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A case of total war: Paraguay,

1864–1870
a
Vera Blinn Reber
a
Shippensburg University
Published online: 21 Feb 2012.

To cite this article: Vera Blinn Reber (1999) A case of total war: Paraguay, 1864–1870, Journal
of Iberian and Latin American Research, 5:1, 15-40, DOI: 10.1080/13260219.1999.10429960

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 A Case of Total War: Paraguay, 1864-1870.

Vera Blinn Reber

Shippensburg University
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Although civil wars and internal conflicts have been relatively common
within Latin America in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, wars
between Latin American countries have been few. Of these conflicts-the
Argentine-Brazilian War, 1825-28; the Chilean and Peru-Bolivian
Confederation War, 1836-39; the War of the Pacific, 1879-83; the Chaco
War, 1932-35; the Ecuador-Peru Conflict, 1941; and the Soccer War,
1969-The War of the Triple Alliance, 1864-70, was the most catastrophic
in modern Latin American history.l As a result ofthe destructiveness of the
conflict between Paraguay and the Allied forces of Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay, and the great war's influence in defining the balance of power
within the Rio de la Plata region, historians have debated at length the
causes of the war and described in detail the military campaigns, but
neglected analysis of the war's duration.2 In comparison with the other
military conflicts among Latin American nations, the War of the Triple
Alliance lasted the longest. The questions which need to be considered are
as follows: How did the nation of Paraguay manage to survive for so long
against the overwhelming odds of the combined forces of Argentina, Brazil,
and Uruguay? Why did the Paraguayans desire to do so?
There is no doubt that disorganisation among the Allies, internal political
problems in Uruguay and Argentina, the long transportation routes, and
the Allied powers' unwillingness to pay the high cost of the war in men and
military expenses contributed to the length of the war. But these factors
alone neither explain Paraguay's willingness to fight valiantly nor the
eventual Allied victory. The Paraguayan war economy is crucial to an
analysis of the duration of the war; the economy and society sustained the
war effort for five years through its conversion to total war and its
commitment to national self-sufficiency.3
National self-sufficiency meant that a nation was able to maintain itself
without the import of food and raw materials.4 Argentina, Brazil, and
Uruguay had controlled Paraguayan links to external markets and by mid-
1865 had effectively ended much of Paraguay's ability to import or export,
thereby forcing the nation to depend upon internal resources. But self-

JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

sufficiency alone does not assure either military power or a long war.
Rather the economic policies of both Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia
(1811-1840) and Carlos Antonio L6pez (1844-1862) had sought to create a
strong self-sufficient economy, and it was the redirection of the economy
toward total war that assured military resistance for five years. Total war
assumed that the entire economy and society were organised toward
military efforts. Thus the government established priorities, determined
prices and wages, and regulated labour; the distinction between soldier and
civilian was blurred as the entire population was mobilised.5
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Jose Gaspar Rodriguez de Francia and Carlos Antonio L6pez began national
development of ranches, farms, industry and trade. Utilising the centralised
political and economic system, Francisco Solano L6pez (1862-1870)
mobilised the Paraguayan economy and society for total war. As the
previous Paraguayan governments had developed a centralised political
system, F.S. L6pez could redirect with relative ease the economy and society
to wage total war. Paraguayan agricultural self-sufficiency, its nascent
industrial base, its transport and communication system, and its adaptable
labour supply supported the continuation of a long war despite the
destruction.6

Paraguay's government and economy, 1811-1870

The war economy grew out of a centralised administrative power. The
government of Francisco Solano L6pez represented not new directions, but
the consolidation of power of his two predecessors, Jose Gaspar Rodriguez
de Francia and Carlos Antonio L6pez. The political basis of his power was
the constitution of 1844 which defined three branches of government:
executive, legislative, and judicial. The two-house legislature consisted of an
elected chamber of deputies and a presidentially appointed council of state.
The president, who served for ten years, convened the Congress and
published its laws. In practice, however, the constitution allowed all powers
to be centralised in the hands of the president, who created the legislation
and merely convened the congress every fifth year to obtain approval for his
actions. This constitution had codified the system created by Rodriguez de
Francia and legitimised the power of both Carlos Antonio L6pez and
Francisco Solano L6pez. 7
The central administration under Francisco Solano L6pez included a Vice
President, who also served as judge of the appeals court, a secretary of
state, a minister of finance and commerce, a minister of war and marine,
and a minister of internal affairs. To help the senior officials, L6pez also
appointed an accountant, additional secretaries, an assistant to the
treasurer, an assistant to the minister of war, additional customs officials
and judges, and a defender of the poor. Some of the men who had obtained
experience under his father were appointed to new positions.B

16
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

Under F.S. Lopez the country continued to be divided into twenty regional
departments, although the number of districts in the interior had increased
during his father's administration as a result of population growth. In 1865
there were 95 districts if one included the various barrios of Asuncion as
distinct districts. Each region had a judge and a militia commander. Within
the district a justice of the peace and lower military officers, such as
captains and sergeants, located at major towns, exercised power. Regional
and district officials received low salaries for their work.9
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The justices of peace settled petty differences, and the judge of first instance
in each department tried cases of a minor character. In Asunci6n police and
inspectors maintained order, while in the interior the judges and the
military enforced the law. Civilian and criminal judges, residing in the
capital, tried cases of importance and all appeals from the country. Further
appeals could be made to a higher civil or criminal judge. Even with judicial
bureaucracy, power remained centralised in the hands of L6pez. The
president tried all cases of treason or riots, and he also appointed all
judicial authorities, making specific efforts to appoint qualified criminal
judges and competent appeals judges.IO Following independence from Spain
in 1811 through to the end of the war in 1870, Paraguay was a country in
which executive, legislative, judicial and military power remained
concentrated in presidential hands. Preparation for total war required
refocusing of priorities, but not the augmentation of presidential authority.
In economic terms, Paraguay was a nation of small farmers, who produced
with limited capital investments for internal consumption and export.ll
This agricultural base depended on women and children, who were
accustomed to working in the fields to produce food for the family. During
the war years, their efforts were able to sustain the population for three
basic reasons: women's prewar experience and importance in agriculture,
the traditional self-sufficiency of Paraguayan agriculture, and the decreased
production of traditional cash crops due to lack of markets. Francisco
Solano L6pez early recognised the significance of these family farms and
encouraged increased production. He gave Vice President Domingo Sanchez
the responsibility for encouraging production to support the military and
those displaced by the war. Beginning in 1863, Lopez asked for reports on
total agricultural production and decreed biannual district planting
censuses. By 1867 the government recommended that each household plant
300 liiios, 4.5 acres, of food crops. District officials distributed cotton seeds.
Each family was to have one or two yokes of oxen so that the fields could be
plowed, and maize and manioc planted.l2
:Ouring the Carlos Antonio L6pez years, state farms had supplied the
military with all the food it required, and the government purchased
produce primarily for export and profit. But during the war, feeding the
large army led to open market agricultural purchases, and market prices

