PSF -0S5

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OFFICE O F STRATEGIC SERVICES

WASHINGTON, D . C.
BRR

7 April 19.44

' i s s Grac e Tully ,

'J'h'? ',' h it,r• HoU!-f',
l"o:::h i nt.;tori , D. C.

General Dollov<m asked me t o f orv1&rc1 Lhe at-

tacl-iP.d report t o thP Presi dent , f'nd I would aprirec i ate

.
it i " vo11 1'.oulc - it to his attention .
brin~

Thank yo u.

Si ncerely ,

~~~7::
G. D:lward Buxton ,
.l'.cti ng Lirector.

~\Wwu-"
&. & 11162, loo. ~ ml l(D) • (B)
C.IA oo'7lP .:lQ.. MAY 11974
.. - ~ Dow ......._

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 OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, 0 . C .

7 April 191.L.

'fl•' l)f.A:~DID' FOR THF Pt1.Efl DENT

I attach a copy of ll r Pport by Ci>pta in Y'alter

R. Mansfi 0 l d , U~~.:CR , on liis misE=ion to tho headt:uar-
tors of \i ihailovich , y,h ich may be of interest. t o you .

Respectful ly

~~~t·-
G. Ldward Buxton
/1cting Director
REPORT Or CAPTAlN W. R. llANSFIKLD,
USMCR , on OSS Ml:>&ION TO GENERAL
MIHAILOV!C.
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Page
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Su.mmarr • • • . • • • • • • • • • • i - vi
I. Chronological Outline of Personal
Activities . . . . . l
II. Mihailovic and bis Policy 20
111. Miha ilovic's Army . • . • 27
(a) Organization of the Ar ,,.y •. . • . 28
(b ) State of Ar!J3, llor3le, and Fighti"8
Ability . . . . . 30
(cl Co11:1Unications . • • • 34
(d) Intelligence . . • . • • • • . . 35
(el Operations to Data • • , • • • • J6
(f) Operations Planned • • • • . . . 37
(g) Medical ntteodance and Suppliee JS
(h) Training .a nd Pocrui t.oent . . • • 38
(il Prope&anda . . . . . . . . . . . 40
(j l food Situation . • . . • • . . • ... 41
( le) Reprisals - hostages - potential
airdromes - targets - personal
histories of Cetni.k Officers -
German disposition • . . . . 42
IV. The Partisan-Cetnik War - Attitude of
Cetoiks • . . . • . . • • • . . • 43
V. Collaboration between Cetnilca and Cer~ans . 46
VI. Wihailovic 's Com:irunications wit.b his
Govel'n!llent • . . . . . • . . 48
•
l. I wu in Y1.1goslavia for six months, i.e. from
18 August 1943 to 15 February 1944 rlth llibailovic ' s
forces. The first three months were spent rlth General
~ihailovi~ at his General Staff Headquarters; the last
three months on a tour of inspection of his tl'OOps. I
travelled. through the entire area of West and North Central
Serbi~ on the inspection tour, going north from the Drina
and Ll.m Rivers to a point just south of the Sava River at
Sabuc, west to a point 40 miles south of Be~rade, and south
Glmost to Raska, in ~e !bar Valley. (See Exhibit A for
route taken. ) I got out of Yugoslavia by going overland
·.with saall Cetnik bands through Herzogovina and Southern
Dalmatia to a point on the Adriatic Sea a few miles south
of Dubrovnik.
I had many tallts with General Mihailovic and various
members of his Staff and gathered information about him,
his policies, his staff, army, co11111W1ications system, opera-
tions and relations with the British Mission attached to him.
On the inspection tour, I personally inspected at least
6, 000 Cetnik troops with arms, and 10,000 without arms. I
gathered statistics and information in each area inspected
on the nwaber of 111en mobilized, number mobilizable, n1111ber
and types of arms and ammunition on hand, communications,
personal histories of commanders and their officers, number
and disposition of the enemy in the area, operatio~s executed
and planned, reprisals, hostages, propaganda (both Cetnik
and enemy), morale of troops and peQPle, attitude of troops
and people toward- the Partisans, living conditions and food
situation, potehtial airdromes, etc. However, all of my
pencilled notes and most propaganda collected were turned
over to my superior, Lieutenant Colonel Seitz, whom it was
thought would get out f irst, but who i s still there. But I
took out complete statistics furnished by Mihailovic on his
army, letters from Mihailovic to Ii'esident Roosevel t and,
General Donovan. I also have a substantial number of photo-
graphs.
In this report I have tried to limit myself to facts
personally witnessed, and huve accepted statements from
 Mi.b&ilovic 's offi a.ra with qua lific atio n. I was allowed
frff doa of rout e in the area s inspec~.
2. Mihailovio haa a fair ly well organized army mob
zed in Serb ia. It is composed most ly of fol'!ler Yugo ili-
offi a.rs and men who had two year s mili tary trai ning slav ar:;y ·
the war. It is organized on a geog raph ical basi s withbefo re
comanders and brig ades in 11ach •s rez• or pol itic al sepa rate
sion and a chai n of cou and from the Min iste r hiu eli subd ivi- ·
the aaa lles t plat oon . J.lihailovic clai~e he has 57,4 down to
mobilized and could mobilize over 400, uOO if he had 40 men
Based on nuabers of men aeen, I et?tillate he has 35, OVO ar ms.
J10bilized with &rll8 but can give a bett er esti11&te when men
tena nt Colonel Seit z retu rns with our figu res which Lieu-
spot-checked aga inst J.lihailovic ' s figu res. can be
...
3. J.lihailovic is now doing very l i ttle figh ting aga inst
the Germana, al though he did have a mon
acti vity afte r the Ital ian capi tula tion thinof cons ider able
September 1943,
when he cut the Be~ade -Sarajevo Rail road by dest royi ng two
important brid ges, took many to'illlls in batt les agai nst t he
Gel'll&lls , incl udin g Visegrad, Prie polj e, Prib oj, Rog
Gacko, Pecka, and obta ined pers onal surr ende r of theatica,
"Venetzia" Divi sion at Berane. Ital ian

J.lih ailo vic' s poli cy is to hold up

•D-Day• (or •Jus tanek' aa the Serbs calloper atio ns unti l
an Alli ed invasion and stat es that he willit)throw
when he expects '
into one all- out effo rt. He refu ses to star t operall he has
atio
stat ing (1) he wants to avoid heavy repr isal s on t he ns now,
and (2) that he does not have enough arms and ammuniti?8opl e,
He is dete rain ed to preserve the Serb population ethi on. ,
and numerica lly aga inst the Croats. He also claims call y
he has only a •one-sho t• anay which will be wiped outthat
German reinforcements if be undertakes oper ations befoby
"D-Day•. He claims will ingn ess to undertake continuo re
t i ons agai nst the Germans if he is given a steady streus oper a-
supp lies which woul d enable him to do it and thus counam of
attempted repr isal s. On the othe r h and, his record teract
that whil e he promised to cut the iaain Belgrade-Nis -Sko shows
Railroad line s in the !bar or Vardar valleys (which plje
most valuable to the GeI'118.118 as suppl y line and aven are
retr eat from Greece), he fail ed to keep his sprom ise
ues of
his commande r for this area rece ived substant ial arms r afte
plan e f rom the Brit ish. iie also has 1ail ed to dest royby
Bor and Trepsa Mines, important sources of copper and the
lead
ii.
 ~. .
to the Genaans.
Uihailovic complains that the British have failed to
assure him that requested operations have been coordinated
with general Allied strategy elsewhere.
Most Cetnik co11111anders and troops seen in Serbia would
l ike to fight, but ask for more arms and amnp1nition which
t he.y claim they need in order to carry the fight to the Ger-
mans and Prevent heavy reprisals.
4. There is compl ete distrust of the British by Wihailo-
vic and his leaders, who feel the British have now sold t hem
do#O the river to Stalin. They are particularly irritated at
the British because of the BBC London Yugoslav news, which is
their main Allied news source. Station WRUL, Boston, i• t oo
. ·.reak to be heard regularly. They point out that since Septem- .
ber 1943, BBC has devoted its time almost exclusively to Parti-
san news and ignored Mihailovic despite the fact that he car-
ried out substantial anti-German operations, especially in
September and October, 1943, after the Italian capitulation.
Mihailovic also complains bitterly t hat in many instances in
the fall of 1943, BBC f alsely credited the Partisans with
many anti-German activities in fact carried out by his forces.
I personally saw some evidence supporting this contention.
5. Mihailovic' s forces appear to have complete control
of t he mountains and smal! towns in the area inspected7 il)-
cluding most of Serbia. The only Partisans seen here were a
band of about 800 near Ivanica, which had been pushced into
Serbia from t he Ss,nj ak and was fighting Mihailovic's forces
t here. I also saw small bands of Partisans t hrough north
Her zogovina.
6. There i s bi tter civil war raging between ~ihai lovic 's
forces and the ?artisans in Herzogovina, Sanjak and Bosni a,
wnere t he Cetniks are devoting vir tually all of t hei r efforts
t o fi&hti.ng t he Partisans . The Cetnik attitude is t hat t he
civil war 36ainst the Partisans i s now primarily r~cia l._ se-
cvnaarily ideological. Cetniks claim t hat over 7~~ of the
?artisans are Croats, many of whom are former German C(uisling
iJ:.;t.:icni who deserted t he Yugoslav Ar:uy in 1941 t o join wi t h
t.ne Ge1-:.ians when German victory appeared inevitabl e, and ~hw
no,; h;.v e joined the .Part isans when i t. appears t~at t he All 1~s
:n<.y win after all; anu that. t hese Croat s, carry~ng. over their
e~• rlier raci al and religious di scontent, first aec1:nated t he
[ e:·b poiJulation in t neir blood purge of 1941-2, and are now

iii.
)
detenained to build up Croat control at all costs.
7. I saw no collaboration between Cetnik.s and Ger:nans
in Serbia, other than a liaison with the Medici at Belanovica,
east of Valjevo and at Aranjelonc, soutli of Belgrade, al ·
legedly for the purpose of gettin& information on German move-
ments. I saw one instance near Stragari where this enabled
the Area Colllll8.Ilder to aake a successful attack on a German
column and capture arms.
Cetniks in Southern Herzogovina and Southern Dalmatia
are in some places collaboratin& with the Germans to the ex-
tent that the Germans an not fighting them there and are al-
lowing them to travel WlllOleste<i so that they can fight Parti-
sans. In one instance a local vill age cOlllllllJlder admitted
knowing the Germans there and assistin& to billet 640 German
troops. One Cetnik soldier showed 11e a legiti11acia issued
to him by the German AruJ.y at Dubrovnik, which described him
as a "Cetnik" entitled to go into Dubrovnik to visit the
hospital. · I saw no evidence, however, that the Germans were
giving arms to the Cetnik.s, or that Yihailovic knew about
this collaboration.
8. I gathered there is a feeline on the part of b9th
Cetnik troops and people that, while they are all for the King,
they would not favor the government in exile.
9. The people in that part of Servia inspected are
l l}0% for King Peter II and very strong for ~ihailovic, whom
they revere because he led the resistance in 1941 when all
other nations were losin8, and becau..;e i1e stands for King
and democracy. They do not seem to want coiw;iunis~ or Parti-
sans. In Herzogovina I was unable to get such a strong im-
pression.
10. ~ost arms seen with ~iha i lovic's forces were in
very poor condition and area co1JL1Danders claimeJ they des-
perately needed arms and ammunition. ...lost rifles were ol d
Yugoslav army type, pitted and worn. There are substantial
numbers of German machine pistols anci Barettas. ~ight
machine guns were Z orkas or Holland type. '!'here nere very
few mortars or heavy ;nachine g\ins , anci practically no ar-
tillery pieces. I would estimate eacn soldier h~s un aver&6e
of about 25 to 40 rounds per rifle, and 150 to 200 roumi:;
per machine gun. About every other soldier c~rries ~ hwid

iv.
 . 11. r.iihailovic st.Ii tes he has 90, 739 rifles, 321 Hi.IC • s
1.149 LJ.IG's, 65 Mortars, ana 294 ~achine Pistols. The excess
oi 8.rlls over nW1ber of men mobilized does not exist in that
part of Serbia inspected, however, but in such areas as
Herzegovina and Southern Dal.Jlatia, where it should be "noted
most fighting has been against the Partisans.
12. Most troop colllllanders impress me as capable· soldiers.
~ihailovic himself, while in good health and obviously having
considerable ability as a leader, has surrounded himself with
a s~ntl rate General Staff, with a politicdl adviser, Dr.
Moljevic, who is an extreme Pan-Serb. Mihailovic l acks abil ity
to delegate.
13. The average Cetnik soldier is extremely poorly
clothed and has be!!ll" living a hard, rugged, and miserable life
for three years in the woods, suffering many hardships, living
in dirty peasant huts and eating what the peasant will give
ilim. 1any troops have not seen their families for nearly
three years, or have lost t hem through German r eprisals. Con-
sidering these factors, the morale and discipline of the troops
in Serbia is very good ; in Herzegovina rather poor.
14. The Army has a poor communications system, with a
sprinkl ing of home-made, weak radio transmitters and r elies
mainly on couriers who take hours or ddys to del iver messages
which shoul d be r eceived at once.
15. Military Intelligence generally is very poor.
16. The Serbian people are tremendousl y enthusiastic
f or nJDericans. They ref er to Americd as t he only ndtion
which has no ultimate designs on them.
17. !Jor;j,le of Serbian· t r oops· and people would be t r e-
mendously increased by even a token Allied invasion. They
would t hen probably want to rise up in revolt ·at once.
18. There i s no famine in parts of Serbia visited.
Germans al'e collectil18 only a por t i on of the requisitions
demanded, anct t.hen only in the pl ains regions where they
can come and get it.
>

• 19. I cannot state •hat "line" Cet.nik propaganda to

t he people i s taking because it was too voluminous to be

v.

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translated. A large batch of Cctnik pamphlets, newspapers

and mimeographed material collected in t he various areas
inspected has been sent. to \1ashington for translation.

RECOl.t.!ENDATIO:'lS:
(l) The Allies should maintain some liaison with ~i­
hailovic rather than cut off relations entirely, for the
following reasons:
(a) He serves as a source of intelligence.
(b) His army is too strofl6 to be concuered 0r
absorbed by the Partisans, at least ·.,hile they are
occupied with Germans. If there is a "D-Day", or ...
Allied invasion of · the Balkans he would probably fight
Germans and destroy some targets.
(c) In the meantime, ~ihailovic keeps a certain
number of German and Bulgar troops im;nobilized. "ith-
drawal of all Alliec liaison or labelint; him as a
traitor would undoubtedly free some of these troops
for use on some other front.
(d) foli~ically the Allies. still recognize
the government of which Mihailovic i s t he :Ainister
of iiar. · ·
(e) Complete severlillce of relations may ad-
versely affect Al lie<i inf luence over Tito's operations.
(f) If the door is kept open with 1.tihailovic,
it is always possible that he will change his position
and start operations against the Germans, in which
event the Allies might wish to send in more repre-
sentatives to him, ·or at least to coordinate his
operations with general Al lied strategy.
If liaison is to be maintained with Mihailovic
solely for intelligence, it is recom:.:?ended that:
(a) There be an American representative ~ith
him because of t he distrust of the British, which
might cause refus ~l of intelligence on the ground

vi.
 that it would be given to Tito.
(b) A complete understa nding be reached with the
Royal Y~oslav Government and Mihailovic regardin g the
scope and function s of the liaison o:ficers .
(2) Wbether the Allies should go further and give posi-
tive aid to Mi.h ailovic depends on answers to many question s
which I 8!11 not in a position to give. Some of these problems
are:
(a) ·,·, nether addition al aid would be worth the
investment.
(b) The extent to which the Allies could insure
control of ~ihailovic, so that the aid would be used
in operatio ns desired by them instead of using it
against Partisan s or savi ng it up so that he can in-
crease his own strength against the Partisan s after
the y,•ar against the Germans is finished .
(cl How addition al aid would affect relation s
with uss ia, and Allied relation s with Tito.
R
(d) i1hether the Allies trust Mihailovi c to
carry out operatio ns, in view of his past recorci.,
(e) '; ;nether the Allies plan any "D-Day• or
invasion of the Balkans, and are will ing to gamble
that ~ihailovic will use aid on "D-Day• operatio ns.
(J) The United St ates, Great Britain and Fussia should
brin& pressure to bear upon Tito an,1 !.lihailovic to make
peace, or at l east an hrtnistic e, and devote all t heir atten-
tion to f i ghting the tierinans. ;.. geogr aphical division of
their forces still seems possible for the reason that Mi-
hailovic ' s forces see~ to be disposed almost entirely in
art>as of Serbia where t:iey are exc.iusive. The Royal Jugo-
slav Government in l::xi le cou:d make ~ ihailovic agree to a
truce. It i s up to the Great Powers to make Tito do t he
sa~e by exercisin g sanction s they obvious ly ;ossess .

•
vii.

