June 2016

Alliance Airborne
Anti-Submarine Warfare
A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW
in the Future Operational Environment

Joint Air Power

Competence Centre
Cover picture © US Navy

© This work is copyrighted. No part may be reproduced by any process without prior written permission. Inquiries should be made to:
The Editor, Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC), [email protected]

Disclaimer
This publication is a product of the JAPCC. It does not represent the opinions or policies of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and is
designed to provide an independent overview, analysis, food for thought and recommendations regarding a possible way ahead on the subject.

Author
Commander William Perkins (USA N), JAPCC
Contributions: Commander Natale Pizzimenti (ITA N), JAPCC

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FROM:
The Executive Director of the Joint Air Power Competence Centre (JAPCC)

SUBJECT:
A Forecast for Maritime Air ASW in the Future Operational Environment

DISTRIBUTION:

JOINT AIR POWER COMPETENCE CENTRE

All NATO Commands, Nations, Ministries of Defence and Relevant Organizations

The Russian Federation has increasingly been exercising its military might in areas
adjacent to NATO Nations. From hybrid warfare missions against Georgia to paramilitary
operations in Crimea, the Russian Federation has used its land-based military to influence

von-Seydlitz-Kaserne I Römerstraße 140 I 47546 Kalkar I Germany / Allemagne I Tel +49 (0) 2824 90 2201 I Fax +49 (0) 2824 90 2208 I www.japcc.org
regional events in furtherance of their strategic goals. Similarly, the use of their Naval
capability has increased, notably through an increase in submarine deployments, the
repositioning of highly capable submarines to new home ports in the Black Sea and the
execution of submarine-launched cruise missile strikes into Syria.

NATO’s Maritime Air element has a long history with Russian submarines, reaching from
the earliest days of the Alliance and peaking during the Cold War years. Although signs do
not portend a return of the Cold War, there are certain aspects of peacetime submarine
monitoring which are beginning to challenge NATO’s ability to maintain maritime
situational awareness.

NCN: +234 or 239 2201 I E-Mail: [email protected]

Joint Air Power Competence Centre I centre de compétence de la puissance aérienne interarmées
In this spirit, this study reviews the current and future capability of NATO’s Maritime Air to
conduct Anti-Submarine Warfare against potential future adversaries. It culminates with an
environmental forecast outlining possible futures with which NATO’s forces may need to
contend and concludes with numerous recommendations for NATO’s Maritime Command
and other elements of the anti-submarine domain to address identified capability shortfalls.

We welcome your comments on our document or any future issues it identifies. Please
feel free to contact the author, Commander William Perkins, USA N, at [email protected],
or any member of the Maritime Air section of the Combat Air Branch at [email protected].

Joachim Wundrak
Lieutenant General, DEU AF
Executive Director, JAPCC

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.........................................................................................................................................................................1

CHAPTER I
Introduction
1.1 Aim............................................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.2 Assumptions.......................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.3 Methodology......................................................................................................................................................................................5
1.4 Limitations............................................................................................................................................................................................6
1.5 Evolving Environment...................................................................................................................................................................6

CHAPTER II
Terms and Definitions
2.1 Submarine Classes and Missions............................................................................................................................................7
2.2 Nuclear Powered Submarines..................................................................................................................................................7
2.3 Diesel-Electric Powered Submarines...................................................................................................................................8
2.4 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV)............................................................................................................................9
2.5 Aircraft Carriers..................................................................................................................................................................................9
2.6 Oceanography ...............................................................................................................................................................................10
2.7 Maritime Surveillance.................................................................................................................................................................10
2.8 Maritime Patrol...............................................................................................................................................................................11
2.9 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................11

CHAPTER III
The Evolution of Theatre-Wide ASW Operations
3.1 A Multinational MPA Approach to Cold War ASW....................................................................................................12
3.2 Theatre-wide Command and Control for Cold War ASW....................................................................................14
3.3 The MACA Construct..................................................................................................................................................................14
3.4 Theatre ASW Commander.......................................................................................................................................................15
3.5 Is the NATO Command S­ tructure Sufficient?...............................................................................................................17
3.6 TASWC EXTAC..................................................................................................................................................................................17
3.7 Recommended TASWC C2 Structure................................................................................................................................17
3.8 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................19

CHAPTER IV
The Russian Perspective – Strategy for Submarine Employment.
4.1 From Politics to Strategy ..........................................................................................................................................................20
4.2 Putin’s Strategic View of the Navy.......................................................................................................................................21
4.3 Recent Russian Submarine Operations...........................................................................................................................23
4.4 The Link Between the Russian Populace and the Kremlin’s Use of Military Force................................25
4.5 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................26

ii JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

CHAPTER V
Submarine Development
5.1 The Russian Federation’s Submarine Development................................................................................................28
5.2 Overall Detectability....................................................................................................................................................................30
5.3 The Export Challenge.................................................................................................................................................................31
5.4 The Russian Federation’s Use of Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).................................................31
5.5 Submarine Development in the Rest of the World.................................................................................................32
5.6 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................34

CHAPTER VI
The ASW Environment
6.1 Overview............................................................................................................................................................................................36
6.2 Acoustic Properties of Submarines....................................................................................................................................36
6.3 Acoustic Raypaths........................................................................................................................................................................37
6.4 Today’s Challenge with Traditional Passive Detection...........................................................................................38
6.5 Sonobuoy Utilization Rate: Then and Now...................................................................................................................39
6.6 Multi-statics.......................................................................................................................................................................................40
6.7 Classification via Active Sonar...............................................................................................................................................41
6.8 Environmental Considerations and Impacts to Training......................................................................................41
6.9 Radio Frequency Interference...............................................................................................................................................42
6.10 Space Support to ASW..............................................................................................................................................................42
6.11 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................42

CHAPTER VII
ASW and Joint Operations
7.1 Introduction......................................................................................................................................................................................44
7.2 Role of ASW in NATO’s Joint Operations 1990–2015..............................................................................................44
7.3 The Role of Theatre ASW Prior to Major Joint Operations...................................................................................48
7.4 The Impact of an Un-located Submarine on NATO’s Land and Air Components................................48
7.5 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................49

CHAPTER VIII
Should NATO Explore a Common MPA Replacement?
8.1 The ASW Roadmap......................................................................................................................................................................50
8.2 How National Interests Impact the Alliance Composite ASW Capability..................................................51
8.3 Aging Fleets Across NATO’s MPA Force............................................................................................................................53
8.4 New Participants in MPA...........................................................................................................................................................54
8.5 Assessing the Validity of a NATO MPA Squadron.......................................................................................................55
8.6 Is an MPA Needed for ASW? ..................................................................................................................................................57
8.7 Rebuilding NATO’s ASW Experience ................................................................................................................................58
8.8 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................58

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 iii

 CHAPTER IX
ASW Doctrine
9.1 Current ASW Doctrine................................................................................................................................................................60
9.2 Experimental Tactics....................................................................................................................................................................62
9.3 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................64

CHAPTER X
Coordinated ASW Operations and Emerging Technology
10.1 Multi-layered Approach to ASW..........................................................................................................................................65
10.2 SOSUS...................................................................................................................................................................................................66
10.3 MQ-4 Triton.......................................................................................................................................................................................66
10.4 Other UAS to Augment ASW.................................................................................................................................................67
10.5 Self-Synchronization of Drones for Anti-Submarine Warfare............................................................................67
10.6 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV).........................................................................................................................67
10.7 The Surface Fleet’s ASW Advancement..........................................................................................................................68
10.8 The Advent of Persistent Sound Technologies...........................................................................................................69
10.9 Other Emerging Technology..................................................................................................................................................69
10.10 New Adversary Technology ...................................................................................................................................................70
10.11 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................70

CHAPTER XI
MPA Mission Support Centres / Maritime Air Control Authority
11.1 Cold War ASWOCs........................................................................................................................................................................72
11.2 The Evolution of Mission Support Centres....................................................................................................................72
11.3 MACA Support to NATO’s ASW Exercises.......................................................................................................................73
11.4 Deployable Multi-Mission Support Centre Capability (MMSC)........................................................................74
11.5 METOC Support to ASW Missions......................................................................................................................................75
11.6 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................76

CHAPTER XII
The Environmental Forecast
12.1 Environmental Forecast.............................................................................................................................................................77
12.2 Trends and Driving Forces (STEEP).....................................................................................................................................78
12.3 Social Trends and Driving Forces.........................................................................................................................................78
12.4 Technological Trends and Driving Forces......................................................................................................................81
12.5 Environmental Trends and Driving Forces.....................................................................................................................81
12.6 Economic Trends and Driving Forces...............................................................................................................................82
12.7 Political Trends and Driving Forces.....................................................................................................................................84
12.8 Summary ...........................................................................................................................................................................................85

CHAPTER XIII
The Environmental Forecast: Likely Futures and Wild Card Events
13.1 Futuring...............................................................................................................................................................................................86
13.2 The Baseline Forecast.................................................................................................................................................................87
13.3 Other Possible Future Scenarios..........................................................................................................................................88
13.4 Potential Wild Card Events.......................................................................................................................................................92
13.5 Other Perspectives on Possible Futures .........................................................................................................................93
13.6 Summary............................................................................................................................................................................................95

iv JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

CHAPTER XIV
Findings and Recommendations
14.1 Critical Findings..............................................................................................................................................................................96
14.2 Doctrine..............................................................................................................................................................................................97
14.3 Organization.....................................................................................................................................................................................98
14.4 Training................................................................................................................................................................................................99
14.5 Materiel............................................................................................................................................................................................. 100
14.6 Leadership and Education.................................................................................................................................................... 102
14.7 Personnel......................................................................................................................................................................................... 104
14.8 Facilities............................................................................................................................................................................................ 104
14.9 Information/Interoperability............................................................................................................................................... 105
14.10 Limitations of the Study......................................................................................................................................................... 106
14.11 Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................................................... 106

APPENDIX A
The Russian Federation in the Post-Cold War Era
Transforming the Post-Cold War Russian Military.............................................................................................................. 108
How Did Russia’s Military Modernize?....................................................................................................................................... 109
The Influence of the Russian Federation on European Politics................................................................................. 111

APPENDIX B
Tactical Oceanography and the Sonar Equations
Oceanography......................................................................................................................................................................................... 112
Temperature.............................................................................................................................................................................................. 112
The Sonic Layer Depth........................................................................................................................................................................ 112
Pressure......................................................................................................................................................................................................... 113
Acoustic Raypaths.................................................................................................................................................................................. 113
The Direct Path Raypath..................................................................................................................................................................... 114
The Convergence Zone Raypath.................................................................................................................................................. 114
Passive Acoustic Detection.............................................................................................................................................................. 114
The Passive Sonar Equation............................................................................................................................................................. 114
Sound Pressure Level........................................................................................................................................................................... 115
Today’s Challenge with Traditional Passive Detection.................................................................................................... 116
Sound Pressure Level........................................................................................................................................................................... 117
Active Acoustic Prosecution............................................................................................................................................................ 117
Monostatics................................................................................................................................................................................................ 118

APPENDIX C
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Helicopters......................................................................................................................... 120

APPENDIX D
Acronyms and Abbreviations.................................................................................................................................................... 130

APPENDIX E
List of Figures......................................................................................................................................................................................... 132

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 v

6 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As the Cold War ended and the Russian Federation’s ‘Many assessments of what the Russian military can
naval projection was challenged both by the inter- and cannot do have been inaccurate. This isn’t just
nal politics of glasnost and the stark realities of their problematic for the facts’ sake – more troubling, it
national economic situation, their submarine de- risks skewing our assessment of how far Moscow
ployments throughout the NATO theatre nearly will go … When Western analysts – and in turn,
ceased. Many nations in the Alliance re-focused na- Western leaders – seek to discredit Russian military
val assets away from submarine tracking and moni- capabilities, Moscow will likely continue to take the
toring to support emerging mission portfolios opportunity to prove them wrong.’
which supported NATO’s new operational environ- Garrett Cambell, Brookings Institution
ment. The Alliance is today experiencing a resur-
gence in submarine patrols throughout much of Since non-NATO submarine deployments nearly
the NATO Area of Responsibility and finds itself with ceased in the mid-1990s, NATO now has a generation
limited ability, both in resources and, arguably, in a of officers and civilian leaders who did not grow up
strategic imperative, to resume large-scale subma- experiencing the ‘cat and mouse’ environment of sub-
rine prosecutions. As NATO struggles with many marine warfare which existed during the Cold War.
other challenges, the changing future with respect NATO has conducted three major joint operations dur-
to increased non-NATO submarine operations ing since the end of the Cold War. None of these op-
should not be discounted. erations were conducted in an area challenged by the
presence of an adversary submarine. Just as air chiefs
Following a Request for Support from Allied Mari- fight the perception NATO will always have air superi-
time Command (MARCOM), the JAPCC completed ority in any campaign, maritime leaders must also en-
this study to investigate the current Maritime Air gage to challenge the perception that NATO’s mari-
support capability for Anti-Submarine Warfare time forces will always have maritime superiority. This
(ASW). The aim of this project is to define the cur- perception, coupled with inaccurate beliefs regarding
rent challenges experienced by ASW-capable air the capability of the Russian Federation’s maritime ca-
platforms in both today’s operational environment pability, has coloured maritime defence spending for
and in a range of possible future environments as- decades. As a result, NATO has ceded much of the ad-
sessing whether the Alliance has a capability short- vantage it earned at the conclusion of the Cold War.
fall in the ASW mission area. This will involve a re- Therefore, to dispute this prevailing theory, this study is
view of environmental challenges, oceanography intended to be read by a much broader audience than
and NATO’s Maritime Air history with this mission to purely the maritime component.
set the stage for detailed discussions about the cur-
rent and future challenges in the ASW domain. This Unlocated submarines present numerous problems for
will be followed by an analysis of current and pro- both the Maritime component and for NATO writ large.
jected Non-NATO submarine capability to include a An adversary submarine which is not tracked from a
review of national intent and a brief discussion theatre level will have freedom of movement to pose
about the use of submarines as an element of sea numerous threats to NATO forces and territories. A sin-
power. Finally, the project will examine current gle submarine can effectively close a maritime choke
NATO Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and ASW heli- point, such as the Strait of Gibraltar, preventing mer-
copter force structure and explore procurement chant traffic or naval forces from transiting. An unlo-
plans to meet future ASW challenges. cated submarine can lie in wait for a naval task force

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 1

 and effectively pick off the high value capital ships, re- cated submarine could establish a covert operating
moving in a single blow a significant part of the joint area close to a NATO nation’s coastline. From there, it
capability to project power (aircraft carrier, amphibious can project striking power deep into NATO, exploiting
assault ship) or resupply naval forces at sea Adversary recent advancements in modern cruise missile capabil-
attack submarines (SSN) are charged with detecting ity (some with ranges in excess of 1500 km) and ballistic
and potentially engaging not only NATO surface ships, missile capability. All of these situations become signifi-
but NATO’s ballistic missile submarines serving as the cantly mitigated by tracking submarines throughout
seaborne aspect of the nuclear deterrent. If those sub- their deployment at a theatre level. NATO excelled at
marines are not tracked at a theatre level, it puts the tracking submarines in the Cold War, but the skills have
nuclear deterrent force at risk. Furthermore, an unlo- atrophied and the resources have dwindled.

RECOMMENDATIONS
NATO has a history of misreading Russian intent and 3. NATO should identify a common mechanism for
being ill prepared for Russian military activity. A MPA and MPH post-mission acoustic analysis and
­pervasive feeling amongst many maritime strategists request national aircraft mission support centres
and naval planners is that submarines are a relic of the adopt this standard.
Cold War. Subsequently, anti-submarine force devel- 4. NATO should develop Experimental Tactics and
opment has not received the proper prioritization in test them for ratification into formal doctrine.
many national procurement programs.
The JAPCC wishes to thank members of the Centre
This study concludes maintaining a credible theatre- of Excellence for Confined and Shallow Water Oper-
wide submarine monitoring capability is a critical ations (COE CSW) and the Centre for Maritime
­enduring peacetime function, but NATO is not cur- ­Research and Experimentation (CMRE) for providing
rently capable of doing it. insightful comments throughout the development
of findings.
It identifies four critical findings with significant impact
on NATO’s current and future ability to conduct ASW: In addition to the four critical findings listed above,
21 additional findings and recommendations to
1. NATO should create a theatre-wide ASW Com- mitigate shortfalls identified in the study were iden-
mander, vested with the proper authorities to tified. Although the Cold War is not returning, the
more efficiently coordinate NATO’s limited ASW Bear is awakening from hibernation and NATO can-
resources across ships, submarines, and aircraft. not afford to function with a future capability short-
2. NATO should identify a common aircraft replace- fall against a growing submarine presence.
ment for the P-3 Orion series.

2 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 3
© US Navy

A P-3C Orion starts engines prior to a night mission.

CHAPTER I showing the potential for an increased number of

deep water non-NATO submarine patrols by many

Introduction nations (most notably Russia, India, and China).

During the decades following the conclusion of the ‘Once again, an effective, skilled, and technologi-
Cold War, non-NATO submarines virtually ceased oper­ cally advanced Russian submarine force is
ations in the European theatre. This resulted in the dras- ­challenging us. Russian submarines are prowling
tic reduction of Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) experi- the Atlantic, testing our defenses, confronting our
ence garnered year over year by NATO’s Maritime Air command of the seas, and preparing the complex
ASW forces. Additionally, during this ­period, alliance underwater battlespace to give them an edge in
­nations dramatically reduced their Maritime Patrol Air- any future conflict.’
craft (MPA) inventories. Furthermore, over the last two VADM James Foggo, Commander, US SIXTH FLEET2
decades MPA forces have ­experienced expansive growth
into mission areas b
­ eyond Maritime Patrol and ASW. As emerging technologies are developed and re-
placement aircraft for aged MPA and helicopters are
Unfortunately, NATO’s MPA force has gone almost explored, budgets and other factors continue to
two decades without encountering a significant hamper the development of the future ASW force
submarine threat. As a result, some question the structure. Unless NATO retains an ASW competency,
­current ASW proficiency in NATO’s MPA and ASW there is growing risk the Alliance will find itself un-
Helicopter force. ASW was identified as one of the prepared to capably respond to a potential increase
critical capability shortfalls at the 2014 Wales in future non-NATO submarine operations. In this
­Summit.1 Conversely, recent trends have emerged spirit, this study examines the current status of the

4 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Airborne ASW capability within NATO. It also offers • Review NATO and partner nations’ Maritime ­Patrol
recommendations to ensure the future capability Aircraft and ASW helicopter forces, to include
­remains aligned with the projected operational envi- ­inventory, basing, and sensors.
ronment, ensuring the Alliance remains well pos- • Review non-NATO nations’ submarine capability
tured to protect Naval and Merchant shipping from and discuss current and future challenges
submarine threats. ­presented by emerging submarine classes and
national goals related to the use of sea power for
‘At a time when NATO Air Power has shown itself to projection.
politicians and policymakers to be a versatile and • Discuss the Joint aspect of ASW and how this
essential tool for conflict resolution, those same mission set crosses service boundaries.
­decision-makers are making reductions that could • Provide MARCOM with an assessment of current
undermine the capability they have so recently used Maritime Air capability against the current threat
to such good effect. This has happened before, with and offer MARCOM a projection of the future
armies slashed only to be resurrected in great haste force against the likely future threat.
at the onset of the next challenge.’ • Make recommendations to MARCOM for future
General Frank Gorenc, Director JAPCC employment considerations and to shape poten-
Commander, Allied Air Command tial technical developments.
as stated in the Future Vector Project
1.2 Assumptions
The Commander, Joint Force Command, Naples This study assumes Alliance defence budgets will
(JFC ­Naples), Admiral Mark Ferguson, advised in a continue to be constrained, resulting in a sustained
briefing to the North Atlantic Council on 6 October political will to support the principles of NATO’s Smart
2015 that Naval forces should be ‘on-call for real-world Defence (SD) and the European Union’s Pooling &
events to reduce mobilization time, and those forces Sharing (P&S) initiatives in the long term. Additionally,
need to invest in new technologies to keep up with this study takes into account the currently proposed
Russian investment’.3 This study offers solutions to procurement plan for replacement MPA and ASW-­
­address the challenge presented by the increase in capable helicopters, which is always subject to change
non-NATO submarine operations. based on national priorities.

1.1 Aim 1.3 Methodology

This study defines the current challenges experienced The study first reviews environmental challenges and
by ASW capable air platforms in both today’s oper­ oceanography and provides a summary of NATO’s
ational environment and a range of possible future Maritime Air history with ASW to provide context for
­environments to assess whether Alliance Maritime Air the current and future challenges in the ASW domain.
ASW platforms have a capability shortfall in the ASW This is followed by an analysis of the current and pro-
mission area. jected capability of non-NATO submarines, to include
a review of national intent and a discussion about the
This document will: use of submarines as an element of sea power. The
study examines current NATO and Partner Nation MPA
• Briefly review the role of Maritime Air in the ASW and ASW helicopter force structure, recommending
mission during the Cold War. changes to meet f­uture requirements in some cases,
• Study the ocean as a domain and discuss how and explores procurement plans to meet future ASW
the domain has changed from the Cold War to challenges. The study then compares Cold War-era
today with an examination of future challenges ASW Command and Control that of the new NATO
presented by the ocean environment. Command ­Structure. Finally, the study offers a ­forecast

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 5

 of likely and possible futures as a basis for the exami- 1.5 Evolving Environment
nation of potential capability shortfalls.
Research for this study began in July 2015, six months
The data in this study was generated from a variety of before the Russian military demonstrated the integra-
sources. The JAPCC participation in numerous mari- tion of their newer generation diesel submarines into
time forums was key to assessing the current state their Joint Operations in Syria. Initial conclusions
and direction of NATO’s Maritime Air capability. Inter- throughout the research phase were exchanged with
views with Commander, Maritime Air NATO, and Com- the primary stakeholder, NATO’s Allied Maritime
mander, Submarine Forces NATO, were conducted to Command (MARCOM). They have been, to some
­
assess the operational commanders’ challenges with ­extent, confirmed through the accelerated action of
command and control of anti-submarine forces. Infor- the Russian Navy’s involvement in operations in Syria
mation from NATO public websites, open source and throughout the Eastern Mediterranean and the
­material and relevant unclassified Coalition/Alliance, Black Sea. This is a rapidly changing environment with
Joint, and National doctrine was used as a reference. potential impacts across the full range of military
Additionally, publicly available information regarding ­operations, and many of the driving forces affecting
national procurement strategies for aircraft and the forecast in Chapters 12 and 13 continue to evolve.
­submarines was explored. Finally, to create the fore-
cast, the Delphic forecasting model, coupled with As the conclusions drawn from analysis of Russia’s
comparison to other strategic forecasts (specifically strategy go beyond their use of submarines and as
the UK, US and Allied Command for Transformation the increased use of submarines has an impact across
products) was employed. the joint spectrum of operations, the JAPCC recom-
mends this study not only to strategists in the Mari-
time service but across NATO’s Joint Force.
1.4 Limitations
Research and analysis associated with this study
­included both open and classified sources. To permit
the widest dissemination, the published study has
been kept at the unclassified level. Additionally, this
1. https://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/files/chathamhouse/field/field_document/201410
study was focused on the ASW capability of Maritime 30NATOWalesSummit.pdf
Air forces and is not intended to provide a holistic 2. ‘The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic’. VADM James Foggo and Alarik Fritz. Proceedings Magazine
June 2016. Available online at: http://www.usni.org/node/87164#footnotes
view of all ASW capability across NATO’s surface and 3. Admiral Mark Ferguson, 6 Oct. 2015 Speech to North Atlantic Council. Available online at:
subsurface forces. http://www.c6f.navy.mil/speech/remarks-delivered-adm-mark-ferguson-atlantic-council

6 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © US Navy
Retired P-3s at the Boneyard on Davis Monthan Air Force Base.

CHAPTER II ‘Submarines are like steel sharks – quiet, silent, and

deadly. They are designed to hunt and kill. Occa-
Terms and Definitions sionally, it becomes necessary to find and destroy
them – to keep open sea-lanes of communication,
The purpose of this chapter is to provide sufficient to sweep an area and make it safe for Allied ship-
background for terms used in the study so that ­readers ping. Destroying a submarine is the hardest task in
‘off the street’ and not fully versed Anti-Submarine naval warfare.’
Warfare will fully understand the content of the study. Admiral James Stavridis
NATO’s 16th Supreme Allied Commander1

2.1 Submarine Classes and Missions

2.2 Nuclear Powered Submarines
The two predominant types of submarines em-
ployed are characterized by their propulsion sys- Three types of submarines have nuclear-powered
tems: nuclear and diesel-electric. These two types propulsion systems. These are the strategic nuclear
are further broken down into generic classes (based ballistic missile submarine (SSBN), whose primary mis-
on mission) and finally into hull-specific classes sion is to remain undetected in order to deploy bal-
(based on hull and propulsion design). This chapter listic missiles; the Fast-Attack Submarine (SSN), whose
will introduce various submarine types to provide primary mission is to locate and engage other subma-
context for a discussion about oceanography, sound rines; and the Guided Missile Submarine (SSGN).
propagation, and the challenges both the ocean ­SSGNs are normally one of the previous two hull types
­environment and new submarine classes present to that have been modified with a significant anti-ship
Maritime Air forces. missile capability and have a primary Anti-Surface

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 7

 Warfare mission. Although SSBNs generally only have center around a quiet battery to provide power and
one mission, secondary missions of the SSN and SSGN limited propulsion when submerged and a diesel
classes include Intelligence; Surveillance and Recon- ­engine to provide power, propulsion and recharging
naissance (ISR); Special Operations; Mine Warfare and the battery while surfaced. The length of time a diesel
Anti-Surface Warfare (for the SSN). submarine may remain submerged and operate
­solely on battery power is a function of the hull-­
As a general rule, nuclear submarines of all types op- specific design.
erate in a deeper portion of the water column than
their diesel-electric counterparts. First, their propul- Diesel submarines are comprised of SS and SSK types,
sion plant and propeller combination is more efficient with the primary mission of Anti-Surface Warfare. They
in denser, deeper water. Secondly, the nuclear power also have secondary missions of Mine Warfare and
plant can operate for extended periods of time with- Special Operations. Although both classes have
out surfacing. For nuclear submarines whose mission ­similar propulsion systems, Guided Missile diesel sub-
is to detect other submarines or ships, the deeper marines (SSK) are the higher-end, more capable sub-
ocean environment offers increased acoustic detec- marines, comprising the majority of modern subma-
tion possibilities by exploiting the properties of sound rines in this category. In addition to having a significant
travel in the deep ocean environment. anti-ship missile capability (varies by nation), many
SSKs also have improved sensors to aid the mission.
‘A single Nuclear Submarine sinks half the Furthermore, many SSK operate an Air Independent
US Carrier Strike Group’ Pro­pulsion (AIP) system, which significantly extends
Chinese Submarine Academy’s Professor Chi ­Guocang the amount of time the submarine may remain fully
references an ‘After Action Report’ from a French and US submerged before needing to surface to charge the
bilateral ASW exercise in 2015 where the small ­Rubis batteries. SS class submarines are those types
­
class SSN achieved constructive kills against the CVN ­considered to be of lesser capability but also operate
and its ASW screen by utilizing the acoustic ­environment a diesel-electric propulsion system.
to the benefit of the hunter over the prey.2
For all diesel submarines, travelling at high speed
Nuclear submarines are significantly faster, operate ­consumes battery power at an excessively high rate.
significantly deeper and remain submerged for However, operating the diesel engine to generate
­significantly longer than diesel-electric submarines. A high speed also generates a significant amount of
nuclear-powered submarine uses speed to its advan- acoustically detectable engine noise. Therefore, in the
tage when conducting its mission, as it can travel at conduct of its mission, a diesel submarine will use
high speeds for extended periods of time while stealth to its advantage, slinking to its desired operat-
­remaining relatively undetected by acoustic means. ing area at an extremely slow speed to conserve
However, the basis of propulsion remains a nuclear ­power while it lies in wait for adversary naval or
power plant. As such, they are significantly more ­merchant shipping. Accordingly, the diesel submarine
­expensive to build and operate safely. Therefore, there will normally remain in a shallower portion of the
are only a few non-NATO nations with an active ­water column, using other oceanographic features to
­nuclear submarine fleet.3 mask its location (pinnacles, shelves, reefs, and fishing
fleets) and loiter while it waits to conduct its mission.

2.3 Diesel-Electric
Modern non-nuclear submarines are both more
Powered Submarines ­advanced than their predecessors and more widely
Diesel-electric submarines (referred to for the remain- proliferated, as defence industries that served their
der of this study as ‘diesel’ submarines) operate a home markets during the Cold War now struggle to
­variety of different types of propulsion plants, but all increase exports to maintain economic viability. Many

8 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

decades of continual investment by countries like manned Aerial Systems (UAS) sharing common air-
Germany and Sweden have finally paid off in the form space with manned platforms, the maritime domain
of non-nuclear submarines with air-independent sys- is starting to see a significant increase in the use of
tems which dramatically increase the time between Unmanned Underwater Vehicles (UUV), potentially
surfaced battery re-charging operations. These sub- sharing waterspace with manned submarines. As
marines still do not provide the mobility and endur- seen by the explosion in commercial sector’s drone
ance of a nuclear submarine, but they greatly reduce use, the aviation sector is far ahead of the maritime
the non-acoustic detection vulnerability of a tradi- sector with respects to the number and capability of
tional diesel-electric submarine, which must expose a unmanned assets.
snorkelling mast to recharge its batteries every few
days at a minimum and much more frequently if The development of UUVs is an emerging t­ echnology.
forced to operate at high speed. Many of the existing models still require some level of
tethering to a mothership and can be assessed as
Modern diesel-electric submarines are also armed robotic extensions of that ship. Development is
­
with more advanced weapons and fire control sys- ­underway in many countries for a truly autonomous
tems than earlier models. One particularly alarming capability, which would provide a long dwell time
development is the marriage made possible by the with no man-in-the-loop required. Some systems
end of the Cold War of the Air-Independent Propul- currently exist, such as the oceanographic drone
­
sion (AIP) system of some modern non-nuclear sub- ‘Waveglider.’ This system operates autonomously for
marine with submarine-launched anti-ship missiles. months on end travelling on the surface of the ocean
Armed with Harpoons or Exocet missiles available measuring currents and other oceanographic data.
from several western suppliers, these platforms can But the development of UUVs in the warfighting
launch fire-and-forget missiles from over the radar spectrum presents two specific challenges to the
horizon without the need for the noisy, battery-­
­ maritime domain: detection and collision avoidance.
draining approach necessary for a traditional, torpedo-­ Most UUVs are extremely small compared to
armed diesel-electric boat. ­sub­marines, but even a collision with a small UUV
could cause damage to a manned submarine’s pro-
This capability circumvents the traditional ASW peller which could be catastrophic. COMSUBNATO is
­approach to dealing with very quiet diesel-electrics, developing a procedure to address this issue to avoid
which was to flood the ocean’s surface with radar. The Blue on Blue or Blue on White submarine and
submarine is then forced to use speed – and its UUV interaction.
­battery charge – to reposition to a radar-free area and
conduct battery recharging operations undetected. Secondly, and perhaps more critically, is the chal-
In those circumstances, the submarine commander lenge posed by detection. Currently, there is no sys-
was forced to choose between operations that ran tem, ­sensor or method in place to monitor a long
down its battery, potentially causing exposure, or duration, battery operated (i.e., silent) UUV. If an
staying quiet and defensive. However, modern AIP ­adversary were to develop a high-end kinetic capa-
equipped SSK are not faced with this dilemma, as they bility using a UUV, NATO forces would remain
now have the flexibility to operate for extended ­extremely challenged to detect and defeat the UUV
­periods between recharging operations. from accomplishing its mission.

2.4 Unmanned Underwater 2.5 Aircraft Carriers

Vehicles (UUV) Although many NATO nations refer to their capital
As the aviation service is grappling with challenges ships as aircraft carriers, NATO has not yet embraced a
presented by the proliferation of various sizes of Un- definition which embraces the significant air power

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 9

 capability difference between Catapult Assisted Take- vent of relatively cheap and readily available com-
off and Barrier Arrested Recovery (CATOBAR) class nu- mercial technology, ISR collection capability writ
clear-powered aircraft carriers and conventionally large and maritime ISR specifically have expanded
powered Short Take-Off Vertical Landing (STOVL) class to aircraft of varying types and capability. For the
of aircraft carrier. This study will use the term aircraft purposes of this study, as they have no ASW capabil-
carrier to refer to the CATOBAR type CVNs operated by ity, purely Maritime Surveillance aircraft will not be
the US and France. The term Amphibious Assault Ship considered.
will refer to the STOL/STOVL carriers (UK Ocean and
Queen Elizabeth Classes, ITS Garibaldi class, FR Mistral Maritime Surveillance includes all aspects of mari-
Class, US Wasp Class, SP Juan Carlos Class). time-related ISR and Maritime Situational Aware-
ness (MSA), most importantly the ability to develop
a comprehensive surface picture via visual or elec-
2.6 Oceanography
tro-optical systems and radar (regardless of whether
Oceanographic terms and other terminology applica- the radar has an imaging capability) and potentially
ble to understanding sound propagation in the un- including an electromagnetic detection capability
derwater environment will be further defined in ap- to aid in correlating radar returns with targets of in-
plicable sections of Chapter 6 and Appendix B. terest. The functions of Maritime Surveillance can
aid the Maritime Component Commander’s mission
or be aligned with national objectives of counter-
2.7 Maritime Surveillance
narcotics, counter-piracy, and maritime border en-
Recently MPA ISR collection capability has evolved forcement. Maritime Surveillance may also incorpo-
far beyond traditional Cold War ASW. With the ad- rate functions such as pollution monitoring and

Figure 1 – A Comparison of Worldwide Aircraft Carriers.

© worldwideaircraftcarriers.com

10 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

other water measurements for environmental marine based on mission, hull and propulsion system
change impact assessment. construction, and, finally, how the submarine exploits
the sound propagation properties at various parts of
the water column are key to assessing the challenge
2.8 Maritime Patrol
each type of submarine presents for detection as we
Maritime Patrol contains all aspects of Maritime Sur- look forward.
veillance, with the addition of anti-submarine
acoustic tracking capability coupled with the ability
to engage and eliminate either surface or subsur-
face hostile targets (missiles, bombs, mines, and tor-
pedoes). Many nations are referring to new aircraft
conducting Maritime Surveillance as MPA. For this
study, only aircraft capable of conducting prosecu-
tion of a submerged submarine and deploying a
torpedo and targeting hostile surface ships with
missiles or bombs will be considered Maritime Pa-
trol Aircraft (MPA). 1. ‘Destroyer Captain: Lessons of a First Command’. Stavridis, James (ADM, USA N, ret). Naval
Institute Press, 1 Apr. 2011, Pg 48.
2. ‘How to Sink a US Carrier: China turns to France for Ideas’. Goldstein, Lyle. The National Inter-
2.9 Summary est, 13 Dec. 2015. Available online at: http://www.nationalinterest.org/feature/how-sink-
us-navy-carrier-china-turns-france-ideas-14605
3. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare after the Cold War’. Cote, Owen and Sapolsky, Harvey. MIT Secu-
Understanding the missions associated with each rity Studies. Available online at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/conf_series/ASW/
submarine class, the limitations of each type of sub- ASW_Report.html

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 11

© US Navy

A P-3C Orion flies over a Soviet Victor-III class Fast Attack submarine in the mediterrean sea circa 1983.

CHAPTER III Having its origins in the aftermath of the World War
II struggle to protect convoys from submarines with
the explosion of submarine technology and num-
The Evolution of bers in the 1950s and ’60s and the tensions of the
Theatre-Wide ASW Operations Cold War as a backdrop throughout the ’70s and
into the ’80s, this organization was critical to pro-
3.1 A Multinational MPA tecting Alliance member nations against the threat
Approach to Cold War ASW imposed by ballistic missile submarines, and to
­protect naval and merchant shipping against the
Multinational submarine prosecutions were de potential threat of SSN hunter-killer submarines.
­rigueur throughout the Cold War, as many NATO
nations retained an active MPA ASW force and
­ US forces in this campaign were led by C
­ ommander,
­routinely participated in joint submarine prosecu- Submarine Forces, US Atlantic Fleet (COMSUBLANT)
tions. Coming on stride in the 1960s and sustained who was responsible for ASW operations in the
into the mid-1990s, NATO maintained a robust capa- ­Atlantic Ocean. He directed these operations from
bility of cooperative effort to simultaneously prose- his homeport in Norfolk, Virginia, (US) through
cute multiple submarines utilizing MPA from many Commander, Task Force 84 (CTF-84) in Keflavik,
participating nations. ­Iceland. CTF-84’s resources were assigned by the
Atlantic Fleet and included surface ships, Attack
To counter the near constant presence of Soviet Submarines (SSNs), and Maritime Patrol Aircraft
submarines, a robust organization was established (MPA) and the Undersea Surveillance Systems (fixed
for coordinated multinational ASW prosecutions. and towed).1

12 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

The Soviet Union SSBNs in this campaign were The patrol box east of Bermuda was like a barometer
­deployed from their Northern Fleet. Their patrol boxes forecasting potential trouble. If more than two Soviet
were in the Western Atlantic within striking distance SSBNs were in the box at any one time, or were in tran-
of the North American mainland as well as European sit at any given time, it raised apprehension among
capitals. US intelligence analysts. To counter the SSBN threat,
two strategies were used. First, when each Soviet
Attack Submarines (SSs and SSNs) and Guided Missile SSBN left port, they were closely trailed by NATO Fast
Submarines (SSGs and SSGNs) also deployed out of Attack Submarines (SSNs) which remained with their
the Northern Fleet, but were generally in transit to the target throughout the entirety of its patrol. They
Mediterranean theatre or operated in the eastern developed intelligence about Soviet SSBN tactics,
­
­Atlantic. At this location, they stalked US Naval Units procedures, and acoustic signatures. Second, NATO
and patrolled sea-lane choke points. The patrol Maritime Patrol Aircraft of various nationalities and
­sequence settled into a busy routine for both the models (P-3 Orion, CP-140 Aurora, Breguet Atlantic,
hunter (NATO ASW forces) and the prey (Soviet ­SSBNs). and MR2 Nimrod) maintained a near-constant ‘on-top’
The Soviet SSBNs would depart their Northern Fleet presence over the Soviet SSBNs during their entire
bases into the Barents Sea and, round North Cape in ­patrol, both in transit and on station in their patrol
Norway, transit the Norwegian Sea, clear the Green- box. These MPA, along with the SSNs, allowed com-
land-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap and emerge manders two options to neutralize the Soviet SSBNs in
into the North Atlantic. South of Iceland, the SSBNs the event hostilities began.3
would then cross the Mid-Atlantic ridge and enter the
North American basin continuing southwest until The task of maintaining a constant presence on top of
­arriving at their patrol box east of Bermuda. At this all Soviet SSBNs once they left port and returned after
point, the SSBNs would slow to a speed of approxi- their patrol was a daunting responsibility involving
mately 4 knots and begin a meandering toward the crews from eight bases and four countries. When the
south end of their patrol box. Normally, there were SSBNs transited the Barents Sea and rounded North
two SSBNs in the patrol box at any one time, with the Cape, they were kept under close surveillance by the
arrival of one submarine timed to occur simultane- Norwegian Air Force and their P-3s based at Andoya.
ously with the departure of another. When one SSBN When the SSBNs were in the Norwegian Sea, ­P-3 Ori-
exited the box at the north end to transit home, an- ons from Naval Air Station (NAS) Keflavik Iceland and
other SSBN entered the box and began its southerly UK MR2 Nimrod aircraft from Royal Air Force station
course; while SSBN at the southern end of the box (RAF) ­Kinloss Scotland joined in the tracking. When
would turn and start north.2 the ­SSBNs cleared the GIUK gap and crossed the mid-­
Atlantic ridge, they continued to be tracked by US
P-3s from NAS Keflevik and MR2 Nimrods from RAF
Kinloss Scotland and RAF St. Mawgan, Cornwall. Cana-
dian CP-140s from CFB Greenwood, N.S. joined in the
surveillance as they passed east of Newfoundland.
When the Soviet SSBNs reached the mid latitudes and
their patrol box east of Bermuda, they were then
tracked by US P-3s from NAS Bermuda and NAF Lajes,
Azores. With an operational radius of approximately
1200 nautical miles (and an on-station endurance of
at least four hours) the MPA were able to cover the
SSBN transit route and patrol box from their North
­Atlantic bases.4 Bringing together prosecution capa-
Figure 2 – Representation of a Typical Soviet SSBN Patrol. bilities of submarines, MPA, and other highly classified

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 13

 tracking sensors was the epitome of true theatre-wide The synergy between the two commands was high,
ASW before there was a concept of ‘theatre ASW’. and well-coordinated handover procedures between
both the theatre forces, Maritime Air Control A­ uthority
‘For most of the post-Cold War era, there has been (MACAs), and national MPAs were refined to a high
no consensus on ASW war-fighting or investment level. Procedures such as the ‘Keflavik Covert Turnover
strategies, the various communities (submarines, Pattern’ and processes to hand contact over between
surface combatants, aircraft, and undersea surveil- MPA to MPA, or MPA to NATO submarine and vice
lance) have largely set their own priorities and ­versa, during a transit of the Strait of Gibraltar were
­fended for themselves.’ ingrained in MPA aircrew across both theatres. In fact,
The Unraveling and Revitalization CTF-66 became so proficient it could determine, a
of US Navy Antisubmarine Warfare, Robert White priori, the path a submarine would take through the
straits based on the hand-off of contact information
from the Atlantic Command.7
3.2 Theatre-wide Command and
Control for Cold War ASW
3.3 The MACA Construct
Further enhancing the Command and Control (C2)
model in use during the Cold War was the establish- In subsequent years, the Mediterranean Maritime Air
ment of Task Groups underneath CTF-84. MPA Bases Control Authority (MACA) network was developed as
and ASW Operations Centres (later renamed Tactical a multinational method for coordinating and ­providing
Support Centres) around the Atlantic were ­designated mutual support for GBR, SP, IT, FR, US, GR, and TU MPA
under Operational Control of CTF-84 (Keflavik CTG 84.1, and MPH operations in the Mediterranean Sea. MACA
Lajes CTG 84.2, Rota CTG 84.3).5 The true synergy of Gibraltar had dual chains of command, both under
this effort was realized in the combination of the sub- CTF-431 (established in the 1990s) and also under
marine forces, the highly classified acoustic detection CTF-84. MACAs were developed under national
SOSUS system; the ships with long range acoustic ­OPCON but over the course of their existence have
detection capability; and the multinational MPA
­ been organized under both NATO and Multinational
­localization, tracking, and if needed, engagement ca- C2 structures. For example, in 1994, CTF-431 (assigned
pability all under one commander for peace-time, to the existing Commander Maritime Air Forces South,
anti-submarine operations. Concurrently, as shown Naples IT) was formally established to oversee MPA
below, a similar construct was developed for oper­ operations in the Balkans and the Adriatic Sea. A for-
ations in the Mediterranean Sea.6 mal task organization was created between each of
the eight existing MACAs, designated as CTG 431.X.

CTF66 This resulted in some of the MACAs renaming them-

COMASWSIXFLEET selves from Maritime Air Coordination Agency (owing
to the origins of MPA mission coordination and safety
of flight de-confliction) to Maritime Air Control
CTF67 CTF69
CTF66 ­Authority as they began to exercise C2 authority over
(MPA) NATO COMSUBMED
(Surface)
(SSN) assigned MPA forces for the duration of the NATO
­Operation.
Figure 3 – ASW C2 circa 1980 – 1982.
Commander ASW Forces SIXTH Fleet
­(COMASWSIXTHFLT) was established and Thus, MACA Sigonella became CTG-431.3 (for ­example)
in this role, CTF-66 not only coordinated air, and had TACOM over the US P-3s (permanently
surface and subsurface ASW assets, but also stationed) or Dutch/French/German MPA (when
­
Alliance assets as NATO Commander assigned) for the execution of CTF-431 missions.
­
Submarine Forces Mediterranean. ­ASWOC Sigonella remained a CTU under the US MPA

14 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

squadron CTG in the national command structure. 3.4 Theatre ASW Commander
When not executing NATO missions, the same ­ASWOC
or MACA facility reverts to a national support system, Although it has a lengthy history with the concept,
and the regular national chain of command remains NATO has not yet formally embraced Theatre ASW, nor
in place. has a Theatre ASW Commander been identified.
­According to US doctrine, the ‘Theatre ASW Com-
In 2010, CTF-431 dissolved as part of the consolida- mander (TASWC) is a standing organization respon­
tion of COMMARAIRNORTH with COMMARAIRSOUTH sible for ASW C2 in a theatre area of responsibility. The
(Commander NATO Maritime Air North/South). D ­ uring TASWC has operational control (OPCON) of all theatre
the creation of NATO’s single Maritime Command, the ASW assets: submarine, surface, and air, as well as
command relationship between COMMARAIRNATO ­information systems.’
(CMAN) and the MACAs dissolved. Since then, the
­MACAs have reverted completely to their national
mission support line of operation and only operate
the MACA function during exercises.

© US Navy

Figure 5 – Resources of a Theatre ASW Commander.

Although existing only within US doctrine today, Para-

graphs 3.2 and 3.3 above have outlined NATO’s
lengthy history in exercising this operational concept
in everything but name.

