THE
UNITED
NATIONS
CONSPIRACY
by Robert W Lee
To those Americans disappointed
by the performance of the United
Nations, th is book gives a startling
reply: the U N is performing precisely
as programmed and achieving the
goals of th o se who conceived it.
How c a n th a t be? After all, in the
three and a half decades of the UN's
existence w e have seen increasingly
bloody w ars and "police actions,”
growing instability, a global epidemic
of terrorism , widening hostility to
American ideals and a corresponding
decline in o u r influence.
As a u th o r Robert W. Lee demon
strates, t h a t apparent contradiction
is an illusion. The UN charter is not
an in stru m e n t for peace, but a blue
print for w a r; the natural function
of the UN is not the easing of world
tensions, b u t their exacerbation; and
rather t h a n a framework for liberty
it is a h a rn e s s to restrain opposition
to tyranny.
In The U n ite d Nations Conspiracy
you will discover the powers th at
launched t h e UN and control it to
this day. A n d , while you may still be
d isa p p o in te d by the UN’s perfor
mance, y o u will be Bure th a t they are
not.
THE
UNITED NATIONS
CONSPIRACY
THE
INITED NATIONS
CONSPIRACY
by Robert W. Lee
WESTERN ISLANDS
PUBLISHERS
BOSTON LOS ANGELES
Copyright © 1981 by Western Islands
All rights reserved.
Published by
Western Islands
395 Concord Avenue
Belmont, M assachusetts 02178
Printed in the United Statei of America
ISBN: 0-88279-236-9
Mom and Dad
Karen
Mike, Gary, Reed, Bruce, Larry
— and Snooks
CONTENTS
D e d i c a ti o n ........................................................................... iv
Foreword ........................................................................... ix
1. S e ttin g T he S t a g e ...................................................... 3
2. M en A t T he T o p ...................................................... 13
3. W ar A nd P e a c e ......................................................... 33
4. A g g re s s io n ..................................................................... 47
5. K orea ........................................................................... 51
6. R hodesia .................................................................... 61
7. T hey Love M e? T hey Love Me N o t ? .................. 69
8. A M a tte r Of O p i n i o n ............................................... 81
9. A rticle 19 ..................................................................... 89
10. J u s t Like US ............................................................. 95
11. T he C h a r t e r ...................................................... Ill
12. N a tio n a l S o v e r e i g n t y ............................................... 119
13. P a t r i o t i s m ..................................................................... 127
14. One W orld G overnm ent ........................................ 139
15. Dem ocracy ................................................................. 143
16. HoneBtly! ..................................................................... 147
17. F eathering T h e N est ............................................... 153
18. T he H u m a n it a r i a n s ................................................... 157
19. U N IC E F — A C ase H istory . . . ...................... 165
20. M odel UN — A Case H i s t o r y ................................. 173
21. O ut O f S i t e ! .................................................................. 181
22. G et U S O ut? ............................................................ 185
23. G et U S o u t ! .................................................................. 189
24. U nited N atio n s U p d a t e .......................................... 197
A p p en d ices ......................................................................... 215
F ootnotes ............................................................................ 263
Index .................................................................................... 269
A Note Of Interest
An idler, looking up a t the narrow sid e of th e Secre
ta r ia t B uild in g from F orty-second S treet, spoke cynically
to his com panion.
“ You know why they b u ilt it t h a t w ay?” he ask ed . “ Like
a m atchbox s ittin g on one end? T hey d id it so, w hen they
get read y , th ey can strik e a m a tc h down th e sid e an d th e
whole th in g 'll go up in sm oke.”
UN: T o d a y a n d Tom orrow by E leanor Roosevelt an d
W illiam D eW itt (New York: H a rp e r & B rothers, 1953),
p. 35.
Foreword
The United Nations is in serious trouble. The American
people have finally begun to recognize the world organization
for what it is — a pro-Communist force designed to enslave us
in World Government — rather than the peacekeeping entity its
advocates have claimed it to be.
In 1959, the Gallup Poll reported th a t eighty-seven percent of
the American people thought th a t the UN was doing a good job.1
Four years later, polls were claiming eighty percent support.3
But on UN Day, October 24, 1970, Thomas Vail, a member of
the President’s Commission for the Observance of the 25th
Anniversary of the United Nations, told an audience in Des
Moines, Iowa, “ Public faith in the U.N. peacekeeping ability
has declined from eighty percent to fifty percent.”3 In 1971 Dr.
Gallup reported a drop to thirty-five percent,4 and in 1973 U.S.
Ambassador to the UN John Scali referred to a poll indicating
th at only thirty-four percent of the American people thought
the UN was doing an effective job.6 By January, 1976 the
Gallup Poll revealed that support for the UN had fallen to an
all-time low of thirty-three percent, with an actual majority of
those polled (fifty-one percent) specifically asserting th a t the
UN was doing a “ poor job.”6 And, on November 19, 1980, Dr.
Gallup released the results of yet another poll which revealed:
“The public’s rating of the United Nations’ performance has
declined to a 35-year low. Currently, only three Americans in 10
(31 percent) feel the U.N. is doing a ‘good job' in trying to solve
the problems it has had to face, while 63 percent feel it is doing
a ‘poor job.’” Dr. Gallup then notes th at his poll “ has measured
the public’s attitudes toward the U.N. since its formation in
1945, using questions appropriate to the international situation
at the time. At no point since then has satisfaction with the
overall performance of the world organization been as low as it
is today.’’7
This mounting antagonism toward the UN has been reflected
in many other wayB as well. For example, visitors to UN head
quarters in New York City numbered over one million in 1967,
X The United Nations Conspiracy
but dropped to 765,000 in 1972, and plunged an additional
thirteen percent in 1973," In 1975, an unidentified member of
the US mission to the UN lamented, . . there are even some
Congressmen calling for us to quit the U.N. altogether . . .
believe me, those of us involved with, and concerned about, the
organization are pretty damned worried."'1 In March of that
year, Senator Charles Percy (R.-Illinois) reported, “Criticism of
the United Nations has probably never been greater than it is
now in the United States,’’10 while his Democrat colleague,
Senator Dick Clark of Iowa, stated two months later, “It is
becoming fashionable to be against the U.N.” 11 In November,
1975, Senator Gale McGee (D.-\Vyoming) reinforced these
statem ents by asserting, “ I have never seen the anti-U.N. senti
ment within the Congress b o strong in my 17 years as a U.S.
Senator.” 12 And in May, 1976, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Organization Affairs Samuel W. Lewis told an
audience in Milwaukee, “The polls show that public regard for
the UN has recently reached a new low. . . . And more Ameri
cans are writing to us, calling for the U.S. to leave the UN if it
does not ‘mend its ways’.” 13
During 1977 alone, a t least fifteen separate bills and Resolu
tions were introduced in the House and Senate to limit or reduce
U.S. contributions to the UN; and yet another demanded the
impeachment of UN Ambassador Andrew Young.14 Meanwhile
the news media are increasingly critical of the UN, with many
of those who have defended the world body taking a second
look, and others who have grudgingly tolerated it concluding
th a t the time has come for the United States to get out.
These withdrawal symptoms are encouraging, for they ap
parently mean we are moving ever closer to the day when we will
get the UN monkey off our back. As an editorial in the Arizona
Republic put it:
When the United Nations once wan generally considered a
respectable forum for maintaining some semblance of world
harmony, the John Birch Society virtually was alone in its
billboard demands to “(let US out of The U.N.”
Foreword xi
Time and events seem to prove the Birch Society may simply
have been ahead of its time.
The U.N . has lost its sacred cow standing. Members of
Congress, the man on the street and the media have been showing
increased belligerence to the U .N .14
Time is always on the side of tru th . Today the UN is
increasingly regarded not as a sacred cow, but rather as a troika
composed of a white elephant, a Trojan horse, and a Judas goat.
White elephants were the rare albino pachyderms th at tradi
tionally belonged to Siamese kings, who would then present
them to courtiers they didn’t like. Since white elephants were
not allowed to work, could not be disposed of without offending
the king, and had enormous appetites, they would eventually
reduce the courtier to ruin. T he United Nations, a "gift" to our
country from its founders, has had roughly the same destruc
tive impact. The decline of our national honor, influence, and
independence since 1945 has resulted in large part from the
manner in which our foreign policy (and much of our domestic
policy) has been molded to m eet United Nations specifications.
The Trojan horse was presented as an offering of peace and
good will to the people of Troy; in fact, it was loaded with
Athenian warriors bent on Troy’s destruction. The main differ
ence between the Trojan horse and the UN is th a t the Trojans
didn’t know th at the horse contained their enemies; the UN, on
the other hand, was wheeled into New York City with the full
knowledge of our leaders th at its key posts were controlled by
Communists and other anti-Americans, and th a t diplomatic
immunity would give our enemies a protected base for their
operations within our borders. As the late FBI Director J. Edgar
Hoover warned in 1971:
Red Chinese intelligence in the United States, as compared
with Soviet Russia’s, has a major handicap in th a t Peking is
n o t . . . a member of the United Nations. This deprives the Red
— Chinese-of a legal base from which to operate spies. A high
percentage of Soviet espionage, for example, is carried out by
xii The United Nations Conspiracy
Soviet diplomat* assigned to . . . the USSR's Mission to the
Unitad Nations in New York."
Of course, the "problem ” of Red Chinese recognition by the
UN W8B solved later th a t same year when President Richard
Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger successfully
maneuvered Red China into the world body.
Judas goats are animals trained to lead other animals peace
fully to slaughter. Their job is to keep the victims deluded about
their actual situation until it is too late to do anything about it.
Similarly, propagandists for the UN have consistently misled
the American people regarding the true nature of the world
body. They imply th at it is carrying us along the road to peace
when, as we shall see, it is taking us down the garden path
toward a Marxist-oriented World Government. Such deception
has become so salient a feature of the United Nations operation
th a t it iB doubtful the organization could survive without it. In
fact, it is largely because Americans are finally catching on to
the subterfuge th at the UN is in such hot water today.
The following chapters are intended to hasten the exposure
of this deceit.
THE
UNITED NATIONS
CONSPIRACY
World War I witnessed physical destruction, bloodletting,
and social disorganization on a scale seldom equaled in human
society to that time. It furnished a powerful stim ulus to an
often complacent Victorian world for eliminating war and
creating machinery for nonviolent adjustm ent of disagreements
in the world community. Out of the "war to end wars” and to
"make the world safe for democracy" came intensive and
widespread study of methods for setting up a viable
international organization. From numerous sources, both official
and priuate, suggestions and proposals were made which finally
coalesced into the Covenant of the League of Nations . . . .
- Cecil V. Crabb, Jr.*
Chapter 1
Setting The Stage
Colonel Edward Mandell House was President Woodrow
Wilson’s closest and most influential adviser. A powerful be
hind-the-scenes manipulator, House had enormous influence in
shaping Wilson’s domestic and foreign policies to support eco
nomic collectivism and political internationalism. As noted by
one biographer:
For all his might, Wilson could not stand alone. In every
fruitful enterprise he borrowed the Colonel’i brain. I shall not
impute feet of clay to the idol. I concede they are living flesh.
But they are not his own. Woodrow Wilson stalks through history
on the feet of Edward Mandell House.'
Colonel House wrote the first draft of the League of Nations
covenant3 and, in September, 1917, convinced President Wilson
to commission a group of “ intellectuals" to devise terms for
peace and draft a program for a world government.4 T he group,
later known aB The Inquiry, consisted of some highly talented
individuals, many of whose names later became household
4 The United Nations Conspiracy
words as prominent journalists, top government officials, and
influential academicians. For instance:
Sidney Mezes, House’s brother-in-law and president of the
City College of New York, was named director. Jam es T. Shot-
well was in charge of historical geography and then of the library.
There was [«t'c| Christian A. Herter, later to become Secretary of
State, and Norman Thomas, a Marxian Socialist. And the secre
tary was a gentleman named W alter Lippmann . . . .
And then there were a couple of brothers, enterprising chaps —
Allen Welsh Dulles [later Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency] and John Foeter Dulles [later Secretary of State].*
President Wilson drew heavily upon the work of The Inquiry
in formulating his famous Fourteen Points program which was
presented to Congress on January 18,1918, as a peace strategy to
save the world.* The group incorporated various peace proposals
and the League of Nations covenant into the document, which
the United States rejected first on November 19, 1919, and
again on March 20, 1920.7
American Internationalists expected the frustration and dis
ruption generated by World War I to condition the American
people so the United States could be enticed into the League of
Nations as an alleged means of avoiding future wars.
However, by the spring of 1919 it had already become clear
that the League would face serious, possibly fatal, opposition in
the United StateB Senate. Colonel House and a few of his
followers therefore began laying groundwork for a long-range
effort to condition Americans to accept eventual United States
membership in a supranational organization steeped in their
particular brand of collectivist internationalism. If World War I
couldn’t do it then perhapB some later conflict could, for as
Alexander Hamilton had recognized decades earlier:
Safety from external danger is the moat powerful director of
national conduct. Even the ardent love of liberty will after a
time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of life and
property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm atten
Setting The Stage 5
dant on a state of continual danger, will compel nations the moet
attached to liberty to resort for repose and security to institutions
which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political rights.
To be more safe, they a t length become willing to run the risk of
being less free.'
On May 30, 1919, Colonel House and his associates met with
some like-minded Englishmen at the Majestic Hotel in Paris.
The British participants subsequently established the Royal
Institute for International Affairs (RIIA), while the Americans
returned to the United States and founded the American
Institute for International Affairs (AIIA). (See Appendix A.)
The AIIA subsequently merged with the Council on Foreign
Relations (CFR), a languishing discussion group which had been
formed in New York during the war. The merger was formally
incorporated in New York City on July 29, 1921. According to
Hamilton Fish Armstrong, who served for fifty years (until
October, 1972) as managing editor and editor of the CFR’s
influential quarterly, Foreign Affairs, “ Besides taking the Coun
cil’s name, they gained the financial backing of its public-
spirited membership. They also acquired a locus, something
vital if they were to continue functioning collectively and not as
individuals dispersed in academic and other centers.’’®
Since th at time, the CFR has greatly influenced American
foreign and domestic policies to fit the designs for world
government envisioned by its founders, and has conditioned the
American people to accept the changes as both wise and neces
sary.
This is not to imply, of course, th at all members of the CFR
support the dangerous internationalism promoted by the orga
nization as a whole. To the contrary, some members have
themselves attem pted to expose and clarify the group’s modus
operandi and goals. Admiral Chester Ward, for instance, a CFR
member and former Judge Advocate of the United States Navy,
has pointed out:
the vast influence attributed to CFR is not exercised
6 The United Nations Conspiracy
through or by the Council on Foreign Relations as an organization.
. . . CFR, aa such, does not write the platform* of both political
parties or select their respective presidential candidates, or con
trol U.S. defense and foreign policies. But CFR members, as
individuals, acting in concert with other individual CFR mem
bers, do.10
The Admiral continues:
Once the ruling members of CFR have decided th a t the U.S.
Government should adopt a particular policy, the very substantial
research facilities of CFR are put to work to develop arguments,
intellectual and emotional, to support the new policy, and to
confound and discredit, intellectually and politically, any opposi
tion. The most articulate theoreticians and ideologists prepare
related articles, aided by the research, to sell the new policy and to
make it appear inevitable and irresistible. By following the
evolution of this propaganda in the most prestigious scholarly
journal in the world, Foreign Affairs, anyone can determine years
in advance what the future defense and foreign policies of the
United States will be. If a certain proposition is repeated often
enough in that journal, then the U.S. Administration in power —
be it Republican or Democratic — begins to act as if th at
proposition or assumption were an established fact."
Americana in recent years have been asking the question:
"Why do policies detrim ental to our nation continue regardless
of which Party is in power?” An im portant clue to the answer
can be found in a careful study of the Council on Foreign
Relations.* Ab Thomas Jefferson once observed: “Single acts
of tyranny may be ascribed to the accidental opinion of a day;
but a series of oppressions, begun at a distinguished period, and
pursued unalterably through every change of ministers, too
plainly prove a deliberate, systematical plan of reducing us to
slavery.” 12
'S ee Appendix B for the complete CFR membership renter as of June 30, 1980.
An excellent source of background information on the CFR is The CFR Packet,
available for two dollars from American Opinion, Belmont, Massachusetts
02178.
Setting The Stage 7
World W ar II was launched by the German invasion of
Poland on September 1, 1939. Even before the end of that year,
influential Americans were planning for the post-war years. A
CFR publication describes how the organization achieved its
early influence on governmental affairs:
Within a week [of the war’s start], Hamilton Fish Armstrong,
Editor of Foreign Affairs, and Walter H. Mallory, Executive
Director of the Council, paid a visit to the Departm ent of State
to offer such aid on the part of the Council as might be useful
and appropriate in view of the war.
The Department was already greatly overworked as a result of
the crisis. . . . The Council representatives suggested th a t, pend
ing the tim e when the D epartm ent itself would he able to
assemble a staff and begin research and analysis on the proper
scale, the Council might undertake work in certain fields, with
out, of course, any formal assignment of responsibility on the
one side or restriction of independent action on the other. . . .
The Departm ent officers welcomed the Council’s suggestion
and encouraged the Council to formulate a more detailed plan.
This was done in consultation with D epartm ent officials, The
Rockefeller Foundation was then approached for a grant of
funds to put the plan into operation. When assurances had been
received th a t the necessary funds would be available, the person
nel of the groups were selected and on December 8, 1939, an
organization meeting was held in Washington . . . ,IS
Following that meeting, the State Departm ent established a
Committee on Post-War Problems, assisted by a research staff
th at in February, 1941, was organized into a Division of Special
Research. After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, the
research facilities were expanded and the overall project was
reorganized into an Advisory Committee on Post-W ar Foreign
Policies. Serving on the Committee were a num ber of influen
tial CFR members, including Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Sumner
Welles, Isaiah Bowman, Norman H. Davis, James T. Shotwell,
Myron C. Taylor, and Leo Pasvolsky. The Russian-born Pasvol-
sky became^ the Committee’s Director of Research,14 (When
8 The U nited N a t ions Conspiracy
Pasvolsky died in 1963, Time magazine described him as “archi
tect of the United Nations charter . . . .’M5)
On August 14, 1941, President Roosevelt and British Prime
M inister W inston Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter, claim
ing the need for “ establishment of a wider and permanent
system of general security.” The Charter makes no mention of
an international organization:
Mr. Churchill, ai we have since learned, had proposed to
include this; but President Roosevelt was unwilling. He told Mr.
Sumner Welles [Undersecretary of State] th a t he thought
“ nothing could be more futile than the reconstruction of a body
such as th e Assembly of the League of Nations.” 16
On January 1, 1942, the nations a t war with the Axis powers
formed a wartime coalition by signing a Declaration by United
Nations pledging their adherence to the principles of the Atlan
tic Charter. The pieces were rapidly falling into place.
On Septem ber 21, 1943, the House of Representatives passed
the Fulbright Resolution (House Concurrent Resolution 25)
favoring “ the creation of appropriate international machinery
with power adequate to establish and to m aintain a just and
lasting peace, among the nations of the world” and “ participa
tion by the United States therein through its constitutional
processes.” A few weeks later, in November, the Senate ap
proved the Connally Resolution (Senate Resolution 192) that
recognized, among other things, “the necessity of there being
established at the earliest practicable date a general interna
tional organization; based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by
all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of interna
tional peace and security.”
A month earlier, President Roosevelt had traveled to Moscow
for a meeting (October 13-30) with the Foreign Ministers of the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. The resulting Moscow
Declaration, to which China also became a party, committed the
four nations to close cooperation after the war and to the
Setting The Stage 9
establishm ent of an international organization to keep the
peace.
The Moscow Declaration was confirmed and strengthened at
subsequent high-level Conferences in Cairo (November 22-26,
1943) and Teheran (November 28-December 1, 1943). In mid-
1944, draft proposals subm itted by the four governments be
came the basis for the Dumbarton Oaks discussions (August
21-October 7, 1944) from which the basic structure of the UN
emerged. The Dum barton Oaks Conference, however, failed to
reach a decision on two key points: the extent of the veto power
to be exercised in the Security Council, and the number of seats
each government was to have in the General Assembly. Those
m atters were resolved a t the notorious Yalta Conference (Feb
ruary 4-11, 1945). Each of the major powers was given a
Security Council veto, while the Soviet Union — and only the
Soviet Union — was given two extra votes in the General
Assembly! The story of those extra votes is both interesting and
revealing.
Former Secretary of S tate Dean Acheson (CFR) m et with
FDR for the last time shortly before the President’s inaugura
tion for an unprecedented fourth term in January, 1945.
Acheson relates:
Leo Pasvolaky, Alger Hiaa, and I went with [Secretao1o f State]
StettiniuB to brief the President for the forthcoming meeting at
Yalta on Ruaaian claima to multiple votea in the General Aaaem-
bly of the propoaed U nited Nationa. . . . I reported th a t the
Ruaaian poaition would cauae trouble on the Hill. He would deal
with it, he aaid, by claiming a vote for each of the forty-eight
states and work it out from there.17
The Russians were demanding additional votes and separate
UN memberships for the Ukraine and Byelorussia, which were
actually intergral parts of the Soviet Union. When th e request
was formally m ade at Yalta on February 7, Roosevelt agreed to
go along, but he told S talin in a February 10 communication:
I am somewhat concerned leat it be pointed out that the United
10 The United Nations Conspiracy
States wilt have only one vote in the Assembly. It may be
necessary for me, therefore, if I am to insure wholehearted
acceptance by the Congress and people of the United States of
our participation in the World Organization, to ask for additional
votes in the Assembly in order to give parity to the United States.
I would like to know, before I face this problem, th at you
perceive no objection and would support a proposal along this line
if it is necessary for me to make it at the forthcoming confer
ence."
Stalin replied the next day, agreeing th a t "since the number
of votes for the Soviet Union is increased to three . . . the
number of votes for the USA should also be increased. . . . If
it is necessary I am prepared officially to support this propos
al.” 1®
President Roosevelt, in other words, had three voteB for the
United States in hand, if he wanted them. But what did he do?
Secretary of S tate Byrnes had left Yalta for Washington prior
to conclusion of the Conference. Awaiting his return was a
telegram from Presidential adviser Harry Hopkins confirming
Stalin’s willingness to give the United States three votes, but also
noting: "In view of the fact th a t nothing on this whole subject
appears in the communique [issued following the Conference],
the President is extremely anxious no aspect of this question be
discussed even privately.”20 Even when the President finally
told the United States delegation to the San Francisco Confer
ence about the scheme, he did so "in strictest confidence.
. . .”21 The curtain of secrecy prevented the American people
from learning about the situation. As a result, the feared
protest failed to materialize, and ‘‘Later Roosevelt decided not
to ask for the three voteB for the United States."28 So, while the
Soviets got their three voteB, we got one — plus an early example
of the "America Last" attitude which has so consistently
afflicted our home-grown UN clique.
On April 6, 1945, the Harold P ratt House in New York City
was formally opened as headquarters for the Council on Foreign
Relations. Secretary of S tate Stettinius (CFR) addressed a
Setting The Stage 11
general meeting of the UN Council on th at d ate and asserted: “I
come to bear witness, as has every Secretary of State during the
past quarter of a century, to the great services and influence of
this organization. . . .” 23 And when the San Francisco Confer
ence convened on April 25 of th a t year to finalize and approve
the UN Charter, more than forty members of the U nited States
delegation had been, were, or would later become members of
the CFR (see Appendix C). This indicates the success w ith which
that organization had promoted its aims and strategically placed
its members and fellow travelers to carry them out.
Chapter 2
Men At The Top
The Secretary-General is the UN’s chief executive officer
and its primary spokesman on m atters of purpose and policy.
Articles and statem ents from influential American Interna
tionalists have regularly praised the leadership of those who
have held the poet. For example, UN Ambassador Adlai Steven
son once effused: “ I can only say th a t we have been fortunate
indeed in the quality of the men we have chosen [as Secretary-
GeneralI.” 1 Another UN supporter claimed: “ Future historians
af the United Nations will undoubtedly refer to successive
Secretaries-General . . . as among the outstanding personalities
who have represented most powerfully and effectively in the
public mind the UN idea and who have made major contribu
tions to its development in practice.” 1
Who are these men whose lives have had such a prodigious
influence on the United Nations? Let's see.
Alger Hiss
The first man to fill the im portant post of UN Secretary-
General was a CFR member who had been active at the San
14
Francisco Conference — and whose name is today a household
word synonymous with subversion and betrayal. As Time maga
zine announced in its issue for April 16, 1946:
The Secretary-General for the San Francisco Conference was
named at Yalta b u t announced only last week — lanky, Harvard
trained Alger Hiss, one of the State D epartm ent’s brighter young
men. . . . At San Franciico, he and his Secretariat of 300 (most
ly Americans) will have the drudging, thankless clerk's job of
copying, translating and publishing, running the thousands of
paperclip and pencil chores of an international meeting. But
Alger Hiss will be an im portant figure there. As secretary-general,
managing the agenda, he will have a lot to say behind the scenes
about who gets th e breaks.
Life magazine’s “Picture of the Week" for July 16, 1945,
portrayed a trium phant HisB with the Charter at his feet, and
was captioned: “ At the conclusion of the San Francisco Con
ference the C harter of the United Nations was bundled off to a
waiting plane. . . . Chief custodian was Conference Secretary-
General Alger Hiss, shown here with the Charter at end of the
cross-country trip .”
Hiss, who had served as a key adviser to President Roosevelt
at the Yalta Conference, had been influencing United States
foreign policy for many years. According to Dean Acheson:
From the tim e I came into the [State] Department in 1941 to
sometime in April or May 1946 . . . Alger Hiss had worked first
for Dr. Stanley Hombeck in the Far Eastern Division and later
for Dr. Leo Pasvolsky in a division preparing for and participat
ing in the Dumbarton Oaks and San Francisco conferences on the
United Nations and the Chapultepec conference in Mexico, and
still later in the winter of 1945-46 he participated in the organiza
tional meeting of the United Nations in London. . . . In April or
May 1946 he was put in charge of a division having charge of our
relations with the United Nations. He reported to Secretary
Byrnes, or to me in the Secretary’s absence, until he left the
D epartm ent for the Carnegie Endowment around the end of the
year.5
M en A t The Top 15
Hiss was eventually exposed as a Soviet spy, convicted for
perjuring himself before a federal Grand Jury while being
questioned about his Communist activities (the sta tu te of
lim itations for espionage had run out), and served forty-four
months in a federal penitentiary.
Many of Hiss’s influential friends rallied to hiB defense
both prior to, and after, his conviction. For example, Mrs.
Eleanor Roosevelt told readers of her newspaper column for
August 16, 1948:
Smearing good people like Lauchlin Currie [former administra
tive assistant to President Roosevelt), Alger Hiss and others is, I
think, unforgiveable. . . . Anyone knowing Mr. Currie or Mr.
Hiss, who are the two people whom I happen to know fairly well,
would not need any denial on their p art to know they are not
Communists. Their records prove it.4
Parenthetically, FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover had informed
President Truman on November 8, 1946, th at Lauchlin Currie
was one of a number of federal employees who "have been
furnishing data and information to persons outside the Federal
Government, who are in turn transm itting this information to
agents of the Soviet Government.”5 In 1951, Currie was identi
fied before the Senate Internal Security Subcom m ittee as a
member of a Communist cell by Elizabeth Bentley and Whit
taker Chambers (both of whom had testified similarly, from
first-hand experience, against Hiss) and former Communist
Party functionary Louis Budenz. Budenz, for example, testified
that Currie played a prominent role in the Communist Party's
plans in 1942 to smear patriotic officials in the State D epart
ment. Budenz laid th at Earl Browder, then the boss of the
Communist Party in the U.S.A. told him that Currie had helped
to work out the propaganda used in the Communist press against
the patriots.'
Following Hiss's conviction on January 21, 1960, Secretary of
State Dean Acheson told a news conference on January 26: “I
16 The United Nations Conspiracy
should like to make it clear to you th a t whatever the outcome of
any appeal which Mr. Hiss or his lawyers may take in this case I
do not intend to turn my back on Alger Hiss.”7
In the wake of the Hiss scandal, many UN propagandists
attem pted to downplay Hiss’s highly significant role in launch
ing the UN. One, for example, claimed th a t "Hiss was a minor
figure in San Francisco in 1945,"' while another haughtily (and
falsely) asserted: “ As a staff member of the State Depart
m ent, he did not work on the original draft” of the UN Charter.
Forgotten, or purposely ignored, was the following colloquy
between Hiss himself and Representative (later Senator) Karl
M undt (R.-South Dakota) during Congressional hearings in
1948:
Mr. M undt: W hat I was trying to get to is whether you
participated in the creation of the draft [of the Charter].
Mr. Hiaa: I did participate in the creation of the draft th a t was
sent by President Roosevelt to Churchill and Stalin, which was
the draft actually adopted at San Francisco.10
Alger Hiss, the m an who gave the post of Secretary-General
an inauspicious beginning, was released from prison on Novem
ber 27, 1964.*
Trygve Lie
Norwegian Socialist Trygve Lie succeeded Alger Hiss, becom
ing the U N ’s first elected Secretary-General after ratification
of the UN Charter on October 24,1945. CFR member Thomas J.
Hamilton, who was also head of the UN Bureau of the New York
Times, noted in Foreign Affairs that Lie had been brought up “ to
see evils in both Communism and capitalism ," and excused the
Norwegian’s reluctance to “ commit himself irrevocably to the
anti-Communist side" on grounds th a t Norway was vulnerable
to Soviet reprisals.11 If this was true, then Secretary-General
Lie’s decisions were partly influenced by Soviet extortion.
*For excellent fint- and second-hand accounts of the Hiss esse, see (respective
ly) W hittsker Chambers, W itn tii (New York: Random House, 1962), Ralph de
Toledsno, Seeds of Treaton (Boston, Western Islands, 1966 [I960]), and Allen
Weinstein, Perjury: The H iu -C h a m b en Case (New York: Knopf, 1978).
\4en A t The Top 17
The record indicates, however, th a t Lie’s pro-Communist
ictivities were simply an extension of his own Leftist commit-
nent. He had been a high-ranking member of Norway’s Social
Democratic Labor Party, which was an offshoot of the early
Communist International.11 And when Leon Trotsky, chief rival
>f Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin, was exiled in Norway,
Trygve Lie was the m iniiter of juitice of that country. Acting in
accordance with the wishes of Stalin, Lie confronted Trotaky
with an ultim atum of choosing between either ceasing all criti
cism of the Communist regime in Moscow or going to jail. Trotsky
continued to write expoiii of the ruthlessneu of Stalin and his
henchmen. Lie, consequently, had him thrown in priaon and later
deported him to Mexico.19
Trotsky was assassinated in Mexico, apparently by one of
hose Stalin henchmen, on August 21, 1940.
The socialist League for Industrial Democracy (LID), which
n the early Sixties spawned the violent Students for a Demo-
:ratic Society (SDS), honored Lie a t its annual conference in
.947. “In his introductory remarks, Bryn J. Hovde, L.I.D. vice-
resident and former president of the New School for Social
lesearch, gloried 'in the fact th at one of our kind is Secretary -
General of the United Nations.’ ” u
Prior to selecting a Secretary-General, the newly formed
Jnited Nations had had the task of choosing a President for its
jfeneral Assembly. Trygve Lie had been a candidate for the
>08t, but had withdrawn. On the morning of January 10, 1946,
he day the Assembly President was to be elected, the Soviet
Ambassador sought him out to say th a t the USSR and its
Eastern European satellites wanted to nominate him. According
o Trygve Lie:
Mr. [Andra] Gromyko (Soiuet UN Am baisador) strode to the
rostrum and declared:
“Weighing the candidates which have recently been mentioned
in connection with the election of the President . . . the Soviet
Delegation has come to the conclusion th a t the m ost appropriate
18 The United Nations Conspiracy
candidature would be th at of the Foreign M inister of Norway,
Mr. Trygve Lie.’’. . .
W incenty Rzymowsky of Poland then rose in dutiful support
of the nomination, and spoke of Norway and of me in generous
terms. He was followed by Dmitri Z. Manuilsky, the “ Old
Bolshevik” from pre-Stalin days who was then Foreign Minister
of the Ukrainian S.S.R., and was to be one of the United
Nations' more dram atic personages in its first years."
Nevertheless, Lie was narrowly defeated by Belgian Socialist
Paul-Henri Spaak, a setback which left him available for the
much more influential post of Secretary-General. In the subse
quent campaign for the higher office, the Soviets again as
sumed the role of virtual campaign manager for Lie. “The
Soviet Union Btrongly supported Trygve Lie as the first Secre
tary-General of the United Nations. Andrei Gromyko nomi
nated Lie for the position. . .
Following his confirmation, Lie fully justified the confi
dence the Communists had placed in him. As noted in Foreign
Affairs: “ Prior to his intervention on [sic] Korea Mr. Lie had
supported Soviet moves in the 'cold war,’ and criticized those of
the United StateB, more often than he had supported the United
States.” 17
For example, in April, 1946, Lie sided with the Soviets on an
issue involving Iran. Iran had filed a complaint against the
Soviet Union for its failure to remove Red troops from Iranian
territory bb agreed to earlier. Then, Iran suddenly withdrew the
complaint and joined with the Soviets in urging th at the m atter
be removed from the agenda of the Security Council. “This was
opposed by the United States and a majority of the Council,
who felt th at the withdrawal of the Iranian complaint had been
extorted by Soviet pressure. Mr. Lie supported the Soviet
Union. . . .,M*
Again, in early 1960 Lie started a campaign for the Soviet
goal of having Communist China adm itted to the UN. “ Former
ly he had drawn back when he met seriouB opposition. On China
he did not draw back, although his moves aroused increasing
Men A t The Top 19
disapproval in the United States and some of the other democ
racies, approval in others, and hosannas of praise from Com
munist organs throughout the world.” 1*
On another occasion, Lie threatened to resign his position
because he disagreed with the American position regarding the
partition of Palestine.
. . . I went to see Mr. Gromyko. . . . I announced the feeling
th a t I should resign in protest at the American shift of position,
and I have never found Ambassador Gromyko more friendly. His
melancholy features lit up with sympathy. But he seemed half
alarmed at my idea. “Speaking for myself,” he said, "I hope you
will not resign, and I advise you against it. . . . In any case, I
would be grateful if you would take no action before I have time
to consult my government."20
Lie waited, and on “Tuesday, Mr. Gromyko took me aside. He
had cabled Moscow, he reported, and Moscow’s reply was: ‘No,
definitely not.’ "21
Lie stayed.
Thomas Hamilton claimed in Foreign Affairs that, Bince there
is no Charter provision for removing a Secretary-General prior
to the expiration of his term, there is “force in the argument
that a more able or courageous spokesman [than Lie] might have
split the organization apart."2* One certainly haB to wonder
about an organization which is threatened by leaders who might
exhibit excessive amounts of ability and courage. And it is a
revealing commentary on Trygve Lie th a t friends of the UN
actually defended hit pro-Communist comm itm ent by contend
ing th a t he was a man of limited ability and courage, which they
sited as being an asset to the world body!
