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INDEX

S. NO. CAUSE TITLE CITATION

Constitutional Law
1. AK Gopalan v. The State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27
(Preventive Detention)
2. Shankari Prasad v UOI AIR 1951 SC 458
(Parliament had the power to amend F.R)
3. Unni Krishnan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 AIR 2178
(Wider interpretation of Article 21)
4. Parmanand Katara v. UOI AIR 1989 SC 2039
(Right to health care as part of Article 21)
5. Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124
(Freedom of Press)
6. I.C Golaknath v. State of Punjab 1967 AIR 1643
(Fundamental Rights cannot be curtailed)
7. His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti & Ors. v. State AIR 1973 SC 1461
of Kerala & Anr.
(Basic Structure)
8. M. Nagraj v Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71
(Detailed Explanation of basic structure)
9. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299
(Basic Structure)
10. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Ors. 1978 (1) SCC 248
(Constitutional Validity)
11. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106
(Freedom of Expression)
12. ADM Jabalpur v. Sivkanth Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207
(Preventive Detention)
13. Minerva Mills case AIR 1980 SC 1789

14. Waman Rao v UOI AIR 1981 SC 271

(Challenge to IX Schedule)
15. SP Gupta v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1949
(Public Interest)
16. Mithu v State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 473
(Death penalty mandatory for accused is
unconstitutional)
17. Olga Tellis v. BMC 1985 SCC (3) 545
(Right to livelihood part of Right to life)
18. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477
(Reservation)

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19. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918

(President’s Rule)
20. Francis Coralie vs. Union Territory of Delhi 1981 AIR 746
(Right to life includes Right to live with dignity)
21. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. vs. Proprietors of (1985) 1 SCC 641
Indian Express Newspapers
(Right to know or to be informed)
22. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 409
(Rights of the Prisoners)
23. I.R Coelho and State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861
(IX Schedule cannot escape judicial scrutiny)
24. Naz Foundation v Govt. of NCT Delhi WP (C) No. 7455/2011
(Constitutional Morality Test)
25. National Legal Services Authority and Union of AIR 2014 SC 1863
India
(Recognition of transgenders as third gender)
26. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 1 SCC 1
(Triple Talaq)
27. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369
(Concept of PIL Introduced)
28. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. the State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1
(Essential Religious Practices Test)
29. Common Cause vs. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC
(Right to die with dignity)
30. Shakti Vahini vs. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 1601
(Right to choose a life partner is part of Article 21)
31. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1
(Right to Privacy)
32. Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI W.P (c) No. 1031 of
(Right to access internet part of freedom of speech 2019
and expression)
Indian Penal Code
33. Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3011
(Sexual Harassment at Work Place)
34. Laxmi v. Union of India (2014) 4 SCC 427
(Acid Attack)
35. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4321
(Section 377)
36. Joseph Shine v. Union of India SCC/SC 1676
(Section 497)
37. Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 1
(Nirbhaya Gang Rape Case)
38. K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605
39. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898

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(Rarest of Rare Case)

40. Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470
(Rarest of Rare Case)
41. Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 454
(Passive Euthanasia)
Code of Criminal Procedure
42. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610
(Guidelines for Arrest)
43. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. MANU/SC/0194/1985
(Maintenance under 125 Cr.P.C)
44. Richpal Kharra v. State (2014) 4 CRIMES 2
(DNA Test Mandatory- Sec. 53A Cr.P.C.) (Raj)
45. Gurubaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565
(Principles with Regard to Anticipatory Bail)
46. Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & (2008) 7 SCC 164
Ors.
(Punishment for non-registration of FIR)
47. Arnab Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2021) 1 SCC 802
(Bail under Article 226)
48. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537
(Procedure after FIR)
49. Madhu Limaye v. the State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47
(Exercise of power under 482 Cr.P.C)
50. Gurcharan Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 179
(Factors while granting bail)
51. Daniel Latifi v. Union India 7 SCC 740
(Maintenance beyond period of iddat)
52. Indra Sharma v. V.K.V Sharma AIR 2014 SC 309
(Women in Live-in= Wife under 125 Cr.P.C)
Environmental Law
53. M.C Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. 1986 SCR (1) 312
Public Liability and Public Nuisance- Oleum Gas
Leak)
54. RLEK, Dehradun vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1987 SC 2187
(Sustainable Development)
55. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union AIR 1999 SC 1502
of India
(Environmental Impact Assessment))
56. M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SCR (2) 538
(Ganga Pollution)
57. Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum Vs Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715
(Environment and Pollution)
58. MC Mehta v. Union of India 1991 SCR (1) 866
(CNG Vehicular Case)
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59. MC Mehta V. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388

(Doctrine of Public Trust)
60. MC Mehta v. Union of India 1987 AIR 1086
(Taj Trapezium)
61. TN Godavarman v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1228
(Wildlife and Forest Protection)
62. Samit Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. (MANU/GT/0150/2016)
(Polluter Pays Principle)
Contract Law
63. Balfour v. Balfour (1919) 2 KB 571
(Intention to create contract)
64. Mohoribibi v. Dharmodas Ghose 30 IA 114
(Contract with minor void ab initio)
65. Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt (1913) 11 All LJ 489
(Acceptance of offer is important)
66. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893) 1 QB 256
(Communication of acceptance not necessary in
general offer)
67. Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562
(Privity to contract not essential for consumer to
sue manufacturer)
68. Hadley vs Baxendale 1854 EWHC J70
(Consequential Damages in case of contractual
breach)
69. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots (1953) 1 QB 401
Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.
(Display is invitation not an offer)
70. Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Nestle Co. Ltd. (1960) AC 8
(Consideration should be sufficient and not
adequate)
71. Harvey v Facey (1893) AC 552
(Quotation of price is not a valid offer)
72. Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs Gorie Mahomed (1887) ILR 14 Cal 64
(Promissory Estoppel)
73. Brodgen v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) 2 AC 666
(Contract by Conduct of Parties)
Administrative Law
74. Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab 1955 SC 549
(Scope of Executive Power of the Government)
75. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India 1969 (2) SCC 262
(Strengthens Rule of law)
76. Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. The International AIR 1979 SC 1628
Airport Authority
(Guidelines while exercising administrative duties)

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77. Asif Hameed v. J&K AIR 1989 SC 1899

(Doctrine of Separation of Power)
78. State of MP & Anr. v. Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170
(Principles of natural justice violated)
79. In Re: Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332
(Extent Delegation of Legislative Power to the
Executive)
80. Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman Patna AIR 1954 SC 569
Administrative Committee
(Extent of Valid Delegation)
81. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of UP 1954 AIR 224
(Regulation of power of the Executive Authority by
legislative order)
82. Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa AIR 1984 SC 1572
(No one should be a judge in his own case)
83. H.L. Trehan & Ors. Etc. vs Union of India & Ors. AIR 1989 SC 568
(Hear the other side)
Tort Law
84. Ryland v. Fletcher L.R 3 H.L. (1868)
(Strict Liability)
85. Nichols v Marsland (1876) 2 ExD 1
(Act of God exception to Strict Liability)
86. Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562
(Vicarious Liability)
87. Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P. AIR 1965 SC 1039
(Negligence in Discharge of Statutory Functions=
Sovereign Function?
88. Ashby v White (1703) 92 ER 126
(Injuria Sine Damnum)
89. Bhim Singh v. State of J. & K. AIR 1986 SC 494
(Wrongful Confinement and Injuria Sine Damnum)
90. Gloucester Grammar School Case (1410) Y.B. 11 hen. IV
(Damnum Sine Injuria) of 47
91. M/s. Rural Transport Service v Bezlum Bibi & AIR 1980 CAL 165
Others
(Contributory Negligence)
92. Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1 K.B. 205
(Volenti Non-Fit Injuria)
93. Hardy v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau (1964) 2 QB 745
(No action arises out of a wrongful consideration)
94. Booker v. Wenborn (1962) All ER 431
(Duty of Care)
Family Law
95. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 1531

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(Principles against practice of solemnizing second

marriage by conversion to Islam)
96. Mohamad Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum 1985 AIR 945
(Muslim Personal Law Challenged)
97. Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650
(Second Marriage without prior divorce from first
marriage void)
98. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558
(Irretrievable breakdown of marriage)
99. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469
(Live-in Relationship comes under Domestic
Violence Act)
100. Seema v. Ashwani Kumar AIR 2006 S.C 1158
(Registration of Marriages is compulsory)

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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1. A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 27

A.K. Gopalan was a politician who was detained in prison in 1947 under the
Preventive Detention Act, 1950. A.K. Gopalan challenged his detention by filing a writ
of habeas corpus and challenged various provisions of the Preventive Detention Act
as being violative of Article 13, 19 and 21 of the Indian Constitution.

The court upheld the constitutional validity of the law but struck down section 14
which prohibited a person detained from disclosing to the Court the grounds on
which a detention order has been made or the representation made by him against the
order of detention as unconstitutional. It held that under the Indian Constitution,
there is only a procedure established by law and the due process clause and
international human rights charters have no application under the Indian Law. More
importantly, the court rejected that there was any relation between Article 14, 19 and
21 of the Indian Constitution and held them to be standing separately.

However, Justice Fazal Ali dissented from the majority opinion and said that
fundamental rights violation provisions must be construed harmoniously and not
simply as silos. According to him, the expression procedure established by law under
Article 21 of the Indian Constitution did not exclude certain fundamental principles
of natural justice which were inherent in every civilized system of law. He further
enunciated that the importance of the protection in Article 21 would be vilified by
allowing the undesirable consequences of any procedure enacted by statute, however
draconian and arbitrary it may be, as ‘procedure established by law’.

It was the first case where the court attempted to interpret the term ‘procedure
established by law’ under Article 21 of the Indian Constitution but gave a very narrow
interpretation.

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2. Shankari Prasad v UOI AIR 1951 SC 458

Facts

The Zamindari system prevailed in India before the Independence and the Zamindars
had all of the powers relating to possession such as the purchase and sale of the land.
They were in charge of collecting the taxes from the peasants and handing them over
to the British.

Before the adoption of the Constitution, there were Zamindari abolition bills being
passed in various states all across the country such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh. When the zamindars challenged the same contending that it
violated their right to property pursuant to Article 19 and Article 31 of the
Constitution of India, the courts delivered varying judgements where the Patna High
Court held the bill to be unconstitutional and the High Courts of Uttar Pradesh and
Madhya Pradesh upheld the constitutional validity of such bills. This prompted the
Government of India to enact the First Constitutional Act of 1951. This First
Constitutional Amendment Act was challenged before the court in this case.

Issues

• That whether the Constitutional First Amendment Act, 1951 was constitutional?
• Whether such amendment fall within the ambit of the term ‘law’ under Article 13
(2) of the Constitution of India?
Judgment

The 5 Judge Constitution Bench of the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India dismissed the
petition and held that the word ‘law’ pursuant to Article 13 must be taken to mean
rules and regulations made in the exercise of ordinary legislative power and not
amendments to the Constitution made in exercise of constituent power, with the result
of which Article 13(2) does not affect amendment made under Article 368. Thus, the
validity of the First Constitutional Amendment Act, 1951 was upheld.

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3. Unni Krishnan vs. State of Andhra Pradesh 1993 AIR 2178

Facts

String of petitions were filed by various private educational institutions to challenge

the state laws which directed the regulation of the capitation fee charges in those
particular states (Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh). Some
institutions in these respective states have already challenged the same before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court. This questioned the precedent which was set by the
landmark judgment of Mohini Jain v. State of Karnataka and also challenged the
purview and the scope of Article 21 with respect to the right to education.

Issues

• Whether a citizen has a fundamental right to education for medical, engineering,

or other professional degrees?
• Whether the Constitution of India guarantees a fundamental right to education to
its citizens?
• Whether there is a fundamental right to establish an educational institution under
Article 19(1)(g)?
Judgment

The court held that every citizen of this country had the right to education as a
fundamental right. However, the same was not an absolute right and had to be
construed with the conditions laid down in Articles 41 and 45. The court said that
every person has a right to free and compulsory education until he attains the age of
14 years. Thereafter, this right is subject to reasonable restrictions. The private
educational institutions that are neither funded or aided by the state are in no
compulsion to not charge a higher fee, provided that it should not exceed the ceiling
amount.

Ratio laid down by the court

The fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution in Part III can be segregated
into two major divisions, a) injunction restraining the government from denying some
fundamental rights such as Article 21 and, b) enforcing such rights positively such as
Articles 19, 25, and 26.

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Part III and Part IV are not contained in different watertight compartments and thus,
Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles should be construed harmoniously as
they form the social conscience of the Constitution.

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4. Parmanand Katara v. UOI AIR 1989 SC 2039

Facts

The petitioner was a human rights activist and he filed a writ petition before the
Hon’ble Supreme Court of India on the basis of the news article published in the
Hindustan Times where a scooter driver was knocked down by a speeding car. The
injured was taken to a near by hospital but he refused to attend the patient and
referred the patient to a hospital which was 20 km away and while on the way he
succumbed to his injuries. A petition was filed under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution wherein he prayed to direct the Union of India that every injured citizen
brought for medical treatment should be instantaneously given medical aid to
preserve life.

Issue

Whether a person can be allowed treatment by the hospital authorities in accident

cases, without having to follow several legal formalities before the victim is rendered
medical aid?

Judgment

The Supreme court held that Article 21 of the Indian Constitution casts a primary duty
upon the state to preserve life and there could be no second opinion on the fact that
the preservation of life is of paramount importance. The court further held that the
doctor, whether at government hospital or otherwise had the professional obligation
to extend his or her services with due expertise for protecting life.

The court said that that there was no legal impediment as such for a medical
professional when he or she was called upon or requested to attend to an injured
person from an accident that was in need of immediate medical assistance. It said that
the effort to save the injured person should be the top priority not only of the medical
professionals but even of the police and any other citizen who happened to be
connected with the accident matter or who happens to notice such an incident or a
situation.

Ratio laid down by the court

The right to life is of paramount importance and that right would override the legal
and medical formalities in case of emergency aid.

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5. Romesh Thapar v. The State of Madras AIR 1950 SC 124

Facts

The petitioner was a printer, publisher and editor of a journal in English called Cross
Roads. Under section 9 (1-A) of the Maintenance of Public Order Act, 1949, the entry
and publication of his journal was banned in the state of Madras. He challenged this
ban in the Supreme Court by filing the writ petition on the ground that the same was
an excessive restriction on the freedom of expression under Article 19 of the
Constitution.

Issue

Whether the State can make such restriction as averred by the petitioner? Or Whether
ban of publication of journal of the petitioner under the garb of public order violative
of the fundamental freedom of expression under Article 19?

Judgment

The court was of the view that fundamental freedoms were subjected to reasonable
restrictions under Article 19 (2) of the Indian Constitution. The restrictions were
allowed under the Act for wider purpose of public order. It said that the two term
namely public order and public safety should be read together. The court said that
where an act was used beyond the constitutional limits, it was void and thus, the
impugned section was considered to be unconstitutional and the government order
that banned the publication was set aside.

The court said that the legislation imposed a prior restraint i.e., it allowed the
government to prohibit or ban circulation in anticipation of public order, which in the
eyes of the court was choking of the freedom of speech and expression even before
the same could be exercised. Following a long-established tradition in common law
as well as American constitutional jurisprudence, the Court held that a legislation
imposing prior restraint bore a heavy burden to demonstrate its constitutionality.

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6. I.C Golaknath v. State of Punjab 1967 AIR 1643

Facts

The petitioner and his brother were in a possession of 500 acres land in Jalandhar,
Punjab. The Government had passed the Punjab Security and Land Tenures Act by
virtue of which they were only entitled to keep 30 acres each and the rest was to be
declared surplus. This came to be challenged in the court. The petitioner filed a
petition under Article 32 of the Indian Constitution on the ground that the same
violated their constitutional right to hold and acquire property and practice any
profession. They sought to have challenged the Constitutional Seventeenth
Amendment Act, by virtue of which the Punjab Act was placed in the IX Schedule.

Issue

Whether Parliament had the absolute power and the power to amend the fundamental
rights enshrined under the Constitution?

Judgment

At that time, it was the largest constitutional bench ever (eleven judge bench). The
majority of the view that if Sajjan Singh remained in law, it would give rise to a
situation where at some point of time all the fundamental rights adopted by the
Constituent Assembly would be changed and the Democratic character of the State
would turn into a Totalitarian State and thus Sajjan Singh was overruled.

The majority in its judgment said that the parliament had no right to amend the
fundamental rights and that those rights were beyond the reach of parliamentary
legislation. Therefore, to save the democracy from an autocratic actions of the
parliament the majority held that parliament cannot amend the fundamental rights
enshrined under Part III of the Constitution of India. The majority said that
fundamental rights were the same as natural rights and were important for the growth
and development of a human being.

The court impliedly came out with a conclusion that there were certain essential
features of the Constitution which could not be changed i.e., there was a Basic
Structure which could not be altered. The same was explained and further elaborated
by the 13 Judge Constitution bench in Kesavananda Bharti case.

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7. His Holiness Kesavananda Bharti & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Anr. AIR 1973 SC
1461

Facts

Kesavananda Bharati was the chief pontiff of the Edneer Mutt, a monastic religious
institution located in Kasaragod district, Kerala and owned a Mutt in the land. The
Kerala state government passed the Land Reforms Amendment Act in 1969. As per
this Act, the government could acquire some of the lands that belonged to the Mutt.
The contentions made by the petitioners brought to the fore the validity of various
amendments that were brought in by the Parliament to nullify the effects of Golaknath
v State of Punjab. The petitioners challenged, in particular, three constitutional
amendments – 24th Amendment, 25th Amendment and 29th Amendment and their
validity.

Issues

• Whether the Constitutional 24th and 25th Amendment Act was constitutionally
valid?
• To what extent could the Parliament exercise its power to amend the Constitution?
• Was the power of Parliament to amend the Constitution unlimited? In other
words, could Parliament alter, amend, abrogate any part of the Constitution even
to the extent of taking away all fundamental rights?
Judgment

The court was of the opinion that if the Parliament were to get unfettered power to
amend, there were chances of that power to be misused, and that governments would
change it as per their own preferences and whims. Such limitless powers vested in the
hands of the government would mean that the basic features and also the very essence
and spirit of the Indian Constitution could be changed. There was a need for a doctrine
which could protect the rights of both the Indian Parliament and Indian citizens and
therefore, the court established the basic structure doctrine, that protects the rights of
both camps and upholds the theory of implied limitations.

Though the Petitioner did not succeed in his case, but it was due to him that the court
had the opportunity to dwell into the issue of the extent of powers of the Parliament
and establishing the Doctrine of Basic Structure.

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8. M. Nagraj v Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71

Facts

The Madhya Pradesh government provided reservation for the Scheduled Casts and
Scheduled Tribes in the promotion in government jobs. Through the present writ
petitions the validity of the decision of providing reservation in promotion by the
Madhya Pradesh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2002 has been challenged in the
Madhya Pradesh High Court. On the ground that the government’s actions violated
the principle of law laid down in the M. Nagaraj Case.

The High Court of the State, responding to the writ petitions, quashed the Madhya
Pradesh Public Services (Promotion) Rules, 2002 which provided for reservation for
depressed casts in promotions in Government services. The division bench comprised
of CJ. Ajay Khanwilkar and J. Sanjay Yadav observed that the rules violated the law
laid down in M. Nagaraj v. UOI and were against the public policy. The same was
challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India.

Issue

Whether the 77th, 81st, and 85th Constitutional Amendment is violative of the basic
structure of the Indian Constitution?

Judgment

The Constitutional validity of the amendments were upheld and the court held that
while the doctrine of equality was a part of the basic structure doctrine, the rule that
prevented conferring seniority was not one and thus, the doctrine of basic structure
could not be attracted and that the tests laid down in various cases cannot be resorted
to and made applicable in the present case for the reason that those tests are to try the
violation of basic structure and something that does not constitute its violation cannot
be tried keeping in mind the same principles and same tests.

The Court held that the idea of providing for accelerated promotions and application
of the said principle is merely an evolution of the service jurisprudence, which has
been propounded by various Courts and thus, cannot be tried or tested on the same
grounds and principles as that of the and various components of the basic structure
doctrine. On the scope of judicial review, it was held that the power of judicial review
is a part of the basic structure of the Constitution and that the Court is duty-bound to
exercise this power whenever it is faced with the questions pertaining to a
transgression of basic structure.

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9. Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain AIR 1975 SC 2299

Facts

Raj Narain was a political contender against Indira Nehru Gandhi for Rae Bareilly
Constitution. Mrs. Gandhi won the election by a sweeping majority. Mr. Raj Narain
challenged the poll results contenting that Mrs. Gandhi had performed election
malpractices. The High Court of Allahabad speaking under Justice Jagmohanlal Sinha
found Indira Gandhi guilty of misusing government machinery u/s 123(7) of
Representative of Peoples Act, 1951. The court held that Mrs. Indira Gandhi cannot
continue as the Prime Minister of the nation, further, she cannot contest elections for
another six years. Aggrieved by this decision Indira Gandhi went to appeal this ruling
of Allahabad High court in Supreme Court. However, SC being in vacation at that
point of time granted a conditional stay on execution on 24 June 1975.

Issue

Whether the 39th Constitutional Amendment, 1975 was Constitutionally Valid?

Judgment

This is the first case whether the landmark case of Kesavananda Bharti was applied
by the Supreme Court. The court declared clause 4 of Article 329A to be
unconstitutional. The court found the amendment as violating the Rule of Law and
Justice Khanna said that the act is not in accordance with the norms of free and fair
elections. The bench found the amendment as violative of the principles of natural
justice i.e., Audi Alteram Partem as it denied the right of fair hearing to the one who
was challenging the election of the members mentioned under the amendment. The
parliament cannot make retrospective law which makes an invalid election valid
because this is nothing but domineering use of unrestrained power.

According to Justice K.K. Mathew the clause destroyed the most essential and basic
feature of the constitution i.e., any election dispute should be settled by the judiciary
according to laws adjudicative facts. A democracy in his idea is the possibility of
conducting fair elections and the clause simply dishonors this fact.

