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SGI 2022 | 2 Netherlands Report

Executive Summary
The years 2020-2021 were the last of the Rutte III government that came to
power in March 2017. This was an uneasy four-party coalition between center-
right parties (the conservative-liberal People’s Party for Freedom and
Democracy (VVD) and the largely ideology-free Christian Democratic Appeal
(CDA)) and center-left parties (pragmatist social liberals Democrats 66 (D66)
and the left-leaning Christian fundamentalist Christian Union (CU) with their
near-immovable principles on health ethics). It had a flimsy majority in
parliament (76/150 in the Second Chamber, 38/75 in First Chamber), which it
lost after new elections for the First Chamber, or Senate, in 2020.

Its policy history shows a Janus face. On the one hand, macro- and micro-
economic policy success stories due to the neoliberal embrace of industry and
business. On the other, an accumulation of nondecisions and half-baked
compromises on a raft of urgent social and sustainability problems, like
poverty and precarious temporary jobs for too many workers; a housing
shortage in terms of availability, access to financing and unsustainable quality;
dealing with manifestations of institutional racism; growing inequalities and
decreasing quality in education; a lack of smooth compensation for earthquake
damage due to decades-long gas exploitation in the province of Groningen;
personnel shortages in the public sector (teaching, nursing) and the
construction sector; and a skills shortage for private projects in climate change.

Then came the nitrogen crisis, called the “biggest problem” for his cabinet by
the prime minister himself. Angry farmers on processions of tractors blocked
roads and government buildings and occupied squares in the capital. Political
anger, fanned by right-wing populist parties, was everywhere. Analysts saw
events as a direct confrontation between “Twitter and the polder.” The
cabinet’s fall seemed imminent. But beginning in 2020, all of a sudden, there
was the coronavirus pandemic, which proved to be a political gamechanger.
The prime minister transformed himself into a successful crisis manager, and
his personal popularity and government support soared. Yet this too ebbed
away after the fall of 2020, evolving into increased criticism and contestation
and a flurry of sometimes violent demonstrations or riots against a night
curfew and reintroduced, gradually stricter lockdown measures during the fall
and winter of 2021.
SGI 2022 | 3 Netherlands Report

Simultaneously, the final blow for the cabinet was in the making. A
parliamentary commission investigating childcare benefits as implemented by
the tax services, published a report entitled “Unprecedented Injustice,”
showing that since 2013 tens of thousands of citizens and families had been
illegally accused of fraud in requesting childcare benefits, with many forced to
pay full repayments that caused the poorer families to fall into deep poverty
for years – frequently with disruptive effects (stress-related illness, divorce,
loss of child custody). All of this was seen as the result of overzealous fraud-
chasing legislation by parliament, systematic but merciless implementation by
the tax authorities, and until 2019, a complete lack of judicial review and
protection at all levels. Many citizens, political observers and civil servants
experienced this policy disaster as the most radical breach of political trust
between citizens and the government since World War II. It also damaged
trust between the coalition partners; and between them and all other political
parties.

The COVID-19 crisis in 2020 put the government in an entirely different

position, due to the necessary mobilization in times of crisis. Confidence in
public institutions was transferred to the government, and doubts were put
aside, at least at the beginning of the crisis.

In January 2021, the Rutte III cabinet collectively resigned, only to continue as
a caretaker government to prepare the March 2021 elections and govern (the
pandemic continued) until a new cabinet was formed. Curiously, the electorate
blamed the civil servants more than the minister(s) for the childcare benefits
disaster, which allowed Rutte/VVD be the winner of the elections by
capitalizing on its reputation of coronavirus leadership. Members of
parliament were less forgiving, and almost managed to torpedo Rutte’s
political career, but finally settled on the longest ever cabinet formation
process, 290 days (completing on January 10, 2022), which brought the same
four political parties back into a new cabinet with slightly changed power
relationships – particularly with D66 stronger than before. The coalition
agreement is a shopping list of good intentions, using previously rejected
policy instruments to tackle social and environmental policy problems that
have been put off with huge amounts of money, financed at very considerable
risk. These are given a twist of green industrial policy; and further embedded
in promises to restore trust and repair rule-of-law damage by implementing
policies realistically and with a “human face.”

Citation:
Montesquieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet zo stoffig, toch?’ Een terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III, Den Haag

NRC, 19 October 2021. Raad van Europa: ‘De Nederlandse bestuurscultuur werkt, maar kan beter’.

NOS, 29 January 2021. Peilingwijzer: kiezer rekent Rutte niet af op toeslagenaffaire en val kabinet.
SGI 2022 | 4 Netherlands Report

NRC next, Ahaouray et al., 27 February 2021, Coronakabinet Rutte III: van crisis naar crisis

NRC, Van den Brink, 3 December 2021. ‘Wat normaal is bepaal ik zelf’ werkt niet meer

NOS Nieuws, 10 December 2021. ‘Probleem van regeerakkoord is niet geld, maar beschikbare mensen’

Key Challenges
In 2019 we wrote that three challenges affecting the sustainability of
governance in the Netherlands had as yet been insufficiently addressed: the
maintenance of traditional state functions and the integrity of the separation of
powers, the transition to a sustainable economy, and the need to address
growing inequalities in income and living standards. Since then, two crises
have confirmed and deepened these challenges. Two years of coronavirus
pandemic crisis management forced a break with traditionally frugal budget
policies, laid bare the disadvantages of austerity and market-inspired
institutional reforms in the healthcare system and the social domain, and
deepened existing social inequalities. The childcare benefits scandal reported
in the “Unprecedented Justice” report showed how all three branches of
government were complicit in causing a legislative and implementation
disaster for tens of thousands of citizens and families, many of them of non-
Dutch descent. Both crises, jointly, challenged the hubristic self-image of the
“high” quality of Dutch governance for citizens, political commentators and
journalists, and civil servants. The question, then, is whether or not, and to
what extent, the coalition agreement for the new Rutte IV government presents
a promising response.

With regard to policy-performance indicators, the government appears to have

given up on neoliberalism, austerity and frugal budget policies. Relying on the
ECB’s reassurances that it would keep the euro alive and interest rates low, the
government has implicitly embarked upon the untested waters of Modern
Monetary Theory (Kelton, 2020). It is using this financial “bonanza” mainly to
fund long-term projects to tackle overdue economic sustainability problems
while seeking to reduce greenhouse gas emissions: nitrogen emissions from
overblown export-directed livestock farming; an energy transition for
consumers and, more so, the energy-intensive industry; and a spatial-planning
crisis stemming from the combined impact of increased private and
commercial transport and mobility, a housing shortage and increasing
competition over land use (between housing, nature, farming, industry, space
for renewable energy production). Considerable sums are also reserved for
education (higher salaries for more teachers) and to provide compensation to
SGI 2022 | 5 Netherlands Report

the victims of the childcare benefits and Groningen earthquake damages

affairs. The generally liberal Rutte IV government devotes less money and
policy effort to the issue of correcting broader social inequalities. The tax
system bias in favor of wealth/assets over labor income is left untouched, and
is perhaps even exacerbated, as CO2 emissions are not immediately taxed;
rather, the government seeks to reduce them in the long run via hefty state
subsidies offered to firms that in return promise to develop and use green
technologies in industry. It remains unclear how the government intends to
deal with serious implementation gaps and manpower shortages that have
emerged in policy areas including education, housing, (youth, elderly and
hospital) care, infrastructure construction, public transport, and policing and
judicial work. These latter two areas are all the more worrisome given efforts
to fight drug-related and (financial) cybercrime. Particularly education is now
contributing to social inequality, instead of acting as an equalizer. Emergent
and potentially disruptive technological innovation requires the development
of a strategic approach to digitalization that will address its effects on human
rights, while also introducing regulation and control mechanisms, and
developing consensus-building mechanisms able to handle contentious
(ethical) issues. This will be a task for a designated minister for digital affairs
in the Rutte IV government.

Regarding the challenge of ensuring that traditional state functions are

improved, more money has been made available for the military and to support
citizen access to the courts, by paying for the fees of social lawyers. No
serious steps are being taken to tackle the country’s reputation as a tax haven
for large sums of foreign (U.S. and Russian) capital. In large parts of the
country, there are serious symptoms of state absence/failure with regard to
protecting citizens from violence, and even a considerable number of murders,
in the fight against drug-related crime. The police and judiciary have failed to
stop the country from sliding toward the status of a so-called narcostate. The
number of big (Antwerp, Vlissingen, Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Delfzijl) and
smaller harbors along the coastline and the county’s import/export economic
interest in smooth and fast customs clearance of goods make the Netherlands
the biggest entry and exit point for drugs to the rest of Europe; ineffective
policing of sparsely populated rural areas has helped the country become the
biggest exporter of synthetic drugs and a main distribution point for cocaine. It
is unclear how the government intends to deal more seriously with these
symptoms of state failure.

Regarding the challenge of improving the actual functioning of the checks and
balances of the trias politica, so hurtfully damaged in the childcare benefits
scandal, the government has mainly provided promises and an open admission
of failure. Small beginnings are visible in a new Law on Open Government
SGI 2022 | 6 Netherlands Report

(Woo) and a slight increase in the intellectual and financial resources provided
to parliament. So far, there has been little effort to impose any firm regulation
of the conduct and finances of political parties, even though this makes them
more reliant on and vulnerable to external, sometimes foreign funding. Policy
formulation, and, ironically, suggestions to improve implementation tests, are
often outsourced to government-sponsored think tanks. The independence of a
well-functioning judicial branch is still under pressure due to underfinancing
and understaffing, although more resources have been made available from the
government budget for more court personnel and digitizing court procedures.

The third longer-term task is to strike a balance between identity politics and
globalization. In the Netherlands, globalization manifests itself (among other
indicators) through continuous immigration and an increasingly multiethnic
population. Although a recent expert report offers four scenarios, there has to
date been no public debate, let alone policy formulated, regarding the future
demographic composition and size of the population. Curiously, the public
media system, tasked by law to further national coherence, will be expanded
by one broadcasting organization for “Black” and another for “white-Dutch”
voices and interests. Resources for adequate immigration and asylum policies
within the country remain totally inadequate. For the open Dutch economy,
cooperation within the European context is crucial. And indeed, the Dutch
government and the country’s political parties appear to have made a turn back
toward Europe.

It is increasingly clear that tackling these challenges will require new modes of
constructive citizen participation and representation beyond protests and large-
scale demonstrations. The gap between government policy on the one hand,
and citizens’ feelings and experiences on the other, has created significant
discontent and anti-establishment sentiment, feeding populist calls for more
direct democracy. Participatory democratic practices are (again) limited to
policy implementation at the local and municipal level. Critics have called for
a change of course away from “defensive” participation to the opening of a
“second track” – that is, a more proactive form of participation in the
beginning stages of policy formulation. The extent to which this will be
realized remains unclear. There is a reason for optimism – Dutch society has
demonstrated a great deal of resilience and flexibility during the testing times
of the coronavirus crisis.

Time will tell whether the Rutte IV coalition agreement is just throwing
money at a knot of intertwined problems, or will represent a tipping point in
moving away from a traditional growth-based to a life- and truly prosperity-
based mode of governance.

S. Kelton, 2020. The deficit myth. Modern monetary theory and the birth of the people’s economy
SGI 2022 | 7 Netherlands Report

Party Polarization
At all levels (national, provincial and local), the Dutch political-party
landscape is more fragmented than ever. Tellingly, the 17 March 2021
elections brought 19 political parties into the 150-seat national parliament:
four single representative parties; five parties with three representatives; six
parties with less than 10 representatives; and four larger parties with more than
10 representatives (CDA:14; PVV: 17; D66: 24; and VVD: 34). Although not
all national political parties are represented at provincial and local levels,
adding to the fragmentation at national level, a quarter to a third of the seats at
these levels are filled by strictly local political parties. Fragmentation clearly
hampers policymaking and coalition building. For example, the formation of a
new cabinet (Rutte IV) took almost 10 months between the parliamentary
election in March 2021 and the swearing-in ceremony in January 2022. As of
30 November 2021, the new cabinet (Rutte IV) was still being formed. The
duration of 299 days was a new record compared to the previous record of 226
days, which had been achieved by the last government formation (Rutte III), of
all things.

All modes of polarization (ideological, affective, facts-polarization) are

increasing. Ideological polarization has been moderately increasing since
2010. After the depoliticizing 1990s, the Dutch started to have more diverging
beliefs and attitudes on globalization, the EU and direct democracy (esp.
referendums). On issues like multiculturalism, income equality and
redistribution, and climate change, views follow the conventional left-right
dimension and alignment with party platforms is high. But in a very short
time, polarization on the climate issue has become a strong dividing line.

For a traditionally “tolerant” nation, affective polarization has grown

remarkably between 2017 and 2021: most Dutch think negatively about their
political opponents; in 2021, especially on issues like income redistribution
and climate change. No doubt this tendency is influenced by the emergence
and parliamentary visibility of radical-right political parties.

Polarization in terms of facts – that is, strong differences in the perception of

factual reality, for instance deriving from belief in conspiracy theories around
the coronavirus and climate, or anti-evolution theory – also has increased
alarmingly. People in favor of more income redistribution overestimate
scientifically validated income inequalities. People with anti-immigration or
SGI 2022 | 8 Netherlands Report

pro-immigration stances systematically over- and underestimate the number of

immigrants in the country. On average, Dutch people have much more doubt
about the role of human agency in climate change than do climate scientists.
Fact-polarization clearly depends on institutional trust, especially regarding
the media and science. This divide became exacerbated during the coronavirus
pandemic with increased conspiracy belief and institutional distrust,
particularly at the extremes of the political landscape.

Affective and fact-polarization combined raise deeply worrying political

concerns. The tone and civility of public discourse is losing out to harsher and
outright brutal ways of expression – even in parliament. If both trends
continue, they may erode the common ground for political debate. (Score: 5)

Citation:
Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2021, Versplinterde vertegenwoordiging

Parlement.com, 29 october 2021. Record aan diggelen: kabinetsformatie 2021 is nu officieel de langste ooit

SCP (P. Dekker en J. den Ridder), 2019. Burgerperspectieven

A. Krouwel en B. Geurkink, Politieke fragmentatie in Nederlandse gemeenteraden, Jaarboek van de Griffier,

2016, 127-139

Toshkov, D., & Krouwel, A. (2022). Beyond the U-curve: Citizen preferences on European integration in
multidimensional political space. European Union Politics. https://doi.org/10.1177/14651165221080316

an Prooijen, J-W., Cohen Rodigues, T., Bunzel, C., Georgescu, O., Komáromy, D., & Krouwel, A. (2022).
Populist Gullibility: Conspiracy Theories, News Credibility, Bullshit Receptivity, and Paranormal Belief.
Political Psychology. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12802
SGI 2022 | 9 Netherlands Report

Sustainable Policies

I. Economic Policies

Economy

Economic Policy According to international economic watchdogs like the World Economic
Score: 8
Forum and IMF the Netherlands is ranked fourth among economies with
regard to being well prepared for post-COVID-19 recovery. This is largely due
to generous government support to firms, combined with an excellent digital
infrastructure and strong digital skills among the local population, which
together allows the economy to stay afloat while people work from home.
GDP growth for 2021 is estimated at 3.8%. In the fourth quarter of 2021, the
economy was expected to surpass its pre-coronavirus level.

Generous government support, amounting to 3.6% of GDP, has prevented an

unemployment increase of between 65,000 to 188,000 unemployed persons.
The government’s tax agency has become a crucial lender for Dutch firms:
274,000 firms and entrepreneurs (from restaurant and shop owners to
multinationals with tens of thousands of workers) owe the government a total
of €19.7 billion. Terms of repayment allow firms 60 months to pay off their
debts. Only by then the real cost of government support, estimated as €1.5
billion, will become clear. There are indications that too much support has
found its way to firms with low productivity and a weak financial position.

The rosy image of the Dutch economy is clouded by worries about inflation,
which reached a rate of 5.6% during the last quarter of 2021 (due to stagnating
supply chains, raw material shortages and the steep increase in energy prices);
the lasting impact of ultra-low interest rates on savings and pensions; and
persistent labor shortages. At the time of writing there were 126 vacancies for
every 100 unemployed people. Together, these phenomena may cast a shadow
on the optimistic expectations of post-COVID-19 recovery and the transition
to a post-carbon, more sustainable economy.
SGI 2022 | 10 Netherlands Report

A final observation is that political debate on economic policy has turned

strongly toward issues of inequality, and especially the widespread feeling that
in spite of the country’s satisfactory macroeconomic performance and well-
balanced state budget in recent years, Dutch households have yet to experience
serious improvements with regard to inequalities in life chances, wages and
wealth, housing, health, and work-leisure balance. Perhaps one is observing a
lasting shift in economic debate from conventional macroeconomic indicators
to greater weight being attributed to sustainable development and quality of
life (“broad prosperity”) criteria.

Citation:
NRC, 29 September 2021 IMF,CPB: coronabeleid was successvol

NRC, 25 November 2021 (Schinkel), Koopkrachtverlies in 2022 staat nu al vast

NRC, 20 July, 2021, De lage rente voedt de kater van de toekomst

NRC 26 June 2021, De vijf belangrijkste ongelijkmakers

CBS, 15 April 2021, Economische groei en het inkomen van Nederlanders

CBS, 28 May 2021, Aflevering 4: De Monitor Brede Welvaart. Over hier, nu en later

Labor Markets

Labor Market In 2020, the coronavirus-triggered contraction caused economic growth to

Policy
plummet from +1.8% in 2019 to -3.7%. In February 2020, the unemployment
Score: 7
rate was at a record low of 2.9 % (277,000 unemployed); but due to the
contraction, increased by the end of the year to 4.6 % (or 384,000
unemployed). Due to very generous (non-pharmaceutical) government support
to firms and entrepreneurs, by November 2021 unemployment was back to its
pro-coronavirus level of 2.9%.

Nothing much changed in the underlying structure of unemployment figures,

though. The youth unemployment rate was at an all-time low of 6.7%, which
in 2020 increased to 9.1%. Some observers consider youth unemployment to
be a serious threat to the country’s long-term prospects. A very considerable
number of young people are not in education or employment. Youth
unemployment rates are twice as high among those without official
qualifications and among those with a migration background. A large
proportion of those young people lack a basic level of literacy, and show
deficits in computer literacy and technical craft skills. Better educational and
school-to-work transitional arrangements are crucial.

Other structural labor-market weaknesses include relatively low labor market

participation rates among those with a migrant background, especially young
migrants; an increasingly two-tiered labor market that separates (typically
SGI 2022 | 11 Netherlands Report

older) “insiders” with significant job security and (old and young) “outsiders,”
who are often “independent workers,” lack employment protection and have
little to no job security; and high levels of workplace pressure. The OESO
considers the Netherlands an outlier in Europe in terms of work flexibilization.

This “dualization” of the labor market is attributed to government policy; for

firms, flexible workers are financially much more attractive (by as much as
7% in labor costs) than are workers with fixed contracts. An OECD report
judges the Dutch labor market situation as being problematic in the long run,
because firms invest less in the education of their flexible workers, thereby
threatening the long-term labor productivity of the economy as a whole. This
labor market precarity also leads to lower capacity to invest in housing, family
planning and other core conditions that provide a healthy and safe work-life
balance, crucial for high productivity.

In late 2018, the government established an independent expert commission

(Commissie Borstlap) tasked with designing policies that would align labor
law, social security and fiscal policies with a view to redesigning the labor
market to benefit all workers in a sustainable national economy. In January
2020 the commission published its report, titled “In what country do we want
to work?” It proposes strong remedies for differences in protection and
taxation between different categories of workers with a view to continuous
labor market participation of all. These proposals are very controversial; the
IMF, WEF and the Dutch association of entrepreneurs (VNO/NCW) are, for
example, very positive about the high degree of flexibility and consider it a
major asset of the Dutch economy. For this reason, they oppose major changes
in policy and regulation. Without being specific, the December 2021 coalition
agreement states that, using the Borstlap commission report and advice from
the Socioeconomic Council as a guideline, the government intends to decrease
differential treatment between fixed and flexible work (in income, taxation and
social security).

Citation:
CBS, 22 July, 2021, Werkloosheid in juni onder de 300 duizend

Elseviers Weekblad, 18 November 2021, Werkloosheid weer net zo lag als voor corona, en fors lager dan
elders in de eurozone

NRC, 23 January 2021 (Pelgrim), Waar blijven de nieuwe regels rond werk. Het is oorverdovend stil.

Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, Cijfers over Jeugdwerkloosheid (nji.nl, consulted 1 December 2021)

OECD, June 2019. OECD Input for the Netherlands Commission for Regulation of Work. (pdf)

Coalitieakkoord 2021-2025, 15 December 2021.Omzien naar elkaar, vooruitzien naar de toekomst

SGI 2022 | 12 Netherlands Report

Taxes

Tax Policy Tax revenues have allowed the government to keep the deficit within
Score: 6
manageable bounds even when long-term trends are very uncertain because of
the pandemic and climate change (see also “Budgets”). Taxes in the
Netherlands are complex and far from transparent. Income policy not only
works through tax rates and brackets, but also through tax credits and
situation-dependent benefits to households, as well as a jungle of exemptions,
deductions, tax reductions and referrals. The more visible income taxation
apparently respects the progressive carrying capacity principle
(draagkrachtbeginsel), but the overall outcome of the system is regressive.

Pre-tax income and benefits have grown more unequal but are successfully
tweaked by government tax policy toward a more equal output. The Gini index
for net incomes corrected for household size is just under the European
average of 0.3, and has remained steady for the last 20 years. The Central
Bureau for Statistics (CBS) calculates Gini index scores based solely on data
from tax declarations. This neglects data about the lower (flexible workers and
workers on temporary labor contracts without insurance coverage or pensions)
and higher income brackets (many types of un(der)taxed capital gains like
house sales or profits from selling shares). The Gini index score for wealth has
for decades fluctuated around a very high 0.8. Since 2015, it has decreased a
bit due to the increasing value of homes, as home ownership represents the
bulk of ordinary citizens’ wealth. But here too there is more inequality than
meets the eye as evinced by, for example, the wealth hidden in possessions in
foreign countries and family trusts. As many issues in daily life demand
private investments – homework guidance, excess insurance risks, access to
sports and culture – lower- and middle-income households increasingly lack
the private wealth to participate on an equal footing. The crux of the matter is
that, since the 1998-2002 Kok II cabinet introduced the “boxes” system, the
tax system treats capital and labor very differently, with progressive taxes on
labor income, and regressive taxes on share income and income from savings
and investments.

One of the manifestations of lenient taxation of wealth and business is the

Netherlands’ status as a tax haven which allows multinational corporations to
siphon off considerable taxation of their profits in their countries of origin.
Comparative studies by OESO and Tax Justice Network (TJN) place the
country in fourth place worldwide, after the British Virgin Islands, Bermuda
and the Cayman Islands, but well before Switzerland and Luxemburg. Only
under considerable international pressure is the Dutch government is
cooperating with the EU’s anti-tax evasion guideline. So far, the government
has continued to defend favorable conditions for attracting multinational
SGI 2022 | 13 Netherlands Report

corporations to locate in the Netherlands through a combination of low

corporate taxation, the use of favorable innovation incentives and generous tax
deductions for R&I. Another manifestation of favoring capital over labor is the
“greening” of the fiscal system. To date, green fiscal instruments (mostly high
value-added taxation of end-use polluting by firms and consumption by
citizens) treat sustainability gains as added benefits associated with a more
stable government income. An estimated 55% of fossil fuel consumption by
industry remains untaxed.

A radical and coherent reform effort is needed to make the fiscal system fairer
and more sustainable. The coalition agreement of December 2021 announced
an intention to simplify the tax system, beginning with abolition of the benefit
system that confuses taxpayers with overcomplex rules and forces them to pay
hefty recoveries (evidenced traumatically in the childcare benefits affair).
Further reforms have been delayed to a distant future, partly to create a less
turbulent policy environment for an overburdened tax authority.

Citation:
NRC-H, 5 March 2021, Heilbron, Het belastingstelsel is een wangedrocht

NRC-H, 21 June 2021, Beunderman en Molijn, De grote scheefgroei – 2. Inkomensongeleijkheid, 3.

Vermogensongelijkheid

NRC-H, Stellinga, 13 Februry 2021, Belastingen zo krom al seen banaan

Jacobs en Cnossen, Ontwerp voor een beter be;astingstelsel (njb.nl) Ontwerp voor een beter belastingstelsel,
onder redactie van Sijbren Cnossen en Bas Jacobs, een uitgave van ESB, vakblad voor economen, 298 p.,
2019 op de site van ESB: https://esb.nu

NRC-H., Beunderman, 10 March 2021, Nederland ‘doorsluisland’ op plek vier, na Bermuda

PBL, 17 November, 2017, Huidige fiscale wetgeving ontoereikend in aanpak milieuschade.

Coalitieakkoord 2021-2025, December 15 2021. Omzien naar elkaar, vooruitzien naar de toekomst

Budgets

Budgetary Policy Since the euro zone crisis, the government has steadily improved the state of
Score: 7
its finances. Therefore, in 2020 it was relatively well prepared for the
coronavirus crisis. As of the time of writing, at the end of 2021, it is still
considered well positioned for a post-coronavirus restoration and investment
effort. The state budget reversed from a surplus of 1.7% of GDP to a deficit of
4.3% of GDP in 2020, followed by a deficit of 5.9% of GDP in 2021. This is
due, of course, to generous wage cost subsidies (estimated at €82.1 billion and
counting, as when coronavirus infections were on the rise again, the policy
was extended until spring 2022) and other types of financial support, as well as
the decline in tax revenues due to the pandemic-triggered recession. While in
SGI 2022 | 14 Netherlands Report

2019, public debt stood at 48.6% of GDP, it is approximately 9 percentage

points higher in 2021 and 2022; it is projected to reach 60.4% of GDP in 2025.
Despite all this, interest payment on public debt will be lower in 2022 (0.4% of
GDP) than in 2019 (0.8% of GDP) because of very low interest rates. The
deficit and the increase in public debt will stay well under average in the euro
zone.

Most financial experts agree that government finances are not in danger, and
there is room for government spending on urgent issues. The extra spending is
kept outside normal budget rules by creating special funds. A large part of the
spending will be dedicated to climate measures, as the Netherlands has missed
most of its climate goals over the years, and is still among the most polluting
countries in the European Union.

Meaningful project- and policy-driven spending from these funds will

generally extend over periods longer than an ordinary four-year government
period. This is supposed to alleviate investors’ fear of long-term investments,
especially in training workers to acquire the necessary new skills needed for
large-scale climate change and energy transition projects. At the same time,
other experts have warned against too loose of an approach, and are urging a
return to conventional rules for budget discipline. They warn against
overheating the economy, where in some sectors a shortage of labor
(infrastructure, housing, care) and inflation (especially in the energy sector)
are no longer expectations but realities.

Nevertheless, the four political parties that will build the next Rutte IV
government, take the risk of a big spending spree: €35 billion for a climate
change fund (for green industrial policy), €25 billion for a nitrogen fund (for
the greening of farming), €7.5 billion for a housing fund (to quickly build
appr. 100,000 new houses), €3 billion for infrastructure in the northern
provinces (to compensate homeowners for earthquake damages and a new
railway connection). Defense and education will structurally get billions of
euros to help restore years of underfunding in the past. Of course, taxes will
also increase, somewhat more for firms than for citizens.

The rosy financial picture on national level is not mirrored on the provincial
and local levels. At these levels there is a dormant financial crisis. National
budget cuts (2013-2019) have been proportionally allocated to local
government budgets even though national policy, especially since 2015,
burdened local governments with new tasks (e.g., youth and elderly care, and
recently more tasks and responsibilities in town-and-country planning) without
structural budget compensations. Nearly all local governments, irrespective of
political make-up, are confronted with loss of subsidies for welfare, culture
SGI 2022 | 15 Netherlands Report

and sports; as well as substantial cutbacks for anti-poverty and town district
policies, maintenance and services. At the same time, charges for parking,
garbage collection and processing, and property taxes have increased for
citizens. The coalition agreement does not mention reform of the system for
local finances, the Gemeentefonds, which covers approximately 70% of local
government budgets. It merely promises more financial resources for local
governments in order to implement national policy initiatives.

From the perspective of democratic and public accountability, the General

Accountability Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) has warned since 2016 that an
ever-larger share of nationally collected taxes (fully two-thirds in 2019) is
actually spent without much parliamentary budgetary oversight. Provincial and
local governments, independent public organizations like schools and
universities, the police, the executive agency for employee insurances (UWV),
the Social Insurance Bank (SVB), other social funds, and the EU all spend tax
money under highly restricted or fragmented accountability arrangements. The
Council of State (Raad van State) is more and more concerned about this
problematic situation, which tends to erode the principle of no taxation without
representation.

Citation:
CPB, Centraal Economisch Plan, 2021

NRC, 22 September 2021 Strooien met geld is nu gewoon

NRC, Stellinga en Rutten, 15 December 2021. Rutte IV wil problemen te lijf met een doorgeladen bazooka
vol geld.

NRC, 26 October 2021, DNB, CPB en Financiën: veel ruimte voor incidentele investeringen, niet voor
permanente verhoging uitgaven.

Algemene Rekenkamer, 30 September 2021, Coronarekening – editie Prinsjesdag 2021

NRC, 20 October 2021 Harde kritiek op nieuwe verdeling gemeentegeld

Raad van State, 15 September 2021. Septemberrapportage begrotingstoezicht 2021 en advise Miljoenenota
2022

Algemene Rekenkamer, 13 July 2016. Inzicht in publiek. geld. Uitnodiging tot bezinning op de publieke
verantwoording. (rekenkamer.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Centraal Planbureau, January 2022. Analyse coalitieakkoord 2022-2025

Research, Innovation and Infrastructure

R&I Policy Regarding knowledge infrastructure as whole – that is, pre-university

Score: 9
education, technical and vocational education and training, higher education,
SGI 2022 | 16 Netherlands Report

research, development and innovation (RDI), information and communications

technology (ICT), and economy, in addition to the general enabling
environment – Netherlands is a leading performer. It ranks fifth out of 138
countries in the Global Knowledge Index 2020 and fifth out of the 56
countries with very high human development. As strengths, the Global
Knowledge Index mentions: expenditure on non-tertiary vocational education,
secure internet servers, the availability of research and training services, and
the impact of ICT on new services and products.

Regarding R&I in the narrow sense of the word, the 2021 EU Innovation
Scoreboard mentions Sweden as a leader of innovation in the EU, followed by
France, Denmark and Belgium. The Netherlands is identified as a “strong
innovator” whose performance improved 10%-15% compared to 2019-20. In
the 2021 World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index, the
Netherlands ranks fifth, ex aequo with Singapore, after Switzerland, Sweden
and Denmark.

R&D expenditures (aggregated for both public and private) in the Netherlands
have increased from half a billion euros in 1964 to €17.8 billion in 2019. As a
percentage of GDP, R&D expenditures over the last 50 years have moved in a
band between 1.64% and 2.18%. The government has determined that 2.5% is
its policy goal. Public R&D expenditure is stable at approximately 62%-64%
of total expenditures. Since 2017 it has increased, but not proportionally to the
growth in GDP. Private expenditures are not likely to increase either. Private
business expenditure on R&D is similar to the EU-27 average, but below the
OECD average. Some economic sectors are clearly R&D-intensive, like
ICT/software, high-tech, automotive and particularly pharmaceuticals. But the
Dutch economic structure is traditionally more dominated by R&D-extensive
sectors like oil and gas, trade, hospitality and building. A number of studies
demonstrates how this mix of economic activities and sectors strongly
determines the level of private investment in R&D.

The leap from an R&D expenditure of 2.18% to 2.5% of GDP cannot be

achieved by incremental increases of several hundreds of million euros. It
means a full-scale transition to a different economic structure in which the
government pursues a mission-driven innovation strategy focusing on great
societal challenges: an energy transition, strong efforts to mitigate climate
change, innovations in agro-food, water management, and physical and
cybersecurity. Green industrial policy may offer the proper double-edged
instrument that, on the one hand, stimulates industry to use technologies
befitting a sustainable and circular economy, and on the other uses levies on
CO2 emissions.
SGI 2022 | 17 Netherlands Report

Citation:
Rathenau Instituut, Voorpublicatie Totale Investeringen in Wetenschap en Innovatie (TWIN) 2017-2023,
(rathenau.nl)

European Commission, Innovation Union Scoreboard 2021 (ec.europa.eu)

World Economic Forum, The Global Competitiveness Report 2021 (reports.weforum.org))

Rathenau Instituut, 9 November 2021, Twee en een half procent

Haveman, E. Donselaar, P. Innovatieplatform Analysis of the Netherlands’ private R&D position 2008

NRC.next, Stellinga, 11 September 2021 Groene Industriepolitiek, is dat een goed idee?

Global Financial System

Stabilizing The Netherlands is losing its position in the important bodies (IMF, ECB, BIS)
Global Financial
that together shape the global financial architecture. In EU policymaking
System
Score: 8
before Brexit, the Dutch tended to agree with the UK position in principle, but
ultimately follow the German position in practice. After all, as a small but
internationally significant export economy, the Dutch have a substantial
interest in a sound international financial and legal architecture. It has been
estimated that under a merely regional trade treaty, the Netherlands would
have been 7.7% poorer; under the WTO regime, this would figure would rise
to 9.3%. Without the EU’s internal market, estimated GDP income loss would
be around €65 billion (in 2018).

During the wave of political skepticism toward international affairs, as

exemplified by “No” votes in the EU constitution and the 2016 Ukraine
referendums, the Dutch have until recently been more reluctant followers than
proactive initiators or agenda setters. After a decade or so, in its State of the
EU 2021 report, the government finally seems ready to support a stronger,
action-capable Europe for issues like climate change, digitalization, migration,
internal security and even defense. It formulated three principles for its EU
policy: resilient and secure nation states converging to the highest level of
welfare; geopolitical use of EU-instruments; and an effective and transparent
Union that fully respects democracy and the rule of law.

Public opinion is in line with this European orientation. However, the

translation of values and principles into policy on the ground is still hesitant.
In EU negotiations over the Stability and Growth Pact, Prime Minister Rutte
(“Mr. No”) and especially Finance Minister Hoekstra insulted many southern
states by demanding they first get their finances in order before becoming
eligible for support. An expert commission on foreign policy frankly stated
that in EU negotiations the Dutch were inconsistent, opportunist and
SGI 2022 | 18 Netherlands Report

unreliable. For example, in budget negotiations, and for national consumption,

the government stresses it is a long-time net payer to the EU, while neglecting
to mention that, overall, contributing €1 brings in €12 to GDP. Especially
richer Dutch farmers profit considerably from EU membership. Also, even
during and after the coronavirus crisis, the Dutch government has stuck to the
position that public health is an issue of national sovereignty. After demanding
that all EU countries needed to show solid plans as a condition for access to
the European Restoration Fund, the Dutch (at the time of writing) were the
only laggards due to the caretaker status of the present cabinet.

Nevertheless, looking at actual voting behavior of Dutch ministers and high

officials in EU policymaking and negotiations, it appears that the Dutch
aversion to the EU is reversing to a more positive and realistic political
attitude.

Citation:
Algemene Rekekamer, Wat draagt Nederland bij aan en wat ontvangt Nederland van de EU?

CBS, Kazemier en Verkooijen, December 2016. Nederland en de EU: betalingen en ontvangsten

FTM, 12 September 2021, Rutte kreeg in Brussel de bijnaam ‘Mr. No’. Zijn ministers zegggen steeds vaker
‘ja’.

NRC, 31 January 2020 (Alonso en Van der Wiel), Nettobetaler in de EU? ‘Juist Nederland verdient goed’.

Financieel Dagblad, Bouman, 13 April 2018. Zonder interne markt was Nederland misschien wel 65 mrd
armer.

NRC-H, 8 July 2021, Stellinga en Alonso, ‘Nederland moet eem keuze maken over zijn EU-beleid en
ophouden met zwabberen’

Korteweg, R., Houtkamp, C., Sie Dhian Ho, M., Krouwel, A. & Etienne, T., Sep 2020, 9 p.. (Clingendael
Buitenland Monitor) https://www.clingendael.org/publication/dutch-views-transatlantic-ties-and-european-
security-cooperation

Sie Dhian Ho, M., Houtkamp, C., Zandee, D., Krouwel, A., & Etienne, T., (2020). Clingendael Buitenland
Monitor: De Nederlandse wending naar Europa, (Clingendael Buitenland Monitor).
https://www.clingendael.org/nl/node/12039

II. Social Policies

Education

Education Policy The dominant theme for Dutch education over the last two years obviously
Score: 6
was the response to COVID-19. The crisis exacerbated some structural
weaknesses of the system and accelerated other developments. In 2019, the
Dutch education system was performing strongly, with attainment somewhat
SGI 2022 | 19 Netherlands Report

exceeding the OECD average. Educational spending was below the OECD
average, and was geared toward efficiency. Amidst lockdowns and other
restrictions, the educational system remained resilient. The mix of autonomy
and innovation in the Dutch educational system, combined with broad support
for the social role of schools, resulted in a swift initial response to the
coronavirus crisis. School closures were seen as a measure of last resort.
Elementary schools reopened as soon as possible. For children of essential
workers, schools and daycare centers never closed. At-risk children –
particularly from vulnerable families or those at risk of domestic abuse – also
returned to school quickly. Since the pedagogical environment in Dutch
schools is not overly competitive, concerns about “missing material” were not
as great as feared. Instead, quite quickly, attention shifted to “vulnerable
children.”

However, this flexibility has a downside: inequality in education deepened

during the COVID-19 crisis. This continued a trend seen over the last 10-15
years. Income, social status and migrant origin determine to a large extent the
school outcome of children. A recent study states that PISA achievements are
the worst among students whose parents have completed only lower levels of
education, and/or among those who are from migrant families. Also, those
children are more likely to follow lower education paths (vocational education
as opposed to general or academic education).
These issues of inequity deepened during the pandemic. Schools differed
substantially in the quality of online education. Families differed in their
ability to offer support to children, material or otherwise (e.g., electronic
devices, adequate internet access, a quiet place to study or parental assistance
with homework assignments). In particular, single parents – mostly women –
faced severe burdens. Here again, parents with higher levels of education and
greater work autonomy, as well as two-parent households, were better able to
home-school children as compared to single-parent households, parents with
less education and parents with less flexible working environments.
Innovations in curriculum and teaching have always been encouraged in Dutch
schools, with only a few general requirements. This allowed schools to adapt
quickly to the pandemic, without significant disruption. Most schools offer
adequate digital-learning platforms – with smart boards being standard from
the elementary to the higher education level, and many interactive elements in
teaching. However, variation between schools is considerable. Some schools
needed to be trained to make video recordings within a week, while others
simply expanded their blended learning platforms to full-time use. Generally,
the crisis accelerated the acquisition of ICT skills by teaching staff, including
among older teachers who might have been more reluctant prior to the
pandemic.
SGI 2022 | 20 Netherlands Report

Still, an overall drop in the quality of teaching cannot be attributed entirely to

the COVID-19 crisis. Elementary school pupils’ test results in basic skills are
dropping, and falling behind the ambitions formulated in 2010. The share of
students reaching basic math and reading skill levels is lower than expected. It
seems that teaching writing poses organizational difficulties in the context of
elementary education in the Netherlands. While elementary schools returned to
in-person teaching after the first wave, secondary and post-secondary
institutions struggled to provide at least first year students with a minimum
amount of face-to-face education, never exceeding 30% of all study hours.
This resulted in a significant rise in psychological issues among adolescents,
due to the disturbance of school’s socialization role during the lockdowns. The
quality of higher education in the Netherlands is guaranteed by mass entrance
exams at age 11 and mass centralized exams for graduates. Both had to be
skipped and/or adapted over extended periods of time and with more
exemptions, due to the pandemic. Discussions about the pros and cons of these
examinations have been fueled by this unintended experiment, particularly in
the light of deepening inequality.

Vocational schools suffered the most deeply, and disadvantaged students

suffered doubly. A strength of the Dutch education system – its practical
orientation, with substantial workplace-learning components – turned into a
liability during the COVID-19 crisis. It became increasingly difficult to
arrange work-study places, as many businesses had to close and work from
home became the norm for extended periods of time. This was true
particularly for secondary vocational education programs, but also for higher
professional education and some professionally oriented university studies.
Due to the segregation of Dutch education, in which children from lower
socioeconomic and migration backgrounds are overrepresented in vocational
education, the disturbance of the learning-on-the-job model affected more
vulnerable students to a greater extent. Combined with lower-quality housing
and the loss of access to digital resources due to school closures, already
vulnerable students experienced a disproportionate delay in their studies.
In the higher education sector, the general feeling is that hybrid forms of
teaching will be here to stay. Many higher education institutions were already
used to fewer contact hours and a relatively high share of independent project
work. Small project groups were generally allowed to work together until the
second lockdown. While the changes were rather minor for many students, the
loss of social contact with fellow students, and the inability to undertake lab or
practical work for some study programs, were significant impacts. Other
programs, especially small-scale professional programs that relied on personal
contact and supervision, had to make more drastic adjustments.
SGI 2022 | 21 Netherlands Report

Many students experienced psychological issues as a result of the isolation, but

also because they lost their part-time jobs and thus incomes. The extent to
which this has led to study delays has yet to be estimated, and effects seem to
vary widely both at the individual level and between programs and
universities. The student loan system contributed to delays, stress and
inequality and became unsustainable. The new government announced a plan
to reverse it back to basic student financing.

Both at the higher vocational training and university levels, issues of skewed
financing (favoring research in technical and natural sciences over social
sciences and education in general), combined with an increased number of
international students, have resulted in work pressures and quality issues.
Academic staffers reportedly regularly work from one-quarter to one-third
longer than their paid hours. The most overwork is in education. The demands
of online education added to the strain. Structural problems that were not
adequately addressed before the crisis also deepened due to the increased sick
leave and higher workloads. The greatest concern before the crisis, the acute
shortage of teachers, has yet to be resolved, in spite of salary increases,
including designated bonuses for teachers at schools with many disadvantaged
students. The gap in remuneration between elementary school teachers and
high school teachers still remains, and is perceived as unfair by many. The
government came up with a national plan for recovery. The plan is aimed at
making up for the delays and at mitigating the inequalities. The National
Education Program is aimed at turning the COVID-19-repair efforts into
sustainable improvements across the education sector. The primary points of
focus include the shortage of teachers and school administrators,
improvements in quality and efforts to equalize opportunities, sustainable
investment in knowledge structure through knowledge sharing and utilization,
and local efforts to improve youths’ future prospects. However, the program
has been widely criticized for being oriented only to the short term, and for
failing to address structural issues. For example, school buildings are 40 years
old on the average, and over 80% do not meet the requirements for clean air,
but the financing for renovation is lagging behind. In addition, lots of private
parties take part in the recovery efforts, which contributes further to a process
of hidden privatization in public education. The number of private schools in
the Netherlands is still negligible; however, other channels are gaining in
importance: private “homework coaching,” additional payment for exclusive
forms of education such as bilingual classes (English-Dutch), as well as many
extracurricular activities, including language lessons, that take place at school
during school time. Add to this a significant number of individual remedial
teachers, coaches and mentors, many of them also privately paid, and you get
an interesting landscape of inequality achieved through private means in
public settings.
SGI 2022 | 22 Netherlands Report

In the midst of COVID-19 concerns, the issue of freedom of education was

prominent in 2021. Art. 23 of the constitution, which grants freedom of
confessional education, came under attack, because some schools have
actively promoted homophobia and have failed to create a safe environment
for LGBTQ students. This was triggered by many cases of homophobia and
intolerance in religious schools, both of Muslim and Christian affiliation.
Advice provided by the Dutch Council of Education stressed the necessity to
specify the mandatory portion of curriculum and the idea of democratic
citizenship, stating that freedom of education has its limits.

https://www.onderwijsraad.nl/publicaties/adviezen/2021/06/3/advies-nationaal-programma-onderwijs

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Nederlands primair en secundair onderwijs
(www.nwo.nl/binaries/contents/documents/nwo/algemeen/documentation)

OECD, “Netherlands,” in Education at a Glance 2020 – Country note, EDUCATION AT A GLANCE

(EAG) 2020 » © OECD 2020

Ministerie van OCW, Onderwijs in Cijfers oswincijfers.nl

Rapport Onderzoek Lerarentekort, PO Raad 2019

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SGI 2022 | 23 Netherlands Report

Social Inclusion

Social Inclusion Income inequality in the Netherlands produces a score of between 0.28 and
Policy
0.29 on the Gini Index, and has not changed significantly since 2007. Because
Score: 6
the Gini index assesses only taxable incomes, it is likely that the degree of
inequality is underestimated. The difference between the highest and lowest
incomes has increased. This pattern is even more visible in the incomes of
women. While the incomes of the highest-earning women increased
significantly, particularly for younger women, only one-quarter of all women
are in full-time employment. On average, personal incomes of men are much
higher than those of women, though the gap is gradually closing for younger
women. Women still constitute a slight majority of people living in poverty.
Half of all people living at or under the poverty level have a migrant
background.

The average age of first-time home buyers has increased due to precarious
incomes, stricter loan regulations, increasing house prices and a shortage of
new, affordable houses. During the COVID-19 crisis, house prices continued
to rise. Prices of existing houses have gone up 20% in the last year alone. The
gap between homeowners and people renting houses is widening and even
long-term certainty of housing is gradually becoming a privilege of
homeowners.

Young people entered the pandemic in a precarious situation. A combination

of student debt, flexible employment, irregular incomes and rising housing
prices has resulted in a situation in which young people are today living with
their parents for longer than in previous generations. People working as
independent contractors within low-wage sectors turned out to be a
particularly vulnerable group, with little or no job protection. The Dutch labor
market has become one of the most flexible in western Europe (WRR 2020).
Before the Netherlands was confronted with COVID-19, there were 1.9
million people with flexible employment situations and more than 1.1 million
self-employed workers. Many of these flex workers are employed in sectors
that were hit particularly hard by the coronavirus crisis, such as the hotel and
catering industry, tourism, transport, and culture. Overlapping with these
precarious groups are labor migrants from southern and eastern Europe, who
often work low-wage jobs on flexible contracts while living in inadequate
housing.

Compared to other EU member states, the number of Dutch households at risk

of social exclusion or poverty is still low, with around 6% of households at
SGI 2022 | 24 Netherlands Report

risk of falling below the poverty line (CBS 2019). The number of households
under the poverty line remained stable in 2021, and no change is projected for
2022. The share of households at risk of poverty began decreasing in 2014, but
this decline has since leveled out, and has remained stable. Energy-driven
poverty, induced by the increase in gas prices, is not included in the data, and
is still an issue in spite of a modest compensation package. Single-parent
families, ethnic-minority families, migrants, divorcees and those dependent on
social benefits are overrepresented in this poverty-exposed income bracket.
Income inequalities have not only grown, but are also passed on to the younger
generations. The postal address of pupils has become a strong predictor of
financial success in life. Income mobility has stagnated since the previous
financial crisis, and the coronavirus crisis has made it only worse. Fully 53%
of children in low-income families stay in this income bracket.

Municipal governments are largely responsible for poverty policy in the

Netherlands. Given the budgetary side effects of other decentralization
policies, there are clear signs that poverty policy, both in terms of quality and
accessibility, is at risk of deteriorating. The COVID-19 crisis has exacerbated
differences between municipalities, since relief measures were taken at the
national level, and municipal governments had to alleviate extreme cases and
provide support to all those who did not have access to the national
compensation measures. By and large, due to the decentralized structure of
social services, municipalities took on the task of supporting the most
vulnerable. The adequacy and effectiveness of such measures varied across
different municipalities, as measures were dependent upon municipalities’
capacities to identify and reach out to vulnerable groups, as well as the local
economic structure, which varied widely. Naturally, some municipalities were
hit harder than others, depending upon demographics and the prevalence of
certain business activities. Access to social services remained problematic for
groups with limited digital skills, particularly the elderly and people with
mental and learning disabilities.

Since 2015, municipalities have been responsible for assisting people with
disabilities in finding suitable work. The number of young people with
disabilities who have a job has increased by 9%, but their incomes have on
average worsened due to a combination of low earnings and benefit cuts. A
study of 47 Dutch municipalities showed that few had plans for implementing
the UN agreement on the rights of disabled people, let alone inclusive policies.

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SGI 2022 | 25 Netherlands Report

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langer-thuis-a3652927
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-
gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2019/02/05/studieschuld-huizenmarkt-en-flexibele-contracten-houden-jongeren-
langer-thuis-a3652927

Patricia van Echtelt, Klarita Sadiraj, Stella Hoff, Sander Muns, Kasia Karpinska, Djurre Das (WRR),
Maroesjka Versantvoort, m.m.v. Lisa Putman,Eindevaluatie van de Participatiewet, SCP, november 2019

https://zorghulpatlas.nl/2019/11/01/vn-verdrag-handicap-werk-aan-de-winkel-voor-gemeenten/

CBS: Verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC, August 16, 2019

https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/economie/opinie/column/5245397/column-cody-hochstenbach-overheid-huurders-
wegwerproduct
https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/financien/nieuws/coronasteun-verschilt-sterk-tussen-
gemeenten.16777619.lynkx?
https://www.zonmw.nl/nl/actueel/nieuws/detail/item/sociale-gevolgen-corona-stilte-voor-de-storm/

Health

Health Policy In 2020, the Dutch hybrid healthcare system was subjected to the stress test of
Score: 6
the COVID-19 pandemic. Both the vulnerabilities and the strengths became
highly visible and gained importance. Never before has the healthcare system
received so much attention and public scrutiny. Never before was the
healthcare system the central driving force of all government policymaking for
two years already. The healthcare system functioned in crisis mode, with
priorities gradually shifting from homes for the elderly to the availability of
intensive care beds, balancing COVID-19 treatment and general care. Mass
vaccination was the key concern of 2021, with an extra mobilization for a
booster campaign at the end of the year. Prevention tactics and long-term
strategy for living with COVID-19 are yet to be developed.

On the positive side, the Netherlands performs well on key health indicators,
such as life expectancy, self-reported health status and patient satisfaction. The
SGI 2022 | 26 Netherlands Report

system is generally inclusive: the number of citizens who forgo medical

treatment due to affordability is the lowest in the OECD (5.8%). In addition, in
spite of the many concerns in the sector, long-term elderly care is highly
inclusive and affordable. The proportion of elderly people in long-term care
centers is decreasing (115,000 people in 2019), however, due to the policy
shift to extramural care, people in care today generally have relatively more
serious health issues and needs. Since the increase of the copayment for
nursing home care, many patients have delayed their admission to care homes.
They rely longer on home care and as a result, the total cost of care has
slightly decreased. The added burden of expenditure and efficiency issues, as
well as the chronic shortage of staff, made elderly care homes a particularly
vulnerable part of the healthcare system during the coronavirus pandemic.
Many homes for the elderly were hit hard, with high numbers of deaths early
in the pandemic. In addition, intramural care for the elderly relied heavily on
volunteers and family members, and the burden of keeping basic operations
going increased after the lockdown.

Prevention in the Netherlands is organized through general practitioners who

act as gatekeepers to healthcare services. These GPs maintain a high level of
trust among the Dutch population, which remained stable at around 95%
during the pandemic. The general policy response to the system, however,
effectively bypassed general practitioners, as the focus was on intensive-care
units, hospital beds, ventilation devices and hospital staff. The shortage of
general practitioners has become significant in some places, and structural
solutions have not yet been found. Ongoing non-COVID-19-related care –
which remained in the hands of general practitioners, but with limitations
imposed by hospitals – has become problematic.

The focus on efficiency and cost containment in recent years has left the
Netherlands with significant pressure on bed occupancy, a push to shorten the
average hospital stay and a need to plan routine procedures tightly, with little
room for contingencies. The challenges presented by the COVID-19 pandemic
– an increased number of long-term intensive care and hospital stays, varying
and unpredictable care outcomes, and little control over the number of patients
requiring hospitalization – exposed the vulnerability of the system.
Furthermore, nursing and care staff are notoriously underpaid, overworked and
in high demand, which proved to be an impediment to flexibility and the
expansion of care during COVID-19 without jeopardizing other necessary
care. The various professional organizations (e.g., for specialists, intensive-
care physicians, general practitioners, nurses and care workers) all have
different and sometimes contrary stakes, both financial and organizational.
Hygiene, prevention, testing and vaccination tasks are in the hands of the
municipal healthcare services, which adds another dimension to the complex
SGI 2022 | 27 Netherlands Report

task of coordination. Vaccination programs are voluntary, but the coverage

rate is quite high in the Netherlands. In recent years, a decline in the
vaccination rate of children has prompted debate about mandatory
vaccinations as an access requirement for childcare. Nonetheless, the
Netherlands vaccination campaign has been largely successful. Unvaccinated
groups are most typically found within migrant enclaves, religious groups and
a group that chooses not to trust the government.

Citation:
Kiezen voor Houdbare Zorg. Mensen, middelen en maatschappelijk draagvlak (rapport nr. 104, WRR, 2021)

Factsheet Publieksonderzoek Hoe wil Nederland oud worden? 28 februari 2020 Dit onderzoek is een
initatief van ActiZ,
branchevereniging van zorgorganisaties

Barometer Nedrlandse Gezondheidszorg 2019: Rentement stijgt ten koste van personeel, EY 2021
https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2375543-inspectie-situatie-in-jeugdpsychiatrie-onhoudbaar

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/12/16/bezuiniging-van-5-miljard-op-de-zorg-dat-is-te-kort-door-de-bocht-
a4069274

https://www.cpb.nl/eigen-bijdragen-verpleeghuiszorg-effect-op-zorggebruik-gezondheid-en-financieel-
risico
Gezond verstand, publieke kennisorganisaties in de gezondheidszorg, Rathenau Instituut, 6 september 2017

Van verschil naar potentieel. Een realistisch perspectief op de sociaaleconomische gezondheidsvershillen.

WRR Policy Brief 7, August 2018

Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, NZa: uitgaven langdurige zorg groeien sneller dan verwacht, 13-06-2019,
https://www.nza.nl/actueel/nieuws/2019/06/13/nza-uitgaven-langdurige-zorg-groeien-sneller-dan-verwacht

Nederlandse Zorgautoriteit, Stand van de zorg 2018,

(https://magazines.nza.nl/standvandezorg/2018/03/investeren-in-gezondheidswinst-voor-de-patient,
consulted 6 November 2018)

https://www.lhv.nl/thema/praktijkzaken/huisartsentekorten/

https://www.dutchnews.nl/news/2019/04/health-covenant-heavily-influenced-by-food-and-alcohol-industry-
say-experts/

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/welvaart-in-coronatijd/gezondheid/

CBS: verschil hoogopgeleide en laagopgeleide wordt groter, NRC Next, 16 August 2019

https://www.nu.nl/economie/4368814/nza-weigerde-terecht-tarieven-per-zorgaanbieder-openbaar-
maken.html ( november 2019)

Zorgen voor burgers: onderzoek naar knelpunten bij de toegang tot zorg, De Nationale Ombudsman, 14 mei,
2018

Engbersen, G., van Bochove, M., de Boom, J., el Farisi, B., Krouwel, A., van Lindert, J., Rusinovic, K.,
Snel, E., van Heck, L., van der Veen, H., & van Wensveen, P. (2021). De laag-vertrouwensamenleving: de
maatschappelijke impact van COVID-19 in Amsterdam, Den Haag, Rotterdam & Nederland.
Kenniswerkplaats Leefbare Wijken. https://www.eur.nl/essb/media/99176
SGI 2022 | 28 Netherlands Report

Families

Family Policy By far the biggest scandal in 2021 was the childcare benefits tax scandal,
Score: 6
which eventually led to the fall of the Rutte III government. Thousands of
families fell victim to a rigid, automated tax system aimed at detecting fraud.
As a result, many innocent families were forced to pay back large amounts of
money to the state. This resulted in family tragedies, divorces, the loss of
homes, mounting debts, children growing up in poverty and distress, and in
some cases even out-of-home placement. Many victims still have not been
fully compensated. The fallout of the scandal has influenced the whole Dutch
welfare system, trust in government and the overall political climate.

Family policy in the Netherlands is formally characterized by the need to

recognize a child’s best interest and to provide support for the family and the
development of parenting skills. According to EU-28 data, the Dutch spend
approximately 32% of GDP on social protections (healthcare, old age,
housing, unemployment, family), but just 4% of this is spent on family costs
(compared to an EU-28 average of 8%). Day care centers for young children
are becoming a luxury item, as they are not directly subsidized and parents
face a steep increase in costs based on higher contributions for higher taxable
income. This situation was somewhat alleviated at the beginning of 2018,
when community and commercial providers of childcare were subjected to the
same quality criteria and the same financial regime. The childcare subsidy was
significantly increased in 2019, with an additional increase slated for 2020.
Nevertheless, the cost and availability of day care varies substantially,
depending on local municipal policies. During the coronavirus crisis, families
received some compensation for the period when childcare facilities were
closed.

The government has established an extensive child protection system through

its policy of municipal “close to home” youth and family centers, which are
tasked with establishing a system of digital information related to parenting,
education and healthcare. Nevertheless, parents complain of a lack of
information about and access to youth and family centers. Local governments
have in some cases violated decision-making privacy rules in the allocation of
youth-care assistance. In recent years, there were several scandals involving
the death of very young children due to parental abuse as a result of
uncoordinated and/or belated interventions by youth-care organizations. In
spite of some success in the recent years, violence has been seen to flare up
again within a year and a half in 53% of the families that have received help.
In response, the government is investing an additional €5 million in 2022 for
regional and local efforts to tackle the problem.
SGI 2022 | 29 Netherlands Report

The devolution of powers in youth healthcare to local governments in 2016

resulted in cases where necessary psychiatric care was withheld or
significantly delayed due to a lack of financing. Vulnerable children were
particularly hard hit by the decentralization and fragmentation of services,
which led to longer waiting times. Other issues included travel to healthcare
facilities and coordination between services. For the first time since
decentralization in 2015, the number of children and young adults in youth
care declined significantly, by 11,000. Notwithstanding, the total number of
children in youth care remains high, and stands at approximately one in 10
children. Against the backdrop of a permanent shortage of funding at the
municipal level, it is not clear whether preventive efforts are effective or
parents are simply opting out of the system and choosing private providers
instead. In 2019, a wave of care-provider bankruptcies gave further fuel to
critics of the decentralization effort, particularly as it was combined with
severe financial cuts. The government now instead recommends regional
cooperation and some centralization. However, recent further cuts have
exacerbated the situation. Short-term solutions at the municipal level cannot
make up for the structural problems in the sector.

In practice, child support for families also is an instrument designed to

improve parents’ labor market participation. Enabling a work-family balance
is less of a guiding policy principle. The gap between professional women
working longer hours and less educated women not participating in the labor
market is growing. Almost two-thirds of mid-career women experience the
combination of childcare tasks and work as difficult. Full-time female labor-
force participation is hindered mainly by a high marginal effective tax burden
on second earners, reflecting the withdrawal of social benefits according to
family income. Consequently, in the World Economic Forum’s Global Gender
Gap Index 2017, the Netherlands ranked 32 out of 144 countries, having
ranked 16 in 2016 and 9 out of 130 countries in 2008. The drop was largely
due to the inclusion of top incomes in the calculations, which revealed a
glaring absence of women in highly paid positions in the country. Other
factors include unfavorable school times, a childcare system geared toward
part-time work, and the volatility of financing for and poor access to care
policies, particularly at the municipal level. For the first time, the number of
full-time working women exceeded 1 million. The share of working women
with only lower levels of education is still very low, at about 20%. Recently,
the government announced plans to increase parental leave significantly,
including paternal leave for fathers, in an effort to address these difficulties.
The plan will be implemented in 2022.

The coronavirus crisis affected Dutch families in a number of crucial ways.

First, the government chose to support businesses, without providing direct
SGI 2022 | 30 Netherlands Report

support to families. Alleviation efforts for families were organized at the

municipal level, with varying degrees of success. Second, working families
with children, particularly those with low incomes and a disadvantaged
background, experienced an extra strain due to home schooling or the need to
provide day care. Third, the situation with youth services worsened, leaving
many families in distress, sometimes producing abuse and complex
psychological issues as a result. Fourth, many students lost their part-time
jobs, returned to live at home and experienced study delays, all of which added
to the financial burden of families.

Citation:
https://www.nji.nl/nieuws/vijf-leden-hervormingstafel-stappen-op
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/kamerstukken/2021/12/16/kamerbrief-over-zevende-
voortgangsrapportage-programma-geweld-hoort-nergens-thuis
https://www.ad.nl/politiek/langer-ouderschapsverlof-vanaf-2022
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/coronavirus-covid-19/onderwijs-en-kinderopvang/corona-kosten-
kinderopvang-ouders
CBS: Dashboard arbeidsmarkt, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/visualisaties/dashboard-arbeidsmarkt

http://www.cpb.nl/publicatie/ex-post-analyse-effect-kinderopvangtoeslag-op-arbeidsparticipatie
https://www.nu.nl/economie/4875062/aantal-fulltime-werkende-vrouwen-passeert-grens-van-miljoen.html

Een werkende combinatie deel 1, SER, October 2016

https://www.ser.nl/~/media/db_adviezen/2010_2019/2016/werkende-combinatie-deel1.ashx

84 procent van de thuiszitters is vrouw, 14 augustus 2019, https://www.kinderopvangtotaal.nl/84-procent-

van-de-thuiszitters-is-vrouw/

World Economic Forum, Global Gender Gap Report, 2018

Geen betere Cao Ziekenhuizen: vakbonden starten eind juni met acties, 6 juni 2019, Zorggids Nederland

Roeters, A., F Bucx, Kijk op kinderopvang, SCP, Den Haag, 28 augustus 2018

Gesprekken met gemeenten gaan alleen nog over geld, NRC Next, 13 mei 2019

Pensions

Pension Policy The Dutch work fewer hours and retire later than people in other EU member
Score: 8
states. The average pension age has increased from 61 years in 2007 to 64
years and 10 months in 2017. The proportion of people aged between 60 and
65 still active in the labor market has almost doubled since 2005. In 2020,
94,000 people retired, 30% more than in the previous two years. Also 6.8% of
employees over 55 retired, as opposed to 5.5% in 2019. It is not clear whether
these trends were influenced by the coronavirus crisis. The retirement age is
still gradually increasing, but slower than before. In 2020, the average
statutory pension retirement age of employees was 65 years and six months, in
2021 it increased to 66 years and four months, in 2022 it will increase another
three months, and will reach 67 years in 2024. Afterward, the increase will be
eight months for each year of longer life expectancy.
SGI 2022 | 31 Netherlands Report

The Dutch pension system is based on three pillars. The first pillar is the basic,
state-run old-age pension (AOW) that provides benefits for people 66 years
old and older. Everyone under 66 who pays Dutch wage tax and/or income tax
pays into the AOW system. The system may be considered a “pay-as-you-go”
system. This pillar makes up only a limited part of the total old-age pension
system. Because the current number of pensioners will double over the next
few decades, the system is subject to considerable and increasing pressure.
The second pillar consists of obligatory occupational pension schemes that
supplement the AOW scheme. Both employees and employers are obliged to
contribute. In this way, the pension scheme covers all employees of a given
company and industry/sector. The third pillar comprises supplementary
personal pension schemes that anyone can buy from insurance companies.

Many self-employed people (who number more than 1.2 million in the
Netherlands) do not opt for a pension package, as this is not yet compulsory.
Previously, self-employed people often had a short history in the conventional
labor market that gave them some pension; however, most newly self-
employed or freelance people today do not have any pension scheme
whatsoever.

Although the system is considered the world’s best after those in Denmark and
Australia, it – like most European systems – is vulnerable to demographic
changes related to an aging population, as well as to disturbances in
international financial markets. This is because pension funds, driven by the
need to meet their growing financial obligations, are large players in stock
markets. As of 2013, the government gradually increased the age of AOW
pension eligibility to 66 by 2018, with a further increase to 67 by 2021. For
supplementary pension schemes, the retirement age rose to 67 in 2014. During
the review period, further increases in the retirement age were capped, and
concessions were made for people engaged in physically demanding jobs. Due
to the fact that the actual average retirement age is significantly lower that the
legal level of 65, the average retirement age is continuing to rise.

Due to the very low interest-rate levels, pension-fund assets, although still
enormous (totaling €660 billion or 193% of GDP), have not grown in
proportion to the number of pensioners. The liquidity ratio of pension funds
must be maintained at a minimum threshold of 105%. The time period given
for recovery after failing to meet this threshold was increased by the Dutch
central bank from three to a maximum of five years. Nevertheless, quite a few
pension-insurance companies are at risk of having to lower their benefits.
Interim framework bills for strengthening the governance of pension funds
(e.g., requirements for the indexation of pension benefits, the inclusion of
SGI 2022 | 32 Netherlands Report

pensioners on governing boards, and the use of oversight commissions and

comparative monitoring practices) were adopted by parliament in the summer
of 2014. In 2022, some funds that have met the minimum threshold of 105%
will be allowed to index pensions for the first time in 13 years.

A more definitive reform of the Dutch pension system was approved after a
long “poldering” or stakeholder consultation process. Debate focused on the
redistributive impacts (on the poor and rich, young and older, high and low
education) and on the creation of more flexible pension schemes that give
individuals more choice opportunities versus retaining collectively managed
pension schemes. In 2019, the long-due retirement-plan agreement was finally
signed, but was immediately called into question by the trade unions due to
extremely low interest rates. Eventually, the new pension law was passed, and
implementation is to begin after a delay in 2023. It involves simpler, more
uniform rules, including for survivors’ pensions. A mandatory pension plan for
freelance workers will contribute to diminishing the gap between contracted
and flexible workers.

Citation:
Rijksoverhead, Pensioenakkoord: een toekomstbestendig pensioenstelsel,
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel (visited 3 november 2019)

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2021/15/meer-werknemers-met-pensioen-gegaan-in-2020

https://www.mercer.com/our-thinking/global-pension-index-2021.html

Pensioendilemma’s in tien grafieken, 18 maart 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-

politiek/1293173/pensioendilemma-s-in-tien-grafieken

Pensioenlefftijd nederlanders voor het eerst beoven de 65 jaar, 17 augustus 2019, https://fd.nl/economie-
politiek/1311155/pensioenleeftijd-nederlanders-voor-het-eerst-boven-de-65-jaar

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/pensioen/toekomst-pensioenstelsel

Centrale banken bederven het pensioensprookje, NRC Next, 21 June, 2019

SER, Naar een nieuw pensioenstelsel, Juni 2019

Integration

Integration Policy The Netherlands is a sizable immigration-destination country, with a

Score: 7
considerable integration task. In 2020, almost a quarter of Dutch population
was of migrant origin, roughly half of them being second-generation migrants.
The major cause of growth is asylum seeking. Three large groups of migrants
can be distinguished in terms of policy issues and risk. The first group are
people with a migration background, mostly of the second and third
generations. The second group consists of new migrants, mostly refugees from
SGI 2022 | 33 Netherlands Report

various regions in the world. The third group includes migrants from Eastern
Europe, predominantly seasonal workers. Each of these groups has their own
issues and risks. The economic position of second- and third-generation
migrants is gradually improving, although they still experience
disproportionate discrimination within the labor market.

The proportion of school pupils in these groups assessed as being capable of

entering the higher tiers of Dutch secondary education (HAVO or VWO) and
the proportion actually receiving this level of education in year three of
secondary school has risen more sharply than among schoolchildren with a
native Dutch background. The in-depth analyses show that this improved
educational position also leads to a better employment position, although a
difference remains. On average, their employment rate after graduation is
lower than among graduates with a native Dutch background. However, the
higher the level of education achieved, the smaller the difference. As a result,
the relative representation of migrants within crime statistics is still high, but
has shown a decreasing trend over the last decade. The decrease is particularly
strong for second-generation migrants. Women with a migrant background are
doing significantly better than their male peers, both at school and at work.

Elections in March 2021 have triggered debate on the representation of

minorities in political bodies. This explains the relative success of DENK, a
Turkish minority party (2.0% of the vote), and the anti-discrimination party
BIJ1 (previously Artikel 1, 0.8% of the vote).

In 2020, the Migrant Integration Policy Index ranked the country in a third
tier, “Temporary integration – halfway favorable,” together with Germany,
Italy, France and the United Kingdom. Asylum policy has been a point of
concern. Efficiency and speed have been clearly been given a high priority in
asylum decisions, and the use of algorithms has led to a significant number of
arbitrary decisions. The system of refugee camps was not reformed after the
crisis in 2015, which led to problems at the end of 2021 due to the influx of
refugees from Afghanistan. People were placed in almost unacceptable
accommodations. Eventually, the minister forced municipalities to accept large
numbers of refugees without local consensus. A U.N. commission investigated
Dutch policies and noted, inter alia, that detention is used much too often.
Undocumented people also end up in such camps. Children, particularly girls,
do not feel safe in family centers, and children still disappear under the radar.

In a 2018 representative public opinion poll on immigration and integration

issues, 38% of respondents stated that immigration, integration and racism
were the second-most important public concern, after healthcare. In view of
occasional riots and disturbances at municipal council meetings on the location
SGI 2022 | 34 Netherlands Report

of refugee settlements, integration issues flared up again. National and local

parties with anti-immigration agendas gained seats in municipal councils
across the country, but never managed to repeat their success from 2017. Apart
from the occasional provocation, they have not managed to initiate a
substantial debate on the issue of integration. Although the dominant concern
during the review period seemed to be over growing levels of income
inequality, there are still widely shared concerns over growing polarization
and radicalization on both sides of the political spectrum.

Since 2009, all non-EU nationals who migrate to the Netherlands have been
required to learn Dutch and essential facts about Dutch history and society.
The Civic Integration Abroad policy involves obligatory integration tests in
the country of origin for family-reunion applicants. Refugees are expected to
“deserve” their status in the Netherlands by taking language tests, and many
refugees accumulate debt paying for obligatory language courses, which are
also difficult to find and are often of unreliable quality. Migrants without
refugee status are allowed to take a loan of up to €10,000 to pay for their
integration, to be repaid within three years. The new law addresses many of
these issues, but not all. Two improvements stand out. First, municipalities
have recovered their coordination role, thereby putting an end to the lucrative
language courses offered by all kinds of unmonitored organizations. Second, a
great amount of flexibility has been added to the system, allowing for refugees
to proceed more quickly to school or to higher level paid jobs, since they will
be offered language lessons at a higher level. A downside is the punitive
character of the system that has been preserved. Refugees are to pay a fine if
they do not complete their program on time, which means that many of them
may opt out for lower, “easier” language levels, which would be detrimental to
their integration in the long run.

Compared to other countries, immigrants benefit from several measures

targeting employment and labor market integration. Nevertheless,
unemployment rates among non-Western migrants are three times as high
(16%) as among Dutch-born citizens (under 4% at the end of 2018). The
employment rate of refugees stagnated during the coronavirus crisis. In 2020,
44% of those who received refugee status in 2014 had a job. They usually
work fewer hours than native Dutch persons, have flexible contracts and are
overrepresented in low-end service jobs. More recent refugees seem to find
work faster. Recent research shows that ethnic discrimination in the labor
market is widespread and difficult to address. Muslim citizens self-report
experiences with and perceptions of discrimination, as well as incidents of
harassment and violence, at levels quite high by comparison with other
European counties. Rampant discrimination, racism and Islamophobia in the
police force were recently revealed by a series of whistleblowers in response
SGI 2022 | 35 Netherlands Report

to inadequate responses by top police officials. In 2021, a case against the

police on ethnic profiling was lost. The national Monitor Discrimination
reported a record number of complaints in 2020.

Another precarious group – East European migrants – was hit particularly hard
by the pandemic. First off, virtually no integration programs exist for people
coming from within the EU. In addition, many are seasonal workers with
temporary “all-in” contracts by agencies that provide employment, housing
and transportation, under conditions resembling human trafficking in many
cases. A report by a special committee came up with a number of
recommendations. Implementation of these has been slow and piecemeal, so
far.

Citation:
Migrant Integration Policy Index 2015. Integration Policies: who benefits?
(http://mipex.eu/sites/default/files/downloads/files/mipex_integration-policy_po licy-brief.pdf consulted 5
november 20190

Burgerperspectieven 2019|3, Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau (scp.nl, consulted November 2, 2019)

Nederlands Jeugdinstituut, Jeugdwerkloosheid, 29 oktober 2019

https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/publication/2021/15/asylum-and-integration-2021

https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/nieuws/2018/44/aantal-immigranten-en-emigranten-ook-in-2018-hoog

CBS, Jaarrapport integratie 2020 https://longreads.cbs.nl/integratie-2020/

https://www.ru.nl/fsw/@1331552/stem-geven-kiezers-migratieachtergrond/
https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/15/asiel-en-integratie-2021-cohortonderzoek-asielzoekers-en-
statushouders
Migrantenkinderen verdienen minder, NRC Next, June 13, 2019

‘Moslimfobie, intimidatie bij politie – en de top kijkt weg’, NRC Next, July 13, 2019
https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/09/22/rechtbank-marechaussee-mag-etnisch-profileren-bij-
vreemdelingentoezicht-a4059212
https://stichtingcivic.nl/het-nieuwe-inburgeringsbeleid-een-hindernisbaan-van-sancties/
https://www.ser.nl/nl/thema/werkwijzer-vluchtelingen/feiten-en-cijfers/aantallen-herkomst
https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2020/10/30/tweede-advies-aanjaagteam-bescherming-
arbeidsmigranten
https://njcm.nl/actueel/vn-comite-onderzoekt-discriminatie-in-nederland/

Safe Living

Internal Security Since 2010, opinion polling has shown that confidence in the police is
Policy
consistently high and satisfaction regarding policing performance is fairly high
Score: 6
(28% of those polled express that they are “very satisfied”). Research shows
that this is independent of the actual conduct and performance of police
officers. In the last 10 years, self-reported crime has consistently decreased.
Crimes registered by police decreased by one-third, and the number of crimes
as estimated by citizens decreased even more, by approximately 40%. At the
SGI 2022 | 36 Netherlands Report

same time, the percentage of resolved cases remains steady, at about 25%. A
recent CBS report called this “the mystery of the disappearing crime.”
However, this decline came to a grinding halt during the review period, with a
rise in sexual offenses, probably related to human trafficking particularly of
underage subjects. The types of crime reported shifted in 2020 from more
“traditional” crime toward organized crime and digital/cybercrime.

Cybercrime rates have increased and the types of crimes have diversified –
from harassment to organized attacks on vital public systems. Recent studies
have concluded that the Dutch police lack the technical expertise to effectively
tackle cybercrime. A new study warned in 2019 of the dangers of “digital
dependency” and the possible resulting havoc. Since 2011, the Dutch
government has been implementing an EU-coordinated National
Cybersecurity Strategy that prioritizes prevention over detection. Regarding
terrorism threats, the intelligence services (Nationale Coordinator
Terrorismebestrijding, established 2004) appear able to prevent attacks. The
Dutch Safety board concluded in a report from 2020 that the Netherlands’
approach to digital safety and security needs to change rapidly and
fundamentally to prevent Dutch society from being disrupted by cyberattacks.
The newly formed government included a cybersecurity paragraph, and for the
first time has a designated minister for digitalization.

There is deep concern about the infiltration of organized crime into local
politics, business and police forces, which has resulted in an unwanted seepage
of the illegal economy into the formal economy, and has undermined the
credibility of the public administration. Recently, a number of reports drew
attention to the scale of illegal-drug production and distribution in the
Netherlands and beyond. Synthetic drugs with an estimated street value of
over €18 billion and marijuana production have become a structural part of
Dutch economy, thereby creating a constant danger of spillover into the
mainstream economy. In an attempt to tackle the problem, a number of
municipalities have begun experimenting with the legalization of soft drugs.
However, the issue is increasingly hard drugs. Over the last decade, the
Netherlands, as has been made clear from recent court cases involving murders
among criminals, has become a crucial distribution center for cocaine and
synthetic drugs in Western Europe.

In the 2022 budget, an additional €524 million is allocated to enlarging police

capacity and building social resilience. The police forces have indicated that
this is not sufficient to bring about structural change.

Two recent attempts (one successful) to assassinate lawyers are considered to

be extremely alarming, as they expose the true reach of organized crime and
SGI 2022 | 37 Netherlands Report

their very violent practices. The assassination of the investigative journalist

Pieter R. de Vries was a shock, and revealed the alarming degree to which
organized crime has infiltrated Dutch society. Other high-profile cases, such as
a hostage situation in Amsterdam and violent robberies in broad daylight, have
generated feelings of insecurity, even if overall levels of crime are down. The
coronavirus crisis also led to the intimidation of scientists and politicians,
thereby creating an overall feeling of an unsafe, more perilous and harsher
society.

Members of the police rank and file are expressing decreasing confidence in
their leaders, due to scandals related to racism, discrimination and bullying.
Police spokespeople maintain that the citizenry’s confidence in the police
forces remains high. Following debates about more aggressive standard police
equipment, incidents of disproportionate police violence are growing, and the
government has gone to great lengths not to sanction the perpetrators. The
trend is a reason for concern.

The policies of the present government focus on cost reduction, and the
centralization of the previously strictly municipal and regional police, judicial,
and penitentiary systems. Recent reports indicate serious problems in
implementing reforms, with police officers claiming severe loss of operational
capacity. Meanwhile, there is profound discontent and unrest inside the
Ministry of Justice and Safety. Judges, prosecutors, lawyers and other legal
personnel have voiced public complaints about the “managerialization” of the
judicial process and the resulting workload, which critics contend have led to
“sloppy” trials and verdicts. Efforts to digitize the judicial process, intended to
reduce costs, have resulted in a massive operational failure and a cost overrun
of approximately €200 million. The coalition agreement announces more
money for paying fees of social lawyers in an effort to help citizens (re)gain
more access to legal procedures. But government policy is also attempting to
relieve part of the burden on the judicial system by introducing intermediation
procedures. The coronavirus crisis had significant influence on the way
prevention, law enforcement and the court system functioned. During the
lockdowns, some tasks were discontinued or significantly delayed. Particularly
for prevention and youth detention centers, the delays were significant. The
already overburdened courts started working online to prevent even further
backlogs, inevitably impacting the quality of verdicts.

According to research for Transport & Logistiek Nederland, the police have
been neglecting transportation crimes for years. Precise number of criminal
activities are difficult to quantify, but it seems that organized crime uses
transportation frequently and with a very low risk of being caught. The reasons
are, again, shortage of personnel, insufficient funding and decentralization.
SGI 2022 | 38 Netherlands Report

One high-level administrator has characterized the situation as “organized

crime facing an unorganized state.”

Environmental crime is also growing in impact and frequency. The Dutch

court of audit concluded that the whole chain of response is not functioning
well. Information and data on environmental crimes are insufficient and
unreliable. What is needed is risk-oriented action, instead of sporadic reactions
after the fact. The Dutch court of audit recommended making all the
information on environmental hazards public, to increase transparency and to
increase the pressure on companies to comply.

The overall picture from the safety and security, and judicial institutions of the
Dutch government is one of increasing stress and challenge, lack of
enforcement capacity, and an inadequate response to organized crime in the
drug sector, human trafficking, ecological crime and cybercrime.

L. van der Veer et al., Vertrouwen in de politie: trends en verklaringen, Politie en Wetenschap, Apeldoorn,
Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2013

https://www.parlementairemonitor.nl/9353000/1/j9vvij5epmj1ey0/vlnje0e06mzw

Cybersecuritymonitor 2020, CBS, https://www.cbs.nl/nl-nl/publicatie/2021/18/cybersecuritymonitor-2020

Handhaven in het duister: De aanpak van milieucriminaliteit en – overtredingen, deel 2, Algemene

Rekenkamer 30.-06.2021

https://www.bureaubervoets.nl/portfolio/doorbraak-verzocht-transportcriminaliteit/
https://www.cbs.nl/en-gb/news/2020/10/less-traditional-crime-more-cybercrime

Liquidatie van advocaat is ‘aanslag op rechtsttaat,” NRC, 18 september 2019

https://www.om.nl/onderwerpen/strafzaak-peter-r.-de-vries

https://www.wrr.nl/onderwerpen/digitale-ontwrichting/nieuws/2019/09/09/digitale-ontwrichting

Veiligheidsmonitor, 2019 ((veiligheidsmonitor.nl, consulted 3 November 2019)

Jurien de Jong, Het Mysterie van verdwenen criminaliteit, Statistische Trends, CBS, Mei 2018, Den Haag

Tops, P. et al, Waar een klein land groot in kan zijn. Nederland en synthetische drugs in de afgelopen 50
jaar.The Hague 2018

https://www.tweedekamer.nl/debat_en_vergadering/uitgelicht/georganiseerde-criminaliteit-en-ondermijning
https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht

Daling criminaliteitcijfers laatste halfjaar gestaakt, NOS, Jan. 17, 2019

Dutch police are being infiltrated by criminal gangs, report says, July 16, 2019

https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/nederland/artikel/5215875/kritiek-op-peperdure-politie-advocaten-zaak-
mitch-henriquez

https://twnews.nl/nl-news/gebrekkig-materieel-en-achterstallig-onderhoud-wat-zijn-de-grootste-problemen-
bij-defensie
SGI 2022 | 39 Netherlands Report

https://www.wodc.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/05/03/bekostiging-van-politie-om-en-rechtspraak-onderzocht

Fundamental intervention is needed to ensure Dutch digital safety and security, Dutch Safety Council,
https://www.onderzoeksraad.nl/en/page/19862/fundamental-intervention-is-needed-to-ensure-dutch-digital-
safety-and

https://www.slachtofferhulp.nl/over-ons/jaarverslag/

https://www.nrc.nl/nieuws/2021/03/03/deze-lui-deinzen-nergens-voor-terug-a4034051

https://www.ftm.nl/artikelen/de-onderschatting-van-de-
cocainehandel?utm_source=linkedIn&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=CokeSlot&share=Q4NMfP6Lr
H9191wkcohz%2B0U5e8Ql5X7pX7Te%2B04IuOqJYq2L1vsCC%2FljpNL3RYQ%3D
https://criminaliteit-en-recht.nl/

Global Inequalities

Global Social The Netherlands ranks sixth in the Commitment to Development Index. It does
Policy
best in trade (first place), development finance (seventh), and health (seventh).
Score: 6
The components for which it has the most room for improvement are
technology (rank 24), investment (18th), and security (16th). The
development-aid budget was cut by the Rutte III cabinet, with the intention of
adding expenditure for international conflict management and climate policy.
In addition, costs for climate policy are allocated to development-aid budgets.
The pattern of focusing on trade and the stimulation of Dutch business
relations remains largely unchanged. The driving idea is that “economic and
knowledge diplomacy” can forge a coalition between Dutch business-sector
experts (in reproductive health, water management and food
security/agriculture), and business and civil society associations in developing
countries. Climate has been included as a key focus area, alongside poverty,
migration and terrorism. The focus is on unstable regions close to Europe.

Human rights are still a priority for Dutch foreign policy. The new
government’s coalition agreement stresses that future trade and investment
treaties should include high standards of fair production, human rights, food
safety, sustainable growth and climate. The budget is expected to rise and to
be explicitly tied to the Sustainable Development Goals. The budget has been
expanded by €500 million, mainly to participate in the COVAX program and
to aid in climate adaptation and climate mitigation. In addition, different
tranches of money were put toward alleviation of the coronavirus crisis in
India and other countries. An additional €25 million was spent on vaccines in
poor countries. Also, Afghanistan received about €10 million for humanitarian
help.

Dutch immigration policy since 2015 has mimicked Denmark’s efforts,

seeking to discourage refugees from coming to the Netherlands. The
SGI 2022 | 40 Netherlands Report

government did provide an additional €290 million for refugee relief in

countries in the Middle East and Northern Africa, as a pivotal part of the
Dutch refugee approach. All of this shows a pattern of declining commitment
by the Dutch government to global policy frameworks and the fair global-
trading system. Instead, the aspiration has been to link development aid to
Dutch national economic and international security interests. Tellingly, in the
new coalition government, the Department for Development Aid and
International Trade has been rebaptized as the Department for International
Trade and Development Aid. The international fight against terrorism has
colored immigration policy for the last 20 years.

In spite of ample evidence of human trafficking and exploitation of workers, in

some cases from poor regions within Europe, Dutch authorities have taken
insufficient legal action against such crimes. Recent evidence about illegal
pushbacks by Frontex also raises questions about Dutch support for the
organization.

Citation:
Rijksoverheid, Beleidsnota Investeren in Perspectief, 2018

WRR (2010), Minder pretentie, meer ambitie. Ontwikkelingshulp die verschil maakt, Amsterdam University
Press

Center for Global Development, Commitment to Development Index, 2021

(https://www.cgdev.org/commitment-development-index-2018, consulted 8 November 2019)

https://www.nlontwikkelingssamenwerking.nl

https://www.rekenkamer.nl/actueel/nieuws/2021/09/28/aanpak-arbeidsuitbuiting-door-inspectie-niet-
effectief

Knoope, P. 20 jaar strijd tegen terrorisme bleek geldverslindend falen,14-07-2021

https://spectator.clingendael.org/en/node/5418

https://www.prakkendoliveira.nl/en/news/news-2021/eu-agency-frontex-charged-with-illegal-pushbacks

III. Environmental Policies

Environment

Environmental A few key facts about the Dutch economy help to understand why the
Policy
Netherlands is struggling with environmental issues. The Netherlands is an
Score: 6
agricultural superpower within an urbanized society. In terms of value, the
Netherlands is the second-largest agricultural exporter in the world. Most
exports are in livestock; its feed needs to be imported, what remains in the
country is manure, which, processed into fertilizer, leaves a huge nitrogen
SGI 2022 | 41 Netherlands Report

emission impact. Household electricity and gas use constitute 12% of total
energy use in the Netherlands. Traffic and transport have a slightly larger
share of 15%. The largest share of about 40% is from industry. The structure
of the Dutch economy is energy-intensive. The share of renewable energy is
small; the largest contribution is made by biomass, but the Netherlands is
unable to meet its energy demand using only domestically grown biomass, as
there simply is not enough land available. The Dutch have never been more
mobile. Add to this that the Netherlands is a country of transport flows. Every
day, goods are shipped from Dutch harbors to the European hinterland by air,
ship, railroad and road transportation services that have a total annual (2021)
value of €54 billion. In other words, environmental policy has immediate and
severe impacts on the country’s economic business model.

The Rutte III government has described itself “the greenest coalition” to date,
and put climate change on its political agenda. A Climate Act was approved by
parliament in December 2018. Broad consultations eventually produced a
climate agreement that set the goal of a 49% reduction in CO2 emissions by
2020. Before the Paris Accords, the Dutch government had resisted more
ambitious international climate goals. At the moment, the goals are not being
met, and the State Council called for immediate remedial measures instead of
waiting for the new coalition government.

The new coalition agreement has more ambitious plans: a minimum of 55%
CO2 reduction in the Climate Law, binding agreements regarding pollution
reduction with the top 20 industrial polluters, and, remarkably, the revival of
nuclear energy as a sustainable source. The new government even has a
minister of climate and energy.

There has been a clear policy shift in recent years toward climate adaptation.
This appears manageable today because any adverse developments in the
Netherlands will be gradual. The Netherlands’ natural-gas reserves have
diminished rapidly and will necessitate gas imports from 2025 onward, despite
decreasing demand. Meanwhile, earthquakes and soil subsidence are damaging
houses in the northern provinces where the Dutch gas reserves are located. The
government has introduced compensation measures for victims (but these are
still contested as too small, unfairly distributed and inefficiently allocated).

Plastic is seen as a problem, but is dealt with largely at the municipal level, as
a part of local recycling programs. A deposit paid by consumers on plastic
bottles was introduced in 2021.

The quality of air and surface water in the Netherlands remains poor, with
intensive farming and traffic congestion the primary causes of concern, as well
SGI 2022 | 42 Netherlands Report

as soil salification in agricultural lands. Half of the country’s rivers, canals and
lakes contain too much nitrogen and phosphates. Air pollution levels,
especially of particulate matter in the region around Amsterdam, Rotterdam
and The Hague, are among the highest in Europe, and the concentrations of
ozone and nitrogen dioxide are linked to a very considerable amount of
premature deaths.

Sustainable agriculture, particularly meat and dairy farming, is on the agenda

and is gaining social support. In October 2018, the Urgenda environmental
association won a major victory, with the Court of Appeal ruling that the
government’s failure to reduce carbon dioxide emissions significantly violated
its human rights obligations. The verdict was upheld by the Supreme Court. In
a separate case, courts rejected a scheme for trading future emissions in
nitrogen, deeming that it failed to protect the environment sufficiently, and
failed to assure air quality. The verdict effectively brought a large number of
construction projects, including housing construction, to a halt. The reaction
was to turn a focus on a primary culprit in this area – Dutch industrial farming,
particularly livestock farming, which is the largest contributor to the country’s
nitrogen emissions. A call to reduce the sector by half led to mass
demonstrations by farmers, and even riots in some locations. Construction
workers also protested, as they too viewed their jobs as being at risk.

Eventually, even the suggestion that industrial farming should be reduced at

least by half to resolve the nitrogen crisis (and the exacerbation of the housing
problem due to the delay of construction projects) led to loud and intimidating
protest by the newly established Farmers Defense Force (with tractors in the
streets of the Hague and blocking highways), and to the election of a member
of parliament from the new Farmers’ Citizen Movement. Evidently, both the
farming and the construction sectors will have to act to meet the Urgenda
goals by 2025, according to the Dutch Environmental Assessment Agency.

All in all, the government that originally called itself “green” was forced by
these verdicts to increase the pace of its climate action, in some cases through
the use of emergency measures. A very visible measure has been the speed-
limit reduction on highways to a maximum of 100 kilometers per hour during
daylight hours. These measures have become possible due to a gradual shift in
public opinion. The discussion is no longer if emissions reductions will
happen, but about the distribution of costs. For example, many have expressed
a fear that the weakest shoulders will carry a disproportionately high burden.
Still, the new coalition is allocating €25 billion to compensate farmers and to
stimulate sustainable farming, by this confirming the fears that ordinary
citizens as taxpayers will continue to carry the burden of energy transition and
climate adaptation.
SGI 2022 | 43 Netherlands Report

At the same time, the Netherlands continues to invest heavily in fossil fuels.
After heavy criticism, it signed the COP26 agreement in Glasgow to end
investment in fossil fuel. Recently, the sustainability of biomass (an important
element in the climate agreement) has been called into doubt. By denying an
environmental permit to an energy producer using biomass, the Dutch court in
2021 set a precedent that could lead to shutting down businesses as well, rather
than being limited to bringing construction projects to a halt. The permit was
denied on the grounds that nitrogen emissions were too high. Although
industry is responsible for 9% of the country’s nitrogen emissions, businesses
could be a target of more court orders in the coming months and years, since
many of them hold old permits, sometimes exceeding the current norms by
three to four times.

The airline industry is still not paying its fair share with regard to the
amelioration of pollution, although the government has pledged to resolve this
issue at the European level. The coronavirus crisis did not stimulate any long
term measures in this respect. Instead, KLM was saved by generous support
with taxpayers’ money. The new coalition is allocating €22 billion to stimulate
environmentally friendly practices at KLM, Tata Steel and other big industrial
polluters.

In 2021, in a historic verdict, Royal Dutch Shell was ordered to reduce its CO2
emission by 45% compared to the total 2019 level. As a response, Shell moved
its headquarters to the United Kingdom.

Although the Netherlands has been praised as a pioneer in the area of mapping
and assessing ecosystems and their management, and in developing natural
capital accounting systems, significant problems remain. The most serious
problems involve habitat fragmentation and biodiversity loss, atmospheric
nitrogen deposition, desiccation and acidification. Over the last 25 years, about
140 species inhabiting the North Sea have suffered a 30% decline, mainly due
to recently forbidden commercial fishing techniques.

Citation:
Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, 5 August, 2014. The Netherlands in 21 infographics.

The EU Environmental Implementation Review Country Report – The Netherlands, Brussel, April 2019

Algemene Rekenkamer, Focus op kosten windenergie op zee, 27-09-2018

Planbureau voor de leefomgeving, Klimaat – en Energieverkenning 2019

Urgenda wint hoger beroep klimaatzaak, http://news.smart.pr/urgenda/persbericht-urgenda-wint-hoger-

beroep-klimaatzaak, October 2018

WRR-Policy Brief 5, Klimaatbeleid voor de lange termijn: van vrijblijvend naar verankerd, October 2016
SGI 2022 | 44 Netherlands Report

Planbureau voor de Leefomgeving, Balans van de leefomgeving 2018,

http://news.smart.pr/urgenda/persbericht-urgenda-wint-hoger-beroep-klimaatzaak

Raad voor de leefomgeving en infrastructuur, Duurzaam en gezond. Samen naar een houdbaar
voedselsysteem. Maart 2018
Deltaprogramma 2020, Doorwerken aan de delta: nuchter, alert en voorbereid,
https://www.deltacommissaris.nl/deltaprogramma, visited 2 november 2019

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/aanpak-stikstof/uitspraak-raad-van-state-en-gevolgen-einde-pas,
visited october 2019

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/ministeries/ministerie-van-economische-zaken-en-
klimaat/documenten/publicaties/2019/06/28/het-klimaatakkoord-in-meer-dan-70-vragen

Global Environmental Protection

Global The Dutch government has traditionally been a strong supporter of EU

Environmental
leadership in the Kyoto process of global climate policy and advancing global
Policy
Score: 5
environmental protection regimes. It has also signed related international
treaties on safety, food security, energy and international justice. In Glasgow,
the Netherlands signed the COP26 deal to end fossil fuel investments,
following initially sharp criticism both within the country and abroad.
The government continues to aspire to a coherent sustainability policy or a
“policy agenda for globalization.” It regards resource and energy scarcity,
transborder disease control, climate change, transborder crime, and
international trade agreements as the most pressing global issues. The
amalgamation of trade and development work has gone further under Rutte III.
The new coalition agreement has the ambition to green its trade instruments,
shift toward more justice in trade practices and cut aid to fossil industries.

As an immediate response, climate change is addressed mainly as a mitigation

effort, for example, through the Dutch Risk Reduction Team, offering
assistance and expertise to water-related risk areas around the globe. A
coherent globalization policy also means that research is conducted and
monitoring is performed regarding any ways that one policy may undermine
others. In spite of this intention, Dutch reassessment of development aid
appears to favor bilateral over multilateral global sustainability policy. For
example, the financing of Dutch initiatives in advancing global public goods is
no longer separately budgeted but is instead part of the diminishing
development-aid budget.
The Netherlands participates in efforts targeting global climate resilience that
are focused on tapping technological innovation to reduce CO2. Bilateral
projects with various countries outside the EU are centered on knowledge
sharing, particularly in the area of water management. Water management is
also a key element of the Dutch contribution to the Global Commission on
SGI 2022 | 45 Netherlands Report

Adaptation, of which the Netherlands is initiator, a convening country and a

direct funder. Water management systems are also a key asset in Dutch trade.

However, the Dutch economy is currently one of the worst polluters in Europe,
not at home but through its trade activities beyond the country’s borders and
their impact on people and ecosystems. The Netherlands ranks last (31st) on
the EU spillover list. The list compares the effect of national policies on the
life and welfare of other member states. The main reason for this abysmal
score is Dutch tax policy. The Netherlands occupies fourth place in the
ranking of tax-havens in the world, with a total of 12,400 mailbox companies.
This means that other countries lose approximately €20 billion in tax revenue
on a yearly basis.

The Netherlands Commission for Environmental Assessment is an

independent advisory body composed of experts. In 2017, it won an award for
the quality of its services. It provides advisory services and capacity
development to international governments, focusing on the quality of
environmental assessments, with the aim of contributing to sound decision-
making. However, on the domestic front, its data on nitrogen deposits in
protected natural areas were called into question by major political parties
when court cases on the issue forced the government to take urgent measures
in the agricultural and construction sectors.

Citation:
Kabinetsreactie op het WRR-rapport: Minder pretentie, meer ambitie (2010)
(www.eerstekamer.nl/id/vimdknvvxtfz/document-extern/briefmp110112)

Adapt now: a global call for leadership on climate resilience. Global Commission on Adaptation, September
2019

Additional reference:
http://www.aiv-advies.nl/ContentSuite/upload/aiv/file/webversie_AIV%2084_NL.pdf

Rijksbegroting 2016 Defensie (http://www.rijksbegroting.nl/2019/voorbereiding/begroting, consulted 6

November 2019)
https://www.rvo.nl/subsidies-regelingen/dutch-risk-reduction-team-drr-team

Netherlands Commission on Environmental Assessment, 2018 (era.nl, accessed 8 November 2018)

https://nltimes.nl/2021/11/08/netherlands-signs-cop26-deal-end-fossil-fuel-investments
SGI 2022 | 46 Netherlands Report

Robust Democracy

Electoral Processes

Candidacy With a score of 80 out of 100 points the Netherlands ranked 8 out of 158
Procedures
countries in the March 2018 Perceptions of Electoral Integrity Index, after
Score: 9
Denmark (score 86), Finland, Norway, Iceland, Sweden, Germany and Costa
Rica. Its highest scores are in the areas of electoral laws and electoral
procedures; somewhat lower scores are in the areas of voter registration and
party and candidacy registration. In 2019, this index ranked the Netherlands at
seventh place, with 61 out of 70 points, after all the Nordic countries and
Germany. Based on data from Transparency International’s Global Corruption
Barometer – EU 2021 on perceptions of electoral integrity, the Netherlands
fell at fourth place (after Finland, Sweden and Denmark).

The country’s electoral law and articles 53 through 56 of the constitution detail
the basic procedures for free elections at the European, national, provincial
and municipal levels. The independence of the Election Council (Kiesraad)
responsible for supervising elections is stipulated by law.

All Dutch citizens residing in the Netherlands are equally entitled to run for
election, although some restrictions apply in cases where the candidate suffers
from a mental disorder, a court order has deprived the individual of eligibility
for election, or a candidate’s party name is believed to endanger public order.
Anyone possessing citizenship – even minors – can start a political party with
minimal legal but considerable financial constraints. Some argue that party-
membership and party-caucus rules strongly diminish formal equality with
regard to electoral-system accessibility. Political parties with elected members
receive state money (subsidies and other benefits), while qualifying as a new
party necessitates payment of a considerable entry fee.

P. Norris et al., March 2018. Corruption and Coercion: the Year in Elections, 2017

Transparency International, People see low political integrity throughout EU (transparency.org)

P. Norris, M. Grömping, 2019, Perception of Electoral Integrity

https://nos.nl/nieuwsuur/artikel/2304406-nederland-is-het-wilde-westen-van-de-partijfinanciering
https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/politicoloog-krouwel-giften-aan-politieke-partijen-werken-corruptie-in-de-
hand~b48994ba/
SGI 2022 | 47 Netherlands Report

https://www.trouw.nl/politiek/de-cda-ruzie-laat-zien-dat-er-regels-voor-partijfinanciering-nodig-zijn-dit-is-
toegestane-corruptie~b76f7ca7/
https://www.nporadio1.nl/fragmenten/de-nieuws-bv/a9b142f4-12ca-447e-98f7-9883847a5177/2021-06-18-
bijna-alles-mag-bij-partijfinanciering

Media Access The Media Law (Article 39g) requires that political parties with one or more
Score: 8
seats in either chamber of the States General be allotted time on the national
broadcasting stations (radio, television) during the parliamentary term,
provided that they participate in nationwide elections. The Commission for the
Media ensures that political parties are given equal media access free from
government influence or interference (Article 11.3). The commission is also
responsible for allotting national broadcasting time to political parties
participating in European elections.

Broadcasting time is denied only to parties that have been fined for breaches
of Dutch anti-discrimination legislation. The public prosecutor has brought
group insult and inciting to discrimination charges against Geert Wilders, the
leading member of parliament representing the Party for Freedom (PVV). The
charge was upheld (minus the aspect of inciting to discrimination) by the
Supreme Court, but no legal punishment was ordered; nor were disadvantaged
parties accorded the right of compensation. In this way, the PVV kept its free
airtime on national Dutch broadcasting channels. Commercial media outlets
decide themselves how much attention to pay to political parties and
candidates. Since 2004, state subsidies for participating in elections have been
granted only to parties already represented in the States General. Whether this
practice constitutes a form of unequal treatment for newcomers is currently a
matter of discussion.

However, media access these days also means access to social media (Twitter,
blogs, YouTube), especially when competing for younger voters (18 – 35 age
group). Dutch political parties have together spent more than €200,000 on
Facebook advertisements in the run-up to the European Parliament elections in
2019. Public debate on topics of this nature is only beginning, inspired by
issues such as the general financing of political parties, access to social media
by new political parties, movements with strong but undisclosed financial
support, and foreign interference in national elections. Even in the
Netherlands, some parts of society are turning against media reporting, and are
threatening journalists. Public media broadcasting equipment (vans, cars) have
removed their logos for fear of damages through attacks by inimical
individuals, bands or crowds.

Citation:
NU.nl, 3 November 2019. Politieke partijen gaven 200.000 euro uit aan Facebook-advertenties

Adformatie, 1 nNovember 2016. VVD strijdt ook ‘achter Facebook’ en boekt meeste succes op social media
(Adformatie.nl, accessed 3 November, 2019)
SGI 2022 | 48 Netherlands Report

de Rechtspraak, 9 December 2016 Wilders schuldig aan groepsbelediging en aanzetten tot discriminatie

Openbaar Ministerie, Strafzaak Wilders (afgesloten 6 Juli 2021)

Villamedia Website over Journalistiek, 15 October 2020. NOS verwijderd logo’s vanwege bedreigingen van
journalisten

De Telegraaf, 22 November 2021. Omroep Brabant verwijdert logo’s van wagens: ‘Knieval voor geweld’.

Voting and Voter registration is passive and based on the unified population register
Registration
maintained by municipalities. Voters residing abroad who wish to receive the
Rights
Score: 10
ballot are required to actively register. Up to 1 million citizens reside outside
of the Netherlands, but only some 80,000 requested to be registered for the
upcoming elections.
Contrary to other civil rights, the right to vote in national, provincial or water
board elections is restricted to 13 million citizens with Dutch nationality of 18
years and older (as of election day). For local elections, voting rights apply to
all registered as legal residents for at least five years and to all EU nationals
residing in the Netherlands. Convicts have the right to vote by authorization
only; as part of their conviction, some may be denied voting rights for two to
five years over and above their prison terms. Since the elections in 2010, each
voter is obliged to show a legally approved ID in addition to a voting card.
Legally approved IDs include either a (non-expired) passport or driver’s
license.

Characteristic of the high level of trust in election procedures in the

Netherlands is the fact that the law regulates complaints and appeals regarding
specific parts of the electoral process, such as voter registration, registration of
party names, candidate registration and election day proceedings, but there are
no specific rules or regulations permitting judicial appeals to other crucial
aspects, including campaign finance, campaigning and challenges to the
election results.

After the national elections held during the pandemic on 17 March 2021,
which entailed special health measures such as postal voting inside the country
and social distancing, several changes in the voting procedure have been
considered. Proposals have included a change making voting possible over the
course of several days, limiting the number of proxy vote authorizations, and
adapting ballot design to the increase in the number of political parties on the
ballot.

Citation:
art J24 Kieswet:
http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0004627/AfdelingII/HoofdstukJ/6/ArtikelJ24/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-
2013
SGI 2022 | 49 Netherlands Report

art 1 Wet op Indentificatieplicht:

http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0006297/geldigheidsdatum_24-05-2013#HoofdstukI_Artikel1

OSCE, Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, The Netherlands, Parliamentary Elections
March 17 2021, ODHIRNeeds Assessment Report 19-22 January 2021

NRC, ten Velde, 13 October 2021 Nieuw stembiljet, extra stemdagen

Party Financing The Dutch government spends less money than its counterparts in most other
Score: 4
European countries on financing political parties, at €1 per voter (compared to
€9.70 for Iceland). Based on GRECO estimates, Dutch political parties are
also less reliant on government money (receiving between 35% and 50% of
their funding from this source) than are most other European political parties,
with the exception of those in Germany.

Until about a decade ago, political-party finances were not a contested issue in
Dutch politics. Party funds come largely through membership contributions
(40% – 50%), a “party tax” applied to elected members’ salaries, event
revenues and donations, and government subsidies. However, relatively new
parties like the Pim Fortuyn List (Lijst Pim Fortuyn, LPF) and the Party for
Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid, PVV), as well as Forum for Democracy,
have received substantial gifts from businesses and/or foreign sources, while
the Socialist Party (Socialistische Partij, SP) has made its parliamentarians
completely financially dependent on the party leadership by demanding that
their salaries be donated in full to the party.

As government transparency became a political issue, these glaring opacities

in the Dutch “non-system” of party financing were flagged by the Council of
Europe and the Group of Countries against Corruption (GRECO) – resulting in
increasing pressures to change the law. Political expediency caused many
delays, but the Rutte I Council of Ministers introduced a bill on the financing
of political parties in 2011, which was signed into law in 2013. GRECO has
also addressed the procedure for monitoring party finances (particularly when
the rules are improved), noting that this task should rest not with a minister or
political figure, but with an independent body.

The 2013 law eradicates many – but not all – of the earlier loopholes. Political
parties are obliged to register gifts starting at €1,000, and at €4,500 they are
obliged to publish the name and address of the donor. This rule has been
opposed by the PVV as an infringement of the right to anonymously support a
political party. Direct provision of services and facilities to political parties is
also regulated. Non-compliance will be better monitored. The scope of the law
does not yet extend to provincial or local political parties. The law’s possible
discrimination against newcomer political parties remains an unresolved issue.
SGI 2022 | 50 Netherlands Report

In 2018, an ad hoc advisory commission evaluated the 2013 law. It argued that
anonymous donations (especially from foreign donors) should be prohibited,
and that the threshold and conditions for non-disclosure should be changed in
favor of greater transparency. It additionally recommended that state
subsidization should in the future be based on the number of party members
rather than the number of parliamentary seats, with the aim of strengthening
political parties’ societal roots. Furthermore, it said that provincial and local
political parties should be brought within the scope of the law. The
government only partially followed the commission’s advice. Foreign
donations were limited to within-EU donations, but the idea of privileging
membership numbers more than the number of seats held was put on hold.
Recently, an alleged corruption case involving aldermen in the municipal
government of The Hague has placed the issue back on the political agenda,
particularly given concerns about growing criminal influences within local
governments.

Citation:
Parlement & Politiek, Partijfinanciering, 2016 (parlement.com, consulted November 9 2016

I. van Biezen, 2017. De financiering van politieke partijen – een internationale vergelijking
(kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl, accessed 3 November 2019)

NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.

Nieuwsuur, 2 October, 2019. ‘Nederland is het Wilde Westen van de partijfinanciering’

Follow The Money (FTM), Dossier De financiering van onze politieke partijen

Popular Decision- Binding popular initiatives and referendums are unlawful both nationally and
Making
subnationally, as they are considered to be incompatible with the
Score: 4
representative system. At the municipal level, many experimental referendum
ordinances have been approved since the 1990s, but the national government
has prohibited several ordinances that gave citizens too much binding
influence on either the political agenda or the outcome of political decision-
making. In 2016, a large number of municipal government mayors, aldermen,
councilors, scientists and businessmen initiated “Code Orange” for
“civocracy,” (“citizen power”) which aims to involve citizens more in local
governance through “citizen pacts” (“burgerakkoord”). The citizen pacts are
intended to replace and/or complement the traditional “coalition pacts”
between local political parties, which normally are the basis for policymaking.
After the 2018 elections experiments in citizen pacts are being conducted.
Though all the experiments are struggling with the practical aspects of
integrating citizen pacts into the legal framework and normal division of labor
of local forms of representative democracy.
SGI 2022 | 51 Netherlands Report

At national level, the issue has been on the political agenda since the 1980s.
Under pressure from new populist political parties, the Dutch government
organized a consultative referendum on the new European Constitution in
2005, using an ad hoc temporary law. With turnout of 63.3% of the eligible
electorate, this constitution was rejected by a clear majority of 61.5%, sending
shockwaves through all EU member states and institutions. In September
2014, a bill for an advisory referendum on laws and treaties passed the Senate,
and was implemented on 1 July 2015. This law allows for non-binding
referendums on petitions that gain 10,000 signatories within a four-week
period. Subsequently, another 300,000 citizens are needed to sign up in
support of the initial request within a six weeks period.

Geen Peil, an ad hoc anti-EU organization, successfully mobilized enough

votes for an advisory referendum on the provisional EU association treaty with
Ukraine, which was signed by the Dutch government. With a mere 32.3%
voter turnout, the no-vote (61%) was valid nevertheless, and the government
was obliged to renegotiate the deal at EU level. In March 2018, in another
consultative referendum, Dutch voters rejected a proposed Law on the
Intelligence and Security Services (Wet op de Inlichtingen en
Veiligheidsdiensten) by a narrow margin (49.44% against, 46.53% for and 4%
undecided). This result forced the government to reconsider some parts of the
law. The unpleasant referendum campaigns and their contested outcomes
prompted the Rutte III government to abolish the consultative referendum as
one of its first regulatory decisions. Nevertheless, the Remkes Commission for
State-Legitimacy Reforms (Staatkundige Hervorming) states that Dutch
democracy suffers from a “representation deficit” defined by demography,
educational attainment, wealth and professional background. Among many
other reform proposals, the Remkes Commission has seriously considered
putting the issue of a binding referendum back the political agenda. To date,
only one political party (D66) has adopted this advice, using the issue as an
element of the party’s 2020 election campaign.

Citation:
R. Hoppe (2010/11), Institutional constraints and practical problems in deliberative and participatory
policymaking, in Policy & Politics, Vol. 39, Nr. 2, 163-183 (online 19 August 2010, DOI:
10.1332/030557310X519650)

NOS, Nee-stem in Oekraïne-referendum blijft zonder gevolgen, 2 October 2016 (nog.nl, consulted 9
November 2016)

VNG, Code Oranje voor verandering politieke democratie, 26 October 2016 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November
2016)

M. Chavannes, Wat je stem wel en niet zegt bij het referendum, De Correspondent, 16 March 2018

Nieuwsuur, Commissie Remkes pleit voor invoering bindend referendum

(https://nos.nl/l/x/2237616?social=m, accessed 25 October 2018
SGI 2022 | 52 Netherlands Report

Access to Information

Media Freedom The freedoms of the press/media and of expression are formally guaranteed by
Score: 6
the constitution (Article 7). The Reporters Without Borders Press Freedom
Index 2021 ranked the Netherlands at sixth place, one rank lower than
previously. The somewhat lower ranking results from the fact that despite
accepting an Open Government Law in both houses of parliament in 2021, the
government, hampered by the coronavirus crisis, hasn’t improved the media’s
access to state-held information, with the result that documents requested by
journalists often arrive late and are incomplete, with entire pages or lengthy
passages erased or redacted. Mass data collection by the government has
sometimes violated the privacy of journalists and their right to protect their
sources.

Even parliament has fallen victim to active blocking of access to government

information. According to one high-profile professor of public law, over the
last decade the Rutte governments have incompletely or misinformed
parliament 43 times; that is, about 10 times more frequently than the
governments in power during the 2001-2010 period. Paradoxically, in the
follow-up to the childcare benefits scandal, where for several years the tax
authorities and the government actively blocked information to the press and
to parliament, SMS messages by the prime minister were made public for the
very first time.

Another factor is that right-wing populist politicians attack the mainstream

media and journalists as messengers of so-called fake news and as “enemies of
the people,” questioning the legitimacy of the traditional media and restricting
targeted journalists’ access to political meetings. In this way, they legitimize
and encourage interference with the work of journalists. Such sometimes
violent interference has become much more common, making public
broadcasting organizations remove logos from their equipment. Some
individual journalists from local media have been visited at their homes by
these people, with attackers throwing stones through windows or inserting
Molotov cocktails into their houses through mailboxes. As a consequence,
Dutch journalists practice precautionary self-censorship on sensitive issues
such as immigration, race, Islam and national culture and character. However,
by international standards, journalists in the Netherlands are free from
governmental interference. For example, their right to protect their sources is
usually formally upheld even when called upon as witnesses in criminal cases.

Public-broadcast programming is produced by a variety of civil organizations,

some reflecting political and/or religious denominations with roots in the era
of pillarization, others representing more contemporary societal and cultural
SGI 2022 | 53 Netherlands Report

groups. These independent organizations get allocated TV and radio time that
is relative to their membership numbers. However, broadcasting corporations
are required to comply with government regulations laid down in the new
Media Law. This new law abolished the monopoly of the incumbent public-
broadcasting corporations and aims to boost competition by giving access to
program providers from outside the official broadcasting corporations. A
directing (not just coordinating) National Public Broadcasting Organization
(NPO) was established, with a government-nominated supervisory board,
which tests and allocates broadcasting time. This board has never functioned
well, due to internal disagreements. The new law states that public
broadcasting should concern information, culture and education, while pure
entertainment should be left to private broadcasters. In practice this has led to
blurred boundaries between “information” and “infotainment.” Critics have
argued that younger people and non-Dutch population groups are not well
served by the public broadcasting system. Currently, public broadcasting is
both privately funded through advertisements and publicly funded. Regional
broadcasters have been subject to budget cuts, which forces them to
collaborate to survive. Influenced by a new EU guideline, a new more
comprehensive Media Law has sought to harmonize regulations for
commercial advertising through traditional linear public and private
broadcasting through radio and TV, and those for non-linear, digital platforms
and streaming services like YouTube and Netflix.

Citation:
Reporters Without Borders, 2021. Netherlands

NRC, Nieber, 18 January 2021. ‘Overheid deelt liever geen stukken’

NRC, De Koning en Hofman, 17 June 2021. Voor het eerst sms’jes van premier Rutte openbaar gemaakt.

Trouw, Julen, 5 October 2021. Wet Open Overheid eindelijk aangenomen, komt nieuwe bestuurscultuur ook
een stapje dichterbij?

W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Machiavelli in de polder, pp. 175-6

Media Pluralism The Dutch media landscape is very pluralistic but nonetheless subject to a
Score: 6
gradual narrowing of media ownership, internationalization and rapid
commercialization. On the other hand, availability of (foreign and national)
web-based TV and radio has increased tremendously. The Dutch media
landscape is still characterized by one of the world’s highest newspaper-
readership rates. Innovations in newspaper media include tabloids, Sunday
editions, and new-media editions (online, mobile phone, etc.). On a regional
level, the one-paper-city model is now dominant; there are even several cities
lacking local papers altogether. Nevertheless, there is also an increasing sense
of news fatigue among younger citizens in particular, many of whom are
increasingly avoiding the news.
SGI 2022 | 54 Netherlands Report

The degree of ownership concentration in the print media is high. Three

publishers control 90% of the paid newspapers circulated, and foreign
ownership of print media outlets is growing. As the circulation of traditional
magazines decreases, publishers are launching new titles to attract readers.
There are currently at least 8,000 different magazine titles available for Dutch
readers. Print outlets – both newspapers and magazines – carry a high share of
advertising, but this is declining. There are several public and private
television and radio stations at the national, regional and local levels. The three
public channels continue to lose viewers. The Netherlands also shows one of
Europe’s highest rates of cable TV penetration (about 95%). However, online
access to news and entertainment has increased due to the prevalence of
smartphones, widespread availability of Wi-Fi, and paid news and
entertainment sources. Though the issue of ownership concentration also
affects the social media and internet search engines. Internet usage rates in the
Netherlands are high and many people are connected through broadband
(almost 50% of Dutch households). Ten million Dutch residents use the
internet on a regular basis, amounting to almost 95.5% of the population aged
over six years old. For both print and digital media, users usually trust news
reports and do not worry excessively about the issue of fake news, although a
clear majority believe that technology and media companies ought to provide
better information about and more opportunities for identifying fake news. The
government also has a responsibility according to many internet users.

In the European Union’s Media Pluralism Monitor 2020, the Netherlands was
characterized as being low risk in the domains of basic protection, political
independence and social inclusiveness (especially the use of sign language for
the deaf). However, the country was characterized as being medium risk in the
area of market plurality, especially media viability. In 2020, even before the
COVID-19 outbreak, the share of Dutch people who paid for online news
increased from 11% in 2019 to 14% in 2020. The lockdown led to a temporary
increase of the reach of television, radio and news media. At the same time,
revenues decreased due to lower incomes from advertisements. There is also
high risk for concentration of cross-media ownership, as there are no legal
restrictions at all and transparency of ownership is low. Consequently, a
typical person’s media sources are likely to be controlled by the same, one
owner. This requires better regulation of media mergers.

In 2020, a substantial reduction of media pluralism took place. With the

acquisition of Sanoma by DPG Media – the owner of newspapers such as AD
and De Volkskrant, along with a large number of regional papers – the
commercial media market is now dominated by only two publishers, both
Belgian. Next to DPG Media, Mediahuis, who own the newspapers De
SGI 2022 | 55 Netherlands Report

Telegraaf and NRC also increased concentration by acquiring the NDC

mediagroep. The Netherlands has thus entered a level of media ownership
concentration that raises important questions with regard to media pluralism.

Citation:
P. Bakker, 30 jaar kranten in Nederland: consolidatie en monopolievorming, in mediamonitor.nl., consulted
5 November 2014

EUI/Robert Schumann Center, Media Pluralism Index 2020, Klein, June 2021. Country Report: The
Netherlands
Media Pluralism Monitor 2017 – Results, Netherlands, October 2017 (monitor.cmpf.eui.eu, consulted 13
October 2017)

Irene Costera Meijer and Tim Groot Kormelink, The Netherlands in Reuters Institute
Digital News Report 2021. https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/digital-news-report/2021/netherlands

https://www.cvdm.nl/actueel/covid-19-zorgt-voor-toename-nieuwsgebruik-interesse-en-vertrouwen

Access to The Government Information (Public Access) Act (WOB) 1991 governs both
Government
active and passive public access to information. Under the WOB, any person
Information
Score: 7
can demand information related to “administrative matters” if it is contained in
“documents” held by public authorities or companies carrying out work for a
public authority. Information must be withheld, however, if it would endanger
the unity of the Crown, damage the security of the state, or particularly if it
relates to information on companies and manufacturing processes that were
provided in confidence. Information can also be withheld “if its importance
does not outweigh” the imperatives of international relations and the economic
or financial interest of the state.

Between 2010 and 2012, access to government information became a

politically contested issue. In practice, the law was used more and more to
justify withholding of information to citizens and journalists in the name of
“state interest,” which usually referred to the desire to retain the confidentiality
of intra-government consultation. In December 2020, the issue politically
exploded when the Commission Van Dam, a parliamentary investigation
commission on the childcare premium scandal, explicitly accused government
of withholding information for many years. Focusing on Minister-resident
Rutte as the main culprit, the government (non)information strategy was
subsequently called the Rutte doctrine. Under this strategy, the information
shared with parliament (and the media) was restricted to that relating to post-
factum responsibility and accountability for policy decisions. Far less or no
information was shared about the process of decision-making, about how
decisions were reached or about how judgments were made by whom, on
which scenarios and following what lobbying efforts. After the government
collectively stepped down on 15 January 2021, the so-called Rutte doctrine
became a major topic of discussion in a public and political debate over a new
administrative culture, in which government promised to be much more
SGI 2022 | 56 Netherlands Report

proactive and transparent in sharing information with parliament and the

media.

Meanwhile, this new information regime acquired a legal basis in a new Law
on Open Government (Wet open overheid, Woo) to be effective in 2022. All
administrative bodies are obliged to proactively publish certain categories of
information on a national Platform for Open Government Information. As
under the older law, every citizen (but in practice generally journalists) may
request specified items of information. Every administrative body will have a
contact person tasked with helping citizens look for the information they
demand. In addition, there will be a special advisory body on publicity and
information to help government apply the new law and mediate in conflicts
between government and the media.

Citation:
Your citations
VNG, z.d., Wet open overheid (vangrealisatie.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)

Stibbe, 27 March 2019. Ook WhatsApp – en SMS-berichten op privé telefoons vallen onder de Wet
openbaar bestuur (Stibbe B.V., accessed 4 November 2019)

Verslag – Parlementaire ondervragingscommissie Kinderopvangtoeslag Ongekend onrecht

35 510 Parlementaire ondervraging Kinderopvangtoeslag
17 december 2020

G. Entoven, 2011. Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie
tussen regering en parlement, dissertatie Universiteit van Tiburg. Delft: Eburon

W. Voermans, 2021. Het land moet bestuurd worden. Macchiavelli in de polder, Amsterdam: Prometheus

Nrc.next, Rutten, 21 January 2021. De Rutte-doctrine: catchphrase die de ergernis van de Kamer verwoordt

Rijksoverheid, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)

Civil Rights and Political Liberties

Civil Rights The Netherlands formally guarantees and protects individual liberties, and all
Score: 6
state institutions formally respect and – most of the time – effectively protect
civil rights. The Netherlands publicly exposes abuses and reports them to the
UN Human Rights Council or the European Union. It cooperates with the
monitoring organizations of all international laws and treaties concerning civil
liberties signed by the Dutch government.

However, there are developments worthy of grave concern. The right to

privacy of every citizen tops the list of preoccupations. Dutch citizens are
more at risk than ever of having their personal data abused or improperly used.
In addition, current policies regarding rightful government infringement of
SGI 2022 | 57 Netherlands Report

civil rights are shifting from legally well-delineated areas like anti-crime and
terrorism measures toward less clearly defined areas involving the prevention
of risky behavior in areas such as healthcare and travel (coronavirus
demonstrations). Increased monitoring and digital surveillance technologies
disproportionally target those most dependent on state support, creating
inequalities in policing and fraud control. After U.N. Special Rapporteur for
Human Rights Philip Alston criticized the Dutch government (and parliament)
for its use of an algorithmic system (Systeem Risico Indicatie) to detect social-
benefits fraud, a new law (Wet Gegevensverwerking
Samenwerkingsverbanden) even aims to expand the system to link data from
across all government and many private databases to generate an individual
fraud-risk profile. This law awaits approval in the Senate. Most recently it was
discovered that the tax authorities used a secret list (Fraude Signalering
Voorziening) of some 250,000 people suspected of possible tax fraud, without
informing them that they had been listed as potential “frauds.” Being listed
implied that citizens could be excluded from regular public support for debt
restructuring and repayment, insurance contracts, and loans (like mortgages).

Human Rights Watch has criticized recent Dutch legislation restricting the
number of locations for hosting asylum-seekers, as well as the long wait times
for asylum decisions and family-reunion procedures. The Council of State was
criticized for failing to sufficiently uphold the rights of asylum-seekers in
appeals to government decisions. On the other hand, the Dutch government
withdrew a bill that would have criminalized illegal residence, allowing
authorities to put those lacking residence permits in jail. There were concerns
about racial profiling by police officers and white Dutch citizens interfering in
protests against the traditional “Black Pete” (“Zwarte Piet”) figure in
traditional St. Nicholas festivities. However, Frisian pro-Black Pete activists –
who stopped anti-racist protesters by blocking a highway – were condemned
for disturbing the public order, with this verdict upheld in a higher appeals
court. But public ambiguity around racial profiling remains after a judge
decided in a case brought by Amnesty International to allow military police
officers at the border (e.g., Schiphol Airport) to use racial profiling in
surveilling incoming “strangers.”

Citation:
NRC, Heck, 10 November 2021. Datawet pakt boef, maar wellicht ook burger
Human Rights Watch. World Report| 2019. Events of 2018 (hrw.org., consulted 3 November 2019)

NRC, Boonman, 22 September 2021. Rechtbank: marechaussee mag etnisch profiren bij
vreemdelingentoezicht
RTL Nieuws, Taakstraffen geëist tegen snelwegblokkeerders: ‘Het draait niet om Zwarte Piet’
(rolnieuws.nl, accessed 25 October 2018)

https://www.binnenlandsbestuur.nl/bestuur-en-organisatie/nieuws/algoritmes-kunnen-grondrechten-flink-
aantasten.9595151.lynkx
SGI 2022 | 58 Netherlands Report

Political Liberties All the usual political liberties (of assembly, association, movement, religion,
Score: 8
speech, press, thought, unreasonable searches/seizures and suffrage) are
guaranteed by the constitution. The Netherlands is a signatory to all pertinent
major international treaties (Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, European Convention on
Human Rights). All relevant ranking institutions, such as The Economist’s
Intelligence Unit Democracy Index and the Freedom House ranking of
political liberties, consistently list the Netherlands as one of the top 10 most
free countries in the world.

However, as everywhere else, the coronavirus crisis triggered numerous

tensions between the government’s constitutional task (Article 23, Dutch
Constitution) of protecting and furthering public health and political liberties
such as the freedom of assembly and demonstrations, the freedom of
movement (lockdown, travel within and between countries), freedom of
religion (number of attendees at religious services), the right to privacy (limits
on visits to institutions of care for the elderly, number of visitors per day per
household), access to the judiciary (limits on the number of court cases due to
social distancing rules), etc. Across the board, legal specialists and the general
public have judged that the tension between public health and political
liberties was managed reasonably well by the government, within the limits
created by necessity and the proportionality of the measures.

However, the freedom of assembly and demonstration in particular came

under considerable pressure. The number and size of demonstrations is
changing over time due to the influence of social media. Such tools enable the
rapid mobilization of large numbers of protesters, while the polarized and
radicalized messages in social media have resulted in a so-called cancel
culture that undermines the freedom of thought and speech. The number of
demonstrations in the Netherlands has doubled over the last five years. As the
duration of the crisis increased, and public dissatisfaction with and protest
against coronavirus policies rose (especially because of announcement of the
evening curfew), this trend became even stronger. Uncharacteristic for this
country, demonstrations ended in mass chaos, destruction of property, and
violence between protesters and police in a significant number of cases.

Freedom House, Freedom in the world 2021, Netherlands (freedom house.org, consulted 16 December
2021)

College voor Rechten van de Mens, n.d., Dossier: Coronavirus en mensenrechten

Elseviers Weekblad, 21 Janury 2021. De Haan, Demonstreren in coronatijd? Ook dan gelden maatregelen.

Trouw, Pols,27 February 2021. Van klimaatmars tot coronaprotest: Nederlanders gaan steeds vaker de straat
op
SGI 2022 | 59 Netherlands Report

Non- The Netherlands is party to all the important international anti-discrimination

discrimination
agreements. A non-discrimination clause addressing religion, worldviews,
Score: 6
political convictions, race, sex and “any other grounds for discrimination” is
contained in Article 1 of the Dutch constitution. An individual can invoke
Article 1 in relation to acts carried out by the government, private institutions
or another individual. The constitutional framework has been specified by
several acts that also refer to the EC Directives on equal treatment. Since
1994, a General Law on Equal Treatment (Algemene Wet Gelijke
Behandeling) has prohibited distinctions to be drawn between people on the
basis of race or nationality. The law applies to all housing, healthcare, cultural
and educational institutions. Thus, in hiring and firing decisions, race and
nationality may not be taken into account, for example. The Dutch penal code
also contains articles that prohibit insulting minorities and engaging in hate-
mongering.

In sum, there is a high degree of formal protection. A recent expert report

criticized Dutch anti-discrimination sanctions as “ineffective,” and as neither
“dissuasive” nor “proportionate.” There are signals that discrimination is
practiced by Dutch police, in the labor and housing markets, in the medical
world, in the media, and in public and political debate. PVV-leader Geert
Wilders was convicted of discriminating against the group of Moroccans; but
the trial took three years, and although he was deemed guilty, he was not
punished.

In 2018, more than a quarter of the Dutch population reported being subject to
some form of discrimination in a survey by the Social Cultural Planning
Bureau (SCP). Dutch of Moroccan, Turkish, Antillean and Surinamese descent
experience discrimination with particular frequency; 30% of these respondents
reported being surveilled as a matter of policy, where the average for the entire
population is 3%.

In terms of policy, the Dutch government does not pursue affirmative action to
tackle inequality and facilitate non-discrimination. Generally, the government
relies on “soft law” measures as a preferred policy instrument to curb
discrimination. There are more and more doubts about state policies’
effectiveness. Depending on the pressures created by significant (international)
events (e.g., Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, terrorist attacks and public debates
about #MeToo and after the Black Lives Matter demonstrations in the United
States, discussions about Dutch colonialism/slavery), an increase can be seen
in visible discriminatory actions, internet-based threats and insults targeting
Jews, Muslims, Afro-Dutch citizens and women. Especially worrisome is the
broad-based and well above the European average negative climate of opinion
SGI 2022 | 60 Netherlands Report

and stereotyping of Muslims. Growing awareness of employer’s

discriminating against young people with migrant backgrounds in job
application processes forced new national and local-government initiatives.
According to recent survey research, the Dutch population is seriously worried
about the intolerant and discriminatory dominant approach to diversity at
present.

Citation:
B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57

NRC Next, 25 September 2019. Politiechef die discriminatie aankaartte, is naar huis gestuurd. ((NRC.nl,
accessed 3 November 2019)

Volkskrant, Frijters, 21 May 2021. Discriminatie in Nederland: veel bewustzijn, stigens aantal strafzaken

SCP, 2019. Perceived discrimination in the NL

De Correspondent, Mulder and Bol, 10 June 2020. Institutioneel racosme in Nederland: wat het is, waar het
zit, en wat je eraan kunt doen

B. van der Ent, 2019. Discriminiatie op de arbeidsmarkt, in Sociologie, 4,1:25-57

Rule of Law

Legal Certainty Dutch governments and administrative authorities have allegedly to a great
Score: 6
extent internalized legality and legal certainty on all levels in their decisions
and actions in civil, penal and administrative law. In the World Justice Project
Rule of Law Index 2021, the Netherlands was again ranked sixth out of 129
countries. However, the no more than slight decline in its score since 2016
curiously ignores the dominant opinion in politics, civil society and legal
academic circles in the country itself.

In a “stress test” examining the state’s performance on rule-of-law issues in

2015, former ombudsman Alex Brenninkmeijer argued after a comprehensive
review that particularly in legislation, but also within the administrative and
judicial systems, safeguards for compliance with rule-of-law requirements
were no longer sufficiently in place. The trend was to bypass new legislative
measures’ rule-of-law implications with an appeal to the “primacy of politics”
or simply “democracy,” and instead await possible appeals to European and
other international legal bodies during policy implementation. As one
commentator aptly observed: rule-of-law considerations have become a mere
footnote to desirable policies proposed by the government and rubberstamped
by coalition political parties in parliament. Many of the recent scandals (the
childcare benefits scandal; the mess around earthquake damages compensation
in the former gas-producing areas of the province of Groningen; the illegal
collection and linking of large data sets about citizens by the police, anti-
SGI 2022 | 61 Netherlands Report

terrorism organizations, and the military) boil down to violations of

fundamental human and citizen rights or of legal rules, and to an obstinate
perseverance in implementing merciless and badly designed laws.

This mood or attitude exploded into political crisis when the childcare benefit
affair came to light during the fall of 2020, eventually causing the entire Rutte
III government to step down in January 2021. The childcare benefit affair is a
policy catastrophe demonstrating that over the past decade, all branches of
government have been complicit in negligence and indifference to rule-of-law
considerations in public policy. Parliament insisted on an “all-or-nothing”
fraud hunt, disregarding signals from whistleblowers in the tax services, and
neglecting warnings from lawyers and a deputy minister that strict law
enforcement would make many eligible and deserving families suffer because
of a small number of rule-breakers. In the end it was clear that tax authorities
had legally stopped tax benefits for thousands of families, and required huge
recovery payments sometimes amounting to many years of benefits received
for trivial errors like spelling mistakes, errors in birth dates and response
deadlines that had been missed by just a few days. The large repayment sums
demanded pushed poor and frequently second-generation Dutch families into
debt and poverty, often leading to the loss of housing, divorce and even loss of
parental custody. Because judges and the Supreme Court routinely ruled in
favor of the tax authorities in the cases brought against them, a parliamentary
investigation concluded that the judiciary had for too long been looking the
other way. It took the foreign eyes of the Council of Europe’s international
rule-of-law inspectorate, in a report on Dutch practice by the Venice
Commission, to humble the Dutch parliament into admitting that it was its
own insistence on hardline fraud control that had initiated and maintained a
process with a catastrophic outcome.

Many other serious concerns about the state of the judiciary as a branch of
government have also been raised in recent years. In an exceptional move,
lawyers, judges and prosecutors recently wrote a joint letter to the government
expressing their “fear for the future of the judiciary branch.” The chair of the
Council of Jurisprudence, a body established in 2002 as an independent
advisory commission sitting between the Ministry of Justice, parliament and
the judiciary, publicly admitted that the judiciary as constituted was outdated
for a modern, rapidly changing society. Citizens and businesses alike stated
that judicial procedures were too expensive, too complex, too time-consuming
and too uncertain in their outcome. Indeed, the penal code required a complete
modernizing overhaul. Meanwhile, the digitalization of routine judicial
procedures has been a failure, and has cost the government dearly.
SGI 2022 | 62 Netherlands Report

Judging by the coalition agreement for the Rutte IV government, reform of the
judiciary is finally high on the political agenda. Not for nothing does the
agreement open with an entire chapter on rule-of-law issues. The new
government has promised to overhaul legislation, implementation practices
and case law in order to prevent another childcare benefit scandal. Improved
implementation institutions will be more reliable, just and serviceable, it says.
The state will not rely on impersonal algorithms alone to render mass
decisions on benefits in social security policies. Respect for general principles
of “decent” governance (beginselen van behoorlijk bestuur) like
appropriateness and proportionality will be strengthened, and the people
implementing policies will be granted more discretionary power. An
inspectorate for algorithms (Algoritmetoezichthouder) and an equivalent of the
U.S. Taxpayers Advocate Service will be set up. More money will be available
for police forces in their combat with organized crime, especially the illegal
drugs trade.

Citation:
Worljusticeproject.org. The Netherlands, 2021

A. Brenninkmeijer, Stresstest rechtsstaat Nederland, in Nederlands Juristenblad, 16, 24 April 2015, pp.
1046-1055

Orde van Advocaten, Nieuwsberichten, 10 maart 2021, Staatkundige hervorming vormt een terugkerend
thema

Jesse Frederik, De Correspondent, 2021. Zo hadden we het niet bedoeld. De tragedie achter de
toeslagenaffaire.

Ellen Pasman, Kafka in de rechtsstaat. De gevolgen van een leesfout: de toeslagenaffaire ontleed.
Amsterdam, Prometheus, 2021.

NRC-H, Jensma, 30 October 2021, Opinie uit Europa: Kamer is zelf schuldig aan ‘Toeslagen’

Ministerie van Financiën, Staatssecretaris Vijlbrief, 21 March 2021.

Betreft Overzicht van wetten waar de Belastingdienst zich niet aan gehouden heeft

De Correspondent, Chavannes, ca. 20 November 2021, Geen wonder dat de burgers afhaken bij een
overheid die regelmatig de eigen wet overtreedt

NRC-H, Jensma, 18 December 2021. Rutte IV herstelt de rechtshulp en wil grondwet aan de rechter
vrijgeven

Judicial Review Judicial review for civil and criminal law in the Netherlands involves a closed
Score: 6
system of appeals with the Supreme Court as the final authority. Unlike the
U.S. and German Supreme Court, the Dutch one is barred from judging
parliamentary laws in terms of their conformity to the constitution. This is
supposed to be a task for parliament itself, especially the Senate as a chamber
of deliberation and reflection. Partially making up for this lack of a
constitutional conformity review is the fact that parliament is supposed to
check that new legislation conforms with EU and other international law to
SGI 2022 | 63 Netherlands Report

which the country is signatory. However, this task is often neglected or, given
the political mood over the last decade, deliberately disparaged; this has
helped prompt strong criticism of the quality of parliamentary legislative
work.

Offering further testimony to the fact the Dutch governmental system is not
about the separation of powers, but rather about mutual checks and balances
between the three branches of government, is the fact that the intensity of
judicial review of executive actions has peaked since 2015. This attracted
international attention when a Dutch appeals court upheld a landmark climate
change ruling, confirmed in a Supreme Court verdict in 2019, instructing the
Rutte government to raise its greenhouse-gas reduction goal of 17% to at least
25%. Meanwhile in 2019, another such Supreme Court ruling ordered the
government to tighten its nitrogen emission rules, leading to an immediate
cessation in the issuance of many new licenses for farming, road construction
and housing construction activities. Even the private sector has not escaped the
larger scope of judicial review: In May 2021, Shell was legally obliged to
halve its CO2 emission in the next nine years. The ensuing deep policy
paralysis still awaits a political settlement even after the new coalition
agreement of December 2021. These events have initiated a new debate on the
proper relations between politics/policy and the judiciary/legal system; some
believe that legal activism (or even dikastocracy) is infringing the primacy of
politics and its sovereignty. This offers further evidence of the practice of
checks and balances; the judiciary itself came under increasing political and
civil society scrutiny, both with regard to the degree to which it is truly
independent of politics and in its internal functioning.

In 2017, a deputy minister of legal affairs openly admitted that he had reduced
the provision of state-supported legal assistance (fees for pro deo social
lawyers) to ordinary citizens in order to achieve more punitive court sentences.
Only the new coalition agreement of December 2021 turned this decision
around, by providing more state resources to social lawyers. And in the
context of anti-drugs and crime-control policy, police, mayors and fiscal
authorities often “harass” suspects rather than initiating legal procedures,
which are perceived as a time-consuming nuisance with zero practical impact.
Judges have voiced concerns as to the quality of the work performed by
lawyers, and thus directly about professional practices and indirectly about the
legal-education system. The reputation of the public prosecution service
(Openbaar Ministerie, OM) too has come under public scrutiny. It has been
criticized striking mega-deals (such as fines) with corporations and banks,
which in light of a neoliberal efficiency analysis are presumably deemed more
efficient than conducting full-fledged trials responding to legally sanctionable
financial or managerial misconduct. Evidence has shown that OM staffers
SGI 2022 | 64 Netherlands Report

lacking the proper professional accreditation have rendered decisions on

thousands of criminal cases with insufficient evidence. The prosecution
service’s degree of independence from the government has also come under
public and journalistic scrutiny, and integrity problems within the organization
itself have hampered its proper functioning.

Whereas the Supreme Court is part of the judiciary and is supposedly

“independent” of politics, administrative appeals and review are allocated to
three high councils of state (Hoge Colleges van Staat), which are subsumed
under the executive, and thus not fully independent of politics: the Council of
State (serves as an advisor to the government on all legislative affairs and is
the highest court of appeal in matters of administrative law); the General Audit
Chamber (reviews legality of government spending and its policy
effectiveness and efficiency); and the ombudsman for research into the
conduct of administration regarding individual citizens in particular. Members
are nominated by the Council of Ministers and appointed for life (excepting
the ombudsman, who serves only six years) by the States General.
Appointments have not to date been politically contentious. In international
comparison, the Council of State holds a rather unique position. It advises
government in its legislative capacity, and it also acts as an administrative
judge of last appeal involving the same laws. This situation is only partly
remedied by a division of labor between an advisory chamber and a judiciary
chamber.

Some observers defend this structure, arguing that only an entity with detailed
and intimate knowledge of the practical difficulties associated with policy
implementation (uitvoering) and law enforcement (handhaving) can offer
sound advice to the government. The ruling on climate goals and nitrogen
emissions appear to support this evaluation. However, the child benefits
scandal and other cases involving illegal data collection and sharing about
citizen behavior demonstrate that the judiciary often, due to executive
organizations’ (like the tax authorities, or the Integration and Naturalization
Service (IND)) willful or practically incomplete disclosure of information,
lacks detailed information about implementation practices. Regarding the
childcare benefits affair, the Administrative Court’s highest judge recently
apologized that the courts had stuck to a strict law enforcement “groove” far
too long, attributing this state of affairs to a “political climate” of pressing for
“zero tolerance” and “strict, stricter, strictest.” In addition, fragmented
legislation – for example, citizens had to appeal consecutive and
interdependent tax decisions one by one – hampered judges’ ability to gain a
clear overall view of the situation, the judge added. The Supreme Court was
also charged with making rulings that were too “executive friendly” when
dealing with information from refugees and foreigners, for politically inspired
SGI 2022 | 65 Netherlands Report

reasons. However, new EU directives have been able to offer more leverage to
lower court judges.

Citation:
Andeweg, R.B. and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houdmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (pages 203-2011).

The Guardian, 9 October 2018. Dutch appeals court upholds landmark climate-change ruling.

NRC Next, 22 February 2019. OM wil strenger zijn met schikkingen (NRC.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)

Binnenlands Bestuur, Burgemeesters eisen rol /crimefighter’ op, 12 January 2018 (binnenlandsbestuur.nl,
accessed 28 October 2018)

Pieter Tops and Jan Tromp, 2016. De achterkant van Nederland.Leven onder de radar van de wet, Balans

RTL Nieuws, 30 July 2019. OM wil af van hoofdofficieren met geheime relatie en onderzoekt mogelijk
strafbare feiten (rtlnieuw.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)

NR Handelsblad, 12 March 2019. Hoe de kritiek op onterechte straffen werd weggepoetst. (NRC.nl,
accessed 4 November 2019)

NRC-H, Alonso en Derix, 20 November 2021. We zaten te lang in de strenge groef

NRC-H, Sillevis Smitt, 22 June 2021, Vreemdelingenrechters zoeken steun tegen strenge Raad van State

NRC-H, Jensma, 2 October 2021. Het is tijd om aan rechten als objectieve wetenschap te gaan twijfelen.

Volkskrant,, Weijer and Hotse Smit, 26 May 2021. Historische uitspraak in klimaatzaak: Shell moet CO2-
uitstoot drastisch verminderen.

Appointment of Justices, both in civil/criminal and in administrative courts, are appointed by

Justices
different, though primarily legal and political bodies in formally cooperative
Score: 8
selection processes without special majority requirements. In the case of
lower-level criminal and civil courts, indirect political influence by the
executive is possible through the Council for the Judiciary (Raad voor de
Rechtspraak). Its members are appointed by the minister for justice and safety;
council members choose the administrators and directors (bestuursleden) of
lower courts, who in turn provide (or fail to provide) opportunities for
individual judges.

The Netherlands’ highest court, the Council of State, is subject to relatively

strong political influence, mainly expressed through the appointment of former
politicians. This may explain why the council sides with government most of
the time; as shown in instances such as appeals of the tax authorities’ decisions
in the childcare benefits scandal, or appeals of decisions made by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service in immigration cases. Only state
counselors working in the Administrative Jurisdiction Division (as opposed to
the Legislative Advisory Division) are required to hold an academic degree in
law. Appointments to the Supreme Court are for life (judges generally retire at
70). Only Geert Wilders, parliamentarian for the right-wing populist Party for
SGI 2022 | 66 Netherlands Report

Freedom (PVV), has proposed (in 2011) a reform creating a five-year term
instead. At this moment the appointment procedure for High (Supreme) Court
judges combines peer- and political selection. A selection committee made up
of High Court members draws up a list of six candidates that are
recommended to the Parliament’s Second House. The House then picks three
of them in order of preference and invites the highest-ranking judge for a non-
public hearing. If the candidate passes this selection hurdle, the minister of
justice proposes him or her for appointment by the government.

Reforms that would limit the influence of the executive and the legislature in
the appointment of Supreme Court judges and members of the Council of the
Judiciary have not been formally approved. In the case of appointments for
lower court judges, the new procedure lends more weight to peer selection by
giving local court administrators and sitting judges a stronger voice in
selecting additional and new single judges. For the Supreme Court, the
selection committee will consist of one member of Parliament (appointed by
all other members of parliament), one member of the Supreme Court
(appointed by its president), and another legal expert appointed jointly by the
parliament and the Hight Court. This tripartite committee would make a
binding selection, and the candidate would then be appointed by the
government. This reform will require a change of the constitution, and will
take several more years to come in force.

Citation:
COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE
COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF
THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30
September 2020

De Volkskrant, “Worden in andere EU-landen ook rechters door politici benoemd, zoals Polen beweert?
Nou nee,” 23 July 2017

De Correspondent, Chavannes, 3 March 2021. De benoeming van rechters in Nederland is niet

onafhankelijker dan in Polen of Hongarije

NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4
November 2019)

Mr., 2 March 2021. Rechters krijgen meer zeggenschap over benoeming gerechtsbestuurders

NRC Next, 8 March 2011. Wilders pareert kritiek op plan tijdelijke benoeming rechters (nrs.nl, accessed 4
November 2019)

Corruption The Netherlands is considered a relatively corruption-free country, both in the

Prevention
international rankings of perceptions of corruption and in its own self-
Score: 6
conception. The Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index
ranks the Netherlands at fourth place in Europe and eighth globally with
regard to low levels of perceived corruption. In a Eurobarometer study, 71% of
SGI 2022 | 67 Netherlands Report

Dutch respondents believe corruption is widespread, yet, in spite of reading

daily about corruption cases in the media, only 4% believe it affects their daily
lives. Also, 60% have high confidence in the effectiveness of public
authorities in fighting corruption. This contrasts strikingly with the opinions of
professional corruption fighters, who publicly doubt the effectiveness of anti-
corruption measures as being too little and too late.

Probably due to this hubristic self-image among the people and politicians,
Dutch anti-corruption policy was until recently underdeveloped, if not outright
naïve. It focused on petty corruption and minor integrity issues in the public
sector. But this is no longer the case. Authorities have realized that the
Netherlands shows tendencies of becoming a narcostate: drug use has been
normalized among the population, and has created a highly profitable market.
The country produces synthetic drugs and cannabis, and large amounts of
cocaine enter through Dutch (Rotterdam, Vlissingen) and Belgian harbor cities
(Antwerp). The illegal drug production and trafficking has led to the
distribution of drugs labs all over the country, especially in less populated
rural areas, as well as to more (lethal) violence in the streets due to drug
organizations fighting among each other. It has also meant an increase in
corruption, not only among customs officers and other harbor workers, but
also in areas involving gambling, hospitality, sports/health centers and other
infrastructural services, much of this a result of the massive amounts of money
earned in drug trafficking. There are small local governments whose budgets
are dwarfed by the amount of money earned in drugs trafficking within their
borders.

The marketing of drugs is facilitated by underfunding and neglect of youth

care policy in certain city quarters, where disadvantaged youths are easy to
recruit as drugs runners or for other similar jobs. Organized crime thrives on
conditions of pauperization and exploitation, where younger people, lacking
proper education and job opportunities, choose criminal careers because they
feel they have nothing to lose. It is believed that most leading criminals in the
so-called mocro-mafia started their careers this way. Apart from investing in
sophisticated crime fighting investigation equipment, like tools to hack
criminal communication channels, better youth care services in the larger
cities are badly needed. The Netherlands’ highly favorable business climate
and its flexible financial system have also proven to be fertile ground for
corruption, as they attract criminal activities in the form of front companies
engaging in money laundering and other illegal activities. By linking
corruption fighting to a more realistic diagnosis of its causes, Dutch anti-
corruption policy is coming of age.
SGI 2022 | 68 Netherlands Report

Several other problems also have been highlighted by national and

international watchdogs, including integrity violations within police forces
with respect to leaking information and having connections with organized
crime. In some cases, similar problems have also been identified with respect
to local politicians.

On the national level, the country has seen high profile cases of people abusing
access to high level (party) officials and ministers. For example, Sywert van
der Liendsen used his connections to obtain business deals relating to medical
protection materials and allegedly defrauded the government of millions of
euros.

Citation:
Transparency International: 2021 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI),
January 28, 2021

COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE

COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF
THE REGIONS 2020 Rule of Law Report The rule of law situation in the European Union Brussels, 30
September 2020

Het Parool, Kieft en Van Unen, 28 September 2019. Schrijver ‘Gomorra’: Nederland heeft dit aan zichzelf
te wijten.

Trouw, Spapens, 6 October 2021. Nederland is nog geen narcostaat, maar daadkracht tegen drugscriminelen
is nodig

Additional references:

Heuvel, J.H.J. van den, L.W.J.C. Huberts & E.R. Muller (Red.) 2012. Integriteit: Integriteit en
integriteitsbeleid in Nederland. Deventer: Kluwer

de Koning, B., 2018. Vriendjespolitiek. Fraude and corruptie in Nederland, Amsterdam University Press,
Amsterdam

https://rm.coe.int/fifth-evaluation-round-preventing-corruption-and-promoting-integrity-i/1680931c9d
SGI 2022 | 69 Netherlands Report

Good Governance

I. Executive Capacity

Strategic Capacity

Strategic The Dutch national government is run at the cabinet level as an exercise in
Planning
political risk management by a smart “fixer” (e.g., Prime Minister Rutte), who
Score: 7
is well known for his aversion to strategic vision. The political inevitability of
multiparty coalition governments with narrow parliamentary majorities almost
dictates a monistic relationship between parliament and executive. Therefore,
important decisions are taken during Monday morning meetings between the
prime minister and his core cabinet and the leaders of (four) coalition parties.
Sectoral ministers outside the core lend support in preparing decisions, but
play a larger role in departmental implementation planning. In cases where
political support is difficult and the problematic is societally and technically
complex, the Rutte government used another typical Dutch coalition tactic:
“poldering” through extensive societal consultation with numerous business
and civil society associations (also see “Societal Consultation”) This “double
compromise” nature of Dutch politics is hardly conducive to policymaking
through well-thought-out long-term strategy.

As a kind of countervailing factor, the Dutch government has four strategic-

planning units: the Scientific Council for Government Policy
(Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regereingsbeleid, WRR), the Netherlands
Bureau for Economic Policy (Centraal Plan Bureau, CPB), the Netherlands
Institute for Social Research (Sociaal Cultureel Planbureau, SCP) and the
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Bureau (Planbureau voor de
Leefbaarheid, PBL). All of these are formally part of a ministry, but their
statutes guarantee them independent advisory functions. Yet, their close ties to
government departments means they are frequently used to model the short-
and mid-term effects of proposed policy proposals. The CPB and PBL in
particular are “obligatory passage points” in the financial-economic feasibility
testing that has dominated neoliberal austerity strategies for over a decade.
SGI 2022 | 70 Netherlands Report

Even parliament imposed upon itself the rule that every new policy proposal
had to fit within given financial constraints. This resulted, on one hand, in the
huge financial reserves that allowed the government to provide generous
support to firms during the coronavirus pandemic; on the other hand, for a
long time, it slowed down the shift away from neoliberalism and effectively
choked serious policy initiatives and investment in areas such as education and
the greening of the economy.

It was this political climate that in 2019-2021 led to political demonstrations

by farmers, construction workers, teachers, students and healthcare workers on
a scale not seen for decades. Another long-term negative impact of the
neoliberal political mood has been knowledge “leakage,” if not destruction, in
the departmental structure and in the civil service. In the departmental
structure, the political will to reduce the cabinet to as few members as possible
resulted in the abolition of the Department for Housing, Spatial Planning and
Environment – policy domains where huge problems popped up during Rutte
III. The recruitment and training of civil servants focused much more on
procedural matters, political communication skills and damage control rather
than innovative thinking in terms of the environment, climate change, the
sustainability transition strategy, or the skills needed for a rapidly changing
economy and society. Also hampering matters was the fact that the system for
recruiting top-level civil servants is not linked to strategic government goals,
but rather to implementing a carousel of interorganizational mobility with
fixed term limits (the average departmental top-level civil servant occupies
his/her position for only about four years before moving on to another
position, mostly in another department.)

Long-term steering capacity has traditionally been strong in the areas of water
management and the management of care – that is, in ensuring the maximum
opportunity for good care for every eligible citizen, for an acceptable cost.
Planning units jointly advocated a coordinated long-term exit strategy for the
coronavirus crisis and the development of pandemic preparedness for a next
public health crisis; and they have released a flurry of new policy proposals,
although their data and policy recommendations, in the age of science
skepticism, have been attacked by the political parties that normally rely on
them for political debate and deliberation. These proposals have addressed the
areas of pensions, population growth, most aspects of climate change (the
Urgenda verdict, the new nitrogen-emissions rule, biodiversity in the Dutch
natural environment), the future of Dutch agriculture, traffic infrastructure and
mobility, (social) housing, the future of care as a social issue, the role of
money and financial regulation, and labor market regulatory reforms,
digitalization and the use of algorithms by government, and for the first time in
many years, long-term planning on defense issues.
SGI 2022 | 71 Netherlands Report

Many of the issues mentioned in these long-term strategic explorations and

scenarios appear to have found their way into the new coalition agreement of
December 2021. Yet the agreement reads more like a wish-list expressing the
need to start making serious policies on long overdue problems than a coherent
strategy for the future. Moreover, responding to the political mood and desire
to conduct government in a more dualist way, and to have more steering
flexibility and space for political debate and negotiations with opposition
parties, the agreement for the first time in recent history drops the routine
practice of thorough financial feasibility testing of coalition agreement
proposals.

Citation:
Joop van den Berg, Schrammen maar geen wonden Premier Mark Rutte en de grenzen van de
individualisering, in Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den
Haag, 13-27

R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen,
Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)

CPB, CBS, SCP, PBL, Verkenning en Monitor Brede Welvaart

(https://www.cpb.nl/sites/default/files/omnidownload/PBL-CPB-SCP-Verkenning-Brede-Welvaart-
2018.pdf)

WRR, News, WRR and KNAW: government must anticipate different coronavirus scenarios 16-11-2021

Haagse Beek, Weggeman en Spaan, 15 June 2021. Hoe de carrousel van de ABD zorgt voor
kennisvernietiging bij de overheid

Universiteit Utrecht, Nieuws, 15 January 2021. Algemene Bestuursdienst (ABD) moet zichtbaarder en
strategischer worden

DRIFT en NSOB, Bode et al., October 22, 2020. Sturing in transities. Een raamwerk voor strategiebepaling.

WRR rapport no. 105. 11 November 2021. Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.

Clingendaal, Netherlands Institute of International Relations, DECEMBER 2020. Hoe moet de Nederlandse
defensie er in de toekomst uitzien? Het perpetuum mobile van uitstel.

Expert Advice The government frequently employs ad hoc commissions of scientific experts
Score: 6
on technical topics like water management, harbor and airport expansion, gas
drilling on Wadden Sea islands and pollution studies. The function of
scientific advisory services in departments has been changed through the
establishment of “knowledge chambers” and, following U.S. and UK practice,
the appointment of chief scientific officers or chief scientists as advisory
experts. Depending on the nature of the policy issues, these experts may
flexibly mobilize the required scientific bodies and scientists instead of relying
on fixed advisory councils with fixed memberships. This also allows room for
political flexibility – that is, by hiring or contracting commercial, private
consultancies to provide politically needed and desirable research and advice.
SGI 2022 | 72 Netherlands Report

Although the use of scientific expertise is quite high, its actual influence on
policymaking cannot be precisely ascertained, as scholarly advice is intended
to be instrumental and therefore is less welcome in the early phases of
policymaking. During the pandemic, the government has relied heavily on
expert advice from the Outbreak Management Team. It is certainly not
transparent to the wider public, although the public has become more aware of
– and alarmed – about the importance of expert advice during the management
of the coronavirus pandemic. Since 2011, the focus of advice has been
redirected from relatively “strategic and long-term” issues to “technical,
instrumental and mid-/short-term” matters.

As might be expected in times of political polarization and science skepticism,

even members of parliament have expressed doubts about the integrity of the
knowledge institutes and the validity of their information. The research unit of
the Ministry of Justice and Safety (Wetenschappelijk Onderzoeks – en
Documentatie Centrum, WODC) has been subject to political meddling, and
during the debates and deliberations on the climate agreement, on flight routes
to and from the newly built but not yet used Lelystad Airport, and especially
on estimating the agriculture sector’s nitrogen emissions, the Environmental
Planning Agency’s measurement and modeling practices came under scrutiny.
Generally, politicians and the wider public have become more aware that
expert advice frequently relies on plausible assumptions-based modeling rather
than on evidence-based information.

Nevertheless, the cabinet still appears to rely heavily on its knowledge

institutes and departmental knowledge centers for its long-term strategies and
decision-making. The scrutiny by political parties, members of parliament,
civil society associations and journalists has generally been beneficial with
regard to the transparency of information collection and the policy support
provided by the government’s knowledge institutes.

R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen,
Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)

RTL Nieuws, Commissie: huidig rekensysteem stikstof niet geschikt voor vergunningen
15 juni 2020

Volkskrant, Yvonne Hofs. 19 juli 2020. Boeren gaan protesteren bij ‘selectief’ rekenend RIVM: soepel voor
de snelweg en streng voor het vee

P. Omtzigt, 2021. Een nieuw social contract, Deel III. Hoe modellen Nederland bepalen, Amsterdam:
Prometheus

Boin, A. et al., 2020. Een analyse van de nationale crisiresponse. Leiden: The Crisis University Press

R. Hoppe, 2014. Patterns of science/policy interaction in The Netherlands, in P. Scholten & F. van Nispen,
Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Policy Press, Bristol (ISBN 9781447313335)
SGI 2022 | 73 Netherlands Report

Interministerial Coordination

GO Expertise The Dutch prime minister is formally in charge of coordinating government

Score: 6
policy as a whole, and has a concomitant range of powers, which include
deciding on the composition of the Council of Ministers’ agenda and
formulating its conclusions and decisions; chairing Council of Ministers
meetings, committees (onderraad) and (in most cases) ministerial committees;
adjudicating interdepartmental conflicts; serving as the primary press
spokesperson and first speaker in the States General; and speaking in
international forums and arenas (e.g., European Union and the United Nations)
on behalf of the Council of Ministers and the Dutch government as a whole.
This figure is also responsible for all affairs concerning the Royal House.

The prime minister’s own Ministry of General Affairs office has 14 advising
councilors (raadadviseurs, with junior assistants) at its disposal. The advising
councilors are top-level civil servants, not political appointees; they are the
secretaries of the cabinet subcouncils and committees. In addition, the prime
minister has a special relationship with the Scientific Council of Government
Policy. Sometimes, deputy directors of the planning agencies play the role of
secretaries for interdepartmental “front gates.” To conclude, the Prime
Minister’s Office and the prime minister himself have a rather limited capacity
to evaluate the policy content of line-ministry proposals unless they openly
clash with the government platform (regeer-akkoord). The current prime
minister’s style of running his cabinet his sectoral ministers with considerable
scope for action.

Of course, personal skills and experience make a difference, and Prime

Minister Rutte has a reputation for clever informal leadership and conflict
management, and (until recently) a Houdini-like skill with regard to
extricating himself from political affairs and scandals. He is also known for his
aversion to visionary leadership, expressed in a quip ascribed to him: “If you
have a vision, consult your eye doctor.” In late 2020 and early 2021, Prime
Minister Rutte’s political career was endangered by his own political
shrewdness, which included a tendency to provide parliament with meager and
only piecemeal information with regard to the cabinet’s decision-making
practices (the so-called Rutte-doctrine), along with a routine tactic of claiming
selective memory (“Sorry, but I have no active memory of X,Y,Z.”). This
misfired when he was caught lying to parliament. He only survived because,
despite this, he was a winner in the March 2021 elections, because he could
exploit his highly visible leadership role in the efforts to manage the
coronavirus crisis. His party (VVD) rallied around him, and in a record-long
SGI 2022 | 74 Netherlands Report

process of cabinet formation, he regained sufficient levels of trust from the

other party leaders involved (CU and especially D66) by giving in to their
demands and promising to revise his governing and leadership style.

Citation:
http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/bewindspersonen/jan-peter-balkenende/taken

http://www.nationaalarchief.nl/selectielijsten/BSD_Coordinatie_algemeen_regering
sbeleid_stcrnt_2009_63.pdf

M. Rutte, De minister-president: een aanbouw aan het huis van Thorbecke, Lecture by the Prime Minister,
12 October 2016 (rijksoverheid.nl, consulted 8 November 2016)

M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Rhijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat
zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Wikipedia, Rutte-doctrine

Nu.nl., April 1, 2021. Rutte opperde andere functie voor CDA-kamerlid Omtzigt; ‘Minister maken’.

P. de Koning, 2020. Mark Rutte, Uitgevrij Brooklyn

Line Ministries Since about 2010, departmental reform in the Netherlands sought to transform
Score: 7
the notion of line ministries itself, as the limited number of cores or building
blocks in the organization of the bureaucracy. The key idea was that task
allocation and coordination were no longer to be dependent on (ever-changing)
policy directions, leading to repeated disappointments when abolishing certain
departments, initiating a new department, or the amalgamation of several
departments every time new government were installed after elections.
Instead, the idea was to define organizational units around their core
managerial functions (personnel, information, organization, finances,
communication, facilitation and building); these would in turn flexibly support
ever-changing policy formulation and implementation tasks with less
organizational inertia and resistance, and lower transfer costs.

This so-called liquid governance would position ministers as managers of

organizational complexes, supporting relatively easy-to-change core policy
programs. Paradoxically, this resulted in ever more organizational reshuffling
within a government that was increasingly seen as apolitical and managerial in
nature. For example, the core Economic Affairs department was expanded so
as to attend also to agricultural policies when the separate Department of
Agriculture was abolished; later, the Department of Agriculture was
resurrected, but climate change policy was added to a department now named
Economic Affairs and Climate Change. Under the Rutte IV government there
will be, next to the “old” Economic Affairs, a new Department of Climate and
Energy. Policing, formerly part of Homeland Affairs, was transferred to a
Justice department, now rebaptized as Justice and Safety. The Rutte IV
government has made many such political adaptations and reshuffles, with 20
SGI 2022 | 75 Netherlands Report

full ministers and nine deputy ministers attending to the major political crises
of the moment. These include mining (mainly to attend to earthquake damages
in the former gas-exploiting areas of the province of Groningen; fiscal affairs
(Fiscaliteit) and allowances and customs (Toeslagen en Douane, which is
under the Finance Department), poverty policy, participation and pensions,
which is distinct from social affairs and employment, and nature and nitrogen.
The make-up of the Rutte IV government represents a shift from the idea that
government should have as few ministers as possible. There is a lesson to be
learned from the fact that a large number of (deputy) ministers in the Rutte III
government left their jobs, citing family, burnout or a new job as the
motivation.

Generally, departmental legislative or white-paper initiatives are rooted in the

government policy agreement, EU policy coordination and subsequent Council
of Ministers decisions to allocate drafting to one or two particular ministries.
In the case of complex problems, draft legislation may involve considerable
jockeying for position among the various line ministries. The prime minister is
always involved in the kick-off of major new policy initiatives and sometimes
in the wording of the assignment/terms of reference itself. After that, however,
it may take between six months and four years before the issue reaches the
decision-making stage in ministerial and Council of Ministers committees, and
again comes under the formal review of the prime minister. Meanwhile, the
prime minister is obliged to rely on informal coordination with his fellow
ministers. It is difficult to draw conclusions regarding the effectiveness of
informal coordination, information-sharing procedures and other such
practices. High-level civil servants close to the prime minister have
complained about the increasing use of spin doctors and political assistants in
such processes. But the prime minister has a good reputation with regard to
formal leadership and conflict management.

Citation:
Your citations
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NSOB, Van der Steen and van Twist, 2010. Veranderende vernieuwing: op weg naar vloeibaar bestuur. Een
beschouwing over 60 jaar vernieuwing van de rijksdienst.

NSOB, Termeer et al., 2021. Het terugkerend verlangen naar regie. Over de vraag hoe belangen van
landbouw, natuur en vitaal platteland stevig te behartigen zijn in vele spelen met vele andere legitieme
belangen.

RTL Nieuws, 17 November 2021. Clash ministeries Hoekstra en Wiebes over plan Europees noodfonds

Trouw, Van Egmond en Wijffels, 11 September 2021. Industrieterrein Nederland heeft een ministerie van
ecologische zaken nodig

De Zeeuw en Verdaas, n.d., Na Wild West en Science Fiction op zoek naar de juiste film. Naar een nieuw
struringsconcept voot de inrichting van Nederland
SGI 2022 | 76 Netherlands Report

NRC-H, Dupuy and Aharouay, December 17, 2021. Rutte na eerste formatieoverleg: een grotere ploeg,
verdeling posten per partij is rond; and Nog twee nieuwe posten: ministers voor Natuur en Stikstof en
Armoedebeleid, Participatie en Pensioenen

Cabinet Council of Ministers committees (onderraad) involve a separate meeting

Committees
chaired by the prime minister for the ministers involved. Each committee has a
Score: 7
coordinating minister responsible for relevant input and documents.
Discussion and negotiations focus on issues not resolved through prior
administrative coordination and consultation. If the committee fails to reach a
decision, the matter is pushed up to the Council of Ministers.

Since the Balkenende IV Council of Ministers there have been six standing
Council of Ministers committees: international and European affairs;
economics, knowledge and innovation; social coherence; safety and legal
order; and administration, government and public services. Given the elaborate
process of consultations and negotiations, few issues are likely to have escaped
attention and discussion before reaching the Council of Ministers.

However, since the Rutte I and II government, cabinets have consisted of two
or more political parties of contrary and/or very divergent ideological
character in the Second Chamber (the conservative-liberal VVD and the PvdA
or Labor Party, in the case of Rutte II; VVD, CDA, CU and D66 in Rutte III).
Political pragmatism has tended to transform “review and coordination” to, in
the Dutch political jargon, “smart positive exchange,” meaning that each party
agrees tacitly or explicitly not to veto the other’s bills. This tendency has
contributed to the public image of a “managerial” governing style, and may
have had negative consequences for the quality of policymaking, as minority
views in the cabinet have effectively won parliamentary majorities if they
were feasible from a budgetary perspective, without first undergoing rigorous
policy and legal analyses. In the second half of the Rutte III cabinet, much to
the dismay of VVD and D66, government lost majority support in the Senate
and, thus, had to garner ad hoc political support for its policy initiatives
through elaborate negotiations with political parties that were not part of the
governing coalition. Introducing a wider range of perspectives and decision
criteria though, may have increased the quality of policymaking and the
democratic nature of the process, given that not only ministerial committees
but also political parties were involved.

Trouw, Lagas. 14 February 2013. Heerlijk helder ruilen lukt VVD en PvdA niet.

Nu.nl., November 2, 2017. Rutte bereikt compromis en sluit bezuiniging wijkverpleegkundige uit.

Trouw, Kieskamp, 19 July 2020. Ruttes lelijke akkefietje met de Eerste Kamer.

De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 November 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijf dat mensen onverdiend
wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.
SGI 2022 | 77 Netherlands Report

Ministerial Since the 2006 elections, politicians have demanded a reduction in the number
Bureaucracy
of civil servants. This has resulted in a loss of substantive expertise, with civil
Score: 5
servants essentially becoming process managers. For example, during the
beginning of the pandemic and through a good deal of the later events, the
Ministry of Public Health had no medical experts among its top-level civil
servants. Moreover, it has undermined the traditional relations of loyalty and
trust between (deputy) ministers and top-level officers. The former have
broken the monopoly formerly held by senior staff on the provision of policy-
relevant information and advice by turning increasingly to outside expertise
such as consultants and lobbyists. Top-level officers have responded with risk-
averse and defensive behavior exemplified by professionally driven
organizational communication and process management. They have embraced
some Dutch variation of New Public Management (NPM) thinking and
practices. One of the results is that in the 2019 International Civil Service
Effectiveness Index (InCiSE), the Netherlands received a below-average score
in the area of policymaking.

The upshot is that ministerial compartmentalization in the preparation of

Council of Ministers meetings has increased. Another, recently severely
criticized NPM-related impact has been the sharp organizational boundary
between policy formulation and implementation in independent administrative
organizations (Zelfstandige Bestuurs Organen, ZBO) like the Social Security
Bank (Sociale VerzekeringsBank, SVB) for pensions and children’s
allowances; the Implementation Institute for Employee Benefits
(Uitvoeringsinstituut WerknemersVerzekeringen, UWV) for a raft of different
employee benefits; and even the tax authorities, which no longer just collect
taxes but also manage a gamut of tax benefits/incentives for thousands of
eligible families, such as the now scandal-ridden child assistance benefits. The
consequence has been that policy is off-loaded to implementation institutions
without thorough feasibility testing, let alone prior assessment of impacts on
citizens. The neoliberal mood also meant that the monitoring and oversight
bodies, the inspectorates, were overburdened and understaffed.

R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin ( 2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
NRC.next, 30 June 2021. VWS volgt altijd de Gezondheidsraad – bij gebrek aan kennis

H. Tjeenk Willink, Een nieuw idee van de staat, Socialisme & Democratie, 11/12, 2012, pp. 70-78

Vereniging voor Bestuurskunde, van den Berg, August 31, 2017. De ongemakkelijke waarheid van Tjeenk
Willink.

De Correspondent, Den Haag bestuurt het land alsof het een bedrijf is. En democratie heeft het nakijken, 29
June 2018

International Civil Service Effectiveness Index (InCiSE), 2019, p. 54

SGI 2022 | 78 Netherlands Report

Informal Very little is actually known about informal coordination at the (sub-)Council
Coordination
of Ministers level regarding policymaking and decision-making. The best-
Score: 7
known informal procedure used to be the “Torentjesoverleg,” in which the
prime minister and a core members of the Council of Ministers consulted with
the leaders of the political parties supporting the coalition in the Prime
Minister’s Office (“Het Torentje,” meaning the small tower) or elsewhere,
usually at the beginning of the week. Although sometimes considered
objectionable – as it appears to contradict the ideal of dualism between the
executive and the legislative – coalition governments cannot survive without
this kind of high-level political coordination between the government and the
States General. Given shaky parliamentary support such informal coordination
is no longer limited to political parties providing support to the governing
coalition.

Under present conditions, in which ministers and civil servants are subject to
increasing parliamentary and media scrutiny, and in which gaps in trust and
loyalty between the political leadership and the bureaucracy staff are growing,
informal coordination and the personal chemistry among civil servants are
what keeps things running. Regarding interministerial coordination, informal
contacts between the senior staff (raadadviseurs) in the prime minister’s
Council of Ministers and senior officers working for ministerial leadership are
absolutely crucial. Nonetheless, such bureaucratic coordination is undermined
by insufficient or absent informal political coordination. Until recently,
contacts between civil servant and members of parliament were prohibited
(oekaze Kok); under Rutte III this rule was somewhat relaxed.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 154-163, 198-203, 220-228.

S. Jilke et al., Public Sector Reform in the Netherlands: Views and Experiences from Senior Executives,
COCOPS Research Report, 2013

M. van Weezel and T. Broer, Max en Thijs over de premier: het geheim van politiek trapezewerker en ‘nat
zeepje’ Mark Rutte (Vrij Nederland, vn.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Digitalization for Although it may safely be assumed that well-known digital technologies like
Interministerial
WhatsApp and Signal are used in Dutch interministerial coordination,
Coordination
Score: 5
digitalization designed specifically for interministerial coordination appears
absent or is unknown. Like in ICT use across government in general, different
departments use different systems whose interoperability is low or absent.
Although the Legis project aspires to a more integrated ICT approach in the
Dutch legislative system, results have been poor. For example, it is impossible
as a non-insider to trace progress in legislative work on a particular bill, let
SGI 2022 | 79 Netherlands Report

alone to have an overview of all bills in preparation. Digitalization in

legislation and interministerial coordination in the Netherlands clearly lags
behind that in the United Kingdom or Finland.

In 2019, two important leaders in the push for improved ICT use within
governmental departments resigned, and there are severe disagreements
between the political and administrative levels of the Department of Internal
Affairs and the leadership of the ICT Assessment Bureau, which was
established in 2015 to coordinate ICT projects and contain cost overruns.

Responding to concerns voiced by the Council of State, the Rathenau Institute

and the Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR), the December 2021
coalition agreement creates a minister for digital affairs. This figure will focus
on the uses of algorithms in decision-making relating to policy designs,
legislative work, jurisprudence and implementation practices.

Citation:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition. Comparative study of the legislative processes
in Finland, Slovenia and the UK as a source of inspiration for enhancing the efficiency of the Dutch
legislative process, Leiden University ((open access.leidenuniv.nl, accessed 31 October 2018)

Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2014-5, 33 326, nr. 5, Eindrapport onderzoek naar ICT projecten bij de
overheid (accessed 4 November 2018)

Trouw, 15 May 2019. De ICT-projecten bij de overheid zijn nog steeds een chaos. (trouw.nl, accessed 8
November 2019)

Rathenau Instituut, November 5, 2021. Deskundigen in de Eerste Kamer over AI bij

overheidsbesluitvorming.

WRR, November 11, 2021. WRR-rapport nr. 105: Opgave AI. De nieuwe systeemtechnologie.

Raad van State, June 28, 2021. Publicatie Raad van State over digitalisering in wetgeving en
bestuursrechtspraak.

Evidence-based Instruments

RIA Application In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields:
Score: 8
environmental-impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-
reduction assessments (ABRAs).

Environmental impact assessments are legally prescribed for projects (e.g.,

infrastructure, water management, tourism, rural projects, garbage processing,
energy and industry) with foreseeable large environmental impacts. Initiators
of such projects are obliged to produce an environmental impact report that
specifies the environmental impacts of the intended project and activities and
includes major alternatives. Environmental research and multi-criteria analysis
are the standard methods used.
SGI 2022 | 80 Netherlands Report

The development of a method for ex ante evaluation of intended legislation

regarding compliance costs to business and citizens was entrusted in 1998 to
an ad hoc, temporary, but independent advisory commission called the
Advisory Board on Administrative Burden Reduction (ACTAL). In 2011,
some policymakers suggested that ACTAL become a permanent rather than
temporary body. The policy philosophy on administrative regulation was at
that time already shifting from (always negative) “burden reduction” to
(prudentially positive and strategic) “appropriate regulation.” After evaluating
its impact, the government decided in 2017 that ACTAL would be succeeded
by a formal advisory body, the Advisory Body on Assessment of Regulatory
Burdens (Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, ATR). Parliament has called for
the ATR to assess the administrative burden associated not only with new
regulation, but also of existing regulation as well. At present the ATR, which
is slated to retain temporary status until 2022, has no capacity to do this.

During the coronavirus crisis, the ATR was involved in the rapid assessment
of all new regulations; it rejected some, and its advice was incorporated in
improved bills and rules. The ATR is involved in assessing a large number of
regulations concerning topics such as small and medium-sized enterprises,
social care, education and EU regulations. The body has concluded that the
quality of legislation is insufficient. In about 25% of new laws, the
parliament’s rationale (necessity and utility) is not identified or is
insufficiently argued. In about two-thirds of cases, there is inadequate or
hardly any attention paid to feasibility; the laws do not fit the way firms have
shaped their production processes, or how citizens organize their lives.

Meanwhile, the Dutch government has been developing an integrated impact

assessment framework for policy and legislation, which ought to be applied by
every Dutch civil servant preparing policy documents for ministerial decision-
making. The ATR has argued that this framework does not fit policymaking
officials’ expectations, and has noted that nobody is responsible for
monitoring or correct use of the system.

Citation:
Milieueffectrapportage (nl.m.wikipedia.org, consulted 26 October 2014)

Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van
het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk

Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal

afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)

ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)
Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van
het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
SGI 2022 | 81 Netherlands Report

Ministerie van Justitie en Veiligheid, Kenniscentrum Wetgeving en Juridische Zaken, Integraal

afwegingskader voor beleid en regelgeving, 16 October 2018 (accessed 31 October 2018)

ATR, Naar betere regels. Lessen uit 17 jaar Actal (air-regeldruk.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Adviescommissie Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.

Quality of RIA RIAs are obliged to identify one or several alternatives to the option chosen by
Process
an initiator. According to Advisory Board on Administrative Burden
Score: 8
Reduction (ATR) guidelines, alternative options for administrative burden
reduction assessments (ABRAs) are usually investigated. In principle, the
option involving the greatest cost reduction ought to be selected. The extent to
which practice follows theory is not known; in several cases, the ATR has
judged that the less cost-efficient solution was selected. Stakeholders and
decision-makers have been involved in the process of producing RIAs, helping
in the process of creating burden-reduction analyses by providing needed
information.

Stakeholders and interested parties, typically including semi-public bodies and

the lobbyists for commercial and/or professional associations (e.g.,
representing SMEs, social- and medical-care professionals, or farmers), are
generally consulted in the intra- or interministerial preparation of bills and
policy proposals. Before a draft is passed onto the Council of Ministers, a
proposal has to pass a wide range of quality tests, for example regarding
budgetary effects, business effects, administrative-burden effects, and societal
and environmental effects. In some cases, departments publicize a draft bill as
part of an e-consultation process to solicit feedback from citizens, but this
practice is exceptional. Sometimes the results of the burden-reduction
assessments do not reach parliament in time to be used. In an evaluation of the
ATR’s performance by Berenschaot Consultants, stakeholders indicated that
they were in general satisfied.

Given the continued and widespread complaints, mainly by business, about

regulatory burdens (e.g., by dentists, general practitioners, youth workers,
nurses, farmers and shopkeepers, to mention just a few), there is some
question as to the effectiveness of regulatory-burden reduction campaigns and
the efficacy of the ATR as an independent watchdog. Interestingly, the ATR
claims that it warned several years ago that the complexity of tax-benefit
regulation surpassed the understanding and capability of citizens.

Citation:
W. Voermans et al., 2012. Legislative processes in transition, Leiden University (open access.leideuniv.nl,
accessed 31 October 2018)

Staatscourant nr. 29814, 29 Mei 2017, Besluit van 17 mei 2017, nr. 2017000809, houdende instelling van
het Adviescollege toetsing regeldruk
SGI 2022 | 82 Netherlands Report

V. Bekkers and A. Edwards, 2018. The role of social media in the policy process, in H. Colebatch and R.
Hoppe (eds.), Handbook of Policy, Process and Governing, Cheltenham, Edward Elgar

De Volkskrant, 30 September 2019. Drrie redenen waarom regeldruk de zorg blijft teisteren. (volkskrant.nl,
accessed 8 November 2019)

Adviescollege Toetsing Regeldruk, Jaarverslag 2020.

Financieel Dagblad, 1 November 2021. Als je al die peperdure regels niet snoeit dan woekeren ze voort

Sustainability In the Netherlands, RIAs are broadly and effectively applied in two fields:
Check
environmental impact assessments (EIMs) and administrative-burden-
Score: 8
reduction assessments (ABRAs). EIMs have been legally mandated since
1987. Anyone who needs a government license for initiating substantial spatial
or land-use projects with potentially harmful environmental impacts is obliged
to research and disclose potential project impacts. More than 1,000 EIM
reports have been administratively and politically processed. They guarantee
that environmental and sustainability considerations play a considerable role in
government decision-making. However, environmental impact assessments are
sometimes subordinated to economic impact assessments. There are no
systematic social – or, for example, health – impact assessments. In 2017, and
repeatedly in later years, the DNB (Dutch National Bank) warned that there
would a review of whether firms in the financial sector had sufficiently
explored the risks of climate change in their policies. In the water sector,
similar stress tests of policies by water management boards, and municipal and
local water management/emergency plans are being prepared. In 2018, the
results of recent climate-change platform debates, and negotiations between
government, business and other stakeholders were elaborately scrutinized and
re-calculated by the Planning Bureau for the Living Environment (PBL).

Nevertheless, as reported elsewhere (see “Environment”), the Dutch

government has regularly helped economic sectors (farmers, fishermen, civil
aviation) delay necessary action and downplay the urgency of sustainability
problems. This continued hesitation and delay finally drove environmental
activists to sue the government successfully for negligence and lack of effort
(in the Urgenda and nitrogen emission cases).

Given the trend toward operationalizing the Sustainable Development Goals

into measurable units, and similar efforts to broaden conventional economic
indicators like GDP into an indicator system measuring welfare more broadly,
it is to be expected that environmental RIA practices will be affected sooner or
later.

Citation:
NRC.next, “DNB waarschuwt financiële sector voor risico’s klimaatverandering, 4 October 2017”

Kennisportaal Ruimtelijke Adaptatie, “Verpliche stresstest wateroverlast voor waterschappen en

SGI 2022 | 83 Netherlands Report

gemeenten,” consulted 12 October 2017

PBL, Analyse van het voorstel voor hoofdlijnen van het klimaatakkoord, 27 September 2018
(www.pbl.nl>publicaties, accessed 31 October 2018)

M. Chavannes, 19 July, 2019. De net-niet-politiek van Nederland: zwoegen aan het Klimaatakkoord om
draagvlak te creëeren voor rustig aan doen. (decorrespondent.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Me Judice, 2 apr 2021 Stam and van Zanden, De politieke neutraliteit van bbp ontmaskerd

Quality of Ex The General Audit Chamber (Algemene Rekenkamer) scrutinizes ex post

Post Evaluation
policy evaluations by ministerial departments. Since 2000, the chamber has
Score: 6
reported its findings to parliament on the third Wednesday in May each year.
In 2012, the government introduced the Regulation for Regular Evaluation
Studies, which specifies research criteria for assessing policy efficiency, goal
achievement, evidence-based policymaking and subsidy-based policies. Yet,
time and again, the chamber has reported deficits in goal achievement and
weaknesses in goal formulation, which undermine the quality of ex post
evaluation research. Other weaknesses in policy evaluation studies include the
lack of citizen perspectives, inability to accurately calculate societal costs and
benefits, overreliance on input from implementing organizations for evidence
and lack of public access to many evaluations. In line with the general trend
toward more instrumental advice, over the last couple of years, the General
Audit Chamber has focused its attention on specific points in departmental
agendas.

Moreover, there are a wide range of additional non-obligatory evaluations

produced by ministerial departments, parliament, government-sponsored
knowledge institutes, the ombudsman, implementation bodies and quasi-
independent non-governmental bodies. In response to the coronavirus crisis,
several evaluations were undertaken, including a review of impacts on
different groups of citizens. The PBL did an ex ante evaluation of the
sustainability impacts of proposals in the party platforms of six political
parties. In response to worries about the use of algorithms in governance, and
anticipating the abuse of algorithms by the tax authorities in the child benefits
affair, the General Audit Chamber developed an ex ante evaluation framework
for the design and use of algorithms. Since evaluation findings are just one
factor in designing new or adjusting existing policies, it is not clear how much
policy learning from formal and informal evaluations actually occurs. A recent
study commissioned by the minister of finance assessed past evaluations and
their use. The study confirmed that although “no other country evaluates so
many of its policies,” policymaking civil servants and members of parliament
are less sensitive to the outcomes of previous policies than to images and
incidents (in the press). Moreover, obstruction and disinterestedness contribute
to methodological weaknesses in many of the evaluation studies, this
assessment found. For example, although the government agreement stipulates
SGI 2022 | 84 Netherlands Report

that a new policy decriminalizing the use of hashish may be experimentally

tested at the local level, interference in the study’s design has already made a
politically unbiased evaluation of results as good as impossible.

Dutch ex post evaluators closely follow international trends of “evidence

informed” and “behavioral knowledge” evaluation studies. There has been a
tendency to move away from a focus on single, case-specific ex post
evaluation studies to a focus on the construction of broader, more balanced
departmental knowledge portfolios, in which ex post evaluation studies are
embedded as elements in a larger body of knowledge accessible to
policymakers and other participants in policy subsystems. It is not yet clear to
what extent such trends in evaluation research really inform evaluation
practices.

Citation:
A. Knottnerus, Van casus-specifieke beleidsevaluatie naar systematische opbouw van kennis en ervaring,
Beleidsonderzoek Online, May 2016

Meyken Houppermans, ‘Wat is de toegevoegde waarde van de onafhankelijk

deskundige bij beleidsdoorlichtingen?’, Beleidsonderzoek Online juni 2018,
DOI: 10.5553/BO/221335502018000005001

SEO Economisch Onderzoek, december 2018. Beleidsdoorlichtingen belicht (SEO-rapport nr. 2018-110,
sep.nl, accessed 8 November 2019

Algemene Rekenkamer,26-01-2021. Betere kwaliteitscontrole en meer inzicht voor burgers nodig bij
algoritmes overheid

Platform O, Klieverik and Zwetsloot, 22 March 2021, Overheid, positioneer algoritmes als oplossing

FD, Daan Ballegeer Jean Dohmen 16 mrt 2021. ‘Er wordt veel beleid gemaakt waarvan we niet weten of het
werkt’

PBL, 01-03-2021. Analyse leefomgevingseffecten verkiezingsprogramma’s 2021-2025

Societal Consultation

Public International references to the “polder model” as a form of consensus-building

Consultation
through practices of societal consultations testify to the Dutch reputation for
Score: 7
negotiating non-parliamentary support for public policies, often on contested
issues as a precondition for parliamentary approval. In this form of neo-
corporatism and network governance, the government consults extensively
with vested interest groups in the economy and/or civil society during policy
preparation and attempts to involve them in policy implementation. It has been
a strong factor in the mode of political operation and public policymaking
deployed by all the Rutte governments. Recent examples include the public
debate on pension reform, the national summit on climate policy following the
Paris Accords (involving five sectoral platforms: electricity, built environment,
SGI 2022 | 85 Netherlands Report

industry, agriculture and land use, and mobility), and preventive public health
(focusing on obesity, smoking and “problematic” alcohol consumption).

In spite of its apparent revival, this mode of politics and policymaking is

contested. Trade unions have suffered due to an erosion of representativeness
and increasing fragmentation, although employers’ associations have been less
affected. Professional associations of teachers, nurses and others also suffer
from a representation deficit; their constituencies frequently show their
disaffection with policy agreements concluded by their leadership. This has
resulted in many public demonstrations near government buildings in The
Hague. Another criticism is that results may be politically pre-cooked
depending on who is invited to sit at the negotiation table. For example, in the
negotiations over the climate agreement, this criticism applied to the
discussions on energy and health issues, in which the results allegedly strongly
reflected the interests of the energy and pharmaceutical industries. Even the
High Council of State issued a warning that agreements reached in the polder
model are too often presented by the government to parliament as a fait
accompli. They also too often lead to very broad platform legislation that
specifies future goals and indicates a budget, but leaves implementation
commitments and legal implications wide open. Green NGOs dissatisfied with
the influence they have been able to exert through the polder model, and who
have watched one delay after another in the implementation of environmental
pollution policy, have successfully turned to the judiciary to force government
to finally take its climate goal commitments seriously. All this means that
some stakeholders venue-shop outside the mainstream polder model to
increase their influence on government policy. Therefore, a side effect of the
reviving “polder” tradition within a more fragmented political landscape may
be the emergence of an extensive network of professional lobbyists with a
dense network of contacts within political parties and with single members of
parliament and cabinet ministers. Lobbyists are known to influence party
platforms before elections, and even the cabinet formation process itself. There
are signs that business lobbies have achieved clear successes. Another
criticism of the poldering process is that it leads to sluggish policymaking,
creating a “musical chairs” process in which the responsibilities of
government, business and influential civil society or non-governmental
organizations remain blurred, undermining effective decision-making. The
recent revival may owe more to the fact that none of the Rutte cabinets have
been able to rely on solid parliamentary support than to any renewed vigor on
the part of business, labor unions and civil society associations.

Since 2011, national departments involved in developing new policies and

legislative projects have been able to use the internet to consult with citizens,
thereby avoiding some of the “usual suspects” problems associated with the
SGI 2022 | 86 Netherlands Report

traditional “poldering” process. The extent to which this has been successful
remains unclear. During the coronavirus lockdowns, a temporary law on
digital consultation and decision-making (Tijdelijke wet voor digitale
beraadslaging en besluitvorming) ensured continuity. New permanent
legislation on the subject is in the making.

Citation:
Your citations

Internetconsultatie nieuwe wet – en regelbegeving (Rijksoverheid, accessed 8 November 2019)

A.van Roessel, De Groene Amsterdammer, 13 March 2019. Polderen (groen.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Rathenau Instituut, Bas et al., 28 June, 2021. Digitaal democratisch, maar hoe? Discussienota over
functionele Eisen aan digitale beraadslaging en besluitvorming

R. Hoppe (2022), When power hosts knowledge. A Political theory of policy formulation, in B. Guy Peters
and G. Fontaine (eds.), Handbook of Research on Policy Design (to be published)

Hoge Raad der Nederlanden. 2019. 2019 Highlighted; Brief Review of 2019. The
Hague.(jaarverslaghogeraad.nl)

Financieel Dagblad, Knoop’ 31 aug 2021. Haagse draaideurdiscussie ontvlamt na ‘opportunistische’

overstap Van Nieuwenhuizen

Nieuwsuur, Jonker, June 18, 2021. Hoe het kabinet meer naar de bedrijvenlobby luisterde dan naar de eigen
ambtenaren.

C. Braun, Aan tafel op het Malieveld Rutte III en de omgang met het maatschappelijk middenveld, in
Montesqieu Instituut, 2021. ‘Niet stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III. Den Haag, 83-94

Policy Communication

Coherent The Informatie Rijksoverheid service responds to frequently asked questions

Communication
by citizens over the internet, telephone and email. In the age of “mediacracy,”
Score: 7
the government has sought to make policy communication more coherent,
relying on the National Information Service (Rijksvoorlichtingsdienst, RVD),
which is formally a part of the prime minister’s Department for General
Affairs, and whose Director General is present at Council of Ministers
meetings and is responsible for communicating policies and the prime
minister’s affairs to the media. The government has streamlined and
coordinated its external communications at the line-ministry level.

Another effort to engage in centralized, coherent communication has involved

replacing departmentally run televised information campaigns with a unified,
thematic approach (e.g., safety). These efforts to have government speak with
“one mouth” appear to have been fairly successful. For example, the
information communicated by the government regarding the downing of a
passenger plane with 196 Dutch passengers over Ukraine on 17 July 2014 and
SGI 2022 | 87 Netherlands Report

its aftermath was timely, adequate and demonstrated respect for the victims
and the emotions and needs of their families. Another example is the long
series of press conferences by the prime minister and the minister of public
health during the coronavirus crisis, which were still being held as of the time
of writing (January 2022).

The continuous technological innovation in information and communication

technologies has led policy communication to adapt to the new possibilities.
New developments are focused on responding more directly to citizen
questions, exploring new modes of behavioral change, and utilizing internet-
based citizen participation and communication channels in policymaking.
Moreover, algorithms are being used by the tax agencies, and in the delivery
of public services to citizens. For example, in 2011 the Dutch government
decided to participate in the global Open Government Partnership. But in 2017
the Dutch government was criticized for structurally misleading and
insufficient communication on issues of animal disease and food safety due to
prioritizing agricultural interests over public health. In the coronavirus crisis,
priorities were turned around, with public health issues taking priority over
economic, social and cultural dimensions. In general, government
communication occurs in an increasingly challenging media environment in
which competition, polarization, trolling and “fake news” represent major
challenges. In 2019, in response to repeated criticism that the language used in
official communications was unclear, the government decided to create an
“Instant Clarity Brigade” (Direct Duidelijk Brigade) to assist departmental
policymakers in writing more understandable proposals, rules and decrees
(Jip-en-Janneke taal). Considerable criticism was voiced about the increasing
and abundant use of communication experts – estimates ran as high as 800
such experts in 2020 – in government, compared to the ongoing loss of
expertise in the civil service and the insufficient use of experts in
(government-sponsored) think tanks. In journalistic and academic circles, the
feeling was that the thin line between government communication and
information and propaganda defending government policies is becoming more
and more blurred.

In 2020-21, policy communication had only one focus: coronavirus crisis

management. The Dutch communication experts followed a complex strategy
of communication. One theme was shifting between two communicative
registers: that of communicating order in the crisis through informing and
instructing, based on expert knowledge; and another that focused on showing
empathy with those nudged into compliance, with this taking place through
listening, interpreting and narrating. A second theme was openness about the
government’s “dilemma” logic – that is, sharing with the public the
government’s efforts to balance often contradictory considerations and
SGI 2022 | 88 Netherlands Report

assumptions in its policy decisions. The major contradiction here was between
the public health considerations and the values of the medical profession
advocates and the values predicated on economic, social, cultural and psychic
well-being held by those who advocated putting a higher priority on keeping
the economy and society running. After initial successes and a rally-around-
the-flag effect, the strategy gradually fell apart, as it ran up against the public’s
tolerance for sustained uncertainty associated with “broken promises” and
repeated delays of a clear exit. The clarity of policy communication also
declined due to the political competition in the March 2021 election campaign;
not to mention strong polarization later in the pandemic around stricter
measures (evening/night curfew, strict lockdown periods) and stronger efforts
to persuade people to comply with recommendations (for vaccination, use of a
coronavirus pass as condition for access to hospitality sector establishments
and larger cultural and sports events). The polarization went beyond the logic
of crisis management itself, and became highly political when stricter
measures and nudges were interpreted as anti-constitutional and as infringing
on personal and civic liberties.

Citation:
G. Rijnja and M. Bakker, Reikende handen: communiceren in ongewisse tijden, in: V. Wijkheid and M. van
Duin, eds., 2021.Lessen uit de coronacrisis: het jaar 2020, Den Haag: Boom Bestuurskunde, 217-231

Trouw, Omtzigt,October 8, 2021. Stop liever geld in doordacht beleid dan een leger aan voorlichter.

Nationale Ombudsman,5 April 2016.Het verdwijnen van de blauwe envelop. Een onderzoek naar de
digitalisering van het berichtenverkeer met de Belastingdienst. (zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl, accessed
8 November 2019)

overheidsexpertise.nl/communicatie (overheidsexpertise.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

NRC Next, 24 October 2019. De Direct Duidelijk Brigade moet teksten overheid weer begrijpelijk maken.

Implementation

Government In its first year, the Rutte III cabinet realized five of its 36 officially announced
Effectiveness
legislative initiatives; two of which simply involved abolishing (consultative
Score: 5
referendum, fiscal reduction for home-owners) existing laws. In its second
year, two of its big initiatives, a pension agreement and a climate agreement,
were achieved. Then came the pandemic, which generated 19 emergency laws.
All in all, out of 363 proposed original new bills (minus approvals of EU
legislation, treaties and technical “repair” laws), a total of 186 (51%) had been
adopted by January 2021; as of the time of writing 23 bills were awaiting
approval in the First Chamber. However, in its overall assessment of
government performance, including goals achievement, in 2018 – 2019, the
General Audit Chamber, in an especially pessimistic annual report, found most
departmental reports inadequate owing to “bad memory” and inadequate
records. For the first time, it also identified illegal expenditures.
SGI 2022 | 89 Netherlands Report

Ineffective policy shows up in virtually all policy areas and departments. In

international comparisons the Netherlands scores low with regard to
generating sustainable energy and building new houses, and very high with
regard to the emissions of nitrogen. The education system produces inequality
among students; economic inequalities are increasing; infrastructure
maintenance (roads, bridges) is overdue; there is a tremendous backlog in the
exams for driving licenses; substantial amounts of cocaine and synthetic drugs
are imported or produced; the percentage of physically and mentally
challenged workers in paid jobs is among the lowest in Europe; and the
coronavirus-era track-and-trace, testing and vaccination programs all suffered
from organizational barriers and personnel shortages.

No doubt the most shocking and politically impactful case of policy failure
was the childcare benefits system as implemented by the tax authorities. Tens
of thousands of families (often of non-Dutch descent) were considered to have
acted fraudulently on flimsy evidence, illegally placed on fraud lists without
being informed about it, and “lawfully” subjected to recovery regimes that
pushed them into poverty for a long time. In many cases, this led
psychological problems, divorce and even loss of custody of children. Any
proportionality between the size and severity of violations and the degree of
punishment was completely disregarded. This is no longer denied even in
parliament, which is partly to blame because of over-hasty and sloppy
legislative initiatives pushing for zero tolerance on social benefits fraud.
Ironically, parliament’s insistence on fast and across-the-board compensation
for the victims has turned into an implementation nightmare itself. (The Rutte
IV cabinet has a special deputy minister to clear up the mess.) Even legal
appeals fell on deaf ears for many years, as the High Court systematically
followed the tax authorities’ stricter-than-strict interpretation of the law. This
scandal evolved between 2009-2020 and, demonstrating poor policy feedback
mechanisms, was only documented by the Van Dam Parliamentary
Investigative Commission in the autumn of 2020. After publication of this
report (“Unprecedented Injustice”), only two politicians (among many more)
directly responsible for the tax authorities’ conduct in the recent past
immediately ended their (national) political career. On 15 January 2021, the
Rutte III cabinet collectively and symbolically stepped down, but in fact
continued on as a caretaker government to deal with urgent coronavirus
matters, prepare national elections in March 2021 and govern the country
during the cabinet formation process that would last a record number of days
from 17 March 2021 until 10 January 2022.

Citation:
M. Chavannes, 25 September 2019. Wij hebben een mooi klimaatakkoord. Wat niet betekent dat we het
gaan uitvoeren. (decorrespondent, accessed 3 November 2019)
SGI 2022 | 90 Netherlands Report

Algemene Rekenkamer, Verantwoordingsdag. Toespraak President van de Algemene Rekenkamer, 15 May

2019 (Rijksoverheid, accessed 3 November 2019)

De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.

B. van den Braak, 2021. Bescheiden ambities en smalle marges. De wetgevingsoogst van Rutte III, in
Montesquieu Instituut, ‘Niet zo stoffig, toch?’ Terugblik op het kabinet Rutte III, 105-108

Bernard ter Haar, blog published 23 April, 2021. De Nederlandse overheid heeft deze eeuw nog niets
substantieels tot stand gebracht.

De Correspondent, Jesse Frederik, January 15, 2021. De tragedie achter de toeslagenaffaire

RTL Nieuws, March 5, 2021 Toeslagenschandaal veel groter

NOS Nieuws, November 29, 2021.Duizenden in financiële problemen gebracht door zwarte lijst
Belastingdienst.

Volkskrant, Witteman, August 20, 2021. Vermorzeld in de raderen van de Belastingdienst

NRC-H., van den Bunt, March 16 2021.Catshuisregeling betekent weer systeemfalen.

Ministerial Dutch ministers’ hands are tied by party discipline; government/coalition

Compliance
agreements (which they have to sign in person during an inaugural meeting of
Score: 7
the new Council of Ministers); ministerial responsibility to the States General;
and the dense consultation and negotiation processes taking place within their
own departments, other departments in the interdepartmental administrative
“front gates” and ministerial committees. Ministers have strong incentives to
represent their ministerial interests, which do not necessarily directly reflect
government coalition policy. The record-long formation period for the Rutte
IV government, which nevertheless consists of the same four coalition partners
(VVD, CDA, CU, and D66) as Rutte III, resulted in a government agreement
that is more than 50 pages long – a “delivery by forceps” according to one
spokesperson. Thus, structural cleavages (along left-right, “good” populism
versus anti-populism, immigration and ethical issues) and the legacy of
distrust between the coalition partners from the previous Rutte III experiences
will lead to considerable intra-cabinet tensions, and thus opportunities for
individual ministers to highlight their party-political affiliation and downplay
the government agreement. This tendency may be stronger than usual since the
new cabinet promised to change the traditional “governing culture”
(bestuurscultuur) in which the coalition or cabinet agreement was politically
sacrosanct.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 140-163

NOS Nieuws, December 13 2021, Akkoord nieuw kabinet: “Het had soms iets van een tangverlossing.’

NRC, de Witt Wijnen, December 16, 2021. Elke partij kan eigen winstpunten noemen.
SGI 2022 | 91 Netherlands Report

Volkskrant, Sitalsing, April 22, 2021. De ‘nieuwe bestuurscultuur’ waar je nu zoveel over hoort, is geen
modegril, maar noodzaak

Monitoring Given the Prime Minister Office’s lack of capacity to coordinate and follow up
Ministries
on policy proposal and bills, systematic monitoring of line ministries’
Score: 4
implementation activities is scarcely possible. The child benefits policy
catastrophe shows this clearly: Although the child benefit system was a bill
designed by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment, its
implementation was entrusted to the tax authorities (in the role of allocator of
tax benefits), formally part of the Ministry of Finance. When the first alarming
signs of the affair became public, neither the minister of social affairs nor the
prime minister were sufficiently well-informed or felt responsible to intervene.
Even legal appeals fell on deaf ears in the Supreme Court, and an alarming
report by the Ombudsman was neglected. Non-intervention on other
departments’ turf and a hard division between policymaking/legislation and
implementation practice hamper and complicate monitoring.

Since 2013 to 2014, General Audit Chamber studies have focused on salient
and financially relevant policy issues on departmental domains. In 2012, the
General Audit Chamber reported that just 50% of governmental policy
initiatives were evaluated. Most of these evaluations incorrectly were
considered effectiveness studies. Hence, parliament remains largely ill-
informed about the success of governmental goals and objectives. In 2017, the
audit chamber launched a website for monitoring ministerial compliance of its
recommendations. Three out of five recommendations made by the audit
chamber were complied with, according to ministerial self-reports. In 2019,
policy failures were signaled with regard to sustainability targets, nitrogen
emissions policy for agriculture and building activities, and toxic risks policy
for soil and paints. Eventually, judging by the new coalition agreement, these
failures appear today to be leading to remedial action.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houdmills, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan: 188, 198-203

Teller Report, November 23 2021. Weekers warned Asscher about allowance affair: “If only I had persisted’

Algemene Rekenkamer, 2021. Voortgangsmeter aanbevelingen

Monitoring The many implementation failures and low level of policy effectiveness are
Agencies,
generally considered to have resulted from the cuts imposed under the
Bureaucracies
Score: 4
austerity policies of the previous Rutte governments. Inspectorates tasked with
monitoring policy implementation practices by QANGOs and bureaucracies
have also had their work impaired by the legacy of strict austerity measures. A
2016 evaluation study of the national Framework Law on
SGI 2022 | 92 Netherlands Report

Agencies/Bureaucracies had insufficient scope, according to members of

parliament: too many agencies are exempted from (full) monitoring directives,
while annual reports are delivered too late or are incomplete. Hence, the
government and parliament lack adequate oversight over the dozens of billions
of euros of expenses managed by bodies (QUANGOs) at some distance from
the central government. In 2019, the Inspection Council (Inspectieraad) judged
that the current legal structure and limited influence exerted by ministerial
oversight result from a neglect of implementation problems and a
predominantly efficiency-focused inspection approach. Inspectorates in sectors
like building, education, healthcare, environment, labor conditions and even
some water management regions are now considered impotent due to
understaffing, underfinancing and overburdened staffs. A similar situation is
evident in the consumer and privacy protection field, especially with regard to
the digitalization of citizen registrations and the accessibility of online-only
government services.

Citation:
Inspectieraad, 2019. Reflecties op de staat van het toezicht, Den Haag (Rijksoverheid, accessed 2 November
2019)

Evaluatie Kaderwet zelfstandige bestuursorganen, Kamerstuk 33 147, nr. 5, Verslag van een schriftelijk
overleg, 20 September 2018

A. Pelizza and R. Hoppe, Birth of a failure. Media debates and digital infrastructure and the organization of
governance, in Administration & Society, 2015

NOS Nieuws, n.d., 2021. Milieuovertredingen weinig gecontroleerd; vaak niet bestraft

De Groene Amsterdammer, Estra and Staal, 21 November 2021. Onderzoek: Omgevingsdiensten handhaven
niet. ‘Bel de pers’.

Groene Amsterdammer, Peek and Woutersen, 29 September 2021. Investico: Inspectie pakt uitbuiting niet
aan. Voor de tweede keer slachtoffer.

Task Funding Since 2010, the national government has devolved a significant number of
Score: 4
implementation tasks to subnational governments. Subnational governments,
which are positioned closer to citizens, are presumed to be more effective in
delivering localized social and healthcare policy responses. However, local
governments did not receive commensurate financial compensation for their
additional activities, as “tailor-made” policies were intended to involve
savings for the national budget. The more complicated interadministration
relations and multilevel governance structures have made government and
administrative responsibilities fuzzier, and policy performance harder to
evaluate. According to data published by the Association of Local
Governments (VNG), nearly half of such government entities are not
financially resilient. Provincial and local audit chambers do what they can, but
the amount and scope of decentralized tasks is simply too large for their
capacity at this moment. Policy implementation in the fields of policing, youth
SGI 2022 | 93 Netherlands Report

care and care for the elderly in particular are increasingly sources of
complaints by citizens and professionals, and thus becoming matters of grave
concern.

Citation:
VNG, De wondere wereld van de gemeentefinanciëen, 2014 (eng.nl, consulted 9 November 2016)

Financieel Dagblad, 26 February 2019. Gemeenten in zwaar weer door verplichte sociale uitgaven.

VNG, 23 November 2021. Financiële weerbaarheid bij veel gemeenten onder de maat

NRC-H, Engelaar, April 30, 2021. Stop de fictie van ‘lokaal maatwerk’

Constitutional Dutch local governments are hybrids of “autonomous” and “co-government”

Discretion
forms. Typically, starting in 2016, the Local Government Fund
Score: 5
(Gemeentefonds) budget has decreased and/or increased in step with the
national government’s budget. Local autonomy is defined mostly negatively as
pertaining to those tasks left to local discretion because they are not explicitly
designated as national policy competencies. Co-government is financially and
materially constrained in rather extensive detail by the elaborate set of
indicators specified in the Local Government Fund (Gemeentefonds).
Increasingly, the Dutch national government uses administrative and financial
tools to steer and influence local policymaking. Some would go so far as to
claim that these tools, jointly, violate the European Charter for Local
Government in having created a culture of quality control and accountability
that paralyzes local governments by reducing their policy flexibility to near
zero. This is due in part to popular and political opinion that in a small country
like the Netherlands local policymaking, levels of local-service delivery and
local taxes ought to be equal everywhere. The transfer of policy competencies
in many domains of care imply that local discretion has formally increased,
sometimes resulting in different treatment of similar cases by local
governments in different parts of the country. In 2021 the Dutch Association
of Local Governments (VNG) offered a moderately positive evaluation
regarding its increasing share in the national budget. But it also went so far as
to publish a critical analysis of what it called an erosion of local government
and democracy and, overturning the present constitutional three-level structure
of inter-administrative relations (Huis van Thorbecke), advocated a radically
innovative design for a Law on Decentralized Government.

Citation:
Hans Keman and Jaap Woldendorp (2010), „The Netherlands: Centralized – more than less!‟, in: Jürgen
Dieringer and Roland Sturm (hrsg.), Regional Governance in EU-Staaten, Verlag Barbara Budrich: 269-286.

VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2019, Bijzondere Ledenbrief, (vng.nl., consulted 1 November 2018)

VNG, February, 2021. Manifest. Het roer om. Naar nieuwe verhoudingen in het openbaar en decentraal
bestuur,
SGI 2022 | 94 Netherlands Report

VNG, September 2021. VNG-reactie op de Rijksbegroting 2022. Bijzondere ledenbrief.

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken en Koninkrijksaangelegenheden, Staat van het bestuur 2020: groeiende
zorgen over decentrale democratie en het lokaal bestuur. (kennisopenbaarbestuur.nl)

National National standards are implicit in the nationwide local-government fund

Standards
model, which allocates a share of national tax revenues to the roughly 360
Score: 5
local governments on the basis of numerous variables. This funding today
comprises 86% of local-government budgets. Local governments themselves
also try to meet mutually agreed-upon standards. Several studies by local audit
chambers have involved comparisons and benchmarks for particular kinds of
services. Local governments have been organizing voluntary peer reviews of
each other’s executive capacities. In 2009, the Association of Dutch Local
Governments established the Quality Institute of Dutch Local Governments
(Kwaliteitsinstituut Nederlandse Gemeenten, KING, renamed VNG Realisatie
B.V.). As part of a knowledge platform (Waarstaatjegemeente.nl), the
Association of Dutch Local Governments produces a comparative report on
the status of local governments that collects relevant policy evaluations and
assists local governments in their information management. Nevertheless, due
to the implementation of ill-considered decentralization plans, including
funding cutbacks, it is likely that the uniformity of national standards in the
delivery of municipal services has somewhat diminished. Instead of strict
output equality, official discourse now refers to “situational equality.” This
development is counteracted by increasing cooperation by municipalities in
transboundary tasks (e.g., garbage collection and treatment, youth care, care
for the elderly, but also regional energy and innovation policy). Cooperation
agreements for such transboundary tasks escape normal democratic control by
local councils, and have reached numbers and degrees of intensity that give
rise to concerns about the scope and quality of local democracy.

Citation:
A. Korsten, 2004. Visiteren van gemeentebesturen, Bestuurwetenschappen, 1-15, VNG Uitgeverij

P. Meurs, Maatwerk en willekeur. Een pleidooi voor situationele gelijkheid, Raad voor Volksgezondheid en
Samenleving, 28 January, 2016

Waarstaatjegemeente.nl, 2021

Raad voor het Openbaar Bestuur, Van den Berg et al., May 11 2021. Perspectief op interbestuurlijke
samenwerking: Beelden van het rijk en decentrale overheden kwanitatief vergeleken.

Effective The government frequently formulates policy goals that are more far-reaching
Regulatory
than can realistically be achieved in practice. For example, virtually none of
Enforcement
Score: 5
the coronavirus policies could or can be implemented with the existing
contingents of nurses, care workers, police officers and their assistants.
Realistically speaking, enforcement of coronavirus policies rests on moral
appeals to firms and citizens and nudging them to obey the rules (regarding
SGI 2022 | 95 Netherlands Report

social distancing, wearing masks, etcetera), paired with small-scale law-

enforcement activities. The same could be argued about traffic control;
enforcing anti-pollution and environmental rules for firms; and drugs, food
and sustainability rules for consumers.

Paradoxically, generally weak rule enforcement leads to overreaction and

harsh rule enforcement in other cases. The child benefit affairs could come
about only because of a policy of zero tolerance for social benefits fraud,
which was deemed necessary to guarantee citizens’ solidarity and willingness
to pay taxes. Another example is the use of regulatory enforcement by
administrative bodies (rather than legal prosecution by legal authorities) to
counter the efforts of criminal organizations to penetrate the formal economy
and government administrations. Attention has been focused on illegal-drug
production, traffic (notably in harbor cities, but also in the relatively empty
rural areas of the country’s south and east), transportation and trade, as well as
on human trafficking (women, refugees). Special police teams, mayors of
larger cities, national and local public prosecutors, and fiscal detectives
collaborate (not very successfully) in detecting drug and human trafficking
gangs. Through the use of ordinary administrative laws, authorities “harass”
drug and human traffickers to such an extent that they close down their
business or, more frequently, relocate. Studies trying to estimate the
effectiveness of such methods have been methodologically contested and are
thus inconclusive. It is in connection to illegal drugs and human trafficking
that mayors of larger cities and sometimes small, rural villages become “crime
fighters.”

Citation:
Trouw, 31 August 2019. Niet alleen in Amsterdam zijn drugs een probleem.

De Correspondent, 26 October 2019. De CO-2 heffing die nooit werd geïnd.

NRC-H, Meeus, December 4, 2021 Minder hijgerigheid, meer tegendruk: ambtenaren en de komst van Rutte
IV

Inspectie Justitie en Veiligheid, 18-05-2021. Jaarbericht 2020: Grote druk op uitvoeringsorganisaties

Tweede Kamer, 25 February, 2021. Eindrapport onderzoek uitvoeringsorganisaties overhandigd. (‘Klem

tussen balie en beleid’.)

Adaptablility

Domestic Government reform has been on and off the agenda for at least 40 years, but
Adaptability
there has been no substantial reform of the original government structure,
Score: 5
which dates back to the 1848 constitution, “Thorbecke’s house.” The Council
of State, which is the highest court of appeal in administrative law, is still part
of the executive, not the judiciary. A brief experiment with consultative
referendums was nipped in the bud early in the Rutte III cabinet rule. The
SGI 2022 | 96 Netherlands Report

Netherlands is one of the last countries in Europe in which mayors are

appointed by the national government. In spring 2013, the Rutte II government
largely withdrew its drastic plans to further reduce the number of local and
municipal governments. Given the Dutch citizens’ relatively high level of trust
in national institutions, it could be argued there was no need for reforms. But
in 2021, as a response to the child benefit scandal and many other signs of
policy failure, the general public’s levels of trust in politics and politicians
suddenly dropped dramatically.

For years there had been a negative political mood, manifesting in typical
expressions of unease like “I am OK, but the country is going down the drain,”
by “angry” or “worried” citizens who feel they are not being “listened to,” are
“not visible,” or are “forgotten,” “orphaned,” no longer “at home” and
“threatened in their identity.” Some analysts framed this as the emergence of a
psychological-populist political culture, exploited by both right-wing populist
(PVV, FvD, JA91) and identitarian parties (Bij1, DENK) and human interest
and lifestyle-based media. Dozens of political opinion leaders, scientists and
even high-level civil servants stepped forward with analyses of how and why
the political system structurally fails to be responsive, is averse to learning
from failure, avoids deep political conflicts and, generally, lacks sufficient
learning capacity. In these analyses two major points stand out. First,
parliament has lost its capacity and interest in careful co-legislation; and in its
role of holding the executive to account it lacks information about policy
impacts on the life world of citizens. Second, in the executive, control over
implementation has shifted to experts in process management, financial
control and performance measurement. In other words, the bureaucracy’s
ethos is no longer anchored in the concept of “public value and service for
citizens” but rather in “correct rule compliance” and “cost-efficiency in the
service delivery process.”

The first signs of trouble in this area came in a 2018 report by the Remkes
Commission, which advocated state reforms rebalancing the demands of
democracy and the rule of law. Among its 83 recommendations, the report
advocated for the direct election of politicians tasked with forming new
cabinets, the introduction of a binding corrective referendum process, the
establishment of a Constitutional Court tasked with assessing the
constitutionality of parliamentary laws, and procedures that would give voters
greater influence over who is elected to parliament. The commission also
called for a new political culture that would accept less detailed government
coalition agreements, and would be more willing to consider the possibility of
minority governments or governing through shifting majorities. In the 2021
coalition agreement, finally, in a first section entitled “strengthening of
democracy and the rule of law” (versterking van de democratische rechtsorde),
SGI 2022 | 97 Netherlands Report

many of these recommendations are embraced as to-be-elaborated intentions

and promises by the Rutte IV cabinet.

Citation:
Gemeentelijke en provinciale herindelingen in Nederland (home.kpn.nl/pagklein/gemhis.html, consulted 27
October 2014)

Staatscommissie parlementair stelsel (die. Remkes), December 2018. Lage drempels, hoge
dijken.Democratie en rechtsstaat in balans, Amsterdam: Boom

De Groen Amsterdammer, van der Hoeven, March 10, 2021. Is de publieke zaak nog in goede handen? ‘We
moeten zaken simpeler willem huden.’

R. Bekker, March 2020. Dat had niet zo gemoeten.Fouten en fallen van de overheid onder het vergrootglas.
Boombestuurskunde

J. Bussemaker, 2021. Ministerie van verbeelding. Idealen en de politieke praktijk, Uitgeverij Balans

NRC, de Witt Wijnen, January 15, 2021. Meer transparantie, altertere ambtenaren

Montesquieu Instituut, van den Berg en Kok, August 30, 2021. Onbehagen bestrijden? Meer rechtsstaat,
minder emotiecultuur.

NRC, 22 November, 2021. Wantrouwen gaat niet over samenleving maar over politiek.

Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naar elkaar, en vooruitkijken naar de toekomst’

International The Netherlands has been a long-time protagonist in all forms of international
Coordination
cooperation since the Second World War. However, research has shown that
Score: 7
since the late 1970s, 60% of EU directives have been delayed (sometimes by
years) before being transposed into Dutch law. Although popular support for
the EU never fell below 60% in Eurobarometer studies, the present-day
popular attitude to international affairs is marked by reluctance, indifference or
rejection. This has had an impact on internal and foreign policy, as indicated
by the Dutch shift toward assimilationism in integration and immigration
policies; the decline in popular support and subsequent lowering of the 1%-of-
government-spending-norm for development aid; the government’s continued
message that the country is an “unfairly” treated net contributor to EU
finances; and the rejection of the EU referendum and the rejection of the EU
treaty with Ukraine in a non-binding referendum.

The change in attitudes has also negatively affected government participation

and influence in international coordination of policy and other reforms. Since
2003, the Dutch States General have been more involved in preparing EU-
related policy, but largely through the lens of subsidiarity and proportionality –
that is, in the role of guarding Dutch sovereignty. Although the number of civil
servants with legal, economic and administrative expertise at the EU level has
undoubtedly increased due to their participation in EU consultative
procedures, no new structural adjustments in departmental policy and
SGI 2022 | 98 Netherlands Report

legislative preparation have been implemented. At present, a political mood of

“Dutch interests first” translates into a political attitude of unwillingness to
adapt domestic political and policy infrastructure to international, particularly
EU, trends and developments (beyond what has already been achieved).
Nevertheless, Dutch ministers do play important roles in the coordination of
financial policies at the EU level. The present vice-president of the European
Commission, Frans Timmermans, is a former Dutch minister. Indeed, it is only
since the beginning of the banking and financial crisis that the need for better
coordination of international policymaking by the Dutch government has led
to some reforms in the architecture of policy formulation. The sheer number of
EU top-level meetings between national leaders forces the Dutch prime
minister to act as a minister of general and European affairs, with heavy
support from the minister of finance. In tandem, they put the brakes on the
Stability and Growth pact for a coordinated European approach to economic
reforms and mitigation of the economic impacts of the coronavirus crisis. At
of the time of writing, the Dutch were the only country to have not yet filed a
national plan for reforms as a condition for gaining access to SGP funds.

But regarding the EU. there is change in the air. The December 2021 coalition
agreement states that from now on, the Dutch government intends to play a
leading role in making the EU more ready for decisive action, and in making it
economically stronger, greener and more secure. This implies more
willingness to implement EU directives swiftly and to cooperate on issues like
climate, migration, security, trade and tax evasion. Tellingly, the Dutch
government is considerably increasing its national defense budget, and
supports EU military cooperation and a potential European security council.
To date, information about EU policies and decisions have typically reached
citizens not through governmental information services, but only through the
media and the Dutch parliament through a large number of fragmented
channels. As part of a new Europe Law, the government intends to structurally
inform citizens and parliament more transparently about EU decision-making
and the impacts and value-added associated with EU policies.

Globally, the Netherlands, ranking 11th out of 165 countries, is doing fairly
well in achieving its own Sustainable Development Goals. The bad news is
that its spillover score ranks 159th out of 165, meaning that it hardly has any
positive spillover effects on other countries or parts of the world on
dimensions like environmental and social impacts embodied in trade,
economy, finance and security. Especially in the areas of the economy and
finance, the country contributes to corporate tax evasion, financial secrecy and
profit shifting; it also plays a small but substantial role in weapons exports.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of The Netherlands (2014). Houndmills,
SGI 2022 | 99 Netherlands Report

Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 220-228 regarding coordination viz-a-viz the EU and 251-272 for
Foreign Policy in general.

Instituut Clingendaal, Europa NU,22 december 2021. Europese Commissie wil brievenbusfirma’s
aanpakken, Nederland onder de loep

Coalitieakkoord, December 15, 2021. ‘Omzien naae elkaar, vooruitkijken naar de toekomst.

Sustainable Development Report 2021 – SDG Index

Organizational Reform

Self-monitoring There have only been two visible changes in the institutional practices of the
Score: 5
Dutch government at the national level. One is that the monarch was stripped
of participation in cabinet-formation processes in 2012; the second chamber or
senate now formally directs that process; in practice it is in the hands of the
largest political party after elections. The effect on government formation was
mixed, with a historically rapid formation in 2012 and two coalition formation
processes of record-setting length in 2017 and 2021. The second change was
the informal adaptation to lower levels of parliamentary support on the part of
the Rutte I and II governments. Informal coordination processes between
government ministers, and all members of the senate and second chamber have
become crucial for governing at the national level. Following provincial
elections in 2019, this also applied to the Rutte III and will apply to the Rutte
IV cabinet. However, in 2019, the Council of State warned that there was a
risk of subjecting parliamentary legislation to the outcomes of poldering
practices that effectively give too much power to organized and vested
stakeholder interests (e.g., in the context of the big agreements on housing,
pensions and climate).

Two open organizational-reform crises have emerged in recent times that

threaten citizens’ well-being in the long run. The first is the underfunded,
understaffed and ill-considered transfer of policy responsibility to municipal
and local governments within important domains such as youth care,
healthcare and senior-citizen care. Strikingly, in 2020-21, many critical studies
and reports signaled strong “peripheral discontents” in the northern, eastern
and southern areas of the country; many citizens living in those parts of the
country feel unheard, unseen and neglected. They frequently organize
demonstrations in the political capital, The Hague. A task-driven (as opposed
to a problem-driven) national politics and policy hampers the development of
more appropriate regional and local policy responses. Regional and local
governments now demand a long-overdue overhaul of interadministrative
relations between national, provincial and local government and water boards.
Practical problems and tensions crystallize in the now often politically
contested role of mayors.
SGI 2022 | 100 Netherlands Report

Second, there is a looming reform crisis in the justice and policing system,
which undermines the government’s task of protecting citizens’ security. The
reform of the policing system from regional or local bodies into a single big
national organization is stagnating; police officers have mounted strikes based
on wage and working-condition issues; and the top echelon of the police
leadership is in disarray. The digitalization of the justice system and the
reduction in the number of courts, in addition to imposed cutbacks, has
wreaked havoc within the judicial branch of government. There is a crisis in
the relations between the political and the bureaucratic elements, given that the
Department of Justice and Security, later renamed according to its true order
of priorities, Security and Justice, is supposed to provide political guidance to
both of these reform movements. The subordination and instrumentalization of
law to policy and the securitization of the judiciary is evident in the fact that
under the Rutte IV cabinet, the top echelon of the department no longer
consists of top-level legal specialists; instead, the department is run by
specialists in political science and public administration.

Citation:
NRC-Handelsblad, 11 April 2019. Raad van State: parlement maakt zichzelf machteloos door akkoorden.

NOS Nieuws, September 1, 2021. Vorige informateur (Tjeenk Eillink) voelt ‘plaatsvervangende schaamte’
voor impasse formatie

Raad van State, 25 November 2021, Verzoek om voorlichting over interbestuurlijke verhoudingen

Van den Berg and Kok, 14 September 2021. Regionaal Maatschappelijk Onbehagen. Naar een
rechtsstatelijk antwoord op perifeer ressentiment. (in opdracht van LNV)

Boogers et al., January 2021. Teveel van het goede? De staat van het burgemeesterambt anno 2020.

Institutional No major changes have taken place in strategic arrangements or capacities

Reform
beyond what has already been mentioned regarding externally driven policy
Score: 5
coordination in fiscal and economic matters. Generally, strategic capacity is
rather weak. Due to the long period of austerity, which came to an end only in
2019, strategic capacities have not been strengthened. This became clear for
all to see following the government’s steering problems during the pandemic.
Experiments in participatory budgeting and local democracy may to some
extent harness citizen knowledge and expertise, and serve as a countervailing
power to local government bodies. A hesitantly more pro-EU policy mood
may also result in some institutional reform over the mid-term.

But this is going to take a lot of effort and, probably, time. Although
institutional arrangements are monitored regularly (for instance, by the
Scientific Council of the Government on citizen self-reliance, the Council for
Public Administration on local democracy and administrative effectiveness,
SGI 2022 | 101 Netherlands Report

annual reports by the national Council of State on politically salient issues, and
regular reports on citizens’ perceptions of well-being by the Socio-Cultural
Planning Agency), recommendations and plans often receive little follow-up
due to a lack of political will. It has been plausibly argued that the weak link
between critical self-monitoring and political action is due to a systematically
biased self-image among the country’s leading politicians, civil servants and
intellectuals: Every failure is disparaged as an “incident” or “accident” in a
normally smoothly run, exemplary country. In the typically pragmatic and
technocratic style of policymaking characteristic for the country since the
1990s, this leads to muddling through rather than reform and institutional
change. Policymakers routinely ask: “How can we do things better?” instead
of “Are we doing the right things?”

Citation:
VPRO, 26 December 2021. Mathieu Segers: de voorbeeldrol die Nederland zich aanmeet, is heel vaak
misplaatst

De Correspondent, Chavannes, 27 December 2020. De overheid werd een bedrijft mensen onverdiend
wantrouwt. Alleen Kamer en kabinet kunnen die denkfout herstellen.

II. Executive Accountability

Citizens’ Participatory Competence

Political Political knowledge depends on levels of trust in politics and patterns of

Knowledge
government-enabled and either invited or spontaneous participation. Voter
Score: 6
turnout rates in national elections have been stable between 75% and 80% for
some time. Turnout rates in European elections are half this level, while for
local and provincial elections, they vary between 55% and 60%. Recent
political science research has found that a broad majority of voters believe that
the March 2021 elections – during the pandemic – were conducted honestly.
But respondents expressed doubts as to the reliability of voting by proxy and
mail, which were allowed on a larger scale than usual because of coronavirus
measures.

Patterns of participation are stable: more than half of the adult population is
non-active; 15% of people occasionally write an email to their local
government; 14% are politically active on the neighborhood level; 6% are
locally active and have many contacts with local government and politicians;
and 7% are “all-rounders” who are both politically and societally active. Since
the rise of neoliberal politics, the government has shifted participatory
SGI 2022 | 102 Netherlands Report

opportunities from the beginning to the end of the policy cycle: from
stimulating political participation as an institutionalized and legitimate
opportunity for citizens to influence policymaking to regarding societal
participation as individual citizens’ self-determined responsibility to co-
produce policy implementation and public service delivery. This shift is
visible even in citizens’ appreciation of the judiciary: instead of relying on
courts and judges, they are increasingly turning to do-it-yourself justice
through mediation procedures.

Dutch citizens claim to spend slightly more time than the average European
citizen on collecting political information. But many people find political
information uninteresting or too complicated; if not for themselves, then for
others. Younger people (15-30 yrs.) have begun to avoid political news; if
politically interested, they seek information through social media. The broader
public does not seem to be well-informed on a wide range of government
policies; particularly in the area of international politics, the Dutch public’s
knowledge is alarmingly low. This may explain why on the EU, Dutch citizens
are caught in a dependence-cum-distrust paradox: they instinctively distrust
the European Union and would resist transferring more national powers to the
EU level, but simultaneously believe that the European Union should have
greater influence over most policy domains.

In addition to disinterest and an increasing knowledge gap between

educational levels, systematic (foreign- and nationally led) efforts to
disseminate conspiracy theories and disinformation and create “fake news,”
even by members of parliament, have had a polarizing effect on knowledge
levels regarding political issues and decision-making. The coronavirus crisis
has increased awareness of the impact of government on citizens’ daily lives.
After a rally-around-the-flag surge, trust in government plummeted as the
coronavirus crisis lingered on; exacerbated by public policy failures such as
the child benefits scandal, delayed and unfair compensation for earthquake
damages in the gas-exploiting areas of Groningen, delays and nondecisions
related to the huge levels of nitrogen emissions, and increasingly visible
inequality. Ironically, the fact that previous levels of trust were so high has led
to disappointment, and this in turn to high levels of distrust, and even disgust
and hatred of politics.

Dutch citizens split evenly over the issue of more or less direct influence by
citizens. It is the less educated who demand more political influence (through
binding referendums), whereas higher educated citizens, especially those with
tertiary qualifications, have turned against the idea of referendums, binding or
advisory. There has been a wide and broad range of initiatives across all levels
of government in all kinds of citizen engagement projects; recently, highly
SGI 2022 | 103 Netherlands Report

regarded advisory bodies have recommended the use of citizen forums on a

national scale for thorny problems like energy transition and (health) care.
Thus, belief in participatory options co-exists with low levels of knowledge on
policies and widespread discontent with politics and governance. A surge in
street protests and large-scale demonstrations – by younger people, climate
and animal activists, but also middle-class groups like teachers, nursing
personnel, farmers and building-industry employees, has been evident in the
years since 2019; this trend continued during the coronavirus crisis of 2020-21
when social distancing rules were frequently disobeyed in large-scale protests
and demonstrations. Overall, it appears that spontaneous, citizen-initiated
efforts to exert power outside and beyond institutionalized venues and
government-sponsored participatory policy exercises are gaining political
traction.

Citation:
M. Bovens, and A. Wille, 2011. Diplomademocratie. Over spanningen tussen meritocratie en democratie,
Bert Bakker

SCP,. van Houwelingen et al., March 2014. Burgermacht op eigen kracht? Een brede verkenning van
ontwikkelingen in burgerparticipatie, Den Haag

Stichting KiezersOnderzoek Nederland, 2021. Versplinterde Vertegenwoordiging.

SCP, De sociale staat van Nederland, 2020

Trouw, Visser, 23 August 2020.Een pandemie is voedsel voor complottheorieën: die bloeien als noot
tevoren.

Trouw, de Wit, 25 June 2021. Nederlanders lijden aan een rampzalig gebrek aan kennis over internationale
betrekkingen.

SCP, Djunjeva and de Ridder,8 October 2021. Dutch citizens’ expectations and perception of the EU’.

NRC, de Koning and Valk, 24 September 2021. ‘Mensen willen de politiek wel vertrouwen’

NRC.next, 20 March 2021. Klimaattransitie: ‘Stel burgerforum rond klimaatbeleid in.’

NRC, 4 December 2021. Jensma. Het recht als institutie raakt stilaan uit de gratie bij de burgers.

Open The Dutch state shows a Janus face with regard to the issue of open
Government
government. On one hand, an avalanche of information about objective data
Score: 6
and their official (often scientific) interpretation is made available to every
citizen; on the other, the government maintains considerable secrecy about
alternatives that may be on or off the table, arguments pro and con used in
policy design, considerations relevant in shaping organizational matters, and
which organizations and/or representatives participated in the deliberations.

The most important and high-prestige knowledge institutes regularly publish

comprehensive, timely and accurate data and analyses. Such information is
used in the annual information packages that accompany parliamentary
SGI 2022 | 104 Netherlands Report

deliberation and decision-making on the national budget and other issues.

Throughout the year, government provides topical information about issues
pertaining to ministerial policy agendas on the government website. For
politically engaged citizens, it is thus quite possible to be well-informed on
government policies. In the Edelman Trust Index 2019, like in the recent past,
the Netherlands scored relatively high on trust in government information,
with little difference between the well-informed and the broader public. But in
2021, much like in other countries, a deep divide showed up between the well-
informed and the mass public: four in 10 of the latter believe the government
intentionally misleads citizens through statements it knows to be incorrect or
exaggerated and biased; moreover, also four in 10 believe that journalists do
the same.

Not all of this can be explained as an expected response to fears triggered by

the uncertainty and consequences of the pandemic. The Dutch government in
fact proved to be less than an open government for two reasons.

First, the Department of Public Health refused to comply with the law which
offers public access to most routine government information (Wet Openbaar
Bestuur, WOB). Compliance with WOB demands was already an issue of
political concern because the law also offers decision-makers plenty of
opportunities to withhold or delay information if “necessary” for political
convenience. In this case, refusal was based on the argument that in the midst
of crisis management, there was not enough staff to process the demands for
release of information. A deal with the written media bought time for the
department to comply with running requests later; but this promise was never
kept. Second, and more serious for trust in government among citizens and
members of parliament, in many other cases and for many years the
government actively withheld information from parliament. This was possible
due to the so-called Rutte doctrine, named after its alleged originator, the
prime minister himself. The doctrine held that the government could not be
obliged to disclose information to citizens or (against the grain of the
constitution, Art. 68) to parliament about “personal policy beliefs intended for
internal deliberation (only).”

This exemption ground, stretched in extremis, resulted in tens of thousands of

redacted passages in documents disclosed (including those from the child
benefits affair), much to the anger and frustration of members of parliament,
journalists, NGOs and many citizen activists. At the same time, investigative
journalism articles published in De Correspondent and Follow the Money
disclosed hidden governance agendas and issues, and government facilitation
of structural business lobbying arrangements.
SGI 2022 | 105 Netherlands Report

Meanwhile, as of the time of writing, the Rutte doctrine has been rejected as
unconstitutional for parliament and members of parliament. The new coalition
government promised to change the rules of information disclosure fully in
line with the constitution. And the old WOB is being replaced by a new Open
Government Law (Wet Open Overheid, Woo), which will enter into force on 1
June 2022. The new law foresees active publication of government
information on specified categories by means of a special Platform for Open
Government Information. Every government body will have a contact person
tasked with helping citizens find the information they are seeking; and an
Advisory Body for Open Government and Information Management will
advise the government and parliament on compliance with rules on active
information publication, and will mediate in conflicts between governing
bodies and professional information users, like journalists.

Citation:
De Correspondent, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. De Black Box van het openbaar bestuur.

Adformatie, Mulder, 18 February 2021. Dramatische val van van vertrouwen in Nederland; Edelman Trust
Barometer is ongekend pessimistisch

Follow the Money, 27 July 2019. ABDUP: al bijna 75 jaar de onzichtbare lobby van Nederlandse
multinationals. (ftm.nl, accessed 8 November 2019)

Rijksoverheid.nl, 5 October 2021. Eerste Kamer stemt in met Wet open overheid (Woo)

Legislative Actors’ Resources

Parliamentary A comprehensive study on the information exchange between the States

Resources
General and government in the Netherlands over the past 25 years concludes:
Score: 7
“In a mature democracy the primacy of information provision to parliament
ought to be in the hands of parliament itself; but in the Netherlands in 2010 de
jure and de facto this is hardly the case. … De facto the information arena in
which the cabinet and the parliament operate is largely defined and controlled
by the cabinet.” The informal code governing information release to
parliament has become known under the label of the Rutte doctrine (see
“Access to Government Information”). This reflects the necessity of forming
government coalitions supported by the majority of the States General. As an
institution, the States General is not necessarily a unified actor. As basically
every parliamentary vote can result in the downfall of a government, this
creates mutual dependence for political survival: parliamentary groups
supporting the government (part of the legislature) and government ministers
(the executive) become fused, which threatens the democratic principle of
control and accountability.

Moreover, the States General’s institutional resources are modest.

Approximately 600 staff assist parliamentarians in developing legislation,
SGI 2022 | 106 Netherlands Report

knowledge storage and use, and ICT issues. Dutch members of parliament in
large parliamentary factions have one staffer each, while members of
parliament of smaller factions share just a few staffers. Experienced members
of parliament say that a political party needs 15 seats (with staffers) to
adequately handle the normal workload of parliamentary business. At present,
only four political parties have this size; one of which (populist PVV) has a
track record of frequent absence with regard to legislative work. Smaller
fractions simply lack the time and the manpower to participate seriously in
legislative debate, and thus have to choose their battles carefully, taking their
visibility in the press and among their electorate into consideration. Since the
larger parties are needed to maintain a stable coalition, in-depth legislative
debate de facto is the prerogative of the larger parties that support the
government.

In October 2019, the cabinet approved a modest budget enlargement for staff
assistance to parliament. Legislators belonging to the coalition parties are
usually better informed than are opposition members of parliament. Members
of parliament do have the right to summon and interrogate ministers, although
the quality of the question-and-answer game is typified as: “Posing the right
questions is an art; getting correct answers is grace.” The hard, detailed work
of legislation, oversight and control occurs out of the spotlight in
departmentally organized permanent parliamentary committee meetings. The
small Parliamentary Bureau for Research and Public Expenditure does not
produce independent research, but provides assistance to members of
parliament.

Policy and program evaluations are conducted by the departments themselves,

or by the General Audit Chamber (which has more information-gathering
powers than the States General). Another more standardized mechanism is the
annual Accountability Day, when the government responds to the Audit
Chamber’s annual report on its policy achievements over the last year. Due to
restrictive contact rules (oekaze Kok) day-to-day contacts with officials are
fuzzy and unsatisfactory. Formal hearings between members of parliament and
departmental officials are rare. Members of parliament can ask officials to
testify under oath only in the case of formal parliamentary surveys or
investigations. Although this is considered an extraordinarily time-consuming
instrument, parliament has voted to use it in three cases of contested issues:
regarding gas exploitation and earthquakes in the province of Groningen, the
child benefits affair and management of the coronavirus crisis.

Citation:
Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie
tussen regering en parlement, Eburon

Wikipedia, Parlementaire enquête in Nederland (nl.m.wikipedia.org, accessed 3 November 2018)

SGI 2022 | 107 Netherlands Report

Parlement.com, van den Berg, 16 July 2021. Problemen met wetgeving, oud en nieuw

Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?

Kabinet akkoord met grotere financiële steun Kamerleden en partijen

NRC.next, 27 March 2021. Al die parlementaire enquêtes een gevaar voor Rutte IV? Dat is voorbarig

Obtaining The government has to provide correct information to the States General
Documents
(according to Article 68 of the constitution). However, this is often done
Score: 6
defensively, in order to protect “ministerial responsibility to parliament” and a
“free consultative sphere” with regard to executive communications.
According to the Rutted doctrine, providing the States General with internal
memos, policy briefs (e.g., on alternative policy options), interdepartmental
policy notes or advice from external consultants is viewed as infringing on the
policy “intimacy” necessary for open deliberation, as well as the state’s
interests. Documents containing such information frequently reach parliament
in incomplete form with crucial passages rendered unreadable. As political
scientist Hans Daalder noted a long time ago: “In practice, it is the ministers
that decide on the provision of information requested.” There are recent
examples of cases where the Dutch parliament has not been informed or has
been informed incorrectly. These include a childcare allowance scandal and a
parliamentary investigation into the legality of (covert) crime investigation
techniques used by the police (see Guido Enthoven in de De Groen
Amsterdammer, 2021).

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke:
174-182.

Guido Enthoven (2011), Hoe vertellen we het de Kamer? Een empirisch onderzoek naar de informatierelatie
tussen regering en parlement, Eburon

De Groen Amsterdammer, Enthoven, 12 January 2021. Het einde van de Rutte-doctrine. De Black Box van
het openbaar bestuur.

Summoning Parliamentary committees may invite ministers to provide testimony or answer

Ministers
questions. Usually, such requests are duly obeyed. For example, in 2018 a
Score: 9
minister for public health even canceled international commitments in favor of
dealing with parliamentary issues concerning the bankruptcy of two local
hospitals. Nevertheless, ministers often do not answer questions in a forthright
manner. Sometimes ministers avoid public accountability and step down
before being summoned to escape a censure or no-confidence motion. Every
week, parliamentarians have the opportunity to summon ministers and pose
questions.
SGI 2022 | 108 Netherlands Report

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke:
174-182.

NOS, Minister Bruins wil vinger in de pap bij keuze overnamekandidaat ziekenhuis Lelystad, 2 November

Parlement.com, Aftredende bewindslieden

Summoning Parliamentary committees may and do regularly summon experts. For

Experts
example, during the coronavirus crisis, the Committee for Public Health,
Score: 9
Welfare and Sports regularly summoned members of the Outbreak
Management Teams for so-called technical briefings. In the past, parliament
has summoned experts for special topics like climate change.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg & G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of the Netherlands. Houndmills, Basingstoke:
163-174.

Tweede Kamer, Debat gemist, Update coronavirus

18 augustus 2021 Vaste commissie voor Volksgezondheid, Welzijn en Sport Technische briefing

Task Area There are 12 (fixed) parliamentary committees (vaste kamercommissies). Only
Congruence
the prime minister’s Department of General Affairs lacks an analogous
Score: 9
dedicated parliamentary committee. There are also fixed committees for
interdepartmental policymaking on aggregate government expenditure,
European affairs and foreign trade, and development aid. Parliamentary
committees usually have 25 members, representing all political parties with
seats in the States General; they specialize in the policy issues of their
dedicated departments and inform their peers (i.e., tell them how to vote as
part of the party voting-discipline system). Members of parliament in these
parliamentary oversight committees usually have close contacts with (deputy)
ministers and (far less) high-level civil servants in the departments they
oversee. Some observers see this as having contributed to a mutual
interweaving of the executive and legislative branch of the government,
thereby diminishing the executive’s accountability to the legislature. There are
approximately 1,700 public and non-public committee meetings per year. By
giving the committees the right to introduce, discuss and vote on motions
(without a subsequent plenary debate and voting), the pressure on the plenary
meetings is reduced, and the oversight role of the committees strengthened.

There has been a debate about the Committee on Security (Commissie

Stiekem), which includes all leaders of the political parties, as some
lawmakers have expressed concern about a lack of effective parliamentary
oversight on crucial security issues. Very little is known about why such
criticism was voiced and how members look at their role in the parliamentary
SGI 2022 | 109 Netherlands Report

committee. Other committees have public sessions (since 1966) that are
broadcast, which means that there is more information available on the
activities of the various political parties. Smaller political parties, especially
ones with between one and three members, simply cannot attend all committee
meetings. Over time, the core of parliamentary activity has moved from the
plenary sessions to the committees.

Citation:
Commissies (tweedekamer.nl, consulted 6 November 2014)
S. Otjes, 6 February 2019, Wie bepaalt de agenda van de Tweede Kamer? (stukroodvlees.nl, accessed 8
November 2019)

G. H. Hagelstein, De parlementaire commissies (Nederlands parlementsrecht, Monografie VI,

Dissertatie Groningen 1991; Groningen: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1991, xix + 443 blz., ISBN
90 01 36530 2.

Hijzen, Constant. 2013. “More Than a Ritual Dance. The Dutch Practice of Parliamentary
Oversight and Control of the Intelligence Community.” Security and Human Rights
24; 227-238.

Investico, Kuipers et al., 10 March 2021. Wat geeft de wetgever om de wetten?

Media

Media Reporting Dutch public media are not completely state-run. Rather, they are organized
Score: 6
along different segments of the population, each with their own distinct set of
beliefs, perspectives, convictions and paying members. The system has been
modernized several times, most recently by limiting the number of media
organizations to six (plus two task-oriented ones). Every five years the culture
branch of the Department of Education, Science and Culture, advised by
relevant commissions, judges on the basis of the number of memberships and
(vague) substantive criteria which organizations are representative enough to
claim broadcasting time and public resources (money, equipment) in this
public media system. Every five years, two “aspiring” members are admitted
on a temporary basis. To the astonishment of many, in 2021, Unheard
Netherlands! (ON!) and Black (Zwart) were admitted. Both broadcasting
organizations are rooted in vocal protest movements, and have been visible in
Dutch public debate for some time thanks to demonstrations and provocative
actions. ON! has frequently criticized Dutch media and journalists as
disseminating biased news and for being too left-leaning. Since the public
media are by law supposed to further “societal coherence,” it is feared that by
coopting these two organizations, the system will be damaged from within.
Other recent changes to the system provided more time for regional news on
national TV/radio, and devoted less time for commercials, with this falling all
the way to zero around children’s programs.
SGI 2022 | 110 Netherlands Report

Several media-use trends appear to have reached tipping points. Digitalized

media consumption is becoming dominant, even though during the lockdowns
the population of people aged 50 and older turned more to paper media and
linear tv. This will be a structural change in media use, slowly moving from
younger to older users. Streaming services have become mainstream. On-
demand video- and audio-content is used by all age groups. All media
organizations and enterprises are converging toward cross-media products.
Consequently, they group all their content offerings under one and the same
brand name. Even former paper-based media like Nieuwe Rotterdamse
Courant (NRC) and Algemeen Dagblad (AD) have transformed themselves
into cross-media news enterprises. The shift from analog to digital media
consumption implies that the advertisement incomes of traditional media are
transferring to the digitalized cross-media organizations and firms. Since
advertisement income is concentrated on big tech companies like Google and
Facebook, national broadcasting and publishing companies worry about their
economic sustainability. In the Netherlands, this has generated upscaling and
acquisition initiatives; for example, the Belgian DPG bought Sanoma, and
RTL (with Bertelsmann in the background) intends to become the Dutch
media champion. With only two big players, the Media Pluralism Monitor
2021 reports for the Netherlands that: “News media concentration (85%)
indicates a high risk. The market is concentrated both in terms of audience
share as well as market share. There is no media legislation restricting
ownership of media.” Yet the report also states that as yet, this has not resulted
in a lack of pluralism or an impoverishment of news sources and varieties.

Citation:
Commissariaat voor de Media, 21 November 2021. Mediamonitor 2021.

NRC, van den Brink, January 23 2021. ‘Eigen signatuur’ pakt rampzalig uit

NRC, Nieher, 4 October 2021. ‘Het is ingewikkeld om deze omroepen af te wijzen’

NRC, Takken and Smouter, 14 November 2021. Mediaminister Slob: ‘Het huis van de publieke omroep is
wel erg vol’

Parties and Interest Associations

Intra-party The dominant political view is that government interference in private

Decision-Making
organizations like political parties is incompatible with the role of the state in a
Score: 4
liberal democracy. A law for internal party democracy is appropriate for
countries with a history of non-democratic governance (e.g., Germany, some
states in southern Europe and in central and eastern Europe). However, in the
Netherlands with its strong democratic tradition, many consider it superfluous.
Several recent reports show the vulnerability of Dutch democracy to
(international) manipulation through weak controls over and accountability for
SGI 2022 | 111 Netherlands Report

party finance, political campaigning and candidate selection. For example,

some political parties deal with their representatives’ ethical issues (especially
regarding gender issues) through internal councils or executive organs,
political parties report inflated numbers of formal members in order to boost
state subsidies, and candidate lists and leadership-succession practices
frequently lack transparency, illustrating Robert Michels’ thesis that political
parties act as oligarchies.

In addition, political parties are not obliged to have a membership organization

or conduct internal decision-making practices democratically. One party (the
anti-immigrant party PVV) has only one member – its leader – and not even its
members of parliament or local councils are able to join the party they
represent, and not even members of parliament have any formal say in
policies, candidate selection or internal workings of this party. Several
political parties have received very considerable amounts of money (up to €1
billion), sometimes from foreign countries. Entrepreneurs have sold time with
ministers and other high officials from governmental parties to companies
during dinner parties in order to finance campaigns, eradicating the line
between partisan activities and formal duties. Some political scientists
therefore advocate a separate law on political parties, including grounds for
prohibiting parties that undermine democracy itself; and an independent (non-
state) commission for oversight and enforcement. Such a Party Law that would
acknowledge the special and crucial functions that parties perform in the
country’s democracy is now being prepared.

The very narrow basis of political parties is reflected in their membership

figures. Political-party membership reached an all-time low of 285,851 in
2015. It increased to 316,000 in 2021 (2.4% of the electorate), owing to an
increase in young voters joining D66, Green Left and Forum for Democracy.
Approximately 10% of party members are considered active. Frequently party
activism is used as a launching pad for a political career. Across all major
political parties, political activists and (semi-)professionals dominate decision-
making with regard to candidate lists and political agendas. Political parties
are not bottom-up movements. Rather, they are intermediaries between
political elites and their electorates, with political-party members as links. The
attitude to intra-party democracy (e.g., party congresses, election of party
leaders and intra-party referendums) is ambivalent. One former minister of
defense and Labor party member commented: “Party congresses don’t buy
combat planes.” Party leadership succession, even in political parties with
some tradition of intra-party democracy (e.g., Christian Democrats, social
democrats and D66), is not necessarily democratically regulated, but is often
determined by opaque, “spontaneous” selection processes managed by party
elites. In recent years, some political parties – such as the PvdA – have moved
SGI 2022 | 112 Netherlands Report

to a primary model, but can and do return to much more closed procedures of
leadership and candidate selection.

The functional loss of political parties as clear representatives of social groups

reverberates across the political system at all levels (see also “Association
Competence (Others)”). Lower-educated citizens’ mobilization and integration
into politics has declined in particular. Paired with the decline of the centrist
parties (in particular the former dominant parties, the social-democratic PvdA
and Christian democratic CDA), the rise of more extremist and fringe parties,
increasing electoral volatility, parliamentary fragmentation, polarization on
particularly cultural issues and strong anti-establishment sentiments have
created anxieties regarding the role of politicians and political parties.

Citation:
R.B. Andeweg and G.A. Irwin (2014), Governance and Politics of The Netherlands. Houndmills,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan: 80-95

NRC Handelsblad, 26 January 2019. Kabinet: verbod op partijfinanciering van buiten de EU.

NRC Handelsblad, 9 March 2019. Politieke partijen die regels ontwijken – en een ministerie dat steeds
wegkijkt.

https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/rapporten/2018/02/01/rapport-he t-publieke-belang-van-politieke-
partijen

Gr. A’dammer, Rijkema, 8 December 2021. Onzeker gesternte.

NRC, 20 March, 2021. Wij zijn het Wilde Westen van het politieke geld.

Andre Krouwel (2012) Leadership and Candidate Selection in Krouwel, A (2012). Party Transformations in
European democracies. SUNY Press (State University of New York Press).

Andre Krouwel (1999) The selection of parliamentary candidates in Western Europe: The paradox of
democracy, Working Papper Vrije Universiteit
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279848031_The_selection_of_parliamentary_candidates_in_West
ern_Europe_The_paradox_of_democracy

Association For a long time, there was no lobbying culture in the Netherlands in the usual
Competence
sense. Instead, prominent members of labor unions and business associations
(Employers &
Unions)
are regular members of high-level formal and informal networks that also
Score: 8 include high-level civil servants and politicians. For example, the day the
government announced that it was going into crisis mode due to the
coronavirus pandemic, the chairs of the two major employers’ and labor
unions met with the ministers of Finance, Economic Affairs and Climate, and
Social Affairs and Employment. In the next months, they cobbled together the
generous and fast wage-support system that would ultimately save jobs and
business activities during the coronavirus lockdowns (see “Economy” and
“Labor Markets”). Members of these networks discuss labor market and other
important socioeconomic policy issues. These processes have become
SGI 2022 | 113 Netherlands Report

institutionalized. For instance, there are tripartite negotiations, especially

organized in and through the Socioeconomic Council (Sociaal-Economische
Raad, SER), in which employers, employees and government experts are fixed
discussion partners in government decision-making regarding labor issues. A
similar process takes place for regular negotiations with economic interest
associations.

The analytic capacities of business and labor associations are well-developed.

For example, the strongest labor union, FNV, has claimed success in
influencing government policy on stricter hiring and firing rules, the pension
agreement, and stricter regulation of a flexible labor market. However,
membership in trade unions has shown a continuous decline, particularly
among younger people. In addition, members and supporters of trade unions
and professional and commercial associations frequently have more radical
opinions than their representatives. In recent demonstrations, especially by
farmers, teachers and hospital workers, association representatives in
negotiations with the government were called back by their followers.

Since the mid-1970s, employers’ associations have consistently been in favor

of the liberalization of labor market institutions. They have supported efforts
to decentralize, deregulate, individualize and more recently also to
decollectivize wages, working-time arrangements and collective bargaining. In
the early 2010s, however, even while employers organizations maintained that
labor-cost moderation was necessary, they started to acknowledge that the
purchasing power of large groups of (middle-class) employees was lagging
behind and that in some sectors, labor shortages had reached dangerous levels.
Moderation among unions and the presence of center-right (dominated)
governments reduced the urgency of dismantling the Dutch corporatist
framework throughout most of the post-1970s period. Most demands made by
employers thus ended up in the general agreements; however, this posture has
changed, and employers organizations have several times questioned the need
for collective bargaining and corporatist decision-making. The weakness of the
unions has clearly emboldened employers, which could signal more labor
market unrest in the (near) future.

This institutionalized “poldering” model has seen the rise of a parallel venue
of strong business lobbying. There is now a Professional Association for
Public Affairs (BVPA) that boasts 600 members (four times the number of
parliamentarians) and a special public-affairs professorship at Leiden
University. The professionalization of lobbying is said to be necessary in order
to curb unethical practices such as the creation of foundations or
crowdsourcing initiatives as a means of pursuing business interests. However,
the “quiet politics” (Culpepper) of business lobbying through organizations
SGI 2022 | 114 Netherlands Report

such as the Commissie Tabaksblat, the Amsterdam (later Holland) Financial

Center (Engelen), or Dutch Trade Investment Board (Follow the Money) has
proven more than successful in influencing public policies on corporate
governance, easing regulation of the banking and financial sector, keeping
taxes for business low, and influencing the Dutch stance on Russian gas
imports. There is convincing evidence that in terms of election programs and
promises, over the long run, Dutch households have been systematically
disadvantaged compared to corporations and business. For example, tax
reductions and exemptions for business are systematically higher than for
ordinary citizens (see also “Taxes”).

Citation:
P.D. Culpepper, 2010. Quiet Politics and Business Power. Corporate Control in Europe and Japan,
Cambridge University Press

W. Bolhuis, Van woord tot akkoord: een analyse van verkiezingsprogramma’s en regeerakkoorden, 1885-
2017, Universiteit Leiden

W. Bolhuis, Elke formatie faalt. Verkiezingsbeloftes die nooit werden waargemaakt, Uitgeverij Brooklyn,
2018

NRC, Marée, 3 November 2021. Dit jaar opnieuw sterke daling vakbondsleden

NTC, Pelgrim and Sterk, 8 March 2021. Han Busker: ‘De flexibele arneidsmarkt werd gezien als
natuurkracht’

NRC, Heck, 5 April 2021. De ceo kan de minister altijd bellen

Follow the Money, Keyzer and Geurts, 11 September 2021. Shell fluisterde Nederlands standpunt in over
gas uit Rusland

Boumans, S. (2021). Neoliberalisation of industrial relations: The ideational development of Dutch

employers’ organisations between 1976 and 2019. Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1-22.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0143831X211020086

Association Policymaking in the Netherlands has a strong neo-corporatist (“poldering”)

Competence
tradition that systematically involves all kinds of interest associations in the
(Others)
Score: 7
policymaking process – not just with regard to business and labor issues, but
also in the education, care, culture, sports and health sectors. Owing to their
well-established positions, associations such as the consumer association; the
associations for home-owners, for car owners or for bikers and cyclists; all
kinds of environmental NGOs, religious associations, municipal (Vereniging
voor Nederlandse Gemeenten) and provincial interests (InterProvinciaal
Overleg), and medical and other professional associations (e.g., teachers,
universities, legal professions) can influence policymaking through the
existing consensus-seeking structures. Tradeoffs are actively negotiated with
ministries, other involved governments, stakeholder organizations and even
NGOs. Furthermore, noneconomic interest organizations react to policy
proposals by ministries and have a role in amending and changing the
SGI 2022 | 115 Netherlands Report

proposals in the early stages of the cabinet formation and regular

policymaking process. During the 2021 cabinet-formation process, many
noneconomic associations – representing, for example, the arts, education, the
elderly and the care sector – inundated negotiators with policy memos and
demands. Of course, they are also involved again at a later stage, during
implementation processes. Sometimes, as in the Lelystad airport noise case,
truly spontaneous citizen activist groups may be successful in penetrating
official policymaking.

Recent research by investigative journalists has unearthed serious evidence

that there are systematic links between political parties and more informal
sources of influence through jobs and positions in noneconomic and non-
political associations. For example, the American tactic of shadow-lobbying –
big corporations hiring ostensibly neutral research bodies as indirect sources,
above suspicion, that then criticize government policy initiatives – is also
practiced in the Netherlands. More important, political parties, especially
VVD, D66, PvdA and CDA, are successfully pushing party members that
leave formal political positions into high-level leadership and administrative
positions in the non-political and noneconomic associations that make up the
third sector or civil society – like chairperson positions in the Dutch
Association of Local Governments (VNG), the Dutch Organization of
Scientific Research (NWO), the Dutch Organization for Applied Scientific
Research (TNO), health insurance companies, the National Railway system
(NS), etc. Of course, a considerable number of politicians also leave political
jobs to go to more lucrative lobbying jobs in business or to prominent civil
society organizations. The most recent case is that of the minister of
infrastructure and water management leaving her position in the Rutte III
caretaker government for a position as chair of Energie Nederland, the
umbrella organization for energy companies.

Citation:
Woldendorp, J.J. (2014). Blijvend succes voor het poldermodel? Hoe een klein land met een kleine
economie probeert te overleven op de wereldmarkt. In F.H. Becker & M. Hurenkamp (Eds.), De gelukkige
onderneming. Arbeidsverhoudingen voor de 21ste eeuw (Jaarboek voor de sociaal-democratie, 2014) (pp.
211-227). Amsterdam: Wiardi Beckman Stichting/Uitgeverij Van Gennep.

NRC Next, 25 juni 2019. ‘Maatschappelijke kosten Lelystad Airport onderschat.’NRC,

Meeus, 20 November 2021 Heeft de Amerikaanse methode van ‘schaduwlobbyen’ Den Haag bereikt?

Groene Amterdammer, 22 February, 2021. Keken and Wittman, Baantjes in de polder. Hoe Nederland
liberaal-blauw kleurde.

Montesquieu Instituut, 2 September 2021. Democratie op Donderdag: afkoelingperiode bewinsdpersonen

SGI 2022 | 116 Netherlands Report

Independent Supervisory Bodies

Audit Office The Netherlands’ General Audit Chamber is the independent organ that audits
Score: 7
the legality, effectiveness and efficiency of the national government’s
spending. The court reports to the States General and government, and its
members are recommended by the States General and appointed by the
Council of Ministers. Parliament frequently consults with this institution, and
in many cases, this leads to investigations. Investigations may also be initiated
by ministers or deputy ministers. However, such requests are not formal due to
the independent status of the General Audit Chamber. Requests by citizens are
also taken into account. Every year, the chamber checks the financial
evaluations of the ministries. During the coronavirus crisis, the Audit Chamber
periodically calculated total costs and reported on them. Chamber reports are
publicly accessible and can be found online and as parliamentary publications
(Kamerstuk). Through unfortunate timing in view of (more) important political
developments, in recent years such evaluations played only a minor role in
parliamentary debates and government accountability problems. By selecting
key issues in each departmental domain, the General Audit Chamber hopes to
improve its efficacy as instrumental advice. In addition, there is an evident
trend within the chamber to shift the focus of audits and policy evaluations
from “oversight” to “insight.” In other words, the chamber is shifting from ex
post accountability to ongoing policy-oriented learning. Unfortunately, this has
been accompanied by a substantial reduction in resources for the Audit
Chamber, resulting in a loss of 40 full-time employees and the need to
outsource research frequently. The childcare benefits affair caused the Audit
Chamber chair to admit that, obviously, the Chamber and other oversight
bodies had been unable to present their criticism in an effective and persuasive
way.

Citation:
NRC, 1 October 2021, Aharouay and Valke, Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is
teveel waan van de dag’

Algemene Rekenkamer, Coronarekening, Editie Prinsjesdag 202

http://www.rekenkamer.nl/Over_de_Algemene_Rekenkamer

P. Koning, Van toezicht naar inzicht, Beleidsonderzoek Online, July 2015

Ombuds Office The National Ombudsman is a “high council of state” on a par the Council of
Score: 7
State and the Netherlands General Audit Chamber. Like the judiciary, the high
councils of state are formally independent of the government. The National
Ombudsman’s independence from the executive is increased by appointment
by the States General (specifically by the Second Chamber or Tweede Kamer).
The appointment is for a term of six years, and reappointment is permitted.
SGI 2022 | 117 Netherlands Report

The National Ombudsman office was established to give individual citizens an

opportunity to file complaints about the practices of government before an
independent and expert body. The national ombudsman is assisted by deputies
tasked with addressing problems facing children and veterans.

Where the government is concerned, it is important to note that the National

Ombudsman’s decisions are not legally enforceable. The ombudsman
publishes his or her conclusions in annual reports. The ombudsman’s tasks are
shifting toward providing concrete and active assistance to citizens who – due
to debt and poverty, digitalization and other problems with access to
government regulation – have lost their way in the bureaucratic process. On
such issues, the ombudsman’s reports have in recent years become harsher in
their judgments, as was the case for his forerunner. The childcare benefits
affair illustrated the ombudsman’s repeated judgment that policy
implementation practices offer too few opportunities for citizens to call for the
redress of injustices and mistakes; but also showed the institution’s inability to
a make a difference. The affair also showed that too few citizens use the
ombudsman function for complaints.

Citation:
De Nationale Ombudsman, Mijn onbegrijpelijke overheid. Verslag van de Nationale ombudsman over 2012.

Tweede Kamer, vergaderjaar 2020-2021, 35 743, nr. 2, JAARVERSLAG VAN DE NATIONALE

OMBUDSMAN, DE KINDEROMBUDSMAN EN DE VETERANENOMBUDSMAN OVER 2020

NRC, Ahaouray and Valk, 1 October 2021. Naar de drie toezichthouders wordt vaak niet geluisterd: ‘Het is
teveel waan van de dag’

NRC, Valk, 11 May 2021. Nationale Ombudsman: ‘Laat Rutte maar een club oprichten die onze rapporten
leest’

Data Protection The Dutch Data Protection Agency (Authoriteit Persoonsgegens, APG)
Authority
succeeded the “College Bescherming Persoonsgegevens” (CBP) in 2016, and
Score: 4
simultaneously saw its formal competencies somewhat enhanced by the right
to fine public and private organizations in violation of Dutch and since mid-
2018 European data protections laws (the General Data Protection Regulation,
GDPR).

Effective data protection is practically impossible since 2016 for a number of

reasons: many capable personnel have left the DPA, even though the number
of staff has increased; the organization is underfinanced; hardly any
consequential fines have been imposed; “naming and shaming” appears to
work, but comprehensive oversight capacity is lacking; laws and regulations
are frequently changing, and consequently monitoring and jurisprudence are
constantly “in the making.” It looks like the DPA is evolving from a
supervisory body to an organization that advises both public and private
SGI 2022 | 118 Netherlands Report

organizations, and individual citizens on privacy issues, and on how to deal

with personal data in ways that (more or less) comply with ever changing
regulations and interpretations. All in all, the DPA operates in self-
contradictory ways (as both a “hard” inspectorate, and a “soft” advisory body
that “names and shames,” and advises commercial and public data-users and
data-providers) in a technologically turbulent environment. In 2019, the DPA
found that most data leaks are caused through sloppiness in addressing
documents and emails; that this occurs more in institutions of care than
anywhere else; and that victims are usually individuals rather than entire
categories of people. In 2019, the DPA received an additional €3.4 million in
funding for enforcement of the General Decree for Data Protection (Algemene
Verordening Gegevensbescherming, AVG) and EU privacy rules. During the
coronavirus crisis, the APG appeared to play a more prominent role as an
advisor on coronavirus-related privacy issues. Yet, it is calculated that only
0.15% of cases are investigated. The organization’s leader admits its inefficacy
and asserts that it is underfinanced (€66 billion is needed instead of €45 billion
at present), and still grossly understaffed (400 full-time employees are needed,
rather than the organization’s current 180).

Citation:
VPNGids.nl, Onderzoek Autoriteit Persoonsgegegeven: Meeste datalekken vinden plaats vanwege fouten in
adressering (vpngids.nl, accessed 4 November 2019)

Tweakers, 12 June 2019. Authorities Persoonsgegeven krijgt extra geld voor handhaving AVG.
(tweeakters.net, accessed 4 November 2019)

Volkskrant, Verhagen, 16 July 2020. Hoe effectief is de corona app? En hoe zit het met de privacy.

NOS Nieuws, Damen and Bouma, 25 March 2021 De Privacywet wordt tamper gehandhaafd, is meer geld
de oplossing?
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