The controversy over water distribution of Indus River System (IRS) between provinces started in 1921

when British rulers started developing irrigation system with construction of new barrages, canals and
dams. Government of India appointed various committees to defuse the water issue between provinces.
Following committees and commissions were set up for apportionment of the Waters of the IRS
between provinces:  Tripartite Agreement (1921)  Indus Discharge Committee (1921)  SVP Inquiry
Committee (1932)  Anderson Committee (1937) South Asian Studies 28 (1) 10  Rao Commission (1945)
 Akhtar Hussain Committee (1968)  Fazle-e-Akbar Committee (1970)  Chief Justices Commission
(1977)  Haleem Commission (1983)

The Tripartite Agreement (1921) The first agreement between Punjab province, Bahawalpur and
Bikaner States was signed in 1921. It was for sharing waters of the Sutlej and Beas rivers. Bahawalpur
State protested against the allocation of water supplies to the non-riparian Bikaner State on the ground
that the water was insufficient to meet the needs of the two riparian Punjab and Bahawalpur State. The
Government of India persuaded the Punjab, Bahawalpur and Bikaner States to sign the tripartite
agreement. The agreement was based on three widely recognized water-right principles as below: 1.
Priority of existing use 2. Recognition of claims of riparian owners, and 3. Equitable apportionment
regardless of history of use or of geographical location

The Indus Discharge Committee (1921) Government of Bombay (Sindh was also part of Bombay
presidency till 1935) objected to Punjab’s proposals for new projects. States of Bahawalpur and Bikaner
were also claiming for more water supplies. Different claims from Punjab and Sindh were referred to the
Secretary of State London. He sanctioned construction of Sutlej Valley Project (SVP) and Sukkur Barrage
with seven canals. Decision on the other projects was deferred till after more reliable river flow data was
available (Federal Planning cell, 1990). In response to appeals and counter claims by Sindh and Punjab,
Government of India appointed the ‘Indus Discharge Committee’ in 1921. The committee planned to
observe daily discharge at various sites on the rivers and canals in the Indus Plains. To improve the
availability of hydrological data for these and other projects under consideration, the Government of
India recommended to the provincial government a comprehensive network of gauge and discharge
observation sites at all important sites along the Indus and its tributaries. Arrangements were also made
between Sindh and Punjab to cooperate in discharge observations and in methods of keeping their
record. Sindh was also allowed to post resident engineers to monitor river and canal discharge in
Punjab. The committee recommended project of Haveli Canal and pointed out that future projects
proposed by Punjab should be considered by taking into account the possible impact on Sindh water
rights. A two member ‘Nicholson Trench Iram Khalid & Ishrat Begum Hydro Politics in 11 Committee’
was appointed to study the feasibility of Bhakra dam. In 1930, the committee in its report cleared
Bhakra for construction.

SVP Inquiry Committee (1932) Actual operations of SVP canals revealed that there was storage of
supplies, especially in early Kharif because actual river flows fell short of requirements. A committee was
appointed in 1932 to look into the problem. It recommended exclusion of some areas in Bahawalpur
State, construction of new feeder canals and adjustment in the command areas of certain canals
(Federal Planning cell, 1990)
Anderson Committee (1935) By the 1932, all the 11 SVP canals with four barrages and Sukkur Barrage
project were completed. A number of problems arose with the operation of these canal networks.
Bahawalpur and Khairpur States sought additional supplies. Punjab also asked for more water for Haveli
project. In 1935, Government of India formed ‘Committee of the Central Board of Irrigation on
Distribution of Waters of the Indus and Tributaries’- known as the “Anderson Committee”. It comprised
representatives of K.PK , Bikaner, Khairpur and Government of India. It had eight experts to look into the
matter and find a solution. The committee submitted its report in 1937. It increased irrigation supplies
for Haveli and Thal projects. As regards Bhakra Dam, an agreement had already been reached between
the governments of Bombay and Punjab in 1934. The report cleared Haveli canal project which was
started in 1934 and completed in 1939. Construction of Kalabagh Barrage and Thal canal was started in
1939. But due to outbreak of World War II, it was not commissioned till January, 1947.

Rao Commission (1945) After the implementation of Government of India Act 1935, the development
of river waters became a provincial subject. Provinces were free to plan and undertake any work for
development of river waters passing through its territory. The Governor-General could intervene only on
receiving complaint by one province against the other. On receipt of complaint by Government of Sindh
against Punjab’s proposal for increased withdrawals from the rivers passing through its territory,
Government of India appointed a Commission named ‘Rao Commission’ in September 1941. The
commission had two chief engineers namely P.B Hickey and E.H Chave as its members. Terms of
reference of the commission were to South Asian Studies 28 (1) 12 “investigate effects of water
withdrawals on lowering of water levels in Sindh to result from storing water in Bhakra Reservoir and
from withdrawals sanctioned for Haveli, Thal and Sutlej Valley Canals” (Malik,2011 pp. 70). The Rao
Commission submitted its report in July 1942. The commission established priority for the allocation of
water for Paharpur canal and also confirmed allocations for the Thal and Sukkur schemes as
recommended by the Anderson Committee. The commission found that upstream withdrawals would
adversely affect operation of inundation canals in Sindh, especially during September. The best way to
counteract this effect was to construct barrages at Guddu and Kotri. The Commission also
recommended that “compensation should be paid to the Sindh from Punjab province for damages likely
to result from upstream withdrawals” (Malik, 2011, pp.70). Its findings and recommendations however
were neither accepted by Punjab nor by Sindh. At this stage negotiation were opened between the two
chief engineers of Sindh and Punjab to find a solution and reach an agreement. After prolonged
negotiations between Sindh and Punjab, a draft agreement was drawn in September 1945. It was
subject to settlement of the financial phase of the dispute with respect to sharing of waters of the Indus
and Punjab rivers.