Justice Y. V. Chandrachud found the amendment violative of the principle of

Separation of Power. Further it is also violative of Article 14 of the constitution. Many
such reasons led the bench to strike down the 39th amendment in order to rescue the
basic structure of the constitution.

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10. Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India & Ors. 1978 (1) SCC 248

Facts

The Passport Authority issued a notice of impoundment of the passport of Petitioner

in the interest of general public. As soon as the petitioner got the notice of such
impounding, she reverted back to the authorities asking for specific detailed reasons
as to why her passport shall be impounded. The authorities however, answered that
the reasons are not to be specified in the interest of the general public.

The petitioner then approached Supreme Court under Article 32 for the enforcement
of Fundamental Right mentioned under Article 14 against the arbitrary action of the
authorities. The petition was further sought enforcement of Article 21 i.e., Protection
of Life & Personal Liberty, Article 19(1)(a) i.e. Right to freedom of speech & Article
19(1)(g) i.e. Right to freedom of Movement. Among the major reasons contended for
the filing of such petition, the petitioner contended that the impugned order is void
as it took away the petitioner’s right to be given a fair hearing to present her defense.

Issues

• Whether article 14, 19 and 21 were independent or had some nexus between them?
• What is the scope of the word Procedure Established by Law?
• Whether right to travel abroad resides in Article 21?
• Is it reasonable if a legislation takes away right to life?

Judgment

The court expanded the scope of Article 21 and held that though the phrase used in
Article 21 is “procedure established by law” instead of “due process of law” however,
the procedure must be free from arbitrariness and irrationality. The court overruled
Gopalan’s case by stating that there is a unique relationship between the provisions
of Article 14, 19 & 21 and every law must pass the tests of the said provisions.

Article 21 was given an expansive interpretation. The court obligated the future courts
to expand the horizons of Article 21 to cover all the Fundamental Rights and avoid
construing it in narrower sense. The right to travel abroad as held in Satwant Singh
was within the scope of guarantees mentioned under Article 21. The court held that
Section 10(3)(c) & 10(5) of the Passport Act is an administrative order therefore, open
to challenge on the grounds of mala fide, unreasonable, denial of natural justice and

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ultra vires. The court also suggested government to ordinarily provide reasons in
every case and should rarely use the prerogative of Section 10(5) of the 1967 act.

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11. Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India AIR 1973 SC 106

Facts

The petitioners were working as a media conglomerate and were indulged in

publication of newspapers. Under the Import Control Order, 1955, Newsprint Order
1962, Newsprint Policy 1972-73, the government had imposed a restriction on the
import of newsprint. This was challenged by the petitioners.

Issues

• The preliminary question was whether the petitioners were being companies could
contravene the fundamental rights?
• Whether Art. 358 of the Indian Constitution was a moratorium to any challenge by
the petitioner’s side on the violations of fundamental rights?
• Whether the restriction imposed on newsprint import under the 1955 Order was
the violation of Art. 19(1) (a) of the Constitution?
• Whether the newsprint Policy fall within the Section5 (1) of the Import, Control
Order 1955 was valid or not?
• Whether Clauses 3 and 3A of Section 3 of the Newsprint Order, 1962 were violative
of Article 14 and Article 19(1) (a) of the Constitution?

Judgment

The court held that the restriction on the import of newsprint under Import Order
1955, Newsprint order 1962, and Newsprint Policy 1972-73 and the direct regulation
of size and circulation of newspapers under the Newsprint Policy orders were
unconstitutional. The court held that the petitioners were companies not barred to
grant relief for violation of the Fundamental Rights of editorial staff and shareholders
(who were also petitioners).

Further the court said that the press had to carry on its activity by keeping in view the
class of readers, the condition of labor, price of material, availability of advertisement,
size of paper and the different kinds of news comments and’ views and advertisement,
size of paper and the differences which were to be published and circulated. The law
which lays excessive and prohibited burden which would restrict the circulation of a
newspaper will not be saved by ARTICLE 19 (2) of the Indian Constitution. The Court
was of the opinion that freedom of the press was an essential element of freedom of
speech expression guaranteed under ARTICLE 19(1)(a) of the Indian Constitution.

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12. ADM Jabalpur v. Sivkanth Shukla AIR 1976 SC 1207

Facts

After the Allahabad High Court had passed the judgment which ruled Indira
Gandhi’s election void and she was ineligible to seek an election or hold office for the
next six years. She appealed to the Supreme Court and she was only given a
conditional stay by the apex court. After which she urged the President to declare
Emergency stating that the India’s stability was at risk of internal disruptions.
Subsequently on 27th June 1975, the Emergency was declared and all the fundamental
rights came to be suspended.

Many opposition leaders, who were perceived to be a political threat was taken into
custody. All these persons challenged their detention in various High Courts and the
high courts gave diverging views upon the same and the government moved the
Supreme Court to challenge the decision of the High Courts which were against them.

Issue

Whether a writ petition can be filed or not under Article 226 of the Constitution before
the High Court in order to enforce the Fundamental Rights during the period of
proclamation of emergency?

Judgement

The majority decision said that during the time of emergency if any action is taken by
the government whether it is arbitrary or illegal, its actions cannot be questioned. This
is because in such circumstances the government safeguards the life of the nation by
using its extraordinary powers, and which are provided to them as emergency is also
an extraordinary factor. Therefore, as liberty is a gift of law, it can also be forfeited by
law. The court held that the application for Habeas Corpus under Article 491 of Code
of Criminal Procedure cannot be filed simultaneously before the High Court.

Justice Khanna gave the dissenting opinion and he said that Curtailment of Article 21
would in general terms mean that there occurs deprivation of the right to life and
personal liberty, which is against the fundamental right ensured to every citizen of
India since birth, along with the Articles of Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
which India is a part of.

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13. Minerva Mills case AIR 1980 SC 1789

Minerva Mills case is important as the court explained the Basic Structure Doctrine
and further evolved it by stating that the edifice of our constitution was built upon the
concept which was crystallized in the Preamble. It said that the powers to amend the
constitution was limited and held that the balance between a fundamental right and
a directive principle was an essential feature of the basic structure of the Constitution.

In 1970, the central government had appointed the committee under the Industries
Development and Regulation Act 1951 to make report of the company and submit the
report. The committee submitted the said report in January 1971. Based on the said
report, the government passed the order to take management of the Minerva mills.
The central government nationalized the Minerva Mills under the silk textile
undertakings act 1974. The reason given was that the company’s affairs were managed
in a way detrimental to the public interest. Together with shareholders, the company
challenged the government’s move under Article 32 of the Constitution.

The Supreme Court dismissed the said petition of Minerva Mills to nationalization
but held that clause 5 of Article 368 which was inserted by the 42nd Constitutional
Amendment had removed all the limitations on the amending power of our
parliament and clause 4 had deprived the court of their ability to review and thus held
both the clauses to be unconstitutional. The case also sustained the ‘basic structure’
doctrine by holding that the balance between fundamental rights and Directive
Principles of State Policy as being part of the basic structure of our Constitution.

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14. Waman Rao v UOI AIR 1981 SC 271

Facts

On 26th January 1962, the Maharashtra Government had passed a Maharashtra

Agricultural Land (Ceiling on Holdings) Act which imposed ceiling on land holdings.
Many amendments were made which lowered the ceiling limit. In Dattatraya Govind
Mahajan & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Anr the review petition was filed in the
Supreme Court against the decision of Bombay High Court but because this was filed
during the period of emergency the court rejected the appeal and held that it was
entirely left on the legislature to decide which policy to adopt for the purpose of
improving the agrarian system of the country. After the emergency was revoked, a
petition was filed by Waman Rao challenging the decision in Dattatraya’s Case.

Issues

Whether Articles 31A, 31B, and 31C are constitutionally valid?

Judgment

The court upheld the constitutional validity of the provisions in question on the
ground that the purpose behind such provisions was to reduce the inequalities and
economic gap in the society for the development of the country.

The court also clarified the confusion which was created by the Kesavananda Bharati’s
case by saying that all the acts and regulations placed under ninth schedule before the
date of Kesavananda Bharati’s judgement cannot be challenged in the court of law on
the ground of violation of Fundamental Rights mentioned under Part III of the Indian
Constitution. However, the court also observed that all the acts and regulations placed
under the ninth schedule after the date of Kesavananda Bharati’s judgement would
be constitutionally valid if they pass the basic structure test of the constitution.

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15. SP Gupta v. President of India & Ors. AIR 1982 SC 1949

Facts

A number of petitions were filed which involved some important constitutional

questions regarding the appointment and transfer of judges and the independence of
judiciary. The relevant part of the case concerns the disclosure of certain documents
between the Minister of Justice, the Chief Justice of Delhi and the Chief Justice of India,
as well as the relevant notes made in connection with the non-election of the judges
over time and the Appeal of the High Court Judge. The appellants, together with one
of the judges in question, sought disclosure of these documents. The government said
that no person is entitled to give evidence from unpublished official records relating
to any matters of the State, without the consent of the relevant head of department,
who shall grant or withhold such permission, thinks it to be necessary. The validity of
any dispute will be decided by the court.

Issue

Whether the Central Government orders on the non-appointment of two judges are
valid?

Judgment

The Supreme Court of India rejected the government's claim for safeguarding from
disclosure and ordered the Union of India to disclose the documents contained in the
book on the ground that an effective democracy required accountability and access to
information by the public about government performance. Therefore, disclosure of
information regarding government operations should be a separate law and secrecy
can be maintained where there is a strict public interest requirement.

There are only two grounds on the basis of which the Central Government’s decision
regarding appointment and transfer can be challenged

• there was no full and effective consultation between the Central Government and
the appropriate authorities, and
• the decision was based on irrelevant grounds.

The correspondence in question would be relevant qua both these grounds, which
necessitates its disclosure. Public interest lies at the foundation of the claim for
protection under the Evidence Act. Under these considerations, the Court must decide
whether disclosure of a particular document will be contrary to public interest. It must
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balance the public interest in fair administration of justice through disclosure with the
public interest sought to be protected by nondisclosure, and then decide if the
document should be protected.

The correspondence in the present case was found not to be protected. It dealt with
appointment and transfer of judges, a matter of great public interest, and its disclosure
would not have been detrimental to public interest. The apprehension of an ill-
informed or captious public or of political criticism were not enough to justify the
protection of the correspondence. After examining the correspondence, the Court
decided that the Central Government order regarding non-appointment was justified.

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16. Mithu v State of Punjab AIR 1983 SC 473

Facts

Mithu Singh, the accused appellant, and one Bharpur Singh were tried on charge
under Section 302/34 I.P.C. for the murder of Gurdial Kaur while they were in prison.
In view of unlicensed pistols having been recovered from each one of them they were
also charged under Section 27 of the Arms Act, 1959. The Sessions Court found both
the accused persons guilty of the offences charged and sentenced them to life
imprisonment along with a fine of Rs.1,000 under Section 302/34, I.P.C. They were
also sentenced to two years rigorous imprisonment each under Section 27 of the Arms
Act. Both the accused persons preferred appeals before the High Court of Punjab
which have been dismissed. Special leave petitions were filed by both of them before
the Hon’ble Supreme Court. The SLP filed by Bharpur Singh was directed to be
dismissed by this Court. However, the petition filed by Mithu Singh, the appellant
was entertained.

Issue

Whether section 303 of IPC infringes the guarantee contained in Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution?

Judgment

The court held that section 303 of IPC was unconstitutional as it violated the
provisions of Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution. There is no rational
justification for making a distinction in the matter of punishment between persons
who commit murders whilst they are under the sentence of life imprisonment and
persons who commit murders whilst they are not under the sentence of life
imprisonment. Further, no rational distinction can be made in the matter of sentencing
between a person who commits murder after serving the sentence of life
imprisonment and a person who commits murder while he is still under that sentence.
A person who stands unreformed after a long term of incarceration is not, by any logic,
entitled to preferential treatment as compared with a person who is still under the
sentence of life imprisonment. The classification based upon such a distinction
proceeds upon irrelevant considerations and bears no nexus with the object of the
statute, namely, the imposition of a mandatory sentence of death.

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17. Olga Tellis v. BMC 1985 SCC (3) 545

Facts

The BMC (Bombay Municipal Corporation) in the year 1981 ordered to evict all the
people including slum dwellers who had made the pavements in the city of Bombay
as their home on the ground that slum dwellers caused huge amount of traffic snarls
which resulted in the disturbance of smooth functioning of law and order related to
traffic. Eventually, the slum dwellers were made to evict forcefully under the orders
of the then Chief Minister of Maharashtra and the same eviction was carried out as
per the guidelines provided under Section 314 of the Bombay Municipal corporation
Act, 1888. A writ petition was filed by the slum dwellers in the High Court of Bombay
restraining the implementation of orders by BMC under the directions issued the then
Chief Minister of Maharashtra.

Issue

• Whether the act of the BMC was in violation of the Constitutional provisions?
• Whether right to livelihood is covered within the ambit of the term right to Life
under Article 21?
• Whether estoppel can be claimed against the enforcement of Fundamental Rights
under the Indian Constitution?

Judgement

The court was of the view that no person irrespective of anything had right to
encroach on any public place, pavement, road, highway and expressway. It said that
the contention of the petitioners that the slum and pavement dwellers were evicted
without giving any notice did not hold much sense and section 314 of the Bombay
Municipal Corporation Act was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary in nature. It is not
necessary to issue a notice for the proposed action. It would further delay the eviction
as slum dwellers could delay the eviction under the garb of notice. The court also said
that the slum existing for more than 20 years should not be removed unless the land
is required for public purposes and in this case, alternative sites should be provided
to homeless people and high priority should be given to resettlement.

The Supreme Court gave a wider interpretation to Article 21 and said that if the right
to livelihood was not covered under the ambit of right to life under Article 21, one of
the easiest methods of depriving an individual’s right to life is by stripping him of his
means to livelihood to the point of abrogation.

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18. Indra Sawhney v. Union of India AIR 1993 SC 477

The Mandal Commission was set up in 1979 to determine the criteria for defining
socially and educationally backward classes. The Mandal Commission reported that
52% of the population at that time was ‘Socially and Economically Backward Classes’
and recommended 27% reservation for SEBCs in addition to the existing 22.5%
reservation for SC/STs.

In 1989 when the Janata Party came to power, they issued an office memorandum
implementing the recommendation of the Commission. When Janata party collapsed,
Narasimha Rao led government introduced economic criterion by providing
importance to the poorer sections of Social and Educationally Backward classes from
that 27% and also inserted 10% reservations to the Educationally Backward classes of
the Higher caste people.

A writ petition was filed challenging the office memorandum and the matter was
referred to the 9 Judge Constitution Bench. The court by a majority of 6:3 majority held
the decision of the Government of India to reserve 27% of the jobs to the socially and
economically backward classes as constitutionally valid but struck down the
provision which provided 10% reservation for economically backward people among
the higher castes as invalid. The court laid a maximum cap on the limit of the
reservation at 50% and said that the creamy layer should be excluded from the benefit
from the reservation over and over again.

The rationale behind the decision was that caste cannot be used for reservation but
only for a backward class. The court held that classification for providing reservation
is not on the basis of caste but on the basis that the caste is a backward class and that
backward class is not adequately represented in the services of the state.

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19. S.R. Bommai v. Union of India AIR 1994 SC 1918

Facts

S.R. Bommai was the Chief Minister of Karnataka and his government was dismissed
under Article 356 of the Indian Constitution where the President’s Rule was imposed
on the grounds that the incumbent government does not have majority due to the
defection of a large number of MLAs. Mr. Bommai sought the permission of the then
Governor to prove his majority but the same was not provided to him and therefore,
he moved to the High Court against the decision of the Governor. The High Court
dismissed his petition and therefore he was compelled to approach the Supreme Court
of India.

Judgment

The court said that the Proclamation of Emergency was subject to judicial review to
the extent of examining that whether the conditions precedent to the issuance of the
Proclamation had been satisfied or not. The examination would necessarily involve
the scrutiny as to whether there existed material for the satisfaction of the President
that a situation had arisen in which the Government of the State could not be carried
on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

Secondly the court said that the Court had the power to overrule the Proclamation
issued by the President whether it was approved by Parliament or not and which
meant that the courts also had the power to restore the status quo.

In 1983, Sarkaria Commission was constituted to look into the Centre-State Relations
and the Commission had suggested that Article 356 must be used only in extreme
cases, as a measure of last resort where all other alternatives have been exhausted or
failed to prevent or rectify a breakdown of constitutional machinery in the States,
which was also what the intention of the Constitution framers all along. The court
supported the finding of the Sarkaria Commission and said that the warning must be
issued to the errant State that it is not carrying on the government of the State in
accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.

The court set aside the findings of the Karnataka High Court and restored the
dismissed state government of Karnataka declaring that the proclamation issued in
the state was unconstitutional.

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20. Francis Coralie vs. Union Territory of Delhi 1981 AIR 746

Facts

The petitioner was a British national and was arrested under section 3 of the
COFEPOSA Act. The Petitioner filed a petition in the Court for a writ of habeas corpus
challenging her detention, her petition was rejected. The petitioner was also not
allowed to meet her counsel due to the rigid procedures and she was detained on
attempting to smuggle hashish out of the country and hence for her defense, interview
with her lawyer was of extreme importance.

Issues

• Whether the sub-clause (i) and (ii) of clause 3 (b) of COFEPOSA are in violation of
Article 14 and 21 of the Indian Constitution?
• Whether the right given in Article 22 of the Indian Constitution is also violated as
the Petitioner was not allowed to meet his legal representative?

Judgment

The Court held that the Sub-clause (i) of Clause 3 (b) of COFEPOSA Act which is
regulating the right of the petitioner to have an interview with a legal adviser of his
choice is violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India and must be held
to be unconstitutional and void. The court held that it was reasonable if the Petitioner
were to be entitled to have an interview with his legal adviser at any reasonable hour
during the day after taking an appointment with the Superintendent of the Jail, which
appointment should be given by the Superintendent without any delay.

The Hon’ble Court also said that the interview need not necessarily take place in the
presence of a nominated officer of Customs/Central Excise/Enforcement but if the
presence of such officer can be conveniently secured at the time of the interview
without involving any postponement of the interview, then such officer and if his
presence cannot be so secured, then any other Jail official may, if thought necessary,
watch the interview but not so as to be within hearing distance of the detenu and the
legal adviser.

The court allowed the writ petition and granted relief to the petitioner.

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21. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. vs. Proprietors of Indian Express Newspapers

(1985) 1 SCC 641

Facts

The petitioner company had offered for public subscription secured convertible
debentures after obtaining the consent of the Controller of Capital Issues. Before the
public issue was due to open, certain writ petitions etc. were filed in some High Courts
challenging the grant of consent or sanction for the public issue.

On August 25, 1988 an article appeared in the Indian Express to the effect that the
Controller of Capital Issues had not acted properly and legally in granting the sanction
to the issue, and that the issue was not a prudent or a reliable venture. The petitioner
moved the Court for initiating contempt proceedings against the respondents for
alleged interference with the due administration of justice by publication of an article
commenting on a matter which was sub-judice. The Court, while declining to take
cognizance of contempt in the absence of the consent of the Attorney General, issued
an order of injunction restraining publication of articles.

Issue

Whether there was any necessity for the continuance of the order of injunction?

Judgment

It was held by the court that

• The Constitution of India is not Absolute with respect to freedom of speech and
expression, as enshrined by the First Amendment to the American Constitution.
• A judiciary is not independent unless courts of justice are enabled to administer
law by absence of pressure from without, whether exerted through the
blandishments of reward or the menace of disfavor. A free Press is vital to a
democratic society for its freedom given it power.
• The law of contempt must be judged in a particular situation. The process of due
course of administration of justice must remain. Public interest demands that there
should be no interference with judicial process and the effect of the judicial
decision should not be pre-empted or circumvented by public agitation or
publications. At the same time, right to know is a basic right which citizens of a
free country aspire in the broader horizon of the right to live in this age in our land
under Article 21 of our Constitution.
• The Court must examine the gravity of the evil.

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• The Court must see whether there was a present and imminent danger for the
issuance/continuance of injunction. It is difficult to lay down a fixed standard to
judge as to how clear, remote or imminent the danger is.

The orders passed on 19th August, 1988 as reiterated on 25th August, 1988 stated that
there must be no legal impediment in the issue of the debentures or in the progress of
the debentures, taking into account the overall balance of convenience and having due
regard to the sums of money involved and the progress already made.

• The continuance of this injunction would amount to interference with the freedom
of Press in the form of preventive injunction and it must therefore be based on
reasonable grounds for the sole purpose of keeping the administration of justice
unimpaired.
• There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is real
and imminent. The subscription to debentures having been oversubscribed, there
is no such imminent danger of the subscription being withdrawn before the
allotment so as to make the issue vulnerable by any publication of article.
• As the issue is not going to affect the general public or public life, nor any injury is
involved, it would be proper and legal, on an appraisal of the balance of
convenience between the risk which will be caused by the publication of the article
and the damage to the fundamental right of freedom of knowledge of the people
concerned and the obligation of Press to keep people informed, that the injunction
should net true any further.

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22. Sunil Batra v. Delhi Administration (1978) 4 SCC 409

Facts

The petitioner in question, Sunil Batra was a convict serving a death sentence at the
Tihar Central Jail. He wrote a letter to a Judge of the Supreme Court entailing the poor
living conditions and questionable treatment of inmates at the jail. He also complained
of the brutal assault and torture by the Head Warden Maggar Singh of another
prisoner, Prem Chand as a ploy to extract money from the victim’s visiting relatives.

This letter was treated as Public Interest Litigation under the ambit of Article 32 of the
Constitution by the Supreme Court. Dr. YS Chital and Shri Mukul Mudgal were
appointed to meet the prisoner and to interview the necessary witness. After paying
a visit to the prison and examining the witnesses reported and also confirmed that the
prisoner had sustained serious anal injury.

Issues

• Has the Court jurisdiction to consider prisoner’s grievance, not demanding release
but, within the incarcerator circumstances, complaining of ill-treatment and
curtailment short of Illegal detention?
• What are the broad contours of the Fundamental Rights, especially Article 14,19,21
which belong to a detainee sentenced by Court?
• What judicial remedies can be granted to prevent and punish their breach and to
provide access to person justice?
• What practicable prescriptions bearing on prison practices can be drawn up by the
Court consistently with the existing provisions of the Prisons Act, and Rules bent
to shape to conform to part III?
• What prison reform perspectives and strategies should be adopted to strengthen,
in the long run, the Constitutional mandate and human rights imperatives?

