SECOND DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 223042. July 06, 2022 ]

CANDY A.K.A. BABY/JILLIAN MURING FERRER,
PETITIONER, VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
[G.R. No. 223769]
DHAYME JAMUAD (A.K.A. - NIKKI MURING
FERRER) AND CANDY A.K.A. BABY/JILLIAN
MURING FERRER, PETITIONERS, VS. COURT OF
APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Cases

In G.R. No. 223042, petitioner Candy a.k.a. Baby/Jillian Muring

Ferrer (Candy) assails, via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
Decision[1] dated July 22, 2015, and Resolution[2] dated February
11, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-C.R.-H.C. No.
01570 which affirmed her conviction, together with Dhayme
Jamuad a.k.a. Nikki Muring Ferrer, for violation of 4(a), in relation
to Sections 6(a) and (c) of Republic Act No. (RA) 9208, otherwise
known as the Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003; and denied
her subsequent motion for reconsideration, respectively.
On the other hand, in G.R. No. 223769, petitioner Dhayme Jamuad
a.k.a. Nikki Muring Ferrer (Nikki) assails the same dispositions of
the Court of Appeals via Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Antecedents

The Charge

Under Information dated February 27, 2009, both petitioners,

together with Ruben, Jason a.k.a. Jeffrey, and Shane, were charged
with qualified trafficking in persons in violation of RA 9208, thus:

That sometime in the month of November, 2008, in the

City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the said accused, conniving and
confederating together and mutually helping one another,
with deliberate intent, with intent of (sic) gain, did then
and there recruit, transport and then maintain for purpose
of prostitution, pornography, or sexual exploitation eight
(8) female and one (1) male, seven (7) of which are
children, namely, [EEE] 14 years old, [FFF] 17 years
old, [BBB] 17 years old, [GGG] 16 years old, [DDD] 17
years old, [CCC] 15 years old[,] and [AAA] 16 years
old, with the qualifying aggravating circumstance:

1. The trafficked persons are children;

2. The crime is committed by a syndicate;
3. That the crime is committed in large scale.

CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court-Branch 6, Cebu

City.[4]
Only petitioners got apprehended as their co-accused remained at
large.[5]

On arraignment, petitioners pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Then 16-year-old AAA223042[6] testified that she worked as a

dancer at the Fantastic Bar in Cagayan de Oro City. In November
2008, her uncle introduced her to petitioners who were then
planning a trip to Cebu. She asked petitioners if she could go with
them as she heard there was "bigger money" in Cebu since more
foreigners are staying in that area. Petitioners told her she could
come along and work as a dancer in Cebu but as part of her job,
customers may request her to stay with them for three (3) days for a
price or "bar fine." Despite her initial hesitation, she eventually
agreed, nonetheless.[7]

On November 12, 2008, she and petitioners went to Gaisano Mall,

Cagayan de Oro City where they bought several tickets for their trip.
They also dropped by a restaurant to meet five (5) other girls
recruited by petitioners. One of the girls was a fellow dancer at
Fantastic Bar. Together, they boarded a boat bound for Cebu that
evening. During the boat ride, petitioners gathered their recruits in
one room and told them that should anyone ask them about their
purpose in going to Cebu, they should just say they were going there
for a vacation.[8]

When they docked in Cebu, petitioners instructed her and the other
recruits to wait for a Korean guy to fetch them. After waiting for
about two hours, a man whom they thought was a kargador (porter)
asked who and how old they were. The man turned out to be a
police officer. Then, a police car arrived and they were brought to
the police station, along with the Korean guy Ruben. There,
petitioners instructed them to tell the police that they were going to
attend the wedding of Candy and her Korean fiancé.[9]

She and the other recruits were later turned over to the Children
Intervention Unit of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development (CIU-DSWD). There, she was interviewed by the
International Justice Mission (IJM), albeit she did not know why.[10]

Then 17-year-old BBB223042 corroborated AAA223042's

testimony. BBB223042 testified, too, that petitioners also recruited
her and two other friends to work as dancers in a bar to be opened in
Cebu. Petitioners paid for their taxi fares and gave them TransAsia
tickets bound for Cebu. The tickets bore fake names.[11]

During the boat ride, petitioners gathered them with five (5) other
girls and gave the details of their work in Cebu: working hours
would be from 8 o'clock in the evening until 3 o'clock in the
morning of the following day; the uniform would be bra and parity
or t-back; their salaries would be about P200.00 per day for guest
relation officers (GROs) and P300.00 per day for dancers; and they
would earn half of the bar fine worth P6,000.00 should a customer
request for them. AAA223042, CCC223042, DDD223042, and
GGG223042 were among those who attended the meeting.[12]

When they arrived at the pier they waited for Candy's boyfriend to
fetch them. Meantime, two police officers approached and asked
them some questions. They lied to the police officers per petitioners'
instructions. But they were still taken to the police station, together
with petitioners and Candy's Korean boyfriend Ruben. Thereafter,
she and the other recruits were brought to the CIU-DSWD.[13]

Then 15-year-old CCC223042 testified she had similar experience

as AAA223042 and BBB223042. Shane introduced her to Nikki on
November 9, 2008. Nikki asked her if she was willing to work in
Cebu as a dancer. She accepted the offer so Nikki instructed her to
meet her at Gaisano Mall on November 12, 2008. Nikki paid for her
taxi fare and bought her a ticket to Cebu. She then met Nikki's other
recruits, including AAA223042 and DDD223042.[14]

During the boat ride to Cebu, petitioners told her she would be a
dancer with a salary of P300.00 per night, and customers would be
allowed to bring her to a hotel and have sex with her upon paying a
bar fine.[15]