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 t~
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l !forch 1944

RT OF CJ.I'Ti.IN '.'.:. P.. M.JU;srr~ USMCR or;

U SSION TO GEiiEhhL DF.AGA :H :li:ILOV C

I. · ClrnOiWLOGICAL OUTLINt: 01' ·,,i:.£S,JiiiJ, AC7 [V fTfi !.:

On the night of 18 J.ugust 1943 I 11as dro,>,..Ed by ,.iarac:1ute
from a Halifax bomber to the Generlil Staff of Gener al '.lih<-ilovic
on a mount ain near I vanica, Ser bic., after " five .1our t ri,, f r om
Lerna, Africa. b"e spotte<i th€ si€Jlal fir es almost imrledia.tel y
!illd made a pass at the fielci , auriug y,aich I coulci see tht: f ires
f r om the hole tnrough which I j uaped. . J..s soon as 11e ci1eci:eci our
flash signal 11ith the one seen on tile ground, v.e did &. circ~e of
about ten wiles, and C&.llle bcCIC. T!len I shook acnds 11ith tue R.hF
dispatcher, gave our "thUIDbs u,>" sie-nal, i:ind v.:ien the H i nt Vient
green, shoved off. When t he chut e blossome<i I i mme:diately sav.
tn fir es, realized I ' 'as a " o.Y off to on" sicie , and lande<i in a
i>i,le of rocks, hurting my .1ip sli s htl J·. I found myself on &. cool
mountainside and i1t a fell miLute:s ·~as :;urrvJnded by " irou,:i of
big b€arded Cetniks v. no trieci to smother me v. itn kisses, /eili ng
"Zdravo. Purvi J.merik...nec! " (Greetings, r'irst 1.roericc.n) I l it
;DJ Very Li ght, signo..i.lin6 tne pilot u:i.l 11as ok:.y i.1.nd 1'us leci to
U1e droi>,,ing ground v.:1ere I :n1;t mc.n; r.1ore C.:t.:.iks, Colontl
'ii ill iam Bailey, C:.i ef oi tile Bri tis:1 :;. i.ssion, w1ci .~ aj or Gre1=nlees,
:iis Cnief of Staff. In a littie 1:.lih tm: : l:ine r e tJrHEC w1d
m.o.rly beaned us v. i:.!1 a"oout 15 cont<.iners, ~ i,;t' in 5 its iint.s us
·i t di;;ap,.ieare:d i n t.ne: nii:.ht. T:iej -..ere i ~.liitO iutelj t c.::t:n u\'.aJ
in oxen carts.
I leanu:d t.h11t. IHhailovic' s "St a.rb" v.&s l ess t ...an one 1.o:ir
av.ay o.nd t.nat ne v.as aaitin 0 to see :ne: . ~ e v.c.lked over t !1e
I mounl11in, noticing Cetnik . u.,rtls ;'ostt:d on all surr-ounc i11> .1 i l ls
as v.e ticssed t.1em i1; t..he: darkness . 'lne "Starb" (or Gene r: 1 ::te.1"f

•.
 I

I
I
Held quar tere) pro• ed t.o be a''tew •k.e hltt para chut e
tent . grou ped
t.op' tber and cupl lfll8 ed ~ a cppae near a tew •kol ibara • (1101JDtaill
:: rt
hut.a uaed b7 abep berd s) •/ Thlr.e was not.hill& but
the roug heat
l.yiD g abou~. ,. 8nd a fire ' bum illg with lop arou nd ..
/

A few •illu t.ee l~ter the Mini at.er appeareei'

ness wit.11~ 1M11lbera of his Staf f and pereo nalout of the dark -
body
11et &qi 1fere able t.o conv erse in French. I found hill guard . We
•an of abou t 50 year s. aedi ua buil d, heavy gray bear to be a
a frien dly aail e, and a shar p sens e of huao r. Be illtrod, glaa sea.
11e at once to Gene·r al Trifuniv ic. hif
duce d
Chie f of Staf f, Lieu tena nt
Colonel Lsl.a devic . his Oper atio ns Offi cer, and othe r
sat arou nd the fire , dri nkin g •raJcl a• (prun e whiskey,s. We then
vodka) and disc uasi ng peop le we knew. Most , men pres simi lar to
bear ded and showed the effe cts of nearl ,y three year s ent wer.e
woods•. They were dres sed in' all kind s of odda enta, •iJl the
ing rellinanta of thei r old Y1J8oslav unifoJ'llls. Colo nel soae wear -
brok e the ice for m.e in getti llg t.o know them. Bail ey

Afte r an hour I went t.o the Briti sh Camp abou t a half

awa.y, which I foun d t.o be a cr\¥i e peas ant hut , and mile
(_ · tent s. Here I .met Lieu tena nt Colo nel Duane two p~ute
Brit ish offi cer sent in, who l anded blind by!iud1subm
on, the firs t
!4onteneg ran coas t ill Sept eabe r 1941, and two Royalarine
Mari
on .the
who had been capt ured on Cret e in. 1941 and j\llpe d a ne serg eant s
in Y1J8oalavia. We had a littl e 11ore •rak ia•, then went priso n train
on SOiie ba.y in one of· the tent s. In the Man tiae the. to bed
arriv ed and were bein g unloaded by the Cetn iks. oxen teams

I spen t the next few da,ys gett ing used t o a ne1! life ,
was fair ly rugg ed, and learn ing something abou which
t the curr ent situ a-
tion . We paid an offi ci al visi t to the Mini ster and
on the f ollow in5 da,y. Ther eaft er I had dinn er his Staf f
seve
l!i t h the Uini ster around his camp fire, and eng~ed in tiM sral
~'i th Colo nel Baile y, Colo nel Hudson, Miha
long talk s
ilovi c and his Staf f
llt!mbers. Only •fau x-pa s• co!ll'llitted t.o my knowledge was
to the Min ister with the phra se "Tvrd, za l.lllloge godi ne•, toas ting
meaning of whic h I will not EIX.i)la in here . Much of what the
was sent home over Bail ey's radio . Before leav ing Cair I leli.l'Iled
told by Maj or Huot tilat I shou ld use t he Brit ish ciph o I waa
ther e was an unders~and ing that all of our messages woul er beca use
d' be seen

•• - 2 -
l )
by the Bri tish . I was also give n a poem cii'h er
only . When I arri ved in YU8 osla via, Col one l B~ilf or eme1 ·~t!n cy use
Cai ro had sen t a sign al stut ing tha t I shou ld useey a.iv ist!d ~~
code , showing all mes sage s t.o him befo re send ing ~Y o"n ~rivate
aod I und erst ood this t.o mean t hat my wire s .-ou them. Both he
him. He adv ised 11~ tha t I shou ld fee l free t.o ld be seen only by
send any thin g I
like d. I ther efo re used m:y poem ci~her unt il Lieu
Sei tz late r arr ived . tena nt Col one l

Life here was fair ly rugg ed. Y:e .-ere loca ted on
of Cel"llern ina Plan ina , "ith Germans abou t thre e the ula teau
I imm edia tely boug ht pack and ridi ng nors es and hou rs a'f.·e.y' by foo t.
pack ing dri lls were held so tha t we cou l4 be u~ seve r al quick-
hurr y if nec essa rf . Y.e slep t on the ground and and a11ay in <> •
pot. Each day I s~ent aa.e time with a Cet. nik ate out of a. codlluon
lang uag e. Our Cet nik guard of abo ut 30 men Ylere offi cer l~i ng the
dUV, and very curi ous but rugg ed look ing and willragg ing
edly.. clot hed ,
to help us
in ever y •ay. They mos tly carr ied old Yug osla
and worn. · v r ifle s, pitt ed

We we~ not s tarv ed, however . The re Wh8 plen ty

brea d, Ii.llak (a kind of but ter made from the top of blac k
) pig , lamb, pot atoe s, ;>lums and a litt le tea and of the milk ) ,
with me. sug ar v.hic h Ciillle

Colo nel Be,i ley was mos t help ful -to me upon
imp ress ed me as a capa ble, broa d minded , inte ll my arri val . lle
i~ent, and pati ent
offi cer who was f ar more f•i lia r "ith ' the -.>r oble
deaJ ,ing with Yih ail9 vic than offi cer s wi tn whom rns f aced ·in
Cai ro. He spea ks the l angu age l ike a nat ive and I had· t alked in
per1D1ali ties invo lved , hav ing been in Yugo sla~ia knows all of t he
befo re the 11ar. He adv ised me t iiat "hil e I v.as for many y~ars
Bri tish IJis sion I sho uld feel f r ee to vis it !.lih tJar t of' the
Sta ff whenever I like d, wit.hout r ese rvat ion . Heailo vic ar,d nis
"'as verf glad American re:i rese ntat i ves were co:a stat eci t~ut he
tha t ther e would be more. ing, , dlid hoped
·
Both Colo nels Bai ley and Huds on out line d to me
acti viti es as Bri tish Lia ison Off i cers , wxi t he the ir
r elat ions with Mih ailo vic. At this time do.i lti nist ory of t heir
in try in6 to get :i.ihailo vic t.o unde rtake more exte wo.s enr ross 1..d
tion s agai nst the Ge rman s. Mih11ilovic was balk nsiv e oper a-
that he nad insu ffic ien t arm s, !ind t hc.t t.J1e reping, on the t,round
ri sals Youl d be

- J -
~·-
'· too heavy. A few days after ray arrival, Bailey: sent Mihailovic
a written ultimatum , pointing out how Mihailovic had failed· on
certain .operations, and · requesting t hat o'rders be given for
execution of. thes~ operations. Bailey's one stron~ point waa
t he failure of llihailovic to carry out sabotage · on the north-
south c011111unication lines in the Ibar and Vardar valleys where
the area co11111andant, Djuric, had r eceived a substantial· nllllber
of planes. Mibailovic replied by letter, agreeing to issue
orders for ~re action; and specifically hgreeing to order Djuric
to start operations in his area. ·
I , found a situation on arrival . where there was some
friction between Colonel Bailey and Cairo, because of alleged 1

l aclc of cooperation by Cairo i n -not sending planes with arms for

operations , ~hich Cairo was in~ isting that Mihailovic carry out
immed iatel,y. Vihen ,t>lanes did arrive they contained a great .de.al
of defective or wrong equipment. I, myself, saw containers ·
·, fill ed y;ith nothing but undersize shoes and overcoats ~·hich would
f it .iJeople only five feet, two inches high. Despite repeated
~ir~s to Cairo givin~ exact pin points, times, requests, et~.,
•·ires from ~ iro indicated that they were paying no attention to
Bo.il ey' s rec;uests. For example, ~uite aside from the questior, of
E.rms and equipment, the _t)ersonal ne~s and necessitie s of. the
l.iissioir were being neglected, and some members la.eked proper
clothes , boots, etc.
In my daily t alks with Mihailovic and his Staff, I received
considerable i nformation about h is ar.ny, organization, and com-
munications. I also s turiied living conditions for the purpose of
t,iVing oy ,iJros,t>ective commanding officer some idea of what he
t.ould f ace, wici ~ :1a t ·j1e shoul d bring in v.ith him in the v.ay of
s:.i,;) lies.
Everyone, botn 'in the Britis h :A i zsion, und in ;~ihailovic's
s t a:f' were interested !.n kno,;ine; Vlhr..t wr:.i;: to be the status erid
f un ct ions of the American '.)f f icers , \'"i.1 etner :nore Americans v;ere
coming; ~hetner tne ,.·m ericans ·1.oulc send in c;.rms and su,>;>lies ;
~h6. t 11·li.s our a ttitude 'tov....rri t :1€ ?;.;rtis ans ; whe t l1er we v. oulc! aave
our ov.·n :irivate r r.dio t o C<.iro ; i:llld si:nilar ·,_uestions. Miua i l ovic
Y.1:1s , cf Cours e nerticularly interestt:d in r.nov. ing wneti1er the
;.:::t?:- i c.;.ns 11.oul C:• be undt:r t hE: ::lri tish, or v.oul .... ::iet. Utl se:)ar.:;te

• "·.. ·. - 4 -
 •

ais aions wi th him . Be for e lea g Cai ro I had re~eatedly asked

for ins tru cti on s on ou r fun cti vin
ons
go ing in sim ply to pre par e the way, and had been tol d tha t I l .'l:.S
be ful ly bri efe d ; tha t I sho uld for a sen ior off ice r wno would
acc;ua int my sel f wi th the ~e rsonul
tie e blld ge ne ral sit ua tio n, &.nd sen i­
suc h inf orm ati on and int ell ige nce d home over the Bri tis h r c.dio
off ice r coming in, pa rti cu lar ly as miglit be of use to my s~nior
he sho uld pe rso na lly bri ng in. on the c,u eat ion of v.nat s upp lie s
An sw
fun cti on s were alw ays very ge ne ral ers on .the qu est ion o: our
oif ice r would be ab le to i nst ru ct and to the eff ec t t hat my sen ior
ing con fer enc e wi th 1Aajor Inman, me upo n arr iva l. I he.cl one bri ef-
Ca iro , in '•h ich he adv ise d th11 t head of the Yugosl nv C.esk at !J. 0. 4,
fig hti ng ag ain st the Germans tha nthe Pa rti san s were do in( 1ouch more
ing gre at dif fic ult y get1-ing Mi haiMi hai lov ic; ~hat Bai ley w~s hav -
and was, in fac t , no t see n by ~ih lov ic to und ert ak e ope rat ion s,
tu sen d in a new man wi th a f irm ailovic; t :u..t it " ou ld be ~ece ss u-y
.,,·ould bri ng pre ssu re to be ar on hand, Bri gad ier P.rms tro ng , Y.ho
op erat ion s; and tha t the most im).li hai lov ic to ca rry ou t the se
of lin es of communication in the po rta nt op era tio ns were de str uc tio n
main r ail roa d lin es int o Gre ece ! ba r o.nd V!irdar Va lle ys, i. e. the
bJ'ld Bu lga ria .
. I, the ref ore , ans we red the
(J me rel y sen t ·in to pre par e the waymany c:ue rie s by sta tinc, tna t I l.us
a be tte r poe i ti on to ans wer ; tha for my su~erior, Y.ho ~ou ld be in
Americans "·ou ld co!Dlll in, bu t I nop t I did not know :1ov. mwiy more
fu ll coop~ration wi th the Bri tis h ed many; tha t we were .,,or kin g i n
pre sen t I would be sill lply o.n Americiin QJ.l res~ec ts; W1d tha t for the
.t.ll 10il it& .rj ob ser ver .
Wi tho ut knowing ex~ctly
seemed to me tha t we mi ght powh at olir fun cti on s wou ltl bf: , it
ssi bly ser ve in tny of the f oll ow
ing cap aci tie s: -
(1) li.l ili ta rt Ob ser ver , rep ort
in tel ligenc e. Bu for thi s s!un cti
i11g :1ome io ili tar J
or 40 rep res en to. ti ves tar ougi1out on , "e wou ld need :, t lto st JO
tro op s , wi th rad ios , i n ord er. to are as occu.[.lied by, l.:in ail ov ic ' s
i~o fig ht ine; ia done by !H
ret 'or t I irs t-1 rnn d lnt
hai lov ic ' s G. 11. ~ ., exce.Jt y.·:1eeJ. li bt::nce.
it. i s
att ack ed . American r e,i>resenta ti vus 11
a con uu it, tr&ne111itiint, t o:ne suc tae re cou ld onl J ser ve as
as l.l iha ilo vic ' s Ctl ief of In telligh daJ - to-duy w1co1.f i:nnea re~ orts
cou ld ea sil y hancile tni s jo'o for enc e :nir.ht off er. 01u: 01 1 ice r
bot h or i t.is ll 1:.nu 1..mericw1s.
( 2) :A ilit ar. ) Lia iso n to adv
ise :·.!lh i:ii lov ic 0!1 sir1..te~..>' •
• -' -
 f~EJ!b ,JI.
~ ~d coordinate his operations with general Allied ·strategy in
~urope. This function would require that the offi~er have some
mo•ledge from Cairo as to lihat advice could be given regarding
general strhtegy.
(3) Sup¢1Y Liaison, checking on Yihailovic's needs and
rec:uirements fOr operation, nOJ,ldling negotiations •ith Cairo for
S <.l_JtJlies , auministering the c!-istribution of SU,i1.lies to
".l inuilovic's forces, and checking en their use in the field.
Tnis "ould de.p end on y,·hetiler the U. S. A. 'l'as going to send in
o.ay su_J_Jlies. . ·
(4) 0¢erations. JJnerican representatives could furnish
nmerican technical operational J:lersonnel such as demolition
ex~erts , ra~io oper1:1tors, etc.

The le.st .three of the above would depend, of course, on

v.hether Mihailovic's operations were 5oing to be extensive
1::nough · to v.arrant them.
For the first t"o weeks life was relatively calm. Two
:-.lusselmt:n SJ:lies t1·ere captured and I had the \,\llpleasant experience
of se eing them get the'ir throats slit. An average of about two
German trans,t>orts, and one light. bomber flew over every day, but
"e v.ere well cW11ouflaged. The local Korpus commander gave us a
tre~end ous dinner out in the open under the trees (about four
miles av.ay) at 1·. ;uch I stuffed myself, drank "rakia", and even
&ave a speech of tnanks with • hat little Serbian I knew. Cetn'iks
unci r1t1:1sants c&JDe and gaped o.t me wi.U.le I ate. I was initiated
into the "kola" (national dcince) to the music C1f a harmonica, and
n.:.C. to neave tne snot ,:mt a bit. At this J:lOint it seemed like a
cia.rllll r,ood w-.r "i tn no uc..ng and _Jlenty of _Jleasant J:leople who v.-ere
o ~viouslJ lioniiir.g me rieht and l eft.

On 4 Septernuer "e hearo of the Allied invasion of Italy

a.nd i;.11ruediate1y noped we ;1ould be in Belgrade by Christmas.
So a.id. the Serbs. There wc..s muc.h celebrating, a.nd on 5 Sept ember
iires -.ere lit i n ~1onor of Kine ?eter's birthday.
On the following morning, 6 Septem.b er, the Germans let us
a ave it hlld I had 1oy f irst taste . of combat. In the early morning
:J i s t o. f orce of about 2.00 Germw1s came UJ! the mowitc.in side
0 11 our si·j e of tne General Staff, wnile we were asleep. All of

- 6 -
 )
a sudden heavy aacbine fire started close by in all directio ns.
Bailey and I threw on our pants and shoes , grabbed our rifles
and~·uick-pa cka•, slit a hole Ui.rough the back of our tent and
jua into the woods. The Gel"llans were COiiing up over the
hil s at about 400 yards in their blue-gre en uniforms with rifles
and opened up !ire on us. But there did not see• to be any front.
Machine guns, Sten guns were being fired from all directio ns,
both in front and in back of us, and were cutting branches in
the trees overhead. Bailey suggested we back further into the
woods, which we did. Finally we did a semi-ci rcl e about a half-
rnile back and were near the Starb. The firill8 continued another
'1oµr and a half. We learned that the Germans had been driven
back down the mountain. We then went back, eot our horses
and things and returne d to Mihailovic.
Several were killed on both sides and some prisone rs taken.
I saw one prisone r being alterna tely questioned and then kicked
and beaten. Later I was told that he had had his throat cut.
"

We !media tely left on a long dey and night march in th' I 1 l

rain over the steep mountai.ns for two days to Zlatibo r, with
) Mihai.lovic, hi.s Staff and· a guard of about 150 soldi ers. Here
we pitched camp near the Uvac Ri.ver. Mihailovi.c and Staff were
located about two mi.lea from us, spread out in di.ffere nt koli-
bars. Bis· radio station s were located about one mile from us
on the other side. It was the usual custom for us to spread
out in thi.s fashion , for securit y reasons, and to have some
privacy . On the march we always traveled in sill8le column,
with about 250 people, and 40 to 50 horses.
We were now in the area of bushy-haired Captain Radovic, /
local commander, who became a close friend· when l gave him.
some film. Be gave me a consider able amount of intell igence
on German disposi tion in his area, which I wired to Ca iro.
That week four of his soldier s created a mild sensatio n by
dress ing up in the uniforms of some Germans they had killed1
go ing into Vzice (where there was a large German garrison )
and machine gunnill8 a notorio us ~u i sling l eader in his home.
On the night of 8 September we heard over the BBC the
announcement that Italy had .s i ened a capitul ation on J September.