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that, vis-a-vis Article 32 and Article 226, it had the power to
intervene and restore the fundamental rights of prisoners. That is, it was completely
within the authority of the court to intervene and protect prisoners from harsh or
inhuman treatment. It also said that during the prisoner’s time in jail, the jail
authorities do not have any rights to punish, torture or in any way discriminate
against them without the explicit permission or orders of the court. Only the court had
that right.

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The court said by virtue of Section 30(2) of the Prison Act, the jail authorities had the
power to keep a prisoner in a separate cell, this provision was not to be misinterpreted
as a right or freedom to torture inmates. This is because the prisoner still possesses the
right to life and liberty. The court further said that section 56 of Prison Act empowered
the Superintendent to take necessary precautions by putting the prisoners in irons,
but they were allowed to do that only when such orders were duly confirmed by the
local government and they could not do this on their own discretion. In this specific
case, Prem Chand was kept in a separate cell with irons without express permission
from the local government. As a result, the Superintendent was liable for his actions.

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23. I.R Coelho and State of Tamil Nadu AIR 2007 SC 861

Facts

The case arose out of an order of reference made by a five-judge constitution bench in
1999 which stated that the judgment in Waman Rao needs to be reconsidered by a
larger bench so that it is made clear whether an Act or regulation which, or a part of
which, is or has been found by the courts to be violative of one or more of the
fundamental rights conferred by articles 14, 19 or 31 can be included in the ninth
schedule or whether it is only a constitutional amendment amending the ninth
schedule which damages or destroys the basic structure of the Constitution that can
be struck down.

Issue

Is it permissible for the parliament under Article 31-B to immunize legislations by

inserting them into the ninth schedule and thus outside the purview of the courts and,
if so, what was its effect on the power of judicial review of the court?

Judgment

The court applied the rights test and the essence of the right test and said that if by
applying the above-mentioned tests to the ninth schedule laws, the infraction affects
the basic structure, then such a law(s) will not get the protection of the ninth schedule.

The court said that if a judge made law opines that a particular law is violative of the
fundamental rights then subsequent insertion of the same in the Ninth Schedule after
the 24th April 1973, would be open to challenge on the ground that it destroys or
damages the basic structure as indicated in Article 21 read with Article 14, Article 19
and the principles underlying thereunder.

This judgment can be said to be a modified version of Golaknath judgement, because

in Golak Nath any abridgement of part III was held to be invalid, but here the degree
of invasion would be examined by the courts in the light of tests subsequently
developed to test the infringement of fundamental rights.

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24. Naz Foundation v Govt. of NCT Delhi WP (C) No. 7455/2011

Facts

Section 377 of the IPC was a colonial era legislation which was interpreted and to
mean all variations and kinds of sexual activity except heterosexual penile-vaginal
intercourse. A petition was filed by the Naz Foundation challenging the constitutional
validity of the provision but the Delhi High Court refused to entertain the petition on
the ground that the petitioner did not have any locus standi in the case. An appeal
was preferred in the Supreme Court and the apex court held that the Naz Foundation
had the locus standi to file a public interest lawsuit in this case. The case was sent back
to the Delhi High Court for reconsidering the same on merits.

Issue

• Whether Section 377 violated fundamental rights enshrined in the Indian

Constitution?
• Whether the impugned provision should be interpreted to decriminalize penile
non-vaginal sex between consenting adults?

Judgment

The court held that the right to dignity and the privacy of the person are part of sexual
orientation and thus, section 377 is a clear contravention of the above-mentioned
rights and therefore contradicts the essence of Article 21. The Court applied the tests
laid down by the Supreme Court in the decision of State of West Bengal v. Anwar Ali
Sarkar to answer whether the same was violative of Article 14. The Court ruled that
unreasonable distinction was reflected between the disputed law and the
criminalization of consensual sexual interactions between adults and the prevention
of sexually exploited children or enhanced public health. The court subsequently
interpreted the word “sex” in Article 15 not only to imply sex but also to have a
broader scope, like “sexual orientation” and ruled that Article 377 was prima facie
discriminatory against sexual minorities, thereby breaching Article 15. The Court
found it superfluous to discuss the issue in Article 19 since the challenged legislation
contravened Article 21 and Article 14.

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25. National Legal Services Authority and Union of India AIR 2014 SC 1863

Facts

The petitioner filed a writ petition to give legal representation to marginalized

sections of society. The petition was joined by a non-governmental organization
‘Poojaya Mata Nasib Kaur Ji Women Welfare Society’, a registered association,
seeking reliefs in respect of Kinnar community and an individual “Laxmi Narayan
Tripathi’ who identified himself as a Hijra. The petitioner prayed for a legal
declaration of their gender identity and that the non-recognition of their gender
identity violates Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.

Issue

• Whether a person who is born as a male with predominantly female orientation or

vice-versa has a right to get himself to be recognized as a female as per his choice
more so, when such a person after having undergone operational procedure,
changes his/her sex as well?
• Whether transgender (TG) who are neither males nor females have a right to be
identified and categorized as a “third gender”?

Judgment

The court held that gender identity was the most fundamental aspect of life and refers
to a person’s intrinsic sense of being male, female, or transgender person. The Court
held that TGs are entitled to affirmative action as guaranteed under Article 15(4) and
also to reservation in the matter of appointment and the state is bound to act and give
them due representation in public services. The court emphasized on need for legal
recognition of transgender identity and concluded that they belong to a distinct socio-
religious and cultural group and must be considered as “third gender”, apart from
male and female. To protect the rights of the transgender guaranteed in the
constitution of India, it was declared that Hijras, Eunuchs, apart from binary gender,
must be treated as “third gender” and right of transgender persons to decide their
self-identified gender was also upheld.

The court directed the state and the central government to grant legal recognition of
their gender identity such as male, female or as third gender and also to take steps to
treat them as socially and educationally backward classes of citizens and extend all
kinds of reservation in cases of admission in educational institutions and for public
appointments.
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26. Shayara Bano v. Union of India (2017) 1 SCC 1

Facts

Talaq-ul-Biddat was the issue of controversy before the court. This is known as Triple
Talaq which was challenged before the SC in this case. Though, Talaq-ul-biddat is
banned in Shias, Hanafi School considers it to be sinful but is practiced by a large
Muslim community who follow Hanafi school. In this type of Talaq the Husband does
not follow the approved form of Talaq i.e., talaq-ul-sunnat and he neither waits for
iddat period nor to the abstention from sexual intercourse. This had become an escape
route developed by the Islamic patriarchal society to avoid their marriage.

Issue

• Whether Triple Talaq is constitutionally valid?

• Whether Triple Talaq is an essential religious practice?

Judgement

By a thin majority of 3:2, the court held that the practice of Triple Talaq was
unconstitutional. The majority came to the conclusion that triple talaq is not an
essential religious practice while the minority was of the opinion that it was an
essential religious practice.

The court held that the Triple Talaq or Talaq-e-biddat is not protected by the exception
laid down in Article 25 i.e., the court found the said practice is not an essential element
of Islamic religion. The court justified its point of view in the sense that although it
was practiced by the Hanafi School but it was considered sinful in itself. Triple Talaq
was against the basic tenets of Quran and whatever is against Quran is contrary to
Shariat therefore, what is bad in theology cannot be good in law. The majority bench
relied on its earlier decision Shamim Ara which held that this practice of Triple Talaq
is against both theology and law and just because it is followed by a large number of
people it cannot be validated. Therefore, such practice was declared unconstitutional
and set aside.

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27. Hussainara Khatoon v. State of Bihar AIR 1979 SC 1369

Facts

The petition for the issue of a writ of habeas corpus came before the Court for the
hearing of the release of under-trial prisoners in the state of Bihar. The state of Bihar
was ordered to file a new chart showing a year-wise break-up of the under-trial
prisoners after splitting it into two broad groups which are minor offenses and major
offenses that had not been carried out. Importantly there was a delay in release of the
under-trial prisoners. The court was doubtful whether the under-trial prisoners in
bailable offenses were informed by the Magistrates when they were produced before
them that they could apply for bail which was their duty as mentioned under Section
167(2) (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure.

Issues

• Whether the detention of under-trial prisoners, for periods more than the term that
they would have to serve if convicted, violates Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution?
• Whether the unavailability of legal aid to the prisoners at state expense, in this
case, is in violation of Article 39(a) of the Indian Constitution?

Judgment

The Court directed the release of the under-trial prisoners whose names and
particulars were given in the list filed by Mrs. Hingorani forthwith as continuance of
their detention would be illegal and in violation of their fundamental right under
Article 21 of the Constitution because they have been in jail for a duration exceeding
the maximum term that they should have been convicted for. The Court also directed
that on the next remand dates, when the under-trial prisoners, charged with bailable
offenses, are produced before the Magistrates, the State Government should appoint
a lawyer at its own cost for making an application for bail.

Ratio

The detention of under-trial prisoner for a period exceeding the maximum term that
they should have been convicted for is morally and ethically wrong and in complete
violation of the Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. Article 39A is a fundamental
constitutional directive that emphasizes that free legal service is an inalienable
element of ‘reasonable, fair and just’ procedure for without it a person facing

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economic or other disabilities would not be able to secure justice. This right is to be
considered implicit in the guarantee of Article 21.

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28. Indian Young Lawyers Assn. v. The State of Kerala (2019) 11 SCC 1

Facts

In Sabrimala Temple, there was exclusion on entry of women in the temple because
Lord Ayyappa was a Naishtika Brahmachari and to protect the celibate nature of the
idol, the women were not allowed between the age group of 10 to 50 years. A group
of 5 women lawyers had challenged rule 3 (b) of the Kerala Hindu places of Public
Worship (Authorization of entry) Rules, 1965 which sanctioned restriction on the
women of menstruating age. The Kerala High Court had upheld this practice and the
same was in consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

Issues

• Whether exclusion of women based on their biological factor was violative of

Articles 14, 15 and 17 and was not protected by morality under Article 25 and 26
(6) of the Indian Constitution?
• Whether exclusion of women was an essential religious practice under Article 25?
• Whether Rule 3 (b) of the Kerala Hindu places of Public Worship (Authorization
of entry) Rules, 1965 is ultra vires to the Part III of the Constitution of India.

Judgment

The court by a majority of 4:1 held the practice of exclusion of entry of women into the
temple to be unconstitutional as the same was not a part of the essential religious
practices. The court said that the same violated the right to equality, liberty, and
freedom of religion under Articles 14, 15, 19 (1), 21 and 25 of the Indian Constitution.
The court also struck down Rule 3 (b) of the Kerala Hindu places of Public Worship
(Authorization of entry) Rules, 1965.

The court remarked that women is no less than a man. Patriarchy of religion cannot
be permitted to trump over faith and biological and physiological reasons cannot be
accepted in freedom for faith.

Justice Indu Malhotra gave a dissenting opinion and stated that what constituted
essential religious practice was for the religious community to decide and not for the
Courts. A review petition was filed against the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court
which the court by the majority of 3:2 decided to refer the same to the larger bench.

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29. Common Cause vs. Union of India (2018) 5 SCC

Facts

The petitioner, a registered NGO filed a PIL before the supreme court for legalizing
living will and passive euthanasia. The petitioner had made representation to the
ministry of law and justice but received no response and therefore filed a PIL before
the Court. The petitioners further contended for legalizing living wills whereby a
person undergoing persistent pain and suffering can write about the medical
treatment and authorize the family to stop such treatment.

Issue

• Whether Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees the Right to Life includes
the Right to Die?
• Whether passive euthanasia should be permitted on the living will of patient?
• Whether there is any difference in passive euthanasia and active euthanasia?
• Whether an individual has any right to refuse medical treatment including
withdrawal from life saving devices?

Judgment

The Supreme Court held that a person has right to die with dignity and it is included
under the right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. Hence,
now it is allowed to withhold the life support system or medical treatment of the
patient who has no hope of recovery. The Court also recognized the need for creating
a living will and thus it laid down certain guidelines regarding the procedure for
execution of Advance Directives/living will and guidelines related to passive
euthanasia also. The court also said that there is a need for proper legislation on
passive euthanasia and related aspects. The directive and guidelines laid down by the
court shall remain in force till the Parliament brings legislation in the field.

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30. Shakti Vahini vs. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 1601

Facts

A Writ petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution of India seeking
directions to the respondents to take preventive steps to combat honour crimes, to
submit a National & State Plan of action to curb crimes of the said nature and further
to direct the State Governments to constitute special cells in each district which can be
approached by the couples for their safety and well-being. A prayer for issuance of
writ of mandamus to the State Governments was made to launch prosecutions in each
case of Honour killing and take appropriate measures so that all such honour crimes
and embedded evil in the mindset of certain members of the society are dealt
appropriately.

Issues

• Whether an individual has a right to choose life partner of his/her choice?

• Whether honour killings undertaken by khap panchayats are legal?

Judgment

The court held that the choice of an individual is an inextricable part of dignity, for
dignity cannot be thought of where there is erosion of choice. If the right to express
one’s own choice is obstructed, it would be extremely difficult to think of dignity in
its sanctified completeness.

The Court has provided preventive, remedial and punitive measures to construct a
strong mechanism that could spot and punish the supporters of Honour Killing and
directed the states to carry out these instructions within 6 weeks.

A larger societal change is required to curb such crimes in the long run. This is only
possible through education and awareness. The Government will have to formulate
and implement policies in order to uplift the socio-economic condition of women,
sensitization of the police and other parties concerned towards the need for gender
equality and it must be done with focus in areas where statistically there is a higher
percentage of crimes against women.

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31. K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India (2017) 10 SCC 1

Facts

K.S. Puttaswamy (Retired high Court Judge) filed a petition against the Union of India
challenging the constitutional validity of Aadhaar because it was violating the right
to privacy which had been established on reference from the Constitution Bench to
determine whether or not the right to privacy was guaranteed as an independent
fundamental right under the constitution of India following past decisions from
Supreme Court benches

Issues

• Whether or not there is any fundamental right of privacy under the Constitution
of India?
• Whether or not the decision made by the Court that there are no such fundamental
rights in M.P. Sharma & Ors. vs. Satish Chandra, DM, Delhi & Ors. and also, in
Kharak Singh vs. The State of U.P, is that the correct expression of the
constitutional position?

Judgment

The nine-judge constitution bench of the Supreme Court held that Right to privacy fell
within the ambit of Article 21 of the Indian Constitution. It is stated in the judgment
that the privacy is to be an integral component of Part III of the Indian Constitution,
which lays down the fundamental rights of the citizens. The Supreme Court also
stated that the state must carefully balance the individual privacy and the legitimate
aim, at any cost as fundamental rights cannot be given or taken away by law, and all
laws and acts must abide by the constitution. The Court also declared that the right to
privacy is not an absolute right and any invasion of privacy by state or non-state actor
must satisfy the triple test of legitimacy, proportionality and legality.

The court overruled the decisions in MP Sharma v Satish Chandra, Kharak Singh v.
State of UP and held that the right to privacy is protected as an intrinsic part of the
right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the constitution of India and as a
part of the freedoms guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution.

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32. Anuradha Bhasin v. UOI W.P. (c) No. 1031 of 2019

Facts

An advisory was issued by the Civil Secretariat, Home Department, Govt. of J & K
stating to cut short their stay and make their safe arrangements to go back.
Subsequently, educational institutions and offices were also shut down until further
orders. On August 4, 2019 internet services, mobile connectivity and landline were
shut down until further orders.

On 4th August, 2019, the internet services, mobile networks and landline connectivity
was discontinued and on August 5, 2019, the Constitutional Order No. 272 was passed
by the President of India applying all provisions of the Constitution of India to Jammu
and Kashmir and stripped it from special status enjoyed since 1954. On the same day,
due to prevailing circumstances, the District Magistrate passed the order restricting
the movement and public gathering, apprehending breach of peace and tranquility
under Section 144 of CrPC. Due to this, journalist movements were restricted and this
was challenged under Article 19 of the Constitution which guarantees freedom of
speech and expression and freedom to carry any trade or occupation.

Issue

• Whether the act of prohibition of internet access by the Government is valid?

• Whether the imposition of restrictions under Section 144, Cr.P.C. were valid?
• Whether the restrictions violated the freedom of press of the Petitioner?

Judgment

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that freedom of online expression and freedom to
practice any profession through online means is protected by the Indian Constitution.
The Court denied to lift the restrictions and left it into the discretion of the State to
review it and remove the unnecessary impositions. The Court also ordered the
restrictions to be of a temporary nature. This case widened the scope of Section 144 of
Cr.P.C. by applying its use even in the cases where there is apprehension of danger.
This case also made observations regarding the illegitimate use of Section 144 and its
prohibition as it will lead to abuse of power of the State. However, the Court also
stated that a responsible government should always take care of all the rights and
needs of press and media and provide them protection in their freedom of speech.

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INDIAN PENAL CODE

33. Vishaka & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 3011

Facts

Barware Devi was a social worker in a programme initiated by the state government
of Rajasthan aiming to curb the evil of Child Marriage. Amidst, the protest to stop
child marriage in one Ramadan Gujjar’s family Bhanwari Devi tried her best to stop
that marriage. However, the marriage was successful in its completion even though
there are widespread protests. In order to take revenge, one Ramakant Gujjar along
with his 5 men gang-raped her in front of her husband. She was subjected to harsh
cruelty by the female police attendants. Her request to spend the night in the police
station was also refused.

The trial court acquitted the accused but she didn’t lose hope and seeing her
determination all-female social workers gave their support. They all filed a writ
petition in the Supreme Court of India under the name ‘Vishaka’.

Issue

Whether the enactment of guidelines mandatory for the restraining sexual harassment
of women at workplace?

Judgement

The court observed that it is a fundamental right of a functioning woman under

Article 14, 19(1)(g), and 21 of the Constitution to carry on any work, trade, or
profession but it should be ensured that employer should provide a safe working
environment at workplace. It was of the view that the fundamental right to carry on
any kind of occupation, trade, or profession depends on the ease of use of a “safe”
working environment.

The Supreme Court ruled that at all workplaces there should be a sexual code and
there should be a proper mechanism to enforce cases, which fall under the ambit of
this sexual harassment code. The court widened the definition of the term sexually
determined behavior to any kind of acts which include bodily contact, call for sexual
favors, sexual comments, showing pornography, oral or physical conduct of a sexual
nature with women.

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The Supreme Court stated that the guidelines for the sexual code at every workplace
are to be treated as a declaration of law in accordance with Article 141 of the
constitution. And these rights should not be based on prejudices any right available
under the protection of the Human Rights Act 1993.

The guidelines and norms specified by the apex court include the obligation of the
employer in the workplace and other institutions, preventive steps to be taken in this
regard, criminal proceedings, disciplinary action, complaints, mechanism and
complaints committee to encourage worker initiative, creating awareness and against
any third-party harassment etc.

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34. Laxmi v. Union of India (2014) 4 SCC 427

Facts

Lakshmi was an acid attack survivor who had filed a PIL before the Supreme Court.
She was attacked by three men in New Delhi busy streets as she refused to marry a
man named Naeem Khan aka Guddu. Attempt to murder was filed against the
culprits and got convicted by the court of Delhi. Those who were convicted by the
Delhi’s district court later got bail from the High court. This led to a surprise to the
victim as granting of bail was not appropriate for such pain she has suffered. All this
led of filing a public interest litigation by the victim which targeted at the easy
availability of acid, no proper provision related to acid attack cases, including
expenses, surgeries and rehabilitation for acid attack survivors.

Issue

A prayer was made by the petitioner to:

• To direct the respondents to make appropriate amendments in the IPC, CrPC

specially to deal with acid attacks.
• A complete ban on the sale of acid and in all form of acid should be notified as a
scheduled banned chemical and should be available across the counter.

Judgment

The supreme court issued the following guidelines:

The Supreme Court took a quick step to regulate the trading of acid by issuing the
subsequent guidelines:

• No acid could be sold to a person below the age of 18 years, further the buyer has
to produce photo identity card and mention the purpose for such purchase. The
seller has to forward this information to the nearest police station within 3 days.
• The seller has to submit the report of the stocks of acid to the Sub-divisional
magistrate within fifteen days.
• The Sub-divisional magistrate has the power to confiscate the unreported stocks
of acid and can impose the fine to the extent of 50,000 rupees.

Following the decision several amendments were made to the IPC, CrPC and
Evidence Act to combat such issues of acid attack.

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35. Navtej Singh Johar v. Union of India AIR 2018 SC 4321

Facts

A writ petition was filed by on 26th April 2016 by Navtej Singh Johar, a dancer from
the LGBT community along with 4 others to challenge the constitutional validity of
Section 377 of IPC which criminalizes consensual sexual intercourse between same-
sex adults in private. In the prayer, the petitioners prayed for declaration of right to
sexuality, right to sexual autonomy and right to choose of a sexual partner to be a part
of right to life guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It was also prayed
by the petitioners to declare Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code as unconstitutional.

Issues

• Whether section 377 of IPC was unconstitutional?

• Was the rationale of the Supreme Court judgment in the Suresh Kumar Koushal
case sound in its understanding of morality as social morality?

Judgment

The court held that Section 377 discriminates against individuals based on their sexual
orientation and/or gender identity, thereby violating Articles 14 and 15 of the
Constitution. Further, they ruled that Section 377 violates the rights to life, dignity,
and autonomy of personal choice under Article 21. Finally, they found that it inhibits
an LGBT individual’s ability to fully realize their identity, by violating the right to
freedom of expression under Article 19(1)(a). They all referred to Court’s recent
judgments in NALSA v Union of India (recognized transgender identity) and Justice
K.S. Puttaswamy v Union of India (recognized fundamental right to privacy).

It overruled the decision in NAZ Foundation. The bench also referred to Shafin Jahan
v. Asokan K.M. and Shakti Vahini v. Union of India to reinstate that an adult’s right
to “choose a life partner of his/her choice” is an aspect of individual liberty and held
that something that two individuals belonging to the LGBT community decide to do
in private in no manner harms the “public decency or morality”. Intimacy between
consenting adults of the same sex is beyond the legitimate interests of the state.

