THE

B O O K OF F A L L A C I E S :

FR O M

U N FIN ISH ED PAPERS

OF

JEREMY BENTHAM.

BY A F R IE N D .

LONDON:
P U B L IS H E D B Y J O H N A N D H . L. H U N T ,
T A V IS T O C K STREET, COVENT GARDEN.

1824.
 LONDON:
PRIN TED BY R IC H A R D T A Y L O R , SH OE-LANE.
 EDITOR’S PREFACE.

T he substance o f this treatise, drawn up

from the most unfinished o f all M r . B ent-
ham's Manuscripts, has already been pub­
lished in French by M . D u m o n t; and con­
sidering the very extensive diffusion o f that
tongue, the present work, but for one con­
sideration, might seem almost superfluous.

T h e original papers contain many appli­

cations o f the writer's principles to British

Institutions and British interests ; which, with
a view to continental circulation, have been
judiciously omitted by M . Dum ont.

T o the English Reader, the matter thus

omitted cannot but be highly important and
a 2
IV EDITORS PREFACE.

instructive. W ith the view o f enabling him

to supply the deficiency, and to obtain sepa­
rately a treatise o f general importance, which
in the French work has somewhat unfortu­
nately been appended to one o f more limited
interest,— namely, that, on the mode o f con­
ducting business in Legislative Assemblies,
— the Editor has made the present attempt.

T o have done justice to the original mat­

ter, the whole ought to have been re-written ;
this, the Editor's other pursuits did not allow
him leisure to accomplish, and he has been
able to do little more than arrange the papers,
and strike out what was redundant.—-I n pre­
paring the work for the press, M r. Bentham
has had no share ;— for whatever therefore
m ay be esteemed defective in the matter, or
objectionable in the manner, the Editor is
solely responsible. Still, he thought it better
that the work should appear, even in its pre­
sent shape, than not appear at all; and having
devoted to it such portion o f his time as could
 e d i t o r ’s p r e f a c e . V

be spared from the intervals o f a life o f la­

bour, he hopes he shall not be without ac­
knowledgement, from those who are com pe­
tent to appreciate the value o f whatsoever
comes from the great founder o f the science
o f morals and legislation.

M. D um ont’s work contains an exami­

nation o f the declaration o f the Rights o f
M a n , as proclaimed by the French Consti­
tuent Assem bly. This forms no part o f the
present volume, to the subject o f which, in­
deed,— Fallacies employed in debate ,— it is
not strictly pertinent. B u t, in fact, the ori­
ginal papers have been mislaid, and they
seemed to lose so much o f their spirit in a
translation from the French, that the contents
o f the additional chapter would not compen­
sate for the additional bulk and expense o f
the book.
 C O N T E N T S.

IN T R O D U C T IO N .

Page.
Sect. 1. A Fallacy, what.............................................................. 1
Sect. 2. Fallacies, by whom treated o f heretofore................ ib.
Sect. 3. Relation o f Fallacies to vulgar E r r o r s ..................... 5
Sect. 4. Political Fallacies the subject o f this W o r k ............ 7
Sect. 5. Division or Classification o f F a lla cies..................... 9
Sect. 6 . Nomenclature o f political F a lla cie s ......................... 12
Sect. 7. Contrast between the present W ork and Hamilton’s
Parliamentary Logic ................................................ 16

PART T H E FIRST.

FALLACIK S OF A U T H O R IT Y,

The subject o f which is Authority in various shapes ,■ and the object,

to repress all exercise o f the reasoning Faculty.

Chap. I. 1. Analysis of A u th ority............................................ 32

2. Appeal to authority in what cases fallacious . . 44
Chap. II. The Wisdom of our Ancestors, or Chinese Argu­
ment,— (ad verecundiam)....................................... 69
Chap. III. 1 . Fallacy o f irrevocable Laws,— (ad super -
stitionem ).................................................................. 82
2. Fallacy o f Vows or promissory Oaths,— (ad
superstitionem) ......................................................... 104
f hap. IV. No-precedent Argument,— (ad verecundiam) .. 113
Vlll CONTENTS.

Page.
Chap. V. 1. Self-assumed Authority,— (ad ignorantiam, ad
verecundiam) .............................................................. 116
2. The Self-trumpeter’s Fallacy ......................... 120
Chap. VI. Laudatory Personalities,— (ad amicitiam)............ 123

PA RT T H E S E C O N D .

FALLACIE S OF DANGER,

The subject matter o f which is D anger in various shapes; and the

object, to repress Discussion altogether, by exciting alarm.

Chap. I. Vituperative Personalities,— (ad o d iu m )................. 127

1 . Imputation o f bad d e s ig n .............................. 131
2. Imputation o f bad character......................... 132
3. Imputation o f bad m o tiv e .............................. 133
4. Imputation o f inconsistency .......................... 135
5. Imputation o f suspicious connections.—
( Noscitur ex so ciis)....................................... 136
6 . Imputation founded on identity o f denomi­
nation.— ( Noscitur ex cognominibus.J 137
7. Cause o f the prevalence o f the fallacies be­
longing to this class ................................... 140
Chap. 11. 1. Hobgoblin Argument, or, “ N o Innovation !”
(ad metum) ..................................................... 143
2. Apprehension o f mischief from change, what
foundation it has in truth.............................. 145
3. Time the innovator-general, a counter fal­
lacy ................................................................... 148
4. Sinister interests in which this fallacy has
its s o u r ce ......................................................... 151
Chap. III. Fallacy o f Distrust, or, “ W h a t’s at the bottom ?”
(ad metum) ..................................................... 154
Chap. IV. Official Malefactor’ s Screen,— (ad metum) —
"A ttack us, you attack Government.” . . 158
 CONTENTS. IX

Page.
Chap. V. Accusation-scarer's Device,— (ad metum)— " I n ­
famy must attach somewhere.” ................ 184

PART T H E T H IR D .

FALLA C IE S OF DELAY,

The subject matter o f which is D elay in various shapes j and the

object, to postpone Discussion, with a view o f eluding it.

Chap. I. The Quietist, or, “ N o Complaint,” — (ad quietem) 190

Chap. II. Fallacy of False-consolation,— (ad quietem) . . . . 194
Chap. III. Procrastinator’s Argument,— (ad socordiam)
“ W ait a little, this is not the time.” ............ 198
Chap. IV. Snail’s-pace Argument,— (ad socordiam) “ One
thing at a tim e! N ot too fa s t ! Slow and
sure !” ................................................................... 201
Chap. V. Fallacy o f artful Diversion,— (ad verecundiam) . . 209

PART T H E FO U RTH .

FALLACIE S OF CO N FU SIO N ,

The object o f which is, to peiplex, when Discussion can no longer be

avoided.

Chap. I. Question-begging Appellatives,— (ad judicium ).. 213

Chap. II. Impostor Terms,— (ad judicium) .......................... 22 1
Chap. III. Vague Generalities,— (ad judicium ).................... 230
1. Order .............................................................. 232
2. Establishment ................................................ 235
3. Matchless Constitution .............................. 236
4. Balance o f P ow er........................................... 248
5. Glorious R evolution....................................... 256
Chap. IV. Allegorical Idols,— (ad imaginationem)........... 258
X CONTENTS.

Page.
]. Government j for members o f the governing
body .............................................................. 258
2 . The Law ; for lawyers.................................. Ibid.
3. The Churchy for churchmen......................... 260
Chap. V. Sweeping Classifications,— (ad judicium )........... 2G5
1. Kings ;— Crimes o f K in g s ......................... Ibid.
2 . Catholics j— Cruelties of C a th olics........... 266
Chap. VI. Sham Distinctions,— (ad judicium) ..................... 271
1. Liberty and Licentiousness o f the Press Ibid.
2. Reform ; — temperate and intemperate .. 276
Chap. VII. Popular Corruption,— (ad superliam)................ 2 79
Chap. VIII. Observations on the seven preceding Fallacies 287
Chap. IX. Anti-rational Fallacies,— (ad verecundiam) . . . . 295
1. Abuse o f the words Speculative, Theore­
tical, &!C ........................................................... 298
2. U t o p ia n .......................................................... 301
3. G ood in theory, bad in p ractice................ 303
4. T oo good to be practicable ..................... 307
Chap. X. Paradoxical Assertion,— (ad judicium) ................ 314
1 . Dangerousness o f the Principle o f Utility 315
2. Uselessness o f Classification..................... 316
3. Mischievousness o f Sim plification............ 319
4. Disinterestedness a mark o f Profligacy . . 320
5. How to turn this Fallacy to account . . . . 322
Chap. X I. Non-causa pro causd: or, Cause and Obstacle
confounded,— (ad judicium) ................ 328
1 . Effect, Good Governm ent:— Obstacle re­
presented as a cause,— the influence o f
the C r o w n ................................................ 330
2. Effect, Good G overnm ent:— Obstacle re­
presented as a cause,— station of the
Bishops in the House o f L o r d s ............ 332
3. Effect, Useful national Learning j— O b­
stacle stated as a cause,— system o f edit-
 CONTENTS. XI

Page.
cation pursued in Church-of-England
Universities................................................ 334
4. Effect, National virtue 3— Obstacle repre­
sented as a cause,— Opulence o f the
C le r g y ......................................................... 336
Chap. XII. Partiality-preacher’ s Argument,— (ad judicium)
“ From the abuse, argue not against the
use.” .............................................................. 339
Chap. XIII. The End justifies the Means,— (ad judicium) . . 341
Chap. XIV. Opposer-general’s justification,— (ad invidiam)
“ Not measures, but m en,” or “ Not
men, but measures.” .............................. 344
Chap. XV. Rejection instead o f Amendment,— (ad judicium) 349

PART TH E FIFTH .

Chap. I. Characters common to all these Fallacies ............ 359

Chap. 11. O f the mischief producible by Fallacies................ 361
Chap. III. Causes o f the utterance of these Fallacies .... 362
First Cause :— Sinister interest, o f the operation
o f which the party affected by it is con sciou s.. Ibid.
Chap. IV. Second C ause:— Interest-begotten Prejudice . . 372
Chap. V. Third Cause :— Authority-begotten Prejudice 376
Chap. VI. Fourth Cause :— Self-defence against counterFal-
lacies....................................................................... 379
Chap. VII. Use o f these Fallacies to the utterers and ac­
ceptors o f them ................................................ 382
Chap. VIII. Particular demand for Fallacies under the En­
glish Constitution ........................................... 389
Chap. IX. The demand for political Fallacies:— how created
by the state o f in te re sts .................................. 392
Chap. X. Different parts which may be borne in relation
to F allacies......................................................... 400
Chap. XI. Uses o f the preceding Exposure............................. 406
 I N T R O D U C T I O N .

Section I.

A FALLACY, W HAT.

B y the name o f fallacy it is com m on to designate

any argument em ployed, or topic suggested, for the
purpose, or with a probability, o f producing the effect
o f deception,— o f causing some erroneous opinion
to be entertained by any person to whose mind such
argument may have been presented.

Section II.

F A L L A C IE S . B Y W H O M T R E A T E D OF H E R E T O F O R E .

T he earliest author extant in whose works any men­

tion is made on the subject o f fallacies is A ristotle;
by whom, in the course or rather on the occasion o f
his treatise on L ogic, not only is this subject started,
but a list o f the species o f arguments to which this
denomination is applicable is undertaken to be given.
U pon the principle o f the exhaustive method at so
early a period em ployed by that astonishing genius,
and in comparison o f what it might and ought to
have been, so little turned to account since, two is the
B
 O

number o f parts into which the whole mass is distri­

buted— fallacies in the diction, fallacies not in the
diction : and thirteen (w hereof in the diction six, not
in the diction seven) is the number o f the articles
distributed between those two parts51.
A s from Aristotle down to L ocke, on the subject o f
the origination o f our ideas, (deceptious and unde-
ceptious included,)— so from Aristotle down to this
present day, on the subject o f the forms, o f which such
ideas or combination o f ideas as are em ployable in
the character o f instruments o f deception, are suscep­
tible,— all is a blank.
T o d o something in the way o f filling up this blank
is the object o f the present work.
In speaking o f Aristotle’s collection o f fallacies,
as a stock to which from his time to the present
no addition has been made, all that is meant, is, that
whatsoever arguments may have had deception for
their object, none besides those brought to view by
Aristotle, have been brought to view in that character
and under that nam e; for between the time o f Aristotle
and the present, treatises o f the art o f oratory, or po­
pular argumentation, have not been wanting in various

* 'Lotpicp,a, from whence our English word sophism, is the word

employed by Aristotle, The choice o f the appellation is singular
enough ; troipog is the wc. d that was already in use for designating a
wise man. It was the same appellation that was commonly employed
for the designation o f the seven Sages. from whence our
sophist, being an impretative of was the word applied as it were
in irony to designate the tribe o f wranglers, whose pretension to the
praise o f wisdom had no better ground than an abuse o f words.
 3

languages and in considerable num ber: nor can any

o f these be found in which, by him who may wish to
put a deceit upon those to whom he has to address
himself, instruction in no small quantity may not be
obtained.
W hat in these books o f instruction is professed to
be taught com es under this general description : viz.
how, by means o f words aptly em ployed, to gain your
p o in t ; to produce upon those with whom you have
to deal, those to whom you have to address yourself,
the impression, and, by means o f the impression, the
disposition most favourable to your purpose, whatso­
ever that purpose may be.
A s to the impression and disposition the produc­
tion o f which might happen to be desired, whether
the impression were correct or deceptious, whether
the disposition were with a view to the individual or
community in question, salutary, indifferent, or per­
nicious, was a question that seemed not in any o f these
instances to have com e across the author’s mind. In
the view taken by them o f the subject, had any such
question presented itself, it would have been put aside
as foreign to the su b ject; exactly as, in a treatise on
the art o f war, a question concerning the justice o f the
war.
Dionysius o f Halicarnassus, Cicero, and Quintilian,
Isaac V oss, and, though last and in bulk least, yet
not the least interesting, our own Gerard Hamilton
( o f whom more will be said), are o f this stamp.
Between those earliest and these latest o f the writers
B ‘2
 4

who have written on this subject and with this view,

others in abundance might be inserted ; but these are
quite enough.
A fter so many ages past in teaching with equal
com placency and indifference the art o f true instruc­
tion and the art o f deception— the art o f producing
good effects, and the art o f producing bad effects—
the art o f the honest man and the art o f the knave—
o f promoting the purposes o f the benefactor and the
purposes o f the enemy o f the human r a c e ;— after so
many ages during which, with a view to persuasion,
disposition, action, no instructions have been endea­
voured to be given but in the same strain o f imper­
turbable impartiality, it seemed not too early in the
nineteenth century to take up the subject on the ground
o f morality, and to invite com m on honesty for the first
time to mount the bench and take her seat as ju dge.
A s to Aristotle’s fallacies, unless his petitio principii
and his Jallacia, non causa pro causa be considered as
exceptions, upon examination so little danger would
be found in them, that, had the philosopher left them
unexposed to do their worst, the omission need not
have hung very heavy upon his con scien ce; scarce
in any instance will be discovered any the least dan­
ger o f final deception : the utmost inconvenience they
seem capable o f producing seems confined to a slight
sensation o f embarrassment. And as to the embar­
rassment, the difficulty will be, not in pronouncing
that the proposition in question is incapable o f form ­
ing a just ground for the conclusion built upon it, but
 5

in finding words for the description o f the weakness

which is the cause o f this incapacity : not in discover­
ing the proposition to be absurd, but in giving an
exact description o f the form in which the absurdity
presents itself.

Section I I I .

R E L A T IO N OF F A L L A C IE S TO V U L G A R E R R O R S .

Error , vulgar error a, is an appellation given to an

opinion which, being considered as false, is considered
in itself only, and not with a view to any consequences
o f any kind, o f which it may be productive.
It is termed vulgar with reference to the persons
by whom it is supposed to be entertained : and this
either in respect o f their multitude, simply, or in re­
spect o f the lowness o f the station occupied by them
or the greater part o f them in the scale o f respectabi­
lity, in the scale o f intelligence.
Fallacy is an appellation applied not exclusively to
an opinion or to propositions enunciative o f supposed
opinions, but to discourse in any shape considered as.
having a tendency, with or without design, to cause
any erroneous opinion to be embraced, or even, through

a Vulgar errors is a denomination which, from the work written on

this subject by a physician o f name in the seventeenth century, has.
obtained a certain degree o f celebrity.
Not the moral (of which the political is a department), but the phy­
sical, was the field o f the errors which it was the object o f Sir Thomas
Brown to hunt out and bring to view : but o f this restriction no inti­
mation is given by the words o f which the title o f his work is composed.
 6

the medium o f erroneous opinion already entertained,

to cause any pernicious course o f action to be engaged
or persevered in.
Thus, to believe that they who lived in early or old
times were, because they lived in those times, wiser
or better than those who live in later or modern times,
is vulgar error : the em ploying that vulgar error in
the endeavour to cause pernicious practices and insti­
tutions to be retained, is fallacy.
By those by whom the term fallacy has been em ­
ployed, at any rate by those by whom it was originally
em ployed, deception has been considered not merely
as a consequence more or less probable, but as a con­
sequence the production o f which wras aimed at on
the part at least o f some o f the utterers.
EXsy%oi Gotpisav, arguments em ployed by the sophists,
is the denomination by which Aristotle has designated
his devices, thirteen in number, to which his com m en­
tators, such o f them as write in Latin, give the name
fallacice , (from fallere
of to deceive,) from which our
English word fallacies.
That in the use o f these instruments, such a thing
as deception was the object o f the set o f men men­
tioned by Aristotle under the name o f sophists, is al­
together out o f doubt. O n every occasion on which
they are mentioned by him, this intention o f deceiving
js either directlv asserted or assumed.
 7

Section I V .
P O L IT IC A L F A L L A C IE S T11E SU B JE C T OT T H IS
W ORK.

T he present work confines itself to the examination

and exposure o f only one class o f fallacies, which class
is determined by the nature o f the occasion in which
they are em ployed.
T h e occasion here in question is that o f the forma­
tion o f a decision procuring the adoption or rejection
o f som e measure o f government: including under the
notion o f a measure o f government, a measure o f le­
gislation as well as o f administration ; two operations
so intimately connected, that the drawing o f a boun­
dary line between them will in som e instances be mat­
ter o f no small difficulty, but for the distinguishing o f
which on the present occasion, and for the purpose o f
the present work, there will not be any need.
U nder the name o f a Treatise on Political Fallacies,
this work will possess the character, and, in so far as
the character answers the design o f it, have the effect
o f a treatise on the art o f government: having for its
practical object and tendency, in the first place, the
facilitating the introduction o f such features o f good
government as remain to be introduced ; ' in the next
place giving them perpetuation— perpetuation, not by
means o f legislative clauses aiming directly at that ob­
je c t (an aim o f which the inutility and mischievousness
will com e to be fully laid open to view in the course
o f this work), but by means o f that instrument, viz.
 8

reason, by which alone the endeavour can be produc­

tive o f any useful effect.
Em ployed in this endeavour, there are two ways in
which this instrument may be applied : one, the more
direct, by showing, on the occasion o f each proposed
measure, in what way, by what probable conse­
quences it tends to prom ote the accom plishm ent o f
the end or object which it professes to have particu­
larly in v ie w : the other, the less direct, by point­
ing out the irrelevancy, and thus anticipating and de­
stroying the persuasive force, o f such deceptions ar­
guments as have been in use, or appear likely to be
em ployed in the endeavour to oppose it, and to dis­
suade men from concurring in the establishment o f it.
O f these tw o different but harmonizing m odes o f
applying this same instrument to its several purposes,
the more direct is that o f which a sample has, ever
since the year 1802, been before the public, in that
collection o f unfinished papers on legislation, pub­
lished at Paris in the French language, and which
had the advantage o f passing through the hands o f
M r. Dum ont, but for whose labours it would scarcely,
in the author’s life-time at least, have seen the light.
T o exhibit the less direct, but in its application the more
extensive mode, is the business o f the present work.
To give existence to good arguments was the object
in that instance : to provide for the exposure of bad
ones is the object in the present instance—to provide
'for the exposure of their real nature, and thence for
the destruction of their pernicious force.
 9
Sophistry is a hydra o f which, if all the necks could
be exposed, the force would be destroyed. In this
work they have been diligently looked out for, and in
the course o f it the principal and most active o f them
have been brought to view.

Section V .
D IV IS IO N O R C L A S S IF IC A T IO N OF F A L L A C IE S .

So numerous are the instruments o f persuasion which

in the character o f fallacies the present work will bring
to view, that, for enabling the mind to obtain any tole­
rably satisfactory com m and over it, a set o f divisions
deduced from some source or other appeared to be
altogether indispensable.
T o frame these divisions with perfect logical accu­
racy will be an undertaking o f no small difficulty ; an
undertaking requiring more time than either the author
or editor has been able to bestow upon it.
A n imperfect classification, however, being prefer­
able to no classification at all, the author had adopted
one principle o f division from the situation o f the ut-
terers o f fallacies, especially from the utterers in the
British Houses o f P arliam ent:— fallacies o f the ins,—
fallacies o f the outs,— cither-side fallacies.
A principle o f subdivision he found in the quarter
to which the fallacy in question applied itself, in the
persons on whom it was designed to op era te; the af­
fections, ihe judgement, and the imagination.
T o the several clusters o f fallacies marked out by
this subdivision, a Latin affix, expressive o f the faculty
or affection aimed at, was given ; not surely for osten­
tation, for o f the very humblest sort would such osten­
tation be, but for prominence, for impressiveness, and
thence for clearness : arguments 1. ad verecundiam :
2. ad superstitionem: 3. ad amicitiam: 4. ad metum :
5. ad odium : 6. ad invidentiam : 7. ad quietem :
8. ad socordiam : 9 • ad super biam : 10. ad judicium :
\\. ad imaginationem.
In the same manner, Locke has em ployed Latin d e­
nominations to distinguish four kinds o f argum ent: ad
verecundiam , ad ignorantiam , ad hominem,adjudicium.
M r. D um ont, who som e few years since published
in French a translation, or rather a redaction, o f a con­
siderable portion o f the present work, divided the fal­
lacies into three classes, according to the particular
or special object to which the fallacies o f each class
appeared more immediately applicable. Som e he
supposed destined to repress discussion altogether;
others to postpone i t ; others to perplex, when discus­
sion could no longer be avoided. T h e first class he
called fallacies o f authority, the second fallacies o f
delay, and the third fallacies o f confusion: he has
also added to the name o f each fallacy the Latin affix
which points out the faculty or affection to w'hich it
is chiefly addressed.
T h e present editor has preferred this arrangement
to that pursued by the author, and w ith some little
variation he has adopted it in this volume.
In addition to the supposed immediate object o f a
given class o f fallacies, he has considered the subject
matter o f each individual fallacy, with a view to the
coraprehenfling in one class all such fallacies as more
nearly resemble each other in the nature o f their sub­
je c t m atter: and the classes he has arranged in the
order in which the enemies o f improvement may be
supposed to resort to them according to the emergency
o f the moment.
First, fallacies o f authority (including laudatory
personalities); the subject matter o f which is authority
in various shapes, and the immediate object, to repress,
on the ground o f the weight o f such authority, all ex­
ercise o f the reasoning faculty.
Secondly, fallacies o f danger (including vituperative
personalities) ; the subject matter o f which is the sug­
gestion o f danger in various shapes, and the object, to
repress altogether, on the ground o f such danger, the
discussion proposed to be entered on.
Thirdly, fallacies o f delay; the subject matter o f which
is an assigning o f reasons for delay in various shapes,
and the object, to postpone such discussion, with a view
o f eluding it altogether.
Fourthly, fallacies o f cotfusion ; the subject matter
o f which consists chiefly o f vague and indefinite gene­
to produce, when discussion
ralities, while the object is
can no longer be avoided, such confusion in the minds
o f the hearers as to incapacitate them for forming a
correct judgem ent on the question proposed for deli­
beration.
In the arrangement thus made, imperfections will
be found, the removal o f which, should the removal
o f them be practicable and at the same time worth
the trouble, must be left to some experter hand. T h e
classes themselves are not in every instance sufficiently
distinct from each oth er; the articles ranged under
them respectively not appertaining with a degree o f
propriety sufficiently exclusive to the heads under
which they are placed. Still, imperfect as it is, the
arrangement will, it is hoped, be found by the reflect­
ing reader not altogether without its use.

Section V I .
N O M E N C L A T U R E OF P O L I T I C A L F A L L A C IE S .

Between the business o f classification and that o f

nomenclature, the connexion is most intimate. To
the work o f classification no expression can be given
but by means o f nomenclature : no name other than
what in the language o f grammarians is called a proper
name, no name more extensive in its application than
is the name o f an individual, can be applied, but a
class is marked out, and, as far as the work o f the
mind is creation, created.
Still, however, the two operations remain not the
less distinguishable : for o f the class marked out, a
description may be given o f any length and degree o f
com plication ; the description given may be such as
to occupy entire sentences in any number. But a
name properly so called consists either o f no m ore
than one word, and that one a noun substantive, or at
most o f no more than a substantive with its adjunct:
or, if o f words more Ilian one, they must be in surli
sort linked together as to form in conjunction no more
than a sort o f compound word, occupying the place o f
a noun substantive in the com position o f a sentence.
W ithout prodigious circumlocution and inconve­
nience, a class o f objects, however well marked out by
description, cannot be designated, unless we substitute
for the words constituting the description, a word,
or very small cluster o f words, so connected as to
constitute a name. In this case nomenclature is to
description what, in algebraical operation, the sub­
stitution o f a single letter o f the alphabet for a line
o f any length com posed o f numerical figures or letters
o f the alphabet, or both together, is to the continu-
/
ing and repeating at each step the com plicated mat­
ter o f that same line.
T he class being marked out whether by description
or denomination, an operation that will remain to be
performed is, i f no name be as yet given to it, the find­
ing for it and giving to it a name : if a name has been
given to it, the sitting in judgem ent on such name, for
the purpose o f determining whether it presents as ade­
quate a conception o f the object as can be wished, or
whether some other may not be devised by which that
conception may be presented in a manner more ade­
quate.
Blessed be he for evermore, in whatsoever robe ar­
rayed, to whose creative genius we are indebted for
the first conception o f those too short-lived vehicles,
by which, as in a nutshell, intimation is conveyed to
 14

us o f the essential character o f those awful volumes

which at the touch o f the sceptre becom e the rules o f
our conduct, and the arbiters o f our destiny :— “ T h e
Alien A c t,” “ T h e Turnpike A ct,” “ T h e M iddlesex
W aterworks Bill,” &c. & c .!
H ow advantageous a substitute in some cases, how
useful an additainent in all cases, would they not
make to those authoritative masses o f words called
titles, by which so large a proportion o f sound and so
small a proportion o f instruction are at so large an ex­
pense o f attention granted to us ; “ A n A c t to explain
and amend an A c t entitled A n A ct to explain and
amend,” & c. See. !
In two, three, four, or at the outside half a dozen
words, information without pretension is given, which
frequently when pretended is not given, but confusion
and darkness given instead o f it, in twice, thrice, four
times, or half a dozen times as many lines.
Rouleaus o f com m odious and significative appella­
tives, are thus issued day by day throughout the session
from an invisible though n otan unlicensed m int; but no
sooner has the last newspaper thatappeared the last day
o f the session made its way to the most distant o f its
stages, than all this learning, all this circulating medium,
is as com pletely lost to the world and buried in ob li­
vion as a French assignat.
So many yearly strings o f words, not one o f which
is to be found in the works o f Dryden, with whom
the art o f coining words fit to be used became num­
bered am ong the lost arts, and the art o f giving birth
 15

to new ideas among the prohibited ones ! So many

words, not one o f which would have found toleration
from the orthodoxy o f Charles Fox !
Let the workshop o f invention be shut up for ever,
rather than that the tympanum o f taste should be grated
by a new sound ! Rigorous decree ! more rigorous if
obedience or execution kept pace with design, than even
the continent-blockading and commerce-crushing de-
crees proclaimed by Buonaparte.
So necessary is it that, when a thing is talked of,
there should be a name to call it by ; so conducive,
not to say necessary, to the prevalence o f reason, o f
com m on sense, and moral honesty, that instruments
o f deception should be talked of, and well talked of,
and talked out o f fashion,— in a word talked down,—
that, without any other license than the old one
granted by H orace, and which, notwithstanding the
acknowledged goodness o f the authority, men are so
strangely backward to make use of,— the author had,
under the spur o f necessity, struck out for each o f
these instruments o f deception a separate barbarism,
such as the tools which he had at command would
enable him to produce : the objections, however, o f
a class o f readers, who, under the denomination o f
men o f taste, attach much more importance to the
manner than to the matter o f a com position, have in­
duced the editor to suppress for the present some o f
these characteristic appellations, and to substitute for
them a less expressive periphrasis.
 16

Section V I I .
CON TRAST B E TW E E N TH E PRESEN T W ORK AND
Ha m i l t o n ’s “ p a r l ia m e n t a r y l o g ic .”

O f this work, the general conception bad been

form ed, and in the com position o f it some little pro­
gress made, when the advertisements brought under
the author's notice the posthumous work intituled
“ Parliamentary Logic , by the late W illiam G erard
H am ilton,” distinguished from so many other H am il-
tons by the name o f Single-speech Hamilton.
O f finding the need o f a work such as the present,
superseded in any considerable degree by that o f the
right honourable orator, the author had neither hope
nor apprehension : but his surprise was not inconsider­
able on finding scarcely in any part o f the two works
any the smallest degree o f coincidence.
In respect o f practical views and objects, it would
not indeed be true to say that between the one and
the other there exists not any relation; for there exists
a pretty close one, nameh7, the relation o f contrariety.
W hen, under the title o f “ Directions to Servants ,”
Swift presented to view a collection o f such various
faults as servants, o f different descriptions, had been
found or supposed by him liable to fall into, his ob ­
je c t (it need scarce be said), if he had any serious ob­
je c t beyond that o f making his readers laugh, was,
not that compliance, but that non-com pliance, with
the directions so humorously delivered, should be the
practical result.
 17

Taking that work o f Swift’s for his pattern, and

what seemed the serious object o f it, for his guidance,
the author o f this work occasionally found in the
form o f a direction for the framing o f a fallacy, what
seemed the most convenient vehicle for conveying a
conception o f its nature : as in some instances, for
conveying a conception o f the nature o f the figure
he is occupied in the description of, a mathemati­
cian begins with giving an indication o f the m ode in
which it may be framed, or, as the phrase is, ge­
nerated.
O n these occasions much pains will not be neces­
sary to satisfy the reader that the object o f any
instructions which may here be found for the com ­
position o f a fallacy, has been, not to prom ote, but as
far as possible to prevent the use o f i t : to prevent
the use o f it, or at any rate to deprive it o f its
effect.
Such, if Gerard Hamilton is to be believed, was
not the object w’ith Gerard H am ilton : his book is a
sort o f school, in which the means o f advocating what
is a good cause, and the means o f advocating what
is a bad cause, are brought to view with equal
frankness, and inculcated with equal solicitude for
success : in a word, that which M achiavel has been
supposed sometimes to aim at, Gerard Hamilton
as often as it occurs to him does not only aim at,
but aim at without disguise. W hether on this ob ­
servation any such imputation as that o f calumny
is justly chargeable, the samples given in the course
C
 18

o f this work will put the reader in a condition to

judge.
Sketched out by himself and finished by his editor
and panegyrist11, the political character o f Gerard
Ham ilton may be com prised in a few words : he was
determined to jo in with a p arty; he was as ready to
side with one party as another; and whatever party
he sided with, as ready to say any one thing as any
other in support o f it. Independently o f party, and
personal profit to be made from party, right and wrong,
good and evil, were in his eyes matters o f indifference.
But having consecrated himself to party, viz. the party,
whatever it was, from which the most was to be got,
— that party being, o f whatever materials com posed,
the party o f the ins,— that party standing constantly
pledged for the protection o f abuse in every shape,

a Extract from the preface to Hamilton’s work:—

“ He indeed considered politics as a kind o f game, o f which the
stake or prize was the administration o f the country. Hence he thought
that those who conceived that one party were possessed o f greater abi­
lity than their opponents, and were therefore fitter to fill the first offices
in the state, might with great propriety adopt such measures (consistent
with the Constitution) as should tend to bring their friends into the
administration o f affairs, or to support them when invested with such
power, without weighing in golden scales the particular parliamentary
questions which should be brought forward for this purpose; as on
the other hand, they who had formed a higher estimate o f the opposite
party might with equal propriety adopt a similar conduct, and shape
various questions for the purpose o f showing the imbecility o f those in
power, and substituting an abler ministry, or one that they considered
abler, in their room ; looking on such occasions rather to the object o f
each motion than to the question itself. And in support o f these po­
sitions, which, however short they may be o f theoretical perfection, do
 ly
and in so far as good consists in the extirpation of
abuse, for the opposing and keeping out every thing
that is good ,— hence it was to the opposing o f whatso­
ever is good in honest eyes, that his powers, such as
they were, were bent and pushed with peculiar energy.
O ne thing only he recognised as being malum in se,
as a thing being to be opposed at any rate, and at any
price, even on any such extraordinary supposition as
that o f its being brought forward by the party with
which, at the time being, it was his lot to side. This
was, parliamentary reform.
In the course o f his forty years labour in the ser­
vice o f the people, one thing he did that was good :
one thing to wit, that in the account o f his panegyrist
is set down on that side:—

not perhaps very widely differ (says Mr. Malone) from the actual state
o f things, he used to observe that, if any one would carefully examine
all the questions which have been agitated in Parliament from the time
o f the Revolution, he would be surprised to find howfew could be point­
ed out in which an honest man might not conscientiously have voted
on either side, however, by the force o f rhetorical aggravation and the
fervour o f the times, they may have been represented to be o f such
high importance, that the very existence o f the state depended on the
result o f the deliberation.
“ Some questions, indeed, h^ acknowledged to be o f a vital nature, o f
such magnitude, and so intimately connected with the safety and wel­
fare o f the whole community, that no inducement or friendly dispo­
sition to any party ought to have the smallest weight in the decision.
One o f these in his opinion was the proposition for a parliamentary re­
form , or in other words for the new modelling the constitution o f par­
liament ; a measure which he considered o f such moment, and o f so
dangerous a tendency, that he once said to a friend now living, that he
would sooner suffer his right hand to be cut off than vote for it.1'
C 2
 20

O ne use o f government (in eyes sucii as his the

principal use) is to enable men who have shares in it to
em ploy public money in payment for private service:—
W ithin the view o f Gerard Ham ilton there lived a
man whose talents and turn o f mind qualified him for
appearing with peculiar success in the character o f an
amusing com panion in every good house. In this cha­
racter he for a length o f time appeared in the house o f
Gerard H a m ilton : finding him an Irishman, H am il­
ton got an Irish pension o f 300/. a year created for
him, and sent him back to Ireland : the man being in
Dublin, and constituting in virtue o f his office a part
o f the lord lieutenant’s family, he appeared in the same
character and with equal success in the house o f the
lord lieutenants

a “ Yet, such was the warmth o f his friend’s feelings, and with such
constant pleasure did he reflect on the many happy days which they
had spent together, that he not only in the first place obtained for him
a permanent provision on the establishment o f Ireland *, but in addi­
tion to this proof o f his regard and esteem, he never ceased, without
any kind o f solicitation, to watch over his interest with the most lively
solicitude; constantly applying in person on his behalf to every new
lord lieutenant, if he were acquainted with him ; or if that were not
the case, contriving by some circuitous means to procure Mr. Jephson’s
re-appointment to the office originally conferred on him by Lord Town-
shend: and by these means chiefly he was continued for a long series
o f years under twelve successive governors o f Ireland in the same sta­
tion, which had always before been considered a temporary office.”—
Pari. Log. 44.

* Note by editor Malone :— “ A pension o f 3001. a year, which the

Duke o f Rutland during his government, from personal regard and a
high admiration o f Mr. Jephson’s talents, increased to 000/. per annum
for the joint lives o f himself and Mrs. Jephson. He survived our author
 21

H is Grace gave permanence to the sinecure, and

doubled the salary of it. Here was liberality upon li­
berality—here was virtue upon virtue. It is by such
things that merit is displayed ; it is for such things
that taxes are imposed; it is for affording matter and
exercise for such virtues ; it is for affording rewards
for such merit, that the people of every country, in so
far as any good use is made of them, are made.
To a man in whose eyes public virtue appeared in
this only shape, no wonder that parliamentary reform
should be odious:—of parliamentary reform, the effect
of which, and, in eyes of a different complexion, one
main use would be, the drying up the source of all
such virtues.
Here, in regard to the matter of fact, there are two
representations given of the same subject: represen­
tations perfectly concurrent in all points with one an­
other, though from very different quarters, and begin­
ning as well as ending with very different views, and
leading to opposite conclusions.
Parliament a sort of gaming-house ; members on
the tw'o sides of each house the players; the property
of the people, such portion of it as on any pretence
may be found capable of being extracted from them,
the stakes played for. Insincerity in all its shapes,
disingenuousness, lying, hypocrisy, fallacy, the instru-
but a few years, dying at his house at Black Rock, near Dublin, o f a
paralytic disorder, May 31, 1803, in his sixty-seventh year.”
Note.—That not content with editing, and, in this way, recommend­
ing in the lump these principles o f his friend and countryman, Malone
takes up particular aphorisms, and applies his mind to the elucidation
o f them. This may be seen exemplified in Aphorisms 243, 249.
 22

inents em ployed by the players on both sides for o b ­

taining advantages in the g a m e : on each occasion,— in
respect o f the side on which he ranks himself,— what
course will be most for the advantage o f the universal
interest,— a question never looked at, never taken into
a c c o u n t: on which side is the prospect o f personal ad­
vantage in its several shapes,— this the only question
really taken into consideration: according to the an­
swer given to this question in his own mind, a man
takes the one or the other o f the two sides : the side
o f those in office, i f there be room or near prospect
o f room for h im ; the side o f those by whom office
is but in expectancy, i f the future contingent presents
a more encouraging prospect than the immediately
present.
T o all these distinguished persons, to the self-ap­
pointed professor and teacher o f political profligacy,
to his admiring editor, to their com m on and sympa­
thizing friend a, the bigotry-ridden preacher o f hollow
and com m on-place morality, parliamentary reform we
see in an equal degree, and that an extreme one, an
ob ject o f abhorrence. H ow should it be otherwise ?
By parliamentary reform, the prey, the perpetually re­
nascent prey, the fruit and object o f the game, would
have been snatched out o f their hands. Official pay
in no case more than what is sufficient for the security
o f adequate service,— no sinecures, no pensions, for
hiring flatterers and pampering parasites:— no plunder­
ing in any shape or for any purpose:— amidst the cries

* Se< 2t>
 o f N o theory ! no theory ! the example o f Am erica a
lesson, the practice o f Am erica transferred to Britain.
T h e notion o f the general predominance o f self-re­
garding over social interest has been held up as a
weakness incident to the situation o f those whose con ­
verse has been more with books than men. Be it so :
look then to those teachers, those men o f practical
wisdom, whose converse has been with men at least
as much as with books : look in particular to this
right honourable, who in the house o f com m ons had
doubled the twenty years lucubration necessary for
law, who had served almost six apprenticeships, who
in that office had served out five com plete clerkships:
what says he ? Self-regarding interest predominant
over social interest ? Self regard predominant ? no :
but self-regard sole o ccu p a n t: the universal interest,
howsoever talked of, never so much as thought o f ;
right and wrong, objects o f avowed indifference.
O f the self-written M em oirs o f Bubb D odington
how much was said in their day ! o f Gerard Ham il­
ton’s Parliamentary L ogic, how little ! T h e reason is
not unobvious: D odington was all anecdote; Ham il­
ton was all theory. W hat Hamilton endeavoured to
teach with M alone and Johnson for his bag-bearers,
D odington was seen to practise.
N o r is the veil o f decorum cast o ff any where from
his practice. In H am ilton’s book for the first time
has profligacy been seen stark naked. In the reign
o f Charles the Second, Sir Charles Sedley and others
were indicted for exposing themselves in a balcony in
 24

a state o f perfect nudity. In Gerard Ham ilton may

be seen the Sir Charles Sedley o f political morality.
Sedley might have stood in his balcony till he was
frozen, and nobody the better, n obody much the w orse:
but Ham ilton’s self-exposure is m ost instructive.
O f parliamentary reform were a man to say that it
is good because Gerard Ham ilton was averse to it, he
would fall into the use o f one o f those fallacies against
the influence o f which it is one o f the objects o f the
ensuing work to raise a barrier;
This however may be said, and said without fallacy,
viz. that it is the influence exercised by such men, and
the use to which such their influence is put by them,
that constitutes no small part o f the political disease,
which has produced the demand for parliamentary
reform in the character o f a remedy.
T o such men it is as natural and necessary that
parliamentary reform should be odious, as that Botany
Bay or the Hulks should be odious to thieves and
robbers.
A b ove all other species o f business, the one which
Gerard Ham ilton was most apprehensive o f his pupils
not being sufficiently constant in the practice of, is
misrepresentation. U nder the name o f action, thrice
was gesticulation spoken o f as the first accomplish­
ment o f his profession by the Athenian o r a to r ;
By G erard Ham ilton, in a collection o f aphorisms,
5 5 3 in number, in about 4 0 vice is recom m ended
without disguise ; twelve times is misrepresentation,
i. e. premeditated falsehood with or without a mask,
recomm ended in the several forms o f which it pre­
sented itself to him as susceptible : viz. in the way o f
false addition three times, in the way o f false substi­
tution twice, and in the way o f omission seven times.
H e was fearful o f deceiving the only persons he
meant not to deceive (viz. the pupils to whom he was
teaching the art o f deceiving others), had he fallen
into any such omission, as that o f omitting in the
teaching o f this lesson any instruction or example that
might contribute to render them perfect in it.
O f a good cause as such, o f every cause that is en­
titled to the appellation o f a good cause, it is the cha­
racteristic property that it does not stand in need,— o f
a bad cause, o f every cause that is justly designated
by the appellation o f a bad cause, it is the character­
istic property that it does stand in need o f assistance
o f this kind. N o t merely indifference as between good
and bad, but predilection for what is bad is therefore
the cast o f mind betrayed or rather displayed by G e ­
rard Hamilton. For the praise o f intelligence and
active talent, that is, for so much o f it as constitutes
the difference between what is to be earned by the
advocation o f good causes only, and that which is to
be earned by the advocation o f bad causes likewise,
— o f bad causes in preference to good ones,— for this
species and degree o f praise it is, that Gerard H am il­
ton was content to forgo the merit o f probity, o f sin­
cerity as a branch o f probity, and take to him self the
substance as well as the shape and colour o f the op ­
posite vice.
 This is the work which, having been fairly written
out by the author a, and thence by the editor, presumed
to have been intended for the press, had been “ shown
by him to his friend D r. Johnson.” This is the work
which this same D r. Johnson, i f the editor is to be
believed, “ considered a very curious and masterly
perform ance.” This is the work in which that pom -

a Extract from the preface to Hamilton’s w ork:—

“ But in the treatise on Parliamentary Logic we have the fruit and
result o f the experience o f one, who was by no means unconversant
with law, and had himself sat in Parliament for more than forty years;
who in the commencement o f his political career burst forth like a
meteor, and for a while obscured his contemporaries by the splendour
o f his eloquence; who was a most curious observer o f the characteris­
tic merits and defects o f the distinguished speakers o f his tim e: and
who, though after his first effort he seldom engaged in public debate,
devoted almost all his leisure and thoughts, during the long period
above mentioned, to the examination and discussion o f all the princi­
pal questions agitated in Parliament, and o f the several topics and
modes o f reasoning by which they were either supported or opposed.
“ Hence the rules and precepts here accumulated, which are equally
adapted to the use o f the pleader and orator: nothing vague, or loose,
or general *, is delivered; and the most minute particularities and
artful turns o f debate are noticed with admirable acuteness, subtilty
and precision. The work, therefore, is filled with practical axioms,
and parliamentary and forensic wisdom, and cannot but be o f perpe­
tual use to all those persons who may have occasion to use their dis­
cursive talents within or without the doors o f the House of Commons,
in conversation at the Bar, or in Parliament.
- “ This Tract was fairly written out by the author, and therefore may
be presumed to have been intended by him for the press. He had
shown it to his friend Dr. Johnson, who considered it a very curious
and masterly performance.”

* For “ n o th in g read “ the greatest part." J. B.

 <J7

pous preacher o f melancholy moralities saw, if the

editor is to be believed, nothing to “ object to,” but
“ the too great conciseness and refinement o f some
parts o f it,” and the occasion it gave to “ a wish that
some o f the precepts had been more opened and ex­
panded.”
So far as concerns sincerity and candour in debate,
the two friends indeed, even to ju dge o f them from
the evidence transmitted to us by their respective pa­
negyrists, seem to have been worthy to smell at the
same nosegay: and an “ expansion and enlargement,”
com posed by the hand that suggested it, would beyond
doubt have been a “ very curious and masterly,” as
well as amusing addition to this “ very curious and
masterly performance.”
T w o months before his death, when, if he him self
is to be believed, ambition had in such a degree been
extinguished in him by age and infirmities, that after
near forty years o f experience a seat in Parliament
was becom e an object o f indifference to him a,— four
years after he had been visited by a fit o f the palsyb,—
he wras visited by a fit o f virtue, and in the paroxysm
o f that fit hazarded an experiment, the object o f which
was to try w hether, in a then approaching parliament,
a seat might not be obtained without a com plete sa­
crifice o f independence. T h e experiment was not
successful. From som e lord, whose name decorum
has suppressed, he was, as his letter to his lordship

* page 26 . b page 11.

testified, “ on the point o f receiving” a sea t; and the
ob ject o f this letter was to learn whether, along with
the seat, “ the power o f thinking for him self ” might
be included in the gra n t; the question being accom ­
panied with a request that, in case o f the negative,
som e other nominee might be the object o f his lord­
ship’ s “ confidence.”
T h e request was inadmissible, and the confidence
found some other object.
It is in the hope o f substituting men to puppets,
and the will o f the people to the will o f noble lords,
puppets themselves to ministers or secret advisers,
that parliamentary reform has o f late becom e once
more an object o f general desire : but parliamentary
reform was that sort o f thing which “ he would sooner,”
he said, “ suffer his hand to be cut o ff than vote for a
whether it was before or after the experiment that
this magnanimity was displayed, the editor has not
informed us.
T h e present which the world received in the publi­
cation o f this work may on several accounts be justly
termed a valuable one. T h e only cause o f regret is,
that the editor should, by the unqualified approbation
and admiration bestowed upon it, have made the prin­
ciples o f the work as it were his own.
True it is, that where instruction is given, showing
how m ischief may be done or aimed at, whether it
shall serve as a precept or a prohibition, depends in*

* page xxxvii.
 29

the upshot, upon the person on whom it operates with

e ffe c t:
M any a dehortation that not only has the effect o f
an exhortation, but was designed to have that e ffe c t;
Instructions how to administer poisons with suc­
cess, may on the other hand have the effect o f enabling
a person who takes them up with an opposite view, to
secure himself the more effectually against the attack
o f p oison s;
But by the manner in which he writes, by the ac­
cessory ideas presented by the words in which the in­
struction is conveyed, there can seldom be much dif­
ficulty in comprehending in the delivery o f his instruc­
tions whether the writer wishes that the suggestions
conveyed by them should be embraced or rejected :
I f occasional! mfv there can be room for doubt in this
respect, at any rate no room can there be for any in
the case o f Gerard Hamilton. A s little can there be
in the case o f his editor and panegyrist:Qui mihi dis-
cipulus puer es, cupis atque doceri, Hue ades, hcec ani-
mo concipe dicta tuo : T h e object or end in view is,
on occasion o f a debate in Parliament,— in a supreme
legislative assembly,— how to gain your point, whatever
it be. T he means indicated as conducive to that end
are sometimes fair ones, sometimes foul o n e s ; and be
they fair or foul, they are throughout delivered with
the same tone o f seriousness and composure.
C om e unto me all ye who have a point to gain, and
I will show you how : bad or good, so as it be not par­
liamentary reform, to me it is matter o f indifference.
 30

H ere then, whatever be the influence o f authority,

authority in general, and that o f the writer in parti­
cular, it is in the propagation o f insincerity ( o f insin­
cerity to be em ployed in the service it is m ost fit for,
and in which it finds its richest reward,) that through­
out the whole course o f this work, and under the name
o f Gerard H am ilton, not to speak o f his editor and
panegyrist, such authority exerts itself.
T o secure their children from falling into the vice
o f drunkenness, it was the policy we are told o f Spar­
tan fathers to exhibit their slaves in a state o f inebria­
tion, that the contem pt might be felt to which a man
stands exposed when the intellectual part o f his frame
has been thrown into the disordered state to which it
is apt by this means to be reduced. A n English father,
if he has any regard for the morals o f his son, and in
particular for that vital part in which sincerity is con ­
cerned, will perhaps no where else find so instructive
an example as Gerard Ham ilton has rendered him self
by this b o o k : in that mirror may be seen to what a
state o f corruption the moral part o f man’s frame is
capable o f being reduced ; to what a state o f degra­
dation, in the present state o f parliamentary morality,
a man is capable o f sinking even w'hen sober, and
without any help from wine ; and with what delibe­
rate zeal he may him self exert his powers in the en­
deavour to propagate the infection in other minds.
 PART THE FIRST.

FALLACIES OF AUTHORITY,
The subject o f which is Authority in various shapes,
and the object, to repi'ess all exercise o f the reason­
ing fa cu lty.
W it h reference to any measures having for their
object the greatest happiness o f the greatest number,
the course pursued by the adversaries o f such measures
has com m only been, in the first instance, to endeavour
to repress altogether the exercise o f the reasoning fa­
culty, by adducing authority in various shapes as con­
clusive upon the subject o f the measure proposed.
But before any clear view can be given o f the de­
ception liable to be produced by the abuse o f the spe­
cies o f argument here in question, it will be necessary
to bring to view the distinction between the proper
and the improper use o f it.
In the ensuing analysis o f Authority, one distinction
ought to be borne in mind ;— it is the distinction be­
tween what may be termed a question o f opinion, or
quidfaciendum ; and what may be termed a question
o f fa ct , or quidfactum. Since it will frequently hap­
pen, that whilst the authority o f a person in respect
to a question o f fact is entitled to more or less regard,
it is not so entitled in respect o f a question o f opinion.
32 FALLACIES OF AU TH O RITY. [Ch. 1 .
CHAPTER I.
Sect. 1. Analysis o f A u thority .
Sect. 2. Appeal to A u thority , in what casesfallacious .
I. W hat on any given occasion is the legitimate
weight or influence o f authority regard being had to
the different circumstances in which a person, the
supposed declaration o f whose opinion constitutes the
authority in question, was placed at the time o f the
delivery o f such declaration ?
1st. U pon the degree o f relative and adequate in­
telligence on the part o f the person whose opinion or
supposed opinion constitutes the authority in question,
— say o f the persona cujus , 2dly, U pon the degree o f
relative probity on the part o f that same person,
3dly, U pon the nearness or remoteness o f the relation
between the immediate subject o f such his opinion and
the question in hand, 4thly, U pon the fidelity o f the
medium, through which such supposed opinion has
been transmitted (including correctness and com plete­
ness),— upon such circumstances, the legitimately per­
suasive force o f the authority thus constituted, seems
to depend : such are the sources in which any defi­
ciency in respect o f such persuasive force is to be
looked for.
Deficiencyof attention, i.e. intensityandsteadi­
nessofattentionwithreferencetotheinfluencingcir­
cum stancesonwhichtheopinioninordertobecor­
rect, requiredtobegrounded; deficiencyinrespect
Sect. 1 . ] FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 33

o f opportunity or matter o f information, with reference

to the individual question in hand ; distance in point
o f time from the scene o f the proposed measure;
distance in point o f p la ce ;— such again are the sources
in which, the situation o f the person in question being
given, any deficiency in respect o f relative and ade­
quate intelligence is, it seems, to be looked for.
It is in the character o f a cause o f deficiency in re­
lative and adequate information, that distance in point
o f time operates as a cause o f deficiency in respect o f
relative and adequate intelligence, and so in regard to
distance in point o f place.
A s to relative probity, any deficiency referable to
this head will be occasioned by the exposure o f the
persona cujus to the action o f sinister interest: con ­
cerning which see Part 5, Chapter 2 .— Causes o f the
utterance o f these fallacies.
T h e most ordinary and conspicuous deficiency in
the article o f relative probity, is that o f sincerity: the
improbity consisting in the opposition or discrepancy
between the opinion expressed and the opinion really
entertained.
But as not only declaration o f opinion, but opinion
itself, is exposed to the action o f sinister interest, in
so far as this is the case, the deficiency is occasioned
in two w a y s; by the action o f the sinister interest
either the relevant means and materials are kept out o f
the mind, or, if this be not found practicable, the atten­
tion is kept from fixing upon them with the degree o f
D
34 FALLACIES OP AU T1IO RITV. [C/i. .
1

intensity proportioned to their legitimately persuasive

force.
A s to the mass o f information received by any per­
son in relation to a given subject, the correctness and
completeness o f such information, and thence the pro­
bability o f correctness on the part o f the opinion
grounded on it, will be in the jo in t ratio o f the suffi­
means o f collecting such information, and
ciency o f the
the strength o f the motives by which he was urged to
the em ploym ent o f those means.
O n both these accounts taken together, at the top
o f the scale o f trustworthiness stands that mass o f
authority which is constituted by what may be termed
scientific or professional opinion : that is, opinion en­
tertained in relation to the subject in question by a
person who, by special means and motives attached
to a particular situation in life, may with reason be
considered as possessed o f such means o f ensuring the
correctness o f his opinion as cannot reasonably be ex­
pected to have place on the part o f a person not so
circumstanced.
A s to the special motives in question, they will in
every case be found to consist o f good or evil : profit
for instance, or loss, presenting themselves as even­
tually likely to befall the person in question; profit
or other good in case o f the correctness o f his opi­
nion ; loss or other evil in the event o f its incorrect­
ness.
In proportion to the force with which a man’s will
Sect. 1 .] FA L L A C IE S OF A U T IIO H IT Y . 35
is operated upon by the motives in question, is the
degree o f attention employed in looking out for the
means o f information, and the use made o f them in
the way o f reflection towards the formation o f his
opinion.
Thus in the case o f every occupation which a man
engages in with a view to profit, the hope o f gaining
his livelihood, and the fear o f not gaining it, are the
motives by which he is urged to apply his attention to
the collection o f whatsoever information mav contri-
bute to the correctness o f the several opinions which
lie may have occasion to form, respecting the most
advantageous method o f carrying on the several ope­
rations, by which such profit may be obtained.
1. The legitimately persuasive force o f professional
authority, being taken as the highest term in the scale,
the following may be noticed as expressive o f so many
other species o f authority, occupying so many inferior
degrees in the same s ca le :
2. Authority derived from power. T he greater
the quantity o f power a man has, no matter in what
shape, the nearer the authority o f his opinion com es
to professional authority, in respect o f the facility o f
obtaining the means conducive to correctness o f de­
cision.
3. Authority derived from opulence. O pulence
— being an instrument o f power, and, to a consider­
able extent, applicable in a direct w*ay to many or
most o f the purposes to which power is applicable,—
D 2
36 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [6V/. I.
seems to stand next after power in the scale o f instru­
ments o f facility as above.
4. Authority derived from reputation , considered
as am ong the efficient causes o f respect. By reputa­
tion, understand, on this occasion, general reputation,
not special and relative reputation, which would rank
the species o f authority under the head o f professional
authority as above.
N ote, that o f all these four species o f authority it
is only in the case o f the first that the presumable ad­
vantage, which is the efficient cause o f its legitimately
persuasive force, extends to the article o f motives as
well as means. By having the motives that tend to
correctness o f information, the professional man has
the means likew ise; since it is to the force o f the m o­
tives under the stimulus o f which he acts that he is
indebted for whatever means he acquires. It is from
his having the motives that it follow s that he has the
means.
But in those other cases, whatsoever be the means
which a man’ s situation places within his reach, it
follows not that he has the motives,— that he is ac­
tually under the impulse o f any motive sufficient to
the full action o f that desire and that energy by
which alone he can be in an adequate degree put in
possession o f the means.
O n the contrary, in proportion as in the scale o f
power the man in question rises above the ordinary
level, in that same proportion, in respect o f motives
 Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF AU TH O IU TY. 37
for exertion (be the line o f action what it may), he is
apt to sink below the same le v e l: because the greater
the quantum o f the share o f the general mass o f o b ­
jects o f desire that a man is already in possession of,
the greater is the amount o f that portion o f his desires
which is already in a state o f saturation, and conse­
quently the less the amount o f that portion which, re­
maining unsatiated, is left free to operate upon his
mind in the character o f a motive.
U nder Oriental despotism, the person at whose
command the means o f information exist in a larger
proportion than they do in the instance o f any other
person whatever, is the despot; but necessary motives
being wanting, no use is made by him o f these means,
and the general result is a state o f almost infantine
imbecility and ignorance.
Such in kind, varying only in degree, is the case
with every hand in which power is lodged, unincum­
bered with obligation ; or, in other words, with sense
o f eventual danger.
In England the king, the peer, the opulent borough­
holding or county-holding country gentleman, should,
on the above principle, present an instance o f the sort
o f double scale in question, in which, while means d e­
crease, motives rise.
But so long as he takes any part at all in public
affairs, the sense o f that weak kind o f eventual respon­
sibility to which, notwithstanding the prevailing habits
o f idolatry, the monarch, as such, stands at all times
exposed, suffices to keep his intellectual faculties at a
38 FALLACIES OF AU TH O R ITY . [ C h . J.

point more or less above the point o f utter ign oran ce;
whereas, short o f provable idiotism, there is no degree
o f imbecility that in either o f those two other situa­
tions can suffice to render it matter o f danger or in­
convenience to the possessor, either to leave alto­
gether unexercised the power annexed to such situa­
tion, or, without the smallest regard for the public
welfare, to exercise it in whatever manner may be
m ost agreeable or convenient to himself.
A ll this while, it is only on the supposition o f per­
fect relative probity, viz. o f that branch o f probity that
consists o f sincerity, as well as absence o f all such
sources o f delusion as to the person in question are
liable to produce the effects o f insincerity,— in a word,
it is only on the supposition o f the absence o f exposure
to the action o f any sinister interest, operating in such
direction as to tend to produce either erroneous opi­
nion or misrepresentation o f a man’s opinion on the sub­
je c t in question, that, in so far as it depends on the in­
formation necessary to correctness o f opinion, the title
o f a man’s authority to regard bears any proportion
either to motives or to means o f information as above.
O n the contrary, if either immediately, or through
the medium o f the will, a man’s understanding be ex­
posed to the dominion o f sinister interest, the more
com plete as well as correct the mass o f relative in­
form ation is which he possesses, the more com pletely
destitute o f all title to regard, i. e. to confidence, un­
less it be in the opposite direction, will the authority,
or pretended or real opinion, be.
Sect. 1.] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 39
H ence it is that on the question, W hat is the system
o f remuneration best adapted to the purpose o f ob­
taining the highest degree o f official aptitude through­
out the whole field o f official service ?— the authority
o f any person who here or elsewhere, now or formerly,
was in possession or expectation o f any such situation
as that o f minister o f state, so far from being greater
than that o f an average man, is not equal to 0, but in
the mathematical sense negative, or so muchbelow 0 :
i. e. so far as it affords a reason for looking upon the
opposite opinion as the right and true one.
So again as to this question— W hat, in so far as
concerns cognoscibility, or econom y and expedition
in procedure, the state o f the law ought to be ?— in the
instance o f any person who here or elsewhere, recently
or formerly, but more particularly in this country, was
in possession or expectation o f any situation, profes­
sional or official, the profitableness o f which, in the
shape o f pecuniary emolument, or in any other shape
(such as power, reputation, ease, and occasionally
vengeance), depended upon the incognoscibility, the
expensiveness, the dilatoriness, the vexatiousness o f
the system o f judicial procedure,— the weight o f the
authority,— the strength o f its title to credit on the
part o f those understandings to which the force o f it
is applied,— is not merely equal to 0, but in the mathe­
matical sense negative, or so much below 0.
N ote, that where, as above, the weight or probative
force o f the authority in question is spoken o f as being
not positive but negative (being rendered so by sinister
40 F A L L A C I E S OF A U T H O R [ T V . [ C/l. I.

interest), what is taken for granted is, that the direc­

tion in which the authority is offered is the same as
that in which the sinister interest acts ; for if, the di­
rection in which the sinister interest acts lying one
way, the direction in which the opinion acts lies
the other way, in such case the title o f the opinion
to credit on the part o f the understandings to which
it is proposed, so far from being destroyed or weakened,
is much increased, because the grounds for correctness
o f opinion, the motives and the means which in that
case lead to correctness being more com pletely within
the reach of, and according to probability present to,
the minds o f this class o f men, the forces that tend to
prom ote aberration having by this supposition spent
themselves in vain, the chance for correctness is there­
by greater.
A ccordan t with this, and surely enough accordant
with experience and com m on sense, is one o f the few'
rational rules that as yet have received admittance
am ong the technically established rules o f evidence.
In a man’s own favour his own testimony is the weakest,
— in his disfavour, the strongest, evidence.
It is on this account that, wherever a man is in a
superior degree furnished as above with means of,
and motives for, obtaining relevant information, the
stronger the force o f the sinister interest under the
action o f which his opinion is delivered, the stronger
is his title to attention. In the way o f direct and
relevant argument applying to the question in hand
in a direct and specific way, if the question be suscep­
Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF AU TH O RITY. 41

tible o f any such arguments, in proportion to the effi­

ciency o f the motives and means he has for the acqui­
sition o f such relevant information is the probability
o f his bringing such information to view. If, then,
instead o f bringing to view any such relevant informa­
tion, or by way o f supplement and support to such
relevant information (when weak and insufficient), the
arguments which he brings to view are o f the irrelevant
sort, the addition o f such bad arguments affords a sort
o f circumstantial evidence, and that o f no mean de­
gree o f probative force, o f the inability o f the side thus
advocated to furnish any good ones.
Closeness o f the relation between the immediate
subject in hand and the subject o f the supposed opi­
nion o f which the authority is com posed, has been
mentioned as the third circumstance necessary to be
considered in estimating the credit due to authority :
— o f this, it is evident enough, there cannot be any
com m on and generally applicable measure. It is that
sort o f quantity o f the amount o f which a judgm ent
can only be pronounced in each individual case.
A s to the fourth,— fidelity o f the medium through
which the opinion constitutive o f the authority in ques­
tion has been, or is supposed to have been, transmitted,
— it is only pro memoria that this topic is here brought
to view in the list o f the circumstances from which
the legitimately persuasive force o f an opinion con­
stitutive o f authority is liable to experience decrease :
o f its admission into this list the propriety is, on the
42 FALLACIES OF AU TH O R ITY . [Ch. 1.
bare mention, as manifest as it is in the power o f rea­
soning to make it. In this respect the rule and mea­
sure as well as cause o f such decrease stand exactly
on the same ground as the rule with respect to any
other e v id e n ce ; authority being to the purpose in
question neither more nor less than an article o f cir­
cumstantial evidence.
T h e need for the legitimately persuasive force o f
authority, i. e. probability o f comparatively superior
information on the one hand, is in the inverse ratio o f
information on the part o f the person on whom it is
designed to operate, on the other. T h e less the de­
gree in which each man is qualified to form a ju d g ­
ment on any subject on the ground o f specific and re­
levant information,— on the ground o f direct evidence,
— the more cogent the necessity he is under o f trusting,
with a degree o f confidence more or less implicit, to
that species o f circumstantial evid en ce: and in pro­
portion to the number o f the persons who possess,
each within himself, the means o f forming an op i­
nion on any given subject on the ground o f such
direct evidence, the greater the number o f the per­
sons to whom it ought to be matter o f shame to
frame and pronounce their respective decision, on no
better ground than that o f such inconclusive and ne­
cessarily fallacious evidence.
O f the truth o f this observation, men belonging to
the several classes, whose situation in the community
has given to them in conjunction, with efficient power,
Sect. 1.] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 43

a separate and sinister interest opposite to that o f the

community in general, have seldom failed to be in a
sufficient degree percipient.
In this perception, in the instance o f the fraternity
o f lawyers, may be seen one cause, though not the
only one, o f the anxiety betrayed, and pains taken, to
keep the rule o f action in a state o f as com plete in­
cognoscibility as possible on the part o f those whose
conduct is professed to be directed by it, and whose
fate is in fact disposed o f by it.
In this same perception, in the instance o f the
clergy o f old times in the Rom ish church, may be
seen in like manner the cause, or at least one cause,
o f the pains taken to keep in the same state o f incog­
noscibility the acknowledged rule o f action in matters
o f sacred and supernatural law.
In this same perception, in the instance o f the En­
glish clergy o f times posterior to those o f the Rom ish
church,— in this same perception,— may be seen one
cause o f the exertions made by so large a proportion
o f the governing classes o f that hierarchy to keep back
and if possible render abortive the system o f invention,
which has for its object the giving to the exercise o f
the art o f reading the highest degree o f universality
possible.
T o return. Be the subject matter what it may, to
the account o f fallacies cannot be placed any mention
made o f an opinion to such or such an effect, as having
been delivered or intimated by such or such a person
by name, when the sole object o f the reference is to
 44 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ 6 7 / . 1.

point out a place where relevant arguments adduced

on a given occasion may be found in a more com plete
or perspicuous state than they are on the occasion on
which they are adduced.
In the case thus supposed there is no irrelevancy.
T h e arguments referred to are, by the supposition,
relevant o n e s ; such as, if the person by whom they
have been presented to view were altogether unknown,
would not lose any thing o f their w eigh t: the opinion
is not presented as constitutive o f authority, as carry­
ing any weight o f itself, and independently o f the con ­
siderations which he has brought to view.
N either is there any fallacy in making reference to
the opinion o f this or that professional person, in a
case to such a degree professional or scientific, with
relation to the hearers or readers, that the forming a
correct judgm ent on such relevant and specific argu­
ments as belong to it, is beyond their com petence. In
matters touching medical science, chemistry, astro­
nom y, the mechanical arts, the various branches o f
the art o f war, & c., no other course could be pursued.

