MODULE 1: General Principles of Administrative Law

Beja, Sr. v. Court of Appeals

DOCTRINE: (1) The PPA General Manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and
without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension.
(2) An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative supervision.

FACTS:
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr. was first employed by the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) as
arrastre supervisor in 1975. He became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations
Officer in 1977. In February 1988, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor. On October 21, 1988, the
PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 against petitioner
Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct, willful violation of reasonable
office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service for allegedly
erroneously assessing storage fees resulting in the loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA.
Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the charges. This case, however, was considered
closed for lack of merit. On December 13, 1988, another Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was filed
against Beja by the PPA general manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of
reasonable office rules and regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for
being notoriously undesirable. Beja was also placed under preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41
of P.D. No. 807. The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and
thereafter, the PPA general manager indorsed it to the Administrative Action Board (AAB) of the
Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC) for "appropriate action." Beja filed a petition
for certiorari with preliminary injunction before RTC Misamis Oriental and subsequently filed with the
AAB a manifestation and motion to suspend the hearing of the case on account of the pendency of the
certiorari proceeding before the court. This was denied by the AAB. Beja moved for the dismissal of the
certiorari case in the court and proceeded to file a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or
temporary restraining order before this Court which referred the case to the CA. Meanwhile, a decision
was rendered by the AAB dismissing Fidencio Y. Beja from service. CA dismissed the petition for lack
of merit. In his petition now, Beja assails the CA ruling by contending that (a) the PPA general manager
has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary approval of the PPA board
of directors; (b) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the administrative case filed against
him to the DOTC-AAB, and (c) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB
itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the administrative case against him.

ISSUES:
(a) Whether or not the PPA general manager has power to issue a preventive suspension without the
necessary approval of the PPA board of directors.
(b) Whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and hear administrative cases
against the PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.

HELD:

(a) YES. Section 41 of the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) states that, "Sec. 41. Preventive
Suspension. — The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance of duty, or if there
are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges which would warrant his removal from
the service.” In this case, petitioner contends that the PPA General Manager cannot subject him to a
preventive suspension in accordance with the P.D. No 857 as under this law, the PPA Board of Directors
and not the PPA General Manager is the “proper disciplining authority” As correctly observed by the
Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates "preventive suspension" as a remedial measure
with "suspension" as a penalty for administrative dereliction. Imposed during the pendency of an
administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself but rather a measure of
precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene
of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus, preventive suspension is distinct
from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8(d) of P.D.
No. 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges
against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the
investigation or the final disposition of the case. Thus, in this case, The PPA General Manager is the
disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors,
subject a respondent in an administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are
sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting
heads of agencies the "jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions
against officers and employees" in the PPA. Thus, the PPA general manager has power to issue a
preventive suspension without the necessary approval of the PPA board of directors.

(b) In this case, the Court qualifiedly ruled in favor of petitioner. The PPA was created through P.D. No.
505 dated July 11, 1974. Under that law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing
Board of Directors known as the Philippine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave
the Council the power "to appoint, discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical
staff of the Authority and other personnel." On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by
P.D. No. 857. Sec. 4(a) thereof created the Philippine Ports Authority which would be "attached"
to the then Department of Public Works, Transportation and Communication. When Executive
Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987 reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications
was issued, the PPA retained its "attached" status. Even Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative
Code of 1987 classified the PPA as an agency "attached" to the Department of Transportation and
Communications (DOTC). Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the
agencies attached to the DOTC "shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the
respective charters or laws creating them, except when they conflict with this Code.” Attachment of an
agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships mentioned in the Administrative
Code of 1987. An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department
to which it is attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or
administrative supervision. This is borne out by the "lateral relationship" between the Department
and the attached agency. With respect to administrative matters, the independence of an attached
agency from Departmental control and supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency
under a Department’s administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to
appointments and other personnel actions "in accordance with the decentralization of personnel
functions" under the Administrative Code of 1987. Thus, to a certain extent, an attached agency is free
from Departmental interference and control.

