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AGENTS OF CHANGE YOUTH FELLOWSHIP November 2023

Managing Water Scarcity in an Age of

Climate Change:
The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
By Gökçe Şencan

The Euphrates and Tigris Rivers are the lifeblood With conditions in the region changing so
of the Eastern Mediterranean. They span sever- significantly, cooperative and sustainable
al countries, bringing life—both physically and management of the Euphrates-Tigris River Basi
economically—to one of the most water-inse- carries an even greater urgency, as these rivers
cure regions in the world.1 Yet the same region become even more critical sources of water for
is also a climate hot spot and warming at a the countries that depend on them for prosperi-
much faster pace than the rest of the world—a ty and growth.
trend which will only accelerate in the absence
of serious climate action.

Middle East Environmental Change

Program and Security Program
 Dams built in the Tigris and
Euphrates river basin

Keban Dam

Turkey Karakaya Dam

Ilisu Dam
Ataturk Dam

Mosul Dam

Tehran
Baryan Dam

Syria

TIG
RIS
EU
PH
RA
TE
S Baghdad

Iraq Iran

Figure 1: Map of the ET basin countries.2

Saudi Arabia
The Euphrates originates in Turkey and flows through Iraq and Syria before converging with the Tigris
River, which has tributaries in both Turkey and Iran and flows towards southeastern Iraq. The two
rivers converge to form Shatt al-Arab before discharging into the Persian Gulf.

Figure 2: Percentage of flows by country in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin3

% of flows Iraq Iran Syria Turkey

Euphrates - - 11% 89%
Tigris 39% 10% - 51%

Unfortunately, the rivers themselves also suffer from the ramifications of climate change—in addi-
tion to the already existing problems like waterlogging, pollution, ecosystem degradation, and high
salinity. As the climate warms, the basin stands to lose anywhere from 10-60% of its snow-water
availability according to one study4 (and 55-87% according to another study), while its flows could
decline by 25-55% and the timing of flows could shift to 18-39 days earlier in the year,5 which would
have serious implications for agriculture in the region.

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
This is more bad news for a region already go- Current problems and their histori-
ing through a devastating drought (since 2020) cal context
and experiencing extreme water stress.6 In both
Iraq and Syria, the water available for human Historically, there have been attempts to estab-
consumption is already below the WHO recom- lish a management framework in the Euphra-
mended level of 1,700 cubic meters (cbm) per tes-Tigris River Basin to alleviate uncertainty
capita annually (355 cbm per capita in Syria and and scarcity, but most of these efforts have
847 cbm per capita in Iraq).7 Turkey is currently failed for various reasons. These failures can be
at 2,719 cbm per capita, but this number has linked to a lack of trust, domestic politics, and
been declining exponentially since the 1960s— disagreements over legal assumptions.
and the local average in its arid southeastern
Up until the 1970s, the main challenge in the
parts, where the Euphrates and Tigris originate,
basin was flooding, and the relative abundance
could be even lower. In either case, Turkey is
of water both minimized the conflict over shar-
projected to experience high water stress by
ing it and negated the need for a water sharing
2040.8
structure.14 After the countries began construct-
At 80% of total usage, agriculture is the largest ing large dams in the 1960s, claims over water
water consumer in the region,9 and it could rights on the rivers grew more competitive.
significantly suffer from the loss of river flows.
When the construction of the Keban Dam
Crop yields in Iraq might decline nearly 20%
began on the Euphrates in 1966, Turkey guaran-
by 2035 due to water deficit.10 Increased water
teed an average of 350 cbm/s of flows to Iraq
demand from agriculture due to higher tempera-
and Syria—a step taken in response to project
tures and expanded irrigation will also worsen
donor USAID’s desire to avoid downstream
the water scarcity for the whole basin.11
harm. After the Keban Dam was completed,
Coupled with poor water management, the however, its filling coincided with a drought
real-world impacts of these changes already and the filling of the Tabqa Dam in Syria. This
can be observed in this fragile basin, where the led to the first major water crisis between the
risk of sociopolitical conflict is growing because countries in 1975, when Iraq blamed Syria
of increased competition over dwindling water for the dramatically reduced river flows, and
resources.12 Iraq has repeatedly asked Turkey Syria defended its position by accusing Turkey
to release more water in 2018, 2022, and 2023 of holding back the water.15 As Karakaya Dam
due to drought conditions.13 Although the risk construction began in 1976, Turkey increased its
of military conflict between the countries is promised flows to 500 cbm/s to guarantee the
currently low, tensions between Iraq and Iran World Bank funding for the project.16
are also elevated due to Iraq’s claim that Iran
In the 1980s, even amidst the political turmoil
is cutting off river flows into Iraq and diverting
in the region,17 there were still attempts to build
them to a receding Lake Urmia.
dialogue around water issues. Turkey and Syria
signed protocols on water for the first time in
their history in 1987. Syria agreed to cooperate

