GLOBAL

RISK
ANALYSIS
March 2023
INTRODUCTION (1/2)
ACAPS analysts conduct the daily monitoring and independent analysis of more than 150
countries, including regular risk analysis. ACAPS’ Global Risk Analysis outlines a number
of key contexts where new crises may emerge or where a particular situation may notably
deteriorate within the next six months, causing a spike in humanitarian needs.

The risks included in this report were based on the identification of: ACAPS identifies risks at the regional, country, ACAPS METHODOLOGY AND PROCESS
or subnational level.
• ‘Newly emerging crises’ (new risks) following new events or The ACAPS risk methodology defines risk as the probability of
factors (triggers) that may emerge over the coming six months. ACAPS has identified risks over the next six months in the fol- a hazard or multiple hazards materialising, combined with the
Such triggers would point towards a hazard materialising, which lowing 11 locations to alert humanitarian decision makers and estimated impact of such hazards. Simplistically stated: risk =
would result in new or more severe humanitarian needs in a responders on the possible emergence of new crises or significant impact x probability. The associated risk level (low, medium, or
monitored context. deteriorations of existing humanitarian crises. The aim is to support high) is given by the combination of impact x probability, with the
preparedness for timely and adequate responses. risk level increasing as either the expected severity of the impact
• Potential ‘rapid and marked deterioration’ in an existing
of the event or its probability of happening increases.
crisis that, because of a combination of deteriorating trends Afghanistan
and new events, may significantly deteriorate in the next six Impact is the expected overall humanitarian consequences of a
High Myanmar
months, leading to worse humanitarian outcomes. We run a hazard. It can be an increase in the number of people needing
Palestine
trend analysis to identify such risks. It should be noted that a assistance, the severity of their needs, or both. The impact is
steadily deteriorating humanitarian situation that continues at based on the assessment of the following components:
the same pace is considered a trend and not a risk. This report Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC)
does not include trends. Medium Nigeria • exposure to the hazard: people, property, systems, or other elements
Pakistan present in hazard zones that a hazard could adversely affect
ACAPS closely monitors previously identified risks to see if they • intensity (of the hazard): the degree, level, strength, or magnitude
materialise. You can find the updates on the risks identified in Peru
of a hazard
ACAPS’ Global Risk Analysis – October 2022 at the end of this Türkiye/Syria • severity of impact: the degree or level of humanitarian consequences
report. Zimbabwe resulting from the materialisation of the hazard
• the population’s vulnerability to shocks
Armenia/Azerbaijan • people’s coping strategies and local, national, and international
Low Tunisia response capacities to deteriorating living and humanitarian con-
ditions.

2  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

INTRODUCTION (2/2)
ACAPS classifies impact on a five-point scale: very low, low, LIMITATIONS OTHER ANTICIPATORY ANALYSES FROM ACAPS
moderate, significant, or major.
• Considering the diversity and complexity of the crises presented ACAPS often produces country-specific risk reports, scenarios,
Probability is the chance of a hazard materialising. ACAPS in this report, we cannot cover each in detail. Instead, we and anticipatory notes. Some recent publications that complement
assesses probability on a five-point scale: very low, low, medium, highlight the broad evolution of each crisis to flag potential this global analysis are:
high, or very high. deteriorations and inform the framing of operations, strategies,
• Madagascar: Tropical Cyclone Freddy Exposure and
and policies.
Probability and impact levels are not mathematically calculated Vulnerabilities
but assigned through expert judgement based on context knowl- • Risk analysis focuses on negative outcomes and may not • Syria/Türkiye Earthquakes: What to Watch over the Next Month
edge. The overall risk level is the combination of the two, meaning adequately consider the potential benefits or opportunities of • Ukraine: Outlook and Risk Analysis for 2023
it is also assigned through expert judgement. different events. • Colombia: Colombia Risk Analysis Update
• Afghanistan: Forward-Looking Snapshot of the Afghan
• This report does not capture all the risks that we are monitoring.
KEY PRINCIPLES OF RISK ANALYSIS Economy
It is a selection of 11 contexts that we deem relevant to the
• Afghanistan: Risk Update – December 2022
Risk analysis  requires  a solid understanding of the con- humanitarian sector for the next six months.
• Somalia: Outlook on Drought
text  and  an  investigation of the interaction of variables
• Geophysical sudden-onset disasters (such as earthquakes
that could cause or resist change. For the complete list of risks ACAPS analysts have identified
and volcanic eruptions) and other unforeseen circumstances
during their daily monitoring and analysis, you can consult the
Risk analysis has a certain degree of uncertainty. An event iden- that may change the course of events are difficult to account
ACAPS Risk List.
tified as a hazard might not evolve or materialise as anticipated, or for in risk analysis.
it might not have the projected impact. Events or factors (triggers)
• Information and data gaps for certain contexts limit the analysis.
expected to drive a shift or change in the situation may not occur,
or new factors may arise that prevent the projected change or • While we seek to ensure that all information is current at the
shift from happening. time of publication, the fluidity of the situation in some countries
means significant changes can occur quickly.
Risk probability does not need to be high to warrant concern. A
hazardous event with a low or medium probability of occurring
should be a cause of concern for humanitarians if the expected Read more about our risk methodology
impact is medium, high, or very high.

3  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

GLOBAL TÜRKIYE/SYRIA
*The risks identified on this map
Risk level
High

RISK ANALYSIS
are expected to materialise within
the next six months.
Medium
Involuntary mass returns of Syrians refugees
PALESTINE from Türkiye results in displacement,
Low
MARCH 2023 New proposed legislation and evictions
increased protection needs, and deterioration
planned by Israel cause an uprising and
in the humanitarian situation in Northwest
violence in the West Bank, with potential
Syria
of spillover in Gaza, affecting Palestinians’
livelihoods and humanitarian conditions
and generating heightened protection
concerns AFGHANISTAN
A severe economic crisis, harsh MYANMAR
PERU winter, and disruption of aid Heightened military response
Continued protests and mobility and winterisation support the following increased territorial
restrictions affect the living conditions TUNISIA increase in food insecurity and control of and collaboration among
of economically vulnerable population A political deadlock and economic malnutrition until July-August anti-military resistance forces results
groups, worsening their overall living deterioration increase protests in intensified conflict across most of
conditions and civil strikes, leading to clashes the country, leading to a deterioration
between civilians and security forces of the humanitarian situation
and increased food and livelihood
needs, especially in central western
governorates

NIGERIA
High inflation and economic
disruptions contribute to PAKISTAN
worsening food insecurity Pakistan’s prolonged economic crisis and stalling
countrywide of the bailout programme result in increased
DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC poverty and social unrest, leading to heightened
OF CONGO (DRC) food insecurity and protection concerns
The expansion of the areas under
the control of the 23 March
Movement (M23) in North-Kivu ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN
causes increased violence targeting Escalation of conflict between Armenian and
Rwandophone communities, Azerbaijan in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered by the
resulting in displacement and ZIMBABWE Lachin corridor blockade results in population
protection needs Electoral violence, compounded by the
displacement and increased humanitarian needs
deepening economic crisis, leads to
protection incidents and increased food
insecurity across the country
The border lines and names of the countries or territories indicated on this map comply with
4  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023 official international practices (UN) and do not in any way reflect an ACAPS political stance.
 Risk level High

AFGHANISTAN (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

A severe economic crisis, harsh winter and disruption

of aid and winterisation support the increase in food IMPACT
insecurity and malnutrition until July-August

RATIONALE  A ban imposed on women NGO workers by the Interim Taliban IMPACT   
Authority on 24 December 2022 has also led to disrupted aid and
The Taliban takeover in August 2021 has resulted in financial winterisation support from humanitarian organisations in 2023, Approximately 20 million people in Afghanistan were projected to
restrictions, further aggravating Afghanistan’s already dire economic worsening the situation (NRC 25/01/2023; UN Women 13/01/2023). be severely food-insecure –facing Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse
situation and precipitating into an economic crisis (HRW 04/08/2022; Though temporary, the sudden aid disruption during the harsh food insecurity levels – between November 2022 and March
VOA 13/08/2022). Consequently, over 80% of Afghan households winter has made people more vulnerable and less resilient to 2023, including six million people projected to face Emergency
have since suffered a substantial drop in income or completely overcoming economic hardship. The situation has contributed (IPC Phase 4) levels. The food security situation is especially
lost their means of income (WFP 31/01/2022; UN 09/05/2022). to increasing food insecurity. Even if the majority of the Afghan dire in Ghor province, where all humanitarian activities remain
population dependent on agriculture as their main source of income suspended as a result of disagreements between local authorities
In 2022–2023, Afghanistan endured a severe winter (winter typically
receives sufficient support to plant in the spring, many will see no and humanitarian organisations (WFP 07/02/2023). 
runs from December to March), with temperatures dropping to
income until harvest in July–August and will face increasing food
−34° C in January in some provinces, making it the coldest winter Over 3.2 million children under five are projected to be acutely
insecurity into the summer months. At the same time, the urban
in a decade (Reuters 19/01/2023; UNHCR 02/02/2023). Over malnourished in Afghanistan. Of this number, 875,227 are likely
population will face further reductions in their salaries and casual
70,000 cattle died within a week in January as a result of harsh to be severely malnourished (SAM) and 2,347,800 moderately
labour opportunities because of the economic crisis.
winter conditions, leaving many agricultural workers without malnourished (MAM). Between November 2022 and April 2023,
resources (BBC 24/01/2023; CNN 24/01/2023). With the loss 16 provinces are expected to fall into Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4)
of drought-stricken animals, farmers will face a severe loss of acute malnutrition.
income and difficulties in crop cultivation. Winter also disrupts
transportation and food supplies, with heavy snowfall making roads
impassable, affecting people’s access to essential services, like
healthcare, and aggravating the already precarious situation of
many Afghans. Reduced income and high prices resulting from
inflation have forced Afghans to choose between buying food or
paying for heating (Al Jazeera 17/01/2023).

5  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level High

AFGHANISTAN (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

An increase in food insecurity and a lack of a diverse diet will Projection: acute malnutrition situation (November 2022 to April 2023)
increase malnutrition and child mortality in the country. Increased
food insecurity and the harsh winter may result in lasting respiratory
diseases and potentially more deaths for children, the elderly,
and people with chronic diseases or disabilities.  In January,
over 160 people died from the harsh winter (DW 28/01/2023).
Acute respiratory diseases also increased, mainly among children
(UNICEF 15/02/2023).

The economic crisis since 2021 has taken its toll on people’s
resilience. Coping mechanisms have been stretched to the limit
(ACAPS 13/12/2022). Any further increase in food insecurity will
result in the increased adoption of negative coping mechanisms,
including child marriage and child labour, which will have a dispro-
portionate impact on women and girls (CARE 11/2022). The loss
in food security can also lead people to migrate or seek refuge to
neighbouring countries in search of protection and work, exposing
people to protection risks while migrating. 