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36. Joseph Shine v. Union of India SCC/SC 1676

Facts

The petitioner, Joseph Shine, had questioned the constitutionality of section 497 of
Indian Penal Code in this case. The main purpose of the petition was to protect Indian
men from being abused by vengeful women or their husbands for extramarital
relationships. A close associate of Petitioner’s in Kerala committed suicide after a
woman co-worker threatened him with malicious rape. Section 497 is a grotesque
incidence of unequal masculinity, hierarchical hegemony, and male supremacy. In
contemporary society the conventional context under which section 497 was written
no longer exists.

Issues

• Whether it is unethical to be unfair, unlawful, unreasonable, and breaching human

freedoms, Sec 497 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
• Whether Sec 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is unconstitutional in
that it is unjust, unlawful, and violates human rights.

Judgement

The Court found Section 497 in violation of Article 14, 15, and 21 of the Constitution
to be unconstitutional and ruled that Section 198(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure,
1973 is unconstitutional to the degree that it relates to Section 497 Indian Penal Code,
1860.

It was pointed out in the judgment that section 497 on existence is discriminatory. A
husband may agree to permit his wife to have an affair with another male. Therefore,
this section does not cover the ‘family sanctity.’ The clause retains the husband’s legal
rights that he maintains over his partner. That clause forbids the wife from filing a
lawsuit against her husband. There is no clause in this section that deals with a
married man having an affair with unmarried women.

The court held that Husband is not the master of his wife and have equal standing in
society and will have the chance to bring forward their stance.

The court said that a crime is done against the entire humanity when fraud is a
personal matter. Adultery does not work into the definition of criminality, because it

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would otherwise violate marriage’s intense realm of privacy. Adultery, however, may
be treated as a legal mistake, which is a legitimate basis for divorce and is not a
criminal offence.

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37. Mukesh & Anr. v. State for NCT of Delhi & Ors. (2017) 6 SCC 1

Facts

A rape was committed by 6 men in a moving bus in Delhi. The original name of the
victim is unpublished and mentioned as Nirbhaya in all discussions. Nirbhaya a 23-
year-old woman with his friend was waiting at a bus stop at night. She was convinced
and made to enter the empty bus. The driver, along with 5 other members including
a minor of age 17 engaged in the act of forceful sexual assault. The friend who tried to
protect Nirbhaya from such forceful acts was beaten up by those 6 members. That
running bus was made a place for the brutal rape and various other harsh injuries.
She was later admitted to the hospital for treatment but ended up joining hands with
the death. Her death bed witnessed her physical and mental instability, multiple
organ failure, internal bleeding, cardiac arrest, and various other troubles.

Issues

• Whether rape as defined under section 375 of the IPC covers the offence entirely?
• Whether death penalty can be given to the convicts as punishment for such
heinous crime?
Judgment

The court held that the brutal, barbaric and diabolic nature of the crime was invincible
from the acts committed by the accused persons viz, attacking the deceased by forcibly
disrobing her and committing violent sexual assault by all the appellants, their brutish
behaviour in having anal sex with the deceased and forcing her to perform oral sex;
injuries on the body of the deceased by way of bite marks (10 in number); and insertion
of rod in her private parts that, inter alia, caused perforation of her intestine which
caused sepsis and, ultimately, led to her death.

The medical history of the prosecutrix demonstrates that the entire intestine of the
prosecutrix was perforated and splayed open due to the repeated insertion of the rod
and hands; and the appellants had pulled out the internal organs of the prosecutrix in
the most savage and inhuman manner that caused grave injuries which ultimately
annihilated her life. These acts itself demonstrate the mental perversion and
inconceivable brutality as caused by the appellants.

Arriving at the singular conclusion that the aggravating circumstances outweighed

the mitigating circumstances brought on record, the Hon’ble Judge held that the High
Court had correctly confirmed the death penalty.
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38. K.M Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1962 SC 605

Facts

K.M Nanavati, an Indian Naval Officer shifted to Bombay in March 1959 with his
family and got to meet Prem Bhagwandas Ahuja, a businessman in Bombay. While he
was out of Bombay for his duty, Sylvia, his wife, developed an illicit relationship with
Prem Ahuja. He was then confronted with the confession of his wife when she opened
with her relationship with Ahuja. Further, in the heat of his agony, he went to his ship
to procure a loaded revolver and drove himself to Prem Ahuja’s office. On not finding
him at his workplace, he then drove to his residence. After an altercation, at his
residence, he fired two shots which hit Ahuja. Jury voted in favour of the accused. The
case was referred to hon’ble High Court under Section 307 of The Code of Criminal
Procedure. The Division Bench of the High Court went on to declare the accused
guilty under Section 302 of IPC. An appeal was finally decided by the Supreme Court.
The appellate court held that there were mis directions in the session’s court.

Issues

• Whether Nanavati shot Ahuja in “the heat of the moment” or whether it was a
premeditated murder?
• Whether SLP (Special Leave Petition) can be entertained without fulfilling the
order under Article 142?

Judgment

The court held that the conduct of the accused clearly showed that the murder
committed by him was an act of deliberate nature and was not in any grave and
sudden provocation as the accused by adducing evidence failed to bring the case
under General Exception of IPC. Therefore, as a result, the court convicted Nanavati
under section 302 of IPC and sentenced him of Imprisonment for Life. The court
upheld the decision of the high court on the following grounds:

• The time lapse between the confession and murder was sufficient to regain his self-
control.
• The mere fact that before the shooting the accused abused the deceased and the
abuse provoked an equally abusive reply could not conceivably be a provocation
for the murder.

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39. Bachan Singh v. State of Punjab AIR 1980 SC 898

Facts

The appellant Bachan Singh was tried and convicted and sentenced to death under
Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code for the murders of Desa Singh, Durga Bai and
Veeran Bai by the Sessions Judge.

The High Court had confirmed his death sentence and dismissed his appeal. In turn,
he appealed to the Supreme Court by special leave petition under Article 136 of the
Constitution and the question raised in the appeal was, whether the facts of his case
were “special reasons” for awarding him the death sentence as required in Section
354(3) of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issues

• Whether the death penalty provided for the offence of murder in Section 302, Penal
Code is unconstitutional?
• Whether the sentencing procedure provided in Section 354(3) of the CrPC, 1973 is
unconstitutional on the ground that it invests the Court with unguided discretion?

Judgment

The Supreme Court with 4:1 majority dismissed the challenges pertaining to the
constitutionality of Sec 302 of IPC and 354(3) of CrPC and said that the six
fundamental rights guaranteed under Art 19(1) are not absolute rights. These rights
are subjected to inherent restraints stemming from the reciprocal obligation of one
member of civil society to so use his rights as not to infringe or injure similar rights of
another. It was held that Section 302 is not violative both Art 19 and 21 of the
Constitution.

It was further held that Section 354 (3) of CrPC was not unconstitutional and that the
expression “special reason” in the section means “exceptional reasons” founded in the
exceptionally grave circumstances of a particular case relating to the crime as well as
the criminal. The apex court laid down the principle of “rarest of the rare cases” in
awarding the death penalty. It was reaffirmed that for those convicted for murder, life
imprisonment is the rule and death sentence is an exception.

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40. Machhi Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab (1983) 3 SCC 470

Facts

A course of 5 series of incidents where 17 people were murdered in 5 different villages

had occurred and one Machhi Singh had planned and executed those incidents.
Machhi Singh was prosecuted in the five different sessions court and he along with 2
others were awarded a death penalty. They challenged this decision in the High Court
but the high court upheld the order of the sessions court. After which they filed a SLP
before the Supreme Court challenging the decision of the high court.

Issue

Whether a death penalty could be given to Machhi Singh and other by applying the
Rarest of rare doctrine formulated in Bachhan Singh’s Case?

Judgment

The supreme court held that the fundamental rights were not absolute and were
subjected to reasonable restrictions and said that Article 20, 21, and 22 deal with the
penal enactments of the other laws under which the personal liberty could be taken
away in the interest of the society. The supreme court stated the following guidelines
in the case:

• The extreme death penalty need not be inflicted except in gravest cases.
• Life imprisonment is a rule and death penalty an exception.
• A balance sheet of aggravating and mitigating circumstances has to be drawn up
and in doing so the mitigating circumstances have to accorded full weightage.
The supreme court upheld the death penalty of Machhi Singh and others imposed by
the lower court by stating that the circumstances of the case reveal that it was a cold-
blooded murder and victims were helpless and defend less.

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41. Aruna Shanbaug v. Union of India (2011) 4 SCC 454

Facts

Aruna Ramachandra Shanbaug was a staff Nurse working in King Edward Memorial
Hospital, Parel, Mumbai. On the evening of 27th November, 1973, she was attacked by
a sweeper in the hospital who wrapped a dog chain around her neck and yanked her
back with it. He tried to rape her but finding that she was menstruating, he sodomized
her. To immobilize her during this act he twisted the chain around her neck. The next
day, a cleaner found her in an unconscious condition lying on the floor with blood all
over. It was alleged that due to strangulation by the dog chain the supply of oxygen
to the brain stopped and the brain got damaged.

36 years had lapsed since the said incident. She had been surviving on mashed food
and could not move her hands or legs. It was alleged that there is no possibility of any
improvement in the condition and that she was entirely dependent on KEM Hospital,
Mumbai. It was prayed to direct the Respondents to stop feeding Aruna and let her
die in peace.

Issues

• When a person is in a permanent vegetative state (PVS), should withholding or

withdrawal of life sustaining therapies be permissible or `not unlawful’?
• If the patient has previously expressed a wish not to have life-sustaining
treatments in case of futile care or a PVS, should his/ her wishes be respected when
the situation arises?
• In case a person has not previously expressed such a wish, if his family or next of
kin makes a request to withhold or withdraw futile life-sustaining treatments,
should their wishes be respected?

Judgment

The court said that based on the doctor’s report Aruna was not brain dead, though
she was a PVS, her conditions was stable and terminating her life would be
unjustified. the Supreme Court allowed passive euthanasia in certain conditions,
subject to the approval by the High Court following the due procedure. When an
application for passive euthanasia is filed the Chief Justice of the High Court should
forthwith constitute a Bench of at least two Judges who should decide to grant
approval or not. Before doing so the Bench should seek the opinion of a committee of
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three reputed doctors to be nominated by the Bench after consulting such medical
authorities/medical practitioners as it may deem fit. Simultaneously with appointing
the committee of doctors, the High Court Bench shall also issue notice to the State and
close relatives e.g., parents, spouse, brothers/sisters etc. of the patient, and in their
absence his/her next friend, and supply a copy of the report of the doctor’s committee
to them as soon as it is available. After hearing them, the High Court bench should
give its verdict. The above procedure should be followed all over India until
Parliament makes legislation on this subject.

However, Aruna Shanbaug was denied euthanasia as the court opined that the matter
was not fit for the same. If at any time in the future, the staff of KEM hospital or the
management felt a need for the same, they could approach the High Court under the
procedure prescribed.

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CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

42. D.K. Basu v. State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610

Facts

The petitioner addressed a letter to the Supreme Court of India calling its attention to
certain news published in the Telegraph Newspaper about deaths in police custody.
He requested that the letter be treated as a Writ Petition within the “Public Interest
Litigation”. Considering the importance of the issues raised in the letter, it was treated
as a written Petition and the Defendants were notified.

While the writ petition was being considered, Mr. Ashok Kumar Johri addressed a
letter to the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court calling his attention to the death of a
Mahesh Bihari from Pilkhana, Aligarh in police custody. The same letter was also
treated as a Request for Writing and was included along with D.K. Basu’s Request for
Writing. On 14/08/1987 the Court gave the order for issuing notices to all state
governments, including a notice to the Law Commission requesting appropriate
suggestions within a two-month period.

Issues

• Growth in incidents of Custodial Torture and Deaths by Police.

• The arbitrariness of Policemen in arresting a person.
• Is there any need to specify some guidelines to make an arrest?

Judgment

The Court was of the opinion that custodial violence, including torture and death in
prisons, was considered by the court to be one of the worst crimes in a civilized society
governed by the rule of law and the same was in violation of the constitutional right
to life and personal liberty.

The court issued a list of 11 guidelines in addition to the constitutional and the
statutory safeguards to be followed in cases of arrests and detention:

• Police must wear a proper uniform so that he can be easily identified along with
his status.
• Police must prepare a memo of arrest which will be witnessed by at least one
member of the family and should be signed by a detainee.

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• A person arrested has a right to have a friend or relative or other person known to
him or who has an interest in his well-being will be informed.
• Police must notify a detainee’s time, place of detention, and place of custody where
he is being kept to the detainee’s next friend or relative living outside the district
or city through the District’s Legal Aid Organization and the station.
• The person arrested must be made aware of his rights to have someone informed.
• In case the arrested person discloses about his arrest to a friend, the name of the
friend must be entered in the case diary.
• The arrested person, if requests must be examined and an inspection memo must
be prepared which shall be signed by the police officer and the detainee.
• The detainee must undergo a medical examination by a trained physician every 48
hours while in custody by a physician.
• Copy of all the documents must be sent to the Magistrate for Registration.
• The arrested must be allowed to meet his advocate.
• A Police Control Room must be provided where the arresting officer must
communicate information about the arrest and the place of custody of the arrested,
within 12 hours after the arrest and the same must be displayed on a visible notice
board.

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43. Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum & Ors. MANU/SC/0194/1985

Facts

The petitioner was a lawyer by profession, married to the respondent in 1932, had
three sons and two daughters from this marriage. In 1975, when the respondent’s age
was 62 years, she was disowned by her spouse and was tossed out from her marital
home together with her children. In 1978, she filed an appeal in the presence of Judicial
Magistrate of Indore, because she was abandoned from the maintenance of Rs. 200 per
month, which was guaranteed to be provided by him. She demanded Rs. 500 per
month as maintenance. Subsequently, the husband gave her irrevocable triple talaq
on November 6th, 1978, and used it as a defense to not pay maintenance. The
magistrate, in August 1979, directed the husband to pay an entirety of Rs 25 per month
as maintenance. Shah Bano in July 1908 made a plea to the High Court of M.P, to
change the sum of maintenance to Rs. 179 each month, and high court increased the
maintenance to the said amount i.e., Rs. 179 per month. The same was challenged by
the spouse within the Supreme Court as a special leave petition to the High court’s
decision.

Issues

• Whether the “WIFE” definition includes a divorced Muslim woman?

• Whether section 125 overrides personal law?
• Whether a Muslim husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced
wife is in or not in the conflict between section 125 and Muslim Personal Law?

Judgment

The Supreme Court dismissed the said petition and said that Section 125 of the code
applies to all citizens independent of their religion and consequently Section 125(3) of
Code of Criminal Procedure is pertinent to Muslims as well, without any sort of
discrimination. The court further stated that Section 125 overrides the personal law if
there is any conflict between the two.

The Court held that since the obligation of Muslim husband towards her divorced
wife was restricted to the degree of ‘Iddat’ period, indeed though this circumstance
does not contemplate the rule of law that’s said in Section 125 of CrPC, 1973 and
subsequently the obligation of the husband to pay maintenance to the wife extends
beyond the iddat period in the event that the wife does not have sufficient means to
maintain herself. It was further stated by the court that this rule according to Muslim

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Law was against humanity or was wrong because here a divorced wife was not in a
condition to maintain herself.

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44. Richpal Kharra v. State (2014) 4 CRIMES 2 (Raj)

Facts

The complainant-respondent Sanju Devi lodged a FIR against the petitioner for
offence under-section 376 IPC. However subsequently she informed the Investigating
Agency as well as the concerned Court that she does not wish to pursue the matter.
As, according to her no offence of rape had ever taken place. Despite statement made
by her before the concerned Court, despite filing of negative final report by the police
by order dated 21.03.2013, the learned Magistrate has returned the file of the case back
to the police with the specific direction that the police should procure the FSL report
with regard to underwear and vaginal swab which was sent to it for chemical
examination.

Issue

Whether section 53A of the Code of Criminal Procedure was mandatory in nature?

Judgment

The court after considering the mandatory nature of the section 53A Cr.P.C. directed
S.P.(Rural), Jaipur, to supervise the investigation. The Court directed the petitioner to
appear before the concerned S.P. on 15.05.2013. The court directed the petitioner to
give the sample for DNA profile, which shall be sent by the Investigating Officer to
the FSL. The FSL was directed to submit its report before the police within a period of
one month from the date of receipt of the sample from the police. The Police was
directed to immediately bring the FSL report to the concerned Court so that the
concerned Court may proceed further, if necessary.

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45. Gurubaksh Singh Sibba v. State of Punjab (1980) 2 SCC 565

Facts

The appellant, Mr. Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia, was the Minister of Irrigation and Power
in the Government of Punjab under the Congress regime. He and a few others were
facing serious accusations of corruption and undue use of power. The minister along
with the other appellants apprehended arrest.

The appellants applied for anticipatory bail under Section 438 of the code in the High
Court of Punjab and Haryana. They prayed for the HC to direct the appellants to be
released on bail in the event of arrest on the basis of the above stated charges.

The application was dismissed by the full bench of the High Court but on special leave
to appeal, the application was allowed by the Supreme Court.

Issues

• Does “reason to believe” mentioned in Section 438(1) of CrPC include ‘mere fear’?
• Does filing of FIR or Charge-sheet is necessary for filing for an Anticipatory bail
under Section 438?
• What is the life or currency of an anticipatory bail once the same has been granted
by the competent court?
• What are the necessary conditions for the granting of anticipatory bail?
• Can a person be granted an anticipatory bail if the arrest has been done?
• Can the anticipatory order be limited with conditions or is boundless?

Judgment

The supreme court dismissed the petition and held that the discretion of granting
Anticipatory bail must be used more objectively and the higher courts have the power
to correct this discretion if the need arises. The bench laid down the following
guidelines while exercising the discretionary power:

• Due care, caution and circumspection must be used while exercising such powers.
• The Individual applying for anticipatory bail must have a reasonable
apprehension of getting arrested for a non-bailable offence.
• Anticipatory bail must not be denied in cases where the accused is suspected to
have committed an offence punishable in the form of death penalty or life

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imprisonment unless the court has sufficient evidence before it to justify the
refusal.
• Blanket or protective orders of bail should not be passed.
• Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to the grant of anticipatory bail under
section 438 and the individual can be granted bail as long as no arrest has been
made.
• The provisions under Section 438 cannot be invoked after the arrest has been made.
• Under Section 438, interim bail order can be passed without issuing a notice to the
Public Prosecutor but it should be mandatorily issued to him afterwards.
• The court has the power to limit the operation of anticipatory bail orders until after
the FIR is filed. The applicant may be asked to obtain a bail order under Sections
437 or 439 of Cr.P.C. after the filing of FIR has taken place.

Ratio laid down in the judgment

• Reason to believe does not include mere fear.

• High Court or Sessions court must apply their minds and cannot leave the question
for magistrate concerned under section 437.
• Filing of FIR is not a condition precedent to the grant of anticipatory bail under
section 438.
• Anticipatory bail can be granted even after in F. I. R. is filed, so long as the
applicant has not been arrested.
• The provisions of Section 438 can’t be invoked after the arrest of the accused.

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46. Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (2008) 7 SCC 164

Facts

The petitioner, a minor girl was kidnapped by local goons. Her father, Bhola Kamat
went to police station to lodge an FIR which police refused. The father further went to
the superintendent of police and under his direction a FIR was registered. But even
then, investigation was not started and the police did not take any measure to nab the
accused or recover the minor girl either.

Hence, a writ petition was filed under article 32 before the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether a police officer is bound to register a First Information Report (FIR) upon
receiving any information relating to commission of a cognizable offence under
Section 154 of the CrPC or the police officer has the power to conduct a ‘preliminary
inquiry’ in order to test the veracity of such information before registering the same?

Judgment

The court referred the matter before the appropriate bench but observed.

• Registration of FIR is mandatory under section 154, if information discloses

commission of a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is to be done in
such case.
• If information received does not disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain
whether there was a commission of a cognizable offence or not.
• If a unanimous complaint is lodged, it must first be put in the list of preliminary
inquiry, if there is well found substance regarding commission of cognizable
offence, then FIR is to be registered.
• If there is a chance that a certain complaint could be false, preliminary inquiry is
to be conducted.
• If preliminary inquiry discloses commission of a cognizable offence, the FIR must
be registered.
• The police officer cannot avoid his duty of registering offence if cognizable offence
is disclosed. Action must be taken against erring officers.

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• Scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify veracity or otherwise of the

information received but only to ascertain whether information received discloses
commission of cognizable offence or not.
• As to what type and in which cases preliminary inquiry is to be conducted will
depend on facts and circumstances of each case. Preliminary inquiry must be done
in cases like-
➢ matrimonial disputes or family disputes
➢ commercial offences
➢ medical negligence
➢ corruption cases
➢ cases where there is an abnormal delay or laches in reporting the matter.
• While ensuring and protecting rights of accused and complainant, a preliminary
inquiry must not exceed 7 days. In case of further delay, the reason behind the
delay must be noted down in the General Diary.
• Since general diary or station diary or daily diary is the record of all information
received in a police station, it is directed that all information relating to cognizable
offences, whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry must be
meticulously noted in such diary. If preliminary inquiry is done, the reason behind
doing so is to be noted.

Ratio

Registration of FIR in cases of cognizable offense is mandatory.

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47. Arnab Goswami v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (2021) 1 SCC 802

Facts

An FIR was filed in alleged suicide committed by deceased Anvay Naik and his
mother Kumud Naik, who were Directors of an interior design company Concorde
Design Pvt. Ltd. It is alleged that the deceased V.S. Sherla/B.T. Punde 4 / 56 1-IAST-
4278-2020.doc left behind a note, wherein it was stated that the deceased was
committing suicide on account of the non-payment of CDPL's dues. The officers of the
Alibaug Police Station visited the petitioner's 'ARG Outlier Media Private Limited'
('ARG' for short) office informing him about the unfortunate incident and the note left
behind by the deceased which had the name of the petitioner. After which the
petitioner was arrested in connection with the same FIR.

