UNITED NATIONS

GENERAL ASSEMBLY

BACKGROUND GUIDE

LA MARTINIERE GIRLS' MODEL UNITED NATIONS



AGENDA
Deliberating upon the misuse of weapons of mass destruction and throwing
light upon the exploitation of ballistic and hypersonic missiles while
addressing the loopholes of NPT

Dear Delegates,
It is with great pride that we welcome you to the United Nations General
Assembly- Disarmament and International Security Committee being stimulated
at the La Martiniere Girls' Model United Nations 2023.
To the selected delegates that have successfully entered this committee, we would
first like to congratulate you all. Our committee is one of the most intriguing
committees of this edition of the La Martiniere Girls Model United Nations and
deals with the very important situation of the increasing exploitation of Missile
Technologies and Weapons of Mass Destruction(WMDs). This particular agenda is
deeply interesting as this is the only committee that debates, discusses, and makes
recommendations on subjects about international peace and security including
disarmament, human rights and international law.
Hence, before you set foot on this committee, remember that you are on a
committee of grave importance. This session of the United Nations General
Assembly is of great significance because there has been no previous
comprehensive discussion and a resolution (since 2008) on concerns of ballistic
missiles and anti-missile defence systems.
We expect you to pack up your best diplomatic skills, as much research and
knowledge as you can possibly muster, and the ability to think on your feet, for we
assure you that there shall never be a dull moment in committee. With this, we
would like to leave you to prepare, delegates. Do note that there is no substitute for
knowledge, and you are all expected to enter the committee when you are knee-
deep into research. We wish you all the best for your committee sessions and hope
that this committee will be able to achieve what it has been called for.
Looking forward to meeting you all in July!
Warm Regards,
The Executive Board


Question 1:
What is the United Nations?
The United Nations is an international organisation founded in 1945 to maintain
international peace and security, develop friendly relations among nations and promote
social progress, better living standards and human rights in 51 countries. The United
Nations has 6 principle organs.
The UN has 4 main purposes
⦁ To keep peace throughout the world;
⦁ To develop friendly relations among nations;
⦁ To help nations work together to improve the lives of poor people, to conquer hunger,
disease and illiteracy, and to encourage respect for each other’s rights and freedoms;
⦁ To be a centre for harmonising the actions of nations to achieve these goals
PRINCIPLE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS:
Question 2:
What is Model United Nations?
Model United Nations is a simulation of the actual United nation which is done to
enhance knowledge about pressing International issues. It is called Model United
Nations not mock United Nations because it does not work as an exact replica of the
United Nations, it is just an attempt to understand the working of the United Nations by
practising some of its working mechanisms. Every person who participates is given a
country to represent and is called Delegates of their respective committees. There are
some rules that we follow in MUNs to facilitate the debate called rules of procedure. The
procedure that is closest to what is followed in the actual UN is UN4MUN.
Question 3:
What is considered to be valid evidence in Model United Nations? Evidence or proof
that is acceptable from sources
1. News Sources:
a. REUTERS – Any Reuters article which clearly makes mention of the factor is in
contradiction of the fact being stated by a delegate in the council.
http://www.reuters.com/
b. State-operated News Agencies – These reports can be used in support of or against the
State that owns the News Agency. These reports, if credible or substantial enough, can be
used in support of or against any Country as such but in that situation, they can be
denied by any other country in the council.
 Some examples are,
i. RIA Novosti (Russia) http://en.rian.ru/
ii. IRNA (Iran) http://www.irna.ir/ENIndex.htm
iii. BBC (United Kingdom) http://www.bbc.co.uk/
iv. Xinhua News Agency and CCTV (P.R. China) http://cctvnews.cntv.cn/
2. Government Reports: These reports can be used similarly to the State Operated News
Agencies reports and can, in all circumstances, be denied by another country.
a. Government Websites like the State Department of the United States of America (
http://www.state.gov/index.htm ) or the Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation (
http://www.eng.mil.ru/en/index.htm )
b. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of various nations like India (http://www.mea.gov.in/),
People’s Republic of China (http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/)
France (http://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/),
Russian Federation (http://www.mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/main_eng)
c. Permanent Representatives to the United Nations Reports
http://www.un.org/en/members/
(Click on any country to get the website of the Office of its Permanent Representative)
d. Mulilateral Organisations like
NATO (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm),
ASEAN (http://www.aseansec.org/),
OPEC (http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/) etc.
3. UN Reports: All UN Reports are considered credible information or evidence for the
Executive Board of the Security Council.
a. UN Bodies: Like the
SC (http://www.un.org/Docs/sc/),
GA (http://www.un.org/en/ga/),
HRC (http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/Pages/HRCIndex.aspx) etc.
b. UN Affiliated bodies like the
International Atomic Energy Agency (http://www.iaea.org/),
World Bank (http://www.worldbank.org/),
International Monetary Fund (http://www.imf.org/external/index.htm),
International Committee of the Red Cross (http://www.icrc.org/eng/index.jsp), etc.
c. Treaty Based Bodies like the Antarctic Treaty System (http://www.ats.aq/e/ats.htm), the
International Criminal Court (http://www.icccpi.int/Menus/ICC)

