t ..

J~`J "rrJJ~ J~~

W- Countdown - Ta-Disaster
~ Blast From The Past
W- Ejection .
~ Best of the Rest
w- To Intervene or Not To Intervene?
The Copilot's Catch 22
De-Deicing -,."Iw w1= ,
- Canada
 Table of Contents
From the Editor
`l;
r~'

r~~ JlJ r
Editorial ,
~J~~ ~tt~ ~IJ-r
1 . . . .. . ... . . ... .. . . .,. . ..., .,. . ., .. ..,.. ... . . Frctt» thr Eciltor
2 . ..,..., .. .. .., ..... . . ,.,. .. ., ., Countdown ~1'o Disaste_r Bar to Distinguished Directorate of Flight Safety
havc been attempting to ascribe a theme to each issue oi Flight Comment .
Hopefully the linkagr amongst the lead articles will generate discussion and

Service Order
perhaps encourage you to do ftuther reading . 7'he theme of this issue is
4 . ._. .,_---
. . . . . . . . . . .--
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .__
. . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . . . . . As 1 ~ee It! Diredor of Flight Safety conuttunicalic~n .
Col M. Legault
5 . .. ... . . . .. ... . . ... . . ... ... . . ... . ... . ... . .. . . .. . . .. De-Deicing Editor For people that live in the so-called information age we do a very poor job of
CollishawD .S,O ., O .B .E ., D.S .C., D.F.C ., Raymond Lt . Capt.1 .S . Medves communicatinl;. Aerhaps some of our comrnunication problems are simply
6 . .. . . . ... . ... ., . . . . .. . .... .. . . . .. . ... Blast From The Past the result of having lo try to proeess the huge amount of inforntation we are
(T.Maj .) RAF21 Sept 1918 Art Diredion
7 . . .., . . . . . .. . . C)SH Answerti . .. FPFE c_tn the ~'V'1:f3! DGPA-Creative Services-98C5-0015 qt exposed to each and every day. Although 1 tend to believe that while we have
,~ brillianl syuadron Icader of exccptional daring, tvho becorne experts in sending the message, we still remain sadly lacking in lislen-
. Photographic Support
8 . .. ., . . . . . .. . ... . . ... .. . . . .. . .... .. . . . . .. . .. . . ... .. . . . ... Fjc~tron ha~ destroyed 51 enemv machine~ . Early one morning CF Photo Unit-Rockdiffe ing abilities. Fog Horn Leghorn i~ alive and wcll .
he, ~s~ith another p ilot,~attacked an enemv aerodrome . Cpl K. Allan
10  ., . . . . _ .. . ., .. . . . .. . .. ,. . . . .. . ... . Eiest of the (Zt~sl Seein b~ tltree ntachines hrou i,~ht out of a burnin J han ar ~I'he article "Countdown to Disaster" relates a tra~ic sienario svhere I~tck o1
Translation
he dived tive times, tirin~ bursts at these from a very Coordinator communication leads to a mid-air collision . Cuuld soniething similar happen
15 ., . . ... . .... .. . 'Io Intervene or Ncrt 'l~t Intervene?
Iow alliludc, and drolr Ei~rng l ombs on the Ir~ rng quar-
Official Languages here? You betcha . lf ,you can read this article and don't find yoursrlf 5hakin~
"1'he Copilot's Catch 2? your head anci thinkin~ back to sume "what are we doin~ here?" missinn You
ters . He then saw an enemy aeroplane descending over Printer
Tri-co are either verv luiky or blissfully unaware .
25 . . . ... ... . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . .. . .... . Could this be you? thr acrodrornc ; he attackcd it and drove it down in Ottawa, Ontario
tlames . Later, when returninl; from ~t reconnaissance 1'ou are on tire! A sintple statement you would think would he hard to miscon-
of the d~rrnaged hangars, he was attacked by three The Canadian Forces strue . liut what ha l> }>ens when the ~()nlmrrrllCatllln It i ; no t ,~t c1dr~c5~cd
~ c o rrcctly .
Albatross scouts, ti,ho pursued hitu to our lines, when Fli 9 ht Safet Y Mag azine A dehacle - and all the result uf imprrrisr communication.
he turned ~3nd ~jtt~tcked one, ti~~hich fell out of control
Departments
,rncl ~r~~shed . " flight Comment is produced 4 times a Communicating with outside agencies are not the only hroblems we encountcr.
year by the Directorate of Flight Safety .
22 . .. . . . . ... . ., . ...., .. .., ., .. ..,. ...., hrorn the Investil;ator Have you ever heen on the flight deck when everyone is talking, hut no one is
The contents do not necessarily refled
. official policy and unless otherwise listening? Ur the self-induced sterile cockhit where nc~ one is talkin~ or listenin~?
26 .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . .... .. . . . For hiUletitiron~111Sn1 stated should not be construed as Scarv stutt: The article "To intervene or not lo intervene? The copilot's ( :atch ?2"
regulations, orders or directives . offer~ esrellent advise on ho~~~ critical intormation shnrrld be conunuui~ated
on the tlight deck and the article "l~oth starboard engines have gone!" shows
Contributions, comments and criticism ,j fir .~l-ralr practical dentonstration of communicative skills in truly trying
are welcome; the promotion of flight
circumstances .
safety is best served by disseminating
ideas and on-the-job experience. Send
LaStly there is non-verbal commtrnication . We,end nc~n-verbal communication
submissions to :
ATr:
all the time (childrC:n are masters of the lorn~ i . 'l'he te~hnician who didn't pull
Editor, Flight Comment the chocks on lhe I lercules tvas really telling the aircrew "regardless of what
On the Cover Directorate of Flight Safety vott want to do, l am not r;oin~ to let vou kill vourselves ." 1 don't think he could
NDHQ1Chief of the Air Staff have found a ntore rllrctive svav, to communicate his ntes .,a7e F, . ln
Sopwith triplane N 5492 "Black Mana" of No 10 Syuadron RNAS piloted by Flight Major-General George R. Pearkes Bldg . this case sc~meone was listening.
Commander Raymnnd Collishaw on 27 June 1917 . On this date Fl~yht Commander Ottawa, Ontario K1A OK2
Colhshaw shot down and killed Lieutenant Karl Allrnenroder, a thirty victory ace of Jasta 1 1 Telephone : (613) 995-7495 We do tend to listen better when the message is one we
FAX: (613) 992-5187 ~tianl to hcar. ()ne message I received at the flight s,tfety
Other B Fllght trip)anes and Canadian pilots, were : E~mail : ac912~issc.debbs .ndhq.dnd .ca conference was to pluck the l)F5 saf~tv bird .
Flic)ht
_ Sub-Lieutenant Nash in N 5376 "Black Shee p "
~~5 1 h~iVe neVer bi:fll a tall llt llul' luran n1~1S-
Flight Sub-Lieutenant Ried in N 5483 "Black Roger" Subscription orders cot I am mcrre than hapf~y to listen, liuzz R.
Fliyht Sub-Lieutenant Alezander ~n N 5487 "Black Prince" should be directed to :
S,rle h~rs gone to the big
Flight Sub-Lieutenant Sharman in N 6307 "Black Death" Publishing Centre, CCG,
u1LI1IGV5~ . Ottawa, Ont. K 1 A OS9 roost in the sky.
Raymond Collishaw was arguably the greatest air leader Canada has ever produced . Telephone : (613) 956-4800
~ 4w,llm,e 7r Olwt

" Bln,i Fm~ il~.N.a

" Ykrnrn ~.
He was the most successtul fiyhter pilot of lhe Royal Naval A~r Service and h~s mspired currfirrrrerl orr pra~le 4
~ IkrtollkW~ .v Annual subscription rate :
r (olnlnnur,~ .\'q'f Inb .rM
n,-aM4r ; iarA u leadership made the "Black" Flight of No . 10 Squadron RNAS one of the most admired for Canada, S19.95, single issue 55 .50;
and feared units on the Western front . Raymond Collishaw later saw service in Russia for other countries, 519.95 US .,
.~c tka~ .
('a nn~Li
single issue $5.50 U5 . Prices do not
during the Bolshevik revolut~on and ~n North Africa dunng World War Two . He reached
indude GST. Payment should be made
the rank of Air Vice-Marshal and was made a Companion of the Order of the Bath . to Receiver General for Canada . This
Additionally he received the Distinguished Service Order twice, the Distinguished Service Publication or its contents may not
Cross, the DisUnguished Flyng Cross, as well as both military and civil grades of the be reproduced without the editor's
approval .
Order of the Brltish Emp~re . The citation for his Bar to the Distrngu~shed Service Order
is printed above .
155N 0015-3702
Painting by Mr. Roy Ahopelto A-15-000-0061JP-000
 Countdown To Disaster
The target arca was Firc Support Base Barbar,a, a gun Black Une's right-hand loadrnaster saw this meant thev
emplacernent in the arttty's liigh Kange training area were headin g for Black Two. He called Hal es ba~k
~ - ~ I eft vv hrlc,
' ~
suuthwest afTotvnsville . on Black Two, Burke was told by his lelt-hand loadmaster :
"He's turning right come right:' But Black Two's right-hand
No aerial maps were provided at the brieting . No recunnais-
loadmaster saw the danger uf hitting Black Three : "We can't
. sance had been done bv the pilots . The only map was one
hlil 11'ir~ 1~1E' ('lr(d111 0~' h~ move right:' The formation was still off track.
dravvn by the SAS, mainly to guide the ground assault
c~r,enrs rhar leci 1~4 svl- + 1~ .
.,
troops . It was put up on a whiteboard and it was wrong - it The target was difficult to see, not only hecause it as flat on
c1i~~rs ra thc~ir ilrath> ur~
l:~~r~~ I' ;'ci`ryfrar, irrAu;trctliu :~ ti 1~
/ de 1~icted a nonexistent S un em1~lacemcnt to the northwest the ground but because the sunset atierglow meant the target
of the point ~i here, Hales's helicopter, Black C)ne, was to area was in shadow and not visible with the night goggles.
u~or :ct rrrilitary c~i`a>ter cirree tlre r~ drop its troops .
G'a~~n<<c~r inlfisinn? This was another straw for the camel's back . The board
I'1' was ,tn u~ici way to plan a
I, I'~espite the lack of accurate maps, the daylight operation speculates that the fact the aircraFt were off track and that
, went ahead smoothly and Black One, the lead aircraft> the crew cuuld not yet see the targets meant loadmasters
a~unterterrorist exercise . t pstairs
otf luaded its troohs without ,t problcm. who ought to have been ensuring the hclicopters ivere
in thc '1'ownsville ~armv building,
properly separated had their attention diverted .
5peci,~l Air Service Regiment Later the SAS and the aviators disiussed the operation
soldiers gathered in private to again, separately. The SAS ~,~anted important changes: that A few htrrldfed metres from the targct, the gun positions
plan the next dav's miatiion, a the two helicopters providing tire support be released from that detined the drap ~ones emerged frorn the gloom and a
, '  .
rescue of ` hosta~cs rnvolvin g six the forrnation ertrly, and that thc sound and visibility of all third right turn was made by Black Une . (At least, that is
hcli~o l~ters and live ammunition . the Blaik Hawks be reduced. accordtng to the board, whrch drscounted evtdence trom
I)ownstairs> appctrcntly excluded ihe pilot of Bl;~ik Four, immcdiately behind, who believed
At the rneeting of air irew, thc pilot uf Black Two, Captain
In lhe n~rnle Ut~ Seiur'ltv, i17P ,tll' Black Two turned leh into Black One .l
cretvs rvho tvould have to llv the David Burke, suggested to Hales that he had drupped his
troo 1~s at the wron gl~oint. l lalcs disa g reed, but the p air The evidence suggests this fatal last turn by Black One was
ti~1ti irntnlerterrorist troo 1~s to the
app arentlv resolved the issue bv, ar;reein
~ K thev; would both due to Hales's confusion about where he was to drop his
tarf;et held their cwvn meetinu~ .
go to exactl,y the sarne points in the night mission. Hales troops . He had approachcd Irum a different direction than
hverv' so olten, whenever com- also su gg ested thev tlv a new route , u 1~ a vallev , to mask thc during the day. ln these circumstanies, the board believed,
hined 1~lannin J was ialled for, aircraft's a ll
> >roach . Hales's su F~erior~ hla'or
) (:hristo 1~her he mlght have needed to rely un his mental image of the
ofliiers lroru bolh uruts took to the stairs . It was the would Icad thc flight . '1'he pair werr ,rlready larniliar - Hales )ameson, says he responded: "(;et f ,., ed . That's crazy mate, inaccurate whiteboard map.
evening of lune 1 l, l~)~~(~, and the tirst dav of Dav, Kutor 96, hacl heen copilot tu Bellis, himself a former army Black it would ictke a ntonth to praitise, lUe'll do it exactlv as tve
. .- I-lawk helicupter pilut, in previuu~ c~xer~ises . "ft seems Gkelv that Captain Hales, convinced this was not
alr,tn rc,
t rtl c~xer~is
~ e dc,r ~ ned te maintain ihe,A . . ca 1 abrlr did this atternoon:'
ties tcn~ a helicopter-hornc counterterrorist strikr . the gun emhlacernent of hi ; rig point, turned right and
The mission of f unc 12 was to rescue hosta~es taken by But they didn't : the (light was lowcr and slightly, but cru- tracked towards the rig point of t3l~jck'I'wo," the board found.
"~1'his vv~ts the lirsl oicasion on which detailed ic~mbined "tcrrorists':'Iwo runs tiverc planned - one in daylight and cially, otf the path taken by day The six Black Hawks took
plannin~ tuok place," noted the Bl~tck llawk hoard ol une at night . Accor-dint; to the hoard, it was probably that otf at about 6.30pnt . 'There was no moon, little wind and Une of Bttrke's crew in Black Two shouted at hlnl to move
inyrnr~~ report released this week . "Albeit, rnuch of it was evening, up or da`vn lhe stairs, th ;tt liales learned the SAS the rem,jins of the sunset glowed on the hurizon, The aews u 1~. Burke didn't kn ow wh et 1te r Black thrcc
~ ~ `v~as still besidc
,
nut faie-to-f~ce :' woulcl like the Rlack F{avvks ta assault in a formation that wore night-~~ision goggles. At a point about 1 l km from the him - it was not - so didn t that way. Burke was trying to
pul thrce Ira~l hcliioptrrs line ;tbreast - ihal i,, next to each target, ,~ three minute call was given . The helicopters began climh when Hales sought to avoid ;~ a~llision with a left-
'hhe irt y uirv, tried to 1~iece to gether the kev t~~ctors that other and ~epar~3ted by no less th~~n tvvo rotur-widths . bank that brought Black One's rotors smashin~ inro the
"contour tlight' ; dipping and rising ovcr the ridges and
led to the deaths of 123 solcliers vvhen two Blaik I lava~k tail of the other helicopter.
I lales, a relativclv inexpcrienced pilot and new to the posi- valleys at abotrt 100 knots.
hclicopters cullided at abc~ut h.~~pm on )une 1?, the dav
fi~llnwing those initial, separate mectings, tiun nt "tli ~ht lead' ; app arentlv: aKreed to this p ro P usal . It '1'he route was north towards the target, with thc plan that Ea~lt of the f'our roturs struck once and a tifth strike seems
turned out to be a very b;td ideet, the three lectding E31ack Hawk . came in abreast. t'nusually for likely, according to the evidence of engineers who ex,tmined
tieven soldiers, their names deleted from the public reprn~t, the wreckage .'I'he tirst passed through the fuel tank, the
The Perth-based SAS keeps its counter-terrorism syu;tc{ron a flight leader Black One was on the left of the three instead
tvere held accuuntable bv the inyuiry Five v~ ill fair action, other three struck the engine.
un a high st ;rge ol readiness. But the heliiupter crews cit of the middle, a posilion that made right-hand turns more
three ol'them di~iiplinary (but not ir-iminal) char~es that
Totimsville are also reyuircd i~rr uthcr ctrmv tasks and had prublematii . It was at ahuut this 1~oint Ihe forrnatiun began Blaik Une w;ts qtuckly dcromed. Fuel from Blaik Two was
carr~~ posible jail ternts. to go utt to the left of thc route it had used durint; the day.
trained liir Da ) Rotc~r onlv, a few weeks hefore . The tltree- suiked over its engines, resulfinl; in a midair explosion ;and
Yct the report does not appear to seek scapet;o~tts . lt argues . . Most ol the p ilots n o h~cd,
' - ~ hut n c~ c~ ne told Hales . . _ 0 trmes that of gravity, the
tire . It rolled over and , at a luru
abreast formation v~~as not 1 ra~tivrd .
there were 16 separ~rtr hrintary links in a ihain ol event~ aircratt 1~lummeted u P side down and ex1~loded on im l~act,
Thi~ Ic~rntation, es 1~eiiallv, when crews'vision is restricted '1'hc next call w;ts the 30 secund ~all . It was the signal t~~r the
that ntade the disaster inevitahle. T~,~entv six uther con- two Black 1 {awks with snipers to move off. But the call rtta,y Eleven men died . Hales wa5 arnong lhcm . Incredibly, two
trihuting faiturs, inclucling thc serious crosion ol ;tvi;rtion hy nit;ht-visiun gogglrs Iwhiih reduce field of vision to soldicrs survived an SAS trooper ;tnd a loadrttaster .
abuut one-tifth of normal) is inherently risky, a~iording to have eonfused the crevvs hecause it was made at least a
~kills due tn unserviieable heliinhter ; and inadeyuate pay minute befurc thc tarKet would be reached .
the bc~c~rd . The chan~rs ol suntrthing going wrong uncier (~n hoard Black Tvvo, Burke said something like : "l'm sorry
an~1 cunditiuns, ;tre also listrd .
hre~,ure ,tre cc~n~ic{erable, especially when the middle Crew lookinK for the target at the 30 se~ond iall vvould have guys, we're dead :' "Don't f . . . ing give up on us now," his
So the bl ;tnle is s 1~read wid~lv. and over ~~ time tr .rnle ul ;tiriratt h~r~ nc~ roc~m to m~rnoetn~re out of trouble . been unable to sre an}~thing yet - triggering, aicording to left-hand loadmaster, Sergeant Bill Mark, said or thought .
Sevtral 1''C~ll'ti . lillt lt w~IS UIl lUlle 11 th,tt Ih~ n1C~st Inlmtdl ;ltP Burke didn't .
At IDam on lune 1?, all the air crew and SAS troops gath- expert witnesses, anxietv.
l~roblem~ be ?~~an to emer ~~e ~nd the upstairs-downstairs
planning that cvcning is ~iled as one of the contributing ered for thc dav', bricling, `I'he phtn tvas that four ~roups Inside the helicopters the SAS troopers got ready to rope 1ti'ith the tail seition in t,ttters, the helr~o
'- 1~ tcr
~ l~c~g an tc r rcr tate
factor~ in the c{i~a;ter. uf SAS troo 1~s would ra 11 > >el on ro 1~es from the hoverin dowm . Blaik One, tlown by Hales, Black Ttti~o, flotvn by clockwise and was airborne for a turther tive to 10 ;ecunds,
I
Blaik lawks ~jnd att.tik the terrorrsts, using live ammuni- Rurke, and Black 'I'hree mo~~ed breast of each other in order Burke wanted to keep it upright because the Bla~k 1 lawk was
11u~t ul thr iunt ;tct that evenin T oicurred bett,~een Ca ptain tion . Thev wnuld he backed bv SAS ~nipers in tt~~o c~ther to drop their troops a line . No move had yet been ntadc to designed with substantial crash safetv features .
tiean B~Ilis from the SAti and ~ ;aptain Krl~~in I lales oi ~th heli~c~ 1 ~ters anci mortar ~u Il > >ort . correct the tlight path . Blaik One madc the tirst of three
;w i~rtion regiment, a rel.ltively inexperienced ufticer who c'orrtiiruc~d orr pct~~~e 5
rnoves to the right at about the 30second call, tollowed by
a second shortlv atter.
2 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Fliqht Comment No, 3, 1998 3
 " "

