeline leak that contaminated a
drinking well and caused other pollution problems for people living near Garfield, Minnesota. [467]
1993 On December 2, a 10 inch diameter Conoco pipeline ruptured, spilling 8,400 US gallons (32,000 L)
of gasoline into a creek in Washington, Missouri.[468]
1993 An explosion and fire on a gas transmission pipeline on December 20, near Mellen, Wisconsin, cut off
the gas supply to 3,500 customers in the area.[469]
1994 In January, a pipeline ruptures, dumping almost 162,500 US gallons (615,000 L) of oil in a river, the
Marais des Cygnes River in Osawatomie, Kansas. In addition to a $804,700 fine, BP Amoco agreed to
spend at least $145,300 on a supplemental environmental project involving reconstruction improvements to
Osawatomie's water intake.[470]
1994 On February 1, the third explosion in 7 years hit a LPG/NGL pipeline Terminal in Iowa City, Iowa. 11
workers at the Terminal escaped injury, and 6 families within 1 1/2 miles of the Terminal were evacuated.
The 2 previous explosions were in 1987 and 1989.[471]
1994 The Texas Eastern Transmission Corporation Natural Gas Pipeline Explosion and Fire : Previous
damage caused a 36 inch diameter natural gas transmission pipeline to rupture at Edison, New Jersey on
March 23, 1994. Several apartment buildings were destroyed in the massive fire. One woman died of a
heart attack, and at least 93 others had minor injuries. Delays in shutting off one of the pipeline's valves was
cited as contributing to the damage.[472]
1994 A 2-inch-diameter steel gas service line that had been exposed during excavation separated at a
compression coupling about 5 feet (1.5 m) from the wall of a retirement home in Allentown, Pennsylvania on
June 9. The escaping gas flowed underground, passed through openings in the building foundation, migrated
to other floors, and exploded. The accident resulted in 1 fatality, 66 injuries, and more than $5 million in
property damage.[473]
1994 A residents near O'Fallon, Missouri detected a petroleum smell, early on September 22. The local Fire
Department was called several hours later, and noticed an oily mist in the area, and found a leaking pipeline.
The owner of the 10 inch diameter petroleum products later claimed the spill volume was less than 1,000 US
gallons (3,800 L), but later calculations and batch volume measurements indicate a spill of 29,000 to 37,000
US gallons (140,000 L). EPA officials later admit someone lied about the spill volume. Over the next 10
years, 8 attempts at remediation were made, before the O'Day Creek was cleaned of all petroleum
products.[474][475]
1994 On October 8, a lightning strike shut a valve on a crude oil pipeline, while the oil was flowing, triggering
a pressure buildup that ripped a 50-square-inch hole in a section of the pipe that was already weakened by
corrosion. Pipeline employees — unaware of the rupture in the pipe — turned on the pumps after the
pipeline shut down automatically, sending oil pouring into the creek for about an hour. The spill created a 12-
mile (19 km)-long slick on Nueces and Corpus Christi bays along the Texas Gulf Coast. Nearly seven years
later, delicate coastal marshes that serve as a nursery for shrimp, flounder, crabs and other marine life have
not fully recovered. The estimated spill size was 2,151 barrels (342.0 m3), but that was debated as being too
small a size. The pipeline eventually agreed to pay more than $45 million in damages. [476]
1994 In October, record high flooding along the San Jacinto River in Texas lead to the failure of 8 pipelines
crossing that river. Due to the flooding many other pipelines were also undermined. More than 35,000
barrels (5,600 m3) of petroleum and petroleum products were released into the river. Ignition of the released
products resulted in 547 people receiving (mostly minor) burn and inhalation injuries. Spill response costs
exceeded $7 million, and estimated property damage losses were about $16 million.[477][478]
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9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

1994 A natural gas explosion and fire destroyed a one-story, wood frame building in Waterloo, Iowa on
October 17. The force of the explosion scattered debris over a 200-foot (61 m) radius. 6 persons inside the
building died, and one person sustained serious injuries. 3 persons working in an adjacent building sustained
minor injuries when a wall of the building collapsed inward from the force of the explosion. The explosion
also damaged nine parked cars. A person in a vehicle who had just exited the adjacent building suffered
minor injuries. Additionally, two firefighters sustained minor injuries during the emergency response. Two
other nearby buildings also sustained structural damage and broken windows.[479][480]
1994 A leak of at least 20,000 US gallons (76,000 L) of diesel fuel was discovered on a Koch Industries
pipeline near Plover, Wisconsin on November 29. The leak brought this pipeline's total spill volume to
100,000 US gallons (380,000 L) on a 91 miles (146 km) pipeline section through several years.[481]
1995 Since starting operations in 1954 until 1995, Yellowstone Pipeline had 71 leaks along the Flathead
Indian Reservation in Montana, spilling 3,500,000 US gallons (13,000,000 L) of petroleum products.
Eventually, the Flathead refused to sign a new lease with Yellowstone.[482]
1995 A 26 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline ruptured and burned near Castle Rock, Washington on
March 6. There were no injuries.[483]
1995 On March 20, a natural gas transmission pipeline leaked and burned near Chipola, Louisiana. There
were no injuries reported.[484]
1995 On March 27, a bulldozer operator ruptured a 40 inch diameter gas transmission pipeline in
Huntersville, North Carolina, causing an explosion. The operator was knocked off the bulldozer, then was
run over by the driverless bulldozer.[485]
1995 On December 2, 3 contractors were killed, and another injured, when a vacuum used to control
flammable fumes accidentally reversed during welding at a pipeline facility near McCamey, Texas. [486]
1995 A bulldozer hit a 16 inch diameter gas pipeline in North Attleboro, Massachusetts on December 9,
forcing evacuations of a nearby shopping mall. An estimated 40,000 people were evacuated.[487][488]
1995 On December 19, a gas explosion at a twin dwelling in Norristown, Pennsylvania, killed 2 people and
injured another person. Gas had migrated from a crack in a 6 inch cast iron gas main in the street. [486]
1996 A gas pipeline failure excised a 30-foot (9.1 m) section of pipe, and the gas later ignited, causing a
vegetation fire in East Stroudsburg, Pennsylvania on January 6. Later inspections found numerous flaws on
this pipeline.[489]
1996 On February 5, a pipeline ruptured and spilled diesel fuel into a creek in Fairview Heights,
Missouri.[490]
1996 A 20 inch diameter pipeline ruptured at a location near Gramercy, Louisiana, on May 23, 1996. The
ruptured pipeline ultimately released about 475,000 US gallons (1,800,000 L) of gasoline into a common
pipeline right-of-way and marsh land. Gasoline also entered the Blind River, causing environmental damage
and killing fish, wildlife, and vegetation in the area. The pipeline controller did not at first recognize the
pipeline had failed, and continued to ignore alarms from the pipeline SCADA system.[491]
1996 A 36 inch diameter Colonial Pipeline ruptured at the Reedy River, near Fork Shoals, South Carolina,
June 26. The ruptured pipeline released about 957,600 US gallons (3,625,000 L) of fuel oil into the Reedy
River and surrounding areas. The spill polluted a 34-mile (55 km) stretch of the Reedy River, causing
significant environmental damage. Floating oil extended about 23 miles (37 km) down the river.
Approximately 35,000 fish were killed, along with other aquatic organisms and wildlife. The estimated cost
to Colonial Pipeline for cleanup and settlement with the State of South Carolina was $20.5 million. No one
was injured in the accident. The pipeline was operating at reduced pressure due to know corrosion issues,
but pipeline operator confusion led to an accidental return to normal pressure in that pipeline section, causing

en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_pipeline_accidents_in_the_United_States 29/52
9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