IMPORTANT NOTE: THIS BACKGROUND GUIDE ISN’T A VALID SOURCE FOR PROOF.
IT IS JUST FOR REFERENCE, DON’T RESTRICT YOUR RESEARCH TO THE SAME.
 Question 4:
How to prepare for the Model United Nations?
General Research and Preparation Guidelines
There are three consistently significant parts of representative planning. They are
useful; meaningful; and positional planning. Practical readiness outfits the
representatives with essential apparatuses, including a comprehension of the guidelines
important to act on the board of trustees. The meaningful component gives preparation
of explicit data on the subject regions. At long last, positional planning requires the
understudies to embrace viewpoints that are not their own. In light of this, the EB gives
three instruments to help you: this Guide to Delegate Preparation, Background Guides,
and position papers. Together, these will guarantee you will be prepared for the
gathering. Past perusing and understanding the material we have given, the more
pragmatic experience you can gain through banter, goal composing, making
introductions, and so forth, the readier you will be.
Meaningful Preparation
The Background Guides are a consequence of broad exploration and exertion
concerning the Executive Board and are the establishment of the considerable
groundwork for every advisory group. We recommend that you read them, talk about
them, and read them once more. On the off chance that an agent has not perused and
ingested the data in the Background Guide, the person won't contribute adequately to the
board. An ambitious beginning on the Background Guides will empower you to
completely comprehend the subjects and start to tissue out your thoughts. Advise
yourself that you should go about as policymakers, dissecting and shaping the data you
have gotten into arrangements and goals. Conversations with different representatives
will likewise assist you with fostering your thoughts. While the Background Guide will
give a large portion of your meaningful readiness, autonomous exploration is valuable,
fulfilling and important for a fruitful gathering.
Positional Preparation
We expect representatives to receive the situation of a particular country all through
the UN reproduction. This is a vital component of the "global" experience of a model UN as
it powers representatives to analyse the points of view, issues, and arrangements of one
more country at an exceptionally major level. It is additionally quite possibly the most
troublesome part of MUN because understudies should go up against the natural
inclinations of their own public viewpoints and authentic data. The position papers are
the focal point of positional planning before the meeting.
Albeit generally short, we request that you invest energy and exertion in investigating and
keeping in touch with them.
Materials arranged by the EB are not intended to fill in for your individual exploration.
All things being equal, they ought to give a beginning stage, motivating you to ask
yourself inquiries about the current issues. The best-arranged agents are those that
accept the given materials as the start of their exploration and dig further into the
theme regions. Past these materials are a large group of data administrations, starting
with United Nations sources. UN's assets regularly have ordered measurements,
outlines, and charts which you may discover supportive in understanding the issues.
Most UN report communities convey records of UN gatherings; maybe the most ideal
approach to comprehend your nation's position is to see it iterated by its diplomat.
Explicit assets to research include:
Yearbook of the United Nations: The Yearbook is a decent beginning stage for your
examination. The Yearbook will furnish you with general data on what has been done
on your theme during a specific year. It likewise gives exceptionally accommodating
references to past articles and goals.
United Nations Chronicle: This magazine gives you general data on the procedures
of the UN. Watch out for exceptional reports on your theme region, which will
advise you about the point and countries' situations on it.
UN Document Index: This record for all UN reports comes in three distinct
renditions: UNDI (1950-1973), UNDEX (1970-1978), and UNODC (1979-present).
Contingent upon which of the three you are utilizing, you will track down a subject
record, a nation file, and an alphanumeric rundown of all reports distributed (this
is helpful in light of the fact that each panel has its own novel alphanumeric prefix
and accordingly you can track down every one of the records put out by a board of
trustees during a specific year paying little heed to the particular theme.
UN Resolutions: This arrangement is both significant and extremely simple to
utilize. The record is aggregate from 1946, which implies that you need just check
the most current list to track down every one of the goals on your point that the UN
has at any point passed.
Other UN Sources: Depending on the subject, there may be extra pertinent UN
sources. Check for books and exceptional reports put out by the WHO. Past United
Nations sources, notwithstanding, are general wellsprings of data. Explore your
school and nearby libraries. Look at diaries, periodicals, and papers for more
current sources. Remember to ask the curators for help.
Books: Up-to-date books are probably going to give you a profundity and
exactness that is hopeless from UN sources or periodicals. Try to check library
postings for bound materials. Book research, in any case, can take a decent
arrangement of time, so use prudence when choosing books.
Periodicals: Periodicals are valuable for straightforward, current data on points
(the Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature and InfoTrack fill in as a record for
these materials). Try not to anticipate that they should supply you with the
profundity of data you will require for the Conference.
People: A regularly ignored source; individuals can help you extraordinarily in
your exploration. A few groups to remember are: bookkeepers, individual agents,
personnel counsellors, and your board of trustees' Director, Moderator, and
Assistant Directors. Not exclusively can these individuals help you discover what
you are searching for, yet they may likewise suggest new sources that you had
not thought of. Try not to spare a moment to call or email your advisory group
Director. The individual has spent the whole summer doing investigate the
Background Guide and will be glad to address any inquiries.
Embassies and Consular Offices: Contact the government office or consular
office of the country that you are addressing. These spots are happy to help you
in your exploration via mailing factual information and other unclassified data.