When their group disembarked at the pier in Cebu, police officers

approached them and asked for their ages and where they came
from. They were then brought to the police station and interviewed
by a social worker. She was later on turned over to the DSWD
office.[16]

Version of the Defense

Petitioners denied the charges. They testified that they are also
victims since they too are prostitutes.[17] They lamented that the real
recruiters were not even charged.[18]

Candy testified that she personally knew two of the complainants as

they were dancers and entertainers in Fantastic Bar in Cagayan de
Oro City. During one of their conversations, she told them about her
experiences in Cebu. She also told them that compared to Cagayan
de Oro City, the pay was better in Cebu and she planned to return
there. The victims asked to come with her and requested her to pay
for their fare, subject to reimbursement. She agreed to the
arrangement and asked her Korean boyfriend Jik Rhu to send her
money. She only wanted to help the girls.[19]
For her part, Nikki testified that she overheard the girls'
conversation about bigger income in Cebu. She went along because
she was also interested. She paid for her own fare. She never forced
the other girls to come to Cebu with her and she never did anything
wrong to them.[20]

Ruling of the Trial Court

By Decision[21] dated November 28, 2011, the trial court found

petitioners guilty of qualified trafficking in persons under Section
4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and (c) of RA 9208 viz.:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dhayme

Jamuad a.k.a. Nikki Muring Ferrer and Candy a.k.a.
Baby/Jillian Muring Ferrer, guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Violation of R.A. 9208 and
sentences them to each suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to each pay a fine of Two Million
Pesos (Php2,000,000.00). The accused are entitled to full
credit of their preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.[22]

The verdict of conviction was hinged on the credible testimonies of

the three (3) minor victims who positively identified petitioners as
the ones who recruited them to work as club dancers and sex
workers. As the victims categorically stated, it was petitioners who
organized their transport, paid for their fares, gave them an
orientation on the work they would be doing in Cebu, and instructed
them on what to say if police officers question them. In light of
these positive testimonies from the victims themselves, petitioners'
defense of denial crumbled. Finally, petitioners' offense was
qualified by the fact that there were at least three (3) trafficked
persons and the victims were minors.
The trial court denied reconsideration on August 7, 2012.[23]

Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioners faulted the trial court for rendering a verdict

of conviction despite the prosecution's alleged failure to prove all
the elements of the crime. Specifically, it was purportedly not
established that the purpose for which the girls were brought to
Cebu was for prostitution. At any rate, their actions only amounted
to attempted trafficking in persons which is not a crime under RA
9208; it only became punishable under RA 10364, Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.[24]

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) defended the trial court's
ruling, albeit it recommended the award of moral and exemplary
damages to complainants.[25]

Dispositions of the Court of Appeals

Under Decision[26] dated July 22, 2015, the Court of Appeals

affirmed with modification, awarding moral and exemplary
damages to complainants, viz.:

WHEREFORE, this appeal is DENIED. The Decision

dated November 28, 2011 and Order dated August 7,
2012 of Branch 6 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu
City in Crim. Case No. CBU-86668 is AFFIRMED.
Accused-appellants are likewise required to jointly and
severally pay each of the victims AAA, BBB, CCC,
DDD, EEE, FFF, and GGG the amount of P500,000 as
moral damages and P100,000 as exemplary damages.
 SO ORDERED.[27]

First. All the elements of the crime of recruitment and

transportation of victims for purposes of exploitation were duly
established in accordance with Section 4(a), in relation to Sections
6(a) and (c) of RA 9208.[28]

Second. RA 9208 did not require that the victims be subjected first
to prostitution before they should be rescued by authorities. In fact,
Section 25 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9208[29] outlined the procedure in the interception, arrest, and
investigation of traffickers in persons at local airports, seaports, and
land transportation terminals. As well, the IRR provided a
framework through which people can report suspected trafficking
activities to the authorities.[30]

Third. Petitioners' defense that they, too, are prostitutes and victims
of trafficking could not negate their culpability. It is neither an
exempting nor mitigating circumstance under RA 9208.[31]

Finally. In accordance with People v. Lalli,[32] the award of

P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages are in order.

The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration under Resolution[33]

dated February 11, 2016.

The Present Petitions

In G.R. No. 223042,[34] Candy prays anew for the reversal of the
verdict of conviction via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
She asserts that none of the recognized grounds for a warrantless
arrest under Section 5 of Rule 113[35] of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure was present when she got arrested. Her arrest was
therefore in violation of her constitutional right, hence, invalid. Too,
the arresting officers neither provided her with counsel nor apprised
her of her Miranda rights, in violation of Section 12, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution.[36] These violations render the evidence
against her and Nikki inadmissible in any proceeding. Consequently,
the verdict of conviction against her has no leg to stand on; she
cannot be convicted of any offense based on such inadmissible
evidence.[37]

At any rate, the prosecution allegedly failed to prove her guilt. The
act of accompanying a person to Cebu is not a crime. She never
forced anyone to travel with her. Her mere presence in the places
mentioned by the prosecution witnesses did not signify her
involvement in any crime.[38]

There was definitely no forced labor, slavery, or servitude to speak

of here, thus, negating the existence of the offense charged.[39] At
best, the prosecution merely imputed attempted exploitation and
prostitution which is not punishable under RA 9208; it only became
a crime in 2012 under RA 10364.[40]

In her Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,

via G.R. No. 223769,[41] Nikki claims that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion when it affirmed the trial
court's ruling despite the glaring violation of her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. She
points out that the Information merely charged her and her co-
accused with violation of RA 9208, sans specificity of the acts under
Section 4 or 5 of RA 9208 which she allegedly violated.[42]

In its Consolidated Comment,[43] the OSG ripostes that Rule 65 is

an improper remedy; any objection against the validity of
petitioners' warrantless arrest and the sufficiency of the Information
against them may not be raised for the first time on appeal; and
petitioners were properly charged with and proven guilty of
qualified trafficking in persons.

