CROSS Newsletter

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023

Fire performance of
timber cladding

Collapse of folded plate

timber roof at a school

Serious inconsistencies
when installing passive
fire protection

Understanding finite
element analysis for
pile caps

Share knowledge
to help create a
safer built environment
Editorial

Since the last issue of the Newsletter, This really brought the problem to the Contents
you will have no doubt seen the attention of the construction sector.
extensive coverage in the media As a direct consequence of the Alert, Fire performance of 4
on Reinforced Autoclaved Aerated the Institution of Structural Engineers timber cladding
Concrete (RAAC). CROSS played a (IStructE), following CROSS advice, set
Report ID: 1194
significant role in raising the alert up a RAAC study group which led to
on RAAC and helping the industry the publication of their Investigation Collapse of folded plate 8
to prepare. and Assessment guides>, which are timber roof at a school
now being used widely to assess the
The first warning from CROSS (or Report ID: 1160
condition of RAAC planks across the
SCOSS as it was back then) dates back
public and private estate. Serious inconsistencies 11
to 1999 when the Standing Committee
when installing passive
on Structural Safety recommended In many ways, RAAC is a great
fire protection
that owners of buildings with RAAC example of how the sharing of
information can work well. CROSS can Report ID: 1199
roof planks have them inspected.
raise the alert and the Professional
Since then, CROSS has received Understanding finite 14
Engineering Institutions can prepare
multiple reports connected to RAAC. element analysis for
to advise on technical matters. Since
The first of these> was published in pile caps
2019, CROSS has worked with the
2007. In it, a reporter describes their Report ID: 1152
Department for Education, the NHS
experience during the construction of
and the Cabinet Office discussing
a building in the 1970s where a RAAC The stack effect and 17
proposals for how estates can be best
plank failed and fell to the ground. considerations for
investigated to assess if they have
When the reporter investigated smoke control
any RAAC. We’ve also worked with
the failure, they found that the Report ID: 1250
the National Federation of Roofing
reinforcement in the plank did not
Contractors in developing an alert for
extend to the bearing ends; and that Painted faying surfaces 20
their members. There have, to date, leads to connections with
it had failed in shear. After further
been few recorded incidents of RAAC insufficient load capacity
investigation, they condemned 30%
plank collapses in comparison to the
of all the roof planks due to poor Report ID: 896
huge number that are out there, and
manufacturing quality.
luckily there is no record of anybody Provision of water 22
This is interesting, as poor manufacture being injured. However, it is likely, for firefighting
is a significant contributing factor to that we do not have the full story and Report ID: 1204
the current concern regarding RAAC, many planks will have previously been
with reinforcement not necessarily replaced or strengthened. Combination load cases in 23
being located over the critical bearing proprietary software
The situation continues to develop.
supports. cause concern
There have been several incidents
Report ID: 1170
Fast forward to 2018 and the collapse reported this year that led to the
of a RAAC plank at Singlewell Primary Department for Education’s decision
Failure of Firefighters lift 25
School in Kent. It was this event, to close a number of school buildings.
to operate
together with previous CROSS Reports, These closures were immensely
Report ID: 1232
that triggered the release of our Safety worrying to many parents, teachers
Alert on RAAC planks in 2019. and headteachers and disrupted
Fire protection to structure 27
children’s education.
The Safety Alert> was targeted by cavity barriers
at owners of buildings dating CROSS has anecdotal evidence that Report ID: 1231
from the 1960’s to the 1980’s and people were concerned with the
specifically mentioned government degradation of RAAC well before
departments and local authorities the 2018 collapse. Such concerns,
with responsibility for schools or however, did not translate into
similar buildings. It called for RAAC a significant number of reports
planks to be identified, inspected and, submitted prior to 2018.
ultimately, for consideration to be Visit:
This shows the importance of people
given to their replacement. www.cross-safety.org/uk
reporting safety concerns.

Email:
[email protected]

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 2

Editorial

If all the knowledge of RAAC planks So please, if you have seen or More from CROSS
out there had been shared earlier, experienced a fire safety or structural
then perhaps an alert could have been safety issue, submit a report.
CROSS Expert Panel Meeting at
issued earlier?
As the events connected to RAAC have IStructE HQ on 15th November
Each year, CROSS receive more shown, reporting to CROSS can help
reports than the year before. There to raise awareness of an issue. Your CROSS held an in person meeting
has been a growing awareness of report will make a positive difference. of our UK Expert Panels in
us, and a growing trust. This issue of November, our first face-to-face
the newsletter contains a selection meeting since our remit expanded
of our most recent fire and structural Paul Livesey to include fire safety reporting.
Safety Reports, a handful of the Scheme Manager,
Our Expert Panels> are at the
many reports CROSS has received, CROSS
heart of what CROSS does.
reviewed, and published since its
Comprised of leading experts,
creation. However, there is still a long
the volunteer members use
way to go. We depend on industry their expertise to help readers
professionals, people like you, to of CROSS safety information
submit concerns to us. understand what can be learned
from the reports we receive.
The panels aim to identify the
underlying causes of safety
issues and provide references for
relevant publications that can be
accessed and used.

Help to improve safety by

submitting a report CROSS win Collaboration of the
Year award

Reports are the oxygen of our work here at The CROSS team were delighted
to accept the award for
CROSS. Our secure safety reporting system Collaboration of the Year at FIRE
promotes a no blame culture, and all Magazine's Excellence in Fire &
Emergency Awards 2023. The
reports are anonymised and de-identified ceremony was held at One Great
George Street on 1st December.
to ensure confidentiality.
CROSS were finalists in two
other categories - Resilience and
Learning from Major Incidents,
The reporting process is straightforward,
and International Best Practice.
and we encourage anyone with information
to share to submit a report. By sharing
knowledge, you will help to create a safer NCE’s The Engineer’s
Collective Podcast
built environment.
October’s episode of The
Engineers Collective podcast>
featured CROSS Scheme
Manager Paul Livesey in
Find out more >
conversation with NCE Assistant
News Editor, Rob Hakimian.
Listen to hear the two discuss the
history of CROSS as a unique,
confidential reporting scheme, our
expansion into fire safety post-
Grenfell and the input CROSS had
on the RAAC crisis.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 3

Fire performance of timber cladding

Fire performance of timber cladding Structural Safety – Theory &

Practice by Allan Mann

Allan Mann's new book,

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1194
Structural Safety - Theory &
Practice is now available to
buy as a hard copy> and as
an e-book>. It looks at the
This reporter relays a concern that guidance to The Building various reasons behind building
Regulations 2010 regarding the use of timber cladding may failures and the lessons that can
be the result of a misinterpretation. be learned.

This volume represents a

distillation of many years’
extensive experience and as
such will prove of immense
Key Learning Outcomes relevance (and the ideal
Christmas present) for practising
For designers and building control inspectors: civil and structural engineers
and students of these subjects.
• A footnote in a table that forms part of guidance to The Building Designers and other personnel
Regulations 2010 could be based on a misinterpretation of tests done in the construction industry will
and referenced in earlier guidance also find this book of value.
• Decisions to use timber cladding on external walls should be made
considering all available information, not restricted to Approved
Document B
Second Edition of Structural
robustness and disproportionate
collapse in buildings published
10th November

In 2010, the first edition of

R Full Report this guidance provided a
background to the fundamental
Approved Document B> has previously and continues to permit the use of attributes of robustness. This
"timber cladding at least 9 mm thick" in the guidance related to the reaction included an interpretation of,
to fire performance of external walls. The current format of this guidance from and practical guidance to, the
Approved Document B, Vol. 2, states in the footnote of Figure 12.1, "timber regulations being followed in
the UK at the time (primarily
cladding at least 9mm thick is also acceptable".
British Standards), with more
The guidance makes no specific mention of the type or configuration of timber detailed guidance on each of the
cladding, or indeed what may or may not constitute 'timber'. This led the reporter to main materials (insitu concrete,
investigate the origins of the recommendation to garner greater insight into how the precast concrete, steel, timber
guidance should be applied in practice, and its potential bounds of applicability. and masonry).

The reporter is concerned that, given the current and necessary drive to reduce This second edition> builds
the embodied carbon in our buildings, greater use of this piece of guidance will be on the first, to be fully aligned
encountered in the future. It is, therefore, necessary to understand the context in with Eurocodes — with a
which it can apply. particular focus on BS EN 1991-
1-7 and the Building Safety
It is the reporter's understanding, that this element of the guidance comes from the
Act. It contains new chapters
former prescriptive regulations and has been transferred from imperial to metric
on risk, alterations to existing
units, with the relevant extract from The 1965 Building Regulation>, E7 below: buildings, classification of
existing buildings, and considers
lightweight steel frame as a
material distinct from steel.
There is an emphasis on modern
methods of construction (MMC)
and a selection of new worked
examples within each of the
material specific chapters.
Figure 1: Extract from The 1965 Building Regulation, E7

3/8 inch thickness converts to around 9.5mm. The reference to 3/8 inch can also be
found in Fire Research Note 8 (FRN 8, see Reference [1] below for further details),
which sets out the principles embodied in the regulations, with emphasis on the
external wall. Reference is made to the experiments of Ashton and Malhotra in

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 4

Fire performance of timber cladding

Fire Research Note 436 (FRN 436, see Reference [2] below for further details). News Roundup
Specifically, in reference to these experiments, Fire Research Note 8 says that:
In every interval between CROSS
Newsletters, failures of some kind
or incidents related to structural
and fire safety are reported
in the press. Here are some
accompanied by a brief comment:

Figure 2: An extract from Fire Research Note 8

1. Luton Airport Car Park Fire >
Based on eleven large scale experiments with different wall constructions, in FRN
The ability of fires to initiate and
436 Ashton and Malhotra conclude that:
then spread was further illustrated
"… no undue hazard is introduced by use of a combustible cladding of solid timber. by a very significant fire at the
The use of other combustible materials needs separate consideration since they multistorey car park at Luton
introduce undesirable hazards." Airport. Approximately 1,400
vehicles were destroyed and
The statement in FRN 436 is broadly like that in FRN 8, apart from the mention of
the car park itself will have to be
a dimension of 3/8 inch. The reporter has subsequently reviewed the experiments
demolished. The fires appearance
by Ashton and Malhotra to see what timber was tested. The cladding was said to
shows similarities with the fire that
have comprised of 1 inch cedar boarding on top of timber studs, backed by 3/8 inch
devastated the Liverpool Echo
plasterboard.
Arena car park in 2018.
A section is provided below, with the thickness figure differing from the text of the
report, noting the cedarwood to be 7/8 inch in thickness and not 1 inch. CROSS issued a press statement>
the day after the fire and Neil
Gibbins, our Lead Fire Safety
Consultant, and Alastair Soane,
our Principle Consultant, were
interviewed by The Times. The
article is available online behind
a paywall>.