The United Nations General Assembly First Committee (Disarmament and

International Security Committee), commonly known as DISEC, is one of
the six main committees of the United Nations General Assembly. It serves
as a forum for member states to discuss and address global disarmament
and security issues.

Since its inception, DISEC has been at the forefront of disarmament and
security discussions, fostering dialogue and cooperation among nations.
The committee provides a platform for member states to express their
concerns, propose resolutions, and engage in meaningful debates regarding
a wide range of pressing issues. These include nuclear disarmament, non-
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, conventional weapons
control, cyber warfare, and the prevention of illicit arms trafficking.
Over the years, DISEC has witnessed significant achievements in advancing
global disarmament and security objectives. Resolutions adopted by the
committee have contributed to the negotiation and implementation of vital
treaties and agreements, such as the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and
the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT). The committee also provides a platform for
states to discuss regional conflicts and promote peaceful resolutions
through dialogue and diplomacy.
As an inclusive and representative body, the committee encompasses the
diverse perspectives and interests of its member states. It encourages
collaboration, consensus-building, and the exchange of ideas, ultimately
working towards the collective goal of a safer and more secure world. By
addressing disarmament and international security challenges, the DISEC
reaffirms the United Nations' commitment to peace, stability, and the
promotion of global security.
 AN INTRODUCTION TO THE AGENDA

WHAT ARE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION?

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) are a category of highly destructive weapons

which carry the potential to cause significant damage on a large scale. Nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons–the three commonly recognized “weapons of
mass destruction” (WMD)–are distinguished from “conventional” weapons by their
capacity to destroy huge amounts of life and property in single attacks, These
weapons are primarily intended to attack civilian economy and populations, even
though they might be employed against massive and grouped military units. A
medium-sized city might be demolished by a single high-yield thermonuclear
hydrogen bomb. A professionally prepared and executed biological attack utilising
an agent like anthrax might result in the deaths of well over 100,000 people. The
greatest possible fully human-made sources of death and destruction are WMDs.
The unprecedented threat posed by nuclear weapons was generally understood
throughout the early Cold War years and was occasionally even exaggerated. But as
time passed, nations developed coping mechanisms for the bomb. Even while it
might be exaggerating to say that people gained accustomed to these weapons'
management, public worry has only infrequently surfaced since the early 1960s. The
relaxation of concern has been due in part to the end of the Cold War, and in part to
the sheer passage of time, during which the taboo against using nuclear weapons
has been reinforced. It is uncertain how motivated governments or other groups will
be to obtain such weapons or to use them, but the technological barriers to
acquiring them have been falling. Eight countries currently possess nuclear
weapons (a ninth, South Africa, developed and then dismantled them). An uncertain
but probably greater number have clandestine chemical or biological weapon (BW)
programs. For weak and isolated countries, or ones at odds with the sole remaining
superpower, incentives for acquiring weapons of mass destruction have grown as
well. Countries like Iraq, Iran, or North Korea have no conventional means by which
to contest American military power; WMD may be the only strategic “equalizer”
available to them.
USE OF WMDs IN ARMED CONFLICTS
1. Hiroshima and Nagasaki - World War II (1945): The United States fired atomic bombs
on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, which is the most
infamous application of WMDs. Around 200,000 people perished immediately as a
result of the bombings, while many more had long-term consequences like radiation
sickness and cancer.