As I See It! Capt John T. Park C130 Pilot Yokota AB, Japan

e cr1l ~ot out and starteri lookirrg at t{re aircrcr/t we of soapy water. ltZistakenlv,
, this washing soLution was
n these early days of my tenure as Chiet of the Air lr~ac~ jusi ihnrorc by
Thl ~ deicecl. lt laokerl like n bi thought to be deice fluid. TA tilled it up the rest of the
Staff, I am pleased to have the opportunity to write buuc~t c'ake rvith w)ritish icin~~P orarec~ ull over it, truck with real deicer.l'Ue got the truck with the 5015U
an As 1 See It column for our Flight Comment streaks rrrnnirt~kT dotvrr the ;idcs . Icicle; hrcrrg ct/f~~rops nfrd soapy water and deicing tluid!
magazine . 'I'he editor has informed me the theme of wiu ti s. ~I'ow!
Atter deicing the tail section, the engineer came intu lhe
t'
~ (~,~

this issue is effective commtmication. There is more

V !

than a little serendipity at work here, as I believe that This story touk place in November 1994 . It represents aircraft and closed the crew entrance door to prevent
productive and successful communicalion is the thc challertges and inherent risks that military and civilian deicer from getting in the aircraft . As bulldozers continued
keystone ot any safety prugramme . aviation must face when dealing with deicing aircraft . ln to remove snow frorrt the runway, he monitored the last
recent years, aircrah mishaps, both minor and major, of the deicing from the center escape hatch. lt was naw
nur tli ght salelv.P ro gramme emP hasizes o P en and have made the aviation communitv hopefully more vigi- dark. The Snuw was still falling heavily as we prepared for
honest occurrence reporting and the dissemutation of lant aboul deicing!~rocedures and ol~erations in winter engine start. We had a full cargo load and a snow covered
that information as its primary preventive tool . Factual, precipitati~n . As parts of the Urtited States achieve record rumvay . w5th the KCK, the engineer ligured critical lield
trmely, ar~ td frank communication , coup led with the snowfalls this year, a stor,y about my own first winter length at 7,000 feet Over 1,0011 feet to spare beyond the
conscientious efforts of all our Etersonnel, contributed weather o l~eration comes to mind . actual runwav, len g th No P roblcm . As we cuntinued with
to our lowest ever accident rate in 1997 . ( am always the before-starting-engines checklist, the loadmaster (out-
I was a copilot stationed at Yokota AB, Japan, anci this
trlled wrth prrde whcn I read the crtatrons of the side the airplane ) rcported that the airman uut there with
particular ntrssron was tlown mto Ivlrsawa AI3 about 13
recipients of (~ood Show and For Professionalism him refused to pull chocks .
huurs into our crew duty day. t'nlike Yokota, Misawa is
awards . The outstandtng efforts of our personnel are
My message to you about safety is simple - nathing is blessed with snow and ice much earlier in the year . On this The pilot asked, "What's lhe prublem?"
clearly curtununrcated, yet barrrers to succcssiul conunu-
more important than safety in a peacetime environntent . particular clay, our tirst two stops were in fair weather, but
nication remain . Those barriers can utclude imprecise "He says he won't pull the chctcks because there is ice on
Nothing! How can the primacy of safety he reconc%led htisawa reported low visibility due to blowing snow and the planc:'
language, unwarranted or non-existent cmphasis,
with the goal af successful mission accom l~lishment? snow shuwers . This was its first ma~or snow tall of the
personal or corporate agendas, iilcontplete or inaccurate "l~'hat ice is he talking ahout?" inytrired the pilot.
Easily.'vllhile our aim is to "do the job; the job cannot st~t5(trt .
inforniation, inappmpriate tone, and lack of understanding .
be dnne when our personnel are injured or killed and "'1'he ice on thr side ol lhe airplane," said the loadmaster.
1ti'ltile much ctf our daily cuntmunication is innocuous, Our crew rechecked the weather immediately before tak-
our eytripment is damaged or destroyed.
a~itical flight safety inFormation must be transmitted in ing off and once again en route.l'hr snow was sti11 coming As they carried ctn this conversation, I looked back at the
a clear and timely matter. '1'he P.A .C .E . ntodel, explained I see the air force as a pruud team tltat accomplishes down, but the visibility had improved to about 1 .5 rtltl . No, 4 prop and could see iucles hanging off the blades
ftrrther in this issue, is an excellent example. Should you its missions professionally. Strong individual leadersltip against the hacklighting of the ramp lights .
The landing was likc something ollt of a simulator mis-
find yourself in a situation that reduires an emergen~y at all levels will foster safe, gralifying and productive sion . We broke out of the weather on the II,S about 1,500
warning, don't hesitate to give it - you oftcn have only carcers for our people . To achieve these guals,l reyuire "Pilot, there are icicles on the props! Something ain't
AGL and had clear visibility below the clouds, but every- right!" I said with a slight wavering in my voice.
une`silver bullet'to shoot and You had better use it at your total and honest rummitment to our safety pro- thing was white. I had to crosscheek that I was on the
the right time . Conversely, in non-time-critical situations, grarnme. As I see it. " localizer course . . . lhe runway shuuld be straight ahead . We all got out and started looking at the aircraft we had
excessive and inappropriate ert~phasis can cause a loss of About 2 miles out, we picked up the "rabhit" and looked just thoroughly deiccd . lt looked like a big bundt cake
credibility and result in a really critical message being the outline of the runway lights .'vVe had apparently rnade vvith whitish icing pouring all over it, streaks running
ignored. To properly cummunicate your safety message Lieutenant-General D.N. Kinsman
uur approach between snow showers, The next one was at down the sidcs . lcicles hunr; oi'f p ro F~s and wingti 1~s . Wow!
it must be delivered at the correct time, in lhe ~orrect Chief of the Air Staff the west end of the field and headed our way This was Something was really messed up! The engineer, pilot, and I
forrn and in the correct medium . my lirst lancling on about 4 inches of newfallen snow. As got real quiet for a minute as we at eaclt c~ther with wide
advertised, the snow was blowing around quite a bit as eyes .lNe all suddenly realised that the young airman who
the C130 slowed below 70 knots in full reverse power. An mfused lu pull chocks had probably just saved our lives.
. uneventful, vet memorable landing!
~rom t e ~t Je r
itor ~,~rrtir~r~~~~ 1i~~,rrr r~ 1 could just picture us starting engines and taxing out into
the darkness .'I'he sheet of ice on the tlight controls would
tlpon engine shutdown, thr snow started a heavy fa11
almost passea uut altugctlter, In i>rdc:r to tind oul what a g ain . Atter unloadin ga nd loadin g cargo fnr ? hours , th e give way to 3,000 psi of hydraulic pressure, and we would
I huhe vrru enjuy thr crwer pcrinting of the tiuptti~ith
was happening Lt lc~nes askecl mc tu llv al as high a speed snow had accumulated yuite a bit on the top of the l lerc . never sus 1~ect a thin g. As we rolled down the runwa }~,
tirl lane . Thcr~
~ ~ r,'ti a cet
er d ~~ncv fc~r 1~co,le
1 tc~ think of ( :rreat
The engineer called for a deice truck. And this is where it acceleration would be normal .l3ut when I said "Go" and
titi'ar aircraft as hcing slructrrrally weak ; nolhing could be a ; hc~ssihle over a hut in which «~as a iamera uh~cur,~, t,- rc~
ieciing an image on tu a tahlr . A~ thr aeruplane, Sop~,~ifh gets real interesting . Iie did an excellent job uf direct to the Itilot ("~ulled back on the voke
, ~ nothin g from that 1~oint
f~trthrr from the truth . Sir ~ernun lirown is yuoted from
1~i -?~30, 11etiv uvc~r lhc, lol~ 'its im,rt,t ,
,, >1as shc tvn thrc ul, t in g the transient alert (TA1 p ersonnel on thorou gYhl on would be as predicted. With all uur lifting surlaces ~ov-
"The fighting'1'ripl,rnes" by Fv,tn Hadinl;harn, ,
lh~ lens on to the h,~her, ~md, b~~ mcans of a metrc~ncmte, deicing the aircraft . The problent was not where they ered tivith a layer of ice, plus the eatra weight, l started to
`llne of the things we di~l not Ullderstanct was that as were spraying the p lane, but with what . wondcr how many knots above our charted take-uff ~peed
he was able to pcunt it everv second as 1 made ~ircles .
the aircraft gut l;t~ter and fa~ter, so we cxperien~ed some Att ert~iards it was a sim 1~le calculatiun tu find out what we would need to limp into the air. Would be able clear
As ntentioned earlier, this was the tirst major snowfall for the hills at the end of thc runway or makr the minimum
rathrr ~~xtraurdinarv ellccts, It we Ilew t~~st and then did g had hecn apl,lud, . . h~lisawa that vear. Une uf T,q's trucks was full of deice tluid>
a tit;ht turn, or, (i~r instance, iiived an ainralt and then climb gr~idients? Wltat if we lost an engine after take-oft?
`Lt )c~nes t~~und hv repcatrd cxpcrintent that 1 could hold and the other had been used for washing an aircraft
pulled it ovc~r in too tight a loc~p, a sort ot haziness crept
~ .5 g for l0,rcon~i,, and that I cc~ul~l hulcl (~ r; tor several days earlier. Well, this wash truck was still half full contirrued orr page 15
up over onr's r~~ec, rither like a mist ; and there wtre occa
sions if vou
, htld thc ti ~~ht turn ti~r too lun ,;; wherr ,vou ~}-5 secortds . "

4 Flight Comment No, 3, 1998 Flight Comment No. 3, 1998 5

 Blast From The Past
meamti~hile and he t1oated back
to earth, landing in front of lhr

OSHAnswers ..
beruused ctmbulance and tire crews
who were rushing to the assistance
of Tonv Davies .llon y ~ recovered ftrllv,
You are on flre! the nose ot the tank along the western boundarv and pancaked rn from his nastv, in'urvl .

FREE on the
ground, the noisr of this being over- the 1~lou ghed field o I'1' osite with t}te
, ,a~c~rcise Vi~ilnrtt resrclted in an Hunter's tail overhanging the grass
urrpreudertted series o~events on
come by that of the engines. The Number Three
rough surface of the taxiway quickly vcrge. Fortunatelv there was no traf-
~~1crv?ith wherr 3 aircra/t were The Javelin pilot watched all this
wore a hole in thc tt~nk, there were tic about at the tirne! The station's

WEB !
involvc~cl irr sericirrs nccidents in the sparks and the firel caught tire but emergency crews roared off towards going on, saw red Very tlares being
caurse or f0 rrrirrutes. Jn 1955 f3oz mercifully did not explode. '1'hc the incident although thankfullv, fired and people iumping up and
kn(~insorr x~c~.~ n yotrrtg Flig{tt 1 ietrtertartt Davies escaped unscathed . down gesticulating madly but still
lavelin continued to taxi trailing
serr~irrQ ai Hors{r~~m St Faith, '1'o ihis did not associate the activity w~ith
t1<tme and hlack smoke.
dn,t~ he can vividly remember t{ie events anything that was happening to his
vj f{rctt c~cr)~ . . . NumberTwo aircraft. He continued to taxi but bv
now the navi gator was com 1~l .tinin g~ amilton. ., The Canadian Centre for ~ccupational Health
The shouted on frre message was
about feeling hot . The pilot con- and Safety (C(;OHS) has launched a free occupational
also heard by ~I'ony Hilton who was,
firmed the temper.tturc control tivas health and safety (OI1&SI inforrn:~tion ser`~ice on its
vou will recall, on his way back to
at `full cool' - and then noticed the wehsite www.ccohs .ca .
St Faith with a Pcrceived engine
problem and he too thought the orange tinge to the edgrs of the '1'he CC01IS Inqturies Service, which has answered over ~f)O,OOU
message was directcd at him. l le canopy . Realization dawned and ()HSrS telephone inquiries from Canadi~rns over the years, has
decided to get down as quickly as the crew hastilv evacuated, clinrbing created the new service u~ order to di~seminate information to
he could, turncd in short, blew the alon g the nose~and dro }'}' in g the many more penple . Inquiries staff have compiled the most fre-
wheels down and without ceremony 14 feet to the grotmd . '1'he onlv quently asked C~11ScS questions thev've received over the vear-s
force landed across the airfield . l }e injury sustained, "~as to the pilot's and 1~osted them , ~ti~ith the answers ,~ on CCOHS' wcbsite . Now
put the Hunter down hard . It feet through landing in the runniug anyor~e can helh themselves to this information at anytime.
bounced and broke up, the impact position! The aircraft hurned,
fracturing the fuselage behind the without cxploding, to a pile of ash The questions represent the concerns of working Canadians, and
Clne of the Hunter Number One leaving a conspicuous delta outline retlect current occupational health and .tiafety trends in ( ;anada and
cockpit and simultaneously firing
~t's great weaknessrs was on the ground . Horsham St [~tith abroad . The answers are the result uf research by CCUIIS' suhject
~'Vhilst this was going on, Tany the primary charge of the ejection
that it was under powered and at was dosed f~r ? hours. specialists, who consult the most reliable sources, and evaluate and
Davies in another 1 iunter w~ts in seat . As hr shot upwards, lris elbow
height and in a tighl turn the engine summarize the information in simple, non-technic,il language .
the process ot taking ott when he hartly severed in the process, the
would tend to surge. This is exactly I could not believe what I saw when
aircraft ~onlinucd to slide along the
what happencd ovcr ihe North Sea heard Air'I'rallic's urgent call `You I returned to St Faith! 'There was the lblain headings in OSH Answers include : Cherrticcrls ~~ ~laterials;
are on fire!" on the station freyurncy. ground . The wing sliced through an most extraordinary sight of smoke, Ergonortics/Hurnrrn Fcactors ; llisE~ases, Disorders cand Jrrjuries ;
to Tony Hilton who, along with mc,
Thinking the warning was directed airmcn's hut I~rovidcntially, missin g wreckage and devastatiun, Thcre Persvrral Protc°ctive E~uiprnenr; Ccrrradicnt Hc~S Legis{ation
had been scrambled at dawn from
at him Davies aborted takeoff and all the occuhants. It went on to were still a loi of us in the ~~ir in (including ~1r1 I~~9IS) ; Itt/arrrutfion kesources ~r Referruls ctnd
Horsham St Faith on the tirst dav
dcmolish several bicycles . Tony
ot Exerirse ~ rgrlant . Tom , shut
. the overshot the runway, sruashed our exercise marked, white linned many more . OSH Answers covers over 100 topics, answering mnre
through the fence on the edge of Hilton's parachute had deployed Hunters . We had all tound plenty ot than 1,000 qurstions . 'l~hc rehertoire will steadily grow as CCOHS
engine down and set course for a
return to 1rase ncr t realizing th~~1 t the airtield, skirnmed across the targets and had Fushcd uur luel to continues to handle inqturit, from all over Canada . ~
the surge had been caused by thc main road which runs alongside its the absolttte limits . C~Itishall was For ntore information contact CCOHS' Inquiries Service at
increase in the angle ot attack and out of action : its runwavs were 1-800-263-8466 (in ( :anada only) or e-mail inqturiesC~ccohs .ca .
the reduced power setting hc hud being resurfaced and we could get
applird and that he haci ;hut down nothing out of a shell shu~ked A'I'C ?501~~1ain Street East,
a perfeitlr~ serviceahle cngine. al Sl Faith so v~e went to 1ti'esl Hamilton, ()ntario
Raynham praying that our fuel (;~rnad .i LSN 1 HE~
Aleanwhile a lavelin of 141 Scluadron would last but found that here Air
which w~s b~ised at St Faith lor the Traftic were tc~tally preoccupied with 1-800-668-4284 or(905}570-8094
duration uf Vigilant had been scram- something like 16 aircraft waiting to Fax: (905) 572-2206
bled too. It was titted with ~ `11USUnl' E-mail : custservOccohs .ca
land . The fuel SItUahOn (ienl<lnlled
tanks and ,ts it st,irted to taxi the Web: httpalwwrv.ccohs.ca
that w~e find a suitable gap amongst
front attachment of one of them the ~'Neteors,l1eteor Night Fighters,
failed, allowing the t~mk to swing Javelins and f ltmters and get do`vn,
down about its rear mounting . Having landed it was literallv a case
$ecause of the large delta wing the of steerin g amon gJst aircralt ~that h,rd
tank failure was hidden frorn the rolled to a halt out of fuel! ~
sight of the cresv and the pilot taxied
on unarvare ol the problem, pu~hing Reproduced from Talkdown, the
magazine of the Norwich Airport
Aviation Group and 14 Sqn's
history book

Fli 9 ht Comment No . 3, 1998 - Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 7

6
 " I
I
I
I

I
I
I
I
I

Heard ul compressiott Iractures? ~l his is when they occur.

The t~ront portion of your vertebr~t are squeezed together
bv the unnatural benilin~ of your hack and some receive
hairline frcrctures,

Don't believe it? ~ti'e have had several cases of~ the top ot
flving heltnets being dantaged by tht~ sr~t pan asscmbly!

