Review

AC Microgrid Protection System Design Challenges—A

Practical Experience
Sarat Chandra Vegunta 1,*, Michael J. Higginson 2,*, Yashar E. Kenarangui 1, George Tsai Li 2, David W. Zabel 1,
Mohammad Tasdighi 1 and Azadeh Shadman 1

1 Consulting & Analytical Services, S&C Electric Company, 6601 N Ridge Blvd, Chicago, IL 60626, USA;
[email protected] (Y.E.K.); [email protected] (D.W.Z.);
[email protected] (M.T.); [email protected] (A.S.)
2 Engineering Services, S&C Electric Company, 6601 N Ridge Blvd, Chicago, IL 60626, USA;

[email protected]
* Correspondence: [email protected] (S.C.V.); [email protected] (M.J.H.);
Tel.: +1-773-338-1000 (S.C.V. and M.J.H.)

Abstract: Alternating current (AC) microgrids are the next step in the evolution of the electricity
distribution systems. They can operate in a grid-tied or island mode. Depending on the services
they are designed to offer, their grid-tied or island modes could have several sub-operational states
and or topological configurations. Short-circuit current levels and protection requirements between
different microgrid modes and configurations can vary significantly. Designing a microgrid’s pro-
tection system, therefore, requires a thorough understanding of all microgrid operational modes,
configurations, transitional states, and how transitions between those modes are managed. As part
of the microgrid protection design, speed and reliability of information flow between the micropro-
cessor-based relays and the microgrid controller, including during microgrid failure modes, must
be considered. Furthermore, utility protection practices and customer requirements are not always
inclusive of the protection schemes that are unique to microgrids. These and other aspects contrib-
Citation: Vegunta, S.C.; Higginson,
ute to the overall complexity and challenge of designing effective microgrid protection systems.
M.J.; Kenarangui, Y.E.; Li, G.T.;
Zabel, D.W.; Tasdighi, M.; Shadman, Following a review of microgrid protection system design challenges, this paper discusses a few
A. AC Microgrid Protection System real-world experiences, based on the authors’ own engineering, design, and field experience, in us-
Design Challenges—A Practical ing several approaches to address microgrid protection system design, engineering, and implemen-
Experience. 2021, 14, 2016. tation challenges.
https://doi.org/10.3390/en14072016
Keywords: distribution energy resources; microgrids; power distribution; power system protection
Academic Editor: Ali Bidram

Received: 31 January 2021

Accepted: 2 April 2021
1. Introduction
Published: 6 April 2021
An electricity distribution system, which connects a large amount of electrical equip-
Publisher’s Note: MDPI stays neu- ment, is among the most complex and sophisticated platforms of energy exchange. An
tral with regard to jurisdictional electricity distribution system must also continuously ensure the safety, reliability, stabil-
claims in published maps and insti- ity, power quality, efficiency, and cost effectiveness of electrical power supply to the ex-
tutional affiliations. pectations of its users and to the requirements of governing standards, laws, and regula-
tions [1].
A convergence of factors, such as deregulation of electricity markets globally, the
urgent need to address climate change, the achievement of maturity in modern renewable
Copyright: © 2021 by the authors. Li- energy technologies, particularly the wind and solar generation, their low cost, etc., have
censee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. led a significant shift in the source of electricity generation. This shift in electricity gener-
This article is an open access article ation has been from bulk centralized transmission system connected power plants to more
distributed under the terms and con- distributed decentralized distribution system connected Distributed Energy Resources
ditions of the Creative Commons At-
(DERs) [1, 2]. In some geographic locations, a shift in the connection of power generation
tribution (CC BY) license (http://crea-
to the distribution systems has been rapid. For example, in 2015, for the first time, the
tivecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).

Energies 2021, 14, 2016. https://doi.org/10.3390/en14072016 www.mdpi.com/journal/energies

Energies 2021, 14, 2016 2 of 23

installed renewable energy generation capacity on the Great Britain (GB) distribution sys-
tem surpassed and connected at a rate approximately 4.3 times faster than that of the in-
stalled renewable energy generation capacity on the GB transmission system [3].
With an increase in the penetration of DERs (such as photovoltaic (PV) arrays, wind
turbine generators, energy storage systems, etc.), which themselves require an increased
network reliability and power quality to function properly, the already complex distribu-
tion systems have become more complex. The need, therefore, for an effective manage-
ment of distribution system complexity—including the design and coordination of their
protection schemes and the maintenance and improvement of electricity supply perfor-
mance metrics—has never been greater [2]. An approach to manage this growing com-
plexity is to carefully distribute the complexity, by partitioning and or containing the
growth of an existing distribution system, to smaller (but scalable), manageable subsys-
tems called microgrids.
A microgrid, with its own group of interconnected electrical loads and DERs within
a clearly defined electrical boundary, acts as a single controllable entity with respect to its
connected utility system or main grid [4]. The microgrid can operate in a grid-tied or is-
land mode and can transition between the two modes, either seamlessly or via a power
interruption, depending on the microgrid’s requirements, application, engineering, com-
plexity, and cost dictated by the electrical loads powered by that microgrid.
“[Microgrids] are considered a critical link in the evolution from vertically integrated
bulk power systems to smart decentralized networks, by facilitating the integration of
DERs”[5]. Microgrids, if properly maintained, can maintain and improve the overall elec-
tricity supply performance (such as reliability, resilience, power quality, efficiency, etc.)
of distribution systems. Microgrids allow for a greater accommodation of renewable
DERs, offer an increased operational flexibility to their connected main utility grid (or
grids), provide ancillary services, such as a black start, peak-or retail energy time-shifting,
Volt/Var support, frequency response/regulation, spinning reserve, economic or power
flow optimization, etc. [4-7]. Depending on a desired use-case of a microgrid, a microgrid
can incorporate several of these services.
It may be a challenge to properly design a microgrid protection scheme if the existing
utility protection philosophy and practice and customer preferences do not adequately
support and or address the microgrid protection needs. The added layer of complexity for
microgrids, where the network conditions (such as short-circuit levels, inertia, etc.) can
vary significantly depending on whether the system is grid-tied or operated in an island,
makes their protection system design more challenging [8]. Although there are DER self-
protection and utility interconnection protection standards and recommendations (such
as in References [9-11]), currently, there is limited industry guidance and no presently
available Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) standard for microgrid-
specific protection systems.
This paper, initially, provides an overview of the impact of high penetration of DERs
on the existing distribution systems. Following this, the paper discusses how microgrids
can address some of these challenges, but also present their own set of protection design
challenges. Furthermore, the paper reviews the current challenges with protecting mi-
crogrids and provides an overview of several commonly used protection strategies with
their respective advantages and disadvantages in addressing those challenges based on
the authors’ experience. Finally, the paper shares lessons learned from the authors’ own
successful experiences in designing microgrid protection systems globally.

