CRIMINAL LAW (Book 2)

By

Irene Resurreccion-Medrano
CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY AND THE LAW OF NATIONS

Crimes Against National Security

Article 114. Treason

Article 115. Conspiracy and Proposal to commit treason
Article 116. Misprison of treason
Article 117. Espionage
- PROVOKING WAR AND DISLOYALTY IN CASE OF WAR
Article 118. Inciting to war or giving motives for reprisals
Article 119. Violation of Neutrality
Article 120. Correspondence with hostile country
Article 121. Flight to enemy’s country

- PIRACY AND MUTINY ON THE HIGH SEAS OR IN PHILIPPINE

WATERS
Article 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or
in Philippine waters
Article 123. Qualified Piracy
- CRIMES AGAINST FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

- ARBITRARY DETENTION OR EXPULSION, VIOLATION OF DWELLING,

PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF PEACEFUL
MEETINGS AND CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

Article 124. Arbitrary Detention

Article 125. Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the
proper
Article 126. Delaying release
Article 127. Expulsion
- VIOLATION OF DOMICILE
Article 128. Violation of Domicile
Article 129. Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse
in the service of those legally obtained
Article 130. Searching domicile without witnesses

- PROHIBITION, INTERRUPTION, AND DISSOLUTION OF

PEACEFUL MEETINGS
Article 131. Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of
peaceful meetings

- CRIMES AGAINST RELIGIOUS WORSHIP

Article 132. Interruption of religious worship
Article 133. Offending the religious feelings
- CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

- REBELLION, COUP D’ETAT, SEDITION, AND DISLOYALTY

Article 134. Rebellion or insurrection – How committed
Article 134-A. Coup d’etat – How committed
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d’etat
Article 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or
insurrection
Article 137. Disloyalty of public officers or employees
Article 138. Inciting to rebellion or insurrection
Article 139. Sedition – How committed
Article 140. Penalty for sedition
Article 141. Conspiracy to commit sedition
Article 142. Inciting to Sedition
- CRIMES AGAINST POPULAR REPRESENTATION
- CRIMES AGAINST LEGISLATIVE BODIES AND SIMILAR BODIES
Article 143. Acts tending to prevent the meeting of the
Assembly and similar bodies
Article 144. Disturbance of proceedings

- VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

Article 145. Violation of parliamentary immunity

- ILLEGAL ASSEMBLIES AND ASSOCIATIONS

Article 146. Illegal assemblies
Article 147. Illegal associations
- ASSAULT UPON, AND RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO, PERSONS
IN AUTHORITY AND THEIR AGENTS
Article 148. Direct assaults
Article 149. Indirect assaults
Article 150. Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its
committees, by the Constitutional Commissions,
its committees, subcommittees or divisions
Article 151. Resistance and disobedience to a person in
authority or the agents of such person
Article 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in
Authority – Who shall be deemed as such
- PUBLIC DISORDERS
Article 153. Tumults and other disturbances of public order
Article 154. Unlawful use of means of publication and
unlawful utterances
Article 155. Alarms and scandals
Article 156. Delivering prisoners from jail
- EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE
Article 157. Evasion of service of sentence
Article 158. Evasion of service of sentence on the occasion of
disorders, conflagrations, earthquakes, or other
calamities
Article 159. Other cases of evasion of service of sentence
- COMMISSION OF ANOTHER CRIME DURING SERVICE OF PENALTY
IMPOSED FOR ANOTHER PREVIOUS OFFENSE
Article 160. Commission of another crime during service of
penalty imposed for another previous offense -
Penalty
Treason
Treason is committed by any Filipino citizen or an alien residing
in the Philippines, who shall levy war against the Philippines or
adhere to her enemies giving them aid or comfort within the
Philippines or elsewhere. (Article 114; 1946 Bar Exam)

Treason is a war crime. It is not an all-time offense. It cannot be

committed in peace time. While there is peace, there are no
traitors. (Laurel v. Misa, G.R. No. L-409, January 30, 1947)
Filipino Citizen and Resident Alien
A foreigner owes temporary allegiance to the government of the
place wherein he resides in return for the protection he receives.
Such temporary allegiance continues during the period of his
residence. If an alien, while residing in a foreign country, does an
act, which would amount to treason if committed by a citizen of
that country, he will be held liable for treason. (52 Am Jur 797)
Furthermore, Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code punishes a
resident alien for committing treason. (2012 Bar Exam)
Two-witness Rule
No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of
two witnesses at least to the same over act or on confession of the
accused in open court. (Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code)

Testimony of two witnesses is needed to prove overt act of giving aid

and comfort to the enemy but not to establish the element of
adherence to the enemy. Thus, the testimony of one witness is
enough to prove that the accused is a member of Makapili, an
organization of traitors, to show that he is adhering to the Japanese
Imperial Army. (People v. Rosas, G.R. No. L-2958, March 16, 1951)
Proposal or Conspiracy to Commit Treason

Proposal or conspiracy to commit treason is committed by

Filipino citizen or resident alien, who has decided to commit
treason and proposes its execution to some other person or
persons. (Article 115)

Conspiracy to commit treason is committed by two or more

Filipino citizens and/or resident aliens, who come to an
agreement concerning the commission of treason and decide to
commit it. (Article 115)
Membership
Treason by levying was requires actual assemblage of men for
purpose of executing a treasonable design by force. If there is
actual assemblage of men for treasonable purpose, there is
treason even though there is no actual clash of arms. (Criminal
Law Conspectus by Justice Florenz Regalado)
Doctrine of Absorption
1. Proposal – If a person to whom the proposal is made does
not agree to commit treason, the proponent
shall be held liable for the “crime of proposal to
commit treason.”
2. Conspiracy – If a person to whom the proposal is made
agrees and decides to commit treason, said
person and the proponent shall be held liable
for the “crime of conspiracy to commit treason,”
the proponent cannot be separately held liable
for proposal to commit treason since conspiracy
to commit treason absorbs proposal to commit
treason.
Doctrine of Absorption
3. Treason – If the person to whom the proposal is made
actually commits the crime of treason, said
person and the proponent as conspirators are
liable for the “crime of treason”; the proponent is
also considered as principal by inducement; the
conspirators could not be held liable for treason
and conspiracy to commit treason since former
absorbs the latter. Conspiracy in this case is
just a mode of incurring collective criminal
liability for treason.
Peacetime and Wartime Crime
Group of armed men seized a southern island of the Philippines and
declared war against the government. X, a Filipino, and, Y, a citizen of
Rwanda, agreed to help the armed men by raising funds in support of
their armed struggle. X and Y are not liable for conspiracy to commit
treason for the following reasons:

1. The armed men, who seized a southern island of the Philippines,

are liable for rebellion by rising publicly and taking up arms to
remove a southern island of the Philippines from the allegiance to
Republic of the Philippines and its laws. (see: Lagman v.
Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017) Thus, agreeing and
deciding to help the rebels by raising funds constitutes conspiracy
to commit rebellion, and not conspiracy to commit treason.
Peacetime and Wartime Crime
2. Treason and conspiracy to commit treason are war crimes.
They cannot be committed in times of peace. The war
contemplated in treason and conspiracy to commit treason
pertains to armed disputes between the Philippines and a
foreign state, and not a mere civil war. Since the Philippines is
not at war with a foreign state, X and Y cannot be held liable
for conspiracy to commit treason.
Peacetime and Wartime Crime
3. Y, for not being a Filipino citizen or a resident alien, cannot
commit treason; hence, Y cannot conspire with X in
committing treason. (2018 Bar Exam)
Filipino citizen as offender in misprision of
treason
The offenders in treason and conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason are Filipino citizen and a resident alien. (2018 Bar Exam)
On the other hand, the offender in misprision of treason is a
Filipino citizen. The phrase “person who owes allegiance to the
Philippines, without being a foreigner” in Article 116 of the
Revised Penal Code pertains to a Filipino citizen. Hence, an
alien, resident or non-resident, cannot commit misprision of
treason.
Misprision of Treason
Misprision of treason is committed by a person who owes
allegiance to the Philippines, without being a foreigner, who has
knowledge of any conspiracy against them, and shall conceal or
shall not disclose and make known the same, as soon as
possible to the governor, mayor or fiscal of the place in which he
resides. (Article 116)
Filipino citizen as offender in misprision of
treason
The offenders in treason and conspiracy or proposal to commit
treason are Filipino citizen and a resident alien. (2018 Bar Exam)
On the other hand, the offender in misprision of treason is a
Filipino citizen. The phrase “person who owes allegiance to the
Philippines, without being a foreigner” in Article 116 of the
Revised Penal Code pertains to a Filipino citizen. Hence, an
alien, resident or non-resident, cannot commit misprision of
treason.
Concealment or non-disclosure of conspiracy
to commit treason
In misprision of treason, a Filipino citizen obtains knowledge of
“conspiracy to commit treason” by a Filipino citizen or resident
alien but he fails to report the matters to proper authorities.

Misprision of treason cannot be committed without conspiracy to

commit treason. Thus, failure to disclose information regarding
the location of the food, supplies, and arms of the enemy is not
misprision of treason. (1968 Bar Exam)
Espionage

Espionage is committed by any person who, without authority

therefor, shall enter a warship, fort or naval or military
establishment or reservation to obtain any information, plans,
photographs or other data of a confidential nature relative to the
defense of the Philippines; or by a public officer, who shall
disclose to a representative of a foreign nation the contents of
articles, data or information of a confidential nature relative to the
defense of the Philippines, which is in his possession by reason
of his office. (Article 117; 2012 Bar Exam)
Espionage

The differences between treason and espionage are as follows:

1. Treason is a war crime while espionage can be committed

whether in time of war or peace;

2. Treason can only be committed by a Filipino citizen or

resident alien while espionage can be committed by a person
regardless of his nationality or residency.
Rebellion

Rebellion or insurrection is committed by multitude of persons

who rise publicly and take arms against the Government for the
purpose of:

1. Removing the territory of the Philippines or part thereof, or its

armed forces from the allegiance to said Government or its
laws; or
2. Depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature of any of their
powers or prerogatives or part thereof. (Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code)
Doctrine of Absorption

Crimes committed in furtherance of rebellion are deemed

absorbed in one single crime of rebellion. Direct assault, murder,
homicide, arson, robbery, and kidnapping, just to name a few, are
absorbed in the crime of rebellion if committed in furtherance of
rebellion. It cannot be made a basis of a separate charge. Murder
committed in furtherance of the crime of rebellion is stripped of its
common complexion and is absorbed in the crime of rebellion.
(People v. Hernandez, G.R. Nos. L-6025-26, July 18, 1956;
People v. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956;
Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)
Terrorism and Rebellion or Coup d'état

1. Objectives in Rebellion and Terrorism – In determining what

crime was committed, the court must look into the main objective
of the malefactors. If it is political, such as for the purpose of
severing the allegiance of Mindanao to the Philippine Government
to establish a wilayat therein, the crime is rebellion. If, on the other
hand, the primary objective is to intimidate the general public,
provoke or influence by intimidation the government, create an
atmosphere or spread a message of fear, or seriously destabilize
or destroy the fundamental political, economic, or social structures
of the country, the crime is terrorism under R.A. No. 11479.
(Lagman v. Medialdea, supra; 2019 Bar Exam)
Terrorism and Rebellion or Coup d'état

2. Non-mutually exclusive crimes – Rebels can be held liable

of rebellion and terrorism. In Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No.
231658, July 4, 2017, the Supreme Court stated that there is
nothing in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code and R.A. No.
9372 (now RA No. 11479) which states that rebellion and
terrorism are mutually exclusive of each other or that they
cannot co-exist together. RA No. 9372 (now RA No. 11479)
does not expressly or impliedly repeal Article 134 of the Code.
Terrorism cannot absorbs rebellion as they have different
elements.
COUP D’ÉTAT

Coup d'état is committed by a military, police or public officer, with

or without support or participation of civilians, who swiftly and
singly or simultaneously attacks by means of violence,
intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth, the duly constituted
authorities of the Philippines, or facilities needed for the exercise
and continued possession of power such as military camp or
installation, communications networks, or public utilities
anywhere in the Philippines for the purpose of seizing or
diminishing state power. (Article 134-A of the Revised Penal
Code; 2002 and 2012 Bar Exams)
Doctrine of Absorption

Doctrine of absorption in the Hernandez case is applicable to

coup d'état for being a political crime because the purpose of the
coup plotter is to seize or diminish state power. (Gonzales v.
Abaya, G.R. No. 164007, August 8, 2006, concurring opinion by
Justice Callejo)
Sedition

Sedition is committed by persons who rise publicly and tumultuously, and by

means of force, intimidation, or by other means outside of legal methods, in
order:

1. To prevent the promulgation or execution of any law, execution of any

administrative order, or the holding of any popular election, or the free
exercise of functions of any public officer or the government;
2. To inflict any act of hate or revenge against private persons or any social
class for any political or social end or upon the person or property of any
public officer; or
3. To despoil any person, or government of its property for any political or
social end. (Article 139)
There is a public and tumultuous uprising in Edsa Revolution III. The
purpose of the tumultuous uprisers is to compel President Arroyo to
resign or to prevent her from freely exercising her functions as a public
officer. It is submitted that the crime committed is sedition. But
hypothetically, if the participants of Edsa Revolution III attacked
Malacañang, killed soldiers, police officers and PSG personnel, and
burned buildings to compel President Arroyo to resign, the crime
committed is rebellion. The purpose of the armed uprisers is to deprive
President Arroyo her executive powers and prerogatives.
Even if there is a public and armed uprising, if the purpose of the
uprisers is not an object of rebellion, the crime committed is
sedition.
Freedom of Expression

Speeches calling resignation of high government officials are just an

exercise of freedom of expression. Even though the utterance of statements
is irritating or obnoxious to the ears of the police officers, the same is still
protected by the Constitution. (2011 Bar Exam)
Freedom of Expression

Statement “bukas tuloy ang welga natin hanggang sa magkagulo na” made
in presence of his followers justifies the arrest of the person, who uttered it,
on the basis of the honest belief of the arresting officer that he is committing
inciting to sedition. The validity of the arrest was sustained because in the
balancing of authority and freedom of expression, the scale was tilted in
favor of authority but “only for purposes of the arrest.” (Espiritu v. Lim, G.R.
No. 85727, October 3, 1991) But for purposes of conviction for inciting to
sedition, whether such statements constitute inciting to sedition or an
exercise of freedom of expression is not clear. Applying the pro reo doctrine,
the scales of justice should be tilted in favor of the accused. Hence, accused
is not liable for inciting to sedition. (2011 Bar Exam)
Inciting to Rise Publicly

What is the proper charge against a person who, without taking arms or
being in open hostility against the Government, shall incite others to deprive
Congress of its legislative powers, by means of speeches or writings?
(2012 Bar Exam)

The crime is inciting to sedition of the second form since the offender uttered
seditious speeches or writings which tend to disturb or obstruct any lawful
officer in executing the functions of his office, tend to instigate others to
cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes; or lead or tend to stir up the
people against the lawful authorities; or lead or tend to disturb the safety
and order of the government.
Note:
1. To be held liable for inciting to rebellion, the offender must incite
others not only to accomplish any purposes of rebellion but likewise
too perform the acts of rebellion. Thus, the offender must also
incite them to rise publicly and take up arms to deprive legislative
power.
2. To commit inciting to sedition of the first form, the offender must
incite others to rise publicly and tumultuously in order to attain the
ends of sedition.
1. Seditious Speech

In People v. Nabong, G.R. No. 36426, November 3, 1932, at a necrological

service on the occasion of the death of a communist leader, accused
delivered a speech as follows:

“They committed a real abuse in seizing the flag. The members of the
Constabulary are bad because they shoot even innocent women, as it
happened in Tayug. In view of this, we ought to be united to suppress that
abuse. Overthrow the present government and establish our own
government, the government of the poor. Use your whip so that there may
be marks on their sides.”
1. Seditious Speech

The accused in the Nabong case is not liable for inciting to rebellion since
he merely incited the audience to overthrow the government, which is an
object of rebellion; but he did not incite them to rise publicly and to take up
arms against the government.
Neither is he liable for inciting to sedition of the first form since he did not
incite them to rise publicly and tumultuously. However, he is liable for inciting
to sedition of the second form since his speech:

1. Instigated the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purpose;
2. Suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies;
3. Tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities; and
4. Tended to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the
Government.
A teacher in General Santos during the corona virus crisis posted in
Facebook “Maraming mamamatay sa gutom if hindi tayo magtutulungan na
magreport sa Pangulo na inutil ang ating Mayor. Panawagan sa walang
makain, sugurin nyo na nang sabay-sabay ang Lagao Gym. Nakatambak
doon ang pagkaing para sa inyo.” She was arrested for inciting to sedition
with the qualifying circumstance of using information or communication
technology under R.A. No. 10175.

There is no crime of inciting to coup d'état or treason. However, a person

who incites others to commit coup d'état or treason may be held liable for
inciting to sedition of the second form.
2. Seditious Words

In People v. Perez, G.R. No. 21049, December 22, 1923, accused, a

municipal secretary, and the municipal president engaged in a discussion
regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in
Perez shouting a number of times:

“The Filipinos, like himself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood’s head for
having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos for he has killed our
independence.”
This is inciting to sedition of the second form because the words uttered:

1. Instigated the poor to cabal and meet together for unlawful purposes;
2. Suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies;
3. Tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities; and
4. Tended to disturb the peace of the community and the order of the
Government.
Incited audience

It is not required in inciting to rebellion or inciting to sedition that the third

persons or audience be actually incited to commit rebellion, sedition, or any
evil acts against the government or public authorities.

Article 146 of the Revised Penal Code punishes illegal assembly where the
audience are actually incited to commit rebellion or sedition. If the audience
in an assembly are incited to commit rebellion or sedition, the audience,
leader, and organizer are liable for illegal assembly.
If the offender in a public plaza tried to incite audience to commit rebellion or
sedition, he is liable for inciting to rebellion or inciting to sedition. However, if
the audience are actually incited to commit rebellion or sedition, the inciter
shall be prosecuted for the graver crime of illegal assembly as leader; the
organizer and the incited audience are also liable. In sum, the intention of
the law is to make successful incitement as an element of illegal assembly
but not as an element of inciting to rebellion or inciting to sedition. To rule
otherwise is to obliterate the distinction between inciting to sedition or
inciting to rebellion and illegal assembly committed by a leader.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Revised Penal Code which required that
the persons being incited are successfully incited to commit rebellion or
sedition or any other evil acts. In the case of Perez, there is no showing that
the two persons, who heard to seditious utterance involving the killing of
Wood by the accused Perez, were successfully incited to kill or assassinate
Wood.
 REBELLION / INCITING TO
TREASON ESPIONAGE COUD D’ ETAT SEDITION
INSURRECTION SEDITION
1. Levies war against 1. Without authority, 1. Public uprising 1. Swift attack with violence, 1. Persons rise publicly and 1. Inciting others to
the Philippines enters a warship, 2. Taking arms against the intimidation, threat, strategy tumultuously by force / commit sedition by
fort, or naval or government or stealth intimidation means of speeches,
2. Adheres to her military • Removing from the 2. Directed against duly • Prevent promulgation of proclamations,
enemies giving establishment or allegiance to said constituted authorities of the any law or holding writings, emblems,
them aid or comfort reservation to government or its laws, Republic, military camp/ elections cartoons, banners, or
obtain any the territory of the installation, communications • Prevent the other representations
information, Republic of the network, public utilities or Government, provincial, 2. Uttering seditions
plans, Philippines or any part facilities needed for the municipal government, words or speeches
photographs or • Of any body of land, exercise and continued or any public officer for which tend to disturb
other data if naval or other armed possession of power exercising his function or the peace
confidential forces 3. Person/s in the prevent the execution of 3. Writing, publishing,
nature relative to • Or depriving the Chief military/police holding any any administrative order or circulating
the defense. Executive / Legislative, of public office or employment • Inflict any act of hate or scurrilous libels
2. Being in any of their powers or with or without civilian revenge against private against the
possession, by prerogatives support for seizing / persons or any social government or any of
reasons of the diminishing state power class its constituted
public office of • Despoil for any political authorities which
articles, data or or social end, any tend to disturb peace
information, person, municipality or 4. Knowingly concealing
discloses their province or the National such evil practices
contents to a Government of all its
representative of property or any part
a foreign nation. thereof
 TREASON
REBELLION / INSURRECTION COUP D’ ETAT SEDITION
(punishable acts)

Conspiracy and Conspiracy and Proposal to

Conspiracy and Proposal to Conspiracy and Proposal to Proposal to Commit Sedition
Commit Treason Commit Rebellion / Insurrection Commit Cout D’
Etat (No Proposal)

Misprision of Treason X X X

X Inciting a Rebellion / Insurrection X Inciting to Sedition

Distinguish rebellion from insurrection.

The term “rebellion” is more frequently used where the object of the
movement is completely to overthrow and supersede the existing
government; while “insurrection” is more commonly employed in reference
to a movement which seeks merely to effect some change of minor
importance, or to prevent the exercise of governmental authority with
respect to particular matters or subjects.

Note: Rebellion or insurrection is an act of terrorism under R.A. No. 9372

when it is committed in a manner which tends to create a condition of
widespread fear or panic in order to pursue its objectives.
 ARBITRARY DETENTION KIDNAPPING ILLEGAL DETENTION
(Art. 124) (Art. 267) (Art. 267)
The offender is a law enforcer The offender is private person It is committed by a private
acting in the performance of or a law enforcer acting in his individual who unlawfully
public duties (BOADO, supra private capacity (BOADO, kidnaps, detains, or otherwise
at 777). supra at 777) deprives a person of liberty
(REYES, Book Two, p. 743).
 ARBITRARY DETENTION and UNLAWFUL
ARREST, DISTINGUISHED

ARBITRARY DETENTION UNLAWFUL ARREST

(Art. 124) (Art. 269)
As to Classification
Crime against the fundamental law of the State Crime against liberty
As to Offender
Public Officer Any Person
As to Purpose of Offender
No intention to bring the offended to proper authorities but Purpose of arrest is to bring the victim to proper authority
merely to detain him and file a charge
As to Manner of Commission
Although authorized, detains a person without legal ground Private Person: Arrests a person without reasonable
ground, and the purpose is to deliver the person arrested to
the proper authorities.

Public Officer: Not authorized to arrest and detain a

person, or he did not act in his official capacity
 ARBITRARY DETENTION and DELAY IN THE
DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS TO PROPER
JUDICIAL AUTHORITY, DISTINGUISHED

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED

ARBITRARY DETENTION
PERSONS TO PROPER JUDICIAL AUTHORITY
(Art. 124)
(Art. 125)
As to Presence of Warrant
No warrant of arrest No warrant of arrest, but with legal ground
As to Nature of Detention
The detention is illegal from the beginning The detention is legal in the beginning, but the
illegality of the detention starts from the
expiration of any of the periods of time
specified in Art. 125, without the person
detained having been delivered to the proper
judicial authority.
 ARTICLE 135
PENALTY FOR REBELLION OR INSURRECITON
OR COUP D’ETAT

PERSONS LIABLE FOR REBELLION, INSURRECTION and/or COUP D’ETAT

The Leaders The Participants
a. Any person who: a. Any person who:
i. Promotes; i. Participates; or
ii. Maintains; or ii. Executes the commands of others in rebellion,
iii. Heads a rebellion or insurrection; or or insurrection;

b. Any person who: b. Any person in the government service who:

i. Leads; i. Participates; or
ii. Directs; or ii. Executes directions or commands of others in
iii. Commands others to undertake a coup d’etat; undertaking a coup d’etat;

c. Any person in the government service who:

i. Participates;
ii. Supports;
iii. Finances;
iv. Abets; or
v. Aids in undertaking a coup d’etat
Illegal Assemblies
Illegal assemblies is committed by the organizers or leaders of, and persons
present at, a meeting attended by armed persons for the purpose of
committing a felony; or in which the audience is incited to the commission of
treason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault. The word “meeting” shall be
understood to include a gathering or group, whether in a fixed place or
moving (Article 146)
Illegal Association
Illegal association is committed by the founders, directors, presidents and
members of association totally or partially organized for the purpose of
committing a felony or for some purpose contrary to public morals. (Article
147)
Illegal Association and Illegal Assembly
The differences between illegal association and illegal assembly are as
follows:

1. In illegal assembly, it is necessary that there is an actual meeting or

assembly of armed persons for the purpose of committing a felony, or of
individuals who, although not armed, are incited to the commission of
treason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault; in illegal association, it is not
necessary that there be an actual meeting.
Illegal Association and Illegal Assembly
2. In illegal assembly, it is the meeting and attendance at such meeting that
are punished; in illegal association, it is the act of forming or organizing
and joining in the association that are punished.

3. In illegal assembly, the persons liable are: (1) the organizers or leaders
of the meeting and (2) the persons present at the meeting; in illegal
association, the persons liable are: (1) the founders, directors and
presidents, and (2) the members thereof. (Revised Penal Code by Luis
Reyes)
Illegal Association and Illegal Assembly
4. The purpose of illegal assembly is to commit a felony or to incite the
audience to commit treason, rebellion, sedition or direct assault; the
purpose of illegal association is to commit a felony or act, which is
contrary to public moral, e.g., offense punishable under special law.
(1951 and 1967 Bar Exams)
Interruption of Religious Worship
Interruption of religious worship is committed by any public officer who
prevents or disturbs the ceremonies or manifestations of any religion.
(Article 132) Use of threat or violence is a qualifying circumstance in
interruption of religious worship.
Offending the Religious Feelings
Offending the religious feelings is committed by anyone who performs acts
notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful in a place devoted to
religious worship or during the celebration of any religious ceremony (Article
133)
Notoriously Offensive to Religious Feelings

Peeved by the denunciations of extrajudicial killing by Fr. Chris in his homily,

Policeman Stone, a parishioner, approached the priest during the homily,
openly displayed his firearm tucked in his waist, and menacingly uttered at
the priest: “Father, may kalalagyan kayo kung hindi kay tumigil.” The
celebration of the mass was disrupted, and the Congregation left the Church
in disgust over the actuations of a co-parishioner. (2017 Bar Exam)
Remarks that those, who believed that Christ is God, are Anti-Christ, that all
members of the Roman Catholic Church are marked by the demon, and that
the Pope is the commander-in-chief of Satan are notoriously offensive to the
feelings of the Catholics. (Mandoriao, CA-G.R. No. 12114, February 25,
1955) The statement “Come on now, they are already starting, let us have a
jam session” is not notoriously offensive. Hence, the crime committed is
unjust vexation. (People v. Tamarra, CA-G.R. No. 02658-R, July 1, 1963)
A famous tour guide, Carlos Celdran, in protesting against the Church’s
opposition to the reproductive health bill dressed like Jose Rizal, stood in
front of the main altar of Manila Cathedral during an ecumenical service, and
brought out a placard emblazoned with the word “DAMASO.” Commotion
ensued when Celdran started shouting while inside the church saying
“Bishops, stop involving yourself in politics,” disrupting and showing
disrespect to a solemn celebration. Celdran was convicted of offending the
religious feelings. His acts were meant to mock, insult, and ridicule those
clergy whose beliefs and principles were diametrically opposed to his own.
(Celdran v. People, G.R. No. 220127, March 21, 2018)
What are the ways of committing the crime of direct assault?

The two (2) ways to commit are:

1. Without public uprising, by employing force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of
sedition and rebellion ; or
2. Without public uprising, by attacking, by employing force or seriously
intimidating or by seriously resisting ay person in a authority or any of
his agents while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on the
occasion of such performance.
What are the elements of the crime of indirect assault?

The elements are:

1. That any of the forms of direct assault defined in Article 148 is being
committed or has been immediately committed against a person in
authority or an agent of a person in authority;
2. That the offended party cones to the aid of such person in authority or an
agent of a person in authority being attacked
3. That the offender makes use of force or intimidation upon such person
coming to the aid of the person in authority or agent of a person in
authority
 DIRECT ASSAULT INDIRECT ASSAULT

1. PIA/APIA victim of direct assault

1. Without public uprising by • If PIA/APIA is in the actual performance of
employing force / intimidation duties -> motive of attack is immaterial 2. Private person comes to the aid
for the purposes enumerated in of APIA
sedition and rebellion • If not in the performance of duties ->
evidence of motive is important 3. Offenders makes use of force
2. Without public uprising by upon such person coming to the
attacking, employing force or aid of APIA
seriously intimidating or POSSIBLE COMPLEX CRIME
seriously resisting by PIA or APIA
while engaged in the • Direct assault with Murder
performance of official duties or
on the occasion of such • Direct assault with serious physical injury
performance
• Direct assault with less serious physical
APIA – Violence / Intimidation or injury
resistance must be serious
• Direct assault with slight physical injury
PIA - Immaterial
Mayor Alingasaw is the Municipal Mayor of Simunol in Tawi Tawi. One day, while
he was about to go out of the City Hall, a single sniper shot was heard. Mayor
Alingasaw instantly died for sustaining a head shot. From afar, the mayor’s security
team noticed a man in a prone position holding what supposed to be a Barret .50
caliber sniper rifle. The man was instantly apprehended by the police. What is the
crime committed?

ANS: The crime committed by the man was the special complex crime of direct
assault with murder qualified by the use of a weapon. Direct assault under Art. 148
of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any person or persons who without
public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate any person in
authority or any of his agents, while in the performance of their official duties, or on
occasion of such performance. It is qualified when there is a weapon employed in
the attack or the offender is a public officer. The rule on special complex crime is
applicable because the single act of shooting resulted to a grave offense. In the case
at bar, the man attacked Mayor Alingasaw, a public officer using a high caliber
weapon resulting to his instantaneous death (People v. Herminio Vibal, Jr y Uayan
a.k.a Pato et Al, G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018).
Alternative Answer

The man committed plain murder. Notwithstanding, the political figure of the Mayor
being the highest official in the Municipality of Sumipol, there is no sufficient
evidence pointing to the fact that the crime was politically motivated or is connected
with his previous or current position in the Government. What is clear was that he
was intentionally killed with the attending circumstance of treachery and that the
assailant was identified. Other than that, the problem provided no facts for the man’s
reasons in killing the Mayor. In the absence of which, the default crime should be
murder.
Makapogi, a popular vlogger in the Philippines known for his YouTube prank contents thought of
making a joke out of the recent corona virus pandemic. Using his large internet followings, he logged
in to his Facebook Account and posted a fake pandemic story which states that the corona vaccine
produced in China contains a hallucinogenic compound that induces people to lose their mind. In
minutes, Makapogi’s post garnered a hundred to a thousand comments and likes. As a consequence
of the post, the IATF has reported a significant reduction of Filipinos who are willing to be inoculated
all because of the fake news . Alarmed by the effect, the Office of the President ordered the NBI Anti
Cyber Crime Prevention Task Force to press charges against Makapogi.
a. What is the crime/s committed by Makapogi?

Makapogi is liable for the crime of unlawful use of means of publication (par. 1 of Art. 154 of the
RPC as amended) in relation to Republic Act 10175 or the Cyber Crime Prevention Act. This
provision punishes any person, who shall publish or cause to be published false news which may
endanger the public order, or cause damage to the interest or credit of the State. If the false news is
published with the use of communication or information technology, the penalty for unlawful use of
means of publication shall be upgraded one degree higher. In the instant case, Makagapogi’s
malicious post on the harmful effects of the China vaccine may cause panic to the community
disrupting the ongoing inoculation efforts by the Government. Considering further that the fake news
was posted by way of using a social media account, the same qualifies the act to be violative also of
the Cyber Crime Prevention Act, further increasing its imposed penalty to a higher degree.
b. Suppose Makagwapa (Makapogi’s girlfriend) “liked” the malicious post, is she likewise
criminally liable?

ANS:
No. Makagwapa is not liable for liking the post. In a recent Supreme Court decision, it was
held that persons who reacted to a defamatory message on social media by clicking the
button for like, Comment, or Share are not liable for aiding or abetting an act likewise
punishable under the Anti Cyber Crime Law (Disini vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No.
203335, February 18, 2014).
•
•
 Article 155
Alarms and Scandals
Punishable Acts
1. Discharging any firearm, rocket, firecracker, or other explosive
within any town or public place, which produces alarm or
danger;

Note: The discharge of the firearm should not be directed at a

person. Otherwise, the offense committed would be Discharge of
Firearms under Art. 254.
It is the result, not the intent that counts. The act must produce
alarm or danger as a consequence.

The discharge may take place within one’s own garden or yard
located in town, since the law does not distinguish as to where in
town (REYES, Book Two, supra at 167).

According to Viada, the discharge of firecrackers and rockets

during fiestas and festivals are not covered by the law.
Punishable Acts:
2. Instigating or taking an active part in any charivari or other
disorderly meeting offensive to another or prejudicial to public
tranquility;

Charivari includes a medley of discordant voices, a mock serenade of

discordant noises made on kettles, tins, horns, etc. designed to annoy
or insult.

The reason for punishing instigating or taking active part in charivari

and other disorderly meeting is to prevent more serious disorders.
Punishable Acts:
3. Disturbing the public peace while Wandering about at night or
while engaged in any other nocturnal amusements; and

4. Causing Any disturbance or scandal in public places while

intoxicated or otherwise, provided Art. 153 is not applicable.

Note: If the disturbance is of a serious nature, the case will fall

under Art. 153 (Id. At 166-167).
 Article 156
Delivering Prisoners from Jail
Elements:
1. That there is a person Confined in a jail or penal
establishment;

2. That the offender Removes therefrom such person, or helps

the escape of such person (REYES, Book Two, supra at
168).

The prisoner may be a detention prisoner or one sentenced by

virtue of a final judgment (REYES, Book Two, supra at 168).
If the offender is a public officer who is actually and presently in
custody or charge of the prisoner, (e.g. a guard on duty) he is
liable for infidelity in the custody of a prisoner under Art. 223
(AMURAO, Book Two, Part One, supra at 251).