In 2022, income from opium production accounted for 29% of the

total agricultural sector value. Despite the current ban on drug
cultivation, opium production is likely to continue – especially in
areas less tightly controlled by the Taliban. The opium harvest from
April–July will provide income to some rural households during Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance.
ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation
that period, mitigating the impact of food insecurity in some rural
Source: ACAPS using IPC (accessed 14/03/2023)
areas (UNODC 11/2022).

6  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level High

MYANMAR (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

Heightened military response following increased

territorial control of and collaboration among anti-military IMPACT
resistance forces results in intensified conflict across
most of the country, leading to a deterioration of the
humanitarian situation
  
 RATIONALE   adopting innovative technologies (such as weaponised drones). country. The military is likely to increase air strikes, especially
Since 2022, there has been increased collaboration between the as a result of congenial non-monsoon weather conditions, to
Myanmar’s military is currently facing a conflict of scale and PDFs and ethnic armed organisations on military training, the conduct air operations (VOA 01/02/3023; BBC 31/01/2023; The
intensity they had never faced before (CSIS 05/12/2022; Stimson supply of arms, and common defensive and offensive strategies Wilson Center 05/2022). It is also likely to attack civilians and
27/09/2022 b; ACLED accessed 16/02/2023). It is estimated that (USIP 03/11/2022; The Irrawaddy 06/02/2023, 03/02/2023, infrastructure, heightening constraints on humanitarian access.
the junta and its militias have full control only of nearly 30% of 07/02/2023 a, and 07/02/2023b; Fulcrum 10/02/2023; Myanmar The junta has already employed this tactic to force anti-military
the 330 townships of Myanmar. Around 60% of the townships are Now 09/02/2023, 06/02/2023, and 26/10/2022). On the other resistance groups to use up their resources for meeting the needs
either contested or under the control of anti-military resistance hand, the junta’s military has been losing personnel because of of conflict-affected populations and to cut off such groups from
groups (Special Advisory Council for Myanmar 05/09/2022; OHCHR injuries, defections, and desertions, leading it to tap into other their access to food, finances, intelligence, and recruits (OCHA
31/01/2023; Al Jazeera 04/02/2023). forces, such as the police and militias, for support (Stimson 25/01/2023 and 15/01/2023; OHCHR 03/03/2023; The Irrawaddy
27/09/2022 a and 27/09/2022 b; CSIS 05/12/2022). It has also 09/02/2023).
The February 2021 coup by the Myanmar military was followed by
issued a ‘right to arms’ policy allowing civilians to access weapons,
the formation of a government in exile called the National Unity
with the aim of facilitating the creation of new or the expansion
Government (NUG) and its armed wing, the People’s Defense Forces
of existing pro-military junta militias (The Diplomat 09/03/2023;
(PDFs), with the NUG acting as a parallel government in the areas
Myanmar Now 13/02/2023 and 17/02/2023).
under its control (The Diplomat 06/05/2021 and 06/09/2022;
ISEAS 28/01/2022; USIP 03/11/2022; Mizzima 15/03/2022; The Because of the increased territorial control of and collaboration
Irrawaddy 07/02/2023). Since the coup, the PDFs have been in among anti-military resistance forces, the military and its affiliated
intense conflict with the military (ACLED accessed 16/02/2023; militias are expected to increase operations in the coming months
Al Jazeera 01/02/2023; The Wilson Center 05/2022). Through to gain back lost territories and reduce the strength of resistance
time, the PDFs have been enhancing their capacities, including by forces. As a result, conflict will escalate across most of the

7  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level High

MYANMAR (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

IMPACT   Trend in violent and security incidents as at January 2023 and projections until July 2023

An escalation of fighting across the vast majority of the country will 2000

likely increase the number of IDPs to 2.4 million in the third quarter
1500
of 2023, as per OCHA 2023 projections. Currently, there are more
than 1.6 million IDPs in the country, of whom about 1.4 million are
1000
post-coup IDPs (OCHA 15/01/2023; UNHCR 08/03/2023).

*As at day 24
Many people will likely flee conflict-affected areas to remote 500

locations, such as jungles, which are cut off from any services
and beyond the reach of humanitarian responders. Displacement 0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb* Mar Apr May Jun Jul
will increase protection threats, such as family separation, psy-
2021 2022 2023
chological distress, gender-based violence, and human trafficking
Note: The projections were made by the ACAPS team only for battles, explosions/remote violence, violence against civilians, and fatalities, based on the risk raised
(OCHA 25/01/2023 and 15/01/2023; The Guardian 03/02/2022;
UNHCR 06/06/2022; TRT World 04/10/2021). The agriculture Fatalities Explosion/remote violence Protests Violence against civilians Strategic developments Riots Battles
Fatalities (upper bound projection) Fatalities (lower bound projection) Violence against civilians Battles (upper-bound projection)
sector employs more than 70% of the workforce in Myanmar
(upper-bound projection) Violence against civilians
(ITA 28/07/2022). If conflict intensifies, agriculture inputs and Source: ACAPS using data from ACLED (10/03/2023) (upper-bound projection)
infrastructure could be damaged and looted, and landmines and
explosive remnants of war will contaminate croplands. Many
farmers will be forced to leave their lands, losing their source of live- Projections for the number of IDPs in 2023
lihood. The food production gap will further increase, heightening
2.70
food insecurity and malnutrition. Increased movement restrictions, 3 2.40
2.10
Number of IDPs

1.70
the rapid depreciation of currency and inflation, high fertiliser and 1.50
(in millions)

2
fuel costs, and a lack of government support for farmers will also 1 Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA
heighten the loss of livelihood and food insecurity situation (OCHA (15/01/2023)
0
15/01/2023; The Irrawaddy 16/02/2023; Al Jazeera 02/02/2023 Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
and 26/01/2023; Frontier Myanmar 27/04/2022; East Asia Forum 2022 2023 (projection)
24/01/2023).

8  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level High

PALESTINE (1/2) NEW RISK PROBABILITY

New proposed legislation and evictions planned by

Israel cause an uprising and violence in the West Bank, IMPACT
with potential of spillover in Gaza, affecting Palestinians’
livelihoods and humanitarian conditions and generating
heightened protection concerns
 
RATIONALE   Yatta locality and of 200 residents of Khan Al-Ahmar (Roya News IMPACT  
24/01/2023; MSF 19/01/2023). It has also already authorised nine
Benjamin Netanyahu, the longest-serving Israeli leader, returned to settlements in the West Bank (Al Jazeera 13/02/2023). In 2022 An uprising in the West Bank will expose at least three million
power on 29 December 2022 under a fragile coalition, with Likud alone, Israeli authorities demolished and confiscated more than 950 Palestinians to conflict and deteriorating humanitarian conditions,
and ultra-nationalist parties holding the majority of parliamen- structures in the West Bank, including homes and agricultural and with a spillover of violence into Gaza. During the first (1987–1980s)
tary seats. Since then, the coalition has agreed on a number of livelihood-related structures. These included shops, warehouses, and second (2000–2005) Palestinian uprisings, the violence
measures, which vow to annex the occupied territories of the West and public infrastructure, such as water pipes. More than 28,400 killed nearly 2,000 and 4,300 people, respectively, with 75% of
Bank, legalise 70 settlements, and overhaul the judicial system to people were affected, and over 1,000 were forcibly displaced. In the the casualties being Palestinians (Britannica 21/05/2020; Vox
limit its power (NPR 29/12/2022; JP 28/12/2022; TOI 28/12/2022; first three months of 2023, over 250 structures were demolished, 14/07/2014). The second uprising caused a steep decline in all
Xinhua 30/12/2022). The draft legislation for reforming the judicial affecting more than 11,000 people and displacing almost 400 Palestinian economic indicators: the real national income shrunk by
system would allow the Israeli Parliament to overrule by simple (OCHA accessed 16/02/2023 a; OCHA accessed 16/02/2023 b). 38%, and both exports and imports contracted by about 33%. Over
majority the Supreme Court of Israel’s decisions. This includes The announcement of the new legislation and the increased number a quarter of the private workforce was laid off during the second
turning down parliamentary laws intended to legalise settlements of demolitions and evictions will likely cause an uprising in the intifada, affecting livelihoods and forcing households to adopt
and outposts on private Palestinian land and pave the way for West Bank, mainly in cities and refugee camps, resulting in violence negative coping mechanisms, such as selling assets, borrowing,
the annexation of the West Bank (The Guardian 04/01/2023; Al and clashes between Israeli security forces and Palestinians, both and cutting consumptions, including food (WB 05/2003).
Jazeera 03/02/2023; Reuters 07/03/2023; Adalah 15/06/2020; civilians and armed individuals and groups. In May 2021, forced
MEMO 28/07/2022). It would also give the executive branch more evictions and demolitions in East Jerusalem sparked protests
power in appointing judges and government legal advisers (AP and the escalation of hostilities in both the West Bank and Gaza.
16/01/2023; Xinhua 13/01/2023).  In the West Bank, 26 people were killed, and about 6,900 were
injured. In Gaza, 256 were killed, and 2,000 were injured (OCHA
In its first two months, the new Government has already called
04/06/2021; ACAPS 08/06/2021).
for the eviction of 1,000 Palestinians from their homes in Msafer

9  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level High

PALESTINE (2/2) NEW RISK

A new uprising will significantly affect livelihoods and humanitar- People affected and displaced by demolitions in the West Bank in 2022
ian conditions for Palestinians already suffering a humanitarian Disclaimer: the boundaries and names
crisis. Currently, an estimated 2.1 million Palestinians (of the total depicted, as well as the data used on this map,
do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship
population of 5.3 million) are in need of humanitarian assistance, or acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's
including 800,000 people residing in the West Bank and 1.3 million misuse or misrepresentation
in Gaza (OCHA 25/01/2023).

Palestinians already face serious protection challenges, including

threats to life, liberty, security, property, and freedom of movement
compounded by a lack of accountability and effective remedy
(OCHA 2020). In the West Bank, OCHA categorises the humanitarian
situation for one quarter of households as ‘catastrophic’, ‘extreme’,
or ‘severe’, and 31% reported challenges in meeting basic needs,
such as food and health. In Gaza Strip, OCHA categorises the
humanitarian situation for 29% of households as ‘catastrophic’ or
‘extreme’, and 81% reported challenges in meeting basic needs,
such as food and health (OCHA 29/06/2022; OCHA 25/01/2023). 

Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 21/02/2023)

10  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF PROBABILITY

CONGO (DRC) (1/2) NEW RISK

IMPACT
The expansion of the areas under the control of the
23 March Movement (M23) in North-Kivu causes increased
violence targeting Rwandophone communities, resulting in
displacement and protection needs
    
 RATIONALE    2022, demonstrations against the regional force’s lack of action the M23 withdrawing from the controlled areas or to a decrease
escalated into the destruction and looting of shops believed to be in the intensity of the anti-Rwandan sentiments in the DRC. While
Since the resurgence of the M23 in November 2021, tensions have Tutsi-owned. Churches were also ransacked on the grounds that the ceasefire is supposed to have taken effect, clashes between
intensified between the DRC and Rwanda, which accuse each other they were mainly frequented by the Banyamulenge community the Congolese army and the M23 still continue, and both sides
of supporting rival armed groups in North Kivu province (BBC (descendants of Rwandans) (RFI 20/06/2022 and 15/06/2022; accuse each other of launching attacks on their positions (RFI
24/12/2022; DW 20/01/2023; RFI 27/01/2023). Demonstrations Actualité 16/06/2022 and 07/02/2023). Because of the inability 07/03/2023; UN 06/03/2023; Le Figaro 07/03/2023).
by civil society organisations have taken place in several provinces of the regional force, MONUSCO, and the Congolese army to
of the country since May 2022 to support the Congolese army, curb the advances of the M23, violence against Rwandophone IMPACT   
demand a more offensive attitude from the East Africa regional communities is likely to increase. 
force towards the M23, or even express their hostility towards The expansion of the area under M23 control is likely to cause an
Rwanda. These demonstrations often turn into attacks against In addition, these communities are increasingly being accused of
increase in retaliatory attacks against Rwandophone communities
people and their property because of their presumed Rwandan sympathy for the M23. Some of them claim to have been threatened
across the country. The property of many people from these com-
origins or proximity to the M23 (RFI 20/06/2022; Afrique XXI and beaten by Congolese troops or armed groups and militias
munities will likely be destroyed or looted in the demonstrations
23/01/2023; ICG 25/08/2022; BBC 22/06/2022).  fighting the M23 in Kitshanga (Masisi territory), forcing them to
that follow M23 advances. With the context of the tension between
flee to other localities and hide (TV5 Monde 26/12/2022; France 24
the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda being conducive to the
Since January 2022, riots or attacks by armed groups targeting 12/12/2022; La Prunelle RDC 05/01/2023). A ceasefire expected
expression of hostile feelings against the latter, some civil society
people of Rwandan origin have killed at least 12 people. These to start on 7 March 2023 and supposed to be implemented by
members will continue to maintain a discourse of hatred against
attacks have intensified since June 2022 in Maniema, North Kivu, the M23 was announced by the President of Angola, which is
Rwandophone communities.
and South Kivu provinces, shortly after the M23 took over the border currently mediating peace efforts between the DRC, Rwanda,
town of Bunagana (ACLED accessed 14/02/2023). In February and the M23. That said, the ceasefire seems unlikely to lead to

11  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF
CONGO (DRC) (2/2) NEW RISK

Incidents involving armed groups and militias fighting the M23 Violence targeting rwandophone communities since January 2022
and conflating ethnicity and ideological support are also likely to Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as
well as the data used on this map, do not represent
increase (France 24 12/12/2022; BBC 22/06/2022; Afrique XXI ACAPS's official sponsorship or acceptance. ACAPS
23/01/2023).  is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Although not the whole country subscribes to such stigmatisation,

and certain civil society organisations continue to defend Rwan-
dophones, such as Association jeunes Tutsi au Nord-Kivu and the
Archidiocese of Kinshasa, the security of the latter will likely be
increasingly threatened, particularly in areas where armed groups
fighting the M23 are active (TV5 Monde 26/12/2022; Clingendael
Spectator 24/08/2022). Many protesters will consider members
of Rwandophone communities as foreigners and threaten them
into returning to Rwanda.

The announcement of the Rwandan President to no longer host

Congolese refugees, without giving more details, risks further
reducing the options of those who wish to find refuge in Rwanda
(RFI 10/01/2023; VOA 09/01/2023). As a result, new IDPs (both
Rwandophone and not) within the DRC will be added to the thou-
sands already displaced by the resurgence of the M23, with critical
needs for protection, health, livelihoods, and shelter. 

Source: ACAPS using data from OCHA (accessed 21/02/2023)

12  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023
 Risk level Medium

NIGERIA (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

High inflation and economic disruptions

contribute to worsening food insecurity IMPACT
countrywide

RATIONALE    By early 2023, fuel shortages countrywide had driven up fuel

prices and increased transportation costs, contributing to high
Inflation rates in Nigeria have risen steadily since January 2022 and inflation rates (NESG 01/2023; Punch 16/02/2023; Premium Times
are projected to remain high or rise further in 2023 (WB 01/2023). 24/01/2023). Cash shortages had also resulted from a government
In January 2023, the inflation rate was 21.82%, the highest since initiative to phase out existing naira notes and replace them with
September 2005 (TE accessed 15/02/2023; NBS 01/2023). Food new ones (BBC 14/02/2023; Al Jazeera 02/02/2023). The lack of
inflation in January 2023 also rose to the highest in 17 years. Floods cash to continue business operations has forced many small busi-
in 2022 damaged 676,000 hectares of farmland and affected nesses and traders to cease operations (Coin Geek 08/02/2023; DW
harvests at the end of the year, possibly contributing to food 10/02/2023). These cash and fuel shortages have triggered violent
inflation in 2023 (WB 01/2023; NBS 01/2023; OCHA 19/12/2022; protests in Kano, Ogun, and Oyo states (Africanews 10/02/2023;
UNDRR 28/10/2022). In 2023, the residual impact from the floods, AP 07/02/2023). High levels of electoral violence characterised
compounded by high fertiliser prices, is likely to contribute to the the pre-electoral season (October 2022 to February 2023), with
lower domestic production of staple crops, like maize, paddy rice, protests breaking out after the announcement of the outcome
and sorghum, and export crops, like cocoa beans. A decline in of the February presidential elections (ICG 10/02/2023; ACLED
domestic crop production could push food prices higher, since 03/02/2023; AP News 06/03/2023). These factors have caused
the demand would exceed the supply. The Nigerian naira could high levels of sociopolitical uncertainty, creating an unfavourable
also further depreciate against the US dollar in 2023, resulting environment for businesses. To minimise losses, many businesses
in costlier imports and contributing to increased inflation (AFEX and investors are expected to adopt a cautious approach in early
2023; NESG 01/2023; Commodity.com 25/04/2022). 2023, possibly contributing to an economic slowdown in the first
quarter of the year (AFEX 2023).

13  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

NIGERIA (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

IMPACT  Inflation and food inflation rates in January 2023 rising to the highest levels since September 2005

133 million Nigerians are multidimensionally poor1. Low-income

households spend a greater share of their income on food. They
are likely to be the most affected by the higher cost of living, which
could push them deeper into poverty (ILO 2023; WB 01/2023; NPM
accessed 15/02/2023). The disruption of business activities and
livelihoods as a result of pre-/post-electoral violence, compounded
by the cash shortage, is likely to reduce income for people work-
ing in the informal sector (Coin Geek 08/02/2023; ABC News
18/02/2023). The income of many households will not increase
in line with rising inflation, and the decline in real income would
erode their purchasing power (ILO 2023). 

Food inflation contributes to worsening levels of acute food insecu-

rity. The number of people facing acute food insecurity in Nigeria is
projected to increase from 17 million between October–December
2022 to 25 million between June–August 2023 (Food Security
Cluster 01/12/2022). Unemployment rates are likely to increase as
a result of a slowdown in economic growth in 2023 (NESG 01/2023).
The rise in unemployment could in turn increase mental health
concerns, such as depression and suicidal ideation. It could also
drive high crime rates and contribute to higher levels of conflict
and violence in the country, since unemployment is among the
factors that drive recruitment into armed groups. An escalation
in violence would result in displacement and disrupt farming
activities, further worsening food insecurity (UNDP 07/02/2023; Inflation rate Food inflation rate
Food Security Cluster 01/12/2022; Business Day 24/02/2022). Source: ACAPS using data from NBS (01/2023)

1. The Nigeria Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI) examines 15 indicators within four dimensions: health, education, living
standards, and work and shocks.  As per the Index “[a] household is considered poor if they are deprived in more than one dimension,
or the equivalent share (26%) of the weighted indicators measured in the index” (OPHI 17/11/2022).
14  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023
 Risk level Medium

PAKISTAN (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

Pakistan’s prolonged economic crisis and stalling

of the bailout programme result in increased poverty IMPACT
and social unrest, leading to heightened food insecurity
and protection concerns

RATIONALE Gulf countries, are also getting narrower, as these countries activities. The deepening economic decline is likely to generate
also signalled to lend Pakistan money on the same conditions additional mass protests, resulting in increased social unrest.
Pakistan’s economy is in decline as a result of the compound given by the IMF (Bloomberg 05/02/2023; VOA 03/02/2023; Pakistan’s Central Organization of Traders has announced its
effects of COVID-19, the war in Ukraine on the global supply chain Reuters 06/02/2023). Regardless of funding from the IMF and plan to organise state-wide demonstrations in response to the
and trade, and the 2022 monsoon floods on the country’s produc- other countries, the Pakistani Government will likely need to Government’s potential implementation of IMF-recommended tax
tion. The country is currently experiencing a balance-of-payments make structural reforms to avoid an economic collapse, including increases, which would add to the current political demonstrations
crisis because of high external debt (VOA 03/02/2023). Along with reducing subsidies and introducing new taxes, affecting both against the increased activity of armed groups (The New Indian
high inflation rates (the consumer price inflation rate rose to 31.5% enterprises’ and people’s economies (Nikkei Asia 19/01/2023). The 06/02/2023; DW 25/05/2022; FP 24/02/2023).
in February 2023 compared with 12.2% in February 2022), currency industrial sector is preparing for more job cuts and a sharp decline
depreciation, and a drop in foreign reserves, this crisis has made the in production, with over one million informal workers in the textile IMPACT
country dependent on loans (Reuters 26/01/2023; TOI 10/02/2023; sector expected to lose their jobs. Small businesses have been
TE accessed 14/03/2022). Pakistan’s foreign reserves dropped to greatly affected, and some people are finding it difficult to afford The impact of this prolonged economic crisis is multifaceted and
USD 2.9 billion in February 2023, from 4.3 billion in January 2023, basic necessities, such as food and education (Mint 03/02/2023; will likely result in the increased prices of essential commodities,
affecting the country’s ability to import basic goods (Al Jazeera BT 28/02/2023; HRW 06/02/2023; Daily Times 15/01/2023; Nikkei food insecurity, a livelihood crisis, and social unrest (The Intercept
10/02/2023; TOI 10/02/2023; Pakistan Today 09/02/2023; The Asia 19/01/2023). 12/02/2023). The major impact will befall poor people. 20% of the
Guardian 12/02/2023; Reuters 12/01/2023). This has already total population was already living below the poverty line before
caused a shortage of essential medicine and medical equipment Political instability and insecurity have also led to a significant
the crisis started, and an additional nine million people ran into
(BT 26/02/2023). fall in foreign investment. The activity of Taliban- and Islamic
poverty as a direct impact of the 2022 monsoon floods (Dawn
State-affiliated groups contribute to high levels of insecurity,
06/10/2022; WB 06/10/2022 and 10/2022; Al Jazeera 21/10/2022).
A new IMF loan could be disbursed, after having stalled since especially in Balochistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province
2022, but this loan is conditioned on some economic reforms and (IFPRI 10/2022; WB 28/10/2022; Arab News 23/08/2022; Dawn
austerity measures Pakistan has so far failed to follow (Reuters 20/07/2021). Since 2021, there have been active protests across
06/02/2023). Funding options from other sources, such as the Pakistan against political instability and growing armed group