In her Reply,[44] Candy admits that issues regarding the validity of

an arrest cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. But she asserts
that one exception is when what is involved is a grave offense and
its interplay with life and liberty and the basic constitutional
presumption of innocence. In any event, an appeal opens the entire
case for review. Thus, even matters not timely raised may be
discussed to fully appreciate the merits of the case.

Meanwhile, in her Compliance and Reply to Comment,[45] Nikki

maintains that the Court of Appeals evaded or virtually refused to
perform it positive duty under the law when it failed to reverse and
set aside the verdict of conviction. She claims that since her right to
due process was violated, her recourse to certiorari is warranted.

Our Ruling

We deny the Petitions.

Petitioners availed of improper remedies

Preliminarily, the Court notes that petitioners Candy and Nikki took
different routes before the Court. Candy filed a Petition under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court within fifteen (15) days from receipt[46]
while Nikki filed a petition under Rule 65, availing herself of the
60-day reglementary period therefore.[47] But both modes are
improper for the purpose of assailing the dispositions of the Court of
Appeals here. Section 3 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure is apropos:

Section 3. How appeal taken. —

(a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court, or to the

Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial
Court in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, shall be
taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which
rendered the judgment or final order appealed from and
by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party.

(b) The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided

by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction shall be by petition for review
under Rule 42.

(c) The appeal to the Supreme Court in cases where

the penalty imposed by the Regional Trial Court is
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or
where a lesser penalty is imposed but for offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of
the same occurrence that gave rise to the more
serious offense for which the penalty of death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment is imposed,
shall be by filing a notice of appeal in accordance
with paragraph (a) of this section.

(d) No notice of appeal is necessary in cases where the

death penalty is imposed by the Regional Trial Court.
The same shall be automatically reviewed by the
Supreme Court as provided in section 10 of this Rule.
 (e) Except as provided in the last paragraph of section
13, Rule 124, all other appeals to the Supreme Court
shall be by petition for review on certiorari under Rules
45. (3a) (Emphases and italics supplied)

In Arambullo v. People, (Arambullo)[48] the Court clarified that as a

general rule, appeals in criminal cases shall be brought to the Court
via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court[49] except when the Court of Appeals imposed the penalty of
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, in which case, the appeal
shall be made by a mere notice of appeal before the Court of
Appeals.[50]

Here, the courts below uniformly sentenced petitioners to life

imprisonment. Hence, in accordance with Section 3(c) of Rule 122
of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure and Arambullo,
petitioners should have simply filed a notice of appeal with the
Court of Appeals.

At any rate, in the interest of substantial justice, the Court will treat
the petitions as ordinary appeals in order to resolve the substantive
issues at hand with finality.[51]

Validity of
warrantless
arrest and
sufficiency of
the Information
cannot be raised
for the first time
on appeal

Candy questions the validity of their arrest. She argues that there
was no probable cause to arrest a person who was simply
accompanying another person to Cebu. On the other hand, Nikki
assails the sufficiency of the Information against them as it did not
allegedly specify the provision of RA 9208 which they supposedly
violated. Too, the facts alleged did not constitute an offense since
attempted trafficking in persons was only made punishable when
RA 9208 was amended in 2012 by RA 10364, The Expanded Anti-­‐
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.

We are not convinced.

It is settled that any objection involving a warrant of arrest or

procedure for acquisition of the court's jurisdiction over the person
of the accused must be made before one enters his or her plea,
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.[52] In Lapi v. People,[53]
citing People v. Alunday:[54]

The Court has consistently ruled that any objection

involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure for the
acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
the accused must be made before he enters his plea;
otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. We have also
ruled that an accused may be estopped from assailing the
illegality of his arrest if he fails to move for the quashing
of the information against him before his arraignment.
And since the legality of an arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused,
any defect in the arrest of the accused may be deemed
cured when he voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of
the trial court. We have also held in a number of cases
that the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient
cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error; such
arrest does not negate the validity of the conviction of
the accused.[55]
The same is true with respect to formal defects in the Information.
Section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
decrees:

Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any

ground therefor. – The failure of the accused to assert
any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a
motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said
motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections
based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b),
(g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule.[56]

Hence, in People v. Solar,[57] the Court deemed appellant to have

waived his right to question the defects of the Information filed
against him upon noting that the latter did not file a motion to quash
or for bill of particulars before entering his plea.

Here, petitioners admit that they are assailing their arrests and the
purported defects in the Information filed against them only here
and now. It is therefore too late in the day to complain against these
so-called defects.

Petitioners are
guilty of
Qualified
Trafficking in
Persons.

To repeat, petitioners were charged with trafficking in persons as

defined and penalized under Section 3(a) of RA 9208, thus:

Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment,

transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of
 persons with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders by means
of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having
control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or

receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall
also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it
does not involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.

