Occupational Injury and Accident Research A Comprehensive Review
Occupational Injury and Accident Research A Comprehensive Review
Safety Science
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/ssci
Review
a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t
Article history: In this paper, a comprehensive review of the concepts of occupational injury and accident causation and
Received 17 April 2011 prevention is presented. Starting with hazard identification, the issues on risk assessment, accident
Received in revised form 28 November 2011 causation, and intervention strategies are discussed progressively. The distinctiveness and overlaps in
Accepted 12 December 2011
accident and injury research are highlighted. Both empirical research in terms of hypotheses tested
Available online 10 February 2012
and theoretical research such as accident causation models are compared and contrasted. Finally, based
on the critical appraisal of the comprehensive review, future research directions on occupational injury
Keywords:
research are delineated.
Occupational accident
Occupational injury
Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Hazard identification
Risk assessment
Accident causation
Injury mechanism
Injury intervention
Contents
1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1356
2. Taxonomy of literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1356
3. Methods of hazard identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1356
4. Methods of risk assessment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1357
4.1. Methods based on criterion variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1358
4.2. Methods based on modeling techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1358
5. Accident causation theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1358
5.1. First generation: Accident proneness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1359
5.1.1. Pure chance hypothesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1359
5.1.2. Accident proneness theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1359
5.1.3. Unconscious motivation theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1359
5.1.4. Adjustment-stress and goal-freedom-alertness theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
5.2. Second generation: Domino theories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
5.3. Third generation: Injury epidemiology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
5.4. Fourth generation: System models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
5.4.1. Sociotechnical and macroergonomic models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1360
5.5. Factors affecting injury . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1361
5.5.1. Individual-related factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1361
5.5.2. Job-related factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1361
5.5.3. Organization-related factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1361
6. Injury mechanism models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1362
6.1. Deviation models. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1362
6.2. Energy models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1362
6.3. Injury severity models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1362
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +91 3222 283750; fax: +91 3222 282272.
E-mail address: [email protected] (J. Maiti).
0925-7535/$ - see front matter Ó 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.ssci.2011.12.015
1356 V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367
Table 1
Taxonomy of literature.
ronmental losses. Identification of hazards is the first step in assess- search is focused on potentially hazardous elements (like energy
ing risk of injury. Hazard identification includes identification of concentrations and hazardous materials), and potential targets
hazardous energy sources (for example, fuels, pressure containers, (i.e. persons or equipment). Critical or significant factors influ-
rotating machinery) and identification of hazardous processes and encing safety are focused while searching for hazards. Upon
situations (for example, oxidation, radiation, rapid pressure identifying these factors, paths leading to accident are drawn
changes, mechanical shocks) in a worksystem. Two approaches up. Following methods adopt morphological approach: (i)
are common in hazard identification (Kumamoto and Henley, Change analysis (Johnson, 1980; Ferry, 1988), (ii) energy analy-
1996): (i) a general engineering evaluation based on previous data sis (Haddon, 1980; Johnson, 1980; Harms-Ringdahl, 1993), (iii)
and operational history (an informal approach), and (ii) a formal ap- deviation analysis (Harms-Ringdahl, 1993), (iv) comparison
proach using well-developed hazard identification techniques. The analysis (Kjellen, 1995), (v) hazard and operability (HAZOP)
approaches towards hazard identification can be further divided studies (Lees, 1980; ILO, 1988; CPS, 1992; Harms-Ringdahl,
in three categories (Suokas, 1988; Willquist and Torner, 2003): 1993; Bahr, 1997), (vi) job safety and work safety analysis
(Suokas and Rouhiainen, 1984; Harms-Ringdahl, 1993), (vii)
1. Biased reactive approach, where information is analyzed after management oversight and risk tree (MORT) (Johnson, 1980),
occurrence of an accident event. This is typically an informal and (viii) operation and support hazard analysis (O&SHA) (Bahr,
approach, and general engineering evaluations fall under this 1997). Many hazard identification techniques are generic in nat-
category. ure, and can be applied to any worksystem. However, hazards
2. Biased proactive approach, where identification of hazards and are specific to worksystem under consideration (Maiti, 2005),
failure modes are based on information from similar systems or and professional experience is required to accurately identify
historic data from the same system. This is a formal approach hazards in a given worksystem. Biased proactive methods
towards hazard identification, and backward and forward track- depend heavily on available previous knowledge of the system.
ing methods fall under this category. Fault-tree analysis (FTA) Even unbiased proactive methods are not completely unbiased,
(Lees, 1980; Harms-Ringdahl, 1993; Kumamoto and Henley, as previous experience is valuable in morphological hazard
1996; Bahr, 1997) is a typical backward tracking method, while identification. Domain knowledge, thus plays an important role
event-tree analysis (ETA) (Lees, 1980; Harms-Ringdahl, 1993; in hazard identification.
