The Letter as Cutting Edge

Author(s): Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak

Source: Yale French Studies, No. 55/56, Literature and Psychoanalysis. The Question of
Reading: Otherwise (1977), pp. 208-226
Published by: Yale University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2930437 .
Accessed: 18/12/2014 17:00

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

Yale University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Yale French
Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

The Letteras CuttingEdge

If one projectof psychoanalytical criticismis to "submitto this

test[of the a
statusof speaking] certainnumberof the statements
of the philosophictradition,"1 the Americancommoncriticmight
well fixherglanceupon ChaptersTwelveand Thirteenof Samuel
TaylorColeridge'sBiographiaLiteraria.These two chaptersare in-
variablyinterpreted as an important paradigmatic statement of the
unionofthesubjectand objectin theact ofthemind,oftheorganic
Imagination, and theautonomous yearsNew
self.Overthelast fifty
Criticism-theline of I. A. Richards,WilliamEmpson,and then
of Brooks,Ransom,Tate,and Wimsatthas "founded[itself]on the
implicitassumptionthat literatureis an autonomousactivityof
the mind."2 It is not surprising thatthis School,whichhas given
Americathemostwidelyacceptedgroundrulesofliterary pedagogy,
is also oftena runningdialoguewiththe Coleridgewho is taken
to be the prophetof the sovereignsubject.I quote a passagefrom
Richards,as he proposesto discussChaptersTwelveand Thirteen:
"In beginning now to expoundColeridge'stheoryof the Imagina-
tion,I proposeto startwherehe himself in theBiagraphia... really
started:thatis, witha theoryof the act of knowledge, or of con-
sciousness,or, as he called it, 'the coincidenceor coalescenceof
an OBJECTwitha SUBJECT." 3

I Jacques Lacan, "A Jakobson," Le Sdminaire de Jacques Lacan,

ed. Jacques-AlainMiller, Livre XX, Encore (1972-1973),Paris, 1975, p. 25.
All referencesto Lacan are in my translation.
2 Paul de Man, "Form and Intent in the American New Criticism,"
Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of ContemporaryCriticism,
New York, 1971, p. 21.
3 Ivor ArmstrongRichards,Coleridge on Imagination,Indiana Univer-
sity Press, Bloomington,1960, p. 44. On Coleridge's central role in
propagating"organisticformalism,"the received opinion is nicely stated
in the passage below: "This organisticformalismhas many antecedents:
it startedin Germanylate in the eighteenthcenturyand came to England

208

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Spivak
GayatriChakravorty

The testingof these two chaptersof the Biographia by the

Americancommoncriticby the rules of new psychoanalysis is
therefore not withouta certainplausibility, not to say importance.
As I describethattesting,I shall implyits ideology-an ideology
of "applying"in criticalpracticea "theory"developedunderother
auspices,and of discovering an analogyto the task of the literary
criticin anyinterpretativesituationinhabiting any"scienceofman."
At the end of this essay,I shall commenton thatideologymore
explicitly.For reasonsthatshouldbecomeclear as the essay pro-
gresses,I shall make no attemptto "situate"Coleridgewithinan
intellectualset, nor deal withthe richthematicsof his so-called
'plagiarisms."
The Biographia Literariais Coleridge'smostsustainedand most
importanttheoreticalwork.It is also a declaredautobiography.
The criticwho has attendedto the maintextsof the new psycho-
analysishas learnedthatany act of languageis made up as much
by its so-calledsubstanceas by the cuts and gaps thatsubstance
servesto frameand/orstop up: "We can conceiveof the shutting
[fermeture] of the unconsciousby the actionof something which
plays the role of diaphragm-shutter [obturateur]-theobject a,
suckedand breathedin, just wherethe trapbegins." These prob-
lematicsmightplay interestingly in a declaredautobiography such
as Coleridge's.Armedwith this insight,the criticdiscovers,in
Coleridge'stext,logicaland rhetorical slips and dodges,and what
looksverymuchlikea narrative obturateur. The textis so packed,
and so thoroughly commented upon,thathereI outlinethesimplest
blueprintof thesemoments.
The entireBiographiainhabitsthe narrativestructure of pre-
monitionand postponement (today we mightsay difference-

with Coleridge.. . . Coleridge,Croce, and Frenchsymbolismare the immedi-

ate antecedentsof modernEnglishand Americanso-called New Criticism."
Ren6 Wellek,Conceptsof Criticism,ed. StephenG. Nichols, Jr.,New Haven
and London, 1963, p. 354.
4 Lacan, "Analyse et verit6,"Seminaire,ed. Miller,Livre XI, Les quatre
concepts fondamentauxde la psychanalyse(1964), Paris, 1973, p. 132. The
discrepancybetweenthe object a and the unconsciousis containedin Lacan's
optic metaphor,which accomodates the idea of the angle of incidence.