‘During both pre-kinetic and kinetic operations, the

theatre wide focus enables the TASWC to prepare the
Figure 4 – MACA Sigonella Unit Logo circa 2002. water space for the arrival of strike/task groups. Prior
to their arrival, the TASWC pre-plans ASW operations
and pre-searches the operating area. Upon manoeu-
Ground support, both for pre-flight coordination vre into the TASWC AOR, the task group ASW com-
and mission planning as well as for post-flight mander will take control of the local area from the
acoustic ­assessment, data-processing, and timely TASWC while the TASWC retains OPCON for the
dissemination of collected information about the ­remainder of its AOR. The TASWC then monitors local
target sub­marine, is critical to the success of any execution of the plan, as well as any changes, through
MPA ASW ­mission. Chapter 11 further explores the reports from the task group. In addition, it provides a
relationship between MPA and MACAs. It further reach-back capability for the task group ASW com-
highlights s­ pecific challenges to ASW mission sup- mander to call upon as required. Upon transit out of
port currently being experienced by today’s MPA the area, responsibility returns to the TASWC and the
force and identifies a p­ roposed strategy to mitigate new area transitions to local OPCON.’8 NATO has not
many of these ­challenges. currently adopted this model in doctrine, but nations

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 15

 Engage Observations from RIMPAC 2014
Target neutralization
(force deception/evasion/
nonlethal or lethal kill)
‘Theater ASW requires a team and teamwork, not
Cooperative
multiplatform
engagements
only among the surface, air, and subsurface
Control Coordination control of
­warfare communities, but also with our coalition
ASW prosecution units
partners.’
Effective two-way tactical
communications
between prosecuting units
Rear Adm. Phil Sawyer, commander of Submarine Force,
Automated threat threshold US Pacific Fleet.
determination and recommended
unit assigment to maintain
force tactical control
Detect Cohorent surface/subsurface picture
(shared common tactical picture among ‘RIMPAC’s theater anti-submarine warfare exercise
all assets)
is all about gaining experience; each different coun-
Automated ID/classification of all contacts
(including assessed threat levels) try brings a different set of skills … tying it all in in-
Automated intergration of all contacts ternationally, we can take various bits of informa-
(collect, collate, process, and display
multisource data)
tion from each country and come up with an
Effective two-way communications between
shore and at-sea assets international way of doing business.’
(including automated contact dissemination)
Royal Australian Navy LNO Lt. Martin Talbot
Continuous automated position keeping among all ASW
units and/or sensors

Initial sensor employment based on knowledge of Additionally, prosecutions of non-Japanese sub­

environment/automated tactical decision aids
marines operating near the Japanese islands have
Tactical sensors with sufficient
Timely access to naional/theater
ISR
resolution to support force data ­operationally employed the TASWC executed by CTF
correlation algorithms
74 in a bi-lateral construct with Japan and Multi-lateral
Figure 6 – Network-Centric–Based ASW Force arrangement with RoK Navy forces.
Coordination.
Further enhancing interoperability at the Theatre
on the more advanced ASW capability scale are and Tactical level, Japan has occasionally embarked
­discussing its merits.9 forces on US command ships to more fully inte-
grate Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force’s (JMSDF)
Many consider this a bridge too far for NATO’s current forces into the Composite Warfare Commander
command structure. Some postulate that this step is (CWC) structure. In 2015, JMSDF Commander,
not warranted because without a standing NATO ­Escort Flotilla 2, Rear Admiral Hidetoshi Iwasaki,
­approved operation, there is no existing maritime ­assumed the role of Sea Combat Commander (SCC)
component with the authority to conduct ASW. onboard the US Navy’s forward-deployed aircraft
­Others, such as SHAPE’s Strategic Communications carrier USS RONALD REAGAN (CVN 76) during
Chief Mark Laity, counter we are already in Phase Zero ­Annual Exercise 2016 (AE-16). During strike group
of a hybrid conflict and certain enduring functions operations, the SCC is responsible for defending
must be conducted continually10 Although he was the aircraft carrier from surface and sub-surface
­responding to a question regarding operations in ­opposed units.11 In previous exercises, the ASW
Syria, his comments are poignant and on target when staffs had remained segregated by country with the
viewing ASW from a larger scale. JMSDF staff remaining aboard JMSDF ships. This
model of combining both the tactical level staffs
The US and allies in the Pacific region have conducted aboard one flagship and the theatre wide ASW
numerous theatre-wide exercises, to include national planning staffs at the MPA headquarters (for
(Valiant Shield series), Bilateral (both with Japan and ­bi-­lateral MPA planning) and CTF-HQ (for overall C2
the Republic of Korea), and Multinational (Rim of the of the theatre-wide prosecution) is a model NATO
Pacific-RIMPAC) where the TASWC construct was exer- should assess for utility in the MARCOM command
cised, tested, and employed. structure.

16 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

3.5 Is the NATO Command Due to the nature of protecting friendly submarine
­ perations, during the early phase of any non-NATO
o
­Structure Sufficient?
submarine prosecution, details involving the target
Russia has recently increased its submarine presence ­location and nearby friendly assets conducting oper­
throughout the NATO AOR. Chapters 4 and 5 will p
­ rovide ations at this stage of a prosecution will remain
further insight into Russia’s submarine employment ­extremely guarded. This will impact the available com-
strategy. However, with specific regard to C2 of ASW mand structure for this portion of the prosecution. It is
forces as discussed in this chapter, it is noteworthy not feasible to involve the entire Alliance at this early
that in an effort to generate MPA coverage of a recent stage, as there are information sharing challenges in this
non-NATO submarine transiting on the surface, domain which likely would not be overcome. However,
MARCOM requested support from multiple NATO
­ as the prosecution of a non-NATO submarine continues
­nations. Two issues complicated this prosecution. out of these remote areas and closer to the European
continent, it will require the resources of more nations
Firstly, MARCOM is not assigned any forces to exe- and should ideally become a NATO-led prosecution.
cute an ASW prosecution. The Standing Naval
Groups over which MARCOM has OPCON are sched-
3.6 TASWC EXTAC
uled by SHAPE, not MARCOM, for maritime engage-
ment activities. This prevents MARCOM from redir­ In early 2016, Commander NATO Submarine Forces
ecting and employing them for ASW without SHAPE (COMSUBNATO) drafted an Experimental Tactics pub-
and potentially NAC approval. Furthermore, those lication (EXTAC 181), which was endorsed by the 2016
Standing Naval Groups are, according to a recent Maritime Operations Working Group and is expected
Maritime Strategy Paper briefed to the North Atlantic to be formally published later in 2016. Although this
Council, ‘consistently under-­resourced and lack the EXTAC outlines the initial concept to stand up an Area
ability to sustain high-level operations over a pro- ASW Warfare Coordinator, this study determined the
longed period of time.’ 12 proposed C2 structure does not go far enough in
solving all of the authority challenges currently
­
Secondly, MARCOM is not vested with the authority ­experienced in this domain.
to directly allocate or support MPA or submarine
forces. It has a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ with the na- The proposed structure does outline a robust coord­
tions … some choose to support when it aligns with ination network, but falls short in establishing a true
national objectives, others choose not, or are not chain of command. It relies on the will of nations to
able to, based on the availability of forces. Addition- share information without a defined command and
ally, there is no formal ­information sharing mecha- control relationship. This is the reality with which
nism between the national MACAs (or Maritime Ops MARCOM has struggled for the last few years.
Centres). Following a recent submarine transit, ­Although this EXTAC is a step in the right direction
weeks passed before some nations provided even and gets nations talking about processes which NATO
basic data such as the submarine position. No acous- has recently executed poorly (i.e. sharing location
tic data was shared across the force, and limited data data on submarines), the language in the draft EXTAC
was provided between nations to support refined is not robust enough to solve the current challenge.
mission planning. If this particular submarine had sub-
merged, many believe a coordinated subsurface acous-
3.7 Recommended TASWC C2
tic prosecution would have been impossible because
NATO is missing a command structure to coordinate Structure
the necessary resources effectively. This is not the last Therefore, accepting that in the very early stages of
non-NATO submarine to challenge NATO’s current submarine detection intelligence on the target may
ability to locate, detect, and track submarines. ­remain within a small group of nations and prosecution

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 17

 These items include whether the use of active sono-
TF123
Theatre ASW Commander
buoys or submarine overflight with bomb-bay doors
open would be permitted. Providing clear and univer-
TG 123.1 TG 123.2 TG 123.3 TG 123.4
Submarine
Force Commander
Maritime Patrol Aircraft
Force Commander
Surface Ship
Force Commander
SURTASS/LFA
Special Mission Ships
sally implemented direction for all nations in each spe-
TU 123.1 TU 123.2.1 TU 123.3.1 TU 123.4.1
cific submarine prosecution is critical to achieving
Submarine Nation #1 MPA National MOC/MACA National MOC National MOC
­NATO’s strategic objectives. This is because not all track-
TE 123.1.1.1 TE 123.2.1.1 TE 123.3.1.1 TE 123.4.1.1
Submarine MPA Squadron Ship Ship ing efforts need to achieve the same ­effect and the
TU 123.1.2 TU 123.2.2 TU 123.3.2 TU 123.4.2 goals for each prosecution may vary. Today, there is no
Submarine Nation #1 MPA National MOC/MACA National MOC National MOC
entity capable of setting the standards for each prose-
TE 123.1.2.1 TE 123.2.2.1 TE 123.3.2.1 TE 123.4.2.1
Submarine MPA Squadron Ship Ship cution. It falls to each nation and experience has shown
TU 123.1.3
Submarine Nation #1
TU 123.2.3
MPA National MOC/MACA
TU 123.3.3
National MOC
TU 123.4.3
National MOC
that leads to drastically different ­results on-station.
TE 123.1.3.1 TE 123.2.3.1 TE 123.3.3.1 TE 123.4.3.1
Submarine MPA Squadron Ship Ship
To generate the appropriate authorities to execute all
Figure 7 – Notional TASWC Command Structure. phases of Theatre ASW, ranging from peacetime tracking
of a transiting non-NATO submarine to coordinating
screening efforts for NATO Naval Task Forces to oversee-
plans will executed only by this core group, this study ing the handover of prosecution to the local ASW Com-
recommends that when the target submarine crosses mander within a Naval Task Force, and if necessary, coordi-
some to-be-defined geographic boundary, the hand­ nating and overseeing the attack phase of a submarine
over of the prosecution to NATO’s TASWC would occur prosecution occurring outside the local ASWC’s area of
and involve all NATO Maritime Nations. MARCOM responsibility, this study r­ ecommends creating a standing
(­including COMSUBNATO and CMAN) will need to co- Task Force with the following command relationships:
ordinate with the nations to whom this applies and
­develop a handover procedure to the NATO TASWC, to Regions or sectors with a ‘lead-nation’ role will need to
include processes for submarines arriving into NATO’s be geographically identified. This implies a particular
AOR from the High North or Baltic Sea. For submarines nation would be responsible for providing national
originating within the NATO AOR (i.e. a submarine ASW assets, and would provide basing and mission
which originates from the Black Sea or within the support for other nations’ MPA and MPH entering the
­Mediterranean), NATO TASWC would have the lead for region to assist in the prosecution. The lead nation’s
all stages of the prosecution. Below follows the recom- MACA/MOC would be charged with oversight and col-
mended command structure for the TASWC. lection of mission data from MPA and MPH and provide
it to the TASWC (MARCOM). MARCOM would then call
As the last 15 years have seen some nations expand on other nations to fill gaps in resources. These may run
their MPA capability (i.e. Poland and Turkey) or re-align the gamut of ASW resources, including MPA, MPH, ASW
the internal structure for national control of MPA, MPH ships, submarines, and if necessary, coordinating with
and ASW ships into Maritime Operations Centres, any AIRCOM for the use of ISR assets overwater.
future C2 structure must include a link into each
­national element capable of conducting C2 of MPA, Finally, and perhaps most critically, handover proce-
MPH, Submarine and ‘other’ special mission ships (for dures as the submarine transits from one lead nation’s
those nations with the capability such as Surveillance AOR to another must be identified. This would be the
Towed array Sonar System-SURTASS and Low overall responsibility of a Theatre ASW Warfare com-
­Frequency Active ships). One added benefit of this mander but must be agreed to and adopted by the
structure is the ability to promulgate the prosecution nations executing the tactical phases of prosecution.
posture. The prosecution posture includes elements of This is a process that ideally is in place prior to the
tracking where some aspects may be more provocative commencement of operations and in many cases can
than others and may not align with a strategic goal. be a standing arrangement once codified.

18 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

None of this is new. In the 1970s and into the late 1990s, l­eaving the pier, passing through a choke-point or
the Consolidated Maritime Briefing Book (a C
­ ONFIDENTIAL through loss of acoustic tracking data for some reason),
document shared amongst the countries participating the potential location of that submarine expands expo-
in ASW at the time) promulgated the ASW C2 structure nentially as a function of time and transit speed (i.e.
in use, MPA and MPH roles in different types of prose­ ­nuclear and diesel submarines have drastically different
cution procedures (overt/covert), Air-to-friendly sub- transit speeds due to their propulsion design. Therefore
marine coordination procedures, prevailing meteoro- the time-late furthest-on circle expands at a different
logical and oceanographic items of note in each rate). A coordinated effort at the theatre level has
specific region, and specific bottom topography fea- shown to be the most efficient in managing resource
tures with notes on specifically how/where to use pas- shortfalls and maximizing employment of assets to
sive sonobuoys to exploit the unique characteristics of ­regenerate contact on submerged submarines.
sound propagation around those features. Perhaps
most critically, its periodic updates provided the sole As many nations have reduced their national inven-
resource for retaining salient lessons learned about ad- tory of MPA and submarines, and while non-NATO
versary counter-detection tactics specific to the exploi- submarine patrols in the NATO AOR continue to rise,
tation of the ocean environment in that region. NATO should explore methods to improve interaction
between NATO ASW forces. This should seek to mini-
Each ASWOC was charged with maintaining currency mize both resource shortfalls and maximize sensor
and profiency regarding their specific region. As the coverage provided by available ASW assets. This
ASW command structure dissolved in the late 1990s, ­analysis must include a holistic review of C2 and a
and the subsequent closures of ASWOC Keflavik, Lajes, thorough assessment of required capabilities provid-
Rota, and Gibraltar, this critical ASW resource was no ed by MPA/MPH ground support stations to enhance
longer updated. Following MACA Sigonella’s regional interoperability. NATO should look to establish a
update in 2002, this document has vanished into ob- ­Theatre ASW Commander structure for use in peace-
scurity, and no record could be located for this study. time, modelling the success of this construct both
If a copy were to be located in any national archive, it within NATO’s history and in other multinational
would fill many current information gaps identified in ­arrangements in use today across the globe.
the lead-nation concept. Perhaps it is worth the effort
to recreate the data before the last ASW officer or
­sailor with Cold War ASW experience and first-hand 1. ‘The Cold War Times’. Robideau, Larry. Feb 2006, Vol 6 Ed. 1. Available Online at: http://
www.coldwar.org/text_files/coldwartimesfeb2006.pdf.
use of this publication were to retire from service. 2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
3.8 Summary 5. Ibid.
6. What Role can a Theatre ASW Commander Serve in the Modern Maritime Strategy? White,
Robert. Naval War College, Oct 2006. Available online at: http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/
The key strengths of a submarine are stealth, silence,
fulltext/u2/a463664.pdf
and depending upon the type of submarine, speed. 7. Ibid.
Finding a hostile submarine poses the most significant 8. Ibid.
9. ‘Fleet Battle Experiment-KILO (FBE-K) Sea Shield: ASW’ Analysis report, Naval Warfare
challenge to ASW forces. As a general rule, once a sub- Development Command 27 March 2003. Available online at: https://www.nwdc.smil.
marine has been detected and forces assigned to exe- mil/mbc
10. Mark Laity, Speech on 22 Nov 2015, JAPCC Air and Space Power Conference, Essen GE.
cute the tracking phase of a submarine prosecution, Comments published with permission of Mr. Laity, as the JAPCC Conference is conducted
whether MPA, surface ship or another submarine, those under Chatham House Rules.
forces are usually successful at maintaining contact, or 11. ‘Japanese Admiral embarks Ronald Reagan as Sea Combat Commander during Annual
Ex 16’. Sextone, Sara. PACOM News. 24 Nov 2015. Available online at: http://www.pa-
regenerating contact should it be lost for some time. com.mil/Media/News/tabid/5693/Article/631180/japanese-admiral-embarks-ronald-
The challenge to ASW planning becomes one of geog- reagan-as-sea-combatant-commander-during-annual.aspx
12. ‘The Renaissance at Sea’ Hudson, Peter as cited in The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for
raphy and distance: As a submarine passes from a a Maritime Century. Nordenman, Magnus. Brent Snowcraft Centre briefing to the Atlantic
known position to an unknown position (whether Council. 2015. Pg. 13.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 19

© US Navy

Maritime Patrol Aircraft from nine NATO Nations are staged for Anti-Submarine Warfare missions
(NAS Keflavik circa 1996).

CHAPTER IV With that in mind, it is critical to consider President

Vladimir Putin’s maritime strategy, including the role
of submarines as a critical component of power
The Russian Perspective – ­projection. Over the decades, NATO has continually
Strategy for Submarine failed to understand, predict, and prepare for Russian
Employment military actions, which, when viewed through the lens
of history, should have been anticipated. Russian
‘Among the most intangible qualities of a combat mari­time strategy has traditionally relied upon the
force are those cultural factors that influence its basic strategic importance of submarines, dating back to
fighting capabilities. To take what is the most sensa- the time of the Tsars. Yet there remains today amongst
tional example, consider the Kamikaze pilot. No mere many NATO politicians and military leaders a p­ ervasive
quantitative assessment of the Japanese tactical and dangerous attitude that today and tomorrow’s
aviation forces of the Second World War could have Russian Federation submarines were defeated in the
accounted for Kamikazes. Only an assessment of Cold War and will not provide a significant impact to
­cultural characteristics could have keyed analysts to NATO. Recent examples prove otherwise.
the possibility. In retrospect, we can understand the
Japanese belief in the divinity of their empire and the
4.1 From Politics to Strategy
cultural abhorrence of shame that could allow for
creating pilots sufficiently motivated to embrace Analysis in Appendix A shows a link between Russian
­suicidal missions.’ influence and the rise of populist, nationalistic, and
Edward Timperlake1 xenophobic political parties across Europe. Many of

20 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

these entities receive financial support from Russian- mission is too late – Alliance security, in the Maritime
affiliated non-governmental organizations (NGOs).3 domain and beyond, requires continuous presence
Taking advantage of Europe’s economic malaise, and overt tracking.
these increasingly successful fringe parties have con-
tributed to the weakening of political support for the
4.2 Putin’s Strategic View
European Union and governments across Europe.
of the Navy
‘The transatlantic community awoke March 18,
2014, to a strategic surprise: the Russian Federa- A Grand Strategy for Maritime Forces
tion, a ‘strategic partner’ of the EU, had formally ‘The renewed interest and investment in sea power is
­annexed Crimea.’2 a component of Russia’s increasing assertiveness and
desire for global influence and power. Contemporary
Their impact is most evident in the former Eastern Russian maritime thinking is marked by a significant
Bloc, where institutions and civil society remain coherence in its aims, objectives, and synergies with
­underdeveloped and susceptible to the revitalization wider Russian grand strategy.’9
of former Soviet networks. As Heather Conley wrote in
2015, ‘Although the 21st-century East-West confronta- Russia’s formal doctrine for the employment of its
tion does not bear the same ideological vestiges of ­naval forces matches much of her Western counter-
the Cold War, there is a clear ideological component parts. Current Russian Federation doctrine defines
today … The unqualified success of Central Europe’s ‘­opposing [Western] naval task groups’ as a core oper-
transformation from Communism to liberal democra- ational-strategic task of the Navy, in addition to strate-
cies and market economies is not immutable, and we gic deterrence. ‘It will engage with fires the adversary’s
should not trick ourselves into believing it is so.’4 naval task forces in the far and near maritime zone, it
will aid other Armed Forces services operating in sec-
Although many government officials and experts tors with an outlet to the sea. The forms of the Navy’s
­perceive Russia as weak, Putin has proven time and employment will be as follows: first and subsequent
time again he is highly adept at successfully ‘playing fleet operations (within the framework of a maritime
what appears to be a weak hand.’5 Ukrainian President operation); combat operations by the fleets to ­engage
Peter Poroshenko has described Putin as ‘unpredicta- naval task forces and other important targets. This is
ble, emotional, and dangerous.’6 Whether President intended to aid in ensuring ‘a favourable operational
Putin can manage and for how long is an open ques- regime’, that is, sea control for maritime operations’.10
tion, but we not should assume it will end in the near
term or whoever comes after Putin will be more open The operational and tactical employment of all classes
to negotiation.7 of submarines fits well into both the politically stated
and doctrinally published strategic goals of the mari-
‘NATO’s new Eastern Front – consisting of … the Bal- time service.
tic States, Poland, Romania, and Bulgaria – wants
physical assurances that NATO will prevent potential Furthermore, according to Vladislav Inozemtsev of
Russian aggression, not reassurances that NATO will Moscow’s Higher School of Economics, a recently
respond to aggression after it has occurred.’8 A simi- stumbling Russian economy does not lead to the
lar perspective should be applied to ASW: if we as an Kremlin spending less on its military and internal se-
Alliance are not proactively monitoring submarine curity forces or to the beginning of widespread politi-
activity in peacetime, we cede the initiative to our cal upheaval.11 Russia’s economy has been in a down-
potential adversaries and allow them to hold the ward spiral for years – not just because of falling oil
­entire Alliance Maritime enterprise (military and civil) prices and Western sanctions, but because the gov-
at risk. Finding a submarine after it has achieved its ernment itself is increasingly bloated. It is spending

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 21

 ­ perations in the Baltics. As noted in a 1990 RAND
o
study, ‘(a)lthough Sweden’s stated policy is one of
non-alignment [with NATO], Swedish sympathies and
security interests lie with the West. Though this is not
the public view of the Swedish government, this is
certainly the perspective of the Soviet planner …
­Soviet submarine incursions and related operations
can be fully interpreted only within the context of
such a scenario. ‘13
© Janes

Highlighted by the famous ‘Whiskey-on-the-Rocks’

grounding of a Soviet Whiskey Class submarine in Oc-
Figure 8 – ‘Whiskey’ on the Rocks.
tober 1981 in the waters of Gasofjarden, incursions
into Swedish territorial waters were aggressively
more on weaponry rather than stimulating the coun- tracked through their high point in 1989 at more than
try’s business sector. The Kremlin has been success- 30 violations.14 In fact, an investigation into the Whis-
ful in convincing the public that its economic woes key grounding, including logbook entries, revealed
can be blamed on the West – for sanctions causing intentional, deliberate and systematic incursion.15
food prices and unemployment to rise. It also has
distracted Russians with interventions in Crimea and Although the ‘Soviet’ government is not the reigning
eastern Ukraine.12 Russia’s history with showcasing power in Russia today, both the military objectives
military might in an effort to quell or respond to and the Soviet perspective on Sweden outlined above
challenges in the homeland feeds directly into may colour modern Russian military planners. In fact,
­Putin’s ­vision of the role of submarines to achieve his it may be a driving influence on some of today’s
grand maritime strategy. ­Russian submarine activity. As a case in point, in both
2014 and 2015, Sweden detected Russian submarines
A Russian View of the Baltics and the High North operating inside its territory on multiple occasions, a
Having strategic, geographic importance for any con- claim which the Kremlin disputes.16, 17
flict between Russian and other nations’ naval forces,
the Baltics are of considerable relevance to any mari- Additionally, some Russian military planners view
time scenario. Submarine operations in the Cold War operations against Sweden’s ASW forces (surface
­
were frequent in this area, as well as other important ships and ASW helicopters, land-based radars and sur-
strategic areas in and around the North Atlantic. It is veillance aircraft), as an opportunity to practice
logical to assess that Russian submarines would con- counter-­detection against high-end Western capabili-
duct operations to familiarize themselves with the op- ties without necessarily engaging NATO forces.18
erational environment in the Baltics in preparation for
any potential maritime conflict. The Baltic Sea could Looking to the High North, Russia’s operations in the
be used as a staging area for the conduct of cruise Arctic cause interaction (and friction) with other
missile attacks, a haven from which to expand opera- ­nations having claims to the region. This area is also
tions into the Atlantic, or an area in which to lie in wait the traditional space for early interaction between
for NATO forces. western ASW assets and Russian nuclear submarines
traveling south into the Atlantic. Based on the loca-
However, specific operations conducted around tion of the Russian North Fleet and the remoteness of
­Sweden during the Cold War also outline the Soviet this area (providing an excellent training location for
perspective on that nation’s neutrality. This perspec- Russian submarine crews), the High North should
tive is a likely impetus for the current submarine continue to be an area of interest for Alliance and

22 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

partner ASW forces. Some analysts have noted that If one accepts a common Western perception ‘there
Russia has recently prioritized the High North as a remains a deep-seated failure to grasp that aggres-
­focal point for operations through investments in sion against Russia in one form or another is not a key
­submarine upgrades, evolution in doctrine and a re- aim of NATO or US policy – which stems from the
newed comprehensive maritime strategy. even deeper failure to perceive that, in the current
decade, it is no longer axiomatic that no significant
The Role of Submarines in Putin’s Navy problem can be addressed without Russian involve-
Putin has long held that Russia’s ability to project influ- ment,’24 then Putin’s stated goal of a powerful navy
ence is tied to having a strong maritime presence. and expansive submarine force makes more sense,
From the 1960s up to the 1990s, the Soviet Navy and should not be quickly discounted.
­conducted distant operations to achieve this level of
influence. In 2013, TASS announced that, after a Submarines as a Strategic Communications Tool
­21-year hiatus, Russia planned to resume nuclear sub- NATO’s Chief of Strategic Communications, Mark Laity,
marine patrols similar to those seen in the Cold War in remarked that ‘the purpose of Strategic Communica-
the southern seas to continue Putin’s vision of a strong tion is the marriage of communications and messag-
and agile military.19 Additionally, the Kremlin has ing delivered specifically to achieve a desired effect.’ 25
­stated in response to NATO expansion, Russia would
station a permanent naval presence in the Mediterra- Just knowing a submarine is out there causes naval
nean Sea and increase ongoing activity in the Atlantic planners to conduct risk assessments and account for
and Arctic.20 the potential action of that submarine. Announcing
deployments of ballistic missile submarines, transiting
‘There is more activity from Russian submarines on the surface from the North Fleet to the Black Sea
than we’ve seen since the days of the Cold War. This and test firing ballistic missiles (and more recently fir-
is very different from the period of quiet submarine ing live warheads into Syria from Kilo Class SSKs) all
activity that perhaps we’ve seen in the past.’ Simul- result in NATO’s maritime planners accounting for
taneously, the technical capabilities displayed by Russia’s activity – achieving a strategic effect in line
Russian submarines have increased. It is ‘a level of with Russia’s grand strategy.
Russian capability that we haven’t seen before,’ the
admiral says. The Russian Navy accomplished this
4.3 Recent Russian Submarine
‘through an extraordinary investment path not mir-
rored by the West’ and has made ‘technology leaps Operations
that [are] remarkable, and credit to them.’ Russian Navy Chief Admiral Chirkov noted from
Vice Admiral Clive Johnstone ­January 2014 to March 2015 the intensity of patrols by
Commander, Allied Maritime Command 21 submarines has risen by almost 50 percent as com-
pared to 2013.26 Not only has the deployment num-
In late 2015, two Bulava ballistic missiles were test- ber been on the rise, but also the strategic effect of
fired off of a Borei class submarine,22 the Russian each deployment is starting to be realized.
­Federation’s newest SSBN. The Bulava ballistic missile
is the next generation component of the Russian • In 2009, a pair of Akula class SSNs deployed inside of
­nuclear triad and although testing throughout the 200nm from the US East Coast, the first mission of its
early 2000s saw mixed success, the most recent five kind so close to shore in nearly a decade. The White
tests firings have all been successful.23 This represents House indicated they did not know specifically what
validation of one the stated purposes of the SSBN the submarines were doing, while Pentagon officials
fleet and is in keeping with Putin’s grand maritime elaborated the submarine mission appeared to be
strategy of ensuring Russia remains globally relevant part of efforts by Moscow to show a greater military
and part of any conversation between global powers. presence around the world. 27

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 23

 © IHS Janes

Figure 9 – GBR Retired its NIMROD Fleet and Was Forced to Request NATO Assistance to Track Russian Submarines.

• In Aug 2010, an Akula class SSN was discovered • In perhaps the most notable and most visible exam-
­attempting to track a UK Vanguard Class Ballistic ple of the modernization of Russia’s submarine force,
­Missile Submarine (carrying the National independ- in December 2015 the second Kilo en route to the
ent nuclear deterrent) off the Clyde Approaches (off Black Sea conducted Kalibr cruise missile strikes into
the coast of Liverpool, UK).28 Syria. 34
• In late 2012, an Akula SSN allegedly remained unde- • In January 2016, as research for this project was com-
tected for several weeks while conducting oper­ ing to a close, the French Navy detected a Russian
ations in the Gulf of Mexico. 29 ­Nuclear ballistic missile submarine, likely a Delta-IV
• Later in 2012, a Sierra-2-class guided-missile sub­ class SSBN, operating just outside the Bay of Biscay.35
marine crept within a mere 200 miles of the Eastern
Seaboard of the United States and observed oper­ This list serves to highlight recent noteworthy deploy-
ations of a US Carrier Strike Group. 30 ments. There have been more. In fact, some reports
• In the Mediterranean, Russian submarines have simi- indicate that the UK may have asked for NATO MPA
larly increased operations, including participation in assistance as many as 20 times in 2015 to prosecute
a large scale naval exercise off the coast of Syria in submarines near British waters.36
January 2013. 31
• In December 2014 and early 2015, Britain asked on As a result of the Russian Federation’s recent surge in
multiple occasions for NATO MPA assistance to military activity in what has recently been referred to
search for a submarine reportedly operating in Scot- as the ‘arc of steel’ (from the Arctic to the eastern Med-
tish waters, as the UK no longer has MPA capability. 32 iterranean), the US finds itself, in the short term, forced
• In September 2015, a Kilo SSK conducted an intra-fleet to review its global posture in terms of air and naval
­surfaced transit from the North Fleet to its new home in assets. The reinforcement of Russia’s military strong-
the Black Sea. More Kilos are expected to make this holds in the Far North, – bases, surface-to-air batteries,
transfer in the upcoming years, re-establishing Russia’s troops, etc. – has resulted in an unprecedented ‘anti-
ability to ­deploy submarines into the Mediterranean access/area denial’ challenge, which neither the re-
Sea with ­little notice and bringing the Kilo’s ‘Kalibr’ cruise sources nor the current strategy of the US (and NATO)
missiles within range of targets in Eastern Europe. 33 are capable of countering.37

24 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

As established in Tom Spahn’s recent ‘Proceedings’ start of the year, hitting an all-time low of 85 Rubles per
­article, US Navy planners are growing increasingly dollar on (21 January 2016). Official statistics show over
concerned with the link between stated Russian 20 million Russians, roughly 14 percent of the popul­
­intentions and the reality of the significant increase in ation, are now living in poverty. That compares with 16
actual submarine patrols. ‘Although Moscow has ­million in 2014.
made no attempt to conceal the fact that it plans to
accelerate submarine operations, the audacity of While Putin still enjoys approval ratings of up to
some recent patrols exemplifies a troubling trend.’38 89 percent, small cracks are starting to appear in Rus-
sian resilience. Russian long-haul truck drivers have
‘The language coming from the Russian military re- protested outside Moscow against a new road tax
flects the mindset and actions characteristic of di- they say could destroy their business. Pensioners in
rect challenge and confrontation with NATO. What the Olympic town of Sochi blocked traffic demanding
makes this approach troubling is hybrid warfare free transportation to be reinstated in the city after it
coupled with the ever-present threat of the full ap- was cut as part of the country’s austerity measures.
plication of robust conventional and nuclear forces.’ Businesses in Russia’s crucial oil and gas industry are
Admiral Mark Ferguson, Commander, Joint Forces Command also complaining about punishing conditions. The
Naples in a briefing to North Atlantic Council 6 October 2015 price of oil has collapsed in the last 18 months,
­sending their revenues plunging.39

4.4 The Link Between the Russian

All of this has resulted in a growing sense of unrest
Populace and the Kremlin’s within the populace, which history suggests may
Use of Military Force ­result in a military show of force from the Kremlin. This
is likely to be directed not at the populace, but at the
In reviewing Russia’s past to assess Putin’s likely future world to demonstrate capability, resolve, and strength
intentions, it is important to remember Putin f­ requently with the secondary effect of building national pride
broadcasts his intentions. Unfortunately, those signals within the Rodina.
are often either overlooked, ignored or not believed,
frequently due to western behavioural mirroring. As of ‘They want to be a major global power but with a
the writing of this study, the global price of oil has hov- limited ability to do it-that makes them more unpre-
ered for weeks at a decade-low $30 per barrel. The Rus- dictable … It puts an enormous pressure on the Rus-
sian economy is mired in turmoil and nearing stag­ sian leadership to deliver something to the Russian
nation; however, many assess a proportional increase in public.’
defence spending (as seen by the strategic goals of Lieutenant General Kjell Grandhagen
shipbuilding and naval deployments) will not only con- Director of the Norwegian Intelligence Service
tinue, but increase in the coming decades as Russia
­attempts to keep pace with global powers. In the latter half of 2015, this type of demonstration
took the form of an arms show over Syria, showing to
Ordinary Russians are suffering because of the devas- the world the might and reach of Russian Federation
tating impact of low oil prices and Western sanctions. military capabilities, including submarines. In 2016
Kottasova and Chance reported in January 2016 that and beyond, as President Putin has already expressed,
real wages fell 9.5 percent in 2015, and official data it is likely NATO will see the increase in submarine
show an average Russian earning just over 30,300 ­deployments continue for many of the same reasons.
­Rubles ($385) a month last year. At the same time, pric-
es are rising fast. Inflation hit 12.5 percent in 2015 and In fact, in conjunction with the re-establishment of a
could take a long time to slow down if the Ruble permanent submarine presence in the Black Sea with
­continues to fall. The currency has plunged since the the reassignment of a portion of the North Fleet’s Kilo

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 25

 SSK inventory to a new homeport, in Novorossiysk, to the prevailing theory that the Russian military is not
Russia, (just east of the former Russian naval base in operating at significant levels, nor is comprised of sig-
Crimea) the Russian Federation Navy has also ‘revived nificant submarine capability, to warrant prioritization
the Soviet-era practice of permanently stationing of effort. It is this prevailing attitude which has result-
warships in the Mediterranean, with large destroyers ed in the ASW resource and MPA inventory shortfall
and cruisers beginning to patrol in January 2016.’40 which will be elaborated in Chapter 8.

1. ‘Squadron Fighter Pilots: The Unstoppable Force of Innovation for 5th Generation Ena-
‘The new maritime doctrine tells us that Russia will
bled Concepts of Operations’. Edward Timperlake. Second Line of Defense, 28 Feb 2016.
counter our existing ASW technologies; challenge Available online at: http://www.sldinfo.com/squadron-fighter-pilots-the-unstoppable-
US and NATO’s maritime presence in the Atlantic as force-of-innovation-for-5th-generation-enabled-concepts-of-operations/
2. ‘Russians Influence on Europe’. Conley, Heather. 2015 Center for Strategic and Interna-
well as the Baltic, Black, and Mediterranean seas; tional Studies Global Forecast. Pg. 28.
and expand Russian permanent presence in the Arc- 3. Ibid Pg. 31
4. Ibid Pg. 31
tic and Mediterranean.’ 5. ‘Putin’s Dilemma’ Kuchins, Andrew 2015 Center for Strategic and International Studies
Vice Admiral James Foggo, Commander, US SIXTH FLEET 41 Global Forecast. Pg. 33
6. Ibid Pg. 31
7. Ibid Pg. 31
4.5 Summary 8. ‘NATO’s Eastern Front’ Michta, Andres. 2015 Center for Strategic and International Studies
Global Forecast. Pg. 45
9. ‘The Russian Federation Navy: An Assessment of Strategic Setting, Doctrine and Pros-
This chapter reviewed the political backdrop of the pects’. Bosbotinis, James. Defence Academy of the UK.
evolution of the current Russian Military stemming 10. Ibid.
11. ‘Despite Declining Economy, Russia Shows No Signs of Slowing Military Spending’. Grady,
from the economic challenges following the Cold
John. USNI News, 22 Feb. 2016 Available online at: http://news.usni.org/2016/02/22/
War. A historical background and insight into Putin’s despite-declining-economy-russia-shows-no-signs-of-slowing-military-spending
motivation for the current use of military force to 12. Ibid.
13. ‘Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters’. McKormick, Gor-
achieve his grand strategic plan was further explored, don. RAND Corporation, Jan. 1990.
with further details outlined in Appendix A. There is a 14. Ibid. Pg. 5
15. Ibid. Pg. 7
clearly defined link between the economic status and 16. ‘Sweden confirms foreign sub in its waters’. Castillo, Mariano and Isaac, Lindsay. CNN
the challenges faced by the national population with 14 Nov. 2014. Available online at: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/11/14/world/europe/
an expansion in military spending and operations. Ad- sweden-russia-submarine-mystery/
17. ‘Submarine Intruders on Sweden’s Coastline’. Braw, Elisabeth. World Affairs – Trans-
ditionally, there is a clearly defined global ambition for Atlantic Connection. 29 Sept 2015. Available online at: http://www.worldaffairsjournal.
Putin to ensure the Russian Federation remains rele- org/blog/elisabeth-braw/submarine-intruders-sweden%E2%80%99s-coastline
18. ‘Stranger than Fiction: Soviet Submarine Operations in Swedish Waters’. McKormick, Gor-
vant and interacting with Western powers as a peer in don. RAND Corporation, Jan 1990. Pg. 30
any global issue. 19. ‘Russia to send nuclear submarines to South Seas’. Anishchuk, Alexei. Reuters, 1 June
2013. Available online at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-submarines-patrol-
idUSBRE95007V20130601
As a backdrop to understanding the development of 20. ‘Russia will boost Navy in Atlantic and Arctic to counter unacceptable NATO expansion’.
Russian maritime strategy, Appendix A provides fur- Oliphant, Roland. The Telegraph, 28 July 2015. Available online at: http://news.nation-
alpost.com/news/world/russia-will-boost-navy-in-atlantic-and-arctic-to-counter-
ther insight into the cultural issues at work within the unacceptable-nato-expansion
Soviet Union and the current Russian Federation 21. The Diplomat citing IHS JANES WEEKLY http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/russian-sub-
marine-activity-at-highest-level-since-cold-war/
which influence the behaviour of its political leader- 22. ‘Confirmed: Russia’s Deadliest Sub test-fires 2 ballistic missiles’. Gady, Franz-Stephan.
ship and the operations of its military forces. Addition- The Diplomat, 18 Nov. 2015. Available online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/
ally, the Appendix includes an assessment of the im- confirmed-russias-deadliest-sub-test-fires-2-ballistic-missiles/
23. Ibid.
pact of economic sanctions on the Russian Federation 24. ‘Russian Military Transformation – Goal in Sight?’ Giles, Kier and Dr. Monaghan, Andrew.
and how sanctions may have resulted in President US Army War College Press. May 2014. Available online at: http://www.StrategicStudies-
Institute.army.mil/
Putin’s viewpoint on the use of submarines as a por- 25. Mark Laity, Speech on 22 Nov. 2015, JAPCC Air and Space Power Conference, Essen GE.
tion of his grand maritime strategy. Comments published with permission of Mr. Laity, as the JAPCC Conference is conducted
under Chatham House Rules.
26. ‘Russian Navy Chief: Submarine Patrols up 50% over last Year’. LaGrone, Sam. US Naval
As it pertains to this study, this chapter and the associ- Institute, 19 Mar. 2015.
ated appendix provide a detailed counter-argument 27. ‘Russian subs patrol off US East Coast’. Entous, Adam. Reuters 5 Aug. 2009. Available online

26 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 at: http://www.reuters.com/article/us-security-usa-subs-idUSTRE5740DV20090805 ‘Royal Navy relied on NATO to protect British waters 20 times in 2015’. Merrill, Jamie. 12
36. 
28. ‘Following its removal, how necessary in UK Defence is a Long-Range Maritime Patrol Air- Feb. 2016 The Independent. Available online at: http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
craft capability?’ Croydon, Tim. 12 Mar 2012. Dept of War Studies, King’s College London. uk/home-news/royal-navy-relied-on-nato-to-protect-british-waters-20-times-in-
29. ‘Russian Navy Chief: Submarine Patrols up 50% over last Year’. LaGrone, Sam. US Naval 2015-a6870686.html
Institute, 19 Mar. 2015. ‘The Arc of Steel’: Responding to Russian Strategy from the Arctic to the Mediterranean’.
37. 
30. Ibid. TTU Authors, 1 Feb. 2016. SLD Defense Online. Available at: http://www.sldforum.
31. Ibid. com/2016/02/the-arc-of-steel-responding-to-russian-strategy-from-the-arctic-to-
32. ‘MoD forced to ask US for help in tracking "Russian submarine"’. Ward, Victoria. The Tel- the-mediterranean/
egraph. 9 Jan. 2015. Available online at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/de- ‘Russian Navy Chief: Submarine Patrols up 50% over last Year’. LaGrone, Sam. US Naval
38. 
fence/11334836/MoD-forced-to-ask-US-for-help-in-tracking-Russian-submarine.html Institute, 19 Mar. 2015. Available online at: http://news.usni.org/2015/03/19/russian-
33. ‘US Sensors detect Russian Submarines near cables’. Star, Barbara. CNN Politics, 29 Oct. navy-chief-submarine-patrols-up-50-percent-over-last-year
2015. Available online at: http://edition.cnn.com/2015/10/28/politics/russian-subma- ‘Russians are getting angry about the economy’ Kottasova, Ivana. 26 Jan. 2016. CNN-
39. 
rine-expansion-atlantic/index.html Money. Available online at: http://money.cnn.com/2016/01/26/news/russia-protests-
34. ‘Russian Submarine hits targets in Syria’. Cavas, Christopher. DefenseNews. 9 Dec. 2015. economy/index.html?iid=obnetwork
Available online at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/12/08/ ‘ISIS, Russia and NATO’s Evolving Threat in the Mediterranean’. USNI News. Paulsson,
40. 
submarine-russia-kalibr-caliber-cruise-missile-syria-kilo/76995346/ Henrik. 8 Mar. 2016. Available online at: http://news.usni.org/2016/03/08/opinion-isis-
35. ‘Russian Ballistic Missile Sub Spotted Off French Coast’ Majumdar, Dave. The National russia-and-natos-evolving-threat-in-the-mediterranean
Interest. 10 Mar. 2016. Available online at: http://www.nationalinterest.org/blog/the- ’The Fourth Battle of the Atlantic’. VADM James Foggo and Alarik Fritz. Proceedings Maga-
41. 
buzz/russian-ballistic-missile-sub-spotted-french-coast-15463 zine Jun. 2016. Available online at: http://www.usni.org/node/87164#footnotes

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 27

© Janes

A Russian Akula SSN was leased to india in 2012.

CHAPTER V with NATO submarines, the decades of neglect of the

Russian maritime service and significant delays in
Submarine Development construction of new classes have resulted in a signifi-
cant inventory reduction of the Russian strategic and
5.1 The Russian Federation’s attack submarine fleets. However, Russia has recently
Submarine Development invested significant resources and effort to address
this, and it is likely to see increased numbers of these
In the past decade, Russian shipbuilding has made new classes in the near future. This chapter provides a
great strides in returning to a dominant role in the brief overview of the capability of the new classes
world. Submarine construction is a key aspect of this. ­either currently at sea or in development.
Not only does ship and submarine export continue to
be one of the major sources of Russia’s income, but, as SSBN
many of the Cold War era submarine classes are at the The Yuri Dolgoruky, Russia’s newest ballistic missile
end of their service life, Russia is expending significant submarine and first of the Borei Class SSBNs, officially
effort to upgrade its entire submarine fleet with mod- entered service in the Northern Fleet in early 2013.1
ern replacements. These upgraded systems still retain Upgrades over previous models include advances in
ballistic missile strike capability coupled with the full quieting technology, including to the propulsion sys-
gamut of nuclear and diesel-electric mission sub­ tem. As an SSBN’s primary mission is strategic strike,
marine portfolios. the deterrent capability of the submarine is linked
with the capability of its embarked missiles. Although
Although the new submarine classes are extremely the Yuri Dolgoruky was completed in 2008, significant
capable and are slowly narrowing the capability gap delays in the development and testing of the Bulava

28 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 SSN
Russia’s hunter-killer Fast Attack submarine is the
­Akula SSN. Stealthy and fast, the improved Akulas
­significantly closed the capability gap with their West-
ern SSN counterparts in the mid-1990s. The Akula
­entered service in 1986 with an improved model field-
ed in 1995. As of 2015, 19 Akula remain in service with
14 in the Northern Fleet. Much of the fleet, including
all three of the improved Akulas, are expected to
© Janes

­remain in service until 2025. Russia also has two Sierra

and five Victor-III SSNs. Both have similar capability to
Figure 10 – A Borei Class SSBN Sets Sail for Sea Trials.
the Akula class, remaining in the Northern Fleet inven-
tory and projected to remain in service through 2017.
ballistic missile delayed fielding of the submarine. Of note, the Akula is one of the few nuclear sub­
Recent Bulava test firings have proved successful
­ marines in the world available for export. The newest
enough for Russia to formally field the platform. The hull was constructed in 2012 and leased to India, for
Borei class SSBNs (ten projected) are replacing the which it is currently in service.2
­aging Typhoon and Delta III/IV series (14 total SSBN as
of 2015, nine of which are stationed in the Northern SSGN
Fleet with the remainder in the Pacific Fleet) which The Guided Missile submarine in the Russian inventory
entered service in 1981 and 1976/1981 respectively. is the Oscar-II class SSGN. A large submarine, yet also
© Janes

Figure 11 – The Emblem of the Russian Federation Figure 12 – A Kilo Class SSK Type 636 Variant.
Navy.

Class Baltic Black Northern Pacific

Fleet Sea Fleet Fleet Fleet
Nuclear Powered Balisstic Missile Submarines (SSBN) – 8 5
Delta III/IV, Typhoon, Borei
Nuclear Powered Guided Missile Submarines (SSGN) – 4 5
Oscar II, Yasen
Nuclear Powered Attack Submarines (SSN) – 13 5
Akula, Sierra, Victor-III
Attack Submarines (SS/SSK) – Kilo, Lada 2 6 7 8
Figure 13 – Disposition of the Russian Federations Submarine Fleet 2016.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 29

 stealthy and fast, the Oscar-II is equipped with 2­ 4 SSN- Fleet to the Black Sea Fleet for future operations in the
19 Shipwreck missiles, sometimes referred to as carrier- Mediterranean and Black Seas.
killers. As of 2015, nine Oscar-II SSGNs (four in North
Fleet) remain active. The Oscar II first sailed in 1985 and The planned replacement submarine to the Kilo, the
is expected to remain active past 2020, although some Lada, experienced significant design challenges with
have already been decommissioned.3 Russia is also up- the initial hull (St Petersburg). The initial hull of the
grading 12 of the remaining Oscar-II’s and Akula’s com- Lada class design failed to live up to design goals,
bat systems, countermeasures, and weapons systems. 4 specifically in the propulsion system. The class
­
­remained stalled for years. In 2014, construction of the
To replace the SSN and SSGN fleet, Russia elected to second and third Lada resumed. The Lada is designed
construct a hybrid to upgrade its current capability. with an AIP fuel cell with a projected submerged time
Being built with low magnetic signature steel, the of 45 days at 3 knots.7 An export variant of the Lada,
Yasen will displace less than the Akulas with im- the Amur, is also under development. Multiple n ­ ations,
provements in weapons capability, delivering in- including India and China, have expressed interest in
creased firepower.5 Based on a common hull design, acquiring an upgraded AIP-capable SSK.8
two variants of the Yasen will be constructed, one to
meet the SSN role of protecting the SSBN fleet
5.2 Overall Detectability
against other SSNs and the other designed to hunt
carrier strike groups in the SSGN role. The S­ everodvinsk, Advances in equipment quieting, hull construction
first of the new Yasen class SSGN (eight projected), and propulsion plant design have resulted in modern
completed Sea Trials and is expected to be fielded submarines producing less and less noise detectable
by 2016. The Yasen class SSGN will serve its multipur- via passive acoustic means. The Office of Naval Intelli-
pose role as the older Akulas and Oscar-IIs begin to
leave service.