Arambullo[58] clarified though that Section 3(a) of RA 9208 merely

provides the general definition of "Trafficking in Persons." The
specific acts punishable under the law are found in Sections 4 and 5,
viz.:

It must be clarified that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208

merely provides for the general definition of
"Trafficking in Persons" as the specific acts
punishable under the law are found in Sections 4 and
5 of the same (including Sections 4-A, 4-B, and-4-C if
the amendments brought about by RA 10364 are taken
into consideration). This is evinced by Section 10 which
provides for the penalties and sanctions for committing
the enumerated acts therein. Notably, Section 10(c) of
RA 9208 (renumbered as Section 10 [e] under RA
10364) of the law also provides for penalties for
 "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" under Section 6.
Nonetheless, since Section 6 only provides for
circumstances which would qualify the crime of
"Human Trafficking," reference should always be
made to Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5 of the law.
Hence, convictions for "Qualified Trafficking in
Persons" shall rest on: (a) the commission of any of
the acts provided under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or
5; and (b) the existence of any of the circumstances
listed under Section 6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be
convicted of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is
not found to have committed any of the punishable acts
under the law.[59] (Emphases added)

Verily, Sections 4 and 5 must be read in relation to Section 3(a), RA

9208.

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be

unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit
any of the following acts:

(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or

receive a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or apprenticeship, for the
purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;

xxxx

Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. – x

x x (Emphases supplied)
On this score, the successful prosecution of trafficking in persons
under Section 4(a) requires:

(a)the act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or

harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;"

(b)the means used which include "threat or use of force,

or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over
another;" and

(c)the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which

includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs."[60] (Emphases supplied)

As invariably found by the courts below, these elements were all

duly established here.

First. Three (3) brave victims came forward and testified that
petitioners recruited them in Cagayan de Oro to work for a newly-
opened bar in Cebu. Petitioners themselves organized their transport
by purchasing their tickets, paying for their fares, and
accompanying them to Cebu. AAA223042 testified, thus:[61]

PROS. AVILA:

xxxx
Q Could you still remember what month and year did
you first meet Nik[ki] [Dhayme Jamuad] and Candy?
A The first time I met them was in 2008 November.

Q What were you doing in Fantastic Bar in Cagayan de

Oro in November of 2008?
A I worked as a dancer.

Q When did you start working as a dancer?

A Mid[-]June 2008.

Q So you were already working as a dancer in Fantastic

Bar in Cagayan de Oro City for around 5 months
when you first met Nikki and Candy?
A Yes.

COURT:

Q How old were you at that time?

A 16.

PROS. AVILA:

Q How did you notice the presence of Nikki and Candy?

A I learned about them through my uncle working in the
bar as waiter[,] that Nikki and Candy are coming over
here in Cebu.

Q What is the name of your uncle[?]

A Uncle x x x xx x x xxxx.

Q What did you do upon learning that Nikki and Candy

are going to Cebu?
A When I talked to Nikki I learned that they will be
going to Cebu. I asked her if I could go with them and
I will pay for my own fare. Nikki said that l don't
have to bother because they will pay for my fare.

xxxx

PROS. AVILA:

Q You said that when you called Candy, (sic) were

you fetched from your boarding house or you went
to Nikki's place?
A I was fetched.

Q How many days did you stay in Nikki's house?

A I could no longer recall.

Q What happened when you were at Nikki's house?

A A When we were about to go on that day and on
November 12 the fiancée of Candy called up and
said that the money of P25,000.00 is ready to be
picked up.

xxxx

Q Do you know what was that P25,000.00 for?

xxxx

A Yes, for the fare of the girls.

xxxx

PROS. AVILA:
Q Who claimed the P25,000.00, if you know?
A It was Nikki.

Q What happened after that?

A Then we went to Gaisano to buy tickets for the girls[']
fare. We dropped by the restaurant to meet the other
girls who are going with us.

Q You mean Gaisano in Cagayan?

A Yes.

Q You still remember what time was that when you met
with the girls?
A I can no longer remember.

Q Who were with you in going to Gaisano Cagayan?

A The two of them.

INTERPRETER LACHICA:

The witness is pointing to the 2 accused, Nikki and

Candy.

PROS. AVILA:

Q You mentioned of girls that you met in Gaisano

Cagayan, upon arrival thereat how many girls did you
see?
A 5.

Q Do you know these 5 girls before you met them in

Gaisano Cagayan?
A Only one I know.

xxxx
 Q After you met with the girls in Gaisano Cagayan
together with Nikki and Candy, what happened next?
A We went then to the pier.

Q Where did you go, where were you going?

A Here in Cebu.

xxxx

Q What happened while you were still in the boat?

A We were told to go to the room of Nikki and Candy
and we had a meeting and we were instructed that
if anyone would ask us we will just tell them that
we are having a vacation in Cebu.

Q What time did the boat arrive in Cebu?

A 8:00 o'clock in the morning the following day.

xxxx

Q Aside from the instruction given of (sic) Nikki and

Candy that if somebody asks you where are you
going, you are going [o]n a vacation, what else did
they say?
A When we got to the police station[,] we were
instructed that if we would be asked[,] we would tell
them that we would be attending a wedding of Candy
who is getting married to her Korean fiance.[62]
(Emphases added)

Second. Petitioners took advantage of the victims' vulnerability as

impoverished minors by enticing them with an opportunity to earn
"bigger money" from foreigners in Cebu. CCC223042 testified:[63]
ATTY. TAN

xxxx

Q When did Shane introduce you to Nikki?

A November 9, 2008.

Q When you were introduced to Nikki, what did

Nikki say?
A She asked if I have (sic) experience being a dancer.

Q And what did you tell Nikki?

A I said, yes.

Q When you said yes to Nikki, what did Nikki do?