Sect. 2. Appeal to authority, in what casesfallacious a.

T h e case in which reference to authority is open to
the imputation o f fallacy, is where, in the course o f a
debate touching a subject lying in such sort within*

* “ An unquestionable maxim ” (it is said) is this :— “ Reason and

not authority should determine the j u d g e m e n t s a i d ? and by whom?
even by a bishop; and by what bishop ? even Bishop Warburton : and
Sect. 2 .] FALL ACI ES OF A U T H O R I T Y . 45

the comprehension o f the debaters, that argument

bearing the closest relation to it would be perfectly
within the sphere o f their comprehension ,— authority
(a sort o f argument in the case here in question not
relevant) is em ployed in the place o f such relevant
arguments as might have been adduced on one side,
or, in opposition to irrelevant ones, adduced on the
other side.
But the case in which the practice o f adducing au­
thority in the character o f an argument is in the highest
degree exposed to the imputation o f fallacy, is, where
the situation o f the debaters being such that the form ­
ing a correct conception of, and judgm ent on, such
relevant arguments as the subject admits is not beyond
their com petency, the opinion, real or supposed, o f an^
person who, from his profession or other particular
situation, derives an interest opposite to that o f the
public, is adduced in the character o f an argument, in
lieu o f such relevant arguments as the question ought
to furnish. (In an appendix to this chapter will be
given examples o f persons whose declared opinions,
on a question o f legislation, are in a peculiar degree
liable to be tinged with falsity by the action o f sinister
interest.)
H e who, on a question concerning the propriety o f
any law or established practice with reference to the
time being, refers to authority as decisive o f the ques­

this not in one work only, but in two. The above words are from his
Div. Legat, 2, 302 ; and in his Alliance, &c. is a passage to the same
effect: here then we have authority against authority'.
46 FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [C fl. 1 .

tion, assumes the truth o f one or other o f two posi­

tions : viz. that the principle o f utility, i. e. that the
greatest happiness o f the greatest number, is not at the
time in question the proper standard for judging o f the
merits o f the question, or that the practice o f other
and former times, or the opinion o f other persons,
ought to be regarded in all cases as conclusive evi­
dence o f the nature and tendency o f the practice :—
conclusive evidence, superseding the necessity and
propriety o f any recourse to reason or present expe­
rience.
In the first case, being really an enemy to the com ­
munity, that he should be esteemed as such by all to
whom the happiness o f the com m unity is an object o f
regard, is no more than right and reasonable, no more
than what, i f men acted consistently, would uniformly
take place.
In the other case, what he does, is, virtually to ac­
knowledge him self not to possess any powers o f rea­
soning which he him self can venture to think it safe
to trust t o : incapable o f form ing for him self any
judgm ent by which he looks upon it as safe to be
determined, he betakes him self for safety to some
other man, or set o f men, o f whom he knows little or
nothing, except that they lived so many years a g o ;
that the period o f their existence was by so much an­
terior to his own lime ; by so much anterior, and
consequently possessing for its guidance so much the
less experience.
But when a man gives this account o f him self,—r-
Sect. 2 .] FA LLACIES O F A U T H O R I T Y . 47

when he represents his own mind as labouring under

this kind and degree o f imbecility,— what can be more
reasonable than that he should be taken at his word ?
that he should be considered as a person labouring
under a general and incurable imbecility, from whom
nothing relevant can reasonably be expected ?
H e who, in place o f reasoning, deduced (if the sub­
je c t be o f a practical nature) from the consideration
o f the end in view, em ploys authority, makes no se­
cret o f the opinion he entertains o f his hearers or his
readers : he assumes that those to whom he addresses
himself are incapable, each o f them, o f forming a
judgm ent o f their own. I f they submit to this insult,
may it not be presumed that they acknowledge the
justice o f it ?
O f imbecility, at any rate o f self-conscious and self-
avowed imbecility, proportionable humility ought na­
turally to be the resu lt ;
O n the contrary, so far from humility,— o f this spe­
cies o f idolatry,— o f this worshipping o f dead men’s
bones, all the passions the most opposite to humility,
— pride, anger, obstinacy, and overbearingness,— are
the frequent, not to say the constant accompaniments.
W ith the utmost strength o f mind that can be dis­
played in the field o f reasoning, no reasonable man
ever manifests so much heat, assumes so much, or
exhibits him self disposed to bear so little, as these
men, whose title to regard and notice is thus given
up by themselves.
W hence this inconsistency? W hence this violence
48 FA LL A CI ES OF A U T H O R I T Y . [ C k . I.

From this alone, that having som e abuse to defend,

som e abuse in which they have an interest and a profit,
and finding it on the ground o f present public interest
indefensible, they fly for refuge to the only sort o f ar­
gument, in which so much as the pretension o f being
sincere in error can find countenance.
B y authority, support, the strength o f which is pro­
portioned to the number o f the persons join in g in it,
is given to systems o f opinions, at on ce absurd and
pernicious— to the religion o f Buddh, o f Brama, o f
Foh, o f M ahom et.
A n d hence it may be inferred that the probative
force o f authority is not increased by the number o f
those who may have professed a given opinion, unless
indeed it could be proved that each individual o f the
multitudes who professed the opinion, possessed in
the highest degree the means and motives for ensuring
its correctness. Even in such a case it would not
warrant the substitution o f the authority for such di­
rect evidence and arguments as any case in debate
might be able to supply, supposing the debaters capa­
ble o f com prehending such direct evidence and argu­
ments ; but that, in ordinary cases, no such circum ­
stantial evidence should possess any such legitimately
probative force as to warrant the addition, much less
the substitution o f it, to that sort o f information which
belongs to direct evidence, will, it is supposed, be
rendered sufficiently apparent by the follow ing consi­
derations ;
1. I f in theory any the minutest degree o f force
S e c t. £ . ] FALLACIES OF A U TH O RITY. 49
were ascribed to the elementary monade o f the body
o f authority thus com posed, and this theory were fol­
lowed up in practice, the consequence would be, the
utter subversion o f the existing state o f things :— as
for example,— I f distance in point o f time were not
sufficient to destroy the probative force o f such autho­
rity, the Catholic religion would in England be to be
restored to the exclusive dominion it possessed and
exercised for so many centuries : the Toleration laws
would be to be repealed, and persecution to the length
o f extirpation would be to be substituted to whatever
liberty in conduct and discourse is enjoyed at present;
— and in this way, after the abolished religion had
thus been triumphantly restored, an inexorable door
would be shut against every imaginable change in it,
and thence against every imaginable reform or im­
provement in it, through all future ages :
Q. I f distance in point o f place u’ere not understood
to have the same effect, some other religion than the
Christian,— the religion o f M ahomet for example, or
the way o f thinking in matters o f religion, prevalent in
China,— would have to be substituted by law to the
Christian religion.
In authority, defence, such as it is, has been found
for every imperfection, for every abuse, for every the
most pernicious and most execrable abomination that
the most corrupt system o f government has ever hus­
banded in its bosom :—
And here may be seen the m ischief necessarily at-
E
50 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 1.

tached to the course o f him whose footsteps are regu­

lated by the finger o f this blind guide.
W h at is more, from hence may inferences be de­
duced— nor those ill-grounded ones— respecting the
probity or improbity, the sincerity or insincerity, o f
him who, standing in a public situation, blushes not
to look to this blind guide, to the exclusion of, or in
preference to, reason— the only guide that does not
begin with shutting his own eyes, for the purpose o f
closing the eyes o f his followers.
A s the world grows older, i f at the same time it
grows wiser, (which it will d o unless the period shall
have arrived at which experience, the mother o f wis­
dom , shall have becom e barren,) the influence o f au­
thority will in each situation, and particularly in Par­
liament, becom e less and less.
T ake any part o f the field o f moral science, private
morality, constitutional law, private law,— go back a
few centuries, and you will find argument consisting
o f reference to authority, not exclusively, but in as
large a proportion as possible. A s experience has
increased, authority has been gradually set aside, and
reasoning, drawn from facts and guided by reference
to the end in view, true or false, has taken its place.
O f the enormous mass o f Rom an law heaped up in
the school o f Justinian,— a mass, the perusal o f which
would em ploy several lives occupied by nothing else,
— materials o f this description constitute by far the
greater part. A . throws out at random some loose
Sect. 2.] F A L L A C I E S OF A U T H O R I T Y . 51

th ou gh t: B., catching it up, tells you what A . thinks

— at least, what A . said : C . tells you what has been
said by A . and B . ; and thus like an avalanche the
mass rolls on.
H appily it is only in matters o f law and religion
that endeavours are made, by the favour shown and
currency given to this fallacy, to limit and debilitate
the exercise o f the right o f private inquiry in as great
a degree as possible, though at this time o f day the
exercise o f this essential right can no longer be sup­
pressed in a complete and direct way by legal punish­
ment.
In mechanics, in astronomy, in mathematics, in
the new-born science o f chemistry,— no one has at this
time o f day either effrontery or folly enough to avow,
or so much as to insinuate, that the most desirable
state o f these branches o f useful knowledge, the most
rational and eligible course, is to substitute decision
on the ground o f authority, to decision on the ground
o f direct and specific evidence.
In every branch o f physical art and science, the
folly o f this substitution or preference is matter o f
demonstration,— is matter o f intuition, and as such is
universally acknowledged. In the moral branch o f
science, religion not excluded, the folly o f the like
receipt for correctness o f opinion would not be less
universally recognised, if the wealth, the ease, and the
dignity attached to and supported by the maintenance
o f the opposite opinion, did not so steadily resist such
recognition.
E2
52 FA LLA C IES OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 1.

Causes o f the employment and prevalence o f this fa l­

lacy.
It is obvious that this fallacy, in all its branches, is
so frequently resorted to by those who are interested
in the support o f abuses, or o f institutions pernicious
to the great body o f the people, with the intention o f
suppressing all exercise o f reason. A foolish or un­
tenable proposition resting on its own support, or the
mere credit o f the utterer, could not fail speedily to
encounter detection and exposure;— the same proposi­
tion extracted from a page o f Blackstone, or from the
page or mouth o f any other person to whom the idle
and unthinking are in the habit o f unconditionally sur­
rendering their understandings, shall disarm all op p o­
sition.
Blind obsequiousness, ignorance, idleness, irrespon­
sibility, anticonstitutional dependence, anticonstitu­
tional independence, are the causes which enable this
fallacy to maintain such an ascendancy in the govern­
ing assemblies o f the British empire.
First, In this situation one man is on each occasion
ready to borrow an opinion o f another, because through
ignorance and imbecility he feels himself unable, or
through want o f solicitude unwilling, to form one for
h im self; and he is thus ignorant, if natural talent does
not fail him, because he is so idle. Knowledge, espe­
cially in so wide and extensive a field, requires study;
— study, labour o f mind bestowed with more or less
energy, for a greater or less length o f time.
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S O F A U T H O R I T Y ’. 53

But, Secondly, In a situation for which the strongest

talents would not be more than adequate, there is fre­
quently a failure o f natural talent; because, in so many
instances admission to that situation depends either on
the person admitted, or on others to whom, whether
he has or has not the requisite talents is a matter o f
indifference, that no degree o f intellectual deficiency,
short o f palpable idiocy, can have the effect o f ex­
cluding a man from occupying it.
Thirdly, The sense o f responsibility is in the instance
o f a large proportion o f the members wanting altoge­
ther ; because in so small a proportion are they at
any time in any degree o f dependence on the people
whose fate is in their hands, and because in the in­
stance o f the few who are in any degree so dependent,
the efficient cause and consequently the feeling o f such
dependence endures during so small a proportion o f
the time for which they enjoy their situations : be­
cause also, while so few are dependent on those on
whom they ought to be dependent, so many are de­
pendent on those who ought to be dependent on them,
— those servants o f the crown, on whose conduct they
are commissioned by their constituents to act as
judges. W hat share o f knowledge, intelligence and
natural talent is in the house, is thus divided between
those who are, and their rivals who hope to be, ser­
vants o f the crown. T he consequence is, that, those
excepted in whom knowledge, intelligence and talent
are worse than useless, the house is com posed o f men
the furniture o f whose minds is made up o f discordant
54 FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ Ch. 1.

prejudices, o f which on each occasion they follow that

by which the interest or passion o f the moment is
most promoted.
Then, with regard to responsibility, so happily have
matters been managed by the house,— a seat there is
not less clear o f obligation than a seat in the opera
house : in both, a man takes his seat, then only when
he cannot find more amusement elsew here; for both,
the qualifications are the same,— a ticket begged or
b o u g h t: in neither is a man charged with any ob ­
ligation, other than the negative one o f not being a
nuisance to the com p an y; in both, the length as well as
number o f attendances depends on the amusement a
man finds, except, in the case o f the house, as regards
the members dependent on the crown. True it is,
that a self-called independent member is not necessa­
rily ignorant and w e a k : if by accident a man pos­
sessed o f knowledge and intelligence is placed in the
house, his seat will not deprive him o f his acquire­
ments : all therefore that is meant is, only, that igno­
rance does not disqualify, not that knowledge does.
O f the crown and its creatures it is the interest that
this ignorance be as thick as possible. W h y ? Because
the thicker the ignorance, the more com pletely is the
furniture o f men’s minds made up o f those interest-
begotten prejudices, which render them blindly obse­
quious to all those who with power in their hands
stand up to take the lead.
But the emperor o f M orocco is not more irrespon­
sible, and therefore more likely to be ignorant and
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 55
prone to be deceived by the fallacy o f authority, than
a member o f the British Parliam ent:— the emperor
o f M orocco’s power is clear o f obligation ; so is the
member’s :— the emperor’s power, it is true, is an in­
teger, and the member’s but a fraction o f i t ; but no
ignorance prevents a man from becoming or continu­
ing emperor o f M orocco, nor from becoming or con­
tinuing a m em ber:— the emperor’s title is derived
from birth ; so is that o f many a member :— to enjoy
his despotism, no fraud, insincerity, hypocrisy or jar­
gon is necessary to the em p eror; much o f ali to the
member :— by ascending and maintaining his throne,
no principle is violated by the em p eror; by the mem­
ber, if a borough-holder, many are violated on his
taking and retaining his se a t:— by being a despot, the
emperor is not an im p ostor; the member is :— the
emperor pretends not to be a trustee, agent, deputy,
delegate, representative ; lying is not among the ac­
companiments o f his tyranny and in solen ce; the
member does pretend all this, and (if a borough-
holder) lies.— A trust-holder? y e s; but a trust-breaker:
— an agent? y e s ; but for h im self:— a representative
o f the people? yes; but so as M r. Kem ble is o f M ac­
beth :— a deputy ? y e s ; because it has not been in
their power to depute, to delegate any body e ls e :—
deputy,— delegate,— neither title he assumes but for
argument, and when he cannot help i t ; deputation
being matter o f fact, the word presents an act with
all its circumstances, viz. fewness o f the electors, their
want o f freedom, & c . ; representation is a more con­
56 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [Ck. 1 .
venient word, the acts, &c. are kept out o f sight by i t ;
— it is a mere fiction, the offspring o f lawyer-craft, and
any one person or thing may be represented by any
other. By canvass with colours, a man is represent­
e d ; by a king, the whole p e o p le ; by an ambassador,
the king, and thus the people.

Rem edy against the influence o f this fa lla cy .

For banishing ignorance, for substituting to it a
constantly competent measure o f useful, appropriate
and general instruction, the proper, the necessary, the
only means lie not deep beneath the surface.
T h e sources o f instruction being supposed at com ­
mand, and the quantity o f natural talent given, the
quantity o f information obtained will in every case be
as the quantity o f mental labour em ployed in the col­
lection o f it— the quantity o f mental labour, as the
aggregate strength o f the motives by which a man is
excited to labour.
In the existing order o f things, there is, com para­
tively speaking, no instruction obtained, because no
labour is bestowed,— no labour is bestowed, because
none o f the motives by which men are excited to la­
bour are applied in this direction.
T h e situation being by the supposition an object o f
desire, if the case were such that, without labour em­
ployed in obtaining instruction, there would be no
chance o f obtaining the situation, or but an inferior
chance, while in case o f labour so em ployed there
would be a certainty or a superior chance,— here, in­
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 57
struction would have its motives,— here, labour applied
to the attainment o f instruction,— here, consequently,
instruction itself would have its probably efficient cause.
T h e quality, i. e. the relative applicability o f the
mass o f information obtained, is an object not to be
overlooked.
T h e goodness o f the quality will depend on the
liberty enjoyed in respect o f the choice. By prohi­
bitions, with penalties attached to the delivery o f al­
leged information relative to a subject in question, or
any part o f it, the quality o f the whole mass is im­
paired, and an implied certificate is given o f the truth
and utility o f whatsoever portion is thus endeavoured
to be suppressed.

A P P E N D IX .
Examples o f descriptions o f persons whose declared
opinions upon a question o f legislation are peculiarly
liable to be tinged with falsity by the action o f
sinister interest.
1. L aw yers; oppositeness o f their interest to the
universal interest.
The opinions o f lawyers in a question o f legislation,
particularly o f such lawyers as are or have been prac­
tising advocates, are peculiarly liable to be tinged with
falsity by the operation o f sinister interest. T o the
interest o f the community at large, that o f every ad­
vocate is in a state o f such direct and constant op p o­
sition (especially in civil matters), that the above
assertion requires an apology to redeem it from the
58 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [67/. ].
appearance o f trifling: the apology consists in the ex­
tensively prevailing propensity to overlook and turn
aside from a fact so entitled to notice. It is the people’s
interest that delay, vexation and expense o f procedure
should be as small as possible :— it is the advocate’s
that they should be as great as possible : viz. expense
in so far as his profit is proportioned to i t ; factitious
vexation and delay, in so far as inseparable from the
profit-yielding part o f the expense. A s to uncertainty
in the law, it is the people’s interest that each man’s
security against wrong should be as com plete as pos­
sible; that all his rights should be known to him ; that
all acts, which in the case o f his doing them will be
treated as offences, may be known to him as such, to­
gether with their eventual punishment, that he may
avoid committing them, and that others may, in as few
instances as possible, suffer either from the wrong or
from the expensive and vexatious remedy. H ence it
is their interest, that as to all these matters the rule o f
action, in so far as it applies to each man, should at
all times be not only discoverable, but actually present
to his mind. Such knowledge, which it is every man’s
interest to possess to the greatest, it is the lawyer’s
interest that he possess it to the narrowest extent pos­
sible. It is every man’s interest to keep out o f law­
yers’ hands as much as possible ; it is the lawyer’s in­
terest to get him in as often, and keep him in as long,
as p ossible: thence that any written expression o f the
words necessary to keep non-lawyers out o f his hand
may as long as possible be prevented from com ing into
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 59
existence, and when in existence as long as possible
kept from being present to his mind, and when pre­
sented from staying there a. It is the lawyer’s interest,
therefore, that people should continually suffer for the
non-observance o f laws, which, so far from having re­
ceived efficient promulgation, have never yet found
any authoritative expression in words. This is the
perfection o f oppression : yet, propose that access to
knowledge o f the laws be afforded by means o f a code,
lawyers, one and all, will join in declaring it im pos­
sible. T o any effect, as occasion occurs, a ju dge will
forge a rule o f law : to that same effect, in any deter­
minate form o f words, propose to make a law, that
same judge will declare it impossible. It is the judge’ s
interest that on every occasion his declared opinion
be taken for the standard o f right and w rong; that
whatever he declares right or wrong be universally re­
ceived as such, how contrary soever such declaration
be to truth and utility, or to his own declaration at
other tim es:— hence, that within the whole field o f
law, men’s opinions o f right and wrong should be as
contradictory, unsettled, and thence as obsequious to
him as possible : in particular, that the same conduct

a A considerable proportion o f what is termed the Common law o f

F.ngland is in this oral and unwritten state. The cases in which it
has been clothed with words, that is, in which it has been framed and
pronounced, are to be found in the various collections o f reported de­
cisions. These decisions, not having the sanction o f a law passed by
the legislature, are confirmed or overruled at pleasure by the existing
judges; so that, except in matters o f the most common and daily oc­
currence, they afford no rule o f action at all.
60 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ 6 7 / . 1.
which to others would occasion shame and punish­
ment, should to him and his occasion honour and re­
ward : that on condition o f telling a lie, it should be
in his power to do what he pleases, the injustice and
falsehood being regarded with com placency and re­
verence ; that as often as by falsehood, money or ad­
vantage in any other shape can be produced to him,
it should be regarded as proper for him to em ploy re­
ward or punishment, or both, for the procurement o f
such falsehood. Consistently with men’s abstaining
from violences, by which the person and property o f
him and his would be alarmingly endangered, it is his
interest that intellectual as well as moral depravation
should be as intense and extensive as possible ; That
transgressions cognizable by him should be as nume­
rous as p ossib le; That injuries and other trans­
gressions committed by him should be reverenced as
acts o f virtue ; That the suffering produced by such
injuries should be placed, not to his account, but
to the immutable nature o f things, or to the wrong­
doer, who, but for encouragement from him, would not
have becom e such. His professional and personal in­
terest being thus adverse to that o f the public, from
a lawyer’s declaration that the tendency o f a proposed
law relative to procedure, &c. is pernicious, the con­
trary inference may not unreasonably be drawn. From
those habits o f misrepresenting their own opinion
(i. e. o f insincerity), which are almost peculiar to this
in comparison with other classes, one presumption is,
that he does not entertain the opinion thus declared;
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 61

— another, that if he does, he has been deceived into

it by sinister interest and the authority o f co-pro­
fessional men, in like manner deceivers or deceived :
in other words, it is the result o f interest-begotten pre­
judice. In the case o f every other body o f men, it is
generally expected that their conduct and language will
be for the most part directed by their own interest, that
is, by their own view o f it. In the case o f the lawyer,
the ground o f this persuasion, so far from being weaker,
is stronger than in any other case. His evidence being
thus interested evidence, according to his own rules his
declaration o f opinion on the subject here pointed out
would not be so much as hearable. It is true, were
those rules consistently observed, judicature would be
useless, and society dissolved : accordingly they are
not so observed, but observed or broken pretty much
at pleasure; but they are not the less among the num­
ber o f those rules, the excellence and inviolability o f
which the lawyer is never tired o f trumpeting. But
on any point, such as those in question, nothing could
be more unreasonable, nothing more inconsistent with
what has been said above, than to refuse him a hear­
ing. O n every such point, his habits and experience
afford him facilities not possessed by any one else for
finding relevant and specific arguments, when the na­
ture o f the case affords any ; but the surer he is o f
being able to find such arguments, if any such are to
be found, the stronger the reason for treating his naked
declaration o f opinion as unworthy o f all regard : ac­
companied by specific arguments, it is useless ; desti­
6‘2 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [C h . 1 .

tute o f them, it amounts to a virtual confession o f

their non-existence.
So matters stand on the question what ought to be law.
O n the question what the law is, so long as the rule o f
action is kept in the state o f com m on, alias unwritten,
alias imaginary law, authority, though next to nothing,
is every thing. T h e question is, what on a given oc­
casion A . (the ju dge) is likely to think: wrait till your
fortune has been spent in the inquiry, and you will
know ; but, forasmuch as it is naturally a man’s wish
to be able to give a guess what the result will even­
tually be, before he has spent his fortune, in the
view if possible to avoid spending his fortune and get­
ting nothing in return for it, he applies through the
medium o f B. (an attorney) for an opinion to C . (a
counsel), who, considering what D . (a former ju dge)
has, on a subject supposed to be more or less analo­
gous to the one in question, said or been supposed to
say, deduces therefore his guess as to what, when the
time com es, Judge A ., he thinks, will say, and gives it
you. A shorter way would be to put the question at
once to A . ; but, for obvious reasons, this is not per­
mitted.
O n many cases, again, as well-grounded a guess
might be had o f an astrologer for five shillings, as o f a
counsel for twice or thrice as many guineas, but that
the lawyer considers the astrologer as a smuggler, and
puts him down.
But P ackw ood’s opinion on the goodness o f his own
razors would be a safer guide forju dgin g o f their good ­
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 65

ness, than a judge’s opinion on the goodness o f a pro­

posed la w : it is Packw ood’s interest that his razors
be as good as p ossible;— the ju dge’s, that the law be
as bad, yet thought to be as good, as possible. It
would not be the judge’s interest that his com m odity
should be thus bad, if, as in the case o f Packw ood, the
customer had other shops to go t o ; but in this case,
even when there are two shops to go to, the shops
being in confederacy, the com m odity is equally bad in
b o th ; and the worse the com m odity, the better it is
said to be. In the case o f the ju dge’s com m odity, no
experience suffices to undeceive m en ; the bad quality
o f it is referred to any cause but the true one.

Example 2. Churchmen; oppositeness o f their interest

to the universal interest.
In the lawyer’s case it has been shown that on the
question, what on such or such a point ought to be
law, to refer to a lawyer’s opinion given without or
against specific reasons, is a fa lla cy ; its tendency, in
proportion to the regard paid to it, deceptiou s;— the
cause o f this deceptious tendency, sinister interest, to
the action o f which all advocates and (being made
from advocates) all judges stand exposed. T o the
churchman’s case the same reasoning applies : as, in
the lawyer’s case the objection does not arise on the
question, what law is, but what ought to be law,— so
in the churchman’s case it does not arise as to what
in matters o f religion is law, but as to what in those
matters ought to be law. O n a question not connected
64 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ Ck. 1.
with religion, reference to a churchman’s opinion as
suck , as authority, can scarcely be considered as a
fallacy, such opinion not being likely to be considered
as constitutive o f authority. T o understand how great
would be the probability o f deception, i f on the ques­
tion, what in matters o f religion ought to be law, the
unsupported opinion o f a churchman were to be re­
garded as authority, we must develop the nature and
form o f the sinister interest, by which any declaration
o f opinion from such a quarter is divested o f all title
to regard. T h e sources o f a churchman’s sinister in­
terest are as follows :—
1. On entering into the profession, as condition
precedent to advantage from it in the shape o f sub­
sistence and all other shapes, he makes o f necessity a
solemn and recorded declaration o f his belief in the
truth o f 39 articles, framed 262 years ago, the date
o f which, the ignorance and violence o f the time con­
sidered, should suffice to satisfy a reflecting mind o f
the impossibility o f their being all o f them really be­
lieved by any person at p resen t:
2. In this declaration is generally understood to be
included an engagement or undertaking, in case o f ori­
ginal belief and subsequent change, never to declare,
but, i f questioned, to deny such ch a n g e:
3. In the institution thus established, he beholds
shame and punishment attached to sincerity, rewards in
the largest quantity to absurdity and insincerity. N ow
the presumptions resulting from such an application o f
reward and punishment to engage men to declare as­
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 65
sent to given propositions are, 1st, That the proposi­
tion is not believed by the p rop oser; 2nd, Thence,
that it is not true ; 3rd, Thence, that it is not believed
by the acceptor. It is impossible by reward or punish­
ment to produce real and immediate b e lie f: but the
following effects may certainly be produced : 1st, The
abstaining from any declaration o f disbelief; 2nd, D e ­
claration o f b e lie f; 3rd, T h e turning aside from all
considerations tending to produce disbelief; 4th, The
looking out for, and fastening exclusive attention to,
all considerations tending to produce belief, authority
especially, by which a sort o f vague and indistinct
belief o f the most absurd propositions has every where
been produced.
O n no other part o f the field o f knowledge are re­
ward or punishment nou'-a-days considered as fit in­
struments for the production o f assent or dissent. A
schoolmaster would not be looked upon as sane, who,
instead o f putting Euclid’s Demonstrations into the
hands o f his scholar, should, without the Dem onstra­
tions, put the Propositions into his hand, and give him
a guinea for signing a paper declarative o f his belief in
them, or lock him up for a couple o f days without
food on his refusal to sign it. And so in chemistry,
mechanics, husbandry, astronomy, or any other branch
o f knowledge. It is true, that in those parts o f know­
ledge in which assent and dissent are left free, the im­
portance o f truth may be esteemed not so great as
here, where it is thus influenced; but the more im­
portant the truth, the more flagrant the absurdity and
F
66 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ 6 7 / . 1.

tyranny o f em ploying, for the propagation o f it, in­

struments, the em ploym ent o f which has a stronger
tendency to propagate error than truth.
4. For teaching such religious truths as men are
allow-ed to teach, together with such religious error as
they are thus forced to teach, the churchman sees re­
wards allotted in larger quantities than are allotted to
the most useful services. O f much o f the matter o f
reward thus bestowed, the disposal is in the king’s
hands, with the power o f applying it, and motives for
applying it, to the purpose o f parliamentary service,
paying for habitual breach o f trust, and keeping in
corrupt and secret dependence on his agents, those
agents o f the people whose duty it is to sit as judges
over the agents o f the king. In Ireland, o f nine-tenths
o f those on pretence o f instructing whom this vast mass
o f reward is extorted, it is known, that, being by con­
science precluded from hearing, it is impossible that
they should derive any benefit from such instruction.
In Scotland, where Government reward is not em­
ployed in giving support to it, Church-of-Englandism
is reduced to next to nothing.
T h e opinions which, in this state o f things, interest
engages a churchman to support, are— 1st, T h at re­
ward to the highest extent has no tendency to pro­
mote insincerity, even where practicable, to an un­
limited extent, and without chance o f detection; 2nd,
O r that money given in case o f com pliance, refused
in case o f non-compliance, is not reward for com ­
pliance ; 3rd, O r that punishment,applied in case o f
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 6 7

non-compliance, withheld in case o f com pliance, is not

punishment; 4th, O r that insincerity is not vice but
virtue, and as such ought to he prom oted ; 5th, That
it is not merely consistent with, but requisite to, good
government to extort money from poor and rich to
be applied as reward for doing nothing, or for doing
but a small part o f that which is done by others for a
small proportion o f the same reward, and this on pre­
tence o f rendering service, which nine-tenths o f the
people refuse to receive.
It is the interest o f the persons thus engaged in a
course o f insincerity, that by the same means perse­
verance in the same course should be universal and
perpetual; for suppose, in case o f the reward being
withheld, the number annually making the same de­
claration should be reduced to h a lf: this would be
presumptive evidence o f insincerity on the part o f half
o f those w'ho made it before.
T h e more flagrant the absurdity, the stronger is
each man’s interest in engaging as many as possible
in joining with him in the profession o f assent to i t ;
for the greater the number o f such co-declarants, the
greater the number o f those o f whose professions the
elements o f authority are com posed ; and o f those
who stand precluded from casting on the rest the im­
putation o f insincerity.
T h e following, then, are the abuses in the defence
o f which all churchmen are enfisted : 1st. Perpetua­
tion o f immorality in the shape o f insincerity ; 2. O f
absurdity in subjects o f the highest im portan ce;
F 2
6S F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ Ch. I .

3. Extortion inflicted on the many for the benefit o f

the few ; 4. Reward bestowed on idleness and inca­
pacity to the exclusion o f labour and ability ; 5. T h e
matter o f corruption applied to the purposes o f cor­
ruption in a constant stream ; 6. In one o f these king­
dom s a vast majority o f the people kept in degrada­
tion avow edly for no other than the above purposes.
But whoever is engaged by interest in the support o f
any one Governm ent abuse, is engaged in the support o f
all, each giving to the others his support in exchange.
It being the characteristic o f abuse to need and re­
ceive support from fallacy, it is the interest o f every
man who derives profit from abuse in any shape to
give the utmost currency to fallacy in every shape,
viz. as well those which render more particular ser­
vice to others’ abuses as those which render such ser­
vice to his own. It being the interest o f each person
so situated to give the utmost support to abuse, and
the utmost currency to fallacy in every shape, it is
also his interest to give the utmost efficiency to the
system o f education by which men are most effectually
divested both o f the power and will to detect and ex­
pose fallacies, and thence to suppress every system o f
education in proportion as it has a contrary tendency:
lastly, the stronger the interest by which a man is
urged to give currency to fallacy, and thus to propa­
gate deception, the more likely is it that such will be
his endeavour: the l$>s fit, therefore, will his opinion
be to serve in the character o f authority, as a standard
and model for the opinions o f others.
Ch. 2 .] FALLACIES OF A U TH O RITY. 69

CHAPTER I I.

The wisdom o f our ancestors; or Chinese argument.

Ad verecundiam.

Sect. 1 . Exposition.
T h is argument consists in stating a supposed re­
pugnancy between the proposed measure and the opi­
nions o f men by whom the country o f those who are
discussing the measure was inhabited in former times ;
these opinions being collected either from the express
words o f som e writer living at the period o f time in
question, or from laws or institutions that were then
in existence.
O u r wise ancestors— the wisdom b f our ancestors —
the wisdom o f ages— venerable antiquity—wisdom o f
old times —
Such are the leading terms and phrases o f propo­
sitions the object o f which is to cause the alleged
repugnance to be regarded as a sufficient reason for
the rejection o f the proposed measure.

Sect. 2. Exposure.
This fallacy affords one o f the most striking o f the
numerous instances in which, under the conciliatory
influence o f custom , that is o f prejudice , opinions
the most repugnant to one another are capable o f
maintaining their ground in the same intellect.
70 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 2.

This fallacy, prevalent as it is in matters o f law, is

directly repugnant to a principle or maxim universally
admitted in almost every other department o f human
intelligence, and which is the foundation o f all useful
knowledge and o f all rational conduct.
“ Experience is the mother o f w isdom ,” is am ong
the maxims handed down to the present and all future
ages, by the wisdom, such as it has been, o f past ages.
N o ! says this fallacy, the true mother o f wisdom
is, not experience, but inexperience.
A n absurdity so glaring carries in itself its own re­
futation ; and all that we can d o is, to trace the
causes which have contributed to give to this fallacy
such an ascendancy in matters o f legislation.
A m ong the several branches o f the fallacies o f au­
thority, the cause o f delusion is more impressive in
this than in any other.
1st, From inaccuracy o f conception arises incor­
rectness o f expression; from which expression, con ­
ception, being produced again, error, from having
been a momentary cause, com es to be a permanent
effect.
In the very denomination com m only em ployed to
signify the portion o f time to which the fallacy refers,
is virtually involved a false and deceptious proposition,
which, from its being em ployed by every mouth, is at
length, without examination, received as true.
W h at in com m on language is called old time, ought
(with reference to any period at which the fallacy in
question is em ployed) to be called young or early time.
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 71

A s between individual and individual living at the

same time and in the same situation, he who is old,
possesses, as such, more experience than he who is
young ;— as between generation and generation, the
reverse o f this is true, if, as in ordinary language, a
preceding generation be, with reference to a succeed­
ing generation, called old ; — the old or preceding ge­
neration could not have had so much experience as
the succeeding. W ith respect to such o f the materials
or sources o f wisdom which have com e under the cog­
nisance o f their own senses, the two are on a p a r ;—
with respect to such o f those materials and sources o f
wisdom as are derived from the reports o f others, the
later o f the two possesses an indisputable advantage.
In giving the name o f old or elder to the earlier
generation o f the two, the misrepresentation is not
less gross, nor the folly o f it less incontestable, than
i f the name o f old man or old woman were Ogiven to
the infant in its cradle.
W hat then is the wisdom o f the times called old ?
Is it the wisdom o f gray hairs ? N o .— It is the wis­
dom o f the cradle a.
T h e learned and honourable gentlemen o f T h ib e t

a N o one will deny that preceding ages have produced men emi­
nently distinguished by benevolence and genius; it is to them that we
owe in succession all the advances which have hitherto been made in
the career o f human improvement: but as their talents could only be
developed in proportion to the state o f knowledge at the period in which
they lived, and could only have been called into action with a view to
then-existing circumstances, it is absurd to rely on their authority, at
a period and under a state of things altogether different.
7l2 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R I T Y . [Cfl. 2 .
d o homage to superior wisdom— superiority raised to
the degree o f divinity— in the person o f an infant
lying and squalling in his cradle.
T h e learned and honourable gentlemen o f W est­

m in s t e r set down as impostors the lam as o f T u r-

b e t , and laugh at the folly o f the deluded people
on whom such imposture passes for sincerity and
wisdom.
But the worship paid fit T h ib e t to the infant body
o f the present day, is, if not the exact counterpart, the
type at least o f the homage paid at W e s t m in s t e r

to the infant minds o f those who have lived in earlier

ages.
2ndly, Another cause o f delusion which promotes
the em ploym ent o f this fallacy, is the reigning pre­
ju d ice in favour o f the d e a d ;— a prejudice which,
in former times, contributed, more than any thing
else, to the practice o f idolatry: the dead w ere speedily
elevated to the rank o f divinities; the superstitious
invoked them, and ascribed a miraculous efficacy to
their relics.
This prejudice, when examined, will be seen to be
no less indefensible than pernicious— no less perni­
cious than indefensible.
By propagating this mischievous notion, and acting
accordingly, the man o f selfishness and malice obtains
the praise o f humanity and social virtue. W ith this
jargon in his mouth, he is permitted to sacrifice the
real interests o f the living to the imaginary interests
o f the dead. Thus imposture, in this shape, finds ;
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 73

the folly or improbity o f mankind a never failing fund

o f encouragement and reward.
D e mortuis nil nisi bonum ; — with all its absurdity,
the adage is but too frequently received as a leading
principle o f morals. O f two attacks, which is the
more barbarous, on a man that does feel it, or on a
man that does not ? O n the man that does feel it, says
the principle o f utility : O n the man that does not,
says the principle o f caprice and prejudice— the prin­
ciple o f sentimentalism— the principle in which ima­
gination is the sole mover— the principle in and by
which feelings are disregarded as not worth notice.
T h e same man who bepraises you when dead, would
have plagued you without mercy when living.
Thus as between Pitt and Fox. W hile both were
living, the friends o f each reckoned so many adversa­
ries in the friends o f the other. O n the death o f him
who died first, his adversaries were converted into
friends. A t what price this friendship was paid for
by the people is no secreta : see the Statute Book, see
the debates o f the time, and see Defence o f Economy
against Burke and Rose.
T he cause o f this so extensively-prevalent and ex-
tensively-pernicious propensity lies not very deep.
A dead man has no rivals,— to nobody is he an ob­
je c t o f envy,— in whosesoever way he may have stood
when living, when dead he no longer stands in any

a For the payment o f Mr. Pitt’s creditors was voted 40,000/. o f the
public money:— to Mr. Fox’s widow, 1500/. a year.
74 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R I T Y . \Ch. 2.

bod y’s way. I f he was a man o f genius, those who

denied him any merit during his life, even his very
enemies, changing their tone all at once, assume an
air o f justice and kindness, which costs them nothing,
and enables them, under pretence o f respect for the
dead, to gratify their malignity towards the living.
Another class o f persons habitually exalts the past
for the express purpose o f depressing and discouraging
the present generation.
It is characteristic o f the same sort o f persons, as
well as o f the same system o f politics, to idolize, under
the name o f wisdom o f our ancestors, the wisdom o f
untaught inexperienced generations, and to undervalue
and cover with every expression o f contem pt that the
language o f pride can furnish, the supposed ignorance
and folly o f the great body o f the people a.
So long as they keep to vague generalities,— so long
as the two objects o f comparison are each o f them
taken in the lum p,— wise ancestors in one lump, ig­
norant and foolish m ob o f modern times in the other,
— the weakness o f the fallacy may escape detection.
Let them but assign for the period o f superior wisdom
any determinate period whatsoever, not only will the
groundlessness o f the notion be apparent (class being
com pared with class in that period and the present
one), but, unless the antecedent period be compara­
tively speaking a very modern one, so wide will be the
disparity, and to such an amount in favour o f modern

a A “ Burdett mob," for example.

Sect.%.~\ F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 75

times, that, in comparison o f the lowest class o f the

people in modern times (always supposing them pro­
ficients in the art o f reading, and their proficiency em ­
ployed in the reading o f newspapers), the very highest
and best informed class o f these wise ancestors will
turn out to be grossly ignorant.
Take for exam ple any year in the reign o f Henry
the Eighth, from 1509 to 1546. A t that time the
House o f Lords would probably have been in pos­
session o f by far the larger proportion o f what little
instruction the age afforded : in the House o f Lords,
am ong the laity'-, it might even then be a question
whether without exception their lordships were all o f
them able so much as to read. But even supposing
them all in the fullest possession o f that useful art,
political science being the science in question, what
instruction on the subject could the}' meet with at
that time o f day ?
O n no one branch o f legislation was any book ex­
tant from which, with regard to the circumstances o f
the then present times, any useful instruction could
be derived : distributive law, penal law, international
law, political econom y, so far from existing as sciences,
had scarcely obtained a name: in all those departments,
under the head o f quid faciendum , a mere blank : the
whole literature o f the age consisted o f a meagre
chronicle or two, containing short memorandums o f
the usual occurrences o f war and peace, battles,
sieges, executions, revels, deaths, births, processions,
ceremonies, and other external events; but with scarce
76 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R I T Y . [67/. 2 .
a speech or an incident that could enter into the com­
position of any such work as a history of the human
mind,— with scarce an attempt at investigation into
causes, characters, or the state of the people at large.
Even when at last, little by little, a scrap or two of
political instruction came to be obtainable, the pro­
portion of error and mischievous doctrine mixed up
with it was so great, that whether a blank unfilled
might not have been less prejudicial than a blank thus
filled, may reasonably be matter of doubt.
If we come down to the reign of James the First,
we shall find that Solomon of his time, eminently
eloquent as well as learned, not only among crowned
but among uncrowned heads, marking out for prohi­
bition and punishment the practices of devils and
witches, and without any the slightest objection on
the part of the great characters of that day in their
high situations, consigning men to death and torment
for the misfortune of not being so well acquainted as
he was with the composition of the Godhead.
Passing on to the days of Charles the Second, even
after Bacon had laid the foundations of a sound phi­
losophy, we shall find Lord Chief Justice Hale (to the
present hour chief god of the man of law’s idolatry)
unable to tell (so he says himself) what theft was;
but knowing at the same time too well what witch­
craft was, hanging men with the most perfect com­
placency for both crimes, amidst the applauses of
all who were wise and learned in that blessed age.
Under the name of Exorcism the Catholic liturgy
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 77

contains a form o f procedure for driving out devils :—

even with the help o f this instrument, the operation
cannot be performed with the desired success but by
an operator qualified by holy orders for the working
o f this as well as so many other w onders.
In our days and in our country the same object is
attained, and beyond comparison more effectually, by
so cheap an instrument as a com m on newspaper: be­
fore this talisman, not only devils but ghosts, vam­
pires, witches, and all their kindred tribes, are driven
out o f the land, never to return again ; the touch o f
holy water is not so intolerable to them as the bare
smell o f printers’ ink.
I f it is absurd to rely on the wisdom o f our ances­
tors, it is not less so to vaunt their p rob ity: they were
as much inferior to us in that point as in all others ;
and the further we look back, the more abuses we
shall discover in every department o f G overn m en t:—
nothing but the enormity o f those abuses has produced
that degree o f comparative amendment on which at
present we value ourselves so highly. Till the human
race was rescued from that absolute slavery under
which nine-tenths o f every nation groaned, not a sin­
gle step could be made in the career o f im provem ent;
and take what period we will in the lapse o f preceding
ages, there is not one which presents such a state o f
things as any rational man would wish to see en­
tirely re-established.
U ndoubtedly, the history o f past ages is not want­
ing in some splendid instances o f probity and self-de­
 78 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [67/. 2.

votion ; but in the admiration which these excite, we

commonly overrate their amount, and become the
dupes of an illusion occasioned by the very nature of
an extensive retrospect. Such a retrospect is often
made by a single glance of the mind ; in this glance
the splendid actions of several ages (as if for the very
purpose of conveying a false estimate of their number
and contiguity) present themselves, as it were, in a
lump, leaving the intervals between them altogether
unnoticed. Thus groves of trees, which at a distance
present the appearance of thick and impenetrable
masses, turn out on nearer approach to consist of
trunks widely separated from each other.
Would you then have us speak and act as if we
had never had any ancestors ? Would you, because
recorded experience, and, along with it, wisdom, in­
creases from year to year, annually change the whole
body of our laws ? By no means : such a mode of
reasoning and acting would be more absurd even than
that which has just been exposed; and provisional
adherence to existing establishments is grounded on
considerations much more rational than a reliance on
the wisdom of our ancestors. Though the opinions of
our ancestors are as such of little value, their practice
is not the less worth attending to ; that is, in so far
as their practice forms part of our own experience.
How’ever, it is not so much from what they did, as
from what they underwent (good included as well as
evil), that our instruction comes. Independently of
consequences, what they did is no more than evidence
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 79
of what they thought; nor yet, in legislation, is it
evidence of what they thought best for the whole com­
munity, but only of what the rulers thought would be
best for themselves in periods when every species of
abuse prevailed unmitigated, by the existence of either
public press or public opinion. From the facts of their
times, much information may be derived :—from the
opinions, little or none. As to opinions, it is rather
from those which were foolish than from those which
were well grounded, that any instruction can be de­
rived. From foolish opinions comes foolish conduct;
from the most foolish conduct, the severest disaster;
and from the severest disaster, the most useful warn­
ing. It is from the folly, not from the wisdom, of our
ancestors that we have so much to learn ; and yet it
is to their wisdom, and not to their folly, that the fal­
lacy under consideration sends us for instruction.
It seems, then, that our ancestors, considering the
disadvantages under which they laboured, could not
have been capable of exercising so sound a judgment
on their interests as we on ours: but as a knowledge
of the facts on which a judgment is to be pronounced
is an indispensable preliminary to the arriving at just
conclusions, and as the relevant facts of the later pe­
riod must all of them individually, and most of them
specifically, have been unknown to the man of the
earlier period, it is clear that any judgment derived
from the authority of our ancestors, and applied to ex­
isting affairs, must be a judgment pronounced without
evidence ; and this is the judgment which the fallacy
in question calls on us to abide by, to the exclusion
SO F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . \Ch. 2 .
of a judgment formed on the completest evidence that
the nature of each case may admit.
Causes o f the Propensity to be influenced by this
Fallacy.
Wisdom o f ancestors being the most impressive of
all arguments that can be employed in defence of
established abuses and imperfections, persons interest­
ed in this or that particular abuse are most forward to
employ it.
But their exertions would be of little avail, were it
not for the propensity which they find on the part of
their antagonists to attribute to this argument nearly
the same weight as those by whom it is relied on.
This propensity may be traced to two intimately-
connected causes:— 1. Both parties having been train­
ed up alike in the school of the English lawyers, headed
by Blackstone; and, 2. Their consequent inability, for
want of practice, to draw from the principle of gene­
ral utility the justificative reason of every thing that is
susceptible of justification.
In the hands of a defender of abuse, authority an­
swers a double purpose, by affording an argument in
favour of any particular abuse which may happen to
call for protection, and by causing men to regard with
a mingled emotion of hatred and terror the principle
of general utility, in which alone the true standard
and measure of right and wrong is to be found.
In no other department of the field of knowledge
and wisdom (unless that which regards religion be an
exception) do leading men of the present times recom­
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 81
mend to us this receipt for thinking and acting wisely.
By no gentleman, honourable or right honourable, are
we sent at this time of day to the wisdom of our an­
cestors for the best mode of marshalling armies, navi­
gating ships, attacking or defending towns ; for the
best modes of cultivating and improving land, and
preparing and preserving its products for the purposes
of food, clothing, artificial light and heat; for the
promptest and most commodious means of conveyance
of ourselves and goods from one portion of the earth’s
surface to another; for the best modes of curing, al­
leviating or preventing disorders in our own bodies
and those of the animals which we contrive to apply
to our use.
Why this difference ? Only because in any other
part of the field of knowledge, legislation excepted,
(and religion, in so far as it has been taken for the
subject of legislation,) leading men are not affected
with that sinister interest which is so unhappily com­
bined with power in the persons of those Leading men
who conduct Governments as they are generally at
present established.
Sir H . D a vy has never had any thing to gain,
either from the unnecessary length, the miscarriage,
or the unnecessary part of the expenses attendant on
chemical experiments; he therefore sends us either to
his own experiments or to those of the most enlighten­
ed and fortunate of his cotemporaries, and not to the
notions of Stahl, Van Helmont, or Paracelsus.
G
82 FALLACIES OF AU TH O RITY. [Ch. 3.

CHAPTER III.

1. Fallacy o f Irrevocable Laws.

2. Fallacy o f Vows.
Ad superstitionem.

T h e two fallacies brought to view in this chapter

are intimately connected, and require to be considered
together : the object in view is the same in both, the
difference lies only in the instrument em ployed ; and
both o f them are in effect the fallacy o f the wisdom o f
our ancestors, pushed to the highest degree o f extra­
vagance and absurdity.
T h e object is to tie up the hands o f future legislators
by obligations supposed to be indissoluble.
In the case o f the fallacy derived from the alleged
irrevocable nature o f certain laws, or, to speak briefly,
the fallacy o f Irrevocable laws, the instrument em­
ployed is a contract— a contract entered into by the
ruling powers o f the state in question with the ruling
powers o f som e other party. This other party may be
either the sovereign o f som e other state, or the whole
or som e part o f the people o f the state in question.
In the case o f the fallacy derived from vows, a su­
pernatural power is called in and em ployed in the
character o f guarantee.

Fallacy o f Irrevocable Laws.

Exposition.
A law, no matter to what effect, is proposed to a
legislative assembly, and, no matter in what way, it is
Sect. 1.] FALLACIES OF AU TH O K ITY. 83
by the whole or a majority o f the assembly regarded
as being o f a beneficial tendency. T h e fallacy in
question consists in calling upon the assembly to re­
je c t it notwithstanding, upon the single ground, that
by those who, in som e former period, exercised the
power which the present assembly is thus called on to
exercise, a regulation was made, having for its object
the precluding for ever, or to the end o f a period not
yet expired, all succeeding legislators from enacting a
law to any such effect as that now proposed.
W h at will be tolerably clear to every man who will
allow him self to think it so, is— that, notwithstanding
the profound respect we are most o f us so ready to
testify towards our fellow creatures as soon as the
moment has arrived after which it can be o f no use to
them, the com forts o f those who are out o f the way o f
all the comforts we can bestow, as well as o f all the
sufferings we can inflict, are not the real objects to
which there has been this readiness to sacrifice the
comforts o f present and future generations, and that
therefore there must be som e other interest at the
bottom.

Exposure.
1. T o consider the matter in the first place on the
ground o f general utility.
A t each point o f time the sovereign for the time
possesses such means as the nature o f the case affords
for making himself acquainted with the exigencies o f
his own time.
84 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . \Ch. 3.
W ith relation to the future, the sovereign has no
such means o f information ; it is only by a sort o f
vague anticipation, a sort o f rough and almost random
guess drawn by analogy, that the sovereign o f this
year can pretend to say what will be the exigencies o f
the country this time ten years.
H ere then, to the extent o f the pretended immuta­
ble law, is the government transferred from those
who possess the best possible means o f information, to
those who, by their very position, are necessarily in­
capacitated from knowing any thing at all about the
matter.
Instead o f being guided by their own judgment, the
men o f the 19th century shut their own eyes, and give
themselves up to be led blindfold by the men o f the
18th century.
T h e men who have the means o f knowing the whole
body o f the facts on which the correctness and expe­
diency o f the judgm ent to be form ed, must turn,
give up their own judgm ent to that o f a set o f men
entirely destitute o f any o f the requisite knowledge o f
such facts.
M en who have a century more o f experience to
ground their judgm ents on, surrender their intellect to
men who had a century less experience, and who, un­
less that deficiency constitutes a claim, have no claim
to preference.
I f the prior generation were, in respect o f intellec­
tual qualification, ever so much superior to the sub­
sequent generation,— if it understood so much better
Sect. 1 .] F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . 85

than the subsequent generation itself the interest o f

that subsequent generation,— could it have been in an
equal degree anxious to promote that interest, and con­
sequently equally attentive to those facts with which,
though in order to form a judgm ent it ought to have
been, it is impossible that it should have been ac­
quainted? In a word, will its love for that subsequent
generation be quite so great as that same generation’s
love for itself?
N o t even here, after a moment’s deliberate reflec­
tion, will the assertion be in the affirmative.
A nd yet it is their prodigious anxiety for the welfare
o f their posterity that produces the propensity o f these
sages to tie up the hands o f this same posterity for
evermore, to act as guardians to its perpetual and in­
curable weakness, and take its conduct for ever out o f
its own hands.
I f it be right that the conduct o f ihe 19th century
should be determined not by its own judgm ent but by
that o f the 18th, it will be equally right that the con ­
duct o f the 20th century should be determined not by
its own judgm ent but by that o f the 19th.
T h e same principle still pursued, what at length
would be the consequence ?— that in process o f time
the practice o f legislation would be at an en d : the con ­
duct and fate o f all men would be determined b y those
who neither knew nor cared any thing about the mat­
ter ; and the aggregate body o f the living would re­
main for ever in subjection to an inexorable tyranny,
exercised, as it were, by the aggregate body o f the dead.
86 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ Ch. 3.
This irrevocable law, whether good or bad at the
moment of its enactment, is found at some succeeding
period to be productive of mischief—uncompensated
mischief—to any amount. Now of this mischief, what
possibility has the country of being rid ?
A despotism, though it were that of a Caligula or a
Nero, might be to any degree less mischievous, less
intolerable, than any such immutable law. By bene­
volence (for even a tyrant may have his moments of
benevolence), by benevolence, by prudence,—in a
word, by caprice,— the living tyrant might be induced
to revoke his law, and release the country from its
consequences. But the dead tyrant! who shall make
him feel ? who shall make him hear ?
Let it not be forgotten, that it is only to a bad pur­
pose that this and every other instrument of deception
will in general be employed.
It is only when the law in question is mischievous,
and generally felt and understood to be such, that an
argument of this stamp will be employed in the sup­
port of it.
Suppose the law a good one, it will be supported,
not by absurdity and deception, but by reasons draw’n
from its own excellence.
But is it possible that the restraint of an irrevocable
lawr should be imposed on so many millions of living
beings by a few score, or a few hundreds, whose ex­
istence has ceased P Can a system of tyranny be esta­
blished under which the living are all slaves—and a
few among the dead, their tyrants ?
 Sect. 1.] FA LLA C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 87
T he production o f any such effect in the way o f
constraint being physically impossible, if produced in
any degree it must be by force o f argument— by the
force o f fallacy, and not by that o f legislative power.
T h e means em ployed to give effect to this device
may be com prised under two heads ; the first o f them
exhibiting a contrivance not less flagitious than the
position itself is absurd.
1st, In speaking o f a law which is considered as
repugnant to any law o f the pretended immutable
class, the wray has been to call it void. But to what
purpose call it void ? O nly to excite the people to re­
bellion in the event o f the legislator’s passing any such
void law. In speaking o f a law as void, either this is
meant or nothing. It is a sophism o f the same cast as
that expressed by the words rights o f man, though
played o ff in another shape, by a different set o f
hands, and for the benefit o f a different class.
A re the people to consider the law void ? They are
then to consider it as an act o f injustice and tyranny
under the name o f la w ;— as an act o f power exercised
by men who have no right to exercise i t : they are to
deal by it as they would by the com m and o f a robber;
they are to deal by those who, having passed it, take
upon them to enforce the execution o f it, as they would
deal, whenever they found themselves strong enough,
by the robber him selfa.

a Lord Coke was for holding void every act contrary to Magna
Charta. I f his doctrine were tenable, every act imposing law-taxes
would be void.
88 FALLACIES OF AU TH O RITY . [C h. 3.

Sndly, T h e other contrivance for maintaining the

immutability o f a given law, is derived from the notion
o f a contract or engagement. T h e faithful observance
o f contracts being one o f the m ost important o f the
ties that bind society together, an argument drawn
from this source cannot fail to have the appearance
o f plausibility.
But be the parties interested who they may, a con­
tract is not itself an end ; it is but a means toward
some end : and in cases where the public is one o f
the parties concerned, it is only in so far as that end
consists o f the happiness o f the w hole community,
taken in the aggregate, that such contract is worthy
to be observed.
L et us examine the various kinds o f contract to
which statesmen have endeavoured to impart this
character o f perpetuity:— 1, Treaties between state
and foreign state, by which each respectively engages
its government and p e o p le ; 2, G rant o f privileges
from the sovereign to the whole community in the
character o f subjects ; 3, G rant o f privileges from the
sovereign to a particular class o f su bjects; 4, N ew
arrangement o f power between different portions or
branches o f the sovereignty, or new declaration o f the
rights o f the community ; 5, Incorporative union be­
tween two sovereignties having or not having a com ­
mon head.
Take, then, for the subject and substance o f the
contract any one o f these arrangements : so long as
the happiness o f the whole community, taken in the
Sect. ].] FALLACIES OF A U TH O RITY. 89
aggregate, is in a greater degree prom oted by the exact
observance o f the contract than it Mould be by any
alteration, exact ought to be the observance:— on the
contrary, if, by any given change, the aggregate o f hap­
piness would be in a greater degree prom oted than by
the exact observance, such change ought to be made.
True it is, that, considering the alarm and danger
which is the natural result o f every breach o f a con ­
tract to which the sovereignty is party, in case o f any
change with respect to such contract, the aggregate o f
public happiness will be in general rather diminished
than promoted, unless, in case o f disadvantage pro­
duced to any party by the change, such disadvantage
be made up by adequate compensation.
Let it not be said that this doctrine is a dangerous
doctrine, because the compensation supposed to be
stipulated for as adequate may prove but a nominal,
or at best but an inadequate, compensation. Reality
and not pretence, probity not improbity, veracity not
mendacity, are supposed alike on all sides;— the con­
tract a real contract, the change a real change, the
compensation an adequate as well as real compensa­
tion. Instead o f probity suppose improbity in the
sovereignty; it will be as easy to deny the existence,
or explain away the meaning o f the contract, or to
deny or explain away the change, as, instead o f a real
to give a nominal, instead o f an adequate to give an
inadequate, compensation.
T o apply the foregoing principles to the cases above
enumerated, one by one.
90 FALLACIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ C k . 3.

1. In the case o f the contract or treaty between

state and foreign state, the dogm a o f immutability has
seldom been productive o f any considerable practical
inconvenience: the ground o f com plaint has arisen
rather from a tendency to change than a too rigid ad­
herence to the treaty.
H ow ever, som e com m ercial treaties between state
and state, entered into in times o f political ignorance
or error, and pernicious to the general interests o f
com m erce, are frequently upheld under a pretence o f
regard for the supposed inviolability o f such contracts,
but in reality from a continuance o f the same igno­
rance, error, antipathy or sinister interest, which first
occasioned their existence. It can seldom or never
happen that a forced direction thus given to the em­
ploym ent o f capital can ultimately prove advanta­
geous to either o f the contracting parties ; and when
the pernicious operation o f such a treaty on the in­
terests o f both parties has been clearly pointed out,
there can be no longer any pretence for continuing its
existence. N otice, however, o f any proposed de­
parture from the treaty ought to be given to all the
parties concerned ; sufficient time should be afforded
to individuals engaged in traffic, under the faith o f the
treaty, to withdraw, if they please, their capitals from
such traffic, and in case o f loss, compensation as far
as possible ought to be afforded.
Q. Grant o f privilege from the sovereign to the
whole community in the character o f subjects.— If, by
the supposed change, privileges to equal value be given
Sect. 1.] FA LLA CIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 91

in the room o f such as are abrogated, adequate com ­

pensation is made : if greater privileges are substi­
tuted, there is the greater reason for supporting the
measure.
3. Grant o f privileges from the sovereign to a
particular class o f subjects.
N o such particular privilege ought to have been
granted if the aggregate happiness o f the community
was likely to be thereby dim inished: but, unless in
case o f a revocation, adequate compensation be here
also made, the aggregate happiness o f the community
will not be increased by the change; the happiness o f
the portion o f the community to be affected by the
change, being as great a part o f the aggregate happi­
ness as that o f any other portion o f equal extent.
U nder this head are included all those more parti­
cular cases in which the sovereign contracts with
this or that individual, or assemblage o f individuals,
for money or m oney’s worth, to be supplied, or ser­
vice otherwise to be rendered.
4. N ew arrangement or distribution o f powers as
between different portions or branches o f the sove­
reignty, or new declaration o f the rights o f the com ­
munity.
L et the supposition be, that the result will not be
productive o f a real addition to the aggregate stock o f
happiness on the part o f the whole community, it ought
not to be made : let the supposition be the reverse,
then, notwithstanding the existence o f the contract, the
change is such as it is right and fitting should be made.
92 F A L LA C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ C h . S.