On October 1,1949, "[Soinef Foreign M inister Andrei] Vyshin
sky told Lie a t a dinner party in New York th a t he was the only
man the Soviet Union would support. In January 1950 the Soviet
Government informed the Norwegian Government of its inten
tion to support Mr. Lie for another t«rm, and this was an
nounced in Moscow on May 15, I960.’’13
20 The United Nations Conspiracy
Open Soviet ardor for Mr. Lie cooled following UN interven
tion in Korea, but, as we shall see later, Soviet “opposition” to
UN action in Korea was roughly equivalent to Br’er Rabbit’s
“ opposition” to being tossed into the brier patch.
Dag HammarskjSld
Trygve Lie retired at the conclusion of hi* second term as UN
Secretary-General on April 10, 1953 and wag succeeded by
Sweden’s Dag Hammarskjflld. Yet another Socialist imbued
with an exaggerated, humanistic view of his ability to “save the
world," HammarskjSld once wrote to a girlfriend, “I think I was
12 years old when I had a very strong feeling that I am a new
JeBus.’’24 Well-informed Swedes at home deemed him “ an
extreme left-winger in politics."J* In another letter to a friend in
the mid-1950’s HammarskjOld confided, “It is a little bit humili
ating when I have to say that Chou Gn-lai to me appears as the
most superior brain I have so far met in the field of foreign
politics. As I said to one of the Americans: 'Chou is so much
more dangerous than you imagine because he is so much better a
m an than you have ever adm itted.’ ”28This despite the fact th at
Chou En-lai, in association w ith Mao Tse-tung, administered
in China whal the Guinness Book of World Records describes as
“The greatest massacre in hum an history,"r slaughtering (ac
cording to a study commissioned by a Senate subcommittee)
between 34,300,000 and 63,784,000 human beings.” While Ham-
marskjttld was in charge of UN affairs in the Swedish Foreign
Office in 1951, his government refused to support a UN
resolution mildly condemning Red China as an aggressor for its
subjugation of Tibet.aB
Like Trygve Lie, Dag Hammarskjttld had no trouble with the
Soviet Union until it was too late for such contrived Russian
“ opposition” to do him much harm. For example, the Soviets
backed his actions in the Suez crisis of 1966 and,
on October 31, 1956, the Soviet representative made an even
stronger statem ent in support of Hammarakjold when he said:
fen A t The Top 21
“ May I begin by Raying th at the Soviet delegation has confidence
in the Secretary-General of the United Nationg and lends him its
support." This attitude prevailed when Mr. Hammarskjold was
re-elected Secretary-General on September 26,1957.50
HammarskjBld was primarily responsible for the early plan
ing and direction of the UN’s war against the anti-Communist
Congolese province of Katanga in the early 1960s. The UN
noved to crush Katangan independence by conducting a vicious
nilitary operation that included the bombing of hospitals,
ittacks on ambulances, and general violence no extreme th a t the
orty-Bix civilian doctors in the Katangan capital of Elizabeth-
rille, who had to care for the dead and wounded, sent telegrams
o world leaders imploring them to intervene "to stop the
errorist bombardment of hospitals and civilian populations by
he United Nations." The telegram was later incorporated in a
engthy report issued by the doctors which, accompanied by
pictorial examples of UN atrocities, documented the horror the
JN was inflicting in the name of “ peace.”31 Today, thanks in
arge part to the UN operation in Katanga, the former Belgian
Songo (now called Zaire) is ruled by the Communists — as are
its mineral wealth and vast supplies of nuclear raw materials.
Secretary-General HammarskjOld was also responsible for
the persecution of Danish UN diplomat Povl Bang-Jensen after
Bang-Jensen refused to turn over to Hammarskjttld a list of
Hungarian refugees who had testified in confidence to a special
UN committee that investigated the 1956 anti-Communist up
rising in Hungary. The refugees feared reprisals against rela
tives in Hungary if their names were revealed and Bang-Jensen,
as assistant secretary of the UN committee, had promised to
keep the names confidential. When he attem pted to keep his
word, HammarskjOld had him suspended and subjected to an
incredible campaign of harassm ent and character assassination.
Bang-Jensen’s appeal for reinstatem ent was pending when he
was found dead of a bullet wound in a New York City park on
November 24, 1959. His death was quickly labeled a suicide, but
a subsequent investigation by the Senate Internal Security
22 The United Nations Conspiracy
Subcommittee raised the real possibility th a t he had been the
victim of a Soviet MVD assassination. After cataloguing
numerous flaws in the suicide theory, the Subcommittee
concluded:
If Bang-Jensen did not commit suicide, he was the victim of
political murder dressed up as suicide. While the Kremlin main
tains a terror apparatus for the purpose of liquidating enemies
and suspects, it must have serious motivation before it issues
instructions for murder. It is the opinion of this report th at such
motivation probably did exist in the case of Povl Bang-Jensen.99
Following his death, information was revealed th at Bang-
Jensen had been in contact with a Soviet national a t the UN who
wanted to defect and expose Soviet penetration of both the UN
Secretariat and American intelligence.
This shocking information was then dispatched to Allen Dulles
(CfTJ], head of our Central Intelligence Agency, who, instead of
moving resolutely to acquire the full details from this vital
source of information, let Bang-Jensen and th e Soviet defector
cool their heels for seven long and agonizing months before even
expressing any interest. By this tim e the defector had been sent
back to Russia. The CIA never did ask Bang-Jensen for details.9*
The Senate Subcommittee reported:
During the course of 1958 it had become known to at least
several people that Bang-Jensen had been approached in Novem
ber 1966 by a would-be Soviet defector who wished to convey
information concerning Soviet control of key persons in the U.N.
Secretariat and Soviet infiltration of American intelligence.
Bang-Jensen had information — but the reports were vague and
no one knew precisely how much he had or how m uch he had
conveyed. Worried by this uncertainty, the MVD may very well
had [sic.] decided to take Bang-Jensen in for the purpose of
finding out what contacts he had had, how much he knew, and
how much he had already told the American authorities. If Bang-
fen A t The Top 23
Jensen was taken into custody for such an interrogation, his
liquidation would have been the inevitable sequel.*4
Whether Povl Bang-Jensen committed suicide or was mur-
lered by the MVD to protect their agents in the UN and
lsewhere, it seems clear th at his demise was directly related to
he frustrating attem pt to m aintain his integrity and an ti
communist position within a pro-Communist UN hierarchy,
iad he gone back on his word to the Hungarian Freedom
l'ighters as demanded by Secretary-General Hammarskj&ld, and
imply ignored the would-be Soviet defector, he would likely be
ilive today.
U T hant
Dag HammarskjBld died in a plane crash in Northern Rho-
iesia on September 18, 1961. Prior to that incident, much
publicity had been given to an alleged Soviet attem pt to under
mine the office of Secretary-General with demands for a
)roika arrangement which would replace th at office with a
triumvirate of representatives from Communist, Western, and
‘neutral” nations. T h at this w aB simply a ploy intended to
generate sympathy and support for the UN in non-Communist
countries was confirmed when the Soviets passed up the oppor
tunity to veto candidates to succeed HammarskjOld and to presB
for their troika. Instead, they turned off the troika talk like a
water faucet and rallied behind Burmese Marxist U T h a n t’s
campaign for the office of Secretary-General.
When the Secretariat election came, T hant won more easily
than expected. "Every time a serious crisis threatens world
peace,” said Anastas Mikoyan, Russian first deputy premier and
firm troika advocate, “ we shall turn to Secretary-General T hant,
who has won confidence and support."M
T hant was appointed Acting Secretary-General on November
3, 1961.
24 The United Nations Conspiracy
This appointm ent ended the major Soviet effort to establish
the "troika.” It may be im portant to note th at Soviet protests
about im portant decisions between the death of HammarskjOld
and the appointm ent of U T hant were relatively perfunctory.3®
In November, 1962, Thant was appointed Perm anent Secre-
tary-General. On July 27, 1966, an Associated Press dispatch
datelined Moscow reported:
U T hant has been assured the support of the Soviet Union for
another term as Secretary General of the United Nations. . ..
The sources said Premier Alexei N. Kosygin told T h an t during
a long talk yesterday th a t the Soviet government wants him to
accept reelection when his current 5-year term expires Nov. 3.
. . . Soviet support for another term had been reported from
the United Nations as early as last April.37
Thant did, indeed, accept another five-year term, eventually
retiring on December 31, 1971.
The Soviets were pleased with T hant because his Marxism
and anti-Americanism dominated his decade of service. T hant
was a prot6g6 of U N u, the Burmese Prime Minister who on May
1, 1948, asserted during a speech: "If we now look back to
history, we find th a t Stalin followed the right p ath .”3' During
th a t same speech, U Nu advocated strengthening ties with the
Soviet Union, confiscating all capitalist enterprises in Burma,
abolishing private ownership of land, and forming a league to
propagate M arxist doctrine.
After the Japanese occupation in 1942, U Nu invited Thant to
Rangoon to become secretary of Burma's Educational Reorganiz
ing Committee, and to plan a new system of education in Burma.
Thant accepted, and wrote a report which was published and put
to use after the war.
T hat was the beginning of T h a n t’s public career. The next step
came in 1948, when U Nu asked him to become press officer of
the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League, the political party
that developed out of the wartime resistance movement. When U
Nu became Prime Minister, U T hant was named his aide, with a
bewildering range of appointments, from Deputy Director of
Wen A t The Top 25
Information to the catch-all title of Secretary to the Prime
Minister. From 1952 on, U T hant traveled the world with U Nu,
served in the Burma delegation at the United Nations, and
became head of the delegation in 1957.’*
In 1966, T hant confided to correspondents th at he had
written anonymous editorials for a Burmese newspaper for a
decade prior to his 1957 appointment as United Nations dele
gate.40 Such clandestine press manipulation by a key govern
ment official was a revealing insight into T h a n t’B philosophy
about press freedom and the proper role of government.
During his years as Secretary-General, T hant constantly
feigned concern about “ racism" in the world, frequently using
it as an excuse to undermine anti-Communists, but was alwayB
careful to ignore “ racism” in Communist countries. After
concluding the UN’s bloody war against black-ruled, anti-Com-
m unist Katanga, he turned his attention to the white-ruled,
anti-Comm unist regimes in South Africa and Rhodesia. Under
T h a n t’s leadership, Rhodesia became (on December 16, 1966)
the target of the first economic sanctions ever voted by the
United Nations.
In contrast to his staunch anti-Rhodesia position, in early
1969 T hant called for an end to the economic boycott of
Communist Cuba, falsely asserting: “I am always for the
term ination of the isolation or segregation of any member of
the international community. I am always for the revival of
contacts and communications and exposure, as I have said."41
In his annual report to the United Nations released in
September, 1966, T h an t claimed: "T he most conspicuous and
anachronistic mass violation of human rights and fundam ental
freedoms is that which continues to be enforced against the
nonwhite majority of the people of South Africa."42 This was
u tter nonsense, since the worst violations of human rights and
fundam ental freedoms had been and were occurring in the
Soviet Union, Red China, Cuba, and other countries held captive
by Communists, and the victims were a majority comprising all
races, creeds, and colors. No word was ever spoken of the
26 The United Nations Conspiracy
millions held in concentration camps by Communist regimes.
Instead, Thant followed the Red line and vented his wrath
against anti-Communist Rhodesia and South Africa.
During the Vietnam War, Mr. T hant continually used his
prestige and influence to undermine the United States and
propagandize for the Communists. News reports consistently
documented the extent to which T hant ignored Communist
aggression and blamed the war on the United States. For
instance:
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y. Nov. 11 [/966| — Secretary General
U T hant today cited an unconditional cessation of American
bombing in North Vietnam as the first key to peace.41
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 1 (1967] — The United
States should unilaterally declare a cease-fire in Vietnam as the
first step toward peace, U.N. Secretary General U T hant said
today.44
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., July 30 [1967\ — U.N. Secretary
General U T hant said tonight that the conflict in Vietnam cannot
be ended until the United States recognizes th a t it is “ a war of
national independence” rather than a war of Communist ag
gression.44 i
T hant continued to compare “the position of North Vietnam
to that of the American colonies in the Revolutionary War,”48
proving simply th at history was not his strong point. Indeed, his
claim reminded some observers of T h an t’s M ay 26, 1964, attack
on the United S tates for dropping the atom ic bomb on non
white Japan, but not on white Germany. He had asserted, “As
you know, Nazi Germany was also a t war with the allies.”47 Nazi
Germany had surrendered on May 7, 1945 — three months
before the A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima (August 6th) and
Nagasaki (August 9th).
On April 7, 1970, the Associated Press ran the following
revealing dispatch, datelined the United Nations:
Secretary General U T h an t praised Vladimir I. Lenin, founder
of the Soviet Union, as a political leader whose ideals were
reflected in the U.N. charter.
Men A t The Top 27
T h a n t released Monday the text of a statem ent sent to a
symposium on Lenin at Tampere, Finland, sponsored by th e U.N.
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.
"Lenin was a man with a mind of great clarity and incisive-
ness, and his ideas have had a profound influence on the course
of contemporary history,” T hant's statem ent said.
"(Lenin’s) ideals of peace and peaceful coexistence among
states have won widespread international acceptance and they are
in line with the aims of the U.N. C harter.”4*
Considering the extent of T h an t’s admiration for Lenin, it
should come as no surprise to learn th at he chose as his personal
assistant a Communist who was also an officer of the Soviet
KGB, the modern-day successor to the original terrorist police
organization (Cheka) established under Lenin in December, 1917.
Former Secretary General U T h a n t for years had a personal
adviser named Viktor Mechislavovich Lessiovsky, who, unbe
known to him [w'c], was a KGB officer. U T hant states th at he
first met Lessiovsky in the early 1960s when he was Burmese
M inister of Information and the Russian was stationed a t the
Soviet embassy in Rangoon. The two became so well acquainted
th a t U T hant gave Lessiovsky’s baby daughter a Burmese nam e.41
It is UN custom th at the Secretary-General’s staff include a
citizen from each of the major powers. Lessiovsky was the only
Russian T hant knew in the Secretariat, so he appointed him as
Personal Assistant. "U T hant notes that he had no reason to be
wary because no one had ever warned him th at Lessiovsky was a
KGB officer.’’50 To the contrary, Lessiovsky’s former service in
the Soviet embassy in Rangoon was indeed a reason to be wary,
since Soviet embassies are notorious nesting grounds for KGB
agents. The simple truth, we suspect, is th at T h a n t simply
didn’t care about his friend’s KGB background.*
*“A Soviet 'diplom at,' named by the S tw York T im ti a* a veteran eapionage
agent, will be retained by the United Nation* a* director of external relation* for
the Office of Public Information. The >27,000.a.year contract of Vladimar P.
Pavlichenko, identified a t a veteran officer of the dread KGB, wai due to
expire earlier thi* month. It wa* extended for two year* by Secretary-General U
T h an t.” (Human E v tn tt, October 30,1971, p. 2.)
28 The United Nations Conspiracy
Kurt Waldheim
U T hant retired on December 31, 1971. Ten days earlier, Kurt
Waldheim of Austria had been selected by the Security Council
as his successor. The New York Times reported, "One of Mr.
W aldheim’s greatest assets in his successful campaign was that
he was the preferred candidate of the Soviet Union from an
early stage. . . Even so, Red China (which had been ad
m itted to the world body on October 25,1971) could have vetoed
the nomination, but chose instead to abstain. Ab the Times put
it, Communist “China’s abstention made Mr. Waldheim’s elec
tion possible."
A few m onths earlier, Waldheim had received forty-seven
percent of the vote bb the presidential candidate of the Catholic
People’s Party of Austria. He ran so inoffensive a campaign
th at, after being defeated by the Socialists, the winners re
turned him to the United Nations as their representative and
backed his candidacy for Secretary-General.'2
Waldheim’s native Austria was the first free country to fall
victim to Adolf H itler’s aggression. An article in the Boston
Pilot for January 1, 1972, reported: “Never having engaged in
politics, he [ Waldheim] survived the Nazi occupation of Austria
without stigm a. As a soldier in World War II, he was wounded in
1942. . . .”
Let’s see. If the year is 1942, and you are wounded as an
Austrian soldier, then you are fighting for a regime that has
captured your country — you are, in fact, marching with
H itler’s legions! As foreign affairs expert Hilaire du Berrier has
noted, Waldheim served as “an infantry lieutenant with the
swastika on his collar.”83 Kurt Waldheim, as usual, was simply
going along to get along.
In 1968, the Soviet Union invaded Austria’s neighbor, Czecho
slovakia. R ather than condemn the Communists, Mr. Waldheim
again proved accommodating. As the Boston Pilot article noted,
“ Dr. Waldheim is also gratefully remembered in Moscow for
helping to soothe tensions in Austria during the Soviet’s August
1968 invation [sic] of neighboring Czechoslovakia."
Hen A t The Top 29
During a speech to the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
la separate entity from the national CFR referred to earlier) on
Vpril 23,1975, Waldheim asserted:
It was a little more than thirty years ago th at Wendell Willkie
wrote his book, “ One World.” I can think of no more useful
way of returning to fundam entals on our quest for peace than by
rediscovering the power and validity of w hat he was trying to tell
us.M
T hat is a most revealing statem ent. Wendell Willkie waB the
‘Republican” candidate defeated by President Roosevelt in
1940. Yet, bb noted in an article in Vista, formerly the official
monthly publication of the United Nations Association of the
United States:
Willkie had never been much of a Republican anyway. He had
been a Democrat in his early adult years, serving as a delegate to
the Democratic convention in 1924 . . . and he had voted for
Roosevelt when the New Deal came along. . . . Even when he
joined the Republican Party he did so as a maverick, taking an ti
isolationist, pro-interventionist poeitions th a t even outdid F.D.R.
He won the 1940 Presidential nomination by a fluke. . . . HiB
foreign policy views were not so much in opposition to Roosevelt’s
as strongly in support.**
Vista noted th at when Presidential adviser Harry Hopkins
once made a slurring remark about Willkie, "President Roosevelt
thundered, ‘Don’t ever say anything like that around here again.
Don’t ever think it. . . , He was a godsend to this country when
we needed him m ost.’ "ft8 The article continues, “By 1944,
Roosevelt, having used Willkie for morale-boosting missions to
Britain in 1941 and around the world in 1942, was seriously
considering him as his running mate in the forthcoming election
even though Willkie was planning another try a t the Republican
Presidential nom ination."l1
^ThaT,raround the world” trip in the late summer and early
fall of 1942 subsequently served as the basis for Willkie’s book,
30 The United Nations Conspiracy
One World (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1943). Essentially,
the book is an outline of his wildly internationalist ideas,
including a fervent plea for a post-war world of accommoda
tion between the United States and the Soviet Union. His
traveling companions had been Gardner Cowles, Jr., and Joseph
BameB, both members of the Council on Foreign Relations.
Willkie wrote his book from noteB and outlines provided by the
two,” which is significant not only because of the CFR influ
ence involved, but because
in awom [Congressional] testimony, W hittaker Chambers, Louis
Budenz, Alexandr Barmine, Karl Wittfogel, and Hede Massing,
swore of their own personal knowledge th a t they had known
Barnes as a Communist agent."
Such is the background and philosophy of the book whoee
“ power and validity” Secretary-General Waldheim recom
mended as a guide to the fundam entals of "peace.”
Following the admission of Red China to the United Nations,
K urt Waldheim fully concurred in the UN's /984-style drive to
obliterate every last vestige of Free China. He supported the
expulsion of Free C hina’s press representatives from UN head
quarters (an unprecedented move th a t had been taken by his
predecessor, U T hant, following action by the General Assem
b ly.)'0 He also went along with Red C hina’s demand th a t there
be no text or tables dealing with Taiwan’s population, trade,
industry, or any other data in future editions of the world
organization’s Statistical Yearbook — even though this was
entirely inconsistent with past UN policy. (Figures for Red
China, for instance, had been included in the yearbooks even
prior to 1971.)*' And it was Waldheim himself, acting under
pressure from the Communists, who ordered the removal from
the wall of the General Assembly chamber of a large plaque,
featuring a quotation from Confucius, th a t had been donated
by Free China in 1968.'2
When Red Chinese Premier Chou En-lai died on January 8,
1976, Waldheim sent a message of condolence which asserted:
Men A t The Top 31
I have learnt with deep lorrow of the death of Hit Excellency
Mr. Chou Gn-lai . . . . He was a most distinguished and es
teemed leader who served his country and his people with great
devotion for many decades. His dedication to the fostering of
better understanding among nations and international peace is
widely recognized. The world will be poorer for no longer having
the benefit of his statesmanship in these critical times. Mr. Chou
En-lai inspired admiration and respect among all who were
privileged to meet him.”
All this praise for a man who not only played a major part in
the slaughter of thirty to sixty million of his fellow citizens but
who also instituted some of the most inhuman tortures ever
devised in the process of forcing Communism on the peoples of
China.
After the CommunistB were permitted to take all of Vietnam
following conclusion of the lengthy no-win (for anti-Commu-
nists) war, Kurt Waldheim was urged by United States officials
to use his good offices to convince the North Vietnamese to
perm it the safe evacuation of South Vietnamese refugees.
W aldheim declined. Since the Communists said they would not
release the three to four million displaced persons in the South,
he claimed: "It is not in the interest of the United Nations to get
involved in this political aspect."'4 Pressed on the matter,
Waldheim claimed that any pressure on the Communists to
release their civilian hostages might jeopardize existing UN
hum anitarian projects in the area. "Waldheim said the Commu
nists contended the refugees would be aided in their territory
and there was no reason for them to leave."'* Waldheim, who
thinks “Everything in life is relative,”" believed them.
Such is the record of the current leader of "mankind’s best
hope for peace.”
Thus far, as we have seen, the United Nations has been
headed by a Soviet spy, two self-proclaimed Socialists, a
Burmese MarxiBt, and a former Nazi foot soldier. Each Secre
tary-General to date has been an aggressive enemy of limited
government and free enterprise economics, and has used his
32 The United Nations Conspiracy
talents and influence to expand the reach, influence, and
control of government over the lives of people everywhere. And
each has been sympathetic to the goals (and obedient to the
demands) of the Communists — the greatest enemies of true
peace, freedom, and prosperity the world has ever known.
If it is true th at an organization can be judged by the quality
of its leadership, the character of those who have held the post
of UN Secretary-General becomes a rather compelling reason to
Get US out! of the world body.
Chapter 3
War And Peace
Of all the cliches th at have played a role in the historical
development of the United Nations, none has been used more
extensively than the claim th a t the UN is m an’s last and best
hope for peace. Even today it is difficult to locate a pro-UN
article, speech, or book th at does not emphasize this central
theme, despite the fact th at not a single provision in the UN
Charter contemplates an end to war.
The San Francisco Conference was not a peacetime confer
ence; it was a wartime congregation, and each participant “was
in a state of war when the Conference began. Many were
engaged throughout the weeks of its deliberation in bitter and
costly fighting.” 1Indeed, membership in the UN "was denied to
Sweden, Switzerland and Ireland on the official grounds that
they were not ‘peace-loving’ nations — as witness the fact that
they had not fought in the World W ar.’’2 The Charter was signed
on June 26, 1945; yet within weeks the atomic bomb exploded on
Hiroshima and Nagasaki.4'
*In 1066, Luii Quintanilla (a former representative of Mexico in the UN
General Assembly) “suggested th a t the atom bomb deserve* the Nobel peace
prize for having ipurred m ankind's efforts toward realization of a warless
world.” (C/in’j tta n Century, August 11, 1966.)
34 The United Nations Conspiracy
Writing in Foreign Affairs, R. K eith Kane (CFR) explained:
The Charter does not call on it* signatories to renounce force;
rather, it seeks to bring force under control by registering
agreement on certain purposes and binding the contracting par
ties to refrain from the threat or use of force in any manner
inconsistent with those purposes.1
In other words, the United Nations condones war as long as it
is fought to achieve a UN goal, in which case it becomes mag
ically transformed into a “ peace-keeping” operation. According
to Canadian historian Kenneth McNaught, also writing in For
eign Affairs'.
. . . th e program envisaged by the U.N. assumes that certain
things are valued more highly than peace itself. . . . The entire
machinery of collective security is based upon the assumption
th at force must be used (i.e. the peace must be broken) against
any Btate committing aggression [as defined by the UN] upon
thoee values which are held higher than peace [cm determined by
the UN]*
Professor McNaught continued: “It is the people of the
world who believe the peace mythology of the United Nations.
. . . it is a mythology which is perpetrated in true Machiavellian
style by their governments who do not for a moment believe it
themselves.”6
This view has also been confirmed by former UN General
Assembly President CharleB Malik: “ When responsible represen
tatives deliberated the United Nations Charter at San Francisco
in 1946 nobody ever thought for one moment th at the new world
organization was going to abolish war for all tim e. . . . the
whole Organization . . . is predicated on the distinct possibility
of war.”8
J. Reuben Clark, Jr. served for many years as U.S. Under
secretary of State and Ambassador to Mexico, and he was
widely recognized as one of our nation's foremost international
War A n d Peace 35
lawyers. Between June and August, 1945, Ambassador Clark
composed an analysis of the UN Charter, concluding:
. . . there is no provision in the Charter itself th a t contemplates
ending war. It is true the Charter provides for force to bring
peace, but such use of force is itself w a r.. . .
The Charter is built to prepare for war, not to promote
peace. . . .
The Charter is a war document not a peace document. . . J
Ambassador Clark further predicted:
Not only does the Charter Organization not prevent future
wars, but it makes it practically certain that we shall have future
wars, and as to such wars it takes from us the power to declare
them, to choose the side on which we shall fight, to determine
what forces and military equipment we shall use in the war, and
to control and command our sons who do the fighting.'
The UN’s so-called “ police action” in Korea five years later
confirmed the accuracy of Ambassador Clark’s perceptive
analysis. Discussing Korea in a speech in Seattle on March 8,
1952, former American Bar Association President Frank E.
Holman angrily exclaimed:
. . . America is not allowed to win the war though we were put
into it by United Nations action. Because of the conflicting
interests and policies of other nations, America is not allowed to
prosecute the war to a successful conclusion. . . . The chief
objective of this United Nations war is to produce a stalemate
and prolong the war instead of achieving victory. T hus, the
United Nations in prolonging the war which might otherwise be
concluded acts as a menace to peace.*
Remember that the Vietnam War was fought under the same
UN-inspired, “no-win” ground rules, with results even more
tragic for the cause of peace and freedom in the world.
In 1954, Clarence K. Streit, the Internationalist founder of
the Atlantic Union movement, adm itted: “ Under guise of
36 The United Nations Conspiracy
reducing the international anarchy, the United Nations really
made it much more dangerous.’’10 Similarly, Charles Malik
claimed th a t “ it is possible to show th at the public and unlim
ited handling by the United Nations of certain cold war issues,
far from having helped in easing them, has actually tended to
aggravate them .’’11
Such aggravation has occurred, on occasion, because of the
UN’s tendency to draw uninvolved third parties into a fray and
compel them to take sides. Columnist Paul Weaver has speculated:
If the U.N. didn’t exist, for instance, it ii hard to imagine th at
hostilities in the Mideast would seriously engage more than the
great powers, Israel, and its immediate neighbors — in all, maybe
a dozen nations. But the U.N. does exist. . . . [/ts members]
spend a large fraction of their tim e a t the U.N. . . . on the
Mideast question. By now there is scarcely a handful of countries
left in the world th at haven't long since chosen up sides in th at
conflict and acquired something of a stake in its outcome.'*
When the whole world is enticed to choose sides on issues
which divide hostile nations, factions and competing power
blocs are spawned which in time
take on a life of their own, quite apart from the specific issues
th at gave rise to them, and they tend to politicize m atters th at
would otherwise be unobjectionable. It is a truism th at to mini
mize conflict, issues should be treated separately, questions
defined narrowly, and the number of participants kept as small
as possible. The U.N. pushes in the opposite direction; it is by
nature an exacerhator and spreader of conflict.11
In a speech delivered in West Branch, Iowa on August 10,
1962, former U.S. President Herbert Hoover (CFR) recalled that
he had urged ratification of the UN Charter, but lam ented that
it had become necessary to recognize th at the UN had failed to
offer even a remote hope for lasting peace. “ Instead,” he
acknowledged, “it adds to the dangers of wars which now
surround us.” 14 And he was right, for it could hardly be
W ar And Peace 37
otherwise when the world’s most notorious arsonists — the
Com m unists — were (and are) firmly entrenched in positions of
g reat influence on the very commission charged with extinguish
ing the flames of war.*
The three main weapons used to promote Communist-style
totalitarianism throughout the world during the past two cen
tu ries have been money, hatred, and war. Money is an obvious
necessity for th« fueling of any movement. Carefully-culti-
vated hatreds and antagonisms (whites vs. blacks, men us.
women, young us, old, Christian vs. Jew, Catholic vs. Protestant,
etc.) help te a r apart existing societies and prepare them for
reconstruction along new, M arxist-oriented lines. And then
comes war.
Among other things, war enables governments to divert popu
lar attention from troublesome difficulties and problems at
home to the war effort abroad, in line with the advice Shake
speare’s King Henry IV gave to Prince Henry: “Be it thy course
to busy giddy minds with foreign quarrels; th at action, hence
borne out, may waste the memory of the former days.” 1®War
also conditions populations to accept government intrusions
(such as wage and price controls, rationing, wild deficit spend
ing and its accompanying inflation, etc.) which they would
vigorously resist in calmer times. And, war psychology condi
tions people to exchange liberty for security. Goodrich and
Hambro claim:
. . . the [LW| C harter would not have been possible if the
peoples and government* which participated in the making of the
Charter had not been motivated by a common de*ire to m aintain
peace and security in a world devaatated by war. . . . It was the
unity bom of the experience of war which in the last analysis
produced this common effort in the cause of peace.1'
*“ In view of the cold war, the pretence of Soviet* and American! under one roof
posed a novel problem for Western diplomacy. In a tim e when we were struggling
to organize a world-wide defensive coalition against the Communist threat, we
had to meet and negotiate with our alii— in the pre tence of the enemy." (Lincoln
P. Bloomfield [CFR], Foreign Affairti, July 1968, p. 698.)
38 The United Nations Conspiracy—
And Charles Malik adds that the war “generated a sufficient
political and spiritual impetus to make possible the United
Nations such as it is. If the birth of the United Nations had
been delayed Bix months or one year, it is likely th at it would
never have been born.”17 As one prominent Internationalist put
it, “When there is no crisis, no one gives a dam n.’’"
Consider Bome of the effects of World War I, as generalized
and summarized by socialist author Stuart Chase:
Free enterprise within nation* was replaced by planned econ
omies, government controlled.
Free speech was replaced by cenaorihip and propaganda.
Free world market* were replaced by government control of
exporta and im p o rts.. . .
The gold standard was abandoned.
The whole credit structure was wiped out in some countries,
distorted in all, while relations between debtors and creditors were
shattered by inflation and devaluation."
And James Avery Joyce, long-time member of the British
Fabian Society, adds: "One result of th a t war was to magnify in
thoughtful minds the need for worldwide institutions and a
supranational o u tlook.. . .’,20
Clearly, some aspects of the internationalist philosophy con
tribute to the view that war is a frightful blessing in disguise.
This attitude may be gleaned from the writingB of prominent
“world citizens” involved in World War II. One recalls, for
instance, the Btartling statem ent made by Secretary of War
Henry Stimson (CFR) regarding his initial reaction to the
bombing of Pearl Harbor:
When the news first came th at Jap an had attacked us my first
feeling was of relief that the indecision was over and that a crisis
had come in a way which would unite all our people. This
continued to be my dom inant feeling in spite of the news of
catastrophes which quickly developed.31
Stimson adm itted th at at a White House Cabinet meeting on
War A n d Peace 39
November 26, 1941 — less th an two weeks prior to Pearl Harbor
— the question discussed “ was how we should maneuver them
[the Japanese] into the position of firing the first shot without
allowing too much danger to ourselves.”118
A few years later, in his book One World, Wendell Willkie
asserted: “ For I live in constant dread th at this war may end
before th e people of the world have come to a common
understanding of what they fight for and what they hope for
after the war is over.”*3
W hat are we to think of men who are relieved when wars
start, and live in dread th a t they will end before the desired
conditioning haB been accomplished? Men who apparently elate
in the extent to which “ World wars are great promoters of co
operation and the chief occasion for talking about peace”?2*
And what about peace, UN-style? As we have Been, even
Secretary-General Thant adm itted th a t the ideals of peace and
peaceful coexistence held by Communist leader Vladimir Lenin
“are in line with the aims of the U.N. C harter."2®
The Communists, of course, use the word “ peace” to mean an
absence of resistance (and potential resistance) to Communism.
As noted by Socialist Harold Laski in Foreign Affairs'.
Nor, Lenin argues, can revolutionary Communism halt at its
own frontiers. The best defensive is the offensive method; it
m ust attack other states lest they become centers of attack
against itself.2"
And an anonymous scholar, also writing in Foreign Affairs,
recalled:
It iB an axiom with S talin that capitalist* are filled with envy
and hatred, and that whenever they can and dare they will seek to
intervene in the Socialist country and restore capitalism. This
danger he dramatized as "capitalist encirclement,” declaring that
Socialism cannot be considered finally achieved as long as this
danger of intervention and re8toration_perBistB.,7
The UN record Btrongly implies that the world body has
40 The United Nations Conspiracy
indeed worked to shield the Communist world from th a t “ dan
ger of intervention and restoration.” Its bloody war of aggres
sion against antUCommunist Katanga was labelled a “peace
keeping” operation; its drive to pull down anti-Communist
Rhodesia was branded a “ peace” maneuver (and peaceful
Rhodesia was smeared as a “ threat to peace” ); and expelling
anti-Communist Free China, and welcoming as members the
mass murderers of Red China, was a "move toward peace" by
UN standards.
On July 24, 1975, former UN Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge (CFR) told a Congressional Subcommittee that “since
1945 there have been 14 international and 24 civil wars, all with
substantial casualties.” 2' Actually, the record was far worse.
Years earlier, the UN publication UNESCO Courier had re
ported: “ More than 100 wars or other international and national
conflicts have occurred since the end of the Second World
W ar."2®In response to such a distressing statistic, advocates of
the UN usually express relief that, a t least, there has been no
world war since 1945. For example, Clark Eichelberger, former
National Director of the American Association for the United
Nations, claimed: "Every day since the Second World War there
has been spasmodic fighting somewhere on earth, but these
conflicts have not resulted in a Third World War. The United
Nations haB made the difference.”30 And, in 1975, a newspaper
advertisement sponsored by the McDonnell Douglas Corporation
(a company which treats UN Day as a paid employee holiday)
asserted: "In the 30 years since [the U N ’s founding], those armed
conflicts th a t have erupted have stayed contained, often with
the help of the UN.” 31
We detect some hardening of the moral arteries in such
argum ents. It is as if such horrors as Korea and Vietnam, the
bloodshed in the Middle E ast and in Africa, etc ., are somehow
“ acceptable" wars simply because they did not degenerate into
“ unacceptable" world wars. In the words of Ambassador J.
Reuben Clark, Jr., "We have been so intrigued by the Concept
and phrase that godlesB men coined — ‘total w ar’ — th at we not
War And Peace 41
only tolerate, but take pride in boasting about, butcheries of
peoples th a t a generation ago would have shocked to the very
core all but the most depraved.”32 Even Belgian Socialist Paul-
Henri Spaak, who was the General Assembly's first President,
acknowledged in 1957:
In the present United Nations setup . . . everything short of
war is allowed. Treaties may be violated, promises can be broken,
a nation is licensed to menace its neighbor or to perpetrate any
sort of trick on it, ju st as long as there is no actual war. . . .