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
with Turkey on security matters and accepted include Syria in some of these efforts.23 Howev-
Turkey’s “first right to use” the Euphrates-Tigris er, some advocacy groups criticized this coop-
waters; in exchange, Turkey guaranteed 500 eration effort as opportunistic on Turkey’s part.
cbm/s of flows directly to Syria.18 Turkey later Several of them argued that it mainly serves
claimed that Syria was not abiding by the proto- the economic interests of Turkey, because Iraq
col’s terms, however, and argued that it was not would have to directly invite Turkish conglom-
obliged to follow its commitments either. Syria erates, which are usually known for their close
and Iraq also signed an agreement on sharing ties to the Turkish government, to participate in
Euphrates River waters in 1989 in which Syria the bidding processes for joint projects.24
agreed to release 59% of its flows from Turkey
to Iraq. Domestic politics and legal
assumptions
Tensions continued to increase in the 1990s.
Iraq demanded several times that Turkey in- With the headwaters of both rivers mainly
crease promised flows from 500 to 700 cbm/s. within its borders, Turkey has an upstream
While the Atatürk Dam was filling, Syria claimed advantage over Syria and Iraq, which removes
that the flows had fallen well below the agreed most of the incentives for Turkey to cooperate
500 cbm/s, to 300-350 cbm/s. In 1996, Syria with them. Indeed, some commentators have
and Iraq, with the backing of the Arab League, argued that this hydro-geographic advantage
campaigned to stop the construction of Birecik elevates Turkey to the status of a hegemon.25
Dam in Turkey.19
The three countries also have fundamental
In the 2000s, there was a brief period of en- disagreements over applying the international
hanced dialogue and attempts for basin-wide water law and sharing the flows of the Euphra-
initiatives. In 2009, Turkey and Syria agreed to tes and the Tigris. Turkey advocates for the “no
pursue joint projects like the Friendship Dam significant harm” and “equitable utilization”
on the Orontes River, which signaled improved principles—which assert that the distribution of
trust and goodwill. They also agreed to coop- water should be determined based on needs,
erate on water quality, drought, flooding and productivity, and utilization, and aim to maxi-
climate change issues.20 However, with the out- mize the basin-wide benefits.26
break of the Syrian civil war in 2011 and Turkey’s
Turkey also argues that it has sovereignty over
support for Syrian rebel factions, all diplomatic
all natural resources within its boundaries—in-
dialogue between Turkey and Syria was sus-
cluding waters that eventually cross borders—
pended indefinitely and the construction of the
and liberally exercises its upstream advantage.
Friendship Dam was halted.21
One example is the Southeastern Anatolia Proj-
Iraq and Turkey’s dialogue from 2000s onwards ect, an expansive hydropower, irrigation, and
similarly focused on cooperation over water socioeconomic development project that aims
resources, drought and flood management, to boost the economy of Turkey’s historically
irrigation efficiency, business partnerships, underdeveloped and underinvested Kurdish-ma-
data collection and exchange,22 with a desire to jority southeastern region.27