Kumamoto and Henley, 1996; Bahr, 1997) is a typical forward
tracking method. Apart from FTA and ETA, following methods 4. Methods of risk assessment
adopt biased proactive approach: (i) Cause-consequence
Analysis (Lees, 1980; Henley and Kumamoto, 1981; Kumamoto Risk is defined as chance of loss, the degree of probability of
and Henley, 1996), (ii) Failure Mode Effect Analysis (FMEA) loss, a situation involving exposure to danger, or possibility that
(Harms-Ringdahl, 1993; Kumamoto and Henley, 1996; Bahr, something unpleasant will happen (Webster, 2002). Risk can also
1997; Franceschini and Galetto, 2001), and (iii) Failure Mode be defined as the ‘‘considered expected loss or damage associated
Effect and Criticality Analysis (FMECA) (Kumamoto and Henley, with the occurrence of a possible undesired event’’ (Nieuwhof,
1996). 1985). Risk assessment involves identifying potential threats, esti-
3. Unbiased proactive approach, where hazard analysis is carried mating their likelihood, and estimating the consequences. The
out without waiting for the events to occur, and without any combination of these estimates represents the risk associated with
restrictive assumptions about presence of specific hazards in the activity being evaluated. More formally, risk is perceived as a
the worksystem. This is also a formal approach and morpholog- collection of all possible pairs of likelihoods and outcomes [Li, Oi;
ical methods fall under this category. In these methods, the i = 1, 2, . . . , n], where Oi and Li denote an outcome and its likelihood,
1358 V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367
respectively (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). Distribution pattern of ability or consequences (Chung et al., 1986; Freivalds and Johnson,
a given likelihood-outcome pair is known as risk profile. Occupa- 1990; Mallick and Mukherjee, 1996; Boyd and Radson, 1999; Cuny
tional injury risk is the likelihood of getting injured while perform- and Lejeune, 2003; Chang, 2004; Maiti and Khanzode, 2009; Maiti
ing a particular job. Phases in assessment of injury risk include et al., 2009; Khanzode et al., 2011). Beta distribution-based model
identification of hazards, evaluation of risk, and categorization of with lost workdays (consequence model) as indicator of injury risk
hazards based on risk index (Maiti, 2005). is one of the common models (Coleman and Kerkering, 2007).
Risk assessment methodologies are classified as: (i) qualitative Acute traumatic injuries occurring to individuals follow Poisson
methods, and (ii) quantitative methods (Tixier et al., 2002; Arunraj process and the inter-injury periods are exponentially distributed
and Maiti, 2007). These categories can further be classified as (Boyd and Radson, 1999). Injuries are modeled using mixed
deterministic, probabilistic, and combinatorial approaches. Quanti- Weibull distribution, considering injury as a failure, analogous to
tative risk assessment requires the estimation of frequency and reliability concepts. Such models assume differential injury liabil-
consequence severity in quantitative terms. This approach is suit- ity across individuals. Poisson regression models (Bailer et al.,
able when the risks are high, costs of detailed analyses are justified, 1997) are useful in adjusting injury rates for one or more explana-
and relevant data is available. The results are represented in the tory variables (for example, age, experience and occupation).
form of risk profiles. Qualitative risk assessment is more suitable Conditional probability-based models capture the risk of injury
when risks are low and small number of categories can cover entire through three-phase mechanism, namely pre-injury, injury and
range of consequences and likelihoods. The results are represented post-injury phases (Kjellen, 1984b,c).
in the form of risk matrices where occurrence probability and con- Third, soft computing techniques such as neural network-based
sequence severity represent the two axes. Risk assessment process models (Zurada et al., 1997) and functional block diagram-based
includes two decisions: (i) selection of criterion variables, and (ii) models (Papazoglou and Ale, 2007) are used for evaluating injury
selection of modeling techniques. As stated earlier, the modeling risk.
techniques can be subjective using scoring system to measure risk Apart from injury risk assessment methods, other techniques are
such as low, medium or high or quantify objectively the values of found in literature, which are applicable in different contexts. Rapid
likelihood and consequences using probability distributions. Use of upper limb assessment (RULA) (McAtamney and Corlett, 1993), pos-
probability models also helps in developing risk intervals instead tural loading on the upper body assessment (LUBA) (Kee and Kar-
of a point value. Based on these decisions, risk assessment methods wowski, 2001), and quick exposure checklist (QEC) (David et al.,
are divided into different categories that are explained below. 2008) are the methods of assessing risk of ergonomic hazards to
industrial workers. Risk of human errors (Reason, 1990) in a work-
4.1. Methods based on criterion variables system is evaluated by using techniques like Action Error Analysis,
Cause-consequence Analysis (Taylor, 1979; Lees, 1980; Singleton,
Different criterion variable-based indices are employed to esti- 1984a), Success Likelihood Index Method (Kirwan, 1990), and Hu-
mate risk of accident/injury. The most frequently used risk mea- man Error Probability Index (Khan et al., 2006). Probabilistic risk
sure is injury rate based on descriptive statistics (Pines et al., assessment (PRA) is the most commonly used methodology for reli-
1987; Jeong, 1999). Lost-time injury frequency rate, fatal accident ability and risk assessment in chemical, aerospace, nuclear and
rate (Kjellen and Sklet, 1995), cumulative incidence rate, severity other high-risk industries (Kumamoto and Henley, 1996). However,
rate, severity index (Boyd and Radson, 1999), disabling frequency PRA is primarily used in system- and component-level risk assess-
rate and disabling severity rate (Sheu et al., 2000) are some of ment in high-risk systems, and not for assessment of risk of injury
the indices commonly used to quantify risk. These rates are calcu- to industrial workers.
lated based on incidents per time period (for example, month or
year), man-hours worked (for example, thousand mandays or mil-
lion manhours), and number of persons (for example, per thousand 5. Accident causation theories
employees) (Kjellen and Sklet, 1995; Duzgun and Einstein, 2004).