SS/SSK
The Kilo-class submarine has become globally recog-
nized, as Russia has exported variants to China, Brazil,
Vietnam, India, and Iran. Other Southeast Asia coun-
tries have expressed interest in acquiring a low-cost,
highly capable diesel-electric platform.6 ­Although the
Kilo first entered service in the early 1980s, upgrades
to electronics and propulsion in later models have
­significantly raised the capability of this very stealthy
submarine, especially when operating on batteries
(enhanced by AIP technology).

Not only are Russian Kilos equipped with a highly

­capable anti-shipping missile (the SS-N27 Sizzler), but
also they are equipped with ‘Kalibr’ land-attack cruise
missiles. These were used in December 2015 for strikes
from the Mediterranean Sea into Syria. Currently nine
© US Navy ONI

Kilo Type 877 and four ‘improved’ Kilo Type 636 remain
in the inventory in addition to the Kilo submarines
based in the Pacific. A small number of Kilo Type 636
have been designated for transfer from the Northern Figure 14 – Relative Detectability of Submarines.

30 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

gence created two unclassified charts (Fig. 14) ­showing
the relationship between modern submarines and
their predecessors.

One of the significant challenges Russia will face with

the fielding of these three new submarine classes is
each of them was designed and partially constructed
more than a decade ago before the financial crisis hit
the shipyard and shipbuilding industry extremely
hard. Therefore, these submarines should not neces-
sarily be viewed as the most modern, as the design

© Janes
and propulsion models are 10–15 years old even
though the boats are just now coming down the
sluiceways. However, there will be some level of Figure 15 – A Kilo SSK is Transported for Delivery
­improvement to propulsion and stealth over what is to its Foreign Buyer.
currently at sea. Major improvements will be realized
in electronics, weapons systems, and system integra- low-cost submarines that can tip the balance of
tion capability (C4I advances), which can be overlaid ­power in a region.
on top of existing hull designs.
Learning how to both safely and tactically operate a
submarine is no small feat. When Russia sold sub­
5.3 The Export Challenge
marines to Iran, they deployed crews for significant
‘The diesel submarine may become the perfect lengths of time as advisors to train and operate with
asymmetric weapon for countries, which can afford the customer. They would likely follow the same
to purchase them, and which wish to disrupt US ­model for future buyers of Russian export submarines,
power projection operations off their shores at regardless of the nationality of the buyer. Therefore,
some future date.’9 one cannot assume a low capability for a nation with
limited submarine experience upon purchase of a
The export of diesel-electric submarines is a contin- Russian export, as it is very likely Russian advisors with
ued growth area for Russia’s shipbuilding industry. significant experience will train them.
Throughout the Cold War, Russia found willing cus-
tomers for an export industry. This included Khadaffi’s
5.4 The Russian Federation’s
regime in Libya, which purchased a Foxtrot class SS
(1970s era diesel submarine). This submarine remains Use of Unmanned Underwater
in the Libyan active inventory today, although many Vehicles (UUV)
NATO analysts have doubts about its serviceability.
Additionally, it has been assessed not to pose a seri- Russia has explored the use of UUV for non-­warfighting
ous threat to NATO forces due to its significant age roles, such as submarine-launched drones to travel to
and reduced capability. In the waning years of the 20th the ocean floor and monitor fiber-optic cables (inter-
century, Russia sold twelve export variant Kilo SSs to net, voice, etc …).11, 12 UUVs used in this manner could
China, three to Iran, four to Algeria and ten to India. either tap or disable (cut) communication lines. Two
Current buyers on the Kilo market include Vietnam accidents in 2008 show the vulnerability in these sys-
and Venezuela. China, Morocco, Malaysia, and India tems. Cables to the Middle East were simultaneously
have expressed serious interest in the Amur (Lada severed from both directions (Europe and Asia), one
­export) AIP-capable SSK.10 The challenge to NATO due to a ship dragging anchor and one due to an un-
­remains the proliferation of highly capable, relatively dersea landslide, which in essence isolated the Middle

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 31

 East from the rest of the world. All internet, including missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles (it is suspect-
classified systems, and communications networks ed but not confirmed that these may be nuclear
were significantly reduced when satellite connect- capable). Perhaps unique when discussing ‘RoW
­
ivity and cables with considerably less bandwidth ­diesels’ (Rest of the World), Israel has both a power
­capability became the predominant communications projection and deterrence role (sea-based second
method.13 strike capability) explicitly assigned to its diesel sub-
marine fleet. The Dolphin SSK are comparable to the
On the kinetic end, in November 2015, a Russian news German Type 212, with three of the five being AIP
station ‘inadvertently’ showed classified documents modified.
allegedly containing a description and diagrams of a
kinetic submarine launched ‘drone’ equipped with a The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
nuclear warhead that was capable of travelling The People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria has pur-
­autonomously deep into an adversary’s port before chased four Kilo SS (two Type I and two Type II
detonating.14, 15 No credible evidence supports the ­improved Kilos), and in late 2014 it ordered two addi-
­existence of this capability; however, it offers insight tional Kilo SSKs. ‘Algeria is in the process of expanding
into Russia’s technical aspirations for the maritime its navy, as it faces problems such as smuggling, illegal
­employment of UUVs. migration, and indigenous terrorism. In April 2012 it
emerged that Algeria had signed a contract with the
China Shipbuilding Trading Company for three light
5.5 Submarine Development
frigates, after ordering two Meko A200N frigates from
in the Rest of the World Germany’s ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems in March
This section will discuss the views of other nations with 2012. Algeria has also ordered two new Tiger class
a robust submarine force likely to be encountered by corvettes from Russia.’17
NATO, either within the European theatre or during a
potential out-of-area deployment. Inside the Mediter- The Republic of Egypt
ranean, four non-NATO nations operate submarines. The Egyptian Navy boasts four German-built new-
Libya’s sole Foxtrot has been discussed already, leaving construction Type 209 SSKs, a high-end diesel sub­
Israel, Egypt, and Algeria. Outside the Mediterranean, marine, to complement its four much older Romeo
NATO ASW forces have the potential to interact with class SS. In spite of Type 209 not being the newest
submarines from Iran, India, and the PRC. German SSK export (Type 214), it remains a submarine
with modern electronics, acoustics, and weapons
­systems. The first of the four Type 209s first sailed in
December 2015, and when the full complement is
­realized, Egypt will have one of the more capable
­submarine forces in the Mediterranean.18

Figure 16 – Israeli Dolphin SSK (INS Tanin) at Kiel

Dry Docks.

The State of Israel

© Janes

Israel’s five Dolphin class SSK submarines contain a

relatively modern electronics suite. The Dolphins are
also equipped with US-built Harpoon anti-shipping Figure 17 – An Egyptian Type 209 SSK.

32 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

The Republic of Iran
Although possessing only three export-class Kilo
SSs of an older model (the third delivered in 1997),
which are arguably in poorer condition than any
other countries’ submarine force due in no small

© US Naval Institute
part to the challenging operational environment
posed by high water temperatures, Iran offers per-
haps the highest likelihood of encounter with NATO
forces executing the current maritime operation
Ocean Shield in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden. Iran
Figure 18 – PRC Song Class SSKs.
has, on multiple occasions, sent a Kilo into the Red
Sea for operations. An Iranian Kilo is commonly op- India’s maritime strategic goals include power projec-
erated on the surface rather than fully submerged, tion from the Arabian Gulf to the exits of the Strait of
and usually in proximity with one or more escort Malacca, and it has recently pushed back against what
ships. However, Iran has shown the capability for it considers Chinese incursion into the region.
short duration submerged operations. Iran’s princi-
ple use for the Kilos would be in an anti-shipping or The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)
mining role in an attempt to close off a critical Perhaps the most capable non-NATO submarine navy
chokepoint. besides Russia, China has been focused on expanding
both its submarine inventory and capability for much
In addition to the Kilos, Iran also has a fleet of mini- of the past three decades to re-assert its naval projec-
submarines (Ghadir and Nahang classes) for covert/ tion past the first island chain. China has a large fleet
special operations missions. These mini-subs will likely of nuclear and conventional classes of submarine cov-
not proceed out of the Arabian Gulf region. Therefore, ering SSBN, SSN, SSGN, SS and SSK classes. In the last
the likelihood of interaction with NATO forces is mini- decade, China has made particular efforts to increase
mal with the exception of those countries with the length and distance of out-of-area submarine de-
­national interests and permanent presence in the ployments. China has already conducted bilateral exer-
Middle East AOR. cises with the Russian surface navy off the coast of Syria,
so it is not unlikely NATO would see a Chinese submarine
The Republic of India in the Mediterranean Sea in the not too distant future.
India boasts both nuclear and conventional sub­
marines. Possessing a single Akula SSN (leased from China has aggressively monitored US, Japanese, and
Russia from 2012 through 2022), India does field a Korean naval exercises to include attempts at Cold
­robust diesel SSK fleet of 13 operational submarines, War-esque covert intercepts of aircraft carriers.
nine remaining Sindhughosh class (Russian built, one Although the acoustic design of the indigenous
­
lost in 2013 due to explosion) and four Shishumar ­Chinese submarines lags both Russian and Western
class (German built). India is also indigenously pro- high-end submarines, the skill of the Chinese sub­
ducing two Arihant SSBNs and six Kalvari SSKs. In fact, mariners is increasing annually, including improved
the INS Arihant class sailed for Acceptance Sea Trials in exploitation of the ocean environment. By 2020, it is
April 2016 as this study was coming to a close.19 India expected the Chinese submarine inventory will grow
has also expressed interest in leasing either a second to somewhere between 69 and 78 submarines21,
Aklua or a Yasen class SSN with the goal of integrating ­depending on the retirement timeline of the older
Indian Engineers in the construction phase. They ­elements of the fleet.
would then bring the experience back to India to
­facilitate an indigenous shipbuilding project with a The rapid growth of the Chinese submarine inventory,
goal of fielding six additional SSN.20 coupled with increased patrols both seaward of the

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 33

 first island chain and southward throughout the Although having less range than the Shang, other
South China Sea has caused many nations to re-assess ­potential candidates for interaction with NATO forces
their naval capability to respond in kind. The maritime include their advanced diesel submarine fleet,
environment in Southeast Asia is extremely dynamic. ­comprised of the Song and Yuan class SSK (13 hulls of
There are many hot-spots surrounding national claims each type are in the active inventory).
to fishing and mineral rights. The dramatic uptick in
submarine inventory throughout the theatre is repre- The Song class is one of the most advanced diesel-
sentative of each country’s desire to protect its electric attack submarine types designed and built by
­national interests in the region. indigenous Chinese effort. It is planned to replace the
aging Ming SS fleet. The Song is equipped to fire the
From a strategic perspective, China will most likely ­retain YJ-82 (a submarine-launched version of the ship-
her ballistic missile fleet in waters close to the home- launched C-801) missile, as well the YU 1/YU4 Torpe-
land. However, China has shown intent to use advanced does and various types of mines. In broad terms, many
SSN and SSKs far from the Pacific in a testament to her assess the Song SSK to be at a technological standard
global power projection aims. The most likely classes of generally similar to that of Western submarines built
submarine for NATO forces to encounter will be the during the 1980s.25
Shang SSN and the Song and Yuan class SSKs.
A more advanced Chinese diesel submarine is the
As a significant upgrade to the aging Han class SSN, newer Yuan class, which, in addition to the technolo-
‘the Shang’s range and weaponry give the PLA its first gy found in the Song, is assessed to be equipped with
non-nuclear global strike capability. Incorporating an Air Independent Propulsion (AIP) system enabling
­advanced quieting technology with a hydro-dynami- significantly longer submerged operations over other
cally efficient hull form, a single shaft, and a highly diesel-electric submarines.26
skewed 7-bladed propeller, the Shang is equipped
with torpedoes, antisubmarine warfare missiles, and a
5.6 Summary
submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missile, possibly
a follow-on to the C801, as well as the projected Land This chapter reviewed the submarine development
Attack Cruise Missile.’22 ­underway by the Russian Federation as well as other
­nations within the NATO AOR. Additionally, a brief dis-
The Shang is estimated to be 6,000-7,000 ton dis- cussion of submarines with which NATO forces may in-
placement when dived. This is about 50 percent larger teract while deployed to the Middle East (for example
than the displacement of the earlier Type 091 Han supporting Operation ATALANTA) was also conducted.
class. The Shang features a water-drop shape hull,
with a pair of fin-mounted hydroplanes and four The trend for submarine operations in both the
­diving planes. It is fitted with sophisticated sonar sys- ­Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea is rising. Almost
tems, including bow-mounted sonar and H/SQC-207 every nation which boasts a submarine capability is
flank-mounted sonar. The Shang has six 533mm bow expanding their current inventory. Further chapters
torpedo tubes (four above, two below), and is pre- will discuss the reality that NATO is behind in counter-
sumed to be equipped with a range of anti-subma- ing this growth trend.
rine and anti-surface vessel torpedoes of wire-guided,
acoustic- and wake-homing, based on both Chinese 1. ‘What Russia’s New Sub means’. Adomanis, Mark. USNI News, 24 Jan 2013. Available
and Russian designs. The torpedo tubes can also be online at: http://news.usni.org/2013/01/24/what-russias-new-sub-means
2. SSN Akula Class. Available online at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/akula/
used to launch Chinese indigenous YJ-82 anti-ship 3. Project 949 Antey/Oscar Class. Global Security. Available online at http://www.globalse-
missiles.23 The Shang has recently conducted opera- curity.org/military/world/russia/949-program.htm
4. ‘Diving Deep: Inside Russia’s Next Gen nuclear submarines’. Space Wars, 11 Nov 2015.
tions with Chinese naval units as far West as the Bab-al Available online at: http://www.spacewar.com/reports/Diving_Deep_Inside_Rus-
Mandeb Strait, the approach to the Red Sea.24 sias_Next_Gen_Nuclear_Submarines_999.html

34 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 5. Yasen / Grenay class submarine. Naval Technology.com. Available at: http://www.naval- 16. ‘Algeria orders two Kilo SSK from Russia’. Defenseweb.com 27 June 2014. Avail-
technology.com/projects/yasengraneysubmarine/ able online at: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_con
6. ‘Vietnam to Get Fifth Kilo Submarine from Russia in Early 2016’. Parameswaran, Prashan- tent&view=article&id=35262:algeria-orders-two-kilo-submarines-from-
th. The Diplomat. 22 Dec 2015. Available online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/ russia&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106
vietnam-to-get-fifth-kilo-submarine-from-russia-in-early-2016/ 17. Ibid
7. Lada Class. Military-today.com 24 Nov 2014. Available online at: http://www.military- 18. ‘Egypt’s type 209 German submarine launched’. Egypt Independent, 11 Dec 2015.
today.com/navy/lada_class.htm Available online at: http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/egypt-s-german-type-
8. Project 677 Lada Class / Project 1650 Amur Class Submarines, Russia. Naval-Technology. 209-1400-submarine-launched
com. Available online at: http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/project-677-la- 19. ‘India’s First Boomer Leaves On Acceptance Trials’. LaGrone, Sam. USNI News. 20 April
da-class-project-1650-amur-class-submarines/project-677-lada-class-project- 2016. Available online at: https://news.usni.org/2016/04/20/indias-first-boomer-
1650-amur-class-submarines3.html leaves-on-acceptance-trials
9. ‘ASW in the 21st Century’. Ketter, Timothy. 20 May 2004. Naval War College.
20. ‘Hitches Persist in Indian Navy’s plans to Lease second Russian SSN’ Bedi, Rahul. Janes
10. ‘Morrocco to buy Russian Amur-1650 Super-quiet Submarine’. Sputniknews.com 22 Aug
Defense Weekly, 6 Jan 2016 Vol 53 Issue 1 pg. 16.
2015. Available online at: http://sputniknews.com/military/20150822/1026060064/
21. ‘Why China’s submarine force still lags behind’ Gady, Franz-Stephan. 28 May 2015. The
morocco-russia-amur1650.html
Diplomat. Available online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-chinas-subma-
11. ‘These Russian submarines could attack the internet itself’. Huddleston, Tom Jr. Fortune.com 26
rine-force-still-lags-behind/
Oct 2015. Available online at: http://fortune.com/2015/10/26/russian-submarines-internet/
12. ‘Russia deploys underwater drone to disrupt global internet’. Tikhonova, Polina Val- 22. Type 093 Shang Class Nuclear Attack Submarine. Global Security. Available Online at:
uewalk.com 15 Dec 2015. Available online at: http://www.valuewalk.com/2015/12/ http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/china/type-93.htm
russia-deploys-underwater-drone-disrupt-global-internet/ 23. Ibid
13. ‘Third undersea internet cable cut to Mideast’. Nakhlawi, Elham et alia. CNN Feb 2008. 24. ‘Chinese Nuclear Subs in the Indian Ocean’. Gosh, P. K. 12 April 2015. The Diplomat. Avail-
Available online at: http://www.cnn.com/2008/WORLD/meast/02/01/internet.outage/ able online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/chinese-nuclear-subs-in-the-indian-
14. ‘Russian TV stations broadcast secret nuclear torpedo plans’. The Guardian. 11 Nov 2015. ocean/
Available online at: http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/12/russian-tv- 25. Song Class Patrol Submarine. Military Today. Available online at: http://www.military-
stations-broadcast-secret-nuclear-torpedo-plans today.com/navy/song_class.htm
15. ‘Russia building nuclear armed drone submarine’. Gertz, Bill. Freebeacon.com 8 Sep 2015. 26. ‘Why China’s submarine force still lags behind’ Gady, Franz-Stephan. 28 May 2015. The
Available online at: http://freebeacon.com/national-security/russia-building-nuclear- Diplomat. Available online at: http://thediplomat.com/2015/05/why-chinas-subma-
armed-drone-submarine/ rine-force-still-lags-behind/

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 35

© US Navy

Sonobuoy load is tailored to exploit the characteristics of the ocean environment.

CHAPTER VI ler noise, and noise generated as water moves over

the hull. Chapter 2 outlined the differences in sub­
marine classes and propulsion systems, while Chapter
The ASW Environment 3 discussed submarine operations during the Cold
War. This section will explore those oceanographic
6.1 Overview characteristics most prone to exploitation by aircraft
Recognizing the Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions in ASW prosecution and those that affect tools used
and Procedures (ATP-1) provides details for tactical for detection.
­exploitation of the ocean environment, some know­
ledge of oceanography is necessary to understand Blade Rate / Max Quiet Speed
the evolving challenges in this domain. This chapter For both diesel- and nuclear- powered submarines,
will provide a foundation in tactical oceanography for there is a speed (unique to each submarine class)
those readers unfamiliar with the concepts. A more ­below which the propeller generates minimal cavita-
detailed review of specific technical aspects of tactical tion, and the rotation of the shaft and movement of
oceanography is provided in Appendix 2. the blades through the water is essentially undetect-
able. Submarines travelling faster than this blade rate
threshold speed generate significant acoustic signal
6.2 Acoustic Properties
from the propeller which is easily detected by ASW
of Submarines forces. Therefore below this ‘blade rate threshold’ or
Submarines generate noise in the water mainly from ‘maximum quiet speed’, the primary noise generator
three different sources: Propulsion plant noise, propel- is the propulsion system itself.

36 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Propulsion Plant Noise so the exposure time for full recharging of the battery
The nuclear propulsion system generates approxi- system is minimized. Modern AIP-equipped diesel
mately the same amount of noise regardless of the submarines can remain submerged for close to
submarine’s speed. When operating below the 45 days between full recharge cycles.
­detectable ‘blade rate threshold’, the submarine will
have, for each frequency generated, a standard Hull-Generated Noise
amount of noise produced by the propulsion system Water travelling over a smooth, laminar surface
at various frequencies. ­encounters little friction and, as such, generates little
turbulence. The ideal form for a submarine would be
The intensity of this sound will vary by frequency, something that generates as little friction and turbu-
based on the mechanics of the propulsion system of lence as possible as it travels. However, mission
that class. Reactor coolant pumps, auxiliary equip- ­requirements and installed systems often result in
ment, and steam turbines are some of the sources protrusions from the hull (towed array sonar, propeller
generating noise within a nuclear submarine’s propul- guards, control surfaces, modules attached to the hull
sion plant. Although the nuclear reactor and many of to support Special Operations forces, etc.). These
its associated components produce the same amount protrusions generate turbulence, therefore noise,
­
of noise regardless of the speed, some components which is detectable by ASW forces.
are only utilized in certain speed regimes. For example,
some pumps may only operate above a certain speed; Each class of submarine generates different amounts
therefore, if the frequency associated with that pump of water flow noise. Many of these ‘swaths’ are class
is detected, it is an indicator the submarine is travelling specific and may be utilized when determining what
above that known threshold. Detection of these ‘speed type of submarine has been detected (classification).
related components’ is a useful tool in determining the Additionally, unlike propulsion noise, which will
approximate speed of the submarine. ­remain relatively constant, hull-generated noises are
not only unique to each submarine class but are also
‘Picking up the quiet hum of a battery-powered, unique to a specific speed regime for each class.
diesel-electric submarine in busy coastal waters is
like trying to identify the sound of a single car Frequency and Source Level
­engine in the din of a major city.’ Each of these ‘noise sources’ discussed above is gener-
Rear Adm. Frank Drennan USA (N), March 2015 ated at a specific frequency and sound intensity based
on the design of that specific submarine. Therefore,
Diesel submarines have two methods to generate each type of submarine will generate different fre-
propulsion. This results in drastically different amounts quencies at different sound source levels. The goal of
of detectable noise. When submerged and using the submarine builders is to construct a submarine that
battery (electric mode), very little detectable noise is generates as little detectable noise as possible, and
generated. However, the amount of noise generated recent models prove they are succeeding. Sub­
when using their diesel engines during periods of bat- sequent sections will demonstrate the challenge of
tery recharging is significant. Therefore, it is a critical traditional ASW passive tactics when viewed through
vulnerability of the diesel submarines that they are the lens of an ocean which is growing louder and sub-
more detectable during battery recharging periods, marines which are becoming quieter.
both acoustically and with radar/electro-optic detec-
tion systems because their air intake is exposed and
6.3 Acoustic Raypaths
their diesel engines are operating.
Although many different raypaths (the direction of
It is for this reason that Air Independent Propulsion travel sound takes from the source to the receiver as
(AIP) systems are being developed by many nations, influenced by the variables outlined in Appendix B)

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 37

 exist and are well discussed in NATO ASW publi­
cations, two are worth highlighting in this study:
­Direct Path and Convergence Zone. Appendix B pro-
vides further insight into tactical oceanography and
the variables in the active and passive sonar equations
as each raypath is exploited.

The Direct Path Raypath

© Janes
On the Direct Path raypath, as the name indicates,
sound travels directly from the source (submarine) to
Figure 19 – An Acoustic Operator Onboard a
the receiver (sonobuoy) without undergoing a refrac- 201 Squadron Nimrod Feb. 1975.
tion (change in direction due to pressure etc …) or
reflection (bottom or surface). This is the most com- As a general rule, modern submarines do not generate
mon raypath exploited in the tracking and targeting a high enough source level to provide sound in the con-
phase of prosecutions. It provides the most accurate vergence zone detectable by today’s air-launched sono-
locating data on the submarine. However, due to buoys. Nonetheless, the raypath may still be exploitable
attenuation, spreading, and other factors which
­ by ship/submarine passive towed array sonars or by air
­degrade noise as it travels through the water, the launched mono/multi-static active sonobuoys.
­frequencies used in Direct Path exploitation have rela-
tively short detection ranges. As a general rule, loud
6.4 Today’s Challenge with
submarines may provide direct path ranges in excess
of 2nm. For very quiet modern submarines, the range Traditional Passive Detection
is measured in scant hundreds of yards. In the 1970s–80s, it was not uncommon to measure
submarine passive detection ranges in miles, as
The Convergence Zone Raypath ­depicted in the CZ grey arc in Figure 20. Tactics were
Previously submarines had generated sufficient employed to convert this CZ detection to direct path
sound to be detected at significant distances. In most contact and leveraged the fact submarines generated
cases, the sound generated from a submarine will sufficient sound levels (noise) to support these detec-
­initially bend downward as temperature has the larg- tion tactics. Submarines could be detected on the
est near surface impact to sound velocity. As tempera- second or even third CZ annulus. As the ocean grows
ture cools and the water depth increases, pressure louder and warmer while submarines become quiet-
begins to take over and will eventually bend that er, Cold War methods of submarine detection have
sound wave back toward the surface. This takes place begun to falter in today’s ocean environment. The fol-
over the course of many miles. It requires both signifi- lowing changes are impacting current and future pas-
cant water depth and initial signal strength/source sive acoustic detection techniques.
level (submarine loudness) for there to be sufficient
detectable sound signal remaining when it returns to • Modern Submarines are quieter and designed to
the near surface environment. produce less noise
• Raypaths which were exploited in the past for initial
Due to variances in the waveform and the effects of submarine detection are no longer viable due to the
pressure, temperature, salinity, and other influences, this decrease in submarine noise
sound won’t re-converge in a single spot, rather over an • There is insufficient depth to exploit some ray-
annulus of a few miles of gradually decreasing sound paths due to diesel submarines operating closer to
intensity. This annulus is referred to as the convergence shore
zone. Tactics for exploiting this sound have evolved in • The ocean itself is louder than in the past further
both the submarine and maritime air communities. masking submarine generated noise

38 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 Figure 21 – This section discusses the mathemati-
cal relationship between SPL, MDR and sono-
buoy utilization rate. Readers are cautioned to
ensure availability of a soft landing place in the
event of inadvertent narcolepsy.

Sound Pressure Level (SPL)

Submarine source levels are measured in decibels
Figure 20 – Notional Depiction of Propagation which exert sound pressure upon the passive receiver.
Loss Curves and the Convergence Zone Raypath. As discussed earlier, the submarine generates noise
(sound pressure) at a given frequency dependent
It is unrealistic for today’s modern submarines to yield upon each piece of machinery. A decibel is a unit used
CZ contact. More realistically, modern submarines, to measure the intensity of the sound level of a signal
both nuclear and diesel, provide passive detection by comparing it with a given level on a logarithmic
ranges better characterized as hundreds of yards (non-linear) scale. A 3db change is a doubling of
instead of multiple miles. Non-NATO submarines have
­
sound intensity whereas a change of 10db is a change
grown increasingly quiet with each subsequent class in sound intensity by a factor of ten.2 Therefore, the
fielded. Technology to reduce propulsion plant and 636 Kilo class (SSK) with an acoustic signature of
propeller generated noises have been implemented 105 decibels is ten times as loud as the 95 decibel
and anechoic hull coatings to both reduce noise and acoustic signature of a more advanced NATO SSN.3
mitigate active sonar detection have been fielded.
The key takeaway is that as improvements in sub­
Additionally, with the increase of submarine opera- marine design are achieved, reducing the SPL gener-
tions in the littorals, there is insufficient water column ated at each frequency, for a given 10db drop due to
depth to support the regeneration of sound energy improvements in design, there is a corresponding ‘sig-
into a convergence zone, as sufficient depth to reach nificant’ decrease in the passive detection ranges
the point where pressure forces the sound ray to using the propagation loss curves discussed in
­
­return to the surface, and thus, the raypath, simply ­Appendix B. This is the crux of the issue and the actual
doesn’t exist in shallow water. challenge with passive detection today.

Furthermore, the ambient, or background, noise in

6.5 Sonobuoy Utilization Rate:
the ocean has been notably increasing over the last
few decades. Over the last half century, as cargo ship- Then and Now
ping and deep sea oil exploration has increased, back- Nuclear submarines typically operate submerged,
ground noise in the ocean has doubled roughly every therefore MPA traditionally used passive search pat-
decade.1 This has a dramatic impact on the ability to terns for initial detection. Sonobuoy fields, normally
discriminate submarine generated noise against consisting of between 24–32 buoys, were deployed in
the background noise. As quieting technology im- as wide an area as possible, nominally five times the
proves, eventually a point of diminishing return will Median Detection Range (MDR). This was done to
be reached. maximize the chances of a submarine passing within

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 39

 passive detection range of that same notional 500
yards used in the buoy spacing example above will
provide fewer than 5 minutes of contact time on each
sonobuoy. (i.e. at 7 knots, the submarine will travel
­approximately 1000 yards in about 4 and a half min-
utes, 500 yards detectable into the buoy and 500
yards down Doppler outbound from DIFAR 99 as
shown in the figure below).

Figure 22 – Notional Depiction of a Passive Therefore, in the tracking phase of the prosecution,
Sonobuoy Detection Range. instead of the buoy utilization rate of 7–9 buoys per
hour which was the goal in the 1990s, crews today are
the passive detection range of one sonobuoy during experiencing double or treble the hourly utilization
the notation time, at which point the MPA would con- rate due to decreased passive ranges on modern sub-
vert from the ‘search’ into the ‘localization’ and ‘track- marines. This stresses both aircraft on-station time
ing’ phases of prosecution. (planned for 4–5 hours based on a typical sonobuoy
load and aircraft turnaround time) and total force
During the Cold War, MDR was measured in multiple ­sonobuoy inventory. Assuming passive detection and
thousands of yards versus the small hundreds of tracking was the sole method employed, today’s pas-
yards presented by modern submarines. Assuming sive buoy utilization rate would rapidly deplete NATO’s
an MDR of 3000 yds and a 32 buoy search pattern passive sonobuoy inventory.
deployed at 5 MDR spacing, this would cover an area
close to 1690 square miles. This meant that the tac- Further exacerbating this challenge is the national
tics of the Cold War were effective: SOSUS or some ­sonobuoy inventory. As the cost to build each sono-
other sensor could provide an MPA with a large buoy has increased, and the stockpiles are no longer
search area (due to time latency) and still be assured kept at Cold War levels, the inventory of sonobuoys
one of the first few flights of a multi-day prosecution has dramatically fallen across NATO. It is not uncom-
would locate the submarine. mon for national restrictions to impose carriage limi-
tations on aircrew, limiting the number of buoys
However, assuming an MDR of 500 yards of a more brought for training missions to well below the carry-
modern submarine, that same 32-buoy search pat- ing capacity of the airframe. This has a measurable
tern deployed at 5 MDR spacing could only cover impact on the decision making of less experienced
47 square miles with the same probability of subma- aircrew, who are often hesitant and overly conserva-
rine detection. Therefore, to generate the same tive when employing sonobuoys. This hesitancy has,
amount of coverage as in previous years, significantly in many cases, led to lost contact during dynamic
more sonobuoys would need to be deployed. A point phases of the prosecution such as the initial period
of diminishing returns is reached as many MPA are following a submarine submerging or during aircraft
only capable of monitoring a limited number of sono- on station prosecution turnover.
buoys simultaneously. In short, passive detection
against today’s submarines relies on precisely know-
6.6 Multi-statics
ing where to look and when to look there, or the
chances of detection are drastically reduced. Mono-statics, developed in the early 1990s, were an
improvement on traditional active sonar employment
Furthermore, in the tracking phase, a submarine trav- and are discussed in greater detail in Appendix B.
elling at 7 knots (a notional figure below the detecta- Mono-­statics were briefly employed in the 1990s and
ble blade threshold rate of most submarines) with a were originally designed to exploit an incoherent

40 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

s­ignal utilizing the Convergence Zone raypath. The sensor deployment to aid in submarine detection
use of Mono-Statics is briefly discussed for historical with multi-statics.
context in Appendix B. During that time period, it was
assumed (likely open-ocean, deep-travelling, nuclear- Because the traditional passive detection and tracking
powered) submarines would be operating in water sensors and tactics are rapidly approaching a point of
deep enough to support CZ transmissions. However, obsolescence, active sonar systems, including hull
with the current shift away from n ­ uclear submarines mounted sonar, active sonobuoys, and multi-static
and the proliferation of diesel submarines operating systems provide the most viable future submarine
in or near the littorals, new ­detection technology is ­detection methods.
required. Many navies have turned to multi-statics for
use in the littorals.
6.7 Classification via Active Sonar
Multi-statics employ a coherent signal, similar to an A limit to the use of active sonar has always been the
active buoy but at a much larger signal strength. Little lack of ability to ‘classify’ the return. Passive signals can
signal drops off from an off-beam aspect return. be used to determine submarine type/class and in
­Additionally, the receiver buoys are not collated with some cases even the specific hull if a unique sound is
the source buoys, which means the submarine, generated. Although an extremely experienced
should it determine a multi-static source is being em- acoustic operator might be able to estimate sub­
ployed, cannot know which direction to turn to avoid marine size from the active return, active returns have
the pattern. Multi-statics are still an emerging tech- not yet evolved in discrimination to determine sub-
nology, but, based on analysis of classified briefs made marine class or even friend from foe. Future develop-
available for this study, may address many of the chal- ment not only in the use of multi-statics for initial sub-
lenges presented by quiet submarines operating in marine detection but also for target classification via
acoustically challenging operational environments. active sonar will become a necessity.

NATO’s Centre for Maritime Research and Experi-

6.8 Environmental Considerations
mentation (CMRE) is developing a Multi-static Tool
Planning Aid (MSTPA) for use in refining generated and Impacts to Training
area of probability and recommendation for initial With the advent of active sonar, including mono- and
multi-statics, came an awareness of the impact of
­active sonar use on marine mammals. All western
­navies take this into account, and stringent rules are
observed during the planning and execution of ASW
training exercises. This will continue to be a planning
factor, but to date both COMMARAIRNATO and
­COMSUBNATO indicate that abiding by the construct
of the current mammal mitigation procedures has
not, and is not assessed to, impact either operations
or exercises/preparation for operations. Additionally,
improvements made in acoustic modelling may also
help in this area. ‘High-fidelity, multi-static sonar
performance models can also be used to gauge
­
© US Navy

compliance with environmental noise regulations

­
concerning marine mammal protection.’4 Chapter 9
Figure 23 – Multi-static Sonobuoys, Receiver and provides an overview of governing NATO doctrine
Transmitter. ­regarding mammal mitigation.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 41

 6.9 Radio Frequency Interference detection systems might yield more precise data.
­Finally, research into other aspects of space support
Another challenge to littoral ASW is Radio Frequency (such as the ability to detect the minute changes in
Interference (RFI). Currently, sonobuoys pass acous- ocean surface level due to the deep passing of a sub-
tic data to aircraft via a VHF uplink. In operations marine) are ongoing and may offer other avenues of
close to land, or with the aircraft at higher altitude, non-traditional space support to ASW.
signal inference from and based systems operating
in the same frequency spectrum can be severe. This
6.11 Summary
will only get worse in the future, and in some of
­today’s ASW hot-spots, RFI can be excessive (Medi- As this study is focused on Maritime Air’s capability in
terranean Sea, Arabian Gulf, South China Sea). Some the ASW domain, it is important to recognize a variety
research has been conducted into either encrypting of methods exist for cueing an MPA or helicopter onto
the signal to prevent RFI or migrating the communi- a potential submarine. Surface ship-mounted towed-
cation medium to an entirely different spectrum. array sonar systems and hull-mounted active sonar
­Until this is complete, RFI will continue to challenge exist in almost every NATO nation’s navy. Other
littoral ASW. ­methods including satellite detection of emissions
and Surveillance Towed Array Sonar System (­SURTASS)
Low-Frequency Active Sonar exist to generate poten-
6.10 Space Support to ASW
tial submarine locations. To exploit this, MPA and heli-
Space provides support to ASW operations in two copters routinely practice prosecution of submarine
main areas: meteorological prediction and ISR. In the datums generated by surface ships.
future, space support to meteorological prediction
tools will continue to provide invaluable mission plan- The tried and true passive detection tactics of the
ning for aircrew conducting submarine detection Cold War are no longer viable against modern
missions. Prediction of radar refraction ranges and ­submarines. Submarines are significantly quieter, the
oceanographic modelling of the water column for ocean is significantly louder, and the challenge of
acoustic range prediction will continue to be a critical those two facts would yield an unsustainable sono-
component of ASW planning. buoy utilization rate. Sonobuoy inventory has also
affected both the training and proficiency of many
NATO MPA and MPH aircrew. It is not uncommon for
© Janes

an inexperienced or less-proficient crew to lose con-

tact on a submarine due to being overly conserva-
tive deploying sonobuoys due to national inventory
limitations.

Leveraging the discussion in Chapter 2 of submarine

propulsion design and mission sets, this chapter
­analysed Cold War ASW tactics against the modern
nuclear and diesel submarine threat through the lens
Figure 24 – Satelites maybe used to Detect the
of acoustic oceanography. Acoustic detection and
Presence or Absence of Submarines in Port.
passive tracking are not as effective in today’s environ-
Additionally, ISR roles in both the submarine pre-­ ment as they were in previous decades. As active
sailing phase (imagery of thermal heat blooms in ­sonar and active sonobuoy (of various types) use
­engine rooms, pier-side supplies onload, etc …) as ­became the preferred method to generate targeting
well as electro-optic or signals collection of surfaced quality locating data on submarines, a brief discussion
submarines underway provide cueing for which other of mammal mitigation concerns with the use of active

42 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

sonar was conducted. Finally, challenges to littoral Perhaps the most critical takeaway from a review of
ASW close to populated areas with respect to sono- current and projected environmental challenges is
buoy RF signal interference was highlighted. that as submarines grow quieter (not necessarily in
the current Russian models, but perhaps in future
Looking to the future, the ASW problem presented by ­designs), a point of sound parity will be reached,
current and emerging non-NATO submarines is best at which submarines will be quieter than the other
addressed with non-acoustic detection methods. noise in the ocean. This will completely remove
Multi-statics seem to be the predominant way ahead the ability for passive detection, tracking and use
in many navies. The theoretical science behind the in engagement.
concept is mature, although the software and
­computer processing for exploiting this type of prop-
agation is still under development. Additionally,
Chapter 10 outlines other non-acoustic submarine 1. ‘Underwater Noise is Killing Whales but we can make the Oceans Quieter’. Adele Peters.
16 May 2016. Available online at:http://www.fastcoexist.com/3059650/underwater-
detection methods as well as new technology under noise-is-killing-whales-but-we-can-make-the-oceans-quieter
development which may mitigate the challenge 2. ‘China’s Anti-Access Strategy’. American Innovation, 24 Dec 2013. Available online at: http://
manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2013/12/chinas-anti-access-strategy-submarine.html
presented by today’s quiet submarines in today’s
­ 3. Ibid.
louder ocean environment. 4. ‘Underwater Acoustic Modeling and Simulation 3rd edition’ Etter, Paul C. Chapter 2.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 43

© US Navy

CHAPTER VII Recent NATO operations have been conducted in

­areas where maritime superiority, almost supremacy,
was the position at the commencement of the opera-
ASW and Joint Operations tion. A competently crewed submarine would have
the goal of evading an ASW screen to strike at the
‘Just as the Navy is an enabling force for the other highest value naval target. NATO has never experi-
services, ASW is the enabling mission for the Navy.’1 enced the loss of a capital warship and, consequently,
NATO’s psyche might not be prepared for the loss. The
presence of adversary submarines will occupy signifi-
7.1 Introduction
cant attention of the maritime force and, in many
Beginning with the advent of the modern battle- cases, might require requesting support from other
ship and continuing with the evolution of the air- services to locate and defeat the threat. Failure to do
craft carrier force and submarine-launched cruise so will have significant consequences.
missile, the maritime component has had the capa-
bility to project power deep inland in addition to its
7.2 Role of ASW in NATO’s Joint
other historical roles. However, a single submarine
can wreak havoc on an entire campaign plan by Operations 1990–2015
­impeding maritime force operations. The maritime During the Cold War, aggressive encounters at sea
component’s ability to ensure maritime superiority bordering on simulated battles between Western and
has a significant impact on the execution of the Russian Naval Task Forces occurred with regularity and
joint operation. NATO’s exercises were scripted with this role in mind.

44 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

As the Cold War ended, NATO’s military forces began upgrades to their MPA fleet. The US, Dutch, and French
seeing predominant use in a land role in Iraq and MPA were used in both an ASW and overland ISR (and
Afghanistan. Although this has been identified in
­ even strike in the case of the US) role. During this
­numerous fora, not the least of which was the 2014 operation, at no time was a submarine detected
­
Wales Summit, NATO must re-learn the importance of underway. Some intelligence analysts believe the
­
certain aspects of Maritime warfare to be fully submarines were hidden in a tunnel or intentionally
­pre­pared for the future. bottomed in the harbour to prevent them from being
sunk. The lack of a threat to naval forces permitted the
Whether a future operation will employ the Mari- aircraft carriers to operate freely inside the confined
time component as a joint enabler, integrating the waters of the Adriatic Sea. A submarine threat would
deep strike capability into the Joint Air campaign, or have likely changed this geometry, pushing the
the maritime component’s role will be to provide carrier south into the Ionian Sea, shortening on-­
­
transportation for the amphibious Landing Force station times for carrier-based strikers and straining
and then control the Sea Lines of Communication the tanker plan.
for the duration of the joint campaign, a single sub-
marine could wreak havoc to the maritime compo- Operations in Afghanistan and Iraq
nent and potentially impact the entire time-phased Although Air Force heavy bombers flying from out-
joint campaign. side the theatre delivered the vast preponderance
of munitions, US carrier-based air power, flew
While executing its last three major Joint Operations, 75 per­cent of all strike missions. The Navy jets sub-
NATO’s Maritime Component entered Phase 1 of stituted almost entirely for land-based theatre air
each campaign having already achieved Maritime forces because of an absence of suitable forward
Supremacy – there was little to zero threat to mari- operating locations for the latter. Barely more than
time forces at sea. Largely because of maritime a year later, in 2003, the Navy’s carrier force
­supremacy, maritime components were seen as joint again played a pivotal role when American forces
enablers, integrating deep-strike capability into the
Air Campaign or as transport and support for
Air Force bombers
­amphibious units. Additionally, Maritime Supremacy (701 total)
Navy and
Air Force Marine Corps
permitted full freedom of manoeuvre to execute the SOF aircraft (4.900 total)
full spectrum of maritime operations in support of (225 total)

the joint campaign. Air Force

3% 10%
fighters
(720total)
As other nations invest in their submarine fleets, NATO
must re-learn the importance of certain aspects of 11%
Maritime warfare, particularly ASW and full-scale naval
combat, in order to be fully prepared for the future.