Indus Water Treaty (1960) On 14 August1947, when Indian Sub-continent was divided in to two
independent countries, there existed one of the most highly developed irrigation system in the world.
The boundary line between the two countries was drawn without any respect to the irrigation work. Just
after the creation of Pakistan, India stopped water on April 1, 1948 in the Pakistan Canals off-taking from
rivers Ravi, Beas and Sutlej, who’s Headwork, were located in India. (Ali, 1973). This gave rise to a
serious first water dispute with India, which was ultimately resolved through the good offices of the
World Bank and Indus Water Treaty (IWT) was signed with India in 1960. The Treaty gave exclusive
water rights of the three eastern rivers namely Ravi, Beas and Sutlej to India, while the water rights of
the three western rivers namely; Indus, Jhelum and Chenab were allocated to Pakistan except for some
specified uses in the occupied State of Jammu & Kashmir. Pakistan was required to meet the needs of
eastern river canals from the western rivers by constructing the suitable replacement works comprising
storage dams and inter-river transfer links. These works were to be completed by Pakistan in a period of
ten years i.e., from 1960 to 1970, then after that period, India was given right to stop water flowing to
Pakistan in the three eastern rivers (Ghani, 2009). Iram Khalid & Ishrat Begum Hydro Politics in 13

Akhtar Hussain Committee (1968) A Water Allocation and Rates Committee were constituted by the
Government of West Pakistan (one unit) in May 1968. It was called Akhtar Hussain Committee after the
name of its chairman. Its terms of reference included: review barrage water allocations, reservoir
release patterns, drawdown levels and use of ground water in relation to surface water deliveries
(Government of the Punjab, 2002). However the committee submitted its report on 30 June, 1970. One
Unit was dissolved splitting West Pakistan into four provinces. And this report could not attain any
attention.

Justice Fazle Akbar Committee (1970-71) Pakistan Government set up a committee on October 15,
1970, chaired by former justice Fazle Akbar of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The Committee was to
recommend apportionment of water allocations of groundwater and its coordinate use with flow
supplies and reasonable water requirements of the provinces for agriculture, industrial and other uses.
The committee submitted its report to the government in 1971. No decision was taken on the report. In
the meanwhile ad hoc distribution of waters stored by Chashma Barrage and later Terbela Reservoir was
ordered among the provinces. Seasonal ad hoc distribution of waters stored by the two reservoirs
continued till coming into effect of Water Apportionment Accord in 1991 as noted presently.

Chief Justices’ Commission (1977) Government of Pakistan in 1977 constituted a commission to

examine the issue of water apportionment. The commission comprised all chief justices of the four
provincial High Courts and was chaired by the chief Justice of Supreme Court of Pakistan. Its report
however remained pending with the government till the Water Apportionment Accord came into effect
in 1991. Haleem Committee (1983) This commission conducted the hearing of the case within limited
framework and submitted its report to the president of Pakistan in the end of the April 1983(Siddique,
2003). The issue of water distribution could not be resolved and provinces received irrigation supplies
through ad hoc distribution of Indus waters notified by Federal Govt. for each period/season of the year.
South Asian Studies 28 (1) 14

Water Apportionment Accord (1991) The government of Pakistan appreciating the urgency of the
matter approved the water Apportionment Accord on March 16, 1991. It was approved by the council of
common interest on March 21, 1991. According to the water Apportionment Accord, share of each
province, both for Kharif and Rabi and allocation of balance supplies was allocated in maf as given in
Table 1. The main clauses of Water apportionment Accord (1991) are given as follow:  It supersedes all
previous sharing arrangements and agreements arrived at in this regard.  It protects the existing uses of
canal water in each province.  It apportions the balance river supplies including flood surpluses and
future storage amongst the provinces.  It recognizes the need for constructing new storages wherever
feasible on the Indus and other rivers for planned future agriculture development.  It also recognizes
the need for certain minimum escapage to sea below Kotri to check sea intrusion for which further
studies are to be undertaken.  It lays down the procedures for sharing shortage and surpluses on all
Pakistan bases.  The need to establish an Indus River System Authority for implementation of the
Accord was recognized and accepted. It would have representation from all the four Provinces.  The
balance river supplies including flood supplies and future storages are allocated as: 37% for Punjab, 37%
for Sindh, 14% for K.PK and 12% for Baluchistan

Introduction In the immediate aftermath of the partition of the subcontinent between

the two independent states of Pakistan and India, the issue of water distribution in the
Indus basin gained immediate urgency for the Pakistani government and the populace.
The partition left the headworks of two important canal systems in Indian territory and
the command areas in Pakistani territory.

Standstill Agreement and BRBD Link Canal To address the water sharing issue, a
"standstill agreement" was concluded between the two countries, which maintained
existing flows until March 31, 1948, to allow time for a longer-term settlement. However,
the agreement lapsed without settlement, and the provincial government of Indian
Punjab suspended supplies to Pakistan. This led to the initiation of the Bombanwala-
Ravi-Bedian-Dipalpur (BRBD) link canal project by the Pakistani water bureaucracy.

Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) Under the active mediation and financial support of the
World Bank and the Western powers, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty
(IWT) in 1960. The treaty allocated the three eastern tributaries (Ravi, Sutluj, and Beas) to
India and the three western tributaries (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan. The
World Bank provided aid to both countries to build storage and conveyance facilities for
remedial water supplies.

Geopolitical Context and Resource Allocation The resources for water storage and
diversion facilities were made available in the geopolitical context of the Cold War.
Pakistan's alignment with the U.S.-led Western military alliances and India's membership
in the Non-Aligned Movement influenced the resources provided by the Western allies,
led by the United States, to both countries.

Treaty Features and Conflict The IWT was a trilateral treaty between India, Pakistan,
and the World Bank. It divided the basin between the two countries without
emphasizing meaningful cooperative management or sharing. The treaty granted India
limited use of the three western rivers, which caused conflict. The IWT provided specific
coordination mechanisms through the Indus Commission for dispute resolution.
Technical Annexures and Interpretation The IWT included extensive technical
annexures that Pakistani engineers interpret literally, while Indian engineers focus on the
treaty's criteria for project design. The limitations on structures with movable gates and
substantial storage on projects upstream of Pakistan have been points of contention.

Hydropolitical Implications and Defensive Infrastructure The massive water

development projects following the IWT provided temporary benefits to agricultural
water supplies. However, one significant hydropolitical implication was the capacity of
the two governments to build infrastructure with security implications. Canals were
recognized as defensive infrastructure, influencing military planning in both countries.

Military Functionality of Canals The alignment and operation of canals, such as the
BRBD canal and the Indira Gandhi Canal, took into account defensive considerations.
Canals have been utilized for military exercises and simulated flooding, compromising
their primary function as irrigation water suppliers.
Dispute Resolution under the IWT Rubric

Introduction The Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has managed to survive wars and military
mobilizations between India and Pakistan. However, disputes arising from the treaty
reveal the nationalist-driven hydropolitics of the basin and the supply-side engineering
bias of the water managers in both countries.