Note: If the offender is an off-duty jail guard he may be liable for

delivering prisoners from jail (People v. Del Barrio, C.A. No.
018910-CR, September 3, 1963).
Delivering Prisoners from Jail and Infidelity in
the Custody of Prisoners; Distinguished
Delivering Prisoners from Jail Infidelity in the Custody of Prisoners
As to person of offender
Any person who is not the custodian of the Public officer who had the prisoner in his
prisoner. custody or charge who was in connivance
with the prisoner in the latter’s escape
As to class of prisoner in custody
May be a convict or a detainee
 Article 157
Evasion of Service of Sentence
Elements:
1. That the offender is a Convict by final judgment;

2. That he is Serving his sentence, which consists in deprivation

of liberty; and

3. That he Evades the service of his sentence by escaping

during the term of his sentence (Id. At 171-172).
If the accused escaped while the sentence of conviction was
under appeal, he is not liable under Art. 157, the judgment not
having become final, and this is true even if his appeal was later
dismissed because he had escaped (Curiano v. Court of First
Instance, G.R. No. L-8104, April 15, 1955)
Crimes against Public Interest

• Forging the seal of the Government, signature or stamp of the Chief

Executive (Art. 161, RPC);
• Using forged signature, seal or stamp (Art. 162, RPC);
• Making and importing and uttering false coins (Art. 163, RPC);
• Mutilation of coins (Art. 164, RPC);
• Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer.
(Art. 166, RPC)
Acts of Forgery
• Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury or Bank Notes and Other
Instruments of Credit (Art. 168, RPC); and
• How Forgery is Committed. (Art. 169, RPC)
Acts of Falsification
• Falsification of legislative documents (Art. 170, RPC);
• Falsification by public officer, employee, or notary, or ecclesiastical
minister (Art. 171, RPC);
• Falsification by private individuals (Art. 172, RPC);
• Falsification of wireless, cable, telegraph, and telephone messages
(Art. 173, RPC);
• Falsification of medical certificates, certificates of merit or service
(Art. 174, RPC);
• Using False Certificates (Art. 175, RPC); and
• Manufacturing and Possession of Instruments or Implements for
Falsification. (Art. 176, RPC)
Other Falsities
• Usurpation of Authority or Official Functions (Art. 177, RPC);
• Using Fictitious and Concealing True Name (Art. 178, RPC);
• Illegal Use of Uniforms and Insignia (Art. 179, RPC);
• False Testimony Against a Defendant (Art. 180, RPC);
• False Testimony Favorable to the Defendant (Art. 181, RPC);
• False Testimony in Civil Cases (Art. 182, RPC);
• False Testimony in Other Cases and Perjury in Solemn Affirmation
(Art. 183, RPC);
• Offering False Testimony in Evidence (Art. 184, RPC);
Frauds
• Machinations in Public Auctions (Art. 185, RPC);
• Monopolies and Combinations in Restraint of Trade (Art. 186, RPC);
and Repealed by the Phil. Competition Act
• Importation and Disposition of Falsely Marked Articles or
Merchandise Made of Gold, Silver, or other Precious Metals or their
Alloys. (Art. 187, RPC)
Making and Importing and Uttering False Coins
(A. 163)
1. That there be false or counterfeited coins
2. The offender either made, imported or uttered such coins
3. In case of uttering false or counterfeited coins, he connived with the
counterfeiters or importers

(Extends even to coins withdrawn from circulation)

Q: A seller was paid by a purchaser of goods in the former’s store
with a false coins. He placed it in his drawer. During a search by law
enforcement, the false coins was found in the drawer. May the seller
be convicted of illegal possession of false coin?

A: NO, because Art. 165 requires three things as regards possession of

false coins, namely: (1) possession; (2) intent to utter; and (3)
knowledge that the coin is false. The fact that the seller received it in
payment of his goods and place it in his drawer shows that he did not
know that such coin was false. (People v. Go Po, G.R. No. 42697, August
1, 1985)
What maybe forged or falsified under Art. 166?

1. Treasury or bank notes

2. Certificates
3. Other Obligations and securities payable to bearer
Illegal Possession and Use of False Treasury Bank Notes
and Other Instruments of Credit (A.168)
1. That any treasury or bank note or certificate or other obligation and
security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other
document of credit not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by
another person;
2. That the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged
or falsified; and
3. That he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such
forged or falsified instruments.
Q: Is mere possession of false bank notes enough to consummate the
crime under Art. 168 of RPC which is the illegal possession and use of
false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit?

A: NO. As held in People v. Digoro, possession of false treasury or bank

notes alone, without anything more, is not a criminal offense. For it to
constitute an offense under Article 168 of the RPC, the possession must
be with intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. (Clemente v.
People, G.R. No. 194367, June 15, 2011)
Is mere possession of false treasury or bank notes
punishable under Art.168?

No. For violation of Art. 168 to prosper as an offense, one

must knowingly possess said false treasury or bank notes with
intent to use the same (People vs. Digoro, G.R. No. L-22032,
March 4, 1966).
Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone without anything
more, is not a criminal offense. For it to constitute an offense under
Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code the possession must be with
intent to use said false treasury or bank notes. From the provision of
the law the foregoing is clear. Xxx It follows that an information, as in
this case, alleging possession of false treasury and bank notes without
alleging intent to use the same but only "intent to possess" them,
charges no offense.
Q. Inside a restaurant, the informer introduced to Mang Andy the said
Pedro Labita and Johnny Marqueta as the persons interested in buying
US dollar notes. Apparently convinced, Mang Andy drew ten (10)
pieces of US $100 dollar notes from his wallet. At that moment, and
upon a pre-arranged signal from the informer, Labita and Marqueta
introduced themselves as Central Bank operatives and apprehended
the man called Mang Andy whom they later identified as the herein
petitioner Alejandro Tecson. Is the arrested person liable for the
charge of illegal possession and use of counterfeit US dollar notes, as
defined and penalized under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code?
Yes, the arrested person is liable for Art. 168 of the RPC. He was caught in
flagrante delicto in the possession of and in the act of offering to sell
counterfeit US dollar notes. The elements of the crime charged for violation
of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code, are: 1) that any treasury or bank
note or certificate or other obligation and security payable to bearer, or
any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable
to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; 2) that the offender
knows that any of the said instruments is forged or falsified; and 3) that he
either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified
instruments. Hence, possession of fake dollar notes must be coupled with
the act of using or at least with intent to use the same as shown by a clear
and deliberate overt act in order to constitute a crime, as was sufficiently
proven in the case at bar (Tecson vs. CA, GR. No. 113218, November 22,
2001).
What are the 2 ways of committing “FORGERY”?
1. Giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to
bearer / order the appearance of a true and genuine document

2. Erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the

figures, letters, words or signatures contained therein.
When counterfeiting is not forgery
The subject of forgery should be treasury or bank notes. If the subject
of forgery were a document other than these, the crime would be
falsification. (Boado, 2008)
What is the difference of forgery from falsification ?

Forgery under Art. 169 refers to the falsification and counterfeiting of

treasury or bank notes or any instruments payable to bearer or order
while falsification is the commission of any of the acts in Art. 171 on
legislative, public, official, commercial, private documents, or wireless
or telegraph messages.
Falsification by Public Officer, Employee or Notary Public
or Ecclesiastical Minister
Elements
1. That the offender is a public officer, employee, notary public, or an
ecclesiastical minister;
2.That he takes advantage of his official position:
3. That he falsified a document by committing any of the following acts
(enumeration under Art 171)
When is the offender considered to have taken
advantage of his official position?

1. Offender has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene

in the preparation of the document;
2. Offender has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
(Typoco vs. People, GR. No. 221857, August 16, 2017)
Punishable Acts (Falsification)
1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;
2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate;
3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding
statements other than those in fact made by them;
4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
5. Altering true dates;
6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes
its meaning;
7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an
original document when no such original exists, or including in such a copy a
statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or
8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a
protocol, registry, or official book.
Falsification by a Private Individual and Use of
Falsified Documents (A. 172)
1. Private Individual who commits any of the acts of falsification in any
public or official document or letter of exchange or any commercial
document
2. Any person, who to the damage of third party, or with intent to
cause such damage, shall in any private document committed any
of the acts of falsification
3. Use of falsified document in a judicial proceeding or use in any
other transaction
Falsification of a private document

Elements:
1. Offender committed any of the acts of falsification except Art. 171
(7), that is, issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to
be a copy of an original document when no such original exists, or
including in such a copy a statement contrary to, or different from that
of the genuine original;
2. Falsification was committed private document; and
3. Falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.
Use of Falsified Document (A.172 par.3)

(Introducing in a judicial proceeding)

• No damage is required

(If used in any other transaction)

• There should be damage on intent to cause damage
“legal obligation to disclose the truth”

The prosecution need not identify a specific provision of law under

which the accused has the obligation to disclose the truth. As long as
the offender has such obligation from the very nature and purpose of
the document (Solis v. Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 193248-49, September
17, 2018).

“inherently required by the document because of the nature thereof”

FALSIFICATION
• If there is no attempt of the accused to imitate the signature of the
other person (signatures are entirely unlike), accused may be guilty of
2nd mode of Falsification. (US vs. Freimut, G.R. # 1368, February 2,
1904
• There is no complex crime of Estafa though Falsification of Private
Document. If Falsification of a Private Document is committed as a
means to commit Estafa, it is falsification. If Estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, it is Estafa. (Co vs.
People , GR # 233015, October 16, 2019)
In a crime of falsification of a public or official document, the principal
thing punished is the "violation of the public faith and the destruction
of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed." (People v. Pacana, 47
Phil. 48 [1924]; People v. Po Giok To, 96 Phil. 913 [1955]; Sarep v.
Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 440 [1989]) Thus, intent to gain or to injure is
immaterial. Even more so, the gain or damage is not necessary.

In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling

consideration is the public character of a document and the existence
of any prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause
such damage becomes immaterial (People v. Pacana)
Note:
Arias doctrine which states that "all heads of offices have to rely to a
reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the good faith of
those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into
negotiations.”

However, when a matter is irregular on the document's face, so much

so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine
is unavailing.

Cesa v. Office of the Ombudsman, when there are facts that point to
an irregularity and the officer failed to take steps to rectify it, even
tolerating it, the Arias doctrine is inapplicable.
In the case of LihayLihay v. People, We ruled that:
In this relation, it must be clarified that the ruling in Arias v.
Sandiganbayan (Arias) cannot be applied to exculpate petitioners in
view of the peculiar circumstances in this case which should have
prompted them to exercise a higher degree of circumspection, and
consequently, go beyond what their subordinates had prepared.

As held in the case of Bacasmas v. Sandiganbayan, et al. when there

are reasons for the heads of offices to further examine the documents
in question, they cannot seek refuge by invoking the Arias doctrine.
Falsification of Time Records

Veradio vs. CA, G.R. No. L-49483-86. March 30, 1981.

Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC in Rosales,
Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of
falsification of public or official documents of the seven (7) separate
informations filed against her for making false entries in her daily time
records
• Further, on the issue of malus animus, or criminal intent, it was ruled by
the court a quo, confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, that in
falsification of public document, in contradistinction to private document,
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, for,
what is penalized is the undermining or infringement of the public faith
and the violation of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the
case of People v. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this ruling,
petitioner cited the case of People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the
ponente in the instant case upheld in the case of People v. Motus, CA-G.R.
No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that although the idea
of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, this Court
emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change
in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same
or change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for, unless that
happens, there could not exist the essential element of the intention to
commit the crime which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3) of the Penal
Code."
Closely adhering to the policy of no work-no pay, a daily time record is primarily, if
not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss to the government as would result
in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily
time record as an official document, however, remains untarnished if the damage
sought to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed in the
case of People v. Motus, supra, while it is true that a time record is an official
document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as
when it does not cause damage to the government. It may be different in the case
of a public document with continuing interest affecting the public welfare which
is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where the truth is necessary for
the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the instant case, the time
records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any damage to
the government or third person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner
may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no
more use to require their continued safe-keeping. Public interest has not been
harmed by their contents, and continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
In fine, the entries in petitioner’s daily time records were not
absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be said to have a color of
truth, not a downright and willful falsehood which alone would
constitute falsification as a crime.
Q: Ana counterfeited the signature of Brenda but what she entered
in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of Brenda are all true and
correct. Is there a crime committed?
A: YES. In falsification of a public document, it is immaterial whether or
not the contents set forth therein were false. What is important is the
fact that the signature of another was counterfeited. In a crime of
falsification of a public document, the principal thing punished is the
violation of public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed. Thus, intent to gain or injure is immaterial. Even
more so, the gain or damage is not necessary. (Caubang v. People, G.R.
No. L-62634 June 26, 1992)
Lack of Intent to Commit the Crime

Defense of Good Faith

This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1
of Article 172, like Article 171, does not require the idea of gain or the
intent to injure a third person as an element of conviction. But, as early
as People v. Pacana, we have said:
Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official
documents, whether by public officials or by private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a
third person, for the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents,
the principal thing punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it
must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or to change
the effects which it would otherwise produce; for unless that happens,
there could not exist the essential element of the intention to commit the
crime which is required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code.
In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, the accused construction contractor
was absolved even if he had admittedly falsified time books and
payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he did not benefit from
the transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers
in order to collect the piece of work he had actually constructed. xxx In
other words, although the accused altered a public document or
made a misstatement or erroneous assertion therein, he would not
be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one
was prejudiced by the alteration or error.
Take Note of this case
[ G.R. No. 186329, August 02, 2017 ]
DR. FRISCO M. MALABANAN, PETITIONER, V. SANDIGANBAYAN, RESPONDENT.
[G.R. Nos. 186584-86, August 2, 2017]
ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, PETITIONER, V. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN -
1stDIVISION, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, HON. SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. No. 198598, August 2, 2017]
ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, PETITIONER, V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
RESPONDENT.
On 1 September 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the
necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance. In his Post Travel
Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on 28 to 31 July
2004. He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post
Travel Report. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to read "28 JULY
2004", and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato" appearing on
the PAL Ticket was altered to read "Davao-Manila-Cotabato."

Charge: FALSIFICATION BY A PUBLIC OFFICER UNDER ART 171.

Conviction: Falsification of a private document under paragraph 2,
Article 172
Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification respectively
enumerated therein, it is readily apparent that the two felonies are different.
Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes beyond the elements of
falsification enumerated under Article 171. The former requires additional
independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third
person. Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element of the crime;
but in paragraph 2 of Article 172, or falsification of a private document,
damage is an element necessary for conviction.
Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2, Article
172 are included under Article 171. Specifically, the former offense requires
the element of damage, which is not a requisite in the latter. Indeed, the
Information charging Alid of a felony did not inform him that his alleged
falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage
to a third party.
Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of
the accusation against him, he cannot be convicted of falsification of a
private document under paragraph 2 of Article 1 72. To convict him therefor,
as the Sandiganbayan did, violates the very proscription found in the
Constitution and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this ground alone, we
find that the court a quo erred in its decision.
Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the
Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds to peruse the nature of the crime
established in the records of this case.
Guillergan v. People declares that the falsification of documents
committed by public officers who take advantage of their official
position under Article 171 necessarily includes the falsification of
commercial documents by private persons punished by paragraph 1 of
Article 172.
Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage
or intent to cause damage as an element of the crime; and that Article
171 encompasses all the elements required in a conviction for
falsification under paragraph 1 of Article 172. Thus, in Daan v.
Sandiganbayan, we allowed the accused facing Informations for
falsification of public documents under Article 171 to plead guilty to
falsification under Article 172. We specifically stated that "in the charge
for Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the
lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals inasmuch as it does
not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in
allegedly falsifying the timebook and payroll of the Municipality of
Bato, Leyte.
Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Alid
of paragraph 1 of Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is bound to sentence
him to that lesser offense. But, as mentioned, it overlooked this
provision and jumped to convicting him of falsification under paragraph
2 of Article 172. As discussed, the latter felony is not covered by his
indictment under Article 171.
Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by
means of dolo, such as falsification. Such intent is a mental state, the 2
existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person. Thus, the
acts of Alid must have displayed, with moral certainty, his intention to
pervert the truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of
falsification, we have interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert
the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not
benefit from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to
the government or to a third person.
Here we find that, similar to Amora, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board, there is no moral certainty that Alid benefitted from the
transaction, with the government or any third person sustaining damage
from his alteration of the document.
The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket
just to be consistent with the deferred date of the turnover ceremony for the
outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Quezon
City. Notably, he had no control as to the rescheduling of the event he had to
attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred any additional
benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he submitted the
PAL Ticket that he had used to support his liquidation for a cash advance of
P10,496, the public funds kept by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal
disbursement was made; or any additional expense incurred.
Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket -
to remedy his liquidation of cash advance with the correct date of his
rescheduled travel - we find no malice on his part when he falsified the
document. For this reason, and seeing the overall circumstances in the case
at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a commercial
document under paragraph 1 of Article I 72.
Q: Atty. Constantino notarized the Joint Acknowledgement of the last
will and testament of Severino. Dr. Asuncion was not present during
the execution, but his name was not crossed out from the document.
He only signed the document after it was notarized. With this, Atty.
Constantino was charged of the crime of falsifying a public document
under Article 171(2) of the Revised Penal Code for making it appear
that Dr. Asuncion appeared before him and witnessed the execution of
the Last Will and Testament. Is Atty. Constantino liable for the crime of
falsifying a public document?
Here, the first element has already been proven since petitioner is a notary
public. The second element is presumed when the alleged falsity committed
by the notary public pertains to the notarization. However, the third and
fourth elements are lacking. Even if Atty. Costantino falsely certified that Dr.
Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the execution of the will, one
crucial detail remains: Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgement after
it was notarized. Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgement
before it was notarized, he cannot be considered as having attested and
subscribed to its due execution at the time of its notarization. It was not
petitioner who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the
execution of the Joint Acknowledgement, but Dr. Asuncion himself.
Petitioner, therefore, must be acquitted. (Atty. Constantino v. People, G.R.
No. 225696, April 8, 2019)
Q. Ms. Dimatinag was a utility worker (janitress) at a private university.
She made it appear on her leave application that she was on forced
leave and vacation leave when in fact, she was serving a 20-day prison
term for a conviction she had for a crime of slight physical injuries. Ms.
Dimatinag was able to receive her salary since her leave was approved.
Ms. Dimatinag’s supervisor, Mr. Dimaano claims that the former is not
entitled to receive her salary because of her falsified leave application.
Mr. Dimaano thereafter filed a case against Ms. Dimatinag for
falsification of public document. Is Ms. Dimatinag liable for the crime?
Explain.
ANS: No, Ms. Dimatinag is not liable for the crime of falsification of
public document. One of the requisites of falsification of public
document is that the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the
truth of the facts narrated in the document. There is no law imposing
upon Ms. Dimatinag the legal obligation to disclose where she was
going to spend her leave of absence. Thus, Ms. Dimatinag may not be
convicted of the crime of falsification of public document by making
false statements in a narration of facts without any legal obligation to
disclose where she was going during her vacation and forced leave
(Enernecio v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 146731, January 13,
2004).
People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil 1253
The possessor of a falsified document is presumed to be the author of
the falsification

People vs. Sendaydiego, 82 SCRA 120

The presumption also holds if the use was so closely connected in time
with the falsification and the user had the capacity of falsifying the
document
Q. A falsified official or public document was found in the possession
of the accused. No evidence was introduced to show that the accused
was the author of the falsification. As a matter of fact, the trial court
convicted the accused of falsification of official or public document
mainly on the proposition that "the only person who could have made
the erasures and the superimposition mentioned is the one who will be
benefited by the alterations thus made" and that "he alone could have
the motive for making such alterations". Was the conviction of the
accused proper although the conviction was premised merely on the
aforesaid ratiocination? Explain your answer.
Yes, the conviction is proper because there is a presumption in law that
the possessor and user of a falsified document is the one who falsified
the same.
 FALSE TESTIMONY

Art. 180 Art. 181 Art. 182 Art. 183

False Testimony against a False Testimony favorable False Testimony in civil False Testimony in other
defendant to the defendant cases cases and perjury in solemn
affirmation
Basis of Penalty: Sentence Basis of Penalty: Felony
of the accused charged to the accused

• Offender testifies under • Offender testifies under • Must related to the • Falsely testify under oath
oath knowing his oath in favor of the issues presented in said (must not be a judicial
statement to be false defendant knowing his case proceeding)
statement is false
• Defendant is acquitted/ • Testimony is false • Making a False affidavit
convicted • Conviction / acquittal is
-> (final judgement of not necessary • Testimony must be
conviction / acquittal) malicious with intent to
affect the issues
 Art. 180 Art. 181
False Testimony against a defendant False Testimony favorable to the defendant

Basis of Penalty: Sentence of the accused Basis of Penalty: Felony charged to the accused

False testimony even if the testimony is not considered • Intent to favor the accused. False testimony in favor
by the court of a defendant need not directly influence the
decision of acquittal and it need not benefit the
What is being considered here is the tendency of the defendant. The intent to favor the defendant is
testimony to establish or aggravate the guilt of the sufficient. (People v. Reyes, C.A., 48 O.G. 1837)
accused and not the result that the testimony may
produce.
Commission of perjury
• Falsely testifying under oath; or
• Making a false affidavit.
Elements
• Accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a
material matter ;
• Statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
receive and administer oath;
• In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood ; and
• Sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law.
The third element of the crime of Perjury requires that the person making
the false statement must do so willfully or deliberately. The term willfully has
been defined as “intentionally, with evil intent and legal malice, with
consciousness that the alleged perjurious statement is false with the
intent that it should be received as a statement of what was true in fact. It is
equivalent to “knowingly.” “Deliberately” implies “meditated” as
distinguished from “inadvertent acts.” Therefore, to satisfy this requisite, it
must appear that the accused knows his statement to be false or is
consciously ignorant of its truth. (Monfort III, et. al. vs. Salvatierra, et. al.,
G.R. No. 168301, 05 March 2007.)
The third element requires that the accused must make a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement or affidavit. A mere
assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not enough. The assertion
must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be
malice on the part of the accused. Willfully means intentionally; with evil
intent and legal malice, with the consciousness that the alleged perjurious
statement is false with the intent that it should be received as a statement of
what was true in fact. It is equivalent to knowingly [sic]. Deliberately implies
meditated as distinguished from inadvertent acts. It must appear that the
accused knows his statement to be false or as consciously ignorant of its
truth (Saulo vs. People, G.R. No. 242900, June 08, 2020 ]
The final and arguably most significant element, for a willful assertion
of falsehood to be punishable as Perjury, is that the affidavit or sworn
statement must be required by law or for a legal purpose. Not all
affidavits, even if containing absolute falsehoods, can subject a person
to the crime of Perjury. The Revised Penal Code requires that the sworn
statement or affidavit must be executed pursuance to a legal
requirement.
 Offering False Testimony in Evidence (A. 184)
Elements
1. Offender offered in evidence a false witness or false testimony;
2. He knew that the witness or testimony was false; and
3. Offer was made in a judicial or official proceeding.

(Art. 184 does not apply when the offender induced a witness to testify
falsely. It applies when the offender knowingly presented a false
witness, and the latter testified falsely. The one offering the testimony
is liable under Art. 184 while the witness who testified is liable under
Arts. 180-183, depending on the proceedings on which the testimony
was offered and for whose favor the false testimony was made.)
Is there a crime of Subornation of Perjury?

It is committed by a person who knowingly and willfully procures

another to swear falsely and the witness suborned does testify under
the circumstances rendering him guilty of perjury.

Subornation of perjury is not expressly penalized in the RPC, but the

person who induces another to commit a perjury may be punished
under Art. 183, in relation to Art. 17, as a principal by inducement to
the crime of perjury while the one induced is liable as a principal by
direct participation.
Q. Xiamen, a Chinese national, filed a petition under oath for
naturalization, with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In said
petition, he averred the following: that he is married to Angela, that he
is living with her in Quezon City, and that he is of good moral character.
At the time of the filing of the petition, however, Angela was already
living in Davao while Xiamen was living with Babes in Malabon, with
whom he has an illicit relationship. Later on, after his direct testimony,
Xiamen withdrew his petition for naturalization. What crime did
Xiamen commit, if any? Explain.
Xiamen committed the crime of perjury. The elements of perjury are:
1. The accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter;
2. The statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer authorized to receive
and administer oath;
3. In that statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood; and
4. The sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made for a
legal purpose.

All these elements are present in the instant case. Xiamen (petitioner) willfully and
deliberately alleged false statements concerning his "residence" and "moral character" in
his petition for naturalization. The petition for naturalization was duly subscribed and
sworn to by Xiamen before a Notary Public, a person competent and authorized by law to
receive and administer oath. Also, Xiamen started testifying under oath on his false
allegations before the trial court. The allegations in the petition regarding "residence" and
"moral character" are material matters because they are among the very facts in issue or
the main facts which are the subject of inquiry and are the bases for the determination of
Xiamen's qualifications and fitness as a naturalized Filipino citizen.
(See Alfonso Choa vs. PP and Leni Choa, GR No. 142011, March 14, 2003)
Offenses contemplated in Art. 177
1. Usurpation of Authority – by knowingly and falsely representing
oneself to be an officer, agent, or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or any foreign government.
NOTE: The mere act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be
an officer, etc. is sufficient. It is not necessary that he performs an act
pertaining to a public officer.

2. Usurpation of Official Functions– by performing any act pertaining

to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
Government or of a foreign government or any agency thereof, under
pretense of official position, and without being lawfully entitled to do
so.
Relampagos did not commit the crime of usurpation of authority or official
functions. The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any person
who, under pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any
person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled
to do so. In this case, there was no attempt to represent the President in the
letter. It appears that Relampagos was acting on behalf of Secretary Abad,
upon the instructions of the President. Under the doctrine of qualified
political agency, department secretaries may act for and on behalf of the
President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in
their respective departments. (Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 212416, December 5, 2018)
 Using fictitious name and concealing true name (A178)

Fictitious Name Concealing True Name

1. Name other than the real name 1. Conceals true name

2. Uses publicly 2. All other personal circumstances

PURPOSE PURPOSE

1. Conceal a crime 1. Conceal identity

2. Evade execution of a judgement
3. Cause damage to public interest
- Damage must be to public interest. If
damage is to private interest -> Art. 315
2(a)
Illegal use of Uniform or Insignia (A.179)

• Offender makes use of insignia, uniform or dress;

• The insignia, uniform or dress pertains to an office not held by the
offender, or to a class of persons of which he is not a member; and
• Said insignia, uniform, or dress is used publicly and improperly.
Machinations in Public Auctions (A. 185)
Punishable Acts

1. Soliciting any gift or promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part
in any public auction;
(It is not required that the person making the proposal actually refrains from taking
part in any auction.)

2. Attempting to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts,

promises or any other artifice.
(The threat need not be effective nor the offer or gift accepted for the crime to
arise. Mere attempt to cause prospective bidders to stay away from the auction by
means of threats, gifts, promises or any other artifice with the intent that the thing
auctioned, should command a lesser price, is sufficient to constitute an offense.
The threat need not be effective nor the offer or gift accepted)
Imposition and Disposition of Falsely marked articles or
merchandise made of gold, silver, or other precious metals or
their alloys (A. 187)

1. Offender imports, sells, or disposes of any of those articles or

merchandise;
2. Stamps, brands, or marks of those articles of merchandise fail to
indicate the actual fineness or quality of said metals or alloys; and
3. Offender knows that the stamps, brands or marks fail to indicate the
actual fineness or the quality of the metals or alloys.
Crimes Against Public Morals
Grave Scandal (A. 200)
Elements:
1. That such act or acts be Highly scandalous as offending
against decency or good customs;
2. That the offender performs an Act or acts;
3. That the highly scandalous conduct is Not expressly falling
within any Article of the RPC; and
4. That the act or acts complained of be committed in a Public
place or within the public knowledge or view (U.S. v.
Samaniego, G.R. No. 5115, November 29, 1909)
Decency
It means proprietary of conduct; proper observance of the
requirements of modesty, good taste, etc. (REYES, Book Two,
supra at 359)
Customs
It means established usage and social conventions carried on by
tradition and enforced by social disapproval of any violation
thereof (Id.).
Grave Scandal
Consists of acts which are offensive to decency and good
customs which, having been committed publicly, have given rise
to public scandal to persons who have accidentally witnessed the
same (Id.)

The act punishable by Article 200 are those which by their

publicity and character can cause public scandal among the
person witnessing them, besides being contrary to morals and
good customs (People v. Dumlao, C.A., 380 O.G. 3715).
Where act must be performed
1. Public place; or
2. Private place, within public knowledge or view (U.S. v.
Samaniego, G.R. No. 5115, November 29, 1909).
 PUBLIC PLACE PRIVATE PLACE
Public view is not required Public view or public knowledge is
required
Criminal liability arises irrespective of
whether the immoral act is open to Degree of publicity is an essential
the public view element of the crime

Note: When the acts were performed in a private house and seen by one
person, the crime was not committed. The circumstance does not
constitute the degree of publicity which is an essential element of the
crime (U.S. v. Catajay, G.R. No. 2785, August 23, 1906)
TITLE SEVEN - CRIMES COMMITTED BY PUBLIC OFFICERS

Article 203. Who are public officers

DERELICTION OF DUTY
Article 204. Knowingly rendering unjust judgment
Article 205. Judgment rendered through negligence
Article 206. Unjust interlocutory order
Article 207. Malicious delay in the administration of justice
Article 208. Prosecution of offenses; negligence and tolerance
Article 209. Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor –
Revelation of secrets
 - BRIBERY
Article 210. Direct bribery
Article 211. Indirect bribery
Article 211-A. Qualified bribery
Article 212. Corruption of public officials

- Frauds and Illegal Exactions and Transactions

Article 213. Frauds against the public treasury and similar
offenses
Article 214. Other frauds
Article 215. Prohibited transactions
Article 216. Possession of prohibited interest by a public
officer
- Malversation of Public Funds or Property
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property –
Presumption of malversation
Article 218. Failure of accountable officer to render accounts
Article 219. Failure of a responsible public officer to render
accounts before leaving the country
Article 220. Illegal use of public funds or property
Article 221. Failure to make delivery of public funds or property
Article 222. Officers included in the preceding provisions

- Infidelity of Public Officers

- INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF PRISONERS
Article 223. Conniving with or consenting to evasion
Article 224. Evasion through negligence
Article 225. Escape of prisoner under the custody of a person
not a public officer
- INFIDELITY IN THE CUSTODY OF DOCUMENTS
Article 226. Removal, concealment or destruction of
documents
Article 227. Officer breaking seal
Article 228. Opening of closed documents

- REVELATION OF SECRETS
Article 229. Revelation of secrets by an officer
Article 230. Public officer revealing secrets of private
individual
- Other Offenses or Irregularities by Public Officers
- DISOBEDIENCE, REFUSAL OF ASSISTANCE, AND
MALTREATMENT OF PRISONERS
Article 231. Open Disobedience
Article 232. Disobedience to order of superior officer, when
said order was suspended by inferior officer
Article 233. Refusal of assistance
Article 234. Refusal to discharge elective office
Article 235. Maltreatment of prisoners

- ANTICIPATION, PROLONGATION, AND ABANDONMENT OF THE

DUTIES AND POWERS OF PUBLIC OFFICE
Article 236. Anticipation of duties of a public office
Article 237. Prolonging performance of duties and powers
Article 238. Abandonment of office or position
- USURPATION OF POWERS AND UNLAWFUL APPOINTMENTS
Article 239. Usurpation of legislative powers
Article 240. Usurpation of executive functions
Article 241. Usurpation of judicial functions
Article 242. Disobeying request for disqualification
Article 243. Orders or requests by executive officers to any
judicial authority
Article 244. Unlawful appointments

- ABUSES AGAINST CHASTITY

Article 245. Abuses against chastity - penalties
Direct Bribery

1. Public Officer – The offender in direct bribery is a public officer.

However, assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and claim commissioners,
experts or any other persons performing public duties can also
commit direct bribery. (Article 210)

Under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, direct bribery can be
committed by “any other persons performing public duties.”

However, according to Luis Reyes, this phrase does not cover a

private individual because the additional penalty of special temporary
disqualification for bribery has no practical application to a private
person.
Direct Bribery

A private secretary of judge was persuaded by a litigant to have his

case calendared as early as possible for a consideration of P500.
The private secretary is not liable for direct bribery since he is neither
a public officer nor a person performing public duties contemplated in
Article 210. (1990 Bar Exam)
Direct Bribery

2. Agreement – As long as there is an agreement, the public officer and

bribe-giver are liable for direct bribery and corruption of public officer,
respectively, regardless of who initiated the negotiation leading to
such agreement.

The agreement between the public officer and the bribe-giver to

commit a crime may be express or implied, and the same may be
proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. To hold otherwise, would
allow the culprit to escape liability with winks and nods even when the
evidence as a whole proves that there has been a meeting of the
minds to exchange official duties for money. (Tad-Y v. People, G.R.
No. 148862, August 11, 2005)
Direct Bribery

3. Official Duties – In direct bribery, the act, which the public officer agreed
to commit or omit is connected with his official duties. The term
“official duties” include any action authorized by law. It is sufficient if
the officer has the official power, ability or apparent ability to bring
about or contribute to the desired end. The acts referred to in the law,
which the offender agrees to perform or execute, must be ultimately
related to or linked with the performance of his official duties. It is
sufficient if his actions, affected by the payment of the bribe, are parts
of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the
government agency. However, where the act is entirely outside of the
official functions of the officer to whom the money is offered, the
offense is not bribery. (Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August 11,
2005)
Commission of Crime

Article 210 in defining direct bribery involving commission of a crime uses the
phrase “shall agree.” Hence, the actus reus (criminal act) in this kind of direct
bribery is the act of agreeing to commit a crime. Neither commission of the
crime nor acceptance of gift is necessary for the consummation of this direct
bribery. Mere agreement to commit a crime in consideration of gift offered or
promised (or present received) is sufficient to complete this direct bribery.