Issue

Whether a writ petition under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution read with 482
Cr.P.C be filed for interim protection/bail?

Judgment

The court held that High Courts in their jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India have the power to grant bail in suitable cases.

The court said that ‘In an application under Article 226, the High Court must be
circumspect in exercising its powers to grant bail on the basis of the facts of each case.
However, the High Court should not foreclose itself from the exercise of the power
when a citizen has been arbitrarily deprived of their personal liberty in an excess of
state power, it said.

This is probably the first time where a person has been granted bail while exercising
the jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Indian Constitution.

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48. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537

Facts

Gurinder Kaur died as a result of burns received by her and allegedly she was burnt
by her husband and his parents on account of failure to satisfy their demand for
dowry. The circumstances in which Gurinder Kaur met with her unnatural death were
investigated by the Central Bureau of Investigation and a report was filed by the
Central Bureau of Investigation in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on
August 11, 1982 stating that in their opinion in respect of the unnatural death of
Gurinder Kaur no offence appeared to have been committed.

The petitioner was however not aware that such a report had been submitted by the
Central Bureau of Investigation and he, therefore, brought an application for initiating
proceedings for contempt against the Central Bureau of Investigation on the ground
that the Central Bureau of Investigation had not completed their investigation and
submitted their report within the period stipulated by the Court by its earlier order
dated May 6, 1983. It was in reply to this application for initiation of contempt
proceedings that the Central Bureau of Investigation intimated that they had already
filed their report in the Court of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate on August 11, 1982
and the report was pending consideration by the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate.
When this fact was brought to our notice we immediately passed an order dated
November 28, 1983 directing that the petitioner should be heard before any final order
was passed on the report.

Issue

Where FIR is lodged and after completion of investigation initiated on the basis of the
FIR, the police submitted a report that no offence has been committed, the magistrate
can accept the report and drop the proceedings without issuing such notice to the first
informant or to the injured or in case the incident has resulted in death, to the relatives
of the deceased?

Judgment

In a case where the Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded under Section 173(2) (i)
decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceedings or takes the
view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons
mentioned in the First Information Report, the magistrate must give notice to the
informant and provide him in opportunity to be heard at the time of consideration of
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the report. Unnecessary delay on account of the difficulty of effecting service of the
notice on the informant cannot be a valid objection against this view because in any
case the action taken by the police on the First Information Report has to be
communicated to the informant and a copy of the report has to be supplied to him
under Section 173(2)(i). Moreover, the difficulty of service of notice on the informant
cannot provide any justification for depriving the informant of the opportunity of
being heard at the time when the report is upon consideration of the Magistrate.

The injured person or any relative of the deceased who is not informant, though not
entitled to notice from the Magistrate, has locus to appear before the Magistrate at the
time of consideration of the report, if he otherwise comes to know that the report is
going to be considered by magistrate and if he wants to make his submissions in
regard to the report; Magistrate is bound to hear him. The Magistrate may also, in the
exercise of his discretion, if he so thinks fit, give such notice to the injured person or
to any particular relative or relatives of the deceased, but not giving of such notice will
not have any invalidating effect on the order which may be made by the Magistrate
on a consideration of the report.

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49. Madhu Limaye v. the State of Maharashtra AIR 1978 SC 47

Facts

The appellant was prosecuted for having made statements defamatory to the then
Law Minister of the Government of Maharashtra. The Government decided to
prosecute the appellant for an offence under Section 500 of Indian Penal Code on the
ground that the Law-Minister was defamed in respect of his conduct in the discharge
of his public functions. Sanction was purported to have been accorded under section
199(4)(a). Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed a complaint in the court of the
Sessions Judge.

Process was issued against the appellant upon the said complaint. The appellant filed
an application to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no
jurisdiction to entertain the complaint. The appellant contended that the allegations
were made against Shri Antulay in relation to what he had done in his personal
capacity and not in his capacity as a Minister. The appellant challenged the jurisdiction
of the court on some other grounds, also challenging the validity of the sanction. The
Sessions Judge rejected the contentions of the appellant and framed a charge against
the appellant under section 500 of the Penal Code. The appellant, thereupon, filed a
revision application in the High Court.

The High Court without going into the merits held that the revision application was
not maintainable in view of provisions of section 397(2).

Issues

What is the connotation of the term "interlocutory order" as appearing in sub-s. (2) of
s. 397 which bars any revision of such an order by the High Court?

Judgment

The court held that same order to be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of
sub-section (2) of section 397 of the 1973 code and set aside the judgment and order of
the High Court and remit the case back to it to dispose of the appellant's petition on
merits, in the manner it may think fit and proper to do in accordance with the law and
in the light of this judgment.

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50. Gurcharan Singh v. Delhi Administration AIR 1978 SC 179

Facts

All the accused persons ranging from the Deputy Inspector General of Police and the
Superintendent of Police at the top down to some police constables were alleged to be
a party to a criminal conspiracy to kill one Sunder and they were alleged to have
caused his death by drowning him in the Jamuna river in pursuance of the conspiracy.
During the preliminary inquiry, all the six alleged eye-witnesses did not support the
prosecution case, but gave statements in favour of the accused.

During the course of the investigation, seven witnesses including six persons already
examined during the preliminary inquiry, gave statements implicating the accused in
support of the theory of prosecution. The witnesses were also forwarded to the
Magistrate for recording their statements under S. 164, Cr. P. C. All the seven
witnesses continued to support the prosecution case in their statements on oath
recorded under S. 164, Cr. P. C. All the seven witnesses continued to support the
prosecution case in their statements on oath recorded under S. 164, Cr. P. C. Six eye-
witnesses who made discrepant statements and had supported the defense version at
one stage, explained that some of the accused had exercised pressure on them to make
statement in favour of the defense. It was in the above background that the Delhi
Administration moved the High Court for cancellation of the bail granted by the
Sessions Judge.

Issues

Whether a high court can cancel a bail under section 439 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure?

Judgment

The supreme court held that the Sessions Judge did not take into proper account the
grave apprehension of the prosecution that there was a likelihood of the accused
persons tampering with the prosecution witnesses. The peculiar nature of the case
revealed from the allegations and the position of the accused in relation to the eye-
witnesses it was incumbent upon the Sessions Judge to give proper weight to the
serious apprehension of the prosecution with regard to tampering with the eye-
witnesses, which was urged before him in resisting the application for bail. The High
Court had correctly appreciated the entire position. Therefore, the Supreme Court will

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not be justified under Art. 136 of the Constitution in interfering with the discretion
exercised by the High Court in cancelling the bail of the accused persons.

51. Daniel Latifi v. Union India 7 SCC 740

Facts

In Shah Bano’s Case the court held that muslim women were entitled to maintenance
under section 125 CrPC after Divorce. Shah Bano won the Case and got the Right to
get Alimony from her Husband. This Judgment was later changed by the Indian
Parliament due to the pressure. The Parliament to revoke passed the Muslim Women
(Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986. Section 3(1) of the Act states that any
divorced women are entitled to reasonable and fair maintenance within the iddat
period.

But one of the Counsel of Shah Bano felt that the Act passed was constitutionally
invalid as even after the iddat period the wife who was dependent on her husband
before marriage has the right to life even after marriage. Thus, this Act violates the
fundamental right under Article 21 and also under Article 14 and 15 and was
challenged before the Supreme Court.

Issues

Whether Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986 is

constitutionally valid?

Judgment

The court restored the values laid down in the Shah Bano’s case. Till Danial Latifi’s
case, the Act was not changed and any dispute regarding Muslim women’s
maintenance was governed by the Act. It is stated that every woman Hindu, Muslim,
Christian, or Parse irrespective of their religion can avail their right under Section 125
of the Criminal Procedure Code. A woman is exempted from not getting maintenance
under Section 125 when she gets fair or reasonable settlement under Section 3 of the
Muslim women protection Act.

The wife will get maintenance under Section 125 till the husband completes his duty
under Section 3 of the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. In
the case of Shabana Bano v. Imran Khan, the court held that the wife is entitled to get
maintenance even after the iddat period as long as she doesn’t remarry. Hence, a
balanced judgment between the Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce)
Act, 1986 and Criminal Procedure Code was given by stating the Act to be

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constitutionally valid and the women can also avail the maintenance irrespective of
their religion under Section 125 of the Criminal Procedure Code till the husband fulfils
his duty mentioned in Section 3 of the Act.

52. Indra Sharma v. V.K.V Sharma AIR 2014 SC 309

Facts

Ms. Indra Sharma, an unmarried woman, left her job and began a live-in relationship
with Mr. V.K.V. Sharma for a period as long as 18 years, despite knowing that he was
married. Mr. Sharma abandoned Ms. Sharma in a state where she could not maintain
herself. Under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, failure to
maintain a woman involved in a ‘domestic relationship’ amounts to ‘domestic
violence.’ Two lower courts held that Mr. V.K.V. committed domestic violence by not
maintaining Ms. Sharma, and directed Mr. Sharma to pay a maintenance amount of
Rs.18,000 per month. Thereafter, on appeal, the High Court of Karnataka set aside the
orders of the lower courts on the ground that Ms. Sharma was aware that Mr. Sharma
was married and thus her relationship with him would fall outside the protected
ambit of “relationship in the nature of marriage” under the Protection of Women from
Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

Issues

Whether a live-in relationship of a woman with a married man knowing his marital
status would amount to a ‘relationship in the nature of marriage’ falling within the
definition of ‘domestic relationship’ under Section 2(f) of the Protection of Women
from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 and thereby disruption of such a relationship by
failure to maintain a women involved in such a relationship amounts to ‘domestic
violence’ within the meaning of Section 3 of the DV Act?

Judgment

The court laid down certain factors to look into for testing under what circumstances
a live-in relationship will fall within the expression ‘relationship in the nature of
marriage’ under Section 2(f) of the DV Act:

• Duration of period of relationship: They should have cohabited together for a

reasonable period of time.
• Shared Household.
• Pooling of resources and financial arrangements: Supporting each other, or any
one of them, financially, sharing bank accounts, acquiring immovable properties
in joint names or in the name of the woman, long term investments in business,

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shares in separate and joint names, so as to have a long-standing relationship, may

be a guiding factor.
• Domestic Arrangement: Entrusting the responsibility, especially on the woman to
run the home, do the household activities like cleaning, cooking, maintaining or
upkeeping the house, etc. is an indication of a relationship in the nature of
marriage.
• Sexual Relationship: Marriage like relationship refers to sexual relationship, not
just for pleasure, but for emotional and intimate relationship, for procreation of
children,
• Children: Having children is a strong indication of a relationship in the nature of
marriage
• Socialization in public: Holding out to public as husband and wife.
• Intent and conduct of parties: Common intention of parties as to what their
relationship is to be

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ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

53. M.C Mehta v. Union of India & Ors. 1986 SCR (1) 312

Facts

M.C. Mehta, a social activist lawyer, submitted before the Supreme Court a writ
petition seeking an order for closure and relocation of the Shriram Caustic Chlorine
and Sulphuric Acid Plant to an area where no real danger to the people’s health and
security will exist. Pending disposal of the petition, the Supreme Court allowed the
plant to restart its capacity and work. On 4 and 6 December 1985, Oleum gas leaked
from one of its units during the pending lawsuit, causing substantial harm to local
residents as a result of the plant’s gas leakage. A lawyer who practiced in the Tis
Hazari Court also died as a result of oleum gas inhalation.

The people had hardly recovered from the shock of this tragedy when, within two
days, another leakage occurred, though this time a minor one, due to the escape of
oleum gas from a pipe’s joints, after which the claims for compensation were filed, for
the people who had suffered damage as a result of Oleum Gas escape, by the Delhi
Legal Aid & Advice Board and the Delhi Bar Association. The Delhi administrations
issued an order dated 6th December 1985 requiring Shriram to cease the occupation of
manufacturing and processing of dangerous and lethal chemicals and gasses,
including chlorine, Oleum, Super Chlorine, phosphate, etc. at their facility in Delhi
and to remove such chemicals and gasses from the facility within 7 days and to refrain
from storing them in the same place again or to appear in the District Magistrate Court
on 17 December 1985, to show cause as to why this order should not be enforced.

The Supreme Court held that the case should be referred to a larger bench because the
questions raised involve substantial law issues relating to the interpretation of Articles
21 and 32 of the Constitution. In order to assess whether a writ in conjunction with
compensation could be awarded, the court had to interpret Article 32. In relation to
the private companies Article 21, which establishes the right to protect life and
freedom, was also to be interpreted as being essential in the public interest.

Issues

• Whether these harmful industries should be permitted to operate in these areas?

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• Whether a regulating mechanism should be established if they are permitted to

function in such areas?
• How should the liability and amount of compensation be determined in such
cases?
• How does Article 32 of the Constitution extend in these cases?
• Whether the rule of Absolute Liability or Ryland v Fletcher is to be followed?
• Whether ‘Shriram’ could be considered to be a ‘State’ within the ambit of Article
12?

Judgment

The court held that the proposal to eliminate toxic and hazardous factories could not
be followed because they still contribute to improving the quality of life. Industries
must, therefore, be established even if they are harmful as they are necessary to
economic and social development. The court said that the risk or danger factor
towards the public can only be hoped to be reduced by taking all the measures
required to position these industries in an environment where the public is least
vulnerable and the safety requirements are maximized in such industries. It was also
noted that permanent factory closure would result in the unemployment of 4,000
workers in the caustic soda factory and which would add to the social poverty
problem. Consequently, the court ordered that the factory be opened temporarily
under 11 conditions and appointed a committee of experts to control the activity of
the industry.

The court also stated that in the event of a threat to fundamental rights, the power
under Article 32 was not limited to only preventive actions, but was also applicable to
remedial acts where rights are already being violated as observed in the case of
Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India. Furthermore, in cases where a fundamental
right violation was gross and affects large-scale people or people who are
disadvantaged and backward, the court has held that it has the power to offer
remedial relief.

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54. RLEK, Dehradun vs. State of Uttar Pradesh AIR 1987 SC 2187

Facts

In Mussoorie hill range of Himalayas, the activity of quarrying was being carried out.
Limestone was extracted by blasting out the hills with dynamite. This also resulted in
cave-ins and slumping because the mines dug deep into the hillsides, which is an
illegal practice per se.

Due to lack of vegetation, many landslides occurred which killed villagers and
destroyed their homes, cattle and agricultural lands. In 1961, mining was prohibited
in the state by the state minister of mines. However, quarry operations reopened the
mining operations by successfully lobbying with the chief Minister of the state under
which they got mining leases for 20 years. This led to corrupt and illegal practices and
still there was no enforcement of safety rules.

In 1982, eighteen leases came up for renewal, which were rejected by the State on
account of the ecological destruction. However, an injunction was granted by the
Allahabad High Court which allowed the applicants to continue mining, giving the
reason that economic benefits outweighed ecological factors.

In 1983, the Rural Litigation and Entitlement Kendra sent a letter of complaint to the
Supreme Court which was against environmental degradation. The Court treated the
letter as a writ petition under article 32. More than 100 mines joined this and the
litigation became complex. The Supreme Court conducted a review of the need for
mining operations and provided for funding and administrative oversight of
reforestation of the region.

Issues

Determining the scope of the powers and functions of administrative agencies and in
striking a balance between the environment and development.

Judgment

During the course of the litigation, in 1986, Parliament enacted the Environment
Protection Act. After this, the Valley was designated as an ecologically fragile area
under the Environment Protection Act. The Supreme Court concluded that mining in
reserved forests in the Dehradun valley violated the Forest Conservation Act.
However, the Forest Conservation Act only prohibits non-forest activities on forest

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lands that do not have the approval of the Central Government. In addition to
ecological integrity and national interests, the Supreme Court was also concerned
with the welfare of mine operators and laborers left unemployed by closure of the
Dehradun Valley operations. The Court issued the following directions:

• Orders that mine lessees whose operations were terminated by the court would be
given priority for leases in new areas open to limestone mining.
• Orders that the Eco-Task Force of the central department of Environment reclaim
and reforest the area damaged by mining and that the workers displaced by mine
closure be given priority for jobs with the Eco-Task Force operations in the region.

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55. Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action vs. Union of India AIR 1999 SC 1502

Facts

Bichhri is a small village located in Udaipur district of Rajasthan. Northern part of this
village is captive with the chemical industrial plants like Hindustan Zinc Limited and
many other. In the year 1987 when the fourth respondent that is Hindustan Agro
Chemicals Limited started producing concentrated form of sulphuric acid what is
known as Oleum along with the single super phosphate which is hazardous for the
people living in that particular area. Afterwards another respondent Tata Silver
Chemicals also started with the production of “h” acid give me the same complex.
Acid h was produced for the export transactions.

Along with this Jyoti chemical is another complex established which particularly
produces acids ‘H’ besides many other chemicals. Many Other industries were setup
to produce fertilizers and other chemicals which is directly or indirectly creates
pollution.

These all created the production of toxic effluents in that particular area which is not
properly treated by the industries. Be it water, be it air and everything which comes
into the contact of these industries were being poisoned.

According to the report submitted, there were about 2500 tons of highly toxic sludge
was produced and on the other hand 375 tons of H acid were being thrown into the
open field of village area without being treated properly. These toxic chemicals
released out polluted the ground and polluted the water at ground level. Over the
time, all the wells and other streams turned black and polluted by these toxic
chemicals. The water in the wells used for drinking, irrigation and cattle feeding etc.

Pollution that was created from the toxic chemicals also result into various of diseases,
disasters economics death in the village area and in the nearby areas.

As a result, the villagers took an action and rose up a virtual revolt imposition of
Section 144 of CPC by the District Magistrate of that area for the closure of these
industries.

Issues

• Whether industry which are engaged in production of hazardous chemicals taken

some measures to safeguard the environment?

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• Whether the respondent is liable to pay the amount necessary to carry out the
appropriate remedial action?

Judgment

The court applied the polluter pays principle and declared that industry must deposit
the amount as directed by this Court with compound interest. The court directed the
industry to pay Rs. 37,385,000 INR (USD 608,628) along with compound interest @
12% per annum from April 11, 1997 till the amount is paid or recovered. The applicant
industry was also directed to pay costs of Rs.1,000,000 INR (USD 16,280) in both the
Interlocutory Applications for the litigation was kept alive for almost 15 years and
enormous court’s time had been wasted for all these years.

The court applied the principle of polluters pay principle that means according to the
court if the activity carried on is hazardous in nature, then the pollutant carrying such
activity is liable to make good the loss caused to any other individual irrespective of
the fact that whether he took reasonable precautions or not while performing his
activity.

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56. M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India AIR 1988 SCR (2) 538

Facts

Ganga is a trans-boundary river of Asia flowing through India and Bangladesh. It is

one of the most sacred rivers to the Hindus and a lifeline to a billion Indians who live
along its course. One of the most populated cities along its course is Kanpur. This city
has a population of approx. 29.2 lakhs (2.9 million). At this juncture of its course Ganga
receives large amounts of toxic waste from the city´s domestic and industrial sectors,
particularly the leather tanneries of Kanpur.

In 1985, M.C. Mehta filed a writ petition in the nature of mandamus to prevent these
leather tanneries from disposing off domestic and industrial waste and effluents in
the Ganga River. The court bifurcated the petition into two parts as Mehta I and Mehta
II.

Judgment

Mehta I

The court held that despite several preventive provisions in the Water (Prevention
and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Environment Protection Act, no effective
measures were taken by the Government to prevent public nuisance caused by the
tanneries.

The Court ordered the tanneries to establish primary treatment plants if not Secondary
treatment plants. That is the minimum which the tanneries should do in the
circumstances of the case

The court further stated that the financial capacity of the tanneries should be
considered as irrelevant while requiring them to establish primary treatment plants.
Just like an industry which cannot pay minimum wages to its workers cannot be
allowed to exist a tannery which cannot set up a primary treatment plant cannot be
permitted to continue to be in existence for the adverse effect on the public at large
which is likely to ensue by the discharging of the trade effluents from the tannery to
the river Ganga would be immense and it will outweigh any inconvenience that may
be caused to the management and the labour employed by it on account of its closure.

Mehta II

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The Court issued certain directions such as:

• It directed the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika to take appropriate action under the
provisions of the Adhiniyam for the prevention of water pollution in the river and
to either shift diaries to any other place outside the city or dispose waste outside
the city area.
• It also directed the Kanpur Nagar Mahapalika to increase the size of sewers in the
labour colonies and increase the number of public latrines and urinals for the use
of poor people.
• The court further directed that any new applications for licenses to establish new
industries made in future shall be refused unless adequate provision has been
made for the treatment of trade effluents flowing out of the factories.

The court also placed emphasis on Article 52 A (g) which imposes a fundamental duty
of protecting and improving the natural environment.

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57. Vellore Citizen Welfare Forum Vs Union of India AIR 1996 SC 2715

Facts

The petitioner filed a public interest litigation under Article 32 of the Indian
Constitution against the large-scale pollution caused to the River Palar due to the
discharge of untreated and unaltered effluents by the tanneries and other industries
in the state of Tamil Nadu. The water of River Palar was the main source of drinking
water and household activities of the surrounding people.

Then the Tamil Nadu Agricultural University Research Centre, Vellore found that the
nearly 35,000 hectares of agricultural lands had become either wholly or partially
unsuitable for the cultivation.

Issues

Whether the tanneries should be allowed to continue to operate at the cost of lives of
lakhs of people

Judgment

The Supreme Court after examining the reports delivered its judgement making all
efforts to maintain a harmony between the environment and development. The Court
admitted the fact that tanneries in India are the major foreign exchange earner and
also provides employment to several thousands of people. But at the same time, it also
observed that they destroyed the environment and posed a health hazard to everyone.

The Court directed all the tanneries to deposit a sum of Rs. 10,000 as fine in the office
of collector as fine. The Court further said that the State of Tamil Nadu to award Mr.
M. C. Mehta with a sum of Rs. 50,000 as appreciation towards his efforts for the
protection of the environment. The Court in this case also emphasized on the
constitution of Green Benches in India dealing specifically with the matters relating to
the environment protection and also for speedy disposal of environmental case.

