Marx's Concept of Ideology
Author(s): H. M. Drucker
Source: Philosophy , Apr., 1972, Vol. 47, No. 180 (Apr., 1972), pp. 152-161
Published by: Cambridge University Press on behalf of Royal Institute of Philosophy
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3750102
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
https://about.jstor.org/terms
and Cambridge University Press are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend
access to Philosophy
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
H. M. DRUCKER
THE CONCEPT of ideology plays an important part in contemporary social
and political thinking. In many works which raise the question about
the relationship between what men think and how their societies operate
some mention of ideology is made. Since the variety of thinkers who write
about this relationship have a variety of views on the subject, it is not at
all surprising that they disagree about just what an ideology is. It might
be helpful if we could agree on just one usage, or, failing that, understand
why a variety of usages is necessary and understand them.
I do not propose to undertake here the enormous task of reconciling
these varied understandings. Neither do I propose to seek to change the
situation by proposing yet another definition of ideology. But I do think
a great deal of the confusion and disagreement on the subject could be
dissipated by an analysis of the original use of the term. The concept of
ideology as we now use it-all theories agree in this whatever their other
disagreements-stems from Karl Marx. Marx was not the man who
coined the term; that man was Antoine Louis Claude Destutt de Tracy.'
Neither was Marx the first to take up the coinage. The word appears in
something like its original usage in Napoleon's correspondence; it is used
by John Adams and Thomas Jefferson in their correspondence and its use
was known to Jeremy Bentham.2 But all these pre-Marxist usages can
be safely relegated to the preserves of early nineteenth century intellectual
historians. For practical purposes the career of ideology begins with
Marx.
That a newly coined word did not immediately become popular cur-
rency but had to wait some fifty years (from 1798 to 1846) before achieving
any importance is itself worthy of wonder. Why, we may ask, did Marx
use a word which had previously been all but neglected to refer to one of
his central concepts? Why, more interestingly, did Marx's use of the
term achieve wide currency where its predecessors failed? I cannot give
anything like a full answer to these questions-full answers would involve
something like a complete theory of language-but I do hope to show
that one major cause of the confusion about 'ideology' is due to the failure
of its successive users to appreciate that what Marx did with the word was
considerably more complex than they seem to appreciate. Marx was not
merely giving a name to a thing; he was not behaving in the way nominal-
ists say men behave when they use new words.
There is, of course, a simple and temptingly cynical view of why Marx's
complex concept of ideology became popular where its predecessors did
not. This cynical view comes to light when we realise that Marx's view
is considerably more complex, and consequently difficult to understand,
than his predecessors. Even the most superficial reading of De Tracy
152
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
reveals what he understands ideology to be. For De Tracy 'ideology' was
the name of the new science which he was in the process of inaugurating. 3
He intended his new science to give a correct and universally compre-
hensible explanation of politics, based on an equally clear natural science.
'Ideology', in its author's intention, was to replace opaque disciplines such
as metaphysics, theology and political philosophy. While the other pre-
Marxist uses of 'ideology' were different from De Tracy's they were
derived from his use, and what is equally important were as unambiguous
as his.
De Tracy and his friends formed a political club to publicise his ideas
and to examine their ramifications. De Tracy published a three-volume
work, Elements of Ideology, which elaborated these notions. Jefferson,
who approved of them, had the politically relevant portions of the
Elements translated into English, for the enlightenment of the Americans.4
Napoleon made a practice of flattering the group of "Ideologues", as they
called themselves, when on his return from Egypt he sought to gain public
approval as more than a soldier. Since the "Ideologues", political naivety
matched their philosophical optimism, they were easily taken in by this
flatterv. So much were they taken in that they came to support Napoleon's
claims in the hope that he would rule according to the precepts of their
programme once in power. When their hopes were disappointed, they
attacked him and he reciprocated by attacking ideology. In the course of
this attack (which consists of little more than a few remarks scattered
over a period of several years) ideology was aptly portrayed as a vacuous,
naive form of political pretension.3
Although Napoleon was originally talking about the "Ideologues", this
reference -became lost as 'ideology' came to stand for any form of wishful
political thinking. Perhaps the only element of De Tracy's original use
to be found in this newer use was the contrast between 'ideology' and
traditional political theory; the inversion involved in the newer meaning
is seen in De Tracy's approval of the former and Napoleon's approval of
the latter. But the major point for our purpose is that all these pre-
Marxist uses were readily comprehensible and of little subsequent interest
where Marx's use was neither of these things.