If a stenographer agreed to commit falsification of document by altering the

stenographic notes taken by him during the trial of a case for monetary
consideration, he is liable for direct bribery involving commission of crime. If the
stenographer falsified the notes, he is also liable for falsification of document in
addition to direct bribery.
Commission of Crime

The evidence custodian in consideration of P500,000.00 paid by drug

trafficker destroyed 20 grams of shabu confiscated during a buy-bust
operation. The evidence custodian is liable for direct bribery; obstruction of
justice for destroying an object to impair its availability as evidence in a
criminal case; violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 for giving unwarranted
preference, advantage or benefit to a private individual through manifest
partiality and evident bad faith.
Performance of Unjust Act

Agreement to commit the unjust act and acceptance of gift in consideration

thereof are required to complete this direct assault. However, acceptance of
gift need not happen before or at the time the public officer agreed to
perform the unjust act. It is sufficient if he received the gift afterwards in
pursuance of a prior agreement. (Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862, August
11, 2005)
Performance of Unjust Act

Unjust Act – In Marifosque v. People, G.R. No. 156685, July 27, 2004, a
police officer directly received the bribe money from the
complainants in consideration for his recovery from alleged
robbers, gas tanks, which was an act not constituting a crime.
He was convicted of direct bribery by accepting a gift to
perform an act, which is not a crime. Note: The act of
recovering stolen properties from the robbers is not unjust,
and yet, the police officer was convicted of direct bribery.
Performance of Unjust Act

However, according to Luis Reyes, citing the case of People v. Pamplona,

C.A., 51 O.G. 4116, in direct bribery by accepting gift to perform a non-
criminal act, the act not constituting a crime must be unjust; otherwise the
crime committed is indirect bribery. In Tad-Y v. People, G.R. No. 148862,
August 11, 2005, the Pamplona principle was reaffirmed.

Act, which does not constitute a crime, must be unjust to make the public
officer, who accepted the gift to execute it, liable for direct bribery. (Catalan
v. Silvosa, A.C. No. 7360, July 24, 2012; People v. Barrozo, A.C. No. 10207,
July 21, 2015)
Performance of Unjust Act

Acts which are neither illegal nor unjust, but which are performed in the
course of the public official’s duties and in exchange of the gift or favor given
to the public official, falls under indirect bribery. (Concurring opinion of
Justice Brion, Re: Allegations made under oath at the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee hearing against Justice Gregory Ong, A.M. No. SB-14-21-J,
September 23, 2014)
Performance of Unjust Act

An accused in a homicide case gave money to the judge of the court where
the case is pending for the prompt disposition of the case. The judge is
liable for indirect bribery for accepting gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. He is not liable for direct bribery since prompt disposition of the case,
in consideration of which he accepted money, is neither criminal nor unjust.
The accused, who gave the money, is liable for corruption of public officer.
(2001 Bar Exam)
Non-Performance of an Official Duty

In Balderama v. People, G.R. Nos. 147578-85, January 28, 2008,

demanding and receiving from a taxicab operator protection money in
consideration for LTO officers refraining from performing their official duty of
conducting inspections on the taxicab units being operated by the former to
determine any possible violation of LTO rules and regulations. Accused was
convicted of direct bribery.

If the public officer agreed to refrain from performing his official duty and
such omission constitute a crime such as dereliction of duty, the public
officer is liable for direct bribery involving commission of a crime.
Qualified Direct Bribery

Qualified direct bribery is committed by a public officer entrusted with law

enforcement, who refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender who
has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of gift or present given, offered or promised to him, or asked
or demanded by him. (Article 211-A of the Revised Penal Code; 2010 Bar
Exam)
Offender

The offender in direct bribery is a public officer or persons performing public

duties. On the other hand, the offender in qualified direct bribery is a public
officer, who is entrusted to enforce the law with duty to arrest or prosecute a
criminal such as police officers, NBI agents, or prosecutors.
Offender

A judge cannot be liable for qualified bribery as this crime requires that the
offender must be a public officer entrusted with law enforcement, who
refrains from arresting or prosecuting an offender in consideration of any
promise, gift or present. (Buenaventura v. Mabalot, A.M. No. P-09-2726,
August 28, 2013) Moreover, refraining from convicting the offender is not
equivalent to refraining from arresting or prosecuting him, which is an
indispensable element of qualified direct bribery. (2010 Bar Exam)
Crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death penalty
A, a police officer, arrested B after the latter committed murder, which is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. While on the way, in
consideration of the sum of P50,000.00, A allowed B to escape. The crime
committed is qualified direct bribery. The crime of dereliction of duty is
absorbed in the crime of qualified bribery since the former is an
indispensable means to commit latter. B is liable for corruption of officer.
Crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death penalty
A, a police officer, arrested B after the latter committed homicide. While on
the way, in consideration of the sum of P50,000.00, A allowed B to escape. A
is not liable for qualified bribery since the penalty for homicide is only
reclusion temporal. Since refraining from arresting an offender is a crime, A
is liable for direct bribery and dereliction of duty. The doctrine of absorption
is not applicable since Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides that
penalty for direct bribery is in addition to the penalty for the crime committed.
B is liable for corruption of officer.
Consummation of direct bribery and
qualified direct bribery
In direct bribery involving the commission of crime or non-performance of
duty, mere agreement to commit a crime or to refrain from performing his
duty in consideration of gift offered or promised or present received is
sufficient to complete the crime. Neither commission of crime, or refraining
from performing his duty; nor acceptance of gift is necessary for the
consummation of the crime..

In direct bribery involving performance of an unjust act, acceptance of gift in

connection with the agreement to commit an unjust act is required to
complete the crime. Performing the unjust act is not necessary for the
consummation of the crime.
Consummation of direct bribery and
qualified direct bribery
In qualified direct bribery, Article 210-A uses the phrase “who refrains from
arresting or prosecuting.” Thus, the essence of qualified direct bribery is the
refrainment from arresting or prosecuting an offender. Actual refrainment is
necessary to consummate qualified direct bribery. Agreement or acceptance
of gift without actual refraining from arresting or prosecuting the offender is
not enough to consummate this crime.
Direct bribery and Indirect bribery
(Agreement)
Where there is no showing that public officers received the money from a
contractor by virtue of an agreement to commit an act in connection with
contract with the local government pertaining to the development of an
economic and tourism hub and construction of the Blank Sports Arena, the
former is only liable for indirect bribery while the latter for corruption of public
officer. (2017 Bar Exam)
Direct bribery and Indirect bribery
(Agreement)
The plaintiff gave money to the judge who, in consideration thereof, subsequently
rendered an unjust decision in favor of the plaintiff. The judge is liable for direct
bribery while the plaintiff is liable for corruption of public officer. Moreover, the judge
and the plaintiff are liable for the crime of rendering unjust judgment as principal by
direct participation and principal by inducement, respectively. (1975 Bar Exam)

The plaintiff gave money to the judge who subsequently rendered a decision
against the plaintiff. The judge is not liable for direct bribery since rendering a just
decision against the plaintiff indicates that the former did not receive the money in
consideration of rendering a decision in favor of the latter. It seems that the plaintiff
merely gave the money to the judge by reason of his position. However, the judge
is liable for indirect bribery. On the other hand, the plaintiff is liable for corruption of
public officer. (1993 Bar Exam)
Direct bribery and Indirect bribery
(Unjustness or justness of the act)
The sheriff received from the plaintiff and her lawyer necessary amounts
constituting the sheriff’s fees and expenses for execution in addition to
P2,000.00 in consideration of prompt enforcement of the writ. The sheriff is
liable for indirect bribery for accepting gifts offered to him by reason of his
office. He is not liable for direct bribery since the prompt enforcement of the
writ is neither criminal nor unjust. The plaintiff and lawyer, who gave the
money, are liable for corruption of public officer. (2001 Bar Exam)
Corruption of Public Officer
Corruption of public official is committed by any person who shall offer or
promise or shall give the gifts or presents to a public officer, who commits
direct bribery, qualified direct bribery or indirect bribery. (Article 212)
 DIRECT BRIBERY INDIRECT BRIBERY QUALIFIED BRIBERY CORRUPTION OF PUBLIC OFFICIALS
(Art. 210) (Art. 211) (Art. 211-A) (Art. 212)

Agreeing to perform, or by performing, in 1. The offender is a Public Officer 1. The offender is a public officer 1. The offender makes to a public officer:
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or 2. He accepts Gifts; and entrusted with Law enforcement; a) Offers or promises; or
present, an act constituting a crime, in 3. The said gifts are offered to him by 2. The offender refrains from Arresting or b) Gives gifts or presents; and
connection with the performance of his reason of his Office (REYES, Book Two, prosecuting an offender who has
official duties; supra at 466) committed a crime punishable by 2. The offers or promises are made or the
reclusion perpetua and/or death; and gifts or the presents Given to a public
There is no attempted or frustrated indirect officer, under circumstances that will
By accepting a gift in consideration of the bribery because it is committed by accepting NOTE: If the crime committed is punishable make the public officer liable for direct
execution of an act which does not gifts offered to the public officer by reason by a penalty less than reclusion perpetua. bribery or indirect bribery (REYES, Book
constitute a crime, in connection with the of his office. If he does not accept the gifts, The public officer is liable under Art. 208 and Two, supra at 470).
performance of his official duty; he does not commit the crime. If he accepts direct bribery
the gifts, the crime is consummated (Id. at This article punishes the person who made the
By agreeing to refrain, or by refraining, from 467) 3. The offender refrains from arresting or offer or promise or gave the gift, even if the gift
doing something which it is his official duty prosecuting the offender in was demanded by the public officer and the
to do, in consideration of gift or promise. consideration of any Promise, gift or offer was not made voluntarily prior to the said
demand by the public officer (Id.)
present.
If the officer refused to be corrupted, the crime
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH QUALIFY THE is attempted corruption of public officials but
CRIME there is no bribery in the part of the officer who
refused. There is no frustrated corruption and
1. Position of offender; and frustrated bribery because these crimes involve
2. Nature of the crime he fails to the concurrence of the will of the corruptor and
prosecute. the public officer. Hence, once they agreed the
crime is immediately consummated (BOADO,
Same with Art. 208, the guilt of the offender supra at 607).
is a prejudicial question to the liability of the
officer charged under this provision (U.S. v.
Mendoza, G.R. No. 7540, September 23,
1912)
 Art. 217-222 – MALVERSATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR
PROPERTY
Malversation is also called “embezzlement”

PUNISHABLE ACTS

1. Appropriating public funds or property;

NOTE: To appropriate public funds or property includes every attempt to
dispose of the same without right
2. Consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, permitting any other
person to take such public funds or property;
3. Taking or misappropriating the same; or
4. Being Otherwise guilty of the Misappropriation or malversation of such funds
or property (Id.).
 MALVERSATION AND ESTAFA
DISTINGUISHED

MALVERSATION ESTAFA
(Art. 217) (Art. 315)
As to Nature of Funds
Public properties or funds Private Funds
As to Conversation
Not required Required
As to Need of Prior Demand
No need of a prior demand Demand is necessary
As to Damage
Does not require damage to the There must be damage
government
Art. 220 – ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY
Also referred to as “technical malversation”

ELEMENTS
1. The offender is a Public officer;
2. There is a Public fund or property under his administration;
3. Such public fund or property has been Appropriated by law or ordinance;
and
4. That he applies the same to a public use Other than that for which such fund
or property has been appropriated by law or ordinance (Id.)

It is necessary that public funds or properties had been diverted to any public
use other than that provided for by law or ordinance (Palma Gil v. People, G.R.
No. 73642, September 1, 1989).
 ACCUSED CANNOT BE CONVICTED OF TECHNICAL
MALVERSATION IN AN INFORMATION CHARGING
MALVERSATION

The elements of the two are distinct and different from

each other. In malversation, the offender misappropriates
public funds for personal use or allows another to take such
public funds. In TM, the public officer applies public funds
under his administration to a public use other than that for
which it was appropriated by law or ordinance. Technical
malversation is not included in nor does it necessarily
include malversation of public funds (Parungao v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 96025, May 5, 1991)
 ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY AND
MALVERSATION, DISTINGUISHED
ILLEGAL USE OF PUBLIC FUNDS OR PROPERTY MALVERSATION
(Art. 220) (Art. 217)
As to Person of the Offender/s
The offender are accountable public officers

As to Derivation of Profit
The offender in certain cases profits from the proceeds of the
The offender does not derive any personal gain or profit
crime.
As to Subject Matter
The public fund or property is applied to the personal use and
The public fund or property is applied to another public use
benefit of the offender or of another person.
As to Illegality of Act
The act is illegal per se for the public funds were diverted to
The act is not illegal per se because it is another public use
personal use
As to Appropriation of Funds
There must be an appropriation either by law such as a general
appropriation law or an ordinance enacted by a legislative There is no such requirement
body
Art. 223 – CONNIVING WITH OR CONSENTING TO EVASION
ELEMENTS
1. The offender is a Public officer;
2. He had in his Custody or charge, a prisoner, either detention prisoner or
prisoner by final judgment;
3. Such prisoner Escaped from his custody; and
4. He was in Connivance with the prisoner in the latter’s escape (REYES, Book
Two, supra at 557)

Connivance with the prisoner (agreement between the prisoner and the public
officer) in his escape is an indispensable element of the offense (U.S. v.
Bandino, G.R. No. 9964, February 11, 1915)
 CLASSES OF PRISONERS INVOLVED
1. If the fugitive has been sentenced by final judgment to any penalty; and
2. If the fugitive is held only as detention prisoner for any crime or violation of
law or municipal ordinance (Id, at 558).

A detention prisoner is a person in legal custody, arrested for, and

charged with some crime or public offense.

Leniency, laxity, and release of detention prisoner, who could not be

delivered to the judicial authority within the time fixed by law, are not considered
infidelity in the custody of prisoners (People v. Lancanan, G.R. No. L-6805,
June 30, 1954). There is real and actual evasion of service of sentence when
the custodian permits the prisoner to obtain a relaxation of his imprisonment
and to escape the punishment of being deprived of his liberty, thus making the
penalty ineffectual, although the convict may not have fled (U.S. v. Bandino,
G.R. No. 9964, February 11, 1915).
 Art. 224 – EVASION THROUGH NEGLIGENCE

ELEMENTS
1. The offender is a Public officer;
2. He is charged with the Conveyance or custody of a prisoner by final
judgment; and
3. Such prisoner escapes through his Negligence (REYES, Book Two, supra at
560)
The negligence referred to in the RPC is such definite laxity as all but amounts to a
deliberate non-performance of duty on the part of the guard. It is the duty of any
police officer having custody of a prisoner to take necessary precautions to assure
the absence of any means of escape. A failure to undertake these precautions will
make his act one of definite laxity or negligence amounting to deliberate non-
performance of duty (Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 58652, May 20, 1988).

Unlike in Art. 223, connivance need not be proven to hold an accused liable under
Art. 224 (Rodillas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 58652, May 20, 1988).

The fact that the public officer recaptured the prisoner who had escaped from his
custody does not afford complete exculpation (REYES, Book Two, supra at 475).

A policeman who, assigned to guard a prisoner, falls asleep, with the result that the
prisoner escapes, is guilty of negligence in the custody of a prisoner (People v.
Guiab, G.R. No. 39631, May 6, 1934)
 Art. 226 Art. 229 Art. 230
Removal, Concealment or Revelation of secrets by an officer Public Officer revealing
Destruction of Documents secrets by the private
individual

1. Offender is a public official - 1. Public officer in charge of papers • Not necessary that
Officially entrusted with damage is suffered by
documents or papers 2. Should not be published the private individual

2. Abstracts, removes, conceals or 3. Delivery to a third person

destroys documents or papers
- For illicit purpose -> tamper with 4. Damage to public interest
it, profit, commit an act
constituting a breach of duty

3. Damage
• Serious act
• To a third party
• to public interest
Crimes Against Persons
PARRICIDE
DEATH OR PHYSICAL INJURIES UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
MURDER
HOMICIDE
DEATH CAUSED IN A TUMULTUOUS AFFRAY
PHYSICAL INJURIES
GIVING ASSISTANCE TO SUICIDE
DISCHARGE OF FIREARMS
INFANTICIDE
ABORTION
DUEL
MUTILATION
RAPE
 PARRICIDE
The crime committed by a person who kills his:

a) Father or mother

b) Child whether legitimate or illegitimate

c) Legitimate ascendant

d) Legitimate descendant

e) Lawful spouse
The basis of the classification is the blood relationship in the direct
ascending and descending lines

1). Killing of siblings (brother/sister) and other collateral relatives is not parricide

2) Non-relatives or strangers who participate in the killing will be liable for homicide or
murder as the case may be

The killing maybe through negligence as when a father plays with his gun which went off
and killed the wife
If the accused is not aware that the victim is his relative, he will be charged for the actual
crime committed but Article 49 will be applied to determine his penalty
The crime may be aggravated by the circumstances which qualify murder but they will be
considered as ordinary aggravating circumstances. For example: The husband may poison
the wife or kill her by means of fire, or resort to treachery. Said circumstances will be
appreciated as generic aggravating circumstances.
Death or PI under Exceptional Circumstances (A. 247)

Requisites
1. A legally married person or a parent surprises his spouse or
daughter, the latter under 18 years of age and living with him, in the
act of committing sexual intercourse;
2. He or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or both of
them any serious physical injury in the act or immediately
thereafter; and
3. He has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife or
daughter, or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of
the other spouse.
Murder (Art. 248)
Elements of murder
1. That a person was killed;
2. That the accused killed him;
3. That the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
mentioned in Art. 248; and
4. That the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
Notes on Murder
A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying
circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and
so unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or
her defense. (People v. Perez, G.R. No. 134756, February 13, 2001)

The rule is well-settled in this jurisdiction that treachery may still be

appreciated even though the victim was forewarned of the danger to
his person. What is decisive is that the attack was executed in a
manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to ret
aliate. (People v. Glino, G.R. No. 173793, December 4, 2007)
 Treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods or forms in its execution
which tend directly and especially to ensure its execution, without risk
to himself or herself arising from any defense which the offended
party might make. (People v. Torres, Sr., G.R. No. 190317, August 22,
2011)
When treachery exists in the crime of murder
1. The malefactor employed such means, method or manner of
execution to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory
acts of the victim;
2. At the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend
himself; and
3. The accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular
means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. (People v.
Lagman, G.R. No. 197807, April 16, 2012)
Requisites of evident premeditation
• Time when the accused decided to commit the crime;
• Overt act manifestly indicating that he clung to the determination;
and
• A sufficient lapse of time between the decision and execution,
allowing the accused to reflect upon the consequences of his act.
(People v. Grabador, G.R. No. 227504, June 13, 2018)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDJEN CAMARINO, LUMINO, FULDERICO
DECDEC LUMINO, DENNIS SENGANE, SABELO SAMONTAO, HONORIO SENTILAN,
ARNOLD SENGANE, AND LITO SAMONTAO, FRED SENTILAN, JANJEN LUMINO,
DISON TUTO, AND JOHN DOES, AT-LARGE, G.R. No. 222655, December 09, 2020

• Issue: Whether or not the accused(s) may be held

liable for the crime of Murder.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDJEN CAMARINO, LUMINO, FULDERICO
DECDEC LUMINO, DENNIS SENGANE, SABELO SAMONTAO, HONORIO SENTILAN,
ARNOLD SENGANE, AND LITO SAMONTAO, FRED SENTILAN, JANJEN LUMINO,
DISON TUTO, AND JOHN DOES, AT-LARGE, G.R. No. 222655, December 09, 2020

Ruling: Yes.

The essential elements of murder are:

(1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him;
(3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying
circumstances mentioned in Article 248 [of the Revised Penal
Code; and
(4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDJEN CAMARINO, LUMINO, FULDERICO
DECDEC LUMINO, DENNIS SENGANE, SABELO SAMONTAO, HONORIO SENTILAN,
ARNOLD SENGANE, AND LITO SAMONTAO, FRED SENTILAN, JANJEN LUMINO,
DISON TUTO, AND JOHN DOES, AT-LARGE, G.R. No. 222655, December 09, 2020

All the elements of the crime of Murder qualified by treachery

were present in this case. Romeo was killed and it was
established by the prosecution, through the testimony of
eyewitness Eugenio, that accused appellants killed Romeo when
they indiscriminately fired at the houses in the vicinity of the
plaza, including Elito's store where Romeo was buying cigarette.
Romeo was unarmed and unprepared for the attack.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. EDJEN CAMARINO, LUMINO, FULDERICO
DECDEC LUMINO, DENNIS SENGANE, SABELO SAMONTAO, HONORIO SENTILAN,
ARNOLD SENGANE, AND LITO SAMONTAO, FRED SENTILAN, JANJEN LUMINO,
DISON TUTO, AND JOHN DOES, AT-LARGE, G.R. No. 222655, December 09, 2020

Also, the execution of the crime was without risk on the part of the accused-
appellants and there was no doubt that Romeo could not mount a defense
for himself. He had no chance to resist or escape. Both the trial court and
the appellate court also correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof
of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do not write down their lawless
plans and plot. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be
deduced from the mode and manner of the commission of the offense or
inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action,
and community of intent. It did not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as
the act of one is the act of all, and each incurred the same criminal liability.
Homicide (Art. 249)
Elements
1. That a person was killed;
2. That the accused killed him without any justifying circumstance;
3. The accused had intention to kill which is
presumed; and
4. The killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances
of murder, or by that of parricide or infanticide.
Proving intent to kill
Evidence to prove intent to kill in crimes against persons may consist of:
• The means used by the malefactors;
• The nature, location and number of wounds sustained by the victim;
• The conduct of the malefactors before, at the time of, or immediately after
the killing of the victim;
• The circumstances under which the crime was committed;
• The motive of the accused; (People v. Lanuza y Bagaoisan, G.R. No. 188562,
August 17, 2011) and
• Words uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim may also
be considered. (De Guzman v. People, 742 SCRA 501, November 26, 2014)
Use of unlicensed firearms in committing murder or homicide

In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. 8294 and R.A. 10591,

separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal possession of firearms
are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearms is merely
taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. (People v.
Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016)
Infanticide (A. 255)
• It is the killing of any child less than 3 days old or 72 hours of age,
whether the killer is the parent or grandparent, any relative of the
child, or a stranger.
• NOTE: Art. 255 does not provide a penalty for infanticide. If the killer
is the mother, or father, or a legitimate grandparent, although the
crime is still infanticide, the penalty, is that of parricide.
• If the offender is not so related to the child, although the crime is still
infanticide, the penalty corresponding to murder shall be imposed.
• Regardless, the penalty for murder and parricide is the same.
Intentional Abortion (A. 256)
The crime of intentional abortion is committed in three ways
1. By using any violence upon the person of the pregnant woman;
2. By administering drugs or beverages upon such pregnant woman
without her consent; or
3. By administering drugs or beverages with the consent of the
pregnant woman.
Elements
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is exerted, or drugs or beverages administered, or that the
accused otherwise acts upon such pregnant woman;
3. As a result of the use of violence or drugs or beverages upon her, or any
other act of the accused, the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having
been expelled therefrom; and
• Abortion is intended.
• NOTE: In intentional abortion, the offender should know that the woman is
pregnant because the very intention is to cause an abortion.
Persons liable for intentional abortion

1.. The person who actually caused the abortion under Art. 256; and
2. The pregnant woman if she consented under Art. 258.

Note:Abortion is not a crime against the woman but against the fetus.
The offender must know of the pregnancy because the particular
criminal intention is to cause an abortion. As long as the fetus dies as a
result of the violence used or drugs administered, the crime of abortion
exists, even if the fetus is over or less is in full term. (Viada as cited in
Reyes, 2008)
Unintentional Abortion (A.257)
Elements
1. There is a pregnant woman;
2. Violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an
abortion; Violence is intentionally exerted; and
3. As a result of the violence exerted, the fetus dies either in the
womb or after having been expelled therefrom.
• Q: Can unintentional abortion be committed through negligence?
• A: YES. Unintentional abortion is a felony committed by dolo or
deliberate intent. But it can be committed by means of culpa.
However, the culpa lies not in the aspect of abortion but on the
violence inflicted on the pregnant woman. Thus, there can be a crime
of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Unintentional Abortion.
Abortion practiced by the woman herself or by
her parents (A. 258)

Abortion is caused by:

1. The pregnant woman herself;

2. Any other person, with her consent
3. Any of her parents with her consent, for the purpose of concealing
her dishonor
Mitigation of liability when the purpose of abortion
is to conceal dishonor

The liability of the pregnant woman is mitigated if the purpose for

abortion is to conceal her dishonor. However, if it is the parents who
caused the abortion for the purpose of concealing their daughter’s
dishonor, there is no mitigation, unlike in infanticide.
 Infanticide and Abortion
Art. 255
Art. 257 Art. 258
Infanticide Art. 256
Unintentional Abortion by the woman or
child Intentional Abortion
Abortion her parents
< 3 days old

Mitigating circumstance 1. Violence upon the pregnant 1. Violence is Mitigating circumstance

woman intentionally caused
without intending
Mother or maternal 2. Without violence, without an abortion. To conceal dishonor
grandparents to conceal her consent of the woman (such (woman)
dishonor as use of drugs/beverages)

3. Woman should have

consented
 A. 259. Abortion practiced by the
physician/midwife/pharmacist dispensing abortives.

Elements of this crime as to the physician or midwife

• 1. There is a pregnant woman who has suffered abortion;
• 2. Abortion is intended;
• NOTE: If abortion was not intended or was a result of a mistake, no crime is
committed. If the woman is not really pregnant, an impossible crime is
committed.
• 3. The offender must be a physician or midwife who causes or assists in
causing the abortion; and
• 4. Said physician or midwife takes advantage of his or her scientific
knowledge or skill.
Elements of this crime as to the pharmacists
• Offender is a pharmacist;
• There is no proper prescription from a
• physician; and
• Offender dispenses an abortive.
• As to the pharmacist, the crime is consummated by dispensing an abortive
without proper prescription from a physician. It is not necessary that the
abortive is actually used.
• If the pharmacist knew that the abortive would be used to cause an
abortion and abortion resulted from the use thereof, the pharmacist would
be an accomplice in the crime of abortion. (Reyes, 2017)
What is the criminal liability of the offender if the fetus did not
die in Intentional Abortion?
If the fetus survives in spite of the attempt to kill it or the use of
violence, abortion is not consummated. If abortion is intended and the
fetus does not die, it is frustrated intentional abortion.
Even if the child was expelled prematurely and was deliberately alive at birth,
the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of
6 months is not viable. (People v. Paycana, 551 SCRA 657, citing U.S. v. Vedra,
12 Phil 96 [1909])

Q: What is the criminal liability, if any, of a pregnant woman who tried to

commit suicide by poison, but she did not die and the fetus in her womb
was expelled instead? (2012 BAR)
A: The woman who tried to commit suicide incurs no criminal liability. The
woman will also not incur criminal liability for “expulsion of the fetus” from
her womb since committing a suicide is not a felony. Unintentional abortion
is also not committed since it is punishable only when caused by violence
and not by poison. There is also no intentional abortion since the intention
of the woman was to commit suicide and not to abort the fetus.
Q. Live in partners killed their newly born child to conceal dishonor.
What is their criminal liability?

A. If victim is non viable, abortion

If victim is viable but less than 3 days old, infanticide
if victim 3 days or more, parricide.
Q. A mauled his pregnant wife without intent to kill her or abort the
unborn fetus. The wife and unborn fetus dies.
A is liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion

Q. A mauled his wife (6 months pregnant), without intent to kill or

abort. Wife dies and fetus is expelled prematurely. Fetus dies after
a few minutes.
A is liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion
Q. A mauled his wife (pregnant for six and a half months) without
intent to kill her or abort the fetus. Wife died and fetus was expelled
prematurely. After 36 hours, the infant dies
A is liable for the complex crime of parricide and infanticide.

Q. A mauled his wife (pregnant for six and a half months) without
intent to kill or abort. Wife died, fetus was expelled prematurely, after
3 days the child died.
Complex crime of double parricide
Duel (A. 260)
It is a formal or regular combat previously consented between two
parties in the presence of two or more seconds of lawful age on each
side, who make the selection of arms and fix all the other conditions of
the fight to settle some antecedent quarrels.

Punishable acts
• Killing one’s adversary in a duel;
• Inflicting upon such adversary physical injuries; and
• Making a combat although no physical injuries have been inflicted.
A mere fight as a result of an agreement is not necessarily a duel
because a duel implies an agreement to fight under determined
conditions and with the participation and intervention of seconds who
fixed the conditions.
Q. How is the crime of serious physical injuries committed?
A. It is committed by Wounding; Beating; Assaulting; or Administering
injurious substance to another person without intent to kill.

Note of the Qualifying circumstances of serious physical injuries

• If it is committed by any of the persons referred to in the crime of
parricide; or
• If any of the circumstances qualifying murder attended its
commission.
 LESS SERIOUS PHYSICAL
SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
INJURIES
Insane, Imbecile, Impotent, blind Incapacity for labor 10 days or • Incapacitated from labor for
more OR shall require medical 1 to 9 days or shall require
Lost speech, power to hear or assistance for the same period medical attendance for the
smell, lost an eye, a hand, foot, same period
ear, leg, lost the use of any such
member, incapacitated to work • Injuries which did not
(habitual engaged) prevent the offended from
engaging in habitual work or
Deformed, lost any part of his did not require medical
body or use thereof, ill or attendance
incapacitated to work (habitually
engaged) for more than 90 days • Ill treatment of another by
deed without injury
Illness or incapacity for labor for
more than 30 days

Medical attendance is not

necessary
 Serious, Less Serious and Slight
Physical Injuries
GRAVITY INJURY DAYS
Incapacity from habitual work Permanent
Illness/incapacity from habitual Over 90 days
SERIOUS
work (91 or over)
(Art. 263)
Illness/incapacity from labor
31-90 days

Incapacity from labor/medical

LESS SERIOUS
attendance required 10-30 days
(Art. 265)

SLIGHT Incapacity from labor/medical

1-9 days
(Art. 266) attendance required
Tumultuous affray

It means a commotion in a tumultuous and confused manner, to such

an extent that it would not be possible to identify who the killer is if
death results, or who inflicted the serious physical injuries, but the
person or persons who used violence are known.
Elements
There be several or at least 4 persons;
• That they did not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and
attacking each other reciprocally, otherwise, they may be held liable as co- conspirators;
• That these several persons quarreled and assaulted one another in a confused and
tumultuous manner;
• Someone was killed in the course of the affray;
NOTE: The person killed in the course of the affray need not be one of the
participants in the affray. He could be a mere passerby.
• It cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased.
NOTE: if the one who inflicted the fatal wound is known, the crime is not
tumultuous affray. It is a case of homicide.
• The person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be
identified.

This article does not apply if there is concerted fight between two organized groups.
What brings about the crime of tumultuous affray?
• The crime of tumultuous affray is brought about by the inability to
ascertain the actual perpetrator, not the tumultuous affray itself that
brings about the crime. It is necessary that the very person who
caused the death cannot be ascertained or identified.

(It does not apply when if the person who caused the death is known
but cannot be identified )
Q: Mario left his house together with Raul, to attend a public dance.
Two hours later, they decided to have a drink. Not long after, Mario
left to look for a place to relieve himself. According to Raul, he was
only about three meters from Mario who was relieving himself when
a short man walked past him, approached Mario and stabbed him at
the side. Mario retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled
bottle of beer. Almost simultaneously, a group of seven men, ganged
up on Mario and hit him with assorted weapons, i.e., bamboo poles,
stones and pieces of wood. Raul, who was petrified, could only watch
helplessly as Mario was being mauled and overpowered by his
assailants. Mario fell to the ground and died before he could be given
any medical assistance. What crime is committed?
A: The crime committed is Murder and not Death Caused in
Tumultuous Affray. A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel
occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and
tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. The quarrel in
the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of
whom was sufficiently identified as the principal author of the killing,
as against a common, particular victim.(People v. Unlagada, G.R. No.
141080, September 17, 2002)
Giving assistance to Suicide
Punishable acts
1. Assisting another to commit suicide, whether the suicide is
consummated or not
2. Lending assistance to another to commit suicide to the extent of
doing the killing himself.

(Art. 253 does not distinguish and does not make any reference to the
relation of the offender with the person committing suicide. Hence, the
penalty would be the same even if the offender is the father, mother or
the child of the one committing suicide)
Discharge of Firearm (A. 254)

Elements
1. Offender discharges a firearm against another person; and
2. Offender has no intention to kill the person.

(Purpose of the offender is only to intimidate or to frighten the

offended party)
The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner fired his
.45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant
circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence tending to prove
that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note
that the prosecution witnesses did not see whether petitioner aimed to
kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the
mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus
interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as
is required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent
to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient
to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt.
Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner
should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge of firearm under
Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code. The elements of this crime are:
(1) that the offender discharges a firearm against or at another person;
and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. Though
the information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be
validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense which is
necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person.
Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint
or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved
(Dado vs. people, G.R. No. 131421 November 18, 2002)
 RAPE (A. 266)

By sexual intercourse

Rape Inserting penis to mouth

or anal orifice
Sexual assault
Any instrument / object into the genital
or anal orifice of another person
 AS AMENDED BY RA 11648
RAPE, QUALIFIED SEDUCTION, SIMPLE SEDUCTION, RA 7610 Sec. 5, 7, 9
and 10
 OLD LAW NEW LAW
“Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Article 266-A. Rape; When and How
Committed. – Committed. - Rape is committed:
Rape Is Committed –

“1) By a man who shall have carnal "1) By a person who shall have carnal
knowledge of a woman knowledge of another person under any
under any of the following of the following circumstances:
circumstances:

“a) Through force, threat, or

intimidation; "x x x"
“b) When the offended party is
deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
“c) By means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse
of authority; and
“d) When the offended party is under twelve d) When the offended party is under sixteen (16)
(12) years of age or is demented, even years of age or is demented, even though none of
though none of the circumstances the circumstances mentioned above be present:
Provided, That there shall be no criminal liability
mentioned above be present.
on the part of a person having carnal knowledge
of another person sixteen (16) years of age when
the age difference between the parties is not
more than three (3) years, and the sexual act in
question is proven to be consensual, non-abusive,
and non-exploitative: Provided, further, That if the
victim is under thirteen (13) years of age, this
exception shall not apply.