2. Nuclear Threats: The Cold War (1947-1991): The Cold War between the United States
and the USSR posed a constant nuclear threat. Both engaged in an arms race,
stockpiling thousands of nuclear warheads. The world was on the brink of nuclear war
during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 when the United States and the Soviet Union
confronted each other over the placement of nuclear missiles in Cuba. Fortunately,
diplomacy prevailed, averting a nuclear conflict.

3. Syrian Civil War (2011-present): The ongoing Syrian Civil War has witnessed the use
of chemical weapons, particularly by the Syrian government. Multiple instances of
chemical attacks have been reported, including the 2013 Ghouta attack near Damascus,
which killed hundreds of people.

MISSILE TECHNOLOGIES
Missile Technologies continue to be a focus of increased international attention and
negotiations. The international community has long harboured concerns regarding
the accumulation, proliferation, threat, and use of ballistic and other types of missiles.
States have pursued various unilateral, bilateral, and multilateral measures to restrict
the proliferation of missile technologies.
Despite the concerns of the international community, there is no legally binding
instrument specifically governing the development, testing, production, acquisition,
transfer, deployment, or use of missiles. Since missiles have the potential to carry and
deliver weapons of mass destruction (WMD) payload quickly and accurately, it makes
them a qualitatively significant political and military issue plus the diversity in
international views on matters related to missile technologies poses a severe challenge
to the efforts to address the issue in multilateral fora.
Presently, several multilateral regimes exist which seek to prevent the proliferation of
missiles and related technology. These include, notably, the Hague Code of
Conduct(HCOC) and the Missile Technology Control Regime(MTCR). A number of
key issues have been taken into consideration in order to address the issue of
missiles. These issues include the global and regional security backdrop which
motivates missile development, testing, production, acquisition, transfer, possession,
deployment, and use; the circumstances of transfer to and use of certain types of
missiles and missile technology by State or non-State actors; the issue of
disarmament, arms control and non-proliferation; and missile defence. The fact that
ballistic missiles are often armed with warheads remains unaltered which gives rise
to distinctive security concerns, both global and regional.
Recent ballistic missile strikes have shown that these weapons remain attractive for
many countries as they seek to develop missile capabilities by building domestic
production capacities or by resorting to external suppliers. Whether ballistic missiles
are coupled with weapons of mass destruction or not, they can be seen as powerful
weapons which carry a degree of prestige and the potential to cause massive
depredation. They can have a deterring effect due to the damage they can inflict if
they hit highly populated areas. They remain hard to detect and destroy before the
launch and, as has been demonstrated by recent operational uses, it is difficult to
intercept even for states which have heavily invested in missile defence.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MISSILE

TECHNOLOGIES AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

The connection between Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) and ballistic

