Problems of Interpretation

Author(s): Robert C. Tucker

Source: Slavic Review, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring, 1983), pp. 80-84
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ROBERT C. TUCKER

Problemsof Interpretation

By titlea case study,J.ArchGetty'sessayis a contribution to the general

interpretiveliterature
on thepurges.It is implicitly criticalofmuchof existing
scholarship and offersa novelreconstruction ofthepurgesofthe1930s.I will
takeup a numberof thebroaderissuesposedin thisarticle.
A wordaboutthesourcesfirst. I agreewithGettythatweneedtotakemore
accountofwhatcan be learnedfromtheSmolensk Archive,theSovietpressof
thepurgeperiod,and othersourceshe mentions. But Getty'sbias againstthe
memoirliterature, evidentin his firstfootnoteand in his reconstruction of
events,is unfortunate.It is truethat"fewSovietmemoir writerswereso highly
placedas to be ableto describethecircleofhighpolitics."Butthosewhowere,
Khrushchev forexample,whose1956SecretSpeechand otherrelevantstate-
mentshave in partthe character of a memoir,and W. G. Krivitsky, whose
important memoir,In Stalin'sSecretService,goes unmentioned in Getty's
cannotproperly
listing, be disregarded to reconstruct
in an effort thehistory of
the purges.Nor can one ignoreRoy Medvedev'sindispensable Let History
Judge,a collection oforalhistory accounts,someofthembypeoplewhoheld
highofficesat the time.Furthermore, some who "saw the cataclysmfrom
below,"as forexampleF. Beck and W. Godin,wereable to gainsignificant
insightsintothemeaning ofthelargerprocessesofwhichtheywerevictims. 1So
thescholar,evenas he attendsto theArchiveandthepress,mustnotslightthe
memoirliterature. For thepurgedecisionsbelongedto "highpolitics,"and all
crediblesourcesofevidencemustreceivecloseattention. Naturally,all possible
criticalcautionshouldbe employedin usingthe memoirliterature.Thus,
A. Svetlanin'sDal'nevostochnyizagovor, whichGettycitesinhisfootnote1 as
testimony thatTukhachevskii, Gamarnikand othersreallydid organizean
anti-Stalinmilitaryconspiracy, has been persuasivelyexposedby an ex-Soviet
sourceas a forgery.2
Mysecondpointconcerns thematterofperiodization and therelatedkey
issueof thepurposesof thepurges.GettywritesthatFainsod"describedthe
periodfrom1933to 1939as an 'almostcontinuous purge'intheWestern Region,
culminating in the'smashing crescendo'of trialsand policeterrorof the 1937
Ezhovshchina," andsaysthat"thisconceptual framework hasdominated nearly
all viewsof the periodand is based on the idea thatafter1933 a steadily
increasingand plannedlevel of 'purging'was accompaniedby a similarly
increasing atmosphere of fearand panicforall."3

1. F. Beck and W. Godin, Russian Purge and Extractionof Confession(London, 1951).

2. A. Svetlanin,Dal'nevostochnyizagovor(Frankfurt/Main:Possev,1953);A. Rollin,"Che-
kistskaia
fantastika,"NicolaevskyCollection,HooverInstitutionArchives,Stanford,California.
3. Fainsod'spositionis notquiteaccurately
presentedhere.Getty'snote29, to thispassage,
referstopp. 57-58and222-30ofFainsod'sSmolensk UnderSovietRule(NewYork:Vintage,1958).
Thephraseshegivesinquotation marks(savefor"purge"insteadof"purges")appearina sentence
of Fainsod'sp. 222 thatreads:"The assassination
of Kirovin December1934touchedoffa new
roundofalmostcontinuous purgeswhichspreadoutinever-widening circlesandroseto a smashing
crescendoin thevirtualdestruction of theoblastPartyleadershipin 1937."Thus,the timeof

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Problemsof Interpretation 81