209

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

certainlyavoidanceand longing)that so manyRomanticworks

share. "Intendedin the firstplace as a prefaceto the Sibylline
Leaves(a collectionofpoems),it grewintoa literary autobiography,
whichcame to demanda preface.This prefaceitselfoutgrewits
purposedlimits,and was incorporated in the whole work,which
was finallyissuedin two parts-theautobiography (two vols.) and
the poems."5
The BiographiaLiteraria,then,is not a bona fidebook at all,
forit was intendedonlyas a preface, pointing to whatwouldcome
afterit. Onlybecause it failedin its self-effacingtask did it be-
come a full-fledged book. Even as such it is un-well-made, for,
amongotherreasons,it containswithinit its own failedpreface.
One cannotsituatethe book in its own place. It looks forwardto
itspromiseand backwardat itsfailureand,in a certainway,marks
its own absence: autobiography by default,prefacesgrownmon-
strous.And,even beyondthis,the workas it standsis oftenstill
presentedas a preface:"In the thirdtreatiseof myLogosophia,"
neverto be written"announcedat the end of thisvolume,I shall
give (deo volente)the demonstrations and constructions of the
DynamicPhilosophy scientifically "Be
arranged"(179-180). assured,
however," "thatI lookforward
Coleridgewritesto himself, anxiously
to yourgreatbook on the CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY, which you
have promisedand announced"(200).
The narrativedeclaration ofthestatusoftheBiographia Literaria
is thusdeliberatelyevasive,the writingreminder of a gap. Within
such a framework, the celebratedchapter on Imagination (XIII)
declaresits ownversionof absence.Coleridgetellsus thatthebur-
den of argumentation in that chapterhas been supressedat the
requestof a friend,(who is, as is well-known, "a figment of Co-
leridge'simagination," anotherway of saying"Coleridgehimself":
"Thus far had the workbeen transcribed for the press,when I
receivedthe following letterfroma friend,whosepracticaljudg-

5 "Introduction,"Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Biographia Literaria, ed.

J. Shawcross, London, 1907, Vol. 1 (hereaftercited in the text by page
referencealone), p. lv.

210

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Gayatri ChakravortySpivak

ment I have had ample reason to estimate and revere.... In con-

sequence of this very judicious letter, ... I shall content myself
for the presentwith statingthe main result of the Chapter,which
I have reserved for that futurepublication,a detailed prospectus
of which the reader will find at the close of the second volume
[a fruitlesspromise]" (198, 201-202).
It would perhapsbe morepreciseto say thatthe chapterdeclares
its own inaccessibilityratherthan its properabsence. For it is sup-
posed to exist, and Coleridge's friend,its privileged reader, has
read it, but, because the BIOGRAPHIA is an autobiographyand a pre-
face, it must be suppressed: "For who, he [your reader] might
trulyobserve,"Coleridge's"friend"observes,"could fromyourtitle-
page, viz. 'My LiteraryLife and Opinions,' published too as in-
troductoryto a volume of miscellaneous poems, have anticipated,
or even conjectured,a long treatiseon ideal Realism..." (200-201).
We are assured of the chapter's massy presence in the least re-
futableway; in termsof money and numbersof pages: "I do not
hesitate in advising and urgingyou to withdrawthe Chapter from
the presentwork.... This chapter,whichcannot,when it is printed,
amount to so little as a hundred pages, will of necessity greatly
increase the expense of the work" (200). Those paragraphs,begin-
ning "The IMAGINATION then,I consider,"that have been quoted so
frequentlyas "Coleridge's theoryof the Imagination,"are merely
"the main resultof the Chapter,which I have reserved[held back]
for the futurepublication,a detailed prospectus [which looks for-
ward] of which the reader will find at the close of the second
volume" (201-202).
The greatestinstrumentof narrativerefractionin these chapters,
the obturateur,if you like, is, of course, the letterthat stops publi-
cation of the original Chapter Thirteen. The gesture is about as
faras possible from"the eternalact of creationin the infiniteI AM,"
(202) the most abundantlyquoted Coleridgean formula,descriptive
of the primaryImagination.It is a writtenmessage to oneself re-
presentedas being an externalinterruption.And, the critic cannot
forgetthat it is this that is presentedin the place of the organic

211

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

processand growthof the argument leadingto thecelebratedcon-

clusionsaboutthenatureof thesovereign imagination. Whyshould
a falsedisowning (since the letteris by Coleridgeafterall) of the
name of the self as author,a false declarationof the powerof
another,inhabitthe place of the greatestcelebrationof the self?
It is a questionthat her psychoanalytical studieshave prepared
our criticto ask.
"I see clearlythatyouhavedonetoo muchand yetnotenough,"
Coleridgewritesto Coleridge.In thesechapters,in additionto the
general narrativemotif of declared and stopped-upvacancy,
the readerencountersthis particularsortof rhetoricaloscillation
betweena thingand its opposite,sometimesdisplacingthat op-
position(as here,what is too much is presumablywhat is not
enough,the two can neverof coursebe the same),whichartfully
suggeststheabsenceofthethingitself, at thesametime,practically
speakingand thanksto the conventions of rhetoric, suggesting its
presence.The typicalhiding-in-disclosure, thesignifier creating"the
effectof the signified" by rusinganticipation-that psychoanalysis
has taughther to recognize.Here are some of these rhetorical
gestures.
Considerthe titleof ChapterTwelve."Requests"-lookingfor-
ward to a futureresult-and "premonitions"-knowing the result
beforehand, concerning the "perusal"or "omission"of "thechapter
thatfollows."The firsttwopagesare takenup with"understanding
a philosopher's ignorance" or being"ignorant ofhis understanding."
The connection betweenthisand whatfollowsis not immediately
clear in the text.The distinction seems to be invokedsimplyto
reinforce the rhetoricaloscillation.We move next to the request
that the reader"will eitherpass over the following chapteralto-
gether,or read the wholeconnectedly" (162). Even if we overlook
the factthatColeridgewill set up numerousobstaclesto reading
thesechaptersconnectedly, and thatthisrequestis advancednotin
its ownproperplace,but "in lieu of thevariousrequestswhichthe
anxietyof authorship addressesto the unknownreader,"(162) we
mightquite justifiably ask, "whichfollowingchapter?"Chapter