the rupture.[492][493]
1996 On August 4, 420,000 US gallons (1,600,000 L) of unspecified petroleum product spilled from a
Lakehead pipe near Donaldson, Minnesota.[436]
1996 A Koch butane pipeline ruptured, causing an explosion and fire, near Kemp, Texas, on August 24.
Two teenagers were killed after driving into the unseen butane cloud while going to report the pipeline leak.
A mobile home was also destroyed by the fire. The leak was caused by external corrosion. The pipeline was
only 15 years old at the time.[494][495][496][497]
1996 On October 23, in Tiger Pass, Louisiana, the crew of a Bean Horizon Corporation dredge dropped a
stern spud into the bottom of the channel in preparation for dredging operations. The spud struck and
ruptured a 12-inch-diameter submerged natural gas steel pipeline. The pressurized natural gas released from
the pipeline enveloped the stern of the dredge and an accompanying tug, then ignited, destroying the dredge
and the tug. No fatalities resulted from the accident.[498][499]
1996 A Colonial Pipeline stubline in Murfreesboro, Tennessee was undergoing maintenance on November
5. The pipeline was returned to service, but a valve on that pipeline was accidentally left closed from the
maintenance, causing pressure to rupture the pipeline.[500]
1996 On November 21, an explosion occurred in a shoe store and office building in Rio Piedras, Puerto
Rico. Thirty-three people were killed, and at least 69 were injured. Crews from the local gas provider,
Enron, had not found any gas leaks previously, despite complaints of propane odor in the buildings.[501]
1997 A leak was detected on a 12 inch diameter pipeline near Mount Morris, Illinois on May 9. Between
125,000 and 130,000 US gallons (490,000 L) of gasoline were spilled. A month later, gasoline was till being
extracted from the area.[502]
1997 On May 30, Colonial Pipeline spilled approximately 18,900 US gallons (72,000 L) of gasoline, some
of which entered an unnamed creek and its adjoining shoreline in the Bear Creek watershed near Athens,
Georgia. During the spill, a vapor cloud of gasoline formed, causing several Colonial employees to flee for
safety. This spill resulted from a calculation error related to a regular procedure. No one checked the
calculations, nor did Colonial have a procedure in place to check such calculations. [493]
1997 A gas pipeline rupture and fire, in Indianapolis, Indiana, on July 21. A 20-inch-diameter steel natural
gas transmission pipeline ruptured and released natural gas near an intersection adjoining the Charter Pointe
subdivision. The gas ignited and burned, killing one resident and injuring another. About 75 residents
required temporary shelter. Six homes were destroyed, and about 65 others sustained damage significant
enough to be documented by the local investigation team. A nearby directional drilling operation had hit &
weakened the pipeline before the failure.[503]
1997 In August, residents in Vacaville, California noticed petroleum fumes, but a leaking pipeline was not
found until September 10. A hairline crack from the pipe's manufacturing was the cause, and 20,000 to
60,000 US gallons (230,000 L) of petroleum products had leaked by the time the source was found.[504]
1997 Over a period of years, more than 420,000 US gallons (1,600,000 L) of gasoline spilled from small
leaks in Colonial Pipeline near Darling Creek in St. Helena Parish, Louisiana, before Colonial finally
discovered the leak in December 1997. As of September 1999, a plume of gasoline, including leaded
gasoline, extended over approximately 14 acres (57,000 m2) on the groundwater surface, more than 60
acres (240,000 m2) of groundwater had been contaminated, and some of the gasoline had entered Darling
Creek.[493]
1998 On January 23, at least 800 barrels (130 m3) of light crude oil was spilled into the Gulf of Mexico 50
miles (80 km) south of Galveston, Texas by a leaking pipeline.[505]
1998 A rupture in Colonial Pipeline in a landfill at Sandy Springs, Georgia, discovered on March 30,
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9/24/12 List of pipeline accidents in the United States - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

resulted in the release of more than 30,000 US gallons (110,000 L) of gasoline. When the pipe was
excavated, it was found to be buckled and cracked. The NTSB found that the pipeline ruptured because of
settlement of soil and trash underneath the pipeline.[506]
1998 On April 4, a tow of the M/V Anne Holly, comprising 12 loaded and 2 empty barges, which was
traveling northbound on the Mississippi River through the St. Louis Harbor, struck the Missouri-side pier of
the center span of the Eads Bridge. Three of these barges drifted toward the President Casino on the
Admiral, a permanently moored vessel below the bridge on the Missouri side of the river. A natural gas leak
resulted when the natural gas supply line to the Admiral was severed in the course of the accident. When the
line broke, natural gas began escaping. Although the escaping gas did not ignite, the gas leak had continued
for about 3 hours before being stopped.[507]
1998 In South Riding, Virginia, on July 7, a natural gas explosion and fire destroyed a newly constructed
residence in the South Riding community in Loudoun County, Virginia. A family consisting of a husband and
wife and their two children were spending their first night in their new home at the time of the explosion. As a
result of the accident, the wife was killed, the husband was seriously injured, and the two children received
minor injuries. Five other homes and two vehicles were damaged.[508]
1998 Lightning struck a Florida Gas Transmission Co. natural gas compressor plant near Perry, Florida on
August 13, causing an explosion and massive fire. A second explosion later followed, injuring 5 firefighters &
pipeline company employees. 6 nearby homes were also destroyed.[509]
1998 On September 22, a 8,810 barrels (1,401 m3) crude oil spill from a Lakehead (now Enbridge)
pipeline near Plummer, Minnesota was caused by an excavator hitting that pipeline. [510]
1998 On December 3, a natural gas liquids pipeline near Moab, Utah failed and ignited near Highway U-
191, injuring 4 pipeline workers. Asphalt in the road was melted, and traffic was stopped.[511]
1998 A natural gas pipeline rupture and subsequent explosion, in St. Cloud, Minnesota, on December 11.
While attempting to install a utility pole support anchor in a city sidewalk in St. Cloud, Minnesota, a
communications network installation crew struck and ruptured an underground, 1-inch-diameter, high-
pressure plastic gas service pipeline, thereby precipitating a natural gas leak. About 39 minutes later, while
utility workers and emergency response personnel were taking preliminary precautions and assessing the
situation, an explosion occurred. As a result of the explosion, 4 persons were fatally injured; 1 person was
seriously injured; and 10 persons, including 2 firefighters and 1 police officer, received minor injuries. Six
buildings were destroyed. Damage assessments estimated property losses at $399,000.[512]
1999 Natural Gas Explosion and Fire at a gas pressure station, Wytheville, Virginia, destroying a home and
motorcycle store.[513] (January 3, 1999)
1999 In Bridgeport, Alabama, on January 22, while digging a trench behind a building, a backhoe operator
damaged a 3/4-inch steel natural gas service line and a 1-inch water service line. This resulted in two leaks in
the natural gas service line, which was operated at 35 psig. One leak occurred where the backhoe bucket
had contacted and pulled the natural gas service line. The other was a physical separation of the gas service
line at an underground joint near the meter, which was close to the building. Gas migrated into a building
nearby, where it ignited. An explosion followed, destroying three buildings. Other buildings within a two-
block area of the explosion sustained significant damage. Three fatalities, five serious injuries, and one minor
injury resulted from this accident.[514]
1999 On January 23, a construction crew ruptured a 10 inch diameter petroleum products pipe near
Germantown, Wisconsin, spilling about 41,000 gallons of gasoline.[515][516]
1999 A pipeline rupture in Knoxville, Tennessee, and released over 53,000 US gallons (200,000 L) of
diesel fuel into the Tennessee River on February 9. A brittle-like crack was found on the pipe in an area of

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Engineering Sciences
Thermal Science
The Phoenix Series of Liquefied Natural Gas Pool Fires

Figure 1: LNG cargo carrier entering Boston harbor for offload.

Figure 2: Large scale LNG pool

fire experimental site.