15  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

PAKISTAN (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

Without international financial support, and in the event of eco- Inflation and food inflation rates increasing steadily between January 2022 and January 2023 
nomic austerity measures, more people will be pushed into poverty,
affecting food insecurity levels across the country. Balochistan,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Sindh provinces might be the worst
affected, as an estimated 8.5 million people from these provinces
are already facing IPC 3 or worse food insecurity levels (IPC
30/12/2022). The overall health situation and malnutrition rates
will likely increase across the country, particularly among children
(The Borgen Project 17/02/2023; Dawn 30/10/2022; Pakistan &
Gulf Economist 28/11/2022; IPC 30/12/2022). 17.7% of children
aged under five are already acutely malnourished (Nutrition Cluster
07/2022; WFP accessed 06/03/2023). The inability to access
basic goods will likely push the poorest to adopt adverse coping
strategies, such as skipping meals, borrowing money, removing
children from schools, and resorting to child labour.

The 2022 floods displaced 7.9 million people, including 800,000 ref-
 
ugees (Pakistan hosts a total of 1.35 million refugees, mostly from
Afghanistan) (OCHA 04/10/2022; 3UNHCR accessed 10/03/2022).
The impact of this risk will be more severe on displaced people
already in need of humanitarian assistance.  

Finally, a possible intensification of social unrest could result in

violence, potentially causing internal and cross-border displace-
ment. Afghan refugees would face secondary displacement or
forced returns as a result. Displacement would then expose them Inflation rate Food inflation rate
to several risks, including human trafficking and exploitation,
particularly for women and children (US Department of State Source: ACAPS using data from TE (accessed 17/02/2023 a); The Nation (02/08/2022); TE (accessed 17/02/2023 b)
06/2016; Asian Human Rights Commission 14/05/2016).

16  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

PERU (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

Continued protests and mobility restrictions affect

the living conditions of economically vulnerable IMPACT
population groups, worsening their overall living conditions

RATIONALE resulting in a higher cost of living and lower spending capacity. IMPACT 
Sociopolitical instability is aggravating an already weakened eco-
Sociopolitical instability in Peru, which has been continuing for nomic situation, hitting mainly the most economically vulnerable Prolonged protests and further extensions of the state of emer-
more than two years, has been on the rise since 7 December 2022 groups (Forbes 02/01/2023; RPP 01/01/2023; BCRP 07/12/2022).  gency are expected to result in mobility restrictions, affecting
because of the impeachment of Pedro Castillo, the president the labour force and the livelihoods of the most economically
elected on 20 July 2021. This is the fifth presidential impeachment Since 2017, political instability has been weakening public institu- vulnerable groups in the country (Últimas Noticias 16/12/2022;
since 2018 (Portafolio 08/12/2022; Wilson Center 20/01/2023). tions, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which processes Defensoría del Pueblo de Perú 30/12/2022). Over 80% of Vene-
The subsequent appointment of Dina Boluarte as president, a residence permits (VOA 13/12/2022; El Pitazo 25/01/2023). These zuelans do not hold permanent employment contracts and are
former vice-president in Castillo’s government, sparked nationwide institutional shortcomings have affected the Venezuelan popula- at higher risk of dismissal (Venezolanos en Perú 03/02/2023; El
protests especially in Arequipa, Cuzco, Lima, and Puno cities (BBC tion. Delays in the processing of permits have resulted in at least Pitazo 25/01/2022; Efecto Cocuyo 24/01/2023). Although there
19/01/2023; El País 15/01/2023).The protests are likely to continue 35% of Venezuelans remaining in an irregular situation, affecting are no exact figures, many Venezuelans earn their income in the
if some of the demands are not met, including the dismissal their access to basic necessities, such as education and health informal sector as street vendors, and the protests undermine
of Boluarte, general elections to renew Congress, and a new (R4V 06/12/2022; 3INEI accessed 10/03/202Y). A nationwide their sales (VOA 13/12/2022; El Pitazo 25/01/2023; Efecto Cocuyo
constitution (NYT 27/01/2023 and 17/01/2023; BBC 19/01/2023; state of emergency declared on 15 December 2022 and extended 24/01/2023). Labour constraints may further impact Venezuelan
El País 15/01/2023). The response to the protests included mobility for 60 days on 4 February 2023 will likely further restrict mobility women’s income, as they tend to earn lower wages and spend more
restrictions, mass arrests, and 60 killings as at mid-February (BBC (BBC 14/12/2022; DW 15/01/2023; The Guardian 15/01/2023; VOA time on informal work (Gobierno de Peru 18/01/2022; Venezolanos
19/01/2023; El País 15/01/2023); LA Times 10/02/2023). A similar 05/02/2023). The state of emergency involves the suspension of en Peru 25/01/2023). Indigenous and Afro-Peruvian people also
response can be expected for future protests. several basic rights, including to freedom of movement, personal tend to be economically vulnerable, with at least 38.5% and 32.1%,
liberty, and security (The Guardian 15/01/2023; VOA 05/02/2023). respectively, falling below the poverty line. These groups have
In Peru, around 1,700,000 people are estimated to be in need of The effects of prolonged social unrest are expected to be felt limited access to the formal labour sector and lower wages owing
humanitarian assistance, including around 1.01 million Venezuelans mainly by the most economically vulnerable population and will to exclusion and racism (Ministerio de Cultura 05/2022; El Peruano
living in Peru, 66,200 Venezuelans in transit, and 618,000 Peruvians, cause a deterioration of their living conditions. 24/06/2022).
especially indigenous and Afro-Peruvians (R4V 06/12/2022).

In 2022, Peruvian inflation reached 8.46%, the highest in 26 years,

17  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

PERU (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

The economic impact of sociopolitical instability Timeline of sociopolitical instability and main migration developments in Peru
has decreased the availability of fuel and food,
leading to high food prices and reduced pur-
chasing power, which may affect food security 15 DECEMBER 2022
09 NOVEMBER 2020
(Infobae 26/01/2023; Perú21 16/01/2023; Canal-N Impeachment of President
Entry into force of the
first state of emergency 15 FEBRUARY 2023
MartÍn Vizcarra and
15/12/2022). For Venezuelans, further delays in appointment of President
for 30 days Modification of Legislative
BBC 14/12/2022; Decree 1236, the Migration
their regularisation could also restrict access to Manuel Merino
28 JULY 2021 The Guardian 15/01/2023 Law, which imposes new
2015 DW 30/01/2023 restrictions on access to goods
education and public healthcare. Changes in the Start of Venezuelan Impeachment of President and services for migrants in an
migration to Peru Francisco Sagasti and irregular situation
Migration Law in early February 2023, which requires R4V 06/12/2022
appointment of President
UNHCR accessed 13/02/2023;
Pedro Castillo
El Pitazo 30/01/2023
regularisation for rent, can also limit their access to DW 30/01/2023
housing (UNHCR accessed 13/02/2023; El Pitazo
30/01/2023). Time

Poor road infrastructure, complex geographical 2015 2023

areas (such as mountains and deserts), and a lack

of connectivity between regions, especially in rural 23 MARCH 2018
07 DECEMBER 2022
areas where people in need live, are already hamper- Impeachment of President
Pedro Pablo Kuczynski,
Impeachment of Pedro
Castillo, appointment
ing humanitarian access (El Peruano 11/06/2022; appointment of President
of Dina Boluarte as new
MartÍn Vizcarra and the
president and start of
SNI 31/08/2022; Nature Serve 29/10/2022). Road beginning of sociopolitical
protests
instability 15 NOVEMBER 2020 04 FEBRUARY 2023
blockades, fuel shortages, and violence during pro- DW 30/01/2023 Impeachment of President
DW 30/01/2023
Extension of the state
of emergency
tests may further hamper humanitarian operations Manuel Merino and
appointment of President for another 60 days
from reaching people in need. Francisco Sagasti VOA 05/02/2023
DW 30/01/2023

At least 1.57M Venezuelan migrants,

1.57M asylum seekers, and refugees in
Peru by December 2022
Sources: ACAPS using data from R4V (06/12/2022); DW (30/01/2023); BBC (14/12/2022); The Guardian (15/01/2023); VOA (05/02/2023); UNHCR (accessed
13/02/2023); El Pitazo (30/01/2023)

18  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

TÜRKIYE/SYRIA (1/2) NEW RISK PROBABILITY

Involuntary mass returns of Syrians refugees from

Türkiye results in displacement, increased protection IMPACT
needs and deterioration in the humanitarian situation
in Northwest Syria