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
Iraq and Syria argue that they have co-sover- struction of Keban and Karakaya dams, when
eignty over the rivers’ governance, and claim USAID and the World Bank requested minimum
“historical equal rights” over water quantities flow commitments from Turkey.32
as Turkey does.28 Agricultural water is strongly
There is also contention over the applicable
associated with the two countries’ national
legal framework for the river systems, which
identities, and they argue that, until the con-
stems from Turkey’s opposition to the UN
struction boom, they could use the river waters
Watercourses Convention of 1997. The UNWC
without any limits whatsoever. Hence, any new
provided a foundational framework for trans-
reduction in water quantity represents a loss of
boundary water management and promoted
their historical entitlement. This situation also
institution-building, cooperation and environ-
triggers Iraq and Syria’s fears of food security,
mental protection, but has been criticized for
as both regimes (especially Syria) have histori-
having a limited scope and failing to address
cally relied on the rivers’ water to a great extent
climate change.33
to maintain food self-sufficiency,29 survive
embargoes, and preserve their alliance with Turkey voted against the UNWC due to Article
farmers.30 7 of the agreement, which emphasizes “avoid-
ing causing harm” to other countries that use
The countries disagree on the hydrology of the
the same transboundary water resource, and
river system as well. Turkey treats the rivers as
“eliminating or mitigating such harm” if it is
a single system, claiming that they are connect-
unavoidable.34 In its objection, Turkey argued for
ed via Iraq’s Tharthar Channel and merge before
“reasonable and equitable utilization” of the
discharging into the Persian Gulf. Iraq and Syria
water sources and only avoiding “significant35
both object to this approach and seek to nego-
harm” to other riparian countries.36 It is highly
tiate the waters of the two rivers separately.31
likely that this objection was influenced by the
Iraq, in particular, claims that the single-system
UNWC’s possible ramifications for Turkey’s
approach would disproportionately benefit Tur-
development projects on the Euphrates-Tigris,
key, and it believes that the separate-systems
such as the Birecik Dam, which was subject to
approach would result in more water allocations
an aggressive cancellation campaign by Syria
to Iraq and Syria.
and Iraq in 1996—the year before the UNWC
There is also disagreement over whether the passed.
rivers are international or transboundary re-
sources. Syria and Iraq view the Euphrates and Establishing a trilateral management
Tigris as “international,” whereas Turkey defines framework
them as “transboundary.” For Syria and Iraq, the
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey currently do not have a
international designation subjects the rivers to
formal framework to manage the Euphrates
international water law and third-party interven-
and Tigris Rivers. The closest proposal to such
tion. From Turkey’s perspective, the rivers are
a framework was Turkey’s Three Staged Plan,
transboundary resources. Thus, any disputes
which included provisions on independent data
over them should be resolved among the three
collection, taking inventory of land resources,
countries without third-party involvement—as
and evaluating the water supply and demand.
demonstrated by negotiations over the con-

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
This plan was strongly opposed by Iraq and Syr- Fundamental principles for a sustainable
ia on the basis that the framework would bene- management framework
fit Turkey the most. They instead proposed their
The countries need to be pragmatic about
own “mathematical formulas” to determine the
the basin’s political and climatic reality: A rigid
allocations based on self-reported water use
water-sharing regime that does not account for
and demand.37
climate swings will lead only to more conflict,
Iraq’s pleas with Turkey for increased water rather than peace. Accounting for both rivers as
releases from the Turkish dams at least three a single basin would enhance the adaptability
times in the last five years demonstrates the and flexibility of the management framework.
urgency of the need for a formal water shar- Inclusion of third parties that previously influ-
ing protocol.38 Disconnected from the region’s enced water regimes in negotiations would
intensifying climate swings and droughts, this further exacerbate trust issues between the
unstructured “pleading” method is becoming three countries, but neutral parties such as the
increasingly unsustainable and diminishes the United Nations (either as an observer or a com-
likelihood of achieving a sustainable water munication channel) could encourage dialogue
agreement,39 as the risk of conflict and severe and compromise. Lastly, the status quo already
loss of livelihoods is escalating.40 However, favors Turkey, which has been aggressively pur-
there are still opportunities for cooperation suing dam and irrigation projects43 and doesn’t
among riparian countries, as evident from the have many incentives to forego its upstream
past bilateral agreements, despite the detrimen- advantage. However, Turkey still needs to recog-
tal impact of climate swings on negotiations.41 nize that water insecurity and consequent hu-
manitarian crises in neighboring countries, like
Flexibility and specificity through a basin-wide
the war in Syria or ISIS on the Iraq-Syria border,
management framework would encourage
engender a spillover risk that would eventually
cooperation.42 Such a framework would also
threaten its own citizens and national interests.
provide a sense of certainty to all parties,
especially during droughts, and allow for better Considering an idealistic scenario where the
planning under worsening circumstances. diplomatic relations between Turkey and Syria
Given the opposing perspectives over the basin, are restored and there is goodwill on all sides, a
however, such a framework is not possible Euphrates-Tigris Basin management framework
without compromises, goodwill, and trust. It should include three fundamental elements:
is also critical to acknowledge the Syrian civil
• Equitable and adaptive distribution of
war’s role in obstructing dialogue, as well as the
both risks and rewards means that the
animosity between Syria and Turkey. Without a
allocation regime should have flexibility to
clear communication channel between the two
accommodate the needs and demands of
governments, a sustainable trilateral solution to
countries, as well as the rivers’ ecosystems.
the basin’s woes will be elusive.
Water allocations should not be bound by
pre-set and inflexible quotas or minimum
requirements, but instead tied to the hy-
drologic conditions of the rivers and chang-