212

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

Twelve,thechapterthathas justbegunand willimmediately follow,

or ChapterThirteen,the chapterthatcomesafterthisone? I am
not suggesting,
of course,thatcommon-sensically,we cannotmake
our choice; but that rhetorically,
the requestseems to blur the
possibility
of the presenceof the matterunderdiscussion.
Upon the rhetoricof oscillation,Coleridgenow imposesthe
rhetoricof condition.He tellsus whatkindof readerhe does not
want. "If a man receivesas fundamentalfact,. . . the generalnotions
of matter,spirit,soul,body,action,passiveness, time,space,cause
and effect,consciousness, memory habit,"et cetera,
perception, and
et cetera,"to sucha mindI wouldas courteously as possibleconvey
the hint,thatforhim this chapterwas not written"(163). After
this sentence,withits significantbreakdownin parallelism once it
getsto "cause and effect,"Coleridgeplungesintothe languageof
"moreand less" where,ifwe readclosely,we willsee thatthe"not
more difficult is it to reduce them" and the "still less dare a
favorableperusalbe anticipated"do not match: "Taking [these
terms]therefore in mass,and unexamined,it requiresonlya decent
apprenticeship in logic,to drawforththeircontentsin all formsand
colours,as theprofessors oflegerdemainat ourvillagefairspullout
ribbonafterribbonfromtheirmouths.And not moredifficult is it
to reduce them back again to their differentgenera. ... Still less
dare a favorableperusalbe anticipated fromthe proselytes of that
compendious philosophy..."(163) The rhetoric of "moreand less"
is thereto beguileus. In itselfa deviceto announcetheabsenceofa
thingin its propermeasure,here deflectedand defective, it leads
us intofurther dissimulative playsof presenceand absence.
"But,"writesColeridgein thenextparagraph, "it is timeto tell
the truth."A negativetruth,presentedin haltingalternatives:"it
is neitherpossibleor necessaryfor all men,or formany,to be
PHILOSOPHERS" (164). Afterthis divisivemove,Coleridgeleaves
the place of spontaneousconsciousnessvacant of or inaccessible
to humanknowledge:"we divideall the objectsof humanknowl-
edge into those on this side, and those on the otherside of the
spontaneousconsciousness" (164).

213

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

Coleridgethen assumeswhat is recognizably the languageof

philosophicalexposition. Andherethereaderrepeatedly meetswhat
mustbe called logicalslippages.
In ChapterTwelve,simplybreaking groundforthegranddemon-
strationof ChapterThirteen, Coleridgesubmitsthat"thereare two
cases equallypossible.EITHER THE OBJECTIVE IS TAKEN AS THE FIRST,
... OR THE SUBJECTIVE IS TAKEN AS THE FIRST." For "theconception
of naturedoes not apparently involvethe co-presenceof an in-
telligencemakingan ideal duplicateof it,i.e. representing
it" (175).
So far so good. Yet a few pages later,Coleridgedesignatesthe
groundof the firstalternativeas prejudice,and thatof the second
simplyas ground.The reasonbeingone of compulsion;otherwise
thoughtdisappears.

THAT THERE EXIST THINGS WITHOUT US ... remains proof against

all attempts to remove it by grounds or arguments ... the philosopher
thereforecompels himselfto treat this faith as nothingmore than a pre-
judice ... The other position ... is groundless indeed. ... It is groundless;
but only because it is itself the ground of all other certainty.Now the
apparent contradiction... the transcendentalphilosophercan solve only
by the supposition ... that it is not only coherent but identical ... with
our own immediateself-consciousness(178; italics mine).

Upon thisfundamental, compulsive,and necessarydesire,the phi-

losopher'sdesireforcoherenceand the possibilityof knowledge-
the desireforthe One, Coleridgelays the cornerstoneof his argu-
ment.And thensuggeststhat to demonstrate the identityof the
two positionspresentedin the passage above is "the officeand
objectofphilosophy!"(175-178).An officeand object,as thereader
sees in thenextchapter,thatcan onlybe performed by deferment
and dissimulation.
Indeed,in thissectionofChapterTwelve,Coleridgeis preparing
us systematically
forthe analysisof ChapterThirteen, the chapter
to come,and givingus the termsforits analysis-a chapterwhich
he warnsmostof us againstreading,and whichis not goingto be
thereforanyofus to readanyway. And all throughChapterTwelve,
Coleridgegrappleswiththemostpatentcontradiction inhistheory:

214

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

of the objectmustbe rejectedout of hand

The possiblepriority
of the subjectand object,althoughit maybe seen
and theidentity
as no morethan a compulsiveproject,mustbe presentedas the
theoremof philosophy.This "identity"is itselfan infiniteand
primarypropertyof self-representation
and self-signification,
both
conceptsthat are constitutedby separationfromthe self. Yet,
despiteall this,theidentitymustbe seamless.Now thisis ofcourse
not a contingency peculiarto Coleridge.If confronted at random
with"mindis onlywhatit does, and its act is to makeitselfthe
objectofitsownconsciousness," whowouldassigna properauthor?
In thepassageI citedaboveColeridgecomescloseto suggesting
that the drivingforceof the philosopher's projectis desire.Else-
whereColeridgewill not openlydeclarethatthe forcethatwould
bringthe objectand the subject,as well as the dividedgroundof
the self,intounity,is also desire,a desirethatLacan will analyze
intothe desireof the otherand the desireto producethe otheras
well as to appropriate the other,the object,the object-substitute,
as well as the imageof the subjector subjects-a playof all that
masqueradesas the "real." Yet Coleridge'sdesireforunitaryco-
herenceseemsconstantly to be betrayed by a discourseof division.
Firstthe divisionbetweena principleand its manifestation. "This
principle[ofidentity] manifests itself..." (183). The manifestation
of identityis itselfgivenin two pieces,not one, connectedby an
alternative,supported by thepossibilityof translation, whichwould
contradict its uniqueness,and, giventhe multiplicity of languages,
wouldmakeit in principleopen-ended. The firstpiece is theLatin
wordsum,suggesting on the page its Englishgraphicequivalent:
"sum."Its translatedsubstitute breaksthe unitarysum intotwo:
"I am." "This principle,and so characterized, manifestsitselfin
the SUM or I AM."
Soon Coleridgeneatlyturnsthe table.A fewpagesback,as we
have noticed,he was suggesting that the objectiveand the sub-
jectivepositionsare alternatives,and "to demonstrate theiridentity
is the officeand object of... philosophy."Now, with the most
sweepingof intermediate steps,and certainly nothing likea demon-

215

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

stration,Coleridgeasserts: "It maybe describedtherefore

as a per-
petualSelf-duplicationof one and the same powerintoobjectand
subject"(183).The following THESIS, punctuated
by "therefores"
and
"it follows"-es,
does not in factdependupon or look forwardto
proofspresentedin the text,and is statedwith such uncharged
assurancethatit has all the forceof law:

for herein consists the essence of a spirit, that it is self-representative.

... It must follow that the spiritin all the objects which it views, views
only itself. ... It has been shown, that a spirit is that, which is its own
object, yet not originallyan object, but an absolute subject for which all,
itself included, may become an object. It must thereforebe an ACT. ...
Again the spirit ... must in some sense dissolve this identity[of subject
and object],in order to be conscious of it. ... But this impliesan act, and
it follows thereforethat intelligenceor self-consciousnessis impossible,
except by and in a will. . Freedom must be assumed as a ground of
philosophy,and can never be deduced from it (184-185).

In all this barrageof compulsiveargumentation,

one tendsto
forgetwhatis written threepagesbefore,whereColeridgedescribes
thestrategy oftheimaginationthatmightproducesucharguments:

Equally inconceivableis a cycle of equal truths without a common and

central principle.... That the absurditydoes not so immediatelystrike
us, that it does not seem equally unimaginable,is owing to a surreptitious
act of the imagination,which, instinctivelyand without our noticingthe
same, not only fillsup the interveningspaces, and contemplatesthe cycle
... as a continuouscircle givingto all collectivelythe unityof their com-
mon orbit; but likewise supplies ... the one centralpower, which renders
the movementharmoniousand cyclical (181).

Does it helpourcriticto speculatethattheinstinctive,

surreptitious,
and unnoticedimagination, filling
up thegapsin thecenterlesscycle
of equal-infinitelysubstitutable-truths,each signifying
the next
and vice versa,mightfollowthe graphthatLacan has plottedin
"La Subversiondu sujet et la dialectiquedu desir?" Would Co-
leridgehave welcomedLacan's notionof the pointsde capiton-
quiltingbuttons:"bymeansofwhichthesignifier stopsthe other-
wise indefinite
slidingof signification?"
6

6 Lacan, "La Subversion,"tcrits, Paris, 1966, p. 805.

216

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

The criticcannotknow the answerto that question.But she

can at least see that forColeridge,if the controlling imagination
or self-consciousnessis not takenas performing its task of fixing
thoseconditions whatresultsis chaos,infinite
ofintelligibility, way-
stationsof slidingsignification. Coleridge,in an older language,
calls thisfixingor stabilizingthe locationof ground."Even when
theObjectiveis assumedas thefirst, we yetcan neverpass beyond
the principleof self-consciousness.Shouldwe attemptit, we must
be drivenback fromgroundto ground,each of whichwouldcease
to be a Groundthe momentwe pressedon it. We mustbe whirl'd
downthe gulfof an infinite series."But whereasLacan or Derrida
would see the protectivemove againstsuch a threatas simply
that,and perhapsas a "characteristic" of textor subject,Coleridge
speaksof it in thelanguageofnecessityand norm:

But thiswouldmakeour reasonbafflethe end and purposeof all reason,

namely,unityand system.Or we must break offthe seriesarbitrarily,
and affirm an absolutesomethingthatis in and of itselfat oncecause and
effect..., subjectand object,or ratherthe identityof both.But as this
it follows... that... we
exceptin a self-consciousness,
is inconceivable,
arriveat ... a self-consciousnessin whichthe principium essendidoes
not standto theprincipium cognoscendi in the relationof cause to effect,
but boththe one and the otherare co-inherent and identical(187).