T h e first o f these can never furnish a case for com ­

pensation, unless in so far as, without charge or disad­
vantage to the people, the members o f the sovereignty
can contrive to satisfy one another; such members o f
the sovereignty being, as to the rest o f the community,
not proprietors but trustees.
T h e frame or constitution o f the several American
united„states, so far from being declared immutable or
imprescriptible, contains an express provision, that a
convention shall be holden at intervals for the avowed
object o f revising and improving the constitution, as
the exigencies o f succeeding times may require. In
Europe, the effect o f declaring this or that article in
a new distribution o f powers, or in the original frame
o f a constitution, immutable, has been to weaken the
sanction o f all laws. T h e article in question turns
out to be mischievous or im practicable; instead o f
being repealed, it is openly or covertly violated ; and
this violation affords a precedent or pretext for the
non-observance o f arrangements clearly calculated to
prom ote the aggregate happiness o f the community.
5. Case o f an in c o r p o r a t e union between two
sovereignties, having or not having a com m on head.
O f all the cases upon the list, this is the only one
which is attended with difficulty.
This is the case in w hich, at the same time that a
contract with detailed clauses is at once likely and fit
to be insisted on, compensation, that compensation
without which any change would not be consistent
with general utility in the shape o f justice or in any
Sect. 1.] FALLA CIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 93
other shape, is an operation attended with more diffi­
culty than in any other o f these cases.
Distressing indeed would be the difficulty, were it
not for one circumstance which happily is interwoven
in the very nature o f the case.
A t the time o f the intended union, the two states
(not to embarrass the case by taking more than two
at a time) are, with relation each to the other, in a
greater or less degree foreign and independent states.
O f the two uniting states, one will generally be
more, the other less, powerful. I f the inequality be
considerable, the more powerful state, naturally speak­
ing, will not consent to the union, unless, after the
union, the share it possesses in the government o f the
new-framed com pound state be greater by a difference
bearing some proportion to the difference in prosperity
between the two states.
O n the part o f the less powerful state, precautions
against oppression com e o f course.
W herever a multitude o f human being's
O
are brought
O

together, there is but too much room for jealousy, sus­

picion, and mutual ill-will.
In the apprehension o f each, the others, i f they ob­
tain possession o f the powers exercised by the com ­
mon government, will be supposed to apply them un­
justly. In men or in money, in labour or in goods,
in a direct way or in some indirect one, it may be the
study o f the new com pound government, under the
influence o f that part o f the quondam government
which is predominant in it, to render the pressure o f
 94 FA LLA C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [C h . 3 .

the contributions proportionably more severe upon

the one portion o f the new com pounded state than
upon the other, or to force upon it new customs, new
religious ceremonies, new laws.
L et the hands o f the new government remain alto­
gether loose, one o f the two com pound nations may
be injured and oppressed by the other.
T ie up the hands o f the government in such degree
as is requisite to give to each nation a security against
injustice at the hands o f the other, sooner or later
com es the time in which the inconveniencies resulting
from the restriction will becom e intolerable to one or
other, or to both.
But sooner or later the very duration o f the union
produces the natural remedy.
Sooner or later, having for such or such a length o f
time been in the habit o f acting in subjection to one
government, the two nations will have becom e melted
into one, and mutual apprehensions will have been
dissipated by conjunct experience.
A ll this while, in one or both o f the united states,
the individuals will be but too numerous and too
powerful who, by sinister interest and interest-begotten
prejudice, will stand engaged to give every possible
countenance and intensity to those fears and jealousies,
to oppose to the entire com posure o f them every de­
gree o f retardation.
If, in either o f the united communities at the time
o f the union, there existed a set o f men more or less
numerous and powerful, to whom abuse or im perfec­
Sect. !.] FALLA CIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 95
tion in any shape was a source o f profit, whatsoever
restrictions may have been expressed in the contract,
these restrictions will o f course be laid hold o f by the
men thus circumstanced, and applied as far as possi­
ble to the giving protection and continuance to a state
o f things agreeable or beneficial to themselves.
A t the time o f the union between England and
Scotland, the T ory party, o f w hom a large proportion
were Jacobites, and all or most o f them high-church­
men, had acquired an ascendant in the H ouse o f
Com m ons.
Here, then, a favourable occasion presented itself
to these partisans o f E piscopacy for giving perpetuity
to the triumph they had obtained over the English
presbyterians, by the A ct o f U niform ity proclaim ed in
the time o f Charles the S e co n d s
In treaties between unconnected nations, where an
advantage in substance is given to one, for the purpose
o f saving the honour o f the other, it has been the
custom to make the articles bear the appearance o f
reciprocity upon the face o f them ; as if, the facilitating
the vent o f French wines in England being the o b ­
je c t o f a treaty, provision were made in it that wine
o f the growth o f either country might be imported into
the other, duty free.
By the combined astutia o f priestcraft and lawyer-
craft, advantage was taken o f this custom to rivet for
ever those chains o f ecclesiastical tyranny which, in

a 13 and 14 Charles II. c.4.

96- f a l l a c ie s OF A U T H O R IT Y . \Ch. 3.
the precipitation that attended the Restoration, had
been fastened upon the people o f England.— For se­
curing the 45 Scotch members from being outnum-
bered by the 5 13 English ones, provision had been
made in favour o f the church o f Scotland : therefore,
on the principle o f reciprocity for securing the 51 3
English members from being outnumbered by the 45
Scotch ones, like provision was made in favour o f the
church o f England.
Blackstone avails him self o f this transaction for
giving perpetuity to whatever imperfections may be
found in the ecclesiastical branch o f the law, and the
official establishment o f England.
O n a general account which he has been givin ga
o f the articles and act o f union, he grounds three o b ­
servations :—
1. T h at the two kingdoms are now so inseparably
united that nothing can ever disunite them again, ex­
cept the mutual consent o f both, or the successful re­
sistance o f either, upon apprehending an infringement
o f those points which, when they were separate and
independent nations, it was mutually stipulated should
be “ fundamental and essential conditions o f the
union.”
Q. That, whatever else may be deemed “ funda­
mental and essential conditions,” the preservation o f
the two churches o f England and Scotland, in the
same state that they were in at the time o f the union,

a
Vol. i. 97, 98.
Sect. I .] FA LLA C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 97
and the maintenance o f the acts o f uniformity which
establish our com m on prayer, are expressly declared
so to be.
3. That therefore any alteration in the constitution
o f either o f those churches, or in the Liturgy o f the
church o f England (unless with the consent o f the
respective churches collectively or representatively
given), would be an infringement o f these “ fundamen­
tal and essential conditions,” and greatly endanger the
union.
On the original device, an improvement has, we
see, been made by the ingenuity o f the orthodox and
learned commentator. If,— as for example by the
alteration o f any o f the 39 articles,— if, by the aboli­
tion o f any o f the English ecclesiastical sinecures, or
by any efficient measure for ensuring the performance
o f duty in return for salary, the ecclesiastical branch
o f the English official establishment were brought so
much the nearer to what it is in Scotland, the Scotch,
fired by the injury done to them, would cry out, a
breach o f faith ! and call for a dissolution o f the
union.
T o obviate this danger, a great one he denom i­
nates it, his ingenuity, in concert with his piety, has
however furnished us with an ex p ed ien t:— “ The
consent o f the church collectively or representatively
given,” is to be taken; by which is meant, if any
thing, that by the revival o f the convocation, or some
other means, the clergy o f England are to be erected
into a fourth estate.
H
98 F A LLA C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 3 .
W hat is evident is, that, unless the sinister influence
o f the Crown could be supposed to becom e felo de se,
and em ploy itself in destroying a large portion o f
itself, nothing but a sincere persuasion o f the utility
o f a change in relation to any o f the points in ques­
tion, and that entertained by a large proportion o f the
English members in each house, could ever be pro­
ductive o f any such change that, in any attempt to
force the discipline o f the church o f Scotland upon
the church o f England, the 45 Scotch members in the
H ouse o f C om m ons, supposing them all unanimous,
would have to outnumber, or som e how or other to
subdue, the 51 3 English ones ;— that in the H ouse o f
L ords, the sixteen Scotch members, supposing all the
lay lords indifferent to the fate o f the church o f En­
gland, would in like manner have to outnumber the 2 6
bishops and archbishops.
But the Tories, who were then in vigour, feared
that they might not always be so, and seized that o p ­
portunity to fetter posterity by an act which should
be deemed irrevocable.
T h e “ administration o f justice in Scotland a.” —
T his forms the subject o f the 19th article, which has
for its avowed object the securing the people o f Scot­
land against any such encroachments as might other­
wise be made by the lawyers o f England, by the use
o f those fictions and other frauds, in the use o f which
they had been found so expert. But throughout the

a j Ann. c. S. art. 19. anno 1708.

Sect. 1.] FA LLA CIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 99
whole course o f this long article, the m ost rational
and uniform care is taken to avoid all such danger as
that o f depriving the people o f Scotland o f such bene­
fit as, from time to time, they might stand a chance
o f receiving at the hands o f the united Parliament, by
improvements in the m ode o f administering justice :
“ subject to such regulations as shall be made by the
Parliament o f G reat Britain,” is a clause over and
over again repeated.
It would have been better for Scotland if, on the
subject o f the next article, viz. “ heritable offices,” in­
cluding “ heritable jurisdictions,” the like wisdom had
presided. By that short article, those public trusts,
together with others therein mentioned, are on the
footing o f “ rights o f property ” reserved to the owners;
yet still, without any expression o f that fanatic spirit
w hich, on the field o f religion, had in the same statute
occupied itself in the endeavour to invest the conceits
o f mortal man with the attribute o f immortality.
Nine-and-thirty years after, cam e the a c t a for abo­
lishing these same heritable jurisdictions. H ere was
an act made in the very teeth o f the act o f union.
Mark now the sort o f discernment, or o f sincerity,
that is to be learnt from Blackstone.
In a point blank violation o f the articles o f union,
in the abolition o f those heritable jurisdictions which

a **abolishing the heritable jurisdictions in Scotland ” are so many

words that stand in the title of it. Anno 1747, 20 Geo. 2. c. 43.
II 2
100 FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Cli. 3.
it was the declared object o f one o f its articles (2 0 )
to preserve, he saw nothing to “ endanger the anion.”
But suppose any such opinion to prevail, as that it
is not exactly true that by the mere act o f being born
every human being merits damnation a (if by damna­
tion be meant everlasting torment, or punishment in
any other shape), and a corresponding alteration were
made in the set o f propositions called the 39 articles,
the union would be “ greatly endangered.”
Between 20 and 30 years afterwards, at the sug­
gestion o f an honest member o f tlie Court o f Session,
cam e upon the carpet, for the first time, the idea o f
applying remedies to som e o f the most flagrant im­
perfections in the administration o f Scottish justice :
and thereupon cam e out a pamphlet from James Bos­
well, declaiming, in the style o f school-boy declam a­
tion, on the injury that would be done to the people
o f Scotland by rendering justice, or what goes by that
name, a little less inaccessible to them, and the breach
that would be made in the faith plighted by that
treaty, which, to ju dge from what he says o f it, he
had never looked at.
Again, in 1S06, when another demonstration was
made o f applying a remedy to the abuses and imper­
fections o f the system o f judicature in Scotland, every
thing that could be done in that way was immediately
reprobated by the Scotch lawyers as an infringement

a Art. 9.
Sect. 1.] F A L L A C I E S OF A U T H O R I T Y . 101

o f that most sacred o f all sacred bonds— the union :

nor, for the support o f the brotherhood on the other
side o f the T w eed, was a second sight o f the matter
in the same poiut o f view wanting in England.
A s to any such design as that o f oppressing their
fellow subjects in Scotland, nothing could be further
from the thoughts o f the English members ; neither
for good nor for evil uses was any expense o f thought
bestowed upon the matter. T he ultimate object, as it
soon became manifest, was the adding an item or two
to the list o f places.
U pon the whole, the following is the conclusion
that seems to be dictated by the foregoing considera­
tions. Every arrangement by which the hands o f the
sovereignty for the time being are attempted to be
tied up, and precluded from giving existence to a fresh
arrangement, is absurd and m ischievous; and, on the
supposition that the utility o f such fresh arrangement
is sufficiently established, the existence o f a prohibitive
clause to the effect in question ought not to be consi­
dered as opposing any bar to the establishment o f it.
True it is, that all laws, all political institutions, are
essentially dispositions for the future ; and the pro­
fessed object o f them is, to afford a steady and per­
manent security to the interests o f mankind. In this
sense, all o f them may be said to be framed with a
view to perpetuity ; but perpetual is not synonymous
with irrevocable; and the principle on which all laws
ought to be, and the greater part o f them have been,
established, is that o f drfeasible pcrpctuihj; a perpe­
102 FA LLA C IE S OF A U T H O R I T Y . [ Ch. 3.
tuity defeasible only by an alteration o f the circum ­
stances and reasons on which the law is founded.
T o comprise all in one w ord— Reason, and that
alone, is the proper anchor for a law, for every thing
that goes by the name o f law. A t the time o f passing
his law, let the legislator deliver, in the character o f
reasons, the considerations by which he was led to
the passing o f i t a.
This done, so long as in the eyes o f the succeeding
legislators the state o f facts on which the reasons are
grounded appears to continue without material change,
and the reasons to appear satisfactory, so long the law
contin ues: but no sooner d o the reasons cease to ap­
pear satisfactory, or the state o f the facts to have un­
dergone any such change as to call for an alteration
in the law, than an alteration in it, or the abrogation
o f it, takes place accordingly.
A declaration or assertion that this or that law is
immutable, so far from being a proper instrument to
ensure its permanency, is rather a presumption that
such law has som e mischievous tendency.
T h e better the law, the less is any such extraneous
argument likely to be recurred to for the support o f
it; the worse the law, and thence the more com pletely
destitute o f all intrinsic support, the more likely is it
that support should be sought for it from this extra­
neous source.

a For a specimen, see the end o f the first volume o f Dumont’s

Truitts flc Legislation.
O
Sect. 1 . ] FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 103

But though it is the characteristic tendency o f this

instrument to apply itself to bad laws in preference to
good ones, there is another, the tendency o f which is
to apply itself to good ones in preference to bad : this
is what may be termed justification; the practice o f
annexing to each law the considerations by which, in
the character o f reasons, the legislator was induced to
adopt i t a ; a practice which, i f rigidly pursued, must
at no distant interval put an exclusion on all bad laws.
T o the framing o f laws so constituted, that, being
good in themselves, an accompanim ent o f good and
sufficient reasons should also be given for them, there
would be requisite, in the legislator, a probity not to
be diverted by the action o f sinister interest, and in­
telligence adequate to an enlarged comprehension and
close application o f the principle o f general utility: in
other words, the principle o f the greatest happiness o f
the greatest number.
But to draw up laws without reasons, and law's for
which good reasons are not in the nature o f the case
to be found, requires no more than the union o f will
and power.
The man who should produce a body o f good law's
with an accompanim ent o f good reasons, would feel
an honest pride at the prospect o f holding thus in
bondage a succession o f willing generations; his
triumph would be to leave them the power, but to

a See Bentham per Dumont Truitts de legislation, \ c . ; Papers on

Codification ; and letters to the l rniled States.
104 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T lI O liI T V . [ Cfl. 3.

deprive them o f will to escape. But to the champions

o f abuse, by whom, amongst other devices, the conceit
o f immutable laws is played oft' against reform, in
whatever shape it presents itself, every use o f reason
is as odious as the light o f the sun to moles and
burglars. ^

2. Trows, or promissory Oaths.

T h e object in this fallacy is the same as in the pre­
ceding ; but to the absurdity involved in the notion o f
tying up the hands o f generations yet to com e is
added, in this case, that which consists in the use
sought to be made o f supernatural power : the arm
pressed into the service is that o f the invisible and
supreme ruler o f the universe.
T h e oath taken, the formularies involved in it being
pronounced, is or is not the Alm ighty bound to do
what is expected o f him ? O f the two contradictory
propositions, which is it that you believe ?
I f he is not bound, then the security, the sanction,
the obligation amounts to nothing.
I f he is bound, then observe the consequence:— the
Alm ighty is bound; and by whom bound P— o f all the
w orms that crawl about the earth in the shape o f men,
there is not one who may not thus im pose conditions
on the supreme ruler o f the universe.
And to what is he bound ? to any number o f con ­
tradictory and incompatible observances, which legis­
lators, tyrants, or madmen, may, in the shape o f an
aotli, be pleased to assign.
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S OF A U T I I O I U T V . 105

Eventual, it must be acknowledged, and no more,

is the power thus exercised over, the task thus im­
posed upon, the Alm ighty. So long as the vow is
kept, there is nothing tor him to do ;— true : but no
sooner is the vow broken, than his task com m ences ;
a task which consists in the inflicting on him by whom
the vow’ is broken a punishment, which, when it is in­
flicted, is o f no use in the way o f example, since no­
body ever sees it.
T h e punishment, it may be said, when inflicted, will
be such exactly as, in the judgm ent o f the almighty
and infallible judge, will be best adapted to the nature
o f the offence.
Y es: but what offence? not the act which the
oath was intended to prevent, for that act may be in­
different, or even meritorious; and, if criminal, ought
to be punished independently o f the oath : the only
offence peculiar to this case, is the profanation o f a
cerem on y ; and the profanation is the same, whether
the act by which the profanation arises be pernicious
or beneficial.
It is in vain to urge, in this or that particular in­
stance, in p roof o f the reasonableness o f the oath, the
reasonableness o f the prohibition or command which
it is thus em ployed to perpetuate.
T he objection is to the principle itself: to any idea
o f employing an instrument so unlit to be em ployed.
N o sort o f security is given, or can be given, for
the applying it to the most beneficial purpose rather
than to the most pernicious.
106 FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ Ch. 3.

O n the contrary, it is more likely to be applied to

a pernicious than to a beneficial purpose ;
Because, the more manifestly and undeniably bene­
ficial the observance o f the prohibition in question
would be in the eyes o f future generations, the more
likely is the prohibition to be observed, independently
o f the oath : as, on the other hand, the more likely
the prohibition is not to be observed otherwise, the
greater is the demand for a security o f this extraor­
dinary com plexion to enforce the observance.
W e com e now to the instance in which, by the ope­
ration o f the fallacy here in question, the cerem ony o f
an oath has been endeavoured to be applied to the
perpetuation o f misrule.
A m on g the statutes passed in the first parliament
o f W illiam and M ary, is one entitled “ A n A c t for
establishing the Coronation Oath a. ”
T h e form in which the cerem ony is perform ed is
as fo llo w s :— By the archbishop or bishop, certain
questions are put to the m on a rch ; and it is o f the
answers given to these questions that the oath is com ­
posed.
O f these questions, the third is as fo llo w s : “ W ill
you, to the utmost o f your power, maintain the laws
o f G o d , the true profession o f the G osp el, and the
protestant reformed religion established by law ? A nd
will you preserve unto the bishops and clergy o f this
realm, and to the churches committed to their charge,*

* 1 W. arid M. o. 0. anno K>88.

Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R I T Y . 107
all such rights and privileges as by law d o or shall
appertain unto them, or any o f them ? ”
Answer. “ A ll this I promise to d o .”
A fter this, anno 170b, com es the A c t o f U nion, in
the concluding article o f which it is said, “ That after
the demise o f her majesty . . . the sovereign
next succeeding to her majesty in the royal govern­
ment o f the kingdom o f Great Britain, and so for ever
hereafter, every king or queen succeeding and com ing
to the royal government o f the kingdom o f G reat
Britain, at his or her coronation, shall in the pre­
sence,” & c. “ take and subscribe an oath to maintain
and preserve inviolate the said settlement o f the
church, and the doctrine, worship, discipline and g o­
vernment thereof, as by law established, within the
kingdoms o f England and Ireland, the dominion o f
W ales, and town o f Berwick-upon-Tweed, and the
territories thereunto belonging
D O
a.”
A notion was once started, and upon occasion may
but too probably be broached again, that by the above
clause in the coronation oath, the king stands pre­
cluded from joining in the putting the majority o f the
Irish upon an equal footing with the minority, as well
as from affording to both together relief against the
abuses o f the ecclesiastical establishment o f thatcountry.
In relation to this notion, the following propositions
liave already, it is hoped, been put sulhciently out o f
doubt.

® "> Ann c 8. art. Q'i. § S.

108 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [67/. 3.
1. That it ought not to be in the power o f the so­
vereignty to tie up its own hands, or the hands o f its
successors.
2. That, on the part o f the sovereignty, no such
power can have existence, either here or any where
else.
3. That, therefore, all attempts to exercise any
such power are, in their own nature, to use the tech­
nical language o f law vers, null and void.
4. Another, which will, it is supposed, appear
scarcely less clear, is, that no such anarchical wish
or expectation was entertained by the framers o f the
oath.
T h e proposition maintained is, that to any bills, to
the effect in question, the monarch is, by this third
and last clause in the oath, precluded from giving his
assen t: if so, he is equally precluded from giving his
assent to any bills, to any proposed laws whatever.
It is plainly in what is called his executive, and not
in his legislative capacity, that the obligation in ques­
tion was meant to attach upon the monarch.
So loose are the words o f the act, that, if they
were deemed to apply to the monarch in his legisla­
tive capacity, he might find in them a pretence for
refusing assent to almost any thing he did not like.
I f by this third clause he stands precluded from
consenting to any bill, the effect o f which would be
to abolish or vary any o f the “ rights ” or “ privileges ”
appertaining to the bishops or clergy, or “ any o f
th em /’ then by the first clause he stands equally pre-
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C I E S OF A U T H O R I T Y . 109
eluded from giving his concurrence to any law, the
effect o f which would be to abolish or change any
other rights. For by this first clause he is made
“ solem n ly ” to “ promise and swear to govern the
people .. . . according to the statutes in parlia­
ment agreed
O J
on, and the laws and customs o f the
sam e.” A fter this, governing according to any new
law, he could not govern according to the old law
abrogated by it.
If, by any such ceremony, misrule in this shape
could be converted into a duty or a right, so might it
in any other.
I f Henry V I I I . at his coronation had sworn to
“ m aintain” that Catholic “ religion,” which for so
many centuries was “ established by law,” and by fire
and sword to keep out the Protestant religion, and
had been considered bound by such oath, he could
never have taken one step towards the Reformation,
and the religion o f the state must have been still Ca­
tholic.
But would you put a force upon the conscience o f
your sovereign ? By any construction, which in your
judgm ent may be the proper one, would you preclude
him from the free exercise o f his ?
M ost assuredly n o t : even were it as com pletely
within as it is out o f my power.
All I plead for is, that on so easy a condition as
that o f pronouncing the word conscience, it may not
be in his power either to make himself absolute, or in
any shape to give continuance to misrule.
110 FA LLA C IES OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 3 .
L et him but resign his power, conscience can never
reproach him with any misuse o f it.
It seems difficult to say what can be a misuse
o f it, if it be not a determinate and persevering habit
o f using it in such a manner as in the judgm ent o f the
two houses is not “ conducive,” but repugnant “ to
the utility o f the subjects,” with reference to whom ,
and whose utility alone, either laws or kings can be o f
any use.
A ccord in g to the form in which it is conceived,
any such engagement is in effect either a check or a
license :— a license under the appearance o f a check,
and for that very reason but the more efficiently op e­
rative.
Chains to the man in p ow er? Y es :— but such as
he figures with on the sta ge: to the spectators as im ­
posing, to him self as light as possible. M odelled by
the wearer to suit his own purposes, they serve to
rattle but not to restrain.
Suppose a king o f G reat Britain and Ireland to
have expressed his fixed determination, in the event
o f any proposed law being tendered to him for his
assent, to refuse such assent, and this not on the per­
suasion that the law would not be “ for the utility o f
the subjects,” but that by his coronation oath he stands
precluded from so doing :— the course proper to be
taken by parliament, the course pointed out by prin­
ciple and precedent wrould be, a vote o f abdication :
— a vote declaring the king to have abdicated his
royal authority, and that, as in case o f death or in­
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . Ill
curable mental derangement, now is the time for the
person next in succession to take his place.
In the celebrated case in which a vote to this effect
was actually passed, the declaration o f abdication was
in lawyers’ language a fiction,— in plain truth a false­
hood, — and that falsehood a m ock ery ; not a particle
o f his power was it the wish o f James to abdicate, to
part w ith ; but to increase it to a maximum was the
manifest object o f all his efforts.
But in the case here supposed, with respect to a
part, and that a principal part o f the royal authority,
the will and purpose to abdicate is actually declared:
and this, being such a part, without which the re­
mainder cannot, “ to the utility o f the subjects,” be
exercised, the remainder must o f necessity be, on their
part and for their sake, added a.

“ The variety o f the notions entertained at dift'erent periods, in dif­

ferent stages o f society, respecting the duration o f laws, presents a cu­
rious and not uninstructive picture o f human weakness.
1. At one time we see, under the name o f king, a single person,
whose will makes law, or, at any rate, without whose will no law is
made; and when this law-giver dies, his laws die with him.
Such was the state o f things in Saxon times,— such even continued
to be the state o f things for several reigns after the Norman Conquest *.
2. Next to this comes a period in which the duration o f the law,
during the life-time o f the monarch to whom it owed its birth, was
unsettled and left to chance f .
3. In the third place comes the period in which the notions re­
specting the duration o f the law concur with the dictates of reason
and utility, not so much from reflection as because no occasion o f a

* To Ric. I. inclusive.
| John, Ed. I and II.
m F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 3.
nature to suggest and urge any attempt so absurd as that o f tyrannizing
over futurity had as yet happened to present itself.
4. Lastly, upon the spur o f an occasion o f the sort in question,
comes the attempt to give eternity to human laws.
Provisional and eventual perpetuity is an attribute which, in that
stage o f society at which laws have ceased to expire with the individual
legislator, is understood to be inherent in all laws in which no expres­
sion is found to the contrary.
But if a particular length o f time be marked out, during which, in
the enactment o f a law, it is declared that that law shall not be
liable to suffer abrogation or alteration, the determination to tie up the
hands o f succeeding legislators is expressed in unequivocal terms.
Such, in respect o f their constitutional code, was the pretension set
up hy the first assembly o f legislators brought together by the French
revolution.
A position not less absurd in principle, but by the limitation in
point o f time, not pregnant with any thing like equal mischief, was
before that time acted upon, and still continues to be acted upon, in
English legislation.
In various statutes, a clause may be found by which the statute is
declared capable o f being altered or repealed in the course o f the same
session. In this clause is contained, in the way o f necessary impli­
cation, that a statute in which no such clause is inserted is not capable
o f being repealed or altered during the session,— no, not by the very
hands by which it was made.
Ch. 4 . ] FA LLA CIES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 113

CHAPTER IV.

No-precedent Argument.
Ad verecundiam.

Exposition.
“ T h e proposition is o f a novel and unprecedented
co m p le x io n : the present is surely the first time that
any such thing was ever heard o f in this house.”
W hatsoever may happen to be the subject intro­
duced, above is a specimen o f the infinite variety o f
forms in which the opposing predicate may be clothed.
T o sucli an observation there could be no ob jec­
tion, if the object with which it were made was only
to fix attention to a new or difficult su b ject: “ D eli­
berate well before you act, as you have no precedent
to direct your course

Exposure.
But in the character o f an argument, as a ground
for the rejection o f the proposed measure, it is o b ­
viously a fallacy.
W hether or no the alleged novelty actually exists,
is an inquiry which it can never be worth while to
make.
T hat it is impossible that it should in any case af­
ford the smallest ground for the rejection o f the mea­
sure,— that the observation is completely irrelevant in
i
114 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R I T Y . [ 6 7 /. 4 .

relation to the question, whether or no it is expedient

that such a measure should be adopted,— is a propo­
sition to which it seems difficult to conceive how an
immediate assent can be refused. I f no specific good
is indicated as likely to be produced by the proposed
measure, this deficiency is itself sufficient to warrant
the rejection o f it. I f any such specific good is indi­
cated, it must be minute indeed if an observation o f
this nature can afford a sufficient ground for the rejec­
tion o f the measure.
I f the observation presents a conclusive objection
against the particular measure proposed, so it would
against any other that ever was proposed, including
every measure that ever was adopted, and therein
every institution that exists at present. I f it proves
that this ought not to be done, it proves that nothing
else ought ever to have been done.
It may be urged, that, if the measure had been a
fit one, it would have been brought upon the carpet
before. But there are several obstacles besides the
inexpediency o f a measure, which, for any length o f
time, may prevent its being brought forward.
1. If, though beyond dispute promotive o f the in­
terest o f the many, there be any thing in it that is ad­
verse to the interests, the prejudices, or the humours
o f the ruling few, the wonder is, not that it should not
have been brought forward before, but that it should
be brought forward even now'.
2. If, in the com plexion o f it, there be any thing
which it required a particular degree o f ingenuity to
Ch. 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 115

contrive and adapt to the purpose, this would o f itself

be sufficient to account for the tardiness o f its appear­
ance.
In legislation, the birth o f ingenuity is obstructed
and retarded by difficulties, beyond any which exist
in other matters. Besides the more general sinister
interest o f the powerful few in whose hands the func­
tions o f government are lodged, the more particular
sinister interest affecting the body o f lawyers, is one
to which any given measure, in proportion to the in­
genuity displayed in it, is likely to be adverse.
Measures which com e under the head o f indirect
legislation, and in particular those which have the
quality o f executing themselves, are the measures
which, as they possess most efficiency when establish­
ed, so they require greater ingenuity in the contri­
vance. N o w in proportion as laws execute them­
selves, in other words, are attended with voluntary
obedience, in that proportion are they efficient; but
it is only in proportion as they fail o f being efficient,
that, to the man o f law, they are beneficial and pro­
ductive; because it is only in proportion as they stand
in need o f enforcement, that business makes its way
into the hands o f the man o f law.
U6 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [ Cll. 5.

CHAPTER V.

Self-assum ed A u th ority.
Ad ignorantiam; ad verecundiam.

T h is fallacy presents itself in two shapes:— 1. A n

avowal made with a sort o f m ock m odesty and cau­
tion by a person in exalted station, that he is incapa­
ble o f forming a judgm ent on the question in debate,
such incapacity being sometimes real, sometimes pre­
tended : 2. O pen assertion by a person so situated o f
the purity o f his motives and integrity o f his life, and
the entire reliance which may consequently be reposed
on all he says or does.

Sect. 1.
T h e first is com m only played o ff as follow s:— A n
evil or defect in our institutions is pointed out clearly,
and a remedy proposed, to which no objection can be
m a d e ;— up starts a man high in office, and, instead o f
stating any specific objection, says, “ I am not pre­
pared ” to do so and so, “ I am not prepared to say,”
&c. The meaning evidently intended to be conveyed
is, “ I f I, w ho am so dignified and supposed to be so
capable o f forming a judgm ent, avow m yself incom pe­
tent to d o so, what presumption, what folly must there
b e in the conclusion form ed by any one else!” In
truth, this is nothing else but an indirect way o f browr-
beatin g;— arrogance under a thin veil o f modesty.
I f you are not prepared to pass a judgm ent, you
Sect. 1 . ] FA L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 117

are not prepared to condemn, and ought not, there­

fore, to op p ose: the utmost you are warranted in
doing, if sincere, is to ask for a little time for consi­
deration.
Supposing the unpreparedness real, the reasonable
and practical inference is,— say nothing, take no part
in the business.
A proposition for the reforming o f this or that abuse
in the administration o f justice, is the com m on occa ­
sion for the em ployment o f this fallacy.
In virtue o f his office, every judge, every law-officer,
is supposed and pronounced to be profoundly versed
in the science o f the law ;
Y e s ; o f the science o f the law as it is, probably as
much as any other man : but law, as it ought to be,
is a very different th ing; and the proposal in question
has for its avowed, and com m only for its real object,
the bringing law as it is somewhat nearer to law as it
ought to be. But this is one o f those things for which
the great dignitary is sure to be at all times unpre­
pared :— unprepared to join in any such design ; every
thing o f this sort having been at all times contrary to
his interest:— unprepared so much as to form any
judgm ent concerning the conduciveness o f the pro­
posed measure to such its declared o b je c t: in any
such point o f view it has never been his interest to
consider it.
A mind that, from its first entrance upon this sub­
je ct, has been applying its whole force to the inquiry,
as to what are the most effectual means o f making its
 118 FA LLA C IES OF A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 5r
profit o f the imperfections o f the system ;— a mind to
which o f consequence the profit from these sources o f
affliction has been all along an object o f com placency,
and the affliction itself, at best, but an object o f indif­
feren ce;— a mind which has, throughout the whole
course o f its career, been receiving a correspondent
bias, and has in consequence contracted a corre­
spondent distortion;— cannot with reason be expected
to exert itself with much alacrity or facility in a track
so opposite and so new.
For the quiet o f his conscience, if, at the outset o f
his career, it were his fortune to have one, he will
naturally have been feeding him self with the notion,
that, if there be any thing that is amiss, in practice it
cannot be oth erw ise; which being granted, and, ac­
cordingly, that suffering to a certain amount cannot
but take place, whatsoever profit can be extracted
from it, is fair game, and as such, belongs o f right to
the first occupant am ong persons duly qualified.
T h e wonder would not be great if an officer o f the
military profession should exhibit, for a time at least,
som e awkwardness if forced to act in the character o f
a surgeon’s mate : to inflict wounds requires one sort
o f skill, to dress and heal them requires another. T e -
lephus is the only man upon record who possessed an
instrument by which wounds were with equal dispatch
and efficiency made and healed. T h e race o f Telephus
is e x tin ct; and as to his spears, if ever any o f them '
found their way into Pom peii or Herculaneum, they
remain still among the ruins.
Sect. 1.] FA LLACIES OF A U T H O R I T Y . 1 If)

Unfortunately in this case, were the ability to form

a judgm ent ever so com plete, the likelihood o f c o ­
operation would not be increased. N on e are so com ­
pletely d eaf as those who will not hear,— none are so
com pletely unintelligent as those who will not under­
stand.
Call upon a ch ief justice to concur in a measure for
giving possibility to the recovery o f a debt, the re­
covery o f which is in his own court rendered im pos­
sible by costs which partly go into his own pocket,
as well might you call upon the P ope to abjure the
errors o f the church o f Rom e. I f not hard pressed,
he will maintain a prudent and easy silence ; if hard
pressed, he will let fly a volley o f fallacies : he will
play o ff the argument drawn from the imputation o f
bad motives, and tell you o f the profit expected by
the party by whom the bill was framed, and petition
procured, to form a ground for it. I f that be not suf­
ficient, he will transform himself in the first place
into a witness, giving evidence upon a com m ittee;
in the next place, after multiplying him self into
the number o f members necessary to hear and re­
port upon that evidence, he will make a report ac­
cordingly.
H e will report in that character, that when in any
town a set o f tradesmen have, on their petition, ob ­
tained a judicatory in which the recovery o f a debt
under 40s. or 5/. is not attended with that obstruction
o f accumulated expense by which the relief which his
judicatory professes to afford is always accompanied,
120 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . \Ch. 5.
it has been with no other effect than that o f giving in
the character o f judges effect to claims, which in the
character o f witnesses it was originally their design,
and afterwards their practice, to give support to by
perjury.

Sect. 2. The second o f these two devices may be called

The S e lf trumpeter s Fallacy.
By this name it is not intended to designate those
occasional impulses o f vanity which lead a man to dis­
play or overrate his pretensions to superior intelli­
gence. Against the self-love o f the man whose altar
to him self is raised on this ground, rival altars, from
every one o f which he is sure o f discouragement,
raise themselves all around.
But there are certain men in office who, in discharge
o f their functions, arrogate to themselves a degree o f
probity, which is to exclude all imputations and all
inquiry : their assertions are to be deemed equivalent
to p r o o f ; their virtues are guarantees for the faithful
discharge o f their duties ; and the most implicit con ­
fidence is to be reposed in them on all occasions. If
you expose any abuse, propose any reform, call for
securities, inquiry, or measures to prom ote publicity,
they set up a cry o f surprise, amounting almost to in­
dignation, as if their integrity were questioned, or their
honour wounded. W ith all this, they dexterously
mix up intimations, that the most exalted patriotism,
honour, and perhaps religion, are the only sources o f
all their actions.
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C I E S OE A U T H O R I T Y . 121

Such assertions must be classed among fallacies,

because, 1. they are irrelevant to the subject in dis­
cussion : 2. the degree in which the predominance
o f motives o f the social or disinterested cast is com ­
m only asserted or insinuated, is, by the very nature
o f man, rendered im possible: 3. the sort o f testimony
thus given affords no legitimate reason for regarding
the assertion in question to be tru e; for it is no less
com pletely in the power o f the most profligate than
in that o f the most virtuous o f mankind : nor is it in
a less degree the interest o f the profligate man to
make such assertions. Be they ever so com pletely
false, not any the least danger o f punishment does he
see himself exposed to, at the hands either o f the law
or o f public opinion.
For ascribing to any one o f these self-trumpeters
the smallest possible particle o f that virtue which they
are so loud in the profession of, there is no more ra­
tional cause, than for looking upon this or that actor
as a good man because he acts well the part o f Othello,
or bad because he acts well the part o f Iago.
4. O n the contrary, the interest he has in trying
what may be done by these means, is more de­
cided and exclusive than in the case o f the man o f
real probity and social feeling. T he virtuous man,
being what he is, has that chance for being looked
upon as such ; whereas the self-trumpeter in question,
having no such ground o f reliance, beholds his only
chance in the conjunct effect o f his own effrontery,
and the imbecility o f his hearers.
122 F A L L A C IE S O F A U T H O R IT Y . [Ch. 5.
These assertions o f authority, therefore, by men in
office, who would have us estimate their conduct by
their character, and not their character by their con­
duct, must be classed am ong political fallacies. If
there be any one maxim in politics more certain than
another, it is, that no possible degree o f virtue in the
governor can render it expedient for the governed to
dispense with good laws and good institutions a.

a Madame de Stael says, that in a conversation which she had at

Tetersburgh with the Emperor o f Russia, he expressed his desire to
hetter the condition o f the peasantry, who are still in a state o f absolute
slavery; upon which the female sentimentalist exclaimed, “ Sire,your
character is a constitution for your country, and your conscience is its
guarantee.” Ilis reply was, “ Quund cela serait,je ne seraisjamais qu’un
accident heureux.” — JDix Annies d'Exil, p.313.
Ch. 6.] F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . 123

CHAPTER V I.

Laudatory Personalities.
Ad amicitiam.

P e r s o n a l i t i e s o f this class are the opposites,

and in some respects the counterparts, o f vitupera­
tive personalities, which will be treated o f next in
order, at the com m encem ent o f the ensuing book.
Laudatory personalities are susceptible o f the same
number o f modifications as will be shown to exist in
the case o f vituperative personalities : but in this case
the argument is so much weaker than in the other,
that the shades and modifications o f it are seldom re­
sorted to, and are therefore not worth a detailed ex­
position. T h e object o f vituperative personalities is
to effect the rejection o f a measure, on account o f
the alleged bad character o f those who prom ote i t ;
and the argument advanced is, “ T h e persons who
propose or prom ote the measure, are b a d : therefore
the measure is bad, or ought to be rejected.” The ob­
je c t o f laudatory personalities is to effect the rejection
o f a measure on account o f the alleged good charac­
ter o f those who oppose i t ; and the argument ad­
vanced is, “ T he measure is rendered unnecessary by
the virtues o f those who are in power,— their op p o­
sition is a sufficient authority for the rejection o f the
measure.”
124 F A L L A C IE S OF A U T H O R IT Y . [ Cll. 6.
T h e argument indeed is generally confined to per­
sons o f this description, and is little else than an ex­
tension o f the self-trumpeter’s fallacy. In both o f
them, authority derived from the virtues or talents o f
the persons lauded is brought forward as superseding
the necessity o f all investigation.
“ T h e measure proposed implies a distrust o f the
members o f His M ajesty’s G overnm ent; but so great is
their integrity, so com plete their disinterestedness, so
uniformly d o they prefer the public advantage to their
own, that such a measure is altogether unnecessary.
T heir disapproval is sufficient to warrant an opposi­
tion ; precautions can only be requisite where danger
is apprehended ; here, the high character o f the indi­
viduals in question is a sufficient guarantee against
any ground o f alarm.”
T h e panegyric goes on increasing in proportion to
the dignity o f the functionary thus panegyrized.
Subordinates in office are the very m odels o f assi­
duity, attention, and fidelity to their trust; ministers,
the perfection o f probity and intelligence : and as for
the highest magistrate in the state, no adulation is
equal to describe the extent o f his various merits.
There can be no difficulty in exposing the fallacy
o f the argument attempted to be deduced from these
panegyrics.
1st, T h ey have the com m on character o f being ir­
relevant to the question under discussion. T h e mea­
sure must have something extraordinary in it, if a right
judgm ent cannot be founded on its merits without first
Ch. 6 . ] FA LLA C IES OF A U T H O R IT Y . 125
estimating the character o f the members o f the G overn­
ment.
2nd, I f the goodness o f the measure be sufficiently
established by direct arguments, the reception given
to it by those who oppose it, will form a better criterion
forju d gin g o f their character, than their character, (as
inferred from the places which they occupy,) for ju d g ­
ing o f the goodness or badness o f the measure.
3rd, I f this argument be good in any one case, it is
equally good in every o th e r; and the effect o f it, if
admitted, would be to give to the persons occupying
for the time being the situation in question, an abso­
lute and universal negative upon every measure not
agreeable to their inclinations.
4th, In every public trust, the legislator should, for
the purpose o f prevention, suppose the trustee dis­
posed to break the trust in every imaginable way in
which it would be possible for him to reap, from the
breach o f it, any personal advantage. This is the
principle on which public institutions ought to be
formed ; and when it is applied to all men indiscri­
minately, it is injurious to none. T he practical in­
ference is, to oppose to such possible (and what will
always be probable) breaches o f trust every bar that
can be opposed, consistently with the power requisite
for the efficient and due discharge o f the trust. In­
deed, these arguments, drawn from the supposed vir­
tues o f men in power, are opposed to the first princi­
ples on which all laws proceed.
5th, Such allegations o f individual virtue are never
126 F A L L A C I E S OF A U T H O R I T Y . [C h.

supported by specific proof, are scarce ever suscepti­

ble o f specific d is p r o o f; and specific disproof, i f of­
fered, could not be admitted : viz. in either house o f
parliament. I f attempted elsewhere, the punishment
would fall, not on the unworthy trustee, but on hiir.
by whom the unworthiness had been proved.
 PART THE SECOND.

FALLACIES OF DANGER,

The subject m atter o f which is D a n g er in various

shapesy and the object, to repress discussion altoge­
ther y by exciting alarm.

CHAPTER I.

Vituperative Personalities.
Ad odium.

T o this class belongs a cluster o f fallacies so inti­

mately connected with each other, that they may first
be enumerated and some observations be made upon
them in the lump. By seeing their mutual relations
to each other, by observing in what circumstances
they agree, and in what they differ, a much more cor­
rect as well as com plete view will be obtained o f
them, than i f they were considered each o f them by
itself.
T h e fallacies that belong to this cluster may be
denominated,
1. Imputation o f bad design.
2. Imputation o f bad character.
3. Imputation o f bad motive.
128 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [Ctl. 1.
4 . Imputation o f inconsistency.
5. Imputation o f suspicious connexions.— Nosci-
tur ex sociis.
6 . Imputation founded on identity o f denom ina­
tion.— Noscitur ex cognominibus.
O f the fallacies belorujin" to this class, the com m on
character is the endeavour to draw aside attention
from the measure to the man a ; and this in such sort
as, from the supposed imperfection on the part o f the
man by whom a measure is supported or opposed, to
cause a correspondent imperfection to be imputed to
the measure so supported, or excellence to the mea­
sure so opposed. T h e argument in its various shapes

■ On the subject o f personalities o f the vituperative kind, the fol­

lowing are the instructions given by Gerard Hamilton: they contain
all he says upon the subject. I. 31. 36T. p. 67. “ It is an artifice to
be used (but if used by others, to be detected), to begin some persona­
lity, or to throw in something that may bring on a personal altercation,
and draw off the attention o f the House from the main point.”
II. 36. (470) p. 86. “ I f your cause is too bad, call, in aid, the party ”
(meaning, probably, the individual who stands in the situation o f party,
not the assemblage o f men o f whom a political party is composed) :
“ if the party is bad, call, in aid, the cause : if neither is good, wound
the opponent.” III. “ I f a person is powerful, he is to be made ob­
noxious; if helpless, contemptible : if wicked, detestable.” In this we
have, so far as concerns the head o f personalities, ct the whole fruit and
result o f the experience o f one who was by no means unconversant with
law ” (says his editor, p. 6), “ and had himself sat in Parliament for
more than forty years; . . . devoting almost all his leisure and
thoughts, during the long period above mentioned, to the examination
and discussion o f all the principal questions agitated in Parliament,
and o f the several topics and modes o f reasoning by which they were
either supported or opposed.”
Ch. .]
1 FALLACIES OF DANGER. 129

amounts to this :— In bringing forward or supporting

the measure in question, the person in question enter­
tains a bad design ; therefore the measure is bad :—
he is a person o f a bad character, therefore the mea­
sure is bad :— he is actuated by a bad motive, there­
fore the measure is bad :— he has fallen into incon­
sistencies ; on a former occasion he either opposed it,
or made som e observation not reconcileable with some
observation which he has advanced on the present
occasion ; therefore the measure is bad :— he is on a
footing o f intimacy with this or that person, who is a
man o f dangerous principles and designs, or has been
seen more or less frequently in his com pany, or has
professed or is suspected o f entertaining some opinion
which the other has professed, or been suspected o f
entertaining; therefore the measure is bad :— he bears
a name that at a former period was borne by a set o f
men now no more, by whom bad principles were en­
tertained, or bad things done ; therefore the measure
is bad.
In these arguments thus arranged, a sort o f anti­
climax may be observed ; the fact intimated by each
succeeding argument being suggested in the character
o f evidence o f the one immediately preceding it, or at
least o f some one or more o f those which precede it,
and the conclusion being accordingly weaker and
weaker at each step. T h e second is a sort o f circum­
stantial evidence o f the first, the third o f the second,
and so on. I f the first is inconclusive, the rest fall at
once to the ground.
K
130 F A L L A C IE S O F D A N G E R . [C h . l.
Exposure.

Various are the considerations which concur in de­

monstrating the futility o f the fallacies comprehended
in this class, and (not to speak o f the improbity o f
the utterers) the weakness o f those with whom they
obtain currency,— the weakness o f the acceptors.
1. In the first place, com es that general character
o f irrelevancy which belongs to these, in com m on with
the several other articles that stand upon the list o f
fallacies.
2. In the next place, com es the com plete inconclu­
siveness. W hatsoever be their force as applied to a
bad measure, to the worst measure that can be ima­
gined, they would be found to apply with little less
force to all good measures, to the best measures that
can be imagined.
A m on g 6 5 8 or any such large number o f persons
taken at random, there will be persons o f all charac­
ters : i f the measure is a good one, will it becom e bad
because it is supported by a bad man ? I f it is bad,
will it becom e good because supported by a good
man ? I f the measure be really inexpedient, why not
at once show that it is s o ? — Y ou r producing these
irrelevant and inconclusive arguments in lieu o f direct
ones, though not sufficient to prove that the measure
you thus oppose is a good one, contributes to prove
that you yourselves regard it as a good one.
A fter these general observations, let us examine,
more in detail, the various shapes the fallacy assumes.
Sect. 1.] F A L L A C I E S O F D A N G E li. 131

Sect. 1. T o begin with the Imputation o f bad design.

T h e measure in question is not charged with being
itself a bad on e; for i f it be, and in so far as it is thus
charged, the argument is not irrelevant and fallacious.
T he bad design imputed, consists not in the design o f
carrying this measure, but some other measure, which
is thus, by necessary implication, charged with being
a bad one. Here, then, four things ought to be p roved:
viz.— 1. That the design o f bringing forward the sup­
posed bad measure is really entertained : 2. That this
design will be carried into effect: 3. That the measure
will prove to be a bad one : 4. That, but for the ac­
tually proposed measure, the supposed bad one would
not be carried into effect.
This is, in effect, a modification o f the fallacy o f
distrust, which will shortly be treated of.
But on what ground rests the supposition, that the
supposed bad measure will, as such a consequence,
be carried into effect ? T he persons by whom, if at
all, it will be carried into effect, will be, either the
legislators for the time being, or the legislators o f
some future contingent time : as to the legislators for
the time being, observe the character and frame o f
mind which the orator imputes to these his judges ;—
“ G ive not your sanction to this measure; for though
there may be no particular harm in it, yet, i f you do
give your sanction to it, the same man by whom this
is proposed, will propose to you others that will be
b a d ; and such is your weakness, that, however bad
K2
132 F A L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . [G7/. l.

they may be, you will want either the discernment

necessary to enable you to see them in their true light,
or the resolution to enable you to put a negative upon
measures, o f the m ischief o f which you are fully con ­
vinced.” T h e imbecility o f the persons thus addressed
in the character o f legislators and judges, their conse­
quent unfitness for the situation,— such, it is manifest,
is the basis o f this fallacy. On the part o f these le­
gislators themselves, the forbearance manifested under
such treatment,— on the part o f the orator, the confi­
dence entertained o f his experiencing such forbearance,
— afford no inconsiderable presumption o f the reality
o f the character so imputed to them.

Sect. 2. Imputation o f bad character.

T h e inference meant to be drawn from an imputa­
tion o f bad character is, either to cause the person in
question to be considered as entertaining bad design,
i. e. about to be concerned in bringing forward future
contingent and pernicious measures, or simply to de­
stroy any persuasive force, with which, in the charac­
ter o f authority, his opinion is likely to be attended.
In this last case, it is a fallacy opposed to a fallacy
o f the same com plexion, played oft' on the other side :
to em ploy it, is to com bat the antagonist with his own
weapons. In the former case, it is another m odifica­
tion o f the fallacy o f distrust, o f which, hereafter.
In proportion to the degree o f efficiency with which
a man suffers these instruments o f deception to operate
upon his mind, he enables bad men to exercise over
Sect. 3.] .F A L L A C I E S O F D A N G E R . 133
him a sort o f power, the thought o f which ought to
cover him with shame. A llow this argument the
effect o f a conclusive one, you put it into the power
o f any man to draw you at pleasure from the support
o f every measure, which in your own eyes is good, to
force you to give your support to anv and every
measure which in your own eyes is bad. Is it good ?
— the bad man embraces it, and, by the supposition,
you reject it. Is it bad ?— he vituperates it, and that
suffices for driving you into its embrace. Y ou split
upon the rocks, because he has avoided th em ; you
miss the harbour, because he has steered into it.
G ive yourself up to any such blind antipathy, you
are no less in the power o f your adversaries than by
a correspondently irrational sympathy and obsequious­
ness you put yourself into the power o f your friends.

Sect. 3. Imputation o f bad motive.

T he proposer o f the measure, it is asserted, is actuated
by bad motives, from whence it is inferred that he en­
tertains some bad design. This, again, is no more than
a modification o f the fallacy o f distrust; but one o f
the very w eakest; 1. because motives are hidden in
the human breast; 2. because, if the measure is benefi­
cial, it would be absurd to reject it on account o f the
motives o f its author. But what is peculiar to this
particular fallacy, is the falsity o f the supposition on
which it is grounded : viz. the existence o f a class or
species o f motives, to which any such epithet as bad
can, with propriety, be applied. What constitutes a
134 FA L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . [ Ch. 1 .

motive, is the eventual expectation, either o f some

pleasure, or exemption from pain ; but forasmuch as
in itself there is nothing good but pleasure, or exem p­
tion from pain, it follows that no motive is bad in it­
self, though every kind o f motive may, according to
circumstances, occasion good or bad actions a ; and
motives o f the dissocial cast may aggravate the mis­
ch ief o f a pernicious act. But if the act itself to
which the motive gives birth,— if, in the proposed
measure in question, there be nothing pernicious,—
it is not in the m otive’s being o f the dissocial class,—
it is not in its being o f the self-regarding class,— that
there is any reason for calling it a bad one. U pon
the influence and prevalence o f motives o f the self-
regarding class, depends the preservation, not only o f
the species, but o f each individual belonging to it.
W hen, from the introduction o f a measure, a man
beholds the prospect o f personal advantage in any
shape whatever to himself,— say, for example, a pe­
cuniary advantage, as being the most ordinary and
palpable, or, dyslogistically speaking, the most gross,
-—it is certain that the contemplation o f this advan­
tage must have had som e share in causing the conduct
he pursues— it may have been the on ly cause. T he
measure itself being by the supposition not pernicious,
is it the worse for this advantage? O n the contrary, it
is so much the better. For o f what stuff is public advan­
tage com posed, but o f private and personal advantage?

a See Dumont TraU.es de Legislation, tom. ii. c. 8. ed. 2 ; Bentham,

Theory o f Morals and Legislation.
Sect. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . 135
Sect. 4. Imputation o f inconsistency.
Admitting the fact o f the inconsistency, the utmost
it can amount to in the character o f an argument
against the proposed measure, is, the affording a pre­
sumption o f bad design in a certain way, or o f bad
character in a certain way and to a certain degree, on
the part o f the proposer or supporter o f the measure.
O f the futility o f that argument, a view has been
already g iv en ; and this, again, is a modification o f
the fallacy o f distrust.
That inconsistency, when pushed to a certain de­
gree, may afford but too conclusive evidence o f a sort
o f relatively bad character, is not to be d en ied : if,
for example, on a former occasion, personal interest
inclining him one way (say against the measure), ar­
guments have been urged by the person in question
against the measure, while on the present occasion
personal interest inclining him the opposite way, ar­
guments are urged by him in favour o f the measure,—
or if a matter o f fact, which on a former occasion was
denied, be now asserted, or vice versa ,— and in each
case if no notice o f the inconsistency is taken by the
person himself,— the operation o f it to his prejudice
will naturally be stronger than if an account more or
less satisfactory is given by him o f the circumstances
and causes o f the variance.
But be the evidence with regard to the cause o f the
change what it may, no inference can be drawn from
it against the measure unless it be that such inconsis-
136 FA L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. l.

tency, i f established, may weaken the persuasive force

o f the opinion o f the person in question in the cha­
racter o f authority : and in what respect and degree
an argument o f this com plexion is irrelevant, has been
already brought to view.

Sect. 5. Imputation o f suspicious connexions.

Noscitur ex sociis.

T h e alleged badness o f character, on the part *

o f the alleged associate, being admitted, the ar­
gument now in question will stand upon the same
footing as the four preceding; the weakness o f which
has been already exposed, and will constitute only
another branch o f the fallacy o f distrust. But before
it can stand on a par even with those weak ones, two
ulterior points remain to be established.
1. O ne, is the badness o f character on the part o f
the alleged associate.
2. Another, is the existence o f a social connexion
between the person in question and his supposed as­
sociate.
3. A third, is, that the influence exercised on the
mind o f the person in question is such, that in conse­
quence o f the connexion he will be induced to intro­
duce and support measures (and those mischievous
ones), which otherwise he would not have introduced
or supported.
A s to the two first o f these three supposed facts,
their respective degrees o f probability will depend on
the circumstances o f each case. O f the third, the
Sect. 6.] FA LLA C IES OF D A N G E R . 157
weakness may be exposed by considerations o f a ge­
neral nature. In private life, the force o f the pre­
sumption in question is established by daily expe­
rience : but in the case o f a political connexion, such
as that which is created by an opposition to one and
the same political measure or set o f measures, the
presumption loses a great part, sometimes the whole,
o f its force. Few are the political measures, on the
occasion o f which men o f all characters, men o f all
degrees, in the scale o f probity and improbity, may
not be seen on both sides.
T h e mere need o f information respecting matters
o f fact, is a cause capable o f bringing together, in a
state o f apparent connexion, some o f the most op p o­
site characters.

Sect. 6. Imputationfounded on identity o f denomination.

Noscitur ex cognominibus.

T h e circumstances by which this fallacy is distin­

guished from the last preceding, is, that in this case
between the person in question and the obnoxious per­
sons by whose opinions and conduct he is supposed
to be determined or influenced, neither personal inter­
course nor possibility o f personal intercourse can exist.
In the last case, his measures were to be opposed be­
cause he was connected with persons o f bad charac­
ter ; in the present, because he bears the same deno­
mination as persons now no more, but who, in their
own time, were the authors o f pernicious measures.
In so far as a community o f interest exists between
 138 FA LLA C IES OF D A N G E R . \Ch. 1.
the persons thus connected by community o f denom i­
nation, the allegation o f a certain community o f de­
signs is not altogether destitute o f weight. Com m u­
nity o f denomination, however, is but the sign, not the
efficient cause, o f community o f interest. W hat have
the Rom ans o f the present day in com m on with the
Rom ans o f early times P D o they aspire to recover
the empire o f the world ?
But when evil designs are imputed to men o f the
present day, on the ground that evil designs were en­
tertained and prosecuted by their namesakes in time
past, whatsoever may be the community o f interest,
one circumstance ought never to be out o f mind :—
this is, the gradual melioration o f character from the
most remote and barbarous, down to the present
time; the consequence o f which is, that in many par­
ticulars the same ends which were formerly pursued
by persons o f the same denomination are not now
pursued ; and if in many others the same ends are
pursued, they are not pursued by the same bad means.
I f this observation pass unheeded, the consequences
may be no less mischievous than absurd : that which
has been, is unalterable. If, then, this fallacy be
suffered to influence the mind and determine human
conduct, whatsoever degree o f depravity be imputed
to preceding generations o f the obnoxious denomina­
tion,— whatsoever opposition may have been mani­
fested towards them or their successors,— must con ­
tinue without abatement to the end o f time. “ Be my
friendship immortal, my enmity mortal,” is the senti­
Sect. 6 . ] F A L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . 139

ment that has been so warmly and so justly applaud­

ed in the mouth o f a sage o f antiquity: but the fallacy
here in question proposes to maintain its baneful in­
fluence for ever.
It is in matters touching religious persuasion, and
to the prejudice o f certain sects, that this fallacy has
been played off* with the greatest and most pernicious
effect. In England, particularly against measures for
the relief o f the Catholics, “ those o f our ancestors,
who, professing the same branch o f the Christian re­
ligion as that which you now profess, were thence di­
stinguished by the same name, entertained pernicious
designs, that for some time showed themselves in per­
nicious measures; therefore you, entertaining the same
pernicious designs, would now, had you but power
enough, carry into effect the same pernicious mea­
sures :— they, having the power, destroyed by fire and
faggot those who, in respect o f religious opinions and
ceremonies, differed from th em ; therefore, had you
but power enough, so would you .” U pon this ground,
in one o f the three kingdoms, a system o f government
continues, which does not so much as profess to have
in view the welfare o f the majority o f the inhabitants,
— a system o f government in which the interest o f the
many is avowedly, so long as the government lasts,
intended to be kept in a state o f perpetual sacrifice to
the interest o f the few. In vain is it urged, these in­
ferences, drawn from times and measures long since
past, are completely belied by the universal experience
o f all present time. In the Saxon kingdom, in the
140 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 1.
Austrian empire, in the vast and ever-flourishing em ­
pire o f France, though the sovereign is Catholic, what­
soever degree o f security the G overnm ent allows o f is
possessed alike by Catholics and Protestants. In vain
is it observed (not that to this purpose this or any
other part o f the history o f the 17th century is worth
observing), in vain is it observed, and truly observed,
the church o f England continued her fires after the
church o f R om e had discontinued hers51;
It is only in the absence o f interest that experience
can hope to be regarded, or reason heard. In the
character o f sinecurists and over-paid placemen, it is
the interest o f the members o f the English Governm ent
to treat the majority o f the people o f Ireland on the
double footing o f enemies and subjects; and such is
the treatment which is in store for them to the extent
o f their endurance.

Sect. 7. Cause o f the prevalence o f the fallacies be­

longing to this class.
W hatsoever be the nature o f the several instru­
ments o f deception by which the mind is liable to
be operated upon and deceived,— the degree o f
prevalence they experience,— the degree o f success
they enjoy,— depends ultimately upon one com m on
ca u se : viz. the ignorance and mental imbecility o f
those on whom they operate. In the present instance,*

* Under Janies I., when, for being Anabaptists or Arians, two men
Mere burnt in Sniithfield.
StCt. 7.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 141

besides this ultimate cause or root, they find in an­

other fallacy, and the corresponding propensity o f the
human mind, a sort o f intermediate cause. This is
the fallacy o f authority: the corresponding propensity
is the propensity to save exertion by resting satisfied
with authority. Derived from, and proportioned to,
the ignorance and weakness o f the minds to which
political arguments are addressed, is the propensity to
judge o f the propriety or impropriety o f a measure
from the supposed character or disposition o f its sup­
porters or opposers, in preference to, or even in ex­
clusion of, its own intrinsic character and tendency.
Proportioned to the degree o f importance attached to
the character and disposition o f the author or sup­
porter o f the measure, is the degree o f persuasive force
with which the fallacies belonging to this class will
naturally act.
Besides, nothing but laborious application, and a
clear and comprehensive intellect, can enable a man
on any given subject to em ploy successfully relevant
arguments drawn from the subject itself. T o em ploy
personalities, neither labour nor intellect is required :
in this sort o f contest, the most idle and the most ig­
norant are quite on a par with, if not superior to, the
most industrious and the most highly-gifted individuals.
N othing can be more convenient for those who would
speak without the trouble o f thinking; the same ideas
are brought forward over and over again, and all that
is required is to vary the turn o f expression. Close
and relevant arguments have very little hold on the
 142 F A L L A C IE S OF DANGER. [C //. 1.

passions, and serve rather to quell than to inflame

them ; while in personalities, there is always som e­
thing stimulant, whether on the part o f him who
praises or him who blames. Praise forms a kind o f
connexion between the party praising and the party
praised, and vituperation gives an air o f courage and
independence to the party who blames.
Ignorance and indolence, friendship and enmity,
concurring and conflicting interest, servility and inde­
pendence, all conspire to give personalities the ascen­
dancy they so unhappily maintain. T h e more we lie
under the influence o f our own passions, the more we
rely on others being affected in a similar degree. A
man who can repel these injuries with dignity may
often convert them into triumph : “ Strike me, but
hear,” says h e ; and the fury o f his antagonist redounds
to his own discomfiture.
Ch. 2 .] FA LLA CIES OF D A N G E R . 143

CHAPTER II.

The Hobgoblin Argum ent , or, N o Innovation !

Ad metum.

Exposition.