Disputes over Projects Disagreements emerged over Indian plans to build the Salal
hydroelectric project on the Chenab River. Although the project was eventually accepted
by Pakistan in the 1970s, the Tulbul/Wullar project on the Jhelum River and the Baglihar
hydroelectric project on the Chenab River became prolonged sources of disagreement.
The Baglihar project led Pakistan to invoke the arbitration clause in the IWT for the first
time in 2005.

Baglihar Project Dispute Pakistan objected primarily to the technical specifications of

the Baglihar project, which was a run-of-the-river project without dams or storage. The
objections arose in 1999 when changes in the project's design were made without
consulting Pakistan. Pakistan viewed these changes as an attempt by India to dam the
Chenab River, while India saw it as another example of Pakistan's negativism towards
Indian projects. The dispute revealed different interpretations of the treaty by engineers
from both countries.

Technical Objections and Security Concerns Pakistan's objections to projects like

Baglihar are informed by security concerns, such as India's potential to control water
during low-flow winter months or cause flooding during high-flow months. India argues
that it cannot flood Pakistan without flooding itself first, that the projects are necessary
for the development of Jammu and Kashmir, and that design elements are vital for
safety and viability. The neutral expert appointed by the World Bank gave a binding
decision on the Baglihar dispute in 2007, allowing the project to proceed with some
design changes.

Pakistan's Objections and Public Opinion Pakistan's objections to Indian projects on

the western rivers are often based on a literal reading of the IWT. These objections are
influenced by security concerns but are also shaped by public opinion. The highly
emotive nature of the issue makes it difficult for Pakistani engineers to evaluate projects
on their technical merits alone. Pakistan's possessiveness about the western rivers is not
unfounded, considering India's cumulative storage capacity and the potential to limit
water flows during low-flow winter months.

Rescinding the Treaty and Kishenganga-Jhelum Project There were discussions in

India about rescinding the IWT in 2002 due to "cross-border terrorism," but the expert
view favored its continuation. The Kishenganga-Jhelum run-of-the-river hydroelectric
project has raised tensions recently. Pakistan is irked by India's lack of transparency
regarding project specifications and flow data. Data quality and accessibility are at the
heart of the conflict between the two countries.

Conclusion The IWT has its limitations, and the disputes highlight the trust deficit and
nationalist agendas between India and Pakistan. While the treaty moderates their worst
impulses, it leaves ecological and social consequences to be negotiated and contested
at the subnational level, negatively impacting the Indus basin's ecology and societies.
Subnational Hydropolitics

Introduction Subnational hydropolitics in both India and Pakistan have been sources of
political tension and conflict. In India, disputes over interstate water distribution
between Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan played a role in a destructive separatist
insurgency in Punjab. In Pakistan, conflicts over water distribution between the
dominant Punjab province and smaller provinces, particularly Sindh province, have
remained peaceful but could have future repercussions.

Historical Overview of Interprovincial Water Conflict in Pakistan The interprovincial

conflict over water allocation in Pakistan dates back to the massive canal construction by
the British in the Punjab in the mid-nineteenth century. The 1945 water allocation treaty
between Punjab and Sindh allocated 75% of the waters of the main-stem Indus River to
Sindh and 25% to Punjab. However, with the partition of the Subcontinent and the
signing of the Indus Waters Treaty, Punjab's share of the Indus basin waters was mostly
allocated to India. This allocation was perceived by Sindhis as a loss of their rightful
share of water.

Groundwater Issues and Salinity Groundwater plays a significant role in Pakistan,

supplying almost 50% of the country's crop-water requirements. However, extensive
groundwater pumping has led to problems of waterlogging and salinity, affecting 4.5
million hectares of land, particularly in Sindh. Salinity and waterlogging reduce
agricultural productivity and exacerbate water scarcity issues.

The Dam Controversy The controversy over the construction of the Kalabagh Dam on
the Indus River in Punjab has become a surrogate for Sindhi grievances against the
Punjabi-dominated system in Pakistan. Sindh fears that the dam will further appropriate
its rightful share of water and negatively impact the Indus Delta's ecology and
livelihoods. The controversy polarizes public opinion, with proponents arguing for more
storage and mega-projects while critics advocate for improved efficiency and
sustainable water management practices.

Recent Developments in the Subnational Water Debate Efforts to diffuse tensions

and improve interprovincial water management include the installation of a telemetry
system in 2004 to provide real-time flow data. However, the system has faced
challenges and has not effectively addressed concerns, particularly in Sindh. Tensions
persist over the opening and closure of link canals and water theft in Punjab, leading to
water scarcity in Sindh. The media's coverage of the debate and the inclusion of wider
social, cultural, environmental, and equity-related concerns could contribute to resolving
the issue.

The Impact of Flooding and Reevaluation The devastating floods in Pakistan in 2010
brought attention to the highly regulated river channels and irrigation system
management procedures. There are concerns that a singular focus on maximizing water
withdrawals and river regulation may have contributed to exacerbating flood peaks. The
floods call for a comprehensive reevaluation of the water-management system,
considering the balance between benefits and hazards and achieving more equitable
water distribution spatially and socially.

Conclusion Subnational hydropolitics in India and Pakistan have had significant political
implications. The conflicts over water distribution between provinces in both countries
highlight the need for comprehensive and sustainable water management practices,
considering the ecological, social, and cultural dimensions. Balancing the interests of
different regions and stakeholders is crucial to avoiding conflicts and ensuring the
equitable and efficient use of water resources
 Water conflict and cooperation between
India and Pakistan
Water disputes between India and Pakistan are deepening. For almost sixty
years the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) survived diplomatic tensions but recent
upstream water infrastructure projects have rekindled conflicts. Meanwhile, the
territorial conflict over Kashmir threatens to undermine the treaty. The worsening
effects of climate change on the Himalayan glaciers could increase the likelihood
of disasters and threaten the long-term water security of communities. These
factors all have implications for future interstate cooperation and regional
developments.
Time
 1947 - ongoing
Intensity
Conflict country
 India
 Pakistan
Resource
 Water
Fragility risks

Content

 CONCEPTUAL MODEL
 CONFLICT HISTORY
 ACTORS
 CONFLICT RESOLUTION
 RESILIENCE AND PEACE BUILDING
Conceptual Model
Climate ChangeEnvironmental ChangeFragility and Conflict RisksIntermediary
MechanismsSocial and Economic DriversGradual Change in Temperature and/or
PrecipitationIncreased Water ScarcityInfrastructure DevelopmentChange in
Access / Availability of Natural ResourcesInterstate Tensions
CONFLICT HISTORY
For over a half century, rivalry over river resources has been a source of
interstate tension between India and Pakistan (Wirsing & Jasparro, 2006). During
the partition of British India in 1947 and the formation of the two states, border
lines were drawn following what was defined as the “Indus watershed” (Gardner,
2019). The position of the lines meant that India gained control of upstream
barrages, which regulated water flow into Pakistan (TBL, 2014). As the boundary
between India and Pakistan cut across many of the river’s tributaries, an
upstream-downstream power structure emerged, which has been the source of
tensions between the two countries, particularly in response to dam projects in
Indian-administered territory (see Kishanganga Dam conflict).