2. Latest on RAAC and the safety

of school buildings>

RAAC continues to be in the news

as more buildings are found
to contain the material and
Figure 3: A section of the report noting thickness of the cedarwood are deemed at risk. There are
now around 240 schools which
An elevation of the cladding is provided below to show the nature require remediation; several
of the assembly that was tested: theatres have been closed and
the roof over Cardiff’s St Davids
Hall is to be replaced.

On 19th November, the House

of Commons Public Accounts
Committee issued a report about
RAAC with a news release title:
Unacceptable and alarming:
Deteriorating school buildings
prompt urgent warnings. The
full report> can be read on the
House of Commons website.

Figure 4: The elevation of cladding

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 5

Fire performance of timber cladding

The timber cladding was of a shiplap In the reporter's opinion, limited 3. Barton House evacuation
type construction, comprising 7/8 inch regard should be given to the 9 in Bristol>
cedar boards, with planks spanning mm recommendation in Approved
vertically, forming an essentially Document B or its reproduction in A large Bristol apartment
continuous and homogeneous other codes and standards. block was evacuated at short
flat surface. notice after 'structural faults'
Whilst there might be no evidence
were discovered. The block is
Upon reviewing the work of Ashton of a potential hazard owing to
65 years old and was home
& Malhotra, the reporter concluded the longstanding nature of the
to around 400 people. It is
that the interpretation (in FRN 8) of recommendation and its potential
understood that the building
FRN 436 was likely incorrect, with the widespread application, the
was constructed in the late
timber thickness (7/8 inch as per the premise upon which the value was
1950s and may be a Large
above figure) mistaken for that of the recommended appears to be incorrect.
Panel Structure (LPS).
plasterboard (3/8 inch).
It would be the reporter's The Building Safety Regulator
This interpretation subsequently recommendation, that greater (BSR) requires that all Higher
entered the regulations in 1965 emphasis is placed on the guidance Risk Buildings (HRBs) are the
and guidance, through Approved relating to reaction to fire classifications subject of Risk Assessments
Document B, thereafter. of external surfaces, i.e., Euroclass which consider potential
standards. In such instances, the dangers from extreme events
This is potentially problematic as any
Euroclass achieved by ‘timber’ such as explosions or fire.
evidence relating to the adequacy
should not be generalised, noting
of timber cladding at largescale was
that the reaction to fire performance There have been several
premised upon a thickness of circa
in apparatus such as the SBI (Single CROSS reports submitted
22 mm, not 9.5 mm. The figure has
Burning Item) rig is not a function of the regarding the condition of older
subsequently been rounded down to 9
material, but a function of a system, reinforced concrete buildings
mm, meaning a difference of around
i.e., with dependencies on the material, but little about HRBs despite
2.3 times that of the timber cladding
the dimensions of components, the concerns that have been
originally tested. Given that the
the configuration of components, expressed about these in the
ignition of timber will be influenced by
substrates, etc. This would help to public domain over many years.
its in-depth heating, it is foreseeable
address both the dimensional error
that this potential error could result in
identified and any ambiguity regarding Data must be collected on the
9 mm timber cladding more readily
what constitutes timber cladding. state of HRBs and information
supporting vertical fire spread than
shared for the public good.
was originally observed or intended in
CROSS can collect and analyse
the 1960s. References
such data so would encourage
Further to this, the definition of ‘timber [1] G. J. Langdon-Thomas and M. those with knowledge about
cladding’ relevant in this context is one Law, ‘Fire and the external wall’, LPS HRBs to submit reports.
of softwood (cedar) planks abutted Joint Fire Research Organisation,
in a manner to form an essentially flat Boreham Wood, England, Fire
and homogeneous timber surface. Research Note 8, 1966.
Any conclusions reached by Ashton 4. Balcony failure in
[2] L. A. Ashton and H. L. Malhotra,
and Malhotra would not be readily East London>
‘Fire Research Note 436. External Walls
transferred to different configurations
of Buildings - Part I. The Protection
of timber cladding, for example, A balcony failure occurred in
of Openings against Spread of Fire
slatted systems with air gaps in a four-year-old block of flats
from Storey to Storey’, Fire Research
between or behind planks, nor could in East London. Photographs
Station, Boreham Wood, 1960.
it be readily extrapolated to timber appear to show the collapse
based products such as plywood. of the balcony perimeter
brick slip cladding and the
The underlying issue appears to be
one of misinterpreting the research
C Expert Panel detachment of the balcony

of Ashton and Malhotra when Comments soffit. It has been reported

that up to 80 balconies might
transitioning to National Building
require remedial work. CROSS
Regulations. Subsequently, there The general feeling from the Expert has issued several reports on
has not been a detailed review Panel is agreement with the findings dangerous balconies including
of the origins of the 9 mm value, and opinions of the reporter. a Safety Alert in 2022>.
with it reproduced through various
iterations of the Regulations and, The government needs to consider
more recently, Approved Document this further and reflect upon the
B. The phrase ‘timber cladding’ has apparent fragility of a guidance
also been poorly defined, leaving it system that includes generic
open to interpretation i.e., the types of recommendations based on research
materials and products that constitute that is more than 60 years old, with
timber cladding, and how they might little evidence of subsequent re-
be configured. examination and verification.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 6

Fire performance of timber cladding

A standard timber cladding design, 5. Cambridge e-bike fire

The government however, is likely to have a gap tragedy, fire service calls for
of 10mm between the panels, i.e., law changes>
needs to consider they are not designed to act as a
this further and fire resisting spandrel system. In The Cambridgeshire Fire
such conditions, the fire may spread Service calls for law change
reflect upon the into the cavity, and the panels may on e-bikes and scooters,
apparent fragility be exposed in two directions. This highlighting the fire dangers
could considerably increase the fire's following the death of a mother
of a guidance intensity within the cavity and could and her two young children.
system that cause more rapid and extensive
external fire spread.
includes generic
recommendations This is an interesting issue, with
extensive historical research behind it. It
6. Failed concrete pour>

based on research is a very good point that a small amount Five workers were hurt during

that is more than of testing, conducted several decades

ago, has translated into guidance which
a concrete floor pour when the
temporary support failed. As
60 years old, with doesn't bear much resemblance to the ever, proper design of temporary

little evidence of original test findings. works is critically important.

subsequent re- However, it should be noted that

this is not a new material, it is used
examination and regularly on buildings, and this 7. Crane collapse in Leeds>
verification guidance has been in place for
several decades. There are many Parts of Leeds city centre were
other factors that would affect the evacuated after emergency
The government should confirm risk. These include the extent of the services had to deal with an
whether the test mentioned by the timber cladding (presumably if it is 'unstable' tower crane being
reporter was used as a basis for only used in isolated areas, it would used for high rise construction.
the minimum 9mm timber cladding be less of a concern than if it were The crane was later made safe.
panel thickness. Also, it is essential over the entire facade) and the
to understand the factors considered evacuation strategy for the building.
for this decision. For example, based Any building over 18m height with a
on current guidance, timber cladding ‘defend in place’ approach could not 8. Road tunnel collapse
can be used for buildings other than use timber cladding. in India>
relevant and residential buildings
up to 18 metres. That means there CROSS supports the call for A road tunnel collapsed in India
might have been some consideration further research. trapping 40 workers behind
regarding the tolerable risk level. debris. Fortunately, they were
However, if the consideration was successfully brought out after
only based on the chance of the rescue work lasting more than
Submit Report
spread of the flame, the argument two weeks. This is a reminder of
would be different. the generic hazards associated
Submit Feedback
with tunnelling and the need
Ashton and Malhotra conducted a always to have a rescue plan.
series of eleven tests, some of which
used timber cladding.