"As used in this Act, non-abusive shall mean the

absence of undue influence, intimidation,
fraudulent machinations, coercion, threat, physical,
sexual, psychological, or mental injury or
maltreatment, either with intention or through
neglect, during the conduct of sexual activities with
the child victim. On the other hand, non-
exploitative shall mean there is no actual or
attempted act or acts of unfairly taking advantage
of the child's position of vulnerability, differential
power, or trust during the conduct of sexual
activities."
Sexual Intercourse is accomplished through:

a. Through Force, threat or intimidation

b. Deprived of Reason or otherwise unconscious
c. Fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority
d. Under 12 years of age or demented, even though none of the above
circumstances are present. (As amended)
Rape
Rape by sexual assault is not necessarily included in rape through
sexual intercourse unlike acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Bon, G.R. No.
166401, October 30, 2006)

Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape

cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is
present when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose.
(People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011)
• The term statutory rape should only be confined to situations where
the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years old. If the victim is a
person with mental abnormality, deficiency or retardation, the crime
committed is simple rape under par 1 (b) as she is considered
“deprived of reason” notwithstanding that her mental age is
equivalent to that of a person under 12 years old (People vs. Baay,
People vs. Dalan) . Note now 16 years old

• But in P vs. Deniega, the SC affirmed the conviction of the accused of

statutory rape for the rape of a 16 yr old child with mental capacity of
6 yr old.
• Rape of a person suffering from mental retardation falls under Art.
266 (A) 1 (b) when the offended party is deprived of reason. It does
not fall under 1 (d) which is statutory rape of a person below 12 yrs
old or demented (P vs xxxx, GR. No. 253236) LATEST JURISPRUDENCE
Amount of force necessary to consummate the
crime of rape

Jurisprudence firmly holds that the force or violence required in rape

cases is relative; it does not need to be overpowering or irresistible; it is
present when it allows the offender to consummate his purpose.
(People v. Funesto, G.R. No. 182237, August 3, 2011)
 “Touching” in rape
In People v. Campuhan, it was held that touching when applied to rape cases
does not simply mean mere epidermal contact, stroking or grazing of organs,
a slight brush or a scrape of the penis on the external layer of the victim’s
vagina, or the mons pubis. There must be sufficient and convincing proof
that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and
not merely stroked the external surface thereof, for an accused to be
convicted of consummated rape. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female
organ or touching the mons pubisof the pudendum is not sufficient to
constitute consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest
penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either labia of the
pudendum by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can
only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness. (People v. Butiong, G.R.
No. 168932, October 19, 2011)
Take note of the 10 scenarios in Art. 266 (B) which QUALIFIES RAPE

NOTE: A step-brother or step-sister relationship between the offender

and the offended party cannot elevate the crime to qualified rape
because they are not related either by blood or affinity. The
enumeration is exclusive.
Qualified Rape
1. When by reason or on occasion of the rape, a homicide is
committed.

2. When the victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a

parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity
or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common law spouse
of the victim.

2. When the victim is under the custody of the police or military

authorities or any law enforcement or penal institution.
4. When rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of
the children or other relatives within the third civil degree of
consanguinity.

5. When the victim is engaged in a legitimate religious vocation or

calling and is personally known to be such by the offender before or
after the commission of the crime.

6. When the victim is a child below 7 years old.

7. When the offender knows that he is inflicted with HIV/AIDS or any other
sexually transmissible disease and the virus or disease is transferred to the
victim.

8. When committed by any member of the AFP or paramilitary units thereof

or the PNP or any law enforcement agency or penal institution, when the
offender took advantage of his position to facilitate the commission of the
crime.

9. When by reason or on occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered

permanent physical mutilation or disability.
10. When the offender knew of the pregnancy of the offended party at
the time of the commission of the rape.

11. When the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional

disorder, and/or physical handicap of the offended party at the time of
the commission of the crime. (Art. 266-B, RPC)
Note:
A step-brother or step-sister relationship between the offender and the
offended party cannot elevate the crime to qualified rape because they
are not related either by blood or affinity. The enumeration is exclusive.
Hence, the common law husband of the victim’s grandmother is not
included.
Q. What is the effect as to the liability when the offender lack
awareness as to the mental condition of the victim?

A. RPC punishes rape of a mentally disabled person regardless of the

perpetrator’s awareness of his victim’s mental condition, proof
that the accused knew of the victim’s mental disability is important
only for qualifying the charge of rape which imposes death penalty
if the offender knew of the victim’s mental disability ( People vs.
Martinez, GR No. 226394)
Rape is qualified when the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the offended party at
the time of the commission of the crime. This qualifying circumstance
should be particularly alleged in the Information. A mere assertion of
the victim's mental deficiency is not enough. Allan can only be
convicted of four (4) counts of rape under Article 266-A 1(d) of the
Revised Penal Code because the prosecution failed to allege the
qualifying circumstance in the Information. (People v. Corpuz, G.R. No.
208013, July 3, 2017)
The force, violence, or intimidation in rape is a relative term,
depending not only on the age, size, and strength of the parties but
also on their relationship with each other. AAA was already 67 years of
age when she was raped in the dark by Bill who was armed with a
knife. A woman of such advanced age could only recoil in fear and
succumb into submission. In any case, with such shocking and
horrifying experience, it would not be reasonable to impose upon AAA
any standard form of reaction. Different people react differently to a
given situation involving a startling occurrence. (People v. Jastiva, G.R.
No. 199268, February 12, 2014)
In statutory rape, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are
not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the
woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The child's consent is
immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil.
In this case, the defense did not dispute the fact that AAA was 10 years old at
the time of the incident. AAA was able to narrate in a clear and categorical
manner the ordeal that was done to her. It is well-settled that when a
woman, more so when she is a minor, says she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is required to prove the ravishment. The accused may thus be
convicted solely on her testimony-provided it is credible, natural, convincing
and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things. (People
v. Gutierez, G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014)
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and rape,
felonies committed against or without the consent of the victim. It
operates on the theory that the sexual act was consensual. It requires
proof that the accused and the victim were lovers and that she
consented to the sexual relations. For purposes of sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under R.A. 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person. (People v. Udang, G.R. No. 210161,
January 10, 2018)
• Take note of the Special Complex Crime under Art. 266 (B)

• Attempted Rape with Homicide

• Rape with Homicide
• It is immaterial that the person killed is someone other than the woman
victim of rape. It is also immaterial that death would supervene by mere
accident, that 2 or more persons are killed (P vs. Laog)

• Pardon principle is not applicable to accomplices, accessories and

multiple rape

• Marriage should be valid, legal and contracted in good faith

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.
ADONIS CABALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT, G.R. No.
213831, September 25, 2019
Facts: On January 16, 2005, at around 3 o'clock in the
afternoon, 13-year-old AAA was sleeping in a bedroom inside
their house when she was woken up by Cabales' kiss on her
face. Cabales is AAA's uncle, being the husband of BBB's sister.
AAA bolted upright and tried to push Cabales away. Cabales,
however, held her hand and pointed a fan knife at her neck,
and warned her not to shout or move. He proceeded to
remove AAA's jogging pants and panty, undressed himself, and
inserted his penis into her vagina.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.
ADONIS CABALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT, G.R. No.
213831, September 25, 2019

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held liable for

the crime of rape in the absence of failure of the victim to
thwart accused advances and absence of use of force in
the victim’s medico legal certificate.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, V.
ADONIS CABALES, ACCUSED-APPELLANT, G.R. No.
213831, September 25, 2019
Ruling: Accused is liable for the crime of rape. There is no standard
behavior expected by law from a rape victim. She may attempt to
resist her attacker, scream for help, make a run for it, or even freeze
up, and allow herself to be violated. By whatever manner she
reacts, the same is immaterial because it is not an element of rape.
Neither should a rape victim's reflex be interpreted on its lonesome.
Absent any other adequate proof that the victim clearly assented to
the sexual act perpetrated by the accused, a victim shall not be
condemned solely on the basis of her reactions against the same.
Moreover, while a medical certificate attesting to the victim's
physical trauma from the rape has corroborative purposes, it is
wholly unnecessary for conviction, if not a mere superfluity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALENTINO CATIG Y
GENTERONI, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020

Facts: On July 23, 2008, at around 9:30 in the morning,

BBB asked AAA, a mental retardate, to fetch water from
appellant's house. AAA complied. Upon arriving at
appellant's house, the latter instructed her to go inside.
Once inside, he laid her on the bed, took off her shorts
and panty, touched her vagina, and raped her. After he
was done with his bestial act, appellant gave AAA money
and sugarcane. AAA then went home.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALENTINO CATIG Y
GENTERONI, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020

Issue: Will the testimony of a mental retardate be given

due credence following the alleged act of rape committed
against her.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. VALENTINO CATIG Y
GENTERONI, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020

Ruling: Yes. The trial court has the best opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witness so as to determine if there is indeed truth to
his or her testimony in the witness stand. It is well settled that the
evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a
matter best undertaken by the trial court because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their
demeanor, conduct, and attitude under grilling examination. It is not
required for a rape victim to undergo a comprehensive medical
examination so as to prove that he/she is a mental retardate. We have
repeatedly pronounced that mental retardation can be proven by
evidence other than medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony
of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

Facts: At around 6:00 p.m. on March 22, 2008, the victim, AAA,
was at home with her two brothers, her grandmother and her
father, herein accused-appellant. BBB, her mother, was out
selling barbecue. Thereafter, while AAA's brothers were at the
basketball court, her father instructed AAA to go up to the
bedroom. Subsequently, he ordered her to remove her shorts.
After AAA complied, accused-appellant inserted his penis into her
vagina which caused her pain. AAA shouted and pleaded, "wag
na, tama na po". AAA did not report anything as she feared that
her father might do something to her mother.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held

liable for the crime of qualified rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

Ruling: Yes. A young girl's revelation that she had been

raped, coupled with her voluntary submission to medical
examination and willingness to undergo public trial where
she could be compelled to give out the details of an
assault on her dignity, cannot be so easily dismissed as
mere concoction.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

The elements of Qualified Rape are:

(1) sexual congress;
(2) with a woman;
(3) done by force and without consent;
(4) the victim is under [eighteen] years of age at the time of the
rape; and
(5) the offender is a parent (whether legitimate, illegitimate or
adopted) of the victim. In this case, AAA was below eighteen
years old when the crime was committed against her, which
was verified by her birth certificate.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

Relevantly, "when the offender is the victim's father, as in

this case, there need not be actual force, threat or
intimidation because when a father commits the odious
crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a
minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his
moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes
for violence and intimidation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. XXX, G.R. No. 218277,
November 09, 2020

Moreover, "testimonies of child victims are given full

weight and credit, because when a woman, more so if
she is a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in
effect all that is necessary to show that rape was
committed. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of
truth and sincerity.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 225781,
November 16, 2020

Facts: On December 25, 2005, at around 8 o'clock in the

evening, BBB was out having a drink with her neighbors, while
AAA and her siblings were left in their house. Around the same
time, AAA's siblings were already sleeping in a room, while the
victim was sleeping on a bench outside the said room.
Meanwhile, accused-appellant, the live-in partner of BBB, who
earlier declared that he would be going to his ducks or "itikan",
returned to their house. He then chanced upon the victim and
proceeded to remove her clothes, leaving her totally naked. After
undressing himself, accused-appellant went on top of the victim
and held her hands.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 225781,
November 16, 2020

Thereafter, he inserted his penis into the victim's vagina, and

kissed her lips and neck. On another occasion, on January 5,
2006, AAA and her sister went to the hut erected on the place
where accused-appellant was raising ducks to get drinking water
from an artesian well. Upon seeing her, he held her hands and
brought her inside the hut. He then instructed her to lie down on
a wooden bed. When she refused to abide by his instruction, he
poked a pointed knife at her neck. Accused-appellant then went
on top of the victim. When he was about to remove his pants,
BBB arrived. Upon seeing her live-in partner on top of her
daughter who was wriggling her feet, BBB hit him with a piece of
wood.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 225781,
November 16, 2020

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held liable for the
crime of rape following a victim’s recantation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 225781,
November 16, 2020

Ruling: Yes. When a rape victim's testimony is straightforward

and marked with consistency despite grueling examination, it
deserves full faith and confidence and cannot be discarded. If
such testimony is clear, consistent and credible to establish the
crime beyond reasonable doubt, a conviction may be based on it,
notwithstanding its subsequent retraction. Mere retraction by a
prosecution witness does not necessarily vitiate her original
testimony. As a rule, recantation is viewed with disfavor firstly
because the recantation of her testimony by a vital witness of the
State like AAA is exceedingly unreliable, and secondly, because
there is always the possibility that such recantation may later be
repudiated.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 225781,
November 16, 2020

Indeed, to disregard testimony solemnly given in court

simply because the witness recants it ignores the
possibility that intimidation or monetary considerations
may have caused the recantation. Court proceedings, in
which testimony upon oath or affirmation is required to be
truthful under all circumstances, are trivialized by the
recantation. The trial in which the recanted testimony was
given is made a mockery, and the investigation is placed
at the mercy of an unscrupulous witness.
Crimes against Property
ROBBERY
BRIGANDAGE
THEFT, QUALIFIED THEFT
ESTAFA
OTHER FORMS OF SWINDLING
OTHER DECEITS
ARSON
MALICIOUS MISCHIEF
Elements of Estafa in General
1. Accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit
This covers the three different ways of committing estafa under Art. 315,
thus:
• With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence;
• By means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts; or
• Through fraudulent means
2. Damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person.
• The failure of the entrustee to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the
goods, documents, or instruments covered by a trust receipt, to the extent
of the amount owing to the entruster, or as appearing in the trust receipt;
or
• The failure to return said goods, documents, or instruments if they were
not sold or disposed of in accordance with the terms of the trust receipt.
 Art. 315 (ESTAFA)
1 (a) 1(b)
1(c)
With unfaithfulness Abuse of confidence

Misappropriating or converting money, goods or other personal

property received in trust, or on commission, or for administration
or under obligation to make delivery of or to return the same or by
denying having received such money, goods or other property.
Taking undue
Altering the Deceit is not an essential requisite of Estafa with abuse of
advantage of the
substance, quantity confidence since the breach of confidence takes the place of fraud/
signature of the
or quality of deceit which is the usual element in other crimes of Estafa
offended party in
anything of value
Note: blank
• Demand is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation.
• Received to be sold but was pledged -> Estafa
• Received to be pledged but sold -> Theft
 Art. 315 (2) False Pretenses/Fraudulent Acts
Executed prior to a simultaneously with commission of fraud

(a) (b) (c) (d)

• Using fictitious name • Altering the • Pretending to • Postdating a check

quality finess, or have bribed any or issuing in
• Falsely pretending to possess weight of government payment of an
power, influence, qualification, anything employee obligation
property, audit, agency, business pertaining to his
or imaginary transactions or by art or business • (Check is drawn to
means of similar deceits enter into an
obligation)

• (Obligation is not
pre-existing)
 Art. 315 (3)
Estafa through Fraudulent means

(a) (b) (c)

• By inducing another, by • By resorting to some • By removing, concealing or

means of deceit to sign any fraudulent practice to insure destroying, in whole or in
document success in a gambling game part, any court record,
office files, or any other
papers
US vs. Yap Tian Jong, GR No. 10675, February 28, 1916.

By mistake a box of sinamay, consigned to a merchant at Manila, was

put off a coasting steamer at an intermediate port and turned over to
the accused, together with a shipment of goods duly consigned to him.
The accused took possession of the box thus delivered to him by
mistake, converted it to his own use, and upon demand being made
some days later by the captain of the ship for its return, denied that he
had received it and declared that he knew nothing whatever about it.
Held: That the accused is guilty of the crime of estafa .
Q. Gringo was the managing director of Full Systems Exhaust Co. The
company gave Gringo a number of machineries and equipment vital to
the operations of the company for his management, care and custody.
For months, Gringo did not receive his salary from Full Systems Exhaust
Co. This prompted him not to return the machineries and equipment
despite the repeated demands of the company president. He claims
that he has a lien over the subject properties. May Gringo be held
criminally liable? Explain.
ANS:Yes. Gringo may be held criminally liable for the crime of estafa
under Art. 315 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. A person is guilty of
estafa if he is under the obligation or duty to return the property but
failed to return the same. It is immaterial even if a person merely
retained the properties for the purpose of preserving his right of lien
over them. Failure to return upon demand the properties which one
has the duty to return is equivalent to appropriating the same for his
own personal use. (D’Aigle v. People, G.R. No. 174181, June 27, 2012).
Reimbursement or Payment

The reimbursement or restitution to the offended party of the money

or property swindled does not extinguish criminal liability. It only
extinguishes civil liability (Sajot vs. CA, GR NO. 109721, March 11,
1999)

“The fact that, subsequent to the filing of the cases in the Court of First
Instance (now Regional Trial Court), petitioner (accused) made partial
payments on account does not alter the situation. Payment does not
extinguish criminal liability for Estafa.” (Samo v. People)
Non Payment of a Loan

In the case of BETTY GABIONZA and ISABELITA TAN, COURT OF

APPEALS, LUKE ROXAS and EVELYN NOLASCO, G.R. No. 161057,
September 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held that nonpayment of a
LOAN does not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion.
• “To the benefit of private respondents, the Court of Appeals ruled,
citing Sesbreno v. Court of Appeals, 310 Phil. 671 (1995), that the subject
transactions are akin to money market placements which partake the
nature of a loan, the non-payment of which does not give rise to criminal
liability for estafa. X x x. Sesbreno affirmed that a money market
transaction partakes the nature of a loan and therefore nonpayment
thereof would not give rise to criminal liability for estafa through
misappropriation or conversion. X x

• Indeed, Sesbreno explains: In money market placement, the investor is a

lender who loans his money to a borrower through a middleman or
dealer. Petitioner here loaned his money to a borrower through
Philfinance. When the latter failed to deliver back petitioner's placement
with the corresponding interest earned at the maturity date, the liability
incurred by Philfinance was a civil one. X x x.”
The transaction between appellant and the Abagat spouses, in our view, was
one for a loan of money to be used by appellant in her business and she
issued checks to guarantee the payment of the loan. As such, she has the
obligation to make good the payment of the money borrowed by her. But
such obligation is civil in character and in the absence of fraud, no criminal
liability under the Revised Penal Code arises from the mere issuance of
postdated checks as a guarantee of repayment. We find appellants
allegation, that the Abagat spouses entered into a joint venture
agreement with her for the supply of materials with the AFP, is self-
serving. But we also note that the trial court convicted appellant on a
general allegation that all the elements of estafa under Article 315, 2 (d) of
the Revised Penal Code had been proved by the prosecution without making
any reference to or giving any proof of the actual fraud that appellant
allegedly committed to make her liable for estafa. It is elementary that
where an allegation in the information is an essential element of the crime,
the same must be proved beyond reasonable doubt to sustain a
conviction. In this case, the prosecution did not establish specifically and
conclusively the fraud alleged as an element of the offenses charged
(PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RICA G. CUYUGAN, G.R. Nos. 146641-43,
November 18, 2002)
Compromise or Novation under Estafa
Criminal Liability for estafa already committed is not affected by compromise
or novation of contract, for it is a public offense which must be prosecuted
and punished by the state. (People vs. Moreno, GR. No. 130067)

Novation is not a ground under the law to extinguish criminal liability.

Article 89 (on total extinguishment) and Article 94 (on partial
extinguishrnent) of the Revised Penal Code list down the various grounds for
the extinguishment of criminal liability. Not being included in the list,
novation is limited in its effect only to the civil aspect of the liability, and, for
that reason, is not an efficient defense in estafa. This is because only the
State may validly waive the criminal action against an accused. The role of
novation may only be either to prevent the rise of criminal liability, or to
cast doubt on the true nature of the original basic transaction, whether or
not it was such that the breach of the obligation would not give rise to penal
responsibility, as when money loaned is made to appear as a deposit, or
other similar disguise is resorted to (Deganos vs. People, GR NO. 162826)
Degaños claims that his partial payments to the complainants novated his
contract with them from agency to loan, thereby converting his liability from
criminal to civil. He insists that his failure to complete his payments prior to
the filing of the complaint-affidavit by the complainants notwithstanding,
the fact that the complainants later required him to make a formal proposal
before the barangay authorities on the payment of the balance of his
outstanding obligations confirmed that novation had occurred.

Although the novation of a contract of agency to make it one of sale may

relieve an offender from an incipient criminal liability, that did not happen
here, for the partial payments and the proposal to pay the balance the
accused made during the barangay proceedings were not at all incompatible
with Degafios liability under the agency that had already attached. Rather
than converting the agency to sale, therefore, he even thereby confirmed his
liability as the sales agent of the complainants.
Q. Accused fraudulently offered to sell to private complainant a share
over Subic Island Club, while concealing from the former the material
fact that accused has yet to secure the requisite licenses and
registration with the SEC to sell shares of the project and from the
DENR and HLURB to develop and construct the same. Relying on the
accused’s misrepresentations, private complainant paid him the total
amount of Php835,999.94, as consideration but he was never able to
gain possession of a Certificate of Membership given accused’s
continued failure to proceed with the project. Nonetheless, private
complainant did not present evidence that accused misappropriated
the amount he has given to him, can accused be held liable for estafa
under Art. 315 2 (a)?
Proof of Misappropriation is not an element of estafa
under 2(a)
Yes, accused is liable under Art. 315 2 (a). Unlike estafa under
paragraph 1 (b) of Article 315 of the Code, estafa under paragraph 2( a)
of that provision does not require as an element of the crime proof
that the accused misappropriated or converted the swindled money or
property. All that is required is proof of pecuniary damage sustained by
the complainant arising from his reliance on the fraudulent
representation. The prosecution in this case discharged its evidentiary
burden by presenting the receipts of the installment payments made
by Sy on the purchase price for the Club share (Lopez vs. People, G.R.
No. 199294, July 31, 2013)
Fraud, in its general sense, is deemed to comprise anything calculated to
deceive, including all acts, omissions and concealment involving a breach of
legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence justly reposed, resulting in
damage to another, or by which an undue and unconscientious advantage is
taken of another. It is a generic term embracing all multifarious means which
human ingenuity can device, and which are resorted to by one individual to
secure an advantage over another by false suggestions or by suppression of
truth; and includes all forms of surprise, trick, cunning, dissembling and any
other unfair way by which another is cheated. Deceit is a species of
fraud. And deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of
that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury. The false
pretense or fraudulent act must be committed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud, it being essential that such false statement
or representation constitutes the very cause or the only motive which
induces the offended party to part with his money. In the absence of such
requisite, any subsequent act of the accused, however fraudulent and
suspicious it might appear, cannot serve as basis for prosecution for estafa
under the said provision (Aricheta vs. People, 533 SCRA 695)
In Aricheta vs. People, accused was acquitted because the prosecution failed to
prove that the property was indeed earlier sold to a third person before it was sold
to private complainant.
“As can be gleaned from the allegations in the information, petitioner was charged
with Estafa for allegedly selling to private complainant the subject property
knowing fully well that she had already sold the same to a third party. From this, it
is therefore clear that the supposed false representation or false pretense made
by petitioner to private complainant was that she was still the owner of the
property when she sold it to private complainant. Xxxx As above explained, the
alleged false representation or false pretense made by petitioner to private
complainant was that she was still the owner of the property when she sold it to
private complainant. To prove such allegation, the prosecution should first establish
that the property was previously sold to a third party before it was sold to private
complainant. The prosecution utterly failed to do this. The fundamental rule is that
upon him who alleges rests the burden of proof. It made this allegation but it failed
to support it with competent evidence. Except for private complainant’s bare
allegation that petitioner told her that she (petitioner) sold the property to another
person, the records are bereft of evidence showing that the property was indeed
previously sold to a third person before it was sold again to private complainant. “
Estafa under Art. 315, paragraph 2(d)

(1) the offender has postdated or issued a check in payment of an

obligation contracted at the time of the postdating or issuance;
(2) at the time of postdating or issuance of said check, the offender has
no funds in the bank or the funds deposited are not sufficient to cover
the amount of the check; and
(3) the payee has been defrauded.
Can a person charged with Qualified theft be convicted
for Estafa?

As a rule, a person charged with qualified theft cannot be convicted for

Estafa. As provided by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified theft
is defined as the taking of one’s property without the owner’s consent, and
must be done by a domestic servant, with grave abuse of confidence, if the
property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter, or cattle, consists of coconuts
from premises of plantation, fish from fishpond, and taken during a calamity.
Also, in theft, he only took material possession of the thing. Estafa or
swindling is defined in the Revised Penal Code as defrauding another
through abuse of confidence or through means of deceit, where the owner
consented to the voluntary giving of a thing to the offender and was
entrusted to take care of it for administration, trust or commission. Thus, in
Qualified Theft, the owner did not consent to the taking of the property,
while in Estafa, there is a voluntary entrustment of the property.
However, by applying the variance doctrine and by analogy with the
recent case of Tan vs. People, it may well be possible to convict an
offender with the crime of Estafa even if he is charged in the
information for the crime of Qualified Theft. (Tan vs. People, G.R. No.
210318, July 28, 2020)
Liability of issuer of the REPLACEMENT under Art. 315
(2) (d) of the Revised Penal Code due to the dishonor

What is obvious to us is that NATY borrowed money from ROBERT through

the intercession of the latter's sister-in-law, Teresita Lim. In payment therefor
she issued postdated checks. When such checks became due she notified
ROBERT not to deposit them, since these were not yet funded. ROBERT
agreed that NATY replace the checks with another set of six postdated
checks, four of which were her personal checks and the other two were
issued by another which NATY indorsed to ROBERT. Ineluctably, the
replacement checks were issued in payment of an obligation long
contracted and incurred. It cannot therefore be said that NATY committed
fraudulent acts in the issuance and the indorsement of the replacement
checks. In short, the replacement checks were by no means the device
used by NATY to induce ROBERT to lend her money without which the
transaction would not have been consummated (P vs. Chua, G.R. No.
130632 September 28, 1999)
Liability of issuer of the REPLACEMENT under Art. 315 (2) (d) of
the Revised Penal Code due to the dishonor

Appellant maintains that her actions thereafter also belied any intention to
defraud. After she was notified of the dishonor of the first check, she did not
hide or abscond, but she offered to replace the first check with two checks.
Appellant also contends that when JCT accepted the replacement checks in
place of PCIB Check No. 142254, she was relieved of her obligation of
funding said check. Hence, she alleges that she is not covered by the prima
facie presumption of fraud under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised
Penal Code. She claims that since deceit is absent in this case, she is not
liable for Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code.
•
In accepting the two replacement checks and surrendering the first
check to appellant instead of demanding payment under the first check
(PCIB Check No. 142254) on the same day that JCT’s Acting Manager
informed appellant of the dishonor of the first check, JCT led appellant
to believe that she no longer had to deposit the necessary amount to
cover the first check within three days from the verbal notice of
dishonor. On July 31, 1991, appellant’s balance in her account with
PCIB Isulan Branch was ₱78,400. It is possible that appellant could have
deposited ₱11,400 to make good the first check worth ₱89,800 if JCT
made it clear that it was demanding payment under the first check.
• It would have been different if JCT accepted the replacement checks
three days after appellant’s receipt of the verbal notice of dishonor of the
first check, because by then the prima facie evidence of deceit against
appellant for failure to deposit the amount necessary to cover the first
check within three days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, under
Article 315, paragraph 2(d), of the Revised Penal Code, would have been
established.

• Under the circumstances of this case, the fact that appellant no longer
deposited the amount necessary to cover the first check, PCIB Check No.
142254, within the required period cannot be considered prima
facie evidence of deceit against appellant. For it was due to complainant
JCT’s own act of accepting the replacement checks and surrendering the
first check to appellant that appellant was no longer obliged to deposit the
amount necessary to cover the first check within three days from receipt of
the verbal notice of dishonor as JCT was no longer holding her liable for
payment under the said check.
A chance meeting between Diana and Roma got them to converse. Diana learned
that Roma had just opened a hardware store. Diana, on the other hand, needed to
procure materials for the construction of his apartment house. Diana proposed to
buy, and Roma agreed to sell, the items that the latter could supply on cash basis. As
orders were placed on different dates by Diana, so also were deliveries made by
Roma. Each time, no payment was made; deliveries, however, continued until the
total unpaid account reached Php100,000.00. Roma kept on making demands for
payment but Diana, on every such occasion, would ask for an extension of time
within which to pay. Later on, Diana issued a check in favor of Roma as payment
for his total accountability. When presented for encashment, the check was
dishonored because the bank account had by then already been closed. Demands for
payment of the due obligation were again made by Roma but the same fell on deaf
ears. Hence, Roma filed a case for Estafa under paragraph 315, paragraph 2(d) of
the Revised Penal Code against Diana. Will the case filed by Roma prosper?
Explain.
Answer:

No. The law penalizes the issuance of a check only if it were itself the immediate
consideration for the reciprocal receipt of benefits. In other words, the check must
be issued concurrently with, and in exchange for, a material gain to make it a
punishable offense under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. In
the issuance of a check to pay a pre-existing obligation, as in the instant case, the
drawer derives no such contemporary gain in return since the obligation sought to be
settled is already incurred and outstanding before the check is issued. (Haniel
Castro and Pio Castro v. Hon. Rafael Mendoza and People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 50173, September 21, 1993)
Other Forms of Swindling (Art. 316)
• Conveying, selling, encumbering, or mortgaging any real property,
pretending to be the owner of the same.
• Disposing real property knowing it to be encumbered even if the
encumbrance be not recorded.
• Wrongful taking of personal property from its lawful possessor to the
prejudice of the latter or a third person;
• Executing any fictitious contract to the prejudice of another;
• Accepting any compensation given to him under the belief it was in
payment of services or labor when he did not actually perform such
services or labor; and
• Selling, mortgaging, or in any manner encumbering real property while
being a surety in bond without express authority from the court or before
being relieved from the obligation.
Nery owns a parcel of land known with an area of 1,452 square
meters. Nery agreed to sell 295 sq m of her land to Mario in installment
basis. Nery obliged herself to deliver to the said spouses the title to
this portion of land free from all liens and encumbrances upon full
payment by the said vendee of the purchase price. Nery later on
mortgaged to a bank the entire lot, including the portion subject of
their agreement. When Mario completed their payment of the
installments, he demanded from Nery the delivery of the title for the
portion he bought and the execution of the corresponding absolute
Deed of Sale for said property. Nery executed a deed of absolute sale
for the lot in question with a statement in his Deed of Conveyance that
the subject land sold is “free from all liens and encumbrances” despite
the fact that there was still an existing mortgage thereon in favor of the
bank. Did Nery commit any crime?
Yes, Nery committed other forms of swindling under Art. 316 (2). She
placed an express warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale that the lot in
question is free from all liens and encumbrances, when it was not so in
fact. It would be at this second stage of the transaction when deceit
was exercised. As fraud involves acts or spoken or written words by a
party to mislead another into believing a fact-to be true when it is not
in fact that express warranty in the Deed of Absolute Sale covering the
lot in question that said land is "free from all liens and encumbrances"
constitutes the false representation or deceit and one of the elements
giving rise to the crime of estafa. (People vs. Galsim 107 Phil.
303). Nery cannot rightfully claim that no damages on Complainant
was brought about by the false warranty made in the Deed of Absolute
Sale. Mario's damage inherently consists in his inability to receive a
property free from encumbrances. As the rightful vendee, he would
acquire title to the property but subject to the restrictions of the
existing liens. (Antazo vs People of the Philippines, G.R. No. L-45278
Aug. 28, 1985
Other Deceits A. 318

• Defrauding or damaging another by any other deceit not mentioned

in the preceding articles; and
• Interpreting dreams, making forecasts, telling fortunes, or taking
advantage of the credulity of the public in any other similar manner,
for profit or gain.
Removal, Sale or Pledge of Mortgaged Property (Art. 319)

Punishable acts
• Knowingly removing any personal property mortgaged under the
Chattel Mortgage Law to any province or city other than the one in
which it was located at the time of execution of the mortgage,
without the written consent of the mortgagee or his executors,
administrators, or assigns.
• Selling or pledging personal property already pledged, or any part
thereof, under the terms of the Chattel Mortgage Law, without the
consent of the mortgagee written on the back of the mortgage and
noted on the record thereof in the office of the register of deeds of
the province where such property is located.
Arson
Two Kinds of Arson
1. Simple (PD 1613 as amended)
2. Destructive Arson (A. 320)

Destructive arson is characterized as heinous crime; while simple arson

under PD No. 1613 is a crime manifesting a lesser degree of perversity.
Simple arson contemplates the malicious burning of property not included in
Article 320 of the RPC (People vs. Macabando, GR No. 188708, July 31,
2013). Burning of inhabited house or dwelling or personal property is simple
arson under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1613 because it is not included in Article
320 of RPC.
Commission of Destructive Arson
1. Any person who shall burn One or more buildings or edifices, consequent
to one single act of burning, or as a result of simultaneous burnings, or
committed on several or different occasions;
2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in
general, or where people usually gather or congregate for a definite purpose
such as, but not limited to official governmental function or business, private
transaction, commerce, trade workshop, meetings and conferences, or
merely incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels,
motels, transient dwellings, public conveyance or stops or terminals,
regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are persons in
said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of
whether the building is actually inhabited or not;
3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted
to transportation or conveyance, or for public use, entertainment or
leisure;
4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances
thereto, which are devoted to the service of public utilities; or
5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing
or destroying evidence of another violation of law, or for the purpose
of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.
The elements of simple arson under Section 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613 are:
(a) there is intentional burning; and (b) what is intentionally burned is
an inhabited house or dwelling. Both these elements have been
proven in the present case. The Information alleged that the appellant
set fire to his own house, and that the fire spread to other inhabited
houses. xxxThe appellant likewise testified that his burnt two-story
house was used as a residence. That the appellant’s act affected many
families will not convert the crime to destructive arson, since the
appellant’s act does not appear to be heinous or represents a greater
degree of perversity and viciousness when compared to those acts
punished under Article 320 of the RPC. The established evidence only
showed that the appellant intended to burn his own house, but the
conflagration spread to the neighboring houses (People vs.
Macabando, G.R. No. 188708, July 31, 2013)
Note:
• If the main objective is to kill the victim in a building, and fire is
resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal, the crime
committed is murder only. Murder qualified by means of fire absorbs
arson since the latter is an inherent means to commit the former
(People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27, 1994).