During an investigation, the PPA General Manager, as established earlier, may subject the
employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance
with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807. 13 Only after gathering sufficient facts may
the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the latter action
which requires the approval of the PPA Board of Directors. From an adverse decision of the PPA
General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee concerned may elevate the matter to the
Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal directly to the Civil Service Commission. In
this case, It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the
AAB was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an investigation,
made the proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA
Board of Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the
then DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case. Thus, AAB decision
here is null and void and the case is reprimanded to the PPA whose General Manager shall conduct
with dispatch its reinvestigation.
 Eugenio v. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 115863 | 31 March 1995

DOCTRINE:
● An office created by law can only be abolished by law. An office created by the legislature is
wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office, and the
powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office.”
● CESB is an autonomous entity that cannot be abolished by CSC. Respondent Commissioner’s
power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Sec. 16, Chap. 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Eugenio is the deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service Eligibility (CES) and a CESO Rank. She was given CES
eligibility, and later on, she was recommended to be the President for a CESO rank by the Career
Executive Service Board.
However, on Oct. 1, 1993, respondent, Civil Service Commission passed Resolution No. 93-
4359, streamlining, reorganizing, and effecting changes to the organizational structure: where the
Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was changed to Office for Career Executive Service of the
Civil Service Commission. The existing personnel, budget, properties, and equipment of the Career
Executive Service Board has now formed part of the Office for Career Executive Service.
This Resolution became an impediment to the appointment of Eugenio as Civil Service Officer,
Rank IV. In a letter to petitioner, Hon. Antonio Carpio, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel stated:
"Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359,
including whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service
Board. Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from
considering appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks. xxx xxx xxx
"You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal issues arising
from the issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all
concerned.”
Petitioner, finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the CESB which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, filed a petition to the Supreme Court to annul
the said resolution. Petitioner argues that: (1) Respondent CSC usurped the legislative functions of
Congress when it abolished the CESB, an office created by law; and (2) usurped the legislative functions
of Congress when it illegally authorized the transfer of public money through the issuance of the said
resolution.
The Solicitor General, in its comment, agreed with the contentions of the petitioner. However,
the respondent, CSC, chose to defend its ground. It contends that: (1) the petition states no cause of
action; (2) the recommendation submitted to the President for appointment to a CESO rank was a valid
act of the CESB and it does not have any defect; (3) the Office of the President is estopped from
questioning the validity of the recommendation of the CESB since the president has previously
appointed to CESO rank four officials similarly situated as petitioner; and (4) the integration of the CESB
into the commission is authorized by law (Sec. 12(1), Title i, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987).

ISSUE/S:
Whether or not the Civil Service Commission has the power to abolish CESB.

RULING:
No. The Court held that the Civil Service Commission has no power to abolish CESB. The
controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential Decree
No. 1 on Sept. 1, 1974, which adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan. It cannot be disputed
therefore, that as CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an
unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative
function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and Employees: “Except for such offices
as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily a legislative function. In so
far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by constitutional provisions, it is supreme,
and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in
the exigencies of government it is necessary to create and define duties, the legislative department has
the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether these duties shall be
attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by the legislature is wholly
within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the office and the powers and
duties of the incumbent and, if it sees fit, abolish the office.
In this case, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the CESB. On
the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside
funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3,
Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.
Section 17 provides: "Organizational Structure.— Each office of the Commission shall be
headed by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary
to carry out their respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may
effect changes in the organization as the need arises." But, as well pointed out by petitioner and the
Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates
the offices under the respondent Commission, "SEC. 16. Offices in the Commission. — The
Commission shall have the following offices: (1) The Office of the Executive Director; (2) The Merit
System Protection Board; (3) The Office of Legal Affairs; (4) The Office of Planning and Management;
(5) The Central Administrative Office; (6) The Office of Central Personnel Records; (7) The Office of
Position Classification and Compensation; (8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement;
(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards; (10) The Office of Human Resource Development;
(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Relations and Audit; (12) The Office of Personnel Relations;
(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs; (14) The Office of Retirement Administration; and (15) The
Regional and Field Offices.”
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission's power to
reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16. From its inception, the
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee "the CESB shall be autonomous. It
is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook." The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment to
respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the control of
respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one
functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain "policy and program coordination."
This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
"(3) Attachment. — (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program coordination.
The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the governing board
of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights,
if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with a system of
periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and projects; and having the department
or its equivalent provide general policies through its representative in the board, which shall serve as
the framework: for the internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.”
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside.
 Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. L-83578 | 16 March 1989

DOCTRINE:
The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial
powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the
existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is
naturally interested in the success of his case.

FACTS:
On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales assigned with the petitioner Presidential Anti-
Dollar Salting Task Force (PADS Task Force) issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160
and 161 against the petitioners (now private respondent) Karamfil Import-Export Co., Inc., P & B
Enterprises Co., Inc., Philippine Veterans Corporation, Philippine Veterans Development Corporation,
Philippine Construction Development Corporation, Philippine Lauan Industries Corporation, Intertrade
Development (Alvin Aquino), Amelili U. Malaquiok Enterprises and Jaime P. Lucman Enterprises. The
application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the
Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said
application is the affidavit of Josefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task
Force.