In the ones where timber cladding 9. Oxfordshire explosion:

was used, there was no gap Crews work through night
between the timber claddings. The at recycling plant>
observations of the specimen after
the test did not show any indication There was a dramatic gas
of flame penetration into the cavity. explosion in an Oxfordshire
This could be because the design recycling plant. Safety issues
considered the impact of spandrel include the initiation cause
panels and separation on the spread (lightning), and the capability of
of the flame. This point is important fires to spread. Three out of five
because the panels burned from a plant cylinders were destroyed.
single direction in such conditions.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 7

Collapse of folded plate timber roof at a school

Collapse of folded plate timber roof 10. Storm Babet in October> and
Storm Ciaran in November>
at a school Storm Babet caused much
CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1160 damage - severe flooding,
riverbank erosion and landslides.
In one National Trust historical
house, the roof runoff rate
This report is about a critical safety issue concerning folded overwhelmed the guttering. This
is a known weak spot of large
timber roofs, in various settings, including over school halls. warehouse type roofs.
Storm Ciaran followed a month
later. Ciaran was particularly
strong and caused a large
Key Learning Outcomes amount of structural damage in
the Channel Isles. The pattern
of house roof damage conforms
For owners and persons responsible for the safety with what might be expected
of buildings including schools: from wind suction effects. There
was also significant flooding.
• Inspect and assess existing buildings, particularly those that are of a
significant age, to see if they contain unusual forms of construction,
including roofs similar to the reported failure

• If so, or if there is doubt, arrange for structural inspections and risk 11. Back of Cockermouth's Old
assessments to be undertaken by engineers who are suitably qualified Courthouse collapses into river>
and experienced persons (SQEP) – normally Chartered Structural or
Chartered Civil Engineers The eroding effect of water was
well illustrated by the collapse of
the back wall of Cockermouth’s
For inspecting engineers: Old Courthouse. Images show
that three storeys plus the
• Undertake a risk assessment of old and unusual structures where there is
roof collapsed.
a life safety risk should they fail

• Consider what combination of causes could lead to a structural failure

• Understand where structural elements may be beyond their reasonable

12. Stonehaven crash:
service life
Network Rail to face fatal
• Look out for signs of distress, including those in hidden components derailment charges>
or locations
Network Rail pleaded guilty in a
• Be aware of the risks associated with moisture build-up, particularly
trial about the Stonehaven train
where timber is a structurally significant component
derailment of 2020. The train hit
a landslide, but this was initiated
by a faulty drainage system
which had not been maintained.
Rail Accident Investigation
Branch (RAIB) recommendations
information to help identify similar
R Full Report roofs. However, the reporter, who is
included 'better management of
civil engineering projects
a Chartered Structural Engineer, has
and improved response to
This report is about a critical safety had another enquiry concerning a
extreme rainfall'.
issue concerning folded timber roofs, roof suspected to be of the same type
in various settings, including over of construction. In researching this
school halls. enquiry, the reporter has come across
a news report of a collapse of another
In 2011, the reporter told CROSS 13. Aftermath of the Hawaiian
school roof in England in 2019 which
(known at that point in time as wildfire disaster>
appears to be of the same type of
SCOSS) of a sudden failure of a
construction as that which collapsed
proprietary timber roof system Fire spread is amply illustrated
in 2011. The construction of the roof
over a school hall that had been by the Hawaiian disasters of
appears to be similar to that shown in
constructed in 1959. In response to August. The town of Lahaina was
Figures 1 and 2 below. The age of the
the failure, SCOSS issued Report effectively destroyed with 2,200
roof is not known to the reporter.
273 - Collapse of proprietary building lost. Damage costs have
timber roof>. The reporter believes been put at $6 billion.
that local authorities shared that

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 8

Collapse of folded plate timber roof at a school

The reporter also makes the point that 14. Large section of nursery roof
a robust system for local authority collapses in London>
surveyors to share safety information
concerning their buildings is essential, A large roof section of a London
given that such system builds were nursery collapsed completely
widely adopted and may, by now, be onto classrooms below. Once
showing their age. However, given again, good luck prevented a
the erosion of in-house local authority more serious incidient. All the
services, the reporter is not sure if children had gone home, and so
any such reporting mechanisms that there were no casualties.
existed may have atrophied.

Figure 1: sketch of roof system C Expert Panel

Comments
This roof collapse was reported as a
sudden failure. Such types of failures
should be guarded against as they
often come with no warning. Very
fortunately, the failure happened
during a school holiday otherwise the
outcome, as the reporter says, could
have been catastrophic. The reporter
Figure 2: side view at bearing
is right that this incident should have
been shared widely. This would
The reporter considers that if the cases especially be the case if the roof is
are similar, the end blocks of the roof, a proprietary system where generic
which were likely just held with glue weakness may exist.
and panel pins, may have become
detached, as they did in the previous The cause of the collapse was not
case, resulting in a sudden shear clear, however any structure that relies
failure and the collapse of the roof. upon glue and panel pins is unlikely
to be robust if water damage occurs
If this second case does indeed
at critical connections. It may be that
concern the same proprietary
a lack of maintenance permitted
system, continues the reporter, then
water penetration which impacted
it has been involved in two sudden
critical connections and precipitated
collapses, either of which would have
the collapse. Any roof with suspected
had catastrophic consequences if
water penetration or water shedding
the buildings had been occupied at
problems should be inspected and
the time. The reporter considers that
repaired as a priority, as water
a significant number of these roofs,
degradation can cause structural
which may not have had failsafe
damage and failures. Water and
remedial work undertaken, could
moisture generally are contributing
exist, and users of such buildings may
factors to much deterioration and
be at significant risk. The reporter is
failure of buildings. Good detailing,
of the opinion that the failure of these
construction, and maintenance of
roofs is almost inevitable as they age,
weatherproofing systems are essential.
and that a reminder concerning these
structures would be very timely.
Deterioration can contribute to the
collapse of structures. An ice rink
roof collapsed onto skaters in Bad
two sudden Reichenhall, Bavaria, Germany,
collapses, either of in 2006, killing fifteen people.
Investigations found no single cause
which would have for the collapse, but rather a series
had catastrophic of contributing defects and damage.
The design capacity of the failed
consequences, had elements was found to be inadequate.
the buildings been This already inadequate capacity
was then further reduced over time
occupied at the due to deterioration in the timber box
time of collapse girders. The structure was about 34
years old at collapse.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 9

Collapse of folded plate timber roof at a school

The reporter is concerned that previous efforts to identify

Any roof with suspected water similar plywood folded box timber roofs may not have been
completely successful. This failure in North West England
penetration or water shedding appears to support that concern, and responsible bodies
problems should be inspected of buildings potentially containing such roof structures, are
urged to take notice of this latest failure.
and repaired as a priority
Responsible bodies of buildings
CROSS published Report 1227 - Collapse of unusual
hybrid concrete and steel strand truss on school roof> in
potentially containing such roof
May 2023. This new failure in North West England, and structures, are urged to take
the failure of the unusual hybrid truss, have remarkable
similarities in that both are unusual forms of roofing
notice of this latest failure.
structure, both were used in school roofs, and both roofs
were of significant age.
The reporter also makes the point that a robust system for
For brevity, the findings of the unusual hybrid truss report, local authority staff to share safety information concerning
as well as CROSS Report 273 - Collapse of proprietary buildings is essential, but the reporter is not sure if any such
timber roof> (concerning the collapse in 2011 mentioned by reporting mechanisms that existed may have atrophied.
the reporter) are not repeated here. However, readers are
advised to read both as the issues and concerns are wholly This concern emphasises the importance of the voluntary
related to this latest report. reporting system provided through CROSS> and if any
readers have experience of such roof systems then will they
This report markedly reinforces the importance of robust please submit a CROSS report.
and timely inspection and maintenance strategies as
outlined in both earlier reports. In addition, CROSS understands that the Department for
Education, seeks to make bodies responsible for education
facilities in England aware of building issues of concern.
Similar arrangements could be in place across other
This report markedly reinforces devolved administrations.
the importance of robust
and timely inspection and
Submit Report
maintenance strategies
Submit Feedback

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 10

Serious inconsistencies when installing passive fire protection

Serious inconsistencies when installing passive fire protection

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1199

An onsite fire engineer, engaged on behalf of the end client during the construction of a new
residential development, reports a significant amount of inadequately installed passive fire
protection elements.

Key Learning Outcomes

For principal contractors and clients: • Other work, such as the fitting of door sets, may also
be critical in terms of fire safety
• Ensure that fire protection work is carried out in
accordance with the designed fire strategy

• The engagement of specialist fire protection

contractors is likely to be necessary for work
recognised to be specifically related to fire protection

Specialist fire stopping installers had been appointed to

R Full Report the project; however, in the opinion of the reporter, it soon
became clear that the installation of certain details was
This report relates to a project involving the construction of carried out by various parties who did not have any specific
a new residential development comprising numerous blocks qualifications nor could correctly record and document the
of flats. executed works. This meant they failed to follow the principles
The reporter's role was to act as the onsite fire engineer of the golden thread, which the client intended to adopt.
engaged throughout the construction period for Furthermore, the contractors carrying out the works were not
approximately two years. Their role was to ensure that the aware of the intended function of these details or systems and
works carried out were consistent with the requirements lacked the necessary, demonstrable competence.
agreed in the fire strategy and relevant standards, and that Most fire stopping details, such as pattresses and
the quality of work satisfied the functional requirements of proprietary seals, were installed by third party accredited,
the Building Regulations. fire stopping installers; these details were generally of an
The reporter suggests that the project faced numerous acceptable standard.
challenges where, in their view, unqualified contractors However, other fire stopping details, for example within
carried out the installation of life safety elements, resulting plasterboard partitions, were installed by dry lining
in potential risks to the future building occupiers as well as operatives with no appropriate accreditation or expertise
creating significant delays. in fire stopping. Some of the reporter's key findings are
summarised below:

the contractors carrying out • Inadequate products were used which would not perform
correctly in the installed arrangement
the works were not aware of • Products from different manufacturers were
the intended function of these inappropriately mixed with each other, thus not meeting

details or systems and lacked any standard (tested and certified) installation detail

the necessary, demonstrable • Products that may have been appropriate were installed
incorrectly, essentially creating a breach in the fire
competence resisting element