The Indus’ transboundary course

Glaciers and tributaries originating in the high mountains of the Ngari Prefecture
in western Tibet, the Himalayas, Hindu Kush in Afghanistan and the Karakoram
feed the extensive Indus river system. Its floodplain, where most of Pakistan’s
population live, is one of the largest agricultural regions in Asia. Around 90% of
Pakistan's food and 65% of its employment depend on farming and animal
husbandry, which are sustained by the Indus (Pohl & Schmeier, 2014).

The river system is split primarily between India (39%) and Pakistan (47%) with
small sections in Tibet and eastern Afghanistan (FAO, 2011a). In the mountains,
the courses of its tributaries played a key role in the definition and contestation of
the “Line of Control” (LOC), a land boundary splitting Indian and Pakistani
territory (Gardner, 2019). Many tributaries run through and along the LOC, which
separates the Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir from the Pakistani-
administrated regions of Gilgit-Baltistan and Asad Kashmir.

Increasing water stress

Many communities in the Indus Basin face water scarcity under current usage
and storage patterns. According to NASA, the Indus Basin is the world’s second
most over-stressed aquifer (Buis & Wilson, 2015). Unlike India, Pakistan relies
almost exclusively on the Indus, and southern downstream areas are especially
vulnerable to strains on the basin’s water supply. This makes Pakistan one of the
most water-stressed countries in the world, although there are significant
disparities in how this is experienced (see Kalabagh Dam conflict).
Over-extraction of its finite groundwater resources is a major challenge in the
Indus Basin (Kugelman, 2016). In the long run, groundwater recharge is
expected to significantly decline (Jayaram, 2016), reducing water availability for
the whole basin (Dharmadhikary, 2008; Diamond, 2014). Meanwhile, total water
demand in Pakistan is projected to increase from 163 km3 in 2015 to 225 km3 in
2050 (Amir & Habib, 2015). In northern India where the Indus tributaries flow,
irrigation is particularly intensive, and groundwater depletion may increase by up
to 75% in 2050, putting further pressure on the upstream portions of the Indus
River (Dhawan, 2017).

Compounding effect of climate change

Although water scarcity in the Indus Basin is often attributed to water

mismanagement, climate change also plays an important role (Diamond, 2014).
The Himalayan Glaciers, which feed the Indus Basin, are predicted to diminish
further in the coming years. This may increase water flow in the short term, but it
will also deplete groundwater recharge in the long run, thus reducing available
water resources (Jayaram, 2016). At the same time, heavy rains during the
monsoon are predicted to become more irregular, bringing further challenges to
address potential flood risks (Stolbova et al., 2016). This is likely to aggravate
tensions around issues of water distribution and flow management (Diamond,
2014).

Strains on diplomatic relations

Fears of future water shortages due to the construction of dams are causing
diplomatic tensions between India and Pakistan. Divisive political narratives in
both India and Pakistan are generally seen to increase the likelihood of conflict.
In India, a narrative of Pakistani-affiliated Islamic terror cells attacking civilians
has been used to justify backing away from diplomacy and even threatening to
reduce Pakistan’s water supply (Al Jazeera, 2019; Roy, 2019). Meanwhile,
nationalist media in Pakistan have blamed floods in the country on poor water
management in India (Mustafa et al., 2017).

Pakistanis also fear that India will use its upstream dams to control how much
water flows down into Pakistan via the Indus. It is this inherent suspicion and
mistrust between the two states that has also been used to provoke anti-Indian
sentiment in Pakistan, providing fertile ground for further hostility and conflict
(Katchinoff, 2010).

Opposition to upstream dam projects

 Over the past two decades Pakistan has launched multiple attempts to prevent
India from building dams on both the Chenab and the Neelum rivers
(see Kishanganga dam conflict). The Neelum is a tributary of the Jhelum River
and Pakistan has opposed both projects on the grounds that they contravene the
Indus Waters Treaty signed by the two countries in 1960 (Gupta & Ebrahim,
2017).

The Salal Hydroelectric Project It is the Chenab River-related first major dispute that was efficiently
resolved with the help of the Indus treaty. On 14th April 1978, the countries signed the" Salal Project
Treaty." This dam enabled the flow of water to Pakistan without India having to divert or store it.
Nevertheless, Pakistan opposed the installation of 6 anti- sedimentation low-level drain outlets for
sediment control. India complied, and the outlets were reduced in height from 40 to 30 feet (Shah &
Baloch, 2018).

The Kishenganga Dam India started a 330 megawatts facility across the Kishenganga River (Neelum
River). It comprises a 103m dam and a 27-kilometer long canal to transport water to Wullar Lake, where
a power plant will be built. Pakistan expressed its reservations and protested the proposal, citing
negative effects on its 969 megawatts "NeelumJhelum" project. The Neelum-Jhelum plant was proposed
in 1994 but never got off the ground due to a lack of money and political will on the part of Pakistani
administrations. Pakistan estimates a 21 percent drop in the flows of the River Neelum as a result of the
Indian Kishenganga project. This decline in water use will result in a 9 percent reduced power generation
( Saqib Riaz, Ishaque, & Baig, 2020).

The Baglihar Project

This 450 megawatts plant is being built on the Chenab River in the Doda District. Pakistan has objected
to the proposal, claiming that it will lead to a daily loss of at least 8000 cubic feet per second of water
during the rabi season. Pakistan believes that once the waters at Dulhasti, Baghliar, and Salal are
discharged during the monsoon, the Bajwat region above the Marala Headworks will be flooded. In
response to Pakistan's complaints, the WB named Professor Raymond Lafitte as an expert under the
Indus Water Treaty. A settlement provision has been applied on this (Saqib Riaz, Ishaque, & Baig, 2020).