2. Microgrid Protection Challenges

Distribution systems have been traditionally designed for a one-way power flow
from substations to loads. DER integration with these distribution systems presents sev-
eral protection challenges [2]. For example, utility radial systems, which were typically
designed for unidirectional current flow and short-circuit sensing conditions, may require
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 3 of 23

an upgrade or redesign. Relays lacking directional power flow sensing may require re-
placement. Relays may mis-coordinate for reverse direction short-circuits, have inade-
quate sensitivity to detect some short-circuits, and DER protection must coordinate with
the utility auto-reclosing scheme, etc.
In addition to the challenges that independently connected DERs present to their re-
spective utility or grid systems, microgrids, due to the nature of their operation and em-
bedding DERs within them, present additional challenges [8]. For example, microgrids
are likely to have significantly different and variable short-circuit levels when operated in
a grid-tied or island mode. They may have limited short-circuit current contribution, par-
ticularly, from predominantly inverter-based DERs (such as PV, battery-based energy
storage, full-converter-based wind turbine generators, etc.). With a variation in genera-
tion, load, and circuit topology, microgrid feeders may have a bidirectional power flow.
The microgrid during and after transitioning from grid-tied to island operation may lose
a relatively low-impedance zero-sequence path on a normally effectively grounded dis-
tribution system. Detecting a loss of utility source could be challenging. Microgrid protec-
tion systems adapting to a circuit topology, generation, or load change should be carefully
designed. Microgrid re-synchronization process with its utility grid when transitioning
from an island to normal grid-tied mode, when improperly or poorly designed, may lead
to problems of an excessive inrush current, disturbances in voltage and frequency, transi-
ent stability, etc.
With a change in the microgrid operating condition, including a transition to a new
microgrid topology, microgrid operation in a grid-tied or island mode, etc., a microgrid
protection system must ensure (for example, via adapting mechanisms, which are dis-
cussed later in the paper) the safety of the microgrid system, microgrid connected equip-
ment, and personnel at all times. A microgrid protection system must also never falsely
operate, for example, by responding to a utility or grid event that does not warrant an
operation of that microgrid protection system. Additionally, during microgrid transition
periods, many types of protective relays may become inoperative or enter an indetermi-
nate state momentarily while the settings of those relays are being changed or adapted,
leaving that microgrid vulnerable to a lack of adequate protection [8].
Voltage sensing is a component of several protective elements used in microgrid sys-
tems, including Under-Voltage (UV, IEEE device 27), Over-Voltage (OV, IEEE device 59),
directional Over-Current (OC, IEEE device 67), voltage-restrained OC (IEEE device 51V),
and voltage-controlled OC (IEEE device 51C). These schemes are discussed in more detail
in Section 3. Consequently, loss of a voltage input to a relay, caused for example by a
blown voltage transformer (VT) fuse, can have a significant impact on microgrid protec-
tion schemes. Voltage-restrained or voltage-controlled OC elements could operate inad-
vertently on a blown fuse condition on a set of VTs [12]. UV elements could also operate
inadvertently on a blown fuse condition on a set of VTs [13]. If a voltage sensing function
is not available, directional OC elements may mis-operate or not operate when needed
[13]. These and other anticipated impacts of loss of a voltage input to microgrid protection
schemes must be considered. Protection schemes that do not require voltage sensing for
protection (such as current differential and non-directional OC protection) are not direct
replacements for voltage controlled and voltage restrained OC protection schemes [13].
The differential current scheme requires measurement inputs from remote terminals of
the protected circuit elements, and the non-directional OC lacks the sensitivity of the di-
rectional OC and voltage controlled and voltage restrained OC schemes.
Microgrids can have a considerable portion of their generation sourced from inverter
based DERs. A DER’s short-circuit contribution is dictated by its type, design, and con-
trols. Inverter-based DER controls are typically designed or set to limit the maximum out-
put current to 1–2 p.u. (but more often around 1.1–1.2 p.u.) of the rated current of those
DERs [14-16]. Traditional power system equipment (such as synchronous or asynchro-
nous machines) could contribute short-circuit current up to 5–8 p.u. of the machines’ rated
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 4 of 23

current [14-16]. Furthermore, inverter-based DERs not only have a lower positive se-
quence short-circuit contribution to system short-circuits, but, during unbalanced system
conditions, those DERs may not produce any negative-or zero-sequence current [8, 17].
Therefore, detecting short-circuits (particularly, asymmetrical short-circuits) and identi-
fying short-circuit current directionality in a microgrid, particularly when operated in an
island mode, adds to the protection system design challenge [8].
Most microgrids have shorter feeder-circuit lengths. They can also have lower short-
circuit levels and higher short-circuit source impedances; this is particularly the case when
microgrids are operated in an island mode. These conditions lead to an increased sensi-
tivity of microgrid voltages to electrical disturbances (such as short-circuits, generation or
load-step changes, etc.) within those microgrids, and DERs’ controlled voltages will likely
be impressed on to the connected electrical load’s terminals [5]. Additionally, as low-in-
ertia inverter-based DERs are a predominant source of electricity in microgrids, particu-
larly when in island mode, the microgrids generally have low inertia [5, 8]. This reduction
in inertia leads to an increased sensitivity of system frequency to electrical disturbances,
including a rapid drop in system frequency during short-circuits, a sudden loss of a large
generator, or a sudden pickup of a large load. To maintain electrical stability, reliability,
and power quality of a microgrid during these conditions, rapid detection, communica-
tion, and clearance of short-circuits is, therefore, essential [5, 8].

3. Microgrid Protection Strategies

There are many approaches to microgrid protection, and each strategy has its ad-
vantages and disadvantages that depend on a combination of factors. These factors in-
clude the DER types used in a microgrid, microgrid circuit topology, a customer’s perfor-
mance and service requirements (i.e., reliability, and power quality), utility practices (in-
ternal and external to a microgrid), and the cost associated with implementing and oper-
ating microgrid protection strategies.
Novel microgrid protection approaches exist and are detailed in the available litera-
ture [18-21]: to a name a few, advanced optimization for relay setting calculation [22, 23],
application of machine-learning algorithms in adaptive protection [24, 25], and distance
protection on distribution voltage level [26, 27]. However, many of these listed approaches
are in the research or prototype phase and have not been widely implemented in the real-
world microgrids. In this paper, the performance of commonly used and field-tested pro-
tection strategies, in terms of the performance criteria of selectivity, speed, sensitivity, re-
liability, and cost, in the real-world microgrids are discussed based on the authors’ expe-
rience.
A microgrid protection system design involves a consideration of various perfor-
mance criteria and an appropriate set of compromises based on the microgrid’s applica-
tion. Furthermore, backup protection and redundant communication schemes are typi-
cally required to ensure adequate overall protection system reliability. Even though it may
be acceptable for backup protection to have compromised selectivity and, thus overtrip,
the backup protection must still provide adequate protection in cases of primary protec-
tion failure.
In microgrid applications, there are additional technical criteria compared with tra-
ditional distribution systems without DERs. One such criteria is system stability, which
requires that the short-circuits are cleared rapidly, such that the synchronous generators
that are connected to and within a microgrid can recover to a stable operating condition
and do not cause power quality issues. For example, differential and or communication-
based protection schemes can be utilized when traditional time-graded OC protection
schemes do not provide sufficiently fast response. While a sufficiently fast response is
required to maintain system stability and required power quality, it is also advantageous
to ride-through short-circuits as appropriate to avoid unnecessary outages while in an
island mode. Of course, a microgrid’s fault ride-through during an electrical disturbance
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 5 of 23

must consider the stability and power quality performance tolerances of connected equip-
ment and the set design tolerances of that microgrid. There may also be ride-through re-
quirements from the utility on the microgrid when it is operated in a grid-tied mode, for
example, as part of the utility’s adoption of the IEEE Standard (Std) 1547: 2018 [9], which
needs to be considered as part of the microgrid’s protection design.
Meeting various protection criteria at once in a microgrid application can be chal-
lenging. In the authors’ experience, the complexity of the protection system is an im-
portant consideration, as it may adversely impact the overall microgrid system’s reliabil-
ity and cost, particularly when additional personnel training, required documentation,
testing, and commissioning are accounted for. Therefore, tradeoffs that allow for a simpler
microgrid protection system, while meeting and maintaining the safety, technical, func-
tional, and cost requirements of a microgrid, are preferred.
Within a microgrid, both system and equipment level protection systems must be
coordinated, and such coordination is unique to a system under consideration. This paper,
however, primarily focuses on microgrid system protection.