• Fire protection elements such as intumescent putty pads

behind electrical sockets, smoke seals of fire doors along
Whilst undertaking site visits at different phases of the the escape routes, and linear joint seals, were found to be
construction, the reporter identified a significant amount of missing altogether
inadequately installed elements of passive fire protection.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 11

Serious inconsistencies when installing passive fire protection

• Fire resisting door sets were inadequately installed, either Following the Grenfell Tower tragedy, the construction
by not adopting a specific detail or because installation industry is undergoing a significant culture change, where
was based on architectural drawings which were subject more emphasis is placed on life safety and ensuring that
to significant alterations from the tested detail without buildings are safe to be occupied. In the reporter's opinion,
any supporting information there is still a long way to go. There is a need for everyone
involved in the construction industry to raise the bar and
• Fire dampers were not appropriately installed and gaps
not accept compromises on safety aspects that can have a
were observed around the items
significant impact in the long term.
• Plasterboard partitions did not include an adequate head
It is important that people are accountable for their work
detail to accommodate any slab deflections during a fire
and a concise record is maintained of all life safety elements,
• Other non standard details were used without not only to assure the end client of the safe condition
documented evidence of their suitability of the building, but also to ensure the building can be
appropriately maintained throughout its lifetime.
The construction included numerous service penetrations,
Ensuring continuity in the design process by following the
or openings through fire resisting partitions, which were
principles of the golden thread of information is crucial. It
inadequately sealed, thus creating breaches through
is also key that fire engineers are involved throughout all
various fire resisting elements. These included compartment
design and construction stages up to handover to mitigate
walls between flats, protected corridors, and protected
risks and ensure that the fire safety principles are correctly
entrance halls.
adopted. The importance of third party accreditation,
quality assurance and accurately recording evidence

eventually, the reporter should also be emphasised. These provide assurance of

the competence and quality of workmanship of contractors
advised the client not to carrying out the works.

proceed with the handover of

the building until all issues had C Expert Panel Comments
been resolved
The issues discussed in this report are, sadly, still typical of
the industry, and certainly what we continue to experience.
The reporter goes on to explain that at various stages
of the process, different stakeholders and technical While it is encouraging that qualified (competent)
specialists were involved in discussions to try and justify the subcontractors were used in some areas in the project
inappropriate works that had already been completed. described, it clearly was not enough. There is a movement
However, the reporter asserts that the arguments were towards ensuring the competency of installers, using correct
purely qualitative and product manufacturers were products, with third-party assurance, but this is still a work
unwilling to provide any sort of guarantee for non- in progress.
standard details retrospectively to reflect the works onsite. It is felt that the necessary culture change is not happening
This resulted in difficult conversations and eventually, the quickly enough at the installer level.
reporter advised the client not to proceed with the handover
of the building until all issues had been resolved. It is still the responsibility of those carrying out building work
to ensure that the construction meets the requirements of the
In principle, it would be expected that any fire stopping or Building Regulations. Thus, they need to appoint competent
passive fire protection works are carried out by competent people and utilise appropriate products to achieve that
professionals. This is similar to the expectation that masonry aim. Moreover, as stated in this report, when third party
partitions would be constructed by bricklayers, building accredited installers are used, the quality of the installation
services would be installed by mechanical or electrical is as expected. This point reaffirms the recommendation
engineers. Whilst it is not a legal requirement for third party stated in Approved Document B>
accredited installers to carry out these works, there is an
obligation that the systems function as intended and are "Third party schemes of certification and accreditation of
suitable from a workmanship perspective, as indicated in installers can provide confidence that the required level of
Regulation 7 of the Building Regulations>. performance for a system, product, component or structure
can be achieved. Building control bodies may accept
certification under such schemes as evidence of compliance
with a relevant standard. However, a building control
body should establish before the start of the building work
that a scheme is adequate for the purposes of the Building
Regulations. For further information about third party
certification schemes and competent person schemes, see
Chapter 5 in Volume 1 and Chapter C in Volume 2 of the
Manual to the Building Regulations."

The relevant extract from Regulation 7 of the

Building Regulations

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 12

Serious inconsistencies when installing passive fire protection

Another aspect worthy of note is the apparently significant

The fire safety sector has number of fire engineering judgments used to justify
otherwise unsubstantiated installations. It is felt that often
an enormous challenge such submissions are little more than opinions, made with
in improving the level of neither the necessary competency nor an established basis
upon which to justify an acceptable technical assessment.
understanding throughout The Passive Fire Protection Forum's Guide to Undertaking
construction companies and Technical Assessments of Fire Performance of
Construction Products Based on Fire Test Evidence, 2021>
by individual operatives is a useful reference.

CROSS has received a significant number of reports about

issues with passive fire protection. When these come to light, Submit Report
there is often a significant impact on occupiers and other
stakeholders, including financial misery and stress. Submit Feedback
The fire safety sector has an enormous challenge in
improving the level of understanding throughout
construction companies and by individual operatives, of
the seemingly trivial details, which if installed incorrectly,
potentially undermine the entire fire performance of the
structure. We cannot expect individuals or construction
companies to close this gap themselves; such an approach is
expecting individuals to know what they don't know. The fire
industry needs to develop a structured process for educating
the construction industry as effectively as it discusses its
failings amongst itself.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 13

Understanding finite element analysis for pile caps

Understanding finite element analysis for pile caps

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1152

A reporter has encountered situations where two-dimensional finite element (2D FE) shells
are used to model structural elements such as pile caps, combined bases and large ground
bearing or pile foundation structures for stability cores. However, the depth or thickness of the
structural element is such that the reporter questions the validity of the structural model.

Key Learning Outcomes

For civil and structural design engineers: • If a finite element method (FEM) is used, designers
should know and understand the theory while being
• The design of basic pile caps can be carried out aware the selection of element type and size will
using strut and tie methods affect the results
• Be mindful of The Concrete Centre advice that
'Design using FE analysis requires engineering
judgement and a feel for the behaviour of concrete'

R Full Report
modelling of structural
A reporter has encountered situations where two- thicknesses greater than
dimensional finite element (2D FE) shells are used to model
structural elements where the depth or thickness of the
the upper limit may give
structural element is such that the validity of a 2D FE surface, inaccurate results
and in particular, the application of the underlying theory
used in the formulation of the elements, is questionable. The
models encountered were being used to design elements In both cases, in the reporter's view, modelling of structural
such as pile caps, combined bases, and large ground thicknesses greater than the upper limit may give inaccurate
bearing or pile foundation structures for stability cores. In results. The structure may be over-constrained, and the
each case, the depth of the structural element could not be effects of shear may be underestimated. A design based on
considered small. FE elements used outside of their range of applicability may
The reporter says earlier versions of FE modelling would therefore give forces that are lower than they might be in
have been based on Kirchhoff-Love theory, often referred the real structure.
to as 'thin plate theory', which is the 2D extension of Euler- The reporter contends that too often FE analysis is used
Bernoulli beam theory. The underlying assumption of the without sufficient thought and understanding. Before using
Kirchhoff-Love theory is that the thickness of the plate is any FE analysis software, they believe the designer should
significantly smaller than the in-plane dimensions. For this know the underlying theory used for the elements being
version of the theory to be relevant, the span-to-depth ratio employed and understand the potential impact this may
needs to be greater than 10. have. In general purpose structural software there is often no
To overcome this limitation, general 2D FE structural analysis choice (or a very limited choice) of elements to be made, but
software tends to employ Mindlin-Reissner plate theory, in more specialist FE software a range of elements are used,
which is the 2D equivalent of Timoshenko beam theory - and choosing the correct element for the problem in hand is
often termed 'thick plate theory'. According to the reporter, of vital importance. In the reporter’s experience, proficiency
various resources give slightly different limits but the span- in using FE within structural engineering is often measured as
to-depth ratio should be no lower than in the range 3-5. the ability to use a software package rather than the ability to
understand the underlying basis of the software.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 14

Understanding finite element analysis for pile caps

There is even a case on safety grounds for concern about

The element size should be less using normal beam design here. The problem is that the
high depth/span ratio will result in relatively low rebar and
than span/over 10 and its width the capacity of the concrete section based on reasonable
larger than the slab depth concrete strength may exceed the section strength based
on rebar. Under overload, the section could fail as concrete
cracks and the rebar, giving lower strength, does not
contribute. The performance of the section has been
The reporter believes the situation is not helped by the transformed from ductile to brittle - very undesirable.
available guidance, which is either too general in nature or However, the rules for minimum reinforcement in the
too specialised. In response, the reporter has resorted to Eurocode are generally formulated to give reinforcement
researching texts and references on plate bending theory with at least the same strength as the cracking strength of the
itself. The reporter found only one publication they felt concrete section.
dealt satisfactorily with the issue, The Concrete Centre's
publication How to design reinforced flat slabs using Finite
Element Analysis>. This says the element size should be less what the beam analysis will
than span/over 10 and its width larger than the slab depth.
Therefore, the span would need to be more than 10 times
not pick up is that the force is
the depth to comply. fairly constant between the two
The reporter goes on to say that while it is the responsibility piles and will not drop off as
of the user of the software to make sure they understand
the analysis and limitations, the software producers could
predicted by beam theory
perhaps also do more. Though it is difficult to implement
dimensional checks due to the relative geometric freedom
that FE gives, they could perhaps give more explicit details
of the FE formulation used and any limitations. In most cases, the FE analysis will give a reasonable
approximation of the maximum forces. For example, the
Both British Standard BS 8110 (now withdrawn) and maximum area of tension steel calculated for a two pile cap
Eurocode BS EN 1992-1-1, place limits on the ratio of beam from an FEM may be similar to that found by using beam
depth to span length over which a beam is considered a theory or strut and tie. However, what the beam analysis will
deep beam. The Eurocode also provides an explicit limit on not pick up is that the force is fairly constant between the two
the thickness of a slab. In both codes, the standard design piles and will not drop off as predicted by beam theory.
rules are limited to those structures not considered deep
beams or slabs. In the case of the British Standard, the A worrying aspect is that some software packages are
designer is referred to specialist literature. In the case of starting to be used directly for detailing and, in this case, it
the Eurocode, while no direct mention is made of the design would be very possible to get an unsafe design. To expand
of deep beams, it does contain a reference to ‘strut and tie’ on this; 2D elements, whether formulated as thick or thin
design methods. The reporter contends it appears that these plate/shell, work on the assumption that the structure is
code requirements, which are not specific to FE but do reflect essentially working in bending, but pile caps are usually of
the underlying limits of Euler-Bernoulli beam theory, are not such thickness that they act as deep beams. In other words,
well known by designers or perhaps reflect a mistaken belief shear behaviour is significant and they are better considered
that FE is somehow unlimited in its use. as behaving as a strut and tie.