RATIONALE  The Turkish Government had already announced in 2022 the IMPACT  
construction of more than 68,000 prefabricated briquette houses
The current President of Türkiye, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has vowed in areas of Northwest Syria for the return of Syrian refugees (VOA The plan of the current Turkish Government and opposition parties
to return one million out of the 3.5 million Syrian refugees in the 26/09/2022; Global Voices 08/05/2022). The construction of to return Syrian refugees would expose at least five million people
country to 13 areas held by Turkish-backed Syrian opposition these houses is part of the bigger project to establish residential to the risk. This figure includes the refugees currently in Türkiye
factions, mainly in Northwest Syria, with no set date yet (PMM compounds in 13 areas of northern Syria, which would eventually and the people residing in Turkish-backed Syrian opposition
accessed 14/03/2023; NPA Syria 19/01/2023; MEMO 03/10/2022). absorb one million Syrian refugees from Türkiye (Al-Monitor functions in Northwest Syria (NPA Syria 19/01/2023 and 30/01/2023;
With the approaching general Turkish elections scheduled in May 08/05/2022; Sabah 05/05/2022). Around a half million Syrians have MEMO 03/10/2022 and 03/09/2021; Arab News 29/06/2022;
2023, some leaders from the main opposition parties are also already voluntary returned to Syria, some because of economic GT 20/02/2023). The influx of returnees will put a strain on
vowing to return at least two million Syrian refugees within two hardship, discrimination, and a general feeling of being unsafe in infrastructure and limited resources, worsening humanitarian
years if they were to win the elections (MEMO 03/10/2022 and Türkiye (MEMO 03/10/2022; SCF 27/9/2022).  needs in the area (Al-Monitor 08/05/2023; Sabah 05/05/2022; IOM
03/09/2021; NPA Syria 30/01/2023; Arab News 29/06/2022; GT 13/05/2020; OCHA 18/01/2023). The February earthquakes highly
20/02/2023). Early opinion polls have pointed to a tight contested The earthquakes that hit southeastern Türkiye and northwestern affected northwestern Syria, killing more than 51,000 people,
election in May, with some early polls showing opposition coalition Syria in February 2023 could increase the resentment towards injuring more than 120,000, and damaging more than 220,000
parties leading (Al Jazeera 30/01/2023; France 24 22/01/2023; refugees, as competition over public services and housing would buildings, including hospitals (OCHA 06/03/2023 and 24/02/2023;
OSW 24/01/2023; PolitPro 31/01/2023). The anti-refugee public likely increase. The deterioration of humanitarian conditions in IBC 13/02/2023). Prior to the earthquake, Northwest Syria was
sentiment in Türkiye has been increasing in the past years accord- Northwest Syria as a result of the earthquakes will pose challenges already hosting 2.9 million IDPs, with 1.8 million living in camps.
ing to opinion polls, in combination with the decline of the economic and delay the Turkish Government’s plans to return Syrian refugees Four million people relied on humanitarian assistance, with 3.3
situation generating competition over jobs and services (Arab News to the region. million being food insecure.
06/02/2022; NPA Syria 19/01/2023; Al Jazeera 30/01/2023; The
New Arab 24/06/2022; SWP 21/02/2020; Al Jazeera 27/07/2022).

19  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

TÜRKIYE/SYRIA (2/2) NEW RISK

Northwest Syria faces very high humanitarian access constrains in Provincial breakdown of Syrian refugees in Türkiye as at January 2023
an area where politics and humanitarian issues overlap. Cross-bor-
der and crossline operations have been highly constrained and
since 2014 regularly re-negotiated at the UNSC level. Aid for
Northwest Syria is highly politicised and has been limited by
authorities in charge of different areas. Damaged infrastructure
from the conflict and earthquakes further complicates humani-
tarian access in the region, potentially hampering the provision
of assistance to returnees (ISPI MED accessed 13/03/2023;
The Guardian 07/02/2023; CARE et al. 06/01/2023; Al Jazeera
06/02/2023; ACLED accessed 14/05/2022). 

Many returnees to Syria are facing grave human rights violations,

torture, and blackmail by the Government of Syria and the different
opposition militias. Future returnees from Türkiye are likely to face
similar protection concerns (HRW 24/10/2022; STJ 14/02/2022;
EASO 06/2021). On the longer term, if the areas of return would
come under the control of the Syrian army – whether to prevent
Turkish advancement or in coordination with Türkiye – there
would be heightened concerns for the safety of those perceived
by the Government of Syria as opposition figures and activists
(HRW 17/08/2022; VOA 23/12/2020; AI 18/10/2019; The Guardian
23/08/2022). Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or
acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation

Source: ACAPS using data from UNHCR (17/01/2023) and Liveumap (accessed 13/02/2022)

20  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

ZIMBABWE (1/2) NEW RISK PROBABILITY

Electoral violence, compounded by the deepening

economic crisis, leads to protection incidents and IMPACT
increased food insecurity across the country

RATIONALE electoral issues (The Mirror 05/04/2022; AllAfrica 31/07/2015; and lead to the damage or destruction of business properties. There
ICG 21/08/2018; Africa Portal 31/12/2018). will also likely be an increase in cases of sexual and gender-based
General elections in Zimbabwe are scheduled for July or August violence, which the military and police have been accused of
2023. Regularly disputed and contested results because of electoral Each side is unlikely to concede defeat because they are confident
during protests, especially in areas where there are no civil society
malpractices since 1995 and episodes of political violence make of victory, and supporters of the losing candidate may refuse
organisations monitoring or reporting on the situation. Survivors
tensions around elections also probable this year (ASC Leiden to accept the electoral outcome (BNN Bloomberg 21/02/2023;
will require healthcare and psychological support, as well as access
15/03/2002; Vox 02/08/2018; The Guardian 09/08/2013; EISA Pindula News 08/12/2022).
to legal services (The Guardian 31/01/2019; OHCHR 10/06/2020;
accessed 15/02/2023). In 2022, there were more than 140 protests HRW 09/08/2014; AI 15/09/2022; DW 09/01/2016).
Foreign investors are likely to be sceptical of investing during the
and riots and 2,000 cases of political violence countrywide, an
electoral period because of possible insecurity. The withdrawal of
increase by more than half compared to the cases recorded in 2021 The increase in fertiliser prices will likely further affect households
foreign investment could lead to a rise in unemployment rates and
(VOA 03/11/2022; ACLED accessed 13/02/2023; DW 30/12/2022; already experiencing low agricultural produce because of succes-
a decrease in purchasing power. As at 1 February 2023, inflation
AllAfrice 19/01/2023; Stratfor 23/01/2023). Divisive remarks by sive drought and climate changes, leaving them vulnerable to food
stood at 229.8%. It is likely to remain above 200% in 2023. Increased
some politicians about the upcoming elections are likely to be a insecurity (EIU 25/06/2020; Fitch Solutions 12/05/2022; WFP
inflation and further currency devaluation resulting from economic
breeding ground for violence (VOA 12/07/2022). Opposition rallies 19/08/2022). Eight million people were estimated to experience IPC
disruptions could contribute to further increasing the prices of
are already experiencing violent incidents resulting in injuries, fatali- 3 or worse levels of food insecurity in December 2022, an increase
imported goods, such as fertilisers, food, and petroleum products
ties, and the postponement of their rallies (The Star 28/02/2022; US of around 200,000 people from November 2022 and of 400,000
(AA 19/01/2023; IMF accessed 08/03/2023; Mondaq 15/02/2021;
News 28/02/2022; AllAfrica 31/01/2023; Al Jazeera 26/10/2022). from October. A further reduction in household purchasing power,
TE accessed 15/02/2023; AP 25/06/2022; DW 09/01/2016). 
the devaluation of the local currency, and an increase in the prices
The present Government has yet to implement any promised of food and fertilisers could increase the number of food-insecure
electoral reforms recommended by the EU Election Observation IMPACT people by mid-2023 (WFP 18/01/2023; FAO 22/12/2023).
Missions after the 2018 elections (VOA 20/05/2022; The Stand-
ard 18/12/2022). Opposition parties are also distrustful of the Social unrest following the elections will likely increase police
institutions tasked with managing the electoral process – i.e. the violence, arbitrary arrests, and forced disappearances. The violence
Zimbabwe Electoral Commission and the courts tasked with hearing will likely disrupt access to services, such as education and health,

21  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Medium

ZIMBABWE (2/2)
 
NEW RISK

Rise in inflation since February 2022 as a result of numerous economic shocks

Inflation rate Food inflation rate

Source: ACAPS using data from Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe (accessed 14/03/2023); TE (accessed 14/03/2023)

22  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Low

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN PROBABILITY

(1/2) NEW RISK

Escalation of conflict between Armenian and Azerbaijan IMPACT

in Nagorno-Karabakh triggered by the Lachin corridor

blockade results in population displacement and increased
humanitarian needs

RATIONALE   open for Russian peacekeepers and emergency services of the displaced 7,600, affected 160,000 in total, and damaged over
International Committee of the Red Cross, but transit is still limited 90 buildings (IFRC 07/10/2022). Nagorno-Karabakh has been
Since 12 December 2022, Azerbaijan has blocked the Lachin for trucks transporting essential goods and for stranded civilians recognised as part of Azerbaijan since 1993 but is de facto con-
corridor, which connects Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia (France (RFE/RL 10/01/2023; France 24 07/01/2023; HRW 21/12/2022). On trolled by an ethnic Armenian administration (CEIP 11/11/2020;
24 25/12/2022). There have been reports of shortages of essential 22 February 2023, the International Court of Justice issued a ICG 10/11/2020). Russia has previously intervened to mitigate
medicine and food as a result of the blockade, affecting those provisional measure ordering Azerbaijan to end the blockage of tensions between the two countries over Nagorno-Karabakh and
living in Nagorno-Karabakh, largely ethnic Armenians (Reuters Lachin corridor (Forbes 25/02/2023). Armenia is accusing Azer- has a peacekeeping troop on the Lachin corridor (Time 18/01/2023;
22/12/2022; Euractiv 28/12/2022; BBC 06/01/2023). Gas and baijan of ignoring these orders (Asbarez 03/03/2023; Panorama. France 24 25/12/2022). 
electricity provision and internet connectivity have been disrupted am 04/03/2023). 
during the blockade, demonstrating Azerbaijan’s ability to affect the Since the beginning of the blockade, in December 2022, Russia
access to essential resources of Nagorno-Karabakh residents (Aza- Nagorno-Karabakh is a long-disputed area between Azerbaijan and has taken a distant role in the situation because of its war with
tutyun 17/01/2023; OC Media 17/01/2023; MassisPost 17/01/2023; Armenia. In September 2020, tensions between the two countries Ukraine. The current tensions between Armenia and Azerbaijan
RFE/RL 17/01/2023; Eurasianet 16/12/2022; CEIP 15/12/2022).  over the Nagorno-Karabakh region escalated into armed conflict, could result in renewed hostilities between the two countries,
killing more than 140 civilians and thousands of combatants. On 9 with a subsequent humanitarian implication similar to those in
The Lachin corridor, which runs across Azerbaijani territory, is the November 2020, the countries signed a ceasefire agreement, but September 2020 and 2022.
only land connection between Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh tensions still continued. In September 2022, clashes between the
enclave. The Azerbaijani Government reports that the road is two countries resulted in 207 dead or missing people, internally

23  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Low

ARMENIA/AZERBAIJAN (2/2) NEW RISK

IMPACT    Displacement, livelihood disruptions, fighting, and insecurity will

also result in an increased need for mental health and psychosocial
An escalation of conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan in support to overcome stress and trauma (IFRC 07/10/2022). 
Nagorno-Karabakh will expose at least 1.5 million people in
and around the contested region to conflict, displacement, and  
humanitarian needs (Statistical Committee of Armenia accessed Nagorno-Karabakh Enclave and Lachin Corridor
13/03/2023; UNHCR accessed 29/05/2022). Previous conflict
between the two countries killed more than 25,000 people and
displaced more than one million (HRW 01/12/1994; UNSDG
19/10/2021; DW 14/07/2020). The conflict escalation is expected
to increase the displacement of mainly ethnically Armenian resi-
dents from Nagorno-Karabakh. Most likely, the displacement will
be towards areas in Armenia, as has happened during previous
hostilities (IFRC 07/10 /2022). Because the area still has landmines
from the 1988–1994 conflict and the 2020 hostilities, relocation
and displacement would increase protection incidents (HALO
accessed 11/01/2023; Al Jazeera 09/11/2021).