Snap! The paraihute pull~ yeru rle,tr ol lhe seat . [f the WHAT CAN GO WRONG?
~r,tt h~i, heen tumhlin~ Iwhich is more likelv ifvou
, e'ect
I
What Y our mother never told Y ou durin~ a rullin~ manoeuvre or s }~in 1 then there mav, he Pins? ~1Vtiru 1)evple rrr tlre hrst?y yelirs lrcat'e drecl (leiarr<e tfie'" 7
By WG Cdr Nick Spiller: the Cornmand flight Safety Ofificer sume whiplash as you are jerked strai~ht hy tht parachute. f ~'r ~'~,t tlrc ;enr pirrs.
Quite otten the risers beconte twisted, ~t ; secn here, durin,;
This is it! Straps tight. Head bnck itr the hend box. I3ack }~~trachute de 1~lovment
, . AS these strai f~~hten, you
, will he Slttll1 g hel 9 ht? 1/-~~nrr irre sittin~~ ton hi~~h in thc seat,
nice arrd srrniKht . (.~heck that the Nar~/Pilnt lras his head twisted round . Your helmet mav suctg un the untvindin~ (ikc tlri~ irrdivirlunl, t(rrrr r,~lrert t~orr hit the wirrclblnst ron risk
clea~-o% tlre cnrropy Give the hrrndle n goorl pull. risers, i~erha }~s c~rusin `L dama~Je~to
r Your visur c~r dislc~il ~inU ti~crur hecrd beinS,1
~ hv ri~r ta-tcndc~d vi~cr thc to1'1 o ~thc hcad hox
VOlll' OXV~;cn maSk . Thc' hr~lln 11,tleS thfSl' rt~t~tU(~Ilal IUrceti! c~rrd /rncturinfi,vour <krcll vrr thc rc?in/orced top o% llrc scut .
WOW! Uon't hclievc lhc prclty
}~i~tur~~s in the sale~ brc~chure Frl 9 htenin 9 ? ~'ou'd better helieve it! ftut it all tak~s leg Restra i nt? tl i~nu rlorr't takc~ thc~ sktck otrt of your
(ur in Air C:}ues Aur; 951 . les~ than ~ ,~c~conds, and it is intinitelv bciter than dving in Ic,t rc`tr~cilrt~ th~~n t'orc ri~k yotu~ Ic~gs haurrc-irt~7 up nrrrllrittitt~
'fhis is wh,tt it's reallv the wreckx k~e . tlrc~ lrc~ttorrr uj tlre irr~tnunt~nt pnrrc~l or tltc~ co~rtrrirr,~~ . "
like! ~[1,5()0 lbs c~f
Reprinted courtesy of RAF Sirike Safe issue 51
thrust ('i'hat's ahout the ~UCh! ~'ou hit the windhlast . At this stage, you are still
thrust of one I'h~mtom travellinK at lhe saute speed a~ the aircratt . The windblasl
EGIt ? in fall reheat or throws you hack intc~ the seat, er,tending your hody up and
the m~ixuuurn thru .t c f back ~t i,~ainst Ihe stra 1» and seat . Your head should h~o neatlv.
into the centre ot the l~added headhax but , if You are THE BOTTOM LINE
8 H~~wks) takin~ the seat
up the rails. ~uu arc tunrh}in~, it cuuld hit the cc_rmer ot the headbox or miss . Ejection seats save lives.
pushcd clown insicle ,31to~ether . ~ume people lose consciotrsness at this stage.
. Always e~ert tn ttme.
tlte slrtp5 with the spine Sit too high in thr scat and vou risk your head t;oing ri~ht
hending like a h~tirpin to hack over thc hradhc~x and thc lower rear o(' vour head Always strap in assuming that you will have to ejeci.
<thsorb the sltock,ll is strikinc; the solid metal bar on the to 1' of thelseat . This . !f time permits, make sure that the frontlrear seater is ready and clear of the canop .
imE~ossihle to aihieve Y
c,tn hc I,tt,+l .
this hosition without Have a clear plan for Command Ejection .
the ?Il ~ ; ot ejection . . Sit at the correct eye datum height even if this means your thighs are not in contact with the seat
cushion . Better a broken 1eg than a fractured skull.

8 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 9

 rnountain waves. 'Lhe were all wearing ,tircraft qtuckly ralled through rnore
our full tivc~ l,oint h~trncsscs, with than 4~ degrees in heavv buffet (an
aur seats raised up and forwards to angle one ~a~ctuld never appro~tch in such
see outside.'I'he Captain reduced an aircrali, let alone in the vacuum-thin
speed to .78 A1ach becattae ol the air ctt e~treme altitude).

the Rest
turbulence and, as nld autopilots are
prone to dropping out from time tct Quicklv refocusing on his artificial
time, he had his hands on the control horizon , 1~lartin could hardlv, believe
wheel to intervene immediatelv if his eyes as he saw the b;~nk rapidly
that happened or in case the autopi- increase I~ast ~~ dr g rees, Thinkin c~ his
. gvro must have toppled lrom ;r major
lot couldn't cope :'
electri~al failure, he immediatelv
Here 1 should mention that the 707's looked across at the battcrv- .Powered
single 19 :~Os technology autopilot standbv instrument, hut that con-
h;rs limited abilities, even w-hen tirnted/the aircrait's P crilous attitude .
maintained to perfection . ~1lthough At the same time, with lightning
su lI
> >osedlv, caP able of holdin g head- retlexes Ca l~tain Ber gelund disen-
ing and height, tracking a VOR radial ~a ~ed the auto I~ilot, and held full left
and following an ILS it does none ,tileron and rudder to try to get the
of these thin~s with ntodern di g ital stricken freighter back to an even kerl .
precision, and frequently r~~akes
hi gger cuntrol in l~uts lhan
"Both starboard en 9 ines 18,000 707 hc~ur5 . All three ~~~ere verv onwards as the available loads dictated .
une wetuld hope for. The
ex l~erienied in 'i'hird lUorld lonc;- I)espite their earlier trihulations, the
have 9 one!" h~tul air c~lrgo c~perrltions, ;tnd dtrrin~ crew m;tnaged tc+ push-back on
manut~ttturer's proud hoast
was that tt could apply auto-
he carlv; morning Alt~ine cloud lhe Past t~~rtnight they haJ circum- schedule at Oi(Ill l'T(;.
matic up elevator in turns!
vvas t;rey and buntP)~ a; the navigated Alrtia srveral times .
The 707's maximum takeoff weight
hcavv l~oeing 7t17 struggled for ln ;m attempt to get ahove
A lclng-haul charter pilot's litc is is 1 ~ l tons . ~\iih ~9 tcrns of fucl in
altituclt . Laden with luel and n~ining the turbulent cloud lacer,
never easy bul sonte davs can he its tanks, 5N-~1AS weighed all ctf that
equipment, lhe freighters multinational taxied past and one toc~k a photo- r\1~trtin reyuested Flight
uvc,rse than ctthers . hiartin deseribes as its four high-hours hut rcliallle
crew wa,~ ;m~ic~trs to ~lintb out of the graph : He later told Ivlartin "Yott Level ~ 30 . The airi,rctft
the start af 31s1 ~`,1ar~h ly9? a~ IT3I)313 turbcrlans gradually acceler
turhulence and into the clear blue skv used every inch o1 that runway on was rrally a little hea~y tc~
"Rloody awful :' lt began with a ~lam ated it alcln g I,uxemhourg 's ~I,()00
thev, cuuld ~,~~lim l?se ~~bove 33,0(-)0 feet. takeoff: The aero I~lane brcame achieve this altitude immcdi-
wake-up aiter ;~ brief rest at a sm ;tll, metre Rtmwa Y '~ . (~enerally reckctned
tiuddrnlti~, with a loud dc~uhle repcrrt .rirbornc at 071 Sz . atelv, bul the crrw hnped tc~
a~ld out-of-tc~t~'n pensiun (having to have been draw'n bv VC-1 0
the aira-att rolled hard ril;ht . make ~ gentle cruise-climb to
rivallin g~ salcsrnen the 707's takec~Ff
t
heen displared hy a conference frc~m ~Taking usc° of a runway~-end valley
get out ol the increasinglti'
Strrartuns ; fuel, the stricken airliner the airport hotel the previous dayl pertc~rmanie charts were alwavs opti- to accelerate, the crew retracted the rctugh cloud, f A new 707 ~,~as
started its tinal desccnt . ln the cock- and a long laxi drive in the' d;trk mistic, hlost c~f us tamiliar with the E3oeing's tlahs, Their smoke-tr~tiling
only cvcr stresscd to +? .5 and -1 (T) . The tlight deck was .t ~acophony crl
pit, the cc~pilot' .~ mind tl<ished hack along the winding, hilly rc~acl to lumberint; heast have seen cnough Pr ;ttt ~i 1Vhitneys, belying the `hush-
~iartin descrihes the usual 707 noisc as the autopilc~t disengaged
~~ Ve~l-S . I3\' ~l Une In a ntilhcln the airpc~rt . hit;h-s
. I~ccd closeu l~s of the t~ir end kitted' stiekers on their Hanks,
tlU'hUletlie s1'Illplutllti Ot t~eXlng warhler mingled wilh tlle dealcning
chance, that earlier day he had ~een al,hr~~ach lights to last ~t career, but howled with the iomhined thrust
Their airiratt was 5N-~1 ;1ti, ;r thirty win f~~s, noddins;,
~ tl,tilinr; ent;ine
~ I~ods rngine tire bell hclow the ilight engi-
a 707 whi~h, having shed an engine, this run w'as even Innger th ;ln usual of 72,000 paunds, ;IS they thundered
vear-uld, sixtv lhousand-hc~ur, ,tnd con,lantlv-chan
, g~ins; airiluw neer's table anli a varietv crl tortured
was then ionsumed hv (lames .ltirrre as thc' he~l~'y machinr struggled into ahead througll thc dawn twilight . An
Ni k7c~rian re h~istercd ~ctcran .'1'his suunds as they terked anci lurched ~trurtural and airtlcnv noises frrtm
thev ti~ suff~r lhr sante fate' Unlv' th~ the uti indle,s skv at the very end of understanding air tratlic controller
ex-Pan Am , ex-lran Air , ex l'~andah their way lhrough thr humps . "It was hehind ;rnd clutside . Both h1artin
~rc'atest
. c~~ teamwc~rk attil superlalivc the runway . Thc m ;uginal departure ileared thern in a straight line direi-t
Airways, ez I)an .Air Bc~c~ing 7f)i 3? 1 much too roug~h to write, sc~ 1 ste~wed and 7'errv thc cngincer attentt~ted
tlyint; skill could s;tve the o~ctipants . was witnessed by, atuc~ng others, to S,tint Prex V()R lSPll} climbing
had suh~cquently been cunverted to ntv, tli~ht
~ lc>g> heside nte and ccmccn- ,everal times tct silence the tir~ hc~ll
ltirere thcv up cc~ it? b1'ithin half ;tn sctme Engli~h cunstruction wc~rkers unrestricted to ~light Level ?90 .
,t treiC;hter and owmcd bv a successic~n .  - ,, ,,c lratecl on luokint; out ti~r a hreak in by hressing the cancel huttcm cm the
h~tur thcy Gvould know . .. litlrng Ihc nc~~' utntrol tcnticr s cuI la . Using their ttti'in l)ntega I~tng-range
ol ntainlv Brili~h freight comhaties the clouds. As thev slowlv sla g~~rrecl glareshield, hut tc, no eifecl,lti~arning
Theti~ vv~aved tu lhr ~revv a~ the t3ueing navig~ttion sets, the ircuv srl cc,urse
I'he highly experienced crew had who used it predominantlv tor high- ctn u t~ l,ast 3',300~teet, the ?-,~rev: ;kti~ lights illuntinatcd anel tlashed . (wer
totvards the distant ~'()R besiile
uvorked togrthcr lor just two weeks . weight, long-ciist ;rnce tlit;hts acrc,ss ahcwc gradually be~ame lighter, with thc hell's din a ~trident horn bcgan
picluresque Lake Geneva .
C;aplain Ingemar Bergelund, ~t Swede the North Allantic as (_~-Bl~'Lf ancj n~r~tsional glimpses of hlue, sct thev signalling inrrra~ing cahlr1 altitude
in his mid Gllies, had Ictggcd ? ~,000 ( ;-tiNGH . The ~tircraft had recentlv Nearly an h~ur later, as thev ~russed kne"' thev were nearlv clear. ;tnd dtivindlin t,~ lif'e-su llc
, > >r tt'n l,ct}gcn
~ r ~ , ,
hc~urs on many airliners, including a been ai:c1 uircd bv. the hano-re gTistered the Swiss horder, thev had reachrd for the irevv', ltul ~s .
'1'hc atnber light and tone of the
decade or more un 7117s. } G ; ~t ~ vcar- Nigerian ~omp~lm' Tr ;tns-Air Lld fi~r I'L290 and achieved a cruise s l~eed ~~f
altrtude ;tlerter had lust indicated The aerc~plane was descending f,tst,
c~ld Ent;lish fir,t oFlicer ~lartin Emcrv- an African charler frei ;;ht opcr;~tiitn i~9ach .80 acrr 300 knots IASI as lhev-
700 fcet to levrl-otl when suddenly, slipping down hall sidcways on the
had prrvicrusl,y 1i~llowed hrief careers hased in I .u~enthr~urti . Its planned turncd south, on track tirr ;~1artit;ues
. shaking itself lik~~ a wet dng, the ragged edge c~f ~antrol, and perilously
as air tratfic controllcr and tlving flight that dav ;ts ~NI~ (,71 was frnm (h~IT(;) 1`1;trtin describes the ride as
hig jet staggerrd undcr thc ncar- clo ;e to a'ji't-upset' when its increas-
instructur, and had amassed ~16, ;00 I u~emhuurl; rct I~~os (Nigcria) wit]t they appmaihed the 111ps as "Rough
stmultaneous du~l h~immer hlc~uvs ing ~\lach numher wc~uld rapidly
hc~urs, morc than hall of them ~tn hig a htll load uf nearlv tc~rtv lc~ns ot as hell in verv dark stratiforrtl cloud .
c~1 two deep, dull, ntull led thuds . render the manu,tllv-pcnver~d con-
jet tranahc~rts, including 4,500 on petromining cyuipment lor I~sso, Althctugh it tivas turbulent, we saw
As these twin trenutrs resc~unded trols immuvahle even under the t}vo
7117, . Fli ; ;ht enginrer Terr~' Rc~on~, thrn on tc~ Accra I(-~hanal, B;tmako nothing on our radar; f think the
through the entire air(rame, the hilots' amtbined elforty,
stl ;u ,l l3rit in his earlv fihies, had over Ine~tr Timhuktou in t\lalil, and bumps m«st h:lve b~~n ~uuscd bv

10 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 - Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 11

 This realization gave Tvlartin a horri- dearance over the Alps, and were However the two-engine landing
Atter a te4v seconds turmoll the
ble feeling ol deja vu lor, as a young able to steer visually around the checklist requires an additional t<venty
Captain regained control ot the
air trattic control cadet, he had been mountains [o leave the high ground knots to ensure that the aircratt
wotmded war-horse I although ninetv
in a training unit near the littoff end behind . Now some serious tactical remains under directional control.
degrees off course to the right ) and
of Heathrow'S Runwav, l~ Ri g ht on dccisions had to be made, so the I Vmca on tvvro cngincs is 152 knuts
reduced speed to it~ ?30knot \'a (the
that sumrner day in 1y68 when captain handed over control of the it the hydralilic rudder boost is still
ruaximum for tull control dellectton,
Australia-hound BC~AC 707 G-AR~ti~'E harelv mana ¬7eahle
, aero p lane to working . The I \'mca on three engines
vrhich i~ also the recommended
had shed its burning number three ltleartin for tive minutes while he without rudder boost is 161 knots, but
structural failure speed I, lt was clear
engine into a Staines reservoir . pondered their plight . It was clear nobody was sufticiently pessimistic to
that something was terrbly w rong
Martin had alerted A~I'C that he h~td that, even with power on its ttivo work oui thc minimum controllablc
with their aircralt, but in one partic-
seen the engine ~tblaze ; and witnessed rernaining engines, the aircraft would speed with both hvo engines and
ular respect they w~ere lucky it was a
the staggering airliner's abbreviated continue descending, and could nnlv rudder boost inoperative) . The 707
707, not a later type .