Gettycounters thatidea withtheviewthatthereweretwodistinct phases,

from1933to 1936and from1936to 1939,characterized bytwoquitedifferent
processes.The first phasesaw the1933purge,the1935"Verification of Party
Documents," and the1936"Exchangeof PartyDocuments."Thesewere"or-
ganizational-administrative operations ratherthanpoliticalwitchhunts."They
were"nonpolitical," "administrative purges"undertaken as "attempts to deal
withinefficiency," with"confusion and 'clutter'in theparty'sbookkeeping."
The subsequent"Ezhov terror,"on the otherhand,was a police operation
growing outofa "central-regional conflict
havinglittleto do withtheopposition
orwithKirov."In thecourseofit,"thecentertriedtocontrol andrationalize the
regional administrations.Conflict sharpened as thecenterbecamefrustrated and
local officialsbeganto fearusurpation bythecenterof theirprerogatives and
autonomy. The conflicteruptedin theEzhovshchina and thebureaucracy was
destroyed."
While,as I shallargue,Getty'sviewis profoundly flawed,he is on strong
groundinhisemphasison theneedto distinguish phasesinthedevelopment of
eventsfrom1933to 1939.He mightwellhavenoted,however,thatnumerous
earlierscholarshave made thisdistinction, if not in his way. Thus Fainsod
himself describestheterror, whichhe datesfromtheKirovmurder(notfrom
1933) as movingthroughthreephases: fromDecember1934 to Yagoda's
removalin September 1936;fromthento July1938("thecrescendo");andthe
finalphaseof winding downunderBeria.4
Turning nowto Getty'sinterpretation, I wantfirstto questiontheidea that
the1933purge- granted thatitstargets wereatthelowerlevel- wasa purely
nonpolitical partyhousekeeping effort. The purgedecisionwas takenon the
basisofStalin'sCentralCommittee plenumspeechofJanuary 7, 1933,inwhich
he stressedtheneed forvigilanceagainstenemiesand demandedexpulsionof
"double-dealers" fromtheparty;and thefirst twoof sixcategoriesslatedfor
expulsion,mentioned in theCentralCommittee's purgedirective of April28,
1933,were"classalienand hostileelements"and "double-dealers wholiveby
deceiving theparty."We mayinferthatpartycriticsof Stalinand hispolicies
wereat leastone of thetargetsof thepurge.
Next,and thisis a veryseriousissue,is Getty'sdisregardof the Kirov
murder on December1, 1934as a keyturning pointmarking thestartofa new
phase - theterroritself.For ifthe Kirov murder marked the beginning ofthe
terror,Getty'scharacterization of 1933-36as a periodof nonpolitical party
purgesconducted foradministrative reasonscannotbe maintained. Evidencefor
thisdate as the starting pointof the terroris providedby the widespread
denunciation meetings,expulsions, andarrests thattookplaceshortly afterthe

ever-intensifying
terror butfromDecember1,
is datedbyFainsodnotfrom1933,as Gettysuggests,
1934,whenKirovwas murdered.
4. MerleFainsod,How RussiaIs Ruled,rev.ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: HarvardUniversity
Press,1963),pp. 439-42.ForT. H. Rigby'sextremely division
illuminating oftheterror
periodinto
phases, see his CommunistParty Membershipin the U.S.S.R. 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton
University pp. 212-14.In Stalin:TheManandHis Era (NewYork:Viking,
Press,1968),especially
1973),p. 388,AdamB. Ulamdescribes phaseoftheGreatTerror."In
1934-36as "thepreliminary
my own work in preparation,Stalin and Soviet Russia: RevolutionFrom Above 1929-1939, the
to distinguish
to August1936is calledthe"quietterror"
periodfromKirov'smurder it fromthe
thatbeganaboutthetimeof thefirst
terror
unbridled greatshowtrialin August1936.