Composite indices derived using principal component analysis A number of accident theories and models are put forth and
from more than one criterion variables (for example, number of examined by researchers over the years, but we divide these theo-
days away from work, degree of permanent disablement, and addi- ries and models into four generations as shown in Table 2. First
tional expenses) are used in some studies (Cuny and Lejeune, 1999, generation theories hold a primitive viewpoint towards accident
2003). Time between incident occurrences are also used as crite- causation. These theories hold a person’s traits and unsafe behavior
rion variable in some studies (Maiti and Khanzode, 2009; Maiti as responsible for accident (Greenwood and Woods, 1919). Second
et al., 2009). In a recent study, Maiti (2010) developed worksystem generation theories (domino theories) conceptualize a chain of
safety-capability index, similar to process capability index used in sequential events leading to an accident, and call these events as
quality control. dominos (Heinrich, 1932). Removal of any one domino from the
chain would break the chain of accident events. Domino theories
4.2. Methods based on modeling techniques are most widely used for accident mitigation in industry (Heinrich
et al., 1980). Deviation theory (Kjellen, 1984a,b) is a variation of
Different modeling techniques are proposed by researchers for domino theory where possible deviations in each domino are iden-
assessing accident/injury risk. First, ordinal scales are used for eval- tified and evaluated quantitatively. Injury epidemiology models
uating consequences of accident/injury incidents (Kejriwal, 2002). (originated in 1960s) represent third generation of accident re-
FMEA, FMECA, abbreviated injury scale (AIS) and injury severity search (Haddon et al., 1964). Injury epidemiology approach holds
scale (ISS) (Mitchell et al., 1993) employ different kinds of classifi- that accident prevention efforts do not necessarily lead to injury
cation schemes to weigh the consequences. Rao-Tummala and Leu- control in a worksystem. This approach focuses on energy transfer
ng (1996) propose a two-way priority matrix for risk assessment involved in injury incident, and tries to minimize it in order to min-
based on probability of occurrence and severity of consequences. imize the losses. System approach to accident causation (the fourth
Index of harm is a useful tool to compare occupational risk across generation) emerged in 1970s as a response to the challenge of
industries (Soloman and Alesch, 1989). maintaining safety in increasingly complex worksystems. Socio-
Second, accident/injury risk is modeled through appropriate technical systems theory (originated in 1950s) is a parallel sys-
statistical distributions, by fitting distribution of occurrence prob- tem-level approach for optimizing safety performance (Trist and
V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367 1359
Table 2 sociotechnical system models (Brown et al., 2000; Paul and Maiti,
Accident theories: generations. 2008) and macroergonomic models (Hendrick, 1986) also investi-
Generation Theory Important features gate this interactive sequence. These models take holistic approach
Gen-I Accident Personality traits responsible for accident, and examine job-related factors apart from organization and indi-
proneness theory Differential involvement in accident, vidual-related factors.
Behavioral interventions
Gen-II Domino theories Unsafe act and condition as immediate 5.1. First generation: Accident proneness
predecessors of accident, Interventions
focused on unsafe acts
Gen-III Injury Uncontrolled energy transfer focused, There are four prevalent theories which belong to the first gen-
epidemiology Control at pre-injury, injury and post- eration of accident causation theories as follows:
theory injury stages
Gen-IV System theories Holistic approach, Integrated safety
5.1.1. Pure chance hypothesis
systems
STS theory Interacting social and technical sub- Pure chance hypothesis (prevailed up to 1920s) is the most
systems, Job design based on STS principles primitive viewpoint of explaining accidents, and generally not re-
Macroergonomic Holistic approach like system models, garded as ‘‘theory’’ (Haddon et al., 1964). The hypothesis states
theory Organization-centered Approach that everyone in a population has an equal chance of meeting an
accident. There are no patterns in the events leading to accident,
and the accident is an Act of God. Obviously this hypothesis finds
Bamforth, 1951). Macroergonomics has evolved as a approach hardly any place in modern accident and injury research.
towards system safety improvement since late 1980s (Hendrick,
1986). 5.1.2. Accident proneness theories
There is a correspondence among four generations of accident Accident proneness theory is the first theory that systematically
theories, the prevailing accident causation themes, and types of investigates accident proneness of individuals working in a system.
causal factors. Three themes of accident causation are: person- Greenwood and Woods (1919), Greenwood and Yule (1920) and
as-cause, system-as-cause, and system-person sequence as-cause Farmer and Chambers (1929) are the proponents of the term
(Leigh et al., 1990; Brown et al., 2000; Paul and Maiti, 2008). Each ‘‘accident proneness’’. The theory suggests that there exists a
theme examines specific causal factors to explain accident events. certain subgroup within the general population that is more likely
Causal factors responsible for accident/injury are divided into three to meet accidents. This liability is caused by some innate personal-
types as: (i) individual-related, (ii) organization-related, and (iii) ity traits explained through the construct ‘‘accident proneness’’
job-related factors (Paul and Maiti, 2007, 2008; Bajpayee et al., (Davis and Coiley, 1959; Keehn, 1959; Whitlock et al., 1963; Irwin,
2004; Huang et al., 2006; Mullen, 2004; Kjellen and Hovden, 1964; Kunce, 1967; Guilford, 1973; Kunce, 1974). Initially, accident
1993). The correspondence between generations of accident theo- proneness was perceived as a non-modifiable characteristic. Later
ries, themes of accident causation and types of causal factors are studies suggested the role of transient factors like stress, socio-
shown in Table 3. psychological make-up of an individual, safety culture, and work
Person-as-cause theme holds a person’s traits as responsible for environment in explaining accident proneness. The membership
accident/injury, and examines individual-related factors for acci- of accident-prone group keeps changing, and a person’s accident
dent causation. This belief is reflected clearly in first generation proneness may change with time. Liability towards accident is also
of accident theories, especially in accident proneness theory. Sec- influenced by previous accident experience. The liability either
ond generation (domino theory) accounts for system factors like decreases (burned fingers hypothesis) or increases (contagious
unsafe conditions, but focuses on person while designing interven- hypothesis), after meeting an accident compared to the rest of
tions. Domino theory includes factors like job satisfaction among the population (Schulzinger, 1954; Kirchner, 1961; Surry, 1969;
the dominos causing accident. Typically, proponents of the first Shaw and Sichel, 1971; Verhaegen et al., 1976). Persons prone to
two generations design behavioral interventions to minimize acci- injury at workplace are also prone to injury at other places (for
dents and injury. The second theme, system-as-cause, asserts that example, home), and during other activities (for example, leisure
the reasons of failure should be traced in the system, rather than activities or sports) (Salminen and Heiskanen, 1997). Number of
holding an individual responsible (Deming, 1986). Fourth genera- individuals with repeated injuries is higher than that expected by
tion models (system models) support this belief, and examine a chance (Visser et al., 2007) indicating presence of accident prone-
number of organization-related factors for accident causation ness. Sometimes the term ‘‘differential accident involvement’’ is
(Reason, 1997; Zohar, 2010). The third theme hypothesizes an used to describe accident proneness. However, the term ‘‘accident
interactive sequence between system and person. Job-related fac- proneness’’ lacks to convey the intention of prevention (McKenna,
tors play an important role in determining the nature of system- 1983), and puts more blame on individual than system. Accident
person interactions. Third generation models investigate energy proneness models align to person-as-cause theme of injury causa-
interactions in a worksystem and examine the role of job-related tion and suggest behavioral interventions for safety improvement.