Here Coleridgeglossesoverthe possibility thatif the principle

of being(essence,truth)is not the cause of the principleof know-
ing,thetwoprinciples mightverywellbe discontinuous ratherthan
identical,simplyon thegroundthatsuch a discontinuity wouldbe
"inconceivable."But in an argument aboutknowingand being,in-
and unreasonableness
conceivability are not argument enough.One
mustallow the aporia to emerge.Especiallysince,a page earlier,
Coleridgehad excusedhimselfpreciselyon the groundof the dif-
ference,ratherthan the identity, betweenthese two principles:
"We are not investigatingan absoluteprincipium essendi; forthen,
I admit,manyvalidobjectionsmightbe startedagainstour theory;
but an absoluteprincipium cognoscendi"(186). The difference-at

217

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

the sensible frontierof truthand knowledge 7-that must be

coveredoverby an identityworriesColeridge.
And it is thisgap betweenknowingand beingthatthe episode
of the imaginary letteroccludes.At the end of ChapterTwelve,
Coleridgeinvokes,in a sentencethatseemsstrangely unrelatedto
the rest of the page, an overtlytheologicalratherthan merely
logicalauthority forthinking unityratherthandifference:"I will
concludewiththe wordsof Bishop Jeremy Taylor: he to whom
all thingsare one, who drawethall thingsto one, and seeth all
thingsin one, mayenjoytruepeace and restof spirit"(194). But
by theendofThirteen, theimaginary friend,theself'sfiction,
takes
the place of God's instrument, the good Bishop.A fallendiscourse
of "beingas mereexistence," theautobiographical anecdote,a letter
fromthe worldof others,interrupts the discourseof knowing, and
prevents themovement whereby its presentation would(ifit could)
be identicalwithits proof,and haltson a promise:a promiseto
read and to write.
A readerof Lacan can interpret thistextualgestureyetanother
way: the eruptionof the Otherontothe textof the subject.Read
thisway,whatis otherwiseseen as merelyan interruption of the
development of the argument about the imagination maynot only
be seen as a keepingalive, by unfulfillment, of the desire that
movesthe argument, but also as the rusethatmakespossiblethe
establishment of the Law of the imagination. The author'sfriend,
theselfsplitand disguisedas theOther,cartin thisviewbe called
the "Legislator,"he who at once dictatesthe author'scourse of
actionand makes it possibleforthe law to be erected.Seeking
to bringhis text to the appropriate conclusion-theex cathedra
paragraphs on the Imagination-thesubjectin thisview mustask
the Other(no longerthe objectbut whatseemsanothersubject)
"Whatis yourwish?" (My wish is thatyou shouldsuppressthis
chapter.)"By meansof whichis yet moremarkedthan revealed
the truefunctionof the Fatherwhichat bottomis to unite(and

7 Ibid., p. 795.

218

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

not to oppose) a desireto the Law."8 Coleridge'stext desiresto

be logicallydefectiveand yetbe legislative.The pathto such con-
clusionsas "the IMAGINATION, then..." and so forth,is pavedwith
logicaldissimulation.By demanding thatthe path be effaced,the
Lawgiverallows the unacknowledgeable desireto be unitedwith
the Law (ratherthanthe argument, whichis the text'sostensible
desire)of the Imagination. The richnessof the text is increased
whenwe realizethatthe Law in questionis not anylaw, but the
Law of the sovereignty of the Self,and thatColeridge'stextnar-
ratesthislegislationin termsof an authorwho,rusingly, "fathers"
the Legislatorratherthan vice versa,and that that fathering is
disavowed. A labyrinthof mirrorshere...

In Coleridgeour criticseems confronted with an exemplum.

Minglingthe theoryand the narrativeof the subject,Coleridge's
text seems to engagemost profitably withthe workof the new
psychoanalysis. The double-edged playof the desirefora unitarian
theoryand a desirefordiscontinuity seemsaccessibleto thatwork.
If our criticdoes followthe ideologyI have predictedforher,
she willproceedto searchthroughthebasic textsof Lacan forthe
meaningof herreading,and realizethatshe has relatedColeridge's
chaptersto the two greatpsychoanalytic themes: castrationand
the Imaginary, the secondspecifically articulated
by Lacan.
Althoughinevitably positionedand characterized by its place
in the"symbolic" worldofdiscourse, thesubjectnonetheless desires
to touch the "real" worldby constructing object-images or sub-
stitutesof that"real" worldand of itself.This is the place of the
Imaginary, and, accordingto Lacan, all philosophicaltextsshow
us its mark."In all thatis elaboratedofbeingand evenof essence,
in Aristotleforexample,we can see, readingit in termsof the
analyticexperience, thatit is a questionoftheobjecta." 9 Coleridge,
by declaring carefullythathe willwriteon knowing, notbeing,does
not seem to have escapedthatmark.For all discourse,including