I am convinced that any such simple attempt to explain the success of
Marx's use and the failure of De Tracy by reference to the former's
seeming obscurity must fail precisely because the obscurity is merely
seeming and does not exist in Marx's theory.6 Further, I am convinced
that far from being obscure Marx's concept of ideology is of value pre-
cisely because it points to a complex relationship between phenomena not
usually seen to be related at all.
II
Even those who dislike Marx intensely cannot deny that he possessed a
fine sense of historical understanding. Even they cannot deny the
153
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PHILOSOPHY
poignancy of his work which derives from his judicious use of this power.
Marx places all social facts within an historical context. Thus, when he
examines, say, the teachings of Aristotle, he keeps in mind that Aristotle
lived in a slave-owning city-state.7 He never makes the mistake of
speaking of these teachings as if they were meant to apply to bourgeois
society. Of course, we would be making such a mistake ourselves if we
expected him to do so since he lived in an intellectual milieu in which
historical consciousness was common.
For these reasons it is rather startling to realise that a good deal, if not
all, of the commentaries on Marx's concept of ideology ignores this fact.
This ignorance is all the more startling once one does raise the matter
because it is clear that when Marx refers to ideology he is using the word
in two different historically differentiated ways. When he refers to the
thinking characteristic of an ascendant class-specifically of the bourgeois
before they seized power-he is talking about something very different
from the thinking characteristic of a ruling class-specifically of the bour-
geois once they were in power. While recognising that they are different,
Marx uses the same word 'ideology' to describe both of them thus indi-
cating that they have much in common, to wit, they are both the product
of a particular class (as opposed to humanity in general), both these kinds
of thinking, different though they are in content, guide and defend that
class and both are, what is more important, wrong.
Putting the matter as concisely as is consistent with veracity we may
express Marx's thinking thus: Today's established rulers were yesterday's
parvenus; they may well be tomorrow's has-beens. Today their needs
are different from tomorrow's. One of the needs of every class is a theory
which will orient it to its world and prescribe its future tasks. Since the
needs of the class change quite radically it will have to change its theory
too. Throughout its life the theorists of this class will search assiduously
for whatever factual or scientific basis for their preconceptions they can
find. When no such basis can honestly be found something which looks
like one will be patched up and put forward. Honest or not, a class will
exalt as 'true' that theory which seems to provide good reason for actions
it wants to take in any case.
Today's established rulers (Marx developed his concept of ideology in
the mid-1840s) are the bourgeois; not so long ago they were an ascendant
class faced with the task of overthrowing the landed classes. In their
earlier period the bourgeoisie found, in the political economy of Adam
Smith and his school, an honest scientific basis for their claims. Among
other things, Smith taught that the lifting of restrictions on trade would
aid the process of capital-accumulation and that the first nations to over-
throw the shackles of restriction, which had been originally inspired by
the Physiocrats, would become wealthy fast.8 This was just what the
Capitalists wanted to hear. When they achieved power they did just as
Smith prescribed and his predictions proved true. But once this had been
154
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
achieved, this new ruling class had need of new theories. The very success
of its society produced stresses which Smith had not foreseen. It became
necessary for it to explain, among other things, why the large majority of
men could never hope to share in their new wealth; why there should
always be a class of poor men. Thus it was fortuitous, from the point of
view of the ruling class, that the Reverend Thomas Malthus discovered
(Marx suggests he invented) his theories at about this time. From
Malthus one could learn that human population would always grow at
such a rate as to ensure that the demand for a subsistence level of food
always exceeded the available supply.9 Malthus based these convictions
on the supposed fact that human population will always grow in geo-
metric ratio, whereas production of food can only grow in arithmetic ratio.