factors in uncontrolled energy release. System models, especially
5.1.3. Unconscious motivation theory
Table 3
The theory of unconscious motivation has its roots in psychoan-
Correspondence between generations and causation themes. alytic theory. Accidents are caused by subconscious processes that
include guilt, aggression, anxiety, ambition, and conflict. This the-
Generation Causation theme Types of factors examined
ory focuses on an individual and correlation of his/her perception
Gen-I Person-as-cause (unsafe acts) Individual-related of environment with personality traits. Low scores on positive or
Gen-II System-as-cause (unsafe Individual- and job-
conditions), Person-as-cause related
socially desirable traits, low opinions on jobs and work environ-
(unsafe acts) ment, and withdrawals from work are found as significant contrib-
Gen-III System-person sequence (energy Job-related (leading to utors to accidents/injuries (Hill and Trist, 1953; Castle, 1956;
interactions) energy interactions) Davids and Mahoney, 1957; Fine, 1963; Eysenck, 1964; Verhaegen
Gen-IV System-as-cause, System-person Organization-related, Job-
et al., 1976). The unconscious motivation theory is aligned with
sequence related, Individual-related
person-as-cause theme, and leads to behavioral interventions.
1360 V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367
5.1.4. Adjustment-stress and goal-freedom-alertness theory However, applications of epidemiological approach in different
Adjustment-stress theory holds that individuals who cannot ad- worksystems are scarcely reported.
just with their work and work environment tend to have more
accidents than those who can (Kerr, 1950). Failure to adjust is 5.4. Fourth generation: System models
caused by a range of physical and psychological stressors. Goals-
freedom-alertness theory (Kerr, 1957) is an extension of Over the years, organizations have become more and more
adjustment-stress theory. This theory holds that certain persons complex to meet the societal demands in terms of productivity,
are accident prone at work due to lack of alertness on the task at safety and quality. Identification of deviation from normal operat-
hand, which is a result of lack of freedom to set goals at work. ing conditions and propagation of injury event has become more
Hardly any researchers have examined and reported these complex. As linear approach is insufficient to understand such
hypotheses in the context of occupational injury. complex events (Leveson, 2004), holistic system approach is
adopted to explain accident events (Leplat, 1984; Purswell and Ru-
5.2. Second generation: Domino theories mar, 1984; Singleton, 1984b; Leveson, 2004). However, holistic
models for accident causation need to incorporate quantitative
Heinrich suggests the concept of dominos (Heinrich, 1932) to analysis to increase the strength of explanation (Attwood et al.,
explain accident causation. He perceives the following five domi- 2006). To explain accident events using a large number of system
nos: (i) ancestry and social environment, (ii) person’s fault, (iii) un- factors, simulation-based models are commonly used (Hale and
safe act and/or condition, (iv) accident, and (v) injury. Heinrich Hale, 1970; Ayoub, 1975, 1980; Brenner, 1975; Smillie and Ayoub,
argues that removal of any one domino (in most conditions, unsafe 1976; Kjellen, 1987; Woodcock et al., 2005). Rao-Tummala and
act of a worker) breaks the propagation of accident event. Bird and Leung (1996), Carder and Ragan (2003), and Bellamy et al. (2008)
Loftus (1976) replace ancestry and social environment by manage- propose system models for occupational safety and accident anal-
ment’s lack of control, and adds basic causes (personal and job fac- ysis. An integrated safety management information system is pro-
tors) and immediate causes (substandard practices, conditions or posed for analysis and decision making related to accident events
errors) to the dominos. Domino theory holds that injury severity and safety interventions (Ayoub, 1979; Kjellen, 1982). System dy-
is a result of pure chance (Heinrich et al., 1980), which is con- namic modeling and structural equation modeling approaches are
tradicted by Shannon and Manning (1980), who argues that injury employed to address coalmine safety issues (Maiti and Bhattachar-
severity is a function of worksystem characteristics (the job-re- jee, 2000; Bhattacharjee and Maiti, 2000).