J
_,.,_
 ·;;e were at the time, not far froJJ a garriso n of about 2, 000
\ · Italian s at Priboj , and were surpris ed that•• had not ·receiv ed
6 so1.1e advance notice from Cairo, which would have enabled us to
place Wihail ovic's troops near the Italia n garriso n and obtain
their person al surren der, as well aa their arms, before the
Germans steppe d in. On the following day, Colonel Bailey re-
ceived a wire from Cairo, instruc ting him to do everyt hing pos-
sible to obtain surren der of the Italian s in the area, but not
to take their arms and ammunition away from them if they would
.ae:ree to fight with the Cetnik s agains t the Germans. At Berane,
was located the Italian •venet zia• Divisi on, command post for
Italian troops there and at Priboj . The •Tauranese• and •Emili a•
Divisio ns were reporte d to be ' in the area from Podgor ica and
Bokor Kotor north to .Dubrovnik. Bailey i.Jlmediately set out with
Jajor Lukasevic and a band of Cetnik s for Berane to try to ob-
. tain surren der of the •venet zia• divisio n. I repeate dly wired
Cairo for orders to go with him, thinkin g that it would be help-
ful to have an Allerican repres entativ e at any talk with the
Italian commandant, but receive d no reply for over a week.
On 11 September, Colone l Hudson and I went to Priboj to try
to obtain person al capitu lation of the ~talians there, whom we
could hear all night fightin g the Cetnik s who were attack ing
tneir garriso n. l\e arrived that night close to the Italian
garriso n, but when our peasan t courie r tried to make contac t
witll the Italian s inside , they opened heavy fire on us, which·
lasted three hours. We retrea ted up the mountain, and receive d
word on the follow ing day from the· Italian commandant that he
was under orders f.rom his command post at Berane, and that -he
would not surren der ·until he receive d instruc tions to do. so from
his General. T..o days later the garriso n surrend ered to us and
we spent some ti ~e in Priboj talkin g with the Italian office rs
ond placing the town under Cetnik contro l. It remained under
Cetnik contro l for almost two months. Later Major ~asevic '
disarmed t he Italian s when the town was threate ned by Germans .
In the meantime, :~ihailovic had sent out a genera l order
to his troopi; throughout Yugoslavia to attack lines of commu-
nicatio n, and Geman troops . I had a copy of this order trans-
l ated and sent home a si&lal about it. Therea fter, for severa l
days, :~ihailovic was showing me radio report s from all of his
Korpus commanders reporti ng extens ive sabotag e and attacks on
~mall Ger:lllll columns throug hout SerDia , Herzogovina, Bosnia ,
and vol.matia; that sever4~ trains were deraile d in south Gervia;
th<.t a large number of German lorrie s were destroy ed and severa l

-8-
 =www UAi... --. • ..,..-..=~-- ---~

)
r
• villa ges and towns takPn. eo..anders in Bosnia and
were COllplaining bitte rly about being attac ked in theDa.laa tia
rear by
Parti sans whi~e Cet.ni.lts were fight ing Geraans. For exam ple,
they state d that afte r takin g Gaclto and drivi ng the Germans
toward Bilec a, Parti sans walked into Gacko and claimed that
they had taken it from the Germans.
While this waa all going on, BBC London, -on its Yugoslav
news program, began an exten sive program of Parti
voting its atten tion almos t exclu sivel y to repo rtssanthat
news, de-
Parti sans were fight ing the Geraans everywhere , and takinthe
nU11erous citie s and towns from the Germans throughout thegregio
of Bosnia, North Berzogovin a, and Dalmatia. Mihailovic was n
never mentioned, desp ite the fact that his inte
were to the effe ct that he had taken many towns,lligesuch
nce repo rts
as Beran e,
Priep olje, and Gacko; and had carri ed out the above ment
oper ation s. The American stati on ~RUL was repo rting bothionedCetnik
and Parti san opera tions at this time, but it was so weak that it
could be heard only infre quen tly.
At this time Mihailovic asked me to see h~ at a confe rence
with his staff ; He was furio us at the Briti sh becau
BBC news, and showed me intel ligence repo rts from hisse01ll'I
of the
manders indic atine that some of the BBC news was false . Becom-
asked me whether it would be poss ible to have a group .of American
obse rvers come in ao}el.y for the purpose of going out with his
troop s to see for themselves the oper ation s which he
ing and repo rt back intel ligen ce to my government. Hewaastat conuu ct-
~
that he felt furth er talk with the British on the subj ect would
be usele ss because it was Guite apparent to him that t he Brit ish
had sold him down the rive r fo Stali n. I told him
repo rt the matt er home for cons idera tion by my chiet!uit
f. I
I woul d
immedi-
ately revea led our entir e conversati on to the Brit ish Missi on
and sent home a sign al.
From t hi s poin t on there was compl ete 4istr ust of the
Briti sh by :1liha ilovi c, his staf f, and his area
feel ing toward the Americans, on the othe r hand comm anders. The
, was one of in-
tense frien dship . Time and again , both Uiha ilovi c and .)lis
offic ers state d that they felt that Jlmerica was t he on.Ly democ-
rar;y l eft which lloul d take a fair and unbia sed vie" of what '"ai;
coine on in the country.
I had now been in the country one month , sent home over 96
signa ls , and receiv~ four repl i e5 . one concr atula ted me on my

- 9-
 ifNjitjp
safe arrival. The second was not decipherable. The third ad-
vised me to keep each message l.lllder 300 letters, rather than
35J letters, the British lillit, and to stay with Mihailovic
-
rather than join Bailey on the trip to ' Priboj . I received no
r eplies to several questions sub~itted to Cairo during the
r!lonti1 . A fourth had to do wit}} the Theater Command.
On: 2J S~ptember, Colonel Bailey returnea from Berane. He
ana the .British· enlisted personnel with him reported that on the
way down to Berane, Lukasevic and his troops had taken Priepolje
from the Germans in an all day attack, driving the Germans toward
Plevlje and killing , I believe, over 100; that he had obtained
com?lete personal capitulation from the Italian commanders at
Berane and Priboj and entering into !ill agreement for joint co-
ordinated action Sf.ainst the Germans; that in view of this agree-
ment he had not disarmed the Italians, but had left a skeleton
Cetnik force in each town. About two weeks later, Mihailovic
reported that the Partisans had attacked Berane, and disarmed
t he Italians. This only increased his ire.
On 2J September .Colonel beitz and Brigadier Armstrong
v.ere dropped to us on Zlatibor. Armstrong brought with him
:Jajor Flood, Intel ligence Of ficer; Major Jacks, Operations Of-
f icer; Li eutenant Colonel Howard, Chief of Stai f; two enlisted
v.ireless operators; and one batman. J:>oth Seitz and Armstrong
lost a great deal of t heir equipment upon landing, either through
theft or dropping .too far from the landinr, ground.
Col onel Seitz was unable to answer many of the above ques-
tions ree ardin? our functions, which I h ad •faced the first month
because there was a strong difference between him and Brigadier
/.rms trone on t hese mattPrs. At the first meeting with the Minister
anc.i his Staf f, Brigadier Armstrong pr1?1>ented lette.rs to Mihailovic
from Kine Peter II, General l"ilson, and Colonel Putnik, heaa of
t~e Yugoslav l egation at Cairo. Seitz stated that he had not
been advi sed of t hese l etters . After the initial greetings the
Brigadi er obtained a private audience with the Minister for him-
self and Colonel Ba iley, to "hich Se itz y,•as not invited , and
on t he f ollowinJ! day, at t~e first official staff conference
Vii t h :~ihai lovic -and his staff, . the Brigadier excluded us in
front of all per~onne l present , inc! ud ine the Yueoslavs . The
Eri:.ad ier also took the position that whi l e Yle must show him
'1 11~ of our ,,irPs , he need not i:;how us al l of his wires to Cairo.
~h ortly t hereafter, he also forbade Col onel ~eitz's going to
Pri boj to purchase a horse, and to see the Italians v·ho had i:;ur-
r endered , al tho1:e;h his own Intelligence uf ficer, Major Flood ,
Ii
10.
 v.c.s ullov.e d t.o Gu \.he r e.
The ;.rneri can .nember s or t111;; ••Ii< sivn ~ert:- no1 rt - t ~a t•d to
tne ,>osit ion of cioi:ic. ,,r •.cli c ... :.i J 1.oli:i11 ... 'i t s .it.1J it t,., j i.
signu l to Ca i ro ou t.:,e <.i.,ove , ••nu rt-ct:- i vt?Ci u rt>: l .i i..1c.t v. ., ;·t> rt'
und er l ne Bri!,;a dier ' s COU!." lt.nd; t.i1at tne Jn:.j· . 1o:rs ons :...:.lo·;. e.i
:,o stt t i1e :Jiuis t~·r v.oulu be iir i 1 c:ci ier , r 1.;;lron t., or, i:. .. is
<;.bsence , .1is nexl in <..OULl:J no , am. Colone.:. :.it>i t.,_ or , i;. .. is
absenc e, .1is nexl i n coui.'JW1d, iu t :1t :J"!' s.:nce of .:n intcr_'rt:t.€r
s c. lected by Ilri i;.aci ier f r :ns t ror.t! ; w1u tn::l t.:it : l'i'-<-c ie? ' :;
mess ages v.oula be s uuject . t.0 scl'uti n.)' i:1 .. is i.: i tt. l't !. io:1.

Soon af t e r :ii s arri v u~ , t..1e Jl rit.ati ie r •'L.teu t...;..t 'hi:! .::o·Jh :.

tXt>eCt Vtrj" f e v. ,;lw1e s all \' li•ttr, l;EC <l:..IS c l.:~ fhf V.<:.s t !.l O" ir.;
only a verJ s mall numbe r for tncs1; o,>era lions; lnat !.tiha 1lovic
v.ould only ~et su . : lies by 11l ane for s,-eci.:'ic op.. ration i: , 1·.:.:t::!l
he noped t o per s uade '.lihai lovic to umiert .u e , s uch c.s t.:t ~ low ­
ing up 01 uridg-:-s on tne Ibar anci Varda vc.llEy railro e:ci !. incs .

During h~ s firs t v. ee~, L\-ie ::ri i;.at: ier >1ent with Color.e l
tiudson to blov. U.<J c. br idge on t11e lielgr ace - '."'a ra.je vo na.rrov. tU!!.cie
railro ad line near Vardi ste . T~i s joc ias ~ s uccess , an~ tney
return ed six days l c:.tt r . .Curint. tais . eriO...: there nud "ot ... n c.
co;n;Jl ete miX-UiJ 11 ith Co.iro on 1•.11et.1e r urms would oe sent iu ior
the job. Cair o had ref used e. ;;lane loud t o ~. 1£. tiL or, on 1,ne
t;;rounci tuat i t v.as locc.t~ loo uea.r ?c..rti: ;ans in 1..ne SCJ1jw ;
out eventu ally aueed to send arms to Ct r 13er 11h .C:1 . ;_,itult nGJ1t
Koluro v ic sent a l a r 1;.e i;roup of oen t \\o Jc.ya trc.ve l ti.""" t o
l.1i s lat t er si:iot v.:1ic:1 "' c.s nov. dan1..er ous becaus e i t :iuc.1 cet n /
c.omi)ro mi sta 1.n1::n v.e iert c..l:.ac,;,ed 't;y t.1e Gtrlll011s t..1ere on
6 Se;>te:Tiber. 'i:11ey v.ai t ed s <:vero.l ni 0 nts in L1c.. cold t:Jt 11 0
,>lane came . T:1is on...y s t r veci to ir.crtuSt:- the strt..in .:.t Ll.e t:n
~.!ina ilo v ic &.11ci t.t1e br i t.isil , ts,.iec:i1:1lly ;. ince :i.ina. i l ovic
hi.0
c..lr £:acii sanct.i oneci t11is r c.ther i m:•ortbJ lt j ob ~.h ic.1 ·~oula c ut
the sup;.ily lines by rc:.ilro aci fro m 3.,::...,rc.>(.e '-O r:utroVJ1ik.
~l:!SJJ i le r e 1iec.t ed cl ec.r v i r es f r u1a t he ilri tish :,H ss i on on
,,in
;1oints f or lw1din6 5 r ounas on /lat.ib or , .;io1c. ls r .,c..., i vt:-tl t ro:n
Cairo in1..ica ttd eilne r " c.om;il t:-1..e ru isunue rstc.1.u i n,-: or i , 1.or a:.ce
oi our si~..ils .
On 2 uctoo er, llri E;<..ll ier hrmstr ont,, Colon1;l ~t i tz , Culor. el
'.~udson ,
....nd :Aajor J ac.-s \lent 1•. i th 1. lo.l'c,e 1.u,11ber oi Cet.n iks to
,1 r.ttacK Visee; rad i.nd tlestro y the lar~e ruilro au bridge o:. t.1e

- 11 -
 . . .

Slf!lu:fb
I
\.,.
Belgrade-Sara jevo near Rogatica. The operation waa a succeas.
The Genans were ariven out of Viaegrad and the Cetniks gained
co~trol of the railroad lin'e. The bridge was blown up a couple
of days later. Du.r ing this period, I was attending intelligence
meetings daily with Major Flood and Lieutenant Colonel Novarkovic,
the ~inister's Chief of Intelligence . Daily Intelligence bulletins
were sent home ·by flood and myself, in the American cipher, for
the reason t..c~at the British deciphering branch at Cairo reported
that they had such a back-log of undeciphered messages that we
could expect ~uicker transmittal if we used our own cipher
•hich was jointly held by the British.
The Brigadier, uµon his return from the Visegrad Job, ~ould
have daily conferences ..-i th the Minister, to so.me of which
Colonel Seitz was now being invited. At these' conferences, the
Brigadier would try to get the Minister to undertake new opera-
tions, but ~ihailovic would continue to stall action, raising
such questions as whether the British would give him arms for
t he jobs, whether the cost in reprisals was too high, and how
the · job f itted into General Allied strategy. Many conferences
were held, for instance, on a plan for Djuric in the south
to attack the ~a in r oilroad lines north of Skoplje with a
:nobi.ie striking force y,·hich would t hen mov& south toward Macedonia
and cut the Salonika line. i..fter much haggling lh hailovic
agreeii to authorize tne job, provided certain special
weapons were sent in to Djuric by the British. Hot much
hope was neld out for com~letion of the Oyeration, ho..-ever,
becuuse Aihailovic ho.d already r eneged on a previous order to
Djuric, who had stated that he had received no previous or.!
ders to carry out an attack on the railroad lines.
fie4ations ..-ere becouing more and more strained, however,
and tile Brigadier' s position was getting more and ~ore
di:'ficult because ·~·e were receiving vil"t ually no sup;.i.i..ies, ana
e.;ch day BBC .i....Jncion ·~ dev.:>ting its time entirely t.o the
Pat tis:ins.
In October, ~e received one plane at the General Stolff
coatuinine,: tNo bo..iies and so;ne explosives. Thereafter I
b.,.i.iev.; t.u:t no planes were sent in to :4inailovic anywhere •
..iina.ih>vic at tn'3 sSJAe 'time was incensed because after his
trJops u d.i t a.:en Hogatica froia tne Germi.ns in early October,
W l.l :usu llSSe1~b.i.etl a lar6e number of nis forces for an at.tack
·• on Sa1'..1jevo, he was attacked in t he rear by Partisans.
•
- 12 -
 ) SimultlllleouGi1 , UDC announcea t hot the ?artl&lllls had t aken
Roc•tica from the Germane , s lthough the Cet.nlke had contt'Ol of
the t o•n ot the ti111~ .
In vier of theae clrcu:ietances , I su1:ge•led to Colonel
S..i tz that we we an appreciation of the altu•tlon to det.er:olo•
ho• the Aaerlcen o;nbers nifbt be of u•e in this theater. Colonel
Seitz and 1 then pr•pared a basic estiu tA • hich reached the
conclus ion th•t Allied control of llihailovlc operations was
necessary: Ul~t cuch control could be obtalneo onl;f I! the t.llles
were in a vaci U on lo feed him Tith suppll•• : and that • e should
make a general inrpeclion of Minallovic ' G arJq in Central u,r bia
and report our flndl ne• lo C•iro ond hsh in~ton. Col onel S., i tz
took the report. up with t.he Brieatli er , •·i".o t;unclioneu the in-
spect.ion tour. 'r.lc subst.n.nce of t..1-ic report was vent. in s iptnuls
to Ca i ro. 'fhe llri~adior then too< up tho pro, oocd i nspection
tour wi th :Hhoilovic , • ho aereed •·ith our plan and assie,ned
Captain b. Tovorovic , Yugoslav officer with the General :,t.aff,
as our l iai&on officer. Colonel Hudson • •S a.a~ i;Jl~Q a6 in~er­
preter from the Br i t ish ~iss ion. I t • a• ant lci;>"te<I th•t • •
•oulc t r y to o,et out of L'ie country et the con<:luslon o~ tite
tour after we had obtalneo all of the •tatlatlca on ~ ihailovic'•
ar-.;,.
ln t..11e meantii;e , t'<.' • ere attac~ed ty ::emans anci s trafed
by Gfi'nan planes neur fi~do , on t..1.e :..im hi ve r, Md covea nor t H
for several d;ys close to Ljubovija , wh ich Is on the !Jrina
f< iver, southt.'PAt from Valjevo , :Jort..h Sflrbia . ·
Our Itinerar y • as se lec te-0. to enabl e us to see the l •l'!l•St
nWl:beJ" o!' areoc nnd troo;:itt in Centrttl Serbia. t.tat. could be
inSpPcted in about one month and & hal~ . Theijc n.reos incl\;Ced.
f..?:o~e unaer tho follow in~ COEienC.ers : - ajor i\acic , ·:bior ·.;i lO-
Vli!\OVic, c~,»t.din ·:inkovic , Capt.B i:. Kala.l:ic , 1.!.aJor Smi jani c,
~ajor VtTckovic, 'Jf\jor CvPtic , nnc. .-ajor ...uitavacvic. Uaps
!'>t.ot ing the rout""• fol lowfl'O , places ... here t.e st.o1101l'C and the
t.rooy.s and pPO?lo vi•tro are ettachec. heret.o 81!' i.,;hibit. • " "·
This i t inPrarv ~ould l\J.80 peroi t us to sE-e t.rOOiJi> bot..~ in the
plH ins in ::ort..i !..t rbi:i o.nc t?\e i;.ou.nt..aini.. in t.hc tout.h .
Un 7 i;ovarit.t)r 194) , v e l eft. on Ul-' tour t.it.11 i.Cujor I-acic ,
,;P.n t. nor t h tower!.l ~"bn c 1 ro ine pa,i;t. thro 11.:h VluU i mirci , south
to a point belo~ Vnljpvo, eoat to a point nnnr Topo la , then
t•out.h neAr Cornje ~.:ilrino vne , Cacr.k , Cuen , .,nd ing up i n Ct.·e tic ' s
.. area nPAr Reeka .