75%
Operation ALLIED FORCE
The Yugoslavian Navy possessed a small handful of
low-capability diesel submarines during the conflict.
MPA were employed during this campaign in a
­manner representing their true multirole capabilities.
SOURCE: Sea Power, March 2002.
MPA were employed overwater with a specific ASW NOTE: SOF = Special Operaions Forces.

mission: if the adversary submarines were detected

outside Tivat harbour, find and sink them. At the same Figure 25 – Operation ENDURING FREEDOM (OEF)
time, some NATO nations had begun installing ISR Strike Sorties b
 y Service Through December 2001.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 45

 c­onducted around-the-clock operations against ry. Therefore, the lack of an aircraft carrier did not
Saddam Hussein’s forces in Iraq. Six of 12 carriers impact the ability to conduct deep strike missions
and their air wings were surged to contribute to the from the early days of air operations. Although the
campaign, with a seventh carrier battle group held lack of AWACS/AEW assets in the early days did im-
in ready reserve in the Western Pacific and an eighth pact the early phases of operations, it was mitigated
also deployed at sea and available for tasking. The through use of the sea-based Tactical Air Control
air wings from the committed carriers flew approxi- Center (Navy TACC) embarked on the Amphibious
mately half the total number of fighter sorties Assault ship USS KEARSEARGE. Additionally, some
­generated by US Central Command.2 limited strike capability did exist with the sea-based
AV-8B Harrier fleet on USS KEARSEARGE and ITS
The lack of established basing for land-based aircraft GARIBALDI. Furthermore, those and other ships in
forced commanders to rely heavily on the US and the region provided the sea-based Combat SAR
­Allied aircraft carriers. Even then, the tyranny of dis- forces. This proved to be instrumental in the Tactical
tance was a challenge to the naval force and signifi- Recovery of Aircraft and Personnel (TRAP) opera-
cantly strained the air refuelling tanking plan. tion of BOLAR 34,3 an F-15 shot down early in
­Although Afghanistan had zero naval capability, three the campaign.
local nations of varying levels of participation in the
coalition possessed a submarine capability. This Additionally, there was again limited-to-no threat to
proved to be a factor in the daily execution of the air naval forces presented by the Libyan navy. Although
plan: the Agosta SSKs operated by Pakistan, the Kilo Libya does indeed possess a submarine force, it is
SSK and Akula SSN operated by India and most aged and extremely limited in capability and did
­notably the three Kilo SSKs operated by Iran were not sail during the conduct of this operation. The
closely monitored for potential impact to operations. only threat to naval forces from the sea was in the
form of the potential threat posed by guns from
Looking back at the initial stages of the operation, smaller coastal patrol craft, shore-based cruise mis-
the potential impact of submarines to the projection sile threat, and potential of strike aircraft originating
of naval power was less than feared. The Iranian sub- from ashore. This permitted MPA to focus on coastal
marines, the most likely potential adversary, did not surveillance and ISR instead of ASW. A US P-3C Orion
present a significant risk because they would have did fire two Maverick missiles into a Libyan Corvette
been rapidly identified leaving port. If the political or engaging in gunfire on nearby merchant ships,4 but
military situation had devolved to the point where a the majority of the MPA role was devoted to the ISR
true threat to coalition forces was anticipated, based collection plan.
on the capability mismatch between coalition forces
and the Iranian submarine force, it is likely that threat Summary of ASW in NATO Joint Operations
would have been rapidly neutralised, resulting in Since the end of the Cold War and the reduction of
limited impact to air operations. As NATO assumed a significant threat posed by the Soviet Navy, NATO
the follow-on Operation INHERENT RESOLVE, the has been fortunate in that recent Major Joint
carrier support reduced as land-based air power
­ ­Operations have been conducted with Maritime
­capacity increased. Supremacy from the onset of combat operations.
However, many non-NATO nations have dramati-
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN/UNIFIED PROTECTOR cally increased their defence spending, many nota-
Similar to operations in Afghanistan, operations bly into acquisition of newer diesel submarines,
over Libya began with a multinational operation and the likelihood that all future NATO operations
which expanded into a NATO operation. However, will occur with Maritime Supremacy in hand and lit-
unlike Afghanistan, the JOA in Libya could be tle to no submarine threat will reduce accordingly.
reached from existing air bases within NATO territo- Should a future Maritime Component Commander

46 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

(MCC) have to fight their way to the beach, the Total U.S. combat deaths
Lebanon (1982-1984) Marine barracks (1983), 241 264
defence of the naval force requirements would
­ Grenada (1983) 18
impact Joint Operations in many ways. Assets
­ Lybia (1986) 2
Panama (1989-1990) 23
would have to be allocated for defensive purposes Persian Gulf War (1991) 146
Somalia (1993) 43
to counter a threat posed by adversary surface Kosovo (1999) 0
ships and submarines. Some strike aircraft from car-
Total U.K. combat deaths Apprx.
riers would have to be re-allocated from a strike Falklands (1982) Air, land and at sea 265
role to defensive anti-Surface Combat Air Patrol Other combat deaths
(SUCAP) stations. This would have a two-pronged (by individual engagemant)
USS Roberts (1982) and
result of reducing the support to the land-based USS Princeton Tripoli (1991), 0
damaged from mines in Persian Gulf
target striking plan and potentially raising the
­requirement for land-based aircraft from the JFACC USS Stark (1987),
damaged by 2 Exocet 37
to be apportioned overwater to fill naval defence missiles in Persian Gulf
roles (Anti-Air and potentially Anti-Surface) in the Indian warship Khukri,
event the aircraft carrier and her embarked carrier sunk by 3 Pakistani 191
torpedoes (1971)
air wing could not meet the requirement. Addition-
Argentine warship Belgrano 368
ally, MPA would fulfil their primary role of ASW and sunk by 2 U.K. torpedoes (1982)
Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW). MPA, which normally
supports the ISR Collection Plan, might, therefore, Source: Future Undersea Warfare Perspectives
John’s Hopkins APL Technical Digest (2000).
not be available, further impacting the target strike
plan and campaign phase timing. Figure 26 – Comparison of Deaths from Anti-Ship
Torpedoes with Combat Deaths due to other
‘The only thing that really frightened me during the Weaponry in RegionalConflicts.
war … was the U-boat peril.’
Sir Winston Churchill
Furthermore, the impact of the sinking of an aircraft
Finally, the Joint Task Force Commander will have to carrier (instantaneous loss of 5500 personnel and up
determine how much support from outside the to 75 aircraft) or amphibious assault ship (loss of 2500
­maritime component is be required to protect the personnel, including the majority of the landing force
maritime force to a sufficient level. The impact of infantry and equipment as well as up to 36 embarked
­getting this decision wrong could be devastating to aircraft) would be significant, not only to the opera-
the entire joint campaign plan. tional plan but also by striking directly at NATO’s criti-
cal vulnerability, the will of the nations. While a single
Although Figure 26 pre-dates operations in Iraq, submarine could achieve this, it is noteworthy that
­Afghanistan, and Libya, it shows the manpower Russia currently has approximately 60 and China cur-
loss comparison from some of the most notorious rently have approximately 84 submarines at their dis-
sinkings in the 20th century against other land posal.
campaigns. Anecdotal evidence indicates each of
those maritime losses are burned into the psyche In future conflicts, NATO JTF commanders will have to
of the respective countries’ naval forces, remem- re-learn the Sea-basing concept and how to operate
bered for the suddenness of the incident as well as from contested seas, rather than assuming the luxury
for bringing to light the disparity between low- of maritime supremacy at the onset. The best way to
cost munitions (mines, torpedoes) against the cost solve the submarine problem is to do it at a distance,
in blood of a warship and what damage a single prior to the submarines’ entry into the JOA, if possible.
submarine strike can inflict on the entire maritime From this stems the relationship of the Theatre ASW
campaign. Commander with the local ASW Commander.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 47

 ‘Military capabilities that have asymmetric effects c­ ommander whenever the submarine transits within
are very attractive. In maritime terms, systems that the task force AOR based on its resources and ability
can provide anti-access or area denial capabilities to conduct a submarine prosecution. In wartime, the
will continue to proliferate. Submarines fit perfectly TASWC would oversee engagement of submarines
into concepts for anti-access and area denial (­­A2/ outside the local ASWC’s AOR with the goal of
AD). Analyses of past maritime conflicts, combined preventing the submarine from ever becoming a
­
with the knowledge of the challenges faced by threat to the force. If submarines originate from within
Western militaries against asymmetric threats in the JOA, or transit between the waterspace overseen
­Afghanistan and Iraq, have led some nations to by the TASWC into the Task Force’s ASW AOR, prosecu-
­focus on various asymmetric assets. tion, and engagement of that submarine would fall to
In the maritime domain, submarines and mines make the local ASWC.
up a central part of such strategies. Submarines are
considered to be an excellent sea denial weapon of Even in peacetime, accepting gaps in submarine track-
choice. They are proven, cost efficient, robust, stealthy, ing at the theatre level induces challenges to the pro-
and lethal. Submarines are sought both by great tection of the task force at the local level. Having a r­ obust
­powers, such as China and India, as well as smaller theatre-wide capability becomes requisite as an opera-
states, so called “maritime underdogs.” Conventional tion transitions from peacetime to crisis response. If no
submarines are “the weapon of the weak against the coordinated NATO-wide effort is put into tracking sub-
strong” and will continue to be attractive.’ marines prior to the onset of a crisis response operation,
Decision time for ASW: it will overly burden the maritime component with a
Increased Cooperation to Prevent Irrelevance problem that could have already been managed.
Commander Oliver Berdal Royal Norwegian Navy

7.4 The Impact of an Un-located

7.3 The Role of Theatre ASW Prior Submarine on NATO’s Land and
to Major Joint Operations Air Components
Chapter 3 outlined the history of NATO’s Theatre ASW
Commander and proposed a C2 construct to enhance In addition to the challenges un-located adversary
the Alliance ability to locate, track, and monitor sub- submarines pose to the Maritime component, the
marine activity throughout NATO’s AOR in periods modern cruise missile systems on many modern SSK
prior to the commencement of Crisis Response oper- class submarines have a significant range and preci-
ations. The goal of this construct is to hand over sion capability. When layered into the larger Anti-­
peacetime continuous tracking of a non-NATO sub- Access/Area-Denial problem, these missiles will po-
marine to the Naval Task Force assigned ASW tentially challenge both the Air and Land components.

Figure 27 – A Submarine Periscope is Sighted next to a NATO Aircraft Carrier.

© Crown Copyright

48 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Figure 28 – Notional Range Rings for a Kilo SSK Launched Kalibr Cruise Missile.

The SS-N-30A Kalibr cruise missiles launched from a 7.5 Summary

Russian Kilo SSK submarine into Syria have an approx- ASW has a critical link to Major Joint Operations. If the
imate range of between 1000km and 1500km.5 Those maritime component has to expend resources to gain
cruise missiles could target critical NATO C2 nodes, maritime supremacy, fewer resources are available to
standing airbases and other critical military targets. support land operations. Furthermore, a single sub-
Furthermore, the shore- and sea-strike capability of marine can have devastating effects on an entire cam-
these submarines could potentially be used to coun- paign plan by sinking a critical asset such as an Aircraft
ter NATO’s burgeoning Integrated Air and Missile Carrier, Landing Ship, or Oiler/Re-supply ship. Every
­Defence system by targeting critical elements of the component of the campaign should be aware of sub-
system either afloat or ashore. Kalibr missiles are marine threats.
­domestically produced in both an anti-shipping and
land strike model, and many assess them to be capa-
ble of either conventional or nuclear warheads.
­Although he was likely talking about the combination
of ground-based and submarine-launched cruise
­missiles, Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu an-
nounced in July 2015 that Russia ‘will boost the number
of cruise missiles fivefold in the next three years and by
1. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare after the Cold War’. Cote, Owen and Sapolsky, Harvey. MIT Secu-
30 times by 2020’.6 His plans put the submarine-
rity Studies. Avaialble online at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/conf_series/ASW/
launched cruise missile strike capability d­ emonstrated ASW_Report.html
by Russia in the Syrian conflict in stark perspective. 2. ‘The New Face of Naval Strike Warfare’. 2005 RAND Corporation Study. Available online at:
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_briefs/2005/RAND_RB9137.pdf
3. ‘The Rescue of Bolar 34’. Phillips, Josh. Naval Aviation News, 15 Dec 2011. Available online
Although traditionally a ballistic-missile submarine at: http://navalaviationnews.navylive.dodlive.mil/2011/12/15/bolar-34/
4. ‘VP-5 Takes out a Libyan Combatant’. JaxAirNews. 6 Nov 2011. Available online at: http://
mission, the advent of the missile technology availa- jaxairnews.jacksonville.com/military/jax-air-news/2011-04-06/story/vp-5-takes-out-
ble on the SSKs allows them to potentially target libyan-combatant
­numerous densely populated urban areas. By exploit- 5. ‘Russian Submarine hits Targets in Syria’. Cavas, Christopher. Defense News. 09 Dec 2015.
Available online at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/breaking-news/2015/12/08/
ing the strengths of diesel submarines as described in submarine-russia-kalibr-caliber-cruise-missile-syria-kilo/76995346/
Chapter 3, modern SSKs have the ability to close 6. ‘US Concerned about Russian Submarines with Nuclear Armed Cruise Missiles near Wash-
ington’. The Atlantic Council Guardian and Foreign Policy branch. 6 Jan 2015. Available
­critical maritime chokepoints while simultaneously online at: http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/us-concerned-about-rus-
holding at risk critical infrastructure ashore. sian-submarines-with-nuclear-armed-cruise-missiles-near-washington

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 49

© DGA-CELM Landes

A French Atlantic-II launches a MU90 torpedo.

CHAPTER VIII ACT, is developing a roadmap to identify areas that

may be addressed by each nation to mitigate capabil-
Should NATO Explore a ity shortfall challenges identified at the 2014 Wales
Summit. Although not yet fully mature across each of
Common MPA Replacement? the capability areas, a significant amount of work has
been put into developing the ASW roadmap. The cur-
‘Mass (quantity) has a quality all its own’ rent version of the roadmap further divides ASW into
Unidentified Russian Naval strategist three mission areas: MPA, Submarine, and Surface
Ships. Although the details of the ASW Roadmap
As air defence planners in Taiwan have come to realize in ­remain classified, it does bring to light the MPA com-
a rather public forum, capacity is a requirement in addi- munity is experiencing challenges resulting from a
tion to capability.1 In the same vein, NATO’s MPA force will reduced inventory. Expanding upon a NATO Industrial
have a significant capacity challenge in the near term. Advisory Group (NIAG) study (NIAG SG. 166) c­ ompleted
Unless a solution is formulated, the Alliance runs the risk in June 20122, the roadmap highlights many NATO
of being unable to maintain the required levels of Mari- ­nations’ current MPA will reach the end of service
time Situational Awareness (MSA) of submarine activity. life at around the same time (near 2025) which will
­exacerbate the challenge if left unresolved.

8.1 The ASW Roadmap

Stemming from this, the International Military Staff
The Defence Investments Division of the International (IMS) established Specialist Team 5 as an element
Military Staff, working in conjunction with ACO and of the Under Water Warfare Coordination Group to

50 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 Andoya
6 6

10 0
Keflavik Kinloss/
Lossiemouth
21 0
Nordholz
Valkenburg 10 6

Lann-Bihoue
8 0
6 6 Toulon
8 8 Greenwood Elefsis
Moron Topel
0 8
Brunswick 7 3 Beja Sigonella
30 0
Jacksonville
30 ~ 0 6
P3C 20 P8A Bermuda 6 6
8 0

10 0 10 P3 4-6
2016: Net Reduction of
12 ATL P3
~ 120 MPA across NATO
1985 2016

Figure 293 – MPA Inventory 1985–2016.

e­xplore a possible MPA replacement airframe for mains a source of concern that many of the proposed
­effected nations. Unfortunately, in the last two years, signatory nations and who find themselves in the most
little progress has been made on this issue. As of the need of a replacement airframe do not ­actively partici-
Fall 2015 meeting, nations participating in this team pate in this M3A development team.
have not even provided the UWWCG ST-5 with a
­national position on the MPA capabilities requirement
8.2 How National Interests
matrix, which was agreed upon at the 2012 workshop,
although some headway was made toward this end Impact the Alliance
in early 2016. Further effort is needed to define the Composite ASW Capability
requirement before any true conversations regarding
a common airframe can proceed beyond the theo- The NIAG SG.166 study provides a comprehensive
retical. This is a key focal point of the ASW Roadmap, and holistic review not only of the current MPA inven-
which is being folded into the NDPP and national tory shortfall but also of the challenges of the current
Country Target Books. procurement process. Observing the US experience in
fielding the P-8 Poseidon and matching conclusions
The IMS is developing a Letter of Intent (LOI) for key na- drawn in the NIAG, this study concurs with previous
tions of which MPA are most in need of replacement to assessments that approximately ten years will pass
­explore the potential of a common airframe solution to from definition of the requirement to operational de-
this challenge. Although many of the nations on ST-5 ployment of a new airframe. The challenge for NATO
(re-designated as M3A – Multi-Mission Maritime Air- today is the current MPA of many nations are already
craft) have expressed initial support for this LOI, it re- at the ten-year window of their expected end-of-­

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 51

 78 SSBN
12 SSBN
138
russia SSGN/SSN
russia 26 SSGN / SSN
Inventory shared between Inventory shared between
Northern (Atlantic) and Northern (Atlantic) and
Pacific Fleets 154 Pacific Fleets 19 SSK
SS/SSK

6 SS/SSK
algeria 2 SS algeria
6 SS 1 SS
libya libya (likely non-operational)
4 SS
8 SS/SSK
egypt egypt
3 SS
5 SSK
israel israel
0 SS
3 SSK and
iran iran 25+ Midget submarines

1 SSN 1988-91
8 SS 1 SSN and 13 SSK
india india
1 SSBN 5 SSBN
china 3 SSN china 9 SSN
More than 80 SS
of various models 43 SS/SSK

circa 1985 TOTAL: 151

TOTAL: 478 circa 2016

Figure 304 – Submarine Inventory Comparison 1985–2016.

service life. Yet neither a national nor NATO-common The UK elected to retire the Nimrod citing airframe
way ahead has been developed. airworthiness concerns and also elected not to
­replace the capability with a new airframe. The three
Each nation is faced with internal budgetary challeng- MR-2 Nimrod squadrons were decommissioned, and
es to be balanced against the perceived threat to the GBR hoped to subsume the MPA portfolio of ASW and
nation and their ability to provide collective security Long Range Search and Rescue into its ship and heli-
to the Alliance. As an example of how a national deci- copter force. This decision turned out to be flawed. In
sion has broader impacts across NATO’s maritime ca- November 2015, GBR announced the intention to
pability, in the first decade of the 2000s, both GBR and purchase a fleet of nine P-8 Poseidons from the US,
NLD dissolved their MPA capability. NLD sold their but it will be some number of years before that capa-
P-3C fleet to Portugal (to establish an MPA capability) bility is realized in Britain. The Netherlands, GBR, and
and to Germany (to replace their aging Atlantics) and Greece also either decommissioned entire MPA
has elected not to pursue a replacement capability. squadrons or transitioned those squadrons entirely
out of the ASW mission into maritime surveillance.
The US decommissioned half of its fleet of 24 P-3C
Orion Squadrons between 1992 and 1995. Other
­nations have permitted their MPA fleet inventory to
dwindle while only maintaining a small number of
mission capable aircraft.
© Janes

The result of these decisions was an overall reduction

in NATO’s MPA inventory of over 120 MPA airframes.
Figure 31 – The UK Scrapped its Complete This number may appear skewed as the US numbers
Inventory of the MR2 Nimrod and its Planned account for a large percentage of the reduction with
Replacement, the MRA-4, in 2011. the elimination of 12 entire squadrons in the early

52 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

1990s. Six of those squadrons and their aircraft were still was a net reduction in inventory and maximum
based on the US East Coast. This study includes them on-station coverage realized through this exchange.
as resources readily available to NATO. In addition, the German P-3Cs are in the midst of a life
extension program (2016-2017) to bring the expected
The submarine inventory chart above (Figure 30)5 com- end of service life to near 2035.6 Previous experience
paring non-NATO submarines in a similar timeframe as with P-3C life extensions have shown mission availa-
the MPA inventory on the preceding page highlights a bility to decline toward the end of projected service
reduction from approximately 478 to 151 submarines. life as airframe fatigue and parts support issues
Not all of these currently operate in the NATO theatre, ­become exacerbated.
but all of them could if their nation demanded. Analysis
of the MPA-to-submarine ratio with the assumption Spain‘s P3 fleet has dwindled to three aircraft upgrad-
that in 1985 China had no capability to deploy to ed from P-3B model to P-3M. This model provides an
NATO’s AOR and assuming the Russian North and
­ ASW capability nearing that of the P-3C and will
Pacific Fleets were equally balanced indicates that
­ ­extend the airframe service life to around 2025. Spain
NATO had over 180 MPA available to prosecute what has not yet identified an ASW-capable replacement to
was likely around 100 submarines yielding a near 1.8 : 1 follow the P-3. The Spanish maritime mission portfolio
(MPA to submarine) ratio. In 2016, with the drastic has become predominantly maritime surveillance
­reduction in MPA contrasted against the current sub- rather than maritime patrol. The surveillance portfolio
marine inventory (assuming China now has the capa- has been offloaded to other airframes such as the
bility to deploy to NATO’s AOR and maintaining the CASA 235 which is neither ASW capable nor equipped
same assumption about Russia’s fleet balance), that to deliver ordnance.7
­ratio is now nearly the opposite- 1 : 2 (MPA to submarine).
Greece found itself in a similar position. As the end of
This is further exacerbated by the fact that many life approached on its fleet of P-3Bs, service life exten-
­nations are increasing their submarine shipbuilding sion was explored. Unfortunately, national budgetary
while few nations are increasing their MPA inventory. restrictions derailed many of those efforts, and the
fleet was sidelined in 2007.8 Greece is currently with-
out MPA capability, although some plans to restore a
8.3 Aging Fleets
portion of the Hellenic P-3 fleet are being explored. In
Across NATO’s MPA Force fact, in 2014 Greece contracted for a life extension to
The NLD and GBR decisions to eliminate their MPA five P-3B airframes, which would bring another 15,000
fleet are amplified by end-of-service life challenges flying hours9 (until approximately 2025). Doubts about
experienced by Spain, Canada, Italy, Greece, France, Greece’s ability to fund the contract amidst its current
and Germany. fiscal challenges remain.

Although the acquisition of the former Dutch P-3s Italy has experienced nearly the same challenge with
­offset the retirement of the German Atlantic I to some the retirement of its fleet of Atlantic IIs projected for
extent, Germany has had significant material readi- later in 2016. Although Italy can boast the capability
ness challenges with all of its P-3C Orion airframes. As to project ASW capability from its robust shore based
a result, mission availability is a constant challenge. helicopter fleet in addition to those embarked on
Additionally, eight P-3Cs were acquired to offset the ASW ships, the MPA replacement, the Italian variant of
two squadrons of Atlantics. Although both squadrons the ATR-72 is not expected to be configured for ASW.
remain in existence today, each operates fewer air- However, Italy is actively participating in the UWWCG
craft and has fewer aircrew than with the Atlantics. M3A replacement aircraft development team and is
Although the endurance and range capability differ- researching options to restore a long-range ASW
ences of the two airframes are somewhat offset, there ­capability by 2030.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 53

 Canada operates the CP-140 Aurora, an MPA model into the politically approved long-term plan for the
based on the P-3 airframe. Canada has upgraded its Norwegian Armed Forces, scheduled to be reviewed
mission systems aboard its Aurora fleet in the last few in mid-2016, which will have bearing on the future of
years. It is believed to be on par with that of the US the Norwegian MPA fleet.
P-3C model10 (prior to the US ASW C4I upgrade in
2015). This was a factor in the decision to perform a
8.4 New Participants in MPA
subsequent airframe life extension versus aircraft
replacement. Canada had expressed interest in a
­ Turkey has begun operating the CN 235 Persuader as
­variant of the P-8 Poseidon but, in late 2015, elected to a Maritime Patrol Aircraft, which in mid 2016 was
conduct a life-extension to the CP-140. This service life ­re-designated the P-235. The P-235 (inventory of 6
extension includes upgrading 14 airframes with Block ASW variants) has an integrated sensor suite of
IV ASW/C4I upgrades to maintain an ASW capability FLIR, ESM, radar and acoustic and can carry up to
to 2030, although the total invetory will be reduced to 2 ­MK-46/54 lightweight ASW torpedoes.14 Turkey also
14 airframes.11 intends to operate a small fleet of ASW modified
­ATR-72 aircraft (P-72) with a target of 6 airframes by
France was interested in building the Atlantic III but in 2018.15 Turkey is also exploring a long range Multi-
2015 elected to conduct an ASW sensor upgrade and Mission Aircraft capability to address capability short-
life extension on 15 of the 27 Atlantic IIs. This is falls by the P-235 and P-72 aircraft.
­expected to take the airframe to 2030.12 With the
pending retirement of the Italian Atlantic fleet, France Poland operates a fleet of five M-28B Bryza 1R Mari-
will be the only remaining NATO nation operating the time Surveillance aircraft16, one of which is configured
Atlantic model of MPA. for ASW. The Bryza ASW variant integrates Star
­Sapphire optics with an imaging radar and acoustic
Norway currently operates two models of P-3 Orions, suite and is equipped with Link 11 capability. Regard-
two P-3N, and four P3C UIP. Norway has elected to ing the bridge between Maritime Surveillance and
conduct service life extensions to its Orion fleet with Maritime Patrol, the Bryza is not capable of carrying or
expected service life between 2025-2030.13 The addi- deploying torpedoes, but can hand-deliver light
tional challenge Norway will face involves aircrew bombs by opening the cabin door.17
training and simulator use, as Norway uses the US P-3
training pipeline at VP-30 in Jacksonville, FL. The US Portugal has been operating a small fleet of six P-3P
is scheduled to migrate complete away from P-3 Orions since the mid-2000s18. It has been an active
­support in upcoming years. participant in the limited prosecution of submarines
recently conducting surfaced transits near Portugal.
The Norwegian Chief of Defense released his De- All of these models are expected to maintain service
fense White Paper in October 2015, in which he pro- life until the late 2020s.
poses to retire the P-3 Orion fleet by 2020 due to
budgetary prioritization. In its place, it is proposed to These new MPAs stem from a variety of airframe back-
execute the long-range maritime surveillance func- grounds. Technology has to some extent levelled the
tion through the use of Medium Altitude Long En- playing field for surveillance sensors (imagery sys-
durance (MALE) Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). tems, datalinks, radars provide the maritime compo-
Recognizing the ­severe impact this will have on both nent commander a similar capability regardless of
national and NATO ASW capabilities, NOR is in the which airframe is employed), but these other MPA
process of prioritizing new and renewed capabilities. have a lower level of acoustic onboard processing
Potential items on this list include eventually replac- ­capability than traditional MPA (P-3, ATL, P-8). Subse-
ing the current 4 P-3C UIP MPA with a new airframe, quently, their utilization in a multinational ASW pros-
such as the P-8 Poseidon. The White Paper will lead ecution would have to be factored accordingly. NATO

54 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

should specifically focus on integrating these
­ASW-capable aircraft into ASW exercises to enhance
joint interoperability, grow experience, and explore
integration and capability seams brought on by
­differing levels of acoustic capability. In the future,
­operations may efficiently use the capability brought
by these nations who are new to the submarine
­prosecution domain.

Further details about each variant of MPA operated

by a NATO nation may be found in the Appendix C.

8.5 Assessing the Validity

© POR MND
of a NATO MPA Squadron
The challenge for the UWWCG’s MPA Specialist Team
as they attempt to move forward in researching a Figure 32 – View from the Cockpit of a Portuguese P-3 Orion.
NATO common MPA airframe is nations do not share a
common perspective on maritime patrol. Those with airframe with scalable models from high-end ­Maritime
a lengthy history of MPA operations in the Cold War, Patrol (with embedded surface and subsurface
who have adapted their current MPA fleets into true ­engagement capability) to low end maritime surveil-
multi-mission aircraft (MMA) while maintaining a lance might be more financially acceptable to many
­robust sensor and training program to retain an ASW nations.
capability, have one perspective on what the portfolio
of a future MPA should be. Those nations less involved A detailed review of the options and differences be-
with traditional ASW and more focused on coastal tween national procurement of MPA compared to a
surveillance and other aspects of maritime security NATO procured and owned MPA squadron was out-
have a different perspective. A true multi-mission side the scope of this study. However, the following
­aircraft capable of performing at high levels across the sections, which are an adaptation of the conclusions
spectrum of Maritime Patrol and ISR will be a signifi- from the JAPCC research into the creation of a NATO/
cant financial expenditure that not all nations will be Multinational Joint ISR Unit (Oct 2015), offer some in-
willing to afford. sight into the issue. The complete MNJISRU study is
available at www.japcc.org/portfolio/nato-mnjisru/.
To advance the discussion on this issue, as time is
fleeting to have a replacement aircraft fielded be- Common Will. The sustained political will to support
fore the existing MPA are no longer serviceable, the principles of NATO’s Smart Defence is essential for
NATO must first determine the requirement then the initial creation of a NATO MPA squadron and its
elect whether to approach a solution from national long term success. The declared objectives of the
procurement channels or via the NATO procure- 2014 Wales Summit, such as reversing declining
ment process. ­defence budgets, emphasizing multinational cooper-
ation, as well as enhancing and reinforcing NATO’s
Selecting a common airframe across the Alliance will ASW capabilities, mesh well with the creation of a
lead to efficiencies in interoperability (air to air and air NATO owned MPA squadron.
to ship). It will also permit common logistics process-
es and smooth out some of the ground support chal- Common Funding. Initial acquisition and funding
lenges identified in Chapter 3. Furthermore, a single will require a multinational or joint funding approach.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 55

 © JAPCC

Figure 33 – Unit Patches from MPA Squadrons, ASWOCS and ASW Bases which have Decommissioned since 1995.

Based on the analysis of the study, once the unit is Common Training. Not all nations interested in par-
established, costs for operations and maintenance as ticipating in ASW may be capable of appointing fully
well as general unit support should come from NATO trained and qualified personnel for a NATO-specific
common funding. This funding model would align MPA platform. The unit could be initially augmented
with the principles of the NATO Smart Defence Initia- with a dedicated training element from those nations
tive by sharing the financial burden amongst all 28 with lengthy ASW histories both in the air and at
NATO nations. This would not only leverage the politi- ground mission support stations. This could also serve
cal will to create an MPA squadron but also strongly as a central NATO ‘ASW Training Centre’ for the benefit
support the long term sustainability of the unit. of all participating nations.

Common Ownership. As a direct result of using the Common Post Sharing. Similar to NATO’s AWACS
NATO common funding model, the MPA squadron’s squadron, a NATO MPA squadron could be based in a
equipment and materiel will be owned by NATO itself. single location and operate with small detachments
Therefore, it would not be subject to any national to current MPA bases for routine, enduring operations
­caveats. This will significantly contribute to ensuring (surveillance, exercises) and surge operations. De-
the unit’s full operational capability. pending on the location of the base selected, the
­majority of submarine prosecution missions could be
Common Platform. All MPA missions involving ASW operated from the home base. This should be a con-
require personnel specifically trained and qualified sideration for the squadron’s home location.
for that specific platform. As more nations share a
common MPA platform, the more likely it is that Common Architecture. The MPA squadron should
personnel for an MPA squadron and associated
­ be structured to provide seamless integration into
ground support stations could be provided without both NATO peacetime and wartime ASW and ISR
requiring additional training. architectures. This requires consideration of C2
­

56 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

­arrangements regarding ASW prosecution manage- stealth and duration similarities, MPA, MPH and
ment (Theatre ASW Commander), ISR Collection space systems provide an irreplaceable part of the
Management, and practical employment of the ASW continuum.
assets. Concurrently, the question of retaining
­
­national ­OPCOM over the assets also requires care- Some have postulated that the MPA capability could
ful consideration. be ‘outsourced’ to ships and their embarked ASW ca-
pable helicopters. This study concludes that at the
Magnus Nordenman, in his recent study ‘NATO’s Next tactical, or naval task force level, embarked helicopters
Consortium: Maritime Patrol Aircraft’, has further pro- are capable of screening friendly ships against an ASW
posed that a Consortium might be a viable way ahead threat, although continual, persistent 24-hour cover-
to address current shortfalls. His proposed consorti- age would be limited by the number of aircraft and
um would be able to ‘coordinate their efforts, acquire crews within the task force. Although coordinated
a range of capabilities and share platforms, mainte- operations in a hi-boy/low-boy role are common
­
nance, basing, training and the intelligence derived ­between MPA and helicopters, an MPA in this instance
from MPA missions’.19 Although this is an exceptional is also suited to address the need to search, detect
model which leverages the best of the Smart Defense and potentially engage at distance, prior to the arrival
and Pooling & Sharing initiatives from the 2014 Wales of the task force into an operations area. Furthermore,
Summit, our study concludes that this model would MPA provides the ability to deliver ordnance on a po-
not fully address one of the most critical MPA short- tentially hostile submarine and then returning to land
falls: Inventory. to re-load and re-arm, giving the task force ­commander
the flexibility to employ ASW weapons without
In fact, it is likely that should this model be pursued, ­depleting the at-sea task force inventory.
that, although the new aircraft would be equipped
with latest sensors and technology, there would The helicopter fleet is not only range limited c­ ompared
likely be even fewer airframes available for tasking to an MPA, but also limited to the relocation capability
in the future using this model than there are today. of the ship on which it is embarked. Therefore, due to
the slow manoeuvre speed of ships compared to air-
craft, at-sea based helicopters alone are insufficient to
8.6 Is an MPA Needed for ASW?
address ASW on a wider, theatre wide perspective.
ASW has been proven to be best conducted using a Finally, land-based ASW helicopters would have
­
layered, and when possible federated, system of ­similar range and speed limitation issues compared to
­sensors.20 From space systems to bottom mounted an MPA and would be unable to prosecute ­submarines
sensors and leveraging the capabilities of platforms operating in the deep ocean far from land.
above, on and below the sea, NATO has best
succeeded in locating and tracking non-NATO
­ Low MPA inventory will eventually strain NATO’s
­submarines when exploiting the full spectrum of ­response capability with MPA. Although the NDPP
available resources employed in a layered approach. used a more detailed level of analysis to determine its
The ocean is a diverse and challenging environment, recommended MPA inventory, a simple review of the
and there are many reasons why a single sensor number of airframes needed to prosecute a single
could lose contact on a submarine from one mo- datum is insightful. Assuming a baseline a 1.5 hour
ment to the next, not the least of which could be the transit, 4 hours on task then 1.5 hours return transit
experience of the submarine commander in exploit- (nominally 400nm at 250kts) with a 30 min overlap for
ing weaknesses in detection and tracking tech­ a relieving aircraft, it requires 7–8 aircraft to maintain a
nology. ­Although few would argue that one of the 24 hour MPA coverage. Factoring in traditional aircraft
best systems for tracking a submarine is another readiness rates and accounting for multiple datums
submarine, due in no small part to its inherent speed, across NATO’s AOR, it becomes apparent that a large

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 57

 number of MPA inventory is required just to meet the duct a prosecution of a patrolling submarine. In fact,
operational demand of theatre wide ASW in an they have done so in recent months. But if, in five
environment with multiple submarines underway.
­ years’ time, a significant surge in submarine deploy-
The inventory issue becomes further exacerbated ments were to be realized, as trends are indicating,
when acknowledging the numerous ISR and overland then NATO will be challenged to prosecute more than
roles which MPA have filled in the last 20 years and are one submarine in geographically diverse areas with its
now part if the Joint ISR process, a critical enabler to current low numbers of MPA. This problem will be ex-
any joint campaign. acerbated by the projected further reduction as both
the P-3 Orion and Atlantic models reach end of ser-
Therefore, there are certain aspects of the ASW ­domain vice life in the next 10–15 years.
which are best filled with employment of an MPA. It is
imperative, as NATO moves forward to ­address shortfalls This is not a new issue. It has been identified as far back
within the ASW domain, that MPA works in concert with as 2012. However, not all nations have assigned the
other systems, platforms and technologies. procurement of a replacement airframe with the same
level of urgency as others. This is evidenced by the fact
that, as of January 2016, no nation had provided its na-
8.7 Rebuilding NATO’s
tional priorities and required capabilities to the team
ASW Experience exploring a common NATO airframe even though the
Following nearly two decades where ASW was not spreadsheet matrix was agreed to four years earlier. It
conducted at high levels, it may take a full generation appears some nations were waiting on GBR’s decision.
to rebuild the experience of airborne ASW. This is It is unlikely the remaining NATO nations who operate
viewed not just from an airframe perspective, but also MPA will have the funds to pursue GBR’s solution to
to grow the experience level and build the ­expertise of procure nine P-8 Poseidon aircraft. Therefore, reaching
acoustic operators and mission commanders in various consensus on this issue has even more urgency.
MPA and MPH platforms. Rebuilding experience is not
something which can be readily solved by a political The commonality of airframe has many benefits, in-
statement or by increasing funding for technology; it cluding the opportunity to exercise NATO’s Joint Lo-
takes time operating on top of non-cooperative sub- gistics process as well as ease basing support chal-
marines which are actively trying to evade detection. It lenges as MPA deploy in and around the entirety of
will take a period of years to grow the core competency NATO’s AOR. Furthermore, should the concept of a
for a n
­ ation which stopped its airborne ASW program. NATO-operated MPA squadron be desired, this study
This is an important lesson for the nations with new offers some very initial conclusions in this matter, al-
ASW platforms to understand. though a detailed review of that aspect of a replace-
ment MPA was not part of the scope of this study. This
study concurs with the process and planning factors
8.8 Summary
with which the NDPP used to identify the appropriate
Looking to the future, mitigation strategies for many number of NATO MPA. It is this target number, cou-
of the shortfalls within the ASW domain are currently pled with the looming decrease in inventory expect-
being pursued. However, the inventory of NATO’s MPA ed next decade, which is driving the urgency of the
is one of the shortfall areas for which a clear, cohesive work underway toward identifying a potential re-
mitigation strategy has not been identified. placement airframe.

The challenge is less about the capability of each air- This study recommends the Military Committee rein-
frame, but rather more about the lack of theatre-wide force to the UWWCG and its subordinate MPA
capability NATO loses as inventory shortages increase. ­Specialist team the urgency of reaching a decision
It is commonly agreed NATO’s MPA fleet could con- and direct them to strive toward identifying a com-

58 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

mon MPA airframe. This airframe must have the ability 10. ‘Upgrades to Aurora aircraft puts Royal Canadian Air Force on cutting edge of anti-submarine
warfare’. Fisher, Matthew. 14 Jul. 2014. Canada.com. Available online at: http://o.canada.
to perform not only extended ASW (to include attack com/news/upgrades-to-aurora-aircraft-puts-royal-canadian-air-force-on-cutting-edge-
if needed) but also all aspects of both Maritime Patrol of-anti-submarine-warfare
11. ‘Maintaining Canada’s CP-140 Fleet’. Defense Industry Daily, 13 Aug. 2014. Available
and ISR. The period for resolving this is short: History Online at: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/canada-moves-to-longterm-perfor-
informs us it takes approximately ten years from iden- mancebased-contracts-for-its-p3-fleet-01474/
12. ‘Future Maritime Patrol PT 3’ Think Defense. Jan. 2014. Available online at: http://www.
tification of requirements to airframe delivery. Many thinkdefence.co.uk/2014/01/future-maritime-patrol-part-3-dedicated-long-range-air-
NATO nations are fast approaching ten years before craft-p3-p1-atl-319/
13. ‘Norway Re-winging, Refurbishing its P-3 Orions’. Defense Industry Daily, 04 May. 2014.
the end of their current MPAs’ service life. Available Online at: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/norway-rewinging-refurbish-
ing-its-p3-orions-03106/
14. ‘CASA CN235-100M ASW’ Bospohorous Naval News. Available online at: https://turkish-
1. ‘Taiwan Forced To Rethink Its Air Defense Strategy’ Lostumbo, Michael. Defense News 13 navy.net/casa-cn-235-100m-asw/
Apr. 2016. Available online at: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/commen- 15. ‘Turkey’s New ATR-72 Maritime Patrol Planes’ Defense Industrial Daily, Jul. 2014. Avail-
tary/2016/04/13/taiwan-forced-rethink-its-air-defense-strategy/82897760/ able online at: http://www.defenseindustrydaily.com/219m-for-10-turkish-asw-
2. NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group 166 (NIAG SG.166) 30 Jun. 2012 aircraft-0905/
3. Numbers as reported in ‘Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft’ 1980–2015 16. PZL Mielec M28 Skytruck / Bryza Aircraft, Poland. Naval-technology. Available online at:
4. .Numbers as reported in ‘Janes Fighting Ships’ 1980–2015 http://www.naval-technology.com/projects/pzlmielecm28skytruck/
5. Information for this chart obtained from IHS Janes online database and Jane’s Fighting Ships 17. ‘Polish Navy Experience using M28 in Maritime Surveillance and Security’ Captain Jan
1985–1986 pg. 512–533 Kaczmarek. Available online at: http://tangentlink.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/6-
6. ‘Airbus and Lockheed to upgrade German Navy’s P-3C Orion aircraft fleet’. 30 Jul. 2015. Available Polish-Navy-Experience-using-the-M28-High-Performance-STOL-Aircraft-in-Maintain-
online at: http://www.naval-technology.com/news/newsairbus-and-lockheed-to-upgrade- ing-Maritime-Surveillance-Security.pdf
german-navys-p-3c-orion-aircraft-fleet-4635236 18. ’The Watching Wolves of Portugal’. Macro Borst. Available online at: http://www.p3orion.
7. P3 Orion Research Group. 8 Oct 2015. Available online at: http://www.p3orion.nl/news.html nl/poaf.pdf
8. ‘Greece’s Maritime Patrol Aircraft’. Defense Industry Daily, 8 Oct. 2014. Available online at: http:// 19. ‘NATO’s Next Consortium: Maritime Patrol Aircraft’. Magnus Nordenman, May. 2016. Brent
www.defenseindustrydaily.com/greeces-maritime-patrol-aircraft-competition-05118/ Scowcraft Center on International Security in a project brief to the Atlantic Council. Pg. 7
9. P-3B Orion Aircraft. Skordas, Aggelos. 5 Apr. 2015. The Greeke Reporter. Available online at: 20. UK White Paper: Strategic Defence and Security Review 2 Dec. 2011 Avail-
http://greece.greekreporter.com/2015/04/05/greek-govt-signs-500-mln-contract-with-u-s- able online at: http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmd-
company-for-modernization-of-p-3b-orion-planes/ fence/761/76107.htm

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 59

© US Navy

An MH-60R deploys an exercise torpedo.

CHAPTER IX ing, and when necessary, attacking and defeating

­adversary submarines.

ASW Doctrine Additionally, this document provides the process and

9.1 Current ASW Doctrine procedures for ship, helicopter, and MPA Coordinated
ASW operations. It includes recommended tactics for
NATO’s Maritime Community has developed and efficient integration of the various sensors provided
published a significant amount of doctrine in the ASW by each. This allows the maritime task force ASW com-
domain. Much of it remains relevant; however, contin- mander to assign available resources to prosecute
ued development of emerging technology and con- the submarine based on what assets are available at
version into standardized TTPs and approved NATO any given time, to include ship’s passive sonar tail
doctrine is necessary. Several major publications (­TACTASS, MFTA etc..), ship’s active sonar capability,
­cover the employment of Maritime Air assets in ASW and the sonobuoy loadout/acoustic capability pre-
and are in great need of doctrine review and updates sented by each type of ASW-capable helicopter or
to advance Maritime Air’s support to ASW. MPA which may be on station at any given time.

ATP-1 – Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions Although much of this publication is founded on Cold
and Procedures (NC) War tactics and has to some extent integrated Experi-
This document provides general guidance for mission mental Tactics (EXTACSs), which have been tested and
planning aspects of ASW. It is a relatively comprehen- validated in the subsequent years, the current doc-
sive document that provides a solid foundation for trine falls short in addressing the expanded capability
the fundamental concepts involved in locating, track- of today’s ASW helicopters.

60 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Many of NATO’s ASW helicopters have significantly Air. However, there remain some sections regarding
improved active (dipping) sonar capability over previ- other aspects of Arctic operations which have been
ous models. This fact has not been fully explored nor identified (at the Maritime Operations WG) for review.
codified into doctrine. The same dimensions for
search areas between MPA and MPH (with helicopters ATP-28 – Allied Anti-Submarine
nominally being assigned Sector Zero in most ASW Warfare Manual (NC)
Airplans) from 30 years ago are still in use and have ATP-28 provides an excellent foundation for detailed
not been adjusted to account for the improvements ASW mission planning. It includes a thorough review
in dipping sonar, which is now a component of much of types of submarines and their capabilities, and
of today’s ASW helicopter force. As an example, in the types of friendly force ASW resources and their capa-
US inventory, 15 years ago the only dipping sonar ca- bilities, although at times this document tends toward
pability existed on the helicopters embarked on an over-classification. ATP-28 is the source document for
aircraft carrier. With the development of the MH-60R, further details beyond the information provided in
that capability is now resident on the helicopters em- Chapters 5 and 6 of this study.
barked on the DDG/CG. This has significantly altered
the ASW capability available to the commander at any ATP-28 does fall short in addressing different types of
given time. NATO MPA and MPH (specifically newer models),
which will provide significantly different capabilities in
Other NATO nations have included a low-frequency coordinated ASW operations with surface ships. ATP-
active dipping sonar capability on recent models of 28 discusses passive acoustic tactics and techniques
ASW helicopters. This includes the EH-101/Merlin over the course of 49 pages, whilst only four are de-
(ITA/GBR), and the NH-90 (BEL, DEU, FRA, ITA, NLD voted to active sonar/sonobuoy procedures. Al-
and NOR). Additionally, improvements in the dip- though passive sonar tactics are still in use today, by
ping ­sonar capability have been realized in the last comparison, the level of detail provided in the publi-
10–15 years to the point where the current dimen- cations does not reflect the current use of active so-
sions of ASW AIRPLAN sectors have not kept pace. nar, both ship mounted, via airborne deployed active
Further ­information on the specific sensors installed sonobuoys or MPH dipping sonar. This is an area in
on ASW helicopters may be found in the appendices need of improvement in the next revision.
of this study.
As previously stated, ATP-28 provides a solid founda-
ATP-1 should be reviewed to insure the tactics em- tion and thorough review of the fundamentals of
ployed align with the capabilities of today’s aircraft. ASW; however, the specific tactics for coordinated
operations between MPA, MPH and surface ships do
ATP 17 – Naval Arctic Manual (NU) not reflect current MPA and MPH sensor capabilities.
This publication discusses water mass, oceanography, The next review of this publication should address
bottom topography and sound propagation in the this shortcoming.
Arctic. It is important for ASW aircrews to understand
the differences between polar water masses and non- AJP 3.3 – Joint Air Operations (NU) and
polar oceans and is recommended reading prior to ATP 3.3.3 – Allied Joint Doctrine for
any Arctic operation. Additionally, the chapter on Arc- Air-Maritime Coordination (NU)
tic air navigation outlines different procedures when AJP 3.3 recently underwent a review and is expected
flying in the extreme high latitudes. Finally, the discus- to be ratified in the spring of 2016. Moving forward for
sion about ice generated ambient noise and Arctic the next version, AJP 3.3 will be reviewed for applica-
propagation loss curves due to sea ice are valuable. bility of additional guidance to the integration of Joint
This study concludes no significant shortcomings ex- Air assets into the Integrated Air and Missile Defence
ist in this document specifically related to Maritime domain so subordinate doctrinal publications may

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 61

 provide guidance for how the Land, Air, and Maritime ongoing challenge for naval forces for the last two
components will deal with that joint problem set. decades. Restrictions to operations to manage this
have resulted in some reductions in ASW exercise op-
In the same vein, this document should be modified to erations areas around the globe, threshold settings on
include guidance on all services’ air contribution to the active sonars, and even speed restrictions on ASW
Anti-Submarine Warfare problem set. It should include a ships sailing in areas populated by certain species of
brief overview of the domain and contributions other marine mammals. After consultation with MARAIR
services may provide to the Maritime component in this and COMSUBNATO and based on the author’s per-
area. Subordinate documents are attempting to codify sonal experiences in ASW operations both within
the process by which non-maritime assets may inte- ­NATO’s waters and also throughout the Pacific, this
grate overwater to provide support to the Maritime study concludes that the current restrictions on active
component. In order to align with higher governing sonar do not overly burden aircrew or significantly im-
doctrine, this concept should be identified in the next pact NATO’s ability to train and exercise tracking and
revision of AJP 3.3 and ATP 3.3.3. engagement of submarines.

