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NAVIGATION SYSTEMS

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

88 Smart Probe Air 2015G2H2H-8 Goodrich Embraer 34 AFR AFR/KLM

Data Computer E-Jet
2015G2H2H-8A
2015G2H2H-9

When a pitot inlet (PN 00857-0841-0002) of the Smart probe is corroded during its warranty period, Hamilton/UTC
denied the warranty and the replacement of the pitot inlet is not free of charge. Hamilton/UTC has informed Air
France that smart probes have to be only exposed to water or isopropyl alcohol for cleaning and not exposed to
other chemicals; but during the warranty period, the smart probe is always exposed to chemicals and contaminants
everywhere in world by all the airlines.

Air France would like to know why the technical specification of this smart probe is not enough to avoid the corrosion
during the warranty period.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

89 ADSP 2015G2H2H-8A Goodrich E-Jet 34 AZU

2015G2H2H-9

The E-Jet aircraft is a modern airplane, which uses digital technology and that has 3 air data systems, composed of
4 ADSP (Air Data Smart Probe). Despite of this, it has some limitations, such as:
1. Until today, when there is failure in the air data system, there is no way to know with precision which of the 4
ADSP has failed, and due this reason at least two of them have to be removed, even if one of them isn't in
failure.
2. If the ADSP number 4 is in failure, for instance, the airplane cannot be released even to do a ferry flight.

These problems causes a huge problem for AZUL, due a time spent for troubleshooting, time in AOG condition as
well as due the ADSP that is removed without failure. AZUL has 88 E-Jets and in the last 2 years we had 95 ADSP
removals due failures only.

In the light of what has been explained, what Embraer intends to do, to at least minimize the problem caused by
troubleshooting time and regarding the problem caused when ADSP number 4 is failed? Other operators are having
this kind of problem?

Embraer, comments please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

90 Angle of Attack Sensor 0861EW1 Rosemount MD-90 34-18 DAL

Boeing B717

A large number of units processed through the shop exhibit water damage to the internal components. Initial findings
from the shop visit indicate water intrusion across the face of the outer bearing. Subsequent discussions with the
OEM, UTAS/Rosemount, indicate the external bearing is not designed/intended to be sealed. We would like a
solution to this water intrusion problem.

Rosemount, Boeing, and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

91 Pitot Probe 0851HL Airbus A32X 34 ETD

UTAS

In October 2014, EASA released AD 2014-0237 (later superseded by EASA AD 2015-0205) instructing the
replacement of Thales pitot probes by UTAS pitot probe or new EASA icing requirements compliant pitot probe on
A32X fleet. Consequently, in November 2014, Airbus released OIT 999.0123/14 in order to announce to operators
the revision of SB A320-34-1170 to extend the effectivity to all MSNs equipped with Thales pitot probes.

Once rev 29 of SB A320-34-1170 became available in February 2015, Etihad processed the Purchase Order for 27
EAs of UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL and started the installation in March 2015. Later, in June 2015, Airbus
released RIL SA34M15007584 (Title: Install UTAS Pitot probes P/N 0851HL). The purpose of this RIL was to
announce the provision of UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL under Free of Charge conditions for POs placed before
30th September 2016.

As Etihad placed the purchase order in March 2015, before the release of the RIL in June 2015, we were considered
as not entitled to the FOC conditions of the purchased UTAS pitot probes PN 0851HL. After several communications
with Airbus, they were finally willing to cover only 50% of the pitot probe cost.

Etihad would like to know why it took so long for Airbus to release RIL SA34M15007584 in June 2015, when the OIT
999.0123/14 was released in November 2014. And why Airbus or UTAS are reluctant to reimburse the cost of the
UTAS pitot probes purchased before June 2015.

For more information refer to Airbus FAIR item 15.0328.

Other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

92 Pitot Probe 851AK Rosemount B717 34-10 HAL

Average MTBUR (2 years) 1521 flight hours (very modest) but the standard deviation is 1427 flight hours reflecting
that some stay on very few hours. Good warranty but the unreliability causes significant delays.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

93 IRU HG1050 Series Honeywell B757 34-43 FDX

A300

Obsolete test system, CMM calls out test equipment that has been out of production since 1984 for a board site
programmer. To update the MAGVAR tables to 2015 table, OEM FAA-approved service bulletin allows the AMT to
use whatever board site programmer their engineering agrees to use. However, the S/B still requires the AMT to use
the CMM to return the unit to service, which leads to a conflict between the two documents.

FedEx would like Honeywell to update the CMM to bring continuity between the CMM and Service Bulletin and
provide a recommended list of programs to use.

Other operators and Honeywell comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

94 ADIRU HG2030AE23 Honeywell A320 34-12 VRD

Airbus

A recent development regarding Honeywell ADIRU configuration constraints with SBAS capable MMRs requires
upgrade of all Honeywell ADIRUs prior to iMMR retrofit. Further to that, Block II ADIRUs are not software loadable
and will likely require substantial turn time for upgrade. As a result of the currently understood timeline, aircraft
configured with Block II ADIRUs will not be certifiable until post 2020 with additional retrofit and TAT constraints,
which will likely require several years.