- lJ-
 ".

The procedure fol l owed in each area

f irst had a long conf erence with each AreawuC011a abou t t.be same. le
ander , in which we
obta ined gene ral infol"llation about his staf f, troo ps, 8nlB on hand
men mobi li zed , men 110bilizable, co11111unic at.io na, enem y disp osit ion,
oyer at.ions executed and planned, repr isal s, medical supp
tial uir port a, eDellJ' 110ve11ents, .~ othe r info naat ion. lies , pote n-
ation .... .. tabu lata ble we obj.&ined on a fora of ques tion Such inform-
1::acn Srez from the cou sMe r inter view ed. The bala nce nair e for
was
in penc illed .note s. At t he' same time, Captain Todorovic recorded
c.; uest.ed the Mini ster to obta in the sue
had re-
info rmat ion froa
Co1119a.11de rs whoa •e would be unab le to visi t and to forw all Area
same to us in Cve tic' s art1a where we ex,>ected to .be in ard the
~iddle of December.
the

Following is a list of troops and people .actua).ly seen by us

on the enti re tour :

Area No. of Ho. of

Coua nde r men with people with-
Loca tion ~ . Unit Ama out ams
Uajor Raci c Dern ja O~avica Azhukovaaka 350 900
Brig ade ' I
• Stav e Radjevska 125 125
Brigade
" Gornje Sipu la Cerska and 400 250
Jaduska
Brigade a
• Sino covi c Poce rlti 40 JOO
Brigade
• Svil enva ? 50
tJajo r Milov&1'1 - Tult1.ri
ovic - lat Tamnavsha 50 2, 000
Bri,a ae
" Dup ljaj 200 2, 000 inclu d-
and ing women and
vici nity chil dren
" Strugani k - Valjevska 70 350
Brigade
Captain Ivan ovci ? 190 200
Nink ovic
Capt ain
I alao ic
? - Irei ljeva
Gardia
600 JOO
" Vlaclcca - Orasacka
Brigade
80 . 500
'. " Stragari ? 100 750
illajor I a.au:n i ca 24 Uov 400
Si11ljGllic ? 100

- 14 -
 ,.,...
COU'Mtr Local.loo
~R~11 Ho . of
Mii • 1th
Ho. o{
.,.otl• 11 ~h- .
~ l!.llil Ar¥ oy Ary

llaf~rJ
S anic
Ljljaci 25 ~O'f 2d
B~•
[N~ anb 250 250
ll&Jor Biolo 26 lloY 2d Tt.konka )00 400
\l\ickoYic Poljo Bri&ad•
• ~&nica 27 HOY )00
• Pranjaoi 28 NOY lat Tt.koveka 140 6)1.l
Bri~ado
ll&rkoYic ( uollica JO llo'< 50
VuckoYic (rotac l Doc 70
• l ot.Ku ) Dec ? J.21) 200
• Luke A Dec 200
11&.j or Rll<lno S Dec . Staff Cos. of 89 100
Cvetic lat & 2d utud-
enica Brigades
• • 7 Dec 'l 2UO
• Golija 19 Dec Daiervaka )vO ! , 2..lO
lit.a. Br igade recruila
'Iotal J.~ 9,625
','
The aboYe dooa not include many hundreds of troops seen by
ue before and af'!Ar tho formal inspection tour. Nor does it in-
) clude all of' lllhailovic' s troops in the o eaa vial tod because we
often • OUJ.d hit an area by surprise and stay toe ehort a ti..
for t roops to be brousht in f roa eurr<>unding diatrict a.
We arriYed in Cvetic 's area in the first part of Dece2bor
near Ruka. At \.hie t111e tho Brigadier was stlll up north in
Racic 's area. The inforution requested. fro:11 the ;linist.er had
not arrived and • • had no radio cont.act with the Central Steff
because CVetic•a radio was not working. When the radio was re-
paired •• sent 10118 11eaa1111es to the Brigadier throush Ul.bailo- 1
YiO 1 1 General Staff, but bad no replies. ·
After ni ting 1neral aore daya • • decided to try to ulte
for the Adriatic Coast as soon as • • had obtained the buance
of the inforut.ion from t..~e Miniater, in order to present t~i•
information which we thought wou!d be of some i~portance to our
Covernaent. in deciding its policy toward llihailovic.
On Deceool>er 2)rd, wtule we were hiding a• a)' in the little
villa,. of Irljani in Cvetic' s area, we received a pencilled
note •la Celjt.k courier fro:a C•pt.ain John iade, British Liaison
Offi cer attached t o l e1&erovio. He atat.ed that ht was • it.h a
group of •ix enliated OH!n le<:ated about three houro from us , and
that. pur auant to orders received from Cai ro, he wao on ni• way
t o croaa over to ~ht Partisans in order t.o leave tne count ry.
-15-
 '{ e illlllediately went over and foWld him. Ho atated that relations
bet•een the Allies and Wihsilovic • ere alllloet broken off because
lHhailovic '"" refueing to fight the Cemana, lllld that !4ih8ilovic
' "" accuaed of colleborating •ith C..raana in hia fi ght. agaioot
the ?artisblla; a.nd t.Ut he u s ordered to Join the Partisans i f
he f elt that he could oake bla • a;f over wilh a reuonable clegroe
of safety. !!o bad been given a pin ,><>int nwar Berane, but since
t.ne intenen l.na territory .as heavily ,>0,>ul•\Ald >lth c.,,.,.ans and
Cet.niks , he decided to tey to :Hl:e nls " a:/ IJ\roUfh Zlatibor,
then cross t.ie Orin• , and • ark his wa/ down aouth Wltil he could
:.a.lr.e contact with I.ho Partisans . ~e was told to ask fo r the
co11monder of the 2nd ?artisan Ioryus iiJlO wu advised that sti.fe
~ass;.ge t o Italy l'"'1 been gullI'llllteed by tho Part isans.

Colonels lludaoo and Seitz dec ided that • • • ould j oin i:ade
ot once. Colonel S<?itz felt that if we wa ited any longer the
in1or:iation >..ico • • h..d col,lected •ould becoce st,.le atld that
it • "" bettEr to gn out nth pi.rt of the Womation rather
tnan lose all. 3ud.aoo etay.a • itb hde, wilo . .nt to Sr ecinja
f.• il., • :ier. •~ jol.D.d :>.!.:: UM! next d._,. T:U.t niF)lt Colonel
!:eitz ...nd r Wuc toe 2 .i.t.t.er over f urther, uxl decided that
it 1u>u1Q ee 0.,tter 1i M " •nt on •i t.:1 the infomation ulready
colJ..ect.eci •~1 ile I • alt.ed, obtoined the be.lance of tne infoma-
t.ioo, !.nC !'ollo-.. td bl:a u s oon as :)'O&s ible. I QbY~ biai all of
:ay ;enc i ilt«.1 11ot.e1 blwi lt.ht.istica.l d'°t.a collectt?d f ro:a various
,, Nh CouWldera 011 our t.our of insi>ect.i ·on. Early on t..ne morning
o! <.4 !A:&.:.e!D~r, t..1e - r1 tire ; &rt.1 left. 111 6 • fifst.crly d i rection
~o•hrd !:t.itkovo, • .:ile I r em£.ined at. Sr ednjn Reka .

On l lw aftenioon of 24 Dece~oe r, :.lajor Cv•tic ..nd C•J) toln

:ocor~ .. i c ;.,ir·i.V'""'\l ut. ~1"'1nj c he!ka, and I 1irX:Jl•ini;:<f t.o t.neai -.hat
~1- .:...J ~rJ{'(i. Jn '":sriat..'Ja.~ c.a.y • .-: rectti 'led a :Mtas ... ~e f~ Lne
.: .r.~at~i- ;,.-o tne t-f1'"ct. t .\b t. :.l ... jor I..uJc;iae·1 ic ""'°
:.c" ..._ir. • it!l ...:1 in;orAo.t ion, ~ lo;.ilt,;,. ~scort. us t.o t.ne coc:1.st.
leav in6 in a
~.ro.J:,.-• c... c~ 1ic' ~ .. r e• \,.l~re a co.ru.1 'las O\J• o;>en. On l J~ Jary
.~.-.· ::-... :>ccu not..11.,, o:" Lul aJEVic, I c-:>ctded t..o ~ush on Lo.-itrd
.• ovo ·.rt.1r-0P, i.1 t.\U .. s~vlc ' ::t &rec., in \.i1~ llOi>'O t..Vtt. I could
... t •. :.J.1sn i. i.!i~un \,i.t...\ .110 . 4'1.. sav"" ti•nt?. On < J 11n1.1ttry l or r ived
iu .11.i:.... l)vo ,Jl... l v WIY t.i.;.t "'c ... l:'r ~ sor1 01.1.nJed on t..1ri;L ::.iaes
1'j' .... r 11~1s ..:i1,,1 .\~rt.t r.tons y,,10 .1.J.... '"0:11( o ve r· f ro1J t.ho ~anj ak, and
-.. .. -~ it \tilJ J:•.i ~ i :i(u~s lf.tltt t..J hi,u: &.Y. t1t in ~ aca~ll vl ~l ... tte, . i'or
t:u: r~hSon .... ~t. s .. t.-": t NU..>8 .JJ r'...r t. 1shn6 ,\..i.tl be\Jn Ln!1lt.r at1nt
ir.t. ... t.tl~ .ir·ll.:' .. J :.' o:- a'".:., r .. : · ""'~•. s . ! ... i. ... ' !'"o.m.... t..\ot. :.uk....st:"vic
_,J ;, ... ~ .. ! ~v i\,. · ~r~ c.ot n .11l" ...r .•ovo 'lbros (U l. sa,..~ri.. t.ed froL us

- 11> -
 F I

st~a~
1
by Genun and Partisan troops. we tberetore left
as the firing start..d and made a hasty fifteen hour retreat bael:
to the area of the S"'1nja Reita. Enroute we bwaped into Captain•
... J .llore and Stock, British iuilY, •ho said they were following 'l'ade •
I advised them of the s ituation , and I.hey decided to wait whi l e
I went back to try to eatablish liaison with llibailovic. 'A'e were
then separated by very heavy t wo day snow fall, after which I
found that they had . puohed on. "
After eight daya I went forward again as far as Bratljevo
and found that about 800 Partisan&' had been pushed from the San-
jak into the St i tkovo area, and were now between ua and Novo Varos,
our objective. On the night of 13 January we attempted to sneak
through their lines but wore unsuccessful when our two guides wem
captured by t ile Partis ans. On the f ollowing day we circumvented
t he Partiaans by going over Javor ~ountain, and arrived safel y
in Stitkovo, • here •e saw t alait ovic, who told us that the canal
to the sea was now open, and t hat we should proceed in the direc-
tion of Priboj to meet Lukasevic.
Froa then on we continued our march to t.he sea, in t.he
courae of which we had a few brushe.s with Partisans and Cenoans.
Briefly, our route was from Stitkovo t o Novo Varos, Priboj . Rudo,
Gorazde, Ialinovik, Ulog, lifino Mlo, Lubinje, Stare Slano,
and the region south of D.ibrovni k. 'lie crossed the Lim River at
I Priboj, the Drina River at Gorazde, and the Tr.ebisnjica River
at Stare Slano. Not one day passed without gunfire oo~ewhere near ·us.
During all this period, I wore GI pants and leather- j acket
with insignia, except when we crossed the Drina River at Gora zde,
where there were about 200 Ge man troops: Here I donned complete
~BBant garb, put ~ equipJ1ent in a peasant sack, which was placed
on a horse, and wal ked across the bridge, and t..hru Gorazde. •te
walked right in fI'¢ nt of t he Cer.oan guards , but were not s'tcpped.
At Priiloj we met Lieut enant Colonel Os toj ic, who advised
Lukasevic had lef t with a party of 16 y.,goslavs nav•l ofi'icers
for t.he coast. He gave us l etter~ from ~ih ai lov ic to Roos evelt,
Donovan, and Eisenhower, which I sewed i nside of O;' jacket. 1>t
Priboj t he route of the canal was outlinoa t o us , and •e follo•e<i
it with some variations de~nding upon •bet.her •e &et Par tisans
or Gemans enroute. t.'e t raveled wi t h armed escorts ranging f rom
five to sixty men, depending upon how mllJly we ccul~ obtain fro~
the local Cetnilc comander in each area. 1ie made severbl Jarced
marches , one for t.wen t.y ... two hours, ·.rit.hout s topping , and t.everal
during the night t.i11i.e to e.voiU conflict •i t h t he Pi.rt.is&.n,:) , "h~n
we arrived sout.h of Kifino s~10 we f ou nd ourselves blocked by
bands of Partisans in t :te surrouo<lin,g mountains anJ after trave.iin&
six hours t o try to make a path t.hr ou6h, our &Ua.rtl of ) j ~en b• lkeu ,
and were forced to retreat back near Kifino Sdo . On t he !'ollodn~
;norning we learned tna t Colonel 11i'll i o..c &aiiey it.no. .~<:1.jor uUi &.bevic
were not f• r -17-
•.f9 a•ay, and we joined t.he i r part.y.
I le - rned immedi at.ely from Colonel Bll.i.ley that he l'ias
doing the same thing aa myself and ho~ to get out of the
coWltr y by giving a pin point by radio to the British, ..nd
having a naval craft ;>ick him up. He invited me to join him,
and I did so. .·
,
Previously my plans were to try t o capture or bu,y a small
boat on the coast and see if I could 11ake my way across the
/,i riatic. I heard that.. t wo .tiarties had done this successfully.
Our party now numbered about 180 men. "·e succeeded in
?Ushing throuc;h the Partisan area to a spot near Lubinje,
wher e we found ourselves blocked by several hundred Germans on
one side, and a brigo.de of Partisans on the other. Aft.er
almost buapiDg intv Ule Genans, we decided to change our route
and go betTOeen t.he Partisans and the Genaans. We had proceded
only one half hour when I, at t.1e head of one of the columns,
bumped into a Gerra..n patrol at about fifty yards. Here it was
Lukasevic' s cuick thinking which saved us. He advanced with
some men as if he were looking- for the Ge~ans , and told us to
go ba~. I luter l earned t.1at he demanded to see their commandant,
s tating that he v.as Ule Coama.ndant. of the Cetnik Nevisinje Brigade,
and that he had important i.nforaation to hive the Germans; that
he t.as escorted into the village , wet the German couandant and
advised him that he was out scouting for Partisans and that a
large bMd 01" Pi..rtis hlls were intending to attack ~e Germans that
night, and that he, Lukasevic, hoped that the Germans would be
on the alert. The GeI'!lans c.llowed him to go for the pw•pose of
f ighting toe Partisans . In a little ~hile the local Cetnik Srez
co111nander lll'rived. He stated that he was ac~ uainted with the
German COlll!ll&ndant, that ne had f ound living acco11111odation s for
640 of the German troops ill the area and was ex?ecting i.nother
(,4,J t.ne next day. That night we "ent in the dark through the
area, not far from "here the Germans were billeted. On the
f oll o?.inf day 11e crossed t he Trebesnjica, and 111ade contact with
~i P.utenant Colone l Bacevic ' s Headc,uarters . Tnereaft er, "e remain-
~u in the vicinity of Dubrovnik, while Colonel Bailey mil.de contact
by radio with Cairo.
V"e y,·ere then r.uout f ive hours fran t he coast. Bacevic uad
i..dvance notice of our co~ing ,and a young Yu[ osl av navy lieutenant
-- i n his orea y;ho kner. tnE coast very y;ell had made a s w·vey f or

- 18 -
 the purpose of t.eying to find a pin point. He
&iCitt
finally selected
a point about fiTe kilOMtera south of Cavtat where tne rocks
descended abruptly into the Adriatic Sea anci. there was a deep
water cove froa which. •• could flash a signal without its being
seen by Genaana. The ool.y difficulty was that t~ere were several
Tillages between us and the point which harbored . a nwaber of
Ustaohi. Between ua and these villages was a larg~ range of
aountains descending to a plateau which in tllnl descended to the sea
Another difficulty ,waa t.hat Bailey's batteries needed to be
charged. We had been told that Bacevic would do this at his head-
quarters which were about eight hours inland, but wben we arrived
we found he had no gaaoline. W'e therefore sent a courier into
Trebinje, where the batteries were charged by 11 local concern. ·;;e
finally ude contact with Cairo and received word a day or ao later
to atand by for thre~ days at t he pin point, the coordinat es of
which we had signaled to Cairo, and to signal certain letters by
Morae code with our flashlight each night for three hours.
Up to this point the weather had been exce.i..lent. On the
night we 'start.ed down to the coast, a big storm blew up. Af ter
sneaking down the aountainside through several villages, in rubber-·
solQd shoes, made out of pieces of rubber tires, and do; igi·ng~ ' ·
Ustachi patrols we arrived at the pin point without 111Uch aifficulty.
) There was an apgry sea and we knew that we could not embark, but
we kept flas4ing the signal for three hours. When no boat showed
up, our Celjak guide, who lived about three quarters of an hour on
the pin point, agreed that we could hide out up in his bedroom the
next day, so we returned and stayed there all that night and the next
day. The village was· ful l of Ustachi who11 we could see t hr ough a
crack in the window. There were now ten of us, and lie stayed in
this room without moving out, the landlord bringing us food during
the day. Again we tried the next night, but without success, be-
cause the weather was still unsettled, and we stayed one more night
and day in the same house. When the boat·did not show up. 1-be' third
night, we made a long h&lti retreat up over the mountains for five
hours back to the Inezevic faaily, who hid us for the f ollowing day.
On the following hight we returned to the little safe village from
whi ch we had originally started.
By this time we were pretty discouraged because we found out ·
that the Gestapo .knew that we were in the general vicinity, through
spies in Dubrovnik, but did not know exactly where we were. ~ e re-
ceived this word through on~ of Bacevic 1 s spies in t he local Gestapo &