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
 ing demands of the countries. Efficiency straints and reach a compromise on their
improvements should be encouraged and conflicting assumptions.
rewarded. • Structure of the management framework
• Scientific and diplomatic transparency The management framework should have
emphasizes the importance of objective three pillars: (1) trilateral organizational
and independent data collection and scien- structure; (2) transparency and trust-building
tific research to inform the water allocation reforms; and (3) cross-sectoral investments
process. Transparency in data and scientific and regional development.
methods would ideally bolster diplomacy by
encouraging meaningful and lasting cooper- Trilateral organizational structure
ation among the countries and reconciling
A trilateral organizational structure should con-
different assumptions over the rivers.
sist of (1) a High-Level Decision Council, (2) a
• The new, uncertain reality and scarcity
Trilateral Science Committee, and (3) a Trilateral
in the basin caused by climate change
Planning Committee. All three organizational
should be acknowledged and incorporated
units would require consensus on their deci-
into the negotiations and management
sions. Central governments would pay an equal
decisions. The three countries have to rec-
proportion into a common budget and cover the
oncile with the basin’s climate reality: The
salaries of staff, as well as the technical infra-
rivers can no longer meet the current water
structure. Once placed in the committees, the
demand. They will need to take individual
members should have term limits and protec-
responsibility in demand management while
tions to shield them from political pressure.
recognizing each other’s needs and con-

Figure 3: Proposed organizational chart, with committee and council mandates

High-Level Decision Council (HDC):

Approval and implementation of annual water budgets
Nomination of TSC's and TPC's members
Consensus-based decision-making
Internal management decisions like budgeting
Regular briefings by TSC and TPC

Trilateral Science Committee (TSC) Trilateral Planning Committee (TPC)

Long-term climate risk analysis Water budgeting for human needs, agriculture
Determination of annual water availability and other sectors
and drought tiers Water demand analysis and management,
Hydrological data collection and monitoring including groundwater
Identifying the water needs of the basin's ecosystems <3.*.0,/)/$'*53%1*+'$A)#$%F.=/5
Water efficiency and conservation planning
and endangered species Basinwide pollution tracking and analysis
Contingency planning for disasters
Identifying opportunities for multi-benefit
transboundary projects

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
• High-Level Decision Council (HDC): planning the long-term water sustainability
HDC should have cabinet leaders or their of the basin. The annual allocations would
delegates from each country to oversee be calculated based on the TPC’s indepen-
the implementation of the management dent estimates of human need for water
framework with equal voting power. The in each country, as well as water demand
members would be responsible for appoint- from agriculture and other sectors. These
ing and approving members of the Trilat- demand estimates would also account
eral Science Committee and the Trilateral for local water resources like rainfall and
Planning Committee. The HDC would also groundwater. As part of long-term planning,
make decisions on budget, receive briefs the TPC would identify opportunities for
from the science committee and evaluate agricultural water conservation (crop switch-
the partnership opportunities identified by ing, irrigation efficiency, fallowing etc.) and
the planning committee. local water supply projects like wastewater
• Trilateral Science Committee (TSC): treatment, recycling, and groundwater re-
This committee should consist of credible charge, as well as other cross-sectoral and
non-partisan scientists and scholars who transboundary projects such as renewable
are not public officials. The candidates for energy-water exchanges, or investment in
this committee would be nominated by their recycling in exchange for more water alloca-
respective countries’ representatives in the tion or storage space.44 The TPC would also
HDC and approved by the other two coun- identify pollution hotspots across the basin,
tries’ representatives. The committee would plan and coordinate ecosystem restoration
be responsible for modeling and updating projects and create disaster contingency
climate scenarios and identifying the risks plans. And, finally, the TPC would also brief
for the basin. It would also create a drought the HDC on project and partnership oppor-
tier system and determine both the annual tunities and projected water allocations in
drought tier and the expected water avail- the basin.
ability in the basin based on meteorological
Transparency and trust-building reforms
data. This would inform the water allocation
decisions by the planning committee. The For a long time, data in the basin has been
committee would also identify the water treated as a strategic asset to use as leverage
needs of the basin’s ecosystems and endan- in negotiations, instead of as an essential ele-
gered species and monitor the water levels ment of collaboration and sound decision-mak-
throughout the basin to make sure all water ing. Thus, an open data model needs to be em-
users (including the ecosystems) receive braced for the framework to function. The three
their allocation. countries should agree to freely sharing data,
• Trilateral Planning Committee (TPC): This modernize data collection, make joint invest-
committee, following the same member ments in water quality and quantity monitoring,
nomination-consensus model as TSC would and establish an online open data portal.
be responsible for translating the TSC’s
annual drought tier and water availability The data needs to be freely available not only
projections into annual water allocations and to these governments, but also to the trilateral