This poses a problem as Honeywell MMRs are not up-gradable to SA AWARE which is necessary for operations
post 2020. Thus, iMMR is the only Honeywell upgrade path, which is restricted by Honeywell ADIRUs.

Given the reasoning stated above, Virgin America would like comments from both Honeywell and Airbus on the
probability of improving A320 certification with newly required ADIRU standards.

Honeywell and Airbus comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

95 ADIRU HG2050 Boeing B737NG 34-21 NAX

Honeywell B737MAX

ADIRU - On-wing MagVar update capability NAX asked Boeing last year about ADIRU MagVar on-wing update
capability (SR NSB-NSB-15-0103-01C). In their response, Boeing stated they are working with the ADIRU supplier
to add the on-wing loadable software feature to the new HG2050BC ADIRU still in development. A fleetwide MagVar
update on the B737NG is very time consuming for a large fleet, and unreasonably costly due to the need for
expensive seed units.

NAX is aware that other models, such as B777, B787 and Airbus, have the capability for on-wing MagVar updating.
NAX is very interested in the benefits on-wing MagVar loading can bring, and urges Boeing to implement this
capability on B737NG and B737 MAX.

NAX asks for other operators’ support and comments, as well as comments from Boeing.
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

96 SAARU HG2040AD0X Honeywell B777 34 JAL

JAL thinks that there are not enough maintenance messages prepared for Secondary Attitude Air Data Reference
Unit (SAARU) comparing with Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU). ADIRU has accurate maintenance
messages and will be replaced at convenient maintenance opportunity. Operator cannot sense failure of SAARU or
lack of functionality previously. On B777 without Integrated Standby Flight Display (ISFD), SAARU’s failure is not
allowed to be carried over by Minimum Equipment List (MEL). Even if on the airplane with ISFD, it would not be
favorable to carry over SAARU failure on particular conditions. The sudden appearance of SAARU failure message
causes a long delay.

This agenda may be submitted several times in the past AMCs. JAL would like to ask that Boeing and Honeywell
reconsider changing software design for messaging. We feel lacking of redundancy of total design and
maintainability of inertial navigation system of B777.

Comments from B777 operators, Boeing, and Honeywell are appreciated.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

97 IRU HG1103BA01 Honeywell MD88 34-41 DAL

Delta often sees unpredictable removals of the IRU on the MD88 aircraft. These removals are mostly attributed to
failed Ring Laser Gyros installed. The Ring Laser Gyros life varies greatly from one component to the next. When
the gyros fail on MD88 aircraft, similar to the B737, there is a higher potential for operational interruption and delay
and cancellations to take place.

Delta would like to know if any other operators experience this variation on the gyros.

Delta would also like to know if Honeywell has any plans to standardize the gyro buildup process to ensure a more
predictable life span of the gyros. The guaranteed interval is intentionally lower than the actual life of the parts,
however the parts' costs are so high it is difficult to change the parts at the promised life when they can be used for
1,000 to 5,000 hours further without incident.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

98 ADIRU HG2050AC07 Honeywell B737NG 34-27 WJA

HG2050AC11
HG2050BC02

Due to our aging fleet, WestJet airline is seeing more and more ADIRU failures (mostly due to gyros). Almost any
defect regarding these units cause either a delay or a cancelation. We worked with Honeywell to try and find a soft
time or hard time for the gyros but nothing cost effective could be determined.

The older model of ADIRU (on the B737CL) had a LIM voltage that was the primary ring laser gyro health indication.
LIM voltage could be tested during the shop visit to give you some idea on the gyro performance. The newer
HG2050AC07 and AC11 no longer have this LIM voltage value.
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WestJet would like to know if the LIM voltage was a good reflection of gyro performance. Do B737CL operators use
this value to determine any proactive maintenance during shop visits?

Also, has Honeywell considered reintroducing a life expectancy testing like LIM to new gyros being installed?

And last, knowing that aging gyros are the primary cause of ADIRU failure, does the newest ADIRU (HG2050BC02)
have some sort of test for the gyros that would help in determining gyro performance and life expectancy?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

99 ADIRU HG2050ACXX Honeywell B737 34-21 SWA

Southwest Airlines tracks items that are of operational impact to the daily operations and the ADIRU or Air Data
System for 2015 was consistently in the top 5 each month. The ADIRU had a component alert almost every month
and the cause was always due to gyro failures. A unit would fail and a single gyro would be replaced and most of the
time, a second gyro would fail soon after the unit was installed. There is no consistency or explanation for failures.
The cost of replacing all three gyros is cost prohibitive. SWA does not see this issue on new units, only once a unit
has experienced it first failure/removal.

Do other operators have this same experience?

Honeywell, is there any way to better predict the life of a gyro? Is there a better testing method? Is there a difference
between new gyros and rebuilt gyros?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

100 ADIRU HG2050AC07 Honeywell B737 34-41 DAL

B757
B767-400

Delta often sees unpredictable removals of the ADIRU on dual redundant system aircraft (B737). These removals
are mostly attributed to failed Ring Laser Gyros installed. The Ring Laser Gyros life varies greatly from one
component to the next. When the gyros fail on 737 aircraft, there is a higher potential for operational interruption and
delay and cancellations to take place.