• If the main objective is to burn the building, but death results by

reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is arson with qualifying
circumstance of resulting death (People vs. Enriquez, G.R. No.
248372, August 27, 2020)
• If the objective is to kill, and in fact the offender has already done so,
and arson is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, the
offender may be convicted of two separate crimes of either homicide
or murder, and arson (People vs. Cedenio, G.R. No. 93485, June 27,
1994).
Malicious mischief
1. Offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another;
2. Such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction; and
3. Act of damaging another’s property be committed merely for the
sake of damaging it.
Special cases of Malicious Mischief
Punishable acts
• Causing damage to obstruct the performance of public functions;
• Using any poisonous or corrosive substance;
• Spreading any infections among cattle; and
• Causing damage to the property of the
• National Museum or National Library, or to any archive or registry,
waterworks, road, promenade, or any other thing used in common by
the public.
Elements of robbery in general

1. There is personal property belonging to another; (BAR 1992, 1996)

2. There is unlawful taking of that property;
3. Taking must be with intent to gain; and
4. There is violence against or intimidation of any person or force upon
things. (BAR 1992, 2002, 2005)
 Robbery
Violence / Intimidation of persons Force upon things (Art 299)
(unlawful taking is complete if offender has already Things must be brought outside the building to
in his possession even if no opportunity to dispose it) consummate robbery
1. By reason or occasion of robbery homicide is
committed, or when accompanied by Rape, In an inhabited house public In an uninhabited place /
intentional mutilation or arson. building / house of worship Private building

(penalty is based on value of (penalty is based on value of

2. Serious Physical Injuries par 1
property or on whether offender property)
carry arms)
3. SPI par 2

4. Degree unnecessary for the commission of the

(A)
crime, SPI 3 and 4
1. Opening not intended for entrance or 1. Opening not intended for entrance or
egress egress
5. Simple Robbery
2. Breaking wall/roof/floor/door or window 2. Breaking wall/roof/floor/door or
3. False keys/picklocks window
QUALIFIED IF: 4. Fictitious name/pretending the exercise 3. False keys/picklocks
of public authority 4. doors, wardrobes, chests or any sealed
or closed furniture or receptacle has
- uninhabited place (B) been broken
- Band 5. Closed/sealed receptacle, has been
1. Breaking doors,wardrobes, chests or any removed even if the same to be broken
- Attacking a moving train locked/sealed receptacle open elsewhere
- Or on a street or airship and the intimidation 2. By taking such furniture or objects to be
is with the use of unlicensed firearms broken or forced upon outside the place
of robbery
Unlawful taking is completed

Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons, UT is

completed from the moment the offender gains possession of the
thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same.

Robbery with Force Upon Things, UT is completed when the culprit

had taken the thing out of the building to consummate the crime.
The property taken must be personal property, for if real property is
occupied by means of violence against or intimidation of person, the
crime is usurpation. (Art. 312, RPC)
 ATTEMPTED /
FRUSTRATED
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE ROBBERY WITH RAPE NOTE
ROBBERY WITH
HOMICIDE

• Homicide may precede • Intent to take (Exception, already • Robbery A/F Art. 48 or
robbery or may occur after personal property provided by law • Killing A/F Separate crime
robbery
must precede rape under Art. 297)
• Collective responsibility
• Rape may occur
• Causal connection bet before, during or
robbery and homicide after robbery • Robbery
Art. 48 or
- consummated Separate crime
• Proper crime regardless of • Covers cases of • Killing A/F
the number or injuries multiple rapes
committed

• Victim may be a bystander, • Robbery

policeman, or even one of accompanied by
the robbers. Rape
• The killing may be
intentional, or accidental.
The following will constitute robbery with
homicide:
1. The robber fired his gun upwards to frighten the victim but the bullet
killed a person who was hiding in the ceiling

2. The victim drew a gun to defend but his aim was deflected and
instead hit his companion

3. It was a responding policeman who was killed by a robber.

4. The responding policeman fired a shot but missed and killed the
victim of robbery
5. The several robbers fought over the loot and one killed another, even
if this took place after the taking had taken place and the robbers had
fled the scene of robbery

6. One of the victims suffered a stroke due to the tension and dies

7. The gun of a robber accidentally fell and killed a person outside the
house

8. The killing may be before, during, or immediately after the taking

provided that the original intent of the robbers must have been to rob
and not to kill, which need not be the sole motive either.
There is no crime of robbery with multiple homicide under the RPC.

The crime is robbery with homicide notwithstanding the number of

homicides committed on the occasion of the robbery and even if
murder, physical injuries, and rape were also committed on the same
occasion. (People v. Hijada, G.R. No. 123696, March 11, 2004)
Q: Is there such a crime as robbery with murder?

A: NONE. Treachery cannot be considered as qualifying circumstance of

murder, because the crime charged is the special crime of robbery with
homicide. The treachery which attended the commission of the crime
must be considered not as qualifying but merely as a generic
aggravating circumstance. (People v. Mantawar, 80 Phil. 817; People v.
Abang, G.R. No. L-14623, December 29, 1960)
Q: In case there is conspiracy, are all conspirators liable for the crime
of robbery with rape?

A: YES. In People v. Suyu, it was ruled that once conspiracy is

established between several accused in the commission of the crime of
robbery, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by
anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them
proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing
rape. (People v. Gallo)
Q: Can there be such a crime as robbery with attempted rape?

A: NO. The crime cannot be a complex crime of robbery with

attempted rape under Article 48, because a robbery cannot be a
necessary means to commit attempted rape; nor attempted rape, to
commit robbery. (People v. Cariaga, C.A., 54 O.G. 4307)
The Court finds, at the outset, that the trial judge erred in designating the offense
committed by the appellants as rape with homicide aggravated by robbery in band.
For one, neither in law nor in jurisprudence is there an aggravating circumstance as
robbery in band. More importantly, the evidence shows that what was committed
is the special complex crime of robbery with homicide aggravated by rape. The
overwhelming evidence reveals that the original design of the malefactors was to
commit robbery in order to facilitate their escape from the penal colony. Their
original intent did not comprehend the commission of rape. Hence, the crime of
rape cannot be regarded as the principal offense. In this case, since it attended
the commission of robbery with homicide, the rape is deemed to aggravate the
crime but damages or indemnification for the victim may be awarded. (See People
v. Bacsa, 104 Phil. 136 [1958]; People v. Tapales, 93 SCRA 134 [1979]). Instead of
ignominy, it is the rape itself that aggravates the crime (People v. Mongado, 28
SCRA 642 [1969]). With respect to the deaths of Daisy Gonzales and Yolanda Arque,
the appellants are clearly liable therefor since, as held by this Court in People v.
Mangulabnan, (99 Phil. 992 [1956]) it is immaterial that the death of a person
supervened by mere accident, provided that the homicide is produced by reason or
on occasion of the robbery. Since rape and homicide co-exist in the commission of
robbery, the offense committed by the appellants is the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, aggravated by rape, punishable under Paragraph 1 of
Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) (People vs. Aspili, G.R. Nos. 89418-19.
November 21, 1990.)
Take Note :

1. Robbery with Homicide

2. Robbery with Rape

3. Robbery with Intentional Mutilations

4. Robbery with Arson

5. Robbery with Physical Injuries

Is there robbery with rape when the rape is committed
prior to robbery?
Yes. If the intention of the culprits from the beginning was to take
personal property. Even if the rape was committed before the taking of
personal properties, if rape was not the primary objective, robbery
with rape is committed (People vs. Canastre, GR No. L-2055, Dec. 24,
1948).

Additional rapes committed on the same occasion of robbery will not

increase the penalty ( People vs. Regala, GR No. 130508, April 5, 2000)
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

• Facts: AAA was born on November 28, 1995. She was a 17-
year-old minor at the time of the complained incidents. On
August 31, 2013, at about 11:30 p.m., AAA was walking towards
her boarding house after attending a birthday party when Bueza
suddenly pulled her and pushed her to the ground. Thereafter,
he pointed a knife at her side and declared a hold-up. Accused-
appellant forcibly took her two (2) cellphones, each worth
₱1,700.00 and ₱1,000.00, as well as her wallet containing cash
amounting to ₱4,000.00.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

As there were several people congregating at a nearby bridge,

Bueza instructed AAA to stand up, then placed his arm around
her shoulder while his other hand poked a knife at her side. He
instructed her to walk casually as they pass the bridge ahead.
Accused-appellant then brought her inside a public restroom
along a narrow alley. While still pointing his knife at her, he
removed his shorts and brief. AAA tried to escape but was
unsuccessful. She tried begging Bueza to stop but he merely
cautioned her not to make a sound. Still at knifepoint, accused-
appellant removed her clothes and underwear, kissed her breast
and vagina, then inserted his penis into her vagina.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

Issue: Whether or not the accused may be held liable for

the crimes of Robbery with Rape and Grave Threat.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

Ruling: Yes. Robbery with Rape is penalized under

Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Section 9 of RA 7659. It contemplates a
situation where the original intent of the accused was to
take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
another and Rape is committed on the occasion thereof
or as an accompanying crime.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

The following elements must concur in the crime of

Robbery with Rape:
(1)the taking of personal property is committed with
violence or intimidation against persons;
(2)the property taken belongs to another;
(3)the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus
lucrandi; and
(4)the Robbery is accompanied by Rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. ARMANDO BUEZA Y
RANAY, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020

The prosecution sufficiently established the elements of

the crime of Robbery with Rape, to wit: that on August
31, 2015, Bueza, while armed with a knife, forcibly took
private complainant's two (2) cellular phones and wallet
containing ₱4,000.00. The absence of hymenal
laceration does not exclude the existence of rape. Such
explanation is also consistent with the well settled rule
that in rape cases, the absence of lacerations in
complainant's hymen does not prove that she was not
raped.
Robbery with Physical Injuries
Physical injuries must be serious

To be considered as such, the physical injuries must always be serious.

If the physical injuries are only less serious or slight, they are absorbed
in the robbery. The crime becomes merely robbery. But if the less
serious physical injuries were committed after the robbery was already
consummated, there would be a separate charge for the less serious
physical injuries. It will only be absorbed in the robbery if it was
inflicted in the course of the execution of the robbery. The same is true
in the case of slight physical injuries.
Other cases of simple robbery
• Any kind of robbery with less serious physical injuries or slight
physical injuries falls under this specie of robbery.

• NOTE: But where there is no violence exerted to accomplish the

snatching, the crime committed is not robbery but simple theft.
Robbery with Arson
Commission of composite crime
• The composite crime would only be committed if the primordial intent of the
offender is to commit robbery and there is no killing, rape, or intentional
mutilation committed by the offender during the robbery. Otherwise, the crime
would be robbery with homicide, or robbery with rape, or robbery with
intentional mutilation, in that order and the arson would only be an aggravating
circumstance.
Robbery must precede arson
• It is essential that robbery precede the arson, as in the case of rape and
intentional mutilation, because the amendment included arson among the rape
and intentional mutilation which have accompanied the robbery.

• NOTE: Arson has been made a component only of robbery with violence against
or intimidation of persons but not of robbery by the use of force upon things.
Hence, if the robbery was by the use of force upon things and therewith arson
was committed, two distinct crimes are committed.
Execution of Deeds by means of violence or intimidation
(A. 298)
• Offender has intent to defraud another;
• Offender compels him to sign, execute, or deliver any public
instrument or document; and
• Compulsion is by means of violence or intimidation.
NOTE: Arson has been made a component only of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons but not of robbery by the
use of force upon things. Hence, if the robbery was by the use of force
upon things and therewith arson was committed, two distinct crimes
are committed.
1. If the girl is robbed, raped and then killed, the crime is Robbery with
Homicide aggravated by rape

2. If the girl is raped, then robbed and then killed the crimes are (i)
Rape with Homicide and (ii) Robbery

3. If the girl is raped and then a personal property is taken the crimes
are (i) Rape and (ii) Theft
Robbery by a band

Robbery is committed by a band when at least 4 armed malefactors

take part in the commission of a robbery.

If any unlicensed firearm is used, the penalty imposed upon all the
malefactors shall be the maximum of the corresponding penalty
provided by law, without prejudice to the criminal liability for illegal
possession of such firearms.
(This is a special aggravating circumstance applicable only in a case of
robbery in band. )
Liability for the acts of the other members of the band
A member of the band is liable for any of the assaults committed by the
other members thereof, when the following requisites concur:
• That he was a member of the band;
• That he was present at the commission of a robbery by that band;
• That the other members of the band committed an assault; and
• That he did not attempt to prevent the assault.
Possession of Picklocks or Similar Tools
Elements
• Offender has in his possession picklocks or similar tools;
• Such picklocks or similar tools are specially adopted to the
commission of robbery; and
• Offender does not have lawful cause for such possession.
(Possession of picklocks is a crime by itself)

False keys
• Picklocks or similar tools;
• Genuine keys stolen from the owner;
• Any key other than those intended by the owner for use in the lock
forcibly opened by the offender.
Q. May a person who unlawfully took the postdated check belonging
to another, but the same was apparently without value, as it was
subsequently dishonored be held liable for theft?

A. No. The personal property subject of the theft must have some
value, as the intention of the accused is to gain from the thing stolen.
This is further bolstered by Article 309, where the law provides that the
penalty to be imposed on the accused is dependent on the value of the
thing stolen. There can be no question that as of the time that
petitioner took possession of the check meant for Mega Foam, she had
performed all the acts to consummate the crime of theft, had it not
been impossible of accomplishment in this case. Thus, the offender is
liable for Impossible Crime of Theft ( Gemma Jacinto vs. People, G.R.
No. 162540 July 13, 2009)
Q. When the victim says, the offender “suddenly grabbed my necklace
and I was shocked”, can the offender be liable for Simple
Robbery?
A. The offender cannot be liable for simple robbery. The elements of
robbery are: (1) there is taking of personal property; (2) the personal
property belongs to another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and
(4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of persons or
with force upon things. Clearly, for the requisite of violence to obtain
in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery
or there should be some kind of violence exerted to accomplish the
robbery. The crime is only Theft.
 Theft
1. There is taking of personal property;
2. Property taken belongs to another;
3. Taking was done with intent to gain;
4. Taking was done without the consent of the owner; and
5. Taking is accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons of force upon things.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same
to the local authorities or to its owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of
another, shall remove or make use of the fruits or objects of the damage
caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an enclosed estate or a field where trespass is
forbidden or which belongs to another and without the consent of its owner,
shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other forest or
farm products.
Ownership is immaterial in theft. The subject of the crime of theft is
any personal property belonging to another. Hence, as long as the
property taken does not belong to the accused who has a valid claim
thereover, it is immaterial whether said offender stole it from the
owner, a mere possessor, or even a thief of the property. (Miranda v.
People, G.R. No. 176298, January 25, 2012)

Unlawful taking is deemed complete from the moment the offender

gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to
dispose of the same.
Thus, the Court has been consistent in holding that "intent to gain or
animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful
taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Thus, actual
gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain."
In this case, it is clear from the established facts that it was Mejares
who opened the drawer in the masters' bedroom and took away the
cash and valuables it contained. (People v. Mejares, G.R. No. 2255735,
January 10, 2018)
We noted that the crime of theft implies an invasion of possession;
therefore, there can be no theft when the owner voluntarily parted
with the possession of the thing. The Court agreed with the
observation of the Solicitor General that a thief does not ask for
permission to steal. Indeed, a taking which is done with the consent or
acquiescence of the owner of the property is not felonious (Medina vs.
People, G.R. No. 182648, June 17, 2015)
The intent to steal is presumed from the taking of personal property
without the consent of the owner or its lawful possessor. As in all
presumptions, this may be rebutted by evidence showing that the
accused took the personal property under a bona fide belief that he
owns the property. xxx In all cases where one in good faith takes
another's property under claim of title in himself, he is exempt from
the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in
fact be. And the same is true where the taking is on behalf of another,
believed to be the true owner. Still, if the claim is dishonest, a mere
pretense, it will not protect the taker. xxxThe gist of the offense is the
intent to deprive another of his property in a chattel, either for gain
or out of wantonness or malice to deprive another of his right in the
thing taken. This cannot be where the taker honestly believes the
property is his own or that of another, and that he has a right to take
possession of it for himself or for another, for the protection of the
latter (Igdalino vs. People, G.R. No. 233033, July 23, 2018 )
Immateriality of carrying away of the thing taken

• In theft, it is not required for the thief to be able to carry away the
thing taken from the owner. The consummation of this crime takes
place upon the voluntary and malicious taking of the property which
is realized upon the material occupation of the taking, that is, when
he had full possession thereof even if he did not have the opportunity
to dispose of the same.
• Proof that the accused is in possession of a recently stolen property
gives rise to a valid presumption that he stole the property.
Ana is a bookkeeper of a bank. As such, Ana was authorized to collect
and/or accept loan payments from the bank’s clients, accomplish a cash
transfer slip at the end of each banking day, and remit such payments to
her supervisor. It was later on discovered, however, that Ana failed to
remit some loan payments made by the bank’s clients. It was later on
found out that she used the said loan payments for her own benefit.
When the bank discovered Ana’s dishonesty, it filed a case for Theft.
During the preliminary investigation of the case, Ana argued that she
could not be held liable for theft because technically, there was no
taking of personal property considering that it is one of her duties to
receive loan payments from the bank’s clients. After due hearing,
Prosecutor Elsa filed and Estafa case against Ana. Is the ruling of the
Prosecutor Elsa correct? Explain.
Answer:

No. The ruling of Prosecutor Elsa is incorrect. The crime committed is Theft. Records
show that Ana was merely a collector of loan payments from the Bank's clients. At the
end of every banking day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together
with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor. As such, the money merely
passes into her hands and she takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking
day. Hence, as an employee of the Bank, specifically, its temporary cash custodian whose
tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no juridical possession over the missing funds but
only their physical or material possession.

Thus, being a mere custodian of the missing funds and not, in any manner, an agent who
could have asserted a right against the Bank over the same, A had only acquired material
and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be charged for the
crime of Estafa. as charged. In fine, the dismissal of the Estafa charge against X should
come as a matter of course, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charge against her as may be warranted under the circumstances of this case.
(Cherry Ann M. Benabaye v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203466, February 25,
2015.)
 Qualified Theft
1. If theft is committed by a domestic servant;
2. If the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence;
3. If the property stolen is a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle;
4. If the property stolen consist of coconuts taken from the premises of
a plantation;
5. If the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; or
6. If property is taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon,
volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.
That [on] or about the period from January 1996 up to March 1997 in
the [M]unicipality of Obando, [P]rovince of Bulacan, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, being employed as accountant, cashier and teller of Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. (OFMPCI) and as such had
access to the books, cash vaults and bank deposits of the Cooperative
and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and without the
knowledge and consent of Obando Fisherman's Multi-Purpose
Cooperative, Inc., take, steal and carry away with her cash amounting
to Php6,016,084.26, to [the] damage and prejudice of the said Obando
Fisherman's Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc., in the said amount of
Php6,016,084.26.
Petitioner then insists that the proof adduced plausibly indicates commission
of estafa and not qualified theft. Petitioner argued that if the thing is not
taken away, but received and then appropriated or converted without the
consent of the owner, the crime committed is estafa.

Juridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right

over the thing transferred and this he may set up even against the owner. It
was established in the trial that petitioner never received the sum of money
in trust, or on commission or for administration. Correa outlined the
procedure followed by the cooperative in the deposit of its funds with the
cooperative's depository banks
Clearly, the above testimonies show that petitioner did not have
juridical possession of the sum of money. She did not have the right
over the sum of money she may have received in the course of her
functions as accountant, teller and cashier of the cooperative. The CA
was correct when it described the possession of the petitioner was akin
to that of a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to
the bank. Payment by third persons to the teller is payment to the bank
itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received,
and has no independent, autonomous right to retain the money or
goods received in consequence of the agency, as when the principal
fails to reimburse him for advances he has made, and indemnify him
for damages suffered without his fault (G.R. No. 176114, April 08, 2015
- GRACE SAN DIEGO Y TRINIDAD, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, Respondent.)
 Brigandage (A. 306)
There is brigandage when the following requisites are present:
• There be at least 4 armed malefactors;
• They formed a band of robbers; and
• The purpose is any of the following:
• To commit robbery in the highway;
• To kidnap persons for the purpose of
• extortion or to obtain ransom;
• To attain by means of force and
• violence any other purpose.

Essence of brigandage
Brigandage is a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not
only against specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all
prospective victims anywhere on the highway and whoever they may potentially
be.
 Persons exempt from criminal liability in crimes against
property
Crimes involved in this Article
• Theft;
• Swindling (estafa); and
• Malicious mischief
Exempted
1. Spouses, ascendants and descendants, or relatives by affinity in the same
line;
2. Widowed Spouse with respect to the property wc belonged to the
deceased spouse;
3. Brothers and sisters and brothers in law and sisters in law, if living
together
Crime Against Personal Liberty
KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION
SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION
UNLAWFUL ARREST
KIDNAPPING AND FAILURE TO RETURN A MINOR
INDUCING A MINOR TO ABANDON HIS HOME
SLAVERY
EXPLOITATION OF CHILD LABOR
SERVICES RENDERED UNDER COMPULSION IN PAYMENT OF DEBT
Crimes Against Security
ABANDONMENT OF PERSONS IN DANGER AND ABANDONMENT OF
ONE’S OWN VICTIM
ABANDONING A MINOR
EXPLOITATION OF MINORS
QUALIFIED TRESPASS TO DWELLING
OTHER FORMS OF TRESPASS
GRAVE/LIGHT THREATS/OTHER LIGHT THREATS
GRAVE/LIGHT COERCION/OTHER SIMILAR COERCION
 Art. 124 Art. 125 Art. 269 Art. 267

Arbitrary Detention Delay in the Delivery of Detained Unlawful Arrest Kidnapping and Serious Illegal
Persons to the Proper Judicial Detention
Authorities
• Public officer with authority • Offender is a public officer • Offender public • Private Individual
to detain officers (not vested
• Detention is for some legal with authority to • Detention is illegal
• Without legal ground ground arrest or detain) or • more than 3 days
a private person • simulating public authority
• No intention to bring the • Failed to deliver to the proper • Serious Physical Injuries are
victim to the authorities but judicial authorities within certain • Arrests a person made, threats to kill him
merely to detain him period without are made
reasonable ground • Minor, female or public
and purpose is to official
deliver to the
proper authorities

Note: No period of Special Complex Crime

Note: Detention is illegal from the Note: Illegality stands for expiration detention is fixed by
beginning of the periods. law but motive is • Kidnapping with Rape
controlling • Kidnapping with Homicide
 Art. 267
Art. 268
Slight Illegal Detention
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention

• Private Individual • Private Individual

• Kidnaps or detains another
• Detention is illegal • Illegal
• more than 3 days • Without the circumstances of A. 267
• simulating public authority
• Serious Physical Injuries are made, threats to kill
him are made
• Minor, female or public official

Special Complex Crime Mitigating:

Release within 3 days
• Kidnapping with Rape Without having attained purpose
• Kidnapping with Homicide Before criminal proceedings are instituted
Note:
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was for
the purpose of extorting ransom even if none of the circumstances
above are present
The taking is always without the consent of the victim. Kidnapping need not
be followed by detention as where the talking was only to briefly restrain
the victim. It is usually for ransom.

To “detain” is to deprive a person of his liberty or restrict his freedom of

locomotion or movement, and may not involve a kidnapping. This includes
the following situations:
a). Lock up or actual physical deprivation of the personal liberty by
confinement in an enclosure
b). immobilizing the victim though he has not been placed in an enclosure
c). by placing physical, moral or psychological restraint on his freedom of
locomotion or movement
The curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not involve any physical
restraint upon the victim’s persons. If the acts and actuations of the
accused produced such fear in the mind of the victim sufficient to
paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit
his own actions and movements in accordance with the wishes of the
accused, then the victim is detained against his will (Aslega vs. People,
Oct. 01, 2003)
• Regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or merely an
after thought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under A. 48 nor be treated as separate crimes, but shall
be punished as a special complex crime (P vs. Montanir, GR No.
187534)

• If the primary and ultimate purpose of the accused is to kill the

victim, the incidental deprivation of the victim’s liberty does not
constitute kidnapping but is merely preparatory to the act of killing
( People vs. Delim, GR No. 142773)
• Kidnapping with Rape----Taking of the victim was without lewd
designs
• Forcible Abduction with Rape—At the outset, there is already lewd
design
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention with Homicide

The person killed is the victim of the kidnapping or illegal detention. If

the person killed is a third person, it is article 48 which applies and the
crime is an ordinary complex crime.
Kidnapping/Serious Illegal Detention with Rape
The victim of rape is the victim of kidnapping and not a third person
Notably, however, no matter how many rapes had been committed in
the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape, the resultant crime
is only one kidnapping with rape. This is because these composite acts
are regarded as a single indivisible offense as in fact R.A. No. 7659
punishes these acts with only one single penalty. In a way, R.A. 7659
depreciated the seriousness of rape because no matter how many
times the victim was raped, there is only one crime committed—the
special complex crime of kidnapping with rape (People vs. Mirandilla,
Jr., 654 SCRA 761).
Where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely
an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide can no longer
be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate crimes, but
shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last paragraph
of Art. 267, as amended by RA No. 7659 (People v. Elizalde, G.R. No.
210434, December 5, 2016).
• Although the victim initially consented to go to a place with the
accused, but was thereafter prevented through force from leaving
the place, there is kidnapping and serious illegal detention (P vs.
Pickrell, GR No. 120409)

• Voluntary Release is only mitigating in Slight Illegal Detention

Question: Maria was kidnapped, ransom was demanded, and then
later she was killed. What crime was committed?
(Answer): Kidnapping for Ransom with Murder. ( PP. vs. Ramos: Oct. 12,
1998),

Question: Suppose Maria was also raped before being killed?

(Answer). It is still Kidnapping for ransom with Murder. The rape will be
considered as an aggravating circumstance
Q. Jaime, Andy and Jimmy, laborers in the noodles factory of Luke Tan,
agreed to kill him due to his arrogance and miserliness. One afternoon, they
seized him and loaded him in a taxi driven by Mario. They told Mario they
will only teach Luke a lesson in Christian humility. Mario drove them to a
fishpond in Navotas where Luke was entrusted to Emil and Louie, the
fishpond caretakers, asking them to hide Luke in their shack because he was
running from the NBI. The trio then left in Mario's car for Manila where they
called up Luke's family and threatened them to kill Luke unless they give a
ransom within 24 hours. Unknown to them, because of a leak, the
kidnapping was announced over the radio and TV. Emil and Louie heard the
broadcast and panicked, especially when the announcer stated that there is
a shoot-to-kill order for the kidnappers. Emil and Louie took Luke to the
seashore of Dagat-dagatan where they smashed his head with a shovel and
buried him in the sand. However, they were seen by a barangay kagawad
who arrested them and brought them to the police station. Upon
interrogation, they confessed and pointed to Jaime, Andy, Jimmy and Mario
as those responsible for the kidnapping. Later, the 4 were arrested and
charged. What crime or crimes did the 6 suspects commit?
• Jaime, Andy and Jimmy committed kidnapping with homicide. The original
intention was to demand ransom from the family with the threat of killing.
As a consequence of the kidnapping, however, Luke was killed. Thus, the
victim was deprived of his freedom and the subsequent killing, though
committed by another person, was a consequence of the detention. Hence,
this properly qualified the crime as the special complex crime of
kidnapping for ransom with homicide (People v. Mamarion, G.R. No.
137554, October 1, 2003; Art. 267, Revised Penal Code).

• Emil and Louie who smashed the head of the victim and buried the latter
in the sand committed murder qualified by treachery or abuse of superior
strength. They are not liable for kidnapping because they did not conspire,
nor are they aware of the intention to detain Luke whom they were
informed was hiding from the NBI (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code).

• Mario has no liability since he was not aware of the criminal intent and
design of Jaime, Andy and Jimmy. His act of bringing Luke to Navotas for "a
lesson in Christian humility" does not constitute a crime.
Alternative Answer
• Jaime, Andy and Jimmy committed kidnapping with ransom. After kidnapping
Luke, they demanded ransom with the threat of killing him. However, the killing
of Luke is separate from the kidnapping having been committed by other persons,
who had nothing to do with the kidnapping, and who will be liable for a different
crime (Penultimate par. of Art. 267, Revised Penal Code).
• Emil and Louie who smashed the head of the victim and buried the latter in the
sand committed murder qualified by treachery or abuse of superior strength.
They are not liable for kidnapping because they did not conspire, nor are they
aware of the intention to detain Luke whom they were informed was hiding from
the NBI (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code).
• Mario has no liability since he was not aware of the criminal intent and design of
Jaime, Andy and Jimmy. His act of bringing Luke to Navotas for "a lesson in
Christian humility" does not constitute a crime.
The rule now is where the person kidnapped is killed in the course of
detention, regardless of whether the killing was purposely sought or
was merely an afterthought, the kidnapping and murder or homicide
can no longer be complexed under Art. 48, nor be treated as separate
crimes, but shall be punished as a special complex crime under the last
par. of Art. 267, as amended by RA 7650 (People vs. Ramos, GR No.
118570, Oct. 12, 1998)
Brenda, a Filipino, is a transgender who underwent gender reassignment surgery and
had implants in the different parts of her body. She changed her name from Bogart
to Brenda and was a finalist in the recent Miss Gay International. After coming back
to the Philippines and while she was walking outside her home in Fairview Quezon
City, she was abducted by Patok and Potak who took her to a house in Quezon
Province. She was then placed in a room where Patok forced her to have sex with
him at knifes point. When it dawned upon Patok that Brenda is not actually a
female, he then called Potak to help him beat Brenda. Thereafter, Patok and Potak
beat Brenda using vegetables from the houses kitchen which includes but not limited
to giant opos and squash (kalabasa). The Beatings that Brenda received eventually
caused her death. What crime/s, if any were committed?

ANS: Patok and Potak by means of conspiracy are liable for the special complex
crime of kidnapping with homicide. Abducting Brenda is not forcible abduction
since the victim in this case is not actually a woman under the definition of the law.
Gender reassignment will not make Brenda a woman within the meaning of Art 342
of the Revised Penal Code.
 Can a parent be guilty of kidnapping?
• Article 270. Kidnapping and failure to return a minor. – The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall
be imposed upon any person who, being entrusted with the custody of a minor person, shall
deliberately fail to restore the latter to his parents or guardians.
• Article 271. Inducing a minor to abandon his home. – The penalty of prision correccional and a
fine not exceeding seven hundred pesos shall be imposed upon anyone who shall induce a
minor to abandon the home of his parent or guardians or the persons entrusted with his
custody.
• If the person committing any of the crimes covered by the two preceding articles shall be the
father or the mother of the minor, the penalty shall be arresto mayor or a fine not exceeding
three hundred pesos, or both.

• These provisions have been employed to prosecute a parent in a specific case where the
father and the mother were living separately and the custody of the child had been given to
one of them by the court.
• The parent who took the minor from the parent who had been granted custody by the court
will be charged with the crime of kidnapping and failure to return a minor under Article 270.
 Slavery (A. 272)

• Offender purchases, sells, kidnaps or detains a human being

• Purpose is to enslave

Qualified if the purpose of the offender is to assign the offended party

to some immoral traffic
 Exploitation of Child Labor (A. 273)

1. Offender retains a minor in his service

2. Against the will of the minor
3. Under the pretext of reimbursing himself of a debt incurred by an
ascendant, guardian or a person entrusted with the custody of such
minor
Services rendered under compulsion in payment of debts
(A. 274)

Any person who, in order to require or enforce the payment of debt,

shall compel the debtor to work for him, against his will, as household
servant or farm laborer.
Abandonment of Persons in Danger and
Abandonment of One’s Own Victim (A.275)
1. Failing to render assistance to any person whom the offender finds in an
uninhabited place wounded or in danger of dying when he can render such
assistance without detriment to himself, unless such omission shall
constitute a more serious offense.
Elements:
• The place is not inhabited;
• Accused found there a person wounded
• or in danger of dying;
• Accused can render assistance without
• detriment to himself; and
• Accused fails to render assistance.
2. Failing to help or render assistance to another whom the offender
has accidentally wounded or injured.
• NOTE: The character of the place is immaterial.
3. Failing to deliver a child under 7 years of age whom the offender has
found abandoned, to the authorities or to his family, or failing to take
him to a safe place.
• NOTE: It is immaterial that the offender did not know that the child is
under 7 years.
Abandoning a Minor (A. 276)
1. That the offender has the custody of a child.
2. Child is under 7 years of age
3. That he abandons such child
4. That he has no intent to kill the child when the latter is abandoned
A. 277 Abandonment of Minor By a Person
Entrusted with his Custody; Indifference of Parents
Punishable Acts
1. Delivering a minor to a public institution or other persons without
the consent of the one who entrusted such minor to the care of the
offender or, in the absence of that one, without the consent of the
proper authorities.
2. Neglecting his (offender’s) children by not giving them the
education which their station in life requires and financial condition
permits
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling (A. 280)
Elements
1.Offender is a private person;
2. He enters the dwelling of another; and
3. Such entrance is against the latter’s will.

• If the offender is a public officer or employee, the entrance into the

dwelling against the will of the occupant is violation of domicile
punishable under Art. 128.
Qualifying circumstance of the offense
• If the offense is committed by means of violence or intimidation, the
penalty is higher (prision correctional in medium and maximum
periods; fine not exceeding ₱200,000).
• If violence or intimidation is employed, there is no need for
prohibition. In fact, even if violence or intimidation took place
immediately after the offender has entered the dwelling, there is
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling. (U.S. v. Abanto, G.R. No. 5266,
February 16, 1910; U.S. v. Arceo, G.R. No. 1491, March 5, 1904)
Circumstances when the crime of trespass to dwelling is not committed
--
1. When the purpose of the entrance is to prevent serious harm to
himself, the occupant or third persons.
2. When the purpose of the offender in entering is to render some
service to humanity or justice.
3. Anyone who shall enter cafes, taverns, inns and other public houses
while they are open.
Q: At about 11:00 in the evening, Dante forced his way inside the house of
Mamerto. Dante pulled a knife and stabbed Jay on his abdomen. Mamerto
heard the commotion and went out of his room. Dante, who was about to
escape, assaulted Mamerto. Jay suffered injuries which, were it not for the
timely medical attendance, would have caused his death. Mamerto
sustained injuries that incapacitated him for 25 days. What crime/s did Dante
commit?