This brand of justice . . . amount* to rewarding any nation
which is audacious enough to accomplish the most reprehensible
act but which very cleverly stops short, not of violence, but of
open war.”
The assertion th a t the UN has somehow staved off World
War III is baseless speculation. The organization is totally
incapable of preventing such an outbreak should a major power
decide to launch it. Even Secretary-General Kurt W aldheim has
admitted: “ Past experience has shown th at the United Nations
cannot either successfully deal with disputes if the Govern
ments concerned do not wish to do so, or, against their opposi
tion, impose the settlem ent of a dispute.”34 And Alexander
Dallin, Professor of Government and History at Stanford
University, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on
May 14, 1976: “ In its entire history the UN has only rarely been
able to constrain any com batant nation. It has never constrained
any of the major powers. It must be recognized th a t it can do
least where it would be needed m ost.” 31
The absence of World War III to date has been due to the
motivations and inclinations of those nations capable of s ta rt
ing it, not to the exaggerated influence of a braggart United
Nations. Even a t the time of the UN’s founding, Secretary of
State Stettinius testified on July 9, 1945: “If one of these
Ipermanent UN member] nations ever embarked upon a course
of aggression, a major war would result, no m atter what the
membership and voting provisions of the Security Council
might be.”3®
42 The United Nations Conspiracy
Rather than curb war, the UN haB actually contributed to
hostilities. It is claimed by some UN advocates th a t the General
Assembly provides a forum for verbal assaults which reduces
the chances for war because “ letting off steam ” has a cathartic
effect on the speakers. Yet, as explained by Abraham Yeselson
(Chairman of the Political Science Departm ent of Rutgers
University) and Anthony Gaglione (Professor of Political Sci
ence a t E ast Stroudsburg [Pennsylvania] State College), “When
Jews are described as Nazis at the UN, Israelis become more
than ever convinced that war iB the only means of dealing with
their enemies. . . . South Africans who are constantly re
minded at the UN th a t their words are unworthy of being heard
by more civilized ears become even more hardened in their
positions.”31 Yeselson and Gaglione (both of whom support the
basic concept of the UN) conclude: “ Real negotiations require
th a t the parties define differences as narrowly as possible,
avoid recriminations, exclude extremists from discussions. At
the UN, issues are widened, insults are common, and the most
violent spokesmen frequently dominate the debate.”3*
And columnist Paul Weaver has noted:
By providing a first-class propaganda platform, an opportu
nity to make and mobilize allies, and other resources th a t are
useful in conflict situations, the U.N. allows nations to postpone
the day when exhaustion or defeat forces them to resolve their
differences. Moreover, by making such resources available to
every comer, the U.N. provides scores of impotent and impov
erished new nations with the wherewithal to engage in conflicts
they would otherwise be unable to afford.3*
In short, the very manner in which the UN serves as a public
forum for the airing of grievances, which has so often been
propagandized by UN advocates as a contribution to peace, is
actually a roadblock to peace. Cecil Crabb, Jr., points out:
In recent years, informed students of international affairs
have challenged the efficacy of "open diplomacy,” as epito-
War And Peace 43
mized by discussions in the UN General Assembly. Particularly
when deliberations are televised to millions of viewers and the
galleries are open to the public, proceedings are apt to degenerate
into propaganda contests, in which each side tries to outscore the
other in verbal sp arrin g .. . . Above all, officials think they
must avoid the slightest intimation that they are “appeasing" the
enemy or failing to “protect" the national honor.40
Conservative author G. Edward Griffin illustrates the point
ivith an enlightening analogy:
Consider what would happen if every tim e a small spat arose
between a husband and wife they called the entire neighborhood
together and took turns airing their complaints in front of the
whole group. Gone would be any chance of reconciliation. Instead
of working out their problems, th e ugly necessity of saving face,
proving points, and winning popular sympathy would likely drive
them further apart. Likewise, public debates in the UN intensify
international tensions. By shouting their grievances a t each other,
countries allow their differences to assume a magnitude they
would otherwise never have reached. Quiet diplomacy is always
more conducive to progress than diplomacy on the stage.41
So we see th a t the UN, whose proponents claim it was formed
to stop war, curb international hostilities, and promote freedom,
has compiled a truly miserable record. Sold to us as a forum of
reason and cooperation, it has in practice seethed with hostility
and wild rhetoric. Allegedly intended to replace war with the rule
of law, its history has been drenched with blood. Supposedly
founded to promote the cause of human rights, it has become
an aggressive enemy of freedom. Accepted a> a mechanism to
enhance our nation's foreign policy, it has become instead the
world's leading anti-American outlet.
There is also a paradox in those provisions of the UN Charter
that have to do with economic cooperation. They are “ based on
the premise th at a necessary condition of the maintenance of
international peace and security is the creation generally
throughout the world of ‘conditions of stability and well-being.’
44 The United Nations Conspiracy
It is only under such conditions that ‘peaceful and friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ can exist.’’42
The economic system best equipped to contribute such stability
and well-being is Free Enterprise, with its emphasis on the
production of new wealth and the right of individuals to own
and control private property (thuB enhancing their incentive to
produce). But the United Nations is an advocate of Socialist
economic policies, with an emphasis on redistribution of exist
ing wealth. A few years ago, former Senator Jacob Javits (R.-
New York; CFR), a staunch defender of the UN, Berved as one
of twenty members on a United Nations panel studying m ulti
national corporations. The panel’s findings, issued in a report on
June 7, 1974, were typical. As described by Senator Javits:
. . . the two implicit assumptions of the Report are th a t govern
mental involvement is preferable to private initiative, and that
governments know best and will act always in the long run in the
interest of .their citizens. Based on long experience, I seriously
question both assum ptions.41
Leaders of the Socialist International have stated with good
reason: “The ultimate object of the parties of the Socialist
International is nothing less than world government. As a first
step towards it, they seek to strengthen the United Nations.’’44
The point, they say, "is th a t the United Nations as a concept is
essentially a democratic socialist idea.’’48
As viewed by the UN, the lot of the poor can be improved by
“ ripping o ff’ the rich. "From each according to his abilities, to
each according to his needs,” 4®an Karl Marx put it. And since
the wealthy victims are the very nations now footing most of the
bill for UN expenses, the UN has itself created yet another
threat to world peace, similar to th at described by Alexander
Hamilton: "There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the
tranquility of nations than their being bound to m utual contri
butions for any common object th at does not yield an equal and
coincidental benefit.”47
War And Peace 45
If the various specialized agencies of the UN were allowed to
;ake everything we have and redistribute it to poor nations,
>verall misery in the world would scarcely be affected: There
ire simply too many of them, and too few of us. But if we
;ould assist the backward nations in throwing off the shackles
>f Socialism that are keeping them backward, and adopting
nstead the basic economic techniques th a t have been respon-
lible for our unprecedented abundance, we would be making an
inparalleled contribution to world stability and well-being. The
Jn ited Nations, unfortunately, stands as a serious Marxist
‘oadblock to such a change, which must be removed before there
vill be much chance to cope realistically with the problems of
vorld hunger and poverty.
Contrary to the implications of UN propaganda, prosperity is
io sure guarantor of peace. Hunger, ignorance, disease, etc. are
terious problems which merit concern and solution — but they
ire not the roots of war. After all, it takeB arm aments and large
irmies to fight a big war. Nations hovering on the brink of
aoverty and disease are too sick and hungry to produce suffi
cient arm aments and effectively field armies, and too poor to
ceep a war going (unless, of course, their military preparations
ire assisted from the outside by the affluent nations or the
UN). On the other hand, Germany’s health, educational, eco-
lomic, and social Btatus ranked among the highest in the world
prior to World War I, and there was little economic distress or
jnemployment in Germany a t the start of World W ar II. History
ihows that it has been advanced nations, rather than backward
lations, th at have disturbed world peace.
Nor are wars prevented by increased understanding between
lations. Surely, few nations on earth understood each other
letter than England and Germany, yet they fought bitterly in
aoth world wars. As decent people learn more about reprehensi-
ale nations, movements, or individuals, they become increasingly
repelled. The more understanding Jews gained about the Nazis,
the greater became the breech between them. T he more advo-
:ates of freedom learn about Communism, the more repulsive
46 The United Nations Conspiracy
the Red record appears. And, as one disgruntled Republican
observed, “Richard Nixon wan admired and respected until the
American people found out more about him than he wished
them to know.”
In 1949, George D. Stoddard (a member of the Board of
UNESCO, the UN’s Educational, Scientific and Cultural O r
ganization) seemed to recognize this principle when he expressed
relief th at a Gallup Poll had shown that only or^ percent of the
people had ever heard of UNESCO, because "It means th a t
hardly anybody has been turned against it!” 4" As Charles M alik
once observed, “ human nature being essentially and mysteri
ously subject to envy, spite, pride, and inordinate ambition — a
certain degree of ‘distance’ from a country or culture is some
times preferable to too intimate an acquaintance with it. . . .”49
During a 1965 tribute to the United Nations, former NATO
Ambassador Harlan Cleveland (CFR) wrote: “It is almost im
possible even to think about a durable world peace without the
United Nations.” 60 Which may be true. But it is even more
inconceivable to think about a durable world peace with the
United Nations. Testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, Rutgers Professor Abraham Yeselson (who person
ally opposes U.S. withdrawal from the UN) declared:
It will be extraordinarily difficult now to rationalize con
tinued involvement in an Organization which sponsors wars,
passes one-sided or unenforceable resolutions, provides forums
for international insult instead of diplomacy, and is guilty of the
most outrageous examples of selective justice."
He speculated: "PerhapB it will be impossible for the Amer
ican people to overcome disillusion and they will demand
withdrawal from the world body.”M
We’ll keep our fingers crossed.
Chapter 4
Aggression
Article 2 of the UN Charter lists the chief obligations
issumed by UN members and the principles on which the
irganization is founded. The fourth principle asserts th a t “All
nembers shall refrain in their international relations from the
,hreat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
ndependence of any state, or in any other m anner inconsistent
vith the Purposes of the United N ations.” As Secretary of State
Stettinius noted in 1945, “This means th a t force may be used in
in organized manner under the authority of the United Nations
;o prevent and to remove threats to the peace and to suppress
jets of aggression.” 1
Suppressing aggression, most would agree, is a noble aasign-
nent. Assuming, of course, that the term "aggression” is
lefined in some rational manner, such as “initiating the use of
'orce against another party.” That definition, however, would
;learly brand the UN itself as an aggressor for its action against
Katanga and Rhodesia. Such an obvious and rational definition
>f the term would be incompatible with the long-range goals of
i world body bent on using aggression to suppress opposition to
ts pro-Marxist brand of "peace.” As a result, the UN’s search
48 The United Nations Conspiracy
for a more pragmatic definition of "aggression” proved ex
tremely difficult.,
Attempts were made at the San Francisco Conference to
achieve agreement on a definition, but they were eventually
abandoned as futile. President Trum an explained in a subse
quent report to Congress:
The United States and some other delegations advocated th at
the Assembly should discontinue its attem pts at definition as no
satisfactory one could be found. A definition which enumerated
all possible acts of aggression would necessarily be incomplete
and could thus be harmful', conversely, an abstract and general
formula would be too vague to prove useful. Therefore, those
states considered it preferable to leave the United Nations
organs, which are responsible for determining an aggressor, full
discretion to consider all circumstances of each case.1 [Emphasis
in original. ]
In other words, the UN could not even define what it was
supposed to oppose, so simply left it up to each UN “organ” to
operate under its own definition.
During the next thirty years, additional attem pts were made
to reach some sort of consensus. In 1952, the General Assembly
established a 15-member committee to formulate a definition,
but adjourned in confusion. A second committee, established in
1954, waited another two years before convening, and then
produced nothing. The General Assembly spawned a third
committee in 1957, but its meager task was simply to decide
when the Assembly should “consider again the question of
defining aggression.”9 It m et only four times during the next
decade, and reached no decision.
In 1967, a fourth group (called the “ Committee on the
Question of Defining Aggression” ) was created. Seven years
later, it finally produced a definition which was approved by
the General Assembly on January 14, 1975. Running three full
pages (which we shall simply excerpt here), the definition
begins as follows (Article 1):
\ggreaaion 49
Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of
another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the
Charter of the United Nations.4
Note th a t this would not preclude the use of armed force by a
:onglomerate of states (i.e., the UN itself), nor the use of
iggressive force when it is consistent with the UN Charter.
Article II, in typical UN fashion, then makes the self-serving
lefinition totally meaningless by permitting the Security Coun-
:il to “undefine" aggressive acts as aggression whenever the
nclination arises. It asserts:
The first use of armed force by a State in contravention of
the Charter shall constitute prima facie evidence of an act of
aggression although the Security Council may, in conformity
with the Charter, conclude th at a determination that an act of
aggression has been committed would not be justified in the light
of other relevant circumstances, including the fact th at the acts
concerned or their consequences are not of sufficient gravity.'
So, aggression once again becomes whatever the UN says it is
—or is not. If the Soviet Union were to re-invade Hungary (as in
.956) or Czechoslovakia (as in 1968), and the Red Chinese were
igain to rape Tibet (as in 1959), their aggression could easily be
ixcused and ignored under the UN’s phony definition. Should
he UN itself invade another country as it did Katanga in 1961,
>r conduct diplomatic aggression against other nations as it haB
Ihodesia, it could do so without the need to censure itself for
)eing an aggressor.
On the other hand, the definition leaves the UN free to
:ondemn as "aggressors” any countries which might attem pt to
lefend themselves against pro-Communist aggression (as when
Vlarxist rebels attacked Portugal’s overseas provinces — and the
JN condemned Portugal).
The U N ’s definition of aggression is obviously as duplicitous
is its definition of “ human rights" (Bee Chapter Ten). It may
60 The United Nations Conspiracy
be accurately paraphrased as follows: “ Aggression is whatever is
harmful to the existence and spread of Communism; and any
act which aids the Communist advance is not and never can be
aggression.” It is yet another reason why the UN is no place for
sovereign nations or men of honor.
Chapter 5
Korea
North Korea invaded South Korea on June 24,1960 (June 25,
Corea time). The UN Security Council promptly passed a
esolution fixing blame on the North Koreans and urging UN
members to render assistance to repel the Communist aggres-
ion. Two days later, the Security Council approved another
esolution calling on UN members to supply military assistance
o the Republic of Korea. Soviet vetoes could have killed both
eBolutions, but none were cast.
Using the non-membership of Red China as an excuse, the
ioviets had stalked out of the Security Council the previous
anuary, and were still “ boycotting” the Council when the war
«gan. Most pro-UN accounts claim th a t the boycott repre-
ented a serious Soviet blunder because, contrary to “obvious”
loviet wishes, it perm itted the UN to rush to the aid of the anti*
Communists. For example, President Trum an reported to Con-
resB: “ Only fortuitous circumstances had enabled the United
Nations to take swift action against the North Korean aggres-
ion: . . . the Soviet delegate had boycotted the Security Coun-
il and therefore was not able to veto its recommendations.” 1
Another UN advocate wrote th a t the Soviet absence “enabled
he Council, unhindered by a Soviet veto, to pasB its celebrated
52 The United Nations Conspiracy
resolution calling upon member states to assist in repelling
aggression in Korea. Even the Russians can make mistakes.’’2
In the same spirit, former U.S. Secretary of State Christian
Herter (CFR) claimed: “ . . . by one of those curious accidents
which can play such a large part in the world’s history, the
Russians were absent from the Security Council, and that
Council voted without a veto to oppose the aggression of the
North Koreans.” 3
And former Senator Margaret Chase Smith (R.-Maine),
after telling her Senate colleagues th at "United Nations inter
vention in the Korean conflict was perhaps itB greatest achieve
m ent,” asserted:
But in all honesty, we m ust recognize that it was the fortuitous
circumstance of a Russian boycott of the U.N. Security Council
at the time. Had not Russia so boycotted the Security Council at
that time but instead had been present to vote, undoubtedly
Russia would have exercised her veto power and thus prevented
the United. Nations from intervening and going to the defense of
South Korea.4
This “ Russian blunder" hypothesis appeared plausible to
many a t first glance, but closer scrutiny exposed it as a hoax.
Following is some of the evidence supporting the revisionist
hypothesis th at the Soviets were not caught by surprise by the
North Korean invasion, but instead were deeply involved in
planning and launching it; that they did not oppose the UN
intervention, b ut were actually anxious for the UN to become
involved in the Korean fiasco.
Article 27 of the UN Charter clearly states that decisions of
the Security Council on non‘procedural m atters "shall be made
by an affirmative vote of seven members including th e concur
ring votes of the perm anent members. . . .” The Soviet Union,
as one of the “perm anent members," caBt no concurring vote. Its
refusal to participate in the Council’s deliberations was, under
the terms of the Charter, equivalent to a veto. This im portant
point, however, was simply ignored, and the Korean Resolutions
Korea 53
were implemented despite their conflict with the Charter. The
Soviets raised no meaningful objection.
W riting in his memoirs, former Soviet dictator Nikita K hru
shchev revealed:
About the time I was transferred from the Ukraine to Moscow
at the end of 1949, Kim Il-sung [North Korea's Communist
leader] arrived with his delegation to hold consultations with
Stalin. The North Koreans w anted to prod South Korea with the
point of a bayonet. . . . N aturally Stalin couldn’t oppose this
idea. . . .
We had already been giving arms to North Korea for some
time. It was obvious th a t they would receive the requisite quantity
of tanks, artillery, rifles, machine guns, engineering equipment,
and anti-aircraft weapons. . . .
The designated hour arrived and the war began. The attack
was launched successfully. T he North Koreans swept south
swiftly.6
Khrushchev then made a most revealing admission:
. . . when Kim Il-sung was preparing for his march, Stalin called
back all our advisors who were with the North Korean divisions
and regiments, as well as all the advisors who were serving as
consultants and helping to build up the army. I asked Stalin
about this, and he snapped back at me, “It’s too dangerous to
keep our advisors there. They might be taken prisoner. We don’t
want there to be evidence for accusing us of taking part in this
business. It’s Kim Il-sung’s affair." So our advisors were recalled/
Writing in Foreign Affairs for October, 1950, New York Times
UN Bureau Chief Thomas Hamilton (CFR) acknowledged that
North Korea "clearly could not have launched its aggression
without its patron’s [the Soviet Union's| full approval.”'1
One year later former Senator Paul Douglas (D.-Illinois;
CFR) asserted in Foreign A ffairs: "The North Korean Commu
nists, without doubt under Russian stimulation, crossed the 38th
Parallel___
And in April, 1952, yet another Foreign Affairs contributor
declared th a t the North Korean aggression “was supplied and
64 The United Nations Conspiracy
equipped by the Soviet Union and could not have occurred
without its instigation or approval.”®Those words were written
by then-Senator Adlai Stevenson (D.-Illinois; CFR) who would
later, as our UN Ambassador, help promote the m yth that the
North Korean invasion caught the Soviets off-guard.
Additional evidence surfaced on May 15, 1954, when the U.S.
Defense Department released a report entitled, "The T ruth
About Soviet Involvement In The Korean W ar.” The document
began by asserting that the Soviet-assisted military buildup in
North Vietnam had begun in 1946, and th a t "W hen the North
Korean Army had reached a degree of strength which indicated
it could conquer all of Korea, the Russians gave it the signal for
the attack across the 38th parallel.” 10
The study further charged:
. . . when the tide of battle turned against the North Koreans
and th e Chinese entered the conflict and stayed in it for more
than two years, it was Russian support that made it possible for
the Communist forces to ward off complete defeat. Without
th at help, the Chinese with their inadequate industrial structure
could not possibly have m aintained effective military forces in
Korea on their own resources.11
This means, of course, th a t the chief enemy in Korea was the
Soviet Union, Yet, the issue of Soviet involvement was never
formally raised by the UN. As we have seen, influential
Americans such as Senators Paul Douglas and Adlai Stevenson
adm itted (in Foreign Affairs) th at the Soviets had helped insti
gate the conflict. Why d id n 't they speak out and demand th at
the UN condemn the USSR as an aggressor along with the North
Koreans and Chinese? P art of the answer lies in the fact th at
North Korea and Red China were not UN members, while the
USSR was, and to condemn the Soviets would have placed the
UN in the untenable position of warring with one of its most
powerful member-states. The primary role played by the So
viets was therefore simply ignored by all concerned.
According to the Defense Departm ent study, a North Korean
major who had been captured as a prisoner of war confessed
Korea 55
‘th a t as the flow of Russian equipment into Korea increased
luring the period imm ediately preceding the initial attack, the
low of Russian advisors increased with it. All orders, he said,
:ame from these advisors, and he, who spoke Russian, was given
he job of ‘translating them into Korean.’ ” 12The report continues:
Many Russian “advisors” were attached to the North Korean
Array advance headquarter* established in June, 1950. They wore
civilian clothing, th e Major added, and it was forbidden to
address them by rank. They were introduced as "newspaper
reporters” but they had supreme authority. They took the lead in
making operational and mobilizational plans, and in commanding
and manipulating troops. They treated the Korean officers who
were nominally their chiefs, th e Major said, “like their servants,
or children.”
The North Korean Major identified two of these Russian
“advisors" as Lieutenant General Vasiliev and Colonel Dolgin.
Vasiliev, he said, apparently was in charge of all movements
across the 38th parallel.13
\nother prisoner “said he actually heard General Vasiliev give
the order to attack on June 25.” 14
That Soviet general, Vasiliev, w b b the same man who from
1947 to 1950 had served as the Soviet representative on the UN’s
Military Staff Committee. His Soviet bosses had evidently
moved him to a new assignment.
So the Soviets knew the attack was coming, because they had
supplied and arranged it, which means they wanted to have us
embroiled in the Korean conflict. Their absence from the
Security Council was obviously nothing more than a contrived
ploy to permit the UN to become involved in Korea under
conditions that would camouflage the obvious Soviet desire that
it do so. After all, the Soviets had one of their own men
(Undersecretary General for Political and Security Council
Affairs Konstantin E. Zinchenko) in charge of the UN D epart
ment responsible for application of UN enforcement measures.
And it was clearly in the Soviet interest to have the supremely
powerful United States Army placed under an international
56 The United Nations Conspiracy
command in a war it would not be allowed to win. The "lim ited"
war precedent thus established, which significantly neutralized
U.S. military potential, would serve their purposes in many ways
(as Vietnam subsequently proved).
The following excerpts from General Douglas M acArthur's
autobiography give an idea of how little the Communists had to
fear from the UN’s Korean expedition. M acArthur, one of
the most able and patriotic military leaders in our nation’s
history, had been placed in command of UN forces, then
compelled by Washington to fight over and around artificially-
imposed roadblocks:
I was . . . worried by a aeries of directives from Washington
which were greatly decreasing the potential of my air force. First
I was forbidden "hot” pursuit of enemy planes that attacked our
own. M anchuria and Siberia were sanctuaries of inviolate protec
tion for all enemy forces and for all enemy purposes, no m atter
what depredations or H ssaults might come from there. Then I was
denied the right to bomb the hydroelectric plants along the Yalu.
The order was broadened to include every plant in North Korea
which was capable of furnishing electric power to M anchuria and
Siberia. Most incomprehensible of all was the refusal to let me
bomb the im portant supply center at Racin, which was not in
M anchuria or Siberia, but many miles from the border, in
northeast Korea. Racin was a depot to which the Soviet Union
forwarded supplies from Vladivostok for the North Korean
Army. I felt th a t step-by-step my weapons were being taken away
from m e.111
Note the remarkable parallel between General M acA rthur’s
situation and the “ no-win” policy forced on our fighting men in
Vietnam.*
*The only legal basis for our involvement in Vietnam was the entangling alliance
called the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SGATO), a regional UN subsid
iary set u p under Article 62 of th e UN C harter. In the New York T im et for
March 2, 1966, C.L. Sulzberger (CFR) revealed: "\John Foster] Dulles |CFW|
lathered SKATO w ith the deliberate purpose, as he explained to me, of
providing the U.S. President w ith legal authority to intervene in Indochina.
When Congress approved SEATO it signed th e first of a series of blank checks
yielding authority over Vietnam policy,” After serving its purpose, SKATO was
disbanded in February, 1976,
(orea 57
On June 27, 1950, President Truman commanded U.S. air
nd sea forces to supply cover and support to South Korean
roops and ordered our Seventh Fleet into the Formosa Strait,
illegedly to preclude any military action against Formosa by
led China, and vice versa.18 Most significant by far was the
iffect the Fleet’s presence had in precluding any action by
i’ormosa against the M ainland. In effect, beginning with the
lecond day of the war, our Seventh Fleet was assigned to protect
he Red Chinese who, five months later, would attack our forces
n Korea. General M acArthur was ordered
to isolate the Nationalist-held island of Formosa from the
Chinese mainland. The United States Seventh Fleet was turned
over to my operational control for this purpose, and I wan
specifically directed to prevent any Nationalist attacks on the
mainland, as well as to defend the island against Communist
attacks.1’
The decision to move across the 38th Parallel into North
Korea presented MacArthur
with problems of the gravest import. It immediately raised the
shadow of Red Chinese intervention. Actually, the possibility of
such an intervention had existed ever since the order from
Washington, issued to the Seventh Fleet in June, to neutralize
Formosa, which in effect protected the Red China mainland
from attack by Chiang Kai-shek’s force of half a million men.
This released the two great Red Chinese armies assigned to the
coastal defense of central China and made them available for
transfer elsewhere."
On April 8, 1952, William C. Bullitt (former Ambassador to
both the USSR and France; CFR) testified before the Senate
Internal Security Subcommittee, reminding Subcommittee
members th at “Chiang Kai-Bhek offered to send 30,000 troops
immediately, just as soon as the attack of the North Koreans
took place. Our Government refused to accept them. He not
only offered 30,000, he also offered to send as many more as we
58 The United Nations Connpiracy
wanted. I would have taken a great quantity of them. I think if
you had taken them, and put them into the fight, we would have
won it in the very early days. . . .” 19 Asked by Senator Arthur V.
Watkins (R.-Utah) if the Free Chinese had a navy, Bullitt replied:
Oh, ye§, As a m atter of fact, it has been quite an efficient
force, although it is forbidden to act in any way by fiat of our
Government which has given orders to our fleet to prevent it
from stopping the Communist supply ships going up to Korea.
They sail right by Formosa, loaded with Soviet munitions put in
the Polish Communist ships in Gdynia. They come all the way
around and go right by Formosa and sail past there taking those
munitions up, taking those weapons up to be used to kill Amer
ican soldiers in Korea, and by order of our Government the
Chinese Navy is flatly forbidden to stop them on their way up
there.”10
Senator Watkins then asked: “ Would the Chinese Navy have
the power, except for that order, to intercept them and capture
them ?” Ambassador Bullitt replied, “ Certainly, without ques
tion, without question.’’21
On September 29, 1954, General James A. Van Fleet, Com
mander of the Eighth Army in Korea, testified before the
Subcommittee. Asked if the neutralization of Formosa by the
Seventh Fleet had freed the Red Chinese for action in Korea, he
replied: “ Yes, it would certainly help them ; give them a feeling
of security th at they could go north free from a threat in the
south." Asked if th a t made any sense militarily, the General
answered: "No.” 22
Additional evidence that the Seventh Fleet had been posi
tioned primarily to protect Red China surfaced following the
1952 Presidential election when, in his first State of the Union
message to Congress on February 2, 1953,
President Dwight D. Eisenhower [ CFR | announced the decision
to lift the blockade of Formosa by the United States Seventh
Fleet as a base for Nationalists’ attacks on the Communist
Chinese mainland. The President said that he was “issuing
Corea 59
instructions th a t the Seventh Fleet no longer be employed to
shield Communist China” from attack by Chinese N ationalists
on Formosa. He wanted "to make crystal clear this order implies
no aggressive intent on our part. But we certainly have no
obligation to protect a nation fighting us in Korea
Most of the damage, of course, had already been done.
The overall military situation was so incredible th a t General
vlark Clark* later speculated:
, . . perhaps Communists had wormed their way to deeply into
our government on both the working and planning levels th a t they
were able to exercise an inordinate degree of power in shaping the
course of America in the dangerous postwar era.
I could not help wondering and worrying whether we were
faced with open enemieB across the conference table and hidden
enemies who sat with us in our most secret councils.a‘
General Clark’s concern was justified. General MacArthur,
having directly experienced the problem himself, had written:
That there was some leak in intelligence was evident to
everyone. |Brigadier General Walton] Walker continually com
plained to me th at his operations were known to the enemy in
advance through sources in Washington. . . . information must
have been relayed to them, assuring th a t the Yalu bridges would
continue to enjoy sanctuary and th at their bases would be left
intact. They knew they could swarm down across the Yalu River
without having to worry about bombers hitting their Manchurian
supply lines.211
General MacArthur then cited an official leaflet published
by Red Chinese General Lin Piao:
I would never have made the attack and risked my men and
military reputation if I had not been assured that Washington
•General Clark tucceeded General Matthew Ridgway (CFR) in 1963 as UN
Commander in Korea. Ridgway had replaced General MacArthur in 1961 after
President Truman fired MacArthur for wanting to win the war.
60 The United Nations Conspiracy
would restrain General M acArthur from taking adequate retalia
tory measures against ray lines of supply and com m unication."
During his Senate testimony cited earlier, General James A.
Van Fleet was asked if the Red Chinese would have entered the
war if they had not been assured that our military response
would be limited. He responded: "No, he would not have entered
Korea if he did not feel safe from attack in north China and
M anchuria."87
One source of some of those leaks was exposed in 1967 when a
British newspaper succeeded in tracking down in Washington a
secret report which State Departm ent intelligence officers had
compiled in 1956 in an attem pt to assess the damage done by two
Soviet spies who had operated in Britain. According to news
accounts, the confidential document (Why was it still secret in
1967?) showed th at one of the spies, Donald MacLean, “had
full knowledge of the critical American determination to ‘local
ize the conflict,’ and therefore of its decision not to allow the
United Nations forces under Gen. MacArthur to carry the war
against the Chinese coaBt.”2* MacLean had defected to the
Soviet Union in 1951 and was, as General Clark suspected, a
hidden enemy sitting with us in our most secret councils.
The Korean armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953.
More than 33,000 Americans had died, another 103,000 had been
wounded, and General Clark (who signed the agreement) was
compelled to lament that he had “gained the unenviable distinc
tion of being the first United States Army commander in
history to sign an armistice without victory.” 2®
Such was the war that would subsequently be touted by many
influential UN supporters as the organization’s “ greatest
achievement.” From the Communist viewpoint, it probably was.
Chapter 6
Rhodesia
United States involvement in the UN has twisted our foreign
jolicy to the point where it actually works against our country’s
>est interests. The UN-provoked boycott of Rhodesia, briefly
nentioned in Chapter Three, is a prime example of this.
The story begins on November 11, 1965, when Rhodesia
ieclared her independence from Great Britain in a manner
limilar to our own nation’s declaration of two centuries before,
rhe UN General Assembly condemned Rhodesia th a t same day,1
»nd the Security Council followed suit the day after.* On
November 20, the Security Council formally branded Rhodesia
‘a threat to international peace and security.”3
Applying the Communist definition of “ peace” (i.e., an
absence of resistance to Communism), Rhodesia could indeed
have been classified as such a threat. But according to the
concept of “ peace” held by most people, the action of the
Security Council was incredible. Indeed, when Britain first
called for UN sanctions against Rhodesia, the resolution sub
mitted did not contain a finding that Rhodesia was a threat to
peace. T hat conclusion was simply inserted — with no support
62 The United Nations Conspiracy
ing facts — and the resolution sent on its way, after it was
pointed out that such a finding was necessary before the UN
could take action.4
Rhodesia had never had a large, aggressive armed force; had
never threatened her neighbors with aggression; and had never
posed a military or economic threat to world peace or security.
Yet it was claimed, with her internal racial policies cited bb an
excuse, th a t some other nations th a t disagreed with thoBe
policies might someday attack Rhodesia. This, by United Na
tions standards, made Rhodesia the threat to peace! It was like
blaming the chickens for the gleam in the eye of the fox — or,
in the words of one Congressman, "like saying that a law-
abiding home is a dangerous threat to law and order in the
community because some criminal may rob or burglarize it. . . ."s
The November 20, 1966, Security Council Resolution called
for voluntary sanctions against RhodeBia, but m et with little
success. So, on December 16, 1966, the Council voted to impose
mandatory sanctions,® an action that stands to this day as the
only time in'UN history th a t such sanctions have been applied.
This is quite revealing. After all, the UN was founded in 1945.
Since th a t time the Communists have instigated aggression
after aggression, including the two major wars in Korea and
Vietnam, and have forcibly enslaved more th an one billion
human beings along the way. Yet, when the UN finally moved to
impose sanctions against a “ threat to peace,” it selected as its
target the small, benign, pro-Western, anti-CommuniBt country
of Rhodesia. The Rhodesians had had both the courage and
the wisdom to take their affairB into their own hands and
achieve real independence before the United Nations, the
socialist government of Britain, and our S tate Department
could arrange for them the sort of completely phony and
chaotic “ independence” th a t has plagued most of the African
continent in recent years — and which has so often served as the
excuse and the means for placing ever more of the ea rth ’s
population under M arxist control.
The UN crowd simply couldn’t stand for it.
The Constitution of the United States gives Congress — not
Rhodesia 63
he President or the United Nations — the power to regulate our
:ommerce with foreign nations.1 Nowhere in th a t document is
he expedient of the Executive Order even mentioned. Yet, on
January 5, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson signed Executive
3rder 11322, declaring it to be a criminal offense for any
\m erican to engage in the import of a wide range of Rhodesian
jroducts, and severely restricting U.S. exports to that country."
Dn July 29, 1968, the President signed another Executive Order
'Number 11419) barring all United States imports from, and
•xports to, Rhodesia."
These unilateral actions by President Johnson placed our
nation in a very peculiar and uncomfortable position. At the
time, our men were being killed and maimed in Vietnam by
Communists supplied primarily by the Soviet Union.* Rhodesia,
in contrast, had offered to send troops to help us fight in
Vietnam. Yet our government leaders were permitting extensive
shipments of goods and materiel to the Soviet Union and other
Communist countries comprising the arsenal of the Vietcong, at
the very time they were refusing to ship those items to friendly
Rhodesia. For example, in 1966 the State Department set forth
the following policy, which was in effect throughout the
Vietnam War:
All American citizen* should know th a t any American busi
nessman who chooses to engage in peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union or Eastern European countries and to sell the good* he buys
is acting within his rights and i* following the policy of hi*
government. So, too, is any American citizen who chooses to buy
such goods. . . .
But any organization, however patriotic in intention, that
undertakes to boycott, blacklist, or otherwise penalize or attack
any American business for engaging in peaceful trade with
Eastern European countries or the Soviet Union, is acting against
the interests of the United S tates.10
Yet, on October 17, 1973, during joint subcommittee hearings
‘ “They |the Soviet*] furnish 80 to 86 percent of the »ophi*ticated military
equipment for the North Vietnamete force*. W ithout th a t *Mi*tance, North
Vietnam would not have the capability to wage the major war they are againit
the United State*.” (President Richard Nixon, new* conference, March 4, 19B9: re
printed, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, March 10,1969, p. 367.)