Delta would like to know if any other operators experience this variation on the gyros.

Delta would also like to know if Honeywell has any plans to standardize the gyro buildup process to ensure a more
predictable life span of the gyros. The guaranteed interval is intentionally lower than the actual life of the parts,
however the parts' costs are so high it is difficult to change the parts at the promised life when they can be used for
1,000 to 5,000 hours further without incident.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

101 Mach Airspeed Indicator 4039891-903 Honeywell B757 34-14 DAL

4039891-906 B767

Honeywell and Moog has reported to Delta that they are working to improve the DC torque drive motors found in the
MASI.

Will Honeywell and Moog continue to support the current CMM 29-50-09 to repair and maintain motor 4039838-1?
Are there plans to update the CMM to include all the correct values and specifications for testing and troubleshooting
of the motor?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

******15-083******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Mach Airspeed Indicator 4038981-906 Honeywell B767-300 34-14 DAL

B757-200
B757-300

The Honeywell Mach Airspeed Indicator (MASI) has been a known reliability issue for Delta for a number of years for
our B767-300 aircraft.

In an attempt to find a solution, Delta has been trying to make use of Honeywell CMM 24-09-50, Publication
# C32-2171-001, for the DC Torque drive motors. The motors whose part numbers are listed as 4039838-1
(21607A-CY-04S/D593) are found in the MASI, where there are 3 motors per assembly. These motors are also
found in the Honeywell Altimeter part number 4039892-907.

Delta has recorded over 8 years of correspondence surrounding the reliability of this motor in emails to Honeywell
and has been tracking removal rates of these motors for a number of years. There continues to be an increase in an
adverse impact on Delta's B767-300 and B757-200/300 operations in the form of delays and/or ODIs as a result of
this motor’s failure.

Honeywell has a current CMM on their portal for this motor to be cleaned, repaired, and returned to service. We
have been experiencing difficulty in getting parts to repair this motor using the CMM procedures provided by
Honeywell. The motor is a PMA part provided to Honeywell from MOOG.

 Will the parts from Honeywell CMM 24-09-50 be made accessible for the users of these components?
 Are there plans to release an improved DC drive motor for the MASI to aid in ensuring the integrity of Delta’s
fleet and the reliability of the components placed on our aircraft?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

102 Back Up Speed Scale Airbus A32X 34 ETD

(BUSS)

Airbus released SB A320-34-1397 for the activation of the Back Up Speed Scale (BUSS) function on the A32X fleet.
This SB is applicable to 12 Etihad aircrafts, 6 of them are EIS1 and the remaining 6 aircrafts are EIS2.

The concurrent requirements section of the mentioned SB demands the previous embodiment of certain
modifications that only applies to EIS2 aircrafts. Although the SB contains EIS1 aircrafts in its effectivity, the
literature does not warn operators that the SB can only be embodied on EIS2 aircrafts.

As this SB has flight ops impact (FCOM & FM), Etihad requested the intermediate revision of the affected flight ops
sections to be updated at the next revision for all Etihad aircrafts to which this SB was applicable. As a result, on line
available versions of FCOM & FM wrongly reflected, during a certain period of time, that the Back Up Speed Scale
(BUSS) function was available on those EIS1 aircrafts although these aircraft would never be BUSS capable thru the
embodiment of SB A320-34-1397.

Once Etihad realized about the mistake it highlighted the situation to Airbus in March 2015 and they decided to
release Operator Information Transmission (OIT) ref. 15-0020 in April 2015. Below is an extraction of the principal
content of OIT #15-0020:

“The upgrade up to EIS2 is an RFC RMO procedure, thus to avoid several updates of the referenced SB, Airbus
decided to put all the fleet in this referenced SB. This allows operators to introduce back-up speed scale function
on aircraft following upgrade to EIS2. The referenced SB should be disregarded for aircraft fitted with EIS1.”

In parallel, Airbus released SB A320-34-1543 (Define Back Up Speed Scale (BUSS) with EIS1) rev 00 on the 12th
of March 2015. This SB was applicable only to EIS1 aircrafts and all Etihad EIS1 fleet (6 aircrafts) were correctly
included in the effectivity.

Taking into account that the upgrade from EIS1 to EIS2 is a heavy and very costly modification, Etihad would like:

1. Airbus to reconsider its policy when including MSNs into the effectivity of SBs, knowing that the current
configuration of those MSNs does not allow the embodiment of the SB, especially if the SB has flight ops
impact and the operator can mistakenly request their update, leading to an unsafe situation for the operation
of the aircraft.
2. If in future SBs Airbus considers including MSNs that are not in the proper configuration to receive the
embodiment of the modification, Airbus shall provide sufficient warnings in the literature of the SB so
operators will avoid the planning of such SBs on non-applicable aircrafts and avoid the request of updated
flight ops documentation (in case the SB has flight ops impact).

Just to mention an example: our partner airline, Air Serbia, made the same mistake of evaluating SB A320-34-1397
on MSNs that were EIS 1, just by the fact that this SB included their MSNs in the effectivity and there were no clear
warnings on the non-applicability to EIS1 aircrafts.