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58. MC Mehta v. Union of India 1991 SCR (1) 866

Facts

A PIL was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution by a practicing advocate who is
the Chairman of the Environment Protection Cell working at Delhi and prayed the
court to issue guidelines for shutting down of unsafe ventures situated in the thickly
populated zones of Delhi and for guideline of air pollution brought about via
automobiles working in the region as additionally the thermal units creating power
for the Delhi Electric Supply Undertaking. (DESU)

The apex Court recognized that the issue of environmental pollution is world-wide.
The result of effluence is not limited by the administrative borders of a nation or a
state. Its consequence is extensive and effect not only human lives but also the flora
and fauna.

Judgment

The court while keeping pending the writ petition passed an interim order saying:

• The assimilation of environment protection guidelines as a duty of the State in the

DPSP’s furthermore, the directions in Article 51-A to the residents of India as a
part of fundamental duties indicate the Constitutional recognition of significance
of safe environment for both plant and animal lives.
• Rules and regulations alone can’t help in re-establishing a uniformity in the
biospheric disorder, and nor will the funds be of much help in improving
environmental condition. The condition requires an observation and innovative
preparation.
• Every individual using a vehicle ought to have a fair information on the harmful
impact on the lives of people and flora and fauna. Until that is done in a compelling
way the fitting attitude would not be created and mutual aid for reducing
pollution would not develop.
• A Committee was established by the court to oversee the issue of vehicular
pollution in Delhi and for developing ways and means of resolution of this issue.
• A retired Judge of the court was to go about as Chairman, the petitioner and the
Chairman of the Central Pollution Control Board and the individual speaking to
the Association of Indian Automobiles Manufacturers could be the individuals

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from the Board. The Committee would likewise have the ability to co-select experts
not surpassing three for its effective working from time to time. The Joint Secretary
in the Ministry of Condition and Forests will be the Convenor-Secretary of the
Committee.
• The Committee will be set up with effect from 18th March, 1991, under an
applicable Notice of the Union Government.
• The Committee will deliver a report to the Court once in two months with respect
to the means taken in the matter. The Union Government and the Delhi
Administration are coordinated to successfully collaborate with the Committee for
its effective activity.

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59. MC Mehta V. Kamal Nath (1997) 1 SCC 388

Facts

A private company, Span Motels Private Ltd. had floated an ambitious project called
Span Club. Kamal Nath who was the Minister of Environment and Forests had direct
links with this company. The company encroached upon 27.12 bigas of land which
also included forest land. The land was regularized and subsequently leased out to
the company on 11th April 1994.

This encroachment had an impact on the course of river Beas. For more than 5 months
the Span Resorts management moved bulldozers and earth movers to turn the course
of the river for the second time. In September, 1993, these activities by the company
caused floods in the river and a property worth Rs. 105 Crores was destroyed.

Issue

• Whether the court has wrongly inducted Mr. Kama Nath as a Respondent in the
present petition?
• Whether the construction activity carried out by the Motel Company justified?

Judgment

The court established the public trust doctrine as part of the law of the land and
quashed the lease-deed by which forested land was leased to the Motel Company and
held that the construction activity carried out by the Motel Company was not justified.

The Motel was ordered to pay compensation by way of cost for the restitution of the
environment and ecology of the area. The Motel was ordered to construct a boundary
wall at a distance of not more than 4 meters for the building of the motel beyond which
they were not allowed to use the land of the river basin.

The Court also restricted the Motel from discharging untreated effluent into the river.
Himachal Pradesh Pollution Control Board was directed to inspect and keep a check
on the same.

The doctrine of public trust so established by the court provides the means for
increasing the effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment Laws and makes it
a duty of the state to protect the ecological resources of the country.

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60. MC Mehta v. Union of India 1987 AIR 1086

Facts

Taj Trapezium refers to an area of 10,400 sq. km. trapezium shaped area around Taj
Mahal covering five districts in the region of Agra. Taj Mahal is one of the most
popular and beautiful monuments of the world. Taj is one of the best examples of the
Mughal architecture in India. It was declared as a UNESCO World Heritage Site in
1983. In 1984, M.C. Mehta, a public interest lawyer visited Taj Mahal. He saw that the
monument’s marble had turned yellow and was pitted as a result of pollutants from
nearby industries. This compelled Mehta to file this petition before the Supreme Court

Issues

To issue directions to the concerned authorities to take immediate steps to stop air
pollution in the area and save The Taj.

Judgment

The court observed that the Taj Mahal was moving towards its destruction and
damage and observed that such damage was not only by the traditional causes but
there were other various socio and economic factors. Expert authorities submitted
various reports by stating the air pollutants generated from industries have harmful
effect on the marble of Taj Mahal and was also affecting the people living in the Taj
trapezium zone. The pollution in TTZ has to be reduced.

The court ordered that, the industries which are not in the position to obtain gas
connections shall stop its functioning with the aid of coke/coal in TTZ and they may
have to relocate themselves and held that the applications for the grant of gas
connections will be finalized by the Gas Authority of India Limited (GAIL).

The court further stated that 292 Industries shall change over the natural gas as an
industrial fuel and gave certain rights and benefits to the workmen employed in these
292 Industries and held that the workmen shall continue of employment at the new
town and place where the industry is shifted. The period between the closure of the
industry in Agra and its restart at the place of relocation shall be treated as active
employment and the workmen shall be paid.

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61. TN Godavarman v. Union of India & Ors. AIR 1997 SC 1228

Facts

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad filed a writ petition with the Supreme Court of India
to protect the Nilgiris forest land from deforestation by illegal timber operations. In
view of the great significance of the points involved in these matters, relating to the
protection and conservation of the forests throughout the country, the Court formed
the opinion that the matters required a further in-depth hearing to examine all the
aspects relating to the National Forest Policy. However, it considered that certain
interim directions were necessary in respect of some aspects, to oversee the
enforcement of forest laws across the nation.

Issues

• Whether the new interpretation of Section 2 of the Forest Conservation Act and
forest land is violative?
• Whether the usage of timber for commercial purposes is justified?
Judgment

The court emphasized that the word 'forest' must be understood according to its
dictionary meaning of the term irrespective of the nature of ownership and
classification thereof. According to this new broader definition, any forest thus
defined, regardless of ownership, would be subject to Section 2 of the FCA. Section 2
of the Act specifies that no state government or other authority may allow the use of
any forest land for any non-forestry purpose without prior approval from the central
government. Under the new interpretation of forest land under section 2 of the FCA,
states could no longer de-reserve protected forests for commercial or industrial (non-
forestry) use without permission.

The court issues the following directions:

• All forest activities throughout the country, without the specific approval of the
Central Government must cease forthwith. Therefore, running of saw mills,
plywood mills and mining are all non-forest purposes and they cannot carry on
with the Central approval;
• The felling of all trees in all forest is to remain suspended except in accordance
with the working plan approved by the Central Government;
• Complete ban on the movement of cut trees and timber from any seven north
eastern states of the country either by rail, road or water ways. The Indian railways
and state governments were directed to take all measures necessary to ensure strict

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compliance of this directions. Railways were asked to shift immediate to concert

tracks than to using wooden sleepers. Defense establishments were also asked to
find alternatives to consumption of wood-based products;
• A High-Power Committee was to be constituted to oversee the implementation of
the judgment and to guide the Court in making further orders, especially in the
North East. The Committee was directed to prepare an inventory of timber and
timber products lying in the forest, transport depots and mills in the region. The
HPC was empowered to permit the use or sale of timber products if it considered
appropriate through the State Forest Corporation.;
• Licenses given to all wood-based industries shall stand suspended;
• An action plan shall be prepared by the Principal Chief Conservator of Forest for
intensive patrolling and other necessary protective measures to be undertaken in
identified vulnerable areas and quarterly report shall be submitted to the Central
Government for approval.

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62. Samit Mehta v. Union of India and Ors. (MANU/GT/0150/2016)

Facts

On 12.08.2011 a ship (M.V. Rak Carrier) carrying more than 60054 metric tons of coal
and also containing 290 tons of fuel oil and 50 tons of diesel sank approximately 20
nautical miles from the coast of South Mumbai due to water ingression in ballast
tanks, which has happened due to technical faults. The coal was for Adani Enterprises
Limited shipped by Delta Group International. The marine oil spill over the sea has
caused environmental damage to the aquatic life and thus caused marine pollution.
Adani enterprises has taken no action to control the pollution caused by the spillage
whatsoever. So, Indian Coastguard stepped in and made measures to control the
damage caused and as a result significant amount of costs were incurred by the Indian
Government. A petition was filed before the National Green Tribunal by Samir Mehta,
an environmentalist.

Issues

• Whether the NGT Tribunal has jurisdiction to try this case, as the incident
happened around 20 nautical miles from the coast of Mumbai, which is beyond
the territorial waters of India that extends only up to 12 nautical miles?
• Whether the Tribunal has power to grant compensation in lieu of lawful exercise
undertaken by the Government of India (Indian Coast Guard)?
• On whom the liability should be fixed?
• Whether sinking amounted to dumping?

Judgment

The Tribunal held that it has jurisdiction to entertain the case because India’s
sovereignty over the natural resources extended up to contiguous zone and exclusive
economic zone under Maritime Zones Act, 1976 and under this Act, the Central
Government had exclusive jurisdiction to preserve and protect maritime environment
in the said zones and in order to achieve this purpose, the tribunal has jurisdiction to
deal with matters relating to maritime pollution in exclusive economic zones.

The Tribunal has further held that it has power to grant compensation for the costs
incurred by the Central Government to clean the wrecks which may posed hazards to
navigation and to marine environment and directed respondents number 5, 7 & 11

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(Delta Group International) to pay environmental compensation/damages to the tune

of Rs. 100 Crores to the Ministry of Shipping for causing marine pollution.

The Tribunal with reference to whom the liability should be fixed held that according
to Section 71 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1958 even though a person is not an owner
of ship but he is beneficially interested other than by way of mortgage he is liable to
pay pecuniary damages and held Adani enterprises to pay damages up to a tune of 5
crore rupees to Ministry of Shipping.

The respondents have failed to discharge their obligation and are, therefore, liable
under the Precautionary Principle and also liable to pay compensation to the
Government of India for the pollution caused. The Court thereby reaffirmed the
Precautionary Principle and Polluter Pays Principle and also recognized Right to clean
environment as a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India
which guarantees protection of life and personal liberty.

The Tribunal held that the ship sinking accident is said to have led to the pollution of
the marine environment on three counts

(a) Dumping of the cargo on the ship

(b) Release of the Fuel oil stored on board and the resultant oil spill caused by it, and

(c) wreckage of the ship itself, which contained the materials.

Therefore, in the present case, sinking of the ship is held equivalent to dumping.

Thus, the Tribunal has finally awarded compensation to the tune of 100 crores to the
Delta Group and 5 crores to the Adani Enterprises to be paid to the Ministry of
Shipping under Government of India.

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CONTRACT LAW

63. Balfour v. Balfour (1919) 2 KB 571

Facts

Mr. Balfour was a civil engineer and lived with his wife, Mrs. Balfour in Ceylon (Sri
Lanka). During Mr. Balfour’s leave, they both went to England. On this vacation, Mrs.
Balfour developed rheumatoid arthritis and the Dr. advised her to stay in England, so
Mr. Balfour returned back to Ceylon and promised her to send her an amount of 30
for the probable expenses of maintenance until he returns. He did send the amount
for some time, but afterwards the differences arose between them, resulting in their
separation and he stopped making the payments. Later on, Mrs. Balfour sued him to
keep up with the monthly 30 payments.

Issue:

Was the contract between Mr. & Mrs. Balfour valid in nature?

Judgment

The court recognized that certain forms of agreements does not form contract. An
agreement between a husband and wife is such a form of agreement. In such
agreements, one party is given a certain sum of money on a daily, weekly or monthly
basis. However, these agreements do not form contract because legal obligations were
not intended.

Thus, here the husband’s promise did not give rise to a legal contract.

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64. Mohoribibi v. Dharmodas Ghose 30 IA 114

The case of Mohori Bibee v. Dharmodas Ghose ILR (1903) 30 Cal 539 (PC) is one the
landmark cases in the contract law where the question of consideration was whether
the contract made by a minor would be void or voidable. The ambiguity arose because
section 10 provided that the parties must be competent to contract and section 11
provided that if minor is incompetent to contract, but none provided that whether if
a contract was made by the minor was void or voidable.

Facts

Mohori Bibee was a minor and also an owner of the immovable property. His mother
was appointed as his legal custodian by the Calcutta High Court. Mohori Bibee
mortgaged his property in favor of one Brahmo Dutta and at the time of the mortgage,
was a minor. He secured the mortgage deed for Rs. 20000 at 12% interest. When his
mother got to know about the mortgage, she brought a legal action the Brahmo Dutta
claiming that the mortgage so executed by his son, who was a minor at that time, is
void and improper. During the proceedings, the appellant died and the appeal was
indicted by his executors.

Issue

The issue before the court was whether the mortgage between the plaintiff and the
defendant was voidable or void and that whether the defendant was liable to return
the amount of loan which he had received by the mortgage of property.

Judgment

The trial court in the case held that the mortgage deed between the plaintiff and the
defendant was void as it was executed by a person who was a minor and therefore,
not competent enough to contract.

Consequently, an appeal was filed against the said judgment in the Calcutta High
Court where the court reaffirmed the trial courts judgment and dismissed the appeal.

On appeal to the Privy Council, it held that there cannot exist any contract between a
minor and a major and hence the appeal was dismissed.

Principle Laid Down

A contract made by a minor is void ab initio.

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65. Lalman Shukla v. Gauri Dutt (1913) 11 All LJ 489

Facts

Gauri Dutt’s nephew had absconded and was nowhere to be found. After this, she
sent all her servants in search of missing nephew. The Plaintiff, Lalman Shukla was
one of the servants who went in search of the missing nephew. The Plaintiff found
him and brought back to the Defendant.

When the Plaintiff left for Haridwar from Kanpur in search of the nephew, he was
handed some money for his railway fare and other expenses and the Defendant
announced a reward of Rs. 501 for whosoever found Dutt’s nephew. The Plaintiff
wasn’t aware of any such announcement.

After 6 months of the said incident, the Defendant removed the Plaintiff from work.
Thereafter, the plaintiff claimed for the reward for tracing down the Defendant’s
nephew. The Defendant denied to pay any such remuneration, as a result, Lalman
Shukla filed a case against Gauri Dutt, for not rewarding as he was entitled.

Issues

• Whether the act of Plaintiff be termed as a valid acceptance of the offer made by
the Defendant?
• Is this a valid contract?
• Whether the Plaintiff was entitled to get the reward from the Defendant?

Judgment

The Allahabad High Court decided on the case. The court held that for creating or
entering into a valid contract there has to be knowledge and assent to the offeree made
by the proposer. Simply, for the acceptance of an offer, knowledge of offer is essential.
In the present case, the Plaintiff wasn’t aware of the reward before performing the
task, and only came to know about it later on.

Hence, there was no contract between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. The Plaintiff
was not entitled to claim any reward from the Defendant.

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66. Carlill v. Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. (1893) 1 QB 256

Facts

The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. made a product called “snow ball” and claimed it to be
a cure for influenza and other diseases. The Company published advertisements in a
number newspapers claiming that they would pay 100 to anyone who got sick with
influenza after using that product according to the instructions provided with it.

Mrs. Louisa Elizabeth Carlill saw the advertisement, bought one of the snow ball and
used it as per the instructions provided with it, but she still caught the flu. She claimed
100 from the Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. as per the advertisement. They ignored her two
requests and on third request they replied that if it is used properly the company has
complete confidence in their product’s efficiency and would need the Plaintiff to come
to their office to use the ball each day and be checked by the secretary.

Mrs. Carlill sued the Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. The Plaintiff argued that the
advertisement and her reliance was a contract between the company and Mrs. Carlill,
so the company ought to pay, whereas the company argued that it wasn’t a serious
contract.

Issue

• Whether there was any binding effect of the contract between the parties?
• Whether the contract in question required a formal notification of acceptance?

Judgment:

The Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. Lost its argument and it was held that there was a fully
binding contract for 100 between the company and Mrs. Carlill. The reasons given by
the three judges (Lord Justice Lindley, Lord) were -

That the advertisement was not a unilateral offer to the whole world, but an offer
restricted to those who acted upon the terms contained in the advertisement,

That satisfying the conditions for using the snow ball constituted the acceptance of the
offer. That purchasing or merely using the snow ball constituted good consideration,
because it was a distinct detriment incurred at the behest of the company and more
people buying snow balls by relying on the advertisement was a clear benefit to the
company,

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That the company’s claim in the advertisement that 1000 was deposited at the Alliance
Bank showed the serious intention to be legally bound.

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67. Donoghue v. Stevenson (1932) AC 562

Facts

On the evening of 26th August, 1928, May Donoghue (the Plaintiff) went to the
Wellmeadow Cafe. A friend, who was with her, ordered Scotsman Ice cream float, a
mixture of ice cream and ginger beer, for her. Francis Minchella, the owner of the Cafe,
brought over a tumbler of ice cream and poured ginger beer on it from a brown and
opaque bottle labelled D. Stevenson, Glen Lane, Paisley.” The Plaintiff then drank
some of the contents of the tumbler. However, when her friend poured the remaining
ginger beer into the tumbler, a decomposed snail also floated out of the bottle.
Donoghue complained of abdominal pain, was required to consult a Dr. and was also
admitted in a hospital for emergency treatment.

The ginger beer had been manufactured by David Stevenson (the Defendant).

Donoghue commenced the proceedings against the manufacturers. She, not being a
party to contract, wasn’t able to claim through breach of warranty of contract. This is
based on the principle of Privity to Contract - Only the parties to the contract can sue
each other and not the third party.

Issue

Did the Defendant owe a duty of care towards the Plaintiff in absence contractual
relationship between them?

Whether Privity to Contract is essential for a consumer to sue a manufacturer?

Judgment

In the House of Lords, Lord Atkin arose to deliver a judgment which established that
the manufacturer of a product owed a duty of care to its customers. “A manufacturer
of products, which he sells in such a form as to show that he intends them to reach the
ultimate consumer in the form in which they left it, with no reasonable possibility of
intermediate examination and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable care
in the preparation of the product will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or
property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.”

The principle of Privity of contract was held to be not applicable in an action for tort
in this case. The “Neighbour Principle” was developed in the present case to establish
when a duty of care might arise.

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68. Hadley vs Baxendale 1854 EWHC J70

Facts

The Plaintiffs, Mr. Hadley & others, operated a mill and worked together in a
partnership. They were forced to shut down when the crank shaft of their steam
engine broke. They contacted the manufacturer of the engine, W. Joyce & Co., who
agreed to make a new shaft using the pattern of the old one.

Hadley contracted with the Defendants, Baxendale &others, who were operating
together as common carriers under the name Pickford & Co., to deliver the crankshaft
to the engineers to repair by a certain date at a cost.

But Baxendale failed to deliver on the decided date causing Hadley to lose business.
As a result, the Plaintiff sued the Defendant for the profits he lost due to his late
delivery and the jury awarded the Plaintiff damages. the Defendant appealed,
contending that he didn’t know that the Plaintiff would suffer any particular damages
due to late delivery.

Issue

Whether a Defendant in case of breach of contract could be held liable for damages
that the Defendant wasn’t aware would be incurred from breach of the contract.

Judgment

The court declined to allow Hadley to recover lost profits, holding that Baxendale
could be held liable only for the losses that were foreseeable. However, if the special
circumstances, under which the contract was actually made on communication
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant, and thus known to both parties, about the
damages resulting out from the breach of the contract, would be amount of injury
which would ordinarily follow from a breach of contract under these circumstances
so known and communicated between the parties.

It follows, therefore, that the loss of profits here cannot reasonably be considered such
a consequence of the breach of contract because the Plaintiff never communicated the
special circumstances to the Defendant.

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69. Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain v Boots Cash Chemists (Southern) Ltd.
(1953) 1 QB 401

Facts

Boots Cash Chemist instituted a new way for its customers to buy certain medicines.
Shoppers could now pick drugs off the shelves in the chemist and buy them by paying
for them at the till. Before then, all the medicines were stored behind a counter
meaning a shop employee would get what was requested.

The Pharmaceutical Society of Great Britain objected and argued that under the
Pharmacy and Poisons Act, 1933, this is an unlawful practice. The society argued that
display of goods was an offer and when a shopper selected and put the drugs into
their shopping basket, that was an acceptance, the point when the sale is affected. As
no pharmacist had supervised the transaction at this point, Boots was in the breach of
the act. Whereas, Boots argued that the sale was affected only at the tills.

Issue

Whether the contract of sale was concluded when the customer selected the product
from the shelves, or when the items were paid for? At what stage of a purchase in a
self-service store, is there an acceptance of offer?

Judgment

The court held that the Defendant was not in breach of the act, as the contract was
completed on payment under the supervision of the pharmacist. The display of the
goods on the shelves were not an offer which was accepted when the customer
selected the item, rather the proper construction was that the customer made an offer
to the cashier upon arriving at the tilt, which was accepted when the payment was
taken. This analysis was supported by the fact that the customer would have been free
to return any of the items to the shelves before a payment had been made.

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70. Chappell & Co. Ltd. v. Nestle Co. Ltd. (1960) AC 8

Facts

The Defendants, Nestle, contracted with a company manufacturing gramophone

records to buy several recordings of music.

The Plaintiff, Chappell & Co., held the copyright in these recordings. The Defendant
offered to sell these recordings at a discount price to anyone presenting their wrappers
of their chocolate bars.

The wrappers themselves were worthless and were only thrown by the Defendant.
The Plaintiff sought an injunction restraining the manufacture and sale of the records
as they breached the copyright.

Issue

Whether the wrappers were consideration for the sale of records or were they merely
a qualification for buying the records?

Judgment

The House of Lords held that the wrappers did form a part of the consideration for
the sale of records despite the fact that they had no intrinsic economic value in
themselves. Lord Reid said that, “The consideration has two parts: The buying of the
chocolate bars for the wrappers and the payment of money. Clearly, both are of value
to the Nestle.”