-19-
Dubromik. Furthermore, our batteries bad run out, and we had
no way of getting them charged except at Trebinje. When we sent
a peasant t here with the batteries to be charged, he found th•t
the Germans were getting their batteries charged, and had left
a soldier to watch their batter!ee. The soldier becace interested
in our batteries which were of a different t ype, so th•t we had
to eet the batteries out of there that nidit. FinaUy we managed
to get another battery, lly otealing it oul: of a ra·i lroad car.
The weather con t inued to be bad and we had a heavy SD.ow
otom. Je finally established contact with Cairo and tried
to arrange that we woul<! not 'proceed again to the pin po int
until Coiro gave us a signal t h, t the ship had &lready left
Bari . Th i s •·e did because we felt the canal was good for only
two more days and we d id not want to compromise it. The signal
finally came through from Cairo and we 88•in proceeded on the
night of LG February over a •lightl y different route to the
pin ·point. The trip down t he mountainside was extre11:ely
difficult because of t he sno• • hich eade our boot.a slip on
r ocics and roused several dogs i n ' the neighborhood. te were
on l y t~enty minut es at the pin point fl••hinf the letters R N
~hen we hoard t he l o- hum of the motor. About fifteen minut es
later t~ie ship slowly pulleci up and . allll4! a d ingy overbo•rd.
I n 26 minutes we had embarked all ni ne of our party. The • hip
·..,.,; ·• Bri tish N•vy type llL, about 75 tons, bristling dth. nine
oachino guns . lie arrived in Bari at 0900 the following l:iOrning.
v:hil• in .southern Dalmat ia I was advi•ed by everyone , both
'fu;:oslav officere and peasan ts , thti.t. there were no Partisans
south of Dubrovn ik. I Jid not run into any on our trip to the ·
coast throu,eh this aree.
II. llIHAI!.OVIC A!ID Hlb POLICY
Mihai l ovic' s general policy i s the same as that of any
other .(uerrilln force in an occupied country , i.e., resistance
beFed on ultimate Allied victor7. Ris order of battle, however,
os eYore,•t><i both by hiOISolf and aany of his leader s, is based
\_1,.•on gi,v i•.~ uµ hi s o:f ensive for "D·D8J'" or "ustanek" , as it
i ~ caUt>d by the Yup,oslavs. This pPl icy is based upon the
assUllption that the Alli•• will invade the Bal.leans , or if they
oo no! , t h" t he will he called upon to ~&Ice one grand effort
to t~.ro~ t he Cen:iens out o~ Yugoslavia •i t hout Allied help.
;J,ihailovic ' ti po~ition i E t.htlt he does not have enou.&h 8.J"m& t.o

- 20 -
 engeee in &xtensive 'operstions befol'O this great ' D- Day• and ·
still have enough left for the gN•t day. He bases this upon
the tl'emendous reprisals and Gerc611 counter offensive which
followed his • justanek• . in the fall of 1941. lfe also wishes
to avoid any. further extensive reprisals which he beUeves dll
only serve to further reduce the numbers of the Serb populati¢n
which he states has already been decimated by the Croats, Usu.chi
and Germans. Be i s determined to preserve the Serb population
ethnically and nucerically to avoid Cro•t domination after the
occupator is thl'oon out.
For t he above reasooi:; hi s pol i cy a.s expressed ycrsonally
and in operational orders to his area com.ai&.nders is to cut d oYiD
operations aeainst the Germans and Bulgars before •D-Day " to a
minimum , unless he receives sufficient arcs from the Ailies t.o
~age a continuous war aeainst them . Ri6 µresent orders al low
each col'!IDl.ander t.o engage in small attacks 3f,binst the German
f orces ~here his 0"11 forces are nWierical ly superior in t.he
par ticu l ar in•tance to those of the eneoy and gain from the
operation ( e l t~er in arms captured or dwna;ie done) v:ill t:.ore
than offset t he subsequen t cos t in reprisals.

\ ) The only major departure from t he above P.Ol icy durine the
past year came immed iately after the Italian capitulation, in
September 1943, when for a period of one !llonth 11ihailovic
issued general orders to his leaders to attack coomunications
and enell\)' fo rces ...hercver possible.
At the sw::.e t ime, Mihailovic continues ext ens ive fi e.hting
against the Partisans, insisting , hor,ever, that his orders are
that coCDCanders will fi ght Partisans onJ.y when attllcke<l. In
January I was advised by Capt ain Todorovic, who had sst in on
secl'Ot meetings of Mihailovic ' s Staff, t h•t Mihailovic allocate•
percentages of arms to be used in certain areas a;;ain• t I.he
Cermans anU P1:1.rtisans; and that. evPrvihere he is al locating a
greater percentage (estiU>ated at aoout 65%) to the Parti•an Tiar.
This it borne out by Mihailovic' s o•n figure& ••hich sho\" he has
an excess of arms over men in certai n ar-eas , ij\ICh as Herzos.;ovine. ,
"here he is fighting t he Partisans. ·
The above oolicy reduces t he Cetnik &1'111)' in ~erbia (•here

..
there is li ttl e or no confl i ct wi th Partisans, becau•c t here are
very few Partisans in Serbia) to a s tatic condition • here every_
body is waiting f or 'D-Day•. Many of the leauer• anu oen r.oula

- 21 -

-- --·
 probably like to do more fighting because they are sic~ of being
in the 11'0ods for three years. Yihailovic thus only serves Uie
purpose of keepin~ immobilized. a certain nwaber of German troops
who muLt be on hand to check the threat of a general uprising
by his troops.
The following i s Mihailovic's hi story ii.a related to me by
Colonels Bailey, Hudson, and others: Mihailovic personally is
a regular career offirep in the Yugoalav· arm,y, born near
lvanica, - Central Serbia, of Serbian parents. Before the war
he had served in several different c•pacities in Uie Yugoslav
army. For a time he. was ·Military Attache at Prague, Czechoslovakia,
8:'1d Military A~tache · at Sofia, Bulgaria. He· speaks ~ood French.
Yhen the war with Germany broke out he was a General ~taff Colonel
on the extreme left wing in Bosnia , near Sarajevo. when the
aI"lll.,Y began collapsing in his area he immediately retired to Uie
hills with several of his officers and men. Gradually he was
joined by others and found himself to be the highest ranking
officer. · At Uiat time his immediate policy was not to fight
the Axis until he was supported by the Allies , tliereby precluding
heavy reprisals upon the Serbs. He planned to wait until
"D-Day", when he would make on great effort to . throw out the
Germans. He soon found that the Musselmen in Bosnia were being
appealed to by the Croat anti-Serb population to join wiUi the
Ustachi in the purge of the Serbs , so he went from Bosnia in
!lay .1941 to Ravne Gora, north of Cacak;. At this time the
country was in a virtual state of an~chy because the Germans
had not yet organized their control. It was being run by Belgrade
commissars and gendarmes who were too wealt and demoralized to
keep order for the Germans. Mihailovic got considerable backing
from the local people around Ravne Gora by putting local bandits in
t he hills. He was also joined by. large numbers of Yugoslav
officers and men who had escaped the Germans and uid not want to
go into t he cities where they would be taken prisoner and sent
to prison camp.
In June 1941 Russia entered the war against Germany.
Prior t o this Uie Communis ts had been outla'fled in Yugoslavia.
Nor: a small group who call themselves Partisans ana l1ho were
. strongest in the vicinity of li1011tenegro (where the poverty of
the land has al~·ayio caused the population to take more to

..
Communism and to produce more artisans who showed Colllllunistic
feelings) began organizing. Ti1eir chief app~al was t hat now
the people, and not t he army ana polit icians llho had let them
dovin, ~ould do the fi~htin~ . The Partisans were ·therefore
fairly popular because they promiseo. everything, oidn 't go
aeains t the Kin e, and were all for getting rid of the olci
pol iticians.
- 22 -
 .I

"ihailovic's position at, this time was not strong, because

he came froa an aray which had been coaproaised. The Serb
·peasant •ho fol'lled over 80% of the popul11tion of Serbia, was
extremely diaappointed at the showing made by· his country' s
~ of 1,500,000 aen, which he had supported by the sweat of
hie brow for many years. The ~rb felt that he had paid for
a fight and that he hand 't received a fight.
In the fall of 1941 the Germans left a very, small force
to occupy Serbia, mainly because thP.y- had drawn most of their
fol'.ces to the Russian front. The Partisans, finding the Gennaos
we8.k, beg&n llllking successful attac.lc.s on commilnications,
railroads, and small Genaan coluans.
'
Yihailovic was now forced to take a different posi tion ,
r because he foiind himself with a competitor appealing to the
Serbian people who were getting excited over t he successes of
the Partisans. In August 1941 he t herefore issued a general
statement ·that he realized the temper of the people, that he "
had been appealed to as a responsible leader, and that h~, was
now going to come down and lead a general revolt against .the
' ) occupator. Thie he did, with considerable success for two
months, working with the Partisans jointly part of t he time.
Uzici, Pozega, Cacak, and many other towns in Central Serbia
were taken , and Valjevo was besiegea.
·The joint offensive did not last very long, howe~er, be-
cause of the many differences between the Partisans and the
Cetniks. Peace was made fQr a while, but did not last long.
Then the Germans mustered their strength, made a drive south
into Serbia and crushed both the Par.tisans and Mihailovic with
a full scale offensive with tanks and infantry. Mihailov~c went
into Montenegro. The Partisans first ' went -into Herzogovina
and were pushed from there into Bosnia. Th:is spelled the end
of the Partisan appeal to the· Serb people because the Partisans
were defeated and now lledic and the collaborators became
popular. The general feeling wai that a Ge:rsan victory was in-
evitable anc' that t he people might as 'llell fo l lo11' the Neciic
slogan , "Work, and order. Let the bi g nations f ight out the
issues which the Serbs cannot settle, and from which the Serbs
can only get futile bloodshed•. Noll the people wanted peace
and no reprisale--particularly those who ·woul d lose the mos t.
'

- - -- ~--~-~----
 ,
'~r
Mihailovic now sat in Montenegro where he reorganizea his
army with orders that it should sta,y under cover until it
could be strengthened. Re was able to stay in Montenegro
from September 1942 until May 1943 because of collaboration
between his local leaders there and the Italian occupators
'to whom control of Montenegro had been given by the Axis after
t he defeat of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic justified t he receipt of
Italian arms which he used against the Partisans on the ground
that he would subsequently use them against the Italians them-
selves.
Toda,y Mi hailovic still has a great c.rip on the Serbian
peasa.,t. Everywhere Colonel 5ei tz and I traveled on our tour
through north- central Serbia t he people in villages who turned
out to see us cheered him madly. In private conversations they
talk of him as one would of the Messiah. Cetn ik troops and
peasants alike sing romantic songs about him, and Ravne Gora,
his o.riginal hideout, has become very sacred to the Serbian
people. To them, Mihailovic still stands as a symbol of their
spirit of resistance ap.ainst the occupator. He al so stanas
for the things they want, King and democracy. They feel that
he did not desert t hem in their greatest hour of need, immediate-
ly a!ter capitulation, but stayed to organize their resist ande
·ana four ht aeainst the Germans in 1941 when the big n~tions
were losinp, the war everywhere else. One must remember that
the Serb peasant is ,a simple man, uneducated, and bound to grasp
firmly to simple ideas. ,
As far as qualities of l eadership are concerned, Mihailovic
seems to lack the abili ty to delegate authority. For example,
hP personally SPeft and answer s every telegram and letter from
his various coma:anders and other represPntatives througiiout the
country. This wastes valuable time which could be used for
important matters, and delays answers which must be sent off
immediately. Even on minor mat t ers such as arran&ements for
mov~mcnt of his GHQ to another location he personally supervises
everything.
Colonel Bailey has also reported that Mihailovic fancies
hi ~~elf ae a very clever politician and diplomat who has
attcm;>tcd in relations v:ith the British to get help Y:ithout
:naking commitments binding upon himself, liith t he result that

,, -u -
 I
llJ he hurts his own positi on because he only encourages hard
dealin g and l ack of complete frankness on both sides. For
example, he refuse d to accept as a condit ion to the receip
Britis h aid, that he would permit Britis h Lia ison office rs ttoof
witness t.lie oper~tions which he said he woula carry put if the
aid were forthcoming, and he isolate d himself from Colone l
Bailey , after Bailey had made this reques t. Bailey ' s positio
was that if ~Jihailovic was actua...ly going t.o carry out the n
O}lerations as re..,uested, he would lose nothing by allowing
Britis h o:;: ficers to witnes s them anci. l\·oul<l in fact probably ·
help himse lf because the Britis h could render first- hand
report s to Cairo. Later , ~ihailovic with.ire• from this positio n
and reesta blishe d relatio ns with Bailey .
In his ueali.ngs with the Britis h missions sent i n to him,
Yihail ovic, (accor ding to Bailey ) has unfort unatel y aaopt eci an
attitu de that they are only glorif ied 1<uartermaster.s. He has
limite d his discus sions prima rily to ma.king rer,ues ts for arms
and ammunition, anci that the Britis h broadc ast certai n
propaganda submit ted by him. No attemp t was Jlllllie ~t the out-
set to enter into complete and f rank joint discus sions or
agreements on proposed operat ions, anci. whet.ner they would tie
it wit.h Allied policy . This may partly be due to early action
of the Britis h. ilt the outset of their relatio ns with Mihailovi'c,
in the fall of 1941, they sent /itihailovic a pllille loa.U of arms
over the object ion of their own Britis h liaiso n office r_, Colone l
Hudson, wpo pointe d out that the aid 'ol'ould be used in the civil
war which was beginn ing to brew wi th tne Partis ans. 11hen
~ihailovic learne d of this he adopted the attitud e t hat the
Britis h mission was relativ ely unimportant because he could get
aid in spite of it. During this same period BBC London, regard -
le11 of messages from Hudson , was milking a world wide figure
of
lilihai lovic. This only tended to inflat e :.lihail ovic' s su,iez·i ori
complex in his early dealin gs with Hudi;on, and in his later ty
dealin gs with Bailey . .tihail ovic also shov1ed evi:J.ence of small-
ness in his treatm ent 'of Col onel nuason . ;·,nen he found that
Hudson had tried to stop Cairo from sending aid, he kept Hudson
virt.unlly incommunicado for i.lnlost six· mont.nb. More recent ly
Bailey report s that Mihailovic tried in severa l ways to keep him
from gettin g out of the country.
Toward Colonel Seitz and myself , '
~ihailovic has always been

t. - 25 -
 ..
•
ha••
111>at affable, but we nner liad deal~• With bia in•olvini
American auppliea or requeated operationa•
WihailoYio baa a ••?'1 eecond rate a.nan!. at&!!, probably
~&~:"'due to bia inability to delegate authority. Ill• next
at rankjn' officer i• General TrifwliYiCt' who appear•
to be bia Chi• of Staff. Aot.11•JJ1 be . . . . to • .t o be
nothing but a rubber ataap, Rum6r baa it tbat llihailoyic kept
Trifunivic constantl.7 at bia ride to preYent p0tential ri•~
for control of the Yaaoala• a:rw,. Before le&•ini, boweYer, I
beard that Trifuni•ic bu 'beeD pl&ced in c.bar&e of a &J'OUP of
Iorpuaea. Kihailo•ic 'a Chief Operatiooa Officer, Liwtenmt
Colonel Laladevic ia :r9ported b7 the British to be rather
narrow 111nd8d and in.efficien t. Wihailo•ic 'a political advisor,
Dr. llolje•ic, ia an extre• pan-Serb, antiaCroa't., a ·former
lawyer who li•ed and practiced in Banja Luka, which wu purged
mercilessl y by Uatachi in 1941 and 1942. U:i!f Tereic and
Captain SiepcOYic, oth411' uaiatanta to the ater, are pleuant
and friendly but sff9 to lack ability and force. The only at.aft
officer.. who ,appears to haft ability suited to hi• poaition ia .
Lieutenant Colonel Ho•arko•io, Chief. of Intelligen ce, who ia :
a hard worker, but he ia haapered by poor co.m1 nicationa ayatea
\' and lack of operationa l ordera rqardinl intelligen~e •
..
Aa distinguish ed froa the General Staff officers, Wihailovic 'a
Area and Iorpua coereuvlera are on the mole fairly capable
leaders, when one takea into considerat ion the paucity of
officer aaterial available after capitulati on, and that the
creaa of the office.rs, nuabering about 12,000 are in Gerun
prison caapa. The Cetnik co1111umders are, with few exceptions,
fonaer regular Yugoalav ~rmy officers, aver~ing about 35 years
of 118•· Nearly all of the11 ha•e been with lili.hailovic since hia
ear l.y days in ~awe <aora, and are ~ed to ~ hardships after
three years in the wooda. These c'bmaandera must allloat of ·.
necessity be fairly capable men, because they 1111st l ead groupa
of volunteers serving without pay, without adequate equipment
or arms, and under moat rugged li•ing conditions .
Idealogicall,y ~ilovio stands for Iing, and deaocratic
principle• of representa tive govel'llllllnt. A1 Minister of War of
the only Yugoslav Gonmaen t politicall y recognized by the Allies,
Mihailovic take• the position that he ia the legaL head of all
men of legal fighting age throughout Yllgoslavia, and that upon
receipt of orders from hia they should mobilize under his bliDller.
c. This ay color bis thinking on the nwaber of men he can actuall,y
110bilize because be fllAY be wider the impression that they will
mobilize merely because 1.hey are legally aobilir.abl e.
- 26 -
•
•
III. MlHAILOVlC' S Af9Q'