64 The United Nationn Conspiracy
in the House of Representatives, Congressman John Buchanan
(R.-Alabama), who appeared as a witness against continued
U.S. trade with Rhodesia, testified:
. . . four individuals and two corporation!) were indicted by
federal grand jury for violating the U.N. sanction* against Rho
desia last year. All pleaded guilty to planning to build a $50
million chemical fertilizer plant in Rhodesia and to enter into a
secret agreement with the Rhodesia regime to ship $5 million
worth of ammonia to Rhodesia. All were fined.11
Fertilizer and ammonia? Consider:
On January 19, 1966, the Commerce Department authorized
shipment to the U.S.S.R. of technical data for the construction
and operation of a plant to produce synthetic ammonia. . . .
On March 2, 1966, the Department of Commerce issued a
license to authorize sending technical inform ation to the
U.S.S.R. for three more fertilizer plants. . , .
On August 3, 1966, a license was issued by the Commerce
Department to authorize shipm ent to the U.S.S.R. of another
ammonia plan t.u
Indeed, “ On January 28, 1966, the Department of Commerce
issued a routine announcement that it was licensing export of
technical data to enable a United States firm to build six
fertilizer plants in Soviet Russia. . . . That same week, in
Senate committee testimony, Secretary of Defense Robert S.
M cNamara |CFft) revealed th a t volume shipments of war sup
plies — including fertilizer — were coming into the North
Vietnamese port of Haiphong from the U.S.S.R.” 13
In short, it was official policy to give aid and comfort to our
worst enemies while boycotting one of our best friends.
One result of this immoral double standard was to make us
increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union for chrome, a vital
strategic material. The world’s three main sources of chrome ore
are South Africa, the Soviet Union, and — Rhodesia. The rest
of the world lags far behind, and practically no chrome ore is to
be found in the United States or elsewhere in N orth America.
ihodesia 65
''ollowing the imposition of sanctions against Rhodesia, the
soviet Union greatly increased the price of its chrome ore, and
ve were soon paying an outrageous premium for the privilege of
lecoming dependent on an enemy for a material essential to the
iroduction of stainless steel and other high-performance steels
ind superalloys. (It is chromium th at imparts to such metals
heir vital resistance to heat and corrosion.) As noted by one
lational news magazine:
Kver since the U.S. dapped an embargo on Rhodesian chro
mium for diplomatic reason*, thi» country has been forced to rely
on Soviet Russia for 46 percent of its entire supply of the
strategic metal. Not only that, complain critics of th e whole idea,
but the Russians have upped the price from $1)0.60 to $72 a to n .14
It was primarily this situation that prompted Senator Harry
7. Byrd, Jr. (I.-Virginia) to make a determined bid to reinstate
ihodesia as a source of supply for chrome ore. In 1971, Congress
tpproved an amendment submitted by Senator Byrd th a t per-
nitted the United States to import strategic materials from
ihodesia if those materials were also imported from Commu-
list nations. It was a modest, sensible proposal th a t was clearly
n tune with our country’s best interests. As explained by
Senator Byrd:
The legislation did not make it impossible for th e executive
branch to prevent importation from Rhodesia.
What the legislation did Hay . . . is th a t the importation of
chrome from a Free World country cannot be prohibited if th a t
same strategic material is being imported from a Communist-
dominated country, . . .
So if the President of the United States does not want to have
chrome imported from Rhodesia, he can stop the importation of
chrome from Russia. . . . So there is a way, if the President of
the United States so desires, th a t the importation of this strategic
material from Rhodesia can be prevented.15
Nevertheless, the Byrd Amendment immediately aroused the
Internationalist Left to a frenzy of opposition because it
66 The United Nation« Conspiracy
permitted a partial circumvention of the UN sanctions against
Rhodesia.
The Byrd Amendment became effective on January 1, 1972.
It was promptly challenged, and upheld, in the courts. On May
16, 1973, the Communist newspaper Daily World published an
editorial calling for its repeal, asserting: “The crucial step today
is to compel Congress to repeal the pro-imperialist, pro-racist
position it adopted, legalizing violation of the U.N.'s embargo in
1971.” Later in the year, then-Senator Gale McGee (D.-Wyo-
ming; CFR) admitted:
The central issue is not chrome from Rhodesia. The central
issue is not repealing something just to repeal it. The central issue
is, what is going to happen to the United Nations? It is the United
Nations that is on the line. . . .
. . . every Member of this body [the Senate] ought to know
what he is voting. He is voting to start getting out of the U.N.
. . . if the United States is to go back under th e Charter of the
United Nations . . . this amendment must be repealed. T hat is
the whole issue.1'
Remember th a t the basis for the UN’s Rhodesian embargo
was the claim th a t Rhodesia was “minority-ruled” and a “threat
to peace." Our leaders were calling for repeal of the Byrd
Amendment, while at the same time advocating increased trade
with the minority-ruled, peace-threatening Soviet Union. On
March 7, 1974, during hearings before th e Senate Finance
Committee, the following revealing exchange took place be
tween Senator Byrd and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (CFR):
Senator Byrd. Do you recognize our action in embargoing
trade with Rhodesia as being just?
Secretary Kissinger. Yes.
Senator Byrd. Do you regard the Soviet Union as being
governed by a tight dictatorship, by a very few persons over
a great number of individuals?
Secretary Kissinger. I consider the Soviet Union, yes, as a
dictatorship of an oligarchic n atu re, th a t is, of a small
number of people in the Politburo.
Rhodesia 67
Senator Byrd. In your judgment, ia Rhodesia a threat to
world peace?
Secretary Kiaainger. No.
Senator Byrd. In your judgm ent, is Russia a potential
th reat to world peace?
Secretary Kissinger. I th in k the Soviet Union has the
military capacity to disturb the peace, yes.
Senator Byrd. In your judgment, does Russia have a more
democratic government than Rhodesia?
Secretary Kissinger. N o .. . .
Senator Byrd. . . . you have testified th a t you do not
regard Rhodesia as heing a threat to world peace.
Secretary Kissinger. T h at is correct.
Senator Byrd. And then you know, of course, th a t under
the United N ations C harter action can only be taken
against a country in regard to an embargo, if th at country is
judged to be a threat to world peace.
And so my question to you is do you think th e United
Nations acted improperly?
Secretary Kissinger. I had not thought th at the United
Nations had acted improperly, but in the light of what you
have said, I would have to review the particular positions of
the embargo.17
Secretary Kissinger never did come up with a rational basis on
which to brand Rhodesia a “th reat to peace.” He simply con
tinued to advocate repeal of the Byrd Amendment. The Con
gress, however, rejected attem pts to repeal the Amendment on a
number of occasions between 1972 and the end of 1976. But in
early 1977 it buckled under the pressure and voted to scrap the
Byrd Amendment and place our nation once again in compliance
with the UN’s immoral and illegal boycott. On M arch 18, 1977,
President Jimmy Carter stated:
I’m very grateful this morning to have a chance to sign House
Resolution |»ic]* 1746, which gives me the authority to reestablish
•Actually, it wa» a bill (H.R. 1740), not a resolution. The prefix "H .R ." does not
designate " H o u m Resolution,” a t is widely believed, but rather "House of
Representative*”— the body in which the bill originated. House Resolutions are
abbreviated "H. Res."
68 The United N ation» Connpiracy
the embargo against the purchase of chrome from Rhodesia, . . ,
I think it puts us on the side of w hat's right and proper.111
You will recall th at in 1961 it was an anti-Communist black
regime in Katanga which the UN and American International
ists sought to destroy for seeking a "prem ature,” non-Marxist
independence. From 1966 to 1980, it was the anti-Communist
white regime in Rhodesia. It should be quite obvious that the
common denominator is not race, but anti-Communism. Ka-
tangans resisted Communism, were branded a "threat to peace,”
and saw their province invaded by a UN arm y which bombed
hospitals and bazookaed am bulances1' until "peace” was re
stored. Rhodesians resisted Communism, were branded a threat
to peace, and were subjected to UN sanctions and widespread
UN-condoned attacks by guerrilla terrorists. For Rhodesia, like
Katanga, the incredible pressures loosed against her by the UN
and other subdivisions of the International M arxist Conspiracy
proved to be .too much. On April 18, 1980, she officially died
and became the terroriBt-ruled, Communist-backed, nation of
Zimbabwe.
The time iB approaching when those African nations that
are still free will be engaged in a life-or-death battle against
Communist subjugation. The role of Rhodesia’s loyal anti-
Communists in this fight remains to be seen. But one thing is
certain: If this brave little country had not been betrayed by her
allies, foremost among whom we m ust count the United States,
she would undoubtedly be alive and well today — and her
survival would have marked a significant turning point in the
battle for freedom.
Chapter 7
They Love Me?
They Love Me Not?
It may seem absurd today, but a key argument used by UN
advocates until just a few years ago was the claim th a t the
United States should support the UN because the Communists
were anxious to destroy it. This false premise was in turn used as
the basis for claiming that anti-Communist Americans who
opposed the UN were working for the same goal as the Commu
nists. Here, for example, is how former Senator Frank Church
(D.-Idaho; CFR) manipulated the argument during a Senate
speech:
If you tell them [UN haters] th a t their objective of getting the
United States out of the U.N. is just what Khrushchev would like
to see happen; that it wan the shoe-poundlng Khrushchev who
tried to bully his troika plan through the General Assembly, with
the purpose of undermining the office of the Secretary General,
so that the U.N. might be rendered as impotent as its predecessor,
the League [of Nations], they grow angry and abusive as they
grope for the answers they cannot find.1
We will not become angry and abusive as we "grope for the
70 The United Nations Conspiracy
answers.” As we find them , however, we may become just a
little indignant at having been deceived for so long by propa
gandists like Senator Church.
In 1965, the State Department was claiming that “The United
States has never been defeated in any im portant political
question in the United Nations. On the other hand the Soviet
Union can usually count on only 5 out of 60 votes in the General
Assembly.”2 Similarly, former UN Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge (CFR) once asserted th at the Communists do not domi
nate the UN because “The United States has never been
defeated on any im portant political question in the United
Nations.” 3
Since those statem ents were made, Red China has been
adm itted to (and Free China expelled from) the UN, the
terrorist Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) has been
welcomed and glorified by the world body, and the UN General
Assembly has launched an hysterical anti-American crusade
th a t now mqkes us feel lucky if we attract as many as 5 votes
out of 154 (as of November, 1980) in its chambers. Indeed, the
UN “almost automatically lines up alongside Moscow’s ‘three
antis’: anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism and anti-racism. The
fact th a t the United States winds up on the losing side of
almost every such U.N. argument is a welcome bonus to the
leaders of the Kremlin.”4
The U N ’s alleged "anti-Comm unist” cover has beer blown
for good; yet jt* apologists continue to offer such absurd
rationalizations as th at of former Senator Gale McGee (D.-
Wyoming; CFR): "For the first time since the founding of the
United Nations, the U.S. has to work for a vote. . . . This is an
im portant development and it is good for us, since it requires a
greater effort and participation in the U.N. to achieve our
goals."8 (Emphasis added.) Obviously, no m atter how deranged
and anti-American the UN becomes, there always will be seman
tic magicians conjuring up ways to justify the continuation of
our support.
Communist support of the UN has been evident from the
They Love Me? They Love Me Not? 71
start to those not blinded by misleading pro-UN propaganda. In
1942 Earl Browder, former General Secretary of the Communist
Party, USA (and twice its candidate for the Presidency of the
United States), wrote of the wartime anti-Axis alliance th a t
served as a key landmark on the road to San Francisco: “ . . . the
American Communists worked energetically and tirelessly to lay
the foundation for the United Nations which we were sure
would come into existence.”6 The goal, of course, was to have
the Soviet Union become a wartime ally of the United States so
it could take political advantage of the alliance both during and
after the war. As far back as July 19, 1936, U.S. Ambassador
to the Soviet Union William C. Bullitt (CFR) had sent the
following dispatch to Secretary of State Cordell Hull:
It is . . . the heartiest hope of the Soviet Government that the
United StateB will become involved in war with Japan. . . . To
think of the Soviet Union aB a possible ally of the United States
in case of war with Jap an is to allow the wish to be father to the
thought. The Soviet Union would certainly attem pt to avoid
becoming an ally until Japan had been thoroughly defeated and
would then merely use the opportunity to acquire Manchuria and
Sovietize China.7
That was an incredibly accurate projection of exactly what
happened. At the Yalta Conference, the Soviets had been
assured control of the M anchurian railroads. (It was well known
th at whoever controlled the railroads would dominate M an
churia.) Two days after the A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima
(six days before Japan's surrender), Russia declared war on
Japan. Subsequently, after grabbing M anchuria and looting its
industrial equipment, the Soviets turned it over to Mao-Tse-
tung as an operational base for the Red Chinese (along with tons
of arms, ammunition and supplies taken from the defeated
Japanese). It was a crucial beginning step, as planned more than
a decade earlier, to facilitate the eventual Communist subjuga
tion of Mainland China.
Dr. Bella Dodd, a former top official of the Communist
Party, USA, who eventually defected, has revealed:
72 The United Nations Conspiracy
When the Yalta conference had ended, the Communist*
prepared to support the United Nations Charter which was to be
adopted at the San Francisco conference to be held in May and
June, 194fi. For this I organized a corps of speakers and we took
to the street comers and held open-air meetings in the millinery
and clothing sections of New York where thousands of people
congregate at the lunch hour. We spoke of the need for world
unity and in support of the Yalta decisions."
Political Affairs is the monthly theoretical journal of the
Communist Party, USA. Two months before the San Francisco
Conference, that journal told its readers: “Great popular sup
port and enthusiasm for the United Nations policies should be
built up, well organized and fully articulate. . . . The opposi
tion must be rendered so impotent that it will be unable to
gather any significant support in the Senate against the United
Nations Charter and the treaties which will follow.’’*
“ Popular support” for the Charter was indeed well organized.
Francis 0 . Wilcox (CFR), a member of the U.S. delegation at
San Francisco, later reminisced:
i
During irty years on Capitol Hill I can recall only a few
instances when mail in foreign policy questions made any heavy
impact on the Foreign Relations Committee. One instance con
cerned the ratification of the U.N. Charter, when the flood of
letters and telegrams made it unm istakably clear th a t the great
majority of Americans in all walks of life strongly favored U.S.
membership in the new world organization. If any serious doubts
had been lurking in the minds of the committee, they should have
been dispelled by Jhut outpouring of popular sentim ent.10
Indeed the opposition was rendered so impotent th at only two
Senators, William Langer (R.-North Dakota) and Henrik Ship-
stead (R.-Minnesota), voted against the Charter. (The tally was
89 to 2 on July 28, 1945.) In fact, the Associated Press had
reported on June 24, 1946, — even before the C harter was
completed — th a t fifty-two of seventy-five Senators inter
viewed had already gone on record favoring itB ratification.11 In
other words, a majority of Senators committed themselves to
’'hey Love Me? They Love Me Not? 73
oting for a crucial foreign policy document before they could
lossibly have read it, since it had not yet been finished.
At San Francisco, “ The Soviet Government took an active
tart. . . . Noteworthy is the fact th a t Soviet Russia was willing
o compromise, as the New York Times pointed out in an
ditorial, on at least ten im portant issues in order to assure
he prompt and successful establishment of the U.N.” 12
On March 23, 1946, Josef Stalin was quoted in Pravda as
laving declared: “ I attribute great importance to U.N.O. since it
g a serious instrument for preservation of peace and interna-
ional security."11 And the Soviet publication Bolshevik for
November, 1946, asserted: "The masses know th a t peace is
jossible only on the basis of cooperation among the existing
states, . . . The Soviet Union is fighting to have the United
Slations as effective as possible."14
In 1947, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Vi9hinsky
proclaimed: “The policy of the U.S.S.R. with regard to the
United Nations calls for strengthening that body, extending and
reinforcing international cooperation, unfaltering and consis
tent observance of the Charter, and the implementation of its
principles.” 16
In 1964, the Communist Daily Worker pointed out to its
readers that “ . . . it's not the UN that merits your scorn and
active opposition, but the policies that have undermined the
UN.” 1H And in 1957, the Communist Party, USA adopted a
Constitution, the Preamble of which asserted that “the true
national interest of our country and the cause of peace and
progress require . , . the strengthening of the United Nations as
a universal instrument of peace.” 17
During his visit to the United Nations in I960, Soviet Premier
Nikita Khrushchev told the General Assembly: "Experience of
the work of the United Nations has shown that this body is
useful and necessary. . . .” |1' The next year, as Communist
support of the UN began to surface even more forcefully in the
wake of increasing antagonism within the United States toward
the world body, the West Coast Communist Party newspaper
People's World declared:
74 The United Nations Conspiracy
The UN command* a great reservoir of support in our country.
'I'his support should now be made vocal.
People should write President Kennedy, telling him —
I)o not withdraw from UN.
Restore UN to the flrand Design of Franklin Roosevelt — the
design for peaceful coexistence.1*
In early 1962, The Worker (no longer a daily) ran an article
headlined, "Birchers Take W arpath Against jJN Peace Hopes,”
telling its readers: “The John Birch Society has instructed its
members to prepare a hate campaign against the United N a
tions." The Worker article described this development as "insid
ious business.”20
In late 1964 and early 1965 the Xerox Corporation (whose
Board Chairman, Sol Linowitz, was a member of the CFR)
sponsored a television series consisting of the most blatant sort
of UN propaganda. In commenting on one of these programs,
the Communist People's World for January 23, 1965, noted:
“It’s not a little horrifying th at in our country a t this tim e a
pitch is needed for the UN and for peace, but th at is the case,
and we’re all for figuratively hitting people over the head with
the message. The [Xerox) program did th a t.”21
A few months later, Soviet spokesman Mikhail Sergeyevich
Lvov told a Moscow radio audience:
There can be no doubt that with the United Nations consti
tuted as it is at present, the consistent line of the Soviet Union in
pressing for the -United Nation* to face fully up to the problems
of strengthening peace and insuring freedom is producing more
and more positive results.11
And in 1973, an article in Political Affairs asserted:
As for the positive role of the United Nations in international
relations and in the affairs of its member-states, the list of its
accomplishments is extensive. . . .
To further th e continuation and strengthening of this trend of
United Nations activities, support of the people is necessary, and
especially the support of the majority of the people of the United
States.”
1hey Love Me? They Love M e Not? 75
Clearly, the belief that the Communists ever opposed the UN
annot w ithstand the massive evidence to the contrary.
All of this does not mean, of course, th at the Communists
lid not pretend to oppose the UN on occasion. To the contrary,
he Communists realize better than anyone else how repulsive
heir system iB to the vast majority of mankind, and they are
lerfectly willing to attack th e UN and its policies from time to
ime if th a t will help to rally public opinion in non-Communist
ountries behind policies they really want. An example of this
trategy, taken from another context, was reported in U.S. News
i World Report:
Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to Stewart L. Udall, U.S.
Secretary of the Interior, while the two men posed for new*
photographers in Moscow: “ If it will help you out, you can go
ahead and shake a finger in my face.”24
Two former UN Ambassadors helped confirm thiB tactic as it
elates to the organization. Henry Cabot Lodge (CFR) once
isBerted:
I've seen it happen many times — the free nations, being free,
start to drift apart, and everyone follows his own way. The
politicians in the free nations start attacking each other. Rut
when it gets to th a t point, the Soviet representative will say
something that is so monstrous, so shocking, so irritating that the
free people start pulling together again.™
And Adlai Stevenson (CFR) told the UN Security Council on
February 15, 1961:
. . . the Soviet Union has attacked the United Nations, has
refused to pay its share of th e Congo expenses, and has laid siege
to the institution of the Secretary ‘General. Thus, as often before,
the Soviets have pressed their attack at a moment when the fUNJ
community seems most divided against itself. B ut, once again,
that very attack makes the members realize more deeply that they
are members of a community and causes them to draw together}*
[Emphasis added. |
76 The United Nationa Conspiracy
Note th a t Stevenson’s reference to Soviet attackB on the post
of Secretary-General is similar to th at of Senator Church which
we quoted earlier. You will recall that Soviet demands for a
troika were very firm until Secretary-General Dag Hammar-
skjttld was killed in a plane crash. But rather than use the
opportunity his death presented to hamstring the UN, “The
Soviet Union gave up for the time being its attem pt to impose a
three block ‘troika’ agreement, and the assembly elected T hant
unanimously. "27
Another unintended confirmation of this Communist duplic
ity waB given on March 3,1966, when pro-UN news commentator
Howard K. Smith spoke a t Brigham Young University in Provo,
Utah. Mr. Smith made this point: “The Russians attacked us
bitterly over the Congo, but the key fact is they voted for U.N.
intervention in the Congo. The Russians attacked us bitterly
over the Cyprus crisis, but the main thing is they did not veto
U.N. action; they let it go in.” 2*
And in 1964, when the Afro-Asian block at the UN was
pressing for aji increase in membership on various UN councils,
the Communists pretended to oppose the move in public debate,
b u t then quietly reversed themselves when it counted:
The Soviet Union quietly backed down in its opposition to
Afro-Asian demand* for an expansion of the United Nations
Security Council and economic and social council. . . . During
the assembly's debate on these resolutions, the Soviet Union and
the entire Communist bloc . . . opposed the proposal.™
Also in 1964, Associated Press writer Max Harrelaon com
mented on this Communist tactic, noting:
Those who have observed Soviet actions at the United Nations
over the past 18 years are sure only th a t the Russians can — and
do — change their minds.
They may walk out of a U.N. body today and return without so
much as a word to explain their reversal.
Over th e years they have made many threats they have never
carried out, and they have suddenly abandoned policies which
they previously held to be absolutely unchangeable.10
Vhey Love Me? They Love Me Not? 77
M any additional examples of pretended Communist opposi
tion could be cited, but these few should make it clear th a t the
JN propaganda network not only covered up the extent to which
he Communists support the UN, it even worked in concert with
hem to create a false impression of Communist opposition to
he organization. This deception helped effectively to neutral-
ze anti-Comm unist opposition to the world body.
The UN is invaluable to Communist purposes as a base for
Soviet intelligence operations. As early as 1952, informed esti
mates were suggesting “ th at as many as one-half of the 1,350
idministrative executives in the UN are either Communists or
)eople who are willing to do what they w ant.” 11 Even “ Liberal”
:olumnist Jack Anderson admits: “ Indeed, the U.N. is the main
Soviet espionage center in this country."12 A top-secret training
manual for th e Soviet KGB, obtained a few years ago by a
Western security service, asserts: “ In the U.S., in addition to
)rdinary cover, we UBe various international organizations and
>ur representations in them. The most important of these is the
Jnited Nations and its branch institutions.”33
Incredibly, the American taxpayer is being forced to help
Inance such Communist subversion. According to John Barron:
The KGB derives still another advantage from placing its
officers on the United Nations payroll. Since the United Staten
pays 25 percent of the entire U.N. operating budget, it pays 25
percent of th e bountiful salaries granted KGB officers insinu
ated into the U.N. jobs. American taxpayer* are thus compelled to
finance KGB operations against themselves and the non-com
munist world. Moreover, the Soviet Union requires its citizens
paid by international organizations to rebate the greater part of
their salaries to the government. Thus, it actually makes money
each time it plants a KGB officer in the U.N.34
In addition to the protection it affords Communist spies
vithin our country, the UN guarantees the continued enslave
ment of the millions of people imprisoned behind the Soviet
Iron Curtain. As explained by historian Charles Callan Tansill:
In Article 42 of the United Nations Charter it is provided that
78 The United Nations Conspiracy
the Security Council "may take such action by air, sea or land
forces as may be necessary to m aintain or restore international
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade and other operations by air, sea or land forces of
Members of the United Nations.” As long as the Soviet govern
ment does not assume an active role in any breach of world peace,
this military force will help to protect its far-flung empire of
satellite states from outside aggression.
It is obvious th at under these conditions, the role of America
has been reduced to one of mere containment. . . . The United
Nations was created to help Russia, not to hurt her.91
One of the moat im portant posts within the UN (Secretary-
General Trygve Lie described it as “the most important assistant
secretaryship”5®) is th a t of Undersecretary for Political and
Security Council Affairs:
It is the function of this departm ent to work permanently with
the Security Council on any problem which may affect interna
tional peace. There is no territorial, military, or juridical dispute
in the world th at would not come t o . . . [thwl department for
documentation. When any member of the Security Council or of
the Military Staff Committee needs any special data, he turns to
this departm ent for help.17
From the beginning, this crucial position has been held by a
Communist. Here is the list (as of November, 1980):
1946-1949 Arkady Sobolev (USSR)
1949-1953 Konstantin Zinchenko (USSR)
1953-1954 Ilya Tchernychev (USSR)
1964-1957 Dragoslav Protitch (Yugoslavia)
1958-1960 Anatoly Dobrynin (USSR)
1960-1962 Georgy Arkadev (USSR)
1962-1963 E.D. Kiselev (USSR)
1963-1965 V.P. Suslov (USSR)
1965-1968 Alexei E. Nesterenko (USSR)
1968-1973 Leonid N. Kutakov (USSR)
1973-1978 Arkady N. Shevchenko (USSR)
1978- Mikhail D. Sytenko (USSR)
hey Love Me? They Love Me Not? 79
Trygve Lie wrote th a t Soviet representative Andrei Vyshinsky
as first to inform him of the decision by the Big Five to
ppoint a Soviet national as Undersecretary for Political and
ecurity Council Affairs: “The preservation of international
eace and security was the Organization’s highest responsibility,
id it was to entrusting the direction of the Secretariat depart-
lent most concerned with this to a Soviet national th a t the
mericans had agreed.” M And what did our leaders seek for our
vn country? Lie continued: “To my surprise, they did not ask
•r a departm ent concerned with comparable substantive af-
tirs, like the economic or the Bocial. Rather Mr. StettiniuB
roposed th at an American citizen be appointed Assistant
ecretary-General for Administration and Financial Services.’’3®
Is it conceivable th a t the Communists could object to an
rrangement like that?
t
Chapter 8
A Matter Of Opinion
In a letter dated July 3,1952, accompanying his report on UN
ictivities for the previous year, President Harry S Truman
isserted: “ In the United Nations no country can escape the
udgment of mankind. This is the first and greatest weapon
igainst aggression and international immorality. It is the great
est strength of the United Nations.” 1
Similarly, UN Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge claimed in
954: "And the Soviet Union, while it m aintains an iron dictator-
hip wherever it has the legal [sic] power to do so, is very
ensitive to public opinion in the world outside its borders.”2 In
December, 1962, a State Departm ent publication claimed: “The
>ne great asset and powerful weapon of the United Nations, of
:ourse, is the moral force of world public opinion. . . . Urn
brce cannot be overestimated, It acts as the collective con-
icience of mankind. No nation can lightly accept a position of
>pen defiance to this powerful moral force.":I
In 1963, former UN General Assembly President Charles
Vlalik wrote: "The force of public opinion generated at the
Jnited Nations and as a consequence throughout the world, has
82 The United Nations Conspiracy
often exerted considerable pressure . . .”4 The next year, the
Board Chairman of the United Nations Association of the
United States went so far as to claim: "In the final analysis, the
whole force and power of the UN depend upon public opinion.”5
Many more examples could be cited to illustrate how an
alleged world public opinion has been used to convince Ameri
cans th at the UN deserves support as a powerful moral force
for peace. Yet on May 8, 1976, another influential UN advocate,
former Senator J.W . Fulbright (D.-Arkansas), told the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee (which he chaired for many
years): "The assumption . . . th at the moral weight of world
opinion expressed through the General Assembly, would have a
moderating effect on the deplorable events and practices has
not been borne out by events.” *
For once, Senator Fulbright had correctly analyzed a situa
tion. The world opinion argum ent has been, from the start, a
misleading hoax th at has hurt our nation and the free world in
many ways. While the United States haB meekly revamped its
foreign policy to meet the demands of an alleged United
Nations "world opinion,” the Communists have simply con
tinued with their job of taking over the world, shrugging off
world opinion all along the way.
Moral pressure elicits response only from those who are
morally sensitive. The Communists are not morally sensitive:
they view so-called world opinion as a myth, and therefore
dismiss it entirely unless it happens to coincide with their goals.
In contrast, the very Western nations th at invented and popu
larized the world opinion concept were bo successful in convinc
ing their people of its existence, and the need to abide by it, that
they soon found themselves confronted with the alternative of
either going along with the collectivist UN majority or violating a
principle of their own creation. This, in turn, has encouraged
anti-American regimes around the world fearlessly to stick out
their tongues at us, and vote againBt us, because they know we
will not retaliate in any way th a t might offend world public
opinion. On the other hand, these same nations cower before the
t
M atter Of Opinion 83
oviet bloc, since they know th a t group ignores such nonsense.
Hamilton Pish Armstrong wrote in the April, 1961 issue of
oreign Affairs:
Those that need to turn to both East and West for help with
their social and economic problems are always under temptation
to talk and vote against the United States; they know they can do
it with impunity, and they know that opposite behavior would
awaken damaging Soviet displeasure.''
Part of Secretary-General U T hant’s own openly-expressed
intem pt for the United States, and go-easy attitu d e toward the
ommunistB, was apparently attributable to this phenomenon:
Although he [Thant J lost few opportunities to speak out about
Vietnam, American diplomats found him somewhat less forth
right in his criticism of Communist behavior. . . . He seldom
found cause for strong rebuke of Hanoi.
Some analysts put this down to the underlying facts of U
Thant’s situation. The Soviet Union held the mortgage, as it were,
on the workings of the U.N.; by withdrawing support or threaten
ing non-cooperation, Moscow could cause paralysis. Thant knew
that the U.S. was unlikely to resort to such tactics.'
In 1957, Henry Kissinger (CFR) had written a book titled
hiclear Weapons and Foreign Policy, which was the culmination
f his two years of service as director of nuclear weapons and
>reign policy studies for the CFR. Kissinger pointed out:
Because Soviet doctrine teaches the inevitable hostility of the
non-Communist world, no potential gain can be sacrificed to win
an illusory good will. . ..
As a result, the Soviet leaders never give up the chance to fill a
vacuum, real or imagined, for the sake of winning the good will
of the non-Communist world.'
He then reminded his readers: “T he immense reservoir of
empathy built up [by the Soviets] during World War II was
icrificed without hesitation to obtain a bastion in Eastern
84 The United Nations Conspiracy
Europe.”10 For example, as noted by Professor Hans J. Morgen-
thau (CFR) in Foreign Affairs, “The Soviet Union put the success
of the intervention |m Hungary in 7956'| above all other consid
erations, and succeeded. Its prestige throughout the world suf
fered drastically in consequence. But Hungary is today a
communist state within the orbit of the Soviet Union, and
Soviet prestige recovered quickly from the damage it suffered
in 1956.” n
Harry Hopkins, influential advisor to President Roosevelt,
once attem pted to convince Soviet dictator Josef Stalin th a t he
(Stalin) should be less abrasive in his comments about the
United States, lest he offend public opinion in America.
Writing in Foreign Affairs, McGeorge Bundy (CFR), who later
became a Hopkins-type adviBor himself in the adm inistrations
of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson, revealed:
If Generalissimo Stalin understood this point, he never showed
i t . . . . He never asked why Americans were disturbed, or w hat
Soviet Russia might do to calm them down. American public
opinion, whose controlling influence in all American policy
Hopkins was trying to communicate, seemed to Stalin either a
weapon in bargaining or a problem for management by western
statesm en. Neither the value of its support nor the cost of its
opposition seems to have struck him as very im portant.11
Following the Yalta Conference in 1945, Andrei Vishinsky,
who would later represent the Soviet Union at the UN, inter
vened personally to help install a puppet Communist regime in
Rumania. In January, 1946, while visiting Bucharest, he was told
th a t the methods he was requiring the Rumanian authorities to
use would undoubtedly prove offensive to the United States
and Britain. According to McGeorge Bundy, he replied curtly:
“ Let the sparrows tw itter.” 13 Bundy further describes Soviet
behavior after Yalta as "a policy characterized by an apparent
decision to disregard as unim portant th e good will of the non-
Communist west and to proceed as energetically as possible tc
expand an d consolidate Communist power.” 14 T h a t’s exactly
what it was.
4 M atter Of Opinion 85
When the Soviets moved to suppress the Hungarian uprising
n 1956, they ignored world opinion entirely. On April 9, 1958,
luring a speech at the Csepel Iron and Steel Works in Hungary,
Nikita Khrushchev acknowledged:
We knew that we might be reproached for having allegedly
intervened with our armed forces in the internal affairs of the
Hungarian People’s Republic. . . . We knew th a t the imperialists
would shout wildly th a t we interfered in the Hungarian people's
internal affairs, b u t we also kn ew . . . th a t there was only one
correct road open before our Soviet country: to extend our
assistance to our Hungarian class brothers.15
Likewise, when the Soviets suppressed the rebellion in
Dzecho-Slovakia in 1968, they ignored world opinion. Again,
;heir image was briefly tarnished, but Czecho-Slovakia remains
Communist to this day.
UN apologists continued nevertheless to make absurd claims
mch as this excerpt from the pen of former British Labour
Party leader Hugh Gaitskell:
But even for dictatorship* the importance of world opinion
should not be underestim ated. The Soviet government itself . . .
cannot ignore its own reputation . . . and if, as in the case of
Hungary, it is denounced by the Assembly, then its power and
influence . . . suffers a setback.” "
In contrast to Hungary and Czechoslovakia, when the British,
French, and Israelis invaded Suez in 1956 after Egypt’s pro-
Communist dictator, Gamal Abdel Nasser, seized the Suez
3anal, they were quickly pressured by world opinion to w ith
draw, leaving the Canal under Nasser’s control. Clark M.
Eichelberger (CFR), a staunch defender of the UN and a
member of the five-man committee th a t prepared the first
working draft of the UN Charter, wrote:
The British, French, and Israelis, responding to an appeal of
world opinion in th e United Nations, agreed to withdraw their
troops. . . .
86 The United Nations Conspiracy
In comparison, the simultaneous emergency session to secure
the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Hungary was a disappoint
ment. The Soviet Union w b b not responsive to public opinion as
were the British, French and Israeli governments.17
Of course it wasn’t. As President Eisenhower (CFR) told a
joint session of Congress in January, 1967:
T he United Nations was able to bring about a ceasefire and
withdrawal of hostile forces from Egypt because it was dealing
with government* and peoples who had a decent respect for the
opinions of mankind . . . But in the case of Hungary the situa
tion was different. The Soviet Union vetoed action by the
Security Council to require the withdrawal of Soviet armed
forces from Hungary. And it has shown callous indifference to
the recommendations, even the censure, of the General Assembly.1*
Some observers believe that the spectre of world opinion
played a role in affecting U.S. policy during the tragic Bay of
Pigs venture in 1961:
The United States had an interest in eliminating the political
and military power of the Soviet Union. . . . The United States
also had an interest in avoiding whatever would jeopardize its
standing in the new and emerging nations. T he United States
failed to assign priorities to these two interests. In order to
minimize the loss of prestige, the United States jeopardized the
success of the intervention. . . . In consequence, the United
States failed thrice. The intervention did not succeed; in the
attem pt we suffered the temporary impairment of our standing
among the new and emerging nations; and we lost much prestige
as a great nation able to use its power successfully on behalf of
its interests.19
Remember, the world opinion myth was planted and culti
vated by our home-grown Internationalists, and has been used to
hamstring our own foreign policy (and th a t of the West in
general), while leaving the Communists free to do aB they
please. It has been a "heads I win, tails you lose” proposition
I M atter O f Opinion 87
avoring the Communists. We must demand th a t our leaders
tart making foreign policy decisions on the basis of w hat is
ight and best for America — not what will affect a chimerical
vorld opinion. j
Advocates of the UN have consistently asserted th a t the
‘force of world public opinion” is the U N ’b greatest strength. It
s a strength which has, in practice, been exerted entirely against
he free world. 1
Chapter 9
Article 19
American Internationalists, as we have seen, are strongly
inclined to place the interests of the UN ahead of those of our
own nation whenever the two conflict. The controversy over
Bnforcement of Article 19 of the UN Charter during the early
19608 is a revealing example.