Qi~
circuit and approactt, dragging a trail rcnt~un aloft for a lintitcd time, requires extremely careful handing
Fur the 707 is the only big jet airliner of yellow fl~~mes and thick hlack
A French controller provided a
on two engines, and several have been
to have manual tlving controls, smoke across thc hazv skv, to land lost in these ~onditions . Unlv the fol-
southerly heading towards A-iarseilles
~ ~ 1 b y ~ old-fashioncd cables,
(~peratcc dowmvind on Runwav 0~, where it lowin g,vear an RA,AF 7(17 s P un in
Alarignane airport, and relayed the
pushrods, bell-cranks, sprockets and- burned out rn a serres ot small explo- from a low-spccd dcmonstration
weather, whtle the captarn gave the
bicycle chcjins, and aided bv balance sion~, killing four p~tssengers and a Vrnca ~ortie .
order to start durnping fuel to reduce
panels and servo tabs, these are a stewardeti ; .
therr w~etght as much as possrble . As they made therr left turn ontu
trihute to the skills of Bocing's aero- hvdraulic pumps, two sources of bleed with the heavy controls to }told the
aircratt on their new westerly cotrrsr It now became <hillingly clear to \leanwhile the tlight and ground Marseille's localiser, with an amazing
clynamicists, ~lorc irnportantly for air and tvti~o of the three cabin air
while trying to asses their situation . Martin that they themselves wcre in a engineers laboriously wound down stroke of screndipity, ~\9artin glanced
our crew, they will still continue to compressors, So, to compound [}teir
The engineer tried to figure out whirh similar situation, and only the great- the undercarriage using the three past his strarnlng c~lptalJl arld saw
work regardless oi whrtt subsidiary problems, the normal lutliercarrrage
svstems had been lost, and wh,~t tht est ot therr comblned skrlls, mrxed manual hand cranks rn the tlrght belovv, through a break rn the cloud,
systems may have heen lost . '1'he and flap cxtension mechanism was
ramitications were, Com 1~letin g the witlt considerable luik, tivould save deck floor . However, it soon became a lon gT runway. framed in the tar
only artificial assistance is a hydraulic lost, the electrical system vvas severelv
them . Eventually convincing the oth- clear from the pilots' radar that avindow. "1'hat would bc bctter ; land
jack to hoost rudder detlection and degraded and cabin pressurisatron was `vital actions ; ~tartin lookcd out of
ers of their plight, he cut off the fuel Marseille's into-wind Runway 32 thert" he called, while trying to
reduce the engine-out control speed failing . Oh, and fucl lines were severeil his side window to check the outboard
to the second right-slde engine (but approctch was obscured by thunder- cstabllsh (rom Marscillcs approach
lVmca) to a safe minimum . and the integral wing tanks ruptured, enginc lor ~igns of tire .
still could not silence the tire bell l storms, and they dare not suffer any where it was. It turned out to he no
but [his tiv~ould not becortte evident for
But, hefore the crew had time to He will never forget that ~ight . and then carried out the remainder more turhulenie . The captain sug- lcss than the ~f,000 ntetre runwav of
a fevv minutcs ,vet .
ret1ect on this, thev were back in Although the,y were still in ~loud, it of the fire drill's `cleanup' items . gested a right, turn for Pahna, vvhich the French tlight test centre at [stres,
thrck ~loud and heavy turbulence, off lloing their hest, numbers one and was clear that, where the outboard was wide open, but his crew~ felt that a s P ~rce-shuttlc enterg encv, landin g~
At the same time he was repeatedly
course, and dcscending rapidly in a two engines on the lett wing were engine and its pylon should be, It W~1S Ollt ot rell~h . ground . Perfect.
making Mayday calls, using the call-
crippled cr~3ft tovvards the highest producing maximurn continuous there vvas nothing but a gclping holr
in thc leading-edge . Shocked, \lartin si g n `Mavda
, Y 671' br~ause "1 didn't Bctween thcm, thcy dccided their Nlarscilles C;ontrol handed thern
mountains in Europe . More recent power as, not yet knowing the eYact
swun g~ hack to thc c~a 1~tain and said tvant to die trying to get the phonet- satest course of action was to attempt over to Istres Approach who asked
big-f;m equipped Boeing airliners can condition of their aircralt, the cap-
"Number four is missing!"'I'hcn he ics ri ght" but he g ot little help ,lnd a straight-in landing through thc their pasitioit. "Dou't worry, we're
rnaintain a reasonable height on the tain tried to n1lnInlISe height luss and
suttered a series ot frequency and hroken stratus onto the reciprocal overhead" replied hiartin. "11~e are
power of just two engines, hut the 707 called for the tire drill . ;~tartin and had a sudden thought and, twisting
squawk changes . Exasperated by Runway 14, despite a tailwind eaused commeniing a procedure turn, will
is not so luck,y except at ver~~ low ihe enginecr carried out thc rncrt~ory back to press his left cheek hard
A'1'C's poor gras P of the situation by the Rhone valley's ;\~listraL But call visual :' So Itilartin helped his
weights . Having burned ott ten tons items, first fi~r No 4 engine then for against the thick glass I for it is almost
and lack ot assrstance, and rrrrtated Martu~ w~as stlll uneasy, ~utd scanned captain around a left teardrop turn
of fuel since t~tkeoft, 5N-MAS now No 3, but thev were perplexed that impossible to see a 707's inboard
by the constant interruptions of his high-level chart for evidence of to position cross-wind lor a circuit
weighed around l10 tons ( mintrs a both right-side thrust lever .~ Ithrot- engines frum the cockpit) he could ,
other French-speaklng arrcratt, lte the better ntrlttary frekis he knetiv ro land on istres s Runway 32 .
few tons u1 engines 1 so its three- tlesl had slamrned to the Iront ot just glimpse the raggcd gap left by
finally set (he transponder to 7700 cxrsted trom hts lrght atrcratt tourtng
engine drift-down hcight l the altitude [heir cl uadrant . Pullin g the No 4 fim the No ; p ower 1~lant. He called louder Nuw Captain t3crgclund tti~as panting
ldent and concentrated on establish- of the area . The captau~ resumed
it could maintain vvith maximum con- handle to cut off the fuel, electrics "lioth starhoard engines havc gone!" with the ~heer effort ot tighting the
ing their position and calculating control as ~\9artin negotiatcd un the
tinuous power on the three remaining ,tnd air supplics l'rom the outboard Terry the rngu~eer replied, in the controls as thcir speed redu~ed . liut
an (MSA) radio and the others found the rele-
enginesl wuuld be helow'O,OUt) feet . engine, the,y did not at first touch the g gTe (lt these Ocl~t5lolls "~,ome
Idn'll~l
vant approach plates, then ttmed and thev had to turn left, against the
Its two engine dril[-down height was inboard en g inc's fuel cutoffs, bec,tu~e on'~t,trtin , don't muck about jokin~, ,, l 1)uring this activitv it occurred to thrusl ol lhe opcrating ertgines, to
. ,  identitied thc, radio
. aids . By this trmc
likelv to have been subterranean . they w,utted to take advantage of thrnl,s arc bad rnuugh already. Martu him that, avith a severelv disabled re~tch the airport . (wer the ~hrilling
thcv vvcre down to aruund R,000 Icct
whatever powcr it might be able [o quickh~ transmitted a i~lrrydcty call, aircraft, old flight data and iorkpit lirc hcll h-1artin called repeatedly lor
GVhat thc~ crew did not yet knovv, hut givr them and retain its hydraulic 1 g their situation,
hrietlv, ex?lainin~ voice recorders> and an uncompre-
on a high, wide leit base w'lth the
a turn hut, between gasps tor breath,
would ~oan find out vvith .~ horritied requcsting the 1171rllmlUn S:lte altltulie
wirtd hlowing , lrum thcir righl uar-
l~um }t anti clcctrics . l(~nly cl 707's hending air traftic control, thev were
ter. The 707 s maxlmum landing
the captain replied that he couldn't
shock, was that they had lotit both inboard engines havc hvdraulic (119tiA1 in thrir ~rrea and radar vectors likcly tn perish w~ithout anvbody ever do it ; in tact he could no longer even
their right engines. That is, they had weight is l 1? tons, hut at this time
l~ t tm p s , and number three's t,Jenerator to, a landing . ~1TC aid not seem to knowing why. Sn he pulled out his
;~S would still have weighed about keep straight . But if he did not turn
not ju~t been robbed of thesr normallr~ supplies power to the essen- understand the ~eriousness ol their camera and took a photograph of now they wottld all be buried in the
enr;incs' [hrust, which woulci have plight, ctnd kept asking for their 13 ; tons, lor which the entergency
tial busbar for the (~a p tain's E~rinl~trv, the damaged right wing . good earth of Provence, and the
been hazardous enou g h, but [hev had instruments) . position, ~omeihing Alartin hoped Vref lthreshold speedl is Iti0 knots.
exhau~ted captain seemed to be los-
shed the entire povvcr-plant~, pods, At 2?,000 feet they popprd uut of t?sing the normal half-headwind
to get ti~um thcm, He esplained their ing directional control, so 1lartin
suhporting struts and all . \1'ith thrm Each crew member was fullv o~cupie~t structural 1~rohlem and declared cloud to see snowcapped peaks all incremcnt Iwith a minimum uf eight
., reachee} across and throttled back the
had gorte ttivo of their four electrical with his owm tasks, `fhe Cahtain tvas around, and a further cloud lavrr knotsl they should ha~c all roached
. . -
'lirltited manoeuvrmg but still got two live engines . .~s the induced vaw
generators, one ot the two main working physiwllv very hard, wre~tling below, Fortunatelv thrv still had on lour engines at 158 knots .
no useful responsc . swung the arrcral[ rnto a lclt bank, he

Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 13

12 Flight Comment No, 3, 1998 -- - - -- ---
 To Intervene or
reestablishcd nearlv tull power on the rudder and tttade small adjustment ;, anti-skid and spin-up protections it is had to jurllp from the main entr~'
inboard l°ngine and opened up lhe while Alartin nlodulated the power, not surprising that, even using caretul door because its slide did not intlate.
outhuard as much as he dared, to retaining as much as po5sible on the short `squirts', he eventuallv burst some As he hit the grounli M~irtin shouted

Not To Intervene?
t'rSLUr~ tiUllte ~OUtC01 . inboard rngine to keep them ~loft . af th~ l~~res, but tlol briure their speed to his collea tes "Cume on 'y~ou lot,
Thev dared not reduce airspced ti'a~ ~C~Itltll g llnlleC ~Ontr01 . bloodv well run!" and stumbled for-
Bllt nolv thell' ln~l'e~t5ed detiCellt Cate,
below ?00 knots for fear ol losin~ tti~ard to get atvav, trom the wreck .
with onlv linlited thrusl lo offset the Captain Bergelund perfnrmed a per- Looking back, he desa'ibed the
dircctional control, ti'et they had

The Copilot's
drag of th~ l~tnliing gear, m~tde sn fect landing and kcpt straight as ~tn Ilaming hulk as louking like the Torrev
thirtv knuts of 1Gstral tailwind . I'1'h~
into-wind ,t ll
> >roa~h seem im P ossible. ~trro~~ despite the lack ot both Canvon , and was deli g hted to see his ~
maximum Pcrmissiblr laihti~ind for
But even svorse ~sas to ~onte for, as hydraulic nose-svheel stecring and cou g~hing fellaw crew memhers sta?,h J 7er
ldtllllng a iU/ Is ten k110t5 .1
thev slowed to exiend the~ fl~p~ by differ~ntial braking but, with a tail-

Catch
from the roilin g black srnoke like lohn
their etnert;encv eleitrical svstcm,
, Landing with only psrtial flap at svind, it w~ts inevitable that thev ltiavnr gunslingers emerging trom the
there w~as an ex 1~losiott . Fuel esca 1tin ?~7 I ~0 tons and well over ?UO krlots would eventually lose airectional embers ot the ()1\ Curral .
lront the ruptured tank ; and line, in (on wlteels anci tuldercarriage stressed conlrol as s 1~eed reciuced . About
the rit;ht s~°ing had bren ignited b~~ for clnlv l 1Z tons at l9~ kt~1 thcv three-quarters of the way along thc As they left, the fire service arri~-ed
bare rlertri~al ~~~ires protruding from t o t t~h l'd down 1'ust l~ast the nunthers runway the No ? engine reverser to hose the airframe, tirst tvith tivater, Dr Robert 0. Besco (Capt AAL, Ret.) President, PPI (M00949)
111 3 hyl(111'S 1(lck~t . itlUtil ol lltl and slightly letl uf the centreline . inexorably pulled them off the lett then with loarn, "1'hanks to lheir
right-side 11aps were bluwn ~ttivay i the 1~1artin later said "1 h~td never seen an side and, titi~ilh a wrv sruile, illartirl tintelv intervention the cargo was Introduction and Back 9 round
liebris danlaging the elevaturl, the airport go hy su fa .~t!" Trving to, get reialls travellin~~ fast acro,s the i,Jrass saved~and the airrraft 5uffend littlc widely accepted cause of pilot error accidents in the last twentv years
wing spars tivere seriousls disrupted, thrtr sl., lld
 undcr . ~c, ntrc,l, as theti' tcl stup thirtv metrcs shurt ol a large further dama g e, g ivin ¬~T the investi ¬~Tat- has been P oor Cock 1~it Resource Mana getnent (CR~i) . It has become
~tnci the ,tircratt a g ain he~Jan
~ rollin g crossed the fence he relin a tushed the stecl L) C) Iv~
` 1 T PAtiS
. TH IS P()ItiT ing team guod evidertre to work un, la wcll-eslablished fact that the deficient and flawed attitude and
rtl,ht. ~lartin had tc> thrc> ttle h~~t ~-k No throttles to his c~tptain and grahbed si~n . A; thev ruckcd and slithered to knrn~~ledge components of pilot perforruance have been a major prnblem in
From tirst losing the engines to
1 ellglIle eti'eJl mol'e a5 the Cl)Illla~ra- li~r the spoilers while thev were still in a h~ill at ri ~ltt an ~les to thc runwav, CR~ti9 perlormance breakdowns (Arbon, Mouden, and Feeler, 1990; Besco,
skidding to a halt took a ntcre
tion hegan e<tting away the trailing the air I'~jlthough unly the auxiliary he hecame astiare ot a hi g~h volutne 1990, 1991, 199?, and 1994 ; Caesar,1989 ; Cooper, Whlte, arld Lattller,198U ;
25 minutes, and it was still only lust
rllge, lurther reducing litt on that systenl-powered inboard spoilers of noise out~ide the aircr;tft . 1 ielmreich,1990 ; Hurd,1987 ; Lautmann, and (;allimore, 1987 ; Lederer, 199U ;
after eight thirty in the rnorning
side and nlaking it evcr harcier to tv~luld have workclil, Aftcr touchdostin Nagel,1988 ; National Transportation Safety Bctard, 1994 ; Oftice of Technology
I)urint; the rollout ht saw lhe entire UTC Martin attrihutes their survival
holll the aircraft strai~ht . '1'errv cautiuuslv hauled up No 2 to "Bloody good teant work" and Assessment,1988 ; Sears,1989 ; and Wiener,1989) . Most Cockpit Resource
1VItll; N'1t$ llll lntern0 Of tl~llle ~lnd
ent;ine's throttle lu ntaxitttunt reverse . Management training programs have focused on the personality conflicts and
hoilinc; hl~~~k smoke, and guessed says that, when checked by the doc-
As they broke through the tors an hour and a half later, their unsanitary small group dynamics of air crews (Helmreich and Foushee,1993) .
cloud at 1,200 feet, trailing black adrenaline-charged heart rates were Recently CRM programs are starting ro provide a reemphasis on nlure opera-
smoke and flame, lstres tower still up to fctur tinles highcr lhan tionally relevanl conlents of CRM training I Besco,199~1 ; Besco and Lederer,
twice warned ihem they were normal . l99? ; Helnlreich,1993 ; and Schwartz,1987) .
on fire and deared them unre-
stricted to land onto any runway. During a brief two-day enquiry This paper exantines the yueslion of what speci(ic knowledge, attitude, and skill
fverybody now realised they I ~jt which the crew apalogised for components would he most beneticial to subordinate crew members when they
had to get down immediately, melting the runway) their French nnrst challenge the performance of a Captain. Such a crilical siluatiun can be
which meant landing downwind. hosts gave them lun~h with tvine very difticult for the junior crew memhers, especially if they are still in their
And they had just one chance to and brandy. A K(:.l 35 I military 7U7 ) new-hire, 1trobationar YP eriod, If the org ani~ation is one thal leads bv, lcar,
get it right. captain said "l~or this surt of intimidation, and reprisal, all crew memhers will he very reluctant to tell an
etnergency we evacuate en vol ~~nd established Captain that nlistakes are being made lBesco,l9$9; Bruggink,1989 ;
Aliguing the tlaming sircr~tft w~ith the parachute tu safety, why did yuu llegani and Wiener,1991 ; and NTSB,1994 ) .
I'lln`Ya~' anll lllUlttg lo g~l lhtm thcl'e stay~ with thc acro P lane~"
A new component is suggested to be added to CR'12 training . "1'.A .C .E :' is
at their uniummonlv high grounll- the acronym uscd to deiine this new set of survival skills-Prohing, Alerting,
"Easy," s~tid Martin, "No parachutcsl"
speed touk all ul their cornbined Challenging, and Emergency Warning.
skill~ . (-~aptain Bergelund helll a slight "The tW0 1111SSIttg enginrs wcre later
l~it hank ~~~ilh full lcft ~tilcron ,tnci found 800 mrtres apart, 14,4U(1 feet These four steps form an ordered prugression of inyuiries designed to reduce
that, ~tlthuugh lhe~~ were ntir~tculuusly
Il~verse thrust should high in a Swiss ntountain furest . risks at each level of the intervention seyuence . The "P.A.C .E :' skills will
alivt~, thev would not rcmain so for
only be used svmntctri- Although the ofticial French report enable subordinate flighl crew members to clfectively intervene when a
lung unlcss they were very yuick .
callv on thr 70i, but hc has not yet been publi~hcd, il ~tppears Captain is not performing up to reasonable professional standards. The
Realiiing h~ w~ls the unlv one tvho
rightly rcali~ed that, with that the rout cause of the aicldent "P.A .C .E :' inquiry procedural steps will insure that thc intervention by
had scrn the lire, he shc~uteli tor
no hvdr~tulic brakl's, thc was a fatigue tailure of one ol 1\0 3 CoP ilots will alwa y~s increase the marg ins of safet Y. The "P.A .C .E ." intervention
prioritv wa~ ncnv to get ~hhr'rv to ~ut the luel and electrics, engitte's pylon tnountings originating progression tools will never make a bad situation worse.
their carcrrinr ; ju ~r;er- threw open his heavv winllow, frum an area uf corr~~sion .
naut Stuhpeci . grahhed thr l~vacuation str,tp ahove
(c) R . J . Grimstead 199~1 The Need for Enhanced Survival Skills
it, hr,wed this to the grounli and,
Conlirming lh,tt the nor- There have heen many incidents and accidents in which the subordinate flight
~houting`.1:vacuate, evacuate get Editor's note : The folluwing year the
mal ioot hrakes ~~~err u!5, crew ntembers had detected serious problerns in the performance of the
out no~1~", ~lid lic~wn it . crew was awarded Che Guild of Air
thc taplain gr,tbbed ti7r
Pilots and Air Navigators `Hugh Captain. Subordinate crew members were a~~lare of the gravity of the situation
the red em~rgeniv air sv~- Befi~re leaving, he was aware ol ~l~'rrv but Gvere unable to select suitable res 1~onses to the P erceived P roblem (NTSB
Gordon Burge Nlcmorial Awarll . "
t~nl handle on hts lower foll~t~~'ing him ,tnd the captain acting 1994) . The Copilots and other subordinate crew members were noi able tct
I'l~llt 1I15trlinlent pdnll . similarl~ on the far side ol th~ coikpit, Reproduced courtesy of Pilot prevent crashes in the following fatal aircraft aciidents:
`Illie thls b14~asties al~ the The loalltn,t~ter and g7r~und enr;ineer
. Magazine November 1994

14 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 - Flight Comment No . 3,1998 15