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
committees and the public in order to encourage Considering Iraq and Syria’s approach to food
research, innovation, and better policymaking in security, the three countries could cooperate
the basin. The committees should be authorized on food trade, especially during drought years,
to utilize, expand, and upgrade the existing data to ease these two countries’ anxieties over
collection infrastructure if necessary. food security, while building trust and goodwill
among the basin countries. Another advantage
Upstream countries should enable public input
of cooperation over food security would be for
from downstream countries’ civil societies for
Turkey, which has been facing a food inflation
major projects. This can be achieved by allowing
crisis48 and could benefit from Iraq’s and Syria’s
participation in domestic Environmental Impact
milder winters and longer agricultural season.
Assessment processes for projects with poten-
For example, water releases from Turkish dams
tially significant impacts for downstream coun-
could be increased in winter in exchange for
tries.45 In addition to encouraging democratic
produce from Iraq and Syria.
participation, this inclusive approach would give
a voice to those who would experience the Conclusion
real-life impacts of these projects and foster
goodwill and trust among the basin countries. Climate-fueled droughts threaten the stability
in the Euphrates-Tigris River basin, as well as
Cross-sectoral investments and regional the welfare of tens of millions of people whose
development lives depend on the rivers. The region is already
suffering from the impacts of such droughts,
Although climate change will challenge the
like declining agricultural production and hy-
Euphrates-Tigris Basin in many ways, there
dropower output, disruptions to urban water
is also a great potential for the countries to
supplies, and drying marshlands in southeast-
develop their economies in collaboration and
ern Iraq.
partnership with each other. One of the most
evident areas of collaboration is on renew- Iraq, Syria, and Turkey will need to resolve their
able energy. Climate-fueled droughts severely current disputes over hydrological and legal
impact hydropower generation in the basin, assumptions. In this process, they will also
which is becoming increasingly unreliable as a need to reconcile their historical approaches to
power source. For example, hydropower output the rivers with the current reality and convince
in Turkey, which meets 20-30% of the country’s their water users to accept and prepare for the
electricity demand, was down 23% in 2021 climate future of the basin.
due to dry conditions.46 All three countries have
noteworthy potential for non-hydro renewable A basin-level management framework, along
energy, particularly solar, which is more reliable, with new transnational scientific, planning, and
scalable and less water-dependent than hy- decision-making institutions will be needed
dropower. A solar development strategy in the in the basin for a unified response to climate
basin could boost energy security for all three change. This management framework will
countries, allow for more flexibility in water need to be based on impartiality, transparency,
releases from dams, and enable a transbound- scientific integrity, and consensus-building to
ary energy-water market where countries trade establish trust between the basin countries.
their excess solar energy.47

Managing Scarcity in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin in the Age of

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
Additional cooperation on data-sharing, trans- more willingness to cooperate and compro-
parency and development projects on the mise. While the status quo benefits Turkey, all
energy-water-food nexus will also be needed to countries have more to win from a sustainable
improve the livelihood of the basin’s inhabitants basin that fosters the economic and diplomatic
and ecosystems. ties in the region, certainty around water quanti-
ties, and reliable partnerships. It is also a moral
Iraq, Syria, and Turkey should seize this mo-
obligation to ensure that everyone who calls the
ment to resolve their past disagreements,
Euphrates-Tigris River basin home has access
unite against climate change and droughts as a
to adequate food, clean water, a livable environ-
common adversary, and come to the table with
ment, and a prosperous life.