In conclusion, the reporter says that FE analysis is perhaps If a pile cap is being modelled in 2D elements and the analyst
used in some cases without a proper understanding of is only interested in how the forces are distributed into the
the underlying theory. They believe the focus may be on piles, then the mesh density makes little difference. However,
producing a photorealistic representation of the structure if an understanding on what is happening within the pile
rather than producing a valid and appropriate model. cap is desired, then the 2D elements will give only a partial
The reporter considers that guidance is needed specific to picture based on the assumption the cap is working entirely
structural engineering and aimed at the practicing engineer. in bending and ignoring (or minimising) the effect of shear in
transferring the load.

Moving on to FE modelling more generally, The Concrete

C Expert Panel Comments Centre publication mentioned earlier lists a series of
advantages and disadvantages of FE analysis on its front
It is important to emphasise that engineers should understand page. One of the disadvantages is 'Design using FE analysis
the nature and probable behaviour of a structure irrespective requires engineering judgement and a feel for the behaviour
of any FE analysis. Pile caps in practice are thick stiff units, not of concrete'. CROSS is concerned about the number of
thin slabs, and manual design with the traditional strut and tie reports being submitted about problems with the use and
method is generally a reliable way of proceeding. understanding of FEM.
In 2018, CROSS issued the Safety Alert Effects of scale> One Expert Panel member is also a reviewer for the Institution
in which the design process suggested, FE analysis being of Structural Engineers (IStructE) chartered membership
relevant to thin slabs, is inappropriate for 'thick slabs' and, when presented with multicoloured FE analysis plots
(although what is meant is not thickness directly but short in a portfolio, they typically ask candidates to explain how
'beams' with very high depth/ span ratio). the structure is working and whether they have produced

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 15

Understanding finite element analysis for pile caps

It is not thought that many structural FE analysis packages

There is a lack of knowledge, use such formulations, apart from those where they might
be available as an advanced option. Shells that use Mindlin
and the evidence suggests formulation ('thick shells') do include shear stiffness but
software is being used without they still assume that the normal remains straight, meaning
that while shear deflection is included in the behaviour,
a proper understanding of deformation of the section is not.
how it works This means shells are great for general structural
modelling but they begin to lose accuracy where shear
dominates. It is not a particular problem in the region
'order of magnitude' checks to satisfy themselves that the FE around a column in a flat slab, as this is a small part of the
analysis answer is reasonable (particularly when it produces overall structure, and the recommendation is to consider
reinforcement quantities). shear in this zone in a separate, more detailed model.
Where shear dominates throughout, they do not capture
The reviewers do not always get satisfactory answers, and the full behaviour of these structures.
these often get worse when candidates are asked about FE
analysis deflection calculations and the material parameters As mentioned, this is a different consideration to the element
used. There is a lack of knowledge, and the evidence suggests size itself. The NAFEMS guides do not give recommendations
software is being used without a proper understanding of for minimum element sizes, but the converse. For example,
how it works and, significantly, without an independent check their Finite Element Analysis for Engineers - A Primer
by someone more experienced in the use of these systems publication states:
and their limitations.
"Use enough elements to provide results of sufficient
The issue with use of FE analysis is far wider than just the accuracy, with smaller elements in areas where the
appropriate selection of shell, plate or solid elements. There physical behaviour varies most rapidly, such as near stress
should be more rigorous verification and validation as well. concentrations, and larger elements away from such areas."
Validation is the comparison with known results (numerical
Similarly, The Concrete Centre publications, How to
or experimental). Verification establishes that the model is
design reinforced concrete flat slabs using Finite Element
not sensitive to discretisation or imperfections and the like. It
Analysis, states:
is useful to reflect on the fact that the only exact formulation
for a finite element is that for a beam, all other formulations "Definitive advice cannot be given as to the ideal size mesh
are approximate. size, but a good starting point is for elements to be not
greater than span/10 or 1000 mm, whichever is the smallest."

Discussion on element types And

Looking at the theory section, to quote the National Agency "…a finer mesh giving more accurate results. The engineer
for Finite Element Methods and Standards (NAFEMS) has to assess how fine the mesh should be; a coarse mesh
publication, Finite Element Analysis for Engineers - A may not give an accurate representation of the forces,
Primer (2013): especially in locations where the stresses change quickly in
a short space e.g. at supports, near openings or under point
'In Kirchhoff theory, the out of plane normal remain straight
loads. This is because there are insufficient nodes and the
and normal to the 2D surface. In Mindlin theory, also known
results are based on interpolations between the nodes."
as Reissner-Mindlin theory, the normal remain straight
but can rotate relative to the 2D surface. Both theories Note that these statements are in direct opposition to
allow simple bending behaviour with either the absence or those given by the reporter in their submission to CROSS.
presence of shear straining, respectively.' In the IStructE's Computational Engineering>, there is the
recommendation that:
It is worth noting that a plate carries only bending, a plane
stress element carries only in-plane forces, and a shell "the element width should be at least twice its thickness"
is a mathematical combination of a plate and a plane
However, this is for usefulness of result rather than accuracy.
stress. This means that shells using Kirchhoff/Kirchhoff-
The engineering sin is not that the elements are too small,
Love formulation (known as 'thin plates' or 'thin shells')
but rather are too large in areas where the stresses are
are suitable only where there is minimal shear, such in a
changing rapidly.
membrane structure like a cooling tower.
The Panel agree with the reporter that all too often FE
analysis is used without sufficient thought and understanding.
shells are great for general
structural modelling but they Submit Report
begin to lose accuracy where
Submit Feedback
shear dominates

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 16

The stack effect and considerations for smoke control

The stack effect and considerations for smoke control

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1250

Stack effect can significantly impact fire safety and smoke spread in the escape stairwells of tall
buildings. The reporter states real world tests have demonstrated that existing smoke control
systems, designed in accordance with standard industry design guidance and idealised
conditions, may not suitably account for typical winter stack effect conditions.

Key Learning Outcomes

For designers and installers: • Testing and commissioning of smoke control systems
should not be done in isolation, it should be carried
• When modelled, smoke control systems such as out in realistic and suitably representative building
smoke extract shafts should account for realistic conditions to capture the impacts of the stack effect
building and environmental conditions to
demonstrate they can overcome the powerful and
competing air flows driven by the stack effect

R Full Report Design and commissioning

The internal and external temperature distributions
The stack effect is a natural phenomenon that occurs and gradients before a fire are not always accurately
predominantly in tall buildings, where difference in air represented by practitioners in design approaches that
temperature results in pressure between the inside and utilise Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) based fire
outside of a building and causes air to flow through vertical modelling, such as the widely used Fire Dynamics Simulator
spaces. In the event of a fire, the stack effect can promote (FDS). Moreover, when these pre-fire temperature
smoke and hot gases to rise and accumulate in the upper conditions are included in the model, the prevalent use of
floors of a building, while drawing fresh air from the lower the default inert wall thermal boundary conditions in FDS
floors. This can create a hazardous situation where smoke may significantly influence the preservation of temperature
and heat are drawn into the stairwells, which are critical as gradients. This happens because these conditions model
escape routes for occupants of the building as well as for fire an infinite heat transfer to keep the wall temperature at a
rescue service intervention. steady 20°C.

As illustrated in Figure 1, the stack effect can interfere with Stack effect is often overlooked in smoke control design
the operation of certain types of smoke control systems by with some guidance, such as EN12101-6-2006 Annex B
encouraging a flow of air that is opposite to the desired (informative), even suggesting to intentionally reduce or
direction of airflow. remove the impact stack effect during the commissioning
of smoke control systems: "B.2 Where stack effect is
likely to be a significant factor, this may be minimized by
operating the pressure differential system for a period of
one hour before testing so that the external air and shaft
temperatures can equalize."

This report highlights alarming observations where the

impact of stack effect in tall buildings undermined the active
smoke control systems and illustrates how, if not suitably
designed for, means of escape and fire rescue operations
may be compromised.

Figure 1: Fire safety impact of stack effect

Observations
Responding to reports of various fire system faults, recent
investigations were carried out during winter and spring
months at several tall buildings.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 17

The stack effect and considerations for smoke control

For Observation Test 1 the building was a 40-storey

residential building with a naturally ventilating Automatic
Opening Vent (AOV) provided at the top of the escape
stairwell intended to act as a make-up air source for a smoke
extract shaft within the lobby. The interior temperature was
18°C-26°C, and the exterior was 8°C -10°C.