lated factors). Models based on domino theory are also known as Leamon’s human machine model (Leamon, 1980) identifies
process models (Kjellen and Larsson, 1981). International Loss Con- components of worksystem, while his occupational health and
trol Institute’s (ILCI) loss causation model (Bird and Germain, safety model (Leamon, 1988) identifies interactions in worksystem
1992) is based on domino theory. The ILCI model explicitly consid- leading to occupational accidents. However, applications of Lea-
ers contact with energy as the domino leading to injury. mon’s model in analyzing occupational injuries in different indus-
Domino theory captures the dynamics of injury event. However, trial settings are not reported. A number of factors affect safety in a
the theory does not account for complex interactions that take worksystem. The relationships between these factors and the
place during injury. Issues of risk quantification across each dom- safety status of the system are multivariate in nature, and some
ino are not addressed in the theory. Focusing on only five (or six) studies examine these relationships (Brown et al., 2000; Paul and
dominos leads to an error of generalization. In practice, safety pro- Maiti, 2008). The prevailing system models analyze and explain
fessionals perceive unsafe act as the ‘‘easiest-to-blame’’ domino, only the accident causation and do not focus on injury event, en-
and leave unsafe conditions generally unattended. Out of this nar- ergy interactions, and injury severity.
row focus on unsafe acts, behavioral interventions are commonly
designed and implemented, when unsafe conditions demand more 5.4.1. Sociotechnical and macroergonomic models
attention of the management. Originated as a methodology to study productivity problem in UK
coalmines in 1950s (Trist and Bamforth, 1951), Sociotechnical sys-
5.3. Third generation: Injury epidemiology tem (STS) approach evolved as a theory of organization design in
1980s (Emery, 1969; Cherns, 1976, 1987; Susman, 1976; Clegg,
Injury epidemiology models are derived from epidemics (Rob- 1988, 2000; Appelbaum, 1997; Keating et al., 2001; Majchrzak and
ertson, 1998). These models compare and contrast injury and dis- Borys, 2001; Carayon, 2006; Reiman and Oedewald, 2007). More re-
ease. Both cause harm to human body, and both are highly cently, STS methodology is used to model, analyze, and manage
patterned. While injuries damage the human body quickly, dis- occupational safety and risk in worksystems (Robinson, 1982; Ras-
eases do so at a slower pace (Haddon, 1980). Studies of injury pat- mussen, 1997; Galli, 1999; Brown et al., 2000; Svedung and Rasmus-
terns are helpful in injury control. Injury epidemiology models sen, 2002; Morel and Chauvin, 2006). According to STS approach, a
perceive three factors to explain the injury phenomenon as (Had- system is composed of two interacting subsystems: social and tech-
don et al., 1964): the host (the person injured), the agent (the en- nical subsystem. Joint optimization of these subsystems leads to
ergy leading to injury), and the environment (physical, biological better performance of the whole system. In modeling injury risk,
and organizational). Among the environmental factors, transient joint consideration of person-level (social) factors and system-level
factors (those changing with time) are the most immediate factors (technical) factors is necessary according to STS approach. However,
causing injury. Injuries resulting from such instantaneous factors such approach is adopted by only a few researchers, for example,
are common, yet poorly understood from etiological perspective Brown et al. (2000) in steel industry, and Paul and Maiti (2008) in
(Sorock et al., 2001). Examination of transient factors through coalmining. This status of literature leaves open opportunities for
appropriate study design warrants researchers’ attention. Sorock researchers to adopt STS approach in modeling accident and injury
et al. (2004) examines transient factors for hand injuries in differ- risk and safety performance in different industrial settings. Macr-
ent occupations in US and reports malfunctioning equipment and oergonomic approach to worksystem design focuses on interactions
use of nonstandard method as significant factors. Chow et al. at organization-level (Smith and Sainfort, 1989; Hendrick, 1986;
(2007) examines transient risk factors for hand injuries in different Carayon and Smith, 2000; Robins, 2000; Kleiner, 2006). A number
occupations in Hong Kong and reports absence of hand-gloves, of premises of the macroergonomic approach are drawn from
being rushed and working overtime as significant factors. sociotechnical systems theory (Kleiner, 2006). Work compatibility
V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367 1361
model is a recent methodology of assessment of occupational risk in worksystems containing more hazards. There are more chances
(Genaidy et al., 2007a,b, 2008, 2009), which is fundamentally a of getting injured while performing certain activities in a worksys-
macroergonomic approach. tem. Manual material handling is one of the most common activi-
ties leading to workplace injury (Davies et al., 2003). Manual
5.5. Factors affecting injury material handling is also the commonest activity responsible for
musculoskeletal disorders, strains and sprains. Individuals are
Accident causation theories and causation themes (Table 3) more prone to injury when working in night shifts than in day
identify several factors contributing towards the occurrence of shifts. Workplace factors like poor housekeeping and space avail-
accidents/injuries in worksystems. Over the years, a large number ability are found to be responsible in causing accidents in construc-
of individual-related, job-related, and organizational-related tion industry. Job stress (Paul and Maiti, 2005), job dissatisfaction
factors are examined in different studies. In the following para- (Paul and Maiti, 2005), job responsibility (Ferguson et al., 1984,
graphs findings on effect of these factors on accident/injury event 1985) and work performance (Ferguson et al., 1984, 1985) are
are presented in brief. some more job-related factors that correlate strongly with injury.