T h e hobgoblin, the eventual appearance o f which

is denounced by this argument, is A n a rch y ; which
tremendous spectre has for its forerunner the monster
Innovation . T h e forms in which this monster may
be denounced are as numerous and various as the sen­
tences in which the word innovation can be placed.
!
“ H ere it comes ” exclaims the barbarous or un­
thinking servant in the hearing o f the affrighted child,
when, to rid herself o f the burthen o f attendance, such
servant scruples not to em ploy an instrument o f terror,
the effects o f which may continue during life. “ H ere
it comes !” is the cry ; and the hobgoblin is rendered
but the more terrific by the suppression o f its name.
O f a similar nature, and productive o f similar ef­
fects, is the political device here exposed to view.
A s an instrument o f deception, the device is gene­
rally accompanied by personalities o f the vitupera­
tive kind. Imputation o f bad motives, bad designs,
bad conduct and character, &c. are ordinarily cast on
the authors and advocates o f the obnoxious measure ;
whilst the term em ployed is such as to beg the ques­
tion in dispute. Thus, in the present instance, inno-
144 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N C E R . \Ch. 2 .
vation means a bad change, presenting to the mind,
besides the idea o f a change, the proposition, either
that change in general is a bad thing, or at least that
the sort o f change in question is a bad change.

Exposure.
All-comprehensiveness o f the condemnation passed by this fallacy.

This is one o f the many cases in which it is diffi­

cult to render the absurdity o f the argument more
glaring than it is upon the face o f the argument itself.
W hatever reason it affords for looking upon the
proposed measure, be it what it may, as about to be
mischievous, it affords the same reason for entertain­
ing the same opinion o f every thing that exists at pre­
sent. T o say all new things are bad, is as much as
to say all things are bad, or, at any event, at their
com m en cem en t: for o f all the old things ever seen
or heard of, there is not one that was not once new.
W hatever is now establishment was once innovation.
H e who on this ground condemns a proposed mea­
sure, condemns, in the same breath, whatsoever he
would be most averse to be thought to disapprove.—
H e condemns the Revolution, the Reformation, the
assumption made by the House o f Com m ons o f a part
in the penning o f the laws in the reign o f Henry V I .,
the institution o f the House o f Com m ons itself in the
reign o f Henry I I I .,— all these he bids us regard as
sure forerunners o f the monster Anarchy, but particu­
larly the birth and first efficient agency o f the House o f
C om m ons; an innovation, in com parison o f which all
 Sect. ‘2 .] FALLACIF.S OF D A N G F K . 145
others, past or future, are for efficiency, ami conse­
quently mischievousness, hut as grains o f dust in the
balance.

Sect. 2. apprehension o f mischieffrom change, what

foundation it has in truth.
A circumstance that O gives a sort o f colour to the
use ol this fallacy is, that it can scarcely ever be found
without a certain degree o f truth adhering to it. Sup­
posing the change to be one which cannot be effected
without the interposition o f the legislature, even this
circumstance is sufficient to attach to it a certain
quantity o f mischief. The words necessary to com ­
mit the change even to writing cannot be put into
that form without labour, importing a proportional
quantity o f vexation to the head em ployed in it; which
labour and vexation, if paid for, is compensated by
and productive o f expense. W hen disseminated by
the operation o f the press, as it always must be, before
it can he productive o f whatever effect is aimed at, it
becomes productive o f ulterior vexation and expense.
Here, then, is so much unavoidable mischief, o f which
the most salutary and indispensable change cannot
fail to be productive : to this natural and unavoidable
portion o f mischief, the auditions that have been made
in the shape o f factitious and avoidable mischief o f the
same kind are such as have sufficient claim to notice,
but to a notice not proper for this place.
Here, then, we have the minimum o f mischief,
L
146 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 2.
which accompanies every change ; and in this mini­
mum o f m ischief we have the minimum o f truth with
which this fallacy is accom panied, and which is suf­
ficient to protect it against exposure, from a flat and
undiscriminating denial.
It is seldom , however, that the whole o f the mis­
chief, with the corresponding portion o f truth, is con ­
fined within such narrow bounds.
W heresoever any portion, however great or small,
o f the aggregate mass o f the objects o f desire in any
shape,— matter o f wealth, power, dignity, or even re­
putation ;— and whether in possession or only in pro­
spect, and that ever so rem ote and contingent, must,
in consequence o f the change, pass out o f any hand
or hands that are not willing to part with it,— viz.
either without compensation, or with no other than
what, in their estimation, is insufficient,— here we
have, in som e shape or other, a quantity o f vexation
uncom pensated: so much vexation, so much m ischief
beyond dispute.
But in one way or other, whether from the total
omission o f this or that item, or from the supposed
inadequacy o f the compensation given for it, or from
its incapacity o f being included in any estimate, as in
case o f remote and but weakly probable as well as
contingent profits, it will not unfrequently happen that
the compensation allotted in this case shall be inade­
quate, not only to the desires, but to the imagined
rights o f the party from whom the sacrifice is exacted.
Sect. 2 . ] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 147

In so far as such insufficiency appears to himself to

exist, he will feel himself urged by a motive, the force
o f which will be in proportion to the amount o f such
deficiency, to oppose the measure : and in so far as
in his eyes such motive is fit to be displayed, it will
constitute what in his language will be reason, and
what will be received in that character by all other
persons in whose estimate any such deficiency shall
appear to exist. So far as any such deficiency is spe­
cifically alleged in the character o f a reason, it forms
a relevant and specific argum ent; and belongs not to
the account o f fallacies ; and, if well founded, consti­
tutes a just reason— if not for quashing the measure,
at any rate for adding to the compensation thus shown
to be deficient. And in this shape, viz. in that o f a
specific argument, will a man o f course present his
motive to view, if it be susceptible o f it. But when
the alleged damage and eventual injury will not, even
in his own view o f it, bear the test o f inquiry, then,
this specific argument failing him, he will betake him­
self to the general fallacy in lieu o f it. H e will set
up the cry o f Innovation! Innovation! hoping by
this watchword to bring to his aid all whose sinister
interest is connected with his own : and to engage
them to say, and the unreflecting multitude to believe,
that the change in question is o f the number o f those
in which the m ischief attached to it is not accom pa­
nied by a preponderant mass o f advantage.

L 2
148 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R .

Sect. 5. Time the innovator-general , a counter-fal­

lacy.
A m on g the stories current in the profession o f the
law, is that o f an attorney, who, when his client ap­
plied to him for relief against a forged bond, advised
him, as the shortest and surest course, to forge a release.
Thus, as a shorter and surer course than that o f
attempting to make men sensible o f the imposture,
this fallacy has been every now and then met by what
may be termed its counter-fallacy.— Time itself is the
arch-innovator. T h e inference is, the proposed change,
branded as it has thus been by the odious appellative
o f innovation, is in fact no ch a n g e; its sole effect
being either to prevent a change, or to bring the mat­
ter back to the good state in which it form erly was.
This counter-fallacy, if such it may be termed, has
not, however, any such pernicious properties or con ­
sequences attached to it as may be seen to be indi­
cated by that name. T w o circumstances, however,
concur in giving it a ju st title to the appellation o f a
fallacy : one is, that it has no specific application to
the particular measure in hand, and on that score
may be set down as irrelevant; the other, that by a
sort o f implied concession and virtual admission, it
gives colour and countenance to the fallacy to which
it is opposed : admitting by implication, that i f the
appellation o f a change belonged with propriety to
the proposed measure, it might on that single account
with propriety be opposed.
Sect. 3.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 149

A few words, then, are now sufficient to strip the

mask from this fallacy. N o specific mischief, as likely
to result from the specific measure, is alleged : if it
were, the argument would not belong to this head.
W hat is alleged is nothing more than that mischief,
without regard to the amount, would be am ong the
results o f this measure. But this is no more than can
be said o f every legislative measure that ever did pass
or ever can pass. If, then, it be to be ranked with
arguments, it is an argument that involves in one
com m on condemnation all political measures whatso­
ever, past, present, and to c o m e ; it passes condem ­
nation on whatsoever, in this way, ever has been or
ever can be done, in all places as well as in all times.
Delivered from an humble station, from the mouth o f
an old woman beguiling by her gossip the labours o f
the spinning-wheel in her cottage, it might pass for
simple and ordinary ignorance:— delivered from any
such exalted station as that o f a legislative house or
judicial bench, from such a quarter, if it can he re­
garded as sincere, it is a mark o f drivelling rather
than ignorance.
O

But it may be said, “ M y meaning is not to co n ­

demn all change, not to condemn all new institutions,
all new laws, all new measures,— only violent and
dangerous ones, such as that is which is now proposed.”
T he answer is: N either drawing or attempting to draw
any line, you do by this iudiscriminating appellative
pass condemnation on all change ; on every thing to
u’hich any such epithet as nexv can with propriety be
1.50 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [ 6 7 / . C.
applied. D raw any such line, and the reproach o f
insincerity or imbecility shall be withholden : draw
your lin e ; but remember that whenever you do draw
it, or so much as begin to draw it, you give up this
your argument.
A live to possible-imaginable evils, dead to actual
ones,— eagle-eyed to future contingent evils, blind
and insensible to all existing ones,— such is the cha­
racter o f the mind, to which a fallacy such as this
can really have presented itself in the character o f
an argument possessing any the smallest claim to
notice. T o such a mind, that, by denial and sale
o f justice, anarchy, in so far as concerns nine-tenths
o f the people, is actually by force o f law esta­
blished, and that it is only by the force o f morality,
— o f such morality as all the punishments denounced
against sincerity, and all the reward applied for the
encouragement o f insincerity, have not been able to
banish, that society is kept togeth er;— that to draw
into question the fitness o f great characters for their
high situations, is in one man a crime, while to question
their fitness so that their motives remain unquestioned
is lawful to an oth er;— that the crime called libel re­
mains undefined and undistinguishable, and the liberty
o f the press is defined to be the absence o f that secu­
rity which would be afforded to writers by the esta­
blishment o f a licenser ;— that under a show' o f limi­
tation, a government shall be in fact an absolute one,
while pretended guardians are real accom plices, and
at the nod o f a king or a minister by a regular trained
Sect. 4.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 151

body o f votes black shall be declared white ; miscar­

riage, success ; mortality, health ; disgrace, h on ou r;
and notorious experienced imbecility, consummate
sk ill;— to such a mind, these, with other evils bound­
less in extent and number, are either not seen to be
in existence, or not felt to be such. In such a mind,
the horror o f innovation is as really a disease as any
to which the body in which it is seated is exposed.
A n d in proportion as a man is afflicted with it, he is
the enemy o f all good, which, how urgent soever
may be the demand for it, remains as yet to be done;
nor can he be said to be com pletely cured o f it, till
he shall have learnt to take on each occasion, and
without repugnance, general utility for the general end,
and, to ju dge o f whatever is proposed, in the charac­
ter o f a means conducive to that end.

Sect. 4. Sinister interests in which this fallacy has its

source.

C ould the wand o f that magician be borrowed at

whose potent touch the emissaries o f his wicked an­
tagonist threw o ff their several disguises, and made
instant confession o f their real character and designs;
— could a few o f those ravens by whom the word in­
novation is uttered with a scream o f horror, and the
approach o f the monster Anarchy denounced,— be
touched with it, we should then learn their real cha­
racter, and have the true import o f these screams
translated into intelligible language.
1. I am a lawyer (would one o f them be heard to
152 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [ C / /. 2.

say), a fee-fed ju dge, who, considering that the money

I lay up, the power I exercise, and the respect and
reputation I enjoy, depend on the undiminished con­
tinuance o f the abuses o f the law, the factitious delay,
vexation and expense with which the few who have
money enough to pay for a chance o f justice are
loaded, and by which the many who have not, are cut
oft' from that chance,— take this method o f deterring
men from attempting to alleviate those torments in
which my com forts have their source.
2. I am a sinecurist (cries another), who, being in
the receipt o f 38,000/. a year, public money, for
doing nothing, and having no more wit than honesty,
have never been able to open my mouth and pro­
nounce any articulate sound for any other purpose,
— yet, hearing a cry o f “ N o sinecures !” am com e to
join in the shout o f “ N o innovation ! down with the
innovators ! ” in hopes o f drowning, by these defensive
sounds, the offensive ones which chill my blood and
make me tremble.
3. I am a contractor (cries a third), who, having
bought my seat that I may sell my v o te s ; anti in re­
turn for them, being in the habit o f obtaining with
the most convenient regularity a succession o f good
jo b s , foresee, in the prevalence o f innovation, the de­
struction and the ruin o f this established branch o f
trade.
4. I am a country gentleman (cries^a fourth), who,
observing that from having a seat in a certain assem­
bly a man enjoys more respect than he did before, on
StCt. -I.] F A L L A C I E S OF O A N G F K . 153

the turf, in the dog-kennel, and in the stable, and

having tenants and other dependents enough to seat me
against their wills for a place in which I am detested,
and hearing it said that if innovation were suffered
to run on unopposed, elections would com e in time
to be as free in reality as they are in appearance and
pretence,— have left for a day or two the cry o f
“ Tally-ho ! ” and 44 Hark forward ! ” to jo in in the cry
o f “ N o Anarchy ! ” “ N o innovation ! ”
5. I am a priest (says a fifth), who, having proved
the P ope to be Antichrist to the satisfaction o f all
O rthodox divines whose piety prays for the cure o f
souls, or whose health has need o f exoneration from
the burthen o f residence ; and having read, in niy
edition o f the G ospel, that the apostles lived in pa­
laces, which innovation and anarchy would cut down
to parsonage-houses, though grown hoarse by scream­
ing out, “ N o reading ! ” “ N o writing ! ” “ N o Lan­
ca ste r!” and “ N o p o p e r y !”— for fear o f com ing
change, am here to add w hat remains o f my voice to
the full chorus ot “ N o A n a r ch y !” “ N o Innova­
tion!”
U>± F A L L A C IE S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 3.

CHAPTER III.

Fallacy o f D istru st , or, W h a t's at the bottom ?

Ad metum.

E xposition .

T h is argument may be considered as a particular

m odification o f the N o-Innovation argument. A n ar­
rangement or set o f arrangements has been proposed,
so plainly beneficial, and at the same time so mani­
festly innoxious, that no prospect presents itself o f
bringing to bear upon them with any effect the cry
o f N o innovation. Is the anti-innovationist mute? n o:
he has this resource :— In what you see as yet (says
he) there may perhaps be no great m isch ief; but de­
pend upon it, in the quarter from whence these pro­
posed innoxious arrangements com e, there are more
behind that are o f a very different com plexion ; if
these innoxious ones are suffered to be carried, others
o f a noxious character will succeed without end, and
will be carried likewise.

E xposu re.

T h e absurdity o f this argument is too glaring to be

susceptible o f any considerable illustration from any
thing that can be said o f it.
1. In the first place, it begins with a virtual ad­
mission o f the propriety o f the measure considered in
itself; and thus, containing within itself a demonstra-
C/l. 3 . ] FALLACIES OF DANUKI.’ . 13.5

tion o f its own futility, it cuts up from under it the

very ground which it is endeavouring to make: yet,
from its very weakness, it is apt to derive for the m o­
ment a certain degree o f force. By the monstrosity
o f its weakness, a feeling o f surprise, and thereupon
o f perplexity, is apt to be produced : and so long as
this feeling continues, a difficulty o f finding an appro­
priate answer continues with it. F or that which is
itself nothing, what answer (says a man) can I find ?
2. I f two measures, G and B, were both brought
forward at the same time, G being good and B bad,
rejecting G because B is bad would be quite absurd
enough ; and at first view a man might be apt to sup­
pose that the force o f absurdity could go no further.
But the present fallacy does in effect go much fur­
ther :— two measures, both o f them brought upon the
carpet together, both o f them unobjectionable, are to
be rejected, not for any thing that is amiss in either
o f them, but for something that by possibility may be
found amiss in some other or others, that nobody
knows of, and the future existence o f which, without
the slightest
O ground,7 is to be assumed and taken for
O
granted.
In the field o f policy as applied to measures, this
vicarious reprobation forms a counterpart to vicarious
punishment in the field o f justice, as applied to persons.
T he measure G , which is good, is to be thrown out,
because, for aught we can be sure of, some dav or
other it may happen to be follow ed by some other
measure B, which may be a bad one. A man A , agains
156 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N C E K . [ Ch . 3.

whom there is neither evidence nor charge, is to be

punished, because, for aught we can be sure of, som e
time or other there may be som e other man who will
have been guilty.
I f on this ground it be right that the measure in
question be rejected, so ought every other measure
that ever has been or can be proposed : for o f no
measure can anybody be sure, but that it may be fol­
low ed by som e other measure or measures, o f which,
when they make their appearance, it may be said that
they are bad.
If, then, the argument proves any thing, it proves
that no measure ought ever to be carried, or ever to
have been carried ; and that, therefore, all things that
can be done by law or government, and therefore law
and government themselves, are nuisances.
This policy is exactly that which was attributed to
H erod in the extermination o f the in n ocen ts; and
the sort o f man by whom an argument o f this sort
can be em ployed, is the sort o f man who would have
acted as H erod did, had he been in H erod ’s place.
But think, not only what sort o f man he must be
who can bring himself to em ploy such an argum ent;
but moreover, what sort o f men they must be to whom
he can venture to propose i t ; on whom he can expect
it to make any impression, but such a one as will be
disgraceful to himself. “ Such drivellers,” (says he to
them in effect,) “ such drivellers are you, so sure o f
being imposed upon, by any one that will attempt it,
that you know not the distinction between good and
Ch. 3 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 1:37

b a d : and when at the suggestion o f this or that man

you have adopted any one measure, good or bad, let
but that same man propose any number o f other mea­
sures, whatever be their character, ye are such idiots
and fools, that without looking at them yourselves, or
vouchsafing to learn their character from others, you
will adopt them in a lump.” Such is the com plim ent
wrapt up in this sort o f argument.
158 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . fOh. 4.

CHAPTER IV .

Official Malefactor s Screen.

Ad metuni.

"Attack us, you attack Government.”

Exposition.
T he fallacy here in question is em ployed almost
as often as, in speaking o f the persons by whom, or
o f the system on which, the business o f the G overn­
ment is conducted, any expressions importing con ­
demnation or censure are uttered. T h e fallacy co n ­
sists in affecting to consider such condemnation or
censure as being, if not in design, at least in tendency,
pregnant with m ischief to government itself:— “ O p ­
pose us, you oppose G o v e r n m e n t “ Disgrace us,
you disgrace G o v e rn m e n t;” “ Bring us into con ­
tempt, you bring Government into co n te m p t; and
anarchy and civil war are the immediate conse­
quences.” Such are the forms it assumes.

Exposure.

N o t ill-grounded, most assuredly, is the alleged

importance o f this maxim : to the class o f persons by
or for whom it is em ployed, it must be admitted to be
well worth whatsoever pains can be em ployed in deck­
ing it out to the best advantage.
Let but this notion be acceded to, all persons now
partaking, or who may at any time be likely to par­
Ch. 4.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 159

take, in the business and profit o f misrule, must, in

every one o f its shapes, be allowed to continue so to
d o without disturbance : all abuses, as well future as
present, must continue without remedy. T h e most
industrious labourers in the service o f mankind will
experience the treatment due to those to whose dis­
social or selfish nature the happiness o f man is an o b ­
je c t o f aversion or indifference. Punishment, or at
least disgrace, will be the reward o f the most exalted
virtue ; perpetual honour, as well as pow>er, the reward
o f the most pernicious vices. Punishment will be,
and so by English libel-law it is at this day,— let but
the criminal be o f a certain rank in the state, and the
mischief o f the crime upon a scale to a certain degree
extensive,— punishment will be, not for him who com ­
mits a crime, but for him who complains o f it.
So leng as the conduct o f the business o f the G o ­
vernment contains any thing amiss in it,— so long as
it contains in it any thing that could be made better,
— so long, in a word, as it continues short o f a state
o f absolute perfection,— there will be no other m ode
o f bringing it nearer to perfection, no other means o f
clearing it o f the most mischievous abuses with which
Government can be defiled, than the indication o f
such points o f imperfection as at the time being exist,
or are supposed to exist in it, which points o f imper­
fection will always be referable to one or other o f two
h e a d s — the conduct o f this or that one o f the indi­
viduals by whom in such or such a department the
business o f Governm ent is conducted ; or the state o f
 160 F A L L A C I E S Ol- D A N G E R . [Cil. 4.

the system o f administration under which they act.

But neither in the system in question, nor in the co n ­
duct o f the persons in question, can any imperfection
be pointed out, but that, as towards such persons or
such system, in proportion to the apparent importance
and extent o f that imperfection, aversion or contem pt
must in a greater or less degree be produced.
In effect, this fallacy is but a m ode o f intimating
in other words, that no abuse ought to be reformed :
that nothing ought to be uttered in relation to the
m isconduct o f any person in office, which may produce
any sentiment o f disapprobation.
In this country at least, few, if any persons, aim at
any such object as the bringing into contem pt any o f
those offices on the execution o f which the maintenance
o f the general security depends;— any such office,
for example, as that o f king, member o f parliament,
or ju d g e. A s to the person o f the king, i f the maxim,
“ T he king can d o no wrong,” be admitted in both its
senses, there can be no need o f imputing blame to
him, unless in the way o f defence against the impru­
dence or the improbity o f those who, by groundless
or exaggerated eulogiums on the personal character
o f the individual monarch on the throne, seek to ex­
tend his power, and to screen from censure or scru­
tiny the misconduct o f his agents.
But in the instance o f any other office, to reprobate
every thing, the tendency o f which is to expose the
officer to hatred or contempt, is to reprobate every
tiling that can he said or done, either in the way o f
Sect. 2.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 161

com plaint against past, or for the purpose o f prevent­

ing future transgressions;— to reprobate every thing
the tendency o f which is to expose the office to hatred
or contempt, is to reprobate every thing that can be
said or done towards pointing out the demand for re­
form, how needful soever, in the constitution o f the
office.
If, in the constitution o f the office in respect o f
m ode o f appointment, m ode o f remuneration, & c.,
there be any thing that tends to give all persons placed
in it an interest acting in opposition to official duty,
or to give an increased facility to the effective pursuit
o f any such sinister interest, every thing that tends
to bring to view such sinister interest, or such facility,
contributes, it may be said, to bring the office itself into
contempt.
That under the existing system o f judicature, so far
as concerns its higher seats, the interest o f the judge
is, throughout the whole field o f his jurisdiction, in a
state o f constant and diametrical opposition to the
line o f his d u ty ;— that it is his interest to maintain
undiminished, and as far as possible to increase, every
evil opposite to the ends o f justice, viz. uncertainty,
delay, vexation and expense ;— that the giving birth
to these evils has at all times been more or less an
object with every judge (the present ones excepted, o f
whom we sav nothing) that ever sat on a Westminster
hall bench, and that under the present constitution o f
the office it were weakness to expect at the hands o f
a judge anv thing better ;— whilst, that o f the above-
M
162 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . \Ch. 4.

mentioned evils, the load which is actually endured by

the people o f this country, is, as to a very small part
only, the natural and unavoidable lot o f human nature;
— are propositions which have already in this work
been made plain to demonstration, and in the belief
o f which the writer has been confirmed by the observa­
tions o f nearly sixty y ea rs;— propositions o f the truth
o f which he is no more able to entertain a doubt than
he is o f his own existence.
But in these sentiments, has he any such wish as
to see enfeebled and exposed to effectual resistance
the authority o f judges? o f any established judicatory?
o f any one occupier o f any such judicial seat ? No :
the most strenuous defender o f abuse in every shape
would not go further than he in wishes, and upon o c ­
casion in exertion, for its support.
For preventing, remedying, or checking transgres­
sion on the part o f the members o f Government, or
preventing their management o f the business o f G o ­
vernment from becom ing com pletely arbitrary, the
nature o f things affords no other means than such, the
tendency o f which, as far as they go, is to lower either
these managing hands, or the system, or both, in the
affection and estimation o f the people : w'hicli effect,
when produced in a high degree, may be termed
bringing them into hatred and contempt.
But so far is it from being true that a man’s aver­
sion or contem pt for the hands by which the powers
o f Governm ent, or even for the system under which
they are exercised, is a p roof o f his aversion or con ­
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 163

tempt towards Governm ent itself, that, even in pro­

portion to the strength o f that aversion or contempt,
it is a p roof o f the opposite affection. W h at in con­
sequence o f such contempt or aversion he wishes for,
is, not that there be no hands at all to exercise these
powers, but that the hands may be better regulated ;
— not that those powers should not be exercised at
all, but that they should be better exercised ;— not
that, in the exercise o f them, no rules at all should be
pursued, but that the rules by which they are exer­
cised should be a better set o f rules.
A ll government is a trust; ever}7 branch o f govern­
ment is a trust ,* and immemorially acknowledged so
to be : it is only by the magnitude o f the scale that
public differ from private trusts.
I complain o f the conduct o f a person in the cha­
racter o f guardian, as domestic guardian, having the
care o f a minor or insane person. In so doing, do I
say that guardianship is a bad institution ? D oes it
enter into the head o f any one to suspect me o f sc-
doing ?
I complain o f an individual in the character o f a
commercial agent, or assignee o f the effects o f an in­
solvent. In so doing, do I say that commercial
agency is a bad thing ? that the practice o f vesting
in the hands o f trustees or assignees the effects o f an
insolvent for the purpose o f their being divided among
his creditors, is a bad practice ? D oes any such con­
ceit ever enter into the head o f man, as that o f sus­
pecting me o f so doing?
164 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E U . [Ch. 4.

I com plain o f an imperfection in the state o f the

law relative to guardianship. In stating this supposed
im perfection in the state o f the law itself, d o I say
that there ought to be no law on the subject ? that
no human being ought to have any such pow er as
that o f guardian over the person o f any other ? D oes
it ever enter into the head o f any human being to
suspect me so much as o f entertaining any such per­
suasion, not to speak o f endeavouring to cause others
to entertain it?
N oth in g can be more groundless than to suppose
that the disposition to pay obedience to the laws by
which security in respect o f person, property, reputa­
tion and condition in life is afforded, is influenced by
any such consideration as that o f the fitness o f the
several functionaries for their respective trusts, or even
so much as by the fitness o f the system o f regulations
and customs under which they act.
T he ch ief occasions in which obedience on the part
o f a member o f the community in his character o f
subject is called upon to manifest itself, are the habi­
tual payment o f taxes, and submission to the orders
o f courts o f justice : the one an habitual practice, the
other an occasional and eventual one. But in neither
instance in the disposition to obedience, is any varia­
tion produced by any increase or diminution in the
good or ill opinion entertained in relation to the offi­
cial persons by whom the business o f those depart­
ments is respectively carried on, or even in relation to
the goodness o f the systems under which they act.
Sect. 2.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 165

W ere the business o f Governm ent carried on ever

so much worse than it is, still it is from the power o f
Governm ent in its several branches that each man re­
ceives whatsoever protection he enjoys, either against
foreign or domestic adversaries. It is therefore by
his regard for his own security, and not by his respect
either for the persons by whom or the system accord­
ing to which those powers are exercised, that his wish
to see obedience paid to them by others, and his dis­
position to pay obedience to them himself, are pro­
duced.
W ere it even his wish to withhold from them his
own obedience, that wish cannot but be altogether in­
effectual, unless and until he shall see others in suffi­
cient number disposed and prepared to withhold each
o f them his own obedience ; a state o f things which
can only arise from a com m on sense o f overwhelming
misery, and not from the mere utterance o f complaint.
There is no freedom o f the press, no power to com ­
plain, in Turkey ; yet o f all countries it is that in
which revolts and revolutions are the most frequent
and the most violent.
H ere and there a man o f strong appetites, weak
understanding, and stout heart excepted, it might be
affirmed with confidence that the most indigent and
most ignorant wouid not be foolish enough to wish to
see a com plete dissolution o f the bonds o f govern­
ment. In such a state o f things, whatsoever he might
expect to grasp for the moment, he would have no
assured hope o f keeping. W ere he ever so strong,
166 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 4.

his strength, he could not but see, would avail him

nothing against a momentarily confederated multi­
tude ; nor in one part o f his field against a swifter in­
dividual ravaging the opposite part, nor during sleep
against the weakest and most sluggish : and for the
purpose o f securing himself against such continually
impending disasters, let him suppose him self entered
into an association witli others for mutual security;
he would then suppose him self living again under a
sort o f government.
Even the comparatively few who, for a source o f
subsistence, prefer depredation to honest industry, are
not less dependent for their wretched and ever palpi­
tating existence than the honest and industrious are
for theirs, on that general security to which their prac­
tice creates exceptions. Be the momentary object o f
his rapacity what it may, what no one o f them could
avoid having a more or less distinct conception of, is,
that it could not exist for him further than it is secured
against others.
So far is it from being true, that no G overnm ent
can exist consistently with such exposure, no good
Governm ent can exist without it.
U nless by open and lawless violence, by no other
means than lowering in the estimation o f the people
the hands by which the powers o f Governm ent are
exercised, if the cause o f the m ischief consist in the
unfitness o f the h an ds; or the system o f management
under which they act, if the cause o f the m ischief lie
in the system,— be the hands ever so unfit, or the sy­
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 167
stem ever so ill-constructed,— can there be any hope
or chance o f beneficial change.
There being no sufficient reason for ascribing even
to the worst-disposed any wish so foolish as that o f
seeing the bonds o f G overnm ent dissolved, nor on
the part o f the best-disposed any possibility o f contri­
buting to produce change, either in any ruling hands
deemed by them unfit for their trust, or o f the system
deemed by them ill adapted to those which are or
ought to be its ends, otherwise than by respectively
bringing into general disesteem these objects o f their
disapprobation,— there cannot be a more unfounded
imputation or viler artifice, if it be artifice, or grosser
error, if it be error, than that which infers from the
disposition or even the endeavour to lessen in the es­
timation o f the people the existing rulers, or the ex­
isting system, any such wish as that o f seeing the
bands o f Government dissolved.
In producing a local or temporary debility in the
action o f the powers o f the natural body, in many
cases, the honest and skilful physician beholds the
only means o f cure : and from the act o f the physi­
cian who precribes an evacuant or a sedative, it would
be as reasonable to infer a wish to see the patient
perish, as from the act o f a statesman, whose endea­
vours are em ployed in lowering the reputation o f the
official hands in whom, or the svstem o f management
in which, he beholds the cause o f what appears to
him amiss,— to infer a wish to see the w hole frame o f
Government either destroyed or rendered u'orsc.
168 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . \Ch. 4 .
In so far as a man’s feeling and conduct are in­
fluenced and determined by what is called public opi­
nion, by the force o f the popular or moral sanction,
and that opinion runs in conform ity with the dictates
o f the principles o f general utility,— in proportion to
the value set upon reputation, and the degree o f re­
spect entertained for the community at large, his con ­
duct will be the better, the more com pletely the quan­
tity o f respect he enjoys is dependent upon the g ood ­
ness o f his beh aviou r; it will be the worse, the more
com pletely the quantity o f respect he is sure o f en­
joy in g is independent o f it.
Thus, whatsoever portion o f respect the people at
large are in the habit o f bestowing upon the individual
by whom on any given occasion the office in question
is filled, this portion o f respect may, so long as the
habit continues, be said to be attached to the office,
ju st as any portion o f the emolument is which happens
to be attached to the office.
But as it is with emolument, so is it with respect.
T h e greater the quantity o f it a man is likely to re­
ceive independently o f his good behaviour, the less
good , in so far as depends upon the degree o f influence
with which the love o f reputation acts upon his mind,
is his behaviour likely to be.
I f this be true, it is in so far the interest o f the
public that that portion o f respect, which along with
the salary is habitually attached to the office, should
be as small as possible.
If, indeed, the notion which it is the object o f the
Sect. 2.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 169

fallacy in question to inculcate were true, viz. that the

stability o f the Governm ent or its existence at each
given point o f time depends upon the degree o f re­
spect bestowed upon the several individuals by whom
at that point o f time its powers are exercised,— if this
were true, it would not be the interest o f the public
that the portion o f respect habitually attached to the
office, and received by the official person indepen­
dently o f his good behaviour in it, should be as small
as possible. But in how great a degree this notion is
erroneous has been shown already.
But while it is the interest o f the public, that in the
instance o f each trustee o f the public the remunera­
tion received by him in the shape o f respect should
be as com pletely dependent as possible upon the
goodness o f his behaviour in the execution o f his
trust, it is the interest o f the trustee him self that, as
in every other shape, so in the shape o f respect, what­
soever portion o f the good things o f this world he re­
ceives on whatever score, whether on the score o f re­
muneration, or any other, should be as great as pos­
sible ; since by good behaviour, neither respect nor
any thing else can be always earned by him but by
sacrifices in some shape or other, and in particular in
the shape o f ease.
W hatsoever, therefore, be the official situation which
the official person in question occupies, it is his in­
terest that the quantity o f respect habitually attached
to it be as great, and at the same time as securely at­
tached to it, as possible.
170 F A L L A C I E S 01’ D A N G E R . \Ch. 4.
And in the point o f view from which he is by his
personal and sinister interest led to consider the sub­
ject, the point o f perfection in this line will not be
attained until the quantity o f respect he receives, in
consequence o f the possession he has o f the office, be
at all times as great as the nature o f the office adm its;
— at all times as com pletely independent o f the g ood ­
ness o f his behaviour in his office as p ossib le;— as
great, in the event o f his making the worst and least
good use, as in that o f his making the best and the
least bad use, o f the powers belonging to it.
Such being his interest, whatsoever be his official
situation, if, as is the case o f most if not all official
situations, it be o f such a nature as to have power in
any shape attached to it, his endeavour and study will
be so to order matters as to cause to be attached to
it as above, and by all means possible, the greatest
portion o f respect possible.
T o this purpose, amongst others, will be directed
whatsoever influence his will can be made to act with
on other wills, and whatsoever influence his under­
standing can be made to exert over other understand-
ings.
If, for example, his situation be that o f a ju d g e ; by
the influence o f will on will, it will seldom in any
considerable degree be in his power to com pell men
by force to bestow upon him the sentiment o f respect,
either by itself or in any considerable degree by means
o f any external mark or token o f i t : but he may re­
strain men from saying or doing any o f those things,
Sect. 2.] .FALLA CIES OF D A N G E R . 171

the effect o f which would be to cause others to bestow

upon him less respect than they would otherwise.
If, being a judge o f the K ing’s Bench, any man
has the presumption to question his fitness for such
his high situation, he may for so doing punish him by
fine and imprisonment with et cat eras. I f a L ord
Chancellor, he may prosecute him before a judge, by
whom a disposition to attach such punishments to such
offences has been demonstrated by practice.
Thus much as to what can and what cannot be done
towards attaching respect to office, by the influence o f
will on will.
W hat may be done by the influence o f understand­
ing on understanding remains to be noticed :— laying
out o f the question that influence which, in the official
situation in question, is exercised over the understand­
ings o f the people at large independently o f any exer­
tions on the part o f him by whom it is filled,— that
which on his part requires exertion, and is capable o f
being exercised by exertion, consists in the giving ut­
terance and circulation in the most impressive man­
ner to the fallacy in question, together with a few such
others as are more particularly connected with it.
U pon the boldness and readiness with which the
hands and system are spoken ill of, depends the dif­
ference between arbitrary and limited government,—
between a government in which the great body o f the
people have, and one in which they have not, a share.
In respect o f the members o f the governing body,
undoubtedly the state o f things most to be desired, is,
172 FA LLA CIES OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 4 .
that the only occasion on which any endeavours should
be em ployed to lower them in the estimation o f the
public should be those in which inaptitude in some
shape or other, want o f probity, or weakness o f ju d g ­
ment, or want o f appropriate talent, have justly been
imputable to them : that on those occasions in which
inaptitude has not in any o f those shapes been justly
imputable, no such endeavour should ever be em ­
ployed.
Unfortunately, the state o f things hereby supposed
is plainly (need it be said ?) an impossible one. Ad­
mit no accusation, you may and you will exclude all
unjust o n e s ;— admit just ones, you must admit unjust
ones along with them ; there is no help for it. O ne
o f two evils being necessarily to be chosen, the ques­
tion is, which is the least ?— to admit all such impu­
tations, and thereby to admit o f unjust ones, or to ex­
clude all such imputations, and thereby to exclude all
ju st ones. I answer without difficulty,— the admis­
sion o f unjust imputations is, beyond comparison, the
least o f the two evils. Exclude all unjust imputations,
and wdth them all ju st ones, the only check by which
the career o f deterioration can be stopped being thus
removed, both hands and system will, until they arrive
at the extreme o f despotism and misrule, be continually
growing worse and w o rse ;— the hands themselves will
grow worse and worse, having nothing to counteract
the force o f that separate and sinister interest to the
action o f which they remain constantly ex p osed ;—
and the system itself will grow worse and worse, it
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F D A N G E R . 173

being all along the interest and, by the supposition,

within the power o f the hands themselves to make
it so.
A dm it just imputations, though along with them
you admit unjust ones, so slight is the evil as scarcely
to bear that name. A lon g with unjust imputations,
are not defences admitted ? In respect o f motives
and o f means, have not the defendants in this case,
beyond all comparison, the advantage o f the com ­
plainants ?
A s far as concerns motives, in the instance o f every
person included in the attack (and in an attack made
upon any one member o f the Government as such,
who does not know how apt all are to feel themselves
included?), the principle o f self-preservation is stronger
than the exciting cause productive o f the disposition
to attack can be in any instance.
A s far as concerns means o f defence, i f the person
against whom the attack is principally levelled w'ants
time or talent to defend himself, scarce a particle o f
the immense mass o f the matter o f reward, which, in
all manner o f shapes, for the purpose o f carrying on
the ordinary business o f government, lies constantly
at the disposal o f the members o f the Government,
but is applicable, even without any separate expense,
to the extraordinary purpose o f engaging defending
advocates.
Let it not be said, “ This is a persecution to which
an honourable man ought not to be exposed ;— a per­
secution which, though to some honourable men it
174 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G El’ . \Ch. 4.

may be tolerable, will to others be intolerable,— in­

tolerable to such a degree as to deprive the public o f
the benefit o f their services.”
A notion to any such effect will scarcely be advanced
with a grave fa ce.— That censure is the tax imposed
by nature upon eminence, is the A B C o f com m on
place. W h o is there to whom it can be a doubt that
exposure to such imputations is am ong the inevitable
appendages o f office ? I f it were an office w hich in
no shape whatever had any adequate allowance o f the
matter o f reward annexed to it,— if it w’ere a situation
into which men w-ere pressed,— the observation wrould
have som e better grou n d 7: but in the class o f office
here in question, exists there any such ?
A self-contradiction is involved in the observation
itself. T h e subject, o f which sensibility thus morbid
is predicated, is an honourable m an: but to an honour­
able man, to any man to wdiom the attribute honour­
able can with truth and justice be applied, such sen­
sibility cannot be attributed. T h e man who will not
accept an office but upon condition that his conduct
in it shall remain exem pt from all imputation, intends
not that his conduct shall be what it ought to be.
T h e man to whom the idea o f being subject to those
imputations to which he sees the best are exposed, is
intolerable,— is in his heart a tyrant,— and, to becom e
so in practice, wants nothing but to be seated on one
o f those thrones, or on one o f those benches, in which,
by the appearance o f chains made for show and not
for use, a man is enabled, with the greater dignity as
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S Ol- DA NO Eit. 175

well as safety, to act the part o f the tyrant, and glut

himself with vengeance.
T o a man who, in the civil line o f office, accepts a
commission, it is not less evident that by so doing he
exposes himself to imputations, some o f which may
happen to be unjust, than to a man in the military
line it is evident that by acceptance o f a commission
in that line he exposes him self to be shot a t : and o f
a military office, with about equal truth, might it be
said, that an honourable man will not accept it on
such condition, as o f a civil office that an honourable
man will not accept it, if his conduct is to stand ex­
posed to such imputations.
In such circumstances, it is not easy to see how it
should happen to a public man to labour at the long-
run under an imputation that is not just. In so far as
any such incident does take place, evil does in truth
take place : but even in this case, the evil will not be
unaccompanied with concomitant good, operating in
compensation for it. O n the part o f men in office, it
contributes to keep up the habit o f considering their
conduct as exposed to scrutiny,— to keep up in their
minds that sense o f responsibility on which goodness
o f conduct depends, in which good behaviour finds its
chief security.
O n the part o f the people at large, it serves to keep
alive the expectation o f witnessing such attacks ; the
habit o f looking out for th em ; and, when any such
attack does com e, it prevents the idea o f hardship
which is apt to attach upon any infliction, how neces­
176 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [ Ch. 4.

sary soever, o f which it can be said that it is unprece­

dented or even r a r e ; and hinders the public mind
from being set against the attack, and him who finds
exertion and courage enough to make it.
W hen, in support o f such imputations, false facts
are alleged, the act o f him by whom such false alle­
gations are made, not only ought to be regarded as
pernicious, but ought to be, and is, consistently with
justice and utility, punishable;— punishable even when
advanced through temerity without consciousness o f
the falsity, and more so when accom panied with such
dishonest consciousness.
But by a sort o f law, o f which the protection o f
high-seated official delinquency is at least the effect,
not to say the object, a distinction thus obvious as
wrell as important has been carefully overlooked : and
whenever to the prejudice o f the reputation o f a man,
especially i f he be a man in office, a fact which has
with more or less confidence been asserted or insi­
nuated turns out to be false, the existence o f dishonest
consciousness, whether really existing or not, is as­
sumed.
In so far as public men, trustees and agents for the
people in possession or expectancy are the objects, a
general propensity to scrutinize into their conduct, and
thereby to cast imputations on it at the hazard o f their
being more or less unmerited, is a useful propensity.
It is conducive to good behaviour on their part, and
for the opposite and corresponding reason, the habit o f
general laudation, laudation without specific grounds,
Sect. 2 .] .FALLACIES OF D A N G E R . 17 7

is a mischievous propensity, being conducive to ill

behaviour on their part.
Render all such endeavours hopeless, you take from
a bad state o f things all chance o f being better :— al­
low to all such endeavours the freest range, you do no
injury to the best state o f things imaginable.
W hatsoever facilities the adversaries o f the existing
state o f things have for lowering it in the estimation
o f the people, equal facilities at least, if not greater,
have its friends and supporters for keeping and raising
it up.
U nder the English constitution, at any rate, the
most strenuous defenders o f the existing set o f mana­
ging hands, as well as o f the existing system o f ma­
nagement, are not backward in representing an op p o­
sition as being no less necessary a power among the
springs o f Governm ent than the regulator in a w atcha.
But in what way is it that opposition, be it what it
may, ever acts or ever can act but by endeavouring
to lower either the managing hands, or, in this or that
part o f it, the system o f management, in the estimation
o f the people P and from a watchmaker’s putting a
regulating spring into the watch he is making, it would
be just as reasonable and fair to infer that his meaning
is to destroy the watch, as from the circumstance o f a
man’s seeking, in this or that instance, to lower in the
estimation o f the people the managing hands, or this
or that part o f the system o f management, to infer a
desire on his part to destroy the Government.*

* More's Observations, p. 77, 78.

AT
178 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [ C fl. 4.
U nder the English constitution at least, not only in
point o f fact is the disposition to pay that obedience
by which the power o f Governm ent is constituted, and
on which the existence o f it depends, independent o f
all esteem for the hands by which this power is
exercised, unaffected by any disesteem for this or that
part o f the system o f management according to which
it is executed,— but under such a constitution at least,
the more com plete this independence, the better for
the stability and prosperity o f the state. Being as it
is, it suffices for carrying on at all times the business
o f Governm ent,— viz. upon that footing in point o f
skill and prosperity which is consistent with the apti­
tude, probity and intelligence o f the managing hands,
and the goodness o f the system o f management under
which they a c t : but if on each occasion it depended
on the degree o f estimation in which the conduct and
character o f the managing hands and the structure o f
the system o f management under which they act hap­
pened at that time to be held by the majority o f the
people, this power would be seen strong, and per­
haps too strong, at one time,— weak to any degree o f
weakness,— insufficient to any degree o f insufficiency,
— at another.
A m on g the peculiar excellencies o f the English con ­
stitution, one is, that the existence o f the Governm ent,
and even the good conduct o f it, depends in a less de­
gree than under any other monarchy upon the per­
sonal qualifications o f the ch ief ruler, and upon the
place he occupies in the estimation o f the people.
Conceive the character o f the ch ief ruler perfect to a
Sect. 2.] FA LLA CIES OF D A N G E R . 179

certain degree o f perfection, all checks upon his

power would be a nuisance. On the other hand,
under a constitution o f government into which checks
upon that power are admitted, the stronger and
more efficient those checks, the worse the personal
character o f the chief ruler may be, and the business
o f government still go on without any fatal dis­
turbance.
On recent occasions, as if the endeavour had been
new and altogether anomalous to the constitution,
great were the outcries against the audacity o f those
parliamentary electors and other members o f the com ­
munity who, in the character o f petitioners, were using
their endeavours to lower the H ouse o f Com m ons in
the estimation o f the people, or, in stronger terms, to
bring it and its authority into contempt. That by the
individuals in question an endeavour o f this nature
should be regarded as a cause o f personal inconve­
nience, and as such be resisted, is natural en ough ;
but as to its being, on the part o f the authors o f those
exertions, blameable,— or, on the part o f the consti­
tution, dangerous,— surely no further observation need
here be added.
But what was complained o f as an abuse, was the
existence o f that state o f things, o f that system o f ma­
nagement, under which, in a number sufficient on or­
dinary occasions to constitute or secure a majority,
the members o f that governing body have a sinister
interest separate from and opposite to that o f the
people for whom they profess to serve: that being in-
N2
180 FALLACIES OF DANGER. [6 7 /. 4 .
dependent as towards those to whom they ought to
be dependent,— as to those whom it is their duty to
control, and towards whom they ought to be inde­
pendent,— they are dependent; and that, by means, by
which, though altogether out o f the reach o f punish­
ment, the dependence is rendered beyond comparison
more constant and effectual than it would be by acts
o f punishable bribery.
In this state o f things, i f any alteration in it be de­
sirable, it is impossible that such alteration should be
brought about by other means than lowering in the
estimation o f the people not only the system itself,
but all those who act willingly under it, and use their
endeavours to uphold it.
W ithout this means, and by any other means, how
is it that by possibility any such change should be
produced ? Supposing them assured o f possessing, in
the event o f a refusal o f all such change, as high a
place in the estimation o f the people as they hold at
present, any thing done by them in furtherance o f such
a change w’ould be an effect without a cause. In their
personal capacities, they have all, or most o f them,
little to gain, while they have much to lose, by any
proposed change.
True, it may be said, to be remedied, an imperfec­
tion, be it what it may, must be pointed out. But
what we complain o f as dangerous to Government, is,
not the indication o f such imperfections with their sup­
posed remedies, but the mode in which they are apt
to be pointed o u t;— the heat, the violence, w-ith which
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 181

uch indication is accompanied. This we object to,

n ot merely as dishonest, but as unwise,— as tending
to irritate the very persons at whose hands the remedy
thus pleaded for is sought.
T o this, the answer is as follows :—
1. W hatsoever may be the terms most decorous,
and, upon the supposition, the best adapted to the
obtaining o f the relief desired, it is not possible to
com prise them in any such scheme o f description as
will enable a man to satisfy him self before-hand what
terms will be considered exposed to, what exempt
from, censure.
2. T h e cause o f irritation is not so properly in the
terms o f the application, as in the substance and nature
o f the application its e lf: so that the greatest irritation
would be produced by that m ode o f application, which­
ever it were, that appeared most likely to produce the
effect in question;—th e effect, the production o f which
is on the one part an object o f desire, on the other o f
aversion: the least irritation by that which, in what­
ever terms couched, afforded the fairest pretence for
non-com pliance.
3. T he imperfection in question being, by the sup­
position, one o f a public nature, the advantages o f
which are enjoyed by a few, while the interest which
the many, each taken individually, have in the remo­
val o f the imperfection is com m only comparatively
small and remote, no little difficulty is com m only ex­
perienced by any one whose endeavour it should be
to persuade the many to collect amongst them a de­
182 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Cfl. 4 .
gree o f impressive force sufficient to operate upon the
ruling powers with effect. O n the part o f the many,
the natural interest being in each case com m only but
weak, it requires to bring it into effective action what­
soever aids can be afforded it. Strong arguments,
how strong soever, will o f themselves be scarcely suf­
ficient ; for at the utmost they can amount to no more
than the indication o f that interest which, in the case
o f the greater part o f the many whose force it is ne­
cessary to bring to bear upon the point in question, is
by the supposition but weak. In aid o f the utmost
strength o f which the argument is susceptible, strength
o f expression will therefore be necessary, or at least
naturally and generally regarded as necessary, and as
such em ployed. But in proportion as this strength o f
expression is em ployed, the m ode o f application stands
exposed to the imputation o f that heat, and violence,
and acrimony, the use o f which it is the object o f the
alleged fallacy to prevent.
4. It is only on the supposition o f its being in effect,
and being felt to be, conducive, or at least not repug­
nant, to the interest o f the ruling powers addressed,
that the simple statement o f the considerations which,
in the character o f reasons, prove the existence o f the
supposed imperfection, and, if a remedy be proposed,
the aptitude o f the proposed remedy, can with reason
be expected to operate on them with effect. But the
fact is, that on the part o f those ruling powers, this
sort o f repugnance, in a degree more or less consider­
able, is no other than what on every such occasion
Sect. 2 .] FA LLA CIES OF D A N G E R . 183

ought in reason to be expected. I f the imperfection

in question be o f the nature o f those to which the
term abuse is wont to be applied, these ruling powers
have some or all o f them, by the supposition, a special
profit arising out o f that abuse, a special interest con ­
sequently in the preservation and defence o f it. Even
if there be no such special interest, there exists in that
quarter at all times, and in more shapes than one, a
general and constant interest by which they are ren­
dered mutually averse to applications o f that nature.
In the first place, in addition to their ordinary labours,
they find themselves called upon to undertake a course
o f extraordinary labour, which it was not their design
to undertake, and for which it may happen to som e
or all o f them to feel themselves but indifferently pre­
pared and qualified; and thus the application itself
finds itself opposed by the interest o f their ease. In
the next place, to the extent o f the task thus im posed
upon them, they find the business o f Government taken
out o f their hands. T o that same extent their conduct
is determined by a will, which originated not am ong
them selves; and if, the measure being carried into
effect, the promoters o f it w'ould obtain reputation,
respect and affection, o f those rewards a share more
or less considerable falls into other hands : and thus
the application in question finds an opponent in the
interest o f their pride.
184 F A L L A C IE S Or D A N G E R . [Ch. 5.

CHAPTER V.

Accusat ion-scarer's D evice.

Ad metum.

“ Infamy must attach somewhere.”

Exposition.

T h is fallacy consists in representing the imputa­

tion o f purposed calumny as necessarily and justly at­
taching upon him who, having made a charge o f mis­
conduct against any person or persons possessed o f
political power or influence, fails o f producing evidence
sufficient for conviction.
Its manifest object, accordingly, is, as far as possi­
ble, to secure impunity to crimes and transgressions
in every shape, on the part o f persons so situated :—
namely, by throwing impediments in the way o f accu­
sation, and in particular, by holding out to the eyes
o f those persons who have in view the undertaking
the functions o f accusers, in case o f failure, in addi­
tion to disappointment, the prospect o f disgrace.

E xposure.

<c Infamy must attach somewhere.” T o this effect

was a dictum ascribed in the debates to the Right
Honourable G eorge Canning, on the occasion o f the
inquiry into the conduct o f the Duke o f Y ork in his
office o f Commander in Chief.
67/. 5.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 185

In principle, insinuation to this effect has an un­

limited application,— it applies, not only to all charges
against persons possessed o f political power, but, with
more or less force, to all criminal charges in form o f
law against any persons whatsoever : and not only to
all charges in a prosecution o f the criminal cast, but
to the litigants on both sides o f the cause, in a case
o f a purely non-penal, or, as it is called, a civil
nature.
I f taken as a general proposition, applying to all
public accusations, nothing can be more mischievous
as well as fallacious. Supposing the charge unfounded,
the delivery o f it may have been accompanied with
mala Jides (consciousness o f its injustice), temerity
only, or it may have been perfectly blameless. It is
in the first case alone that infamy can with propriety
attach upon him who brings it forward. A charge
really groundless may have been honestly believed to
be well-founded, i. e. believed with a sort o f pro­
visional credence, sufficient for the purpose o f en­
gaging a man to do his part towards the bringing
about an investigation, but without sufficient reasons.
But a charge may be perfectly groundless without at­
taching the smallest particle o f blame upon him who
brings it forward. Suppose him to have heard from
one or more, presenting themselves to him in the cha­
racter o f percipient witnesses, a story, which, either
in totOj or perhaps only in circumstances, though in
circumstances o f the most material importance, should
186 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 5.
prove false and mendacious,— how is the person who
hears this, and acts accordingly, to blame ? W hat
sagacity can enable a man previously to legal investi­
gation, a man who has no power that can enable hirn
to ensure correctness or completeness on the part o f
this extra-judicial testimony, to guard against decep­
tion in such a case ? M rs. C . states to the accuser,
that the D uke o f Y ork knew o f the business; stating
a conversation as having passed between him and her­
self on the occasion. A ll this (suppose) is perfectly
false : but the falsity o f it, how was it possible for one
in the accuser’s situation to be apprized o f?
T h e tendency o f this fallacy is, by intimidation, to
prevent all true charges whatever from being made,—
to secure impunity to delinquency in every shape.
But the conclusion, that because the discourse o f a
witness is false in one particular, or one occasion, it
must therefore be false in toto,— in particular, that be­
cause it is false in respect o f some fact or circumstance
spoken to on some extra-judicial occasion, it is there­
fore not credible on the occasion o f a judicial exami­
nation,— is a conclusion quite unwarranted.
I f this argument were consistently and uniformly
applied, no evidence at all ought ever to be received,
or at least to be credited : for where was ever the
human being, o f full age, by whom the exact line o f
truth had never been in any instance departed from in
the whole course o f his life ?
T h e fallacy consists, not in the bringing to view, as
Ch. 5 . ] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 187

lessening the credit due to the testimony o f the wit­

ness, this or that instance o f falsehood, as indicated
by inconsistency or counter-evidence, but in speaking
o f them as conclusive, and as warranting the turning a
deaf ear to every thing else the witness has said, or, i f
suffered, might have said. U nder the pressure o f some
strong and manifest falsehood-exciting interest, sup­
pose falsehood has been uttered by the witness : be it
so ; does it follow that falsehood will on every occa­
sion— will in the particular occasion in question—
be uttered by him without any such excitement ?
U nder the pressure o f terror, the A postle Peter,
when questioned whether he were one o f the adherents
o f Jesus, who at that time was in the situation o f a
prisoner just arrested on a capital charge,— denied his
being s o ; and in so doing, uttered a wilful falsehood;
and this falsehood thrice repeated within a short time:
-—does it follow that the testimony o f the Apostle
ought not on any occasion to have been considered as
capable o f being true ?
I f any such rule were consistently pursued, what
judge, w'ho had ever acted in the profession o f an ad­
vocate, could with propriety be received in the cha­
racter o f a witness ?
Again, with respect to the object o f the charge, so
far from receiving less countenance where the object is
a public than where he is a private man, accusation,
whether it be at the bar o f an official judicatory or at
the bar o f the public at large, ought to receive, beyond
comparison, more countenance. In case o f the truth
188 F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . [Ch. 5.
o f the accusation, the m ischief is greater, the demand
for appropriate censure, as a check to it, correspon-
dently greater. On the other hand, in case o f non-de­
linquency, the m ischief to the groundlessly-accused
individual is less. Power, in whatever hands lodged,
is almost sure to be more or less abused ; the check,
in all its shapes, so as it does not defeat the good
purposes for which the power has been given or suf­
fered to be exercised, can never be too strong. T hat
against a man who, by the supposition, has done no­
thing wrong, it is not desirable, whether his situation
be public or private, that accusation should have been
preferred,— that he should have been subjected to the
danger, and alarm, and evil in other shapes attached
to it, is almost too plainly true to be worth saying.
But in the case o f a public accusation, though, by the
supposition, it turns out to be groundless, it is not
altogether without its u s e ;— the evil produced is not
altogether without compensation : for by the alarm
it keeps up, in the breasts in which a disposition to
delinquency has place, such accusation acts as a
check upon it, and contributes to the prevention or
repression o f it. O n the other hand, in the situation
o f the public man, the mischief, in the case o f his
having been the object o f an unfounded accusation, is
less, as wre have shown in the preceding chapter,
than in the case o f a private man. In the advan­
tages that are attached to his situation, he possesses
a fund o f compensation, which, by the supposition,
has no place in the other case : and apprized as he
Ch. 5.] F A L L A C I E S OF D A N G E R . 189

ought to be, and, but for his own fault, is, o f the
enmity and envy to which, according to the nature
o f it, his situation exposes him, and not the private
man, he ought to be, and, but for his own fault
will be, proportionably prepared to expect it, and
less sensibly affected by it when it com es.
 PART THE THIRD.

FALLACIES OF DELAY,

The subject-matter o f which is D elay in various

,
shapes ; and the object to postpone discussion with ,
a view o f eluding it.

CHAPTER I.

,
The Quietist, or “ N o Complaint
Ad quietem.

Exposition.
A n ew law or measure being proposed in the
character o f a remedy for some incontestable abuse
or evil, an objection is frequently started to the fol­
lowing e ffe c t :— “ T h e measure is unnecessary ; no­
body complains o f disorder in that shape, in which it
is the aim o f your measure to propose a remedy to i t ;
even when no cause o f com plaint has been found to
exist, expecially under Governm ents which admit o f
complaints, men have in general not been slow to
com p la in ; much less where any ju st cause o f com ­
plaint has existed.” T h e argument amounts to this :
— N o b o d y complains, therefore nobody suffers. It
amounts to a veto on all measures o f precaution or
Ch. 1 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 191
prevention, and goes to establish a maxim in legisla­
tion, directly opposed to the most ordinary prudence
o f com m on life ; — it enjoins us to build no parapets
to a bridge till the number o f accidents has raised an
universal clamour.

Exposure,

T h e argument would have more plausibility than it

has, if there were any chance o f complaints being at­
tended to ;— if the silence o f those who suffer did not
arise from despair, occasioned by seeing the fruitless­
ness o f former complaints. T h e expense and vexa­
tion o f collecting and addressing complaints to Par­
liament being great and certain, complaint will not
com m only be made without adequate expectation o f
relief. But how can any such expectation be enter­
tained by any one who is in the slightest degree ac­
quainted with the present constitution o f Parliament ?
M embers who are independent o f and irresponsible to
the people, can have very few and very slight motives
for attending to complaints, the redress o f which
would affect their own sinister interests. Again, how
many complaints are repressed by the fear o f attack­
ing powerful individuals, and incurring resentments
which may prove fatal to the com plain an t!
T h e most galling and the most oppressive o f all
grievances is that complicated mass o f evil which is
com posed o f the uncertainty, delay, expense and
vexation in the administration o f justice : o f this,
all but a comparatively minute proportion is clearly
192 F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . [ Ch. I.

factitious!l,— factitious, as being the work originally

and in its foundation o f the man o f l a w ; latterly, and
in respect o f a part o f its superstructure, o f the man
o f finance. In extent, it is such, that o f the whole
population, there exists not an individual who is not
every moment o f his life exposed to suffer under i t :
and few advanced in life, who, in som e shape or other,
have not actually been sufferers from it. By the price
that has been put upon justice, or what goes by the
name o f justice, a vast majority o f the people, to som e
such amount as -jVths or -i^ths, are bereft altogether
o f the ability o f putting in for a chance for it; and to
those to whom, instead o f being utterly denied this
sort o f chance, it is sold, it is sold at such a price as
to the poorest o f such as have it still in their power
to pay, the price is utter ruin, and even to the richest,
matter o f serious and sensible inconvenience.
In comparison o f this one scourge, all other politi­
cal scourges put together are feathers : and in so far
as it has the operations o f the man o f finance for its
cause, if, instead o f one-tenth upon incom e, a property
tax amounted to nine-tenths, still an addition to the
property tax would, in comparison o f the affliction
produced by the sum assessed on law proceedings, be
a r e lie f: for the income tax falls upon none but the
comparatively prosperous, and increases in proportion
to the prosperity, in proportion to the ability to sus­
tain it ; whereas the tax upon law proceedings falls

a See Scotch Reform.

Ch. 1.] FA LLA CIES OF D E L A Y . 193
exclusively upon those whom it finds labouring under
affliction,— under that sort o f affliction which, so long
as it lasts, operates as a perpetual blister on the mind.
Here, then, is matter o f com plaint for every British
subject that breathes :— here, injustice, oppression and
distress are all extrem e: complaint there is none ;
why ?— because by unity o f sinister interest, and con ­
sequent confederacy between lawyer and financier,
relief is rendered hopeless.

o
194 FALLACIES OF DELAY. [Ch. Q.

CHAPTER II.

Fallacy o f False-consolation.
Ad quietem.

Exposition.
A m easu re, having for its object the removal o f
some abuse, i. e. o f some practice the result o f which
is, on the part o f the many, a mass o f suffering more
than equivalent to the harvest o f enjoyment reaped
from it by the few, being proposed,— this argument
consists in pointing to the general condition o f the
people in this or that other country, under the notion,
that in that other country, either in the particular
respect in question or upon the whole, the condition
o f the people is not so felicitous as, notwithstanding
the abuse, it is in the country in and for which the
measure o f reform is proposed.
“ W hat is the matter with you ? ” “ W h a t would
you have ?” L ook at the people there, and there :
think how much better o ff yon are than they are. Y ou r
prosperity and liberty are objects o f envy to them ;—
your institutions are the models which they endeavour
to imitate.
Assuredly, it is not to the disposition to keep an
eye o f preference turned to the bright side o f things,
where no prospect o f special good suggests the o p p o ­
site course,— it is not to such a disposition or such a
 Ck. 2 .] FALLACIES OF DELAY. 195
habit that by the word fallacy it is proposed to affix a
mark o f disapprobation.
W hen a particular suffering, produced as it appears
by an assignable and assigned cause, has been point­
ed out as existing, a man, instead o f attending to
it himself, or inviting to it the attention o f others,
em ploys his exertions in the endeavour to engage
other eyes to turn themselves to any other quarter in
preference (he being o f the number o f those whose
acknowledged duty it is to contribute their best en­
deavours to the affording to every affliction within
their view whatsoever relief may be capable o f being
afforded to it without preponderant inconvenience),—
then, and then only, is it that the endeavour becom es
a just ground for censure, and the means thus em­
ployed present a title to be received upon the list o f
fallacies.
Exposure.
T h e pravity as well as fallaciousness o f this argu­
ment can scarcely be exhibited in a stronger or truer
light than by the appellation here em ployed to cha­
racterize it.
1. Like all other fallacies upon this list, it is nothing
to the purpose.
2. In his own case, no individual in his senses
would accept it. Take any one o f the orators by
whom this argument is tendered, or o f the sages on
whom it passes for sterling: with an observation o f the
general wealth and prosperity o f the country in his
o 2
196 FA LLA CIES OF D E L A Y . [Ch. 2.

mouth instead o f a half-year’s rent in his hand, let any

one o f his tenants propose to pay him thus in his own
coin,— will he accept it?
3. In a court o f justice, in an action for damages,
to learned ingenuity, did ever any such device occur
as that o f pleading assets in the hand o f a third per­
son, or in the hands o f the whole country, in bar to
the demand ? W hat the largest wholesale trade is to
the smallest retail, such and more in point o f magni­
tude is the relief com m only sought for at the hands
o f the legislator, to the relief com m only sought for at
the hands o f the ju dge.— W hat the largest wholesale
trade is to the smallest retail trade, such in point o f
magnitude, yea and more, is the injustice endeavoured
at by this argument when em ployed in the seat o f
legislative power, in comparison o f the injustice that
would be com m itted by deciding in conform ity to it
in a court o f justice.
N o country so wretched, so poor in every element
o f prosperity, in which matter for this argument might
not be found.
W ere the prosperity o f the country never so much
greater than at present,— take for the country any coun­
try whatsoever, and for present time any time what­
soever,— neither the injustice o f the argument, nor the
absurdity o f it, would in any the smallest degree be
diminished.
Seriously and pointedly in the character o f a bar,
to any measure o f relief, no, nor to the most trivial
improvement, can it ever be employed. Suppose a bill
Ck. 2 . ] F A LLA C IE S OF D E L A Y . 197

brought in for converting an impassable road any

where into a passable one, would any man stand up to
oppose it who could find nothing better to urge against
it than the multitude and goodness o f the roads we
have already P N o : when in the character o f a serious
bar to the measure in hand, be that measure what it
may, an argument so palpably inapplicable is em ploy­
ed, it can only be for the purpose o f creating a diver­
s io n ;— o f turning aside the minds o f men from the
subject really in hand to a picture which by its beauty,
it is hoped, may engross the attention o f the assembly,
and make them forget for the moment for what pur­
pose they came there.
198 F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . [C/*. 3.