Figure 3: Observation Test 2

Similar to Observation Test 1, Figure 3(B) shows how, during

the test, the air flows within the escape stair were reversed
compared to the design flow. Additionally, the combined
force of the smoke extract system and stack effect caused fire
curtains in front of the lift doors to fail to fully close on the fire
Figure 2: Observation Test 1 floor and the ground floor. However, it should be noted that
in a similar case with a taller building, the ground level fire
Figure 2(A) illustrates the typical idealised flow to remove air curtains were pulled out of the runners when the ground level
via a smoke shaft in the lift lobby (driven by a smoke extract doors from the lobby to the exterior were opened. In some
fan) with airflow being drawn from the stairwell’s open AOV. instances, particularly when the firefighting lobby door to
During a test of the smoke control systems, the main entrance the main office floorspace was opened, the firefighting lobby
and exterior stair doors at ground level were open. exhaust was also unable to prevent airflow into the adjacent
escape stairwell.
Figure 2(B) shows what was observed during the test, namely
how the smoke exhaust systems were unable to counter Figure 3(C) demonstrates that if a fire occurred while the
stack effect driven flow up the stair shaft. This required building was experiencing a winter stack effect condition,
retroactive amendments to the system which may not have vents at the top of the building will likely exhaust warm air
been undertaken in other buildings, particularly those (even on milder days), compromising the design intent of the
commissioned on warmer days. smoke control system.

Finally, Figure 2(C) demonstrates that if a fire occurred while Observations have also shown that the winter stack effect
the building was experiencing a winter stack effect condition, can be further exaggerated when escape stairs are glazed.
smoke could be actively pulled into the stair as the exhaust A glazed stair with high solar gain can allow sunlight to
shaft is unable to overcome the draw of air into the stair. enter the building and heat up the surfaces and air inside,
Furthermore, it shows it is likely to be exacerbated by fire creating a larger temperature difference between the
driven mechanisms such as a buoyancy driven upwards air interior and exterior of the building. If the glazed stair is
flow, increasing pressure in the lobby corridor. in an area of the building where the stack effect is already
strong, such as a tall building, the high solar gain can
For Observation Test 2 the building was a >30 storey office enhance this effect significantly.
building with protected firefighting lobbies containing a
dedicated firefighting lift and smoke extract shaft. The escape It was observed that the failure of the smoke control systems
stair which opens into the firefighting lobbies at each level to prevent airflow into the escape stairwell was due to the
was provided with an AOV for natural make-up air. The lack of consideration for the stack effect in both the design
interior temperature was 22°C-26°C, and the exterior was and guidance assumptions. Specifically, standard testing
5°C -8°C. Fire curtains were included in the smoke control methods allow for stack effect to be ignored and considers
system to provide compartmentation to reduce smoke stairwells in isolation to all other vertical shafts.
movement through the lift shafts in lieu of fixed lobbies. These
This is not representative of modern building behaviour.
fire curtains were designed to activate on the ground (escape)
Recent publications, amendments and additions to codes
level and the level where the fire is detected.
have begun to identify stack effect, and wind, as key design
Figure 3(A) illustrates the idealised design flow, which was conditions. However, these are often limited to 60m+ tall
observed to not sufficiently account for flow through the buildings (EN12101-13). While being a predominant cause of
firefighting lift. The exhaust function was intended to generate issues in tall buildings stack effect, wind-driven flow will be
a pressure differential across the escape stair door to prevent present in all buildings and can affect air movement in even
airflow into the escape stairwell. During the test, the lift low-medium rise buildings.
motor room vent was open as well as the main entrance and
If a fire occurred in a tall building that was experiencing a
exterior stair doors at ground level.
stack effect condition due to cold external temperatures, and
the building was not suitably designed to accommodate the
stack effect, then smoke could be drawn into the escape stair.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 18

The stack effect and considerations for smoke control

While this report focuses on active depressurising systems,

similar stack effect air flows in fully naturally ventilated
C Expert Panel Comments
stairwells may result in similar issues in taller buildings.
The Panel agree with the concerns raised by the reporter,
Stack effect should be reflected in the modelling, design and which also highlight the issue of a lack of engineering rigour.
testing of smoke control systems. Specific attention should No engineered solution should be considered valid without
be put on medium-high rise and taller buildings, and layouts sufficient examination of the sensitivities and parameters
which provide open connections at the top of interior vertical that could lead to the failure of such a system. Once the
shafts and the exterior. parameters of failure have been identified, an analysis of the
Within the industry, a greater emphasis needs to be placed likelihood that such circumstances could be present would
on ensuring that testing and commissioning is carried out in provide an indication of the level of confidence that can be
realistic and suitably representative conditions, e.g. occupied applied to the solution being proposed. This should form part
levels heated. Testing which ignores the stack effect and of the design process, and not be left to be uncovered during
considers stairwells in isolation should not be considered testing of an installation.
suitably representative.

Submit Report

Submit Feedback

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 19

Painted faying surfaces leads to connections with insufficient load capacity

Painted faying surfaces leads to connections with insufficient

load capacity
CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 896

Painted, rather than the required unpainted connection faying surfaces, were identified
by the resident engineer of a reporter's firm during the erection of a primary frame for a
large project.

The painted surfaces resulted in the connections not having sufficient load carrying capacity
and necessitated remedial works.

Key Learning Outcomes

For civil and structural design engineers: For steel fabricators and contractors:
• If there are any unusual features of a design, Where there are large connections with faying
these should be made known to all parties and surfaces ensure that the specification for finishes is
emphasised both in the specification and with notes agreed with the designer
on drawings
Where special conditions are specified, ensure that all
• Good communication between designers, parties know what these are and can comply with them
contractors, and site supervisors is essential and and that adequate quality control measures are in place
there should be a suitably qualified and experienced
Pay particular attention to inspections of painted/
person responsible for coordinating this
unpainted areas and the requirements of the specification
• The importance of finishes on faying surfaces on
Steel fabricators should not make unilateral changes
joints should be more widely recognised
to the engineer's specification or design without
their approval

The reporter continues that the connection design

R Full Report submitted by the subcontractor complied with this
requirement and assumed fully prepared unpainted faying
Faying surfaces are the surfaces or faces placed in tight surfaces at the connections for maximum friction, together
contact to form a joint. During the erection of a primary with tension control bolts to ensure that the correct
frame for a large project, the resident engineer (RE) of a clamping forces were achieved.
reporter's firm identified the presence of painted faying
surfaces, rather than the required unpainted ones.

The issue was identified by the RE when the steel was should slip occur in the joints
delivered to site and prior to it being erected. The error
was brought to the attention of the contractor, who took the
suddenly, at or close to
decision to erect the steelwork despite it being non-compliant serviceability limit state (SLS)
with the design or with the specification requirements.
loads, significant additional
The connections in question were significant and were
present in the main long span roof trusses of a major
dynamic forces could be
structure with some connections carrying very high loads. generated
The long span nature of the roof structure meant that slip
in the connections, arising from movements made possible
by bolts in clearance holes, would cause considerable The reporter was also of the view that, should slip occur in
deflection of the trusses. The designer’s specification the joints suddenly, at or close to serviceability limit state
therefore called for no slip in the connections at ultimate (SLS) loads, significant additional dynamic forces could
limit state (ULS). be generated because of the very substantial weight of
the roof dropping suddenly. Once it was found that the

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 20

Painted faying surfaces leads to connections with insufficient load capacity

faying surfaces had been painted, and so therefore the

design assumptions had not been met, the reporter’s firm Were the implications of
undertook an independent review of the implications and
laboratory testing. This review showed that the slip factor painting of the steelwork
was dramatically reduced, and that the connection could
slip at ULS.
highlighted on the drawings
and in the project plan? If so,
was there a communication
In the reporter's view, this case issue between the designers
calls into question the quality and fabricators?
and checking regimes on some
major sites where there are and so earlier slip. The basic philosophy of such joints in
Consequence Class 3 buildings Codes has always been nonslip at SLS, with slip at ULS, but
with limits on plate thicknesses to assure that shear capacity
and in bearing capacity is achieved. This means that
strength capacity is there even if the joint slips.
The reporter considers the issues to be significant due to
the scale and mass of the roof structure involved and the Detailed information on the subject can be found in the
risk of joints slipping under serviceability design loads. In Guide to Design Criteria for Bolted and Riveted Joints, 2nd
the reporter's view, this case calls into question the quality Edition> from the American Institute of Steel Construction.
and checking regimes on some major sites where there are
Consequence Class 3 buildings (as referred to in Approved
Document A)>. Furthermore, the reporter cites that in The basic philosophy of such
accordance with BS EN 1990:2002+A1:2005 Table B5 -
Inspection levels (IL)>, such buildings should have been subject joints in Codes has always
to extended inspection including third party inspection.
been nonslip at SLS, with slip
The reporter says remedial works, including welding
and plating, were subsequently undertaken. These were
at ULS, but with limits on plate
however, in the opinion of the reporter, not completed thicknesses to assure that
without frustration.
shear capacity and in bearing
The reporter has highlighted the issues above, to emphasise
the risks of inadequate site supervision, the potentially
capacity is achieved
dangerous impact of changes to design, and the safety risk
that may arise from any lack of ownership and responsibility
to rectify identified defects. There are two significant issues in this report. The first and
most obvious is that painting the faying surfaces was in
contravention to the specification. The second issue is that
C Expert Panel Comments while the design team may have departed from normal
practice by requiring no slip at ULS, the contractor should
This is an interesting report which raises several issues. Years not have proceeded with the works once the issue was
ago, when high strength friction grip (HSFG) bolts were raised. If something unusual is being proposed, then it
widely used, there were many technical articles about them. becomes very important to ensure that everyone concerned,
There was a good deal of discussion about how to guarantee including the fabrication team, understands the implications.
the preload and what the surface friction values were, In this case, were the implications of painting of the
largely because their introduction was to replace rivets. It steelwork highlighted on the drawings and in the project
then became accepted that modern high strength bolts didn't plan? If so, was there a communication issue between the
need to be pre-loaded (at least for standard applications), designers and fabricators?
however US practice at that time was always to torque
the bolts up. Much of this knowledge of prestressing bolts The panel agrees with the reporter about the safety critical
was forgotten and it is unusual nowadays to look for no slip importance of communications between designers and
connections in building structures. fabricators, and the recognition of the importance of changes.