Article 19 states:
A member of the United Nations which it In arrears in the
payment of its financial contributions to the Organization shall
have no vote in the General Assembly if the amount of its arrears
equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due from it
for the preceding two full years. T he General Assembly may,
nevertheless, permit such a member to vote if it is satisfied that
the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the
member.
On January 1, 1964, the Soviet Union, which had refused to
pay its share of the coat of the U N ’s war in Katanga despite a
ruling by the International Court of Justice th a t it was obligated
to do so, fell more than two years behind in paying its UN dues.
90 The United Nations Conspiracy
The Soviets did not contend th a t their failure to pay was the
result of conditions beyond their control, the only excuae
recognized by the Charter. Indeed, as reported by U.S. News &
World Report: “ At present, Russia owes $5,793,331 more than
the total amount of two years of obligatory assessments. Russia
says it is quite able to pay this amount but does not choose to do
so."1 Under terms of the UN Charter, the Soviets should have
been autom atically and immediately stripped of their votes in
the General Assembly.
During an appearance on NBC’s “ Meet the Press” broadcast,
UN Ambassador Adlai Stevenson (CFR) was asked what the
consequences would be if the Soviets refused to pay. He said it
was his opinion they would pay. (Ambassador Stevenson hab it
ually gave Russians the benefit of American doubts.) He waB
then asked if the United States would move to strip them of
their votes if they did not pay, and he replied:
Oh, yes. I d o n 't think there is any question about that. If the
organization is going to survive, we have to comply with the terms
of the charter, and the charter is explicit on this subject. It is not
a question of interpretation.9
Similarly, former Senator Frank Church (D.-Idaho; CFR)
explained in a Senate speech:
The charter is crystal clear.
. . . there are no “ifs, ands, or buta.” A nation which is 2 years
behind “shall have no vote." .. . The U.S.S.R. thinks th a t when
the showdown does come, many nations will be afraid of depriv
ing Russia of her vote, and that some way will be found to
“chicken out” on these very specific provisions of the charter.
. . . The Congress of the United States has made its own
position unmistakenly clear: the Soviet Union must either pay
what she legitimately owes, or relinquish her vote in the General
Assembly. We can take no other stand.9
Indeed, on October 2, 1962, Congress had approved a $100
million UN bond issue on the basis of a firm pledge th at our
Article 19 91
government would not back down on this m atter; otherwise the
bond money would, in effect, be covering Soviet debts. Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for International Affairs Richard
N. Gardner (CFR), for example, asserted:
There are some people who oppose our coining to the aid of the
United Nations in its present financial crisis on the grounds th at
we will be paying for the Soviet share. This charge is completely
incorrect. On July 20th [J962] the International Court of Justice
confirmed the obligation of United Nations members to pay
assessments denied by the General Assembly for the expendi
tures incurred in the conduct of the United Nations Emergency
Force in the Middle E ast and the United Nations Operation in the
Congo. If the Communist bloc countries continue to refuse to pay
their arrearages on these accounts, they stand to lose their votes in
the General Assembly as of January 1, 1964, in accordance with
Article 19 of the charter.4
Other officials also assured Congress time and again th at the
bond purchase could be approved in complete confidence that
there would be no temporizing on the Article 19 issue.
On August 17, 1964, the U.S. House of Representatives voted
unanimously (351 to 0) to urge the UN either to collect the debts
of its deadbeat members or deprive them of their votes. On
October 8th, a State Department memorandum made it per
fectly clear once again that the United States would demand
th a t the SovietB pay their debt or lose their votes, declaring:
“The consequences of not applying it [Article /9], if it becomes
applicable, would be to undermine the very integrity and capac
ity of the U .N .’’8 T hat same day, Ambassador Stevenson sent a
memo to Secretary-General U Thant, declaring there “ is no
alternative" to application of Article 19. Stevenson claimed that
failure to apply it “ could be a violation of the Charter which
would have far-reaching consequences,” that it would “ be a
repudiation of the International Court of Justice,” th at it would
“undermine the constitutional integrity of the United N a
tion.”' And on October 24, 1964, Undersecretary of State George
Ball (CFR) told a UN Day dinner in Kansas City, Missouri:
92 The United Nation* Compiracy
. . . let no one confuse the desire to preserve the United Nations
membership intact with vacillation on the basic issue of the
powers of the General Assembly. When the chips are down, we
are convinced that the members will uphold the integrity of the
charter. . . . Any other course is a prescription for progressive
deterioration and dissolution.1
Similar statem ents of the U.S. position were made during the
next ten months, until everyone, everywhere, had been made
aware of America’s unswerving intention to Btand firm.
And then, we backed down.
The late Leftist columnist Drew Pearson telegraphed the
turnaround in his column for July 1, 1965:
Meanwhile you can write it down as certain that Article 19 it
dead and will be quietly forgotten. The view is unanimous inside
the Administration not to tell the Kussians what they should do
and how much they should pay. We’ll let our position wither away
and, we hope, be forgotten during the summer."
On August 16, 1965, Arthur J. Goldberg (CFR), who had
succeeded Stevenson as our UN Ambassador, announced th a t we
were throwing in the towel, reversing our position, and would not
even try to have the m atter brought to a vote. Addressing the UN
Special Committee on Peace-Keeping Operations, he phrased
the surrender in these words:
The United States regretfully concludes, on ample evidence,
that at this stage in the history of the United Nations the General
Assembly is not prepared to carry out the relevant provisions of
the charter in the context of the present situation. . . .
Therefore . . . the United State* recognizes, as it simply
must, th a t the General Assembly is not prepared to apply article
19 in the present situation and th a t the concensus of the
membership is th at the Assembly should proceed normally. We
will not seek to frustrate th a t consensus, since it is not in the
world interest to have the work of the General Assembly immobil
ized in these troubled days.'
irticle 19 93
Goldberg was simply adm itting in typical bureaucratese style
:hat all prior statem ents committing our nation to enforcement
)f Article 19 were a joke, th at Congress had been deceived by the
State Department, and th a t it was worth a disgraceful capitu
lation by the United States, on a m atter where we were legally
and morally right, to keep the UN going its illegal, immoral way.
Administration spokesmen attem pted to soften the blow of
)ur ignominious capitulation by claiming that, after all, if we
:ouldn’t compel Russia to pay, she couldn’t compel us to pay,
sither.10 Big deal! It reminded one observer of the story about
the reprobate in church who, becoming increasingly uncom
fortable during a discussion of the Ten Commandments, sud
denly brightened as he recalled with relief th at he had made no
graven images. Yet another observer noted th a t “ThiB major
A m erican concession brought to an end one of the most BeriouB
crises in the history of the United Nations.” 11 Of course. Just
like our “concession” to the Communists in Vietnam ended that
serious crisis. A ny serious crisis is term inated when one side
surrenders.
On the day following Ambassador Goldberg's address, the
Washington Evening Star reported that United States officials
were bracing themselveB for expected Congressional criticism in
the wake of the sell-out, since “ Congress had been assured for
more than two years th a t the Russians would be forced to pay
their dues,” and "had gone along with the recent U.N. bond
issue on the underntanding that the United States would not
yield on the dues is8ue.” 1!l Congress sputtered and fumed a bit,
but took no effective counter-action, apparently caring little
that the tax money it had voted for UN bonds had, indeed, been
used indirectly to cover Soviet debts. Shortly thereafter, the
Washington Post carried a dispatch which wrapped up the whole
fiasco in a fitting manner:
The Soviet Union had promised a substantial contribution as
B oon as the United States agreed to sweep the controversy over
Article 19 under the rug, but no donation haa been forthcoming
94 The United Nation« Conspiracy
since the United Nations dropped its challenge under Article 19
last A uguit,11
It is important to note that the black eye we suffered did not
result so much from anything the Communists did as from
what our own leaders did — first committing us to a firm
position, then hacking down. Actually, a vote by the General
Assembly was not even required under Article 19, since it states
th at a delinquent nation "shall” lose its vote — not “ may" lose
its vote. Rather than raise this point, we went along with the
view that a vote was needed, then failed to demand one. (A
recorded vote would a t least have given the world a specific list
of those nations willing to violate the Charter openly.) In short,
our policy was carried out in a manner which maximized damage
to our own reputation, while protecting the UN and enhancing
the position of the victorious Soviets. Some think it was planned
th at way from the start. At the very least, it was yet another
revealing example of the destructive influence which our associ
ation with the UN has had on both our foreign policy and our
reputation in the world.
Max Jacobsen, writing in the Saturday Review World, de
scribed the Article 19 mess as "th e beginning of an American-
Soviet detente in the United Nations context."14This is basically
true, since it involved our total capitulation to a Soviet demand
— and that is the very essence of detente with the Communists.
Chapter 10
Just Like US
A counterfeit, to be effective, must come aB close as possible
o the real thing. A dollar bill colored red, white and blue with a
:aricature of Archie Bunker in the center is unlikely to fool your
ocal bank teller. Color it green and substitute George Washing-
on, and your chances of getting away with the deception
ncrease appreciably.
The United Nations has for over three decades been hawking
carefully contrived counterfeits intended to mislead Americans
nto believing that the world body stands four-square with our
Founding Fathers. To one UN apologist, “The UN Charter iB
founded on principles that parallel those of our own C onstitu
tion. The aims of the organization and its specialized agencies
ire akin to our own.” 1 Another had claimed, “ In its origin the
United Nations had been largely an American conception. Its
jnderlying philosophy showed the influence of American tra
ditions. . . .”J If you want democracy, “the spirit and the
methods of the U.N. are Becond nature to American democracy.
. . .”5 Or, if you prefer a republic, “ It will be just as easy for
nations to get along in a republic of the world as it is for you to
96 The United Nations Conspiracy
get along in the republic of the United S tates.”4 One Senator
even asserted: "Our own Congress is about as near to or similar
to the U.N. as any significant political institution in the
world."6 And, in November, 1948, American Bar Association
President Prank E. Holman wrote to various top-level govern
ment officials (including the Secretary of State) to urge that
the American people be advised of what was being done in their
name a t the Paris convention th a t was formulating the UN’s
Declaration of Human Rights. He later wrote:
The naive answer was to the effect th a t if the American
people and American lawyers would think of the Declaration as
analogous to our own Declaration of Independence, then they
would not be disturbed.'
Quite often, UN advocates even try to draw a parallel
between the federation of nations under the UN and the
federation of American colonies under the Constitution. But
there is no real parallel. John Jay, writing in The Federalist
Papers, described some of the unique characteristics which
favored federation of the American colonies:
It has often given me pleasure to observe, th at independent
America was not composed of detached and distant territories,
but th a t one connected, fertile, wide-spreading country was the
portion of our western tons of liberty. . ..
W ith equal pleasure I have as often taken notice, th a t Provi
dence has been pleased to give this one connected country to one
united people — a people descended from th e same ancestors,
speaking the same language, professing the same religion, a t
tached to the same principles of government, very similar in their
m anners and custom s.. . ,7
Compare th a t situation with th a t of the United Nations, as
described by UN supporter Morris B. Abram (CFR) in Foreign
Affairs:
Even among the nations which originally constituted the
Just Like US 97
United Nation* . . . there were significant differences in values
and outlook. They included the communist nations of Eastern
Europe and the capitalist nations of Western Europe and Amer
ica. They were both developed and underdeveloped nations.
These differences sharpened when the cold war shattered the
big-power anti-Nazi alliance, and they m ultiplied when a large
number of new states in Asia and Africa — nonwhite, non-
Christian, culturally different and economically underdeveloped
— were adm itted to the U .N .'
In 1974, the Associated Press carried a brief dispatch that
illustrated rather well a fundam ental difference between UN
and U.S. institutions:
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 23 (AP) — About half the
United Nations' interpreters called in sick today in protest againBt
long working hours, forcing cancellation or postponement of
most meetings at U.N. headquarters.'
An exhaustive search has failed to uncover evidence th a t any
sessions of the United States Congress have been cancelled due
to a Bhortage of interpreters.
Senator Robert A. Taft (R.-Ohio) surveyed the UN structure
and exclaimed:
Here we would be attem pting to unite peoples who do not
understand even how their new fellow citizens begin to think; we
would join democracies with dictatorship, Moslem states with
Christian states, the Brahmin with the Rotarian, men who talk
only Japanese with men who talk only English. We would attem pt
to unite the most highly civilized with the aborigines, the work
man who earns twenty dollars a day with the coolie who earns
twenty cents a day.10
The problem of holding together such diverse elements under
one government is obviously insuperable. How would you medi
ate between the Hindu who views cattle as objectB of holiness
and an American who views them as raw material for McDonalds?
It is important to remember that, despite the remarkable
98 The United Nations Conspiracy
compatibility of our early states, it was less than a century
before they were fighting a lengthy, bloody civil war, thus
proving th a t mere political federation is no guarantee of peace.
Despite the many limitations th at our Constitution placed on
the power of the Federal Government, the usurpation of author
ity by ambitious and evil men has nevertheless led to a concen
tration of power in Washington, and encroachment on our
personal liberties, that would have appalled our Founding Fa
thers. Yet for thirty years we have been asked to believe th a t an
international union under the economic, political, cultural,
geographic, and linguistic Tower of Babel on New York’s East
River can save us from the scourge of war and protect our
personal liberties! It is an incredibly unrealistic, and dangerous,
assumption.
Yet another misleading UN counterfeit is found in the
Preamble to the UN Charter, which begins: “ We the peoples of
the United Nations. . . .’’ It Bounds very much like “ We, the
people of the United States” th at launches the United States
Constitution. It was planned that way. “The insertion of these
words in the C harter,” notes one pro-UN source, “ was proposed
by the Delegation of the United States. . . . The proposal was
inspired by the opening words of the Constitution of the United
States.” 11 The purpose was to make plausible such counterfeit
claims as: “ With its opening words, ‘we the peoples,’ the
Preamble shows th a t it is speaking for the peoples of the world
instead of merely for their governments."12 And again: “The
Charter opens with the phrase, ‘We, the peoples of the United
Nations. . . .’ It is, in a sense, an agreement between peoples
rather than between governments. The opening phrase marks, in
some respects, the most fundam ental distinction between the
Charter and the League of Nations Covenant.” 13
An actual reading of the complete Preamble, and the Charter
itself, makes it abundantly clear th a t “ peoples” have no real say
in the UN’s decision-making process at all.
While the Preamble to the Charter opens with the words “We
the peoples of the United Nations,” the concluding words of the
Preamble, “ Accordingly our respective Governments, through
Just Like US 99
representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco," etc.,
make it clear th a t the Charter is not a constituent act of the
peoples of the United Nations, but rath er an agreement freely
entered into between governments.14
Even more to the point is the observation of yet another
author who favors the concepts of internationalism and world
government:
"We the people ( s i e |. . . " — these symbolic words of demo
cratic government — do not belong in the San Francisco Charter.
Their use in the preamble is in total contradiction to everything
else in it, and only historians will be able to decide whether they
were used from lack of knowledge or lack of honesty. The simple
truth requires th at “ We, the people . . in the preamble of the
charter be accurately read: “ We, the High Contracting Powers.
” 16
By using a phrase dear to the hearts of Americans who revere
their own Constitution, the instigators of the UN were merely
attem pting to make their counterfeit come close to the real
thing.
Perhaps the most dangerous and far-reaching attem pt by the
UN to mislead Americans has involved the drive to create the
impression th at rights under the UN are protected as they are in
our Bill of Rights. A 1962 pro-UN propaganda piece asserted,
for example: " ‘Human Rights Day,’ now observed annually on
December 10, grew out of The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the first such international statem ent in history. So
many of its principles are embodied in our own Constitution
that America must take deep pride in its existence."16 Another,
issued in 1963, claimed: "The guarantees of freedom in the Bill
of Rights provide a familiar framework which serves well for a
study of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.” 11 In
1964, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organiza
tions Richard N. Gardner (CFR) wrote: “The Universal Declara
tion is a comprehensive affirmation of basic political and
economic rights found in the Constitution and basic legislation
of the United S tates."1*
100 The United Nation# Conspiracy
Even our Chief Executives have helped to perpetuate the
deception. Former President Richard Nixon, while declaring
Hum an Rights-Hill of Rights Day on December 9, 1971,
claimed: "T he Universal Declaration of Human Rights . . . is
in the tradition of our Constitution and its Bill of Rights.” 19
President Gerald Ford, in a similar proclamation issued Decem
ber 3,1974, alleged: “The link between it [the Universal Declara
tion] and our Hill of Rights is clear."20 And President Jimmy
Carter stated on December 9, 1977, th at our “ experience of
successful struggle for human rights in our own country . . .
propelled us into a leading role in the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations.” 21
Despite these prestigious observations, the philosophy of
rights under the UN is diametrically opposed to th a t of our Con
stitution and Bill of Rights. There is simply no compatible link
between the two.
The two basic concepts of the origin of human rights are (1)
that they derive from government, or (2) th a t they come from a
source outside of government. The first view w aB ably stated
during debate on the Universal Declaration in the UN General
Assembly on December 10, 1948, by Soviet spokesman Andrei
Vishinsky: "The rights of hum an beingB cannot be considered
outside the prerogatives of governments, and the very under
standing of human rightB is a governmental concept."22 This
attitude toward human rights was explained more recently by
William Korey, director of B’nai B'rith’s United Nations office:
In Communist ideology, the individual’s rights are not counter
posed to the state but, rather, are an integral part of it. A
basically similar view prevails among most of the developing
countries of the Third World. . . . A revealing document is the
official summary of the UN-sponsored human rights seminar on
Africa held in Tanzania in 1973. Protection of the rights of the
individual was frankly acknowledged to be secondary as com
pared to the needs of the state.11
In contrast to the Communist view th a t rights come from
government (which, as we shall Bee, is also the UN view) is the
fust Like US 101
raditional American concept th at rights are endowed by a
> eator (i.e., a Source outside of government), and th at govern-
nent's job is simply to protect — not to infringe, m anipulate, or
itherwise violate — them, In the words of Dr. Clarence B. Car
on: “ If government can create rights, it can withhold and de
troy rights. The practical consequences of this fact are th at if
ights are derived from governments, there are no rights.”24
"H um an right*" are mentioned in the UN Charter, but
'There is no attem pt made in the Charter to define the ‘human
ights’ and 'fundamental freedoms’ to which reference is
nade.”24 Delegates a t the U N ’s founding conference simply
ouldn’t agree on a definition for the phrase “ hum an rights.”
to noted by another prominent Internationalist and UN supporter:
Conflict* of meaning exist in the United Nations charter
itself, as well as in speeches delivered under its auspices. Take
the expression “human rights,” for which a definition was
actually sought in San Francisco. The Russians wanted "the right
to work” included, which was frowned upon by some, and both
the British and Russians opposed the American wish to include
“the right to free enterprise” ; both also grew perplexed when it
was proposed to bring in practically the whole Bill of Rights. The
search was quickly abandoned for the sake of expediency.. . .M
Despite having failed even to define human rights at the
Charter level, the UN later adopted its vague, non-binding
Declaration of Human Rights on December 10, 1948. According
o former UN General Assembly President Charles Malik:
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the
General Assembly in Paris in 1948 without a single dissenting
vote, is one of the fundam ental documents of this age. . . . The
message does not come from this or that positive legal system,
this or that special religion, this or that special outlook on life.
The message comes from the combined and considered views of
all systems, all religions, all cultures, and all outlooks.17
Think about that for a moment. Could anything be more
idiculous and futile than attem pting to pour the “ views of all
102 The United Nations Conspiracy
systems I Communist and Capitalist), all religions [Christian
and M oslem ), all cultures [Western and Hottentot], and all
outlooks [mora/ and imm oral]” into a melting pot and come up
with anything resembling a decent human rights policy? The
only meaningful precedent we can think of is Dr. Franken
stein’s renowned attem pt to piece things together. He, too,
created a monster.
The UN Declaration grants all Borts of human rights in its
early Articles, then emasculates them with this language in
Article 29:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall
be Bubject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just require
ments of morality, public order and the general welfare in a
democratic society.
(3) These rights and freedoms may in no case be exercised
contrary to the purposes and principles of the United Nations.M
Suppose you are a Hitler, a Mao Tse-tung, or an Ayatollah
Khomeini. Would the UN Declaration stand in the way of your
oppressive rule? Of course not — because all you would need to
do is claim th at your opponents were threatening “ public order,”
harming the “general welfare,” or violating the “just require
ments of morality."
The UN’s collectivist philosophy of human rights was later
drafted into various covenants, conventions and declarations.
On November 20, 1969, for instance, the General Assembly
adopted a “Declaration on the Rights of the Child" that asserts
(Principle 7): “The child is entitled to receive education, which
shall be free and compulsory, at least at the elementary stages”29
and (Principle 10): “The child shall be protected from practices
which may foster racial, religious and any other form of
discrim ination.” 30 ThiB means, if words have any definition at
all, th a t parents could be in serious trouble should they advise
their children th a t (for instance) Catholicism is superior to
fust Like US 103
^rotestantism (or vice versa),, Mormonism is superior to Chris-
ian Science (or vice versa), Christianity iB superior to Buddhism
or vice versa), — for such would be religious “discrim ination.”
On December 12, 1974, th e UN General Assembly adopted a
‘Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States” which
'rants each State the “right” (Article 2) to “ nationalize, expro-
jriate or transfer ownership of foreign property. . . .”31 Article
J, a socialist directive urging government involvement in each
cey area of our liveB, asserts: “Every State has the primary
esponsibility to promote the economic, social and cultural
levelopment of its people. . . .’’3J And Article 26 begins: “All
States have the duty to coexist in tolerance and live together in
jeace, irrespective of differences in political, economic, social
ind cultural systems, and to facilitate trade between States
laving different economic and social systems,”:i5 which would
:ommit us not only to permanent "coexistence" with our Com-
rmnist (and other) enemies, but to trading with them as well.
On December 21, 1965, the General Assembly approved an
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, which was signed by President Lyndon
Johnson on September 28, 1966, and subm itted to the Senate by
President Carter on February 23, 1978. Sidney Liskofsky, Direc
tor of the American Jewish Committee’s Division of Interna
tional Organizations, told a House Subcommittee on February
11, 1976, that “racial discrimination as defined in article I of
the \Race Convention | . . . is sufficiently broad to encompass
any discriminatory condition, however Bmall and however unin
tentional. Not one UN member is free of discrimination under
its definition, not to speak of states where the grossest discrim
inations exist, but which the UN, under its selective morality,
overlooks.” 14
Article 4 of the Race Convention demands that “ States
Parties condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are
based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of
persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attem pt to
justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form,” and declares th at the States:
104 The United Nations Conspiracy
(a) Shall declare an offence punithable by law all dissemina
tion of idea* bated on racial superiority or hatred. . . .
(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and alto
organized and all other propaganda activities, which promote and
incite racial diicrimination, and thall recognize participation in
such organizations or activities as an offence punishable by law;
(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public institutions,
national or local, to promote or incite racial discrimination.11
The threat to free speech and freedom of the press becomes
obvious when the UN travesty is compared with Article I of the
United States Bill of Rights, which unqualifiedly asserts:
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances.
William Korey, writing in Foreign Affairs shortly after the
Race Convention was adopted, took note of arguments that
parts of it "clash with the American Constitution and that
Article 4 . . . threatens freedom of speech and association,”
and admitted th a t "the imprecision of the language does raise a
serious question."34 It certainly does!
On December 9, 1948, the General Assembly adopted an
International Convention on the Prevention and Punishm ent of
the Crime of Genocide (hereafter “ Genocide Convention"),
which was signed by the United States two days later and
submitted to the Senate by President Trum an on June 16, 1949.
Article II of the Convention states th a t "genocide means any
of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole
or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group. . . .”31
Dr. Alfred J. Schweppe, a designated representative of the
American Bar Association,* testified before a Senate Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on March 10, 1971:
•The ABA vigorously opposed the Genocide Convention from 1949 to 1976. On
February 17,1976, it suddenly reverted its stand. T his despite the fact th a t there
had been no changes made in the Convention since 1949 to lessen its dangers.
Just Like US 105
As originally drafted, the Convention included “ political” as
well as "national, ethnical, racial and religious groups.” The
Soviets announced that they wouldn’t play unless "political
groups” were expunged from the draft. They insisted on preserv
ing the right to assassinate and exterm inate the political opposi
tion as essential to the safety of the state. . . . Result: the
United States yielded, and "political groups” were eliminated
from the draft.3*
American delegates also tried to have the phrase “ with the
complicity of government" included in the definition, since they
knew th a t genocide could never have occurred in Nazi Germany
or Communist countries (nor anywhere else) unless deliberately
directed, encouraged or condoned by government. The Soviet
Union again objected, the United States yielded, and the impor
tant phrase wa9 dropped. As a result, a Convention allegedly
intended to outlaw genocide exempts the very Communist
governments th a t have long engaged in genocide on a vast scale
— as in Cambodia.38
The specific acts of genocide listed under Article II include:
"(a) Killing members of the group” (such as a Black Panther by
a policeman?); “ (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to
members of the group” (such as criticizing Communists or
Nazis, thus causing them “ mental harm "?); “ (c) Deliberately
inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring
about its physical destruction in whole or in part” (such as
refusing to grant the amount of welfare benefits deemed
desirable?); “ (d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births
within the group" (such as the many State laws which authorize
court-ordered sterilization of lawbreakers who are feeble
minded or otherwise unfit to procreate normal children?); and
“ (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another
group” (such as forced busing of school children for racist
purposes?).
If the examples of potential “genocide” cited in parentheses
sound too far-fetched to be taken seriously, consider this
statement by former Senator Sam J. Ervin (D.-North Carolina):
106 The United Nations Conspiracy
. . . demands have already been made that the United Nations
investigate the slaying of Black Panthers by police officers on
the ground th a t their slaying constituted genocide under article
11(a), and th at the United Nations investigate the action of the
legislature of one State in respect to welfare benefits on the
ground that the legislative action constituted genocide under
article 11(c) .4U
In 1951, the Civil Rights Congress (a Communist Front)
prepared a two hundred-page complaint formally accusing the
President and other high U.S. officials, and the officials of
eleven Southern states, of genocide against Negroes. The alleged
basis was Article 11(c) of the Genocide Convention. The com
plaint was presented to the General Assembly a t Paris by
William Patterson (a Communist who was Secretary of the Civil
Rights Congress) in 1951.
The UN could take no action because the United StateB was
not a party to the Genocide Convention, b u t the accusation is
still pending before the UN, awaiting Senate ratification of the
Convention.41
On October 17, 1970, the Communist newspaper Daily World
carried a “ Petition to the United Nations to End Genocide”
which had been circulated by another M arxist front, the Emer
gency Conference Committee. The petition asserted, in part:
The racist planned and unplanned terror suffered by more
than 40 millions of black, brown, red and yellow citizens of the
United States cannot be regarded solely as a domestic issue. . . .
On the basis of simple justice, it is tim e for the United
Nations to call for universal action to apply economic and
political sanctions against the United States Government until
such time as the United States will abide by the Genocide
Convention and the Declaration of Human R ights.,s
This wildly inflammatory document was signed by, in addi
tion to Communist William Patterson, such luminaries as Mrs.
M artin Luther King, Jr., the Reverend Ralph Abernathy, Repre
sentative Shirley Chisholm (D.-New York), comedian Dick
Gregory, and Black Panthers Huey Newton and Bobby Seale.
fust Like US 107
Ratification of the Genocide Convention would not only
endanger many of our basic Constitutional rights, but would
ilso open the UN floodgates for a new surge of anti-American
>ropaganda.
Equally dangerous, if not more so, are the UN Covenant on
Uivil and Political Rights (hereafter “ CP Covenant” ) and the
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter
'ESC Covenant” ). Both were adopted by the General Assembly
>n December 16, 1966, signed by President Carter on October 5,
1977, and submitted to the Senate on February 23, 1978.
By definition, “The obligation of a state ratifying the [ESC]
Covenant would be to take steps for the promotion of conditions
or economic, social, and cultural progress and development.” 43
n other words, this Covenant would also commit the federal
government to involve itself further in the economic, cultural
md social affairs of our nation, at a time when increasing
lumbers of Americans are recognizing th a t what is actually
leeded is a cut back in government's role in these very areas.
Article I, for example, commits nations to take steps, “to the
naximum of its available resources,” to achieve progressively
he "rights" set forth in the Covenant;44 Article 7 commitB
(overnments to provide a minimum wage and “decent living” to
vorkers; Article 9 asserts a right to “ social security, including
locial insurance"; Article 11 requires governments to assure
idequate "food, clothing and housing” ; Article 12 mandates
socialized medicine through “creation of conditions which
vould assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
ivent of sickness” ; and Article 13 provides for government
:ontrol of education, and the use of schools as pro-UN indoc
trination centers, by asserting th at all educational institutions
must “ further the activities of the United Nations” and con
form to such standards “ as may be laid down by the S tate.”
These examples are by no means exhaustive. There is hardly
in area of human society left untouched by the ESC Cove
nant's far-reaching statist provisions. Paragraph 2 of Article 2
requires participating governments “ to guarantee that the rights
108 The United Nations Conspiracy
enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without
discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status." This is as all-inclusive as one
could possibly make it. Presumably, if “other sta tu s” means a
convicted murderer in prison, or a willfully indolent freeloader
who refuses to work, his “right" to exercise (and benefit
from) his myriad so-called "rights" could not be denied. The
ESC Covenant is a socialist blueprint th at encourages open-
ended, unlimited government meddling of the sort on which
dictatorships thrive.
Whereas the ESC Covenant “ can only be implemented pro
gressively, depending on the resources available to the State
party,” the even more sinister CP Covenant “deals with rightB
th at are legally enforceable” and whose “ obligations are meant,
by and large, to be carried out immediately upon ratification by
a State.”48 Article 20 of the CP Covenant “requires States parties
to prohibit by law any propaganda for war and any advocacy of
national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitem ent to
discrimination, hostility or violence. . . .”48 In the United
States, the right to preach, print, and propagandize even wrong
headed views has been one of our most cherished and vigorously
defended freedoms. The UN’s CP Covenant, however, would
require Congress to pass the very sort of laws suppressing free
speech which Article 1 of the Bill of Rights presently prohibits.
Other Articles in this incredibly ominous Covenant grant
alleged “rights,” but then, in the spirit of the UN Declaration
of Human Rights cited earlier, destroy them with vague, weasel-
worded exceptions.- For example:
Article 18
1. Everyone shall have th e right to freedom of thought,
conicience and religion. . . .
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs may be
subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are
necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the
fundam ental rights and freedom of others.
fust Like US 109
Article 19
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression;. . .
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in Paragraph 2 of
this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It
may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall
only be such as are provided by law.
Article 21
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.
No restriction may be placed on the exercise of this right other
than those imposed in conformity with the law.
Article 22
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with
others.
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those which are prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society.41
It is little wonder that the Soviet Union has enthusiastically
pproved the UN’s phony CP and ESC Covenants. As noted in
iur newspapers a t the time:
The Soviet Union said today (.September 28, 1973) th at the two
international human rights covenants th at it has just ratified
gave it specific authority to limit the right of emigration, the
free flow of ideas and other individual liberties.
Two major articles in Communist party publications used the
covenants today to justify existing restrictions rather than to
offer any hope th a t Moscow was preparing to relax its rules.4'
It is clear th at the U N ’s “human right*” documents are
leverly-contrived counterfeits to mislead the unwary. Their
otalitarian spirit is in total conflict with the free spirit of our
in stitu tio n and its Bill of Rights.
Chapter 11
The Charter
When its ratification was being considered by the United
States Senate in 1945, the UN Charter was widely propagandized
as a great political document which would Berve as the basis for
solving the world’s major ills. For example, Judge L. Stauffer
Oliver, Chairman of the Board of the United Nations Council
of Philadelphia, told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
on July 12, 1945, that the Charter "comes as close to being a
perfect document as can be prepared in a practical and imper
fect world. We think th a t it is a marvelous document, notable
for its directness, simplicity, and completeness."1
On that same date, Clark M. Gichelberger (CFR), Director of
the American Association of the United Nations (AAUN),
testified that his organization supported the Charter "because
it believes th at it offers a workable, practical means for the
achievement of political security, justice, and economic and
social cooperation." He described the C harter as "an excellent
document."2
Livingston Hartley, director of the AAUN’s Washington
office, followed with the claim th a t "American entry into the
United Nations Organization will give the United States leader
112 The United Nations Connpiracy
ship and unparalleled influence among the nations of the
world.”3 At the time, we already had such leadership and
influence. Today, thanks in large part to our involvement in the
UN, we have lost it. Mr. Hartley went on to claim th at, should
the Senate reject the Charter, " it will set in motion forces of
power politics which would tend to create exactly the type of
world Bystem most dangerous to our future, an eventual world
balance of power between two great regional blocs.”4 He in
cluded with hiB testimony a chart which claimed th at a "Yes"
vote by the Senate on the Charter would, among other things,
strengthen our security, enhance U.S. leadership, improve rela
tions with our allies, lead to a decrease in taxes, and strengthen
democracy abroad.*
The Senate voted “ Yes.”
We now find ourselves (1) increasingly insecure in the face
of the Soviet-bloc military buildup, (2) in trouble with allies
everywhere ( b b we have actively worked to undermine some of
them — such as Free China and Rhodesia — in accord with pro-
Marxist UN policies), (3) taxed nearly to death (in part to
bolster the UN network), and (4) reminiscing about the many
countries which, relatively free in 1946, have fallen under
Communist rule. Indeed, figures compiled by the “ Liberal"
organization Freedom House indicated, at the start of 1976, th at
“only 19.8 per cent of the world’s 4.06 billion people now live in
freedom, 36.3 per cent are partly free and 44.9 per cent are not
free.” 8 Yet, it was a vote against the Charter th at UN propagan
dist Livingston Hartley had claimed would endanger our securi
ty, reduce U.S. leadership in the world, antagonize our allies,
keep our taxes high, and cause a decline in democracy abroad!