Endnotes
1 Maddocks, A., Young, R. S., & Reig, P. (2015). Ranking the World’s Most Water-Stressed Countries in 2040. World Resourc-
es Institute. https://www.wri.org/insights/ranking-worlds-most-water-stressed-countries-2040

2 Map by Elena Shao from Rubin, A. J. (2023, July 29). A Climate Warning from the Cradle of Civilization. The New York
Times. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/07/29/world/middleeast/iraq-water-crisis-desertification.html;
Zhang, A.T., Gu, V.X. (2023). Global Dam Tracker: A database of more than 35,000 dams with location, catchment, and
attribute information. Scientific Data, 10, 111. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41597-023-02008-2

3 Chenoweth, J., Hadjinicolaou, P., Bruggeman, A., Lelieveld, J., Levin, Z., Lange, M. A., Xoplaki, E., & Hadjikakou, M. (2011).
Impact of climate change on the water resources of the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East region: Modeled 21st
century changes and implications. Water Resources Research, 47(6). https://doi.org/10.1029/2010WR010269
Frenken, K. (2009). Irrigation in the Middle East region in figures: AQUASTAT Survey 2008.

4 Özdoǧan, M. (2011). Climate change impacts on snow water availability in the euphrates-tigris basin. Hydrology and Earth
System Sciences, 15(9), 2789–2803. https://doi.org/10.5194/hess-15-2789-2011

5 Bozkurt, D., & Sen, O. L. (2013). Climate change impacts in the Euphrates-Tigris Basin based on different model and sce-
nario simulations. Journal of Hydrology, 480, 149–161. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhydrol.2012.12.021

6 NASA Earth Observatory. (2021, January 11). Turkey Experiences Intense Drought. https://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/
images/147811/turkey-experiences-intense-drought

7 Lootsma, A. (2023, March 19). Water Security Provides Opportunity to Achieve Peace and Development in Iraq.
United Nations Development Programme. https://www.undp.org/arab-states/blog/water-security-provides-opportuni-
ty-achieve-peace-and-development-iraq;
World Bank. (n.d.-a). Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) - Iraq. Retrieved August 2, 2023,
from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC?locations=IQ;
World Bank. (n.d.-b). Renewable internal freshwater resources per capita (cubic meters) - Syrian Arab Republic. Retrieved
August 2, 2023, from https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/ER.H2O.INTR.PC?locations=SY

8 Maddocks et al., 2015

9 UNICEF. (2021). “Running Dry”: unprecedented scale and impact of water scarcity in the Middle East and North Africa.
https://www.unicef.org/mena/press-releases/running-dry-unprecedented-scale-and-impact-water-scarcity-middle-east-and-
north

10 Kullab, S. (2022b, November 18). Politics and climate conspire as Tigris and Euphrates dwindle. Los Angeles Times.
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2022-11-18/politics-and-climate-conspire-as-tigris-and-euphrates-dwindle

11 Yilmaz, Y. A., Sen, O. L., & Turuncoglu, U. U. (2019). Modeling the hydroclimatic effects of local land use and land cov-
er changes on the water budget in the upper Euphrates – Tigris basin. Journal of Hydrology, 576, 596–609. https://doi.
org/10.1016/J.JHYDROL.2019.06.074

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12 Climate Diplomacy. (n.d.). Turkey, Syria and Iraq: Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris. Retrieved July 16, 2023, from https://
climate-diplomacy.org/case-studies/turkey-syria-and-iraq-conflict-over-euphrates-tigris;
Crisp, W. (2023, January 10). After Comeback, Southern Iraq’s Marshes Are Now Drying Up. Yale E360. https://e360.yale.
edu/features/iraq-marshes-drought-climate-change;
Kullab, 2022b;
Loveluck, L., & Salim, M. (2021, October 21). Climate change in Iraq poisons Fertile Crescent farmland, empties villages.
The Washington Post. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2021/iraq-climate-change-tigris-euphrates/;
Saeed, A., Sudani, I., & Azhari, T. (2023, June 5). Drought drives economic exodus from Iraq’s rivers and marshlands. Reu-
ters. https://www.reuters.com/business/environment/drought-drives-economic-exodus-iraqs-rivers-marshlands-2023-06-05/

13 AFP. (2022, July 17). Iraq asks Turkey to release more water along Tigris, Euphrates. Arab News. https://www.arabnews.
com/node/2123556/middle-east;
AFP. (2023, March 21). Erdogan pledges to ease Iraq’s water shortage. France 24. https://www.france24.com/en/live-
news/20230321-erdogan-pledges-to-ease-iraq-s-water-shortage;
Reuters. (2018, October 10). Turkey agrees to release more water to ease Iraqi shortages. https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-iraq-turkey/turkey-agrees-to-release-more-water-to-ease-iraqi-shortages-idUSKCN1MK1W3

14 Kibaroglu, A., & Maden, T. E. (2014). An analysis of the causes of water crisis in the Euphrates-Tigris river basin. Journal of
Environmental Studies and Sciences, 4(4), 347–353. https://doi.org/10.1007/S13412-014-0185-9/METRICS;
Treaty of Friendship and Neighbourly Relations Between Iraq and Turkey. (1946).