CHAPTER III.

Procrasl inators Argument .

Ad socordiam.

“ Wait a little, this is not the time.”

Exposition.
T o the instrument o f deception here brought to
view, the expressions that may be given are various
to an indefinite degree; but in its nature and con cep ­
tion nothing can be more simple.
T o this head belongs every form o f words by which,
speaking o f a proposed measure o f relief, an intima­
tion is given, that the time, whatever it be, at which
the proposal is made, is too early for the purpose; and
given, without any p ro o f being offered o f the truth o f
such intim ation; such as, for instance, the want o f
requisite information, or the convenience o f some pre­
paratory measure.

Exposure.

This is the sort o f argument or observation which

we so often see em ployed by those who, being in wish
and endeavour hostile to a measure, are afraid or
ashamed o f being seen to be so. T h ey pretend, per­
haps, to approve o f the measure ; they only differ as
to the proper time o f bringing it forward ; but it may
be matter o f question whether, in any one instance,
this observation was applied to a measure by a man
Ch. 3 . ] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 199

whose wish it was not, that it should remain excluded

for ever.
It is in legislation the same sort o f quirk which in
judicial procedure is called a plea in abatement. It
has the same object, being never em ployed but on the
side o f a dishonest defendant, whose hope it is to o b ­
tain ultimate impunity and triumph by overwhelming
his injured adversary with despair, impoverishment
and lassitude.
A serious refutation w'ould be ill bestowed upon so
frivolous a pretence. The objection exists in the will,
not in the judgm ent, o f the objector. “ Is it lawful
to d o good on the sabbath day ? ” was the question put
by Jesus to the official hypocrites. W h ich is the
properest day to do good ? W hich is the properest
day to remove a nuisance ? Answer, T he very first day
that a man can be found to propose the removal o f it :
and whosoever opposes the removal o f it on that day,
will, i f he dare, oppose the removal on every other.
T h e doubts and fears o f the parliamentary procras­
tinator are the conscientious scruples o f his prototype
the Pharisee, and neither the answer nor the example
o f Jesus has succeeded in removing these scruples.
T o him, whatsoever is too soon to-day, be assured
that to-morrow, if not too soon, it will be too late.
True it is, that, the measure being a measure o f re­
form or improvement, an observation to this effect
may be brought forw'ard by a friend to the measure :
and in this case, it is not an instrument o f deception,
but an expedient o f unhappily necessary prudence.
200 F A L L A C IE S OF D E L A Y . [ Ch. 3.

W hatsoever it may be some centuries hence, hitherto

the fault o f the people has been, not groundless cla­
mour against imaginary grievances, but insensibility
to real ones ;— insensibility, not to the effect, the evil
itself, for that, i f it were possible, far from being a
fault, would be a happiness,— but to the cause, to the
system or course o f misrule which is the cause o f it.
W hat, therefore, may but too easily be— what hi­
therto ever has been— the fact, and that, throughout
a vast proportion o f the field o f legislation, is, that in
regard to the grievances com plained of, the time for
bringing forward a measure o f effectual relief is not
yet com e : why ? because, though groaning under the
effect, the people, by the artifice and hypocrisy o f their
oppressors, having been prevented from entertaining
any tolerably adequate conception o f the cause, would
at that time regard either with indifference or with
suspicion the healing hand that should com e forward
with the only true and effectual rem edy. Thus it is,
for example, with that Pandora’s box o f grievances
and misery, the contents o f which are com posed o f
the evils opposite to the ends o f justice.
C h. 4 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 201

C H A P T E R IV.
Snail's-pace Argument.
Ad socordiam.

“ One thing at a tim e! Not too fast! Slow and sure!"

Exposition.

T iie proposed measure being a measure o f reform,

requiring that for the com pletion o f the beneficial
work in question a number o f operations be perform­
ed, capable, all or some o f them, o f being carried on
at the same time, or successively without intervals, or
at short intervals, the instrument o f deception here in
question consists in holding up to view the idea o f
graduality or slowness, as characteristic o f the course
which wisdom would dictate on the occasion in ques­
tion. For more effectual recommendation o f this
course, to the epithet gradual are com m only added
some such eulogistic epithets as moderate and tem­
perate ; whereby it is implied, that in proportion as
the pace recommended by the word gradual is quick­
ened, such increased pace will justly incur the censure
expressed by the opposite epithets,— immoderate, vio­
lent, precipitate, extravagant, intemperate.

Exposure.
This is neither more nor less than a contrivance for
making out of a mere word an excuse for leaving un­
202 FA LL A C IE S OF DELAY. [Ch. 4 .
done an indefinite multitude o f things which, the
arguer is convinced, and cannot forbear acknowledg­
ing, ought to be done.
Suppose half a dozen abuses which equally and
with equal promptitude stand in need o f reform ; this
fallacy requires, that without any reason that can be
assigned, other than what is contained in the pro­
nouncing or writing o f the word gradual, all but one
or two o f them shall remain untouched.
O r, what is better, suppose that, to the effectual
correction o f som e one o f these abuses, six operations
require to be perform ed— six operations, all which
must be done ere the correction can be effected,— to
save the reform from the reproach o f being violent
and intemperate, to secure to it the praise o f gradu­
a lly , moderation and temperance, you insist, that o f
these half-a-dozen necessary operations, some one or
som e two only shall be talked of, and proposed to be
done ;— one, by one bill to be introduced this session
i f it be not too late (which you contrive it shall be) ;
another, the next session ; which time being com e,
nothing more is to be said about the matter, and there
it ends.
F or this abandonment, no one reason that will bear
looking at can be numbered up, in the instance o f any
one o f the five measures endeavoured to be laid upon
the s h e lf; for if it could, that would be the reason
assigned for the relinquishment, and not this unmean­
ing assemblage o f three syllables.
A suit which, to do full justice to it, requires but
Ch» 4 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y ; 203
six weeks, or six days, or six minutes in one day, has
it been made to last six years ? That your caution
and your wisdom may not be questioned, by a first
experiment reduce the time to five years, then if that
succeeds in another parliament, should another par­
liament be in a humour (which it is hoped it will not),
reduce it to four years,— then again to three years;—
and if it should be the lot o f your grandchildren to see
it reduced to two years, they may think themselves well
off, and admire your prudence.
Justice,— to which in every eye but that o f the plun­
derer and oppressor, rich and poor have an equal right,
— do nine-tenths o f the people stand excluded from all
hope of, by the load o f expense that has been heaped
up. Y o u propose to reduce this expense. T he ex­
tent o f the evil is admitted, and the nature o f the
remedy cannot admit o f d o u b t : but by the magic o f
the three syllables gra-du-cil, you will limit the remedy
to the reduction o f about one-tenth o f the expense.
Som e time afterwards you may reduce another tenth,
and go on so, that in about two centuries, justice may,
perhaps, becom e generally accessible.
Im portance o f the business— extreme difficulty o f
the business— danger o f innovation— need o f caution
and circumspection— impossibility o f foreseeing all
consequences— danger o f precipitation— every thing
should be gradual— one thing at a time— this is not
the time— great occupation at present— wait for more
leisure— people well satisfied— no petitions presented
— no complaints heard— no such mischief has yet
204 F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . [ Cfl. 4.

taken place— stay till it has taken place;— such is the

prattle which the magpye in office who, understanding
nothing, understands that he must have something to
say on every subject, shouts out am ong his auditors
as a succedaneum to thought.
Transfer the scene to domestic life, and suppose a
man who, his fortune not enabling him without run­
ning into debt to keep one race-horse, has been for
some time in the habit o f keeping six. T o transfer
to this private theatre the wisdom and the benefit o f
the gradual system, what you would have to recom ­
mend to your friend would be something o f this s o r t:
— Spend the first year in considering which o f your
six horses to give u p; the next year, if you can satisfy
yourself which it shall be, give up some one o f them :
by this sacrifice, the sincerity o f your intention and
your reputation for econom y will be established; which
done, you need think no more about the matter.
A s all psychological ideas have their necessary root
in physical ones, one source o f delusion in psychologi­
cal arguments consists in giving an improper extension
to som e metaphor which has been made choice of.
It would be a service done to the cause o f truth, if
som e advocate for the gradual system w'ould let us
into the secret o f the metaphor or physical image, if
any, which he has in view, and in the same language
give us the idea o f some physical disaster as the result
o f precipitation. A patient killed by rapid bleeding,
a chariot dashed in pieces by runaway steeds, a vessel
overset by carrying too much sail in a squall,— all
Ch. 4 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 205

these images suppose a degree o f precipitation which,

if pursued by the proposers o f a political measure,
would be at once apparent, and the obvious and as­
signable consequence o f their course would afford un­
answerable arguments against them.
A ll this while though by a friend to the measure,
no such word as above will be em ployed in the cha­
racter o f argument; yet cases are not wanting in which
the dilatory course recomm ended may be consented
to or even proposed by him.
Suppose a dozen distinct abuses in the seat o f le­
gislative power, each abuse having a set o f members
interested in the support o f i t ; attack the whole body
at once, all these parties join together to a certainty,
and oppose you with their united force. Attack the
abuses one by one, and it is possible that you may
have but one o f these parties, or at least less than all
o f them, to cope with at a time. Possible ? Y es :—*
but o f probability, little can be said. T o each branch
o f the public service belongs a class o f public servants,
each o f which has its sinister interest, the source o f the
mass o f abuses on which it feeds ; and in the person
and power o f the universal patron, the fountain o f all
honour and o f all abuse, all those sinister interests are
joined and em bodied into one.
This is a branch o f science in which no man is ever
d eficien t; this is what is understood,— understood to
perfection by him to whom nothing else ever was or
can be clear ,— Hoc discunt omnes, unto alpha et beta
puelli.
20(> F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . [Ch. 4.
I f there be a case in which sucli gradu ally as is
here described can have been consented to, and with
a reasonable prospect o f advantage, it must have been
a case in which, without such consent, the whole busi­
ness would be hopeless.
U nder the existing system, by which the d oor o f
the theatre o f legislation is opened by opulence to
members, in wrhose instance application o f the faculty
o f thought to the business about which they are sup­
posed to occupy themselves, would have been an effect
without a cause, so gross is the ignorance, and in co n ­
sequence, even where good intention is not altogether
wanting, so extreme the timidity and apprehension,
that on their part, without assurance o f extreme slow­
ness, no concurrence to a proposal for setting one foot
before another, at even the slowest pace, would be
obtained at a l l : their pace, the only pace at which
they can be persuaded to m ove, is that w^hich the tra­
veller would take, whose lot it should be to be travel­
ling in a pitch-dark night, over a road broken and
slippery, edged with precipices on each side. T im e is
requisite for quieting timidity : w'hy ? because time is
requisite for instructing ignorance.

Sect. 1. Lawyers; their interest in the employment

o f this fallacy .
In proportion to the magnitude o f their respective
shares in the general fund o f abuse, the various fra­
ternities interested in the support o f abuses have each
Sect. 1.] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 207
o f them their interest in turning to the best account this
as well as every other article in the list o f fallacies.
But it is the fraternity o f lawyers, who (if they have
not decidedly the most to gain by the dexterous ma­
nagement o f this or o f other fallacies) have, from the
greatest quantity o f practice, derived the greatest de­
gree o f dexterity in the management o f it.
Judicature requiring reflection, and the greater the
com plication o f the case, the greater the degree and
length o f reflection which the case requires: under
favour o f this association, they have succeeded in esta­
blishing a general impression o f a sort o f proportion
in quantity as well as necessity o f connexion between
delay and attention to justice. N o t that, in fact, a hun­
dredth part o f the established delay has had any ori­
gin in a regard for ju stice; but,— for want o f sufficient
insight into that state o f things by which in persons
so circumstanced in power and interest the general
prevalence o f any such regard has been rendered phy­
sically impossible,— in his endeavours to propagate
the notion o f a sort o f general proportion between
delay and regard for justice, the man o f law has, un­
happily, been but too successful. And it is, perhaps,
to this error, in respect to matters o f fact, that the
snail’s-pace fallacy is indebted, more than to any other
cause, for its dupes. Be this as it may, sure it is,
that in no track o f reform has the rate o f progress,
which it is the object o f this fallacy to secure, been
adhered to with greater effect. By the Statute Book,
if run over, (and little more than the titles would be
208 F A L L A C IE S OF D E L A Y . [Ch. 4 .
necessary) in this view, a curious exemplification o f
the truth o f this observation is afforded. A n abuse so
monstrous, that, on the part o f the judicial hands by
which it was manufactured, the slightest doubt o f the
mischievousness o f it was absolutely im possible,— ge­
neration after generation groaning under this abuse,—
and at length, when, by causes kept o f course as much
as possible out o f sight, the support o f the abuse has
been deemed no longer practicable, com es at length
a remedy. A n d what rem edy? N ever any thing
better than a feeble palliative.
Ch. 5.] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y H09

CHAPTER V.

Fallacy o f artful Diversion.

Ad verecundiam.

Exposition and Exposure.

T he device here in question may be explained by
the following direction or receipt for the manufacture
and application o f i t :—
W hen any measure is proposed, which on any ac­
count whatsoever it suits your interest or your humour
to oppose, at the same time that, in consideration o f
its undeniable utility, or on any other account, you
regard it unadvisable to pass direct condemnation on
it,— hold up to view some other measure, such as,
whether it bear any relation or none to the measure
on the carpet, will, in the conception o f your hearers,
present itself as superior in the order o f importance.
Y ou r language, then, is— W hy that? (meaning the mea­
sure already proposed.)— W h y not this?— or this?
mentioning some other, which it is your hope to ren­
der more acceptable, and by means o f it to create a
diversion, and turn aside from the obnoxious measure
the affections and attention o f those whom you have
to deal with.
O ne case there is, in which the appellation o f fal­
lacy cannot with justice be applied to this argument;
and that is, where the effectuation or pursuit o f the
measure first proposed would operate as a bar or an
p
210 F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . [Ch. 5.

obstacle to som e other measure o f a more beneficial

character held up to view by the argument as com pe­
titor to it: and what, in the way o f Exposure, will be
said o f the sort o f expedient just described, will not
apply to this case.
However, where the measure first proposed is o f
unquestionable utility, and you oppose it merely be­
cause it is adverse to your own sinister interest, you
must not suggest anv relevant measure o f reform in
lieu o f it, except in a case in which, in the shape o f
argument, every m ode o f opposition is considered as
hopeless : for unless for the purpose o f forestalling
the time and attention that would be necessary to the
effectuation o f the proposed beneficial measure, a
measure altogether irrelevant and foreign to it is set
up, a risk is incurred, that something, however infe­
rior in degree, may be effected towards the diminution
o f the abuse or imperfection in question.
In the character o f an irrelevant counter-measure,
any measure or accidental business whatever may be
made to serve, so long as it can be made to pre­
occu py a sufficient portion o f the disposable time and
attention o f the public men on whose suffrages the
effectuation or frustration o f the measure depends.
But supposing the necessity for a relevant counter­
measure to exist, and you have accordingly given in­
troduction to it, the first thing then to be done is, to
stave o ff the undesirable moment o f its effectuation as
long as possible.
A ccordin g to established usage, you have given no-
Ch. 5 .] F A L L A C I E S OF D E L A Y . 211

tice o f your intention to propose a measure on the

subject and to the effect in question. T he intention
is o f too great importance to be framed and carried
into act in the compass o f the same year or session :
you accordingly announce your intention for next ses­
sion. W hen the next session conies, the measure is
o f too great importance to be brought on the carpet
at the commencem ent o f the session ; at that period
it is not yet mature enough. I f it be not advisable to
delay it any longer, you bring it forward just as the
session closes. T im e is thus gained, and without any
decided loss in the shape o f reputation : for what you
undertook, has to the letter been performed. W hen
the measure has been once brought in, you have to
take your choice, in the first place, between operations
for delay and operations for rejection. Operations
for delay exhibit a manifest title to preference: so
long as their effect can be made to last, they accom ­
plish their object, and no sacrifice either o f design or
o f reputation has been made. T h e extreme import­
ance and extreme difficulty are themes on which you
blow the trumpet, and which you need not fear the
not hearing sufficiently echoed. W hen the treasury
o f delay has been exhausted, you have your choice to
take between trusting to the chapter o f accidents for
the defeat o f the measure, or endeavouring to engage
some friend to oppose it and propose the rejection o f
it. But you must be unfortunate indeed, if you can
find no opponents, no tolerably plausible opponents,
unless among friends, and friends specially comuiis-
P 2
c2 12 F A L L A C IE S OF D E L A Y . \Ch. 5.
sioned for the purpose : a sort o f confidence more or
less dangerous must in that case be reposed.
U pon the whole, you must however be singularly
unfortunate or unskilful, if by the counter-measure o f
diversion any considerable reduction o f the abuse or
im perfection be, spite o f your utmost endeavours, ef­
fected, or any share o f reputation that you need care
about, sacrificed.
 PART THE FOURTH.

FALLACIES OF CONFUSION,
The object o f zvhich is, to perplex , when Discussion can
no longer be avoided.

CHAPTER I.

Question-begging Appellatives.
Ad judicium.

P e t it i o principiij or begging the question, is a

fallacy very well known even to those who are not
conversant with the principles o f logic. In answer to
a given question, the party who em ploys the fallacy
contents him self by simply affirming the point in de­
bate. W h y does opium occasion sleep ?— Because it
is soporiferous.
Begging the question is one o f the fallacies enume­
rated by A ristotle; but Aristotle has not pointed out
(what it will be the object o f this chapter to expose)
the m ode o f using the fallacy with the greatest effect,
and least risk o f detection,— namely, by the em ploy­
ment o f a single appellative.

Exposition and Exposure.

A m ong the appellatives em ployed for the designa­

tion o f objects belonging to the field o f moral science,
214 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. [Ch. l.
there are some by which the object is presented singly,
unaccompanied by any sentiment of approbation or
disapprobation attached to i t :—as, desire, labour, dis­
position, character, habit, &c. With reference to the
two sorts of appellatives which will come immediately
to be mentioned, appellatives of this sort may be
termed neutral.
There are others by means of which, in addition to
the principal object, the idea of general approbation
as habitually attached to that object is presented :—
as, industry, honour, piety, generosity, gratitude, &c.
These are termed eulogistic or laudatory.
Others there are again, by means of which, in ad­
dition to the principal object, the idea of general dis­
approbation, as habitually attached to that object, is
presented:—as, lust, avarice,luxury, covetousness, pro­
digality, &c. These may be termed dyslogistic or
vituperative a.
Among pains, pleasures, desires, emotions, motives,
affections, propensities, dispositions, and other moral
entities, some, but very far from all, are furnished
with appellatives of all three sorts :—some, with none
but eulogistic ; others, and in a greater number, with
none but those of the dyslogistic cast. By appella-*

* See the nature o f these denominations amply illustrated in Springs-

of-Action Table.
O f the field o f thought and action, this, the moral department, though
it be that part in which the most abundant employment is given to the
instrument o f deception here in question, is not the only part. Scarcely,
perhaps, can any part be found to which it has not been applied.
Ch. I . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 215
tives, I mean here, o f course, single-worded appella­
tives; for by words, take but enough o f them, any
thing may be expressed.
Originally, all terms expressive o f any o f these ob ­
jects were (it seems reasonable to think) neutral. By
degrees they acquired, some o f them an eulogistic,
som e a dyslogistic, cast. This change extended itself
as the moral sense (if so loose and delusive a term
may on this occasion be em ployed) advanced in
growth.
But to return. A s to the mode o f em ploying this fal­
lacy, it neither requires nor so much as admits o f being
taught : a man falls into it but too naturally o f him­
self ; and the more naturally and freely, the less he
finds himself under the restraint o f any such sense as
that o f shame. T h e great difficulty is to unlearn i t : in
the case o f this, as o f so many other fallacies, by teach­
ing it, the humble endeavour here is to unteach it.
In speaking o f the conduct, the behaviour, the in­
tention , the motive, the disposition o f this or that man,
if he be one who is indifferent to you, o f whom you
care not whether he be well or ill thought of, you em­
ploy the neutral term :— if a man whom, on the occa ­
sion and for the purpose in question, it is your object
to recommend to favour, especially a man o f your
own party, you em ploy the eulogistic term :— if he be
a man whom it is your object to consign to aversion
or contempt, you em ploy the dyslogistic term.
T o the proposition o f which it is the leading term,
216 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 1 .
every such eulogistic or dyslogistic appellative, secretly
as it were, and in general insensibly, slips in another
proposition o f which that same leading term is the
subject, and an assertion o f approbation or disappro­
bation the predicate. T h e person, act, or thing in
question is or deserves to be, or is and deserves to be,
an object o f general approbation ; or the person, act,
or thing in question is or deserves to be, or is and
deserves to be, an object o f general disapprobation.
T h e proposition thus asserted, is com m only a pro­
position that requires to be proved. But in the case
where the use o f the term thus em ployed is fallacious,
the proposition is one that is not true, and cannot be
proved : and where the person by whom the fallacy
is em ployed is conscious o f its deceptive tendency,
the object in the employm ent thus given to the appel­
lative is, by means o f the artifice, to cause that to be
taken for true which is not so.
By appropriate eulogistic and dyslogistic terms, so
many arguments are made, by which, taking them
altogether, misrule, in all its several departments, finds
its justifying arguments, and these in but too many
eyes, conclusive. Take, for instance, the follow ing
eulogistic term s:—
1. In the war department, honour and glory.
2. In international affairs, honour, glory, and dignity.
3. In the financial department, liberality . It being
always at the expense o f unwilling contributors that
this virtue (for among the virtues it has its place in
Ch. 1 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 217

Aristotle) is exercised; for liberality , depredation may,

in perhaps every case, and without any impropriety,
be substituted.
4. In the higher parts o f all official departments, dig­
nity ;— dignity , though not in itself depredation, ope­
rates as often as the word is used, as a pretence for, and
thence as a cause of, depredation. W herever you see
dignity , be sure that money is requisite for the support
o f i t : and that, in so far as the dignitary’s own money
is regarded as insufficient, public money raised by
taxes imposed on all other individuals, on the prin­
ciple o f liberality , must be found for the supply o f
i t a.
Exercised at a man’s own expense, liberality may
be, or may not be, according to circumstances, a vir­
tue :— exercised at the expense o f the public, it never
can be any thing better than vice. Exercised at a
man’s own expense, whether it be accompanied with
prudence or no, whether it be accom panied or not
with beneficence, it is at any rate disinterestedness :—
exercised at the expense o f the public, it is pure self­
ishness : it is, in a word, depredation : money or
m oney’s worth is taken from the public to purchase,
for the use o f the liberal man, respect, affection, gra­
titude with its eventual fruits in the shape o f services
o f all sorts : in a word, reputation, power.
W hen you have a practice or measure to condemn,

a See this principle avowed and maintained by the scribes o f both

parties, Burke and Rose, as shown in the defences o f economy against
those advocates o f depredation.
218 FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION. \Ch. 1.
find out som e more general appellative within the im­
port o f which the obnoxious practice or measure in
question cannot be denied to be included, and to
which you or those whose interests and prejudices you
have espoused, have contrived to annex a certain d e­
gree o f unpopularity, in so much that the name o f it
has contracted a dyslogistic quality,— has becom e a
had name.
Take, for example, improvement and innovation ;
under its own name to pass censure on any improve­
ment might be too bold : applied to such an object,
auy expressions o f censure you could em ploy might
lose their fo r c e : em ploying them, you would seem
to be running on in the track o f self-contradiction and
nonsense.
But improvement means something new, and so
does innovation. H appily for your purpose, innova­
tion has contracted a bad sen se; it means something
which is new and bad at the same time. Im prove­
ment, it is true, in indicating something new, indicates
something good at the same time ; and therefore, if
the thing in question be good as well as new, innova­
tion is not a proper term for it. However, as the
idea o f novelty was the only idea originally attached
to the term innovation, and the only one which is di­
rectly expressed in the etym ology o f it, you may still
venture to em ploy the word innovation, since no man
can readily and immediately convict your appellation
o f being an improper one upon the face o f it.
W ith the appellation thus chosen for the purpose
Ch. 1 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 219

o f passing condemnation on the measure, he by whom

it has been brought to view in the character o f an irn-
provement is not (it is true) very likely to be well satis­
fied : but o f this 3'ou could not have had any expecta­
tion. W hat you want, is a pretence which your own
partisans can lay hold of, for the purpose o f deducing
from it a colourable warrant for passing upon the im­
provement that censure which you are determined,
and they, if not determined, are disposed and intend,
to pass on it.
O f this instrument o f deception, the potency is
most deplorable. It is but o f late years that so much
as the nature o f it has in any way been laid before
the public : and now7 that it has been laid before the
public, the need there is o f its being opposed with
effect, and the extreme difficulty o f opposing it with
effect, are at the same time and in equal degree mani­
fest. In every part o f the field o f thought and dis­
course, the effect o f language depends upon the prin­
ciple o f association,— upon the association formed be­
tween words and those ideas o f which in that way
they have becom e the signs. But in no small part o f
the field o f discourse, one or other o f the two censo­
rial and reciprocally correspondent and opposite af­
fections,— the amicable and the hostile,— that by which
approbation and that by which disapprobation is ex­
pressed,— are associated with the word in question by
a tie little less strong than that by which the object
in question, be it person or thing,— be the thing a
real or fictitious entity, he it operation or quality, is
 220 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 1.
associated with that same articulate audible sign and
its visible representations.
T o diminish the effect o f this instrument o f decep­
tion (for to d o it away com pletely, to render all minds
without exception at all times insensible to it, seems
scarcely possible), must, at any rate, be a work o f
time. But in proportion as its effect on the under­
standing, and through that channel on the temper and
conduct o f mankind, is diminished, the good effect o f
the exposure will becom e manifest.
By such o f these passion-kindling appellatives as
are o f the eulogistic cast, comparatively speaking, no
bad effect is produced : but by those which are o f the
dyslogistic, prodigious is the mischievous effect pro­
duced, considered in a moral point o f view. By a
single w'ord or two o f this com plexion, what hostility
has been produced ! how intense the feeling o f i t !
how' wide the range o f i t ! how full o f mischief, in all
imaginable shapes, the effects a !

' a As an instance remarkable enough, though not in respect o f the

mischievousness, yet in respect o f the extent and the importance o f the
effects producible by a single word, note Lord Erskine’s defence o f the
Whigs, avowedly produced by the application o f the dyslogistic word
faction to that party in the state.
Ch. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 221

CHAPTER II.

Impostor Terms.
Ad judicium.

Exposition.
T he fallacy which consists in the em ploym ent o f
im postor terms, in some respects resembles that which
has been exposed in the preceding chapter : but it is
applied chiefly to the defence o f things, which under
their proper name are manifestly indefensible: instead,
therefore, o f speaking o f such things under their proper
name, the sophist has recourse to some appellative,
which, along with the indefensible object, includes
some o th e r ; generally an object o f favour ;— or at
once substitutes an object o f approbation for an ob­
je c t o f censure. For instance, persecutors in mat­
ters o f religion have no such word as persecution in
their vocabulary ; zeal is the word by which they
characterize all their actions.
In the em ployment o f this fallacy, tw'o things are
requisite :
1. A fact or circumstance, which, under its proper
name, and seen in its true colours, would be an object
o f censure, and which, therefore, it is necessary to dis­
guise ; {res tegenda ;)
2. The appellative, which the sophist employs to
conceal what would be deemed offensive, or even to
222 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 2 .
bespeak a degree o f favour for it by the aid o f some
happier accessary : (Tegument) a
Exposure.
E xam ple .— Iiifluence o f the Crown.
T h e sinister influence o f the crown is an object
which, if expressed by any peculiar and distinctive
appellation, would, comparatively speaking, find per­
haps but few defenders, but which, so long as no
other denomination is em ployed for the designation o f
it than the generic term influence, will rarely meet
with ^discrim inating reprobation.

a The device here in question is not peculiar to politicians. By an

example drawn from private life, it may to some eyes be placed, per­
haps, in a clearer point o f view. The word gallantry is employed to
denote either o f two dispositions, which, though not altogether without
connexion, may either o f them exist without the other. In one o f
these senses, it denotes, on the part o f the stronger sex, the disposition
to testify on all occasions towards the weaker sex those sentiments o f
respect and kindness by which civilized is so strikingly and happily
distinguished from savage life. In the other sense, it is, in the main,
synonymous to adultery: yet, not so completely synonymous (as in­
deed words perfectly synonymous are o f rare occurrence) but that, in
addition to this sense, it presents an accessary and collateral one.
Having, from the habit o f being employed in the other sense, acquired,
in addition to its direct sense, a collateral sense o f the eulogistic cast,
it serves to give to the act, habit, or disposition, which in this sense it
is employed to present, something o f an eulogistic tincture, in lieu o f
that dyslogistic colouring under which the object is presented by its
direct and proper name. Whatever act a man regards himself as being
known to have performed, or meditates the perfonnance of, under any
expectation o f his being eventually known to have performed it, he
will not, in speaking o f it, make use o f any term the tendency o f which
Ch. 2 .] FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION. <223

Corruption ,— the term which, in the eyes o f those to

whom this species o f influence is an object o f disap­
probation, is the appropriate and only single-worded
term capable o f being em ployed for the expression o f
it,— is a term o f the dyslogistic cast. This, then, by
any person whose meaning it is not to jo in in the
condemnation passed on the practice or state o f things
which is designated, is one that cannot possibly be
em ployed. In speaking o f this practice and state o f
things, he is therefore obliged to go upon the look-out,
and find some term, which, at the same time that its
claim to the capacity o f presenting to view the object
in question cannot be contested, shall be o f the eulo-

is to call forth, on the part of the hearer or reader, any sentiment of

disapprobation pointed at the sort of act in question, and consequently,
through the medium of the act, at the agent by whom it has been
performed. To the word adu ltery , this effect, to every man more or
less unpleasant, is attached by the usage of language. On every oc­
casion in which it is necessary to his purpose to bring to view an act
of this obnoxious description, he will naturally be on the look-out for
a term in the use of which he may be supposed to have had another
meaning, and which, in so far as it conveys an idea of the forbidden
act in question, presents it with an accompaniment, not of reproach,
but rather of approbation, which in general would not have accompa­
nied it but for the other signification which the word is also emploved
to designate. This term he finds in the word ga llan try.
There is a sort of man, who, whether ready or no to commit any
act or acts of adultery, would gladly be thought to have been habitu­
ated to the commission of such acts: but even this sort of man would
neither he found to say of himself, “ I am an adulterer,” nor pleased
to have it said of him, “ He is an adulterer.” But to have it said of him
that he is a man of gallantry,—this is what the sort of man in question
would regard as a compliment, with the sound of which he would he
pleased and flattered.
224 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. [ Ch. 2.

gistic or at least o f the neutral ca s t; and to one or

other o f these classes belongs the term influence.
U nder the term influence, when the crown is con­
sidered as the possessor o f it, are included two species
o f influence: the one o f them, such, that the removal
o f it could not, without an utter reprobation o f the
monarchical form o f Governm ent, be by any person
considered as desirable, nor, without the utter destruc­
tion o f monarchical government, be considered as pos­
sible. T h e other, such, that in the opinion o f many
persons the com plete destruction or removal o f it
would i f possible be desirable; and that, though con ­
sistently with the continuance o f the monarchical g o ­
vernment, the com plete removal o f it would not be
practicable, yet the diminution o f it to such a degree
as that the remainder should not be productive o f any
practically pernicious effects would not be impracti­
cable.
will on will, influence o f understanding
Influence o f
on understanding : in this may be seen the distinction
on which the utility or noxiousness o f the sort o f in­
fluence in question depends.
In the influence o f understanding on understanding,
may be seen that influence to which, by whom soever
exercised, on whom soever exercised, and on what oc­
casion soever exercised, the freest range ought to be
l e f t :— left, although, as for instance, exercised by the
crown, and on the representatives o f the people. N o t
that to this influence it may not happen to be produc­
tive o f m ischief to any amount, but that because, with-
Ch. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 225
out this influence, scarce any good could be a ccom ­
plished, and because, when it is left free, disorder can­
not present itself without leaving the door open at
least for the entrance o f the remedy.
T h e influence o f understanding on understanding
is, in a word, no other than the influence o f human
reason,— a guide which, like other guides, is liable to
miss its way, or dishonestly to recommend a wrong
course, but which is the only guide o f which the na­
ture o f the case is susceptible.
U nder the British constitution, to the crown belongs
either the sole management, or a principal and leading
part o f the management, o f the public business: and
it is only by the influence o f understanding on under­
standing, or by the influence o f will on will, that by
any person or persons, except by physical force imme­
diately applied, any thing can be done.
T o the execution o f the ordinary mass o f duties
belonging to the crown, the influence o f will on will,
so long as the persons on whom it is exercised are the
proper persons, is necessary. O n all persons to whom
it belongs to the crown to give orders, this species o f
influence is necessary: for it is only in virtue o f this
species o f influence that orders, considered as deliver­
ed from a superordinate to a subordinate,— considered
in a word as orders, in contradistinction to mere sug­
gestions, or arguments operating by the influence o f
understanding on understanding,— can be productive
o f any effect.
Thus far, then, in the ca se.of influence o f will on
226 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 2 .
will, as well as in the case o f influence o f understand­
in g oil understanding, no rational and consistent ob­
jection can be made to the use o f influence. In either
case, its title to the epithet legitimate influence is above
dispute.
T h e case among others in which the title o f the in­
fluence o f the crown is open to dispute,— the case in
which the epithet sinister or any other mark o f disap­
probation may be bestowed upon it (bestowed upon
the bare possession, and without need o f reference to
the particular use and application which on any par­
ticular occasion may happen to be made o f it),— is
that where, being o f that sort which is exercised by
will on will, the person on whom on the occasion in
question it is exercised is either a member o f parlia­
ment, or a person possessed o f an electoral vote with
reference to a seat in parliament.
T he ground on which this species o f influence thus
exercised is, by those by whom it is spoken o f with
disapprobation, represented as sinister, and deserving
o f that disapprobation, is simply this :— viz. that in
so far as this influence is efficient, the will professed
to be pronounced is not in truth the will o f him whose
will it professes to be, but the will o f him in whom
the influence originates, and from whom it proceeds :
in so much, that if, for example, every member o f
parliament without exception were in each house under
the dominion o f the influence o f the crown, and in
every individual instance that influence were effectual,
the monarchy, instead o f being the limited sort of
Ch. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 227
monarchy it professes to be, would be in effect an ab­
solute one,— in form alone a limited o n e ; nor so
much as in form a limited one any longer than it hap­
pened to be the pleasure o f the monarch that it should
continue to be.
T he functions attached to the situation o f a mem­
ber o f parliament may be included, most or all o f
them, under three denominations— the legislative, the
judicial, and the inquisitorial : the legislative, in virtue
o f which, in each house, each member that pleases
takes a part in the making o f la w s: the judicial,
which, whether penal cases or cases non-penal be con ­
sidered, is not exercised to any considerable ex ten I
but by the House o f Lords : and the inquisitorial, the
exercise o f which is performed by an inquiry into
facts, with a view to the exercise either o f legislative
authority, or o f judicial authority, or both, whichever
the case may be found to require. T o the exercise
o f either branch may be referred what is done, when,
on the ground o f some defect either in point o f moral
or intellectual fitness, or both, application is made by
either house for the removal of, anv member or mem­
bers o f the executive branch o f the official establish­
ment, any servant or servants o f the crown.
But for argument sake, suppose the above-mention­
ed extreme case to be realized, all these functions are
equally nugatory. Whatever law is acceptable to the
crown, will be not only introduced but carried. No
law that is not acceptable to the crown, will be so
much as introduced. Every judgm ent that is accept­
er 2
228 FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION . [ Ch. 2.

able to the crown will be pronounced. N o judgm ent

that is not acceptable to the crown will be pronounced.
Every inquiry that is acceptable to the crown will be
made. No inquiry that is not acceptable to the
crown will be m a d e ; and in particular, let, on the
part o f the servants o f the crown, any or all o f them,
m isconduct in every imaginable shape be ever so
enormous, no application that is not acceptable to the
crown will ever be made for their removal : that is,
no such application will ever be made at a l l ; for in
this state o f things, supposing it in the instance o f any
servant o f the crown to be the pleasure o f the crown
to remove him, he will be removed o f c o u r s e ; nor
can any such application be productive o f any thing
better than needless loss o f time.
Raised to the pitch supposed in this extreme case,
there are not, it is supposed, many men in the country
by whom the influence o f the crown, o f that sort which
is exercised by the will o f the crown on the wills o f
members o f parliament, would not be really regarded
as com ing under the denomination o f sinister in­
fluence ; not so much as a single one by whom its
title to that denomination would be openly denied.
But am ong members o f parliament, many there are
on whom, beyond possibility o f denial, this sort o f in­
fluence— influence o f will on will— is exerted : since
no man can be in possession o f any desirable situation
from which he is removable, without its being exerted
on h i m ; say rather, without its exerting himself on
him, for to the production o f the full effect o f in-
Ch. 2 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 229
fluence, no act, no express intimation o f will on the
part o f any person, is in any such situation necessary.
Here, then, com es the grand question in dispute.
In some opinions, o f that sort o f influence o f will on
will, exercising itself from the crown on a member o f
parliament, or at any rate on a member o f the H ouse
o f C om m ons com posed o f the elected representatives
o f the people, not any the least particle is necessary,
— not any the least particle is in any way beneficial,
— not any the least particle, in so far as it is opera­
tive, can be other than pernicious.
In the language o f those by whom this opinion is
held, every particle o f such influence is sinister in­
fluence, corrupt or corruptive influence, or in one
word corruption.
Others there are in whose opinion, or at any rate,
i f not in their opinion, in whose language, o f that in­
fluence thus actually exercising itself, the whole, or
some part at any rate, is not only innoxious but bene­
ficial, and not only beneficial but, to the maintenance
o f the constitution in a good and healthful state, ab­
solutely necessary: and to this number must natu­
rally be supposed to belong all those on whom this
obnoxious species o f influence is actually exercising
itself.
230 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 3 .

CHAPTER III.

Vague Generalities.
Ad judicium.

Exposition.
V a g u e generalities com prehend a numerous class
o f fallacies resorted to by those who, in preference to
the most particular and determinate terms and expres­
sions which the nature o f the case in question admits
of, em ploy others more general and indeterminate.
A n expression is vague and ambiguous when it de­
signates, by one and the same appellative, an object
which may be good or bad, according to circumstances;
and if, in the course o f an inquiry touching the quali­
ties o f such an object, such an expression is em ployed
without a recognition o f this distinction, the expres­
sion operates as a fallacy.
Take, for instance, the terms, government, laws,
morals, religion. The genus com prehended in each
o f these terms may be divided into two species— the
good and the bad; for no one can deny that there
have been and still are in the world, bad governments,
bad laws, bad systems o f morals, and bad religions.
T h e bare circumstance, therefore, o f a man’s attack-
ing government or law, morals or religion, does not o f
itself afford the slightest presumption that he is en­
gaged in any thing blameable : if his attack is only
Ch. 3 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 231
directed against that which is bad in each, his efforts
may be productive o f good to any extent.
This essential distinction the defender o f abuse
takes care to keep out o f sight, and boldly imputes to
his antagonist an intention to subvert all governments,
laws, morals, or religion.
But it is in the way o f insinuation, rather than in
the form o f direct assertion, that the argument is in
this case most com m only brought to bear. Propose
any thing with a view to the improvement o f the
existing practice in relation to government at large, to
the law, or to religion, he will treat you with an ora­
tion on the utility and necessity o f government, o f
law, or o f religion. T o what end P T o the end that
o f your own accord you may draw the inference which
it is his desire you should draw, even that what is
proposed has in its tendency something which is pre­
judicial to one or other or all o f these objects o f gene­
ral regard. O f the truth o f the intimation thus con ­
veyed, had it been made in the form o f a direct asser­
tion or averment, som e p roof might naturally have
been looked for. By a direct assertion, a sort o f no­
tice is given to the hearer or reader to prepare him­
self for something in the shape o f p r o o f: but when
nothing is asserted, nothing is on the one hand offer­
ed, nothing on the other expected, to be proved.
<23‘2 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 3.

Exposure.
]. Order.
A m ong the several cloudy appellatives which have
been com m only em ployed as cloaks for misgovern-
ment, there is none more conspicuous in this atm o­
sphere o f illusion than the word Order.
T h e wordorder is in a peculiar degree adapted to
the purpose o f a cloak for tyranny ; — the word order
is more extensive than law', or even than government.
But, what is still more material, the w'ord order is
o f the eulogistic c a s t; w'hereas the w ords government
and lau\ howsoever the things signified may have
been taken in the lump for subjects o f praise, the
com plexion o f the signs themselves is still tolerably
neutral : just as is the case with the words constitu­
tion and institutions.
Thus, whether the measure or arrangement be a
mere transitory measure or a permanent law, if it be
a tyrannical one, be it ever so tyrannical, in the word
order you have a term not only w'ide enough, but in
every respect better adapted than any other which the
language can supply, to serve as a cloak for it. Sup­
pose any number o f men, by a speedy death or a lin­
gering one, destroyed for meeting one another for the
purpose o f obtaining a remedy for the abuses by w'hich
they are suffering, what nobody can deny is, that by
their destruction, order is maintained ; for the worst
order is as truly order as the best. A ccordingly, a
clearance o f this sort having been effected, suppose in
Sect. 1.] F A LLA C IE S OF CONFUSION. 233
the H ouse o f C om m ons a L ord Castlereagh, or in
the House o f Lords a Lord Sid mouth, to stand up
and insist that by a measure so undeniably prudential
order was maintained, with what truth could they be
contradicted ? And who is there that would have the
boldness to assert that order ought not to be main­
tained ?
T o the word order add the word good, the strength
o f the checks, if any there were, that were thus ap­
plied to tyranny would be but little if at all increased.
By the word good, no other idea is brought to view
than that o f the sentiment o f approbation, as attached
by the person by whom it is em ployed to the object
designated by the substantive to which this adjunct is
applied. Order is any arrangement which exists with
reference to the object in question ;— good order is
that order, be it what it may, which it is my wish to
be thought to approve of.
Take the state o f things under Nero, under Cali­
gula : with as indisputable propriety might the word
order be applied to it as to the state o f things at
present in Great Britain or the American United
States.
W hat in the eyes o f Bonaparte was good order?—
T hat which it had been his pleasure to establish.
By the adjunct social, the subject order is perhaps
rendered somewhat the less fit for the use o f tyrants,
but not much. A m ong the purposes to which the
word social is employed, is indeed that o f bringing to
view a state o f things favourable to the happiness o f
234 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. [ Ch. 3.

society : but a purpose to which it is also em ployed,

is that o f bringing to view a state o f things no other­
wise considered than as having place in society. By
the war which, in the Rom an history, bears the name
o f the social war, no great addition to the happiness
o f society was ever supposed to be made, yet it was
not the less a social one.
A s often as any measure is brought forward having
for its object the making any the slightest defalcation
from the amount o f the sacrifice made o f the interest
o f the many to the interest o f the few, social is the
adjunct by which the order o f things to which it is
pronounced hostile is designated.
By a defalcation made from any part o f the mass
o f factitious delay, vexation and expense, out o f which
and in proportion to which lawyers’ profit is made to
flow,— by any defalcation made from the mass o f
needless and worse than useless emolument to office,
with or without service or pretence o f service,— by
any addition endeavoured to be made to the quantity
or improvement in the quality o f service rendered, or
time bestowed in service rendered in return for such
emolument,— by every endeavour that has for its ob ­
je c t the persuading the people to place their fate at
the disposal o f any other agents than those in whose
hands breach o f trust is certain, due fulfilment o f it
morally and physically impossible ,— social order is
said to be endangered, and threatened to be de­
stroyed.
Proportioned to the degree o f clearness with which
Sect. 2 . ] FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION. 235
the only true and justifiable end o f government is held
up to view in any discourse that meets the public eye,
is the danger and inconvenience to which those rulers
are exposed, who, for their own particular interest*
have been engaged in an habitual departure from that
only legitimate and defensible course. _ H ence it is,
that, when com pared with the words order, mainte­
nance o f order, the use even o f such words as happi­
ness, welfare, well-being, is not altogether free from
danger, wide-extending and comparatively indetermi­
hap­
nate as the import o f them i s : to the single word
piness substitute the phrase greatest happiness o f the
greatest number, the description o f the end becomes
more determinate and even instructive, the danger
and inconvenience to misgovernrnent, and its authors,
and its instruments still more alarming and distress­
ing ; for then, for a rule whereby to measure the good ­
ness or badness o f a government, men are referred to
so simple and universally apprehensible a standard as
the numeration table. By the pointing men’s atten­
tions to this end, and the clearness o f the light thus
cast upon it, the importance o f such words as the
u'ord order, which by their obscurity substitute to the
offensive light the useful and agreeable darkness, is
more and more intimately felt.

2. Establishment.
In the same way again, Establishment is a word in
use, to protect the bad parts o f establishments, by
236 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 3 .

charging those who wish to remove or alter them with

the wish to subvert all establishments, or all good
establishments a.

3. Matchless Constitution.
T h e constitution has some good p oin ts; it has some
bad o n e s : it gives facility and, until reform — radical
reform, shall have been accom plished, security and
continual increase to waste, depredation, oppression
and corruption in every department, and in every
variety o f shape.
N o w in their own name respectively, waste, depre­
dation, oppression, corruption, cannot be toasted :
gentlemen would not cry, W aste for e v e r ! D epreda­
tion for ever ! Oppression for ever ! Corruption for
ever ! But T h e constitution for e v e r ! this a man may
cry, and does cry, and makes a merit o f it.

a In the church establishment, the bad parts are:—

1. Quantity and distribution o f payment;— its inequality creating
opposite faults— excess and deficiency. The excessive part calling men
off from their duty, and, as in lotteries, tempting an excessive number
o f adventurers : the defect deterring men from engaging in the duty,
or rendering them unable to perform it as it ought to be performed.
2. Mode o f payment;— tithes, a tax on food, which discourages agri­
cultural improvements, and occasions dissention between the minis­
ter and his parishioners.
3. Forms o f admission, compelling insincerity, subversive o f the
basis o f morality. As to purely speculative points, no matter which
side a man embraces, so he be sincere, but highly mischievous that he
should maintain even the right side (where there happens to be any)
when he is not sincere.
Sect. 3.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 237

O f this instrument o f rhetoric, the use is at least as

old as Aristotle. A s old as Aristotle is even the re­
ceipt for making it ; for Aristotle has himself given it:
and o f how much longer standing the use o f it may
have been, may baffle the sagacity o f a M itford to de­
termine. H ow sweet are gall and honey ? how white
are soot and snow r
Matchless constitution! there’s your sheet-anchor!
there’s your true standard ! rally round the constitu­
tion : that is, rally round waste, rally round depreda­
tion, rally round oppression, rally round corruption,
rail}* round election terrorism, rally round imposture;
— imposture on the hustings, imposture in honourable
house, imposture in every judicatory.
Connected with this toasting and this boasting is a
theory, such as a Westminster or Eton boy on the
sixth form, aye, or his grandmother, might be ashamed
of. For among those who are loudest in crying out
theory (as often as any attempt is made at reasoning,
any appeal made to the universally known and indis­
putable principles o f human nature), always may some
silly sentimental theory be found.
T he constitution, why must it not be looked into ?
why is it that under pain o f being ipso facto anarchist
convict, we must never presume to look at it other­
wise than with shut eyes? Because it was the work o f
our ancestors :— o f ancestors, o f legislators, few o f
whom could so much as read, and those few had no­
thing before them that was worth the reading. First
theoretical supposition, wisdom o f barbarian ancestors.
238 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSIOfr. [C/l. 3.

W hen from their ordinary occupation, their order

o f the day, the cutting o f one another’s throats, or
those o f W elchm en, Scotchm en, or Irishmen, they
could steal now and then a holiday, how did they
em ploy it? In cutting Frenchm en’s throats in order
to get their money ; this was active virtue :— leaving
Frenchmen’ s throats uncut was indolence, slumber,
inglorious ease. Second theoretical supposition, vir­
tue o f barbarian ancestors.
Thus fraught with habitual wisdom and habitual
virtue, they sat down and devised ; and setting before
them the best ends, and pursuing those best ends by
the best means, they framed in outline, at any rate,
they planned and executed our matchless constitution:
— the constitution as it stands,— and may it for ever
sta n d !
Planned and executed ? O n what occasion ? on
none. A t what place ? at none. By whom ? by no­
body.
A t no time ? O h yes, says every-thing-as-it-should-
be Blackstone. O h yes, says W h ig after W hig, after
the charming commentator, anno D om ini 1660, then
it is that it was in its perfection, about fourteen
years before James the Second mounted the throne
with a design to govern in politics as they do in M o ­
rocco, and in religion as they do at R om e; to govern
without parliament, or in spile o f parliam ent: a state
o f things for w hich, at this same era o f perfection, a
preparation was made by a parliament, which, being
brought into as proper a state o f corruption as if Lord
Sect. 3.] F A LLA C IE S OF CONFUSION. 239
Castlereagh had had the management o f it, was kept
on foot for several years togelher, and would have been
kept a-foot till the whole system o f despotism had
been settled, but for the sham popish plot by which
the fortunate calumny and subornation o f the W higs
defeated the bigotry and tyranny o f the Tories.
W hat then says the only true theory,— that theory
which is uniformly confirmed by all experience ?
O n no occasion, in no place, at no time, by no
person possessing any adequate power, has any such
end in view as the establishing the greatest happiness
o f the greatest number, been hitherto entertained : on
no occasion on the part o f any such person has there
been any endeavour, any wish for any happiness, other
than his own and that o f his own connexions, or any
care about the happiness or security o f the subject
many, any further than his own has been regarded as
involved in it.
A m ong men o f all classes, from the beginning o f
those times o f which we have any account in history,
among all men o f all classes, an universal struggle and
contention on the part o f each individual for his own
security and the means and instruments o f his own
happiness, for money, for power, for reputation natu­
ral and factitious, for constant ease, and incidental
vengeance. In the course o f this struggle, under fa­
vourable circumstances connected with geographical
situation, this and that little security has been caught
at, obtained, and retained by the subject many, against
the conjoined tyranny o f the monarch and his aristo-
240 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [67/. 3.

cracy. N o plan pursued by any body at any tim e ;—

the good established, as well as the bad remaining, the
result o f an universal scramble, carried on in the
storm o f contending passions under favour o f opportu­
nity :— at each period, some advantages which form er
periods had lost, others, which they had not gained.
But the only regular and constant means o f security
being the influence exercised by the will o f the people
on the body which in the same breath admit them­
selves and deny themselves to be their agents, and
that influence having against it and above it the cor­
ruptive and counter-influence o f the ruling few, the
servants o f the monarchy and the members o f the
aristocracy,— and the quantity o f the corruptive mat­
ter by which that corruptive influence operates being
every day on the increase, hence it is, that while all
names remain unchanged, the whole state o f things
grows every day worse and worse, and so will continue
to d o till even the forms o f parliament are regarded
as a useless incumbrance, and pure despotism, unless
arrested by radical reform, takes up the sceptre with­
out disguise.
W hile the matter o f waste and corruption is con ­
tinually accumulating, while the avalanche com posed o f
it is continually rolling on, that things should continue
long in their present state seems absolutely impossible.
Three states o f things contend for the ultimate result:
— D espotic monarchy undisguised by form ; Repre­
sentative dem ocracy under the form o f m on arch y ;
Representative dem ocracy under its own form.
Sect. S .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 241
In this, as in every country, the Government has
been as favourable to the interests o f the ruling few,
and thence as unfavourable to the general interests o f
the subject many, or in one word as bad, as-the sub
je c t many have endured to see it, have persuaded
themselves to suffer it to be. N o abuse has, except
under a sense o f necessity, been parted with : no re­
medy, except under the like pressure, applied. But
under the influence o f circumstances in a great de­
gree peculiar to this country, at one time or another
the ruling few have found themselves under the ne­
cessity o f sacrificing this or that abuse, o f instituting
or suffering to grow up this or that remedy.
It is thus, that under favour of the contest be­
tween W higs and Tories, the liberty o f the press, the
foundation o f all other liberties, has been suffered to
grow up and continue. But this liberty o f the press
is not the work o f institution, it is not the work o f
law ; what there is o f it that exists, exists not by means,
but in spite, o f law. It is all o f it contrary to law ;
by law there is no more liberty o f the press in En­
gland, than in Spain or M orocco. It is not the con­
stitution o f the Governm ent, it is not the force o f the
la w ; it is the weakness o f the law we have to thank
for it. It is not the W higs that we have to thank
for it, any more than the Tories. T he Tories, that
is, the supporters o f monarchy, would destroy it, sim­
ply assured o f their never being in a condition to have
need o f it. T h e W higs would with equal readiness
R
£42 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 3.
destroy it, or concur in destroying it, could they pos­
sess that same com fortable assurance. But it has
never been in their power : and to that im potence is
it that we are indebted for their zeal for the liberty
o f the press and the support they have given to the
people in the exercise o f it. W ithout this arm they
could not fight their battles: without this for a trumpet
they could not call the people to their aid.
Such corruption was not, in the head o f any original
framer o f the constitution, the work o f d esign : but
were this said without explanation, an opinion that
would naturally be supposed to be implied in it, is,
that the constitution was originally in som e one head,
the whole, or the ch ief part o f it, the w ork o f design.
T h e evil consequence o f a notion pronouncing it the
work o f design, would be, that, such a design being
infinitely beyond the w'isdom and virtue o f any man
in the present times, a planner would be looked out
for in the m ost distant age that could be found,—
thus the ancestor-wisdom fallacy would be the ruling
principle, and the search would be fruitless and end­
less. But the non-existence o f any determinate d e­
sign in the formation o f the constitution may be proved
from history. T h e H ouse o f Com m ons is the cha­
racteristic and vital principle. A n n o 1258 the man
by whom the first germ was planted, was Simon de
M ontfort, Earl o f Leicester, a foreigner and a rebel.
In this first call to the people there was no better nor
steadier design than that o f obtaining momentary sup-
Sect. 3 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 243

port for rebellion. T he practice o f seeing and hear­

ing deputies from the lower orders before money was
attempted to be taken out o f their pockets, having
thus sprung up, in the next reign Edward the First
saw his convenience in conform ing to it. From this
time till Henry the Sixth’s, instances in which laws
were enacted by kings, sometimes without consulting
com m ons, sometimes without consulting them or
lords, are not worth looking out. Henry the Sixth’s
was the first reign in which the H ouse o f C om m ons
had really a part in legislation ; till then they had no
part in the penning o f any la w s; no law was penned
till after they were dissolved : here then, so late as
about 1450 (between 1422 and 1459), the H ouse o f
Com m ons as a branch o f the legislature was an in­
novation, till then, (A n n o 1450) constitution ( i f the
House o f Com m ons be a part o f it) there was none.
Parliament ? yes : consisting o f king and lords, legis­
lators ; deputies o f com m ons, petitioners. Even o f
this aristocratical parliament the existence was pre­
carious : indigence or weakness produced its occa­
sional reproduction; more prudence and good fortune
would have sufficed for throwing it into disuse and
oblivion : like the obsolete legislative bodies o f France
and Spain, it would have been reduced to a possibi­
lity. A ll this while, and down to the time when the
re-assembling o f parliaments was imperfectly secured
by indeterminate laws occasioned by the temporary
nature o f pecuniary supplies, and the constant era-
244 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 3.
vings o f royal pau pers; had the constitution been a
tree, and both houses branches, either or both might
have been lopped off, and the tree remain a tree still.a
A fter the bloody reigns o f Henry the Eighth, and
M ary, and the too short reign o f Edward the Sixth,
com es that o f Elizabeth, who openly made a merit o f
her wish to govern without parliament: members pre­
suming to think for themselves, and to speak as they
thought, were sent to prison for repentance. After
the short parliaments produced in the times o f James
the First, and Charles the First, by profusion and di­
stress, cam e the first long parliament. W here is now
the constitution ? W here the design ?— the w isdom ?
— T h e king having tried to govern without lords or
com m ons, failed : the com m ons having extorted from
the king’s momentary despair, the act which converted
them into a perpetual aristocracy, tried to govern
without king or lords, and succeeded. In the time
o f Charles the Second, no design but the king’s de­
sign o f arbitrary government executed by the instru­
mentality o f seventeen years long parliament. As
yet, for the benefit o f the people, no feasible design,

a Between Henry the Third, and Henry the Sixth (Anno 1258 to 1422)
it is true there were frequent acts ordaining annual and even oftener
than annual parliaments**. Still these were but vague promises, made
only by the king, with two or three petty princes : the commons were
not legislators, but petitioners : never seeing till after enactment the
acts to which their assent was recorded.

* See Christian on Blackstone.

Sect. 3 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 245
but in the seat o f supreme power ; and there, concep­
tion o f any such design scarce in human nature.
T h e circumstance to which the cry o f matchless
constitution is in a great degree indebted for its per­
nicious efficiency, is— that there was a time in which
the assertion contained in it was incontrovertibly true.
T ill the American colonies threw o ff the yoke and
becam e independent states ; no political state pos­
sessed o f a constitution, equalling it or approaching it
in goodness, was any where to be found.
But from this its goodness in a comparative state,
no well-grounded argument could at any time be af­
forded against any addition that could at any time be
made to its intrinsic goodness. Persons happier than
m yself are not to be found any w h ere: in this obser­
vation, supposing it true, what reason is there for my
forbearing to make m yself as much happier than I am
at present, as I can make m yself?
This pre-eminence is therefore nothing to the pur­
pose ; for o f the pains taken in this way to hold it up
to view, the design can be no other than to prevent
it from being ever greater than it is.
But another misfortune is, that it is every day
growing less and less : so that while men keep on
vaunting this spurious substitute to positive goodness,
sooner or later it will vanish altogether.
T he supposition always is— that it is the same one
day as another. But never for two days together has
this been true. Since the revolution took place,
never, for two days together, has it been the sa m e:
246 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 3 .
every day it has been worse than the preceding : for
by every day, in some way or other, addition has
been made to the quantity o f the matter o f corrup­
tion— to that matter by which the effect o f the only
efficient cause o f good government, the influence o f
the people, has been lessened.
A pure despotism may continue in the same state
from the beginning to the end o f time : by the same
names the same things may be always signified. But
a mixt monarchy such as the English never can con ­
tinue the same : the names may continue in use for
any length o f time ; but by the same names the same
state o f things is never, for two days together, signi­
fied. T h e quantity o f the matter o f corruption in the
hands o f the monarch being every day greater and
greater; the practice in the application o f it to its
purpose, and thence the skill with which application
is made o f it on the one hand, and the patience and
indifference with which the application o f it is wit­
nessed, being every day greater and greater, the com ­
parative quantity o f the influence o f the people, and
o f the security it affords, is every day growing less and
less.
W hile the same names continue, no difference in
the things signified is ever perceived, but by the very
few who, having no interest in being themselves de­
ceived, nor in deceiving others, turn their attention to
the means o f political improvement. H ence it was,
that with a stupid indifference or acquiescence the
Rom an people sat still, while their constitution, a bad
Sect. 3 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 247

and confused mixture o f aristocracy and dem ocracy,

was converted into a pure despotism.
W ith the title o f representatives o f the people, the
people behold a set o f men meeting in the House o f
Com m ons, originating the laws by which they are
taxed, and concurring in all the other laws by which
they are oppressed. O nly in proportion as these their
nominal representatives are chosen by the free suf­
frages o f the people, and, in case o f their betraying the
people, are removable by them, can such representa­
tives be o f any use. But except in a small number
o f instances,— too small to be on any one occasion
soever capable o f producing any visible effect,—
neither are these pretended representatives ever re­
movable by them, nor have they ever been chosen by
them. If, instead o f a House o f C om m ons and a
House o f Lords, there were two Houses o f Lords,
and no House o f Com m ons, the ultimate effect would
be just the same. I f it depended on the vote o f a re­
flecting man whether, instead o f the present H ouse o f
Com m ons, there should be another H ouse o f Lords,
his vote would be for the affirmative : the existing de-
lusion would be com pletely dissipated, and the real
state o f the nation be visible to all eyes ; and a deal
o f time and trouble which is now expended in those
debates, which, for the purpose o f keeping on foot the
delusion, are still suffered, would be saved.
A s to representation, no man can even now be
found so insensible to shame, as to affirm that any
real representation has place: but though there is no
248 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ C //. 3 .

real representation, there is, it is said, a virtual one :

and with this, those who think it worth their while to
keep up the delusion, and those who are, or act and
speak as i f they were, deluded, are satisfied. I f those
who are so well satisfied with a virtual representation
which is not real, would be satisfied with a like virtual
receipt o f taxes on the one part, and a virtual pay­
ment o f taxes on the other, all would be w e ll; but
this unfortunately is not the case. T h e payment is
but too real, while the falsity o f the only ground on
which the exaction o f it is so much as pretended to
be justified, is matter o f such incontestable verity, and
such universal notoriety, that the assertion o f its ex­
istence is a cruel mockery.