The displacement of people and forced confinements during con-

flict disrupt income-generating activities, especially in agriculture.
During previous hostilities, one of the main priorities was restoring
livelihood support so that people could meet their basic needs,
particularly regarding food.

During past conflicts between the two countries, various diseases

affected the health of displaced populations, including COVID-19,
monkeypox, waterborne diseases, and other vaccine-preventable
diseases (IFRC 07/10/2022). Future hostilities will likely cause
displacement, which will lead to shelter needs. In 2020, shelter
Disclaimer: the boundaries and names depicted, as well as the data used on this map, do not represent ACAPS's official sponsorship or
was one of the priority needs (Artsakh Ombudsman 01/11/2020). acceptance. ACAPS is not liable for the map's misuse or misrepresentation
Source: ACAPS using data from UNHCR (xx/xx/xxxx)

24  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Low

TUNISIA (1/2) MARKED DETERIORATION PROBABILITY

A political deadlock and economic deterioration increase

protests and civil strikes, leading to clashes between civilians IMPACT
and security forces and increased food and livelihood needs,
especially in central western governorates

RATIONALE  By September 2022, people had started experiencing shortages

of commodities in markets, increasing discontent with the way the
Following the Jasmine revolution in 2011, Tunisia has been President was running the country (The National News 06/09/2022;
experiencing a sharp socioeconomic crisis marked by high unem- Al Araby 29/08/2022; AP 11/10/2022). The Government’s inability
ployment, particularly among educated youth, and slow economic to pay subsidies and public salaries has already triggered strikes,
growth. A mismanagement of the country’s finances has led to such as in the bakery and transportation sectors (The New Arab
shortages in foreign currency reserves, affecting imports and the 07/12/2022; Al Jazeera 02/01/2023). 
availability of some food items in the market, such as milk, butter,
and sugar (WB 06/09/2022; JT 08/09/2022; The North Africa Inflation rates have been following a steady upward trend since July
Post 21/01/2023). The IMF has frozen an agreement meant to 2021 and will likely continue to increase alongside food prices (TE
help the Government get loans to pay public sector salaries and accessed 14/02/2023). The number and intensity of protests will
fill budget gaps aggravated by the COVID-19 pandemic and the likely increase, with a possibility of clashes with security forces.
fallout from Russia-Ukraine war. The loan is conditioned on political Major strikes in the education and health sectors are also likely to
reforms that have not been met until today (AP 24/12/2022 and take place, as disruptions to their access to these services will likely
06/03/02022; Al Jazeera 18/12/2022; The New Arab 30/01/2023). increase people’s frustration with the Government. It is also likely
Even if an IMF loan is secured, the Government will still likely have that organised civil unions, such as the Tunisian General Labour
to follow the IMF conditions and reduce food and energy subsidies, Union, will be calling for even more protests and igniting a social
driving more protests across the country (Reuters 29/10/2022).  uprising until the removal of the President.

People have been increasingly protesting to remove President

Kais Saied since he sacked the parliament in July 2021 (France
24 25/07/2021). Most people consider the political deadlock a
major reason for the increase in food and fuel prices (Reuters
25/09/2022; The New Arab 15/10/2022).

25  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 Risk level Low

TUNISIA (2/2) MARKED DETERIORATION

IMPACT  Inflation and food inflation rates between February 2022 and January 2023

About 2.5 million people (more than 21% of Tunisia’s population)

who live under the poverty line will likely experience difficulties
in accessing food and employment in case of a social uprising in
Tunisia (BBC 16/10/2022; Shems FM 17/10/2021; Afrigate News
23/01/2022).

States in the central western governorates (Al-Kaf, Beja, Kairouan,

and Kasserine), who already have the highest poverty rates in
Tunisia, will likely be the most affected. Kairouan, in particular, Inflation rate
has the largest number of people living below the poverty line Food inflation rate
(nearly 200,000), ten times higher than in Tunis governorate. The  
central western governorates are also the least served in terms of
access to services, such as education and livelihoods (Inkyfada
23/09/2021). These social and economic vulnerabilities will likely Source: ACAPS using data from Statista (accessed 14/02/2023) and TE (accessed 14/02/2023)
increase the impact of a social uprising on the residents of cities
in the central western region of Tunisia.  Unemployment rate in Tunisia between 2000–2023

A social uprising will further hinder efforts to obtain loans from

the IMF or even the World Bank, meaning that food prices will
likely increase further. The import of food items will also likely be
limited, as the Government will continue to lack foreign currency
to do so. A social uprising will also aggravate the socioeconomic
crisis Tunisia is facing, leading to higher unemployment rates that
will affect mainly the livelihoods of the most vulnerable people.

Unemployment rate

Source: ACAPS using data from Macrotrends (accessed 13/03/2023) and TE (accessed 13/03/2023)

26  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

LATEST ITALY MOLDOVA (1/2)

DEVELOPMENTS
New restrictions and potential logistical delays in issuing Russian interference escalating violence in Moldova results
needed permissions for humanitarian organisations’ rescue in security concerns and disrupts access to services and
ships will likely increase the number of missing migrants and humanitarian aid

TO WATCH (1/2)
asylum seekers in the Mediterranean
Anti-government protests attended by thousands of people began
Towards the end of 2022, the newly elected Italian Government in Chisinau, Moldova, in September 2022 and have continued into
made amendments to a decree issued by the Ministry of Interior early 2023 because of the high cost of living. The protests were
in 2018 known as the Security Decree. The amendments concern organised by pro-Russia political parties with funding from Russia
restrictions around the stay and disembarkation of both commercial (France 24 20/02/2023; BBC 20/02/2023; Reuters 18/09/2022).
and rescue ships in Italian waters of the Mediterranean Sea. The Russia is likely aiming to fuel the social tensions and political
decree states that organisations will only be able to carry out a instability in Moldova to interfere in Moldova’s path to the EU
single rescue each time they are at sea after obtaining permissions (VOA 10/02/2023; AP 10/03/2023).
from the Sea Coordination Centre, whereas ships usually carry
out multiple rescues. At the same time, the Government recently The protests are happening in a period of socioeconomic distress
started assigning ports for NGO rescue ships to dock, which are caused by the combined negative economic impact of the COVID-19
far away from Sicily where NGO boats normally disembark after pandemic, the effects of the 2020 drought, and the Russian invasion
rescuing migrants and asylum seekers. and people stranded at sea of Ukraine, which triggered a refugee influx in 2022. These have been
would face an increasing risk of drowningduring bad weather and compounded by an energy crisis, after a 30% reduction of gas supply
sea conditions (MSF 05/01/2023; Gazzetta Ufficiale 02/01/2023). by Russia in October 2022, which reached 50% by the end of 2022
Both measures could result in significant delays for rescue ships (Warsaw Institute 22/12/2022; BBC 20/02/2023; UN 21/01/2023;
to return to search-and-rescue operation areas. WB 20/12/2022; Balkan Insight 07/03/2022; UNECE 07/10/2022;
Atlantic Council 05/12/2022). Energy costs are affecting poor
In the event of any political interference or bureaucratic delay, households, particularly those in rural areas (UNDP 09/09/2022;
some logistical delays will likely occur during the implementation BBC 20/02/2023; ECFR 13/10/2022; Reuters 28/11/2022; France
of these procedures. This could further hinder rescue operations. 24 20/02/2023). The inflation rate in December 2022 reached 30%,
People stranded at sea risk dehydration and drowning, since up from 14% during the same period in 2021 (IONITA 11/01/2023).
migration boats are unsafe. Children, especially unaccompanied Both the Moldovan and refugee populations have been affected
ones, are the most at risk (Al Jazeera 05/11/2022; UN 10/06/2022). by economic hardship and become more reliant on governmental
Without the timely rescue of migrants and asylum seekers, they and international support (REACH 31/01/2023). Ukrainian refugees
will face higher risks of drowning at sea or increased needs for continue to arrive in the country, with almost 110,000 present as at
urgent healthcare. mid-March 2023, up from 90,000 in October 2022 (UNHCR accessed
10/03/2023; ILO 24/10/2022).

27  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

LATEST MOLDOVA (2/2) YEMEN

DEVELOPMENTS
Overall, Moldova received almost 650,000 Ukrainian refugees and The formation of a new military force under the chairman
77,000 third-country nationals since late February 2022 (UNHCR of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC) risks sparking
accessed 13/03/2023). renewed tensions among members of the anti-Houthi

TO WATCH (2/2)
front, leading to fighting in the south, which would result in
Russia is known to have plans to destabilise Moldova by sending displacements and social and economic deterioration
armed individuals into Moldova to take control of state institution
On 29 January, the head of the PLC Rashed Al Alimi issued a
buildings by force, a situation that can be aggravated by the
presidential decree to establish new reserve military units under
presence of Russian military forces in Transnistria, designated
its command called the National Shield Forces, with the support of
by the Council of Europe as a Russian-occupied territory of
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) (Asharq Al-Awsat 31/01/2023).
Moldova (ECFR 29/07/2022; Balkan Insight 16/03/2022; RFE/
The decision is an effort to unify under one structure all military
RL 09/02/2023, FP 15/02/2023). Social unrest and a potential
units in areas under the control of the Internationally Recognized
violent overthrow of the EU-oriented Government would result in
Government of Yemen (IRG), but it has raised concerns that the
the disruption of services and humanitarian response in Moldova,
new military formation will be a presidential force competing with
as well as overall reduced security and access in the country (EU
armed groups under the command of other members of the PLC,
Observer 13/02/2023; ECCEU 08/02/2023; Politico 10/02/2023;
namely those affiliated with the Southern Transitional Council (STC)
AP 10/03/2023).
(South24 30/01/2023; Arab News 30/01/2023). Under the Riyadh
Agreement signed in 2019, all IRG and STC forces should fall under
the supervision of the KSA. As the agreement stalled, the KSA has
tried to find new opportunities to strengthen its influence among
the fragmented southern governorates under the nominal control
of the IRG but de facto ruled by a number of different forces, mainly
the STC. Depending on how the president of the PLC will determine
the real objectives and location of the National Shield Forces,
there is a risk of escalating tensions within the anti-Houthi front,
de-legitimising the PLC, and leading to fighting among different
armed groups in IRG-controlled governorates (MEI 31/01/2023).
The fighting would likely result in displacement and economic
deterioration, with the risk of violence spreading to other areas if
the DFA takes advantage of the situation to re-ignite expansionist
efforts, particularly around Ma’rib. ACAPS continues to monitor the
situation, particularly in light of talks among the warring parties
for the renewal of the truce agreement. 