missiles is a critical aspect of international security and strategic considerations.
Ballistic missiles serve as a delivery system for WMDs, which include nuclear,
chemical, and biological weapons. The combination of these two elements presents a
formidable threat due to their potential to cause widespread destruction and
casualties.
Ballistic missiles are suited for delivering WMDs over long distances. Their
trajectory, powered by powerful engines, allows them to travel at high speeds and
follow a parabolic path, enabling precise targeting of distant
locations. This Makes it an attractive option for nations seeking to project power or
deter potential threats. By possessing ballistic missiles capable of carrying WMDs, a
nation can exert influence, enhance its strategic position, and potentially “bully” other
nations.
Nuclear weapons have historically been the primary focus when discussing the link
between WMDs and ballistic missiles. The ability to deliver a nuclear warhead with a
ballistic missile offers a nation a long-range striking capability, making it a significant
player in global politics. The destructive potential of a single nuclear warhead is
immense, with the ability to cause massive casualties and leave long-lasting
environmental and societal impacts(from what we saw from the Hiroshima-Nagasaki
attack in 1945). The deployment of ballistic missiles capable of carrying nuclear
warheads raises concerns regarding the stability of international relations, as the
threat of nuclear escalation can have far-reaching consequences.
Beyond nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles can also be utilized to deliver chemical and
biological weapons. The use of chemical and biological agents can result in widespread
casualties, as well as contaminate the affected area, posing significant challenges for
recovery and decontamination efforts. Ballistic missiles offer a means of overcoming
geographic limitations, allowing these weapons to be delivered to targets that may be
inaccessible through other means.
International efforts to prevent the spread of ballistic missile technology and WMDs
have been a focal point of non-proliferation initiatives. Treaties like the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) aim to limit the transfer of ballistic missile technology and
control the proliferation of WMDs. These agreements emphasize the importance of
maintaining strict controls and safeguards on the development, production, and
transfer of both ballistic missiles and WMDs.
Arms control and disarmament negotiations have also sought to address the link
between WMDs and ballistic missiles. Treaties such as the Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) have been pursued to limit the number of ballistic missiles and WMDs
possessed by nations. These efforts aim to reduce the risk of their use and enhance
global security by promoting transparency, confidence-building measures, and
verifiable reductions.
The link between WMDs and ballistic missiles underscores the complex challenges
faced by the international community in maintaining global stability and preventing
the proliferation of weapons capable of causing
catastrophic harm. It necessitates ongoing dialogue, cooperative measures, and
sustained diplomatic efforts to address the concerns associated with these dual
threats. By focusing on non-proliferation, arms control, and disarmament, the
international community can work towards minimizing the risks posed by the
combination of WMDs and ballistic missiles and foster a more secure and
peaceful world.
With the conclusion of the Cold War came a slew of accords and agreements aimed at
reducing the threat posed by nuclear weapons and substantially reducing the
number of warheads deployed. This time of increased collaboration and optimism
coincided with the potential of negotiating new non–proliferation measures and
strengthening current ones.

Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation (HCOC)

The HCOC, formerly known as "The International Code of Conduct" (ICOC), was
agreed upon during an international conference held on November 25-26, 2002 in
The Hague. As a political enterprise, the HCOC seeks to increase efforts to restrict and
delegitimize ballistic missile proliferation across the world. The HCOC is the only
normative mechanism for verifying the proliferation of ballistic missiles. The Code
does not call for any missiles to be destroyed; rather, it is an agreement among
governments on how to "manage" their trade-in missiles.
States are advised to adopt legally binding Code commitments to restrict the spread
of WMD-capable ballistic missiles and to use extreme prudence in developing,
testing, and deploying such missiles. The Code contains transparency standards for
ballistic missile and space launch programs, such as yearly declarations and pre-
launch notifications.
The Code is not a feasible and verifiable anti-ballistic missile regime. It is instead a
non-binding declaration that encourages governments to take limited actions such
as reporting on their ballistic missile programs on an annual basis and alerting all
other signatories before conducting ballistic missile tests. There is no attempt to hold
signatories legally accountable. The HCOC has created a standard that complements
the MTCR and aims to mitigate the risk posed by ballistic missiles. It has developed a
nearly uniform system to minimize misunderstanding between Space Launched
Vehicles (SLV) launches, missile tests, and attacks, based on the then-bilateral US-
Soviet (and later US–Russian) launch pre-notification agreements. To counteract the
destabilizing nature of these weapons, the Code imposes several behavioural and
openness constraints on missile owners. Even though it is not legally enforceable, it is
a tremendous success in terms of non–proliferation. With the approval of the HCOC,
the international community openly recognised that the proliferation of ballistic
missiles and WMDs is a threat to international security that must be addressed.
Governments' systematic co-development of WMDs and ballistic missiles underlines
the importance of such a norm against delivery vehicles. The development of WMDs
continues to be a major source of concern and, in most cases, a violation of
international accords; nonetheless, the threat presented by these programs is mostly
theoretical due to the lack of an adequate vehicle to deliver them. To reduce the
consequences of WMD programs, it is vital to avoid the spread of ballistic missiles.
The link between the UN and the HCOC (which was negotiated outside the context of
the United Nations), is established with the Resolutions regarding the HCOC that
were adopted during the 59th, 60th, 63rd, 65th, 67th, and 69th UN-General
Assemblies in New York. In the 59th session, resolution 59/91 passed in the General
Assembly and formalized the support of the UN towards the HCOC.