17
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

rose as the government purchased corn, beans, manioc, molasses,

aguardiente (rum), yerba mate, and other agricultural produce. Corn, the
principal food of the population, more than doubled in price between 1865
and 1866.13 Although during the war the troops continued to plant crops,
there was less labour available for both private and state farms.
Although labour shortages reduced crop size, the planting and harvesting of
manioc, corn and beans remained sufficient to sustain the population
through 1867. Before the war the average household produced 7.59 acres of
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crops. Total crop production included the basic food crops of beans, corn and
manioc, vegetables such as squash and potatoes, and also cash crops of
tobacco and cotton. Although agricultural production fell from 1863 to 1867,
particularly in 1866, cash crops declined precipitously while basic food
production in 1867 remained above the 4.5 acres recommended by the
government to assure adequate food for the civilian and military
population. In early 1868 heavy rains and the shortage of labour adversely
affected the harvest, but with the exception of cotton, which was affected by
a worm infestation, most crops eventually did well. In 1869 military combat
and the loss of territory further reduced production, but invading forces
reported fields of maize and manioc in the districts of Caapucu, Yta,
Carapegua, Yaguar6n, and Paraguari (see Map 1 on following page).
Increasing reports of food shortages by the end of 1869 suggest that
agricultural productivity fell below the 4.5 acres per household encouraged
by the government.l4 Thus, the subsistence nature of Paraguayan
agriculture, with low capital demands and utilisation of women, old men
and children for labour, provided most Paraguayans and the army with food
throughout the war.
In Asuncion and larger towns, food was in shorter supply. The Allied
blockades prevented foreigners living in Paraguay from obtaining wine,
wheat flour, and oil which had generally been imported. Little wheat was
grown in Paraguay before the war, and by mid-July 1865 town bakeries
were closing because of lack of wheat flour. Foreigners had to adapt to
manioc flour and palm oil, which were available and formed an important
part of the Paraguayan diet.l5
During the war, plantings of tobacco and fruit trees declined more than
cotton plantings.l6 Tobacco, the farmers' major cash crop, declined in price
as it was exported only by the state.l7 The war also discouraged the
planting of fruit trees, since they needed to grow several years before
producing, thus requiring investment and a certain optimism. But even in
March of 1867 the government noted the planting of 30,098 fruit trees in
Carapegua, 15,893 in Villa Rica and 13,711 in Villa de San Pedro. IS
Higher market prices encouraged some cotton production and rising food
prices provided new profitable cash crops for farmers. In 1867 the
government offered monetary incentives to encourage the production of

18
 Downloaded by [Flinders University of South Australia] at 01:19 05 January 2015

ARGENTINA

19
Map l
Par agu ay
Pop ulat ed
Reber: A case of total war: Paragu ay
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

high quality cotton, giving 332 prizes that varied from 50 pesos to 5,000
pesos.l9 Even after 1868, when Francisco Solano LOpez transferred the
population from areas controlled by the Allies and established new capitals,
first at Luque then at Piribebuy, seventy miles from Asunci6n, planting and
harvesting of basic staples of corn, manioc, vegetables, as well as cotton,
continued.20
Both private ranches and state estancias supplied cattle and horses for the
army. After 1867 the government introduced a quota system which required
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each district to provide cattle to feed the troops, but the state ranches
continued to be the army's major suppliers. During the war, cattle herds
declined in size, although some evidence suggests that the largest depletion
of the Paraguayan herds came after the Allied victory. Invading forces
passing through the districts of Carapegua, Yta, Yaguar6n, Paraguarf and
Ytaugua reported that they were able to eat well on 'wild cattle', and
Argentines exported cattle to their own country.21

War production
The Allied blockade forced Paraguay to be as self-sufficient in consumer
goods as it was in agricultural production and to reorient production to
meet war needs. In particular, the government needed cloth for military
uniforms, heavy ponchos for the rainy season, and blankets. Early in the
war the government purchased all available cloth for army uniforms and
then sought to encourage local production. Despite the difficulty of weaving
with poor quality thread on simple looms, which required three months
work to make a single poncho or cover, the women responded to the
challenge. In November of 1864 ponchos were coming from the districts of
Atira, Caazapa, San Jose, and Villa Rica. Production for the war effort
increased from 1864 to 1865 as illustrated by the residents of Yaguar6n,
who sold thirty-five ponchos to the government in November 1864 and in
January of 1865 sold another sixty-seven.22
Because cotton was in short supply, women utilised a variety of other
materials for spinning and weaving. They made thread from caraguata, the
leaves of coconut palms, which were found throughout the country.
Caraguata was normally used to make burlap needed in ship construction,
but during the war women used the fibre to weave ponchos and shirts for
the troops. In 1867 and 1868 almost every district, including the towns of
Acahai, Quiindi, Ytaugua, and San Lorenzo de la Frontera, provided shirts
for the army and yards of the material for hospital use. To increase
caraguata shirt production, the German engineer Robert von Fisher
Treuenfeldt adjusted textile looms to equip a factory which used the thread.
The women also used palm leaves to make hats, hammocks, rope and cloth,
and they utilised natural dyes, including indigo, from indigenous plants,
long familiar to the Guarani Indians.23

20
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

To enlarge wool production, the state estancias raised sheep. Sheep were
also raised in those regions which were major textile producers such as
Acahaf, Capiata, Pirayn, and Quiindi. By 1864 the availability of wool
increased the production of woollen cloth for wartime use. The domestic
textile industry produced common cloth in great quantities. It also
continued to turn out some fine materials and embroidered items, as some
women wove fine linen handkerchiefs and embroidered and dyed fine
shirts.24
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Other important industries were paper production and medical supplies.

Under the direction of the Minister of the Interior, Saturnino Bedoya,
assisted by Robert Von Fischer Treuenfeldt and wounded veterans,
Paraguay began a paper industry using native plants to produce newsprint
and other types of paper. In May 1867 El Semanario and Centinela were
printed on the first newsprint manufactured in Paraguay. Within a year the
industry was supplying paper for Cabichut and other war journals.25 Since
Paraguay could no longer import drugs, doctors and paramedics resorted to
traditional medicines. Pharmacists distilled aguardiente and wine to
provide hospitals with alcohol.26
Some industries which had previously produced peacetime goods were
redirected to support the war effort. By April of 1865 the foundry of Ybycui
was producing mostly war materials: cannons, hand grenades and mortars.
The foundry operated until13 May 1868 when Brazilians demolished it.27
Blasting powder production, which dated from colonial times and was
partly in private hands, was expanded to meet the war needs. The foundry
at Ybicui made mortars and the Valenzuela region, which had both sulphur
and saltpetre, became the centre of the explosives industry. Pedro Jara
opened a new saltpetre factory at San Juan Nepomuceno, and by the end of
the war the districts of Bobf, Yuty, Ajos, Barrera Grande, San Jose de los
Arroyos, and Caraguatay were also producing saltpetre. To support the
metal industry the government began to mine manganese in northern
districts and copper near Itapua.28
The shipyard, steam sawmill, and arsenal at Asunci6n also supported the
war needs. Between 1866 and 1868 the shipyard did not begin any new
large steamers, but it continued to construct smaller craft used to carry
troops and supplies. The major function of the shipyard and arsenal was to
maintain and repair ships. River towns constructed canoes, lighters, and
launches which were utilised for the war effort rather than commerce. For
example, in 1865 the government ordered sixteen interior and northern
districts to construct 446 canoes of 12 to 15 varas in length.29

21
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

Trade and contacts during the war

Despite the Allied blockade of river traffic, internal trade and some foreign
business which supported war needs continued. The ability of Paraguay to
continue the war depended on transporting produce, manufactures, men
and supplies. The Paraguayan road and river system maintained internal
trade and supported the integrated national economy.
The war increased the risks and difficulties of foreign commercial
operations. The Allied blockade of Paraguay was initially irregularly
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enforced, but it became increasingly difficult for goods to pass the blockade.
In February of 1865 some Argentine merchants managed to provide
Paraguay with clothing for the troops and other imports in exchange for
yerba mate, but by 1868 the Allies were rigorously enforcing the blockade,
making foreign trade extremely difficult.30 The Paraguayan government
refused foreigners passports to travel to the interior and prohibited
nationals from selling large quantities of food which might be needed by the
army.31
Import-export merchants were frustrated by the lack of produce and specie
(metallic coins) and the government control of commerce. Many
businessmen with considerable capital in paper money, which was rapidly
decreasing in value and of no use in Buenos Aires, could convert it into
merchandise or metallic coins only at high risk or substantial cost.
Wholesale and retail prices of imported goods increased, which brought
unexpected profits for goods already imported, but profits could not be
realised in Buenos Aires, as tobacco and yerba were unavailable and specie
could be obtained only at a very unfavourable exchange rate, plus the
payment of a six per cent export duty. Thus, many foreigners, merchants,
druggists, hatters, and shoemakers, sought early in the war to liquidate
their businesses and to leave Paraguay. By December 1865, imports, valued
at only 14,997 pesos, arrived on three ships, one national and two foreign;
by comparison, the previous month's imports, worth 126,433 pesos, arrived
in two national and seventeen foreign ships. Nevertheless, the value of
exports appeared normal as merchants liquidated their businesses and
exported profits. 32
Merchants who experienced confiscations and devastation of property due
to military campaigns sought indemnity. Once war was officially declared,
Paraguay confiscated goods belonging to the Allied nationals or perceived
sympathisers. Although foreign governments often successfully defended
the interests of their nationals, Paraguayans whose goods were confiscated,
were not so fortunate since the government required loyalty of its citizens
and they had no means of challenging government policies. Both foreigners
and nationals who were imprisoned had their property confiscated. The
result of confiscations was that the government obtained some imports at
pre-war prices. Although confiscated property provided additional income to
the governments, it was of minor significance. sa