28  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

UPDATE
The violence has started to trigger internal displacement in Benin
COLOMBIA and Togo. In Benin, at least 1,200 IDPs have been reported in the
department of Atakora, while in Togo, more than 2,200 IDPs are

FROM THE
In January 2023, ACAPS raised a risk on Dialogue and negotiations
between the Colombian Government and armed groups deteriorate registered in the region of Savanes (GRANIT 30/11/2022). 
the security situation in targeted regions and increase attacks against
Armed group activity in the northern regions of Benin, Côte d’Ivoire,

OCTOBER 2022
civilians in areas under their influence. As at March 2023, while
Ghana, and Togo has not seemed to affect food insecurity levels,
dialogue and negotiations are ongoing, attacks against civilians,
as the number of food-insecure people remained stable between
including forced displacement, confinement and HRD killings

RISK ANALYSIS
October–December 2022 compared to the same period in 2021
persist in areas under the influence or disputed by armed groups.
(GRANIT 30/11/2022).
For more information of current active risks, and evolution of past
risks, ACAPS raised for Colombia you can read our Colombia Risk
Analysis Update report.
This is an update of the risks DRC Medium risk level

identified in the last Global Risk The resurgence of the 23 March Movement (M23) and

Analysis report published in COASTAL COUNTRIES OF WEST AFRICA Medium intensification of conflict lead to displacement and further
deterioration of the humanitarian situation in Nord-Kivu
October 2022. The expansion of armed groups from central Sahel to coastal
(from March 2022 report)  

countries (Bénin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo) leads to The DRC update below refers to the risk initially raised in March 2022
displacement and increased food insecurity   and then updated in the Global Risk Analysis of October 2022.

This risk is materialising at a slow pace. A progressive deterioration This risk has materialised, while the humanitarian situation contin-
of the security situation in the northern regions of West African ues to deteriorate. Clashes between the Congolese army and the
coastal countries is observed. Between October 2022 and January M23 are still continuing, forcing thousands of people to flee. The
2023, more than 73 violent incidents involving mostly non-state M23 continues to expand its area of influence and threatens to cut
armed groups have been reported in the northern regions of off the main supply routes to Goma, the capital of North Kivu (RFI
Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo (Africanews 28/12/2022). 10/02/2023; TV5 Monde 10/02/2023). The killing of more than a
On the same period in 2022, around 30 incidents were reported hundred people in December 2022 is also attributed to the M23
(ACLED accessed 13/03/2023). These incidents included attacks (RFI 08/02/2023; BBC 08/12/2022). As at January 2023, more
on civilians and security forces, kidnappings, the destruction of than 520,000 had been displaced since the clashes intensified in
property, and the use of improvised explosive devices. Benin is March 2022 (OCHA 19/01/2023). A lack of food and the poor living
the country recording the highest number of attacks by armed conditions of the displaced people in sites in Kanyaruchinya and
groups, followed by Togo. In Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, the attacks surrounding areas in Nyiragongo territory led to the declaration of
are on a smaller scale given a still-low presence of armed groups, a cholera outbreak by the provincial authorities on 14 December
but these are becoming more regular (VOA 09/02/2023; Togoweb 2022. The confirmed cases have risen to 4,530, with 16 related
14/02/2023; VOA 09/02/2023). 

29  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 FROM OCTOBER 2022

UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

deaths recorded in Nyiragongo and Karisimbi health zones as at ahead with the division of West Papua province into West Papua scheduled for 14 February 2024, and the new provinces are set
8 February 2023 (WHO 09/02/2023; MSF 13/12/2022). and Southwest Papua provinces (Antara News 09/12/2022; Asia to participate in them. This will likely heighten tensions in West
Times 19/08/2022; The Jakarta Post 18/09/2022). Protests and Papua territory from 2023–2024 (Antara News 27/01/2023; West
The ceasefire agreement concluded in Luanda between the DRC
riots in reaction to social and political issues, such as disputes and Papua Daily 18/11/2022). 
and Rwanda in November 2022, which requires the withdrawal of
human rights violations, continued at a similar pace in West Papua
M23 fighters from areas under their control, has not been followed
territory throughout 2021–2022, contrary to ACAPS’ anticipated
(RFI 13/02/2023). In November 2022, East African states deployed
increase in the October 2022 risk report. There have been some
a regional force to end armed group violence in eastern DRC. That
protests against the creation of Southwest Papua province. Violent
MAURITANIA Low risk level
said, some civil society organisations and inhabitants of North Kivu
incidents have become less frequent and less intense (with fewer Rising food and fuel prices worsen socioeconomic instability
do not perceive this force as offensive enough. Demonstrations
fatalities) since October 2022 compared to what was observed in and ethnic tensions, leading to social unrest and food and
have taken place mainly in Goma to demand the departure of this
2021 and in the first eight months of 2022. The West Papua National livelihood needs
force or a more offensive attitude towards the M23. The negoti-
Liberation Army (TPNPB) has continued their separatist activities
ations conducted by the regional force with the M23, perceived The risk has not materialised, as inflation rates reached a peak in
and engaged in clashes with the Indonesian security forces from
by some as support for the armed group, have reinforced doubts October (12.7%) and started to decrease since then. Inflation rates
October 2022 to January 2023 (ACLED accessed 16/02/2023).
on the agenda of the regional force (Agenzia Fides 10/01/2023; in January dropped to 10.3% (TE accessed 15/02/2023). There
Activists continue to fight the Government through protests,
Actualité 07/02/2023; Jeune Afrique 19/01/2023).  have been no major changes in the food security situation, as
lobbying and gaining public support from other provinces. The
food-insecure people remained in Stressed (IPC Phase 2) levels.
The M23 continues to illegally tax people in areas under their con- Indonesian President has continued to call for the implementation
Even though the harvest season between October–December 2022
trol and to forcibly recruit civilians into their ranks (DW 02/01/2023; of stern policies in the region to thwart armed group activities (The
was generally good, some people resorted to buying from markets
HRW 06/02/2023). Diplomat 21/12/2022; CNN 19/12/2022; Benar News 20/12/2022;
to meet their food needs despite high inflation and the rising
Jacobin 18/12/2022). Papua province’s governor was arrested by
prices of some food items (FEWS NET 31/12/2022). There is no
the country’s anti-graft agency after he was charged with bribery
indication that the local currency of Mauritania (the ouguiya) has
in return for infrastructure contracts. On the other hand, some
INDONESIA Medium risk level activists believe that he was arrested because of his opposition
seen any further depreciation. There has also been no social unrest
in the past months. The prices of some food items continued to
Violent crackdown on protests and insurgency, and rising to the creation of new provinces in West Papua territory (CNA
rise as at February 2023, as the risk suggested. These food items
ethnic tensions after the announced division of Papua 10/01/2023; UCA News 11/01/2023; ULMWP 12/01/2023). The
included fruits and vegetables (tomatoes, potatoes, and onions),
province result in increased displacement and protection TPNPB has rejected all forms of government offers and asked
milk, cheese, eggs, fish, seafood, and cooking oils (Sahara Medias
needs in West Papua territory non-Papuans to leave the region. It has threatened to kill those
13/02/2023; Anbaa 13/02/2023). Food inflation rates peaked in
who would support the Government in the newly created provinces
The risk has not materialised yet and is still active. The law to divide July 2022 (17.4%). Between August 2022 and January 2023, food
in the region (West Papua Daily 07/12/2022, 16/12/2022, and
Papua province into four provinces in Indonesia was passed in inflation ranged between 11.8–15.9% (TE accessed 15/02/2023). 
15/01/2023; BBC 08/02/2023). General elections in Indonesia are
June 2022. In December 2022, the Government of Indonesia went

30  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 FROM OCTOBER 2022

UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

The increase in migration flow has led to longer delays in migration The conflict resulted in heightened security measures across
MEXICO Medium risk level
procedures and an increased number of migrants and asylum Rakhine, including the blockage of waterways and roads, limiting
An increase in the number of Haitian and Salvadoran migrants seekers stuck in southern Mexico, especially in Tapachula (Forbes people’s movement and obstructing aid delivery. The military
and asylum seekers in Mexico seeking to reach the US causes 01/01/2023; La Silla Rota 03/01/2023; Agencia EFE 02/02/2023). junta temporarily suspended all humanitarian activities in several
a deterioration of needs at the southern border The high number of arrivals at the southern border has continued townships, halting assistance to nearly 240,000 people. Since
to put a strain on the already limited resources, capacities, and November, the temporary truce and relaxation of some of the
The risk materialised from January–December 2022, with around
opportunities in the area. People have no other option than to live access restrictions have allowed for the gradual resumption
over 444,000 migrants and asylum seekers crossing into Mexico,
in makeshift shelters in streets and parks. Besides shelter, health of humanitarian activities (OCHA 01/10/2022, 31/10/2022,
an increase of 44.4% compared to 2021 (Segob 02/2023). On
assistance, clean water, NFIs, emergency education, and food are 03/12/2022, and 30/12/2022; ECHO 19/09/2022). 
the southern border alone, more than 152,400 people entered
needed (Agencia EFE 02/02/2023; INM 31/12/2022). 
through the state of Chiapas and around 48,300 through the state Increased insecurity and violence and access constraints since
of Tabasco in 2022, an increase of 99% and 9.9%, respectively, mid-2022, combined with existing poor socioeconomic conditions,
compared to 2021 (Segob 02/2023; Chiapas Paralelo 22/01/2023). have pushed the Rohingyas in Rakhine to increasingly embark
MYANMAR High risk level on risky maritime journeys to reach other countries, especially
In El Salvador, since October 2022, political instability, the eco-
Malaysia and Indonesia. Numerous Rohingyas have been arrested
nomic crisis, and the current state of emergency have triggered The large-scale military response of the junta following the
for travelling beyond Rakhine state in attempts to cross into
the increase in asylum applications of Salvadorans in Mexico (La Arakan Army’s increased control of Rakhine state results in
foreign countries (CASS accessed 16/02/2023; TNI 26/01/2023;
Prensa Gráfica 07/12/2022). In 2022, around 7,400 Salvadorans intense fighting and violence, leading to displacement and
increased humanitarian and protection needs The Straits Times 06/12/2022).
applied for asylum in Mexico, an increase of almost 80% compared
to the previous year (La Prensa Gráfica 07/12/2022; Resumen The risk is still active. Renewed conflict between the Arakan Army During the conflict, the AA captured or destroyed several junta
Latinoamericano 02/01/2023). The main drivers for Salvadorans (AA) and the Myanmar military spanned August–November 2022, bases along the border between Bangladesh and Maungdaw
leaving the country have been increased protection needs and killing more than 40 civilians and displacing more than 23,000 district, in Rakhine. This allowed them to strengthen their control
declining livelihoods (INM 05/01/2023; Resumen Latinoamericano others. As at 2 February 2023, around 12,500 people remained over the border with Bangladesh, which is critical for political
02/01/2023). displaced as a result of the conflict. The clashes ended when the and commercial relations. The military junta has been bolstering
two groups agreed upon a temporary truce in late November 2022 their position with a resupply of military resources in Rakhine
In Haiti, the humanitarian crisis has been deteriorating (PBS
(ACLED accessed 16/02/2023; RFA 07/10/2022 and 26/09/2022; state during the truce. Tensions between the AA and the military
04/12/2022). By January 2023, at least 18,000 Haitian migrants and
Narinjara News 25/09/2022; BNI 14/11/2022; The Irrawady and its allies persist in the state. The truce is considered fragile,
asylum seekers were stranded at Mexico’s southern border, espe-
28/11/2022 and 15/12/2022; Myanmar Now 28/11/2022; Myanmar and it has been reported that the conflict may resume in Rakhine
cially owing to delays in migration procedures (INM 27/12/2022;
Witness 16/01/2023; OCHA 02/02/2023; DMG 23/12/2022). at any time, as the rice cultivation season is coming to an end in
Monitoreamos 23/01/2023; La Vanguardia 23/01/2023).
March/April (Myanmar Now 05/01/2023; Nikkei Asia 05/01/2023;
UNHCR 17/02/2023). 