3.1. Differential Protection Scheme

Current differential protection schemes, due to their advantages of their operational
speed, sensitivity, and reliability, are extensively used in substation and transmission pro-
tection schemes. Since such schemes are not affected by a bi-directional power flow, var-
ying and or low short-circuit current levels, meshed configuration, and weak short-circuit
infeed, they offer several benefits and are advantageous for use in microgrids [8, 28]. Be-
cause of the aforementioned advantages of this protection scheme, the scheme can be suc-
cessfully applied in both microgrid grid-tied and island modes.
To achieve the required protection performance with the differential current scheme,
typically, both phase and sequence currents are used. Phase differential elements of the
scheme are responsible for providing high speed protection for short-circuits that have
high short-circuit currents, while the scheme’s negative-and zero-sequence differential el-
ements provide a more sensitive protection for low short-circuit-current-based unbal-
anced short-circuits [29].
When using this scheme, there is a trade-off between protection sensitivity (including
restraint functions) and security performance: An increased protection sensitivity may
come at a cost of reduced protection security, leading to spurious or nuisance trips due to
short-circuits outside the implemented scheme’s zone of protection. Therefore, care must
be applied when setting a differential relay pickup threshold, which neither should be a
very high value, allowing it to detect short-circuits within its zone of protection, nor it
should be a very low value that the relay responds to, for example, a current transformer
(CT) saturation, line charging effect with that zone of protection, etc. Most modern micro-
processor-based relays, however, use CT saturation detectors and line charging current
compensation to overcome these inaccuracies [30].
A salient feature of current differential schemes is that they do not require voltage
sensing. To increase the overall reliability of a protection system, particularly when dif-
ferential protection elements are selected as the primary protection, OC-and UV-based
protection elements could be used as a backup protection.
Implementing a differential protection scheme requires additional CTs, relays, and
communication infrastructure; this may affect the overall cost of a microgrid [31]. Moreo-
ver, differential protection can be technically difficult to operate or may be impractical for
protection of some power system components, such as distribution lines with a radial to-
pology.
Based on the authors’ experience with implementing differential protection scheme
in microgrid projects, this scheme provides the required speed and reliability performance
as part of a bus, transformer, or generator protection, if the project can accommodate the
cost and the scheme is technically practical for the microgrid topology.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 6 of 23

3.2. Voltage-Controlled and Voltage-Restrained Over-Current Protection Scheme

When a microgrid is connected to a weak external grid or when operated as an island,
where the source of short-circuit current within that microgrid may be small, the OC-
based protection alone may not adequately discriminate a short-circuit current from a
normal high current or temporary current overload. However, as the source impedance is
typically high in such microgrid operating conditions, the microgrid voltages may drop
significantly for short-circuits with low short-circuit-to-ground impedances. This drop in
microgrid voltages, in combination with an OC protection scheme, can be used to detect
short-circuits more sensitively. A protection scheme that works on this well-known prin-
ciple is called voltage-controlled and voltage-restrained OC protection scheme [29].
However, when operating in a microgrid’s island mode, adequate protection coordi-
nation and selectivity, and identifying a short-circuit and its location, can be a challenge
due to the following reasons [8]: (a) the need for using low current pickup relay settings
to allow a pickup of low short-circuit currents; (b) during short-circuits, similar voltage-
drops are impressed across a large part of that microgrid when islanded or when con-
nected to a weak utility system or grid; and (c) transient conditions, such as a transformer
inrush, that may produce a voltage drop similar to a short-circuit condition.
Since implementing the voltage-based OC protection requires VTs, in addition to the
required CTs and relays, implementing the scheme affects the overall cost of a microgrid
[31].
Based on authors’ experience with the implementation of voltage-controlled and
voltage-restrained OC protection in microgrids, these schemes can provide the required
sensitivity in island operation. The authors of this paper frequently apply these techniques
as a component of successful and operational microgrid protection applications.

3.3. Adaptive Protection Scheme

Adaptive protection refers to a scheme where a protection system, in a timely man-
ner, adapts to a change in a system operating condition [8]; for example, a protection sys-
tem adaption could include a change in relay group settings or setting values, protection
functions, and or control logic. In a microgrid, varying system conditions, such as an op-
eration in a grid-tied or island mode or a change in microgrid topology, are the principal
reasons for using this scheme [32].
There are two adaptive protection-scheme approaches: (a) event-table-based and (b)
near-real-time-calculation-based. Each approach has its advantages and disadvantages,
and they must be thoroughly evaluated to ensure suitability of selected approach’s impact
on safety, protection performance (i.e., selectivity, speed of operation, reliability, depend-
ability, and security), required communication infrastructure, complexity, engineering,
customer or utility practices or grid requirements, and cost.
In an event-table-based approach, at the microgrid protection system design stage,
all possible microgrid operating conditions are thoroughly thought through and a set of
protection settings and control logic is developed for each protective device and microgrid
operating condition. Based on this, a look-up event table, listed with a mapped set of mi-
crogrid operating conditions against their corresponding pre-calculated protection set-
tings groups, is prepared. When a planned microgrid operating condition is identified,
the pre-calculated protection settings group corresponding to that identified operating
condition for each device is fetched from the event table and is applied in that protective
device in a timely manner.
In a near-real-time-calculation-based approach, an accurate model of the microgrid
system is developed and real-time measurements from the microgrid site are fed into the
model as an input. A set of power system analysis software and hardware tools is used
to—rapidly but accurately—simulate the microgrid system condition, analyze the simu-
lated outputs, and calculate the required per protective device protection settings group.
The calculated protection settings groups are then applied in corresponding microgrid
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 7 of 23

protective device hardware in a near-real-time manner via a fast communication infra-

structure [8].
An important consideration in the design and operation of an adaptive protection
scheme is the determination of the exact conditions and, perhaps, the instance of time the
change in the protection settings must occur upon detection of a microgrid’s transition to
a planned operating condition, for example, a microgrid’s transition from a grid-tied to
an island mode. This is important because many types of protective relays may become
inoperative or enter an indeterminate state momentarily while their settings are being
changed, leaving a microgrid vulnerable to a lack of protection during a protective relay
settings update or change event [8].
The authors of this paper frequently and successfully applied adaptive protection
schemes in currently operating microgrids. Aspects of an adaptive protection scheme that
was successfully applied by the authors of this paper in several microgrid projects is de-
tailed in Section 4.2.