Large-scale experiments Due to the growing demand for natural to reach a maximum value then decrease
gas nationwide, the number of liquefied to reach a limiting value with increasing
enable researchers to natural gas (LNG) tanker deliveries to U.S. diameter. For LNG, the limiting power is
ports (Figure 1) is expected to increase, thus uncertain. To fill the knowledge gaps and
examine big spills that would raising concerns about accidental spills or reduce uncertainty, it became necessary to
other events. The risks and hazards of a leverage Sandia’s considerable expertise in
occur from LNG tankers LNG spill will vary depending on its size, the thermal science to stage very large (> 25-m
environmental conditions, and the harbor. diameter) LNG pool fires that would surpass
Risks include not only harm to nearby by a factor of ten anything that had been
For more information:
people, but also significant property damage attempted previously.
Technical Contacts: and economic impact due to long-term To accomplish this task, the Sandia team
Thomas K. Blanchat interruptions in the LNG supply. Therefore, came up with a simple, low-cost concept
505-844-9061 methods to ensure the security of LNG of excavating a shallow 120-m diameter
[email protected] terminals and shipments in the event of an pool for the water, and then using the soil
incident are critical from both public safety to create a deep, insulated 310,000 gallon
Michael M. Hightower
and property perspectives. reservoir to hold the LNG needed for the test
505-844-5499
Much progress has been made in LNG (Figure 2). Concrete pipes from the center
[email protected] threat consequence and vulnerability of the reservoir transported the LNG to the
Science Matters Contact: assessment. A general approach to risk center of the water pool (Figure 3). A simple
Alan Burns evaluation has been developed, and is used removable plug allowed gravity to control
as a basis in site-specific risk assessments. the flow rate (Figure 4). The considerable
505-844-9642
However, there are significant knowledge safety issues were reservoir integrity,
[email protected]
gaps in the science of very large-scale thermal hazards (from cryogenic to extreme
LNG pool fires. These gaps create serious heat), asphyxiation, explosion, drowning,
uncertainties that may either under- or and aviation traffic. An advanced three-
over-estimate latent hazards. Generally, dimensional transport simulation was used
the surface emissive power of a pool fire to evaluate both the thermal performance
is a function of pool size and will increase of the reservoir and components, the
transport of gaseous boil-off during the cool-down process, results in that the fire diameter was smaller than the
and the design of the diffuser in the middle of the pool used spreading LNG pool diameter (Figure 5). Previous studies
to translate the linear momentum of the LNG in the pipes with stagnant pools in pans had resulted in fires the same
to a radially-spreading pool. Data was captured via cameras size as the pool. However, in all such studies, the pans have
(gyroscopically stabilized and suspended from helicopters), edges that can result in flame stabilization that would not be
spectroscopic diagnostics, and heat flux sensors. available on the open water. The data further showed that,
Experiments were completed on two LNG spills, with in both very light and significant cross-winds, the flame will
diameters of 25 m and 85 m. Datasets will now allow model stabilize on objects projecting out of the water, suggesting
development and validation for extrapolation to a scale that the ship itself will act as a flame holder.
expected for a spill (300-500 m). The data had unexpected

Figure 3: Schematic of test facility showing LNG reservoir (right), and concrete piping
going to the center of the pool.

Figure 5: Image of 85-m pool fire that shows flames not extending across
spreading (white area) LNG pool.

Figure 4: Schematic of gravity fed flow and removable plug in center of pool.

Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-program laboratory managed and operated by Sandia Corporation, a wholly owned
subsidiary of Lockheed Martin Corporation, for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security Administration
under contract DE-AC04-94AL85000. SAND2010-5893P
09/2010
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 Tanker Fires

ASSAM STATE FIRE SERVICE ORGANISATION

L.P.G. Tankers' Fire

On 1-11-1998, one L.P.G. Bullet Tanker caught fire at Khanapara, Guwahati, where there was a BLEVE
(Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) in which 8 persons died and 5 Fire Servie Officers and
men were injured seriously. Out of the the seriously injured, the Dy.Director(Tech.) Shri D.K.
Chakraborty died at the Hospital and one Sr.Station Officer, Shri Thaneswar Nath, survived
miraculously after a long treatment.

In this incident, 10 Water Tender Pumps alongwith 40 fire fighter fought the fire for more than 8 hours
and saved the densely populated area from further casualities.

Prepare for Worst if LNG Tankers Are Targeted<BR>

<IMG SRC="LNGtanker.jpeg" WIDTH=468 HEIGHT=210 X-CLARIS-USEIMAGEWIDTH X-
CLARIS-USEIMAGEHEIGHT BORDER=2 ALIGN=bottom></B></FONT></CENTER>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica"><B>By Craig Hooper</B></FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">For South Boston and Dorchester,

liquefied natural gas (LNG) is a permanent neighbor. Every
week tankers carrying combustible liquefied natural gas
trundle past Castle Island, heading toward the
Tractebel/Distrigas operated LNG receiving terminal in
Everett. These enormous ships, surrounded by a small
security armada, are hard to miss. So too is the colorful
Keyspan LNG Gas Tank, a long-standing landmark for travelers
on the Southeast Expressway. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Most local officials consider

Boston's liquefied natural gas infrastructure a potential
terror target. Last month, former White House official
Richard Clarke inflamed local fears by revealing, in his
tell-all book Against All Enemies, that al Qaeda associates
used Algerian LNG tankers as a conduit into Boston.
Reporters pounced on Clarke's claims and used a lot of ink
to detail indignant FBI or White House counterclaims.
Unfortunately, the stories offered scant analysis of the key
question behind Clarke's concern: Does liquefied natural gas
infrastructure endanger Boston? </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Natural gas infrastructure makes a

tempting economic target for adversaries seeking to wage
economic mischief. During the Cold War, Western operatives
duped Russian agents into purchasing booby-trapped
components for use in a natural gas pipeline. In June 1982,
the newly constructed pipeline blew up, producing, according
to former Air Force Secretary Thomas C. Reed, "the most
monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from
space." The explosion, detailed in a February New York Times

file:///C|/Users/Art/Desktop/LNG/1.%20SORT/WholeBay/Tanker%20Fires.html (1 of 4) [26/09/2012 4:39:05 PM]

Tanker Fires

column by William Safire, was estimated to have yielded an

explosion of 3 kilotons or better. Natural gas is not
something to be treated lightly.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">The natural gas industry insists

that any threat posed by LNG infrastructure is overestimated
and that the risk of an LNG-fueled explosion is limited. But
U.S. military leaders think otherwise, and treat LNG
facilities with extreme caution. When American military
planners discussed retaking Kuwait in 1991, the US Marine
Corps insisted a Kuwaiti LNG plant be destroyed before
committing troops near the facility. A proposal to
preemptively destroy the LNG plant was nixed by General
Schwarzkopf, who reportedly claimed, "I do not want to
destroy Kuwait in order to save it." In January of this
year, an explosion and fire at an Algerian natural gas
facility killed more than 20 people, offering further
evidence that liquefied natural gas can turn
lethal.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Keyspan's Gas Tank is the only

obvious piece of permanent liquefied natural gas
infrastructure in South Boston and Dorchester. The
thirty-year old facility, sitting quietly by I-93 and tucked
under the approaches to Logan Airport, has a relatively
spotless operational history. To Keyspan's credit, the LNG
tank has suffered only a handful of leaks due to minor
mechanical and human errors. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Keyspan contends that the tank

poses little danger to Dorchester. In the days after the
attacks of September 11, 2001, the Boston Globe reported
that Keyspan representative Mike Connors insisted the tank
could not explode and that heat from a fire at the tank
would not harm neighbors. Given that both the Boston Globe
and Boston Herald have since reported on studies that say
that an LNG fire can release enough heat in thirty seconds
to scorch unprotected skin a half-mile away, Keyspan may
well be relying upon outdated safety assumptions.
</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Is the double-walled Keyspan gas

tank tough enough to take on present-day terrorists? One
popular terrorist weapon, the modern, hand-held anti-tank
grenade launcher, is becoming increasingly powerful. The
2004-2005 issue of Jane's Infantry Weapons, a compendium of
modern weaponry, suggests that a light-weight, easily hidden
rocket-propelled grenade called an RPG-7, can, when firing a
modern warhead, penetrate over three feet of
military-quality armor and break through more than a meter