All this was just a bit too convenient for the purposes of the bourgeois
class, for 'the parsimonious parson', as Marx called him, had fiddled the
figures. This was no science, it was a sham designed to keep the poor
quiescent in the knowledge that there was nothing that could be done for
them while salving the conscience of the bourgeois for not attempting
to do anything.
From the knowledge available in the middle of the nineteenth century
it was clear to Marx that Smith had been mistaken in 1776 when he wrote
The Wealth of Nations. Smith thought that Capitalism could go on
creating new wealth indefinitely. Marx claimed to have evidence that this
was not so, that there was a limit to the productive capacity of a society
organised on Capitalist lines. This error was no fault of Smith's for his
work had been the best that could be expected in the eighteenth century.
All the same, in the middle of the nineteenth century, it was possible to
see that it was wrong and therefore at variance with the teachings of a
truly scientific political economy. Therefore Smith's teaching is now
ideological, that is, unscientific. Malthus's teaching never had been
scientific; it was always fraudulent. 10 It had gained currency because it
said what the now oppressive ruling class wanted to hear. Malthus's
work is also ideological, that is, it is intended to hold back the forces of
progress in aid of a selfish class. One might say that in the middle of the
nineteenth century the two works amount to the same thing: bourgeois
ideology.
Marx's comments on the works of Jeremy Bentham provide us with an
excellent illustration of the difference between the two kinds of ideology.
Bentham's writing, on Marx's interpretation, spanned the period when the
bourgeois came to power in the French Revolution; thus it is possible for
Marx to describe him at different times as the archetypal bourgeois
theorist and the worst of bourgeois apologists. When describing the
development of bourgeois ideology in the period before the French Revo-
lution, Marx is kinder to Bentham than when he is describing the period
after that event.
155
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PHILOSOPHY
In the Holy Family Marx mentions Bentham only in passing. By way
of relating the history of Materialism, which led to his own thought, he
notes that Bentham, along with Mandeville, was a British Materialist.
He writes:-
"Bentham based his system of correctly understood interest on Hel-
vetius' morality and Owen proceeded from Bentham's system to found
English Communism". 1I1
Marx also credits Bentham with founding a plan for penal reform and
codification of the laws.12 And, while there is nothing in the Holy
Family to indicate that Marx took any great interest in Bentham's works,
he is obviously sympathetic.
The German Ideology, which Marx wrote with Engels immediately
following the Holy Family, presents a more detailed view of Bentham's
contributions. Marx notes that Hegel had seen that the theory of utility
-Bentham's theory-was the final result of the Enlightenment.1 3 He
explains this theory in some detail, showing its progress through Hobbes
and Locke and the French Materialists and examining the relation
between Materialism and Capitalism. 14 Here, again, Marx notes that the
theory reduces all human relations to the relation of utility. This is to
say that in bourgeois theory, as in bourgeois society, love, honour and
beauty are manifest only in so far as they are useful to the person professing
them. Putting this the other way round, the only relations between
people are those in which they exploit one another. All this Utilitarian-
ism, in Marx's understanding of it, reaches its zenith in Bentham. 15
But even at the moment of Bentham's writing, this social order was
changing. Ideology was now becoming more than an unscientific theory
-it was becoming an apology. Thus, as well as leading the bourgeois, it
took on the role of misleading the proletariat. Marx hints at this change
in the German Ideology:-
"The economic content gradually turned the utility theory into a mere
apologia for the existing state of affairs, an attempt to prove that under
the existing conditions the mutual relations of people are today the
most advantageous and generally useful. It has this character in all
modern economists. 16
In Capital these hints become more explicit and detailed. Capital was
written almost two decades after the German Ideology and the Holy
Family. It is tempting to suggest that Marx developed his notion of
ideology as an apologetic technique in the later period of his life. But it
must be remembered that he wrote of religion in a similar manner in his
Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right as early as 1844. It seems more
accurate to suggest that it was Marx's interest rather than his notion which
changed as he matured. We find much more attention given to the later
period of bourgeois ideology in the later part of his life, and hence we find
more vehement condemnations of bourgeois ideology in his later writings.
