SS-305:

Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Regime
ZEESHAN JAVED
25-10-2023

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NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION
ARRANGEMENTS

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Arrangements
In addition to the traditional MECRs and NPT, there are other treaties and
arrangements that are designed to prevent nuclear non-proliferation
These arrangements work in parallel, or in addition, to the pre-existing
nuclear non-proliferation treaties and MECRs
In addition to nuclear non-proliferation, these arrangements also look at the
curtailing of the Weapons of Mass Destruction.

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Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Arrangements
Fissile
UNSC Comprehensive
Conference on Material
Disarmament
Resolution Nuclear Test
Cutoff Ban Treaty
1540
Treaty

Prevention
Chemical Biological
of Arms IAEA
Weapons Weapons
Race in Safeguards
Convention Convention
Outer Space

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CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT

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 Conference on Disarmament
Established in: 1979
Membership: 65 States
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) was formed in 1979 during the 10th
UNGA Special Session on Disarmament
CD is the successor to the Ten-Nation Committee on Disarmament (1960), the
Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament (1968) and the Conference of the
Committee on Disarmament (1978)

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Conference on Disarmament
The CD is adopts its own rules and agendas, keeping in view the
recommendations made by the UNGA
It reports to the UNGA annually
The CD and its predecessors negotiated multilateral arms treaties such as
the NPT, BTWC, CWC and the CTBT.

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Conference on Disarmament
The CD’s permanent agenda is known as Decalogue and includes the following:
1.Nuclear weapons in all aspects
2.Other weapons of mass destruction
3.Conventional weapons
4.Reduction of military budgets
5.Reduction of armed forces
6.Disarmament and development
7.Disarmament and international security
8.Collateral measures; confidence building measures; effective verification methods in relation to
appropriate disarmament measures, acceptable to all parties
9.Comprehensive program of disarmament leading to general and complete disarmament under effective
international control.
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Conference on Disarmament
The tenth item on the agenda was the focus on Chemical Weapons, which the CD was able to achieve with the passing of
the CWC in 1992.

Due to the ambitious nature of the CD, each year a narrower agenda is adopted. In 2013, the following agenda was
specified:

1. Cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament

2. Prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters

3. Prevention of an arms race in outer space (PAROS)

4. Effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear
weapons

5. New types of weapons of mass destruction and new systems of such weapons; radiological weapons

6. A comprehensive program of disarmament

7. Transparency in armaments

8. Consideration and adoption of the annual report and any other report, as appropriate, to the General Assembly of the
United Nations.
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UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL
RESOLUTION 1540

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UNSC Resolution 1540
Resolution 1540 was passed, unanimously, by the members of the UNSC, on
April 28th, 2004.
Adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

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UNSC Resolution 1540

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UNSC Resolution 1540
Three Primary Obligations:
All States are prohibited from providing any form of support to non-state actors seeking to
acquire weapons of mass destruction, related materials, or their means of delivery.
All States must adopt and enforce laws criminalizing the possession and acquisition of such
items by non-state actors, as well as efforts to assist or finance their acquisition.
All States must adopt and enforce domestic controls over nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons, their means of delivery, and related materials, in order to prevent their
proliferation.

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FISSILE MATERIAL CUTOFF TREATY
(FMCT)

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FMCT has not yet been officially negotiated and signed
The proposal of an FMCT has been raised at the CD numerous times
Focus of the FMCT is to limit or control the amounts of weapons-grade fissile
material stockpiles
As most of the NNWS are already under IAEA safeguards, the FMCT will be
mostly applicable to the P5 and India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
The International Panel on Fissile Material (IPFM) presented a proposal on
the drafting of a FMCT that can monitor and regulate the production of fissile
material globally

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
The proposal argues that the verification mechanism should be handed over to the
IAEA
The proposal also indicates that State Parties would agree not to produce, acquire or
encourage the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear
explosive devices
Each State Party would also agree to disable, decommission and, when feasible,
dismantle its fissile material production facilities
Also calls on States to declare and submit to IAEA monitoring fissile materials in
excess of their military requirements and future excess materials resulting from
future nuclear disarmament measures

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The Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty
FMCT or/and FMT?
The argument is that instead of proposing a cutoff for the existing number of
fissile material, why not impose a materials treaty
An FMT will reduce the existing number of fissile material stockpile and also
limit future production
Pakistan’s case

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COMPREHENSIVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN
TREATY
(CTBT)

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
With the development of nuclear weapons, nuclear tests were being carried
out in vast numbers
These tests were being carried out in the atmosphere, outer space and even
underwater
Between the Trinity test of 1945 and the formation of the Partial Test Ban
Treaty, there were 499 nuclear tests
There was widespread concern regarding these tests and the nuclear fallout
due to the development and testing of thermonuclear weapons.