A She asked me if I could go with her to Cebu.

xxxx

Q What did you say about Nikki's offer?

A We agreed.

Q What happened after you agreed?

A We were told to meet them at the Gaisano Mall.

Q When?
A November 12, 2008.

xxxx

ATTY. ARCHIVAL

Q Will you tell this Honorable Court that you filed a

case against them these two accused whom you
 immediately identified would not victimize other
people (sic). Did you say that?
A Yes.

Q Are you saying, [CCC223042], that you are a

victim in this case because the accused conspiring
and confederating with each other, they acted as
manager or acting in your behalf so that you will
be bar fine (sic)?
A Yes.

Q But that alleged bar fine which you declared before

this honorable court that the customer whom you do
not know, you were not told what to do (sic), never
materialized because while walking to the corner you
were accosted by the policemen and you were asked
by (sic) your respective ages, is that correct?
A Yes.[64] (Emphases added)

Taking advantage of the victims' desperation, petitioners were able

to gain control over them. This "control" over the victims
manifested in several ways: petitioners themselves organized their
transport, briefed the victims on their would-be jobs in Cebu,
instructed them to lie to police officers in case they get asked about
the purpose of their travel, and practically served as adult
supervisors of the minor victims.

Lastly. The clear purpose of the victims' recruitment and transport

was for prostitution. They were brought to Cebu to work in a newly-
opened bar partly owned by Candy's Korean boyfriend. They would
become either GROs at P200.00 per night or dancers at P300.00 per
night. They would be working from 8 o'clock in the evening until 3
o'clock in the morning, wearing only their bra and panty or t-back.
Should clients take them out of the club for sex, they would earn
half of the P6,000.00 bar fine. BBB223042 testified on these
deplorable details, thus:[65]

ATTY. TAN:

Q While onboard the ship when Nikki and Candy

gathered you in that room, what happened?
A We discussed about our work, our workplace and our
salary.

Q What did Nikki or Candy talk about your work?

A Our work will start at 8:00 in the evening and
would end at 3:00 o['] clock in the morning.

Q How about your uniform, what will you wear at

work?
A Panty and bra or t-back.

Q How about the salary?

A Our salary if you are a dancer, it would be
P300.00.

Q If you are not a dancer, how much?

A GRO would be P200.00.

Q What will your work be when you reached Cebu?

A I would be a dancer and bar fine (sic) with
customers.

xxxx

Q What else did Nikki or Candy tell you about your

work in Cebu?

xxxx
 A The bar fine is P6,000.00 and we have a share of
P3,000.00 and the bar will have P3,000.00.[66]
(Emphases added)

Clearly, the testimonies of the victims sufficiently established that

petitioners are guilty of trafficking in persons under Section 4(a) of
RA 9208. Indubitably, petitioners' acts of recruiting and transporting
the victims to Cebu were for the purpose of prostituting them to
foreigners in a bar co-owned by Candy's Korean boyfriend. To gain
control over their victims, petitioners enticed them with the
possibility of earning more from foreign clients in Cebu than in
Cagayan de Oro.

As the courts below uniformly held, the testimonies of AAA223042,

BBB223042 and CCC223042 deserved full weight and credence.
Their categorical, straightforward, and spontaneous statements
remained consistent even on cross. There was also no showing that
they were impelled by improper motive when they identified
petitioners as the perpetrators of the crime.[67] To be sure, the
factual findings of the trial court, including its assessment of the
credibility of witnesses arid probative weight of their testimonies,
are accorded great weight and respect, especially when affirmed by
the Court of Appeals, as here.[68]

Petitioners'
litany of
defenses does
not persuade

In an attempt to absolve themselves of criminal liability, petitioners

allege: first, they never forced the victims to travel with them;
second, they were prostitutes themselves, hence, similarly situated
with the victims; third, there was no conspiracy between them and
their co-accused; fourth, even if they recruited and transported the
victims for the purpose of prostitution, they were not actually
subjected to such purpose, consequently the offense, if any, was
committed only in its attempted stage which is not punishable under
RA 9208; and lastly, at most, they are only liable for attempted
trafficking in persons under RA 10364.

We are not persuaded.

a. Consent is not an element of the crime

The allegation that petitioners never forced the victims to travel with
them is not a valid defense. Section 3(a) of RA 9208 is clear – the
crime may be perpetrated "with or without the victim's consent or
knowledge." More so, when the victims are minors who could not
validly give consent. People v. Ramirez,[69] citing People v. Casio,
[70] elucidates:

The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to

the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use
of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.

xxxx

Similarly, in People v. De Dios:

It did not matter that there was no threat,

force, coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception or abuse of power that was
employed by De Dios when she involved
AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA was
still a minor when she was exposed to
 prostitution by the prodding, promises[,]
and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons
may be committed also by means of taking
advantage of the persons' vulnerability as
minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA,
was sufficiently alleged in the information
and proved during the trial. This element was
further achieved through the offer of financial
gain for the illicit services that were provided
by AAA to the customers of De Dios.[71]
(Emphases added, citations omitted)

Here, the three (3) victims who testified were all minors when the
crime was committed. In 2008, AAA223042 was 16; BBB223042,
17; and CCC223042, 15. In fine, their supposed willingness to join
petitioners in going to Cebu would not dissolve petitioners' criminal
liability.

b. Even prostitutes may become liable for trafficking in persons

The fact that petitioners are prostitutes themselves does not render
them incapable of committing the crime of trafficking in persons.
On the contrary, their occupation rendered them well-placed and
experienced to do just that.

