1|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES

2|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES

 LIST OF CASES
Agrarian Law

CASE TITLE PAGE

1. AGUSTIN RIVERA vs. NEMESIO DAVID. G.R. NO.

157307; FEBRUARY 27, 2006 4
2. VDA. DE AREJOLA vs. CAMARINES SUR REG.
AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL, ET AL., 110 SCRA 517 (1960) 9
3. JAIME MORTA, SR., ET AL., vs. JAIME OCCIDENTAL,
ET AL., G.R. NO. 123417, (JUNE 10, 1999) 12
4. HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS vs. CA,
(327 SCRA 293) 16
5. DAR vs. ROBERTO CUENCA, ET AL., G.R. NO. 154112,
SEPTEMBER 23, 2004. 22
6. ERNESTO INGLES, ET. AL. vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET.
AL., G.R. NO. 125202, JAN. 31, 2006 33
7. HEIRS OF JULIAN DE LA CRUZ vs. OF ALBERTO CRUZ,
G.R. NO. 162890, NOVEMBER 22, 2005 39
8. MORTA, SR. vs. OCCIDENTAL (G.R. 123417, 10 JUNE
1999, 308 SCRA 167) 50
9. RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB vs. COURT OF APPEALS.
UDK No. 9864. December 3, 1990. 50
10. (PHIL. VETERANS BANK vs. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R.
NO. 132767, JANUARY 18, 2000) 56
11. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, 321 SCRA 629). G.R. NO. 128557. DECEMBER 29, 60
1999.]
12. LBP vs. LEONILA P. CELADA, G.R. CASE NO. 164876,
JANUARY 23, 2006) 79
13. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON
CITY & PABLO MENDOZA vs. ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, G.R. 80
No.176549, January 20, 2016
14. DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON
CITY & PABLO MENDOZA vs. ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, G.R. 95
No.176549, October 10, 2018 Resolution
15. JULIAN S. LEBRUDO and REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO vs.
REMEDIOS LOYOLA, G.R. No. 181370 March 9, 2011 101

3|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES

CASE N0. 1
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2006 > February 2006
Decisions > G.R. No. 157307 - Agustin Rivera, et al. v. Nemesio David :

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 157307 : February 27, 2006]
AGUSTIN RIVERA, substituted by GREGORIO B. RIVERA, DOMINGA
B. RIVERA, ORLANDO B. RIVERA, ROSARIO R. LOPEZ, CRISANTO
B. RIVERA, EMILIANO B. RIVERA and CONCHITA B.
RIVERA, Petitioners,
v.
NEMESIO DAVID, Respondent.

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated
October 1, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58211, and its
Resolution2 dated February 19, 2003 denying reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals had overturned for lack of jurisdiction of the DAR the Decision dated
January 31, 1995 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAB) ° and the Decision dated March 6, 2000 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
The pertinent facts of the case are as follows:
Respondent Nemesio David, with the other heirs of Consolacion Suarez David,
owned in common five hectares of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47588-R in Dau, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner Agustin Rivera occupied
1.8 hectares of the land. Through counsel, the Davids demanded that petitioner
vacate the property. Rivera refused and instituted a complaint with an
application for injunction to maintain peaceful possession before the PARAB.3
In his Complaint, Rivera averred that he was a duly instituted tenant. To support
his averment, he submitted a certification from the Municipal Agrarian Reform
Office together with the affidavits of two neighbors.
Respondent David denied that Rivera was his family's tenant. According to
respondent, Rivera had been squatting on the property since 1965 and had put
4|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES
up, without the Davids' consent, a hollow blocks business and also a piggery in
the property. David sought the dismissal of the case before the PARAB alleging
that the PARAB lacked jurisdiction, considering that the property was not an
agricultural land and the case involved the issue of ownership.4
The PARAB required the parties to file their position papers. In his position
paper,5 Rivera averred that he occupied the land, at first, as a tenant; then, as an
owner in 1957. He alleged that the land became his own as disturbance
compensation. He prayed that he be declared as a qualified beneficiary of the
agrarian reform program and he be awarded three hectares as mandated by law.
For his part, respondent David reiterated his defenses and added that Rivera's
claim that the property was transferred to the latter in 1957 was inconsistent with
Rivera's claim of disturbance compensation since the idea of disturbance
compensation was introduced only by Republic Act No. 38446 on August 8, 1963
and the disturbance compensation awarded to an agricultural lessee is equivalent
only to five years' rental. Even so, the 1.8 hectares claimed by the petitioner was
in excess of what is allowed under said law.7
Initially, the PARAB held that David was guilty of laches or estoppel since he
and his predecessors-in-interest had allowed petitioner to retain the property.
Further, the PARAB said it had more reasons to believe that respondent's
predecessors-in-interest had given the land to the petitioner as the latter had long
occupied the property and developed it. It rendered judgment maintaining
petitioner Rivera in peaceful possession of the property without prejudice to his
claim as qualified beneficiary of the agrarian reform program.8
On appeal, the DARAB affirmed the PARAB's finding of estoppel and added
that the action to recover the property was barred by the Statute of Limitations
under Section 389 of Rep. Act No. 3844.10
Respondent David elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, raising the
following issues:
(A) DID RESPONDENT [petitioner herein] FAIL TO DISCHARGE THE
BURDEN OF PROVING BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE HIS
AFFIRMATIVE ALLEGATIONS OF (I) FARMING AND TILLING; (II)
PALAY PRODUCTION; (III) PERSONAL PERFORMANCE OF ALL
PHASES OF PRODUCTION; (IV) PAYMENT OF LEASEHOLD
RENTALS; (V) SETTLEMENT BY PETITIONER'S FATHER OF A
CONTROVERSY WITH HIM; (VI) CONVEYANCE BY PETITIONER'S
FATHER OF THE 1.8 HECTARES TO RESPONDENT?
(B) DID RESPONDENT'S EVIDENCE FAIL TO ESTABLISH THE
TRADITIONAL SIX ESSENTIAL ELEMENTS TEST FOR TENANCY
RELATIONSHIPS IN CHICO V. COURT OF APPEALS, 284 SCRA 33, 36
AND BARANDA V. BAGUIO, 189 SCRA 194, 200?
5|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES
(C) IS MERE ALLEGATION OF CONVEYANCE WITHOUT PROOF
ENOUGH TO SUSTAIN THE DARAB'S CONCLUSION THAT
RESPONDENT IS A TENANT-FARMER ENTITLED TO SECURITY OF
TENURE?
(D) IS A DARAB DECISION BASED ON SOME HEARSAY AFFIDAVITS
AND CERTIFICATION - NOT SUBJECTED TO PRIOR
REAFFIRMATION IN OPEN COURT BY THE AFFIANT OR PERSON
CERTIFYING AND TO A PROCESS OF SANITIZING OR PASTURIZING
AS TO THEIR SELF-SERVING CONTENT - A DECISION BASED ON
EVIDENCE THAT LACKS RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?
(E) IS A DARAB DECISION BASED ON HEARSAY AFFIDAVITS AND
CERTIFICATION - NOT SUBJECTED TO PRIOR IDENTIFICATION BY
THE AFFIANT OR PERSON CERTIFYING - A DECISION BASED ON
EVIDENCE THAT [LA]CKS RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?
[(F) IS A DARAB DECISION BASED ON SOME HEARSAY
AFFAIDAVITS AND CERTIFICATION - NOT SUBJECTED TO CROSS-
EXAMINATION - A DECISION BASED ON EVIDENCE THAT LACKS
RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?] [sic]
(G) IS THE DARAB'S MARCH 6, 2000 DECISION AD[O]PTING THE
FINDINGS OF ADJUDICATOR ILAO ONE THAT IS BASED ON
EVIDENCE THAT LACKS RATIONAL PROBATIVE FORCE?
(H) DOES THE PARAB/DARAB (sic) HAVE JURISDICTION TO MAKE A
FINDING OF OWNERSHIP UNDER THE GUISE OF A
CHARACTERIZATION TO THE EFFECT THAT PETITIONER'S
FATHER HAD MADE A CONVEYANCE TO RESPONDENT?11
The appellate court reversed the decisions of both the PARAB and the DARAB.
It reasoned that the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) no longer had
jurisdiction over the case because by petitioner Rivera's own admission, the
tenancy ended in 1957. The appellate court set aside the decisions of both the
PARAB and DARAB for lack of jurisdiction and dismissed petitioner's
complaint, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged decisions of both
the PARA[B] and the DARAB are REVERSED and SET ASIDE, including the
writs of execution issued by the PARA[B], and another is rendered
DISMISSING the respondent Agustin Rivera's complaint. No costs.
SO ORDERED.12
Petitioner before us raises now mainly the issue concerning jurisdiction, alleging
that:

6|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PARA[B]
AND THE DARAB HAVE NO JURISDICTION OVER RIVERA'S
COMPLAINT.13
Simply put, the main issue now is as follows: Does the DAR have jurisdiction?
Secondly, was petitioner the owner of the land and are his substitute-petitioners
entitled to its peaceful possession?
We note that because of petitioner Rivera's death, his heirs are now substituted
as petitioners. At any rate, petitioner had insisted that the DAR had jurisdiction
over the case for he had sufficiently established before the PARAB and the
DARAB that he was a tenant of respondent's predecessor-in-interest. He asserted
that as tenant of respondent's predecessor-in-interest, his tenancy was intimately
related to the issue of ownership and thus his case fell under the jurisdiction of
the DAR.
Petitioner further contended that even though the tenancy relation no longer
existed at the time the complaint was filed, the DAR had not been deprived of its
jurisdiction since under Section 1(e), Rule II of the DARAB
Rules of Procedure,14 it has jurisdiction over cases involving the alienation of
agricultural lands covered by the agrarian reform program. He added that the
definition of "agrarian dispute" under Rep. Act No. 665715 included any
controversy relating to compensation of land acquired under the Act and other
terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to farm workers,
tenants, and other agrarian reform beneficiaries.
For his part, respondent David reiterates before us the arguments in his earlier
pleadings before the administrative agencies and the appellate court.
First, on the matter of jurisdiction. We agree with petitioner that the DAR has
jurisdiction over his case. In the 2004 case of David v. Rivera,16 a case involving
the same parcel of land here, filed before the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
(MCTC) of Mabalacat by the respondent against petitioner, the issue raised was
whether the MCTC or the DAR had jurisdiction. Therein, we held that the
existence of prior agricultural tenancy relationship characterizes the controversy
as an "agrarian dispute", adding that -
Even if the tenurial arrangement has been severed, the action still involves an
incident arising from the landlord and tenant relationship. Where the case
involves the dispossession by a former landlord of a former tenant of the land
claimed to have been given as compensation in consideration of the renunciation
of the tenurial rights, there clearly exists an agrarian dispute. On this point the
Court has already ruled:
Indeed, section 21 of Republic Act No. 1199, provides that 'all cases involving
the dispossession of a tenant by the landlord or by a third party and/or the
7|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES
settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the relationship of landlord
and tenant . . . shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Court
of Agrarian Relations.' This jurisdiction does not require the continuance of the
relationship of landlord and tenant - at the time of the dispute. The same may have
arisen, and often times arises, precisely from the previous termination of such
relationship. If the same existed immediately, or shortly, before the controversy
and the subject-matter thereof is whether or not said relationship has been
lawfully terminated, or if the dispute otherwise springs or originates from the relationship
of landlord and tenant, the litigation is (then) cognizable only by the Court of Agrarian
Relations . . .17
Although the cause of action now may differ from that in the 2004 case of David
v. Rivera, under the facts of the cases, and by our prior judgment on the issue of
jurisdiction, the parties herein are bound by the conclusiveness of judgment in
the 2004 case of David v. Rivera, in accordance with Rule 39, Sec. 4(c), of the
Rules of Court.18 Conformably then, the DAR has jurisdiction.
Now, on the issue of ownership, we find that petitioner Rivera failed to prove
that he indeed owned the property.
All he submitted was an affidavit from a Feliciano Manansala stating that there
was a verbal agreement between him and the respondent's predecessor-in-interest
giving him the 1.8 hectares. However, petitioner did not present the affiant in
court. Where the affiant did not appear, nor was he presented during the
administrative investigation to identify his sworn statement, his affidavit is
hearsay, hence inadmissible in evidence.19
On the other hand, respondent David presented TCT No. 47588-R, dated
September 29, 1965, tax declarations from 1941 to 1963 under the name of
respondent's predecessors-in-interest, and tax declarations from 1965 to 1971
under the name of the respondent and his co-heirs. Compared to petitioner's
dearth of evidence, these sufficiently show that respondent and his co-heirs still
owned the land. As a corollary, since it has been established that petitioner Rivera
is not the owner of the land, he and his heirs are not entitled to peaceful
possession thereof.
In sum, we find that the Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing Agustin
Rivera's complaint, not because the DAR had no jurisdiction over the case but
because his complaint lacks merit.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. We affirm the Decision dated October
1, 2002 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2003 in CA-G.R. SP No. 58211
dismissing Agustin Rivera's complaint. The Decision dated January 31, 1995 of
the PARAB in DARAB Case No. 664 P 94 and the Decision dated March 6,
2000 of the DARAB in DARAB Case No. 4960, including the writs of execution
issued by the PARAB are SET ASIDE. Respondent Nemesio David and his
8|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES
fellow heirs of Consolacion Suarez David are hereby declared owners of the
contested land covered by TCT No. 47588-R under the Registry of Deeds of
Mabalacat, Pampanga. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 2:

G.R. No. L-15753 December 29, 1960

JUANA REYES VDA. DE AREJOLA vs. CAMARINES SUR REGIONAL
AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL, ET AL. -->
Home > ChanRobles Virtual Law Library > Philippine Supreme Court
Jurisprudence >

EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15753 December 29, 1960
JUANA REYES VDA. DE AREJOLA, Petitioner,
vs.
CAMARINES SUR REGIONAL AGRICULTURAL SCHOOL,
SILVESTRE TUSCANO, EUGENIO ABLAZA, NUMERIANO REZO and
JUDGE PASTOR REYES of the Court of Agrarian Relations, Sixth Regional
District, Naga City, Respondents.
Jacobo C. Briones for petitioner.
N. G. Nostratis and L. M. Ipac for respondents.
BENGZON, J.:
The question for decision is whether the Court of Agrarian Relations has
jurisdiction favorably to act on the complaint of herein respondents (except Judge
Pastor Reyes) against herein petitioner.
On May 20, 1959, the former filed with the Court's Sixth Regional District, Naga
City, a complaint for "illegal ejectment, with prayer for issuance of preliminary
injunction" (CAR Case No. 340-CS-58) alleging: that the Camarines Sur
Regional Agricultural School was the owner and/or legal possessor of a parcel
of land of about seven hectares; tilling it, Silvestre Tuscano, Eugenio Ablaza and
9|PA G E AGRARIAN CASES
Numeriano Rezo were tenants of said School; on May 16, 1958, Luis P. Arejola
(predecessor of herein petitioner) "without the prior knowledge and consent of
the complainants, through force and intimidation fenced the entire area of their
holding by means of barbed wire" and continually prevented them (the tenants)
from planting thereon, unless they recognized him as the absolute legal owner
and gave him the landholder's share; and the "tenants" were thereby left without
means of support. Therefore, complainants asked that Arejola be ordered to
desist from molesting or interfering with their cultivation of the premises. (They
also asked for preliminary injunction.)
Arejola asserted he was the lawful possessor of a parcel of land of 280 hectares,
of which he had been declared the owner by the courts; and if complaining
"tenants" were occupying a portion thereof, they had no right to do so. Anyway,
he argued, there being no tenancy relationship between himself and
complainants, the Court of Agrarian Relationship had no jurisdiction over the
controversy. The remedy, he maintained was an action in the ordinary courts of
justice for unlawful entry.
When the case was called for hearing, counsel for Arejola made this statement:
This representation in behalf of the respondent admits that the Agricultural
School in this CAR Case No. 340-C.S., is landholder of the petitioner-tenants,
which we dispute the ownership, and the respondent has nothing to do with the
contract of tenancy, implied or expressed between the Agricultural School and
the other petitioner-tenants. We respectfully pray that judgment on the pleadings
could be had in behalf of our answer and on the basis of the petition.
And insisted on the Agrarian Court's lack of jurisdiction.
As the parties apparently admitted the identity of the lot and the dispossession of
the "tenants" by Arejola, the Court, invoking sec. 21 of Republic Act 1199, and
sec. 16 of Republic Act 2263 which provides: "it shall be unlawful for any third
party to dispossess the tenant of his holding except by order of the court," directed
Arejola to reinstate the "tenants" Tuscano, Ablaza and Rezo to their respective
landholdings.
Hence this appeal by certiorari, raising the only question of jurisdiction, as
already stated.
We have heretofore held, in at least two cases, that where no tenancy relationship
exists between the contending parties and the situation is one merely of forcible
entry, the Court of Agrarian Relations has no jurisdiction.
Thus, in Tumbaga vs. Vasquez, G.R. L-8719, July 17, 1956, we declared that when
a mere intruder holds possession of property belonging to another, the ordinary
courts do not lose jurisdiction in a forcible entry case even if he should claim
(untruthfully) a tenancy relationship with the owner. In other words, where the
10 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
case is really mere forcible entry, the Court of Agrarian Relations does not have
jurisdiction. And in Pabustan vs. De Guzman, 109 Phil., 278, we ruled that when
there is no tenancy relationship between the contending parties, the Agrarian
Court has no jurisdiction.
The reason is not far to seek.
Under sec. 7 of Republic Act 1267 (as amended by Republic Act 1409) creating
said Court, it is given jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle all
questions . . . involving those relationships established by law which determine
the varying rights of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land
where one of the parties works the land.
The Court is thus empowered to act where there is a legal "relationship" between
the parties fighting before it. Such relationship must necessarily be that of
agricultural tenancy. And the law governing agricultural tenancy, Republic Act
1199 explains that tenancy relationship is a "juridical tie" which arises between a
landholder and a tenant once they agree expressly or impliedly to undertake jointly
the cultivation of land belonging to the former, etc. [Sec. 6] (See also sections 3
and 5, Republic Act 1199.)
It must be remembered that the Court was established to enforce all laws and
regulations governing the relation of capital and labor on all agricultural lands.
Necessarily, the law contemplated a legal relationship between landowner and
tenant. This does not exist where one is owner or possessor and the other a
squatter or deforciant.
It is true that sec. 21 of Republic Act 1199 says:
All cases involving the dispossession of a tenant by the landholder or by a third
party and/or the settlement and disposition of disputes arising from the
relationship of landholder and as well as the violation of any of the provisions of
this Act, shall be under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of such courts as
may now or hereafter be authorized by law to take cognizance of tenancy
relations and disputes.
However, we perceive no compelling reason to widen the scope of sec. 7 of
Republic Act 1267 (as amended) creating the Court of Agrarian Relations so as
to include any legal dispute wherein one party is agricultural tenant, no matter
who his opponent is. Considering the whole Act, 1 the "third party" mentioned in
the said sec. 21 should be construed to mean a person who is neither landholder
nor tenant, but who acts for, openly, secretly, or factually for the landholder. For
instance, a sheriff enforcing an execution sale against the Iandholder; or a
purchaser or transferee of the land, 2 or a mere dummy of the landowner.
No such situation obtains here. The "tenants" have no legal relationship with
Arejola. They do not claim to be his tenants. Indeed, they refused to recognize
11 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
him as such. They do not aver he was acting for or in connivance with their
landlord, the Agricultural School. If the Court acted favorably to the tenants'
desire and was consistent, it would have to declare them as "tenants" of Arejola, -
(which it did not) - with the right of the latter to get a share of the crops; thereby
recognizing the right of Arejola to possession (constructive at least) of the very lot
which he had allegedly fenced and entered illegally.
One further circumstance which the Court below obviously overlooked: the
complainant Camarines School is not a "tenant" of Arejola, nor a "tenant" at all.
Such being the case, how could the Court intervene in a dispute between the latter
on the one hand and such institution on the other? And when the Court declares
the tenants as tenants of Arejola, what happens to the rights of the School?
Evidently realizing at last the peculiar situation they were in, the School and the
tenants have refrained from contesting Arejola's petition here. Only the
respondent judge answered, opposed it and maintained his power to act in the
matter.
In view of the foregoing, the certiorari petition is granted the respondent judge
having no jurisdiction, the decision is revoked and the complaint in CAR Case
No. 340-Cs-58 dismissed. Without prejudice to the proper action in the ordinary
courts of justice. No costs.
Paras, C. J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
and Paredes, JJ., concur.

CASE NO. 3:

June 1999 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1999 > June 1999 Decisions > G.R. No.
123417 June 10, 1999 - JAIME MORTA, SR. v. JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ET AL.:

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 123417. June 10, 1999.]

JAIME MORTA, SR. and PURIFICACION PADILLA, Petitioners,

v.
12 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
JAIME OCCIDENTAL, ATTY. MARIANO BARANDA, JR., and DANIEL
CORRAL, Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

What is before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision 1 of the Court of
Appeals and the resolution, 2 denying petitioners’ motion for reconsideration and
supplemental motion for reconsideration. In its decision, the Court of Appeals dismissed
the petition for review filed before it, ruling that the cases below fall within the jurisdiction
of the DARAB.

The antecedent facts are as follows: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On January 10 and 21, 1994, 3 petitioners Jaime Morta, Sr. and Purificacion Padilla filed
two (2) cases 4 for damages with preliminary injunction, with the Municipal Trial Court,
Guinobatan, Albay, against respondents Jaime Occidental, Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr. and
Daniel Corral, which were consolidated pursuant to Rule 31 of the Revised Rules of Court.
In the complaints, petitioners alleged that respondents through the instigation of Atty.
Baranda, gathered pilinuts, anahaw leaves, and coconuts from their respective land,
delivered the produce to Atty. Mariano Baranda, Jr., and destroyed their banana and
pineapple plants. In Civil Case No. 481, petitioners claimed damages amounting to
P8,930.00, plus costs of suit; in Civil Case No. 482, petitioners claimed P9,950.00, as
damages. The court considered the cases covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure and
ordered respondents to file their answer.

In their answer, respondents claimed that petitioners were not the owners of the land in
question. They alleged that the torrens titles of the land indicated a certain Gil Opiana as
the registered owner. Gil Opiana was the father of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan who inherited
the lots upon the former’s death. Respondent Jaime Occidental contended that he was a
bona fide tenant of Josefina Opiana-Baraclan. Respondents stated that there was no
annotation on the titles establishing petitioners’ right over the land. They denied harvesting
the anahaw leaves and coconuts, as well as delivering the produce to Atty. Baranda, Jr.

Thereafter, the Municipal Trial Court ordered the parties to submit affidavits of their
witnesses and other evidence on the factual issues, together with their respective position
papers. After respondents’ failure to file their position papers within the prescribed period,
the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.

On March 29, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court rendered decision 5 in favor of petitioners.
It held that petitioners had been in actual, continuous, open and adverse possession of the
land in question for forty-five (45) years. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is rendered in favor of
the plaintiffs and against the defendants in both cases as follows: j

"1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and disturb the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs in the lands in question situated at San Rafael, Guinobatan;

13 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
"2) Condemning the defendants in Civil Cases No. 481 to jointly and severally pay the
plaintiffs the total amount of P8,130.00 representing the value of the coconuts, pilinuts and
anahaw leaves and for the destroyed plants;

"3) Ordering the defendants in Civil Cases No. 481 jointly and severally to reimburse the
plaintiffs the amount of P202.00 as legal expenses incurred filing this suit;

"4) Condemning the defendants in Civil Case No. 482 jointly and severally to pay the
plaintiffs the total amount of P9,950.00 representing the value of the coconuts and anahaw
leaves;

"5) Ordering the said defendants in Civil Case No. 482 to jointly and severally reimburse
the plaintiffs the sum of P202.00 as legal expenses in filing this suit."
cralaw virtua1aw library

"Guinobatan, Albay, March 29, 1994.

(signed)

JAIME R. REMONTE

Judge" 6

Respondents appealed to the Regional Trial Court, Ligao, Albay. They questioned the trial
court’s jurisdiction contending that the case was cognizable by the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudicatory Board (DARAB). They alleged that petitioners engaged in forum
shopping and that the trial court erred in granting the reliefs prayed for.

On August 10, 1994, the Regional Trial Court rendered decision reversing that of the
Municipal Trial Court and dismissing the above cases, 7 ruling that these cases for
damages are tenancy-related problems which fall under the original and exclusive
jurisdiction of the DARAB. The court also declared that the filing of Civil Cases Nos. 481
and 482, while a case involving the same issue was pending before the DARAB, amounted
to forum shopping.

On September 9, 1994, petitioners filed a petition for review 8 with the Court of Appeals,
contesting the decision of the Regional Trial Court. On May 31, 1995, the Court of
Appeals 9 rendered decision affirming the lower’s court ruling that the cases fall within the
original and exclusive jurisdiction of DARAB. However, it ruled that petitioners did not
engage in forum shopping.

On June 6, 1995, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration. 10 On June 13, 1995, they
filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration, 11 stressing that there was no tenancy
relationship between the parties, as certified by the Municipal Agrarian Reform Office
(MARO). 12

On December 8, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the motions. 13

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioners claim that Morta is not a tenant of either Jaime Occidental or Josefina Opiana-
Baraclan, as shown by the MARO certification. They argue that the civil actions for
damages are not tenancy-related, and, hence, are properly cognizable by the trial court, not
14 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
the DARAB.