High stress, high dissatisfaction, less responsibility, and poor work
5.5.1. Individual-related factors performance are associated with more injuries. Technology change
Individual-related factors are examined the most commonly by may reduce injury risk in one area and increase in other unknown
first generation theorists. Age and work experience are the most areas. Effect of technology change on injury is more prevalent
investigated factors. Increase in age increases risk of injury (Fotta among younger workers (Blank et al., 1996). A study of Turkish
and Bockosh, 2000; Jeong, 1999). However, contrary findings also coal mines shows that mechanization changes the riskiest loca-
exist (Bennett and Passmore, 1984a). Inadequate work experience tions from face to out-by-face, and reduces number of injuries (Sari
(less than 1 year) poses high risk of injury (Keyserling, 1983; Butani, et al., 2004).
1988). Young workers (under 25 years) are at higher risk in nonfatal
injury incidents, while older workers are at higher risk in fatal injury 5.5.3. Organization-related factors
incidents (Salminen, 2004). Warr (1993) classifies occupational Since 1970, organizational factors have been considered as
tasks into four types as: age-impaired, age-counteracted, age-neu- important causal factors of accident occurrences (e.g., (Powell
tral, and age-enhanced tasks. The relationship of injury risk with et al., 1971)). Subsequently, the term ‘safety climate’ was defined
age is respectively increasing, inverted-U shaped, unaffected, and by Zohar (1980) as the summary of molar perceptions that employ-
decreasing for these four types (Laamme and Menckel, 1995). Injury ees share about their work environment. Some of the significant
risk is high in initial years of employment, diminishes when an indi- organization-related factors are: workgroup size (Guastello and
vidual acquires sufficient work experience, and rises again with Guastello, 1987), management support (Gillen et al., 2002; Maiti
aging. Gun and Ryan (1994) find absence of correlation between et al., 2004), coworker support and supervisory support (Gillen
age/experience and injury. However, such results are exceptions, et al., 2002; Maiti et al., 2004), management’s commitment to
rather than trends, and are applicable only to age-neutral tasks. safety (O’Toole, 2002), workplace safety status (Lindell, 1997; Gil-
Age, experience, education (Leigh et al., 1990) and mental ability len et al., 2002), and workgroup size (Guastello and Guastello,
correlate well with injury as well as with poor work performance 1987). Higher management, coworker and supervisory support,
(Ferguson et al., 1984). Living habits (alcohol and tobacco consump- higher commitment towards safety, safer perception of system sta-
tion) are found to have an association with injury events (Dawson, tus, and smaller workgroup sizes (less than 15), are found to be
1994; Zwerling et al., 1996). Negative affectivity (the chronic expe- associated with low injury risks. Workers, who experience their
rience of negative emotional states and lack of emotional stability) workplace as safe, also perceive management and coworker
correlates strongly with injury (Verhaegen et al., 1985; Maiti et al., support as high (Gillen et al., 2002). Cheyne et al. (2002) measured
2004; Paul and Maiti, 2005). Skill-based errors correlate strongly employee safety attitudes and examined relationships between
with injuries (Reason, 1990; Hobbs and Williamson, 2002) as com- components of organizational safety elements, perceptions of phys-
pared to violations and mistakes. Absenteeism, risk-taking nature ical work environment and perceptions of workplace hazards.
and injuries correlate with each other (Verhaegen et al., 1976). Neg- Organizational variables influence environmental and job-related
ative affectivity and risk-taking nature correlate with violations variables, which in turn influence precursors to safe behavior. How-
leading to injury (Verhaegen et al., 1985). Negative affectivity and ever, the focus of this work is only behavioral. Behavioral safety
risk-taking behavior along with job dissatisfaction are strong predic- models hypothesize a relationship between safe/unsafe behavior
tors of injury in Indian coalmines (Paul et al., 2005; Paul and Maiti, and injury. Safer the behavior at work, lesser is the risk of injury.
2007). According to Hill and Trist (1953), the negative traits A number of studies aimed at finding drivers of safety behavior find
(absenteeism, negative affectivity, risky behavior and violations) that unsafe behavior correlates with higher injury (Andriessen,
reflect the quality of relationship of an individual with the organiza- 1978; Prussia et al., 2003).
tion and contribute to injury. Role overload (Mullen, 2004), organization’s priority to perfor-
mance over safety (Mullen, 2004), influences of socialization at
5.5.2. Job-related factors work (Mullen, 2004), poor safety attitudes (Rundmo and Hale,
Injury risk differs job-wise and a number of job-related factors 2003; Mullen, 2004), perceived hazards (Seo, 2005), and high per-
are the predictors of injury (Ferguson et al., 1985). This relationship ceived risks (Rundmo, 1996; Mullen, 2004; Seo, 2005) are some of
is stronger than individual-related factors (McLeod et al., 2003). the drivers of unsafe behavior at work. An improvement in per-
Some of the commonest job-related factors examined and found ceived safety climate leads to a shared understanding of unsafe
significant by the researchers are: occupation (Leigh et al., 1990; behavior (Prussia et al., 2003), particularly in tightly-coupled sys-
Maiti and Bhattacherjee, 1999; Maiti et al., 2001), location of work tems (Perrow, 1984), which in turn seemingly reduces injury risks.
(Leigh et al., 1990; Maiti and Bhattacherjee, 1999; Maiti et al., Measurement of safety climate and its effect on safety performance
2001), hazards in worksystem (Maiti et al., 2004; Khanzode et al., has witnessed growing attention of researchers in the past few
2011), activity (Leigh et al., 1990), shift of working (Levin et al., years (Gillen et al., 2002; Prussia et al., 2003; Fullarton and Stokes,
1985; Frank, 2000), and workplace factors (Haslam et al., 2005). 2007). Instruments measuring safety climate predict injury rates
Injury risk differs with different occupations, and is affected by with varying strength and validity. Siu et al. (2004) evaluated effect
location of work where a given job is performed. Injury risk is high of safety climate on safety performance through a path model.