At any rate, the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that petitioners'

"defense" could hardly relieve them of their criminal culpability.
Indeed, the harsh reality is that victims of prostitution are sometimes
led to victimize others as well. In order to put an end to the cycle,
the victim-turned-trafficker should also be penalized for violating
RA 9208.

c. There was conspiracy to commit trafficking in persons

Conspiracy exists where two or m.ore persons come to an

agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit the same. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of action
and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the
crime itself, must be proved beyond reasonable doubt.[72]

Here, the testimonies of the three (3) minor victims established the
conspiracy between petitioners and their co-accused. As earlier
shown, the concerted actions of Candy and Nikki in recruiting the
victims, funding their transport, briefing them about their work, and
supervising their movements speak volumes of their common
criminal design. We cannot give credence to petitioners' defense that
they simply "accompanied" the victims since their actions show
otherwise. They were not mere companions for they took an active
role in facilitating the transport of the victims for purposes of
prostitution.

d. RA 9208 does not require the victim to actually be prostituted

Petitioners further assert that even assuming they recruited and

transported the victims for prostitution, the latter were not actually
subjected to such purpose. Hence, the crime was only committed in
its attempted stage which is not punishable under RA 9208.

Petitioner's theory is far from novel. In People v. Estonilo,[73] citing

People v. Aguirre,[74] the Court ruled that RA 9208 does not require
the victim to actually be subjected to prostitution before an accused
may be prosecuted for trafficking in persons, viz.:

In this regard, the CA erred in opining that no trafficking

existed as "there was no person to whom [Estonilo]
endorsed or recruited his victims," (sic) and further
stressing that the sexual acts transpired not between
AAA or BBB and any of Estonilo's clients, but between
AAA and BBB themselves. As aptly pointed out by
Associate Justice Ramon Paul L. Hernando neither the
presence of the trafficker's clients, nor their
intercourse with the victim/s, is required to support a
finding of trafficking. As held in People v. Aguirre:

Furthermore, the presence of the trafficker's

clients is not an element of the crime of
recruitment or transportation of victims under
Sections 3 (a) and 4 (a) of RA 9208. In the
same vein, the law does not require that the
victims be transported to or be found in a
brothel or a prostitution den for such
crime of recruitment or transportation to
be committed. In fact, it has been held that
the act of sexual intercourse need not have
been consummated for recruitment to be
said to have taken place. It is sufficient
that the accused has lured, enticed or
engaged its victims or transported. them
for the established purpose of exploitation,
which includes prostitution, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and the
removal or sale of organs. In this case, the
prosecution has satisfactorily established
accused­-appellants' recruitment and
transportation of private complainants for
purposes of prostitution and sexual
exploitation.[75] (Emphases supplied)

Thus, the fact that neither AAA nor BBB had sexual
contact with any of Estonilo's clients will not affect
the latter's criminal liability for Qualified Trafficking
in Persons. To be sure, the gravamen of the crime of
trafficking is "the act of recruiting or using, with or
without consent, a fellow human being for [inter alia,]
 sexual exploitation" – which, as already discussed, was
established to have been committed by Estonilo.[76]
(Emphases added)

Indeed, what is essential under RA 9208 is that a person is recruited

and transported for the purpose of prostitution. The victim does not
have to be actually subjected to prostitution, had danced as a GRO,
or had sex with a client before the recruiters can be held liable under
the law. Precisely, the law was passed to curtail human trafficking.
This entails punishing the acts themselves that would lead to
prostituting the victims, as here.

e. The crime cannot

be categorized as
attempted
trafficking in
persons under RA
10364

Finally, petitioners argue that their actions merely constituted

attempted trafficking in persons under RA 10364, viz.:

Section 5. A new Section 4-A is hereby inserted in

Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:

"SEC. 4-A. Attempted Trafficking in Persons. – Where

there are acts to initiate the commission of a trafficking
offense but the offender failed to or did not execute all
the elements of the crime, by accident or by reason of
some cause other than voluntary desistance, such overt
acts shall be deemed as an attempt to commit an act of
trafficking in persons. As such, an attempt to commit any
of the offenses enumerated in Section 4 of this Act shall
constitute attempted trafficking in persons.
 "In cases where the victim is a child, any of the
following acts shall also be deemed as attempted
trafficking in persons:

"(a) Facilitating the travel of a child who

travels alone to a foreign country or territory
without valid reason therefor and without the
required clearance or permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development, or a written permit or
justification from the child's parent or legal
guardian;

"(b) Executing, for a consideration, an

affidavit of consent or a written consent for
adoption;

"(c) Recruiting a woman to bear a child for

the purpose of selling the child;

"(d) Simulating a birth for the purpose of

selling the child; and

"(e) Soliciting a child and acquiring the

custody thereof through any means from
among hospitals; clinics, nurseries, daycare
centers, refugee or evacuation centers, and
low-income families, for the purpose of
selling the child." (Emphasis added)

It must be stressed though that petitioners were charged with

qualified trafficking in persons committed in November 2008. Thus,
the governing law is RA 9208 before it got amended by RA 10364
on February 6, 2013. Consequently, the provisions of RA 10364
cannot, as a general rule, apply to petitioners' case. By way of
exception, however, the provisions of RA 10364 may find
retroactive applications if they are beneficial to the accused.

This brings us to the question – can RA 10364 be retroactively

applied to downgrade the designation of petitioners' offense to
attempted trafficking in persons?

We rule in the negative.

As Associate Justice Mario V. Lopez keenly observed during

deliberations, RA 10364 criminalized attempted trafficking in
persons as a means to fully strengthen and institutionalize the
mechanisms and principles behind the protection of rights of
trafficked persons. It was not designed to reduce the penalties for
consummated offenses, but to proscribe a new crime altogether.