22
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

Throughout the war the government developed new commercial contacts as

it sought to encourage foreign trade (see map 2 on following page). A small
amount of trade was carried on with Bolivia, while Corrientes, sympathetic
to Paraguay, remained a major trading partner that provided contraband
goods. Francisco Solano Lopez had hoped to finance the war by selling yerba
mate, but the increasingly effective blockade of the Parana River, the
decrease in yerba harvesting, and the consumption of yerba by the troops
severely limited that possibility. Some Paraguayan produce reached
Corrientes and entered international markets through it and other
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Argentine border towns. In March 1865 George Stewart was selling yerba
mate purchased from the Paraguayan government in Buenos Aires. The
16,100 arrobas (402,500 pounds) of his yerba mate, which was initially
seized by the Buenos Aires government, was eventually released as it
belonged to his brother, Robert Stewart, a British merchant in Buenos
Aires. Stewart and Co. made a solid profit. Around the same time the
government furnished considerable quantities of yerba to several English
businessman, including Mr. Lanuz, who had operated a shipping company
between Buenos Aires and Asuncion. Although most yerba was traded in
domestic markets, the government through 1868 exported some despite the
blockade; however, it was merchant entrepreneurs rather than the
Paraguayan government who reaped the most profit.34
During the war most of Paraguay's legal and contraband trade continued to
pass through Corrientes. While much of the Paraguayan trade must have
gone unreported, even as late as 1868 the Corrientes customs house
recorded duties on Paraguayan imports. The contraband and legal
commerce through Corrientes most likely made its way to Buenos Aires.35
In 1867 Corrientes detained ships from Buenos Aires and Montevideo
carrying supplies and equipment for Allied troops and forced them to pay
duties of 23 per cent.36
Costly overland transportation made trade with Bolivia insignificant even
during wartime, when, for economic and political reasons, the Paraguayan
government emphasised friendship with Bolivia and expanded
communications and commerce.37 The government sought to improve
transportation links with Bolivia by opening a road to Corumba. Money was
contributed by the Sociedad Progresista de Bolivia to continue the road
from Bahia Negra, Paraguay to Santiago de Chiquitos, Bolivia, but an
individual absconded with the funds.38 A decree of Francisco Solano Lopez
on 22 February 1867 encouraged trade with Bolivia, and merchants from
the Bolivian provinces who wished to trade with Paraguay by the Corumba
road and the Paraguay River were welcomed and prote<;ted. They were
permitted to export specie to Bolivia to pay for imports and exports that
were also exempted from duty.39

23
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

KEY
CJ Ceded to Brazil 1870
Ill Ceded to Ar,rentina 1874
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.........

Map2

24
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

Despite all the difficulties, Bolivian merchants, tempted by large profits,

brought some produce and goods to Asuncion. Commerce with Bolivia
increased in 1867 and 1868. El Semanario reported on 24 August 1867 that
eight merchants had arrived from Bolivia via Corumba with imports. In
December 1867 the French consul noted the arrival of several canoes of
provisions from Bolivia. Goods brought by two merchants from Bolivia in
April 1868 were valued at 16,000 pesos.40 Bolivian commerce was further
encouraged by requiring merchants to pay Bolivians in bullion at
favourable exchange rates. By April 1868, Bolivian merchants occasionally
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brought sugar and coffee from their home districts and imported English
textiles from Peru. To facilitate imports and to free administrative
personnel for other occupations, the government lifted all duties. Although
meaningless, the government in 1868 prohibited commerce with Brazil,
Argentina and Uruguay. Paraguay pursued new alliances with Bolivia,
Peru, and Chile, which sought to mediate between the Triple Alliance and
Paraguay, and encouraged the sympathy of France and Italy.41
Although import-export trade was drastically reduced by the war, the
government encouraged and controlled internal trade. Paraguayans
adjusted to the war by growing different produce, manufacturing primarily
war materials, and facing shortages. Luxury items were unavailable and
trade routes had to take account of military operations. The government
sought to ensure that food was available by limiting the sale of large
quantities of staples. Thus police sometimes prohibited merchants in the
Asuncion market from selling more than nine kilograms of flour or manioc
to the same person.42
Amidst complaints of shortages, high prices, and poor quality, produce
continued to come from the interior to Asunci6n, which remained an active
commercial city until abandoned to the Allies near the end of the war. Some
entrepreneurs also established profitable new businesses which supported
war efforts. For example, Marcos Quaranta set up a bakery in Tuyuty in
1866. When the war was over in 1869, he moved to Asuncion, where his
business expanded to include a noodle factory and a flour mill in 1885.43
Manuel Ferraro in 1867 started importing and exporting leather goods as
well as selling general merchandise, and this firm was still in operation in
1906.44
Individuals needed authorisation to bring yerba from the interior;
otherwise, the government confiscated it and fined the transporter on the
assumption that it was being smuggled abroad. The government also
stiffened penalties and at times imprisoned smugglers. For example, in
1866 the government apprehended and imprisoned three of six individuals
involved in smuggling 3158 pounds ofyerba from the interior to Asunci6n.45
Only as the end of the war approached did the commercial situation of
Asuncion become impossible. In February 1869, an observer noted many

25
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

destroyed and abandoned buildings in the city, which by then lacked most
amenities.46 By April the market place was barren, the shops were but
miserable stores rather like those found in the 'camp-towns' of the
Argentine Republic, and the few businessmen remaining sought to liquidate
their businesses at all speed. Some abandoned the city, leaving hides and
tobacco, which they eventually tried to claim from the Allied Commission.
After the Allies entered Asuncion on 5 January 1869, foreign merchants
returned in numbers, some setting up booths to sell imports as well as
items left by fleeing Paraguayans and to enjoy the free market system
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which the Paraguayan war regulations had denied them.47

An examination of Paraguayan external trade during the war suggests that
through contraband and legal trade merchants continued to import and
export at a much reduced level. Although the government directed trade
toward the import of military essentials, it was not able always to enforce
its regulations. Merchants sought to bring in goods that sold well in the
market. Early in the war, advertisements in El Semanario announced the
arrival of goods from Paris and the auction ofimports.48
The military acquisition of carts, pack horses, river steamers and small
river boats reduced internal trade. Shortages were caused not by scarcity of
produce, but by inability to transport it, since carts and boats could not be
constructed rapidly enough to meet needs. The government encouraged the
continued construction of small boats and carts for civilian and military use,
but production lagged since women lacked skills in construction. Conveying
goods along roads was slow, and the preferred means of travel was by river.
War vessels protected the Paraguay river so that steamers could provision
army bases, and canoes could operate on smaller rivers and streams.
Paraguayan agricultural production was large enough, but limited
transport led to an ill-fed army, since much of the fighting was carried on in
the lightly populated southern region, away from easy river supply lines.
Even in peacetime, when the harvest was abundant, merchants and
farmers complained about the shortage of carts.49
The great war decreased external communications. When the blockade of
Paraguay began in early 1865, Paraguay initially cut communications.
Nevertheless, diplomatic correspondence continued to reach Asunci6n, with
Corrientes serving as an exchange point. Thus, the French consul in Buenos
Aires at the suggestion of the former foreign minister, Jose Berges, sent
despatches to an agent in Corrientes who forwarded them to Asunci6n.50
Only in April1868 did Charles A. Washburn, the United States minister to
Paraguay, complain that he had not received any correspondence from
Buenos Aires for three months. The blockading nations allowed diplomatic
correspondence between Buenos Aires and Asunci6n, although it arrived
irregularly. A three months' lapse in correspondence was common in
nineteenth century Paraguay, even during peacetime, but diplomatic