4. Balance o f Power.
In general, those by whom this phrase has been
used, have not known what they meant by i t : it has
had no determinate meaning in their minds. Should
any man ever find for it any determinate meaning, it
will be this— that o f the three branches between
which, in this constitution, the aggregate powers o f
government are divided, it depends upon the will o f
each to prevent the two others from doing any thing
— from giving effect to any proposed measure. H ow ,
by such arrangement, evil should be produced, is easy
enough to s a y : for o f this state o f things one sure ef­
fect is— that whatsoever is in the judgm ent o f any one
o f them contrary to its own sinister interest, will not
be done ; on the other hand, notwithstanding the sup-
Sect. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 249

posed security, whatsoever measure is by them all

seen or supposed to be conducive to the aggregate
interest o f them all, will be carried into effect, how
plainly soever it may be contrary to the universal in­
terest o f the people. N o abuse, in the preservation
o f which thev have each an interest, will ever, so Ions
as they can help it, be removed : no improvement in
the prevention o f which any one o f them has an inter­
est, will ever be made.
T he fact is, that wherever on this occasion the word
balance is em ployed, the sentence is mere nonsense.
By the word balance in its original import, is meant
a pair o f scales. In an arithmetical account, by an
ellipsis to which, harsh as it is, custom has given its
sanction, it is em ployed to signify that sum by which
the aggregate o f the sums that stand on one side o f
an account, exceeds the aggregate o f the sums that
stand on the other side o f that same account. To
the idea which, in the sort o f occasion in question,
the word balance is em ployed to bring to view, this
word corresponds not in any degree in either o f these
senses. T o accord with the sort o f conception which,
i f any, it seems designed to convey, the word should
be— not balance, but equipoise. W hen two bodies
are so connected that whenever the one is in motion,
the other is in motion likewise, and that in such sort
that in proportion as one rises the other falls, and yet
at the moment in question no such motion has place,
the two bodies may be said to be in equipoise; one
250 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 3.
weighs exactly as much as the other. But o f the
figure o f speech here in question, the object is not to
present a clear view o f the matter, but to prevent any
such view o f it from being taken: to this purpose there­
fore, the nonsensical expression serves better than any
significant one. T h e ideas belonging to the subject
are thrown into confusion, the mind’s eye in its en­
deavours to see into it is bew ildered; and this is what
is wanted.
It is by a series o f simultaneous operations that the
business o f government is carried on : by a series o f
a ctio n s:— action ceasing, the body politic, like the
body natural, is at an end. By a balance, if any
thing, is meant a pair o f scales with a weight in each :
the scales being even, if the weights are uneven, that
in which is the heaviest weight begins to m o v e ; it
moves downward, and at the same time the other
scale with the weight in it moves upwards. A ll the
while this motion is going on no equipoise has p la ce ;
the two forces d o not balance each o th e r ; if the wish
is that they should balance each other, then into the
scale which has in it the lighter weight must be ad­
ded such other weight as shall make it exactly equal
to the heavier w eigh t: or, what com es to the same
thing, a correspondent weight taken from that scale
which has in it the heavier weight.
T he balance is now restored. T h e tw'o scales hang
e v e n ; neither o f the two forces preponderates over
the other. But with reference to the end in view, or
Sect. 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 251

which ought to be in view— the use to be derived

from the machine— what is the consequence ?— A ll
motion is at an end.
In the case in question, in s te a d 'o f two, as in a
com m on pair o f scales, there are three forces which
are supposed, or said to be, antagonizing with one
another. But were this all the difference, no con clu ­
sive objection to the metaphor could be derived from
i t ; for, from one and the same fulcrum or fixed point
you might have three scales hanging with weights in
them, if there were any use in i t : in the expression
the image would be more com plicated, but in sub­
stance it would be still the same.
Preeminently indeterminate, indistinct, and con ­
fused, on every occasion, is the language in which, to
the purpose in question, application is made to this
image o f a balance ; and on every occasion, when thus
steadily looked into, it will be found to be neither
better nor worse than so much nonsense. N othing
can it serve for the justification o f : nothing can it
serve for the explanation of.
T h e fallacy often assumes a more elaborate shape.
“ T h e constitution is com posed o f three forces, which,
antagonizing with each other, cause the business o f
government to be carried on in a course which is dif­
ferent from the course in w-hich it would be carried
on if directed solely by any one, and is that which re­
sults from the jo in t influence o f them all, each one o f
them contributing in the same proportion to the pro­
duction o f it.”
252 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Qh. 3.

Com position and resolution o f forces. This image,

though not so familiar as the other, is free from the
particular absurdity which attaches upon the o th e r :
but upon the whole the matter will not be found much
mended by it. In proportion as it is well conducted,
the business o f G overnm ent is uniformly carried on
in a direction tending to a certain end,— the greatest
happiness o f the greatest number :— in proportion as
they are well conducted, the operations o f all the
agents concerned, tend to that same end. In the
case in question, here are three forces each tending to
a certain end : take any one o f these fo r c e s ; take the
direction in which it acts; suppose that direction tend­
ing to the same exclusively legitimate end, and sup­
pose it acting alone, undisturbed, and unopposed, the
end will be obtained by i t : add now another o f these
fo rc e s ; suppose it acting exactly in the same direction,
the same end will be attained with the same exact­
ness, and attained so much the s o o n e r: and so again
if you add the third. But that second force— if
the direction in which it acts be supposed to be ever
so little different from that exclusively legitimate di­
rection in which the first force acts, the greater the
difference, the further will the aggregate or com pound
force be from attaining the exact position o f that legi­
timate end.
But in the case in question how is it with the
three forces ? So far from their all tending to that
end, the end they tend to is in each instance as
opposite to that end as possible. True it is, that
Sect, 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 253

amongst these three several forces, that sort o f relation

really has place by which the sort o f com prom ise in
question is produced : a sort o f direction which is not
exactly the same as that which would be taken on the
supposition that any one o f the three acted alone,
clear o f the influence o f both the others. But with
all this com plication, what is the direction taken by
the machine ? N o t that which carries it to the only
legitimate end, but that which carries it to an end not
very widely distant from the exact opposite one.
In plain language, here are two bodies o f men, and
one individual more powerful than the two bodies put
together— say three powers— each pursuing its own
interest, each interest a little different from each o f
the two others, and not only different from, but op p o­
site to, that o f the greatest number o f the people :—
o f the substance o f the people, each gets to itself and
devours as much as it can. Each o f then), wrere it
alone, wrould be able to get more o f that substance, and
accordingly would get more o f that substance, than
it does at present. But in its endeavours to get that
more, it would find itself counteracted by the two
oth ers: each therefore permits the two others to get
their respective shares, and thus it is that harmony is
preserved.
Balance o f forces.— A case there is in which this
metaphor, this image, may be em ployed with pro­
priety : this is the case o f international law and inter­
national relations. Supposing it attainable, what is
meant by a balance o f forces or a balance o f power is
Q54 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [6 7 /. 3 .

a 'legitimate o b je c t ;— an object, the effectuation o f

which is beneficial to all the parties interested. W hat
is that object ? It is in one word rest; — rest, the ab­
sence o f all hostile motion, together with the absence
o f all coercion exercised by one o f the parties over
an oth er: that rest which is the fruit o f mutual and
universal independence. Here then, as between na­
tion and nation, that rest which is the result o f well-
balanced forces is peace and prosperity. But on the
part o f the several official authorities and persons by
whose operations the business o f G overnm ent in its
several departments is carried on, is it prosperity that
rest has for its consequence ? N o : on the contrary,
o f universal rest, in the forces o f the body politic as
in those o f the bod y natural, the consequence is death.
N o action on the part o f the officers o f G overnm ent,
no m oney collected in their hands,— no money, no
subsistence,— no subsistence, no service,— no service,
every thing falls to pieces, anarchy takes the place o f
government, government gives place to anarchy.
T h e metaphor o f the balance, though so far from
being applicable to the purpose in question, is in it­
self plain enough : it presents an image. T h e meta­
phor o f the com position o f forces is far from being so,
— it presents not any image. T o all but the com pa­
ratively few to whom the principles o f mechanics, to­
gether with those principles o f geometry that are asso­
ciated with them, are thus far familiar, they present
no conception at a l l : the conversion o f the two tracts
described by two bodies meeting with one another at
Sect. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 255
an angle formed by the two sides o f a parallelogram
into the tract described by the diagonal o f the paral­
lelogram, is an operation never performed for any
purpose o f ordinary life, and incapable o f being per­
formed otherwise than by som e elaborate mechanism,
constructed for this and no other purpose.
W h en the metaphor here in question is employed,
the three forces in question, the three powers in ques­
tion, are, according to the description given o f them,
the power o f the monarch, the power o f the House o f
Lords, and the power o f the people. Even according
to this statement, no more than as to a third part o f
it would the interest o f the people be p rom oted : as
to two-thirds it would be sacrificed. For exam ple:—
out o f every 300/. raised upon the whole people, one
hundred would be raised for the sake and applied to
the use o f the whole p e o p le ;— the two other thirds
for the sake and to the use o f the two confederative
powers, to wit the monarch and the House o f Lords.
Notveryadvantageoustothem ajorityofthepeople,
not veryem inentlyconducivetogoodgovernm ent,
wouldbethisstateofthings; inaprodigiousdegree,
however, m oreconducivewoulditbethanisthereal
stateofthings. For, intherespectinquestion, what
isthisreal stateof things? Thepowerdescribedas
abovebythenam eofthepowerofthepeople, is, in­
steadof beingthepowerof thepeople, thepowerof
them onarchandthepowerof theHouse of Lords,
togetherwiththatoftherestofthearistocracyunder
thatothernam e.
2 56 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [CL 3.

5. Glorious Revolution.
This is a W hig’s cry, as often as it is a time to look
bold, and make the people believe that he had rather
be hanged than not stand by them. W h a t? a revo­
lution for the people ? N o : but, what is so much
better, a revolution for the W higs,— a revolution o f
1688. There is your revolution : the only one that
should ever be thought o f without horror,— a revolu­
tion for discarding kings ? N o : only a revolution for
changing them. There would be some use in changing
them, there would be something to be got by it.
W h en their forefathers o f 1688 changed James for
W illiam and M ary, W illiam got a good slice o f the
cake, and they got the rest am ong them. If, instead
o f being changed, kings were discarded, what would
the W higs get by it? They would get nothing;— they
would lose not a little: they would lose their seats,
unless they really sat and did the business they were
sent to do, and then they would lose their ease.
Thereal uses of this revolutionweretheputting
anendtothetyranny, political andreligious, of the
Stuarts:—thepolitical,governingwithoutparliament,
andforcingthepeople topaytaxeswithoutevenso
m uchastheshowof consentingtothembydeputies
chosenbythem selves:—thereligious, forcingmento
joininasystemofreligionwhichtheybelievednotto
betrue.
Butthedeficienciesoftherevolutionwere,leaving
thepovverofgoverning,andinparticularthatoftaxing,
Sect. 5.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 257

in the hands o f men whose interest it was to make the

amount o f the taxes excessive, and to exercise misrule
to a great extent in a great variety o f other ways.
So far as by security given to all, and thence, by
check put to the power o f the crown, the particular
interest o f the aristocratical leaders in the revolution
promised to be served, such security was established,
such check was applied. But where security could
not be afforded to the whole community without
trenching on the power o f the ruling few, there it was
denied. Freedom o f election, as against the despotic
power o f the monarch, was established ;— freedom o f
election, as against the disguised despotism o f the
aristocracy, Tories and W higs together, remained ex­
cluded.

s
258 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 4 .

CHAPTER IV .

Allegorical Idols.
Ad imaginationem.
Exposition .
T he use o f this fallacy is the securing to persons
in office, respect independent o f good behaviour. This
is in truth only a modification o f the fallacy o f vague
generalities, exposed in the preceding chapter. It con ­
sists in substituting for men’s proper official denom i­
nation the name o f some fictitious entity, to whom,
by customary language, and thence opinion, the attri­
bute o f excellence has been attached.
Exam ples 1. Government; for members o f the
governing body. 2. The church ; for churchmen.
3. The law ; for lawyers. T h e advantage is, obtain­
ing for them more respect than might be bestowed on
the class under its proper name.

Exposure.

I. Government.— In its proper sense, in which it

designates the set o f operations, it is true, and uni­
versally acknowledged, that every thing valuable to
man depends upon i t : security against evil in all
shapes, from external adversaries as well as domestic.
II. Law : execution o f the law.— By this it is that
men receive whatsoever protection they receive against
dom estic adversaries and disturbers o f their peace. By
Cll. 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 259
government,— law— the law,—-are therefore brought
to view the naturalest and worthiest objects o f respect
and attachment within the sphere o f a man’s obser­
vance : and for conciseness and ornament (not to
speak o f deception) the corresponding fictitious enti­
ties are feigned, and represented as constantly occu ­
pied in the performance o f the above-mentioned all­
preserving operations. A s to the real persons so o c ­
cupied, if they were presented in their proper charac­
ter, whether collectively or individually, they would
appear clothed in their real qualities, good and bad
together. But, as presented by means o f this contri­
vance, they are, decked out in all their good and ac­
ceptable qualities, divested o f all their bad and unac­
ceptable ones. U nder the name o f the god Aescula­
pius, Alexander the impostor, his self-constituted high
priest, received to his own use the homage and offer­
ings addressed to his god. Acquired, as it is believed,
comparatively within late years, this word governmeiit
has obtained a latitude o f import in a peculiar degree
adapted to the sinister purpose here in question. From
abstract, the signification has becom e, as the phrase
is, concrete. From the system, in all its parts taken
together, it has been em ployed to denote the whole
assemblage o f the individuals em ployed in the carry­
ing on o f the system : o f the individuals who, for the
time being, happen to be members o f the official esta­
blishment, and o f these more particularly, and even
exclusively, such o f them as are members o f the ad-
s 2
260 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 4.

ministrative branch o f that establishment. For the

designation either o f the branch o f the system or o f
the members that belong to it, the language had already
furnished the word Administration. But the word
Administration would not have suited the purpose o f
this fa lla cy : accordingly, by those who feel themselves
to have an interest in the turning it to account, to the
proper word Administration the too ample and thence
im proper word Government has been, probably by a
mixture o f design and accident, com m only substituted.
This impropriety o f speech being thus happily and
successfully established, the fruits o f it are gathered
in every day. Point out an abuse,— point to this or
that individual deriving a profit from the abuse, up
com es the cry, “ Y ou are an enemy to governm ent!”
then, with a little news in advance, “ Y o u r endeavour
is to destroy govern m en t! ” thus you are a Jacobin, an
anarchist, and so forth : and the greater the pains you
take for causing government to fulfill, to the greatest
perfection, the professed ends o f its institution, the
greater the pains taken to persuade those who wish,
or are content, to be deceived, that you wish and en­
deavour to destroy it.
III. Church .— This is a word particularly well
adapted to the purpose o f this fallacy: to the elements
o f confusion shared by it with government and law, it
adds divers, proper to itself. T h e significations indif­
ferently attachable to the word Church, are, 1. Place
o f w orship; 2. Inferior officers engaged by G overn-
Ch. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . ‘2 6 1

ment to take a leading part in the ceremonies o f wor­

ship a. 3. A ll the people considered as worshippers.
4. The superior officers o f Governm ent by whom the
inferior, as above, are engaged and managed. 5. The
rules and customs respecting those ceremonies.
T he use o f this fallacy to churchmen, is the giving
and securing to them a share o f coercive p ow er; their
sole public use and even original destination being the
serving the people in the capacity o f instructors,— in­
structing them in a branch o f learning, now more
thoroughly learnt without than from them b. In the
phrase “ church and state” churchmen are represented
as superior to all non-churchmen. By “ church and
kin g ” churchmen are represented as superior to the
king. Fox and N orfolk were struck o ff the list o f
privy counsellors for drinking “ T h e sovereignty o f the
peoplethe reduction would be greater were all
struck of t' who have ever drank “ Church and king.”
A ccording to Bishop W arburton’s Alliance, the people
in the character o f the church, meeting with all them­
selves in the character o f the state, agreed to invest
the expounders o f the sacred volume with a large share
o f the sovereignty. Against this system, the lawyers,
their only rivals, were estopped from pleading its se­
ditiousness in bar. In Catholic countries, the church­
men who com pose holy mother church possess one
beautiful female, by whom the people are governed in

a Articles 19, ‘20.

b ex. gr. from unoulained Methodists, &c. and Quakers.
262 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 4.

the field o f spiritual law, within which has been in­

closed as much as possible o f profane law. By P ro­
testants, on holy mother church the title o f W h ore o f
Babylon has been conferred : they recognise no holy
mother church. But in England, churchmen, a large
portion o f them, com pose two A lm a M atres Acade­
mia — kind M other Academ ies or Universities. By
ingenuity such as this, out o f “ lubberly post-masters’
b o y s ” in any number, one “ sweet M rs. Anne P a g e ”
is com posed, fit to be decked out in elements o f amia­
bility to any extent. T h e object and fruit o f this in­
genuity is the affording protection to all abuses and
imperfections attached to this part o f the official esta­
blishment. Church being so excellent a being, none
but a monster can be an enemy, afoe, to her. M on­
ster■, i. e. anarchist, Jacobin, leveller, &c. T o every
question having reform or improvement in view as to
this part o f the official establishment, the answer is
one and the same— “ Y ou are an enemy to the church.”
For instance, among others, to such questions as fol­
low : 1. W hat does this part o f the official establish­
ment do, but read or give further explanation to one
book, o f which more explanation has been given al­
ready than the longest life would suffice to hear ?
2. D oes not this suppose a people incapable o f being
taught to read ? 3. W ou ld it not be more read if
each o f them, being able to read, had it constantly by
him to read all through, than by their being at liberty
some o f them to go miles to hear small parts o f it ?—
Suppose it admitted, that by the addition o f other ser-
C/l. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 263
vices conducive to good morals and good government,
business for offices not much inferior to the existing ec­
clesiastical offices might be found,— then go on and ask,
— 1. A s to the connexion between reward and service,
d o not the same rules apply to these as to profane offices?
2. Pay unconditioned for service, is it more effectual
in producing service here than there? 3. Here more
than there , can a man serve in a place without being
there ? 4. Here, as there, is not a man’s relish for the
business proved the greater, the smaller the factitious
reward he is content to receive for doing it ? 5. The
stronger such his relish, is not his service likely to be
the better? 6. O ver and above what, if any thing, is
necessary to engage him to render the service, does
not every penny contribute to turn him aside to other
and expensive occupations, by furnishing him with
the means ? 7. In Scotland, where there is less pay,
is not residence more general, and clerical service more
abundant and efficient?
Answer,—Enemy!—and, if English-bred,—Apo­
state!
1. In Scotland, does any evil arise from the non­
existence o f bishops? 2. In the House o f Lords, any
good ? 3. Is not non-attendance there more general
than even non-residence elsewhere ? 4. In judicially
does any bishop ever attend, who is not laid hold o f
after reading prayers? 5. In legislature ever, except
where personal interest wrears the mask o f gratitude?
6. Such non-attendance, is it not felt rather as a relief
than as a grievance ?
26'4 F A L L A C IE S OF C O N F U S IO N . [C //. 4 .

Answer,— “ Enemy to the church ! ”

1. In Ireland, what is the use o f Protestant priests
to Catholics, who will neither hear nor see them, to
whom they are known but as plunderers ? 2. By such
exemption from service, is not value o f preferment in­
creased ? 3. By patrons, as by incumbents, are not
bishopricks thus estimated ? 4. Is it not there a
maxim, that service and pay should be kept in separate
hands? 5. In eyes not less religious than gracious,
is not the value o f religion inversely as the labour, as
well as directly as the profit? .
6 Is not this estimate
the root o f those scruples, by which oaths imposed to
protect Protestantism from being oppressed are em ­
ployed in securing to it the pleasure o f oppressing ?
Answer,— “ Enem y to the ch u rch ! ”
Ch. 5 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . <265

CHAPTER V.

Sweeping Classifications.
Ad judicium.

Exposition.
The deviceof thosewhoemployinthewayof
fallacy,sweepingclassifications, isthatofascribingto
anindividualobject(personorthing), anyproperties
of another, onlybecause theobject inquestionis
rankedintheclasswiththat other, bybeingdesig­
natedbythesam enam e.
In its nature, this fallacy is equally applicable to
undeserved eulogy as to undeserved censure; but it is
more frequently applied to the purpose o f censure, its
efficiency being greater in that direction.

Exposure.
Example 1 .— K ings;— Crimes o / K ings.
In the heat o f the French revolution, when the lot
o f Louis X V I . was standing between life and death,
among the means em ployed for bringing about the
catastrophe that ensued, was the publication o f a mul­
titude o f inflammatory pamphlets, one o f which had
for its title “ T h e Crimes o f K ings.”
Kings being rnen, and all men standing exposed to
those temptations by which some o f them are led into
crimes, matter could not be wanting for a book so en­
266 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 5 .
titled : and if there are som e crimes to the temptation
o f which men thus elevated stand less exposed than
the inferior orders, there are other crimes to which,
perhaps, that elevation renders them but the more
prone.
But o f the man by whom on that occasion a book
with such a title was published, the object, it is but
too probable, was to com pose out o f it this argument:
criminals ought to be pun ished; kings are criminals,
and Louis is a k in g : therefore Louis ought to be pu­
nished.

Exam ple 2 .— Catholics ; cruelties o f Catholics.

N o t long ago, in the course, and for the purpose
o f the controversy on the question whether that part
o f the community which is com posed o f persons o f
the Catholic persuasion, ought, or ought not, to be
kept any longer in a state o f degradation under the
predominant sect, a book made its appearance under
the title o f “ Cruelties o f the Catholics.”
O f any such com plete success, as the consigning in
a body to the fate in which that Catholic king was,
with so many o f his nearest connections, involved, all
such British subjects as participate with him in that
odious name, there could not be much h o p e : but
whatsoever could, by the species o f fallacy here in
question, be done towards the prom oting o f it, was
done by that publication. T h e object o f it was to
keep them still debarred from whatsoever relief re­
Ch. 5 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . Q67
mains yet to be administered to the oppressions under
which they la b ou r: either it had this object, or it had
none.
T o the com plexion o f this argument, and o f the
mind that could bring it forward, justice will not be
done, unless an adequate conception be form ed o f the
practical consequences to which, if to any thing, it
leads.
O f the Catholics o f the present and o f all future
time, whatsoever be the character, the cruelties and
other enormities committed by persons who in former
times were called by the same indefinitely com pre­
hensive name, will still remain what they were. W hat­
soever harsh treatment, therefore, this argument war­
rants the bestowing on these their namesakes at the
present time, the same harsh treatment will, from the
same argument, continue to receive the same justifi­
cation so long as there remains one individual who,
consistently with truth, is capable o f being characte­
rized by the same name.
Be they what they may, the barbarities o f the C a­
tholics o f those times had their limits : but o f this ab-
horrer o f Catholic barbarities, the barbarity has, in
respect o f the number o f intended victims, no limits
other than those o f time.
O f the man who, to put an end to the cruelties o f
kings, did what depended upon him towards extir­
pating the class o f kings, the barbarity, so far as re­
garded this object, was, comparatively speaking, con ­
fined within a very narrow range. A ll Europe would
268 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 5.

not have sufficed to supply his scaffold with a dozen

victims. But after crushing as many millions o f the
ve:min whom his piety and his charity marked out
for sacrifice, the zeal o f the abhorrer o f Catholic cru­
elties would have been in the condition o f the tiger
whom in the plains o f Southern A frica a traveller de­
picted to us as lying breathless with fatigue amidst a
flock o f antelopes.
In the same injurious device the painter o f the
crimes o f kings might, by a no less conclusive argu­
ment, have proved the necessity o f crushing the E n ­
glish form o f the Protestant religion, and consigning
to the fate o f Louis X V I . the present head o f it.
By order o f K ing James I. two men, whose misfor­
tune it was not to be able to form in relation to some
inexplicable points o f technical theology the same
conception that was entertained, or professed to be
entertained, by the royal ruler and instructor o f his
people, were burnt alivea. G eorge I V . not only bears
in com m on with James I. the two different deno­
minations, viz. Protestant o f the Church o f England,
and K ing o f G reat B ritain; but, as far as marriage
can be depended on for p roof o f filiation, is actually o f
the same blood and lineage with that royal and tri­
umphant champion o f local orthodoxy.
If, indeed, in the authentic and generally received
doctrines o f the religion in question, there were any
thing that com pelled its professors to burn or other-

B Consult Hume, Tiiulal, Harris, Henry.

6 V /. 5 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 26’9
wise to destroy or ill-treat all or any o f those that dif­
fered from them, and if by any recent overt-act an
adherence to those dissocial doctrines had appeared
in practice, in such case the adherence to such disso­
cial doctrines would afford a just ground for what­
soever measures o f security were deemed necessary to
guard other men from the effect o f such doctrines and
such practice.
But by no doctrines o f their religion are Catholics
com pelled to burn or otherwise ill-treat those who dif­
fer from them, any more than by the doctrines o f the
Church o f England James I. was com pelled to burn
those poor Anabaptists.
I f from analogy any sincere and instructive use had
on this occasion been intended to be derived from dif­
ferent countries professing the same persuasion, in
these our times a much more instructive lesson would
be afforded than any that could be derived from even
the same country at such different times.
I f in Ireland, where three-fourths or more o f the
population is com posed o f Catholics, no ill-treatment
has within the memory o f man been bestowed by C a­
tholics, as such, upon Protestants, as such ; while in
the same country so much ill-treatment has on other
accounts been bestowed by each o f these persuasions
upon the other, it is, it may be said, because the power
o f doing so with impunity is not in their hands.
But in countries where the Catholic religion is the
predominant religion, and in which at the same time,
as in our islands, barbarity on the score o f heresy was
270 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 5.
by Catholics exercised according to law, and in the
countries in which the exercise o f those barbarities
was at those times most con sp icu ou s; o f no such bar­
barities has any instance occurred for a long course o f
years a.

■ Even in Spain I have been assured, if I may depend upon an as­

surance given me by persons fully informed, and o f the most respect­
able character, no instance o f a capital execution for any offence
against religion has occurred within these 22 or 23 years.
In the capital o f Mexico, if I may believe a gentleman o f distinction
in our own country, by whom the capital o f that kingdom was lately
visited, he was by the Grand Inquisitor himself conducted into every
apartment o f the prison o f the Inquisition for the purpose o f his being
assured by ocidar demonstration o f the non-existence o f any person in
the state o f a prisoner within the walls.
Ch. 6 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 271

CHAPTER VI.
Sha?7i Distinctions.
Ad judicium.

Exposition .
O f the device here in view the nature may be ex­
plained by the follow ing direction for the use o f it.
W hen any existing state o f things has too much
evil in it to be defensible in toto, or proposals for
amendment are too plainly necessary to be rejectible
in toto, the evil and the good being nominally distin­
guished from each other by two corresponding and
opposite terms, eulogistic and dyslogistic, but in such
sort that to the nominal line o f distinction thus drawn,
there corresponds not any determinate real difference,
declare your approbation o f the good by its eulogistic
name, and thus reserve to yourself the advantage o f
opposing it without reproach by its dyslogistic name,
and so vice versa declare your disapprobation o f the
evil, &c.

Exposure.
Example 1.—Liberty and Licentiousness o f the
Press.
TakeforexamplethecaseofthePress.
Thepress(includingunderthisdenominationevery
instrument em ployedoremployable forthepurpose
ofgivingdiffusiontothem atterof humandiscourse
27Q F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 6.

by visible signs)— the press has two distinguishable

uses, viz. moral and p o litica l: moral, consisting in
whatsoever check it may be capable o f opposing to
misconduct in private l i f e : political, in whatsoever
check it may be capable o f opposing to m isconduct
in public life, that is, on the part o f public men— men
actually em ployed, or aspiring to be em ployed, in any
situation in the public serv ice: opposing, viz. by
pointing on the persons to whom such m isconduct is
respectively imputable, a portion more or less consi­
derable o f disapprobation and consequent ill-will on
the part o f the public at large— a portion more or less
considerable according to the nature o f the case.
I f to such m isconduct there be no such check at all
opposed, as that which it is the nature o f the press to
apply, the consequence is, that o f such misconduct
whatsoever is not included in the prohibitions and
eventual punishment provided by law, will range un­
controlled : in which case, so far as concerns the poli­
tical effect o f such exemption from control, the result
is power uncontroulable, arbitrary despotism, in the
hands whatsoever they are, in which the powers and
functions o f Governm ent happen to be reposed : and,
moreover, in the instance o f such m isconduct as is in­
cluded in that system o f prohibition and eventual pu­
nishment, the control will be without effect in so far
as by delay, vexation, and expense, natural or facti­
tious, the individual who would be led to call for the
application, is prevented from making such demand.
A t the same time, on the other hand, the use o f the
Ch. 6 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 273

press cannot be altogether free, but that on pretence

o f giving indication o f misconduct that has actually
taken place, supposed misconduct that never did ac­
tually take place, will to this or that individual be im­
puted.
In so far as the imputation thus conveyed happens
to be false, the effects o f the liberty in question will,
so far as concerns any individual person thus unjustly
accused, be o f the evil cast, and by whomsoever they
are understood so to be, the dyslogistic appellation
licentiousness will naturally be applied.
Here then com es the dilemma,— the two evils be­
tween which a choice must absolutely be made. Leave
to the press its perfect liberty, along with the just im­
putations, which alone are the useful ones, will com e,
and in an unlimited proportion, unjust imputations,
from which, in so far as they are unjust, evil is liable
to arise.
But to him whose wish it really is that good morals
and good government should prevail, the choice need
not be so difficult as at first sight it may seem to be.
L et all just imputations be buried in utter silence ;
w'hat you are sure o f is, that misconduct in every part
o f the field o f action, moral and political, private and
public, will range without controul— free from all that
sort o f controul which can be applied by the press,
and not by any thing else.
On the other hand, let all unjust imputations find
through this channel an unobstructed course, still, o f
the evil— the personal suffering threatened by such
T
274 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 6.

infliction— there is neither certainty, nor in general

any near approach to it O pen to accusation, that
same channel is not less open to defence a. H e there­
fore who has truth on his side, will have on his side
all that advantage which it is in the nature o f truth to
give.
That advantage, is it an inconsiderable one ?— O n
the contrary supposition is founded, whatsoever is
done in the reception and collection o f judicial evi­
dence— whatsoever is intended by the exercise o f ju ­
dicial authority— by the administration o f whatsoever
goes by the name o f justice.
M eantime, if any arrangements there be by which
the d oor may be shut against unjust imputations, with­
out incurring to an equal amount that sort o f evil
which is liable to result from the exclusion o f ju st
ones, so much the better.
13ut unless and until such arrangements shall have
been devised and carried into effect, the tendency and
effect o f all restrictions having for their object the
abridging o f the liberty o f the press, cannot but be
evil on the whole.
T o shut the door against such imputations as are
either unjust or useless, leaving it at the same time
open to such as are at the same time just and useful,
would require a precise, a determinate, a correct and
com plete definition o f the appellative, whatsoever it

a I f it by accident be not so, this constitutes a different and distinct

evil, for which is required a different and distinct remedy.
Ch. 6 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 275

be, by which the abuse— the improper use— the sup­

posed preponderantly pernicious use— o f the press is
endeavoured to be brought to view.
T o establish this definition belongs to those, and to
those alone, in whose hands the supreme power o f the
State is vested.
O f this appellative no such definition has ever yet
been given — o f this appellative no such definition can
reasonably be expected at the hands o f any person so
situated, since, by the establishing o f such definition,
their power would be curtailed, their interest preju­
diced.
W h ile this necessary definition remains unestablish­
ed, there remains with them the faculty o f giving con­
tinuance and increase to the several points o f abuse
and misgovernment by which their interest in its se­
veral shapes is advanced.
Till that definition is given, the licentiousness of
the press is every disclosure by which any abuse from
the practice o f which they draw any advantage, is
brought to light and exposed to sh am e:— whatsoever
disclosure it is, or is supposed to be, their interest to
prevent.
The liberty o f the press is such disclosure, and
such only, from which no such inconvenience is appre­
hended. v
N o such definition can be given but at their ex­
pense :— at the expense o f their arbitrary power,— o f
their power o f misconduct in the exercise o f the func­
tions o f Government,— at the expense o f their power
T 2
276 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 6 .

o f misgovernment,— o f their power o f sacrificing the

public interest to their own private interest.
Should that line have ever been drawn, then it is
that licentiousness may be opposed without opposing
lib erty : while that line remains undrawn, opposing
licentiousness is opposing liberty.
Thus much being understood, in what consists the
device here in question ? It consists in em ploying the
sham approbation given to the species o f liberty here
in question under the name o f liberty , as a mask or
cloak to the real opposition given to it under the name
of licentiousness.
It is in the licentiousness o f the press that the Judge
pretends to seethe downfall o f that Governm ent, the
corruption o f which he is upholding by inflicting on
all within his reach those punishments which by his
predecessors have been provided for the suppression o f
all disclosures, by means o f which the abuses which
he profits by might be checked.

Exam ple 2 .— Reform , temperate and intemperate.

For the designation o f the species or degree o f poli­
tical reform which, by him who speaks o f it, is meant to
be represented as excessive or pernicious, the language
affords no such single-worded appellative as in the
case o f liberty '.— the liberty o f the press. For making
the nominal and pretended real distinction, and mark­
ing out on the object o f avowed reprobation the per­
nicious or excessive species or degree, recourse must
therefore be had to epithets or adjuncts: such for in­
Ch. 6 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 277

stance as violent, intemperate, outrageous, theoretical,

speculative, and so forth.
If, with the benefit o f the subterfuge afforded by
any o f these dyslogistic epithets, a man indulges him­
self in the practice o f reprobating reform in terms thus
vague and comprehensive, and without designating by
any more particular and determinate word the species
or degree o f reform to which he means to confine his
reprobation, or the specific objections he may have to
urge, you may in general venture to conclude it is not
to any determinate species or degree that his real dis­
approbation and intended opposition confines itself,
but that it extends itself to every species or degree o f
reform which, according to his expectation, would be
efficient: that is, by which any o f the existing abuses
would find a corrective.
For, between all abuses whatsoever, there exists
that connexion,— between all persons who see each o f
them any one abuse in which an advantage results to
himself, there exists in point o f interest that close and
sufficiently understood connexion, o f which intimation
has been given already. T o no one abuse can cor­
rection be administered without endangering the exist­
ence o f every other.
If, then, with this inward determination not to
suffer, so far as depends upon himself, the adoption
o f any reform which he is able to prevent, it should
seem to him necessary or advisable to put on for a
cover, the profession or appearance o f a desire to con ­
tribute to such reform,— in pursuance o f the device or
278 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 6.
fallacy here in question he will represent that which
goes by the name o f reform as distinguishable into two
sp ecies; one o f them a fit subject for approbation, the
other for disapprobation. That which he thus pro­
fesses to have marked for approbation he will accord­
ingly, for the expression o f such approbation, charac­
terize by some adjunct o f the eulogistic cast, such as
moderate, for exam ple, or temperate, or practical, or
practicable.
T o the other o f these nominally distinct species he
will, at the same time, attach som e adjunct o f the
dyslogistic cast, such as violent, intemperate, extrava­
gant, outrageous, theoretical, speculative, and so forth.
Thus, then, in profession and to appearance, there
are in his conception o f the matter two distinct and
opposite species o f reform, to one o f which his appro­
bation, to the other his disapprobation, is attached.
But the species to which his approbation is attached
is an em pty species,— a species in which no individual
is, or is intended to be, contained.
T h e species to which his disapprobation is attached
is, on the contrary, a crow ded species, a receptacle in
which the whole contents o f the genus — o f the genus
reform — are intended to be included.
 Ch. 7 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 279

CHAPTER V IE

Popular Corruption.
Ad superbiam.

Exposition.
T i i f instrument o f deception, o f which the argu­
ment here in question is com posed, may be thus ex­
pressed :— T he source o f corruption is in the minds o f
the p e o p le ; so rank and extensively seated is that
corruption, that no political reform can ever have any
effect in removing i t a.

Exposure.
This fallacy consists in giving to the word corrup­
tion, when applied to the people, a sense altogether

a This was an argument brought forward against parliamentary re­

form by William Windham in the House o f Commons, and by him
insisted on with great emphasis. This man was among the disciples,
imitators of, and co-operators with, Edmund Burke— that Edmund
Burke with whom the subject many were the swinish multitude:—
swinish in nature, and apt therefore to receive the treatment which is
apt to be given to swine. In private life, that is, in their dealings with
those who were immediately about them, at any rate such o f them as
were o f their own class, many o f these men, many o f these haters and
calumniators o f mankind at large, are not unamiable; but, seduced by
that sinister interest which is possessed by them in common, they en­
courage in one another the antisocial affection in the case where it
operates upon the most extensive scale. If, while thus encouraging
himself in the hating and contemning the people, a man o f this cast
finds himself hated by them, the fault is surely more in him than them;
and, whatever it may happen to him to suffer from it, he has himsell
1<> thank for it.
280 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 7 -

indeterminate,— a sense in and by which all that is

distinctly expressed is the disaffection o f the speaker
as towards the persons spoken of, imputing to them
a bad moral character or cast o f mind, but without
any intimation given o f the particular nature o f it.
It is the result o f a thick confusion o f ideas, whether
sincere, or affected for the purpose.
In the case o f a parliamentary election, each elec­
tor acts as a trustee for him self and for all the other
members o f the community in the exercise o f the
branch o f political power here in question. If, by the
manner in which his vote is received from him, he is
precluded (as by ballot) from the possibility o f pro­
moting his own particular interest to the prejudice o f
the remainder o f the universal interest, the only in­
terest o f his which he can entertain a prospect o f pro­
moting by such his vote is his share o f the universal
interest: and for doing this, he sees before him no
other possible means than the contributing to place
the share o f power attached to the seat in question in
the hands o f that candidate who is likely to render
most service to the universal interest.
N ow , how inconsiderable soever may be in his eyes
this his share in the universal interest, still it will be
sufficient to turn the scale where there is nothing in
the opposite scale: and, by the supposition, the em pti­
ness o f the opposite scale has been secured in the
m ode o f election by ballot, where the secrecy thereby
endeavoured at is accom plished, as to so com plete a
certainty it may be. I f then, to continue the allusion,
Ch. 7.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 281
the value o f his share in the universal interest, in his
eyes, is such as to overcom e the love o f ease,— the
aversion to labour,— he will repair to the place, and
give his vote,— to that candidate who, in his eyes, is
likely to do most service to the universal interest: if
it be not sufficient to overcom e that resisting force, he
will then forbear to give his v o t e ; and though he will
do no good to the universal interest, he will d o no
harm to it.
Thus it is that, under an apposite system o f elec­
tion procedure, supposing them in the account o f
self-regarding prudence equal, the least benevolent set
o f men will, on this occasion, render as much service
to the universal interest as the most benevolent : the
least benevolent, if that be what is meant bv the most
co rru p t; and if that is not meant, nothing w hich is to
the purpose, nor in short any thing which is determi­
nate, is meant.
On the other hand, in so far as the system o f elec­
tion is so ordered, that by the manner in which he
gives his vote a man is enabled to prom ote his own
separate interest, what is sufficiently notorious is, that
no ordinary portion o f benevolence in the shape o f
public spirit will suffice to prevent the breach o f trust
in question from being committed.
In the case, therefore, o f the subject many, to whom
exclusively it was applied, the word corruption has no
determinate and intelligible application. But to the
class o f the ruling few, it has a perfectly intelligible
282 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Cfl. 7.

application;— application in a sense in which the truth

o f it is as notorious as the existence o f the sun at noon­
day. Pretending to be all o f them chosen by the sub­
je c t many,— chosen in fact, a very small proportion o f
them in that manner,— the rest by one another,— they
act in the character o f trustees for the subject many,
bound to support the interest o f the subject m a n y :
instead o f so doing, being with money exacted from
the subject many bribed by one another acting under
the ruling one, they act in constant breach o f such
their trust, serving in all things their own particular
and sinister interests at the expense and to the sacri­
fice o f that interest o f the subject many, which, to­
gether with that o f the ruling few, com poses and con ­
stitutes the universal interest. Corrupt, corruption,
corruptors, corruptionist, applied to conduct such as
hath been ju st described,— the meaning given to these
terms wants assuredly nothing o f being sufficiently in­
telligible.
A circumstance that renders this fallacy in a pecu­
liar degree insidious and dangerous, is a sort o f o b ­
scure reference made by it to certain religious notions:
to the doctrine o f original sin as delivered in the com ­
pendium o f Church o f England faith, termed the 39
articles.
Into that doctrine, considered in a religious point o f
view, it is not necessary on this occasion to make any
inquiry. T h e field here in question is the field o f
p o litics; and applied to this field the fallacy in ques­
C h . 7.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 283

tion seeks to lay the axe to the root o f all government.

It applies not only to this, but to all other remedies
against that preponderance o f self-regarding over so­
cial interest and affection, which is essential to man’s
existence, but which for the creation and preservation
o f political society, and thence for his well-being in it,
requires to be checked— checked by a force formed
within itself. It goes to the exclusion o f all laws, and
in particular o f all penal la w s ; for if, for remedy to
what is amiss, nothing is to be attempted by arrange­
ments which, such as those relative to the principle
and m ode o f election as applied to lulers, bring with
them no punishment,— no infliction,— how much less
should the accom plishm ent o f any such object be at­
tempted by means so expensive and afflictive as those
applied by penal laws!
By the em ploym ent given to this fallacy, the em ­
ployer o f it afforded himself a double gratification;—
he afforded an immediate gratification to his own anti­
social pride and insolence, while he afforded to his ar­
gument a promise o f efficiency by the food it supplied
to the same appetite in the breasts o f his auditors,
bound to him, as he saw them to be, by a community
o f sinister interest.
Out o f the very sink o f immorality was this fallacy
drawn : a sentiment o f hatred and contempt, o f which
not only all the man’s fellow-countrymen were the
declared, but all mankind in at least equal degree were
the naturally supposable, object. “ So bad arc they
284 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . rch. 7.
in themselves, no matter how badly they are treated :
they cannot be treated worse than they deserve : O f
a bad bargain (says the proverb) make the b e s t; o f
so bad a crew, let us make the best for ourselves : no
matter what they suffer, be it what it may, they deserve
it.” I f N ero had thought it worth his while to look
out for a justification, he could not have found a
more apt one than this : an argument which, while it
harmonized so entirely with the worst passions o f the
worst men, screened its true nature in som e measure
from the observation o f better men, by the cloud o f
confusion in which it wrapped itself.
In regard to corruption and uncorruption, or, to
speak less ambiguously, in regard to vice and virtue,
how then stands the plain and real truth ? That in
the ruling few there is most vice and corruption, be­
cause in their hands has been the power o f serving
their own private and sinister interest at the expense
o f the universal interest: and in so doing they have,
in the design and with the effect o f making instruments
o f one another for the accomplishment o f that perpe­
tual object, been the disseminators o f vice and cor­
ruption :— That in the subject many, there has been
least o f vice and corruption, because they have not
been in so large a degree partakers in that sinister in­
terest, and have thus been left free to pursue the track
pointed out to them, partly by men who have found
a personal interest in giving to their conduct a univer­
sally beneficial direction,— partly by discerning and
C h . 7.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 285
uncorrupted men, who, lovers o f their country and
mankind, have not been in the way o f having that
generous affection overpowered in their breasts by any
particular self-regarding interest.
N early akin to the cry o f popular corruption is lan­
guage com m only used to the following e ffe c t:— “ In ­
stead o f reforming others, instead o f reforming your
betters, instead o f reforming the state, the constitution,
the church, every thing that is most excellent,— let
each man reform himself— let him look at home, he
will find there enough to do, and what is in his power,
without looking abroad and aiming at what is out o f
his power, &c. & c.”
Language to this effect may at all times be heard from
anti-reformists, always, as the tone o f it manifests, ac­
companied with an air o f triumph,— the triumph o f
superior wisdom over shallow and presumptuous arro­
gance.
O ne feature which helps to distinguish it from the
cry o f popular corruption, is the tacit assumption
that, between the operation condemned and the ope­
ration recommended, incompatibility has p la ce: than
which, when once brought clearly to view, nothing, it
will be seen, can be more groundless.
Ceriain it is, that if every man’ s time and labour is
exclusively employed in the correcting o f his own
personal imperfections, no part o f it will be employed
in the endeavour to correct the imperfections and
abuses which have place in the Government, and thus
2S 6 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [CA. 7.
the mass o f those imperfections and abuses will go on,
never diminishing, but perpetually increasing with the
torments o f those who suffer by them, and the com ­
forts o f those who profit by th em : which is exactly
what is wanted.
Ch. 8 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 287

CHAPTER V III.

Observations on the seven preceding Fallacies.

I n the seven preceding fallacies, and in others o f a

similar nature, the device resorted to is uniformly the
same, and consists in entirely avoiding the question in
debate, by substituting general and ambiguous terms
in the place o f clear and particular appellatives.
In other fallacies the argument advanced is gene­
rally irrelevant, but argument o f som e kind they do
contain. In these, argument there is none; Sunt verba
et voces prcctereaque nihil.
T o find the only word that will suit his purpose,
the defender o f corruption is obliged to make an as­
cent in the scale o f generalization, to soar into the re­
gion o f vague generalities, till he com es to a word by
the extensiveness o f whose import he is enabled, so
by confounding language, to confound conceptions, as
without general and immediate fear o f detection to
defend with a chance o f success an object o f the de­
fence o f which there would under its proper and pecu­
liar name be no hope.
W hen o f two terms, viz. a generic term, and a spe­
cific term included under it, the specific term alone is
proper, i. e. the proposition into the composition o f
which it enters, true ; the generic term, if substituted
to it, is ambiguous, and o f the ambiguity, if the effect
288 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N -. [Cl/. 8.
o f it is not perceived, the consequence is error and d e­
ception.
O pposite to this aerial m ode o f contestation, is the
m ode already known and designated by the appella­
tion o f close reasoning.
In proportion as a man’s m ode o f reasoning is close,
(always supposing his intention honest,) for the desig­
nation o f every object which he has occasion to bring
to view, he em ploys in preference the most particular
expression that he can fin d : that which is best adapted
to the purpose o f bringing to view every thing which
is its object to bring to view', as clear as possible from
every thing which the purpose does not require to be
brought, and which in consequence it is his endeavour
to avoid bringing, to view.
In proportion as a man is desirous o f contributing
on every occasion to the welfare o f the community,
and at the same time skilled in the means that most
directly and certainly lead to the attainment o f that
end, he will, on the occasion o f the language em ployed
by him in the designation o f each measure, look out
for that plan o f nomenclature and classification by
which the degree and m ode o f its conduciveness or
repugnancy to that end may be the more easily and
correctly judged of.
Thus, in regard to offences— acts which on account
o f their adverseness to the general welfare are objects
m eet for discouragement,— for prohibition, and in
case o f necessity, for punishment,— not content with
the employing for the designation o f each such act in
Ch. 8 .] FAT. LAC IKS O F C O N F U S IO N . 289
particular, that m ode o f expression by which every in­
dividual act partaking o f the com m on nature indicated
by the generic term may be brought to view', to the
exclusion o f every act not partaking o f that com m on
nature, he will, for the designation o f the relation it
bears to other offences, and o f the place which it o c ­
cupies in the aggregate assemblage o f these obnoxious
acts, find for it and assign to it som e such more gene­
ral and extensive appellation as shall give intimation
o f the mode in which the wound given by it to the ge­
neral welfare is perceptible.
1. Offences against individuals other than a man’s
self, and those, assignable individuals. 2. Against a
man’s self. 3. Against this or that particular class
o f the community. 4. Against the whole community
without distinction.
In the case o f individuals; offences against person,
against reputation, against property, against condition
in life ;— and so on through the other classes above
designated a.
For the opposite reason, in proportion as without
regard to, and to the sacrifice of, the general welfare,
a man is desirous o f promoting his own personal or
any other private interest, he will on the occasion o f
the language em ployed in the designation o f each
measure look out for that plan o f nomenclature and
classification, by which the real tendency o f the mea-

a See Truitts de Legislation, to m . i. p . 1 7 2 . Classification dts delits

U
290 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Cll. 8 .
sure to which he proposes to give birth or support, shall
be as effectually masked as possible :— rendered as dif­
ficult as possible to be com prehended and ju dged of.
In the English law under the principle o f arrange­
ment which till comparatively o f late years was the
only one, and which is still the predominant one, such
were the groupes into which, by the classical denom i­
nations em ployed, they were huddled together, that by
those denominations not any the slightest intimation
was given o f the nature and m ischief o f the offences
respectively contained under them. Treasons, felo­
nies unclergyable, felonies clergyable, premunires,
misdemeanors.
By the four first o f these five denominations what is
designated, is,— not the offence itself,— but the treat­
ment given to the offender in respect o f it in the way
o f punishment: by the other denomination not so
much as even th a t:— only that the act is treated on
the footing o f an offence, and on that score made pu­
nishable : it is the miscellaneous class, the contents
o f which are com posed o f all such offences as are not
comprised under any o f the others.
T o what cause can a scheme o f arrangement so in-
com patible with clear conception and useful instruc­
tion be ascribed ?
Its creation may be traced to one so u rce :— its con ­
tinuance to another. For its creation, (such is its an­
tiquity,) the weakness o f the public intellect, presents
an adequate cause. O f treason and felony,— terms
Ch. 8.J F A L L A C IE S O F O O N F C S IO Y . 291
imported at the N orm an conquest with the rest o f the
nomenclature o f the feudal system,— the origin is lost
in the darkness o f primaeval barbarism: religion, a per­
version o f the Christian religion, gave birth after a
hard and long labour to the distinction between cler­
gyable and unclergyable. Religion by a further per­
version gave birth to premunires in the reign o f
Edward I I I .
T o the designs o f those whose interest it is that
misrule in all its shapes should be perpetuated, and
thence, that useful information, by which it might be
put to shame, and in time to flight, should as long as
possible be excluded, nothing could be more service­
able than this primaeval imbecility. U nder these de­
nominations in general, and in particular under felony,
acts o f any description are capable o f being ranked
with equal propriety, or rather with equal absence o f
impropriety : acts o f any description whatsoever, and
consequently acts altogether pure from any o f those
mischievous consequences from which alone any suf­
ficient warrant for subjecting the agents to punish­
ment, can be found ; and offences thus clear o f every
really mischievous quality, have accordingly been
created, and still continue in existence, in convenient
abundance.
By this contrivance the open tyranny o f the lawyer-
led legislator, and the covert tyranny o f the law-m ak­
ing ju dge are placed at the most perfect ease. T he
keenest eye cannot descry the felonies destined to be
created by the touch o f the sceptre upon the pattern
U2
sya F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 8.
o f the old : the liveliest imagination cannot pourtray
to itself the innoxious acts destined to be fashioned or
swollen into felonies.
Analogous to this ancient English system— corre­
spondent and analogous both as to the effect itself,
and as to its cause, is the system lately brought out
by the legislators o f France and their forced imita­
tors in G erm any. Faute , contravention, delit, crime,
classes, rising one above another in a climax o f se­
verity,— all o f them designative how indeterminately
soever, rather o f the treatment to which at the hands
o f the judge, the agent is subjected, than o f the sort o f
act for which he is subjected to that treatment, much
less o f the ground, or reason, on which (regard being
had to the quality and quantity o f m isch ief) it is
thought fit he shall be so dealt with.
Lawyer-craft in alliance writh political tyranny may
be marked out as the source o f this confusion in the
English case; lawyer-craft in subjection to political
tyranny in the French case.
In England it is the interest o f the man o f law that
the rule o f action should be, and continue, in a state
o f as general uncertainty and incognoscibility as pos­
sible : that on condition o f pronouncing on each o c­
casion a portion o f the flash language adapted to that
purpose he may in his state o f law-adviser and advo­
cate, be master o f men’s purses; in his state o f judge,—
o f purse, reputation, condition in life, and life itself,
to as com plete a degree and with as little odium and
suspicion as possible. This is the state o f things ;
Ch. 8 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N -. 29S

which it always lias been, and will be his interest to

perpetuate: and this is the state o f things which hi­
therto it has been in his power to continue, and which
accordingly does to this day continue in existence.
In France where the man o f law is not the ally o f
the politician, but his slave, that which it is not the
interest o f the politician to keep out o f the view o f the
subject is, what the law is ; — that which it is his inter­
est to keep (nor even that in all parts) out o f the view
o f the subject, is,— what it is for the interest o f the
subject that the law should be ; — what, in a word, the
law ought to be.
Having brought the rule o f action within a compass,
the narrowness o f which, in respect o f the quantity o f
words, has never, regard being had to the amplitude
o f the matter, yet been equalled,— the tyrant o f France
has by this one act o f charity displayed a quantity o f
merit, ample enough o f itself to form a covering to no
inconsiderable a portion o f his sins.
But the exemplifications o f vague generalities af­
forded by these systems o f classification are sufficient­
ly striking. T o save the authors o f the systems from
ranking any one o f the offences in question under a
denomination which would be manifestly inapplicable
to it, and from the discredit which would attach to
them from such a source,— ascending to a superior
height in the logical scale,— in the scale o f genera
and species,— they provide a set o f denominations so
boundless in their extent, as to be capable without
impropriety o f including any objects whatsoever on
294 F A L L A C IE S 9 1 ' C O N F U S IO N . [ C/l. 8 .

which it might be found convenient to stamp the fac­

titious quality desired. Noxiousness to other indivi­
duals in this or that way, noxiousness to a person
himself in this or that way— noxiousness to a particu-
cular class o f the community in this or that way—
noxiousness to the whole community in this or that
way,— these are qualities which it is not in the power
o f despotism to com m unicate to any act o f any s o r t ;
but to cause such persons as it is performed by, to
be punished with such or such a punishment, these
are effects which, be the sort o f act what it may, it is
but too easy for supreme power in whatsoever hands
reposed, to anpex to it.
H ere then are so many instances where the turn o f
the man in power not being capable o f being served,
or at least so well served, by giving to an object that
which is at once its most particular and m ost proper
name, a name o f more general and extensive im port
is em ployed for the purpose o f favouring that d ecep ­
tion, which by the designating o f it by such its proper
name, would have been dissipated, and thus giving to
an exercise o f power, which, if rightly denominated,
would have been seen to be im proper and mischiev­
ous, the chance o f not appearing in such its true light.
Ch. 9 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 2 95

CHAPTER IX.

A nti-rational Fallacies.
Ad verecundiam.

Exposition.

W hen reason is found or supposed to be in o p ­

position to a man’s interests, his study will naturally
be to render the faculty itself and whatsoever issues
from it an object o f hatred and contempt.
So long as the Governm ent contains in it any sort
o f abuse from which the M embers o f the Government
or any o f them, derive in any shape a profit, and in
the continuance o f which, they possess a proportion-
able interest, reason being against them, persons so
circumstanced will be in so far against reason.
Instead o f reason we might here say th o u g h t :
Reason is a word that implies not merely the use o f
the faculty o f thinking, but the right use o f it. But
sooner than fail o f its object, the sarcasm and other
figures o f speech em ployed upon the occasion are di­
rected not merely against reason, but against thought
itself: as if there were something in the faculty o f
thought that rendered the exercise o f it incompatible
with useful and successful practice.
1. Sometimes a plan the adoption o f which would
not suit the official person’s interest, is without more
ado pronounced a speculative one : and by this obser­
vation all need o f rational and deliberate discussion,—
296 FA I.LA Cl KS OF CONFUSION'. [Ch. 9 .
such as objection to the end proposed, as not a fit
one,— objection to the means em ployed as not being
fit means,— is considered as being superseded.
T o the word speculative, for further enforcement,
are added or substituted, in a number more or less
considerable, other terms, as nearly synonymous to
it and to one another, as it is usual forwords called
synonymous to be : viz. theoretical, visionary , chime­
rical, romantic, utopian.
2. Sometimes a distinction is taken, and thereupon
a concession made. T he plan is good in theory , but
it would be had in practice , i. e. its being good in
theory does not hinder its being bad in practice.
3. Sometimes, as if in consequence o f a further
progress made in the art o f irrationality, the plan is
pronounced to be too good to be practicable : and its
being so good as it is, is thus represented as the very
cause o f its being bad in practice.
4. In short, such is the perfection at which this art
is at length arrived, that the very circumstance o f a
plan's being susceptible o f the appellation o f a plan ,
has been gravely stated as a circumstance sufficient
to warrant its being rejected : rejected, if not with ha­
tred, at any rate with a sort o f accompaniment, which
to the million, is com m only felt still more galling—
with contempt.
“ Looking at the House o f Com m ons with these
views (says a writer on the subject o f Parliamentary
R eform ,) my object would be to find out its chief de­
lects, and to attempt the remedy o f these one by one.
Ch. 9 - ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 297
T o propose nosystem , no great project, nothing which
pretended even to the name o f a plan, but to intro­
duce in a temperate and conciliatory manner * * * *
one or two separate bills a.”
In this strain were these men proposed to be
addressed A nno 1810, by M r. Brougham : in this
strain were they addressed A nno 1819 by Sir James
M ackintosh, in moving for a committee on the penal
laws. T o give a man any chance o f doing any thing
with them, in this same way they have ever been ad­
dressed, and must ever be addressed, till by radical
reform (for it cannot be by any thing less) the house
shall have been purged o f a class o f men o f whom the
most com plete inaptitude in respect o f every element
o f appropriate aptitude, is an essential characteristic.
In the scale o f appropriate probity, in the scale o f
appropriate intellectual aptitude, to find their level, a
man must descend below that o f the very dregs o f the
people. O h what a picture is here drawn o f them,
and by so experienced a hand ! H ow cutting, yet
how unquestionably just, the perhaps unintended, per­
haps intended satire! T o avoid awakening the real
terrors o f some, the sham terrors o f others, all con ­
sistency, all comprehensive acquaintance with the
field o f action must be abjured. W hen idolatry in
all its shapes shall have becom e extinct, and the words

“ This was Brougham: the time about June 1810. Reference is

made to the Government periodical called the Satirist (by Manners),
June 1810, No. 33. p. 570. But that wretched performance is now’
pretty well forgotten.
298 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 9-

wise ancestors no longer an instrument o f deception,

but a by-w ord, with what scorn will not ancestors such
as these be looked back upon by their posterity ?
Intimate as is the connexion between all these con­
trivances, there is however enough o f distinction to
render them, in this or that point o f view, susceptible
o f a separate exposure.

Exposure.
Sect. 1. Abuse of' the words Speculative, Theoreti­
cal, & c.

O n the occasion o f these epithets, and the propo­

sitions o f which they constitute the leading terms,
what will be held up to view in the character o f a fal­
lacy, is, not the use o f them, but merely the abuse.
It may be placed to the account o f abuse, as often
as in a serious speech, without the allegation o f any
specific objection, an epithet o f this class bestow­
ed upon the measure, is exhibited as containing the
expression o f a sufficient reason for rejecting it, by
putting upon it a mark o f reprobation thus contem p­
tuous.
W h a t is altogether out o f dispute, is, that many
and many a measure has been proposed, to which this
class o f epithets, or som e o f them, would be justly
applicable. But a man’s conceptions must be woe­
fully indistinct, or his vocabulary deplorably scanty,
if, be the bad measure what it may, he cannot con ­
trive to give intimation o f what, in his view, there is
bad in it, without em ploying an epithet, the effect o f
Sect. 1 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO X . 2 99
which is to hold out, as an object o f contempt, the
very act o f thinking, the operation o f thought itself.
T h e fear o f theory has, to a certain extent, its foun­
dation in reason. There is a general propensity in
those who adopt this or that theory to push it too far:
i. e. to set up a general proposition which is not true
until certain exceptions have been taken out o f it,— to
set it up without any o f those exceptions,— to pursue
it without regard to the exceptions,— and thence, pro
tantOj in cases in which it is false, fallacious, repug­
nant to reason and utility.
T h e propensity thus to push theory too far is ac­
knowledged to be almost universal.
But what is the just inference ? N o t that theoreti­
cal propositions, i. e. propositions o f considerable ex­
tent, should from such their extent be concluded to be
false in toto: but only that in the particular case, in­
quiry should be made, whether, supposing the propo­
sition to be in the character o f a general rule gene­
rally true, there may not be a case in which, to reduce
it within the limits o f truth, reason and utility, an ex­
ception ought to be taken out o f it.
Every man’s knowledge is, in its extent, propor­
tioned to the extent as well as number o f those gene­
ral propositions, o f the truth o f which, they being true,
he has the persuasion in his own m in d: in other words,
the extent o f these his theories comprises the extent
o f his knowledge.
If, indeed, his theories are false, then, in propor­
300 FALLACI ES O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 9 -

tion as they are extensive, he is the more deeply

steeped in ignorance and error.
But from the mere circumstance o f its being theo­
retical, by these enemies to knowledge its falsehood is
inferred as if it were a necessary consequence, with
as much reason as if from a man’s speaking it were
inferred as a necessary consequence, that what he
speaks must be false.
O ne would think, that in thinking there were som e­
thing wicked or else unw ise; every body feels or fan­
cies a necessity o f disclaiming it. “ I am not given
to speculation.” “ I am no friend to theories.” Spe­
culation, theory, what is it but thinking? Can a man
disclaim speculation, can he disclaim theory, without
disclaiming thought ? I f they d o not mean thought,
they mean n oth in g; for unless it be a little more
thought than ordinary, theory, speculation, mean n o­
thing.
T o escape from the imputation o f meditating de­
struction to mankind, a man must disclaim every
thing that puts him above the level o f a beast.
A plan proposes a wrong end ; or the end being
right, proposes a wrong set o f means. I f this be what
a man means, can he not say so ? W ould not what he
says have somewhat more meaning— be a little more
consistent with the principles o f com m on sense—
with com m on honesty— than saying o f it that it is
theoretical— that it is speculative ?
Sec/. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 301

Sect. 2. Utopian.
A s to the epithet utopian, the case in which it is
rightly applied seems to be that in which, in the event
o f the adoption o f the proposed plan, felicitous effects
are represented as about to take place, no causes ad­
equate to the production o f such effects being to be
found in it.
In Sir Thom as M ore’s romance, from which the
epithet utopian has its origin, a felicitous state o f
things is announced by the very name.
Considering the age in which he lived, even without
adverting to the sort o f religion o f which he was so
honest and pertinacious an adherent, we may be suffi­
ciently assured that the institutions spoken o f by him
as having been productive o f this effect, had, taking
them altogether, very little tendency to produce it.
Such, in general, is likely enough to be the case with
the portion o f political felicity exhibited in any other
rom an ce: and thus far the epithet romantic is likely
enough, though not certain, to be found well applied
to any political plan, in the conveyance o f which, to
the notice o f the public, any such vehicle is em ployed.
Causes and effects being alike at the command o f this
species o f poet in prose, the honour o f any felicitous
event is as easily ascribed to uninfluencing circum­
stances, or even to obstacles, as to causes.
I f the established state o f things, including the
abuse which in so many shapes is interwoven in it,
were any thing like what the undiscriminating de­
309 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [C /l. 9 -

fenders o f it represent it as being, viz. a system o f per­

fection,— in this actually established system, (real in
so far as abuse and imperfection are ascribed to it,
imaginary in so far as exem ption from such abuse and
im perfection is ascribed to it,) might indeed be seen
an utopia— a felicitous result, flowing from causes not
having it in their nature to be productive o f any such
effects, but having it in their nature to be productive
o f contrary effects.
In every department o f Governm ent, say the advo­
cates o f reform, abuses and imperfections are abun­
dant ; because the hands in which the powers o f G o ­
vernment are reposed, have, partly by their own arti­
fice, partly by the supineness o f the people, been
placed in such circumstances, that abuse in every
shape is a source o f profit to themselves.
U nder these circumstances, if any expectation were
really entertained, that by these hands any conside­
rable defalcation from the aggregate mass o f abuse
will ever be made,— to no other expectation can the
charge o f utopianism be with more propriety applied :
effects so produced would be produced against the
force o f irresistible obstacles, as well as absolutely
without a cause.
But in that same system there has all along been
preserved, by the many, a faculty, and that a faculty
every now and then, though much too seldom and
too weakly, exercised, o f creating, and without very
considerable inconvenience or danger to themselves,
uneasiness, more or less considerable, to these their
Sect. S.] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 303

rulers. In the state o f things thus described, there is

nothing o f utopianism ; for it is matter o f universally
notorious f a c t ; and in this faculty on the part o f the
many o f creating uneasiness in the bosoms o f the few,
— in this faculty on the part o f those who suffer by
the abuses o f creating uneasiness in the bosoms o f
those who profit by them,— in this invaluable, and,
except in Am erica, unexampled faculty,— rests the
only chance, the only source o f hope.