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Tanker Fires

of reinforced concrete. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">On land, the rocket threat can be

beaten. At the Keyspan LNG tank, a variety of tasteful and
relatively inexpensive steps can quickly make Dorchester's
liquefied natural gas tank an unappealing target for
rocket-wielding terrorists. Simple barriers significantly
reduce the chance that hand-held missiles might puncture the
tank and ignite the contents. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Insuring LNG tanker security is

another matter. The terror threat to these high-profile
targets is real. According to a recent report published in a
Lebanon-based newspaper, the Daily Star, an American
counterterrorist official was quoted as saying that al Qaeda
has developed a manual to teach how rocket-propelled
grenades can "turn liquefied natural gas (LNG) tankers into
floating bombs."</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">This threat isn't the product of

idle terrorist brainstorming. Terrorists have already
successfully targeted tankers. During the Iran/Iraq war,
Iranian radicals, sailing small craft, used anti-tank
missiles to damage merchant shipping in the Persian Gulf.
While no LNG tankers were hit, tankers of similar design
were assaulted. The Lloyd's Register/Fairplay database on
shipping accidents records that, on July 3, 1988, Iranian
terrorists attacked a liquid petroleum gas (LPG) tanker, the
Berge Strand. Anti-tank grenades punctured the dual-hulled
ship and compromised several of the tanker's LPG storage
tanks. While the Berge Strand wasn't carrying fuel at the
time, successful penetration of the fuel storage tanks may
validate the larger terror threat. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">The LNG industry is quick to cite

a different Persian Gulf attack as evidence that LNG
carriers are able to withstand attack. The fully loaded LPG
tanker Gaz Fountain survived after being set ablaze by
aircraft-launched rockets. What goes unreported by the LNG
industry is that the attack occurred in the open sea,
allowing firefighters to operate unimpeded and without
regard for secondary blazes ignited by LNG's concentrated
combustive power. Even though every gallon of LPG holds
several hundred times less potential energy than a gallon of
LNG, the Gaz Fountain was kept miles out of port, and
experts were flown in to prevent an explosion. An attack in
a crowded, closed harbor offers little in the way of
conveniences for firefighters and may make controlling an
LNG tanker fire much more difficult. </FONT></P>

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Tanker Fires

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Any attacked or damaged tanker

must leave Boston the way it entered - passing by South
Boston and Dorchester. In the event of an LNG emergency at
the Keyspan LNG tank or in the harbor, many local
neighborhoods may require rapid evacuation. Are the
neighborhoods prepared? No. Are the companies that operate
Boston's LNG infrastructure encouraging greater neighborhood
readiness? No. This is exactly the sort of complacency that
led America to a disaster on September 11, 2001.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Help isn't on the way. Governor

Mitt Romney, the LNG industry and the federal government are
working hard to stymie forthright debate over the risks and
benefits of Boston's LNG infrastructure. Rather than spend a
bit more to better secure LNG, Boston's LNG-associated
companies seem brazenly confident that America's growing
demand for LNG will outweigh Boston's overwhelming desire
for a prudent and secure LNG infrastructure. </FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica">Boston may need this

clean-burning, environmentally friendly fuel, but, given the
gathering terror threat, Boston's present safety
arrangements are unacceptable. Boston can live with LNG only
if our elected officials, insurance companies and entire
neighborhoods demand that Boston prepare for the worst.
Boston holds a strong position; if Boston's LNG operators
come to the table and go the extra mile to be a good
neighbor here, the entire LNG sector will benefit. If not,
then the LNG industry risks losing Boston and will have a
tough time finding a foothold anywhere else in the
Northeast.</FONT></P>

<P><FONT FACE="Helvetica"><I>Craig Hooper is a graduate

student at the Harvard Graduate School of Public Health. He
lives on Sagamore Street in Dorchester.</I></FONT></P>

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 Appendix C3
C3-1 Chronological List of LNG Accidents
C3-2 Marine Safety and Security Requirements
C3-3 Design and Safety Standards Applicable to
Natural Gas Projects
 C3-1
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF LNG
ACCIDENTS

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port March 2006

 CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF LNG ACCIDENTS

Major LNG Incidents

Ship/
Incident Ship/Facility Ship Injuries/ LNG Spill/
Location Property Comment
Date Name Status Fatalities Release
Damage
LNG peakshaving facility. Tank failure and no
East Ohio Gas Cleveland, 128 earthen berm. Vapor cloud formed and filled the
1944 NA NA NA
LNG Tank Ohio, US deaths surrounding streets and storm sewer system.
Natural gas in the vaporizing LNG pool ignited.
1
Canvey A transfer
1965 seriously Yes
Island, UK operation
burned
1965 Jules Vernet Loading No Yes Yes Overfilling. Tank covered and deck fractures.
Disconnec
Methane
1965 ting after No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures.
Princess
discharge
Unloading
LNG ship Esso First documented LNG rollover incident. Tank
LNG into
Brega, La developed a sudden increase in pressure. LNG
1971 Italy the NA NA Yes
Spezia LNG vapor discharged from the tank safety valves and
storage
Import Terminal vents. Tank roof slightly damaged. No ignition.
tank
Industrial incident unrelated to the presence of
LNG (construction incident). During the repairs,
vapors associated with the cleaning process
Texas Eastern Staten
apparently ignited the mylar liner. Fire caused
1973 Transmission, Island, NY, NA 40 killed No No
temperature in the tank to rise, generating
LNG Tank US
enough pressure to dislodge a 6-inch thick
concrete roof, which then fell on the workers in
the tank.

Glass breakage. Small amount of LNG spilled

upon a puddle of rainwater, and the resulting
Canvey
1973 NA No Yes Yes flameless vapor explosion, called a rapid phase
Island, UK
transition (RPT), caused the loud "booms". No
injuries resulted.
1974 Massachusetts Loading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures.

March 2006 C3.1-1 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
Major LNG Incidents
Ship/
Incident Ship/Facility Ship Injuries/ LNG Spill/
Location Property Comment
Date Name Status Fatalities Release
Damage
Methane
1974 In port No Yes No Touched bottom at Arzew.
Princess
Not caused by LNG. An iso-pentane intermediate
Philadelphia
1975 NA No Yes NA heat transfer fluid leak caught fire and burned the
Gas Works
entire vaporizer area.
Aluminum valve failure on contact with cryogenic
1 worker
temperatures. Wrong aluminum alloy on
1977 Arzew Algeria NA frozen to NA Yes
replacement valve. LNG released, but no vapor
death
ignition (LNG liquefaction facility).
1977 LNG Aquarius Loading No No Yes Tank overfilled.
An explosion occurred within an electrical
substation. LNG leaked through LNG pump
electrical penetration seal, vaporized, passed
through 200 feet of underground electrical
1 killed,
Cove Point, conduit, and entered the substation. Since
Columbia Gas 1
1979 Maryland, NA Yes Yes natural gas was never expected in this building,
LNG Terminal seriously
US there were no gas detectors installed in the
injured
building. The normal arcing contacts of a circuit
breaker ignited the natural gas-air mixture,
resulting in an explosion. (LNG regasification
terminal)

Mostefa Ben-
1979 ? Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Deck fractures.
Boulaid Ship
1979 Pollenger Ship ? Unloading No Yes Yes Valve leakage. Tank cover plate fractures.
Stranded. Severe damage to bottom, ballast
El Paso Paul
1979 At sea No Yes No tanks, motors water damaged, bottom of
Kayser Ship
containment system set up.
1980 LNG Libra At sea No Yes No Shaft moved against rudder. Tail shaft fractured.
Stranded. Ballast tanks all flooded and listing.
1980 LNG Taurus In port No Yes No
Extensive bottom damage.

March 2006 C3.1-2 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
Major LNG Incidents
Ship/
Incident Ship/Facility Ship Injuries/ LNG Spill/
Location Property Comment
Date Name Status Fatalities Release
Damage
Fire in engine room. No structural damage
1984 Melrose At sea No Yes No
sustained - limited to engine room.
Not Steering gear failure. No details of damage
1985 Gradinia In port No No
reported reported.
Cargo valve failure. Cargo overflow. Deck
1985 Isabella Unloading No Yes Yes
fractures.
1989 Tellier Loading No Yes Yes Broke moorings. Hull and deck failures.
Sustained structural cracks allegedly caused by
1990 Bachir Chihani At sea No Yes No
stressing and fatigue in inner hull.
LNG leak from open run-down line during a pipe
modification project. LNG entered an
Indonesian
underground concrete storm sewer system and
1993 liquefaction Indonesia NA No NA NA
underwent a rapid vapor expansion that
facility
overpressured and ruptured the sewer pipes.
Storm sewer system substantially damaged.
Collision with a U.S. Navy nuclear-powered
East of the
LNG ship attack submarine, the U.S.S Oklahoma City. In
2002 Strait of At sea No Yes No
Norman Lady ballast condition. Ship suffered a leakage of
Gibraltar
seawater into the double bottom dry tank area.
27 killed
56 injured On January 2004: No wind, semi-confined area
(The (cold boxes, boiler, control room on 3 sides).
casualties The fire completely destroyed the train 40, 30,
are mainly and 20, although it did not damage the loading
2004 Skikda I Algeria NA NA NA
due to the facilities or three large LNG storage tanks also
blast, few located at the terminal. Complete details are
casualties pending until completion of ongoing accident
due to investigation.
fire)
Sources: University of Houston, "LNG Safety and Security," October 2003. http://www.beg.utexas.edu/energyecon/lng/. Cited with permission; Sonatrach, "The Incident
at the Skikda Plant: Description and Preliminary Conclusions", March 2004.