ATP 3.3.3.1 – Air-Maritime Coordination

9.2 Experimental Tactics
Procedures (NU)
In its early stages, this publication began as a method Unique to the Maritime doctrinal portfolio are Ex-
by which the Air Defence procedures for the Maritime perimental Tactics (EXTACS) publications. EXTACS are
component could be identified for use by other ser- used to propose doctrine codifying the procedures
vices. But the document has not been updated in al- for a new technology, new capability, or even new
most a decade. In late 2015, the custodian hosted a command structure. The concept behind an EXTAC
drafting conference. At that time, JAPCC proposed is that once approved, it is folded into the Maritime
and all participants agreed to expand the scope of the exercise portfolio to be tested and evaluated. If the
document to include all aspects of integration of joint procedure identified in the EXTAC is validated
and non-organic maritime aircraft into the airspace through experimentation and exercises with live na-
controlled by various maritime components. The new val forces, it is then folded into an existing Allied Tac-
concept for this document would be to provide infor- tical Publication (ATP) or, if needed, a new ATP is writ-
mation for land-based fighters to join the maritime air ten to codify the procedure into formal maritime
defence network. Examples include codifying proce- doctrine. The EXTAC library is maintained in AXP-5
dures to check in and work an over-water CAP station (NC). The following list highlights EXTACs pertinent
integrated into the maritime Air Defence Plan and to to this study:
clarify the linkage between land-based AOCs (CAOC,
JAOC) with Maritime AOCs. Additionally, it will define EXTAC 181 – LFAS in Support of an HVU
the process for land-based MPA and helicopters to This document provides guidance on the use of Low-
join and integrate into the surface and subsurface Frequency Active Sonar (LFAS) in support of defend-
warfare domain. The custodian expects to have a ing a High Value Unit (HVU) such as an aircraft carrier
study draft with all of these concepts included routed or logistics re-supply ship. The applicability to Mari-
for national review in the fall of 2016. time Air involves the generation of a moving barrier to
screen and protect the High Value Unit from adversary
MC-0547 – Code of Conduct for the Use of submarines. Although the science behind the EXTAC
Active Sonar to Ensure the Protection of is sound, it falls short of addressing tactics to convert
Marine Mammals Within the Framework of an LFAS detection ahead of the HVU’s movement. This
Alliance Maritime Activities EXTAC proposes one method of using LFAS to gener-
Protection of marine mammals from harm due to ate a sonobuoy barrier to screen an HVU’s movement,
sound intensity provided by active sonars has been an but it seems to blur the line between ‘detect’ and

62 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

­‘deter’ and per ATP-1, fails to clearly articulate the pur- Warfare (AAW) missions and the impact the geo-
pose of the ASW prosecution. graphic and relative stationing of an AAW ‘goaltender’
will have on CVN flight operations.
One additional challenge in this EXTAC is the potential
for national differences in terminology involving Low- Finally, as discussed in Chapter 2, many NATO nations
Frequency Active Sonar. This EXTAC refers to ASW refer to their amphibious assault ships as aircraft carri-
­Naval Combatant ships with hull-mounted active so- ers. With the arrival of the F-35B to Alliance STOVL car-
nar with realistic detection ranges out to the first CZ. riers in the next few years, there will likely be a signifi-
There are other Special Mission ASW ships with a Low- cant change in both capability and amount of
Frequency Active in some national inventory capable fixed-wing flight operations conducted from the
of detection at significantly longer ranges, prosecut- STOVL Carriers/Amphibious Assault Ships. Flight
ing raypaths in multiple CZ convergences. ­operations on these types of ships differ dramatically
from CVNs and should be addressed in this EXTAC.
This study recommends this EXTAC be reviewed for
prosecution tactics beyond just the generation of a EXTAC 193 should be reviewed by STRKFORNATO for
moving barrier. Additionally, further coordination with concurrence and to ensure that all types of CVN and
the Terminology Working Group to ensure there is a Amphibious Assault Ship flight operations are
clear definition of Low-Frequency Active Sonar to reflected with appropriate ASW tactics derived
­
separate the different types and significant differenc- ­accordingly.
es in LFA capability across disparate types of LFA
­systems is needed. EXTAC 194 – ASW Operations in
Situations Other Than War
EXTAC 193 – ASW Protection of a Carrier This EXTAC addresses what is commonly referred to as
This EXTAC derived from France’s experiences dur- Peacetime ASW but viewed from the Task Force ASW
ing Charles De Gaulle’s recent deployments to the Commander perspective. This EXTAC provides a solid
Indian Ocean leveraging actual ASW interaction foundation for developing coordination handover
with IR, IN and CH submarines operating near the procedures from a Theatre ASW Commander to a TF
carrier strike unit. The EXTAC specifically highlights or Local ASW Commander. At the 2016 MAROPS WG,
methods to adapt NATO doctrine to increase flexi- COMSUBNATO was requested to synthesize salient
bility in conducting ASW operations in and around ­elements of this EXTAC for inclusion in their proposed
CVN air operations. It includes procedures for which Area ASW EXTAC 197.
the level or air activity of the CVN at any given time
is taken into account by the ASW Warfare Com- EXTAC 195 – Multi-Static Sonar Operations
mander and ASW-related air operations in close The field of bi- and multi-statics is a developmental
proximity to the carrier. area that is progressing only as fast as R&D / S&T
­efforts are driven by a few nations. This EXTAC is not
This study finds subtle but important differences in fully developed and, per agreement at the 2016
the operation of the French CVN and the operation of Maritime Operations Working Group, will be re-
US CVNs, specifically regarding the launch and recov- tained in its current status until Nations are able to
ery aspects of flight operations. It is also important to field Multi-Static Sonar capabilities into their fleets
remember frequently there will be a subsurface, sur- for experimentation.
face and air threat to the CVN which require a three
dimensional protective screen be employed. There- EXTAC 197 – Area ASW Operations
fore positioning of ASW ‘goaltenders’ as outlined in (DRAFT as of Feb 2016)
this EXTAC must take into account the potential for This EXTAC defines a proposed command structure.
concurrent Anti-Surface Warfare (ASuW) and Anti-Air COMSUBNATO would serve as focal point for ASW

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 63

 operations occurring outside a naval task force’s lo- 9.3 Summary
cal ASW commander’s AOR. This is a step towards
formalizing a Theatre ASW commander, moving for- This chapter reviewed current NATO doctrine and
ward in parallel with and as a result of research and provided recommendations for updating certain ATP
conclusions in this study. In the opinion of this and for exercising then ratifying certain EXTACs. Al-
study, as drafted the EXTAC falls short of defining though many of the higher level documents align
the authorities truly needed to execute theatre- with current strategy and provide a solid foundation
wide peacetime ASW. There remains a reliance on for the execution of ASW operations, some work is
the willingness of the nations to participate and needed to align the tactical documents, specifically
share information. There is no forcing function to those involving coordinated ASW operations and use
ensure CMAN/CSN receives either the information of ASW helicopters, to account for modernization of
needed to shape theatre-wide ASW prosecutions sensors. Additionally, the study reviewed salient ASW
nor the formalized arrangement for temporarily as- EXTACS with a recommended priority for immediate
signing maritime forces to MARCOM for the purpos- evaluation of the experimental tactics in upcoming
es of conducting peacetime ASW. exercises.

This study endorses the steps taken by the current Finally, and perhaps most critically for NATO’s ability to
draft of this EXTAC and recommends immediate ap- conduct peacetime ASW, is a recommendation for im-
proval and validation at the next opportunity as a step mediate endorsement of EXTAC 197 (Area ASW Op-
toward a future TASWC structure. Furthermore, con- erations). Although this study concludes the pro-
clusions on TASWC and recommendations for com- posed C2 plan in EXTAC 197 does not go far enough,
mand structure to solve the current C2 challenges are it is moving in the right direction and should be im-
further identified in Chapter 3. plemented immediately.

64 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © US Naval Air Systems Command
Artist’s conception of MPA and an air-deployable UAV jointly conducting ASW.

CHAPTER X with more endurance, like a nuclear submarine, and

coordinated tactics between MPA and submarines
Coordinated ASW Operations for joint prosecution evolved with advances in ad-
versary submarine technology over the decades.
and Emerging Technology The surface warfare community was slowest to
change its traditional ASW methods, remaining de-
10.1 Multi-layered Approach to ASW
pendent on active sonar and short range ASW
Detecting, tracking, and engaging adversary subma- weapons until the late 1970s. Then, in response to
rines has never been a one-asset show. From the his- the deployment of more capable Soviet submarine-
tory of submarine tracking in the 1960s to today, a launched anti-ship missiles, surface combatants
layered approach to ASW has been utilized. Maritime also embraced passive acoustics and long-range,
Patrol Aircraft have traditionally played a key role, shipborne ASW helicopters.1
working with submarines and other assets, as under-
sea surveillance systems became fully operational in Today, at the Naval Task Force level, coordinated ASW
the early 1960s. operations remain a focus of effort. Shifting from de-
tecting and holding a submarine at arm’s length, ASW
MPA offered speed that submarines lacked, making operations inside the Task Force AOR are migrating
them particularly useful in the initial localization of a toward detecting and engaging hostile submarines to
contact, which could be handed off to a platform protect a High Value Unit within the Task Force. Exer-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 65

 cises practice a myriad of detection methods, includ- towed arrays, was called the Integrated Undersea Sur-
ing surface ships’ passive sonar tails or active bow- veillance System (IUSS).’2
mounted sonar, radar, or ESM detection from a ship,
MPA or MPH or acoustic detection from a sonobuoy The system reached its Cold War peak with 11 NAV-
field. Furthermore, once contact has been generated, FACs/NOPFs, 14 SURTASS ships, two Ocean Systems
procedures for passing contact back and forth be- commands, and manned by approximately 4,000 per-
tween tracking assets (ships, MPA, MPH) are practised sonnel in the late 1980s. Eventually, Soviet intelligence
to avoid losing contact in the turnover process. Finally, learned of the existence of SOSUS and its remarkable
coordinated attack procedures are also exercised, not success in tracking Soviet submarines at long ranges
only from the aircrew perspective but also involving with the help of information supplied by the Walker-
decisions made by the LASWC involving the presence Whitworth spy ring. John Walker was a US Navy war-
of friendly submarines to avoid fratricide. rant officer and submarine communications expert
who sold countless naval messages to the Soviets
from 1968 to his arrest in 1985.3 Jerry Whitworth was
10.2 SOSUS
another Navy communications specialist recruited by
Historically, multiple types of sensors have been used Walker to assist with his espionage activities.4 The Rus-
in a layered approach for initial submarine detection. sian Navy responded by working to quiet their sub-
In the Cold War, a bottom-mounted acoustic detec- marines. By the end of the Cold War in the late 1980s,
tion system (SOSUS: Sound Surveillance System) the ability of IUSS to detect and track Soviet nuclear
would gain initial submarine detection and pass that submarines at long ranges had decreased significant-
information to ships and aircraft for further prosecu- ly. Modern diesel-electric submarines are even quieter
tion. This was an extremely closely guarded secret. It is and more difficult to detect by passive listening.
still representative of intelligence sharing challenges
between various NATO nations. Of note, the entire The combination of the end of the Cold War and im-
SOSUS/­ Integrated Undersea Surveillance System proved technology resulted in a much smaller
(IUSS) underwent a drawdown as significant as that ­system. By 2010, only two NOPFs, five SURTASS ships
experienced by MPA, albeit for a different reason. (all in the Pacific Ocean), a single system command,
and about 1,000 personnel remained.5 Bottom
‘As increasing numbers of Soviet submarines began ­sensors today, including their location and capabili-
entering the North Atlantic from bases in the Barents ty, remain highly classified but are still a part of the
and White Seas, additional acoustic monitoring facili- holistic ASW prosecution.
ties (referred to as NAVFACs) were established in Ice-
land and Wales. By the mid-1970s, the SOSUS system
10.3 MQ-4 Triton
consisted of 20 NAVFACs, two Ocean Systems com-
mands (COMOCEANSYSLANT and PAC), and about The advent of UAS into the ASW mission will be real-
3,500 personnel. In the 1980s, improved cable tech- ized with the US Navy’s MQ-4 Triton. As the EP-3
nology, closely related to the technology used in ­Aries retires, the SIGINT capabilities of that asset will
transoceanic telephone cables, allowed the arrays to be shared between the P-8 Poseidon and the MQ-4
be located farther from the NAVFACs. All of the coastal Triton. The Triton is a maritime derivative of the
Atlantic and Caribbean sites were replaced by Naval Global Hawk. Equipped with a Maritime GMTI radar,
Ocean Processing Facility (NOPF) Dam Neck, for exam- an EO/IR sensor, and SIGINT/ELINT detection
ple. In addition, the network of fixed arrays was aug- ­systems, the Triton will bring long-duration mission
mented by acoustic surveillance ships deploying the capability to this portfolio.
Surveillance Towed Array Sensor System (SURTASS).
This consisted of a towed line array over 8,000 feet Specific to ASW, Triton may offer initial cueing
long. The overall system, including both the fixed and based on radar periscope detection or ELINT for

66 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

f­urther ­prosecution by other ASW assets. Along the Aqua-Quad, is a four-propeller design that has
with the P-8A Poseidon, the MQ-4C Triton is integral been tested in sea states up to ten feet. This model is
to the Navy’s Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance equipped with both a solar power system enabling
Force (MPRF) Family of Systems and airborne ISR long-duration operations up to three months as well
­recapitalization strategy. Triton is expected to reach as an acoustic sensor which could be used to detect
IOC in 2018.6 submarines. This drone is essentially autonomous and
can take flight from the water to reposition, or remain
in place for significant periods of time.7
10.4 Other UAS to Augment ASW
The ability of other types of UAS to augment the Mari­
10.5 Self-Synchronization of Drones
time component in the execution of ASW is currently
limited to the Search/Initial Detection phase of pros- for Anti-Submarine Warfare
ecution. Long-duration ISR assets, such as the mari- One of the significant challenges to passive sonar de-
time MQ-4 Triton, the Air component’s Alliance tection, as discussed in Chapter 6 and Appendix 2, is
Ground Surveillance System (AGS), the MQ-9B Reaper, the passive detection range of submarines decreases
with its Maritime Wide Area Search (MWAS) using as submarine quieting technology improves. There-
­radar and EO, or other manned ISR platforms (includ- fore, once a submarine has passed beyond the pas-
ing Maritime Surveillance planes not normally capa- sive detection range a sonobuoy, that buoy is effec-
ble of ASW) can all play a role in the initial detection of tively of no further use.
a submarine. Diesel submarines present non-acoustic
detection opportunities when exposing their snorkel The Aqua-Quad technology could replace a passive
while recharging their batteries. Although this hap- sonobuoy field with a swarm of these drones. Then,
pens less frequently with the advent of AIP-equipped by either self-synchronizing to reposition ahead of an
SSK, the opportunity is still present. ISR assets can evasive submarine or being controlled to do so by a
cross-cue radar with AIS (Automated Information manned MPA or through a link from an unmanned
System – similar in concept to IFF for merchant high-altitude UAS, these drones could effectively
ships), convert to electro-optics, and make an initial maintain a moving ‘net’ around a transiting or patrol-
identification, which can be then passed on to a ling submarine.
prosecution platform.
Once the network technology is developed, these
Although less likely in the Search/Detection phase, systems could work in concert with other long dura-
Tactical UAS embarked on naval ships may also be tion tracking assets, such as the Sea Hunter unmanned
used to validate radar returns. The EXTAC on Maritime surface vehicle, MQ-4 Triton, manned MPA, or even a
Tactical UAS should be expanded to include this tacti- surface ship. This would mitigate many of the long du-
cal possibility. The key takeaway in the Detection ration tracking challenges currently experienced by
Phase is for the maritime component to remember NATO. If a situation evolved where escalation from
the air component can offer assistance in the form of tracking to engagement occurred, these drones could
ISR assets to this phase and to not hesitate to request provide cueing data to an attack platform, likely an
the Maritime Component Commander to request MPA or MPH.
support formally.

10.6 Unmanned Underwater Vehicles

Acoustic tracking of a submerged submarine is not in
any current UAS’ portfolio. However, one of the more (UUV)
promising emerging technologies is a small, light- The development of NATO standards for Unmanned
weight quad-copter, which may be deployed in an Underwater Vehicles has the potential to address the
ASW role. One of the prototypes of this technology, ASW shortfall. Although UUVs have made tremen-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 67

 dous strides in their role in Naval Mine Warfare (mostly
in mine detection) during the last decade, the tech-
nology is not yet mature enough to initiate experi-
mental tactics development for inclusion of UUV into
the ASW role. The key enabler for advancing UUV inte-
gration to the ASW tracking and detection aspects of
submarine prosecution stems from the development
of a robust communications data network capable of

© US DOD/DARPA
linking the UUV to other assets in the ASW prosecu-
tion. The ocean as a medium for this network provides
many challenges for bandwidth which are not resi-
dent in airborne link architectures. The Centre for Mar-
itime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) is re- Figure 34 – Artists Conception of the Sea Hunter
searching potential solutions to this challenge in USV Tracking a Submarine.
coordination with those nations putting effort to-
wards the development of UUVs. P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft and MH-60R
Seahawk helicopters.’8
One interesting development in the field of UUVs is
the long-duration sub tracking capability proposed This technology is intriguing and may offer a potential
by DARPA’s Sea Hunter (a derivative of research into solution for long-duration submarine tracking. How-
Anti-Submarine Warfare Continuous Trail Unmanned ever, in heavy weather, the submarine can dive deep
Vessel – ACTUV). Although not a detection system, and avoid the worst of the environmental impacts.
this UUV would be designed to maintain continuous Surface assets, like Sea Hunter, may not be able to
track overtop of an adversary submarine with a long- ­remain in the area as waves grow to excessive heights.
duration capability of between 60-90 days. A handover to another ASW asset in the family of
­systems will be required at that point.
‘Sea Hunter will be a trimaran design (artist’s concep-
tion in Fig. 34), with the vast majority of its hull and Additionally, a surface-based ASW asset, whether
superstructure built of lightweight and radar-translu- manned or unmanned, is not necessarily granted
cent carbon-composite materials. It will have a length ­special status by the International Rules of the Road
of around 130 feet, and its centre hull will be long and (COLREGS-72: Regulations for the Prevention of Colli-
streamlined. The trimaran design lends itself to endur- son at Sea). It will therefore need to interact with other
ance, sea keeping, and speed, which will be necessary ships likely in the Power-Driven Vessel status rather
for keeping up with sprinting diesel submarines as than ­Restricted in Ability to Manoeuvre. This may
well as those that are running slow and quiet for long ­further complicate the submarine tracking capability
periods of time. The first ACTUV prototype, named in a high-traffic environment, such as the littorals.
Sea Hunter, is currently under construction at the Or- Nevertheless, the technology is promising and opens
egon Iron Works and will be tested on the Columbia up a range of possibilities for interaction with Mari-
River in 2016. Aside from its on-board tracking sen- time Air ASW assets.
sors, the most important electronics suite aboard Sea
Hunter will be its satellite and line-of-sight datalinks
10.7 The Surface Fleet’s
that provide situational awareness to controllers thou-
sands of miles away, as well as connectivity with other ASW Advancement
sub hunting assets. These include Sea Hunter’s high To meet expanded foreign submarine operations and
and long flying semi-autonomous cousin, the Navy’s UUV technological advancements, the surface naval
new MQ-4C Triton, as well as sonobuoy dropping force employs state-of-the-art ASW technology

68 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

aboard numerous destroyers. The SQQ-89A(V)15 ASW capable ships, the concept is being explored
Combat System, which will be aboard 64 US destroy- by more than one corporation.
ers by 2020, and the new Multi-Functional Towed
­Array (MFTA) are game changers in ASW operations.
10.9 Other Emerging Technology
Their combined capabilities alter the methods by
which the surface navy searches and tracks sub­ National research programs are also offering new
marines. With enhanced sensor capability and data technology that may be integrated into an ASW pros-
processing, the surface naval forces have an increased ecution.
role in integrated ASW operations. ASW surface ships
can remain on station longer than aircraft and also • UASs Deployed from MPA: The future concept of
provide real-time command and control capability operations for the P-8 Poseidon involves a shift to
beyond that of a submarine. high-altitude stand-off tracking and attacking of
submarines. This is due to the increased potential
As an integrated component of many ASW ships, their of submarine-launched surface-to-air missiles and
embarked ASW helicopters have also undergone the subsequent risk to the aircraft. The adaptation
­numerous sensor upgrades, including an enhanced of torpedoes for high altitude deployment (fins
active dipping sonar. This new sonar is advertised to and guidance system upgrades) and the potential
increase detection ranges from three to seven times of a UAS deployed from the P-8 with a magnetic
that of legacy systems.9 detection capability for tracking submarines are
under exploration.
The upgrades to both the surface ship sonar suites • Improved Ocean Measuring Sonobuoys as Po-
and their embarked helicopters’ dipping sonar have tential Detection Devices: Research is ongoing
resulted in an increased capability not yet reflected into using extended-life sonobuoys to better char-
in NATO’s ASW doctrine for tracking and attacking acterize and predict the behaviour of sound in the
adversary submarines. Chapter 9 highlighted spe- littoral environment. Some designs contain a
cific examples where coordinated ASW operations ­thermistor string to measure ocean temperatures
tactics should be reviewed and updated to reflect and hydrophones to measure ambient noise. This
current technology. type of complex sonobuoy would be far more ex-
pensive than a traditional single-measurement
­device, but it could provide a more thorough envi-
10.8 The Advent of Persistent Sound
ronmental assessment.11 Additionally, research into
Technologies using these sonobuoys (or a UUV) as long-duration
Research is also ongoing into the integration of acoustic monitoring device has begun. A long-dura-
multi-statics into traditional passive systems (fixed tion asset could signal when it has been ‘triggered’
sensors, passive sonobuoys, and ship-deployed pas- by a submarine, which would then be prosecuted
sive tails). Chapter 6 outlined the challenges pre- by another ASW asset.
sented by a sound medium which is becoming • Bottom-Mounted Environmental Sensors: Simi-
louder with ­increased traffic coupled with a target lar to the previous item, scientific research includ-
which is becoming quieter through sound suppres- ing both environmental measurements and track-
sion technology. Pervasive Sound refers to integra- ing of cetaceans and dolphins using an
tion and data fusing of input from multiple types of Autonomous Multi-­channel Acoustic Recorder (ei-
ASW sensors to generate a holistic view of the wa- ther bottom mounted or moored) has already
terspace, accounting for differences in sound prop- been completed.12 Many of these are remotely
agation raypaths.10 Although the term Pervasive monitored through the internet rather than pro-
Sound has been coined by one particular defence cessing data on station with ships, UUVs or aircraft.
contractor developing a system for installation on A challenge is the inadvertent d
­ etection of friendly

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 69

 submarines by these systems. A process for coordi- 10.10 New Adversary Technology
nation is already underway. Conversely, existing
systems or potential future derivatives might be As NATO is researching advanced technology for im-
exploited in chokepoints or other a­ reas of likely proving ASW operations, other non-NATO nations are
non-NATO submarine operations to serve as initial doing the same. In addition to the nuclear-tipped hy-
detection devices. personic UUV discussed in Chapter 5, other research
• An Evolution In Sonobuoy Transmission ­Medium: areas of interest are noted below:
Sonobuoys may be migrating away from today’s
typical radio frequency interface toward a digital or • Based on some challenges with the first-in-class
even web-based interface. NATO is developing a deployment of the St Petersburg, Russia has
STANAG for sonobuoy standardization to assign pushed back deployment of its AIP capability until
each an individual IP address.13 In this instance, the 2020. Research into quieting technology and over-
standardization precedes the technological capabil- coming engineering setbacks will be its focus in
ity, but it will only serve to improve the process as the next few years.16
that capability comes online. • China is researching a supersonic submarine de-
• Adding MSA to Helos and UAS: Some nations are sign based on supercavitation, which was originally
exploring the potential of multi-static processing developed by the Soviets in the ’60s. In theory, su-
aboard their ASW helicopters. In 2014, the UK e­ lected percavitation could allow for speeds up to the
to outfit their EH-101 Merlin fleet with MSA speed of sound – which, underwater, is approxi-
­capability14 to enhance interoperability with NATO’s mately 3,300 mph. This technology could further
MPA fleet as Multi-Static Active technology contin- be applied to weaponized torpedoes. Of note, hy-
ues to develop. per-cavitating torpedoes17 are operated by Russia,
• UAS to Deploy Sonobuoys: One final advance in so- Germany, and Iran (which likely reversed engi-
nobuoy technology involves the miniaturization of neered the Russian ‘Shkval’).18
future buoys for adaptation and carriage by UAS. Al-
though not currently fielded by any nation, an
10.11 Summary
­exploration into the feasibility of internal carriage by
UAS (requires airframe adaptation) or external pod Coordinated, multi-layered prosecution of subma-
carriage is ongoing. The engineering behind carriage rines is the logical answer to both a dynamic problem
and deployment of sonobuoys is sound. However, the within a Naval Task Force and for detection and track-
technical limitation (bandwidth ­being the most criti- ing in a large, potentially theatre-wide area where dis-
cal limiting factor) of remote acoustic processing of a tances will challenge the availability of all resources.
UAS deployed sonobuoy field must still be overcome. As technology has advanced the capability of surface
• Pervasive Sound Technology: Investigation into de- ships and their embarked helicopters, NATO should
tection of pervasive sound is underway in some NATO review applicable ASW tactics to ensure it is aligned
nations. Focusing on the principle of Distributed ASW with current sensor capabilities.
(networking the sonar systems of multiple platforms
[ships, buoys, friendly submarines] so that they per- The development of emerging technology will con-
form as a linked set of sensors rather than an inde- tinue to bring new challenges for the ASW domain.
pendent, discrete sonar system), Pervasive Sound Potential adversaries are researching capabilities to
technology refers to exploiting ‘sonar energy which is which NATO does not have a current response, while
diverse with respect to frequency, time and space NATO research into expanding the integration of
(depth/positon) which can be detected and processed UUV into ASW is dependent upon the development
multi-statically across a wide geographic area with of an appropriately capable underwater data ex-
the emphasis on utilization of multiple lower power change network.
­energy sources rather than few high power sources.15

70 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

1. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare after the Cold War’. Cote, Owen and Sapolsky, Harvey. MIT Secu- 10 ULTRA Integrated Sonar System technical design brochure. Available online at: https://
rity Studies. Avaialble online at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/conf_series/ASW/ www.ultra-electronics.com/uploads/business-documents/media-brochures/Janes_pro-
ASW_Report.html file_Sept_2015.pdf
2. ‘SOSUS - The Secret Weapon of Undersea Surveillance. Undersea Warfare’. Whitman, E. C. Vol 11. ‘Potential Impact of Long-Life Environmental Sonobuoys on Active ASW’. Debalzo, Leclere
7 No. 2, Winter 2005. Available online at: http://www.dosits.org/people/history/SOSUShis- and Klicka. Aug 2010. Proceedings of 20th International Congress on Acoustics
tory/ 12. ‘Beaked whale and dolphin tracking using a multichannel autonomous acoustic recorder’.
3. Ibid. Wiggins et alia. Jan 2012. US National Library of Medicine National Institutes of Health.
4. Ibid. Available online at: http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/22280580
5. Ibid. 13. NATO Industrial Advisory Group (NIAG) Study Group 166 (NIAG SG.166) 30 June 2012
6. MQ-4C Triton. Naval Air Systems Command. Available Online at: http://www.navair.navy. pg. 18
mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.displayPlatform&key=F685F52A-DAB8-43F4-B604- 14. ‘UK moves ahead with multistaic active ASW upgrade for Merlin’. Scott, Richard. Janes Inter-
47425A4166F1 naitonal Defense Review. April 2014 Vol 47. Pg. 21
7. ‘The submarine-hunting drone that takes off and lands on water: US Navy reveals new breed 15. Pervasive Sound – A New Paradigm for ASW Sonar Ultra Electronics information pamphlet.
of amphibious solar UAVs’ MacDonald, Cheyenne. 7 April 2016. DailyMail.com. Available www.ultra-electronics.com.
online at: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3528556/The-submarine-hunt- 16. ‘Russia’s Lada Class submarine project suffers further delays’. Novichkov, Nikolai. 19 Jan
ing-drone-takes-lands-water-VERTICALLY-Navy-reveals-new-breed-amphibious-drones. 2016. Jane’s Defense Weekly. Available online at: http://www.janes.com/article/57350/
html russia-s-lada-class-submarine-project-suffers-further-delays
8. ‘DARPA's Unmanned Submarine Stalker Could Change Naval Warfare Forever’ Rogoway, Ty- 17. ‘China’s Supersonic Submarine’. Sebastian, Anthony. 27 Aug 2014. Extreme Tech. Available
ler. FOXTROT ALPHA. 5 March 2015. Available Online at: http://foxtrotalpha.jalopnik.com/ online at: http://www.extremetech.com/extreme/188752-chinas-supersonic-submarine-
darpas-unmanned-submarine-stalker-could-change-naval-wa-1695566032 which-could-go-from-shanghai-to-san-francisco-in-100-minutes-creeps-ever-closer-to-
9. ‘A New Era in Anti-Submarine Warfare’. Benson, Jeff. USNI News, 27 Aug 2014. Available reality
online at: http://news.usni.org/2014/08/27/opinion-new-era-anti-submarine-warfare 18. Ibid.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 71

© US Navy

A deployable mobile Tactical Operations Centre is capable of supporting the entire mission portfolio of MPA.

CHAPTER XI land at Keflavik and have that acoustic data analysed,

processed, and disseminated across the MPA and the
entire ASW force intelligence system. The same was
MPA Mission Support Centres / true for all varieties of MPA at each of the TSCs or ­MACAs.
Maritime Air Control Authority French, German, and Italian Atlantics could be support-
ed alongside Dutch and US P-3s by the MACA at
NATO’s MPA come with their own unique set of ­Sigonella. At that time, Alliance MPA systems were
ground mission support requirements and, of course, ­mutually supportable by each other’s ground stations.
interoperability challenges. Several possible solutions
could mitigate those challenges as aircraft evolve. As the digital age has unfolded and national procure-
ment processes have overtaken aircraft upgrades
without an eye toward NATO interoperability, this
11.1 Cold War ASWOCs
­mutual support by a common ground station is no
Not only was the C2 relationship discussed in Chapter 3 longer the standard today.
critical to multinational support, but the success of the
MACA construct and the MPA-based ASWOCs/TSCs
11.2 The Evolution of
(ASW Operations Centres/Tactical Support Centres)
outside the Mediterranean were able to support MPA Mission Support Centres
from any nation. In the past, a Norwegian P-3 conduct- As many MPA were modified for ISR mission capability
ing the ASW high-boy role overtop a US Orion and and ISR collection grew to consume a larger portion of
­recording acoustic data from the US sonobuoys could the MPA mission portfolio, many ASWOCs and national

72 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

MACAs were concurrently modified. Additionally, the the national support structure. Post-mission data is
advent of the digital age and availability of commercial processed through national channels. It is then given
technology resulted in both MPA and their associated to MARCOM in a pre-determined post-mission report
mission support centres evolving without considera- format. This is a fundamental shift from the operation-
tion of interoperability with other NATO nations’ assets, al construct in place 15 years ago.
which previously was a hallmark of the ASW mission in
the 80s and 90s. For example, the US MACA in S­ igonella, For ASW exercises, most MACAs provide a NATO-­
IT, is currently only capable of processing and review- level portion of the facility (separate and distinct
ing acoustic data collected from the US P-3C Orion. It from the national systems and spaces). In this area,
will be augmented by the Mobile Tactical Operations the basic mission planning, safety of flight briefing,
Centre (MTOC, which deploys with each P-8 squadron) and post-mission interviews to determine exercise
upon the arrival of the P-8 Poseidon into theatre. objectives may be conducted. In flight, real-time
MACA Sigonella cannot process acoustic data from support is no longer possible through most of the
­either Italian or French Atlantics, or Spanish, Greek, MACAs. That has now reverted to national channels.
German or Norwegian P-3s. These countries’ national This limits the high-end capability (cipher communi-
systems have evolved to unique data recording mech- cations, datalinks, inflight ISR data exchange, etc …)
anisms which can no longer be processed across the to only those aircraft from the nation which operates
NATO MACA architecture. Rather, this data can only be that particular MACA.
processed at their national MACAs.
For exercises, MARCOM traditionally generates an
This problem persists across each of the national MACAs ASW exercise support cell. This is because much of the
in the Mediterranean. Post-mission analysis of acoustic MACA’s ‘national manpower’ has been reduced to the
data to confirm the aircrew was actually tracking the point where they cannot operate both a MACA
submarine they thought they were tracking, or to ­detect ­conducting NATO ASW missions and maintain their
post-mission actual submarine contact, which a crew national mission support centre simultaneously.
may have overlooked in the air, are both critical func-
tions of any MPA or MPH ground support station. During exercises, there exists a rudimentary level of
post-mission reconstruction. Each nation has devel-
In the search phase of a submarine prosecution, this oped software to convert the MPA and MPH ‘mission
post-mission ‘missed detection’ capability provides an computer’ data (aircraft track, positions of deployed
irreplaceable link in the management of ASW resourc- sonobuoys, specific items recorded by the comput-
es for future events. Post-mission analysis, to confirm er – ESM, MAD detections, etc.) to a common format
whether contact was missed, of patterns deployed at for integration into a debriefing tool. This capability
critical locations, such as choke points, may mean the is not resident in every MPA and MPH nation. Some
difference between future missions searching inside rely on hand-written logs, which are provided post
or outside the Strait of Gibraltar. With the loss of mutu- mission to the ASW cell for integration into the
ally supporting post-mission analysis capability, a ­exercise reconstruction.
multinational prosecution is severely inhibited.
Most importantly, mission reconstruction capability
does NOT include acoustic data processing. It is only
11.3 MACA Support to
the basic information recorded by the mission com-
NATO’s ASW Exercises puter. All MPA and MPH acoustic data is recorded on a
In many instances, MACAs truly only exist/operate different system than their onboard computer. As
when supporting NATO exercises. Even during opera- NATO has diverged from any semblance of a common
tional missions (such as in support of Operation Ac- standard, the hardware and software for the MACA’s
tive Endeavour), aircrew obtain mission briefings from to process other nations acoustic data does not exist.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 73

 Acoustic processing, as discussed, is a key element in of mutual support. This challenge extends to MACAs
the post-mission analysis. beyond just Sigonella.

Additionally, information exchange with MARCOM

11.4 Deployable Multi-Mission Sup-
has significantly degraded since its move from Naples
to Northwood. In the course of upgrading their port Centre Capability (MMSC)
­national MPA to ISR and overland strike missions (as is Although a standing requirement for a deployable
the case for the US and France), the building which MPA mission support system has been recognized for
houses many national MACAs underwent infrastruc- over 20 years, the resultant systems were developed
ture alignment to more closely align with national nationally in concert with national upgrades to the
­information systems and is now less aligned with MPA aircraft. The interoperability NATO MPA enjoyed
NATO information exchange systems. has nearly atrophied completely.

In fact, MACA Sigonella has undergone internal build- During the height of NATO’s ASW operations, deploy-
ing upgrades and modifications necessary to accom- ment to remote airfields to minimize transit distance
modate the national mission support realized with to the mission area was commonly practiced and a
the combination CTF-67 (formerly located in Naples) large number of Cold War ASW bases were estab-
with the MACA in Sigonella. This resulted in restrict- lished to provide ASW support to visiting MPA of e­ very
ing the aircrew briefing rooms, which were used in nation. Today, many nations’ MPA retain the ability for
the past for NATO aircrew performing missions over remote site operations, though, unfortunately, many
­Kosovo, or multinational ASW missions in the Medi- of the bases which supported this capability have
terranean, to only US aircrew. This includes access to ­either been closed entirely or have eliminated the
the acoustic processing equipment for MPA and MPH ASW support capability.
aircrew to do things such as post-flight analysis of
passive acoustic contact and other ASW -mission During the 1990s–2000s, many nations which
support functions. Currently, there are a small num- ­upgraded their MPA to an ISR role also developed a
ber of bare-bones rooms available in NATO spaces, deployable remote site support capability so crews
but those spaces do not have the IT infrastructure could download ISR mission data and broadcast that
support and are nowhere near the equivalent of the information back to their home nation. Some nations
spaces to which NATO used to have access when even developed a limited ASW support capability in
­visiting this MACA. these units. Many of these deployable units have also
been decommissioned. In the US, the ten Mobile
Furthermore, MACA Sigonella is unable to meet the ­Operations Control Center (MOCC) were all disestab-
manpower requirements for simultaneous national lished as part of the conversion process to P-8A. Each
mission support and NATO ASW mission support. Poseidon squadron has organic deployable technical
During exercises, even with a moderate number of support for operations away from a home base that is
ASW missions such as the Dynamic Manta/Mongoose not compatible with other MPA. This resulted in the
series, MACA Sigonella is only able to provide a small loss of deployable ASW support provided by the US to
number of personnel to an ASW aircrew briefing/­ any airframe except the P-8A.
debriefing cell. It must rely upon augmentation from
other nations to perform this function. NATO has recognized the current capability gap and is
working on several fronts to acquire systems to allevi-
The original MACA construct was arranged such that ate it. The Under Water Warfare Capability Group
nations would be able to perform both a national and ­(UWWCG) oversees many Specialist Teams. The Team
a NATO function without augmentation, leveraging devoted to researching an MPA replacement aircraft
the pooling and sharing concept through execution (ST-5) is covered in detail in Chapter 8. Additionally, a

74 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

related Specialist Team is focused on Maritime Air 11.5 METOC Support to
Support Interoperability (MASI) and has developed a
ASW Missions
CONOPS for a deployable Maritime Multi-mission
Support Centre. Chapter 6 and Appendix B address the fundamental
principles of submarine-generated acoustic signa-
This CONOPS is presently in draft form, but it is tures. Accurate acoustic modelling is key to devel-
­expected to be formally presented to the UWWCG in oping the proper sonobouy pattern, location, and
2016. The version of the CONOPS made available for depth. Here NATO experiences another interopera-
this study indicates a deployable mission support bility challenge.
centre capable of processing data from MPA Radar (in-
cluding both SAR and ISAR), ESM, Imagery (still and Modelling of the ocean is unclassified. In fact, many
video), Automatic Identification System (AIS), and nations share data from MPA, MPH, or ship-launched
acoustic data (both passive and active) has been con- bathythermal sonobuoys. This is one input to the
ceived. Further development will not proceed beyond development of the sound speed profile curve,
­
the current conceptual level without dedicated which is then assessed against the target sub­
­resources from the nations. marine’s predicted sound intensity and frequency, to
develop propagation loss curves (see Chapter 6 for
The key to moving toward interoperability stems further details). However, national restrictions on
from national compliance with STANAGs for data ­information sharing of submarine signatures compli-
formatting. This may require the addition of an cate the process tremendously.
­interface module for some aircraft that have already
developed mission software which is not in a format Each MPA and MPH crew must resort to their respec-
compatible with the MMSC. The MMSC would pro- tive national meteorological support infrastructure
vide the full mission support capability resident in for ASW acoustic modelling, even while being sup-
national mission support centres or MACAs. It would ported by another nation’s MACA. The key is that this
also provide an interface with both the JFACC (for information is frequently not available real time if an
ATO coordination) and JISR collection process as aircrew is deployed outside of its national support
well as MPA post-mission products (such as Purple, structure to another MACA or ASWOC. Therefore,
Contact Reports, Acoustic grams snippets, ­interoperability in support of effective mission plan-
­Bathythermograph data for inclusion into the mete- ning is further challenged.
orological prediction tools). Additionally, the
MMSC CONOPS reviews other aspects of deployable Furthermore, the most accurate acoustic prediction
mission support such as force protection and and tactical decision aids are based on the collection
­manpower. sensor as well as the target. Since multiple variants of
P-3 Orion acoustic processors exist, multiple variants
Although significant details, such as agreements for of active dipping sonar exist on NATO helicopters, and
manpower augmentation when deployed, need to multiple variants of passive tail and bow-mounted
be approved by the nations, the initial proposal is for ­active sonars exist on a myriad of NATO surface ships,
three MMSC ‘systems’ to be hosted (two by nations, target classification capability by each detection
the third and ‘first to deploy’ at MARCOM Northwood ­sensor also remains within national channels.
UK). This deployable mission support concept would
likely be more cost effective than rebuilding a full The result is MPA and MPH crews are forced to reside
ASW mission support centre in Keflavik or Lajes, as solely inside classified national channels and operate
those are increasingly likely to be used as temporary on classified national systems for mission planning,
MPA bases for ASW missions as non-NATO submarine to include oceanographic prediction. Until NATO
activity continues to increase. ­develops a NATO common database for submarine

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 75

 s­ ignatures and a NATO common acoustic prediction support. Today’s ASWOCs only provide visiting aircrew
tool based on NATO sensors, this is unlikely to change. a ‘Safety of Flight’ brief with general SA about other
It is not uncommon for a NATO MPA crew to just ‘fig- operations in their flight region. NATO must rebuild
ure it out’ on station, to use generic pattern spacing or the capability to provide all aspects of pre- and post-
to react rather than plan when operating away from mission support to all variants of NATO MPA and MPH.
their home base where they do not have easy access This should include pre-mission acoustic planning
to national support systems. and meteorological prediction tools, and post-mis-
sion acoustic analysis support for confirmation of val-
id contact or detection of missed contact.
11.6 Summary
This study has been careful not to look back to the Furthermore, NATO must rebuild the capability to op-
Cold War as the future. However, certain elements of erate MPA from remote sites such as Lajes, Keflavik,
historical operations existed and no longer function and bases in GBR. ASW missions have recently begun
today that, if restarted, could alleviate many challeng- to operate from those bases due to the identified up-
es experienced today by maritime air forces conduct- tick in submarine patrols, but since those bases have
ing ASW missions. closed their ASW Operations Centres, actual mission
support remains limited and does not achieve the
NATO’s MPA ground support stations must re-develop level a theatre ASW Commander will require for future
the ability for full, mutual, and multinational mission peacetime ASW missions.

76 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © ITA MOD
An Italian Atlantic-I from the 41 AeroStormo Squadron.

CHAPTER XII ming from trends and environmental driving forces,

are identified in the following section. This environ-
The Environmental Forecast mental forecast concludes with examples of likely
possible futures in order to offer NATO’s Maritime
12.1 Environmental Forecast leadership insight into the most likely future environ-
ments NATO Maritime Forces may anticipate in the
As we have already seen, Maritime Air ASW domain 2020–2030 timeframe.
faces many challenges in the years ahead. Forecasting
technology will provide leadership insight into the What is Forecasting?
most likely future environments NATO Maritime Forecasting and futuring are methods to explore the
­Forces may anticipate in the 2020–2030 timeframe. environment and are broken down into Social, Techni-
cal, Environmental, Economic, and Political (STEEP)
For readers not familiar with Forecasting, applicable ­issues to identify driving forces and change agents.
terminology will be defined in each section as the They are analysed to project likely and possible
forecast unfolds. The following forecast was generat- ­outcomes or futures for which the organization can
ed primarily through Delphi modelling (referencing make preparations. This chapter will review dominant
input from ASW experts at MARCOM, NATO HQ and global trends across the STEEP spectrum and discuss
within the Maritime Air ASW community, both current potential future scenarios involving NATO’s Maritime
and prior service experts). Scenario planning, stem- Air ASW forces.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 77

 Forecasting is not a prediction. Rather it is a system- ‘It may be useful in this context to remember three
atic review of the current environment and an identi- fairly unique characteristics of submarine warfare:
fication of socio-political forces at work. This is done to
offer a glimpse at what might happen so organiza- First, a lone submarine can do more damage in both
tional leaders may choose the best course of action a military and a political sense than probably any
for their organization’s resources. other single conventional platform, naval or mili-
tary.
In general, three drivers shape the future. Each of the
three drivers creates a different type of future with its Second, one man – the submarine commander - can
own characteristics and tools: have enormous impact on the capability of that
lone submarine.
• Trends – continuous change of some variable over
time, often described by a mathematical function. Third, a small force of submarines can be supported
Trends lead to the probable or most likely future by a tiny portion of the population of any country.’2
(sometimes called the baseline future). The baseline
future is expected and relatively predictable assum-
12.2 Trends and
ing nothing surprising happens. Logical and quanti-
tative analysis are preferred ways to understand the Driving Forces (STEEP)
baseline future. The trends and driving forces identified below were
• Events – a sudden change in some condition, usu- developed synthesizing the trends cited in the UK
ally closing one era and opening a new one. It is Strategic Global Trends (Ed 5), the Allied Command
difficult if not impossible to say immediately how Transformation Strategic Forecast 2017, and the
much change an event will create. Events lead to ­Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
plausible futures. Alternative futures could happen Global Forecast 2015, the Johns Hopkins Future
instead of the baseline. Scenarios based on reason- ­Undersea Warfare Perspectives (2000), as well as envi-
able imagination and speculation are preferred ronmental scanning conducted by the author
ways to understand the plausible futures. ­between July 2015 and March 2016, with specific
• Choices – decisions made by ourselves and others ­focus on Maritime- and Air-related items using the
and the actions we take to implement those deci- STEEP modelling plan.
sions. Choices lead to the preferred future. Individu-
als and groups strive for their preferred future. Vision- The diagram represents the significant trends
ing and planning are used to move in the direction ­impacting Maritime Air ASW as identified in the
of the preferred future.1 STEEP model and an assessment of the level of
­impact to NATO. From these most likely and most
The intent of this study is to provide MARCOM and impactful trends, the possible future scenarios in
other stakeholders information from which to derive the chapter have been derived.
informed choices, thereby shaping NATO’s future. This
chapter will therefore focus on emerging global
12.3 Social Trends and
trends and provide derivative scenarios, review the
basic forecast and likely futures. Driving Forces
Resources and Funds Available to Defence
It is also intended to provide insight into possible un- Spending in NATO
planned events, referred to as Wild Cards. Choices are The 2014 Wales summit identified a goal for each
made by stakeholders as emerging issues develop. ­nation to spend at least 2 percent of national Gross
Finally, it will offer emerging issues which may require Domestic Product (GDP) on defence. As of 2015, only
a future choice within the Alliance. three nations are meeting this agreed goal. Without

78 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 Exampler of STEEP Subcategories
Social Technological Enivronmental Economic Political
Community Natural resources
Education Biotechnology Sustainability
Business
Culture Cloning Climate
Trade
Values Nanotechnology Land Governance
Work
Gender issues Computers Air Legislation
Globalization
Race Information Water Laws, rules and
Multinationals
Lifestyles Processing Endagered regulations
Collective
Arts Internet Species Democracy
Bargaining
Health Communications Energy sources Authoritarianism
Taxes
Spiritual Space Pollution Privacy
Currency
Demography Medicine Eco-Activism Advocacy
Work
Children/Youth Robotics Pesticide usage
Volenteerism
Peace/Conflict Transortation Food
Leisure/recreation Carrying capacity

STEEP Subcategories in the Maritime Air ASW Community

Social Technological Environmental Economic Political
Availability of Oil as a
Resources and funding Self-repairing metals Protection of Marine NATO’s Political will to
world commodity
available to defence Mammals during Naval allocate resources
spending in NATO DNA Nano-technology Operations toward defence
National willingness to
to fabricate nano-scale spending
accept nuclear power
The Globalization of devices Global Warming and
Europe impact of Green Global terrorism crisis
Stability of the
Cybernetics and man- Technology
European Union (EU)
Demographics of machine interface Migration into Europe
NATO’s aging military Advanced carbon-
Stability/Volatility of
Driverless transport capture technology NATO expansion
Chinese and Asian
Global urbanization (Unmanned autos)
markets
Resources in the Arctic Russian aggression
Shift away from MPA, MPH, UUV and and potential for
Growing impact of
coal/oil based industry UAV integration conflict Future of NATO and the
Maritime Chokepoints
through common Cohesiveness of the
to Maritime commerce
Social impact of the network Quantum Computing Alliance
internet of things impact to METOC
Value of US Dollar
Hyperspectral imagery modelling NATO ‘Shared Threat’
(Oceanography) perspective
Shift in Global
Economic Centre of
Gravity

Figure 35 – STEEP Subcategories in the Maritime Air ASW Community.

a major military threat emerging to stimulate a social the potential of eroding traditional, nationalist view-
and political response, this is unlikely to change in points. Approaching social and civil issues with a more
the next decade, continuing to strain national homogeneous worldview will likely define the next
­defence resources against planned operations and 20 years.
future requirements.
Demographics of NATO’s Aging Military
The Globalization of Europe Due to national mandatory length-of-service retirement
Globalization of Europe is likely to continue, not only eligibility requirements juxtaposed with a ­reduction in
due to the current significant uptick in immigration total force size, many NATO nations are experiencing an
into the continent, but also the spreading of culture aging military. There is a bow-wave approaching in the
and social mores across international borders. This has next 15 years. In this period, a significant amount of expe-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 79

 Defence expenditures
(Billion 2010 US dollars)

1200
1065 1077
1014 1012
1000 966
919
884 871
288 279 275 266 261 257 254 253
800

600
777 798 739 746 705 662 630 618
400

200

0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
North America NATO Europe

Defence expenditures as a percentage of a gross domestic product

% (based on 2010 prices and echange rates)

5.5
4.94
5.0 4.67
4.46 4.42
4.5 4.09

4.0 3.78
3.51
3.5 3.37

3.0
2.5
2.0 1.69 1.70
1.64 1.56 1.53 1.51 1.47 1.43
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
North America NATO Europe

Source: NATO press release 28 Jan. 2016

Figure 36 – Defence Expenditures of NATO Nations.

rienced and aged personnel will retire and some nations carbon-based fuel sources. Some project the US may
are struggling to replenish the ranks at a similar pace. shift from one of the world’s largest consumer of oil to
a ‘net-exporter’ by 2030.5 This shift has the potential to
Global Urbanization create a technology gap and further strain the rela-
The next two decades will likely see not only an increase tionship between those countries who can afford to
in global population but also an increasing percentage invest in this area and those who cannot. The driving
of the population who will live in urban areas. Looking force behind this investment will remain a social and
further, ‘by 2045, the proportion of people living in ur- environmental issue.
ban areas is likely to have increased from a little over
50% to around 70% of the world’s population.’3 Not only Social Impact of the Internet of Things
does increased population density exacerbate impacts The tremendous growth of the internet has had not
of natural disasters, resource shortages, and disease, but only a technological impact but a social one as well.
it also provides a potential breeding ground for civil The ever-expanding interconnectedness of things is
­unrest and instability in areas with poor governance.4 either a symptom or a by-product of globalization.
­Regardless, the next generation of leaders will have
Shift Away from Coal/Petroleum Based Industry grown up with the internet and its expanding level
The next two decades will likely see an increased of global connectivity. Some project that by 2040,
­focus by some nations to move further away from each person on the planet will have on average over

80 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

ten separate ‘connected’ devices.6 Any major conflict ment of future vehicles which are capable of execut-
which develops (for example over resources) will ing a rudimentary set of mission parameters and
have this global inter-connectedness as a correcting slowly crossing the line from automation into rudi-
force (opposing the connectivity trend-line). In the mentary autonomy.
next 20 years, the influence of that correcting force
will expand. MPA, MPH, UUV and UAS
Integration Through a Common Network
One of the significant challenges facing today’s vision
12.4 Technological Trends
of an integrated ASW force spanning sensors in space
and Driving Forces to ships to manned/unmanned air vehicles to
Self-Repairing Metals manned/unmanned undersea vehicles is a network
The next 15 years are likely to experience significant capable of handling the bandwidth required particu-
advances in metallurgy and nanotechnology. Scien- larly through the ocean. Research into this area is
tists are exploring/have made progress on metal that ­ongoing, and the slope of the trend-line will be a driv-
can be damaged and actually repair itself.7 The pros- ing force to future UUV integration.
pects for the military alone are overwhelming, let
alone the potential civil applications. Hyperspectral Imagery
As the ocean environment will continue to challenge
DNA Nanotechnology to the use of passive sonar for submarine detection and
Fabricate Nano-Scale Devices tracking, research into other methods of detection is
Breakthroughs in nanotechnology in the next 30 years ongoing. Systems exist that permit imagery sensors to
will likely permit the self-assembly mechanisms of look through the ocean, but they are limited by the
DNA to be harnessed to fabricate mechanical, electri- amount of processing power which can be mounted
cal, and optical devices and circuits which may be mi- in an air vehicle to produce a clear image. Current
croscopic compared to today’s circuit boards.8 Cou- trends show the likelihood of other types of non-
pled with the increase in computer processing power acoustic submarine detection will evolve as the tech-
(as evidenced by Moore’s Law – the theory computer nology to support the mathematical theory is realized.
processing power will approximately double every
two years9), dramatic results may be experienced in
12.5 Environmental Trends
the development of nanobots and other unmanned
systems (air, subsurface). and Driving Forces
Protection of Marine Mammals
Cybernetics and the Man-Machine Interface During Naval Operations
Related to the previous two trends, Cybernetics and Protection of marine mammals during Naval Opera-
the ability to integrate man and machine will likely ad- tions will presumably remain an enduring focal point,
vance in capability during the forecast period. Of note, around which exercises and training must be planned.
availability of rare-earth metals may become a driving Although NATO currently has governing guidance for
force in these three areas, perhaps even to the point safe operations protecting many species (MC-0547),
of generating conflict. Cybernetics advances may re- this will likely be a continual driving force behind the
alize external and internal electro-mechanical devices training, exercising, and tactical development of anti-
capable of enhancing human physical performance.10 submarine operations.