Etihad would appreciate other operators’ comments and experience in case of being affected.
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

103 UNS-1E 2017-41-221 Universal Avionics DHC8-Q400 34 ANA

Systems Corporation
(2017-XX-XXX)

ANA request UASC to improve the reliability of FMS UNS-1E (P/N: 2017-41-221).
In 2015, ANA experienced 31 removals of UNS-1E (ANA is operating 36 units) and the MTBUR in 2015was 2776 hr.
ANA recognize the reliability is very low and should be improved.

The main removal reason of UNS-1E is GNSS discrepancy. In 2015, 48% of all removals in ANA were due to GNSS
discrepancy.

In recent 3 years 2013, 2014, 2015, ANA experienced 29 removals due to GNSS discrepancies. 93% of them were
found GNSS failure in UASC repair shop as well. This rate shows the removal discrepancy was not due to GNSS
temporary failures during operations but due to its hard failures in the units.

After the GNSS discrepancies were confirmed in UASC repair shop, the repair actions were always replacing GNSS
board or GPS module or both of them. ANA request UASC to provide the failure trend of GNSS board and GPS
module, and also the schedule to improve the reliability of them.

Other operator and vendor comments, please.

******14-090******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Multi-Mode Receiver TLS755-01-0102A Thales A319/320 34-36 USA

TLS755-01-0101B A321
A330

USA continues to see a low reliability of Thales’ MMRs. At the end of year 2013, the MMR units operated less than
half of the guaranteed (22,500 flight hours) MTBUR at 10,000 flight hours. Numerous faults are being confirmed at
the shop ranging from “ILS-RF,” “CMD,” “PS,” “HIRF” faults – with “ILS-RF” being the top offender. Failure modes
approximate breakdown:
 ILS-RF at 25%
 CMD at 15%
 PS at 15%
 HIRF at 15%
 GPS at 15%
 MON at 6%
 Cable-related at 6%
 Chassis-related at 3%

USA is implementing by attrition all component Service Bulletins that Thales has recommended to improve reliability.
Several units have experienced multiple removals within 18 months. USA has yet to witness the benefit of an
increased reliability.

Component Service Bulletins implemented:

 755-01-01-34-03 – IMPROVE SHAPE OF INPUT SIGNALS
 755-01-01-034-04 – PREVENT PLL CLOCK JITTERING
 755-01-01-34-05 – STABLIZE AND INCREASE MODULATION RATES
 755-01-01-34-06 – UPGRADES ILS RF BOARD
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 755-01-01-34-07 – IMPROVEMENT OF BITE FUNCTIONS
 755-01-01-34-08 – CORRECTION OF LABEL 260, GPS FUNCTION
 755-01-01-34-09 – IMPROVES ISOLATION BETWEEN MMR’S DURING TEST
 755-01-01-34-10 – INSPECTION AND REPLACEMENT OF CAPACITOR
 755-01-01-34-11 – IMPROVEMENT OF MODULES
 755-01-01-34-12 – INSPECT FOR CORROSION ON REAR CHASSIS
 755-01-01-34-13 – SOFTWARE UPGRADE TO PREVENT LOSS OF GPS
 755-01-01-34-16 – SUPERSEDED (INSPECTION TO DETECT A FAILURE ON THE TWO HPMX
COMPONENTS INSURING THE TEST FUNCTION)
 755-01-01-34-17 – IMPROVE POWER SUPPLY HIGH TEMPERATURE FUNCTION IN CASE OF MA8
REPLACEMENT
 755-01-01-34-19 – REPLACEMENT OF THE HPMX COMPONENTS

Airbus Technical Follow-Ups (TFUs) and Maintenance-Engineering articles (WISE) have been published to discuss
MMR reliability issues. However, none seem to address all the faults that USA experiences. USA has queried
Thales with the current MMR reliability of USA’s fleet and Thales responded with an MMR reliability solution via SB
755-01-01-34-19 to address the HPMX issue (accounting for 12% of total removals in 2013), a type of failure
occurring in “ILS-RF” failure mode. However, USA is seeking a solution that addresses all the major contributors of
the MMR failures.

USA would like to ask Thales for an MMR reliability roadmap that addresses all the failure modes that USA is
suffering from.

Comments from Airbus and other airlines experiencing the same issue are appreciated.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

104 Multi-Mode Receiver 066-50029-1161 Honeywell A320 34-36 VRD

Airbus

Virgin America would like to inquire about the A320 certification date of Honeywell iMMR, compliant with
91CFR.227.

Virgin America currently operates non-compliant Honeywell SA ON MMR P/N 066-50029-1161 (RMA-55B),
whereby the certification date has serious impact on fleet-wide retrofit schedules. Given that there is no upgrade
path from existing Honeywell MMR (RMA-55B) to SA AWARE, the iMMR certification date is critical. Certification
dates appear to be inconsistent with Virgin America’s understanding.

Request comments from Honeywell and Airbus together on the certification dates to ensure all commitment dates
are well established and transparent as they have tremendous impact on operator retrofit schedules.