The information· which follows is based upon a personal

inspection made by Colonel Seitz and 11,yself of lo!ih11ilovic's
troops in North C~tral Serbia, the areas of wh~ch have alreaoy
been listed above. While each area commander SUf.gested a route
through his area which would permit us to see the greatest
nuaber of his troops we •were given free choice to choose our
own routes if we so desired. Maps showine our exact route are
attached hereto as Exhibit "A.". Scarcely a day was passed
without an inspection and review of some unit of Mihailovic•s
forces. Photographs were taken of ne11rly all Brigades inspected
and are attached hereto as Exhibit "!~".
In nearly all areas l arge numbers of vill agers and towns
people collected to"greet us. In fact, ~ur ciaily receptions by
the people in some areas were almost overwhelming. For instance,
in Milovanovic's area, north of Valjevo, people lined t he roads
for miles , showering us wiU-1 flowers and fruit, and stoppin8
us for brief visits. It was possible to make Ulis trip without
running into the enemy because we always kept on the move.
..) "
.; 1,
Under the above conditions we had an excellent opport.Unity
to study the condition of the men, their arms, moral e, age , etc.
fe also had a chance to gain some illpression of the type and
ability of their leaders and the morale and attitude of the
people.
. We first obtained from each Area Commander, detailed inlol'llla-
tion from his area on each of the following topiC's: (1) ni.mes
and short personal history sketches of his offiC'ers; (2) Dis-
position of enemy in his area, with .reasons why t hey are so
disposed; (3) Disposition of his own troops; (4) Description
of targets in area; (5) Communications System; (6) Supply; t(.7)
Reprisals; (8) Hostaees ; (9) Poten.t ial Airoromes; (10) List of"
operations to date; (11) Plan of Operations; '(12) Hel ations T:ith
Nedici; (13) Propaganda, including enem,i, Cetnik, Parlisllll, and
Allied; (14) Economic Intelligence. Pencil led notes taken by me
on tile above were turned over to Colonel ~eitz. . '
Each Area Commander also gave us 11 schedul e 1;>repared by
him showing for each Srez in his area, the follow1ng: (l)
Population; (2) Number of men alreaciy mobi l ized and uncier arms;
(.3) Men mobilizable in ull t hree brancnes; (4). Armi; and &!DlDuni-
tion on hand; (5) Arms and ammunition requested. ln addition
... - 27 -
 .~-iiiGaifb -,
to the above , Mihailo vic gave me his own schedule giving the
same infonaa tion for all Areas , includi ng those vis i t«i by us. I
This schedule is att ached as Exhibit •c..•. A glance will show
the painsta king work to which Mihailovic has gone in order to
set forth the number s for each Sr ez , or politic al distric i. .I
j
l t was our plan to check the figures per sonally collect ed
by us , anci spot-cl.eclced in the field , against those receive d
· from ."4ihailovic, This will be impossible , hOliever , until .
Colonel ' ~e itz returns , for the reason that 1 turned over all
schedules to him except the one receive d froa Major Cvetic.
The latter checks very closely again~t Mihailovic' s figures .
~inceColonel Seitz has all of the notes , schedul es, and
propaganda collect ed in the figures , the inforaa ti on set forth
below i E reconst ructed entirel y from memory, and hence is very
incomplete. ·
.Ca) Organiz ation of the Arw
~ihailovic states that he has 57, t40 men mobilized, and
t~at he could •obiliz e 472, 900 for the firs~group (active
mobile combat troops, la to LO years); l69 ,6o0 for the second
~roup (sabote ur s , men between 40 and 55 years of age); and
5B ,520 for the thirci group (hoHguard , over 55 years of 11ge) .
. I believe t..~at Yi hailovi c now has aobiliz ed about 35,000
·men ;.it'.: aros. ThiE figure, which must of necessi ty be .a pure
~· t:ess , is based upon the fact that in the very, very limited
ered of Serbia inspected by us we saw at l east k, 000 men with
:ir:ns . In m'.lAy areas we are unable to see all of the Brigade s ,
for many aiffere nt reasons . Some were doing guard duty. Others
.,··ere stationed too fer from us to appear. In some areas wethat
shor~ up as a total surpris e to t he Iorpus coanander, so
he .-as ·unable to muster all men from t he differe nt parts of his
area curing t he very short period ~hen we were with him. ,
Th~ anny i s organized geogr aphical ly. Each Srez in Serbia
(poli t.i cal di vis i on of area compri!; ing a small section of
Yuf oslevia ) has et .ieei.:t onP Brigade aepenuine upon its popula-
t ion, of whi c~ an averll{;e of about .250 men are constan tly mobili:t ed
i~ ~he ~ oo~s . Tilere are also many' more recruit s rithout arms in
f'aci. i.rf'11 1~i•o are called t.oge t.her frequen tly for a period of
t r 1o i ni1:· • If compli;t ely moi· ilized , ei.ch brigwie ll'ould number
retrec:>:i 2 , ~00 and 5, 0::J:J men , deµend ini:- upon the populution of
P· ~;ie area.
- 28 -
•
 = -~=- --- ]

The army is organized a.a follows : :

(l) Vod (Troop or platoon)
(2) Ceta (company - 2 or 11ore vO<is
(3) Brigade - 2 or more cetas
(4) I orpus - 2 or more brigades
(5) Area or Call - 2 or more korpus es
\
The C011111ander of each unit is resvon ., ible t.o the commc.nder of
the next hiehes t unit, and each Area Commander i 6 responsible
direct ly to General Mihail ovic. Korpuses lilld .~rezep are shown
in a map attached hereto as Exhib it D. and D-1. .
Unti l very recent ly Mihail~vic made no promotions of
office rs in t he army, who continued to hold the rank which they
had at t he t ime of capitu lation . ~~ile korpus commanders tried
as much as possib le , for the s ake of di scipli ne, to have Junior
officer s who were subord inate in rank, it was not uncommon t.o
find a Lieute nant in command of a Brigade , with a Captai n un~er
him, the Lieutenant havine proven him.self a more capabl e leaaer
of troops during the past two years. Of late , however; Wihai lovic
bas promoted some office rs , and t~ere now appears to be a
hierar chy of co111Dand. Of course , all troops serve wi thout pay,
and are told not to expect pay in the futur~.
Iorpus commanders are respon sibie for ail oper 11.tioos
within their areas and enter t he areas of other Korpus CO!Dlllanders·
only upon orders of their Area Commander or Uihail ovic.
. . Gueri lla warfare (requi ring men to organi ze where cover
i s be~t and to live mostly in the woods) re ,uir es that any
o~gan1zation of f orces be flexib le and adapt abl e to ciu:ing.ed
circumstances. In genera l, howev~r, each hrea and Korpus
Commander has a Chief of Staff, Intel l igence Office r, Intend
Adjutant, Propaganda Office r, and a St11.1f Comr any or Person alant,
Guard. Each off icer and soldie r i s issued a personal Cet nik
legite~acia , and a roll is kept of membership i n each area.

Each I orpus Co11mander wivised that figure s showi11t, the

- 29 -
·•· '

..
---- - .. ~-----
 . ]

nuber ot MD llbm be cou.ld 80biliM in· hia area wve baaed upcD
aecret rolla kept b7 the C.tatr llQora of tbe •iU.Cu in µ..
areu; that t.ti.7 could rel.7 Upclll the lo7alt.J of the people in
then 'y iJ.lqea, and that periodic•~. oraaniu.\icnal . ...till&•
••re ti.ld for t.ti. purpcM of teatiJlig the 110ral• and •illinpeaa
of the people to Mne. In aome areu t.roopa 110bili&ed for
active dut7 are conat.antl.7 kept in rot.&tiOll ao that lar&• nWlbera
of the population enntuallJ llff ••nice at •OM t.1M or anbther
in the Cebrlk ranka. /
In llOat areu rlai~ there wu alnya a larp nuaber of
men •itbou~ a.ru, who t.Urned out for inspection. For instance,
in Vucltovic's area at one inapection we saw over 6oo auoh 11en.
(b) State of ArV, Morale, ml Fi&ht1~e Ability
ilben the troopa originally rallied a.round Kiahilovic on
Bame Gora in 1941. aan,y had their uoifo:rw, rifles, and
·-JDition; a great deal of which wu depleted b7 the unauooeaa-
ful revolt in the fall of 1941. Duri.ni the past 2-l/2 7eara
their uniforu have worn out and there baa been very little
( replace11ent of clothing, with the reault that the troops are ,
' now in an extruely ragged condition. While the peaaanta can
supply food and ahelter, clothes and ahoea are alllost iarsaible
to obtain. Tbe7 .wit be purchased on the black ll&I'ket a aky
high prices, and without fund& thia ia illpcaaible. The onlJ
source of clothing ia an att ack on ~ea.Y troops, and I have
heard troops planning such an attack to get theuel ves SOM
clothes. At present llihailoYic'a troopa wear all kinda of
odd..-its, including peasant garb, and Italian, German, Bulgar,
and British uniforu. 1be great aajority wear native Opankaa
for shoes, and these afford little protection against rain,
reeks and snow. Perhaps the 110St extreme example of raggedneaa
was in Vuckovic's area, where we aaw 25 soldiers of the Second
Takovska Brigade, who bad walked without shoes eight hours i.n
t.he snow to appear for inspection. Yet one rarely hears t.hea
or their coaunders coaplain about lack of proper clothes.
All they ask ia arms ml 8mllllllitioo.
About half the Cetniks are heavily bearded, carry their
•m111 1nition on their persons, Nith one or two hand grenade•
hooked into their belts, and look like "tough hoabres•.

- JO -

- ·-- - --
.... )
The aver-&• Cet.nik soldier in Serbia haa a Yugoslav rifle
which ia pitt..d and worn, and shows the urka of having been
boried for aOIM ti.M. after capitulatio n. ':'he leather &ling
hu been worn out coapletely , and is now replaced with rope or
rq. There are no supplies, soap or oil for cle&11jn5 these
rifles, so ~t it ia illpossible to keep thea in first class
condition. In short, the average rifle often looks more like
a auaeua piece, than an instrwaent ready for use on the battle-
field.
Mihailovi c's figures ahow that for 57,440 men 110bil ized,
he hu on hand the following arms and auunition:
90,739 Rifles
321 Heavy Machine Guns
l, l.4'9 Light Machine Guns
65 Mortars
294 Machine Pistols
SOM of these figures seea out of all proportion to what we
found on inspection . For instance, Mihailovic ' s repor t states ..
) that he has over one and one-half times as many rifles as men
mobilised. Upon inspection , we found everywhere in North Serbia,
that there were insufficie nt aru. Each Colll!llander advised that
if he had more aI"llUI he would mobilize more troops.
Mibailovi c'' own figures show that the excess of aras over
aen mobilized does not exist in the part of Serbia inspected by
us, but in areaa like Herzogovina where he is fighting the
Partisans. This ties in with my own observation. Lieutenant
Colonel Bacevic did state, for instance, t hnt in his area
(Herzogovina and. South Dalllatia) he had plenty of aI"lllB taken
froa the Italiana, and d.id not want anything except shoes am
clothing for his men. /
As for •!1!111nition, the amount varies in different areas
in Serbia. An individual soldier may have fro11 10 to 100 rounds
for h.i s particular rifle, or at best, enough for about onEt day's
fighting. 'lbere ie a small aprinkling of automatic weapons
and light aachine guns in every korpus, and each korpus usually
bas two or three mortars ~ith sufficient bombs to l ast not aore

• > - Jl -

- ---- -
 than llD bour in battle. There are practically 'DO heavier
weapons such as light mountain artillery pieces (seventy-five
· mil0118ters), Howitzers, or the like. ·
There are, of CO\ll'se, exceptions to the above. For
instance, Ialabic' s area, lller9 the Iing' s guard is located,
has a subst.ant.ial nUllber .of light machine guns captured from
the Gemans in August 194.3.

The best way to test all of U:ihailovic's figures will be

to check them 88ainst those personally obtained by us when
Colonel Seitz returns. '
•hen o~e considers that for two and a half years these men
have been serving without pay, living in the wooda under most .
difficW.t conditions, s~fferiilg reprisals upon ·t heir families,
and that they are poorly equipped, poorly clothed, and poorly
housed and fed, their morale is excellent. Their clothes are
often so ragged that they loo.le more like tramps than soldiers.
In the bitter Serbian winter, without any clothes, other than
thin jackets and pants, witho1,1t gloves, and without shoes other
than thin •opanciea• they live under conditions which I would
have considered it impossible for them to stand if I had not
seen it with my own eyes, often marching many hours with heavy
equipment through deep snows.
· The discipline in the berbian Cetnik is also amazingly'
good. I have seen men ordered by their commanders to carry
out long marches under most difficult conditions without a
murmur. In fact·, ., on the road they keep up spiri ~ by singing
peasant songs. Breaches of orders are, however, dealt with
rather drastically. Men may be shot by their c<>1111an<lers for
violations which incur a lesser penalty in our army. Minor .
infractions are punished by 25 blows on the back with a stic~
in front of the platoon.
It is dif ficult to g88e the fighting ability of the Cetnik
soldiers. The .majority, i.e. all men over 25 years of 88e,
went through two years of compulsory training required by the
Y~oslav ~overnllent before the war, and henc, have a basic
knowledge of infantry weapons. There seems to be a noticeable

- .32 -

,
- ·- -·- - -
7
--'---.'' - - • -.- .

'r )
lack• boweTer. of capable jun ior tac tica l off
ice rs.

Bri41ade co....,.nc!ers and jun ior tac tica l offi cer

in for any ute nsi n trai nin &- befo s do not go
re
enq y or carryin& out a sabotage ope rati on. mak ing an atta ck on the
inte llig e.nc e bef ore a.ttack is very poor• . The The ir coa bat
the ~leeent of 111n:prise for auccess, but they y rely main lY upon
sur pris ed th.eraaelTea by fact ors which were not are apt to be
bef ore the atta ck, such a.a the leng th and con pro perl y brie fed
'bridge, the housing of the enu,y forc es. the stru ctio n of a
enem,y in the neighborhood, the leng th of ti.me llllllber of the .
the poi nt of atta ck, and the deploY11ent of theto get to a.nit froa ·
Usually, howeyer. the Cetnik has an advan~ ir own forc es.
e over sup erio r
nllllbers of the eneay because he knows the terr
get s inf ona tion from nat ives concerning the ain bet ter, and
German stic ks 11ostly to the towns and main road enem,y. Hence. the
Tenturea up into the hil ls. s, and rare ly _

The tac tics used by Cetniks

crud e. The forc es usu ally a.ssemblin e
atta cks on the itnemy ·a.re
in
( ) ta.r get. If the tare et is a moving colWthe lll•
woods olos& to the ir
they stri ke heav ily
by sur pris e from the woods, and the ~ttaok is
or fail ure wit hin the fir st hour. In atta cki eith er a success
trie d to .a.trike by sur pris e during the nig ht ng towns t hey
ing up with in stri kin g dist anc e. If or' at dawn, ste al-
they have
invade the town, kill as many of the eneay as success they
ta.r gets . and take off what food and equipment pos sibl e, des troy
If the gen eral area is held by Cetn iks they they can lug.
unt il they a.re ousted .by the enem,y. stay in the town

Nihailo vic 'a &1"111 obt ains its

pea san te who seem to giv e both food food from the Serb ian
a.nd lodging wil ling ly to
the Cet ni.U . Wost co!llllA.nders adv
ever necessary to req uia itio n foodised from
tha t It was rare ly if
the pea san ts, and
tha t the peasants were only too gla d to giv
co11111ander find s it necessary to ask for la.rge it. When a
con cen trat ed group of his ao.L<iiers, he sometim e amounts for a
to the pea san t, which it is hoped wil l ent itle es gives a rece ipt
payment afte r the war. The pro ble a remaUui the peasant to
would. be supported if it were full y mobilize as to how the &I'll, )'
all the peaaanta would then be taken off the d, sinc e nea rly
farms and put in
• '

- 33 -

-- ·-·- - -·-·
 '

t.be &J'W1• llo.t c- •Men fffl that wo.n and childND could
work the f&n8 duri.D& thia period.
Tbe abo•e i.Dtoratio n applle• ~ tO that part of Serbia
inapected b7 ua. In Southern Benogo•i.Da and Dabiatia, throuib
which I 'Hilt on .., trip out of the countr,, the •1tu&tion
diffe.red COQaiderable fl'Oa Serbia. The troopa in. these areu
H•8eci to haft more &n8 and ·-initiao , which Lieutenant
Colonel Bace•ic, com•nder tor the area, atated that be had
taken froa the Italiu• after tbe7 capitulate d. But t.be morale,
fi&hting spirit, and discipline of theae forces does not co.pare
with that of the Cetnik1 in S.rti'ia'. for uaaple, one band of 60
Cetnika re~ to oootinlMI •,11.h ua thl'OQlh one area aoath of
Ne•iaiDJe because they wre, -afraid of l"llDllinc into Partieana
who blocked off the area. ' ~ the retreat back to our atartiJlg
point, about 50 of t.bea,- HD diaappeared. There waa a great
lack of junior officers with the result that 100.Mn would often
be under a 1eraeant oni,. In am inatance, a aold:ie.r aent off
on a moat urgent aisaion u a oourier wu fOWld two hours later
still waiting around for a reat, ellll ao.eth1ng to eat before be
left.. llajot Iek• .....ic D9&rlJ' ordered hi.a to be llhot. Thia lack
of 90rale M1 in part. be due to the collaborat ion with Gel'UD8
in this area, .and in part. to the fact that. the people are war
weary.
(c) C-i•m·i oat.ioy
11ba1lo•ic 1 a a.ray bu a •er, poor and inadequate cc- nica-
1
t:ion 11,.t.ea, with the result. that. 'it depend• ahoat. ent.i.rel)'
upon couriers, who take da,ys to deliver a M&lage which should
be delivered at. once. At the General Staff there are five
central radio tranaait.te ra, each one of which maintairul dail)'
liaison with· about seven Iorpua COllll•Mera. Each of theae ·
coamandera in tum· baa a allllil name-made, l ow-powered priaittve
radio tranaait.te r which ia uauallJ' onl1 capable of operation
during the da,y ti•, and ia often out of comai.aaion. Some of
the Iorpua co=r•ndera have a few aiailar t.ranaait.t.era within
their areaa for the purpose of keeping liaison wit.h distance
Brigade Collll8nders.
llben Colonel Seitz and I were on our tour of inspect.ion we
saw how frustratin g it. can be to try to operate an a.ray with
such an inadequate syste11. For instance, when I waa in the
lf1 aouthem part of C.et.ic 1 a area I made a two day trip. over

-· .34 -

- ·-----
 ,9
'