3.4. Communication-Based Protection Scheme

There are several advantages of using communication-based protection schemes in
microgrid applications due to their immunity to external loading conditions, high-imped-
ance short-circuits, bi-directional power flow, modes of operation, and looped configura-
tions [33-35]. In these schemes, a set of permissive and blocking signals are exchanged
between the relays based on a set of gathered information, such as voltage and current
magnitudes, sequence quantities, phase angles, and direction for current measurements.
These signals are then used by the relays to locate and or to clear a fault. Thus, reliable
and high-speed communication channels, such as fiber-optic-or Ethernet-based systems,
are required for these protection schemes to perform at an acceptable level using peer-to-
peer communication or network protocols, such as International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) Std 61850-8-1: 2020 [36] Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event (GOOSE)
messaging. GOOSE messaging can offer communication latency of under 4 ms, which is
adequate for protection and control. As the setup of a fast, broadband-based communica-
tion infrastructure—an indispensable aspect for current and future smart grids—becomes
common, the same infrastructure could then be used for protection (if the infrastructure
has a satisfactory reliability and speed performance), driving down the cost of implement-
ing such a protection scheme [33].
Communication-based protection schemes are typically used as part of the primary
protection, and they include a variety of schemes, such as directional interlocking, Direct
Transfer Trip (DTT), Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping (POTT), and Directional
Comparison Blocking (DCB). To allow for microgrid protection during a communication
failure, a slower backup non-communications-based protection scheme is required and
typically implemented; such backup schemes, for example, could include time-graded OC
elements with voltage and or directional control supervision.
Interlocking schemes have been used extensively in the industry for radial distribu-
tion systems. When these schemes incorporate a directional element, in addition to the
use of a current magnitude, they are more suitable for microgrid applications [8]. DTT
schemes, which use permissive signals, have many uses in microgrid and DER applica-
tions, including preventing unintentional islanding, reacting to breaker failure events, etc.
Directional OC control is often used by communication-based protection schemes to
check whether the fault is located in front of or behind the measurement point [37]. There
are challenges to implementing directional controls in a microgrid, particularly, accom-
modating the microgrid’s various operational modes. For example, different impedances
of microgrid fault current sources can challenge directional polarization [38]. Further-
more, changes in system frequency during a fault can also challenge directional polariza-
tion [39]. Phase, negative-sequence, zero-sequence, and voltage memory are used as po-
larizing quantities by different devices and in different applications [37]. Different polar-
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 8 of 23

ization methods may be available, and the performance of the polarization method se-
lected must be considered. It is useful to test the directional OC settings using a short-
circuit model for faults at different microgrid locations and configurations.
Based on authors’ experience with the implementation of communication-based pro-
tection schemes in microgrid projects, these schemes can provide the required speed and
reliability for bus, line, anti-islanding, and other microgrid protection functions. Conse-
quently, the authors of this paper frequently apply communication-based schemes as a
component of successful and operational microgrid protection systems.

3.5. Under/Over Voltage and Under/Over Frequency Protection Schemes

UV, OV, Under-Frequency (UF, IEEE device 81U), and Over-Frequency (OF, IEEE
device 81O) are among the most commonly used protection schemes implemented at both
an equipment level (via self-protection internal logic of that equipment) and at a microgrid
system level (via protection relays). Most DERs have these protective functions integrated
into their controls and are usually enabled by default. These integrated protection ele-
ments could be used to protect a DER from damage due to abnormal power system con-
ditions, disconnect or isolate that DER from the questionable power system during short-
circuit or unplanned or unintentional island conditions, and more. However, there may
be other DER specific protection systems, such as direct current (DC) OV and UV protec-
tion schemes on inverters, battery overcharge protection on Battery Energy Storage Sys-
tems (BESSs), mechanical, over-or under-speed protection schemes on synchronous or
asynchronous generators, etc., that may complement the DERs’ UV, OV, UF, and OF pro-
tection schemes.
A fundamental tradeoff when selecting a set of DER voltage and frequency protec-
tion settings is the balance between the need to trip-to-cease-to-energizing short-circuits
(or unintentional islands) and the need to ride through short-circuits and support the con-
nected system while the fault is cleared by some other device. In microgrids, especially
when operating in an island mode, DERs are among the principal sources of power sup-
ply. Consequently, it is essential that when the system is in an island, the DERs can ride-
through system voltage and frequency variations that are typical of a low-inertia system.
While a microgrid is in an island mode or state, system voltage and frequency can vary
significantly as compared to nominal operating conditions and more frequently than
when that same microgrid is in a grid-tied mode. The IEEE Std 1547: 2018 recognizes this
need for different DER settings while operating in an island mode [9]. However, this need
for ride-through while a microgrid is in an island mode must be balanced with the utility
system operation and protection needs while the DER is in a grid-tied mode. Once ade-
quate UV, OV, UF, and OF protection settings have been determined for the individual
DERs, backup UV, OV, UF, and OF protection settings for protective relays can be chosen
to respond before or after the individual DERs, as desired for the application.
At a microgrid system level, the UV, OV, UF, and OF protection schemes are some-
times used exclusively for system protection. This is mostly used in applications where
microgrids are small and or simple. A few of these protective functions, as discussed in
Section 3.2, are often used to support other implemented protection schemes to improve
the overall protection system’s sensitivity and reliability. Voltage-and frequency-based
protective elements on their own have significant limitations for microgrid protection ap-
plications. These parameters can indicate a presence of an electrical disturbance (such as
a short-circuit, sudden connection or loss of generation or load, transformer energization,
etc.). However, these elements have both reliability and selectivity limitations. For exam-
ple, an under voltage can be indicative of either a large load acceptance, inrush condition,
or short-circuit condition, and it may require significant delays to prevent nuisance oper-
ations. Furthermore, voltage-and frequency-based protective elements are inherently
non-selective. That is, the location of the short-circuit cannot be readily determined from
a grid side fault to inside the microgrid fault. This lack of selectivity can cause an outage
of more high priority loads than necessary and can challenge locating a short-circuit. In
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 9 of 23

large systems, such as distribution system microgrids, with long circuits, including un-
derground circuits, locating a short-circuit even with selective protection can be challeng-
ing, which could delay the eventual restoration of these priority loads. In the US, the arti-
cle 700.10(B)(5)(b)(ii) of the 2020 National Electrical Code (NEC), National Fire Protection
Association (NFPA) 70 in [40], requires protection coordination in emergency systems
with a common OC protective device, indicating the value and need for selective coordi-
nation, even in contingency operations, where loads are a high priority or critical.

3.6. Performance Comparison of Protection Schemes

The advantages and disadvantages associated with commonly used microgrid pro-
tection strategies were discussed in the previous subsections. The performance in terms
of selectivity, speed, sensitivity, reliability, and cost, for each of the discussed microgrid
system protection strategies is summarized in Table 1 based on authors’ experience in
implementing them as part of successful operational microgrid protection systems. Please
note that the advantages and disadvantages detailed in Table 1 should be read in the con-
text of the discussion presented in this paper.

Table 1. Advantages and disadvantages of discussed microgrid system protection schemes.

Protection
Advantages Disadvantages
Scheme
• Sensitivity to low fault current lev-
els
• Relatively high cost of relays, instrument
• High speed can be achieved as the
transformers, and wiring
protection does not use time-graded coor-
Differential • May not be practical with some system to-
dination
pologies (e.g., radial distribution circuits and
• Less sensitive to changes to availa-
tapped lines)
ble fault current
• Dependable and secure operation
• Selective coordination requires time delays
Voltage-con- • Sensitivity to reduced fault current
• Relatively high cost of relays and instru-
trolled and volt- levels while islanded
ment transformers (both CTs and VTs)
age-restrained • Selective operation when properly
• Nuisance relay trip may result on loss of
OC coordinated
voltage sensing (i.e., blown fuse)
• Selective coordination requires time delays
• Selectivity in networked and looped sys-
• Selective operation when properly tems not always possible
Non-directional coordinated in some system topologies • Response time at low currents (e.g., from
time-graded OC • Inexpensive and commonly availa- Inverter-Based Resources (IBRs)) can be delayed
ble • Margin between fault current and normal
load current may be insufficient to provide ade-
quate sensitivity
• Selective coordination requires time delays
• Margin between fault current and normal
• Selectivity in networked and load current may be insufficient to provide ade-
looped systems quate sensitivity
Directional time-
• Sensitivity to DER fault contribu- • Protection margins are more sensitive to
graded OC
tions (e.g., to isolate microgrid for up- available fault current than with current differen-
stream faults) tial or communication-based schemes
• Relatively high cost of relays and instru-
ment transformers (both CTs and VTs)
• High-speed protection can be
achieved • Cost, especially of establishing reliable and
Communication- • Communication enables selectivity low latency communications between devices
based even in complex system topologies • Often relies on directional control and thus
• Can be adaptive to changes to the can have similar disadvantages
available short-circuit current
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 10 of 23

• Lack of selectivity as local devices typically

experience similar voltage drops due to faults
• Inexpensive and commonly availa- • Relatively slow speed if time delay is used
UV/OV and ble to avoid nuisance operation due to transformer
UF/OF • Dependability of operation for low magnetizing inrush and motor starting
impedance faults • Security is low due to potentially other
phenomenon causing voltage drops than a short-
circuit condition
Table key: CT, current transformer; OC, Over-Current; OF, Over-Frequency; OV, Over-Voltage;
UF, Under-Frequency; UV, Under-Voltage; VT, voltage transformer.