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82 Slavic Review
murder andcausedpolitically consciouspeopleofthattimeto feel,as Eugenia
Ginzburg expressed itintheopeningwordsofJourney intotheWhirlwind, that
"theyear1937began,to all intents and purposes,at theend of 1934- to be
exact,on thefirst of December."
These denunciations, expulsions, and arreststook place in obedienceto
secretordersfromStalin'sCentralCommittee offices, whichimmediately after
Kirov'smurder circulateda closedletteron "LessonsoftheEventsBoundUp
WiththeEvil Murderof ComradeKirov"instructing thepartyorganizations
everywhere to holdmeetings of partycellsto discusstheletterand to plan a
vigilancecampaignagainst"alienelements."5 This letterwas followedby the
secretcircularletterofMay 13,1935on the"Verification ofPartyDocuments."
To countertheidea thattheverification was a further stepin thedeveloping
terroristic
purge,Gettycitesa Sovietsourcesayingthatthepurge/verification
was plannedin November1934,thatis, beforetheKirovmurder.He assumes
thatStalindidnotknowthatKirovwasgoingtobe killedinthenearfuture. But
we maysupposethatStalinand Ezhov,who plannedthe purge/verification,
knewin November1934thatKirov'sdayswerenumbered.This supposition
implies,ofcourse,thatStalinwas responsible forKirov'sassassination and the
ensuingterrorin Russia. I believe,however,thatevidenceon the historical
recordestablishes thisfactbeyondreasonabledoubt.6
Testimony frommemoirsourcesshowsthatas earlyas 1935manyparty
members werelivingin fearand thatexpulsions and arrestsof so-called"ene-
mies" were takingplace here and thereon the basis of the denunciations
demandedbyStalin'sheadquarters. Thecircular letterofMay 13inviteddenun-
ciationsbysayinginitssecondparagraph: "A check-up has disclosednumerous
casesinwhichenemiesofthepartyandworking classmadeuseoftheiraccessto
partydocuments, obtainedpartycardsandundertheircoverengagedinthefoul
workofundermining thecauseofthepartyandSovietstate."7Clearly,political
repressionas wellas partybookkeeping wasinprogress, andeventhelatterwas
of realpoliticalimportance to Stalinand Ezhovbecausetheyneededaccurate
partymembership information in preparationforthecomingnewphaseofthe
GreatPurgewhichtheywerethenplanning.By December1935,whenthe
verification
was four-fifthscomplete,ninepercentof partymembers had been
expelled.8Meanwhile,therumbleof politicalpurgethunder was heardin the
May1935decreeabolishing theSocietyofOld Bolsheviks, whichreportedly was
gathering signatures on a petitionagainstthe deathpenaltyin cases against
5. Fainsod,Smolensk, p. 222."TheKirovmeetings," addsFainsod,"providedtheoccasionfor
a massoutburst ofdenunciationsandtheaccumulation oflonglistsofsuspects
manyofwhomwere
soondestinedto be expelledfromtheParty."
6. However,evenif one does notviewtheKirovmurderas Stalin'sdoing,thateventstill
figuredas theturning
pointtowardtheterror. ThusUlam,whodoesnotconsider Stalinresponsible
forthemurder, nevertheless
seesit (see n. 4 above)as inauguratingthe"preliminaryphaseofthe
GreatTerror."
7. SmolenskArchive,WKP499,citedbyFainsod,whonotesin thisconnection (Smolensk,
p. 223) thatprotocolsof partymeetings in theWesternRegion,heldin responseto a Central
Committee ofJune27, 1935,whichrebukedtheregion'spartyleadersfortheirinade-
resolution
quateresponseto theMayletter'sorders,"register a moodof mounting hysteria."
8. Rigby,Communist PartyMembership, p. 297.Rigbyherecitesa progressreviewofAugust
1935published in Partiinoe whichcastigated
stroitel'stvo, partyofficials
"whohad underestimated
thepolitical
importance ofthe'verification,"'andhe notes(p. 209)thattotalpartymembership fell
byabout300,000in 1935and200,000in 1936.

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Problemsof Interpretation 83

ex-oppositionists(Zinov'ev,Kamenevand others)whoat thetimewerebeing

linkedin thepresswiththeKirovmurder,9 and in thefallfromgraceof the
prominent Old Bolshevik Abel' Enukidze,a victimofthecomingpurge.10 And
notto see a politicalandindeeda witch-hunting dimension inthe"Exchangeof
PartyDocuments" of1936istodisregard publicpronouncements ofthetime,for
examplePravda'seditorial ofMarch15,1936callingforleniencetowardpeople
expelledfromthe party(in connectionwiththe exchange)for reasonsof
"passivity" and forseverity and vigilancein "purging thepartyof enemyand
alienelements."
Thus,Getty'sthesisthatthepurgeof1933,theverification of1935,andthe
exchangeof 1936shouldbe seenas "organizational-administrative operations"
ratherthanpoliticalones,coupledwithhisprotestagainstthe"blurring ofthis
fundamental distinction,"does notholdup whenwe examinefactualevidence
showing thattheseoperations werepoliticalas wellas organizational-adminis-
trativeinpurposeandeffect. Thevigilancecampaign thatStalinlaunchedinthe
wakeoftheKirovmurder made1935andthefirst halfof1936a timeoffearand
repression formanyat lowerlevels.Then,in thesummer of 1936,aroundthe
timeof theZinov'ev-Kamenev showtrialin August,a newphase,the Great
Terror,started.
A further majorissueconcerns Getty'sinterpretationoftheGreatTerroras
a police actionto crushlocal partysatrapswho had hitherto more or less
successfullyresistedandsabotagedthecenter's efforts
to "correct administrative
chaos"through, forinstance, theverificationand exchange.If we ask what,in
hisview,thepurgesandterror ofthe1930swereall about,theansweremerging
fromhisessayis thattheywerebasicallyaboutpublicadministration, withthe
centerstriving to controland rationalize, eventually bypoliceterror,and the
localitiesseekingto preserve"theirprerogatives and autonomy."Justwhat
theseprerogatives wereandwhythelocalpartyleaderswouldhavewantedto
preservetheirautonomy byperpetuating administrative chaos,Gettydoes not
say.Nordoeshe referto thedimension ofnationalautonomy, as he mighthave
done,considering thespecialsavagerythattheGreatTerrorvisiteduponthe
leaderships oftheminority nationsin theborderland republics."We are leftin
the darkconcerning the motivation of the regionalpeople in the postulated
"central-regionalconflict."
Beforethe repression of the regionalleaderships in 1937-38,therewas
undoubtedly quiet local resistanceof varyingkindand degreeto the purge