Bridge designers however, sometimes require no slippage at As has been said before, a robust specification supported by
ULS so it may be that the designer used a bridge connection robust inspection and test plans, combined with adequate
design approach. If so, bridge fabricators, with their supervision are good precautions against points of
associated higher design and workmanship standards might difference between designers and fabricators.
have been familiar with this condition.

It is certainly true that slip in truss joints will potentially

add to truss deflection and requiring a nonslip joint is one Submit Report
strategy. However, it is questionable whether it can be
achieved. This follows because at high loads, plates in Submit Feedback
tension will thin and that thinning will lead to loss of preload

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 21

Provision of water for firefighting

Provision of water for firefighting

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1204

The reporter suggests that there is inadequate guidance on firefighting water provision for
more complex and larger buildings.

Key Learning Outcomes

For designers and fire engineers:

• Consider all information available when developing fire strategies for complex
or large buildings to include fire-fighting water supplies

R Full Report C Expert Panel Comments

Firefighting operations, and therefore firefighting water Firefighting equipment, tactics and resourcing have
provision, are critical elements of intervention building changed and the design guidance has not had a wholesale
fires. The reporter suggests that relevant legislation and review in a long time; as such, it is in our view, not sufficient
appropriate guidance is inadequate and does not make the in some areas.
connection between firefighting operations and the provision
We understand this is being looked at as part of the technical
of sufficient water.
review of guidance such as Approved Document B>.
The reporter asserts that there is no check of adequate
When Approved Document B is used or cited, it should be
provision of firefighting water at the design stage. Guidance
directly linked to the 'common building situation' for which
such as BS 9999 and Approved Document B> (and national
it may be appropriate, but more importantly those where
equivalents) do not seem to address this requirement,
it is not. Chapter 7, page 22 of Manual to the Building
especially in respect to the volume/flow of water required for
Regulations from July 2020> supports this. For example,
larger buildings.
in all practical terms, how can the provision of a single
Without adequate water supplies, firefighting could be fire hydrant be sufficient for a very large warehouse? It
ineffective resulting in extremely large fires with total building needs to be acknowledged by all, that where there is an
loss. It could also impact the principles of ‘stay put’ as this is insufficient provision of firefighting water, this will directly
reliant on the fire and rescue service dealing with the fire at the affect firefighting operations and decision making, potentially
source and preventing it from spreading to other residential leading to defensive tactics being deployed.
units. If there is no water, or a delay in accessing or locating
Under the HSE’s Planning Gateway One process for planning
hydrants, it could be critical to a successful outcome.
applications for tall residential buildings, one piece of
This issue is exacerbated by reduced water pressure in town information required in the Fire Statement is to confirm
mains, an active strategy by water authorities over the years whether the local firefighting water supplies have been
to reduce leakage. tested to see if they are adequate. This will presumably help
address this issue for any new buildings which go through
The reporter cites one useful document, the National
that process.
guidance document on the provision of water for firefighting
(3rd edition; Jan 2007)>, which gives guidance on the Interestingly, in the case of the Liverpool Car Park fire> the
volumes required for various buildings. This is not referenced mains supply was completely inadequate and three pumps
in the Approved Documents for England and Wales and, had to be brought in to provide water from an adjacent dock.
in the opinion of the reporter, the guidance in Approved
Document B Volume 2 (Sections 16.8 and 16.12)> is not
adequate. These sections require alternative supplies of
Submit Report
water if 'pressure and flow in the water main are insufficient'.
However, it does not state what 'insufficient' means. This
leads to a judgement being made on the water supply that
Submit Feedback
would be required for the building. Large buildings may need
a larger water supply, and so if the town main isn't sufficient,
it would mean that a separate water tank would be required.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 22

Combination load cases in proprietary software cause concern

Combination load cases in proprietary software cause concern

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1170

A reporter is concerned about a widely used software package that does not, in their opinion,
generate load combinations in accordance with the Eurocodes being followed.

Key Learning Outcomes

For civil and structural design engineers: • When purchasing software, consider how outputs
from the packages being considered will be validated
• Software users should be sufficiently competent and
experienced to recognise incorrect or unexpected For software developers and suppliers:
situations and outputs
• Evidence of validation against a wide range of
• It is good practice to carry out ‘sense checks’ and published test cases is reassuring
validate all analysis and design outputs
• Ensure software updates and errors are notified to
• If you are concerned with any outputs, raise this with all users
the software companies technical support team and
seek clarification

R Full Report C Expert Panel Comments

This report concerns a widely used software package that The reporter deserves credit for doing enough validation to
the reporter does not believe generates load combinations in establish that the software appears to be combining loads
accordance with the Eurocodes being followed. incorrectly, and is right to have highlighted their concerns
to the software supplier.
The reporter’s experience of a proprietary package is that
for roofs, the software combines imposed loads with snow Where there is any concern with software outputs, the issue
loads and wind actions. This, the reporter says, contradicts should be raised with the software technical support team and
the relevant Eurocode [clause 3.3.2(1) of EN 1991-1-1] which clarification sought. Raising awareness is the first step in the
states that on roofs (particularly for category H roofs) process of bringing about improvements to industry practices.
imposed loads need not be applied with either snow loads
Software deficiencies are relatively rare but they do
and/or wind actions.
happen. CROSS Report 538 Failure to check designs
The reporter is concerned that this may lead to an produced by software>, published in 2016, concerned an
overdesigned structure. error in a design package that the software developer later
confirmed had not been previously picked up. It is a pre-
They are further concerned that for certain load
requisite for using software that the user must be able to
combinations, the software utilises incorrect load factors for
recognise incorrect or unexpected situations and outputs.
leading and accompanying actions.
Simply put, software should only be relied upon by those
The reporter believes that the algorithm for the automatic who can anticipate the outputs, otherwise, they will not
generation of load combinations is incorrect and furthermore, recognise errors in the software or more likely, errors in
that the interface with the software does not readily allow for the use of the software. ‘Sense checking’ of all outputs,
manual intervention. This makes it difficult for designers who including load combinations, should be carried out as part
rely on the software for the selection of load combinations of output validation.
and could lead to incorrect design outputs, such as
unnecessarily conservative designs or unsafe designs.

The reporter has presented their concerns to the software Any concern with software
supplier concerned. outputs should be raised with
the software technical support
team and clarification sought

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 23

Combination load cases in proprietary software cause concern

The reporter raises an important concern about selecting The reporter also makes a valid point regarding the ease
appropriate load cases and factors. The selection of of checking software outputs. When selecting software,
combinations and factors should not neglect any possible designers should think through how the outputs presented
circumstances, for example, where wind loading may by different packages will be validated. An offering with
cause uplifts on roofs, care must be taken when considering numerous intermediate outputs, and more transparent
the partial factors. Under the Eurocode system, where an processes, may well enable effective validation to be more
imposed load is favourable, as is likely in a wind uplift case, easily applied.
a suitable partial factor (normally zero) should be applied.
The designer should never forget however, that the
responsibility and liability for all outputs rests with the
Software developer responsibilities designer and not the software supplier.
Software developers should validate that their software CROSS Report 1075 Potentially unsafe buckling resistance
complies with code requirements such that users can checks using software>, published in 2022, considered
trust the software when using it within clearly defined anomalies in software outputs from a structural steelwork
constraints. Evidence of validation against a wide range of design package.
published test cases is reassuring.

When errors in commercially available software are found,

suppliers should be challenged to demonstrate both the The designer should never
validation and the calibration of their software. Where
an error in marketed software is confirmed, it would seem
forget however, that the
reasonable to expect a software house to issue revised responsibility and liability
software to all licence holders. In addition, all previous
users of the software could be notified of the error so that
for all outputs rests with
the implications upon earlier work can be assessed. the designer and not the
software supplier

Submit Report

Submit Feedback

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 24

Failure of Firefighters lift to operate

Failure of Firefighters lift to operate

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1232

The reporter tells of an instance when a Firefighters lift switch, located on the Fire Service
Access Level (FSAL) of a multi storey building failed to operate. After an investigation, the
switch was found not to have been connected.