As can be seen from Table 1, not every protection scheme is suitable for every mi-
crogrid protection system, but a trade-off among the protection schemes exists. These
trade-offs must be carefully studied and optimized in meeting both mandatory and non-
mandatory but desirable requirements of a microgrid protect system and project. Further-
more, protection schemes can be used in combination to achieve improved performance.

4. Practical Experiences with Microgrid Protection Schemes

Principal microgrid protection system design challenges and a few approaches to ad-
dressing them, based on authors’ experience in developing microgrids globally, are dis-
cussed in the subsequent subsections.

4.1. Utility Protection Practices and Standards Versus Microgrid Protection Needs
Microgrid protection often requires a different approach to system and equipment
protection than a conventional distribution system protection does, especially, to accom-
modate the microgrid grid-tied and island modes of operation. Integration of microgrid
and utility system protection systems may present several technical challenges. In a mi-
crogrid that is privately owned and operated, say, by a utility, it is often preferred by the
utility to base the microgrid protection philosophy on the existing internal standards and
practices of that utility. However, typical utility protection philosophy may not properly
address the unique protection needs of microgrids. It becomes a challenge to adapt typical
distribution protection template relay settings for microgrid protection. In the authors’
experience, significant differences between microgrid protection needs and existing dis-
tribution protection standards have come from protection speed requirements, short-cir-
cuit current directionality and ground short-circuit protection, and the use of DTT and
anti-islanding protection; these needs are discussed below.
Microgrid protection often requires a significantly faster operation than a traditional
distribution system requires, especially when the microgrid is operating as an island. The
protection speed requirements are discussed in References [5, 8]. For example, the use of
traditional time-graded OC protection is a common distribution system protection tech-
nique. This approach relies on delaying farther upstream protection to achieve selective
coordination, often using coordination time intervals of several hundred milliseconds and
the interrupting devices must be implemented radially with non-directional power flows
typical of a centralized power system. Differential relaying and communication-based
schemes, described in Sections 3.1 and 3.4, respectively, can operate faster to meet mi-
crogrid protection and stability needs, while also better maintaining protection zone se-
lectivity than time-graded OC protection schemes. Time-graded OC is often used in
backup microgrid protection schemes, acknowledging that the delays with the backup
protection operation may result in a reduction of selectivity, stability, and or power qual-
ity.
Next, integration of DERs can introduce a bi-directional short-circuit current in a sys-
tem that has been historically radial and with non-directional protection schemes. The bi-
directional short-circuit current can introduce many challenges [2]. In microgrids, these
challenges are often exacerbated by the use of grounding transformers, which can be re-
quired by utility standards, for maintaining effective grounding while the microgrid is
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 11 of 23

islanded, reducing the over-voltages on un-faulted phases if a DER contributes to supply

power to a short-circuit after the distribution system was disconnected from the grid, and
for other reasons.
Two examples of significant impacts are as follows: (a) de-sensitization of existing
system protection and (b) reverse short-circuit current flow for out-of-zone short-circuits.
These impacts are illustrated using an example microgrid system in Figure 1 and relevant
description below.

Utility
Infeed

Substation
Transformer

CB11

CB1 CB2 CB3

PoC
X F2
Step-Up
Transformer CB21
Loads Loads
CB22
BESS

CB23
High
Resistance Diesel
Grounding Generator CB24

X F1
Loads
Microgrid

Figure 1. An example real-world utility and microgrid system illustrating protection impacts.

In Figure 1, a utility integrated microgrid serves critical loads on the feeder down-
stream of CB1; the microgrid is the network enclosed in the dashed-line envelope. The
microgrid’s Point of Connection (PoC) is at the microgrid’s connection side of the breaker
CB1. All the circuit breakers (CBs) in Figure 1, except CB23, are operated as normally
closed during the utility’s normal operation and the microgrid’s normal grid-tied opera-
tion. Under this condition, if we consider a short-circuit at the location F1 (in Figure 1),
the short-circuit current flow through the breaker CB21 will consist of short-circuit current
contribution from the utility alone and the breaker CB24 will consist of a combined short-
circuit current contribution from the utility and the microgrid’s (connected and online)
BESS units. Therefore, under this considered microgrid (grid-tied) operating and short-
circuit condition, the breaker CB21 may see less short-circuit current flow through it than
if the microgrid DERs were disconnected and offline. This difference in the short-circuit
current can be significant when ensuring that the end-of-the-line short-circuits are de-
tected—sensitive protection for end-of-the-line short-circuits may require using a differ-
ent relay (in this case, CB24) to mitigate the impacts of de-sensitization during the consid-
ered short-circuit at the location F1. For a short-circuit at location F2, however, for the
same utility and microgrid (grid-tied) operating condition, the breaker CB1 may see short-
circuit current flow towards the substation bus, but the breaker (CB1) must not operate.
These effects can be especially pronounced for sensitive earth short-circuit protection and
systems where instantaneous protection (e.g., a fuse-saving scheme), among others, is
used.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 12 of 23

DTT and anti-islanding protections are often required when integrating a DER. These
protection functions can be used to trip DERs offline in certain conditions. Ensuring DERs
are disconnected from system short-circuits and unintentional islands is imperative to
clear short-circuits and to maintain a safe system operation. However, tripping DERs of-
fline during system events can be undesirable in microgrid applications, as offline DERs
will be unable to seamlessly island and energize or supply critical microgrid loads. These
opposing objectives must be carefully balanced during the microgrid protection design
stage. For example, depending on short-circuit location, operational conditions, and other
factors, microgrid trip signals can be routed to trip the microgrid-utility interconnection
breaker instead of the microgrid embedded DERs. Care must be applied when automati-
cally re-energizing DERs to ensure that a short-circuit is not re-energized or unintentional
island is produced.
Regardless of a protection approach selected for a microgrid, there is complexity in-
volved in implementing and testing the designed protection schemes. A carefully, well
designed microgrid protection system can not only meet the speed of operation require-
ments, but it can also (adequately) achieve the selectivity and reliability requirements.