Missile Technology and Control Regime (MTCR)

The MTCR is an informal non-treaty association of governments sharing common
interests in the nonproliferation of missiles, unmanned air vehicles, and related
technologies. The regime's goal is to limit the risks of proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction (i.e. nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons) by controlling the
transfers that could make a contribution to delivery systems (other than manned
aircraft) for such weapons. The regime consists of Guidelines and an Equipment and
Technology Annex. The annex is divided into two separate groupings of items,
Category I and II. Category I includes complete missiles, rockets, and unmanned air
vehicle systems; major subsystems; and production facilities. The transfer of
production technology for Category I items is prohibited. Category II comprises
specialized materials, technologies, propellants, and sub-components for missiles
and rockets. The transfer of Category II items is less restricted but still requires case-
by-case review and end-use certification or verification where appropriate. The
MTCR has no formal mechanism to enforce compliance. The implementation of the
MTCR is dependent on the resolve of its Member States.
Many of the world’s most advanced missile-producing nations are MTCR members.
The regime’s comprehensive annex of defined delivery systems and subsystems is
regularly updated and forms the basis for many non-subscribing states’ missile
export controls as well as other multilateral non-proliferation mechanisms. Through
its controls, the regime has notably slowed or stopped several prospective missile
programmes and contributed to non-proliferation norms through the presumption
of denial standard for the regime’s most sensitive technologies. Despite these
strengths, in an informal political understanding, it lacks the ability to impose any
legally binding obligations on its members.
For various reasons, the MTCR is far more successful at managing ballistic missiles
than cruise missiles. First, there is a very strong consensus among members to limit
ballistic missiles, but not yet for cruise missiles and other UAVs. Second, governments
who are unable to produce their own cruise missiles will be able to purchase them
despite the constraints imposed by the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR),
an international agreement meant to prevent missile proliferation. The MTCR's
dilemma is that it is primarily concerned with missiles with a range of 300 kilometres
and at least a 500-kilogram payload. Another issue is that certain nations, including
China, have not signed the MTCR.

Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)

