Figuereo, A - SARATOGA - 4-2023 Case - Decision On Pretrial Motions 9-2023

STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF SARATOGA
CITY COURT CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS

______________________________________________
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
-against-
DECISION & ORDER
ON MOTIONS
ALEXIS A. FIGUEREO, Docket No.: CR-01110-23
Defendant.
______________________________________________
Omnibus Motions by:

Alexis A. Figuereo by his attorney, Mark S. Mischeler, Esq.
People’s Response by:

Christopher C. Shambo, Esq., Special Prosecutor
DeStefano, J.:
Defendant stands charged under one count of violation of New York Penal Law §190.05
(Obstruction of Governmental Administration) and one count of a violation of New York Penal
Law §240.20(4) (Disorderly Conduct). These two counts arise out of alleged actions of the
Defendant at a Saratoga Springs City Council meeting on April 4, 2023.
The matter was brought before the Saratoga Spring City Court, where the Defendant was
arraigned on the two charges and subsequently pled not guilty to both. The Court set a motion
schedule Defense submitted Omnibus Motions on July 10, 2023, by and through attorney Mark
S. Mischler, Esq. The People’s Response to the motions were submitted to the Court on July 31,
2023.
FACTS AND ANALYSIS
A. OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION
Defendant is charged, by Information, with a violation of New York Penal Law (PL)
§190.05, namely Obstruction of Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (OGA).
A person is guilty of OGA in the Second Degree when he or she “intentionally obstructs,
impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or
attempts to prevent a public servant from performing and official function, by means of
intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful
act…” (PL§190.05).
The allegations allege that on April 4, 2023, Defendant “prevented the administration of
the Saratoga Spring City Council public comment period of the Saratoga Springs City
Council meeting held in the Music Hall of 474 Broadway, Saratoga Springs, by taking the
microphone away from Dr. Christian Mathieson while he was speaking.” The Information
was sworn to by a police officer, based upon information and belief, and a deposition of City
Commissioner of Public Safety, James Montagnino as well as a recording of the meeting.
To this date, the only deposition was from the Public Safety Commissioner, but no other
City Council members or a statement from Dr. Mathieson.
The Defense argues that the absence of non-hearsay depositions naturally cause the
accusatory documents as insufficient under CPL 100.40(c). This is based upon the fact that
the affiant officer was not present at the said meeting and his information is based upon
viewing a video and the single deposition. The People counter this argument by alleging that
the supporting deposition of Commissioner Montagnino fulfils the non-hearsay requirement
of the charge and that the prima facie requirement of CPL 100.40(c) is satisfied.
As previously stated, a person is guilty of OGA in the Second Degree when he or she
intentionally obstructs a public servant in the performance of an official function. The
elements of the crime requires one of the following three methods for this: 1. Intimidation, 2.
Physical force or interference, or 3. Any independently unlawful act. (See People v. Case,
42 NY2d at 102).
The Court of Appeals has held that purely verbal interference may not satisfy the physical
component under PL §190.05. (See Matter of Davan L., 91 NY2d 88, 91 (1977)). “[M]ere
words alone do not constitute ‘physical force or interference’ [and] in order to trigger
criminal liability under section 195.05, the interference would have to be, in part at least,
physical in nature” (id.). The People cite People v. Romeo, 9 A.D.3d 744 for the premise
that interference can consist of inappropriate and disruptive behavior alone at the scene of an
official function. The individual discussed in Romeo was the boyfriend of a person
undergoing field sobriety tests for a Driving While Intoxicated stop. The individual was not
being examined and not being charged, but continued to insert himself into the action.
This case is distinguished by the fact that the Defendant was actually taking part in the
function. The City Council invites individuals to speak at their meetings, which is precisely
what the Defendant was doing at the time he allegedly committed the crime of OGA in the
second degree. Charges were levied against the Defendant because what he said during this
time was unacceptable to certain Council members.
The fact that he “took the microphone” away from an individual who was speaking is
being held up as the physical force requirement of the statute. There is no description of this
“taking” other than vague statements to that effect. There is no corroboration that this action
was done with “force” and was only physical in nature because it required physical
movement.
For the present case, the People charged the defendant with Disorderly Conduct. If the
defendant was found to be guilty of Disorderly Conduct, it could constitute the independently
unlawful act which is a part of the OGA charge. As the defendant was, in fact, charged with
Disorderly Conduct, we must discuss that charge.
B. DISORDERLY CONDUCT
“A person is guilty of Disorderly Conduct, when with intent to cause public
inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof…without lawful
authority, he disturbs any lawful assembly or meeting of persons” (Penal Law §240.20 (4)).
The intent factor here is a problem for the People. Defense states that the People’s
charge here is devoid of proof of intent to cause public inconvenience, annoyance or alarm. The
People counter that Defendant’s actions of the evening in question are evidence of such intent.
This argument by the People requires this Court to make a bit of a leap. The action evidenced by
the Defendant was that of speaking at a public meeting, during the times that the Board invited
comments from the public. While it is recognized that an information contain the most precise
words or phrases expressing the charge, an accusatory must give the accuse notice sufficient to
prepare a defense. (People v. Dumas, 68 NY2d 729, 731 [1986]). The documents here seem to
have an issue reaching this standard.
The charging documents allege that Defendant did not allow other persons from speaking
at the meeting and caused the meeting to stop. While this may be couched in terms that are
attempting to satisfy the elements of the charge, the statement from the primary complainant of
the Board is inconsistent with this. The voluntary statement given by Commissioner Montagnino
states that Defendant took the microphone from another speaker and began to shout, yell
profanities and other statements, preventing a speaker from addressing the Board and public. His
statement then discusses “Later during the course of the same meeting…”
This statement in and of itself indicates that the meeting was not stopped and, in fact, continued.
It was a subsequent person that the Commissioner alleged prevented the Board from conducting
its business. This inconsistency between the statement of the witness and the charging
documents gives this Court pause.
Defense raises the argument that in charging Defendant, the Board is denying
Defendant’s First Amendment rights and that he only engaged in protected speech. The People
have relied on People v. Albra, 13 Misc.3d 64 to counter this. Although the Appellate Term in
this case, upheld a conviction for Disorderly Conduct, the dissent in this case makes an
extremely strong case to say the conviction for that offense should be reversed. While the case is
similar to the case at bar, a difference was that the issue raised by the counsel was that the
comments from the speaker in this case were simply not part of the agenda. Here, the Board
does not allege that Defendant was asked to stop speaking or stay on agenda topics. The
perceived problem was that Board members did not agree with Defendant’s statements. While
the facts are similar, there is a distinction.
DECISION
The standard of review includes viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party, which in the matter at bar, is the People, this Court must deny the Defendant’s
motion to dismiss under the theories of the accusatory instruments being deficient and a violation
of the Defendant’s First Amendment rights; and
The Court also denies Defendant’s motion to dismiss in the furtherance of justice; and
The Court declines to strike the People’s Certificate of Compliance and Supplemental
Certificate of Compliance; and
The Court directs the People to continue with their obligation to comply with their
continuing obligation of disclosure of Brady material; and
The Court grants Defense request, upon consent of the People, to hold Sandoval/
Ventimiglia/Molineux hearing(s) within the required timeframes; and
The Court will allow further motions, or renewal of motions upon a showing, by the
defense, of good cause; and
The Court requires the Defense to comply with Discovery demands as per the People’s
request.
The foregoing constitutes a Decision and Order of this Court.
Constantine F.
DeStefano
Signed this 8th day of September Hon. Constantine F. DeStefano
at Saratoga Springs, New York City Court Judge