Airbus and Honeywell comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

105 EFIS Symbol Generator 4055900-906 Honeywell MD88 34-22 DAL

Delta has had trouble testing the subject EFIS generator when it is removed from service. The current ATLAS test
procedure appears to have an error in the instructions to test the A12 synchros. The jitter test for Pitch-A (reference
ATLAS Repair procedure line 20-25) requires a 0.2 second time delay. However, for the subsequent Roll-A and
Header jitter tests the time delay required is 2.0 seconds. The Pitch-A jitter test often yields false failure results when
run in the shop, Delta suspects this is due to the short time delay.

Do other operators experience this issue when using the ATLAS procedure?

Can Honeywell evaluate the procedure for accuracy?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

106 Transponder TRA-100B Honeywell A320 34-52 VRD

Virgin America would like to inquire about the A320 certification date of Honeywell transponder TRA-100B,
compliant with DO-260B. Virgin America currently operates and is taking delivery of non-compliant Honeywell
transponders, whereby the certification date has serious impact on fleet-wide retrofit schedules. Certification dates
appear to be inconsistent with Virgin America’s understanding.

Request comments from Honeywell and Airbus together on the certification dates to ensure all commitment dates
are well established and transparent as they have tremendous impact on operator retrofit schedules.

Honeywell and Airbus comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

107 TCAS TPA-100C Honeywell A320 VRD

Airbus

Virgin America is interested in advanced TCAS applications available on Honeywell TPA 100C which has TSO. Has
Airbus considered certification of Honeywell TPA-100C on the A320 fleet type?

Airbus and other operator comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

108 T2CAS 9000000-XXXXX ACSS A320 34 TAP

EGPWS 965-XXXX-XXX Honeywell A330

To keep up with the dynamic changes of airports and topographies, several Terrain and Airport databases are
released per year. However, most LRUs, including the T2CAS and EGPWS units, require the use of physical media,
such as CF-cards or obsolete PCMIA cards, to load the database files either in shop or onboard the aircraft.
Having the high number of database releases per year, the process to maintain an updated fleet it is very resource
and time consuming.

TAP would like to ask other operators how they manage the Terrain and Airport database update.

Are vendors working on a solution for transferring the data into the LRUs without the use of physical media?

Other operator and vendor comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

109 TCAS Various ACSS Various 34 FDX

ADS-B

In order to maintain configuration control and proper access to aircraft S/W parts, FedEx has developed a software
IPC supplement that allows AMTs at any MX station access to the correct software for the right tail number. This tool
effectively eliminates the failure mode of grabbing the wrong S/W from a binder and loading it to the wrong aircraft
type and is part of our FAA approved Air Carrier Manual System.

With the exception of ACSS, vendors have allowed FedEx to load aircraft S/W parts to the IPC supplement website
for distribution as required. FedEx has attempted, on several occasions, to get ACSS’s permission to up load S/W to
the web-site but have been rejected. Consequently, the ACSS software physical media must be delivered to various
sites which limits where and when we can perform TCAS & ADS-B S/W upgrades.

With the updates required for TCAS 7.1 and ADS-B, FedEx requests ACSS’s immediate assistance is resolving this
issue.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

110 TCAS Indicator 066-50001-1001 Honeywell Multiple 34-45 DAL

Honeywell is no longer providing parts needed to repair the TCAS indicator power supply modules. These are high
failure items and we need a solution.

Honeywell comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

111 TCAS Processor 066-50000-2120 Honeywell B767-300 34-45 DAL

B767-400

The TCAS system is plagued by NTF events reported by the flight crews, most are cleared by maintenance using
a bite test on the processor, resetting the circuit breaker or pushing the aural test on the control panel. The
system reliability has been getting worse over the last couple years on both the B767 and B757.

Operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

112 TCAS 822-1710-XXX Rockwell All 34 AFR AFR/KLM

Collins

SB TTR-921/4000-34-16 has been launched in 2011 due to low level of amplification of the TTR-921 receiver
(A2A23 board). This SB initial issue has been quickly stopped due to weak efficiency of the original modification.

Now SB is Rev04, but we are still unable to adjust Receiver module to nominal value (TP9/10/11/12/13). Value stays
to a minimum close to the Low Limit.

The SB requires a lot of man hours for modification, for a poor result. Consequently, we decided to put the retrofit on
hold.

Does Rockwell Collins plan to revise the SB with a more effective solution?

Comments from OEM and airlines please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

113 ISSPU 822-2120-101 Rockwell Collins B787 34 UAL

United has observed that the B787 Integrated Surveillance System Processor Unit (ISSPU) has “dropped” software.
In one instance, the aircraft had “TRANSPONDER R” and “TCAS R” status messages. When the software was
checked on the ISSPU, software ISS OPS Traffic XPND ACAS indicated “NOT LOADED”. Another aircraft had
WXR problems and it was found ISS OPS Weather WXR WRAU was reported as “INVALID”. Reloading the
software for both conditions resolved the problem.

Have other B787 operators had issues with software “dropping” from the ISSPU?

Other operators and Boeing comments please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

114 Enhanced Ground 965-1676-00X Honeywell Airbus 34 ETD

Proximity Warning
System (EGPWS)
965-0976-003-230-230 Boeing

On the 30th of July 2015, Honeywell released Database Service Bulletin DSB201507002.