15 Kut, G. (1993). BURNING WATERS: THE HYDROPOLITICS OF THE EUPHRATES AND TIGRIS.

16 Çarkoǧlu, A., & Eder, M. (2001). Domestic concerns and the water Conflict over the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin. Middle
Eastern Studies, 37(1), 41–71. https://doi.org/10.1080/714004364

17 Syria closed its border with Iraq in 1982 following the outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War; Turkey sided with the coalition forces
during the Gulf War of 1991 to Iraq’s ire, and continuously accused Syria of harboring terrorists who are part of the Kurdish
separatist group PKK throughout the 80s.

18 Çarkoǧlu & Eder, 2001

19 Ibid.

20 Kibaroglu, A., & Gürsoy, S. I. (2015). Water–energy–food nexus in a transboundary context: the Euphrates–Tigris river basin
as a case study. Water International, 40(5–6), 824–838. https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2015.1078577

21 Haemmerli, H., Bréthaut, C., & Ezbakhe, F. (2023). Exploring friendship in hydropolitics: The case of the friendship dam on
the Asi/Orontes river. Environmental Policy and Governance. https://doi.org/10.1002/eet.2058

22 Kibaroglu, A., & Scheumann, W. (2013). Evolution of Transboundary Politics in the Euphrates-Tigris River System: New
Perspectives and Political Challenges. Global Governance, 19. https://heinonline.org/HOL/Page?handle=hein.journals/
glogo19&id=283&div=&collection=

23 Milletlerarası Andlaşma, Pub. L. No. 31595, Resmi Gazete (2021).

24 Dawood, I. (2019, April 18). Does the Memorandum of Understanding in Water Management Between Turkey and Iraq
Guarantee Iraq its Water Rights? Save the Tigris. https://www.savethetigris.org/does-the-memorandum-of-understanding-in-
water-management-between-turkey-and-iraq-guarantee-iraq-its-water-rights/

25 Wouters, P. (2013). Sovereignty Revisited—examining the rules of international law that govern transboundary water re-
sources with a focus on upstream/downstream state practice—possible lessons learned for the Euphrates-Tigris. In Water
law and cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris region : a comparative and interdisciplinary approach.;
Zeitoun, M., & Warner, J. (2006). Hydro-hegemony - A framework for analysis of trans-boundary water conflicts. In Water
Policy (Vol. 8, Issue 5, pp. 435–460). https://doi.org/10.2166/wp.2006.054

26 Kibaroglu, A. (2017). State-of-the-art review of transboundary water governance in the Euphrates–Tigris river basin. Interna-
tional Journal of Water Resources Development, 35(1), 4–29. https://doi.org/10.1080/07900627.2017.1408458

27 Çarkoǧlu & Eder, 2001

28 Kibaroglu, A. (2015). An analysis of Turkey’s water diplomacy and its evolving position vis-à-vis international water law. Water
International, 40(1), 153–167. https://doi.org/10.1080/02508060.2014.978971;
Kibaroglu & Maden, 2014;
Kibaroglu, A., & Ünver, O. (2000). An Institutional Framework for Facilitating Cooperation in the Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
1. In International Negotiation (Vol. 5).

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
29 Kibaroglu & Gürsoy, 2015

30 Barnes, J. (2009). Managing the waters of ba’th country: The politics of water scarcity in Syria. Geopolitics, 14(3), 510–530.
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650040802694117

31 Çarkoǧlu & Eder, 2001

32 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Water Issues Between Turkey, Syria and Iraq: A Study by the Turkish Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Department of Regional and Transboundary Waters.

33 Kibaroglu, 2015

34 Kirschner, A. J., & Tiroch, K. (2012). Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law (Vol. 16). www.mpil.de/red/water;
Loures, F., Rieu-Clarke, A., & Vercambre, M.-L. (2009). Everything you need to know about the UN Watercourses Conven-
tion.

35 This is different from Article 7 of the UNWC, which does not preclude “insignificant” harm from its scope.

36 Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (n.d.). Türkiye’s Policy on Water Issues. Retrieved July 25, 2023, from https://
www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_s-policy-on-water-issues.en.mfa

37 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, n.d.