26
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

communications became more difficult during the last year of the war.51 By
September 1868, when the Allies controlled Humaita and Villa Pilar, river
steamers regularly travelled between Buenos Aires and the Paraguayan
port carrying passengers and army supplies. 52

Government finances during the war

As might be expected, the war adversely affected Paraguayan income,
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expenditures, and currency; total war required the focusing of government

finance on war efforts. Dependent on trade and state production for
revenues, the decrease in foreign trade caused a reduction in the customs
duties collected by the government, while state production in both
agriculture and industry went to support the war effort. In addition to
cutting some costs, Francisco Solano Lopez decreed on 10 April 1865 that
government purchases could be paid entirely in paper currency rather than
the customary one-third in specie. The government saved specie for foreign
exchange and paid internal costs with cheap paper currency. By 1866 specie
represented only four per cent of the government's income and
expenditures.53
With decreased revenues, the government printed currency to finance
military expenditures, and it paid no attention to the relationship of paper
currency to gold or silver. Inflation and devaluation followed. The
government in 1865 decreed that an ounce of gold was equal to 30 paper
pesos, but it actually varied within Paraguay from 40 to 50 pesos per gold
ounce. Beginning the year in 1865 at 28 paper pesos per ounce, by August it
reached 44 to 50, a depreciation of 57 per cent to 78 per cent. In 1866
Paraguayan currency depreciated at least 10 per cent. Even though in April
1868 the government emitted paper currency worth 645,024 pesos, new
revenues limited the depreciation of Paraguayan currency to 5 per cent a
year in 1867 and 1868. From the beginning of the war until December 1869,
paper currency depreciated more than 150 per cent. 54 Paraguayan currency
depreciated even more rapidly externally so that in Corrientes in 1865, 60
Paraguayan paper pesos were needed to buy one ounce of gold and by mid
1867 an ounce of gold sold for between 85 and 95 paper pesos. 55
Donations of money, cattle, cigars and jewellery from various regions
supported the war effort. That Paraguayan currency did not depreciate
more rapidly was a direct result of the minting of gold and silver coins and
tax revenues. The government issued silver coins in 1864 and 1866 from
government specie, and the donations of jewels and gold to the war effort by
Paraguayan women in 1867 allowed for further minting of gold and silver
coins. On 11 September 1867 the government minted a gold coin worth four
pesos, followed by silver coins in 1868 and additional gold coins in 1869 cut
from coins minted in Lima. Between 1866 and 1869 the government took

27
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

Bolivian gold coins and divided them into two, four, or eight parts
representing two, four or eight pesos, and divided Bolivian silver coins into
one, two, and four parts which were stamped as one, two, or four reales
coins. The issuance of paper currency and gold and silver coins did not
alleviate the shortage of small coins that hindered business transactions.56
In spite of donations of jewels, gold and silver to the war effort, the shortage
of coins and the depositing of valuables with foreign diplomats suggests
that gold and silver were hoarded or taken out of the country. In October of
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1868, under the protection of an Italian gunboat, William Stewart sent to

his brother George Duncan Stewart in Buenos Aires 4,400 ounces of coined
gold and 4659.5 silver pesos which belonged to Francisco Solano L6pez, to
pay accounts and provide income if the war was lost. 57 Nor did this large
shipment completely bankrupt the treasury, since the Paraguayan military
transferred thirty-one boxes of paper currency and specie to Luque when
the capital was moved there in April of 1868.58 The cost of the war
destroyed the nation's monetary system since little specie remained to
support the paper money, making it worthless by 1870. The sacking of
Asunci6n by the Allied powers also led to the loss of specie which might
have given some value to the greatly depreciated currency.

Society and war

Total war required the support of all sectors of society: men, women,
indigenous population, blacks and foreigners. The military eventually
required all able-bodied men, some as young as twelve, to fight the Allies.
Although Paraguayan men over the age of seventeen had served in the
military each year from eight days to two months during peace time, they
had primarily worked in state enterprises.59 Some soldiers continued to
work in industry and on state farms and ranches, but military demands
forced the curtailment of state enterprises. Increasingly, two important
groups supported the army on the home front: Paraguayan women, who
provided necessary labour on the farms, and foreigners, who provided
technical skills in industries. In addition, the small black population and
some indigenous peoples helped to maintain the economy. The shortage of
labour was exacerbated by cholera and yellow fever epidemics that reduced
the civilian and military population. Although the war cost Paraguay
between 8. 7 and 18.5 per cent of her prewar population, (not the frequently
asserted 50 per cent) deaths, injuries, and migrations reduced economic
production. GO
In 1864 the Paraguayan army consisted of 37 batallions and 29 regiments,
with a total of 35,305 soldiers and 3,306 officers. Paraguay fielded no more
than 30,000 to 40,000 troops at any given time, and inducted into service
70,000 to 80,000 during the five-year war, out of a population between

28
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

312,000 and 407,000.6 1 Obviously, Paraguay faced a manpower shortage by

1868, for the early drafts inducted those most eligible and the male
population was small in comparison with the Allies. Mortalities, injuries,
and desertion reduced the pool of able bodied men.62 By 1867 the
Paraguayan army may have had no more than 20,000 men facing the Allies,
who fielded twice as many.63
Paraguayan women had always been an important labour force on the
farms and in the marketing of produce, so the economic demands made
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upon them were not entirely new. Before the war women headed one-third
of rural households and provided most of the agriculturallabour.64 Due to
the relatively small Paraguayan population and the military demands of
the great war, which enlisted a large portion of the male population, the
economic burden increasingly fell upon women of all social classes. Some
women served as labourers in military units or provided nursing services,
but most chose to maintain their homes and continue to work in agriculture
and home industries. Women produced most of the food for civilian and
military use in their own fields and on state estancias. Women also carried
out responsibilities in every type of commercial establishment, including
jobs that generally had been reserved for men, such as butchering.65
The war required a range of sacrifices from women. Wealthy women
donated their jewels to finance the war. Poor women made other sacrifices.
For example, Nieves Martinez, who had no jewels, gave 2,291 ears of corn
for the soldiers. Women suffered the loss of children, husbands, and
brothers as well as material possessions, and a few served prison terms for
opposition to the war.66
As during prewar years, British, French, German and Italian technicians
and immigrants provided important services to Paraguay. They worked as
carpenters, blacksmiths, tinsmiths, tailors, small farmers, retailers, and
merchants; and they taught the military, repaired equipment, and
constructed and directed war industries.67 Without skilled foreigners, the
war probably would have been shorter. The British community largely
withdrew when the war broke out and their contracts with the Paraguayan
government ended. However, some technicians contracted by Blyth and
Company on behalf of the Paraguayan government continued to work
throughout the great war. In early 1865 at least 47 British engineers and
mechanics, many with wives and children, worked in the Paraguayan
arsenal and shipyard, served on river steamers turned into warships, or
helped in the construction and operation of the railroad. Another ten served
in other positions, including at least five in the medical profession. 58
Of the foreigners, individual Britons received the most recognition for their
contributions to Paraguay and the government honoured them as heroes of
Paraguay. For example, William K. Whytehead, director of the arsenal, who
committed suicide in a period of mental depression during the first year of