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STATE OF NEW YORK COUNTY OF SARATOGA

CITY COURT CITY OF SARATOGA SPRINGS

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Omnibus Motions by:

People’s Response by:

Defendant at a Saratoga Springs City Council meeting on April 4, 2023.

A. OBSTRUCTION OF GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION

§190.05, namely Obstruction of Governmental Administration in the Second Degree (OGA).

impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or

intimidation, physical force or interference, or by means of any independently unlawful

Commissioner of Public Safety, James Montagnino as well as a recording of the meeting.

City Council members or a statement from Dr. Mathieson.

the supporting deposition of Commissioner Montagnino fulfils the non-hearsay requirement

intentionally obstructs a public servant in the performance of an official function. The

time was unacceptable to certain Council members.

Disorderly Conduct, we must discuss that charge.

“A person is guilty of Disorderly Conduct, when with intent to cause public

inconvenience, annoyance or alarm, or recklessly creating a risk thereof…without lawful

have an issue reaching this standard.

documents gives this Court pause.

the facts are similar, there is a distinction.

of the Defendant’s First Amendment rights; and

Certificate of Compliance; and

continuing obligation of disclosure of Brady material; and

Ventimiglia/Molineux hearing(s) within the required timeframes; and

defense, of good cause; and

The foregoing constitutes a Decision and Order of this Court.

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