 To Intervene or Not To Intervene? The Copilot's Catch 22 ~~n~~~,~~E~<~ and accepted operational procedures
will resolve the intervention conilicts Table 1 : The Green Eagle Code of Ethics
and land the airplane safely on the
1 .'The I)C-8 loss of contrnl at Toledo, Ohio (NTSB, ly9?); dysfunctional but conscious Captain have never been well ground . Don't sleep wh~le your Captain is .
defined or universallv, acceP ted. The P rocedures for ado P tin g
Encourage your Captarn to smoke
2. The L-1011 wind shear accident at DIP~'~' Airport, a t~ew strategy or tlight plan that has not been developeci
Texas ( NTSB, 1986) ; by the Captain are also missing froni current Standard
The Need for the Structure It's hell to fly with a nervous Captain, especially ~f you're the one making
Operating Procedures (SOP(s). "PA.C.E:' provides a hierar- of Intervention him nervous!
3. The }15-748 electrical failure in Pinckneyville,
Illinois (NTSB,198~) ; chy of intervention stralegies for both situations . "PA C.E:' Every airline organization needs to Don't interfere if your Captain absolutely insists on making a fool of himself .
is effective when the Copilot is not flyu~g the airplane (Pilut develop and implcment its own specific
4 . The 737 out of 1ti'ashington Vational, (NTSB,1982) ; Copilots Catch 22 :
Not Plying (PNF) and is just as usetul when the Copilot is "PA.C .E." progression steps with stan-
manipulating the corltrOlS (Pilol Flying I PF I. "PA.C.E ." You are damned if you ignore your Captarn's m~stakes .
5. The llC-8 fuel e~iaustion in Portland, Oregon, dardized terminologies, semantics, and
starts with very general inquiries and progre~s~s to a last You are damned if you do something about them
(NTSB,1979); syntax. The structured phrase~ and the
statement th,it the First Ofticer is novv assuming command universally accepted definitions are to Keep your lousy attitude a secret .
(~ . The 727 into uulles INTSB,1975); and cuntrol of the ~~ircr~aft, be uscd bv subordinate cre~~~ members Survival Rules :
7 . The 1>C-8 freighter into Cold Bay> Alaska, l NTSB,1974) ; tivhen thev.Perceive anornalie;. In P ar- Don't fly with a Captain nicknamed "Lucky" ;
Need for a Precise lan 9 ua 9 e of ticular, paying special attention to the
Don't fly at night;
8. The Com~air into Ncw I iaven, Connecticut, opening statements u~ each step of the
(NTSB, 1972);
Interventlon Don't fly in bad weather ;
intervention hierarchy. The arccpted
Don't mess with the red switches ;
Subordinate tlight crew members Lti~ill use lhc "P.A .C .E :' wording for each progressive step
9, The L-188 into a thunderstorm at Dawson, Texas, hierarchy of inquiry and intervention strategies to success- Never, ever eat a crew meal m the dark .
needs to he learned verbatim by all
(NTSE3, 1969) ; lully cope ~tirith an extremely rare but potcntially lethal Speak very, very softly when you speak to your Captain .
senionty' 1 eve.ls of tlig ht crew members.
Don't make better landings than your captain, until the last trip of the month
10 . The LearJet out of Palm Springs, California, I NTSB, I 967 ); performance break duwn of the Cahtain . First ~~fticers These initial opening intervention
trained and rehearsed in the intervention progression will statements should cover at least four The two basic rules of a Captain's authority :
l 1 . The F-27 into Las Vegas, Nevada, (CAB, I96:~). initiate "PA .C .E ;' when lhere is an indication of upper stcps in progression of increasing Rule One . The Captain is always right .
perfurmance break down in airline cockpits . Creative ad- ioncern for the immediacy of the risk,.
These accidents are all examples of subordinates knowing Rule Two . If the Captain is ever observed making a m~stake, see Rule One.
libhing, on the tlight cleck, will not be productive in life
that the Captain was denying serious risks and displaying Intervention models and strategies
threatening sltUatlollti . The commercial airline Copilot When you upgrade to Captain, you must
counterproductive and unreason~tbly perilous behavior. must be structured so that the imme-
needs the equivalent message used by the militar,v pilot . 1 . Accept responsibility for being right all of the time .
These flight dc~i.k crews all knew that their respecaive drate tLght safety threats are lessened
1'hcre is no misunderstanding, hesitation or mistake in the 2 . Compensate for all of those ~nept and disrespectiul Copilots_
Ca I>tains were either denYg in , discocu~ting or oblivious to by ~ach step in the sequence . Steps
action to be taken when the vving ntan call~, `Blue Leader,
lethal dangers. Unfortunately, not one of them could do in the progression should bc made Keep your Captain out of the morgue, jail, FAA hearings, and Chief Pilot's office,
Break hard left, now!"
anything to change the Captain's behavior, performance, without fear dlat the statements will It's better to be down here, arguing about how you are going to do it up there ;
actions or strategies . Most of them could not even get the The airline Copilot and the tighter pilot wing man share m~~ke the cun~ent situation worse. than to be up there arguing .
Captain to acknowledge the problern . many ~iuties and responsibilities. Clne is to protect the 'I'hcse eommunication patterns and
Always let your Captain be the first ~ut the door of the airplane . After all, there
In several other recent accidents, the Copilots did not Captain or flight leader when the rnission demands lead skills must also enablr junior crew
may not be any stairs .
record rcny comments prior to the crash (NTSB,1994) . to a focusing of attention and narrowing ol perception . It members ro utfurm senior crew
lt is possiblc that these Copilots had detected thc anomalies becomes a question of survival when threats and dangers members of their concerns without Buy your Captain scuba gear, skateboards, power tools and hot dog ski lessons .
and were reluctant to speak up in any manner, i.e . caught emerge that tall outside of thc attention span of either the air- fear of reprisal to the suhordinates, As a Copilot, your primary job is to detect and correct mistakes :
up in the "Copilot's Catch 22," line Captain or lighter pilot leader . 'I'he Copilot and the Wing long term career security or promo- 1 . First, your own mistakes .
ntan buth have .r responsihility to protect their respective lead- tion potential.
2 . Second, your Captain's mistakes .
ers trom ihi5 potenti,tlly lethal form of pericptual ncirrowing .
The "Co P ilot's Catch Z2' is: Nat long ago, before the arrival of 3 . Finally, everybody else's mistakes .
Each step in the intervention sequenre must pravide CRh-1, an unwritten but universal Never, ever awaken your Captain when he is smiling in h~s sleep
2~a . You are darnned if you ignore a Capt~rul's mi~takes! wavs to reduce the hazardous risks and to increase the motto of Cupilots was "Shut Up
Talk up the advantages of early retirement
?2h. You are damned il you do nr say something about them! 1~robabilitv nf an uneventful resolution . Additionall ~, and Move t)p ." There was a twofold
p racticed intervention hierarchies ~an delirse the 1~otential implication in that statement . First, Don't expect your Captain to :
Thc possession of "P A .C.E :' tools, skills, and procedures for open cockpit hostilities that cauld erupt when the it corrld be implied that when a
Pick up the meal check on a layover,
coiild have promptcd these non-contributing Copilots to Captain does not acknowledgr perceptual narrovving, Captain is doing SUInetlllng wrong,
1
intervene with the non-performing Captain . It is also possi- mistakes or performance decrements . Policies ol ev~ry the Copilot should ignore it and Iet 2. Be impressed with your flying background ;
ble that the Copilats, cited hy the NTSB, lvere also oblivious aviation organization mutit support a well defined hierarchy the Captain be grounded for his 3. Think flying is more fun today than it was m the good old days ;
to thc dangers their Captains wcre ignoring . It is possible of intervention, in urder for Copilots to bc effective and mistake. Secondly, it could be implird 4. Hear and understand the ATC request the first time ;
that the Copiluts lacked the airmanship skills and experi- accepted as protectors of the Captains "six o'dock position': by junior i rew members that if they 5. Believe the FAA is doing a satisfactory job ;
cncc to even detect the problems, i .e. "they didn't knotiv that The designs ior the two-person ~ockpit in .~ complex were critical of a Captain, they could 6. Buy anything without asking for an airline discount ;
they didn't know :' long range ~ircraft have caused an tven greater need for only lose by letting negative judg- 7. Wear a small-sized or a low-priced wnst watch ;
well-detinrd hierarchie5 . In the three- l~erson cock l~it, a ments become publrc . A corollary 8 Wear expensive uniform shoes ;
"Fhe critica) need to take over the controls from an incapaci-
confirmation system can be used in thc intervention to this motto was the principle "The 9. Respect the competency of senior airline management;
tated or un~onscious Captain has bcen recognized for years
process simihir to the voting systems used in auto-land keJl to success in this or~crnization is to
(Orlady, Krdera and Harper, 19~3). The technrques tor 10 . Purchase his own newspaper to read on a trip .
taking ovcr tl~e contrnls of the airplane lrom a dangerously Gght controls . In the two-pluce cockpit, only established kcc°p ti~c~ur i ritical npiniorrs nrrc~ (orrsJ~
cattihr~fes ~r ~c~tret."

I Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 17

16 Fli 9 ht Comment No . 3, 1998 - -
 To Intervene or Not To Intervene? The Copilot's Catch 22 ~.>~~~;~~~e "E?A .C .E ."-Probing, rllerting, Challenging, Emergency
Warning-is a four ste pl~ro gression going from an inc1 uirv,
Vernacular translat~on "Captain, you are about ta self
destruct . You have the e9 uivalent of a verv, an g,
rv and armed
to a disaster warning. The progression is gradual and opera- bogey in your six o'clock position .llre are all about to get
Table I shows a set of ironic ethical principles and codes of There is considerable scientitic evidence that personality tionally relevant . the civil aviation equivalent of a 2G millimeter enema."
conduct lor Copilots dcvcloped over ?5 ycars ago. Known as diflerences are not now and have never been related to pilot
The Green Eagle Code of Ethics, thev were developed as a performance differenies (Besco,199~ ; L)olgin and Gibb, Each step is a building block tor the next step. Each step Step 4: EMERGENCY WARNING.
ton g ue-in-cheek p alitical counter force to the organization I989 ; and Hunter and Burke,19921 . Since the majority of serves as a non threatening signal to the Captain that a
"Captain, if you dort't immediately increase our safety mar-
of senior pilots known as the Grey Eagles. It was thought that llight crews do not exhibit these poor characteristics of response to each step is required .
gins, it is my duty and responsibility to immediatcly take
the (ireen Eagles Code might help relieve, in a humorous mental health, individual cre~ti~ members ~~~ill not acknowl- The examples below are "P.A .C .E:' steps that cauld and over control of the airplane"
way, the sometimes awkward relationship between (:aptains edge that the opcrational risks of poor CRlvt exists on their should have been used by the Copilot of the I iS-i48 in
and iunior crew members, This ~ode also illustrates t}tat particular flight decks . A9ost flight crew members will reject Example from NS-748 : "Ccap tnin, if you dorr't irrrmerliately
the Air Illu~ois, night IFR (Instrument Flight Rules), com-
CRA1 P roblems have their roots dee p in conflictin g org aniza- the unproven academic theory that unsanitary mental reverse course arrrl get back tv night VFR ccrnditiorrs, l rnust
plete electrrcal tarlure accrdent (NTSB,1985). The atrcraft
tional policics and practices. hcalth traits are thr primary sources of these ( :RM errors . tuke uver contrvf ojthe airpfane . l icrrrnut n(1ow you tu subjeit
departcd Springfield in night, \'FR conditions on an IFR
Consequently, crew members will judge that, as competent the pcuserrger; tv such rtrr unnecessary and high risk ovj c'ertcrin
flight plan through a line of predicted thunderstornls, to
and reasonable tlight crew memhers, they are not at risk to deratlr. Under these conditions, it is rrry drcty aruf resporrsihility
Formal Written Polic Y Needs to Carbondale, the final destination and corporale mainte-
commit the sarne rnistakes that the aews will commit when to rc~fiet~c~you uf your cnmrnartd."
nance headquarters .
Precede "PA.C.E." the crew contains domineering Captains, submissive Vernacular translation : "Captain, you, your airplane and every
In all day to day activities on the tlight deck, not just for Copilots or other aberrant psychological characteristics . Both generators became inopcrative shortly after takeoff
one on board are about to be dead meat . I ~hoosc not to
crisis P revention > u Ppcr management must vig orously~ P ro- while still in VFR conditions. The Captain elected to continue
There is a reference to this situation drawn in the plot of join you. If you don't immediately cease and desist, I will
mote and actively support the participation of subordinate on through the frontal system on battcry power.
'1'he Ccrinc ~1~lrrtirty (Wouk, 1951 I . ln this fictionalized take the airplane away from you. I owe it to mysclf, my fam-
crew members in minimization of anomalous performance account, the Captain tivas such an emotional cripple that Step 1 : PROBING statement: ily, our passengcrs, and our company to restore an adequate
without threat of reprisal . Arnerican Airlines, for more than the subordrnate olircers re)ccted hrs leadershrp . The crew ot margin of safety."
thirty years, has had a formal definition ot Copilot responsi- "Captain, l need to understand why wc arc [lying like this :'
the Caine saw only two options: I 1) mutinv or (2y mission
bilities that undoubtedly has h~td a significant effect on PA.C .E. Survival Stcp-
iatlurc by submrssrcm tu a dysfunctronal Capt~un . Thcy Example from the HS-748 Copilot : "Cctptain, l dorr't rrrrdcrstand
supparting Copilots to advise (;aptains anomalies and errors. INTERI'ENTION A'~'I) TAKEOVER :
chose mutiny over submissive contpliance to a Captain they why we rfon'r rnaintain VFR (Visrral Fliyht Kules), go lrcuk fo
"First Officer Responsibility : The pilot occupying the vicwcd as sclf dcstruciivc . Thc post-tria) cocktail party solil- Sprin4ttiefd crrrd karrd Irc~ore the bcrrtery ~ves dearl ." "Ca p tain ()uncs), I have the airI~lane !!
First Ofticer position is charg~d with the responsibility oquy by the defense attorney has a lot of wisdom on the
Vernacular translat~on: "Captain, l think lhat you rnight be (Jerry), Take your hands off the controls, NUW!!"
of informing the Captain intmediately and ~tt any time, need to support a lradcr you do not like . '1'hcse classic and
painting yourself into a cctrner and aiming to shoot yourself
should he believe the aircratt is being handled improperly eloc~uently wr~tten prrnciples and concepts, on support ot (Spoken Ioudly, slowly, and with firm authority!!)
in the foot :'
or placed in jeopardy. The Captain may choose to disliked leaders, shuuld be integrated into the content of
disregard this counsel, such is his command privilege, current CRM programs . Step 2: ALERTTNG statement:
Takin Over Control from the Ca tain
but no matter to what degree or how otten such advice 1 hc need to structure lramrng methods, proccdures, and "Captain, lt appears lo me that we am on a course of action A Copilot takeover of the active control of an airplanr has
may be disregarded or ignored, the pilot occupying the
contents on the more operationally and organizationally that is drastically reducing our safety margins and is con- more immediate and lifr critical ramiGcations than in any
First Ofticer's position will nevertheless be held responsi-
basrd com p oncnts of CKM breakdowns hc~s been drlined trary to both your brie(ing and to company's SOPs ;'
ble for always offering such advice :' (American,1983, other complex systems operations environment. The cock-
in recent years (Bescc~, 1994 ; Besco and l,ederer, 1992 ; and
emphasis added) . Example from the HS-148 Copilot: "Cnptain, if we proceed pit of an airaaft is no place to physic~tlly wrest)e over the
Wicncr, 1993) .1'hc aviation community will bcnefit whcn
rrlrencf, ~r0111 L'FR l'OrlGfif 10115 ir1lU t11E' f1r1E' Uf ~iCAt~y rRir1 Sf10W- controls. The operahonal etrquette or mterventtun hterar-
This policy, when practiced, protects the assertive First CRh~i training programs place the main emphasis on
ers, vn battc~ry power orrfy> we wi11 crash bcinuse we have nv ~hies must be clear rut as to wlten the Copilot announces
Officer from official corporate reprisal initi~tted by the rrntoving the organizalional and uperational barriers to
>7~ay rv ~ly instrurnerrts tvherr our bauery gves ciead, lUe should the intention to take command. There should bc no doubt
Captain. Also, the Captain is denied the authority to order tff~~tivc CRh~i .
not everr he f lyin~ IFR wit{r one ,~crrcrrrtor irtoperative, let as to the appropriatcness af the Copilot taking over the
the First Officer to sto P otferin g advice. Without this tv,l~e of I'hc resuhrtiorr o~ pe~rsunrrlit~~ cfi/)t~rc~rrcc~s on tlrc /light dec'k K~ifl controls from the Captain .
crfane tlhing rright 1FX 1r11U Ii~Erlrtttirr~ ctnd lrcavy rain showers
organizational support, the strategies of intervention will be, at rnvst, a tcrtiar}~ issuc x~fren the opercttivrraf and vrgcrrri- 
rvirh hotdr ~~iener~rttors invpercative . The "PA.C .E ." stcps-Probing, Alerting, Challenging ;
seldom operate (h'Iager and Pipe, 198~) .
~atiorrctl corrttnunic'uticrns be~rriers nre e1/'ec-tivf~f}~ reduced or
Vernacular translation: "Captain, it is my job to protect yctur Emergency Warnrng-requrre that thc (.aptarn rnake a
This type of policy makes it clear to both the C~tptain and rnirrirrri~ecf to et P rncticaf
. zero. "EA .C.E:' is the t }p r e of o P era-
hlind sp ots. I see vou are about to walk off a cliff." satisfactory response to the Copilot at each level of inquir,y
the Copilot that one of the prime duties ul the subordinatc tionallv b~tsed trarning program which will enhance crew ,
and interventi~n . It should be an organizational SOP that if
is to protect the "six a'clock position" or the blind side ot performance in all aviation Or~;ilrllZ~ltlOrlti, Step 3: CHALLENGING statement. the C~tptain ignores the Copilot ihrough all four steps of
the leader or Captain. "PA.C .E :', the Copilot must proceed to assunte command"
"Captain, you arc placing thc passengers and aircraft in
"PA.C .E ." A Four Ste P Pro g ression rtnd rontrul ol the airpl,trte .
"PA.C .E." Avoids Overem p hasis on to Survival
I irreversible and Irilmedlate danger . You must immediately
rhoose a rourse of action that will rcduce our unacceptably For the actual announcement ol change of command on
Personalit Y Conflicts I high risk levels ." the tliglrt deck, the Copilot could use a phrase `uch a5
Probr for a better underst,rndin 7 .
htany CRM training programs have tocused on the person- "Captain (Jones), I must take over control of the airplane .
Example from NS-148: "Cnptain, you Are placing t1u pns,errgcrs
alitv dynamics of the tlight crew (I lclrnreich and Foushcc, Alert Ca P tain of the anomalies, ( Jerry), take your hands off the controls, NOW!" The usc
irt ct pusitinn of a iertcain irvsh rvlren the bnttcr,v gves dcad.
19y3 ; Helmreich, Predmore, Irwin, Butler, Tagg7 7art, ~ti'ilhelm ot' a personal tirst name or a nickname can very effective
Challen ge stutahilit Y of P rescnt str.tte g.rv. You ntrrst inrrrtedicrtef ) ~ rererse cvurse Urtd <r;et Iraik to rri~TJrt
<
and Clothicr,1991), ~'hc ncgativc outcome of this mcntal 1'FR iotuiitinns." to break the perceptual narrowing of the Captain. ~ti'hcn a
health emphasis has been that many, if not most, crew Emergencv, ~1'arnin g of critic~al and immediate dan gers. third crew member is present, they can use terminologry
mcmbers will not idcntify with these personality problems such as , "Ca ptain (1ones 1,You must g ive control of the
as the source of P ast CRAi breakdocvns (Helmreich and airplane to (Barry) immediatcly."
lvilhelm,1989) .