A: Dante committed qualified trespass to dwelling, frustrated homicide for

the stabbing of Jay, and less serious physical injuries for the assault on
Mamerto. The crime of qualified trespass to dwelling should not be
complexed with frustrated homicide because when the trespass is
committed as a means to commit a more serious crime, trespass to dwelling
is absorbed by the greater crime and the former constitutes an aggravating
circumstance of dwelling. (People v. Abedoza, 53 Phil 788)
Other Forms of Trespass to Dwelling (A. 281)
Elements
1. Offenders enter the closed premises or the fenced estate of another;
• NOTE: The term premises signifies distinct and definite locality. It may
mean a room, shop, building or definite area, but in either case, locality is
fixed.
2. Entrance is made while either of them is uninhabited;
• NOTE: A place is said to be uninhabited if there is no one living on such
place.
3. Prohibition to enter is manifest; and
4. Trespasser has not secured the permission of the owner or the caretaker
thereof.
 Simple Trespass to Dwelling and
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
Simple Trespass to Dwelling Qualified Trespass to Dwelling
(Art. 280, Par. 1) (Art. 280, Par. 2)
Offender enters the dwelling of Offender enters the dwelling of
another and the entrance is another against the latter’s will
against the latter’s will and the offense is committed by
means of violence or intimidation
 Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and
Other Forms of Trespass
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling Other Forms of Trespass
(Art. 280) (Art. 281)
(As to Offender)
Offender is a private person The offender is any person
(As to Enclosure Entered)
Offender enters a dwelling house Offender enters closed premises or
fenced estate
 Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and other
forms of Trespass, Distinguished
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling Other forms of Trespass
(Art. 280) (Art. 281)
(As to Nature of Place)
The place entered is inhabited The place entered is uninhabited
(As to Act Punished)
The act constituting the crime is It is the entering the closed
entering the dwelling against the premises or the fenced estate
will of the owner without securing the permission of
the owner or caretaker thereof
 Qualified Trespass to Dwelling and other
forms of Trespass, Distinguished
Qualified Trespass to Dwelling Other forms of Trespass
(Art. 280) (Art. 281)
(As to Prohibition to Enter)
The prohibition to enter is express The prohibition to enter must be
or implied manifest
Grave Threats (A. 282)
1. Threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor, or
property, or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime and
demanding money or imposing any other condition even though not
unlawful, and the offender attained his purpose;
2. By making such threat without the offender attaining his purpose;
and
3. By threatening another with the infliction upon his person, honor or
property or that of his family of any wrong amounting to a crime, the
threat, not being subject to a condition.
Qualifying circumstance of the offense

If the threat is made in writing or through a middleman, the penalty is

to be imposed in its maximum period.
Light Threats (A. 283)
1. Offender makes a threat to commit a wrong;
2. The wrong does not constitute a crime;
3. There is a demand for money or that other condition is imposed,
even though lawful; and
4. Offender has attained or has not attained his purpose.
Other Light Threats (A. 285)
Punishable acts
1. Threatening another with a weapon, or by drawing such weapon in
a quarrel, unless it be in lawful self-defense. (Here, the weapon must
not be discharged; )
2. Orally threatening another, in the heat of anger, with some harm
constituting a crime, without persisting in the idea involved in his
threat; and
3. Orally threatening to do another any harm not constituting a felony.
NOTE: In other light threats, there is no demand for money nor any
condition imposed when the offender threatens the offended party. His
acts are limited to verbal threat during the incident involving him and
the offended party.
 Grave Threats and Light Threats
Grave Threats Light Threats
(Art. 282) (Art. 283)
(As to Act Threatened to be Comitted)
Act threatened amount to a crime Act threatened does not amount
to a crime
(As to Act Threatened to be Comitted)
The demand for money or The demand for money or
imposition of any other condition imposition of any condition is an
is not an essential element essential element, whether the
condition is attained or not
Floki learned that one of his guests from an earlier drinking spree was mauled. At
that time, Bjorn was also drinking at the same store were the mauling occurred.
When Floki inquired from several people what happened, Bjorn butted in and
replied, “Bakit, kasama ka ba roon?” Floki replied and had a heated argument with
Bjorn. Amidst their altercation, Bjorn drew a gun from his waist and poked it at
Floki’s forehead, while saying “Ito, gusto mo?” Eventually, Floki filed a case for
Grave Threats against Bjorn. On trial before the Kattegat court, the defense argued
that at most, Floki only committed the crime of Other light threats because the gun
was drawn in a quarrel. If you are the Judge, how will you resolve the case?
Explain.
Answer:

I will convict Floki for the crime of grave threats.

In grave threats, the wrong threatened amounts to a crime which may or may not be accompanied by
a condition. In light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime but is always
accompanied by a condition. In other light threats, the wrong threatened does not amount to a crime
and there is no condition.

Article 285, par. 1 (other light threats) is inapplicable although it specifically states, “shall threaten
another with a weapon or draw such weapon in a quarrel,” since it presupposes that the threat to
commit a wrong will not constitute a crime. That the threat to commit a wrong will constitute or not
constitute a crime is the distinguishing factor between grave threats on one hand, and light and other
light threats on the other. (Ronnie Caluag v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 171511, March 4,
2009)

In this case, the offense committed falls under Article 282, par. 2 (grave threats) since: (1) killing or
shooting someone amounts to a crime, and (2) the threat to kill was not subject to a condition. The
poking of a gun clearly enounces a threat to kill or to inflict serious physical injury on the person of
A. Hence, A could be convicted of Grave Threats contrary to the contention of the defense.
Grave Coercion (A. 286)
1. Preventing another, by means of violence, threat or intimidation,
from doing something not prohibited by law; and
2. Compelling another, by means of violence, threat or intimidation, to
do something against his will, whether it be right or wrong.

NOTE: Coercion is consummated even if the offended party did not

accede to the purpose of the coercion. The essence of coercion is an
attack on individual liberty.
NOTE: Coercion is consummated even if the offended party did not
accede to the purpose of the coercion. The essence of coercion is an
attack on individual liberty.

No grave coercion when a person prohibits another to do an act

because the act done is a crime, and violence and intimidation is
employed
Light Coercion (A. 287)
1. Offender must be a creditor;
2. He seizes anything belonging to his debtor;
3. Seizure of the thing be accomplished by means of violence or a
display of material force producing intimidation; and
4. Purpose of the offender is to apply the same to the payment of the
debt.
 Grave Coercion and Unjust Vexation

Grave Coercion Unjust Vexation

There is violence or intimidation There is no violence or
intimidation
 Grave Coercion and Illegal Detention

Grave Coercion Illegal Detention

Intent to deprive the offended Intent to deprive is present
party of his liberty is not clear (i.e.
may freely leave the house but is
compelled to return)
 Grave Coercion and
Maltreatment of Prisoners
Grave Coercion Maltreatment of Prisoners
(Art. 286) (Art. 235)
Intent to deprive the offended If the offended party is a prisoner,
party of his liberty is not clear (i.e. extracting information using force
may freely leave the house but is or intimidation is maltreatment
compelled to return)
CRIMES AGAINTS
CHASTITY
What are crimes against chastity?
1. Adultery ( ÀRT. 333)
2. Concubinage (Art. 334)
3. Acts of Lasciviousness (ART. 336)
4. Qualified Seduction (ART. 337)
5. Simple Seduction (ART. 338)
6. Acts of lasciviousness with the consent of the offended
party (ART. 339)
7. Corruption of minors (ART. 340)
8. White slave trade (ART. 341)
9. Forcible Abduction (ART. 342)
10. Consented Abduction (ART. 343)
What are crimes against chastity which CANNOT be
prosecuted de officio?
1. Concubinage (Art. 334)
2. Adultery (ART. 333)
3. Seduction whether qualified or simple (ART. 337, 338)
4. Abduction which may be forcible or consented (ART. 342,
343)
5. Acts of Lasciviousness with or without consent (ART. 336,
339)

*These crimes are considered private crimes and they cannot be

prosecuted except upon the complaint initiated by the offended
party.
 ADULTERY
Who are the persons liable?

1. The married woman who engages in sexual intercourse with a man

not her husband

2. The man who, knowing of the marriage of the woman, has sexual
intercourse with her.
 What are the elements of Adultery?

1. That the woman is married

2. That she has sexual intercourse with a man NOT her husband
3. That as regards the man with whom she has sexual intercourse, he
must know her to be married
ADULTERY
(People vs. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047, May 16, 1951)

Each occasion of sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery

(People vs. Zapata, G.R. No. L-3047, May 16, 1951)
ADULTERY
Why is the filing of a subsequent complaint for adultery
while the first complaint is pending do not violate the
constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy?

➢The crime of adultery is an instantaneous crime which

is consummated and completed at the moment of the
carnal union.
➢Each sexual intercourse constitutes a crime of adultery
ADULTERY
What is the effect of abandonment of the offended
spouse?

If the person guilty of adultery committed the offense

while being abandoned without justification by the
offended spouse, the penalty next lower in degree shall
be imposed (ART. 333, last par)
ADULTERY
Effect of death
PARAMOUR OFFENDED PARTY
➢ The death of the paramour ➢ The death of the
will not bar prosecution offended party will
against the unfaithful wife,
not terminate the
because the requirement
that both offenders be proceedings
included in the complaint is
absolute only when the
offenders are alive (ART.
344, par 2)
ADULTERY
(US vs. Mata, G.R. No. L-6300, March 2, 1911)

The gist of the crime of adultery is the danger of introducing spurious

heirs into the family, whereby the rights of the real heirs may be
impaired and a man may be charged with the maintenance of a family
not his own.
ADULTERY
Effect of divorce obtained prior to the
commencement of the case
(Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30,
1989)

The person who initiates the adultery case must be an

offended spouse, and by this, it is meant that he is still
married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the
complaint. Thus, where the offended party (a foreigner) in an
adultery case already obtained a divorce in his country before
the adultery proceedings are commenced, he no longer has
the right to institute proceedings against the offenders.
ADULTERY
Effect of intercourse subsequent to adulterous
conduct

The act of having intercourse with the offending spouse subsequent to

adulterous conduct, is at best, an implied pardon of said adulterous
conduct. But it does not follow that, in order to operate as such, an
express pardon must also be accompanied by intercourse between the
spouses thereafter. Where the pardon given is express – not merely
implied- the act of pardon by itself operates as such whether sexual
intercourse accompanies the same or not.
ADULTERY
Effect of a prior agreement to separate
People vs. Guinucud, et. al. GR. No. L-38672, October
27, 1933

While the agreement is void in law, it is nevertheless,

competent evidence to explain the husband’s inaction
after he knew of his wife’s living with her co-accused,
He may be considered as having consented to the
infidelity of his wife, which bars him from instituting
criminal complaint.
ADULTERY
Adultery is not a continuous crime

Fernandez vs. Lantin, G.R. No. 44759, December 17, 1976

Adultery is not a continuous crime. Adultery is consummated upon

each sexual intercourse.
ADULTERY

Mitigating Circumstance

The criminal liability is mitigated when adultery is

committed while being abandoned by her husband
without justification (ART. 333 par. 3)
ADULTERY

IMPORTANT NOTE:

There is NO crime of frustrated

adultery
ADULTERY
What is the effect of acquittal of one of the
defendants?

It will NOT automatically acquit the other.

➢There may be a joint criminal intent, although there is a joint physical

act
➢One of the parities may be insane and the other is sane
➢The man may not know that the woman is married.
ADULTERY
What are the requirements for pardon?

1. Pardon must come BEFORE the institution of the criminal

prosecution.
2. BOTH offenders must be pardoned.
ADULTERY

Condonation
Bugayong vs. Ginez, G.R. No. L-10033, December 28, 1956)

Condonation is implied from sexual intercourse after knowledge of the other

infidelity. Such acts necessarily implied forgiveness. It is entirely consonant
with reason and justice that if the wife freely consents to sexual intercourse
after she has full knowledge of the husband’s guilt, her consent should
operate as a pardon of his wrong.
ADULTERY
What is the effect of consent?

When there is consent, whether implied or expressed, the husband

CANNOT institute a criminal complaint for adultery.
ADULTERY
People vs. Schneckenburger, G.R. No. L-48183,
November 10, 1941)
Consent applies to future acts while pardon refers to past acts.

Arroyo vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 96602, November

19, 1991
For either consent or pardon to benefit the accused, it must be given
PRIOR to the filing of a criminal complaint.
ADULTERY
Under the law, there can be NO accomplice in the crime of adultery,
although in fact there can be such an accomplice.
ADULTERY
What is recrimination?

People vs. Florez, C.A.G.R.No. 26089-CR, April 6, 1964

Husband’s illicit relationship does NOT absolve but may mitigate wife’s
liability for adultery.
ADULTERY
ADULTERY PROSTITUTION
As to the nature of the crime
Crime against chastity Crime against public morals
As to persons liable
Married woman Woman, whether married or
not
As to manner of commission
Having sexual intercourse with Habitual indulgence in sexual
a man NOT her husband intercourse or lascivious
conduct for money or profit
CONCUBINAGE
Who are the person’s liable?

1. The married man

2. The woman who knew that the man was married.
CONCUBINAGE
ELEMENTS
1. That the man must be married
2. That he committed any of the following acts:
a. Keeping a mistress in the conjugal dwelling
b. Having sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances
with a woman who is not his wife; or
c. Cohabiting with her in any other place; and
3. That as regards the woman, she must know him to be married
CONCUBINAGE

NOTE:
A married man who has sexual relations with a woman not his wife will
NOT make him liable for concubinage unless he does any of the acts
aforementioned.
CONCUBINAGE
Mistress
To be considered a mistress, she must be taken and
sheltered in a conjugal dwelling as a concubine.

Conjugal Dwelling
It is the home of the husband and wife, even if the wife
happens to be temporarily absent on any account.
CONCUBINAGE
Scandal

It consists of any reprehensible word or deed that offends public

conscience, redounds to the detriment of the feelings of honest
persons, and gives occasion to the neighbor’s spiritual damage or ruin.
CONCUBINAGE
Cohabit

People vs. Pitoc, G.R. No. 18513, September 18, 1922

It means to dwell together, in the manner of husband and wife, for

some of time, as distinguished from occasional transient interviews for
unlawful intercourse.
CONCUBINAGE
Beltran vs. People

The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of a husband’s

marriage is NOT a prejudicial question to a concubinage case.
CONCUBINAGE
NOTE:

Adultery is more severely punished than concubinage because adultery

makes possible the introduction of another man’s blood into the family
so that the offended husband may have another man’s son bearing his
(husband’s) name and receiving support from him.
CONCUBINAGE
Scandalous circumstances

Scandal produced by the concubinage of a married man occurs not only

when
1. He and his mistress live in the same room of a house, but also when
2. They appear together in public
3. Perform acts in sight of the community which gives rise to criticism
and general protest among the neighbors. (ART. 334)
CONCUBINAGE
Who can initiate the action for adultery or concubinage?

Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera, G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989

The law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and

concubinage the person who can legally file the complaint should be
the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is
made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by
the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ELEMENTS
1. That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or
lewdness
2. That the act of lasciviousness is committed against a person
of either sex; and
3. That it is done under any of the following circumstances:
a. by using force or intimidation
b. when the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious
c. by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; or
d. when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is
demented.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Lewd

Lutap vs. People, G.R. No. 204601, February 5, 2018

It is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, lecherous, signifying that

form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which
is carried on a wanton manner.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Quimvel v. People
force and intimidation
however, the Court clarified that "force and intimidation" is subsumed under
"coercion and influence,“ and that "x x x lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the
offended party's free will. x x x

influence
The term 'influence' means the 'improper use of power or trust in any way
that deprives a person of free will and substitutes another's

coercion
objective.' Meanwhile, 'coercion' is the 'improper use of x x x power to
compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
What constitutes lewd or lascivious conduct?

It must be determined from the circumstances of each case. The

presence or absence of the lewd designs is inferred from the nature of
the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
ATTEMPTED RAPE ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
Manner of commission is the SAME
The performance of lascivious character is common to both
As to intent
When the acts performed by the There is no intent to have sexual
offender clearly indicate that his intercourse and purpose is only to
purpose was to lie with the offended commit acts of lewdness
woman.
As to the nature of Lascivious Acts
The lascivious acts are but the The lascivious acts are the final
preparatory acts to the commission objective sought by the offender.
of rape.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
"Lascivious conduct" is defined under Article XIII, Section
32 of the Implementing Rules and Regulation of R.A. 7610,
as follows:

The intentional touching, either directly or through

clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of
the genitals or pubic area of a person.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
People vs. Collado, G.R. No. 135667-70, March 1, 2011

Thus, when the touching of the vagina by the penis is coupled with the
intent to penetrate, attempted rape is committed. Otherwise, it is
merely acts of lasciviousness.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

There can be NO attempted and frustrated

acts of lasciviousness
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
People vs. Tabarangao, G.R. No. 116535-36, February 25, 1999

The crime of consummated rape necessarily absorbs acts of

lasciviousness, the essence of which is the commission of acts of
lewdness without any intention to lie with the woman.
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
People vs. Rellota, G.R. No. 168103, August 3, 2010

In cases of acts of lasciviousness, it is not necessary that intimidation

be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to
intimidation annuls or subdues
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Seduction

It means enticing a woman to unlawful sexual intercourse by promise

of marriage or other means of persuasion without use of force
 OLD LAW NEW LAW

Article 337. Qualified seduction. – Article 337. Qualified seduction. –

The seduction of a virgin over twelve The seduction of a minor, sixteen and
years and under eighteen years of age, over but under eighteen years of age,
committed by any person in public committed by any person in public
authority, priest, home-servant, authority, priest, home-servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any domestic, guardian, teacher, or any
person who, in any capacity, shall be person who, in any capacity, shall be
entrusted with the education or custody entrusted with the education or custody
of the woman seduced, shall be of the minor seduced, shall be punished
punished by prision correccional in its by prision correccional in its minimum
minimum and medium periods. and medium periods.
The penalty next higher in degree shall "The penalty next higher in degree shall
be imposed upon any person who shall be imposed upon any person who shall
seduce his sister or descendant, seduce his sister or descendant,
whether or not she be a virgin or over whether or not she be a virgin or over
eighteen years of age. eighteen years of age.

Under the provisions of this Chapter, "Under the provisions of this Chapter,
seduction is committed when the seduction is committed when the
offender has carnal knowledge of any offender have carnal knowledge of any
of the persons and under the of the persons and under the
circumstances described herein. circumstances described therein."
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
TWO CLASSES:

1. Seduction of a virgin OVER twelve (12) years and under eighteen (18)
years of age by persons who abuse their authority or the confidence
reposed in them.
2. Seduction of a sister by her brother or descendants by her
ascendant, REGARDLESS of her age and reputation
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION

Elements
1. That the offended party is a virgin
2. She must be OVER twelve (12) and under eighteen (18) years of age
3. That the offender had sexual intercourse with her; and
4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence or relationship on the
part of the offender.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
What are the acts that constitute qualified seduction?

1. Seduction of a virgin over 12 years and under 18 year of age by

certain persons, such as, a person in authority, priest, teacher, etc.
and
2. Seduction of a sister by her brother, or descendant by her
ascendant regardless of her age or reputation
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Virgin

People vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-25176. February 27, 1968

It refers to a woman of chaste character or a woman of good

reputation. Virginity in this sense does not mean physical virginity.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Babanto vs. Zosa, G.R. No. L-32895, February 28, 1983

Virginity is presumed if the girl is over 12 and under 18 years of age, is

unmarried and of good reputation.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
NOTE:

If there is no sexual intercourse and only acts of lewdness are

performed, the crime is acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339.

Virginity of the sister or descendant is not required and she may be

over 18 years of age. Relationship must be by consanguinity. The
relationship need not be legitimate.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Who are the persons who could be offenders in qualified
seduction?
1. Those who abused their authority:
a. Persons in public authority
b. Guardian
c. Teacher; and
d. Person who, in any capacity, is entrusted with the education or custody of the woman
seduced.
2. Those who abused confidence reposed in them:
a. Priest
b. House servant; and
c. Domestic helper
3. Those who abused their relationship:
a. brother who seduced his sister
b. ascendant who seduced his descendant
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION

NOTE:
The fact that the girl gave her consent to the sexual intercourse is no
defense. In the same way, lack of consent of the girl is not an element
of the offense.
QUALIFIED SEDUCTION
Rape Qualified Seduction
As to elements
1. That the offender has had carnal 1. That the offended party is a virgin, which is
knowledge of a woman; presumed if she Is unmarried and of good
2. That such act is accomplished: reputation;
(a)by using force or intimidation 2. That she must be over twelve (12) and
(b)when the woman is deprived of reason under eighteen (18) years of age
or otherwise unconscious, or 3. That the offender has sexual intercourse
(c)when the woman is under twelve with her
(12) years of age 4. That there is abuse of authority, confidence
or relationship on the part of the offender

As to age of offended party

The age can be less than 12 which is always The girl must be more than 12 but less than 18
rape, if 12 but less than 18, there should be and the crime is by means of cajolery
force or intimidation
As to materiality of virginity
Virginity is not material Virginity is an element
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
ART. 338
 OLD LAW NEW LAW

Article 338. Simple seduction. – Article 338. Simple seduction. –

The seduction of a woman who is The seduction of a minor, sixteen

single or a widow of good and over but under eighteen
reputation, over twelve but years of age, committed by
under eighteen years of age, means of deceit, shall be
committed by means of deceit, punished by arresto mayor."
shall be punished by arresto
mayor.
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
Elements:
1. That the offended party is over 12 and under 18
years if age
2. That she must be of good reputation, single or
widow
3. That the offender has sexual intercourse with her
4. That it is committed by means of deceit.
SIMPLE SEDUCTION

People vs. Iman, G.R. No. 42660, September 12, 1935

Deceit generally takes the form of unfulfilled promise of marriage.

SIMPLE SEDUCTION

People vs. Yap, G.R. No. L-25176, February 27, 1968

It is not required in simple seduction that the victim be a virgin, as all

that is necessary is that she is of good reputation
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
Barba vs. People, G.R. No. L-32267-70, March 26, 1979

Deceit must be alleged in the information for it to be appreciated by

the courts.
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
The gist of qualified seduction is the abuse of authority, confidence, or
relationship as the means of committing the crime.

In simple seduction, it is the use of deceit. But in both kinds of

seduction, there must be sexual intercourse.
 Qualified Seduction and Simple Seduction
Qualified Seduction Simple Seduction
(Art. 337) (Art. 338)
(As to Virginity)
Virginity is an essential element of Virginity is not an essential
the crime element of the crime, but it is
enough that the woman is single
or a widow of good reputation and
has a chaste life
 Qualified Seduction and Simple Seduction
Qualified Seduction Simple Seduction
(Art. 337) (Art. 338)
(As to Deceit)
Deceit is not an essential element Deceit is an essential element of
of the crime the crime
 Qualified Seduction and Simple Seduction
Qualified Seduction Simple Seduction
(Art. 337) (Art. 338)
(As to Commission of the Crime)
Qualified seduction can be Simple seduction can be
committed only with abuse of committed even without abuse of
authority, abuse of confidence, or authority, abuse of confidence, or
abuse of relationship abuse of relationship
 Qualified Seduction and Simple Seduction
Qualified Seduction Simple Seduction
(Art. 337) (Art. 338)
(As to Offender)
This can be committed by specific This may be committed by any
offenders such as a person in public person so long as there is deceit
authority, priest, house servant,
domestic, guardian, teacher, or any
person entrusted with the education or
keeping of the offended woman
seduced, a brother seducing his sister, or
ascendant seducing a descendant
 Qualified Seduction Simple Seduction
As to virginity Virginity is an essential element Virginity is NOT an essential
of the crime. element of the crime, but it is
enough that the woman is single
or a widow of a good reputation
and has a chaste life.

As to deceit Deceit is not an essential Deceit is an essential element of

element of the crime. the crime
As to commission of the crime Qualified seduction can be Simple seduction can be
committed only with abuse of committed EVEN WITHOUT
authority, abuse of confidence, abuse of authority, abuse of
or abuse of relationship confidence or abuse of
relationship

As to offender This can be committed by This may be committed by any

specific offenders such as a person so long as there is deceit.
person in public authority, priest,
house servant, domestic,
guardian, teacher, or any person
entrusted with the education or
keeping of the offended woman
seduced, a brother seducing his
sister, or ascendant seducing a
descendant
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS WITH THE CONSENT
OF THE OFFENDED PARTY
Elements:
1. That the offender commits acts of lasciviousness or
lewdness.
2. That the acts are committed upon a woman who is a virgin
or single or a widow of good reputation. Under eighteen (18)
years of age but over twelve (12) years, or a sister or
descendant regardless of her reputation or age
3. That the offender accomplishes the acts by:
-abuse of authority,
-confidence,
-relationship or
-deceit.
 ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
WITH CONSENT OF THE
OFFENDED PARTY
As to the offended party
Male or female Only female
As to how committed
The acts are committed under The acts of lasciviousness are
circumstances which, had there committed under the
been carnal knowledge, would circumstances which, had there
amount to rape been carnal knowledge, would
amount to either qualified
seduction or simple seduction
SIMPLE SEDUCTION
There is an oversight in the law where the victim is exactly twelve (12)
years of age. If the victim is below 12, the crime will be rape, or
unconsented acts of lasciviousness or forcible abduction. Hence, Art.
339 stating “over 12 years of age” should be construed as twelve years
of age and over, thus construing the doubt in favor of the accused.
CORRUPTION OF MINORS (as amended by BP
BLG. 92)

Who are the persons liable under ART. 340, as amended by B.P. No.
92?

Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution or

corruption of persons underage to satisfy the lust of another.
CORRUPTION OF MINORS (as amended by BP
BLG. 92)
NOTE:
Persons under age means under 18 years of age

The victim must be of good reputation and not a prostitute or

corrupted person

It is not necessary that the unchaste acts shall have been done since
what is being punished is mere act of promotion or facilitation
CORRUPTION OF MINORS (as amended by BP
BLG. 92)

What are the punishable acts under Article 341 as amended by B.P.
No. 186?

1. Engaging in the business of prostitution

2. Profiting by prostitution; and
3. Enlisting the service of any other for the purpose of prostitution
ABDUCTION
What is abduction?

People vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. 19034, February 17, 1923

It is the taking away of a woman from her house of the place where she
may be for the purpose of carrying her to another place with intent to
marry or to corrupt her.
ABDUCTION
ELEMENTS:

1. That the person abducted is a woman regardless of her age, civil

status, or reputation
2. That the abduction is against her will;
3. That the abduction as with lewd designs (People vs. Villanueva, G.R.
No. 230723, February 13, 2019
ABDUCTION
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION GRAVECOERCION/
(ART. 342) KIDNAPPING
As to existence of lewd design
With lewd design No lewd design
As to deprivation of liberty
There is no deprivation of Generally committed habitually
liberty
ABDUCTION
NOTE:

Conviction of acts of lasciviousness is not a bar to

conviction of forcible abduction

People vs. Egan, G.R. No. 139338, May 28, 2002

Attempted rape is absorbed by forcible abduction as
the former constitutes the element of lewd design
ABDUCTION
People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. L-44205, February 16, 1993

Forcible abduction is a continuing crime. As such, the criminal action

may be instituted in the proper court of any province in which the
offense is continued
ABDUCTION
US vs. Ramirez, G.R. No. 13997, March 8, 1919

Sexual intercourse is not necessary in forcible abduction. The intent to

seduce the girl is sufficient.

People vs. Torres, G.R. No. L-43406, January 30, 1936

The virginity of the offended woman is not an essential element of the

crime of forcible abduction.
ABDUCTION
People vs. Espiritu, G.R. No. 128870, October 27, 1999

When the accused forcibly took away the victim, for the purpose of
raping her, as in fact he did rape her, lewd and unchaste designs existed
since the commencement of the crime. As a result, the accused
committed the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
1. The abductor has Carnal knowledge of the abducted woman.
2. By using force or intimidation
3. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious
or when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented.
(People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017)
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
People vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 141125, February 28, 2002

There can only be one complex crime of forcible abduction with rape.
Thus, the subsequent acts of rape can no longer be considered as
separate complex crimes of forcible abduction with rape.
FORCIBLE ABDUCTION
People vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017

There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the

primary objective of the accused is to commit rape.
CONSENTED ABDUCTION
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offended party must be a virgin

2. That she must be over 12 and under 18 years of age
3. That the taking away of the offended party must be with her
consent, after solicitation or cajolery from the offender.
4. That the taking away of the offended party must be with lewd
designs.
CONSENTED ABDUCTION
Valdepenas vs. People, G.R. No. L-20687, April 30, 1996

Virginity is an essential element. The virginity mentioned, as an

essential ingredient in the crime of abduction with consent, should not
be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of
abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation, because the
essence of the offense is not the wrong done to the woman, but the
outrage to the family and the alarm produce in it by the disappearance
of one of its members.
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY WHERE AGE AND
REPUTATION OF THE VICTIM ARE IMMATERIAL

1. Acts of lasciviousness against the will of the

offended party or against a sister or descendant.
2. Qualified seduction of sister or descendant and;
3. Forcible abduction
CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY WHERE AGE AND REPUTATION OF
THE VICTIM ARE IMMATERIAL
People vs. Amante, G.R. No. L-25604, December 6, 1929

When a 15-year old girl was induced by the accused to leave her home
and later was forcibly violated by him, the accused is guilty of the
complex crime of consented abduction with rape.
PROSECUTION OF THE CRIMES OF ADULTERY,
CONCUBINAGE, SEDUCTION, ABDUCTION, RAPE AND
ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS
HOW PROSECUTED:

1. Adultery and concubinage must be prosecuted upon the

complaint signed by the offended spouse (and in the
absence of an express or implied pardon)
2. Seduction, abduction and acts of lasciviousness must be
prosecuted upon the complaint signed by (and in the
absence of an express pardon) the offended party –
a. Even if a minor; or
b. If of legal age and not incapacitated, only she can file complaint
If a minor or incapacitated and refuses to file either of
the next succeeding persons may file:
1. Either of the parents
2. Either of the grandparents whether paternal or
maternal side
3. Legal or judicial guardians
4. The State, as parens patriae when the offended
party dies or becomes incapacitated before she
could file the complaint and she has no known
parents, grandparents or guardians
NOTE:
Rape is now a crime against persons, which may be
prosecuted de oficio (R.A. No. 8353, Sec. 2)

People vs. Yu, G.R. No. L-13780. January 28, 1961

In case of complex crimes, where one of the

component offenses is a public crime the criminal
prosecution may be instituted by the public prosecutor
RATIONALE:
People vs. Yu, G.R. No. L-13780, January 28, 1961

Since one of the component offenses is a public crime, the latter should
prevail because public interest is always paramount to private interest.
In adultery and concubinage, the offended party must
institute the criminal prosecution against both the
guilty parties, if both of them are alive (RPC, Art. 344,
par. 2)

The right to file the action granted to the parents,

grandparent or guardian shall be exclusive of all other
persons and shall be exercised successively in the order
provided by law.
PARDON IN CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY
People vs. Infante, G.R. No. L-36270, August 31, 1932

Pardon in adultery and concubinage must come BEFORE the institution

of the criminal action and both offenders must be pardoned by the
offended party if said pardon is to be effective.
People vs. Miranda, G.R. No. 38171, October 6, 1932

Pardon in seduction must also come before the institution of the

criminal action.
NOTE:

Since condonation is forgiveness based upon the belief that the guilty
party has repented, any subsequent act of the offender showing that
there was no repentance will not bar the prosecution of the offense
People vs. Makilang, G.R. No. 139329, October 23, 2001

Pardon by the offended party who is a minor must have the

concurrence of both parents.
EXCEPT: when the offended party has no parents or the
offender is her own father and mother is dead.
Marriage of the offender with the offended part in seduction,
abduction and acts of lasciviousness extinguishes criminal action or
remits the penalty already imposed, and it benefits the co-principals,
accomplices and accessories.

In rape, it extends only as to the principal.

CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL STATUS
OF PERSONS
PUNISHABLE ACTS:

1. Simulation of births
2. Substitution of one child for another; and
3. Concealing or abandoning any legitimate child with intent to cause
such child to lose its civil status.

*object of the crime under ART. 347 is the creation of false, or the
causing of the loss of, civil status.
SIMULATION OF BIRTHS
When the woman pretends to be pregnant when in fact she is not, and
on the day of the supposed delivery, takes the child of another as her
own.

The operative act in the simulation is the registration of the child in the
registry of births as the pretending parent’s own. The simulation is a
crime is which alters the civil status of person.