This document describes the new Honeywell policy in terms of Enhanced Ground Proximity Warning System
(EGPWS) Terrain Data Base (TDB) updates, by charging for each new TDB release.

Up to now, Honeywell EGPWS MK-V TDB has been updated around 3 or 4 times per year. But according to the new
policy, the TDB will only be updated once a year for free and each additional update (up to 6 per year) will be
charged to the operator.

Moreover, this new practice has made changes in the Honeywell Aerospace Software and Data Services (ASDS)
website. As a result of these changes, Etihad is no longer able to access previous TDB versions (except the latest
release).

In summary, it is Etihad´s impression that Honeywell is decreasing the frequency in TDB updates and forcing the
operator to pay for 6 updates per year, when operators used to have up to 4 updates per year for free, especially
taking into account that the TDB is a critical safety related item.

Further information and comments available in Airbus FAIR 15.0207.

Other operator’s comments and experience in case of being affected please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

115 Enhanced Ground 965-1690-055 Honeywell B737 34-42 SWA

Proximity Warning
Computer (EGPWC)
965-0976-003-232-232

Over the past 5 years, SWA has seen a steady decline in the MTBF for the EGPWC. What used to be over 30,000
hours MTBF in 2009 and 2010 is now down to just over 22,000 hours at the end of 2015. SWA has been in contact
with Honeywell but still waiting for root cause analysis from Honeywell.

SWA is also seeing units being returned NFF.

Honeywell and other operator comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

116 WX Receiver/Transceiver 2041217-0416 Honeywell B757 34-42 DAL

2041217-0418 B767
066-50008-0406 B717
MD88
MD90

Delta has experienced failure of these Radar assemblies due to Power Supply capacitors that show signs of
overheating where the capacitors are found bulging or cracked. Capacitors C2001 and C2002 of Models 4B are
most commonly found showing this condition. These units use forced air cooling through slots in the base to cool
areas surrounding the Circuit Cards.

We have noted that the power supply area, which generates large amounts of heat. The area where the power
supply is located does not have any cooling slots in or around it where these capacitors are located and the heat
may be having an added effect to causing these failures.

Does Honeywell have a record of this issue? Can Honeywell provide information on what can be done to improve
the cooling for the Power Supply sections of these units? Can Honeywell provide information related to what other
reasons may be driving this issue and possible solutions?

Honeywell and other operator comments, please?

******14-108******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Antenna Drive Unit (DAA-4A) 2041444-XXXX Honeywell Various 34 ANA

Reference: 2013 AMC Item 157

Honeywell has addressed that Field Service Bulletin (FSB) to introduce the redesigned cold start circuit is expected
to be released by the end of 2014. ANA would like Honeywell to produce progress of the redesign project and firm
schedule of the FSB release.

Since Honeywell has provided a discounted price of the Azimuth (AZ) motor in 2013 AMC, ANA is imposing the AZ
motor replacement on DAA-4A unit at high operating hours as an interim action. This DAA-4A refurbishment work
requires other component replacement.

Given the tough economic circumstances, ANA feels a repetitive AZ motor replacement is not feasible for operators.
ANA desires Honeywell to keep to the schedule on the FSB. If the FSB release is prolonged, ANA will request
Honeywell to extend the discount campaign period. Price escalation is not acceptable.

Other operator and Honeywell comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

117 RDR-4B WXR Radar 2041444-04XX Honeywell B747 Boeing – 34-43 UAL
Antenna Drive
B757
B767
B777
A319 Airbus – 34-41
A320

Reference 2014 AMC Item 108

In a 12-month period, United had 29 delays and 3 air returns caused by a failed Honeywell WXR Antenna Drive unit.
Shop findings on the removed units show a high number of azimuth drive motor failures as the cause of the antenna
drive unit failures. As indicated in 2014 AMC Item 14-108, a Honeywell Service Bulletin was scheduled for release
in the 4th quarter of 2014. This SB release information was also included in Boeing FTD Article 34-14001.

As of January 25th, 2016, the Honeywell Service Bulletin had not been released.

UAL would appreciate comments from other operators about their service interruptions related to WXR antenna
drive unit failures.

Other operators, Honeywell, Boeing and Airbus comments please.

******14-110******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

WXR Antenna Drive Unit 2041444-XXXX Honeywell LHT

DAA-4A

The reliability of the azimuth motor PN 360-0104-001 is still insufficient.

During operators’ conference 2012 HON committed to a final improvement plan “Plan to have a final product
improvement plan approved by mid-June 2012” but until now no information, improvements or SBs have been
released. We contacted HON several times to get updates, but every time we got the information they are working
on a solution, but still no improvements or solutions.

Honeywell, please comment. What is the actual status, the solution and timeline for this reliability issue?

Honeywell, other operators, MROs, vendors please comment.

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******14-112******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

WXR Drive Unit 2041444-0402 Honeywell B757 34-43 USA

2041444-0406 B767

USA continues to experience reliability issues with the Honeywell Weather Radar Drive unit PN 2041444-0402 and -
0406 on the 757/767 fleet.

Please reference previous AMC questions 13-157, 13-158, 13-159, 12-140, 12-141, 12-142, 11-162, 11-163,
11-164, and 10-174.