18 Flight Comment No . 3,1998 ~ Flight Comment No . 3,1998 19

 Helmreich, R . L., Foushec, H. C . (19931 . "1ti'hy crew resource ;Vational Transportation Safet,v Board . (1982) . Aircra/t Accidertt
To Intervene or Not To Intervene? The Copilot's Catch 22 <<,~+,~~~~~,~ management? Empirical and theoretical bases of human tacrors Repart, Air Flvrida, lrrc ., Boeiub 737-???, N6?AF, Collisiort wilh
training in aviation . "In E, L Wiencr, B. G, Kanki and R . L. l~?th Strect Bridge near 114uhington, Nationnl Airport, ltiashirtgton,
Hclmrcich I Eds. ), Cnckpit rcsorrrce rnanagentent . (pp 3-45) . DC Januarf~ 1 ~, 1932. (NTSBIAAR-82-08) . Washin g ton, DC :
~'4'hen the Copilot is already flying the airplane (PF), the References tian Die go, CA ; Academic Press. Authc,-r.
"P.A .C.E." interventian stcps must be used by the Copilot
r1merican Airlines, Inc . I' 1983, March) . Flight :ti1anual, Part I, Helmreich, R . L ., Predmore, S . C ., Irwin, C.1s1 ., Butler, R . B ., National Transportation Safety Board . i 19851 . Aircraft Aicide»t
to annuun~c lhe intention to implement a strategy not initi- Section 3, Page 2, Paragral?h I, DF1~' Airport, TX : Author. Taggart,l~' . R., Wilhelm, J . A . and Clothier, C, G . (1991) . Report : Air 1lGrtvis, Inc., Hatvker Siddley HSi482A, N7~8LL rrenr
ated by the Captain. Even though the Copilot has control
"Bevond ~Rh1 : Pa P ers from the NASAIt?niversitv of Texas Crew Pinckrreyn'ille,lllinois, Oc7ober 11,198?. IN"fSB/AAR-85-03),
of the aircratt, the Captain still has cornmand responsibility Arbon, E. R., Mouden, L,11 ., and Feeler, R. A. (199U) . "The prac-
tice of aviation salety, ob,ervations from Flight Safety Foundation Performance Proiect :' 1n proceedinl;"s front tlre 6th Iuteruational Washington, DC : Author .
for the basic flight plan and mission control. These same Syrnposiunr o1 Aviativn Psycholo~~y, ColurrtGus, OH : Oluo State
safrls audits ." Fli ~1rt Sa /,
ett~ I>i~~cst , 9 (l,
8 1-~t2.
four steps of progressinn to intervcntiun strategies must Unirer>ity. National 'liansportation Safety Board . (1986), .9ircratt Aa:ident
be followed by the PF Cupilot to formalize the change in Besco, R . Q. (19891 . "Pitness to lead :' .SAE Techrricnf Paper Series 4 Ret? urt: Delta Airlines, Inc ., Lockheed L-lOll-3S5-1, NJ2GDA,
command and return the aircratt to the pre-planned margin 1~1'arrendale, PA : SAE,'fhe Engineering 5ociety for .Advancing llelmreich, R . L . and Wilhehn, J. A . (1989) . "\Nhen training L)alla ./Ft
c ' . l1c'~ rtlt lrtternational Atrpa
~ rt, Te~'a~., Augrcs.t .).,l 98i. .
!slobility Land tiea Air and Space, hoomerangs : negative outcontes associated with cockpit resource (NTSBIAAR-86-U~) . Washington, DC Author.
of safetv.
management prograrn ." R . S . lensen (Ed.) ht proieedings v(the ?th
Beseo, R . 0. (1990) . "Subtle incapacitation of pilots : how National Transportation Safctv l3oard . (1992) . :'aircratt Accident
bttcrr~ativrral Syrnposiunr of Aviatiort I'syehofogy, Cofurnbus OH:
Report, Air Transpvrt Irtterrtational, Irtc . FIiSht 8U5 Douglas
Conclusion to tell if vour captain has died :' F1iS=ht Scrjery Fouudation ,qccident O)uo State Urriversiry.
DC-8-G3, NJ94A1 Lcrss of Control and Crash, Stivantott> Uhiv,
Prcvention, 9'(1) .1-4 .
t1'hen ihe Captain decides to replace the Copilot on the Hunter, D. R . and Burkc, E. F. (199? ) . Meta analysis of February 1 .5,1992 . (N'fSBlAAR-9? 061 . Washington, llC ; Author .
Besco, R . 0,1:1991) . "~1'hy pilots err and what wc can do about it" ctircralt pilot >rlecaivu rneasures. (ARI Research No . 9251),
controls uf thc airplane, the time honored' : ..1've got it" National Transportation Safety Board . (1994) . Sa/~ety Sttrdy; A
Forensic Repvrts, 9(~t), 391-416 . Alesandria, ~';1 :11.5 . ~trmv Rescarch Institute for the Behavioral
b Y the Ca 1~tain is readil Y acknowled ged b Y cver Y'one, Revtew o~ Flightcrex~-Involved, rruajor Accidertts v~ Lr,S, Air Carrit:rs,
,tncl ticr~i,tl ~.i~nic~s,
Unfortunately, there is no universally accepted procedure Besco, R . 0. (19921 . "Analyi.ing knowledge deticiencies in pilot 79i~'1'lrrvus~h 199U, (NTSBISS-9410I) .Washington, DC ; Author .
for the Cu I~ilot to use in taking over control uf the airplane performance :' The hrterncttiorral lnurnrt( c~hariatii~u P~ychvlogy I lurd, W. L. (1987) . "Lessons learned frotn the spacecraft
2(1 l, 53-74 . Office of Technological Assessment . (1988, July). Sa/e skic's /or
frum a conscious but dysfunctional Captain. ( :hallenger :' lrt Proceeding> of the ~Utlr Anuuallnternarivrtal Air
tvr»orrms' a com 1' ctitii'e envirvrtnr~nt. (()TA-SET-381) . Washin gton,
ticrtety Seruirrar (pp 188-1921, w'ashington, DC. Arlington, VA :
1Vhat a Copilot needs is the cummercial aviation eyuivalent Besco, R. 0. (1994, January) . "'The myths of pilot personality I)(_. : rluthur,
Flight Safety Faundation .
' ~es :' ErQvttvrnics
stereo nI L in Uesi n. ?4-28 .
of a universally understoud corumunication, well aaepted Orlady, H .1b'., Kidera, G . J ., and Harper, C . Ft, (1N73) . Developrr :c:nt
Lautmann, L, G ., and Gallimore, P. L, (1987, Octoher) . Contrvl
in the life ur dc~ath teamwork of militar Y fightcr P ilols. Besco, R . 0 ., and Lrderer, l . F. (19921 . "CRM boornerang : benefit o~ ireu'-causecl accidertts. Paper presented to the Flight 5afety of post-rrainirr~l vhjei tivcs /or trairtinSl pilots in Itanclf inK af irr-rlight
~lrhen a lead tightcr pilot hcars the words "Blue Leader, o r bt tst° In Prvcec:din STs o1 ~tJre 7i~~ent )~-Second International Sentinrar Coundatiun 40th Internatiunal Sytnposium>'1'okyo, lapan . irrcapacitativrt . I'aper presented at the XXI International Congress
Break Hard Right ; there is no doubt and no questiun as to v1 Thc° lrrtr°rnatinrtal Snciety v~Air SalEty' Investigator~ . 15ASI on Aviation & Space Medicine, Munich, West Germany.
its meaning. The lead pilot receiving this message will give Forum,?~I(~t), I13-119. Ledercr, l . F. (1990 ; . Safety sciencc irr crviatinn, Paper presented at
Schwartz, D. ( t987) . "Training for situational awareness ;' Irr
rro thuught to group dvnamics, assertiveness, personalities the First World Congress on Safc;ty Sciencc, Cologne, Gcrmany.
Bruggink, G . h~L (1989) . "li,etlection~ of air i~trrier >afctv" The Pruceedin~~s vf the ~IOth Auuuf Internativnal Air Safety S,vrrtposiunt,
ur the need for more information to reassess this situation . 15AS1 forurrt ??(1), ZU-26 Mager, R . F, and Pipe, P (1989) . Analyzing per{orrnance pruhlcrns or (pp 397-4031 . Arlington, VA : Flight Safety Foundatioi~ .
Also, there is no hesitation on the part of the wing man to you really otr,qlrtu tivarrna, (2nd Ed .) . Belmont, C,4 : David S . Lake .
1, . . . Caesar, H, (1989, September) . 1NHat have x~e, learnt uver Sears, R. E (1989, February) . Preventivtr stratc;t~ies fvr the erew
intervene and alert t-1c 1~hght Leader of any and all tml end-
the lasi 3U year~? Paper presentcd at the 2(Ith Annual lnternational Nagel, D . C ., (1988) . "Human error in aviation operations :' ln caused accident. Paper presentcd at the Secon~ Pgyptian Airrraft
ing dangers . Seminar of The lnlernational Society of air Safety Investigators, E . L . ~ti'iener and D. C . Nagel, (Eds . ), Human Factors in Aviatiorr . Accident lnvestigation and Prevention Annual Serninar, Cairo,
The commercial aviatiun utdustry is overdue to develop -- a 'Vluruch, Gerrnarty. (pp.?63-304) . New York : Academic I'ress . Egypt .
univers<tll Y accep ted set of intervention TERMINULOGIES, Civil Aeronautics Board . (1965), Aircra/~tAccident Report. Ronarrza National Transportation Safcty Board. (19(i7) . Avintivn Acciderrt Wiener, E . L . (1989) . "Reflections on human error : matters of
(~PERATIONS, PRL) (,Ll ' ~ ) L ~ RLS,
; AND S1'STEMS for all tli=ht
l, r
Air Lines, lne. Fairchild, F-~iA, * .,,- ~tirtada,
N715L, La. l e,~a r. , Report, Paul Kel1y Ffying Serrice, Inr.(Flying Ti~ers), Lcar Iet 23, life and death :' ln 1'roceedinqs c?f t)te Hurnarr Factors Sviicry 33rd
  . , , -
crew members . The P.A .C .E . p ro g ression is suggc~ted as th~ Ivorr°rrrberZ~, 196~t. File No . 1-0066 . Released Vovember 19. 196~ . r
1\?~3F, Prrlrn SprinS~s, Califvrniu, Noventlrer 14, I96i. (N'1'SBIAAR Anru+al Meetirtg, ( pp,1 - 7 ) . .5 anta ~'s~ u- mca,
' C
~A :1luman Factors
mudel on which to build a hierarchy uf intervention . 06-671 . Washin=ton,
b DC : Author, Socicty.
Coopcr, C . E., White, M . D ., and Lauber, J. K. (Eds .) . I 1980) .
"P,A,C .E ." is based un the following four steps; Rcsc ur~e manabement on tlte tlt~,ht deck ." ln ,NA S~1 Cv ' rrFerert'ce National `I'ransportation Safety Board .119(~91 . Airira/tAcciderrt Wiener, E . I, . (1993) . "Crew coordination and training in the
Puhliccrtiort ? 1Z0 . Moffett Field, CA : NASA Ames Rcscarch Ccnter . Re P nrt, Brartij~Airways, lnc ., Lockheed 1.-18ti, ,V9iU'f ,', rre'ar Itatrwn, advanced-technology cockpit :' In E, L . Wiener, B . G . Kanki and R,
Texas,Alay' 3,19G~4. (NTSBIMR 69-03) .Wa~hint;trm, DC : Author. L . Helutreich lEds .) . Cockpit resource rru~nugernertt . (pp 199-2~9) .
Prubin g - fur a better understanding. Degani, A . and Wiener, E . L. (1991), "Philosnphy, policies, and San Diegc~, CA : Academic Press .
Alcrlin g - the Ca 1~tain of the anomalies . l~rocedures : the thrce P's of ili Kht deck oP erations :' 1SAS1 .jortcru> National Transportalion Sufety Board . (1972) . Aircra/1 AcciderN
2~1(2), 18-23 . Rcpvrt: Alleglreuyrlirliues,lnc . A1lison Prvp let C~nvair 34(1/~1~10, Wouk, H . (1951) . Thc~ Cainc A~futiny Garden ( ;ity, NY : lloubleday.
Challen ging - the suitabilitv, of }~resent strate g,v. N5133', Iv'esc~ Harerr, Counecticut, /urte J,1t171 . INTSBIAAR-7l-10) .
Dolgin, D, L . 8c Gibh, G . D . I 19891 . "Personality Asscssmcnt in Qab 13esco i> an intf'rnatiottally rec'ognizc~d Bc~nrd Certi/ied
11'ashington, DC ; Author,
Emer~Jenc Y Warnin g - ol critical and immediate dan gers. Aviator Selection :' In lensen, R . S . (Ed,1 . Aviation Psychnlvg,t~ Irrdtc;trial PsYdtnlofi ist sP ecializirr ~ irt Avi~ztiott Ps)~cholnS)
~ c llis
(pp.'88-3?0) . Brookfield,~"1': Gower . National Transportation Safety Board . (19741 . Aircra/tAcciriertt
These fnur steps of intervention strategy-"PA .C .E :'- tarriclue yuaiif ictttior2s provirle. rt brvrtc~ c:xperiertce hasc with
Rc~(~ort:11'vrld Airx~ays, lnc ., DG,4-63F, NBUZ WA, Kirrg Core,
will help Helmreich, R. L, (19841 . "Cockpit management attitudes" wlttch to develop htgh tntpact prnJ,=rarrts to rrrtprove fhght crew
Alctskrr . Serrember 8, 19i? . (NTSBIAAIt-7406) . Washington, DC :
Hnmr+n Factvrs, ?6(5), 583-589.
~lttthr~r . per/'ormance . tfe htts Itctd ovc~r 4U yenrc o~~extertsive, rrti+lti-
"to make the world a better place in which to fly." disci P lirtcrrY exP eriertce rts an Air Force Fi~lrter Pi1ot; a Alnrtcr~er
I lelmreich, R . L . (19901 . Studying fight ire~rti' irtteractivn : tlre National Transportation Safety Board. (1975), Aircra/t Accidcnt irr Aircrafl Irtdttstry ; Httmarr Factors Ertgineerirr~ Grnups; a
interseitivrr vf ba~ic arrd applied research. Talk prrsented at ,
Repvrt, Trans tiYvrIdAirfutes, lnc., Boein~ J27-231, N59.3?,K, Cnptatn for a Ma~or Cotrrrrrernal Arrhnc ; cr C~rrtt crstty
the dedication of the NASA-Ames Rescarch (:enter, Human
Performance Rcsearch Laboraton'. Mer'tfet Fielci . CA : Auth or. I Berry~ille, Viryinin, Decerttber 1,Ia,~d . (N I tiB? .AAR-75-16) .
Washutgton, llG: Author.
F'rc?/c'~sor ; cin :lir~ rn.li rlc'i iciettt Ittt'e~tiSTrator ; ctttd ctc atl
Avicttion Cartsttftarti . "
Helmreich, R. L. (19931 . "Future directions in crew resource
ctiational Transportation Safety Board. (1979) . Aircra~t Accident
management training :' 7'1te f5.~1S1 fvrurn, ?4(1 I, 14-I5, Reprinted with permission from ISA51 Forum Volume 27,
Re(~ort : Ilnited Airlirrec, lnc., MeDvnnell-Dnuglas DC-B-til,
NSUR?U Portland, Oregurt, Decentber?,S, 1978. ( N'I'SBIAAR-79-07) . No .S, December 1994.
~~'ashington, DC : Author .

Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 21

20 Fli 9 ht Comment No . 3, 1998
 TYPE: Buffalo CC115465 TYPE : Air Cadet Tow Plane C-GCDL approximately ~0 degrees af turn the left landing gear leg
LOCATION : Innisfail, Alberta broke oft. The lailed le>t, E>ivuted u 1~wards causin g the tire to
LOCATION : 19 Wing Comox strikc: the aircralt on the att portion of the front left wind-
DATE : 7 Feb 98 DATE : 28 Jul 97 shield and sidr vv~indou~ leaving a distinct tire imprint. As
the aircratt settled to the ground the propeller cut into the
Circumstances CII'CUmstanCes
earth stopping the engine . The left wing tip also struck thc
Buffalo CC115~(,~ was scheduled for a High Power The tlight was the first tow mission of the day at thc ground .tnd wa` bent upwards, The solo pilot shut down
run-up following the replacement of the right Prairie Region Gliding School . After an uneventful the aircratt, secured the switches and egressed unaided.
hand PFro ~eller and the left hand enr;ine Fuel take-off, tuw, release and circuit the to~i~ plane set up Fortunatelv hr w~as nut injurtd.
Control Unit . Three qualitied technicians were for landing on the grass tu the east of Runway 16 at
assigned tu carry uut the engine run-ups . lnnisfail, Alherta in aaordance with standard operat-
ing proccdures . After a nonnal tuuchdown on the Investigation
The run-up 1?roceeded norrnally until the left grass and braking tu slow the aircraft, a slight turn to A visual inspec~tiun of the fr~ccture surface reve,rled clear
engine ~~~1ax Forward to h9ax Reverse Slarn Check. the right was initiated at low speed tu pusition the air- indication of a fatigue crack on the underside of the leg just
During this check fi~ll forward thrust is applied to craft on the rrmway for the next tow missiun. After inboard ol thc llat plate that secures the leg to the fu5elage .
the engine being tested and, once stabiliud, thc This leg had previously been in~pected u~ing a
power lever is retarded to Max Reverse within ,^~lagnetii Particle Inspectiun (A1P11 f?roiess
one second . As the throttle was retardtd the during the Scout titruitural lnspection and
engine exploded and a large fire engulfed the (tepair Program ISSIRP1,rpproximately 4~0 fly-
left nacelle. The crew immediately initiated the ing hours prior to the failure .
Red Page emergency checklist to deal with the
situatiun but the engine tire extinguisher failed A Supplementary Inspection vvas initiated an
t o d isc~harge when the Fire T-Bar handle was all other Air Cadet ~~liding I'rogramme Scuut
pulled . Attempts to turn the handle to discharge ting through the turhine casing . ~'Vhen the turbine wheels
,rircrcrft to determine if any others werc similarly
the second tire bottle were also unsuccessful . The crew were cx~rmined it w~,js noted that all blades were missing.
affected . Four other legs 5howcd signs ul similar
advised the tower of the emergency as they 5hut down cracking and are undergoing further analysis at
5everal had heen ejected through the turhine casing and
the right engine and abandon the aircraft . QETE . All landing gear legs wcre either changed
Irad pcnctrated ~he engine nacelle ~rnd fu~elage and were
or pa5seci the 1fP1 u~spection . Investigation into
Several technicians working in Servicing noted the found inside the cabin. The majorit~~ of the blades were
the tield conditions where the Tow Planes oprr-
fire and responded to the scene after ensuring the found forward and to the left uf the engiue . The front
ate at InniSfail is ongoing to determine what if
Fire Hall had been notiGed. '1'hcy brought a 50-1b power turhine wheel was found over 600 feet from the
anv, effeit it mav, have had in thi~ occ:urrcnie .
llalon fire extinguisher with them and began fight- enginc,
ing the tire . Fire trucks arrived soon afterwards Examination of the Engine Fire Extirlguishing system
and bruught the tire under control using 160 litres DFS Comments
revealed that the Sqrub iharges that should have tired to
of foam and 3000 litrcs uf water. '1'here were no release the extingui~her were shorted out hv pie~e~ ul ~1~hile it would be ide<~1 that vve not sutfer
injuries. The aircraft sustained "C" Category damage . shunt v~~ire inserted intu the firing iah, 'I'hese wires are component failures that result in damage, we
installrd for transpart and stor~rgc ecl thc iharges to pre- vvere indeed fortru~ate that this cumponent
Investi 9ation vent aciidental tiring and should have heen removed failed when it ciid . As the air~raft had slowccl
prior la in~tallatiun, to t~rxi speed, the ionseyuences nf the tailurc
Examination of the scene afterwards revealed thal thc were not as scrious as if it had iailcd ~rt cr
two power turbine wheels were fi~rcibly ejected from 1)eterminaticm of the initiatinl; event that caused this higher spec:ci . Althoul;h fhis aircratt is designecl
the bottom of the engine after clestroying the power enginc lc~ lail ia ~r high priuritl~ ,It L)FS .1'he f~jilure of the for operations on rough surlacc~, llle nUnlbel'
transfer shaft on which they were spinning and cut- Squih to activate thc lire extinguishing s,yslem was thc ot take-of'fs and Iandinl;s per hour iarried
suhjc~t of an imn~edia~e lucal SI tc~ contirm that the Fire out in ocu oper,rtiun oi thc airirait ia unique .
Rottle, in all other C( ;l 15s woulcl work whcn n~cdcd . As Hopetirlly the ,rggressive and pruactive mainte-
thcse dcvices arc uscd in other fleet~ for ~imilar purposes nancc prugramnu thal all Regiuns have in
as well ~s in winch cable cutters and for deplo~~ing CP1~, a place will identifi~ iomhonent, that arc likelv
more widespread SI w~rs reiommendect . tu rca~h the end c~l thrir safe life bet~~r~ thc~ ~
The FItR d~rta is being currclated with the C1'R tape to -_ _ _
nldnllt,l~lllrCl''1 rt~clnllllcntiatll)n . "

determine the seyuence ot events after the throttle `vas

moved lrom A1ax Forward lo ;~1 .Ix Reverse . The Propeller
()verspeed tivvitch was hench tested and foun~i to be
unsrrviccable . .an ancjlysis of the C~~'R will bc attenlpted
to determine the r1laXlmlrm propellcr ~pced attaincJ prior
to thc explosion . Failure modes of the pcnver turbine blade
are being re~earche~i ic~ a,certain i( ,In~ l,rilr~i as a rrsult o1
centritug,rllo,jdinl; . "

22 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Flight Comment No, 3, 1998 23

 .