4.2. Approach to Switching Between Protection Setting Groups with Automatic Correction
Understanding the microgrid operating conditions (such as grid-tied mode, island
mode, and sub-operational modes, such as a change in the microgrid’s topological config-
uration or availability of generation sources) that lead to a significant variation in short-
circuit levels within that microgrid is an essential component to determining the required
protection relay settings that are each specific to those operating conditions. Moreover,
microgrid protection settings often vastly vary among microgrid operating conditions.
The authors of this paper have successfully implemented several microgrid protec-
tion systems using the adaptive protection scheme described in Section 3.3 combined with
other complementary strategies described in Section 3. An adaptive protection scheme
refers to modifying a set of relay protection settings that are appropriate for an identified,
planned system operating condition. Many microprocessor-based relays allow for incor-
poration of multiple relay settings, referred to as protection settings groups or profiles;
however, one setting group or profile is active in that relay at any given time. In typical
distribution system protection applications, a protection settings group uses a set of pre-
calculated settings for a specific application and or a system operating condition, such as
for a normal operating condition, abnormal operating condition (for example, a system
overload), contingency (for example, an outage due to a storm event), etc. In a microgrid,
typically, each principal protective device uses a minimum of two protection settings
groups: one group for the microgrid’s grid-tied mode operation, and another group for
the microgrid island mode operation.
To ensure that the correct protection settings group for the system operating condi-
tion is applied to a microgrid protective device, the protective device will require infor-
mation about the microgrid’s state, including its interconnection with the utility system
or grid via the interconnection breaker status. Many microgrid protection schemes use
one or more of the following aspects to apply an appropriate protection settings group:
physical-contact status inputs, communication-based inputs from Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA), and communication-based inputs from other protective
devices and or controllers (e.g., via the IEC Std 61850-8-1: 2020 GOOSE messaging or hard-
wired connections).
A principal challenge of an adaptive protection scheme is that a protective device,
such as a relay, may enter an indeterminate state while switching between the protection
settings groups. This may leave a microgrid relay’s zone of protection temporarily unpro-
tected. Switching between protection settings groups must therefore be carefully choreo-
graphed and timed to ensure that the microgrid system is protected during its transitional
states, for example, when the microgrid is transitioning from its grid-tied to island mode.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 13 of 23

A number of techniques could be employed here including the use of early and fast posi-
tion status switches and overlapping protection schemes.
Transitioning between the protection settings groups during the microgrid open
transitions (i.e., transitions that include the time when the microgrid system is de-ener-
gized) are more straightforward. In these applications, the protective devices can switch
between the protection settings groups when the microgrid is de-energized, prior to re-
connecting the microgrid to the grid or energizing the microgrid island via the DERs con-
nected to that microgrid.
During a microgrid’s seamless transition between its operating modes, for example
from a grid-tied to island mode, the relay protection settings group must be switched
while the microgrid is still energized and operational. To address this challenge, an author
of this paper, collaborating with others, developed a patented Microgrid Adaptive Relay-
ing method to switch between settings groups [41]. This method allows for switching of a
relay protection settings group during a microgrid’s seamless transition during transi-
tional states, ensuring the system is protected throughout the transitions. For example,
when switching from a grid-tied to an island mode, an implementation could be as fol-
lows: (a) a SCADA command signal is sent a few seconds prior to the opening of microgrid
interconnection breaker at the PoC to some of the microgrid protective devices to change
their protection settings groups, such that the change in protection settings groups in
those devices occurs before opening of the microgrid interconnection breaker; and, (b)
shortly after the microgrid interconnection breaker opens and the microgrid has islanded,
the remainder of the microgrid protective devices change their protection settings groups.
The microgrid protection devices are carefully grouped between the devices that re-
quire their protection settings groups changed before and after each microgrid transition.
This to ensure that the microgrid is protected for electrical disturbances (such as short-
circuits) before, after, and during the seamless transition between microgrid operating
modes. This approach comprehensively protects the microgrid system, while compromis-
ing only protection selectivity during the transition.
Figure 2 shows the basic logic behind this method, which was successfully deployed
and tested by the paper’s authors on several microgrid systems that are currently in op-
eration.

SCADA or Remote Bit from Microgrid Controller Rising

(1 = Switch to Grid-tied Settin gs Grou p) Edge

SET Settings Group 1

S Q 1 = Microgrid Grid-tied

PoC interconnection R
CLR
Q
breaker is open Settings Group 2
Rising 1 = Microgrid Island
Edge
1 = Relay Currently in
Grid-tied Settings Group

Note: This figure shows example logic where the relay goes to grid-tied settings before the transition from island to grid-tied mode, and goes to
islanded settings after the transition from grid-tied to island mode. And, some of the relays will need to do the opposite logic.

Figure 2. An example, simplified logic using the Microgrid Adaptive Relaying method.

When implementing a microgrid protection scheme with multiple settings groups

per relay, it is necessary to ensure that the relays are set with the correct protection setting
groups at all times. For instance, during a microgrid’s transition from an island to grid-
tied mode, if a protective device, which was selected to have its protection settings group
changed prior to that transition, but changed after that transition, there is a possibility that
the protection device may mis-operate or fail to operate as desired. This is an important
challenge to address to ensure the microgrid system is protected as intended.
To address this challenge, an author of this paper, collaborating with others, devel-
oped a patented Control System Countermeasures (CSC) method [42]. This method uses
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 14 of 23

programmable logic customization features of the microprocessor-based relays. The logic

design allows a relay to confirm that it has the correct protection settings group appropri-
ate to the microgrid operating condition per the adaptive protection scheme. Using a re-
lay’s internal logic and inputs from other electronic devices and or relays, each relay can
verify whether the active protection settings group currently deployed matches or are ap-
propriate for the present state and topology of the microgrid system. With this infor-
mation, the microgrid controller and a microprocessor relay can use the designed coun-
termeasures to initiate a settings group change to correct discrepancies between the active
settings groups and microgrid operating states, ensuring the protection and security of
the protected system by that relay.
This scheme can accommodate short-term mismatches between the system configu-
ration and protection settings groups in preparation for a microgrid transition, for exam-
ple, between the grid-tied and island mode, or vice versa. However, if the mismatches are
found to persist, they can be detected and corrected accordingly. Figure 3 illustrates the
basic logic for implementing this method. There may be additional factors that affect the
final design implementing the method. For example, the complexity of the microgrid
where this method is implemented, control signals to be used for system configuration,
and communication link status overseeing the status bits are factors to list a few.

PoC interconnection
breaker is closed
Pick up and drop
out timer
1 = Relay Currently in
Island Settings Group SET Settings Group 1
S Q 1 = Microgrid Grid-tied

CLR
R Q
Settings Group 2
PoC interconnection
1 = Microgrid Island
breaker is opened
Pick up and drop
out timer
1 = Relay Currently in
Grid-tied Settings Group

Figure 3. An example, simplified protection logic using the Control System Countermeasures
method.

4.3. Seamless Microgrid Transition Between Grid-Tied and Island Modes

Authors’ field experience on two separate example microgrid design projects are de-
tailed below.

4.3.1. Example Microgrid Experience #1

The authors of this paper recently designed and commissioned a microgrid system,
detailed in Reference [43], with a high-level single-line diagram shown in Figure 4. A prin-
cipal feature of this microgrid was that it can seamlessly transition between the grid-tied
and island modes, both during planned and unplanned system events. Thus, avoiding a
momentary outage to connected customers within that microgrid. This system’s mi-
crogrid controller, considering various decision-making criteria, evaluates the system con-
ditions to control the microgrid’s relay protection behavior by enabling or disabling the
seamless unplanned transfer protection tripping functions.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 15 of 23

Figure 4. Example Microgrid #1—simplified single line diagram.