March 2006 C3.1-3 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
 C3-2
MARINE SAFETY AND SECURITY
REQUIREMENTS

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port March 2006

MARINE SAFETY AND SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
1 Structural Safety Features of the FSRU
Some of the major safety features of the FSRU required that would reduce the likelihood of an
accidental cargo release and would mitigate any release, regardless of cause are listed in the
following table.

Safety Feature Description

Double Hull The FSRU and LNG carriers would be constructed with an outer and inner hull to
Construction provide protection against collisions and resultant cargo loss. These hulls are
separated from each other by structural members and separated from the Moss
spherical tanks by the tank mounts. Thus a collision would need to penetrate three
layers to result in cargo spillage.
Separation of IGC code requires the structural separation of cargo holds from other spaces, as
cargo holds and well as separation of cargo piping from other piping systems. Amongst other things,
piping systems this helps keep cargo leaks away from potential ignition sources and keeps cargo
from inadvertently being pumped through the wrong pipes.
Accessibility for IGC code requires that a tank be constructed so that at least one side is visible and
Inspection Access accessible to inspectors. This allows proper periodic inspection of the tank for
integrity and signs of corrosion or stress.
Leak Detectors in IGC code requires that gas detectors and low temperature sensors be placed in a
Hold spaces cargo hold in order to cargo leakage. An alarm sounds if either is detected and
appropriate repairs and precautions can be undertaken.
Tank ICG code requires that a tank be constructed with materials that can withstand the
Requirements for temperatures involved so as to properly contain the cargo, and have adequate relief
Cargo valve systems to avoid over pressurization.
Containment

Structural Analysis IGC code requires structural analysis of the cargo containment system and specifies
individual tank stress limitations.
Secondary IGC code requires partial secondary containment to contain leaks and prevent
containment and contact of cryogenic liquid with the inner hull. This prevents thermal stress. In
thermal addition, insulation in conjunction with a primary and backup heating system must
management be installed that would keep the cargo from exceeding the thermal limitations of the
material selected for the inner hull should the leak prevention system fail.
Tank Construction IGC codes address standards for workmanship, quality, and testing of tanks under
and Testing construction. Each tank on the FSRU will have had its welds non-destructively tested, and
Requirements have had a pressure test to insure integrity before cargo is pumped aboard.

Isolation, IGC code specifies piping thickness, leak testing, pressure testing, isolation
Construction and requirements, welding requirements and many other aspects of pressure vessel and
Testing piping design and construction. This insures the integrity of these systems before
Requirements for any cargo is brought aboard.
Piping and Pressure
Vessels

March 2006 C3.2-1 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
Safety Feature Description
Emergency IGC code requires remote control shutdown systems for ceasing of cargo and vapor
Shutdown Valves transfer in an emergency. This system must have the ability to be activated from at
and Shutdown least two locations on board the FSRU and will also be automatically activated in
Systems the event of a cargo fire.

Pressure Venting IGC code specifies that appropriate venting of the cargo be installed to keep the
Systems cargo under the design pressure of the tank and keep relief valves from needing to
operate. The FSRU will use some of this gas for fueling the Submerged
Combustion Vaporizers, and will add the rest to the gasified product being pumped
to shore.
Vacuum Protection IGC code requires the installation of relief valves that would prevent under
Systems pressurization of cargo tanks in the event that cargo was pumped out without
adequately providing for vapor return. The FSRU will have sufficient vapor return
capacity to keep the pressures at appropriate levels, however this system will
prevent under pressurization should this system fail to be actuated or fail to work
properly.
Fire Protection IGC code requires that LNG carriers have a saltwater fire main system for fighting
Systems fires throughout the ship, and fixed dry chemical and CO2 systems for cargo areas
and compressor rooms, respectively.
Cargo Tank IGC code requires that each cargo tank be outfitted with an integrated
Instrumentation instrumentation/alarm system that notifies the crew of possible leaks via gas
detection and temperature sensors; and tank liquid levels, temperatures and
pressures. These systems, as well as the pressure relief systems mentioned
above, provide many-layered protection against cargo release either through
equipment malfunction or human error.
Additional Gas IGC code also requires gas detection systems and alarms in spaces where cargo is
Detection Systems located, including compressor spaces, spaces where fuel gas is located, and other
spaces likely to contain gasified cargo. Venting systems for certain spaces and
portable gas detectors are also required.
Automatic Safety IGC code requires that cargo loading areas and the docks be equipped with LNG
Shutdown vapor and fire detection systems that automatically shut down the transfer systems
Systems in the event of a leak or fire. These shutdowns can also be manually operated by
personnel on the dock (in this case, the FSRU) or LNG carrier.
Loading Arm The FSRU loading arms are designed to isolate the flow of cargo and break away
Emergency from their connection to the carrier if relative motion exceeds safety parameters.
Release Couplings This prevents damage to the arms, and averts the spill of cargo which would result
from a broken arm. Quantities spilled during this process would be only a few
gallons, most of which would be caught in drip trays to prevent deck thermal
damage.

2 Operational Measures for Accidental Release Prevention

In addition to the design regulations described above, the international and national entities with
authority to impose such regulations have also provided operational guidelines to reduce the
likelihood and impact of an LNG release aboard carriers. The FSRU, as a Deepwater Port of
the United States, is primarily guided by the Deepwater Port Act as modified in 33 CFR 148 -
150 by the Maritime Safety and Security Act and other legislation and agency determinations.

March 2006 C3.2-2 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
These measures include:
• Training,
• Formal Operational Procedures, and
• Inspections.

2.1 Training
Training requirements for crews of LNG carriers are specified in the IMO STCW Convention and
those for the FSRU are detailed in 33 CFR 150. A wide variety of training is included for both,
including marine firefighting, water survival, spill response and clean-up, emergency medical
procedures, hazardous materials procedures, confined space entry, and training on operational
procedures. Specifics are also included in the below summary of the Deepwater Port
Operations Manual requirements.

2.2 Formal Operational Procedures

Both the FSRU and the visiting LNG carriers would be required to have formal operating plans
that cover an extensive array of operational practices and emergency procedures. LNG carriers
are required by the IMO to meet the ISM Code, which addresses preparing for responding to
emergency situations like fire and LNG releases. The LNG carrier’s navigational, pollution
response, and some emergency procedures would also be covered in the Deepwater Port
Operations manual, which addresses every aspect of the FSRU operations. The minimum
contents of this manual are detailed in 33 CFR 150. This manual provides detailed requirements
that cover contingencies and normal operations. The operations manual must meet all
requirements set forth by the US Coast Guard, and be approved by that organization before
operations begin.

The operations manual is required by 33 CFR 150 to address the following areas:

• The DWP facilities must be clearly described physically and geographically, applicable
codes for design and construction must be detailed, schematics of all systems must be
included which show the positions of all operations and safety equipment. The
communications system must be described and communications procedures laid out.

• Procedures for the visiting LNG carriers are also required to be included. Operating
hours must be set and sizes and types of tankers that may be received must be
described. Navigation standards for the LNG carriers must be set forth, including
operating limits for each type of carrier. Speed limits for the safety zone must be
specified, as well as the means of tracking, communicating and giving routing
instructions to the carriers. Required notices that carriers must give prior to arrival must
be detailed. Rules for navigating in the safety zone and for mooring/unmooring must be
detailed. Special equipment needed for mooring or navigating must be described.
Procedures for clearing all carriers and support vessels away from the FSRU in the
event of an emergency or for normal operations must be specified.