A contracting party can stipulate what consideration he chooses. Therefore, those

wrappers though don’t have any monetary value, and the Lords found in favour of
the Defendants.

The court held that the consideration to a contract must be sufficient but need not to
be adequate. So, the consideration can be anything, need not to be restricted to money.

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71. Harvey v Facey (1893) AC 552

Facts

Harvey (the Plaintiff) was interested in buying a Jamaican property owned by Mr. LM
Facey (the Defendant). He sent Facey a telegram stating - “Will you sell us your
Bumper Hall Pen? Telegraph lowest cash price - answer paid.” “Lowest price for
Bumper Hall Pen £900.”, Facey responded. To which, Harvey responded that, “ We
agree to buy Bumper Hall Pen for the sum of £900 as asked by you. Please send us the
title deed in order we can get an early possession.” Facey, however refused to sell.

The Plaintiff sued stating that the telegram was an offer and he had accepted, as a
result, there was a binding contract.

Issue

Whether the telegram stating the £900 as the lowest price was an offer capable of
acceptance?

Judgment

The Privy Council stated that no contract existed between the two parties. The first
telegram was simply a request for information, so at no stage any definite offer was
made by the Defendant that could be accepted by the Plaintiff.

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72. Kedarnath Bhattacharji vs Gorie Mahomed (1887) ILR 14 Cal 64

Facts

The Plaintiff was a Municipal Commissioner of Howrah and one of the trustees of the
Howrah Town Hall Fund. Sometime ago, it was thought to build a Town Hall in
Howrah, they gave the necessary resources that could be raised, and provided that
things existed, people were intrigued to work to perceive what subscriptions they
could obtain.

After gaining enough subscriptions to support the funds required to build the Town
Hall, the commissioners, including the Plaintiff made an agreement with the
Defendant to build the Town Hall.

The plans for building were submitted and passed, but as the subscription list
increased, the plans also expanded. The original cost which was intended to be Rs.
26,000 increased to Rs. 40,000. the new increased amount of Rs. 40,000 stayed
approved and obligated by the commissioners, including the Plaintiff.

The Defendant made a subscription to pay Rs. 100 for the construction. However, he
refused to pay the amount.

The Plaintiff commenced an action t claim the amount.

Issue

• Whether the suit initiated by the Plaintiff maintainable?

• Whether the Defendant is liable to pay the amount?

Judgment

In an ordinary situation, if anybody puts his name for subscription for a charitable
object, it cannot be recovered, as there is no consideration.

However, in this particular case, persons subscribing knew the purpose for which the
money was applied and were also aware that on the account of their subscription, the
Plaintiff entered into the contract. The court considered this as a valid contract with
consideration.

The court held that even if the Defendant does not benefit from the promise he made
for charitable purposes, he is liable to pay the amount because he made a promise.

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73. Brodgen v Metropolitan Railway Co. (1877) 2 AC 666

Facts

Mr. Brodgen, the chief in a partnership of three, had supplied the Metropolitan
Railway Company with coals for a number of years. There was no written contract
between the Plaintiff and the Defendant. Mr. Brodgen, then suggested that a formal
contract should be created between them for coal supply for longer term. Agents from
each sides met and negotiated. The Railway Company made a draft contract and sent
it to the Mr. Brodgen, to review. Mr. Brodgen made some amendments to the draft
and wrote approved at the end. He then sent the amended document back to the
Railway Company. Metropolitan’s agent filed the documents and did nothing more.
For a while, both parties acted according to the agreement document’s terms. But on
a dispute, Mr. Brodgen argued that there had been no formal contract actually
established.

Issue

When the dispute arose, whether there was a contract between the Plaintiff and the
Defendant and if the written agreement they had was valid?

Judgment

The House of Lords held that the contract had arisen by conduct and Brodgen had
been in clear breach, so he must be liable. A mere mental assent to the agreement’s
terms would not have been enough, but having acted on the terms made it so. The
word “approved” on the document with Brodgen’s name was binding on all the
partners, since he was the chief partner.

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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

74. Ram Jawaya Kapoor v. State of Punjab 1955 SC 549

Facts

Before 1950, the recognized schools in Punjab only used those books which were
prescribed by the Education Department of Punjab. In 1950, post partition, the State
Government of Punjab embarked on the policy of nationalizing textbooks. The
Government prepared and published textbooks on few subjects without inviting them
from publishers or authors.

In 1952, another notification was passed whereby the authors of the books were
supposed to transfer the copyrights of the book to the State Government in place of
5% royalty on the sale of the textbook trough a contract. Thus, the publishing, printing
and selling of the textbooks were now exclusively with the State Government.

Petition was filed under Article 32 of the Constitution against the notification of State
Government passed in 1952, stating that an executive body could not engage in any
trade or business activity without any law being enacted for that purpose and that the
Petitioners were ousted from their business because of the restrictions placed by the
Government and therefore, their fundamental right of carrying any trade or commerce
as per the Article 19(1)(g) was violated.

Issues

• Whether there was violation of Fundamental Rights of the Petitioners?

• Whether executive could function without any law for that purpose?

Judgment

The court noted that in India, there was no strict separation of powers. The court relied
on the case of Motilal v. Government of Uttar Pradesh to conclude that in order to
enable the executive to function, there is no need for a specific law to be in existence
and the function of executive is not merely restricted to implementing such laws.

With respect to the question of violation of fundamental rights, the court held that the
action of government was not in violation of the fundamental rights of the Petitioners
as the Government by the said notice may have restricted the book used in schools
but still these publishers and authors were free to approach the private book shops
for business. Therefore, the court held that the notification did not infringe any
fundamental right of the publishers.

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75. A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India 1969 (2) SCC 262

Facts

In 1966, a service called the Indian Forest Service was constituted, the selection for
which was to be made from among the officers serving in the Forest Department of
the State. The selection board was to be headed by the Chief Conservator of the Forest
of the State while the final selections were to be made by the Union Public Service
Commission (UPSC).

In the state of J&K, Naquishbund was appointed as the acting Chief Conservator of
forest and was also a member of the selection board for recommending the names of
the officers for All India Forest Service. He was appointed to the said post by
overlooking the seniority of three officers: Basu, Baig and Kaul. They had filed
petitions against their supersession to the higher authorities. In the meantime, when
the selection board for recommending the names of the officers for All India Forest
Service was formed, Naquishbund came to appointed as its ex-officio Chairman. The
Board recommended the names of the persons including Naquishbund, but excluding
the other three officers who had been superseded.

The recommendations of the board were submitted to the UPSC, on the basis of which,
the impugned list was published and Naquishbund name was placed at the top of the
list of selected officers.

Naquishbund was also one of the candidates seeking to be selected to All India Forest
Service. Though, he did not sit in the selection board at the time when his name was
considered for selection but he did sit in the board and participated in its deliberations
when the names of Basu, Baig and Kaul were considered for selection and was also
involved while preparing the list of selected candidates in order of preference.

Aggrieved, the Gazetted Officers Association, J&K along with the interested parties
brought a Petition challenging the selections notified in the impugned notification as
violating Articles 14 & 16 of the Constitution and that the selections were made in
contravention of the Principles of Natural Justice.

Issues

• Whether Natural Justice could be applied to the administrative function as well?

• Whether the member of Selection Committee can be a candidate for selection?

Judgment

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The Supreme Court held that selections made by the Selection Committee were in
violation of the Principles of Natural Justice because there was a likelihood of a bias
decision for the mere presence of the candidate on the Selection Board.

The court held that though the action of making selection for government services is
administrative, yet the selection committee is under a duty to act judicially. The
dividing line between an administrative power and a quasi-judicial power is very thin
and being obliterated.

The court held that the basic principle of “nemo judex in causa sua” was being violated
by appointing Naquishbund as a member of the Selection Board. Though, he did not
participate in deliberations of the board when his name was being considered, yet the
very fact that he was a member of the Selection Board had a significant impact on the
decisions of the board. Also, he participated in deliberations when the claims of his
rivals were considered. He was also present when the list of selected candidates in
order of preference was being made.

The court made it clear that impartiality in adjudication is required not only in the
judicial decisions, but also in administrative matters. The Principles of Natural Justice
would apply on the administrative functions also and struck down the selection
process on the ground of violation of Principles of Natural Justice.

The selection made by the Selection Committee were held in violation of the Principles
of Natural Justice.

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76. Ramana Dayaram Shetty V. The International Airport Authority AIR 1979 SC
1628

Facts

The International Airport Authority issued a notice for inviting Registered Class II
hotelier having at least 5 years of experience for putting up and running a restaurant
and two snacks bar at Bombay Airport for a period of 3 years. Six tenders were
received in the response of the notice. Out of the six received tenders, the tender of
only the 4th respondent was entertained as it was complete and offered the highest
amount of license fee. All other tenders were rejected because they were incomplete.
The first respondent got prepared everything for the purpose of running the
restaurant and snack bars. But, since the 4th respondent did not satisfy the description
of the Class II hotelier having a 5 years-experience as stated in the tender notice, the
first respondent in addition to this called upon the evidence by the 4th respondent
proving that they are not the Class II hoteliers. A letter was made by the 4th respondent
in response to the evidence stating they had considerable 10 years of experience in
catering to reputed commercial houses, training centre, banks and factories which
appeared that they did not satisfy the criteria of Class II restaurant of 5-year
experience as stated in the tender notice. Satisfied with the information given by the
fourth respondents, the first respondent accepted their tender on the terms and
conditions set out in its letter. But the 1st respondent was unable to handover the
possession of sites because A.S Irani was already running his restaurant and snack bar
under the previous contract.

Thus, Irani filed a Civil Suit in the Civil Court of Bombay against the respondents by
challenging the decision of the 1st respondent to accept the tender of the fourth
respondent. K.S Irani obtained an ad interim injunction against the respondents, but
after hearing to the respondents, the court dismissed the notice. He filed an appeal in
the High Court which was also dismissed. Later on, Ramana Dayaram Shetty who
didn’t submit any tender, was just a mere stranger but still filed a Writ Petition in the
High Court of Bombay by challenging their decision of accepting the tender of the 4th
respondent.

Issues

• What is the meaning of “Registered Class II hoteliers”?

• Whether the acceptance of the tender of the 4th respondent by the 1st respondent
was invalid?
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Judgment

The court held that the aspect of grading is given by the Bombay Municipal
Corporation only to the hotels or restaurants but not to Class II grade hotelier and the
requirement which is given in the notice that the tender must be a registered Class II
grade hotelier was therefore, a meaningless requirement and could be regarded as
laying down any condition of eligibility. The court held that there is no statutory or
administrative law requiring the 1st respondent to give a contract only by tenders, they
could have given the contract directly to the 4th respondent because it was clearly
mentioned in the contract that there is no obligation on the 1st respondent to accept all
the tenders.

The court held that the petitioner had no locus standi to maintain the petition. The
power of accepting the tender is in the hands of the International Airport Authority
and it was also given in the notice and the writ petition was dismissed by the court.

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77. Asif Hameed v. J&K AIR 1989 SC 1899

Facts

The selection to the MBBS/BDS course for the session 1988-89 in the two government
medical colleges of Jammu & Kashmir has been set aside in a bunch of writ petitions
by a Division Bench of Jammu & Kashmir High Court on the following grounds that
the same was not held in accordance with the directions of the said court given in an
earlier case Jyotshana Sharma v. State of Jammu & Kashmir and it was not held by the
competent authority as constituted by the order of the High Court dated October 17,
1988. Under the said order, competent authority was to consist of three persons.
According to the High Court all the three persons never met and all of them never
scrutinized the cases of the candidates who appeared in the entrance examination and
viva voce and as such the selection was invalid. The State of Jammu & Kashmir and
the selected candidates challenged the above judgment of the High Court in these
appeals.

Issue

Does the High Court have the power to issue directions to the State Government to
constitute ‘statutory body’ for making admissions?

Judgment

It was held by the supreme court that:

• Although the doctrine of separation of powers has not been recognized under the
Constitution in its absolute rigidity, the Constitution makers have meticulously
defined the functions of various organs of the State. Legislature, executive and
judiciary have to function within their own spheres demarcated under the
Constitution.
• Judiciary has no power over sword or the purse nonetheless it has power to ensure
that the aforesaid two main organs of State function within the constitutional
limits.
• When a state action is challenged, the function of the court is to examine the action
in accordance with law and to determine whether the legislature or the executive
has acted within the powers and functions assigned under the Constitution and if
not, the court must strike down the action.
• The Constitution does not permit the court to direct or advise the executive in
matters of policy or to sermonize qua any matter which under the Constitution lies

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within the sphere of legislature or executive, provided these authorities do not

transgress their constitutional limits or statutory powers.

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78. State of MP & Anr. v. Bharat Singh AIR 1967 SC 1170

Facts

State of Madhya Pradesh had issued an order in exercise of powers conferred by s. 3

of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act, 1959 directing the respondent Thakur
Bharat Singh

• that he shall not be in any place in the Raipur district;

• that he shall reside in the municipal limits of Jhabua town, district Jhabua, Madhya
Pradesh, and shall proceed there, immediately on the receipt of this order; and
• that he shall notify his movements and report himself personally every day at 8
a.m. and 8 p.m. to the Police Station Officer, Jhabua.
The respondent moved a petition in the High Court of Madhya Pradesh under Arts.
226 & 227 of the Constitution challenging the order on the grounds, inter alia, that Ss.
3 & 6 and other provisions of the Act which authorized imposition of restrictions on
movements and actions of person were ultra vires in that they infringed the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1) (d) & (e) of the Constitution of
India and that the order was discriminatory, illegal and violated principles of natural
justice. The High court held clause (i) to be valid and clauses (ii) and (iii) to be invalid.
In appeal to the division bench, the court held the clauses (i) and (iii) to be valid, but
clauses (ii) to be invalid and an appeal was preferred against the said judgment in the
Supreme court.

Issue

Whether the decision of the High court holding clauses (i) and (iii) to be invalid is
correct?

Judgment

The court held that the State or its officers cannot in exercise of their executive
authority infringe the rights of the citizens merely because the Legislature of the State
has the power to legislate in regard to the subject on which the executive order is
issued. The court held that the order made by the State in exercise of the authority
conferred by s. 3(1)(b) of the Madhya Pradesh Public Security Act was invalid and for
the acts done to the prejudice of the respondent after the declaration of emergency
under Art. 352 no immunity from the process of the Court could be claimed under
Art. 358 of the Constitution, since the Order was not supported by any valid
legislation and the petition was dismissed accordingly.

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79. In Re: Delhi Laws Act AIR 1951 SC 332

Facts

The three sections referred to in the three questions are all in respect of what is
described as the delegation of legislative power and the three particular Acts are
selected to raise the question in respect of the three main stages in the constitutional
development of India. The first covers the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature
during the period prior to the Government of India Act, 1915. The second is in respect
of its legislative power after the Government of India Act, 1935, as amended by the
Indian Independence Act of 1947. The last is in respect of the power of the Indian
Parliament under the present Constitution of 1950. It is therefore necessary to have an
idea of the legislative powers of the Indian Legislature during those three periods.

Issues

• Was section 7 of the Delhi Laws Act, 1912, or any of the provisions thereof and in
what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Legislature which
passed the said Act?
• Was the Ajmer Merwara (Extension of Laws) Act, 1947, or any of the provisions
thereof and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the
Legislature which passed the said Act?
• Is section 2 of the Part C States (Laws) Act, 1950, or any of the provisions thereof
and in what particular or particulars or to what extent ultra vires the Parliament?

Judgment

The supreme court was of the view that:

• Separation of power was not a part of the Constitution.

• Indian Parliament was never considered as an agent of anybody. Therefore, the
doctrine of delegates non potest delegare is not applicable.
• Parliament cannot completely abdicate itself by creating a parallel authority.
• Only ancillary functions can be delegated.
• There is a limitation on the delegation of power. Legislature cannot delegate its
essential functions.

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80. Rajnarain Singh v. Chairman Patna Administrative Committee AIR 1954 SC 569

Facts

The appellant is the Secretary of the Rate Payers Association at Patna. He and the other
members of his Association reside in an area which was originally outside the
municipal limits of Patna and was not liable to municipal and cognate taxation. On
18th April, 1951, this area was brought within municipal limits and was subjected to
municipal taxation. This was accomplished by a notification of that date. By reason of
this the appellant and the others whom he represents were called upon to pay taxes
for the period 1st April, 1951, to 31st March, 1952. The notifications were issued under
sections 3(1)(f) and 5 of the Patna Administration Act of 1915 (Bihar and Orissa Act I
of 1915). The appellant claims that the notifications are delegated legislation and so
are bad and prays that sections 3(1)(f) and 5 of the Act which permitted this delegation
be condemned as ultra vires.

Issues

Whether the notification issued under section 3 (1) (f) and 5 of the Patna
Administration Act amounts to delegated legislation and can be condemned as ultra
vires?

Judgment

The court held that the Act provided that no municipality competent to tax shall be
thrust upon a locality without giving its inhabitants a chance of being heard and of
being given an opportunity to object. Sections 4, 5 and 6 afford a statutory guarantee
to that effect. Therefore, the Local Government is under a statutory duty imposed by
the Act in mandatory terms to listen to the objections and take them into consideration
before reaching a decision. In our opinion, this is matter of policy, a policy imposed
by the Legislature and embodied in sections 4, 5, and 6 of the Act and an executive
tear up this guarantee in disregard of the mandate. But the court held that:

• section 3(1)(f) is intra vires provided always that the words "restriction" and
"modification" are used in the restricted sense set out above; and
• that the notification of 23rd April, 1951, is ultra vires.

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81. Dwarka Prasad Laxmi Narain v. State of UP 1954 AIR 224

Facts

The Petitioners had a business of selling coal in the city of Kanpur. District Magistrate
and the District Supply Officer for the city of Kanpur who are the Respondents in the
present case, have from time to time, and through directives tried to impose
restrictions of various kinds on the sale and deposit of coal in the city. On 14 February
1953, they fixed the price of coal at such a price that is left only a 20 percent profit
margin for the coal retailers. On 22 May 1953, the said executive order was challenged
by the Petitioners before the Vacation Judge of the High Court of the grounds of being
violative of their Fundamental Rights. The learned Judge granted a stay on the
executive order on the ground that they had no legislative backing.

Subsequently, the state of Uttar Pradesh promulgated by notification and order titled
The Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order 1953 which in a way gave legislative backing
to the aforesaid executive order. Thereupon on 16 July 1953, the respondent again
issued a declaration fixing the price of coal exactly at the same price as they were set
before. Thereafter on 3 October 1953, the Area Ration Officer Kanpur, through a letter,
accused the petitioner of committing various irregularities in connection with coal
depot, and subsequently, on 13 October 1953, the District Magistrate canceled the
license of the petitioners based on those accusations. The present writ petition before
this court challenges the constitutional validity of the coal control order and the
cancellation of the license of the Petitioner.

Issue

• Whether ‘The Uttar Pradesh Coal Control Order 1953’ is violative of Article 14 and
Article 19[1](g) of the Constitution of India?
• Whether the act of canceling of the Petitioner’s license by the District Magistrate of
Kanpur is valid?

Judgement

The Court held that although the state legislature of Uttar Pradesh was competent to
make the said order but the same had to stand the test of Part III of the Indian

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Constitution. If the Order does not satisfy this test the same will be liable to be struck
down.

The court further held that although the power to grant and issue license has to be
delegated to some executive authority, but his discretion should be regulated by some
reasonable procedure to be provided by the said order. If the said discretion is left to
be exercised by the authority without laying down any proper procedure, it is bound
to suffer from the vice of personal biases, zeal or animosity which would be violative
of Article 14.

The Court held that Clause 3(1) of ‘the Order’ gave unrestricted power to the State
Controller. The court held this to be violative of Article 14 as well as Article 19(1)(g)
of the Constitution.

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82. Mohapatra vs. State of Orissa AIR 1984 SC 1572

This case of J. Mohapatra & Co. vs State of Orissa (1984) 4 SCC 103 is a landmark
administrative law matter wherein the Court discussed the principle of Natural Justice
and held that Justice not only should be done but seen to be done.

Facts

In the present case there was a public interest litigation wherein selection of books for
educational institutions by members of the Assessment Sub-Committee, being
themselves the authors whose books were submitted to the sub-committee for
selection, was challenged by a publisher before the High Court of Orissa. The High
Court dismissed the said petition and petitioner approached the Supreme Court
under civil appeal.

Issue

Whether or not the possibility of bias in a case would be considered as actual bias?

Decision

Justice should not only be done but should manifestly be seen to be done. Justice can
never be seen to be done if a man acts as a judge in his own cause or is himself
interested in its outcome. The principle nemo judex in causa sua, that is, no man shall
be a judge in his own cause, is firmly established and is applicable not only to judicial
proceedings but also to quasi-judicial and administrative proceedings and therefore,
it is required that an author-member should not be a member of any such committee
or sub-committee for selection of books.

Principal Laid down

The possibility of bias in a case would be considered as actual bias.

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83. H.L. Trehan & Ors. Etc. vs Union of India & Ors. AIR 1989 SC 568

In this another landmark case of Administrative Law H.L.Trehan & Ors. vs Union of
India & Ors. (1989) 1 SCC 764, the Supreme Court held that post-decisional
opportunity of hearing does not subserve the rules of Natural Justice.

Facts

In present case through a circular dated 8-3-1978 was issued by the Board of Directors
of Caltex Oil Refinery (India) Ltd., a government company, prejudicially altered the
terms and conditions of service of its employees which has resulted in civil
consequences. The employees of CORIL were not given an opportunity of hearing or
representing their case before the impugned circular was issued by the Board of
Directors.

Issue

Whether post-decisional opportunity of hearing granted by the company would be in

compliance with principles of Natural Justice?

Decision

The post-decisional opportunity of hearing does not subserve the rules of Natural
Justice. Once a decision has been taken, there is a tendency to uphold it and a
representation may not yield any fruitful purpose. The authority who embarks upon
a post-decisional hearing will naturally proceed with a closed mind and there is
hardly any chance of getting a proper consideration of the representation at such post-
decisional opportunity. Thus, even if any hearing was given to the employees of
CORIL after the issuance of impugned circular, that would not be any compliance
with the rules of Natural Justice or avoid the mischief of arbitrariness as contemplated
by Article 14 of the Constitution; Where adverse decision and consequent action
involving civil consequences is taken without affording pre-decisional hearing, the
same would be arbitrary.