If the system is capable of seamless unplanned transfer to islanded operation, the

microgrid controller enables the relays’ seamless unplanned transfer protection functions.
This causes the microgrid protection system to trip the interconnection breaker at the PoC
during external system disturbances. The microgrid relays use a combination of DTT sig-
nals, directional OC, OV, UV, UF, OF, and Rate of Change of Frequency (RoCoF) protec-
tion functions, allowing the relays to securely, sensitively, and rapidly detect external sys-
tem short-circuits and Loss of Mains (LoM), triggering a trip of the inter-connection
breaker at the PoC and the microgrid transitioning to an island.
In a situation where the online DERs cannot supply the microgrid loads, the mi-
crogrid controller will disable the relays’ seamless unplanned transfer protection func-
tions, leaving the microgrid PoC interconnection breaker closed throughout the external
system events (e.g., faults). This allows the microgrid connected loads and DERs to rely
on their own protection and the external system’s protection. If the DERs trip based on
their protection settings, it prevents the DERs’ contributions to system short-circuits. This
also allows the microgrid loads to remain connected to the utility system, allowing the
utility protection systems to clear the short-circuit (and reclose after a temporary short-
circuit), and rapidly restore the power to the microgrid connected loads.
System studies at the design phase were crucial in evaluating whether the DERs and
the microgrid would ride-through unplanned outage events. For example, studies
showed that, for a successful seamless islanding transition during an unplanned external
event, the criteria included the following: both Combined Heat and Power (CHP) gener-
ators are running, the maximum net power import across the interconnection breaker is
within acceptable limits, the load was less than the combined capacity of the DERs that
are online, and DERs were expected to ride through the event. Furthermore, the mi-
crogrid’s system inertia was relatively low, necessitating a faster system protection re-
sponse to achieve seamless transitions during unplanned events and a precise control to
minimize the system voltage and frequency variations during seamless planned transi-
tions.
The microgrid’s ability to seamlessly transition during unplanned events was tested
during operation. For example, during a real utility event, the microgrid successfully de-
tected the event and seamlessly transitioned from grid-tied to island mode. During this
event, a fault occurred on the sub-transmission circuit supplying the microgrid. The mi-
crogrid DERs supplied the fault current, which was detected promptly by the UV-super-
vised directional OC protection at the interconnection circuit breaker relay. Figure 5
shows the microgrid interconnection circuit breaker relay current and voltage measure-
ments before the fault, during the system fault, and after the microgrid has separated from
the distribution system. The microgrid voltage is depressed during the fault, but the mi-
crogrid voltage recovers while the utility distribution system voltage collapses due to trip-
ping of the transmission system protection after the microgrid separated from the distri-
bution system.
The microgrid system detailed in this subsection also used the CSC method described
in Section 4.2. to ensure the relays maintained correct protection settings groups.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 16 of 23

Figure 5. Point of Connection (PoC) current magnitude (top chart), utility voltage magnitude (bot-
tom chart: red trace), and microgrid voltage magnitude (bottom chart: yellow trace).

4.3.2. Example Microgrid Experience #2

When designing a microgrid protection system, identifying when to separate from
the utility system to initiate an island operation is an important decision. There are several
competing factors and trade-offs to be accounted for and balance:
• Utility system protection speed requirements: The faster system faults or disturb-
ances in the utility are isolated, the better.
• Equipment ride-through capabilities: The more that the connected equipment can
tolerate disturbances that are longer, more severe, and of various types, the better.
• Microgrid system’s quality of supply performance requirements.
• Protection sensitivity leading to switching between microgrid modes (e.g., grid-tied
and island): The microgrid’s protection system should be sensitive to external dis-
turbances and allow the microgrid to switch to an appropriate mode, as needed, to
reduce the impact of utility disturbances on sensitive equipment connected to that
microgrid. However, the same protection system should not be too sensitive that it
leads to a nuisance, frequent switching between microgrid modes.
• Provision of support to the utility system: The microgrid equipment, particularly
DERs, may have to remain connected to the utility via the microgrid for as long as
possible and support the grid system voltage and frequency during utility system
disturbances.
Some of these considerations drive the microgrid to disconnect more quickly, while
others drive the microgrid to remain connected to the utility system longer. Several of
these factors were at play when the authors designed the protection system for a real-
world microgrid described in Section 4.1. This microgrid required a seamless transfer be-
tween its grid-tied and island modes. A few field experiences drawn from this work are
discussed in this section.
The utility-microgrid project, as shown in Figure 1, was integrated with an existing
utility distribution system. The utility customer opted to install a microgrid in lieu of an-
other transmission line to meet its short-term operating needs. The utility system’s rec-
orded 11 kV voltages and currents, including the fault current for fault at F2 location,
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 17 of 23

through the CB2 and CB21 breakers are shown in Figure 6. The top chart in Figure 6 shows
the line-to-line fault current through the CB2 breaker.

Figure 6. F2 line-to-line fault event traces: (a) CB2 relay currents (top chart) in A, (b) CB2 relay 11
kV line-to-ground voltages (middle chart) in kV, and (c) CB21 relay currents (bottom chart) in A.

With this fault scenario, if the microgrid would have remained grid-connected, the
voltage disturbance would have ended shortly after CB2 cleared the fault. By that time,
however, the microgrid DERs would have been tripped offline by their own protection
systems. Since seamless transitions are needed, the microgrid must separate before the
DERs trip offline in case the fault was in a location that required islanding. A seamless
transition without a voltage interruption is not possible if the DERs trip and are offline
when islanding is required.
With the implemented protection approach, the BESS’s internal logic detected the
utility disturbance, sent a trip signal to the CB21 relay, prepared to transition to a grid-
forming (island operation) mode, and waited to receive the CB21 breaker open confirma-
tion signal. Upon receiving the CB21 break open status confirmation (as detailed in Figure
7), the BESS operated in grid-forming mode and picked up the load within the microgrid.
Note that, in Figure 7, the low and high CB21 Status digital signals denote a breaker close
and open, respectively. Figure 7 shows the terminal voltage and currents of the BESS in-
verter. The BESS inverter voltages (in Figure 7) show that the microgrid voltages did not
collapse to an interruption and the currents show the BESS inverters successfully picked
up the microgrid load during the microgrid transition period.
With the applied protection approach, for conditions and setup at the site at the time
of the fault occurrence at the F2 location, the microgrid equipment saw a voltage disturb-
ance from the time of fault inception through the seamless transfer to islanded operation
and avoided the impact of a more severe and longer disturbance and a few auto-reclose
events that occurred after the initial trip.
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 18 of 23

Figure 7. F2 line-to-line fault event traces: (a) one of two Battery Energy Storage System (BESS)
inverter terminal voltages (top chart) and (b) terminal currents of the same BESS inverter (bottom
chart).

4.4. Adequacy of Industry Standards Related to Microgrid Protection

With the growing complexity of connecting DERs to electricity transmission and dis-
tribution systems, several local and international interconnection standards were intro-
duced or are being developed: For example, in the US, the North American Electric Reli-
ability Corporation (NERC) Std PRC-024-2 [44] and the draft IEEE Std 2800 [45] standards
focus on the interconnection of generation to the transmission bulk power system and the
IEEE Std 1547: 2018 focuses on the DERs, including bulk supply generation, connected to
or embedded in the distribution system, which is the focus of this paper. In GB, there’s
the Energy Networks Association (ENA) EREC G99: 2020 [11] that recommends the re-
quirements for generation equipment connecting to the GB distribution systems. The IEC
Technical Specification (TS) 62898-3-1:2020 in Reference [46] includes protection require-
ments for microgrids.
The IEEE Std 1547: 2018 is a uniform standard for the interconnection and interoper-
ability of DERs with Electric Power Systems (EPSs) and details a set of requirements rele-
vant to the interconnection and interoperability performance, operation and testing, and
to safety, maintenance, and security considerations. The standard categorizes DERs by
their steady-state voltage regulation capabilities (as defined in category A or B) and their
dynamic capabilities (as defined in category I, II, or III). Where, a higher alphanumerically
numbered category has a greater steady-state and dynamic performance capability than
a lower numbered category. Although the IEEE Std 1547: 2018 sets out the qualifying re-
quirements for the steady-state (category A or B) and dynamic (category I, II, or III) capa-
bilities for a DER, it does not provide guidance on how the Area EPS operator may specify
a set of DER functional parameter settings other than the default settings within the spec-
ified ranges of allowable settings, for example, to coordinate with the existing Area EPS
protection-and-control devices [9]. Furthermore, the standard stipulates that the intercon-
nection requirements of DERs or Local EPS at the Point of Common Coupling (PCC), but
it does not detail the requirements of DERs during an intentional or microgrid island op-
eration. The responsibility of whether the DERs are allowed to operate and how they are
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 19 of 23