29
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

the war, produced the heavy calibre field and siege guns used by the army
at Humaita. George Thompson, a civil engineer and a self-taught military
engineer, designed the fortifications and batteries which aided Paraguayan
victories against the Allies and even commanded a garrison near the end of
the war. Charles Twite, a mineralogist, helped to extract sulphur and to
prepare saltpetre for gunpowder, and he also worked in the foundry.
Paraguay needed the medical abilities of John Fox, James Rhind, Frederick
Skinner, William Stewart and the pharmacist, George Frederick
Masterman, who with limited resources saved the lives of many
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Paraguayan troops.
The German community was less visible than the British, but in early 1869
there were at least 18 German subjects in Paraguay. Robert Von Fischer
Treuenfeldt made the most significant contribution to the Paraguayan war
effort as both an engineer and director of the telegraph. He laid most of the
telegraph lines during the war, trained Paraguayan telegraphers and aided
in designing machines for both the paper industry at Luque and the textile
industry. There were at least four German merchants and a distiller who
had married a Paraguayan. There was also a German school master, a
doctor and several artisans. A bricklayer, three blacksmiths, a cigar maker
and a distiller were useful in an economy short of skilled personneJ.69
Foreigners also made sacrifices. The great war increased their vulnerability
to tropical diseases and to a military death. Further, they had to refocus
their efforts from contributing to Paraguayan development to protecting
Paraguayan autonomy. In spite of government contracts, foreigners did not
receive payment in gold after the commencement of the war, but rather
salaries were paid in the continually depreciating paper currency. They
complained about the unavailability of preferred foods, such as wheat bread
and beef. Those working for the government were forced to move to Caacupe
in February 1868 when Asunci6n was abandoned. From the beginning of
the great war, Argentine and Brazilian nationals faced social discrimination
and even imprisonment. 70
Despite difficulties suffered by foreigners, complaints were surprisingly few.
In May and June of 1865 a British gunboat visited Asunci6n, Corrientes,
and other towns on the Parana and offered to take English citizens to
Buenos Aires, but few took advantage of the offer. Two months later the
British government investigated the need to send a British warship up the
Parana to rescue Britons, but, having received complaints only about the
seizure of a few horses and cattle, it decided that a show of force was
unnecessary. 71 Those foreigners with needed skills were discouraged from
leaving Paraguay, although even as late as November 1868, Francisco
Solano L6pez allowed 15 Britons, including some with useful skills, to leave
if they paid their own fare and went directly to Europe and did not land at
any port belonging to nations at war with Paraguay.72 Notwithstanding

30
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

foreign criticism of Paraguayan government policies and later criticism of

Francisco Solano L6pez after his death, as late as July 1869, foreigners
appeared to be faring well. General Martin McMahon, United States
Minister to Paraguay, on his way home through Buenos Aires in July of
1869, reported that the British subjects at General Lopez's headquarters
were in good health and not interested in leaving Paraguay. McMahon
brought with him considerable amounts of money from British subjects,
who in some cases had received salary advances, to be remitted to parties in
Europe and America. 73
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The role of the indigenous population in the great war has barely been
studied. Some, such as the M'bayas and the Cadueveos, fought on the side
of the Brazilians in the Mato Grosso campaign. The Tobas, on the other
hand, although putting their own interest in obtaining arms for hunting
above Paraguay's interest, favoured Francisco Solano L6pez. Indigenous
people who lived near populated regions and who were at least partly
acculturated were required to serve in the military, as they had throughout
the century.74
The Paraguayan government freed a majority of healthy Mrican male
slaves during the war to fight for Paraguay, and conscripted free blacks to
serve in the military. Free blacks joined the Paraguayan army at the very
beginning of the conflict. The next group recruited into the army were the
libertos or slaves working on state estancias and state projects. By the end
of 1866, the government was enlisting male libertos and slaves from private
citizens and offering compensation to the owners, who rarely requested
payment. Those who could not serve in the military-women, children, the
infirm, and the aged-remained in slavery during the war.75 The few blacks
paid dearly for their freedom, since military mortality rates appear to have
been high. According to the census of 1846, there were 7,893 slaves and 523
libertos, making the slave population only 3.51 per cent of all Paraguayans.
Within two generations of the war only a few enclaves of blacks existed in
the Paraguayan countryside due to racial assimilation and mortality during
the war.76
Total war required sacrifices of all sectors of the population and affected all
levels of society. Thus, the government sought to provide public funds to
families that were forced to leave their districts because of the war and
needed food and housing, while the Asuncion elite gave balls to raise money
for the war. New art forms appeared in the form of woodcut illustrations in
newspapers that reflected the spirit and hardships of the war.77
Without doubt the War of the Triple Alliance had a devastating impact on
the Paraguayan people. It affected people differently depending on their
social class, sex, age, ethnicity and the particular year of the war. Between
1865 and 1867, although foreigners and the elite resented the loss of
imported foods and luxuries, most rural families dependent on their own

31
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

production made few material sacrifices. But as the state called up more
men to serve in the army, mortality increased; Paraguay lost territory to
the Allies and life became more difficult for all groups. Between 1867 and
1869, basic foods of manioc, corn, beans and even fruit were available, but
tobacco, sugar, and yerba mate increased in price as quantities decreased.
Imported textiles were no longer available and women wove to provide
military and civilian necessities. Shirts and ponchos, while durable, were of
rough fibre and uncomfortable in summer heat. Rural families were
accustomed to home medical remedies and were not dependent on imported
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medicines, although most certainly shortages contributed to both military

and civilian hospital deaths.
The government requisition of carts and canoes made it difficult to get
limited surpluses to market. The shortage of coins might affect rural
families, but in most cases many farmers had bartered before the war and
simply increased this practice. Those on salaries, such as school teachers
and government officials, felt the effect of currency depreciation. The
sacrifice of gold and silver jewellery to the war effort may have made
women fear for the future though they enjoyed the recognition they received
for their sacrifices. Foreigners and the elite feared imprisonment for
criticism of Francisco Solano L6pez and military failures, but most rural
families seemed little concerned about loss of civil liberties. By 1869 the loss
of loved ones, the increasing difficulty of planting crops as the war came
ever nearer, and the unpredictability of the future, made the War of the
Triple Alliance a tragic event for all Paraguayans. 78

Conclusions
Paraguay was able to prevent defeat for five years due to the political,
economic and social strengths of its society coupled with Allied
incompetence. Francisco Solano L6pez successfully employed the political-
economic system to sustain total war. Although Paraguay had a small
labour force and weak industrial base, the nation effectively used its
population, skills, and resources. Small farms and government estates
assured Paraguay's self-sufficiency in agricultural production. The
government redirected the national foundry and shipyard to military
production, promoted domestic textile production and encouraged the
utilisation of local plants for medicine.
To distribute goods and produce, the government fostered internal
commerce and opened new foreign trade avenues. Although shortages
developed, Paraguayan roads and rivers supported the essential war efforts.
When foreign trade, the traditional basis of government revenues, declined,
the state financed the war by printing paper currency and requisitioning
gold and silver.

32
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

Popular support for the war aided the redirection of the economy, made
possible the commitment to total war, and assured a long Paraguayan
resistance against larger and wealthier nations. Paraguayan men continued
to join the military until near the war's end, while women and children both
laboured on the home front and went to war. Foreigners provided technical
skills. The redirection of the economy for total war resulted in a long and
costly war for Paraguay and the Allies, but it could not produce a
Paraguayan victory against nations with greater resources.
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The long war caused hardships and disillusionment for the population as
the Paraguayan economy and society were sacrificed to wartime needs. The
Allied armies destroyed property, while military fatalities, disease, and
migration reduced the population. Civil liberties were increasingly
sacrificed to total war as the number of lost battles increased.
Demoralisation of the population increased as the Allies claimed
Paraguayan territory, the number of homeless multiplied, and casualties
rose. Decreased support for the government resulted in hoarding and the
migration of families into frontier areas or across borders.
Paradoxically, the Paraguayan economy which sustained the long war led
in the end to the defeat which destroyed the economic system. The long
national commitment to state enterprises and a state-directed economy
ceased, as did reliance on internal finance for development. State industries
were destroyed, and the foreign population that had nurtured technical
development fled.79 After 50 years of economic development under three
rulers, all that remained was the village farm and market system that had
been basic to Paraguay since the time of independence. The crushing defeat
ended Paraguay's self-sufficiency and drastically altered Paraguay's future.
But total war secured Paraguay's political autonomy and role as a buffer
state in the Rio de la Plata.