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
Due to the continuously increasing yield of these nuclear tests, a partial test
ban treaty was proposed in 1963.
The treaty was called, “Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the
Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water” or the Partial Test-Ban Treaty
In September 1996, the treaty, Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
(CTBT) was opened for signatures

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
Under the treaty, the State Parties agree to:

1. Not carry out any nuclear weapon test explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to
prohibit and prevent any such nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control

2. Refrain from causing, encouraging, or in any way participating in the carrying out of any
nuclear test explosion or any other nuclear explosion

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
Under the treat, an organization, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
Organization (CTBTO) was formed

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
However, Article XIV of the CTBT states that the
treaty will enter into force after ratification by 44
states
These states are mentioned in Annex-2 of the
treaty

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Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty
Out of these Annex – 2 states, at least 8 states
have not ratified it yet.

These include, China, India, Pakistan, North Korea,

Israel, Iran, Egypt, and the United States.

In fact, North Korea withdrew from the treaty in

2003 and has openly conducted nuclear tests

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PREVENTION OF ARMS RACE IN OUTER
SPACE
(PAROS)

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Prevention of Arms Race in Outer
Space
PAROS is being currently discussed in CD
The treaty is designed to prohibit the placement of WMDs in space and to curtail the
proliferation of arms in outer space.
Designed to be in tandem with the Outer Space Agreement (1967) and the Moon
Agreement (1984)
However, PAROS has faced strong opposition from the US, which states that it should be
a bilateral discussion with Russia
Technical and scientific advantages in space

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IAEA SAFEGUARDS

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IAEA Safeguards
Through a set of technical measures, or Safeguards, the IAEA verifies that States are
honouring their international legal obligations to use nuclear material and technology
only for peaceful purposes
The objective of IAEA Safeguards is to deter the spread of nuclear weapons by the early
detection of the misuse of nuclear material or technology.
Safeguards are a set of technical measures applied by the IAEA on nuclear material and
activities, through which the Agency seeks to independently verify that nuclear facilities
are not misused and nuclear material not diverted from peaceful uses.

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IAEA Safeguards
Under the NPT’s Article 3, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State is required to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Four main processes of Safeguards:
1. Collection and evaluation of safeguards-relevant information
2. Development of a safeguards approach for a State.
3. Planning, conducting and evaluating safeguards activities
4. Drawing of Safeguards conclusions

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IAEA Safeguards
Under the NPT’s Article 3, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State is required to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Four main processes of Safeguards:
1. Collection and evaluation of safeguards-relevant information
2. Development of a safeguards approach for a State.
3. Planning, conducting and evaluating safeguards activities
4. Drawing of Safeguards conclusions

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IAEA Safeguards
Under the NPT’s Article 3, each Non-Nuclear Weapon State is required to conclude a
safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
Four main processes of Safeguards:
1. Collection and evaluation of safeguards-relevant information
2. Development of a safeguards approach for a State.
3. Planning, conducting and evaluating safeguards activities
4. Drawing of Safeguards conclusions

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IAEA Safeguards
1. Collection and evaluation of safeguards-relevant information:
The IAEA collects, processes and reviews all available safeguards-relevant information about a State to evaluate its
consistency with the State’s declarations about its nuclear program.

2. Development of a safeguards approach for a State:

A safeguards approach for a State includes those safeguards measures to achieve the technical objectives for verifying
the State’s declarations.

3. Planning, conducting and evaluating safeguards activities:

The IAEA develops a plan specifying the safeguards activities to be conducted both in the field and at the Agency’s
headquarters. Once an activity has taken place, the IAEA evaluates the extent to which it has reached the technical
objectives and identifies any inconsistencies that might need to be followed up.

4. Drawing of Safeguards conclusions

The safeguards conclusions drawn by the IAEA are based on its independent verification and findings. They are the final product
of the annual safeguards implementation cycle and provide credible assurances to the international community that States are
abiding by their safeguards obligations.

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QUESTIONS?

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