The woman who stimulates birth and the one who furnishes the child
are both liable as principals.
The unlawful sale of the child by his father was held to be not
punishable under the RPC (U.S. vs. Capillo, G.R. No. 9279, March 25,
1915) Now, it is punishable under P.D. No. 603, under ART. 59(3).
Furthermore, if the accused shall engage in trading and dealing with
children, including the act of buying and selling of children, this type of
child trafficking is punished with reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua (R.A. No. 7610, Section 7)
CONCEALING OR ABANDONING A LEGITIMATE
CHILD
ELEMENTS:

1. The child must be legitimate

2. The offender conceals or abandons such child.
3. The offender has the intent to cause such child to lose its civil
status.
U.S. vs. Capillo, G.R. No. 9279, March 25, 1915

The child must be legitimate and a fully developed and living being.
Abandon

It means to leave a child in a public place where other people may find
the child.
ABANDONING A MINOR SIMULATION OF BIRTHS,
(ART. 276) SUBSTITUTION OF ONE CHILD
FOR ANOTHER, AND
CONCEALMENT OF A
LEGITIMATE CHOLD (ART.
347)
As to classification
Crime against security Crime against the civil status
of a person
As to offender
The one who has custody of Any person
the child
As to purpose of the offender
To avoid the obligation of To cause the child to lose its
rearing and caring for the civil status
child
USURPATION OF CIVIL STATUS
Usurping the civil status of another is committed by assuming the
filiation of the parental or conjugal rights of another, with intent to
enjoy the rights arising from the civil status of the latter
NOTE: the crime is qualified if the purpose is to defraud
the offended party or his heirs

The term “civil status” includes one’s public station, or

the rights, duties, capacities and incapacities which
determine a person to a given class. It seems that the
term “civil status” includes one’s profession.
Intent to enjoy rights

It is absolutely necessary in order to constitute this crime that the

intent of the offender is to enjoy the rights arising from the civil status
of the person impersonated. Otherwise, the case will only be a
violation of ART. 178 for using a fictitious name, or as estafa under ART.
315
BIGAMY
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender is legally married

2. That the marriage has not been dissolved or, in
case the spouse is absent, the absent spouse could
not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1, 2000

The first marriage must be valid. If it is void or voidable, bigamy

may still be committed if there is no judicial declaration of
nullity or annulment of the first marriage. Although marriages
that are void ab initio do not create any marital vinculum,
Article 40 of the Family Code now requires that there must first
be a judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage before
contracting a second marriage. A marriage is presumed valid
until declared as void ab initio.
Mercado vs. Tan, G.R. No. 137110, August 1,
2000

A petition for declaration of nullity of the first

marriage is not a prejudicial civil question that
will operate to suspend the criminal action for
bigamy.
Abunado vs. People

Under the law, a marriage, even one which is void or voidable,

shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Even if petitioner eventually obtained a declaration
that his first marriage was void ab initio, the point is, both the
first and the second marriage were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled.
Manuel vs. People, G. R. No. 165842, November 29,
2005

It is essential in the prosecution for bigamy that the

alleged second marriage, having all the essential
requirements, would be valid were it not for the
subsistence of the first marriage. It does not matter
whether the first marriage is void or voidable because
such marriages have juridical effects until lawfully
dissolved by a court of competent jurisdiction.
Capili vs. People, G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2015

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the

first marriage is immaterial if the crime of bigamy has
been consummated prior to said declaration

Bigamy is a public crime, thus, its prosecution may be

initiated by anyone
Pulido vs. People (GR No. 220149, July 27 2021)

In criminal prosecutions for bigamy, the accused can now validly interpose the
defense of a void ab initio marriage even without obtaining a judicial decree of
absolute nullity; a judicial decree of absolute nullity of a first marriage in a
separate proceeding, irrespective of when it was secured, is a valid defense in a
criminal prosecution for bigamy.
Santiago vs. People
Only if the second spouse had knowledge of the previous
undissolved marriage of the accused could she be included in
the information as a co-accused.

A person convicted of bigamy may still be prosecuted for

concubinage

The death of the first spouse during the pendency of the bigamy
case does not extinguish the crime, because when the accused
married the second spouse, the first marriage was still subsisting
 Bigamy Adultery/Concubinage
As to the nature of the offense
Public offense; crime against status Private offense; crime against chastity

As to effect of pardon
Has no effect Bars the prosecution of the case

As to manner of commission
Celebration of the second marriage Mere cohabitation by the husband
with the first still existing with a woman who is not a wife

As to who may prosecute

At the instance of the state Only at the instance of the offended
party
ILLEGAL MARRIAGE (ART. 350)
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender contracted marriage

2. That he knew at the time that:
a. The requirements of the law were not
complied with;
b. The marriage was in disregard of a legal
impediment; and
3. The offender must not be guilty of bigamy
Qualifying circumstance:

If either of the contracting parties obtains the

consent of the other by means of violence,
intimidation of fraud.

Conviction of a violation of Art. 350 involves

moral turpitude.
PREMATURE MARRIAGES (ART. 351)
ART. 351 ALREADY DECRIMINALIZED
R.A. No. 10655, approved on March 13, 2015, decriminalized the contracting
of a premature marriage by a woman without prejudice to the provisions of
the Family Code on paternity and filiation.

ART. 352 presupposes that the pries or minister or civil authority is

authorized to solemnize marriages. If the accused is not authorized to
solemnize marriage and he performs an illegal marriage ceremony, he is
liable under Art. 177 (i.e. usurpation of authority or public function)

The solemnizing officer of illegal marriages who performs or authorizes the

same, despite his knowledge of the illegality, shall be punished under Sec. 39
of Act 3613
CRIMES AGAINST HONOR
LIBEL
ELEMENTS

1. That there must be an imputation of a crime, or a vice

or defect, real or imaginary, or any act, omission,
condition, status or circumstance
2. That the imputation must be made publicly
3. That it must be malicious
4. That the imputation must be directed at a natural
person or a juridical person, or one who is dead; and
5. That the imputation must tend to cause the dishonor,
discredit, or contempt of the person defamed.
Dishonor
- disgrace, shame or ignomity

Discredit
-means loss of credit or reputation, disesteem

Contempt
-means state of being despised

Publication
-it is the communication of the defamatory matter to some third person or persons. Thus, sending a
letter containing defamatory words against another to a third person is sufficient publication
TEST OF DEFAMATORY CHARACTER OF THE
WORDS USED
A charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers
to suppose and understand that the person against whom they were
uttered was guilty of certain offenses, or are sufficient to impeach the
honesty, virtue or reputation, or to hold him up to public ridicule
LIBEL OR WRITTEN DEFAMATION
Libel is committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical exhibition,
cinematographic exhibition, or any similar means. (Article 355)
Means to commit defamation
Defamatory imputations, which are made not by publication in the
newspapers but by broadcast over the radio, constitute libel.
(2002 Bar Exam)
In Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September 16, 2008,
the claim of editors and president of Remate, the paper on which
the defamatory articles appeared, that they had no participation
does not shield them from liability. Article 360 does not provide
absence of participation as a defense, but rather plainly and
specifically states the responsibility of those involved in
publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a
matter of whether or not they conspired in preparing and
publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states
that they are liable as they were the author. Neither the publisher
nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that
appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation
in the preparation of the same.
They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of
Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they
themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper or
as the president in the publishing company. (2016 Bar Exam)

The criminal liability of the president of the company that

published the libelous articles is the same as that of the author.
The crime of libel would not even be consummated without his
participation as publisher of the libelous articles. One who
furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a
newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or
employees whom he selects and controls may be said to cause
to be published what actually appears, and should be held
responsible therefor, whether he was individually concerned in
the publication or not. Although the participation of each felon in
the crime of libel differs in point in time and in degree, both author
and publisher reneged on the private duties they owe their fellow
men or society in a manner contrary to the accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty, or good morals.
(Ty-Delgado v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R.
No. 219603, January 26, 2016)
Libel, Not a Continuing Crime
People v. Hon. Gines, G.R. No. 83463, May 27, 1991 did not
consider the accessibility of the defamation in the newspaper as
a factor in determining when the prescriptive period will
commence to run. In this case, it was held that the prescriptive
period of one year for libel shall commence to run from the day
the alleged libelous article was published.
Absolute Privileged Communication
If the defamatory statements are absolute privileged
communication, lack of malice is conclusively presumed. In
absolutely privileged communications, the “mala” or “bona fides”
of the author is of no moment as the occasion provides an
absolute bar to the action. (GMA Network, Inc. v. Bustos, G.r. No.
146848, October 17, 2006, G.R. No. 146848, October 17, 2006)
Absolutely privileged communications are those which are not
actionable even if the author has acted in bad faith such as
speech or debate in the Congress or in any Committee thereof
(Philippine Journalists, Inc. v. Thoenen, G.R. No. 143372,
December 13, 2005) or words uttered or published in the course
of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or
relevant to the case (Malit v. People, G.R. No. L-58681, May 31,
1982); or which is legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to
the subject of the controversy that it may become the subject of
the inquiry in the course of the trial. (People v. Sesbreno, G.R.
No. L-62449, July 16, 1984)
Qualified Privileged Communication
If the defamatory statement is a qualified privileged
communication, there is no malice in law. Hence, to prove libel or
defamation, malice in fact must be established beyond
reasonable doubt. The privileged character of the communication
is subject to the qualification that it is made without malice. If
there is proof of actual malice, the defamatory communication is
not privileged; hence, libel or defamation is committed.

Private communication and fair and true report are qualified

privileged communications mentioned in Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code. These privileged communications under
Article 354 are qualified because of Article 362 of the Code which
provides that “libelous remarks or comments connected with the
matter privileged under the provisions of Article 354, if made with
malice (in fact), shall not exempt the author thereof nor the editor
or managing editor of a newspaper from criminal liability.”
Privileged Communication
A private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social study is a qualified
privileged communication. Defamatory imputation in this
privileged private communication is not presumed to be
malicious. (Article 354)
Communicating Complaint to the
Right Person
X, a court employee, wrote the presiding judge a letter, imputing
to Y, also a court employee, the act of receiving an expensive gift
from one of the parties in a pending case. Because of this, Y
accused X of liber. Every defamatory imputation is presumed to
be malicious. (Article 354 of the Revised Penal Code) However,
despite the defamatory character of the imputation, malice is not
presumed if the communication is privileged. A private
communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral, or social duty is a qualified
privileged communication. Hence, defamatory imputation in it is
not presumed. (Article 354)
Since the presiding judge has the duty to act on what the letter
states, malice is not presumed and must be proven by evidence.
(2011 Bar Exam)
Indiscriminately Communicating
Complaint
Qualified privilege communication in Article 354 is a defense in a
libel or defamation case for two (2) reasons: (1) lack of malice;
and (2) element of publicity is not present because the person or
persons with whom the accused has the privilege to
communicate something defamatory is not a third person. That is
the reason why the title of Article 354 is..

“Requirement for Publicity”

If the communication is made to a person, who has no duty to
address the concern, the elements of malice and publicity will be
considered as present.

The accused wrote a complaint for robbery, and threat to his life,
to burn his property and to accuse him of several concocted
crimes. This is a privileged communication if the complaint was
only communicated to proper investigating authorities (e.g. NBI).
However, the privileged character of the letter is lost: (1) when
actual malice is proven; (2) when several provincial and national
government agencies which had no interest, right or duty in the
prosecution of said charges were furnished copies thereof.
(Pastor v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-48772, May 8, 1992)

A letter reporting corruption of the Mayor addressed to the

Municipal Court, Municipal Council and Chief of Police is not
privileged communication. None of the persons to whom the
letter was sent, was vested with the power of supervision over
the mayor or the authority to investigate the charges made
against the latter.
(Daez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 47971, October 31, 1990) A
letter involving corruption should have been addressed to the
Office of the Ombudsman or DILG.

An open letter involving a planned assassination of a person

addressed to the President and published in several newspapers
of general circulation is not a privileged communication. Even if
the interest sought to be protected belongs to the public in
general, certainly, the general public does not have the power to
remedy the alleged dangers sought to be prevented by the
accused in publishing the open letter. His lack of selectivity is
indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of privileged
communication. (Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757
and 121571, October 19, 2004; Buatis v. People, G.R. No.
142509, March 24, 2006) A letter involving a plan to commit a
crime should be addressed to the police authorities or NBI.
Privileged Communication of a Fair
and True Report
A fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments
or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings
which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act
performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions is a
qualified privileged communication. Defamatory imputation in this
privileged private communication is not presumed to be
malicious. (Article 354)
1) Report
- a person, such as a journalist, has the privilege to communicate
to the public a fair and true report of non-confidential official
proceedings, statement or speech made therein or function-
related acts performed by a public officer.
a) True Report
- Defendant, a publishing company, published in its paper,
“Manila American,” a complaint filed against Alejandro and James
with fraud, collusion, and removing money from the safe of the
company for private purposes was filed in court. However, the
complaint contains no incriminatory allegations against James.
The charges are limited to Alejandro. This is not a true and fair
report covered by the privileged communication. (Macleod v.
Philippine Publishing Company, G.R. No. 4841, January 8, 1909)
b) Erroneous Report
Z, a reporter of a certain daily newspaper known as “Bulalakaw,”
published an article concerning an account of a successful raid
by two (2) P.C. officers upon a gambling den and the arrest of
several people. The article also stated that a certain Madame “X,”
the complainant; was among the persons arrested and that her
name was stricken from the Information. It turned out that the
complainant was not caught, arrested, or prosecuted. (1980 Bar
Exam)
Criminal action for libel against Z will not prosper. A fair and true
report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of
act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions
is a qualified privileged communication. (Article 354 of the
Revised Penal Code) Defamatory imputation in this privileged
private communication is not presumed to be malicious.
However, error, misstatement or inaccuracy in news report does
not prove actual malice. Mistakes are inevitable in the exercise of
freedom of expression and press. (Borjal v. CA, G.R. No. 126466,
January 14, 1999)
Private Communication and Fair and
True Report
Privileged private communication pertains to complaint,
grievances, or concern (e.g., report of the commission of a crime)
communicated to a person, who has the authority or duty to
address the same. It is a private communication; hence,
publishing the same in a newspaper or on TV will divest its
character as a privileged communication.

Privileged communication of a fair and true report pertains to true

report without remark of non-confidential official proceedings or
function-related act by public officers communicated to a person
or the public (usually by journalist or reporter). Publishing the
same in a newspaper or on TV will not divest its character as a
privileged communication.

A letter to the NBI requesting for validation of report that the

offended party, Swiss national, was shooting pets in BH homes is
a privileged communication. However, this letter containing
libelous matter lost its character as a privileged communication
when a story regarding the shooting of pets was published in the
newspaper and circulated among the general population.
(Philippine Journalists, Inc. v Thoenen, G.R. No. 143372,
December, 13, 2005) However, a journalist can publish a report
that complaint for shooting pets was filed against a Swiss
national. As long as the publication is confined to the fact of filing
of complaint, the same shall be considered as a privileged
communication of a fair and true report.

Upon report of malversation, the mayor ordered A, the municipal

attorney, to conduct investigation against X, an employee of the
Treasurer’s Office. After conducting an investigation, A submitted
his report. Asked by news report, A stated that he has found X
had malversed public funds and that he has recommended his
prosecution, which is subject to evaluation by the Mayor. (1986
Bar Exam) X has the privilege to communicate this report to the
Mayor as directed. In submitting this report to the Mayor, X
cannot be held liable for libel because of the rule on qualified
privileged private communication. X has the privilege to report
the same to a media reporter. As long as the reporting is confined
to his finding with a statement that the same is subject to the
approval of the Mayor, X is not liable for libel because of the rule
on privileged communication of a fair and true report.
This media reporter has the privilege to communicate this report
to the public. If he will publish this report in the newspaper
without comment or remark, he is also protected by rule on
privileged communication of a fair and true report.
Fair Commentaries
Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are qualified
privileged communications, although they are not listed in
Article 354. These constitute a valid defense in an action for libel
or slander. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in
general every defamatory and public imputation is deemed false,
and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless,
when the defamatory imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
In order that such defamatory imputation to a public official may
be actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a
comment based on a false supposition.
1) Elements of Fair Commentaries
A person, such as a journalist, has the privilege to communicate
to the public fair commentaries on matters of public interest.
There are three (3) requisites to apply the fair commentaries
doctrine, to wit: (1) the defamatory statement is directed
against public officer, public figure or aspirant of public
position or matter of public interest; (2) the defamatory
statement pertains to act committed by public officer or
public figure in connection with their official function or
work; and (3) the accused does not know that the comment
is false or has not recklessly disregarded of knowing
whether it is false or not.
a. Public Officer
- Attacks against public officials under the fair commentary
doctrine do not constitute libel. (1969 Bar Exam) The conduct,
moral fitness, and ability of a public official to discharge his duties
are undoubtedly matters of public interest. A newspaper,
especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to
report on events and developments in which the public has a
legitimate interest with minimum fear of being prosecuted in court
by one group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so
long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the standards
of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
(Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No.
170341, July 5, 2017)
In defamation, where the imputation is based upon a matter of
right public interest, the presumption of criminal intent does not
arise from the mere publication of defamatory matter. A matter of
public interest is common property, and hence, anybody may
express his opinion on it. The public conduct of every public man
is a matter of public concern. A public official must not be too thin-
skinned with reference to comments upon his official acts. (U.S.
v. Bustos, G.R. No. L-12592, March 8, 1918)
b. Function-related
Fair commentary principle is not applicable to defamatory
statement against public officer if the same does not pertain to
his official function or is not related to his work. In Brillante v. CA,
G.R. Nos. 118757 and 121571, October 19, 2004, Brillante
implicated Mayor Jejomar Binay and PUP President Prudente in
a planned assassination of Syjuco as well as election-related
terrorism. The doctrine of fair comment as a defense in libel is not
applicable since the utterances are unrelated to a public officer’s
performance of his duties. Obviously, commission of murder and
terrorism is not related to the performance of their duties as
public officers.
The rule is that defamatory remarks and comments on the
conduct or acts of public officers which are related to the
discharge of their official duties will not constitute libel if the
defendant proves the truth of the imputation. But any attack upon
the private character of the public officer on matters which are not
related to the discharge of their official functions may constitute
libel under Article 355. (Sazon v. Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
120715, March 29, 1996)
c. Reckless Disregard
Comment is not fair if there is reckless disregard of knowing
whether the defamatory imputation is false or not. Hence,
defamatory comment is not a privileged communication if a
journalist failed to make research before making his allegations
of corruption (Erwin Tulfo v. People, G.R. No. 161032, September
16, 2008) or if he failed to exercise efforts to talk to complainant
to clarify the issues and get his side. (Yuchengco v. Alfonso,
supra; 2019 Bar Exam)
X, a tabloid columnist, wrote an Article describing Y, a public
official, as stupid, corrupt, and having amassed ill-gotten wealth.
X relied on a source from Y’s own office who fed him the
information. X committed libel. In the problem given, it appears
that X acted with actual malice when he imputed upon Y stupidity
and corruption. X made such defamatory statement with reckless
disregard of whether it was false or not. X as a columnist failed to
verify the story before publishing it pursuant to the standard
stated in the case of Tulfo v. People, supra. X is liable for libel
since the Article was libelous and inconsistent with good faith and
reasonable care. (2011 Bar Exam)
In his column, Direct Hit, A, a journalist, wrote about X, the head
examiner of the BIR-RDO Manila as follows: “Itong si X ay
talagang BUWAYA kaya ang logo ng Lacoste T shirt niya ay
napakasuwapang na buwaya. Ang nickname niya ay si Atty.
Buwaya. Ang PR niya ay 90% sa bayad ng taxpayer at ang para
sa RP ay 10% lang. Kaya ang baba ng collection ng RDO niya.
Masyadong magnanakaw si X at dapat tanggalin itong bundat na
bundat na buwaya na ito at napakalaki na ng kurakot.” (2016 Bar
Exam) The crime of libel is committed. Journalists bear the
burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession,
even when writing about public figures or matters of public
interest.
In Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No.
170341, July 5, 2017, the article was merely a factual report
which was based on the letter of the Waray employees. The
statements on the “lousy performance” and “mismanagement” of
private complainant as a DTI officer are matters of public interest
as these related to his moral conduct, his capacity to lead the DTI
employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of the office.
These statements undoubtedly make it to the grade of qualified
privileged communication and thus, would require actual malice
to be actionable. Failure of the reported to counter-check the
status of the complaints by the Waray employees, which was
already dismissed, cannot be considered as enough reason to
hold him liable. A reporter may rely on information given by a lone
source although it reflects only one side of the story provided the
reporter does not entertain a high degree of awareness of its
probable falsity
2. Public Figure
The doctrine in Sulivan v. New York Times covers statements
concerning public figures regardless of whether or not they are
government officials. (Lopez v. The Hon. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. L-26549, July 31, 1970) A public figure has been defined as a
person who, by his accomplishments, fame, or mode of living, or
by adopting a profession or calling which gives the public a
legitimate interest in his doings, his affairs, and his character, has
become a “public personage.” He is, in other words, a celebrity.
(Ayer Productions Pty. Ltd. V. Capulong, G.R. Nos. 82380 and
82398, April 29, 1988) Public figures include those, who thrust
themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
Order to influence the resolution of the issues involved. In either
event, they invite attention and comment. (Yuchengco v. Alfonso,
supra)

Fair comment principle is not applicable to defamatory statement

against public figure if the same is not related to his works as a
public figure. In Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28,
2008, Cristy Fermin imputed to Annabelle Rama Gutierrez, an
actress, the crime of malversation and of vices or defects for
being fugitives from the law and of being a wastrel. The doctrine
of fair comment as a defense in libel is not applicable. It is
unrelated to public figure’s work. The defamatory imputation has
nothing to do with the works of Annabelle as an actress.

In her weekly gossip column in a tabloid, Gigi wrote an

unflattering article about Pablo, a famous singer, and his bitter
separation from his wife. The article portrayed Pablo as an
abusive husband and caused him to lose lucrative endorsement
contracts. (2013 Bar Exam) The defamatory publication is not
covered by privileged communication because Gigi was attacking
the personal life of Pablo as a husband and not his public life as
a famous singer.

Other view: This is covered by privileged communication since

the column has something to do with circumstance that caused a
famous actor to lose lucrative endorsement.
In Eliseo Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 225010, November 21,
2018, the accused Soriano, through a religious radio program,
“Ang Dating Daan,” uttered the words “gago,” “tarantadong
pastor,” “pastor ng demonyo iyan,” “bulaang propeta,” which is
directed against Wilde Almeda of the Jesus Miracle Crusade. Fair
commentary is qualified privileged communication. However,
though religion is arguably a matter or subject of public interest,
there is no standard by which it can be declared that the subject
defamatory statements are fair commentaries. On their own, the
words used by the accused do not appear to debunk the
purported falsities in the preaching of JMCIM but actually to
degrade and insult their pastor or founder, Almeda. Moreover,
such defamatory statements are not protected by the Constitution
because plain and simple insults directed at another person
cannot be elevated to the status of religious speech.
Good Motive and Truthfulness
Proof of good intention or motive and justifiable ends and/or
truthfulness of the imputation is a defense in defamation.
1. Good Motive
Publishing defamatory imputation with motives and justifiable ends is a defense in
defamation. Under Article 354, defamatory imputation is not presumed to be malicious if
it is shown that there is good intention and justifiable motive for making it. Truthfulness
of the imputation is not required to cause the acquittal of the accused in the crime of
defamation.

In People v. Chavez, 53 O.G. 8886, imputation made by a nurse upon complainant that
he has contaminated his wife with venereal disease as a precautionary measure to
prevent further contamination, is in the nature of privileged communication. Since it was
made with good intention and justifiable motive, the nurse is not liable for libel. In this
case, there is no showing that the complainant is suffering from venereal disease.
In Eliseo Soriano v. People, G.R. No. 225010, November 21, 2018, the
accused Soriano, through a religious radio program, “Ang Dating Daan,”
uttered the words “gago,” “tarantadong pastor,” “pastor ng demonyo iyan,”
“bulaang propeta,” which is directed against Wilde Almeda of the Jesus
Miracle Crusade. Accused claimed that his motive was harken to other
religious leaders not to use the institution of religion in a manner that would
subject religion to public distrust and disdain. Such motive does not make
his statements justified. Moreover, the defamatory statement does not reveal
such alleged motive.
2. Good Motive and Truthfulness
The defense of good motive and justifiable in defamation will be further
strengthened by proof of truthfulness of the published defamatory
imputation. Under Article 361 of the Revised Penal Code, in every criminal
prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and if it
appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it
was published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants
shall be acquitted.
3. Truthfulness
Without good motives and for justifiable ends in publishing defamatory
statements, proof of truthfulness of the same is not a defense. (Alonzo v.
CA, G.R. No. 110088, February 1, 1995) Under Article 361, proof of the truth
of an imputation of an act or omission shall not generally be admitted. Under
Article 354, even if a defamatory imputation is true, it is presumed to be
malicious, if there is no showing of good intention and justifiable motive for
making it.
However, there are exemptions. Proof of truthfulness of imputation of a
crime or a function-related defamatory act against a public officer is a
defense even though he does not prove that the imputation was published
with good motives and for justifiable ends. (Vasquez v. CA, G.R. No.
118971, September 15, 1999) Under Article 361, proof of the truth of an
imputation of an act or omission constituting a crime, or imputation against
government employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of their
duties shall be admitted; and in such cases if the defendant proves the truth
of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
In the crime of libel, truth is not an absolute defense. But such truthfulness
of the defamatory statement can be considered as a defense in the following
circumstances: (1) the publication of the defamatory but truthful statements
was made with good motives and for justifiable ends; or (2) the publication
of defamatory but truthful statements pertains to a crime or a function-
related act made by a public officer. (2009 Bar Exam)
a. Imputation of Crime
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission constituting a crime
shall be admitted. In such case if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted. (Article 361) This is a
defense regardless of whether the person to whom the crime was imputed is
a public officer or a private person.

For example, A published in a newspaper that B killed C. In a libel case, A

will be allowed to present witnesses and evidence that B in fact killed C. If
there is proof that B really killed C, A will be acquitted. Even if A is an enemy
of B, and thus, the publication was made out of hate, just the same A is not
liable for libel.
b. Imputation of Function-related Act
Proof of the truth of an imputation made against government employees with
respect to facts related to the discharge of their official duties shall be
admitted. In such case if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation
made by him, he shall be acquitted. (Article 361) This is a defense
regardless of whether the function-related act imputed upon the public
officer constitutes a crime or not. (2019 Bar Exam)

A rule placing on the accused the burden of showing the truth of allegations
of official misconduct and good motives and justifiable ends for making such
allegations would not only be contrary to Article 361 of the Revised Penal
Code. It would, above all, infringe on the constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.
Such a rule would deter citizens from performing their duties as members of
a self-governing community (Flor v. People, G.R. No. 139987, March 31,
2005)

Sam wrote a letter to his friends stating that Judge Odon loves obscene
magazines and keeps these in his desk. Charged with libel, Sam cannot
present proof that Judge Odon indeed loves obscene magazines and keeps
these in his desk because he does not impute a crime to Judge Odon or a
defamatory act related to the discharge of his duties. (2011 Bar Exam)
Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5,
2017

In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are

construed in their entirety and taken in their plain, natural and ordinary
meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading
them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another
sense.
MVRS Publications, Inc. vs. Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines,
Inc. G.R. No. 135306, January 28, 2003

The meaning of the writer is immaterial. The question is, not what the
writer meant, but what he conveyed to those who heard or read.
If criminal intention is imputed against another, it is not considered
libelous because intent to commit a crime is not a violation of the law.
Manila Bulletin Publishing Corp vs. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5,
2017

Where the words imputed are not defamatory in character, a libel

charge will not prosper regardless if there is malice or not.
Imputation may cover:

1. Crime allegedly committed by the offended party.

2. Vice or defect, real or imaginary of the offended party
3. Any act, omission, condition, status of, or circumstances relating to
the offended party.
TWO TYPES OF MALICE
1. Malice in fact
Is a positive desire and an intention to annoy and injure

2. Malice in law
- Is a presumption of law. It dispenses with the proof of
malice when words that raise the presumption are
shown to have been uttered. It is also known as
constructive malice, legal malice or implied malice.
(Yuchengco vs. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp,
G.R. No. 184315, November 25, 2009)
When the communication is privileged, malice is not presumed from
the defamatory words. Malice (in fact) must be proved.
GUIDELINES WHEN SEVERAL PERSONS ARE
DEFAMED
1. If the defamation is made on different occasions or by independent
acts, there are as many crimes of libel as there are persons directly
addressed with such statements or directly referred to (Soriano vs.
IAC, G.R. No. 72383, November 9, 1988)
2. If the defamation is made on a single occasion:

a. If defamatory words are used broadly in respect in respect to a large class

or group of persons, and there is nothing that points, or by proper
colloquium or innuendo can be made to apply, to a particular
member of the class or group, no member has a right of action
for libel or slander. Where the defamatory matter had no special, personal
application and was so general that no individual damages could be
presumed, and where the class referred to was so numerous that great
vexation and oppression might grow out of the multiplicity of suits, no
private action could be maintained. (MVRS Publications Inc. vs. Islamic
Da’wah Council of the Philippines, Inc.)
b. If the statement is so sweeping or all embracing as to apply to every
individual in that group or class so that each individual therein can
prove that the defamatory statements specifically pointed to him, he
can bring his action separately. (Newsweek Inc. vs. IAC, G.R. No. L-
63559, May 30, 1986)
c. If several identifiable victims are libeled in a single article, there are
as many crimes of libel as there are persons defamed. (Soriano vs. IAC,
G.R. No. 72383, November 9, 1988)
REQUIREMENT OF PUBLICITY
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be
true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is shown.
(RPC Art. 354)
THE PRESUMPTION OF MALICE IS REBUTTED IF IT IS SHOWN BY THE
ACCUSED THAT:

1. The defamatory imputation is true, in case the law allows proof of

the truth of the imputation (see. Art. 361)
2. It is published with good intention
3. There is justifiable motive for making it
 Malice is not presumed in the following cases
involving qualifiedly privileged communication

• That the person who made the communication had a

1. Private communication legal, moral or social duty to make the communication,
made by any person to or, at least, he had an interest to be upheld.
another in the • That the communication is addressed to an officer or a
performance of any legal, board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the
moral or social duty (RPC. matter; and
• That the statements in the communication are made in
Art. 354, Par 1) good faith without malice (in fact)

2. A fair and true report, made in • That it is fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or
good faith, without any comments or
other official proceedings which are not of a confidential
remarks, of any judicial, legislative, or
other official proceedings which are nature, or of a statement, report or speech delivered in
not of confidential nature or of any said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a
statement, report or speech delivered public officer in the exercise of his functions
in said proceeding, or of any other act • That it is made in good faith
performed by public officers in the
exercise of their functions • That it is without any comments or remarks.
NOTE:

Therefore, qualified privileged communications must be made with

malice and bad faith in order to be actionable

An absolute privileged communication is not actionable even if made in

bad faith, specifically in the Constitution as absolutely privileged are
statements made in official proceedings of Congress by members
thereof, as an implementation of their parliamentary immunity
Armovit vs. Purisima, G.R. No. L-39258, November 15, 1982

Statements made in judicial proceedings are privileged but only if

pertinent or relevant to the case involved
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

The enumeration under Art. 354 is not an exclusive list of qualified

privileged communication.
TWO KINDS OF PRIVILEGED
COMMUNICATIONS

QUALIFIEDLY OR CONDITIONALLY
ABSOLUTE PRIVILEGED
PRIVILEGED
STATEMENTS (APS)
STATEMENTS (QPS)
• Totally not actionable, regardless • Actionable, provided the
of the existence of malice in fact presence of malice in fact or
actual malice is established
DOCTRINE OF FAIR COMMENT
Borjal vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 126466, January 14, 1999

While in general, every discreditable imputation publicly made is

deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved, and every false imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable.
CRITICISM
Deals only with such things as shall invite public attention or call public
comment. It does not follow a public man into his private life nor pry
into his domestic concerns. If one’s good name is assailed in the
newspaper, he may reply by defending himself, and if his reply is made
in good faith, without malice and is not unnecessarily defamatory of his
assailant, it is privileged.
NOTE:

Retaliation or vindicativeness cannot be a basis of self-defense in

defamation.
WAYS OF COMMITTING LIBEL BY MEANS OF WRITINGS
OR SIMILAR MEANS
1. Printing
2. Phonograph
3. Painting
4. Writing
5. Engraving
6. Theatrical exhibition
7. Lithography
8. Any similar means
9. Cinematographic radio; or
10. Exhibition
People vs. Santiago, G.R. No. L-17663, May 30, 1962

Defamation through an amplifier system is slander and not libel

If defamatory remarks are made in the heat of passion which
culminated in a threat, the derogatory statements will not constitute an
independent crime of libel but a part of the more serious crime of
threats.
THREATENING TO PUBLISH AND OFFER TO PREVENT SUCH
PUBLICATION FOR A COMPENSATION

Punishable acts:

1. Threatening another to publish a libel concerning him, or his

parents, spouse, child or other members of the family; and
2. Offering to prevent the publication of such libel for compensation
or money consideration.
While conducting the cross examination of Dr. Ang Galing, Atty. Abogado asked the doctor
if she knew the person who “made” the medical report. Dr. Ang Galing tried to avoid the
question and said that she could not understand the meaning of the word “made”. Atty.
Abogado explained that it should mean “prepare”. Dr. Ang Galing still refused to answer
and asked Atty. Abogado to clarify the question. This caused Atty. Abogado to say “I doubt
how you became a doctor”. Humiliated, Dr. Ang Galing filed libel charges before the
Prosecutor’s office.
Is Atty. Abogado liable for libel for the remarks he made?
ANS:
No, Atty. Abogado is not liable for the remarks made. The statement made by Atty.
Abogado did not amount to the commission of libel. Atty. Abogado was induced to utter the
statement in question when Dr. Ang Galing refused to answer the question as to who
prepared the document presented to her, and when the witness repeatedly evaded the
question by saying that she did not understand the word “made”Well settled is the rule that
parties, counsel, and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander cases for
words otherwise defamatory, uttered or published in the course of judicial proceedings,
provided the statements are pertinent or relevant to the case. The matter to which the
privilege does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of
the controversy that no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevance or impropriety (US v.
Bustos, G.R. No. L-4280, February 1, 1909).
BLACKMAIL
U.S. vs. Eguia, G.R. No. 13540, October 24, 1918

It is any unlawful extortion of money by threats of accusation or

exposure.
It is essential that the threat to publish, or to offer to prevent the
publication of libel must be for a compensation or monetary
consideration in order that it may be penalized under this article.
PROHIBITED PUBLICATION OF ACTS REFERRED TO IN THE
COURSE OF OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender is a Reporter, Editor or Manager of a newspaper

daily or magazine
2. He publishes facts connected with the private life of another; and
3. Such facts are Offensive to the honor, virtue and reputation of said
person
Article 357 is referred to as the “Gag Law” because while a report of an
official proceeding is allowed, it gags those who would publish therein
facts which this article prohibits, and punishes any violation thereof.

The Gag law prohibits the publication of cases relating to adultery,

divorce, legitimacy of children, etc.
Under R.A. No. 1477 ("An Act to Exempt the Publisher, Editor,
Columnist or Reporter of Any Publication from Revealing the Source of
Published News or Information Obtained in Confidence“), a
newspaper reporter cannot be compelled to reveal the source of the
news report he made, unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the
state.
2 KINDS OF SLANDER
(ORAL DEFAMATION)

SIMPLE SLANDER

GRAVE SLANDER
when it is of a serious and insulting nature
FACTORS THAT DETERMINE THE GRAVITY OF
THE ORAL DEFAMATION
1. Expressions used
2. Personal relations of the accused and the offended
party
3. Circumstances surrounding the case
4. Social standing and position of the offended
NOTE:

The slander need not be heard by the offended party.