·~ 110W1tain9 thJ'ou&h Ilea')' anow to StikoYo to try to find Lukuevic

or I a.litoYic, wbo bad radio tranaaittara, 10 I.hut I ai.;it
eatablillh liaiaon ·• i th GHQ by MllAI of t.htir radio. I arrived
to find that both co=•™'era bad left tha vicinit., ho dqa
before and thtt • • • are aurrowidod on Waa aides by Germana
and Part.iaana. All of thia would haYt beta ''°lded i! CYetic'a
I orpua couandar bad had radio llaiaoo "1th CHI, or with i.ukaanic.
The result • •• thtt .. did not kno• whether to talr.e a chance
and go on froa StiUcovo, or to rel.real, Tile approach of Cer:aan
forcH fina.111 led us to lllle a thirteen !lour retreat back to
the point fro:o t bich H etarted,

llihailovic' e &%'11)1 would be tremendouai., l.aproved •itn Ju•t

a .OOerata . .ount of radio tr&ru111ittara p1'0porl.)' placed. W1th
hia preaent inadoquata ayote11, iaport.int co~bat intelligence
oft..m fails to arrive on t i11e. It also 1141o.n& that "hen a
certain brigade 1a ordered to action in an area, action cannot
be c.-enctd until it is too l ate, b<tcauae • ol'll io not received
oo ti.a. It f\l!'U..r rtaul ts in divorc""ent of llrigade Co""8lldera
f'rca their I orpu.t co ·Mara, with the result that I.here cannot
be coordinatioo of actiYltiea in different areu, .,,.; forces are
trapped by the en.,.y because eord cannot be gotten to tnea in
ti.a.
llihailo•io preaently •orka hia pr iaitive radio ayatea to''
'r:
the extraM, and acc°"'pliahea the 11ost ha can, but he i•
• tr.,...odoual.y handicapped by lack of equipMnt.
(d) Ig!.tllWJ)Ct
lliahilovio bu tht facilities for an excellent intelligence
ayataa in Serbia, becauae in e•ery vill "tl• and t.own there ..,..,
C.t.nu. who want t.o help hia. The reaulta obtained, however,
are nry poo.r . · Web (orpua c"'""400.er aee:>td to ua to kno•
the eJlUJ' diapoaition in his area pretty • ell, &n<i aoat
operation• are reported in to tile Iorpua co:aander, but llO&t
(orpua cCNlll&lldara &bowed an appallilJ& l ,a ck of knowledge about /
target.a in their areu or about other atratei;lc information of
iotareat to tha Alliea. For instance, t hey could give on],;o
ro\18h estimates on lengtha and construction of railroad bridgH
and tunnels, the nature and extent of ene,.y ~rot.tct ion of ta;gets ,
the t iolee of 11ov....nta of trains, the dal.l.y aovements and babita
• of en•JIY garrisons, the loc•tioaa and siiee of potential air-

- 35 -

"
 J

'
(~ field.a, the equipment and operation of strategic factoriea and
ataea, etc. Thia ignoranc. i• in part due to probably a lack of
appreoiatioo, and in part to sheer latineaa. It ia aoatly due,
ho•e'fer, to lack of proper organization and oroera fro11 the
Winioter and his Chief of Intelligence. It. waa only recently,
and after 11ucb hammering that •e were able to get Wihailovic to
direct co11111anders to collect details on railroad traffic, enemy
aviation activities, eto. ·
· Good target intelligence ia st.ill lacking. For example,
before our attack on-..Yingrad and the destruction of the Rogatica
bridge, we received three different estimates on the size and
·structure of this bridge, all of which varied greatly, and all
of which were wrong. It would have been a simple task for the
Area Commender to make an accurate and COJIPlete reconnaissance
of the bridge. Me likewise received only the roughest infol'llA-
tion fl'Oll Vuckovic and Cvetic on bridges and factories in their
areas.
No plausible excuse was offered by Area Commanders for not
providin8 excellent intelligence on all matters llo'ithin their
areas . The men who' are now standing by in the woods waiting
for a~ and •D-Day• could easily be put to work to provide the
All ies with. top-notch intelligence. Such activity might also
im?rove their 11orale. I feel that good results will not be .,•
obtai ned unless 1.lihailovic issues a forceful directive making
it cle4l' to everybody .·that he considers the matter to be of
vital importance. At the same time, each commEillder should be give~
the cate~ories into wnich such intelligence must be divided,
such· as (1) Target intelligence, (2) Enemy movements and disposi-
tion, ( J} Disposition of ~ihailovic 's forces , (4) Operations,
( 5) Eneia,y p:·opaganda, (6) Miscellaneous matters, such as word
received concerning eneia,y plans or enemy letters intercepted.
~•ch coomander should also be impressed with the fact that this
is a continuous jvb anJ that detail s are important.
{e) Operations to Date
On the subject of operations generally, my impression is
that yrior to the Italian capitulation. in September 194), .
:.tihailovic ·• as conducting nothing but minor operations against
the Ger~ans . In September and October, a subs~antial amount
of Oyerations ll6dinst t he uer:a..ns v.ere report.ea from all areas,
some of which were witnessed by Allied personnel. ~everal

- J6 -
r11
'ltr ) tra ins were wrecked. A lar ge
tor n up. The Belgrade-Sarajevoamo unt of rai lro ad tra ck .was
Rai lro ad lin e was broken by
des tru ctio n of the Va rdi ste ~ Rogatica bri
a Tery long one). II.any towns were tak en aftdge s (th e lat ter .
Germans, such as Pri epo lje, Bie lo Pol je, Berer atta cks on
Ro gat ica , . Gacko, Bil eca , etc . The Ita lia n ane, Pri boj , Visegrad,
sur ren der ed. A lar ge nUlllber of German caa1on •ve net zia • Div ision .
and a sub sta nti al number of Germans kil led . s were destroyed,
act ivi ty 'eems to have gone down almost to Since October;
its former l eve l.
The fac t remains' however,
has fai led to cut the maln rai lrotha ad
t Mi hai lov ic (de spi te promises)
through the !ba r and Varda vallie s. lin es nor th and south
The se are most important
bot h as pre sen t supply lin es and as the ?ri
which Germans would ret reat from Greece andnci pal means by
Mi hai lov ic has als o fai led to des troy tne BorMacedon ia.
illp ort ant sources of metal to the Germans. o.nd Trepca Uines,

From each Area Co11111ander vis ited, Colonel Sei

obt ain ed a sta tem ent of his ope rati ons tz and I
enem,y, showing the time and pla ce of t he ope to dat e aga ins t the
rati
involved on bot h sid es, wit h the res ult s. Col on, the numbers
has the pen cill ed not es on all of thi s dat a, onel Sei tz now
imposs ibl e for me to lis t the det ail s. i;(y so thut it is
is th~t mos t of the Area Com.aanders claim toonl y recoll ect ion
sev era l sma ll ope rat ions a month durin& t he have car rie d out
ope rati on being one in whi ch a bdlld of 100-2()pas t yea r, a s~a:l
a lar ger number of 1.termans, Lotishevc i, lled .) Cetniks attacke<.l
Arnauts. In some are as muc h lar ger ope rati ons ici, Bulgar s, or
Two typ ica l lis ts of ope rat ions receive<i from ..:.re r epo rted .
which I happened to ret ain , are atta che d ~s ..re a Co1a;nanders,
Ex.~ i bits ...r..__ and::.___.
b~nce the re were no Par tisa ns
on our ins pec tion tour,- the <tUe stio in the are as vis ited by us
Par tisa ns di<l not come up. n of o~t'!rations ae; .... ins t tne
'
(f) Ope r atio ns Planned
:C:ach "re a Co:iuaunder expect s tlu t t her e 1~ill
when he wil l rec eiv e an orO.er to con. .duc t all
be a "D- Day"
aga ins t the enemy within his area! dis pla - out oµe rat ion s
dep loy his ava ilab le ~anpower in sJc h a way n o! att uck is to
that ne can wipe

- 37 -
tt- oul. 111191 garria ooa • it.l\in the area and cut 100,.y linu
of
co.wi icatio o. For in1t.aoc1, (alal> io lhoftd u1 in 10• deta il
boa ill would doplo7 hie troop• to attack the u e111 if the
ene., <U1po 1iticm h the .... oo "D-Da,y " aa it i s oo•
Seib baa our penci lled ootea oo th111 plaoa. . Colon el
.
for opera tiou prior to •D- Da,' each coaun der opera
umer IA order froa t.be llioia ter, dinct ing that te•
discre t ion . carr1 out minor opera tions where the be U1J iD his
forces 1a greate r than the ene,.y, and the result s number of hie
gained will
be worth the coat iD repria ala.
(g) llodic al .lttend aoco and Suppl iea
llihail ovic's aiv ia woefull 1 lackin g in m.edical office
and 'upyliea. r•
Each ..,,.a tu.a one or two medica office rs at
' best, anci no ·auppl ies other than a fe w bandagesl and
bottle
dressi ngs. lo SOiie re11ions, auch as Cvetic ' a aree., there
are no llilita ry docto n, but the Couan dant bu
with certai n docto re iD the toms that they wi llanrender
arrangelMtDt
when called . Thie, of course , would prove moat unaat aoaiet .ance
isfact
during 1DJ large scale OFera tions, becaus e the assi at.ance or1
•ollkl COIN too little and t.oo late.
One of t he 110st pitifu l instan ces of l ack oi medic al
attend ance and equi paent was report ed by t wo ~rilis h enli st.eel
11en whO" were prese nt •hen llaJor Lukaae vic attack ed Priep
iD S.pt.u ber 1943. They st.at.lid that eeveral men olJ•
in the chest or stomach, !iodin g no medic al assiet-.1th bullet &
.anct in the
rear lines , return ed t.o the "front line and contin ued
until t.~ey died. fi ring

(b) Train ing and Recru itment

llihail ovic'e coa:oandera have no diffic ul ty
recrui t.a iD l>erbi a. ta have witnea a maey Ce\llik inrecrui
f inding
cerellOni es , in •hich t.bousanda of Serbia peasan t youths t.cent
up to be s worn in to t.bc Cetnik Aray. I nn Zbt.ib or I oaw 1600
showed
recru it• at one cereiaony in Octob er, and in Cvetic ' s I saw
about 1500 at anothe r io late O.cu! Mr. '!be only diffic
is in findin g arms and lllll:uni tion for these 1Hn. ulty

- - 38 -
 Serbia n youtha who wish to join tho Cetnik ra!IU art
accep ted b;y the local coman ders if found peysico.Uy fit. Tiley
do not, howne r, become Cet.n w 1111Ul they t.&b the oath.
i i ad.tn llter. d by a local Orthodox pope, n an i:apre 7hia
ce~ uauall ;y held iD the • ooda under the
ssivt
the comaandant !ind hi• office rs. All youtn . superv i•ion of
pr01er a G'9 firat read by the pope. Under theasse~b !e, and
guld..n ce of the
pope Nerui t a thOD r Qiae thair ri.jbt hand, near
to the lio&, countr y, and Cetnik a,.,.y . Then t hereallegi ance
are aany
speech es by the local colll!llD.nUer and me11ber a ol his ata.ff,
ll&n.Y cheer s for tin& Peter, Yugoslavia and ~raga '4ihail and
There after, the men go into a period of tninin b •hich ovic.
accor<lio& to their areas. The next step is to provid e v~iea
wit!\ arms. If there are no anas, they Ila;' be return ed them
bo. .a until c&lled to active duty or ph.eed on to t.lleir
.Qt.bo ut anaa, such aa courie r duty. active uuty

The Traini ng in most areas cons i s t s of the YllOo' ..av

aanua l of &l'WI and infant ry t.&ctic a. 'f'bere
cloae order drill, becau se guerr illa warfare ia very little
does not call .,
for it. There is, howeve r , a large Moun t of deployed
.) !.actic s which are used moat of tho ti11e in
seen recru its goio& thc>ugh this tra i ning.
infon try
the woods. ~e have

In ne&rl;y all dist rict s there is a • you~h

Youtba from 12 to 18 years of age are recrui tedmovem ent • .
infan try tactic s, usi1111 wooden rifle• and 111&cllineandguns
trained in
U..;y aake Ule""e lvee. wn!cb

The l i ving condi tions of the recru its and

are 11oat rugged. The recru it ent•r• "i thout payactive
or
soldie rs
e<;uipo
(other than hie rille) and carrie s his o"" food witn him ont
the recrui tment cere110ny, There after, he must live to '
he can on the genoros! ty of tho peaso.nts. os beet

In sou areas aol.die ra are cona lden?d to

which they bring with the11 into the servic e, soomthat the rif}le
i t ia
imposs ibl e to have a rot ating •rm:t· In other areas, howev
(such &s Ialab ic' s area) all &r11s are treat. a as cOOl:lU er,
prope rty. Soldier& are then kept on active duty !lity
for a ;>er!od
of eever al e>0nths, o.nd are \.~en per-. .! t t ed to return to their

-
!ams, being replac ed by ne. recru its who are given their
a.raa . -,

- J9 -
 This system see11S to work out better and permits the area
commander to have a larger number of mobilizable combat troops
available in his area. ·
(i) Propyanda
By far the chief source of All ied news to the. people of
Yugoslavia is the radio, and the only Allied. station which most
radios can always get without interference is BBC London. The
Boston station, WRUL, is too weak to be heard regularly.
In the country areas where ·11e lived ·there are very few
radios, mainly because these people could af ford a radio and
would have di'fficulty getting an accumulator periodically
chargeu for its oper~tion. Each Srez probably has not
more than three radios, one of which is usually owned by the
Bri gade Comm•nder for the area.
The peasant receives his news, therefore, ·by word of mouth
from those who hear the radio, or through mimeographed news
sheets and propaganda i~sued by the Cetnik Commander in his
area, .who has a r.adio. The .only other source of news are the
\ German controlled newspapers, such as "Novo Vreme" or magazines,
s~ch_as "Signal" which is published in the Serbian language.

Each Xorpus has its Propaganda Officer, who is responsible

to the Chief of Prop,aganda with Mihailovic. There is no .uniform
type of propag~da ~eaflet issued for all Serbia. In some
.areas, newsp'lper& are printeci, such as "Ravne 'Gora" and "Gar.dist", '
(published in Kala~ic' s are~) •. Elsewhere, t here are mimeo-
graphed pamphlets issued daily- ll1 some areas, weekly in others.
I &Ill not prepared here to answer questions on the "line•
taken by ~ihailovic's propaganda. Colonel ::ieitz and, I collected
a great volume of material, but we were unable to get it trans-
lated for us because there was not enough time. 'l.'ben this is
~11 trans lated here, we will be in a better pos i tion to see
•!i.. t the gener al trend,. ar-i:ieal, and arguments are. :fy present
i::i~ ression is that·, even tnough there cire few Purtisans in
:io~tn Centr<ll ::>erbia, Miuailovic still issued a great deal of
::inti- ?~rtisan propaganda there.

The sac which, since ::ieptember 1943, has devoted most of

its t.i:ie to Partisan news, has caused a tremendous anti-British
,._ senti:no?nt i n all Cetnik ranks. This is shared to a lesser
exte:lt by t i1e ;:ea:>:illts ·111ho are more perplexed than antagonistic.
,
- /IJ -
15

They cannot wiuersta nd how t.hls rooio station, wh lch pr aised

llihaUovic so hilllllv in 1941 and 1942, 1• now backing· IJ!eir
civil one,.y so ol:roiigly. ht first I.he 1ocal prop4t1anda officers
tried to explain t.he BBC ne.. to t.he people by etatin;: Clot BBC
did not reflect the vi ews of the Britiah people. Since ~ece.::ber ,
however , •hen I.aw, in I.he House of Co...nons, stated I.hat t he
British Governmo nt was givin~ far more aid t o the Partisan s,
becauae they are doing i:iore • igbt ing against tbe Cormans, t.he
have ceased I.hie explanat ion.
The GeMIAJlt, in addition to controll in;: the nowspapers,
issue propaganda pamphlet s and place placards in moot of the
citieo and towns. I turned 1oan,y oi these over to Colonel Soitz,
and upon his retum they can be studied.

The only Allied pamphle t I su was one dropl>«l by plane in

Henogov ina in January. It sho• ed a picture of Roosevel t,
Churchi ll, and ~t.alln at Teheran, and save • Serbian text of
the atat ement issued by t hem t.r.>re.
On I.he • hole, the Serbian peasant oee:::s to learn il>portan t
ne• a events quickly. Of course, I.he fact that both llinailov ic
and the Gen.an controll ed newspapers attack the Partisan •, !>I,}'
class them together in t h• eyes of tho peasant.
The Cetniks like the Bo•ton ra..io at~lion , ~PU:., very
stating they believe it tries t,; give on impartio1 stateQenJIUCh, t of
t..1e news, but are disappoi nted because it is very .ealt and
camot be heard regularl y. Ao for :iscuaoionc on the radio. fro!>
t.he Unit·ed St ateo , however, • hether over .oRUL or rebroadc ast
over BBC, the criticism generall, y was t h•t they did not go
enough into the deeper probleas . The ~o rb3, • hile glau lo
hear broadca sts froo friends of their own race in Acer ica, .,..,
not very iepreaoe d when sioter Divna fro,. Pittsburg h &eta on
the radio and oends best wishea lo everybody in SO<llt to.11 in
Ivanica • here sne used to liv• . TneJ wnnt somet.olnc mor e
serious.
(j) Fooc\ ~ituation

There is no famine in uerbia. The ?••so.nt sti!l eas t bJld

l ives ulmost aa •el ! as he did beforo tne • • r, except th•t ho

- 41 -
 lacks white flour, sugar, and such delicacies, which are so
upensive that they are in aost cases entil'."ly beyond hia
reach. There is ~lenty of black bread, corn, "kill8Jt• , pig,
la:ab, •rachia', chicken, and the like. Th• oo.Ly scarcity ia
found in those 110untainoua areas which a.lwa,ya were poor.
The Gerllans requis i tion from eacb vi l lage a certain
percentage of its crops and livestock, and r e-,uire t no t the
food be delivered to a receiving station periodicAlly in so11e
central town. If it is not delivered as orciered, the Germans
go on punitive c&1paigns, burning nausea, et.c. In the northern
plains t he ~asant del i vers on the aver age about 50% of bis
requisitions, because the flat country enables the Germans to
go out and collect easily. But in the countainous regions,
t he peasant delivers only about 10% of hia requisitions (if
this much) because the Gel'!ll4ns do not have the forces or
inclination to go up into the 1>ountains and collect.
The s1tuation in Southern llerzogovina is ~uite d ifferent.
Here there are areas •here f ood is very difficult to obtain.
Colonel Seit£ and I col lected extensive data on pr evailing
I. prices of food and comcodities in Belgrade and other cities ancl
towns of Serbia, which I turned over to him.
(k) Refrisals - hosta~es - potent i al airciromes - targets -
personal his orics of Cetni officere - German dispoEilion.
Colonel Seitz bas our pencilled not es on each of the above
topics, showing for each ar ea t he number of repri sals und
hostages, location and descr i ption of µotential airdromes,
location and descrivtion of 11ilitary t arget s in each area, and
~rsonal his t ories of Cetnik officers. Since ·•i thout these
notes I could furnish only a hazy general reco llection oi t he
fact s, I suggest we wait until he ar rives with the data.