From the Investigator 'ount own lo ~saster iU1111rrNE'l~ trcrrn > a~e3
They worked, to some extent . The !n its findings, thc board sheets ntuch safetv officer to the aviation regiment,
inertia reel belts locked, and the seats of the blart~e to the inex 1~erience of in tvhich he urg ed a gainst a lax attitude
~md undercarriage absorhed some of 26-year-old Hales, acknowledging the to salctv duc to a "can-do culture' :
TYPE : CH146 GRIFFON 146480 the impact .l3ut the dama~;c from Black One pilot was the product of a
LOCATION : 17 NM SSE Cold Lake AB Black One's rotors caused the cabrn highly stressed system struggling with Failure to report and investigate
incidents properly would eventually
DATE: 16 April 1998 roof to collapse under the weight of unsenrrceable arrcratt and hrgh lo5ses
catch up with them, tivarned :~lartlew
thc mator and transmission . Fuel of experienced pilots to the conu»er-
The crew was conducting a night Visual Flight prophetically, and "leave the regiment
Rule~ ( VFR) navi g ation mission without Ni g ht ignited anci a fire broke out, but cral sector~.
open to major criticism in the evertt
slrtwlv, trom the rear.
Vision Goggles (unaided) . Prior perrnission It is also critical of lack of supervision ofan ezternal investig~itinn intc~ an
had been ohtained to conduct a confined area Some ol the nten were able to struggle bv superiors and of the poor commu- iniident". "
landing on private property during the training out. Several then went back tct dra~ nication between the SAS - with its
mission . An earlier daylight recee had been Copy~right TheArcstrcrlic~n arui reprirtted
out their males, despite lhe cxplosiotts penchant for secrec-v - and the avia-
conducted bv the Aircraft Ca p tain ( AC ) which with their kirtc~ perrrrissiorr
from the ammunition and the tors who were Less practrsed rn
identified two 1~ossible landin g sites on the f~rop - strengthenmg ttre . Burke, hrs three counter-terrorrsm. The board also
erty. The primary site was occupied with heavy cree~ and f~~ur S,AS escaped with picked up on a 1994 report tvritten By Mr. Roy Ecdeston
equipment on the night of the sortie and the their li~c; from Black ~I'wo . by i~9,tjor lonathon ,tilartlew, a former
alternate site was chosen for landing. The crew
was briefed by the AC using a hand drawn map
which contained detailed information but did

Could this be you?

not note the presencc of a 2~ inch high by 6 inch
diameter steel fresh water well casing in the
middle of thc alternate landing site .

The aircraft arrived over the intended landing area low hnver re-established . The well casing was deared and
and circled it at about 50D ft AGL and 60 K1AS . the aircraft IanJed and shut dow~n 30 feet to the north of
The confined area checks were completed during the ob~ect . t was a dark and rainy midnight shift; the only thing green mule slid across the floor heading straight for a big
a downwind rautrack pattern and a two-stage left to do was an cngine runup. "1'he engitte techs had tool board. No number of nh MY God's, or Hail Mar Y's
According to the CHI~I~ Standard Manoeuvre Manual
approach was started with the ~0 foot trees north finished their walk around and were waiting for Bob Bob said wcre slowing this tlting down . After his whole
(SA11~1J, the procedures for night unaided iontined area
of the landing site identified as the barrier to cross . to show up to ride brakcs. l le finally showed uh and career had tlashed before his eyes and the mule had
landmg ; are drlterent trom thc ~iaylrght and nrght aided
Once successfully clear of the harrier trees, a high everyone got on hoard. Only then did Bob reaGze he had finally stopped, Bob stepped down from the saddle to
procedures . The landing light shall be retracted to illu-
hover was attained but frees to the right side ol the forgotten his headset on the serving desk . So, in a hurry see that he had come to a stop just inches from the tool
mtnate the under arrcraft arca ancl at least two low and
aircraft were a little too close to commence the verti- to get the job done and ntayhe catch a few zzz's, he board. "What if someone had been walking through
slow approaches are to be tlo~~~n in order to land in a
cal decent.'1'he high obstructions were cleared as the hopped on the mulc and sped off to the hangar. The here or checking the tool board ?" he thought. He qtuetly
~unfrned arca unarded .'Ihe rnvcstrgahon rs cuntrnumg
AC manoeuvred the helicopter lefr . The landing light hangar doors were open as the aircraft was going to be picked up his headset, cortcealing his shakuig hands
b`~ ex~tmining the procedures for night unaided tlight
was deploycd to the front of the aircraft and the sequcnces anJ lhc tr,ttnrng thal crcttis reccrve at the towed in right after the run so Bob just sped utto the and returned to the aircraft. The run-up went withoul
variable spot light was aimed tnwards the right to hangar without missing a beat . llntil he went to stop a hitch and all was going well until on the ride back to
Operational '~rainint, l'nit and thr~~ut;h t~n 1~h
illuminate thc high trees located in that area . that is . Hc didn't rtalize that the wet tires combined with the hangar one of the engine techs on the run asked
'l~raining . "
the painted hanf;ar tloor had him virtually driving on a Bob, "1-Iow come you're driving so slow?" All he could
An attempt to visually clear skating rink . 4ti'ell, you can just irnagine Bob's surprise say after thinking ahout what could have happened is
lhc landing area under the when he ~a~ent to stop and tive tons or so of specding <`You do_rt't tvant to know  "
aircratt was hampered by the
manner the aircraFt li g hts
were deployed and by the
shadows cast into the area
. .
from in situ lighting . The
airiralt, when clear of high
e- elcin ~~~~r~irtr~r~~l i;"~~rr, ~~~~~~ 5
obstades, descended vertical-
ly onro lhe steel well casing 1 hacl to stup, lt was freezing out aircratt commctnder decided tve had thanked him as ;r ~rew ~tnd told ltirtt
which tore an 18 inch bv there on the rantp, and thinking had too murh excitemenl for one he had dc~ne a great thing.
10 inch hole in thc underside ahc~ut mighl have c~ccurred made me night, and we called it quits . In retrospect, my only regrets is that
fuselage and darnaged a shiver e~~en mctre .
As the air~ralt ~omntander canceled I cannOt rentfrllher the nttlne Ot the
stringer and fuel tank located After ~!D ntinutes, our crew ,tnd TA our tlight pl~tn, I started filling out young airman tvho ntust likelv saved
in that portion of the aircraft . tigured out tvhat was going un . They the safetv report . I slated that the air- mv, life . lf he is readin ~ this ste~rv, I
Upon hearing the noise asso- ialled for the other deice h~uck, but ntan launchin g us out had hroken the want him to know 1 will never for~ct
ciated with the damage, thc it was too late .ll'e were initially "chain of events" that leads to everv the actions he toc~k th~~t ni ;;ht c~n hi~
cjescent was arrested and a . r~ . pushing a l6 hour crew day, and aircraft accident . l ho1~e he realised tuur in lapan . "
.

.
~..5 .~l~1 .

the rnontentous decision he had made

~. S~ ~
- y ~ .
now tvith another deicin~;, we were Reprinted courtesy of Flying Safety
', :w

. _ .r- . ~"i~
staring at almost 1H hours . The hv rehrsing tc~ pull our chocks, ~~''c magazine October 1997

24 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 25

 i
Ca P tain Mike VandenBos Ca p tain Richard Walsh
Second Lieutenant Jason Nelder While conductlng a cross-country Folluwing a formation trtkeoff, Captain ~1'alsh tti~as unable to fully retract the
mission to Bathurst New Brunswick, speed hrakes of his Tutor aircratt .lv'ating that he had zeru hvdraulic pre~sure
Second Lieutenant Nelder, an undergraduate pilot in training, was on Captain VandenBos elected to do a he broke lormation, inlurmed thz lead aircraft> ai~d declared ~~n emergencv.
a solo training mission in a Tutor aircraft performing a practice forced Snowbird p~tch at the Miramichi air- lti''hile initiating the checklist actions tor an emergency gear extension, Captain
landing exercise . When he attempted to retard the throttle to idle he field . When he was at one mile final ~ti'alsh noticed hydraulic tluid on the cuckpit [loor. A ruptured line had draineci
noted that the engine RPIV1 indicated 81 percent instead ~f the normal approach he advanced the throttle all of the ftuid frum both the normal and emergency systems renderin~ the
63 percent . Further investi~ation by Second Lieutenant Nelder con- slightly and heard a thump . Captain landing gear, tlaps, and ;peed brakes inoperative,
tirmed that full throttle movement would only vary the engine RPh-1 VandenBos imrnediately zoomed the
between Sl and IOO hercent . aircraft and headed directly to low Recognizing the potential lor a post landing fire, Captain ltiralsh beg~~n reduc-
key position for a forced landing . ing the residual diesel fuel in the hellv tanks as he continued his ft~rpless, gear
Second Lreuten~jnt
The completion of a compressor stall u p a pl~raach . Ca p tain lti'alsh shut the en K ine u1f E~rior to touch down, landed
Nelder quickly
clearing procedure resulted in no gently on the rumvay centre line, and kept the aircraft straight during the slide
concluded that a
engine response . by using rudder . The aircraft camc tu a halt with minintal darnage .
succcs5ful landrng
rec~uired an engine Captain VandenBos executed a flaw- (;aptain 1~'alsh's calm and thoroughly professional handling of a highly unusual
flamc uut, f[c posi- less forced landing . After touchdown, and hazardou ; ~ittration }~rc~°cntr~l 1hc li~s~ ol a ~~alual~le ~rviatiur~ resource .
tioned the aircraft as the EGT continued to nse, he L1t'll tf0llc'' "
at an airspced and placed the throttle to the cutoff
altitude that would position and allowed the aircraft to
allow him to com- roll out onto a tax~way . Subsequent
plete a dead-stick inspection revealed significant damage
landing. At a dis- to a first stage compressor blade Master Cor P oral Catherine Picard
tance of tive miles Captain VandenBos's timely, efficient, During the summer of 1997, 10 Field Technical Traininy Squadron held a
from the aerodrome and professional reaction to a critical Hornet 30-day seat check re-qualification session Master Corporal Picard was
he tlamed out the and unexpected loss of power pre- monitoring the candidates' level of comprehension in the practical phase of
engine and executed vented the loss of a va~uable aviation ground egresses . She noted one candidate making a serious sequence error in
a flawless engine out resource . Well done~ " the ground egress procedure by omitting a crucial step . If the omission took
pattcrn and landing. place in an actual emergency the individual would be unable to escape from
Cor P oral S . Brassard the aircraft .
Second Lieutenant
Nclder's calmnes5 Master Corporal Picard followed up her findings and discovered that the
Corpural [3ra~sarci, an avirrliun
and professionalism squadron was omitting this step in their unit training . She immediately took
teihnician empluyed on peacekeeping
when face :d wrth an action to rectlfy the problem and notified the Wing Flight Safety Officer. Her
dutic, in 1 laili, was perfurminK a
emergency srtuatron actions were directly responsible for the development of a Wing Seat Check
nit;httime "r1" check on a Twin Huey
allowed him to Standardization pollcy.
helicoplcr wh~n he ubserved some-
recover his aircraft thing w~usu~tl about the tail hoom Master Corporal Picard's dedication, professlonalism and immediate actions
safely, tib'ell donc'! " le(t h~rnd lower mcrunt . '[i~ investig~~te resolved an unacceptable situation . Well done! "
further he requested an assist~jnt to
tihake the t~ril uf the aircraft, which
cau~ed the crack to open and be
Corporal K .H . Smit visible to, the naked eye . (,urporal
Brassard imruecliatelv nutitied his
Corporal Smit, an avionics technician newly qualified as a start controller, was per-
crew chief and the aircratt was hlaced
forming hls first unsupervised night start after a desalinization and airframe wash
uns~rviccablc . Cor p oral Dou g las W. Dupuls
on a Twin Huey helicopter . While conducting the start check on the number two
eng~ne, Corporal Smit noticed liqu~d in the vicinity of the fuel filter which easily Further exarnination revealed that y'~'hile prep~rring to luad trei~ht on an outhuund aircraft, Curpor~rl [)upuis obscrved
could have been mistaken as wash effluent . He investlgated further and concluded thr litting hacl failed thus seriously a f Irrcules aircralt backirt ~ out under its own [~o~;~er frc~m the emharkation t~~cilitv.
that the fluid was fuel leaking from the eng~ne fuel outlet line . compromisint; the ;tructural He noticed that the ramp support had heen lclt in the luadin~ position outside the
intct;rit~~ ul thc tail bourtr . aircraft and was in danger of being run uver. Rcalizing the dama~e the support
Corporal Smit alerted the pilot who in turn shut the helicopter down Detailed
could cau ;e tn the aircraft, Curporal Dupuis imrnrdiately ~ontactrd his supervi~or,
exarY~ination revealed that the number iwo engine outlet fuel line hiad cracked .
The inspectic~n of the motmt is who in turn passed a stup taxi message to the ;iircraft commander .
In nlqht tirne field conditions, with substantial water remaining in the engine compart- nurn~all~~ conducted onlv, on primary
ment from the airframe wash, Corporal Smit's professionalism and attention to detail inspections . Despite the night fic[d The aircraft was halted just in timr tu prr~rnt has in[; its main lan~iin`, ~ear run t,~er
revealed a dangerous fuel leak which undcte~-teri ~ti~~~-~ c1 ha~,~k~ ;cri~~~,sly pnd~~nnnroc~ conditions, Corporal Rrassard's hrufes- the now to 11
> >led ram [~ su [[
>,ort .
both the crew and aircraft . Well done! " tiionalism, attentiun tu detail, and Corporal Dupuis' expeditious and professio~lal a~tic~n; pre~cntcd seriuu ; ,rn~i ~c~~tl ;
~oniprehensive knrnvledge of the ci ;tma e to ~i Hercules aircr~ift . 11'e(1 donc' "
airtrame, allo~~~cd him to identify ~t
dankerous structural fault .11~e11 dorre! "
26 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 27
 Cor P oral Crai 9 5 . Larawa Y Cor p oral Bruce Wentzell
C~rporal Laraway was carr~~ing out an acceptance check on a recently Shortly after receiving three T58 Cor P oral Leon H Y nes
arrived I lornet engine . ~'~'~ule conducting his visual inspection he cn g ine lube tilter ~~ssernblies trom
Durlng a perlodic inspection
notiied a black object which I~oked like an o-ring cvrapped around the supply, Corporal ~4'entzell proceeded
on a Hornet aircraft Corporal
sump scavenge line. On closer inspection, ~s~hich included the removal of to disassemble them far further
Hynes noticed that the ECS
the line, he discovered that a blankin~ hlug had been inadvertently left inspection prior t0 1llsta11~1t10n .
valves were covered with a
on whcn the line was installtc~ . ,Although this procedure was nat
red dye . Realizing that the dye
mandatory, past experience had
The location ol the line is in an area diiticult to access under the engine resembled that used for fuel
shown that engine oil tilter wafers
between accessory components . A detailed inspecti~n of this line is not tank leak checks, and know-
have been inadvertently mixed up
n~rmally part of the acceptance check, as the line tittings do not reyuire ~ng that there should be none
with fortivard tr<jnsmission wafers .
torytung . l{ ;td the blanking plug remained undetected, it could easily in the area, Corporal Hynes
During his inspection, Corporal
have interfered with the safe operation ot the cnginc neccssitating rxten- proceeded with an m depth
~1'eutzell noticed that some of the
sive rcpairs and airiraft do~~~ntirue, investigation . After an exhaus-
tilter screens appeared to he af the tive survey he noticed what
Curporal Laraway's professionalisrn and attention to deiail prevcnled ~~rung size, yet were stamped with looked like a small crack in
damage to lh~ engine ~rnd the 1c~s5 of ;r ~~ ;rluabl~ ;t~riatinn rescrnrce. the correct part number . the number twa fuel cell
Well don~? " Corporal ~1'entzell immediately floor,
notitied his supervisors as he sus- The aircraft was sent to the
pccted that forward transmission tank bay and NDT was carried
tilters had been produced, identitied, out from the inside of the cell . The presence of a three-inch crack was
;md delivered hy the rnanutacturer confirmed . Had fuel leaked onto the hot ECS lines, and with no fire
Ca p tain Dave Maclean using errnneous engine tilter part extinguishlng capabilities in the centre fuselage, the potential for a disas-
numbers . He isolated the suspicious ter was very high .
Captain MacLean, an air traffic controller, was working the inner runway posi- filters and then proceeded to check Corporal Hynes' persistence and determination undoubtedly prevented a
tion in the tower at 4 Wing Cold Lake . He had recently come on duty and there the lc~cal supply of wafers where he major occurrence . Well done! "
was only one aircraft airborne - a locally based CT 133 . The CT 133 crew had discovered several others titi~ith manu-
completed a local Opeval mission and was returning to base via a PAR. facturing defects . Corporal W'eotzell
At five miles on final Captain Maclean issued a ciearance for a touch and go srranged for phcrtographs to be
which was relayed to the pilot by the PAR controller. The pilot acknowledged taken and ensured all intormatu7n Cor p oral
the clearance Including confirrnation that the gear was down and locked . As was a~~ailable for transmission tc~ Ed Ferris
the aircraft approached decision height, Captain MacLean picked up his b'mocu- headquarters .
Durmg a last chance
lars and examined the aircraft configuration . Capta~n MacLean noticed that the
As the result of his prulessionalisru check on a T-33,
landing gear was still retracted and quickly directed the PAR controller to advise
;tnci diligence Corporal ~ti'entzell Corporal Ferris
the pilot. Captain Maclean immedlately followed-up with an emergency guard
discovcred a verv, scrious m~rnul,rc- noticed that the
transmission to overshoot. The aircraft dimbed out and completed an unevent-
turing ancf quality contr~l prohlem . aircraft's right aileron
ful circuit to a safe landing .
Had thr misidentifird tiA~afers been and flap were con-
Regulations do not require controllers to visually check an aircraft's landing installed premature failure ot the tacting each other.
gear. Captain MacLean's professionalism and dedication to duty prevented a The condition only
cngine be ;rrings ma~~ have resulted .
potentially serious accident . Well done! " occurred with full
Ilf~ll ~Ic~rr~~! "
left control inputs .
Corporal Ferris noti-
fied the pilot, who
Second Lieutenant Patrick Gervais until further notice . l le then inlormed his superic~r and felt no abnormalities
consulted the applic ;rhle orders tcr verifv the correct prnce- through the flight
Second Lieutenant Gerv ;ris wa~ working as an r~peratic~ns dure tc~ bc lollowed .l'he c~rders stated th ;it althout;h the Jet controls .
;rssislant at 4~f; S~{uadrnn ~ti~hen he tiv~is infirrmed th ;rt R fuc~I c~f~ the Starlifter was acce p table lur use in the Griffon
there was a nerd lo drain fuel Frc~m a titarlitter lucated at After the aircraft had taxied, Corporal Ferris was still not comfortable with the
it had to be reiirculated and tiltered beti~re transfer in order
the ~terodrc~rne . Second Lieutenant Gervais asked the civil- situation and consulted his supervisoc They then conferred with an airframe
to avoid cc~ntamination, Had the cuntractor proceedeci as
ian in charge of the de(uelling what the dispc~sitic~n of the specialist and a test pilot . The decision was made to direct the aircraft to return
he planned it ~titould have been necessarv to detirel all the
luel would he . The contractor stated that thr luel frc~m the to the ramp prior to take off for further investigation . Subsequent checks revealed
Squaciron's Gritt~~ns and tn replace their fuel tilters.
Starlitter would be used to retirel the Squadron's Griffon an improperly rigged aileron that could have caused serious flight control prob-
helicopter~ . Second Lieutenant Gervais demonstrated superior vigilance lems had the aircraft gone airborne .
and initiati~~e in drfusing a situation that would ha~~c cari .~ed Corporal Ferris' d~liqence and thoroughness prevented a poss~ble disaster
tiecond Lieutenant Ger~~;ris inunediatel~~ informeci the substantial dela~~s to flight oper ;itii~ns . l1'cll etunr! " Well done i. "
~c~ntra~tc~r nc~t to use the fucl taken from the Starlifter