156
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
Thus, Bentham, once so unobjectionable to Marx, becomes the butt of
severe vituperation:-
"6Had I the courage of my friend Heinrich Heine, I should call Mr.
Jeremy Bentham a genius in the way of bourgeois stupidity". 17
Writing in 1867 Marx characterised the change in the bourgeois ide-
ology thus:-
"With the development of the class struggle between the bourgeois and
the proletariat the character of bourgeois political economy undergoes
a sharp change. From the time of the conquest of political power by
the bourgeoisie in France and England, the class struggle, practically as
well as theoretically, took on more and more outspoken and threaten-
ing forms. It sounded the death knell of scientific bourgeois economy
. . In place of disinterested inquiries, there were hired prize-fighters;
in place of genuine scientific research, the bad conscience and the evil
intent of apologetic." 18
III
It is well known that Marx characterised all thinking prior to his own
-and not only bourgeois thinking-as ideological. By way of contrast
his own thinking was 'scientific'. Characteristically, he offers in the
preface to the German Ideology to exorcise the "phantoms" from men's
minds. 19 Later he lumps all these phantoms together under the heading
of ideology so that the word applies to ideas from Plato's Republic (the
ideology of the Pharaohs) to Burke's Reflections on the Revolution in
France (reactionary aristocratic ideology).20
Such an uncompromising procedure was not calculated to charm the
historically sensitive and it certainly calls for some explanation, for it
would seem that by lumping together such temporally disparate works, he
has broken the constraints of historical criticism. Marx's procedure also
calls for explanation when we recall that after carefully separating the
honest and apologetic periods of bourgeois thinking he calls them both
bourgeois ideology. Would it not make more sense to preserve the dis-
tinction as Karl Mannheim did in his subsequent attack on Marx when he
distinguished between utopias (ideas of an ascendant class) and ideologies
(ideas of a declining class)?
Until very recently 'ideology' was almost always used pejoratively. It
was, as the philosophers used to put it, a 'boo-word'. This is to say
that describing something as 'ideological' or saying that something was
an 'ideology' was a way of condemning it. In this 'ideology' was often
opposed to 'science'; 'science' was a 'hurrah-word', its use bespoke
approval. Now a science is a body oftheorywith some more orless complete
confirming evidence (just to simplify a bit), so that if a thinker contrasted
ideology to science he was implying that the ideology was also a body of
theory. When 'ideology' is used in this way the implication is that the
157
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PHILOSOPHY
thing being talked about is a mistaken or discredited theory. In the body
of Marxist literature Smith's Wealth of Nations is an ideology in this
sense.
In the vocabulary of intellectuals at the time Marx wrote, a distinction
was drawn between theories (or sciences) and practices. Self-consciously
hard-headed people make such a distinction today; they constantly
remind us that what is true in theory does not usually work out in practice.
Marx was unhappy with such distinctions; he proclaimed his ideas as a
harmony of theory and practice. This is to say that because his theories
were theoretically valid (scientific) they would be practically useful.
Conversely, because the bourgeois based their hopes on pseudo-scientific
theories they were bound to be disappointed.
Thus there is a clear link between the theoretical error of bourgeois
thinking and its practical failure. In both respects (theory and practice)
the bourgeois are mistaken. The practical failure of bourgeois thinking
is linked to its theoretical weakness. Marx's perception of this link is an
important part of his perception of the social reality of his time. By
describing both aspects of bourgeois thinking with the same word-
ideology-Marx suggests the importance of the relationship. Had he
used two different words, as Mannheim did, he could not have been true
to this harmony of unity and practice. Further, his practice, so far from
being open to question on grounds of historical accuracy, actually mani-
fests considerable historical sensitivity. It is precisely because Marx's
ideas point to the right procedure for the proletariat and are, in this
respect, opposed to all that precedes them, that all previous theory is
ideological; it works against the true interests of the proletariat.