USA has replaced 18 drive units in the last 12 months. Failure of the new Azimuth Motor is responsible for 70% of
the removals from the USA fleet. All USA units have the new Azimuth Motor. USA tried to overhaul the units in 2010;
however, the data suggests that the performance of the drive units decreased after the overhaul. Units with overhaul
= MTBUR = 7955 Hrs, Units with Repair = MTBUR = 12770 Hrs.

Response from Honeywell at the 2013 AMC was the corrective action would be to redesign the Azimuth Motor cold
design circuit. USA contacted Honeywell about the status of this change, and as of early Jan 2014 it was not
approved to be worked in 2014.

USA also understands that work on these drive units has been outsourced. USA is concerned with what affect this
will have on the already poor reliability of this component. Boeing recently updated FTRP 757-FTD-34-14001 to
state the fix would not be available until 1st/2nd Qtr 2015.

Questions:
1. This issue has been around since 2010 in the AMC. Why does it take 5 years to finally provide a solution?
2. What is the status of this issue?
3. If the terminating action is not available until 2015, what does Honeywell recommend for maintenance (i.e.,
inspection) in the interim?

Boeing, Honeywell, and other operator comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

118 Weather Radar 2041444-0403 Honeywell B717 34-42 DAL

Antenna
MD88
MD90

Delta Air Lines recently attempted to order two-part number identification labels from Honeywell, part numbers 620-
1949-010 and 620-1949-009. The next higher assembly is 2041444-0403, Weather Radar Antenna.

After 30 days of waiting for a response, Honeywell informed Delta they do not have the material for the labels nor do
they know how to make them. They advised Delta they had sold off that part of the business to another company.
Delta considers this an unacceptable response.

Are other airlines experiencing this type of product support from Honeywell?

Other airlines, Honeywell and Boeing response.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate Airline

119 WRT-2100 822-1710-00X Rockwell All 34 AFR AFR/KLM

Collins
822-1710-2XX
822-1710-3XX
WRT-701X 622-5132-6XX

According CMM’s, Ideal Aerosmith is the provider of the bench PTS-3500 allowing test on radars components (e.g.,
CMM 34-40-58, CMM 34-45-47).

Due to obsolescence problems, Ideal Aerosmith recently informed AFR (Dec 2015) they will no longer support the
bench PTS -3500 after Feb 2016. Plus, the retrofit to bench PTS-3500 V2 (New capability for PN 822-1710-3XX) will
also be stopped.

We understand obsolescence problems in general, but to be informed 3 months before the end of support is not fair,
in our opinion.

1. How does Rockwell Collins plan to deal with the obsolescence issues on the PTS – 3500 V1? How can
they assure us sufficient support if necessary? To our knowledge, there will be no alternative solution to
the PTS-3500 V1 or V2 for some years.
2. Could Rockwell Collins provide a replacement solution for a new bench with the new P/N capability
(ThreatTrack equipments) and the oldest one (Multi Scan)? What schedule?

Comments from OEM and airlines, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

120 Antenna Drive 622-5135-XXX Rockwell Collins B737-xxx 34-42 DAL

B767-400
A330

Chronic solder cracking of LEDs and Diodes in PCBs are causing intermittent discontinuity resulting in Antenna
Faults. In some cases, in-flight diversions and air turn backs result from this Weather Radar failure. Delta requests
Rockwell Collins develop a more robust repair or new design that is less susceptible to solder cracking.

Affected PCB P/Ns:

 642-0508-001 (LED)
 642-0511-001 (Diode)
 642-0520-001 (LED)
 642-0517-001 (Diode)
 642-0517-002 (Diode)

Operator and supplier comments, please.

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******15-106******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

Weather Radar 066-50008-040X Honeywell MD88 34-41 DAL

On the 4B Honeywell Radar, Models 066-50008-0406, 0407, 0408 and 0409, Delta Air Lines frequently has to load
the latest Database (0005) per Honeywell Service Bulletin RTA-4B-34-151 Rev 1 dated 4/Dec/2009, Publication
Number M-4851. During return to service testing, the ATE program looks for the most current Database, and if it is
not found, the program asks the technician if he wants to load it. Delta frequently sees the database load fail. This
requires the technician to restart the ATE process from the beginning. This database load occurs early in the ATE
testing process, and it is not uncommon to have anywhere from 2 to 6 attempts before we get a complete database
load, with each attempt taking 5 minutes or more.

Has any other operator seen this problem while testing the Honeywell RTA4B?

Operator and Honeywell comments, please.

******14-117******

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

WXR Transceiver 822-1710-002 Rockwell Collins B777 34 ANA

(WRT-2100)

ANA has been experiencing that messages “WXR FAIL”, “WXR SYS”, and/or “WINDSHEAR SYS”, and/or
“WINDSHEAR PRED” are displayed on the ND/EICAS. And most cases are nuisance message and no
maintenance action is required.

Currently five B777 airplanes of our B777 fleet are equipped with WRT-2100. And total 370 nuisance messages
were displayed in these five B777 airplanes in the last nine months.