The NPT's goals are to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons
technology, promote peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and advance the objective of
disarmament. The Treaty established a safeguards mechanism under the
supervision of the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency), which also plays a key
role in areas of technology transfer for peaceful purposes under the Treaty.
The overarching benefit provided by the NPT is that of enhanced international peace
and security. The norm of nonproliferation--the international consensus that the
further spread of nuclear weapons would weaken all states’ security, as well as global
and regional stability--remains strong. The NPT is the cornerstone of the
international nuclear nonproliferation regime which includes the framework of legal
restrictions, safeguards, export controls, international cooperation, and other
mechanisms mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation. The NPT is the only
internationally-binding agreement that provides a global barrier to the spread of
nuclear weapons. In the 40 years since the NPT’s entry into force, there has been
tremendous growth in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. One of the key challenges
to the Treaty continues to be noncompliance with nonproliferation obligations by a
few NPT non-nuclear-weapon states. The overwhelming majority of NPT Parties do
comply with their nonproliferation obligations, but continuing compliance
challenges make clear the need for the international community to remain vigilant
about compliance, to strengthen continually the Treaty’s implementation and the
nonproliferation regime, and to continue to pursue international efforts to bring
non-compliant states back into compliance.
 CASE STUDY
The Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The conflict between Russia and Ukraine has turned into the largest testing ground for
ballistic and cruise missiles in modern warfare. It’s the first time since World War II that
tactical ballistic missiles have played a major role in battle. The use of missiles in the
Russian operation is also different from previous 21st-century wars in terms of the
combination of systems employed. Russia’s missile strategy has involved the use of ballistic
strikes (the Iskander and Tuchka-M), cruise launches (Kalibr), hypersonic strikes (Kinzhal),
and coastal defence systems attacking ground targets (the Bastion and Bal systems). The
Soviet-designed Grad (Hail), Smerch (Tornado), and Uragan (Hurricane) multiple rocket
launchers are designed to fire a salvo of powerful rockets to destroy concentrations of
troops or military equipment. Their use against populated areas inevitably causes heavy
casualties and major damage to civilian infrastructure.
Role of Missile Technologies in the Conflict
Ballistic missiles are leading the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Ballistic Missiles like
Iskander have the precision to hit targets 500 kilometres away. The Iskander is a
multipurpose tool that comes in various versions - bunker buster, smart submunition,
thermobaric, and even EMP (Electromagnetic Pulse). While Iskander-M (ballistic missile) is
a very capable and precise system, the probability of collateral damage, obviously, increases
with the number and intensity of weapons used. To hit key targets, the militaries have used
Iskander missiles that have a range of up to 500 kilometres (around 300 miles) and carry a
much more powerful warhead that can destroy big buildings and some fortified facilities.
Some Iskander missiles were reportedly fired from the territory of Russian ally Belarus,
which has served as a staging ground in this conflict. OTR-21 Tochka Short Range Ballistic
Missile (SRBM), was also used, which was believed to have been retired.
Kinzhal (Dagger), the main hypersonic missile used in this conflict, was launched from the
air, most likely by a MiG-31 warplane. It has been reported that Hypersonic missiles can
travel at more than five times the speed of sound, or Mach 5, and have a range of 2,000
kilometres. Weapons like hypersonic missiles are new-age technologies that are in the
process of being perfected by various countries like China, the US, and India, and these are
considered to be ‘unstoppable’ The Kinzhal aviation missile system with hypersonic aero-
ballistic missiles destroyed a large underground warehouse containing missiles. This
missile also destroyed aviation ammunition in the village of Deliatyn in the Ivano-
Frankivsk region of Ukraine. Kh-101 and Kh-55 cruise missiles, which are launched from
fixed-wing aircraft such as the Tu-95 Bear and Tu-160 Blackjack bombers, were also used.
Such missiles have been regularly spotted flying over Ukraine on their way to their targets
and were used in April attacks on Odesa, according to military analyst Rob Lee.
The Ukrainian military has relied on the same assortment of Soviet-built multiple
rocket launchers and howitzers that the Russian military has. It doesn’t possess
sophisticated long-range precision weapons like Russia’s Iskander ballistic missiles and
Kalibr cruise missiles. The Ukrainian military has Soviet-era Tochka-U short-range
ballistic missiles, which have a powerful warhead but poor precision compared to the
latest Russian weapons. NATO nations like the US are supplying Ukraine's defence
forces which include Javelin missiles, Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, and high-velocity
anti-armour missiles.

ARMENIA AZERBAIJAN WAR

Armenia and Azerbaijan had been in an armed conflict for nearly 30 years over the
Karabakh (Garabagh) region, which is an internationally recognized territory of
Azerbaijan. Armenia launched full-blown military aggression against Azerbaijan
following the Soviet Union’s
dissolution in 1991. The bloody war lasted until a ceasefire in 1994 and saw Armenia
occupying 20 per cent of Azerbaijan’s internationally recognized territories. Over 30,000
Azerbaijanis were killed, and one million were expelled from those lands in a brutal
ethnic cleansing policy conducted by Armenia.
In September 2020, the decades-old conflict between the two countries spiralled after
Armenia’s forces deployed in the occupied Azerbaijani lands shelled military positions
and civilian settlements of Azerbaijan. Armenian military forces carried out unlawfully
indiscriminate rocket and missile strikes on Azerbaijan during the hostilities. There
were incidents in which Armenian forces used ballistic missiles, unguided artillery
rockets, and large-calibre artillery projectiles that hit populated areas in apparently
indiscriminate attacks.
The Armenian military used the lethal Iskander missiles against Azerbaijan. The
Russian-made Iskander supports different conventional warheads such as a cluster
munitions warhead, a fuel-air explosive enhanced-blast warhead, a high explosive-
fragmentation warhead, an earth penetrator for bunker-busting, and an
electromagnetic pulse device for anti-radar missions, as well as nuclear warheads
Russia dispatched Iskander-E missiles, which had a range of about 280 kilometres but
in Azerbaijan, the missile fragments belonging to an “M” type of the Iskander missile
complex that travels up to 500 kilometres, which was not possessed by the Armenian
forces were also found. Azerbaijan used the LORA (Long Range Attack) missiles. Baku
specifically used the LORA to strike a bridge connecting Armenia to Nagorno-Karabakh
in an attempt to cut off Armenian reinforcements and supplies but failed in this
attempt. In addition to causing civilian casualties, the Armenian
attacks damaged homes, businesses, schools, and a health clinic, and contributed to
mass displacement. According to the Azerbaijani prosecutor general’s office, 98 civilians
were killed and 414 wounded during the armed conflict, and over 3,000 homes and 100
apartment buildings were destroyed or damaged. The conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh region included the heavy use of
missiles, drones, and rocket artillery. Azerbaijan was the clear military victor, with both
Russia and Turkey also benefiting politically from the war’s outcome.
The 44-day war featured a diverse array of legacy and advanced air and missile strike
and defence platforms. The ballistic missiles used spanned generations, from older
Soviet-era Scud and Tochka missiles to the newer and more advanced Iskander and the
Israeli-made LORA missiles. Drones of Russian, Turkish, Israeli, and indigenous designs
performed reconnaissance missions to support artillery use and strike missions.
Unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) and loitering munition attacks were able to destroy
heavy ground units, including T-72 tanks and advanced S-300 air defences.