Private respondent Karamfil Import-Export Co. went to the RTC on a petition to enjoin the
implementation of the search warrants in question. In disposing of the petition, the said court found the
material issues to be: (1) Competency of this Court to act on petition filed by the petitioners; (2) Validity
of the search warrants issued by respondent State Prosecutor; (3) Whether or not the petition has
become moot and academic because all the search warrants sought to be quashed had already been
implemented and executed. Petitioner PADS Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to
contest, on certiorari, the twin Orders of the lower court. The Appellate Court held that petitioner is a
special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under P.D. No. 1936 to prosecute foreign
exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. The petitioner, in exercising its quasi-
judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Trial Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction
to declare the search warrants in question null and void. Besides as correctly pointed out by the
Assistant Solicitor General the decision of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is appealable
to the Office of the President. Private respondent sought a reconsideration, on the question primarily of
whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is "such other responsible officer"
countenanced by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants of search and seizure. The Court of Appeals,
on Karamfil’s motion, reversed itself and issued its Resolution, dated September 1987, and
subsequently, its Resolution, dated May 20, 1988, denying the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is, in the first place, a quasi-
judicial body, and one whose decisions may not be challenged before the regular courts, other
than the higher tribunals — the Court of Appeals and this Court. – NO
2. Whether or not the said presidential body may be said to be "such other responsible officer as
may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants under the 1973 Constitution. – NO

HELD:
1. A quasi-judicial body has been defined as "an organ of government other than a court and
other than a legislature, which affects the rights of private parties through either
adjudication or rule making." The most common types of such bodies have been listed as
follows:
 (1) Agencies created to function in situations wherein the government is offering some gratuity,
grant, or special privilege, like the defunct Philippine Veterans Board, Board on Pensions for
Veterans, and NARRA, and Philippine Veterans Administration.

(2) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to carry on
certain government functions, like the Bureau of Immigration, the Bureau of Internal Revenue,
the Board of Special Inquiry and Board of Commissioners, the Civil Service Commission, the
Central Bank of the Philippines.

(3) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is performing some
business service for the public, like the Bureau of Posts, the Postal Savings Bank, Metropolitan
Waterworks & Sewerage Authority, Philippine National Railways, the Civil Aeronautics
Administration.

(4) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to regulate
business affected with public interest, like the Fiber Inspections Board, the Philippine Patent
Office, Office of the Insurance Commissioner.

(5) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking under the police
power to regulate private business and individuals, like the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Board of Food Inspectors, the Board of Review for Moving Pictures, and the Professional
Regulation Commission.

(6) Agencies set up to function in situations wherein the government is seeking to adjust
individual controversies because of some strong social policy involved, such as the National
Labor Relations Commission, the Court of Agrarian Relations, the Regional Offices of the
Ministry of Labor, the Social Security Commission, Bureau of Labor Standards, Women and
Minors Bureau.

A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force’s organic act, Presidential Decree
No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task
Force was not meant to exercise quasi-judicial functions, that is, to try and decide claims
and execute its judgments. As the President’s arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar
salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree
to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more.

The Court sees nothing in Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1936 (except with respect to
the Task Force’s powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to
confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree
No. 1883. Its undertaking, as we said, is simply, to determine whether or not probable cause
exists to warrant the filing of charges with the proper court, meaning to say, to conduct an
inquiry preliminary to a judicial recourse, and to recommend action "of appropriate authorities."

If the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force is not, hence, a quasi-judicial body, it cannot
be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its
enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. In that respect,
there is no error in the respondent Court of Appeal’s resolution sustaining the
assumption of jurisdiction by the court a quo.

2. The "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of
approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." In striking down Presidential
 Decree No. 1936 the respondent Court relied on American jurisprudence, notably, Katz v.
United States, Johnson v. United States, and Coolidge v. New Hampshire, in which the
American Supreme Court ruled that prosecutors (like the petitioner) cannot be given such
powers because of their incapacity for a "detached scrutiny" of the cases before them. We
affirm the Appellate Court.

The Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise,
prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached
"judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike
a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his
office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person
accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused’s adversary and his accuser. To permit him to
issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his
own right, when he is neither.

When the 1973 Constitution spoke of "responsible officer" to whom the authority to issue arrest
and search warrants may be delegated by legislation, it did not furnish the legislator with the
license to give that authority to whomsoever it pleased. It is to be noted that the Charter itself
makes the qualification that the officer himself must be "responsible." We are not saying, of
course, that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force (or any similar prosecutor) is or has
been irresponsible in discharging its duty. Rather, we take "responsibility", as used by the
Constitution, to mean not only skill and competence but more significantly, neutrality and
independence comparable to the impartiality presumed of a judicial officer. A prosecutor can
in no manner be said to be possessed of the latter qualities.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.