N ot everyone testified in favor of the new Charter. On July
13, 1945, for instance, economist and author John T. Flynn took
note of the massive propaganda campaign on behalf of Charter
ratification:
It hat been a grand job. As one who has been watching
propaganda for a great many years, I take off my hat. You
cannot turn on the radio a t any hour of the day — morning, noon
rhe Charter 113
or night — whether you listen to the M etropolitan Opera or to a
hone opera, a hill-billy band, a commentator or a newscaster,
th at you do not hear a plug for this great instrum ent for peace.7
Mr. Flynn astutely noted that hardly anyone had actually
ead the document th at w b b being trum peted to the sky. “ It is
he kind of propaganda," he claimed, “ that Hitler taught the
vorld so effectively — 'D on’t argue with the people. Ju st put
four idea in a slogan or a phrase and repeat it a dozen times a
lay until they take it for granted.1”®
Years later, even some of the key figures who helped sell the
Charter in its early years adm itted they had greatly exaggerated
ts m erits. In 1952, for instance, Adlai Stevenson (CFR) wrote:
'Obviously the United Nations has not fulfilled all the high
lopes th a t some people entertained when it was founded. The
dea th a t it would autom atically usher in an era of sweetness
md light was exaggerated a t the s ta rt." '
Another UN Ambassador, Henry Cabot Lodge (CFR), claimed:
Even at the founding of the United Nations, some people in
1946 in San Francisco, and some of the people who followed
them, undertook to get the idea spread around th a t here was an
autom atic peace producer, an automatic war preventive, like a
patent medicine — you could take a swallow of it, and the disease
would be cured. Well, of course, there isn't any such thing, and
there never will be any such thing.10
In 1964, former Senator Frank Church (D.-Idaho; CFR),
mother vigorous UN backer, also confirmed the deception:
. . . one wonders how so infirm an infant at the United Nations
could ever have received so auspicious a christening. The sup
porters of the U.N., then and now, bear a responsibility for
having oversold it to the American people. From the outset, we
should have stressed th at the U.N. by itself lacked the power to
preserve world peace. . . ."
And former Secretary of State Dean Acheson (CRF) wrote in
lis memoirs:
114 The United Nations Conspiracy
. . . the management of the hearing* before the Senate Commit
tee on Foreign Relations regarding its [t/te Charter's] ratification
fell within my field of responsibility. I did my duty faithfully
and successfully but always believed th a t the Charter was
impracticable. Moreover, its presentation to the American people
as almost holy writ and with the evangelical enthusiasm of a
major advertising campaign seemed to me to raise popular hopes
which could only lead to bitter disappointm ent.11
In other words, the UN Charter as presented and explained to
the American people — and the U.S. Senate — w b b largely a
propaganda hoax. As a result, in the words of two latter-day
Senators who strongly favor the UN, “ Once the Charter was
formally adopted and the institution became a reality, we
allowed ourselves to become caught up in a tremendous euphoria
as we came to expect things from the U.N. that it never had the
capacity for doing, such as playing a major peacekeeping role in
the world.” 13
The massive and misleading propaganda campaign on behalf
of the Charter compelled most Americans to consider only the
theoretical benefits if the C harter organization worked, instead
of the evils th at would result if it failed. They were conditioned
to a»k, “If it workB, what will we get?” when they should also
have been wondering, “ If it fails, what will we suffer?"
Since, as a practical m atter, the Charter is not amendable,
those in the UN hierarchy have simply stretched and m anipu
lated it to fit their purposes. As explained by authors Yeselson
and Gaglione:
. . . neither moral nor legal restraints flow from the invocation
of Charter principles at the UN. National interest creates the
necessary rationalizations. In the world forum, all states defend
all policies by reference to the Charter. Appropriate clauses are
selected to support policies on each issue, and states exchange
positions easily .. . . Charter principles are clearly convenient
pegs on which to hang any foreign policy. This debasement of the
principles causes them to lose whatever moral authority they
might otherwise exert. Furthermore, victorious states are em
The Charter 115
boldened by the vindication of their policies, and losers are
em bittered by injustice.14
Even Adlai Stevenson adm itted th a t “ Every one of the main
:harter restrictions has been loosened,” and speculated: “I
mspect that, if in 1945 there had been proposed such a world
>rganization, endowed with all the actual authority, and energy
vhich the U.N. is showing today, the nations would never have
igreed to i t." 15 And former Secretary of S tate John Foster
[Julies (CFR) claimed: “ I have never seen any proposal made for
:ollective security with ‘teeth’ in it, or for ‘world government’ or
or ‘world federation,’ which could not be carried out either by
he United Nations or under the United Nations C harter.” 18This
s simply an admission, by one of the UN’s founders, th a t the
Charter in practice is whatever the most powerful bloc a t a given
noment wishes it to be. Even Hamilton Fish Armstrong (CFR)
idmitted in 1961 that “ no one of the organization’s key bodies —
Security Council, General Assembly, Secretariat — is function-
ng today as was planned 15 years ago at San Francisco.” 17
T he “ Uniting For Peace” Resolution was a revealing example
>f the extent to which the Charter has been stretched to fit
:ircumstances which a literal interpretation could never cover.
According to Clark Eichelberger, the Resolution th a t was
idopted by the General Assembly on November 3, 1950, “pro-
ides one of the most spectacular illustrations of a liberal
nterpretation of the C harter."11'
The “Uniting For Peace” Resolution was yet another allegedly
inti-Soviet move resulting from the Korean War which actually
nenaced the interests of the free world. The Charter as
iriginally approved gave little effective power to the General
Vssembly to act against alleged aggression. Using frustration
iver Soviet abuse of the veto power in the Security Council as an
xcuse, Secretary of State Dean Acheson led a move to shift
tower from the Security Council to the General Assembly
without formally amending the Charter. ThiB was virtually an
idmission th a t the C harter’s original provisions for collective
116 The United Nations Conspiracy
security gave more comfort to aggressore than to the victims ol
aggression!
As summarized by the United Nations Office of Public
Information, the proposed Resolution provided:
Where there appears to be a th reat to peace, breach of the
peace or act of aggression, and where the Security Council fails
to act because of a negative vote of one of its permanent
members, the Assembly may meet in emergency special session
within 24 hours a t the request of the Council on the vote of any
seven Council members, or at the request of a majority of United
Nations members. In such a case the Assembly may make
recommendations to members for collective measures, including,
in the case of a breach of the peace or act of aggression, the use
of armed force, to m aintain or restore international peace and
security.1’
In effect, the “ Uniting For Peace” Resolution asserts that if
the Security Council is prevented by the veto from taking
effective measures to deal with a situation, the General Ah*
sembly may act on behalf of the UN and authorize action by ita
members. Its main purpose was to circumvent the veto, and, as
British Labour Party leader Hugh Gaitskell confirmed, “ exper
ience shows th at this is ju st what it has done.’’20 Of course, by
eroding the Soviet veto it also eroded our veto. And th a t is indeed
ominous considering the current Marxist makeup of the world
body.
The Resolution was first used in 1956, with predictable
results. According to Historian Cecil Crabb:
When the Assembly had to deal with successive crises in Egypt
and Hungary in 1966, the "Uniting For Peace” resolution was put
into effect for the first tim e. It was of no avail in attem pting to
term inate Soviet oppression of the Hungarian revolutionary
movement.111
Of course not. But, as we have noted earlier, it was success
ful in pressuring the English, French, and Israelis to withdraw
The Charter 117
from Egypt and leave the seized Suez Canal under Marxist
control. As explained by Lincoln Bloomfield, “ With Egypt being
invaded, a veto by Britain and France blocked a cease-fire
resolution in the Security Council. A majority of Council
members . . . then voted to convene the General Assembly in
emergency session, and it was the Assembly th a t created the new
|LW emergency) force” th a t was sent to “stabilize” the situa
tion — and merely precluded further effective action to free
the Suez C anal.”
The "U niting For Peace" Resolution was conceived by Amer
icans who allegedly wished to halt Communist aggression. In
practice, the Resolution merely shifted the UN’s center of
gravity from the Security Council to the increasingly Marxist
and anti-American General Assembly.
The UN has accomplished so much extra-legally, and gath
ered so much power without Charter authority, that even some
influential UN supporters readily acknowledge th a t any a t
tem pt to legalize formally what has been done would result in a
fiasco. Professor Richard Gardner (CFR), for example, a
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, has written:
An attem pt to rewrite its constitution would arrest the con
tinued growth of the United Nations, for some of the members
would be reluctant to give explicit endorsement to some of the
implicit powers th a t have been granted to the organization over
the years. The fact is th at the Charter is a better instrum ent for
the achievement of U.N. purposes than any th at could be
negotiated today.M
Further along, Mr. Gardner makes the startling assertion that
“The day the members of the United Nations decide to be
uncommitted to the principles of the Charter, the organization
will cease to exist.”514This means either Mr. Gardner is wrong or
the UN is a mere figment of our imagination. As we have seen,
UN members long ago abandoned any semblance of meaningful
commitment to the Charter. The real threat to the UN’s survival
would be a serious attem pt to compel its member nations to
abide by the Charter’s provisions.
Chapter 12
National Sovereignty
Article 2, Paragraph 7, of the UN Charter is the im portant
provision that asserts:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nation* to intervene in matter* which are essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the
Members to subm it such m atters to settlem ent under the present
Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of
enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
As Goodrich and Hambro have noted, “This paragraph con
stitutes potentially the most substantial limitation th at is to be
found anywhere in the whole Charter upon the activity of the
United Nations.” 1 And Jam es J. Wadsworth adds: “ It is a
foregone conclusion that had this provision been omitted from
the Charter, literally dozens of prospective members in 1945
would have balked at ratification — certainly the United States
would have been among them ."1
Of course it would have. Any document authorizing an
internationalist outfit to meddle in our domestic affairs would
120 The United Nation* Conn[)ir<uy
have been figuratively tarred-and-feathered and run out of
town. It is therefore revealing (and frightening) to note the
extensive campaign which has been waged to neutralize Article
2(7) and permit the UN to meddle in m atters which are clearly
the domestic concern of member states. A key strategy has been
to promote the idea that nearly everything a nation does has ut
least an indirect impact on other nations, thus nullifying claims
to domestic jurisdiction. As early as 1946, William Carr, a
consultant for the United States delegation at the San Francisco
Conference, wrote:
Under modern conditions, few acts of a nation affect only its
own people. . . . It seems clear th a t no nation which signs this
|l/N ] Charter can justly m aintain th a t any of its acts are its own
business, or within its own domestic jurisdiction, if the Security
Council says th a t these acts are a threat to the peace.3
Similarly, in April, 1949, UN staff member Moses Mosko-
witz publicly stated the ominous contention th at
once a m atter has become, in one way or another, the subject of
regulation by the United Nations, be it by resolution of the
General Assembly or by convention between member States at
the insistence of the United Nations, th a t subject ceases to be a
m atter being "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
member States.” As a m atter of fact, such a position represents
the official view of the United Nations, as well as of the
member States that have voted in favor of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights. Hence, neither the Declaration,
nor th e projected IHuman Rights] Covenant, nor any agreement
that may be reached in the future, on the machinery of imple
mentation of hum an rights, can in any way be considered as
violative of the letter or spirit of Article 2 of the Charter.4
T hat all-encompasBing blueprint for converting the United
StateB into a subservient UN milk cow is even more frightening
in light of President Harry S Trum an’s claim in 1950 th a t “ there
is no longer any real difference between domestic and foreign
affairs.” 5
National Sovereignty 121
The UN has often disregarded Article 2(7) to meet the
demands of expediency. The explosive issue of racial apartheid
in South Africa is one example. Regardless of one’s feeling
about the practice, there is little question about the domestic
nature of a nation's racial policies. As Amelia C. Leiss noted, in
a 1965 study th at amounted to a blueprint for eventual UN
military invasion of South Africa:
Clearly, there are few things more “essentially within the
domestic jurisdiction” of a state than its relationship to its own
citizens, its constitutional form, and its laws, and administrative
and judicial procedures. Yet these are the features of the present
South African system that are under assault and that a majority
of the UN insist be changed.'
Meanwhile Clarence Manion, former Dean of the Notre
Dame Law School and one of our nation’s most astute and
respected Constitutional authorities, pointed out:
Our slavish support of the United Nations’ illegal interfer
ences in the domestic affairs of independent nations has made
us an accessory to crimes committed against our own allies in the
cold war and turned over the management of our foreign policy
to the direction of the United Nations General Assembly — a
revolutionary body that now runs the United Nations in defiance
of its charter.1
Dean M anion’s contention was perhaps most dram atically
documented by our participation in the UN’s shameful and
disgusting crusade to pull down the anti-Communist regime of
Ian Smith in Rhodesia.
On September 9, 1972, the Washington newsweekly H um an
Events reported the incredible news that:
By a 12-to-0 vote, with 10 abstentions, the United Nations
Special Committee on Colonialism last week voted to put Puerto
Rico under study as a colonial territory of the United States
entitled to independence. . . .
122 The United Nations Conspiracy
The resolution to meddle in the internal affair* of the U.S.
was approved despite overwhelming evidence [that] Puerto Rico
citizens do not want independence.’
T h a t “overwhelming evidence” consisted primarily of a 1967
referendum in which Puerto Ricans voted 698,396 to 4,205
against breaking away from the United S tates (a fantastic ratio
of more than 166 to 1!).
Even closer to home is a startling dispatch carried by the
Associated Press and datelined Memphis, Tennessee:
The United Nations Commission on Human Rights will con
sider allegations of police brutality in Memphis th a t could
"embarrass the country," a federal official said Wednesday
[September 6, 1978] . . . .
He [Bobby Doctor, Southern regional director of the U.S. Civil
Rights Commission] said the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
has placed on its Sept. 11 agenda a review of the charges. A U.N.
spokesman in New York Baid the commission would meet Monday
in Geneva, Switzerland.*
Even to “review” alleged “ police brutality” in an American
city is a flagrant violation of Article 2(7) of the Charter. As
explained by Goodrich and Hambro:
While discussion does not amount to intervention [in domestic
affairs], the creation of a commission of inquiry, the making of a
recommendation of a procedural or substantive nature, or the
taking of a binding decision constitutes intervention under the
terms of this paragraph [Article 2(7)]. To lim it intervention to
coercive measures would have the result of largely limiting the
application of the paragraph to the field of the exception which
obviously could not have been intended.19
A serious threat to our national sovereignty is the drive to
repeal the important Connally Amendment th a t qualifies
United States participation in the International Court of Justice
(World Court). We automatically became a member of the
World Court when we joined the UN, but were not bound by its
National Sovereignty 123
jurisdiction until a Senate-ratified declaration to th a t effect
was formally filed. T hat Senate resolution “recognizing as
compulsory . . . the jurisdiction of the International Court of
Justice in all legal disputes hereafter arising” provided th at
such World Court Jurisdiction would not apply to “disputes with
regard to m atters which are essentially within the domestic
jurisdiction of the United S tates.’’11
This, however, was not enough, for who was to define
“ domestic jurisdiction" — the United States or the World Court
itself? Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Tom
Connally (D.-Texas) wanted the resolution to pass, b u t feared it
wouldn’t unless this question was resolved in favor of the
United States. So he succeeded in having these six words added
to the resolution: as determined by the United States. The
resolution, thus amended, passed by a vote of 62 to 2 on August
2, 1946.
As G. Edward Griffin has warned, those six little wordB —
the Connally Reservation — “are all that stand between us and
complete legal subjugation to the whims of fifteen or nine or
five or even two men whose legal backgrounds and personal
ideologies may be strongly antipathetic to the free world in
general and to the United States in particular."12 Nevertheless,
every American President through Carter since 1945 has urged
repeal of the crucial Connally Reservation!
The drive by Internationalists to chip away at U.S. sover
eignty has also included a clever back-door approach th a t merits
comment. Professor Richard N. Gardner (CFR), a former
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, is aligned with those who
are realistically resigned to keeping the Charter largely as is,
since it is nearly unamendable, preferring instead merely to
"interpret” it liberally to fit circumstances. Writing in Foreign
Affairs in 1974, he speculated th a t "we are more likely to make
progress by pressing the existing instrum ent to the outer limits
of its potentialities through creative use, seeking amendm ents
only on carefully selected m atters where they seem both neces
sary and capable of adoption by the constitutionally required
124 The United Nations Conspiracy
m ajority."13 Recognizing th a t world government cannot he
achieved in the near future, Professor Gardner asserted th a t the
“ house of world order" will “ have to be built from the bottom
up rather than from the top down. . . . an end run around
national sovereignty, eroding it piece by piece, will accomplish
much more than the old-fashioned frontal assault. . . . The
question is whether this more modest approach can do the job."
Believing that its chances are reasonably good, Professor
Gardner continues: “ The hopeful aspect of the present situ a
tion is th at even as nations resist appeals for ‘world government’
and 'the surrender of sovereignty,’ technological, economic and
political interests are forcing them to establish more and more
far-reaching arrangements to manage their mutual interde
pendence." He then lists a few of those arrangements that
could prove especially useful to the cause of subtly surrendering
national sovereignty to international institutions:
1. International monetary reforms, which will necessitate
giving the International Monetary Fund (IMF) “ unprecedented
powers to create new international reserves and to influence
national decisions on exchange rates and on domestic monetary
and fiscal policies.” He also notes th at the IMF would probably
be given power to back its decisions “ by meaningful m ultilateral
sanctions."
2. Strengthen the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT) to cover hitherto unregulated “non-tariff barriers” in
order to "subject countries to an unprecedented degree of
international surveillance over up to now sacrosanct ‘domestic’
policies, such as farm price supports, subsidies, and government
procurement practices th at have transnational effects.”
3. Increase resources of international development and tech
nical assistance agencies. “This should enhance the authority of
the World Bank, the regional development banks and the U.N.
Development Program over the economic policies of rich and
poor nations," explains Professor Gardner.
4. Environmentalism, leading to “ new procedures to imple
m ent the principle of State responsibility for national actions
National Sovereignty 125
th at have transnational environmental consequences. . . . At
the same tim e, international agencies will be given broader
powers to promulgate and revive standards limiting air and
ocean pollution.”
5. The so-called “population problem” could drain additional
sovereignty as national programs aimed a t zero population
growth are established and implemented with the help of
international agencies.
6. Food supplies, with the UN’s World Food Conference
likely to result in Internationalist efforts to m aintain adequate
food supplies as “reserves of food and arable land dwindle
under the impact of crop failures and disappointing fish
harvests.” Of course, the socialist policies of government are
primarily responsible for food shortages throughout the world
— the same sort of socialist policies favored by the Interna
tionalists who use the shortages as the excuse to expand their
power.
7. Control of the world’s oceans, once negotiated into the
hands of “ a new international regime," could necessitate “tough
provisions to assure compliance as well as to provide for the
compulsory settlem ent of disputes.”
8. Communication technology is requiring new international
regulatory institutions th a t "will probably be given new powers
to allocate radio frequencies and satellite parking orbits among
users."
9. Disarmament, moving beyond U.S.-Soviet agreements on
strategic weapons to the more m ultinational m atter of conven
tional weapons, could give international agencies "new respon
sibilities for the adm inistration of these arms control and
disarm am ent measures, including means of verification and
enforcement.”
10. Conflict containment, including "international peace
keeping arrangements to patrol borders, supervise elections and
verify compliance with nonintervention norms.”
According to Professor Gardner, “the case-by-case approach
can produce some remarkable concessions of 'sovereignty' th a t
126 The United Nation* Conspiracy
could not be achieved on an across-the-board basis.” He pre
dicted: “ . . . while we will not see ‘world government’ in the old-
fashioned sense of a single all-embracing global authority, key
elements of planetary planning and planetary management will
come about on those very specific problems where the facts of
interdependence force nations, in their enlightened self-inter-
est, to abandon unilateral decision-making in favor of m ulti
lateral procesBeB.”
Numerous observers have claimed that many of our so-called
“crises” in recent years (in energy, environment, food, etc.) have
been largely and purposely manufactured and sustained by
governments. Professor G ardner’s scenario presents one explan
ation of why certain influential individuals would favor such
"crisis" conditions as an excuse to expand their power even as
they undermine the national sovereignty of the United States
and other countries.
In an earlier article in Foreign Affairs, Professor Gardner
asserted: “The most basic division in the world today is not
between communists and non-communists, between blacks and
whites, between rich and poor or even between young and old. It
is between those who see only the interests of a limited group
and those who are capable of seeing the interests of the broader
community of mankind as a whole.” 14 In other (less self-
serving) words, between defenders of national sovereignty and
advocates of World Government.
He is probably ri^ht.
Chapter 13
Patriotism
The drive to undermine our national independence has in
cluded a move to deBtroy the patriotic emotions and loyalties of
the American people. The campaign has included tactics ranging
from character assassination of the Founding Fathers to a ttrib
uting nearly all of the world’s evils to loyalty to one’s country.
Atlantic Union advocate Clarence Streit once went so far as to
assert that "Cain was the first man known to love his country.
Before his time there was no fatherland.” 1 This is absurd,
considering how Adam and Eve must have felt about Eden prior
to falling to tem ptations tendered by history’s most influential
Internationalist. And it w b b the brilliant Marxist sympathizer,
Albert Einstein, who tried to discredit patriotism by referring to
nationalism as "an infantile disease” and “the measles of
m ankind.”2 International collectivists know very well th a t the
nations of the world cannot be comfortably merged into a world
government until the patriotic loyalty of the citizens of those
separate nations haB been replaced by loyalty to an international
entity Buch as the United Nations.
Probably none of the Founding Fathers of our nation haB
128 The United Nations Conspiracy
been more extensively maligned with leas real justification than
George Washington. As military leader of the successful War
for Independence and our first Chief Executive, he is rightly
known as the Father of Our Country. Perhaps it is for this
reason th a t ao m uch time and effort have been expended by
Internationalists to deface his memory.
Consider, for example, the vicious rumor instigated by the
muckraking journalist Drew Pearson in July, 1965, to the effect
th a t President Washington was guilty of a serious conflict of
interest. Pearson alleged th a t while serving aB Chief Executive
the Father of Our Country had owned a Virginia quarry th at
sold sandstone to the government for use in construction of the
U.S. Capitol building. The allegation was given further national
publicity in August by television's David Brinkley (CFR), and
turned up a few weeks after that in a news bulletin of the
National Geographic Society. A num ber of newspapers also
circulated the rumor before someone finally decided to verify
Pearson’s charges. Documents subsequently discovered in the
National Archives proved th a t the quarry in question had been
owned by a man named Henry Brent, and th a t Washington had
held no financial interest in it whatsoever.3
One of the most bizarre charges against General Washington
was made in 1971 when he, Thomas Jefferson (author of the
Declaration of Independence), James Madison (father of the
Constitution), and four other early Presidents were lumped
together and accused of being marijuana smokers. The top
medical officer of the Nixon Administration, Surgeon General
Jesse Steinfield, told the National Commission on M arijuana
and Drug Abuse:
Indeed, Dr. Burke, president of the American Historical
Reference Society and consultant to the Smithsonian [Institu
tion! reports no Icbs than seven U.S. Presidents smoked m ari
juana, including Washington, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe,
Jackson, Taylor and Pierce.
Despite the serious implications of this claim, it went unchal
Patriotism 129
lenged by members of the Commission. Only later was it learned
that there was no such person as “ Dr. Burke,” and th at the
Smithsonian Institution knew nothing of the so-called American
Historical Reference Society. The hoax was eventually traced to
the Chicago Seed, an underground newspaper of the New
Left. The staff of the Seed didn’t know any more about “Dr.
Burke” or his "Society” than did anyone else. They had simply
copied the seedy story from yet another underground paper,
which had apparently made it up.4
Meanwhile the image of many of our nation’s patriotic
figures has been consistently undermined in America’s school
textbooks. One contemporary history book promoted a t the high-
school level was rejected by Texas school authorities who
learned th a t, among other faults, it devoted five times as much
space to Marilyn Monroe as to George Washington.11 And when
This Week magazine compared history books issued before 1920
with those issued after th a t year, it discovered a shocking
tendency in modern texts to denigrate or eliminate some of the
most impressive patriotic events in our national history. Former
Secretary of Agriculture Ezra Taft Benson summarized the
findings of This Week:
Nathan Hale »aid, "1 regret th a t I have but one life to give for
my country," in eleven of the old textbooks, but in only one of
the new textbooks. Patrick Henry said, “Give me liberty or give
me d eath” in twelve out of the fourteen earlier texts, but in only
two out of the forty-five recent text*. But John Paul Jones set
the record. He Raid, "I have not yet begun to fight,” in nine of the
old bookft and in none of the new book*.*
Probably the most effective mechanism used to attack the
patriotic outlook of the American people during the past decade
has been the Vietnam War. It would have seemed incredible to
most Americans, prior to Vietnam, th at a war against so natural
and deadly an enemy as the Communists could have been turned
into a means of reducing the American patriotic spirit. Yet,
consider the obvious lack of desire on the part of our leaders to
130 The United Nations Conspiracy
win the war; the sedition they encouraged and perm itted here at
home by open supporters of the enemies we were fighting in
Vietnam; their insistence on implementing policies which they
knew in advance would needlessly increase American casualties*;
the resulting loss of lives on the battlefield and disruption of
lives at home for clearly phony reaaons; the massive flood of
aid by our government to those Communist nations comprising
the arsenal of the Vietcong; the increased war spending which
helped create the inflationary excuse for such dictatorial m ea
sures as wage and price controls; and a “ conclusion" to the war
on terms so disgraceful and dishonorable as to include a
commitment by our leaders to pay what amounts to reparations.
All of these tragic events and policies combined to create the
widespread doubts, confusion, and despair which have replaced
real patriotism in the minds of many Americans, and which
have helped to erode many other American virtues that were
once taken for granted. The Vietnam War was used with
incredible effectiveness by Internationalists to condition the
American people to accept various parts of the One World
agenda as an "alternative” to future Vietnams.
Many major reviewers of books, movies, and plays have
similarly helped to undermine the spirit of patriotism in Amer
ica by continually lauding works which promote Internation
alism while attacking patriotism , even aB they B tn ear or ignore
those which promote love of country and respect for our
heritage.
*On February 1, 1968, for example, the late President Lyndon B. Johnson
asserted, during presentation of a Medal Of Honor to an Air Force Major: "Let
those who would stop the bombing answer this question: 'W hat would the North
Vietnamese be doing if we stopped the bombing and let them alone?' The
answer, I think, is clear. The enemy force in the South would be larger. It would
be better equipped. The war would be harder. The losses would be greater. The
difficulties would he longer. And of one thing you can be sure: It would cost
many more American lives." Two months later, on March 31, 1968, President
Johnson ordered a unilateral halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. Within one
year, not only had 13,000 additional American lives been lost in Vietnam, but
North Vietnam had completely repaired the damage inflicted by American
bombers prior to the bombing halt. (See Weekly Compilation of Pretidential
Documentt, February 5, 1968, p. 192, and April 8, 1968, p. 620; and The Review
Of The N ew t, April 9, 1969, pp. 10-11.)
Patriotism 131
John Wayne, for example, was a talented and patriotic actor
whose reputation was largely established in movies portraying
him as an American fighting Japanese Fascism. At first no
significant roadblocks were thrown in Wayne’s path by the
Left. But later, when Wayne remained consistent in his p atri
otic outlook and hatred of totalitarianism by opposing the
Communists, the brickbats started coming thick and heavy.
In the early 1960s, for example, Wayne produced, directed,
and starred in a $12 million extravaganza entitled The Alamo. It
was a well-done, highly patriotic movie, with a cast of out
standing stars, and about as far removed from Hollywood’s
typical subversion and perversion as a movie could get. A ppar
ently it was for this very reason that the Left began to howl
against the film and to discourage Americans from patronizing
it. So serious did the situation become th a t a number of
patriotic organizations launched campaigns to encourage Amer
icans to insist th at their local theaters show The Alamo, and
then to Bupport it with their attendance. Fortunately, the film
went on to become a box-office success, despite all the Left
could do to scuttle it.
Another movie directed by John Wayne, in which he also
starred, was The Green Herets, the only regular full-length
feature film produced during the Vietnam War th at reflected a
pro-American, anti-Communist position. This exciting and well-
acted movie was in the tradition of many of Wayne's World
War II films, except that the enemy was Communism. “ Lib
eral” reviewers from one end of the country to the other went to
work to discredit The Green Berets in the same manner as they
had The Alamo. Typical was this review from the New York
Times:
"The Green Herets" is a film so unspeakable, so stupid, so
rotten and false in every detail that it pastes through being fun,
through being funny, through being camp, through everything
and becomes an invitation to grieve. . . . Simplicities of the
right, simplicities of the left, but this one is beyond the possible.
It is vile and insane. On top of that, it is dull.7
132 The United Nations Conspiracy
Compare the tone of that vitriolic diatribe with the Times
review a few weeks earlier of the degenerate "rock” musical
HalY, a production that glorifies drugs and sexual perversion,
desecrates the Flag, and ridicules religion:
What is «<> likable about “ Hair,” th a t tribal-rock musical that
Monday completed its trek from downtown, via a discotheque,
and landed, positively panting with love and smelling of sweat
and flowers, at the Biltmore Theater? I think it is simply th a t it is
so likable. So new, so fresh and so unassuming, even in its
pretentions.'
The very title, HalY, pronounced ah-ee-r, has nothing to do
with what keeps us from being bald, but is the French verb
meaning “to hate.” Yet the New York Times described this
movie as "panting with love" and “so likable.” T h a t’s how the
game is played. At times it is rough!
The most visible symbol of our national pride iB the Flag of
the United States. In recent years it has been a target of
escalating Internationalist attacks. In early 1962, for instance, a
U.S. Air Force recruiting poster was released which depicted a
young man and a young woman in Air Force uniform walking
down the street. It would be expected th at such a poster, urging
young Americans to join a branch of the U.S. military, would
include the Flag of the United States. Yet, aside from the
happy faceB of the figures, the only other conspicuous item in
the poster was a huge UN flag. Even the NATO flag was
discernible! But Old Glory was conspicuous only by its absence.
Adverse public reaction eventually compelled Secretary of
Defense Robert McNamara (CFR) to withdraw the offensive
poster and order a return to the traditional use of the United
States Flag on Armed Forces recruiting posters, but he never did
offer a sensible explanation for eliminating the Flag in the
first place."
Another recent strategy to undermine national sentim ent has
been to demand modification of the wording of the Fledge of
Allegiance to the Flag, on the grounds th a t the goals it sets forth
Patriotism 133
have not actually been realized. The old Look magazine, for
instance, carried, in 1970, a lengthy anti-Pledge article entitled,
“ Do We Need A New Pledge Of Allegiance?” The article
referred to the Pledge’s "unsupportable claims to national
virtues we have not yet attain ed ,” specifically citing "its declar
ation th a t this is a nation indivisible, when proof to the contrary
is all around us,” and questioning why we muBt “ pronounce that
there is liberty and justice for all, when a person only has to look
and to listen to realize we have yet to reach that goal.” Similarly,
in August of 1977 a federal judge struck down a New Jersey law
requiring students to Btand during the Pledge after a student
refused to obey it on grounds th at the phrase “ with liberty and
justice for all” is “a lie.” "
Such specious reasoning reminds one of the argument that
Christians shouldn’t call themselves “Christians” because they
all fall short of living that religion to perfection. The Pledge of
Allegiance focuses on an ideal, not on an imperfect reality. The
Republic for which our Flag stands is one thing; the democracy
into which we are fast degenerating is quite another. And it is to
the noble concept of a Republic united under God with liberty
and justice for all th at we pledge allegiance, and toward which
we Bhould strive. Demands th a t the Pledge be amended because
we are not completely unified, or have yet to achieve perfect
liberty or justice for all citizens, are mere excuses to erode
respect for yet another of our patriotic symbols.
Even our national anthem, "The Star-Spangled Banner," has
Buffered increasing assault in recent years. Advocates of Black
Power showed their contem pt for it a t both the 1968 and 1972
Olympic Games. The new chancellor of a major Western uni
versity cancelled the Anthem at his inauguration because he
considered it “ p r o v o c a tiv e ,I n December, 1971, the president
of another university outlawed playing of the Anthem at home
basketball games for fear of arousing “racial tensions.” 13
During th at same month, the coach of yet another university
basketball team participating in a holiday tournam ent a t Mad
ison Square Garden refused to allow his players on the court
134 The United Nations Conspiracy
while the Anthem was played because, as he put it, "M y team
once honored the National Anthem this season and we lost. Now
we just don’t coyne out until it’s played.” 14 In January, 1973, a
college track team was disqualified from a major meet when its
players insisted on doing stretching exercises while the Anthem
was played. Hut the very next m onth, directors of the Olympic
Invitational Track and Field Meet a t Madison Square Garden
attem pted to drop the Anthem from the Meet’s agenda. They
hastily reversed their decision after an angry and determined
public outcry.18
There has also been a move to have "The Star-Spangled
Banner” replaced by some other song. Critics promoting this line
have ranged from the old Life magazine17 to Senior Scholastic
from the Saturday Review*' to Newsweek,20 from Reader's
Digest21 to M y Weekly Reader,22 and from This Week1'1 to
Scholastic Teacher.2* Some of the arguments used against our
present Anthem are designed to appear politically neutral, such
as the one which claims it is too difficult to sing — a criticism
which some view as reflecting lazy patriotism, similar to the
insistence that Washington’s Birthday and certain other holi
days be celebrated on Mondays rather than on their actual
anniversaries b o we can extend the fun and gameB of a holiday
weekend. After all, how many who consider the Anthem too
hard to Bing have ever taken time actually to practice singing it?
Indeed, most of the criticism of "The Star-Spangled Ban
ner” grows out of radical "peace” propaganda which sees evil in
anything m artial, nationalistic, or conservatively rooted in our
patriotic history. A typical example was an editorial in Christian
Century which condemned the Anthem for being too war-like
("the rockets’ red glare, the bombs bursting in air” ) and too
piously belligerent ("Then conquer we must, when our cause it is
just./ And this be our motto, ‘In God is our tru st.’” ). The
editorial also implied that the Anthem promotes “superpatriotic
self-righteouBness,” and should be replaced by a song which
would generate a sense of "common hum anity” and "move out
in a positive way toward other nations.”26ThuB we see once again
Patriotism 135
the demand th a t a respected patriotic symbol be abandoned in
favor of one more in line with the concept of UN-style world
government. t
Even the incredible tragedy a t the 1972 Olympic Games, in
which many members of the Israeli team were brutally m ur
dered by M arxist terrorists, was turned by Leftists in our news
media into a launching pad for additional anti-nationalist
propaganda. Newscaster W alter Cronkite, for instance, con
cluded his CBS broadcast for September 8, 1972, with this
observation:
Maybe a little less flag-waving, a little less hysteria over
national point-scoring, ia what the Gaines need right now; a little
more emphasis on true sportsmanship and a little less fanfare —
the kind of puffing th at builds up the Games until they become
the natural forum and target for the type of people who carry
machine guns, as they climb the fences around the Olympic
compounds.w
This Bame line was expounded again over CBS on September
13 by commentator Eric Sevareid, who asserted: “ W hat was
designed to produce international spirit has produced blatant
and bitter exhibitions of nationalism. . . . The next Bummer
games set for Montreal in ’76 . . . will have to downplay the
national flags, anthems, and patriotic bands.”*7
Ignored in commentary of this sort is the fact th at almost all
of the trouble at the Olympics in recent years can be laid
directly at the door of anti-nationalists. The Black Powerites
who showed Buch contempt for our National Anthem could
hardly be called patriots, while the exampleH of blatant referee
bias th at occur periodically during the Games are almost always
the work of Internationalists representing Communist countries.