ANA requested some improvement to nuisance fault messages in 2012 and Rockwell Collins recommended
installation of SB6 and SB7 to reduce the nuisance messages. Therefore, we installed SB6 and SB7 to our units;
however, nuisance messages are still displayed on our airplanes.

Rockwell Collins stated that Version 2 (V2) were expected to significantly reduce the instances of WXR FAIL
messages; however, V2 does not have improvement for nuisance messages.

ANA requests improvement of WRT-2100 to reduce the nuisance fault messages.

Other operator and vendor comments, please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

121 WMA-701X, 622-5135-802 Rockwell Collins B737-800 34 JAL

Antenna Pedestal

JAL has experienced the Weather Radar Receiver Transmitter (WRT-2100, P/N 822-1710-001) stored “344111
WXR Antenna (11sq)” on CFDS (NVM), and removed the Antenna Pedestal (WMA-701X, P/N 622-5135-802).
Rockwell Collins did investigate the removal Antenna Pedestal. Rockwell Collins finding was function check OK, but
found corrosion at A2P1, A8J1, A8P1 and A8P3 connectors. These connectors using time were 14,000 hrs. JAL
believes that these connector corrosions are root cause of this trouble, and JAL thinks that occur the ATB and GTB
if the Antenna Pedestal has failure.

JAL would like to strongly request Rockwell Collins the permanent countermeasure of corrosion of connectors.

Other operator comments, please.

A2P1 A8J1

A2P3
A8P1
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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

122 Altimetry System Test C17001BA01 Boeing B737 34-00 SWA

(Air Data Module) C17001CA01 Sextant
C17001DA01

In April 2015, Boeing released Revision 1 of Service Bulletin 737-34-2454 for airlines to accomplish an Altimetry
System Test. The original release was in Nov. of 2013. The service bulletin had operators conduct test of the ADM
with an ARINC 429 Bus Analyzer and record the values of five different test points. Once the service bulletin was
accomplished, Boeing stated the test be incorporated in a scheduled maintenance program and repeated every 72
months. Also reference FTD 34-14004.

Have other operators accomplished this SB and incorporated it into their maintenance program? What failure rate
have you seen of the ADM’s?

Has Sextant seen an increase in returned ADM’s for this SB? And if so, what failure is seen?

SWA understands that this SB could soon be mandated by the FAA in the near future.

Other operator and supplier comments, please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

123 Head Up Guidance 1500-2460-003 Rockwell Collins B737 34-36 SWA

System Computer

The HGS Computer has exceeded the alert levels set by SWA in two months for the last quarter of 2015. Of the
removed/failed units, 67% of the removals experienced their first failure and were under 8000 hours on the unit. This
is very uncommon for this unit as SWA has experienced a very good reliability record with this unit. SWA has asked
Rockwell Collins to investigate a possible root cause. SWA has also seen a slight decrease in all the Head Up
Guidance System components since the Portland repair shop was closed.

Have other operators seen this trend? Please comment.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

124 CDU B50A000-00-100 Honeywell B777 34-61 AAL

CDU MPN 4072800-901 and CDU 4088240-901 are being replaced by CDU-R MPN B50A000-00-100 due to
obsolescence issues. Honeywell SIL Pub Number D201502000022 was released on 31 Mar 2015 addressing this
change.

To date, no CMM has been provided for the B50A000-00-100 CDU-R, yet the CDU-R are showing up on new
deliveries. Further, as per the referenced SIL, Honeywell will be exchanging the older CDUs with CDU-R when a
CDU cannot be repaired due to a failed obsolete component.

When can we expect the CMM for the CDU-R? Will the testing requirements and test equipment (ATE) be the same
for the CDU-R?

Honeywell, Boeing, and other operator comments please.

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Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

125 Stall Warning Computer 965-0449-002 Honeywell MD-88 34-15-14 DAL

MD-90

We requested a transistor from Honeywell for the 965-0449-002 Stall Warning Computer.
The transistor A2-Q2 IPL information as per CMM 34-15-14 is as follows:

Fig Item Part_Number Nomenclature

3 85 2N5566 Transistor

We received Quotation No. 221777137 from Honeywell December 24, 2015, stating that this item is a “Not for sale
item”. Customer Reference No. CASE-11942407.

Does Honeywell intend to continue offering parts support for this Stall Warning Computer?

OEM and operator comments please.

Item LRU Name LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From

126 Flight Management Computer 4052506-955 Honeywell B757 34-61 UAL

B767

The Pegasus FMC uses non-rechargeable lithium batteries on the ECA A3 card for “keep-alive” SRAM power. The
CMM states the batteries have a minimum service life of five years. Low SRAM batteries will potentially cause an
FMC to latch fail during power interruptions.

1. UAL would like to know if Honeywell recommends a hard time removal of the FMCs after an extended on-
wing time to prevent depleted batteries causing an inflight issue. If yes, what is the recommended time for
removal?
2. Same as question 1 for an FMC in long-term storage on the shelf.
3. What is Honeywell’s component maintenance program for dealing with the SRAM battery life?
4. UAL would appreciate comments from other operators on their experience with SRAM battery life and if they
hard time their FMCs to replace the batteries.

Other operators and Boeing comments please.