The topic of missiles has not received considerable worldwide attention, discussion,
and involvement. The importance of missiles of various varieties, both conventional
and non-conventional, in many countries national and regional security policies,
including their offensive and defensive capabilities, is a continuing and expanding
trend. The creation, testing, manufacturing, acquisition, transfer, brokering,
possession, deployment, and use of missiles has long been a source of worry for
international peace and security, both worldwide and locally.
Although the Preamble of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
(NPT) includes the goal of eliminating delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons, the
world has been lamentably slow in fulfilling this promise. This applies not just to
missiles per se, but also to their development, production, stockpiling, export, and
proliferation as well as to missile defences.
Non-state actors are a major concern in the proliferation of missile technologies.
Rockets and missiles have become a major component of non-state actors like
Hezbollah’s military posture. At the level of military organization and strategy,
Hezbollah has grown into an ambitious non-state actor that has mastered the use of
rockets and ballistic missiles to support its political goals. In 2006 Hezbollah militia
fired almost 4,000 missiles from Lebanese territory, causing serious damage and 43
deaths in the densely populated Galilee region in northern Israel. The town of Kiryat
Shmona alone was the target of 911 Hezbollah-launched rockets.
The complexity of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) adds to the growing security
problem posed by missiles and their proliferation, demanding more determined and
coherent efforts from the international community to actually resolve the issue of
“missiles in all its aspects”. Today, the proliferation of missile technology is a critically
important issue for international security, even more as it is linked with the
proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD). A nuclear
weapon, after all, poses much more of a threat if there are appropriate means to deliver
it. Cruise missiles cost four to ten times less than ballistic missiles, they are easier to
acquire and maintain, require less training and logistical support, perform with better
accuracy, and are more reliable. Cruise missiles have been dubbed “the poor man’s air
force” and, for some, their proliferation is of greater concern.
To deal with the problems missiles are causing it is necessary to understand the motives
driving missile proliferation and its security implications. From a military viewpoint,
using ballistic missiles to deliver conventional warheads appears relatively inefficient.
Old generations of missiles lack accuracy, and the more advanced ballistic missiles are
expensive compared with other means of dropping bombs. While so-called states of
concern and terrorists still lack the necessary technical capabilities to pose a global
missile threat, the use of missiles by current nuclear-weapon states remains an issue.
Cooperative approaches are also required for preventive arms control and
disarmament. An effective missile control regime needs to reflect the complexity of the
issue. It should include the various stages of missile development and take into account
that the potential missile threat increases with the missile development process,
making control efforts at later stages more difficult. It would consider the linkages
between different categories of delivery systems.

QUESTIONS THE RESOLUTION SHOULD ANSWER

The thorough case studies and challenges addressed above have offered a very deep
understanding of missile technology development, testing, manufacture, acquisition,
transfer, and usage. To summarize, the questions that each delegate must answer -
1. Do the current mechanisms like the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC) and the
Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) dealing with the issue of missiles
suffice to curb the growing threat of the Proliferation of ballistic missiles?
2. Is a global legally binding structure required to reduce the threat of ballistic and
hypersonic missile technology?
3. How can the international community act to prevent the acquisition, use, and
production of missile technologies by Non-State actors?
4. Are changes required in the current Non-Proliferation Treaty(NPT)?

SEE YOU IN JULY !!!