9. "Letterofan Old Bolshevik," PowerandtheSovietElite(NewYork:

inBorisI. Nicolaevsky,
Praeger,1965),p. 56.
to say,as Gettydoes,that"1935wasa relatively
10. It is inaccurate calmyearfortheformer
opposition." His footnoteto thesentence containingthisstatementreads:"The 'Letterofan Old
Bolshevik,' forexample,notesthatthesuddentrialofZinov'evand Kamenevin 1936was a bolt
from thebluewhichcameaftera periodof'calmandconfidence' However,the
fortheopposition."
"calmandconfidence" ofwhichthe"Letter"speaks(onp. 26,citedbyGetty)is thatofthe"political
elite"or "officercorpsof theCommunist Party"and notthatof theformer opposition.
11. ThishasledM. Agursky ("TheBirthofByelorussia," Supplement,
TimesLiterary June30,
1972,p. 743) to suggestthattheGreatPurgewas in significant parta "nationaltransformation"
whereby variousnationalminority elementsthatgainedstrength duringand afterthe Russian
Revolution wererepressed in favorof theGreatRussianelement.For a criticalexamination of
Augursky's thesis,see RoyA. Medvedev,On Stalinand Stalinism (Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,1979),pp. 112-14.

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84 Slavic Review

pressures reflected in thesecretcircularlettersemanating fromStalin'shead-

quarters. Speakingofthesituation inmid-1935, forinstance,RobertConquest
writesthat"manyof theprovincial committees werestillheadedbymenwho
draggedtheirfeet."'2A likelyreasonforthisfoot-dragging mayhavebeenthe
local leaders'understandable fearof thepossiblelaterimplications forthem-
selvesandthosecloseto themofnumerous provencasesofmasked"enemies"
havinggone undetected fora longwhilein theirbailiwicks.If, on the other
hand,theyresponded tothepressures fromthecenterbygoingalloutinpurging
peoplein theirlocalities,as also happened,theywereopen to thechargesof
heartlessness thatStalin,Zhdanovandothersdulybrought againstthemin1937,
1938,and1939.Theseaspectswillonlybecomeclearifwe takeintoaccountthe
politicaldimensions of thepurgeprocessat everystage.
Finally,Getty'sreconstructionoftheGreatTerroras theviolentresolution
ofa central-regional conflict
thathadbeenbuilding up encounters theobjection
thattheterror of1937-38wasdirected as muchagainstthecentralinstitutionsof
theparty-state as againsttheregionalleadership.The massacreofthemilitary
leadership inmid-1937, towhichGettyrefers, wasonlyonemajormanifestation
of theprocessbywhichthevariousleadersat thecenter,including thepolice
leadership itself,wereheavilyrepressed. The Commissariat ofHeavyIndustry,
othercentersof economicadministration downto theCommissariat of Water
Transport to whichEzhovwas shuntedafterStalindismissed himin late 1938,
the Commissariat of ForeignAffairs,the centralKomsomolapparatus,the
Comintern apparatus,themajorpressorgansand culturalinstitutions wereall
amongthosedeeplyaffected byStalin'sterrorin thisclimactericphase.These
factshardlysupportan interpretation oftheGreatTerrorin primarily central-
regionalterms.
In conclusion, I do notthinkit reflects
an unduebiographical bias on my
partto suggestthatno interpretation thattakesas littleaccountofStalin- his
motivesand his politics- as thisone does can meetthe needsof historiog-
raphy.In thisconnection, Getty'squestion- ifStalinplannedtheGreatTerror
in advance,whydidhe notcarryitout"immediately andquietlywithhislethal
police?"- suggestsa failureto comprehend not only Stalinas a political
personality but also the difficulties
and dangershe facedin implementing so
far-reaching a transformationoftheSovietregimeas thatwhichhe managedto
carryout duringthe 1930sin thestage-by-stage waythathe did.

12. Robert Conquest, The Great Terror:Stalin's Purge of the Thirties,rev. ed. (New York:
Collier Books, 1973), p. 127.

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