- 42 -
 \
I'.
17

IV Tl!!j i'Al\'l'ISAH-CETtl!I 'liAR - ATTITUDE vf c~·rnus

lo Horth Centra l l>erbla • • ••• no Pnrt is ans, and .-ere

anviee d everp htre that the re were no ?ortisa ns in t ne area,
with the except ion of a saall band of h o or tnrct huHJ red ·~o
had crocsed t he Sava River bet ween Sabac a.nci Obrenovac wic
penetra~ a short di&t.ance southwa::\i .
b&C
I t • a• also reporte d
that t.hore • •• a •~all grou; of P-..rtisa ns in t.ne Ia,onik
Mountain s and in the ,..,.t.h near Pristin a. ..hen I arrived
Rasi<a in late Decel!lb er I 1 ounci that a band of &JO t.o l , vvvnear
Partiaa ta had been pusn<d over fro~ the ~Jak, t11. ~·
Stitkovo. On 10 Januar , t hey had ;ienetra t.e.i alaoct •o fi.r
as I vanica , but •ere beini; au,~rounded on al s ides by Cetnik s.
Later I heard t hat t here 'Ner e also Part i s ••ns in t.'1~ ;.lat.ib or
region .
'.I;/ 111pres &ion is tlllit the people in .>erbia oo not iavor
the Par tisans, and that they are ~ain • t co..,,un i sm. Every
peasan t want& only his Ung and a democrat ic foro of i;ove!·nm
•e heard l.!lis expres sed thousan ds of t imes. The peaaan ont .
a.nci hate Uiie Part.isans , whom tn'lly re~res~ot. as a.a ene~y tt• : e ..r
• ill burn do• n thei r houses an,; tulte away all o! tlioir tooci i\1Ch
."
'Jhe genera l feeling on t.\e part of Cet.nik co:ana e"s in
the area of ~erbia inspec ted seeaod t..o be t
• orried about Po.r tioans trying t.o est.abl iahh•t the; • ere not
a foo tilol o. lhe
chief encll\)' in Centra l ~erbia s t ill seems to be t he Cer~!Ul s.
On t.r.e !larch to U10 ••• \.nNu£)1 the SbJlJ:.k an.i .i. rzoi.ovi;w.,
I found an entire ly differ ent situ - tion. Hore lhe chie1 inte.•e st
of L~e Cet.nik co:n:eanders, tlleir ~en, anU the ~erb pc3sc:.nt s •ere
the Partisa ns. By far U1e grea test pa rt o1 t he milit urt cJ1ort
here ia devoted a,;ains t the Parti&&n•, anu
civil war r a;:ing evel')'llh ere. tor ln~tance , t.'lere 1a • bitter
I :>ave ;erson ally
seen ..any houses alleged t.o have been buM>ed do•n b; Partis
in aerzog ovina, and have listened to many local pro-l;e tnik •n•
peasan tc descri be bitterll ho• badly they have been treated ~orb
t he Partisa ns. For instanc e, • hen I hsve asked to buy by
peasan ts , they have re;>lied t:t"t tney ..ould only oe toofood 1,hli
fro:o
give .oe someth ing if tney lBd it, but t hat tnc P•rt!~wis haa to
in the vi1 l a;:e and had taken everyth ing. I have persona ily, been

- 43 -

I
 l~s

fr011 a bil l near ( alinovik, seen the Partisans, tbr<>U&h 11111

f i eld glasses , burning down t he houses of the l ocal Cet.nik
comandant and his leailet"s.
Both the attitude of Uihail ovic, as expressed in his l etter s
to Generals Donovan and Li senhower, and that of his Area Com-
manders, shows that they consider the war against the Partislills
to have primarily a r acial basis, and only secondari ly a ideo-
logical basis. Sever al Yugoslav officers explained t~e situa-
tion to ~• as follows:
'In 1941 the Part isans under Ti to compr ised
mostly poor. Serbs from ;lontenegro and the $anjak,
to whom couWli s.m. appeal ed, becautJe it gave U1ese
people a chance to share the wealth. At the same
t ime, the Partisans appeal ed strongly to those Serbs
who felt that rich pol iticians and bureaucrat s were
responsible for the sudden defeat of t heir large
army. The ~erbs f eel, however, that t.hc real reason
for the 8r1111f' s fiasco "'as the treachery of a l arge
percent age of Croat of f i cer s and men • ho, being
strongly Gemanophil, and bel ieving that .:lazi doC>ina-
t ion of Continent.al turope was inevitabl e, • ere
willing t o surrender. Ni thout res istance. A.ft er the
capitulation, the Ger""'ns brought in Pavelic, and
.t he Ustachi and these traitorous Croats j oined t he
Gstachi. fat this time both Ti\o <UJd Mi hailovic had
the same objective, i . e. to defeat the occupator,
and t he only difference between thea was t hat Tito
s tood for coMunisa. t~eaMhile, t he Ustachi and
treacherous Croats began their blood purge of Serbs
in Croatia, Bosnia, 3eriogovina, and Dal matla, believ-
ing f irml y that permanent Cer:;ian doJ>ination of Yugo-
slavia was inevitable, s ince the Allies "ere losing
heavily oo every front.
"After the ~er:mnns cru&hed bot.h Tito and
~i~ailovic in the fall of 1941, Tito •as eventually
f orced up into t he region of 11est. Bosnia, his ma.in
s t rongholci . iJuring the year 1942 it became ap?ar cnt
t hat the Allies :oit,ht possibly win the war after all .

... ••
- 44 -

• I

-,
 19

Rommel w11 s pu~hed back out of Efypt. The Allies

lMueci in ;;orth Africa. Russia co11t inueu to have
success on I.he Zai;tP.l'11 l ront. The Us t :!chi then
re11lizeC. tlv,t i f t he Allies v:ere . uccessf u1 , they
¥:oulu be :;hot ns '1ar crimina l:- . ~'. iho. ilovic had vov1cd
th~t for every Serh life t&ken by t he Ustachi and
Croat s , a Croat l ife woulc. be t~en in repr:isa l,
and BBC Loniion was broadc•u•t ine this announc~m"n t •. '.
The Ustachi coulti not, t her eforP , m11ke peace ~·i t h
!Jihai lovic , an,. t h.. ir only hopP. 01 savinr, themsel ves
T.as to go over to the Allie<t :; icie by joinin."'. the
Par tisans.
"Int.pec tion of Par t i san bod i es anu prisone rs
t aken in battle sho" s that the Parti11an army is no1
compriseci of more t he.n seventy - five ? ercent Cror·
and former Ustachi . The Cetniks claim that they .·e
fightin g t he Ser bs to preserv e themsel ves ethnica lly
and numeric ally, and to i nsure for themsel ves post-
t1ar co:itrol of 'fut oslavi a. At the bec inni ng of the
war there y;erP about 4 , 8:YJ,OOO Croc.ts in 'fU[;os.:.avia,
6 , :JJO , 'XJ::> ~erbs , l />O::>, JOO ~lovenians , 75J, OOO Musse.L-
men , and 1, 000, 000 of other minorit ies.
•Before t he war, t he Croats both feared and
r esented any Serb J ominati on of Yugosla via. They
felt , on t '.le coutrar J , tha t since th1: ir populc. tion ,
toget hP.r with t hAt of t he Sloveni ans , was almost
e qual to t nat of the Serbe, the c apita l of 'fur,o~la via
.shoul<i be at Zagreb , ef;iecio lly since t hey were
closer to the c enters of t:uropea n culture. f-hile
willing to acce;:>t th1? bt>n<'fit s of a 'fui:osla v ::late ,
the Croats , under Lr. ~.{acek , v:ere constan ti:r agi t nting
for an i ndepPna pnt st11tP , M'1 a, indF: flllJ.Pnt kine ,
not a KAra- GPorgP . Lr. ~!.aCP~ had u~,, ir-.tio11 & for
t he thronP.
"The f•e r b-Croat antr•.-onir.m wf,R furthPr i11creas ed
Ly t he f a.ct that t he Croats are oveM¥helmir1:-:ly Catholi c ,
and t he ~ erbs , Orthooox. In J.'JJ7 t he r.e •1&s n"11 rJ.y a
rel i,ci o1::; Y>r.r betr.een e.e ~ erbs anci Croc. t.s , v!.en the
'fur,oslav Governc.. nt' s C'oucordat g<ive more riGl1ls to
Catholi cs .
.
1 fl
~ .
"The ~ erb
officPr s fpp l tJ1t.t I.Iii' Crolits are tbe
politic ians , whereas the ~erbs have , i11 the course of
history , don'? all thf' f i( liting. Tht>y .-oint to the
- 45 -
 .
.
r~
- '
cowrt.ry' a Mato!')' in t.be lut world war, when t.be s.ri' f -
t.be S&l.oaika troot "re t.be apearblad which eftllt.lal.J.¥ libera-
ted their cOW1tq with a treMDdowi loH of l ifo.
"The C.toik officera aaintain that Ti to i i now dnoti.ng
by far t.be gnater uount of bia force•, aru, and IUlllunition
agal.nat t.be C.toiko in t.be civil war. •
The above expression of attitude ahowa hor bitterl,y the Cet-
ni.ka feel ~:t:::t the Partiaena, ehOll the7 coaai.der u collj>ri•i.o.&
the overwbe percentage of Croat& and tonier D1tach1. Tbet
cannot forgi're the Croat.a for their purge of the Serb poPlll&tion
in 1941 and 1942, which thet, clai.m took 700,000 livee. they cannot
Wlderot.end • b,y Britain, which fol'.WlrJ.¥ backed llihailovic against U..
UGtacbi, in the da,yo whim the Allita ..re 1011.ng the war on all fronts .
ia now 8!">1l80ri.Dg an &nay alleged to consist ...inly of those Ustaohi.
il,y apreasiOQ wu that 110at C.tnilt officda favor an indepen-
dent Serbia after the war. So""' want a grutl!r Serbia • hicb • ill
be tbe predoainating influence in all Jll8oalovia. Some definitel,y
believe thel!<I should be a federation of independent states ( inclu-
di.Dg independent Croat and Serb s tates) oith a federlll. goYeruent,
buing delegated powers, Wider [1.ng Peter. · ·
So11e Cetoik officer• favor a truce • ith the Partieana unti l
the war againot Geraant is fl.Dished. A notable ex&11ple ie llajor
Lulcaaevic, who atatea that aich u be hates the Partisan• ha would
be willing to have a tNce, pro•ided a geographiclll. line could be
establiabed dividing YU&oalavia into t wo ar<!aa, on the ljDderatandiDg
that the Partisans would fight the Germana in the north, and the
Cetoike would fight the Geraana in the - south. Other Cetoik offi-
cer s believe that peace is iaposs ible.
V. OJ!J,ABQP.J.TIOll BE'l'l'Elll CETNlIS AND GER!!ANS
In Nortb-Centrlll. Serbia I ea• DO evidence of collabor ation
between Cetoike and Germans, • i th two aaall exceptions. One in-
stance was at the town of Belanovica, east of Vlll.jeTo, in the
area of Captain Ninkovic, a Cetoik [orpua co..ander. Here there
were about 50 Medi ci gendar11ea Wider one l ieutenaat whose :fwlction
is to keep o:r<ier in the to•n. Ninkovic addaed that the wieu!-'nent

-46
21

and 11c>st of the men • ere loyal to t.he Cetni ks , and st.at.ed t.hi.t
if they were calle d upon, Uley would i ..ediatel.)' join the c~tniks
L I in the woods ; that he could disarm t.he• at. any time, but t.hat
they were 110re u~eful. to him in t heir prese nt capac ity because
they gave hi• valua ble inform ation on German aovements
area. After we had passed near the town, Colonel Seitz inandt.heI
met the Nedici Lieut enant , who had fol lowed us for the
of meeting us in the woods. Re profe ssed to be .loyal topur:-io se
Cet.niks , and willi ng to help them i n any way t.h~ t he couluthe
, but
surpr ised u11 all and infur iated Ninkovic ana the ot.her Cetni
prese nt when, in answer to my quest ion as to hol• the people ks in
the town felt toward the Nedici , he state d that he thou5nt tnat
they were sympathetic , betause the Nedici saved t.hea from heavy
repri sals which the Germans would otherwise have taken .
Likewise, Kalabic admitted that he maintained fri endly
conta ct with aoout 50 Nedici gPndarmes in Aranjelovac, about 50
kilom eters south of Belgr ade , who ,.ere ass if ned t here by t.he
Germans to guard the raiir oad statio n. Re state d that he
maintained this relat ion for the same reason as Ninkovic, and
al so for the reason that they •ere a source of arms .
· out , for example , that they had tipped him off in hugusHet , point ed
1943,
that some German lorri es were trave ling south through St ragai
with a lot of mnchine guns and ammuni:ion. As a resul t of 'i
this information he was ab~e to attac k the column , kill
and captu re 40 Zorka light machine P,Uns with a consiaerGb80 Germans ,
~e amount
of ammwiition. I saw Strag ari. The entir e village, inclu ding
over 150 house s, was destroyed by the Gertlnns in repri sal for
this attac k. ' '
· In southern Herzogovina and :;outht-rn Dalma tia I saw
colla borat ion between the Cetniks &nd the Germans for the
purpose of fight ing the Parti sans . On.one afternoon while I
was at t he head of a coluinn I bumped into a German patro and
made a hasty retre at. ;~ajor Lukasevic wept fonra ro with lsome1
of his troops while we retre ated to a nearby villa ge. I l ater
learn ed that Lukas evic, upon being broue ht doin ' to
German comm!illdbr1t, stat.eel thc..t he was the commanaer the local
of the
Cetnik Nevi sinje Brigade ; that he haa come cio~n purposel,y
make conta ct with the Germans , in order to advi&e them thatto
t here .-as a large band of Parti sans advan cing toward their
posit ion , and that he, Lukasevic and his men, were taking up
posit ions in the ioods to fiF:ht these Parti sans. The Germa
commandant thanked him very much for this information ana n
allowed him and his men to -escape in oraer to fi1)1t the Parti sans.
f.e later met Lukasevic about six hours south of this point.

- 47 -
 ~bile ~e were waiting for ~ukasevic, the locl11 Cet.nik
Srez commander advise<i us thc.t he was friendlJ with the German
commandant for the Lubinje· area; that on the previous .day he
had found l ivine acco11111odations for 6lO of the newly a.rri~ed
German troops , and that he was expecting another 640 shortly.
re could see man.Y of these German troops from the mountains ide.
While· we ~ere hiding out near Dubrovik, south of Trevinje,
one of Bacevic's soldiers showed me a German legitimacia issued
tQ him by the Genaan authorities at Dubrovik. 1be paper had on
it t he ?rinted letterhead of the German Army headquarters at
Dubrovik ~ In the Serbian language it described him as a •cet.nik•
fightin[ the Partisans, and allowed him the r ight to go to the
hosoital at Dubrovik. He advised me thl1t it had been i &sued to
him.by t he G~l"illan authorities at Dubrovik.
V'!'len faced with such evidence of collaboratio n, Lieutenant
Colonel Ba¥evic tried to justify it on the grounds t hat it was
necessary to know ~hat the Germdlls were knowing in hi~ area. I
expressed the opinion that such act.i vi ti es wou:i.d constitute
espiona~e against the Germans , but that this • as not espi on!lge
because t he Germans knew that these men were Cetniks. He
r epli r:d t hat all persons · of Orthodox reli~ ion in the area are
de~cribed as "Cetniks" by the Germans •

. My o~:n i :npression i s that t here is very little collaboratio n

in ~ c-rb i a , ":ic.>r e tho German is still the primary enemy , but.
th;; t t i1ere i s collaborati on in llerzogovina, because Mihailovi c 1 s
leaders , muc~ as they hate t he Gerwans , f eel that t hey must
co:i.laborete aeains t t he Partisl:Uls in order to save themselves
f r:>m lo ~; in- t~e civil war against t he ?artiswts. ':'hi s collabora-
t i:>n coe ~ ~:>t see~ to bot~er t~e ir consc ience any . They point
ol.t t !·.at t:~e;: are , i:'l f act, fi~hting former Croat Ustachi, many
of v. hoc ar e t~re se:1t iy collacorntin g r.i th Paveiic ; and that the
1-r i ti :;h are feea i nf. arm~ to the ?&rti sans , which are be i n5 used
:.: ·; ~:w ?arti su;1s ac".Rinst t ..<? CP.tnik:; , Thi s all plc.ys into t he
:::-:1::~: o: t h•' Gernanr , v·!:o ar e taicing e.civC1J1ta~e o1 tae fac t t i1at
:..:t> c- i vi .i w&r i i= for <>rr.os t in the min.;s of thP. CP.t.nii<s .
7hP ,,:·ov<> col1i; oor P.ti 0n in thP area of sout11Pm Herzo-
:.-:>V i :•.: :: Pe ::~ to t e Jui:t a c:;n t i:iuutLm of the col ...oLoro t i on
v ,1i ~<1 ex i :-te.l eo.r.der i n 1)4:.: WlC i ')L.3 between t.he Cetn ii<o and
t h P Ita.d ans a[.itin:;t, the Parti:;l:Uls.
•
"I.
\' ;i, ·1·
..... ··
"1 "\'I \..."' ' ....'
• ..,...,; ~ ......,- """
~ "'l.)"~
... "'· · IC ••• ...... \"I T!,;• • :• l l '.... vu .. .- .•'C·r
t.J\1'f;df
" ' \r.-·
•
'
·. hen I ar ri ve<.! i~ lu( oslavia, ti1e ~ri t i sh :.iit>si on uivi s ed
- 48 -
23

.·
that. ?Jihailovic' s only method of comounication Y:i t hiis t;overn-
ment in Cairo ~ as by radio to Ualta , in a cipher kno~n to the
DrHish. In January • 1944, Col onel Bailey RQVi•ed he tholl(.M
Mihailovic probably had establi•hed direct radio liaison •·ilh
hi ~ governmeqt, but that his messages •ere unCoubtecily mentored.

As far back as October, ·:ihailovic advised me that he haQ

oirect. liaison 'llit.h Amer i cE ..."ri.r..,u( h a rac. io he kept in t.he wooos ;
t hat h• could send "'essages via t hi s method to Foticn, Yup,oslav
Ambassador at tissh ington ; ann asked i f I wanted to senci a gessoge
direct to anyone i n v:ashineton. I polit ely declineo and repor te<l
t he mat ter to Bailey , • ho took i t up .-!th Ca iro and and Lonuon .
1 l a ter learned he had a young Serb-AmericM, Nobert ~arja::lovic,
t>·ork ing at t hi s s ecret st.at.ion.
IUhaH ovic advised that the radio station ..as in t he woods
not far fro:o Aranje lovac, and ofier<!d t o let me see i t, but I
never went t.bere.

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