setup, including the selection of their functional parameter settings, within those inten-
tional island grids or microgrids, including when operating in island mode, is left to the
Intentional Island Operators (IIOs) or Microgrid Operators (MOs).
Although the IEEE Std 1547: 2018 categorizes DERs based on their performance ca-
pabilities as a principal criterion, there are other international standards or engineering
recommendations that instead categorize DER based on their active-power capacity as a
principal criterion. Furthermore, as such, those standards or engineering recommenda-
tions may stipulate the DERs fault ride-through behavior by recommending UV, OV, UF,
and OF DER protection settings and or how their protection systems ought to operate.
For example, the ENA EREC G99: 2020 classifies DERs (as Type A to D) based on
their generation capacities. Per the ENA EREC G99: 2020, Type A to C DERs are those
with a connection point voltage < 110 kV and with the following active-power generation
capacities: ≥ 0.8 kW but < 1 MW for Type A; ≥ 1 MW but < 10 MW for Type B; and, ≥ 10
MW but < 50 MW for Type C. Moreover, Type D DERs are those with connection point
voltage ≥ 110 kV or a generation capacity of ≥ 50 MW. The DER capabilities and require-
ments also increase with the DER type, as it moves from Type A to D. Although the re-
quired exact DER voltage and frequency protection settings for all DER types are specified
and are similar, if not the same, in the ENA EREC G99: 2020, a principal difference among
the DER types is how they trip on the LoM protection. For example, for Type A through
C DERs, the LoM protection is based on a RoCoF relay. However, for Type D DERs, an
inter-tripping-based protection (based on receiving a trip signal from the utility) is used
instead of a LoM protection.
The transmission and distribution systems have competing DER requirements [47].
For example, from a transmission system’s stability, reliability, and power quality opera-
tion point-of-view, the more a DER or a group of DERscan remain online and ride-through
a disturbance, the better, particularly those DER that export generation onto the transmis-
sion system, either connected to that system directly or embedded in a distribution sys-
tem. From a distribution system protection and safety point-of-view, however, the faster
the short-circuit contributing equipment, including a DER, is disconnected from the sys-
tem—for example, to limit the short-circuit current at the short-circuited site—the better.
Determining an optimum set of functional parameter settings of a DER or a group of
DERs, within the defined steady-state and dynamic capability of DERs per IEEE Std 1547:
2018, that meet the requirements of both an Area and a Bulk EPS needs adds to the mi-
crogrid design challenge, which requires a careful coordination between the DER site de-
veloper, Area EPS personnel, and Bulk EPS personnel to solve it. On the other hand, alt-
hough the ENA EREC G99: 2020 specifies a DER’s fault ride-through behavior by recom-
mending exact protection settings to be used in each DER type (i.e., Type A through D),
the engineering recommendation does not specify DER performance related to UV, OV,
UF, and OF protection setting ranges. Although this approach has the benefit of simplicity
when it comes to adding a new DER on the power system, it has some disadvantages. For
example, if, at a later date, a GB utility chooses to stipulate a different or new set of pro-
tection settings to accommodate changing reliability requirements, the already installed
DERs, which were procured prior to the change in required protection settings had come
into effect, may or may not be able to accommodate the change.
Microgrid systems include DERs, loads, and circuits. They often also include trans-
formers, switchgear, busbars, and other equipment. Presently, there are existing IEEE pro-
tection standards offering guidance on how each of these pieces of equipment can be pro-
tected. However, microgrid protection involves many unique challenges, as discussed
above in Sections 2 and 3. Moreover, there are no existing microgrid specific protection
system IEEE standards in the available literature to address microgrid specific unique
protection challenges. To address this need and to provide industry guidance on mi-
crogrid protection system design, the IEEE Power System Relaying and Control Commit-
tee is currently developing the IEEE Std 2030.12, titled “Guide for the Design of Microgrid
Protection Systems” [48].
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 20 of 23

5. Conclusions
Microgrids offer the benefits of operational flexibility, resiliency, reliability, power
quality, accommodation, management, etc., of DERs. However, they are complex, partic-
ularly when designing their protection systems. Microgrid protection systems must be
designed to accommodate microgrids’ unique operational requirements, such as grid-tied
and island modes, while ensuring the safety of the microgrid, microgrid-connected equip-
ment, and personnel at all times and meeting the microgrid’s stability, reliability, and
power quality requirements to the greatest extent possible. Although there are a few
standards that provide guidance on DER capabilities and interconnection requirements,
they are not always applicable or do not always allow for an extensive exploitation of
microgrids for the benefits they can offer.
This paper presented a detailed review of the current challenges with protecting mi-
crogrids and an overview of several state-of-the-art protection strategies with their respec-
tive advantages and disadvantages in addressing those challenges based on the authors’
successful experiences in designing several effective microgrid protection systems glob-
ally. The paper also discussed benefits and approaches to switching between protection
setting groups with automatic correction as part of adaptive-protection schemes, as well
as seamless planned and unplanned microgrid transitions between grid-tied and island
modes. These approaches were successfully used in design and implementation of pro-
tection systems for several utility-grade, as well as behind the meter microgrids.

6. Patents
There are two patents, namely Micro-grid Adaptive Relaying in Reference [41] and
Control System Countermeasures in Reference [42], that resulted from the work discussed
in Section 4.2.

Author Contributions: Conceptualization, G.T.L., S.C.V., M.J.H., and M.T.; data curation, M.J.H.,
Y.E.K., S.C.V., G.T.L., M.T., and A.S.; methodology, G.T.L., M.J.H., and S.C.V.; project administra-
tion, S.C.V. and M.J.H.; resources S.C.V. and M.J.H.; supervision, S.C.V. and M.J.H.; visualization,
M.J.H., D.W.Z., Y.E.K., and S.C.V.; writing—original draft preparation, S.C.V., Y.E.K., D.W.Z., and
G.T.L.; writing—review and editing, S.C.V., M.J.H., Y.E.K., and D.W.Z. All authors have read and
agreed to the published version of the manuscript.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Acknowledgments: The authors of this paper would like to thank Keith Moses, Xiangyu Ding, and
James K. Niemira—all three individuals from S&C Electric Company—for their help and support
in preparing this manuscript.
Conflicts of Interest: The authors declare no conflict of interest.

Abbreviations
AC alternating current
BESS Battery Energy Storage System
CB circuit breaker
CHP Combined Heat and Power
CSC Control System Countermeasures
CT current transformer
DC direct current
DCB Directional Comparison Blocking
DER Distributed Energy Resource
DTT Direct Transfer Trip
ENA Energy Networks Association
EPS Electric Power System
Energies 2021, 14, 2016 21 of 23

EREC engineering recommendation

GB Great Britain
GOOSE Generic Object-Oriented Substation Event
IBR Inverter-Based Resource
IEC International Electrotechnical Commission
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IIO Intentional Island Operators
LoM Loss of Main
MO Microgrid Operator
NEC National Electrical Code
NERC North American Electric Reliability Corporation
NFPA National Fire Protection Association
OC Over-Current
OF Over-Frequency
OV Over-Voltage
PCC Point of Common Coupling
PoC Point of Connection
POTT Permissive Overreaching Transfer Tripping
PRC protection and control
PV photovoltaic
RoCoF Rate of Change of Frequency
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Std Standard
TS Technical Specification
UF Under-Frequency
US United States (of America)
UV Under-Voltage
VT voltage transformer

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