8 Ibid., p. 824.
9 "Le Savoir et la vdrite,"Encore, p. 87.

219

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

the authorsof discourses,are discoursesof beingin a certainway,

and musttherefore harborthe fascinating antagonistof discourse,
the productionof the Imaginary. Hence Lacan's question: "Is to
have thea, to be?" 10
The "friend"who shares in the responsibility of authorship
mightbe a specular(thusobjectified) as well as a discursive(thus
subjectivized)imageof the subject."The 1 is not a being,it is a
presupposition withrespectto thatwhichspeaks."11"That subject
whichbelievesit can have access to [or accede to] itselfby being
designatedin a statement [enonce], is nothingotherthansuch an
object.Ask thepersoninflicted withthe anguishof thewhitepage,
he will tell you who is the turdof his fantasy." 12

That curiousdetail in the "friend's"letterthat suddenlyde-

scribesthemissingchapterin termsofmoneyand numberof pages
and reducesthe greatthoughton thoughtto a massythingalso
fitsinto these thematics.Lacan says again and again that the
imaginary is glimpsedonly throughits momentsof contactwith
the symbolic.That sentencein the lettermightindeedbe such a
moment.
The letteras a wholeis the paradigmof the "symbolic," a mes-
sage conveyedin language-a collectionof signifiers, a representa-
tivesignifier,ifsuch a thingcan be said. As we have seen,it halts
the fulfillmentof the author'sapparentdesireto presentthe com-
pletedevelopment of his theoryof the Imagination, even as it en-
couragesand promisesfurther writing and reading.It is an instru-
mentwitha cuttingedge.
The criticknowsthat,in psychoanalytic vocabulary, all images
of a cuttingthatgivesaccess to theLaw is a markofcastration. It
is the cut in Coleridge'sdiscoursethat allows the Law to spring
forthfull-fledged. The removalof the phallusallows the phallus

10 Ibid., p. 91. My deliberatelyclumsytranslationtries to, but does not

quite catch the play in French: both, "Is to have the a, being?" and, "Is
to have the a, to be the a?" The (sup)posingof the subject for the subject
relatesto what is in question in Coleridge'stext here.
11 "Ronds de ficelle,"Ibid., p. 109.
12 "Subversion,"tcrits, p. 818.

220

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Gayatri ChakravortySpivak

to emergeas the signifierof desire. "Castrationmeans that,in order

to attain pleasure on the reversedscale of the Law of desire, [or-
gasmic] pleasure [jouissance] must be refused."13 As subsequent
critical reception of Coleridge has abundantly demonstrated,the
letter,by denyingthe full elaboration of a slipperyargument,has
successfullyarticulated the grand conclusion of Chapter Thirteen
with what came before.Thus is castration,as a psychoanalyticcon-
cept, both a lack and an enabling: "let us say of castrationthat
it is the absent peg which joins the terms in order to construct
a series or a set or, on the contrary,it is the hiatus, the cleavage
that marks the separation of elementsamong themselves."14

As American common critics read more and more of the texts

of the new psychoanalysis,and follow the ideology of application-
by-analogy,exegeses like this one will proliferate. 15 And so will

gestures of contemptand caution against such appropriationsby

critics closer to the French movement.I propose at this point to
make a move toward neutralizingat once the appropriatingcon-
fidence of the formerand the comfortinghierarchizationof the
latter and ask what this sort of use of a psychoanalyticvocabulary
in literarycriticismmightindeed imply.
It is conceivable that a psychoanalyticreading of a literarytext
is bound to plot the narrativeof a psychoanalyticscenario in the
productionof meaning,usinga symbologicallexicon and a structural
diagram.Literarycriticswith more than the knowledgeof the field
allowed our whipping-girl, as well as the great psychoanalystsusing
literatureas example seem to repeat this procedure. As a matter
of fact,Freud on The Sand-Man, or Lacan on "The PurloinedLetter"

13 Ibid., p. 827. I am moved by Derrida's argument,general ratherthan

psychoanalytic,for rewritingthe thematicsof castrationas the thematics
of the hymen("La double seance," La Dissemination,Paris, 1972) or of
"antherection"(Glas, Paris, 1974). But since this essay is the story of a
commoncriticarmed with a specificallypsychoanalyticvocabulary,I do not
broach that re-inscription here.
14 Serge Leclaire,Psychanalyser,Paris, 1968, pp. 184-185.
15 For a typicalreadingthat has not been alerted to the importanceof
letters and cuttings,see Owen Barfield, What Coleridge Thought, Mid-
dletown,Connecticut,1971, pp. 26-27.