IV
Marx's partisanship towards the proletariat and his attempt to direct
that class to the path of revolution, which follows from his partisanship,
is central to his concept of ideology. It is only from the point of view of
a revolutionary rhetoric that the two periods of bourgeois thinking are
seen as similar. There is an unexamined premise in this argument: the
political effect of a theory is assumed to be the most important thing
about it.
In a weaker form this premise is hardly objectionable. It is generally
accepted that political theories can have an effect on political practice.
The history of Western politics contains many examples of rulers and private
citizens whose actions have been based on some articulate political theory
or other. One thinks immediately of Socrates; close to home we have
Camus.
In a slightly stronger form there is a widespread notion that each polity
is held together by some political values or theory shared by all citizens.
This belief is common to idealist political philosophers and many empir-
icist political scientists alike. If it is the case that some such commonly
158
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
held values or theory is a precondition of politics-on the argument that
agreement on some values or other, say tolerance, is necessary to induce
men to live peaceably together, then the business of exploring the logical
relations of these values can be of considerable political importance. For
example, it might be questioned whether a country dedicated whole-
heartedly to liberty and equality can long stand, since such a country seems
to be committed to granting its enemies the liberty unrestrictedly to attack
it.
But Marx perceives the relation between political theories and practices
to be even closer than this. He is urging that political theorists have a
responsibility to see to it that their theories are conducive to the creation
and protection of moral policy: and that this responsibility is the most
important task such theorists have. No wanton uncoverer of the idols
of the market place he. That Marx is frequently taken to be such an
uncoverer is some measure of the degree to which his practical intention
is often ignored. Marx is careful to uncover only other men's idols. It
is only when this is appreciated that Marx's procedure in describing all
previous thought as ideological makes any sense at all.
Precisely because Marx is partisan, and makes it his business to claim
that all other theories are partisan as well, he sees the similarity between
the types of ideology as of greater importance than their differences.
The harmony of theory and practice, which amounts to the demand
that rhetoric be given precedence over logic, seeks to keep the differences
between the kinds of ideology hidden from view. For practical, that is
partisan, purposes the two are 'birds of a feather'.
The classical anti-Marxian statement on ideology is found in Karl
Mannheim's Ideology and Utopia.21 A comparison of their respective
remarks will bear out just how closely related are Marx's partisanship and
his perception of ideology. In most of the important respects Mannheim
disagrees with Marx. Most relevant is his disagreement with Marx about
the proper relationship between theory and practice and his consequent
disagreement with Marx about the relationship between the kinds of
false-consciousness.
Mannheim distinguishes between ideologies and utopias. The differ-
ence, according to Mannheim, between an ideology and a utopia, arises
primarily from the fact that the former is thinking characteristic of a
declining class, while the latter is thinking characteristic of an ascendant
class.22 From this it is clear that Mannheim and Marx are making a
rather similar distinction. The difference between the distinctions made
lies in Marx's refusal to see it as important enough for him to assign
different words to the two forms of consciousness where Mannheim
thought the difference of fundamental importance.
According to Mannheim, classes which cannot accept that they have
lost, or are about to lose, power, create ideologies to hide harsh reality
from their eyes. 2 3 They are trying to bury their heads in the sand. On
159
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
PHILOSOPHY
the other side are those who need to kid themselves into thinking
are about to assume power in order, thereby, to bolster their mor
are the utopians. All classes create one or other kind of false conscious-
ness and hence all are deluded (and none are securely in power?).
Mannheim claims that his position is opposed alike to both ideology
and utopia. In distinction to these deluded partisans he is an objective
scientist.24 Putting this another way, we can say that Mannheim's theor-
etical activity is conspicuous by its freedom from the taint of practical
exigency. Since practical considerations, such as the need to bolster
morale, cloud the vision, Man~nheim's theoretical purity is held to be a
necessary condition of the truth of his ideas.