1. The Link between Water Dispute and the Kashmir Conflict

 The interconnection between the water dispute in the Indus basin and the ongoing
conflict over the disputed region of Kashmir.
 The belief that settling the water dispute could lay the foundation for resolving the
Kashmir conflict.
 The expectation that positive diplomatic ties and cooperation on water scarcity could be
achieved if the Kashmir conflict is resolved.
2. Revocation of Article 370 and its Impact
 The revocation of Article 370 by the Indian Parliament in August 2019, which ended
Kashmir's special status.
 The heavy militarization of the region and suspension of communication networks.
 The approval of the "Jammu and Kashmir Reorganization Act," dividing the region and
granting legislative authority to the central Indian government.
3. Stressors behind the Revocation
 Water stressors in India, such as unpredictable monsoon patterns and infrastructure
vulnerabilities caused by extreme weather events.
 The desire of the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party to gain absolute control over
Jammu & Kashmir, a region with a Muslim majority.
 The aspiration to exert control over the waters of the occupied Kashmir, including the
rivers allocated to Pakistan under the Indus Waters Treaty.
4. India's Hydropower Initiatives
 India's strategic focus on hydropower development in Jammu & Kashmir.
 Prioritization of projects on the Ravi, Jhelum, and Chenab rivers.
 The "Atmanirbhiar Bharat Abhiyan" injecting funds for electricity payments and aiming
to make the region a net power exporter.
5. Pakistan's Hydropower Projects
 Pakistan's own hydropower projects in Gilgit Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa.
 Challenges faced by Pakistan in terms of financing, prompting the establishment of a
dam fund.
 China's involvement in funding the "Diamer-Bhasha Dam" and other projects through
the Belt and Road Initiative.
6. Concerns and Geopolitical Considerations
 India's concerns about China's potential impact on the flow of the Indus and
Brahmaputra Rivers and water infrastructure development in Ladakh.
 Pakistan's concerns about India's control over the waters of occupied Kashmir.
 Geopolitical implications of hydropower projects and water management in the region.

Note: The original text does not have clear paragraph breaks or headings. The provided
breakdown is based on the content and logical divisions within the text.

1. Introduction to Kalabagh Dam

 Overview of the location and preliminary feasibility report of the Kalabagh Dam project.
 Recognition of its feasibility, viability, and potential benefits by international experts.
2. Need for Water Storage Capacity in Pakistan
 Dependence of Pakistan's economy on agriculture and the importance of irrigation.
 Lack of development in increasing water storage capacity since the completion of
Tarbela reservoir.
 Importance of large dams for national development.
3. Opposition to Kalabagh Dam
 Opposition from Sindh due to concerns about water availability and surplus water.
 Abandonment of the project by the coalition government based on resolutions passed
by provincial assemblies.
 Political considerations and the principles of federalism influencing the decision.
4. Different Provincial Perspectives on Water Rights
 Sindh's accusation of water theft by Punjab and its concerns about water scarcity, sea
intrusion, and mangrove forest depletion.
 Baluchistan's limited water allocation and accusations against Sindh for using its share
of water.
 Khyber Pakhtunkhwa's criticism of Punjab's wasteful irrigation practices and concerns
about drainage, silting, and water scarcity.
5. Punjab's Perspective on Water Resources
 Punjab's reliance on irrigation for agricultural production and its significant contribution
to the country's economy.
 Water demands increasing in Punjab due to population growth, urbanization, and
industrialization.
 Need for new reservoirs and emphasis on the construction of the Kalabagh Dam.

Note: The original text does not have clear paragraph breaks or headings. The provided
breakdown is based on the content and logical divisions within the text.

https://stud.epsilon.slu.se/5142/11/muhammad_u_121218.pdf

The media is rife with stories of Pakistan’s financial crisis. Unwarranted and ill-
founded parallels are being drawn with Sri Lanka. The fiscal situation in the country
will soon stabilize (though not resolve) after the budget is presented on June 10 and
the IMF releases a tranche of $900 million; this endorsement will prompt China,
Saudi Arabia, and other countries to park some dollars as well. However, other
problems will continue to haunt Pakistan’s socioeconomic and, as an extension,
political circumstances.

The most pressing among these is the acute water crisis. This crisis will not only
affect Pakistan’s agriculture sector, which contributes to 23 percent of Pakistan’s GDP
and employs 42 percent of its labor force, but also it will take the form of an
existential threat to energy and food security, and therefore national security.

A recent report, “Water Crisis in Pakistan: Manifestation, Causes and the Way Forward,”
published by the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics (PIDE) sheds some
light on the gravity of the issue by adducing eye-opening statistics. Pakistan ranks 14
out of 17 “extremely high water risk” countries in the world, as the country wastes
one-third of water available. More than 80 percent of the country’s population faces
“severe water scarcity.” Water availability in Pakistan has plummeted from 5,229
cubic meters per inhabitant in 1962 to just 1,187 in 2017.

One indicator highlighting the seriousness of the issue is the water withdrawal rate,
which can be defined as the amount of water withdrawn from a source (surface or
groundwater). Note that this is different from water consumption, which is the portion
of withdrawn water that has been permanently lost as it was consumed (evaporated,
used by plants or humans, etc.). Pakistan has been ranked 160th, better than only 18
countries, in terms of water withdrawals to water resource ratio. Moreover, the
country treats only 1 percent of wastewater, one of the lowest rates in the
world. Around 40 percent of water in Pakistan is lost due to spillage, seepage, side
leakage, and bank cuttings along with irregular profiling of alignment of banks.

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Agriculture is the largest consumer of water; 97 percent of Pakistan’s freshwater is
used by the sector. The water crisis is putting the largest sector of the country’s
economy at risk. Besides water deficiency and drought, there are other issues like
water-logging and salinity affecting Pakistan’s crops, which are responsible for 60
percent of the agriculture sector’s contribution to GDP. An estimated shortage of
around 70 million tons of food is expected by 2025.

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Additionally, 30 percent of Pakistan’s land is expected to be waterlogged while 13

percent is saline. When coupled together with the overarching issue of growing water
scarcity, one can see an existential threat to the country in the offing. Crop
productivity is affected by water availability. This will impact cotton, which plays a
pivotal role in the backbone of the country’s industry, textiles. Sugar is another crop
that requires sufficient amounts of water and so does wheat.

Col. Abid, a senior defense analyst and an expert on water management in Pakistan,
says that “climate change, the apathy of successive governments towards growing
water shortage at all levels, and the lack of planning have resulted in a severe water
crisis” in Pakistan. “The country has reached a stage where its water management
system seems to be progressing in the wrong direction,” he argued, adding that
“instead of getting better, the crisis is getting worse.”