Driverless Transport (Unmanned Cars) Global Warming and the

The advancement of driverless cars may in many ways Impact of Green Technology
lead advances in see-and-avoid capabilities of UAS Climate Change has been tied to an increase in natu-
and UUV. This will potentially result in the develop- ral disasters and hazardous weather events.11 ­Although

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 81

 Green Technology is developing, it will likely remain in capability for modelling and simulation which will
the early stages for most of the world for the foresee- augment environmental acoustic modelling.
able futures. In those places where it is being imple-
mented, the motive often has as much to do with re-
12.6 Economic Trends
source management as it does with curbing climate
change. By 2030, it is unlikely the world will see any and Driving Forces
significant deviation from current trends in this area.12 Availability of Oil as a Global Commodity
The availability of fossil fuels is a trend line which drives
Advanced Carbon-Capture Technology certain aspects of technology development. Many ex-
Tied to advances in ‘Green Technology’ are advances perts have spent significant resources trying to predict
in both carbon drilling (fracking, etc.) and carbon-­ the amount of oil which may still be recovered. Esti-
capture techniques. In the short term, these will likely mates of the global Ultimately Recoverable Resource
serve as correcting forces on the oil resource trend (URR) for conventional oil fall within the range 2000–
but in the long term will not fulfil an alternative ener- 4300Gb (Gb is a billion barrels). This is compared to cu-
gy source. However, these new technologies might mulative production of 1248Gb through to 2011.
have a near-term impact on climate change.
The IEA’s most recent estimate is 3926Gb, which is
Resources in the Arctic and Potential for Conflict higher than earlier estimates and reflects recent re-
As traditional carbon based resources become more assessments of the non-US YTF (731Gb) and future
strained, coupled with the developing resource chal- reserve growth (681Gb). Estimates of the URR of all-
lenge for rare-earth metals, many nations are explor- oil are much larger (e.g. 7119Gb from the IEA) and
ing new locations for resource acquisition. Competi- suggest only one-sixth of the total recoverable re-
tion over these locations is likely to rise, as other sources has been produced.17 Although the interpre-
nations with a legitimate geographic claim to the tation of forecast models for URR vary, in some cases
same region will likely stake legal claims in an interna- widely as some recovery is based on emerging and
tional forum. Conflict already exists between seven not mature technology, the trend line shows suffi-
nations over small islands and submarine features cient availability in the next 15-20 years and beyond.
(reefs, sandbars, etc.) in the South China Sea over this This implies that oil availability should not drive a
exact issue. In the future, competition between polar drastic reformation in propulsion technology in the
nations will develop regarding mining and access upcoming decades.
rights to mineral beds in the Arctic.13
Figure 37 – Estimates of Ultimately Recoverable
Resources.
Quantum Computing Impact to METOC
tight oil (240 Gb)
­Modelling (Oceanography)
A commonly accepted version of Moore’s Law informs
that as technology develops, computer processing
power will approximately double every two years.14
kerogen oil
Some say a more realistic rate observed today is about (1073 Gb)
crude oil
three years. This would project computers equalling (2245 Gb)

the processing power of the human brain by 2023 and

exceeding that capability by 100,000 times by 2045.15
extra heavy-oil
Although the future regarding quantum computing is and oil sands
(1880 Bg)
uncertain, when it arrives, not only will it potentially
challenge information security (some postulate all
codes are ‘crackable’ and data encryption as we know it
natural gas liquid (433 Gb)
will likely be impossible16), it will also provide increased

82 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

National Willingness to Accept Nuclear Power and common Alliance or EU response to this crisis will
Nuclear power is as much a political issue as it is a emerge. As this crisis strikes directly at the resources
technological one. Although a reliable source of re- needed to address the immigration influx, it may fur-
newable energy, Europe still feels the impact of the ther challenge the stability of the EU in coming years.
Chernobyl catastrophe. That event colours the politi-
cal landscape in a manner similar to 2011 Fukushima Stability/Volatility of Chinese and Asian Markets
incident, which a loud, vocal minority in Japan use to The rapid rise of China on the global market is chang-
make persistent arguments against nuclear energy ing the relationship between other global powers in
use in Japan. Recently in Europe, there has been some Asia, most notably between China and the US, Japan,
turmoil around the re-start of a Belgian reactor.18 and India.20
Should a significant accident happen anywhere on
the globe, the level of political support for this energy The Organization for Economic Co-operation and
source may alter the current trend line. Development (OECD) Deputy Secretary General ob-
served ‘while the region’s economic performance is
Stability of the European Union (EU) still strong, structural reforms, underpinned by co-
‘Economic stability is desirable for the EU because it herent macroeconomic policies, need to be put in
encourages economic growth to foster prosperity place to maintain this positive momentum… Three
and employment, and is one of the primary objectives specific medium- to long-term issues are important
enshrined in the management of Economic and Mon- in shaping the future of the Asian economic and fi-
etary Union and the Euro. Under Economic and Mon- nancial community: First, in the area of trade, the
etary Union, Member States must keep their govern- importance of measuring trade in value added
ment deficits and debt under specified limits (3% and terms; second, funding long-term investment, espe-
60% of GDP, respectively), according to the treaty and cially in infrastructure, and making these invest-
the rules set out in the Stability and Growth Pact. ments ‘greener’; third, regional financial cooperation
These limits are also one of the convergence criteria in Asia that should become more solid and
which a country must meet before it qualifies to robust.’21Recent volatility within the Chinese market
adopt the Euro. The aim is to ensure sound and sus- has had a rippling impact across other inter-con-
tainable public finances in the Member States of the nected global markets.
EU and the Euro area.’19
Growing Impact of Maritime Chokepoints to
These are the published economic principles of the Maritime Commerce
European Commission to ensure stability is main- The interconnectedness of energy markets and trans-
tained across the EU. However, challenges to the na- portation networks may also mean current maritime
tional debt and unforeseen (or even foreseen) crises chokepoints become more congested. The conse-
could arise impacting an individual nation’s ability to quences of blockages in areas such as the Panama
meet guidelines within the EU. If a single nation is Canal, Straits of Hormuz and the Malacca Straits could
forced to withdraw from the EU, as was seriously de- be felt far beyond their point of origin. Current fore-
bated in 2015 and 2016 by different nations, it will casts predict the tonnage of goods transported by sea
have rippling effects across other nations in similar fi- is likely to double within the next 30 years. If tensions
nancial positions. It may in fact sound the death knell rose between countries near to a vital maritime
for the EU writ large. chokepoint, particularly if threats to block the sea lane
were made, the international community would al-
Stability is also currently being challenged by dispa- most certainly act. Should diplomatic efforts fail to
rate national views on a mitigation strategy to the reduce tensions, the international community could
refugee crisis, and supports the adage: ‘where you sit approve the deployment of an international naval
is where you stand’. As such, it is unlikely a cohesive task force to ensure key sea lanes were kept open.22

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 83

 Value of US Dollar from growing a defence capability to address a per-
The Chinese Renminbi and to some extent the Euro ceived future threat in lieu of solutions to address
may potentially challenge the USD as the global the crisis existing today.
economic standard in the coming decades. Cou-
pled with the slow migration toward Asia of the Global Terrorism Crisis
global economic centre of gravity, it is likely that the Terrorist groups, such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Boko Har-
US and Europe will provide comparatively less per- am are likely to continue to splinter and pop up as
centage of the global economy than is seen today. each specific group and threat is addressed. One of
Although it is unlikely either will replace the Dollar, the main driving forces behind the creation of these
current trends point toward a lessening of the Dol- networks is the multi-pronged challenge felt across
lar as a central figure in global trading in the coming the Middle East and Sub-Saharan African continent
decades.23 nations. A youth population ‘bulge’, coupled with re-
source shortages, low employment, and exposure to
Shift in Global Economic Centre of Gravity other quality of life and governance options through
The steady rise of emerging economies in Asia will increased information sharing across the internet all
likely cause the world’s economic centre of gravity – result in fertile ground for religious extremist to sow
the average location of economic activity by GDP – to jihadists and martyrs. All nations of the world must ad-
continue its move eastward.24 The trend in this area dress this challenge, not just the few where this unrest
relates to NATO’s relative buying power and could in- is occurring. This is likely to be an enduring mission
fluence the availability of resources for defence ex- past 2030 requiring all the instruments of national
penditures relative to other nations. power to address the symptoms and the root causes
of the issue.

Migration into Europe

The continued crisis in the Middle East, Africa, and
Syria will likely result in continued migration from ar-
eas of unrest to more stable areas of the world. Na-
tions recognize that as long as these regional crises
exist, families will look to leave those unstable areas in
search of stability. This condition will likely continue
for at least the next 10-15 years, although annual mi-
Figure 38 – Shifting Global Economic Centre of
gration numbers may ebb and flow.
Gravity.25

NATO Expansion
12.7 Political Trends Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Georgia, and Mac-
and Driving Forces edonia26 have expressed interest in joining NATO. Re-
cent Russian aggression has even caused some in Fin-
NATO’s Political Will to Allocate Resources Toward land and Sweden to review their position on the issue.
Defence Spending By 2030, it is likely that NATO27 will have experienced
NATO nations are likely to be continually challenged some level of enlargement, provided the nations can
by ‘other than military’ crises over the next 15 years. meet the principles of the Washington Treaty and pro-
Addressing the challenges posed by the immigra- vide support to the collective security of the Alliance.
tion crisis coupled with the recent increase in small-
level high-impact terrorist attacks in major E­ uropean Russian Aggression
cities will consume the majority of national decision Russia’s stated strategic goals of re-asserting itself on
makers’ efforts. Resources may be deflected away the global stage have been exemplified by its use of

84 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

military (and paramilitary) force in Estonia, Georgia, time Air ASW domain. From them, a baseline forecast
Ukraine, and, more recently, Syria. Additionally, sub- and future scenarios can be explored.
marine deployments have increased significantly in
the last few years and are expected to trend further
upward. The challenge NATO has with Russian aggres-
1. ‘A Theory of Change, An Approach to the Future Prepared for Studies of the Future’ Bishop,
sion is to not assume it is a Soviet mindset, nor to as- Peter. University of Houston-Clear Lake. LMSF 602 Unit 1-2 Reader, Regent University, GLE,
cribe intent and capabilities of the Russian military MSF program. p. 3
2. ‘Anti-Submarine Warfare after the Cold War’. Cote, Owen and Sapolsky, Harvey. MIT Secu-
based on observations of Russian activity since the fall rity Studies. Avaialble online at: http://web.mit.edu/ssp/publications/conf_series/ASW/
of the Berlin Wall. Russia has modernized its military ASW_Report.html
3. UK Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th Edition. Pg. 17
and has a leadership willing to use it to achieve na- 4. Ibid. Pg. 9-19
tional strategic objectives. This trend will continue in 5. Ibid. Pg. 25
6. Ibid. Pg. 57
the future. 7. Ibid. Pg. 27
8. Ibid. Pg. 27
9. Moore’s Law. Available online at: http://www.mooreslaw.org/
NATO ‘Shared Threat’ perspective 10. UK Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th Edition. Pg. 90
The lack of a ‘shared perspective’, hints at the exist- 11. Ibid. Pg. 42
12. ‘Optimal Energy Investment and R&D Strategies to Stabilize Atmospheric Greenhouse Gas
ence of dynamics that could fray and possibly tear at Concentrations’ Bosetti, V. et al. 2009. Available online at: http://www.sciencedirect.com/
the cohesiveness of the Alliance. Multiple and varied science/article/pii/S0928765509000025
13. ‘Russia’s Military is Muscling in on the Arctic.’ Ames, Paul. 20 Oct 2015. GlobalPost. Avail-
threat perceptions could pull NATO in the direction able online at: http://www.globalpost.com/article/6670622/2015/10/17/arctic-melting-
of too many national, regional, and functional priori- means-more-natural-resources-are-coming-out-deep-freeze
14. Moore’s Law. Available online at: http://www.mooreslaw.org/
ties. It may find itself unprepared at the military-op-
15. UK Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th Edition. Pg. 55
erational level and ineffective at the political-military 16. Ibid Pg. 55
consultative level, which is why a continuous strate- 17. ‘The Future of Oil Supply’. Miller, R and Sorrell, S. The Royal Society 2013. Available online at:
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3866387/
gic dialogue is essential among the 28 nations, and 18. ‘Belgium’s aging nuclear plants worry neighbours’. Boelpap, B. BBC News. Available online
further underlining the NDPP’s relevance.28 However, at: http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35469932
19. European Commission. Economic and Financial Affairs. Available online at: http://ec.europa.
although absence of a shared perspective also pre- eu/economy_finance/euro/why/stability_growth/index_en.htm
sents an opportunity for NATO to explore future 20. ‘ASEAN, China’s Rise and geo-political Stability in Asia’. Egberink and Van der Putten, April
2011, Netherlands Institute of International Relations. Available online at: http://www.clin-
ways to become a more dynamic and flexible organ- gendael.nl/sites/default/files/ASEAN,%20China's%20rise%20and%20geopolitical%20
ization, the driving force behind this trend will re- stability%20in%20Asia.pdf
21. ‘The future of the Asian economic and financial community’ Tamaki, Rintaro. OECD Journal
main the national viewpoint of the 28 (or more) Financial Market Trends Volume 2012/2. Available online at: http://www.oecd.org/finance/
member nations. Future_of_Asian_economic_financial_community.pdf
22. UK Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th Edition. Pg. 25, 53
23. Ibid. Pg. 79
24. Ibid. Pg. 7
12.8 Summary 25. Ibid. Pg. 7
26. NATO Homepage - Enlargement. 3 Dec 2015. Available online at: http://www.nato.int/cps/
Dominant trends and driving forces across the Social, en/natolive/topics_49212.htm
27. Turkey recognizes the Republic of Macedonia with its constitutional name
Technological, Environmental, Economic, and Political 28. The Shared Perspective of the World in 2030 and Beyond. Allied Command Transformation’s
landscapes will have great implications for the Mari- Strategic Foresight Analysis workshop Dec 2012. Pg.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 85

© ITL MOD

A pair of Italian Atlantics flying formation on one of the airframe's final flights.

CHAPTER XIII events, which are not likely but could dramatically
alter the landscape.
The Environmental
Forecast: Likely Futures 13.1 Futuring
and Wild Card Events ‘Choucri, like most other political scientists who have
written about prediction and forecasting, defined predic-
‘The basic question in evaluating a forecasting tion as the foretelling of a single future development.
method is not “Can it tell us what will happen?” The Single-outcome forecasts have long been recognized as
question of primary value [of forecasting] in policy dangerous. For example, a 1984 evaluation of intelligence
making is “Can it keep us from being surprised?’1 estimates (analytic reports produced within the intelli-
gence community on a particular issue or country) found
This chapter begins with a discussion of futuring ‘the major factor in failed estimates was overly cautious,
followed by the Baseline Forecast. The Baseline
­ overly conservative, single-outcome forecasting … This
Forecast is the likely future scenario based on the addiction to single-outcome forecasting defied both es-
dominant trends and driving forces identified in the timative odds and much recorded history. It reinforced
previous chapter. From there, possible future some of the worst analytical hazards – status quo bias
­scenarios which derive from modulations in the and a prejudice toward continuity of previous trends.’2
trends can be explored. Some of those alternate fu-
tures are inter-connected as they derive from similar Single-outcome forecasts ‘do not reduce uncertainty.
driving forces. Beyond likely alternates are Wild Card They only increase the margins of surprise’. The solu-

86 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

tion to this problem is forecasting, which Choucri and early 2020s, some assumptions made by nations
many others defined as being ‘concerned with the continuing to operate the P-3C may prove false.
ranges of possibilities and (the) contingencies and Many nations lean on the US very heavily for training,
probabilities associated with each.’3 publication and doctrine, maintenance experience,
and to some extent logistics support for an airframe
Possible futures are just that: possible. They are based for which new parts are no longer made (specifically
on the environmental scanning conducted and STEEP engines). As the US transitions to the Poseidon, those
modelling outlined in Chapter 12. Possible futures are nations that have opted for service life extensions to
not unique. That is to say, multiple possible futures the P-3C may not have the same support for the
may occur, interacting with one another. These ­futures 2020-2030 timeframe.
differ in some ways from those outlined in other glob-
al strategic forecasts in that they have been distilled Additionally, the NATO ASW C2 issues are not likely to
and refined for relevancy and impact to NATO’s execu- be fully resolved. Nations generally feel good enough
tion of the Anti-Submarine mission. is good enough. Although a TASWC construct may be
the most efficient way to manage multinational
­resources, the demand signal isn’t strong enough to
13.2 The Baseline Forecast
jolt the system into changing. This feeling is exacer-
A lack of common, shared perspective and recognition bated by a lack of shared perspective on the true na-
of the growing threat will dominate the next 15 years. ture of ASW threat. NATO nations differ in perspective
Submarines don’t pose a visible threat until they do on nearly all things maritime, as not all share a coast-
something nefarious. Those outside the ASW mission line. Even of those that do, not all have the same expe-
area, such as the general public, elected politicians, and rience with ASW challenges from the Cold War.
even to some extent the Air and Land services (com-
peting for the same resources as the Maritime), are A ‘gentleman’s agreement’ to share information and
­unlikely to be swayed and convinced of the true chal- make assets available when requested is the best the
lenge of the issue until there is a looming crisis. Europe Alliance will generate in the next 15 years. Most sub-
will continue to be faced with economic challenges felt marines will continue to be tracked via national means
as the EU struggles to maintain its existence. It is further rather than a more holistic Alliance approach. This will
challenged by the resource requirements to handle the continue to hamper MARCOM’s ability to manage the
influx of immigrants (likely to consume much of the theatre-wide tracking and monitoring of non-NATO
­political dialogue in the next five to ten years). This will submarines. That doesn’t mean those submarines
parlay directly into national defence spending. won’t be tracked. Rather, it is more likely a small cadre
of nations will shoulder the load, and it won’t be a
It is unlikely many of the 28 nations will ever achieve NATO mission set. Therefore, the NATO command
the 2 per cent spending agreement in future years. structure will remain outside the decision loop until
Therefore, little progress will be made in defence an official crisis response operation has commenced
spending to solve emerging capability gaps (MPA, and a Maritime Component Commander has been of-
etc.). Those nations operating the P-3 (series) and ficially designated.
French Atlantic-II will likely opt for further life exten-
sions in lieu of aircraft replacement. The inventory Although the P-8 Poseidon is expected to conduct its
challenge seen today will be exacerbated as mission first full theatre deployment to Sigonella in 2018 (just
availability rates for MPA plummet as the airframe prior to publication, CTF 67 informed the JAPCC that
limps along toward 2030. the US may deploy a squadron of P-8A to Sigonella as
early as fall 2016 but that is not a final decision as de-
As the US transitions completely away from P-3C ployment schedules are an evolving issue influenced
mission support, training, and maintenance in the by other global events) and maintain a continual pres-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 87

 ence thereafter, other global issues will consume the some of the challenges presented in both the base-
majority of the attention of the US MPA. Many of the line forecast and the possible future scenarios high-
Sigonella squadron’s airframes will likely remain lighted in the next section.
­deployed to the Pacific and the Middle East on ISR
missions, leaving a small contingent of assets availa-
13.3 Other Possible Future Scenarios
ble in Europe. As the MPA operated by FRA, CAN, NOR,
DEU, ITL, ESP, and GRC will either have reached or be An Increase in Russian Federation ‘Show of Force’
reaching end of service life between 2025 and 2030, Submarine Deployments
the reduction in available MPA airframes as mainte- Vladimir Putin has a stated strategic goal of increasing
nance availability will become more of a factor for Russia’s presence in world events by re-building and
NATO in the next 15 years. Although the UK P-8 re-asserting naval influence in areas ceded to NATO
­purchase (nine airframes) will offset the balance to over the last two decades. Additionally, his views on
some extent, the net result is by 2025, there will be the impact of the submarine force as part of the ability
fewer MPA than there are today. to project naval power colour and influence those
lines of thinking. To prove to both its citizenry and to
Even though the US has publicly announced a strate- the global powers Russia has re-emerged as a global
gic pivot to the Pacific, which will likely result in fewer force, Russia will use its Navy as a strategic communi-
resources available in the European theatre, the above cations tool. It will continue to increase its naval pres-
trends will likely lead to an increasing reliance upon ence in the Mediterranean Sea, Black Sea, and patrols
the US. Many after action reports from Operation UNI- into the Atlantic. This will likely include increased use
FIED PROTECTOR, global strategic studies, and even of submarines as well as naval combatant ships. The
the Wales Summit identified over-reliance on the US Mediterranean will see an increase in Kilo diesel-­
as a significant risk for NATO moving forward. electric submarine deployments owing to the re-­
establishment of major naval basing in the Eastern
Finally, the baseline forecast indicates a growing num- Mediterranean and the Black Sea.
ber of SSN and SSK deployments of non-NATO sub-
marines into NATO’s AOR. The rate of expansion may Russian nuclear submarines (SSN and SSBN) will
vary based on Russia’s economic footing coming out ­deploy as single elements to conduct surveillance
of Syria. As the global oil price stabilizes in the next missions into the northern Atlantic. Russia will make
few years, the trend toward increased submarine in- ‘show of force’ deployments of its SSBN force. To prove
teraction with NATO forces is clearly on the rise. Al- to the world that these normally secretive ballistic
though the dominant trends do not indicate any type missile deployments are occurring, Russia will find
of kinetic or hostile interaction between maritime unique ways to allow the rest of the world to ‘detect’
forces, there will be a turn toward Cold War-esque these silent killers. This would include port calls in ei-
missions for submarines. This will be indicated by a ther South America or the Eastern Mediterranean or
move away from the surfaced transits NATO observes surfacing in an exercise with friendly (to Russia) naval
today toward fully submerged, lengthy SSBN and SSN forces in the Atlantic. Although it is unlikely that Russia
deployments. These submarines will likely have the will re-establish permanent deployments to known
mission of tracking NATO maritime forces and resum- Cold War ballistic missile submarine operating areas,
ing ballistic missile stationing patrols. Therefore, the the increased range and superior targeting capability
requirement for a prosecution plan will grow. of today’s missiles only require presence in the south-
ern Atlantic for Russia to be within targeting range of
The baseline forecast calls for an even more challeng- nearly all of NATO. In the late 2010-2020 period, the
ing future environment in Maritime Air ASW than is ability of the Russian naval force to mount large scale
seen today. Chapter 14 offers conclusions and recom- deployments will be tempered by the economic im-
mendations for NATO forces and nations to mitigate pact of the price of oil in a manner similar to the late

88 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

80s-early 90s period, although this will not eliminate models for themselves. The sale of the Kilo SSKs to Chi-
the likelihood of increased submarine deployments. It na (2 Type 877 and 10 Type 636) dramatically impacted
will have an impact on the scale and scope of naval the balance of naval power in the region and jump
ambition. Trends observed since 2013 show that this started Chinese indigenous submarine building.
future is already beginning to unfold and is likely to
continue toward the end state described above. Once ‘India could have a defence budget equal to that of
Russia has proven to the world it has both the intent, the entire EU.’
capacity, and capability to conduct these ‘detected’ UK Global Strategic Trends to 2045
SSBN and SSN deployments, it will have achieved the
goal of reminding NATO, and the rest of the world, The sale of Kilo class submarines to Algeria and Egypt
about a force they neglected. From this point they can has the potential to do the same to the Mediterrane-
continue with more secretive deployments with no an. However, in contrast to China, which has a well-
intentional detection opportunity. If NATO has not re- established vision of maritime presence and influ-
sponded in a manner to ensure the ability to know ence, neither Algeria, Egypt nor Libya have turned
where these submarines are operating, they will even- their Russian Submarines into a robust naval force
tually cede much of the Atlantic, and potentially much once the Russian trainers departed. In any case, it is
of the Mediterranean, back to Russia. extremely likely that Russia will continue to sell sub-
marines, including nuclear submarines, to any coun-
Factors to Monitor to Determine try willing to pay for them, as it did with India. As dis-
if this Future is Unfolding: cussed earlier, foreign military sales is a significant
1. Track not only the number of out of area submarine monetary source to Russia that will not evaporate in
deployments, but also the correlation to specific the coming decades. To whom Russia makes these
hulls to determine whether a broader increase in sales becomes the challenge for NATO.
capacity has been achieved or whether a small
number of high readiness units are deploying. Factors to Monitor to Determine
2. Track the dimensions and duration of deploy- if this Future is Unfolding:
ments. Is the distance from home expanding? 1. Monitor dates of known sales (Vietnam, Indone-
Monitor ports of call. sia, Algeria) to determine if sales proceed as pro-
3. Monitor the number of new hull construction jected or if they are cancelled (similar to the can-
Sea Trial completions. Is the hull construction celled Mistral sale from France to Russia in 2015).
schedule being met? 2. Monitor the price of oil. As the Russian economy
4. A key milestone will be monitoring whether sub- today is still heavily leveraged by the buying
marine deployments are conducted Overtly (sur- power of oil as a commodity, if oil remains low,
faced) or Covertly (submerged). The strategic Russian arms sales will likely increase to offset.
goal of the submarine may be surmised by the
level of covertness it employs in transit. The Conflict Against Violent Extremist Groups
Continues for the Next Two Decades
Russian Federation Submarine Although the current form of today’s struggle against
Arms Sales Continue violent extremism is bounded by the West’s relation-
As they have for much of the last century, Russia will ship with ISIS and Al Qaeda, NATO forces have been
continue to provide high-spectrum weaponry to any dealing with this challenge for decades. There is no
buyer at the right price. Although, similar to the US and true defining ‘start point’, nor is there a true defining
other countries who sell arms, the export variants are endpoint currently in view. NATO forces, whether as
traditionally of lower capability than the indigenous the Alliance or through national policy, are engaged
version, Russia has and will sell quite capable subma- in this issue across the Middle East and Africa. The
rines even if it chooses to reserve the most modernized global challenge spans from islands in the Pacific to

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 89

 bars and coffee shops in Europe to schools and mili- tric motor capability will influence submarine capa-
tary installations in the US. It is a global challenge bility. As previous trends have identified, many
manifesting itself in myriad forms. resources will become scarcer in the coming dec-
ades. They will be strained not only by the availability
Not only is this challenge engaging NATO’s military of the commodity itself but also by the burgeoning
forces, but there are second and third order effects im- global population. ‘Of the 23 cities expected to have
pacting all four elements of national power: Diplo- 10 million or more inhabitants by 2015, 19 are in de-
matic, Information, Military, and Economic. The mi- veloping countries. By 2045 there are likely to be
grant crisis being experienced across almost every around 280 ‘mega-cities’ (more than 20 million in-
nation in the Alliance is one example. Combating ex- habitants)’6 In this case, the development and urban-
tremism will occupy much of the attention of NATO’s ization of many countries is driving the national re-
political leadership in the future. This will in turn affect quirement for vehicles upward and pushing the
the direction and strategy of NATO’s military forces. research to develop cars capable of driving hundreds
of kilometres on a single battery charge. Once this is
The challenge stemming from this future that direct- achieved, it is a simple engineering modification to
ly impacts NATO’s ASW capability is one of funding adapt to diesel-electric submarines, making the ca-
and resourcing. Even following the 2014 Wales Sum- pability of today’s AIP diesels into a close parallel
mit where each nation of the Alliance voted to main- with their nuclear-powered counterparts. This would
tain or exceed 2 percent GPD spending on defence4, nearly negate the need for a diesel-electric subma-
few nations met this spending level. Even fewer are rine ever to surface, further forcing a modification of
projected to meet it in the future.5 This will have an detection tactics.
impact on the resources NATO and NATO Nations
have to address a future increase in airborne ASW Factors to Monitor to Determine if this Future is
requirements. Today, many of NATO’s air ASW re- Unfolding:
sources are tasked with ISR missions in support of 1. Monitor the automotive industry hybrid-electric
operations against ISIS, or tasked with maritime se- cars battery capability.
curity operations in support of the response to the 2. Monitor the price, and availability of, oil.
migrant crisis. One impact of the global conflict on
extremism is NATO will continue to face ISR resource Chinese Submarines will Operate in the Gulf of
challenges and in the meantime will have limited Aden and Eastern Mediterranean Sea
multi-mission aircraft available to address an in- China, and to a lesser extent, India, has significantly
crease in ASW requirements. increased, improved, and employed its submarine
force in the last ten years. This is expected to continue
Factors to Monitor to Determine for the next few decades. As the previous ‘future sce-
if this Future is Unfolding: nario’ outlined, the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Afri-
1. Does NATO continue to deploy forces to Afghani- ca will continue to be a global focal point for combat-
stan beyond 2017? ing violent extremism, a problem that is not likely to
2. Do nations meet the 2 percent spending thresh- be solved by 2030. Although major naval force-on-
old by 2020? force conflict will not be a result of the world’s at-
3. Does the 2016 or 2018 NATO Summit provide a dif- tempts to combat extremism, countries such as Rus-
ferent strategic direction for defence spending? sia, China, and other growing naval powers will
continue to provide naval forces to the region to exert
New Battery Technology Will Revolutionize national objectives. That may be demonstrated by
Diesel-Electric Submarine Capability providing forces or support to shore forces from the
Driven by the push for increased capability in the au- sea, or just by ‘being there’, ensuring they remain part
tomotive industry, research to improve hybrid elec- of the global conversation.

90 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

If China or India deploy a naval task force in this man- As the Air Component is learning, unmanned systems
ner, it would be consistent with maritime strategy to are challenging traditional methods of airspace segre-
employ a submarine (SSN, SSK) with this task group. It gation, and there are direct parallels for seaspace.
would either provide naval force protection or pro- However, the future of unmanned underwater vehi-
vide striking power ashore, as demonstrated by Rus- cles will actually lead to larger systems with higher
sian Kilo SSK cruise missile strikes into Syria in late sensor payloads and longer dwell time. Additionally,
2015. Therefore it is likely Chinese and Indian subma- as western nations are just beginning to explore the
rines will be seen operating with their national naval military applications of UUVs, one can project the
task forces in the Gulf of Aden or Eastern Mediterra- same into NATO’s potential adversaries and extrapo-
nean Sea within the next 15 years. late the undersea domain in the coming decades will
see both manned and unmanned military vehicles of
Furthermore, Exercise JointSea 2015 between the various types, displacement, and capability. If a sub-
Russian Federation and the Chinese People’s Libera- marine today were to have a collision with one of to-
tion Army-Navy (PLAN) occurred in the Mediterrane- day’s UUV’s, the UUV would likely not fare well, and
an this past May between three PLAN Frigates and five the submarine would probably have to touch up
Russian warships of various classes. It is likely China some paint or repair a scratch.
will provide submarines to future Russian Navy bilat-
eral exercises. However, as the UUV size increases, not only does like-
lihood of collision increase, but the damage to the
Factors to Monitor to Determine if this Future is manned vehicle (submarine) will increase as well.
Unfolding: With this comes the increased potential for damage
1. Monitor CH, IN, and other non-NATO submarine to a controlled surface hindering the ability to surface
deployments to the Indian Ocean, Gulf of Aden, and the worst case scenario of a hull rupture from a
and the Red Sea. This will be a precursor event to high-speed collision.
operations in the Mediterranean Sea.
2. Monitor exercises between China and Iran. Additionally, as the time lag between early military
3. Monitor the political relationship between Egypt development and early operational employment (late
and China. 1990s) to today’s explosion in civilian commercial
drone use has been approximately 20 years, there is a
Unmanned Undersea Vehicle Utilization Explosion parallel to UUV utilization which may be drawn.
Just as the Air Traffic Control community is struggling
with a logarithmic explosion in civilian and military As of 2016, few nations have working prototypes for
unmanned aircraft of myriad types and capabilities, so military application. In fact, the majority of UUVs in
will the undersea community become challenged in use today support scientific research projects of vari-
this same way. Although UUVs will not hold the same ous types. Therefore the numbers of UUVs in use, even
allure for the average citizen who today can experi- 25 years hence, will not even come close to the num-
ence the marvels of flight with a cheap drone and in- ber of UAS in use across military and commercial sec-
expensive high-definition camera, UUV use for scien- tors seen today. In fact, at the January 2016 Maritime
tific and military purposes will dramatically rise over Operations Conference, NATO’s experimentation COE,
the next two decades. Keeping submarines from the Center for Maritime Experimentation and Re-
‘bumping into each other’ is a primary function of search (CMRE) assessed the current state of robotics
Commander Submarine Forces NATO. He expends and requisite underwater communications network is
significant effort in both peacetime operations and such that in the near term, a full transition of all as-
wartime operations ensuring safe separation of sub- pects of ASW to UUV is not feasible. However, the
marines through a process known as waterspace technology is not far from where robotics/UUV could
management. integrate with conventional ASW platforms in local-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 91

 ized and limited geographic areas, such as choke- EU Dissolves Due to Internal Conflict
points, etc. Over Common Currency and Migrant Issue
Stemming from a series of national economic crises,
Finally, this future scenario is not forecasting collisions most notably Greece in 2015, in this Wild Card future,
per se, but rather highlighting the increased use of a series of nations emerge that are unable to meet
the undersea domain by vehicles outside the military economic obligations within the EU. EU member na-
and highlighting the risk that brings. tions become disenfranchised with supporting eco-
nomically unstable member nations and vote to dis-
Factors to Monitor to Determine solve the entire EU, including the common currency.
if this Future is Unfolding: Border crossings and checkpoints are re-established,
1. Monitor COMSUBNATO’s efforts to map known and the continental economy slowly grinds down-
civilian underwater vehicle networks. ward. This same disparate level of economic support
2. When NATO nations have achieved a level of syn- is felt within NATO as many of the nations who strug-
chronicity between UUV and other ASW plat- gled to meet EU obligations are simultaneously chal-
forms, it can be assumed adversary militaries lenged to meet Alliance obligations.
have or are close to achieving the same.
3. Monitor the technical development of an under- US and Partners go to war with
water communications network significantly in- China over Pacific Regional Security Issues
creasing bandwidth and transmission speed be- After decades of regional conflict over natural resourc-
tween submerged units over what is available es found in the seabed of the South China Sea, Indone-
today. This will be a precursor event to a signifi- sia, Vietnam, and the Philippines collectively push back
cant ramp-up in UUV military employment. against Chinese maritime expansion in this area and
­simultaneously attack Chinese ships. The US and Japa-
nese naval forces in the area are drawn into a kinetic
13.4 Potential Wild Card Events
conflict with the Chinese navy. The impact to NATO is a
In many forecasting techniques and models, Wild Cards temporary re-alignment of all aircraft carrier and MPA
are assumed to have less than 0.1 percent chance of forces out of NATO and into the Pacific until the conflict
occurring, but would cause a severe shock to the fore- is concluded. NATO is left with no US maritime MPA or
casted environment7 Wild Card events are character- carrier presence to conduct alliance ASW missions.
ized by latent trends leading to a sudden occurrence,
an eruption which contains hyper- and over-reaction ‘The result of the ‘Y2K non-event’ was that many
followed by a slow period of normalization as the shock people subsequently rejected the possibility of
of the event is folds into the environment.8 other Wild Cards ever coming to pass. As a result,
9/11 was a much bigger surprise than it should
The intent of identifying a Wild Card event in this opera- have been.’
tional forecast, future Maritime Air ASW, is not to propose ‘6 Rules for Effective Forecasting’. Saffro, Paul
that these events are likely futures. These are only ‘possi- Harvard Business Review | July–August 2007 pg 122–132
ble’ futures, which are so far outside the box as to not
normally warrant allocation of planning resources. How- NATO Accepts One too Many Eastern Block
ever, identifying the most problematic Wild Card events Country and Russia Responds Kinetically
is an attempt to stimulate thinking within NATO’s mari- [Former Soviet States] understood Moscow regard-
time leadership about how to respond should this ex- ed security cooperation, especially the presence of
tremely unlikely future emerge. Solutions are not nor- NATO or US forces, as a red line, and steered clear –
mally offered for Wild Card events; rather a brief discussion or paid the price. Georgia’s courting of NATO, which
regarding how the Wild Card might manifest with a sum- contributed to the 2008 war with Russia, and Kyr-
mary of the potential impact to the Alliance is offered. gyzstan’s hosting of US forces at the Manas Transit

92 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Center, which helped fuel Moscow’s role in ousting ance submarines. Additionally, future models of non-
former President Kurmanbek Bakiyev, served as ob- NATO submarines will not only exploit the best
ject lessons of the cost of seeking outside security quieting technology but also reduce any vulnerabili-
assurances.9 ties which NATO forces use against them.

By 2025, Georgia, Latvia, Ukraine, Finland, and Swe- A Terrorist Group Acquires an SSK
den have all petitioned for acceptance into the Alli- Whether by overthrowing an unstable government
ance in an effort to generate increased national se- that possessed a submarine or through direct acqui-
curity in the face of a growing Russian military power. sition, a terrorist organization acquires a high-end
Hoping to achieve protection status under Article V, SSK and intends to use it. Then, either through coer-
these nations have spent a decade stabilizing inter- cion or conversion, the same organization acquires
nal economic and security challenges and met all of a crew competent enough to operate this subma-
the NATO pre-requisites. In 2025, member status is rine. Armed with cruise missiles and torpedoes, it
offered to each. Russia interprets this as the final covertly sets sail with the intent of attacking either a
stage of NATO’s preparation to invade the Rodina. It NATO base or major city or to sink as many mer-
pre-emptively conducts a simultaneous naval and chant ships as possible to inflict as much economic
air strike against softer NATO targets, including sink- damage to the Alliance as able. There is no Intelli-
ing an entire naval task force conducting an exercise gence surrounding the target's location and there
in the Mediterranean. Russia correctly assumes the are no associated forces travelling with the subma-
vast majority of this exercise force would be un- rine. It is the ultimate suicide mission. NATO’s naval
armed and unable to respond to a short/no-notice forces must locate a submarine intent on attacking
submarine torpedo attack. The entire Russian sub- an Alliance member.
marine fleet sets sail, the SSBNs heading into the At-
lantic and the SSNs and SSKs taking up station in the
13.5 Other Perspectives
Mediterranean and throughout the Atlantic in prep-
aration for follow-on strikes against naval and mer- on Possible Futures
chant re-supply forces. The Future Vector Project
In the 2014 JAPCC Future Vector Project, Dr. Hans Bin-
Information Insecurity nendijk identified eight Global Megatrends:
The submarine community has seen a true chal-
lenge in the area of information security. Spies, such • European Complacency
as Walker and Ames in the US and others throughout • An Aggressive Russia
NATO’s history, have divulged critical information • Relative American Decline
over the last 40 years. This has led to a significant clo- • Shifting Power
sure in the capability gap between Western subma- • Malthusian Future
rines and those of Russian and Chinese design. For • Impact of Technology
example, a secret propeller design gave the West a • Inadequate Rule of Law
huge advantage until the Russians acquired them in • Complex Conflict
the late 1980s.10
His subsequent conclusions about the impact of
In this Wild Card event, design elements of the latest those megatrends to NATO’s use of Air and Space
generation of Western SSN and Unmanned Underwa- Power published in the JAPCC Future Vector Project
ter Vehicles (UUV) are compromised. This may lead to (FVP) Part 1 remain valid. They have a direct parallel
the complete loss of the technical advantage of West- when viewed through the lens of NATO and potential
ern submarine models. This results in non-Western na- adversary submarine operations. The entire three part
tions having increased ability to locate and track Alli- FVP is available through the JAPCC website.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 93

 © Alexandre Paringaux

Figure 39 – A French Atlantic-II Visits the Birdbath after Tracking a Submarine.

The Future Operational Environment 2035 etons or prosthetics, wearable devices and memory
As an output of the UK’s MOD Development, Con- enhancing drugs.’11
cepts and Doctrine Centre’s recently published Global
Strategic Trends (2045) forecast, the Future Operation- Russia’s Breakout from the Cold War System
al Environment 2035 was recently released, expand- Dmitri Tenin of the Carnegie Moscow Centre pub-
ing on some of the themes. lished a forecast outlining the driving forces affecting
Putin’s future. His conclusions parallel the findings of
Janes Defense Editor Richard Scott’s review of the FOE this study as elaborated in Chapter 14 but are provid-
2035 highlighted many items of interest to the ASW ed in this chapter as additional context for possible
community. These included ‘by 2035 there is an ex- futures shaping the NATO – Russia relationship.
pectation that many Western militaries (with the ex-
ception of the US) will almost certainly have been ‘In 2014, Russia broke out of the post-Cold War order
overtaken in some technologies and may need to be- and openly challenged the US-led international sys-
come accustomed to being overmatched by derived tem. This was essentially the result of the failure of at-
capabilities. Additive manufacturing [3-d printing] is tempts to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic com-
singled out as a disruptive technology and could al- munity. The new period of rivalry between the Kremlin
low individuals, non-state actors and developing and the West is likely to endure for years. Moscow’s
states the capability to produce very large numbers of new course is laid down first and foremost by Presi-
cheap precision weapons [or technology]. By 2035 dent Vladimir Putin, but it also reflects the rising pow-
the majority of missiles will operate at supersonic or er of Russian nationalism.
even hypersonic speeds, with new technologies de-
signed to defeat advanced electronic countermeas- In the next few years, there is unlikely to be any let-up
ures. There is also an assumption that in 20 years, in the US-Russian confrontation. The United States will
physical and cognitive performance will be artificially not accept Russia carving out a sphere of influence in
enhanced via biomechanical systems such as exoskel- its neighbourhood. For its part, Moscow will continue

94 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

to defy US global hegemony. It will act in its own self- development of that future. Finally, Wild Card events
interest, guided by its own set of values and without were identified. Not so that NATO may assign resourc-
seeking prior US or EU approval. It will only agree to es against the Wild Cards, but rather that they may be
the norms and principles that are negotiated by all identified and discussed so that in the event one
relevant actors and apply equally to them all. From the comes to pass, the shock is lessened.
Chinese perspective, Russia is not an all-round ‘major
power.’ It has territory, resources, and a sizeable nu- The purpose of the forecast for the future Maritime Air
clear arsenal, for all that is worth today, but it lacks real ASW environment is to benefit strategists and policy
economic strength. Unless it deals with this massive makers as national and NATO resources are allocated
deficiency, Russia will not be able to play in the top and future resources are procured.
league. Given the present circumstances, it will have
nowhere to go other than to China. Exit Greater Eu-
rope stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, enter
Greater Asia reaching from Shanghai to St. Petersburg. 1. ‘Forecasting for Policymaking in the post-Cold War Period’. Feder, S. A. (2002). Annual Re-
What Russia needs is to turn inward if it is to avoid view of Political Science, Pg 112
2. Ibid. Pg 111-125
squandering its resources and ultimately losing its 3. Ibid. Pg 111-125
cherished independence to China, if not to the United 4. Wales Summit Declaration official text. 5 Sep. 2014. Available online at: http://www.nato.
int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm
States.’12 5. ‘Just Five of 28 NATO Members Meet Defense Spending Goal, Report Says’ Bendavid, Naftale.
Wall Street Journal, 22 Jun. 2015. Available http://www.wsj.com/articles/nato-calls-for-
rise-in-defence-spending-by-alliance-members-1434978193 online at:
13.6 Summary 6. UK Global Strategic Trends Out to 2045. 5th Edition. Pg. 17
7. BIPE Conseil, Institute for the Future, Copenhagen Institute for Futures Studies 1992, pg. 5
8. Dr. Karlheinz Steinmüller The Foresight Company. Presentation at the Future Scene 2004
The previous two chapters reviewed the driving Conference ‘Seize the Future’, UIMC, Jul. 6, 2004
trends across the Social, Technological, Economic, En- 9. ‘The Calculation of Russia’s Neighbors’. Mankoff, Jeffrey. Center for Strategic and Interna-
tional Studies 2015 Global Forecast pg. 34
vironmental; and Political spectrums which have an 10. The Taming of the Screw: Johnston, Paul. Curator of Maritime History National Museum of
impact on the future environment of ASW in the American History Available online at: http://americanhistory.si.edu/subs/anglesdangles/
taming.html
NATO domain. These STEEP driving forces and trends 11. ‘Known Unknowns’ Scott, Richard. IHS Jane’s Defense Weekly 13 Jan. 2016 Vol 53 Issue 2 pg.
were then used to develop the Baseline Forecast or 30-32
12. ‘Russia’s Breakout from the Post-Cold War System – the Drivers of Putin’s Course’. Trenin,
likely future. Further analysis resulted in additional Dmitri. Carnegie Moscow Centre. Dec .2014. Available online at: http://carnegieendow-
possible futures and trigger events to monitor for the ment.org/files/CP_Trenin_Putin2014_web_Eng.pdf

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 95

© US Navy

A P-3C Orion and a P-8A Poseidon fly over NAS Jacksonville.