How, we may wonder, does Mannheim justify his claim to be above
the practical battle? He does this by making the fantastic further claim
that his Sociology of Knowledge will be scientific because its practitioners
will come in equal numbers from the opposed classes. 25 Presumably the
conflict thus engendered will ensure that neutrality wins the day. With
this further claim we can see that it serves Mannheim's purposes to
emphasise the differences between the two types of false consciousness.
He needs (at least) two differing errors so that this can arise in theoretical
purity out of the negation of both.
As it happens, Mannheim's ideas in these respects do not command
much respect. To mention only the most obvious difficulty, it is far from
clear that Mannheim actually attained the non-partisan purity which his
procedure is supposed to ensure. His preference for the utopian form is
ill concealed. He describes it as a relatively diseased form of social
thinking; nothing like so bemused as the ideological. But these diffi-
culties are by the way; there are more than a few difficulties with Marx's
position too. For whatever reason, there seems little enough evidence
that the proletariat want the revolution towards which Marx urges them.
The central point is that Marx's perception of the two different kinds of
false consciousness and his conflation of them are perfectly pellucid once
one takes his historical sensitivity and practical intention into account.
University of Edinburgh.
160
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
MARX'S CONCEPT OF IDEOLOGY
1Destutt de Tracy, "Memoire sur lafaculte de penser", Mimoires de l'Institut National
des Sciences et Arts pour L'an IV de a Republique; sciences morales et politiques Tome
premier, Paris. Thermidor An VI, p. 324.
2See Picavet, F., Les Ideoloques: Essai sur l'histoire des Idees et des Theories Scienti-
fiques, Philosophiques, Religieuses etc. en France Depuis 1759 (Paris, 1891) and Van
Duzer, C. H., Contributions of the Ideologues to French Revolutionary Thought (Balti-
more, 1935).
3De Tracy, op cit., p. 324.
4Destutt de Tracy, A Treatise on Political Economy; to which is prefixed a supplement
to a preceding work on the understanding of Elements of Ideology (Georgetown, 1817).
5For a list of these remarks see Drucker, H., "The Nature of Ideology and its place
in Modern Political Thought", Appendix (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis at London
University).
6cf. Gould, J. and Kolli, W. T., A Dictionary of the Social Sciences (London, 1964),
pp. 315-317, esp. p. 316.
7See Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (London, 1928), Volume I,
pp. 387-8.
8Marx, K., Theories of Surplus Value (Moscow, 1954), Part t, pp. 41, 68-9, 71, 77-79,
83, 85-6, 100, 153.
9Marx, K., op cit., p. 278. See Meek, R., Marx and Engels on Malthus, (London,
1953), pp. 11, 121-2.
1 OMarx is harder on Malthus than his Socialist Theory requires. There is no reason
inherent in Socialism why a Socialist state could not limit birth control. See the intro-
duction by Anthony Flew: Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Har-
mondsworth, 1970), pp. 48-54.
1 'Marx, K., Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique, (Moscow, 1957), p. 176.
12Marx, K., Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique (Moscow, 1957), pp. 237, 249.
13Ma.rx, K., German Ideology (Moscow, 1965), pp. 448-9.
l4op. cit., p. 449.
150p. cit., p. 454; cf. p. 452 on the role of J. S. Mill "The complete union of the theory
of utility with political economy is to be found, finally, in Mill".
16Ibid.
17Marx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Moscow, 1954), Volume I,
p. 620.
18Marx, K., Theories of Surplus Value (Moscow, 1954), p. 25.
19Marx, K., German Ideology, preface.
2OMarx, K., Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (New York, 1967), p. 365;
760 fn.
2'Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia (London, 1936).
22Mannheim, K., Ideology and Utopia (London, 1936), p. 173.
230p. cit., p. 175.
240p. cit., p. 76.
25op. cit., pp. 139-142. The claim mentioned is not, of course, the only guarantee of
the scientific purity of Mannheim's new science. But it is crucial.
161
This content downloaded from
1.152.23.186 on Wed, 16 Aug 2023 07:32:36 +00:00
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