Pakistan’s population is expected to exceed 380 million by 2050, according to a U.N.

report. Moreover, by 2025 the demand for water in Pakistan is expected to reach 274
million acre feet (MAF) as compared to 191 MAF supply of water.
ADVERTISEMENT

The problem is that policymakers, the media, and the public are least bothered with
what I have described as a threat to Pakistan’s national security. Switch on the
television and 99 percent of talk shows will be focused on politics — who said what
to whom. This needs to change. It doesn’t require any computer model or algorithm or
a verbose research paper to see that if the water crisis isn’t addressed with a proactive
approach, this can even lead to conflict between provinces, which can tear away the
fabric of social cohesion, further weakening Pakistan from within.

Water crisis and its management should be prioritized to the highest degree. Pakistan
should impose a water emergency and engage at international and national level to
solve its crisis before it gets too late.

2022 floods.

Abstract
Crises don’t rise out of the blue; they are the result of ongoing circumstances and
are consequences of the actions of a single individual that starts the chain
reaction of complicated existence. Even World War I was sparked by the actions
of a single individual (Khan, 2021). The water crisis around the world, specifically
in Pakistan, is of grave concern.

“Anyone who can solve the problem of water, will be worthy of two noble prizes:
one for peace and one for science” – John F. Kennedy

Water is a finite resource. If it’s not managed wisely, overcoming climate issues
is a great challenge. The paper analyses how the water issue is more of a
management crisis than a natural disaster in Pakistan. Moreover, this paper also
analyzes the case of the Tasman Spirit oil spill for a holistic analysis of
mismanagement and crippled governance

Methodology
The paper is based upon qualitative research focusing on “how” the water issue
prevails and “what” caused the water issue. The qualitative data is obtained from
sources like articles, journals, reports, books, official and unofficial documents,
and academic studies.
Water Issue
Water’s central role in the biosphere implies that several of the large issues
confronting humanity are in fact related to water be it security issues, pollution,
shortage, etc. (Falkenmark, 1990). Whenever the issue of water is being talked
about the terms that are widely used in the international discourse are water
shortage, water stress, water scarcity, and water insecurity (Chellaney, 2012).

The issue of water revolves around crisis, scarcity, insecurity, and shortage.
These terms will be used often in this research paper with the purpose of
analyzing and understanding the water issue prevailing in Pakistan. Water
shortage is the condition when there is a lack of sufficient water resources. This
includes a lack of access to safe water supplies and deprivation to meet basic
water needs.

According to UN-Water, water scarcity is defined as scarcity in the availability of

water due to physical shortage or access due to failure in management and
governance (Water Scarcity, n.d.). When the demand for water exceeds the
amount available during a specific period of time, such a situation is known to be
water-stressed (Green Facts, n.d.). Lastly, water insecurity, as defined by Norins,
is the lack of sufficient water to meet all the needs and the inability to adapt to
disasters (Defining Water Insecurity, n.d.).

Introduction
The continent of Asia is the hub of the water crisis where water emerges as a
source of increasing competition and an underlying discord between the Asian
states (Chellaney, 2012). India and Pakistan are prime examples of such discord.
Asia faces a daunting challenge in the form of the water crisis that threatens its
economy, political rise, and most importantly its environmental sustainability
(Chellaney, 2012).

Due to Asia’s water efficiency and productivity being the lowest in the world, it is
a center of global water issues, be it crises or security issues. A South Asian
country like Pakistan, which has been struggling in almost every aspect ever
since independence, is no exception. Pakistan is amongst those countries of
Asia that are on the hitlist of water issues be it in terms of a crisis, security,
scarcity, or even shortage.
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Scope of Water Issue in Pakistan

Firstly, about 92% of Pakistan has been classified into semi-arid to arid.
Moreover, the vast majority of Pakistan is dependent upon surface and
groundwater from a single source known as the Indus Basin. Secondly, ever
since Pakistan came into existence, its population has more than quadrupled and
by 2100, its population will have increased by tenfold.

Thirdly, about 90% of the country’s agriculture production comes from land
irrigation by the Indus Basin Irrigation System (IBIS) which firmly links national
food security to water levels in the Indus River. Fourthly and lastly, Pakistan’s
water storage capacity is limited to a maximum of 30 days supply which is far
below a 1000 days storage capacity (Parry, Terton, Osman, Ledwell, and Asad,
2016)

Water Issues of Pakistan

The water issue poses a great threat to the country’s future security,
sustainability, and stability. In 2030, according to the Food and Agricultural
Organization, Pakistan is expected to move from being a water-stressed to a
water-scarce country (Omestad, 2013).

The Pakistan Council of Research in Water Resources (PCRWR) delivered a

grave warning that if the government didn’t take action, the country will run out of
water by 2025 (Kundi, 2017). IMF ranked Pakistan 3 rd on the list of water-scarce
countries (Zhang, et al., 2020). Pakistan is hence regarded as one of the most
water-intensive countries (Akbar, Khan, Dilawar, & Hassan, 2021).

One of the deadliest issues that Pakistan faces is water security, particularly due
to political disputes and upheavals. The security concerns related to Pakistan are
primarily Islamist militancy and terrorism, stability in regard to Afghanistan, and
nuclear rivalry with India. While all the concerns are driven towards these issues,
the country’s deteriorating water situation naturally becomes a lesser-known
issue. Despite being a comparatively lesser-known issue, the intensity and
situation are highly alarming.

According to the Peacework report titled “Understanding Pakistan’s Water-

Security Nexus,” authored by Danish Mustafa, Majeed Akhtar, and Natalie
Nasrallah, “Coupled with institutional, operational, and governance failures,
increasing pressure on water, its use, and misuse is fostering domestic discord.
Although water is not a direct driver of conflict, it is an aggravating factor that
threatens various dimensions of Pakistan’s political fragility” (Mustafa, Akhter, &
Nasralla, 2013).

The construction of dams on the Indus River and the depletion of groundwater in
Balochistan are exacerbating tensions and hurting small farms in provinces that
are wracked by extremist violence and the Pakistan Army’s counterinsurgency
operations (Omestad, 2013).

Indicators of Water Scarcity

Despite being a country with the world’s largest glaciers, Pakistan faces the
prospects of water scarcity (“Issues in Managing Water Challenges,” 2015).
When we talk about scarcity, there are four main indicators to measure water
scarcity:

1. Water Stress Indicator

The first indicator provides the relationship between available water and human
pollution. As per the indicator, if a country’s per capita water is below 1700m 3, it
is water-stressed. When per capita water is below 500m 3, the country is in
absolute water scarcity. In 1950, the per capita water was over 5000m 3 in
Pakistan. In 1990, Pakistan touched the water stress line (Ashraf, 2018).