221

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale French Studies

are more than most aware of this bind. The tropologicalor nar-
ratologicalcrosshatchingof a text, given a psychoanalyticdescrip-
tion,can be located as stages in the unfoldingof the psychoanalytic
scenario. There are a few classic scenarios, the most importantin
one view being the one our critic has located in Coleridge: the
access to law throughthe interdictof the father-the passage into
the semiotic triangleof Oedipus: "The stake [settinginto play-
en jeu] of analysis is nothingelse-to recognizewhat functionthe
subject assumes in the order of symbolic relations which cover
the entire field of human relations,and whose initial cell is the
Oedipus complex,where the adoption of one's sex is decided." 16
To plot such a narrativeis to uncover the text's intelligibility
(even at the extreme of showing how textualitykeeps intelligibil-
ity foreverat bay), with the help of psychoanalyticdiscourse, at
least provisionallyto satisfythe critic's desire for masterythrough
knowledge,even to suggest that the critic as critic has a special,
if not privileged,knowledgeof the text that the author eithercan-
not have, or merelyarticulates.The problematicsof transference,
so importantto Freud and Lacan, if rigorouslyfollowed through,
would dismiss such a project as trivial,however it redefinesthe
question of hermeneuticvalue. Lacan explains the transference-
relationshipin termsof the Hegelian master-slavedialectic, where
both masterand slave are definedand negated by each other. And
of the desire of the master-here analyst or critic-Lacan writes:
"Thus the desire of the master seems, fromthe momentit comes
into play in history, the most off-the-markterm by its very
nature."17
What allows the unconscious of patient and analyst to play is
not the desire of the master but the production of transference,
interpretedby master and slave as being intersubjective.Lacan

16 Lacan, "Analyse du discourset analysedu moi," Seminaire, ed. Miller,

Livre I, Les Jb8crits
techniques de Freud (1953-1954), Paris, 1975, p. 80.
Again, our critic would probablynot enter into the sweepingcommentary-
critique of the positionimplied by Lacan's remarklaunched by Gilles De-
leuze and Felix Guattari in L'Anti-Oedipe: capitalisme et schizophrenia,
Paris, 1972, or by schizo-analysisin general.
17 "De linterpretation au transfert,"Quatre concepts, p. 230.

222

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

cautionsas muchagainsta misunderstanding of transference as he

emphasizesits importance in analysis.It is not a simpledisplace-
mentor identification thattheneutralanalystmanipulates withcare.
He is as muchsurrendered to the processof transference as the
patient.The analystcan neitherknow nor ignorehis own desire
withinthat process: "Transference is not the puttinginto action
thatwouldpushus to thatalienatingidentification whichall con-
formization constitutes, even if it wereto an ideal model,of which
the analystin any case could not be the support." 18 "As to the
handlingof transference, myliberty, on the otherhand,findsitself
alienatedby the doublingthatmyselfsuffers there,and everyone
knowsthatit is therethatthe secretof analysisshouldbe looked
for."19
I do not see how literary criticism can do morethandecideto
denyits desireas master,nor how it can not attendto the con-
ditionsof intelligibility
of a text.The textof criticism is of course
surrendered to the play of intelligibilityand unintelligibility, but
its decisionscan neverbe more self-subversive than to question
the statusof intelligibility,or be moreor less deliberately playful.
Even whenit is a questionof isolating"something irreducible, non-
sensical, that functionsas the originally repressedsignifier," the
analyst'sfunction is to givethatirreducible signifier a "significant
interpretation." "It is not because I have said that the effectof
interpretation is to isolate in the subjecta heart,a Kern,to use
Freud'sexpression, of non-sense, thatinterpretation is itselfa non-
sense."20 As SergeLeclairestressesin Psychoanalyser, the psycho-
analystcannotget aroundthe problemof reference. On the other
hand,it seemsto me important that,in theserviceof intelligibility,
usinga textas the narrative of a scenarioor even the illustration
of a principle,the newpsychoanalysis wouldallowus to doubtthe
status,precisely, of the intelligence,themeaningof knowledge, the
knowledgeof meaning."As it [theHegeliandialectic]is deduced,
it can onlybe the conjunctionof the symbolicwitha real from
18 "Analyse et verite," Quatre concepts, p. 133.
19"La direction de la cure," ecrits, p. 588.
20 "De l'interpretation,"Quatre concepts,p. 226.

223

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

which there is nothingmore to be expected. ... This eschatological

excursionis thereonlyto designatewhata yawning chasmseparates
the two relations, Freudianand Hegelian,of the subjectto knowl-
edge."21
Like philosophicalcriticism, psychoanalytical criticismof this
sort is in the famousdoublebind. All precautionstaken,literary
criticismmustoperateas if the criticis responsible forthe inter-
pretation, and, to a lesser extent,as if the writeris responsible
forthetext."If thenpsychoanalysis and philosophy bothfindthem-
selvestodayobligedto breakwith'sense,'to 'depart'radicallyfrom
the epistemology of presenceand consciousness, theyboth find
themselves equallystruggling withthe difficulty (impossibility?)of
placingtheirdiscourseon a level withtheirdiscoveriesand their
programs." n What can criticismdo?-but name frontier concepts
(withmoreor less sophistication) and thusgrantitselfa littlemore
elbowroomto writeintelligibly: Bloom'sScene of Instruction, de
Man's Irony,Kristeva'schora,Lacan's reel.Or tryfrontier styles:
Lacan's Socraticseminarsof the seventies,Derrida's"diphallic"
Glas, and, alas, the generalair of coynessin essayslike this one.
At leastdouble-bind hereusinga psychoanalytic
criticism, vocabula-
ry,invitesus to think-evenas we timidly or boisterously question
the value of such a specularinvitation-thatColeridgewas thus
double-bound:Imaginationhis frontier-concept, the self-effacing/
affecting literary(auto)biographyhis frontierstyle.
Thereis yet anotherangleto the appropriation of the idea of
transference to the relationship
betweentextand critic: "It is fit-
tingherethen,to scrutinize thefact-whichis alwaysdodged,and
whichis the reasonratherthanthe excuse fortransference-that
nothing can be attainedin absentia,in effigie.
... Quiteon thecon-
trary,the subject,in so faras it is subjectedto the desireof the
analyst,desiresto deceivehimthrough thatsubjection, by winning
his affection, by himselfproposingthat essentialduplicity[faus-
set9]whichis love.The effect oftransference is thiseffectof deceit