Gossiping is considered as oral defamation if a defamatory fact is

imputed or intriguing against honor if there is no imputation.
Reyes vs. People, G.R. Nos. L-21528 & L-21529, March 28, 1969

The charge of oral defamation stemmed from the utterance of the

words, “Agustin, putang ina mo” this is a common enough expression
in the dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to
express anger or displeasure. It is seldom, if ever, taken in its literal
sense by the hearer, that is, as a reflection on the virtues of a mother.
REQUISITES OF DEFENSE IN DEFAMATION

1. If it appears that the matter charged as libelous is

true.
2. It was published with good motives; and
3. It was made for justifiable ends.
Fieldman’s Insurance Co. Inc. vs. Ku Nung, CA-G.R. Np. 31559-R, May
26, 1964

To justify one’s hitting back, there must be a showing that he has been
libeled.
SLANDER BY DEED
A crime committed by performing any act which casts dishonor,
discredit or contempt upon another person.
SLANDER BY DEED
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender performs any act not included in any other crimes
against honor;
2. That such act is performed in the presence of other persons; and
3. That such act casts dishonor, discredit, or contempt upon the
offended party
NOTE:

If there is no intent to dishonor the offended party, the crime is

maltreatment by deed under Art. 266
TWO KINDS OF SLANDER BY DEED

SIMPLE SLANDER BY DEED

GRAVE SLANDER BY DEED

which is of a serious nature
2 KINDS OF SLANDER
(ORAL DEFAMATION)

SIMPLE SLANDER

GRAVE SLANDER
when it is of a serious and insulting nature
 2 KINDS OF 2 KINDS OF SLANDER
SLANDER BY DEED (ORAL DEFAMATION)

SIMPLE SLANDER
SIMPLE SLANDER
BY DEED

GRAVE SLANDER GRAVE SLANDER

BY DEED (which is of a
(which is of a serious and
serious nature) insulting nature)
STANDARD OF SERIOUSNESS OF SLANDER
There is no fixed standard in determining whether a
slander is serious or not; hence, the courts have
sufficient discretion to determine the same, basing the
finding on the attendant circumstances and matters
relevant thereto.
SLANDER vs. UNJUST VEXATION
the common denominator present in unjust vexation and slander by
deed is irritation or annoyance. Without any other concurring factor, it
is only unjust vexation; if the purpose is to shame or humiliate, the
offense is slander by deed.
SLANDER vs. ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS

Kissing a girl in public and touching her breast without

lewd designs, committed by a rejected suitor to cast
dishonor on the girl was held to be slander by deed and
not acts of lasciviousness.
SLANDER vs. MALTREATMENT
If the offended party suffered from shame or
humiliation caused by the maltreatment, it is slander
by deed.
Villanueva vs. People, G.R. No. 160351, April 10, 2006

Slapping the face of another is slander by deed if the intention of the

accused is to cause shame and humiliation

Pointing a dirty finger constitutes simple slander by deed.

PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR LIBEL
PERSONS LIABLE:

1. The person who publishes, exhibits or causes the

publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing
or similar means;
2. The author or editor of a book or pamphlet;
3. The editor or business manager of a daily newspaper
magazine or serial publication; and
4. The owner of the printing plant which publishes a
libelous article with his consent and all other persons
who in any way participate in or have connection with
its publication.
NOTE:

An independent civil action may be filed simultaneously or separately

in the same RTC where the criminal action was filed and vice versa
(ART. 360, Par. 3, as amended by R.A. No. 4363)
WHEN PROOF OF TRUTH IS ADMISSIBLE IN A
CHARGE FOR LIBEL
1. When the act or omission imputed constitutes a
crime regardless of whether the offended party is a
private individual or a public officer.
2. When the offended party is a government
employee, even if the imputation does not
constitute a crime, provided it is related to the
discharge of his official duties.
NOTE:

In such cases, if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made
by him, he shall be acquitted (RPC. Art. 361, Par. 3)
U.S. vs. Sotto, G.R. No. 13990, September 24, 1918

The proof of truth of the accusation cannot be based upon mere

hearsay, rumors of suspicion. It must be positive, direct evidence upon
which a definite finding may be made by the court.
Lopez vs. People, G.R. No. 172203, February 14, 2011

If the statement is made against a public official with respect to the

discharge of his official duties and functions and the truth of the
allegations is shown, the accused will be entitled to an acquittal even
though he does not prove that the imputation was published in good
motives and for justifiable end.
LIBELOUS REMARKS
Libelous remarks or comments connected with the matter privileged
under the provisions of Art. 354, if made with malice, shall not exempt
the author thereof nor the editor or managing editor of a newspaper
from criminal liability. (RPC, Art. 354)
ART. 362 does not punish the publication of privileged matters but the
libelous comments or remarks about such privileged matters. Thus, the
author and editor of a newspaper who distorts, mutilates, or discolors
the official proceedings reported by him or add comments thereon to
cast aspersion on the character of the parties concerned, is guilty of
libel, notwithstanding the fact that the defamatory matter, published in
connection with a privileged matter.
INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS
ELEMENTS:

1. That the offender performs an act

2. That by such act he directly incriminates or imputes to an innocent
person the commission of a crime; and
3. That such act does not constitute perjury.
INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS vs.
PERJURY BY MAKING FALSE ACCUSATION
INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERJURY BY MAKING FALSE
PERSONS (ART. 363) ACCUSATION (ART. 183)
As to acts involved
Limited to the act of planting Giving of false statement under
evidence and the like in order oath or making a false affidavit,
to incriminate an innocent imputing to the person the
person. commission of a crime.
As to manner of commission
It is committed by performing It is committed when the
an act by which the offender imputation was falsely made
directly incriminates or imputes before an officer.
to an innocent person the
commission of a crime.
INCRIMINATING INNOCENT PERSONS
vs.
DEFAMATION

INCRIMINATING
INNOCENT DEFAMATION
PERSONS (ART. 363)

Offender does not avail Imputation is public and

himself of written or malicious calculated to
spoken word in cause dishonor,
besmirching the victim’s discredit, or contempt
reputation upon the offended party.
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR
It is committed by any person who shall make any
intrigue which has for its principal purpose blemishing
the honor or reputation of another.

This refers to such intrigues against a person’s honor or

reputation which are not otherwise punished under
other articles of the RPC. It differs from defamation in
that it consists of tricky or secret plots and may be
committed without using written or spoken words
which are defamatory.
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR vs. DEFAMATION
INTRIGUING AGAINST HONOR DEFAMATION (ART. 353)
(ART. 364)
As to source of derogatory remarks
Source cannot be determined Source is known
As to manner of commission
Committed through some Committed in a public and
tricky and secret plot malicious manner
As to nature of remarks
Remarks may be true or not Remarks made are claimed to
be true
QUASI-OFFENSES
CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE (ART. 365)
What are the punishable acts?
Committing through Committing through Causing damage to the Causing through simple
reckless imprudence simple imprudence or property of another imprudence or
any act which,, had it negligence an act which through reckless negligence some wrong
been intentional, would would otherwise imprudence or simple which, if done
constitute a grave or constitute a grave or imprudence or maliciously, would have
less grave felony or light less grave felony negligence. constituted a light
felony felony

(par. 1) (par. 2) (par. 3) (par. 4)

CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE
IMPRUDENCE NEGLIGENCE
As to effect
Both are not crimes and merely determine a lower degree of criminal liability –
they are means of committing crime.

As to nature
Deficiency of action Deficiency of perception
Failure in precaution Failure in advertence
As to Exemption from liability
To avoid wrongful acts; one must take To avoid wrongful acts; paying proper
the necessary precaution once they are attention and using due diligence in
foreseen foreseeing them
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
It consists in voluntarily but without malice,
doing or failing to do an act from which material
damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing
or failing to perform such act, taking into
consideration his enjoyment or occupation,
degree of intelligence, physical condition and
other circumstances regarding persons, time and
place
RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE
ELEMENTS:

1. The offender does or fails to do an act

2. The doing of or the failure to do that act is voluntary
3. It be without malice
4. Material damage results; and
5. There is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of
the person performing or failing to perform such act
taking into consideration;
a. Employment or occupation
b. Degree of intelligence, physical condition; and
c. Other circumstances regarding persons, time and place
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE
Sps. Ermino vs. Golden Village Homeowner’s Assoc. Inc, G.R. No.
180808, August 15, 2018

Would a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom

negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person injured as a
reasonable consequence of the course about to be pursued? If so, the
law imposes a duty on the action to refrain from that course or to take
precaution against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so
constitutes negligence.
TEST OF NEGLIGENCE
Tabao vs. People, G. R. No. 187246, July 20, 2011

In order for conviction to be decreed for reckless

imprudence, the material damage suffered by the
victim, the failure in precaution on the part of the
accused, and the direct link between material damage
and failure in precaution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt.
SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE
It consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those
cases in which the damage impending to be caused is
not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest.
SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE

ELEMENTS:

1. There is lack of precaution on the part of the

offender
2. The damage impending to be caused is not
immediate nor the danger clearly manifest
SIMPLE IMPRUDENCE
NOTE:

Art. 64 relative to mitigating and aggravating

circumstances is not applicable to crimes committed
through negligence.

The defense of contributory negligence does not apply

in criminal cases through reckless imprudence since
one cannot allege negligence of another to evade the
effects of one’s own negligence. It only mitigates
criminal liability
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE:
Failing to lend on-the-spot help to the victims of his act of
negligence raises the penalty one degree higher.

EXCEPTION: the driver can leave his vehicle without

aiding the victims if:
1. He is in imminent danger of being harmed
2. He wants to report to the nearest officer of the law
3. He desires to summon a physician or a nurse for
medical assistance to the injured (Sec. 55, R.A. No. 4136)
DOCTRINE OF LAST CLEAR CHANCE
Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 89880,
February 6, 1991

The doctrine of last clear chance states that a person

who has the last clear chance or opportunity of
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent
acts of his opponent, is considered in law solely
responsible for the consequences of the accident.
The contributory negligence of the party injured will
not defeat the action if it be shown that the accused
might, by the exercise of reasonable care and
prudence, have avoided the consequences of the
negligence of the injured party. The antecedent
negligence of a person will not preclude recovery for
damages for, or bar a defense against liability sought by
the other negligent party.
EMERGENCY RULE
Valenzuela vs. CA, G.R. No. 115024, February 7, 1996

An individual who suddenly finds himself in a situation

of danger and is required to act without much time to
consider the best means that they may be adopted to
avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence
if he fails to undertake what subsequently and upon
reflection may appear to be a better solution, unless
the emergency was brought by his own negligence.
EMERGENCY RULE
The emergency situation must be:

1. Sudden and unexpected

2. Deprives the actor of all opportunity for
deliberation; and
3. Must be such that the actor must have no
knowledge that unusual consequences may result
from his act.
PRIOR CONVICTION OR ACQUITTAL OF RECKLESS
IMPRUDENCE BARS SUBSEQUENT PROSECUTION
FOR THE SAME QUASI-OFFENSE

Ivler vs. Hon. Modesto-San Pedro G.R. No. 172716,

November 17, 2010

The SC held that reckless imprudence or negligence is a

crime in itself. Hence, once convicted or acquitted of a
specific act of reckless imprudence, the accused may
not be prosecuted again for that same act.
REASON:

For the essence of the quasi-offense of criminal negligence under ART.

365 of the RPC lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act
that, if intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. Thus, the
law penalizes the negligent or careless act, and not the result thereof.
Quizon vs. Justice of the Peace, G.R. NO. L-6641, July 28, 1955

Culpa is either a crime (ART 365) or merely a modality of committing a

crime (ART 3).
ART. 365 is culpa that is itself punished. Thus, reckless imprudence is
not a mere modality of committing a crime.
The gravity of the consequence is only taken into account to determine
the penalty; it does not qualify the substance of the offense.

As the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should affect
one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence)
remains one and the same, and cannot be split into different crimes
and prosecution.
ART. 48 DOES NOT APPLY TO ACTS PENALIZED
UNDER ART. 365
ART. 48 ART. 365
Is a procedural device allowing single Substantive rule penalizing not an act
prosecution of multiple felonies defined as a felony but the mental
attitude behind the act, the
dangerous recklessness, lack of care
or foresight.
Congruent to the notion of quasi-
crimes under Art. 365. The
application of Art. 48 in the
prosecution and sentencing of quasi-
crimes is prohibited maintaining the
distinct concept of quasi-crimes as
crafted under Art. 365
IVLER VS. MODESTO-SAN PEDRO G.R.
No. 172716, November 17, 2010

Prosecutions under Art. 365 should proceed from a

single charge regardless of the number or severity of
the consequences. In imposing penalties, the judge will
do no more than apply the penalties under Art. 365 for
each consequence alleged and proven. In short, there
shall be no splitting of charges under Art. 365, and only
one information shall be filed in the same first level
court.
VIOLATION Of ART. 365 CANNOT ABSORB
VIOLATIONS OF SPECIAL LAWS

Loney vs. People, G. R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006

A mala in se felony (such as Reckless Imprudence

Resulting in Damage to Property) cannot absorb mala
prohibita crimes (such as those violating P.D. No. 1067,
P.D. No. 984, and R.A. No. 7942) What makes a former
a felony is criminal intent (dolo) or negligence (culpa);
what makes the latter crimes are the special laws
enacting them.
Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93475, June 5,
1991

An offender previously charged with reckless

imprudence resulting in damage to property with
multiple physical injuries under ART. 365 may also be
held liable for his failure to help or render assistance to
another whom one he has accidentally wounded or
injured under par. 2 of ART 275 which both crimes arise
from the same act.
Ms. Kas Kasero was driving his car when the accelerator stuck. She drove her car
into Metrokol bank, causing slight physical injuries to several of the tellers and
substantial property damage. Ms. Kas Kasero surrendered to responding police
officers. The police, assisted by the Metroko bank, filed a case for Reckless
Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property with Physical Injuries before the
inquest prosecutor. The inquest prosecutor filed an Information in court for
Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Slight Physical Injuries but dismissed the
case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property due to insufficiency
of evidence. The inquest prosecutor was dissatisfied with the supporting
documentation submitted by Metrokol bank.

Dissatisfied, the bank filed a Motion for Reconsideration and submitted additional
proof of the value of the damage incurred as a result of the collision. While the
motion for reconsideration was pending, Ms. Kas Kasero was arraigned in Court,
she pleaded guilty to the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting in Multiple Slight
Physical Injuries and was sentenced to arresto menor. Ms. Kas Kasero
immediately applied for probation.

In the meantime, the prosecutor granted the Metrokol’s Motion for

Reconsideration on account of the additional evidence presented and indicted Ms.
Kas Kasero for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to Property.
Question:

Upon learning of the new indictment, Ms. Kas Kasero, through legal
counsel, filed a Motion to Quash, in court. She cited double jeopardy as
her ground for quashal of the Information. If you were the Judge, how
would you resolve the Motion to Quash? Explain.
Answer:

I would grant the Motion to Quash Information. Reason and precedent both
coincide in that once convicted or acquitted of a specific act of reckless
imprudence, the accused may not be prosecuted again for that same act. For the
essence of the quasi offense of criminal negligence under article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code lies in the execution of an imprudent or negligent act that, if
intentionally done, would be punishable as a felony. The law penalizes thus the
negligent or careless act, not the result thereof. The gravity of the consequence is
only taken into account to determine the penalty, it does not qualify the substance
of the offense. And, as the careless act is single, whether the injurious result should
affect one person or several persons, the offense (criminal negligence) remains one
and the same, and can not be split into different crimes and prosecutions. Hence,
we hold that prosecutions under Article 365 should proceed from a single charge
regardless of the number or severity of the consequences. In imposing penalties,
the judge will do no more than apply the penalties under Article 365 for each
consequence alleged and proven. In short, there shall be no splitting of charges
under Article 365, and only one information shall be filed in the same first level
court. (Ivler vs. San Pedro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010)
Question:

If during the trial of the first case for Reckless Imprudence resulting in
Multiple Slight Physical Injuries, Ms. Kas Kasero was acquitted, can the
subsequent charge for Reckless Imprudence resulting in Damage to
Property prosper in Court without violating double jeopardy?
Answer :

No, filing another case will violate the rule on double jeopardy. It has been settled
in this jurisdiction that prior conviction or acquittal of reckless imprudence bars
subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of the
consequences alleged for both charges. The Court unfailingly and consistently
answered in the affirmative in People v. Belga (promulgated in 1957 by the Court
en banc, per Reyes, J.), Yap v. Lutero (promulgated in 1959, unreported, per
Concepcion, J.), People v. Narvas (promulgated in 1960 by the Court en banc, per
Bengzon J.), People v. Silva (promulgated in 1962 by the Court en banc, per
Paredes, J.), People v. Macabuhay (promulgated in 1966 by the Court en banc, per
Makalintal, J.), People v. Buan (promulgated in 1968 by the Court en banc, per
Reyes, J.B.L., acting C. J.), Buerano v. Court of Appeals (promulgated in 1982 by the
Court en banc, per Relova, J.), and People v. City Court of Manila (promulgated in
1983 by the First Division, per Relova, J.). These cases uniformly barred the second
prosecutions as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE
Dr. Li vs. Spouses Soliman. G.R. No. 165279, June 7, 2011

A wrong committed by a medical professional which has caused bodily

harm to the offended party.
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE/MEDICAL
NEGLIGENCE
Dr. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122445,
November 18, 1997

Such claims are most often brought as a civil action for

damages under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code or as a
criminal case under Art. 365 of the RPC with which the
civil action for damages is impliedly instituted.
Dr. Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122445, November 18, 1997

Whether or not a physician has committed an “inexcusable lack of

precaution” in the treatment of his patient is to be determined
according to the standard of care observed by other members of the
profession in good standing under similar circumstances bearing in
mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of treatment or
the present state of medical science
Violation of RA 9165
On April 13, 2006, a buy bust operation was planned to capture Mr. Durugista in the
act of selling drugs. At 7:30 p.m., PO2 Mabilis along with other went to Sitio
Jawod, Barangay Bulacao, Talisay City to commence the buy-bust operation. The
police officers had a poseur-buyer with them. The asset poseur-buyer transacted
with Mr. Durugista in an alley, while the police officers observed them from a
distance. Once they saw the poseur-buyer scratch his head, their pre-approved
signal, the police officers descended upon Mr. Durugista, who then ran away upon
noticing the approaching officers.

Mr. Durugista ran and hid inside a nearby house and the police officers followed
him. The police officers stumbled upon three (3) men sniffing shabu inside the
house, one (1) of whom they apprehended while the other two (2) managed to
escape. The police officers caught up with Mr. Durugista inside the house, whom
they thereafter frisked. They recovered the marked P100.00 and P50.00 bills from
him. After Mr. Durugistas's arrest, the poseur-buyer handed over the sachet of
shabu he purchased from Mr. Durugista to PO3 Mabilis.
(a) Charged before the RTC, Mr. Durugista alleges that the supposed illegal
sale was never proven because the poseur-buyer was not presented to attest to
the alleged sale. Rule on the contention.

(b) What are the four (4) links that should be established by the prosecution
to constitute an unbroken chain of custody?
(c) Mr. Durugista argued that the prosecution failed to preserve the identity
and integrity of the corpus delicti. He pointed out that the seized item was not
marked with the date of seizure, which meant that it could not be
distinguished from other evidence that may have been in the police officer's
possession. Moreover, he claimed that the drugs allegedly seized were not
photographed. He asserted that the prosecution did not give justifiable
grounds for the apprehending officers' failure to comply with the chain of
custody requirements under the law. Rule on the contention
A.2 People v. Nandi expounded on the four (4) links that should be established by
the prosecution to constitute an unbroken chain of custody:
[F]irst, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from
the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal drug
seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination; and fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug
seized from the forensic chemist to the court. See G.R. No. 207229, September 20,
2017 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. SIEGFRED
CABELLON CABAÑERO, Accused-Appellant
Answer on (c):

The contention is eronneous. In People v. Miranda, the Court clarified that under varied field
conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 may not always be
possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and
photography may be conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in
instances of warrantless seizure, and that noncompliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and invalid the seizure and custody
over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the
apprehending team to strictly comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the
IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and custody over the items as void and invalid, provided
that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable ground for non-compliance; and
(b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.

In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution
must explain the reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the , integrity and value of the seized
evidence had nonetheless been preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the
justifiable ground for non compliance must be proven as , a fact, because that Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist.
Alternative Answer on (c):

Case law exhorts that the procedure in Section 21 of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive law, and
cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects. Therefore, as the requirements are clearly set forth in the law,
then the State retains the positive duty to account for any lapses in the chain of custody of the
drugs/items seized from the accused, regardless of whether or not the defense raises the same in the
proceedings a quo; otherwise, it risks the possibility of having a conviction overturned on grounds
that go into the evidence's integrity and evidentiary value, albeit the same are raised only for the first
time on appeal, or even not raised, become apparent upon further review.
Thus, before courts may consider the seized drugs as evidence despite noncompliance with the legal
requirements, justifiable grounds must be identified and proved. The prosecution must establish the
steps taken to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were preserved.38 It
has the positive duty to establish its reasons for the procedural lapses.
Customs Examiner Marius Landicho (Landicho) testified that at around 5:23 p.m. on February 24, 2012 at the
Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 1, Noah, a Kenyan national who arrived from Kenya via Dubai,
was apprehended for carrying shabu. Landicho then prepared an Inventory Report. Upon testing samples, the
white crystalline substance yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. The test results
showed that the seized items contained shabu, with a confirmatory test yielding the same outcome.

In its January 16, 2014 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Noah guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime charged. It found that Noah had known she was in possession of illegal drugs considering that animus
possidendi is presumed. Moreover, the trial court ruled that the presumption of regularity of duty on the airline
personnel's placing of the bag tags at the airport of origin established that Noah was the real owner of the
luggage. It ruled that there was compliance with Article II, Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165.

(a) What are the elements of illegal transportation of drugs?

(b) Is proof of ownership material in prosecution of this offense?
(c) What is the concept of chain of custody?
(d) Rule whether or not the prosecution established the unbroken chain of custody of the drug seized from
accused.
Answer: (elements of illegal transportation of drugs

The illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 5 of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act. The essential element for the crime of illegal transportation of dangerous
drugs is the movement of the dangerous drug from one (1) place to another. To establish the accused's
guilt, it must be proven that: (1) the transportation of illegal drugs was committed; and (2) the
prohibited drug exists.

Answer : (Proof of ownership)

Proof of ownership of the dangerous drugs seized is immaterial. What is important is that the
prosecution prove the act of transporting as well as the identity and integrity of the seized drugs.
This is because the confiscated drug is the corpus delicti of the crime. Since it is not readily
identifiable by sight or touch and may be easily tampered with, its preservation is paramount. The
chain of custody ensures that there would be no unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the
evidence.
Answer: (Chain of Custody)
Chain of custody is the duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized items at each
stage, from seizure to receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping to presentation in court for
destruction. Such record of movements and custody of seized items shall include the identity and
signature of the person who held temporary custody of the seized item, the date and time when such
transfer of custody were made in the course of safekeeping and used in court as evidence, and the
final disposition.

A.4

(see G.R. No. 228880 - PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, v. LINA

ACHIENG NOAH, ACCUSED-APPELLANT).
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ERWIN BATINO Y
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 254035. November 15, 2021
• Facts: The team conducted the buy-bust operation on April 14, 2016
at around 7:30 p.m. They proceeded at the site together with the
informant. PO1 Bassig and the informant approached Batino. The
informant then asked Batino if he had something on hand at that
time as his (informant) companion (referring to PO1 Bassig) wanted
to buy five packs. Batino replied in the affirmative. PO1 Bassig then
gave him the marked money as payment. Batino in turn handed PO1
Bassig a plastic sachet containing suspected illegal drug, which he
took out from a small metal container from his pocket. PO1 Bassig
then carried out their pre-arranged signal by pulling out the key of
Batino's motorcycle. At that moment, he identified himself to be a
police officer, while PO1 Tan approached them and arrested Batino,
informing the latter of his rights and nature of the offense.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ERWIN BATINO Y
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 254035. November 15, 2021

• Issue: Is the accused liable for illegal sale and possession of

dangerous drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ERWIN BATINO Y
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 254035. November 15, 2021
• Ruling: Yes.

The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs are as follows:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale,
and the consideration; and,
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In a
buy-bust operation, the receipt by the poseur-buyer of the
dangerous drug and the corresponding receipt by the seller of the
marked money consummate the illegal sale of dangerous drugs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ERWIN BATINO Y
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 254035. November 15, 2021
What matters is the proof that the sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the
corpus delicti, as evidence. On the other hand, the elements of
the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs are as
follows:
(a) the accused was in possession of an item or object identified
as a prohibited drug;
(b) such possession was not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, VS. ERWIN BATINO Y
EVANGELISTA, G.R. No. 254035. November 15, 2021

The prosecution was able to establish the consummation of

the sale of dangerous drugs. The evidence clearly shows
that there was an exchange of dangerous drugs and marked
money between PO1 Bassig as poseur-buyer and Batino.
Also, the preventive search conducted after the buy-bust sale
established that Batino was further in possession of
dangerous drugs with intent to possess and without authority
of law. Therefore, there is no dispute and there is no shade
of doubt that Batino sold to PO1 Bassig and was in
possession of dangerous drugs.
Usually, Section 5 is enforced thru a buy-bust operation. In People vs. Tecson Lim, et
al., the Supreme Court explained the concept of a buy-bust operation, to wit:

“Primarily, a buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment whereby ways and means

are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the
execution of their criminal plan. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that
the members of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not
properly performing their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and
credit. When the police officers involved in the buy-bust operation have no motive to
falsely testify against the accused, the courts shall uphold the presumption that they
have performed their duties regularly. The courts, nonetheless, are advised to take
caution in applying the presumption of regularity. It should not by itself prevail over the
presumption of innocence and the constitutionally protected rights of the individual.
Thus, this Court discussed in People v. Doria the “objective” test in buy-bust operations
to determine the credibility of the testimonies of the police officers involved in the
operation:
We therefore stress that the “objective” test in buy-bust operations demands that the
details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer
to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the
consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale.
The manner by which the initial contact was made, whether or not through an
informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the “buy-bust” money,
and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police
officer, must be the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens
are not unlawfully induced to commit and offense. Criminals must be caught but not at
all cost. At the same time, however, examining the conduct of the police should not
disable courts into ignoring the accused’s predisposition to commit the crime. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity,
then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the
predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to
determine the validity of the defense of inducement.”
Corollary to this, it is important to know the distinction between instigation and
entrapment. In the case of People vs. Victorio Pagkalinawan, the distinction of the two
was explained in this wise:

“Instigation is the means by which the accused is lured into the commission of the
offense charged in order to prosecute him. On the other hand, entrapment is the
employment of such ways and means for the purpose of trapping or capturing a
lawbreaker.
In People v. Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng, the Court laid down the distinction between
entrapment and instigation, to wit:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION: -- While it has been said that the practice of
entrapping persons into crime for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to
be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from mere entrapment, has often
been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being criminal
or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that
facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act
was done at the “decoy solicitation” of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that
detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting in its
commission. This is true especially in that class of cases where the offense is one of a
kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.
Mere deception by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed
by him, free from the influence or instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of
an owner acts as a supposed confederate of a thief is no defense to the latter in a
prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the
owner or the public authorities, and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief
in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless committed. It is generally held that it
is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase was made
by a “spotter”, detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

One form of entrapment is the buy-bust operation. It is legal and has been proved to be
an effective method of apprehending drug peddlers, provided due regard to
constitutional and legal safeguards is undertaken.”
The required procedure on the seizure and custody of drugs is embodied in Section 21,
paragraph 1, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, which states:

The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from
the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who
shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
[emphasis ours]
What is the effect of failure to comply with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165?

In the said case of People vs. Sanchez, the Supreme Court answered the question in this
manner: “We recognize that the strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
R.A. No. 9165 may not always be possible under field conditions; the police operates under
varied conditions, many of them far from ideal, and cannot at all times attend to all the
niceties of the procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence. The participation of a
representative from the DOJ, the media or an elected official alone can be problematic. For
this reason, the last sentence of the implementing rules provides that “non-compliance with
these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not
render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.” Thus, non-
compliance with the strict directive of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not necessarily fatal to
the prosecution’s case; police procedures in the handling of confiscated evidence may still
have some lapses, as in the present case. These lapses, however, must be recognized and
explained in terms of their justifiable grounds and the integrity and evidentiary value of the
evidence seized must be shown to have been preserved.”
In the same case of People vs. Sanchez, the Supreme Court extensively discussed the
“Chain of Custody Rule” and its application to wit:

“Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, the elements necessary in every prosecution
for the illegal sale of shabu are:

(1) The identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(2) The delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. Implicit in all these is the need
for proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti – the body of the crime whose core is the confiscated
illicit drug
Proof beyond reasonable doubt demands that unwavering exactitude be observed in
establishing the corpus delicti; every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
established. The chain of custody requirement performs this function in buy-bust operations
as it ensures that doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed. In a long line
of cases, we have considered it fatal for the prosecution to fail to prove that the specimen
submitted for laboratory examination was the same one allegedly seized from the accused.

Black’s Law Dictionary explains chain of custody in this wise:

In evidence, the one who offers real evidence, such as narcotics in a trial of drug case, must
account for the custody of the evidence from the moment in which it reaches his custody
until the moment in which it is offered in evidence, and such evidence goes to the weight
not to admissibility of evidence. Com. V. White, 353 Mass. 409, 232 N.E.2d 335.
The recent case of Lopez v. People is particularly instructive on how we expect the chain of
custody or “movement” of the seized evidence to be maintained and why this must be
shown by evidence:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the
admission of an exhibit be preceded by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include testimony about
every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into
evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and
from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was
delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions
taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item and no
opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost
always impossible to obtain, an unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and
essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is not really identifiable, or
when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to
observe its uniqueness. The same standard likewise obtains in case the evidence is
susceptible to alteration, tampering, contamination and even substitution and exchange. In
other words, the exhibit’s level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering –
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not – dictates the level of
strictness in the application of the chain of custody rule. [Emphasis ours]
Where is the venue of physical inventory and photograph requirement under Section 21 vis-à-vis the
“marking” of seized evidence?

People vs. Sanchez provided the answer, to quote:

“While the first sentence of Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9165
states that “ the apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same,” the
second sentence makes a distinction between warrantless seizures and seizures by virtue of a
warrant, thus:

(a) x x x Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where
the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further
that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and
the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items. [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the venues of the physical inventory and photography of the seized items differ and depend on
whether the seizure was made by virtue of a search warrant or through a warrantless seizure such a
buy-bust operation.

In seizures covered by search warrants, the physical inventory and photograph must be conducted in
the place where the search warrant was served. On the other hand, in case of warrantless seizures
such as a buy-bust operation, the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
nearest police station or office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable; however,
nothing prevents the apprehending officer/team from immediately conducting the physical inventory
and photography of the items at the place where they were seized, as it is more in keeping with the
law’s intent of preserving their integrity and evidentiary value.

What Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules do not expressly specify is the matter of
“marking” of the seized items in warrantless seizures to ensure that the evidence seized upon
apprehension is the same evidence subjected to inventory and photography when these activities are
undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest. Consistency with the “chain of
custody” rule requires that the “marking” of the seized items – to truly ensure that they are the same
items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence – should be done (1) in the
presence of the apprehended violation (2) immediately upon confiscation.”
What are the implications of failure to comply with Section 21, paragraph 1?
People vs. Sanchez held:

“In People v. Orteza, the Court had the occasion to discuss the implications of the failure to
comply with Section 21, paragraph 1, to wit:
… in People v. Laxa, where the buy-bust team failed to mark the confiscated marijuana
immediately after the apprehension of the accused, the Court held that the deviation from the
standard procedure in anti-narcotics operations produced doubts as to the origins of the marijuana.
Consequently, the Court concluded that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the corpus
delicti.
The Court made a similar ruling in People v. Kimura, where the Narcom operatives failed to
place markings on the seized marijuana at the time the accused was arrested and to observe the
procedure and take custody of the drug.
More recently, in Zarraga v. People, the Court held that the material inconsistencies with
regard to when and where the markings on the shabu were made and the lack of inventory on the
seized drugs created reasonable doubt as to the identity of the corpus delicti. The Court thus
acquitted the accused due to the prosecution’s failure to indubitably show the identity of the shaby.
[Emphasis supplied]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 248815.
March 23, 2022

• Facts: On September 8, 2011, at around 11:00 p.m., AAA, who was

then only 14 years old, went with her friend, BBB, to meet with the
latter's "textmates." Upon arriving at the hotel, BBB introduced AAA
to accused-appellant and an unidentified man. Afterwards, the two
men booked two separate rooms and all four of them proceeded to
go upstairs. At first, they all stayed in one room where accused-
appellant tried to get to know AAA. After some time, AAA noticed that
her companions were holding a folded foil paper. Accused-appellant
then asked AAA if she wanted to try it out, which turned out to be
"enchang" or shabu. AAA initially declined the offer but BBB
eventually convinced her to join in and try the substance. Thereafter,
BBB asked AAA and accused-appellant to leave the room.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. XXX, G.R. No. 248815.
March 23, 2022

Accused-appellant then brought AAA to another room. He asked AAA

for her age and further inquired if she was still a virgin. She answered
in the affirmative. Accused-appellant then turned off the lights and
approached her. He tightly held her upper right arm and kissed her on
the lips. While he was taking off her clothes, AAA fearfully pleaded,
"bata pa po ako." Accused-appellant assured her that she would not
get hurt. AAA tried to escape and ran towards the door but accused-
appellant grabbed her clothes and forcefully pulled her back. AAA
resisted but her efforts proved futile and accused-appellant continued
to undress her. After successfully removing all her clothes, accused-
appellant laid AAA in bed, kissed her vagina, went on top of her, and
inserted his penis into her vagina.
GOOD LUCK AND GOD BLESS