CHAPTER XIV experienced in recent ASW prosecutions. Unfortu-

nately, NATO has not reached consensus on a C2
Findings and structure to mitigate the resource coordination
challenge. This study concludes the designation of
Recommendations a formal C2 arrangement, led by a Theatre ASW
commander is the most appropriate method to re-
14.1 Critical Findings
solve the current situation.
This study has identified four Critical Findings and • NATO’s MPA Inventory is in danger of falling below
14 additional findings. All findings will be discussed a key threshold. This has the potential of challeng-
in detail in this chapter. However, identification of ing large area submarine operations with no identi-
the four critical elements will provide context for fied mitigation strategy in place for MPA replace-
the remainder of the chapter. The key critical find- ment aircraft.
ings are: • The interoperability of ASW forces has declined dra-
matically in the last 15 years as nations pursued
• The re-organization of the NATO Command Struc- their own unique aircraft and sensor replacement
ture inadvertently severed critical C2 relationships plans without consideration of a NATO common
between the Maritime Command and subordinate standard. Mutual international support of MPA and
elements. This critically impacted MARCOM’s ability MPH by MACAs is no longer possible. NATO must
to coordinate peacetime ASW functions. The con- identify a common mechanism for MPA and MPH
clusions drawn on C2 during the research phase of acoustic analysis and request national MACAs
this project have been identified due to challenges adopt this standard.

96 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

• ASW Doctrine has not advanced in parallel with the in current doctrine. Improvements in dipping sonar
development of more capable systems and sensors. and other sensors have been realized, yet the doctrine
NATO must develop EXTACs to address both the de- has not evolved to acknowledge new, realistic search
velopment of active search tactics and the better in- dimensions. In the normal course of review for each of
tegration of new sensor technology found in many NATO’s ASW publications, particular attention should
ASW helicopters. be given to ensure the tactics employed align with
the capability of today’s aircraft.
The remainder of this chapter reviews in detail all find-
ings and recommendations found within this study. Additionally, further research into multi-statics is war-
They are organized by DOTMPLFI function. ranted. Once that technology is more mature, devel-
opment of appropriate tactics should shortly follow. It
is important to note even if not all nations procure
14.2 Doctrine
multi-static sonar suites, all maritime air nations will
Findings: retain the capability to serve as a Pouncer aircraft to a
The detection of submarines by passive sonar, upon multi-static detection.
which the majority of NATO doctrine is founded, is ap-
proaching a point of diminishing returns. It is unlikely Of note, both COMSUBNATO and COMMARAIRNATO
passive sonar will serve as the primary detection and indicate abiding by the construct of the current
tracking sensor in the future. mammal mitigation doctrine and procedures has not
affected either operations or exercises/preparation
• Ambient Noise (AN) at most of the initial detection for operations.
frequencies has risen. There is more merchant traffic
and more seabed exploration and drilling than ever Recommendations:
before. The ocean is getting louder by the day. Specifically ATP-1 and ATP-28, but, in general, all tac-
• Perhaps most notably, the design of modern subma- tical level doctrine should be reviewed for currency,
rines has reduced noise generation to the point relevancy, and applicability based on the technical
where soon there may be insufficient sound energy capability of sensors embarked on today’s ASW heli-
to distinguish the submarine from other noises in copters and MPA.
the ocean. Recommended Custodian for this Action:
• Non-NATO submarines have grown increasingly qui- MAROPS Working Group
et with each subsequent class fielded. Technology to
address propulsion plant and propeller-generated
noises has been implemented. As well, anechoic EXTAC 193 should be reviewed by STRKFORNATO for
coating to both reduce hull noises and to mitigate concurrence and to ensure all types of CVN and Am-
active sonar detection has been fielded. phibious Assault Ship flight operations are reflected
• With more submarines operating in the littorals, the with appropriate ASW tactics derived accordingly.
water column does not have sufficient depth excess Recommended Custodian for this Action: MAR-
to support the regeneration of sound energy into a COM in Coordination with STRKFORNATO. Note:
convergence zone for distant detection. France is the Lead Nation Developing EXTAC 193.

Therefore, in the future, NATO must rely on other detec-

tion and tracking methods instead of passive sonar. For nations’ which that are not procuring a multi-static sen-
sor system for their MPA or MPH, address training to a
Many of NATO’s ASW helicopters have a significantly ‘Pouncer’ role. UAS might also have a future role in this area.
improved active sonar capability over previous mod- Recommended Custodian for this Action: ASW
els. This fact has not been fully explored nor captured RTT (Research, Tactics, and Technology) Forum

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 97

 14.3 Organization • The Standing Naval Groups (ships) over which
MARCOM does have OPCON are scheduled by
Findings: SHAPE for maritime engagement activities (Sched-
Formalizing a Theatre ASW C2 chain of command ule of Operations). This prevents MARCOM from
must be done to move beyond the current state of ad redirecting and employing them for ASW without
hoc, nationally directed and stove-piped monitoring SHAPE and potentially NAC approval. SHAPE is cur-
of submarines. NATO must return to the level of fidel- rently exploring modifications to the SAVANT
ity and more efficient utilization of resources to locate (Ships at sea AVAilable for NATO Tasking) process as
and track non-NATO submarine operations, which it part of a holistic Maritime Governance effort. Un-
had previously employed in the Cold War. The EXTAC fortunately, friction within the NCS structure makes
197 proposed by COMSUBNATO is a step in the right these assets very challenging for MARCOM to con-
direction, but further steps, including the formal­ trol, even if vested with Operational Control of
ization of reporting schema between national MOCs those units. Additionally, according to a recent
and MACAs as well as identifying the process by which Maritime Strategy Paper briefed to the Atlantic
assets/resources would be temporarily assigned to Council, those Standing Naval Groups are ‘consist-
MARCOM to execute Theatre ASW is necessary. Sup- ently under-resourced and lack the ability to sus-
porting points to this position include: tain high-level operations over a prolonged period
of time.’
• Providing clear and universally implemented • Many believe a NATO-coordinated prosecution of
­direction for all nations in each specific submarine a fully submerged submarine to be beyond the
prosecution is critical to achieving NATO’s stra­ capability of NATO forces today. Some nations
tegic objectives. Tracking efforts on all submarines ­retain a robust national capability, but the numer-
do not need to achieve the same effect, and the ous challenges identified to NATO’s C2 structure
goals for each prosecution may vary. Any future C2 make a NATO-coordinated prosecution nearly
structure must include a link into each national ­impossible.
­element capable of conducting C2 of MPA, MPH, • ASW capable ships and their embarked MPH have
Submarine, and ‘other’ special mission ships (for sufficient sensors, tactics, and inventory to con-
those nations with the capability such as Surveil- duct localized ASW under the Naval Task Force
lance Towed Array Sonar System-SURTASS and Commander’s C2 construct. However, MPH and
Low-Frequency Active ships). surface ships are unable (due to inventory and
• No formal information sharing mechanism exists be- speed limitations) to replace MPA or to be the
tween the national MACAs (or Maritime Ops ­Centres). primary asset for deep ocean or theatre–wide,
­
Rather, there is a decades old ‘arrangement’ stem- peacetime ASW.
ming from the days of COMMARAIRSOUTH’s rel­
ationship with the MACAs. It functions today only at Recommendations:
a rudimentary level. This study recommends a standing Task Force be
• MARCOM is not vested with the authority to created with the authority to conduct coordinated
directly allocate or support MPA or submarine
­ theatre-wide ASW operations, including peacetime
forces. MARCOM operates under a ‘gentlemen’s
­ submarine monitoring. This should include the au-
agreement’ with the nations. Some choose to sup- thority to task and organize subordinate forces from
port by making forces available for ASW when it NATO’s aviation, submarine, and ship inventories as
aligns with national objectives, others choose not, needed to effect a multinational, multi-platform
or are not able to, based on the availability of ­solution with the most efficient use of NATO’s ASW
­forces. Furthermore, MARCOM is not permanently resources and sensors.
assigned any aircraft or submarine forces to exe- Recommended Custodian for this Action:
cute a submarine prosecution. MARCOM

98 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

14.4 Training
Findings:
A common theme heard in almost every single ASW
forum visited during the research phase of this
study was NATO’s current ASW exercises are not
conducted at a high enough level of difficulty to
represent a truly competently sailed submarine try-
ing to evade detection and achieve a kill against an
HVU. Without exception, exercise planners lament-
ed the current level of ASW proficiency seen by
MPA, MPH, and shipboard ASW operators. This
­detracts from the level of complexity designed into Figure 40 – Fincastle Champions.
the exercise scenario.
emphasis by all nations on solid ASW fundamentals
In a time of austere budgets, it comes as no surprise and regular participation in ASW exercises will bolster
that nations view exercises as unit level training op- NATO’s overall capability in this area.
portunities. The objective is to maintain currency rath- Recommended Custodian for this Action: MARCOM
er than arrive with a level of proficiency to handle var-
sity scenarios. This study concludes that at least one
ASW exercise each year should be reserved for highly Some effort to integrate new models of MPA and MPH
trained and competent aircrew working with a trained has been made, but NATO should continue to focus
and competent ASW ship against a highly manoeu- specifically on integrating ASW-capable aircraft devel-
vrable and evasive target. This exercise should rebuild oped by nations relatively new to the ASW mission
the spirit of camaraderie lost when various ‘challenges’ area (Turkey and Poland for example) into ASW exer-
went by the wayside. For example, Commonwealth cises. The objective should be to enhance joint inter-
nations that operated MPA crowned a FINCASTLE operability, grow experience, and explore integration
champion from 1971 to 2005. But even that event, like and capability seams brought on by differing levels of
the MPA which conducted it, has today turned from acoustic capability so future operations may efficient-
ASW into an ISR competition (when held). Also, the US ly use the capability brought by these nations new to
recently began a program presenting a ‘Champion- the submarine prosecution domain.
ship belt’ to the winner of its annual ASW Rodeo. This Recommended Custodian for this Action:
rodeo consisted of a series of graded simulator events MARCOM
held amongst its non-deployed squadrons.
Figure 41 – ASW Rodeo Champions.

Recommendations:
The entire NATO Maritime Air community would ben-
efit from restarting a high-level ASW competition to
reward the best MPA and potentially best ship/MPH
team annually. There is manoeuvre room within the
current exercise schedule to regenerate this level of
training. This is not only to promote esprit de corps
amongst the Maritime Air community, but also to
strike directly at one of the core challenges: increasing
ASW experience against a highly manoeuvrable and
competent submarine target. Additionally, continued

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 99

 NATO should incorporate EXTAC 181, 193, and 197 ­ rosecution using the C2 framework identified in
p
into the 2017 Maritime Exercise scenarios at the ear- the EXTAC even if it has not been exercised and
liest opportunity. EXTAC 197 (Area ASW CONOPS), ­ratified. It is unlikely the political situation with any
once drafted and endorsed by nations, must be exer- potential NATO adversary will devolve so rapidly as
cised as soon as possible and then ratified/codified to pose a direct and imminent threat to naval forces.
into doctrine. Opportunities to conduct this include However, without planning, NATO may find itself
the existing DYNAMIC MANTA/MONGOOSE series of with an opportunity to ‘practice’ theatre-wide ASW
ASW exercises as well as BALTOPS, which additionally on a live non-NATO submarine prior to a scripted
provides the unique opportunity of involving a N­ aval ‘practice’ in an exercise.
Task Force centred on either an aircraft carrier or Recommended Custodian for this Action:
amphibious assault ship. Although not every year, MARCOM
many BALTOPS do see participation of a Carrier Strike
Group. This could be specifically targeted to explore
the handover relationship between a theatre- COMSUBNATO should brief the Theatre ASW
wide prosecution to a local ASW problem as this is CONOPS / EXTAC 197 details at the 2016 MACA
­
the biggest challenging to both C2 and resource Conference. This should be done provide more
­
­allocation. details to the Maritime Network MOU between
­
Recommended Custodian for this Action: MACAs / MOCs and MARCOM proposed by
­
MARCOM ­COMMARAIRNATO at the 2015 MACC and MACA
Conferences. This conference will occur prior to
formal publication of this study, but this rec­
As a direct result of perceived deficiency in MACA’s ommendation has been coordinated with both
ability to provide mutual support to other nations COMMARAIRNATO and COMSUBNATO in time to
MPA, MARCOM, through the MACAs, should accomplish the recommendation.
coordinate cross training on current and future
­ Recommended Custodian for this Action:
MPA acoustic systems to ensure mutual support COMSUBNATO
­capability is regenerated. This will require training of
both information systems technicians for hardware
and acoustic operators for the grams. This applies
14.5 Materiel
to those countries with MACAs (Italy, Greece,
­Turkey, France, US, Spain) as well as MPA nations Findings:
who operate through ASW Operations Centres The trend for submarine operations in both the
embedded within national Maritime Operations
­ ­Atlantic and the Mediterranean Sea is rising. Almost
Centres (ie Norway, Germany, and likely the UK once every nation which boasts a submarine capability is
C2 capability is restored following the decision to expanding its current inventory while nearly every
re-acquire an MPA). NATO nation has reduced its MPA inventory by ap-
Recommended Custodian for this Action: proximately 120 airframes in the same span. In 2016,
MOCs, MACAs and MARCOM the ratio of MPA to submarines has fallen from 1.8 : 1
(MPA to submarine) to be nearly the opposite 1 : 2 (MPA to
submarine). Of note, many current NATO MPAs will
NATO should practice the TASWC C2 concept on the reach their end of service life inside a decade, further
next submarine deployment even if the EXTAC is not skewing this inventory ratio even more in favour of
ratified. As Russian (and potentially other non-NATO the submarines. This imbalance is exacerbated by the
submarines) will most certainly conduct extended fact many nations are increasing their submarine ship-
submarine deployments in the NATO AOR, consid- building while few nations are increasing their MPA
eration should be given to conducting a future inventory.

100 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Stemming from the results of the 2012 IMS DI MPA Further exacerbating this challenge is the national
Study, the UWWCG M3A team was specifically sono­buoy inventory. As the cost to build each sono-
­created to research options for a potential replace- buoy has increased, and the stockpiles are no longer
ment airframe. The inability of this team to sig­ kept at Cold War levels, inventory of sonobuoys has
nificantly advance toward defining the problem dramatically fallen across NATO. It is not uncommon
and proposing a solution in the subsequent three for national restrictions to impose carriage limitations
years can be directly tied to a lack of a common on aircrew. This will limit the number of buoys brought
shared perspective on the nature of the threat and for training missions to well below the carrying cap­
a lack of a cohesive national position on the future acity of the airframe. This has a measurable and
of MPA/MMA requirements. This team has also been ­observed impact on the decision making of less exp­
distracted by related, but not integral, issues such erienced aircrew who show a tendency to be hesitant
as the potential for establishing a Maritime Patrol and overly conservative when employing sonobuoys.
Centre of Excellence. Nations participating in the This hesitancy has, in many cases, led to lost contact
M3A team were more comfortable discussing the during dynamic phases of the prosecution such as the
merits of a COE (and where it would be established) initial period following a submarine submerging or
than the more challenging discussions of future during aircraft on station prosecution turnover.
MMA requirements.
Radio Frequency Interference with sonobuoys will be
At the Spring 2016 meeting, tied to the generation of an enduring challenge. In operations close to land, or
the LOI discussed in Chapter 8, it appears the teams with the aircraft at higher altitude, signal inference
re-achieved a modicum of focus, but there remains a from based systems operating in the same frequency
significant amount of detailed work to be done. This is spectrum can be severe. This will only get worse in the
challenged by the fact the majority of the nations rep- future and in some of today’s ASW hot-spots RFI can
resented on this team have either already procured an be excessive (examples include the Mediterranean
MMA solution or are comfortable with their nation’s Sea, Arabian Gulf, South China Sea). Some level of
current or projected capability. This team has shown ­investment in the ability to filter non-related data on a
the tendency in the past to lack the cohesiveness and given channel has been done, but this is a problem
focus needed to address the MPA shortfall looming in which is likely to increase in the future, especially
the next decade. Effort should be made at all levels to when operating in the littorals.
better integrate the nations who have a defined need
but as of yet have declined to participate in the M3A Overall, MPA and MPH passive sensors have improved
development process. sensitivity and processing capability somewhat in
­parallel with the advancement of submarine quieting
Furthermore, NATO’s sonobuoy inventory has also technology. The challenge to passive sonar is not a
decreased in parallel with the MPA inventory. The function of sensors’ capability aboard aircraft. Rather, it
passive sonobuoy employment rate has increased is a function of the amount of sound energy g ­ enerated
(due to decrease in sound generated by target sub- by submarines relative to the amount of background
marines). In the tracking phase of prosecution, noise in the ocean. Currently, aircrew are still able to
­instead of the buoy utilization rate of 7-9 buoys per use passive sonar in the search, localize, track, and
hour which was the goal in the 1990s, crews today ­engage phases of prosecution.
are experiencing double or treble hourly utilization
rate. This is due to decreased passive ranges on mod- Although the passive detection ranges have
ern submarines. This stresses both aircraft on-station ­decreased and exploitation of some raypaths (CZ for
time (planned for four to five hours based on a example) is no longer viable, aircrew today still utilize
­typical sonobuoy load and aircraft turnaround time) passive sonar systems to a great extent because direct
and total force sonobuoy inventory. path active sonar is not a viable search sensor or tactic

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 101

 to cover large areas of water and multi-statics are not Nations operating MPA aircraft in many ways, not the
mature enough to take the role as the principle wide least of which is a hard end to logistics (parts) and
area search sensor. Therefore, despite its limitations, training support for the P-3C airframe.
passive sonar remains the principle system used in Recommended Custodian for this Action:
the search phase, which results in frequent instances NATO MC / UWWCG ST-5 (M3A)
of crews not detecting submarines which are oper­
ating in the designated search area. The author
confirmed this during observation of the recent
­ UUV development should continue. More effort
­DYNAMIC MANTA exercise (Feb 2016). should be put into defining the requirement and
­future integration milestones as there is no clearly
Furthermore, most NATO models of airborne, light- ­defined way ahead on this. NATO’s Centre for Mari-
weight torpedoes use a combination of passive and time Research and Experimentation has been ident­
active sonar through the acquisition and targeting ified by the MCMSB as leading the ASW Roadmap’s
phases. They are similarly challenged by a reduction in stated goal of UUV integration into the ASW domain.
passive ranges but still are deemed ‘effective’ against However, this is slightly misaligned, since the nations
the submarine classes underway today. have responsibility for developing assets and res­
ources. CMRE can then explore technical capabilities
Recommendations: and propose interaction models to further the devel-
The International Military Staff should put pressure on opment of UUVs into the ASW domain.
the UWWCG’s MPA Specialist Team to identify a time- Recommended Custodian for this Action:
line for an airframe decision which would yield a field- NATO MCMSB / CMRE
ed airframe NLT 2025. The ASW Roadmap stemming
from the 2014 Wales Summit identified three pillars to
ASW operations: MPA, Surface Ship (including em- Conduct further research into either encrypting the
barked helicopters), and Submarines. To date, techno- signal to prevent Radio Frequency Interference or
logical advancements in MPA have kept pace with the ­migrate the communication medium to an entirely
counter-detection technology developments of sub- different spectrum. Until this is complete, RFI will con-
marines, and there is not a true capability gap be- tinue to challenge littoral ASW.
tween sensors/submarines. Rather, the capability gap Recommended Custodian for this Action:
in the MPA pillar is in quantity of NATO MPA against NATO MCMSB / CMRE
quantity of non-NATO submarines. In comparison,
ASW surface ship and embarked ASW helicopter
­inventories remain relatively healthy. Although some Coordinate with the nations to increase sonobuoy
nations are replacing aged MPA with a new aircraft production and available reserves to the point where
model, some are electing to pursue a wait-and-see mission inventory is not a factor and crews are not
approach and refit older model aircraft with the hopes ‘negatively’ trained with buoy conservation being a
of extending service life for another ten to 15 years. factor over contact generation.
Recommended Custodian for this Action:
A common replacement airframe should be pursued IMS / UWWCG
by NATO nations. Assuming a ten-year turnaround
from decision to aircraft availability, there is limited
time to resolve this issue. The replacement of the US
14.6 Leadership and Education
P-3 with the P-8 Poseidon (to be complete by 2019)
and the UK’s recent decision to acquire the P-8 (nine Findings:
airframes) does not actually alleviate the challenge. In In future conflicts, NATO JTF commanders will have to
fact, it magnifies the issue for the remainder of NATO relearn the Sea-basing concept and how to operate

102 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

from contested seas rather than assuming the luxury Recommended Custodian for this Action:
of maritime supremacy at the onset. Should a future IMS / MARCOM
Maritime Component Commander (MCC) have to
fight their way to the beach, the defence of naval force Assess the models for creating a combined afloat
requirements would impact Joint Operations in many and ashore ASW planning staff for utility within
ways. Assets would have to be allocated for defensive NATO. Chapter 3 outlined the model of combining
purposes to counter a threat posed by adversary sur- both the tactical-level staffs aboard one flagship
face ships and submarines. Some strike aircraft from and the theatre-wide ASW planning staffs at the
carriers would have to be re-allocated from a strike role MPA headquarters (for bi-lateral MPA planning) and
to defensive anti-Surface Combat Air Patrol (SUCAP) CTF-HQ (for overall C2 of the theatre-wide pro­
stations. This would have the two-pronged result of secution). This concept is a model NATO should
reducing the support to the land-based target striking ­assess for utility within the MARCOM command
plan and potentially raising the requirement for land- structure.
based aircraft from the JFACC to be apportioned over- Recommended Custodian for this Action:
water to fill naval defence roles (Anti-Air and poten- MARCOM
tially Anti-Surface) when the aircraft carrier and her
embarked carrier air wing could not meet the require-
ment. Additionally, MPA would fulfil their primary role This study conducted extensive research across a
of ASW and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW). Those MPA broad spectrum of components of the ASW domain.
which normally support the ISR Collection Plan may As part of the research into this study, many d
­ ifferent
not be available. This would further impact the target ASW forums and working groups were contacted.
strike plan and campaign phase timing. To date, the existence of the ASW Roadmap is not
widely known outside of the NATO HQ, nor is that of
Additionally, as an example of potential stovepipes the associated country books and recommended
within various teams working to address ASW as an mitigation plans for each nation. It is recommended
identified Priority Shortfall Area until May 2016, the that DI Division should conduct an education cam-
Maritime Operations Working Groups ASW Syndicate paign on the existence, purpose, and intent of the
and the UWWCG did not have an awareness of each ASW Roadmap to a broader audience. Education
other’s portfolio, efforts or current challenges. There will stimulate more national investment into the
existed little to no interaction between the two and process. Furthermore, it is recommended conclu-
no effort to ensure overlap or mission creep was not sions from this study be incorporated into the more
occurring. As part of a larger education campaign, holistic ASW Roadmap overseen by the Defence
more awareness is needed across the full spectrum of ­Investments division.
Maritime-related COEs and various working groups Recommended Custodian for this Action:
involved with ASW as to the program of work and NATO IMS/Defence Investments Division
­priority of effort of other entities within the domain. Maritime Capabilities Section

Recommendations:
Introduce the concept of a lack of maritime superiority To improve education into future challenges in the
into JHQ and higher table-top exercises. This would help air aspect of the ASW domain, JAPCC has presented/
to educate Joint leaders about the challenge submarine will present findings from this study over the last
operations bring to joint operations. Be candid about month/next 18 months at the following meetings/
the potential loss of a capital warship unless the sub­ conferences:
marine threat is defeated or deterred. Advance this edu-
cation campaign in the appropriate forums for dis­ • Maritime Air Coordination Conference (May 2016)
cussion and enlightenment of NATO’s civilian leadership. • MACA Coord Conference (May 2016)

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 103

 • UWWCG (May 2016) As part of the procurement process for a Deployable
• Amphibious Operations WG (June 2016) Mission Support Centre, augmentation manpower
• ASW RTT (Research, Tactics, and Technology) Work- from existing MACAs should be explored. Also, oppor-
shop 2016 tunities for cross-training on mission support systems
• Maritime Operations WG ASW Syndicate Jan 2017 (such as NATO ASW Exercises) must be identified and
• Other conferences as requested by MARCOM implemented. The next section will have further
­details on this initiative as related to ‘Facilities’.
Recommended Custodian for this Action: UWWCG

14.7 Personnel
Findings:
14.8 Facilities
Although manning and manpower will always remain
a national issue, the following manning challenges Findings:
should be considered: With the US as lead nation, the Maritime Air Support
Interoperability (MASI), and associated Interoperability
If EXTAC 197 is ratified in its current form, or if a Specialist Team generated a CONOPS solution to an
­formal TASWC is re-established within NATO, the identified MPA ground station shortfall which was
manning for this staff should ideally come from ­discussed in Chapter 11. As of 2016, this Deployable
ASW subject matter experts/staff officers within the Maritime Multi-Mission Mission Support Centre
CMAN and CSN staffs. As of 2016, neither staff is ­concept is unfunded, but it will solve many of the
sufficiently manned to operate a full-time ASW
­ ­logistics challenges exacerbated by the stand-down of
planning cell in addition to the voluminous ASW MPA support centres at remote locations to
­MARCOM ASW exercise portfolio. which MPA used to deploy, such as Lajes, Keflavik, and
Gibraltar. These geographic locations will remain crit­
As discussed in Chapter 11, this study concluded a ical bases for MPA in the future. Although the perma-
Deployable ASW support centre is needed to assist nent support structure no longer exists to provide
MPA and potentially MPH crews operating in remote ASW mission planning and post-mission analysis, this
locations where the former ASW Operations Centres study finds that providing a support capability at those
have been closed and the Mobile Maritime Oper­ remote sites, whether by re-opening those ASW Cen-
ations Centres (MOCC) disestablished. tres in a semi-permanent ‘warm readiness’ status (which
could be brought to full-online/hot status in short
Recommendations: ­notice), or though procurement of a deployable unit
MARCOM should refine the staff officer require- with associated MPA support hardware is a requirement.
ments to execute the predicted future ASW exercise
portfolio and what requirements then exist to MACAs have nearly completely turned away from
­support a stand-up of a part-time or full-time t­ heatre NATO’s support to focus solely on national missions.
ASW planning and operations staff. CMAN is Many MACAs only utilize their MACA function to
­normally supported by only a single SME with back- support NATO exercises and the occasional opera-
ground in each of the MPA, MPH, aircraft carrier tional mission in the Mediterranean. This study
­operations and IT fields. CSN has similar staffing found, based on in-person observation of the author,
challenges. Pulling from these two small teams to the ASW aircrew briefing cell utilized in recent NATO
build a competent and enduring theatre-wide ASW exercises provides only rudimentary safety of flight
operations staff in the long run will require billet briefs to aircrew while mission support for detailed
­increases to both. tactical level planning was significantly lacking. This
Recommended Custodian for this Action: was likely due to the ad hoc nature of the briefing
MARCOM team’s composition.

104 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Recommendations: tems. It must also expand and re-establish the deploy-
Restore the capability for sustained multinational ment capability of MPA ground support stations to
MPA/MPH ASW operations from remote bases around remote locations from which ASW operations are
NATO, such as Keflavik, Lajes, Rota, and others. Acquire ­expected to recommence in the next decade.
a capability for multinational ASW mission support to
include pre-mission planning and post-mission Chapter 6 reviewed the challenges the ocean
acoustic analysis. ­environment presents to forces working to detect,
Recommended Custodian for this Action: ­UWWCG track and engage adversary submarines. As sub­
Maritime Air Syndicate and Maritime Air Support marines have historically grown quieter, it is likely sub-
Interoperability (MASI) Specialist Team marines will eventually be quieter than the back-
ground ambient ocean noise. This will dramatically
impact current passive detection, tracking, and
MARCOM should coordinate with MACA Nations and engagement tactics and likely prevent their use
­
nations who operate MPA/MPH but who do not have ­entirely. This will result in a shift entirely to the use of
an established MPA support centre or MACA to ensure active sonar throughout the submarine prosecution.
alignment of information exchange systems and that
sufficient personnel are retained to perform both A significant limitation to the use of active sonar has
NATO and national mission support. always been the lack of ability to classify the return.
Recommended Custodian for this Action: Passive signals can be used to determine submarine
MARCOM class; however, the technology supporting processing
active returns has not evolved to be able to d
­ efinitively
identify the submarine class or even friend from foe.
Future development, not only for initial submarine
14.9 Information / Interoperability
detection but in the realm of target classification via
Findings: active sonar, will become a necessity.
Numerous interoperability challenges face today’s
mari­time air community. Not only is aircraft-to-aircraft Finally, if a complete copy of the Consolidated Mari-
interoperability being challenged by non-common time Briefing Book were to be located in any national
­national procurement of digital systems such as sono- archive, it would fill many current information gaps
buoy uplink encryption, but also digital acoustic identified in Chapter 3. Perhaps it is worth the effort to
­recording devices have become so varied almost none regenerate the data before the last ASW officer or
of them can be processed by other nations. This is fur- sailor with Cold War ASW experience and first-hand
ther exacerbated by disparate ground support systems. use of this publication were to retire from service.
All of these issues can be tied directly to the drawdown
in the ASW mission in the late 1990s, when nations Recommendations:
pushed their MPA into ISR mission areas, resulting in an Address shortfalls in interoperability of ground
accelerated and non-uniform procurement process. ­support stations by establishing a standard minimum
capability requirement and ensuring nations ASW
Additionally, an unintended consequence arose support centres meet this interoperability standard.
­during the creation of the current NATO Command Recommended Custodian for this Action: ­UWWCG
Structure. When the C2 relationship between Maritime Air Syndicate and Maritime Air Support
­MARCOM and MACAs changed, NATO lost a cohesive Interoperability (MASI) Specialist Team
ASW vision and lost unity of effort. It now must spend
significant energy to rebuild capability and interoper-
ability it once possessed. Investment must be made NATO should explore development of the capability
to support interoperability of aircraft and ground sys- to record active sonar for post-mission analysis and

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 105

 the fidelity for active sonar to classify submarines by capability and inventory from 1995 as compared to
type in real time while on station. 2015. As discussion with the primary stakeholder
Recommended Custodian for this Action: ASW Re- ­requesting the study unfolded (Commander Maritime
search, Tactics and Technology Workshop (under Air NATO), it expanded to include a more holistic view
UWWCG). of all air aspects of the ASW problem.

The study conducted thorough research into ­NATO’s

MPA current and projected status. It determined the
14.10 Limitations of the Study
technical aspect of ASW has remained relatively
This scope of this study was limited to an assessment ­balanced (as submarines got quieter, tracking tech-
of ASW capable air platforms currently or projected to nology evolved at a relatively consistent pace), but
be available to the Alliance. This is not a holistic view the dramatic drawdown in MPA inventory across the
of all ASW capability. Further analysis is needed Alliance has resulted in a potentialy significant
­
regarding developments in NATO Submarine and
­ ­future shortfall. Although this problem has been
­Surface Ship detection and engagement capabilities identified in numerous forums, NATO is fast
which will compliment Maritime Air’s capability to ­approaching the time where the normal acquisition
conduct ASW. As the study determined that the timelines will be unable to provide the resources to
­sensors and tactics employed on modern ASW heli- meet the future requirement.
copters, along with their inventory and aircraft inven-
tory, meet the current and projected need, this study ASW is, and always has been, conducted with a
focused mostly on the challenges with MPA. This ­layered and overlapping sensor approach, so the
aligns with findings in the NDPP review conducted loss of one sensor would not necessarily result in
after the 2014 Wales summit. lost contact. Bottom-mounted acoustic systems,
long-range MPA, and even longer dwell time sub-
Additionally, beyond identifying the benefits of a marines worked together to continuously keep
common MPA replacement airframe and exploring track of multiple submarines across the vast NATO
the timeline of the remaining service life of today’s AOR, from off Bermuda to the GIUK Gap to the
MPA force, this study did not undertake a detailed ­extremes of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea. In a
review of the benefits of a NATO-operated MPA
­ similar manner to the drawdown of MPA across
squadron as compared to nationally developed and ­almost every NATO nation, as the adversary sub­
operated squadrons but did offer considerations for marine deployments ceased in the late 1990s, the
the MPA Replacement Specialist Team. ground support stations that conducted ASW pre-
and post-mission support to MPA were closed. The
Finally, the author was unable to personally observe command structure organizing the layered prose-
the Turkish CASA or Polish Bryza MPA. Therefore, this cution was dissolved, relationships between nations
study was unable to make an assessment of the and the Maritime Commander dissolved, and NATO
acoustic capability of those airframes. As this study forgot how to efficiently conduct no-notice, wide-
recommends MARCOM focus on integrating those area submarine detection and tracking.
nations MPA into future ASW exercises, perhaps an
­assessment may be made in the near future. In strict dichotomy to the MPA inventory reduction,
MPH inventory has remained relatively constant and
the sensors and capability on today’s MPH far exceed
14.11 Conclusion
that of 15 years ago. Improvements to other aspects
This study began as a thought piece discussing the of ASW, including surface ships’ passive tails and the
disparity between MPA force structure (P-3 capability slow migration toward acceptance of the use of active
and inventory) balanced against Russian submarine sonar for submarine detection, have continued.

106 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

Where NATO truly suffered was in manpower and • NATO should rapidly pursue a replacement
­experience, but a focus on ASW exercises in the last ­aircraft for the seven countries whose highly
five years is already starting to show an uptick in both ­capable MPA reach the end of their service life
proficiency and depth of experience across the board. in approximately a decade. The status of NATO’s
dwindling MPA force is a known issue. The
This study concluded with an environmental forecast ­challenge moving forward is there is currently not
of possible futures and potential wild card events to a shared perspective of the threat or of the cap­
provide NATO’s planners insight for resource allo­ abilities required to combat the threat. This issue is
cation and milestones to monitor in order to help growing in importance as time advances. Benefits
­determine which future is unfolding. from a common airframe should not be over-
looked.
Now that submarines are starting to resume long • An investment must be made to support inter-
­deployments away from the coastline (out of range of operability and expand the deployment cap­
land-based ASW MPH), NATO is scrambling to rebuild ability of MPA ground support stations to
the capability at which it once excelled. Fortunately, ­remote locations from which ASW operations
Russia is also slowly coming out of a 15 year submarine are expected to recommence in the next
deployment hiatus. It is also experiencing growing ­decade. This issue has also been identified, but no
pains, re-learning things that used to be standard common NATO solution has yet been approved,
­procedures. NATO is not the same NATO of the Cold forcing action back into national channels if any
War, and today’s Russia is not the Soviet Union. Global action is to be taken at all. Therefore, this study
challenges affecting both NATO nations and Russia recommends approval of and funding for the
have an impact on this domain. Although national ­Deployable Ground Station concept proposed to
­defence spending is and will be challenged by other the UWWCG in 2015.
social/political influences, nations have begun to • ASW doctrine must be thoroughly reviewed
­recognize a tipping point is approaching from which and updated to account for and maximize the
NATO might not be able to recover. capabilities of newer acoustic and active
­sensors already in use across NATO’s ASW force.
In addition to the 21 recommendations spanning the Refinement of ASW doctrine to mirror today’s more
DOTMLPFI spectrum, the study yielded four vital capable MPH sensors, continued stress on force in-
conclusions: teroperability between MPA, MPH and ASW ships,
exploration into new technology (multi-statics and
• NATO should re-organize its current ASW Com- UUV specifically) are also identified as important
mand and Control organization into a single C2 steps to improve NATO’s overall ASW capability.
construct under a single commander to allow
MARCOM the authority and resources to ‘Without a sufficient NATO deterrent policy, NATO’s
­respond to the current uptick in Russian sub- hesitancy will further embolden Russia to exert
marine deployments. MARCOM is currently pressure along NATO’s periphery.‘
­taking steps to address this through the genera- Andres Michta, CSIS Global Forecast 2015
tion of EXTACs and the proposals regarding Area
ASW Operations; however, the proposed informa- NATO forces have not completely given up their
tion sharing agreement is just the first step toward ­supremacy and skill. However, failing to respond to
addressing a significant C2 shortfall. Even so, this observable trends and provide correcting action to
small step is still likely to be received with a mod­ identified driving forces will cede the advantage to a
icum of pushback from nations who don’t share potential adversary, which has already twice this
the perspective of MARCOM on the nature of the ­decade surprised NATO with hybrid military oper­
threat and do not feel a need to change. ations at NATO’s borders.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 107

 APPENDIX A Soviet ‘military doctrine’ was just a strategic decep-
tion to screen the Kremlin’s real and insidious inten-
tions. But there were no real plans. The ‘new doc-
The Russian Federation in the trine’ only reflected the demoralized state of the
Post-Cold War Era Russian military chiefs.

Transforming the Post-Cold War However, extrapolations to the naval service from
Russian Military Russia’s recent Operations in Georgia, Estonia and
Crimea provide insight into the Russian perspective of
In January 1990, General Mikhail Moiseyev, then chief hybrid forces and how to integrate asymmetric capa-
of the Soviet general staff, announced at a Military Doc- bilities (such as submarines) into a larger holistic goal.
trine Seminar in Vienna a set of guidelines for a new Many have maligned the Russian Navy of being inca-
Soviet military doctrine. First, war will no longer be con- pable of standing against Western naval elements
sidered a means of achieving political objectives. Sec- due to force-ratio disadvantages experienced in the
ond, the Soviet Union will never initiate military actions post-Cold War era. The Russian military underwent
against any other state. Third, the Soviet Union will more than a decade of economically imposed draw-
never be the first to use nuclear weapons. Fourth, the down of inventory and associated minimizing the de-
Soviet Union has no territorial claims against any other ployments of the submarines which remained. The
state nor does it consider any other state to be its ene- Chechnya campaign had nearly bankrupted the Army.
my. Fifth, the Soviet Union seeks to preserve military In fact, many of its troops were near starving levels.
parity as a decisive factor in averting war, but at much Corruption was rife in the senior General ranks. Mod-
lower levels than at present. Also, war prevention – in- ernization of the fleet was ignored while Moscow
stead of war preparation – emerged as the predomi- dealt with cash and oil shortfalls. Russia’s Navy has
nant political objective of the new doctrine. been called ‘more rust than ready.’ Observers have also
cast doubt on the notion that the Russian Navy, and
‘The questionable performance of the Russian specifically the Black Sea Fleet, can sustain prolonged
armed forces in the conflict in Georgia in 2008 pro- operations. However, NATO cannot continue to ex-
vided the impetus for a program of far-reaching trapolate that reality onto future projections of Rus-
­reform in the Russian military … The depth and sia’s military capability. Only fifteen years after Vladimir
scale of change that the Russian military has under- Putin took office, Russia’s military is bigger, stronger,
gone during the last 5 years of transformation is better equipped and more capable than at any time
­impossible to overstate.’ since the end of the Cold War.
Russian Military Transormation – Goal in Sight?
Giles and Monoghan Today NATO is faced with a Russian military who has
devoted significant effort not only to upgrading and
Extremely strategic in nature, there was little of sub- replacing aged equipment but to streamlining pro-
stance to help a military chief plan, reorganize and cesses in manpower, acquisition, and C2 which are
prepare a battle-ready armed force. Only the fifth resulting in new capabilities and realized operational
guideline had any meaning at all, but except for the efficiency across the force.
nuclear strategic balance with the United States,
preserving ‘military parity’ was out of the Russian ‘Russia will likely increase her defense spending,
military’s reach as the Soviet Union collapsed. There ­although not quickly enough to match China, the
was no longer any conventional ‘military parity’ and US or India.’
there could never be ‘parity’ between NATO and the UK Global Strategic Trends to 2045
fragments of the once proud Red Army. In fact,
many in the West may have thought that this new

108 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

How Did Russia’s ­ arfare, unmanned drones and better logistical
w
support. Russia has taken what was left of the ­Soviet
Military Modernize?
Army and finally turned it into a fighting force
‘Putin’s rise to power coincided with the worldwide ­designed for 21st-Century conflict’
commodity boom. The spectacular rise in the price of Kier Giles
Russian oil and gas and metals (2003–2013) allowed Director, Conflict Studies Research Centre
the Russian economy to grow at a rapid rate while the Defense and National Security editor.
Russian state increased its regulation of the economy Sevodnya newspaper, Moscow.
and began to restore its military.‘ To affect this remark-
able transformation, Putin then seized upon the one In assessing the role submarines play in executing
thing that had united the country in the past, its re- Russian strategy, a look at the recent interaction be-
markable nationalistic pride. tween NATO and the Russian Federation since the fall
of the Berlin wall reveals a consistent and systematic
‘The two most brutal transformations of Russian worldview.
­society – carried out by Peter the Great and Josef
Stalin – were in the long term accepted by Russians ‘Putin … concluded that the West’s approach to Rus-
because they modernized the army and bolstered sia offered scant respect for its interests or views. In
the country's defenses.’ the brief Russo-Georgian War … the Western media
Pavel Felgenhauer and political circles sided with Tbilisi against Mos-
Defense and national security editor. cow. The US response to the 2010 Russian proposal
Sevodnya newspaper, Moscow. to create a joint ballistic missile defence, a joint de-
fence perimeter with Russia and NATO as de facto
He realized that after ten years of unsuccessful military allies, was so tepid that it allowed Putin to
­attempts to reform the former Soviet military, there conclude that the West continued to view Russia as
might be only one glimmer of hope left – the possi- a potential adversary. Thwarted in his attempt to
bility that an obvious external threat could unite the build defences with NATO, he went ahead with plans
Russian nation behind its military as has happened to build them against NATO. In Libya, Russia’s major
several times in Russian history. For several centuries, concession of allowing NATO to use force against a
defence was considered the most important respon- sovereign government – which caused considerable
sibility of any Russian government. The well-being of tensions within Russian political circles and the sen-
individual citizens was always much less important. ior bureaucracy – was not appreciated by Moscow’s
Now the strategic position of Russia is much clearer: nominal partners, but taken for granted and then
an expanded NATO will build a new ‘cordon sanitaire’ misused. This led to a feeling in Moscow of being de-
on Russia’s western borders and it is the role of the ceived and then ignored, as well as a firm resolve not
government to protect its people, at all costs, against to allow such things to happen again – for example,
this external threat to the nation. in Syria. Putin also inferred that the West’s treatment
of Russia was not linked to a particular person in the
‘Russia decisively overran the Georgian military in Kremlin.’
that conflict, but confirmed in the process that the
way its troops were organised and equipped was Putin’s View of Russia
out of date. Since then, Russia has been working Putin, in tapping into that Russian feeling of national-
hard to overhaul almost every aspect of its military, istic pride, seeks to reassert Russia on the global stage
including massive investment in new weapons as a peer of other global powers. In his view, ‘full sov-
­systems – everything from nuclear weapons down ereignty demands both independence of Russian do-
to the uniforms and equipment carried by individu- mestic politics from outside influence and Moscow’s
al soldiers … and improved use of electronic diplomatic equality vis-à-vis Washington.’ Much of

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 109

 © NATO MARCOM

Figure 42 – A Norwegian NH-90 Flies over a German Submarine in a NATO Exercise.

Russia’s actions over the last 15 years can be traced to sia. The less understood dynamic is that Russia is
the fundamental national pride and desire to be seen even more reliant on Europe as the market for 80
as a dominant global power. percent of its total oil and gas exports. While much
has been made of Russia’s recent energy mega-deals
The Impact of Sanctions with China, diversification of Russia’s export markets
Western economic sanctions against Russia as a result to Asia will take a decade or longer, if ever, to reach a
of its actions against and Georgia had the unintended level comparable to its exports to Europe.’ This would
effect of internalizing the Russia Federation’s acquisi- lead many to speculate that sanctions would serve
tion process and jump-starting her defence industrial as an effective deterrent. However, that has not prov-
base. As concluded by the Centre for Research on Glo- en to be the case.
balization, ‘the Army needs hardware to defend the
Motherland, and advanced Russian industry gets The sanctions and Putin’s push toward transformation
more orders from the Ministry of Defence. Factories invoked initial austerity and an economic recession
and workers laid off or semi-retired get a new life, for- whose results were exacerbated by a worldwide
eign customers queue up and the rouble is steadied. plummet in one of Russia’s largest economic drivers,
Young men get some purpose beyond watching tel- oil. The cumulative impact of this decade-long West-
evision and complaining. A feeling of national pride – ern offensive culminating in the current wave of se-
after the terrible humiliations of being unheard and vere sanctions was to provoke a recession in Russia, to
taken-for-granted in Yugoslavia, Ukraine and else- undermine the currency (the Ruble declined 23 % in
where – comes back.’ 2014), drive up the cost of imports and hurt local con-
sumers. Russian industries, dependent on foreign
The often-heard ‘narrative that Europe is heavily de- equipment and parts, as well as oil companies
pendent on Russian energy sources is true for some ­dependent on imported technology for exploiting
European countries. Yet Europe receives overall the Arctic reserves were made to feel the pain of
about 30 percent of its oil and gas imports from Rus- ­‘Putin’s intransigence’.