1362 V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367
Safety attitude and psychological distress affect injury rates (Siu hypothesis which does not account for injury severity. On the con-
et al., 2004). Negative affectivity affects safety climate and both, trary, Hale and Hale (1972), Petersen (1989) and Salminen et al.
in turn, affect injury (Maiti et al., 2004). Poor safety environment (1992) support a differential causation hypothesis for injuries of
is a factor to injury (Paul and Maiti, 2008). Industry-specific haz- varying severity. The differential causation hypothesis warrants
ards affect the relationship between safety climate and safety per- examination of injuries in the light of varying severity. Petersen
formance (Smith et al., 2006). For the last three decades, many (1989) validated the differential hypothesis in mining industry,
researchers focused their study on measuring safety climate, and while Salminen et al. (1992) obtained similar findings independent
establishing relation between safety climate and safety perfor- of occupations in Swedish industry. Severity of injury is not gov-
mance (Zohar, 2010). erned by chance, but depends on energy interaction involved in
the injury event (Shannon and Manning, 1980). In general, two
6. Injury mechanism models types of factors are important in determining injury severity (Hull
et al., 1996): (i) factors related to susceptibility of body tissue to
Transfer of energy to human body is a central issue in injury damage, and (ii) factors related to energy interaction. Type and
incident. Injury models attempt to explain how this energy is built agency of accident, activity and injured body part are found to be
in a worksystem, and what causes release of uncontrolled energy. associated significantly with injury severity in Australian coal-
Consideration of energy interactions those are present at the time mines (Hull et al., 1996) and in Indian coalmines (Khanzode
of injury gains obvious importance in this regard. The entire mech- et al., 2010). However, Hull et al. (1996) found location and occu-
anism is not simple and linear but often multiple-phased, complex pation as non-significant factors. Various other causal factors also
and unpredictable (Perrow, 1984). Till 1960s, objects carrying en- decide injury severity. For example, age, experience, job, location,
ergy were perceived as injury agents. However, Gibson’s work of- mining system are the factors found to be affecting injury severity
fered a paradigm shift in injury research (Robertson, 1998). in coalmines (Bennett and Passmore, 1984b, 1985).
Different types of energy, i.e. mechanical, thermal, chemical, and
electrical energy, and ionizing radiation are now identified as 7. Intervention strategies
agents of injury. Later, Haddon (1972) proposed Haddon Matrix
to categorize injury-related events in three phases namely: pre-in- Intervention strategies for occupational accident/injury control
jury, injury and post-injury for the host, vehicle and environment. are based on the following principles (Haddon, 1980; Heath,
Since then, multiple-phased structure of injury mechanism is 1982): (i) isolating the source of energy release, (ii) separating
examined by different researchers. The models explaining mecha- the source and the user in time–space, (iii) providing protecting
nism of injury event can be classified into three types as follows: envelope around the user, (iv) providing instruction and informa-
tion necessary to enable the users to operate rationally in the pres-
6.1. Deviation models ence of energy release. While first three strategies refer to
engineering interventions (hardware design and organization de-
Deviation is said to occur when a system characteristic attains a sign), the last one refers to education (and training), and enforce-
value beyond norms (Kjellen, 1984a; Kjellen and Hovden, 1993). ment (of safety rules and regulations).
Kjellen and Larsson (1981) identify three distinct phases occur in
injury incident as: initial phase, concluding phase and injury phase.
7.1. Engineering interventions
Haslam et al. (2005) perceive three tiers in injury mechanism as:
originating influences, shaping factors and immediate accident cir-
Engineering interventions generally adopt an approach called
cumstances. Deviation models explain injury on the basis of devi-
‘‘design for safety’’ or ‘‘integrating safety into design’’ (Menckel,
ations occurring in the system variables which lead to release of
1990; Kletz, 1990; Hasan et al., 2003; Pohjola, 2003; Hollnagel,
uncontrolled energy (Kjellen, 1984b,c). However, the deviation
2004). Most common shop floor strategies of engineering interven-
models are scarcely developed by further researchers.
tion include incorporating shields and guards with the equipment,
and providing personal protective equipment to the operator. Engi-
6.2. Energy models neering interventions are often associated with technology
changes. Accident risk increases during phase of rapid technology
Energy models describe the phases in injury mechanism in change (Saari, 1982). Better technology leads to reduction of occu-
slightly different terms as compared to deviation models. These pational hazards, but it is accompanied by increased risks in other
phases are: energy build-up phase, energy release phase and unknown areas (Singleton, 1982). Accidents in high-risk systems
impact phase (Haddon, 1968). Oleske et al. (1989) modeled acci- are usually originated and propagated through system shortcom-
dent types and sources of injury to explain the injury mechanism. ings rather than operators errors. Multiple and unexpected interac-
Energy build-up in worksystem and human interactions with sys- tions causing failures are inevitable in complex systems (Perrow,
tem energy play an important role in injury incident (Tuominen 1984). According to Perrow (1984), the intervention strategies
and Saari, 1982). Investigation of uncontrolled energy transfer as need to be shifted to system shortcomings rather than local design
a direct cause of injury is the foremost step in injury analysis variables.