31  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 FROM OCTOBER 2022

UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

Government, the repatriation plans announced in May in Türkiye
SUDAN Medium risk level SYRIA/LEBANON Medium risk level
may have emboldened the Lebanese Government to announce
Increased intercommunal clashes in Blue Nile state lead to Involuntary mass returns of Syrian refugees from Lebanon similar plans (MEI 24/03/2022; AP 21/06/2022; Daily Sabah
displacement and more needs for shelter, healthcare, and amid a current socioeconomic crisis put them in unsafe and 10/05/2022). UN agencies and INGOs have long stated that Syria
legal documentation inadequate living conditions is not safe for return and have renewed calls against the plan (RPW
16/11/2021; MEI 22/02/2022; HRW 06/07/2022).
The risk that more than 100,000 people would likely be displaced The risk of the involuntary mass return of Syrian refugees from
from Blue Nile has largely materialised, as intercommunal clashes Lebanon is still active. In early 2022, the Lebanese Government
continue to target the Hausa tribe. Between July 2022 and January announced its plan to send 15,000 Syrian refugees monthly back
2023, Blue Nile state recorded the highest number of displacements to Syria (MEMO 24/06/2022; 961 04/07/2022; OLJ 15/08/2022; SYRIA/ TÜRKIYE Medium risk level
across Sudan because of intercommunal conflict. Nearly 120,000 AP 06/07/2022 and 05/11/2022). In October 2022, a first group
Nearing general elections and economic hardship trigger a
people have been displaced, including 97,000 within Blue Nile of around 500 Syrian refugees returned under a programme of the
renewed military incursion of Türkiye into northern Syria,
and 17,600 to White Nile state. The displaced need food, health, Lebanese and Syrian authorities. In November 2022, another 330
resulting in displacement and urgent humanitarian and
nutrition, protection, shelter, education, and WASH support (USAID returned under the same programme (AP 05/11/2022). Beyond protection needs
10/02/2023; OCHA 13/02/2023).  these two groups, the plan has failed to materialise so far. Regard-
less, the risk remains active, as Syrians still face resentment from The risk of renewed military incursion of Türkiye into northern Syria
Clashes have kept taking place since July between armed Hausa is still active. In 2022, Türkiye announced on multiple occasions
members of Lebanese host communities and face pressure from
tribe members and armed men from other tribes (including from its intentions of a military incursion into northern Syria to establish
authorities to leave Lebanon through restricted access to job
the Berta, Funj, Gumuz, Hamaj, and Masalit tribes) in many areas of a “safe zone” and neutralise Kurdish armed groups in the area.
opportunities and services (OLJ 13/08/2022; STC 08/08/2022;
Blue Nile state, especially in Ar Rusayris and Wad Al Mahi localities. The Turkish Government perceives the armed groups to be linked
HRW 06/07/2022). Anti-refugee sentiments in Lebanon stem
Reasons for many of the clashes include disputes following the to the armed separatist Kurdistan Worker’s Party (PKK), with
from a combination of economic, political, and social issues,
Hausa trying to access markets or lands and the escalation of whom it has been in protracted armed conflict since 1984 (BBC
including competition for jobs and pressure on the health and
sporadic attacks targeting Hausa tribe members while they travel 23/11/2022; Al Jazeera 24/11/2022; MEO 23/11/2022; Al-Monitor
education systems (The Economist 22/08/2019; The New Arab
between localities in Blue Nile (IOM 16/02/2023, 02/02/2023, 30/05/2022; ICCT 28/06/2022; CFR 06/01/2023; Asharq Al-Awsat
10/08/2022; ARK 30/06/2021; Brookings 15/04/2021; Enab Baladi
11/01/2023, and 29/12/2022). Some of the people displaced 10/08/2022). In November 2022, an explosion in the centre of
08/08/2022; AP 21/07/2022; OLJ 09/09/2022; WB 25/01/2022; IMF
outside Blue Nile are experiencing severe food insecurity, which Istanbul took place, killing six people and injuring 81. The Turkish
21/09/2022). The economic crisis in Lebanon is worsening, with
is driving them to return to Blue Nile despite the lack of security Government blamed Kurdish armed groups in northern Syria,
the multidimensional poverty rate rising to more than 80% in 2021,
(Dabanga 12/02/2023).  escalating Turkish talks of an incursion (Daily Sabah 14/11/2022;
up from 42% in 2019 (IFRC 03/01/2023; UNESCWA 15/12/2021).
The unemployment rate reached around 30% in 2022 – up from Al Jazeera 14/11/2022 a; Al Jazeera 14/11/2022 b). Türkiye
11% in 2019 (WB accessed 25/01/2023; ILO 12/05/2022; UNESCWA faces strong pushback from the US and Russia against further
16/12/2021). Aside from normalised relations with the Syrian incursion into Syria (HRW 17/08/2022; Al Jazeera 10/10/2019). The

32  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

 FROM OCTOBER 2022

UPDATED RISK ANALYSIS

earthquakes that hit southeastern Turkey and northwestern Syria or evacuations of the population to safer areas outside Kherson Despite the continuation of negotiation efforts following the
in February 2023 have also resulted in high numbers of damage oblast. The damage to or destruction of civilian infrastructure has expiration of the truce on 2 October 2022, Yemen’s warring parties
to buildings and critical infrastructure, deaths, injuries, and the also resulted in the deterioration of people’s living conditions, still had not signed a new agreement as at the end of February
displacement of millions. That said, the damage and destruction also pushing people to leave Kherson (Politico 27/11/2022). 2023. While large-scale conflict has not resumed after the end of
caused by the earthquakes in both countries reduce the risk of a Active ground conflict elsewhere has continued to result in civilian the truce, the risk remains active, as fighting has continued along
Turkish incursion into northern Syria (Al Jazeera 15/02/2023; IBC fatalities, displacements and evacuations, and a lack of access to the main front lines (namely in the governorates of Ad Dali’, Al
13/02/2023, 06/02/2023; NPR 06/02/2023; CNBC 06/02/2023; power, heating, water, and basic services. The risk has especially Hodeidah, Lahj, Ma’rib, and Ta’iz). From October–November 2022,
Al Jazeera 06/02/2023). Within Türkiye, with general elections materialised in active fighting hot spots, including frontline areas the de-facto authority (DFA) in the north of Yemen (also known
scheduled for June 2023, a military operation could raise approval near Bakhmut city, in Donetsk oblast, and in Russia-controlled as the Houthis) also carried out drone attacks on IRG-controlled
ratings for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, the leader of the ruling Justice areas, such as Mariupol city in Donetsk oblast (Radio Svoboda seaports in Hadramawt and Shabwah, preventing ships from
and Development Party and current President, as it did in 2019, 15/12/2022; DW 25/01/2023; WHO 08/02/2023). Humanitarian docking and suspending crude oil exports, the main sources of
helping him secure re-election (Reuters 05/11/2019). Parallel with access to areas outside the Ukraine Government’s control remain revenue for the IRG (South24 09/11/2022; Reuters 21/11/2022).
its military plans, Türkiye renewed its intent to send one million extremely constrained, while access to information in and from The IRG said that the Ad Dabah oil terminal in Hadramawt sustained
Syrians back to Syria (Al Arabiya 03/05/2022; DW 27/07/2022). areas controlled by the Russian military is blocked (Radio Svo- damage that will require at least five to six months of repairs.
boda 17/02/2023). This prevents humanitarian responders from Following the attack in October, the IRG responded by warning that
reaching people in need and limits the possibility of conducting “all options are open” for retaliation, a sign that it could resume
assessments to evaluate the actual scale of needs. The severity of military operations (Asharq Al-Awsat 23/10/2022). The attacks by
UKRAINE High risk level
needs is the highest in all areas close to the front line and in areas the DFA were a means to pressure the IRG to share their revenues
Increased fighting and power and gas supply disruptions controlled by the Russian military. OCHA categorises the severity from crude oil exports, especially to allow the payment of public
severely limit people’s ability to access heating, resulting of needs to be ‘catastrophic’ (in Donetsk, Kherson, Luhansk, and sector salaries and pensions in DFA areas. In the meantime, talks
in loss of life and increased acute humanitarian needs in Zaporizhzhia oblasts, the severity corresponds to level five* as between the DFA and the KSA have continued. If the talks between
Russian-controlled areas and areas of active ground conflict per the ACAPS INFORM Global Crisis Severity Index methodology) the DFA and the IRG fail to lead to a renewed truce, the DFA will
in the southeast (OCHA 05/02/2023 and 28/12/2022; Radio Svoboda 17/02/20232). very likely continue attacking ports in IRG-held areas to prevent
*See the INFORM Severity Index methodology here. Yemeni oil from being exported, and fighting would escalate along
This risk has materialised. The Russian military has continued
the front lines. A prolonged loss of revenues for the IRG will likely
targeting critical civilian infrastructure, with a targeted cam-
lead to a new depreciation and volatility of the Yemeni rial in areas
paign on the energy infrastructure since 10 October 2022 (PAX
under their control. Violence will likely result in displacement and
22/12/2022; GPF 05/12/2022). In newly accessible areas, such YEMEN High risk level
civilian casualties (The New Arab 30/11/2022).
as western Kherson oblast, the Russian forces have continued to
The collapse or non-extension of the truce leads to renewed
heavily target civilian infrastructure both before and after their fighting, resulting in increased civilian casualties, displacement,
withdrawal in November 2022. This has resulted in displacements and reduced access to services, basic goods, and livelihoods 

33  ACAPS GLOBAL RISK ANALYSIS — MARCH 2023

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