Notes
The Postdoctoral Fellow Program of the Tinker Foundation and the Social
Science Research Council made this research possible.
1 For a basic summary of Latin American military conflicts see Simon Collier,
'Wars in Latin America', The Cambridge Encyclopedia of Latin America and
the Caribbean, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1985, pp. 288-290.
2 Vera Blinn Reber, 'The Demographics of Paraguay: A Reinterpretation of the
Great War, 1864-70', Hispanic American Historical Review, 68:2, May 1988,
note 1, lists the various historical explanations. The revaluation of
Paraguayan mortality has also produced a heated debate. See Thomas L.
Whigham and Barbara Potthast, 'Some Strong Reservations: A Critique of
Vera Blinn Reber'e "The Demographics of Paraguay: A Reinterpretation of the
Great War, 186~-70."', Hispanic American Historical Review, 70:4 November
1990, pp. 667-78.

33
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

3 Diego Abente, 'The War of the Triple Alliance: Three Explanatory Models',
Latin American Research Review, 22:2, 1987, pp. 47-65 provides the most
satisfactory explanation to date for the outbreak and duration of the Great
War. Abente examines three competing models: imperialism, balance of
power, and power transition and concludes that a modified power transition
model, with emphasis on economic change and modernisation rather than
stability, is the key to understanding the Great War.
4 Politicians and economists view self-sufficiency in different terms.
Governments do not want to be dependent on other nations for their basic
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food supplies and raw materials for fear that foreign suppliers will control
prices. For the economist the law of 'comparative advantage' should be
utilised to assure that produce and products are produced at the most
efficient level.
5 The concept of 'total war' has been used primarily in reference to World War I
and II. However, Edward Samuel Corwin, Total War and the Constitution,
Freeport, New York, Books for Libraries Press, 1947, pp. 3-6 argues that
total war is as old as recorded history and that within U.S. history Anglo-
American policy toward the Indigenous population as well as the Civil War
represent total war. Jurg Meister, 'River Operations of the Triple Alliance
against Paraguay, 1864-70', Marine Rundschau, West German, 69:10, 1972,
pp. 594-616 and 69:11, 1972, pp. 660-675 argues that the War of the Triple
Alliance was the first total war in modern history.
6 Richard White, Paraguay's Autonomous Revolution, 1810-1840, Albuquerque,
NM, University of New Mexico Press, 1978 viewed Rodriguez de Francia as a
populist and argued that Paraguay underwent an autonomous revolution. The
author is in general agreement with White, although she views both
Rodriguez de Francia and C.A. LOpez as pragmatists who modernised
Paraguay through the use of internal resources. Although Thomas Whigham,
The Politics of River Trade: Tradition and Development in the Upper Plate,
1780-1870, Albuquerque, NM University of New Mexico Press, 1991, also a
revisionist, views the nineteenth century rulers of Paraguay as nationalists as
does John Hoyt William, The Rise and Fall of the Paraguayan Republic,
1800-1870, Austin, Texas, 1979. The most interesting challenge to the state-
led industrialisation in Paraguay is Mario Pastore, 'State-led Indust-
rialisation; The Evidence on Paraguay, 1852-1870', Journal of Latin
American Studies, 26:2, May 1994, pp. 295-324; he shows that the economic
investments of the state were limited, but also provides evidence of economic
growth which could be utilised in the war efforts.
7 El Eco del Paraguay (Asuncion), 13 Nov. 1856, pp. 345-6; Manuel Dominguez,
La constituci6n del Paraguay, 3 vols., Asuncion, Talleres Graficos del Estado,
1912, p. 41.
8 Edward Hopkins to James Buchanan, N.S. Saratoga at Sea, Feb. 1846,
United States National Archives, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited as USNA),
Department of State (hereafter cited as DS), Special Agent (hereafter cited as
SA), Dispatch (hereafter cited as D) 7; C.A. Henderson to Earl of Clarendon,
Asuncion, Dec. 10, 1855, Public Record Office (hereafter cited as PRO),
Foreign Office (hereafter cited as FO), 59/12, p. 298; Sueldos de los empleados

34
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

civiles, 1863, Archivo Nacional (hereafter cited as ANA), Seccion Nueva

Encuadernacion (hereafter cited as SNE), 2275.
9 C.A. Henderson to Earl of Clarendon, 'Report on the Commerce, Industry',
Asuncion, 3 Feb. 1856, PRO,FO, 59/15. Jose Antonio Soares de Souza, 'Urn
Brasileiro no Paraguai em 1849', Revista do Instituto Hist6rico e Geografico
Brasileiro, 234, Jan-March 1957, pp. 6-8.
10 C.A. Henderson to Earl of Clarendon, Asuncion, 3 Feb. 1856, PRO, FO, 59/15,
p. 34; Edward Hopkins to James Buchanan, N.S. Sloop Saratoga at Sea, Feb.
1845, USNA, DS, SA, 1843-1846.
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11 For a more detailed discussion see my 'Small Farmers in the Economy: The
Paraguayan Example, 1810-1865', The Americas, 51:4, April 1995,
pp. 495-524.
12 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, Archives du
Departmento des Affaires Etrangeres, Paris (hereafter cited as AAEP),
Correspondance consulaire et commerciale (hereafter cited as CCC), II, 257;
Charles A. Washburn, The History of Paraguay with Notes of Personal
Observations and Reminiscences of Diplomacy under Difficulty, 2 vols.,
Boston, Lee and Shepard, 1871, 2:177; Efrain Cardozo, Hace cien afios:
cr6nicas de la guerra de 1864-1870, 13 vols., Asuncion, Ediciones Emasa,
1966-1972,6: 89.
13 Various bills, 1865-66, ANA, SNE 2833; Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de
Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC, II; Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn
de Lhuys, Asuncion, 5 July 1866, AAEP, Correspondance politique (hereafter
cited as CP), IV, 159.
14 Felix Candia to President of the Republic, Ytapua, 2 Feb. 1868, ANA, Seccion
Historia (hereafter cited as SH) 356; Villa Oliva, 31 Jan. 1868, ANA, SH 356;
Annex to a political dispatch, 20 Feb. 1869, AAEP, CP Argentine, Vol. 47, no.
79; Reber, 'Demographics of Paraguay', p. 316.
15 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC,
II, 259; Cuverville to Moustier, Luque, 20 June 1868, AAEP, CP Paraguay,
IV, 239-240.
16 Correspondence, 31 March 1867, ANA, SNE 2852; Razon que presentado ala
tesoreria general de todo el tabaco, 30 June 1864, ANA, SNE 3071.
17 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC
Asuncion, II.
18 Carodzo, Hace cien afios, VI, p. 133.
19 The State began encouraging cotton production for export as early as 1861,
but with the war, cotton was needed for domestic consumption. See Thomas
Whigham, 'Paraguay and the World Cotton Market; The "Crisis" of the 1860s',
Agricultural History, 8:3, Summer 1994, pp. 6-13.
20 Porter C. Bliss and George F. Masterman, Memorial of Porter C. Bliss and
George F. Masterman in Relation to their Imprisonment in Paraguay,
Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1869, p. 223.