Even the degenerates who slaughtered the Israeli athletes in 1972
were later found to be linked internationally with a revolution
ary network of terrorists and assassins, and to have used Soviet-
made AK-47 automatic rifles and ammunition in their bloody
Olympic raid.3"
136 The United Nation h Connpiracy
To imply th at true sportsmanship and nationalism are in
compatible is to ignore the clear record of the Olympic Oamen
prior to the 1960b. Spirited competition between individual
nations in an atmosphere of unsurpassed sportsmanship wau the
rule, not the exception. Perhaps it is for this very reason th at
devotees of internationalism have been working so hard to
undermine the traditional Olympic spirit, even arranging to
heap blame for the results of their own agitation on the
scapegoat of “nationalism.”
Another im portant element in the drive toward world govern
ment has been the attem pt to have Americans begin thinking in
terms of international interdependence rather than national
independence, President John F. Kennedy went so far as to
travel to Philadelphia on July 4, 1962 — Independence Day — to
propose a Declaration of Interdependence. The late President
declared: “ But I will say here and now on this day of indepen
dence th at the United States will be ready for a Declaration of
Interdependence. . . . Today Americans must learn to think
intercontinentally.”1* One week later, New York Times colum
nist James Reston (CFR) elated: “This year . . . President
Kennedy went to Independence Hall, of all places, and on the
Fourth of July, of all days, and virtually proposed to repeal the
Declaration of Independence in favor of a declaration of
international interdependence.”30
On M arch 5, 1968, the Mayor and City Council of M inneapo
lis, Minnesota, Bigned, in conjunction with the Hennepin County
Board of Commissioners, "A Declaration of World Citizenship”
th a t recognized the “ right of our citizens to declare that their
citizenship responsibilities extend beyond our city and nation.”
It pledged the signers to “join with other concerned people of the
world in a declaration that we share in this world responsibility
and that our citizens are in thin sense citizens of the world," and
also resolved “that as a symbol of our obligations as world
citizens we request the Municipal Building Commission to
proudly display the United N ations flag on suitable occasions at
the main entrance to the City Hall and the main entrance to the
Patriotism 137
new county building.”51 The Declaration was endorsed by a
dozen other prominent Minnesotans, including Governor Harold
LeVander and Representative Donald M. Fraser (D,; CFR).32
On United Nations Day in 1975, the World Affairs Council
of Philadelphia unveiled the notorious “Declaration of INTER-
dependence" authored by Internationalist historian Henry
Steele Commager. The document called for “ all nations to
strengthen and to sustain the United Nations,” and claimed that
"To establish a new world order” it “is essential that mankind
free itself from the limitations of national prejudice . . .”33
Incredibly, the Commager Declaration was eventually endorsed
by more than one hundred United States Senators and Repre
sentatives (see Appendix D).
The propaganda for interdependence has continued to esca
late, even as many of our national leaders have advocated and
implemented policies aimed at actually making us more depen
dent on other nations (including, in some instances, our enemies
— as when the Rhodesian boycott made us increasingly depen
dent on the Soviet Union for chrome ore) for everything from
military security, to the value of our money, to the everyday
goods we buy.
It is important to keep in mind that neither hatred nor
bitterness toward other countries is a characteristic of true
patriotism. Rather, patriotism is the spirit th a t leadB a citizen to
love his own country best, while respecting all other countries
th a t merit respect. As President Theodore Roosevelt once ob
served: "Patriotism stands in national m atters as love of family
does in private life. Nationalism corresponds to the love a man
bears for his wife and children.”:|4 Surely, loving one’s wife and
children best does not imply hatred of all other women and
children.
Former Pennsylvania Senator .Joseph Clark, an International
ist who became President of the United World Federalists in
1969 and was a vigorous sponsor of the Declaration of INTER-
dependence, once lamented, “ Old-fashioned patriotism is surely
an obstacle to world government.” 15 It surely is! And it is the
responsibility of us all to keep it that way.
Chapter 14
One World Government
la it justified to brand the United Nations a One World
Government? At the present time, it is not — but don’t be
fooled. From the start, it was merely intended as a first step in
th a t direction. In his 1945 report to President Truman, Secretary
of State Edward Stettinius (CFR) noted that “The Security
Council is not the enforcement agency of a world state, since
world opinion will not accept the surrender of sovereignty which
the establishment of a world state would demand.” The report
continued:
A similarly realistic acceptance of the facte of the actual
world limits the General Assembly to discussion and deliberation
without the power to legislate, since the power to legislate would
necessarily encroach upon the sovereign independence of the
member states.1
In “ An Open Letter to the American People" th at same year,
a number of prominent Internationalists declared:
140 The United Nations i'onnpiraiy
The San Franciico Charter, by maintaining the absolute
sovereignties ot the rival nation-states, thus preventing the
creation of superior law in world relations, resembles the Articles
of Confederutiin of the thirteen original American republics,
We know that this confederation did not work. No league system
ever attem pted in human history could prevent conflict between
its members. We must aim at a federal constitution of the world,
a working world-wide legal o rd e r.. . ,J
American Internationalists favored some form of World
Government, and w iB h ed to have the UN eventually evolve into
one, but were sufficiently realistic to recognize widespread
public opposition to the concept. Allen W. Dulles (CRF) and
Beatrice Pitney I^amb, for example, concluded:
Although the ultim ate need for an organization stronger than the
United Nations must be clear to any thoughtful observer, the
question of what type of organization is realistically possible at
the present time is the real issue. . . . There is no indication that
American public opinion, for example, would approve the estab
lishment of a super state, or permit American membership in it.
In other words, time — a long time — will be needed before world
government is politically feasible. . . . this tim e element might
seemingly be shortened so far as American opinion is concerned
by an active propaganda campaign in this country.1
Another committed Internationalist, and a future President
of the United States, General Dwight D. Eisenhower (CFR), was
pleased with how military operations during World War II had
compelled nations to “ptx)l a portion of their authority in a
single headquarters with power to enforce their decisions.” He
wished to see thin essentially dictatorial battle-front experience
applied to peace-time operations of the UN, but lamented that,
because its "application would have m eant some form of
limited federated world governm ent,” it "was politically unac
ceptable to any of the great nations concerned.”4
Ike’s brother, Dr. Milton Eisenhower (CFR), was less pessi
mistic. While acknowledging that the UN Security Council, for
example, was largely a paper tiger, he nevertheless recognized
One World Government 141
th at each member UN nation, by accepting in principle that the
UN should be able to impose military sanctions to “ keep the
peace,” had committed itself in principle to the sacrifice of
individual sovereignty. He asserted th at even this largely “ theo
retical commitment to limited sovereignty" marked “ a consider
able advance in our progress toward effective and orderly world
government.”8
John Foster Dulles (CFR), who would become President
Eisenhower’s first Secretary of State, also recognized the evolu
tionary role of the UN in the gradual drive toward world
government. "The United Nations,” he wrote, “ represents not a
final stage in the development of world order, b u t only a
primitive stage. Therefore its primary tank is to create the
conditions which will make possible a more highly developed
organization.”6
One of the UN specialized agencies actively working to create
those conditions is UNESCO. On one occasion in the UN'b early
years, when UNESCO was widely criticized for promoting One
World propaganda, the Saturday Review candidly editorialized:
If UNESCO is attacked on the grounds th a t it is helping to
prepare the world's people for world government, then it is an
error to burst forth with apologetic statem ents and denials. Let us
face it: the job of UNESCO is to help create and promote the
elements of world citizenship. When faced with such a “ charge,"
let us by all means affirm it from the housetops.7
If only all UN advocates would be th a t candid in their
pronouncements!
It should be clear by now that the UN’s founders and key
supporters intended it eventually to evolve into a powerful
agency of world government — even though for the time being,
as Clark Eichelberger once put it, the UN is “ in the shadowy
area between an organization of States and a world govern
ment. "* Yet some UN propagandists, anxious to keep Americans
hoodwinked regarding the ultim ate goal, have deceptively
claimed: “ It is plainly evident that the United Nations was never
intended to be a super state. It was given no attributes of
142 The United Nation h ('unn/nnny
statehood; it has no potoer to conscript a soldier, levy n Inx nr
enforce a deciHion.""
Of courHe, what the UN was initially, and what it w u
intended to become, Hre two different things. The fledgling UN
wbh to become a superstate in the same sense th at n child la In
become an adult: one Htage a t a time.
What are Home of the adjustm ents which must cvonl willy lie
made to convert the UN into at leant a limited world govern
ment? According to former Senator .Joseph Clark (!).■ IVnnsyl-
vania), onetime head of the United World Federalist*:
Among the major change* in the charter that would l>e required
to create a limited world government with power to keep th« pence
(or wage the war| are (1) elimination of the veto in the Hocurlly
Council; (2) aubktitution for the "one nation, one vote" in I lie
General Assembly of a more realistic ny»tem th at recognize* the
vast disparity of both population and economic power of the
nation-state*; (3) a Helf-operaling *y*tem of financing the UN,
such as a license fee on concetnion* in the »eahed, or a •mull tax
payable directly to the UN treaiury, on tran«action* in interna
tional trade; (4) a atrong United Nation* Peace-Keeping and
Peace-Making Force, «uhject to the control of the aecretnry-
general acting under in*truclion* of the Security Council; (A)
general and complete disarmament; and (6) compulsory juri*dic-
tion over di*putes between nation*, whether ju*tillable or not, hy
the World C ourt (I.e., repeal of the Connally Amendment).1"
A seventh reform cited by Senator Clark is "the admission ol
all nation-states to the U.N." in order to create “a universal
federation of all the nation-states in a limited world govern
ment. . . .” And, a t the same time, he would have the special
ized UN agencies "acquire the power to deal with the problem*
of pollution, poverty, and population."11
Influential American Internationalists in government, educa
tion, the electronic and print media, and many other fields ari
actively promoting those goals at th e present time. And they an
not alone, for as Adlai Stevenson pointed out: “There is nc
possibility of doubting (and no reason for ignoring!) the fact
th at the Soviet objective is one world. . . ."1J
Chapter 15
Democracy
Representative John H. Rousselot (R.-California) once ob-
lerved that the best example of democracy he could think of was
i lynch mob, since there was only one m an against it. This point,
-hat majority rule has no inherent relationship to morality, jus
tice, or fair play, is nowhere more evident than in the m anner in
vhich “democracy" is practiced at the United Nations. As col
umnist Paul Weaver has noted, the UN is “ an upside-down insti
tution, in which the nations th at are dom inant in the world — by
vealth, power, even population — are a tiny minority, and where
he nations that are weak and unim portant are in a position of
inassailable superiority."1
Indeed, the UN may well be the least-representative, most
nal-apportioned political entity in the history of the world. “At
he present tim e," testified former Secretary of State Dean
tusk (CFR) in 1975, “ less than 10 percent of the world’s popula-
ion, with less than 2 percent of the financial contributions to the
JN, can cast two-thirds of the votes in the General Assembly.”2
A minority of nations contribute around sixty percent of the
JN ’s budget. William Korey, Director of B’nai B’rith’s Interna
144 The United Nation h Conspiracy
tional Council, has correctly branded the farce an "taxation
without representation carried to the ultim ate absurdity."5
Brandeis University Professor John Roche, former Chairman
of the “ Liberal" Americans for Democratic Action, also laments:
. . the last time I did a count I discovered sadly th a t about H()
per cent of the member nations of the U. N. are run by regimes I
despise — the democratic countries could caucus in my living
room.’’4
And former Senator J. Glenn Beall, Jr. (R.-Maryland) once
told his colleagues:
It is interesting to note that the U. S. population — approxi
mately 212 million [in 1975] — is greater than the combined popula
tions of the 77 smallest countries represented in the United
Nations. Each of these nations . . . has one vote in the General
Assembly. The U. S. economy exceeds the total output of goods
and services for the combined economies of 124 countries in the
United Nations.*
Even Clarence K. Streit, the leading advocate of interna
tionalism via Atlantic Union, recognized the danger inherent in
attem pting to bring democratic nations (even when they are
roughly equal in population) under an umbrella like the UN or
league of Nations, claiming th at such an arrangement would
actually encourage dictatorship among them . According to Streit:
A league by giving an equal vote to the government of each
nation in it allows the government least responsible and responsive
to its people to maneuver best.
The more democratic a people is the more it respects the
minority [«ic| and requires a government to explain policies to the
people before committing them, and the more important the issue
the more vigilant is its public opinion. But the more these condi
tions obtain the more handicapped the government is in defending
the interests of its citizens in a league. The league system thus
places a premium on whatever strengthens the government as
regards its own people and a penalty on whatever strengthens the
citizen's power to restrain his government.'
Democracy 145
Mr. S treit also noted: "W hen 100,000,000 men league with
50,000,000 they lose power as regards the field of government
they transfer to th e league, for whereas each formerly had the
power of 1 over policy in this field they now have only the power
of one-half, since th e league weights 50,000,000 and 100,000,000
alike. Because it thus shifts the unit in shifting the field of
government, a league entails loss of power to the citizens of all
b ut the least populous of the democracies in it.”7
Clearly, the UN concept of one-nation, one-vote, has simply
sanctified minority rule within the organization, but there iB no
realistic way to change the situation under the Charter. A two-
thirds vote in the General Assembly, followed by ratification of
two-thirds of all UN members (including two-thirds of all perm
anent Security Council members), is required to amend the
Charter — a proposition th a t UN supporter Lincoln Bloomfield
(CFR) labeled “a political impossibility.”®
As a desperate alternative, some UN devotees have urged that
the ballot box be totally abandoned in the General Assembly.
Former NATO A m bassador H arlan Cleveland (CFR), for
example, has argued:
There is a remarkably simple solution to the "voting problem"
in the General Assembly: Don’t take any votes. The alternative
mode — the action mode — is to decide by concensus among those
whose action together is necessary to carry out any given interna
tional program.
Once there is a consensus about action, a vote is unnecessary.
When there is not yet a consensus about action, a vote dramatizes
the difference and makes eventual reconciliation th a t much more
difficult.*
This amounts to an admission, by a vigorous UN advocate,
th at majority rule in the United Nations is a dangerous, unwork
able fraud which makes not voting a t all preferable to the one-
nation, one-vote nonsense. The vast majority of UN members are
weak states unable to contribute support in any meaningful or
effective military or economic way. According to Clyde Eagleton
146 The United Nut urn»
(CFR), these "nations" have little respomilhllity lor wlinl rt««nl j N
bo"are tempted t<) vote through half-thought-out piUnrprUi'i, t
consequences of which must be faced by the low member*
enough to face them .” lu Vernon Aspaturian ndds;
In the United Nations, where majorities do not correspond u> lb*
actual distribution of population, wealth, power, or mtllKlttmi
ment, majority will is a synthetic contrivance expressing the luweit
common denominator of interests and passions which leni|xirnrdy
and adventitiously shaped it, while majority rule, under lb***
conditions, is an unmitigated vice.1'
A few years ago the General Assembly voted, 102 to 1, lnt a
Soviet-sponsored motion calling for an international convention
to regulate satellite television broadcasts, n move Unit w n ^ j
include the “right" of states to veto broadcnatH corndderad (((„.
tasteful. The lone negative vote wax cant by the United S ln ||H
primarily because of the obvious threat potted by such n mov« l()
our First Amendment guarantee of a free prims,IJ On Nnvoittl),,,,
26, 1976 the Assembly voted 124 to 1 to condemn thp U n l^
States for having vetoed Communist Vietnam'* application for
UN m embership.,!l It is obvious th a t so-called "democracy"
the UN is predicated on the lynch-mob principle pin pointed t0
perceptively by Representative Rousnelot.
Chapter 16
Honestly!
Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin once asserted: “ With a diplo-
nat, words m ust diverge from acts. . . . WordB are one thing
ind acts something different. . . . A sincere diplom at would
•qual dry water, wooden iron.” 1
In an address to the UN Security Council on February 15,
961, during the UN’s war against Katanga, U.S. Ambassador
y i a i Stevenson attem pted to reassure American critics of the
JN th a t the United States was not supporting the conflict
nilitarily. He asserted: "In contrast to others, the United States
tas never a t any time provided a single tank, a single gun, a
lingle soldier, a single piece of equipment that could be used for
nilitary purposes to anyone in the Congo.”2
Ambassador Stevenson was simply behaving as Stalin had
,aid diplom ats must behave, for the U.S. government had been
endering military aid and comfort to the UN for its Congo
:aper. For example, U.S. News <6 World Report had earlier
eported:
LEOPOLDVILLE By July 22 [/560J, the Airport here had
come to resemble an American m ilit a r y in it a lla t io n .
448 The United Nations C m s/nm cy
A whole fleet of U.S. Air Force plane* wa» taking off and
landing at all hour*.
It was an impressive display of American air power air
power than can reach easily into the heart of Africa.
Incoming plane* were bringing flour and United Nation*
troops to the Congo.
. . . Hundreds of ton* of flour were unloaded, together with
jeeps and other military equipm ent.3
Toward the end of the year, in its issut for December 19,
I960, U.S. News & World Report ran an advertisement for the
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation th at boasted of the great job
Lockheed planes had done to assist the UN in the Congo:
The call came from the United Nations. W ithin hour* huge
airlifters were rushed to th e Congo with hundreds of U.N. peace
[sic | troops and tons of supplies. One airlifter proved outstand
ing: the Lockheed C-130 Hercules.4
A plane pictured in the ad, presumably being loaded in the
United States or unloaded in the Congo with troops and trucks,
was lettered "U.S. Air Force.”
Another example of diplomatic duplicity a t the UN occurred
on November 16, 1972, when pro-UN Senator Gale McGee (D..
Wyoming; CFK), acting in his capacity as U.S. Representative in
the Fifth Committee on Scale of Assessments for the Appor
tionm ent of the United Nations, introduced a proposal to cut
back the U.S. share of the UN budget from approximately one-
third to no more than twenty-five percent. T his move to pacify
growing public outrage over the unduly large U.S. portion of the
budget was ballyhooed in th e press as a new “ get tough” attitude
on the part of the adm inistration. In fact, the opposite was true.
Ah Senator McGee explained to the Fifth Committee:
. . . there exists in some quarters the belief th a t the proposal I
am introducing today . . . represents a shift in U.S. policy,
reflecting a diminution of interest in and support for the
Organization. I wish to assure you a t the outset th a t this is not the
case. . . . It is aimed not a t weakening but rather at strengthen
Honestly! 149
ing the United Nations as an institution and its varied operations
and important programs.1
The formal budget reduction was simply a ploy intended to
sooth anti-UN feeling within the United States to the point
where greater support could be secured from American ta x
payers for the overall UN operation. As Senator McGee put it:
“The achievement of this objective [budget reduction] . . . will
remove a serious concern which, particularly in recent years, has
clearly had an adverse effect on the attitu d e of the American
public toward the United Nations. I should add, Mr. Chairman,
th at were thiB concern not expunged, it is my considered opinion
th at it would cauBe damage to the interests of this im portant
organization.” But he made clear th at “We do not wish to reduce
the traditional high level of the United States financial com
m itment to the activities of the United N ations.’’®The subtle
strategy was simply to reduce our formal budget assessment to
pacify U.S. taxpayers, while quietly increasing our “voluntary”
contributions to other UN agencies so th at, when all was said
and done, as many — probably more — U.S. dollars would flow
into UN coffers aH ever.
Former UN Ambassador (now Democratic New York Senator)
Daniel Moynihan was once asked by Washington Post corres
pondent Marilyn Berger if he had been telling the tru th during
his sojourn at the United Nations. He replied: "Selectively, like
most people in diplomacy.” Mrs. Berger then asked: “Is a
diplomat sent to the U.N. also to tell lies?” To which Moynihan
responded: “To lie abroad for his country, as they say.”1
A few weeks later, Ambassador Moynihan was asked by CBS
news correspondent George Herman if he planned to resign his
UN post in order to run for the Senate from New York.
Moynihan replied:
. . . 1 would consider it dishonorable to leave this post and run
for any office, and I would hope that it would be understood that
if 1 do, the people, the voters to whom I would present myself in
such circumstances would consider me as having said in advance I
am a man of no personal honor to have done so.*
150 The United Nation* Con»f>trtny
Moynihan subsequently resigned his UN post and, on Juno
10, 1976, announced his candidacy for the U.S. Senate.
Bribery and vote buying are among the sordid facta of lit# nt
the United Nations. U.S. News & World Report, for example,
once quoted a former top U.S. representative a t the UN hr
saying: “ I know 30 delegates who will change their country's vote
for a blonde, a case of Scotch or $5,000. Those representing the
‘third world’ countries don’t get much money from home, so It’s the
‘freebies’ that make being Ambassador to the U.N. worthwhile,"'
Former Ambassador Moynihan was once asked, during n
television interview with CBS correspondent Eric Sevareid: "Are
votes on these things bought in the U.N.?” He replied: "1 have
never seen money change hands, but I know that money doos
change hands.” He continued: “ . . . last fall a vote changed
hands at the U.N. for $600, and that was thought very bad for
the reputation of the institution." And why was it bad for tho
UN’s reputation? Not because it was wrong, b ut rather, in
Moynihan’s words, because "votes are supposed to be worth
more than th a t.”
Asked if he wanted to identify those involved in the bribery,
Moynihan emphatically replied: “ No, I do not.” 10 Strangely,
neither Sevareid nor any other “ Liberal” media sources subse
quently criticized Ambassador Moynihan for the cover-up, or
hounded him further for names. It is a revealing example of the
extent to which the UN's image is protected by its friends in the
American press,
Semantics is yet another area where disingenuous games are
played by the UN crowd to mislead the public. As explained by
former Senator Joseph Clark (D.-Pennsylvania):
Semantic* plays an im portant part in advocacy of or opposi
tion to world government. Everybody is, in theory, in favor of
"peace.” Most people are in favor of "world law” — as long as it
is not enforceable. But if the concept is expressed in terms of
“world government” or "yielding national sovereignty,” most of
these groups who think of themselves as having "a piece of
peace" tend to shy away. The term “world order” tends to attract
Honestly! 151
more supporters, until it* necessary connection w ith world govern
ment is explained.11
This apparently is why recent American Presidents, and a
multitude of other leading Internationalists, ordinarily use the
phrase “world order” when discussing foreign policy goals,
rather than the more precise (but abrasive) phrase, “world
government.” It is important that we recognize the extent to
which the terms are synonymous.
Chapter 17
Feathering The Nest
Bureaucrats employed by the United Nations are the highest
paid in the world, surpassing those of any individual govern
ments, including the United StateB. Indeed, U.S. News & World
Report has told us:
. . . the aize of the U.N. Secretariat in New York keeps growing —
having doubled in the last 10 years to more than 18,000, of which
6,622 are classed as “ professional and higher-level staff.” The
number and size of U.N. agencies also are growing rapidly.
More than 100 U.N. officials get higher pay than the $66,000
annual salary of a member of the U.S. Cabinet. About 1,000 earn
more th an $40,000 a year. . . .
A S tate Department r e p o r t. . . found: U.N. basic rem unera
tion, plus employer contributions to health insurance and retire
ment benefits, exceed the U nited States by 46 per cent to 73 per
cent. U.N. pensions exceed U.S. pensions by 23 per cent to 73 per
cent. U.N. annual leave exceeds U.S. annual leave by 16 per cent to
131 per cent. U.N. sick pay, on a one-year basis, exceeds U.S. sick
leave by 1,400 per cent to 1,000 per cen t.1
W hat do the UN bureaucrats do to justify their pay? For one
154 The United Nation h Conn/limey
thing, they generate tons of reports, resolutions, memoranda,
books, magazines! speech textB, news releases, and other docu
ments. It is certain (and we are speaking from excruciating per
sonal experience) th at no entity in the history of the world him
ever come close to churning out the endless flood of printed
material which emanates from the UN and its affiliated agen
cies. Even Secretary-General U T hant acknowledged:
The United Nations has been suffering from what I would call
a “document explosion." There haa been a vast increase in the
number of meetings of United Nations bodies and conferences
and, although efforts have been made, an effective means of
controlling the conference programme has yet to be found. These
meetings generate large quantities of document*, and there has
been little reduction in the documentation of the permanent
organs. The result is the continuous output, rising to a peak during
the General Assembly, of an enormous mass of paper. . . . many
delegations complain — privately and publicly — th at they can
not digest the content* of the quantity of paper they receive.'
Consider, for example, the 1974 UN Law of the Sea Con
ference held in Caracas, Venezuela. Barry Newman of the Wall
Street Journal reported:
The volume of verbiage is staggering. There are actually three
meetings — one dealing with coastal waters, one with the deep sea
and one with pollution and ocean research — and each is struggling
with several issues that would each m erit conferences of their own.
The UN has 90 mimeograph operators grinding away a t 27
machines around the clock, spewing forth 250,000 pages of docu
ments a day. Each is prepared in three, and sometimes five,
languages by teams of translator* and typist*. . . . The list of
documents produced so far is itself 160 page* long.’
What was the end result of th at paper-besieged Conference?
According to reporter Newman: "So after 70 days of talk about a
law to govern the use of the oceans and their resources the conference
is making only one firm decision: to hold more conferences.”4
Clearly, environmentalists are hypocrites if they do not join
Feathering The Nest 156
the drive to abolish the UN in order to save the world’s trees!
Many have wondered what is done with those m ountains of
documents th at hardly anyone reads. Well,
The other day a mouBe found out. During a meeting of the
General Assembly's Economic Committee, the mouse presented
itself at the microphone of the Maldives, then meandered over to
the delegates from Malta. The delegates clearly could not tolerate
such an affront to their dignity and decorum. So after much
tumbling and Rcurrying, they flattened it with a hefty report. And
that's what they do with those documents.6
On a more serious note, how are your taxes holding up? Out
rageously high, we presume. But did you know th at United States
citizens employed by the UN pay, in essence, no income taxes?
The phrase “ in essence” is required for technical accuracy, since
those UN employees do go through the motions of paying taxes.
But the UN then reimburses the amount paid! As the Washington
Post reported on June 9, 1966, “U.S. citizens working for the
United Nations must pay Federal income taxes, but are reim
bursed for the full amount by the U .N .” An undated U.S. State
Departm ent memorandum entitled “Taxation of U.S. Nationals
Employed by the United N ations” confirms:
In the case of United States citizenB employed within the
United States by the United Nations the amount of tax paid by the
individual to the United States is re-imbursed by the Organization
in order to equAte the citizens’ compensation with the salary of
other employee* of the Organization who are not United States
citizens.
A later missive from the State Departm ent describes the
policy in these terms:
U.S. citizens who are employed by the UN in the United States
do pay income taxes (Federal, State, local). In order to provide
equitable treatm ent to all employees, the United Nations reim-
bursea the income tax paid by American employees so that all have
equal take-home pay for equal work.*
156 The United Nationa Cutupiravy
In the spirit of George OrwelPi Anim al Farm, all Americanii nre
equal, but some qre more equal than otheni. When .you pay your
taxes, the government gets the money and you get a feather*llght
wallet or purse. When your fellow Americans a t the UN pay their
taxes, the government gets the money and they get a complete
refund. Need we remind you that a large p art of the money that
pays their salaries in the first place, and which reimburse* their
taxes, also comes from your pocket?
So much for equality.
Chapter 18
The Humanitarians
It is sometimes alleged, by observers who readily adm it that
the UN’s political activities are (and have been) disastrous, that
the United States ahould nevertheless m aintain its affiliation
with the world body because of the alleged good accomplished
by certain UN specialized agencies. Of course, it is possible to
find some good in almost anything if one's search is sufficient
ly thorough. Even snake venom, we are told, is a t least five per
cent protein. Yet, while it is often a virtue to look for the good in
things and discount the evil, at tim es it can be irrational and
place a person (or nation) in mortal danger.
It would be possible, were we so inclined, to continue our
support of specific specialized agencies after severing all ties
with the UN’s primary political apparatus (the Security Council
and General Assembly). T hat kind of decision could be reached
once we are certain how much actual good the UN’s so-called
“ hum anitarian” endeavors are accomplishing. Considering the
enormous expenditures made over the years by such specialized
agencies as the United Nations International Children’s Emer
gency Fund (UNICEF), World Health Organization (WHO),
158 The United Nations Conspiracy
and others, it is probable th at some of the largesse ha* hit the
proper targets on occasion. However, unlike private charitable
operations here at home, which are constantly subjected to close
inspection by the press and others for possible fraud or misuse
of funds, the activities and expenditures of international
agencies have been widely glorified, but B parsely scrutinized for
waste and corruption. Most of our influential news sources
merely parrot press releases from the various UN agencies, thus
giving the general public little alternative but to swallow whole
the reported claims and statistics.
A case in point is an article about UNICEF by a staff writer
for the Washington Star-News, which appeared in th at news
paper on October 30, 1974. Entitled, “ UNICEF Has Enemies
But Many Little FriendB," it asserts a t one point:
C. Lloyd Bailey, executive director of the U.S. Committee for
UNICEF, acknowledged in a telephone interview from New York
yesterday that administrative and fund-raising costs are higher
than other children’s charities, like the C hriitian Children's Fund
and Save the Children Foundation.
Yet, the reporter simply passed along Mr. Bailey's own self-
serving explanation for the discrepancy (which had to do with
the exorbitant cost of shipping, printing, and warehousing
UNICEF Christmas cards). Elsewhere throughout the article,
every statistic and explanation offered by Mr. Bailey (and other
UNICEF spokesmen with whom the reporter talked) regarding
UNICEF's activities and alleged accomplishments were pre
sented in the same unquestioning, unchallenged manner. No
attem pt was made to investigate thoroughly the veracity of the
pro-UNICEF claims.
Unfortunately, many investigators who would like very much
to dig deeply into such matters simply cannot afford the
expense of doing so. It is one thing to delve into the doings of a
church charity in, say, Maryland, but quite something else to
verify whether UNICEF really did save the life of th at emaci
ated M auritanian child pictured in your local newspaper. A
The Humanitarians 159
panel established by the United Nations Association of the
U.S.A. itself was compelled to conclude:
Although our contributions to UN specialized agencies are
rising, no entity in the U.S. government is adequately equipped to
judge the effectiveness of particular program s.. . . interna*
tional organization programs a t the present time are not evalu
ated in a positive, systematic way. . . . '
All too often, UN agencies receive full credit for various
projects when, at best, only partial credit is deserved. In most (if
not all) cases, private agencies contribute significantly to the
various hum anitarian efforts. For instance:
Over two decades, the UN has had many occasions to be
grateful to its NGO \non-governmental organization] supporters.
In 1946, when UNICEF was working to save the children of war-
devastated areas, it called upon the Red Cross, church groups,
relief agencies and many other citizens’ organizations to help.
World Refugee Year combined the efforts of the UN and
citizens committees in many nations on behalf of the world’s
homeless people. Private industry around the world supports a
continuing fertilizer program within the FAO’s [Food and Agricul
ture Organization'/] Freedom-From Hunger Campaign.3
And in 1976, news accounts described a buffet supper a t UN
headquarters announcing the development of a new high-
protein food (“ Ricetein") which could become a major weapon
in the war against world hunger. In many newspapers, the
accounts carried such headlines as "High-Protein Food An
nounced at U.N."3 and "Sumptuous U.N. BulTet: ‘Ricetein’."4
Readers, skimming their papers quickly, may have gained the
impression th at the UN had scored another im portant hum ani
tarian breakthrough. Yet, careful reading of the news stories
made it clear that two American companies — Nabisco, Inc. of
New York and Riviana Foods, Inc. of Houston — had developed
the new, inexpensive blend of soybean protein and rice.
It iB entirely possible that many of the UN specialized
160 The United Natiunn Conspiracy
agencies would find their activities enhanced if freed from the
corrupting political influences of the Security Council and
the General Assembly. A sizable percentage of the incident!
justifiably cited by critics of the UN to demonstrate the harm
done by this or that agency can be traced to the effects of the
UN’s perverse political pressures. The image of UNICEF, for
instance, suffered a severe blow when, in 1961, funds ear
marked for needy children were — with UNICEF’s knowledge
and consent — temporarily diverted to help finance the slaugh
ter of innocent children during the UN’s vicious war against
anti-Communist Katanga. Former U.S. Representative H.R.
Gross (R.-lowa), a staunch Conservative critic of the UN,
discussed the sordid matter on the House fl(x>r on June 19,1961. He
reminded his colleagues that, during hearings on the bill being
debated, government witnesses had adm itted th at Secretary
General Thant had borrowed from the Children’s Fund to help
finance the Congo operation. According to Congressman Gross:
After the committee adjourned, the witnesses provided a
statem ent showing th at U.N. officials got $12 million from the
United Nations Special Fund and grabbed $10 million from the
United Nations Children’s Fund, UNICEF.*
Another former Congressman and “ Liberal” devotee of the
UN and UNICEF, Richard D. McCarthy (D.-New York), ex
plained to his House colleagues a few years later:
In 1961, the U.S. Government allocated $10 million in support
of UNICEF. Prior to actual payment, the Secretary General
required emergency funds to carry on U.N. action in the Congo.
Acting under U.N. Resolution 1341, authorizing him to borrow
funds from special accounts, and after consulting with UNICEF
and the U.S. Government, the Secretary General was advanced
the $10 million, which was repaid in full to UNICEF before the
end of the y ear.'
Even UNICEF’s Executive Director, Maurice Pate, has
admitted:
The Humanitarians 161
The loan to th e U.N., made with the full knowledge and
approval of UNICEF, came from U.S. government funds not yet
turned over to UNICEF. T hat loan was repaid to UNICEF
December 27 ( ] .7
UNICEF dollars were actually earm arked to help reconstruct
Communist-controlled areas of Vietnam as the no-win war (for
our side) neared its tragic conclusion.
UNITED NATIONS, N.Y., April 16 [1974] — The United
Nations Children’s Fund announced plans today for aid to North
Vietnam and to areas held by the Vietcong in the South.
The 3-year program was described in a report by Henry
Labouisse, the fund'R director, who called for $18-million to be
spent in the North to help rebuild destroyed schools and $4.6-
million to be spent in the South.1
Actually, UNICEF had provided sustenance to the Commu
nists in Vietnam on many earlier occasions. In 1970, for ex
ample, the UNICEF Executive Board approved a $200,000
purchase of cloth, allegedly for North Vietnamese children’s
clothing. The cloth was purchased from the Soviet Union, with
rubles held by UNICEF, and was delivered to North Vietnam by
the Soviet Union (not UNICEF) in 1972.® Needless to say, no one
(but the Communists) knows if that cloth went to children or to
Red troops.
The blatantly pro-Communist bias of UNICEF's assistance
to Vietnam was summarized by Colonel Robert D. Heinl, Jr., in
Human Events:
In programs purportedly established "to help children in
Indochina,” the United Nations’ Children’s Emergency Fund
gave just short of two-thirds of ita collections to North Viet
namese or to the "Provisional Revolutionary Government of
South Vietnam,” sometimes confused with the Vietcong.
The exact numbers, conceded by a UNICEF spokesman, run as
follows: UNICEF collected and disbursed a total of $13,649,433
for its Indochina children’s programs. While smidges of this
162 The United Nation» ('urm/jinity
came from abroad, the overwhelming amount came out ul the
pockets of U.S. taxpayers.
Of thia eight-figure turn, $8,975,587 went to Communist
recipients. . . .