Sect. 3. Good in theory , bad in practice .

Even in the present stage o f civilization, it is almost
a rare case, that by reason, looking to the end in view,
matters o f government are determined : and the cause
is, the existence o f so many institutions, which being
adverse to the only proper end, the greatest happiness
o f the greatest number, are maintained, because favour­
able to the interests o f the ruling few. Custom, blind
custom, established under the dominion o f that sepa­
rate and sinister interest, is the guide by which most
operations have been conducted. In so far as the
interest o f the many has appeared to the governing
few to coincide with their own separate interests, in
so far it has been pursued, in so far as it has ap­
peared incompatible with those interests, it has been
neglected or opposed.
O ne consequence is, that when by accident a plan
com es upon the carpet, in the formation o f which the
only legitimate end o f G overnm ent has been looked
304 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [C/i. 9 -

to, if the beaten track o f custom has in ever so slight

a degree been departed from , the practical man, the
man o f routine, knows not what to make o f i t ; its
goodness, if it be good, its badness, if it be bad, are
alike removed out o f the sphere o f his observance.
I f it be conducive to the end, it is more than he can
see, for the end is what he has not been used to look
to.
In the consideration o f any plan, what he has not
been used to, is to consider what, in the department
in question, is the proper end o f every plan that can
be presented, and whether the particular plan in ques­
tion be conducive to that end. W hat he has been
used to, is, to consider whether in the matter and form
it be like what he has practised. I f in a certain de­
gree unlike, it throws him into a sort o f perplexity. I f
the plan be a good one, and in the form o f reasons,
the points o f advantage whereby it is conducive to the
proper end in view have been presented, and in such
sort that he sees not any, the existence o f which he
feels him self able to contest, nor at the same time any
disadvantages which he can present in the character o f
preponderant ones, he will be afraid so far to com m it
him self as to pronounce it a bad one. By way o f com ­
pounding the matter, and to show his candour, if he be
on good terms with you, he will perhaps admit it to be
good, viz. in theory. But this concession made, it be­
ing admitted and undeniable that theory is one thing
and practice another, he will take a distinction, and, to
Sect. 3.] tA llacjes of c o n fu sio n . 305

pay him for his concession, propose to you to admit

that it is not the thing for practice :— in a word, that
it is good in theory, bad in practice.
That there have been plans in abundance which
have been found bad in practice, and many others
which would if tried have proved bad in practice, is
altogether out o f dispute.
That o f each description there have been many
which in theory have appeared, and with reference to
the judgm ent o f some o f the persons by whom they
have been considered, have been found plausible, is
likewise out o f dispute.
W h at is here meant to be denied, is, that a plan
which is essentially incapable o f proving good in
practice can with propriety be said to be good in
theory.
W henever out o f a number o f circumstances, the
concurrence o f all o f which is necessary to the success
o f a plan, any one is, in the calculation o f the effects
expected from it, omitted, any such plan will in pro­
portion to the importance o f the omitted circumstance
be defective in p ractice; and i f such be the degree o f
importance, bad; upon the whole, a bad one ; the dis­
advantageous effects o f the plan not finding a com ­
pensation in the advantageous ones.
W hen the plan for the illumination o f the streets
by gas-lights was laid before the public by the person
w ho considered himself or gave himself out for the in­
ventor, one e f the items in the article o f expense—
one capital article, viz. that o f the pipes, was omitted
x
306 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Cfl. 9 -
O n the supposition that the pipes might all o f them
have been had for nothing, and that in the plan so ex­
hibited no other such imperfections were to be found,
the plan would, to the persons engaged in the under­
taking, be not merely advantageous, but advantageous
in the prodigious degree therein represented. If, on
the contrary, the expense o f this omitted article were
such as to more than countervail the alleged balance
on the side o f profit, then would the plan, with refe­
rence to the undertakers, prove disadvantageous upon
the whole, and in one word a bad one.
But whatever it prove to be in practice, in theory,
having so important an omission in it, it cannot but
be pronounced a bad one ; for every plan in which, in
the account o f advantages and disadvantages, o f profit
and losses, any item is on the side o f disadvantage or
loss omitted, is, in proportion to the magnitude o f
such loss, a bad one, howf advantageous soever upon
trial the result may prove upon the whole.
In the line o f political econom y, m ost plans that
have been adopted and em ployed by government for
enriching the community by money given to indivi­
duals, have been bad in practice.
But if they have been bad in practice, it is because
they have been bad in theory. In the account taken
o f profit and loss, som e circumstance that has beer
necessary to render the plan in question advantageous
upon the whole, has been omitted.
This circumstance has been, the advantage which;
from the m oney em ployed, would have been reaped;
S ect, 4 .] FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. 307

either in the way o f addition to capital by other means,

or in the way o f com fort by expenditure.
O f the matter o f wealth, portions that by these ope­
rations were but transferred from hand to hand, and
com m only with a loss by the way, were erroneously
considered as having been created.

Sect. 4. Too good to be practicable.

There is one case in which, in a certain sense, a
plan may be said to be too good to be practicable,
and that case a very comprehensive one. It is where,
without adequate inducement in the shape o f personal
interest, the plan requires for its accomplishment that
som e individual or class o f individuals shall have made
a sacrifice o f his or their personal interest to the in­
terest o f the whole. W here it is only on the part o f
some one individual or very small number o f indivi­
duals that a sacrifice o f this sort is reckoned upon, the
success o f the plan is not altogether without the sphere
o f moral possibility; because instances o f a disposi­
tion o f this sort, though extremely rare, are not alto­
gether without exam p le: by religious hopes and fears,
by philanthropy, by secret ambition, such miracles
have now and then been wrought. But when it is on
the part o f a body o f men or a multitude o f individuals
taken at random that any such sacrifice is reckoned
upon, then it is that in speaking o f the plan the term
utopian may without impropriety be applied.
In this case, if, neglecting the question o f practica-
X 2
308 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 9 -

bility, on the mere consideration o f the nature o f the

results the production o f which is aimed at by the
plan, it can with propriety be termed a good one, the
observation, too good to be practicable, cannot justly
be accused o f want o f truth.
But it is not any such intimation that, by those in
whose mouths this observation is most in use, is
meant to be conveyed. T h e description o f persons
by whom chiefly, if not exclusively, it is em ployed,
are those w ho, regarding a plan as being adverse to
their interests, and not finding it on the ground o f
general utility exposed to any preponderant objection,
have recourse to this objection in the character o f an
instrument o f contempt, in the view o f preventing
those from looking into it who might otherwise have
been disposed.
I t is by the fear o f seeing it practised that they are
drawn to speak o f it as impracticable.
In the character o f opposers o f a plan, o f the good ­
ness o f which (that is, o f its conduciveness to the
welfare o f the whole community taken together) they
are themselves persuaded, it cannot be their intention
or wrish to exhibit them selves: it is not, therefore, in
any such property o f the plan that it can be their aim
to engage those on whom it depends, to look for the
cause o f the impracticability which they impute to it.
U nder favour o f such observation as may have been
made o f the instances in w’hich plans,— the goodness
o f which, supposing them carried into effect, has been
beyond dispute,— have failed o f success, what they aim
Sect. 4 .] FA L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. 309

at is the producing, in superficial minds, the idea o f a

universal and natural connexion between extraordinary
and extensive goodness and impracticability : that so
often as upon the face o f any plan the marks o f ex­
traordinary and extensive utility are discernible, these
marks may, as it were by a signal, have the effect o f
inducing a man to turn aside from the plan, and,
whether in the way o f neglect and non-support, or in
the way o f active opposition, to bestow’ on it the same
treatment that he w'ould be justified in bestowing upon
a bad one.
“ U pon the face o f it, it carries that air o f plausi­
bility that, if you were not upon your guard, might
engage you to bestow more or less o f your attention
upon it. But were you to take the trouble, you would
find that, as it is with all these plans that promise so
much, practicability would at last be wanting to it.
T o save yourself from this trouble, the wisest course
you can take, is, therefore, to put the plan aside, and
think no more about the matter.”
There is a particular sort o f grin— a grin o f mali­
cious triumph— a grin made up o f malicious triumph
with a dash o f concealed foreboding and trepidation at
the bottom o f it— that forms a natural accompaniment
o f this fallacy, when vented by any o f the sw'orn defend­
ers o f abu se: and M ilton, instead o f cramming all his
angels o f the African com plexion into the divinity
school disputing about predestination, should have
em ployed part o f them at least in practising this grin,
ivith the corresponding fallacy, before a looking-glass.
310 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 9-
Proportioned to the difficulty o f persuading men to
regard a plan as otherwise than beneficial, supposing
it carried into effect, is the need o f all such arguments
or phrases as present a chance o f persuading them to
regard it as impracticable : and according to the sort
o f man you have to deal with, you accom pany it with
the grin o f triumph, or with the grimace o f regret and
lamentation.
There is a class o f predictions, the tendency and
object o f which is to contribute to their own accom ­
plishment ; and in the number o f them is the predic­
tion involved in this fallacy. W hen objections on the
ground o f utility are hopeless or have been made the
most of, objections on the ground o f practicability
still present an additional resource: by these, men
who, being convinced o f the utility o f the plan, are in
ever so great a degree well-wishers to it may be turned
aside from i t : and the best garb to assume for the
purpose o f the attempt, is that o f one who is a well-
wisher likewise.
T ill the examples are before his eyes, it will not
be easy for a man who has not him self made the ob ­
servation to conceive to what a pitch o f audacity p o­
litical improbity is capable o f soaring: how com pletely,
when an opportunity that seems favourable presents
itself, the mask will sometimes be taken o f f :— what
thorough confidence there is in the com plicity, or in
the imbecility o f hearers or readers.
I f to say a good thing is a good thing is nugatory,
and as such, foolish language, what shall we say o f
Sect.b.] FA L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. Sll
him who stands up boldly and says, to aim at doing
good is a bad thing?
In so many words, it may be questioned whether
any such thing has yet been said : but what is abso­
lutely next to it, scarce distinguishable from it, and in
substance the same thing, has actually been said over
and over. T o aim at perfection has been pronounced
to be utter folly or wickedness ; and both or either at
the extreme. T o say that man (the species called
man) has so much as a tendency to better himself,
and that the range o f such tendency has no certain
limits,— this has been— speculation: propositions or
observations to that effect have also been set down as a
mark o f wickedness. “ By Priestley an observation to
this effect has somewhere or other been made. By
G odw in an observation to this effect has somewhere
or other been made. By Condorcet, or some other
Frenchman or Frenchmen o f the class o f those who,
for the purpose o f holding them up to execration,
are called philosophers, an observation to this effect
has some where or other been made.
“ By this mark, with or without the aid o f any other,
these men, together with other men o f the same leaven,
have proved themselves the enemies o f mankind: and
you too, whosoever you are, if you dare to maintain
the same heresy, you also are an enemy to mankind.”
In vain would you reply to him, i f he be an official
man, Sir, M r. Chalmers who, like yourself, was an offi­
cial man, has maintained this tendency, and written a
312 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [C/i. 9-
book which, from beginning to end, is a demonstration
o f it as clear and undeniable as Euclid’s : and M r. Chal­
mers is neither a madman nor an enemy to mankind.
In vain would you reply to him, if he call him self
a Christian, Sir, Jesus said to his disciples, and to you
i f you would be one o f them, “ Be ye perfect, even as
our Father in heaven is p e r f e c t a n d in so doing has
not only assumed the tendency, but com m anded it to
be encouraged and carried to its utmost possible length.
By observations such as these, may the sort o f man
in question be perhaps for a mom ent silenced ; but
neither by this, nor any thing, nor any body, though
one rose from the dead, would he be converted.
T o various descriptions o f persons over and above
those who are in the secret, a fallacy o f this class is in
a singular degree acceptable and conciliating.
1. T o all idle m e n ; all haters o f business ; a con­
siderable class, where a share in the sovereignty o f an
empire such as ours is parcelled out into portions
which are private property ;— where electors’ votes
are free in appearance only, and scarcely in appear­
ance, and where the votes that are sold for money are
in fact am ong
O the freest that are to be found.
2. A ll ignorant m e n : all who for want o f due and
appropriate instruction, feeling themselves incapable
o f judging on any question on its own merits, look out
ivith eagerness for such com m odious and reputation­
saving grounds.
3. All dull and stupid m e n : in whose instance, in-
Sect. 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 313
formation— reading— such as has fallen to their lot,
has not yet been sufficient to enable them to deter­
mine a question on its own merits.
W h en a train o f argument— when but a single ar­
gument is presented that requires thought,— an opera­
tion so troublesome and laborious as that which goes
by the name o f thought, — an expression o f scorn level­
led at the author, or supposed author, o f this trouble,
as far as it goes, a just, howsoever scanty and inade­
quate, punishment for the disturbance attempted to
be given to honourable repose.
U nder the name o f theory, & c .: what is it that to
men o f this description is so odious? what but refe­
rence to the end— to that which on that part o f the
field o f thought and action which is in question, is,
or at any rate ought to be, the end pursued— and
thence, in every case, the end in view ? (how often
must it, and ever in vain be repeated ?) the greatest
happiness o f the greatest number. But were refe­
rence made to this end— to this inflexible standard
—r-every thing almost they d o— every thing almost
they support— would stand condemned. W hat then
shall be the standard ? Custom -«-Custom : Custom
being their own practice, blindly imitating the prac­
tice o f men in the same situations, put in motion
and governed by the same sinister interests.
314 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 10.

CHAPTER X.

Paradoxical Assertion.
Ad judicium.

1. D angerousness o f the Principle o f Utility .— 2. Use­

lessness o f Classification.— 3. Mischievousness o f
Simplification.— 4. Disinterestedness, a mark o f
profligacy.
Exposition.
W hen o f any measure, practice or principle, the
utility is too far above dispute to be capable o f being
impeached by reasoning, a rhetorician to whose inter­
ests or views it has appeared adverse, has in some
instances in a sort o f fit o f desperation made this at­
tack upon i t ; taking up the word or set o f words
com m only em ployed for the designation o f it, with­
out any such attempt as that o f opposing it by any
specific objection, he has assailed it with som e vehe­
ment note o f reprobation or strain o f invective, in
which the mischievousness or folly o f it has been
taken for granted as if it were undeniable.
Exposure is a sort o f process o f which the device
in question is scarce susceptible : but for the purpose
o f exposition an example or two may have its use.
U tility, method, simplification, reason, sincerity.
By a person unexperienced in the arts o f political and
verbal warfare, it would not readily be imagined, that
Sect. 1 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 315
entities like these should, by any man laying claim to
the distinguishing attribute o f man, be pointed out as
fit objects o f hatred and con tem p t: yet so it is.
1. A s to utility. Already has been named “ a great
character in a high situation” by whom the principle
o f utility was pronounced a dangerous o n ea. A book

a Lord Loughborough, when Attorney-General *. The observation

made by him in the year 1789, was reported to me presently after it was
made. Not till many years after—some time, as I perceive, after what is
in the text was written, was the true import perceived by me. The charac­
ter in which at the time it presented itself to my view, was that o f a gross
absurdity: its true character was that o f deep sagacity. By the prin­
ciple o f utility, what I understood, was— that principle which states
as the only justifiable end o f Government, the greatest happiness o f
the greatest number o f the members o f the community. At that time
I still continued to take for granted ( such was my simplicity) that this
was the end generally aimed at, though often so widely missed By
those, whose desire it was that on each occasion that end should be
attained, it could not without self-contradiction be supposed that the
endeavour to attain it could seem dangerous. But Loughborough was
too well acquainted with the state o f Government in this country (not
to speak o f other countries) not to know that it is the greatest happi­
ness o f the ruling few, and not that o f the greatest number, that is
the end pursued on each occasion by the ruling few. What then was
the interest which, on that occasion, as on all occasions, that member
o f the ruling few, had at heart, and thence preferably if not exclusive­
ly, in mind P It was, o f course, the interest o f the ruling few. But
the interest o f the ruling few is, on the greatest part o f the field o f Go­
vernment, in a state o f continued opposition to that o f the greatest
number: accordingly a principle, which, in case o f competition, and
to the extent o f the competition, called for sacrifices to be made o f the
interests o f the class to which he belonged, and which alone was the
object o f his solicitude, could not but, in his eyes, be a dangerous one.

* Note written August 21,1819:— “ Great characters in high situa­

tions,” a phrase employed about December 1809 by minister Percival,
then Attorney-General, in calling down the vengeance o f the law on
1 forget what alleged libeller, for using the appellation of “ the Doctor”
316 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [C h. 10.

might be mentioned, and one o f no small celebrity a,

in which the same principle— the principle o f utility
— has been pronounced useless:— the principle itself,
and consequently every investigation in which to the
purposes o f legislation or com m on life, application is
endeavoured to be made o f it.
W h at must be acknowledged is, that to make a right
and effectual use o f it, requires the concurrence o f
those requisites which are not always found in com ­
pany: invention, discernment, patience, sincerity; each
in no inconsiderable degree; w hile,for the pronouncing
o f decisions without consulting it, decisions in the
ipse dixit style, nothing is required but boldness.
N o t that, on any occasion on which it promises to
suit his purpose, and he feels in him self a capacity to
apply it to that purpose, the most decided scorner o f
it, ever fails to make use o f it. It is only when, if
consulted, its decisions would be against him, or he
feels him self awkward at consulting it, that he ever
takes upon him to do without i t : and to prove any
thing to be right or wrong, thinks it sufficient for him­
self to say so.

2 .— Classification a bad thing.— Good Method a bad

thing.
O n the same occasion in which a convenience was
found in pronouncing the principle o f utility useless,

in speaking of Lord Sidmouth. By the picture it seemed to give of

the character of the prosecution and of the persons who bore a part in
it, it made a lasting impression on my mind,
* The Edinburgh Review.
Sect. 2 .] F A LLA C IE S OF CONFUSION. 317

the like convenience was found in professing the like

contempt for that quality in discourse which goes by
the name o f good method, or, simply, method, and
that sort o f operation called good classification, or,
simply, classification.
W hen the subject a man undertakes to write upon,
is to a certain degree extensive, as, for example, the
science o f morals, or that o f legislation, whether what
a man says be clear or not, o f falsehood, will depend
upon the goodness o f the method in which the parts
o f it have been cast. 1. I f for example, snow and
charcoal were both classed under the same name and
neither o f them had any other, i f the question were
asked, whether the thing known by that name were
white or black, no inconsiderable difficulty would be
found in answering it either by a yes or no. 2. And
i f under favour o f the identity o f denomination, sugar
o f lead were to be used in a pudding instead o f any
o f the sort o f sugar usually applied to that purpose,
practical inconveniences analogous to those which
were experienced by Thorn bury from eating pancake*,
might probably be found to result from the mistake
thus exemplified in the tactical branch o f the art or
science o f life, call it v/hich you please.
In the course o f an attempt m adeb to cast the

■ In the pancake in question, which, at a table at the Cape o f Good

Hope, was served up to a company o f which Thornbury, better known
by his travels in Japan, was one, white lead was employed instead o f
flour:— some recovered, and some died.
b In a book written Anno 1781, published Anno 1789, under the
title of Introduction to Morals and Legislation.
318 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. [C h . 10.

whole multitude o f pernicious actions into apt classes,

— as a fruit, and proof, and test o f the supposed apti­
tude, about a dozen propositions were mentioned as
being capable o f being without any deviation from the
truth o f things, ascribed to the pernicious acts, respec­
tively, collected together under one denomination by
the names respectively assigned to the four classes to
which they were referred.
O n the same occasion intimation was likewise given,
that in the system o f law and law terms in use, for
the designation o f offences, am ong English lawyers,
no such fair general denomination could be found, to
the contents o f which an equal number, and it might
perhaps have been added, any number at all o f com ­
mon propositions could, without error and falsehood,
be ascribed. A system o f classification and nom en­
clature which can never be em ployed without con ­
founding at every turn, objects which, to prevent prac­
tical and painful accidents, require to be distinguished,
must by every man, who has not a decided interest
in maintaining the contrary, be acknowledged to be
very ill adapted to those which are, or at least which
ought to be, its purposes.
H ere then was an intimation given, that the whole
system o f English penal law is in an extreme degree
ill adapted to what ought to be the purposes o f every
system o f la w : and an implied invitation to those, i f
any such there were,*' who being conversant in the sub­
je c t o f law, had any desire to see it well adapted to
its professed purposes, to show that the system was
not in respect o f the points indicated, a bad one, the
Sect. 3 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 319

radically bad one it was there represented to be, or

else to take measures for making it better. But it be-
ing the interest o f every one who is most conversant
with this subject, that the whole system, instead o f be­
ing as good as it can be made, should be as bad as
those who live under it will endure to see it, the invi­
tation could not in either branch be accepted.
In any other branch o f science that can be named,
M edicine, Chemistry, Natural History in ail its
branches, the progress made in every other respect is
acknowledged to be commensurate to, and at once ef­
fect and cause in relation to the progress made in the
art o f classification:— nor in any one o f those branches
o f science, would it, perhaps, be easy to find a single in­
dividual by whom the operation o f classification w'ould
be spoken o f as any thing below the highest rank in
the order o f importance. W h y this difference ? Be­
cause in any one o f these branches o f science there is
scarce an individual to whose interest the advance­
ment o f the science is opposed : whereas among the
professors o f the law there exists not an individual to
whose interest the advancement o f the art o f legisla-
tion is not opposed ;— is not, either immediately de­
trimental or ultimately dangerous.

3. Simplification.
By the opposite vice, complication, every evil o p ­
posite to the ends o f justice, viz., uncertainty o f the
law itself, unnecessary delay, expense and vexation in
respect o f the execution, is either produced or aggra-
320 F A L L A C IE S OF C O N F U S IO N . [ Cll. 10.

vateda. Consequently, to every one by whom any

wish is entertained o f seeing the mass o f these evils
reduced, a fervent desire is entertained o f seeing the
virtue o f simplification infused into the system o f law
and judicial procedure. O n an occasion that took
place not long ago, if the account o f the debates can
be trusted, a gentleman was found resolute and frank
enough to stand up and rank this virtue, if after that,
such it may be called, am ong the worst o f vices : the
use o f it was evidence o f Jacobinism : evidence o f the
circumstantial kind indeed, but sufficiently conclu­
sive.
I f on a declaration to that effect any sentiment o f
disapprobation were visible in the language or d e­
portment o f that honourable house, none such are, at
least, re co rd e d : and if none such really were percep­
tible, this circumstance alone might afford no incon­
siderable ground for the desire expressed by some, o f
seeing the character o f that honourable house under­
go a thorough change.

4. Disinterestedness a mark o f profligacy.

In his pamphlet on his Official E con om y Bill, to
give up official emolument, is by Edmund Burke pro­
nounced, in so many words, to be “ a mark o f the
basest p rofliga cy: ”
O n somewhat more defensible grounds might this
position itself be pronounced as strong a mark as ever

* See Scotch Reform Table.

Sect. 4 . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 321

was exhibited, or ever could be exhibited, o f the most

shameless profligacy.
A n assumption contained in it, besides others too
numerous to admit o f their being detailed here, is—
that in the eyes o f man there is nothing that has any
value— nothing that is capable o f actuating and giving
direction to his conduct, but the matter o f w ealth :
that the love o f reputation and the love o f power are
themselves, both o f them, without efficient power over
the human heart.
So opposite is this position o f his to the truth, that
the less the quantity o f m oney which, in return for his
engagement to render official service, a man, not pal­
pably unfit for the business o f it, is content to accept,
the stronger is the proof, the presumptive evidence
thereby afforded, o f his aptitude in all points, with re­
lation to the business o f that office : since it is a p ro o f
o f his relish for the business— o f the pleasure he anti­
cipates from the performance o f ita.
Blinded by his rage, in this his frantic exclamation,
wrung from him by the unquenched thirst for lucre, this
madman, than whom none perhaps w-as ever more mis­
chievous,— this incendiary, who contributed so much
more than any other to light up the flames o f that war,
under the miseries occasioned by which the nation is
still groaning, poured forth the reproach o f “ the basest
profligacy” on the heads o f thousands, before whom , •

• See Bentham par Dumont. Traitt des Peines el des Recompenses z

and Defences o f economy against Edmund Burke and George Rose.
Y
322 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 10.

had he known who they were, he would have been

ready to bow the knee. N o t to mention the whole
magistracy o f the empire, whose office is that o f jus­
tice o f the peace,— am ong other persons before whom
he was in the habit o f prostrating himself, o f the ver­
bal filth he thus casts around him, one large mass
falls upon the head o f the Marquess Camden, and
from his, rebounds upon those other official heads,
from which the surrender made o f the vast mass o f
official emolument, drew forth the stream o f eulogium
which the documents o f the day present us with.

5. How to turn this fallacy to account.

T o let o ff a paradox o f this sort with any chance o f
success, you must not be any thing less than the leader
o f a party. F or i f you are, instead o f gaping and
staring at you, men will but laugh at you, or think o f
something else without so much as laughing at you,
because there is no laughing at any thing without
thinking o f it.
M oreover a thing o f this sort succeeds much better
in a speech, than in a book or pamphlet; and that, for
several reasons.
T h e use o f a speech is to carry the measure o f the
m om en t: and i f the measure be but carried, no mat­
ter for the means. T he measure being carried, the
paradox is seen to be no less absurd and mischievous
than it is strange: no m atter; the measure is carried.
W a r is declared, or a negotiation for peace broken
off. Peace you will have some time or other, but in
Sect. 5 . ] FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION. 323
the mean tim e the paradox has had its effect. A law
has passed : and that law an absurd and mischievous
one. Som e day or other the m ischief may receive a
rem ed y : but that day may not arrive these two or
three hundred years a.
In a speech too, it is all profit, no loss. Y ou r point
may be gained, or not gained : your reputation remains
where it was. It is your speech, or not your speech,
whichever is most convenient. T o A , who, under the
notion o f its being yours, admires it, it is your sp eech ;
to B, who, because it is yours, or because it is an ab­
surd and mischievous one, spurns at it, it is not your
speech. I f the words o f your paradox are ambiguous,
as they will be, if they are well and happily chosen,—
susceptible o f two senses, an innoxious and a noxious
o n e ; this is exactly what is wanted. A , who on your
credit is ready to take it, and to adopt it in the noxious
one which suits your purpose, is suffered silently to take
it in that noxious one. But if B , taking it in the noxious
one, attacks you and pushes you too hard, then some
adherent o f yours (not you yourself, for it would be
weak indeed for you to appear in the matter), some
adherent o f yours brings out the innocent sense, vows
and swears it was that meaning that was yours, and
belabours poor B with a charge o f calumny.
I f in the choice o f your expression you have been *

* Till lately, the country has suffered in a variety o f ways by the

law made in the reign o f Elizabeth to prevent good workmanship:
the effect is felt, the cause men cannot bear to look at.
324 F A L L A C IE S OF C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 10.
negligent
O O or unfortunate,9 so that no more than one
sense, and that one indefensible, can with any colour
o f reason be ascribed to it, you thus lose part o f your
advantage: but still no harm can happen to y ou ; you
disavow, that is your adherent, for you, disavows the
very words : and thus every thing is as it should be.
Thus it is that from speeches— spoken and unmi­
nuted speeches— you derive much the same sort o f
advantage as is derived from that sort o f sham law
(which, in so far as it is made by any body, is made
by judges, and is called com m on or unwritten law) by
lawyers : thundering all the while the charge o f insin­
cerity or folly in all who have the assurance to ascribe
to it either a different word, or a different mean­
ing. T o the supposed speech, as to-the supposed law,
they give what words they please, and then to those
words they give what meaning they please. T h e law,
indeed, neither has, nor ever had, any determinate
form o f words belonging to i t : whereas the speech
could not have been spoken, unless it had had a set,
and that a com plete one, o f determinate words be­
longing to it. But in the speech— the words never hav­
ing been committed to writing, or if they have been,
evidence o f their being the same words not being
producible,— the speech-maker is as safe as if he had
never uttered any one o f those words.
In the intellectual weakness o f those on whom, in
this form, imposition is endeavoured to be practised
— in this degrading weakness, and in the state o f ser­
Sect. 5 .] FA LLA CIES OF CONFUSION. 3£5

vitude in which they are accordingly held by the

shackles o f authoritya, may be seen the cause o f that
success, and thence o f the effrontery and insolence,
which this species o f imposition manifests. In pro­
portion as intellect is weaker and weaker, reason has
less and less hold upon it; authority, fortified by the
appearance, real or fallacious, o f strong persuasion,
more and more.
It is in this way that, strange as at first mention it
cannot but appear— it is in this way— and when ad­
dressed to minds o f such a texture, the more flagrant
and outrageous the absurdity, the stronger its persua­
sive force. W h y ? because without the strongest
ground, a persuasion — so strong a persuasion, o f the
truth o f a pro position, at first sight at least, so adverse
to truth, it is taken for granted, could not have been
form ed.
W hen the terrors o f which religion is the source,
are the instruments em ployed for inculcating it, the
strength o f the persuasion thus inspired, presents little
cause for wonder. In the intensity o f the exertion
made for the purpose o f believing, the greater the dif­
ficulty, the greater is, in case o f success, the merit.
H ence that most magnanimous o f all conclusions,
credo quia impossible est. Higher than this, the force
o f faith— the force and consequently the merit— can­
not g o : by this one bound the pinnacle is attained ;
and whatsoever reward Om nipotence has in store for

a See 1 . Ad Cacamdifwi, C 'h . 1 . F a l l a c y n| A u t h o r i t y .

3126 F A L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. [ 6 7 /. 10.

service o f this com plexion, is placed out o f the reach

o f failure.
Be the absurdity ever so flagrant,— the nature o f
man considered, and how absolute the dominion which
is exercised over him by the passions o f fear and hope,
— be the absurdity ever so flagrant, cause o f just won­
der can never be afforded, by any acceptance which
it receives with the support afforded to it by the most
irresistible o f the passions :
T h e understanding is not the source, reason is o f
itself no spring o f action : the understanding is but an
instrument in the hand o f the will : it is by hopes and
fears that the end o f action is determ ined; all that
reason does, is to find and determine upon the means:
But where, at the mere suggestion o f a set o f men
with gowns o f a certain form on their backs, where at
their mere suggestion (unsupported by any m otive o f a
nature to act on the will), we see men living and act­
ing under the persuasion that in the vice o f lying,
there is virtue to metamorphose into justice, the crime
o f usurpation;— here it is not the will that is con ­
founded and overwhelmed, it is the understanding
that is deluded11.

a To form a ground for decision, a judge asserts as true, some fact

which to his knowledge is not true: some fact for the assertion o f
which, if, in the station o f a witness, and without having for his pro­
tection the power o f a judge, a man were to venture the assertion of,
he would by this same judge be punished with imprisonment and in­
famy. To screen it from the abhorrence due to it, this lie, exceeding
in wickedness the most wicked o f the assertions commonly brought
into view under that name, is decked up in the same appellation, fie-
Sect. 5 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 327
tion, which is employed in bringing to view the innoxious and amusing
pictures o f ideal scenes for which we are indebted to the poetic ge­
nius. What you are thus doing with the lie in your mouth ?— had you
power to do it without the lie ?— Your lie is a foolish one. Have you
no such power?— It is a flagitious one. In this mire may be seen laid
the principal part o f the foundation o f English common law.
328 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [C /i. 11

CHAPTER X I.

Non-causa pro causa : or, Cause and obstacle con­

founded.
Ad judicium.

Exposition.
\V IIEN in a system which has good points in it you
have a set o f abuses, or any o f them to d efen d ; after
a general eulogium bestowed on the system, or an in­
dication more or less explicit o f the good effects the
existence o f which is out o f dispute, take the abuses
you have to defend, either separately or collectively,
(collectively is the safest course,) and to them ascribe
the credit o f having given birth to the good effects.
Ciim hoc, ergd propter hoc.
In every political system which is o f long standing,
and which not having been produced, any considerable
part o f it, in prosecution o f any comprehensive de­
sign, good or bad, but piece-meal at different and di­
stant times, according to the casual and temporary
predominance o f conflicting interests, whatsoever may
be the good or the bad points in the state o f things
which at any given time constitutes the result o f it,
among the incidents which may be observed as having
place in it, some, upon proper scrutiny and proper
distinction made, may be seen to have operated in
the character o f effective or prom otivc causes; others,
Ch. 11 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 3l29
in the character o f obstacles or preventives ; others,
to have been in relation to them, in the character o f
immaterial incidents or inoperative circumstances.
In such a system, whatsoever are the abuses or other
imperfections in it, and whatsoever are the prosperous
results observable in it, these prosperous results will
have found, in the abuses and imperfections, not so
many efficient or promotive causes, but so many ob­
stacles or preventives.
Meantime, if so you can order matters that, instead
o f being recognised as having operated in the charac­
ter o f obstacles, the abuses in question shall be be­
lieved to have operated in the character o f efficient or
prom otive causes, nothing can contribute more power­
fully to the effect which it is your endeavour to pro­
duce.
I f you cannot so far succeed as to cause the pro­
sperous results in question to be referred to the abuses
by which they have been obstructed and retarded, the
next thing you are to endeavour at, is, to cause them
to be ascribed to som e inoperative circumstance or
circumstances, having in appearance some connexion
or other— the nearer the better— with the abuses.
A t any rate, you will, as far as depends upon you,
cause the prosperous circumstances in question to be
referred to any causes rather than the real ones : for
in proportion as it becomes manifest o f what causes
they are the results, it will becom e manifest o f what
other circumstances they have not been the results :
whereupon, no sooner is any one o f the abuses you
330 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Ch. 1 1 .
have to defend,considered in this point o f view, than
a question will be apt to occur :— W ell, and this ?—
what has been the use o f this ? T o which no answer
being found, the consequence is such as need not be
mentioned.
Real knowledge being am ong the number o f your
most form idable adversaries, your endeavour must o f
course be to obstruct its advancement and propaga­
tion as effectually as possible.
Real knowledge depends in a great degree on the
being able, on each occasion, to distinguish from each
other, causes, obstacles, and uninfluencing circum­
stances : these, therefore, it must on every occasion
be your study to confound as effectually as possible.

Exposure.
Exam ple 1.— Good Government:— Obstacle repre­
sented as a cause,— the influence o f the Crown.
I f the superiority o f the Constitution o f the English
limited monarchy, as com pared with all absolute or
less limited monarchies, be in England a point un­
disputed, and regarded as indisputable, and the cha­
racteristic by which that limited monarchy is distin­
guished from all absolute and less limited monarchies,
is, the influence, the superior influence o f the mass o f
the people,— the influence exercised by the will o f
the nominees o f the people on the wills o f the nom i­
nees o f the king, and thence on the conduct o f the
king himself,— a circumstance which, in so far as it
operates, diminishes the efficiency o f this influence,
Sect. ] . ] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 331
and on many, if not most occasions, may be seen to
destroy that efficiency altogether,— cannot with pro­
priety be numbered among the causes o f that supe­
riority, but must, on the contrary, be placed to the
account o f the obstacles that obstructed it.
In point o f fact, the members o f the H ouse o f
Com m ons, some really, all in supposition, nominees
o f the mass o f the people, act, as to the nominees o f
the king,— viz. the members o f the executive depart­
ment,— with the authority o f judges : viz. to the pur­
pose o f causing punishment to be inflicted under the
name o f punishment, in case o f special delinquency,
not without the concurrence o f the H ouse o f Lords ;
but to the purpose o f causing removal, without any
such concurrence.
In so far as over the will o f the nominees o f the
people as above mentioned, acting in their above-
mentioned character o f judges, an efficient influence
is exercised by the king or his nominees, the efficiency
o f this judicial authority is destroyed ; the nominees
o f the king, in the exercise o f their respective functions,
committing any enormities at pleasure; and thereupon
in the character though without the name o f judges,
absolving themselves, and, if such be their pleasure,
praising themselves for what they have done.
In this case, the fallacy consists in representing,
defending, and supporting, in the character o f an in­
dispensable cause o f the acknowledged prosperous re­
sults, the sinister and corruptive influence in question;
332 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . [Cll. 11.

— a circumstance which, so far from being in any de­

gree a promotive cause, is an obstacle.
In what way it operates in the character o f an ob ­
structive and destructive circumstance, has already
been shown above. In what way, with relation to the
same effect, it can operate as a cause, has never been
so much as attempted to be shown : it has been on
every occasion taken for granted, and this, on no
other ground than that o f its being a concom itant cir­
cumstance.

Exam ple 2 .— E ffect, good G overnm ent:— Obstacle

represented as a cause,— station o f the bishops in
the House o f Lords.
T o good government, neither in the situation o f a
bishop nor in any other situation can a man be con ­
tributory, any further than as he takes a part in it.
In that department o f government which is carried
on in the H ouse o f Lords, a man cannot bear a part
any further than as he takes a part in the debates
carried on there, or at least attends and gives his
vote.
But o f the whole body o f bishops, including since
the U nion those from Ireland, a small part, upon an
average scarce so many as a tenth, are seen to attend
and give their v o te s : and as for speaking— when any
instance o f it happens to take place, it sets men
a-staring and talking as if it were a phenomenon,
llo w com es it that the number o f those who vote,
Sect. 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 333
and especially o f those who speak, is so small ? Be­
cause a general feeling exists, that to that class tem­
poral occupations and politics are not suitable occu ­
pations.
A n d why not suitable ?
1. Because in that war o f personalities in which, in
a large proportion, the debates in that as well as in
the other House consist, a man o f this class is in a pe­
culiar degree vulnerable. T h e Apostles, did they bear
any part in, had they any seat in, the Rom an Senate,
or so much as in the Com m on-council o f the city o f
Jerusalem? W as it Peter, was it James, was it John,
— was it not Dives, that used to clothe himself in
purple and fine linen ?— W alking from place to place
to preach, comprised their occupations. I f yours were
the same, would you not be rather more like them
than you are ?
2. Because there is a general feeling, though not
expressed in words, from a sort o f decency and
compassion, that a legislative assembly is not a fit
place for a man who is not at liberty to speak what
he thinks ; and who, should he be bold enough to
bring to view any one o f the plainest dictates o f poli­
tical utility, might be put to silence and confounded
by reference to this or that one o f the 39 Articles, or
by this or that text o f Scripture, out o f a Testament
O ld or N ew .
So many things o f which, however improbable, he
is bound to profess his belief.
So many things which, however indefensible by
334 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 11.

reason, he would be bound, were he to open his mouth,

to defend.
M atter o f duty to him to be,— matter o f infamy not
to be,— steeled against conviction.
So many vulnerable parts with which he is embar­
rassed, and with which an antagonist o f his is not em ­
barrassed.
So many chains with which he is shackled, and with
which an antagonist o f his is not shackled.
A man whose misfortune should it be to hear a word
or two o f reason, it would be his duty not to listen to it.
T o a man thus circumstanced, to talk reason would
have something ungenerous in it and indecorous : it
would be as if a man should set about talking inde­
cently to his daughter or his wife.
In vain would they answer, what has been so often
answered, that neither Jesus nor his Apostles ever
meant what they said— that every thing is to be ex­
plained and explained away. By answers o f this sort,
those and those alone would be satisfied, whose satis­
faction, with every thing that is established, is im­
moveable, and not susceptible o f experiencing dimi­
nution from any objections, or increase from any
answers.

Exam ple 3.— E ffect, useful national learning ; Ob­

stacle stated as a cause, system o f education pu r­
sued in Church-of-England Universities.
On the subject o f learning, to the question whether
with relation to it the universities might with more
Sect . 3 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 335
propriety be considered as causes or as obstacles,
much need not here be said, after what has been said
on the subject by the Reverend Vicesim us K nox, and
o f late by the Edinburgh Review.
I f these fragments, with the exception o f the scur­
rilous parts o f the Review, were put together and
made into a book, a most instructive addition to it
might be made by a history o f the treatment expe­
rienced from this quarter by the inventions o f the
quaker Lancaster. In the age o f academical and
right-reverend orthodoxy, learning, it would there be
seen, is even to the very first rudiments o f it, an ob­
je c t o f terror and hatred.
O f this Quaker, though he undertook not to attempt
to make converts, what is certain, is, that no school
would, under his management, have been a school o f
perjury : and since, in so far as by his means the ele­
mentary parts o f knowledge made their way among
the people, intellectual light would take place o f
intellectual darkness, he experienced the hostility that
might so naturally have been expected from those who
love darkness better than light, to wit, for a reason
which may be seen in that book, the knowledge o f
which it was his object to diffuse, as it was theirs to
confine and stifle it.
In virtue and knowledge, in every feature o f felicity,
the empire o f M ontezuma outshines, as every body
knows, all the surrounding states, even the C om m on­
wealth o f Tlascala not excepted.
W here (said an inquirer once, to the high priest o f
336 f a l l a c ie s of c o n f u s io n . [Ch. 11.

the temple o f Vitzlipultzli), where is it that we are to

look for the true cause o f so glorious a pre-em inence?
“ L ook for i t ! ” (answered the holy pontiff,) “ W here
shouldst thou look for it, blind sceptic, but in the
copiousness o f the streams in which the sweet and
precious blood o f innocents flows daily down the altars
o f the great G o d ? ”
“ Y e s ,” answered in full convocation and full chorus
the archbishops, bishops, deans, canons, and prebends
o f the religion o f V itzlipultzli:— “ Y es,” answered in
semi-chorus the vice-chancellor, with all the doctors,
both the proctors and masters regent and non-regent
o f the as yet uncatholiciz’d university o f M exico :■*—
“ Y es, in the copiousness o f the streams in which the
sweet and precious b lood o f innocents flows daily
down the altars o f the great G o d .”

Exam ple 4 .— Effect * national virtue ; Obstacle re­

presented as a cause, opulence o f the clergy.
In several former w'orks it has been shown a, that,
be the effect what it may,— in so far as money or in
any other shape the matter o f reward, is, in the cha­
racter o f an efficient cause, em ployed in the view or
under the notion o f promoting it,— what degree o f effi ­
ciency shall attend in such case the use made o f the
instrument, depends not so much upon its magnitude

a Traite des Peines et des Recompenses. Defence o f Economy against

Burke, and Do. against R ose: both in the Pamphleteer, Anno 1817.
Church-of-Englandism Examined, 1818.
Sect. 4 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 337
as upon the manner in which, and the skill with which,
it is applied ; and in particular, that in so far as that
instrument is com posed o f public money, it is no less
possible, and in some cases much more frequent, so
to apply it that the production o f that effect shall,
instead o f being prom oted, be prevented : that when,
as for working, a man is paid alike whether he
does work or whether he does none, to expect work
from him is impossible, and to pretend to expect it,
mere mockery : that after engaging to render an ha­
bitual course o f service (for the rendering o f which no
extraordinary degree o f talent or alacrity is necessary),
a fit person has received that which is necessary to
obtain his free engagement for the rendering it, every
penny added has no other tendency than to afford
him means and incentives to relinquish his duties for
whatever other occupations are more suitable to his
taste.
N o w if this be true o f all men, it is true o f every
man : and it is not a man’s being called prebend,
canon, dean, bishop, or even archbishop, that will in
his case or in any other person’s case make it false.
It is a proposition that, be it ever so true, is not
evident, but requires argument deduced from ex­
perience to render it so, that by such service as is
rendered by the English clergy, virtue is in any degree
prom oted.
It is a proposition that, be it to a certain extent
ever so true, is to a certain extent notoriously not
true, that to the procurement o f such service, money
z
S38 F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . . [6 7 /. 1 1 .

from any source is necessary. For without a particle

o f money passing from hand to hand, service o f this
sort is rendered by men one towards another, viz.
am ong the people called Quakers : and if for the ex­
hibiting to view the comparative degrees o f efficiency
with which service o f this sort is rendered,— work o f
this sort done,— who is there that will take upon him
to deny that the highest degree o f the scale would be
found occupied by the people called Quakers, or dis­
puted with them by the people called M ethodists,
while the very lowest would be recognised as being
occupied without dispute by the members sacred or
profane o f the established and most opulently endow ed
Church o f England.
It is another proposition that still remains to be
proved, that, admitting that for the procurement o f
this service— to the whole extent in which for the pro­
duction o f virtue it is wanted,— m oney is necessary, it
is also necessary that for the raising o f the necessary
quantity, money should by the power o f Governm ent
be forced out o f the pockets o f unwilling contributors.
Ch. 1 2 .] F A L L A C IE S O F C O N F U S IO N . 339

CHAPTER X II.

Partiality-preachers Argument.
Ad judicium.

From the abuse, argue not against the use.

Exposition.
F r o m abuse it is an error (it lias been said) to ar­
gue against use.
T h e proposition is an absurd one, make the best
o f it, but the degree o f absurdity will depend upon the
turn that may be given to the sentence.
W hichsoever be the turn given to it, the plain and
undeniable truth o f the case as between use and abuse
will alike serve for the exposure o f it.
Be the institution what it may, whatsoever good
effects there are that have resulted from it, these con­
stitute, as far as experience goes, the use o f i t : what­
soever ill effects have resulted from it, these, in so far
at least as they have been the object o f foresight and
the result o f intention, constitute the abuse o f it.
Thus as to past results : and the same observation
applies to expected future ones.

Exposure.
N o w then com e the fallacies to the propagation o f
which it may and must have been directed.
1. In taking an account o f the effects o f an institu­
340 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [i Ch. 12.

tion, you ought to set down all the good effects and
om it all the bad ones.
This is one o f the purposes to which it is capable
o f being applied : this needs not much to be said o f
it.
2. In taking an account o f the effects o f an insti­
tution good and bad, you ought not to argue against
it on the supposition that the sum o f the bad ones is
greater than the sum o f the good ones, merely from
the circumstance that am ong all its effects taken to­
gether, there are som e that belong to the bad side o f
the account.
In this latter sense, such is the character o f the
maxim that nothing can be said against the truth o f
it. A s an instruction, it is too obvious to be o f any
u s e : in the wray o f warning, it cannot by possibility do
any harm, nor is it altogether out o f the sphere o f
possibility, that in this or that instance it may have
its use.
A pplied to a man’s pecuniary affairs it amounts to
this : viz. C onclude not that a man has no property
because he has some debts.
Ch. 13 .] FA L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION. 341

CHAPTER X III.

The End justifies the Means .

Ad judicium.

I n this case surely, if in any, exposition is o f itself

exposure.
T h e insertion o f this article in the list o f fallacies
was suggested by the use made o f it in the Courier
N ewspaper o f the 27th o f August 1819, as reported
and com m ented upon in the M orning Chronicle o f
the 28 th a.
T h e end justifies the means. Y e s : but on three
conditions, any o f which failing, no such justification
has place.
1. O ne is, that the end be good .
2. That the means chosen be either purely good,
or if evil, having less evil in them than on a balance
there is o f real good in the end.

a The Courier Newspaper is, in the other public prints, perpetually

spoken o f as enjoying the favour o f the Monarch o f the day.
1 have all along been upon the watch to see whether a denial in
any shape o f that assertion would be given. I have never been able
to hear o f any such thing. The fact admitted, a conclusion which
can scarcely be refused is, that the principles manifested in that
paper are the principles entertained and acted upon by that royal
arbiter o f our fate, in whose disposal the lives and fortunes o f about
twenty millions or thereabout in the three kingdoms, and sixty mil­
lions in Asia, are placed. Without deigning to wait for and re­
ceive, or if received, to have regard to the evidence on the other
side, at the solicitation o f Lord Sidniouth, Secretary o f State, the Prince
342 FA L L A C IE S OF CONFUSION . \Ch. 1 3 .
3. T hat they have m ore o f good in them, or less
o f evil, as the case may be, than any others, by the
em ployment o f which the end might have been at­
tained.
Laying out o f the case these restrictions, note the
absurdities that would follow.
Acquisition o f a penny lo a f is the end I am at. T h e
goodness o f it is indisputable. I f by the goodness o f
the end, any means em ployed in the attainment o f
it are justified, instead o f a penny, I may give a pound
for i t : thus stands the justification on the ground o f
prudence. O r, instead o f giving a penny for it, I may
cut the baker’s throat, and thus get it for n oth in g :
and thus stands the justification on the ground o f be­
nevolence and beneficence.
In politics, what is the use o f this fallacy ? In the
mouth o f one whose station is am ong the in s , it will
serve for whatsoever cruelties those by whom power
is exercised may at any time find a pleasure in com ­
mitting on those over whom power is exercised, for

Regent by one letter dated August 1819 bestows his approbation

upon the conduct maintained by the Manchester Magistrates, on
the occasion o f the slaughter committed by their officers— by the
armed yeomanry on an unarmed multitude: and by another, dated
the same month, upon Sir John Bing, the General Commander
o f the Regulars, for the support given by him to it. What shall we
say of this r Let prudence give the answer. The Secretary is worthy
to serve such a Sovereign: the Sovereign is worthy to be served by
such a Secretary.— Every stroke he adds to his own portrait, the faith­
ful servant adds to that of his royal patron and protector. A com ­
plete portrait thus formed by lines copied from the Courier, would con­
stitute a most instructive and interesting piece.
Ch. 13.] F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . 343

the purpose o f confirming themselves in the power o f

committing more such cruelties.
The in s , as such, have the power to com m it atro­
cities, and that power having sinister interest for its
spur, is never suffered to be idle. For the use o f this
fallacy, in so far as it can be worth their while to em­
ploy a cloak, they have therefore a continual demand.
The outs, acting under the impulse o f the same
spur, sharpened by continual privation, and continually
repeated disappointment, have on their part a still
more urgent demand for the same fallacy, though the
opportunities o f making application o f it but rarely
present themselves to their hands.
T h e oracular party adage— invented by the W h ig s :
— N o t men but measures, or N o t measures but men :
— for according as you com plete the sentence, you
may word it either way,— This bold but slippery in­
strument o f fallacy has manifest alliance w ith the pre­
sent. Seating in office fit men, being the end, every
thing depending upon that end, and the men in ques­
tion being the only ones by which it can be attained,
no means can be imagined by which such an end may
not be justified.
344 F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U SIO N . [6 7 /. 14

CHAPTER X IV .

Opposer-General's justification :— N ot measures but

men; or, N ot men but measures.

Ad invidiam.

A c c o iid i n g to the notions com m only entertained

o f moral duty under the head o f probity, and in parT
ticular under the head o f that branch o f probity which
consists in sincerity, whatsoever be the nature and
extent o f the business in question, private or public,
it is not right for a man to argue against his own o p i­
nion ;— when his opinion is so and so, to profess it to
be the reverse, and in so doing to bend the force o f
his mind to the purpose o f causing others to embrace
the opinion thus opposite to his real one.
That, in particular, if being a member o f the House
o f Com m ons, and in opposition, a measure which to
him seems a proper one, is brought on the carpet on
the ministerial side, it is not right that he should de­
clare it to be, in his opinion, pernicious, and use his
endeavours to have it thought so, and treated as such
by the H o u se ; and so again, if, being on that same
side, a measure such as to him appears pernicious, is
brought on the carpet on the side o f opposition, it is
not right that he should declare it to be, in his op i­
nion, beneficial and fit to be adopted, and accordingly
use his endeavours to make it generally thought so,
and as such adopted by the House.
Ch. 14.] F A L L A C I E S OF CO N FU SIO N . 345

A n aphorism, said to have been a favourite one with

the late M r. Charles Fox, is the proposition at the
head o f this chapter.
N o t men but measures ! or, N o t measures but men !
are the two forms in either o f which, according as the
ellipsis is filled up, the aphorism may be couched.
N ot measures but men ! is the more simple expres­
sion o f the two, it being in that form that the apho­
rism is marked out for approbation : reprobation be­
ing the sentiment attached to its opposite. Not men
but measures !
I f you look to speeches, then com es the constant
and constantly interminable question— what were the
words in the speeches. T h e words are in that case
on each occasion genuine or spurious, the interpreta­
tion correct or incorrect, according as it suits the pur­
pose o f him who is speaking o f it, and more particu­
larly o f him who spoke it, that it should be.
But on one occasion we have the aphorism from
the pen o f Charles Fox him self: and then, if applied
to the question o f sincerity or insincerity, as above, it
is found to have no direct bearing on it.
“ Are to be attended to,” are the words em ployed
on this occasion to complete the proposition. “ H ow
vain, how idle, how presumptuous (says the declaimer
in his attempt to put on the historian) is the opinion
that laws can do every th in g ! and how weak and per­
nicious the maxim founded upon it, that measures not
men, arc to be attended to ! ’
Weak enough as thus expressed, it must be con­
346 F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 14.

fessed: and abundantly too weak to be by a statesman

considered as worth noticing even by so vague and
ungrounded a note o f reprobation.— A s if any one
ever thought o f denying that both ought to be “ at­
tended to r and as if, even in a debating club, words
so vague and unmeaning as “ attended to” were a fit
subject o f debate.
W h at must be confessed is, that to a man who
wishes well to his country, and sees a set o f men who
in his opinion are a bad set, conducting the affairs o f
it, few things are more provoking than by this or that
com paratively unimportant, but so far as it goes be­
neficial measure, to see them obtain a degree o f repu­
tation o f which one effect may be to confirm them in
their seat.
But what seems not to have been sufficiently “ at­
tended to” is, that it is by the badness o f their mea­
sures that the only warrant for giving to the men the
appellation o f bad men can be grounded : that if they
are really the bad men they are supposed to be, have
a little patience, and they will com e out with some
bad measure, against which, it being by the supposi­
tion bad, and by yourself looked upon as such, you
may without prejudice to your sincerity, point your
attacks: and if no such bad measure ever came from
them, the imputation o f their being bad men, is rather
premature.
Distressing indeed to a man o f real probity must
be the alternative : to sec a set o f men fixed in this
their all-commanding seat, and making a proportion­
Ch. 14.] F A L L A C I E S OF C O N FU SIO N . 347

ally extensive and pernicious use o f i t ; or, for the

purpose o f taking what chance is to be had o f pre­
cluding them from this advantage, to keep on strain­
ing every endeavour to make the H ouse and the pub­
lic look upon as pernicious, a measure o f the utility
o f which he is himself satisfied.
In the abomination o f long and regularly corrupt
parliaments lies the cause o f this distress.
U nder this system, when the whole system o f abuses
has a determined patron on the throne, and that pa­
tron has got a set o f ministers that suit this ruling
purpose, misrule may swell to such a pitch, that with­
out any one measure in such sort bad that you can
fix upon it and say this is a sufficient ground for pu­
nishment, or even for dismission, the State may be at
the brink o f ru in :— meantime some measure may be
introduced, against which, though good or at least in­
noxious o f itself, the people, by means o f some misre­
presentation o f matter o f fact, or some erroneous opi­
nion or other which prevails among them, may to the
disgrace and expulsion o f the ministry be turned
against it, and then com es the distressing alternative.
But were the duration o f the assembly short, and
the great and surely effective mass o f the matter o f
corruption expelled and kept out o f it, no such alter­
native would ever present itself. The chance o f rid­
ding the country o f a bad set o f ministers would be
renewed continually. T h e question supposed to be
tried on each occasion might be the question really
tried : whereas at present on each occasion the ques­
348 FALLACIES OF CONFUSION. [Ch. 14.

tion tried is but one and the same, viz. Shall the mi­
nistry or shall it not continue ?
T h e question brought on the carpet is like the wager
in a feigned issue, a mere farce, which, but for its con ­
nection with the principal question above mentioned,
would not be deemed worth trying, and would not be
tried.
Ch. 15.] F A LLACIES OF CONFUSION. 349

CHAPTER XV.

Rejection instead o f Amendment.

Ad judicium.

Exposition.
T h is fallacy consists in urging in the character o f
a bar, or conclusive objection against the proposed
measure, som e consideration, which, if presented in the
character o f a proposed amendment, might have more
or less claim to notice.
It generally consists o f som e real or imaginary in­
convenience, alleged com m only, but not necessarily, as
eventually to result from the adoption o f the measure.
This inconvenience, supposing it real, will either be
preponderant over the promised benefit or not pre­
ponderant.
In either case it will be either remediable or irre­
mediable.
I f at the same time irremediable and preponderant,
then it is, and then only, that in the character o f an o b ­
jection it is o f itself conclusive.
By him in whose mind discernment and candour
are com bined, this distinction will be not only felt,
but brought to view. I f in respect o f adequate dis­
cernment there be a failure, it will not be fe lt : if in re­
spect o f candour only, it will have been felt, but it
will not be brought to view.
T h e occasion by which opportunity is afforded for
350 F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 15.

the working o f this fallacy, is the creation o f any new

office, including the mass o f emolument which, with­
out inquiry into the necessity, or any means taken for
keeping down the quantum o f it within the narrowed
limits which the good o f the service admits of, is, by
the union o f habit with the sinister interest that gave
birth to it, annexed as o f course, upon their creation,
to all new offices.
T h e fallacy, what there is o f fallacy in the case
consists in the practice o f setting up the two univer-*
sally applicable objections, viz. need o f economy, and
m ischief or danger from the increase o f the influence
o f the crown, in the character o f peremptory bars to
the proposed measure.

Exposure.
T h e ground on which an objection o f this stamp
may with propriety be considered and spoken o f under
the denomination o f a fallacy, is where the utility o f
the proposed new establishment is left unimpeached,
and the sole reason for the rejection proposed to be
put upon the proposed measure consists in the above
topics or one o f them.
- In such case, on the part o f him by whom any o b ­
jections so inconclusive in their nature are relied on,
the reliance placed on them amounts to a virtual ac­
knowledgement o f the utility o f the proposed new es­
tablishment : inasmuch as in an address from one ra­
tional being to another, nothing seems, upori the face
o f the statement at least, more unnatural, than that if
Ch. 15.] F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . 351

a man could find any objection that would apply to

the particular establishment in question in contra­
distinction to all others, he should confine him self to
an objection which applies alike to almost all existing
establishments; that is, to almost the whole frame o f
the existing government.
Such is the case where the two com m on-place o b ­
jections in question, or either o f them, are brought
out in the character o f objections by themselves, and
without being accom panied by any specific ones.
But even when added to specific ones, an objection
thus inconclusive in its nature, if urged in a direct
way, and dwelt upon with any emphasis, can scarcely,
at least while there remain any useless places unabo­
lished, or any overpaid places, from which the over­
plus o f emolument remains undefalcated, be exempted
from the imputation o f irrelevancy.
A t any rate, wherever it happens that a minister at
present in office sees opposite to him in the H ouse
another person who has at any time been in office, it
seems an observation not very easy to answer in the
character o f an argument ad hominem, should it be
said, “ W hen you were in office, there were such and
such offices which were o f no manner o f use ; these
you never used your endeavours to abolish, notwith­
standing the use that would have resulted from the
abolition, in the shape o f diminution o f needless ex­
penditure and sinister influence : yet now, when a set
o f offices is proposed, for which you cannot deny but
that there is some use, your exertions for the benefit
352 FALLACIES OF CON FUSION . [Ch. 15.

o f econom y are reserved to be directed against these

useful ones.”
N o doubt but that on the supposition that the two
opposite masses o f advantage and disadvantage being
com pletely in equilibrio,— advantage in the shape o f
service expected to be rendered in the proposed new
offices on the one hand, disadvantage in the shape o f
expense o f the emolument proposed to be attached to
them on the other,— a weight much less than that o f
the m ischief from the increase o f sinister influence,
would suffice to turn the scale.
Take also another supposition. Suppose (what is
not in every case possible) that the value o f the service
expected to be obtained by means o f the proposed
new offices is capable o f being obtained, and has ac­
cordingly been obtained in figures. Suppose on the
other hand (what will very frequently be feasible) that
the expense o f the establishment may with sufficient
precision be obtained in figures, and being so obtained,
on striking the balance, found to be less than the ad­
vantage so expected from the service. Suppose lastly,
(what is im possible) that the value o f the m ischief
which, in the shape o f introduction o f additional in­
fluence, were with sufficient precision capable o f stand­
ing expressed in figures had been so expressed, and
being so expressed, the quantity o f m ischief in this
shape were found sufficient to turn the scale on the
side o f disadvantage.
H ere w’ould be a sufficient reason for the rejection
o f the proposed establishment, and thence a sufficient
Ch. 15.] F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U SIO N . 353

warrant for bringing into the field the argument in

question, com m on-place as it is. But in regard to
this last supposition at any rate, how far it is from
being capable o f being realized, is but too evident.
U pon the whole, therefore, so far at least as con­
cerns the objection drawn from the increase that would
result to the sinister influence o f the crown, it may be
said that whatsoever time is spent in descanting upon
this topic may be set down to the account o f lost time.
I t is a topic, the importance o f which is surely suf­
ficient to entitle it to be considered by itself. The
influence o f the crown, it ought always to be remem­
bered, can no otherwise receive with propriety the
epithet sinister, than in so far as, by being directed to
and reaching a member o f Parliament or a parliamen­
tary elector, it affects the purity o f Parliament. But
by a system o f measures properly directed to that
end, the constitution o f Parliament might be effec­
tually guarded against any degree o f impurity capable
o f being productive o f any sensible inconvenience,
whatsoever were the lucrativeness o f the utmost
number o f offices, for the creation or preservation
o f which so much as a plausible reason could be
fo u n d : and were it otherwise, the proper remedy
would be found, not in the refusal to create any new
office, the service o f which was understood to over­
balance in any determinate and unquestionable degree
the m ischief o f the expense, but in the taking the no­
mination out o f the hands o f the crown, and vesting it
in some other and independent hands.
2 A
354 F A L L A C IE S OF CO N FU SIO N . [ C/l. 15.