35
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

21 Like most Paraguayan statistics, the suggestion that the cattle population
was reduced from two million head before the war to a mere 15,000 at the end
of the war is certainly exaggerated. Annex to a political dispatch, 20 Feb.
1869, AAEP, CP Argentine, vol. 47, no. 79; Correspondence, 9 Asuncion, 9
Nov. 1869, ANA, Coleco Visconde Rio Branco (hereafter cited as CRB),
1-30,23,178; Irene Szumaztji de Arad, 'La ganaderia en el Paraguay: periodo
1870-1900', Reuista Paraguaya de Sociolog(a, 10:28, Sept.-Dec. 1973,
pp. 187-9.
22 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC,
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II, 257; Juan F. Perez Acosta, Carlos Antonio LOpez: obrero maximo. Labor
administratiua y constructiua, Asuncion, Guarania, 1948, pp. 17, 23.
23 Gordon to Earl of Aberdeen, Hampton, Wick, 29 April 1843, PRO, FO, 121202;
Perez Acosta, Carlos Antonio LOpez, pp. 15, 20-23, 26, 69-70.
24 Perez Acosta, Carlos Antonio LOpez, pp. 21, 25-26, 69.
25 El Semanario, 11 May 1867, p. 3.
26 El Semanario, 13 July 1867, p. 3.
27 Thomas Lyle Whigham, 'The Iron Works of Ybycui: Paraguayan Industrial
Development iJl the Mid-Nineteenth Century', The Americas, 35:2, Oct. 1978,
pp. 213-14.
28 Perez Acosta, Carlos Antonio LOpez, 64-66; John Hoyt Williams, Paraguayan
Republic, pp. 119, 220.
29 Circular sobre construcciones de canoas, 1865, ANA, SH 344, no. 12; L. B.
Yubero and A. F. Antunex, Industria nacional: descripci6n de las diversas
fabricas industrias establecidas en la Asunci6n del Paraguay, Asunci6n, Casa
l!:ditora Tip. de 'La Opini6n', 1897, p. 59; Josetina Pia, The British in
Paraguay, 1850-1870, translated from the Spanish by Brian Charles
MacDormot, Richmond, Surrey, The Richmond Publishing Co., Ltd., 1976,
p. 151.
30 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asunci6n, 6 Feb., 23 Sept. 1865, AAEP,
CCC Asuncion 2; Cuverville to Moustier, Luque 20 June 1868, AAEP, CP
Paraguay, IV, p. 239.
31 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CP
Paraguay 4, p. 104.
32 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1864 and 20 Aug.
1865, AAEP, CCC, 2.
33 Washburn to Jose Berges, 31 Dec. 1866, 16 Jan. 1867, 6 March 1867, 14 Oct.
1867, USNA, DS, Consular Dispatches from the U.S. Consuls in Asunci6n,
(hereafter cited as CD) T329; Affaires Diverses Politique, Paraguay, 1867,
AAEP, dossier no. 5; London Times, 21 Aug. 1865, p. 6; Washburn, History of
Paraguay, pp. 29-31 lists seventy-eight 'leading' citiz~ns of Asuncion,
primarily government appointments and bureaucrats, who pledged their lives
and fortunes to the war efforts; the three merchants on the list died as did
most of the others.

36
 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

34 Vera Blinn Reber, 'Commerce and Industry in Nineteenth Century Paraguay',

The Americas, 42:1, July 1985, p. 51; Harris Gaylord Warren, 'Dr. William
Stewart in Paraguay, 1857-1869,' The Americas, 25:3, Jan 1969, p. 255; Libra
de caja de tesorer(a y colectur(a general de la Republica, 1867, ANA, Seccion
Libras de Caja (hereafter cited as SLC), vol. 67.
35 Although the Argentine Republic, Registro estadistico de la Republica
Argentina, Buenos Aires, lmprenta de Pablo E. Coni, 1871, p. 309 reports no
trade with Paraguay between 1865 and 1869, trade continued with
Argentina's northern provinces. Further, it was quite customary for
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Paraguayan exports to be claimed as those of Corrientes which made it

difficult throughout the nineteenth century to measure the trade of Paraguay.
36 Eduardo Acevedo, Anales hist6ricos del Uruguay, Montevideo, Casa A.
Barreiro y Ramos, 1933, III, p. 483.
37 Jose Berges to Ricardo Bustamante, Asuncion, Oct. 1866, ANA, CRB
1-20,27,68, no. 4; Jose Berges to Francisco Solano L6pez, Asuncion, 29 Aug.
1868, ANA, CRB 1-30,13,27; W. Gould to G.B. Matthew, Headquarters
Paraguayan Army Paso Pricu, 10 Sept. 1867, PRO, FO 6/268.
38 Juan Y. Carcia to Hermogenes Cabral, Santa Coraz6n, 14 April1866, 13 June
1866, ANA, CRB, 1-20,17,45, no. 2; Jose Berges to F. S. L6pez, Asuncion, 29
Aug. 1868, ANA, CRB, 1-30,13,37.
39 Jose Berges to the Foreign Minister of the Republic of Bolivia, Asuncion, 27
Feb. 1867, ANA, CRB, 1-22,22,2 no. 9; El Semanario, 25 Feb. 1867, p. 1.
40 Jose Berges to Mariano Donato Munoz, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Republic of Bolivia, Asuncion, Aug. 1867, ANA, CRB 1-30,9,14, no. 2;
Cuverville to the Minister of Fore.ign Affairs, Luque 8 April 1868, Archives
Nationales, Paris, France (hereafter cited as ANP), Commerce et Industria
(hereafter cited as Cl), F12 7153; El Semanario, 18 May 1867, p. 2; El
Semanario, 24 Aug. 1867, p. 5.
41 Cuverville to Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luque, 8 April 1868, ANP, Cl,
F127152; Cuverville to Moustiere, Luque 20 June 1868, AAEP, CP Paraguay,
IV, p. 239.
42 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC
Asuncion, II, p. 265.
43 Ouverville to Marquis de Moustier, AAEP, CCC, Asuncion, 12 Dec. 1867,
AAEP, CCC, II, p. 351.
44 Arsenio L6pez Decoud, Album grafico de la Republica del Paraguay,
1811-1911, Buenos Aires, Talleres Graficos de la Companfa General de
Fosforos, 1911, p. LXXXI.
45 Expediente formado sobre seis tercios de yerba introducido de contrabando en
este partido de Ytauglia, 28 Feb. 1865, ANA, SNE 2309; Facundo Zalduando
to francisco Sanchez, ~2 July 1866, ANA, CRB, 1-30,22,118.
46 Francisco Ignacio Marcondes Homem de Mello, 'Viagem ao Paraguay em
fevereiro e marco de 1869', Revista trimensal do instituto hist6rico
geographico e ethnographico do Brasil, 36:2, 3rd trimestre 1873, p. 21.