(OSHA, 2002; Storbakken, 2002). Design for safety is not always a viable option for existing work-
systems. However, job redesign is a possible alternative in many
6.3. Injury severity models cases. If human errors are treated as instances of human–machine
or human-task misfits, then systematic or frequent instances of
Examination of factors affecting injury severity in different misfits are the symptoms of design errors, requiring job redesign
worksystems is helpful in minimizing the severity of impact, and (Rasmussen, 1982). On the other hand, occasional instances of mis-
reducing lost mandays under a given situation. Factors affecting in- fits are either due to system variability (system failures) or human
jury severity are not exactly the same as the factors causing injury. variability (human errors). Incidents that increase exposure to en-
Major and fatal injuries are caused by different factors as compared ergy or concentrate on different forms of energy can be modified
to minor and nonfatal injuries. Heinrich et al. (1980) and Lozada- through job redesign under certain conditions (Robertson, 1998).
Larsen and Laughery (1987) perceive an identical causation Typically, any worksystem, originally designed for safe conditions,
V.V. Khanzode et al. / Safety Science 50 (2012) 1355–1367 1363
Studies related to education and training interventions mainly Fig. 2. Gaps in injury and accident literature.
focus on behavioral modification (for example, Heath (1982),
Sulzer-Azaroff (1987), Krause et al. (1999), Williams and Scott-Gel- FMEA, and FMECA are good examples of this. However, the acci-
er (2000), Whysall et al. (2006), Paul and Maiti (2007)). However, dent causation models are not interfaced with hazard identifica-
effects of behavioral interventions on injury prevention are not tion and risk assessment methodologies. Interfaces between risk
conclusively examined and alternate viewpoints exist. Designers assessment techniques and accident causation models would be
of safe behavior programs assume unsafe behavior as the prime helpful in examining whether an accident will occur under given
cause of accidents, and overlook other causal factors (Hopkins, conditions. On the other hand, injury mechanism models and in-
2006). Behavioral scientists assume human beings as objects train- jury severity models are well interfaced with each other. However,
able by reward and punishable to do virtually anything, and gener- these models are not interfaced with accident causation models.
ally overlook energy interactions at workplace (Robertson, 1998). Development of such interfaces will enhance understanding of
Behavioral approach ignores biological limitations as well as inter- how the risk is transferred first to an accident event and then to
mediate cognition between training and expected behavior, and an injury.
therefore may yield poor results. Behavioral interventions can be The complex system-level accident causation models are more
successful only if they decrease exposure to hazards. However, suitable for analyzing event chains that lead from component-level
behavioral interventions do not include components for hazard to system-level failures and cause accidents. These complex event
exposure reduction. The belief that all safety problems can be chains lead to high severity-low frequency accidents and not to
solved by training is a myth (Mason, 1973). Training generally en- low severity-high frequency incidents. However, from injury re-
hances skill and knowledge on the job, and is effective in reducing search point of view, low severity-high frequency incidents are
injury if lack of skill or knowledge is a strong causal factor for in- more important. Methodologies available for analyzing high sever-
jury. However lack of skill or knowledge is not always a causal fac- ity-low frequency incidents are not particularly useful for identify-
tor of injury. Unless the occurrence of energy interactions is ing injury patterns and effectively mitigate them. This ineffective
understood properly, the effectiveness of behavioral interventions ness is reflected in astronomical figures of occupational injuries.
may be limited. Unilateral interventions stressing on behavioral It is therefore essential to develop methodologies that address
change may lead to improvement in perceived safety without the injury problem specifically.
reducing actual injury risk. Thus, behavioral interventions have a Any injury causation model, in order to be effective, needs to
limited usefulness in injury reduction (Robertson, 1998). comprise of four components as shown in Fig. 3. First, as injury in-
volves transfer of energy to human body, models that do not con-
sider energy interactions can only be of limited use in
7.3. Enforcement interventions
understanding injury. Second, transient risk factors are important
in realization of injury risk. These factors are the most immediate
With regard to assessment of enforcement interventions to-
to injury incident and vary between the injured and non-injured
wards injury prevention, status of the literature is even poorer. A
person, when most of the other system variables are the same (Sor-
few researchers examined effects of rules and regulations on occu-
ock et al., 2001, 2004; Chow et al., 2007). Therefore, an injury mod-
pational safety (Hale, 1990; Gun, 1993; O’Toole, 1999; Laurence,
el should provide a scheme for identification of transient risk
2005). A general inclination of authorities to impose more regula-
factors in a worksystem. Third, an injury model needs to establish
tions to improve workplace safety should be curbed as this may be
links of causal factors with energy transfer event. Stronger the rela-
counter-productive (Hale, 1990). As more industries are imple-
tionship, more important is the role of that factor in injury occur-
menting injury interventions, researchers need to critically evalu-
rence. Fourth, injury models use different response variables to
ate significance of effects of such interventions on injury reduction.
measure the injury phenomenon. For the findings to be useful in
understanding injury, the response variable should have a good
8. Critical appraisal and future research directions content validity with injury event. Injury rates, accident rates,
and man-days lost are direct and good measures of injury risk.
There are a number of critical issues that are derived from the However, safe behavior (Brown et al., 2000; Cheyne et al., 2002;
review. As explained earlier (in Section 2), an injury incident fol- Prussia et al., 2003; Rundmo and Hale, 2003; Seo, 2005), safety atti-
lows a chain of events starting with presence of hazard and leading tude (Siu et al., 2004), and safety climate (Hopkins, 2006) are indi-
to injuries of varying severity. The review reveals that there are rect measures of injury incident. The validity of results needs to be
methodological gaps in analyzing this sequence of events, which assessed critically when injury models use indirect measures as
are shown in Fig. 2. response variables.
Fig. 2 shows that hazard identification and risk assessment Effects of different accident prevention strategies on injury
methodologies are well interfaced with each other. ETA, FTA, control and prevention are not evaluated objectively and reported
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