38 AFP, 2022, 2023; Reuters, 2018

39 Dinar, S., Dinar, A., & Kurukulasuriya, P. (2011). Scarcity and cooperation along international rivers: An empirical assessment
of bilateral treaties. International Studies Quarterly, 55(3), 809–833. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2478.2011.00671.x

40 Kullab, S. (2022a, June 12). Iraq’s “pearl of the south” Lake Sawa dry amid water crisis. AP News. https://apnews.com/
article/climate-business-religion-lakes-droughts-c1bc62812c4da7b440cbb67adcc5e988

41 Dinar, S., Katz, D., De Stefano, L., & Blankespoor, B. (2019). Do treaties matter? Climate change, water variability, and coop-
eration along transboundary river basins. Political Geography, 69, 162–172. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2018.08.007

42 Dinar, S., Katz, D., De Stefano, L., & Blankespoor, B. (2015). Climate change, conflict, and cooperation: Global analysis of
the effectiveness of international river treaties in addressing water variability. Political Geography, 45, 55–66. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2014.08.003

43 Schwartzstein, P. (2022). How Water Strategizing is Remaking the Middle East. Wilson Center. https://www.wilsoncenter.
org/publication/how-water-strategizing-remaking-middle-east

44 One example to such a partnership is decommissioning the Mosul Dam in Iraq, which has a significant risk of failure, and
storing its water in Turkey’s dams instead, which would also allow for water savings from decreased evaporation (Alwash,
2016). Another would be for Iraq to sell solar electricity to Turkey to be paid back in water, or in hydropower at night (Al-
wash, 2023).
Alwash, A. (2016). The Mosul Dam: Turning a Potential Disaster into a Win-Win Solution. Wilson Center. https://www.
wilsoncenter.org/publication/the-mosul-dam-turning-potential-disaster-win-win-solution;
Alwash, A. (2023). From Threat to Opportunity: Harnessing Climate Change to Build a Prosperous Future for Iraq
and the Region. Istituto Affari Internazionali. https://www.iai.it/en/pubblicazioni/threat-opportunity-harnessing-cli-
mate-change-build-prosperous-future-iraq-and-region.

45 A detailed explanation of this proposal can be found in Bremer (2016).

Bremer, N. C. (2016). Transboundary Environmental Impact Assessment of Large Dams in the Euphrates–Tigris Region: An
Analysis of International Law Binding Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey. Review of European, Comparative & International Environ-
mental Law, 25(1), 92–106. https://doi.org/10.1111/REEL.12145

46 Alparslan, U. (2022, January 20). Turkey Electricity Review 2022. Ember Climate. https://ember-climate.org/insights/re-
search/turkey-electricity-review-2022/

47 A “Green-Blue Deal” proposal is currently in the works in another part of the Middle East, between Israel, Palestine and
Jordan. According to this plan, Jordan would sell solar electricity to Israel and Palestine in exchange for desalinated water
from Israel and Palestine (Bromberg et al., 2020).
Bromberg, G., Majdalani, N., & Abu Taleb, Y. (2020). A Green Blue Deal for the Middle East. EcoPeace Middle East. www.
ecopeaceme.org/gbd/.

48 Şencan, G. (2022). Türkiye’de Gıda Enflasyonu ve Tarım. IstanPol. https://istanpol.org/post-turkiye-de-gida-enflasyonu-ve-

tar-m

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Climate Change: The Euphrates-Tigris River Basin
About the Author

Gokce Sencan is a climate and water policy researcher based in Cali-

fornia. Her areas of expertise include droughts, water management, and
public health impacts of climate change in Mediterranean climates. She has
worked on issues like urban drought resilience, agriculture, freshwater eco-
systems, water markets, groundwater management, and the energy-water
relationship, and published various reports, policy analyses and fact sheets.
In the MENA region, Gokce focuses on droughts, agriculture, food and water
security, extreme heat, and green development. An active contributor to cli-
mate debates in Turkey, Gokce has previously worked as an intergovernmental affairs intern at the
United Nations Environment Program in New York, and as a climate change research intern at the
Istanbul Policy Center. She has bachelor’s degrees in Chemical-Biological Engineering and Molec-
ular Biology and Genetics from Koc University in Istanbul, and a master’s degree in Environmental
Science and Management from the University of California, Santa Barbara. Gokce speaks Turkish
and English fluently, and Spanish with limited proficiency.

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