110 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

After nearly a decade of military and economic trans- However, in his seminal speech to the Russian As-
formation, Russia has not only become more self-­ sembly formally annexing Crimea on March 18, he
reliant but has been able to modernize, upgrade and articulated a highly chauvinistic form of Russian na-
replace much of its military force while following a tionalism that does not accept the legitimacy of
Western approach of streamlining force size to reduce post – 1991 borders let alone post – World War II
cost. ‘All the indications we have from the Russian and even post–World War I borders.’
economists and business leaders is that they now
consider sanctions the new normal, and they are Putin clearly has made a Faustian bargain with Rus-
working around those sanctions.’ NATO has demon- sian nationalism and oligarchic predators with un-
strated a tendency of mirroring likely western predictable consequences for Russia’s neighbours,
­responses onto their prediction of Russian responses; regional security, and the Russian people.
the true impact of sanctions on the Russian Federa- Kuchins, Andrew, ‘Putin’s Dilemma’ 2015 Center for Strategic
tion must be considered when projecting future and International Studies Global Forecast, pg 31
­submarine activity.
Analysis shows a linkage between Russian influence
and the rise of populist, nationalistic, and xenopho-
The Influence of the Russian
bic political parties as many of these entities receive
Federation on European Politics financial support from Russian affiliated nongovern-
‘Putin, like his Soviet predecessors, has avoided ­reform, mental organizations (NGOs).1 Taking advantage of
and the Russian economy has continued to stagnate Europe’s economic malaise, these increasingly suc-
(1.3 percent growth in 2013) even before Crimea an- cessful fringe parties have contributed to the weak-
nexation and the war in Ukraine despite historically ening of political support for the European Union
high oil prices. It appeared that Putin had already de- and governments across Europe. Their impacts are
cided to abandon economic growth and prosperity as most evident in the former Eastern Bloc, where insti-
the foundation for his political popularity and author- tutions and civil society remain underdeveloped
ity. This risky political strategy would require a new and susceptible to the revitalization of former Soviet
political narrative to justify his indefinite leadership if networks. ‘Although the 21st-century East-West con-
economic growth and prosperity were no longer the frontation does not bear the same ideological ves-
essential thread. tiges of the Cold War, there is a clear ideological
component today … The unqualified success of
This new political narrative began to form in 2012– Central Europe’s transformation from Communism
2013 with a growing emphasis on traditional Rus- to liberal democracies and market economies is not
sian values captured in the 19th-century Russian immutable, and we should not trick ourselves into
policy of ‘official nationality’ revolving around the believing it is so.’2
triptych of autocracy, orthodoxy, and Russian na-
tionality. The crisis over Ukraine offered an ideal op-
portunity to further consolidate this new political
1. Conley, Heather. Russians Influence on Europe. 2015 Center for Strategic and International
narrative. Previously, President Putin had always Studies Global Forecast. Pg. 31
been careful to avoid inflaming Russian nationalism. 2. Ibid.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 111

 APPENDIX B Water in the northern portions of the European thea-
tre may tend to be more isothermal than water in the
Mediterranean Sea, which displays a more traditional
Tactical Oceanography and temperature profile. However, it is important to re-
the Sonar Equations member Temperature, more so than Pressure, is af-
fected by local weather conditions. The Mixed Layer
Oceanography Depth (MLD) is that shallow water point where tem-
As discussed in Chapter 6, each type of submarine perature begins to show a reduction as a function of
generates acoustic noise through a variety of different depth. The near surface water may show influences of
sources. Each of these sources operates at a specific diurnal heating and therefore the shallow water por-
sound frequency. That frequency will travel through tion of the water column above the MLD will treat
water according to a known set of standards. Under- sound differently than the portions below the MLD.
standing how sound behaves in the ocean is the key The Sonic Layer Depth (SLD), which is the point of
to exploiting the acoustic vulnerability of submarines. near surface maximum sound velocity, is approxi-
‘The speed of sound in sea water is a fundamental mately the same depth as the MLD. As the MLD can
oceanographic variable that determines the behav- be measured with bathythermal sonobuoys (while
iour of sound propagation in the ocean.’1 This study the SLD cannot), the SLD is assumed to be located at
discusses the three dominant factors to sound veloc- the MLD as well. MLD/SLD as a general rule will be lo-
ity. ATP-1 provides further details on environmental cated in the first 50–300 feet of the water column.
planning considerations such as upwelling, deep
ocean currents, and eddies.
The Sonic Layer Depth
Three things affect the speed of sound in water: Tem- Oceanographic modelling is important for ASW op-
perature, Salinity, and Pressure. As Salinity is generally erations for two reasons. As discussed earlier, as a
around 34–36ppm worldwide2, it is assumed for the function of the mission of the target submarine, they
purposes determining the velocity of sound in a given may exploit different portions of the water column. A
column of water to be a constant. diesel submarine will generally remain near the sur-
face both to facilitate recharging their batteries and to
aid in targeting of surface shipping. Additionally, die-
Temperature
sel submarines will generally operate in littoral areas,
Temperature tends to either decrease or remain con- which tend to be shallower water. Therefore, it is com-
stant throughout the water column as depth increas- mon for a diesel submarine to operate above or near
es. There are instances of temperature inversions the SLD. When determining the best acoustic tracking
where cold water is on top of warmer water. In shallow frequencies for each class of submarine, the depth of
water, above the Mixing Layer or in the top portion of the SLD will play an important role. If the MLD (and
the Deep Sound Channel, the Sound Velocity Profile therefore the SLD) is deep due to shallow water mix-
will closely resemble the temperature profile and ing, the spectrum of frequencies trapped and exploit-
sound will generally propagate perpendicularly from able inside the surface duct (or layer of water above
the sound velocity curve. Therefore a decrease in tem- the SLD) increase. If the SLD is shallower, only the
perature with depth will result in sound being pushed highest frequencies (the ones most subject to attenu-
back toward the surface whereas isothermal water will ation loss) remain inside the duct.
push sound parallel to the surface. Whether the near
surface water column has a negative temperature Secondly, the SLD plays an important role for deter-
slope or not, as a general rule there is a depth at which mining the depth of air launched passive receiver hy-
most water becomes isothermal. At this point, the in- drophones contained in passive sonobuoys. Until re-
fluence of Pressure on sound will dominate. cently, the depth of a passive buoy could not be

112 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 Temperature/Depth and Sound Velocity Profile find that point in the water column where it will travel
Temperature Sound speed as slow as possible. Therefore sound near the surface,
Mixed Mixed layer Sonic layer
Sonic layer depth unless trapped in a surface layer duct, will try to go
layer
depth Thermocline deeper (due to the influence of Temperature) and
Sound channel axis
sound below the deep sound channel axis will return
Conjugate depths toward the surface (due to the influence of Pressure)
in an effort to travel slower. The result is the genera-
Depth

Depth

tion of a sound wave where sound remains inside the

Deep isothermal
layer
deep sound channel. Provided there is sufficient
Critical depth
sound intensity at that particular frequency, this
Depth excess sound may be exploited by passive acoustic receivers.

‘The speed of propagation has a very complicated de-

Figure 43 – Temperature/Depth and Sound pendence on (Temperature, Salinity and Pressure).
Velocity Profile.3 Some rules of thumb that you can use to relate the
dependence of the speed of sound in seawater to
changed once the aircraft was airborne (as most ASW each of the factors are
aircraft sonobuoys are externally mounted and inac-
cessible while in flight for reprograming). Therefore, if • 1 C increase in temperature equals a 3m/s increase in
the SLD was significantly different than predicted, the speed
MPA crew ran the risk of having the passive hydro- • 1 ppt increase in salinity equals a 1.3 m/s increase in
phones on the wrong side of the layer when search- speed
ing for a diesel submarine. Newer models of passive • 100 meters of depth equals a 1.7 m/s increase in
sonobuoys permit employment with an initial shallow speed’4
depth setting, after which the hydrophone may be
remotely commanded to a deeper depth. This is less Many scientists have noted an increase in ocean tem-
of a factor when searching for an SSN or SSBN, which peratures over the latter half of the previous century.
are most likely operating well below the SLD. Howev- Not only are ocean surface waters getting warmer, but
er, it may also impact search tactics for an SSGN, which so is water 1,500 feet below the surface, albeit with less
may also be operating above or near the SLD. of a defined temperature increase. These increases in
temperature lie well outside the bounds of natural
variation. This data is the results of one particular study
Pressure
and likely needs further analysis to determine the true
Pressure increases at a constant rate of 1 bar (14.5psi) impact to passive ranges, but extrapolation might indi-
for every 33 feet of depth (10.06m). In the thermocline cate a subtle shortening of ranges due to this phe-
and Deep Sound Channel, Pressure dominates the be- nomena. If the near surface temperature increases,
haviour of sound propagation and in effect, forces which it has, while the deeper ocean remains at the
sound back toward the surface. same (cooler) temperature, this increases the down-
ward bending of acoustic energy in the Direct Path
Sound Speed Profile raypath, in effect shortening passive ranges in the
The resulting graph generated from an analysis of tracking and engagement phases of prosecution.
Temperature and Pressure as a function of water
depth is referred to as the Sound Speed/Velocity Pro-
Acoustic Raypaths
file (SSP or SVP). When discussing the Sound Speed
Profile, an important element is the behaviour of Although many different raypaths (the direction of
sound in water. Sound is ‘lazy’ and is always trying to travel sound takes from the source to the receiver as

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 113

 influenced by the variables outlined above) exist, and modern submarines do not generate a high enough
are well discussed in NATO ASW publications, two are source level to provide sound in the convergence zone
worth highlighting in this study: Direct Path and detectable by today’s air-launched sonobuoys. None-
­Convergence Zone. theless, the raypath may still be exploitable by ship/sub-
marine passive towed array sonars or by air-launched
mono/multi-static active sonobuoys.
The Direct Path Raypath
On the Direct Path raypath, as the name indicates,
Passive Acoustic Detection
sound travels directly from the source (submarine)
to the receiver (sonobuoy) without undergoing a re- The Sound Velocity Profile discussion above served to
fraction (change in direction due to pressure etc …) highlight the importance of understanding the prop-
or reflection (bottom or surface). This is the most agation pattern of sound as it travels through the
common raypath exploited in the tracking and tar- ­water. This, when assessed against the likely location
geting phase of prosecutions and provides the most of the target submarine, is used to determine the
accurate locating data on the submarine. However depth that passive receiver sonobuoys are employed
due to attenuation, spreading and other forms of in order to maximize the opportunity for detection of
signal loss, the frequencies used in Direct Path ex- submarine generated noise. This best receiver depth
ploitation have much shorter detection ranges. As a is largely independent of the submarine, and is most
general rule, loud submarines may provide direct impacted by the properties of the water itself. How-
path ranges in excess of 2nm whereas against very ever, when determining how far apart to space the
quiet submarines the range is measured in few hun- receivers, analysis of the sound generated by that
dreds of yards. Specific ranges for each submarine class of submarine is critical.
class and hull are classified.
Chapter 2 identified that each class of submarine
generates sound at different frequencies and differ-
The Convergence Zone Raypath
ent sound intensity levels based on the design of
As the Sound Speed Profile outlines, sound generated that submarine and to some extent to the speed at
below the Sonic Layer Depth (and any sound generat- which the submarine is operating. When planning
ed above it that penetrates below) will initially bend pre-mission buoy spacing or even when conducting
downward as Temperature is the largest near-surface a study of the adversary submarine against the
impact to sound velocity. As Temperature cools and the ocean environment, each frequency and source lev-
water depth increases, pressure begins to take over and el needs to be assessed to determine the most read-
will eventually bend that sound wave back up toward ily identifiable and longest range frequency for
the surface. This takes place over the course of many tracking. This assessment is done using the Passive
miles and requires both significant water depth and Sonar Equation and Prorogation Loss Curves, or oth-
initial signal strength/source level in order for there to er software decision aids with these two principles
be sufficient detectable sound signal remaining when incorporated.
it returns to the near surface environment.

The Passive Sonar Equation

Due to variances in the waveform and the effects of
Pressure, Temperature, Salinity and other influences, this
sound won’t re-converge in a single spot, rather over an
SE = SL – AN – PL +DI
annulus of a few miles of varying sound intensity. This SE = Signal Excess (dB). The amount of leftover noise
annulus is referred to as the convergence zone. Tactics when all other factors are considered. If this number is
for exploiting this sound have evolved in both the sub- above zero, sufficient sound exists at that frequency
marine and maritime air communities. As a general rule, to be detectable by ASW passive sonar systems.

114 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

12000
First, Ambient Noise at most of the initial detection fre-
Growth in Sea Borne Trade
10000
quencies has risen. There is more merchant traffic and
more seabed exploration and drilling than ever before;
6000
the ocean is getting louder by the day. Lower frequen-
4000
cies travel further in water. Therefore, the frequencies
most suitable for initial submarine detection are in the
2000
lower frequency spectrum. However, in this same
0
spectrum, the noise by merchant shipping and other
1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
non-submarine noises has dramatically risen. For every
In recent decades, seaborne trade has increased by 4%
Figure 44 – In Recent Decades, Seaborne Trade has
per year (with the exception of the global recession in dB increase in AN, there is a direct corresponding de-
2009). Source ‘How we fight’
Increased by 4% per Year (with the Exception of crease in dB to the excess signal available for detection
the Global Recession in 2009). Source: ‘How we at that frequency.
fight’ – Handbook for the Naval Warfighter.
The Passive Sonar equation is frequently re-written
SL = Source Level (dB). The amount of noise generates and reflected in terms of FOM (Figure of Merit). This is
by the submarine at a given frequency. the maximum amount of one-way PL (source to re-
ceiver) an SL can experience and still retain sufficient
AN/BN (dB) – the Ambient or Background Noise in the signal strength to be detected by the sensor (i.e., re-
ocean observed at a given frequency. Factors which main above the AN threshold). Further information
increase AN include merchant shipping, biologic, sea- regarding the capabilities of passive detection sys-
bed drilling activity, wind/rain/sea noise, and aircraft tems installed on NATO MPA and ASW Helicopters is
noise or other sources not related to the submarine. included later in this Appendix.

PL – Propagation Loss or Transmission Loss (dB) is Secondly, and perhaps most notably, the design of
the amount of noise lost as a function of distance ­modern submarines have reduced SL to the point
measured one meter from the source to the receiv- where SE may be a negative number when using the
er. PL/TL will vary by frequency; higher frequencies passive ­sonar equation. This means submarines to-
experience more rapid loss due to propagation day may be so quiet that the background ocean
and attenuation. noise is louder than the source the ASW force is
­attempting to detect.
DI (dB) – Directivity Index: The amount of ‘gain’ you
can apply to the detection probability based on the
Sound Pressure Level
sensitivity of the acoustic detection system in use,
the skill (or fatigue) of the acoustic detection system Submarine source levels are measured in decibels
operator, and whether the system is used in Direc- which exert sound pressure upon the passive receiver.
tional or non-directional (360 degrees) search mode. As discussed earlier, the submarine generates noise
Some of the newer MPA systems allow planners to (sound pressure) at a given frequency, dependent
use as much as 10dB gain at this point; however, it is upon each piece of machinery. A decibel is a unit used
not uncommon to leave DI as zero in the planning to measure the intensity of the sound level of a signal
stages to account for on station performance reduc- by comparing it with a given level on a logarithmic
tion due to fatigue and offset any lack of operator (non-linear) scale. A 3db change is a doubling of
proficiency or ASW currency.6 sound intensity whereas a change of 10 db is a change
in sound intensity by a factor of ten.7 Therefore, the
Of the elements in the Passive Sonar equation, two 636 Kilo class (SSK) with an acoustic signature of 105
components stand out which separate today’s ASW decibels is 10 times as loud as the 95 decibel acoustic
challenge from operations in the Cold War. signature of a more advanced NATO SSN.8

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 115

 The key takeaway is that as improvements in subma-
rine design are achieved, reducing the SPL generated
at each frequency, for a given 10db drop due to im-
provements in design, there is a corresponding ‘sig-
nificant’ decrease in the passive detection ranges us-
ing the propagation loss curves discussed above. This
is the crux of the issue and the true challenge with
passive detection today.

Today’s Challenge with Traditional

Passive Detection
In the 1970s-80s, it was not uncommon to measure
Figure 45 – Hypothetical Relationship Between
submarine passive detection ranges in miles. MPA
(a) TL Curve and (b) the Corresponding Propaga-
crews across NATO learned to exploit initial detection
tion Paths and Detection Zones (Cross-Hatched
in the first or second convergence zone (a point Areas near the Sea Surface) Associated with a
where sound, which retains enough Signal Excess to FOM of 85 dB. A Plausible Sound-Speed Profile is
overcome long distance propagation loss, converges shown at the Left Side of Panel (b). Source:
in small zones at increments of 30–32 miles from the ‘Underwater Acoustic Modeling and Simulation’
sound source). Tactics were employed to convert this 3rd ed, pg. 62.
CZ initial detection to direct path contact and lever-
age the fact submarines generated sufficient sound reduce noise and mitigate active sonar detec-
levels to support these tactics. tion have been fielded.
2. With the increase in submarines operating more
Figure 45 highlights the traditional raypaths for pas- in the littorals, the water column does not have
sive detection. Of note, the Propagation loss Curves at sufficient depth to support the regeneration of
the top utilize a Figure of Merit of 85dB which pro- sound energy into a convergence zone.
vides acoustic detection opportunity even out to the 3. Many nations have upgraded both the process-
second CZ. This is where the Cold War methods of ing capability and display functions of their on-
submarine detection begin to falter in today’s ocean board acoustic processor. This was done in an
environment. The following three changes to modern effort to maximize the crews ability to employ
submarines are impacting current and future passive passive sonar. Color displays have been part of
acoustic detection techniques. many MPA and MPH upgrades, not just to pro-
vide a change to the old green on black gram
1. Whereas the example in Figure 44 yielded a de- display, but to permit color display by sector of
tection range of almost 18,000 yards (9nm), it is noise received by the wafer (microphone) in the
unrealistic for today’s modern submarines to DIFAR buoys receiver. This permits the operator
yield that type of range. More realistically, mod- to filter noise not related to the submarine out
ern submarines, both nuclear and diesel, pro- from their display but which may be occurring
vide passive detection ranges better character- at the same frequency level (i.e. nearby ship-
ized as hundreds of yards instead of multiple ping) and obscuring the actual submarine noise.
miles. Non-NATO submarines have grown in- This upgraded capability is captured in the pas-
creasingly quiet with each subsequent class sive sonar equation in the DI variable. It still
fielded. Technology to address propulsion plant reaches a point of diminishing returns as it does
and propeller generated noises have been im- not generate enough of a counter to the de-
plemented, and anechoic hull coatings to both crease in Source Level and remaining Signal

116 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 ­Excess generated by modern and future subma- friendly submarines’ hull-mounted active sonar sys-
rine designs. tems, the air launched active sonobuoys do not pro-
vide sufficient source level to serve as an efficient
‘Over the last half century, as cargo shipping and ‘search’ technique. They are, therefore, predominantly
deep sea oil exploration has increased, back- reserved for use in the Localization, Tracking and En-
ground noise in the ocean has doubled roughly gagement phases of prosecution. This is the Active
every decade.’9 Sonar Equation:

Furthermore, the ambient, or background, noise in

the ocean has been notable increasing over the last EL = SL – 2TL + TS – (NL-DI)/DT
few decades. This has a dramatic impact on the ability
to exploit submarine generated noise against the EL (dB)= Energy level of the Active Return available to
background noise, and as quieting technology im- the sonobuoy.
proves, eventually a point of diminishing return will
be reached. SL (dB) = Source Level of the Active Ping

2TL1 (dB) = Transmission Loss from Source Buoy and

Sound Pressure Level
returning along the same raypath to the receiver in
Submarine source levels are measured in decibels the active buoy (therefore TL is doubled).
which exert sound pressure upon the passive receiver.
As discussed earlier, the submarine generates noise TS (dB) = Target Strength, the reflectivity of the sub-
(sound pressure) at a given frequency dependent marine to provide a return. This is a function of the
upon each piece of machinery. A decibel is a unit used construction of the submarine to include the type of
to measure the intensity of the sound level of a signal hull material used, the size of the submarine, and ef-
by comparing it with a given level on a logarithmic fectiveness of any anechoic coating/tiles.10
(non-linear) scale. A 3db change is a doubling of
sound intensity whereas a change of 10db is a change In addition to the decrease in noise generated by
in sound intensity by a factor of ten. Therefore, the 636 smaller, modern submarine classes, another challenge
Kilo class (SSK) with an acoustic signature of 105 deci- presented to Maritime Air ASW forces by smaller sub-
bels is ten times as loud as the 95 decibel acoustic marines, namely SS/SSK, in the use of active sonar is
signature of a more advanced NATO SSN. their size, which has a direct correlation to the amount
of the active signal return. The smaller the submarine,
The key takeaway is that as improvements in subma- the less sound is reflected back. This smaller signal is
rine design are achieved, reducing the SPL generated then subject to the same propagation losses and at-
at each frequency, for a given 10db drop due to im- tenuation that affects other sound in the water. Sub-
provements in design, there is a corresponding ‘sig- marine coatings have also become more efficient at
nificant’ decrease in the passive detection ranges us- dampening the active signal as a counter-detection
ing the propagation loss curves discussed above. This technique. Finally, the operating environment for the
is the crux of the issue and the true challenge with submarine also has an impact on the use of active so-
passive detection today. nobuoys.

Chapter 2 described the submarine missions based

Active Acoustic Prosecution
on class and propulsion type. As discussed there, it is
In addition to passive detection of submarine gener- more common for a diesel-electric submarine to work
ated noise, MPA and ASW helicopters can employ ac- in the littorals than a nuclear power one. Therefore,
tive sonobuoys. However, unlike surface ships and SSKs are better able to make use of the bottom topog-

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 117

 raphy, pinnacles, walls and even excess signal rever- TS (dB) = Target Strength, the reflectivity of the sub-
beration noted in shallow water to mitigate detection marine to provide an echo of the incoherent sound
by active sonobuoys. signal generated by the EER sonobuoy.11

These issues are not new to the ASW domain and will EER is no longer utilized, as two primary challenges
continue to be a planning factor for all aircrew con- were insurmountable. First, the system was designed
ducting an ASW prosecution. Improved acoustic pro- to exploit the convergence zone with an active source.
cessors aboard MPA, MPH and ASW capable ships have, The signal return was maximized when impacting the
to some extent, countered technology improvements submarine’s beam. Beginning even slightly off-axis,
as they are better able to filter out ambient noise from the signal strength of the return signal dropped off
passive systems and non-target active returns. Howev- significantly to the point of being undetectable
er, the constant battle and slowly closing the gap be- against background noise. This implied that a rather
tween quieting technology and subsequent limitations good initial datum was known in order to place the
of traditional active and passive sensors has resulted in source buoys at the correct distance from the subma-
exploration into other methods of target detection. rine, and the receiver buoys oriented to receive a
beam on reflection. Second, EER was significantly
challenged in a bottom reverberation-limited envi-
Monostatics
ronment such as in shallow water. Advances into Im-
In the late 1990s, some nations explored the potential proved EER (IEER) were explored using a new receiver
of large area active search using a source buoy provid- buoy but have mostly been abandoned due to the
ing a much larger initial source level than traditional emergence of multi-statics.
DICASS. The SSQ-110 and SSQ-110A Extended Echo
Ranging (EER) sonobuoys contained a small explosive
charge constructed as a rapidly burning fuse. This
would provide broadband incoherent noise at a high
signal strength. Initially, it was used in conjunction
with the SSQ-77 Vertical Line Array DIFAR (VLAD) buoy
to exploit the Convergence Zone raypath as outlined
above. The equation used in EER/IEER operations is 1. Etter, Paul C. Underwater Acoustic Modeling and Simulation 3rd edition, Chapter 2.
similar to the Active Sonar Equation discussed above 2. Etter, Paul C. Underwater Acoustic Modeling and Simulation 3rd edition. pg 23.
3. Etter, Paul C. Underwater Acoustic Modeling and Simulation 3rd edition. pg 30.
but takes into account that the receiver and source 4. Principles of Naval Weapons Systems, Edited by Joseph B. Hall, CDR, USN, Dubuque, IA: Ken-
buoys may not be co-located. Therefore, the active dall/Hunt Publishing Co, 2000, p.179 as cited in US Naval Academy Physics textbook Avail-
able online at: http://www.usna.edu/Users/physics/ejtuchol/documents/SP411/Chapter4.
signal (EER source) will travel along two different pdf
paths from the source buoy, first to the target and 5. Technical summary. In: Climate change 2007: Impacts, adaptation and vulnerability. Con-
tribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental
then to a receiver, experiencing two different amounts Panel on Climate Change. Parry, M.L., O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, and co-authors. 2007Edited
of transmission loss (TL) along the way. by M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden, and C.E. Hanson. Cambridge
University Press, pp. 23-78. Available online at: http://www.climatehotmap.org/global-
warming-effects/ocean-temperature.html
6. Active Sonar Equation and Projector Level. Available online at http://www.usna.edu/Users/
EL = SL – TL1 – TL2 + TS physics/ejtuchol/documents/SP411/Chapter16.pdf
7. China’s Anti-Access Strategy. American Innovation, 24 Dec 2013. Available online at: http://
manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2013/12/chinas-anti-access-strategy-submarine.html
8. China’s Anti-Access Strategy. American Innovation, 24 Dec 2013. Available online at: http://
EL (dB) = Energy level of the Echo returning to the manglermuldoon.blogspot.com/2013/12/chinas-anti-access-strategy-submarine.html
receiver. 9. Underwater Noise is Killing Whales but we can make the Oceans Quieter. Adele Peters. 16
May 2016. Available online at:http://www.fastcoexist.com/3059650/underwater-noise-is-
killing-whales-but-we-can-make-the-oceans-quieter
TL1 / TL2 (dB) = Transmission Loss from Source Buoy 10. Active Sonar Equation and Projector Level. Available online at http://www.usna.edu/Users/
physics/ejtuchol/documents/SP411/Chapter16.pdf
to Target (TL1) then Target to Receiver Buoy (TL2), 11. AN/SSQ 110 Extended Echo Ranging (EER) Sonobuoy. FAS Military Analysis Network. Avail-
since they aren’t necessarily collated. able online at: http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/ship/weaps/an-ssq-110.htm

118 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 119
 APPENDIX C
Maritime Patrol Aircraft and Helicopters
© US Navy
© US Navy

120 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

P3C Orion
NATO Countries
Canada, Germany, Greece, Norway, Portugal, Spain, United States of America
Non-NATO Countries
Australia, Brazil, Chile, Iran, Japan, New Zealand, Pakistan, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand

General Aircraft Data

Range with
Crew Transit Loiter
Wingspan Length Max Speed Endurance 3 hours
composition Speed Speed
Onstation
30.38 m 35.61 m
11 405 kts 328 kts 206 kts 12 hr 20 min 1.346 nm
99 ft 8 in 116 ft 10 in

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
APS 115 / APS 137 6 Bombay stations (NTE 4800 lbs total) for Mk 46/50/54
Torpedo and various mines/bombs
EO / IR System
FLIR, AIMS or Star Saphire (varies by country) 10 Wing stations for mines/bombs, 6 AGM-84 Harpoon
or mix of 4 AGM-56F Maverick/AGM-84K SLAM-ER
ESM
ALR-66 (series) Sonobuoys
84 external, 48 internal
Accoustic Suite
3 internal pneumatic single launchers
USQ-78 (series) most common (varies by country)
Datalinks / FMV
Link 11, some Link 16 depending on model
Equipment and sensors may vary from the baseline P-3 depending on the operating country and level of system
upgrades which have occured.

Other Information
BMUP Block Modification upgrade to U-II models to bring them to near P-3C U-III level. Added Link-16 and included up-
grades to the Mk50 torpedo and Harpoon anti-ship missile, improved data processing, high-resulution colour displys, an
AN/USQ-78B accoustic system complete with improved acoustic receiver and data recorder, and AN/ALR66-B ESM.
AIP ISR Variant of the P-3C which added imaging radar (APS-137), EO capability and improved communications. Added
IR weapons capability (Maverick, SLAM-ER). The AIP P-3 poved its value tracking time-sensitive targets over land during
Operations ‘Iraqi Freedom‘ and ’Enduring Freedom‘. Subsequently, Lockheed Martin installed a new real-time-air-to-ground
transmission system, the tactical Common Data Link (TCDL), in 24 AIP P-3CP-3C update IIIs. Altough initially intended for the
update III P-3Cs, AIP was later applied to five low-hour Update II.5 P-3C airframes. The latest additions to AIP aircraft include
Link 16 and IMNARSAT (commercial International Maritime Satellite) connectivity, identified by a new antenna on the upper
fuselage just aft of the cockpit. NATO Nations operating the P-3C Orion have included various national upgrades (CIP, CUP
etc... ) which incorporate many similar design features to the AIP model. This includes CAN, ESP, GER, GRC, NOR and POR.
ARTR/APTR The Acoustuc Receiver Technology Refresh (ARTR) enhanced the Orion‘s ability to receive and 1 sono-
bouy data. The upgrade is a part of a program that is intended to bridge the gap in a technology between the P-3C
and the P-8A. A subsequent Acoustic Processor Technology Refresh (APTR) ugrade enables the P-3C and its replace-
ment to operate a similar set of acoustic software. It establishes a common, but not identical, configuration of proces-
sors, recorders and receivers between the two aircraft. The US Navy also plans to equip the Orion with a nw computer
system that will provide for broader network capabilities to support the anti-submarine warfare mission. Known as C4
for ASW (Command, Control, Communications and Computers for Anti-Submarine Warfare), the system includes Link
16, which provides enhanced situiational awareness and interoperability with surface fleet, other military services,
allied forces and an international maritime satellite (INMARSAT), which provides encrypted broadband services for the
fleet. Aircraft with the AMT-50 Inmarsat antenna are indentified by bulge above the cockpit.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 121

 © FR MOD

© Janes
Breguet Atlantique II
Countries
France

General Aircraft Data

Crew Transit
Wingspan Length Max Speed Ceiling Endurance Range
composition Speed
37.46 m 31.71 m
10-22 350 kts 310 kts 30.000 ft 18 hours 4.900 nm
122 ft 10 3/4 in 104 ft 0.5 in

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
Thales Iguana 8 Mk-46/50/54 torpedoes
EO / IR System NATO series of bombs
SAT/TRT Tango FLIR
Up to 4 missiles (surface or air)
ESM
Sonobuoys
Thales Arar 13A
More than 120 sonobuoy capacity
Datalinks / FMV
Internal pneumatic launcher
Link 11

Other Information
The French Navy announced plans to upgrade its Atlantique 2s in a project designed to keep the ATL-II in service
until 2030. A digital sonobouy acoustic processing system planned as well as mission system upgrades. Upgrades
were reduced 2013 to 18 aircraft from the 22-aircraft fleet. Work is expected to include structual refurbishment in
order to extend service of life to around 2031. The Thales AMASCOS system is planned as the main mission system.
LOTI (Logiciel Opérationnel de Traitement de l‘Information) mission software is now planned for subsystems integ-
ration for overall tactical picture and weapons employment. New Thales radar system planned, based on the
­RBE2-AA AESA radar.
Like other nations, France has pressed the maritime patrol Atlantiques into overland operations. Five aircraft were
deployed in 2013 to Dakar, Senegal, in support of Operation Serval over Mali. These carried out overland ISR duties,
and also dropped 500lb GBU-12 Paveway laser-guided bombs, but with use of buddy-designation by Harfang un-
manned aerial vehicles.

122 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © US Navy

© US Navy
P8 Poseidon
Countries
Australia, India, United Kingdom, United States of America

General Aircraft Data

Range with
Crew
Wingspan Length Max Speed Transit Speed Loiter Speed 4 hours
composition
Onstation
37.67 m 39.47 m 2.222 km
9 490 kts 490 kts 440 kts
123 ft 7 in 129 ft 6 in 1.380 miles

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
Raythoen AN/APY-10 Weapons bay: 5 stations up to 658 kg (1.450 lb) for
MK-46/50/54 torpedoes, bombs, mines
EO / IR System
L-3 Wescam MX-20HD 4 additional wing hardpoints (1.361 kg (3.000 lb) and
658 kg (1.450 lb)) for Harpoon missiles, bombs and mines
ESM
Northrop Grumman AN/ALQ-240(V)1 Sonobuoys
Three in-flight reloadable 10 round rotary sonobouy
Datalinks / FMV
launchers, three additional ‚single-shot‘ internal launchers
Link 11, 16. FMV capeable
with total capacity of 126 sonobuoys
Also equipped with Terma AN/ALG-123(V) with DIRCM counter-missiles system. Magnetic Anomaly Detection (MAD)
capability is not installed in the US or UK variants.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 123

 © Janes

CASA CN235
Countries
Ireland, Spain, Turkey

General Aircraft Data

Crew Transit Loiter
Wingspan Length Max Speed Ceiling Range
composition Speed Speed
2.732 miles
25.81 m 21.40 m 985 nm
245 kts 30.000 ft
84 ft 8,15 in 70 ft 2,5 in w/5.000 kg
payload

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
Thales Ocean Master unarmed
EO / IR System
AN/AAQ-21 Safire or BEA Systems MRT
ESM
Litton AN/ALR-93(V)4

Other Information
Maritime patrol and surveillance versions. In service with Spain (five, three Security Agency, two for Guardia Civil, of
which only one delivered to date) and Turkey for Maritime (nine: six for Navy, three for Coast Guard, assembled by TAI
at Ankara). In mid-1999, Turkey sought proposals from at least even potential integrators of surveillance systems to
provide radar, FLIR and an acoustics suite for naval CN235s; on 6 September 2002, contract valued at USD 350 million
signed with Thales covering supply and integration of AMASCOS (Airborne Maritime Situation and Control System)
,ission equipment. First flight of first modiefied aircraft (TCSG-551 of Coast Guard) took place on 18 June 2007; first
flight of of modified Navy aircraft (TCB-651) on 13 November 2008; all three Coast Guard and six Navy aircraft beeing
upgraded to Meltem II standard by Thales, which will install similar equipment on 10 Turkish Navy ATR 72-500ATR 72-
500 MPA aircraft in Meltem III project. First delivery, to Coast Guard, on 28 Jauary 2013. Both aircraft of Irish Corps up-
graded in 2007-08, including istallation of new radar and FLIR sensors as well as tactical dara management system, all
forming part of Airbus Military FITS (Fully Integrated Tactical System) mission equipment.
The CASA 295 is a stretched version of the CASA 265 and may be ASW modified (CN295 Persuader).

124 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © Janes

M-28 Bryza
Countries
Poland

General Aircraft Data

Crew Range with 3
Wingspan Length Max Speed Ceiling
composition hours Onstation
22.065 m 13.10 m
6 189 kts 19.700 ft 809 nm
72 ft 4.75 in 42 ft 11.75 in

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
ARS-800 X-band synthetic aperture radar Hand deployed bomb capability
EO / IR System Sonobuoys
FLIR inernally launched
Accoustic Suite
National bouy RF Processing
Datalinks / FMV
National Datalink
MAG-10 MAD system

Other Information
Poland has one ASW variant, the other Bryza in the Polish inventory are more traditional Maritime Surveillance. The
ASW variant ist reconfigured for special missions such as detection of objects on sea surface; lead-in and call-in search
and rescue; maritime patrol and submarine detection. Installed equipment to meet these objetives includes ventral
ARS-800-X-band synthetic aperture radar coupled with FLIR system; MAG-10 magnetic anomaly detector; radio-bouy
airdrop system with data receiving and precessing system; and national datalink system. To optimise radar perfor-
mance, the main landing gear has been modified to retract into the fuselage.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 125

 © Janes

ATR72
Countries
Italy (Maritime Surveillance version only), Turkey (ASW Variant)

General Aircraft Data

Crew Transit
Wingspan Length Max Speed Ceiling Endurance Range
composition Speed
6.5 hours
Onstation at
27.05 m 27.17 m
6-10 4275 kts 248 kts 82.000 ft 11 hr 200 nm
88 ft 9 in 89 ft 2 in
range from
base

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
AESA SELEX Galileo Sea Spray 7000E 4 hardpoints
Mk 46/54 torpedo
EO / IR System
Star Saphire
Datalinks / FMV
Link 11, Link 16
Laser and missile Warning system, Chaff/Flares

Other Information
The ATR 72 ASW (Anti-Submarine Warfare) is a multi-role, special mission aircraft based on the ATR 72-600 modern
regional turboprop aircraft from Alenia Aermacchi. The aircraft is designed to perform anti-submarine and anti-sur-
face warfare (ASuW) missions. It can also be deployed in maritime patrol, search and identification of submarines and
search and rescue (SAR) operations. Reconfiguration of the aircraft can take place to perform missions such as protec-
tion of territorial waters, anti-piracy, anti-smuggling, monitoring and intervening of environmental disasters. It can
also be used to protect the sea and coastline. The ATR 72 ASW has been selected by The Turkish Navy for maritime
patrol and personnel / cargo transportation. The Italian Navy meanwhile has acquired four ATR 72 MP variants of the
aircraft offering maritime patrol capabilities, along with future provisions for the ASW capabilities.
The ATR 72 MP serves as a low-cost, consistent, sea-surface surveillance platform for the military forces across the
world. The aircraft helps to detect, locate and rescue people from broken ships and aircraft. It offers cost-effective
surveillance and exclusive economic zone patrol and search-and-rescue (SAR). The side-looking airborne radar (SLAR)
installed on the aircraft helps to detect water pollution from long range and trace underwater activities close to the
sea surface. The Hyper Spectral Scanner (HSS) of the aircraft helps to find the type of polluting agent.

126 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © US Navy

MH-60R
NATO Countries
Denmark, United States of America
Non-NATO Countries
Australia, Japan

General Aircraft Data

Crew Main Rotor
Length Max Speed Ceiling Endurance
composition Diameter
1.6 hour
onstation with
16.4 m 19.8 m 50 nm radius
3 144 kts 14.847 ft
53 ft 8 in 64 ft 10 in Nominal 2.7
hours configured
for ASW

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
AN/APS-153 Multi-Mode Radar MK-46/50/54 Torpedoes, Hellfire Missiles.
4 weapons mounting stations.
EO / IR System
7.62 mm and 50 cal. guns
FLIR/NVG Capability
Sonobuoys
ESM
MH-60R has both the Airborne Low Frequncy Dipping
ESM with integrated avionics over a 1553 databus
Sonar (ALFS) and air launch sonobuoy capability
Datalinks/FMV
Link 16, FMV video stream to CDL/CV-TSC equipped units

Other Information
The MH-60R Seahwak helicopters are a significant upgrade over the LAMPS Mk-III (SH-60B). Employing mix of
sophisticated sensors, they are assuming the US Navy‘s primary anti-submarine and anti-surface warfare roles.The
MH-60 is designed to operate from frigates, destroyers, cruisers and aircraft carriers. Its state-of-the-art mission
system make it an integral part of the layered Task Force ASW defensive screen, and in a departure from the capabili-
ties of previous models of helicopters, can now be used in the search role, rather than being restricted primarily to
detect and engage.
Equipment and sensors may vary depending on the operating country.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 127

 © Janes

NH90 NFH (NATO Fregate Helo)

Countries
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Norway

General Aircraft Data

Crew Main Rotor Cruising
Length Max Speed Ceiling Endurance Range
composition Diameter Speed
16.30 m 19.54 m
4 157 kts 132 kts 6.005 mt 3 hr 20 min 491 n miles
53 ft 5.75 in 64 ft 1.15 in

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
European Navy Radar (ENR) 2 torpedoes (Sting Ray, Mk46, MU90)
(EADS Defence Electronics/Thales/Selex Galileo) 2 Air-to-Surface Missiles (Marte Mk2/S)
Machine guns
EO / IR System
Chaff/Flares
High focal-length tactical FLIR
EUROFLIR 410 sensor turret Sonobuoys
Sonobuoys storage, launch and processing system
ESM
Elettronica-ELT ALR-733 V(4)
Acoustic Suite
Alenia or Thales FLASH dipping sonar
Datalinks/FMV
Link 11

Other Information
Equipment and sensors may vary depending on the operating country and what level of system upgrades have
occured.

128 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

 © Janes

EH101 Merlin
Countries
Italy, Uinted Kingdom

General Aircraft Data

Crew Main Rotor Cruising
Length Max Speed Ceiling Endurance
composition Diameter Speed
18.59 m 22.8 m
4–5 167 kts 150 kts 4.570 km 5 hr
61 ft 74 ft 9.75 in

Aircraft Systems Payload

Radar Weapons
Selex Galileo Blue Kestrel 5000 4 torpedoes (Sting Ray, Mk46, MU90)
Selex Galileo APS-784 2 Air-to-Surface Missiles (Marte Mk2/S)
Machine guns
EO / IR System
Chaff/Flares
Selex Galileo GaliFLIR
Mk11 Depth Charges
BAE Systems MST-S
Sonobuoys
ESM
2 sonobuoys dispensers
Racal Orange Reaper ESM
Alenia SL/ALR-735 ESM Range
610 n miles (four tanks, offshore IFR equipped, with
Acoustic Suite
reserves)
L-3 HELRAS low frequency dipping sonar
750 n miles (five tanks, offshore IFR equipped, with
Thales AQS-950 ADS active dipping sonar
reserves)
Datalinks/FMV
Link 11

Other Information
Equipment and sensors may vary depending on the operating country and what level of system upgrades have
occured.

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 129

 APPENDIX D
GMTI 
Ground Moving Target Integration (Radar)
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AEW Airborne Early Warning IOC Initial Operations Capability

AMDC 
Air and Missile Defence Commander ISAR Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar
(CWC structure)
ISR 
Intelligence, Surveillance and Recon-
AOR Area of Responsibility naissance

ASWC 
Anti-Submarine Warfare Commander IUSS 
Integrated Undersea Surveillance
(CWC structure) System

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare JFACC 

Joint Force Air
Component Commander
ASUW Anti-Surface Warfare
JFMCC 
Joint Force Maritime Component
ATO Air Tasking Order Commander

CATOBAR Catapult Assisted Take-off Barrier JISR 

Joint Intelligence Surveillance and
Arrested Recovery Reconnaissance

CONOPS Concept of Operations JOA Joint Operations Area

CMAN Commander Maritime Air NATO LFAS Low Frequency Active Sonar

CSN Commander Submarines NATO MACA Maritime Air Control Authority

CTF Commander, Task Force MDR Median Detection range

CWC Composite Warfare Commander MOC Maritime Operations Centre

CVN Nuclear Powered Aircraft Carrier MMA Multi-Mission Aircraft

DD/DDG Destroyer/Guided Missile Destroyer MMSC 

Maritime Multi-Mission
Support Centre
DIFAR Directional Frequency and Ranging
(Passive) sonobuoy MPA Maritime Patrol Aircraft

DICASS Directional Calibrated Sonobuoy MPH 

Maritime Patrol Helicopter (ASW
System (Active) sonobuoy capable)

ELINT Electronic Intelligence MSA Maritime Situational Awareness

EXTAC Experimental Tactics RFI Radio Frequency Interference

130 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

ROE Rules of Engagement SS/SSK Diesel-Electric / Guided Missile Diesel
Electric Submarine
SAR Synthetic Aperture Radar
STOVL Short Take-Off Vertical Landing Aircraft
SIGINT Signals Intelligence Carrier (Amphibious Assault Ship)

SLBM Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile SUCAP 

Surface Combat Air Patrol

SLCM Submarine Launched Cruise Missile TACC 

Tactical Air Control Centre

SOSUS Sound Surveillance System TASWC Theatre ASW Commander

SSN Nuclear Powered Submarine TSC Tactical Support Centre

SSBN Nuclear Powered Ballistic Missile UAS Unmanned Aerial System

Submarine
UAV Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
SSGN Nuclear Powered Guided Missile
Submarine VLAD Vertical Line Array DIFAR (Sonobuoy)

JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016 131

 APPENDIX E
List of Figures
Figure 1) Comparison of Worldwide Aircraft
Carriers. Figure 25) OEF Strike Sorties by Service Through
Figure 2) Representation of a Typical Soviet SSBN December 2001.
Patrol. Figure 26) Comparison of Deaths from Anti-Ship
Figure 3) ASW Command and Control Torpedoes with Combat Deaths due to
(circa 1980 – 1982). other Weaponry in RegionalConflicts.
Figure 4) MACA Sigonella Unit Logo circa 2002. Figure 27) A Submarine Periscope is Sighted next
Figure 5) Resources of a Theatre ASW Commander. to a NATO Aircraft Carrier.
Figure 6) Network-Centric–Based ASW Force Figure 28) Notional Range Rings for a Kilo SSK
Coordination. Launched Kalibr Cruise Missile.
Figure 7) Notional TASWC Command Structure. Figure 29) MPA Inventory 1985–2016.
Figure 8) ‘Whiskey’ on the Rocks. Figure 30) Submarine Inventory Comparison
Figure 9) GBR Retired its NIMROD Fleet and Was 1985–2016.
Forced to Request NATO Assistance to Figure 31) The UK Scrapped its Complete Inven-
Track Russian Submarines. tory of the MR2 Nimrod and its Planned
Figure 10) A Borei class SSBN Sails for Sea Trials Replacement, the MRA-4, in 2011.
Figure 11) The Emblem of the Russian Federation Figure 32) View from the Cockpit of a Portuguese
Navy. P-3 Orion.
Figure 12) A Kilo Class SSK Type 636 Variant. Figure 33) Unit Patches from MPA Squadrons,
Figure 13) Disposition of the Russian Federation’s ASWOCS and ASW Bases which have
Submarine Fleet 2016. Decommissioned since 1995.
Figure 14) Relative Detectability of Submarines. Figure 34) Artists Conception of the Sea Hunter
Figure 15) A Kilo class SSK is Delivered by Ship to a USV Tracking a Submarine.
Foreign Buyer. Figure 35) STEEP Subcategories in the Maritime Air
Figure 16) Israeli Dolphin SSK (INS Tanin) at Kiel Dry ASW Community.
Docks. Figure 36) Defence Expenditures of NATO Nations
Figure 17) An Egyptian Type 209 SSK. Figure 37) Estimates of Ultimately Recoverable
Figure 18) PRC Song Class SSKs. Resources.
Figure 19) An Acoustic Operator Onboard a Figure 38) Shifting Global Economic Centre of
201 Squadron Nimrod Feb. 1975. Gravity.
Figure 20) Notional Depiction of Propagation Loss Figure 39) A French Atlantic-II Visits the Birdbath
Curves and the Convergence Zone after Tracking a Submarine.
Raypath. Figure 40) Fincastle Champions.
Figure 21) CAUTION: Bumpy Road Ahead Figure 41) ASW Rodeo Champions.
Figure 22) Notional Depiction of a Passive Figure 42) A Norwegian NH-90 Flies over a German
Sonobuoy Detection Range. Submarine in a NATO Exercise.
Figure 23) Multi-static Sonobuoys, Receiver and Figure 43) Temperature/Depth and Sound Velocity
Transmitter. Profile.
Figure 24) Satelites maybe used to Detect the Figure 44) Increase in Seaborne Trade.
Presence or Absence of Figure 45) Transmission Loss and Propagation
Submarines in Port. Curves.

132 JAPCC | Alliance Airborne Anti-Submarine Warfare | June 2016

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