T h e putting all places in these respects upon the same

footing— necessary and unnecessary ones,— properly
paid and overpaid ones,— ‘wears out and weakens that
energy which should be reserved for, and directed with
all its force against, unnecessary places, and the over­
plus part o f the pay o f overpaid ones.
Another occasion on which this fallacy is often
wont to be applied, is the case in which, from the
mere observation o f a profit as likely from any trans­
action to accrue to this or that individual, a censure
is grounded, pronouncing it a job.
T h e error in case o f sincerity, the fallacy in case o f
insincerity, consists, in forgetting that individuals are
the stuff o f which the public is made ; that there is
no way o f benefiting the public but by benefiting in­
dividuals ; and that a benefit which, in the shape o f
pleasure or exemption from pain, does not sooner or
later com e home to the bosom o f at least som e one
individual, is not in reality a benefit— is not entitled
to that name.
So far then from constituting an argument in dis­
favour o f the proposed measure, every benefit that can
be pointed out as accruing or likely to accrue to any
determinate individual or individuals, constitutes, as
far as it goes, an argument in favour o f the measure.
In no case whatsoever— on no imaginable suppo­
sition— can this consideration serve with propriety in
the character o f an argument in disfavour o f any
measure. In no case whatsoever— on no imaginable
supposition— can it, so far as it goes, fail o f serving
Ch. 15.] F A L L A C I E S OF C O N FU SIO N . 355

with propriety in the character o f an argument in fa­

vour o f the measure. Is the measure good ?— It adds
to the mass o f its advantages. Is the measure upon
the whole a bad one ?— It subtracts, by the whole
amount o f it, from the real amount o f the disadvan­
tages attached to the measure.
A t the same time in practice, there is no argument,
perhaps, which is more frequently employed, or on
which more stress is laid, without doors at any rate,
if not within doors, than this, in the character o f an
argument in disfavour o f a proposed measure : no ar­
gument which, even when taken by itself, is with more
confidence relied on in the character o f a conclusive
one.
T o what cause is so general a perversion o f the fa­
culty o f reason to be ascribed ?
T w o causes present themselves as acting in this
character:
1. It is apt to be received (and that certainly not
without reason) in the character o f evidence— conclu­
sive evidence— o f the nature o f the motive, to the in­
fluence o f which the part taken by the supporters o f
the measure, or some o f them, (viz. all who in any
way are partakers o f the private benefit in question,)
ought to be ascribed.
In this character, to the justness o f the conclusion
thus drawn, there can in general be nothing to object.
But the consideration o f the motive in which the
part taken either by the supporters or the opposers o f
a measure finds its cause, has elsewhere been shown
2 A 2
356 F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . \Ch. 15.

to be a consideration altogether irrelevant*; and the

use o f the argument lias been shown to be o f the num­
ber o f those fallacies, the influence o f which is in its
natural and general tendency unfavourable to every
good cause.
T h e other cause is the prevalence o f the passion o f
envy. T o the man to whom it is an object o f envy,
the good o f another man is evil to himself. By the
envy o f the speaker or writer, the supposed advantage
to the third person is denounced in the character o f
an evil, to the envy o f the hearers or the readers:—
denounced, and perhaps without any perception o f
the mistake, so rare is the habit o f self-examination,
and so gross and so perpetual the errors into which,
for want o f it, the human mind is capable o f being led.
In speaking o f the passion or affection o f envy, as
being productive o f this fallacious argument, and o f
the error, but for which shame w'ould frequently re­
strain a man from the em ploym ent o f it, it is not
meant to speak o f this passion or this affection as one
o f which, on the occasion in question, the influence
ought to be considered as pernicious on the whole.
So far from being pernicious, the more thoroughly
it is considered, the more closely it will be seen to be
salutary upon the w h ole; and not merely salutary, at
least in the best state o f things that has yet been
realized, but so necessary, that without it, society
would hardly have been kept together.

a See Part 2. Personalities.

Cfl. 15.] F A L L A C I E S OF CO N FU SIO N . 357

T he legislator who resolves not to accept assistance

from any but social motives, from none, save what in his
vocabulary pass under the denomination o f pure m o­
tives, will find his laws without vigour and without use.
T h e judge who resolves to have no prosecutors who
are brought to him by any but pure motives, will not
find that part o f his emolument which, under the pre­
sent system o f abuse, is com posed o f fees, and may
save himself the trouble o f going into court— o f sitting
on penal causes. T h e ju dge who should determine to
receive no evidence but what was at the same time
brought to him, and, when before him, guided by pure
motives, need scarcely trouble himself to hear evi­
dence.
The practical inference is— that, if he would avoid
drawing down disgrace upon himself instead o f upon the
measure he is opposing, a man ought to abstain from
employing this argument in confutation o f the fallacy;
since, in as far as he employs it, he is employing in
refutation o f one fallacy (and that so gross an one,
that the bare mention o f it in that character may na­
turally be sufficient to reduce the employer to silence),
he is employing another fallacy, which is o f itself sus­
ceptible o f a refutation no less easy and conclusive.
It is only by the interests, the affections, the pas­
sions (all these u'ords mean nothing more than the
same psychological object appearing in different cha­
racters), that the legislator, labouring for the good and
in the service o f mankind, can effect his purposes.
Those interests, acting in the character ot motives,
358 F A L L A C I E S OF C O N F U S IO N . [ Ch. 15.

may be o f the self-regarding class, the dissocial, or the

s o c ia l:— the social he will, on every occasion where
he finds them already in action, endeavour not only
to engage in his service, but cherish and cultivate:
the self-regarding and the dissocial, though his study
will be rather to restrain than encourage them, he will
at any rate, wherever he sees them in action or likely
to com e into action, use his best endeavours to avail
him self o f directing their influence, with whatever force
he can muster, to his own social purposes.
 PART THE FIFTH.

CHAPTER I.
Characters common to all these Fallacies.

U po n the whole, the following are the characters

which appertain in com m on to all the several argu­
ments here distinguished by the name o f fallacies :
1. Whatsoever be the measure in hand, they are,
with relation to it, irrelevant.
2. T hey are all o f them such, that the application
o f these irrelevant arguments, affords a presumption
either o f the weakness or total absence o f relevant ar­
guments on the side on which the}7 are employed.
3. T o any.good purpose they are all o f them un­
necessary.
4. T hey are all o f them not only capable o f being
applied, but actually in the habit o f being applied,
and with advantage, to bad purposes : viz. to the ob ­
struction and defeat o f all such measures as have for
their object and their tendency, the removal o f the
abuses or other imperfections still discernible in the
frame and practice o f the government.
5 . By means o f their irrelevancy, they all o f them
consume and misapply time, thereby obstructing the
course, and retarding the progress o f all necessary and
useful business.
360 C H A R A C T E R CO M M O N . \Ch. 1.

6 . By that irritative quality which, in virtue o f their

irrelevancy, with the improbity or weakness o f which
it is indicative, they possess, all o f them, in a degree
more or less considerable, but, in a more particular
degree such o f them as consist in personalities, they
are productive o f ill-humour, which in some instances
has been productive o f bloodshed, and is continually
productive as above, o f waste o f time and hindrance
o f business.
7. O n the part o f those who, whether in spoken or
written discourses, give utterance to them, they are
indicative either o f improbity or intellectual weakness,
or o f a contempt for the understandings o f those on
whose minds they are destined to operate.
8. O n the part o f those on whom they operate,
they are indicative o f intellectual w-eakness: and on
the part o f those in and by whom they are pretended
to operate, they are indicative o f improbity, viz. in the
shape o f insincerity.
T h e practical conclusion is, that in proportion as
the acceptance and thence the utterance o f them can
be prevented, the understanding o f the public will be
strengthened, the morals o f the public will be purified,
and the practice o f government improved.
C'h. 2.] MISCHIEF PRODUCIBLE. 361

CHAPTER II.

O f the mischief producible by Fallacies.

T h e first division that presents itself in relation to
the m ischief o f a fallacy, may be expressed by the
words specific and general.
T h e specific m ischief o f a fallacy, consists in the
tendency which it has to prevent or obstruct the intro­
duction o f this or that useful measure in particular.
T h e general mischief, consists in that moral or in­
tellectual depravation which produces habits o f false
reasoning and insincerity :— this m ischief may again
be distinguished into m ischief produced •within doors
and m ischief produced without doors.
Under the appellation o f mischief within doors, is
to be understood all that mischief, that deception,
which has its seat in the bosom o f any member o f the
supreme legislative body.
U nder the appellation o f m ischief without doors,
all that which has its seat in the bosom o f any person
not included in that body,— o f any person whose sta­
tion is among the people at large.
36 2 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. [C/i. 3.

CHAPTER III.

Causes o f the utterance o f these Fallacies.

T he causes o f the utterance o f these fallacies may,
it should seem, be thus denominated and enumerated.
1. Sinister interest— self-conscious sinister in­
terest.
2. Interest-begotten-prejudice.
3. Authority-begotten-prejudice.
4. Self-defence, i. e. sense o f the need o f self-
defence against counter fallacies.

First Cause.
Sinister interest, o f the operation o f which the party
affected by it is conscious.
T h e mind o f every public man is subject at all times
to the operation o f two distinct interests; a public and
a private one. His public interest is that which is
constituted o f the share he has in the happiness and
well-being o f the whole community, or o f the major
»
part o f it: his private interest is constituted of, or by,
the share he has in the well-being o f some portion o f
the community less than the major p a rt: o f which
private interest the smallest possible portion is that
which is com posed o f his own individual— his own
personal— interest.
In the greater number o f instances, these two inter­
ests are not only distinct, but op p osite: and that to
Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 363

such a degree, that if either be exclusively pursued, the

other must be sacrificed to it.
Take for example pecuniary interest: It is the per­
sonal interest o f every public man, at whose disposal
public money extracted by taxes from the whole com ­
munity is placed, that as large a share as possible,
and if possible the whole o f it, should remain there for
his own u se : it is at the same time the interest o f the
public, including his own portion o f the public interest,
that as small a share as possible, and if possible no
part at all, remain in these same hands for his personal
or any other private use.
Taking the whole o f life together, there exists not,
nor ever can exist, that human being in whose instance
any public interest he can have had, will not in so far
as depends upon himself, have been sacrificed to his
own personal interest. Towards the advancement o f
the public interest all that the most public-spirited,
which is as much as to say the most virtuous o f men
can do, is to do what depends upon himself towards
bringing the public interest, that is his own personal
share in the public interest, to a state as nearly ap­
proaching to coincidence, and on as few occasions
amounting to a state o f repugnance, as possible with
his private interests.
W ere there ever so much reason for regretting it,
the sort o f relation which is thus seen to have place
between public and private interest, would not be the
less tru e: nor would it be the less incumbent on the
legislator, nor would the legislator, in so fin as he finds
364 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [ 6 7 / . 3.
it reconcileable to his personal interest to pursue the
public interest, be the less disposed and determined
to act and shape his measures accordingly.
But the more correct and com plete a man’s concep­
tion o f the subject is, the more clearly will he under­
stand, that in this natural and general predominance
o f personal, over every more extensive interest, there
is no ju st cause for regret. W h y ? Because upon this
predominance depends the existence o f the species,
and the existence o f every individual belonging to it.
Suppose for a moment the opposite state o f things—
a state in which every one should prefer the public to
him self— and the consequences— the necessary con ­
sequences, would be no less ridiculous in idea, than
disastrous and destructive in reality.
In the ordinary course and strain o f legislation, no
supposition inconsistent with this only true and ra­
tional one, is acted upon. O n this supposition is
built whatsoever is done in the application made
either o f the matter o f reward, or o f the matter o f
punishment, to the purposes o f government. T h e sup­
position is— that on the part o f every individual whose
conduct it is thus endeavoured to shape and regulate,
interest, and that, private interest, will be the cause by
the operation o f which his conduct will be determined :
not only so, but that in case o f competition as be­
tween such public and such private interest, it is the
private interest that will predominate.
I f the contrary supposition were acted upon, what
would be the consequence? that neither in the shape
Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . 365
o f reward, nor in the shape o f eventual punishment,
would the precious matter o f good and evil be wasted
or exposed to waste, but (in lieu o f requisition, with
reward or punishment, or both, for its sanction, for
securing com pliance) advice and recommendation
would be em ployed throughout the system o f law pe­
nal as well as remuneratory.
Thence it is that, in so far as in the instance o f any
class o f men, the state o f the law is such as to make
it the interest o f men belonging to that body to give
rise or continuance to any system o f abuse however
flagrant, a prediction that may be made with full as­
surance is, that the conduct o f that body, that is, o f
its several members with few or no exceptions, will
be such as t6 give rise or continuance to that system
o f abuse : and if there be any means which have been
found to be, or promise to be conducive to any such
end, such means will, accordingly, how inconsistent
soever with probity in any shape, and in particular in
the shape o f sincerity, be employed.
A com m on bond o f connection, says C icero some­
where, has place among all the virtues : T o the word
virtue, substitute the word abuse, meaning abuse in
government, and the observation will be no less true.
A m ong abuses in government, besides the logical
commune vinculum com posed o f the com m on denomi­
nation abuse, there exists a moral commune vinculum
com posed o f the particular and sinister interest in
which all men who are members o f a government so
circumstanced have a share.
366 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . \Ch. 3.
So long then as any man has any, the smallest par­
ticle o f this sinister interest belonging to him— so long
has he an interest, and consequently a fellow-feeling
with every other man who in the same situation has
an interest o f the like kind. Attack one o f them, you
attack a l l ; and in proportion as each o f them feels
his share in this com m on concern dear to him, and
finds himself in a condition to defend it, he is prepared
to defend every other confederate’s share with no less
alacrity than if it were his own. But it is one o f the
characteristics o f abuse, that it can only be defended
by fallacy. It is, therefore, the interest o f all the con ­
federates o f abuse to give the most extensive currency
to fallacies, not only to such as may be serviceable to
each individual, but also to such as may be generally
useful.' It is o f the utmost importance to them to keep
the human mind in such a state o f imbecility, as shall
render it incapable o f distinguishing truth from error.
Abuses, that is to say institutions beneficial to the
few, at the expense o f the many, cannot openly, di­
rectly, and in their own character, be defended. If
at all, it must be in company with, and under the
cover o f other institutions to which this character
either does not in fact appertain, or is not seen to ap­
pertain.
For the few who are in possession o f power, the
principle the best adapted, if it were capable o f being
set to work, would.be that which should be applicable
to the purpose o f giving to the stock o f abuses esta­
blished at each given period, an unlimited increase.
C/i. 3] CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . 367
N o longer than about a century ago a principle o f
this cast actually was in force, and that to an extent
that threatened the whole frame o f society with ruin :
viz. under the name o f the principle o f passive obe­
dience and non-resistance.
This principle was a primum mobile, by the due ap­
plication o f which, abuses in all shapes might be ma­
nufactured for use to an amount absolutely unlimited.
But this principle has now nearly, if not altogether,
lost its force. T he creation o f abuses has, therefore,
o f necessity been given up ; the preservation o f them
is all that remains feasible: it is to this work that all
exertions in favour o f abuse have for a considerable
time past, and must henceforward be confined.
Institutions, some good, some bad— some favour­
able to both the few and the many ; some favourable
to the few alone, and at the expense o f the many—
are the ingredients o f which the existing system is com ­
posed. H e who protects all together, and without
discrimination, protects the bad. T o this object the
exertions o f industry are still capable o f being directed
with a prospect o f success: and to this object they
actually do continue to be directed, and with a degree
o f success disgraceful to the probity o f the few by
whom such breach o f trust is practised, and to the
intellect o f the many by whom it is endured.
I f the fundamental principle o f all good govern­
ment, viz. that which states as being on every occa ­
sion the proper, and the only proper end in view and
object o f pursuit, the greatest happiness o f the greatest
368 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [Ch. S .
number, were on every occasion set up as the m ark;
on each occasion the particular question would be,
by what particular means can this general object be
pursued with the greatest probability o f success ?
But by the habit o f recurring to and making appli­
cation o f this one principle, the eye o f the inquirer,
the tongue o f the speaker, and the pen o f the writer,
would, on every part o f the field o f legislation, be
brought to some conclusion, passing condemnation on
some or other o f those abuses, the continuance o f
which has this com m on interest for its support.
In a word, so long as any one o f these relatively
profitable abuses continues unremedied,— so long
must there be one such person or more to whose in­
terest the use o f reason is prejudicial, and to whom
not only the particular beneficial measure from which
that particular abuse would receive its correction, but
every other beneficial measure, in so far as it is
supported by reason, will also be prejudicial in the
Same way.
It is under the past and still existing state o f
things,— in other words, under the dominion o f usage,
custom, precedent, acting without any such recurrence
to this only true principle,— that the abuses in ques­
tion have sprung up. Custom, therefore, blind cus­
tom, in contradiction and opposition to reason, is the
standard which he will on every occasion endea­
vour to set up as the only proper, safe, and definable
standard o f reference. Whatever is, is right: every
thing is at it should be. These are his favourite
Ch. 3.] CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . 369
niaxiins— maxims which he will let slip no opportu­
nity o f inculcating to the best advantage possible.
Having, besides his share in the sinister interest, his
share in the universal and legitimate interest, there
must, to a corresponding extent, be laws and institu­
tions, which, although good and beneficial, are no less
beneficial to and necessary to his interest, than to that
o f the whole community o f which he makes a part.
O f these, then, in so far as they are necessary to
his interest, he will be as sincere and strenuous a
defender, as o f those by which any part o f the abuses
w hich are subservient to his sinister interest is main­
tained.
It is conducive, for instance, to his interest, that
the country should be effectually defended against the
assault o f the com m on e n e m y : that the persons and
properties o f the members o f the community in gene­
ral, his own included, should be as effectually as pos­
sible protected against the assaults o f internal ene­
mies— o f com m on malefactors.
But it is under the dominion o f custom, blind or
at best purblind custom — that such protection has
been provided. Custom , therefore, being sufficient
for his purpose, Reason always adverse to it, Cus­
tom is the ground on which it will be his endeavour
to place every institution, the good as well as the bad.
Referred to general utility as their standard, shown
to be conform able to it by the application o f reason
to the case, they would be established and supported,
2 c
37 0 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [C h. 3 .

indeed, on firmer ground than at present. But by

placing them on the ground o f utility, by the applica­
tion o f reason, he has nothing to gain, while, as hath
been seen above, he has every thing to lose and fear
from it.
T h e principle o f general utility he will accord­
ingly be disposed to represent in the character o f “ a
dangerous p r i n c i p l e for so long as blind custom
continues to serve his purpose, such, with reference
to him and his sinister interest, the principle o f general
utility really is.
Against the recognition o f the principle o f general
utility, and the habit o f em ploying reason as an in­
strument for the application o f it, the leading mem­
bers o f the Government, in so far as corruption has
pervaded the frame o f Governm ent, and in particular
the members o f all ranks o f the profession o f the law,
have the same interest as in the eyes o f Protestants
and other non-catholics, the P ope and his subordi­
nates had at the time and on the occasion o f the
change known in England by the name o f the R e -
form ation.
A t the time o f the Reformation, tire opposition to
general utility and human reason was conducted by
fire and sword. A t present, the war against these
powers can not be com pletely carried on by the same
engines.
Fallacies, therefore, applied principally to the pur­
pose o f devoting to contempt and hatred-those who
Sect. .]
1 CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 371
apply the principle o f general utility on this ground,
remain the only instruments in universal use and re­
quest for defending the strongholds o f abuse against
hostile powers.
These engines we; accordingly, see applied to this
purpose in prodigious variety, and with more or less
artifice and reserve;

2 B 2
3 7 .2 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [Ch. 4 .

CHAPTER IV .

Second Cause.

Interest-begotten Prejudice.

I f by interest in som e shape or other, that is by a

motive o f one sort or other, every act o f the will
and thence every act o f the hand is produced, so di­
rectly or indirectly must every act o f the intellectual
faculty : though in this case the influence o f the in­
terest, o f this or that motive, is neither so perceptible
nor in itself so direct as in the other.
But how (it may be asked) is it possible that the
m otive a man is actuated by can be secret to him self?
N othing is more easy— nothing more frequent. In­
deed the rare case is, not that o f his not knowing,
but that o f his knowing it.
It is with the anatomy o f the human mind, as with
the anatomy and physiology o f the human b od y: the
rare case is, not, that o f a man’s being unconversant,
but that o f his being conversant with it.
T h e physiology o f the body is not without its diffi­
culties : but in com parison o f those by which the
knowledge o f the physiology o f the mind has been
obstructed, the difficulties are slight indeed.
N o t unfrequently, as between tw o persons living
together in a state o f intimacy, either or each may pos­
sess a more correct and com plete view o f the motives
Ch. 4 . ] CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . 373

by which the mind o f the other, than o f those by which

his own mind is governed.
M any a woman has in this way had a more cor­
rect and com plete acquaintance with the internal
causes by which the conduct o f her husband has been
determined, than he has had himself.
T h e cause o f this is easily pointed out. By interest,
a man is continually prompted to make him self as
correctly and com pletely acquainted as possible with
the springs o f action, by which the minds o f those are
determined on whom he is more or less dependent for
the com fort o f his life.
But by interest he is at the same time diverted from
any close examination into the springs by which his
own conduct is determined.
From such knowledge he has not, in any ordinary
shape, any thing to gain,— he finds not in it any
source o f enjoyment.
In any such knowledge he would be more likely to
find mortification than satisfaction. T h e purely social
motives, the semi-social motives, and, in the case o f
the dissocial motives, such o f them as have their source
in an impulse given by the purely social or by the
semi-social motives a ; these are the motives, the pre­
valence o f which he finds mentioned as matter o f
praise in the instance o f other men : it is by the sup­
posed prevalence o f these amiable motives that he
finds reputation raised, and that respect and good-w ill

* See Introduction to Morals and Legislation.

374 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [ C/l. 4

in which every man is obliged to look for so large a

portion o f the com fort o f his life.
In these same amiable and desirable endowments he
finds the minds o f other men actually abounding and
overflow ing: abounding during their lifetime by the
testimony o f their friends, and after their departure by
the recorded testimony unregistered in som e monthly
magazine, with the acclamation o f their friends, and
with scarce a dissenting voice from am ong their ene­
mies.
But the m ore closely he looks into the mechanism
o f his own mind, the less o f the mass o f effects pro­
duced he finds referable to any o f those amiable and
delightful causes; he finds nothing, therefore, to attract
him towards this study, he finds much to repel him
from it.
Praise and self-satisfaction, on the score o f moral
worth, being accordingly hopeless, it is in intellectual
that he will seek for it. “ A ll men who are actuated
by regard for any thing but self, are fools ; those only,
whose regard is confined to self, are wise. I am o f
the number o f the wise.”
Perhaps he is a man with whom a large proportion
o f the self-regarding motives may be mixed up with
a slight tincture o f the social motives operating upon
the private scale. W hat in this case will he d o ? In
investigating the source o f a given action, he will in
the first instance set it down, the whole o f it, to the
account o f the amiable and conciliatory, in a word,
the social motives. This, in the study o f his own
Ch. 4 .] CAUSES o r UTTERANCE. 375
mental physiology, will always be his first step, and
this will com m only be his last. W h y should he look
further ? W h y take in hand the probe ? W h y unde­
ceive himself, and substitute a whole truth, that would
mortify him, for a half truth that flatters him ?
T h e greater the share which the motives o f the so­
cial class have in the production o f the general tenour
o f a man’s conduct, the less irksome it seems evident
this sort o f psychological self-anatomy will be. The
first view is pleasing ; and the more virtuous the man,
the more pleasing is that study, which to every man
has been pronounced the proper one.
But the less irksome any pursuit is, the greater, if
the state o f faculties, intellectual and active permit,
will be a man’s progress in it.
376 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [67/. 5.

CHAPTER V.

Third Cause.
Authority-begotten Prejudice.
Prejudice is the name given to an opinion o f any
sort, on any subject, when considered as having been
embraced without sufficient examination : it is a ju d g ­
ment, which being pronounced before evidence, is,
therefore, pronounced without evidence.
N o w , at the hazard o f being deceived, and by de­
ception led into a line o f conduct prejudicial cither
to himself or to som e one to whom it would rather be
his wish to d o service, what is it that could lead a
man to embrace an opinion without sufficient exami­
nation ?
O ne cause is the uneasiness attendant on the labour
o f exam ination: he takes the opinion up as true, to
save the labour that might be necessary to enable him
to discern the falsity o f it.
O f the propensity to take not only facts but opinions
upon trust, the universality is matter o f universal o b ­
servation. Pernicious as it is in som e o f its applica­
tions, it has its root in necessity, in the weakness o f
the human mind. In the instance o f each indivi­
dual, the quantity o f opinion which it is possible for
him to give acceptance or rejection to, on the ground
o f examination performed by himself, bears but a
Ch. 5.] CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . 377
small proportion to that in which such judgm ent, as
he passes upon it, cannot have any firmer or other
ground than that which is com posed o f the like ju d g­
ment pronounced by some other individual or aggre­
gate o f individuals: the cases, in which it is possible
for his opin iou to be home-made, bear but a small pro­
portion to the cases in which, if any opinion at all be
entertained by him, that opinion must necessarily have
been imported.
But in the case o f the public man, this necessity
forms no justification either for the utterance or for
the acceptance o f such arguments o f base alloy, as
those which arc represented under the name o f fal­
lacies.
These fallacies are not less the offspring o f sinister
interest because the force o f authority is more or less
concerned. W here authority has a share in the pro­
duction o f them, there are two distinguishable ways in
which sinister interest inay also have its share.
A fallacy which, in the mouth o f A ., had its root
immediately in interest,— in self-conscious sinister in­
terest,— receiving utterance from his pen or his lips,
obtains, upon the credit o f his authority, credence
am ong acceptors in any multitude. Having thus
rooted itself in the minds o f men, it becom es consti­
tutive o f a mass o f authority, under favour o f which,
such fallacies as appear conducive to the planting or
rooting in the minds o f men in general the erroneous
notion in question, obtain, at the hands o f other men,
utterance and acceptance.
378 causes or utterance . [ Ch. 5 .

2 . Having received the prejudice at the hands o f

authority, viz. o f the opinion o f those whose adherence
to it was produced immediately or mediately by the
operation o f sinister interest,— sinister interest ope­
rating on the mind o f the utterer or acceptor o f the fal­
lacy in question, prompts him to bestow on it, in the
character o f a rational argument, a degree o f attention
exceeding that which could otherwise have been be­
stowed on i t ; he fixes, accordingly, his attention on
all considerations, the tendency o f which is to procure
for it utterance or acceptance, and keeps at a distance
all considerations by which the contrary tendency is
threatened.
Ch. 6.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 379

CHAPTER VI .

Fourth Cause.

Self-defence against counter Fallacies.

T h e opposers o f a pernicious measure may be

sometimes driven to em ploy fallacies, from their sup­
posed utility as an answer to counter fallacies.
“ Such is the nature o f men (they may say), that
these arguments, weak and inconclusive as they arc,
are those which on the bulk o f the people (upon whom
ultimately every thing depends) make the strongest
and most effectual im pression: the measure is a most
mischievous one : it were a crime on our parts to leave
unemployed any means not criminal that promise to
be contributory to its defeat. It is the weakness o f
the public mind, not the weakness o f our cause, that
com pels us to employ such engines in the defence
o f it.”
This defence might, indeed, be satisfactory where
the fallacies in question are em ployed,— not as sub­
stitutes but only as supplements ro relevant and direct
ones.
But if em ployed as supplements, to prove their be­
ing em ployed in that character and in that character
only, and that the use thus made o f them is not in­
consistent with sincerity, two conditions seem requisite.
1. That arguments o f the direct and relevant kind
380 CAUSES OF U T T E R A N C E . [ Cll. 6.

be placed in the front o f the battle, declared to be the

main arguments, the arguments and considerations by
which the opposition or support to the proposed m ea­
sure was produced ;
2. That on the occasion o f em ploying the fallacies
in question, an acknowledgement should he made o f
their true character, o f their intrinsic weakness, and
o f the considerations which, as above, seemed to im­
pose on the individual in question the obligation o f
em ploying them, and o f the regret with which the
consciousness o f such an obligation was accom panied.
If, even when em ployed in opposition to a measure
really pernicious, these warnings are omitted to be
annexed to them, the omission affords but too strong
a presumption o f general insincerity. On the occasion
in question, a man would have nothing to fear from
any avowal made o f their true character. Y e t he
omits to make this avowal. W h y ?— Because he fore­
sees that, on som e other occasion or occasions, argu­
ments o f this class will constitute his sole reliance.
T h e more closely the above considerations are ad­
verted to, the stronger is the p ro o f which the use o f
such arguments, without such warnings, will be seen
to afford o f improbity or imbecility, or a mixture o f
the two, on the part o f him by whom they are em ­
ployed : o f imbecility o f mind, if the weakness o f such
arguments has really failed o f becom ing visible to h im :
o f improbity, if, conscious o f their weakness, and o f
their tendency to debilitate and pervert the faculties,
intellectual and moral, o f such persons as are swayed
Ch.6.] CAUSES OF UTTERANCE. 381
by them,— he gives currency to them unaccompanied
by such warning.
Is it o f the one or o f the other species o f imperfec­
tion, or o f a mixture o f both, that such deceptious
argumentation is evidentiary ? O n this occasion, as on
others, the answer is not easy, nor fortunately is
it material, to estimate the connexion between these
two divisions o f the mental frame ; so constantly and
so materially does each o f them exert an influence on
the other, that it is difficult for either to suffer but the
other must suffer more or less along with it. O n many
a well-meaning man this base and spurious metal has
no doubt passed for sterling; but if you see it bur­
nished, and held up in triumph by the hands o f a man
o f strong as well as brilliant talents— by a very master
o f the mint— set him down, without fear o f injuring
him, upon the list o f those who deceive without having
any such excuse to plead as that o f having been de­
ceived.
382 USE OF FALLACIES. [C /l. 7.

CHAPTER VII.

Use o f these Fallacies to the utterers and acceptors o f

them.
B e i n g all o f them to such a degree replete with
absurdity— many o f them upon the face o f them co m ­
posed o f nothing else— a question that naturally pre­
sents itself is, how it has happened that they have ac­
quired so extensive a currency ?— how it is that so
much use has been made, and continues to be made,
o f them.
Is it credible (it may be asked) that, to those by
whom they are em ployed, the inanity and absurdity
o f them should not be fully manifest?— Is it credible,
that on such grounds political measures should pro­
ceed ?
N o , it is not credible : to the very person by whom
the fallacy is presented in the character o f a reason—
o f a reason on the consideration o f which his opinion
lias been formed, and on the strength o f which his
conduct is grounded,— it has presented itself in its
genuine colours.
But in all assemblies in which shares in power are
exercised by votes, there are two descriptions o f per­
sons whose convenience requires to be consulted,—
that o f the speakers and that o f the hearers.
T o the convenience o f persons in both these situa­
tions, the class o f arguments here in question are in
Ch. 7 .] U SE OF FALLACIES. 3S3

an eminent degree favourable: 1. A s to the situation

o f the speaker :— the more numerous and efficient the
titles to respect which his argument enables him to
produce, the more convenient and agreeable is that
situation made to him. Probity in the shape o f inde­
pendence— superiority in the article o f wisdom— su­
periority in the scale o f rank— o f all these qualities,
the reputation is matter o f convenience to a man ; and
o f all these qualities, the reputation is by these argu­
ments promised to be made secure.
1. A s to independence :— when a man stands up to
speak for tiie purpose o f reconciling men to the vote
he purposes to give, or for the purpose o f giving, to
the side which he espouses whatsoever weight is re­
garded by him as attached to his authority; the nature
o f the purpose imposes on him a sort o f necessity o f
linding something in the shape o f a reason to accom ­
pany and recommend it.
Though in fact directed and governed by some
other will behind the curtain, and by the interest by
which that other will is governed, decency is under­
stood to require, that it is from his own understanding,
not from the will o f any other person, that his own
will should be understood to have received its direc­
tion.
But it is not by the matter o f punishment or the
matter o freward — it is not by fears or hopes— it is
not by threats or promises— it is by something o f the
nature, or in the shape at least o f a reason, that un­
derstanding is ogoverned and determined. T o show,7
384 USE OF FA L L A C IE S . [Ck. 7.
then, that it is by the determination o f his own ju d g ­
ment that his conduct is determined, it is deemed ad­
visable to produce som e observation or other in the
character o f the determinate reason, from which on the
occasion in question, his judgm ent, and thence his will
and active faculty, have received their direction.
T h e argument is accordingly produced, and by this
exhibit, the independent character o f his mind is esta­
blished by irrefragable evidence.
T o this purpose every article in the preceding cata­
logue may with m ore or less effect be made to serve,
according to the nature o f the case.
2. N ext, as to superiority in the scale o f wisdom :
— on running over the list, different articles will be
seen to present in this respect different degrees o f con ­
venience.
Som e o f them will be seen scarcely putting in any
special title to this praise.
In others, while the reputation o f prudence is se­
cured, yet it is that sort o f prudence which, by the
timidity attached to it, is rendered somewhat the less
acceptable to an erect and com m anding mind.
T o this class may be referred the arguments ad
metum and ad verecitndiatn, — the hydrophobia o f inno­
vation, the argument o f the ghost-seer, whose nervous
system is kept in a state o f constant agitation by the
phantom o f Jacobinism dancing before his eyes,— the
idolator, w ho, beholding in ancestry, in authority, in
allegorical personages o f various sorts and sizes, in
precedents o f all sorts, in great characters dead and
Ch. 7 .J u s e OF FALLACIES. 38 .1

living, placed in high situations, so many tyrants to

whose will, real or supposed, blind obsequiousness at
the hands o f the vulgar o f all classes, may bv apt c e ­
remonies and gesticulation be secured, makes him self
the first prostration, in the hope and confidence o f
finding it followed by much and still more devout
prostration, on the part o f the crew o f inferior idola­
ters, in whose breasts the required obsequiousness has
been implanted by long practice.
Other arguments again there are, in and for the
delivery o f which the wisdom o f the orator places
itself upon higher ground. His acuteness has pene­
trated to the very bottom o f the subject— his com pre­
hension has embraced the whole mass o f it— his adroit­
ness has stripped the obnoxious proposal o f the delu­
sive colouring by which it had recomm ended itself to
the eye o f ign oran ce: he pronounces it speculative,
theoretical, romantic, visionary : it may be good in
theory, but it would be bad in practice : it is too good
to be practicable, the goodness which glitters on the
outside is sufficient proof, is evidence, and that con ­
clusive, o f the worthlessness that is within : its appa­
rent facility suffices to prove it to be impracticable.
The confidence o f the tone in which the decision is
conveyed, is at once the fruit and the sufficient evi­
dence o f the com plete command which the glance o f
the moment sufficed to give him o f the subject in all
its bearings and dependences. By the experience
which his situation has led him to acquire, and the
use which his judgm ent has enabled him to make o f
*2 C
386 USE OF F A L L A C IE S . [CA . 7.

that experience, he catches up at a single glance those

features which suffice to indicate the class to which
the obnoxious proposal belongs.
By the same decision delivered in the same tone,
superiority o f rank is not less strikingly displayed than
superiority o f talent. It is no new observation how
much the persuasion, or at least the expression given
to it, is strengthened by the altitude o f the rank as con­
stituted or accom panied by the fullness o f the purse.
T h e labour o f the brain, no less than that o f the
hand, is a species o f drudgery which the man o f ele­
vated station sees the propriety and facility o f turning
over to the base-born crow d below— to the set o f
plodders whom he condescends upon occasion to
honour with his conversation and his countenance.
By his rank and opulence he is enabled in this, as in
other ways, to pick and choose what is most congenial
to his taste. By the royal hand o f Frederic, philoso­
phers and oranges were subjected to the same treat­
ment and put to the same use. T h e sweets, the ela­
boration o f which had been the work o f years, were
elicited in a few moments by the pressure o f an expert
hand.
T h e praise o f the receiver o f wisdom is always in­
ferior to that o f the utterer; but neither is the receiver,
so he but make due profit o f what he receives, without
his praise.
T h e advantage he acquires from these arguments,
is, that o f being enabled to give the reason o f the faith
that is, or is supposed to be, in him.
C/t. 7 .] t.'SK OF FALLACIES. 3S7

In some circumstances in which silence will not

serve a man, it will, and to a certainty, be construed
into a confession o f self-convicting consciousness;—
consciousness that what he does is wrong and inde­
fensible :—
' that what he O wives men to understand to be
his opinion, is not really his opinion ;— that o f the sup­
posed facts, which he has been asserting to form an
apparent foundation for his supposed opinion, the ex­
istence is not true.
By a persuasion to any such effect, on the part o f
those with whom he has to do, his credit, his reputa­
tion, would be effectually destroyed.
Something, therefore, must be said, o f which it
may be supposed that, how little soever may be the
weight properly belonging to it, it may have operated
on his mind in the character o f a reason. By this
means his reputation for wisdom is all that is exposed
to suffer;— his reputation for probity is saved.
Thus, in the case of this sort o f base argument, as
sometimes in the case o f bad money, each man passes
it o ff upon his neighbour, not as being unconscious o f
its worthlessness— not so much as expecting his neigh­
bour to be really insensible o f its worthlessness— but
in the hope and expectation that the neighbour, though
not insensible o f its worthlessness, may yet not find
himself altogether debarred from the supposition, that
to the utterer o f the base argument, the badness o f it
may possibly not have been clearly understood.
But the more generally current in the character o f
an argument any such absurd notion is, the greater is
n
r1
Am t O -m l
S88 USE OF F A L L A C IE S . [Ch. 7.
the apparent probability o f its being really entertained:
for there is no notion, actual or imaginable, that a
man cannot be brought to entertain, if he be but satis-
tied o f its being generally or extensively entertained
by others.
Ch. 8 .] PARTICU LAR DEMAND. 389

CHAPTER V III.

Particular demandfor Fallacies under the E?igiish

Constitution.
T w o considerations will suffice to render it appa­
rent that, under the British Constitution, there cannot
but exist, on the one hand, such a demand for falla­
cies, and, on the other hand, such a supply o f them,
as for copiousness and variety, taken together, cannot
be to be matched elsewhere.
1. In the first place, a thing necessary to the exist­
ence o f the demand is discussion to a certain degree
free.
W here there are no such institutions as a popular
assembly taking an efficient part in the Government,
and publishing or suffering to be published accounts
o f its debates,— nor yet any free discussion through
the medium o f the press,— there is, consequently, no
demand for fallacies. Fallacy is fraud, and fraud is
useless when every thing may be done by force.
T he only case which can enter into comparison
with the English Government, is that o f the United
Anglo-A m erican States.
There, on the side o f the Outs , the demand for fal­
lacies stands without any difference worth noticing, on
a footing similar to that on which it stands under the
English Constitution.
390 PARTICU LAR DEMAND. [67/. 8.

But the side o f the Outs is that side on which the

demand for fallacies is by much the least urgent and
abundant.
O n the side o f the Ins, the demand for fallacies
depends upon the aggregate mass o f abu se: its mag­
nitude and urgency depend upon the magnitude o f
that mass, and its variety upon the variety o f the
shapes in w-hich abuse has manifested itself.
O n crossing the water, fortune gave to British
A m erica the relief that policy gave to the f o x ; o f the
vermin by w'hich she had been tormented, a part
were left behind.
N o d eaf auditors o f the Exchequer : no blind sur­
veyors o f melting iron s: no non-registering registrars o f
the Adm iralty Court, or o f any other judicatory : no
tellers, by whom no money is told but that which is
received into their own p o ck e ts : no ju dge acting as
clerk under h im se lf: no ju d g e pocketing 7 0 0 0 /.
a-year, for useless work, for which men are forced to
address his clerks. N o ju dge, who, in the character
o f ju dge over himself, sits in one place to protect, by
storms o f fallacy and fury, the extortions and o p ­
pressions habitually com m itted in an oth er: no tithe-
gatherers exacting immense retribution for minute or
never rendered service.
W ith respect to the whole class o f fallacies built
upon authority, precedent, wisdom o f ancestors, dread
o f innovation, immutable laws, and many others, o c ­
casioned by ancient ignorance and ancient abuses,
what readers soever there may be, by whom w'hat is to
Ck. 8.] PARTICULAR DEMAND. 391
be found under those several heads has been perused,
to them it will readily occur, that in the Am erican
Congress the use made o f these fallacies is not likely
to be so copious as in that August Assem bly, which,
as the only denomination it can with propriety be
called by, has been pleased to give itself that o f the
Imperial Parliament o f G reat Britain and Ireland.
392 DEMAND HOW CH EATED. \Ch. 9.

CHAPTER IX .

The demandf o r P olitical Fallacies: — how created by

the state o f interests.

I n order to have a clear view o f the object to

which political fallacies will, in the greatest number
o f instances, be found to be directed, it will be neces­
sary to advert to the state in which, with an exception
comparatively inconsiderable, the business o f G overn­
ment ever has been, and still continues to be, in every
country upon earth : and for this purpose must here
be brought to view a few positions, the p roof o f which,
i f they require any, would require too large a quantity
o f matter for this place : positions which, if not imme­
diately assented to, will at an}’ rate, even by tho^p
w hom they find most averse, be allowed to possess
the highest claim to attention and examination.
1. T h e end or object in view to which every p o ­
litical measure, whether established or proposed, ought
according to the extent o f it to be directed, is the great­
est happiness o f the greatest number o f persons inter­
ested in it, and that, for the greatest length o f time.
2. Unless the U nited States o f N orth A m erica be
virtually an exception, in every known state the hap­
piness o f the many has been at the absolute disposal
either o f the one or o f the comparatively few.
3. In every human breast, rare and short-lived
ebullitions, the result o f som e extraordinary strong
C / i. 9 .] D E M A N D HOW C R E A TE D . 393

stimulus or incitement, excepted, self-regarding in­

terest is predominant over social interest: each per­
son’s own individual interest, over the interests o f all
other persons taken together.
4. In the few instances, if any, in wdiich, through­
out the whole tenour or the general tenour o f his life,
a person sacrifices his own individual interest to that
o f any other person or persons, such person or persons
will be, a person or persons with whom he is con ­
nected by som e domestic or other private and narrow
tie o f sym pathy; not the whole number, or the majority
o f the whole number, o f the individuals o f which the
political community to which he belongs is com posed.
5. I f in any political community there be any indi­
viduals by whom, for a constancy, the interests o f all
the other members put together, are preferred to the
interest com posed o f their own individual interest, and
that o f the few persons particularly connected with them,
these public-spirited individuals will be so few, and at
the same time so impossible to distinguish from the
rest, that to every practical purpose they may, without
any practical error, be laid out o f the account.
6. In this general predominance o f self-regarding
over social interest, when attentively considered, there
will not be found any just subject o f regret any more
than o f contestation : for it will be found, that but for
this predominance, no such species as that which we
belong to could have existence: and that, supposing it,
if possible, done away, in so much that all persons or
most persons should find respectively, some one or more
394 D E M A N D HOW CHEATED. [Ch. 9.
persons, whose interest was respectively, through the
whole o f life, dearer to them, and as such more
anxiously and constantly watched over than their own,
the whole species w'ould necessarily, within a very
short space o f time, becom e extinct.
7. I f this be true, it follow s, by the unchangeable
constitution o f human nature, that in every political
com m unity, by the hands by which the supreme pow er
over all the other members o f the com m unity is
shared, the interest o f the many over whom the power
is exercised, will, on every occasion, in case o f com ­
petition, be in act or in endeavour sacrified to the
particular interest o f those by whom the power is
exercised.
8. But every arrangement by which the interest o f
the many is sacrificed to that o f the few, may, with
unquestionable propriety, if the above position be ad­
mitted, and to the extent o f the sacrifice, be termed a
bad arrangem ent: indeed, the only sort o f bad ar­
rangement : those excepted, by which the interest o f
both parties is sacrificed.
9- A bad arrangement, considered as already esta­
blished and in existence, is, or may be termed, an
abuse.
10. I n s o fa r as any com petition is seen, or supposed
to have place, the interests o f the subject many, being
on every occasion, as above, in act or in endeavour
constantly sacrificed by the ruling few to their own
particular interests, hence, with the ruling few, a con ­
stant object o f study and endeavour, is, the preservation
Ch. 9•] DEMAND HOW CREATED. 395
and extension o f the mass o f a b u se: at any rate such
is tiie constant propensity.
11. In the mass o f abuse, which, because it is so
constantly their interest, it is constantly their endea­
vour to preserve, is included not only that portion from
which they derive a direct and assignable profit, but
also that portion from which they d o not derive any
such profit. F or the mischievousness o f that from
which they do not derive any such direct and particu­
lar profit, cannot be exposed but by facts and ob ­
servations, which, i f pursued, would be found to ap­
ply also to that portion from which they do derive
direct and particular profit. Thus it is, that in every
community all men in power, or, in one word, the
In s , are, by self-regarding interest, constantly engaged
in the maintenance o f abuse in every shape in which
they find it established.
12. But whatsoever the In s have in possession, the
O u ts have in expectancy. Thus far, therefore, there
is no distinction between the sinister interests o f the
In s and those o f the O u ts, nor, consequently, in the
fallacies by which they respectively em ploy their en­
deavours in the support o f their respective sinister
interests.
13. Thus far the interests o f the Outs coincide with
the interest o f the Ins. But there are other points in
which their interests are opposite. For procuring for
themselves the situations and mass o f advantages pos­
sessed by the Ins, the Outs have one and but one
m ode o f proceeding. This is the raising their own
3^6 DEMAND IIOW C R E A T E D . [ Ch. 9 -

place in the scale o f political reputation, as com pared

with that o f the Ins. For effecting this ascendancy,
they have accordingly two correspondent inodes :— the
raising their own, and the depreciating that o f their
successful rivals.
14. In addition to that particular and sinister in­
terest which belongs to them in their quality o f ruling
members, these rivals have their share in the universal
interest which belongs to them in their quality o f
members o f the com m unity at large. In this quality,
they are sometimes occupied in such measures as in
their eyes are necessary for the maintenance o f the
universal interest;— for the preservation o f that portion
o f the universal happiness o f which their regard for
their own interests does not seem to require the sacri­
fice : for the preservation, and also for the increase o f
i t : for by every increase given to it, they derive ad­
vantage to themselves, not only in that character
which is com m on to them with all the other members
o f the community, but, in the shape o f reputation, in
that character o f ruling members which is peculiar to
themselves.
15. But, in whatsoever shape the Ins derive repu­
tation to themselves, and thus raise themselves to a
higher level in the scale o f comparative reputation, it
is the interest o f the Outs as such, not only to prevent
them from obtaining this rise, but if possible, and as
far as possible, to cause their reputation to sink.
H ence on the part o f the Outs there exists a constant
tendency to oppose all good arrangements proposed
Ch. 9 - ] D E M A N D HOW C R E A T E D . 397
by the Ins. But generally speaking, the better an ar­
rangement really is, the better it will generally be
thought to b e ; and the better it is thought to be, the
higher will the reputation o f its supporters be raised
by it. I n so far, therefore, as it is in their power, the
better a new arrangement proposed by the Ins is, the
stronger is the interest by which the Outs are incited
to oppose it. But the more obviously and indisputa­
bly good it is when considered in itself, the more in­
capable it is o f being successfully opposed in the way
o f argument otherwise than by fallacies; and hence
in the aggregate mass o f political fallacies, may be
seen the character and general description o f that
portion o f it which is em ployed chiefly by the Outs.
16. In respect and to the extent o f their share in
the universal interest, an arrangement which is bene­
ficial to that interest will be beneficial to them selves:
and thus, supposing it successful, the opposition made
by them to the arrangement would be prejudicial to
themselves. O n the supposition, therefore, o f the
success o f such opposition, they would have to con ­
sider which in their eyes would be the greater ad­
vantage— their share in the advantage o f the arrange­
ment, or the advantage promised to them by the rise
o f their place in the comparative scale o f reputation,
by the elevation given to themselves, and the depres­
sion caused to their adversaries.
But generally speaking, in a Constitution such as
the English in its present state, the chances are in a
S9S D E M A N H H O W C R E A T EI). [Ch. 9 .
prodigious degree against the success o f any o p p o ­
sition made by the Outs to even the most flagrantly
bad measure o f the Ins : much more, o f course, to a
really good one. H ence it is, that when the arrange­
ment is in itself good, if with any prospect o f success
or advantage, any o f the fallacies belonging to their
side can be brought up against the arrangement, and
this without prejudice to their own reputation,— they
have nothing to stand in the way o f the attempt.
17. In respect o f those bad arrangements which
by their sinister interest the Ins stand engaged to
prom ote, and in the prom otion o f which the Outs
have, as above, a com m unity o f interest,— the part
dictated by their sinister interest is a curious and
delicate one. By success, they would lessen that
mass o f sinister advantage which, being that o f their
antagonists in possession, is theirs in expectancy.
T h ey have, therefore, their option to make between
this disadvantage and the advantage attached to a
correspondent advance in the scale o f comparative
reputation. But, their situation securing to them little
less than a certainty o f failure, they are, therefore, as
to this matter, pretty well at their ease. A t the same
time, seeing that whatsoever diminution from the
mass o f abuse they were to propose in the situation o f
Outs, they could not without loss o f reputation, unless
for som e satisfactory reason, avoid bringing forward,
or at least supporting, in the event o f their changing
places with the Ins,— hence it is, that any such defal­
Ch. .9.] DEMAND HOW CREATED. 399

cation which they can in general prevail upon them­

selves to propose, will in general be either spurious
and fallacious, or at best inadequate :— inadequate,—
and by its inadequacy, and the virtual confession in­
volved in it, giving support and confirmation to every
portion o f kindred abuse which it leaves untouched.
400 PARIS PEAK ABLE. [Ch. 10.

CHAPTER X.

Different parts which may be borne in relation to

Fallacies.
A s in the case o f bad money, so in the case o f bad
arguments, in the sort and degree o f currency which
they experience, different persons acting so many dif­
ferent parts are distinguishable.
Fabricator, utterer , acceptor: these are the dif­
ferent parts acted in the currency given to a bad shil­
ling : these are the parts acted on the occasion o f the
currency given to a bad argument.
In the case o f a bad argument, he who is fabricator
must be utterer likewise, or in general it would not
make its appearance. But for one fabricator, who is
an utterer, there may be utterers in any number, no
one o f whom was fabricator.
In the case o f the bad argument, as in the case o f
the bad shilling, in the instance o f each actor, the
mind is, with reference to the nature and tendency o f
the transaction, capable o f bearing different aspects,
which, for purposes o f practical importance, it becomes
material to distinguish.
1. Evil consciousness, (in the language o f Rom an
lawyers dolus; in the language o f Rom an and thence
o f English lawyers mala jides ) : blameable ignorance
temerity , (in the
or inattention, say in one word, 2.
same language sometimes culpa, sometimes temeritas ) :
Ch. 10.] PARTS BEARABLE. 401

3. Blameless agency, actus; which, notwithstanding

an ym isch ief that may have been the casual result o f
it, was free o f b la m e:— by these several denomina­
tions are characterized so many habitudes, o f which,
with relation to any pernicious result, the mind is
susceptible.
In the case o f the argument, as in the case o f the
shilling, where the mind is in that state in which the
charge o f evil-consciousness may with propriety be
made, that which the man is conscious of, is, the bad­
ness o f the article which he has in hand.
In general it is in the case o f the fabricator , that
the mind is least apt to be free from the imputation
o f evil-consciousness. Be it the bad shilling, be it the
bad argument, the making o f it will have cost more
or less trou ble; which trouble, generally speaking, the
fabricator will not have taken but in the design o f ut­
terance, and in the expectation o f making, by means
o f such utterance, some advantage. In the instance
o f the bad shilling, it is certain ; in the instance o f the
bad argument, it is more or less probable (m ore pro­
bable in the case o f the fabricator than in the case o f
the mere utterer) that the badness o f it was known
and understood. It is certainly possible that the bad­
ness o f the argument may never have been perceived
by the fabricator, or that the bad argument may have
been framed without any intention o f applying it to
bad purposes. But in general, the more a man is
exposed to the action o f sinister interest, the more
reason there is for charging him with evil-conscious-
2 1)
402 PARTS BEARABLE. [ Cll
. 10.

ness, supposing him to be aware o f the action o f the

sinister interest.
H ow ever the action o f the sinister interest may
have been either perceived or unperceived, for without
a certain degree o f attention a man no more perceives
what is passing in his own than what is passing in
other mi n d s : the book that lies open before him,
though it be the object nearest to him, and though lie
be ever so much in the habit o f reading, may even
while two eyes are fixt upon it be read or not read,
according as it happens that circumstances have, or
have not, called his attention to the contents.
T h e action o f a sinister interest may have been
immediate or un-immediate.
Im m ediate; it may have been perceived or not per­
ceived : un-im m ediate; it has, almost to a certainty,
been unperceived.
Sinister interest has tw'o media through which it
usually operates. These are prejudice and authority ;
and hence we have for the immediate progeny o f
sinister interest, interest-begotten prejudice and autho­
rity-begotten prejudice.
In what case soever a bad argument has owed its
fabrication or its utterance to sinister interest, and
that interest is not, at the time o f fabrication or ut­
terance, perceived, it has for its immediate parent
either in-bred prejudice or authority.
O f the three operations thus intimately connected,
viz. jabrication , utterance , and acceptance, that the
two first are capable o f having evil-consciousness for
C/i. 10 .] PARTS BEARABLE. 403
their accompanim ent is obvious. A s to acceptance,
a distinction must be made before an answer can be
given to the question, whether it is accompanied with
evil-consciousness.
It may be distinguished into interior and exterior.
W here the opinion, how false soever, is really believed
to be true by the person to whom it has been present­
ed, the acceptance given to it may be termed in­
ternal : where, whether by discourse, by deportment,
or other tokens, a belief o f its having experienced an
internal acceptance at his hands is, with or without
design on his part, entertained by other persons; in
so far may it be said to have experienced at his hands
an external acceptance.
In the natural state o f things, both these modes o f
acceptance have place together : upon the internal,
the external mode follows as a natural consequence.
Either o f them is, however, capable o f having place
without the oth er: feeling the force o f an argument,
I may appear as if I had not felt i t : not having re­
ceived any impression from it, I may appear as if I
had received an impression o f greater or less strength,
whichever best suits my purpose.
It is sufficiently manifest that evil-consciousness
cannot be the accompaniment o f internal acceptance;
but it may be an accompaniment, and actually is the
accompanim ent o f external acceptance, as often as
the external has not for its accompaniment the inter­
nal acceptance.
Supposing the argument such that the appellation
o f fallacy is justly applicable to it, whatsoever part is
2 D 2
404 PARTS BEARABLE. [Ch. 10.

borne in relation to it, viz. fabrication, utterance, or

acceptance, may, with propriety, be ascribed to want
o f probity or want o f intelligence.
Hitherto the distinction appears plain and broad
enough ; but upon a closer inspection a sort o f a mix­
ed, or a m iddle state between that o f evil-consciousness
and that o f pure temerity— between that o f improbity
and that o f imbecility, may be observed.
This is where the persuasive force o f the argument
admits o f different d egrees; as when an argument
which operates with a certain degree o f force on the
utterer’ s mind, is in the utterance given to it repre­
sented as acting with a degree o f force to any amount
more considerable.
Thus, a man who considers his opinion as invested
only with a certain degree o f probability, may speak
o f it as o f a matter o f absolute certainty. T h e per­
suasion he thus expresses is not absolutely false, but
it is exaggerated, and this exaggeration is a species
o f falsehood.
T h e more frequent the trumpeter o f any fallacy is
in its performance, the greater the progress which
his mind is apt to make from the state o f evil-con­
sciousness to the state o f temerity— from the state o f
improbity to the state o f imbecility ; that is, imbecility
with respect to the subject matter. It is said o f gam­
blers, that they begin their career as dupes and end as
thieves: in the present case, th 3 parties begin with
craft and end with delusion.
A phenomenon, the existence o f which seems to be
uot o f dispute, is that o f a liar by whom a lie o f his
Ch. 1 0 .] PARTS BEARABLE. 4 0 .5
own invention has so often been told as true, that at
length it has com e to be accepted as such even by
himself.
But if such is the case with regard to a statement
com posed o f words, every one o f which finds itselt
in manifest contradiction to some determinate truth,
it may be imagined how much more easily, and
consequently how much more frequently, it may com e
to be the case, in regard to a statement o f such
nicety and delicacy, as that o f the strength o f the im­
pression made by this or that instrument o f persuasion,
o f which the persuasive force is susceptible o f innu­
merable degrees, no one o f which has ever vet been
distinguished from any other, by any externally sen­
sible signs or tokens, in the form o f discourse or
otherwise.
I f substitution o f irrelevant arguments to relevant
ones is evidence o f a bad cause, and o f consciousness
o f the badness o f that bad cause, much more is the
substitution— o f application made to the will, to ap­
plications made to the understanding :— o f the matter
o f punishment or reward, to the matter o f argument.
Arguments addressed to the understanding, may,
if fallacious, be answered ; and any m ischief they had
a tendency to produce, be prevented by counter argu­
ments, addressed to the understanding.
Against
O arguments
O addressed to the will 7: those
addressed to the understanding are altogether without
effect, and the m ischief produced by them is without
reined •/v.
406 USES OE EXPOSURE. [67/. II.

CHAPTER X I.

Uses o f the preceding E.rposin'e.

B ut of these disquisitions concerning the state and
character of the mind of those by whom these instru­
ments of deception are employed, what, it may be
asked, is the practical use ?
T h e use is the opposing such check as it may be
in the power o f reason to apply to the practice o f
em ploying these poisoned weapons. In proportion
as the virtue o f sincerity is an object o f love and ve­
neration, the opposite vice is held in abhorrence :—
the more generally and intimately the public in gene­
ral are satisfied o f the insincerity o f him by whom the
arguments in question are em ployed, in that same
proportion will be the efficiency o f the motives by the
force o f which a man is withheld from em ploying
these arguments.
Suppose the deceptions and pernicious tendency
o f these arguments, and thence the im probity o f him
who em ploys them, in such sort held up to view as to
find the minds o f men sufficiently sensible o f it ; and
suppose that in the public mind in general, virtue in
the form o f sincerity is an object o f respect, vice in
the opposite' form an object o f aversion and contempt,
Ch. II. ] U SE S O F E X P O S U R E . 407
the practice o f this species o f improbity will becom e
as rare, as is the practice o f any other species o f im ­
probity, to which the restrictive action o f the same
moral power, is in the habit o f applying itself with the
same force.
If, on this occasion, the object were to prove the
deceptions nature and inconclusiveness o f these ar­
guments, the exposure thus given o f the mental cha­
racter o f the persons by whom they are employed,
would not have any just title to be received into the
body o f evidence applicable to this purpose. Be the
improbity o f the persons by whom these arguments
are employed ever so glaring, the arguments them­
selves are exactly what they are, neither better nor
worse. T o em ploy as a medium o f p roof for dem on­
strating the impropriety o f the arguments, the im pro­
bity o f him by whom they are uttered, is an expedient
which stands itself upon the list o f fallacies , and which
in the foregoing pages has been brought to view.
But on the present occasion, and for the present
purpose, the impropriety as well as the mischievous­
ness o f these arguments is supposed to be sufficiently
established on other, and those unexceptionable,
grou n ds: the object in view now is, to determine by
what means an object so desirable as the general disuse
o f these poisonous weapons may in the com pletest
and most effectual degree be attained.
N ow , the mere utterance o f these base arguments
is not the only, it is not so much as the principal mis
408 USES OF E X P O S U R E . [Ch. 11 .
ch ief in the case. It is the reception o f them in the
character o f conclusive or influential arguments, that
constitutes the principal and only ultimate mischief.
T o the object o f making men ashamed to utter them
must, therefore, be added, the ulterior object o f
making men ashamed to receive th e m : ashamed as
often as they are observed to see or hear them,—
ashamed to be known to turn towards them any other
aspect than that o f aversion and contem pt.
But if the practice o f insincerity be a practice which
a man ought to be ashamed of, so is the practice o f
giving encouragement to— o f forbearing to oppose dis­
couragement to that vice : and to this same desirable
and useful end does that man most contribute, by
whom the immorality o f the practice is held up to
view in the strongest and clearest colours.
N or, upon reflection, will the result be found so
hopeless as at first sight might be supposed. In the
most numerous assembly that ever sat in either house,
perhaps, not a single individual could be found, by
whom, in the com pany o f a chaste and well-bred fe­
male, an obscene word was ever uttered. A nd if the
frown o f indignation were as sure to be drawn down
upon the offender by an offence against this branch
o f the law o f probity, as by an offence against the law
o f delicacy, transgression would not be less effectually
banished from both those great public theatres, than
it is already from the dom estic circle.
If, o f the fallacies in question, the tendency be
Ch. 11.] USES OF E X P O S U R E . 409
really pernicious, whosoever he be, who by lawful and
unexceptionable means o f any kind shall have contri­
buted to this effect, will thereby have rendered to his
country and to mankind good service.
But whosoever he be, who to the intellectual power,
adds the moderate portion o f pecuniary pow er neces­
sary, in his power it lies com pletely to render this
good service.
In any printed report o f the debates o f the assem­
bly in question, supposing any such instruments o f de­
ception discoverable, in each instance in which any
such instrument is discoverable, let him, at the bottom
o f the page, by the help o f the usual marks o f refe­
rence, give intimation o f i t : describing it, for instance,
if it be o f the number o f those which are included in
the present list, by the name by which it stands d e­
signated in this list, or by any more apt and clearly
designative denomination that can be found for it.
T h e want o f sufficient time for adequate discussion,
when carried on orally in a numerous assembly, has
in no inconsiderable extent been held out by expe­
rience in the character o f a real and serious evil. To
this evil, the table o f fallacies furnishes, to an indefi­
nite extent, a powerful remedy.
There are few men o f the class o f those who read,
to whose memory G oldsm ith’s delightful novel, the
V ica r o f Wakefield, is not more or less present.
A n ionO" the disasters into which the O"o o d V icar is be-
trayed by his simplicity, is the loss inflicted on him by
410 USES OF E X P O S U R E . \Ch. 11.

the craft o f Ephraim Jenkins. For insinuating him­

self into the good opinion and confidence o f tnen o f
more learning th in caution, the instrument he had
formed to himself consisted apparently o f an extem ­
pore sample o f recondite learning, in which, in the
character o f the subject, the cosm ogony, and in the
character o f one o f the historians, Sanchoniathon, were
the principal figures. O n one or two o f the occasions
on which it was put to use, the success corresponded
with the design, and Ephraim remained undetected
and triumphant. But at last, as the devil by his
cloven foot, so was Ephraim, though in a fresh dis­
guise, betrayed by the cosm ogony and Sanchoniathon,
to som e persons to whose lot it had fallen to receive
the same p roof o f recondite learning, word for word.
Imm ediately the chamber rings, with— “ Y ou r ser­
vant , M r . E p h ra im !"
In the course o f time when these imperfect sketches
shall have received perfection and polish from some
more skilful hand, so shall it be done unto him, (nor
is there need o f inspiration for the prophecy,) so shall
it be done unto him, who in the tabernacle o f St. Ste­
phen’s or in any other mansion, higher or 1ower, o f si m ilar
design and use, shall be so far o ff his guard as through
craft or simplicity to let drop any o f these irrelevant,
and at one time deceptions argum ents: and instead
of, O rder ! O rder ! a voice shall be heard, followed,
if need be, by voices in scores, crying aloud, “ Stale !
Stale! Fallacy o f authority, Fallacy o f distrust,” & c.& c.
Ch. 11.] USES OF E X P O SU R E . 411

T he faculty which detection has o f divesting D ecep ­

tion o f her power, is attested hy the poet,—

" Qu;ere peregrinum, vicinia rauca reclamant.”

T h e period o f time at which, in the instance o f

the instruments o f deception here in question, this
change shall have been a c k n o w le d g e d to have been
com pletely effected, will form an epoch in the history
o f civilization.

THE END.

Printed by Richard Taylor,

Shoe-Lane, London.