28 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 29

 Cor p oral Brian Mclnall &
Private Chris Cilson Cor p oral Alain Poirier &
11'hilc retrieving ilight line pavs~er units, Corporal Cor p oral Frank Ber er
t9chtall and Private (Jilson notiiecj a I~ool uf hvdraulic
, During a turnaround on a Hornet
tluid near the main landing gear zone on a Silver Star aircraft Corporal Berger noticed
parking spot .'1'he airiraft, ~~~hich had been there, had that the cotter pins on a trailing
recentlv been dispatched ittto hoor weather conditions edge flap aduator appeared
t~tr blue vvater tli b7ht o I~erations. Realizin f; that the abnormally loose. Corporal Berger
iruplications of their discovery were ~ritical, Corporal immediately brought the condltion
~lclnall and Private Gilson immediatelv intc~rmed to the attention of Cor A oral Poirier
thrir su 1~ers'isor, ancf the Silver St~rr ts~as recallcd to an experienced AVN technician,
the rantP thrc~ugh tc~wer frequency. who confirmed the abnormality
Corporal Rod Allen and determined that further investi-
11'hcn thc aircralt vvas shul down Corporal h-9c1na11 During a hot turnaround and crew gation was warranted.
anci Private Gilson's suspicions were contirmed as change of a Griffon hellcopter, r
hydrauli~ Iluid was rapidly being purged from an Closer inspedion of the trailing
Corporal Allen initiated a visual inspec- edge flap actuator assembly
unservtces3ltlc shuttle v;tl>>c', t~on of the engine compartments . revealed that a bushing required to
1~'ithout lhc yui~k professional decisions madc by He ascertained that there was a fuel support the main bolt through the
(_;orporal hlclnall and Private (iilson an aircr;ttt pressure line leak on the number two trailin g ed g e fla p hin 9 e was missin 9
would havc departcd with a Potcntialh~ clisastrouy engine . Corporal Allen immediately A considerable amount of damage
notified the alrcraft captain and a to the actuator eye end, flap hinge
unserviceabilitv . I1i'll dvrtc~' "
shutdown was carried out . and attaching hardware was also
Subsequent maintenance action discovered .
Ca p tain Kevin.E . Mornin 9 revealed that the number two fuel There was no visible indication of
pressure line fitting was loose . the problem other than the loose
(;aptain Morning, a (;rilton Pilot
Corporal Allen demonstrated a high cotter pins . Corporal Berger and
;rt ~I()3 ~yU;lljr(lrl (~a~,et(1W11, 11' ;iS
During a cargo area ' walktng tnward an au'cratt when he level of professionalism, in~tiative, Corporal Poirier's keen attention to
ins Pection Master noticed a piece of darkened ntetal and attention to detail . H~s actions detail and their rneticulous follow
Cor P oral Tom P kins, a ' broke the link in a chain of events up actions higlhlighted a problem
lying on the r~3ntp .
loadmaster with 435 _ that could have lead to a seriou~ that could have created a cata-
Squadron, noticed a !~ Captain Ivloruing immediatelv incident ar acudent Well donel " strophic event. Well done! "
wooden plug handle ' - rc I~orted the f~~rei bJn ob~ect
1 , which
vibratrng loosely on the , ti~~as then p;tssed to servicing. ~ti'hen
emer9encYqP e ui ment ~r_- ` it beiame ;tpParent that the piece
storage rack . Further was from the " hot end " of an
,
insp ection revealed six enginr, the syuac3rc~n s aircrait were
mare loose plugs and recalled f~r inspection . The shard Corhoral I~orster was tasked to carry out a GPti mudification cnn a
one plug missiny alto- tvas founcl to br front thc rxhaust Hercules aircratt . The tti~ork reyuired the remov;il ol an access panel
gethec Master Corparal stack of (~riftitn ~t4t3 . Clnse inspec- that is not normally ohenecl, After complcting his dutv in the area
Tompkins recognized tion rcvc ;rlccl ,tdditiort ;tl rracking Cor1~oral Forster comrncnccd a FUU rhrik and discctvered a sntall
that the missing plug which, had it gone unnoti~ed, would Piece of metal approximately one inch lonf;. l,oncerned ahout the
could cause a serious havc resultcd in picces ol rttetal tinding, ancl although it was not lr ;rde rclaled, he inspecteci everv
FOD hazard . A Special heinf; eiected ii~om the tail rotor com f~onent in the area in an eff~rt to determine the ori hiin of the
Inspection was conducted and Master Corporal Tompkins possihly c~jusin~ signiticant damage object . Fttrther investi ~ation by~ CorI~oral horster revealed that the
UCR in which he recomrnended securing the plug with a tc~ thc air~raft and injury to person- itent, and other.5 like it, were rollers from the co-pilot's rud~er pedal
Although Master Corporal Tompkins' onginal UCR was rejected, and the ncL r1n e~haust ~taik of~ another acljustmenl arnt shalt .
reinstallation of loose plugs continued using adhesive, he continued to (~riffon was alsc~ changed as a
CorPc~ral Fc~rster immediately informed his supervisor of thc fault,
monitor the situation . Further investigation revealed that the adhesive was hreixutic~n .
C'pon cctntE~letic+n c~l another inspection it w;ts ciuiot~ered that onlv
drying out during normal flight and the plugs continued to pose a FOD Captain mornins;'s E~rol~essionalism, twc~ rctller he ;u'in 1 .~ in the assen~hlv, h ;~d rentained intact .
hazard . The original UCR was adopted and is being implemented . initiativc°, anci attenlion t~ detail
Corporal horster's protessionalism and attention to detail hit;hlightrd
Master Corporal Tornpkins' professionalism, perseverance, and attention avcrtcd a scriou5 llit;ht ~al~'tti~
an unserviceabilitv that if lett undetectecl ~cnrld ha~r ~~sral,rte'~I in~c~
to detail prevented a potential serious occurrence . Well done! " occurt'ence .ll~i'flcinrtc'' ~
;t ver y~ serious tli 7ht cc~ntrol m;rltunctirnt . 11'~~11 c~c~ne.' "

30 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 ---- -- ----- -- Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 31

 8661 'E ou 'lon ap sodo~d ZE

Ca P tain John Stirton Captain Gre 9 Carlow

11t the tinte of the incident Captain W'hile performing at the Quinte
Stirton was controlling traftic on the International Airshow Captain " uoilpntis
outer runwav at ~7uose )ati,~ on which Carlow, the Snowbird number three el ap tuawanouap xnaanay,l e
.r Tutor was cor~ductin g sunulated inner left wing pilot, experienccd a atueu~waa~ap ata e 'satuanbasqns
emergencies. Upan turning a short ~umpressor stall and a loss of thrast . sa yooadde sa I tue P uad aaansse
.
base leg, the student pilot requested 'fhe power lo5s occurred immediate- 1a awlea apnti~e uos e aauiqwoa
a touch and go landin g ~tnd con- Iv follotving an inverted pass at tlaree ' I.ia~edde, I a P a~ua6~n .I e. a~o P e W
tirmed that the gear was down and hundred feet above g round level . leaode~ np ate~pawwi uoiheaa e~
locked . L~tnding clearance was given Unable to rnaintain posilion in thc ~aaneab6e,s ap a~ua6an
with a recuntirmation ot the landing formatiun and detecting a strong aun ay~adwa e inb a~ 'alqluodslp
grar posiliun rcyucstcd and rc~cived . vibration, Captain Carla~, reduced atiwi
. . .I tuean ~ea n P aoeai.lia sn I d e I
the throttle tn idle to clear the stall uoqesili}n,l ~ansse e lewiuiw lueanq
As the aircraft ahproached the run- at which time the engine llamed out .
way and commrnccd the roundout -ae> >ane sayaoadde sap aan~a~a,p
tor landing (Japtain Stirton observed (;apt~ain Carlow quiikly turned alolid ne uo~tsa66ns es uoine,l ap
awav from the spectator vietiving uoqentis el ap tueano~ ne tuaie}a , ~ ~aaluan al
that thc landing gear ~~~as not down .
saasin sauuosaad sal anb tuernsse,s ans a~tc55uaaitr un astnpuad as au anb
CaE)tain Stirton rnade all 1rllnledlate area while simultaneousl Yl~erform-
ing comprcssor stall clearing and " ~stuasaad sanaletaads sap ~tiin,is rf ua ta sawsiue6ao
. saani p saI aalua atrna auo asrad r h nb aansatu el anb
radio transmission and the QFI on
au>'ansst~ ua tnot asnar»ad anbraneuoaae uoileuipaaoa el tuemsse 'uoilen~ls rsutt' uotarlS aureatdr,a np aan~tuatuald
bo~trd tuok control ,tnd conducted forced landint;~1~rocedures . The
aamossaa aun aapaad ap aatma,p srur .rad e I asuliew
. . . e aao PWI
e e~ode~ a I -dns taoJJ a~ta ~ ~a~essnaaaat~
. ,1 ~t~.1 taat~dde
.
an overshoat. Subsequent discussion puwer plant continucd to refuse to
luu saluyiil> tuauraruaat.xa sa,uets 'inms tuo mb snpua} stuawow un,p uoilt~an~rtuo, r~l auatuallans~n
with the QFl revealed that he had respond and Captain Carloss executed
Cor p oral Gar Y Madore -uo,ara sap surp ;tiolar_~ atnt~t~d>', np sap sanoa nd ~aleuil a~noa ua aarti .r~n ap snuat sr.d tuus au auuaraae
not veritied the landing gear dotti~n a llawlrss forccd landrng.
sa~ttdoadde ta satrq»wwf saansaur sa~l awnlle tsa,s pllinoaaan uou ayane6 uoitr.lnaaia cl ap sanalgaauo, saq
contirmatton and il)at the student Corporal Madore was controlling uieaa tuer(on al anbsaol (ayd) aepea
Captain (-;arlow's iorrect and immedi-
had failed to select the gear down . a Silverstar aircraft on a PAR 'afyt''aadtur a_~aot ne uoisuaad ap ay~oadde aun ~nod ~uieat al artaos
ate actions under extremelv di$ictilt
approach when it experienced a~essiaaatae un atn,axa s .tult~ r ntiul.rr~ J ap situo tit~nt~ aaft~i~r'ts al anb ta it .ros
Air traliic contrullers have no circurnstances prevented thelossof a aetsaanli5 uoine un aaloatuoa ap
an unsafe left main landinq aurrlrdra al ta'aaolid np suorteaiatllos ireia ur~al al anb aur .tyuoa sed trt?nr u
requirement to visually verity the valuablc ~tviation rcsource while also uieat ua tieta aaopeW leaode~ a~
gear indication on short fmal . xne aapuodaa ap aasniaa t~ anurluo~ t~ ~ L~i nb~a, Lanaa
, tuo ar, .i r.fenb .rnaa~natsur.
landing configur,ttiun of an rrircraft, enstu~ing the safety of the spectators aJ0 P ~w J~.l~ ~I pJOdp -alolid al ~anr sluanbasyns suaitaatua
During the tense moments that anatow ay ~».rol a~t~ssula>>r un p ann ua
Captain Stirton's extra effort and in attcndancc . It'c(l clonr! "
followed, Corporal Madore saanpiaoad sal tuentaa}la ua ta anassaad sa(l- ~zr~ saP asnuaa
. aun aana,aIJ a
~tction prevented a wheels-up ,
-uro~ ailr~rl .r,ap np .ral~aa anod saptrrttrruua sal srad e E~aoq e
maintained control of the situa- .~o sr, al anod
landing . jl~ell cfarte' "
tion, coordinating between the saansalu sap tueuaad ua lnut sanatrtaads ata .lr t~n6 anaaanaasur-aao
. Lrd al ta'or.P ea
various agencies and ensuring all sal urai>'nno.rt as no auoz el ap tacaa ! ard anbiununuo~ ~uauraa>'rpatuun e
personnel ~nvolved were aware raarn
. taatua1~rdt~a e nto1atr~ aurctide,
. , a `I .
Il ~rtaos . , u a~essuaaate
sed ttt~ta . ,P urt~aa
.
of the status of the aircraft . His aI anb anhartuaa
, r uotar.tS, auir~
, t.rd}~a
~turita ~sa s ana~our al `aasod as anod tpuoaaa,l tiewetua ta
suggestion to conduct "min
al ta `a~t" tl:~uaa~p ne ui{ aauaru anod
fuel" approaches assured the rtualt+a nr zt?~ sal irnpa.i t~ swlar~ aumt . I? lE
a~Sili . [ JOJdlir' Uoln1'
a 1 tit'l . ,I atUlUO
rnost effiaent use of the limited -rdt~a al `uoqr.ryr :~ at .rut aun aurauassaa ~an~aa ta
fuel availabte, thus preventing ta uoqetuaoi r~l ap uias nt~ uortrsod es aapueutap ata e uieaa np troit~sod t~l ap
the emergency from deteriorat- atuaaun~tu ap .~lcledr,u~ ~los np snssap-nt~ .
Uu1~ClUlI.1 Uo~a.l C1 ta `aa. P a01Jt' ata
. . E' aiit'S
ing into an even worse situation. spa~d saua, sroat E~ sop al ans a~r~sshd -sraaal~e p uortesraop~r auj~ ~~llrnoaaan
Cor p oral Madore's immediate un saac{e tuawaleiparulur aampua~l tsa,s aa iaaos an~ta urt~aa al anb autayuo~ t~ la
response to the aircraft emer- aluessnld. a p ataad rI ~a~ucssrnd . e 1P a allonap-asod tm aant,a,ffa,p ?pururap e
gency, combined with his calm, npaad e ta .inassaadwo, a~eyaoraap un ~a.rrrr~els
. . aao l id
. a 1 `asr y a 1' adt~ta aaanoa
controlled manner during the ryns t~ `uoiaruuol r~l ap atlanr~~ anauatur ua aatn
. . arune
. sald
, 1~ ~anbrtu~ , , uot~tm~rs
, .
subsequent approaches, played atua n p stoaa
., . naarurtu
. [~arc.l ntou,5 n E~ alol.id ap suortt~lrnuts sa p t~ aie~a,xa s aotn,L
a key role in assuring the timely `MOl.re~) auirtidra al `atutn~t ap lruoit un no~'nr~ I asou ltir t~. aanaual~a
. . .
atsid
and successful resolution of the -euaalut uaraan al~riaads np aapt~a al surp t~l ap ayt~al al an~lu.rluo, uutart~ uyol
situ~t~on . Well donet ~ uaraac
. , a l~,el~ads ua ltt~n
. [ ona. L,r nb sao I~~ aurea~de, al `tuapf,ui,l ap tuatuotu nb.

nno I ar'~ ~aa~ auietid~e~

. uo~its u o~ auietide~

32 Flight Comment No . 3, 1998 -