To successfully prosecute this new crime of attempted trafficking in

persons, Section 4(a) of RA 9208 as amended clearly requires that
the offender failed to execute all the elements of trafficking in
persons. As discussed, however, petitioners herein have
performed all acts necessary to consummate the crime under
RA 9208. To stress, petitioners recruited and transported their
victims to Cebu for purposes of prostitution by taking advantage of
their vulnerability. This combination of acts, means and purpose
already consummated the offense.

The fact that petitioners subsequently got arrested before they could
bring the victims to their workplace did not downgrade their
liability. We said as much in People v. Daguno,[77] thus:

As correctly ruled by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,

the existence of the elements of Qualified Trafficking in
Persons was sufficiently established by the prosecution
beyond reasonable doubt, to wit: (1) that AAA was a
minor when the offense against her was committed; (2)
 that accused-appellant introduced AAA to different
customers on several occasions to engage in sexual
intercourse; and (3) that accused-appellant received
money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of AAA.

The offense is Qualified Trafficking in Persons because

AAA was a minor. The means used to commit the
offense becomes immaterial. At any rate, it may not be
denied that accused-appellant took advantage of the
vulnerability of AAA who was a minor.

Moreover, the Court finds no merit in accused-

appellant's plea for acquittal on the ground that the
acts she allegedly committed on August 5, 2011
merely amounted to an attempt to commit the offense
as it was aborted by her subsequent arrest; and that
such attempt to commit the offense was not
punishable under RA 9208 and became so punishable
only upon the amendment introduced by RA 10364
on February 6, 2013.

As discussed, the allegations in the Information filed

against accused-appellant clearly refer to the
consummated acts of trafficking in persons she
committed on July 10 and July 24, 2011. x x x
(Emphases added, citations omitted)

Just the same, the Court would arrive at the same conclusion had
petitioners committed the crime after the enactment of RA 10364;
petitioners would still be held liable for qualified trafficking in
persons in the consummated stage, not in the attempted stage. To be
sure, Ramirez compared the elements of trafficking in persons under
RA 9208 and RA 10364, thus:

RA 9208 RA 10364
(1) The act of (1) The act of
"recruitment, "recruitment, obtaining,
transportation, transfer or hiring, providing, offering,
harboring, or receipt of transportation, transfer,
persons with or without maintaining, harboring, or
the victim's consent or receipt of persons with or
knowledge, within or without the victim's
across national borders;" consent or knowledge,
within or across national
borders;"
(2) The means used which (2) The means used include
include "threat or use of "by means of threat, or use
force, or other forms of of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power deception, abuse of power
or of position, taking or of position, taking
advantage of the advantage of the
vulnerability of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having consent of a person having
control over another;" and control over another
person," and
(3) The purpose of (3) The purpose of
trafficking is exploitation trafficking includes "the
which includes exploitation or the
"exploitation or the prostitution of others or
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude,
services, slavery, servitude, or the removal or sale of
or the removal or sale of organs."
organs."
Notably, recruitment and transportation of persons remain predicate
acts under both versions of the law. In other words, mere
recruitment and transportation of persons, through any of the means
and for any of the purposes enumerated under Section 4 as amended
would be sufficient to consummate the crime and remove it from the
ambit of attempted trafficking in persons under Section 4(a). Thus,
even under the new law, petitioners' offense here would still be
deemed consummated and way past the attempted stage. Now, if
petitioners are barred from claiming the benefit of a lower sentence
under RA 10364, then with more reason are they barred from
claiming the same benefit prior to its enactment.

Penalty

The crime of trafficking in persons is qualified when either of the

circumstances in Section 6 of RA 9208 is present, viz.:

Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The

following are considered as qualified trafficking:

(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xxxx

(c) When the crime is committed by a

syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried
out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another.
It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group[.]

Here, the crime of trafficking in persons was qualified by the fact

that it was committed against nine (9) victims, of which seven (7)
were minors. Consequently, the courts below correctly sentenced
each petitioner to life imprisonment and pay a fine of P2,000,000.00
in accordance with Section 10(c) of RA 9208.[78]

The award of moral and exemplary damages is also proper. People

v. Lalli[79] is apropos:

The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a

Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without
one's consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and
atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as
a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking
in Persons was aggravated; being committed by a
syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified. (Emphasis and underscoring added)

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, therefore, petitioners are

correctly ordered to jointly and severally pay each of the victims the
amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. These amounts should earn six percent (6%)
legal interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.[80]

ACCORDINGLY, the Petitions in G.R. Nos. 223042 and 223769

are DENIED. The Decision dated July 22, 2015, and Resolution
dated February 11, 2016, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CEB-
C.R.-H.C. No. 01570 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Petitioners Dhayme Jamuad a.k.a. Nikki Muring Ferrer and
Candy a.k.a. Baby/Jillian Muring Ferrer are found GUILTY of
QUALIFIED TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS under Section 4(a),
in relation to Section 6(a) and (c) of Republic Act No. 9208. They
are each sentenced to life imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine
of P2,000,000.00.

Petitioners are further ORDERED to jointly and severally pay each

of the victims AAA223042, BBB223042, CCC223042,
DDD223042, EEE223042, FFF223042, and GGG223042 the
amounts of P500,000.00 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as
exemplary damages. These amounts shall earn six percent (6%)
legal interest per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully
paid.

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, SAJ. (Chairperson), M. Lopez, Dimaampao,* and Kho, Jr.,

JJ., concur.