37
 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

47 Sir Richard Francis Burton, Letters from the Battlefu!ld of Paraguay, London,
Tinsley Brother, 1870, pp. 435, 443-44; Cuverville to Marques de Ia Valette,
Asunci6n, 29 April 1869, AAEP, CCC, II, p. 403.
48 El Semanario, 4 Jan. 1865, p. 4; 22 July 1865, p. 4; 9 Sept. 1865, p. 4.
49 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, 5 July 1866, AAEP, CP, IV Paraguay,
p. 159; El Semanario, 30 Sept. 1865, p. 4; Williams suggests that the army
was ill fed because of 'logistical problems and atrocious roads' rather than
lack of production, Paraguay Republic, p. 219.
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50 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, 15 April 1865, AAEP, CCC II, p. 237;
Vemouillet to Mariano Gonzalez, Buenos Aires, 27 June 1865, AAEP, CP
Argentina, vol. 43.
51 Washburn to Seward, Asuncion, 17 April 1868, USNA, DS CD: Cuverville to
Moustier, Luque, 10 June 1868, AAEP, CP, Paraguay IV, p. 239; Leon Noel to
Marquis of Moustier, Buenos Aires, 4 June 1868, AAEP, CCC Buenos Aires,
VIII, p. 74.
52 Stuart to Lord Stanley, Buenos Aires, 11 Sept. 1868, Confidential Print,
America, South and Central, PRO, FO 420/26, no. 1768.
53 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyn de Lhuys, Asunci6n, 12 July 1865, AAEP, CCC
Asuncion II; Libro de caja de tesoreria y colecturfa general de la Republica,
1866, ANA, SLC, vol. 64.
54 Bills of new emission, Luque, 7 April1868, ANA, CRB, 1-3),21,75-76; Nicasio
Martinez Diaz, La moneda y la poUtica monetaria en el Paraguay, Asunci6n,
La Comena, 1952, p. 69.
55 Laurent Cochelet to Drouyhn de Lhuys, Asuncion, 20 Aug. 1865, AAEP, CCC,
Asuncion II, pp. 269-270; Washburn, History of Paraguay, I, 452.
56 El Seman(lrio, 9 Sept. 1865, p. 2; America Campos F., 'Sistema monetario del
Paraguay', Revista del Centro Estudiantes de Ciencias Econ6micas, 4:42-3,
March/April 1943, p. 584; Enrique Peiia, 'Monedas y medallas Paraguayas',
Revista del Paraguay, 3:24,1900, pp. 59, 61-64, 82.
57 Harris Gaylord Warren, 'Litigation in English Courts and Claims against
Paraguay Resulting from the War of the Triple Alliance', Inter·American
Economic Affairs, 22:4, Spring 1969, p. 35.
58 Razon del dinero consistentes en metalico y billetes y demas objectos
pertecientes a Ia tesoreria general, ANA, CRB 1-30,21,75-76, no. 1.
59 The army during the Carlos Antonio L6pez years was variously estimated at
12,000 to 28,000 with the suggestion that even at this level there was a
shortage of able-bodied men in agriculture and industry. Another 40,000 men
may have served in the reserves. See Louis Bamberger to W. I. Marcy,
Asuncion, 1 April 1856, USNA, DS, CD; Manuel Dominguez, El Paraguay, sus
grandezes y sus glorias, Buenos Aires, Editorial Ayacucho, 1946, p 64; Jose
Maria Rosa, La guerra del Paraguay y las mintoneras argentinas, 4th ed.
Buenos Aires, A. Peiia Lillo, 1974, p. 15.

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 Reber: A case of total war: Paraguay

60 Reber, 'Demographics of Paraguay', p. 290. Most recently Thomas Whigham

and Barbara Potthast-Jutkeit have found a new census taken in 1879 which
challenges my evidence. This census raises more questions than it answers.
Who could compile such a census since governmental structures in town and
district levels had been devastated by the war? Would the population be
willing to provide accurate information? What was the purpose of the census?
61 Pedro Lorela y Maury to Foreign Minister, 26 Dec. 1865, Archivo General del
Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de Espana (hereafter cited as AGMEE),
Politica Paraguay (hereafter cited as PP), Correspondencia respecto a Ia
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Guerra del Paraguay (hereafter cited as CGP), 2576; Cuadro del estado
general del ejercito, 1865, ANA, SH 344 no. 22; Gabriel Carrasco, La
poblaci6n del Paraguay, antes y despues de la guerra: rectificaci6n de
opiniones generalmente aceptadas, Asuncion, Talleres Nacionales de H.
Kraus, 1905, p. 6; Reber. 'Demographics of Paraguay', pp. 295-96.
62 Varios despachos referentes a soldados desertores, various dates in 1865,
ANA, SNE 2840; Natalicio Talavera, La guerra del Paraguay:
correspondencias publicadas en el Semanario, Buenos Aires, Edic. Nizza,
1958. pp. 43-44.
63 Correspondence Pedro Lorela y Maruy, Buenos Aires, 22 March 1867,
AGMEE, PP, CGP, 2576.
64 Barbara J. Ganson, 'Following their Children into Battle: Women at War in
Paraguay, 1864-1870', The Americas, 46:3, January 1990, pp. 341, 346-47.
65 The best available article on the role of women in Paraguay before and during
the war is Ganson, 'Following their Children', pp. 335-371. The author
concludes that although women were crucial for the economy during the war,
their status in Paraguayan society was unaltered.
66 Diccionario de la mujer Guarani, Asunci6n, Editorial Siglo Veintiuno, 1977,
p. 117. Ganson, 'Following their Children', p. 364 discusses three women who
were imprisoned for minor criticism ofthe war.
67 Lista de los estrangeros residentes en Asuncion, Aug. 1867, ANA, NE 1738.
68 Pia, British in Paraguay, pp. 133-34.
69 Statement on the cases of German subjects in Paraguay, PRO, FO 420/16, no.
1768, enclosure in dispatch 307.
70 Cuverville to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Luque, 8 April 1868, ANP, Cl,
BN France, F12 7152; G. Iarie to Chourenel, Asunci6n, 17 March 1863, AAEP,
CP Paraguay III; George Frederick Masterman, Seven Eventful Years in
Paraguay. A Narrative of Personal Experience amongst the Paraguayans,
London, Low and Marston, p. 156
71 Correspondence respecting hostilities in River Plate, May 1865 to 1866, PRO,
FO 420/19, Confidential prints, p. 51.
72 J. S. Monroe to Lord Stanley, Montevideo 22 Nov. 1868, PRO, FO 51/149.
73 Frank Parish to the Foreign Office, Buenos Aires, 13 July 1869, PRO, FO 59/

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 JILAS- Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies, 5:1, July 1999

29 whose report clearly contrasts with that of a number of secondary sources

including Pia, British in Paraguay, pp. 254-58. For documents relating to
McMahon see Arthur H. Davis, Martin T. McMahon: Diplomatico en el
estridor de las armas, Asunci6n, Editora Litocolor, 1985.
74 Branislava Susnik, Los aborigines del Paraguay, 3 vols., Asuncion, Museo
Etnografico, 1981, 1:46-47, 102-04. Barbara Ganson in correspondence
reported that in 1991 an Ava-Chiripa Guarani shaman recalled that General
Francisco Solano LOpez visited his people to ask for special prayers, so that
the Paraguayans would survive the war. The shaman noted that because the
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Ava-Chiripa said these special prayers, the Paraguayans survived.

75 Jerry W. Cooney, 'Abolition in the Republic of Paraguay: 1840-1870',
Jahrbusch fur Geschichte von staat Wirtschaft und Gesellscha{t
Lateinamerikas (Cologne), 2 1974, pp. 159-61; 'The War in Paraguay', Times
(London), 12 March, 1868, p. 10.
76 John Hoyt Williams, 'Observations on the Paraguayan Census of 1846,'
Hispanic American Historical Review, 56:3, Aug. 1976, 431-33; Cooney,
'Abolition in the Republic of Paraguay', pp. 154, 164 assumes that 9 per cent
of the population or 45,000 were slaves or defined as black; this is much too
high given lack of imports; Cooney suggests that the black population was
non-existent after the war.
77 El Semanario, 26 Aug. 1865, p. 4; Decree published 31 March 1868, AAEP,
CP Paraguay IV, p. 328; George Thompson, War in Paraguay with a
Historical Sketch of the Country and its People and Notes upon the Military
Engineering of the War, London, Longmans, Green, 1869, p. 293.
78 For a more detailed description of the impact of the war on the Paraguayan
people see Harris Gaylord Warren, Paraguay and the Triple Alliance: the
Postwar Decade, 1869-1878, Austin, Texas, University of Texas Press, 1978,
pp. 8-46.
79 For the destruction from the war, see for example Williams, Paraguayan
Republic, pp. 224-27 or Milda Rivarola, Obreros, utopias & revoluciones;
formaci6n de las clases trabajadoras en el Paraguay liberal, 1870-1931,
Asuncion, CDE, 1993, pp. 23-28.

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