Key Learning Outcomes

For commissioning engineers: only start upon activation of the firefighter's switch.
The failure of these features would not be apparent
• Check the operation of lifts conforms to the agreed in normal passenger use. They must be specifically
cause and effect strategy. BS EN 81-72 on Firefighter checked in firefighting mode
lifts applies
• Responsible persons should ensure regular checks
For fire and rescue services, responsible are carried out on Firefighter lifts
persons and risk assessors:
• A lift for use by firefighters or for evacuation has a
range of critical, pre programmed behaviours that

R Full Report
The reporter tells of an instance when a firefighting lift switch, It is felt by the reporter, that those persons with responsibility
located on the Fire Service Access Level (FSAL) of a multi for buildings are not conducting regular checks on lifts
storey building, failed to operate. When turned on, the switch provided for the fire and rescue service (FRS), or on
did not recall the Firefighter lift to the FSAL. evacuation lifts. They suggest that there are occasions where
lift engineers do not have a thorough understanding of these
The reporter then interrogated the operation and
types of lifts.
maintenance drawings and discovered that the switch was
not connected to the relay to recall the lift. Therefore, the Furthermore, the reporter feels firefighters are not checking
switch did nothing. the operation of these lifts when they conduct their
familiarisation visits, and that fire risk assessors are not
The electrical engineering drawing for the lifts showed only a
checking test records, which is of particular importance for
communication line running to the FSAL. This was for the two
higher risk buildings as it is a requirement of The Fire Safety
way communication between the lift car and the Firefighter
(England) Regulations 2022 (Reg 7).>
lift switch intercom.

persons with responsibility for

buildings are not conducting
regular checks on lifts provided
for the fire and rescue service

The reporter suggests that this might be a widespread issue.

They hope this report will raise awareness of the guidance
issued by the Lift and Escalator Industry Association (LEIA)
on the tests and inspections of lifts for use by firefighters,
evacuation lifts, and lifts with recall.

Figure 1: Example of Firefighters lift control

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 25

Failure of Firefighters lift to operate

Fire Safety (England) Regulations 2022 add additional

C Expert Panel Comments requirements for Responsible Persons and Accountable
Persons of high risk residential buildings in England. They must:

A widespread issue Undertake monthly routine checks of lifts for the use of the
FRS and evacuation lifts and make a record available to
This is, unfortunately, a common occurrence. It is often
residents. All Responsible Persons should regard regular
discovered Firefighter and evacuation lift controls are not
checks such as these as best practice
operational, either because they were never connected and
tested, or because they subsequently failed and have never • Inform the fire and rescue service electronically, as soon
been subjected to periodic testing during routine maintenance. as practicable, when an identified fault with a lift cannot
be rectified within 24 hours
It is rare to see any comment in a fire risk assessment
regarding the existence or nature of emergency lift controls. • Record information on all the lifts in the building on floor
If such provision is noted, commentary regarding their plans stored within a secure information box (SIB)
maintenance is usually limited to identifying which part of
As a final note, readers of this report may find CROSS
the organisation retains the maintenance certificates.
Report 1182 Design criteria for firefighting lifts> helpful as
it explains the terminology for lifts provided for use by the
Commissioning and routine checks FRS. Firefighters lift indicates a minimum level of protection
compared to the standard. There are also firefighting,
All functions should be confirmed as operational for the
firemen’s and evacuation lifts, and those with some
commissioning and sign off. There appears to have been an
specifically described (but limited) levels of protection.
initial design error, which was then missed due to error in
the commissioning. These errors were then in turn missed in
the ongoing maintenance.
Submit Report
There is a need to review what functionality is checked by
different parties, including the fire service. Any reliance on
Submit Feedback
commissioning checks alone is likely a flawed approach.
This issue also exemplifies the need for an independent
third party approval system in the construction industry
that would carry out such essential tests prior to a Building
Regulations completion certificate being issued by the
building control body.

Guidance highlighted by the Expert Panel

Checks should follow BS 8899 Improvement of firefighting
and evacuations provisions in existing lifts – Code of
practice> once revised, but in the meantime, advice on
routine checks can be found in section 3.1 of Checks and
inspections of lifts for use by firefighters, evacuation lifts,
and lifts with recall> on the Lift and Escalator Industry
Association website.

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 26

Fire protection to structure by cavity barriers

Fire protection to structure by cavity barriers

CROSS Safety Report Report ID: 1231

A reporter is concerned about a potential misconception in the construction industry regarding

the role of cavity barriers and the impact their design and installation can have on the
structural performance of a building.

Key Learning Outcomes

Fire and structural engineers/designers:

• As cavity barriers have a role in protecting the structure as well as inhibiting the spread of fire and smoke, they
should be specified carefully, in particular when they have a role in protecting the structure

the spread of fire and smoke. However, the reporter would

R Full Report like to highlight a further intent set out in Approved Document
B which is to inhibit the unseen spread of fire to reduce the
A reporter contacted CROSS about a potential misconception likelihood of structural failure. Functional requirement B3(1) on
in the industry regarding the role of cavity barriers and the internal fire spread (structure) states:
impact their design and installation can have on the structural
performance of a building. "The building shall be designed and constructed so that,
in the event of a fire, its stability will be maintained for a
In the reporter's view, cavity barriers are needed for reasonable period."
construction technologies that incorporate cavities in their
final assembly. Technical guidance for such instances is Some forms of construction, such as some panel walls, some
outlined in Approved Document B> and Regulation B3 - floor systems, and some light framing solutions rely on their
Internal fire spread (structure) of the Building Regulations enclosing sheathing/linings to protect the structural elements
2010 must be satisfied: located within a cavity. Such systems rely on the integrity of
these linings to achieve their rated fire resistance.
"The building shall be designed and constructed so that the
unseen spread of fire and smoke within concealed spaces in
its structure and fabric is inhibited."
in most cases the cavity barrier
The guidance sets out two approaches to meet this regulation.
The first approach is to sub divide cavities with cavity barriers
achieves substantially lower
(resisting fire spread within the cavity). The second is to close fire resistance compared to
the edges of cavities (resisting fire spread into the cavity). The
minimum recommended fire performance is E30 and I15.
that which is recommended for
the structural frame
the reporter would like to In the case of external loadbearing walls, the possibility exists
highlight a further intent set that the wall will be exposed on two sides at once; on the
internal side by the compartment fire, and on the external
out in Approved Document B side by venting flames or hot gases. This is not explicitly
which is to inhibit the unseen covered in the current technical guidance, which considers
exposure on one face only. The reporter is of the mind that
spread of fire to reduce the these walls may form part of the structural frame, and
likelihood of structural failure their performance should be investigated for simultaneous
exposure on each side.

Fire can circumvent internal protection linings and heat

In the reporter's view, this functional requirement is specific
structural elements by entering a cavity where there are
to limiting unseen fire and smoke spread, with the aim to
penetrations in the wall, e.g., at a window. This route of fire
protect occupants, users, and first responders situated away
spread is mitigated by installing a cavity barrier. However,
from the compartment of origin. This may set a specific bias to
the cause of concern is that in most cases the cavity barrier
practitioners that the role of cavity barriers is solely to inhibit

CROSS-UK Newsletter 71 | December 2023 | www.cross-safety.org/uk 27

Fire protection to structure by cavity barriers

achieves substantially lower fire resistance compared to that maintain overall structural performance.
which is recommended for the structural frame.
The reporter considers that more clarity in current
It is understood by the reporter, through experience from guidance is welcome, and it could be helpful if the concern
reviewing fire incidents, that fire or hot gases can bypass was considered in future updates for clarification and
the sheathing/lining and enter the cavity early to affect highlighting. Specifically, they are of the mind that any part
structural elements. This can also occur due to either a of the structural frame, which might be exposed on any face,
failure (or damaged state) of the sheathing protection, or needs to be considered by designers for fire protection. This
occupant interventions like a fixing that was not installed includes consideration of cavity barrier performance.
appropriately. Another possibility is that this could occur
In the meantime, they believe it is helpful for the issue to be
due to an unprotected ventilation mesh grill on the outside
widely raised in the industry so that designers and building
of external walls (which may be exposed to external venting
control bodies can give appropriate thought to the matter of
flames e.g., from windows, or from balcony fires).
structural protection when cavities exist, always in proportion
Incorrectly specified barriers at the edge of such a to the size, height, and occupancy of the building.
construction, e.g., around a window opening, could
compromise the protection to the structure. Typical E30 and
I15-rated cavity barriers, recommended for purposes of C Expert Panel Comments
resisting unseen fire spread, are unlikely to provide sufficient
protection to the sheathing studs and columns. These comments merit a discussion between fire and
Even where fire and smoke do not spread extensively within structural engineers.
a cavity, there is a possibility that the loadbearing elements This report raises concern for cases where the structural
(columns, beams, or slabs) will be exposed to elevated elements are protected by a system (e.g. partition system)
temperatures at an early stage – thermal degradation, or when there is a chance for them to have opening(s) (e.g.
decomposition if combustible construction is used, will then windows, doors, etc.).
initiate. Apart from the inherent difficulties in suppressing
such unseen fires, this may also lead to localised collapse of As the reporter mentioned, we can see this in load bearing
the structural elements, which in turn may render other cavity external systems.
barriers ineffective and lead to subsequent fire and smoke In such a situation, since the structural element is protected
spread beyond the compartment’s cavity. This, of course, by a system rather than a specific fire protection product,
would be a matter of more significant concern in buildings the primary objective of the cavity closer would be to act as
where cavity barriers were incorrectly designed and installed. a part of the protection system.
In designs where the structure needs protection from fire, Thus, the overall performance of the cavity closer should be
cavity barriers may be chosen to provide this protection; the maximum of the required performance as a part of the
designers should consider the standard required for the protection system and the minimum requirement given in
structure rather than the, potentially lower, standard for the Approved Document B.>
cavity barrier alone.

Designers should also seek to ensure that where sheathing

linings are relied upon to protect the structure, these are Submit Report
adequately designed and installed for fire exposure on
all relevant faces, which may include external faces, to Submit Feedback

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