* Additional Member per Raffle dated June 22, 2022.

[1]G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 49-59. Penned by Associate Justice

Germano Francisco D. Legaspi and concurred in by Associate
Justices Pamela Ann Abella Maxino and Jhosep Y. Lopez (now a
member of this Court), id. at 58.

[2] Id. at 76-78.

[3] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 93-95.

[4] Id. at 96.

[5] Id. at 17.

[6] The real name of the victim, her personal circumstances and
other information which tend to establish or compromise her
identity, as well as those of her immediate family, or household
members, shall not be disclosed to protect her privacy, and fictitious
initial shall, instead, be used, in accordance with People v.
Cabalquinto [533 Phil. 703 (2006)] and Amended Administrative
Circular No. 83-2015 dated September 5, 2017.

[7] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, p. 51.

[8] Id.

[9] Id. at 51-52.

[10] Id. at 151-152.

[11] Id. at 52.

[12] Id.

[13] Id.

[14] Id.

[15] Id.

[16] Id.
[17] Id. at 105-106.

[18] Id. at 53.

[19] Id.

[20] Id.

[21] Id. at 96-111.

[22] Id. 110-111.

[23] Id. at 116-119.

[24] G.R. No. 223769, rollo, pp. 132-151.

[25] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, p. 55.

[26] Id. at 49-59.

[27] Id. at 58.

[28] Id. at 56.

[29] Sec. 25. Procedure in the Interception, Arrest and investigation

of Traffickers in Persons at Local Airport, Seaport and Land
Transportation Terminals. – In cases where the violation is
committed at local seaport, airport or in land transportation
terminals, the members of the law enforcement agency shall
immediately cause the interception and/or arrest of the suspected
traffickers. Thereafter, an investigation shall be conducted by the
law enforcement agency on the person/s intercepted/arrested, and
refer the case to the Prosecutor's Office of the place where the
offense was committed or to the DOJ Task Force Against
Trafficking in Persons or Task Force on Passport Irregularities or
Municipal Trial Court of the place where the crime was committed
in case of municipalities and non-chartered cities for purposes of
inquest or preliminary investigation as the case may be.

[30] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 56-57.

[31] Id. at 56.

[32] 675 Phil. 126, 144 (2011).

[33] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 76-78.

[34] Id. at 13-41.

[35]Rule 113, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Effective

December 1, 2000).

Section 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or

a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed,

is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable
cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it;
and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped
from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final
judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or
 has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person
arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in
accordance with section 7 of Rule 112.

xxxx

[36] 1987 Philippine Constitution. Article III – Bill of Rights.

Section 12.

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission

of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his
right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the
person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be
provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or

any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary,
incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are
prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of

this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions of
violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices,
and their families.
[37] G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 20-23.

[38] Id. at 23-27.

[39] Id. at 26.

[40] Id. at 38-40.

[41] Id. at 3-18.

[42] Id. at 11-15.

[43] Id. at 194-212.

[44] Id. at 302-308.

[45] Id. at 330-337.

[46]Petitioner Candy alleged that she received a copy of the Court

of Appeals Resolution dated February 11, 2016 on February 26,
2016. She has fifteen (15) days from receipt or until March 14, 2016
(March 12 being a Saturday), within which to file a Petition for
Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. She filed a motion
requesting a 30 days extension to end on April 13, 2016, which she
subsequently complied with, id. at 14.

[47] G.R. No. 223769, rollo, p. 7. Petitioner Nikki alleged that she
received a copy of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated February
11, 2016 on February 24, 2016. She has 60 days from receipt or
until April 21, 2016, within which to file a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. She filed the petition at the end
of the period.

[48] G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019.

[49]Section 3(e), Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

[50]Section 13(c), Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal

Procedure.

[51] See Ramos v. People, 803 Phil. 775, 783 (2017).

[52] Lapi v. People, G.R. No. 210731, February 13, 2019.

[53] Id.

[54] See People v. Alunday, 586 Phil. 120, 133 (2008).

[55] Id.

[56]
Section 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the
complaint or information on any of the following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense
charged;

xxxx

(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;

xxxx

(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of

the offense charged, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.

xxxx

[57] G.R. No. 225595, August 6, 2019.

[58] Supra note 48.

[59] Id.

[60] See People v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020.

[61]TSN dated October 5, 2010, G.R. No. 223042, rollo, pp. 120-
144.

[62] Id.

[63] TSN dated January 24, 2011, id. at 215-240.

[64] Id.

[65] TSN dated October 19, 2010, id. at 176-177.

[66] Id.

[67]
Decision dated November 28, 2011 of the Trial Court, G.R. No.
223042, id. at 109.
[68]See People v. Sayo and Roxas, G.R. No. 227704, April 10,
2019, citing People v. Aguirre, 820 Phil. 1085, 1097 (2017).

[69] G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019.

[70] 749 Phil. 458, 475-476 (2014).

[71] 832 Phil. 1034, 1044 (2018).

[72] People v. Jesalva, 811 Phil. 299, 307-308 (2017).

[73] Supra note 60.

[74] 820 Phil. 1085-1106 (2017).

[75] Id. at 1103.

[76] Supra note 60.

[77] G.R. No. 235660, March 4, 2020.

[78] Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties

and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses enumerated in
this Act:

xxxx

(c) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6

shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five
Million Pesos (P5,000,000.00);

xxxx

[79] Supra note 29 at 159.

[80] See People v. Jugueta, 783 Phil. 806, 854 (2016).

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