• Weather forecasting and information dissemination procedures must be set forth.

Specific weather limitations must be defined for carrier arrival, cessation of cargo
transfer operations and departure of carriers from moorings in the event of adverse
weather being forecasted or as it occurs unexpectedly. This includes defining conditions
in which the FSRU would be secured and evacuated.

March 2006 C3.2-3 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
 • The manning requirements for all operational and emergency situations must be
specifically described, with personnel in charge of major evolutions designated by name,
in writing. The supervisors would be reviewed by the US Coast Guard to ensure they
have the proper qualifications and training to perform their duties.

• Procedures for major evolutions, such as cargo transfers, must be set forth in detail.
Manning and training requirements, specific duties for watchstanders and supervisors
and emergency shutdown system settings must be detailed. Special precautions and
handling procedures for LNG must be included.

• Maintenance program requirements and specific procedures are required to document

the service and repair of cargo equipment, fire fighting systems, safety equipment and
cranes.

• Occupational Health and Safety training procedures and requirements must be detailed,
including: housekeeping, illumination requirements, fall arrest equipment, personnel
transfer systems, hazard communication, permissible exposure limits for hazardous
substances, protective guards around machinery, electrical safety, lockout/tagout
procedures, crane safety, sling usage, hearing conservation, hot work, warning sirens,
and confined space entry.

The security plan is part of the operations manual and is covered in detail in the below security
section.

An environmental monitoring program also must be included, which describes procedures for
monitoring the effects of the port on its surroundings. This must include periodic re-examination
of the physical, chemical and biological factors examined in the Environmental Impact
Statement, as well as air and water monitoring proscribed by other statutes and state law.
Detailed studies are required in the event of a spill.

2.3 Inspections
The US Coast Guard has the authority and jurisdiction to perform inspections of Project vessels
in U.S. waters, or on the high seas after a vessel states intent to moor at the DWP. Additional
inspections may be carried out on LNG carriers by their flag states, by classification societies,
and by the owners. Per 33 CFR 150, the US Coast Guard also may inspect the FSRU at any
time, with or without notice, for safety, security, and compliance with applicable U.S. laws and
regulations.

33 CFR 150 mandates that the FSRU be self inspected every 12 months by the owner or
operator to ensure compliance with applicable safety and security laws and regulations. The
results must be reported to the US Coast Guard COTP within 30 days of completion, and may
be checked for accuracy by a Coast Guard inspection at any time. This report must include
descriptions of any failure, and the scope of repairs subsequently made. Any classification
society certification or interim class certificate must be reported to the COTP as well.

The US Coast Guard has marine inspection programs for ships, Outer Continental Shelf
structures, DWP Facilities and waterfront facilities. US Coast Guard Officers and Petty Officers
receive very detailed training on applicable regulations and inspection techniques. For this
project, the most applicable Safety programs include the Port State Control program and 33

March 2006 C3.2-4 Cabrillo Port Liquefied Natural Gas Deepwater Port
Revised Draft EIR
CFR 160 for the inspection and routing of visiting ships, and the DWP inspection program
specified by 33 CFR 150.

Ports State Control of visiting vessels occurs by means of a US Coast Guard Boarding, targeted
at determining the vessels compliance to international IMO standards for safety, pollution
control, loading, and watch stander qualification, training and procedures. Vessel safety,
sanitation and cargo handling equipment is inspected, emergency drills and procedures may be
ran in order to determine crew proficiency, navigation practices are examined, and all pertinent
plans, safety management systems and other required documents are examined. The required
96-hour Notice of Arrival for these vessels allows the Coast Guard ample time to determine
which vessels to board, whether to conduct the boarding in port or at sea, or even if entry is
denied pending an inspection.

The COTP decides which vessels are at highest risk for non-compliance with IMO conventions
through a process by which the following factors are considered: The owner, Flag State and
classification society of the vessel - some owners, flag states and classification societies have a
history of poor inspection and regulation of their vessels; how many times and how recently a
vessel has been boarded or detained for violations previously; and the type of cargo the vessel
is carrying. The vessels having the most factors of concern are boarded immediately, while
others may be boarded on subsequent entries into the U.S.

Vessels found to be in non-compliance with IMO standards may be recommended for further
flag state or classification society audit, detained in port until their discrepancies are fixed,
ordered to anchorage for the same purpose, or forbidden to enter U.S. waters.

33 CFR 160 gives authority to each US Coast Guard District Commander or Captain of the Port
to order a vessel to operate or anchor in the manner directed when there is a suspected
violation of law or treaty, there is a failure to satisfy the cargo transfer provisions of 33
CFR160.113, or if justified by weather, visibility, port congestion or condition of the vessel.

33 CFR 160.113 Gives COTP the authority to prohibit a vessel from transferring cargo or
operating on the navigable waters of the US if the vessel’s history of accidents, pollution
incidents, or serious repair problems creates reason to believe that the vessel may be unsafe or
pose a threat to the marine environment. It also allows these restrictions for other reasons: The
vessel is in violation of a law or regulation, has discharged oil or other hazardous substance in
violation of US law or treaty, fails to comply with Vessel Traffic Service requirements, or does
not have at least one licensed deck officer on the navigation bridge that speaks English.

One of the relevant results of this inspection regimen is that every Project vessel and the FSRU
would be inspected at least yearly for compliance to all applicable IMO standards and U.S. laws.
Equipment, training, qualifications, operating and emergency procedures, administrative
controls, and most every other aspect leading to safe operation of the FSRU and project vessels
would be checked by the owners, the flag states (for vessels) and the United States for
compliance.

3 Security Measures that Help Prevent Release Incidents Due to Deliberate Attacks
Regulation and operational procedures play a vital role in the prevention of terrorist acts. In
fact, much of what prevents or mitigates an accident will do the same for a terrorist act (double
hulls, fire suppression systems, etc). However, potential deliberate acts of terrorism expose the
Project to new threats, many of which cannot easily be prevented, though mitigative actions
may be nearly the same after the incident occurs.

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The foundation for the FSRU and visiting LNG carriers' security would be the requirements for a
security plan outlined in 33 CFR 150. This plan would address security issues including, but not
limited to:
• Access control for people, goods and material;
• Monitoring and alerting vessels that approach or enter the ports security zone;
• Identifying risks and measures to deter terrorist activity;
• Internal and external notification requirements and responses in the event of a perceived
threat or attack on the port;
• Designating a Port Security Officer; providing identification means for port personnel;
security training requirements;
• Actions and procedures that are scalable to the threat; emergency procedures such as
evacuation; special operations procedures (re-manning, refueling, diving, support vessel
operations and logistical concerns);
• Recordkeeping for maintenance; and
• Tests and operations outlined in the operations manual.

In addition, radar monitoring of the security zone is a required when any vessel approaches or
enters the zone. Such vessels must be identified and warned off via radio.

3.1 Requirements to meet IMO’s International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code
(ISPS) Code
IMO’s ISPS code has the following additional requirements:
• Security levels;
• Ship security plans;
• Ship security alarm systems;
• Automatic identification systems;
• Port security plans;
• Declarations of security; and
• Facility security plans.

For the U.S., these IMO requirements are addressed in 33 CFR Subchapter H—Maritime
Security.

3.1.1 Security levels

For the U.S., security levels are covered in 33 CFR 101, which ties the three tiered Maritime
Security (MARSEC) level to the five level Department of Homeland Security's Homeland
Security Advisory System as the below table depicts.

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 Homeland security advisory system Equivalent maritime security
(HSAS) threat condition (MARSEC) level

Low: Green MARSEC Level 1.

Elevated: Blue
Guarded: Yellow

High: Orange MARSEC Level 2.

Severe: Red MARSEC Level 3.

Specific actions would be required of Project personnel at each level, and would be detailed in
the security plan for the FSRU and the Ship Security plans.

Changes in MARSEC level is communicated by the COTP via Broadcast NTM, and all who are
required to have a security plan (facilities, vessels must report attainment of measures in their
plan that correspond to the new MARSEC level to the appropriate Coast Guard District
Commander.