We resolve to grant the petition.

It is axiomatic that what determines the nature of an action as well as which court has
jurisdiction over it, are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief
sought. 14 "Jurisdiction over the subject matter is determined upon the allegations made in
the complaint, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon a claim
asserted therein — a matter resolved only after and as a result of the trial. Neither can the
jurisdiction of the court be made to depend upon the defenses made by the defendant in his
answer or motion to dismiss. If such were the rule, the question of jurisdiction would
depend almost entirely upon the defendant." 15 The complaint filed by petitioners before
the Municipal Trial Court is an action for damages for illegal gathering of anahaw leaves,
pilinuts and coconuts, and the destruction of their banana and pineapple plantations. The
respondents did not question the municipal trial court’s jurisdiction in their answer. The
issue of jurisdiction was raised for the first time on appeal.

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship
between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold over a dispute, it would
be essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: 1) that the parties are the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2) that the subject matter of the
relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is consent between the parties to the
relationship; 4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; 5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and 6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. 16 In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals, 17 we held that the
jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reforms is limited to the following:
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and

c) approval and disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural

lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.

The regional trial court ruled that the issue involved is tenancy-related that falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB. It relied on the findings in DARAB Case No. 2413
that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan appears to be the lawful owner of the land and Jaime
Occidental was her recognized tenant. However, petitioner Morta claimed that he is the
owner of the land. Thus, there is even a dispute as to who is the rightful owner of the land,
Josefina Opiana-Baraclan or petitioner Morta. The issue of ownership cannot be settled by
the DARAB since it is definitely outside its jurisdiction. Whatever findings made by the
DARAB regarding the ownership of the land are not conclusive to settle the matter. The
issue of ownership shall be resolved in a separate proceeding before the appropriate trial
court between the claimants thereof.

At any rate, whoever is declared to be the rightful owner of the land, the case cannot be
considered as tenancy-related for it still fails to comply with the other requirements.
Assuming arguendo that Josefina Opiana-Baraclan is the owner, then the case is not
between the landowner and tenant. If, however, Morta is the landowner, Occidental
cannot claim that there is consent to a landowner-tenant relationship between him and
Morta. Thus, for failure to comply with the above requisites, we conclude that the issue
involved is not tenancy-related cognizable by the DARAB.
15 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 35300 and that of the Regional Trial Court in Civil Cases Nos. 1751 and 1752.

The Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Municipal Trial Court, Guinobatan, Albay, in
Civil Cases Nos. 481 and 482, for damages.

SO ORDERED.

Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

DAVIDE, JR., C.J., dissenting: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I beg to dissent. I agree with both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals that
the cases before the Municipal Trial Court involved an agrarian dispute exclusively
cognizable by the DARAB. It had, in fact, been determined in DARAB Case No. 2413 that
respondent Jaime Occidental — a defendant in one of the MTC cases — is the tenant of
Josefina Opiniana-Baraclan (1st par., p. 7 of ponencia). There is at all no showing that this
determination by DARAB has been set aside by some higher authorities. The claim of
petitioner Morta that he is the owner of the land is of no moment, for whether it is Josefina
or Morta who is the owner does not affect Occidental’s right as tenancy. Tenancy attaches
to the land.

As I see it, the cases filed by petitioners Morta and Padilla were a clever way to defeat the
agrarian law. While the cases were ostensibly for damages, they were, at bottom, a fight on
issues incident to or arising from an agrarian relationship. The first relief granted by the
MTC, to wit: chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

"1) Ordering the defendants not to molest and disturb the peaceful possession of the
plaintiffs in the lands in question situated at San Rafael, Guinobatan;

mirrors the true nature of the controversy.

WHEREFORE, I vote to DENY the instant petition since no reversible error was
committed by the Court of Appeals in its challenged decision.

CASE NO. 4:
March 2000 - Philippine Supreme Court Decisions/Resolutions
Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2000 > March 2000 Decisions
> G.R. No. 109992 March 7, 2000 - HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY
SANTOS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.:
PHILIPPINE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS
16 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 109992. March 7, 2000.]

HEIRS OF THE LATE HERMAN REY SANTOS represented by his widow
ARSENIA GARCIA VDA. DE SANTOS, Petitioners,
v.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JOSE REYES, in his capacity as
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Malolos, Bulacan, HON.
ERASMO CRUZ, in his capacity as former Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD) Malolos, Bulacan, DARAB SHERIFF AMANDO C.
DIONISIO, EXEQUIEL GARCIA and/or ADELA GARCIA and
PANTALEON ANTONIO, Respondents.

DECISION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision 1 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29709 which affirmed the two orders
of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) dated
April 3, 1992 2 and November 18, 1992. 3

The subject of the controversy is a parcel of land in Parulan, Plaridel, Bulacan

which was levied on execution by the Municipal Trial Court of Plaridel, Bulacan
on October 24, 1989. In accordance with said levy on execution, the subject land
was sold at public auction on September 20, 1990 with Herman Rey Santos, now
substituted by his heirs represented by his widow Arsenia Garcia Vda. de Santos,
as the sole bidder for P34,532.50.

Santos registered the Deed of Sale with the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on
October 15, 1990, after private respondent Exequiel Garcia failed to exercise his
right of redemption within the reglementary period. As a result, Ex-Officio
Sheriff Carmelita Itapo executed a Final Deed of Sale dated October 18, 1991 in
favor of Santos which was registered with the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan on
November 7, 1991.

17 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
On April 1, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for Injunction and Damages
with an application for the issuance of a preliminary injunction with the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), docketed as
DARAB Case No. 369-BUL ‘92, praying that petitioner be enjoined from
preventing private respondent from gathering the mango fruits lest they "over-
mature and become useless." 4

The Provincial Adjudicator Erasmo SP. Cruz of the DARAB issued an order on
April 3, 1992, allowing the gathering of the mango fruits and directing that the
proceeds thereof be deposited with the Adjudication Board.

Subsequently, on April 27, 1992, private respondent filed a Petition for

Consignation before the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, in an apparent attempt
to redeem his land. This petition was dismissed.

Meanwhile, one Pantaleon Antonio filed on May 18, 1992 a motion to intervene
5 with the DARAB claiming that "he is affected in his rights and interests as the
party who tended and had the mango trees bear fruits this season."cralaw
virtua1aw library

On May 7, 1992, private respondent filed a complaint for

Annulment/Cancellation of Sale and Document, Redemption with Damages
and Preliminary Writ of Injunction against Herman Rey Santos, the Deputy
Sheriff of Bulacan and the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. 6

Thereafter, on July 1, 1992, the Adjudication Board suspended the hearing on

Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention pending the resolution of the
ownership issue raised in the above-mentioned complaint. 7

On July 8, 1992, intervenor Pantaleon Antonio filed with the DARAB a Motion
to Withdraw Intervenor’s deposited share. 8 The motion was granted and
intervenor Pantaleon Antonio was allowed to withdraw P87,300.00 out of P
174,600.00 harvest proceeds in an Order dated November 18, 1992. 9 Corollarily,
the DARAB recognized Pantaleon Antonio as the duly constituted agricultural
tenant of the subject land.

18 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
As adverted to above, the Court of Appeals affirmed the April 3, 1992 Order of
the DARAB ordering the gathering of the mango fruits and depositing with the
Board the proceeds thereof, and the November 18, 1992 Order allowing the
withdrawal of intervenor’s share in the proceeds and recognizing him as the duly
constituted agricultural tenant.

Hence, the instant petition where petitioner submits that the Court of Appeals
erred:

1. In ruling that the PARAD has jurisdiction over the ancillary matter/s raised
by intervenor in DARAB Case No. 369-BUL ‘92 despite the fact that the
PARAD itself has admitted involvement of question of ownership between the
original parties and has indefinitely suspended the principal/main case pending
the outcome of the issue of ownership at the Regional Trial Court of Malolos;
and

2. In affirming and/or sustaining the order dated November 18, 1992 of the
PARAD allowing the release of 50% of the proceeds of the sale of the harvested
fruits in favor of intervenor without due process, during the supposed indefinite
suspension, and worse, without requiring said purported intervenor to post a
bond that will answer for damages that may be sustained by herein petitioners.

Petitioner alleges that since private respondent’s ownership of the subject land is
in issue before the lower court, his right to harvest the mango fruits is still
questionable.

We find merit in the petition.

Rule II, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Procedure of the DARAB, provides:

SECTION 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian

Reform Adjudication Board shall have primary jurisdiction, both original and
appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases, controversies,
and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Order Nos.
229, 228 and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No.

19 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian laws and their implementing rules and
regulations. (Emphasis supplied)

"Agrarian dispute" is defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657
(CARP Law), as:

(d) Agrarian Dispute refers to any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements,

whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to
agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers associations or
representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or seeking
to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this

Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership from landowners to
farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform beneficiaries, whether the
disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and beneficiary,
landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee.

Clearly, no agrarian dispute is involved in this case. In fact, both are contending
parties for the ownership of the subject property.

In the case of Morta v. Occidental, Et Al., 10 this Court held:

For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy
relationship between the parties. In order for a tenancy agreement to take hold
over a dispute, it would be essential to establish all its indispensable elements to
wit: 1) that the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; 2)
that the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; 3) that there is
consent between the parties to the relationship; 4) that the purpose of the
relationship is to bring about agricultural production; 5) that there is personal
cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and 6) that the harvest
is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de
Tangub v. Court of Appeals (191 SCRA 885), we held that the jurisdiction of the
Department of Agrarian Reform is limited to the following: a) adjudication of all
matters involving implementation of agrarian reform; b) resolution of agrarian
conflicts and land tenure related problems; and c) approval and disapproval of
the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into
residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-agricultural uses.
20 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Petitioners and private respondent have no tenurial, leasehold, or any agrarian
relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy under the ambit of
the agrarian reform laws. Consequently, the DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
controversy and should not have taken cognizance of private respondent’s
petition for injunction in the first place.

Significantly, DARAB admitted that the issue before the Regional Trial Court
was one of ownership. In fact, the issue of ownership had been recognized by the
DARAB in its assailed order of April 3, 1992 when it held that:

A careful analysis of the records and attached documents revealed that the issue
involved is question of ownership between the parties, although the attached
Transfer Certificates of Title reflected the name of herein petitioner.

The next issue to be resolved is whether it was proper for DARAB to take
cognizance of Pantaleon Antonio’s motion for intervention considering that
DARAB had no jurisdiction and the issue of ownership is involved.

This Court rules in the negative.

The issue of who can harvest the mangoes and when they can be harvested is an
incident ancillary to the main petition for injunction. As such, it is dependent on
the main case. Inasmuch as the DARAB has no jurisdiction to hear and decide
the controversy between the parties, necessarily, the motion for intervention loses
the leg on which it can stand. This issue, after all, can be resolved by the trial
court, which has the jurisdiction to order the gathering of the mango fruits and
depositing the proceeds with it, considering that an action has already been filed
before it on the specific issue of ownership.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 29709 which affirmed the April 3, 1992 and
November 18, 1992 orders of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, DARAB is permanently
enjoined from hearing the motion for intervention of Pantaleon Antonio who is
ordered to redeposit the amount of P87,300.00 with the Regional Trial Court.

21 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
The DARAB is likewise ordered to transfer the remaining P87,300.00 on deposit
with it to the Regional Trial Court. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 5:

THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 154112 September 23, 2004
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, petitioner,
vs.
ROBERTO J. CUENCA and Hon. ALFONSO B. COMBONG JR., in His
Capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63, La
Carlota City, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
All controversies on the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP) fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR), even though they raise questions that are also legal or
constitutional in nature. All doubts should be resolved in favor of the DAR, since
the law has granted it special and original authority to hear and adjudicate
agrarian matters.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the March 15, 2002 Decision2 and the June 18, 2002 Resolution3 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 58536. In the challenged Decision, the CA disposed
as follows:
"As previously stated, the principal issue raised in the court below involves a pure
question of law. Thus, it being clear that the court a quo has jurisdiction over the
nature and subject matter of the case below, it did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it issued the assailed order denying petitioner’s motion to dismiss
22 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
and granting private respondent’s application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction.
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is denied due course and is
accordingly DISMISSED."4
The assailed Resolution, on the other hand, denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration.
The Facts
The CA narrated the facts as follows:
"Private respondent Roberto J. Cuenca is the registered owner of a parcel of land
designated as Lot No. 816-A and covered by TCT No. 1084, containing an area
of 81.6117 hectares, situated in Brgy. Haguimit, La Carlota City and devoted
principally to the planting of sugar cane.
"On 21 September 1999, Noe Fortunado, Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
(MARO) of La Carlota City issued and sent a NOTICE OF COVERAGE to
private respondent Cuenca placing the above-described landholding under the
compulsory coverage of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The NOTICE OF COVERAGE also stated
that the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) will determine the value of the
subject land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990.
"On 29 September 1999, private respondent Cuenca filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 63, La Carlota City, a complaint against Noe Fortunado and Land
Bank of the Philippines for ‘Annulment of Notice of Coverage and Declaration
of Unconstitutionality of E.O. No. 405, Series of 1990, With Preliminary
Injunction and Restraining Order.’ The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 713.
"In his complaint, Cuenca alleged, inter alia, that the implementation of CARP
in his landholding is no longer with authority of law considering that, if at all,
the implementation should have commenced and should have been completed
between June 1988 to June 1992, as provided in the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law (CARL); that the placing of the subject landholding under CARP
is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC)
and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee (PARCOM) as
required by R.A. 7905; that Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990
amends, modifies and/or repeals CARL and, therefore, it is unconstitutional
considering that on 14 June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino no longer had
law-making powers; that the NOTICE OF COVERAGE is a gross violation of
PD 399 dated 28 February 1974.
"Private respondent Cuenca prayed that the Notice of Coverage be declared null
and void ab initio and Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 be declared
unconstitutional.
23 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
"On 05 October 1999, MARO Noe Fortunado filed a motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that the court a quo has no jurisdiction over the nature
and subject matter of the action, pursuant to R.A. 6657.
"On 12 January 2000, the respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining
Order directing MARO and LBP to cease and desist from implementing the
Notice of Coverage. In the same order, the respondent Judge set the hearing on
the application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction on January 17
and 18, 2000.
"On 14 January 2000, MARO Fortunado filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the order granting the TRO contending inter alia that the DAR, through the
MARO, in the course of implementing the Notice of Coverage under CARP
cannot be enjoined through a Temporary Restraining Order in the light of
Sections 55 and 68 of R.A. 6657.
"In an order dated 16 February 2000, the respondent Judge denied MARO Noe
Fortunado’s motion to dismiss and issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
directing Fortunado and all persons acting in his behalf to cease and desist from
implementing the Notice of Coverage, and the LBP from proceeding with the
determination of the value of the subject land.
"The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) [thereafter filed before the CA] a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
assailing the writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent Judge on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
"It is the submission of the petitioner that the assailed order is ‘in direct
defiance… of Republic Act 6657, particularly Section 55 and 68’ thereof, which
read:
‘SECTION 55. NO RESTRAINING ORDERS OR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTIONS – No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any
restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction against the PARC or any of its
duly authorized or designated agencies in any case, dispute or controversy arising
from, necessary to, or in connection with the application, implementation, or
enforcement or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian
reform.’
‘SECTION 68 – IMMUNITY OF GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FROM
COURT’S INTERFERENCE – No injunction, Restraining Order, prohibition
or mandamus shall be issued by the lower court against the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), and the Department of Justice
(DOJ) in the implementation of their program.’

24 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
"Petitioner contends that by virtue of the above provisions, all lower courts, such
as the court presided over by respondent Judge, ‘are barred if not prohibited by
law to issue orders of injunctions against the Department of Agrarian Reform in
the full implementation of the Notice of Coverage which is the initial step of
acquiring lands under R.A. 6657.’
"Petitioner also contends that the nature and subject matter of the case below is
purely agrarian in character over which the court a quo has no jurisdiction and
that therefore, it had no authority to issue the assailed injunction order."5
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Stressing that the issue was not simply the improper issuance of the Notice of
Coverage, but was mainly the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 405, the
CA ruled that the Regional Trial Court (RTC) had jurisdiction over the case.
Consonant with that authority, the court a quo also had the power to issue writs
and processes to enforce or protect the rights of the parties.
The appellate court likewise held that petitioner’s reliance on Sections 55 and 68
of RA 6657 had been misplaced, because the case was not about a purely agrarian
matter. It opined that the prohibition in certain statutes against such writs
pertained only to injunctions against administrative acts, to controversies
involving facts, or to the exercise of discretion in technical cases. But on issues
involving pure questions of law, courts were not prevented from exercising their
power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts.
Hence, this Petition.6
Issues
In its Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:
"1. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed serious error by not taking into
cognizance that the issues raised in the complaint filed by the private respondent,
which seeks to exclude his land from the coverage of the CARP, is an agrarian
reform matter and within the jurisdiction of the DAR, not with the trial court.
"2. The Honorable Court of Appeals, with due respect, gravely abused its
discretion by sustaining the writ of injunction issued by the trial court, which is
a violation of Sections 55 and 68 of Republic Act No. 6657."7
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition has merit.
First Issue:
Jurisdiction
In its bare essentials, petitioner’s argument is that private respondent, in his
Complaint for Annulment of the Notice of Coverage, is asking for the exclusion
25 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
of his landholding from the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program (CARP). According to the DAR, the issue involves the implementation
of agrarian reform, a matter over which the DAR has original and exclusive
jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 50 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(RA 6657).
On the other hand, private respondent maintains that his Complaint assails
mainly the constitutionality of EO 405. He contends that since the Complaint
raises a purely legal issue, it thus falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC. We do
not agree.
Conflicts involving jurisdiction over agrarian disputes are as tortuous as the
history of Philippine agrarian reform laws. The changing jurisdictional landscape
is matched only by the tumultuous struggle for, and resistance to, the breaking
up and distribution of large landholdings.
Two Basic Rules
Two basic rules have guided this Court in determining jurisdiction in these cases.
First, jurisdiction is conferred by law.8 And second, the nature of the action and
the issue of jurisdiction are shaped by the material averments of the complaint
and the character of the relief sought.9 The defenses resorted to in the answer or
motion to dismiss are disregarded; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would
depend entirely upon the whim of the defendant.10
Grant of Jurisdiction
Ever since agrarian reform legislations began, litigants have invariably sought the
aid of the courts. Courts of Agrarian Relations (CARs) were organized under RA
126711 "[f]or the enforcement of all laws and regulations governing the relation
of capital and labor on all agricultural lands under any system of cultivation."
The jurisdiction of these courts was spelled out in Section 7 of the said law as
follows:
"Sec. 7. Jurisdiction of the Court. - The Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
all questions, matters, controversies or disputes involving all those relationships
established by law which determine the varying rights of persons in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land where one of the parties works the land,
and shall have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of First Instance over
employer and farm employee or labor under Republic Act Numbered six
hundred two and over landlord and tenant involving violations of the Usury Law
(Act No. 2655, as amended) and of inflicting the penalties provided therefor."
All the powers and prerogatives inherent in or belonging to the then Courts of
First Instance12 (now the RTCs) were granted to the CARs. The latter were

26 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
further vested by the Agricultural Land Reform Code (RA 3844) with original
and exclusive jurisdiction over the following matters:
"(1) All cases or actions involving matters, controversies, disputes, or money
claims arising from agrarian relations: x x x
"(2) All cases or actions involving violations of Chapters I and II of this Code
and Republic Act Number eight hundred and nine; and
"(3) Expropriations to be instituted by the Land Authority: x x x."13
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 946 thereafter reorganized the CARs, streamlined
their operations, and expanded their jurisdiction as follows:
"Sec. 12. Jurisdiction over Subject Matter. - The Courts of Agrarian Relations shall
have original and exclusive jurisdiction over:
a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons in the cultivation and use
of agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor Relations
Commission; x x x ;
b) Questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws,
Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program; Provided, however,
That matters involving the administrative implementation of the transfer of the
land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendatory and
related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be exclusively
cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, namely:
(1) classification and identification of landholdings;
(2) x x x;
(3) parcellary mapping;
(4) x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
m) Cases involving expropriation of all kinds of land in furtherance of the
agrarian reform program;
xxx xxx xxx
p) Ejectment proceedings instituted by the Department of Agrarian Reform and
the Land Bank involving lands under their administration and disposition, except
urban properties belonging to the Land Bank;
q) Cases involving violations of the penal provisions of Republic Act Numbered
eleven hundred and ninety-nine, as amended, Republic Act Numbered thirty
eight hundred and forty-four, as amended, Presidential Decrees and laws relating
to agrarian reform; Provided, however, That violations of the said penal
27 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
provisions committed by any Judge shall be tried by the courts of general
jurisdiction; and
r) Violations of Presidential Decrees Nos. 815 and 816.
The CARs were abolished, however, pursuant to Section 4414 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 12915 (approved August 14, 1981), which had fully been implemented on
February 14, 1983. Jurisdiction over cases theretofore given to the CAR’s was
vested in the RTCs.16
Then came Executive Order No. 229.17 Under Section 17 thereof, the DAR shall
exercise "quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform
matters, and shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the DENR and the Department of Agriculture [DA]." The
DAR shall also have the "powers to punish for contempt and to issue subpoena,
subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its orders or decisions."
In Quismundo v. CA,18 this provision was deemed to have repealed Section 12
(a) and (b) of Presidential Decree No. 946, which vested the then Courts of
Agrarian Relations with "original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions
involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential issuances
promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program."
Under Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A, the DAR was also made
"responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program."
In accordance with Section 5 of the same EO, it possessed the following powers
and functions:
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and
issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writs of execution of its decisions, and
other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program
implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be
appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal;
xxx xxx xxx
"(h) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve
agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems as may be provided for by
law;
xxx xxx xxx
"(l) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be
provided x x x."
The above grant of jurisdiction to the DAR covers these areas:
28 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.
The foregoing provision was as broad as those "theretofore vested in the Regional
Trial Court by Presidential Decree No. 946," as the Court ruled in Vda. de
Tangub v. CA,19 which we quote:
"x x x. The intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the
Department of Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated
and promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive
orders just quoted. The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the
Department, and the allocation to it of —
‘x x x [O]riginal and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it
by law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving
the implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations.’
"The implementing rules also declare that ‘(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall
extend over but not be limited to x x x (that theretofore vested in the Regional
Trial Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged
in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws x x x."20
In the same case, the Court also held that the jurisdictional competence of the
DAR had further been clarified by RA 6657 thus:
"x x x. The Act [RA 6657] makes references to and explicitly recognizes the
effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree No. 229. More particularly,
the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 229, supra,
investing the Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction,
generally, over all cases involving agrarian laws, although, as shall shortly be
pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial Court, limited jurisdiction over two
groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:
‘SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive

29 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
xxx xxx xxx
‘It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,
require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents
and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum
and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall
likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempt in the same
manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.’"21
Nonetheless, we have held that the RTCs have not been completely divested of
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657 confers special
jurisdiction on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are actually RTCs designated
as such by the Supreme Court.22 Under Section 57 of the same law, these Special
Agrarian Courts have original and exclusive jurisdiction over the following
matters:
"1) ‘all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners,’ and
"2) ‘the prosecution of all criminal offenses under x x x [the] Act.’"
The above delineation of jurisdiction remains in place to this date.
Administrative Circular No. 29-200223 of this Court stresses the distinction
between the quasi-judicial powers of the DAR under Sections 50 and 55 of RA
6657 and the jurisdiction of the Special Agrarian Courts referred to by Sections
56 and 57 of the same law.
Allegations of the Complaint
A careful perusal of respondent’s Complaint24 shows that the principal averments
and reliefs prayed for refer -- not to the "pure question of law" spawned by the
alleged unconstitutionality of EO 405 -- but to the annulment of the DAR’s
Notice of Coverage. Clearly, the main thrust of the allegations is the propriety of
the Notice of Coverage, as may be gleaned from the following averments, among
others:
"6. This implementation of CARP in the landholding of the [respondent] is
contrary to law and, therefore, violates [respondent’s] constitutional right not to
be deprived of his property without due process of law. The coverage of
[respondent’s] landholding under CARP is NO longer with authority of law. If
at all, the implementation of CARP in the landholding of [respondent] should
have commenced and [been] completed between June 1988 to June 1992 as
provided for in CARL, to wit: x x x;
"7. Moreover, the placing of [respondent’s] landholding under CARP as of 21
September 1999 is without the imprimatur of the Presidential Agrarian Reform
30 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Council (PARC) and the Provincial Agrarian Reform Coordinating Committee
(PARCOM) as mandated and required by law pursuant to R.A. 7905 x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
"9. Under the provisions of CARL, it is the PARC and/or the DAR, and not x x
x Land Bank, which is authorized to preliminarily determine the value of the
lands as compensation therefor, thus – x x x;
xxx xxx xxx
"12. That the aforementioned NOTICE OF COVERAGE with intendment and
purpose of acquiring [respondent’s] aforementioned land is a gross violation of
law (PD 399 dated 28 February 1974 which is still effective up to now) inasmuch
as [respondent’s] land is traversed by and a road frontage as admitted by the
DAR’s technician and defendant FORTUNADO (MARO) x x x;"
"13. That as reflected in said Pre-Ocular Inspection Report, copy of which is
hereto attached as annex ‘D’ forming part hereof, [respondent’s] land is above
eighteen percent (18%) slope and therefore, automatically exempted and
excluded from the operation of Rep. Act 6657, x x x.25 (Italics supplied)
In contrast, the 14-page Complaint touches on the alleged unconstitutionality of
EO 405 by merely making these two allegations:
"10. Executive Order No. 405 dated 14 June 1990 (issued by the then President
Corazon Aquino) is unconstitutional for it plainly amends, modifies and/or
repeals CARL. On 14 June 1990, then President Corazon Aquino had no longer
law-making powers as the Philippine Congress was by then already organized,
existing and operational pursuant to the 1987 Constitution. A copy of the said
Executive Order is hereto attached as Annex ‘B’ forming part hereof.
"11. Our constitutional system of separation of powers renders the said Executive
Order No. 405 unconstitutional and all valuations made, and to be made, by the
defendant Land Bank pursuant thereto are null and void and without force and
effect. Indispensably and ineludibly, all related rules, regulations, orders and
other issuances issued or promulgated pursuant to said Executive Order No. 405
are also null and void ab initio and without force and effect."26
We stress that the main subject matter raised by private respondent before the
trial court was not the issue of compensation (the subject matter of EO 405 27).
Note that no amount had yet been determined nor proposed by the DAR. Hence,
there was no occasion to invoke the court’s function of determining just
compensation.28
To be sure, the issuance of the Notice of Coverage29 constitutes the first necessary
step towards the acquisition of private land under the CARP. Plainly then, the
propriety of the Notice relates to the implementation of the CARP, which is
31 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
under the quasi-judicial jurisdiction of the DAR. Thus, the DAR could not be
ousted from its authority by the simple expediency of appending an allegedly
constitutional or legal dimension to an issue that is clearly agrarian.
In view of the foregoing, there is no need to address the other points pleaded by
respondent in relation to the jurisdictional issue. We need only to point that in
case of doubt, the jurisprudential trend is for courts to refrain from resolving a
controversy involving matters that demand the special competence of
administrative agencies, "even if the question[s] involved [are] also judicial in
character,"30 as in this case.
Second Issue:
Preliminary Injunction
Having declared the RTCs to be without jurisdiction over the instant case, it
follows that the RTC of La Carlota City (Branch 63) was devoid of authority to
issue the assailed Writ of Preliminary Injunction. That Writ must perforce be
stricken down as a nullity. Such nullity is particularly true in the light of the
express prohibitory provisions of the CARP and this Court’s Administrative
Circular Nos. 29-2002 and 38-2002. These Circulars enjoin all trial judges to
strictly observe Section 68 of RA 6657, which reads:
"Section 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. – No
injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the
lower courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the
Department of Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their
implementation of the program."
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged
Decision and Resolution REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the
February 16, 2000 Order of the Regional Trial Court of La Carlota City (Branch
63) is ANNULLED and a new one entered, DISMISSING the Complaint in
Civil Case 713. The Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued therein is also
expressly VOIDED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

32 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
CASE NO. 6:

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 125202 - January 31, 2006]
ERNESTO INGLES, MAXIMO CANOY, ISMAEL BONTILAO,
CONRADO BONTILAO, SERGIO CANOY, ZALDY CANOY,
REMITSOR CANOY, ROBERTO CANOY, RODULFO NABLE,
GUILLERMO BORRES, ENRIQUE BORRES, LOBERTA BONTILAO,
and NESTOR PIALDA, Petitioners,
v.
MANUEL CANTOS, DAR SECRETARY ERNESTO GARILAO, and DAR
VII REGIONAL DIRECTOR ELMO BANARES, Respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, assailing the Court of
Appeals' Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 37333 promulgated on January 31, 1996
and its Resolution dated April 23, 1996 denying petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the Decision.
From the records, the following antecedents appear:
On January 30, 1981, by virtue of Proclamation No. 2052,1 former President
Ferdinand Marcos declared the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and Sirao
in Cebu City and the municipalities of Argao and Dalaguete as tourist zones
under the administration and control of the Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA).
On a vast tract of land spanning the barangays of Sibugay, Malubog, Babag and
Sirao in Cebu City is the Kang-Irag Sports Complex (Complex). Part of the
Complex is Lot No. 16306, situated at Barangay Sibugay, measuring
approximately 568,878 square meters and owned by private respondent Manuel
Cantos. Herein petitioners, mostly residents of Barangay Sibugay, are farmers
occupying portions of the Complex.
On December 17, 1992, private respondent Cantos filed a petition with the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the exemption of his landholding
from the coverage of the comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP).
Petitioners opposed the petition on various grounds.

33 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Acting on the petition for exemption, DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao ordered
on September 16, 1994 the exclusion of the landholdings within the Complex
from the coverage of the CARP and operation land transfer program of the
government because the area has a slope of more than 18 degrees and therefore
exempted under
Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657.2 In a subsequent Order3 dated
August 30, 1994, the DAR Secretary amended the September 16, 1994 Order by
declaring only 808 hectares of the 1,500 hectares of Complex as excluded from
the CARP since the PTA identified only 808 hectares as ideal for tourism
purposes. Since the actual area excluded from the CARP had not yet been
determined exactly, the DAR Secretary directed the DAR Regional Director to
coordinate with the PTA in delineating the area to be allocated for tourism
development and to devise a comprehensive relocation plan for the farmer-
beneficiaries to be affected by the zoning, including the payment of disturbance
compensation.
The dispositive portion of the August 30, 1994 Order reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Order of this Office dated September 16,
1992, is hereby set aside and a new Order issued, to wit:
1. The area of 808 hectares, more or less, is hereby declared for tourism purposes
and therefore deemed excluded from OLT or CARP coverage;
2. The balance of the area which is covered under Proclamation No. 2052, which
is a total of 2,192 hectares, more or less, is deemed covered under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, either through its land transfer or
Integrated Social Forestry, and Handog Titulo components;
3. DAR Regional Office VII is hereby directed to delineate the 808 hectares for
tourism development with the assistance of the PTA, to determine with
exactitude what areas will be covered by CARP;
4. The legitimate farmer-beneficiaries within the 808 hectares shall be paid
disturbance compensation pursuant to Section 36 of RA 3844, as amended by
Sec. 7 of RA 6389;
5. The DAR Regional Office VII is directed further to devise a comprehensive
relocation/resettlement plan for the farmers that stand to be affected by the
tourism development, which may include among others:
A. Temporary usufructuary agreements for the use of the land pending actual site
development;
b. Permanent relocation sites in the areas outside the 808 hectares;
c. Provision of support services; and

34 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
d. Issuance of Certificates of Land Ownership Award or Certificates of
Stewardship, or other appropriate tenurial instruments, corresponding to the
relocation areas;
6. Directing that any and all development activities, inclusive of preparatory site
development, for the change of the 808 hectares from agricultural to non-
agricultural use shall be suspended until after the payment of just compensation
by the landowners concerned and the actual relocation of the farmers.
In the light of this Order, we deem the Petition of Mr. Manuel Cantos, dated
December 15, 1992, and the Motion For Intervention, dated May 3, 1993, to be
moot and academic, and are hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.4
Through counsel, petitioners requested for a copy of the development plan and
the map delineating the 808 hectares to be excluded from the CARP. On October
19, 1994, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the August 30, 1994 Order,
alleging that private respondent and his agents had demolished and destroyed
their houses for his development plans although the area excluded from the
CARP had not yet been identified. Petitioners also pointed out that the area
which private respondent was developing for tourism purposes is a portion of the
Mananga Watershed Forest Reserve. Petitioners also filed a Supplemental
Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the subject property had been utilized
for the interest of private respondent and not for public purpose.
Private respondent moved for the issuance of a writ of execution of the August
30, 1994 Order contending that petitioners' supplemental motion did not toll the
running of the reglementary period for appeal. The DAR Secretary granted
private respondent's motion in his November 29, 1994 Order, declaring the
August 30, 1994 Order as final and executory, subject to the following
modifications:
IN FINE, the Order of August 30, 1994 is hereby affirmed in toto, with the
following modifications:
A. that pending the final survey of the 808 hectares, the relocation/payment of
disturbance compensation for farmers/farmholdings who can be determined
with certainty to be within the 808 hectares shall proceed;
b. expenses for relocation, including the relocation site, shall be for the account
of the applicant/developer.
The Order of August 30, 1994, as modified, is hereby declared final and
executory. Let the corresponding Writ of Execution be issued by the Regional
Director, DAR Region VII.
SO ORDERED.5
35 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Accordingly, DAR Regional Director Elmo Banares issued an Order of
Execution6 on December 22, 1994. The Order of Execution directed private
respondent to effect the immediate relocation and payment to each petitioner of
disturbance compensation the amount of which was based either on the data
submitted by the Barangay Committee on Land Production or on the proposal
of private respondent, whichever was higher. The Order of Execution also
awarded each petitioner 200 square meters of land, although no relocation site
was provided.
Petitioners moved to quash the Order of Execution, arguing that the order to be
executed was ambiguous as it did not provide for an area where the farmers
affected would be relocated and no hearing or survey was conducted. Petitioners
also filed a motion for actual survey to determine whether or not the area in
question is within the Mananga and Kotkot-Lusaran Watershed Reservations
established under Presidential Proclamations Nos. 502, 581 and 932 and
therefore within the administrative jurisdiction of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The DAR Secretary, however,
affirmed the Order of Execution.
Petitioners elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals, questioning the Order of
Execution via a Petition for Review . According to petitioners, the DAR
Secretary had no authority to issue the Order of Execution since it was equivalent
to a writ of demolition and since it was issued without notice and hearing. The
Order of Execution also purportedly gave unbridled discretion to the
implementing officer because the terms were vague and did not specify the
boundaries excluded from the CARP, the amount of compensation to the farmers
affected by the relocation, and the relocation site itself.
The Court of Appeals promulgated the questioned Decision on January 31, 1996,
dismissing the Petition for Review for lack of merit. For raising no new matters,
the Court of Appeals also denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Hence,
this Petition for Review on Certiorari, raising the following issues:
WHETHER OR NOT AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY, SUCH AS THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM CAN ISSUE AN ORDER
WHICH HAS A FORCE AND EFFECT OF A WRIT OF DEMOLITION
WHETHER OR NOT AN ORDER OF EXECUTION PROMULGATED BY
AN ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CAN STAND AS VALID WITHOUT
NOTICE AND HEARING CONDUCTED IN CONNECTION THEREOF
The instant petition is accompanied by a prayer for the issuance of a restraining
order to maintain the status quo and to prevent private respondent from
committing acts of demolition against petitioners' properties. Before the prayer
for a restraining order could be resolved, petitioners filed a motion to declare the
Order of Execution null and void for want of jurisdiction because as per cadastral
36 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
survey conducted by the Land Management Services Division of the DENR,
private respondent's Lot No. 16306 is within the site of the Kotkot-Lusaran
Watershed and petitioners' homelots are among those listed as within the
premises of the same watershed reservation. Petitioners manifested their
intention to request for a declaration of status as tenured migrants with the
DENR.
On August 12, 1996, the Court issued a Resolution, granting petitioners' prayer
for the issuance of a temporary restraining order enjoining the Court of Appeals
and the DAR from enforcing the questioned Decision and Resolution in CA-
G.R. SP No. 37333.7
On October 16, 1996, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of
petitioners to sufficiently show that the Court of Appeals had committed any
reversible error in rendering the assailed Decision.8 Petitioners moved for the
reconsideration of the denial on the ground that the DAR has no jurisdiction over
the property in question since it is a portion of a watershed. On August 25, 1999,
the Court resolved to grant petitioners' motion for reconsideration, reinstate the
petition and require respondents to file their respective comments on the petition.
Petitioner contends that the DAR Regional Director is not authorized to issue
the questioned Order of Execution because only the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR, is
empowered to issue a writ having the effect of a writ of demolition. Petitioners
also opine that the Order of Execution suffers from procedural defects as it was
issued without notice and hearing to determine key issues such as the relocation
site for the displaced farmers, the expenses for relocation, and who should be
liable therefor, among others.
The petition is meritorious.
The Court finds that the December 22, 1994 Order of Execution issued by the
DAR Regional Director suffers from jurisdictional and procedural defects as it
directed the relocation of petitioners without first conducting a hearing or survey
to determine the portion of the subject property excluded from the CARP.
A writ of execution should conform to the dispositive portion of the decision to
be executed, and the execution is void if it is in excess of and beyond the original
judgment or award, for it is a settled general principle that a writ of execution
must conform strictly with every essential particular of the judgment
promulgated.9 It may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce. Nor
may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed.10 Where the
writ of execution is not in harmony with and exceeds the judgment which gives
it life, the writ has pro tanto no validity.11
The Order of Execution does not conform to the tenor of the orders supposed to
be implemented. The twin orders dated August 30, 1994 and November 29, 1994
37 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
merely declared that only 808 hectares of the Complex would be excluded from
the CARP's coverage and directed that a survey be made to delineate the area. In
the Order dated November 29, 1994, the DAR Secretary clarified that a table
survey is necessary to identify the farmers affected by the exclusion from the
CARP coverage. Neither order categorically declared that private respondent's
property is excluded from the CARP, wholly or partially, or that petitioners
would be affected by the exemption. Hence, the indispensability of the survey.
However, as admitted by respondent DAR Secretary in his order affirming the
assailed Order of Execution, no survey was conducted by the appropriate DAR
officials.
The August 30, 1994 Order directed the suspension of development activities in
the area exempted from the CARP coverage pending actual relocation of the
farmers and recommended the creation of temporary usufructuary agreements
on the excluded area. The import of these directives suggests that an immediate
relocation of the farmers would be premature since a survey is yet to be
undertaken and a possible contentious proceeding would follow once the exact
boundaries of the properties to be excluded from the CARP are identified. As a
matter of fact, in his Comment on the instant petition, respondent DAR Secretary
explained that the orders did "not outrightly contemplate demolition which, under
the Rules, would require a separate order issuable only after notice and hearing
and in compliance with the prescribed conditions."12 On the other hand, the
questioned Order of Execution directed the immediate relocation of herein
petitioners and even enjoined the Philippine National Police to assist the DAR
personnel in its implementation. This significant variance alone indubitably
demonstrates that the Order of Execution goes beyond the content and tenor of
the orders sought to be implemented.
Petitioners' contention that the authority to issue the Order of Execution is vested
with the DARAB and not with the DAR Regional Director is likewise correct.
A Regional Director is the head of a DAR Regional Office which, under the
Administrative Code of 1987, is responsible for "supporting the field units and
supervising program implementation of the Department within the region." The
function of the DAR Regional Office includes "[implementing] laws, policies,
plans, rules and regulations of the Department in the regional area." A similar
function is delegated to the DAR Regional Offices under Executive Order No.
129-A.13 Thus, the functions of the DAR Regional Director are purely
administrative, that is, to put into operation agrarian laws and fill out the details
necessary for their implementation, and not adjudicatory.
On the other hand, when a dispute arises between parties affected by the
operation of agrarian laws, the controversy should be settled in an adversarial
proceeding before the DARAB, the quasi-judicial arm of the DAR.14 A function

38 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
becomes judicial or quasi-judicial in nature when the exercise thereof involves
the determination of rights and obligations of the parties.
In issuing the questioned Order of Execution, the DAR Regional Director
overstepped the limits of his office and crossed the realm of adjudication. While
the orders sought to be implemented merely directed the survey of the areas to
be excluded from the CARP, the Order of Execution, however, included the
search for a relocation site for the benefit of farmers who would be affected by
the order of exemption and the determination of appropriate disturbance
compensation. Thus, the DAR Regional Director turned what was supposed to
be an administrative process into an adjudicatory proceeding. The relocation of
occupants is normally conducted with the issuance of a writ of demolition, an act
which is within the competence of the DARAB.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 37333 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and the Order of
Execution issued by the DAR Regional Director on December 22, 1994 is
likewise NULLIFIED. Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 7:

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162890 November 22, 2005]
HEIRS OF JULIAN DELA CRUZ AND LEONORA TALARO, as
represented by MAXIMINO DELA CRUZ, Petitioners,
v.
HEIRS OF ALBERTO CRUZ, as represented by BENEDICTO U.
CRUZ,1 Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 69671, reversing the decision of the
Department of Agrarian Reform and Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB
39 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Case No. 6297, and ordering the dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian
dela Cruz in Reg. Case No. 5853 NNE 96 for lack of jurisdiction.
The Republic of the Philippines acquired the De Leon Estate located
in Barangay Casulucan, Talavera, Nueva Ecija for resale to deserving tenants and
landless farmers, conformably with Commonwealth Act No. 539, as amended
by Republic Act No. 1400. The property was under the administration of the
Land Tenure Administration and later the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Sometime in 1950, the DAR allocated a portion of the property in favor
of Julian dela Cruz who was a tenant thereon. Such portion was identified as Lot
No. 778 with an area of 3.362 hectares.3
Sometime in September 1960, the Republic of the Philippines sold Lot No. 778
to Julian dela Cruz by virtue of an Agreement to Sell. On September 27, 1960,
the DAR issued Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) No. AS-5323 in his favor as
the qualified allocatee of the landholding.4 Julian bound and obliged himself to
pay the amortizations over the land in 30 annual installments. He cultivated the
property and made payments to the government for a period of almost 20 years.
He died in 1979 and was survived by his wife, Leonora Talaro-dela Cruz and
their 10 children, including Mario and Maximino dela Cruz.5
For a time, Mario administered the landholding. Too old and sickly to cultivate
the property by herself, Leonora dela Cruz executed a private document in May
1980 in which she declared that, with the consent of her children, she had sold
the land in favor of Alberto Cruz, who henceforth had
the right to possess and cultivate the property, and the obligation to continue the
payment of the amortizations due over the land under the terms of the Agreement
to Sell. Mario dela Cruz conformed to the deed.6
Alberto took possession of the landholding and cultivated it over a period of 10
years without any protest from Leonora and her children. He then filed an
application to purchase the property with the DAR. On August 8, 1990,
Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) Paterno Revollido prepared and
signed an Investigation Report, recommending that the landholding be declared
vacant and disposable to a qualified applicant. Declaring that there was no
adverse claimant, the said report also recommended the approval of Alberto's
application to purchase the property.7 Appended to the report was the deed
executed by Leonora in favor of Alberto.
On November 16, 1990, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) issued
an Order8 approving the recommendation of the MARO. He directed the
cancellation of Julian's CLT and declared that whatever rights Julian had over
the landholding and payments made in favor of the government under the
Agreement to Sell were forfeited. The dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, an Order is hereby issued:
40 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
1. Canceling the Order of Award-CLT No. AS No. 5323 issued on 9-27-60,
subject hereof, forfeiture whatever rights and payments made on the account of
the lot in favor of the government, declaring Lot No. 778 pt Block No. xx Pls-
Psd-Pcs N. 56903 of De Leon Estate, located at Casulucan, Talavera, N.E.
vacant and disposable to the qualified applicant; and
2. Giving due course to the application of Mr. Alberto L. Cruz to purchase the
said lot.
Let a Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA), as the case may be, be
issued to the herein new awardee-applicant after fifteen (15) days posting of this
Order, if no protest has been filed by affected parties.
SO ORDERED.9
It appears on the dorsal portion of the order that only Julian (although already
deceased by then) was given a copy of the order by registered mail.10
The PARO endorsed the Certificate of Land Ownership Award (CLOA) to the
DAR Secretary, copy furnished the Regional Director. The DAR Bureau of Land
Acquisition and Distribution reviewed and evaluated the records and
recommended that the PARO's recommendation be affirmed.
On June 27, 1991, the DAR Secretary signed and issued CLOA No. 51750 over
the property in favor of Alberto Cruz, and the certificate was registered with the
Land Registration Authority (LRA). On August 15, 1991, the Register of Deeds
issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. CLOA - 0-3035 over the
landholding in favor of Alberto Cruz.11 The title contained
an annotation prohibiting the beneficiary from selling or transferring the
landholding within a period of 10 years from issuance, except to the Land Bank
of the Philippines (LBP).
Sometime in early 1996, Maximino, one of the surviving children of Julian,
discovered that the landholding had already been registered in the name of
Alberto Cruz. On October 10, 1996, Leonora and her 10 children, with the
assistance of the DAR Bureau of Legal Assistance, filed a petition with the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) for the nullification of the
following: the order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-
3035 issued in favor of Alberto Cruz. The petitioners declared, inter alia, that they
were the surviving heirs of Julian dela Cruz; they had no knowledge of the sale
by Leonora and Mario of their right as beneficiaries of the property; not being
privies to the said sale, they were not bound by the private deed executed by
Leonora; and such sale, as well as the issuance of the CLOA and the title over
the property in favor of Alberto, was null and void, inasmuch as they violated
agrarian reform laws and DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980.
They insisted that they were deprived of their rights as heirs of the beneficiary
without due process of law.12
41 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In his comment on the petition, Alberto Cruz alleged that he acquired the rights
over the landholding from Leonora for P51,000.00 and had taken possession of
the subject property. He further averred that he collected his
share in the produce of the land with the consent of Leonora and her children.
He had been paying the amortizations for the property to the government and in
fact had already paid the purchase price of the property to the LBP in full.13
Meantime, on November 14, 1996, Alberto Cruz paid P8,054.07 to the DAR for
the property and for which he was issued a receipt.14 The PARO directed the
Register of Deeds to cancel the annotation at the dorsal portion of the title
covering the property.15
After due proceedings, the PARAD granted the petition in a Decision16 dated
July 9, 1997. It declared that the petitioners were the rightful allocatees of the
property, and directed the MARO to cancel CLOA No. 51750 and TCT No.
CLOA -0-3035 and issue another in favor of the petitioners. Alberto was ordered
to vacate the property. The PARAD also directed the Register of Deeds of Nueva
Ecija to cancel the said title and issue a new one over the landholding in favor of
the petitioners. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as
follows:
1. Declaring the petitioners to be the rightful allocatees of the subject land;
2. Ordering the respondent or anyone acting in his behalf to peacefully relinquish
the possession of the land in question unto the herein petitioners;
3. Ordering the MARO of Talavera, Nueva Ecija and/or the PARO of North
Nueva Ecija to cancel TCT No. CLOA-0-3035, (DAR CLOA No. 51750)
previously issued to respondent Alberto Cruz and, in lieu thereof, to generate a
new one in the name of herein petitioners, the heirs of Julian dela Cruz;
4. Directing the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija to cancel the above-mentioned
CLOA and to register the new one to be generated in its stead.17
Alberto appealed the decision to the DARAB, which affirmed the ruling of the
PARAD on June 19, 2000. The DARAB ruled that the rights of the petitioners
as farmers-beneficiaries could not be transferred or waived except through
hereditary succession or to the government, conformably with agrarian reform
laws and that the private document Leonora executed may be assailed by her
children by Julian, who were not privies thereto. The DARAB also ruled that in
executing the private document, Leonora failed to comply with DAR
Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980.18
The DARAB further declared that, even if the private document may be
considered a waiver of Leonora's tenancy rights over the landholding,
nevertheless, the CLOA and the title may still be canceled as such waiver is null
42 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
and void. Citing Torres v. Ventura,19 it held that the pari delicto doctrine is not
applicable. The DARAB ruled that under DAR Administrative Order No. 2,
Series of 1994, such sale, the CLOA and the Torrens title issued over the
landholding in favor of Alberto may be cancelled by it.20 Alberto filed a motion
for reconsideration of the decision which the DARAB denied on February 11,
2002.21
Alberto then filed a Petition for Review in the CA, where he raised the following
issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE DAR ADJUDICATION BOARD HAS
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE;
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE CLOA AWARDED TO ALBERTO CRUZ MAY
BE CANCELLED; and
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE SAID LOT MAY STILL BE AWARDED TO
HEREIN PETITIONERS.
He alleged that the Dela Cruz heirs filed their petition with the PARAD only on
October 17, 1996, long after the lapse of 16 years after Leonora executed the
private document and conveyed the property to him on June 1, 1980.
Conformably with Section 38 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, their petition
with the PARAD had already prescribed. He also alleged that the said heirs
should have filed an action for recovery of possession of the property within 10
years from 1980, conformably with Article 1134 of the New Civil Code.
Moreover, their action in the PARAD was barred by estoppel because they failed
to oppose the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO, the issuance of the CLOA
and the transfer of title in his favor. The petitioner maintained that the DARAB
had no jurisdiction over the respondents' petition because the implementation of
agrarian reform laws and rules and regulations was administrative in nature. He
argued that the respondents should have sought relief from the DAR instead
of filing their petition with the DARAB. The petitioner posits that the
landholding subject matter of the petition is a landed estate acquired by the
government under R.A. No. 1400; hence, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27,
which prohibits the sale of tenancy rights over the landholding, does not apply.
Moreover, the ruling in Torres v. Ventura does not apply because the facts therein
are different from those obtaining in the present case.
In their Comment on the petition, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz maintained that
Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 and Section 1134 of R.A. No. 386 have no
application in the case, considering that the issue is not one of tenancy because
43 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
they had never entered into such a relationship with Alberto. They averred that
they were not barred from filing their petition, either by laches or by prescription,
because they discovered the private document their mother executed only in
1995. They claimed that they filed their petition with the PARAD instead of
filing an administrative complaint with the Office of the DAR Secretary because
time was of the essence and further delay in the resolution of the case would only
cause great and irreparable injury to them. Besides, the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz
averred, the MARO and the PARO violated DAR Administrative Order No. 3,
Series of 1990, and deprived them of their right as beneficiaries over the property
without due process of law. They maintained that under Rule 2, paragraph (f) of
the DARAB New Rules and Procedures, the DARAB had jurisdiction over
actions involving the issuance, correction or cancellation of the CLOA and
Emancipation Patents registered with the LRA. They insisted that the ruling of
this Court in Torres v. Ventura is decisive of the issues in the case.
In a Decision dated March 31, 2003, the CA granted the petition and ordered the
dismissal of the petition of the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz in the PARAD for lack
of jurisdiction. The CA declared that there was no tenancy relationship between
respondent Alberto and the said heirs; hence, the DARAB had no jurisdiction
over the petition. It declared that the issue before the DARAB was the rightful
ownership over the landholding.
The said heirs moved for the reconsideration of the decision contending that the
jurisdiction of the DARAB is not confined solely to agrarian disputes, but
includes the cancellation of CLOAs registered with the LRA in favor of persons
who are qualified beneficiaries under Section 22 of R.A. No. 6657. The Heirs of
Julian dela Cruz reiterated the claim that the MARO and PARO violated their
right to due process and the pertinent agrarian reform laws, rules and regulations.
Further, they asserted that respondent Alberto was estopped from assailing the
jurisdiction of the DARAB because he never raised the same in the PARAD and
the DARAB. However, the appellate court resolved to deny the motion in its
Resolution22 dated March 18, 2004.
In the instant Petition for Review , the Heirs of Julian dela Cruz, as petitioners,
maintain that under Rule VI, Section 1(f) of the 1994 DARAB Rules of
Procedure, the DARAB has primary and exclusive jurisdiction over matters
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs registered with the
LRA even if there is no tenancy relationship between the parties. The petitioners
point out that the issues before the DARAB do not only involve the ownership
of the landholding, but also whether the PARO violated their substantive and
procedural right to due process, as well as agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations in issuing the November 16, 1990 Order, and whether they are the
rightful allocatees of the landholding under the ruling of this Court in Torres v.
Ventura.
44 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In their comment on the petition, the respondents aver that the petitioners'
petition in the DARAB was one for recovery of ownership over the landholding,
which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer
or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of
the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is
entitled to any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter
of an action is conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent
or waiver of the parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction
over the nature or subject matter of the action.23 Nor can it be acquired through,
or waived by, any act or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not
apply to confer jurisdiction to a
tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from
addressing the issue, especially where the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction is
apparent on the face of the complaint or petition.24
Indeed, the jurisdiction of the court or tribunal is not affected by the defenses or
theories set up by the defendant or respondent in his answer or motion to
dismiss.25 Jurisdiction should be determined by considering not only the status or
the relationship of the parties but also the nature of the issues or questions that is
the subject of the controversy.26 If the issues between the parties are intertwined
with the resolution of an issue within the exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB,
such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the DARAB.27 The proceedings
before a court or tribunal without jurisdiction, including its decision, are null and
void, hence, susceptible to direct and collateral attacks.28
The ruling of the appellate court that the ownership over the landholding was the
threshold issue before the DARAB is not correct. The petitioners did not claim
ownership over the landholding. When Julian dela Cruz died in 1979, he had not
yet paid in full the amortizations for the property. The DAR issued only a CLT
in his favor on September 27, 1960. Unless and until the amortization for the
landholding is fully paid, the DAR will not issue a CLOA in the name of the
beneficiary. It is only upon the issuance of the CLOA that a beneficiary becomes
the owner of the property.29
The decisive issues raised by the petitioners and Alberto in their pleadings before
the DARAB related to the following: whether petitioner Maximino dela Cruz
and his siblings are bound by the deed of transfer/sale of the tenancy rights
executed by their mother in favor of Alberto; and whether the August 8, 1990
report of the MARO and the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO violated
45 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
R.A. No. 1400, P.D. No. 27, and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent DAR
Orders, memoranda and circulars, including the substantive and procedural
rights of the petitioners.30
However, the Court agrees with the ruling of the CA that the dispute between
the petitioners and the respondents over the validity of the November 16, 1990
Order of the PARO, CLOA No. 51750, and TCT No. CLOA-0-3035 and the
cancellation thereof is not agrarian in nature. Under Section 17 of Executive
Order No. 229, the DAR is vested with quasi-judicial power and exclusive
original jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters, as well
as other matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform laws, except
those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR and the
Department of Agriculture. The President of the Philippines created the DARAB
and authorized it to assume the power and functions pertaining to the
adjudication of agrarian reform cases, which may be delegated to the regional
offices of the DAR in accordance with rules and regulations to be promulgated
by the DARAB.
Section 3(d) of R.A. No. 6657 defines an "agrarian dispute" as "any controversy
relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or,
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning
farmworkers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing,
maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial
arrangements. It includes any controversy relating to compensation of lands
acquired under this Act and other terms and conditions of transfer of ownership
from landowners to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian reform
beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm
operator and beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee."
In Morta, Sr. v. Occidental,31 this Court held that there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case.
It is essential to establish all its indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject matter
of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the
parties to the relationship; (4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) that there is personal cultivation on the part of the
tenant or agricultural lessee; and (6) that the harvest is shared between the
landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee. In Vda. de Tangub v. Court of
Appeals,32 the Court held that the jurisdiction of the DAR is limited to the
following:
a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;
b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land-tenure related problems; and

46 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses.33
The petitioners themselves categorically admitted in their pleadings that there
was no landlord-tenancy relationship between them and Alberto over the
landholding. Nor did they have any tenurial, leasehold, or agrarian relations
whatsoever when petitioners Leonora and her son Mario executed the deed of
sale in May 1980 in favor of Alberto, nor when the petitioners filed their petition
with the DARAB. The sole tenant-beneficiary over the landholding was Julian
dela Cruz. There is no showing that before the execution of the deed of
transfer/sale, Alberto was a tenant or farmer, or that he was landless.
The Court agrees with the petitioners' contention that, under Section 2(f), Rule
II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, the DARAB has jurisdiction over cases
involving the issuance, correction and cancellation of CLOAs which were
registered with the LRA. However, for the DARAB to have jurisdiction in such
cases, they must relate to an agrarian dispute between landowner and tenants to
whom CLOAs have been issued by the DAR Secretary. The cases involving the
issuance, correction and cancellation of the CLOAs by the DAR in
the administrative implementation of agrarian reform laws, rules and
regulations to parties who are not agricultural tenants or lessees are within the
jurisdiction of the DAR and not of the DARAB.
In the present case, the DAR Secretary approved CLOA No. 51750 in the name
of Alberto in the exercise of his administrative powers and in the implementation
of the agrarian reform laws. The approval was based on the Report of the
MARO, the November 16, 1990 Order of the PARO and the recommendation
of the DAR Director of the Bureau of Land Acquisition and Distribution, over
whom the DAR Secretary has supervision and control. The DAR Secretary also
had the authority to withdraw the CLOA upon a finding that the same is contrary
to law and DAR orders, circulars and memoranda. The resolution of such issues
by the DAR Secretary will entail the application and implementation of agrarian
reform laws, inclusive of P.D. No. 946 as well as the implementing orders,
circulars and rules and regulations issued by the DAR. On the issue of who may
be or shall be declared as the owner-cultivator of the landholding, P.D. No. 27
and other agrarian reform laws, DAR Memorandum Circular No. 19, Series of
1978 as amended by DAR Administrative Order No. 14, Series of 1988, and
DAR Memorandum Circular No. 8, Series of 1980 will apply. On the issue of
whether or not the petitioners sold their tenancy rights over the landholding and
barred them from asserting their rights, either by pari delicto, prescription or
laches, the DAR Secretary will apply P.D. No. 27 and the rulings of this Court
in Torres v. Ventura34 and Corpus v. Grospe,35 reiterated in Siacor v. Gigantana.36 On
the issue of whether the petitioners were denied of their right to substantive and
47 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
procedural due process, the DAR Secretary will take into account, inter alia,
Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990.
As the Court ruled in Nuesa v. Court of Appeals:37
P.D. 946 provides that matters involving the administrative implementation of
the transfer of the land to the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27 and amendatory
and related decrees, orders, instructions, rules and regulations, shall be
exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform, including: xxx (5)
issuance, recall or cancellation of certificates of land transfer in cases outside the
purview of P.D. No. 816.
The revocation by the Regional Director of DAR of the earlier Order of Award
by the Secretary of Agriculture falls under the administrative functions of the
DAR. The DARAB and its provincial adjudicator or board of adjudicators acted
erroneously and with grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance of the case,
then overturning the decision of the DAR Regional Director and deciding the
case on the merits without affording the petitioner opportunity to present his
case.
As held by this Court in Centeno v. Centeno, the DAR is vested with the primary
jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have
the exclusive jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the
agrarian reform program. The DARAB has primary, original and appellate
jurisdiction "to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, cases,
controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under R.A. 6657, E.O. Nos. 229, 228
and 129-A, R.A. 3844 as amended by R.A. 6389, P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian
laws and their implementing rules and regulations.
In the case at bar, petitioner and private respondent had no tenurial, leasehold,
or any agrarian relations whatsoever that could have brought this controversy
between them within the ambit of the above-cited provision. Consequently, the
DARAB had no jurisdiction over the controversy and should not have taken
cognizance of private respondent's petition in the first place.
Note that Administrative Order No. 3, Series of 1990, governs the distribution
and titling of lots in landed estates administered by the DAR. This Order
explicitly provides that "since land has a social function, there is a concomitant
social responsibility in its ownership and should, therefore, be distributed to the
actual occupant/tillers" thereof. In the investigation on December 27, 1993,
conducted by the Regional Officer of DAR, it was established that the subject
lots were in the possession and cultivation of persons other than the awardee
Verdillo. Clearly, this constituted a violation of the terms of the Order of Award
issued in favor of private respondent as an awardee, aside from contravening the
underlying principles of agrarian reform as a social justice measure. Given these
48 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
circumstances, we find petitioner Restituto Rivera's plea to overturn the ruling of
the Court of Appeals meritorious.
While it bears emphasizing that findings of administrative agencies, which have
acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are
accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts, care should be taken
that administrative actions are not done without due regard to the jurisdictional
boundaries set by the enabling law for each agency. In this case, respondent
DARAB officials and boards, provincial and central, had overstepped their legal
boundaries in taking cognizance of the controversy between petitioner Rivera
and private respondent Verdillo as to who should be awarded Lots 1932 and 1904
of the Buenavista Estate. Respondent appellate court erred in sustaining
DARAB's unjustified action taken with grave abuse of discretion resulting in lack
or excess of its jurisdiction.
It bears stressing that in Section 1, Rule II of the DARAB Rules of Procedure, it
is made clear that matters involving strictly the administrative implementation of
R.A. No. 6657,38 and other agrarian reform laws and pertinent rules, shall be the
exclusive prerogative of and cognizable by the DAR Secretary. Indeed, under
P.D. No. 27 and other agrarian reform laws (including R.A. No. 6657), the DAR
Secretary is vested with the administrative authority to issue and correct or recall
the CLT issued under Section 24 of R.A. No. 6657. The DAR Secretary is vested
with authority to approve and execute CLOAs on which are based the TCT to
be issued by the Register of Deeds. The DARAB has no jurisdiction over the
orders, resolutions, or other administrative circulars of the DAR Secretary in the
exercise of its administrative powers.
In fine then, the petitioners should have filed their petition against Alberto Cruz
with the DAR Secretary instead of the DARAB. For its part, the DARAB should
have dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction; or, at the very least,
transferred the petition to the DAR Secretary for resolution on its merits. In case
the DAR Secretary denies their petition, the petitioners may appeal to the Office
of the President, and in case of an adverse ruling, a Petition for Review with the
CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The
Court AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
69671 WITH MODIFICATION. The dismissal of DARAB Reg. Case No.
5853 NNE 96 for lack of jurisdiction is without prejudice to its re-filing in
accordance with DAR Administrative Order No. 6, Series of 2000, within thirty
(30) days from the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.

49 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
CASE NO. 8:
Same as CASE 3:

CASE NO. 9:

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 1990 > December 1990
Decisions > [UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.] RUFINA VDA. DE
TANGUB, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the
[CAR] RTC, Branch 4, Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA
MARTIL, Respondents.:

FIRST DIVISION
[UDK No. 9864 : December 3, 1990.]
RUFINA VDA. DE TANGUB, Petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE of the [CAR] RTC, Branch 4,
Iligan City, and SPOUSES DOMINGO and EUGENIA MARTIL,
Respondents.

DECISION

NARVASA, J.:

The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, acting as a special agrarian court, in
the light of Executive Orders Numbered 129-A and 229 and Republic Act No.
6657, is what is at issue in the proceeding at bar.
Rufina Tangub and her husband, Andres, now deceased, filed with the Regional
Trial Court of Lanao del Norte in March, 1988, "an agrarian case for damages
by reason of the(ir) unlawful dispossession . . .was tenants from the landholding"
owned by the Spouses Domingo and Eugenia Martil. 1 Several persons were also
impleaded as defendants, including the Philippine National Bank, it being
alleged by the plaintiff spouses that said bank, holder of a mortgage on the land
involved, had caused foreclosure thereof, resulting in the acquisition of the
property by the bank as the highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, and in the sale
50 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
by the latter, some time later, of portions of the land to the other persons named
as its co-defendants (all employees of the National Steel Corporation), and it
being prayed that mortgage and the transactions thereafter made in relation
thereto be annulled and voided. 2
In an Order rendered on August 24, 1988, respondent Judge Felipe G. Javier, Jr.
dismissed the complaint. 3 He opined that by virtue of Executive Order No. 229
"providing the mechanisms for the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program approved on July 24, 1987" — Executive No. 129-A
approved on July 26, 1987, as well as the Rules of the Adjudication Board of the
Department of Agrarian Reform, jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court over
agrarian cases had been transferred to the Department of Agrarian Reform.:-
cralaw
The Tangub Spouses filed a petition for Certiorari with this Court, docketed as
UDK-8867, assigned to the Second Division. Discerning however no special and
important reason for taking cognizance of the action, this Court referred the same
to the Court of Appeals, that tribunal having concurrent jurisdiction to act
thereon.: nad
The Court of Appeals, by Decision promulgated on October 23, 1989, 4
dismissed the petition, finding that the jurisdictional question had been correctly
resolved by the Trial Court. The Court of Appeals, adverted to a case earlier
decided by it, on August 30, 1989, Estanislao Casinillo v. Hon. Felipe G. Javier,
Jr., et al., in which it was "emphatically ruled that agrarian cases no longer fall
under the jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts but rather under the jurisdiction
of the DAR Adjudication Board." 5 The ruling was grounded on the provisions
of Executive Orders Numbered 229, approved on July 22, 1987, and 129-A,
issued on July 26, 1987, in relation to Republic Act No. 6657, effective on June
15, 1988. Said executive orders, it was pointed out, were issued by President
Corazon C. Aquino undoubtedly in the exercise of her revolutionary powers in
accordance with Section 6, Article XVIII [Transitory Provisions] of the 1986
Constitution providing that the "incumbent President shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until the first Congress is convened."
The petitioner Rufina Vda. de Tangub, now widowed, is once again before this
Court, contending that the Trial Court's "order of dismissal of August 26, 1988,
and the decision of the Honorable Court of Appeals affirming it, are patently
illegal and unconstitutional" because they deprive "a poor tenant access to courts
and directly violate R.A. 6657, PD 946, and Batas Bilang 129."
The petition is without merit.
Section 1 of Executive Order No. 229 sets out the scope of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). It states that the program —

51 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
". . . shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all
public and private agricultural land as provided in Proclamation No. 131 dated
July 22, 1987, including whenever applicable in accordance with law, other lands
of the public domain suitable to agriculture."
Section 17 thereof.
1) vested the Department of Agrarian Reform with "quasi-judicial powers to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters," and
2) granted it "jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of agrarian
reform, except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DENR
and the Department of Agriculture [DA], as well as "powers to punish for
contempt and to issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum and writs to enforce its
orders or decisions."
Section 4 of Executive Order No. 129-A made the Department of Agrarian
Reform "responsible for implementing the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Program, and, for such purpose," authorized it, among others, to —
"(g) Provide free legal services to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve
agrarian conflicts and land tenure problems; . . (and)
x x x
(j) Approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses: . ."
And Section 5 of the same Executive Order No. 129-A specified the powers and
functions of the Department of Agrarian Reform, including the following::- nad
"(b) Implement all agrarian laws, and for this purpose, punish for contempt and
issue subpoena, subpoena duces tecum, writ of execution of its decision, and
other legal processes to ensure successful and expeditious program
implementation; the decisions of the Department may in proper cases, be
appealed to the Regional Trial Courts but shall be immediately executory
notwithstanding such appeal;
x x x
(h) Provide free legal service to agrarian reform beneficiaries and resolve agrarian
conflicts and land tenure related problems as may be provided for by laws;
(i) Have exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural
lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be
provided . . ."
The jurisdiction thus conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform, i.e.:
(a) adjudication of all matters involving implementation of agrarian reform;

52 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
(b) resolution of agrarian conflicts and land tenure related problems; and
(c) approval or disapproval of the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
agricultural lands into residential, commercial, industrial, and other non-
agricultural uses,
is evidently quite as extensive as that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial
Court by Presidential Decree No. 946, which extended to the rights and
obligations of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land, and other
matters affecting tenant-farmers, agricultural lessees, settlers, owner-cultivators,
farms' cooperatives or organizations under laws, Presidential Decrees, Orders,
instructions, Rules and Regulations in relation to the agrarian reform program. 6
Clearly, the latter must be deemed to have been eliminated by its being subsumed
in the broad jurisdiction conferred on the Department of Agrarian Reform. The
intention evidently was to transfer original jurisdiction to the Department of
Agrarian Reform, a proposition stressed by the rules formulated and
promulgated by the Department for the implementation of the executive orders
just quoted. 7 The rules included the creation of the Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board designed to exercise the adjudicatory functions of the
Department, and the allocation to it of —
". . . original and exclusive jurisdiction over the subject matter vested upon it by
law, and all cases, disputes, controversies and matters or incidents involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program under
Executive Order No. 229, Executive Order No. 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844,
as amended by Republic Act No. 6289, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations."
The implementing rules also declare that "(s)pecifically, such jurisdiction shall
extend over but not be limited to . . (that theretofore vested in the Regional Trial
Courts, i.e.) (c)ases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged in the
cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) and other agrarian laws . . ."
The matter has since been further and definitively clarified by Republic Act No.
6657, which was signed into law by President Aquino on June 10, 1988 and
became effective immediately after its "publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation" on June 15, 1988. The Act makes references
to and explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of Presidential Decree
No. 229. 8 More particularly, the Act echoes the provisions of Section 17 of
Presidential Decree No. 229, supra, investing the Department of Agrarian
Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian
laws, although, as shall shortly be pointed out, it restores to the Regional Trial
Court, limited jurisdiction over two groups of cases. Section 50 reads as follows:

53 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
"SEC. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the
implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture [DA] and the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR].
It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most
expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of
every case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case.
Toward this end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just,
expeditious and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before
it.
It shall have the power to summon witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony,
require submission of reports, compel the production of books and documents
and answers to interrogatories and issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum
and to enforce its writs through sheriffs or other duly deputized officers. It shall
likewise have the power to punish direct and indirect contempts in the same
manner and subject to the same penalties as provided in the Rules of Court.
x x x
Notwithstanding an appeal to the court of appeals, the decision of the DAR shall
be immediately executory." 9
The Regional Trial Courts have not, however, been completely divested of
jurisdiction over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of RA 6657, on the other
hand, confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which are
Regional Trial Courts designated by the Supreme Court — at least one (1) branch
within each province — to act as such. These Regional Trial Courts qua Special
Agrarian Courts have, according to Section 57 of the same law, original and
exclusive jurisdiction over:
1) "all petitions for the determination of just compensation to land-owners," and
2) "the prosecution of all criminal offenses under . . [the] Act."
In these cases, "(t)he Rules of Court shall apply . . unless modified by . . . (the)
Act."
It is relevant to mention in this connection that —
(1) appeals from decisions of the Special Agrarian Courts "may be taken by filing
a petition for review with the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from
receipt or notice of the decision, . ." 10 and

54 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
(2) appeals from any "decision, order, award or ruling of the DAR on any
agrarian dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation,
enforcement, or interpretation of this Act and other pertinent laws on agrarian
reform may be brought to the Court of Appeals by Certiorari 11 except as
otherwise provided . . . within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof,"
the "findings of fact of the DAR [being] final and conclusive if based on
substantial evidence." 12
The Regional Trial Court of Iligan City was therefore correct in dismissing
Agrarian Case No. 1094. It being a case concerning the rights of the plaintiffs as
tenants on agricultural land, not involving the "special jurisdiction" of said Trial
Court acting as a Special Agrarian Court, it clearly came within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform, or more particularly,
the Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, established precisely to wield the
adjudicatory powers of the Department, supra.
The petitioner had not bothered to substantiate her contention that she has been
denied access to the courts, which is just as well. The contention is on its face
utterly without merit. It may profit her and her counsel to realize that apart from
granting all concerned parties access to a quasi-judicial forum (the Adjudication
Board of the Department of Agrarian Reform), the law strives to make resolution
of controversies therein more expeditious and inexpensive, by providing not only
that the Board "shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence,"
supra, but also that, as explicitly stated by the penultimate paragraph of Section
50 of the Act::-cralaw
"Responsible farmer leaders shall be allowed to represent themselves, their fellow
farmers, or their organizations in any proceedings before the DAR: Provided,
however, That when there are two or more representatives for any individual or
group, the representatives should choose only one among themselves to represent
such party or group before any DAR proceedings."
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition is DISMISSED, and the Decision
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP. No. 16725 dated October 23, 1989,
AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

55 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
CASE NO. 10:

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 132767 January 18, 2000

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SECRETARY OF THE DEPT.
OF AGRARIAN REFORM, DEPT. OF AGRARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD, DAVAO CITY and LAND BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals,1 dated August
28, 1997, affirming the dismissal by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Tagum,
Davao, of the petition for judicial determination of the just compensation filed
by petitioner for the taking of its property under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner Philippine Veterans Bank owned four parcels of land in Tagum,
Davao, which are covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-38666, T-
38667, T-6236, and T-27591. The lands were taken by the Department of
Agrarian Reform for distribution to landless farmers pursuant to the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657). Dissatisfied with the
valuation of the land made by respondents Land Bank of the Philippines and the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB), petitioner filed
a petition for a determination of the just compensation for its property. The
petition was filed on January 26, 1994 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2,
Tagum, Davao, which on February 23, 1995, dismissed the petition on the
ground that it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period for filing appeals
from the orders of the DARAB. Its order2 states in pertinent parts:
Since this case was filed only on January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period
provided for under Section 51 of Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law within which to appeal, already lapsed.
Sec. 51 of Republic Act No. 6657 provides:
56 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Sec. 51. Finality of Determination. — Any case or controversy before it (DAR)
shall be decided within thirty (30) days after it is submitted for resolution. Only
one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Any order, ruling or decision
shall be final after the lapse of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy thereof.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision was affirmed. It was held that:
Jurisdiction over land valuation cases is lodged in the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board, as is plainly provided under Rule II of the DARAB
Revised Rules of Procedure.
Sec. 1. Primary and Exclusive Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. The Board shall
have primary and exclusive jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine
and adjudicate all agrarian disputes, involving the implementation of the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) under Republic Act No.
6657, Executive Order Nos. 228, 229, and 129-A, Republic Act No. 3844 as
amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such
jurisdiction shall include but not be limited to the following:
xxx xxx x x x.
b) The valuation of land, and determination and payment of just compensation,
fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation, amortization
payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank of the
Philippines.
xxx xxx xxx
The above provision does not negate the original and exclusive jurisdiction
vested in Special Agrarian Court over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners as provided in Section 51 of R.A. 6657.
Note, however, must be taken of Rule XIII, Section 11 of the DARAB Rules of
Procedure, which specifically states that,
The decision of the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination
and payment of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall
be brought directly to the Regional Trial Court designated as a Special Agrarian
Courts within fifteen (15) days from the receipt of the notice thereof. Any party
shall be entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
xxx xxx xxx
In pursuance thereof, it is clear that the right of a landowner who disagrees with
the valuation fixed by the DAR to file a petition for the judicial fixing of just
compensation before special agrarian courts must be exercised within the period
provided in Rule XIII, Section 11.

57 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In this case, appellant neither gives information regarding the date of its receipt
of the questioned Order of the DAR Provincial Adjudicator, nor disputes the
conclusion made by the trial court that, "(s)ince this case was filed only on
January 26, 1994, the fifteen-day period provided for under Section 51 of
Republic Act 6657 which is the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law within
which to appeal already lapsed". The court a quo's conclusion therefore stands.
It did not commit an error in dismissing the petition filed by Philippine Veterans
Bank for having been filed out of time.3
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but its motion was likewise denied.
Hence, this petition for review. Petitioner raises the following issue:
SHOULD A PETITION FOR THE JUDICIAL FIXING OF JUST
COMPENSATION BEFORE SPECIAL AGRARIAN COURT BE [FILED]
WITHIN THE PERIOD PROVIDED IN RULE XIII, SECTION 11 OF THE
DARAB RULES OF PROCEDURE AND BEFORE THE DECISION OF
THE DAR PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR BECOMES FINAL AND
EXECUTORY?
Petitioner argues that DAR adjudicators have no jurisdiction to determine the
just compensation for the taking of lands under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, because such jurisdiction is vested in Regional Trial Courts
designated as Special Agrarian Courts and, therefore, a petition for the fixing of
just compensation can be filed beyond the 15-day period of appeal provided from
the decision of the DAR adjudicator.
On the other hand, respondents argue that actions for the fixing of just
compensation must be filed in the appropriate courts within 15 days from receipt
of the decision of the DAR adjudicator, otherwise such decision becomes final
and executory, pursuant to §51 of R.A. No. 6657.
Petitioner's contention has no merit.
The pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 6657 provides:
Sec. 50 Quasi-Judicial Power of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department
of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). . . .
Sec. 57 Special Jurisdiction. — The Special Agrarian Courts shall have original
and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowners, and the prosecution of all criminal offenses under
this Act. The Rules of Court shall apply to all proceedings before the Special
Agrarian Courts, unless modified by this Act.

58 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
The Special Agrarian Courts shall decide all appropriate cases under their special
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from submission of the case for decision.
There is nothing contradictory between the provision of §50 granting the DAR
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate "agrarian reform matters" and
exclusive original jurisdiction over "all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform," which includes the determination of questions of just
compensation, and the provision of §57 granting Regional Trial Courts "original
and exclusive jurisdiction" over (1) all petitions for the determination of just
compensation to landowner, and (2) prosecutions of criminal offenses under
R.A. No. 6657.4 The first refers to administrative proceedings, while the second
refers to judicial proceedings. Under R.A. No. 6657, the Land Bank of the
Philippines is charged with the preliminary determination of the value of lands
placed under land reform program and the compensation to be paid for their
taking. It initiates the acquisition of agricultural lands by notifying the landowner
of the government's intention to acquire his land and the valuation of the same
as determined by the Land Bank.5 Within 30 days from receipt of notice, the
landowner shall inform the DAR of his acceptance or rejection of the offer.6 In
the event the landowner rejects the offer, a summary administrative proceeding
is held by the provincial (PARAD), the regional (RARAD) or the central
(DARAB) adjudicator, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land,
for the purpose of determining the compensation for the land. The landowner,
the Land Bank, and other interested parties are then required to submit evidence
as to the just compensation for the land. The DAR adjudicator decides the case
within 30 days after it is submitted for decision.7 If the landowner finds the price
unsatisfactory, he may bring the matter directly to the appropriate Regional Trial
Court.8
To implement the provisions of R.A. No. 6657, particularly §50 thereof, Rule
XIII, §11 of the DARAB Rules of Procedure provides:
Land Valuation Determination and Payment of Just Compensation. — The decision of
the Adjudicator on land valuation and preliminary determination and payment
of just compensation shall not be appealable to the Board but shall be brought
directly to the Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts
within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the notice thereof. Any party shall be
entitled to only one motion for reconsideration.
As we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals,9 this rule is an acknowledgment by the
DARAB that the power to decide just compensation cases for the taking of lands
under R.A. No. 6657 is vested in the courts. It is error to think that, because of
Rule XIII, §11, the original and exclusive jurisdiction given to the courts to decide
petitions for determination of just compensation has thereby been transformed
into an appellate jurisdiction. It only means that, in accordance with settled
principles of administrative law, primary jurisdiction is vested in the DAR as an
59 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
administrative agency to determine in a preliminary manner the reasonable
compensation to be paid for the lands taken under the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program, but such determination is subject to challenge in the courts.
The jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts is not any less "original and
exclusive" because the question is first passed upon by the DAR, as the judicial
proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. For that
matter, the law may provide that the decision of the DAR is final and
unappealable. Nevertheless, resort to the courts cannot be foreclosed on the
theory that courts are the guarantors of the legality of administrative action.10
Accordingly, as the petition in the Regional Trial Court was filed beyond the 15-
day period provided in Rule XIII, §11 of the Rules of Procedure of the DARAB,
the trial court correctly dismissed the case and the Court of Appeals correctly
affirmed the order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 11:

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128557. December 29, 1999]
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE PASCUAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
The lofty effort of the Government to implement an effective agrarian reform
program has resulted in the massive distribution of huge tracks of land to tenant
farmers. But it divested many landowners of their property, and although the
Constitution assures them of just compensation its determination may involve a
tedious litigation in the end. More often, land appraisal becomes a prolonged
legal battle among the contending parties - the landowner, the tenant and the
Government. At times the confrontation is confounded by the numerous laws on
agrarian reform which although intended to ensure the effective implementation

60 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
of the program have only given rise to needless confusion which we are called
upon to resolve, as the case before us.
Private respondent Jose Pascual owned three (3) parcels of land located in
Guttaran, Cagayan. Parcel 1 covered by TCT No. 16655 contains an area of
149,852 square meters as surveyed by the DAR but the actual land area
transferred is estimated at 102,229 square meters and classified as unirrigated
lowland rice; Parcel 2 covered by TCT No. 16654 contains an area of 123,043
square meters as surveyed by the DAR but the actual land area transferred is
estimated at 85,381 square meters and classified as cornland; and, Parcel 3
covered by TCT No. 16653 contains an area of 192,590 square meters but the
actual land area transferred is estimated at 161,338 square meters and classified
as irrigated lowland rice.1 Pursuant to the Land Reform Program of the
Government under PD 272 and EO 228,3 the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) placed these lands under its Operation Land Transfer (OLT).4
Under EO 228 the value of rice and corn lands is determined thus -
Sec. 2. Henceforth, the valuation of rice and corn lands covered by P.D. 27 shall be based
on the average gross production determined by the Barangay Committee on Land
Production in accordance with Department Memorandum Circular No. 26, series of 1973
and related issuances and regulations of the Department of Agrarian Reform. The average
gross production shall be multiplied by two and a half (2.5), the product of which shall
be multiplied by Thirty-Five Pesos (P35), the government support price for one cavan of
50 kilos of palay on October 21, 1972, or Thirty-One Pesos (P31), the government support
price for one cavan of 50 kilos of corn on October 21, 1972, and the amount arrived at
shall be the value of the rice and corn land, as the case may be, for the purpose of
determining its cost to the farmer and compensation to the landowner (emphasis supplied).
Hence, the formula for computing the Land Value (LV) or Price Per Hectare
(PPH) of rice and corn lands is 2.5 x AGP x GSP = LV or PPH.
In compliance with EO 228, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO) of
the DAR in an "Accomplished OLT Valuation Form No. 1" dated 2 December
1989 recommended that the "Average Gross Productivity" (AGP) based on "[3]
Normal Crop Year" for Parcels 1 and 2 should be 25 cavans per hectare for
unirrigated lowland rice and 10 cavans per hectare for corn land.5
Meanwhile, the Office of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform (SAR) also
conducted its own valuation proceedings apart from the PARO. On 10 October
1990 Secretary Benjamin T. Leong of the DAR using the AGP of 25.66 cavans
for unirrigated rice lands6 issued an order valuing Parcel 1 at P22,952.977 and
requiring herein petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) to pay the
amount. On 1 February 1991 petitioner LBP approved the valuation.

61 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In 1991 private respondent Jose Pascual, opposing the recommended AGP of the
PARO, filed a petition for the annulment of the recommendation on the
productivity and valuation of the land covered by OLT, subject matter hereof,
with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Oscar
Dimacali, Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Cagayan heard
the case. Despite due notice however Francisco Baculi, the PARO who issued
the assailed recommendation, failed to appear at the trial. Only private
respondent Jose Pascual and Atty. Eduard Javier of petitioner LBP were
present.8 Thereafter private respondent was allowed to present evidence ex-parte.
At the hearings conducted by the PARAD private respondent presented as
evidence another "Accomplished OLT Valuation Form No. 1," for Parcel 3 dated
22 June 1976 to support his claim that the "OLT Valuation Form" issued by
PARO Francisco Baculi extremely undervalued the AGP of his lands. In the
"1976 OLT Valuation Form" the AGP based on "(3) Normal Crop Year" was 80
cavans per hectare for lowland rice unirrigated, 28 cavans per hectare for corn
lands and 100 cavans per hectare for lowland rice irrigated.9
Private respondent also presented Tax Declarations for Parcels 1 and 2 stating
that the AGP was 80 cavans for unirrigated rice lands and 28 cavans for corn
lands.
On 11 June 1992 the PARAD ruled in favor of private respondent nullifying the
2 December 1989 AGP recommended by the PARO.10 Instead, the PARAD
applied the 22 June 1976 AGP and the AGP stated in private respondents Tax
Declarations to determine the correct compensation. The PARAD also used the
"Government Support Price" (GSP) of P300 for each cavan of palay and P250
for each cavan of corn.11 He then ordered petitioner LBP to pay private
respondent P613,200.00 for Parcel 1, P148,750.00 for Parcel 2,
and P1,200,000.00 for Parcel 3, or a total amount of P1,961,950.00.12
After receiving notice of the decision of the PARAD, private respondent accepted
the valuation. However, when the judgment became final and executory,
petitioner LBP as the financing arm in the operation of PD 27 and EO 228
refused to pay thus forcing private respondent to apply for a Writ of Execution
with the PARAD which the latter issued on 24 December 1992.13 Still, petitioner
LBP declined to comply with the order.
On 29 June 1994 Secretary Ernesto Garilao Jr. of the DAR wrote a letter to
petitioner LBP requiring the latter to pay the amount stated in the judgment of
the PARAD.14 Again, petitioner LBP rejected the directive of Secretary Garilao.
Petitioners Executive Vice President, Jesus Diaz, then sent a letter to Secretary
Garilao arguing that (a) the valuation of just compensation should be determined
by the courts; (b) PARAD could not reverse a previous order of the Secretary of

62 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
the DAR;15 and, (c) the valuation of lands under EO 228 falls within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Secretary of the DAR and not of the DARAB.16
On 23 January 1995 the Secretary of Agrarian Reform replied to petitioner -
We agree with your contention that the matter of valuation of lands covered by P.D. 27 is
a matter within the administrative implementation of agrarian reform, hence, cognizable
exclusively by the Secretary.
However, in this particular case, there is another operative principle which is the finality of
decisions of the Adjudication Board. Since the matter has been properly threshed out in the
quasi-judicial proceeding and the decision has already become final and executory, we
cannot make an exception in this case and allow the non-payment of the valuation unless
we are enjoined by a higher authority like the courts.
Therefore at the risk of occasional error, we maintain that payment should be made in this
case. However we believe situations like this would be lessened tremendously through the
issuance of the attached memorandum circular17to the Field Offices.18
Despite the letter of Secretary G. Garilao, petitioner LBP remained adamant in
its refusal to pay private respondent. It reiterated its stand that the PARAD had
no jurisdiction to value lands covered by PD 27.19
On 17 June 1995 counsel for private respondent also wrote petitioner LBP
demanding payment. On 20 June 1995 petitioner replied -
x x x x Although we disagree with the foregoing view that the PARAD decision on the land
valuation of a PD 27 landholding has become final for numerous legal reasons, in
deference to the DAR Secretary, we informed him that we will pay the amount decided
by the PARAD of Cagayan provided the tenant beneficiaries of Mr. Pascual be
consulted first and the land transfer claim be redocumented to the effect that said
beneficiaries re-execute the Landowner Tenant Production Agreement-Farmers
Undertaking to show their willingness to the PARAD valuation and to amortize the
same to this bank. This is in consonance with the legal mandate of this bank as the
financing arm of PD 27/EO 228 landholdings. In other words, the beneficiaries must
agree to the amount being financed, otherwise, financing may not be possible pursuant
to this banks legal mandate (emphasis supplied).20
Petitioner LBP having consistently refused to comply with its obligation despite
the directive of the Secretary of the DAR and the various demand letters of
private respondent Jose Pascual, the latter finally filed an action for Mandamus
in the Court of Appeals to compel petitioner to pay the valuation determined by
the PARAD. On 15 July 1996 the appellate court granted the Writ now being
assailed. The appellate court also required petitioner LBP to pay a compounded
interest of 6% per annum in compliance with DAR Administrative Order No.
13, series of 1994.21 On 11 March 1997 petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
was denied;22 hence, this petition.
63 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Petitioner LBP avers that the Court of Appeals erred in issuing the Writ of
Mandamus in favor of private respondent and argues that the appellate court
cannot impose a 6% compounded interest on the value of Jose Pascual's land
since Administrative Order No. 13 does not apply to his case. Three (3) reasons
are given by petitioner why the Court of Appeals cannot issue the writ:
First, it cannot enforce PARADs valuation since it cannot make such
determination for want of jurisdiction hence void. Section 12, par. (b), of PD
94623 provides that the valuation of lands covered by PD 27 is under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. Petitioner asserts that Sec. 17
of EO 22924 and Sec. 50 of RA No. 6657,25 which granted DAR the exclusive
jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters thereby divesting the Court of
Agrarian Relations of such power, did not repeal Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946.
Petitioner now attempts to reconcile the pertinent laws by saying that only the
Secretary of Agrarian Reform can determine the value of rice and corn lands
under Operation Land Transfer of PD 27, while on the other hand, all other lands
covered by RA 6657 (CARL) shall be valued by the DARAB, hence, the DARAB
of the DAR has no jurisdiction to determine the value of the lands covered by
OLT under PD 27.
To bolster its contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 was not repealed,
petitioner LBP cites Sec. 76 of RA 6657.26 It argues that since Sec. 76 of RA 6657
only repealed the last two (2) paragraphs of Sec. 12 of PD 946, it is obvious that
Congress had no intention of repealing par. (b). Thus, it remains valid and
effective. As a matter of fact, even the Secretary of Agrarian Reform agreed that
Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 still holds. Based on this assumption, the Secretary
of the DAR has opined that the valuation of rice and corn lands is under his
exclusive jurisdiction and has directed all DARAB officials to refrain from
valuing lands covered by PD 27.27 Petitioner maintains that the Secretary of the
DAR should conduct his own proceedings to determine the value of Parcels 2
and 3 and that his valuation of Parcel 128should be upheld.
We do not agree. In Machete v. Court of Appeals29 this Court discussed the
effects on PD 946 of Sec. 17 of EO 229 and Sec. 50 of RA 6657 when it held -
The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have repealed Sec. 12 (a) and
(b) of Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations
with original exclusive jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and
obligations imposed by presidential issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian
reform program (emphasis supplied).
Thus, petitioners contention that Sec. 12, par. (b), of PD 946 is still in effect
cannot be sustained. It seems that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform erred in
issuing Memorandum Circular No. I, Series of 1995, directing the DARAB to
refrain from hearing valuation cases involving PD 27 lands. For on the contrary,
64 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
it is the DARAB which has the authority to determine the initial valuation of
lands involving agrarian reform30 although such valuation may only be
considered preliminary as the final determination of just compensation is vested
in the courts.31
Second, petitioner LBP contends that the Court of Appeals cannot issue the Writ
of Mandamus because it cannot be compelled to perform an act which is beyond
its legal duty.32 Petitioner cites Sec. 2 of PD 251,33 which amended Sec. 75 of RA
3844,34 which provides that it is the duty of petitioner bank "(t)o finance and/or
guarantee the acquisition, under Presidential Decree No. 85 dated December 25,
1972, of farm lands transferred to the tenant farmers pursuant to Presidential
Decree No. 27 (P.D. 27) dated October 21, 1972." Section 7 of PD 251 also
provides that "(w)henever the Bank pays the whole or a portion of the total costs
of farm lots, the Bank shall be subrogated by reason thereof, to the right of the
landowner to collect and receive the yearly amortizations on farm lots or the
amount paid including interest thereon, from tenant-farmers in whose favor
said farm lot has been transferred pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 27, dated
October 21, 1972" (emphasis supplied).
Petitioner further argues that for a financing or guarantee agreement to exist there
must be at least three (3) parties: the creditor, the debtor and the financier or the
guarantor. Since petitioner merely guarantees or finances the payment of the
value of the land, the farmer-beneficiarys consent, being the principal debtor, is
indispensable and that the only time petitioner becomes legally bound to finance
the transaction is when the farmer-beneficiary approves the appraised land value.
Petitioner fears that if it is forced to pay the value as determined by the DARAB,
the government will suffer losses as the farmer-beneficiary, who does not agree
to the appraised land value, will surely refuse to reimburse the amounts that
petitioner had disbursed. Thus, it asserts, that the landowner, the DAR, the Land
Bank and the farmer-beneficiary must all agree to the value of the land as
determined by them.
A perusal of the law however shows that the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is
not required in establishing the vinculum juris for the proper compensation of the
landowner. Section 18 of RA 6657 states -
Sec. 18. Valuation and Mode of Compensation. - The LBP shall compensate the
landowner in such amount as may be agreed upon by the landowner and the DAR and
the LBP in accordance with the criteria provided for in Sections 16 and 17 and other
pertinent provisions hereof, or as may be finally determined by the court as the just
compensation for the land (emphasis supplied).
As may be gleaned from the aforementioned section, the landowner, the DAR
and the Land Bank are the only parties involved. The law does not mention the
participation of the farmer-beneficiary. However, petitioner insists that Sec. 18 of
65 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
RA 665735 does not apply in this case as it involves lands covered by PD 27. It
argues that in appraising PD 27 lands the consent of the farmer-beneficiary is
necessary to arrive at a final valuation. Without such concurrence, the financing
scheme under PD 251 cannot be satisfied.36
We cannot see why Sec. 18 of RA 6657 should not apply to rice and corn lands
under PD 27. Section 75 of RA 665737 clearly states that the provisions of PD 27
and EO 228 shall only have a suppletory effect. Section 7 of the Act also provides
-
Sec. 7. Priorities.- The DAR, in coordination with the PARC shall plan and program the
acquisition and distribution of all agricultural lands through a period of (10) years from
the effectivity of this Act. Lands shall be acquired and distributed as follows:
Phase One: Rice and Corn lands under P.D. 27; all idle or abandoned lands; all private
lands voluntarily offered by the owners for agrarian reform;xxx and all other lands owned
by the government devoted to or suitable for agriculture, which shall be acquired and
distributed immediately upon the effectivity of this Act, with the implementation to be
completed within a period of not more than four (4) years (emphasis supplied).
This eloquently demonstrates that RA 6657 includes PD 27 lands among the
properties which the DAR shall acquire and distribute to the landless. And to
facilitate the acquisition and distribution thereof, Secs. 16, 17 and 18 of the Act
should be adhered to. In Association of Small Landowners of the Philippines v.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform38 this Court of Appeals applied the provisions RA
6657 to rice and corn lands when it upheld the constitutionality of the payment
of just compensation for PD 27 lands through the different modes stated in Sec.
18.
Having established that under Sec. 18 of RA 6657 the consent of the farmer-
beneficiary is unnecessary in the appraisal of land value, it must now be
determined if petitioner had agreed to the amount of compensation declared by
the PARAD. If it did, then we can now apply the doctrine in Sharp International
Marketing v. Court of Appeals.39 In that case, the Land Bank refused to comply
with the Writ of Mandamus issued by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it
was not obliged to follow the order of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to pay
the landowner. This Court concurred with the Land Bank saying that the latter
could not be compelled to obey the Secretary of Agrarian Reform since the bank
did not merely exercise a ministerial function. Instead, it had an independent
discretionary role in land valuation and that the only time a writ of mandamus
could be issued against the Land Bank was when it agreed to the amount of
compensation determined by the DAR -
It needs no exceptional intelligence to understand the implication of this transmittal. It
simply means that if LBP agrees on the amount stated in the DAS, 40 after its review and

66 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
evaluation, it becomes its duty to sign the deed. But not until then. For, it is only in that
event that the amount to be compensated shall have been established according to law.
Although the case at bar pertains to an involuntary sale of land, the same
principle should apply. Once the Land Bank agrees with the appraisal of the
DAR, which bears the approval of the landowner, it becomes its legal duty to
finance the transaction. In the instant case, petitioner participated in the
valuation proceedings held in the office of the PARAD through its counsel, Atty.
Eduard Javier.41 It did not appeal the decision of PARAD which became final
and executory.42 As a matter of fact, petitioner even stated in its Petition that "it
is willing to pay the value determined by the PARAD PROVIDED that the
farmer beneficiaries concur thereto."43 These facts sufficiently prove that
petitioner LBP agreed with the valuation of the land. The only thing that
hindered it from paying the amount was the non-concurrence of the farmer-
beneficiary. But as we have already stated, there is no need for such concurrence.
Without such obstacle, petitioner can now be compelled to perform its legal duty
through the issuance of a writ of mandamus.
Anent petitioners argument that the government will lose money should the
farmer-beneficiary be unwilling to pay, we believe such apprehension is baseless.
In the event that the farmer-beneficiary refuses to pay the amount disbursed by
petitioner, the latter can foreclose on the land as provided for in Secs. 8 to 11 of
EO 228. Petitioner LBP would then be reimbursed of the amount it paid to the
landowner.
Third, petitioner LBP asserts that a writ of mandamus cannot be issued where
there is another plain, adequate and complete remedy in the ordinary course of
law. Petitioner claims that private respondent had three (3) remedies. The first
remedy was to ask the sheriff of the DARAB to execute the ruling of PARAD by
levying against the Agrarian Reform Fund for so much of the amount as would
satisfy the judgment. Another remedy was to file a motion with the DAR asking
for a final resolution with regard to the financing of the land valuation. Lastly,
private respondent could have filed a case in the Special Agrarian Court for the
final determination of just compensation.44
We hold that as to private respondent the suggested remedies are far from plain,
adequate and complete. After the judgment of PARAD became final and
executory, private respondent applied for a writ of execution which was
eventually granted. However, the sheriff was unable to implement it since
petitioner LBP was unwilling to pay. The PARAD even issued an order requiring
petitioners manager to explain why he should not be held in contempt.45 Two (2)
years elapsed from the time of the PARAD ruling but private respondents claim
has remained unsatisfied. This shows that petitioner has no intention to comply
with the judgment of PARAD. How then can petitioner still expect private
respondent to ask the DARABs sheriff to levy on the Agrarian Reform Fund
67 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
when petitioner bank which had control of the fund46firmly reiterated its stand
that the DARAB had no jurisdiction?
Petitioners contention that private respondent should have asked for a final
resolution from the DAR as an alternative remedy does not impress us either.
When private respondent sensed that petitioner would not satisfy the writ of
execution issued by the PARAD, he sought the assistance of the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform who then wrote to petitioner to pay the amount in accordance
with the decision of PARAD.47 Still, petitioner refused. The Secretary then sent
another letter to petitioner telling the latter to pay private
respondent.48 Obviously, the stand of the Secretary was that petitioner should pay
private respondent in accordance with the PARAD valuation which had already
become final. It would have been redundant for private respondent to still ask for
a final resolution from the DAR.
The allegation of petitioner that private respondent should have filed a case with
the Special Agrarian Court is also without merit. Although it is true that Sec. 57
of RA 6657 provides that the Special Agrarian Courts shall have jurisdiction over
the final determination of just compensation cases, it must be noted that
petitioner never contested the valuation of the PARAD.49 Thus, the land
valuation stated in its decision became final and executory.50 There was therefore
no need for private respondent Pascual to file a case in the Special Agrarian
Court.
With regard to the decision of the Court of Appeals imposing an interest based
on Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994, the Order should be examined
to ascertain if private respondent can avail of the 6% compounded interest
prescribed for unpaid landowners. As to its coverage, the Order states: These
rules and regulations shall apply to landowners: (1) whose lands are actually
tenanted as of 21 October 1972 or thereafter and covered by OLT; (2) who opted
for government financing through Land Bank of the Philippines as mode of
compensation; and, (3) who have not yet been paid for the value of their land.
At first glance it would seem that private respondents lands are indeed covered
by AO No. 13. However, Part IV shows that AO No. 13 provides a fixed formula
for determining the Land Value (LV) and the additional interests it would have
earned. The formula utilizes the Government Support Price (GSP) of 1972,
which is P35.00/cavan of palay and P31.00/cavan of corn. For its Increment
Formula AO No. 13 states: The following formula shall apply -
For palay: LV= (2.5 x AGP x P35) x (1.06)n
For corn: LV= (2.5 x AGP x P31) x (1.06)n.51
In the decision of PARAD, however, the Land Value (LV) of private respondents
property was computed by using the GSP for 1992, which is P300.00 per cavan

68 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
of palay and P250.00 per cavan of corn.52 PARAD Dimacali used the following
equations:
For palay: LV = (2.5 x AGP x 300 )
For corn: LV = (2.5 x AGP x 250)
Hence, the formula in AO No. 13 could no longer be applied since the PARAD
already used a higher GSP.
The purpose of AO No. 13 is to compensate the landowners for unearned
interests.53 Had they been paid in 1972 when the GSP for rice and corn was
valued at P35.00 and P31.00, respectively, and such amounts were deposited in
a bank, they would have earned a compounded interest of 6% per annum. Thus,
if the PARAD used the 1972 GSP, then the product of (2.5 x AGP x P35 or P31)
could be multiplied by (1.06)n to determine the value of the land plus the
additional 6% compounded interest it would have earned from 1972. However,
since the PARAD already increased the GSP from P35.00 to P300.00/cavan of
palay and from P31.00 to P250.00/cavan of corn, there is no more need to add
any interest thereon, muchless compound it. To the extent that it granted 6%
compounded interest to private respondent Jose Pascual, the Court of Appeals
erred.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals granting the Writ
of Mandamus directing petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines to pay private
respondent Jose Pascual the total amount of P1,961,950.00 stated in the Decision
dated 11 June 1992 of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of
Cagayan is AFFIRMED, with the modification that the 6% compounded interest
per annum provided under DAR Administrative Order No. 13, Series of 1994 is
DELETED, the same being no longer applicable.
SO ORDERED.

69 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
CASE NO. 12:

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164876 January 23, 2006
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
LEONILA P. CELADA, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Respondent Leonila P. Celada owns 22.3167 hectares of agricultural land
situated in Calatrava, Carmen, Bohol registered under TCT No. 16436,1 of which
14.1939 hectares was identified in 1998 by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) as suitable for compulsory acquisition under the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The matter was then indorsed to petitioner
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) for field investigation and land valuation.
In due course, LBP valued respondent’s land at P2.1105517 per square meter for
an aggregate value of P299,569.61.2 The DAR offered the same amount to
respondent as just compensation, but it was rejected. Nonetheless, on August 27,
1999, LBP deposited the said sum in cash and bonds in the name of respondent.3
Pursuant to Section 16(d) of Republic Act (RA) No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, the matter was referred to the DAR Adjudication
Board (DARAB), Region VII-Cebu City, for summary administrative hearing on
determination of just compensation. The case was docketed as DARAB Case
No. VII-4767-B-990.
While the DARAB case was pending, respondent filed, on February 10, 2000, a
petition4 for judicial determination of just compensation against LBP, the DAR
and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Carmen, Bohol, before
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City. The same was docketed as Civil
Case No. 6462 and raffled to Branch 3, the designated Special Agrarian Court
(SAC). Respondent alleged that the current market value of her land is at least
P150,000.00 per hectare based on the following factors:
14.1. The land in question has been mortgaged to the defunct Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bohol), Inc., for P1,220,000.00 on July 23, 1998 since it was appraised
at P15.00 per square meter;
70 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
14.2. Agricultural lands in said barangay are priced ranging from P140,000.00 to
P150,000.00 per hectare and current land transactions reveal said price range;
14.3. The land in question is titled or registered property, cultivated and fully
developed with rice5 and corn occupying the greater portion thereof;
14.4. The topography of the land, its soil condition, climate and productivity of
surrounding lots justify the just compensation requested or asked for;
14.5. Even the class and base unit market value for agricultural lands in Bohol is
about thirty (30) times higher than the price offered per hectare by DAR/LBP.6
On April 27, 2000, LBP filed its Answer7 raising non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies as well as forum-shopping as affirmative defense.
According to petitioner, respondent must first await the outcome of the DARAB
case before taking any judicial recourse; that its valuation was arrived at by
applying the formula prescribed by law whereas respondent’s was based only on
the "current value of like properties".
The DAR and the MARO likewise filed an Answer8 averring that the
determination of just compensation rests exclusively with the LBP. Thus, they
are not liable to respondent and are merely nominal parties in the case.
Meanwhile, the DARAB Provincial Adjudicator (PARAD) issued an
Order9 dated April 12, 2000 affirming the valuation made by LBP. Respondent
failed to appear in the DARAB case despite due notice.
On June 4, 2001, the SAC issued an order resolving petitioner’s affirmative
defense in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Affirmative Defense of x x x Land Bank is hereby denied.
Besides, in the mind of the court, the recourse to the DARAB is x x x of no
moment since it is only conciliatory to the parties.
Upon agreement of the parties, the pre-trial is reset to June 11, 2001 at 9:00 in
the morning.
SO ORDERED.10
Thereafter, a pre-trial conference was conducted11 and trial on the merits ensued.
On March 1, 2003, the SAC rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Court hereby fixes the
compensation of the land of petitioner at P2.50 per square meter or a total of
P354,847.50 for the portion of 14.1939 hectares subject of compulsory
acquisition under the CARP which it believes just, fair and equitable under the
present circumstances and which shall earn legal interest of twelve percent (12%)
per annum from the time of its taking by the DAR. Furthermore, respondent
Land Bank is hereby ordered to indemnify petitioner the amount of P10,000.00
for attorney’s fee and incidental expenses of P5,000.00 and costs.
71 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
SO ORDERED.12
LBP elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed the
appeal outright on the following grounds:
1. The petition is not accompanied with an affidavit of service, although there is
an explanation that respondent, respondent’s counsel and Judge Venancio J.
Amila were furnished with copies of the petition by registered mail x x x.
2. Petitioner’s counsel indicated his IBP and PTR but not his Roll of Attorney’s
Number x x x.
3. Copies of (a) PARAD Decision x x x adverted to in the petition which fixed the
land valuation for just compensation at P299,569.11 and (b) petitioner’s Petition
for Judicial Determination of Just Compensation filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Tagbilaran City, Branch 3, were not attached as annexes, x x x.13
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration,14 LBP filed the instant petition
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, alleging that:
A
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN X X X RIGIDLY OR STRICTLY
APPLYING PROCEDURAL LAW AT THE EXPENSE OF SUBSTANTIAL
JUSTICE AND THE RIGHT TO APPEAL.
B
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN ASSUMING JURISDICTION OVER THE
PETITION FOR DETERMINATION OF JUST COMPENSATION WHILE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS IS ON-GOING BEFORE THE
DARAB, REGION VII, CEBU CITY.
C
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN FIXING THE JUST COMPENSATION OF
THE LAND BASED NOT ON ITS ACTUAL LAND USE BUT ON THE
VALUATION OF NEIGHBORING LANDS.
D
THE SAC A QUO ERRED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY’S FEES AND
INCIDENTAL EXPENSES X X X.15
On the first assigned error, petitioner asserts that the Court of Appeals should
have liberally construed the rules of procedure and not dismissed its appeal on
technical grounds.
We agree with petitioner.
The Court of Appeals dismissed petitioner’s appeal on three technical grounds,
namely: (a) lack of affidavit of service; (b) failure of counsel to indicate his Roll
72 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
of Attorneys’ number; and (c) failure to attach material portions of the records.
However, the lack of affidavit of service is not deemed fatal where the petition
filed below is accompanied by the original registry receipts showing that the
petition and its annexes were served upon the parties. 16 On the other hand, the
failure of counsel to indicate his Roll of Attorneys’ number would not affect
respondent’s substantive rights, such that petitioner’s counsel could have been
directed to comply with the latter requirement rather than dismiss the petition on
purely technical grounds. As for petitioner’s failure to attach material portions of
the records, we held in Donato v. Court of Appeals17 that:
[T]he failure of the petitioner to x x x append to his petition copies of the
pleadings and other material portions of the records as would support the
petition, does not justify the outright dismissal of the petition. It must be
emphasized that the RIRCA (Revised Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals)
gives the appellate court a certain leeway to require parties to submit additional
documents as may be necessary in the interest of substantial justice. Under
Section 3, paragraph d of Rule 3 of the RIRCA, the CA may require the parties
to complete the annexes as the court deems necessary, and if the petition is given
due course, the CA may require the elevation of a complete record of the case as
provided for under Section 3(d)(5) of Rule 6 of the RIRCA x x x.18
An examination of the records and pleadings filed before the Court of Appeals
reveals that there was substantial compliance with procedural requirements.
Moreover, we have held time and again that cases should, as much as possible,
be determined on the merits after the parties have been given full opportunity to
ventilate their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some
procedural imperfection.19 After all, technical rules of procedure are not ends in
themselves but are primarily devised to help in the proper and expedient
dispensation of justice. In appropriate cases, therefore, the rules may be
construed liberally in order to meet and advance the cause of substantial justice.20
While a remand of the case to the appellate court would seem to be in order, we
deem it proper to resolve the case on the merits if only to write finis to the present
controversy.
We do not agree with petitioner’s submission that the SAC erred in assuming
jurisdiction over respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation
despite the pendency of the administrative proceedings before the DARAB.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals,21 the landowner filed an action
for determination of just compensation without waiting for the completion of the
DARAB’s re-evaluation of the land. The Court nonetheless held therein that the
SAC acquired jurisdiction over the action for the following reason:
It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has
‘original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just
73 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
compensation to landowners.’ This ‘original and exclusive’ jurisdiction of the
RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials
original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court
for the review of administrative decision. Thus, although the new rules speak of
directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special
Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such
jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the
RTCs into appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore
would be void. Thus, direct resort to the SAC by private respondent is valid.22
It would be well to emphasize that the taking of property under RA No. 6657 is
an exercise of the power of eminent domain by the State.23 The valuation of
property or determination of just compensation in eminent domain proceedings
is essentially a judicial function which is vested with the courts and not with
administrative agencies.24 Consequently, the SAC properly took cognizance of
respondent’s petition for determination of just compensation.
In the same vein, there is no merit to petitioner’s contention that respondent
failed to exhaust administrative remedies when she directly filed the petition for
determination of just compensation with the SAC even before the DARAB case
could be resolved. The issue is now moot considering that the valuation made by
petitioner had long been affirmed by the DARAB in its order dated April 12,
2000. As held in Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco,25 the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable when the issue is rendered
moot and academic, as in the instant case.
With regard to the third assigned error, however, we agree with petitioner that
the SAC erred in setting aside petitioner’s valuation of respondent’s land on the
sole basis of the higher valuation given for neighboring properties. In this regard,
the SAC held:
It appears from the evidence of petitioner that the neighboring lands of similar
classification were paid higher than what was quoted to her land by respondent
Land Bank as the value per square meter to her land was only quoted at
P2.1105517 while the others which were of the same classification were paid by
respondent Bank at P2.42 more or less, per square meter referring to the land of
Consuelito Borja (Exh. D) and Cesar Borja (Exh. F). Furthermore, the land of
petitioner was allegedly mortgaged for a loan of P1,200,000.00 before the Rural
Bank of San Miguel, Bohol and that it was purchased by her from a certain Felipe
Dungog for P450,000.00 although no documents therefor were shown to support
her claim. Nevertheless, the Court finds a patent disparity in the price quotations
by respondent Land Bank for the land of petitioner and that of the other
landowners brought under CARP which could be caused by deficient or
erroneous references due to the petitioner’s indifference and stubborn attitude in
74 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
not cooperating with respondent bank in submitting the data needed for the
evaluation of the property. x x x At any rate, the price quotation by respondent
Land Bank on the land of the petitioner is low more so that it was done some
four years ago, particularly, on June 22, 1998 (Exh. 1) and the same has become
irrelevant in the course of time due to the devaluation of the peso brought about
by our staggering economy.26
As can be gleaned from above ruling, the SAC based its valuation solely on the
observation that there was a "patent disparity" between the price given to
respondent and the other landowners. We note that it did not apply the DAR
valuation formula since according to the SAC, it is Section 17 of RA No. 6657
that "should be the principal basis of computation as it is the law governing the
matter".27 The SAC further held that said Section 17 "cannot be superseded by
any administrative order of a government agency",28 thereby implying that the
valuation formula under DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 1998 (DAR
AO No. 5, s. of 1998),29 is invalid and of no effect.
While SAC is required to consider the acquisition cost of the land, the current
value of like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation
by the owner, the tax declaration and the assessments made by the government
assessors30 to determine just compensation, it is equally true that these factors
have been translated into a basic formula by the DAR pursuant to its rule-making
power under Section 49 of RA No. 6657.31 As the government agency principally
tasked to implement the agrarian reform program, it is the DAR’s duty to issue
rules and regulations to carry out the object of the law. DAR AO No. 5, s. of
1998 precisely "filled in the details" of Section 17, RA No. 6657 by providing a
basic formula by which the factors mentioned therein may be taken into account.
The SAC was at no liberty to disregard the formula which was devised to
implement the said provision.
It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to
interpret the law which they are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and
are entitled to great respect.32 Administrative issuances partake of the nature of a
statute33 and have in their favor a presumption of legality.34 As such, courts
cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its
validity was not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid,
courts have no option but to apply the same.
Thus, Section 17 of RA No. 6657 states:
SEC. 17. Determination of Just Compensation. – In determining just compensation,
the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of like properties, its nature,
actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax declarations,
and the assessment made by government assessors, shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and
75 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
by the Government to the property as well as the nonpayment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be
considered as additional factors to determine its valuation.
As stated earlier, the above provision is implemented through DAR AO No. 5,
s. of 1998, which provides that:
A. There shall be one basic formula for the valuation of lands covered by VOS or
CA:
LV = (CNI x 0.6) + (CS x 0.3) + (MV x 0.1)
Where: LV = Land Value
CNI = Capitalized Net Income
CS = Comparable Sales
MV = Market Value per Tax Declaration
The above formula shall be used if all three factors are present, relevant, and
applicable.
A1. When the CS factor is not present and CNI and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CNI x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A2. When the CNI factor is not present, and CS and MV are applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = (CS x 0.9) + (MV x 0.1)
A3. When both the CS and CNI are not present and only MV is applicable, the
formula shall be:
LV = MV x 2
In no case shall the value of idle land using the formula MV x 2 exceed the lowest
value of land within the same estate under consideration or within the same
barangay or municipality (in that order) approved by LBP within one (1) year
from receipt of claimfolder.
Accordingly, petitioner applied the formula under A1 above since the
comparable sales factor ("CS factor") was not present. As observed by the SAC
itself, respondent refused to cooperate with the local valuation office of petitioner
and did not provide the necessary data to arrive at a proper "CS factor". DAR
AO No. 5, s. of 1998 defines "CS factor" as follows:
C. CS shall refer to any one or the average of all the applicable sub-factors,
namely ST, AC and MVM:
Where: ST = Peso Value of Sales Transactions as defined under Item C.2
76 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
AC = Acquisition Cost as defined under Item C.3
MVM = Market Value Based on Mortgage as defined under Item C.4
xxxx
C.2. The criteria in the selection of the comparable sales transaction (ST) shall be
as follows:
a. When the required number of STs is not available at the barangay level,
additional STs may be secured from the municipality where the land being
offered/covered is situated to complete the required three comparable STs. In
case there are more STs available than what is required at the municipal level,
the most recent transactions shall be considered. The same rule shall apply at the
provincial level when no STs are available at the municipal level. In all cases, the
combination of STs sourced from the barangay, municipality and province shall
not exceed three transactions.
b. The land subject of acquisition as well as those subject of comparable sales
transactions should be similar in topography, land use, i.e., planted to the same
crop. Furthermore, in case of permanent crops, the subject properties should be
more or less comparable in terms of their stages of productivity and plant density.
c. The comparable sales transactions should have been executed within the
period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988, and registered within the period January
1, 1985, to September 13, 1988.
xxxx
C.3. Acquisition Cost (AC) – AC shall be deemed relevant when the property
subject of acquisition was acquired through purchase or exchange with another
property within the period January 1, 1985 to June 15, 1988 and registered within
the period January 1, 1985 to September 13, 1988, and the condition of said
property is still substantially similar from the date of purchase or exchange to the
date of FI.
xxxx
C.4. Market Value Based on Mortgage (MVM) – For MVM to be relevant or
applicable, the property subject of acquisition should have been mortgaged as of
June 15, 1988 and the condition of the property is still substantially similar up to
the date of FI. MVM shall refer to the latest available appraised value of the
property.
In the case at bar, while respondent attempted to prove during the hearings before
the SAC, comparable sales transactions, the acquisition cost of the property as
well as its mortgage value, she failed to submit adequate documentary evidence
to support the same. Consequently, there was nothing from which the "CS factor"
could be determined.
77 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In contrast, petitioner arrived at its valuation by using available factors culled
from the Department of Agriculture and Philippine Coconut Authority, 35 and by
computing the same in accordance with the formula provided, thus –
COMPUTATION (Applicable Formula) : LV = 0.90 CNI + 0.10 MV
Comparable Land Transactions (P x x x x ____ ) = P x-x-x
Capitalized Net Income: Cassava 16,666.67 x 0.90 = 15,000.00
Corn/Coco 26,571.70 = 23,914.53
Market Value Cassava 8,963.78 x 0.10 = 896.38
per Tax Declaration: Corn/Coco 10,053.93 = 1,005.39
Computed Value per Hectare: Cassava – 15,896.38; Corn/Coco – 24,919.92
xxx
Value per hectare used: Cassava 15,896.38 x 6.0000 has. = 95,378.28
Corn/Coco 24,919.92 x 8.1939 has. = 204,191.33
Payment due to LO : P299, 569.61
The above computation was explained by Antero M. Gablines, Chief of the
Claims, Processing, Valuation and Payment Division of the Agrarian Operations
Center of the Land Bank, to wit:
ATTY. CABANGBANG: (On direct):
xxxx
q. What are the items needed for the Land Bank to compute?
a. In accordance with Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1998, the value of
the land should be computed using the capitalized net income plus the market
value. We need the gross production of the land and its output and the net income
of the property.
q. You said "gross production". How would you fix the gross production of the
property?
a. In that Administrative Order No. 5, if the owner of the land is cooperative, he
is required to submit the net income. Without submitting all his sworn
statements, we will get the data from the DA (Agriculture) or from the coconut
authorities.
xxxx
q. In this recommended amount which you approved, how did you arrive at this
figure?

78 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
a. We used the data from the Philippine (Coconut) Authority and the Agriculture
and the data stated that Cassava production was only 10,000 kilos per hectare;
corn, 2,000 kilos; and coconuts, 15.38 kilos per hectare. The data stated that in
the first cropping of 1986, the price of cassava was P1.00 per kilo; corn was sold
at P7.75 per kilo; and the Philippine Coconut Authority stated that during that
time, the selling price of coconuts was P8.23 per kilo.
q. After these Production data and selling price, there is here a "cost of
operation", what is this?
a. It is the expenses of the land owner or farmer. From day one of the cultivation
until production. Without the land owner’s submission of the sworn statement
of the income, production and the cost, x x x Administrative Order No. 5 states
that x x x we will use 20% as the net income, meaning 80% of the production in
peso. This is the cost of valuation.
q. 80 % for what crops?
a. All crops except for coconuts where the cost of expenses is only 20%.
q. Summing all these data, what is the value per hectare of the cassava?
a. The cassava is P15,896.38.
q. How about the corn x x x intercropped with coconuts?
a. P24,919.92.36
Under the circumstances, we find the explanation and computation of petitioner
to be sufficient and in accordance with applicable laws. Petitioner’s valuation
must thus be upheld.
Finally, there is no basis for the SAC’s award of 12% interest per annum in favor
of respondent. Although in some expropriation cases, the Court allowed the
imposition of said interest, the same was in the nature of damages for delay in
payment which in effect makes the obligation on the part of the government one
of forbearance.37 In this case, there is no delay that would justify the payment of
interest since the just compensation due to respondent has been promptly and
validly deposited in her name in cash and LBP bonds. Neither is there factual or
legal justification for the award of attorney’s fees and costs of litigation in favor
of respondent.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Tagbilaran City, Branch 3 in Civil Case No. 6462 dated
March 1, 2003 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment is entered
fixing the just compensation for respondent’s land at P2.1105517 per square
meter or a total of P299,569.61.
SO ORDERED.

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CASE NO. 13:

THIRD DIVISION
January 20, 2016 G.R. No.176549
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO
MENDOZA, Petitioners,
vs.
ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the Court of Appeals
Decision dated October 5, 20062 and Resolution dated January 10, 20073 in CA-
G.R. SP No. 88935. The Decision and Resolution reversed the Order dated
February 22, 20054 issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform-Central Office
(DAR-CO) in Administrative Case No. A-9999-03-CV-008-03 which directed
that a 5.0001 hectare piece of agricultural land (land) be placed under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program pursuant to Republic Act (RA) No.
6657 or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.
The Facts
The land originally formed part of the agricultural land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 17680,5 which in turn, formed part of the total of
73.3157 hectares of agricultural land owned by Roman De Jesus (Roman).6
On May 23, 1972, petitioner Pablo Mendoza (Mendoza) became the tenant of
the land by virtue of a Contrato King Pamamuisan7 executed between him and
Roman. Pursuant to the Contrato, Mendoza has been paying twenty-five (25)
piculs of sugar every crop year as lease rental to Roman. It was later changed to
Two Thousand Pesos (P2, 000.00) per crop year, the land being no longer
devoted to sugarcane.8
On November 7, 1979, Roman died leaving the entire 73.3157 hectares to his
surviving wife Alberta Constales (Alberta), and their two sons Mario De Jesus
(Mario) and Antonio De Jesus (Antonio).9 On August 23, 1984, Antonio
80 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Succession with Waiver of Right10 which made
Alberta and Mario co-owners in equal proportion of the agricultural land left by
Roman.11
On June 26, 1986, Mario sold12 approximately 70.4788 hectares to respondent
Romeo C. Carriedo (Carriedo), covered by the following titles and tax
declarations, to wit:
1. TCT No. 35055
2. (Tax Declaration) TD No. 48354
3. TCT No. 17681
4. TCT No. 56897
5. TCT No. 17680
The area sold to Carriedo included the land tenanted by Mendoza (forming part
of the area covered by TCT No. 17680). Mendoza alleged that the sale took place
without his knowledge and consent.
In June of 1990, Carriedo sold all of these landholdings to the Peoples’
Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PLFI) represented by its president, Bernabe
Buscayno.13 All the lands, except that covered by TCT No. 17680, were subjected
to Voluntary Land Transfer/Direct Payment Scheme and were awarded to
agrarian reform beneficiaries in 1997.14
The parties to this case were involved in three cases concerning the land, to wit:
The Ejectment Case (DARAB Case No. 163-T-90 | CAG.R. SP No. 44521 | G.R. No.
143416)
On October 1, 1990, Carriedo filed a Complaint for Ejectment and Collection of
Unpaid Rentals against Mendoza before the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Tarlac docketed as DARAB Case No. 163-T-
90. He subsequently filed an Amended Complaint on October 30, 1990.15
In a Decision dated June 4, 1992,16 the PARAD ruled that Mendoza had
knowledge of the sale, hence, he could not deny the fact nor assail the validity of
the conveyance. Mendoza violated Section 2 of Presidential Decree (PD) No.
816,17 Section 50 of RA No. 119918 and Section 36 of RA No. 3844,19 and thus,
the PARAD declared the leasehold contract terminated, and ordered Mendoza
to vacate the premises.20
Mendoza filed an appeal with the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).1âwphi1 In a Decision dated February 8, 1996,21 the DARAB
affirmed the PARAD Decision in toto. The DARAB ruled that ownership of the
land belongs to Carriedo. That the deed of sale was unregistered did not affect

81 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Carriedo’s title to the land. By virtue of his ownership, Carriedo was subrogated
to the rights and obligation of the former landowner, Roman.22
Mendoza then filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals (CA). The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 44521. In a Decision dated September 7,
1998,23 the CA affirmed the DARAB decision in toto. The CA ruled that
Mendoza’s reliance on Section 6 of RA No. 6657 as ground to nullify the sale
between De Jesus and Carriedo was misplaced, the section being limited to
retention limits. It reiterated that registration was not a condition for the validity
of the contract of sale between the parties.24 Mendoza’s Motions for
Reconsideration and New Trial were subsequently denied.25
Mendoza thus filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, docketed
as G.R. No. 143416. In a Resolution dated August 9, 2000,26 this Court denied
the petition for failure to comply with the requirements under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court. An Entry of Judgment was issued on October 25, 2000.27 In
effect, the Decision of the CA was affirmed, and the following issues were settled
with finality:
1) Carriedo is the absolute owner of the five (5) hectare land;
2) Mendoza had knowledge of the sale between Carriedo and Mario De Jesus,
hence he is bound by the sale; and
3) Due to his failure and refusal to pay the lease rentals, the tenancy relationship
between Carriedo and Mendoza had been terminated.
Meanwhile, on October 5, 1999, the landholding covered by TCT No. 17680
with an area of 12.1065 hectares was divided into sub-lots. 7.1065 hectares was
transferred to Bernabe Buscayno et al. through a Deed of Transfer28 under PD
No. 27.29 Eventually, TCT No. 17680 was partially cancelled, and in lieu thereof,
emancipation patents (EPs) were issued to Bernabe, Rod and Juanito, all
surnamed Buscayno. These lots were identified as Lots C, D and E covered by
TCT Nos. 44384 to 44386 issued on September 10, 1999.30 Lots A and B,
consisting of approximately 5.0001 hectares and which is the land being occupied
by Mendoza, were registered in the name of Carriedo and covered by TCT No.
34428131 and TCT No. 344282.32
The Redemption Case (DARAB III-T-1476-97 | CA-G.R. SP No. 88936)
On July 21, 1997, Mendoza filed a Petition for Redemption 33 with the PARAD.
In an Order dated January 15, 2001,34 the PARAD dismissed his petition on the
grounds of litis pendentia and lack of the required certification against forum-
shopping. It dismissed the petition so that the pending appeal of DARAB Case
No. 163-T-90 (the ejectment case discussed above) with the CA can run its full
course, since its outcome partakes of a prejudicial question determinative of the
tenability of Mendoza’s right to redeem the land under tenancy.35
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Mendoza appealed to the DARAB which reversed the PARAD Order in a
Decision dated November 12, 2003.36 The DARAB granted Mendoza
redemption rights over the land. It ruled that at the time Carriedo filed his
complaint for ejectment on October 1, 1990, he was no longer the owner of the
land, having sold the land to PLFI in June of 1990. Hence, the cause of action
pertains to PLFI and not to him.37 It also ruled that Mendoza was not notified of
the sale of the land to Carriedo and of the latter’s subsequent sale of it to PLFI.
The absence of the mandatory requirement of notice did not stop the running of
the 180 day-period within which Mendoza could exercise his right of
redemption.38 Carriedo’s Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.39
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review with the CA. In a Decision dated December
29, 2006,40 the CA reversed the DARAB Decision. It ruled that Carriedo’s
ownership of the land had been conclusively established and even affirmed by
this Court. Mendoza was not able to substantiate his claim that Carriedo was no
longer the owner of the land at the time the latter filed his complaint for
ejectment. It held that the DARAB erred when it ruled that Mendoza was not
guilty of forum-shopping.41 Mendoza did not appeal the decision of the CA.
The Coverage Case (ADM Case No. A-9999-03-CV-008-03 | CA-G.R. SP No. 88935)
On February 26, 2002, Mendoza, his daughter Corazon Mendoza (Corazon) and
Orlando Gomez (Orlando) filed a Petition for Coverage42 of the land under RA
No. 6657. They claimed that they had been in physical and material possession
of the land as tenants since 1956, and made the land productive.43 They prayed
(1) that an order be issued placing the land under Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP); and (2) that the DAR, the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Officer (PARO) and the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer (MARO) of Tarlac
City be ordered to proceed with the acquisition and distribution of the land in
their favor.44 The petition was granted by the Regional Director (RD) in an Order
dated October 2, 2002,45 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the petition for coverage under
CARP filed by Pablo Mendoza, et al[.], is given due course. Accordingly, the
MARO and PARO are hereby directed to place within the ambit of RA 6657 the
landholding registered in the name of Romeo Carriedo covered and embraced by
TCT Nos. 334281 and 334282, with an aggregate area of 45,000 and 5,001 square
meters, respectively, and to distribute the same to qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
SO ORDERED.46
On October 23, 2002, Carriedo filed a Protest with Motion to Reconsider the
Order dated October 2, 2002 and to Lift Coverage47 on the ground that he was
denied his constitutional right to due process. He alleged that he was not notified
of the filing of the Petition for Coverage, and became aware of the same only
upon receipt of the challenged Order.
83 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
On October 24, 2002, Carriedo received a copy of a Notice of Coverage dated
October 21, 200248 from MARO Maximo E. Santiago informing him that the
land had been placed under the coverage of the CARP.49 On December 16, 2002,
the RD denied Carriedo’s protest in an Order dated December 5,
2002.50 Carriedo filed an appeal to the DAR-CO.
In an Order dated February 22, 2005,51 the DAR-CO, through Secretary Rene C.
Villa, affirmed the Order of the RD granting coverage. The DAR-CO ruled that
Carriedo was no longer allowed to retain the land due to his violation of the
provisions of RA No. 6657. His act of disposing his agricultural landholdings was
tantamount to the exercise of his retention right, or an act amounting to a valid
waiver of such right in accordance with applicable laws and
jurisprudence.52 However, it did not rule whether Mendoza was qualified to be a
farmer-beneficiary of the land. The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Consequently, the Order dated 2 October
2002 of the Regional Director of DAR III, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.53
Carriedo filed a Petition for Review54 with the CA assailing the DAR-CO Order.
The appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 88935. In a Decision dated October
5, 2006, the CA reversed the DAR-CO, and declared the land as Carriedo’s
retained area. The CA ruled that the right of retention is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right, subject to certain qualifications specified by the legislature. 55 It
serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land acquisition by balancing the
rights of the landowner and the tenant by implementing the doctrine that social
justice was not meant to perpetrate an injustice against the landowner.56 It held
that Carriedo did not commit any of the acts which would constitute waiver of
his retention rights found under Section 6 of DAR Administrative Order No. 02,
S.2003.57 The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered and pursuant to applicable law and
jurisprudence on the matter, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED.
Accordingly, the assailed Order of the Department of Agrarian Reform-Central
Office, Elliptical Road, Diliman, Quezon City (dated February 22, 2005) is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered—
DECLARING the subject landholding as the Petitioner’s retained area. No
pronouncements as to costs.
SO ORDERED.58
Hence, this petition.
Petitioners maintain that the CA committed a reversible error in declaring the
land as Carriedo’s retained area.59
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They claim that Paragraph 4, Section 6 of RA No. 6657 prohibits any sale,
disposition, lease, management contract or transfer of possession of private lands
upon effectivity of the law.60 Thus, Regional Director Renato Herrera correctly
observed that Carriedo’s act of disposing his agricultural property would be
tantamount to his exercise of retention under the law. By violating the law,
Carriedo could no longer retain what was left of his property. "To rule otherwise
would be a roundabout way of rewarding a landowner who has violated the
explicit provisions of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law." 61
They also assert that Carriedo waived his right to retain for failure or neglect for
an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done earlier by
exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he abandoned his right
or declined to assert it.62 Petitioners claim that Carriedo has not filed an
Application for Retention over the subject land over a considerable passage of
time since the same was acquired for distribution to qualified farmer
beneficiaries.63
Lastly, they argue that Certificates of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) already
generated in favor of his co-petitioners Corazon Mendoza and Rolando Gomez
cannot be set aside. CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are enrolled in the Torrens
system of registration which makes them indefeasible as certificates of title issued
in registration proceedings.64
The Issue
The sole issue for our consideration is whether Carriedo has the right to retain
the land.
Our Ruling
We rule in the affirmative. Carriedo did not waive his right of retention over the
land.1âwphi1
The 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes landowner retention rights under
Article XIII, Section 4, to wit:
Section 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to
own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers,
to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage
and undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such
priorities and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking
into account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State shall
respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide incentives
for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)
RA No. 6657 implements this directive, thus:
85 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Section 6. Retention Limits. — Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land,
the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size
farm, such as commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility as
determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares.
xxx
The right to choose the area to be retained, which shall be compact or contiguous,
shall pertain to the landowner: Provided, however, That in case the area selected
for retention by the landowner is tenanted, the tenant shall have the option to
choose whether to remain therein or be a beneficiary in the same or another
agricultural land with similar or comparable features. In case the tenant chooses
to remain in the retained area, he shall be considered a leaseholder and shall lose
his right to be a beneficiary under this Act. In case the tenant chooses to be a
beneficiary in another agricultural land, he loses his right as a leaseholder to the
land retained by the landowner. The tenant must exercise this option within a
period of one (1) year from the time the landowner manifests his choice of the
area for retention. In all cases, the security of tenure of the farmers or
farmworkers on the land prior to the approval of this Act shall be respected. xxx
(Emphasis supplied.)
In Danan v. Court of Appeals,65 we explained the rationale for the grant of the right
of retention under agrarian reform laws such as RA No. 6657 and its predecessor
PD No. 27, to wit:
The right of retention is a constitutionally guaranteed right, which is subject to
qualification by the legislature. It serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory land
acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner. A retained area, as its name denotes, is land
which is not supposed to anymore leave the landowner's dominion, thus sparing
the government from the inconvenience of taking land only to return it to the
landowner afterwards, which would be a pointless process. For as long as the
area to be retained is compact or contiguous and does not exceed the retention
ceiling of five (5) hectares, a landowner's choice of the area to be retained must
prevail. xxx66
To interpret Section 6 of RA No. 6657, DAR issued Administrative Order No.
02, Series of 2003 (DAR AO 02-03). Section 6 of DAR AO 02-03 provides for
the instances when a landowner is deemed to have waived his right of retention,
to wit:

86 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Section 6. Waiver of the Right of Retention. – The landowner waives his right to
retain by committing any of the following act or omission:
6.1 Failure to manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain within sixty (60)
calendar days from receipt of notice of CARP coverage.
6.2 Failure to state such intention upon offer to sell or application under the
[Voluntary Land Transfer (VLT)]/[Direct Payment Scheme (DPS)] scheme.
6.3 Execution of any document stating that he expressly waives his right to retain.
The MARO and/or PARO and/or Regional Director shall attest to the due
execution of such document.
6.4 Execution of a Landowner Tenant Production Agreement and Farmer’s
Undertaking (LTPA-FU) or Application to Purchase and Farmer’s
Undertaking (APFU) covering subject property.
6.5 Entering into a VLT/DPS or [Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS)] but failing to
manifest an intention to exercise his right to retain upon filing of the application
for VLT/DPS or VOS.
6.6 Execution and submission of any document indicating that he is consenting
to the CARP coverage of his entire landholding.
6.7 Performing any act constituting estoppel by laches which is the failure or
neglect for an unreasonable length of time to do that which he may have done
earlier by exercising due diligence, warranting a presumption that he abandoned
his right or declined to assert it.
Petitioners cannot rely on the RD’s Order dated October 2, 2002 which granted
Mendoza’s petition for coverage on the ground that Carriedo violated paragraph
4 Section 667 of RA No. 6657 for disposing of his agricultural land, consequently
losing his right of retention. At the time when the Order was rendered, up to the
time when it was affirmed by the DAR-CO in its Order dated February 22, 2005,
the applicable law is Section 6 of DAR 02-03. Section 6 clearly shows that the
disposition of agricultural land is not an act constituting waiver of the right of
retention.
Thus, as correctly held by the CA, Carriedo "[n]ever committed any of the acts
or omissions above-stated (DAR AO 02-03). Not even the sale made by the
herein petitioner in favor of PLFI can be considered as a waiver of his right of
retention. Likewise, the Records of the present case is bereft of any showing that
the herein petitioner expressly waived (in writing) his right of retention as
required under sub-section 6.3, section 6, DAR Administrative Order No. 02-
S.2003."68

87 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Petitioners claim that Carriedo’s alleged failure to exercise his right of retention
after a long period of time constituted a waiver of his retention rights, as
envisioned in Item 6.7 of DAR AO 02-03.
We disagree.
Laches is defined as the failure or neglect for an unreasonable and unexplained
length of time, to do that which by exercising due diligence could or should have
been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable
time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has
abandoned it or declined to assert it.69 Where a party sleeps on his rights and
allows laches to set in, the same is fatal to his case.70
Section 4 of DAR AO 02-03 provides:
Section 4. Period to Exercise Right of Retention under RA 6657
4.1 The landowner may exercise his right of retention at any time before receipt
of notice of coverage.
4.2 Under the Compulsory Acquisition (CA) scheme, the landowner shall
exercise his right of retention within sixty (60) days from receipt of notice of
coverage.
4.3 Under the Voluntary Offer to Sell (VOS) and the Voluntary Land Transfer
(VLT)/Direct Payment Scheme (DPS), the landowner shall exercise his right of
retention simultaneously at the time of offer for sale or transfer.
The foregoing rules give Carriedo any time before receipt of the notice of
coverage to exercise his right of retention, or if under compulsory acquisition (as
in this case), within sixty (60) days from receipt of the notice of coverage. The
validity of the notice of coverage is the very subject of the controversy before this
court. Thus, the period within which Carriedo should exercise his right of
retention cannot commence until final resolution of this case.
Even assuming that the period within which Carriedo could exercise his right of
retention has commenced, Carriedo cannot be said to have neglected to assert his
right of retention over the land. The records show that per Legal Report dated
December 13, 199971 prepared by Legal Officer Ariel Reyes, Carriedo filed an
application for retention which was even contested by Pablo Mendoza’s son,
Fernando.72 Though Carriedo subsequently withdrew his application, his act of
filing an application for retention belies the allegation that he abandoned his right
of retention or declined to assert it.
In their Memorandum73 however, petitioners, for the first time, invoke estoppel,
citing DAR Administrative Order No. 05 Series of 2006 74 (DAR AO 05-06) to
support their argument that Carriedo waived his right of retention. 75 DAR AO
05-06 provides for the rules and regulations governing the acquisition and
88 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
distribution of agricultural lands subject of conveyances under Sections 6,
7076 and 73 (a)77 of RA No. 6657. Petitioners particularly cite Item no. 4 of the
Statement of Policies of DAR AO 05-06, to wit:
II. Statement of Policies
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectares retention area,
the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares
sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the
Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle
of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s’
retained area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare
landholding ceiling pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657.
Insofar as the excess area is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered
considering that the transferor has no right of disposition since CARP coverage
has been vested as of 15 June 1988. Any landholding still registered in the name
of the landowner after earlier dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5)
hectares can no longer be part of his retention area and therefore shall be covered
under CARP. (Emphasis supplied.)
Citing this provision, petitioners argue that Carriedo lost his right of retention
over the land because he had already sold or disposed, after the effectivity of RA
No. 6657, more than fifty (50) hectares of land in favor of another.78
In his Memorandum,79 Carriedo maintains that petitioners cannot invoke any
administrative regulation to defeat his right of retention. He argues that
"administrative regulation must be in harmony with the provisions of law
otherwise the latter prevails."80
We cannot sustain petitioners' argument. Their reliance on DAR AO 05-06 is
misplaced. As will be seen below, nowhere in the relevant provisions of RA No.
6657 does it indicate that a multiple or series of transfers/sales of land would
result in the loss of retention rights. Neither do they provide that the multiple or
series of transfers or sales amounts to the waiver of such right.
The relevant portion of Section 6 of RA No. 6657 referred to in Item no. 4 of
DAR AO 05-06 provides:
Section 6. Retention Limits. – Except as otherwise provided in this Act, no person
may own or retain, directly or indirectly, any public or private agricultural land,
the size of which shall vary according to factors governing a viable family-size
farm, such as the commodity produced, terrain, infrastructure, and soil fertility
as determined by the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) created
hereunder, but in no case shall retention by the landowner exceed five (5)
hectares. xxx
89 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
Upon the effectivity of this Act, any sale, disposition, lease, management,
contract or transfer of possession of private lands executed by the original
landowner in violation of the Act shall be null and void: Provided, however,
That those executed prior to this Act shall be valid only when registered with the
Register of Deeds within a period of three (3) months after the effectivity of this
Act. Thereafter, all Registers of Deeds shall inform the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) within thirty (30) days of any transaction involving agricultural
lands in excess of five (5) hectares. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 70 of RA No. 6657, also referred to in Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06
partly provides:
The sale or disposition of agricultural lands retained by a landowner as a
consequence of Section 6 hereof shall be valid as long as the total landholdings
that shall be owned by the transferee thereof inclusive of the land to be acquired
shall not exceed the landholding ceilings provided for in this Act. Any sale or
disposition of agricultural lands after the effectivity of this Act found to be
contrary to the provisions hereof shall be null and void. xxx (Emphasis
supplied.)
Finally, Section 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 as referred to in Item No. 4 of DAR AO
05-06 provides,
Section 73. Prohibited Acts and Omissions. – The following are prohibited:
(a) The ownership or possession, for the purpose of circumventing the provisions
of this Act, of agricultural lands in excess of the total retention limits or award
ceilings by any person, natural or juridical, except those under collective
ownership by farmer-beneficiaries; xxx
Sections 6 and 70 are clear in stating that any sale and disposition of agricultural
lands in violation of the RA No. 6657 shall be null and void. Under the facts of
this case, the reasonable reading of these three provisions in relation to the
constitutional right of retention should be that the consequence of nullity pertains
to the area/s which were sold, or owned by the transferee, in excess of the 5-
hectare land ceiling. Thus, the CA was correct in declaring that the land is
Carriedo’s retained area.81
Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 attempts to defeat the above reading by providing
that, under the principle of estoppel, the sale of the first five hectares is valid. But,
it hastens to add that the first five hectares sold corresponds to the transferor/s’
retained area. Thus, since the sale of the first five hectares is valid, therefore, the
landowner loses the five hectares because it happens to be, at the same time, the
retained area limit. In reality, Item No. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 operates as a
forfeiture provision in the guise of estoppel. It punishes the landowner who sells
in excess of five hectares. Forfeitures, however, partake of a criminal penalty.82
90 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In Perez v. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc.,83 this Court said that for
an administrative regulation to have the force of a penal law, (1) the violation of
the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute
itself; and (2) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute
itself.84
Sections 6, 70 and 73 (a) of RA No. 6657 clearly do not provide that a sale or
disposition of land in excess of 5 hectares results in a forfeiture of the five hectare
retention area. Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 imposes a penalty where none was
provided by law.
As this Court also held in People v. Maceren,85 to wit:
The reason is that the Fisheries law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Order Nos. 84 and
84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to
that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.86
The repugnancy between the law and Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is apparent
by a simple comparison of their texts. The conflict undermines the statutorily-
guaranteed right of the landowner to choose the land he shall retain, and DAR
AO 05-06, in effect, amends RA No. 6657.
In Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura, Sayoc & De Los Angeles (RMBSA) v. Home
Development Mutual Fund (HDMF),87 this Court was confronted with the issue of
the validity of the amendments to the rules and regulations implementing PD
No. 1752.88 In that case, PD No. 1752 (as amended by RA No. 7742) exempted
RMBSA from the Pag-Ibig Fund coverage for the period January 1 to December
31, 1995. In September 1995, however, the HDMF Board of Trustees issued a
board resolution amending and modifying the rules and regulations
implementing RA No. 7742. As amended, the rules now required that for a
company to be entitled to a waiver or suspension of fund coverage, it must have
a plan providing for both provident/retirement and housing benefits superior to
those provided in the Pag-Ibig Fund. In ruling against the amendment and
modification of the rules, this Court held that—
In the present case, when the Board of Trustees of the HDMF required in Section
1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations Implementing
R.A. No. 7742 that employers should have both provident/retirement and
housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the
Fund, it effectively amended Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. And when the Board
subsequently abolished that exemption through the 1996 Amendments, it
91 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
repealed Section 19 of P.D. No. 1752. Such amendment and subsequent repeal
of Section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the
Board. The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a
regulation not consistent with the law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative
issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law, but must remain
consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or
amend the law.89 (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied.)
Laws, as well as the issuances promulgated to implement them, enjoy the
presumption of validity.90 However, administrative regulations that alter or
amend the statute or enlarge or impair its scope are void, and courts not only
may, but it is their obligation to strike down such regulations.91 Thus, in this case,
because Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 is patently null and void, the presumption
of validity cannot be accorded to it. The invalidity of this provision constrains us
to strike it down for being ultra vires.
In Conte v. Commission on Audit,92 the sole issue of whether the Commission on
Audit (COA) acted in grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed in audit
therein petitioners' claim of financial assistance under Social Security System
(SSS) Resolution No. 56 was presented before this Court. The COA disallowed
the claims because the financial assistance under the challenged resolution is
similar to a separate retirement plan which results in the increase of benefits
beyond what is allowed under existing laws. This Court, sitting en banc, upheld
the findings of the COA, and invalidated SSS Resolution No. 56 for being ultra
vires, to wit:
xxx Said Sec. 28 (b) as amended by RA 4968 in no uncertain terms bars the
creation of any insurance or retirement plan — other than the GSIS — for
government officers and employees, in order to prevent the undue and
[iniquitous] proliferation of such plans. It is beyond cavil that Res. 56 contravenes
the said provision of law and is therefore invalid, void and of no effect. xxx
We are not unmindful of the laudable purposes for promulgating Res. 56, and
the positive results it must have had xxx. But it is simply beyond dispute that the
SSS had no authority to maintain and implement such retirement plan,
particularly in the face of the statutory prohibition. The SSS cannot, in the guise
of rule-making, legislate or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
It is doctrinal that in case of conflict between a statute and an administrative
order, the former must prevail. A rule or regulation must conform to and be
consistent with the provisions of the enabling statute in order for such rule or
regulation to be valid. The rule-making power of a public administrative body is
a delegated legislative power, which it may not use either to abridge the authority
given it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its power beyond the
scope intended. xxx Though well-settled is the rule that retirement laws are
92 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree, nevertheless, there is really nothing to
interpret in either RA 4968 or Res. 56, and correspondingly, the absence of any
doubt as to the ultra-vires nature and illegality of the disputed resolution
constrains us to rule against petitioners.93 (Citations omitted; emphasis and
underscoring supplied.)
Administrative regulations must be in harmony with the provisions of the law for
administrative regulations cannot extend the law or amend a legislative
enactment.94 Administrative issuances must not override, but must remain
consistent with the law they seek to apply and implement. They are intended to
carry out, not to supplant or modify the law.95 Administrative or executive acts,
orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws
or the Constitution.96 Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head
in conformity with law have the force of law.97 As he exercises the rule-making
power by delegation of the lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not
transcend the bounds demarcated by the statute for the exercise of that power;
otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own right
and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.98
If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the rule-making
authority of the administrative agency, they are without binding effect upon the
courts. At best, the same may be treated as administrative interpretations of the
law and as such, they may be set aside by the Supreme Court in the final
determination of what the law means.99
While this Court is mindful of the DAR’s commitment to the implementation of
agrarian reform, it must be conceded that departmental zeal may not be
permitted to outrun the authority conferred by statute.100 Neither the high dignity
of the office nor the righteousness of the motive then is an acceptable substitute;
otherwise the rule of law becomes a myth.101
As a necessary consequence of the invalidity of Item no. 4 of DAR AO 05-06 for
being ultra vires, we hold that Carriedo did not waive his right to retain the land,
nor can he be considered to be in estoppel.
Finally, petitioners cannot argue that the CLOAs allegedly granted in favor of
his co-petitioners Corazon and Orlando cannot be set aside. They claim that
CLOAs under RA No. 6657 are enrolled in the Torrens system of registration
which makes them indefeasible as certificates of title issued in registration
proceedings.102 Even as these allegedly issued CLOAs are not in the records, we
hold that CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens certificate of title, and thus are
not indefeasible.
CLOAs and EPs are similar in nature to a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT) in
ordinary land registration proceedings. CLTs, and in turn the CLOAs and EPs,
are issued merely as preparatory steps for the eventual issuance of a certificate of
93 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
title. They do not possess the indefeasibility of certificates of title. Justice Oswald
D. Agcaoili, in Property Registration Decree and Related Laws (Land Titles and
Deeds),103 notes, to wit:
Under PD No. 27, beneficiaries arc issued certificates of land transfers (ClTs) to
entitle them to possess lands. Thereafter, they are issued emancipation patents
(EPs) after compliance with all necessary conditions. Such EPs, upon their
presentation to the Register of Deeds, shall be the basis for the issuance of the
corresponding transfer certificates of title (TCTs) in favor of the corresponding
beneficiaries.
Under RA No. 6657, the procedure has been simplified. Only certificates of land
ownership award (CLOAs) are issued, in lieu of EPs, after compliance with all
prerequisites. Upon presentation of the CLOAs to the Register of Deeds, TCTs
are issued to the designated beneficiaries. CLTs are no longer issued.
The issuance of EPs or CLOAs to beneficiaries does not absolutely bar the
landowner from retaining the area covered thereby. Under AO No. 2, series of
1994, an EP or CLOA may be cancelled if the land covered is later found to be
part of the landowner's retained area. (Citations omitted; underscoring supplied.)
The issue, however, involving the issuance, recall or cancellation of EPs or
CLOAs, is lodged with the DAR,104 which has the primary jurisdiction over the
matter.105
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated October 5, 2006
is AFFIRMED. Item no. 4 of DAR Administrative Order No. 05, Series of
2006 is hereby declared INVALID, VOID and OF NO EFFECT for
being ultra vires.
SO ORDERED.

94 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
CASE NO. 14:
G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018 - DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN
REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO MENDOZA, Petitioner, v. ROMEO
C. CARRIEDO, Respondents.

SPECIAL THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 176549, October 10, 2018
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, QUEZON CITY & PABLO
MENDOZA, Petitioner,
v.
ROMEO C. CARRIEDO, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
JARDELEZA, J.:
We resolve the motion for reconsideration 1 filed by the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) of the Decision2 dated January 20, 2016.
At the onset, we note that the DAR was not given the opportunity to participate
in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals and before this Court, until it filed
its motion for reconsideration of this Court's Decision. In its motion for
reconsideration, the DAR contends that the agency had been denied due process
when it was not afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations against the
validity of DAR Administrative Order No. 5, Series of 2006 3 (AO 05-06) before
the Court of Appeals and before this Court.4 It argues that the basic requirement
of due process has not been accorded to the agency because it was not even
notified of the petition filed before the Court of Appeals; nor did the Court of
Appeals notify the DAR of the proceedings and its Decision.5 The DAR,
therefore, insists that the Decision dated January 20, 2016 be reconsidered by this
Court especially so that the issues involve the enforcement and validity of its
regulations.6
We agree with the DAR. Being the government agency legally mandated to
implement the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 7 (CARL) and the
primary agency vested with the expertise on the technicalities of the CARL,8 the
DAR's position on the issues raised before us deserves cogent consideration. In
fact, the CARL specifically empowers the DAR to issue rules and regulations,
whether substantive or procedural, to carry out the objects and purposes of the
law.9 Administrative rules and regulations ordinarily deserve to be given weight
95 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
and respect by the courts in view of the rule-making authority given to those who
formulate them and their specific expertise in their respective fields.10 In this case,
it cannot be denied that the DAR possesses the special knowledge and acquired
expertise on the implementation of the agrarian reform program. To pay no heed
to its position on the issues raised before us ignores the basic precepts of due
process. Therefore, under these circumstances, we are impelled to revisit our
Decision, this time taking into account the arguments and position of the DAR.
To reiterate, the core issue before us is whether Romeo C. Carriedo's (Carriedo)
previous sale of his landholdings to Peoples' Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PLFI)
can be treated as the exercise of his retention rights, such that he cannot lawfully
claim the subject landholding as his retained area anymore.11 The issue
necessarily touches on the validity of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 and the relevant
provisions of the CARL. Further, the issue of whether Certificates of Land
Ownership Awards (CLOAs) possess the indefeasibility accorded to a Torrens
certificate of title is likewise raised before this Court.
We will discuss the issues in seriatim.
On the validity of Item No. 4, AO 05-06
The Decision adjudged Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as ultra vires for providing terms
which appear to expand or modify some provisions of the CARL.12 The DAR
argues that this ruling sets back the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
by upsetting its established substantive and procedural components. Particularly,
the DAR contends that the nullification of Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 disregarded
the long-standing procedure where the DAR treats a sale (without its clearance)
as valid based on the doctrine of estoppel, and that the sold portion is treated as
the landowner's retained area.13
Applying Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 to the facts of this case, the DAR submits that
the subject landholding cannot be considered as the retained area of Carriedo
anymore because he has already exercised his right of retention when he
previously sold his landholdings without DAR clearance.14 The DAR specifies
that sometime in June 1990, Carriedo unilaterally sold to PLFI his agricultural
landholdings with approximately 58.3723 hectares. The DAR, therefore, argues
that Carriedo's act of disposing his landholdings is tantamount to the exercise of
his right of retention under the law.15
Item No. 4 of AO 05-06, provides:
II. STATEMENT OF POLICIES
xxxx
4. Where the transfer/sale involves more than the five (5) hectare retention area,
the transfer is considered violative of Sec. 6 of R.A. No. 6657.

96 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
In case of multiple or series of transfers/sales, the first five (5) hectares
sold/conveyed without DAR clearance and the corresponding titles issued by the
Register of Deeds (ROD) in the name of the transferee shall, under the principle
of estoppel, be considered valid and shall be treated as the transferor/s' retained
area but in no case shall the transferee exceed the five-hectare landholding ceiling
pursuant to Sections 6, 70 and 73(a) of R.A. No. 6657. Insofar as the excess area
is concerned, the same shall likewise be covered considering that the transferor
has no right of disposition since CARP coverage has been vested as of 15 June
1988. Any landholding still registered in the name of the landowner after earlier
dispositions totaling an aggregate of five (5) hectares can no longer be part of his
retention area and therefore shall be covered under CARP.
The DAR's argument has merit.
The Constitution mandates for an agrarian reform program, thus:
ARTICLE XIII
xxxx
Agrarian and Natural Resources Reform
Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded
on the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly
or collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive
a just share of the fruits thereof. To this end, the State shall encourage and
undertake the just distribution of all agricultural lands, subject to such priorities
and reasonable retention limits as the Congress may prescribe, taking into
account ecological, developmental, or equity considerations, and subject to
the payment of just compensation. In determining retention limits, the State
shall respect the right of small landowners. The State shall further provide
incentives for voluntary land-sharing. (Emphasis supplied.)
To give life to the foregoing Constitutional provision, the CARL provides,
among others:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles and Policies. -It is the policy of the State to
pursue a Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). The welfare of the
landless farmers and farmworkers will receive the highest consideration to
promote social justice and to move the nation toward sound rural development
and industrialization, and the establishment of owner cultivatorship of
economic-size farms as the basis of Philippine agriculture.
To this end, a more equitable distribution and ownership of land, with due
regard to the rights of landowners to just compensation and to the ecological
needs of the nation, shall be undertaken to provide farmers and farmworkers with
the opportunity to enhance their dignity and improve the quality of their lives
through greater productivity of agricultural lands. (Emphasis supplied.)
97 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
xxxx
Both the Constitution and CARL underscore the underlying principle of the
agrarian reform program, that is, to endeavor a more equitable and just distribution of
agricultural lands taking into account, among others, equity considerations. We find
merit in the DAR's contention that the objective of AO 05-06 is equitable16—that
in order to ensure the effective implementation of the CARL, previous sales of
landholding (without DAR clearance) should be treated as the exercise of
retention rights of the landowner, as embodied in Item No. 4 of the said
administrative order.17
The equity in this policy of AO 05-06 is apparent and easily discernible. By selling
his landholdings, it is reasonably presumed that the landowner already received
an amount (as purchase price) commensurate to the just compensation
conformable with the constitutional and statutory requirement. At this point,
equity dictates that he cannot claim anymore, either in the guise of his retention
area or otherwise, that which he already received in the previous sale of his land.
In Delfino, Sr. v. Anasao,18 the issue of whether the inclusion of the two-hectare
portion sold by Delfino to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. (without DAR clearance)
resulted in the diminution of his retention rights was raised before this Court. In
that case, Delfino was adjudged by the DAR to be entitled to five hectares of
retention area, to be taken out from the tenanted area that he owns.
Subsequently, however, and without prior clearance from the DAR, Delfino sold
two hectares of land to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. This supervening event
prompted the DAR Secretary to clarify his previous Order (albeit the same having
already attained finality) and found it fair and equitable to include the two-hectare
portion sold to SM Prime Holdings, Inc. as part of Delfino's retention area.
Consequently, Delfino is now entitled only to the balance of three hectares. Upon
motion for reconsideration by Delfino, the DAR Secretary explained that the
clarification was made in order not to circumvent the five-hectare limitation as said
landowner "cannot [be allowed to] simultaneously enjoy x x x the proceeds of the [sale] and
at the same time exercise the right of retention under CARP. "19 This Court upheld the
clarification issued by the DAR Secretary insofar as in holding that Delfino had
partially exercised his right of retention when he sold two hectares to SM Prime
Holdings, Inc. after his application for retention was granted by the DAR.20 We
do not see any reason why the same principle cannot be applied in this case.
In relation to this, we also take note of the submissions of the DAR pertaining to
the "immense danger to the implementation of CARP" that it perceives to arise
as a consequence of our Decision. Particularly, DAR posits that the Decision
"will provide landowners unbridled freedom to dispose any or all of their
agricultural properties without DAR clearance and still at a moment's notice
decide which of those lands he wishes to retain, to the prejudice not only of the tenants
and/or farmer beneficiaries but of the entire CARP as well."21 It further posits that to
98 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
allow Carriedo to claim the subject landholdings as his retained area "will in
effect put on hold the implementation of [the] CARP to wait for the landowner,
despite selling majority of his agricultural landholdings, and despite receiving
compensation for the same, to still be able to choose the retention area."22
The DAR, therefore, maintains that AO 05-06 is the regulation adopted by the
agency precisely in order to prevent these perceived dangers in the
implementation of the CARL. The policy behind AO 05-06 should deter any
attempt to circumvent the provisions of the CARL which may arise under a
factual milieu similar in this case.
We also agree with the DAR on this point.
AO 05-06 is in consonance with the Stewardship Doctrine, which has been held
to be the property concept in Section 6,23 Article II of the 1973 Constitution.
Under this concept, private property is supposed to be held by the individual only
as a trustee for the people in general, who are its real owners. As a mere steward,
the individual must exercise his rights to the property not for his own exclusive
and selfish benefit but for the good of the entire community or nation.24 Property
use must not only be for the benefit of the owner but of society as well. The State,
in the promotion of social justice, may regulate the acquisition, ownership, use,
enjoyment, and disposition of private property, and equitably diffuse property
ownership and profits.25 It has been held that Presidential Decree No. 27, one of
the precursors of the CARL, embodies this policy and concept.26
This interpretation is consistent with the objective of the agrarian reform
program, which is, of course, land distribution to the landless farmers and
farmworkers.27 The objective is carried out by Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 as it
provides for the consequences in situations where a landowner had sold portions
of his/her land with an area more than the statutory limitation of five hectares.
In this scenario, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 treats the sale of the first five hectares
as the exercise of the landowner's retention rights. The reason is that, effectively,
the landowner has already chosen, and in fact has already disposed of, and has
been duly compensated for, the area he is entitled to retain under the law.
Further, Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 is consistent with Section 7028 of the CARL as
the former likewise treats the sale of the first five hectares (in case of
multiple/series of transactions) as valid, such that the same already constitutes
the retained area of the landowner. This legal consequence arising from the
previous sale of land therefore eliminates the prejudice, in terms of equitable land
distribution, that may befall the landless farmers and farmworkers.
We note that records also bear that the previous sale of Carriedo's landholdings
was made in violation of the law, being made without the clearance of the
DAR.29 To rule that Carriedo is still entitled to retain the subject landholding
will, in effect, reward the violation, which this Court cannot allow. We
99 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
emphasize that the right of retention serves to mitigate the effects of compulsory
land acquisition by balancing the rights of the landowner and the tenant, and by
implementing the doctrine that social justice was not meant to perpetrate an
injustice against the landowner.30 In this case, however, Carriedo claims his right
over the subject landholding not because he was "deprived" of a portion of his
land as a consequence of compulsory land coverage, but precisely because he
already previously sold his landholdings, so that the subject landholding is the
only portion left for him.
Although constitutionally guaranteed, the exercise of a landowner's right of
retention should not be done without due regard to other considerations which
may affect the implementation of the agrarian reform program. This is especially
true when such exercise pays no heed to the intent of the law, or worse, when
such exercise amounts to its circumvention.
In view of the foregoing, we hold that Item No. 4 of AO 05-06 is valid. Indeed,
the issue in this case is more than the mere claim of an individual to his retained
area, but had been, at the onset, an issue of the implementation of the CARL in
line with the mandate and objective as set forth in the Constitution.
On Certificate of Land Ownership Award
The Decision also adjudged that CLOAs are not equivalent to a Torrens
certificate of title, and thus are not indefeasible.31 The DAR disagrees and
submits that this ruling relegated Emancipation Patents and CLOAs to the status
of a Certificate of Land Transfer, which is merely part of the preparatory steps
for the eventual issuance of a certificate of title.32
We agree with the DAR. A Certificate of Land Ownership Award or CLOA is a
document evidencing ownership of the land granted or awarded to the
beneficiary by the DAR, and contains the restrictions and conditions provided
for in the CARL and otl1er applicable laws.33
Section 24 of the CARL, as amended,34 reads:
Sec. 24. Award to Beneficiaries. - The rights and responsibilities of the
beneficiaries shall commence from their receipt of a duly registered emancipation
patent or certificate of land ownership award and their actual physical possession
of the awarded land. Such award shall be completed in not more than one
hundred eighty (180) days from the date of registration of the title in the name of
the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the emancipation patents, the
certificates of land ownership award, and other titles issued under any
agrarian reform program shall be indefeasible and imprescriptible after one (1)
year from its registration with the Office of the Registry of Deeds, subject to
the conditions, limitations and qualifications of this Act, the property registration
decree, and other pertinent laws. The emancipation patents or the certificates
100 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
of land ownership award being titles brought under the operation of the
torrens system, are conferred with the same indefeasibility and security
afforded to all titles under the said system, as provided for by Presidential
Decree No. 1529, as amended by Republic Act No. 6732. (Emphasis supplied.)
xxxx
Further, in Estribillo v. Department of Agrarian Reform,35 we held that:
The rule in this jurisdiction, regarding public land patents and the character of
the certificate of title that may be issued by virtue thereof, is that where land is
granted by the government to a private individual, the corresponding patent
therefor is recorded, and the certificate of title is issued to the grantee; thereafter,
the land is automatically brought within the operation of the Land Registration
Act, the title issued to the grantee becoming entitled to all the safeguards provided
in Section 38 of the said Act. In other words, upon expiration of one year from
its issuance, the certificate of title shall become irrevocable and indefeasible like
a certificate issued in a registration proceeding. (Emphasis and italics omitted.)
The EPs themselves, like the Certificates of Land Ownership Award (CLOAs) in
Republic Act No. 6657 (the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988), are
enrolled in the Torrens system of registration. The Property Registration Decree
in fact devotes Chapter IX on the subject of EPs. Indeed, such EPs and CLOAs
are, in themselves, entitled to be as indefeasible as certificates of title issued in
registration proceedings.36 (Citation omitted.)
We, however, note that the issue involving the issuance, recall, or cancellation
of CLOAs is lodged with the DAR,37 which has primary jurisdiction over the
matter.38
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration filed by the
Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby GRANTED, and the Decision dated
January 20, 2016 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Item No. 4 of DAR
Administrative Order No. 05, Series of 2006 is hereby declared VALID.
SO ORDERED.

CASE NO. 15:

Philippine Supreme Court Jurisprudence > Year 2011 > March 2011
Decisions > [G.R. No. 181370, March 09 : 2011] JULIAN S. LEBRUDO AND
REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO, PETITIONERS, VS. REMEDIOS LOYOLA,
RESPONDENT. :

101 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 181370, March 09 : 2011]

JULIAN S. LEBRUDO AND REYNALDO L. LEBRUDO,

PETITIONERS,
VS.
REMEDIOS LOYOLA, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before the Court is a petition[1] for review on certiorari assailing the

Resolution[2] dated 4 January 2008 and Decision[3] dated 17 August 2007 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.
The Facts

Respondent Remedios Loyola (Loyola) owns a 240-square meter parcel of land

located in Barangay Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite, known as Lot No. 723-6,
Block 1, Psd-73149 (lot), awarded by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR) under Republic Act No. 6657[4] (RA 6657) or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. This lot is covered by Certificate of Land
Ownership[5] (CLOA) No. 20210 issued in favor of Loyola on 27 December
1990 and duly registered on 14 March 1991 under Transfer of Certificate of
Title (TCT)/CLOA No. 998.

On 27 June 1995, petitioner Julian S. Lebrudo (Lebrudo), now deceased and

represented by his son, petitioner Reynaldo L. Lebrudo, filed with the Office of
the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) of Trece Martires City,
Cavite, an action[6] for the cancellation of the TCT/CLOA in the name of
Loyola and the issuance of another for the one-half portion of the lot in
Lebrudo's favor.

In a Decision[7] dated 18 December 1995, the PARAD dismissed the case

without prejudice on the ground that the case was filed prematurely. On 11
102 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
March 1996, Lebrudo re-filed the same action.[8]

Lebrudo alleged that he was approached by Loyola sometime in 1989 to

redeem the lot, which was mortgaged by Loyola's mother, Cristina Hugo, to
Trinidad Barreto. After Lebrudo redeemed the lot for P250.00 and a cavan
of palay, Loyola again sought Lebrudo's help in obtaining title to the lot in her
name by shouldering all the expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from
her mother, Cristina Hugo. In exchange, Loyola promised to give Lebrudo the
one-half portion of the lot. Thereafter, TCT/CLOA No. 998 was issued in
favor of Loyola. Loyola then allegedly executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay[9] dated
28 December 1989, waiving and transferring her rights over the one-half
portion of the lot in favor of Lebrudo. To reiterate her commitment, Loyola
allegedly executed two more Sinumpaang Salaysay[10] dated 1 December 1992
and 3 December 1992, committing herself to remove her house constructed on
the corresponding one-half portion to be allotted to Lebrudo.

Thereafter, Lebrudo asked Loyola to comply with her promise. However,

Loyola refused. Lebrudo sought the assistance of the Sangguniang Barangay of
Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite; the Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Carmona, Cavite; and the Department of Agrarian Reform to mediate.
However, despite steps taken to amicably settle the issue, as evidenced by
certifications from the PNP and the barangay, there was no amicable settlement.
Thus, Lebrudo filed an action against Loyola.

In her Answer, Loyola maintained that Lebrudo was the one who approached
her and offered to redeem the lot and the release of the CLOA. Loyola denied
promising one-half portion of the lot as payment for the transfer, titling and
registration of the lot. Loyola explained that the lot was her only property and it
was already being occupied by her children and their families. Loyola also
denied the genuineness and due execution of the
two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992. The
records do not show whether Loyola renounced the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated
1 December 1992.

In a Decision[11] dated 13 February 2002, the PARAD of Trece Martires City,

Cavite decided the case in Lebrudo's favor. The dispositive portion of the
decision states:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, JUDGMENT is hereby rendered:
a) Declaring Respondent Remedios Loyola disqualified as farmer beneficiary of
the subject land identified as Lot 723-6, Block 1, under TCT/CLOA No. 998;

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b) Declaring the Deed of sales over the subject lot illegal and ordered the same
set aside;

c) Declaring Plaintiff JULIAN LEBRUDO entitled to one half (½) of the

subject property under TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of Remedios Loyola;

d) Ordering the other one half (½) of the subject lot ready for allocation to
qualified beneficiary;

e) Ordering the DAR PARO Office thru the Operations Division to cancel
TCT/CLOA No. 998 and in lieu thereof, to generate and issue another title
over the 120 square meters in the name of JULIAN LEBRUDO;

f) Ordering the survey of the subject lot at the expense of the petitioner so that
title be issued to plaintiff herein;

g) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to cancel TCT/CLOA

No. 998 in the name of Remedios Loyola;

h) Ordering the Register of Deeds, Trece Martires City to register the title in the
name [of] Julian Lebrudo as presented by the DAR or its representative over
the lot in question;

No pronouncement as to costs and damages.

SO ORDERED.[12]

Loyola appealed to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board

(DARAB).[13] In a Decision[14] dated 24 August 2004, the DARAB reversed the
decision of the PARAD and ruled in Loyola's favor. The dispositive portion
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:

1. Upholding and maintaining the validity and effectivity of TCT/CLOA No.

998 in the name of the respondent;

2. Declaring the Sinumpaang Salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and

December 3, 1992 attached to the petition as Annex C and F, null and void
without legal force and effect;

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3. Directing the Register of Deeds of Trece Martires City, Cavite to reinstate
TCT/CLOA No. 998 in the name of the respondent.

The status quo ante order issued by this Board on November 3, 2003 is hereby
LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.[15]

Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the DARAB denied in a

Resolution[16] dated 12 April 2005. Lebrudo then filed a petition[17] for review
with the CA.

In a Decision[18] dated 17 August 2007, the CA affirmed the decision of the

DARAB. Lebrudo filed a motion for reconsideration which the CA denied in a
Resolution[19] dated 4 January 2008.

Hence, this petition.

The Issue

The main issue is whether Lebrudo is entitled to the one-half portion of the lot
covered by RA 6657 on the basis of the waiver and transfer of rights embodied
in the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28 December 1989 and 3 December 1992
allegedly executed by Loyola in his favor.
The Court's Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

A Certificate of Land Ownership or CLOA is a document evidencing

ownership of the land granted or awarded to the beneficiary by DAR, and
contains the restrictions and conditions provided for in RA 6657 and other
applicable laws. Section 27 of RA 6657, as amended by RA 9700,[20] which
provides for the transferability of awarded lands, states:
SEC. 27. Transferability of Awarded Lands. - Lands acquired by beneficiaries
under this ACT may not be sold, transferred or conveyed except through
hereditary succession, or to the government, or to the LBP, or to other
qualified beneficiaries for a period of ten (10) years : Provided, however,
That the children or the spouse of the transferor shall have a right to repurchase
the land from the government or LBP within a period of two (2) years. Due
notice of the availability of the land shall be given by the LBP to the Barangay
Agrarian Reform Committee (BARC) of the barangay where the land is
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situated. The Provincial Agrarian Coordinating Committee (PARCCOM), as
herein provided, shall, in turn, be given due notice thereof by the BARC.

The title of the land awarded under the agrarian reform must indicate that it is
an emancipation patent or a certificate of land ownership award and the
subsequent transfer title must also indicate that it is an emancipation patent or a
certificate of land ownership award.

If the land has not yet been fully paid by the beneficiary, the rights to the land
may be transferred or conveyed, with prior approval of the DAR, to any heir of
the beneficiary or to any other beneficiary who, as a condition for such transfer
or conveyance, shall cultivate the land himself. Failing compliance herewith,
the land shall be transferred to the LBP which shall give due notice of the
availability of the land in the manner specified in the immediately preceding
paragraph. x x x (Emphasis supplied)

It is clear from the provision that lands awarded to beneficiaries under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) may not be sold,
transferred or conveyed for a period of 10 years. The law enumerated four
exceptions: (1) through hereditary succession; (2) to the government; (3) to the
Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP); or (4) to other qualified beneficiaries. In
short, during the prohibitory 10-year period, any sale, transfer or conveyance of
land reform rights is void, except as allowed by law, in order to prevent a
circumvention of agrarian reform laws.

In the present case, Lebrudo insists that he is entitled to one-half portion of the
lot awarded to Loyola under the CARP as payment for shouldering all the
expenses for the transfer of the title of the lot from Loyola's mother, Cristina
Hugo, to Loyola's name. Lebrudo used the two Sinumpaang Salaysay executed
by Loyola alloting to him the one-half portion of the lot as basis for his claim.

Lebrudo's assertion must fail. The law expressly prohibits any sale, transfer or
conveyance by farmer-beneficiaries of their land reform rights within 10 years
from the grant by the DAR. The law provides for four exceptions and Lebrudo
does not fall under any of the exceptions. In Maylem v. Ellano,[21] we held that
the waiver of rights and interests over landholdings awarded by the government
is invalid for being violative of agrarian reform laws. Clearly, the waiver and
transfer of rights to the lot as embodied in the Sinumpaang Salaysay executed by
Loyola is void for falling under the 10-year prohibitory period specified in RA
6657.

Lebrudo asserts that he is a qualified farmer beneficiary who is entitled to the

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lot under the CARP. DAR Administrative Order No. 3,[22] series of 1990,
enumerated the qualifications of a beneficiary:
1. Landless;
2. Filipino citizen;
3. Actual occupant/tiller who is at least 15 years of age or head of the family
at the time of filing application; and
4. Has the willingness, ability and aptitude to cultivate and make the land
productive.

Lebrudo does not qualify as a beneficiary because of (1) and (3). First, Lebrudo
is not landless. According to the records,[23] Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer
Amelia Sangalang issued a certification dated 28 February 1996 attesting that
Lebrudo was awarded by the DAR with a homelot consisting of an area of 236
square meters situated at Japtinchay Estate, Bo. Milagrosa, Carmona, Cavite.
Next, Lebrudo is not the actual occupant or tiller of the lot at the time of the
filing of the application. Loyola and her family were the actual occupants of the
lot at the time Loyola applied to be a beneficiary under the CARP.

Further, the CA, in its Decision dated 17 August 2007, correctly observed that a
certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title and after the
expiration of the one-year period from the issuance of the registration decree
upon which it is based, the title becomes incontrovertible. The CA also declared
that the basis of Lebrudo's claim, the two Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 28
December 1989 and 3 December 1992, were illegal and void ab initio for being
patently intended to circumvent and violate the conditions imposed by the
agrarian law. The relevant portions of the decision provide:
x x x It is undisputed that CLOA 20210 was issued to the respondent on
December 27, 1990 and was registered by the Register of Deeds of Cavite on
March 14, 1991, resulting in the issuance of TCT/CLOA No. 998 in her name.

Under Sec. 43, P.D. 1529, the certificate of title that may be issued by the
Register of Deeds pursuant to any voluntary or involuntary instrument relating
to the land shall be the transfer certificate of title, which shall show the number
of the next previous certificate covering the same land and also the fact that it
was previously registered, giving the record number of the original certificate of
title and the volume and page of the registration book in which the original
certificate of title is found.

The certificate of title serves as evidence of an indefeasible title to the property

in favor of the person whose name appears therein. After the expiration of the
107 | P A G E AGRARIAN CASES
one-year period from the issuance of the decree of registration upon which it is
based, the title becomes incontrovertible.

Accordingly, by the time when original petitioner Julian Lebrudo filed on June
27, 1995 the first case (seeking the cancellation of the respondent's CLOA), the
respondent's certificate of title had already become incontrovertible. That
consequence was inevitable, for as the DARAB correctly observed, an original
certificate of title issued by the Register of Deeds under an administrative
proceeding was as indefeasible as a certificate of title issued under a judicial
registration proceeding. Clearly, the respondent, as registered property owner,
was entitled to the protection given to every holder of a Torrens title.

The issue of whether or not the respondent was bound by her waiver and
transfer in favor of Julian Lebrudo, as contained in the
several sinumpaang salaysay, was irrelevant. Worse for the petitioner, the
DARAB properly held that the undertaking of the respondent to Julian
Lebrudo under the sinumpaang salaysay dated December 28, 1989 and
December 3, 1992 - whereby she promised to give him ½ portion of the
homelot in consideration of his helping her work on the release of the CLOA to
her and shouldering all the expenses for the purpose - was "clearly illegal and
void ab initio" for being patently intended to circumvent and violate the
conditions imposed by the agrarian laws and their implementing rules. He
could not, therefore, have his supposed right enforced. x x x [24]

We see no reason to disturb the findings of the CA. The main purpose of the
agrarian reform law is to ensure the farmer-beneficiary's continued possession,
cultivation and enjoyment of the land he tills.[25] To do otherwise is to revert
back to the old feudal system whereby the landowners reacquired vast tracts of
land and thus circumvent the government's program of freeing the tenant-
farmers from the bondage of the soil.[26]

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 17

August 2007 and Resolution dated 4 January 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 90048.

SO ORDERED.

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