Principle Laid Down

Post Decisional hearing is not substantial compliance with Natural Justice.

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TORT LAW

84. Rylands v. Fletcher

Rylands v. Fletcher was the 1868 English case (L.R. 3 H.L. 330) that was the progenitor
of the doctrine of Strict Liability for abnormally dangerous activities and conditions.

Facts

In 1860, Rylands paid contractors to build a reservoir on his land, intending that it
should supply the Ainsworth Mill with water. Rylands played no active role in the
construction. While building it, the contractors discovered a series of old coal shafts
and passages under the land filled loosely with soil and debris, which joined up with
Thomas Fletcher adjoining mine. Rather than blocking the shafts up, the contractors
left them. Shortly, Rylands’ reservoir burst and flooded Fletcher’s mine, causing
damages. Fletcher pumped the water out, but his pump burst and the mine again
began to flood.

At this point, a Mine Inspector was brought in, and the sunken coal shafts were
discovered.

Fletcher brought a claim against Rylands.

Issue

Whether the use of Defendant’s land was unreasonable and thus was he to be held
liable for damages incurred by the Plaintiff?

Judgment

Justice Colin Blackburn on the behalf of the Court of Exchequer Chamber declared the
Rule of Law that the person who for his own purpose brings on his land and collects
and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at his peril,
and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damages which are the
natural consequences of its escape.

Rylands appealed.

Lord Cairns, speaking on the behalf of the House of Lords, stated their agreement on
the rule stated by Justice Blackburn, just added a further limitation on liability, that
the land from which the escape occurs must have been modified in a way which
would be considered unnatural, unusual or inappropriate.
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85. Ashby v. White

Facts

Mr. Matthew Ashby, a cobbler turned up to cast his vote for the British Parliament in
December 1701. But was prohibited from voting in the election by a constable, Mr.
William White on the grounds that, “He was not a settled inhabitant and had never
contributed either to the church or poor.” In spite of this, his candidate won the
elections and no harm was caused to him. But Ashby sued the constable for substantial
damages.

At that time, the case attracted great public attention and discussions in the
Parliament.

Issue

The question, in this case, was whether one party may seek damages if one of its civil
rights is violated by the action of another party without any damages being caused?

Judgment

Court held that the vote tendered by the Plaintiff was in the favour of the winning
candidate. Thus, there is no actual damage caused to the Plaintiff but his legal right of
voting was violated by the Defendant. By disallowing a qualified voter to vote was a
civil wrong and hence the Plaintiff had the right to remedy in the Court of Law.

The doctrine of Injuria Sine Damnum prevailed and the compensation was offered to
the Plaintiff.

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86. Gloucester Grammar School case

The celebrated English case of “Gloucester Grammar School” raised a question that
when there is no violation of legal rights but the damages are caused to someone then
how justice is served by the court of law?

Facts

The Defendant was the teacher, who was earlier teaching in Gloucester Grammar
School, had some dispute at the school and he left the school and opened his own
school and even reduced the fees from 40 pence (Gloucester Grammar School fees) to
12 pence. Due to the fame of the defendant in Gloucester Grammar School, the
students left the school and joined the new school. Thus, leading to loss in the business
of Plaintiff. After this, the employees of Gloucester Grammar School sued the
Defendant and demanded for damages against the monetary loss caused due to him
by opening school in that area.

Issues

• Was the Defendant responsible for the loss/damages suffered by the Plaintiff?
• Did the opening of new school damage the rights of the Plaintiff?

Judgment

The court held that the Defendant who opened the rival school would not be held
liable for paying any damages to the Plaintiff. It was true that there is a financial loss
to the Plaintiff but the Defendant has a right to start any legal business and have a fair
competition. Hence, the act of Defendant had not violated any legal rights of the
Plaintiff, so no legal action can be taken against the Defendant. Thus, the Plaintiff
suffered loss, even then he had no remedy as none of his legal rights were violated.

This case covered the essentials of Damnum Sine Injuria, when there is damage but
no infringement of legal rights and thus exempting the Plaintiff from paying any
damages for an act which wasn’t legally wrong.

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87. Hall v. Brooklands Auto Racing Club

Facts

There was a motorcar racing track owned by the members of Brooklands Racing Club
(the Defendant). the track was oval in shape with a long, straight stretch, which was
over 100 feet wide and bounded on its outer side by a cement kerb 6 inches in height,
beyond which a strip of grass 4 feet and 5 inches in width enclosed within an iron
railing of 4 feet and 6 inches in height.

Spectators were admitted on payment to view the races. Stands were provided for the
spectators to view races with safety.

One day, two competing cars on the track got involved in a collision, as a result one
of the cars flung into the air, over the kerb and railing, hitting a group of spectators,
thereby killing two of them and injuring others.

The Defendant was sued for Negligence by Mr. Hall (the Plaintiff), alleging that the
premises had not been made adequately safe for spectators.

Issue

Was the Defendant guilty for Negligence due to which injury was caused to the
Plaintiff?

Judgment

It was the duty of Defendant to see that the track was free from any reasonable danger,
but they were under no duty to guard against risks that weren’t reasonably
foreseeable. As, no such accident of such nature had taken place previously, the
Defendant was under no duty of guard against the risk that was not reasonably
foreseeable. The Plaintiff impliedly took the risk of such injury by purchasing the
tickets for the race. The Defendant was not held liable to provide for the damages of
the injured Plaintiff as he has impliedly consented to the risk involved in watching the
race.

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88. Bhim Singh v. State of J&K

Facts

On the midnight of 9th & 10th September, 1985, Mr. Bhim Singh, an MLA of J&K, was
arrested and detained in the Police custody, as a result he was unable to attend an
important session of the Legislative Assembly which took place on 11th September,
1985. there was also a voting session at the Assembly in which he wasn’t able to vote
due to arrest and his vote was crucial, by the person to whom he wanted to vote won.
He was arrested on the allegations that a case was registered against him under section
153A of the Ranbir Penal Code for delivering an agitating speech at a public gathering
held on 8th September, 1985. He was taken before the Magistrate on 13th September,
1985.

Since the whereabouts of Mr. Bhim Singh was not known to his family, a writ of
Habeas Corpus was filed before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether the detention made here was illegal and fit for claims for Wrongful
Confinement?

Judgment

The Supreme Court observed that the police officers who made the arrest abused their
power and further added that, “If the MLA’s liberty is going to be hampered in such
a way, one does not know what will happen to the lesser mortals in the country.”
Court expressed that whenever a complaint from a person comes for illegal detention
in the police custody has been done by the police personal where their constitutional
rights are invaded, in such situations, the invasion cannot be washed away by just
setting him free, thus in such cases, the court have the jurisdiction to compensate the
victim by awarding compensation through monetary means.

In the present case, the landmark judgment of Supreme Court impacted the Tort Law
in India, defendant was held liable and the court directed the State of J&K to award
Mr. Bhim Singh a sum of Rs. 50,000 within two months for his illegal detention and
false imprisonment.

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89. Donoghue v. Stevenson

Donoghue v. Stevenson, also known as ‘the snail in the bottle case’ was a landmark
court decision in English Tort Law by the House of Lords. It laid the foundation of the
modern law of Negligence, establishing general principles of the duty of care.

Facts

On the evening of 26th August, 1928, May Donoghue (the Plaintiff) went to the Well
meadow Cafe. A friend, who was with her, ordered Scotsman Ice cream float, a
mixture of ice cream and ginger beer, for her. Francis Minchella, the owner of the Cafe,
brought over a tumbler of ice cream and poured ginger beer on it from a brown and
opaque bottle labelled D. Stevenson, Glen Lane, Paisley.” The Plaintiff then drank
some of the contents of the tumbler. However, when her friend poured the remaining
ginger beer into the tumbler, a decomposed snail also floated out of the bottle.
Donoghue complained of abdominal pain, was required to consult a Dr. and was also
admitted in a hospital for emergency treatment. The ginger beer had been
manufactured by David Stevenson (the Defendant).

Donoghue commenced the proceedings against the manufacturers. She, not being a
party to contract, wasn’t able to claim through breach of warranty of contract.

This is based on the principle of Privity to Contract - Only the parties to the contract
can sue each other and not the third party.

Issue

Did the Defendant owe a duty of care towards the Plaintiff in absence contractual
relationship between them?

Judgment

In the House of Lords, Lord Atkins arose to deliver a judgment which established that
the manufacturer of a product owed a duty of care to its customers. “A manufacturer
of products, which he sells in such a form as to to show that he intends them to reach
the ultimate consumer in the form in which they left it, with no reasonable possibility
of intermediate examination and with the knowledge that the absence of reasonable
care in the preparation of the product will result in an injury to the consumer’s life or
property, owes a duty to the consumer to take that reasonable care.”

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The “Neighbor Principle” was developed in the present case to establish when a duty
of care might arise.

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90. Nicholas v. Marsland

Facts

There was an ornamental pool on the Defendant’s land. The pool contained various
safeguards to prevent flooding and allowing excess water to drain away naturally.
However, after an unusual heavy rainfall, all these safeguards were overwhelmed,
causing the water in the pool to flood out onto the Plaintiff’s land and causing
damages.

The Plaintiff sued the Defendant for Negligence.

Issue

Whether the Defendant was responsible for the damages caused due to heavy rainfall?

Judgment:

The Defendant was not held liable for the damages caused by the flooding because it
was unreasonably foreseeable. The exceptionally heavy rainfall was a sufficient
excuse as an Act of God to escape liability under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher. Act
of God is not same as an inevitable accident or the absence of negligence. The
Defendant could not have anticipated the flood.

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91. Hardy v. Motor Insurers’ Bureau

Facts

The Plaintiff was a security officer at a large metal works, sought to question the driver
of a van bearing stolen goods and asking the driver to pull in. While the Plaintiff was
holding onto the open van door with his head inside, the driver drove off at the speed,
dragging him along the road for some distance and causing bodily injuries. The
Plaintiff injured by an uninsured driver, sued the Motor Insurers’ Bureau under the
Motor Insurers’ Bureau Agreement. The Defendant denied liability on the ground that
they weren’t liable to the Plaintiff because this was a deliberate act that was not
required to be covered by the policy of insurance u/s 203 of the Road Traffic Act, 1960.

Issue

Whether the insurance pursuant to the Road Traffic Act, 1960 would provide valid
cover for the benefit of party injured by the deliberate criminal conduct on the part of
the driver?

Judgment

The court held that “No person can claim indemnity or reparation for his own wilful
and culpable crime. He is under a disability precluding him from imposing a claim.”
However, the policy of insurance must cover any liability which may be incurred by
him arising out of the use of the vehicle by him.

Therefore, this was the liability which the culpable motorist was required to cover.

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92. Booker v. Wenborn

Facts

The Defendant, after boarded the train, forgot to close the door which was opened
from outside. The Plaintiff, a porter, who was standing at the edge of the platform got
hit by the opened door and got injuries.

Issue

Whether the Defendant was liable for injuries caused to the Plaintiff?

Judgment

The Defendant was held liable as he owed certain duty of care to the person standing
near the platform. One must take reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions which can
be reasonably foreseen to injure your neighbor.

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93. Kasturilal Ralia Ram Jain v. State of U.P.

Facts

A partner of Kasturilal Raila Ram, went to Meerut for selling gold and silver
ornaments. However, he was taken into custody by police constable at Meerut on the
suspicion of possessing stolen property. He and the gold and silver ornaments
recovered from him were kept in police custody. After some time, he was released
and the silver ornaments seized from him were also returned. But, the gold ornaments
were not returned because the Head Constable misappropriated the ornaments and
fled to Pakistan.

The police officer had failed to follow the regulations of UP Police in taking care of the
gold ornaments.

Issue

Whether the police officer was guilty of negligence in taking care of the gold seized
from the Plaintiff?

Whether the State was liable to compensate the Plaintiff for the loss caused by the
public servant employed by the State?

Judgment

The Act of Negligence was committed by police officials while dealing with the
property which they had seized in the exercise of their statutory powers. Now, the
power to arrest and to seize are the powers conferred by statute and the powers which
can be characterized as Sovereign powers.

The Supreme Court held that the State is not liable on the view that the tort was
committed by the police officers in the exercise of the delegated sovereign powers.

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94. M/s Rural Transport Service v. Belzum Bibi & others

Facts

The conductor of an overcrowded bus invited the passengers to travel on the roof of
the bus. The driver forgot the fact that there were passengers on the roof of the bus
and tried to overtake a cart. As he swerved the bus on the right, a passenger sitting on
the roof was hit by the branch of a tree, as a result he fell down and received severe
injuries and died.

Issue

• Whether the driver & conductor were negligent towards the passengers?
• Who would be held liable?

Judgment

Both the driver and the conductor were negligent towards the passengers. There was
contributory negligence on the part of the passengers, including the one deceased,
who took the risk of travelling on the roof of the bus.

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FAMILY LAW

95. Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India AIR 1995 SC 1531

This Supreme Court case laid down the principles against the practice of solemnizing
second marriage by conversion to Islam, with first marriage not being dissolved.

Facts

In this case, there were two Petitioners, Sarla Mudgal and Meena Mathur. The second
Petitioner was married to Jitendar Mathur. In 1988, Meena Mathur found that Jitendar
converted to Islam and solemnized second marriage with Sunita Narula, also known
Fathima. Meena Mathur complained that her husband converted only for the purpose
of getting married again.

Issues

• Whether a Hindu husband married under Hindu laws is allowed to embrace Islam
and solemnize second marriage?
• Whether the husband can be charged u/s 494 of IPC?

Judgment

The court held that in marriages under Hindu Law the parties acquire certain rights,
and if one of the spouses converts to another religion and enforce it, it would destroy
the rights of the other spouse violating the rules of justice, equity, and good
conscience. Considering the plurality of laws and interest of both the communities the
court stated that it is not the intention of the enlightened Muslim community to
encourage Hindu husbands to convert to Islam only for the purpose of legitimizing
their second marriage. Therefore, they concluded that the Hindu husband married
under Hindu Law cannot solemnize second marriage by embracing Islam.

To answer the question of validity of second marriage, the court stated that the
marriage can only be dissolved by decree of divorce obtained on any of the ground
enumerated in Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act, and a marriage which
contravenes any of the conditions specified in clause (I), (iv), and (v) of S. 5 is void.
i.e., the marriage performed when the spouse is living is void.

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A divorced person can marry again on dissolution of marriage by decree of divorce

and there is no right to appeal against such decree if the time to appeal is over.

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96. Mohamad Ahmed Khan v Shah Bano Begum 1985 AIR 945

This case is commonly referred as the Shah Bano case, was a controversial
maintenance lawsuit in India, in which the Supreme Court delivered a judgment
favoring maintenance given to an aggrieved divorce Muslim woman.

Facts

In 1932, Shah Bano, a Muslim woman, was married to Mohammed Ahmad Khan, a
well-known advocate in Indore and they had five children from their marriage. After
14 years of their marriage, Mr. Khan took a younger woman as second wife. And after
living for years with both wives, he divorced Shah Bano, aged 62 years.

In April 1978, Mr. Khan even stopped sending her money monthly. Shah Bano, having
no means to support herself and her children, filed a criminal suit against her husband
asking for maintenance amount of Rs. 500 per month for herself and her children.

In November 1978, Mr. Khan gave Shah Bano an irrevocable talaq (divorce) and took
up the defense that as she has ceased to be his wife and therefore, he was under no
obligation to provide maintenance to her.

Issue

Whether the Defendant was under obligation to provide maintenance to the Plaintiff?

Judgment

The Supreme Court concluded that there is no doubt on the question of the Muslim
husband’s obligation to provide maintenance for a divorced wife who is unable to
maintain herself. After referring to Quran, holding it to the greatest authority on the
subject, it held that there was no doubt that the Quran imposes an obligation on the
Muslim husband to make provision for or to provide maintenance to the divorced
wife.

The Supreme Court invoked Section 125 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which
applies to everyone, regardless of caste, creed or religion. It ruled that Shah Bano be
given maintenance money, similar to alimony.

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97. Lily Thomas v. Union of India AIR 2000 SC 1650

Facts

Smt. Sushmita Ghosh filed a writ petition in the Supreme Court stating that she was
married to Shri G.C. Ghosh as per the Hindu rituals. In 1992, Shri G.C. Ghosh asked
the wife to give divorce in mutual consent as he has already taken to Islam so that he
can remarry Ms. Vineeta Gupta. Shri G.C. Ghosh also showed a certificate to her
issued by the office of the Maulana Qari Mohammad Idris, Shahi Qazi certifying that
he had embraced Islam. He insisted her to agree to their divorce or she will have to
put up with the second wife. Shri G.C. Ghosh converted to Islam solely for the purpose
of re-marrying and has no real faith in Islam.

Issue

• Whether Shri G.C. Ghosh can solemnize second marriage by converting to Islam?
• Whether Shri G.C. Ghosh would be held liable for bigamy under section 494 of
IPC?
Judgment

The court held that if a party has a living spouse and he contracted or tries to contract
a second marriage, then such marriage would be held null and void under section 11
of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 and under section 17 of the Act, which deals with the
offence of Bigamy.

A Hindu husband who converts to Islam and contracts the second marriage without
dissolving the first marriage, in such case, the second marriage will be invalid u/s 494
& 495 of IPC.

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98. Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558

In this case, the Supreme Court recommended to the Union of India to consider
bringing amendment in the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable
breakdown of marriage as a ground for divorce.

Facts

Naveen Kohli (the Plaintiff) and Neelu Kohli (the Defendant) were married to each
other and had three sons out of the wedlock. After sometime of marriage, the Plaintiff
and the Defendant started living in a rented house because of bad behaviour of the
Defendant.

The Plaintiff claimed that when he went to Bombay with the Defendant and their sons
to attend the golden jubilee marriage anniversary of his father-in-law, he saw that the
Defendant was in a position of agreement with the person named Biswas Rout, soon
after the Plaintiff started staying separately from the Defendant.

Both the parties made several levelled allegations against each other and from there
this matter was brought to the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether a decree of divorce can be granted in the instant case?

Judgment

The Supreme Court set apart the judgment of the High Court and directed that the
wedding should be dissolved in keeping with the provisions of the Hindu Marriage
Act, 1955. The court directed the Plaintiff to pay Rs. 25,00,000 to the Defendant in the
direction of everlasting protection.

The court proposed the Union of India to noticeably remember to bring a change
within the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 to incorporate irretrievable breakdown of
marriage as a floor for the grant of divorce.

Ratio laid down in the case

Situations causing misery should not be allowed to continue indefinitely.

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99. Velusamy v. D. Patchaiammal (2010) 10 SCC 469

Facts

The appellant herein has alleged that he was married according to the Hindu
Customary Rites with one Lakshmi on 25.6.1980. Out of the wedlock with Lakshmi a
male child was born, who is now studying in an Engineering college at Ooty. The
respondent-D. Patchaiammal filed a petition under Section 125 Cr.P.C in the year 2001
(delay of 12 years) before the Family Court at Coimbatore in which she alleged that
she was married to the appellant herein on 14.9.1986 and he had deserted her.

The learned Family Court Judge held by his judgment dated 5.3.2004 that the
appellant was married to the respondent and not to Lakshmi. These findings have
been upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgment. Lakshmi was not made a
party to the proceedings before the Family Court Judge or before the High Court and
no notice was issued to her hence any declaration about her marital status vis-`- vis
the appellant is wholly null and void as it will be violative of the rules of natural
justice.

Issues

• Whether the Appellant married Lakshmi before his marriage with the
Respondent?
• Whether the maintenance under sec.125 CrPC be granted to the respondent?

Judgment

It was held that the High Court and the learned Family Court Judge erred in law in
holding that the appellant was not married to Lakshmi without even issuing notice to
Lakshmi. Hence this finding has to be set aside and the matter remanded to the Family
Court which may issue notice to Lakshmi and after hearing her give a fresh Finding
in accordance with law. The question whether the appellant was married to the
respondent or not can, of course, be decided only after the aforesaid finding.

There is also no finding in the judgment of the learned Family Court Judge on the
question whether the appellant and respondent had lived together for a reasonably
long period of time in a relationship which was in the nature of marriage. Such
findings were essential to decide this case. Hence the impugned judgment of the High
Court and Family Court Judge, Coimbatore were set aside and remanded the matter

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to the Family Court Judge to decide the matter afresh in accordance with law and in
the light of the observations made above. Appeals allowed.

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100. Seema v. Ashwani Kumar AIR 2006 S.C 1158

Compulsory Registration of Marriages

In this case directions were given to the States and the Union Territories in the matter
of framing necessary statutes regarding compulsory registration of marriages. By
order dated 14.2.2006 (reported in Seema v. Ashwani Kumar (2006 (2) SCC 578)
following directions were given:

• The procedure for registration should be notified by respective States within three
months from today. This can be done by amending the existing rules, if any, or by
framing new rules. However, objections from members of the public shall be
invited before bringing the said rules into force. In this connection, due publicity
shall be given by the States and the matter shall be kept oven for objections for a
period of one month from the date of advertisement inviting objections. On the
expiry of the said period, the States shall issue appropriate notification bringing
the rules into force.
• The officer appointed under the said rules of the States shall be duly authorized to
register the marriages. The age, marital status (unmarried, divorcee) shall be
clearly stated. The consequence of non-registration of marriages or for filing false
declaration shall also be provided for in the said rules. Needless to add that the
object of the said rules shall be to carry out the directions of this Court.
• As and when the Central Government enacts a comprehensive statute, the same
shall be placed before this Court for scrutiny.
• Learned counsel for various States and Union Territories shall ensure that the
directions given herein are carried out immediately.

Subsequently, by order dated 25.10.2007 further directions were given [Seema v.

Ashwani Kumar (2008(1) SCC 180)]. Particular reference was made to the earlier
observations to the effect that marriages of all persons who are citizens of India
belonging to various religions should be compulsorily registered in the respective
States and Union Territories where the marriages have been solemnized.

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