2. Water Resource Vulnerability Index (WRVI)

This indicator compares national annual water availability with the total annual
withdrawals. When withdrawal is between 20%-40%, the country is said to be
water scarce. If it exceeds 40%, the country is said to be severely water-scarce.
In the case of Pakistan WRVI is 77% (Ashraf, 2018).
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3. IWMI’s Physical & Economic Water Indicator

Countries that won’t be able to meet the estimated water demands by 2025 are
called physically water scarce. In 2004, Pakistan faced an 11% of shortage in
water which is likely to be increased to 33% by 2025, leading Pakistan to
physical and economic scarcity (Ashraf, 2018).

4. Water Poverty Index

This indicator has the following components:

1. Access to water
2. Water quality, quantity, and variability
3. Water usage for domestic, food, and productive purposes
4. Capacity for water management
5. Environmental aspects

If water is available but of poor quality, the country is said to be water scarce.
According to a survey conducted by PCRWR, in Pakistan, only 23% of urban and
14% of rural areas were provided with safe drinking water (Ashraf, 2018).

Root Causes of the Water Crisis in Pakistan

 Climate Change

Due to climate change, we may witness a decline in aggregated water flows in

the future because climate change disrupts weather patterns, leading to
unpredictability in water availability, exacerbating water scarcity, and
contaminated supply of water (UNICEF, 2022). Pakistan is among the list of 10
most vulnerable countries to climate change (Parry, Terton, Osman, Ledwell, &
Asad, 2016).

 Urbanization and Population Growth

The endless and rapid growth in population and, most importantly, the unplanned
urbanization don’t only portray a threat to a sustainable future but rather put great
pressure on water supply and demand. The lethal combination of climate change
and rapid increase in population puts an adverse effect on water resources
leading to water scarcity (Lamm, 2020).

 Water Policies & Distribution Issue

The growing scarcity of water resources is a prime source of conflict among the
provinces of Pakistan. The conflict is centered on the distribution of available
water. In 2018, Pakistan formulated its first-ever National Water Policy. Although
the policy acknowledges that water is a finite source yet, at the same time, it fails
to reach up to the mark due to several shortcomings. Such shortcomings include
the absence of basic scientific knowledge, neglect of water quality issues, and
lack of SDGs (Sustainable Development Goals) references.

 Mismanagement

Pakistan’s water issue and crisis are the results of the nation’s failure in water
management, poor governance, and the inability of bureaucracy to deliver basic
needs and provide basic facilities (Yusuf, 2020). The dependence of Pakistan on
a single source – the Indus River system and its tributaries – for most of its water
supply is a key cause of the mismanagement breeding water issues (IMF, 2015).

Moreover, water issues arise because there’s a lack or zero development in the
approach of water resource management prioritizing the conservation and
sustainable use of water. In 2017, the State Bank of Pakistan argued that
Pakistan is characterized by multiple authorities with overlapping responsibilities
and duplication of work (Cooper, 2018). This shows that the problem isn’t in
water availability but rather in the governance and management system.

As mentioned earlier, due to the incapable bureaucracy, Pakistan suffers from

the prevailing water crisis. The prime example of such an argument is the flood
that hit Sindh in August 2019 which highlighted that Pakistan suffers from water
mismanagement. The flood caused 10 deaths and multiple causalities due to
electrocution via the water (Salman, 2021).

 Indus Water Treaty

Another root cause of the crisis is the signing of the 1960 Indus Water Treaty.
Before the treaty was signed, Pakistan’s total inflow of water was 117 MAF and
now it is only 80 MAF. The allocation of this inflow amongst the provinces is done
on the basis of number rather than water quality (Salman, 2021). According to
the World Bank, Pakistan’s poor water management is estimated to cost the
country nearly 4% of its GDP which is around $12bn (Dawood, 2020).

Case of the Tasman Spirit

The case of the Tasman Spirit oil spill is a prime example of mismanagement
and poor governance that led to a huge marine and water crisis. The entire
marine crisis showed how Pakistan as a nation is incapable of crisis
management owing to institutional paralysis and crippled governance.

Also Read: Paradigm Shift’s Magazine: June 2023 Edition

On July 27, 2003, a ship carrying crude oil ran aground near Karachi and after
two weeks, it released 37,000 tons of its cargo into the sea (Janjua, et al., 2006).
According to the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), the accident was reported to the
owner of the ship, Polembros, which assured that another tanker (the Endeavour
II) would be sent to remove all of the crude oil in the Tasman Spirit (Khan, 2021).

Three attempts were made to tow it away but all of them failed. Cracks appeared
in the hull on 14 August. Two main beaches of Karachi—Clifton and Sea View—
were adversely affected by the puddles of oil that were clearly visible on the
shoreline. Due to the entire catastrophe, the government of Pakistan declared an
emergency (WWF, 2003).

Conclusion
Lethal natural disasters, pertinently climate change, are indeed the strongest
agents for the rise in water issues. However, when management is crippled, the
water issues are likely to prevail at a very high intensity as seen in the case of
Pakistan. Today, Pakistan is struggling to tackle and manage its water issues.

Introduction
The partition of the South Asian Subcontinent on 14 August 1947 into the
dominions of India and Pakistan gave birth to a host of problems, including
that of the sharing of waters of the mighty Indus River System. The issue was
of concern to Pakistan because the headworks of the rivers that irrigated
Pakistan’s Punjab province mostly went to the Indian side.

Standstill Agreement and Water Supply Disruption

On 30 December 1947, Pakistan and India concluded a ‘Standstill Agreement’

for a three-month period under which Pakistan continued to receive water
supply from the headworks of Madhopur on River Ravi and Ferozepur on River
Sutlej, the two tributaries of River Indus.

As the interim arrangement ended on 31 March 1948, the next day the
Government of Indian Punjab stopped the supply of water to Pakistan from
the Madhopur headwork, affecting, according to one estimate, 5.5% of
Pakistan’s irrigated area.

Inter-Dominion Conference and Initial Negotiations

Pakistan raised the issue at the Inter-Dominion Conference held on 3-4 May
1948. India dismissed Pakistan’s claim over water, from the headworks on its
side as a matter of right but agreed to release water as a provisional
arrangement. It was thus abundantly clear that slowly and gradually the
quantity of water would be reduced.