When the USCG determines it is necessary to enact additional measures to counter a maritime
threat, the USCG Commandant (or delegate) may issue a directive to those required to have a
security plan (or portions of, as needed) to take additional security measures to counter the
threat. Reporting of attainment of the measure or its approved equivalent is carried out in the
same way as a change in MARSEC, but within a time period specified by the directive.

3.1.2 Vessel security plans

33 CFR 104 requires every vessel owner or operator who operates in U.S. waters to develop
and submit to USCG a vessel security plan. The regulations provide the format and
requirements for the plan. Vessel security plan implementation must be evaluated by an
onboard verification by the flag state or a security organization recognized by the flag state
before an International Ship Security Certificate (ISSC) can be issued for that vessel. These
plans must include provisions for access to the ship by ship personnel, passengers, visitors, etc;
restricted areas on the ship; handling of cargo; delivery of ship’s stores; handling
unaccompanied baggage; and monitoring the security of the ship. These measures are
intended to prevent deliberate destructive act on board a vessel and the possible hijacking of
the vessel for use as a weapon (ramming other vessels, bridges, blocking channels, releasing
cargo near shore, etc).

Control and compliance measures for those vessels in violation of this requirement include the
vessel’s inspection, delay or detention. Vessel operations may be restricted, port entry into the
U.S. denied, or the vessel may be expulsed from a U.S. port. Lesser administrative or
corrective actions may be taken. The vessel’s security plan is subject to USCG approval, which
may be withdrawn, which would make it illegal for the vessel to operate in, on, under or adjacent
to U.S. waters.

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3.1.3 Ship security alarm systems
Ship security alarm systems are required by the ISPS code for Project LNG carriers. These
systems are manually operated by the crew in the event of a terrorist destructive act or
attempted takeover. An alarm does not sound on the vessel, but does automatically send a
signal to appropriate authorities, such as the Coast Guard.

3.1.4 Automatic identification systems (AISs)

As described in the above vessel collision avoidance section, an AIS provides augmented data
to radar users, which aid in the identification of vessels. The traffic controllers onboard the
FSRU, the VTS and USCG responders would be able to locate and identify vessels outfitted
with AIS more quickly and accurately, thus decreasing confusion and response time to an
emergency, including security alarm activations.

3.1.5 Port security plans

The ISPS Code requires ports to have a port facility security officer and to develop a port facility
security plan which must interface with the individual vessel security plans. In the United
States, 33 CFR 103 mandates an Area Maritime Security plan which applies to all vessels and
facilities located in, on, under, or adjacent to waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction. This regulation
empowers the COTP to set up counsels to advise on port security, write and exercise the area
security plan and defines required elements of the plan. (ex. Plan must address actions to be
taken for a change of MARSEC, what to do if a vessel security alert system is activated,
estimated response and timeframe for a Transportation Security incident, etc)

3.1.6 Declarations of security

Declarations of security are required by 33 CFR 101 for ports across the US, and are intended
to serve as the formal means by which the security actions of the vessel and port are agreed
upon during mooring and cargo transfer operations. This declaration must be signed by the
vessel and facility security officer prior to commencement of offloading.

3.1.7 Facility security plans

Under the USCG maritime security regulations (33 CFR 105 Subpart D), LNG facilities that
receive LNG carriers will have to develop a facility security plan. Like the vessel security plans
that have to meet the ISPS Code, the USCG regulations define areas the facility security plans
have to address, including:

• Security administration and organization of the facility;

• Personnel training;
• Drills and exercises;
• Records and documentation;
• Response to change in security level;
• Procedures for interfacing with vessels;
• Declaration of Security;
• Communications;
• Security systems and equipment maintenance;
• Security measures for access control, restricted areas, handling cargo, delivery of vessel
stores and bunkers, and monitoring;

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 • Security incident procedures; and
• Audits and security plan amendments.
Like ship security plans, USCG must approve facility security plans. If the COTP deems a
waterfront facility unsafe or insecure in any way by, vessels may be prevented from docking
there, or be moved if already docked.

Other, control and compliance measures for facilities for violations of these requirements
include restriction on facility access, conditions being put on facility operations, suspension of
operations, or revocation of approval for the facility’s security plan which makes it illegal for the
facility to operate.

3.1.8 Coast Guard operational measures applicable to security of the Project

The USCG, in addition to its inspection duties, is also an active enforcer of all applicable
national and international law on the high seas and within the waters of the United States. The
USCG's enforcement of these laws will significantly add to the security of any nearby facility.
These actions may include:

• Enforcement of 96-hour Notice of Arrival (NOA) requirements, including vetting crew and
passenger lists against terrorist and criminal databases.
• Conducting regular patrols with aircraft and armed surface vessels to support Maritime
Domain Awareness (knowing what vessels are within or near U.S. waters).
• Conducting Right of Approach questioning of any vessel to determine county of registry,
last port of call, crew nationality and other useful data.
• Conducting background intelligence checks on sighted vessels and like checks on the
crews of boarded vessels.
• Monitoring all vessel traffic over 300 GWT with 25 NM of Pt. Fermin Light as part of VTS
LA/LB (Note: this area is approx 5nm from the FSRU and covers approaches from the
West).
• Conducting armed escorts of vessels deemed to be High Risk.
• Placing Armed Sea Marshals on board High Risk vessels (Note: the determination to
provide escort or Sea Marshals for any Project vessel is at the discretion of COTP).
• Conducting searches of vessels suspected of violating immigration, customs and
narcotics laws.
• Inspecting the safety gear of all U.S. flagged and state registered pleasure craft and
commercial vessels.
• Conducting searches of foreign vessels with flag state or Master's consent for evidence
of violation of applicable laws.
• Acting in accordance with the U.S. Military Standing Rules of Engagement to protect
U.S. citizens and property.
• Patrolling, warning and boarding vessels to enforce security zones.

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Should the threat level or other circumstance dictate, the USCG and other military branches
would take measures to provide for the security of the Project. The nearby presence of military
vessels and aircraft conducting operations and surveillance of the Point Mugu Sea Range would
also augment Maritime Domain Awareness, and would periodically result in the presence of
armed warships within relatively close proximity to the FSRU. All of these vessels could be
hailed on frequencies available in the FSRU communications centers, and all are allowed by the
rules of engagement to protect themselves, other U.S. military units, U.S. Citizens and property
if being attacked.

The COTP may restrict anyone, or anything from entering a waterfront facility subject to U.S.
jurisdiction or boarding a vessel subject to U.S. jurisdiction deemed necessary for safety or
security. Further, to prevent damage or injury to vessels or facilities or safeguard ports,
territory, or waters of the U.S., COTP may establish a security zone, consisting of whatever
sections of water and land deemed necessary. No person or vessel may enter this zone or
leave any article on a vessel or facility in this zone without COTP (or designee) approval. Any
vessel, facility or person in this zone may be inspected or searched, and items or persons may
be removed from the zone as deemed necessary. Guards may be posted on any vessel or
anywhere in a security zone deemed necessary. Movements of vessels may be controlled as
necessary, and within the territorial seas of the U.S., the COTP may enlist the aid and
cooperation of Federal, State, county, municipal, and private agencies to assist.

Licenses and required documentation may be required by the COTP for personnel entering a
waterfront facility, who may revoke/not approve such based on deciding that the person is a
security risk. An appeals process is set up, as is a board to hear such consisting of a Coast
Guard Officer and members from company management and a labor representative.