21 "Subversion,"Ecrits, pp. 798, 802.

22 Shoshana Felman,"La Mdpriseet sa chance," L'Arc 58 (Lacan), p. 46.

224

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
GayatriChakravorty
Spivak

in so faras it is repeatedat presenthereand now."23Philosophically

naive as it maysound,it cannotbe ignoredthatthe book cannot
thinkit speaksforitselfin thesamewayas thecritic.Now Jacques
Derridahas shown carefullythat the structureof "live" speech
and "dead" writingare inter-substitutable. 24 But thatdelicatephi-

losophicalanalysisshouldnot be employedto providean excuse

forthe will to powerof the literarycritic.Afterall, the general
sense in whichthe textand the personsharea commonstructure
would make criticismitselfabsolutelyvulnerable.And also, the
meaningof the Derrideanmove,whenwritten intocriticalpractice,
wouldmean,not equatingor makinganalogicalthe psychoanalytic
and literary-critical situation,or the situationof the book and its
reader,but a perpetualdeconstruction (reversaland displacement)
of the distinction betweenthe two.The philosophical rigorof the
Derrideanmove rendersit quite useless as a passportto psycho-
analyticliterary criticism.
Nor willthe difference betweentextand personbe conveniently
effacedby refusing to talk about the psyche,by talkingaboutthe
textas partof a self-propagating mechanism. The disjunctive,dis-
-continuous metaphorof the subject,carrying and beingcarriedby
its burdenof desire,does systematically misguideand constitute
the machineof the text,carrying and beingcarriedby its burden
of "figuration." One cannotescape it by dismissing the formeras
the residueof a productivecut, and valorizingthe latteras the
onlypossibleconcernof a "philosophical" literarycriticism.This
oppositiontoo, betweensubject"metaphor"and text "metaphor,"
needsto be indefinitely deconstructed ratherthanhierarchized.
And a psychoanalytic procedure,whichsupplements thecategory
of substitution withthe categoryof desireand vice versa,is a way
to perform thatdeconstruction. The transference situation
willnever
morethan lend its aura to the practiceof literarycriticism. We
knowwell thatall criticalpracticewill alwaysbe defeatedby the

23"De l'interpretation,"Quatre concepts,p. 229.

24Generallyin the firstpart of De la grammatologie,Paris, 1967, and
more specifically,apropos of Husserl, in La Voix et le phenomena,Paris,
1967, Chapter VII.

225

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Yale FrenchStudies

possibility
that one mightnot know if knowledgeis possible,by
its own abyss-structure.But withinour littleday of frostbefore
evening,a psychoanalyticalvocabulary,withits chargedmetaphors,
givesus a littlemoreturningroomto playin. If we had followed
only the logical or "figurative"(as customarily understood)in-
consistenciesin ChaptersTwelve and Thirteenof the Biographia
Literariawe mightonlyhave seen Coleridge'sprevarication. It is
the thematicsof castrationand the Imagination thatexpose in it
theplayofthepresenceand absence,fulfillment and non-fulfillment
of the will to Law. The psychoanalytical vocabularyilluminates
Coleridge'sdeclaration
thattheBiographia is an autobiography.The
supplementation of the categoryof substitutionby the categoryof
desirewithinpsychoanalytic discourseallows us to examinenot
only Coleridge'sdeclarationbut also our own refusalto take it
seriously.

In the longrun,then,the criticmighthave to admitthat her

gratitudeto Dr. Lacan wouldbe forso abjecta thingas an instru-
ment of intelligibility,
a formulathat describesthe strategyof
Coleridge'stwo chapters: "I ask you to refusewhatI offeryou
because thatis not it."25

25 Lacan, "Ronds de ficelle,"Encore, p. 114. The curious construction

leads into the labyrinthby denyingthe very giftit offers.Need I mention
that this formula-taken fromone of Lacan's recent seminars-invokes
the entireLacanian thematicsof the unconsciousproducingits own slippage
as it positionsthe subject by the productionof the sliding signifier?The
locus classicus is still the much earlier "L'instance de la lettre dans l'in-
conscient ou la raison depuis Freud," Ecrits, pp. 493-528 (translatedby
JanMiel as "The Insistenceof the Letterin the Unconscious,"Structuralism,
ed. Jacques Ehrmann,New York: Doubleday, 1970, pp. 101-137).

226

This content downloaded from 128.235.251.160 on Thu, 18 Dec 2014 17:00:01 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions