COMINTERN

ARMY
The International Brigades
and the Spanish Civil War

R. Dan Richardson

THE UNIVERSITY PRESS OF KENTUCKY

 Copyright© 1982 by The University Press of Kentucky
Editorial and Sales Offices: Lexington, Kentucky 40506-0024

Li'brary of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Richardson, R. Dan, 1931-
Comintem Army.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Spain-History-Civil War, 1936-1939-Foreign participation.
2. Spain-History-Civil War, 1936-1939-Foreign participation-Russian.
3. Communist International. I. Title.
DP269.45.R53 946.081 80-5182
ISBN: 978-0-8131-5446-6 AACR2
For Mary Alyce
This page intentionally left blank
 Contents
Introduction 1
1 Spanish Politics and Comintem Strategy 3
2 Popular Front Militias 16
3 The Comintem Raises an Army 31
4 The Defense of Madrid 47
5 The XIII, XIV, and XV Brigades 68
6 A Military Overview 81
7 Comintem Politics 90
8 The Political Commissar 119
9 Comintem Propaganda Instrument 136
10 Dissidence, Desertion, and the Terror 159
Conclusion 177
Notes 181
Bibliographical Essay 217
Index 224
This page intentionally left blank
 Introduction
When the first units of the International Brigades marched
through the wind-swept and sparsely peopled streets of besieged Ma-
drid in the early morning hours of November 8, 1936, a myth was
born. This myth focused on the appealing idea that the men of those
first International contingents, and the thousands who were to follow
them into the whirlwind of civil war in Spain, represented the re-
sponse of world democracy to the threat of fascism. These Interna-
tional volunteers were, so the theme ran, a band of modem Lafayettes
and Garibaldis, the "cream of the progressive youth of the age" and
"premature antifascists" who embarked on a "great crusade" to make
the world safe for democracy.
The facts fail to support the myth. But since this myth meshed so
neatly into the larger one that cast the Spanish Civil War as a clear-cut
struggle between "democracy" and "fascism," so widely held at the
time, it has exhibited remarkable staying power. Actually the Spanish
conflict was, as many have shown, anything but a simple and straight-
forward contest between democracy and fascism. Both sides in the
civil war represented a varied amalgam of mutually incompatible
ideologies. To say that all who fought for the Loyalists were demo-
crats is to stretch that term beyond meaningful definition. To say that
all who fought for the Nationalists were fascists is to do the same.
Once this is understood it becomes unnecessary to hold-as the myth
within a myth would have it-that the foreigners who fought for the
Loyalists were, by definition, fighting for democracy.
In fact, when civil war and revolution exploded simultaneously in
Spain in July 1936, the explosion was the result of long-brewing and
uniquely Spanish developments and had its roots deep in that dis-
tracted country's past. But because of the ideological power struggles
then smoldering in Europe the Spanish conflict quickly assumed an
international significance out of all proportion to its intrinsic impor-
tance outside of Spain itself. Spain had the misfortune to suffer a civil
war at a time when it suited powerful states and fanatical ideological
forces to use that war for their own purposes. Thus Spain, a land
usually self-contained and remote from the dynamic forces of history
north of the Pyrenees, became the arena in which the violent political
passions of the time came to grips.
Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union intervened actively in the
war, using Spain not only as a pawn in their game of power politics
2 INTRODUCTION

but as a proving ground for their respective military and political

techniques. The Soviet Union and its international apparatus, the
Comintern, pursued a policy in Spain of organizing, unifying, and
directing the Loyalist forces, both militarily and politically, while at
the same time seeking to enlist the sympathy and support of a broad
spectrum of world opinion for what they called the "defense of
democracy" and "antifascism." That the Soviet-Comintern leader-
ship saw fit to involve itself in the Spanish affair as it did resulted from
a unique confluence of the stream of Spanish history with the larger
currents swirling about Europe and the world in the tumultuous
decade of the 1930s. It was that confluence also which spawned the
International Brigades and accounted for a Comintern army fighting
in a Spanish civil war.
The fame of the Brigades stems primarily from their military ex-
ploits, exploits certainly of significance and deserving of the recogni-
tion they have received. The Brigades were among the most effective
military units on their side of the barricades and quite possibly made
the difference between survival and defeat for Loyalist Spain during
the critical winter of 1936-1937. But the Brigades were much more
than simply a military force. They were a significant political, ideolog-
ical, and propaganda instrument which could be-and was-used by
the Comintern for its own purposes, not only inside Spain but on the
larger world stage. No realistic understanding of the significance of
the Brigades is possible without an appreciation of their intrinsically
political nature and role, nor of the fact that they were, from begin-
ning to end, an integral part of that interlocking directorate which was
the Soviet-Comintern apparatus in Spain.
1 Spanish Politics
and Comintern Strategy
On July 17, 1936, elements of the Spanish army raised the
banner of revolt against the government of the Republic. The pronun-
ciamiento, however, was not a complete success. Had it been so, the
ministry would have resigned and a military junta would have as-
sumed governmental powers. 1 What happened instead was the deto-
nation of dual revolutions and a full-scale civil war in which each side
sought not only the destruction of the other but the destruction of the
Spanish Republic and the abortive experiment in "bourgeois democ-
racy" which it represented.
The government against which the Spanish army rebelled was de-
pendent upon the Frente Popular, an electoral coalition of leftist
parties which had narrowly won the elections of February 1936. The
cabinets that had held the executive power of the state since the
Popular Front's victory in February had been composed entirely of
left republicans because both the Socialist and the Communist parties
refused to participate in a "bourgeois government." This reflected the
fact that the "bourgeois republican" regime was supported only
grudgingly, if at all, by those very proletarian political forces that
accounted for the bulk of the Popular Front's electoral strength. Thus
the left republican governments had been forced to walk a tightrope
while performing a political juggling act in a frantic effort to keep their
erstwhile political allies from pursuing a too blatantly revolutionary
program while at the same time attempting to keep these same forces
in harness behind the regime. Success in the former would jeopardize
the latter. But failure in the latter would mean the political bank-
ruptcy of a bourgeois republic dependent on the support of Marxist
Socialists, Communists, and Anarchists. 2
Perhaps the most immediate and obvious manifestation of the es-
sential frailty of the Popular Front coalition as a base upon which to
govern the Republic was the precipitous and vociferous radicalization
of the Socialist party of Spain, the party that was the essential key-
stone of the coalition. The left wing of the party, led by the then-styled
"Spanish Lenin," Francisco Largo Caballero, was demanding the
Bolshevization of the party and the revolutionary road to the "dicta-
torship of the proletariat." Largo Caballero and his supporters had
4 CoMINTERN ARMY

made it clear from the beginning that their adherence to the Popular
Front was simply a matter of electoral expediency and implied no
commitment to support the bourgeois republic. "With the Republic
established, our duty is to bring about Socialism," said Largo Cabal-
lero. "I speak of Marxist Socialism ... of revolutionary Socialism....
Our aspiration is the conquest of political power. Method? That
which we are able to use. It [the Popular Front] is a circumstantial
coalition, for which a program is being produced that is certainly not
going to satisfy us. " 3
One of Largo Caballero's chief intellectual lieutenants, Julio Al-
varez del Vayo, put it bluntly. The Popular Front, he said, was "an
intermediate stage of common labor, in which the republicans dissolve
the Fascist centres and purge the armed forces, so that the Socialists
may soon install the dictatorship of the proletariat." In a speech in
February 1936, Luis Araquistain, another of the Socialist intellectu-
als, poignantly pointed out the similarity between the revolutionary
situation of Spain in 1936 and that of Russia in 1917. The weakness
of the Republic, he concluded, set the proper condition for Spain to
become the second country "where the proletarian revolution tri-
umphs."4 Presumably Manuel Azalia, the president of the Republic,
was cast to play Kerensky to Largo Caballero's Lenin.
In April1936 Largo Caballero said: "The present regime cannot
continue," 5 and, indeed, it would have been hard for anyone even
remotely aware of the realities to argue with him on that. The govern-
ment seemed incapable of governing the country or, indeed worse, of
even trying. The most ominous result of the government's dependence
on the sufferance of the proletarian parties was its reluctance to antag-
onize them by enforcing the law with vigor. Thus the period from
February to July 1936 saw a breakdown in public order which was
extreme even for Spain. 6 Speaking out bravely and honestly against
the wave of political strikes, violent demonstrations, church burnings,
and assassinations, Indalecio Prieto, a moderate Socialist, said: "What
no country can endure is the constant bloodletting of public disorder
... what no nation can bear is the attrition of its public authority and
its own economic vitality through the continuance of uneasiness,
anxiety and restlessness ... that way does not lead to Socialism, it
leads to an utterly hopeless anarchy." 7
If an astute and dedicated Socialist felt compelled to speak out
against Spain's decline into chaos, it was hardly surprising that mod-
erate and conservative forces were agitated and alarmed. In a strange
way the words of Jose Maria Gil Robles, a leading conservative
spokesman, seemed to echo those of Prieto: "A country can survive
Spanish Politics 5

as a monarchy or as a Republic, with a parliamentary system or with

a presidential system, with Sovietism or with fascism; however, the
one way it does not survive is in anarchy, and Spain today, unhappily,
is living in anarchy." 8
Against this background of governments that did not govern, stri-
dent revolutionary rhetoric and a rapid slide into chaos, action by the
army, and support of or acquiesence in that action by a wide spectrum
of Spanish opinion was hardly unexpected. When it came, the essen-
tial hollowness of the left republican regime became immediately
apparent. Its already tenuous and feeble authority collapsed as the
bulk of the forces of order normally at the disposal of any government
-the army, the police apparatus, the bureaucracy-went over to the
insurgents. "The state fell and the Republic remained without an
army, without a police force," recalled a leading Spanish Socialist. 9
An astute foreign observer, Pietro Nenni, chief of the Italian Socialist
party and an early participant in the Spanish Civil War, wrote: "The
phenomenon most characteristic of the first phase of the Civil War
was the absence of power, of a central direction .... The state did not
exist, authority had collapsed." 10
Within a few days after the pronunciamiento, the ephemeral Repub-
lican cabinets (there were three within as many days), faced with the
collapse of the state apparatus, gave in to the demands of the proletar-
ian parties for arms. From that moment the writ of the "government"
ceased to count for much. Real power in Republican Spain passed into
the hands of the proletarian parties-parties with frankly revolution-
ary aims. 11 The president of the Republic himself later testified to the
utter collapse of governmental authority and the reality of revolution
in Popular Front Spain: "The revolutionary excess [of the masses of
Republican Spain] spread itself before the eyes of the astonished
ministers. In view of this violent revolution, the cabinet was not able
to choose between methods designed to halt or suppress the criminal
agitation. The Government lacked the forces necessary to do it. And
if it had disposed of some ... their employment would only have run
the risk of provoking a second Civil War." 12 From the beginning then,
the bulk of the elements actively opposing the pronunciamiento were
essentially revolutionary forces motivated not by any desire to defend
"bourgeois democracy," the "Republic," and the status quo ante July
17, 1936, but to "make the revolution."
While the facade of a regularly constituted Republican government
remained in existence in Madrid, because it served the purposes of the
proletarian parties to allow it to do so, 13 the reality of power lay in
the regime of political committees which sprang into being through-
6 COMINTERN ARMY

out Popular Front Spain, committees dominated by the proletarian

revolutionary parties. Despite the calculated denials of Popular Front
propaganda, 14 the fact of revolution was starkly clear to anyone inside
the Popular Front zone of Spain. Entering Barcelona in August 1936,
Franz Borkenau felt as if he had "landed on a continent different from
anything I had seen before." Later that year George Orwell wrote:
"When one came straight from England the aspect of Barcelona was
something startling and overwhelming. It was the first time that I had
ever been in a town where the working class was in the saddle.
Practically every building of any size had been seized by the workers
and was draped with red flags or with the red and black flag of the
Anarchists; every wall was scrawled with the hammer and sickle and
with the initials of revolutionary parties; almost every church has been
gutted and its images burnt." 15 The Cambridge-educated British
Communist John Cornford felt awestruck and delighted at what he
saw. "In Barcelona," he wrote, "one can understand physically what
the dictatorship of the proletariat means. . . . Everywhere in the
streets are armed workers and militiamen, and sitting in the cafes
which used to belong to the bourgeoisie.... It's as if in London the
armed workers were dominating the streets." 16
Madrid made much the same impact. The government appeared
little in evidence. The proletarian political parties and trade unions,
acting with complete autonomy, dominated the city. Each wore its
own insignia and maintained its own armed militia units and strongly
fortified headquarters. 17 This Spain then, caught up in the throes of
revolution and civil war, distracted, divided, and desperate, created
one of the preconditions for the emergence of the International Bri-
gades on the stage of history.
But in another and more critical sense the specifically Spanish
issues were not the crux of the matter. To the men who brought the
Brigades into existence and to the vast majority of those foreigners
who fought in the Brigades, the issue was not really Spain and the
Spaniards but the larger international and ideological forces of the day
which simply found a convenient arena for combat in Spain. In this
sense the International Brigades were both a by-product and ~ in-
strument of a Soviet-Comintern strategy of worldwide scope.
That strategy had been launched as early as 1934 and was a direct
result of the fact that the view from the Kremlin had changed both
rapidly and menacingly in the years immediately preceding. The
threat posed to the Soviet Union by a resurgent Germany and an
aggressive Japan had forced the men in Moscow to alter radically both
the traditional Soviet foreign policy and the party line of the Commu-
Spanish Politics 7

nist International. The new Soviet foreign policy called for rapproche-
ment and, if possible, alliance with any power that did, or might in
the future, oppose German and/or Japanese expansionism. This, in
effect, meant those traditional targets of Communist hostility, the
nations of the "bourgeois imperialist" west. It also led to the Soviet
Union's adherence to the previously despised League of Nations
where its delegation immediately became the most vocal advocate of
collective security. By 1935 the Soviet Union had concluded alliances
with both France and Czechoslovakia and had apparently reversed
her traditionally revisionist foreign policy to become a staunch de-
fender of the status quo.
A second and complementary phase of the new Kremlin strategy
was the Popular Front. The goal of the Popular Front policy was to
secure as wide a spectrum of support as possible within the bourgeois
democracies for foreign policies that would, in effect, support those
of the USSR. Even with this new approach the Soviet leaders well
knew that the vast majority of people and governments of the world
would be little concerned with threats to the security of the USSR as
such. Thus, a fundamental thrust of the Popular Front stratagem was
directed toward making the threat to the Soviet Union appear to be
only part of a general threat to all. 18 To do this the Soviet-Comintern
interpretation of the world situation read that an international Fascist
conspiracy, led by Germany and Japan, threatened the peace and
security of the entire world. As the Soviet commissar for foreign
affairs, Maxim Litvinov, put it: "The flame of war lighted by the
aggressors on two continents threatens to set fire to Europe and then
to the whole world. As always ... it was the Soviet Union which was
the first to raise its voice to the whole world . . . proclaiming the
source of the danger ... and pointing out the ways and means neces-
sary to struggle against this bloody disaster into which fascism is
ready to plunge humanity." 19
Prior to the adoption of the Popular Front program the Communist
line had stressed that the greatest enemies of the working class were
the non-Communist proletarian parties: "The Fascist beasts were
Fascist beasts," wrote Arthur Koestler, a member of the German
Communist party at the time, "but our [the Communists] main preoc-
cupation was the Trotskyite heretics and socialist schismatics." 20 On
February 6, 1934, a leading French Communist, Andre Marty, wrote
in L 'Humanite, "It is impossible to struggle against fascism without
struggling against social democracy." In that same year the Commu-
nist party of Spain took advantage of an abortive insurrection of
Asturian workers to tell the working class that "the Socialist Party
8 CoMINTERN ARMY

is the full manifestation of the impotence of social-democracy." The

Communist's aim, wrote a leading member of the Spanish Communist
party, was "to destroy the Socialist party." 21
The new Popular Front policy began with a cessation of the more
violent forms of abuse against the various socialist and democratic
parties followed by efforts at seeking alliances with them. The slogan
used to attract support for the Popular Front idea, by evoking an
ideological image appealing to the widest possible audience, was "an-
tifascism." Armed with the new ideological shibboleth, the Comin-
tern undertook the task of making the Popular Front a reality. All talk
of "social fascists" ended abruptly as did any hint that Communists
were revolutionaries. "The notion that we [the Communists] had ever
advocated violence was to be ridiculed as a bogey, refuted as a slander
spread by reactionary war-mongers," wrote Koestler. "We no longer
referred to ourselves as Bolsheviks, nor even as Communist ... we
were just simple, honest, peaceloving anti-Fascists and defenders of
democracy." American Communist party chief Earl Browder was
simply parroting the Popular Front line when he later righteously
declared. "The war in Spain is a part of the world-wide offensive
against fascism of all peace loving and democratic peoples." Bour-
geois democracy, which, as Koestler recalled, had a month or two
earlier been castigated as "fascism in disguise," was now "praised as
a guarantee of freedom." All revolutionary slogans were eliminated
from the Communist vocabulary and replaced by the slogans of "free-
dom, peace and national unity." 22 An example of this was the adop-
tion of the slogan "Socialist students, the most active upholders of
peace, democracy and civilization," by the Communist-dominated
Socialist Club at Cambridge University. 23
A close reading of the Popular Front program as officially enun-
ciated at the Seventh Congress of the Communist International of
August 1936 showed that the Communists had not by any means
given up their ultimate objectives of world revolution and the dicta-
torship of the proletariat. They were merely adopting a temporary
tactic to meet the immediate threat posed by the rise of powerful
enemies of the Soviet Union. 24 In clarification of the Popular Front
line, Georgi Dimitroff, chief of the Comintern and the man most
closely identified with that policy, wrote: "The flexible Bolshevik
tactics, which are the application of the general tactical line of the
Seventh Congress of the Communist International to a specific ques-
tion arise of necessity from the whole present-day international situa-
tion." In his explanation Dimitroff made it clear that the real purpose
of the Popular Front was the defense of the USSR. So also did the
Spanish Politics 9

German Comintern spokesman Walter Ulbricht. "No one can really

fight fascism," he said, "so long as he does not contribute to the
strengthening of its most important bulwark in this struggle, the
Soviet Union." 25
That a clear understanding of the true nature and purpose of the
Popular Front policy was well understood by the various branches of
the Comintern was demonstrated by an article signed by Jose Diaz,
the top Spanish Communist, just prior to the Spanish elections of
February 1936. "Our [Communist Party] struggle is for the dictator-
ship of the proletariat, for Soviets, we ... do not give up our aims.
But ... the immediate task now is not the struggle for the dictatorship
of the proletariat but the development of the anti-fascist struggle."
Ulbricht, in a speech to the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern
at which the new line was pronounced said: "In the struggle for Soviet
power, it is possible-during a political crisis-to establish an anti-
fascist popular front, so long as the masses are still not ready for a
Soviet government. Later on, when conditions have improved, we can
continue the struggle for a proletarian dictatorship .... the goal of our
fight is a Soviet Germany." Explaining the new tactic, he said, "We
Communists fight for democratic freedom because it gives greater
mobility to the working class and its organization [the Communist
party], and permits them to prepare the masses for the battle for
Soviet power." 26 The temporary and tactical nature of the new policy
was not stressed outside the confines of the party itself.
Success for the Popular Front required a massive enlargement of
the numbers of people who could be influenced by the Communist
party. This was a task preeminently of propanganda which, to be most
effective, must appear to be in large part of non-Communist origin.
The Comintern had within its ranks a man who was something of a
genius in just the type of work needed. Among the German political
exiles living in Paris after 1933 was Willi Munzenberg, Comintern
chief of agitprop (agitation and propaganda) for western Europe and
Germany. Arthur Koestler, who worked with Munzenberg and knew
him intimately, called him the "Red Eminence of the international
anti-fascist movement." Munzenberg had been extremely successful
since the 1920s in founding, editing, and marketing numerous maga-
zines and newpapers which sought to popularize the Soviet Union and
the Communist party in Germany. He invented and made use of the
"fellow traveller," a new species which was to have a significant
future, especially during the Popular Front period. He developed the
organizational technique for making use of the "fellow traveller" as
well as thousands of unwitting dupes in the ubiquitous front organiza-
10 COMINTERN ARMY

tions clandestinely conducted by the party and designed to mobilize

and direct public opinion in support of virtually any program or point
of view. Of Munzenberg's multifarious propaganda activities, Koes-
tler wrote: "He produced International Committees, Congresses and
movements as a conjurer produces rabbits out of his hat." 27 As an-
other ex-Communist put it, "The success with which the Communist
line was propagated among Social Democrats and liberals during
these years, . . . the thousands of painters, writers and doctors and
lawyers and debutantes chanting a diluted version of the Stanlinist
line" vividly demonstrated the effectiveness of Munzenberg's
efforts. 28
Under the impact of one of the greatest propaganda barrages ever
laid down, the new policy achieved rapid and widespread successes.
Most apparent were those in France and Spain where Popular Front
electoral coalitions with Communist participation put governments
into power in 1936. But in England and the United States, too, the
Communists had never been so popular or so successful. 29 The
American Communists suddenly adopted and loudly supported the
New Deal which just a short time before they had as loudly excoriated
as "semi-fascist" 30 and Earl Browder, secretary of the party in the
United States, posed as a great patriot, adopting the slogan "Commu-
nism is the Americanism of the twentieth century." In France the
Communists attempted to widen the spectrum of the Popular Front
far beyond the range of the political left. L 'Humanite editorially
called for the inclusion of the National Volunteers, a right-wing veter-
ans organization, and the Catholic parties in the "anti-fascist front."
All this seemingly strange benevolence toward those whom the Com-
munists had formerly anathematized followed faithfully the policy
laid down in the Kremlin. Stalin told the French ambassador that
confidentially he did not care what a country's internal regime was so
long as its foreign policy was anti-German. 31
Against this background the eruption of civil war and proletarian
revolution in Spain was highly unwelcome to Soviet policymakers. It
exposed the contradiction in their new policy between the attempt to
convince bourgeois democratic governments that the Soviet Union
was no longer interested in exporting revolution on the one hand and
their desire to continue to pose as the champion ofthe world proletar-
iat on the other. 32 If the pre-Popular Front policy had been still in
effect the Communists could logically have either favored proletarian
revolution in Spain unreservedly or taken a hands-off, plague-on-
both-your-houses, attitude since the whole conflict could have been
written off as one between bourgeois capitalist factions or Fascists. 33
Spanish Politics 11

But in the complicated world of July 1936 no such simple solution was
possible.
At this difficult time the dual nature of the International Commu-
nist movement proved to be of value. While the Soviet Union's regular
governmental apparatus remained, overtly at least, quiet and correct
on the Spanish affair, 34 even to the extent of signing a British-spon-
sored nonintervention agreement designed to isolate the war in
Spain, 35 the Comintern moved quickly and noisily into action. The
immediate interpretation of events in Spain by the Comintern was that
the pronunciamiento of the Spanish army was part of the worldwide
fascist plot. The statement "Hitler is in direct control of the general
staff of the [Spanish] Putschists" summed up this attitude as expressed
in the first issues of the Comintern's official organ after the fighting
broke out. 36 The first official Comintern reaction to the pronun-
ciamiento apparently came at a meeting in Moscow of representatives
of the Comintern and Profintern (the Communist labor organization).
There the idea of aid to the Popular Front forces in Spain was agreed
to in principle. Another joint Comintern-Profintern meeting was held
on July 26 in Prague under the chairmanship of Gaston Monmous-
seau, Chief of the European office of the Profintern. There a program
of financial aid to the Spanish Popular Front was adopted. 37
At the same time Communist parties throughout the world quickly
launched full-scale propaganda campaigns in support of Popular
Front Spain. As early as July 26 Harry Pollitt, chief of the Communist
party of Great Britain, declared to a rally in Trafalgar Square: "We
must compel the national government [of Great Britain] to render
every assistance to the Spanish peoples' front government ... let us
organize a mighty united movement of solidarity ... organize meet-
ings, demonstrations everywhere. " 38 The Comintern also sought to
use the Popular Front momentum to get united action from the
Second International and other proletarian, labor, and liberal orga-
nizations on the Spanish question. 39
Meanwhile Munzenberg's propaganda machine turned its full at-
tention to Spain. A European Conference for the Defense of the
Spanish Republic, called by the World Committee against War and
Fascism, one of Munzenberg's front organizations, met in Paris on
August 13, 1936, to mobilize opinion behind the Comintern's inter-
pretation of the Spanish affair. That conference established an Inter-
national Coordination and Information Commission in Support of the
Spanish Republic, one of the first of the multitude of such commis-
sions and committees organized and clandestinely controlled by the
Comintern in relation to its policy in Spain. 40 On August 31 a meeting
12 COMINTERN ARMY

of the directorate of Secours Rouge, another of the Comintern's front

organizations, convened in Paris. From that meeting emerged the
Comite International de !'aide du Peuple Espagnol. A multitude of
similar organizations for aid to Republican Spain mushroomed into
being. Communist activists were ordered to "proliferate Spanish De-
fense Committees." 41 Most of these committees were directed by
party functionaries who controlled them unobtrusively behind impos-
ing lists of sponsors whose often well-known and respected names
graced the organizations' letterheads and lent weight to their appeals
for funds and support for their cause. 42
On another front in the propaganda war Munzenberg dispatched
party writers like Koestler to Spain to produce firsthand accounts of
the situation there, all, of course, from a strictly defined point of view.
Munzenberg relied on Otto Katz, alias Andre Simon, as his chief
lieutenant for Spain. Katz, a longtime Comintern functionary, orga-
nized the Spanish Relief Committee, directed the Spanish News
Agency, and dispensed Loyalist government propaganda funds to
French newspapers and politicians. As Munzenberg's roving ambas-
sador, Katz made trips to England and Hollywood to collect funds
and organize antifascist committees. 43
The Comintern also lost no time in intensifying its activity inside
Spain, assigning Palmiro Togliatti, chief of the Italian Communist
party, to the Spanish front. 44 Togliatti worked behind the scenes in
Spain using the aliases Ercoli and Alfredo and played a key role in
the direction of the Spanish Communist Party. 45
At about the same time a full-scale Soviet diplomatic and military
mission arrived in Spain. On August 27 the experienced diplomat
Marcel Rosenberg presented his credentials in Madrid as Soviet am-
bassador. He was accompanied by a formidable staff, among whom
was General Berzin, previously head of Soviet military intelligence.
Berzin, along with General Goriev, commanded the staff of Soviet
military advisers who virtually took over direction of the military
operations of the Popular Front forces. 46 During the month of Sep-
tember additional Soviet personnel arrived in Spain. Among them was
Michael Koltsov, Pravdajo leading foreign correspondent and a man
who clearly had more important duties than journalism. 47 About this
time Alexander Orlov arrived with instructions to set up a branch of
the NKVD in Spain. 48 Thus by the middle of September 1936 the
Soviet Union and Comintern had a high-powered contingent in Spain
covering all spheres of political and military operations.
Meanwhile, in an operation that demonstrated the meshing of offi-
cial Soviet military intelligence apparatus with that of the Comintern,
Spanish Politics 13

Red army general Walter Krivitsky, then chief of Soviet military

intelligence in Western Europe, received orders from Moscow on
August 30: "Extend your operations immediately to cover the Spanish
War. Mobilize all available agents and facilities for prompt creation
of a system to purchase and transport arms to Spain." Krivitsky
immediately began setting up "paper companies" in various countries
of Europe for the procurement of arms for Popular Front Spain. 49 His
orders stipulated that the operation must remain highly secret. The
furnishing of military supplies for Popular Front Spain was to be a
clandestine affair which could not be traced back to the Soviet Union.
The Soviet-Comintern machine thus became progressively more
deeply committed to the Popular Front cause in Spain. As yet, how-
ever, the Soviet Union's involvement remained limited, overtly at
least, to diplomatic and propagandistic support. Comintern opera-
tions in Spain were not acknowledged as being sponsored or con-
trolled by the Soviet government and Krivitsky's clandestine
arms-buying did not officially exist.
Swiftly moving political and military developments in Spain soon
brought more direct and overt Soviet intervention. In early September
a new cabinet headed by the Socialist Largo Caballero had assumed
governmental power in Madrid. On specific instructions from Mos-
cow the Spanish Communist party officially participated in the new
government, more clearly than ever tying Communist prestige to the
Spanish Popular Front cause. 50 The Communists were thus in an
increasingly strong position to push their own policies and viewpoints
on the nature of the war and the methods, both political and military,
by which it should be conducted. They sought to control the situation
in Popular Front Spain in such a way that their intervention there
would not wreck their larger policy of rapprochement with the bour-
geois democracies. As the best way to achieve that end, the Commu-
nists adopted the position that the war in Spain (and thus their role
there) was simply the defense of the democratic Republic against
fascism and that it had nothing to do with revolution. An article,
"Spain's Struggle against Fascism," which appeared in the official
Comintern organ, succinctly summed up this position while at the
same time making clear to the initiated the strictly tactical nature of
it.

Present task of the Communist Party is to crush the fascist

revolt and save the republic .... The slogan of the defense of the
democratic republic makes it possible to bring the widest masses
of the people ... into the struggle ... creates a very wide basis
14 COMINTERN ARMY

for the struggle . . . assists its formation of a wide democratic

front around the struggle ... throughout the world. The strug-
gle ... in Spain ... is meeting with the sympathy of tremendous
sections of the population in all the capitalist countries.... The
party understands that this growing wave of sympathy ... is a
strong weapon which the workers organizations [Communist
parties] of all countries must use . . . therefore the party is
against all irresponsible statements, against frivolous chatter as
to projects for the future "reorganization of society" which in
the present international situation can only serve to complicate
the struggle. 51
This stance by the Communists accounted for the paradoxical fact
that they found themselves on the right of the political spectrum of
Popular Front Spain and that many Socialists and virtually all Anar-
chosyndicalists and POUMists regarded the Communist role as coun-
terrevolutionary. So also did many non-Spanish leftists. 52
Despite everything that the new Popular Front government, the
Spanish militias, and the Communists could do, the Popular Front's
military position continued to deteriorate rapidly. Nationalist forces
moving steadily toward Madrid from the south seemed unstoppable.
The Soviet staff in Madrid, as well as most other foreign observers,
concluded that unless substantial outside aid arrived quickly the Na-
tionalists would take the city. Ambassador Rosenberg, General Ber-
zin, and the influential Koltzov were all convinced that without rapid
Soviet intervention the end could not be far off.
In addition to the urgent need for military materiel numerous
observers stressed the need for a more effective fighting force than the
Popular Front militias were affording. Ambassador Rosenberg re-
ported that view to Moscow and, in addition, on September 22 Mau-
rice Thorez, chief of the French Communist Party, flew to Moscow
where he recommended that Soviet aid in the form of military supplies
and equipment be dispatched to Spain immediately and that the Com-
intern undertake the organization of a military unit to be made up
of foreign volunteers and directed by a Comintern political and mili-
tary staff. 5 3 Under the pressure of these events and convinced that the
Popular Front regime could not survive without significant military
aid, Moscow made the decision to intervene more directly and deci-
sively in the Spanish imbroglio, a decision that led to the appearance
of Soviet tanks and planes on Spanish battlefronts in October 1936
and to the arrival of the first of the volunteers recruited by the Comin-
tern for the International Brigades in the same month. 54 Thus the
Spanish Politics 15

origins of the International Brigades are to be found in the working

out of a Soviet-Comintern policy of worldwide scope and not, as some
would have it, in the spontaneous response of world democracy to the
threat of fascism in Spain. To put it differently, without the Soviet-
Comintern decision to intervene directly in the Spanish War and, as
part of that intervention, create a foreign volunteer force for use in
Spain, the International Brigades would never have come into exis-
tence.
2 Popular Front Militias
Since the bulk of the army and heavy police forces of Spain
either sided with the military revolt of July 1936 or were swamped in
the proletarian revolution that followed hard on its heels, the only
effective armed opposition to the pronunciamiento came from militia
units that were organized and controlled by the various Popular Front
political parties and labor unions. The Socialist and Communist par-
ties had in fact been organizing workers and peasant militias for some
time prior to 1936. Enrique Lister, after a three-year sojourn in the
Soviet Union where he attended both the Lenin Institute and a Red
army military school, undertook the task of building up units of the
Communist MAOC (workers and peasants antifascist militia) as early
as 1935. 1 The Italian Comintern agent Vittorio Vidali, who was to
play a leading role during the civil war, arrived in Spain in May 1936
with orders to build the party militia into "the organizational basis
for the future worker-peasant Red Army." 2 The Socialist party organ,
Claridad, declared in headlines in April 1936, "The people's militia
... must be organized in every village in Spain." 3 And Jesus Her-
nandez, a high-ranking member of the Spanish Communist party
wrote just prior to the outbreak of hostilities, "The militia exists
throughout the country." 4 The speed with which the more-or-less
organized militia units of the Popular Front entered the fray against
the insurgent forces in July 1936 could no doubt be attributed to the
prior existence of such paramilitary organizations. 5 But the outbreak
of fighting in July saw a rapid and widespread proliferation of militia
forces.
The militia columns varied greatly from one another, forming as
they did not parts of a single army but independent groups of armed
men controlled by autonomous political factions. The Anarchosyndi-
calists recruited, organized, armed, fed, equipped, and commanded
their militia columns while the Communists, Socialists, POUMists, 6
and others did the same for theirs. Indeed in the early stages of the
conflict the militia units came and went as they or their party leader-
ship saw fit without any direction by the impotent government in
Madrid at all. 7 Even after a government more truly representative of
the forces of the Popular Front was formed in September 1936, with
the Socialist Largo Caballero as premier and minister of war, its
authority over the militias was almost nil. Largo Caballero himself
Popular Front Militias 17

admitted privately that he had no control over the various political

forces supporting the Popular Front cause. 8
These militia columns were not motivated so much by a desire to
defend the democratic-parliamentary republic of the previous period
as to "make the revolution." As George Orwell, who was there, put
it: "The fact is that the Spanish working class did not, as we might
conceivably do in England, resist Franco in the name of 'democracy'
and the status quo; their resistance was accompanied by-one might
almost say it consisted of-a definite revolutionary outbreak." 9 When
the Ascaso column, an Anarchist unit, left Barcelona for the front
near Huesca on August 19, it was, according to a foreign participant,
not an army but "an armed rabble," which, so far as the people in it
were concerned, was "an armed demonstration for carrying the revo-
lution to Saragozza.' 010 A Dutch Communist who joined the militia
and fought on the front south of Madrid echoed the same general
impression. "Our regiments," he wrote, "are nothing but armed party
groups." 11
Three of the most militant and active forces on the Popular Front
side of the barricades-the Anarchosyndicalists, the POUMists, and
the left-wing Socialists-openly avowed their revolutionary aims and
aspirations. For example, Claridad, the organ of the left-wing Social-
ists, declared in August: "The people are no longer fighting for the
Spain of July 16 [the Republic] .... The most powerful support for
the war lies in the total uprooting of fascism, economically and in
every other way. That is, in revolution." 12 The Anarchosyndicalist
attitude was succinctly voiced to Franz Borkenau by an Anarchist
militiaman who told him they were fighting "not for the legal govern-
ment but in order to move swiftly toward the abolition of the state.' 013
Not only were these groups positively oriented toward taking advan-
tage of the collapse of state authority to "make the revolution" but
they saw the militias as the vanguard and guarantee of that process.
On the issue of retaining the militia forces or of trying to organize a
regular People's Army under government control, Claridad declared
on August 20: "Our army must be an army that is in keeping with
the revolution .... To think of replacing the present combatants [mili-
tia] with another type of army which, to a certain extent, would
control their revolutionary action is to think in a counterrevolution-
ary way.'' Eventually the Socialists came around to supporting the
creation of a unified People's Army but only later and under the
pressures of both the realization of its practical necessity for fighting
the war and of the Communists' insistence that a unified army be
created. The Anarchosyndicalists and POUMists never really ac-
18 CoMINTERN ARMY

cepted the change. The right-wing Socialists and the Communists

usually claimed to be defending the Republic but for tactical reasons
that concealed long-run revolutionary goals. Even though the Com-
munists were normally the staunchest proponents, in public, of the
defense-of-the-Republic posture, even they occasionally dropped the
pose. For example, Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasionaria), a member of the
Politburo of the CPS, said, speaking of the People's Army, that it
must be like the Red army, not just the army of a nation but the
"advance guard of shock troops of the world revolution." 14 Only the
small and weak Republican groups could truly be said to be defending
the Republic.
Each militia column represented a replica in microcosm of its
particular ideological vision of the classless society and reflected the
very different concepts held by the various ideologies to be found
within the Popular Front spectrum of what constituted revolutionary
organization and behavior. The Anarchist and POUM units were
highly equalitarian and democratic organizations, at least in theory.
Everyone from commander to private drew the same pay, ate the same
food, wore the same clothes, and mingled on terms of complete equal-
ity. Frequently the troops elected their military commanders and no
one considered it strange for a private to slap the commander on the
back and ask for a cigarette or even to insist upon comradely discus-
sion of commands and decisions. 15
The POUM militia column in which George Orwell served was
fairly typical of the general situation in the units in Catalonia. He
joined the column at the Lenin barracks outside Barcelona and stayed
there for about a week while a new unit was being formed. There were
a thousand or so men and a few militia women at the barracks
as well as a number of militiamen's wives who did the cooking. The
Spanish recruits were mostly boys of seventeen or eighteen, utterly
ignorant of matters military. Discipline did not exist. Chaos reigned.
Uniforms and equipment were doled out piecemeal and the result was
anything but uniform. After a few days the column was "still a rabble
by any ordinary standard," but by Spanish militia standards it was
considered fit to be seen in public. "Any public school O.T.C. in
England is far more like a modem army," wrote Orwell. 16 The militia
units were, as one would expect, hardly military in appearance or
disciplined in action. They were rather, depending on one's point of
view, an armed rabble interested primarily in murder, pillage, and the
destruction of the social order or the heroic and picturesque advance
guard of the revolution. 17 Regardless of how the militias were viewed,
most observers agreed that they left much to be desired as effective
Popular Front Militias 19

military forces. Only the Communists had no philosophical qualms

about demanding strict military discipline and obedience to orders in
their militia units and, true to Bolshevik doctrine, did so. Even so,
only in a very relative sense, and with much effort by their command-
ers and political commissars, did even their much-vaunted Fifth Regi-
ment seem an example of military efficiency.
While the militia units were able to offer a certain amount of
resistance to the forces of the pronunciamiento when they could fight
from stationary defensive positions, a village or town, they could not
stand in the open field against trained and disciplined troops. The
rapid advance of the numerically weak Nationalist forces from the
south during the early months of the war was a repeated story of
sporadic tenacious defense by militia, an outflanking movement by the
Nationalists, and panic and retreat by the militia. 18 One reason for
this lack of effectiveness was that the military officers of the militia
units acted only as technical advisers, all powers of decision being
reserved to the party political leadership, often in the form of a
committee. In the POUM unit in which Orwell served, the technical
military command was exercised by a Belgian ex-officer, George
Kopp, who was called "commandante," and a Polish Jew, Benjamin
Levinski. Real authority in the column was exercised by the political
chiefs of the POUM. The Englishman John Comford wrote of the
militia column with which he served for a time that the column's
leader was an "admirable revolutionary" but had "no conception of
the job of warfare." He also said that there was rivalry between the
leader and his military adviser, a common state of affairs. 19 This was
true even in the more disciplined communist Fifth Regiment where
ultimate authority was exercised by the political commissars. Of
course the problem was less apparent in the Communist militia be-
cause the military officers were almost always also party members and
thus subject to the same political authority as the commissars.
In some cases Spanish officers from the old army or police forces
acted as military officers in militia columns. But they were inevitably
distrusted by the militiamen and in fact exercised no real authority.
A report to the ministry of defense in September 1936 by a regular
officer assigned to command a militia column called Tierra y Libertad
showed the nature of the problem. The unit, he wrote, had fought on
the preceding day with some success. "But today they left the posi-
tions which they were supposed to occupy, saying that they were not
going to defend the socialists." The commander tried to oppose the
retirement of the column, but the troops answered that they "did not
obey any orders except those coming from their Committee. " 20 In
20 CoMINTERN ARMY

another such report a regular army officer, one Colonel Salafranca,

gave vent to his frustration with the militia supposedly under his
command. Their retreat, "or more correctly this cowardly flight, was
not due to the thrust of the enemy, but to the absolute lack of spirit
and morale of these forces," he said. The colonel protested to his
commanding officer about having been given a command in "these
extraordinary conditions of indiscipline." 21
The militias even more obviously lacked effectiveness as offensive
or assault troops, a weakness vividly demonstrated by the failure to
break the resistance of the few hundred defenders of the alcazar at
Toledo. Likewise in Catalonia the militia streamed out from Bar-
celona toward Huesca and Saragossa from the first days of the fighting
with the objective of taking those important cities for the revolution.
But these cities remained untaken throughout the war. Nowhere did
militia units demonstrate any offensive prowess. 22
Even in combat zones the militia units usually operated as com-
pletely autonomous units. Each held its own position at the front and
took care of all its own replacements, administration, and logistics. The
autonomous and highly political nature of the militia units, as well as
the very real consciousness of ideological differences and distrust
between the various proletarian parties, accounted for their occupa-
tion of separate positions and the incessant political discussions which
seemed to be the chief pastime of the militiamen. Orwell wrote that
from his unit's position at the front he could identify the various
points held by the Popular Front units by the political flags each
displayed. He was puzzled when, on reaching the front, the POUM
militiamen pointed out the positions nearby. "Those are the Social-
ists," they said, meaning the PSUC. "Aren't we all Socialists?" asked
Orwell. His attitude was, "Why can't we stop all the political non-
sense and get on with the war?" This, as he said, was the "correct
anti-fascist" attitude which "had been carefully disseminated by the
English newspapers, largely in order to prevent people from grasping
the real nature of the struggle." It was an attitude, he wrote, which
no one could or did keep in Spain for very long. "No event in it [the
war in Spain], at any rate during the first year, is intelligible unless
one has some grasp of the interparty struggle that was going on behind
the government lines." On the Madrid front conditions were much the
same. "The spirit was bad," wrote Louis Fischer. "The soldiers played
at war, and lay around discussing politics but not digging trench-
es. . . . The antagonism between the Communists and the Anar-
chists was growing. The Communists blamed the F AI (Anarchist
Federation of Iberia) for the loss of Toledo and called them 'Fai-
Popular Front Militias 21

scists.' " The Communists declared that not a single rifle should be
given the Catalans because they might fall into the hands of the
Anarchists. 23
By far the most effective of the Popular Front militia units was the
so-called Fifth Regiment organized by the Communists. A notable
exception to the egalitarianism and indiscipline of the militia in gen-
eral, the Fifth Regiment, true to Communist doctrine, stressed iron
discipline and unquestioning obedience to orders. As early as July 22,
1936, the party organ, Mundo Obrero, was demanding "Discipline,
Hierarchy and Organization." And in a manifesto of the central
committee of the party dated August 18, 1936, the party demanded
"that every act, that every rifle responds always to an organized plan,
to a necessity of the war. If in all organization discipline is the funda-
mental base of power and strength, in the army discipline ... for high
and for low, for the units and for the command, and only in the
measure to which this discipline exists will it be possible to conquer
an organized and disciplined enemy." 24 In the tradition of Bolshevik
dictums on discipline in organizing the Red army, commanders and
political commissars of the Fifth Regiment demanded "a discipline of
iron" and at times exercised draconian measures to maintain it. 25
The Communist militia became active in Madrid on the very day
the pronunciamiento took place and from the beginning provided a
vivid example of the meshing of the various elements of the Commu-
nist apparatus as it operated in Spain. On July 18 two of the party's
carefully cultivated adherents among the officer corps of the Spanish
army presented themselves for duty at party headquarters in Ma-
drid. 26 On the same day the party functionary Enrique Castro Del-
gado assumed direction of the militia, and very shortly the Italian
Comintem agent Vittorio Vidali, using the nom de guerre "Carlos
Contreras" in Spain, assumed overall authority as chief political com-
missar. Both Vidali and his wife, Maria Modetti, were old Comintem
functionaries who, like others of their kind, had been assigned to work
in Spain even prior to the outbreak of hostilities. As chief political
commissar and the acknowledged representative of the Comintem,
Contreras exercised supreme authority within the Fifth Regiment.
Indeed he was untouchable even by members of the politburo of the
Spanish party. 27
The Spanish Communists had the further advantage of the services
of a number of cadres who had attended one of the Red army's
training schools in the Soviet Union, including Enrique Lister, later
among the most successful of the Communist's military commanders.
They also enjoyed the services of a corps of non-Spanish Comintem
22 COMINTERN ARMY

functionaries who had military and/or political training and experi-

ence and, finally, they benefited from the expertise of the Soviet mili-
tary mission in Spain. 28
These trained leadership cadres gave the Communists' militia a
tremendous qualitative advantage over any other element on the Pop-
ular Front side. The Fifth Regiment soon became a complete army
in microcosm. All necessary branches, all essential functions-logis-
tics, transport, commissary, quartermaster, medical--developed rap-
idly under the direction and guidance of the Regiment's military and
political staff. The Regiment also proved to be by far the most success-
ful and productive recruiting and training center on the Loyalist side,
claiming some 60,000 to 70,000 men by January 1937. 29
In addition to its important military function, the Fifth Regiment
served Communist purposes in a number of political ways. Among the
most important of these was as a spokesman for the party line on
various important military and political issues such as the imposition
of military discipline on the militia, the creation of a centrally con-
trolled People's Army organized on a regular military basis, the insti-
tution of a political commissar system within that army, and various
other concems. 30 The Communist' position on most of the above
issues ultimately prevailed in part at least because the Fifth Regiment
provided the nucleus for the People's Army of Popular Front Spain.
Indeed the first brigades of that army were simply the old Fifth
Regiment under a new name. This, of course, gave the Communists
the important political advantage of supplying the new army with
Communist officers and political commissars. Neither the speakers
nor the words spoken at the propaganda rally staged to celebrate the
conversion of the Fifth Regiment into the first units of the Popular
Army left much to the imagination as to whose army the Regiment
was. The major speakers were "Carlos Contreras," Jose Diaz, the
chief of the Communist party of Spain, Dolores Ibarruri (La Pasio-
naria), a member of the politburo of the CPS and most effective of
party speakers, and Gustav Regier, a German Communist then serv-
ing as a political commissar in the International Brigades. Among
other things these spokesmen stated that "the Fifth Regiment was
organized at the orders and decisions of the Communist party." La
Pasionaria added the thought that the newly conceived Popular Army
must be like the Red army, not just the army of a nation but the
"advance guard of shock troops of the world revolution." 31
From the first days of the war a sprinkling of foreigners fought in
the ranks of various Popular Front militia columns. One of the more
appealing myths that has been perpetuated about those early volun-
Popular Front Militias 23

teers is that they were the progenitors of the International Brigades.

A second is that they were fighting to defend the Spanish Republic.
Neither of these common and much-repeated assumptions is valid.
There was no connection between foreigners in the militia and the
International Brigades. The fact that some of the foreign militiamen
were ultimately incorporated into the Brigades demonstrates rather
that the Brigades were a new, different, and essentially unconnected
development. Nor were those foreign militiamen fighting to defend
the Republic. The overwhelming majority of them were adherents of
some specifically proletarian revolutionary ideology and, as such,
were fighting not for the "bourgeois republic" but for "the revolu-
tion."
That a significant number of foreigners were available and anxious
to join the Spanish militia was due, in large part, to the extreme
political polarization in Europe at that time. This resulted in a reser-
voir of men frustrated by the bitter life of exile who could see in the
Spanish conflict a chance to strike a blow for their side or perhaps to
find in a victory for the revolution in Spain a first step toward a similar
victory in their own countries. 32 Such an attitude toward the Spanish
conflict found clear expression in the words of many of those drawn
to Spain. The Italian Carlo Rosselli, leader of the Giustizia e Liberto
movement and a longtime political exile, coined the slogan "Oggi in
Spagna, domani in Italia," a phrase that clearly indicated his hope
that victory in Spain might prove a first step toward Rome. "Think,
my dear wife," he wrote from Spain in August 1936, "of the great joy
of your husband in being able to pass from a theoretical position to
a practical position. Spain today, Italy tomorrow." Another Italian,
Randolfo Pacciardi, leader of the Italian Republican party in exile,
echoed Rosselli's thoughts. Of the Spanish struggle he wrote, "Easily,
very easily, this could be the march on Rome and Berlin." Likewise,
Hans Beimler, a member of the central committee of the German
Communist party in exile, told a fellow German Communist, Gustav
Regier, when they met in Spain, "The only way we can get back to
Germany is through Madrid." 33
The first foreigners to fight in the Spanish conflict came from among
those living in Spain when the fighting broke out in July 1936. This
included a number of political exiles who had found the atmosphere
of Popular Front Spain to their liking. It also included, by a strange
coincidence, a number of "red athletes" who were participating in the
so-called Workers' Olympiad then being held in Barcelona. 34 Anum-
ber of these visiting athletes and others associated with the event
immediately entered the fray in Barcelona and subsequently joined
24 COMINTERN ARMY

one of the militia columns. 35 Barcelona became the principal focal

point for men entering Spain from the outside who wanted to fight and
by early September foreigners of diverse nationalities and political
persuasions could be found scattered among Popular Front militia
columns on numerous fronts. 36 Indeed, in several cases foreigners
actually commanded militia units. The Italian Socialist Fernando de
Rosa led a Socialist unit on the Guadarrama front north of Madrid
until he was killed in September 1936. The Italian Communist Bassi,
who went under the nom de guerre Nino Nanetti, entered Spain
immediately after the outbreak of fighting and organized and led a
Spanish unit. In addition, foreign Communists were heavily involved
in the organization and direction of the Fifth Regiment. 37
While it is true that by August-September 1936 an occasional for-
eigner might be found in almost any militia unit, the three main
concentrations of foreigners were in the Anarchist, the POUM, and
the PSUC (Communist party of Catalonia) militia columns operating
out of Barcelona. The partisan political nature of the various militia
found expression from the beginning in the way in which foreigners
wanting to join a given unit found themselves welcomed or refused
admission on the basis of their political credentials. Those foreigners
living in Spain prior to the revolution and those who came into the
country armed with the proper political papers and recommendations
reported to the party headquarters suitable to their respective brands
of proletarian ideology. In Barcelona the Communists and those So-
cialists who were ready to accept Communist discipline found a wel-
come at PSUC headquarters at the Hotel Col6n and the Karl Marx
barracks. Anarchists, and others who preferred their credo, presented
themselves at the Anarchist militia headquarters at the Pedrales bar-
racks outside Barcelona, and the POUM operated from the Lenin
barracks. In the Madrid area foreign Communists joined the Fifth
Regiment, while others could find a number of Spanish Socialist
militia units ready to welcome them. 38 The POUM and Anarchists
were not so exclusive in their political screening as the Communists.
Both accepted Communists into their columns, while the PSUC was
more demanding of proof of orthodoxy. John Comford, an English-
man who was in fact an English Communist party member but had
no credentials to prove it, was denied entry into a PSUC column and
had to settle for a POUM unit. 39 Orwell ended up in a POUM column
because he "happened to arrive in Barcelona with ILP papers." Both
the ILP (Independent Labor party of England) and the POUM were
among those dissident Marxist parties that were opposed to the ortho-
Popular Front Militias 25

dox Stalinist line. As such they were anathema to the Communists in

Spain.
Politics influenced not only the type of militia column a given
foreigner would likely join but also the way in which he interpreted
or rationalized what he was trying to achieve in Spain. All were, of
course, "fighting fascism." But within that broad explanation many
different attitudes and approaches existed. While there were isolated
individuals among the foreign combatants, such as Rosselli and Pac-
ciardi, who were not affiliated with any of the specifically proletarian
revolutionary ideologies, the overwhelming majority of them were
Communists, revolutionary Socialists, Anarchists, or adherents of
various splinter Marxist groups which were in fact much more revolu-
tionary than the orthodox Communist line was at that time. For
example, a German militiaman wrote: "We are socialists and because
we know that we have to achieve socialism from the struggle we are
revolutionaries.... We speak different languages but common to all
of us is the language of the revolution. The workers of the world look
to Spain not for the republic, nor even for democracy.... The interna-
tional comrades [foreign militiamen]---ofwhatever party fight for the
victory of the Spanish proletariat . . . for the total victory of the
proletarian revolution. [They are] the pioneers of the world revolu-
tion. " 40 John Cornford recorded in his diary and in letters to friends
his conversation with a number of Germans in the same unit. Most
of these men, he found, had left the Communist party not because it
was too revolutionary but because "they genuinely believe the CI
[Comintern] has deserted the revolution." Of these men Cornford
wrote, "If anything is revolutionary, it is these comrades." 41
Although practically every European nationality was represented
among the militia volunteers, the bulk of them were French, Italian,
and German. Widespread sympathy for Popular Front Spain existed
among Frenchmen of leftist persuasions, and French sympathizers
found it especially easy to cross the border and join the fighting in the
northern area around Irun and San Sebastian. There a number of
French ex-army officers, many with experience from the World War,
played an important part in organizing the defenses. 42 In August,
Nationalist troops reported finding the bodies of some thirty French-
men following one battle. 43 When the fight for lrun and San Sebastian
was lost, those who wanted to go on fighting simply crossed the border
into France, boarded trains that took them to the French-Catalan
frontier, recrossed into Spain, and joined the PSUC militia in Bar-
celona.44
26 COMINTERN ARMY

French Popular Front organizations began encouraging men to

fight in Spain at an early date. 45 The prime mover behind this effort
was the French Communist party. 46 On August 7 the party organ,
L 'Humanite, proclaimed, mistakenly, that "the French government
authorizes the formation of volunteers to help the Spanish work-
ers."47 The French contigent under PSUC control in Barcelona, com-
posed primarily of Communist party members, styled themselves the
Commune de Paris centuria. Jules Dumont, an ex-French army officer
and longtime Communist stalwart commanded the unit. In September
the PSUC ordered the French centuria, along with other PSUC units,
to Madrid where they came under Fifth Regiment control. 46
The Italians were a more mixed lot, including assorted Socialists,
a strong Anarchist contingent, a few Republicans, and the Commu-
nists. The Republican Randolfo Pacciardi represented one tendency
among the Italians. He wanted to organize an Italian legion that
would be nonpolitical, that is, at the disposal of the Popular Front
government and not affiliated with any particular political party or
ideology. Through the good offices of his compatriots, the Socialist
Pietro Nenni and the Communist Luigi Longo, Pacciardi received a
hearing from Largo Caballero in early September, but Largo Cabal-
lero was uninterested in Pacciardi's proposal. 49 Significantly, Largo
Caballero did not change his mind on the idea of a foreign military
unit until the Comintern decided to foster the organization of one in
mid-October. Pacciardi later commanded the Italian battalion of the
International Brigades, but this turned out to be not quite the nonpo-
litical legion he had originally sought.
In fact, the two major concentrations ofltalians prior to the forma-
tion of the International Brigades were those who served with the
Anarchist Ascaso column in Aragon and those with the Communist
militia. A leading figure among the first of these groups was Carlo
Rosselli. This group, composed primarily of Socialists and Anar-
chists, increased to some 250 Italians by October and remained with
the Anarchist militia even when asked to coalesce with the Italian
battalion of the International Brigade when that unit was organized
in early November. The refusal of Rosselli and others among the
Ascaso group to join with the International Brigades stemmed from
their reluctance to put themselves under Communist authority.50
The second important Italian unit, the Gastone-Sozzi centuria111
under PSUC direction in Barcelona, included combatants from sev-
eral sources. One group had first fought in the northern sector. With
the fall of Irun to Nationalist forces they, like their French counter-
parts, simply crossed the frontier into France, moved down the
Popular Front Militias 27

French side of the border, and reentered Spain through Catalonia.

Arriving in Barcelona, they placed themselves at the orders of the
PSUC. Another small group came fresh from an abortive attempt by
a largely Catalan force to capture Mallorca. 52 In addition, a number
of Italians came directly from France where they had been recruited
by the Italian Comintern functionary Giuseppe de Vittorio. Upon
their arrival in Barcelona they reported to PSUC headquarters at the
Hotel Colon and were quartered, along with other PSUC units, at the
Karl Marx barracks. 53 In early September the PSUC ordered the
Gastone-Sozzi centuria, along with other PSUC units, both foreign
and Spanish, to Madrid where they came under the authority of the
Fifth Regiment. 54 They remained at the Regiment's barracks in the
capital for a few days during which time they were greeted by Nenni
and Longo. The leaders of the centuria were all Communist stalwarts.
The centuria paraded behind the red banner of the Communist party
of Italy and their battle cry was "Italian Communists forward!" 55
The Germans who joined Spanish militia came, like the Italians,
from among the political exiles living in Spain, France, Switzerland,
or elsewhere. They were primarily either orthodox Communists or
Marxists who found the Stalinist line too restrictive and anti-revolu-
tionary. The orthodox Communists naturally went into the PSUC
militia where they formed the Thaelmann centuria of some 100 men
and fought with PSUC forces in Aragon from August to October.
Hans Beimler, onetime Communist Reichstag deputy and political
chief of all German Communists in Spain, acted as the centuria's
political mentor. 56
In early October Ludwig Renn, a German Communist who had
been living in exile in Switzerland, received the party's permission to
go to Spain. Indeed, according to Renn, the German party actively
encouraged its members who had military experience to offer their
services to the Spanish Popular Front forces. On his arrival in Bar-
celona, Renn reported to PSUC headquarters. There he met Beimler
whom Renn, as a disciplined party member, accepted as his immedi-
ate superior in Spain. Beimler took Renn with him next day to visit
the Thaelmann centuria at the front. Renn recognized several mem-
bers of the centuria as acquaintances made in pre-1933 Berlin, mostly
through mutual Communist activities and organizations. The cen-
turia was operating as a component part of a larger PSUC column.
Renn, a former officer of the German army with World War experi-
ence, felt concern at the poor military disposition of the unit. The
column commander, a Spanish trade-union leader with no military
training, had all his troops in the line. When Renn asked him about
28 COMINTERN ARMY

his reserve, the commander seemed not to understand what he was

talking about. Later Renn expressed his misgivings to Beimler about
the military situation in the sector and his frustration at not being able
to do anything about it. Beimler told him, in effect, not to worry about
the situation in Aragon where nothing of a serious military nature
seemed likely to occur anyway but to go to Madrid where his military
knowledge would be of more value. But, cautioned Beimler, Renn
should not accept any post less than that of battalion commander.
Renn saw no more of the Thaelmann centuria until early November
1936, when the remnants of that unit transferred to Albacete to be
absorbed into the International Brigades. 57
The second major group of Germans in Spain, for the most part
anti-Stalinist Marxists, found a more compatible atmosphere in the
ultrarevolutionary POUM. John Cornford reported a number of Ger-
mans among the unit, as did Franz Borkenau. By December there
were, according to Orwell, several hundred Germans in the POUM
militia and they remained with that unit until it was broken up as a
result of the internecine political struggle within Popular Front Spain
in the summer of 1937. 58
A relatively smaller contingent of Englishmen were to be found in
the Spanish militia. Here too, the main concentrations were in the
PSUC and the POUM. A group of English and Irish with the PSUC
militia in Barcelona called themselves the Tom Mann centuria. 59 This
group, which numbered only some twelve men, consisted almost en-
tirely of Communist party members, the most dominant of whom was
Lorrimer Birch, Cambridge graduate and Communist true believer.
One of the Englishmen who joined this contingent, Keith Scott Wat-
son, arrived in Barcelona in late September 1936. He came into Spain
by train with some fifty French and German recruits from Paris. On
their arrival in Barcelona the group reported to PSUC headquarters
in the Hotel Colon. There, after enjoying a substantial meal in a dining
room filled with militiamen, an officer took them upstairs to an office
marked Department des Etrangers. There each man underwent a
searching interrogation which included questions on their political
affiliations and background. Next day Watson joined his fellow Brit-
ishers at the PSUC barracks at Sarrai, a village several Iniles out of
Barcelona. Personality clashes within the English group finally led to
a number of its members becoming so disillusioned with their political
commissar, Nat Levy, that they sought to depose him. After drawing
up an indictment of Levy's shortcomings and misdeeds, the malcon-
tents sent it to party headquarters in Barcelona with the request that
Levy be replaced. After a lapse of time and a second request for action,
Popular Front Militias 29

Ralph Bates, the representative of the Communist party of Great

Britain in Barcelona, arrived at Sarria. His authority to deal with the
matter was accepted by all and he settled it by removing Levy and
replacing him with Birch. 60 The other English group in Spain was
affiliated with the POUM militia. It numbered between twenty and
thirty men, most of whom were affiliated with the ILP, the English
Marxist revolutionary, but anti-Stalinist, party. 61
In addition to the French, Italians, Germans, and English, a num-
ber of other nationalities formed small units. The Poles, for example,
most of whom had been living in France, formed the Dombrowsky
centuria in the PSUC militia. 62 A few Czechs, Yugoslavs, and others
were also present in these PSUC units. 63
Despite the seeming ubiquity of the foreign elements in the ranks
of the Spanish militias, they remained very few. Even the larger
centurias, the Gastone-Sozzi, Commune de Paris, and Thaelmann,
never numbered more than one or two hundred men each. The for-
eigners scattered through other Spanish militia units also amounted
to only a few hundred. The total number of foreign combatants prior
to the formation of the International Brigades was probably not more
than one thousand. 64 Given the paucity of their numbers and the fact
that they were scattered out singly or in small groups, the military
significance of these foreigners was of necessity minimal. While it is
true that in a few cases foreigners with previous military training and
experience provided leadership for militia units, nowhere did foreign
combatants, singly or in groups, achieve any important military re-
sults. Not until the entry of the International Brigades into the conflict
in November 1936 did foreign combatants have a significant military
impact on the war.
Of the thousand or so foreigners in Spanish militias prior to the
organization of the International Brigades, there were probably more
who were affiliated with Anarchist and POUM units than with Com-
munist ones, and they remained with those columns long after the
International Brigades were organized. 65 Indeed, as late as June 1937,
the Popular Front government issued a decree dealing with this mat-
ter. It directed that all foreigners be incorporated into the Interna-
tional Brigades "except where in some other unit there exists a large
nucleus of foreigners forming a unit, in which case the chief of the unit
might ask for their continuance." 66
Only those foreign units already under Communist control, the
PSUC and Fifth Regiment centurias, were incorporated into the In-
ternational Brigades when the Brigades were formed in late October-
early November 1936. 67 The numbers involved in those centurias
30 CoMINTERN ARMY

which did adhere to the International Brigades were insignificant in

comparison to the influx of volunteers into Spain as a result of the
system set up by the Comintern to recruit men for the Brigades. The
first contingents of recruits for the International Brigades entered
Spain in mid-October. By the end of that month some 3,000 to 4,000
men had arrived and by mid-November, probably between 7,000 and
8,000. 68 In contrast, the centurias that were assimilated into these
Brigades amounted to only a few hundred men. 69 In fact only the
French Commune de Paris centuria of about one hundred men was
even included in the first (XI) International Brigade. The Thaelmann
and Gastone-Sozzi groups were subsequently incorporated into the
XII Brigade. When the numerical paucity of the contribution of the
pre-International Brigade centurias is considered, the orthodox inter-
pretation that they formed the nucleus or origins of the Brigades can
hardly be maintained. 70 Although the veterans of the centurias fur-
nished a number of experienced cadres, the International Brigades
were in no meaningful way an outgrowth of those early foreign
groups. To the contrary, the International Brigades, with their sub-
stantial numbers and their separate military and political structure,
came into existence only with the decision of the Comintern to spon-
sor such a unit. It is therefore misleading and incorrect to say, as the
myth has it, that those early foreigners in Spain were the originators,
nucleus, or vanguard of the International Brigades, thus implying
some direct connection or organic development. It is also misleading
and erroneous to say, as the myth goes, that these early foreigners
were fighting to defend "the Republic" or "for democracy" unless it
is clearly understood that the definition of these terms was "proletar-
ian revolution," "Socialism," "Anarchism," or "Communism."
3 The Comintern
Raises an Army
In conformity with the Kremlin's decisions on its Spanish
policy in September 1936, the Comintern launched a full-scale drive
to recruit an international army to fight in Spain. Within the frame-
work of the Comintern the major direct responsibility and role in the
operation went to the Communist party of France. France's contigu-
ous border with Spain, as well as the convenient fact that France had,
at that time, a sympathetic Popular Front government and a large
Communist party with members sitting in the Chamber of Deputies
made that country the obvious choice for the concentration of recruits
and their transportation into Spain.
Paris quickly became the focal point for a large Comintern delega-
tion representing most of the nationalities of Europe. The well-known
French Communist Andre Marty, a member of both his country's
Chamber of Deputies and the Executive Committee of the Comintern,
assumed direct control over the operation. He was ably assisted by the
Italian Communist stalwart Luigi Longo ("Gallo" in Spain), an effi-
cient operator who arrived in Paris directly from Spain in late Septem-
ber with party orders to help organize the recruitment of volunteers
and a system for transporting them into Spain. In addition to Marty
and Longo, the Italian Giuseppe de Vittorio, the Czech Clement Gott-
wald, the Yugoslav Joseph Broz (later called "Tito"), and numerous
lesser-known Comintern figures directed their efforts toward develop-
ing methods for funneling men from various parts of Europe into
France. 1
Communist party offices and local branches of party-affiliated labor
unions in France served as recruitment and processing centers, the
central office being installed in the maison des syndicats on the Rue
Mathurin-Moreau in Paris. The directors of the enterprise quickly
established concentration points at Marseilles for those men slated to
be sent to Spain by sea, and at Perpignan, a town in the southeast
corner of France near the Spanish border, for those going in by land.
Longo soon returned to Spain where, with the help and political
support of the PSUC, he established a receiving center in the Spanish
border town of Figueras for the recruits as they crossed the frontier
from France. 2
32 COMINTERN ARMY

The Comintern assigned recruitment quotas to the various national

Communist parties on the basis of their membership and sympathizer
potential, and Communist parties throughout the world began using
and expanding their existing organizational networks for recruitment
and transportation purposes. The quotas tended to be higher than
each party could reasonably hope to attain, but the party leaders made
the most strenuous efforts to meet them, assigning party functionaries
to the task of recruitment and impressing on them that successful
performance was a party responsibility of the highest priority. Earl
Browder, for example, emphatically stressed to United States party
functionaries the necessity of providing "a constant stream of rein-
forcements and replacements" to the American contingent of the
Brigade, and Harry Pollitt, Browder's British counterpart said, "We
pledge ourselves" that the 750 British men in the Brigades will soon
"become a thousand." The British Communist Charlotte Haldane,
who became intimately involved in the recruitment process both in
Britain and France, later wrote that the British party "had to make
terrific efforts to raise their volunteers for Spain," and that although
party leader Pollitt was reluctant to recruit young boys and married
men he had no choice but to do so. "His quota had to be filled. " 3
During the first months after recruitment began, the Communists
staunchly denied having any part in it. The party line propagated for
public consumption ran that the Brigades represented a spontaneous
movement of individual volunteers. As the British party writer and
sometimes political commissar in Spain William Rust somewhat am-
biguously put it in his book Britons in Spain, "The International
Brigades arose spontaneously in the minds of men .... from the spon-
taneous movement of the volunteers there naturally arose the decision
to form the International Brigade. " 4 The explanation of spontaneity
continued to be widely propagated to the general public long after the
United States Daily Worker had openly adinitted, as early as Septem-
ber 14, 1937, that the party was in the recruitment business, and after
Browder stated publicly in December of that year that the party was
recruiting men for Spain. 5 As late as April 20, 1938, for example,
Time magazine reported: "European observers incline to believe that
the Communist International and its section, the American Commu-
nist Party, were instrumental in creating the Abraham Lincoln-
Washington outfit, but according to its members it arose
spontaneously in Leftist Spain on Christmas Day, 1936. Around a
campfire were some 90 U.S. Leftists who had simply gone to Spain
as individuals and they formed the nucleus of the battalion."
Comintern Raises an Army 33

Indeed the Communists (and others) have continued to put forth

the spontaneity line when it suits their purpose to romanticize the
Brigades or to picture them as a great ground swell of antifascist
solidarity. A recent version of this approach by a Czech writer went:
"The solidarity of all the workers, of the progressive and democratic
men of all the world, found its highest expression in the formation of
the International Brigades. . . . From all points of the globe men
arrived in Spain to place themselves spontaneously at the service of
the Spanish Republican Army." 6
The Communists had good reasons for concealing their role as
creator of the Brigades. For one thing, the operation entailed numer-
ous possible risks for the party. No one could be sure how the venture
would work out, or if it would work out at all. The military and
political situation in Spain made it highly problematical that, even
with Soviet aid and an influx of foreign fighters, the Popular Front
regime would long survive. The Comintern thus sought to play a
cautious role, just as the Soviet Union was doing in its direct interven-
tion in Spain, in staking its prestige too openly on such a shaky
venture. For another thing, the Communists wanted to camouflage
their efforts at raising an army to fight in Spain in the subdued and
chameleon tones of the Popular Front rather than the bright reds of
International Communism. This meshed the enterprise smoothly into
their general strategy of the time, as well as their specifically Spanish
policy. Earl Browder was simply echoing the broad Popular Front,
antifascist, theme of the party's efforts when he said, "the war in Spain
is a part of the world-wide offensive against fascism of all peaceloving
and democratic people. " 7
The Comintern hoped also to attract not only Communists into
their army but a broad spectrum of antifascists. Thus they needed to
cast a wider ideological net than Communism alone would provide.
As one American party writer (and sometime political commissar in
Spain) put it, "By the initiative of our Party we must draw in every
anti-fascist to the movement ... must draw the Socialist Party into
the movement ... must become the initiators of a new flow of men
into Spain." Here too the Comintern's reasons were several. One
stemmed from the desire to use the Brigades as an instrument for
broadening and strengthening the Popular Front. Indeed the Ameri-
can journalist and active Loyalist sympathizer Louis Fischer was told
by Georgi Dimitroff, then chief of the Comintern, that the party was
anxious to recruit non-Communists in the United States into the
Brigades as a way of strengthening the Popular Front. Yet another,
34 COMINTERN ARMY

and quite practical, reason for wanting to recruit non-Communists

was that the party did not want to see its own ranks decimated by
sending too many of its cadres to Spain. And, finally, party leaders
stressed the value of getting nonparty men into the Brigades as a
method of "politically educating" them into the party. 8
As time went on and the successful defense of Madrid made the
International Brigades a well-known and prestigious military unit, the
Communists found it impossible to completely restrain themselves
from taking their due credit. By the summer of 1937 tributes to the
Comintern and its titular chieftain, Georgi Dimitroff, for their role as
founders of the Brigades began to appear occasionally in the party
press. For example, "Comrade Dimitroff mobilized the Communist
party sections throughout the world so that it was possible for the
International Brigades to come to Spain," said the Brigade's own
Boletfn de Informacion on August 7, 1937. And, in 1938, the official
Comintern organ carried the statement: "The International Brigades
are selected units formed ... in reply to the call of the Communist
International. " 9
Even then the party's stance remained ambiguous. ·The Commu-
nists tried to have it both ways: credit for the Brigades and their
glorious exploits and, at the same time, the Brigades as a spontaneous
effusion of antifascist solidarity. The approach actually taken at any
given time depended on the audience being addressed. To an amazing
degree the Communists succeeded in making the most of both worlds.
In their efforts both to broaden their appeal beyond the ranks of the
party itself and to conduct the recruitment enterprise clandestinely,
the Communists sometimes used various front organizations, con-
trolled by the party but ostensibly unconnected with it. The Friends
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, for example, a party front organiza-
tion designed to alford propagandistic and financial support for the
American contingent of the Brigades, served the additional purpose
of recruitment agency. The party in the United States also set up the
American Society for Technical Aid to Spain, a front organization
designed primarily for recruitment purposes. The Society operated
branches in various cities around the country which printed leaflets
and ran advertisements in newspapers for men to go to Spain to "take
the place of skilled workers who had gone to the front." A number
of men were apparently recruited and sent to Spain, ostensibly to do
skilled jobs, only to find themselves in the Brigades. 10
The Communists also extended their recruitment efforts into the
potentially productive areas of the universities and labor unions. Ac-
cording to one American who went to Spain, "The Communist Party
Comintern Raises an Army 35

has units ... in all the colleges and universities in the United States,
and these and other Communist organizations have been very active
in getting volunteers for the Spanish Army [the Brigades]." He stated,
however, that "the Communist Party is careful to do nothing offi-
cially, but operates through agents who pretend to be acting entirely
upon their own responsibility as individuals, and not in connection
with any organization of any kind." 11
The experiences of individuals going through the Comintern's re-
cruitment and processing system naturally varied in detail, but the
general pattern proved much the same. If the potential recruit was a
party member he had to secure the approval of his party superiors.
In the case of rank-and-file members such approval was usually read-
ily granted. Indeed the party put great pressure on members to volun-
teer and in the case of functionaries sometimes ordered them to do
so. 12 Despite the efforts to attract non-Communists, the majority of
those who volunteered were party members. 13 As British party
worker Haldane commented, "The vanguard were Communist Party
members under discipline to show an example to their fellow proletar-
ians."14 In some cases the party ordered members to join the Brigade
as a "control task," a disciplinary measure by which those in bad
grace with the party could prove their loyalty and achieve forgiveness
for their shortcomings. 15 On the other hand, party functionaries were
sometimes denied permission to go to Spain because the party felt they
could not be spared from their activities at home. 16 For example, an
American Communist who had been assigned to party work in the
waterfront section of New York City approached party hierarch, Fred
Brown, and told him he wanted to volunteer for the Brigades. Brown
replied that as a disciplined party member he would go only where
he was sent and that he should return to his assignment on the
waterfront. Later this same man was told by Brown that the party had
decided the time had come for him to go to Spain, and he did. 17
Nonparty men interested in joining the Brigades had, as a first step,
to establish contact with a party recruiter. The recruiter directed the
prospect to one of the party's clandestine enlistment offices where he
was questioned by one or more party agents as to his reasons for
wanting to join, his background, his politics, and so forth. In England,
a "dour member of the Party leadership known as 'Robbie' " per-
formed this task. He interviewed each would-be volunteer and "tried
to weed out obvious adventurers, fascists, and spies ... he was also
the contact man with the C.I. [Comintern] organization in Paris, to
which all volunteers were sent." 18 The party investigated the political
background of each prospective volunteer following this first inter-
36 COMINTERN ARMY

view. If approved, the recruit was sent for a physical examination

from a "politically reliable" physician. If found satisfactory, he re-
ceived instructions for proceeding to the next link in the chain which
would lead eventually to Spain. 19
The procedures and techniques for moving the recruits to the
Comintern's central concentration point in Paris varied, depending on
the different areas from which they were drawn. For example, Nick
Gillain, a Belgian of no particular political persuasion, heard, in the
fall of 1936, that foreign volunteers were being solicited to fight in
Spain. Assuming that the Loyalist government was doing the recruit-
ing and that the logical place to apply would be a Spanish consulate,
Gillain crossed into France and presented himself to the Spanish
consul in Lille. The consul received him courteously but informed him
that the Loyalist government was not involved and that he knew
nothing officially about the business of foreign volunteers. As Gillain
walked toward the door on his way out, however, the Spaniard said
quietly, "Go to the maison des syndicats. You will get what you want
there." At the maison des syndicats Gillain found a scene of lively
activity. "You want to go to Spain?" asked a "Comrade Burneton."
Gillain answered affirmatively and, after a brief questioning, was
assigned to a group of about twenty men and sent to Paris. On
reaching Paris the group went to the central recruitment center, the
maison des syndicates in Rue Mathurin-Moreau. He and his group
quickly went through the induction process and soon left Paris with
a contingent of some five hundred men bound for Perpignan, the last
stop in France for those going into Spain by land. In Perpignan he and
his fellow volunteers received identity documents covered with official
looking stamps and Spanish names. "If they [the French border
guards] ask you why you don't speak Spanish," a functionary told
him, "say you left the country when you were a baby." That proved
to be an unnecessary precaution, for Gillain's contingent crossed the
frontier with no questions asked. 20
Those men recruited in central and Eastern Europe, most of whom
had no passports and whose movements were thus illegal, had to be
smuggled into France via the underground-railway systems estab-
lished for that purpose by the Comintern. The future Yugoslav
strongman, Joseph Broz (Tito), was instrumental in creating the
apparatus for transporting his compatriots and other Balkan nationals
into France. Brotz himself seems to have been among the Comintern
delegation in Paris, while direct responsibility for the system in Yugo-
slavia fell to Blagoye Parovic, a member of the Central Committee
of the Yugoslav Communist party and subsequently a political com-
Comintern Raises an Army 37

missar in the International Brigades. 21 Similarly, an "underground"

route for moving volunteers from Poland to France via Czechoslo-
vakia was directed by Leon Chajn. 22
In most of the western nations Communist parties existed legally
and, although the parties were careful not to admit officially that they
were involved in the recruitment enterprise, at least in the beginning,
they carried on the operation more or less openly. In Great Britain
the party established its central processing center in an office in King
Street, London. Recruits underwent an interrogation and investiga-
tion there and, having been accepted, waited until a new contingent
had been collected and the party was ready to send them across the
channel. The movement of the British into France presented a few
problems. Passports were unnecessary since with the purchase of a
forty-eight-hour return-trip excursion ticket British citizens could
enter France freely. Each contingent traveled under the authority of
a party-designated leader who, in most cases, returned to London
after turning over his charges to party functionaries in France. 23
Among the early volunteers from Britain, Peter Elstob and John
Sommerfield later recorded their recollections of the Spanish adven-
ture. Elstob went through a complicated and highly conspiratorial
process in England, being shuflled from place to place and from
person to person. First names only were used, usually preceded by
"Comrade." After being questioned by numerous comrades in tum,
Elstob finally received a letter of recommendation and the address of
a bookshop in the Gare du Nord in Paris. There, as instructed, he
asked for a "Comrade LeGros," who subsequently questioned him
and told him to sign some papers. The Englishman was then directed
to yet another Paris address where, after presenting his credentials,
he entered a large cellar room in which he joined some two hundred
closely packed men whom he later described as "the choicest selection
of Parisian sewer dregs that I had ever seen." A man stood on a table
haranguing the audience. He finished with a "magnificent gesture,
pointing upstairs," and "they all tore up the ladder ... singing the
'Intemationale.' " At that time Elstob signed yet more documents and
received fifty francs and instructions to report to the train station at
ten o'clock. 24
John Sommerfield, a young Communist, reported to the recruit-
ment office in Paris with a small group sent over from England. They
found a room filled with men talking in a Babel of languages. The
majority seemed to be Frenchmen and Poles and some were, thought
Sommerfield, "pretty tough." At one end of the room two harassed-
looking men sat behind a table strewn with forms printed in French
38 COMINTERN ARMY

and Spanish. Sommerfield and the others filled out a number of ques-
tionnaires stating their ages and military experience, their jobs, and
their politics. Then he and some friends went out and purchased small
pistols, which, said Sommerfield, were "good for the morale." They
left Paris for Spain within the week. 25
In the United States the concentration point for the volunteers was
New York City. Men recruited in various parts of the country re-
ceived money or tickets for their transportation to New York and
instructions on where to report upon arrival there. 26 The party used
the quarters of various front organizations such as the Hungarian
Workers Club as meeting centers where party functionaries, occasion-
ally including Earl Browder himself and visiting Communist celebri-
ties such as the Englishman Ralph Bates (fresh from Spain), en-
tertained the recruits with political speeches and a perfunctory sort
of military drill while they awaited their departure for Europe. 27
While in New York the Americans procured passports and bought
clothing and other items that they were to take with them to Spain.
Arrangements for the voyage to France were made by the party
through Intourist, the Soviet travel agency.
The first group of American volunteers left New York aboard the
S.S. Normandie on December 26, 1936. Typical of the recruiting
procedures in the United States was the experience of a member of
that first contingent, William Herrick. A member of the Communist
party in New York, he offered his services to the section organizer at
party headquarters in lower Manhattan. Mter an interview the sec-
tion organizer told Herrick that he would be contacted. A short time
later he had a second interview, this time in the presence of Paul
Brown, a Comintem agent. 28 The section organizer vouched for Her-
rick's reliability, and Herrick began reporting regularly to a hall in
Manhattan where, along with a growing group of recruits, he engaged
in a perfunctory sort of drill and heard numerous addresses from
party luminaries. 29
Other members of the first American contingent were Robert Glad-
nick and Morris Maken. Gladnick, a member of the Young Commu-
nist League, was working at the time for the party on the New York
waterfront. He applied directly to Paul Brown for permission to go
to Spain. After being accepted he, like Herrick, attended drills and
listened to speeches at the hall. When party member Morris Maken
approached his section organizer about going to Spain the section
organizer directed him to Bill Lawrence, a party functionary active
in the recruitment operation in New York. Mter being cleared by the
Comintern Raises an Army 39

party Maken too attended drills and training sessions which he later
characterized as "a joke." 30
Others went by a somewhat more circuitous route. On a night in
March 1937, the wife of William Ryan brought home a leaflet issued
by the American Society for Technical Aid to Spain. Ryan, a Commu-
nist, "recognized the party's style in the leaflet" even though it men-
tioned neither the party nor fighting in Spain. The following day Ryan
called at the offices of the Society in Milwaukee. When asked for
references Ryan gave the name of a lawyer who was a member of his
party section. When asked about political affiliation, Ryan said he was
a member of the Communist party. The representative then asked if
Ryan's skills included "an ability to handle a rifle?" Ryan said, "This
is, of course, for the army, isn't it?" The answer was yes. Ryan
returned to the office a few days later and the Society's representative
directed him to a physician for a medical examination. The doctor
gave him a "very cursory" check and said, "Well, comrade, you will
go into the trenches." Having cleared the preliminary hurdles, Ryan
received instructions to come to a "little send-off party" at which
some "fellow travelers and liberals would be present." The party
functionary warned him and his fellow volunteers not to use "radical
phrases" but to talk only about fighting fascism. The party proved a
success. Ryan and other recruits made short speeches and a collection
netted part of the money needed to "get the boys to Spain." Next day
Ryan's group took the bus for New York. There they reported to a
hall where they saw "a couple of hundred men from all over the
country, and Canada, Mexico and Puerto Rico." They left New York
on the S.S. Manhattan under the orders of a student from the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin who gave them tickets and distributed the fifteen
dollars per man necessary to enter France. Later during the same
month William McCuiston sailed for France with another contingent.
McCuiston, once a Communist, had become disenchanted with the
party and sometime in 1935 had dropped out. He wanted to go to
Spain, however, so he contacted the party section organizer in New
York City. Three or four weeks elapsed before he learned that he was
to be allowed to go. 31
By July 1937 the party in the United States was apparently finding
it difficult to find enough recruits. During that month John Seacat, an
agent of the Friends of Abraham Lincoln Brigade in Milwaukee,
approached William Harris, a non-Communist, asking if he would be
interested in going to Spain. Seacat informed Harris that a dire need
existed for volunteers. Harris accepted the idea and Seacat gave him
40 COMINTERN ARMY

money for transportation from Milwaukee to New York. After going

through the usual procedure in New York, Harris sailed on the S.S.
Washington within the month. At about the same time party member
Edward Horan approached a section organizer for the party in
Chicago about the possibility of going to Spain. The section organizer
welcomed Horan's offer to volunteer and told him to "recruit as many
men as possible to go to Spain who were not Communist Z' He empha-
sized to Horan that the party wanted to recruit as many nonparty
members as possible for the Brigades. Horan himself, as a party
member, had to get the party's approval before being allowed to go.
He reported first to Eugene Berchtold, the party organizer for Illinois
(and also Chicago secretary of the newly organized front organiza-
tion, the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade). Berchtold sent
Horan to see Irving Herman, a party organizer in Chicago who was
handling the recruitment operation there. Herman told Horan that
since he, Horan, was already doing important party work in the Food
Workers Union, the matter would have to be checked out with party
leaders to see if Horan could be spared. Later Horan received the
word that the Cook County party leaders had decided that he should
go to Spain. Herman then arranged for Horan's physical examination
and gave him money to obtain a passport and to travel to New York
where he was to report to a party official at the Hungarian Workers
Club. He sailed for France on the S.S. Laconia in late September 1937
with a group of eighteen men. 32
The aura of secrecy surrounding the entire enterprise no doubt
added to the sense of adventure of the men involved, but its effective-
ness may be doubted. In both England and the United States the
police authorities were well aware of what was going on. Although
both countries had statues against recruitment for, or enlistment in,
foreign armies within their sovereign jurisdictions, the laws were not,
in the case of the Spanish affair, enforced. It would have been difficult
to make a case that would stand up in court since no official enlistment
documents existed. And, perhaps more important, the strong passions
aroused by the Spanish war would have made any serious attempt at
suppressing the recruitment operation unrewarding politically. At
any rate, no serious efforts were made to halt the operation and no
prosecutions were attempted against those who fought in Spain. 33
Nevertheless, the clandestine nature of the enterprise continued to be
emphasized by the party functionaries in control. On the voyage from
New York to France group leaders ordered the men to maintain
complete secrecy as to their destination, to avoid contact with the
other passengers, and to try to act like tourists. At the time of disem-
Comintern Raises an Army 41

barkation onto French soil the effectiveness of the conspiratorial tone

of the enterprise seemed dubious to some. Maken, for example, had
his first doubts about the "much vaunted efficiency of the Communist
party" when he noticed that "every single man carried precisely the
same ... kind of imitation leather suitcase. Ninety of us pretending
not to know each other.... going [according to their passports] to
Austria . . . Poland . . . and all the four comers of the earth with
identical baggage." That situation evoked comment also by the
American volunteer John Gates who arrived late in February 1937.
"The French customs inspectors took one look at our suitcases and
our fleece-lined coats and congratulated us," he said. Identical bag-
gage was still in style a full year later when Alvah Bessie arrived in
France. 34
In France all volunteers came under the jurisdiction and authority
of the French party. Numerous representatives of other national
Communist parties worked within the apparatus in France and exer-
cised a special responsibility for the men coming in from their own
countries. One such person was the Englishwoman Charlotte Hal-
dane. Her ability to speak French, a rarity within the ranks of the
British party, led to her being asked to work in Paris to handle the
contingents that arrived from England. On her arrival in Paris she
reported to an address in the heart of what she called the "red"
working-class district. This, as it turned out, was the headquarters of
some of the French labor unions. On entering the designated room she
saw several men seated around a table. Asking for Comrade Max as
instructed, she was told to wait outside. After a time Comrade Max
approached her. He came from Prague, was "a prominent member of
the Czech C.P. and branch of the C.l.," spoke fluent French with a
strong Eastern European accent, and was acting as "the chief respon-
sible comrade for the LB. [International Brigade] organization in
Paris, under the general direction ofthe French Party." 35 After satis-
fying himself that her party credentials were valid, Max told her that
he hoped she would stay in Paris indefinitely to help with the English.
"We've asked London again and again, but all the comrades they've
sent have been quite unsuitable," he said. "If they're any good they
can't be spared from London, and those they can spare are useless.
And none of them know French." Haldane agreed to stay. On their
way to a restaurant Max complained of the difficulties they were
having keeping the recruits out of the many drinking dives and broth-
els in the district, especially the English and Americans who usually
arrived with more money than the others. At a large working-class
restaurant, Max led her upstairs where she saw many men seated at
42 CoMINTERN ARMY

long dining tables. The men were all recruits for the Brigades and
spoke "every European language ... from Finnish and Latvian to
Dutch and Walloon." Max led her into a smaller room at the rear
which, as he told her, was reserved for the "responsibles." Entering
the room, Max introduced her to a number of men, among whom
were a German, a Belgian, a Pole, and an Italian. All were introduced
by first names only, the three Americans being Jack, Eric, and Lee.
Later Max informed her that she would be paid 300 francs a month
from the coffers of her own party. When she later tried to refuse the
money, which she did not need, her party superior insisted that she
take it. "It's not a matter of who gets it," he said. "That's what we
pay, and you earn it."
Settling rapidly into her work, Haldane became well acquainted
with the Americans on the staff. She described Jack 36 as "a profes-
sional Communist, a Marxist missionary ... a trusted lieutenant of
the American leaders, Earl Browder and Robert Minor." He had been
"among the first chosen to go to Spain" and had led one of the first
contingents of Americans to France. He had been bitterly disap-
pointed when the party ordered him to remain in France rather than
go on into Spain. Party orders, however, were to be obeyed unques-
tioningly and he had remained to head the American delegation in
Paris. Jack told her of the difficulties he had had with the French party
bureaucrats. Apparently all was not proletarian brotherhood and
international solidarity between the French Communists in charge of
the operation and the various other nationalities, especially the
Americans. The French, according to Jack, had bullied the Ameri-
cans, as they did all the others, until Jack arrived on the scene. He
had had several heated arguments and had "put the French in their
place," always making sure to "base all his arguments with them
strictly on the Party line." In the final analysis, however, there could
be no question but that ultimate control lay with "the dogmatic edicts
of the French Party Executive," which had been delegated final au-
thority by the Comintern. Haldane summarized her observations and
feelings on this subject by writing of the "positive hatred felt by all
the foreign internationals for the French Party bureaucrats under
whose domination they were obliged to work." 37
Haldane's work entailed receiving the English contingents as they
arrived in Paris, seeing to their lodging (in "shabby unobtrusive hotels
in the quarter whose owners' discretion and loyalty could be relied
on"), and in general overseeing them during their usually brief so-
journ in France. Specifically this included lecturing the recruits on the
dangers of drunkenness, brawling, or visiting the brothels. So that
Comintern Raises an Army 43

none of these temptations would become overwhelming to the En-

glish, the party leaders decreed that the recruits' money should be
confiscated and that each man should be given ten francs a day,
enough only for a pack of cigarettes and a beer or two. Her duties also
included giving the recruits a "political peptalk," speaking with each
one individually and then reporting to Max on their "political and
personal reliability." Finally she acted as interpreter for them when
the guides, who were to take them through France and into Spain,
gave them instructions concerning the trip.
Among the most controversial and unpopular rulings of the Comin-
tern directorate of the recruitment enterprise was the policy of confis-
cating passports. Many of the volunteers had no passports to begin
with. But among those who, like the Americans, did have passports,
the demand that they be surrendered caused much dismay and dis-
cord. Haldane wrote that in the cases where British passports were
taken she made sure they were returned to England via a British party
functionary. Whether in fact the passports ever got back to England
she had no way of knowing. She recounted an episode in which she
accidentally took an attache case belonging to Max and found it filled
with passports taken from Czech volunteers. The Soviet intelligence
officer Krivitsky said that the policy on passports came from the
NKVD who took advantage of the opportunity to acquire legal pass-
ports which, with a little expert doctoring, would serve their needs in
moving agents in and out of the countries involved, and that many of
them were actually used in this way. 38
The NKVD also apparently exercised a direct role in the policing
of the recruiting process. The Comintern apparatus clearly attempted,
through interviews, interrogations, questionnaires, and investigations,
to screen out what from its point of view were undesirable or unreli-
able individuals. According to some who were in a position to know,
including General Krivitsky and the onetime German Communist
hierarch Ruth Fischer, this operation fell under the purview of the
NKVD. 39 That various interviews, interrogations, and checks were
made on the volunteers in their own countries, in France, and in Spain
was amply borne out by the experiences and testimony of many who
went through the system. The American volunteer Hecht, for exam-
ple, after having been screened by a party review board in the United
States went through another interrogation by a committee that in-
cluded two Americans at recruitment headquarters in Paris. The same
procedure applied to the American volunteer Horan, a party function-
ary who had been appointed leader of his contingent while en route
from the United States to France. He was questioned in Paris by a
44 COMINTERN ARMY

panel that included an American called Jack (probably the same Jack
reported by Haldane) as to the political reliability of the men in his
contingent. And, on arrival in Figueras, he was questioned once more
by Tony De Maio, an American later reputed to have been an NKVD
agent in Spain. 40
While most of those who left records of their experiences in going
through the recruitment process mention the various interviews and
interrogations involved, they have not mentioned anything about the
NKVD. This would be as expected. Few, if any, of the rank-and-file
volunteers would have had any reason to know that they were under
the watchful eye of the Soviet secret police. The interrogations were
usually conducted by ordinary party functionaries, sometimes even
under the camouflage of one of the party's front organizations. Indeed
a few of the recruits, at least among the non-Communist ones, seem
never to have realized that they were dealing with a Comintem ap-
paratus, much less one under NKVD surveillance. 41 Highly placed
party functionaries who may well have been aware of the NKVD's
role would not have mentioned it publicly. British party writer Rust,
for example, brushed all this off lightly by saying simply, "After a
political and medical examination in London, recruits went on to
Paris, where they were again examined." Those less highly placed,
even when they were part of the recruitment system, quite probably
never knew of the NKVD role. Charlotte Haldane, for example, had
among her various responsibilities in Paris the task of reporting to her
superiors on the "political and personal reliability" of the recruits who
arrived from Britain but apparently had no idea of NKVD involve-
ment.42
If we consider the all-pervasiveness and the virtual omnipotence of
the NKVD in Communist affairs during the period of the Spanish war
(the great purges were under way in Russia and the NKVD was
certainly active in Spain), it would be stranger to think it was not
involved in the Comintem's recruitment activities than the contrary
--especially since the Communists were particularly affected during
this period with a hypersuspiciousness regarding any type of "left
deviationism." They were also very worried about persons with these
opinions slipping into and corrupting their army in Spain. An obvious
step would have been to try to eliminate such persons before they ever
got in the Brigades at all, and for an operation ofthat type, what better
instrument than the NKVD.
The actual movement of men from France into Spain proved rela-
tively simple. By December 1936 the Comintem apparatus was put-
ting several hundred men per day into the country by the overland
Comintern Raises an Army 45

route. Train number seventy-seven, which left the Quai d'Orsay sta-
tion in Paris in the evening and arrived at Perpignan the following
morning, became widely known as the "train of the volunteers," or
the "red express," because of the large numbers of volunteers it regu-
larly carried. 43 •
Elstob's journey from Paris to Figueras was fairly typical. He left
Paris with a contingent of some two hundred volunteers whom he
characterized as "one hundred and ninety-seven Apaches, two Ger-
man doctors and I. " 44 During the train ride through France, the
Frenchmen sang wildly and waved to the people along the way, many
of whom returned the clenched fist salute, 45 making it clear that they
knew who the men on the train were and where they were going. The
party functionaries who met them upon their arrival in Perpignan
stressed the necessity of secrecy and instructed the men to stroll
casually, in groups of twos and threes, to the buses waiting to take
them across the border into Spain. That advice, however, was ignored
by numbers of the Frenchmen, some of whom had brought their own
supply of liquid refreshment along and were in high spirits. Fifty or
so formed up in a column and marched down the street with clenched
fists held high and singing the Internationale at the top of their voices.
The leader of the marchers, a huge Frenchman called Jean, who had
been "pleasantly pie-eyed since leaving Paris," scorned the idea of
secrecy. He seemed to want all southern France to know where they
were going. As it turned out the stress on secrecy proved unnecessary.
The local gendarme carefully turned his back on the whole affair. 46
The buses carrying them to Figueras on the Spanish side of the
border pulled out of Perpignan that evening. When they approached
the frontier the driver turned out the lights inside the bus and the men
became quiet. The French border guard carried out a perfunctory
inspection and asked no embarrassing questions. Indeed, as the bus
rolled past, he smiled and gave the clenched fist salute. 47 On their
arrival at Figueras they were welcomed by what Elstob called a "lively
little man" who mounted a large stone in the courtyard of the Castello
de San Fernando where they were to be quartered, raised his clenched
fist in the familiar salute, and shouted, "Camaradas, Salud!" 48 Pan-
demonium followed. Then the little man who, it seemed, was the
commander of the fortress, gave a short speech of welcome, conclud-
ing with the announcement that they would soon be fed. After eating,
the men settled down in their sleeping quarters in the fortress which
proved to be so filthy and vermin-invested that Elstob ended by sleep-
ing outside on the grass. The Castello de San Fernando was an ancient
fortress with massive walls enclosing numerous buildings and anum-
46 COMINTERN ARMY

ber of courtyards of various sizes. During the five or six days they
remained there, the men had no duties assigned and their favorite
pastime quickly became drinking in the cafe in the village of Figueras
and admiring the charms of the waitress, Rosita. 49
The second route into Spain, by sea, led from Marseilles to a
Spanish Mediterranean port, usually Valencia or Alicante. The En-
glish volunteer Sommerfield left Paris with a contingent of several
hundred men, among whom were French, Polish, German, and Ital-
ian. Their train arrived at Marseilles the next morning and the recruits
spent the day hidden in the back rooms of cafes and cellars in the
working-class district. That night taxi cabs picked them up and took
them to the waterfront where they boarded a Spanish ship. The ship,
carrying some 800 men, steamed out of Marseilles that same night.
The next morning they passed Barcelona, faintly visible along the
horizon, and continued down the Spanish coast. On the following day
they made port at Alicante in southern Spain. The recruits disem-
barked and marched, singing the Internationale, through cheering
crowds. 5°
Another Englishman, Esmond Romilly, also went to Spain via the
sea route, having signed up for the Brigades in Marseilles. He em-
barked on the Spanish ship Mar Caspio, along with some six hundred
other recruits, mostly German and French. The group included a
number of what Romilly called "very tough guy~x-foreign legion-
naires." The ship put in at Valencia where the recruits marched, also
singing the Internationale, to a barracks where they assembled in a
courtyard and listened to a welcoming speech from Andre Marty, the
political chief of the International Brigades. Marty told them that
they would soon depart by train to join the International Column. 5 1
Later, in February 1937, the French government officially closed
the frontier with Spain in compliance with the nonintervention agree-
ment. From that time, moving men into Spain became more difficult.
Now they had to slip across the border through rugged Pyrenees
trails, often at night, to elude French border patrols and some landed
in French jails when apprehended trying to cross illegally. 52 The
official closing of the frontier, however, proved no insurmountable
obstacle to the Comintern in moving men into Spain. Except for
sporadic outbursts of efficiency the French police and border patrols
showed a general lack of interest in stringent enforcement. Indeed,
through its hastily improvised but steadily improved apparatus, the
Comintern moved some 6,000 to 8,000 men into Spain by the end of
November 1936 and between 25,000 and 30,000 by mid-February
1937. 53
4 The Defense of Madrid
The inexorable advance of the Nationalist columns toward
Madrid throughout the month of October created widespread pessi-
mism among Loyalist supporters. The fight seemed to have gone from
the militia. Most observers agreed with Pravda correspondent Kolt-
sov who lamented to his diary, "How is it possible with such troops,
and with such commanders ... to defend Madrid." 1
And yet, not all the advantages lay with the Nationalists. Their
military position was, in fact, extremely vulnerable. Not only were
they numerically weak and physically exhausted from the rigors of
their long campaign from the south, but their long and exposed flanks
presented a constant threat. 2 The Loyalist forces, on the other hand,
were not only more numerous but had the advantages of occupying
the ready~made fortress afforded by the city itself. What they needed
to make these advantages effective was firm direction, determined
will, professional military expertise, and modem technology. Beneath
the surface of continued defeat and spreading pessimism, these re-
quirements were gradually being supplied by the Soviet Union and its
Comintem apparatus.
The Soviet decision to intervene, in late September, had brought a
widely publicized message from Stalin to the prime minister, Largo
Caballero, which contained the much quoted phrase, "The cause of
Spain is the cause of all advanced and progressive mankind." More
important, the decision had brought Soviet tanks and planes, a corps
of Red army advisers and technicians, and, ultimately, the Interna-
tional Brigades. 3
During that period, too, preparation of the defense of Madrid
became the chief business of the formidable Comintem contingent in
the capital and its faithful servant, the Communist party of Spain. 4
Fifth Regiment headquarters became a beehive of activity, the focal
point for the party's campaign to defend the capital. Propaganda
designed to stir resistance poured forth. Instructions, slogans, com-
mands, exhortations bombarded the people of Madrid through the
party press, colorful wall posters, loudspeakers, mass meetings, and
street comer harangues. 5 As early as October 10 Comandante Carlos
(Vidali), chief political commissar of the Fifth Regiment, declared:
"We give the guarantee that Madrid is unconquerable.... Madrid
will not be taken by the enemy come what may." 6 The regiment's
48 COMINTERN ARMY

propaganda stressed that city street fighting was a different thing

entirely from fighting in the open country and that if every house were
turned into a fortress, every window were a gun port, the city could
not be taken. 7 The Communist party hierarchs, Ibarruri, Diaz, and
Checa, made the grand gesture of personally helping to build fortifica-
tions so as to inspire the people of Madrid to emulate them. On a more
practical level the party functionary Enrique Castro Delgado orga-
nized special squads to terrorize and suppress, through nightly arrests
and liquidations, any potential fifth-column activity in Madrid. Mean-
while the party issued manifestos exhorting the people of the city to
"Make Madrid the tomb of Fascism," and while Andre Marty wrote
of"Madrid-The Verdun ofDemocracy," the slogan "No Pasaran"
became the watchword of a good part of the world. 8
Despite all that, however, the Nationalist columns continued to
drive relentlessly forward. By the first days of November they were
within five miles of the center of the city and the end seemed im-
minent. Indeed so desperate did the prospects appear that, on No-
vember 6, the Loyalist government fled to Valencia, leaving the
fate of the capital in the hands of a hastily composed Junta de
Defensa.
When the Largo Caballero cabinet left Madrid it did so with little
hope that the city could be held. An episode reported by the Commu~
nist commander Lister indicated that the Loyalist high command had
decided to abandon Madrid to the Nationalists and that it was the
Communists who determined otherwise. On November 6 Lister re-
ceived orders from General Pozas, recently appointed commander of
the central zone (which included Madrid). According to Lister these
orders were pursuant to the decision of the Loyalist government to
withdraw its forces from Madrid. Lister refused to carry out the order
and reported the situation to Communist party headquarters in Ma-
drid. Jose Diaz, general secretary of the party, countermanded the
order of Pozas and told Lister that the party was assuming responsi-
bility for defending Madrid on its own authority. Lister then pro-
ceeded to ignore the commands of his military superior and to act on
the orders of the Communist party. 9
As for the Junta de Defensa, virtually all observers agree that it was
thoroughly dominated by the Communist apparatus in Madrid. 10 The
Communists, after all, had the organization, the discipline, the will,
and the determination to defend the city to the last drop of Spanish
blood. Moreover, they had control of most of the effective military
power at the disposal of the capital's defenders, the Fifth Regiment,
the Soviet tanks and planes and guns, the technical proficiency of the
Defense of Madrid 49

Red army advisers, and, finally, the International Brigades. The old
Spanish general in nominal command of the Junta, Jose Miaja, pro-
vided a convenient figurehead for the Communists. Their propaganda
cast him as a hero, the doughty old defender of the Republic. This
myth served their purpose at the time, but they have since been less
kind, as have others, in their evaluation of the old general. The still
loyal Communist Lister, writing in the 1960s, agreed with defector
Castro Delgado in this, if in nothing else. 11 The military command
in the Madrid sector devolved, in fact, almost entirely on the Soviet
staff headed by General Goriev. 12
It was against this background of chaos and confusion that the first
of the International Brigades entered the Spanish war as combatants.
Just who was responsible for ordering the Internationals into action
has remained obscure, as has much else about the defense of Madrid
during that chaotic period. But the evidence clearly points to the
Communist apparatus which was in de facto control of the capital.
Brigade hierarch Luigi Longo did not say from whom the order came.
Rather he said that "the comrades of the Spanish Communist Party
made an urgent appeal to the International volunteers to come to the
aid of imperiled Madrid." The Spanish Communist Castro Delgado
also recalled that it was the Communist party (and more specifically
himself and Vittorio Vidali) who were responsible for the Internation-
als coming to Madrid's defense. 13
Others have held that it was General Goriev, the Soviet officer
directing the military defense of the city, who ordered the Brigade to
Madrid. 14 This conclusion seems most reasonable, considering the
real relationship between Goriev and Miaja and the real relationship
between Goriev (representing Soviet authority) and the Brigade com-
mand. The organization and command of the International Brigades
dovetailed neatly into the larger Soviet-Comintern machinery in
Spain. Also, it is quite reasonable, assuming that the decision did
come from Goriev, that his orders to the Brigade command would be
accompanied by an appeal from the Spanish Communist party as a
convenient smokescreen for the somewhat dubious procedure of a
Soviet general issuing orders against the directives of the government
that he was supposed to be serving as an adviser. Regardless of the
source of the order to commit the Internationals to combat, the
Brigade directorate did move the first contingent of its troops (the XI
International Brigade) into the Madrid area immediately. That such
troops existed and were available for use resulted from the strenuous
efforts of the Comintern apparatus in general and of the Brigade
hierarchy in particular over the preceding few weeks.
50 COMINTERN ARMY

As soon as the Comintern recruitment and transportation systems

had been set in motion in France, Luigi Longo returned to Spain.
There, in early October, through the influence and efforts of various
components of the Communist apparatus, he rapidly put together the
essential necessities for receiving, feeding, quartering, and clothing
the first contingents of volunteers coming in from France. Working
through the Communist party in Catalonia (PSUC), Longo received
permission to use the fortress at Figueras as the concentration point
for the men coming into Spain by land. Then he hurried on to the
Spanish capital where he conferred with leading Communist party
figures. Jose Diaz, chief of the Spanish party, assured Longo that he
and the other Communist members of the Popular Front cabinet
would use their influence to see to it that the needs of the Internation-
als would be met. Diaz also suggested that Longo go directly to see
the prime minister, Largo Caballero, in order to offer officially to the
government the services of the arriving volunteers. Longo, however,
thought it would be better to put that off until later, when he could
lead a delegation for that purpose. 15
The first and most pressing requirement facing Longo at that point
was to find a satisfactory location for a base of operations for the
Internationals. The Comintern had no intention of seeing its army
based in Catalonia and Aragon, strongholds of Anarchosyndicalism
and Catalan separatism. Madrid was the focus and fulcrum of Com-
munist strength in Spain and the Comintern was determined to estab-
lish their Brigades in that zone of operations. Longo solved his
problem with the aid and advice of Enrique Lister and Vittorio Vidali,
commander and chief political commissar respectively of the Fifth
Regiment. The regiment had a base in the town of Albacete, a location
well situated to the Brigades' needs along the main railroad line
between Madrid and Valencia. Lister and Vidali offered to make their
organization there available to Longo and the Internationals. With
that problem solved and a letter of introduction to the Fifth Regiment
commander in Albacete, Longo left Madrid and arrived at Albacete
on October 12. The chiefs of the Fifth Regiment in Albacete, includ-
ing one Barneto, a Comintern functionary whom Longo had known
previously in Moscow, cooperated fully in placing their facilities and
personnel at Longo's disposal. 18 This personnel included a number of
non-Spanish Comintern men who had been active in the organization
and direction of the Fifth Regiment and who now transferred part or
all of their activities to the Brigades. 17 It also included several Red
army officers who, while maintaining a low profile, directed their
expertise toward the Brigades. 18
Defense of Madrid 51

Meanwhile, the Comintern organization in France had performed

its function successfully and the first contingents of volunteers were
on their way to Spain. The Spanish ship Ciudad de Barcelona landed
the first of the volunteers who came via the sea route from Marseilles
at the Spanish Mediterranean port of Alicante on October 13. That
group, some 500 strong, entrained for Albacete that night and arrived
there on the following day. On October 15 the first contingents from
Figueras marched into Albacete and new groups of from 200 to 300
each came in almost daily thereafter. 19
With the arrival of the Internationals in Albacete, a Comintern
political directorate took control. Chief among these party stalwarts
was Andre Marty. Marty, a charter member of the Communist party
of France, had, as a young seaman, played a role in the mutiny of the
French fleet operating against the Bolshevik regime in the Black Sea
in 1919. By that action, for which he served four and one-half years
in prison, he established himself with the Bolshevik leaders and
became a Communist folk hero. He had lived for a period in the Soviet
Union where he had been lionized and a number of Soviet factories
were named for him. A devout Stalinist, he never showed the least
inclination to deviate from the party line as laid down in Moscow and
he seems to have been one of the few non-Russian Communists in
whom Stalin had any confidence. An official biographical sketch of
Marty, which appeared in the party press in December 1936, stressed
the fact that Marty had always been a "staunch Leninist" and had
never shown either "Right opportunism" nor "Left deviationism." As
a member of the executive committee of the Comintern, it continued,
Marty was "taking part in the leadership of the whole world Commu-
nist movement" and was among the first to "organize aid for his
Spanish brothers." 20
By the 1930s Marty had become a leading member ofthe Commu-
nist party of France, a member of the executive committee of the
Comintern, a member of the French Chamber of Deputies, and a
Comintern agent working for the Soviet military intelligence ap-
paratus.21 Placed in direct political control of the International Bri-
gades by the Comintern, Marty became one of the most hated men
in Spain. He cowered in the presence of Soviet military and political
representatives but played the iron-fisted autocrat in his dealings with
subordinates and colleagues. He was suspicious of virtually everyone
and highly sensitive about any imagined threat to his position or his
absolute authority in the Brigades. 22 His reputation as a brutal disci-
plinarian and his proclivity for having International Brigade men shot
for "political dissidence," an offense categorically labeled "Trotsky-
52 COMINTERN ARMY

ism" by orthodox Communists during that period of the great purges

in the Soviet Union, won him the unhappy sobriquet "Le Boucher de
Albacete." 23 He demanded the same kind of public adulation within
the Brigades that Stalin was receiving in the Soviet Union and the
Brigade press missed few opportunities to praise Comrade Marty. For
example, the organ of the mainly French XIV International Brigade
declared, "In the sorrowful history of the people the name of Andre
Marty will always be remembered, the friend and the organizer of the
International Brigades." And another Brigade journal pointed out
that "from the first moments our great comrade Andre Marty was the
founder, the organizer and motive force of our glorious International
Brigades. " 24
With Marty came a high powered contingent of leading Comintern
functionaries, or, as Longo referred to them, "professional revolu-
tionaries."25 An interesting recent listing of the organizers of the
Brigades by a Communist writer included Marty, Fran~;ois Billoux,
Longo, de Vittorio, Swierczewski, Copic, Zeisser, Beimler, Stern-
Kleber, Mate Zalka, Togliatti, Dahlem, Codovilla, Stefano, Nenni,
and "other militants of the international workers movement." 26 Sig-
nificantly, of this list only Nenni was not a Comintern stalwart, and
the fact is that Nenni had only an indirect connection with the Bri-
gades.
The most important of these "professional revolutionaries" in di-
rect relation to the International Brigades was Longo. The leading
politico in the Brigades from start to finish (except for Marty himself),
Longo ultimately assumed the title of inspector general of the Bri-
gades. As the Brigade press itself put it, "next to [Marty] Comrade
Luigi Gallo (Longo's nom de guerre in Spain], secretary general of the
Italian Communist Party, Inspector of the International Brigades in
Spain, was able to channel the entire movement of solidarity which
flowed to our nation, being an exemplary commissar."27
Among the Gen;nan contingent of Comintern stalwarts who played
a part in the political apparatus of the Brigades were Walter Ulbricht,
Franz Dahlem, and Heinz Neumann. While Ulbricht's role in Spain
remains somewhat obscure, 28 Dahlem became the chief political com-
missar for the Germans in the Brigades and a leading member of the
political commissariat. Neumann, another seasoned Comintern agent,
was apparently involved in the NKVD-controlled police apparatus in
Spain which dealt in part at least with maintaining the political purity
of the International Brigades. 29
A Communist municipal counselor from Paris and trusted lieuten-
ant of Marty's by the name of Gayman ("Vidal" in Spain) acted as
Defense of Madrid 53

the first military commandant of the base at Albacete. 30 Vidal, who

had been an officer in the French army in the World War and a reserve
officer since, impressed some as a man of organizational ability and
military knowledge. 31 Vidal remained base commandant until re-
placed by the Bulgarian Colonel Bielov in July 1937. 32 In direct
charge of the first arrivals at Albacete was an old French noncommis-
sioned officer who had long military service behind him. Known as
Commander Jean Marie, he demonstrated proficiency in the rough
language of the barracks and loudly announced to all that they would
"crush the fascists" in a couple of weeks. 33
The basic problems of organization, supply, discipline, and training
challenged the abilities of the leaders, who set to work with deter-
mined zeal. They immediately requisitioned numerous buildings
which they converted into offices, barracks, supply depots, and train-
ing rooms and set up an improvised system for processing the recruits
as they arrived from France. After mustering each group of new
arrivals a clerk read off the list of names and asked if there were
officers, noncoms, cooks, stenographers, artillerymen, or machine
gunners among the contingent. That the great majority of the recruits
had some previous military training and, in many cases, combat expe-
rience was a great help in all this. Eventually each man reported to
the office of the political commissariat where he was once more inter-
rogated regarding his name, age, political party affiliation, and reasons
for coming to Spain. The answer to the last question was easy, recalled
one volunteer. "The poster on the wall answered it: 'To Smash Fas-
cism.'" 34
The quartermaster service operated, in the early period at least, in
an extremely erratic way. The American journalist Louis Fischer,
who claimed to be the first American to enroll in the International
Brigade, filled the post of quartermaster for a brief period in early
November 1936. It was not long, however, until he quarreled with
Marty and left the Brigade (a privilege the rank-and-file brigader did
not enjoy) to resume his journalistic activities. 35
The recruits usually received uniforms and equipment on their
arrival in Albacete. The uniforms, supplied in the beginning mainly
by French Communist sources, consisted of heavy khaki coats, full-
cut brown corduroy trousers that strapped around the ankles, boots,
a black or brown beret, a helmet, a mess kit, and a blanket. In many
cases during the early period, however, the men received no weapons
until virtually the time of departure for the front. The arrival and
distribution of rifles was an event provoking an almost mystical excite-
ment for some. John Sommerfield, a young and fervent Communist,
54 COMINTERN ARMY

recalled the emotions fired in himself on that day. "We were in a state
of tremendous impatience; we wanted to see them, to handle them,
to know what type they were; we wanted ours, to hold it and test the
sights and the bolt and the trigger action. And when my tum came,
I experienced a pang of delight." The rifles delivered to Sommerfield's
unit were American-made Remingtons, model1914, still coated with
the grease in which they had been stored and shipped. They were good
rifles, probably as good as any and better than most to be found in
the Spanish war at that time. 36
The task of quickly transforming a multinational group of diverse
individuals into an effective military unit or, as one participant put it,
"to transform militant revolutionaries into obedient soldiers" 37 was
not easy. It was especially difficult to establish the kind of automatic
obedience to officers essential to military efficiency when the officers
themselves were improvised, often without experience and always
without that authority supplied by custom, tradition, and habit so
much a part of the pattern of discipline of a normal army.
In those early days of the Brigades there was much talk among the
rank and file of a "democratic army." The illusion that a Communist
army was a democratic organization ended quickly, however, as the
Comintern hierarchy established firm control. The necessity of abso-
lute discipline, "revolutionary discipline," and the appointment of
military and political officers from above, quickly became the order
of the day in Brigades and, even as in "bourgeois" armies, fatigue
duties and the guardhouse punished slackness and indiscipline. 38
In fact, Communist party discipline provided the otherwise missing
ingredient and thus the basic sinews of authority within the Brigades.
Party discipline worked effectively because, as Brigade hierarch Franz
Dahlem put it, these first contingents were "almost exclusively Com-
munists, mainly party functionaries and Red Front Fighters." 39
From the very beginning political commissars, almost invariably
selected from among tried and true party stalwarts, played a key role
in the life of the Brigades, and political propaganda quickly became
a regular feature of life at Albacete. On the walls of the barracks the
political commissars pinned each morning a copy of Mundo Obrero,
the official organ of the Communist party of Spain, and, often, transla-
tions of articles from Soviet newspapers. The first German contin-
gents at Albacete posted a placard that proclaimed, "Discipline, We
Exalt Discipline," while a French poster exhorted the comrades not
to render themselves unfit for service by contracting diseases in the
brothels. 40
Defense of Madrid 55

Meanwhile all roads led to Albacete for the foreign recruits who
continued to pour in at the rate of several hundred a day. Albacete
itself was what one volunteer called "one of Spain's most unpleasant
towns." A dirty little railroad and manufacturing center and the
capital of the province of Albacete situated on the windswept plateau
of Don Quixote's La Mancha, the town sat astride the railroad line
between Madrid and the important Mediterranean port cities of Va-
lencia and Alicante. Thus it had undoubted advantages as a base of
operations for the Brigades. Devoid of charm, the town boasted two
main industries-the manufacture of knives and a thriving brothel
district-to the latter of which the men of the Brigades brought
booming prosperity. The climate, typical of La Mancha, produced
burning, hot, dry summers and cold, wet winters during which Al-
bacete's unpaved streets became rivers of mud. Others retained some-
what fonder recollections of Albacete. A devout young English
Communist found deeply moving such evidences of the revolution as
the gaily painted and initialed automobiles which sped wildly about,
the ubiquity of working-class dress, and the atmosphere of excitement
and "slightly hysterical gaiety." 41
By early November the town presented a strange spectacle, filled
as it was with men from all over Europe speaking a babel oflanguages.
The Brigades even boasted a few Russians, exiles from their homeland
since the revolution, who were attempting to demonstrate their good
faith toward the new regime in Russia and thus win their eventual
return home by fighting for the Comintern in Spain. Those unfortu-
nate people (who, needless to say, never achieved their goal) were the
only Russians in the International Brigades. Indeed the one European
nationality most significantly not represented among the Brigades was
the Soviet. 42
With the continued influx of recruits (3,000 to 4,000 by the end of
October), 43 Albacete became overcrowded. To cope with this, the
Brigade chiefs ordered the organization of four battalions, based as
nearly as possible on linguistic lines, and their dispersal into training
quarters in the outlying villages. The first official document issued by
authority of the International Brigades was an order for the concen-
tration of troops in the towns of Mahora and Tarazona de la Mancha
on October 29, 1936. The document, typewritten in French, was
signed by Commander Jean Marie and base commander Vidal. The
Italians went to Madrigueras, the Poles and other Slavs to Tarazona
de la Mancha, the French to La Roda, and the Germans to Mahora. 44
In the countryside around their cantonments the newly formed
56 COMINTERN ARMY

squads, companies, and battalions stood morning parades, marched

over the dusty roads, and carried out elementary maneuvers in the
surrounding fields. Through the desperate efforts of officers and politi-
cal commissars, the rudiments of a military organization began to
emerge. As an article published in the Brigade press on the first
anniversary of the formation of the Brigades put it, "Under the reso-
lute direction of our great Comrade Andre Marty ... and ... Com-
rade Vidal ... Albacete became a hub of seething activity, the
birthplace of the International Brigades." 45
Despite all the efforts of the Albacete directorate, their forces were
far from ready for entry into action when the order (or appeal) came
from Madrid. Although four battalions had been formed, they had
had little time to organize or train. Further, no higher military com-
mand structure had as yet been created. Nevertheless, faced with the
call to commit their troops to battle, Albacete put together a neces-
sarily weak and incomplete Brigade structure within which three of
the four available battalions would operate. 46
The first battalion of the newly founded XI International Brigade
was a predoininantly German unit which called itself the Edgar An-
dre battalion in honor of the well-known ex-chief of the Roten Front
Kii.mpfer Bund, the Communist party's paramilitary organization in
Germany (the Red equivalent of the Nazi SA). News of Andre's
execution by the Nazi regime reached the Germans in Spain just as
the battalion was forming. 47 Appointed to command the Andre bat-
talion was Hans Kahle. An ex-German army officer with combat
experience in the World War, a longtime member of the German
Communist party and the Roten Front Kampfer Bund, 48 Kahle was
a big tough man who in his bearing retained much of the appearance
and manner of the Prussian officer. Although he was a thorough
Communist and disciplined party member who obeyed orders without
question, Kahle concealed beneath a rough exterior certain human
characteristics which expressed themselves in an ironic sense of hu-
mor and periodic flings in Madrid during which he indulged himself
with large doses of wine, women, and song. He spoke fluent Spanish
and was one of Hemingway's favorite characters in Spain. 49
The Andre battalion consisted almost entirely of devout German
Communists, most of whom, prior to volunteering for the Brigade,
had been living as political emigres in France. The battalion included
a large number of World War veterans and, like Kahle and th~
battalion political commissar Arthur Dorf, most were party activists
who had a long history of political, military, and/or revolutionary
activity behind them. They had all experienced the frustration of
Defense of Madrid 57

seeing their party, their friends and associates, and their aspirations
crushed in their fatherland since 1933. They were, as militants in a
party forged in the heat of struggle, a highly disciplined group. And,
as embittered losers in their struggle at home, they proved to be
fanatical combatants in Spain. A very high percentage of those who
marched through the streets of Madrid on Sunday, November 8, 1936,
died before the year was out. 50
The French battalion of the XI Brigade adopted the name of the
Commune de Paris centuria, which had recently joined the French
recruits at La Roda. 51 The battalion commander, Jules Dumont, was
an ex-captain in the French army and veteran of Verdun where, a
widely circulated story went, he had faced Hans Kahle across no-
man's-land. A longtime Communist stalwart and one of the earliest
of the foreign combatants in Spain, Dumont had fought at !run in July
and August. As the commander of the Commune de Paris centuria
when it arrived at La Roda and as one who combined military experi-
ence and political reliability, he was the obvious choice to command
the French battalion. 52 Pierre Rebiere, a member of the central com-
mittee of the French Communist party53 and a member of Longo's
delegation to the Largo Caballero government, filled the post of bat-
talion political commissar. The battalion consisted chiefly of those
Frenchmen and French-speaking Belgians who had been among the
first volunteers to come into Spain through the Comintern recruiting
system. They, like their German comrades in the Andre battalion,
were predominantly Communists. 54 While perhaps less anxious to die
than their German counterparts, having lost less and having, there-
fore, more to lose, they too were to die in large numbers in the days
and nights of November and December 1936.
The third battalion of the XI Brigade called itself the Dombrowski.
It was made up predominantly of Polish Communists, most of whom
had been living as political emigres in France and Belgium. The
commander of the Dombrowski battalion was Bolek Ulanovski and
its political commissar, a Comrade Matuczacz. Both men had fought
with the Polish Dombrowski or General Woblewski centuria along-
side the Italian Gastone-Sozzi with the Fifth Regiment prior to the
formation of the International Brigade. 55 Small South Slavic groups
were attached to both the Andre and Dombrowski battalions and
some twenty Englishmen, mostly ofthe old Tom Mann centuria, were
assigned to the Commune de Paris battalion. 56
The XI Brigade, composed of these three battalions, was com-
manded by the Soviet army officer who passed in Spain under the nom
de guerre "General Emilio Kleber." Kleber, a vigorous man of some
58 COMINTERN ARMY

forty years of age whose ruggedly handsome face was topped by a full
shock of iron-gray hair, was to gain worldwide fame as the "Savior
of Madrid" for his role as commander of the International Column
during the defense of the capital in November and December 1936. 57
The propagandists presented him to the world as a soldier of fortune,
a naturalized Canadian, a man of Austrian birth who had been taken
prisoner in the World War by Russian armies and had subsequently
been converted to Bolshevism. 58 Geoffrey Cox, a British Communist
journalist, embellished the story further by saying that Kleber's fam-
ily had taken him to Canada as a child and that he was a naturalized
British citizen whose English showed "only the faintest traces of
foreign accent in addition to its Canadian tone." Cox further wrote
that Kleber originally went to Russia as a member of a Canadian army
of intervention in 1919. From there he made his way across Siberia
to Moscow and joined the Red army with which he served throughout
the Russian civil war. "After that was over he went to Hamburg
(Germany) where he organized Communist shock troops. In 1927 he
was in China, leading one group of the Red armies against Chiang
Kai-Shek. From there Kleber went north to Manchuko and played his
part there. He had been a revolutionary since 1914. The Spanish civil
war is the third in which he has fought." 59
That picture, according to Krivitsky, who was well acquainted with
Kleber, was fabricated by the NKVD which supplied Kleber with a
Canadian passport and complete biography. In fact, Kleber had never
lived in Canada. The elaborate fiction, laced as it was with vagueness
and mystery, served simply as a smokescreen for covering the fact that
Kleber was an officer in the Soviet army. It provided a plausible
background for his sudden emergence as the commander of the
"spontaneous" troops of the International Column. Kleber remained
a mystery man even to many in important positions in the Interna-
tional Brigades. On meeting him for the first time and being informed
that he was the general in command of the International Brigades at
Madrid, Pacciardi asked rhetorically, "Who is this General Kleber?
They say Canadian yet he speaks Russian. But he is not Russian. Who
has made him a general?" 80
Actually, the mysterious General Kleber was General Lazar Stem,
a native of Bukovina, a territory that prior to the World War was
within Austria-Hungary but was after the war in Rumania. Stem-
Kleber, an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army during the Great
War, was captured by the Russian army and interned in a prisoner
of war camp. Mter the revolution in Russia he joined the Red army
and fought throughout the civil wars. Later he attended the Soviet
Defense of Madrid 59

military academy, graduating in 1924. In 1927 Kleber became a mem-

ber of the Red army intelligence department and was assigned to the
military section of the Comintern. 61 In that capacity he performed
numerous assignments in various parts of the world, including China,
Germany, and the United States. 62 By assigning Kleber, and men of
similar status and background, to the military command of the Inter-
national Brigades, the Soviet Union was able to use a reservoir of
trained and experienced military technicians completely under Soviet
control without at the same time compromising the USSR's officially
neutral status in the Spanish war. 63 Acting alongside Kleber as politi-
cal commissar of the XI Brigade was the Italian Communist Giuseppe
de Vittorio ("Nicoletti"), the third-ranking Comintern politico in the
International Brigade directorate. 64
The sudden order for the departure of the Internationals from their
training bases produced both high excitement and barely controlled
chaos. In the morning the troops remained confined to barracks with
kits packed, a situation that led, inevitably, to a rash of rumor and
speculation as to when and where they were going. Some struggled
with pocket dictionaries to decipher three-day-old Madrid newspa-
pers for a clue to the situation. A member of the Commune de Paris
battalion recalled the departure as "a kind of rout. " 65 In the afternoon
the troops formed ranks on the parade field while trucks rolled in
loaded with crates of ammunition. Each man received two or three
cloth slings containing fifty rounds each. Then they marched to the
La Roda station and boarded a waiting train which soon began mak-
ing its slow way across the quiet, night-shrouded, countryside. The
train carried them as far as the village of Alcazar where the troops
transferred to Russian-built trucks. The trucks bounced over rough
roads through the night, arriving the next morning at Vallecas, a town
some ten miles east-southeast of Madrid. That night the men slept in
the fields around Vallecas and heard the far-off rumble of artillery fire
for the first time. It rained and turned cold and the men shivered as
they stood two-hour stints on guard. 66
The next morning as the men of the Commune de Paris battalion
were eating breakfast, the Andre battalion marched past singing a
German Communist marching song and waving a big red banner at
the head of the column. "It was a brave sight," recalled a member of
the British machine-gun section of the French battalion. "All the
glamour and excitement that governments can use to make men
forsake their homes and die on foreign soil for foreign markets, but
it was ours, it was our army, and the glamour was real." 67 The men
of the French battalion stood saluting with clenched fists raised as the
60 COMINTERN ARMY

Andre battalion marched past. Later that morning the French battal-
ion held a brief commemorative ceremony in honor of the nineteenth
anniversary of the Bolshevik revolution. Short speeches in French,
Spanish, and English were followed by singing of the Internationale
in several languages. Not long thereafter they entrained for Madrid
and the celebrated march through the streets of the beleaguered capi-
tal. That march saw the birth of the legend of the Internationals. The
march itself inevitably was seen in sometimes startlingly different
ways by different observers and described in even more startlingly
different ways by some who observed it not at all.
Geoffrey Cox, the British Communist acting as correspondent for
the London News Chronicle in Madrid, wrote of it:

Up the street from the direction of the Ministry of War came

a long column of marching men. They wore a kind of corduroy
uniform, and loose brown Glengarry caps like those of the
British tank corps.
They were marching in excellent formation. The tramp,
tramp of their boots sounded in perfect unison. Over their shoul-
ders were slung rifles of obviously modem design. Many had
scarred tin helmets hanging from their belts. Some were young;
others carried themselves like trained, experienced soldiers.
Each section had its officers, some carrying swords and re-
volvers. Behind rolled a small convoy of lorries stacked high
with machine guns and equipment. At the rear trotted a squad-
ron of about fifty cavalry.
The few people who were about lined the roadway, shouting
almost hysterically, "Salud! Salud!" holding up their fists
clenched in salute, or clapping vigorously. 68

The book La Quatorzieme, published by the commissariat of the

International Brigades in 1937, said ofthe Commune de Paris battal-
ion on that march: "By the word battalion one imagines some hun-
dreds of men dressed and armed uniformly. These men did not
resemble that image. One was in a military blouse, the other in civil-
ian, a third in khaki trousers, the fourth a beret, the fifth a forage cap.
The rifles were Remington, Mausers, surplus of the Swiss Army." 69
Arturo Barea, a Spanish Socialist, working at the time for the
government press bureau in Madrid wrote: "On that Sunday a forma-
tion of foreigners in uniform, equipped with modem arms, paraded
through the center of town: The legendary International Column
which had been training in Albacete had come to the help of Madrid.
Defense of Madrid 61

After the nights of the 6th, and 7th, when Madrid had been utterly
alone in its resistance, the arrival of those anti-fascists from abroad
was an incredible relief. Before the Sunday was over, stories went
round of the bravery of the International Battalions in the Casa de
Campo." 70 And John Sommerfield, one of the marchers, recalled it
this way: "Ours was no triumphant entry; we were a last desperate
hope and, as tired out, ill equipped, and hungry, we marched through
the wind-swept streets.... I thought that the hurrying people on the
pavements looked at us as if we were too late and had come only in
time to die.'m Some of the Brigade units went directly into the lines
with the Spanish militia troops in the Casa de Campo, a large park
in the southwestern outskirts of Madrid. 72 There they set to work
digging trenches and making use of natural cover, elementary military
techniques of which the Spanish militia troops were either unaware
or disdained to practice as beneath the dignity of brave men. The
military efficiency exhibited by the Internationals, which by Spanish
militia standards was phenomenal, was seen by many as one of their
most important contributions to the defense of the city. "The militia-
man learned. He acquired the habits of a soldier. Each international
converted himself, without thinking of it, into a teacher.'' 73 The Inter-
nationals had not come to Madrid to teach, however, but to fight. And
in the days and nights that followed their entry into Madrid they were
to have ample opportunity to do so.
On November 9, as the troops of the XI Brigade were experiencing
their first taste of combat, the Madrid command called on the Al-
bacete directorate for the immediate commitment of all troops still
available to it. The result was wild improvisation and an even more
chaotic situation than had been the case with the XI Brigade's depar-
ture several days earlier. For Albacete had only one organized battal-
ion, a few barely formed companies of diverse nationalities, and the
merest outline of a Brigade structure available. The directorate's
efforts to organize a military unit and simultaneously to move it into
combat produced, as Marty put it, "what the bourgeoisie calls a
miracle." He credited that miracle to the "highly qualified military
cadres" and the "antifascist consciousness of the rank and file of
worker soldiers, above all the Socialists and Communists.'' 74
The one organized battalion available to the Albacete directorate
at that moment, the Italian Garibaldi, had been among .the first
formed, along with the Andre, Dombrowski, and Commune de Paris.
But it had been held out of the XI Brigade to serve as a nucleus for
the organization of a second Brigade. Its commander, Randolfo Pac-
ciardi, had arrived at Albacete and taken effective command of the
62 CoMINTERN ARMY

Italian contingent on November 3. On the following day the Garibal-

dis, who had recently been issued uniforms and rifles, moved to the
village of Madrigueras where they established a base and began seri-
ous training. On November 6 Ludwig Renn, an ex-officer in the·
German army, observed the Italian battalion holding a mock attack
on a hill outside Madrigueras and came away favorably impressed.
Here, thought Renn, were the troops who might really accomplish
something. 75
The Garibaldi battalion stood out in a number of ways as unique
among the units of the International Brigade. For one thing, its first
commander, Pacciardi, was not a Communist but the leader of the
Italian Republican party. Although Pacciardi and his party had ad-
hered to the Popular Front in 1935 along with the Italian Socialists
and Communists, he saw the Spanish conflict chiefly in terms of the
Italian situation, feeling that a defeat for the Right in Spain would be
a defeat for fascism in Italy. He felt, as did numerous other antifascist
Italians, that Italian participation in a victorious struggle in Spain
would be an important step on the road to Rome. Pacciardi thus
favored the formation of a specifically Italian combat unit in Spain
which, he felt, would serve as a living example to the Italian people.
Italians, he wrote, should form a combat "legion" in Spain which
would be a symbol of the vitality of the antifascist cause to Italians,
a legion that would "be honored with sacrifice" and pass from "the
era of martyrs to the era of heroes." Such a force would forge in the
fire of combat the cadres of the revolution and move the Italian people
with their "strong deeds." 76
The Italian legion visualized by Pacciardi would be nonpolitical,
not tied to nor directed by any particular political party but at the
service of the Spanish government and general staff. While interested
in aiding the Popular Front forces in Spain, Pacciardi saw his legion
above all as a demonstration to the Italian people that they could fight
and die for their own liberty. He felt that the knowledge that Italian
democracy in exile was fighting in Spain would rouse the Italians at
home and rally them to "the tradition of Garibaldi." 77
Pacciardi's earlier attempts to interest the Largo Caballero govern-
ment in his Italian legion had proved unsuccessful. But he continued
to work for the idea through the Italian Popular Front committee
made up of representatives of the Communist, Socialist, and Republi-
can parties of Italy and headquartered in Paris. That committee,
dominated by the Communists (since Pietro Nenni, secretary of the
Italian Socialist party, consistently followed the Communist lead), 78
had not favored Pacciardi's plan for creating an Italian military unit.
Defense of Madrid 63

But that attitude changed abruptly following the Soviet-Comintern

decision to organize an international military force for service in
Spain, and the Italian committee's endorsement of Pacciardi's plan
followed quickly. The parties represented on the committee formal-
ized their agreement to create an Italian legion in a document that set
forth the juridical basis of the legion and named Pacciardi as its
commander. 79
The reasons for a Communist-dominated committee appointing a
man from outside the party's ranks as commander were several. Pac-
ciardi had, for one thing, better qualifications from a military stand-
point than most. He had been an officer in the Italian army in the
World War and had been decorated several times for valor. Politi-
cally, his antifascist credentials were impeccable. An early and consis-
tent opponent of Mussolini and the Fascists, he had gone into exile
in 1926 and had remained active in anti-Mussolini politics ever
since. 80 As leader of the small but influential Italian Republican party
and as one who supported the Popular Front program he seemed
eminently fitted, from the Communist point of view, to represent a
Popular Front organization. Longo explained it by saying that the
Communists wanted to show the spirit of unity and not take all the
command positions just because they were in the majority. His fellow
International Brigader and Italian party comrade Giacomo Calan-
drone agreed, saying that in order to emphasize the unitary, broad
antifascist, as opposed to narrowly party, character of the Garibaldi
battalion they had a Republican commander and a Communist and
a Socialist political commissar. 81 While there is an element of truth
in both statements, both are also after-the-fact rationalizations. The
Communists were content to have a known nonparty member in a
conspicuous position in the Brigades so long as he remained com-
pletely amenable to their control. But if he showed any signs of
political unreliability, they spared no effort in getting rid of him as,
in fact, they did with Pacciardi later.
The contractual document creating the legion, dated October 27,
1936, was clearly executed not only after the Comintern decision to
form an international army in Spain but subsequent to the concentra-
tion of a large number of foreign recruits at Albacete. The agreement
made no mention of the fact that the legion was to be part of a larger
international organization, and Pacciardi did not know anything
about the International Brigade until he arrived at Albacete on No-
vember 1 to find, to his surprise, not only Italians but men from most
of the countries of Europe. Longo later claimed that none of the
people on the Paris committee knew of the prior formation of the
64 COMINTERN ARMY

International Brigades. 82 This seems extremely doubtful so far as the

Communist members were concerned and certainly Longo himself
knew all about it. At any rate, Pacciardi's efforts to bring his legion
into being proved successful only after those efforts came to coincide
with the policy of the Comintern, and, in fact, the legion was incorpo-
rated into the Comintern-controlled International Brigades from the
beginning. The Italian legion, which became the Garibaldi battalion
at birth, provided a good illustration of the fact that the Popular Front
only operated with any real effect when following the lead of the
Comintern.
When Pacciardi found that the Italians were to constitute part of
a larger international army, he said: "We Italians had no interest in
a mysterious and unavowed legion. We wanted on the contrary to
popularize it in our country, as an example to the sleeping and a
reprimand to the cowards. We did not want to be lost in the
anomymity of internationalism." The Brigade directorate reassured
him, however, that the Italians would be organized in a specifically
Italian unit to be called the Garibaldi. 83
By early November the Italian contingent at Madrigueras num-
bered· some five to six hundred men. Although composed predomi-
nantly of Communists, including the remnants of the Gastone-Sozzi
centuria, the Garibaldi battalion contained a larger percentage of
non-Communists than any other unit in the Brigades at that time, a
fact recognized symbolically by having two political commissars, An-
tonio Roasio, a Communist, and Arnaldo Azzi, a Socialist. 84 The
Italian volunteers were largely middle-aged men, many over forty, a
fact attributable to the long tenure of Fascism in Italy and the early
date of the effective purging of the country of active antifascist ele-
ments. In organizing the battalion and nominating officers, Pacciardi
took the previous military experience of each one into account. The
commanding officers of companies were all men with military experi-
ence, either as officers or noncommissioned officers. Most of the origi-
nal Garibaldinis were veterans of the World War. Pacciardi proved
to be not only a capable military commander but a successful and
respected leader of men. 85 His only fault was that he would not render
unquestioning obedience to the Brigades' Comintern political chief-
tains and for that he would eventually pay.
The second battalion incorporated into the new XII Brigade took
the name Thaelmann, in honor of the chief of the German Communist
party. Its commander, the German writer Arnold Vieth von Golss-
enau, who used his pseudonym, Ludwig Renn, in Spain, had served
as an officer in the German army in the World War. During the 1920s
Defense of Madrid 65

he had joined the German Communist party and had been a member,
along with Hans Khale, ofthe Roten Front Kampfer Bund. Renn had
been imprisoned in 1933-1934 by the Nazi regime and on his release
from prison his party superiors ordered him to leave the country. He
crossed the border into Switzerland where he joined the growing
ranks of the German Communist party in exile. 86
When the Spanish war broke out Renn contacted KPD headquar-
ters in Paris for recommendations and papers to allow him to enter
Spain. Arriving in Barcelona in early October 1936, he reported to
PSUC headquarters where he met an old acquaintance, Hans Beimler,
who was a member of the central committee of the German Commu-
nist party and political chief of the German Communists in Spain. 87
The next day Renn visited the Thaelmann centuria on the Huesca
front with Beimler and requested that he be allowed to join a military
unit. Beimler told him to go to Madrid where his military experience
would be put to better use. When Renn reported to party headquar-
ters in Madrid both the Spanish Communists and a representative of
the German party's central committee assured him that they would
find a suitable military post for him. He remained in Madrid, however,
still without a command, as late as November 6, when he left the
capital for Valencia with a group of foreign journalists. When that
group went through Albacete on November 6 Renn learned for the
first time of the existence of the International Brigades and offered his
services to the Albacete directorate. 88 That an available party member
with Reno's military background should have been ignored, as it
seems, by the Comintern directorate in Spain was an example of the
way in which the Comintern generally tended to ignore the party's
intellectuals in its plans for staffing the International Brigades. Both
Renn and Gustav Regier, another German Communist intellectual,
came to Spain, according to their reports, without any particular
assignment from the party and only by coincidence or accident
became affiliated with the Brigades. This bears out the general disdain,
contempt, and distrust in which the intellectuals were held by the
party hierarchy in general. The intellectuals, most of whom were
renegades from bourgeois backgrounds, were considered unreliable.
While the party astutely used the intellectuals for its own ends, and
especially in appealing to the bourgeois liberals of western Europe and
America as part of the Popular Front policy, they never really fully
trusted them. 89
Renn's chance arrival at Albacete almost simultaneously with the
urgent mobilization order from Madrid, coupled with the severe
shortage of trained officers available to the Albacete staff, led to his
66 COMINTERN ARMY

being offered command of a new battalion (the future Thaelmann)

then in the process of formation. Renn accepted and plunged into the
chaos engendered by the attempt to organize a multilingual mass of
individuals (Germans, Slavs, Hungarians, British, and more) into a
military unit.
The political commissar of the battalion, Fritz Vehlov ("Louis
Schuster" in Spain), a German Communist who had previously
fought with the Thaelmann centuria and who had arrived in Albacete
with the remnants of that unit a few days prior to Renn's arrival,
explained to Renn that disorganization reigned supreme. Not a single
company had been organized, and the harried Schuster, desperately
trying to bring some order out ofthe chaos, could not (since he spoke
only German) even communicate with many of those assigned to the
battalion. Renn and Schuster called on each of the nationality groups
to pick a political delegate, if possible one who could speak German
or Russian, and in some cases this linguistic factor became the crite-
rion by which unit commanders were chosen. The thirteen men of the
English-speaking group attached to the battalion, for example, sent
forth their only German-speaking member, Arnold Jeans, as its politi-
cal delegate. Having gotten this group together, Renn, who spoke
Russian as a result of having lived in the Soviet Union for several years
where he wrote propaganda for the Comintem, could communicate
with each of the delegates either in German or Russian. Each group,
Renn informed them, would have to organize itself as best it could for
the time being. The battalion would be going into battle before its
officers had a chance to know one another. 90
The battalion, as roughly organized, consisted of a German com-
pany, a German-English company, a Polish company, and a polyglot
company composed of Bulgarians, Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and oth-
ers. The last of those companies had as yet neither a commander nor
a political commissar since no one could be found among them who
spoke Slavic and Magyar as well as German or Russian. A representa-
tive finally came forward who could communicate with Renn in a
half-German, half-Russian patois. The companies were divided into
"zugs" of thirty men each and the zugs into groups of ten. The
English, now numbering some twenty men, made up, along with a few
Flemings and Germans, the third zug of the first company. Their zug
leader, recalled a young Britisher, was a tall, tough Prussian called
Paul, and the company commander was "even more of a Prussian"
called Max. 91 The third battalion of the XII Brigade, the so-called
Franco-Beige or Andre Marty was even less organized than the Thael-
Defense of Madrid 67

mann, lacking even a commanding officer upon departure for the

front. 92
A Soviet army officer of Hungarian origin, Mate Zalka, known in
Spain as General Lukacs, assumed military command of the XII
Brigade. 93 Renn and Lukacs, old acquaintances from their days in the
Soviet Union, had run into each other in Madrid on November 3. At
that time Lukacs had told Renn that he had been sent to Spain to
organize partisan groups for work behind the enemy lines, a task for
which Lukacs was qualified by experience. When Renn arrived at
Albacete on November 6 and offered his services to the Brigade
directorate, he found to his surprise that Lukacs had become the
commanding general of the new XII Brigade. Lukacs explained that
the partisan assignment had been called off. 94
General Lukacs was a man of many talents and one whose qualities
of humanity and warmth set him apart from most of his colleagues
among the Soviet-Comintern hierarchy in Spain. He became the best
liked of the International Brigade commanders. 95 A cavalry officer in
the Austro-Hungarian army before and during the World War,
Lukacs had been captured by the Russian army. When released as a
result of the Russian revolution, he had joined the Bolshevik party
and fought in the Red army during the civil war. He continued to live
in the Soviet Union and remained in the Red army serving at one time
with Cheka troops in the suppression of "banditry." He had been
decorated with the Order of the Red Banner for his services to the
USSR. 96 Communist propaganda, aimed at liberal sentiment in the
western nations, inevitably stressed that he was an author. 97 The
Communists recognized the value of claiming as many intellectuals as
possible as supporters of their cause in Spain. To have an intellectual
general was too good a thing not to make the most of. That Lukacs
was a Red army officer who had come to Spain directly from the
Soviet Union was not mentioned publicly. Longo himself assumed the
post of Brigade political commissar while one Lukanov, a Bulgarian
who used the nom de guerre "Bielov" in Spain and had reputedly been
an artillery officer during the Balkan wars, took the post of Brigade
chief of staff. With this makeshift arrangement the XII Brigade moved
out for combat. 98
5 The XIII, XIV,
and XV Brigades
While the first two International Brigades fought on the
Madrid front, new recruits continued to stream into Albacete at the
rate of 500 to 1,000 a week. Because of the heavy casualties sustained
by the XI and XII Brigades at Madrid, the Albacete staff posted many
of the new recruits to those two Brigades as reinforcements during
November and December. At the same time, they organized new
battalions slated for a third (XIII) International Brigade. One battal-
ion, composed primarily of French and Belgians, trained at Mahora;
another, also predominantly French, at Villanueva de la Jara and
Quentinar de la Orden; a third, composed of Germans, Poles, and
various Balkan nationalities, at Tarazona de la Mancha; and a fourth,
predominantly Italian, at La Roda. 1 One of these battalions, later
dubbed the "Chapaiev" for the popular partisan hero of the Russian
civil wars, was the most international of all the International Brigade
units. It contained Poles, Germans, Hungarians, Swiss, Jews, Czechs,
Austrians, and small groups of Dutch, Swedes, Danes, Norwegians,
and Yugoslavs. 2 The companies and squads of the Chapaiev battalion
took names of national heroes like the Polish Mickiewicz company,
or of antifascist heroes like the Czech Gottwald zug. The two predom-
inantly French battalions of the Brigade were later combined to form
the Henri Vuillemin battalion, named in honor of a Communist killed
in the riots in Paris in February 1934, an occurrence that had become
part of the mythology of the Popular Front. 3
The formation of the command structure, staff, and service units for
the new Brigade proceeded in a much more orderly way than had been
the case with XI and XII Brigades. 4 The man chosen to train the new
Brigade and then to command it, known in Spain as "General
Gomez," was in fact Wilhelm Zeisser, a German Communist and
longtime Comintern functionary. He had served as a lieutenant in the
German army in the World War. Stationed in Russia when the revo-
lution broke out, he joined the Bolshevik party, became a Soviet
citizen, and remained a devoted Communist from that time on. He
received specialized training in Moscow which made him an expert
in the methods and techniques of insurrection and civil war. In the
1920s and 1930s Zeisser functioned as part of the Soviet military
The Brigades 69

intelligence and espionage apparatus in Germany and also on occa-

sion as a Soviet agent in China and Manchuria. His mysterious ap-
pearance in Spain as General Gomez followed the pattern set by
Kleber, Lukacs, and the other Brigade generals. Zeisser was a classic
example of the type of professional revolutionary who performed the
Comintem's work throughout the world. 5
As chief of staff of the XIII Brigade the Albacete directorate chose
another German called Schindler, a Communist who, so the popular
story ran, had once served a prison term for his participation in the
Spartakusbund in the early days of the Weimar Republic. He had
since occupied himself as a journalist specializing in military affairs
and, prior to the Spanish conflict, had been living in France. Schindler
had entered Spain immediately after the outbreak of the conflict in
July 1936. He was prominent among the earliest foreigners to fight in
Aragon where he participated in the formation of the original Thad-
mann centuria and became its first commander. Later he went to Paris
to help in the recruiting of volunteers for the International Brigades.
On his return to Spain in early December he was appointed first chief
of staff in the XIII Brigade. 6
The Brigade chiefs assumed that the XIII Brigade would join the
other International units in the Madrid sector. But in the first days
of December the Albacete command received orders to rush all avail-
able troops to Valencia. The reason given for that unexpected tum
of events, a tum that subsequently vitally and dismally affected
the entire future of the XIII Brigade, read that a seaborne inva-
sion by Italian military forces was imminent. 7 Knowledgeable and
reliable sources have since contended that the real reason behind
this move was not fear of an Italian invasion but of a rising by the pre-
dominantly Anarchist population and militia units in Catalonia and
the provinces to the south against the Popular Front government
itself. 8
Whatever the reason, the Brigade did go to Valencia where it
remained for several weeks. Then, in the last week of December, the
XIII Brigade saw its first combat in an attack on the city of Teruel
in Aragon. Writing long after the event, Longo claimed that the
original purpose of the XIII Brigade's being ordered to Valencia was
to make this attack on TerueP That about three weeks elapsed be-
tween the time the Brigade was ordered to Valencia and the beginning
of the Teruel campaign and that Teruel was some 140 kilometers from
Valencia cast strong doubt on this explanation. More likely the Va-
lencia regime saw the use of the Brigade in an attack on Teruel as a
good method of making a show of strength in an area largely under
70 COMINTERN ARMY

Anarchist control and prone to a dissident attitude toward the govern-

ment.
. The attack on Teruel proved to be a costly failure. The Chapiev
battalion suffered over 50 percent casualties and the two French
battalions lost so heavily that they were subsequently merged into a
single battalion. One factor in the poor showing at Teruel was the
"barely concealed hostility" of the local Spanish command toward the
Internationals. Also, according to Longo, the Spanish troops in-
volved, mainly Anarchist militia forces, showed a distinct hostility
toward the Internationals. Whether or not this was merely a rational-
ization for failure by using two well-known Communist scapegoats-
the non-Communists among the. Loyalist military command and the
Anarchists-or whether it was a real factor in the defeat is hard to
say. Certainly the Anarchists distrusted the International Brigades as
a Communist force which many of them undoubtedly believed was
being used as a counterweight to the Anarchists themselves. The fact
that the non-Communists among the Loyalist army command in
general looked with suspicion and ill-concealed dislike on the Interna-
tionals was attested to by others. 10
The XIII Brigade remained in the southern zone of operations for
the next five months. As a result it was the only International Brigade
that did not participate in the central epic of the war during that
period, the battle for Madrid.
With the departure of the XIII Brigade for Valencia in December,
the Albacete directorate set to work organizing three more battalions
and a fourth Brigade. Appointed commander of the XIV Brigade was
Karol Swierczewski. Known in Spain as "General Walter," Swierc-
zewski was, like Kleber and Lukacs, a Soviet army officer. Of Polish
origin he had joined the Bolsheviks during the revolution and fought
with the Red army during the civil wars. He remained in the Soviet
army thereafter and served as one of that group of non-Russian Red
army officers widely used by the Soviet government through its Com-
intern apparatus in operations throughout the world. A rugged ap-
pearing man, he had received the Order of the Red Star for his services
to the Soviet Union. Walter had served for a time as a professor in
the Soviet military school in Moscow and on the staff of the Chinese
Red army. 11 He ultimately commanded a division in Spain and ap-
peared much later as vice-minister of defense of the Communist
regime in Poland following World War 11. 12
Andre Heusler, a functionary of the French Communist party,
filled the post of Brigade commissar while Ralph Fox, a prominent
member of the small but vocal clique of Communist intellectuals in
The Brigades 71

Great Britain, served as his assistant. 13 A graduate of Oxford's Mag-

dalen College, Fox had worked in the colonial department of the
Comintern in Moscow in 1925 and had remained a dedicated party
member ever since. 14 The Italian Communist Aldo Morandi served
as the Brigade chief of staff. 15 Vincenzo Bianco ("Krieger" in Spain),
an ex-deputy of the Italian parliament from Trieste and a charter
member of the Italian Communist party also held a post on the
Brigade staff. 16 A French Socialist called Putz commanded one bat-
talion of the Brigade. Putz, a soldier of courage and popularity with
his troops, but not a Communist, ultimately left the International
Brigades to command a regular Spanish brigade. 17 Boris Guimple, a
Communist who had been an officer in the French army until shortly
before his arrival in Spain, commanded a company in Putz's battalion.
He later took command of the battalion and eventually became XIV
Brigade chief of staff. 18 Another battalion commander was an ex-
officer of the French army, Delasalle. Delasalle quickly became un-
popular with a number of people in the Brigade hierarchy including
Marty himself. 19 He was soon to meet the same untimely end that
awaited many another who provoked Marty's ire in Spain. George
Nathan commanded the British company of Delasalle's battalion.
Nathan, who had been an officer in the British army in the World
War, succeeded Delasalle as battalion commander and eventually
became chief of staff of another (the XV) International Brigade. He
quickly gained a reputation for great coolness and courage under fire,
a reputation that lasted until he was killed in action in July 1937. One
of the few nonpoliticals who attained relatively high command posi-
tion in the Brigades, Nathan was among those who most clearly fitted
the description of the Internationals as a "bohemian military society."
He commonly led troops in combat with no weapon more potent than
a cane and, in an army not noted for punctilious care in matters of
dress, Nathan stood out as a one-man exhibition of spit and polish. 20
One of the battalions of the XIV Brigade was commanded by a
Bulgarian Communist called Stomatov, a man whose political activi-
ties had cost him seven years in prison in his native country. A Serbian
Communist called Petrovich, who was, as Marty remarked in his
inevitable speech to departing troops, "a young man, but an old
revolutionary,'' 21 served as its political commissar. Commanding the
Italian company was one Bocchi, a Communist who had been living
in Paris prior to the Spanish conflict. As political commissar, the
Italians had the services of a comrade Locatelli, a party stalwart who
had arrived in Spain but a few days earlier direct from the Lenin
School in Moscow. 22
72 COMINTERN ARMY

The XIV Brigade had hardly been formed when it was dispatched
to the Cordova area where it received a scorching baptism of fire in
an action around the town of Lopera. This action turned into a
thorough debacle for the Brigade. The resultant high casualties and
general breakdown in discipline brought both Longo and Marty to the
scene and led to the execution of battalion commander Delasalle for
treason. With order more or less restored, the XIV Brigade was
moved into the Madrid zone of operations where it participated in the
ongoing battles there. 23
In late December 1936 the Albacete directorate launched the for-
mation of the fifth and last of the International Brigades. The new
Brigade, the XV, consisted of four battalions, a British, a French, an
American, and a Slavic-Italian one. 24 The Brigade's military com-
mander, a Red army officer named Janos Galicz, used the nom de
guerre "General Gall" in Spain. The Brigade newspaper pictured him
as "a true son of the people," a Hungarian, a "simple soldier" in the
Austrian army in the World War. Freed by the revolution in Russia
he joined the Bolshevik party and the Red army where he "advanced
militarily." He had been involved, so the story went, in the Bela Kun
affair in Hungary in 1919 following which he returned to Russia and
adopted Soviet citizenship. Subsequently Gall performed various ser-
vices for the Comintern including military work in China. 25 Virtually
all sources except official Communist ones agree that Gall was a vain,
egotistical, brutal man and the worst of the International Brigade
generals. 26 Possessed of a harsh personality he quickly gained a repu-
tation for complete disreg~d of the lives of the men under his com-
mand. Despite this he ultimately moved up to a divisional command
in Spain as did his colleagues Kleber and Walter.
A Croat Communist, Vladimir Copic, served as Brigade political
commissar. He too had become a member of the Bolshevik party in
Russia after being freed from a prisoner of war camp by the revolu-
tion. Immediately after the World War he returned to his homeland
where he became a charter member of the Communist party of Yugo-
slavia. 27 As fervent in his Communism as his colleague Gall, Copic
appeared to have been cut from a different mold. A man with rather
wide cultural interests, he spoke, in addition to his native language,
Russian, German, and English and could get along in several others
including Italian and French. He had traveled widely, been a profes-
sional opera singer, and served briefly as a member of the Yugoslav
Chamber of Deputies. Prior to Copic's entry into Spain he had been
instrumental in organizing the recruitment system in Yugoslavia for
the International Brigades. On his arrival at Albacete in February
The Brigades 73

1937, he assumed the post of political commissar of the XV Brigade.

Copic eventually became commander of the XV Brigade upon Gall's
being posted to command of a division. 28 The picture of Copic as a
cultured cosmopolitan may well have been in large part a propaganda
image. It seems somewhat tarnished by the tone of the following
statement by him: "It is a month since you have come to this point
of Jarama face to face with the fascist enemy and received your
baptism of fire. The fascist hordes have not succeeded in cutting off
and surrounding Madrid, thanks to the heroic stand of the fighters of
the XV Brigade. We withstood the mad attacks of the enemy and
inflicted heavy losses on him. Yet we have even greater and ruder
tasks in front of us. We must crush completely the fascist reptile. The
commanders and men of the XV Brigade will strive to make their
Brigade second to none and to deal with the heaviest blows to the
fascist robbers. Forward to the complete victory of the People's
Front." 29
The French Communist Jean Chaintron ("Barthel" in Spain)
served as assistant Brigade political commissar. A longtime function-
ary of the French party, Barthel had served in various party posts in
France and had been, just prior to his coming to Spain, secretary of
the Communist party of Algeria. Upon Copic's assumption of com-
mand of the Brigade, Barthel replaced him as chief Brigade political
commissar. George Nathan, who had commanded the British com-
pany in the XIV Brigade in its first action at Lopera, became the first
chief of staff of the XV Brigade. 30 One of the few non-Communists
who achieved a relatively high military post in the International
Brigades, Nathan was promoted to major upon his appointment as
chief of staff. Following Nathan's being killed in action an ex-regular
German army officer, Lieutenant Colonel Klaus, filled that post.
Klaus, a member of the German Communist party since 1927, had
been living in exile in France since 1933 and arrived in Spain in July
1936. 31
Following the pattern set by the earlier Brigades, the new battalions
were based and trained at villages in the vicinity of Albacete. The
British battalion began formation at Madrigueras on December 27,
1936, with a nucleus of about 150 men. Following the return of the
XIV Brigade from its unhappy experience at Lopera and its brief
period of action in the Madrid sector in January, the remnants ofthe
British company of that unit joined their compatriots at Madrigueras.
By January 1937 the British battalion had grown to some 500 men.
The battalion, which included a number of Scots and Irishmen, first
adopted the name "Saklavata" in honor of an Indian Communist who
74 COMINTERN ARMY

had once been a member of the British parliament. But the name
never took firm hold and the unit became generally known simply as
the British battalion. 32
The men in charge of training and organizing the British at Ma-
drigueras were Wilfred Macartney, Tom Wintringham, and D.P.
Springhalt.3 3 Macartney, in command of the battalion during its
training period, was a "flamboyant journalist of the Left" who though
not a member of the Communist party had once served a prison term
for giving military secrets to the Soviet Union. Macartney had served
as a British officer in the World War and proved to be an effective
organizer of men and formulator of a realistic training program at
Madrigueras. His most formidable problems involved the mainte-
nence of a modicum of discipline and sobriety among what a fellow
officer and subsequent commander of the battalion called "a mixed
mob--ex-servicemen, hunger marchers, political enthusiasts, and
honest toughs and queer'uns. " 34
Just prior to the battalion's going into combat in early February,
Macartney was shot in the leg by Peter Kerrigan, a functionary of the
British Communist party and at that time chief British political com-
missar at Albacete. The British party hierarchy apparently did not
want Macartney, a nonparty member, to lead the battalion into com-
bat. He was being relieved of command when the shooting, presum-
ably accidental, occurred. 35 As a result of Macartney's incapacitation,
Wintringham assumed command of the battalion. A graduate of Ox-
ford's Balliol College and more recently editor of the Communist Left
Review and military editor for the British Daily Worker, Wintring-
ham was a charter member of the clique of intellectuals who found
a home in the British Communist party. He had been among twelve
British Communists who were convicted and imprisoned in 1925 for
violation of the Incitement to Mutiny Act. 36 Although he had served
in the British army in the World War and had read Clausewitz and
Liddell Hart, his views on war were based, as he put it, less on their
theories than on "those of Frederich Engels, and on the general
Marxist idea of the connections between war and politics." 37
The first political commissars of the battalion were D.P. Springhall
and George Aitken, both functionaries of the British Communist
party. 38 Fred Copeman, an ex-British navy man who had been court-
martialed as a leader of a mutiny in 1931 and had been a member of
the Communist party since 1932, quickly came to occupy a leading
position in the battalion. Another longtime party member who later
assumed command of the battalion when Wintringham was wounded
was Jock Cunningham, a man who had been imprisoned for his part
The Brigades 75

in a mutiny of British troops in Jamaica in 1920. By the end of January

the British battalion, by then numbering some 600 men, most of them
Communist party members, was organized into four companies plus
auxilliary units and stood ready for combat. The battalion had re-
ceived a longer period of training and organization than any previous
International unit. 39
The French battalion called itself the "6 Fevrier" in honor of the
political riots in Paris on that date in 1934. The battalion trained at
Tarazona under its military commander, Captain Fort, a French
Socialist who had served as an officer in the French army in the World
War and as a reserve lieutenant since that time. The first political
commissar of the battalion, a French Communist who went by the
name "Galli" in Spain, was later replaced as political commissar of
the battalion by the French Communist Durbecq. Durbecq had been
a functionary in the French party's labor union work prior to the
Spanish war, a position he had used to recruit large numbers of
Frenchmen to fight in Spain before arriving in Albacete himself in
January 1937. 40
The fourth battalion, composed of Slavs and Italians, had some
difficulty in deciding on a name. The Yugoslavs in the battalion
wanted to call the battalion the "Diura Diakovich," in honor of the
leader ofthe Yugoslavian Communist party and member of the execu-
tive committee of the Comintern. Due to the large number of other
nationalities in the battalion, however, they finally settled on the name
of the chief of the Comintern, Dimitroff. The Dimitroff battalion
trained at Mahora and included four companies of different national
composition. The first consisted of mixed Slavic and Balkan elements
including Yugoslavs, Bulgarians, Czechs, and Rumanians; the second
was predominantly Polish; the third, Italian; while the fourth, the
machine gun company, contained a mixture of nationalitiesY
The commander of the Dimitroff battalion, a Bulgarian Communist
called Grebenaroff, came from among that numerous group of Eu-
ropean Communists who had been living in the Soviet Union prior to
the Spanish conflict and whom the Comintern used as cadres for the
International Brigades. Grebenaroff, a man of twenty-eight years of
age, had attended the Soviet military school in Moscow. He proved
to be both a fervent Communist and a courageous combat commander
until killed by enemy fire in the first action of the Dimitroffbattalion.
The political commissar of the battalion, a German called Furman,
had a brief and stormy career in the Brigades. A Communist fanatic
who resented anyone outside the party being placed in any position
of authority in the Brigades, he soon became the source of a near
76 COMINTERN ARMY

mutiny among some of the officers in the Dimitroff battalion over the
appointment of a non-Communist to command. Although Furman,
like Grebenaroff, came to Spain directly from the Soviet Union and
therefore had a certain aura of sanctity about him, he was subse-
quently demoted and ultimately shot for his lack of discipline. 42
Giorgio Anillo, an Italian Communist who had previously been
commissar of the Italian company of the Dimitroff battalion, suc-
ceeded Furman as battalion commissar. A Bulgarian Communist and
Comintem functionary called Tabakoff who had been imprisoned for
his role in a Communist insurrection in Bulgaria in 1924 later suc-
ceeded Anillo as commissar of the Dimitroff battalion when Anillo
and the other Italians were transferred to the Garibaldi battalion. The
Croat Communist Vidakovitch commanded the Yugoslav company
of the battalion, while a Montenegrin Communist, one Arsenovitch,
acted as the company's political commissar. Commanding the Italian
company of the Dimitroff battalion was Carlo Penchienati, a former
officer in the Italian army and a man of no specific political affiliation.
Penchienati later also joined the Garibaldi battalion with the other
Italians of the Dimitroffs. 43
The first contingent of American recruits for the International
Brigades arrived in Spain on January 5, 1937, and proceeded through
Albacete to their training base at Villanueva de Ia Jara. Composed
primarily of Communists, 44 the American battalion included a large
number of Jews, several blacks, and a contingent of Cubans and
Puerto Ricans. A number oflrishmen who had fought at Lopera with
the British company and had become ruffied because the British Daily
Worker failed to mention the fact that Irishmen had been among
those killed there also joined the American battalion. 45
The American battalion, in line with the Communist party's Popu-
lar Front policy of identifying itself with the historical and patriotic
traditions ofthe various countries, adopted the name "Abraham Lin-
coln." In the same vein a second American battalion, which had a
brief existence later, called itself the "George Washington," and a
Canadian battalion, also organized later and which was in fact pre-
dominantly American, called itself the "MacKenzie-Papineau." 46
The American volunteers differed in a number of ways from their
European counterparts. They were as a group younger. Only a hand-
ful had seen service in the World War. In fact, very few had done any
military service at all although a few had received some rudimentary
Inilitary instruction in college ROTC programs. 47 Strong leadership
cadres among the Americans were also notably lacking, partially
because of the youth of the group, partially because of its lack of
The Brigades 77

military experience, and partially, and most significantly, because the

Communist party in the United States was reluctant to part with its
older and more experienced cadres at home. As a result the American
contingent not only suffered from poor leadership but was completely
at the mercy of the Albacete directorate, since the Americans had no
one of sufficient stature in the Communist party of the United States
to represent their interest in Spain. 48
Another difference was that the Americans, even though composed
predominantly of Communist party members, were unaccustomed to
the strict discipline accepted as a matter of course by their European
confreres .who had been tempered in the heat of revolutionary and
military struggles of which the boys from across the Atlantic had only
a vague and romanticized conception. The situation was not made
happier by the fact that the Americans were viewed with unrelieved
contempt by the Comintern hierarchy of the International Brigades
as little more than adolescent dilettantes and were treated accord-
ingly. In fact, the Brigade chieftains originally intended to use the
Americans as piecemeal replacements for other units rather than form
a separate American battalion. 49
As a result of these shortcomings the Americans experienced seri-
ous disciplinary problems from the beginning. In the absence of any
real military or political leadership or clear authority on the part of
any of'the Americans at Villanueva de la Jara, the men attempted to
operate on the lines of the Communist party at home. The problem
remained, however, that while at home everyone knew where author-
ity lay, at Villanueva de la Jara no one did. Since the Americans in
Spain came largely from the same low to middle status in the party,
none of them could clearly assume policical control as an established
higher party functionary could have. Phil Bard, ex-cartoonist for the
United States Daily Worker, acted as political commissar of the first
contingent of Americans and was apparently intended to serve as
American base commissar at Albacete. Bard soon returned to the
United States, however, and never functioned effectively as political
representative of the Americans at Albacete. He was followed in that
post by George Brodsky, a minor functionary in the party who proved
completely unable to cope with the job. As a result of all this the
Americans at Villanueva de la Jara spent most of their time and
energy in political meetings. Cliques and dissension developed to the
point where arrests and counterarrests were being made by the vari-
ous factions on one another's members. In the delicate phraseology
of a recent apologist: "They were not properly oriented to the exact
nature and need of a 'People's Army.' " 50
78 COMINTERN ARMY

United States party headquarters in New York, concerned by re-

ports of the chaos in Villaneuva de la Jara, sent over Sam Stember,
a second or third echelon party bureaucrat, to try to instill some kind
of political discipline into the sad disarray of Americans in Spain.
Commissar Stember had his problems too as can be seen from the
following somewhat hysterical statement signed by him in the Brigade
journal:
Those who challenge the military or political authority of ...
commanders are self seekers who are no less guilty than the
deserters who have been sentenced to hard labor in the Labor
Battalion at a recent trial.
The challenge manifested itself in the formation of commit-
tees which make demands on the Brigade as if they were framing
demands against the Capitalist Class; in a form of disruption that
tends to demoralize the ranks of the honest soldiers who volun-
teered and have a mandate from the working class at home to
defeat fascism at all costs.... In the American Battalion, such
a committee flared up recently and for a short time demoralized
the Battalion until finally order and discipline was reestablished.
But these traiterous elements are waiting for still further oppor-
tunities ....
Our slogan must be, no traitors in our midst; absolute disci-
pline; one unified, single command. 51
The military command picture in the American battalion was as
bleak as the political. Jim Harris, a party member who claimed to
have had long experience in the United States Army, had been ap-
pointed military commander of the first group of Americans sent to
Spain by Fred Brown, a Comintern representative in New York, and
Alan Johnson, allegedly a former United States Army officer, who
later played a role in the Brigades himself. 52 On January 11 an Ameri-
can named Robert Merriman arrived at Villanueva de la Jara directly
from the Soviet Union. 53 Merriman, who had received ROTC train-
ing during his college career at the University of Nevada (and, accord-
ing to some sources, further training at the Lenin Institute in
Moscow), immediately began to assume a leading role in the battal-
ion. 54 Shortly after his arrival, Merriman, accompanied by Stember,
went directly to International Brigades headquarters at Albacete
where they spoke with Marty and Vidal. 55
Marty, furious with the Americans, vented his spleen, calling them
"spoiled cry babies" and threatening to send them all back home. 56
Marty finally calmed down and Merriman and Stember returned to
The Brigades 79

Villanueva accompanied by Vidal, who informed the Americans

bluntly that they were in an army in which discipline and authority
were of paramount importance and must be accepted. He then con-
firmed Stember as political commissar and Harris as military com-
mander and appointed Merriman battalion adjutant. It seems most
likely that Merriman was slated to take over the military command
of the American battalion from the beginning. Vidal may well have
been governed by the assumption that since Harris had been ap-
pointed "military commander" by the American party hierarchy it
would be impolitic to dismiss him summarily, especially in view of the
already delicate situation in the battalion. Whatever the original in-
tention, Merriman, virtually from the time of his arrival, did assume
de facto command. 57 After having settled down under the triumvirate
of Stember, Harris, and Merriman, the Americans engaged in some
rudimentary military training and instruction. In fact no planned
program of training existed in the International Brigades at that time.
Each unit had to improvise its own. 58
During the first week in February Marty and a contingent of Al-
bacete chieftains arrived at Villanueva de la Jara to review the Ameri-
cans. The battalion, which had by then grown to some 400 men,
received approval from Marty on its progress. He told the troops that
they would soon be moved to the new International Brigade camp at
Pozo Rubio. That, however, never came to pass. 59
The battalion, as then organized, consisted of two rifle companies
and a machine gun company. The first company, which contained a
Cuban-Puerto Rican section, an Irish section, and an American sec-
tion was commanded by Inver Marlowe, a British Communist who
had been on the editorial staff of the London Daily Worker and more
recently on the staff of the American Daily Worker. Marlowe went
under his pseudonym, John Scott, in Spain. Stephen Daduck, a man
who had previously flown a fighter plane for the Loyalists, com-
manded the second company, and Douglas Seacord, who had once
served in the United States Army, commanded the third. 60
On February 12 the American battalion received orders to move
out for Chinchon, a town located in the area in which a large-scale
battle then raged. Just prior to their departure Vidal appointed Merri-
man and Harris to the rank of captain and issued them revolvers and
binoculars. Meanwhile the battalion paraded in the bullring at Al-
bacete and received weapons, equipment, and the usual pep talk from
Marty. 61
Sometime between the battalion's departure from Albacete and its
entry into combat, the Albacete chieftans removed Harris from com-
80 COMINTERN ARMY

mand and replaced him with Merriman. The explanations of how and
why this happened vary. According to one story Harris became un-
nerved upon the battalion's being ordered into action, displayed un-
stable and irresponsible characteristics, and had to be replaced.
According to others the Brigade staff concocted this story about
Harris as a justification for getting rid of him and appointing Merri-
man to command the battalion, something they had intended to do
all along. 62
At any rate Vidal named Merriman commander and the battalion
saw its first action under Merriman's command. Upon their arrival
at Chinchon, General Gall ordered the battalion into reserved posi-
tions near Morata. Somewhere between Chinchon and Morata, Mer-
riman stopped the convoy long enough to allow each man to fire five
rounds from his weapon into a hillside. For many that was the first
time they had fired a rifle although they had been in Spain for over
a month. 63
6 A Military Overview
The entry of the XI Brigade into combat on November 8,
1936, opened a five-month period in which the Internationals played
a crucial, perhaps decisive, military role in the Spanish war. While a
detailed treatment of the campaigns of the International Brigades is
beyond the scope of this study, a brief synopsis and overview of the
military developments in the Madrid area and the role played by the
Internationals in them will serve to illustrate a number of factors of
importance in understanding the politics of the Brigades, both then
and subsequently.
The battles in and around Madrid lasting from November 1936 to
March 1937 can be most easily visualized as three phases of a five-
month-long campaign in which the Nationalists sought to conquer
and the Loyalists sought to defend the Spanish capital. The first
phase, opening in the first week of November and lasting until No-
vember 25, saw the Nationalist effort to take the city by direct frontal
assault. The second phase, opening on November 29 and lasting until
January 10, involved the Nationalist effort to envelop Madrid on its
western flank. The third and final phase, lasting from February 6 to
March 15, was the effort to achieve the same objectives on Madrid's
eastern flank.
Phase one entered its most critical stage when, on the night of
November 14-15, Nationalist forces succeeded in forcing a crossing
of the Manzanares River and quickly pushed up the hills into the
University City on the southwest outskirts of Madrid where they
occupied several buildings. The Madrid command rushed in rein-
forcements including the XI and XII International Brigades. 1 The
fighting in the University City quickly developed into a bitter and
relentless struggle at close range with no quarter asked or given on
either side. The combatants converted the university buildings into
fortresses, sandbagging and barricading windows and doors with
whatever could be found. They mounted machine guns to cover open
approaches, dug communication trenches between buildings, bur-
rowed tunnels under streets swept by enemy fire, and attacked for
limited objectives. At times both sides occupied parts of the same
building and fought for floors and even rooms. The battle raged until
on November 25, after some twenty days of furious fighting, the
82 COMINTERN ARMY

Nationalist command gave up the attempt to storm Madrid by frontal

assault. 2
During the University City fighting several changes were made in
the Brigades' command structure and organization. Among the more
important of these was the elevation of Kleber to command of the
entire Madrid battle sector, a position he had in fact filled since his
arrival with the XI Brigade in early November. He now commanded
not only the XI and XII International Brigades but a number of
Spanish units assigned to that area, a total of some 18,000 effectives. 3
Hans Kahle moved up from command of the Andre battalion to
replace Kleber as commander of the XI Brigade, while Ludwig Renn
moved over from command of the Thaelmann battalion to become
Kahle's chief of staff. The German Communist Richard Staimer re-
placed Renn as commander of the Thaelmann. At the same time the
Thaelmann battalioJt, was shifted from the XII Brigade to the XI and,
in exchange, the Dombrowski went from the XI Brigade to the XII.
Thus, the XI Brigade consisted of the two predominantly German
units, Andre and Thaelmann, and the mainly French Commune de
Paris, while the XII included the Italian Garibaldi, the French Andre
Marty, and the Polish Dombrowski. Several changes in the political
commissar hierarchy also took place. The Italian Nicoletti, who had
been XI Brigade commissar, moved up with Kleber. Both Hans
Beimler, the leading German politico, and Louis Schuster, commissar
of the Thaelmann battalion, were killed at the front during the
fighting. Albert Denz, a German Communist, became XI Brigade
commissar. Longo, who had filled the post of XII Brigade commissar,
reassumed his role as number two man in the overall Brigade political
hierarchy with the title of inspector general of the Brigades while the
German Gustav Regier filled the post of XII Brigade political com-
missar.4
Phase two of the battle for Madrid opened on November 29 and
lasted, with but brief respites, until the middle of January. The Na-
tionalist command hoped that by shifting the action away from the
congestion of the immediate Madrid area the advantages of better
organization, tactical maneuverability, and firepower, which had been
so important in their earlier successes, would once again prove deci-
sive. The Nationalist thrusts followed one another in regular succes-
sion, swinging in ever wider arcs in the effort to outflank the capital's
defenders. But the attackers were to be denied. For, as these events
showed, the forces now defending Madrid were not the disorganized
militia that had been handled so easily in the march toward the
capital. The hardheaded Red army professionals, the Soviet tanks,
A Military Overview 83

artillery and aviation under their direct command, and the Interna-
tional Brigades, also commanded by professionals, proved quite a
different matter.
The last and most powerful thrust of this second phase of the
campaign came on January 3. The Madrid command threw the XI
Brigade into the breach and, at the price of its virtual destruction as
a fighting unit, it broke the momentum of the onslaught. 5 Meanwhile
the XII and XIV Brigades were moved in and, supported by substan-
tial artillery and armor, brought the offensive to a halt. With this
move, the Nationalist effort to envelop Madrid on the west ended. 6
In all these battles the International Brigades played the major role.
Viewed by the Madrid command as the most reliable troops at its
disposal, the Internationals were consistently thrown into the most
critical point of battle and, as consistently, absorbed the Nationalist
blows at the price of extremely high casualties. Of the XI and XII
Brigades, Pravda correspondent Koltsov wrote, "Both have fought
incessantly for more than a month.... They have lost almost forty
percent of their effectives." 7 The Nationalists would try to take Ma-
drid again, from another direction, but for the present they, as well
as their adversaries, needed time to lick their wounds, restore their
strength, and gird themselves for future efforts.
The third and final phase of the battle for Madrid opened on
February 6. The Nationalists struck hard in a new attempt to envelop
Madrid, this time to the east of the city. The assault broke the front
wide open and, as usual, the Madrid command looked to the Interna-
tionals to save the day. The XII Brigade was rushed in first to blunt
the thrust and the XI Brigade was ordered out of its rest quarters in
Murcia. Despite the Loyalist command's efforts to contain the assault,
the Nationalists succeeded in forcing a crossing of the Jarama River
on the night of February 10 and rapidly extended themselves along
its east bank.
On February 12 the recently formed XV International Brigade
moved into the battle. Its British and Dimitroff battalions arrived at
the front that day and both were quickly decimated in the severe
fighting that followed. The British occupied a ridge called, from then
on, "suicide hill." When the battalion withdrew that night only some
125 effectives remained of the 600 who had gone up in the morning.
Most of the officers and political commissars had been killed or
wounded. The Dimitroffs, too, paid a high price for their first day of
combat, suffering some 350 casualties.
The last of the International Brigades to enter the battle, the XIV,
arrived on February 14. By that time the Nationalist offensive had lost
84 COMINTERN ARMY

its momentum. Indeed, for the Nationalist the fourteenth was "el dia
triste de la Jarama," the sad day which "extinguished totally the
illusions of all who participated in the battle." Nationalist officers
were impressed by the fighting capabilities displayed by their oppo-
nents. "The machine-gun and rifle fire is intense. The enemy fights
with a tenacity unknown until now .... The Russian tanks appear
constantly, firing machine-gun and cannon, and disappearing before
anti-tank pieces can be used .... The numbers of our fallen is impres-
sive."8
Not the least of the reasons for the Nationalist defeat was the
expertise of the Soviet general Pavlov ("Pablo" in Spain) in directing
the defense and especially in his tank actions which repeatedly
smashed Nationalist drives. As the Spanish Communist commander
Enrique Lister, who participated in the Jarama campaign, put it:
"General Pablo was the true organizer of the Republican resistance
during those days. . . . The role played by the tanks was at times
decisive. Their rapid counter-attacks often broke the carefully pre-
pared enemy attacks." Of this the Soviet general Voronov, who de-
voted his talents to commanding the Loyalist artillery, recalled that
during the Jarama fighting his colleague Pavlov said to him: "Destroy
with your artillery the anti-tank guns and my tanks will give the
enemy a blow like they never had. " 9
Indeed the role of the Soviet-Comintern combine reached its high-
est level during that period. On February 15 the Madrid command
carried through a reorganization of its forces in the Jarama area into
four divisions and a tank corps. The XII and XIV International
Brigades along with a Spanish brigade formed Division A com-
manded by General Walter (Swierczewski). Division B, composed of
the XI and XV International Brigades and a Spanish brigade was
commanded by General Gall (Galicz). A third division, all Spanish,
was commanded by the Spanish Communist Lister, and the tank
corps by the Soviet general Pavlov. Thus the Soviet-Communist com-
mand role in this army of the Jarama was almost complete, with two
of the four divisions commanded by Comintern generals and com-
posed primarily of the International Brigades, a third division com-
manded by a Communist stalwart, and the tank corps commanded by
a Soviet general. In addition, all units, International and Spanish, had
Soviet advisers. The brunt of the fighting was borne by the Interna-
tional Brigades and the chief direction of the defense came from the
Comintern-Soviet officers. 10
Following the reorganization of its forces, the Madrid command,
by then with a superiority of manpower in the area, sought to retake
A Military Overview 85

the ground lost to the Nationalists. The major thrust of the counterat-
tack focused in the area of the Pingarron heights. Chosen to spearhead
the attack was the recently arrived American battalion. This, their
first taste of combat, proved to be yet another bloody debacle. Aerial
and artillery preparation was weak and ineffective and the promised
tank support failed to materialize. The Spanish battalion on the
American flank moved out of its trenches on schedule only to be met
by such a hail of enemy fire that the troops immediately returned to
their positions. At that point the XV Brigade chief of staff, Lieutenant
Colonel Klaus, ordered the Americans to attack. Battalion com-
mander Merriman, seeing that the heavy enemy fire would make the
attack suicidal, contacted General Gall by telephone and attempted
to explain the situation. Gall demanded that Merriman attack at once
and, using one of his favorite expressions, "at all cost." At the same
time, Springhall, the British political commissar, and Lieutenant Wat-
tis, a British officer attached to the Brigade staff, arrived at Mer-
riman's side with orders for the Americans to advance.
Merriman then ordered the attack. As the men moved out they met
the same deadly fire that had driven the Spaniards back. Many were
hit the instant they left the trenches. Merriman was shot through the
shoulder as he gave the signal to advance and Seacord, the recently
appointed battalion adjutant, was killed. Seeing the massacre, a num-
ber of the Americans refused to leave the trenches until forced to do
so at pistol point by Wattis. The untouched Nationalist machine
gunners cut the poorly trained Americans down by the score. The
attack stopped dead. The men, wounded and unwounded, remained
pinned down behind whatever bit of cover they could find until the
dark of night allowed them to crawl back to their trenches. At nine
o'clock that night Morris Maken, who had survived for nine hours in
no-man's-land and was the only officer in the battalion still alive and
unwounded, found less than 120 men of the battalion who could
answer roll call. Later counts showed some 120 killed and 175 hospi-
talized for wounds. Less than 125 effectives remained of the 400 men
who had composed the battalion that morning. 11
Following the debacle of February 27 the Madrid command aban-
doned its efforts to dislodge the Nationalists, and the dawn of Febru-
ary 28 broke cold, windy, and strangely quiet over the Jarama. The
losses sustained by all four of the International Brigades that partic-
ipated in the Jarama fighting were extremely heavy. Many of the
battalions suffered on the order of 75 percent casualties. Included
among the killed and wounded were a high number of the Internation-
al's military and political cadres including Grebenaroff, commander
86 CoMINTERN ARMY

of the Dimitroff battalion, Wintringham, commander of the British

battalion, Fort, commander of the 6 Fevrier battalion, Merriman,
commander of the American battalion, Pacciardi, commander of the
Garibaldi battalion, Rebiere, political commissar of the XI Brigade,
Azzi, political commissar of the Garibaldi, and Galli, political com-
misar of 6 Fevrier battalion.
Militarily the battles of the Jarama resulted in another inconclusive
standoff between the opposing armies. The Nationalists had main-
tained their initiative in the war, had taken ground, and successfully
held most of it. But they had failed to achieve the strategic goal of the
operation, the envelopment of Madrid. The Loyalist had succeeded in
containing the Nationalist drive, thereby ensuring Madrid's (and per-
haps Loyalist Spain's) continued existence. They had not, despite
superiority in numbers and the large-scale assistance of the Interna-
tionals and the Soviets, been capable of launching an effective coun-
teroffensive or of retaking the lost ground. In the longer view, and in
retrospect, the failure of the Nationalists to break Madrid's defenses
at the Jarama signaled a decisive watershed in the war. Before that
became clear, however, Madrid's defenders faced one more challenge.
It came on March 8, when Mussolini's expeditionary force in Spain,
the Corpo di Truppe Voluntarie (CTV), launched an offensive from
the northeast toward Guadalajara. The plan envisioned the establish-
ment of contact between the Nationalist forces on the Jarama with the
CTV, thus achieving what the Jarama offensive had failed to accom-
plish. The Madrid command reacted by committing the best of the
units at its disposal to the new front, chief among which were the XI
and XII International Brigades.
Forward elements of both the XI and XII Brigades made initial
contact with advancing Italian troops that morning. Heavy fighting
ensued with the attacking forces making but little headway against
stiff opposition from the Internationals. Meanwhile the Madrid com-
mand continued to commit all the troops it could muster to the sector.
By March 11 the defensive line stood fairly firm and was supported
by increasing numbers of reserves. The weather too came to the aid
of the defenders when rain began falling and continued for several
days. The mechanized units of the CTV bogged down in the mud
while fog and overcast skies effectively deprived them of air cover. By
March 13 the Italian offensive had clearly failed of its purpose and the
CTV's commander, General Roatta, made clear to the Nationalist
high command his desire to withdraw his forces and have them re-
placed by Spanish units.
A Military Overview 87

At the same time the Madrid command began preparation for a

counteroffensive. On March 14 General Ivanov, one of the Soviet
officers who had participated in the Guadalajara fighting, spoke to the
staff of the XI Brigade. In high good humor the general informed
them that having stopped the Italian offensive, they would now strike
a strong counterblow. Renn and Kahle looked at him in astonish-
ment. Calling him "Comrade General," Kahle said that the Brigade
had not recovered from the past days of severe fighting. Nevertheless,
said the general, the offensive would be made. 12 It began on March
18 spearheaded by the XI and XII Brigades. Despite the general
disorganization and demoralization of the CTV forces, however, the
Loyalist offensive soon lost its momentum and within a few days the
fighting virtually ended. The long and bloody siege against Madrid
came to a close.
Clearly, between November 1936 and March 1937 the defense of
Madrid depended heavily on the efforts and the manpower of the
International Brigades. If we take into consideration replacements
and reinforcements, the number of International troops involved in
the Madrid fighting by the end of December was in the vicinity of
twelve thousand and must have reached between fifteen and twenty
thousand by February. These units were consistently used as shock
troops to be thrown in wherever the fighting was most intense and the
situation most critical. The undeniably significant role of the Interna-
tionals in the defense of the Spanish capital led many to see the
Brigades as the "saviors of Madrid." To take just two examples,
the Italian Socialist Pietro Nenni, who was intimately involved in
Spain at the time, wrote: "The contribution of the International
Brigades was, without exaggeration, decisive." And the Amer-
ican journalist Louis Fischer, a close supporter of both the Brigades
and the Loyalist cause, wrote of the Internationals: "They saved
Madrid." 13
Others have objected to this view, feeling that it ignores the essen-
tial contribution of the Spaniards themselves in defending the capital.
The point remains debatable. It seems safe to say, however, that while
the Internationals did not, and probably could not have, defended
Madrid alone, Madrid would not have been defended successfully
without them. Thus, while giving due weight to the essential Spanish
contribution, the role of the Internationals was probably decisive. But,
in stressing the role of the Brigades, a larger and even more crucial
point is often overlooked. That is that the Brigades were only one
component of a larger, and even more surely decisive, effort in the
88 COMINTERN ARMY

defense of the Spanish capital, namely, the multifaceted enterprise of

the Soviet-Comintern organization.
Following the battle of the Jarama and its immediate but much less
sanguinary sequel in Guadalajara, the nature of the Spanish war
changed. The Nationalists gave up on their effort to take Madrid and
end the conflict quickly. Instead they settled down to building a large
army composed chiefly of Spanish conscripts and, girding for the long
war, shifted their main attention to conquering the northern prov-
inces. The Loyalist regime likewise concentrated on building a strong
central government and a large People's Army based on conscription
and under that government's authority. This meant an end to the
heavy fighting in the central (Madrid) area (for several months at
least) and, for the Internationals, a prolonged period of relative sur-
cease from major combat.
It also meant a qualitative change in the relative importance of the
Internationals in the war. With the development of an army of several
hundred thousand men by the Loyalist regime, the participation of a
few thousand foreigners as rank-and-file troops could no longer make
a fundamental difference as it had earlier. In addition to the relative
decrease in the military significance of the International Brigades, the
actual number offoreign combatants steadily declined after the spring
of 1937. This resulted from both the high casualty rates among the
Internationals and from the decrease in the numbers of new men who
could be recruited. That ready reservoir of political emigres and Com-
munist militants which had supplied the bulk of the early Internation-
als had been, by the spring of 1937, substantially exhausted. Once that
limited resource had been drained it became more and more difficult
to recruit men for the Brigades. No doubt also the reports of disillu-
sioned Brigade men who had managed to get out of Spain, the reports
of the Communist terror, and the generally growing awareness that
joining the Brigades was less a romantic adventure than a good way
to die young played a part in reducing the numbers of men who might
otherwise have been tempted to join.
Both the relative and the absolute decline in the military signifi-
cance of the Internationals was clearly shown by the so-called Brunete
offensive launched by the Loyalists in July 1937. Employing 50,000
first-line troops organized into army corps and divisions, the offensive
proved without doubt that the Loyalist regime had succeeded in
creating a substantial army. Less encouraging, to some at least, the
offensive had been designed chiefly by the Soviet military staff, and the
command structure of the key combat units remained heavily Com-
munist and foreign. For example, the five International Brigades
A Military Overview 89

which participated in the operation all served under Comintern divi-

sional commanders: the XIII and XV with General Gall's Fifteenth
Division, the XII and CL 14 with General Kleber's Forty-fifth Division,
and the XI with General Walter's Thirty-fifth Division. While the
International Brigades continued to be among the best of the new
People's Army's combat units they were clearly no longer so crucial
to Loyalist military strength as before. The numerical weight of the
International Brigades in the Brunete campaign, some 15,000 effec-
tives, amounted to only about a fourth of the total and even this figure
included large numbers of Spaniards within their ranks. The progres-
sive filling of the ranks of the Brigades with Spaniards had in fact been
going on for some time as the only way of replacing casualties. It was
a process that could not help but alter fundamentally the nature of
the Brigades. After Brunete, 60 to 70 percent of the XII Brigade were
Spanish. 15 The percentage was as great or greater in the XI and XIII
Brigades. The process continued throughout the Brigades' sojourn in
Spain and gradually transformed even the XIV and XV into predomi-
nantly Spanish units with a foreign command. "The XV Brigade is
so diluted with Spanish soldiers that the Internationals are acting
mostly as non-coms," wrote the American volunteer Voros during the
Ebro campaign in 1938. The Brigades were rounding up every avail-
able man and putting them into the decimated combat units. They
were "a pitiful lot ... men ruthlessly evicted from the hospitals, half-
healed ... unfit for battle; the sweepings of the military offices in the
rear, soft and flabby." And, he continued, the few new recruits still
trickling in from the United States and elsewhere were handed rifles
and sent to the front with a week or two, if that, of training-"lambs
offered up for the slaughter." 16
From the Brunete campaign to the end of the war, the main field
of action shifted from the central (Madrid) area to the eastern (Ara-
gon) area. There the Loyalists launched three major offensives: the
Aragon or Belchite-Quinto campaign of August-September 1937, the
Teruel campaign of December 1937-January 1938, and the Ebro
offensive of July 1938. Each followed a similar pattern: initial break-
through, stall, Nationalist counterattack, Loyalist retreat. None
proved successful in the long run. While the International Brigades
fought in all these campaigns, their military significance, in an army
of 500,000 men, was strictly limited. 17
7 Comintern Politics
While the purely military role of the International Brigades
became of progressively less consequence after the spring and summer
of 1937, the political significance of the Brigades as an element in the
Comintern's overall operation in Spain (and in the wider Popular
Front strategy) continued to be seen as of the greatest importance.
Thus the Communists sought to maintain the Brigades as a viable and
reliable Comintern-controlled force within the framework of the Loy-
alist political-military structure.
To succeed in this objective over the long run presented a greater
challenge than it had during the earlier period when the Brigades had
consisted almost entirely of disciplined and highly motivated party
cadres, when most internal problems could easily be brushed aside in
the first flush of enthusiasm, and when the Loyalist regime itself had
little cohesion or authority. But to the Communists the effort was
worthwhile, for from their perspective the Brigades offered a number
of political assets and advantages which they would not willingly
relinquish.
For one thing, so long as the Brigades continued to exist as Comin-
tern controlled units, they remained a source of prestige, political
leverage, and reliable military strength for the Communists within the
Loyalist camp. The Communists made no secret of the pride they took
in the military prowess of the Brigades and stressed from the begin-
ning the key role performed by the Brigades in setting an example of
military organization, discipline, and efficiency for the Spaniards.
That example, they held, had been largely responsible for the success-
ful creation of the Loyalist People's Army. 1 "The International Bri-
gades by their high technical qualifications and their discipline, have
been one of the bases of this new Army," wrote Andre Marty. "This
has been one of the essential services that the International Brigades
have rendered the Spanish Republic .... The International Brigades
... have been a living example of what must be done to win the war." 2
Franz Dahlem, leading German member of the Brigade commissariat,
wrote: "The International Brigades exerted quite a considerable influ-
ence over the growth of the military and moral strength of the Spanish
People's army .... They have maintained their character as the basic
brigades of the People's army, its core.'' 3 The Brigade press empha-
sized this point repeatedly. The "immense prestige" and the "disci-
Comintern Politics 91

pline on which they [the Brigades] were founded did much to help the
remodeling of the army," claimed the Volunteer for Liberty. The
Boletfn de Informacion pointed out how the Internationals had aided
the Spaniards by their example of "discipline and the maximum ac-
quisition of military technique. " 4
Comintern spokesmen continued to insist on the significance of the
Brigades in the military sphere throughout their existence in Spain.
Addressing himself to this question, Longo told a conference of politi-
cal commissars in August 1937, "The International Brigades have had
a great role in the resistance. Now we must be the animators of the
decisive victory." 5 Similarly the Brigades' school for political com-
missars, as late as 1938, continued to instruct its charges that the
Brigades yet had a crucial role to play: "To build the People's Army,
to conquer all weaknesses, to aid the Spanish Popular Front. " 6 In this
context, too, the possibility always existed that the Communists
would see fit to take over the Loyalist regime completely by some type
of coup d' etat. Two of the most knowledgeable students of the Span-
ish war have concluded that they could have done so at most any
time. 7 Although never put to the test, had the Communists ever
decided to do so, their control of the Brigades would have been a key
element in their chances of success.
The Communists saw the Brigades as much more than simply a
reliable military and political force within the framework of Loyalist
Spain, as important as that undoubtedly was. For the Brigades could
and did serve a number of political purposes for the Comintern on a
larger stage than Spain itself. One of the most important of these
focused on the Brigades as representing the most outstanding exam-
ple, the embodiment in action, of that international and proletarian
solidarity of which there had long been much talk but little visible
evidence. The International Brigades, commented the Communist
International, "represent the highest expression of international
solidarity, of the anti-fascist united front and of proletarian honor,
devotion and courage." 8 The Brigades were, according to the Com-
munists, "the pride of the working class, the avant garde of combat
... a symbol of antifascist unity ... the greatest and most active force
of international solidarity ... the burning point of international poli-
tics."9 They represented the "highest expression, the most living wit-
ness of the solidarity of the labouring masses." They constituted "the
highest testimony to international solidarity." 10 The Spanish Com-
munists were equally unstinting in their praise of the Brigades, calling
them a "living expression of international solidarity of the popular
masses throughout the world." "The Comintern was proud," said
92 COMINTERN ARMY

Mundo Obrero, "on counting many of its best militants on the bat-
tlefields of Spain." 11
The Communists recognized too the significant prestige and fever-
age that the Brigades brought to them not only in Spain but elsewhere.
Numerous statements by leading Communist spokesmen attested to
this attitude. "One of the greatest achievements that our party has
ever made is the building of the Lincoln and Washington battalions
of the International Brigades," declared Earl Browder. 12 The central
committee of the United States party assured the American members
of the Brigades, "Your heroic deeds ... have brought glory and honor
to the working class.... Your name has become a symbol of heroism
and inspiration to all of us at home." Maurice Thorez, leader of the
French party, in referring to the overall Communist role in the Span-
ish war, stressed particularly the contribution of the party in having
had "many of its best men" fight in the International Brigades. 13
Calling the Brigades an "International of steeled and disciplined revo-
lutionary fighters," British Communist chief Harry Pollitt said, "The
comrades of the International Brigades, now covering itself with glory
in Spain, are a real People's Army." Later, he declared, "The Spirit
of the Anglo-American volunteers is an inspiration to the movement
at home." 14 The German party hierarch Franz Dahlem wrote: "The
Communist International, the Communist Parties of Germany and
Austria, as the Communist Parties of other countries, can justly be
proud of their fighters in Spain. They have borne aloft the Party
banner." "The International Brigades show in practice the high value
of the International solidarity of the defenders of democracy and,
thus, in all capitalist countries assist the growth of the anti-fascist
People's Front," 15 claimed the Comintern's official publication. The
Brigade Boletfn de Informacion agreed: "The International Brigades
are a powerful lever for the creation of united international action, for
the creation of the international People's Front. The unity between all
anti-fascists is an accomplished fact in the International Brigades. The
Brigades are a school for internationalism." The Communist Interna-
tional, once more stated: "The experience of the International Bri-
gade is above all of tremendous positive significance on the wide :field
of the anti-Fascist struggle in all countries. The example of the ...
Brigade must be an important step toward the unification of all anti-
Fascist forces for a similar struggle in other countries." 16
The Comintern also saw the Brigades as an instrument through
which new members could be brought into the Communist parties.
That would be accomplished directly through proselytization of non-
party men within the Brigades and indirectly through the enhanced
Comintern Politics 93

attraction of the party to a broad spectrum of persons because of its

identification with the Brigades and the Loyalist cause in Spain. "I
make the categoric statement," said Robert Minor, a leading United
States party hierarch, "that the heroic fighting of the American boys
in Spain, and the consequent interest and sympathy and pride awak-
ening among the American people are a major factor in the political
life of this country." 17 That the Communists made a continuous effort
to proselytise nonparty men within the Brigades was clear from both
the content of the Brigade press and from the policies followed by the
political commissars. They approached this task for the most part, as
befitted the general Popular Front orientation of the time, by con-
stantly emphasizing the correctness of Communist policy in Spain and
elsewhere, by consistently representing the Comintern as the guiding
light (and only trustworthy component) of antifascism and by re-
peated and unstinted praise and glorification of the Soviet Union. On
this theme the United States party representative John Little, who had
just returned from a visit to Spain, reported to a New York party
convention on the American members of the Brigade: "Their fighting
spirit, love for our Party, love for the Soviet Union have increased a
hundredfold .... They want above everything else to continue to build
our party." 18
Another important view of the Brigades as seen from within the
structure of the Comintern focused on their value as a forge from
which would come "steeled and disciplined revolutionary fighters," 19
cadres who would lead the party's troops in future battles throughout
the world. On the battlefields of Spain, Longo told the men of the
Brigades, "we have learned lessons that will serve us and our own
peoples in the struggles in our own countries. We have been able to
learn important political lessons." 20 That these lessons were to be
applied in other times and places was clear from the pledge taken by
graduates of the XV Brigade officer training school. "We pledge an
eternal fight against fascism wherever it may be found and in whatever
guise it may hide; we pledge to the international working class that
we will fulfill the trust they have placed in us." 21
Men who served in the Brigades were looked upon, said Marty, as
"worthy members of the World Party of Bolsheviks. They are worthy
sons of that Party which, formed and led by the greatest minds of our
time, Lenin and Stalin, has overthrown the Old World ... All are
worthy of that great Antifascist and Communist, Georgi Dimitroff."
The Communist International opined, "The working class must
understand what a treasure and what experience the fighters for free-
dom now returned from Spain bring with them, into what worthy
94 COMINTERN ARMY

cadres of the movement these fighters have grown." The American

party spokesman and sometimes political commissar in Spain Bill
Lawrence wrote: "Our Party, though making terrific sacrifices [in
Spain], is at the same time developing marvelous cadres." 22
In line with that attitude the Comintern hierarchy treated those
party cadres who served in the International Brigades with special
favor and granted them special recognition and opportunities for
advancement within the party ranks. At a meeting of the politburo of
the Communist party of the United States in November 1937, party
chief Earl Browder introduced four men recently back from Spain:
"The presence of these leading comrades is of special signficance for
us," he said, "because they represent ... one ofthe greatest assets that
our Party has .... The fact that these comrades are back with us now
gives us an opportunity to show how much the Party appreciates such
sterling, fundamental contributions." Browder then proposed that
Steve Nelson, one of the four comrades present, be recommended for
"co-option into the Central Committee of our Party." 23
Given the value of the Brigades in the eyes of the Communists it
followed that they would make every effort to maintain the Brigades
as an autonomous Comintern-controlled force. The effort to do so
became a central theme for the Brigade political hierarchy throughout
their sojourn in Spain.
The nexus through which the Comintern exercised control over the
internal affairs of the International Brigades was the Brigade general
political commissariat. The formation and functioning of the political
commissariat itself assured that its policies and operations meshed
perfectly into the overall Comintern apparatus and policy in Spain.
Just as the party controls the state apparatus in Communist countries
by filling all key state posts with disciplined party members whose
loyalty and duty remain first and last to the party, the Comintern
ensured the political reliability of the Brigades by filling all key politi-
cal (and most military) posts with disciplined party members. Thus
the Brigade political commissariat, composed entirely of Communist
stalwarts, operated at all times under the discipline and authority of
the Comintern. Indeed, it was for all practical purposes simply a
direct extension of the Comintern itself. 24
The Soviet-Comintern apparatus further ensured the reliability of
the International Brigades by assigning numerous individuals of non-
Russian origin who had been living in the Soviet Union prior to the
outbreak of war in Spain to military and political commands through-
out the Brigade structure. 25 Some of those so assigned were Soviet
army officers while others were trained intelligence and espionage
Comintern Politics 95

operatives who were or had been used by Soviet military or Comintern

intelligence apparatus in various parts of the world. For example,
Wilhelm Bahnick, a German Communist, a graduate of the Moscow
military-political school, and a member of one of the Comintern's
apparats in Germany was assigned to the International Brigades.
Victor Sukulov, a Latvian by birth, a Red army officer who worked
in a Comintern espionage apparatus in Belgium and France in the
1930s, served as captain in the International Brigades. 26
The Italian Communist Guido Picelli likewise arrived in Spain
directly from the Soviet Union. Picelli was apparently something of
a hero among Italian Communists for his actions inside Italy during
the early 1920s prior to the full consolidation of the Fascist dictator-
ship. The Italian Communists in the International Brigades evidently
expected great things of him and were bitterly disappointed when he
was killed in action after only a month or two in Spain. 27 Italian party
stalwarts Barontini, Raimondi, and Mallozzi also came to Spain di-
rectly from the Soviet Union. Barontini had left Italy for exile in
France in 1931 at the orders ofthe party. Then, in 1933, he had gone
to Moscow where he worked for the Comintern. On his arrival in
Spain he was appointed political commissar of the Garibaldi battalion
and later of the entire XII Brigade. The American Robert Merriman
also came to Spain from the Soviet Union and, within a brief time,
was placed in command of the American battalion. 28
Another indication of the complete fusion between the Comintern
and the Brigades was the way in which the hierarchs of the Brigades
continued to operate quite openly in their capacity as Comintern
representatives, not only inside Spain but elsewhere. An outstanding
example of that occurred at the meeting between representatives of
the Second and Third Internationals in June 1937 in Switzerland.
Conspicuous among the five-man Comintern delegation were Longo
and Dahlem, both high-ranking commissars of the International Bri-
gades.29
That the Comintern considered its functionaries in the Brigades as
remaining completely at the disposal of that organization was further
demonstrated by the frequent shifting of Communist personnel from
the Brigades to other party posts. An example of that interchangeabil-
ity was the high functionary who had played an important role in the
formation and early development of the Brigades, Nicoletti. The party
subsequently transferred Nicoletti from the International Brigades to
Paris where he assumed the post of editor of the party publication
La Voce degli ltaliani. 30 Likewise, the American David McKelvey
White was withdrawn from the Brigades at the volition of the party
96 CoMINTERN ARMY

to be used in another capacity. Mter a brief tour in Spain the party

ordered White out of the Brigades and back to New York where he
set up a party front organization known as Friends of the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade. 31 The American party also withdrew Bill Lawrence
from the Brigades and assigned him to other duties in the United
States. 32
The experience of the American John Gates offers another example
of the commissariat's control over Brigade personnel. In the summer
of 1937 the political commissariat of the International Brigades
offered Gates the choice of remaining with the International Brigades
in Spain or returning to the United States where he would be used in
propaganda and fund-raising campaigns. Gates chose to remain and
the commissariat appointed him political commissar of the American
section at Albacete. Similarly, Auguste Lecouer, originally assigned
to the International Brigades by the French party, was later pulled out
of the Brigades and reassigned to party propaganda work in France. 33
"In fact, the commissariat completely controlled Brigade personnel
and, in the case of Communist cadres, the commissariat and the
various Communist parties moved them in and out of the Brigades at
will.
Brigade members were also assigned to partisan, guerrilla, espio-
nage, and sabotage units as well as the police apparatus operated by
Soviet and Comintern personnel in Spain. They were recruited as
Soviet espionage agents to operate in areas having no relation to the
Spanish war. Alexander Foote, for example, a member of the British
battalion, returned under orders to England in Semptember 1938,
ostensibly for the purpose of attending the Communist party congress
in Birmingham. At that time the party leadership assigned him the
duty of acting as a courier between Communist party headquarters in
London and the command in the British battalion in Spain. Suddenly,
however, he received new instructions to go to Geneva, Switzerland.
Foote proceeded as instructed and soon found himself working in a
Soviet espionage apparat for the Red army. 34
A number of American Brigade men served in one of these catego-
ries. Robert Minor, active in a variety of capacities in Spain, recruited
Americans from the Brigades to work directly for the Soviet mis-
sion.35 William Aalto, an American who served in one of the guerrilla
units that were organized, trained, and controlled directly by the
Soviet staff, later wrote an article in which he said, "In Spain, guerrilla
warfare was organized under Soviet advice and according to Soviet
principles. . . . Our Soviet military advisors in Spain brought us the
principles of that science ... in our guerrilla schools, lessons from the
Comintern Politics 97

Red Army's experience were taught us, verbally and through Spanish
translations of Red Army manuals." 38
The controversy within the Loyalist camp over the use of guerrilla
warfare tactics offered a striking example of the way the Comintern
apparatus bypassed the Loyalist government, as well as how it con-
trolled the International Brigades. In January 1937, while the XI
Brigade was in rest quarters at Murcia, Renn received a visit from a
representative of the Soviet military mission who spoke to him in
strict confidence about the partisan work the Soviet experts wanted
to organize. The object, according to the Russian, was to foster wide-
spread guerrilla activity in Nationalist territory. But, he continued,
Largo Caballero opposed it. "We cannot, therefore, do it officially,"
he explained, "so we must organize it unofficially." 37 The idea, then,
was to enter the roughly one hundred and twenty men involved on
the rolls of the XI Brigade so as to account for their presence in Spain.
Renn, chief of staff of a military unit that claimed to be under the
orders of the Spanish government, agreed to the request of a represen-
tative of a foreign power to contravene the policy of that government.
The connection between Renn and the Soviet agent, a connection that
completely short-circuited the Loyalist government, was the Comin-
tern to which they both owed their first allegiance and the Soviet
Union, which was the true fatherland of both. 38
Also indicative of the close ties between the Brigade commissariat
and the Soviet mission in Spain was the establishment of a Brigade
historical commission. The American base commissar at Albacete,
Bill Lawrence, informed Voros that, at the request of the Soviet
military authorities in Moscow, the Comintern had ordered the for-
mation of such a historical commission in the Brigades and that
Voros, on orders from the Comintern, was to be chief of the Anglo-
American section. Voros was then transferred to the political commis-
sariat of the Brigades where he began work on his new assignment. 39
A further illustration that the Comintern and not the Loyalist
government or its military staff controlled the Brigades concerned the
authority exercised over the Brigade and its personnel by individuals
who had no connection with that organization except through their
position within the Comintern hierarchy. For example, Togliatti, the
top Comintern figure in Spain, often appeared at Albacete where he
consulted with the Brigade's political chieftains. Despite the fact that
he had no official position or authority either within the Loyalist
government or the International Brigades, the Brigade hierarchs rec-
ognized his authority. 40 The role played by Prosper Moquet, a French
Communist deputy, further illustrated the point. Moquet, who was
98 COMINTERN ARMY

merely on a temporary tour of Spain and had no juridical relationship

with either the International Brigades or the Spanish government,
could and did pledge his word, along with that of Auguste Lecouer,
that certain actions would or would not be taken by the political
directorate of the Brigades. 41 Likewise, Robert Minor, the representa-
tive of the United States party in Spain, with no official connection
with the International Brigades nor the Loyalist government, exer-
cised authority over American Brigade men solely on the basis of his
position in the Communist party. Voros, for example, carried instruc-
tions to Minor from the American party regarding the return to the
United States of certain American party members from Spain. 42
Another factor in the Comintern's ability both to maintain control
of the internal affairs of the Brigades and to maintain their autonomy
within the larger Loyalist framework was the nature of the military
chain of command. The original International Brigade generals were
either Red army officers or old Comintern stalwarts who, with the
single exception of "Gomez" had served in the Red army. Further-
more, the Brigades and their military commanders operated under the
watchful eyes and close direction of the Soviet military staff in Spain.
All International Brigade commanders had Soviet army advisers on
their staffs who represented the direct authority of the Soviet military
mission in Spain. 43 And, finally, many of those same foreign Commu-
nists who originally commanded the International Brigades later
commanded the Loyalist People's Army divisions of which the Inter-
national Brigades were component parts. 44 Thus, while the Interna-
tional Brigades were organizationally assimilated into the framework
of the military structure of the People's Army, they continued to be
under Communist military command, not only at the Brigade level
but at the divisional level.
That the Comintern, and not the Loyalist government, controlled
the personnel and internal authority structure within the Interna-
tional Brigades can also be seen in certain developments during the
spring and summer of 1937 when the Brigades were experiencing
serious internal problems. The XIV Brigade, for example, suffered a
severe morale and disciplinary breakdown in the wake of the Jarama
fighting. Despite everything the officers and commissars could do,
dissension, desertion, and drunkenness continued to plague the Bri-
gade until it came to resemble more "a band of savages" than an elite
military unit. The Brigade newspaper, Le Soldat de Ia Republique,
alluded to this state of affairs in an article condeming what it called
the "malcontent." "An antifascist soldier," it declared, "cannot be a
Comintern Politics 99

malcontent. The volunteers for liberty condemn absolutely the bad

comrade who is never content." 45
One reason for this state of affairs was that following the elevation
of General Walter to a division command, Colonel Putz, a former
batallion commander, became commander of the XIV Brigade. Putz,
well thought of by his officers and men, had proved himself a compe-
tent and courageous combat commander. But, as a non-Communist,
he did not wield the intrinsic political authority that, in the Interna-
tional Brigades, was the ultimate sanction behind the authority of the
military commanders.
The Albacete directorate soon took steps to alter the situation by
placing a staunch party stalwart in command and by reinforcing both
military and commissar staffs with reliable Communists. On April 22
Le Soldat de Ia Republique announced the assumption of command
by Colonel Jules Dumont. Putz was posted first to Walter's divisional
staff and then to command of a Basque division in the northern zone,
thus being completely removed from the International Brigade com-
mand structure. 46
With Dumont's assumption of command of the Brigade, his French
party colleague Marcel Sagnier took command of the Commune de
Paris battalion. The French Communist Vittori, a longtime activist in
the French Communist party, assumed the post of Brigade commis-
sar.47
Dumont, a longtime Communist activist with strong roots in the
French party, immediately instituted a severe disciplinary regime in
the XIV Brigade. The troops were informed that a "pioneer com-
pany" was being formed and that all who continued to indulge in
drunkenness and undisciplined behavior would be assigned to it. Its
purpose was "reeducation" and when the first group selected for this
discipline company were mustered, they were told that only after their
reeducation was obvious would they be returned to their units. They
were also reminded that a military prison existed for incorrigibles. But
discipline companies and guardhouses were not the ultimate sanction
for indiscipline. During this period the firing squad was introduced as
an instrument for the punishment of serious cases. 48
This draconian disciplinary regime was not limited to the XIV
Brigade but was in line with the general policy laid down by the
Albacete commissariat. The commissariat's demand for "ruthless ac-
tion," including executions, against indiscipline in the International
Brigades brought a political crisis in the British battalion where both
battalion commander Copeman and political commissar Aitken op-
100 COMINTERN ARMY

posed the implementation of such severe measures. Disturbed at hear-

ing that death sentences were being carried out in other Brigade units,
Copeman felt not only that such measures were unnecessary and
wrong but that any such actions in the British battalion would likely
provoke mutiny. 49 These disputes brought a thorough shakeup in the
political hierarchy of the battalion in May 1937. Springhall, who had
been British commissar on the Brigade staff, and Peter Kerrigan,
battalion commissar, were both recalled to England. The British
Communist party replaced them with three new party stalwarts, Wil-
liam Paynter, who became British base commissar at Albacete, Bert
Williams, who assumed the post of battalion commissar, and Walter
Tapsell, ex-circulation manager for the British Daily Worker. George
Aitken, previously at battalion level, moved up to the Brigade political
staff. 5o
These changes sufficed to bring the difficulties under control tempo-
rarily, but a new crisis developed from the battalion's experience in
the Brunete offensive in July. When, after having been withdrawn due
to heavy casualties and general exhaustion, the British were ordered
back to the front, the battalion balked. Political commissar Aitken
finally convinced Brigade headquarters that a return to the lines was
impossible. 51 But bitterness and recrimination flared. Battalion com-
missar Tapsell was arrested for making disparaging comments about
the Brigade command. On hearing of this, battalion commander
Copeman went to Brigade headquarters determined to secure Tap-
sell's release, telling his machine-gun commander to bring his guns
and rescue him if he did not return within two hours. On his arrival
at Brigade headquarters Copeman found that not only had Tapsell
been arrested but that Cunningham, now attached to the Brigade staff,
was being blamed for the failure. The Albacete commissariat, sup-
ported by certain of the British political commissars, 52 was again
demanding the death penalty be imposed for indiscipline and leaving
the lines during the battle. Tapsell, whose release Copeman secured,
decided that only the party hierarchy in England could straighten out
the political chaos within the battalion. He told Copeman that he
should return to England with Tapsell so as to be available for the
"inevitable political fight" that he expected. Copeman agreed. "I saw
no reason why indiscriminate shooting of volunteers should be per-
mitted," he wrote. "The fight between us and the others would have
to be settled."
Tapsell, Copeman, and Cunningham did shortly return to England
and a fierce argument before the politburo of the party ensued. Cun-
ningham became so alienated as a result of this affair that he never
Comintern Politics 101

returned to Spain and soon left the party. The politburo's decision was
that Copeman and Tapsell were to return to Spain while the leaders
of the British political commissariat, with the exception of William
Rust, would remain in England. Feeling that this decision "amounted
to a sentence on us," Tapsell and Copeman demanded, and got, a
letter from British party secretary Pollitt, "assuring our authority
while in Spain." 53 This episode demonstrates clearly that such inter-
nal Brigade matters were seen as political issues within the Comintern
and were dealt with and decided not by the Loyalist government but
by the Communists themselves, acting through either the Albacete
commissariat or the party hierarchies of the national contingents
within the Brigades.
Developments in the American battalion also demonstrated the
point. Bitterness over the Pingarron massacre led to a protest delega-
tion going to Albacete and demanding that the contact be made with
the American party at once. The battalion was in such bad shape that
Brigade headquarters appointed a Belgian officer, Captain Van der
Berghe, as temporary commander. In early March Martin Hourihan,
an American of more or less undefined politics, became battalion
commander by a sort of popular referendum on the part of the battal-
ion. Battalion commissar Stember became so unpopular that he was
replaced in mid-March by David Jones, like Stember a Communist
party man. Stember returned to the United States where the party
propagandists soon began using him as a living example of the heroes
of the Lincoln battalion on fund-raising tours. At about this time
Captain Alan Johnson, an American, arrived on the scene. He had
been involved in the organization of the original American recruits in
New York and apparently came to Spain with authority to make
changes in the command structure of the Lincoln battalion, for
shortly after his arrival he replaced Hourihan and Jones with Oliver
Law and Fred Lutz, both Communist party members. Shortly after
this, Johnson went to Tarrazona de Ia Mancha where he assumed
command of the recently established American training base. He
remained in that position until the fall of 1938. Neither Johnson nor
those he appointed to command in the battalion solved the problems
however.
The threat of an embarrassing scandal if word of the sad condition
of the Americans leaked out spurred the party hierarchy in New York
to dispatch a number of trusted cadres to Spain to fill the leadership
vacuum. 54 One of them, Sandor Voros, an American of Hungarian
descent who had long been active in the party, had volunteered to go
to Spain earlier, but the party had refused to allow it. The policy was
102 CoMINTERN ARMY

to keep the experienced cadres at home where they were needed rather
than to send them to Spain and possibly lose them. But several months
later, Saul Mills, a member of the central committee of the Commu-
nist party in the United States, told Voros that the party now wanted
him to go to Spain. The party, Mills confided to Voros, was in trouble
over the Spanish imbroglio. All that glorious hero business that the
Daily Worker was putting out was so much propaganda. The Ameri-
can comrades in Spain were completely demoralized and wanted to
get out. Desertion was a serious problem. If the truth got out, there
would be a tremendous scandal. The party was now sending some
seasoned leaders over to try to get the Americans into shape. For a
party functionary such a request was an order and Voros soon left for
Spain. At about this same time the American party also sent party
activist Steve Nelson to Spain and the Brigades. Shortly after his
arrival Nelson, without previous service in or connection with the
International Brigades, assumed the position of political commissar
of the Lincoln battalion. Another American who was sent to Spain
by the United States party and who assumed a ranking commissar
post upon arrival was Young Communist League functionary Dave
Doran. He ultimately replaced Nelson as XV Brigade commissar. 55
The methods and mechanics by which the Comintem controlled
the Brigades were also indicated by an episode involving the French
party, the Albacete commissariat, and the XIII Brigade. In February
1937 Auguste Lecouer, a French Communist activist, was ap-
proached by the French party about serving in the Brigades in Spain.
The situation in the Brigades, the party spokesman informed Lecouer,
was desperate. The high casualties of the preceding months and the
subsequent demoralization was causing severe problems. Further-
more, the quality of those now being recruited left much to be desired.
The Comintem had urgently ordered the French party to send more
of its reliable cadres to the Brigades who would be capable offunction-
ing as political commissars. Lecouer and some sixty others were
chosen. They assembled in Paris where Maurice Thorez, chief of the
French party, spoke to them, explaining the need and what was
expected of them in Spain. They arrived at Albacete on February 25. 56
Shortly after Lecouer's arrival Marty summoned him to his office.
With Marty was a Pole, the political commissar of the XIII Brigade. 57
The XIII Brigade was experiencing severe morale and disciplinary
problems, said Marty. Lecouer was to select two assistants from
among the French cadres who had come with him and proceed imme-
diately to assume the duties of political commissars in the XIII Bri-
gade. As always Marty blamed the failings and shortcomings in the
Comintern Politics 103

Brigades on traitors, spies, and agents provocateur. Thus, he informed

Lecouer, a key part of the task of the new commissars was to root out
these elements. 58
Albacete also assigned a party writer, Alfred Kantorowicz, to the
XIII Brigade as information officer. His purpose was to help raise
morale by giving this Brigade (which did not share in the glory of the
Madrid battles) some publicity. This he did by writing a series of
articles on the history and martial exploits of the XIII which appeared
serially in the International Brigade's official publication, Volunteer
for Liberty. 59 Although Lecouer was later reassigned to other politi-
cal work by Marty, the commissariat continued to pick tested and
reliable Communists to occupy the political commissar post in the
XIII Brigade. In July 1937, for example, Blagoie Parovic, using the
nom de guerre "Schmidt" in Spain, assumed that post. A member of
the central committee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia since
1934 and a party functionary since 1924, Parovic had long been
engaged in conspiratorial work. In Spain he had gained a reputation
in the party as an extremely reliable political commissar who fought
"with all energy and determination against counter-revolutionary
Trotskyists ... for the Bolshevik line of the party." 60 These develop-
ments involving three of the International Brigades, the XIII, XIV,
and XV, illustrate the fact that the Comintern consistently and effec-
tively used the agencies of the various national Communist parties
and the Albacete commissariat to maintain its control over the inter-
nal structure and affairs of the Brigades.
The Communists' proprietory attitude toward the Brigades and
their determination thoroughly to dominate and control them was
also clearly shown in the case of Pacciardi and the XII Brigade. The
issues between Pacciardi and Albacete stemmed, in part, from their
different conceptions of the origin, nature, and role of the Italian
volunteers in Spain. Pacciardi held that the Garibaldi unit was
founded on the charter of the Italian antifascist committee in Paris,
and his conception centered on the Italian nature of the Garibaldi mili-
tary unit. The Communists, on the other hand, saw it differently. Longo
took the position that the Garibaldi unit was, like all the International
Brigades, an integral part of "a great political and military organiza-
tion," which was able to do what it did, including solving the prob-
lems of rapport with the Spanish government, only because of its
international character. The prevalence of Communists in the Bri-
gades, their discipline and organization, and their international sup-
port, Longo held, were responsible for their success as compared to
the other Italian efforts in Spain. Pacciardi, said Longo, was ap-
104 COMINTERN ARMY

pointed commander of the Garibaldis by the Albacete commissariat

on the same basis and by the same authority as all other Brigade
commanders and commissars and was subject to the same authority
and discipline. 61
During the spring and summer of 1937 the differences between
Pacciardi and the Albacete hierarchy became progressively more pro-
nounced. Pacciardi's appointment of non-Communists to command
positions and his generally independent attitude led to persistent criti-
cism of him by the Communist politicos. 62 The Communists accused
Pacciardi of being a chronic critic of the conditions under which the
unit was committed to battle and one who saw things only from his
own point of view instead of taking into consideration the big picture.
Also, said the Communists, he wanted to be the sole authority over
the internal affairs of the Garibaldi Brigade, accepting no interference
from the political commissariat at Albacete. They complained that
Pacciardi surrounded himself with those who admired him, shunned
the higher authority of the commissariat, and made a point of ap-
pointing non-Communists to his staff, a situation, they said, that
represented an error in a unit composed in the great majority of
Communists. Pacciardi was quite aware of the attitude of the political
commissariat toward him. He informed the non-Communist officer
Penchienati, soon after the latter's appointment as battalion com-
mander, of the political currents in the Brigade and told him that if
he, Penchienati, had any trouble with the Communist politicos to
come directly to him about it. 63
The political tensions within the XII Brigade were exacerbated
further by the outbreak of an internecine struggle within the ranks of
the Loyalist camp and by repercussions of that on the Brigades. On
May 3 the long-brewing enmity between the Anarchists and Commu-
nists flared into an open clash in Barcelona, and a state of hostilities,
complete with machine guns clattering from rooftops, existed in the
city until May 8. The real winners of the ftareup in Barcelona were
the Communists who exploited the situation to engineer the fall of the
Largo Caballero government and to carry out a severe repression
against their political enemies in the Popular Front camp. Neither the
Communists' hatred of the Anarchists nor their antipathy to Largo
Caballero was anything new. They simply took advantage of the
outbreak of open fighting in Barcelona to force a showdown and settle
old scores. The Communists had, in fact, been angling to oust Largo
Caballero for some time. They had assiduously used the fall of Malaga
in February to try to discredit him and his regime but were successful
only in forcing the resignation of his undersecretary for war. Largo
Comintern Politics 105

Caballero had grown progressively more suspicious of the way the

Communists were taking control and, as a result, had become more
truculent toward them. So far as the Barcelona affair went, he was
unwilling to allow the type of wholesale repression of "uncontrolla-
bles" demanded by the Communists. The Communist attitude toward
the Barcelona clash was that "Anarchist adventurers and provoca-
teurs, in accord with the Franquist espoinage agents, opened another
war front at our backs." Using Largo Caballero's reluctance to crack
down rigorously on the Anarchists as the reason for withdrawing
their support, the party determined to force a cabinet crisis and oust
him. As J6se Diaz of the CPS put it, "Either the government must
impose order or we will have a new government." In support oftheir
campaign against Largo Caballero the Communists launched a viru-
lent attack on him to the effect that he was an impediment to the war
effort and, if not an outright traitor himself, was at least surrounded
by and under the influence of traitorous elements.
The Albacete commissariat followed the party line to the letter. As
Longo himself put it: "Agents of Franco had infiltrated into the
ministry, the general staff.... Largo Caballero, was under the influ-
ence of traitorous officers.... The reason for all this [lack of stem
suppression of "uncontrollables" by the Largo Caballero government]
was that the head of government himself-with some of his ministers
and many of his collaborators of the central general staff-were par-
ticipating in the anti-Communist campaign ofthe Poumists and ofthe
fifth column." 64
While the Communists were forcing the cabinet crisis that ousted
Largo Caballero and replaced him with the more pliable Juan Negrin,
the Soviet-Comintem police apparatus, operating independently of
Loyalist government authority, arrested and incarcerated thousands
and shot an unknown number in their secret prisons. 65 They also
either murdered or expelled from Spain a number of foreigners who
had been associated with Anarchist or POUM military units, or about
whom the Communists had some suspicion as to their "reliability." 66
The Communist vendetta against what they more or less indiscrimi-
nately called Trotskyists, Franco or Gestapo agents, uncontrollables,
or fifth columnists carried over, inevitably, into the International
Brigades. In the period following the Barcelona rising the political
commissars, following the direction of the Albacete commissariat,
indoctrinated the troops in the Communist line that the affair repre-
sented an effort of traitors, fascists, and, above all, Trotskyists, to stab
the Popular Front in the back and tum the country over to the
enemy. 67
106 COMINTERN ARMY

The Brigade commissariat sent telegrams to the new premier, Ne-

grin, pledging the Brigades' loyalty to the new government. The
Brigade press editorialized that the change in leadership was a result
of Largo Caballero's failures. The commissars stressed the necessity
for the Brigades to remain calm, maintain strict discipline, and be
vigilant against provocateurs and Trotskyists in their own ranks. An
Albacete directive warned Brigade men who had cause to be in Bar-
celona to secure a special identification document due to the "vigorous
cleaning up of all undesirable and uncontrollable elements by govern-
ment authorities." 68
The Brigade commissariat also took the occasion to attempt a
thorough purge of uncontrollables from the ranks of the Brigades.
The repercussions of that policy were felt primarily in the Garibaldi
Brigade which was the only one with any substantial number of
Anarchists (at least non-Spanish Anarchists) and the only one in
which Anarchists were in any position to command. Pacciardi was
determined that there should be no purge in the Garibaldi and also
that the Garibaldi should take no part, on either side, in the Popular
Front's internecine struggles. On May 5 Penchienati's battalion re-
ceived orders to proceed to Valencia, ostensibly to participate in a
parade. Instead of parading, however, the units remained in the vicin-
ity of Valencia for several days and then moved to Tortosa, a coastal
town about halfway between Valencia and Barcelona. A Spanish
Communist officer who had come from Albacete then ordered the
battalion to Barcelona. Concluding that his battalion was being or-
dered to Barcelona to be used in suppressing the Anarchists who were,
as he put it, being persecuted because they disagreed with the Com-
munists, Penchienati refused to move his battalion until he received
personal orders from Pacciardi whom he contacted by phone. Pac-
ciardi told Penchienati not to move until he got there. The Spanish
officer in command threatened to arrest Penchienati and disarm his
battalion. At that, Penchienati and his men returned to their quarters
and set up machine guns, thus ending the threatened disarming of the
battalion. Pacciardi soon arrived by automobile and had the officer in
command arrested by order of General Lukacs. Penchienati and his
battalion then rejoined the Brigade. 69
Pacciardi's refusal to sanction the use of his troops in the suppres-
sion of "uncontrollables" or to modify his command structure and
staff to "conform with recent events," as suggested by the Interna-
tional Brigade commissariat made the Communist politicos of the
International Brigades more determined than ever to be rid of him.
For them it was only a matter of waiting for the right moment.
Comintern Politics 107

Pacciardi on the other hand had by then become thoroughly disen-

chanted with the Communists and was determined that they should
not completely usurp his authority in the Garibaldi Brigade. As he
later put it, "I understood the political plots of the Communists, and
I placed myself against them." 70
While these political currents smoldered within the XII Brigade,
the new Negrin regime sought to consolidate its position and establish
its image as a government of victory by quickly launching two sepa-
rate military offensives. One of these involved the XII Brigade in an
attack on Huesca, a Nationalist bastion in Aragon. The decision of
the Negrin government to engage in a military action in Aragon
immediately after its accession to power and its use of International
Brigade units in the operation seemed to many, including some Inter-
national Brigade men themselves, to be motivated by internal political
rather than military considerations.
The suspicion, distrust, and hostility of much of the population of
Aragon and Catalonia toward the Loyalist regime was nothing new,
and in much of the area the writ of the Valencia government ran more
in theory than in practice. The Negrin regime, in which no Anarchist
ministers participated and which came in the wake of the Barcelona
affair, was even more suspect to the Anarchist-oriented population of
Aragon than Largo Caballero's had been. Viewing the International
Brigades as a Communist military force, much of the population of
Aragon suspected the presence of the Brigades in their territory and
feared that they were to be used as forces of public order. 71
The attack on Huesca resulted in total failure and high casualties. 72
During the campaign Pacciardi wrote to his divisional commander
protesting any further waste of men in continuing to attack a position
without sufficient strength to hope seriously to take it. His protest was
ignored and the offensive went on. 73
The Albacete directorate took advantage of the vacancies created
by the Huesca casualties to strengthen the Communist hand in the
Brigade. Two party stalwarts, Raimondi and Mallozzi, both of whom
came to Spain via Moscow, replaced the two battalion commanders
who had fallen at Huesca. Felice Platone, the party functionary whom
the Albacete commissariat had earlier forced on Pacciardi, remained
Brigade chief of staff, and the equally reliable Barontini continued in
the post of Brigade political commissar. The Brigade command struc-
ture now stood, except for Pacciardi and Penchienati, staunchly Com-
munist.74
Within ten days of the mauling taken by the Brigade at Huesca it
was reinforced by some 800 untrained, unarmed, and even ununi-
108 COMINTERN ARMY

formed Spanish conscripts and on the following day orders arrived for
the Brigade to proceed immediately to Madrid for further action (the
upcoming Brunete offensive). This, said Pacciardi, was absurd. The
battalions were disorganized and two of the three had lost their com-
manders. In addition, the task of assimilating, training, and equipping
the large infusion of raw Spanish recruits into the ranks had not even
begun. He therefore wrote to his division commander requesting a
period for training and reorganization. But the answer was no: orders
were orders. 75
Pacciardi's open criticism of the Huesca operation and his subse-
quent questioning of the rapid commitment of his Brigade to more
action further exacerbated the hostility toward him on the part of the
Communist hierarchy. Open criticism was the most deadly of sins to
the Communist politicos. Party discipline sealed tight the lips of the
faithful. But for one who did not accept that discipline absolutely and
who had the temerity to challenge openly the party's direction, the
only answer was exorcism from the ranks of the International Bri-
gades. For one of Pacciardi's stature, however, this presented some-
thing of a problem. The events of July and the Brunete campaign led
to a solution to the problem favorable to the Communists.
During that offensive Pacciardi's long-smoldering dissatisfaction
with both the Communist domination of the Brigade and the way in
which the Brigade was being used flared into open confrontation. The
Garibaldis, heavily laden with untrained Spanish recruits, suffered
severely in the early phases of the Brunete campaign. Finally, faced
with an order to launch one more attack which, he felt, would result
in yet another senseless bloodbath, Pacciardi protested vehemently to
General Kleber, and he followed that protest by a violent argument
with the political commissar of the forty-fifth division during which
he accused the commissar of trying to run the Brigade and of being
a spy.
Informed of this crisis in command, Longo hastened to Garibaldi
headquarters, where he addressed the highly ruffied troops and, in an
attempt to soothe them, countermanded the order for the advance. A
few hours later Pacciardi wrote a letter of resignation. That night he
changed his mind but refused to go to divisional headquarters despite
the repeated orders of the Brigade political commissar, Barontini, to
do so. 76
The XII Brigade became racked with dissension between those who
supported Pacciardi and those who supported the commissariat. Pac-
ciardi took the position that the Garibladi Brigade had become an
Italian unit in name only, that the few Italians left were so submerged
Comintern Politics 109

in the masses of Spanish troops composing the People's Army that

militarily they were doing the Spaniards little good and that mean-
while the best cadres of Italian antifascism were being wantonly
wasted. He proposed as a solution the retirement of the Italian volun-
teers for a period, the granting to them of leaves outside Spain if they
so desired, and a new effort to recruit more men for a revitalized all
Italian unit. 77
The Albacete hierarchy by now was determined that Pacciardi
must go, and the commissariat launched a concerted attack against
him. The official organ of the XII Brigade, II Volontario della Liberto,
published a series of articles written by Longo himself which, without
specifically naming Pacciardi, attacked his position regarding the role
of the foreign fighters. One of the articles entitled "Discipline in the
Army Is Necessary for Victory," concluded: "It is necessary that all
the combatants have the maximum faith in the superior command and
especially in the top command. Those who command must obey with
the maximum discipline and promptness . . . the password of our
volunteers and of all combatants must be . . . discipline, discipline,
discipline. " 78 Pacciardi, in the face of this impossible situation, de-
cided to present his case to the Italian exile committee in Paris.
Pacciardi's departure presented the Communist politicos with a
golden opportunity to take full control of the XII Brigade, an oppor-
tunity they were quick to exploit. Brigade commissar Barontini told
his subordinate commissars that he now really commanded and that
Penchienati (who had been left in interim command) counted for
little. 79 The commissariat activated its maneuvers for ousting Pac-
ciardi permanently from command of the Garibaldis by informing the
Spanish authorities that he would not be coming back to Spain and
that a permanent replacement should be chosen. They planned to
replace him with a reliable party stalwart, preferably Barontini. For
once, however, the Communists failed to have their way. The Spanish
authorities, led by war minister Prieto, refused to go along. This was
all happening at a time when Prieto was taking a jaundiced view of
the Communists' attempts to dominate the Loyalist Army and com-
misar system. As part of his efforts to curb the Communists, he sought
to bring the International Brigades more fully under government
control. Thus he refused to accept the appointment of a Communist
politico as a commander of the XII Brigade. The immediate result was
the continuation of Penchienati in the post, but now on a regular
rather than an interim basis.
When an angry Pacciardi returned to Spain, the Communists urged
him to accept a promotion to division staff. He refused at first, saying
110 COMINTERN ARMY

he had not come to Spain to make a military career but to lead an

Italian unit. The Communists, knowing that Pacciardi had at his
disposal a party organization and a newspaper in France through
which he could greatly embarrass them and disrupt the always deli-
cate facade of Popular Front unity, and aware of the deep cleavages
within the XII Brigade, did not want him to leave Spain nursing a
grudge against them. Having achieved their purpose in removing him
from any effective role in the International Brigades, they now hoped
he could be bought off by a powerless post at division level. Pacciardi,
at the urging of both Penchienati and Nenni, finally agreed to accept
the post of vice commander of the division for the duration of the
imminent Aragon offensive as a gesture to buttress the badly shaken
unity and morale of the Garibaldi Brigade. 80 In October, following
the Aragon campaign, Pacciardi left Spain for good. 81 With his depar-
ture the Communists had successfully removed the only person within
the International Brigades who could conceivably stand up to them
or threaten their total control.
While the Brigade political commissariat served as a Comintern
control mechanism in the internal affairs of the Brigades, it also acted
as both buffer to and connecting link with the Loyalist regime. It was
thus the key to maintaining the political autonomy of the Brigades
within that larger political-military structure.
The Brigades' relationship to the Loyalist government in the begin-
ning had been tenuous. In fact Longo, with the aid of the Spanish
Communist and Comintern apparatus in Spain, established the base
at Albacete, and the Internationals were already there in force, before
the Loyalist government was ever officially notified. 82 Only then did
Longo, accompanied by Rene Rebiere, a Frenchman, and Stephen
Wisniewski, a Pole, officially pay their respects and offer the services
of the Internationals to the president of the Republic, Azafia, and the
prime Ininister, Largo Caballero, in Madrid. The conversation be-
tween Longo's delegation and the two Spaniards amounted to little
more than formal and meaningless niceties. Both Azafia and Largo
Caballero were cool toward the delegation and showed little en-
thusiasm for the entire project of the foreign volunteers. 83 Largo
Caballero, who had earlier turned down suggestions for the organiza-
tion of foreign units, now accepted the existence of the International
Brigades, though without enthusiasm. The reason for his doing so was
most likely that he was simply presented with a fait accompli and saw
no way of avoiding it short of alienating the USSR and the Commu-
nists (both of whom he needed).
Comintern Politics 111

On October 17, 1936, Largo Caballero instructed Martinez Barrio,

civil governor of the province of Albacete, to cooperate with the
Comintern chiefs in the establishment of a base for the foreign troops.
The political command of the Brigade, represented by the same three
Comintern stalwarts, Longo, Rebiere, and Wisniewski, concluded a
formal agreement with Martinez Barrio concerning their use of Al-
bacete and on October 22 the base officially opened. 84 All these for-
malities thus amounted to nothing more than an ex post facto
recognition of things already done.
All these public and official acts were done in the name of the
international Popular Front in accordance with the policy of the
Comintern that the specifically Communist role be muted as much as
possible and that the Brigades appear as a spontaneous manifestation
of antifascist solidarity. The Communists generally suffered from a
logical dilemma on this point. They wanted credit for the Brigades as
a Comintern-inspired and -directed unit but at the same time they
needed to present the Brigades as an expression of a broad Popular
Front antifascism. Their efforts to have it both ways produced some
interesting mental gymnastics. For example, after arguing that the
Brigades were not a Communist organization, Longo went on to insist
that it was only the connection of the Brigades with the Comintern,
the discipline, unity, and strength afforded by that connection, and the
prevalence of Communist cadres in the Brigades which made the
Brigades an effective organization and fighting force. 85
The role of Pietro Nenni offers some insight into the nature of the
relationship between the Brigade and the government. As leader of
the Italian Socialist party, Nenni was an important figure in the
overall Popular Front political picture. The fact that he and his party
were affiliated with the Second International and at the same time firm
supporters of the Popular Front program and of the Comintern policy
in Spain made him uniquely valuable to the Communists. Nenni was
perhaps the prime example of a well-recognized non-Communist pro-
letarian leader being intimately involved with and committed to the
Comintern's policies and program in Spain. Being a Second Interna-
tional man also made Nenni more trusted by the Socialist leadership
of the Spanish Popular Front who, in the persons of both Largo
Caballero and Prieto, were less than completely convinced of the
trustworthiness of the Communists.
Nenni had been among the first foreigners to become actively en-
gaged in the Spanish war and he apparently enjoyed close relations
with the Spanish Socialists. He had, naturally, been involved in the
112 COMINTERN ARMY

negotiations of the Italian committee in Paris in creating the Italian

legion, but he had no part in the origins or organization of the Interna-
tional Brigades. In fact, his first direct contact with the Brigades came
only on November 25, 1936. On Nenni's first arrival at Albacete,
Marty offered him the post of political commissar of the new XIII
Brigade, but Nenni declined the honor. Unknown to Marty, Nenni
already had in his pocket a letter from the Spanish authorities ap-
pointing him special commissar in charge ofliaison between the Inter-
national Brigades and the government. It was apparently in that
capacity that he remained closely involved with, but not subject to the
authority of, the Brigade political command. 86
This arrangement seems to indicate several things: first, that the
Loyalist government recognized that the Brigades were an essentially
autonomous organization outside their direct control; second, that the
Spanish leaders saw in Nenni a man who could, and did, work closely
with the Communists and yet was not under Comintern discipline
(and was thus more reliable from their point of view than anyone
under that discipline could be); and third, that Nenni, despite his very
close ties with the Comintern and his acceptance of their policies and
direction, wanted to maintain the possibility of taking an independent
stance and did not therefore want to place himself under Comintern
authority by accepting a post in the hierarchy of the International
Brigades.
In the early stage of the war, autonomous, party-controlled military
units were characteristic of the Popular Front's fighting forces. But
as the Loyalist regime developed more centralized control and built
the People's Army, the situation gradually changed. This change
eventually put the Brigade hierarchy in a difficult position. For while
the Communists were the strongest proponents of centralized control
and a unified army they, at the same time, strongly resisted all efforts
on the part of the government to exercise any real control over the
internal affairs of the International Brigades or to absorb the Brigades
into the People's Army. Thus the Communists had to talk as if they
favored control of the Brigades by the Loyalist ministry of war and
general staff. But at the same time they consistently resented and
thwarted any attempt on the part of the government actually to
implement and make such control effective.
The ambiguity of their attitude toward this question can be seen in
this statement by Longo: "The International Brigades were the ex-
pression of the world Popular Front, at the service and the orders of
the Spanish Popular Front and nothing more. The safeguarding and
defense of this position was the maximum preoccupation of all the
Comintern Politics 113

International volunteers, and was the essential mission, on the politi-

cal plane and in the relations with the government and the various
Spanish political movements, of the Commissariat General of the
International Brigades." 87 Longo did not say that the Brigades were
at the orders of the Loyalist government and military authorities.
Using the standard Communist jargon of the day, Longo, in effect,
said nothing more than that the Brigades were at the orders of the
Comintern. For the Communists saw themselves and their policies as
the only valid and reliable expression of the Popular Front, both
international and Spanish. Indeed, Longo later harshly condemned
the Loyalist authorities, both political and military, for their failure
to implement fully the Communist program in general and the Bri-
gade commissariat's proposals in particular. He believed that the
reason for this failure was the anti-Communism of the authorities. "It
was because of parties and groups, not the direct action of the enemy,
that the difficulties to the normal and rational development of the
International Brigades were artificially created," he insisted. "They
[the Spaniards) feared their [the Brigades] force and their prestige,
just as they feared the force and prestige of the Spanish Communist
Party. They opposed and impeded a large mobilization of the masses,
the creation of a strong popular army, because they feared that all
these favored the development of the influence of the Communist
Party." And, he continued, "they risked the war against fascism for
fear of favoring the Party which was the most tenacious sustainer of
the war and which had sacrificed to it the best of its cadres and its
militants." Thus Longo's attitude, typical of the Communists in gen-
eral, was that only those Spaniards who faithfully followed the Com-
munists' lead were really the Spanish Popular Front. All others were
consigned to the category of traitors. "Naturally," he said, referring
to the Loyalist government and military authorities, "the Commis-
sariat General and the command of the International Brigades could
not close their eyes against the disgraceful actions of the fifth column
and of Gestapo and Ovra agents. These people, in every way, in low
and in high places tried to impede the fusion and the agreement
between the Internationals and the Spaniards." 88
In stating that the essential mission of the Brigade political commis-
sariat was to ensure that the Brigades continued to represent the
world and Spanish Popular Front vis-a-vis the Loyalist government,
Longo was in effect underscoring the attitude of the Brigade director-
ate, and the Communists in general, that the Brigades were an autono-
mous political element and not simply a military unit within the
regular framework of the Loyalist governmental or military structure.
114 COMINTERN ARMY

The very fact that the International Brigades continued to maintain

their own political commissariat, separate and distinct from the
commissariat of war of the Loyalist government, or any other
governmental organ, clearly indicated their autonomous political na-
ture and status. Had the Brigade directorate been truly interested
in a full assimilation of the Internationals into the Loyalist Peo-
ple's Army the disbandment of the Albacete political commissariat
would have been an obvious move. No such thing was ever con-
templated.
Both the determination of the Comintern to maintain its control
over the Brigades and the relationship between the Brigade hierarchy
and the Loyalist government were evident in the debate that arose
over the question of the Brigades' role and status in the spring and
summer of 1937. Following the heavy losses ofthe Jarama battle and
the impossibility of replacing those losses with foreign recruits,
Longo, speaking for the Brigade commissariat, proposed to the gov-
ernment that the Internationals be used more fully as cadres for the
training of the large numbers of Spaniards being conscripted into the
army. Significantly, the method for achieving this would not be the
disbandment of the International Brigades as distinct units and the
posting of the Internationals to regular units of the People's Army.
Rather, the Brigade commissariat proposed that the number of Inter-
national Brigades be doubled so that the experience and capacity of
the International cadres could be used to train and command large
numbers of new Spanish conscripts.
This approach had obvious advantages from the commissariat's
point of view. It could be camouflaged as an effort to use more fully
the talents of the International cadres and to assimilate the Brigades
into the People's Army through the incorporation of Spaniards into
the Brigades. In reality, it would be a method for increasing Commu-
nist influence within the Loyalist army while still retaining the essen-
tial political autonomy of the Brigades. The Spanish conscript troops
who would fill these new Brigades would be trained, indoctrinated,
and controlled by the Communist political and military hierarchy of
the Brigades, and the Comintern would retain, and even expand, the
benefits and advantages that accrued to it by having, in effect, its own
army in Spain.
That the non-Communist Spaniards in the Loyalist government
and army saw through this camouflage no doubt accounted for their
failure to implement the Brigade commissariat's proposal to double
the number of International units. The Spaniards could not, for obvi-
ous reasons, say what they thought. They, after all, needed the Com-
Comintern Politics 115

monists. Longo reported having had many discussions with Loyalist

political and military authorities about the best way to use the Inter-
nationals. He complained that while the Spaniards generally ex-
pressed agreement in principle, they never followed through in
practice. 89 Thus the Brigade chiefs were thwarted in their desire to
expand their role and influence much beyond the original five Interna-
tional Brigades. The Brigade commissariat did succeed, however, in
maintaining the essential autonomy of the Brigades and in filling the
steadily shrinking ranks of the Internationals with Spanish recruits.
These recruits, commanded, trained, and politically indoctrinated by
the International cadres, made possible the continued existence of the
five International Brigades and thus of a Comintern-controlled army
in Spain.
The commissariat's success in maintaining the International Bri-
gades as a reliable Communist force as the number of foreigners
dwindled was closely correlated with their success in training and
indoctrinating the ever-increasing numbers of Spanish conscripts
within their ranks. Marty, referring to this, called the Brigades "an
immense anti-fascist school" in which the Spaniards would be turned
into thoroughly indoctrinated antifascists. Dahlem called it "the most
important question of the internal life of the Brigades." 90 In an article
in the Brigade Boletfn de Informacion, Commissar Inspector Longo
set forth the problem and the solution. The new developments, he
said, created several new problems for their military and political
work. Admitting that some among the Internationals were beginning
to doubt that the Brigades could any longer function in their old
capacity as shock brigades due to the influx of Spanish recruits, he
said this attitude was incorrect. To the contrary, "It must be the task
of the veteran cadres, both military and political, to train, mold,
discipline the new recruits." These new tasks clearly presented new
problems. When the International Brigades were "mainly composed
of comrades who had had a life of militancy behind them, the task of
the military and political command was fairly easy.... Revolutionary
consciousness, the spirit of sacrifice of our volunteers was largely
sufficient to write glorious pages." Now the problems were more
difficult. The most important task of the International cadres now
must be "to transform these people [Spanish recruits] into advanced
and heroic combatants." This, he concluded, was both a "problem of
enlightenment and political propaganda" and "a problem of military
organization and education." Finally, he said that these new tasks
required "a much higher standard of discipline than before." 91 This
became a permanent theme in the Brigade press. "The [new] troops
116 COMINTERN ARMY

must always be prepared for combat; they must always be prepared

politically for the operation. This is the permanent task of the com-
missars, commanders and soldiers," insisted II Garibaldino. Le Soldat
de Ia Republique explained that the new Spanish recruits had little or
no political understanding. Thus it was the duty of each veteran of the
Brigade to instruct them "not only militarily but politically." 92
In line with the commissariat's efforts in this direction, the Brigades
established Spanish sections in all their training schools, both military
and political, in which special attention was given to the problems of
creating effective cadres from among the Spanish recruits. These
efforts brought about what Longo referred to as "a profound transfor-
mation ... in the work of our political commissars." 93 In this way the
International Brigades remained in existence and continued to serve
the Comintern's purposes both as a reliable military and political
force in Spain and as a potent propaganda instrument in the overall
Popular Front policy. By 1938, for example, the XII Brigade had only
some 20 percent Italian effectives to 80 percent Spanish. Yet the
Brigade was still called the Garibaldi, was still commonly viewed as
the Italian Brigade, was still effectively commanded by Italians and
politically controlled by the Albacete commissariat. The same situa-
tion existed to a greater or lesser extent in all the International Bri-
gades.
In its efforts to maintain the Brigades as an autonomous Comintern
army, the Albacete directorate faced its most determined opponent in
the person of the Loyalist minister of war, Prieto. Since assuming the
post of war minister in the Negrin cabinet, Prieto had become increas-
ingly concerned at the ever-growing Communist predominance in
both the army and the political commissar system. As a result he
issued a number of orders designed to curb the Communists from
further enhancing their position in these two highly critical organiza-
tions. As an integral part of his general efforts to decrease, or at least
contain, Communist influence in the Popular Army, Prieto issued a
decree in late September 1937 dealing in very specific terms with the
International Brigades. The clear import of the decree was to begin
the process of assimilating the Brigades into the People's Army and
bringing them under full government control.
The Communists could not overtly oppose the decree's purpose.
After all, the party had been saying that that was what they wanted
from the beginning. They therefore took the public position that they
favored the objectives of the decree. Longo spoke the official word for
the Brigade commissariat on the decree by reaffirming that "a regular
army and unified command" are essential. Therefore, "we receive
Comintern Politics 117

with enthusiasm all those measures in the decree which tend to make
our Brigades more and more intergral parts of the Spanish People's
Army." Actually it fell like a bombshell among the Brigade politicos,
for if energetically carried through it signaled the end of the Brigades
as an autonomous Comintern army in Spain. The Communists pre-
tended to be shocked and insulted by the decree's use of previous
legislation which dealt with the old "Tercio de Extranjeros," or Span-
ish foreign legion, as the legal basis of the Brigades' existence. The
Italian party stalwart Calandrone called the decree "a punch in the
eye for us." But, he continued, "we are in Spain to fight fascism and
we continue to fight in spite of any decree which offends our dignity
as antifascist and as men." 94
Still, a decree was one thing; putting it into effect, another. Only
in the Garibaldi Brigade did it have any noticeable impact and even
there the effect proved to be temporary. Prieto had intervened in the
affairs of the Garibaldi Brigade following the replacement ofPacciardi
as commander. Due to Prieto's stance the Brigade politicos had been
forced to settle for Penchienati, another non-Communist in that post.
Following the Aragon campaign in August 1937, Penchienati suffered
an injury in an automobile accident, and the Brigade commissariat
replaced him, on an interim basis, with Raimondi, a party stalwart.
The commissariat now confidently expected to achieve its goal of a
reliable commander of the Garibaldi Brigade.
Once more Prieto thwarted them. In October he appointed Arturo
Zanoni as commander of the Garibaldis. The Italian Zanoni had
served prior to this time in a Spanish unit and had no previous
connection with the International Brigades. Unlike Penchienati, how-
ever, he had political connections (with Prieto and Nenni) which
made him loom as a real threat to Communist control of the XII
Brigade. Furthermore, he apparently had instructions from Prieto to
put energetically into effect the spirit of the recent decree assimilating
the Internationals into the regular Loyalist military and political
framework.
The Communist chiefs who had maneuvered so ardously to oust
Pacciardi were aghast. It was not the ends of the decree that they
opposed, they said, but the speed with which Zanoni sought to imple-
ment them. Such drastic changes would disrupt the Brigade and lower
its efficiency. Actually morale and efficiency in the Brigade could
hardly have been lower than they already were. The Communists
found fault with such inconsequential things as Zanoni's insistence on
speaking Spanish to them instead of Italian and of his referring to the
Brigade as the XII instead of the Garibaldi. All these faults were
118 COMINTERN ARMY

merely rationalizations for their opposition to the obvious import of

Prieto's decree and his intervention in Brigade affairs. Zanoni's deter-
mination to put the new policy into effect and his refusal to be domi-
nated by the Brigade commissariat made him the focus of the
Communists' frustration. The attitude of the Brigade hierarchy
showed clearly the falseness of their much-talked-of desire to make
the Brigades a normal part of the People's Army. 95
In the long run, the Brigade commissariat had its way. Prieto's
effort to curb Communist influence in the Popular Army and the
commissar system inevitably brought the mobilization of all sectors
of the Communist apparatus in Spain against him and his ultimate fall
from office. 96 Following his departure from the government in April
1938, the Communists once again held full sway in the military minis-
tries. Premier Negrin himself assumed the title of minister of defense,
but he had three Communist undersecretaries for army, navy, and air
force. The "crypto Communist," Alvarez del Vayo, returned as chief
of the revivified commissariat of war in control of the political com-
missar system throughout the entire army and it too was thoroughly
Communist-dominated. With these changes at the top the Brigade
commissariat regained complete control of the Garibaldi Brigade and
appointed two party stalwarts, Martino Martini and Emilio Suardi,
commander and commissar respectively. 97 Thus, despite the avowed
Communist policy of establishing a regular army under centralized
command and despite the attempts by Prieto to regularize the position
of the International Brigades, which meant, in the final analysis,
bringing them under the direct control of the government, the Bri-
gades continued to be, in fact, a Comintern-controlled military force
and an integral part of that interlocking directorate which was the
Communist apparatus in Spain.
8 The Political Commissar
The International Brigade political commissariat maintained
its absolute dominance over the internal affairs of the Brigades
through a variety of means including control of the Brigade press,
censorship, control of appointments to military and political posts,
and, ultimately, the Brigade police apparatus, which carried with it
the power to imprison and execute without recourse to or review by
higher authority. But within the spectrum of the commissariat's con-
trol mechanisms, nothing was more important than the political com-
missar system.
A political commissar system functioned throughout the Loyalist
People's Army from the date of its origins in late 1936 to the end of
the war. The Communists had taken the lead and set the example in
the use of political commissars in their own militia unit, the Fifth
Regiment, from the beginning and were chiefly responsible for the
adoption of the system by the Loyalist government. 1 The Loyalist
government's political commissar system was, throughout the war,
directed by the closest Communist collaborator in the Popular Front
cabinet, Alvarez del Vayo, and the top echelons of the commissariat
were always filled by Communist party cadres. 2 The Communists
moreover took great pains to fill the ranks of the political commissars
at all levels with reliable party members. So successful were they in
doing so that both Largo Caballero and later Prieto attempted to
reduce the virtual Communist monopoly on the commissar posts. 3
The Communists denounced as treasonous all such efforts to bring the
political commissariat and the appointment of political commissars
under the control of the ministry of war. Dahlem's statement that
"Caballero's struggle against the political commissars ... was a crime
against the army and the country" epitomized the Communist atti-
tude. He continued, "The more subtle, but nonetheless ruinous policy
operated by Prieto, of introducing the spirit of 'no politics' in the
army, was one of the reasons why there were times when the People's
Army failed." Marty too took up the cudgels on this subject, denounc-
ing Largo Caballero's attempts at "subjecting the political commis-
sars' appointment to strict rules and subject to the Minister ofWar." 4
The commissariat of war of the Loyalist government, while an
element in the apparatus through which the Communists sought to
control the People's Army, exercised no direct connection with or
120 COMINTERN ARMY

control over the political commissariat and the commissar system of

the International Brigades. The two systems had, however, the same
general purpose and philosophical-political foundation. From the
Communist point of view, military organization, discipline, and
strength were indissolubly linked to, were indeed essentially a func-
tion of, their political counterparts. The Communists frequently com-
pared the Loyalist People's Army to the Soviet Red Army. Both were
"essentially different from any imperialist army .... The special char-
acteristics of the Red Army are due, not to the abstract thinking of
military idealists, but to the nature of the political struggle out of
which they were born." 5
This view of the essentially political nature of Communist armies
accounted for the Communists' prime emphasis on the role of the
political commissar. "The International Brigades have never been
nonpolitical," declared Marty. "Far from that. Not a unit has gone
to the front without the political commissars being appointed. . . . It
is here that the essential strength lies." Dahlem wrote: "Political work
in the International Brigades was indissolubly connected with the
military training and education of the men .... The fighting power ...
depended to a considerable extent on the political work." 8
The Communists thus set the highest value on the work and effec-
tiveness of the political commissars, both within the International
Brigades and in the People's Army in general, and never tired of
heralding the message of the political commissars' key role in the
army. Dolores lbarruri (La Pasionaria) summarized the Communists'
glorification of the political commissars by calling them "the spirit
and the heart of the army." 7 Another leading Spanish Communist and
sometime subcommissar of war, Enrique Castro Delgado, wrote of the
commissars: "They have been the permanent animators of our sol-
diers .... Their continued work in the development of the political
content of our army is the firmest guarantee of its maintaining its
popular and revolutionary character." 8 The leading Comintern figure,
Vittorio Vidali, intimately associated with the commissar system,
wrote: "The Commissar is the soul of a combat unit ... is always the
best, the most intelligent, the most capable. " 9 Again, "The Commis-
sar, the political essence of the most conscious strata of fighting
antifascist&, is the soul of this army. He has forged it into being." 10
Indeed, the Communists placed far greater emphasis on the role of
the political commissar than on that of the military officer, whom they
saw primarily as a technical specialist. As Marty put it: "It is the
military commander who places the sentries, the cannon and the
machine guns and gives the command to fire at the right moment. But
The Political Commissar 121

it is ... the political commissars upon which the political and orga-
nizational work falls. . . . The Commissars constitute the veritable
backbone, the heart and soul of the army." Again, "The Commissars
were the unshakable rock on which the magnificent International
Brigades were built." The work of the political commissars, agreed
Dahlem, "must secure the fulfillment of the military task. ... Com-
missars are the political soul of our Army; they inspire it with her-
oism, see to its ideological education.... Such an army as ours cannot
function without Commissars." 11
Given the Communists' attitude toward the political commissars,
it was perhaps inevitable that friction between the commissars and the
military command often presented a problem. The work and role of
the political commissar was ostensibly separate from and complemen-
tary to the technical role of the military officer. The relationship
between the political commissar and the military commander as the
system was ideally supposed to work received much attention from
those concerned with the commissar system. Generally the official
formula could be summed up in the statement: "The political commis-
sar was to be the first and best auxiliary of the Commander, to be his
right hand ... without for a moment trying to decide military or-
ders."12 The commissar, however, subject to a separate chain of au-
thority, was essentially independent of the military command. Thus
the commissar was to be free to "complete his functions without
interference from the command." 13
Despite the effort to separate the roles and functions of the commis-
sar and the military officer, there were many areas of potential con-
flict. The interpretation of what constituted strictly military decisions
or what involved political considerations could vary greatly. Not only
that, but the commissars' duties entailed large areas that were in fact
of a military nature and clearly overlapped the duties of the military
officer. For example, commissars were instructed that their duties
included such matters as arranging and checking the transport of
troops, loading of troop convoys, choosing and preparing campsites,
cooking and mess facilities, and general control of troops during
movements. When his unit relieved another at the front, the commis-
sar was to check the state of the weapons and munitions and to ensure
new supplies if needed. On taking an enemy position the commissar
was to see that it was immediately fortified against possible counterat-
tack, to see that his troops did not waste time stripping and looting
the enemy dead, and to make sure sentries were posted and relieved. 14
The commissars also took the lead in such matters as sanitation and
hygiene in their units. Lecturing the troops on the poor latrine facili-
122 COMINTERN ARMY

ties and generally poor sanitation situation in their unit, the commis-
sars of the British battalion went so far as to hold up the British army
as an example of the way such matters should be handled. "We must
copy the good points of the Capitalist army," they concluded. 15 The
commissars also carried on a continuous effort to promote general
military efficiency by emphasizing the importance of care of weapons
and equipment by the troops. This problem, and the commissars'
attack on it, intensified with the introduction of Spanish conscript
troops into the Brigades. For example, a front-page article, printed in
II Garibaldino in capital letters, exhorted the soldiers to take care of
their weapons, to learn to be "military technicians." "We must dedi-
cate ourselves to obtaining absolute dominance of the technique of
war.... That every man in our Army shall be a true and efficient
combatant!" 16
The most serious area of ambiguity and potential conflict between
the commissar and the military officer, however, lay at the very heart
of the matter of command: where and with whom did final authority
reside. The ambiguity of the situation was indicated in an article in
the Brigade press on the role of the political commissars which con-
cluded, "Only in special circumstances can the political commissar
countermand the orders of the military commanders." 17
This problem was never really solved. Indeed it could not be. From
the Communist point of view the commissar represented the best, the
most reliable, the most politically conscious element in the army as
well as the most direct representative of the party. 18 Thus they could
never consent to anything that would limit the scope of the commis-
sar's role, nor could they accept the idea of his being placed under the
authority of the military command. On the other hand, everyone
recognized the necessity for a technically competent Inilitary com-
mand which must exercise authority in the area of technical military
matters. In discussing the problem, Vidali wrote that the "relation-
ship between commissar and officer should be 50-50." This, of course,
answered nothing. He went on to emphasize the key role of the
political commissar in the People's Army and to say that the commis-
sar must participate fully in all phases of military operations, must
indeed be "a good Inilitary chief himself." 19
The problem also received considerable attention in the instruc-
tional material for the International Brigades' training school for
political commissars. Here, perhaps more clearly than anywhere else
and despite the effort to smooth over the problem, the crux of the
matter of ultimate command authority was apparent. "The Inilitary
commander is the chief of the unit," read these instructions. But,
The Political Commissar 123

"once the plans of operation have been worked out and approved, if
the command fails [to carry through or perform the orders] the com-
missar has the supreme duty . . . to take into his own hands the
direction of the unit in the attack." 20 The commissar, the instructions
continued, must acquire at least a minimum understanding of the
elements and weapons of war in order to perform his role in combat.
This was necessary not only in the case where the commander fell
during the operation, but to be able intelligently to check the work
of the military commanders. "While the commissar does not place the
machine guns it is clear that unless he has some military expertise he
will not be able to suspect the faults committed in that area, that he
will not be able to detect sabotage in cases where it happens." Com-
missars were "to check orders received by the military officers, verify
that they are precisely transmitted and that the distribution of duties
is fair." To the extent possible he should emphasize the lessons
of previous battles and explain to the officers "the politico-strategic
significance of the work at hand." The commissar was assured
that his responsibility was not in the least dependent on circum-
stances or chance. Rather he was just as responsible as the military
command for all aspects of the work of the unit. "The commissar
is responsible, as much for political work as the military, as much
for the morale of the troops as for their combat capacity and for
the way in which the soldiers and the chiefs perform during the
attack." 21
Given the extensive overlapping of authority and areas of compe-
tence between the commissars and the military officers, conflict be-
tween the two was frequent within the People's Army, especially
where the commissar was a Communist (and the large majority of
them were) and the military commander was not. General Vicente
Rojo, chief of staff of the People's Army, wrote of "the abrasive
interpretation of their [the commissars] function of control which
went so far at times as to act as censors of the orders and dispositions
of the military command. " 22
In the Communist-dominated International Brigades the areas of
conflict were reduced since the vast majority of the military com-
manders were also Communists and thus subject to the same political
authority as the commissars themselves. In the Brigades, the political
authority of the commissariat was clearly supreme and thus, in fact,
the commissar was the dominant partner. In cases where the military
commander was also a Communist party member of stature, the
commissar might well hesitate to challenge him, due to the comman-
der's political position rather than his military rank. 23
124 COMINTERN ARMY

The political commissar system within the International Brigades

operated under the direct authority of, indeed was simply an arm of,
the Comintern-controlled Brigade political commissariat. Subject to
that authority each of the separate Brigades had its own commissariat
directed by a Brigade-level commissar. Directly subject to the Brigade
commissars were the battalion and company commissars. 24 At what-
ever level of command, the commissar, representing the central Bri-
gade commissariat, carried the ultimate authority of the Comintern
into the military units of the Brigades. As commissar inspector of the
International Brigades, Longo made frequent tours of the various
units of the Brigades at which time he gathered the commissars
together for a report to him and for the purpose of informing them
of any new policies or changes in old ones. He often appeared person-
ally when serious trouble arose in any of the Brigades and also made
it a point to be in evidence at the front when the Brigades were in
combat. He used members of his own staff as troubleshooters on
occasion and posted reliable men from the headquarters staff to focal
positions, both political and military, when he felt the need for a
firmer grip on a given unit. The work of the commissariats of the
individual Brigades and battalions thus proceeded under the watchful
eye and close supervision of the Comintern hierarchy of the Bri-
gades.25
The two most fundamental roles and duties of the commissars were
those of politically conditioning the troops and maintaining discipline.
The Brigade commissariat attached the highest priority to the job of
insuring the "correct political orientation of the soldiers," a function
"indissolubly connected with the military training and education." 26
Men being trained to become commissars were taught that the most
important of their duties would be the ideological preparation of the
troops. 27 Commissar Inspector Longo credited the "education and
political propaganda" work of the commissars with making the Bri-
gades a "truly model unit," a "homogeneous bloc." 28 In performing
this role when their units were at the front, the commissars were to
carry out "the most intensive activity in political explanation and
educational work," to impress upon the troops "the comprehension
of the necessity of sacrifice," and thus to create "an atmosphere in
which the soldiers submit voluntarily to military discipline and to
orders received." 29 Commissars were to carry out the ideological
preparation of the troops prior to combat by explaining the military,
strategic, and political significance of the action to be undertaken,
pointing out the problems to be overcome in carrying out the objec-
The Political Commissar 125

tive, and clarifying the importance of the action in the context of the
overall political-military situation. In carrying out this task the com-
missar was to bring out the lessons of previous military actions and
to warn of the activity of the fifth column and the Trotskyists. The
techniques to be used in accomplishing this work of ideological prepa-
ration included use of the Brigade press, tracts, political meetings, and
"the mobilization of the party activists." 30
The Brigade commissariat also stressed the role of the commissar
in directing propaganda toward the enemy. The most spectacular, or
at least most widely publicized, effort of this sort occurred during the
Guadalajara battle. The commissariat, knowing that Italian troops
were on the other side of the lines and knowing from prisoners taken
that the general level of morale among them was low, decided to
launch a vigorous propaganda effort in the hope of encouraging mass
surrender. Longo, his wife Estella, and his close aides, Camen, Calan-
drone, and Nicoletti all played a direct part in the effort. Rounding
up all available typewriters, duplicating machines, and loudspeakers,
they bombarded Mussolini's legions with both verbal and written
propaganda, even dropping tons of leaflets behind the enemy lines.
These messages urged surrender and promised good treatment and
repatriation for those who took advantage of the offer. 31 They also
attempted to appeal to them politically. "Italian brothers, the Spanish
people are fighting for their freedom. Desert the ranks of their ene-
mies! Come over to us! We will welcome you as comrades-in-arms." 32
The messages, both in leaflet and in spoken form, used the information
gained from prisoners already taken and interrogated to touch the
weak spots in the psychological armor of the enemy troops. Prisoners
who were willing were used to speak to their comrades over the
loudspeakers telling them of the friendly reception they could expect
if they came over.
The initiators of the propaganda effort claimed that it brought
about significant results in weakening the enemy's will to fight and in
spurring surrenders. 33 Whether or not it did in fact produce notice-
able results could not be proved. There were no mass surrenders and
those surrenders that did occur, as well as the generally poor perfor-
mance of the Italian units, were quite likely due to their poor orga-
nization and morale and the failure of their mechanized units to stand
up under the weather and other difficulties encountered. The one
positive effect the propaganda effort had on inducing surrenders was
probably in its assuring the enemy troops that they would not be shot
if they did so.
126 COMINTERN ARMY

But while Guadalajara offered a unique opportunity for the Italians

of the Brigades to use these techniques, the commissariat stressed the
role of propaganda directed toward the enemy as a regular function
of the political cominissars of all units. An article signed by Gallo
(Longo) in the Volunteer for Liberty laid down the commissariat's
guidelines on this subject. An outline of topics to be covered in this
propaganda included the reading of war bulletins, why we fight, what
happens within our lines as compared with theirs, why Hitler
and Mussolini send troops to Spain, the inevitability of Loyalist
victory, crimes committed by invading troops, and how we treat
our prisoners. Calling for "loudspeakers at every front," the article
stressed that this work should be carried on systematically and
continuously. 34
The instructions to candidates at the Brigade school for political
cominissars also stressed this function. Candidates learned that their
duties would include finding out the type of troops their units were
facing, their condition and morale, and then pitching the propaganda
effort accordingly. The future commissars also learned that both loud-
speakers and written tracts were to be used in carrying out this duty
and that they should use enemy deserters and prisoners, where possi-
ble, to talk to their comrades as a method of influencing them to
surrender. The Brigade commissariat, calling this the "new artillery,"
showed the importance it attached to this whole operation by assign-
ing top politicos to develop it, including even, in 1938, Vittorio
Vidali. 35
The commissar's role as political propagandist included much more
than just the psychological preparation of his troops for battle and the
direction of propaganda toward the enemy. At the very core of his
ideological-political role was the duty to propagate the Communist
point of view on all subjects. The Communists had in Spain, as else-
where, a unitary line which explained all things and which was, for
the true believer, the only correct explanation. It was the absolute
duty of every party member not only to accept the party line but to
be "ardent defenders and propagandists of the correct policy of our
Party." All communist party members and especially all political
cominissars were expected to strive continuously to put across the
"Bolshevik line of the Party" and to oppose all "faction mongers," a
term elastic enough to include anyone who opposed that line. In the
words of a top Brigade politico: "The concise line of the Communist
Party ... was the guiding star in the political training of our Interna-
tional Brigades cadres and in improving the political morale of the
battalions." 36
The Political Commissar 127

The process of indoctrinating the troops began with the indoctrina-

tion of the commissars themselves. The interpretation of each military
and political development in Spain was worked out by the top eche-
lons of the Albacete commissariat along with the best method of
integrating the party line into the overall context of the war and of
presenting it to the rank-and-file troops. An American Brigade mem-
ber later recalled being present at a meeting of the American commis-
sars where the leading United States party representative, Robert
Minor, explained to the assembled commissars the party line on the
fall of Santander. In the same vein, Le So/dat de Ia Repub/ique carried
a report on a meeting of all Brigade commissars at which they dis-
cussed the topic of the new Negrin government. 37
Once the correct explanation had been decided upon, the commis-
sars at all levels of command had the duty of presenting it in a
convincing way to the troops. They used the Brigade press and peri-
odic political meetings to do so. These political sessions were a regular
feature of life in the Brigades and were considered highly important
by the commissariat. As British Commissar Rust put it: "Morale and
discipline was maintained and strengthened by organized political
work." The American commissar Voros said that attendance at these
meetings was compulsory. The commissars often used excerpts from
official Comintern or Spanish Communist sources as the vehicle for
conveying, through the Brigade press, the party's explanation of
events to the troops. On the fall of Malaga, for example, the Brigade
press printed the promulgation of the central committee of the Span-
ish party on the subject. 38 The Spanish party itself served chiefly as
a convenient conduit for Comintern decisions and policies.
The other side of the commissariat's control of the press and propa-
ganda output of the Brigades as a vehicle of political thought control
was its strict censorship of all reading material not officially sanc-
tioned by the party. Few nonparty newspapers and periodicals, either
Spanish or foreign, could be obtained by the men of the Brigades, and
those that were allowed were strictly censored for news or interpreta-
tions that conflicted with the party line. An American attached to the
staff of the Volunteer for Liberty had as one of his duties the censoring
of all American publications prior to their distribution to the troops.
His orders were to remove any material which indicated that a Loyal-
ist victory was not inevitable and any unfavorable references to the
Soviet Union, the Comintern, or any Communist party. 39
The actual effectiveness of the commissars as ideological mentors
varied depending both on the quality and skill of the individual com-
missar and on the receptiveness of the people with whom he had to
128 COMINTERN ARMY

deal. Political interest among most of the Internationals was high to

begin with. A large majority were Communist party members who,
for the most part, accepted the party line as propounded by the
commissars without qualm or doubt. As Andre Marty put it: "The
Commissars have relied on the workers who form the majority in the
units, and among them on the mass of Socialists and Communists who
now in reality form one united body." 40 Even those in the Brigades
who were not party members were not likely to find much to oppose
in the line as propounded in Spain since it was, on the surface at least,
oriented chiefly toward the general theme of the Popular Front and
antifascist unity.
When the commissar won the respect of the men by courage in
action, hard work, and sincerity of purpose, and when he carried out
his job of explanation skillfully, the troops largely accepted and even
appreciated his efforts as performing a necessary function. Wintring-
ham wrote of the commissars: "For discipline they were more useful
than any number of guard rooms," and through their meetings and
talks and through their example they "strengthened and organized the
morale, the political understanding, and determination that was the
basis of discipline." He called theirs "the most valuable work in
Spain." Gustav Regier, himself a commissar in the XII Brigade, saw
the commissar's role as "a maid of all work, a democratic priest, an
army doctor with his fingers always on the pulse of the Brigade." "The
political commissar," wrote Dahlem, "is the guide, philosopher and
friend of the men. He is always in the front line, and there are many
cases when the command of units has been undertaken by the com-
missar." John Gates, the American Communist who became the chief
commissar of the XV Brigade said: "The commissar was entrusted
with the job of education.... While a military officer in combat, the
commissar was a combination morale officer, chaplain, information
and education officer in the rear." 41 Interestingly, however, Gates
later referred to "the troops under my command," showing, perhaps
unconsciously, the ambiguity of the role of the commissar, even to the
commissar himself. 42
Many commissars, however, became filled with self-importance
and, determined to use the authority granted them by the commis-
sariat, exhibited a haughtiness and arrogance toward both the troops
and the military commanders which made them resented and, there-
fore, ineffective. Inevitably such arbitrary and unlimited power went
to the heads of some. A commissar who gained a reputation as one
who made use of his power to bully or threaten or who abused his
authority to arrest, jail, or shoot men for breaches of discipline or
The Political Commissar 129

criticism quickly became the object of bitter hatred. Reflecting on his

own experiences as XV Brigade commissar, the American John Gates
admitted, "I used my ... authority to denounce and even jail men who
dared to dispute my word." Another American, Sandor Voros, wrote
of the death sentences imposed on Brigade men by the American
commissar, Dave Doran. The most notorious case of a Brigade com-
missar's having men shot for "political dissidence" was Andre Marty
himself, a proclivity that gained him a dreaded reputation in Spain. 43
Other commissars warranted not hatred but merely contempt.
They approached their job of political indoctrination or education in
a pedantic way, gave "long, boring ... political lectures ... a school-
boy rehash of the propaganda poured out by the ton by the Commu-
nist Party." 44 Such an approach quickly bored the rank and file of the
troops. Showing awareness of this problem, the Albacete commis-
sariat warned that the commissars must guard against becoming bu-
reaucrats. If the commissar was to be successful in getting through to
the men, he must "bear in mind the peculiarities of each battalion,
each company, the characteristics of their members .... The work
must be done from different angles, adopted to the mentality and the
general political education of the soldiers." 45 Some commissars, too,
took a narrowly puritanical approach to conduct and discipline,
frowning on such soldierly activities as hard drinking, free and easy
use of four-letter words, and occasional visits to the local bordello.
These, too, were looked upon with dismay and ridicule by the large
number of men in the Brigades who made no remote claim to being
"clean-cut kids" and could scarcely tolerate the lecturing of what they
scorned as a "prissy clique of Y.C.L.ers." 46 Commissars who spent
too much time in Albacete, especially when their units were at the
front, met with that particular contempt that front-line troops reserve
for rear-echelon officers and soldiers with cushy office jobs. They were
tagged by the men with the ironical sobriquets "comic-czars," and
"rearguard commandos" 47 and inevitably became the butt of doggerel
poems and songs such as The Albacete Generals:
On the front of Albacete
Meet the generals of the rear,
Oh! They fight the grandest battles
Though the shells they never hear.
For the wind is in their makeup.
You can hear the generals say:
"Yes, we're going to Jarama
Maiiana or next day." ...
130 COMINTERN ARMY

See them strolling in the evening

To the grogshops for their wine
For they are the brave defenders
Of the Albacete line. 48

The second most important duty of the commissar, and one that
related closely to his role as political mentor of the troops, was the
maintenance of discipline. From the very beginning of the Spanish
conflict, the necessity for discipline stood near the top on the Com-
munist's list of matters of importance. As early as July 22, 1936, the
party press was demanding "Discipline, Hierarchy, Organization." A
manifesto of the central committee of the Spanish party stressed the
point that "in all organization discipline is the fundamental base of
power and strength.... Only in the measure to which this discipline
exists will it be possible to conquer an organized and disciplined
enemy." In this spirit commanders and commissars of the Fifth Regi-
ment demanded a "discipline of steel" and at times exercised
draconian measures to maintain it. Dolores lbarruri (La Pasionaria)
stated the Communist view when she said, "The Commissar's duty
is especially the creation in the new army of a new discipline, a higher
discipline than the old." Longo wrote that the commissar had to be
above all things "an apostle of the necessity of a firm, rigorous, iron
discipline." Thus the Communists stressed both the absolute necessity
of discipline and the central role of the political commissar in achiev-
ing and maintaining it. 49
In the matter of military discipline in the International Brigades,
however, the Communists faced a rather special problem. The Com-
munist line, at least in the western "bourgeois democracies," had long
been "antimilitary." Many of the young men from countries such as
France, Great Britain, and the United States who joined the Interna-
tional Brigades arrived in Spain with naive illusions of becoming part
of a "democratic army," where liberty, equality, and fraternity were
the guiding principles and where soldiers, officers, and commissars
shared the good and the bad as comrades in a spirit of "proletarian
brotherhood." As the British Communist party spokesman and some-
time political commissar in Spain William Rust put it: "Some of the
volunteers had rather extreme ideas as to what constituted democracy
within an armed force, and thought that the International Brigade
could be run by committees and elected officers like a trade union or
political party. Some would have liked to elect a committee to exam-
ine the 'class content' of every order." 50
The Political Commissar 131

In the earliest days of the Brigades, political commissars were

sometimes elected by the men themselves, 51 a phenomenon often
pointed to as indicative of a "democratic army." But this took place
during the hectic period of organization as a matter of expediency
rather than choice. The Brigade commissariat had not yet had time
to organize itself sufficiently to undertake systematic appointments.
Even so, commissar posts at Brigade and battalion level inevitably
went to Communists of known reputation and reliability. 52 Once the
Brigade commissariat had time to organize itself, all appointments to
political commissar posts came under its authority and they were,
almost without exception, filled by reliable Communist cadres. Writ-
ing of the problems of establishing discipline in the early days of the
Brigades, Longo recalled that it was only with a certain amount of
difficulty that the Brigade directorate imposed the concept that offi-
cers and commissars were appointed from above and that they were
responsible only to their superiors and not the rank and file. This was
accomplished primarily, he said, through the work of "the most quali-
fied Communists." Marty also gave credit to the Communist cadres
who filled the commissar posts. They were, he declared, "the unshaka-
ble rock on which the magnificent International Brigades were built."
Dahlem concurred: "The establishment of this type of political com-
missar is the great merit of the central political commissariat of the
International Brigades. " 53
Actually the problem of military discipline presented relatively few
problems so long as the Brigades were composed overwhelmingly of
seasoned and dedicated party activists. These men were accustomed
to strict party discipline and the political commissars derived their
authority among them on the basis of being the spokesmen of the
party. Thus it was political discipline and authority deriving from the
party and not military discipline deriving from the International Bri-
gades as a military unit which held the Brigades together in the
earliest period.
Recognizing the strength and value of party discipline as a method
of enhancing and ensuring their firm control of the Brigades, the
Communists maintained a regular party cell structure within each
military unit. This assured them of a solid core of reliable party
cadres, a disciplined and unified group that could be counted on to
carry through the party position on any given question. This party
structure offered a tighter and, for the party member, more rigid
control mechanism than could possibly be exercised through any
other form. Within the party cell unit the rank-and-file party member
132 COMINTERN ARMY

could be told in a straightforward and authoritative way just what

party policy was and what the party expected of him. The extra
baggage of the Popular Front line could be dispensed with and prob-
lems could be dealt with frankly on their merits as seen by the party
hierarchy. As Dahlem put it, "Many difficulties that arose out of the
specific character of the International Brigades and of the influence
of the inner political struggle for the life of the battalions were only
able to be solved with the aid of the Party organizations which existed
in the battalions from the very outset and the decisions of which were
always carried through by the Communists." 54
While many of the more naive of the rank-and-file Internationals,
especially those from the western democracies, continued to suffer
under the delusion that blind obedience was unbefitting a "demo-
cratic, proletarian and revolutionary army," no such dewy-eyed non-
sense influenced the professional Communists who carried out
Comintem policy in Spain and in the International Brigades. While
Communist propaganda continued to speak of their "revolutionary"
discipline as opposed to "bourgeois," "class," "medieval," or "capi-
talist" discipline, 55 the practical difference, so far as the individuals
concerned, was impossible to discern. Indeed, the disciplinary tech-
niques used in the International Brigades proved a good deal harsher
than in most "bourgeois" armies, and the period of romantic illusions
about the International Brigades being something new and essentially
different in the way of a military organization faded quickly. Many
Brigade men became embittered by the contrast between the demo-
cratic, revolutionary fraternity of equals which they had expected an
army run by Communists to be and what the International Brigades
were in fact. Instead of comradely equality they found as great or
greater rank differentiation as existed in "bourgeois" armies, includ-
ing not only higher pay for officers and commissars than for the rank
and file, but officers' clubs from which the troops were strictly ex-
cluded, an officer's mess, and officer's uniforms which sharply
differentiated them from the common soldier. Instead of comradely
discussion of matters and a fraternal equalitarianism throughout all
ranks and stations they found a stem discipline imposed from the top
and often brutally enforced. 56
Even in the International Brigade hospitals commissars worked
zealously at their roles of ideological preparation and the maintenance
of discipline. "The life of the hospital," wrote a volunteer nurse, "was
carried out in an atmosphere of preparation for the front." Activities
of the hospital commissars included the production of a "wall newspa-
per," the distribution of L 'Humanite, the organization of political and
The Political Commissar 133

"self-criticism" meetings, and song fests at which antifascist songs

were sung in various languages. The political commissar of the hospi-
tal, she continued, was "a very sectarian German comrade" who
insisted on rigid discipline, even though many of the comrades, "espe-
cially the French, did not like it." 57
The problem of maintaining a high level of discipline within the
Brigades became progressively more difficult as the war dragged on,
bringing the inevitable boredom, frustration, and disillusionment to
many of the foreign volunteers as well as a decline in the numbers of
hard-core party activists among them. Also, the ever-increasing num-
bers of Spanish recruits assigned to the Brigades, most of them nonpo-
litical conscripts, presented new disciplinary problems. On the
problem of the Spanish conscripts, Commissar Inspector Longo
wrote: "The veteran cadres, both military and political, must go all
out to train, mold and discipline [the new recruits]. The task is not
only a problem of enlightenment and political propaganda, but also
a problem of military organization and a much higher standard of
discipline than before." On the same problem, and indicative of the
Communist view of the essentially political nature of military disci-
pline, Franz Dahlem wrote of the "considerable amount of political
education required to impose military discipline on these [Spanish]
troops. " 58
An interesting approach to the problems of inculcating discipline,
motivation, and military technique to the ever-increasing numbers of
Spanish conscripts who, by 1938, far outnumbered foreign comba-
tants in all the International Brigades was the "Activist" program.
This was an effort to foster the soldierly virtues by creating a special
category, the ACtivist, which would attract the more highly motivated
troops. They would then, as Activists, serve as examples and exhort-
ers to their less highly motivated comrades. In an article entitled
"Soldados Activistas," Commissar Inspector Longo answered the
question "What is an Activist," by saying, "The activist is the first and
the best." He must be a "model combatant ... and ... an example
for all his comrades.... He must be the most loyal collaborator of the
officers and commissars." The organ of the XIV Brigade defined the
role of the Activist this way: "The Activist must be in the forefront
at all times in accomplishing whatever work there is, especially in
fortification, vigilance and discipline. They must be also the leaders
in combat, animating all their compaiieros of their unit. If there are
comrades who are ignorant of what we fight for, it is the duty of the
Activist to explain clearly.... To gain victory, we must all be Activ-
ists."59
134 COMINTERN ARMY

In the face of all difficulties the commissars hammered away zeal-

ously at the task of inculcating and maintaining discipline. As early
as February 1937, Le Soldat de Ia Republique was demanding that
"all acts of indiscipline ... be dealt with in an exemplary fashion. We
must have an army with discipline of iron ... both in the front and
in the rear." In March 1937 Our Fight was strongly condemning
indiscipline and insisting that "measures must be taken to punish the
culprits and to eliminate bad elements.... We are confident that the
political commissars will do their utmost to irradicate all tendencies
to indiscipline and so carry on the political education of our comrades
so as to make our battalion worthy fighters." 60
The Brigade press enthusiastically endorsed the decree on military
discipline issued in June 1937 by the Loyalist government. "The
necessity of assuring discipline within the army calls for a penal code
of adequate sanctions against indiscipline," editorialized the organ of
the XV Brigade when publishing the new code. Few would argue that
"adequate sanctions" were not included in this one. Among the stipu-
lations of the code were: Any soldier who left his post, twenty years
or death; anyone who fled in the face of the enemy, immediate execu-
tion; any soldier who struck an officer, twelve years or death; any
soldier who disobeyed an order or failed to execute an order, twenty
years or death; any of the above perpetrated at the front or in combat
could be punished by death immediately by either military or political
officers without recourse to higher authority. 61
Along with this the commissars conducted a vigorous and continu-
ous campaign in the Brigade press designed to convince the troops
that military discipline was not "unproletarian." One point in this
effort involved the question of saluting officers. "A salute is not un-
democratic," the men were informed. "A salute is a sign that a com-
rade who has been an egocentric individual in private life has adjusted
himselfto a collective way of getting things done." In a eulogy to the
American commissar, Dave Doran, John Gates, new XV Brigade
coinmissar, wrote: "We vets remember when it was thought bourgeois
to salute an officer." Now, thanks to the work of such exemplary
commissars as Doran, concluded Gates, we have learned better. 62
Meanwhile the Brigade press campaign emphasizing discipline con-
tinued unabated, the commissariat insisting in the most unequivocal
language that an army could not function without "iron discipline,
absolute and blind obedience." The Brigade Boletfn de Informacion
summarized the commissariat's attitude succinctly when it ran the
slogan, boxed and in bold type, "Discipline is to the army what blood
is to the body." 63
The Political Commissar 135

Another important disciplinary function of the commissar was to

act as a political police agent within his unit, to ferret out "fifth
columnists," "Trotskyists," and "defeatists," terms broad enough to
include anyone who proved recalcitrant, critical, undisciplined, or
merely unenthusiastic. The official formula for this function was that
"the political commissar must be always vigilant against and liquidate
energetically all tendencies of treason in our ranks." The political
commissars were to exercise "political vigilance against provocation"
and to "maintain constant vigilance toward defeatist elements,
Trotskyists and deserters." 64
That Trotskyism and desertion were lumped together illustrated
the ambiguity in Communist thinking regarding discipline. They
tended to make little or no distinction between political discipline and
military discipline. This resulted in the tendency to see political dissi-
dence, "enemy agents," or Trotskyism behind all disciplinary prob-
lems and to react to all indiscipline as if it were politically inspired
and treasonous.
Typically, both Marty and Longo took the attitude that all signs of
indiscipline within the Brigades were inspired by Trotskyists and fifth
columnists. Marty saw Trotskyists lurking everywhere and was con-
vinced they were doing everything possible to "split and demoralize
the International Brigades." That the work of these "provocateurs"
did not succeed was due, claimed Longo, to the "quick and firm
reaction by the political commissars." It was the political commissars,
he continued, who overcame the disruptive attempts of "enemy
agents" within the Brigades. 85
9 Comintern Propaganda
Instrument
Among the most important roles played by the International
Brigades within the Comintern's Popular Front strategy during the
Spanish war was that of an extremely potent propaganda instrument:
both as source and as symbol. As source, the voluminous propaganda
output of the Brigades themselves consistently adhered to and rein-
forced Comintern policy in its specifically Spanish and in its larger
international aspects. As symbol, the very existence of the Interna-
tionals in Spain made them a tremendously attractive propaganda
vehicle that could be, and was, exploited to appeal to a number of
different audiences.
Within the Brigades themselves the commissariat's control of all
press and propaganda activities was a vital element in carrying out its
political and ideological function. Commissar Inspector Longo exer-
cised direct authority over that most potent instrument of control
throughout the entire International Brigades. As early as December
1936 the XII Brigade commissars were turning out mimeographed
news sheets, Noi Passeremo for the Italians, Vers Ia Liberte for the
French, and the Dombrowski for the Poles. On January 10, 1937,
Longo ordered Alfred Kantorowicz, a German Communist writer, to
set up and edit a newspaper for the German-speaking volunteers of
the XI Brigade and to recruit someone to translate it into French.
During the four months thereafter Kantorowicz organized and edited
the German and French editions of the Volontaire de Ia Liberte from
Valencia. On April 27 the operation was moved to Madrid at which
time Kantorowicz was assigned to the XIII Brigade for the purpose
of producing some publicity for that theretofore largely ignored unit.
He subsequently produced a series of articles on the XIII Brigade
which appeared in the Volunteer for Liberty. 1
At a conference of political commissars held on the night of Febru-
ary 14, 1937, during the heat of the Jarama battle, Longo promulgated
a new policy on press and propaganda operations within the Brigades.
From that time forward every Brigade and battalion was to publish
brief and frequent news bulletins that would reflect the immediate
experiences and concerns of the troops. These bulletins would be, as
Longo put it, "the instrument of military and political direction of the
Commissariat. " 2
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 137

The various Brigade and battalion commissariats quickly acquired

the equipment and personnel necessary to begin immediate publica-
tion of their "bulletins of information and orientation." The XV
Brigade, for example, set up, during the long trench vigil following
the Jarama battle, a mobile office in a large, camouflaged truck. On
one side it carried its wall newspaper called L 'lnternationale. These
wall newspapers were' common throughout the Brigades and were
apparently highly thought of by those in charge of press operations.
The XIV Brigade journal, Vers Ia Liberte, for example, ran a front-
page article in which "le journal mural" was said to have "immense
utility" and to be "a necessity." 3 Inside the truck a duplicating ma-
chine and three typewriters provided the hardware with which the
staff turned out the Brigade's bulletin, a task which at that time in the
XV Brigade had to be accomplished each day in three editions: the
French Notre Combat, the English Our Fight, and the Spanish Nos
Combats. It was also translated into Croat and Czech for the Slavic
units of the Dimitroff battalion. 4
The overall press and propaganda apparatus of the Brigades under-
went further systemization and elaboration at a conference of political
commissars held shortly after the Jarama fighting. In addition to the
bulletins of the various units there was now to be a centrally edited
and published newspaper which would serve as the official organ of
the commissariat. That publication, to be called the Volunteer for
Liberty, would be published simultaneously in French, German, En-
glish, Italian, Polish, and Spanish. 5
The Volunteer for Liberty, as the official organ of the Brigade
commissariat, was carefully edited to ensure the correct applica-
tion of the party line to all subjects. The editorial staff met regu-
larly to discuss the treatment to be given various topics to ensure
the proper integration of the party line into them. They were
guided in ·this by a careful study of the positions taken and the in-
terpretations given by various official party publications and state-
ments.6
In addition to the Volunteer for Liberty and the various individual
unit publications, the commissariat published a centrally edited news
bulletin, the Boletfn de Informaci{m de las Brigadas Internacionales,
which appeared daily beginning in March 1937 in Spanish, French,
Italian, German, Polish, Hungarian, Czechoslovakian, and English.
The news bulletin normally consisted of from four to six mimeo-
graphea pages. The standard format featured news flashes from the
fronts, Spanish news, international news, articles, and reproductions
of commissariat orders or notices of changes in the Brigade commis-
138 CoMINTERN ARMY

sariat's personnel. The news flashes from the front were almost invari-
ably optimistic and meaningless, and the Spanish and international
news and articles always reflected the general party line, much of it
being excerpts from Mundo Obrero, Izvestia, Pravda, and the British
Daily Worker. In line with the heavily Spanish composition of the
Brigades, the publication of the Boletfn de Informacion in non-Span-
ish languages ceased in December 1937. From that time each unit
produced a similar bulletin in the Spanish language for which the
commissariat continued to furnish news, information, and direction. 7
The Brigade commissariat maintained a Madrid headquarters in a
large building on the Calle Velasquez. From there emanated the large
and varied press and propaganda output of the commissariat as well
as political direction and editorial support for the agitation and propa-
ganda activities of the various sub units. A staff of some thirty-five in
the Madrid headquarters published approximately 2,500 bulletins in
eight languages each day. 8 Under Longo's overall supervision the
editorial staff in Madrid was headed by his trusted lieutenants of the
Italian Communist party, including Edoardo D'Onofrio and
Giacomo Calandrone and Longo's wife, Teresa Noce ("Estella").
Representatives of the various nationalities in the Brigades were regu-
larly assigned to the editorial staff. For example, the English Commu-
nist and sometime Brigade political commissar Ralph Bates served as
the editor of the English edition of the Volunteer for Liberty when it
began publication in May 1937. The American Edwin Rolfe, late of
the United States Daily Worker staff, took over that position in July
1937 and was later succeeded by his assistant, the American Commu-
nist John Tisa. The last to occupy the editorship was the American
party functionary Sandor Voros. 9
The Brigade commissariat also demonstrated the high value it
placed on propaganda by the publication of expensive productions
designed for various audiences. One example, issued in magazine
format, using high-priced glossy paper, a multicolored cover, several
types of print, and many photographs, was entitled Nuestros Es-
paiioles. Aimed chiefly at the Spanish population, it glorified the role
of the Yugoslav element in the International Brigade. The introduc-
tion reiterated the usual Popular Front propaganda line and used the
International Brigades, and in particular the Yugoslav element, as the
great example of the Popular Front in action. The strictly Communist
nature of the message was quite overt. The cover displayed the ham-
mer and sickle emblem prominently. The publication was dedicated
to Blagoye Parovic, whom it described as a member of the central
cominittee of the Communist party of Yugoslavia, and contained a
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 139

full-page photograph of Georgi Dimitroff. Another page was devoted

to glorification of Dimitroff and made the statement that "the Yugo-
slavs fight in Spain in the name of and under the banner of Comrade
Dimitroff." 10
The Brigade commissariat's press and propaganda section also ed-
ited a number of yearbook or souvenir book publications which were
highly propagandistic in nature. Longo, his wife Estella, and Calan-
drone collaborated on the production of one such publication for the
XII Brigade called Garibaldini in Spagna. Following the battle of
Brunete, Alfred Kantorowicz devoted himself, at the direction of
Longo, to editing a book on the XIII Brigade which he called
Tschapaiev: Das Batallion Der 21 Nationen. 11 Theodor Balk per-
formed the same task for the XIV Brigade in his La Quatorzieme, and
the XV Brigade produced Nos Combats: Livre de Ia 15eme Brigade
which also came out in an English version.
The voluminous propaganda output of the Brigade commissariat
unfailingly echoed the Comintern position in all respects. The Popular
Front strategy required the Communists to pitch their propaganda
toward "antifascist solidarity," the "defense of peace and democ-
racy," and "defense ofthe Republic" in Spain, and to avoid an overt
or exclusive emphasis on Communism or "revolution." Thus, as was
intended, Communist propaganda during that era, including that
emanating from the International Brigades, seemed on the surface to
be concerned only with democracy and antifascism. To the Commu-
nists, however, antifascism, for all practical purposes, meant pro-
Soviet Union, and democracy meant Communism. That this was
indeed their underlying premise came through clearly, if perhaps
unconsciously, in much of their propaganda output. For example, this
statement from the Brigade Boletfn de Informacion: "The defense of
the USSR is a fundamental duty of all anti-fascists.... The enemies
of the USSR are the mortal enemies of all humanity.... The USSR
is the invincible lever of peace, of real democracy, of progress and
humanity throughout the entire world." 12
Thus, despite the broad antifascist and Popular Front facade of the
Brigade press output, it meshed smoothly in all respects with the
larger Comintern propaganda effort. While this was so of its overall
tone, it was especially clear in a number of specific areas in which the
party line was consistently followed. Among these were a virulent and
vociferous anti-Trotskyism; a consistent condemnation of all proletar-
ian or labor organizations that failed to follow the Comintern's lead;
a 100 percent pro-Soviet Union and Comintern orientation (including
an inordinate amount of coverage of the USSR for a press supposedly
140 CoMINTERN ARMv

directed to and concerned with Spain); consistent adherence to the

Soviet-Comintern line that the Sino-Japanese conflict was an integral
part of an international fascist conspiracy; and a never-failing accep-
tance of the Communist position on all internal Spanish affairs. This
orientation was further shown (and reinforced) by the almost exclu-
sive use of Soviet and Comintern sources, the most prevalent of which
were Pravda, Izvestia, Communist International, Imprecor, Mundo
Obrero, Frente Rojo, L 'Humanite, and the Daily Worker.
Perhaps the most conclusive of these specific areas was the Bri-
gade's treatment of Trotskyism. The Trotskyist hysteria, which was at
that time running its grotesque and bloody course in the purges in the
Soviet Union, cast its spell over the Comintern leadership and ap-
paratus. It became one of the main preoccupations of the Communists
in Spain to liquidate Trotskyism. "One of the necessary conditions for
the victory of our people must be the destruction, with an iron hand,
of the Trotskyite traitors .... The Trotskyites are just as dangerous
as the armies of fascism," declared a leading Communist spokesman
in Spain. 13
As interpreted by orthodox Stalinists of the time the term Trotsky-
ism came to include virtually anyone whose political persuasions were
to the left of the party line. In Loyalist Spain that created something
of a problem for the Communists because a substantial part of the
population, especially the Anarchists and their large labor organiza-
tion, the CNT, were in fact more revolutionary than the Communists.
The Communists worked around the problem by concentrating their
anti-Trotskyist fire on a small left-deviationist Marxist party, the
Partido Obrero Unificaci6n Marxista (POUM). They then invented a
special denomination, the "uncontrollables," to cover those Anar-
chists and left-wing Socialists who opposed Communist policies.
"Who are the enemies of the people?" asked Jose Diaz, chief of the
Communist party of Spain. His answer: "Fascists, Trotskyists and
uncontrollables." 14
The International Brigade leadership marched in lockstep with the
Comintern on this. The Brigade press zealously took up the chorus
and, like the Communist press in general, raged mightily against the
Trotskyists. An article by the German Communist writer and politi-
cal commissar in the XII Brigade Gustav Regier began by admitting
that the purge trials in Russia were causing some differences of opin-
ion between the leaders of the Second International and the Comin-
tern. It then proceeded to defend the trials by saying, in effect, that
since the USSR represented the socialist revolution it could not be
wrong. "Every comrade must understand that the trial that is devel-
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 141

oping in Moscow is part of the international fight against world

fascism, the same fight as the International Brigades themselves are
in. To disturb the unity of the Soviet state is to disturb the Popular
Front of all Europe .... The people accused of being enemies of the
Soviet Union are also enemies of our Brigades." 15 In another rational-
ization of the purges in Russia the Brigade press declared that the
"unmasking of the Trotskyist center in the USSR has shown that
Trotskyism is an agent of German-Japanese fascism." The Trotsky-
ists, it warned, are "employing against the heroic fighters of Spain the
same methods of combat which served the saboteurs, spies, and ter-
rorists condemned by the Moscow trials.' 016
A feature article entitled "Fascismo y Trotzkismo" in the official
organ of the XIV Brigade offered an outstanding illustration not only
of the anti-Trotskyist line but of a number of other basic Communist
assumptions which regularly, ifless blatantly, found expression in the
Brigade press. The first of these was that "Capitalism, caught in its
contradictions, developed a new phase, fascism." Fascism was defined
as "the rule of finance capital.'' Then, by an extremely convoluted
logical jump, the reader was told that one of the methods by which
this finance capital rule called fascism achieved its ends was-
Trotskyism! Thus, the principal allies offascism were the Trotskyists:
"the bloodiest enemy of the working class" and the "chief support of
fascism." Finally, the real reason for the necessity for proletarian
unity and no talk of revolution in Spain until the war was won was
"in order to take the succession of the capitalist regime which is in
decomposition." 17
The strange logic by which the Trotskyists became, in Communist
terminology, fascists, showed the basic attitude that anyone who op-
posed the Communits was, by definition, a fascist. This was apparent
in a speech by Jose Diaz: "In their hate against the Soviet Union,
against the Great Party of the Bolsheviks and against the Communist
International they [the Trotskyists] show the hand of fascism.'' 18
The Communist nature of the Brigade press and propaganda was
also clear in the inordinate amount of space devoted to, and the
absolute adulation of, the Soviet Union, Soviet leaders, and Soviet
policies. Articles appeared regularly on topics concerning the Soviet
Union. Typical of these was one entitled "Twenty Years Ago the
People Took Power," which appeared in a special edition of the
Boletfn de Informacion celebrating the anniversary of the Bolshevik
revolution. The cover page featured a picture of a Soviet worker with
hammer and sickle held high and a Red army soldier behind him.
Others included "A Recent Stalin Speech," "Soviet Agriculture,"
142 CoMINTERN ARMY

"Twenty Years Ago in the USSR," "Capitalist Maneuvers on the Eve

of the Russian Revolution," and an essay on Lenin in which he is
quoted with approval as saying, "The only criterion by which human
conduct must guide itself is to discern if it aids or if it hinders the cause
ofSocialism." 19 Soviet military specialists discussed the campaigns in
Spain, the statements of Litvinov, Molotov, and Voroshilov were
quoted on various topics, and Stalin received the virtual deification
which had become de rigueur among Communists. 20
This sustained attention to the Soviet Union in the Brigade press
continued in this sequence from the Boletfn de Informacion in Decem-
ber 1937: on the fourth of the month, an article on Sergei Kirov,
"Hero of the Soviet People"; the fifth, John Strachey defending the
Soviet purges; the seventh, "Soviet Socialism Comes of Age," by
Sidney Webb; the eighth, portraits of the candidates in the Soviet
elections; the ninth, another full-page coverage of the elections in
Russia; and on the twelfth, a special edition devoted entirely to the
Soviet elections and the "Stalin Constitution."
The Brigade propaganda machine went into raptures over the
Soviet elections. The theme was that these were the "only truly demo-
cratic elections ever held anywhere," and no opportunity was lost to
compare them with the "sham elections" of the bourgeois democra-
cies. "The elections will be the demonstration of the fact that only
Socialism, only the dictatorship of the proletariat can realize the real
democracy for the workers," declared the Brigade press. Again, "The
USSR is the most liberal and democratic country in the world." 21 The
Red army was consistently depicted as "the best guarantee for peace
among peoples" and as a shining example for the Spanish People's
Army. 22 In a full-page spread on the Red army by Marcel Cachin, in
which he glorified its strength and military virtues, he was able to
discuss its origins without so much as mentioning Trotsky. "The Red
Army was constituted," he declared, "by Lenin and Stalin with other
old soldiers." 23
The same heavy emphasis was devoted to the Comintem and its
leading figures and policies. The basic theme here was that the Comin-
tem and its leadership were the true originators and only staunch
defenders of the Popular Front which in tum made them the only true
and trustworthy leaders of antifascism. Georgi Dimitroff, chief of the
Comintem, was regularly praised as the leading light of the world
antifascist crusade and the moving spirit in the creation of the Inter-
national Brigades. There were also frequent articles dealing with other
well-known Comintem leaders, their activities and statements. The
German and French editions of the Boletfn de Informacion ran stories
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 143

on Ernst Thaelmann, leader of the KPD; the English-language edi-

tions often featured Earl Browder and Harry Pollitt, leaders of the
American and British Communist parties. Frequently featured also
was Maurice Thorez, chief French Communist. "It would be ungrate-
ful not to recognize and underline the forces represented by Maurice
Thorez," declared the Brigade press. "He is the spiritual leader of the
French people." The first several issues of the Brigade journal, Vers
Ia Liberte, included the articles "Trois anniversaries-Lenin, Rosa
Luxembourg and Karl Liebknecht," a "Message from La Pasio-
naria," a reprint from L 'Humanite of an article by Maurice Thorez
entitled "Huit mois de government de Front Populaire," and the
article "Le 5 Regiment passe dans l'armee populaire," which included
passages from speeches by Commandante Carlos (Vidali), Jose Diaz,
La Pasionaria, and XII Brigade commissar Gustav Regler. 24
In the area of Spanish politics the Brigade press emphasized almost
exclusively the writings and statements of leading Communists who,
naturally, adhered strictly to the policy and position of the Comin-
tern. For example, every article in the July 25, 1937, issue of the
Boletfn de Informacion came directly from leading Communist func-
tionaries and spokesmen.
In many ways the Brigade press seemed almost a Comintern house
organ. News, notes, and messages regularly appeared which dealt
with strictly Comintern affairs and personalities that had nothing
directly to do with Spain or the International Brigades. For example,
when Paul Vaillant-Couturier died he was eulogized in the Brigade
press, being identified as a "leading French Communist writer." A
message of condolence to the French Communist party from Dimi-
troff, speaking for the executive committee of the Comintern, was
carried in the Boletfn de Informacion. Another example of this ap-
peared in an article to the effect that "we fighters of the International
Brigades thank the vanguard of the proletariat, the Comintern, for
having expelled from its ranks such traitors as Doriot, Mastow, and
Ruth Fischer." 25 The Brigade press also frequently carried messages
to the Brigades from the Communist parties of various countries and
reported on the activities of the Communist parties at home. The
English-language edition of the Volunteer for Liberty, for example,
carried full coverage of the Congress ofthe British Communist party,
in June 1937 at which D.F. Springhall, former political commissar of
the British battalion, offered several resolutions condemning the Brit-
ish government and the British Labour party for their policy toward
Spain and paid a glowing tribute to the British battalion, which, he
declared, "has saved the honor of the British working class." The
144 CoMINTERN ARMY

Congress ended by sending greetings to the British, Irish, and Ameri-

can comrades in the Brigades. Similarly the Boletfn de Informacion
carried a "Greeting to the International Brigades from the Young
Communist League of France at their 9th Congress." It read, in part:
"We greet all you young antifascist& [in the Brigades]. We greet the
Young Communists among you at the head of which are found mem-
bers of our Central Committee: Richard, Guguet, Escure, Lafout,
Hacke, and Clonet. " 26
The Brigade press consistently took the Comintern position regard-
ing the relations between the Comintern and the various European
proletarian and labor organizations. This position was unfailingly
hostile to the British Labour party leadership which was characteristi-
cally referred to as "reactionary." Labour party policy was described
as "a shameful betrayal of the Spanish workers ... a stab in the back."
The British should "take the line of the Soviet Union and the Popular
Front." 27
The same echo of Comintern policy was apparent regarding the
Second International and the International Federation of Trade
Unions. The Communists wanted very much to get those two impor-
tant "proletarian" organizations to follow their lead and worked hard
to achieve proletarian solidarity. "Unity between antifascist& all over
the world is the only force that can and must put an end to the vast
fascist conspiracy. Comrade Dimitroff has said that this unity is well
on the way to becoming a fact .... The working class of the capitalist
countries has almost liquidated the split provoked in the world move-
ment by social-democracy. . . . The existence of the great Socialist
country [the USSR], powerful bulwark in the struggle by the world
proletariat, bulwark for peace, liberty and progress, is the greatest
factor for liquidating the split in the world movement." 28 Not only
did the Brigade press report extensively on the Comintern's efforts in
this direction, but two of the Comintern representatives in its negotia-
tions with the Second International were the top Brigade politicos,
Luigi Longo and Franz Dahlem. 29
In April 1937 a significant delegation of European Socialist and
Syndicalist leaders visited Spain and the International Brigades.
Among them were Fritz Adler of the Second International and Louis
Schevenels of the Federation of International Syndicalists. Later that
year another important figure, Louis de Brouckere, chief of the Sec-
ond International, visited the Brigades. All these dignitaries received
the full VIP treatment. 30 As a follow-up to these visits the Brigade
commissariat dispatched the following messages that were published
in the journal of the XIV Brigade:
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 145

We have been fighting as anti-fascists in Spain for six months

in the columns of the International Brigades.... We ask you to
hear our appeal for your help.
Your authority ... in the II International means your voice
will be heard, and we, anti-fascists, hope that those forces which
could be realized in this moment of unity of international action
will be utilized to aid Republican Spain. 31

The same issue carried a similar message to Adler and Schevenels:

We have fond memories of your visit to our XIV Brigade in

April ... We, who are giving our lives and our blood in the fight
against fascism were proud to see you in the company of respon-
sible Communist comrades. It is for us the assurance that the
union of all the workers in favor of Republican Spain is in the
process of being realized.
How good we felt to hear you, Adler, exalt our work of
international solidarity in the name of your organization. How
good we felt, Comrade Schevenels, to hear your assurance of
the complete solidarity of the International Syndicalist Federa-
tion. But speed is essential in realizing common action of the
Communist, Socialist and Syndicalist Internationals. . . . Re-
solutions in favor of Republican Spain are fine but we need
action ....
We are certain, Comrades Adler and Schevenels, that our
appeal will be understood. 32
The reluctance of the leadership of the non-Communist proletarian
and labor organizations to "adhere to the unity line called for by
Dimitroff'' led to frequent and often bitter condemnation by the Com-
intern, a position fully reflected in the Brigade press. 33 Some of these
recriminations went so far as to imply that Trotskyism lurked behind
any failure to toe the Comintern line. In an article significantly enti-
tled "Franco's Trotskyist Allies against International Solidarity," this
implication was quite clear: "After the eloquent example of the Com-
munist International's demand for the common action of all workers
organizations in favor of the Spanish people, when already it had done
everything humanly possible, such as the sending of volunteers for the
International Brigades ... and the creating of enthusiastic popular
demonstrations in favor of Spain, none can deny that international
solidarity does not exist." The article then goes on to condemn groups
of Trotskyists in various countries as being "splitters of the workers"
146 COMINTERN ARMY

and "disguised agents of fascism." 34 The reader was left to draw the
obvious conclusion.
The Brigade's propaganda line on the Chinese-Japanese conflict, in
complete conformity with the Comintern's, followed the rather
strained interpretation that Japanese aggression in Asia, like fascist
aggression in Spain, was an integral part of a worldwide fascist con-
spiracy.35 "Faced with the monolithic block of totalitarian states
plotting with imperialist gold, faced with the bloody campaign of all
warmongers, faced with fascist audacity, only a rigid union of all
workers of the world ... can preserve liberty.... Pitting against that
block the union of all the proletariat our victory ... is secure. " 36 Also
emphasized were the key role of the Chinese Communist party and
their Popular Front with the Chinese Nationalists and the interna-
tional working class's interest in the Asian conflict. 37 "In spite of the
resistance of a series of leaders of the Second International and the
reformist leaders of the trades unions, enormous masses have been
mobilized in favor of Spain.... The Chinese people will find the same
support." As to the International Brigade's own role toward the
Chinese, the theme went: "We are aiding the Chinese People by direct
action.... With our Spanish Comrades of the Popular Republican
Army, we shall register further blows against Hitler and Mussolini.
Each defeat for Hitler, Mussolini and Franco in Spain is, at the same
time, a defeat for the Japanese bandits in China." 38
The Brigade press regularly took a vocal and partisan view of
internal political affairs within Loyalist Spain, a view that always
conformed perfectly with the Comintern line. This was true in the
position on Trotskyism and the general implication that those ele-
ments within the Loyalist ranks who did not conform to Communist
policies were "uncontrollables" and, in fact, traitors. 39 It was also true
in the attitude taken on the necessity for unity, a unified army and
command, military and civilian discipline, and "no revolution." 40 The
Brigade leaders and press did not hesitate openly to condemn or
support Spanish government leaders and their policies. The Commu-
nist vendetta ·against Largo Caballero, and later against Indalecio
Prieto, was faithfully reflected in the Brigade press and propaganda.
Andre Marty set the tone by saying that while Largo Caballero served
a useful purpose for a while he "did not grow with the situation." The
Volunteer for Liberty handled the replacement of Largo Caballero by
Juan Negrin in what appeared on the surface to be a straight news
story. The "objective facts" were arranged to justify the change in
government as being a result of Largo Caballero's failures. The same
issue carried the text of telegrams sent, in the name of the Intema-
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 147

tional Brigades, by Luigi Longo to Negrin, Prieto, and Alvarez del

Vayo, members of the new cabinet, pledging the enthusiastic support
of the Brigades to the new government. Also, interestingly, the same
issue carried a message from the "coordinating committee of the
Socialist and Communist parties" ordering all their militants to re-
main calm and to follow the orders received directly from their re-
spective national committees during "any difficulties which the
solution of the present crisis might provoke." 41
The undiluted Communist nature of Brigade propaganda was crys-
tal clear too in the training of political commissars. The study guide
provided for instructional use in the Brigade school for commissars
devoted itself, in large part, toward the political-ideological indoctri-
nation of the students. This indoctrination followed, in all respects,
the Communist position. The first theme, for example, purported to
cover the history of Spain. The emphasis, however, was on the fascist
nature of the military pronunciamiento of July 1936 and in placing
that event in the context of the "world fascist conspiracy." Fascism
was defined as "the reaction of the most reactionary elements of
finance capital." These elements were "preparing to conduct the im-
perialist war for a new partition of the world." Fascist methods for
conquest were described as "collaboration with fascist forces and the
bourgeoisie" in the country to be attacked. Trotskyism acted as an
"agent of fascism" in this preparation by dividing the working class,
and the POUM acted as the main Trotskyist element (and therefore
fascist collaborator) in Popular Front Spain. To complete the picture
of the war in Spain as an integral part of the fight against the "world
fascist conspiracy," a connection was drawn between the war in
Spain, the Sino-Japanese war, and the "fascist war against the USSR."
Required readings for this theme included two articles by the secre-
tary of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitroff, excerpted from the Commu-
nist International, and one by Brigade chief Andre Marty. Thus the
war in Spain was placed in the correct perspective for the student
commissars.
The second theme dealt with "The character of the Spanish revolu-
tion" and the policies of the Spanish Popular Front government. It
condemned what it called "the policy of division of the fight against
the Spanish Communist Party of the Caballero group," and Largo
Caballero's policy "against the Commissars of War." It accused that
group of trying to form a block with "the agents of Trotskyism and
the extremist elements of the Anarchists." It then praised the Negrin
government which, it said, "was opposed by the UGT, CNT and FAI
but was supported by the masses." Thus, in a strange way the largest
148 COMINTERN ARMY

mass organizations of Popular Front Spain were cast into the ranks
of the opponents of the masses. This left only the Communists as the
true representatives of the masses. Assigned readings included an
analysis of the Spanish revolution by Togliatti (Ercoli) and a speech
before the Plenum of the Communist party of Spain by Jose Diaz.
Theme Eight dealt entirely with the subject of Trotskyism. Here the
Trotskyists were, as usual, identified as "the agents of fascism in all
countries." The reasons given for their being such were: they opposed
the Bolshevization of the party; they opposed the Popular Front
policy; they opposed the policy of the Soviet Union; they opposed the
Comintem. They were "the direct agents of the Gestapo" and the
"chief enemies of the people."
The opportunity was used to smear a number of other groups that
were anathema to the Communists with the broad brush of Trotsky-
ism. For example, the German Social Democratic party was labeled
"the principle channel for the activity of the Trotskyists." Trotskyists
had "infiltrated the Anarchist leadership" and the "left wing of the
Spanish Socialist Party." In other words, all political elements that
opposed Communist policy were tarred with Trotskyism and thus
cast into the outer darkness as "agents of fascism." The clear duty of
the party and of all antifascists was the liquidation of Trotskyism and
the "purifying of antifascist organizations." Readings for this theme
included the "Resolution of the Executive Committee of the Comin-
tem of September, 1937, Concerning the Fight against Trotskyism,"
and a speech by Jose Diaz to the Plenum of the CPS entitled "The
Enemies of the People." In this speech Diaz asked the rhetorical
question, "Who are the enemies of the people?" His answer: "fascists,
Trotskyists and uncontrollables." Given the broad definition ofthese
terms by the Communists, that meant, in effect, anyone who opposed
the party line. Thus the would-be commissars were indoctrinated into
the specifically Communist attitude toward Trotskyism which was so
broadly defined that it included virtually all political forces in Popular
Front Spain (and in the world proletarian movement) which did not
sympathize with and support Communist policy.
Theme Seventeen entitled "Twenty Years of Soviet Power: The
Victory of Socialism and Democracy in the Soviet Union," devoted
itself entirely to praise of the USSR and Communism. The "result of
the Communist line," the theme ran, "has been the victory of Social-
ism over one-sixth of the globe." The result of "the line of the capital-
ists and reformists is the victory offascism." The power of the Soviets
reinforces a policy of peace against the policy of war of the bourgeoisie
and "the Social-Democratic leaders." The theme concluded by stating
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 149

that "the defense of the Soviet Union is the duty of men of the entire
world." Readings listed included the Report of Comrade Stalin to the
VII Congress ofSoviets on the New Soviet Constitution, the Resolutions
of the VII World Congress of the Comintern, various selections from
Imprecor, and Stalin's Problems of Leninism. 42
In addition to serving as a direct source of propaganda, the Bri-
gades were a potent symbol for dramatizing and publicizing "prole-
tarian solidarity," the Popular Front, the Loyalist cause in Spain, and
the Comintern itself. "The Brigades," declared the Communist Inter-
national, "represent the highest expression of international solidarity,
of the anti-fascist united front and of proletarian honor, devotion and
courage." 43 Here was a theme that the Spanish Communist press and
the Brigades' own press never tired of repeating. The Brigades were
the "living expression of international solidarity of the popular masses
throughout the world," declared Frente Rojo in October 1937. 44 The
organ of the XII International Brigade, II Garibaldino, said: "These
glorious columns are the bearers of international solidarity in the
people's fight against international fascism." The Boletfn de Informa-
cion opined, "In the history of the working class, the action of the
glorious International Brigades will always be engraved in letters of
blood. They are the best sons of the International working class." 45
That the Brigade directorate saw the Internationals as a major force
among the world proletariat was crystal clear in this passage from the
organ of the XV Brigade in commemoration of May Day 1937: "In
every part of the world when the workers gather together today
to demonstrate their solidarity with one another, we will be in their
thoughts. They will think of all the comrades in the International
Brigades with love and pride.... And as they listen to the story of
the heroic deeds of our Brigades they will pledge themselves to in-
creased support of us volunteers and of the heroic Spanish people."
In a similar vein Le Soldat de Ia Republique reminded its readers:
"We don't forget that we constitute the first International Popular
Army known to history and that the entire world is watching us ....
Therefore, we must be an example of proletarian unity." This view of
the Brigades was also clearly in mind when the Brigade political
commissariat ordered the creation of a historical unit for the Brigades:
"The popular anti-fascist movement will have to know the history of
the International Brigades, so as to be furnished with the ideological
weapons to carry on the struggle against fascism. " 46
The Comintern also saw the Brigades as an especially good instru-
ment for appealing to a much wider public than the specifically prole-
tarian. In this respect the Brigades served especially well the Popular
150 CoMINTERN ARMY

Front policy. The American journalist and supporter of Loyalist

Spain Louis Fischer reported an interview with Georgi Dimitroff,
then secretary of the Comintern, in which Dimitroff voiced the hope
that an American Popular Front could be forged from the Americans
in the International Brigades. 47 Since there were only a few thousand
Americans in the Brigades, Dimitroff could only have had in mind
that the propaganda appeal of the Brigades would be the catalyst for
the formation of a Popular Front in the United States.
Evidence that Dimitroff's optimism about the effects of the Interna-
tionals was fully shared by the American party's hierarchy was re-
flected in this Christman Greeting message to the Americans in the
Brigades.

Your heroic deeds ... have brought glory and honor to the
working class of America, have encouraged and inspired hun-
dreds of thousands and millions to fight against the disgraceful
policy of isolation and false neutrality.
Your great deed is having a profound and enduring effect
upon every section of progressive America. Your deeds and
heroism are today the proud boast of all that is best in America
from coast to coast. Your name has become a symbol of heroism
and inspiration to all of us at home. 48

Somewhat later Robert Minor, a leading hierarch in the Commu-

nist party in the United States, said: "I make the categorical statement
that the heroic fighting of the American boys in Spain, and the conse-
quent interest and sympathy and pride awakening among the Ameri-
can people are a major factor in the political life of this country." The
perspective from within the Brigades themselves was much the same.
"The heroic struggle of the Americans in Spain has, to a great extent,
been responsible for winning the sympathy of the American people to
the support of Republican Spain. This support is expressed in pressure
on the American Government to speak out against the agressors in
Spain and China, in contributions of large sums of money and supplies
... and in the increasing numbers of Americans and Canadians arriv-
ing in Spain to join the struggle against International Fascism," edito-
rialized the Brigade press. 49
This optimistic view of the propaganda value of the Brigades was
not limited to America. "The International Brigades show in practice
the high value of International Solidarity and, thus, in all capitalist
countries assist the growth of the anti-fascist people's front," declared
the Communist International. Again, "The experience of the Interna-
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 151

tional Brigade is above all of tremendous positive significance on the

wide field of the anti-Fascist struggle in all countries.... The example
of the ... Brigade must be an important step toward the unification
of all anti-Fascist forces for a similar struggle in other countries." The
Brigade press echoed this sentiment: "The International Brigades are
a powerful lever for the creation of united international action, for the
creation of the International People's Front." 50
The central committees of the Communist parties of Germany and
Italy assured their colleagues in the Brigades that by fighting in Spain
they were "a symbol of resistance" to the regimes in their respective
countries. 51 From England, Communist party chief Harry Pollitt
declared: "The spirit of the Anglo-American volunteers is an inspira-
tion to the movement at home. " 52 The Brigade press assured the
troops: "At home in England, the presence in Spain of so many brave
comrades has produced profound impressions, and has led to many
actions in support of Republican Spain. Important contributions of
money and materials are being made every day and the significance
of the struggle in Spain has led to a strengthening of the home fight
against reaction, fascism and war." 53
The Brigade press dramatized this point through an interview with
an American lawyer, Levinson, who, apparently, had defended Dimi-
troff in the famous Reichstag fire trials in Germany. In answer to his
interviewer's questions as to his view on the influence of the Interna-
tional Brigades on international politics, Levinson replied: "The influ-
ence of the International Brigades is felt immediately by the people
and has its reflection on the politics of the nation and the world. " 54
Among the most valuable of the Brigades' propaganda roles in the
overall Communist effort in Spain was that of maintaining the interest
of large sections of the public in the various western nations in the
Spanish conflict. The constantly reiterated fact that Americans, or
Englishmen or Frenchmen, as the case might be, were fighting and
dying in Spain exercised an undoubted effect in their respective coun-
tries in keeping alive the identification of at least segments of the
population with that war. In that respect the Communists could count
on the help of much of the bourgeois press of the various nations,
many of whose correspondents in Spain were strongly sympathetic to
the Loyalist cause in general and the International Brigades in partic-
ular. The group of newsmen and writers who were more or less
permanently domiciled in Spain during the war, men such as Herbert
Matthews, Vincent Sheean, Ernest Hemingway, Henry Buckley,
Louis Fischer, Sefton Delmer, Louis Delapree, and George Seldes,
mingled freely and continuously with the men of the International
152 COMINTERN ARMY

Brigades, especially with their more appealing and articulate members

such as Gustav Regier, Ludwig Renn, Hans Kahle, and General
Lukacs.
Typical of the good press afforded the Brigades by bourgeois writers
and correspondents was this by the American Louis Fischer: "The
International Brigade is a daily reminder of the importance of events
in Spain to the cause of democracy .... The Spaniards greatly appreci-
ate the lofty idealism that moved each foreign volunteer to leave his
peaceful home." Martha Gellhorn wrote in the mass circulation mag-
azine Collier's: "The men who came all this distance, neither for glory
nor for money and perhaps to die, knew why they came.... But it
is nothing you can ask them about. ... It belongs to them .... But you
can think about it at night, with the windows open, listening to the
thud of trench mortars .... You can think of it with respect." 55
New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews summed up his
view of the Lincoln battalion this way: "You cannot dismiss these
youngsters with the contemptuous label of 'Reds.' They are not
fighting for Moscow, but for their ideals.'' Vincent Sheean wrote: "In
the darkest moments of the whole dark year of 1938 ... I could think
of the International Brigades in Spain and be sure that courage and
generosity still existed somewhere on this planet.... In the long epic
of the war [the International Brigades] ... suffused the total effort
with a moral value more precious than their lives.'' 56
The Brigade commissariat was keenly aware of this sympathy and
cultivated it carefully. The commissariat's instructions for commis-
sars specifically mentioned that the American "bourgeois press" was
very friendly to "the workers.'' 57 The close relations between the
Brigades and the foreign correspondents as well as the exploitation of
this relationship by the Brigade commissariat was apparent to those
in a position to know. For example, Arturo Barea, a Spaniard who
was a close observer of the foreign press through his position in the
Loyalist censorship bureau in Madrid, wrote of the "foreign writers
and journalists [who] revolved in a circle of their own ... with a fringe
of men from the International Brigades." He also mentioned that the
Brigade political commissars "visited us as a matter of course and gave
us information which we could pass on to the journalists. " 58
Similarly, numerous books on the Brigades were written by Com-
munist party members and published by bourgeois publishers. These
normally made no mention of the party affiliation of the author and
thus were read by the uninitiated public as objective accounts. Typical
of these were Edwin Rolfe's The Lincoln Battalion, Alvah Bessie's
Men in the Ranks, William Rust's Britons in Spain, Tom Wintring-
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 153

ham's English Captain, Geoffrey Cox's Defense ofMadrid, and Gus-

tav Regier's Great Crusade, which had a foreword by Ernest
Hemingway.
The Brigades also served an important propaganda function in
providing a focal point for the activities and interests of numerous
foreigners coming and going in Spain. A great many of these people
visited one of the Brigades. Many others communicated with the
Brigades in writing. This type of activity served not only to focus
attention on the Brigades themselves but to develop and maintain
foreign interest and sympathy toward the Loyalist cause. Among
those who visited the International Brigades frequently was Maurice
Thorez, chief of the French Communist party. His visits were the
occasion for reviews, festivities, speeches, and exchanges of fraternal
greetings. The organ of the XII Brigade, Vers Ia Liberte, carried a
description of a visit by Thorez as its lead article under the heading:
"Maurice Thorez brings the salute of the Popular Front of France to
the XII Brigade." The next edition again gave major space to Thorez's
speech to the Brigade. 59 Other French visitors reported on in the
Brigade press included a Comrade Zyromski who assured the troops
that "the International Brigades represent that which is most influen-
tial in the International workers movement. The XIV Brigade is a
symbol for us." 60
Numerous Americans also visited the Brigades. In reporting on the
festivities in honor of the first anniversary of the International Bri-
gades, the English-language edition of the Brigade press noted that
along with "La Pasionaria," "Gallo," and other Communist stal-
warts visiting the Brigade were "Congressmen Bernard and O'Con-
nell from the U.S.A .... Bernard applauded as vociferously as any
and clenched his fist in the Popular Front salute many times.
He stated that he had seen President Roosevelt before leaving
the U. S. and the President had requested that he bring back a per-
sonal report on the Spanish situation and about the Americans in
Spain." 61
Another American admirer of the Brigades was the writer Anna
Louise Strong. The Volunteer for Liberty reported a visit by her to the
American battalion and a speech she made to the United States over
the Loyalist government radio. The speech was a panegyric of the
Americans in the International Brigade stressing the often expressed
PoP.ular Front interpretation that they were showing their patriotism
by fighting in Spain. This was followed by a message from her to "the
boys of the Lincoln, Washington, and Mackenzie-Papineau battal-
ions" which assured them that they were indeed great heroes. 62
154 COMINTERN ARMY

In May 1937 Notre Combat carried an article, with photographs,

of United States party representative Robert Minor and "Comrade
Ford," the vice-presidential candidate on the Communist party ticket
in the elections of 1936, who were visiting the XV Brigade. "Comrade
Minor," the article stated, "will remain in Spain indefinitely as the
representative of the Daily Worker, among other duties." In July
these two again visited the Internationals, this time conversing with
XV Brigade commander Vladimir Copic. With them also was the
British Communist Ralph Bates, shown "lecturing the boys of the
regiment de train. " That edition also carried a greeting from Francis
Gorman, president of the United Textile Workers of America, and a
member of the North American Cominittee to Aid Spanish Democ-
racy. Paul Robeson also made a much-publicized visit to the Brigades.
Robeson had the advantages, from the Communist's point of view, of
being an American black who was both a well-known singer and a
devout adinirer of Communism and the Soviet Union. He thus com-
bined the useful qualities of representing one of the earth's downtrod-
den people, of being an artist-intellectual, and also a firm adherent of
the Popular Front and its chief protagonist. British party leader Harry
Pollitt selected the active Charlotte Haldane to accompany Robeson
as guide and interpreter on his Spanish tour. 63
From England, too, came numerous visitors to the Brigades, among
whom was Harry Pollitt. 64 "The English comrades are feeling inches
taller today in consequence of the surprise visit of Comrade H. Pol-
litt," declared Our Fight. A greeting from Pollitt to the British battal-
ion went, "We are proud of your glorious achievements and pledge
ourselves to ever greater support from Britain." Our Fight announced
in May 1937 a visit to the British battalion of Communist party
members Will Paynter and Ted Bramley. Paynter, the readers were
informed, was going to remain in Spain, taking over a post as political
commissar at Albacete. One of the more important non-Communist
British visitors to the Brigades, and one whom the political cominis-
sars tried particularly hard to exploit for Popular Front propaganda
purposes, was the well-known Labour party Member of Parliament
Clement Attlee. The Brigade press gave his visit extensive coverage
and the First company of the British battalion took the name "Major
Attlee Company." 65
The International Brigade also proved a valuable propaganda in-
strument in its role as a focal point for various organizations outside
Spain in professing their solidarity with the Loyalist cause. For exam-
ple, the Brigade press carried a notice that the North American
students who were fighting in the Brigades presented a flag to the
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 155

Federal Union of Spanish Students. The flag bore the words "Ameri-
can Students Union" and was presented by George Watt who was
recovering from wounds received at Fuentes de Ebro. "The greatest
proof of the solidarity of American students in Spain," the article
continued, is that "American students have been fighting in Spain side
by side with their international comrades." All this was seen as "proof
of the friendship between students in American and Spain and anti-
fascist students throughout the entire world. " 66
Another example of this friendship was the report of a message
received from the World Youth Congress which had recently con-
vened at Vassar College. The message, addressed to John Gates and
all the American boys in Spain, told of the wild cheers that had
greeted the reading of a message from the title page of a book about
the XV Brigade signed by John Gates, George Watt, and Milton
Wolff, members of the Abraham Lincoln battalion. This was "cer-
tainly the proudest moment that Americans at the Congress had," the
message continued. "In fact it was the only moment at which Ameri-
can young people could say that the international cooperation we all
talked so much about was actually being put into practice by Ameri-
can students." 67
Other organizations were created by the Comintern specifically as
auxiliaries to the International Brigades. Among these were the
Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade in the United States and the
Dependents Aid Committee in England. Organized by the Commu-
nist party and staffed by party functionaries who had spent at least
a brief period with the Brigades in Spain, the Friends served as the
most direct open link between the United States and the Americans
in the Brigades. The United States party used the Friends as a propa-
ganda agency, sponsoring meetings and fund-raising campaigns, re-
cruiting, publishing propaganda material, and supervising the
statements of returned American veterans to the press. An example
of the latter of these functions was the experience of Lincoln veteran
William Herrick. Upon his return to the United States, Lifo magazine
interviewed Herrick. When asked why he had gone to Spain he an-
swered that he had gone as a member of the Communist party. At that
point the representative of the Friends told Herrick to change his
statement and say that he had volunteered because he was Jewish and
wanted to join the fight against fascism. " 68
In Britain the Dependents Aid Committee served the same function
as the FALB in the United States. Party worker Charlotte Haldane
acted as chief spokesman for the DAC at the request of Harry Pollitt.
Her staff consisted of paid party functionaries but, in good Popular
156 COMINTERN ARMY

Front style, numerous prominent persons were solicited to become

patrons of the organization. The Daily Worker ran a daily ad for
contributions. Later, in the fall of 1937, Pollitt replaced Haldane with
Fred Co(leman, ex-commander of the British battalion, now returned
to England after being seriously wounded in action. 69
Given the Comintern's attitude toward the Brigades as the best
example of proletarian solidarity and the Popular Front in action, the
Communists naturally viewed propaganda emanating directly from
the Brigades or from those closely identified with them as especially
valuable. As the Brigade commissariat itself put it: "Every people, of
every nation, must know who are their best sons, what heroic things
they have done, how they have fought, how they have died and in
what manner they have finally won. All of you must communicate this
to your people, from your lips they must know the truth about the
fight and the heroism of your comrades." 70 With this in mind, the
Brigade leadership regularly used selected Internationals for broad-
casting to their various homelands over Radio Madrid, an especially
valuable method of getting propaganda into those countries where
other methods could not be used. The Brigade press informed its
readers of these activities on occasion and sometimes included ex-
cerpts from the texts of the broadcasts. 71
Another technique for using the Brigades as an instrument to influ-
ence opinion outside Spain involved a continuous stream of written
messages sent in the name of the Brigades to persons or groups in
various countries. The German and Czech sections of the Brigade's
officer training school, for example, sent a message to the president
of Czechoslovakia expressing sympathy on the death of Jan Masa-
ryk. 72 An example of how the Brigades were used as a symbol of and
a vehicle for the Popular Front was this telegram sent to the United
States in the name of the Lincoln battalion in commemoration of
Independence Day 1937:
We, Americans in Spain fighting for the preservation of world
democracy, are proud to celebrate today the national festival of
our American ideals on Spanish Soil. ...
As Lafayette, citizen of France, urged by impulses which all
American democrats will honor today, sailed from his own land
... so we have offered ourselves to the Spanish government. ...
Let us unite in our efforts to preserve democracy in Spain, in
America, and throughout the world. 73
This passage typified the approach taken by the Brigade commissariat
when trying to appeal to the broadest possible audience, and espe-
Comintern Propaganda Instrument 157

cially in the identification of the Brigades with "democracy," the

"Spanish government," and "American ideals." Typical also was the
total absence of any mention of Communism or that the party had any
remote connection with the Brigades, the war, or the message itself.
From the other end, widely publicized messages sent to the Bri-
gades from various sources could serve much the same purpose. For
example, this one to the Lincoln battalion from the American Leo.
Gallagher, identified as a "liberal lawyer":
The progressive forces, [in America] ... know that the vic-
tory of democracy in Spain will immediately strengthen the
United front, democratic forces throughout the world, and spe-
cifically in the United States....
The role of the members of the Washington-Lincoln Battal-
ion can be understood when one realizes that the fight in Spain
is likely to shape the future of society....
For this reason, we in America scan each day's paper for news
about the Washington-Lincoln Battalion. We have read with
pride the record of your struggles-volunteers who on foreign
fields are defending American democracy. 74
The commissariat also demonstrated its interest in propaganda and
the Brigades' image by ordering writers in the Brigades, Alfred Kan-
torowicz, Ludwig Reno, Jef Last, Ralph Bates, and Bodo Uhse, to
attend the International Writers' Conference in Madrid in July 1937
and by assigning a number of the Brigades' intellectuals to the duty
of making foreign propaganda tours. In the summer of 1937 Renn
went on the propaganda circuit in the United States, Canada, and
Cuba. In the fall Gustav Regier performed the same role in the United
States. Pietro Nenni made a propaganda tour of Europe in September
of 1937, as did JefLast. Many of the lesser lights of the Brigades were
also used on propaganda tours in their own countries. 75
The commissars also exhorted the men of the Brigades to make
every effort to influence opinion back home. The commissar of the
British battalion, for example, after telling his readers that "we are
playing our part here but [Aneurin] Bevin and Company [the British
Labour party] are stabbing us in the back," reiterated the point that
the men of the British battalion must "use all influence to change the
course in Britain and force unity [of the Labour party with the Com-
munist position of Spain]. One interesting method of getting Brigade-
oriented propaganda out of Spain was the printing of postal cards with
propaganda posters and slogans on them and the label "Comisariado
de las Brigadas Intemacionales." Another technique was by encour-
158 CoMINTERN ARMY

aging the men to mail their issues of the various Brigade publications
home. For example, the Boletfn de Informacfon asked its readers:
"Are you still sending the bulletins to your organizations in Britain
and America? It is a powerful weapon for combatting press lies." 76
The Volunteer for Liberty ran letters from home which, no doubt,
encouraged this practice. For example, a letter from the Friends of the
Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion, the Canadian version of the FALB,
sent a letter thanking the men of the battalion for sending them copies
of the Brigade journals which were "very helpful in gaining support
for the common cause." The Communists also used letters from Bri-
gade men to people back home for propaganda purposes by sponsor-
ing their publication in printed collections. Numerous such letters
also appeared in sympathetic periodicals. Those selected for such
publication naturally conformed to the accepted Popular Front view.
"What impresses one immediately," ran one letter published by the
Nation, "is the complete and unbroken solidarity of all the workers
and peasants in wanting the war won." Then the writer, identified as
a twenty-year-old volunteer with the Lincoln battalion, exhorted his
readers to "mobilize every possible group to give aid to Spain." He
concluded by pointing out that "the fight in Spain is extremely impor-
tant for the future of the world. " 77
10 Dissidence, Desertion,
and the Terror
The mentality of political suspicion, hatred, terror, and mur-
der that was then running its grotesque and bloody course in the
Soviet Union and that cast its spell throughout the Comintem spilled
over into Spain and the International Brigades. An NKVD contingent
arrived with the Soviet diplomatic and military missions in September
1936, under the control of the veteran NKVD officer known as Alex-
ander Orlov. The NKVD, or "Cheka" as it was commonly called,
became notorious in Spain due to its widespread campaign of terror
which included the jailing, torture, and physical liquidation of numer-
ous elements of the political left, most of whom were lumped together
under the elastic and inclusive term Trotskyists. This included numer-
ous groups within the Spanish Popular Front who were too revolu-
tionary as well as a large number offoreigners in Loyalist Spain, many
of whom had been attracted to that country for the very reason that
it was in the throes of a revolutionary situation. Of the operations of
the Cheka in Spain the Soviet Intelligence officer General Krivitsky
wrote: "Thousands were arrested, including many foreign volun-
teers. . . . Any criticism of methods and unflattering opinion of the
Stalin dictatorship in Russia, or association with men of heretical
political beliefs became treason. [The Cheka] employed all the meth-
ods familiar in Moscow of extorting confessions and of summary
executions." 1
Franz Borkenau, a man of the left and Loyalist sympathizer, was,
like hundreds of other foreigners in Spain, arrested by the Cheka and
accused of Trotskyism. Referring to what he called "Trotskyist para-
noia," he wrote: "The Communists have gotten in the habit of de-
nouncing as a Trotskyist everyone who disagrees with them about
anything .... In the Communist mentality, every disagreement in
political matters is a major crime, and every political criminal a
Trotskyist. A Trotskyist, in the Communist vocabulary, is one who
deserves to be killed." 2 "Trotskyist" referred to "left" disagreements.
"Right" disagreement as surely labeled one a "fascist," although the
circle closed as the "Trotskyists" were also labeled a "fascist fifth
column" and the "direct agents of Franco." 3
160 COMINTERN ARMY

George Orwell, too, found himself caught up in the Cheka reign of

terror which reached a peak in the wake of the Barcelona crisis of May
1937. He wrote of the many foreigners with "doubtful political
records" from the Communist point of view who were "on the run
with the police on the track" and of the "horrible atmosphere pro-
duced by fear, suspicion, hatred ... crammed jails ... and prowling
gangs of armed men. " 4
The NKVD carried out its operations in Spain independent of the
authority or control of the Loyalist government although it also rap-
idly infiltrated the ranks of the official Loyalist police organizations. 5
Virtually all the firsthand accounts of arrest and imprisonment for
political reasons in Loyalist Spain make very plain the fact that the
police apparatus was full of foreign Communists acting essentially as
Cheka agents under the guise of government police. Indeed Loyalist
cabinet ministers Prieto, Zugazogoita, and Irujo affirmed that the
Loyalist police were heavily infiltrated with Communists, that the
police carried out mass arrests without government authority, and
that the Communists operated, in addition to all this, their own
independent police apparatus. 6
An example of the techniques of the Cheka was the case of Peter
E1stob. Elstob, a young Englishman of twenty volunteered to go to
Spain as a pilot. Somehow he ended up with a contingent of men
destined for the International Brigades and, despite his efforts to
explain that he was a pilot, he was retained with this contingent at
Figueras, the entrep6t for the Brigade volunteers in Spain. Finally, for
no apparent reason, he was placed under arrest and held incom-
municado for several weeks. Among the people who arrested, impris-
oned, and interrogated him were foreigners of various nationalities.
Many of his fellow prisoners were also foreigners. While in prison he
witnessed the summary execution of numerous men who were stood
against a wall and shot. At one point during his detention the London
Communist party representative in Barcelona appeared at the pris-
on for the purpose of inquiring about Elstob's case. No more was
heard from this individual, however, and Elstob was finally freed
and expelled from Spain thanks to the efforts of the British
counsul. 7
A similar experience was that of Olaf DeWet. An Englishman
flying for the Loyalists, he had volunteered not through political
conviction but for adventure and money. Suddenly, and without ap-
parent cause, he was arrested and imprisoned. Those who arrested,
incarcerated, and interrogated him were foreigners. He mentioned
particularly various Germans among his interrogators. He also wit-
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 161

nessed the execution of a number of his fellow prisoners who were

taken from their cells at night and dispatched with a revolver. 8
An even more pointed example of Cheka terror was that of the
Englishman Robert Smillie. Smillie, a member of the British Indepen-
dent Labour Party (a "left deviationist" Marxist party), was asso-
ciated with the POUM in Spain (and was thus a "Trotskyist" in the
eyes of the Communists). He was arrested, incarcerated, held incom-
municado by the Communists, and eventually died in one of their
secret prisons. 9
This atmosphere of political terror carried over, perhaps inevitably,
into the International Brigades. The Brigade hierarchs--staunch,
dedicated, and disciplined party members all-naturally adhered fully
to the pervading Communist attitudes and were determined to main-
tain the political purity of the Brigades. The search for political
dissidence, its unmasking and punishment, became one of the primary
concerns of the Brigade commissariat. As Brigade man Jef Last put
it: "One of the principal activities of the GPU [NKVD) in Spain
was to imprison, torture and often kill volunteers of the opposition
parties with the intention of ferreting out their relations with the
so-called Trotskyists abroad who could then be handed to the
Gestapo." 10
While the regular Brigade political commissar system served in part
as a political police, the main instrument by which the search for
political dissidence was carried on within the Brigade was the so-
called Servicio Investigaci6n Militar (SIM). One of the Loyalist gov-
ernment's secret police units had the same initials, but the Brigade
SIM was an autonomous organization; there was no connection be-
tween the Brigade organization and the government. In reality the
Brigade SIM was simply a special unit of the Comintern designed to
perform the role of a political police apparatus within the Brigades. 11
It was staffed by Comintern functionaries and party cadres of diverse
nationalities, many of whom had performed similar services for the
Comintern prior to the Spanish war. 12
The Brigade Cheka, as the SIM was commonly called, operated
from headquarters in Albacete and at the direct disposition of the
political commissariat of the International Brigades. The Brigades
maintained their own prison at Albacete until Brigade headquarters
moved to Horto, near Barcelona, in 1938, at which time the Brigade
established its prison at Castel de Fells in the same area. Commandant
of the prison at Castel de Fells was a Lieutenant Copic, younger
brother of the Colonel Copic who commanded the XV International
Brigade. 13
162 COMINTERN ARMY

The Brigade Cheka was a microcosm of the police state in action.

Once a man fell into its clutches he was completely at its mercy. No
judicial review of any kind existed within the Brigade structure and
no review of the internal matters of the Brigades was seriously at-
tempted by the Loyalist government or military authorities. 14 Among
the examples of this were the experiences of Brigade men Gillain and
Honeycomb. Gillain, an officer with the XIV Brigade, fell afoul of the
Brigade leadership and was arrested and imprisoned. Knowing that
no hope existed of any intervention into Brigade affairs by the Loyalist
authorities, he sought the help of Longo, General Walter, and, finally,
de Brouckere of the Second International. None of these, however,
proved willing to interfere in the workings of the Cheka. Honeycomb,
an American, sought the intervention of the Loyalist authorities in his
efforts to leave the Brigades and Spain. He was informed by the
Spanish ministry of war that the matter was not within their author-
ity, that the International Brigades had "complete autonomy."
Honeycomb was subsequently arrested, along with several other Bri-
gade men rounded up in Barcelona, and taken to the front. 15
The Cheka placed undercover agents in all units of the Brigades to
report any words or actions that might be construed as "dissidence,"
a term that very definitely included criticism of the Communist party
or Communist policy. Any individual reported to Cheka headquar-
ters, either by Cheka agents, who in some cases were also the official
political commissars, or by others, faced arrest, imprisonment, or
death. If the arrested person was a Communist party member, he was
likely to be charged as a Trotskyist and "traitor to the party." For
non-Communist Spaniards, the usual charge was "fifth columnist."
German and Italian volunteers, whether party members or not, were
likely to be labeled Gestapo or OVRA agents respectively. In the
Brigade prison the Cheka attempted to force confessions from the
suspects through the use of the same techniques then being used by
the Gestapo and their own parent organization, the Soviet NKVD;
solitary confinement in windowless cells too small for a man to move
about in, the withholding of food, water, and sleep, all-night interro-
gations, beatings, and various other refinements. The final technique
of the Brigade Cheka was the firing squad in the courtyard or a walk
into the cellar and a pistol bullet in the back of the neck. 16
If prisoners died under torture, the case was usually written off as
a suicide. "Suicide a la Beckman" was the ironical term coined to
cover this contingency in the International Brigades. It stemmed from
the case of a German Brigade captain who was arrested by the Cheka
in May 1937 because it learned that Beckman had written a letter to
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 163

the Loyalist authorities criticizing the activities of certain of the Bri-

gades' Communist chieftains including Marty, who, Beckman
affirmed, had ordered the execution of four soldiers and a captain
from Beckman's battalion. He was subsequently arrested by the Bri-
gade Cheka and incarcerated in the prison at Albacete where he was
tortured to death during the attempt to force him to confess that he
had written to the Loyalist authorities because of a personal quarrel
with Marty. Meanwhile, advised of Beckman's arrest and incarcera-
tion by a friend of his, the Spanish authorities sent officials to Albacete
to investigate. When they arrived, Beckman was dead, a so-called
suicide. The affair provoked a small scandal within government circles
and a few demands for investigation. But at the demand of Marty and
Longo, backed up by the Comintern and the Spanish Communist
members of the cabinet, the matter was not pursued. 17
The Brigade Cheka was controlled directly by the Comintern hier-
archy of the International Brigades. According to Penchienati, Vit-
torio Vidali, the ubiquitous Comintern stalwart of Fifth Regiment
fame, acted as the first chief of the Brigade Cheka. Both Marty and
Longo, as the political chieftains of the Brigades, were, no doubt,
intimately involved. The well-known German Comintern figure Wal-
ter Ulbricht played a role in this activity too. According to Ruth
Fischer, Ulbricht, operating from Brigade headquarters in Albacete,
organized the Cheka unit dealing with the German-speaking elements
in the Brigades, personally directed the search for Trotskyists among
his fellow Germans, and ordered the death of many of them. 18 An-
other highly placed German Communist and ex-chief of a GPU
apparatus in Germany, Heinz Neumann, operated with the In-
ternational Brigade Cheka, sometimes using the name "Enrique
Fischer." 19 An American assigned to the Brigade commissariat where
part of his duty was to read outgoing mail for signs of dissidence,
especially any criticism of the party or its operation of the Brigades,
worked under the direct supervision of Neumann who told him on
numerous occasions that he, Neumann, had recently caught and
killed "Trotskyite Fascists."20
The Cheka recruited agents from among party cadres of all nation-
alities. As the British Labour Member of Parliament John McGovern
(who visited Spain and participated in an investigation of the terror
there) put it, there were two International Brigades in Spain, the
military unit of that name and a horde of Comintern gangsters and
gunmen-the Cheka. 21 One of the better documented examples of the
type of person who carried out this work was the American George
Mink. Mink, a long-time Communist, had been involved in party
164 CoMINTERN ARMY

work in the seaman's unions in the United States as early as 1930 and
had worked for the Soviet secret police in various capacities, including
that of assassin, for years prior.to the Spanish war. Supplied with a
false passport under the name "Alfred Hertz" by the NKVD, he
entered Spain in early 1937 and took up his work as a Cheka agent. 22
Mink bore striking similarities to the stereotype of the gangland "tor-
pedo." "I met him in a hotel in Barcelona in April, 1937," said an
American who had previously been a party member himself. "He
[Mink] got drunk and boasted about his NKVD work. ... He showed
me a roll of bills and he was wearing a London tailored suit which
cost him $150.00 and he had very expensive leather luggage and said
that that was the way to get a good reception in a hotel." 23 He appar-
ently worked directly for the Soviet NKVD in Spain and was involved
in their activities against various elements of the left. Mink "operated
in the safe hinterland," wrote Jan Valtin. "His apartment in the Hotel
Continental [in Barcelona] became the breeding place of many of the
murderous GPU night raids on the homes of anti-Stalinists in Bar-
celona." Liston Oak reported that Mink talked to him about the
Communist plan to provoke the POUM into a violent encounter and
implied that Mink had some part in the murder of POUM leader
Andres Nin. 24
Mink was also deeply involved in the Cheka operations in the
International Brigades. He was, in this sense, an example of the close
interconnection between the Soviet NKVD and the Brigade Cheka
activities. He offered Liston Oak an assignment "to put the finger on
'untrustworthy' volunteers [in the International Brigades] ... such as
members of the British Independent Labor party and the American
Socialist party." Another American member of the International Bri-
gades who had known Mink personally through their party work
prior to coming to Spain, testified that he had been present when Mink
and another Cheka agent shot and killed two American Brigade men.
As to the reason for this execution, the witness did not know whether
the men had tried to desert the Brigade and leave Spain or whether
it was for some kind of political deviation. Yet another former Com-
munist also testified regarding Mink's role toward the Americans in
the Brigades, "I know that plenty of American Loyalists [Brigade
men] would like to get their hands on George Mink. He was responsi-
ble for shooting many Americans in the back over there." 25
The American party functionary Steve Nelson was also a good
example of the interlocking nature of the various components of the
Communist apparatus as it operated in Spain. Nelson had attended
the Lenin Institute in Moscow where he received training in espionage
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 165

and organizational work. Later he worked as a Comintem agent in

China and was sent to Spain in 1937 where he apparently worked
closely with the NKVD. "I heard much of his courage and ruthless-
ness in stamping out Trotskyists for the secret police," said Louis
Budenz, then editor of the Daily Worker. In early May 1937 the party
sent Nelson to Spain where, without previous service in the Interna-
tional Brigades, he assumed the post of political commissar of the
Lincoln battalion and subsequently that of commissar of the entire
XV Brigade. As a result of his work in Spain the central committee
of the Communist party in the United States "co-opted" Nelson in
1938, an unusual procedure to distinguish a man who had performed
exceedingly valuable work for the party. At that time United States
party chief Earl Browder spoke "in glowing terms of Nelson's great
services ... in uprooting anti-party elements," recalled Budenz. But
Nelson later told Budenz that Browder and the American party hier-
archy had no choice in the matter. They had been ordered to do it by
"the people he [Nelson] was working with in Spain," that is, the
Russians. 26
In February and March of 1937, when the Brigades were threaten-
ing to fall apart under the combined impact of the heavy casualties
incurred in the Jarama battles and the widespread disillusionment and
poor morale, the Comintem ordered even more of its reliable cadres
into the Brigades to strengthen the party's control. Most of these men
were assigned either to political commissar posts or to specifically
police work. 27 This approach reflected the essence of the Communist
attitude that military discipline was essentially a product of political
discipline. This attitude accounted for the tendency of the Brigade
directorate to see political dissidence, treason, and Trotskyism behind
any and all disciplinary problems from desertion to such common
soldierly foibles as drunkenness, apathy, frustration, and general grip-
ing. It also accounted for their proclivity to treat all disciplinary
problems as extremely serious and deserving of the most rigid coun-
termeasures. The problems of low morale, indiscipline, and desertion
led the Albacete commissariat to demand "ruthless action" by politi-
cal and military authorities in the Brigades and the use of the death
penalty to maintain discipline. Lecouer referred to this period as one
in which summary executions and "promenades" (a euphemism for
shooting political enemies) became common in the Brigades. 28
From at least as early in the war as March 1937, men were deserting
or attempting to desert in large enough numbers to make it a major
issue in the Brigades. As early as February 1937 reports from United
States consular officials in Spain began to ask instructions for dealing
166 COMINTERN ARMY

with American deserters from the Brigades who turned themselves in

to United States consuls for protection and repatriation. 29
The Brigade press also began to attack the problem of desertion
during the spring of 1937. In an article entitled "The Battalion Gets
Cleaned up of Cowards," British political commissar George Aitkin
said that as a result of the recent combat and tours in the lines there
were some grumblers and some attempted desertion. The deserters, he
added, were caught and sentenced to disciplinary labor battalions for
work in the front lines. Le Soldat de Ia Republique warned its readers
against believing a document recently put out by the Nationalists
telling Frenchmen in the Brigades that they would be given safe
passage to France if they came over to the Nationalist lines. The
document also told French Brigade members that if they turned
themselves in at any of the French consulates in Spain they would be
repatriated. Do not believe this, cautioned the Brigade press. It repre-
sents the work of fascist agents and will only get you in serious
trouble. 30
The problem of those in the International Brigades who, for one
reason or another, wished to bid a personal farewell to arms was
complicated by a number offactors. One was that the volunteers never
signed any definite contract as to their length of service in the Bri-
gades, nor did they take any formal oath of allegiance to the Spanish
government. Many assumed that since they volunteered for no partic-
ular period of time that they had the prerogative of leaving when they
so desired. Indeed many of the volunteers had been told very specifi-
cally that their term of service would be three or six months, after
which time they would be free to go or stay as they saw fit. 31
Numerous French and Belgian volunteers, arrested on charges of
desertion, claimed that they had been assured by the Communist
functionaries at the recruitment centers that they would be allowed
to return to their own countries after three-months service in Spain.
When they applied for repatriation, however, they were told that no
such verbal agreement was binding and that they were in for the
duration. 32 So also did various American and British men. On No-
vember 22, 1937, the United States consul in Valencia reported that
a number of Americans from the International Brigades had pre-
sented themselves at the consulate asking for help in getting out of
Spain. They said their contracts with the Brigade had terminated but
that they could not obtain discharges. These men said they had just
come from Albacete where they had witnessed the arrest of some
twenty-five Americans who had left the front and reported to head-
quarters for discharges because their contracts had expired. After a
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 167

fake court-martial the twenty-five had been taken back to the front
under guard and executed. 33
Numerous men also claimed that they had been lured to Spain with
the promise of high-paying jobs. Once in Spanish territory the Brigade
authorities took their passports and informed them that they were in
the army. When the men complained, the answer given was that since
they had no passports they were strictly subject to the Spanish author-
ities and that if they attempted to "desert," they would be shot. An
experience of this type was recounted to the American newspaper
correspondent Edward Knoblaugh by Lawrence Muliers, a Canadian,
and Tim Kennan of Dublin when he met them on board a British
naval vessel. They had succeeded in reaching the British consulate in
Valencia and had been put aboard the ship by the consuP 4 That men
were sometimes recruited under false pretenses was also corroborated
by a twenty-six-year-old American bricklayer from Minneapolis to a
New York Times correspondent in France:

I was born in Coleridge, Neb., where I joined the Communist

party.... Last month I saw an ad in a Minneapolis morning
newspaper for skilled workers for Spain to take the place of men
who had gone to the front. The ad was signed by the Society for
Technical Aid to Spanish Democracy.
"I applied and soon received a ticket to New York. Only
when I reached New York did I begin to suspect that the tools
of my 'trade' were to be a rifle and bayonet. " 35

The problem of desertion grew in intensity as time went on because

of the widespread disillusionment with the Brigades and the war. The
disillusionment stemmed from various causes that were, in some
cases, of a diametrically opposed nature. Some, the type whom party
orthodoxy labeled "left deviationists," became dissatisfied because
they came to feel that the party line in Spain was not "revolutionary"
or "socialist" according to their understanding of the terms. An exam-
ple of this was the case of Henry Scott Beattie who, in a letter to the
editor of the Canadian Forum, voiced the sentiment that the party's
"Spanish policy was nothing less than a betrayal. ... To crush the
mass parties of the Spanish workers and farmers in order that the war
. . . might be made respectable and Spanish capitalism preserved.
Anyone inside or outside our [Communist] Party who was openly
against the protection of private capital was in danger of arrest by our
own secret police." 36 Others became embittered by the contrast be-
tween the democratic revolutionary fraternity of equals which they
168 COMINTERN ARMY

had expected an army run by Communists to be and what the Interna-

tional Brigades were in fact. Indicative of this was an article by a
deserter from the British battalion in which he recounted how the
recruiter at Communist party headquarters in Glasgow, where he had
joined, had presented a picture of an army of brothers who shared all
things equally. This, said the disillusioned Brigade man, was far from
being the case. Rather the difference in living standards between the
Brigade officers and the rank-and-file soldier was immense. It was not
"communistic. " 37
On the other side of the coin were those who became alienated due
to the too blatantly Communist nature of the Brigades. The English
writer and Loyalist supporter Stephen Spender told of the disillusion-
ment of some of the British volunteers who had originally joined the
Brigades because they identified the Republic with liberalism. Once
in the Brigades they had become embittered by the overbearing Com-
munist control. 38
That there was a widespread desire on the part of many of the
Internationals to depart from Spain, either permanently or, as it was
more usually put in official circles, on leave, was too obvious for the
Brigade directorate to deny. Yet the Communist hierarchy of the
International Brigades, quite logically from their point of view, op-
posed any policy that would have allowed the Internationals to leave
the Brigades or Spain. A situation in which troops could simply quit
and go home any time they wanted would be disastrous for discipline
and morale in any military organization. The difficulty of the position
of the Brigade chiefs in the face of a situation in which a goodly
percentage of the troops would have left had they been able was
epitomized by the comment of British political commissar Kerrigan,
when asked to send to a rear echelon post a young British volunteer
who was clearly unfit for combat duty: "It is difficult to withdraw one
man without discouraging the rest," he said. 39
The obvious impracticality of a policy of allowing men simply to
leave whenever it suited them could certainly have been replaced by
a policy of specified enlistment periods. The Communists, however,
had reasons for opposing any policy of allowing men to leave the
Brigades and Spain on any conditions, except in those cases where the
party itself and for its own purposes reassigned men from the Brigades
to party functions elsewhere. One reason was the impossibility of
replacing the men who would leave ifgiven the opportunity. Indeed,
it was impossible even to replace casualties except with Spanish re-
cruits. 40 The Communists wanted the Brigades to retain their interna-
tional character to the greatest extent possible; only in that way would
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 169

the Brigades remain a stronghold of Comintern military and political

power in Spain and would the propaganda value of the Brigades as
the most vivid example of the international and Popular Front nature
of the Spanish war be maintained. Alvah Bessie, a devout Communist
himself and a late volunteer to the Brigades, said as much in his book
on his experiences in Spain, Men in Battle. Writing of the disastrous
demoralization of the American battalion and the small number of
Americans who were still among its effectives after the Aragon retreat
in 1938, he said: "But for the benefit of the folks back home the
Lincoln Battalion was always intact, and the constant figure of thirty-
two hundred Americans were fighting in Spain. We understood why
this was necessary, but it did not prevent us from becoming cyni-
cal."41 Another reason why the Brigade directorate objected to the
repatriation of men was the fear, quite justifiable under the circum-
stances, that a certain number of them would make public some of the
more unsavory aspects of Communist operations in Spain. That
would have further curtailed the value of the Brigades as a propa-
ganda vehicle and would also have damaged the image of respectabil-
ity that the Communists were trying to maintain in the western
nations. 42
On the question of granting leaves outside Spain, the Brigade direc-
torate saw the same objections. Quite realistically they recognized that
once safely out of Spain, few men would ever return. Longo claimed
that the Brigade commissariat wanted to allow Brigade men to go on
leaves outside Spain in the period after the Jarama battle but that the
Spanish government refused. 43 That was extremely doubtful for sev-
eral reasons, the most obvious being that men were moved in and out
of Spain freely whenever it suited the Communists to do so. Second,
it was highly unlikely that Largo Caballero, Prieto, or the Spanish
military staff, none of whom had any great love of the Internationals
anyway, would have stood in the way of allowing them to leave.
Third, even if the Spaniards had objected, the Comintern certainly
had sufficient political leverage to accomplish it had they so desired.
The facts were quite the opposite. As numerous statements and
examples showed, it was the Brigade commissariat which adamantly
opposed allowing men to leave and which, through the Communist
apparatus in Spain, made certain no such policy would be adopted. 44
The attitude of the Brigade directorate toward this matter was clearly
shown by their position on the contention of Pacciardi and numerous
of the Italian volunteers who were affected by the original contract
drawn up by the Italian committee in Paris. That document specifi-
cally mentioned six months service. The Communist chiefs took the
170 CoMINTERN ARMY

attitude, however, that the contract was no longer pertinent to the

case; that when the Italian unit became part of the International
Brigades it became subject solely to Brigade authority. Thus, they
held, the contractual document had no further validity.
That it was the Brigade directorate and not the Loyalist govern-
ment which insisted on service for the duration was specifically stated
to an American volunteer who had been told that he was signing up
for six months. When he was not allowed to leave at the end of that
period he went directly to the Spanish Ministry of Defense. In answer
to his question as to whether it was true that the Loyalist government
required the Internationals to remain in Spain, the answer was: "No,
that is entirely up to the Brigade command." He, along with a number
of other Americans who were attempting to leave Spain, was subse-
quently arrested in Barcelona and taken to the front under armed
guard. The XIV Brigade officer Gillain claimed that following the
battle of Brunete the Spanish authorities proposed to allow a certain
percentage of the troops in the Brigades to go on leave outside Spain
but that the Brigade directorate at Albacete successfully foiled the
move. The anger of the troops, who heard of the government's plan,
was responsible for even more numerous attempts at desertions. 45
The actual attitude of the Spanish authorities on this question
seemed to be ambiguous and vacillating. In March 1937 the United
States consul in Valencia reported to the State Department that six
American Brigade men were at the consulate asking for protection
and repatriation. He said that one of these men had been turned in
by the Spanish authorities themselves. He also reported that the
French consul had told him that he, the French consul, had evacuated
400 French deserters aboard a French naval vessel with the acqui-
escence of the Spanish authorities. He added, however, that the Span-
ish government had since changed its attitude. The United States
secretary of state directed the consul to inquire officially as to the
attitude of the Spanish authorities toward evacuating American de-
serters on United States warships. On March 19 the consul at Va-
lencia informed the State Department that the attitude of the Spanish
authorities had been to allow foreigners, who so desired, to leave the
country; but, as of March 3, that had changed, and since that date the
policy was to treat them as deserters. According to the French consul,
he continued, many arrests were being made among Frenchmen who
were attempting to leave the International Brigades and Spain. The
United States consul reported on March 16, however, that if he had
authorization to put American deserters on United States warships he
could probably obtain approval from the Spanish authorities. Later,
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 171

in July 1937, the United States consul at Barcelona reported that a

group of American deserters from the International Brigades had
been arrested while trying to make their way to the frontier. Most of
them said their passports had been taken from them at Albacete. The
Spanish authorities, he continued, were willing to tum the men over
to the United States consulate for evacuation before formal charges
were brought against them. 46
If the attitude of the Spanish government was ambiguous, that of
the Brigade commissariat was clear enough. In June 1937 Auguste
Lecouer, at that time political commissar in the XIII Brigade, re-
ceived orders to report to Marty at Albacete. Marty told Lecouer that
he had a particularly delicate job for him. There was a veritable
underground railway in operation for smuggling French deserters
from the Brigade out of Spain. The focal point of the network was the
French consulate in Valencia where the deserters could secure food
and protection before leaving the country. Marty ordered Lecouer to
uncover the channels through which the men got to the consulate by
posing as a deserter himself. Once inside he was to index the names
of all whom he saw. Lecouer succeeded in doing this and, once inside,
attempted to talk the deserters into returning to the Brigades. They
said that if they returned they would be put in prison or shot. Lecouer
promised them that if they would return they would not be punished
but that if they did not their names would be sent to the leftist political
organizations in France and they would be labeled deserters there. His
promise of no punishment was backed up by the word of Prosper
Moquet, a Communist member of the French Chamber of Deputies
who happened to be in Valencia at the time. Most of the deserters
decided to accept the opportunity to return to duty rather than face
ostracism at home. The French consulate in Valencia continued to
offer protection and repatriation to those Brigade men (at least the
French and Belgian ones) who turned themselves in. The Belgian
officer Gillain, fearing for his life, found refuge there and was eventu-
ally gotten out of Spain on a French naval vessel in 1938. 47
Even those men who made good their escape from the Brigades and
Spain were not free from the wrath of the Communists. Frenchmen
who deserted were the object of slanderous stories spread among the
leftist element of the population in their homeland. The mere threat
of that had been enough to dissuade one group of Frenchmen, who
were as good as free, from proceeding to France. If anyone had the
nerve to denounce publicly the Communist role in Spain or the Bri-
gade leadership once out of Spain, he was subjected to public humilia-
tion by the posting of leaflets in his home area on which his name was
172 COMINTERN ARMY

prominently displayed along with the most violent denunciations and

accusations. 48 Some were hounded by party thugs and beaten up. 49
The party also persecuted men it considered deserters by using its
influence in various labor unions to pressure employers into refusing
to hire them. The party did that not only with men who had actually
deserted from the Brigades in Spain but to some who deserted from
the party upon their return home. 50
Most of the victims of the harsh disciplinary and political police
regime of the Brigades simply vanished with no record of their fate.
There were, after all, numerous ways of getting rid of dissident ele-
ments and troublemakers. One of the easiest and least provable was
to send men who had been arrested or otherwise designated to the
front lines and keep them there. For especially difficult cases there was
always the possibility of a bullet in the back and a "killed in action"
explanation. Haldane had reason to suspect that such a fate had
befallen the British commissar Wally Tapsall, who had constant dis-
agreements with the Brigade commissariat's policies. He was, said
she, "killed in obscure circumstances." She gathered also that this
same method of doing away with troublesome elements in the Bri-
gades befell an American Communist who had originally been as-
signed to recruitment work in France. After being sent to Spain he
apparently had difficulties with the Brigade leadership and was or-
dered to the front, not with the American battalion but with a Spanish
unit. He was soon reported "killed in action." When Haldane tried
to find out the facts of his death from British commissar Rust, he told
her, "He was sold down the river by his own Party." 51
While many men simply disappeared in mysterious and unrecorded
ways in Spain there were some who, through the knowledge and
testimony of others, were remembered. One of these was Hans
Krause. The German Communist Jan Valtin received word that
Krause, an old friend and Communist party colleague, had been
arrested by the Cheka in Spain. Krause, a veteran of the Profintern,
had conducted arms shipments from Marseilles to Valencia and then
volunteered for the International Brigades. While he was in the hospi-
tal recuperating from wounds received in action Cheka agents seized
him and put him in prison. The accusation was the usual one of
Trotskyism and espionage. The charge, said Valtin, was absurd.
Krause's wife, in Antwerp, showed Valtin a letter from Krause which
had been smuggled out of jail, "a bitter heart-breaking letter." 52
Another case of a German International Brigade man's being killed
by the Communists in Spain was that of Mark Rein. Rein's disappear-
ance from a Barcelona hotel room was inquired into by his friend and
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 173

fellow Socialist Willy Brandt, who, a political exile himself, was in

Spain as a correspondent for a Scandinavian newspaper. Brandt pur-
sued his investigation of Rein's fate into the very top echelons of the
German Communist party in Spain but was unable to get any satisfac-
tory explanation of what had happened to his friend. Brandt found
out later that Rein had been arrested, imprisoned, and eventually
liquidated by the Cheka. Typical also of the type of politically moti-
vated terror that permeated the Communist apparatus in Spain con-
cerned the German Socialist Kurt Landau. While not specifically a
Brigade affair, the individuals involved in Landau's murder were
intimately associated with the Brigades and the techniques and ratio-
nalizations for his liquidation were essentially the same as those deal-
ing with the Brigade men. Landau was arrested and murdered by
German Cheka operatives in Barcelona. This was done at the orders
of Walter Ulbricht and Andre Marty. 5 3
While the political terror in the Brigades undoubtedly bore down
most heavily on the Germans and East Europeans, there were a
number of Americans, English, and French among its victims. One
of them was Paul White. White, a Communist party member, was
shot "presumably for political dissidence" since he "had not commit-
ted any offense ... that deserved punishment by death on military
grounds." Another case was that of Albert Wallach. Arrested and put
in the International Brigade prison at Castel de Fells, Wallach was
later summarily shot on suspicion of being a spy. 54 A fellow American
volunteer, while himself imprisoned at Castel de Fells, shared a cell
with Wallach. He said that Wallach was taken out one night and was
never seen again. While in Barcelona, he had left the International
Brigade and taken a commission in a CNT unit. While at the CNT
offices in Barcelona he was arrested by Cheka agents. Wallach's chief
accuser and interrogator was Tony DeMaio, an American who oper-
ated as a Cheka agent in the International Brigades. 55 Marvin Stem,
a party member who made the mistake of expressing open criticism
of the Brigade leadership also fell victim to the fatal charge of political
dissidence. He was arrested, assigned to a penal battalion, and subse-
quently disappeared. Later, when an American party delegation was
touring Spain, an American Brigade man, a friend of Stem's, asked
one of the party delegation about what had become of Stem. The
answer he received was: "Party discipline is higher than all friendship,
and if I were you, I would not discuss this matter any further." 56
A similar occurrence took place in regard to the disappearance of
the American volunteer Harry Perchuk. When a friend inquired
about Perchuk from the political commissar of the XV Brigade John
174 COMINTERN ARMY

Gates, he was told that Perchuk had been executed for criticizing the
party. Asked how he could have been involved in such a thing when
he knew him well, Gates replied: "You have to be a Bolshevik, and
a Bolshevik would take care of his own mother. You have to introduce
discipline. " 57
The use of terror as an instrument of discipline became even more
pronounced as the war continued with disasters and defeats for Loyal-
ist forces. Gillain referred to the mass executions of Brigade men
during the fighting at Cuesta de la Reina in the fall of 1937 and, of
the retreat in Aragon in 1938, Sandor Voros wrote: "The Kremlin
leaders ... base their main reliance on terror. Officers and men are
ruthlessly executed on their orders. The toll is particularly high
among the Poles, Slavs, Germans and Hungarians, especially those
who came to Spain from Moscow. These are summary executions,
carried out in most cases secretly by the S.I.M." 58
Andre Marty was himself a particularly virulent example of the
general paranoia that affiicted the Comintern hierarchy in those years.
"To Marty," wrote one of the French party men who worked directly
for him on occasion in Spain, "the enemy was more inside the Interna-
tional Brigades and Loyalist territory than on the other side of the
lines." Gustav Regier, appointed political commissar in the XII Bri-
gade in November 1936 by Marty, wrote that Marty emphasized
pointedly to him that Regier had full powers to deal with any difficul-
ties. Later, in the aftermath of the bloody battle of Jarama, the rem-
nants of the Franco-Belgian battalion of the XII Brigade were
overindulging themselves on the wine found in a deserted cellar.
Hearing of it through his spies, Marty ordered Regier to tie the men
to trees to sweat it out in the sun and to "shoot a few in the presence
of the others" if he had any trouble. Regier's final experience with
Marty took place near the end of the war as the remnants of the
International Brigades were crossing the French frontier just ahead
of the advancing Nationalist forces. Marty and a number of his hard-
core followers were attempting to liquidate a group of German Inter-
nationals before they could leave Spain and possibly reveal the things
they knew of him and his activities in Spain to the bourgeois press.
International Brigade men who were caught attempting, or openly
threatening, to communicate any of the unsavory facts, especially of
Cheka operations and the killing of Brigade men by the Cheka, were
invariably shot. 59
Marty's obsession with spies, Trotskyists, and a wide assortment of
other dissident elements whose offenses ranged from criticism of the
party or the Brigade directorate to desertion from the Brigades or
Dissidence, Desertion, & the Terror 175

merely routine breaches of discipline and his penchant for dealing

with all problems by simply having the offenders shot became a scan-
dal even among many Communists. In fact, his reputation as "Le
Boucher d' Albacete" became so well known that the French party
recalled Marty from Spain to explain his actions. In his report to the
party, Marty freely admitted to the execution of some 500 from the
ranks of the International Brigades. "These bandits," he said, "have
committed all sorts of crimes: rape, robberies, murders, kidnappings
of persons, and not satisfied with this, they have rebelled against the
authorities of Valencia and undertaken espionage in favor of Franco
... they even killed the guards of the concentration camps where it
became necessary to imprison them." 60 The Comintern, and thus all
"good" Communists, however, continued to support Marty as a pro-
letarian hero. He remained not only in high esteem and position in
the French party but continued to be looked upon as the grand master
of the veterans of the International Brigades organization. 61
An interesting sequel to the "Boucher d' Albacete" affair was the
furor raised in Communist circles by the unkind treatment dealt out
to Marty by Ernest Hemingway in his For Whom the Bell Tolls.
Hemingway was completely pro-Loyalist in sympathy and had been
practically an honorary member of the Brigades among whose mem-
bers he had many friends. He had allowed himself to be used, will-
ingly, by the Communists to further their own causes and to add
lustre to their image. They were totally chagrined, however, at He-
mingway's brutally truthful account of some of the more unsavory
aspects of the Spanish imbroglio and, most especially, at his stinging
characterization of Marty. Calling Marty by name and identifying
him as the "chief commissar of the International Brigades," Heming-
way discussed Marty at length. "He is crazy as a bedbug. He has a
mania for shooting people ... that old one kills more than the bubonic
plague ... but he doesn't kill fascists as we do ... not in a joke ...
he kills rare things, Trotskyites, Divagationers [sic]. Any rare type of
beasts.... He purifies more than Solvarson." 62
As a result of that characterization, which was all quite accurate,
Alvah Bessie, an American Communist who joined the Brigade in
1938 and who was on the editorial board of the party publication New
Masses in 1939, wrote a review in that journal attacking Hemingway
and the book. The Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade orga-
nization then adopted a resolution condemning Hemingway's book,
and the Communist party in the United States and its affiliated
organizations launched a concerted attack on Hemingway and his
novel. 63
176 CoMINTERN ARMY

The final act ofthe farce was played out in 1952 when the Veterans
of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade published an anthology called The
Heart ofSpain, which included the works of a large number of people
who had written from a pro-Loyalist point of view about the war. The
editors scheduled several selections from Hemingway's works to be
included. News of that intention raised a furor from the French
Communist party and the French Brigade veterans organization. A
number of letters passed back and forth between the American and
French groups, and the veterans organizations in other countries
entered the fray on the side of Marty. As a result, The Heart ofSpain
included no Hemingway selections. 64 The work of several other au-
thors who had subsequently either left the party or adopted an openly
anti-Communist position were also excluded. Among them were An-
dre Malreaux, Gustav Regler, Arthur Koestler, and Tom Wintring-
ham.
Marty, however, was but the instrument, though indeed a particu-
larly crude one, of the policy of his masters in the Comintem hierar-
chy and in Moscow. The hypersuspiciousness, narrow sectarianism,
and totalitarian mentality that he epitomized only reflected the system
of which he was a part.
 Conclusion
On September 21, 1938, Prime Minister Negrin announced
in a speech to the League of Nations that his government had decided
upon the complete withdrawal of all non-Spanish combatants from its
armed forces. He asked that the League create a commission to over-
see the demobilization and repatriation process.
The League complied with Negrin's request and its commission
arrived in Spain on October 14. This signaled the official demise of the
International Brigades as participants in the Spanish Civil War and
their passing into history. But their historical image has been a partic-
ularly fuzzy one. This has been true, in part, because of the nature of
the sources and, in part, because of the continuing emotional and
ideological associations of the Spanish Civil War.
The greatly oversimplified view of that war as a clear-cut struggle
between "democracy" and "fascism" has exhibited amazing staying
power despite the work of many historians pointing out the complexi-
ties of that struggle. The widespread sympathy for the Loyalist side
and the identification of that side with "democracy" have made it
difficult for many to accept or acknowledge the key role played by the
Comintern in the Loyalist regime. These same emotional attachments
have made it difficult for many to accept a sharp focus on the Interna-
tional Brigades as a Comintern-controlled military and political en-
tity. And yet that is what the record shows.
Certainly there were non-Communists in the Brigades. Certainly
there were many who joined the Brigades to fight for "democracy"
or against "fascism." Neither of these truisms alters the fact that the
Brigades were, from beginning to end, a Comintern army.
The Brigades would never have existed but for the Soviet-Comin-
tern decision to call them into being. That this was done resulted from
both the general Popular Front strategy of the period and the specific
Soviet decision to sponsor, through the apparatus of the Comintern,
an international army for use in Spain. Some non-Spanish volunteers
did fight with Spanish militia units before the organization of the
International Brigades, but they never numbered more than a few
hundred. Only with the decision of the Comintern to raise an army
to fight in Spain did the number of foreigners become significant. And
only through the use of the existing Comintern organization and the
178 CONCLUSION

strenuous efforts of its various branches were these men recruited and
transported into Spain.
While the Comintern apparatus provided the machinery through
which the Brigades were recruited and transported into Spain, Com-
intern functionaries provided direction and control. Working in con-
junction with the Soviet-Comintern apparatus in Spain, including the
Spanish Communist party, they obtained the necessary cooperation
from the Loyalist government authorities to quarter, equip, and train
the incoming recruits. And, in conjunction with the same elements,
the Brigades entered the battles for Madrid.
Militarily the Brigades were considered to be crack units and were
often referred to as "shock troops." Certainly they deserved such
esteem, at least by the standards of the Spanish Civil War. The Bri-
gades played a crucial role in all the battles for Madrid in the winter
of 1936-1937. While unprovable, it seems clear that the Internationals
made the difference between survival and defeat for the Loyalist side
during the defense ofthe capital from November 1936 through Janu-
ary 1937 and, perhaps even more decisively, during the Jarama
fighting in February 1937.
The military efficiency of the Internationals resulted from several
factors. A great many of the men in the Brigades had had previous
military training and even combat experience. Also, the Brigades were
strictly disciplined units. The Communist military and political hier-
archy of the Brigades emphasized, in conformance with general party
policy, the absolute necessity of firm and unquestioning discipline.
Military discipline was heavily reinforced by the strict political disci-
pline demanded of all Communist party members.
The Brigades' efficiency could also be accounted for, in part, by the
nature of their military command. They had the advantage of being
commanded, for the most part, by professional officers rather than
amateurs. Kleber, Walter, Gall, and Lukacs were Red army officers
with long training and experience. Kahle, Renn, and Pacciardi also
had significant military experience as did numerous other Brigade
officers. Further, the Internationals operated from the beginning un-
der the tutelage of professional Soviet advisers attached to each Bri-
gade. Finally, the Brigades received the best of the weapons and
equipment available within Loyalist Spain.
But far more important than the stress on military discipline was
the political discipline imposed on the Brigades by the Comintern
stalwarts who dominated them. While the Brigades operated
militarily within the organizational structure of the People's Army
(once that army had been created), they remained throughout their
Conclusion 179

sojourn in Spain an essentially autonomous organization so far as

their internal affairs were concerned. Military and political commissar
appointments were filled at the discretion of the Brigades' Political
Commissariat and all matters of internal discipline and control came
under that same authority. Party cadres from various countries were
moved in and out of the Brigades freely at the volition of the Commis-
sariat (which was itself staffed entirely by individuals sent by and
representing the various Communist parties). Thus, from beginning
to end, the Brigades' command structure, both military and political,
was overwhelmingly Communist and the Political Commissariat, the
highest authority within the Brigades, was made up completely of
seasoned and disciplined party cadres.
The Political Commissariat maintained its control over the Bri-
gades chiefly through a political commissar system. The political
commissar structure existed at all levels of command throughout the
Brigades. It was staffed almost exclusively with seasoned and reliable
party cadres and exercised ultimate authority (in the name of the
Commissariat) within the Brigades. The political commissars were
chiefly responsible for the maintainence of both military and political
discipline within the Brigades as well as morale and political indoctri-
nation of the troops. The Brigade Commissariat also controlled the
press, the police, the hospitals, the prisons, and the officer and com-
missar training schools of the Brigades. Thus the Brigades were, for
all practical purposes, an autonomous Comintern army.
After the Jarama and Guadalajara campaign in February-March
1937, the military significance of the Brigades began to wane as the
Loyalists built a mass People's Army. But despite their relative de-
cline in military significance, the Brigades continued to be a highly
important component in the Comintern's overall operations regarding
the Spanish Civil War and the Popular Front strategy in general. This
was true especially in the propaganda sphere. The Brigades were held
up as the most concrete and heroic example of the Popular Front and
antifascism in action. Nothing served better than the Brigades in
keeping alive the interest and sympathy of large segments of the
population in many countries of the world. The Brigades were also
seen by the Comintern as a highly significant school for party cadres,
a school in which important lessons for future struggles would be
learned and from which steel-hardened party leaders would be
created.
The Comintern proved determined to maintain the Brigades as an
essentially autonomous organization (and thereby to maintain them
as a Comintern-controlled force) even after the growth of the People's
180 CONCLUSION

Army had reduced the military significance of the Brigades. They did
so in the face of attempts on the part of the Loyalist authorities to
incorporate and assimilate the Brigades into their army in a meaning-
ful way. The Comintem's success in this meant that the International
Brigades remained to the end what they had been from the beginning,
an integral part of the Comintem's interlocking directorate in Spain.
 Notes
CHAPTER 1
1. The junta in command of the pronunciamiento included the generals
Sanjuro, Mola, Cabanellas, Goded, and Franco.
2. The dilemma and the weakness of the left republicans are summarized succinctly
by R.A.H. Robinson, The Origins ofFranco's Spain (Pittsburgh, 1970), 264-65, thus:
"lacking masses, they were doomed to be prisoners either of the Socialists or of the
Right." The weakness of the left republicans in mass support was clear from the
electoral results of February 1936. The final count showed a very close split between
the left (Popular Front) coalition and the right. H we take into account both the fact
that the real mass base of the left was the Socialist party and that the left also received
votes from other proletarian sources, it is clear that the left republican parties, as such,
were lacking in mass voter appeal. The ex-Communist Enrique Castro Delgado, Hom-
bres Made en Mosr:U (Barcelona, 1964), 148-49, says the weakness of the Spanish
Republic was the lack of republicans in Spain. But Salvador de Madariaga, Spain: A
Modern History (New York, 1958), has it more nearly right in saying that the Spaniards
destroyed the Republic by being unable to agree on what kind it should be. If all factions
from Azaiia's Republican Left to Gil Robles's CEDA had been able to work within
the same framework, the Republic would have been safe. But the republicans split,
polarizing Spanish politics into irreconcilable opposites and opening the way for the
antirepublicans on both ends of the spectrum to move in and destroy the Republic.
3. Speech by Largo Caballero printed in El Socia/ista. January 1936, as quoted in
Robinson, Franco's Spain. 246.
4. Alvarez del Vayo in the Madrid daily, ABC, January 1936, as quoted in Robin-
son, Franco's Spain, 246; Araquistain quoted in Stanley G. Payne, The Spanish Revolu-
tion (New York, 1970), 193-94.
5. Robinson, Franco's Spain. 261.
6. This was a notorious fact that was freely admitted by both left and right (al-
though each blamed the other). The only source I can locate which emphatically denies
this was the United States ambassador to Spain, Claude Bowers, My Mission to Spain
(New York, 1954). He was an ardent devotee of the Republic. For details on the
breakdown of public order, see Payne, Revolution, 206-17; Robinson, Franco's Spain,
258-60.
7. El Socialista. May 2, 1936, as quoted in Robinson, Franco's Spain, 260.
8. Ibid., 273.
9. Julio Alvarez del Vayo, Freedom's Battle (New York, 1940), 261. The army and
police actually divided fairly evenly between the two sides at the beginning of the
conflict, but the Loyalist regime, caught up in revolution on the left, proved incapable
of effectively using this potential source of strength. Payne, Revolution. 316.
10. Pietro Nenni, La Guerre d'Espagne (Paris, 1960), 43-48.
11. Payne, Revolution. 218-21.
12. Manuel Azaiia, La Velada en Benicarlo (Buenos Aires, 1939), 96.
182 NoTES To PAGES 5-10

13. There were several reasons why the revolutionary parties saw it in their interest
to maintain the fiction of the Republican regime. It lent a facade of legitimacy and
respectability to their cause outside Spain. They could, and did, claim to be defending
the legitimate, elected, and democratic government of the country. Thus the govern-
ment was recognized diplomatically and would presumably be able to elicit support
internationally. In an article in Nuovo Avonti of December 19, 1936, Pietro Nenni
frankly explained to his followers that the real reason for the continuation of the
"republican element" in the Popular Front government was as a sop to public opinion
outside Spain. Also, it suited the policy of the Comintem at the time to play down the
revolution in Spain and to cast the struggle there in terms of "defense of the Republic"
and "antifascism." The fiction of the Republic was maintained by the Popular Front
throughout the war even though from September 1936 on the government was com-
pletely dominated by the proletarian parties.
14. "During the three months that I was director of propaganda for the United
States and England under Alvarez del Vayo," wrote Liston Oak, "I was instructed not
to send out one word about this revolution ... nor are any foreign correspondents
permitted to write freely of the revolution that has taken place." As quoted in Burnett
Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage (New York, 1961), 121.
15. Franz Borkenau, The Spanish Cockpit (London, 1937), 69; George Orwell,
Homage to Catalonia (New York, 1952), 4-6.
16. Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, Journey to the Frontier (New York,
1966), 316.
17. Louis Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941), 352-62; Arturo Barea, The
Forging of a Rebel (New York, 1946), 536-37.
18. Georgi Dimitroff, ''The Peoples Front of Struggle against Fascism and War,"
Communist International 13, no. 11 (December 1936): 717-34
19. This was from a Litvinov speech to the League of Nations. It was reprinted from
Pravda and published in the Boletin de Informaci6n de las Brigadas Internacionales.
no. 269 (October 3, 1937).
20. Arthur Koestler, The God That Failed, ed. Richard Crossman (New York,
1950), 29.
21. Castro Delgado, Hombres, 191-92
22. Koestler, God That Failed, 55; Douglas Hyde, I Believed (London, 1952), 59;
Earl Browder, Next Steps to Win the War in Spain (New York, 1938), 3; Arthur
Koestler, Invisible Writing (London, 1960), 257.
23. Stansky and Abrahams, Journey, 229.
24. Kermit McKenzie, The Comintern and World Revolution (New York, 1964);
Castro Delgado, Hombres, 221; Hyde, I Believed
25. Georgi Dimitroff, ''The United Front of the Struggle for Peace," Communist
Internationa/13, no. 5 (May 1936): 290-93; Carola Stem, Ulbricht: A Political Biogra-
phy (New York, 1964), 70.
26. Jose Dlaz, Communist International 13, no. 6 (June 1936): 406 (from a speech
made in February 1936); Stem, Ulbricht, 66-61.
27. Koestler, God That Failed, 56.
28. Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge, Mass., 1948), 613-
14.
Notes to Pages 10-12 183

29. John Gates, The Story of an American Communist (New York, 1958), 37-39;
Louis Budenz, Men without Faces: The Communist Conspiracy in the U.S.A. (New
York, 1948), 32-34; Hyde, I Believed, 61.
30. Harold Lavine, Fifth Column in America (New York, 1940), 235; Lewis Coser
and Irving Howe, The American Communist Party (New York, 1962), 324.
31. Earl Browder, Lenin and Spain (New York, 1937), 7 (pamphlet containing a
speech by Browder in Madison Square Garden in January 1937); Robert Coulondre,
De Sta/ine aHitler: Souvenirs de Deux Ambassades, 1936-1939 (Paris, 1950), 39-40, as
quoted in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, The Diplompts (New York, 1965), 2:559.
32. Concern over the loss of Soviet-Communist infiuence over the "world revolu-
tionary movement" was expressed by a Soviet leader to the United States ambassador
to Moscow in early August 1936. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States, Diplomatic Papers, 1938 (Washington, D.C. 1955), 2:461.
33. This was done, for example, in the post Popular Front period after the Nazi-
Soviet pact of 1939 when the European war was written off as an "imperialist war" in
which the workers (i.e., the Soviet Union) had no interests. This changed with the
German attack on the USSR, when the war suddenly became a struggle between
"democracy" and "fascism."
34. Jef Last, The Spanish Tragedy (London, 1937), 25. Last, a Dutch Communist
writer, was attending a conference in Moscow in July 1936. At the various official and
social functions he "noted with much indignation a complete lack of interest in events
in Spain. They were not discussed at any gathering and ... personal opinions seemed
to be anxiously avoided." In late August, when the official blessing for Popular Front
Spain was given by Stalin, widescale enthusiasm suddenly became noticeable.
35. The nonintervention agreement was an attempt by the British and French to
isolate the Spanish war. The agreement was officially adhered to by most European
governments but was systematically violated by Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union.
See David T. Cattell, Soviet Diplomacy and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley, 1957),
30-45.
36. International Press Correspondence 16, no. 35 (August 1936): 927-30.
37. Hugh Thomas, TheSponish Civil War (New York, 1961), 214n. 4. Thomas says
the Prague meeting has been confirmed by Albert Vassar, a German who was then a
Comintern representative with the French Communist party. At any rate it is not at
all improbable that such meetings took place, based on the actions of the Comintern.
38. International Press Correspondence 16, no. 5 (August 1936): 929-31.
39. Franz Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 446; Interna-
tional Press Correspondence 16, no. 35 (August 1936): 930; Harry Gaines, How the
Soviet Union Helps Spain (New York, 1936), 30-45.
40. International Press Correspondence 16, no. 37 (August 1936): 18-19.
41. Philip Toynbee, Friends Apart (London, 1954), 87. Toynbee, then a student at
Oxford anrl a Communist, received party orders to "proliferate Spanish Defense Com-
mittees throughout the university."
42. As an indication of the number of organizations that sprang from the Spanish
conflict, see U. S., Congress, House, Guide to Subversive Organizations and Publications,
Document No. 398 (Washington, D.C., 1961). This publication lists some fifteen orga-
nizations devoted to the cause of Popular Front Spain. See also Cecil Eby, Between the
184 NOTES TO PAGES 12-14

Bullet and the Lie (New York, 1969), 4 n. 3, for a list of sponsors to the North
American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy (a front organization).
43. Koestler, Invisible Writing. 209-10; Gustav Regier, The Owl of Minerva (New
York, 1960), 162, 171, 173.
44. Even before the outbreak of the civil war numerous Comintem figures had been
assigned to Spain. The most important of them was Vittorio Codovila, who went by
the name "Medina" in Spain and spoke Spanish with a strong South American accent.
He was the chiefComintem representative to the Spanish Communist party in 1935-
1936 and, as such, exercised ultimate power within its ranks. He played a major role
in accomplishing the party's Popular Front policy of fusion of the Socialist and Com-
munist youth organizations in Spain prior to the outbreak of the war. Of Italian birth,
Codovila had lived in Argentina since 1911 and was a high functionary in the Commu-
nist party of Argentina before being assigned to Spain by the Comintem. He was to
remain a powerful figure behind the scenes throughout the Spanish war. Other impor-
tant Comintem agents operating in Spain prior to the outbreak of the war were the Pole
Stepanov, who served as Comintem adviser to the politburo of the Spanish Communist
party during the war, and the Hungarian Emo Geroe who was the behind-the-scenes
director of the newly unified Socialist-Communist party of Catalonia. See Castro Del-
gado, Hombres, 331; Enrique Lister, Nuestro Guerra (Paris, 1966), 24.
45. Marty Archives (Harvard University). Marty says that Togliatti and Geroe were
the top Comintem representatives in Spain. M. Einaudi, Communism in Western
Europe (Ithaca, N.Y., 1951).
46. Ilya Ehrenberg, Eve of War, 1933-1941 (London, 1963), 146-47, 152; Louis
Fischer, Politics, 361-62,395, 398; Walter G. Krivitsky, InStalin'sSecretService (New
York, 1939), 114-18.
47. Ehrenberg, Eve of War, 124; Robert Colodny, The Struggle for Madrid 1936-
1937 (New York, 1958), states that during crucial periods of the battle of Madrid,
Koltsov maintained direct telephone contact with Moscow. Regier, Owl of Minerva,
276, also indicates that Koltsov was much more than merely the Pravda correspondent
in Spain.
48. Louis Fischer, Politics, 361; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 100-101; Alexander Or-
lov, The Secret History of Stalin's Crimes (New York, 1953). According to Orlov
himself he was assigned to Spain by the politburo on August 26, 1936, and left the
USSR en route to Spain on September 9, 1936. This is from Orlov's written reply to
questions submitted to him by Stanley G. Payne in 1956 (hereafter cited as Orlov
Memo).
49. Krivitsky, Secret Service, 99-108.
SO. Payne, Revolution, 234-35.
51. Communist /ntemationa/13, no. 10 (December 1936):632-38. ''The Decision of
the Presidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International on the
Communist Party of Spain," ibid., 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 865; and for a general
exposition and defense of the Popular Front policy, Georgi Dimitroff, Spain and
the Peoples Front (New York, 1937); and Andre Marty, Heroic Spain (New York,
1937).
52. For example, Bertram Wolfe, Civil War in Spain (New York, 1937); Liston Oak,
"Alert," New Leoder (March 15, 1937).
Notes to Pages 14-19 1gs

53. Louis Fischer, Politics, 361; Colodny, Struggle, 61. Most historians seem to
agree that Thorez made this trip although there is apparently no hard documentry
evidence.
54. Gustav Regier, Owl of Minerva, 176, states that Koltsov showed him a coded
telegram from Moscow which stated that the decision had been made for the formation
of an international military unit.

CHAPTER2

1. Lister, Guerra, 22-21.

2. Payne, Revolution, 204-5 n. 16.
3. Robinson, Franco's Spain, 254.
4. JesUs Herruindez, "The Development of the Democratic Revolution in Spain,"
Communist International 13, nos. 7-8 (August 1936): 437.
5. The United States consul in San Sebastian reported shortly after the outbreak
of hostilities that the "proletariat has certainly obtained arms and barricades have been
erected and bridges blown up." Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1936. 2:440-41.
6. Partido Obrero Unificaci6n Marxista was a small but militant "left deviationist"
Marxist party which was more revolutionary in outlook than the orthodox Communist
line of the day.
7. Jose Martin Blasquez, I Helped to Build an Army (London, 1940), 189.
8. Louis Fischer, Politics, 351, reports being told this by Largo Caballero.
9. Orwell, Catalonia, 48-49.
10. Carlo Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, Domani in Italia (Paris, 1938), 17-20.
11. Last, Tragedy, 63; Nenni, Guerre, 186-88.
12. As quoted in Payne, Revolution, 222-23.
13. Borkenau, Cockpit, 86-87.
14. As quoted in Vers Ia Liberte (Journal du battalion Andre Marty: 12e Brigade
Internationa/e), no. 6 (January 30, 1937). On the hypocrisy of the Communist party
of Spain posing as the defender of the Republic, see Castro Delgado, Hombres. Last,
Tragedy, 15, says the Spanish militiamen in his Communist unit referred to the Repub-
lic as "Ia vieja puta."
15. Orwell, Catalonia, 19-20; Borkenau, Cockpit, 101-5; Stansky and Abrahams,
Journey, 321.
16. Orwell, Catalonia, 3-18.
17. In Catalonia and Aragon the Anarchist militia columns, recruited and organized
for the most part in Barcelona, were active in bringing the revolution to the countryside.
In many villages where the local inhabitants had not disposed of the "fascists," the
militia performed the operation for them. The usual procedure was to arrest all those
suspected of reactionary activities, usually including the local priest, lawyer, landown-
ers, and better-off peasants, assemble them in a group, and shoot them. Then the militia
column, having proclaimed the Anarchist ideal of "comunismo libertario" to be in
effect, moved on to the next village. See Borkenau, Cockpit, 98-99, 109-10.
18. E.M. L6pez Muiiiz, La Bata//a de Madrid (Madrid, 1943), 6.
19. Stansky and Abrahams, Journey, 321.
186 NOTES TO PAGES 19-23

20. Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid (Madrid, 1968), 76 n.
61.
21. In addition to the steady loss of territory, the militia's tendency to panic and bolt
also resulted in the loss of significant quantities of arms and materiel. See the "Diario
de Operaciones de la V Bandera," Martinez Bande, Marcha, 56-58 nn. 39-42.
22. Louis Fischer, Politics, 369, gives an eyewitness report on the chaos at the
alcazar.
23. Orwell, Catalonia, 46; Louis Fischer, Politics, 370; Ehrenberg, Eve of War,
126-27.
24. Dolores lbarruri, Gue"a y revoluci6n en Espana. 1936-1939 (Moscow, 1966),
1:307.
25. Lister, Guerra, 64; Castro Delgado, Hombres, 375, 288-90.
26. The Communists in Spain, in addition to building up a paramilitary unit
(MAOC), had actively sought party adherents among the officer corps of the regular
army. They had at least some success in this program. See Martinez Bande, Marcha,
23; Castro Delgado, Hombres, 236; Payne, Revolution, 205; Bolloten, Camouflage, 223
n. 9.
27. Vidali entered the country ostensibly as a delegate of Socorro Rojo. He had
previously worked as a Comintern agent in Argentina and the United States, but he
arrived in Spain directly from Moscow. Castro Delgado, Hombres, 242-62, tells of a
case where Vidali countermanded Vicente Uribe, a member of the politburo of the
Communist party of Spain.
28. Castro Delgado, Hombres, 332, mentions a Frenchman who had been trained
at the Frunze Military Academy in Moscow and a German who was referred to as
"general" and was from the hierarchy of the German party (280-81). There can be no
certainty about this man's identity, but it seems quite likely that it was Wilhelm Zeisser,
who later commanded the XIII International Brigade under the nom de guerre General
Gomez.
29. Lister, Guerra, 62.
30. Ibid, 54, 63-64; lbarruri, Gue"a, 1:296; Castro Delgado, Hombres, 412-13,
333-34. The party line on the necessity of a unified command and regular Peo-
ple's Army was stressed in a party manifesto as early as August 18, 1936. lbarruri,
Guerra, 1:307-8; Communist International 13, no. 10 (November-December 1936):
634.
31. Vers Ia Libert€, no. 6 (January 30, 1937), 1; Castro Delgado, Hombres, 399;
Lister, Guerra, 74-75.
32. Koestler, God That Failed, 55; Jan Valtin, Out of the Night (New York, 1941),
484-88. Koestler, a member of the Communist party of Germany at the time, said that
virtually the entire "red block" of Communist writers and artists with whom he had
lived in Berlin prior to 1933 subsequently assembled on the left bank in Paris. Indeed
the German Communist party continued to operate as a structural unit of the Comin-
tern from headquarters in Paris.
33. Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, 39; Randolfo Pacciardi, II Battag/ione Garibaldi
(Lugano, 1938), 2; Regier, Owl of Minerva, 285.
34. International Press Correspondence 16, no. 35 (August 1936): 954. This official
Comintern organ explained that the Workers Olympiad had been organized in protest
Notes to Pages 24-27 187

against the regular international olympics which were being held in Berlin that year.
It called the Workers Olympiad a "great anti-fascist sports event."
35. Garibaldini in Spagna (Madrid, 1937); Max Wullschleger, ed., Schweizer
Kampfen in Spanien (Zurich, 1939), 78.
36. Last, Tragedy, 53-54; Roselli, Oggi in Spagna, 11-14; Borkenau, Cockpit, 106-
13; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 18.
37. Nenni, Guerre, 261; Communist Internationa/14, nos. 7-8 (August 1937): 1140-
55.
38. Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, 12-13; Orwell, Catalonia, 3; Borkenau, Cockpit, 72-73;
Last, Tragedy, 170; Nenni, Guerre, 143-144.
39. Pat Sloan, ed., John Cornford: A Memoir (London, 1938), 199. Stansky and
Abrahams, Journey, 317-19, olfers a somewhat different explanation of why Cornford
joined the POUM militia.
40. Juventud Comunista (December 17, 1936). This was a POUM organ. The state-
ment was signed by Fritz Sandler.
41. Stansky and Abrahams, Journey, 340-41.
42. L'Amicale des Anciens Volontaires Francais en Espagne Republicaine, L'
Epopee D'Espagne: Brigades Internationa/es, 1936-1939 (Paris, 1956), 61; Wullschle-
ger, Kampfen, 21-25.
43. Spanish Office of Information, The International Brigades (Madrid, 1952), 17.
44. Epopee, 61; Wullschleger, Kampfen, 26.
45. Keith Scott Watson, Single to Spain (London, 1937), 13-24. Watson, an English-
man who traveled across France and into Spain in September 1936, saw groups of men
in France who were marshaled by what appeared to be "NCO's in mufti, to whom all
gave the party salute."
46. Epopee. 43.
47. Spanish Office of Information, 17.
48. Theodor Balk, ed., La Quatorzieme (Madrid, 1937), 216.
49. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 1; Nenni, Guerre, 266.
SO. Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, 39; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, S, 23. Rosselli had previously
refused to afliliate his independent socialist Giustizia e Liberti party with the Italian
version of the Popular Front because he wanted nothing to do with the Communists.
See David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven, 1955), 208.
S 1. The use of the term centuria as a designation for the militia units seems to have
been confined to those under Communist control. The Spanish generally used the word
column. The use of centuria by the Communist units probably came from the standard
Communist terminology for their paramilitary units in various places where they were
called Red Hundreds. For the use of the term Red Hundreds in this context, see Valtin,
Out of the Night, 437.
52. Garibaldini in Spagna,· lbarruri, Guerra, 2: 113.
53. Wullschleger, Kampfen, 25-27.
54. Nenni, Gue"e, 161; Communist International 14, no. 1 (January 1937): 805.
SS. Nenni, Guerre, 161; Wullschleger, Kampfen, 24-34.
56. Communist Internationa/14, no. 1 (January 1937): 803-6; Bo/etfn de Informa-
ci6n, no. 78 (December 1, 1937), in a eulogy of Beimler, said: "Beimler is for us a
symbol of the fight of the revolutionary workers."
188 NOTES TO PAGES 28-30

57. Ludwig Renn, Der Spanische Krieg (Berlin, 1955), 25-40, 66. Gustav Szinda,
Die XI Brigade (Berlin, 1956), 23; Franz Dahlem, "The Military-Political Work of the
Eleventh Brigade," Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 466.
58. Orwell, Catalonia, 75, 130-40.
59. Tom Mann was one of the founders of the Communist party of Great Britain.
Communist International 13, no. 4 (April 1936): 259.
60. Esmond Romilly, Boadilla (London, 1937), 57; Thomas Wintringham, English
Captain (London, 1939), 42-43; Watson, Single to Spain, 30-40.
61. Orwell, Catalonia, 38-39.
62. Reconquista: Journal of the Thirty-fifth Division (October 20, 1938), 10-11;
Vincent Brome, The International Brigades: Spain 1936-1939 (New York, 1966), 75-76,
mentions a Polish General Wroblewski centuria and documents it from Polacy Wojnie
Hiszpanskiej, ed., Michala Brona. The difficulty in pinning down the names of many
of these early units is complicated by the fact that the names were in no way official
or fixed. The various groups simply adopted a name. Sometimes the same group might
have been called two or more di1ferent names by different people. In this same line,
Hugh Thomas, Spanish Civil War, refers to a French Paris centuria (239). It seems in
both these cases the units referred to are the same as the Dombrowsky and Commune
de Paris.
63. Za Mira Svobody (Madrid, 193 7), as quoted in Arthur London, Espaiia, Espaiia
(Prague, 1965), 180-81; Nuestros Espaiioles (Madrid, 1937).
64. Hard statistics do not exist, but in all the accounts by eyewitnesses and partici-
pants the numbers they mention bear out the cited estimates.
65. Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, 251; Orwell, Catalonia, 130-40.
66. Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La intervenci6n comunista en Ia gue"a de Espana
(Madrid, 1965), 38.
67. The decision on whether a given foreign unit would join with the International
Brigades sheds an interesting light on both the internal political situation in Popular
Front Spain and the political nature of the International Brigades. The POUMists were
anathema to the Communists and would not normally be accepted by them into their
units even had the POUMists been willing to join them, which they were not. The
Communists also did not welcome Anarchists, but Pacciardi, who was not a Commu-
nist, wanted Rosselli's unit to come into the Garibaldi battalion of the International
Brigades because they were Italians. Rosselli, who was not an Anarchist and would
perhaps have been acceptable to the Communists, refused to afti.liate himself or his unit
with the International Brigades because he realized it was a Communist-dominated
outfit.
68. Luigi Longo, Le Brigate Internazionali in Spagna (Rome, 1956), 38-39; Andre
Marty, "The International Brigades-Twelve Magnificent Months," International
Press Comspondence 17, no. 45 (October 1937): 1014-15; Un Aiio de las Brigades
Internacionales (Madrid, 1937). There are no official statistics on the International
Brigades, but by putting together various bits of evidence, these figures would seem to
be about right.
69. Longo, Brigate, 69, says they amounted to only some 150 to 200 men. Other
figures for specific units do not di1fer greatly in total.
70. An example of this point of view is found in Colodny, Struggle, 58-59, 61.
Notes to Pages 31-37 189

CHAPTER 3

1. Marty Archives; Longo, Brigate, 30-45; Wullschleger, Kampfen, 20-30.

2. Nick Gillain, Le Mercenaire (Paris, 1938), 9-10; Longo, Brigate, 30; Spanish
Office of Information, 60-61; Charlotte Haldane, Truth Will Out (New York, 1950),
87.
3. Browder, Next Steps, 15; Bill Lawrence, Democracy's Stake in Spain (New
York, 1938), 23; Communist International 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 869; Haldane,
Truth, 89-93, 98; on this see also Louis Budenz, Testimony, United States Subversive
Activities Control Board (SACB), Docket No. 108-53, Herbert Brownell Jr., Attorney
General of the U.S. vs. Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Recommended
Decision (Washington, D.C., 1955), 20-25; William Z. Foster, History of the Commu-
nist Party in the United States (New York, 1952), 371-72; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 112;
Hyde, I Believed, 60-64.
4. William Rust, Britons in Spain: The History of the XV International Brigade
(London, 1939), 5-6. Rust put forth the theory of an organic continuity between the
few foreigners lighting in the militias prior to the formation of the Brigades and the
Brigades themselves.
5. As quoted in the Boletin de Informacion, December 12, 1937.
6. London, Espana, 177.
7. Browder, Next Steps, 3.
8. Lawrence, Democracy's Stake, 22-23; Louis Fischer, Politics, 405; Krivitsky,
Secret Service, 112; Sandor Voros, American Commissar (Philadelphia, 1961); Edward
Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 26.
9. Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 449-50; see also Ma-
nuilsky's Report to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU, March 1939.
10. William J. Ryan, Testimony, U.S., Congress, House, 76th Cong., Un-American
Activities Committee, Hearings, 1939, 11: 6811 (hereafter cited as HUAC, Hearings);
George Alexson, New York Times, May 25, 1937, 1.
11. Reported to the United States Department of State by the American consul in
Valencia in March 1937. U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1937. 496. On the successful recruit-
ment from labor unions, see Eby, Bullet, 5.
12. Louis Fischer, Politics, 379; Haldane, Truth, 87-93; Auguste Lecouer, Le Parti-
san (Paris, 1963), 60-62; Dallin, Espionage, 84.
13. Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 449-50.
14. Haldane, Truth, 93.
15. Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 16.
16. Voros, Commisar, 269; Joseph Storobin, The Life and Death of an American
Hera: Dave Daran (New York, 1938), 28.
17. Gladnick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 23.
18. Haldane, Truth, 100; Rust, Britons in Spain, 12.
19. Krivitsky, Secret Service, 112; Eby, Bullet, 5-1.
20. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 7-11.
21. Nuestras Espaiioles, 9.
22. Michala Brona, ed., Polacy Wojnie Hiszpanskiej, as quoted in Brome, Interna-
tional Brigades, 75-76.
190 NoTES TO PAGES 37-45

23. Haldane, Truth, 100.

24. Peter Elstob, Spanish Prisoner (New York, 1939), 25-31.
25. John Sommerfield, Volunteer in Spain (New York, 1937), 3-5.
26. William Harris, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 27.
27. Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 27.
28. Paul Brown was an alias for the Comintem agent whose real name was Alpi.
He was a powerful figure behind the scenes in the American branch of the Comintem.
Voros, Commissar, 272-74.
29. Herrick, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic Record of Hearings, 2:427. (These
were not published but I was given access to them at the offices of the SACB in
Washington. Since that agency no longer exists, I am told that the records of its
hearings are available on microfilm through the Library of Congress).
30. Gladnick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 23; Morris Maken, Testi-
mony, SACB, Stenographic Record, 2:472.
31. William Ryan, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 1939, 11:6811; William McQuis-
ton, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 1939, 11:6708.
32. Harris, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 27; Horan, Testimony,
SACB, Recommended Decision, 26-27, and Stenographic Record, 4:1169.
33. Rust, Britons in Spain, 9-13; F. Jay Taylor, The United States and the Spanish
Civil War (New York, 1956), 101-2.
34. Maken, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic Record, 2:725; Gates, American Com-
munist, 43; Alvah Bessie, Men in Battle (New York, 1939), 11.
35. Haldane, Truth. 102-3. That this individual (whoever he really was) was in fact
the chief of the IB organization in Paris must be doubted. He was more likely simply
the highest authority with whom Haldane came into contact. Obviously the troika of
Marty, Longo, and Vittorio, as well as other Comintem hierarchs involved in the
enterprise, were above Max in authority.
36. Haldane said later that "Jack" was, in fact, Arnold Reid, former editor of the
United States party publication, New Masses.
37. Haldane, Truth, 102-20, 296.
38. Ibid., 117-19; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 112-14.
39. Ruth Fischer, German Communism, 500. Fischer said that Walter Ulbricht, for
example, performed this service, among others, for the NKVD.
40. Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 26-27.
41. Romilly, Boadilla, 41; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 112-14.
42. Rust, Britons in Spain, 10; Haldane, Truth, 112-13.
43. Spanish Office of Information, 60; Balk, Quatorzieme, 31.
44. Elstob, Spanish Prisoner, 32.
45. The raised arm and the clenched fist originated as the Communist party salute.
It became the Popular Front salute and was widely adopted in Spain during the civil
war. Its widespread use can be seen in numerous photographs from the period.
46. Elstob, Spanish Prisoner, 32-34.
47. Ibid., 36.
48. The Spanish word salud, meaning "health" became the common term of greet-
ing among adherents of the Popular Front cause in Spain. Its constant use by persons
of all nationalities, even when speaking and writing in their own language, shows that
Notes to Pages 46-47 191

the word took on a special connotation for them, that it was, in fact, one of the ritual
paswords of the Popular Front in the civil war.
49. Elstob, Spanish Prisoner, 38-41.
SO. Sommerfield, Volunteer, 6-18.
51. The term International Column was commonly used during the early period.
International Brigade was not generally used until later, although the term brigade was
used in the first official document signed by the foreign directors of the base at Albacete
on October 28, 1936. A facsimile ofthis order can be seen in Spanish Office oflnforma-
tion, 70. The decision to call the organization by the term brigade was doubtless due
to the fact that the "mixed brigade" was the Soviet, and therefore Comintem, idea for
the best type of organizational structure for the Popular Front army. This concept,
which meant that each "brigade" would be in effect a self-contained unit with its own
auxiliary arms and services around a nucleus of four rifle battalions, was accepted by
the Largo Caballero government about the end of December 1936, against the strong
opposition of part of the Spanish military staff. See Madariaga, Spain, 512; Segismundo
Casado, Last Days of Madrid (London, 1939), 59-60.
52. Ryan, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 1939, 11:6183; Bessie, Men in Battle, 202.
53. Actually, hard and reliable statistics on the Brigades are impossible to come by,
but roughly correct figures are possible by putting various estimates and calculations
together. The first two Brigades, those put together and in action in November 1936,
numbered, by most accounts, about 3,000 each. Each was reinforced with new arrivals
as the fighting of November and December took its toll in casualties; thus the estimate
of 8,000 by late November seems about right. As to the numbers in the Brigades by
February 1937, there is more room for error. The United States Consul in Barcelona
reported on December 31, 1936, to Washington that according to best estimates some
4,000 volunteers had passed through Barcelona in the past week and that some 20,000
had done so since October 31. If this estimate was a good one, it would mean that a
total of some 25,000 men had entered Spain by December 31. This would seem to agree
with other estimates. Madariaga says he knows for certain that the Brigades numbered
22,000 men at one given time. Most observers agree that the number of foreign effectives
in the Brigades reached a peak at about the time of the battle of the Jarama in February
1937 and that this was around 25,000 men. If we allow for high casualty rates sustained
by the Brigades from their entry into the fighting in early November, a figure of25,000
effectives in February would mean that something like 30,000 men had come into them
since the first contingents arrived in October 1936. See U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1936,
632; Madariaga, Spain, 506.

CHAPTER4

1. Mikhail Koltsov, Diario de Ia guerra de Espana (Paris, 1963), 114.

2. Martinez Bande, Marcha, 113-15, 158 n. 157, says the Nationalists had only
some 20,000 effectives at this point.
3. Nenni, Guerre, 52; Geoffrey Cox, Defense of Madrid (London, 1937), 22-24;
Louis Fischer, Politics, 382; Ibarruri, Guerra, 2:133; R. Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera
de Ia Espana republicana (Moscow, 1969).
192 NoTES TO PAGES 47-49

4. Georges Soria, "Preparations for the Defense of Madrid," International Press

Correspondence 16, no. 46 (October 1936):1260; Mundo Obrero, Special Anniversary
Edition (November 7, 1937); Last, Tragedy, 29-30. The Communist party of Spain had
never, prior to the Popular Front era, been large or important. Its leaders did not stand
high in the ranks of the Communist International and were thoroughly subservient to
Comintern and Soviet control. See Castro Delgado, Hombres. Jeslis Hernandez, Yo fu£
un minestro de Stalin (Mexico, 1953), and Valentin Gonzalez, Comunista en Espana
y anti.Stalinista en Rusio (Mexico, 1953). All are memoirs of high-ranking members
of the Spanish party during the civil war who have since left the party and all agree
that the party was simply a Comintem tool. Hernandez, 59, tells of a meeting of the
politburo of the Spanish Communist party in late July 1936, at which the following
non-Spanish Comintem representatives were present: Togliatti, Duclos, Codovila,
Stepanov, and Geroe.Jose Diaz, the chief of the Spanish party, essentially confirms this
in his book Tres aiios de lucha (Toulouse, 1947), 127.
5. "No Pasaran-They Shall Not Pass," Communist Internationa/13, no. 12 (De-
cember 1936):651, tells of a resistance meeting held in Madrid on November 11 at
which Jose Diaz, Enrique Lister, Carlos Contreras, and Nicoletti spoke. Diaz was
secretary of the Spanish Communist party, Lister was the top Spanish Communist
military leader in the Fifth Regiment, Contreras was Vittorio Vidali, the Italian Comin-
tern agent who was the chief political commissar of the Fifth Regiment, and Nicoletti
(Giuseppe de Vittorio) was political commissar of the XI International Brigade.
6. Estampa (October 10, 1936), as quoted in Martinez Bande, Marcha, 119 n. 106.
7. Documentos Historicos, Ediciones del 5 Regimento, Defensa de Madrid, 19, as
quoted in lbarruri, Guerra, 1:162.
8. Ibarruri, Guerra, 1:128, 145-52; Castro Delgado, Hombres. 391; Andre Marty,
"Madrid-The Verdun of Democracy," International Press Correspondence 16, no. 57
(December, 1936):1278. No pasaran was the Spanish equivalent of the French "Ils ne
passeront pas," made famouS at the battle of Verdun in 1916. Cox, Madrid, Sl-52, says
the radio carried continuous fervent speeches studded with the words "no pasaran, no
pasaran" rising almost to a shriek.
9. Lister, Guerra, 84-85. For the best discussion of the ftight of the government
from Madrid and their attitude that the city was lost, see Bolloten, Revolution.
10. Lister, Guerra, 86; Malinovski, Baja Ia bandera, 87; Colodny, Struggle, 52;
Louis Fischer, Politics, 395-98; Renn, Krieg, 78-79; Castro Delgado, Hombres, 395-
405.
11. Lister, Guerra, 288; Castro Delgado, Hombres. )99-402.
12. There is some confusion as to the names of the Soviet military men in Spain since
they used noms de guerre and made as little public display of themselves as possible.
Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera, refers to Berzin, who was in Valencia with the Loyalist
government, as ''the principal military advisor" (68); to Goriev, in Madrid, as the
"Soviet military attache in Spain" (66) and as the "military advisor to General Miaja"
(14); and to Kulik as also being active in the Madrid defense of the winter of 1936-1937
(14-15).
13. Longo, Brigate, 71; Castro, Hombres. 393-94.
14. Colodny, Struggle, 15 n. 111.
Notes to Pages 50-53 193

15. Longo, Brigate, 36-37.

16. Ibid., 38-39.
17. Bolloten, Camouflage, 224 n. This information was supplied to Bolloten by
Vidali.
18. Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera. 266
19. Longo, Brigate, 39-40; Un aflo de las Brigadas Internacionales (Madrid, 1937),
1-20. It is impossible to correlate all the accounts of these early arrivals and come up
with any completely consistent theory. The figures and dates cited here are Longo's,
who should know. Information in the Marty Archives, such as it is, tends to bear this
out. In fact, such inconsistencies as are present are of small consequence.
20. Communist International 13, no. 11 (December 1936):733-34.
21. Marty Archives; Dallin, Espionage, 47; Ypsilon, Pattern for World Revolution
(Chicago, 1947), 219-20.
22. Ehrenburg, Eve of War, 167, suggests that Marty may have been mentally
unbalanced. On some of Marty's disagreeable characteristics, see Louis Fischer, Poli-
ties, 389-90.
23. There are those who defend Marty's activities in Spain. For example, Colodny
agrees with Marty that there were many spies, intelligence agents, and saboteurs in the
Brigades. He also rationalizes the Trotskyist mania by agreeing that Trotskyist orga-
nizations were in fact infiltrated with Nazi and Fascist agents. He says in defense of
Marty, "The task of transforming a collection of revolutionaries from thirty countries
into a disciplined fighting force required a hand of iron." Colodny, Struggle, 63 and
n. 109.
24. Le Soldat de Ia Republique (October 14, 1937); Reconquista (October 20, 1938).
25. Longo, Brigate, 152.
26. London, Espana, 184.
27. Reconquista (October 20, 1938); Longo, Boletin de Informaci6n, no. 231 (Au-
gust 23, 1937); Marty Archives.
28. Ruth Fischer, German Communism, 500 n., states that Ulbricht was in charge
of establishing an NKVD-controlled police apparatus for maintaining surveillance over
the German-speaking members of the Brigades. A recent biographer, Stem, Ulbricht,
71 n., says that the evidence is lacking to establish just what Ulbricht's role in Spain
was but that he was involved with the "political machines of the International Bri-
gades" and those who supervised the German Communists fighting in Spain.
29. Valtin, Out of the Night, 356; Herrick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Deci-
sion, 36-38. Herrick worked under Neumann's supervision in the censorship bureau of
the International Brigades. He reports that Neumann sometimes boasted of the Trotsky-
ites he had executed.
30. Un aflo de las Brigadas Intemacionales; Marty Archives; Boletin de Informaci6n,
no. 282 (October 17, 1937).
31. Louis Fischer, Polities, 386; Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 24; Wintringham, English
Coptain, 60-61; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 42; Le Soldat de Ia Repub/ique, no. SO (October
8, 1937, 1.
32. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 207 (July 31, 1937).
33. Spanish Office of Information, 69-71.
194 NOTES TO PAGES 53-57

34. Romilly, Boadilla, 48-67; Louis Fischer, Politics, 401; Boletfn de Informaci6n,
no. 207 (July 31, 1937), offers a general view of this early organizational work as told
by "Vidal."
35. Louis Fischer, Politics, 386-87. Fischer could hardly have been said to have
"enrolled" in the Brigades. He went down to Albacete and helped out for as long as
it suited him, though he continued to be an active partisan of the Loyalist cause
throughout the war. Madariaga, Spain. 541, says that Fischer acted as chief purchasing
agent for the Negrin government from a Paris headquarters. Fischer also wrote and
spoke extensively for the Loyalists in the United States and contributed numerous
articles to the Nation. See the pamphlet by Fischer, The War in Spain.
36. Louis Fischer, Politics. 387; Pacciardi, Garibald~ 51; Watson, Single to Spain.
196; Romilly, Boadilla, 75-77; Sommerfield, Volunteer, 41; Epapie, 62.
37. Pacciardi, Garibald~ 61.
38. Longo, Brigate, 51-52; Watson, Single to Spain, 107; Sommerfield, Volunteer,
23-24.
39. Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938):446.
40. Romilly, Boadilla, 61-62; Longo, Brigate, 54.
41. Watson, Single to Spain, 109-10; Adolfo Liz6n Gadea, Las Brigadas Interna-
cionales en Espana (Madrid, 1940); Sommerfield, Volunteer, 22-24.
42. Romilly, Boadil/a, 42-43; Watson, Single to Spain. 105.
43. Longo, Brigate, 69.
44. Romilly, Boadilla, 67; Watson, Single to Spain. 69; Longo, Brigate, 69; Spanish
Ollice of Information, 60, contains a photograph of this document.
45. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 282 (October 17, 1937). This article was, interest-
ingly, signed by Vidal's successor as base commander at Albacete, Maurice Lampe.
46. Longo, Brigate, 11.
47. Valtin, Out of the Night, 653; Renn, Krieg, 66-67; Alfred Kantorowicz, Spanis-
ches Tagebiich (Berlin, 1948), 12-13; R. Hanmer, "Heroes of the Communist Interna-
tional," Communist International 13, no. 7 (July 1936): 503.
48. Renn, Krieg, 67; Valtin, Out of the Night, 241.
49. Renn, Krieg, 115; Regier, Owl of Minerva, 297; Barea, Rebel 649; Ernest
Hemingway, preface to Gustav Regier's Great Crusade (New York, 1940); Koestler,
Gad That Failed, 24.
50. Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 66; Balk, Quatorzieme, 1-32; Regier, Owl ofMinerva,
284-85, 311; Szinda, XI Brigade, 24-25; Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5
(May 1938):446. Dahlem states that the Brigade was "made up in its first months
almost exclusively of Communists, mainly Party functionaries and Red Front fighters."
51. Balk, Quatorzieme, 171; Sommerfield, Volunteer, 39.
52. Renn, Krieg, 67; Balk, Quatorzieme, 176-79; Longo, Brigate, 69; Epapie. 62.
53. Longo, Brigate, 69; Epapie, 181, 193.
54. Balk, Quatorzieme, 1-32.
55. Longo, Brigate, 70; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 324; Spanish Ollice oflnforma-
tion, 77, and Brome, International Brigades, 80, all say that the Dombrowski battalion
was commanded by a Pole named Tedeusz Oppman. None offer any documentation.
It seems probable that Thomas and Brome took their information from the Spanish
Ollice of Information (which was published first). I have found no other reference to
Notes to Pages 57-64 195
Oppman and therefore rely on Longo's account for the above names. Also London,
Espafia, 185, says the commander was Bolek Ulanovski and the political commissar
was Matrizsiak.
56. Nuestros Espaiioles, 6; Sommerfield, Volunteer, 39.
57. Cox, Madrid. 184-87; Herbert Matthews, Two Wars and More to Come (New
York, 1938).
58. International Press Correspondence 16, no. 57 (December 1938):1498.
59. Cox, Madrid, 184-87.
60. Krivitsky, Secret Service, 116-17; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 42.
61. Krivitsky, Secret Service, 116.
62. Dallin, Espionage, 396.
63. Co1odny, Struggle, 62 and n. 101, avers that in Kleber, the Red army was
assigning one of its ablest officers to command the Internationals.
64. Longo, Brigate, 72; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 59; Nenni, Guerre, 166.
65. Sommerfield, Volunteer, 44-50.
66. Ibid., 44-70; Epopie, 62-78. The original intention of the Madrid command was
to use the Internationals in an attack on the Nationalist right flank near Vallecas, but
this did not materialize and the Brigade was brought directly into Madrid. Martinez
Bande, Marcha, 122 and Document 6.
67. Sommerfield, Volunteer, 72-83.
68. Cox, Madrid, 66-61.
69. Balk, Quatorzieme, 180.
70. Barea, Rebel. 583.
71. Sommerfield, Volunteer, 84.
72. Units of the XI Brigade apparently saw action in several sectors within the next
few days. According to most accounts, their first action was in the Casa de Campo, but
the Madrid daily Ahora, in the November 9 edition, reported that the Internationals
first entered combat in the Pozuelo area. Martinez Bande, Marcha, 127-30, and nn. 117,
118, offers a thorough discussion of this based on all the available documentation from
the official records of the Loyalist army. See also Verle Johnson, Legions of Babel
(University Park, Pa., 1967), 50 n. 23.
73. Renn, Krieg, 11-12; Cox, Madrid, 16.
74. Marty, "Twelve Magnificent Months," International Press Co"espandence 17,
no. 45 (October 30, 1937):1044; Le Volontaire de Ia Liberti, no. 28 (October 28, 1937);
Longo, Brigate, 12-15; Renn, Krieg, 73.
75. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 51; Renn, Krieg, 68.
76. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 2.
77. Ibid., 4.
78. Einaudi, Communism, 210.
79. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 4-1, 52-56; Longo, Brigate, 261.
80. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 52-56; Dallin, Espionage, 208. Pacciardi commanded a
unit in the allied armies during World War II and served as minister of defense in the
. postwar De Gasperi cabinet.
81. Longo, Brigate, 10; Giacomo Calandrone, La Spagna Brucia (Rome, 1962), 42.
82. Longo, Brigate, 261; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 42.
83. Ibid.
196 NOTES TO PAGES 64-70
84. Calandrone, Spagna, 21, 42.
85. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 59; Regier, Owl of Minerva, 289; Ehrenberg, Eve of War,
174; Nenni, Guerre. 168.
86. Renn, Krieg. 5-18, 23-24, 67; Regier, Owl ofMinerva, 173; Kantorowicz, Tage-
biich, 13; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 63. ·
87. Renn, Krieg. 25; Communist International 14, no. 1 (January 1937):803-6.
88. Renn, Krieg. 40-55, 64-68; Last, Tragedy, 88-89.
89. Koestler, Gad That Failed, 42-43.
90. Renn, Krieg. 65-75; Romilly, Boadi//a, 68-74; Longo, Brigate, 75-77; Pacciardi,
Garibaldi, 63; London, Espana, 185.
91. Renn, Krieg. 74-75; Romilly, Boadil/a, 74.
92. In view of the large number of Frenchmen among the volunteers this could only
have been explained by the fact that all the French with sufficient military or poli-
tical experience must have been with the Commune de Paris battalion in the XI
Brigade.
93. London, Espafia, 76; Nenni, Guerre, 166; Ehrenberg, Eve of War, 171-76;
Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 63; Louis Fischer, Politics, 388.
94. Renn, Krieg. 61-68.
95. Ehrenberg, Eve of War, 174; Regier, Owl ofMinerva, 279, 297; Nenni, Guerre,
178.
96. Communist International 14, no. 9 (September 1937):656-58.
97. Ehrenberg, Eve of War, 173; Louis Fischer, Politics, 388.
98. Longo, Brigate, 76-77; Renn, Krieg. 75-77.

CHAPTER 5
1. Longo, Brigate, 137-38; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 195-96. Contrary to
a widely held view, the XIII Brigade was not, originally, the Slavic Brigade. It became
so only much later when the original XIII Brigade was disbanded and a new one,
predominantly Slavic, replaced it.
2. Alfred Kantorowicz, Tschapaiev: Das Battalion der 21 Nationen (Madrid, 1938).
3. Reconquista (October 20, 1938), 10-11; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich. 197, 194-95.
4. Longo, Brigate, 138.
5. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 71; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 208; Dallin, Espionage, 75,
85-90, 364-66.
6. Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 215-20.
7. Ibid., 196, 207; Longo, Brigate, 138.
8. There is much circumstantial evidence to support this contention. Louis Fischer,
Politics, 427, confirms Largo Caballero's distrust of the Anarchists in December 1936.
Colodny, Struggle, 94, 208 n. 13, states that he had firsthand information from abso-
lutely reliable sources that the XIII Brigade was called to Valencia as an internal
security measure.
9. Longo, Brigate, 140-41.
10. Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 205-15; Longo, Brigate, 142-45; Wullschleger,
Kampfen, 161-62.
Notes to Pages 70-75 197

11. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 27; Spanish Office of Information, 60.

12. Marty Archives; Reco1UJUista (October 20, 1938), 21.
13. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 27; Balk, Quatorzieme, 119; Le So/dat de Ia Republique,
no. l·(February 16, 1937); Boletfn de Informacion, no. 282 (October 17, 1937).
14. Neal Wood, Communism and the British Intellectuals (New York, 1959), 167;
Wintringham, English Captain, 82; Communist International 14, no. 2 (February
1937):869.
15. Epopee, 87.
16. Balk, Quatorzieme, 94; Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 93, 110; Calandrone, Spagna.
210-11.
17. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 92-93; Balk, Quawrzieme, 79; Wintringham, English
Captain, 75-76.
18. Balk, Quatorzieme, 95-97; Le Soldat de Ia Repub/ique, Special Edition (June 27,
1937); tpopee, 87.
19. Marty Archives; Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 282 (October 17, 1937).
20. Balk, Quatorzieme, 76; Wintringham, English Captain, 66-67, 80-86; Brome,
International Brigades, 278-79.
21. Balk, Quatorzieme. 49.
22. Longo, Brigate, 151-52.
23. Ibid., 151-60; Balk, Quatorzieme,· Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 29-37; Wintringham,
English Captain, 85-89.
24. Le Livre de Ia 15eme Brigade Intemationa/e: Nos Combats Contre /e Fascisme
(Madrid, 1937), 15.
25. Notre Combat, no. 1 (March 3, 1937), 1; Livre, 134.
26. Wintringham, English Captain, 145-46, 191-92; Eby, Bullet. 54-59; Arthur
Landis, The Abraham Lincoln Brigade (New York, 1967), 166-67; Steve Nelson, The
Volunteers (New York, 1953), 99.
27. Livre, 135; Notre Combat, no. 25 (April 14, 1937), 1.
28. Reconquista (October 20, 1938), 16; Notre Combat, no. 25 (April 14, 1937), 1.
29. Notre Combat, no. 3 (March 17, 1937), 1. It is possible that some of the more
unfortunate phrases were applied by overzealous editors of the Brigade press.
30. Livre, 136; Marty Archives; Notre Combat, no. 26 (April 23, 1937), 2.
31. Notre Combat, no. 28 (May 17, 1937), 2.
32. Wintringham, English Captain, 91; Volunteer for Liberty (November 7, 1938),
8; Reconquista (October 20, 1938), 14; Communist International 13, no. 2 (February
1936):126.
33. Rust, Britons in Spain, 29; Wintringham, English Captain, 92-100; Livre, 26.
34. Wintringham, English Captain, 95-112; Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 376.
35. Fred Copeman, Reason in Revolt (London, 1948). Copeman eventually rose to
command in the battalion.
36. Wood, Communism, 58-59, 162-66.
37. Wintringham, English Captain, 166.
38. Reconquista (October 20, 1938), 14-15; Rust, Britons in Spain, 35.
39. Volunteer for Liberty (May 1, 1938), 2; Reconquista (October 20, 1938), 15;
Livre, 202; Copeman, Reason, 80; Rust, Britons in Spain, 36.
40. Livre, 15, 34, 137, 202, 258; Marty Archives.
198 NOTES TO PAGES 75-81

41. Nuestros Espafioles, 6, 12; Livre, 15; Carlo Penchienati, Brigate Internazionali
in Spagna: Delitti della "Ceka" Communista (Milan, 1950), 20.
42. Penchienati, Spagna, 18, 27; Livre, 82-84, 206.
43. Nuestros Espafioles, 12; Penchienati, Spagna, 19; Livre, 22, 81, 206.
44. Earl Browder, The Peoples Front (New York, 1938), 128.
45. The Hebrew and Jewish Tribunal (January l, 1937). This New York published
newspaper states that about one-third of the Americans were Jews. On the ethnic
makeup of the American contingent, see Eby, Bullet, 47 n. 9.
46. Volunteer for Liberty (November 7, 1938), 4.
47. Robert Merriman, "The Work of Americans in Spain," Nuestro Combate (De-
cember 1937-January 1938), 14.
48. Voros, Commissar. 269, 333-34; Eby, Bullet, 22-30.
49. Merriman, Nuestro Combate (Jauary 1938), 14; Eby, Bullet, 27; Voros, Commis-
sar, 133. For an in-depth analysis of the composition of the American battalion, see
Robert A. Rosenstone, Crusade on the Left: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish Civil
War (New York, 1969).
50. Landis, Brigade, 27; Voros, Commissar, 333-50; Merriman, Nuestro Combate
(January, 1937), 14; Eby, Bullet, 24-30.
51. Notre Combat, no. 7 (March 15, 1937), 1.
52. Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 22; Eby, Bullet, 30, 204 n. 2.
53. Louis Fischer, Politics, 403; Voros, Commissar, 344-48; Livre, 209-10.
54. Eby, Bullet, 31 n. 6.
55. Voros, Commissar, 349. Voros got his facts on this from Merriman himself.
56. Eby, Bullet, 27.
57. Voros, Commissar. 349-53, does not make it clear whether he agrees that Harris
was appointed by the party in New York or not. Witnesses say he was so appointed
(SACB, Recommended Decision, 22). Landis, Brigade, 33, leaves it a mystery saying
that "no reason exists for Harris' appointment." Most likely he was appointed military
commander of the first contingent in New York due to his alleged army experience,
something, it would seem, none of the other members of the contingent had. It is
doubtful if this appointment was intended to be permanent since Harris had little
stature in the party. Vidal would not likely have known this, since the American party's
liaison with the Brigade hierarchy was poor at the time. See also Eby, Bullet, 30.
58. Merriman, Nuestro Combate (January 1938), 14; Livre, 22.
59. Voros, Commissar. 206.
60. Ibid.; Eby, Bullet, 39; Livre, 249.
61. Voros, Commissar, 352-54.
62. For a full discussion of this dispute, see Eby, Bullet, 38-48.
63. Voros, Commissar, 354-55; Livre, 99; Matthews, Two Wars, 221-22; Volunteer
for Liberty (November 7, 1938), l-2.

CHAPTER 6
1. The XII Brigade moved into the University City fighting directly after
experiencing its first taste of combat (and a sound beating) resulting from its attack on
Notes to Pages 82-89 199

the Nationalist right flank at Cerro de los Angeles (Cerro Rojo). This entire affair had
demonstrated, at the price of numerous killed and wounded, that the Brigade and its
component units were in no condition to carry out the complex task of an offensive
operation. As the Soviet general Batov, who served as adviser to the XII Brigade during
the operation, put it, with some understatement: "The course of the combat already
had begun to reveal the defects of our improvised organization." Pravda correspondent
Koltsov said it more precisely: "A day of disillusionments and great sorrows. The
attack achieved nothing.... Artillery preparation was lamentable. The new comba-
tants, poorly instructed, advanced with indifference and, on approaching Cerro de los
Angeles they were disconcerted before the enemy fire and stuck to the earth.... This
failure was hard." The abortive attack led Pacciardi, commander of the Italian Gari-
baldi battalion, to feel a certain distrust of the high command. "One does not attack
a fortress with the bayonet," he thought. And Pacciardi was not alone. In the wake
of the debacle, Marty sent the German Communist Gustav Regier to the XII Brigade
as a "special commisar." He told Regier pointedly that he had full powers, clearly
meaning that if Regier felt it expedient to have a few men shot to restore discipline he
had Marty's blessing. Regier found XII Brigade commander General Lukacs a tired
and sad man. "We were ordered to take that place without adequate artillery prepara-
tion," he said. "Naturally we were beaten." On this entire operation, see Regier, Owl
of Minerva, 279-89; Pacciardi, Garibald~ 64-71; Romilly, Boadil/a, 104-17; Watson,
Single to Spain. 110-25; Renn, Krieg. 75-80; Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera, 335; Kolt-
sov, Diorio, 224-25; Longo, Brigate, 75-85.
2. Martinez Bande, Marcha. 144-45.
3. Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La lucha en tomo de Madrid (Madrid, 1970),
48-50; Longo, Brigate, 130-31; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 105-6.
4. Renn, Krieg. 113-18; Longo, Brigate, 117, 130-31; Szinda, XI Brigade, 29;
Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938):115.
S. Following this action the XI Brigade, reduced to some 600 effectives, was with-
drawn to Murcia in southern Spain for rest, reinforcement, and reorganization.
6. Esmond Romilly's Boadil/a offers a firsthand account of the XI Brigade in this
action.
7. Koltsov, Diorio, 273; Colodny, Struggle, 105, estimates Nationalist casualties at
15,000.
8. L6pez Mufiiz, Bata//a, 99.
9. Lister, Guerra, 100; Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera. 116.
10 Lister, Guerra, 100; Vicente Rojo, Espaiia Her6ico (Buenos Aires, 1942), 70-71;
Martinez Bande, Lucha, 95-100.
11. There are numerous accounts of the Pingarron debacle. Among those chiefly
relied on here were Voros, Commissar, 355-58; Wintringham, English Captain. 254-57;
Matthews, Two Wars, 223-24; Maken and Gladnick, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic
Record; Eby, Bullet, 40-65.
12. Renn, Krieg. 225-26.
13. Nenni, Guerre, SO, 106; Louis Fischer, Politics, 46-47.
14. For a brief period between the end of the Jarama campaign and the end of the
Brunete offensive the old XII Brigade had been split into two Brigades: the XII
(Garibaldi) and the CL. Shortly thereafter the CL was disbanded.
200 NoTES TO PAGES 89-93

15. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 255; Calandrone, Spagna, l14; Penchienati, Spagna, 91.
The New York Times reporting on the decreasing role of the Internationals on October
24, 1937, gave the figure of 7,000 to 8,000 still on active duty.
16. Voros, Commissar, 410.
17. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 488, states that by the end of 1937 the Nationalist
army numbered 600,000 men. At about the same time, he says (493), the Loyalist army
numbered some 450,000 men.

CHAPTER 7
1. The designations People's Army or Popular Army were used more or less
indiscriminately in referring to the new government army created by the Loyalist
regime.
2. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 302 (November 7, 1937), 4.
3. Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 445-46.
4. "Our Army Is a People's Army," Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 2 (June 1, 1937),
1; Communist International 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 869.
5. Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 44 (August 17, 1937), 3.
6. Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 9, Marty Archives.
7. David T. Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley, 1955), 211;
Payne, Revolution, 374. Something of this nature did occur at the very end of the war
when Communist and non-Communist units of the Loyalist army fought a small-scale
civil war between themselves. By that time, however, the International Brigades no
longer existed. Had they done so, they would surely have been on the Communist side
of the barricades. On this episode see Payne, Revolution, 355-58.
8. Communist International 14, no. 3 (March 1937): 179; also an article by "Nico-
letti," Communist International 13, no. 11 (November 1936): 741.
9. Ecole des Commissaires de Gue"e, Theme 9, Marty Archives.
10. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 280 (October 15, 1937), 6-8.
11. Frente Rojo, as quoted in the Boletin de Informaci6n, no. 283 (October 10, 1937),
4; Mundo Obrero (November 7, 1937).
12. Browder in a speech to an enlarged politburo meeting in November 1937, as
reported in the Communist (December 1937).
13. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 344 (December 28, 1937), 2.
14. Communist International 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 869; Nuestro Combate, no.
35 (December 1937-January 1938), 5.
15. Communist Internationa/15, no. 5 (May 1938): 454-55; ibid., 14, no. 2 (February
1937): 866.
16. Boletfn de Informaci6n, no. 280 (October 15, 1937), 6-8; Communist Interna-
tional 14, nos. S and 6 (June 1937): 1072. See Louis Fischer's report (405) on his
interview with Comintem chief Dimitroff in which Dimitroff voiced the hope that an
American Popular Front could be forged from the Americans fighting in the Intema•
tional Brigades.
17. Robert Minor, Report to the Tenth Convention of the Communist Party of New
York, May 1938.
Notes to Pages 93-96 201

18. Maken, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic Record, 2:752, stated that in the Lin-
coln battalion, commissars adopted the slogan "Every member of the Brigade a member
of the Communist Party." John Little, Report to the Tenth Convention of the Commu-
nist Party of New York, May 1938.
19. Harry Pollitt, Communist International 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 860
20. Boletin de Informacion, no. 283 (October 1937), 1.
21. Volunteer for Liberty 2, no. 2 (January 18, 1938), 4.
22. Marty, Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 21 (November 1, 1937), 11; Communist
International 17, no. 3 (March 1940): 182; Bill Lawrence, Democracy's Stake, 22.
23. Communist (December 1937), 1082-83. On the United States party's treatment
of Nelson, see the Daily Worker (November 10, 1937), "Steve Nelson an Exemplary
Political Commissar in the International Brigades." British battalion commander Fred
Copeman was also rewarded for his services in Spain with co-option into the central
committee of the Communist party of Great Britain. Both Auguste Lecouer and Rol
Tanguy rose into the top echelons of the French party following their work in Spain
and almost the entire hierarchy of the Italian Communist party which emerged after
World War II was composed of ex-International Brigaders.
24. A clear indication of the fact that the Comintem, and not the Loyalist govern-
ment, controlled the Brigade chiefs was the recall of Marty himself to Moscow on one
occasion and before the hierarchy of the French party on another to account for his
direction of the Brigades. Marty's absences from Spain on these occasions were not
publicized but there are various accounts of them. It would seem that in the summer
of 1937 he was absent and that his place had been taken by Fran~is Billoux. Colodny,
Struggle, 106, states that Moscow recalled Marty, and Lecouer, Le Partisan, refers to
Marty's recall.
25. Krivitsky, Secret Service, 112, says some 500 such men went to the International
Brigades. Krivitsky avers that these foreign Communists living in the Soviet Union
were dispatched to Spain by Stalin partly to furnish reliable cadres for the Brigades and
partly to relieve himself of their unwanted presence in Russia where the great purges
were under way.
26. Dallin, Espionage, 40, 54, 84, 87, 140.
27. Longo, Brigate, 188-90; Calandrone, Spagna, 43-44; Nenni, Guem, 167.
28. Marty Archives, handwritten notes on Barontini. He is also discussed by Longo,
Calandrone, Pacciardi, and Penchienati.
29. Longo, Brigate, 364-70; Nenni, Guem, 235-37.
30. Penchienati, Spagna, 50.
31. Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 88-89. The two major functions of
the Friends of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade (FALB) were propaganda and fund
raising. According to White the FALB raised over $425,000. Volunteer for Liberty
(January 1940). The Volunteer for Liberty was the official publication of the veterans
of the Lincoln Brigade. Time magazine (April18, 1938), 21, said the FALB, organized
in April 1937, had over 25,000 dues-paying members. It reported collections of
$115,701.42 as of that date. The FALB also took charge of the veterans upon their
leaving Spain. David Leeds, financial secretary of the Communist party in New York
directed the repatriation of American Brigade men. He operated from Paris using the
name David Ameriglio. McCuiston, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 6725.
202 NoTES To PAGES 96-100

32. Voros, Commissar, 316-17.

33. Gates, American Communist. 50; Lecouer, Le Partisan, 91.
34. Alexander Foote, Handbook for Spies (London, 1953); Dallin, Espionage, 184;
Haldane, Truth, 287-88.
35. Gladnick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 49.
36. As quoted in SACB, Recommended Decision, 51-52. Indeed, according to the
NKVD chief in Spain, Alexander Orlov, he and a Russian staff' under his command
organized and operated the guerrilla warfare operations of the Loyalists. Orlov Memo.
37. Renn, Krieg, 145. Lister, Guerra, 277, corroborates this situation. He says that
both Largo Caballero and later Prieto, as well as most of the high command of the
Loyalist army, opposed the organization of guerrilla warfare and resisted efforts to do
so. The Communists on the other hand favored this approach and ''took certain
practical steps" to organize that type of operation, including the operation of schools
for guerrilla warfare.
38. Renn, Krieg, 145-50.
39. Voros, Commissar. 326-27
40. Penchienati, Spagna, 35; Marty Archives; Koltsov, Diario, 100, says that To-
gliatti was among the Comintem delegation that organized the Brigades in October
1936.
41. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 19.
42. Voros, Commissar, 307-10.
43. The Soviet officers "Colonel Valois" and Petrovitch were involved in the earliest
stages of the Brigades' organization at Albacete. Kleber, a Red army officer himself,
operated under the direct orders of Goriev during the defense of Madrid; Lukacs had
the Soviet general Batov ("Fritz") as his permanent adviser; Kahle enjoyed the constant
services ofthe Soviet officer called "Loti." On the whole subject ofthe Soviet military
mission in Spain, see Malinovski, Bajo Ia bandera; Ehrenburg, Eve of War; Krivitsky,
Secret Service.
44. By the summer of 1937 ex-International Brigade commanders Walter, Gall,
Kleber, and Kahle commanded the People's Army divisions that incorporated the
various International Brigades.
45. Balk, Quotorzieme, 143-44; Longo, Brigate, 325; Gillain, Le Mercenaire. 103-4;
Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 23 (April 14, 1937).
46. Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 24 (April 22, 1937).
47. Marty Archives. Sagnier had served with Dumont in that unit since its origins
in October 1936 and had acted as provisional commander during Dumont's occasional
absences. Balk, Quatorzieme, 140-42, 156, 192-93. Vittori had once served three years
in a French prison in Madagascar. Upon his release and return to France he had served
as secretary of the Secours Rouge, the French branch of that important Communist-
front organization. He had arrived in Spain in January 1937.
48. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 104-12; on the general problem, see Balk, Quatorizreme,
156.
49. The British battalion also went through a thorough reorganization in the wake
of the Jarama battle. Wintringham, wounded in the Jarama lighting, had no further
direct contact with the battalion. When he returned to duty in June 1937, it was to
replace the American Merriman as chief English-speaking instructor at the Interna-
Notes to Pages 100-103 203

tiona! Brigade's officer training school. During the subsequent hard fighting Jock
Cunningham took effective command of the battalion and remained in command until
wounded in a skirmish in March. Cunningham later returned to duty as a major
attached to the Brigade staff. Fred Copeman replaced Cunningham in command of the
battalion, a post he held until April of 1938. Wintringham, English Captain, 229-30,
272-95; Copeman, Reason, 104-10; Rust, Britons in Spain., 51.
50. Volunteer for Liberty (May 1, 1938), 14, announced these changes. British party
writer Rust draws the usual smoke screen of vagueness over this transaction saying
merely, "from Britain there came three new commissars." This purposefully vague way
of saying things was developed to a fine art by Communist writers. The great value of
it was that it told the initiated quite clearly what the writer intended to tell them and
told the uninitiated reader little or nothing about the concrete role of the party in these
operations. Rust, Britons in Spain, 56.
51. Thomas, Spanish Civil War, 465. He cites George Aitkin as his source for this.
52. Copeman, Reason., 136-40. Copeman fails to specify just which of the British
commissars were in favor of the death penalty.
53. Ibid., 136-40.
54. For a full discussion of Johnson and this entire episode, see Eby, Bullet, 105-16.
Landis, Brigade, also deals with this, but less satisfactorily.
55. Voros, Commissar, 270-72; Steve Nelson, The Volunteers; Landis, Brigade,
164-65; Eby, Bullet. 105. Nelson went on to become XV Brigade commissar and, later,
a member of the top echelon of the United States party. Men in the American unit who
received command positions directly from the party in the United States won the
sobriquet "ninth Boor generals," a reference to the ninth Boor of the party's New York
headquarters where the politburo met. On the party's deciding whether a functionary
should go to Spain or not, see Joseph Starobin, The Life and Death of an American
Hero, 78.
56. Among this contingent was Rol Tanguy.
57. Lecouer, Le Partisan., met this man again in 1946 as the military attache to the
Polish Embassy in Paris, 70 n.
58. Ibid. 69-71.
59. These can be seen in various editions of the Volunteer for Liberty and also in
Kantorowicz, Tagebiich. 296 If.
60. Communist /nternationa/14, no. 9 (September 1937):659. At some point during
the Brunete campaign of July 1937 the XIII Brigade underwent a crisis from which
it never recovered. Just what happened or the exact sequence of events remains unclear.
But the results leave no room for doubt as to the seriousness of the event. The XIII
Brigade was dissolved as a unit and its men were scattered into other Brigades. Simulta-
neously the Dombrowski Brigade dropped the CL designation and assumed the number
XIII itself, thus helping to cover up the fact of the dissolution of the original XIII
Brigade. Nothing of this appears in Communist accounts of the Brigades. That there
was some trouble in the XIII Brigade, however, was alluded to by various sources
(Lecouer, Le Partisan., 91-97; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 489-90). Even the Volunteer for
Liberty mentioned that one unit, unnamed, "yielded to panic." August 9, 1937. For
a vivid, if questionable, account of the "mutiny" of the XIII and its dissolution, see
Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 150-55.
204 NOTES TO PAGES 104-107

61. Longo, Brigate, 261-63.

62. Following the battle of Guadalajara the XII Brigade was reorganized into two
separate brigades. One, commanded by Pacciardi, remained the XII (Garibaldi) and
consisted of Italians and Spaniards only.. It was joined in April by Italians from the XV
Brigade and from the old Giustizia e Liberta column which had been with the Anar-
chist militia in Aragon since the beginning of the war. The other included the Poles
of the Dombrowski, the Franco-Belgian Andre Marty battalion, and a newly formed
Slavic-Hungarian battalion named for the Hungarian Communist Rakosi. The new
Brigade took the name "Dombrowski" and the number CL. Both the Garibaldi and
the Dombrowski brigades remained under the overall command of General Lukacs.
Following this reorganization and due to the command appointments made by Pac-
ciardi, the three battalions of the Garibaldi Brigade were commanded respectively by
Battistelli, a Republican; Marvin, a Communist; and Penchienati, a nonparty man.
That command structure, with Pacciardi as Brigade commander, made the Garibaldis
unique among the International Brigades in having a predominantly non-Communist
military command. Francesco Leone, "The International Brigades Yesterday and To-
day," Communist /nternationa/14, nos. 5 and 6 (June 1937): 1070; Balk, Quatorzieme,
175-76; Penchienati, Spagna. 31-32, 57-59; Reun, Krieg. 153-54; Pacciardi, Garibaldi,
213; Calandrone, Spagna, 150-52.
An early example of Pacciardi's attitude toward running his own Brigade was the
case of Captain Morelli, adjutant of the second battalion. Morelli, a Communist, had
printed a circular in which he attacked and libeled several of the non-Communist
officers attached to Pacciardi's stalf'. Pacciardi's immediate arrest of Morelli threw the
Communist politicos into a dither. Their hearts were with Morelli, but they were unable
to pressure Pacciardi into reversing his course. Penchienati, Spagna. 59; Calandrone,
Spagna, 144.
63. Longo, Brigate, 263-65; Calandrone, Spagna, 175-85; Penchienati, Spagna, 59,
90-91.'
64. Longo, Brigate, 330-34.
65. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 82; Louis Fischer, Politics, 428; Orwell, Catalonia, 115;
John McGovern, Terror in Spain (London, 1938).
66. Orwell, Catalonia, 196-232; Borkenau, Cockpit, 244-57.
67. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 82-83; "Treason Is the Only Name for Treason," Our
Fight, no. 39 (May 10, 1937); Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 34 (June 20, 1937); no.
44 (August 17, 1937); no. 45 (August 29, 1937); Longo, Brigate, 330-33.
68. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 1 (May 24, 1937); Departmental Note No. 6540 as
published in the Boletfn de Informacion, July 28, 1937.
69. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 224-27; Penchienati, Spagna. 60-61.
70. Johnson, LegWns, 108-9.
71. Longo, Brigate, 332-41; Nenni, Guerre, 177. For contemporary Spanish voicing
of mistrust of the government and the Communists, whom they called "Stalinist
reactionaries," see Juventud Obrero, a POUM newspaper (which was subsequently
suppressed by the government).
72. On July 11 Lukacs, Pacciardi, Gerassi (commander of the Dombrowski Bri-
gade), Gustav Regier, and "Fritz" (Lukacs's Soviet adviser), proceeded down a road
near the front. Nationalist artillery opened up and hit one of the three cars, killing
Notes to Pages 107-115 205

Lukacs and seriously injuring both Regier and "Fritz." Petrof, Lukacs's vice-com-
mander, assumed command and the operation proceeded.
73. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 234-39.
74. Ibid., 240-44; Penchienati, Spagna. 70; Calandrone, Spagna. 157.
75. Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 140-42, 240-44. The divisional commander was Kleber, the
Comintern general who had commanded the Brigades during the defense of Madrid
in November-December 1936.
76. Calandrone, Spagna. 182; Nenni, Guerre, 181; Longo, Brigate, 390-91.
77. Penchienati, Spagna. 91; Calandrone, Spagna. 182; Nenni, Guerre, 181. While
basically noncommittal on the quarrel Nenni seems largely to agree with Pacciardi. The
Brigade, he said, after ten months of combat, was demoralized and needed a long period
of rest and reorganization. Calandrone says (183-84) that the commissariat agreed to
a period ofleave outside Spain for those who wanted it and that the Spanish government
refused to allow it. This is doubtful. In fact, Brigade men left Spain whenever the
commissariat saw fit. It is also unlikely that the minister of war, Prieto, would have
objected. Certainly the Communists could have arranged it if they had so desired.
78. Calandrone, Spagna. 182.
79. Penchienati, Spagna, 90-92.
80. Nenni, Guerre, 181. Apparently trying to steer a middle course, Nenni merely
says that Pacciardi went to Paris to expose the situation and on his return was assigned
to division staff. He also says, without comment, that this "crisis in command" caused
grave repercussions in the Brigade.
81. Penchienati, Spagna. 94-95; Calandrone, Spagna. 183-84. Despite the knowl-
edge that he had been ousted by the communists, Pacciardi would do nothing to hurt
the cause of Loyalist Spain. When he left Spain in the winter of 1937 he went on a
propaganda tour for the government. He also subsequently wrote a book about the
Garibaldis in Spain in which he said virtually nothing against the Communists.
82. Some 2,000 volunteers were already in Albacete with more on the way. Longo,
Brigate, 40-45; Andre Marty, "Twelve Magnificent Months," International Press Cor-
respondence 17, no. 45 (October 1937): 1014-15.
83. Longo, Brigate, 42-44.
84. Andre Marty, ''Twelve Magnificent Months," 1014-15; Longo, Brigate, 44-45;
Epapee, SO.
85. Longo, Brigate, 262-65.
86. Nenni, Gue"e, 166-67. Nenni is often erroneously referred to as a member of
the Brigades.
87. Longo, Brigate, 254-SS.
88. Ibid., 252-56.
89. Ibid., 254-57.
90. Andre Marty, ''The International Brigades," International Press Co"espandence
18, no. 24 (May 1938): 586; Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. S (May 1938):
450.
91. "Some New Problems and Their Solutions," Boletfn de Informacion, no. 283
(October 24, 1937), 7-8. Later, long after the Spanish war, when Longo wrote his book
on the Brigades he recalled that the situation was not made easier by the attitude of
many ofthe Internationals themselves who exaggerated the role of the Brigades in the
206 NOTES TO PAGES 116-120

war and who felt it was impossible to assimilate the Spanish conscripts who were
"worthless."
92. II Garibaldino, no. 8 (August 16, 1937), 1; "Nuevos Combatientes," Le Soldat
de Ia Republique, no. 49 (September 24, 1937), 1.
93. Longo, Brigate, 255-56.
94. Volunteer for Liberty, no. 20 (November 1, 1937); Calandrone, Spagna, 228-29.
95. Ibid., 229-31.
96. The Communists' chief weapon in their vendetta against Prieto was to call him
a "pessimist" and "defeatist." For fuller discussions of this, see lndalecio Prieto, C6mo
y par que sali del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional (Paris, 1939); Cattel, Communism;
Payne, Revolution.
97. Penchienati, Spagna, 118; Calandrone, Spagna, 219.

CHAPTER 8
1. Indeed it was the Communist Fifth Regiment which served as the
nucleus of that army, forming its first six Brigades. An article in the Volunteer for
Liberty, "Our Army Is a People's Army," no. 2 (June 1, 1937), 1, emphasized the role
of the Fifth Regiment and the Communist party in the creation of the People's Army
and in the institution of the political commissar system throughout that army. For the
best account of the Loyalist commissar system, see Bolloten, Revolution.
2. Some have suggested that Alvarez del Vayo was in fact a "crypto-Communist."
For example, Payne, Revolution, 167. On the formation and role of the commissariat
from the Communist point of view, see lbarruri, "The Time Has Come to Create a
Single Party for the Proletariat," Communist Internationa/14, no. 9 (September 1937):
642; also Communist International 14, nos. 5-6 (June 1937): 1091.
3. Louis Fischer, Politics, 455, recounts a conversation in which Prieto, then minis-
ter of war, said that he had lost trust in the Communists mainly because of the way
they had "tried to get control of the army through the officers and commissars." When
Fischer observed that "at the front the commissars improve the morale of the troops,"
Prieto countered, "But why must the vast majority of them be Communists?"
4. Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 450; Marty, Heroic
Spain, 14-15; Marty, Communist International 14, nos. 5-6 (June 1937): 1090.
5. "Our Army Is a People's Army," 1.
6. Marty, ''Twelve Magnificent Months," 1044; Communist Internationa/15, no.
5 (May 1938): 450.
7. Frente Rojo (April 17, 1937), 1.
8. Enrique Castro Delgado, "La fortaleza de nuestro ejercito reside en Ia con-
sciencia politica de sus soldados," Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 41 (July 27, 1937),
1. In this article Castro Delgado also points out that in its role as animator and political
guide of the army, the political commissariat published 57 periodicals, edited 1,235 wall
newspapers, maintained 490 libraries with 5,438 volumes, and sent 1,299,000 periodi-
cals to the front.
9. From the official organ El Comisario, as quoted in Ecole des Commissaires de
Guerre, Theme 10, Marty Archives.
Notes to Pages 120-126 207

10. Bulletin ofthe Political Commissars ofthe International Brigades, no. 3 (Septem-
ber 1937).
11. Marty, Heroic Spain, 14-15; Castro Delgado, "La fortaleza de nuestro ejercito
reside en Ia consciencia politica de sus soldados," 1; Marty, "The International Bri-
gades," 586; Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 448-50.
12. Livre, 146.
13. Enrique Castro Delgado, "Las relaciones del Comisario con el Mando," Nuestro
Ejercito (October 1938).
14. "Les devoirs des Commissaires,'' Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 10,
Marty Archives.
15. Our Fight, no. 13 (March 20, 1937), 2.
16. II Garibaldino, no. 6 (August 1, 1937), 1.
17.. Ibid., no. 7 (August 7, 1937), 7.
18. El Comisario (organ of the General Commissariat of War), as quoted in Ecole
des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 11, Marty Archives.
19. "Le Commissaire de Guerre, Facteur Essentiel de L'Armee Populaire," trans-
lated and extracted from El Comisario, Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 11,
Marty Archives.
20. Ecole des Commissaires de Gue"e, Themes 11 and 12, Marty Archives.
21. Ibid.
22. Martinez Bande, Lucha, 25 n. 1.
23. An example of this was the conflict between Penchienati, when he commanded
the Dimitroff battalion of the XV Brigade, and the battalion commissar, a German
party fanatic recently arrived from Russia named Furman. When Furman sought to
undermine Penchienati's authority, General Gall told Penchienati to have Furman shot
if he gave him any further trouble. Gall could take such a position with assurance not
because he was Brigade commander but because he was powerfully connected with the
party. Penchienati, Spagna, 24-25.
24. Livre, 160-62.
25. Longo, Brigate, 240-43; Voros, Commissar, 321; Penchienati, Spagna, 33.
26. Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 450.
27. Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 10, Marty Archives.
28. Longo, Brigate, 54-55.
29. Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 10, Marty Archives.
30. Ibid.
31. Longo, Brigate, 285-86; Calandrone, Spagna, 94-95; Pacciardi, Garibaldi, 178.
32. Regier, Owl of Minerva, 305.
33. Longo, Brigate, 289.
34. "Propaganda behind Enemy Lines-A Task for our Political Commissars,"
Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 10 (August 1937), 6.
35. "Organization of Propaganda at the Front," Ecole des Commissaires de Gue"e,
Theme 10, Marty Archives; Longo, Brigate, 250; Calandrone, Spagna, 187.
36. Dolores lbarruri, "Employ All Means to Defend and Consolidate the People's
Front," Communist International 15, no. 2 (February 1938): 282-85; ibid., 14, no. 9
(September 1937): 659; Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 10, Marty Archives;
Dahlem, Communist International 15, no. 5 (May 1938): 450.
208 NOTES TO PAGES 127-133

37. Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 43; also Herrick, ibid; Le
Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 30 (June 1, 1937), l.
38. Rust, Britons in Spain, 31; Voros, Commissar, 319; Le So/dat de Ia Republique,
no. 2 (February 20, 1937), l.
39. Maken, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 36; Last, Tragedy, 36;
Landis, Brigade, 618 n. 3.
40. Marty, "Twelve Magnificent Months," 1044.
41. Shipman, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic Record, 8:3042; Wintringham, En-
glish Captain, 113-14; Regier, Great Crusade, 22; Communist Internationa/15, no. 5
(May 1938): 449; Gates, American Communist, 47.
42. Johnson, Legions, 184 n. 14. This phrase was used in a letter to Johnson from
Gates.
43. Voros, Commissar, 321-40, 410; Penchienati, Spagna, 331; Gates, American
Communist, 62; Eby, Bullet, 185-88, 227-28. There are many firsthand accounts of
death sentences being pronounced. See Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 215; Regier, Owl of
Minerva, 219, 292, 324-25; Penchienati, Spagna, 112; Lecouer, Le Partisan, 12-19.
44. Voros, Commissar, 322.
45. "Bureaucracy and the Commissar,'' Bulletin of the Political Commissars of the
International Brigades (September 1937), 16-17.
46. Voros, Commissar, 322. YCL was the Young Communist League; Last,
Tragedy, 35, says of this situation in the XI Brigade to which he transferred from a
Spanish unit in the summer of 1937, "Even in sexual matters the new puritanism of
the Soviet Union was imitated. Wherever the International Brigades were garrisoned,
the brothels were closed."
47. Gates, American Communist, 55.
48. By an anonymous British volunteer as quoted in Voros, Commissar, 328.
49. Mundo Obrero (July 22, 1936), 1; Ibarruri, Guerra, 1, 302; Lister, Guerra, 64;
Castro Delgado, Hombres, 288-90; Longo, Brigate, 56.
50. Rust, Britons in Spain, 30.
51. Watson, Single to Spain, 82-83.
52. For example, Beimler, "Nicoletti," Longo, Dahlem, Regier.
53. Marty, "The International Brigades," 586; Dahlem, Communist International
15, no. 5 (May 1938): 449.
54. Ibid., 454.
55. For example, the lead article in II Garibaldino, no. 14 (September 30, 1937), 1,
stressed the necessity for strong discipline in all military units. But, it assured its
readers, it was not referring to that "oppressive discipline of the bourgeois armies of
the world."
56. Voros, Commissar, 311-32; Last, Tragedy, 33-34; Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 58;
"Las Brigadas Intemacionales bajo el terror Stalinista," Jupentud Obrero (November
30, 1937).
57. This is from documents located in the Marty Archives on the International
Brigades medical service. The Brigades maintained their own separate medical service
which included at least three hospitals, named La Pasionaria, Universidad, and_ Casa
Roja. Doctors and nurses came from various countries; most of the menial work was
performed by Spaniards. Interestingly, in July 1937 the Spanish employees at one of
Notes to Pages 133-140 209

the hospitals tried to demand higher wages. The Communists blamed this on the
Anarchists and Troyskyists.
58. Luigi Longo, "Some New Problems and Their Solution," Boletfn de Informa-
cion, no. 283 (October 24, 1937), 1; Dahlem, Communist International15, no. 5 (May
1938): 447.
59. Luigi Longo, "Soldados Activistas," Reconquista 1, no. 1 (August 1, 1938),
7; Szinda, XI Brigade, 81-82; "Work of the Activists," La Marsellesa, no. 4 (Au-
gust 25, 1938), 1; "The Activist Pledge," Volunteer for Liberty 2, no. 25 (July 19,
1938), 2.
60. Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 2 (February 20, 1937), 1. Discipline, declared
the same source later that year, is "the first principle for the army," and, it continued,
it is not the role of the military officer but of the political commissar to inculcate this
discipline. Ibid., no. 30 (June 1, 1937), 1; "Discipline in Our Republican Army," Our
Fight, no. 4 (March 8, 1937), 1.
61. Our Fight, no. 73 (June 21, 1937), 1.
62. "What Is a Salute," Nuestro Combate, no. 35 (December 1937), 7; Reconquista
(October 20, 1938), 16.
63. Bulletin of the Political Commissars of the International Brigades (September
1937), 29-30; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 70 (November 21, 1937), 3.
64. "The Fifth Column," Bulletin of the Political Commissars of the International
Brigades (September 1937), 13; "The Conference of Political Commissars in Albacete,"
International Press Correspondence 17, no. 20 (May 1937): 477; Le Commissaire (June
12, 1937).
65. Marty, "Twelve Magnificent Months," 1044; Longo, Brigate, 55; "Vigilance,"
Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 45 (August 29, 1937), 1.

CHAPTER 9
1. Calandrone, Spogna, 54-55; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 98-99; see Kanto-
rowicz, passim, for reprints of the original articles on the XIII Brigade.
2. Longo, Brigate, 244.
3. Ibid; Vers Ia Liberti. no. 8 (February 1, 1937).
4. Livre, 153-60.
5. Longo, Brigate, 250.
6. Maken, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 34-35.
7. Boletfn de Informacion (December 31, 1937). In accordance with the commis-
sariat's order of December 27, 1937, publication was suspended on December 31.
8. Longo, Brigate. 250; Boletin de Informacion. no. 260 (September 24, 1937), 8.
9. Penchienati, Spogna, 48-50. Volunteer for Liberty 2, no. 32 (September 17,
1938), 1; ibid., (November 7, 1938), 12.
10. Nuestros Espofioles (Madrid, 1937).
11. Calandrone, Spogna. 224-26; Kantorowicz, Tagebiich, 520.
12. Boletin de Informacion, no. 299 (November 2, 1937), 8.
13. Francisco Anton, "Trotskyism-The Mortal Enemy of the People's Front,"
Communist International 15, no. 1 (January 1937): 87. See also Francisco Anton,
210 NoTES TO PAGES 140-143

"Trotskyists in Spain-Open Agents of Fascism," Imprecor. Special Edition on Spain,

18, no. 24 (May 17, 1938), 548-52.
14. From a speech by Jose Diaz to the Plenum of the Communist party of Spain,
Valencia, 1937, Marty Archives.
15. Le proces du centre parallele Trotzkiste deviant le Tribunal Supreme de
1'URSS," Vers Ia Libert€, no. 9 (February 2, 1937), 2.
16. "Les Trotzkystes, enemis jures du peuple, de Ia liberte et de Ia democratie," Le
Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 1 (February 16, 1937), 2.
17. "Fascismo y Trotzkismo," Le So/dat de Ia Republique, no. 44 (August 17, 1937),
6.
18. Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Theme 10, Marty Archives. Among the
many other articles run on the subject of Trotskyism were "Franco's Trotskyist Allies
against International Solidarity," Boletfn de Informacion, no. 242 (August 5, 1937), 4;
Andre Marty, Heroic Spain (New York, 1937); "More Poumists Nabbed as Spies,"
Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 10 (August 16, 1937), 3; "Vigilance," Le So/dat de Ia
Republique, no. 45 (August 29, 1937), 1; "Exterminate the Trotskyists," Our Fight, no.
39 (May 10, 1937), 2; Notre Combat, no. 28 (May 17, 1937), 1.
19. Numero Extrodinario, "XX Aniversario de Ia Union Sovietica," (November 7,
1937); Bo/etfn de Informacion, no. 290 (October 27, 1937), 6-10; ibid., no. 284 (October
21, 1937), 7-8; ibid., no. 265 (October 22, 1937), 8; ibid., no. 280 (October 14, 1937),
8.
20. Among the many examples of this were A. Go1ubev, "A Soviet Military Special-
ist on the Significance of the Jarama Battles," Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 3 (June 8,
1937); "The Policy of British Imperialism," ibid., 1, no. 4 (June 15, 1937); Boletfn de
Informacion, no. 310 (November 18, 1937), 6; Marcel Cachin, "Staline," ibid., no. 307
(November 11, 1927), 3; and "The Economic Progress of Soviet Industry," Vers Ia
Libert€, no. 2 (January 25, 1937), 1.
21. Boletfn de Informacion, no. 327 (December 9, 1937), 2; ibid., no. 325 (Decem-
ber 7, 1937), 5; ibid., no. 286 (October 23, 1937), 6; ibid., no. 299 (November 2,
1937), 8.
22. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 2 (June 1, 1937), 2; Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no.
7 (May 2, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 9 (May 5, 1937), 1.
23. Bo/etfn de Informacion, no. 279 (October 13, 1937), 8.
24. Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 36 (July 1, 1937), 1; Volunteer for Liberty 1, no.
4 (June 15, 1937), 6; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 315 (November 23, 1937), 7; Nuestros
Espaiioles; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 213 (August 7, 1937), 5; "Thaelmann in
a
Paris-1932," ibid., no 294 (October 30, 1937), 7-8; "Hommage Notre Grand Ami
Ernst Thaelmann," Vers Ia Liberte, no. 30 (April21, 1937), 1; Boletfn de Informacion.
no. 317 (November 25, 1937), 5-6, offers Browder's analysis of recent American politi-
cal developments. Ibid., no. 330 (December 12, 1937), 12; ibid., no. 319 (November 28,
a
1937), 3; "Maurice Thorez Apporte la 12e Brigade le Salut du Front Populaire
Francais," Vers Ia Libert€, no. 11 (February 5, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 13 (February 9, 1937),
1; ibid., no. 4 (January 27, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 5 (January 28, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 6
(January 30, 1937), 1.
25. Bo/etfn de Informacion, no. 285 (October 19, 1937), 6; Volunteer for Liberty 1,
no. 1 (May 24, 1937), 5; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 239 (September 2, 1937), 5.
Notes to Pages 144-149 211
26. II Garibaldino, no. 18 (October 28, 1937), 7, carried a full-page message to the
Italians in the Brigade from the Italian Communist party. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no.
4 (June 15, 1937), 8; Boletin de Informacion. no. 233 (August 27, 1937), 7.
27. Notre Combat, no. 11 (March 25, 1937), 1; Our Fight. no. 15 (March 22, 1937),
1; Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 4 (June 15, 1937), 6.
28. Boletin de Informacion. no. 315 (November 23, 1937), 7-8.
29. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 5 (June 22, 1937), 1, discusses the proposed meeting,
including a message from Dimitroff, and photographs of the Comintern delegation,
Longo, Dahlem, Thorez, Cachin, Diaz; "Towards United Action," ibid., no. 7 (July
12, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 6 (June 29, 1937), 6.
30. Le So/dat de Ia Republique, no. 25 (April27, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 48 (September
20, 1937), l.
31. Ibid., no. 46 (September 1, 1937), 4. This was addressed to Comrade de Brouck-
ere and signed "The Belgian Comrades of the XIV Brigade."
32. Ibid. This was signed "Vittori, Political Commissar, XIV Brigade and Dumont,
Commander, XIV Brigade."
33. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 4 (June 15, 1937), 6; Andre Marty, Heroic Spain;
Franz Dahlem, "The Communist International in the Fight for International Unity,"
lmprecor, Special Edition (October 1937), 586-90. This article is devoted to a summary
of the Comintern's efforts to "achieve solidarity and unity of action" with the Socialist
and Labor organizations. It shows clearly that the Comintern put a great deal of effort
into the attempt toward getting these groups fully to support the Communist Popular
Front line in Spain and their disillusionment in failing to do so.
34. Boletin de Informacion. no. 242 (August 5, 1937), 4.
35. Georgi Dimitroff, "The United Front of the Struggle for Peace," Communist
International 13, no. 5 (May 1936): 20; ibid., 3, "The Struggle for the Anti-Japanese
People's Front in China."
36. Boletin de Informacion,. no. 321 (December 2, 1937), 6.
37. "Can China Beat Japan?" ibid., no. 292 (October 30, 1937), 7-8 (including an
analysis by Mao Tse-Tung as quoted from Edgar Snow's Red Star over China).
38. Boletin de lnformaci6n, no. 230 (August 24, 1937), 7-8.
39. "Treason Is the Only Name for Treason," Our Fight, no. 40 (May 11, 1937),
1; "Long Live the Popular Front," Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 1 (May 24, 1937), 4.
These were among a ftood of articles on the general subject of Trotskyism and uncon-
trollables following the events in Barcelona of May 1937.
40. This was consistently stressed in the Brigade press; for example, // Garibaldino,
no. 9 (August 24, 1937), 1; Vers Ia Liberti, no. 6 (January 30, 1937), l.
41. The best discussion of the Communists versus Largo Caballero conftict is in
Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution. see also Largo Caballero, Mis Recuerdos (Mexico,
1954). Prieto, Como y por que; Marty, Heroic Spain, 24; Marty, "Spain Is Waiting,"
Boletin de Informacion. no. 306 (November 12, 1937), 6; Volunteer for Liberty 1, no.
1 (May 24, 1937), 1-5; ibid., l.
42. Ecole des Commissaires de Guerre, Marty Archives.
43. Communist /nternationa/11, no. 3 (March 1940): 179; ibid., 13, no. 11 (Novem-
ber 1936): 741.
44. Boletin de Informacion, no. 283 (October 19, 1937), 4.
212 NoTES TO PAGES 149-156

45. II Garibaldino, no. 18 (October 28, 1937), 4-5; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 210
(August 3, 1937), 2.
46. Notre Combat, no. 27 (May 1, .1937), 9; Le Soldat de Ia Republique, no. 49
(September 27, 1937), 4-5; Departmental Notice 6553, Albacete, July 22, 1937, as
printed in the Bo/etfn de Informacion, no. 204 (July 28, 1937), 12.
47. Louis Fischer, Politics. 406.
48. Boletfn de InformaciOn, no. 344 (December 28, 1937), 2.
49. Robert Minor, Report to the Tenth Convention of the Communist Party of New
York. May 1938; Bo/etfn de InformaciOn, no. 282 (October 17, 1937), 6.
50. Communist International 14, no. 2 (February 1937): 866; ibid., nos. 5-6 (June
1937): 1077; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 280 (October 19, 1937), 6.
51. Tagesnachrichten der Internationa/en Brigaden, no. 281 (October 16, 1937), 3.
52. Nuestro Combate, no. 35 (December 1937-January 1938), 5.
53. Bo/etfn de Informacion, no. 282 (October 17, 1937), 7.
54. Ibid., no. 260 (September 24, 1937), 8.
55. Louis Fischer, "Madrid's Foreign Defenders," Nation (September 4, 1937),
235-37; Martha Gellhom, "Men without Medals," Collier's (January 15, 1938), 49.
56. Matthews, Two Wars, 220; Vincent Sheean, Not Peace but a Sword (New York,
1939), 70, 269.
57. Ecole des Commissaires de Gue"e, Theme 9, Marty Archives.
58. Barea, Rebel, 643.
59. Vers Ia Liberti, no. 11 (February 5, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 13 (February 9, 1937),
1.
60. Boletfn de Informacion, no. 332 (December 10, 1937), 2.
61. Ibid., no. 283 (October 9, 1937), 4.
62. Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 7 (July 12, 1937), 2, 6.
63. Notre Combat, no. 28 (May 17, 1937), 3; Volunteer for Liberty 1, no. 7 (July 12,
1937), 4-6; Haldane, Truth, 124-31.
64. Notre Combat, no. 7 (March 15, 1937), 3.
65. Our Fight, no. 3 (March 7, 1937), 1; ibid., no. 36 (May 7, 1937), 1; Boletfn de
InformaciOn, no. 328 (December 10, 1937), 4; Gates, American Communist, 56-57.
66. Bo/etfn de InformaciOn, no. 315 (November 23, 1937), 2.
67. Volunteer for Liberty 2, no. 33 (October 6, 1938), 1.
68. Herrick, Testimony, SACB, Report and Order. 19. The FALB raised over
$450,000. Volunteer for Liberty (January 1940). The FALB metamorphosed into the
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade after the Spanish war and continued to
publish a paper called the Volunteer for Liberty. The VALB was also a party-controlled
organization.
69. Haldane, Truth. 98-99, 141.
70. Nuestros Espofio/es, 9.
71. Boletfn de InformaciOn, no. 28 (October 28, 1937), 7; an article in// Garibaldino
informed the Italian volunteers how word of their activities in Spain was beamed into
Italy. "Le repercussioni in Italia di un anno di Iotta della Brigata," no. 18 (October 28,
1937), 6. The same was true of Yugoslavia. Nuestros Espofioles "Lo que decimos al
mundo de nuestra lucha," 43.
72. Boletfn de Informacion, no. 253 (September 16, 1937).
Notes to Pages 156-162 213

73. Volunteer for Liberty (June 29, 1937), 8.

74. Ibid. (August 23, 1937), 1.
75. K.antorowicz, Tagebiich. 433-34; Renn, Krieg. 294, 318-19; Ehrenburg, Eve of
War, 183; Boletin de Informacion, German Edition, no. 291 (October 27, 1937), 4;
Regler, Owl ofMinerva, 314-1 5; Nenni, Guerre, 229; Last, Tragedy, 232; Notre Com-
bat, no. 29 (June 3, 1937), 5.
76. Ibid, no. 11 (March 25, 1937), 1; Boletfn de Informacion, no. 269 (October 3,
1937), 2.
77. Volunteer for Liberty 2, no. 20 (May 25, 1938), 12; Marcel Acier, ed. From
Spanish Trenches (New York, 1937); Joe Dallet, Letters from Spain (New York, 1938);
FALB, Letters from Spain (San Francisco, 1937); Letters from the Trenches from our
Boys in Spain (New York, n.d.). Letters also appeared in various sympathetic periodi-
cals. "With the International Brigade in Spain," Nation (May 8, 1937).

CHAPTER 10
1. Orlov Memo; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 104.
2. Borkenau, Cockpit, 239-41.
3. Orwell, Catalonia, 175-79.
4. Ibid., 146-47.
5. The notoriety of the Cheka operating as an autonomous force was mentioned
as one factor causing an anti-Communist reaction among many Spaniards in an inter-
esting political analysis sent to the State Department by an American diplomatic officer
in October 1937: Doc. 852100/6955, Foreign Relations of the U.S., 1937, 236.
6. Orwell, Catalonia, 174-75; John McGovern, Terror 1-20.
7. Elstob, Spanish Prisoner, 55-110.
8. Olaf DeWet, The Patrol Is Ended (New York,1938), 320-30.
9. Orwell, Catalonia, 196, 216-17; the POUM newspaper carried an article on
Smillie's death entitled "Un crimen horrendo del que debe responder el Gobierno
Negrin." Juventud Obrero (July 12, 1937), 2.
10. Last, Tragedy, 276.
11. Payne, Revolution, 346-47. This includes a verification of the complete auton-
omy of the Brigade SIM from the official government SIM by a onetime chief of the
government SIM, Manuel Ulibarri. Ulibarri referred to the Brigade police as "a direct
offshoot of the GPU and off limits to us."
12. Penchienati, Spagna, 39.
13. "Las Brigadas lnternacionales bajo el terror Stalinista," Juventud Obrero (No-
vember 30, 1937). This article is based on the statement of a British deserter from the
Brigades in which he tells of being arrested and incarcerated by the Brigade Cheka
in the prison at Albacete. He tells of the many other Brigade comrades imprisoned
there.
14. Late in 1938 certain Loyalist officials did attempt to intervene in the autonomous
police powers of the Brigades. By that time, however, the government was almost ready
to disband the Brigades. Penchienati, Spagna, 121-23.
15. Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 220-25; Honeycomb, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings,
7747-48.
214 NOTES TO PAGES 162-166

16. Penchienati, Spagna, 40-41; Ruth Fischer, German Communism, SOO; Last,
Tragedy, 276; Krivitsky, Secret Service, 104.
17. Penchienati, Spagna, 42.
18. Ibid., 39; Ruth Fischer, German Communism, 500 (on the difficulties of pinning
down Ulbricht's role in the Spanish war, see Stem, Ulbricht 71-72 n.).
19. Valtin, Out of the Night, 356.
20. Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 36-37. Neumann was among the
many Comintern stalwarts who, when recalled from Spain back to Moscow, fell victim
to the purges there. Perhaps he was even accused of Trotskyism.
21. McGovern, Terror, 5-10.
22. Valtin, Out ofthe Night, 308-13; Richard Krebs, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings,
May 27, 1941, 8517.
23. Liston Oak, Testimony, HUAC, Hellrings. March 21, 1947, 72; Liston Oak,
"Alert," New Leader (March 15, 1947).
24. Valtin, Out ofthe Night, 313; Liston Oak, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, March
21, 1947, 73. The murder of Nin became something of a cause ceiebre. The story was
later told by the top Spanish Communist Jeslls Hernandez that in fact Nin had been
imprisoned by Cheka agents and tortured. Later, under the direction of Vidali, a
contingent of German International Brigade men posing as Gestapo Agents, had staged
a jail break to liberate Nin, following which they murdered him. Hernandez, Minestro
de Stalin, 126.
25. Dallin, Espionage, 409, from an article by Liston Oak in the Socialist journal
The Call. December 18, 1937; ibid., 409, as quoted from the testimony of William
McCuiston before the HUAC; ibid., as quoted from the testimony of Maurice L.
Malkin before the HUAC.
26. Budenz, Men without Faces, 35-37. Nelson later played a key role in the Soviet
espionage apparatus connected with getting atomic bomb intelligence in the United
States and was among those convicted and imprisoned under the Smith Act. On
Nelson's background and activities, see Dallin, Espionage, 467-68.
27. For example, Auguste Lecouer was assigned by Marty to the XIII Brigade
political commissar post. Rol Tanguy eventually became political commissar of the
XIV Brigade and, much later, led the Communist attempt to take over Paris before the
Allies or General de Gaulle could arrive. See Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre,
Is Paris Burning? (New York, 1965).
28. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 79; Copeman, Reason, 107-11.
29. U. S. Diplomatic Papers. 1937, 482.
30. Notre Combat, no. 7 (March 15, 1937); "Attention Aux Agents de Franco," Le
So/dat de Ia Republique, no. 20 (April 4, 1937), 1.
31. Gillain, 195; U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1937, 482; Honeycomb, Testimony,
HUAC, Hellrings, 7747-50. There was not, except in the peculiar case of the Italians
who entered the International Brigade through the original Garibaldi group, any
written commitment on the part of anyone. The terms of agreement set down in the
document drawn up by the Italian Popular Front committee in Paris did specifically
state the six-month term.
32. Numerous such cases are documented in The Red Dominion in Spain (Madrid,
1961).
Notes to Pages 167-173 215

33. U.S. Diplomatic Papers, 1937, 556-51. It is doubtful if these men were executed.
The more common practice was to sentence would-be deserters to labor or discipline
companies and to assign these units to dangerous sectors of the front.
34. Edward Knoblaugh, Correspondent in Spain (New York, 1937), 227.
35. New York Times. May 25, 1937, 1. The correspondent was George Axelsson.
This particular recruit actually deserted while in France, having decided on the trip
that he had made a mistake. This case fits the same pattern as that of William Ryan
who also was recruited through the ads for skilled workers run by the Society for
Technical Aid to Spanish Democracy.
36. Henry Scott Beattie, Letter to Editor, Canadian Forum (April 1938).
37. "Las Brigadas Intemacionales bajo e1 terror Stalinista," Juventud Obrero (No-
vember 30, 1937). That this man wrote such an article and that it appeared in a POUM
newspaper would have clearly put him in the category of Trotskyist and have marked
him for liquidation so far as the Communists were concerned.
38. Stephen Spender, World within World (New York, 1951), 220-21.
39. Ibid., 224.
40. Bessie, Men in Battle, 110-95, on the passionate desire of the large majority of
men of the American battalion to leave Spain by the time of the official withdraw! in
late 1938. See Edwin Rolfe, The Lincoln Battalion (New York, 1939), 245-46, on the
drying up of the stream of new recruits by mid-1938 and the numerical weakness of
the American contingent by then.
41. Bessie, Men in Battle, 149.
42. Regier, Owl of Minerva, 325.
43. Longo, Brigate, 258-60.
44. Penchienati, Spagna, 91; Gillain, Le Mercenaire. 196-97.
45. Honeycomb, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 7745-55; Gillain, Le Mercenaire,
196-97.
46. U. S. Diplomatic Papers, 1937, 491-531.
47. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 77-79; Gillain, Le Mercenaire, 230-47.
48. Marty Archives.
49. McCuiston, Testimony, HUAC, Hearings, 6708-25.
50. Herrick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 121; Voros, Commissar,
472.
51. Haldane, Truth Will Out, 127, 137.
52. Valtin, Out of the Night, 717.
53. Willy Brandt, My Road to Berlin (London, 1960); Erich Wollenburg, "Der
Apparat: Stalin's Funfte Kolonne," Ostprobleme, no. 19 (1951), as quoted in Stem,
Ulbricht; Orwell, Catalonia, 207.
54. Maken, Testimony, SACB, Stenographic Record, 4:840-49; Voros, Commissar,
232.
55. Horan, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 39; Voros, Commissar, 286;
Borkenau, Cockpit, 255-56, related a similar case and said, "In general the political
commissars of the International Brigades are in the habit of supposing that every man
who leaves the Brigade in order to take up work in another capacity-not under direct
Communist control-is a deserter, and treat him accordingly."
56. Herrick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 38.
216 NoTES TO PAGES 174-176

57. Gladnick, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 38-39; Johnson, Legions,

108-9; Penchienati, Spagna, 114-20; Copeman, Reason, 136-47, on executions in the
British battalion.
58. Gillain, Le Merr:enaire, 215; Voros, Commissar, 410-11; Penchienati, Spagna,
112-13.
59. Lecouer, Le Partisan, 72; Louis Fischer, Politics, 400-405; Regier, Owl of
Minerva, 179, 292, 324-25; Penchienati, Spagna, 119.
60. Martinez Bande, lntenenci6n comunista, 110; Lecouer, Le Partisan, 79; Louis
Fischer, Politics, 404-5.
61. Marty Archives. In the 1950s he was expelled from the party, but that had
nothing to do with his work in Spain.
62. Ernest Hemingway, For Whom the Bell Tolls (New York, 1939), 417-26.
63. Maken, Wolff, Testimony, SACB, Recommended Decision, 168.
64. Marty Archives.
 Bibliographical Essay

Since I have used a wide variety of primary sources in this study, especially
the official Comintem press and the press of the International Brigades themselves, my
chapter notes provide a better and more thorough indication of this type of material
than could any formal bibliography. In this essay, therefore, I will discuss only the more
important books and documentary sources that I found to be valuable in this study of
the International Brigades.
The standard· general work in English on the civil war in Spain as a whole, both
military and political, is Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961). A
revised and expanded edition of this work was published in 1977. An excellent analysis
of the immediate background to the war, emphasizing the internal chaos of the left and
the radicalization and polarization of politics that led to the pronunciamiento is R.A.H.
s
Robinson, The Origins ofFranco Spain (Pittsburgh, 1970). Solid works on the politi-
cal role of the Communists and the Soviet Union during the civil war are David T.
Cattell, Communism and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley, 1955) and Soviet Diplomacy
and the Spanish Civil War (Berkeley, 1957).
The best and most indispensable works on the internecine struggles of the left during
the war and on the methods by which the Communists succeeded in dominating the
Loyalist regime are Burnett Bolloten, The Grand Camouflage (New York, 1961) and
his later expansion of the same theme, The Spanish Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C.,
1979). Excellent also is Stanley Payne, The Spanish Revolution (New York, 1970).
The memoirs and accounts of participants and firsthand observers of events in Spain
are numerous. Among the more useful are George Orwell, Homage to Catalonia (New
York, 1952), which offers an excellent insight from both a participant and an acute
observer into the actual political situation on the left during the first year or so of the
war. It was among the first to cut through the propaganda smoke screen that depicted
the Loyalists as united defenders of the Republic. Another work that did somewhat the
same thing, but from a more detached point of view, was Franz Borkenau, The Spanish
Cockpit (London, 1937). Useful insights into much that went on in Madrid from the
perspective of a Spanish Socialist who worked in the censorship bureau there are to be
found in Arturo Barea, The Forging ofa Rebel (New York, 1946). An important inside
look at these events by one who was an active participant is Pietro Nenni, La Guerre
de Espagne (Paris, 1960). Nenni was chief of the Italian Socialist party, an active
advocate of the Popular Front and of Loyalist Spain, and a political collaborator ofboth
the Spanish Socialists and the Communists. Other useful accounts by firsthand ob-
servers are Geoffrey Cox, Defense ofMadrid (London, 1937), by a British Communist
correspondent; Ilya Ehrenburg, Eve of War 1933-1941 (London, 1963) by a knowl-
edgeable Russian; and Mikhail Koltsov, Diorio de Ia guerra de Espaiia (Paris, 1963)
by the Pravda correspondent (and a leading Soviet agent) in Spain during the war.
Louis Fischer, Men and Politics (New York, 1941) is an important source from a
218 COMINTERN ARMY

pro-Loyalist American who was well placed and connected to know much of what went
on in Spain during the war.
The recollections of several Loyalist army officers are of some interest. Jose Martin
B!asquez, I Helped to Build an Army (London, 1940), on the problems of creating the
Loyalist People's Army; Seigismundo Casado, Last Days of Madrid (London, 1939),
by the Loyalist officer who led the anti-Communist forces in the showdown within the
Loyalist camp at the end of the war; and Vicente Rojo, Espana heroica (Buenos Aires,
1942), by the chief of staff of the Loyalist army indicate something of the political
relationships within the Loyalist government and army.
Some of the leading politicians of the left have contributed their accounts. Manuel
Azaiia, La velada en Benicar/o (Buenos Aires, 1939), offers the postwar refiections of
the president of the Republic. From the Socialists we have Fransicso Largo Caballero,
Mis recuerdos (Mexico, 1954), and Indalecio Prieto, Como y par que sali del minesterio
de defensa naciona/ (Paris, 1939). From leading Spanish Communists we have accounts
from both those who remained in the party and those who left. Among the former are
Dolores lbarruri, Guerra y revoluci6n en Espana 1936-1939 (Moscow, 1966); Enrique
Lister, Nuestro guerra (Paris, 1966); and Jose Diaz, Tres anos de lucha (Toulouse,
1947), all of whom defend and justify the role ofthe party during the war. Among the
latter are Enrique Castro Delgado, Hombres made en Moscu (Barcelona, 1965); Valen-
tin Gonz8lez, Communista en Espana y anti-Sta/inista en Rusia (Mexico, 1953); and
Jeslls Hernandez, Yo fui un minestro de Stalin (Mexico, 1953). These are to a large
extent exposes of the role of puppet of the Soviet Union and Comintern played by the
Spanish Communists.
On the general theme of Soviet and Comintern policy and strategy during the
Popular Front era and the application of that to the Spanish confiict, Arthur Koestler,
Invisible Writing (New York, 1954) and his essay in Richard Crossman ed., The God
That Failed (New York, 1950) are especially valuable since he was a party activist and
knowledgeable insider at the time. A solid secondary work on this subject is K. E.
McKenzie, The Comintern and World Revolution (New York, 1964). On the American
party Theodore Draper, The Roots ofAmerican Communism (New York, 1957), and
Lewis Coser and Irving Howe, The American Communist Party (New York, 1962) are
good general works, while Louis Budenz, Men without Faces: The Communist Conspir-
acy in the USA (New York, 1948) is by a leading party defector, and William Z. Foster,
History of the Communist Party in the United States (New York, 1952) is the party line
by a leading member.
For European Communist parties, M. Einaudi, Communism in Western Europe
(Ithaca, N.Y., 1951); Franz Borkenau, World Communism (London, 1939); Hilton W.
Young, The Italian Left (London, 1949); Carola Stern, Ulbricht: A Political Biography
(New York, 1964); and Ruth Fischer, Stalin and German Communism (Cambridge,
Mass., 1948) are all good. For England, Philip Toynbee, Friends Apart (London, 1954)
by a one-time party adherent and Douglas Hyde, I Believed (New York, 1950) by a
party activist during the Popular Front era who later defected are revealing. Neal
Wood, Communism and the British Intellectuals (New York, 1959) is an excellent
study of particular value in providing biographical background to many British Com-
munists who participated in the International Brigades. Charlotte Haldane, Truth Will
Out (London, 1949) is valuable as a firsthand account of the Comintern recruitment
Bibliographical Essay 219

elforts and the operations in Paris by a British Communist who later left the party. Also
of interest on this subject are Pat Sloan, ed., John Cornford: A Memoir (London, 1938),
and Peter Stansky and William Abrahams, Journey to the Frontier (New York, 1966).
Works particularly useful in furnishing hard-to-lind information on individuals in-
volved in Comintem activities in Spain and elsewhere, and into some of their activities
prior to the Spanish war, are Walter Krivitsky, In Stalin~ Secret Service (New York,
1939), written by a general in the Soviet army intelligence service in western Europe
in the 1936-1937 period who later defected; David J. Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New
Haven, Conn., 1955); Alexander Orlov, The Secret History of Stalin~ Crimes (New
York, 1953) by the chief Soviet NKVD agent in Spain; Jan Valtin, Out of the Night
(New York, 1941) by an ex German Communist; and J. Rindt and J. Gumpery (pseud.
Ypsilon), Pattern for World Revolution (Chicago, 1947). For the Soviet military person-
nel in Spain (at least those deemed mentionable at the time of publication), Rodin
Malinovski y otros, Bajo Ia bandero de Ia Espana repub/icana (Moscow, 1969). This
is the official Soviet account of the role of their army officers in Spain. Also helpful in
pinning down individuals are the publication of the Spanish Office of Information, The
International Brigades (Madrid, 1952), and Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La interven-
ci6n comunista en Ia gue"a de Espana (Madrid, 1965).
On the military aspects of the war as a whole, the only treatment in English is Hugh
Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961, 1977). On the battles for Madrid,
Robert Colodny, The Struggle for Madrid (New York, 1958) is useful. The standard
Spanish military history of the war is Manuel Aznar, Historia de Ia guerra de Espaiia
(Madrid, 1958). But more useful are the series of monographs on various campaigns
and operations by Jose Manuel Martinez Bande, La marcha sobre Madrid (Madrid,
1968), and La lucha en torno de Madrid (Madrid, 1970). Martinez Bande, an officer
in the Spanish army, had access to the archives of the army's Servicio Historico Militar,
an advantage other historians lack.
On the attitudes and activities of the non-Communist Italians in the Spanish militia,
Carlo Rosselli, Oggi in Spagna, Domani in Ita/ia (Paris, 1938) is interesting. Other
works on the non-Communist foreigners in the militia are George Orwell, Homage to
Catalonia (New York, 1952), and Jef Last, The Spanish Trogedy (London, 1937).
The works dealing with the International Brigades specifically can be categorized in
various ways. There are the official publications of the Brigade Commissariat itself.
Among the more important of these are Aiio de las Brigadas Internaciana/es (Madrid,
1937); Theodor Balk, ed., La Quatorzieme (Madrid, 1931); Le Livre de Ia 15eme
Brigade Internationa/e (Madrid, 1937) and its English language equivalent The Book
of the XV Brigade (Madrid, 1938); Garibaldini in Spagna (Madrid, 1937); Alfred
Kantorowicz, Tschapaiev: Dos Bataillon de 21 Nationen (Madrid, 1938); and Nuestros
Espanoles (Madrid, 1937). All of these are naturally highly slanted to show the Bri-
gades in the most favorable light and follow the standard Communist and Popular
Front line. Their chief value for the historian is in the many names and the biographical
information they provide on individuals in the various units, and in the many details
on at least some of the activities and attitudes prevalent among those in charge of the
Brigades.
A second category would be the semi-official works written by party functionaries
and activists and published under party auspices. These include L'Amicale des Anciens
220 COMINTERN ARMY

Volontaires Fran~ en Espagne Republicaine, L 'Epopee d'Espagne: Brigades Interna-

tionales 1936-1938 (Paris, 1956); Alfred Kantorowicz, Spanisches Tagebiich (Berlin,
1948); Steve Nelson, The Volunteers (New York, 1953); Joe North, Men in the Ranks
(New York, 1939); Marcel Acier, ed., From Spanish Trenches (New York, 1937);
William Rust, Britons in Spain: The History of the XV International Brigade (London,
1939); Gustav Szinda, Die XI Brigade (Berlin, 1956); and Max Wullschleger, Schweizer
Kampfen in Spanien (Zurich, 1939). These adhere to basically the same standards as
the first group and are of value in about the same way.
A third category includes those books written by participants in the Brigades as
individuals rather than under party control. These vary greatly as to approach, range
of view, and knowledgeability of the writers. By far the single most important primary
source book written on the entire subject of the political side of the Brigades is Luigi
Longo, Le Brigate Internazionali in Spagna (Rome, 1956). Although Longo adheres
strictly to the party line, it is the party line from a particularly authoritative source.
Longo's position and role in the Comintern, in the Brigades, and later (at the time his
book was published, for example), the Communist party of Italy all make him a key
witness. His book covers the entire picture of the Spanish war and of the International
Brigades from begiuning to end. It deals with virtually all the political issues and
questions involved. Thus it offers the historian a prime source for an authoritative
statement of the Commuuist position on all these matters. Another source from the
Italian contingent is Giacomo Calandrone, Spagna Brucia (Rome, 1962). This account
by a party member and close collaborator of Longo's while in Spain basically echos
Longo's book but is valuable in furnishing details and also as an example of the
Communist position on many of the controversial issues within the XII Brigade. Two
other essential sources from the Italians are Randolfo Pacciardi, /1 Battaglione Gari-
baldi (Lugano, 1938); and Carlo Penchienati, Brigate Internazionali in Spagna: Delitti
della "Ceka" Communista (Milan, 1950). Pacciardi's book is somewhat disappointing
in its lack of discussion on the political issues in the Brigade. Published while the war
in Spain was still in progress, Pacciardi presumably did not wish to do or say anything
that might weaken or embarrass the Loyalist camp: thus his silence on matters of
importance. Still his book offers the best source for his own attitudes toward what he
thought he (and the other Italians) were, or should be, doing in Spain. Penchienati's
book is quite a different matter. Written long after the event by a nonpolitical who
served in the Brigades from begiuning to end, and who was a top-ranking officer in the
Garibaldi uuit, Penchienati's book is a thorough expose of the political machinations
of the Communist hierarchy of the Brigades, of their vendetta against Pacciardi, and
of the operations of the political police apparatus in the Brigades. It is also a valuable
source for the identification and background of many of the Italians in Spain.
Among the American contributions are Alvah Bessie, Men in Battle (New York,
1939). Bessie, an American party member and writer, was a late arrival in Spain. His
book rellects in general the party line on Spain and the Brigades, but there are a few
places where he sheds light on some of the less positive aspects of things. The book,
like many of the more personal accounts, deals heavily with the combat experience.
Another of this same type is Edwin Rolfe, The Lincoln Battalion (New York, 1939)
by the onetime editor ofthe Volunteer for Liberty in Spain. From a somewhat different
perspective but still completely favorable to the Brigades is John Gates, The Story of
Bibliographical Essay 221

an American Communist (New York, 1958). Written long after the Spanish war by one
who rose to become XV Brigade commissar and who, much later, left the party and
seeks to explain it all in this book, Gates's comments on his experience in the Brigades
are strangely reticent. He still felt, even after losing faith in the party, that his Brigade
experience was the high point in his life. It seems he was still unwilling, or unable, to
disturb that memory with a very searching analysis. Sandor Voros, American Commis-
sar (Philadelphia, 1961) on the other hand is a thoroughgoing critique ofthe Commu-
nist policy in Spain and of the Brigades themselves. Voros, who was a party activist
at the time of his tour in Spain, offers a good many insights into the working of the
American party toward the Spanish war and the Brigades and, from the political side,
is quite a valuable source.
Nick Gi1lain, Le Mercenaire (Paris, 1938), written by a nonpolitical who served as
an officer in the XIV Brigade, takes a critical view of the Communists' role but is mainly
a personal memoir. It provides numerous interesting details about individuals and
events. Auguste Lecouer, Le Partisan (Paris, 1963) is a much more valuable source on
the political side of things. He was an activist in the French party and was sent to Spain
to serve as a politically reliable cadre in the Brigades. He was given several political
assignments by Marty and, in general, was a knowledgeable insider. He wrote this book
after leaving the party.
The fullest account from a German who was in a position to know much of what
was going on is Ludwig Renn, Der Spanische Krieg (Berlin, 1955). Renn deals mainly
with the military campaigns of the Brigades but offers insights into numerous other
matters. Gustav Regier, Owl ofMinerva (New York, 1960) is much more valuable from
the political side. Regier, a member of the German party, sometime political commissar.
of the XII Brigade, and an articulate spokesman for the Communists in Spain, wrote
this book after leaving the party. Its view of the Brigades is interesting when compared
with his earlier fictionalized account in the novel The Great Crusade (New York, 1940).
From the English participants John Sommerfeld, Volunteer in Spain (London, 1937),
Keith Scott Watson, Single to Spain (London, 1937), and Esmond Romilly, Boadil/a
(London, 1937) are personal accounts of the experiences of rank and filers in the
Brigades. Thomas Wintringham, English Captain (London, 1939) is by a more highly
placed and knowledgeable participant. Wintringham, a party member and writer,
commanded the British battalion in its opening combat experience. While uncritical
and mainly concerned with the military side, much factual information is included on
the early development of the Brigades. More valuable from the political point of view
is Fred Copeman, Reason in Revolt (London, 1948). Copeman served in the British
battalion throughout and rose to command it. He later left the party and his book
reflects his disillusionment with the Communists. Jef Last, The Spanish Tragedy (Lon-
don, 1937) is by a Dutch Communist who served in both the Spanish militia and the
Brigades. He later left the party and offers a critical view of its operations in Spain.
The only scholarly secondary work on the Brigades as a whole is the interesting but
slim book by Verle Johnson, Legions of Babel (University Park, 1967). Popular treat-
ments are Vincent Brome, The International Brigades: Spain 1936--1939 (New York,
1960); Jacque de Bayac, Les Brigades Internationales (Paris, 1968); and Adolfo Liz6n
Gadea, Las Brigadas Internacionales en Espana (Madrid, 1940). The most massive
secondary work on the American contingent is Arthur Landis, The Abraham Lincoln
222 CoMINTERN ARMY

Brigade (New York, 1967). It, unfortunately, is basically a rerun of the standard party
line in every respect and is badly tlawed by errors of both commission and omission.
Robert A. Rosenstone, Crusade on the Left: The Lincoln Battalion in the Spanish CiPil
War (New York, 1969) focuses chiefty on the motivation of the American participants.
By far the best and most penetrating study of the American battalion is Cecil Eby,
Between the Bullet and the Lie (New York, 1969).
Perhaps the best, most complete, and most authoritative source for the Communist
position on the Popular Front, the war in Spain, the International Brigades, and other
concerns is the official party press. The most useful are the official Comintern organs,
the Communist International and International Press Correspondence (lmpf"f!C()r).
Also useful are the party newspapers, Mundo Obrero and Frente Rojo in Spain, the
Daily Worker in Britain and the United States, and L 'Humanite in France.
For the position of the Brigade leadership the best source is the Brigade press. I found
the Volunteer for Liberty, Le Soldat de Ia Republique, Nuestro Combate, Reconquista,
and the Boletfn de Informaci6n de las Brigadas Internacionales especially valuable.
The volumes of the Foreign Relations ofthe United States, Diplomatic Papers (Wash-
ington, D.C., 1954, 1955, 1956) for the years of the Spanish Civil War offer occasional
worthwhile insights into certain events in Spain, especially the efforts of American
Brigade men to get out of the country. The testimony of certain witnesses before the
United States Congress, House Committee on Un-American Activities, regarding the
experience of American participants in the International Brigades is also a valuable
source for certain aspects of the story which would otherwise be lacking. A source of
even more value to the study of the Brigades is the hearings of the United States
Subversive Activities Control Board on the Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
organization. Numerous men who had served in the Brigades gave testimony at these
hearings that ran to twelve volumes and many thousands of pages that compose the
Stenographic Record of the hearings. A synopsis of the testimony and the findings of
the board were printed in U.S. Subversive Activities Control Board, Docket no.
108-153, Herbert Brownell Jr., Attorney General of the United States, Petitioner
v. The Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade, Respondent, Recommended
Decision (Washington, D.C., 1955). A second, and even more condensed, synopsis of
the findings was printed as the Report and Order of the Board (Washington, D.C.,
1955).
The Marty Archives are disappointingly scant and sketchy. They contain a collection
of largely irrelevant or redundant material so far as the Brigades, or Marty's role in
them, is concerned. The one item of signifi.cant value in them is a copy of the instructors'
manual used in the International Brigade school for political commissars. This docu-
ment is one of the best firsthand sources for the programs and policies of the Brigade
political hierarchy and of the thoroughgoing Communist orientation provided for
fledgling political commissars in the Brigades.
The Orlov Memo comprises the answers given by Alexander Orlov, the chief Soviet
NKVD man in Spain, to a set of questions posed to him by Stanley Payne. Orlov had
by that time defected from the USSR and was thus free to speak the truth. There is
little or nothing in this about the Brigades themselves, but it is firsthand evidence of
some of the operations of the NKVD in Spain. A copy of this document was kindly
furnished to me by Professor Payne.
Bibliographical Essay 223
A major bibliographical source for the entire Spanish Civil War is R. de Ia Cierva
y colaboradores, Bibliografia sobre Ia guerra de Espana (1936-1919) y sus antecedentes
(Madrid, 1968). The most thorough and easily available bibliography in English is in
Burnett Bolloten, The Spanish Revolution (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1979). Others are in
Hugh Thomas, The Spanish Civil War (New York, 1961, 1977); Stanley Payne, The
Spanish Revolution (New York, 1970); and, specifically on the Brigades, Verle B.
Johnson, Legions of Babel (University Park, Pa., 1967).
The fullest available collection of the Brigade newspapers is in the Hemeroteca
Municipal in Madrid. Other major sources on the Spanish Civil war in Spain are to
be found at the Unidad de Estudios sobre Ia Guerra de Espana, the Biblioteca Nacional,
and the army's Servicio Hist6rico Militar. All of these are located in Madrid. In the
United States the largest collections of material on the Spanish war are at the Hoover
Institution at Stanford University (Bolloten collection), the University of California
(Southworth collection), and the Library of Congress. There is also the David McKelvy
White collection at the New York city public library which contains a very complete
file of the Bo/etfn de Informacion published by the Brigade commissariat. The Marty
Archives are held by the Widener Library at Harvard University.
 Index

Aalto, William, 96 Andre Marty battalion, 66-67, 82

Abraham Lincoln battalion: recruitment Anillo, Giorgio, 76
of, 34-35, 38-41; organization of, in Araquistain, Luis, 4
Spain, 76-80; ethnic composition of, Arsenovitch, 76
76, 101-2, 198 nn.45, 49; political Ascaso column, 26
composition of, 76-78, 92-96, 98, Attlee, Clement, 154
101-2, 127, 138, 201 n.l8; poor Azaiia, Manuel, 4, 110, 181 n.2
leadership of, 77-78, 198 n.57; first Azzi, Amaldo, 64, 86
combat of, 85-95; CPUS views as
party achievement, 92-94, 150; Bahnick, William, 95
internal problems of, dealt with by Balk, Theodor, 139
CPUS, 101-2; political commissars of, Barcelona: revolution in, 6; militia in,
appointed by CPUS, 78, 101-2, 20, 23-29; Workers Olympiad in, 23,
203 n.55; cheka activity in, 164-66, 186 n.34; May crisis in, 104-6
173-74; drying up of stream of Bard, Phil, 77
recruits for, 169, 215 n.40. See also Barea, Arturo, 60, 152
International Brigade, XV Barontini, 95, 107, 109, 201 n.28
Abraham Lincoln Brigade. See Barthel. See Chaintron, Jean
Abraham Lincoln battalion; Bates, Ralph, 29, 38, 154
International Brigade, XV Batov, General (Fritz), 198 n.l,
Adler, Fritz, 144, 145 202 nn.43, 72
Aitken, George, 74, 99-100 Battistelli, 204 n.62
Albacete, 50-56 Beimler, Hans, 23, 27, 52, 65, 82,
Albacete Commissariat. See Political 186 n.32, 187 n.56
Commissariat, International Brigade Berchtold, Eugene, 40
Alvarez del Vayo, Julio, 4, 118-19, Berghe, Van der, Captain, 101
206n.2 Berzin, General Jan, 12, 14, 192 n.l2
American battalion. See Abraham Bessie, Alvah, 41, 152, 175, 215 n.40
Lincoln battalion Bianco, Vincenzo (Krieger), 71
American Society for Technical Aid to Bielov, Colonel, 53, 67
Spain, 34, 39, 215 n.35 Billoux, Francois, 52, 201 n.24
Ameriglio, David. See Leeds, David Birch, Lorrimer, 28-29
Anarchist, 3, 6, 14; attitude toward the Bocchi, 71
militia and the People's Army, 17-18; Boletfn de Informacion de las Brigadas
militia columns, 17, 18, 26; lntercionales, 137-38
Communist attitude toward, 20-21, Borkenau, Franz, 6, 28, 159, 185 n.l7,
104-5, 140, 147-48; attitude toward 215 n.55
the Loyalist government, 69-70, Brandt, Willy, 173
196 n.8; attitude toward the Brigade commissariat. See Political
Communists, 69-70, 107; attitude Commissariat, International Brigade
toward the International Brigades, British battalion: recruitment of, 32,
70, 107, 188 n.67; bring revolution to 35-36; political composition of, 35;
Aragon, 185 n.l7 organization of, in Spain, 73-75; first
Anarchosyndicalist. See Anarchist combat of, 83; internal problems
Andre battalion, 56, 59, 60, 82 dealt with by the CPGB, 99-101,
Index 225
202 n.49, 203 n.50; political 25, 28, 203 n.55, 214 nn.20, 26, 27;
commissars of, appointed by the staffs and controls International
CPGB, 100-1 Brigade military command, 67, 98,
Brodsky, George, 77 195 n.63, 202 n.44; generals
Browder, Earl, 8, 10, 32, 38, 42, 92, 94 command People's Army divisions,
Brown, Fred, 35, 78. See also Brown, 84, 88-89, 202 n.44, 205 n.75; attitude
Paul toward and control of the
Brown, Paul (Alpi), 38, 190 n.28. See International Brigades, 90-118,
also Brown, Fred 149-52, 190 n.39, 193 n.28, 200 n.16,
Broz, Joseph (fito), 31, 36 201 nn.18, 23, 24, 203 nn.50, 55,
Brunete offensive, 88-89 205 n.77, 212 n.71, 213 n.4; attitude
Budenz, Louis, 165 toward the Second International,
144-46, 211 nn.29, 33; relationship to
Calandrone, Giacomo, 63, 117, 131, the CPS, 192 n.4. See also
138, 205 n.77 Communist; Communist party,
Canadian battalion. See France (CPF); Communist party,
MacKenzie-Papineau battalion Germany (CPO); Communist party,
Castro Delgado, Enrique, 21, 48-49, Great Britain (CPGB); Communist
120, 181 n.1, 185 n.14, 206 n.8 party, Spain (CPS); Communist party,
Centuria: origins and activities of, United States (CPUS); Soviet Union
22-23; origin of the term, 187 n.51; Commune de Paris battalion, 57, 59, 82
names of, unofficial, 188 n.62; Commune de Paris centuria, 26, 29, 30
relationship to the International Communist: attitude toward bourgeois
Brigades, 29-30, 188 n.69. See also democracy, 8; party line during the
Commune de Paris; Dombrowski; Popular Front era, 10; party line
Gastone-Sozzi; militia; Thaelmann; toward the Spanish conflict, 13-14;
Tom Mann attitude toward military discipline,
Chaintron, Jean (Barthel), 73 19-21, 130; parties as recruitment
Chapaiev battalion, 68-70 agencies for the International
Checa, Pedro, 48 Brigades, 31-40; attitude toward the
Cheka, 161, 163, 164, 172, 213 nn.5, 11, International Brigades, 90-94, 149-51;
14, 214 n.24. See also NKVD; SIM attitude toward other proletarian
Codovila, Vittorio (Medina), 52, parties, 105, 148; attitude toward the
184 n.44, 192 n.4 Loyalist government, 113-18; attitude
Co1odny, Robert, 193 n.23, 195 n.63, toward and domination of the
196 n.8, 201 n.24 Loyalist political commissar system,
Comintern: as fount of Popular Front 119-21; party members rewarded for
propaganda, 9; interpretation, policy, work in Spain and the International
and actions toward the Spanish Brigades, 201 n.23. See also
conftict, 9-15; agents in Spain, 16, 21, Comintern
184 n.44, 186 n.2, 192 n.4; Communist party: Bulgaria (CPB), 71,
relationship to the Fifth Regiment, 75, 76; Czechoslovakia (CPC), 41;
21-22, 186 n.28; recruitment of the France (CPF), 26, 31-36, 41-43, 57,
International Brigades, 31-46, 70-71, 75, 92, 96, 102, 143, 153,
189 nn.4, 11, 190 nn.35-36; and the 190 nn.35, 36, 201 nn.23, 24,
defense of Madrid, 48-49, 82-84, 202 n.47, 214 n.27; Germany (CPO),
88-89; agents form directorate of the 7, 9, 23, 27, 56, 64, 65, 73, 92, 143,
International Brigades, 51-52, 182 n.32, 186 nn.28, 32, 187 n.56,
202 n.40; cadres staff International 193 n.28; Great Britain (CPGB), 11,
Brigade hierarchy, 51-52, 56-59, 29, 32, 35-37, 41-42, 70, 100-101,
67-76,82,94-97, 194n.50, 201 nn.24, 143, 190 nn.35, 36, 201 n.23,
226 CoMINTERN ARMY

203 n.50; Italy (CPI), 12, 27, 71, 76, meshing of Comintem apparatus in
201 nn.23, 24; Spain (CPS), 3, 7-9, Spain, 21; discipline in, 21; provides
12-13, 16-18, 22, 47-48, 50, 185 n.14, nucleus of the People's Army, 22,
186 nn.26, 30, 192 n.4; United States 206 n.1; as a Comintem political
(CPUS), 8, 10, 32, 34-35, 38-40, instrument, 22; absorbs PSUC militia
77-78, 92, 94, 95, 98, 101-2, 143, 165, units, 26; and the defense of Madrid,
189 n.11, 198 n.57, 201 nn.23, 31, 48; relationship to the International
203 n.55, 214 n.26, 215 n.35; Brigades, 50-51. See also Castro
Yugoslavia (CPY), 36, 72, 75, 103, Delgado, Enrique; Lister, Enrique;
138 Vidali, Vittorio
Contreras, Carlos. See Vidali, Vittorio Fischer, Louis, 20-21, 33, 53, 87, 150,
Copeman, Fred, 74, 99-101, 197 n.35, 152, 194n.35, 196n.8, 200n.l6,
201 n.23, 202 n.49, 203 n.52 206n.3
Copic, Vladimir, 52, 72-73 Fischer, Ruth, 43, 190 n.39, 193 n.28
Cornford, John, 6, 19, 24, 25, 28 Foote, Alexander, 96
Cox, Geoffrey, 58, 60, 153 Fort, Captain, 75, 86
crv, 86 Fox, Ralph, 70, 71
Cunningham, Jock, 74, 100, 202 n.49 Franco-Beige battalion. See Andre
Marty battalion
Daduck, Stephen, 79 Friends of the Abraham Lincoln
Dahlem, Franz, 52, 54, 90, 92, 95, 115, Brigade (FALB), 34, 39, 40, 96, 155,
119, 120-21, 128, 132, 194 n.50, 201 n.31, 212 n.68
211 n.29 Front organizations, Communist, 9, 10,
de Brouckere, Louis, 144 11, 12. See also American Society for
Delasalle, Colonel, 71-72 Technical Aid to Spain; Dependents
de Madariaga, Salvador, 181 n.1 Aid Committee; Friends of the
DeMaio, Tony, 44, 173 Abraham Lincoln Brigade; VALB
Denz, Albert, 82 Furman, 75, 76, 207 n.23
Dependents Aid Committee, 155-56
de Rosa, Fernando, 24 Galicz, Janos (Gall, General), 72,
de Vittorio, Giuseppe (Nicoletti), 27, 73, 80, 84, 85, 89, 202 n.44, 207
31, 59, 82, 95, 192 n.5 n.23
DeWet, Olaf, 160-61 Gall, General. See Galicz, Janos
Diaz, Jose, 9, 22, 48, 50, 105, 140-41, Galli, 75, 86
192 nn.4, 5, 211 n.29 Gallo. See Longo, Luigi
Dimitroff, Georgi, 8, 33, 34, 93, 139, Garibaldi battalion, 61-64, 76, 82, 86,
150, 200n.l6, 211 n.29 95, 103-7, 204 n.62, 205 nn. 77, 80
Dimitroff battalion, 75-76, 83, 86 Garibaldi Brigade. See International
Dombrowski battalion, 57, 82, 195 n.55 Brigade, XII
Dombrowski centuria, 57 Gastone-Sozzi centuria, 26, 27, 29, 30,
D'Onofrio, Edoardo, 138 57, 64
Doran, Dave, 102, 129, 134 Gates, John, 41, 96, 128, 129, 134,
Dorf, Arthur, 56 · 173-74
Duclos, 192 n.4 Gayman. See Vidal
Dumont, Jules, 26, 57, 99, 202 n.47 Gellhom, Martha, 152
Durbecq, 75 George Washington battalion, 76. See
also Abraham Lincoln battalion;
Elstob, Peter, 37, 45, 160 International Brigade, XV
Geroe, Emo, 184 nn.44, 45, 192 n.4
Fifth Regiment: organization of, by the Gillain, Nick, 36, 162, 174
Communists, 19-21; an example of Gil Robles, Jose Maria, 5, 181 n.2
Index 227

Giustizia e LibertO, 23, 187 n.50, 203 n.52, 207 n.23, 208 nn.43, 55,
204 n.62. See also Rosselli, Carlo 209 n.60, 215 nn.33, 55; political
Gladnick, Robert, 38 composition of, 54, 57, 59, 60, 61,
Golssenau, Arnold Vieth von. See 63, 64; and the defense of Madrid,
Renn, Ludwig 59-61, 83, 87, 195 nn.66, 72, 198 n.1,
Gomez, General. See Zeisser, Wilhelm 199 n.6; cadres arrive from the Soviet
Goriev, General, 12, 49, 192 n.12, Union for, 75, 76, 78, 94-95, 107,
202 n.43 201 nn.25, 28; first Americans in,
Gottwald, Clement, 31 76-78, 85, 198 n.45; military role and
Grebenaroff, 75, 76, 85 significance of, 81, 88-89; military
Guadalajara, battle of, 86-87 command of, 82, 83, 84, 89, 98;
Guerilla warfare, 96-97, 202 nn.36, 37 casualties of, 83, 85-86, 199 n.5;
Guimple, Boris, 71 change in role and significance of,
after spring 1937, 88-89, 200 nn.15,
Haldane, Charlotte, 32, 35, 41-44, 154, 17; become heavily Spanish in
172, l90nn.35, 36 personnel, 89, 205 n.9l, 215 n.40;
Harris, Jim, 78, 79, 80, 198 n.57 political significance of, to the
Harris, William, 39 Comintern, 90-94, 147-49; Soviet
Hemingway, Ernst, 153, 175-76 army officers in, 94-95, 202 n.43;
Henri Vuillemin Battalion, 68 Communist parties reward members
Herman, Irving, 40 for service in, 94, 201 n.23;
Hernandez, Jesus, 16, 214 n.24 Comintern authority in, 95-101,
Herrick, William, 38, 155 203 n.50, 207 n.23; Soviet army
Hensler, Andre, 70 advisers to, 98, 202 n.43; military
Honeycomb, 162 command of, 98, 202 n.44; internal
Horan, Edward, 40, 43 problems of, dealt with by
Hourihan, Martin, 101 Comintern, Communist parties,
L 'Humanite, 1, 10, 26 98-103, 203 nn.52, 60, 205 nn.77, 78,
79; Communist parties appoint
Ibarruri, Dolores (La Pasionaria), 17, political commissars in, 98, 102,
18, 22, 48, 120, 130 214 n.27; Spanish conscripts in, 108,
ILP (Independent Labour party), 24, 29 114-16, 133, 205 n.91; training
International Brigade: origins of, 6, schools in, 116, 122-23, 147-49,
14-15, 185 n.54; relationship to 202 n.49; political commissars in,
foreigners in militia units, 29-30, 119-35, 209 n.60; party cell structure
188 nn.67, 69; recruitment of, 31-46, in, 131-32; hospitals of, 132-33,
189 nn.4, 11, 190 n.35, 215 n.35; 208 n.57; press and propaganda of,
transportation of, into Spain, 44-47; 136-58, 212 n.70; Communist nature
numbers of troops in, 46, 88-89, of press and propaganda of, 139-49,
191 n.53, 193 n.l9, 200 n.l5; 211 n.39; attitude toward Trotskyism
concentration and organization of, at of, 140-41, 148, 193 n.23, 211 n.39;
Albacete, 50-56, 202 n.40; Comintern attitude toward the Soviet Union and
staffs the political commissariat of, Comintern of, 141-44, 147-49,
50-52, 82, 94, 110-14; political and 208 n.46; attitude toward other
military hierarchy of, staffed by proletarian parties of, 143-46, 148-49,
Comintern, 51-52, 56-59, 67-76, 82, 157; Communist indoctrination of
94-97, 194 n.50, 201 nn.24, 25, 28, political commissars in, 147-49; as
203 n.55, 214 nn.20, 26, 27; uniforms symbol of proletarian solidarity,
and equipment of, 53-54; military 149-58; intellectuals in, 157-58; SIM
and political discipline in, 54, 79, (Cheka) activities in, 159-72,
98-102, 109, 130-35, 193 n.23, 213 nn.11, 13, 14; desertion from,
228 COMINTERN ARMY

165-72, 214 n.31, 215 nn.33, 35, 40, Landau, Kurt, 173
55 La Pasionaria. See lbarruri, Dolores
International Brigade, XI, 56-61, 81-89, Largo Caballero, Francisco, 3, 4, 13,
97, 195 n.72, 199 n.5 16, 17, 26, 47-50, 57, 62, 97, 104-6,
International Brigade, XII, 61-67, 110, 119, 196 n.8, 202 n.37
81-83, 86, 89, 103-4, 107, 108-10, Last, Jef, 161, 183 n.34, 208 n.46
116, 198n.1, 199n.14, 204n.62, Law, Oliver, 101
205 nn.77, 78, 79 Lawrence, Bill, 38, 94-97
International Brigade, XIII, 68-70, 89, Le Boucher de Albacete. See Marty,
102-3, 196 nn.1, 8, 203 n.60 Andre
International Brigade, XIV, 52, 70-73, Lecouer, Auguste, 96, 98, 102, 103,
83, 89, 98-99, 202 n.47 165-66, 171, 201 nn.23, 24, 203 n.57,
International Brigade, XV, 71-80, 83, 214 n.27
85, 89, 204 n.62 Leeds, David, 201 n.31. See Ameriglio,
International Brigade, CL, 199 n.14, David
203 n.60, 204 n.62 Lincoln battalion. See Abraham
International Column, 191 n.51. See Lincoln battalion
also International Brigade Lincoln-Washington battalion. See
Italian Legion, 26, 62, 63, 64 Abraham Lincoln battalion
Italian Popular Front Committee, 62, Lister, Enrique, 16, 21, 48-50, 84,
63, 187 n.50, 214 n.31 192 n.5
Ivanov, General, 87 Little, John, 93
Litvinov, Maxim, 7
"Jack." See Reid, Arnold Locatelli, 71
Jarama, Battle of the, 83-86 Longo, Luigi (Gallo): early activities in
Johnson, AJan, 78, 101 Spain, 26, 27, 188 n.69; role in
Jones, David, 101 original organization of the
Kahle, Hans, 56, 57, 65, 82, 87, International Brigades, 31, 49, 50, 52,
202 nn.43, 44 63, 64, 67, 70, 72, 82, 90, 93, 95,
Kantorowicz, Alfred, 103, 136-39 211 n.29; differences with Pacciardi
Katz, Otto (Andre Simon), 12 on nature of the Brigades, 103-4,
Kerrigan, Peter, 74, 100 109; attitude toward the May crisis
Klaus, Lt. Colonel, 73, 85 in Barcelona, uncontrollable&, Largo
Kleber, General Emilio, 52, 57, 58, 59, Caballero, 105; on the
69, 70-72, 82, 89, 195 n.63, non-Communist Loyalist military
202 nn.43, 44, 205 n.75. See also stalf, 105; on the significance of the
Stern, General Lazar International Brigades connection
Koestler, Arthur, 7, 8, 9, 10, 12, with the Comintern, Ill; on the
186 n.32 nature and role of the International
Koltsov, Michael, 12, 14, 47, 83, Brigades, 113; on the Comintern as
184 nn.45, 47, 185 n.54, 198 n.1, guide to the Popular Front and the
202 n.40 war in Spain, 113; on the importance
Kopp, George, 19 of training and indoctrinating the
Krause, Hans, 172 Spanish troops in the Brigades, 115,
Krieger. See Bianco, Vincenzo 205 n.91; as chief political commissar
Krivitsky, General Walter, 13, 43, 58, of the Brigades, 124; on key role of
159, 201 n.25 the political commissars, 124-30; on
Kulik, General, 192 n.12 discipline, 131; on the Activist
program, 133; as International
Labour party, British, 143, 144, 157 Brigade press and propaganda chief,
Lampe, Maurice, 194 n.45 136-39
Index 229
Loti, 202 n.43 Mills, Saul, 102
Loyalist government, 112, 114-15, Mink, George, 163-64
182 n.l4; relationship of, to the Minor, Robert, 42, 93, 96, 98, 127, 150,
International Brigades, 98, 100-101, 154
110-11, 116-18 Modetti, Maria, 21
Lukacs, General, 52, 67, 69-70, 198 n.1, Monmousseau, Gaston, 11
202 n.43, 204 nn.62, 72. See Zalka, Moquet, Prosper, 97
Mate Morandi, Aldo, 71
Lutz, Fred, 101 Morelli, 204 n.62
Macartney, Wilfred, 72 Munzenburg, Willi, 9, 10, 11, 12
McCuiston, William, 39
McGovern, John, 163-64 Nanetti, Nino, 24
MacKenzie-Papineau battalion, 76 Nathan, George, 71, 73
Madrid, defense of, 47-67, 81-89, Negrin, Juan, 105-7, 118
184 n.47, 192 nn.5, 9, 12, 195 nn.66, Nelson, Steve, 94, 102, 164-65,
72; 198 n.1 201 n.23, 203 n.55, 214 n.26
~en. Morris, 38, 41, 85 Nenni, Pietro, 5, 26-27, 52, 62, 87,
Mallozzi, 95, 107 110-12, 205 nn.77, 80
Mann, Tom, 188 n.59 Neumann, Heinz, 52, 263, 193 n.29,
Marlowe, Inver. See Scott, John 214 n.20
Martinez Barrio, Diego, 111 Nicoletti. See de Vittorio, Giuseppe
Marty, Andre; early activities of, Nin, Andres, 214 n.24
regarding Spain, 31, 46, 48, 50; NKVD, 12, 43-44, 52, 58, 159-60,
biographical sketch of, 51-52; as 184 n.48, 190 n.39, 193 n.28,
organizer of the International 213 nn.5, 11, 214 n.24
Brigades, 56, 61, 71, 72, 78, 79; on Noce, Teresa (Estella), 138, 139
the significance of the International Nonintervention agreement, 183 n.35
Brigades, 90, 93, 115; paranoia of,
101-3, 193 nn.22, 23, 198 n.l; on key Oak, Liston, 164, 182 n.l4
role of political commissars, 120, Olympiad, Workers, 186 n.34
128-29, 131, 135; as Le Boucher de Oppman, Tedeusz, 194 n.55
Albacete, 163, 174-75, 198 n.1; Orlov, Alexander, 12, 159, 184 n.48,
defenders of, 193 n.23; recall of, 202 n.37
201 n.24 Orwell, George, 6, 17, 18-20, 28, 160
Marvin, 204 n.62
Matthews, Herbert, 152 Pablo, General. See Pavlov, General
Matuczacz, 57, 194 n.55 Pacciardi, Randolfo, 23, 25, 26, 58, 61,
Medina. See Codovila, Vittorio 64, 86; conflict with the Communists,
Merriman, Robert, 78-80, 85-86, 95, 103-10, 188 n.67, 195 n.SO, 198 n.l,
202n.49 204 nn.62, 72, 205 nn. 77, 81
Miaja, General Jose, 49 Parovic, Blagoie (Schmidt), 36, 103, 139
Militia: failure of, to stop Nationalists, Pavlov, General (Pablo), 84
14, 47; Communist and Socialist Paynter, William, 100
parties create, before war, 16; war Penchienati, Carlo, 76, 104-10, 117,
brings proliferation of, 16; reflect 204 n.62, 207 n.23
different ideologies of Popular Front, People's Army: Communist role in
16-26; revolutionary aims of, 17; lack origins and formation of, 17-18, 22,
of military efficiency of, 18-20, 191 n.51, 206 n.1; relationship to the
186 n.21; foreigners in, 22-30; International Brigades, 88, 90-91, 98,
relationship to the International 202 n.44; Prieto's efforts to curb
Brigades, 30 Communist predominence in, 116;
230 CoMINTERN ARMY

political commissar system in, 119, inculcation and maintenance of

206 nn.1, 2, 3; ex-International discipline, 130-35, 209 n.60; as
Brigade generals command divisions political police agents, 135, 165;
of, 202 n.44; Soviet army officers Communist indoctrination and
attached to, 202 nn.43, 44, 205 n.75 training of, 147-49. See also Fifth
Perchuk, Harry, 173 Regiment; People's Army
Petrovich, 71, 202 n.43 Pollitt, Harry, 11, 32, 92, 101, 154
Picelli, Guido, 95 Popular Army. See People's Army
Platone, Felice, 107 Popular Front: Spanish, 4; as a Soviet
Political Commissariat, International strategy, 1-11; dilemma posed by
Brigade: key personnel of, 52-53; as Spanish conflict to, 10; Italian,
direct extension of Comintern, 94-95, 187 n.50
100-103, 107, 111-14; relationship to POUM: attitude toward the
International Brigade military Communists, 14, 204 n.71; attitude
command, 98; demands severe toward militia and People's Army,
disciplinary regime, 99-100; problems 17-18; militia, 24-29; Communist
with Pacciardi, 103-10; and the vendetta against, 138; 140, 185 n.6,
Barcelona May crisis, 104-6; as nexus 188n.67, 204n.71
between the International Brigades Pozas, General Sebastian, 48
and the Loyalist government, 110-18; Prieto, Indalecio, 4, 109-10, 116, 118-
resists efforts to assimilate 19, 202 n.37, 205 n.77, 206 nn.3, 96
International Brigades into the Profintern, 11
People's Army, 112-18; attitude Proletarian parties, Spanish, 3, 4, 5, 6,
toward Loyalist government, 112-15; 182 n.13, 185 n.6
reliance on political commissar PSUC, 24-28, 50, 65
system, 120-24, 131; controls Putz, Colonel, 71, 99
International Brigade press and Raimondi, 95, 107
propaganda output, 137-39; use of Rebiere, Pierre, 56, 86, 110-11
"cheka" (SIM) to police Brigades, Red Army. See Soviet Army
161-65 Red Front Fighters, 54, 56, 65,
Political Commissars, International 194n.5
Brigade: party stalwarts, 54, 100-103, Regier, Gustav, 22, 23, 65, 82, 128,
126-27, 131, 208 n.52; appointed by 140-41, 153, 174, 185 n.54, 198 n.1,
Communist parties, 98, 102, 203 n.50, 204n.72
214 n.27; and indoctrination of Reid, Arnold, 42, 190 n.36
Spanish conscripts, 116; functions of, Rein, Mark, 172
121-35; relationship to military Renn, Ludwig, 27-28, 62-67, 82, 87, 97
command, 121-23; training schools Republic, Spanish, 3-6, 181 nn.2, 6, 9
for, 122-23, 126; as direct extension Republican party, Italian, 23, 62
of the authority of the International Revolution, Spanish, 3-6, 182 nn.13, 14,
Brigade political commissariat and 185 nn.5, 14, 17
the Comintern, 124; as ideological Roasio, Antonio, 64
mentors of International Brigade Robeson, Paul, 154
troops, 124-25, 126-27; as Rojo, General Vicente, 123
propagandists toward enemy forces, Rolfe, Edwin, 138, 152, 215 n.40
124-26; duty to propagate Romilly, Esmond, 46
Communist ideology and party line Rosenberg, Marcel, 12, 14
to the troops, 126; effectiveness of, Rosselli, Carlo, 23, 25, 26, 187 n.50,
127-30; control International Brigade 188 n.67
press and propaganda output, 127, Roten Front Kampfer Bund. See Red
136; and censorship, 127; as key to Front Fighters
Index 231

Rust, William, 32, 44, 127, 130, 152, Staimer, Richard, 82

203 n.SO Stalin, Joseph, 10, 47, 201 n.25
Ryan, William, 39, 215 n.35 Stember, Sam, 78, 79, 101
Stepanov, 184 n.44, 192 n.4
Sagnier, Marcel, 99, 202 n.47 Stern, General Lazar. See Kleber,
Salud, 190 n.48 General Emilio
Salute, Popular Front, 190 n.45 Stern, Marvin, 173
Schevenels, Louis, 144-45 Stomatov, 71
Schindler, 69 Suardi, Emilio, 118
Schmidt. See Parovic, Blagoie Sukulov, Victor, 95
Schuster, Louis. See Vehlov, Fritz Swierczewski, General Karol. See
Scott, John, 79 Walter, General
Seacat, John, 39 Tabakoff, 76
Seacord, Douglas, 79, 85 Tanguy, Rol, 201 n.23, 203 n.56,
Second International, 11, 95, 111, 144. 214n.27
See also Socialist party, Italian; Tapsell, Walter, 100-101, 172
Socialist party, Spanish Thaelmann battalion, 64-66, 82
Sheean, Vincent, 152 Thae1mann centuria, 27-30, 65-66, 69
SIM, 161, 172-75, 213 n.11. See also Thorez, Maurice, 14, 92, 102, 153,
Cheka; NKVD 211 n.29
Simon, Andre. See Katz, Otto Tisa, John, 138
6 Fevrier battalion, 75, 86 Tito. See Broz, Joseph
Smillie, Robert, 161, 213 n.9 Togliatti, Palmiro (Ercoli, Alfredo), 12,
Socialist party, Italian, 5, 62 52, 97, 184 n.45, 192 n.4, 202 n.40
Socialist party, Spanish, 3-4, 9, 16 Tom Mann centuria, 28, 57
Sommerfield, John, 37, 38, 46, 53, 54, Toynbee, Philip, 183 n.41
61 Trotskyism, 7, 140-41, 145, 148, 159,
Soviet Army: officers and the defense of 193 nn.23, 29, 210 n.18, 211 n.39
Madrid, 49, 84, 85, 89, 184 n.47;
officers in the International Brigades, Ulanovski, Bolek, 57, 194 n.SS
50, 75, 76, 78, 94-95, 107, 195 n.63, Ulbricht, Walter, 9, 52, 163, 190 n.39,
201 nn.25, 28, 202 n.44; advisers to 193 n.28
the International Brigades, 94-95, 98, Ulibarri, Manuel, 213 n.11
202 n.43; advisers to the People's Uncontrollables, 105, 106, 140, 148. See
Army, 192 n.12. See also Batov, also Anarchists; POUM; Trotskyists
General; Berzin, General Jan; Galicz, University City. See Madrid, defense of
Janos; Goriev, General; Kleber, Uribe, Vicente, 186 n.27
General Emilio; Lukacs, General;
Pavlov, General; Soviet Union; VALB (Veterans of the Abraham
Walter, General Lincoln Brigade), 176, 212 n.68
Soviet Union: adoption of Popular Valois, Colonel, 202 n.43
Front strategy, 6-8; reaction to the Valtin, Jan, 164, 172
Spanish conllict, 10-14, 183 n.32, 33, Vehlov, Fritz (Schuster), 66, 82
34; military mission to Spain, 12-14, Vidakovitch, 76
22, 50, 192n.12, 202n.43; makes Vidal, 52, 53, 78, 79, 80, 198 n.57
decision to create International Vidali, Vittorio (Contreras), 16, 21-22,
Brigades, 54, 185 n.54. See also 47, 49, 50, 52, 120-22, 163, 186 n.27,
Comintern; International Brigade; 195 n.S
Madrid, defense of; NKVD; Soviet Vittori, 99, 202 n.47
Army Volunteer for Liberty, 136-38
Springhall, D. F., 74, 85, 100 Voronov, General, 84
232 COMINTERN ARMY

Voros, Sandor, 89, 97-98, 101-2, 129, Williams, Bert, 100

138, 174 Wintringham, Tom, 74, 86, 128, 153,
202n.49
Wallach, Albert, 173 Wisniewski, Stephen, 110-11
Walter, General, 52, 70, 72, 84, 89, 99,
202n.44 Zalka, Mate. See Lukacs, General
Watson, Keith Scott, 28 Zanoni, Arturo, 117-18
White, David McKelvey, 95, 96 Zeisser, Wilhelm (Gomez), 52, 68, 69,
White, Paul, 173 186 n.28