In 1951, David Lilienthal, who had formerly served as Chairman of the

Tennessee Valley Authority and as Chairman of the US Atomic Energy
Commission, undertook a research tour of Pakistan and India for writing a
series of articles.

World Bank's Involvement and the Indus Water Treaty

In one of his articles, Lilienthal opined that it would be very beneficial for the
region if the two countries cooperated to jointly develop and operate the
Indus Basin river system. He further suggested that the World Bank might play
 its role in bringing India and Pakistan to agree on some plan to develop the
Indus river system for mutual benefit.

President of the World Bank, Eugene Black, picked up the idea and offered his
good offices to resolve the issue of water sharing between India and Pakistan.
The two neighbors welcomed the initiative and after tough bargaining during
the protracted negotiations that spread over nine years arrived at the contours
of the agreement.

Finally, in September 1960, President of Pakistan Field Marshall Mohammad

Ayub Khan and Prime Minister of India Jawaharlal Nehru signed the Indus
Water Treaty in Karachi.

Key Provisions of the Indus Water Treaty

Under the Indus Water Treaty:

1. Pakistan surrendered three eastern rivers, Ravi, Sutlej, and Beas to India with
some minor rights to Pakistan.
2. Largely three western rivers, namely Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, remained with
Pakistan.
3. India was allowed to use water from the western rivers for irrigation of 642,000
acres of land already being irrigated from these rivers, along with an
entitlement to further irrigate 701,000 acres for crops.
4. Pakistan was to meet the requirements of its eastern river canals from the
western rivers by constructing replacement works.
5. Both parties are bound to regularly exchange flow-data of rivers, canals, and
streams.
6. A permanent Indus Water Commission, with one Commissioner from each
side, was to be set up to resolve issues.
7. Procedures were set out for settlement of 'questions,' 'differences,' and
'disputes' bilaterally and through neutral experts and the International Court
of Arbitration as the case might be.

Challenges and Concerns with Indian Projects

 Although the Indus Water Treaty has been a remarkable success story, lately
some projects undertaken by India in Occupied territory of Jammu and
Kashmir have become major irritants and raised serious concerns in Pakistan.

1. Wullar Barrage (The Tulbal Navigation Lock)

2. Kishanganga Project
3. Baghlihar Dam

Scarcity of Water and Mismanagement in Pakistan

As far as the scarcity of water in Pakistan is concerned, it has to do with

climatic changes and negligence and mismanagement of water resources by
successive governments in Pakistan.

Addressing Water Management Issues in Pakistan

Pakistan needs to address the following problems on an urgent basis:

1. Silting of dams and barrages

2. Seepage in canals
3. Traditional and antiquated agricultural techniques
4. Crop rotation and cultivation of water-intensive crops

Conclusion and Future Challenges

Pakistan's water supply has decreased significantly, and the country is facing a
water crisis. The government needs to prioritize water augmentation, water
conservation, and effective use of water. Developing additional reservoirs and
improving infrastructure are crucial steps. International cooperation and
agreements on water resources are essential for managing shared water
basins effectively.

The Indus Water Treaty, while successful, is not without flaws and concerns
from both Pakistan and India. There is a need for renegotiation and
addressing inherent weaknesses. Pakistan's water shortage is a significant
challenge that requires political will and financial resources to overcome. The
global water crisis and its implications for Pakistan
 Moving Ahead: Prospects for Cooperative Hydropolitics

1. Renegotiating the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT): The IWT has played a crucial
moderating role in hydropolitics between India and Pakistan. However, the treaty should
be modified and renegotiated to align with contemporary international watercourse law,
principles of equitable sharing, and emerging concerns such as water quality,
environmental sustainability, and climate change. This renegotiation requires improved
bilateral relations between India and Pakistan.
2. Improved Communication and Data Sharing: India should be more transparent by
providing timely and accurate flow data and openly communicating its planned projects
on the Indus basin to Pakistan, especially in the western basin. This would help build
trust and prevent misunderstandings.
3. Engaging Positively within the IWT Framework: Pakistan should engage with India in
a positive and constructive manner within the context of the IWT. Rather than being
defensive, Pakistan should approach discussions and negotiations with an open mind,
focusing on technical arguments rather than sensationalizing them as existential threats.
4. Research on Violence vs. Cooperation: More research is needed within Pakistan to
determine the relative weight of violence and cooperation as means of conflict
resolution over water. Enhancing irrigation-water-use efficiency through engineering
and institutional reforms, along with intersectoral water transfers, can address water
scarcity issues and potentially prevent conflicts.
5. Recognizing Internal Drivers of Water Issues: It is important for both the Pakistani
public and media to recognize that Pakistan's water problems are primarily driven by
internal factors. Understanding this perspective can help evaluate the potential threats
of Indian projects in the Indus basin more objectively and allow experts to negotiate the
details of proposed projects within the framework of the IWT.

Recommendations to the International Community:

1. Technical Assistance and Data Sharing: Provide technical assistance to both India and
Pakistan to improve the accuracy, timeliness, and accessibility of stream-flow data. This
would prevent misinformation and emotional responses, serving as a confidence-
building measure.
2. Addressing Concerns on Merit: Encourage the Indian government to address
Pakistan's concerns regarding data availability or storage capacity in individual projects
based on their merits. How projects are implemented and communicated is often as
important as the projects themselves.
3. World Bank Facilitation: Utilize World Bank resources to promote openness,
communication, and data sharing within the IWT's Indus Commission and between the
commission and the public.
4. Debate on Renegotiation: Facilitate a debate on the potential benefits of a more
cooperative approach through a renegotiated IWT treaty aligned with equitable
apportionment principles and contemporary international legal doctrines. This could
help address subnational problems and perceived inequities.
5. Improving Irrigation Efficiency: Provide technical assistance to Pakistan to improve its
irrigation-system efficiency. Enhancing distribution systems can lead to more water
availability than constructing dams.
6. Equity Training for Water Managers: Train and sensitize Pakistani water managers to
the issue of equity in water distribution. This will help them understand and address the
social-equity aspects of water, which are often at the core of water conflicts.
7. Updating Water Laws: Support Pakistan in aligning its surface and groundwater laws
with contemporary developments in water law to ensure effective management and
regulation.
8. Technical Assistance for Storage: Provide training and technical assistance to help
Pakistan develop its groundwater storage capacity and knowledge, addressing the
country's long-term legitimate storage needs.

By implementing these recommendations, there is a greater potential for cooperative

hydropolitics at both the bilateral and international levels, leading to improved water
resource management and reduced tensions between India and Pakistan.