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 C3-3
DESIGN AND SAFETY STANDARDS
APPLICABLE TO NATURAL GAS
PROJECTS

Cabrillo Port LNG Deepwater Port March 2006

DESIGN AND SAFETY STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO NATURAL GAS
PROJECTS
Documents Incorporated by Reference into Title
49 CFR Part 192, Appendix A, as amended Title (applicable edition)
through June 14, 2004
A. American Gas Association (AGA)
(1) AGA Pipeline Research Committee, Project A Modified Criterion for Evaluating the Remaining
PR-3-805 Strength of Corroded Pipe (AGA-PR3-805-1989).
B. American Petroleum Institute (API)
(1) API Specification 5L Specification for Line Pipe (42nd edition, 2000).
(2) API Recommended Practice 5L1 Recommended Practice for Railroad Transportation
of Line Pipe (4th edition, 1990).
(3) API Recommended Practice 5LW Transportation of Line Pipe on Barges and Marine
Vessels (2nd edition, 1996)
(4) API Specification 6D Specification for Pipeline Valves (Gate, Plug, Ball,
and Check Valves) (21st edition, 1994).
(5) API Standard 1104 Welding of Pipelines and Related Facilities (19th
edition, 1999, including its October 31, 2001
errata).
C. American Society for Testing and Materials (ASTM)
(1) ASTM Designation A 53/A53M-99b Standard Specification for Pipe, Steel, Black and
Hot-Dipped, Zinc-Coated, Welded and Seamless
(ASTM A53/A53M-99b).
(2) ASTM Designation A 106 Standard Specification for Seamless Carbon Steel
Pipe for High-Temperature Service (ASTM A106-
99).
(3) ASTM Designation A 333/A 333M Standard Specification for Seamless and Welded
Steel Pipe for Low-Temperature Service
(ASTM A333/A333M-99).
(4) ASTM Designation A 372/A 372M Standard Specification for Carbon and Alloy Steel
Forgings for Thin-Walled Pressure Vessels
(ASTM A372/A372M-1999).
(5) ASTM Designation A 381 Standard Specification for Metal-Arc-Welded Steel
Pipe for Use With High-Pressure Transmission
Systems (ASTM A381-1996).
(6) ASTM Designation A 671 Standard Specification for Electric-Fusion-Welded
Steel Pipe for Atmospheric and Lower
Temperatures (ASTM A671-1996).
(7) ASTM Designation A 672 Standard Specification for Electric-Fusion-Welded
Steel Pipe for High-Pressure Service at Moderate
Temperatures (ASTM A672-1996).
(8) ASTM Designation A 691 Standard Specification for Carbon and Alloy Steel
Pipe, Electric-Fusion-Welded for High-Pressure
Service at High Temperatures (ASTM A691-1998).
(9) ASTM Designation D638 Standard Test Method for Tensile Properties of
Plastics (ASTM D638-1999).

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Documents Incorporated by Reference into Title
49 CFR Part 192, Appendix A, as amended Title (applicable edition)
through June 14, 2004
(10) ASTM Designation D2513-1987 Standard Specification for Thermoplastic Gas
applies to §192.283(a)(1) Pressure Pipe, Tubing and Fittings (ASTM D2513-
1987).
(11) ASTM Designation D2513-1999 Standard Specification for Thermoplastic Gas
Pressure Pipe, Tubing and Fittings (ASTM D2513-
1999).
(12) ASTM Designation D 2517 Standard Specification for Reinforced Epoxy Resin
Gas Pressure Pipe and Fittings (D 2517-2000).
(13) ASTM Designation F1055 Standard Specification for Electrofusion Type
Polyethylene Fittings for Outside Diameter
Controlled Polyethylene Pipe and Tubing (F1055-
1998).
D. The American Society of Mechanical Engineers, International (ASME) and American National
Standards Institute (ANSI)
(1) ASME/ANSI B16.1 Cast Iron Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings
(ASME B16.1-1998).
(2) ASME/ANSI B16.5 Pipe Flanges and Flanged Fittings
(ASME/ANSI B16.5-1996, including ASME
B16.5a-1998 Addenda).
(3) ASME/ANSI B31G Manual for Determining the Remaining Strength of
Corroded Pipelines (ASME/ANSI B31G-1991).
(4) ASME/ANSI B31.8 Gas Transmission and Distribution Piping Systems
(ASME/ANSI B31.8-1995).
(5) ASME/ANSI B31.8S Supplement to B31.8 on Managing System Integrity
of Gas Pipelines (ASME/ANSI B31.8S-2002)
(6) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Rules for Construction of Power Boilers
Section I (ASME Section I-1998).
(7) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels
Section VIII, Division 1 (ASME Section VIII, Division 1-2001).
(8) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Rules for Construction of Pressure Vessels:
Section VIII, Division 2 Alternative Rules
(ASME Section VIII Division 2-2001).
(9) ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Welding and Brazing Qualifications
Section IX (ASME Section IX-2001).
E. Manufacturers Standardization Society of the Valve and Fittings Industry, Inc. (MSS)
(1) MSS SP44-96 Steel Pipe Line Flanges (MSS SP-44-1996
including 1996 errata).
F. National Fire Protection Association (NFPA)
(1) NFPA 30 Flammable and Combustible Liquids Code
(NFPA 30-1996).
(2) ANSI/NFPA 58 Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied
Petroleum Gases (NFPA 58-1998).
(3) ANSI/NFPA 59 Standard for the Storage and Handling of Liquefied
Petroleum Gases at Utility Gas Plants
(NFPA 59-1998).

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Documents Incorporated by Reference into Title
49 CFR Part 192, Appendix A, as amended Title (applicable edition)
through June 14, 2004
(4) ANSI/NFPA 70 National Electrical Code (NFPA 70-1996).
G. Plastics Pipe Institute (PPI)
(1) PPI TR-3/2000 Policies and Procedures for Developing Hydrostatic
Design Bases (HDB), Pressure Design Bases
(PDB), and Minimum Required Strength (MRS)
Ratings for Thermoplastic Piping Materials
(PPI TR-3/2000-Part E only, “Policy for Determining
Long Term Strength (LTHS) by Temperature
Interpolation.”
H. National Association of Corrosion Engineers International (NACE)
(1) NACE Standard RP-0502-2002 Pipeline External Corrosion Direct Assessment
Methodology (NACE RP-0502-2002).
I. Gas Technology Institute (formerly Gas Research Institute (GRI)
(1) GRI 02-0057 Internal Corrosion Direct Assessment of Gas
Transmission Pipelines—Methodology
(GRI 02/0057-2002).

DETERMINATION OF HIGH CONSEQUENCE AREAS

HCAs must be determined using one of two allowable methods described in 49 CFR
192.903, using the process for identification described in 49 CFR 192.905 and guidance
provided in an advisory bulletin (68 FR 42456, July 17, 2003). The length of the
pipeline subject to pipeline integrity assessments and mitigation actions – the pipeline
segment encompassed by the HCA – is also shown in these figures.

Where a potential impact circle is calculated using either Method 1 or Method 2 to

establish an HCA, the length of the HCA extends axially along the length of the pipeline
from the outermost edge of the first potential impact circle that contains either an
identified site or 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy to the outermost
edge of the last contiguous potential impact circle that contains either an identified site
or 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy.

The regulations also allow operators to prorate the number of buildings within an impact
circle until 2006. This exemption was intended to relieve the data collection burden on
operators of existing pipelines but should not be applied to the new pipeline construction
proposed for this Project. Pipeline operators are not required to use the same method
along the entire length of any pipeline.

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 Method 1. HCAs are defined in 49 CFR 192.903 as an area defined as:
(i) A Class 3 location, or (ii) A Class 4 location, or
(iii) Any area in a Class 1 or Class 2 location where the potential impact radius is greater than 660 feet
(200 meters), and the area within a potential impact circle contains 20 or more buildings intended
for human occupancy (unless the exception in paragraph 4 applies), or
(iv) The area within a potential impact circle containing an identified site.

PIR > 660 ft (200 m)

660 ft (200 m) PIR < 660 ft (200 m)

Class 4 Class 3
Cluster of >
Location Location
20 homes

Pipeline Class 1 or 2 Locations

Example of High Consequence Areas using Method 1

Method 2. The area within a potential impact circle containing:

(i) 20 or more buildings intended for human occupancy, unless the exception in paragraph (4)
applies; or
(ii) An identified site.
Paragraph (4) Exception: If the radius > 660 feet (200 m), the HCA may be identified based on a prorated number of
buildings intended for human occupancy within 660 ft from the centerline of the pipeline until December 17, 2006.
This exception was not intended for use for new pipelines.

HCA
HCA

Cluster of >
20 homes

PIR

Cluster of >
20 homes Pipeline

Example of High Consequence Areas using Method 2

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