While Communists were thus getting 61 per cent of UNICEF's
largess, oui ally, South Vietnam, got only $5,360,707, or HO per
cent.10
Again, there wa8 no proof at all that the supplies sent to the
Communists actually reached needy children. When Colonel
Heinl asked a UNICEF spokesman about the m atter, he wan
told: “UNICEF has no way to make sure the supplies to the
Communists got to children. They were dropped off at the
airports and docks and we assume they were used as we
intended."11 That is truly incredible, considering that some of
those supplies, according to Colonel Heinl, included “trucks,
bulldozers, heavy engineer construction equipment, and con
struction tools and m aterials."12
Even so innocuous an international agency as the Universal
Postal Union has suffered from the UN’s pro-Communist
political pressures. Established in 1874, the UPU was the oldest,
and possibly moBt efficient, of all international institutions. Its
assistance in helping to move the mails from one part of the
world to another was uninterrupted even by wars and natural
disasters. But in 1947 the UPU became a specialized agency of
the UN and had to surrender much of its autonomy to policies
set by the world body. Consider:
Ever since the United Nations adm itted M ainland China and
expelled the Formosa Administration, there was a strong suspi
cion th a t the Universal Postal Union might follow this political
action. Now it ii certain, for the necessary procedures have been
undertaken by the Executive and Liaison Committee for its
annual gathering here. Taipei is out; Peking is in .13
Clearly, to the extent th a t some of them may be worth
keeping a t all, the specialized agencies now associated with the
United Nations would be improved by the demise of the U N ’s
The Humanitarians 163
M arxist-biased political apparatus. For this feason, the increas
ingly popular slogan Get US out! most urgently means with
drawal of U.S. financial support from, and membership in, the
UN Security Council and General Assembly.
Chapter 19
UNICEF — A Case History
The U N ’s moat effective public relations front is the United
Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF). It is always
riBky to condemn an agency th a t professeB to aid needy children,
and whenever the General Assembly and Security Council be
have outrageously, references to the alleged good done by
UNICEF are erected as shields to blunt demands th a t the United
States pull out of the UN.
The methods used to build up the UNICEF image are subtle
and far-ranging. Bent known, perhaps, is the annual “Trick-or-
Treat for UNICEF" crusade during which thousands of little
ghosts and goblins spend Halloween night collecting coinB for
UNICEF in addition to goodies for themselves. The amount
collected is, of course, far less important to the One World
effort than the brainwash that accompanies the project. As
adm itted by the U.S. Committee for UNICEF, “The truth in
connection with this is th a t Trick-or-Treat for UNICEF is
primarily an education program.” 1 And Leftist baby doctor
Benjamin Spock has confirmed:
The United Nations Conspiracy
When a Trick or T reat for UNICEF program it well organized
by a school system or a church group, the children study thr
conditions and needs of the countries that are to be assisted, Or
they study the activities of UNICEF and other departm ents of
the UN. This is not just educational in the conventional, academ
ic sense. It changes attitudes and feelings in a way that is likely to
have permanence.5
Some of the methods used to sell UNICEF to American
children are ingenious. As one of the scores of examples that
could be cited, consider the October, 1972, issue of the quarterly
cartoon magazine, Dennis The Menace Pocket Full Of Fun. In
(he fourth Btory (“The Substitute Santa"), the devious Dennis
wants a burro for Christmas and sets out to raise money to help
Santa pay for one. He sets up a panhandling operation to collect
money from passers-by under the guise th a t it will be used to
"Help a poor kid.” Ju st as Dennis’s alarmed parents arrive on
the scene, a passing policeman stops to make a donation and
commend Dennis for raising money for a poor child. He then
nska, "Where are you sending the money . . . to UNICEF?”
And Dennin’a father replies with a sheepish falsehood, “Er . . .
yes! T h at’s it! ”
After the policeman departs, a bewildered Dennis is taken
into the house where his father proceeds with a detailed disser
tation on the blessings of UNICEF. Eventually, Dennis agrees
to forget the burro and send the money to UNICEF. To
complete the advertisement, one of the cartoon panels portrays
Dennis holding an envelope imprinted in bold letters with
UNICEF’s complete mailing address. The story then continues
to its uneventful conclusion.3
UNICEF also sells Christm as cards. For many years the cards
have been advertised and sold in U.S. post offices despite
vigorous opposition by irate taxpayers to such federal promotion
til UNICEF. Among other things, this “ free" advertising and
nii Ioh promotion gives UNICEF a significant advantage over
Iree enterprise greeting card companies which are tax- and rent-
paying entities. In addition, the enormously one-sided publicity
UNICEF — A Case History 167
given UNICEF makes it almost impossible for the card com
panies to register justified protests. We have in our files, for
instance, a letter dated November 9, 1970, from the president of
a major greeting card association to the association’s members.
At one point, it is noted th a t the association itself
has always m aintained a “ hands o f f ’ policy regarding the
UNICEF greeting card activity because the “charity” appeal of
UNICEF seems to make it immune to adverse attacks.
IN ADDITION, in every instance where an organization or
group has tried to Btop the UNICEF program, those making the
attack have incurred serious unfavorable public opinion on the
premise th a t they are putting down “charity.”
So, a segment of American business th at iB being harmed by
unfair competition from a UN agency and its own government
is intim idated into silence by fear of reprisal from a public
misled by one-sided, pro-UNICEF propaganda. It is a disgrace
ful situation.
In 1969, however, something remarkable happened. Public
protest against UNICEF reached such a pitch th at the Post
Office Department actually canceled — for a while — author
ity for the sale of UNICEF cards in Post Offices. The story of
how the decision was made, and how it was eventually reversed,
provides an interesting case history of the stranglehold that the
United Nations has over even our domestic affairs.4
During the latter part of 1969 the mounting opposition to the
sale of UNICEF cards led the Post Office D epartm ent’s
Director of Creative Services to write a frantic letter (dated
October 29, 1969) to the U.S. Committee for UNICEF th at
began: “Your help is urgently needed! We are being deluged by
Congressional inquiries and letters from postal customers, all
questioning the wisdom of granting UNICEF space in Post
Office lobbies for the purpose of selling Christmas cards.” A
request was made for information related to such m atters as
Communist involvement in the UNICEF program, how funds
are handled, and the nature of U.S. involvement in the UNICEF
program.
168 The United Nation* t ii/
The Committee'a November 4, I960, reply wn» only $
responsive to the request. On November 18, thtt Illlf*
Creative Services wrote once again, this time to rtq iin t •/*
regarding proposed UNICEF aid to Vietnam, Wl^"
UNICEFers were unable to deny that such anaistiiiuti
works, the Director sent a memorandum dated Diu'eml*1"
the Postm aster General’s Special Assistant for I’ulilii l /
tion, declaring:
The use of Post Office lobbies by UNICKF to mil gri^
cards has created a public relation* problem of the first nil
tude.
To date we have received about 600 letters of protest •
postal customers and the flow shows no signs of nlmllit|
addition, a few score letters to Congressmen have produced I1
number of inquiries from the Hill. And an undetermined nu»
of protests have been registered with individual Postmnst**
the field.
The reason for this outpouring . . . centen largely on r«
newspaper reports to the effect thst UNICEF has some pl*t(
turn $200,000 worth of supplies over to the government <>l
Vietnam.
I inquired on this point with the headquarters organ!**! li>
the U.S. Committee for UNICEF and learned that it is true
After a lot of due consideration 1 have come to the cone In'!
th a t it would be a grave mistake to continue the prtulM
allowing UNICEF access to post office lobbies in 1970. KrtH1
public relations standpoint it would be nearly suicidal. Kr<*
moral standpoint it would be at best questionable.
Further, I think that I should start including in my r*pll»j!
these protesting customers a statement saying that the POl >'
not be continuing this practice in 1970.
It is my strong belief th a t such a statement would genern1
high degree of public good will for us in general, anil ''
adm inistration in particular.
Do you agree?
The memorandum was returned with this penned-in n<
"Yea — 1. W holeheartedly. 2. Let’s get them out now.” ^
After the decision was announced, the U.S. Commil ^
168 The United Nation# Conspiracy
The Committee’s November 4, 1969, reply wag only partially
responsive to the request. On November 18, the Director of
Creative Services wrote once again, this time to request specifics
regarding proposed U N ICEF aid to V ietnam . When the
UNICEFers were unable to deny th at such assistance wan in the
works, the Director sent a memorandum dated December 17 to
the Postmaster General’s Special Assistant for Public Informa
tion, declaring:
The use of Post Office lobbies by UNICEF to sell greeting
cards has created a public relations problem of the first magni
tude.
To date we have received about 600 letters of protest from
postal customers and the flow shows no signs of abating. In
addition, a few score letters to Congressmen have produced a like
number of inquiries from the Hill. And an undeterm ined number
of protests have been registered with individual Postmasters in
the field.
The reason for this outpouring . . . centers largely on recent
newspaper reports to the effect that UNICEF has some plans to
turn $200,000 worth of supplies over to the government of North
Vietnam.
I inquired on this point with the headquarters organization of
the U.S. Committee for UNICEF and learned that it is tru e .. . .
After a lot of due consideration I have come to the conclusion
that it would be a grave mistake to continue the practice of
allowing UNICEF access to post office lobbies in 1970. From a
public relations standpoint it would be nearly suicidal. From a
moral standpoint it would be a t best questionable.
Further, I think that I should start including in my replies to
these protesting customers a statem ent saying th a t the POD will
not be continuing this practice in 1970.
It is my strong belief th a t such a statem ent would generate a
high degree of public good will for us in general, and this
administration in particular.
Do you agree?
The memorandum was returned with this penned-in notation:
"Yes — 1. Wholeheartedly. 2. Let’s get them out now.”
After the decision was announced, the U.S. Committee for
UNICEF — A Case History 169
UNICEF and one private citizen protested the action. In his
M arch 4,1970, response to th a t single private critic, the Director
of Creative Services asserted:
Since laBt October we have received well in excess of one
thousand letters of protest from our customers all over the
country. In addition, we have received several score Congressional
inquiries regarding this practice.
These letters were not the products of an “ irrational lunatic
fringe,” as you suggest in your letter. Rather, they were from
what was obviously a solid cross section of the American public.
And the bulk of this mail raised some tough, albeit fair,
questions concerning the subject of communist involvement in
UNICEF activities.
. . . a number of our customers sent us a copy of an article,
“The T ruth About UNICEF," by William E. Dunham (copy
enclosed). I personally obtained and read copies of the source
material cited by Mr. Dunham in his article, and must report that
I did not find any of th is inform ation to be in error or
misrepresented. If such is the case, I would be most willing to
have the facts pointed out to me.
. . . a former UNICEF procurement officer was discovered
(in 1966) to be involved in an attem pt to illegally purchase
classified space flight apparatus. Only a hasty exit from this
country prevented his arrest. As some of our customers pointed
out, there is no getting around the fact th a t a man who spends his
time trying to procure accelerometers for space vehicles is not
doing much to help the world's needy children.
Perhaps the biggest bone of contention centered upon the
publication of a news story calling attention to the fact that
UNICEF had been dealing with the communist North Vietnam
government concerning a possible aid program.
I cite these few examples ju st to demonstrate th a t we did make
an honest attem pt to fairly examine the issue in which we found
ourselves embroiled. As a consequence of this examination we
have determined th a t the overall interests of all parties concerned
will be best served if we simply do not again renew lobby privilege
arrangements with the U.S. Committee for UNICEF.
By May 19, 1970, the Director was able to send the following
summary memo to his superior:
170 The United Nation* Cunnpirticy
Here are some quick statistics regarding the decision to term i
nate UNICEF card sales in postal lobbies.
1. We received 1500 individual letters of complaint from
customers. . . .
2. We have received Congressional inquiries from about two-
thirds of the Houbc and S e n a te .. . .
3. We have only received eight letters of thank* for providing
lobby space for these card sales; in each case from a member of a
local UNICEF group.
4. We have received only one letter of complaint over our
decision to terminate the program. . . .
5. We have received 100-200 letters of thank you for term inat
ing the program.
6. Opinion playback from field people generally indicates
that they would be happier if they didn’t have to contend with
the program each year.
And th a t, you would have thought, would be that. But it was
not. For shortly thereafter Postmaster General Winton Blount
intervened personally to reverse the policy and again permit
UNICEF to use tax-financed post offices for its card sales.
This was despite overwhelming opposition to the program from
the public and substantial opposition to it from within the
Department itself!
The unfortunate reversal of policy led to the resignation of
the courageous Director of Creative Services. His August 17,
1970, letter to the Department's Special Assistant for Public
Information sadly declared:
This letter is to officially advise you of my resignation. . . .
My leaving is motivated purely on the grounds of personal
moral principle. The public relations or political reasons for
granting card sale lobby space to the U.S. Committee for
UNICEF aside, 1 am convinced that this action [the reversal of
policy J is morally wrong and injurious to the best interests of the
nation and its citizens.
I make this statem ent on th e basis of an extensive examination
of the UNICEF operation, which I conducted as a result of our
receiving some 1,500 letters of complaint from customers all
across the country.
UNICEF - A Case History 171
The more I investigated these complaints, the more obvious it
became that, since its inception, the constant outpouring of
humanitarian pronouncements with which UNICEF is wont to
surround itself, have served as little more than a facade to hide
sinister men and sinister motives.
In short, I was forced to conclude that it ia morally wrong for
an establishment of the U.S. Government to provide the means
whereby UNICEF can further its financial and propaganda
objectives.
In light of this conviction, I feel it only proper th a t I resign.
Once again, the American people were ignored and a dedi
cated public servant was compelled to quit under Leftist pres
sures from Internationalists a t the top.
Chapter 20
Model UN — A Case History
Kach year, in communities throughout the country, Model
United Nations assem blies are convened for selected high school
and college studentB. Participants, usually the cream of the
academic crop, serve as "delegates” from the various nations,
role-playing the probable attitudes and mannerisms of real-
world delegates. The Model UN network is one of the most
effective pro-UN propaganda ploys yet conceived.
Ah an example of how one Model UN assembly was con
ducted, we have selected the session held for U tah high school
students on the campus of the University of Utah in 1963. We
have done so, despite the gap in years, because th a t event is one
for which we have, owing to unusual circumstances, been able to
collect complete and comprehensive documentation (including
original correspondence, tape recordings, media clips, etc.).
And, at the time, the Utah gathering was both the largest and
oldest high school Model UN assembly in the nation.
The story began in early 1963 when a group of concerned
174 The United Nationti Connpiracy
citizens, represented primarily by a Conservative organization
culled the Citizens Information Committee (C1C), decided the
time had come t«^ present students attending Model UN assem*
lilies with at least a sm attering of information critical of the
UN, as a counter to the complete domination of such events by
adult pro-UN propagandists. In years past (1963 was U tah’s
ninth Model UN) attem pts in th at direction had failed. Now, it
was decided to choose a modest, realistic goal and work for its
achievement as a foundation on which to build in the future.
The plan eventually adopted consisted simply of trying to have
three single-sheet flyers passed out to the delegate-students
sometime during the assembly. The flyers were to consist of;
1. A documented biography of James Avery Joyce, the
Hssembly’s keynote speaker who was also a long-time member of
Britain’s Socialist Fabian Society;
2. An editorial from the respected Santa Ana (California)
Hefiister newspaper which quoted various observers (such as
hum anitarian Dr. Albert Schweitzer) on the UN's war in the
Congo; and
3. A comparison of the concept of human rights held by the
UN with that of the Soviet Union by quoting from the proposed
UN Covenant on Human Rights and the 1936 Soviet Constitution.
It waB expected, since the assembly was to be held on the
campus of the University of U tah and co-sponsored by a
division of the university, that the spirit of academic freedom
would prevail sufficiently to assure that each of the fourteen
hundred Model UN delegates received a set of the informative
flyers.
The two-day gathering was scheduled to convene on April
19th. On April 15th, an officer of the CIC called an assistant to
the university’s president to request permission to distribute the
flyers. Surprisingly, the Committee was told that it would not
itself be permitted to distribute the literature, nor could anyone
distribute the flyer exposing Jam es Avery Joyce — despite the
fact th a t no errors in the flyer could be cited. It might, the
Committee members were told, be possible for the university to
Model U N — A Case History 175
arrange to have the remaining two flyers distributed to the
students.
On th a t same date, a certified letter was sent to the univer
sity’s acting president, summarizing the earlier phone conversa
tion with his assistant, and asserting:
if you will let us know to whom we should deliver the
literature, we shall be happy to do so, in order th at it may be
passed out to the students. (While we cannot agree th at the article
on Dr. Joyce is of such a nature as to be withheld from the
students, and wish it to be distributed, we shall provide only the
other two items unless you give permission to distribute the Joyce
item.)
Incredibly, the same assistant with whom the CIC officer
had spoken earlier responded now on behalf of the acting
president, asserting in his letter of April 17th:
We feel that it is important to guard the integrity of programs
which are arranged and presented on the campus, and that
circulation of your literature on the campus at this time would be
an infringement of the integrity of the Model United Nations
activity. Therefore, I have been instructed to advise you th a t your
statem ents will not be distributed as you have requested.
This ridiculous response completely ignored the fact that the
CIC had agreed to let the university itself pass out the material,
and th a t such distribution could easily have been accomplished
following adjournment of the assembly as the students de
parted the premises. The university spokesman went on to offer
the CIC a forum to present its views on the campuB a t some
future date. Hut such an offer was meaningless, since the
Model UN delegates would not be in attendance a t such a
forum.
Totally dissatisfied with the university’s cavalier reply, a
delegation from the CIC arranged to meet a t the state capitol
with Utah Secretary of S tate Lamont Toronto. Mr. Toronto, a
courageous and principled public servant, was also serving as
176 77i«* U n tie d Nuliott* Conspiracy
acting governor of Utah at the time, in the absence of Governor
George D. Clyde. He was also a member of the university’*
Board of Regents.1
Mr. Toronto told the CIC delegation that they hud every
right to diatribute literature during the Model UN, ah long iin it
was carried out in an orderly fashion and did not diiirupL the
proceedings. He cautioned, however, that such distribution
should be term inated promptly if the university authorities
became overtly nasty about it.
Armed with this support from the acting governor, the CIC
went ahead with its plans.
On the evening of April 17th, Dr. James Avery Joyce ap-
]>eared on a talk show broadcast over Salt Lake radio station
KSL. The first caller set the tone for the evening by compelling
Joyce reluctantly to admit to his twenty-five-year membership
in the British Fabian Society. Other callers continued to expose
various aspects of his Far Left background until the “ distin
guished" Englishman exploded with rage at one caller (who had
merely asked how much, if any, tax money was involved in
bringing him to Salt Lake) and branded those opposed to the UN
"crackpots” who should be “locked up.” He then stuffed his
distinguished foot completely into his mouth by claiming:
You |j4m<>ric(m»| aren't doing anything. You’re only helping
yourselves. . . . You owe the rent of the world bo much. You've
lived on the backs of ao m any people. . . . You don’t Beem to
appreciate the fact th at you owe the world a living.
Subsequently, a KSL employee reported th a t the station
received more unfavorable calls regarding Joyce’s embarrassing
nppearance than it had for any other guest they could recall.
Hy the way, th at single-page CIC flyer about Joyce, which so
frightened the university hierarchy, simply supplied back
ground on the Fabian Society from a book highly sympathetic to
the Society (Anne Fremantle’s This Little Band of Prophets).;
noted Dr. Joyce’s membership in the group; and included an
Model UN — A Case History 177
excerpt from the 1961 edition of the World Book Encyclopedia
which simply noted th at the Fabian Society
was named for Quintus Fabius Maximus, a Roman general who
avoided defeat by refusing to fight any decisivq battles against
Hannibal. The Fabians teach that socialism can be achieved
gradually, through a series of reforms. They differ from the
Communists, who believe that the people can gain ownership of
the means of production only through revolution.
The point, of course, is th a t the goals of the Fabians and the
Reds are the same; they differ only on the methods used to
attain those goals. Yet, officials of the Model UN resorted to
outright censorship to keep the Btudents from learning this
important aspect of their keynote speaker’s background.
On the first day of the assembly, CIC members and friends
arrived at the start of festivities, determined to distribute
flyers during a mid-morning or lunch break (in order to avoid
any disruption while the assembly w bh in session). But another
serious problem became immediately evident. The assembly
officials, in violation of federal law, had placed the United
Nations flag superior to the Stars and Stripes. A message
requesting that an adjustm ent be made was delivered by uBher to
the assembly’s president (a “ Liberal” Political Science Profes
sor at the University). Incredibly, the message was ignored,
whereupon two CIC members drove to the state capitol, ex
plained the situation to Acting Governor Toronto, and waited
while he had his secretary photocopy the federal flag code and
type a letter dvmandinn that the United States Flag be properly
and legally displayed. The letter read:
It has come to my attention that the United States Flag is
improperly displayed on the University Campus. It was reported
that the United States Flag is one of many United Nations Hags
displayed before the audience for the assemblies, which is
contrary to Title 36, Section 175, Federal Code Annotated,
attached copy. In all areas within our country, except the United
Nations Premises in New York, the United States Flag should
have the place of honor.
178 The United Nations Connpiracy
Kindly adjust your Hag display* to comply with the Federal
Statutes.
The letter was immediately taken to the campus, handed to
an usher, and delivered to the assembly president. The assembly
was temporarily halted while the United States Flag was prop
erly placed. While the change was in progress, the assembly
president asserted, “ it seems to subvert w hat we are trying to do
here. . . Just what were they trying to do there that would
have been subverted by proper display of the American Flag?
With that m atter taken care of, the CIC cadre began passing
out flyers during a break in the morning’s proceedings. Incred
ibly, the professor who was assembly president called on univer
sity and city police to stop the distribution!
So literature critical of the UN was suppressed. Once again,
the UN crowd had brought students through a Model UN session
unscathed by a balanced view of the world body. Yet, in a sense,
it was a victory for those who had worked so hard to give
students the other side. The police-state tactics used by the
Model UN authoritarians, the Flag incident, and the antics of
Dr. Joyce combined to raise serious and widespread questions
about the Model UN.
The controversy spread across state lines when a summary of
the key events in a daily Idaho newspaper was reprinted in the
Santa Ana Register for May 8, 1963. Referring to what it called
“United Nations propaganda with a vengeance,” the commen
tary included an account of Dr. Joyce’s radio outburst, the Flag
fiasco, and the assembly professor-president’s “seems to sub
vert what we are trying to do” faux pas. It concluded: “If we’re
at all concerned — as, certainly, we very well may be — we’ll be
giving some pretty serious consideration to the question of what,
indeed, they were ‘trying to do’ there.”
As a postscript, the CIC wrote to the acting president of the
university on May 3, 1963, asserting: “ . . . we will be happy to
arrange for speakers to present our point of view as soon as we
Model U N — A Case History 179
receive written assurance from the Univer&ity that arrange
ments will be made for the same high school students who
attended and participated in this Model U.N . to attend our
presentation.” The letter concluded:
We wish to go on record an believing that any group, be it for ua
or against us, should be allowed to distribute its literature either
before or after any presentation we hold on the campus, or
during intermissions, We will not call out either Salt Lake or
campus police to stop such distribution, and would hope the
University would follow suit.
On May 21st, the dean of the university’s Extension Division
responded: “It is a little late in the year for us to do anything
now," suggesting th at the CIC get in touch “ next school year.’’
Meanwhile the April-May, 1963, issue of The Utah A lum nus,
published by the University of Utah Alumni Association, car
ried a brief article summarizing festivities a t the Model UN.
Totally ignoring the embarrassing incidents we have described,
it simply referred in general terms to the “ antics” of “some
right-wing extremists." Noting th a t “The Model UN operates
just like its big brother on the East River,” the article concludes:
“The world will pay little attention to the decisions made at the
ninth annual Model UN. But U tah’s high school participants
left the campus much wiser in the ways of the world.”
Others left the campus much wiser in the ways of the UN.
Is it any wonder that so many Americans are coming to view
the United Nations as a serious form of heir pollution?
Chapter 21
Out Of Site!
The decision to base the United Nations in New York City
was greatly influenced by the Soviet Union, which obviously
recognized the enormouB value of having such a potential Trojan
Horse located within the borders of its chief adversary. Accord
ing to former UN Secretary-General Trygve Lie:
As the Headquarter* battle got under way in London. . . . The
Russians disappointed meet Western Europeans by coining out at
once for a site in America.
. . . Andrei Gromyko of the U.S.S.R. had come out flatly
for the United Statei. As to where in the United States, let the
American Government decide, he had blandly told his colleagues.
Later the Soviet Union modified its stand to support the east
coast.1
The final decision b b to the exact site for the perm anent UN
headquarters was taken on December 14, 1946. “The dram atic
offer of Mr. .John I). Rockefeller, J r.,” wrote Leland Goodrich
and tidvard Hambro, “of the B um of $8,500,000 for the purpose
of acquiring a tract of land in the City of New York along the
182 The Unitvd Nittton* <'on*/>inn y
East River, between 42nd and 48th Streets led to the ndoplion of
the preferred New York site.” 2 And Thomnn J. Hamilton (t'KIO
added: “ . . .th e United States made an intercut-1r«i< Iomii ol
$65,000,000 to paylor the building.
In all essentials, the seat of the United Nation* In it Mule
within a state. According to Louis Dolivet:
The United States has no jurisdiction. No reprosrntnliv# ol
adm inistrative, judicial, military, or police authority of the
United States may enter that zone without permission ol the
Secretary-General. In short: as long as the seat of the llnltml
Nations remains within the United States, the area occupied by
the United Nations is considered as extra territorial with full
diplomatic privileges and immunities.4
There i8 evidence that it is all blatantly illegal.
On March 15, 1967 an executive session of the Sunnt*
Internal Security Subcommittee heard testimony regarding the*
status of the United Nations Headquarters Agreement. Th»*
testimony was released from its secrecy injunction on November
29 and published on December 11 of that year.11
This hearing is very im portant indeed, for it presents a strong
case th a t the United Nations Headquarters Agreement does not
even exist. If th at is the case, the presence of the United
Nations in New York City is illegal.
Testimony was given by the Subcommittee’s Chief Counsel,
J.G. Sourwine, who confirmed th a t the controversial site agree
ment grants to the UN the right to act, in effect, as a sovereign
nation within the boundaries of the United States. The problem
is, however, th at the UN Headquarters Agreement approved by
the General Assembly of the United Nations is not the same
agreement as the one approved by the Congress of the United
States. Following are the chronological details:
On December 14, 1946, the General Assembly authorized the
Socretary-General to negotiate the Headquarters Agreement. A
draft agreement was signed by the Secretary-General and our
Secretary of State on June 26, 1947, and sent by President
Truman to the Congress for approval on July 2.
Out Of S ite! 183
On July 3, a Jo in t Resolution incorporating the draft agree
ment was introduced in the Senate. It was favorably reported by
the Foreign Relations Committee with an amendment on July 14
and passed by the Senate three days later.
On July 26, the House of Representatives passed the Joint
Resolution after accepting the Senate amendment (which was
designed to protect our immigration laws) and adding its own
amendment to protect the right of this country to safeguard its
own security. The Senate passed the amended measure on the
same day, and on August 4, 1947, the Resolution was signed by
President Truman and became Public Law 367 of the 80th U.S.
Congress.
On October 17, a subcommittee of the UN’s Sixth Committee
issued a report th a t officially transm itted the m atter to the
General Assembly. However, the agreement that was trans
mitted by the report was not the amended agreement th a t the
U.S. Congress had approved: It was the original draft of June
26, 1947. On October 31 of that year the General Assembly
approved the June ‘26 agreement and authorized the Secretary-
General to bring it into effect. In other words, the General
Assembly approved a Headquarters Agreement that did not
include the congressional reservations of Public Law 367. As
Chief Counsel Sourwine expressed it a t the conclusion of his
testimony:
In the absence o f . . . phony rationalization, it is impossible
to point to one single document constituting a United Nation*
Headquarters Agreement which has been legally assented to by
vote of the United Nations General Assembly and the Congress
of the United StHtes, and by any other effective and fully
authorized actions of representatives of both parties. The only
possible conclusion is that there is no United Nations H ead
quarters Agreement.'
On December 12, 1967, the State Departm ent attem pted to
rebut Mr. Sourwine’s explosive (and meticulously documented)
testimony by claiming that an exchange of notes (dated Novem
184 The United Nations Conspiracy
ber 21, 1947) between our Ambassador to the UN (Warren
Austin) and the Secretary-General (Trygve Lie) was sufficient
to validate the UN Headquarters Agreement. But, on December
13th, Senator Strom 'rhurmond (R.-South Carolina) pointed out
th a t the exchange of notes in 1947 actually “offers some of the
most convincing proof that the U.N. never accepted the terms
of Public Law 357.” 7 The Senator entered the complete texts of
both notes into the Congressional Record, and the notes do
indeed confirm th a t the United Nations did accept a different
Headquarters Agreement than that which was passed and au
thorized by the Congress of the United States.
As Senator Thurmond suggested during a Senate speech two
days earlier:
It is intolerable for the United Nations to be occupying its
present site within U.S. territory without the proper legal arrange
ments. If the State Department cannot make the U.N. submit to
our conditions, then the U.N. itself should seek a site in another
part of the world.*
The saga of the Site Agreement stands as yet another tribute
to the essential lawlessness of the United Nations clique.
Chapter 22
Get US Out?
There iB no provision in the UN Charter th a t permits member
nations to withdraw from the organization. Neither, on the other
hand, is there a provision requiring them to stay. When the
Charter was in the draft stage, the only amendment offered on
the subject would have precluded withdrawal. It was defeated.1
Nevertheless, the Committee handling the m atter included in its
report the following clarifying statem ent, with which the U.S.
delegation concurred, and which was eventually adopted at the
San Francisco Conference:
The Committee adopts the view th a t the Charter should not
make ex pres* provision either to perm it or to prohibit withdrawal
from the Organization. . . . If, however, a Member because of
exceptional circumstances feels constrained to withdraw, and
leave the burden of maintaining international peace and security
on the other Members, it is not the purpose of the Organization
to compel that Member to continue its cooperation in the Organi
zation^
It is obvious, particularly, th a t withdrawals or some other
forms of dissolution of the Organization would become inevita
18« The United Nations Conspiracy
ble if, deceiving the hope* of humanity, the Organization wan re
vealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the
expense of law and justice.8
During the Sehate hearings on the Charter, Foreign Relations
Committee Chairman Tom Connally (D-Texas) questioned Dr.
l<eo Pasvolsky (CFR), Special Assistant to the Secretary of
S tate for International Organization and Security Affairs,
about the m atter:
The C hairm an. Let me aak you a question right there: la it not
true th at there iB no application required if a nation desires to
withdraw? Moreover, there is no specific procedure to be fol
lowed. The theory of the whole withdrawal proposal, as I under
stood it, waH that the nation affected would have to be the judge
of the circumstances which it claimed had altered its position,
and the penalty would be simply a mobilization of world opinion
as to whether its cause was a ju st one or an unjust one.
Mr. Pasvolsky. T h a t is quite right.
Mr. C hairm an. And that there was no compulsive power to
keep a nation within the League if it desired to withdraw?
Mr. Paivolaky. T h a t is right.
Mr. C hairm an. It was simply a question of leaving the world
to judge whether they had adequate causes for withdrawal. They
were the one*, however, to determine whether or not their circum
stances hud so changed as to make withdrawal justifiable.
Mr. Pasvolsky. T h a t is right.1
Pasvolsky later re-emphasized this crucial point under inter
rogation by Senator W alter F. George (D-Georgia):
S en ato r George. Then, Doctor, is it your answer that the
Member state has an absolute right to withdraw?
Mr. Pasvolsky. Yes, Senator.
S en ato r (ieorge. Absolute?
Mr. Pasvolsky. Yes.
S en ato r George. Unqualified?
Mr. Paavolsky. Yes.4
Get US Out? 187
Further along in the hearings, the following exchange oc
curred between Senator Wallace H. White, Jr. (R-Maine) and
the State D epartm ent’s Legal Advisor, Green H. Hackworth:
Senator W hite. Mr. Chairman, I did aBk a question some time
back as to whether there were any precedents for a treaty which
had no definite time of life stated in it or which made no
provision for either denunciation or withdrawal of parties to the
treaty. I thought if there were such precedents it might be well to
have somewhere in the record a reference to them.
M r. H ackw orth. There are, Senator White, certain precedents
of th at kind. Some of the old treaties with France, the 1778
treaty, for example, contained no provision for termination.
Congress by an act of July 7, 1798, declared the treaty to be no
longer obligatory on the ground th a t France had repeatedly
violated it.
It is a general rule that where one of the parties to a treaty
violates it, th e other party has a right to regard it as term inated.9
T hat the State Department considers the Soviets to have
violated the UN Charter is a m atter of public record, as
indicated by th iB notation by the D epartm ent’s Assistant Legal
Advisor for T reaty Affairs:
Charter of the United Nations, signed a t San Francisco, June
26, 1945. (TS 99U). (Comment: It is considered th a t the Soviet
Union ha» violated various terms of this charter.)*
Some UN advocates have argued th a t there is no legal way
for the United States to withdraw from the United Nations. To
the contrary, as we have seen, both legislative history and legal
precedent are solidly on the side of the expanding body of
Americans who favor such withdrawal.
Chapter 23
Get US out!
Turtle Bay is the New York City neighborhood in which UN
headquarters is located. Several skirmishes during the American
Revolution were fought in the area, and American patriot
Nathan Hale (“I only regret that 1 have but one life to lose for
my country.” ) was hanged by the British near the corner of 46th
Street and First Avenue. Today, th a t is the site of the offices
of The Inter Dependent, official publication of the United
Nations Association of the USA.1
T hat historical sidelight Heems somewhat symbolic of the
relationship between the United S tates and the UN since 1945.
An honestly intended federation of nations, united for the
legitimate purpose of increasing the freedom of individuals,
goods, and cultures to cross national boundaries, and to decrease
governmental restrictions on individuals, is something most
Americans could support wholeheartedly, for it would be in line
with Richard Cobden’s penetrating observation that ‘‘peace will
come to this earth when her peoples have as much as possible to
do with each other; their governments the least possible."8
UK) The United Nation« Connpiracy
Withdrawal from the UN would not mean a retreat into n o *
ciillt'd "isolation," anymore than absence of the UN prior to
IlMf) meant we were "iHolated," As Robert White and H.L. Imel
have noted:
. . . we had developed many international tie* by 1946 and
curlier. A* individuals, American* had long maintained social and
cultural contact* with people all over the world. More than 400
nongovernment organizations such as Rotary International, the
Y.M.C.A., the Olympic Games organization*, and many other*
N erve to create good will and to act as a force in international
relations. International business and trade grew. By 1945 Ameri
cans had invested more than 13 billion dollars in foreign nations.3
At th at time we were far more admired and respected than we
are after nearly four decades of doing things the UN way. An
columnist Henry J. Taylor once observed, UN diplomacy “ is like
a man walking in the woods who Btopped when he saw a snake. It
turned out to be a stick. But the stick he picked up to kill it with
turned out to be a snake."4
It iB sometimes argued that so-called “ global” mechanisms
are needed to'handle global problems. T hat is the premise, for
example, of Professor Richard G ardner’s ten-point scenario
described in Chapter Twelve. Another prominent International
ist, C. Maxwell Stanley, President of the rabidly pro-UN Stan
ley Foundation, has claimed:
No business would seek to solve country-wide problems in it*
branch offices. Nor does the United States solve it* national
problems at the state level. The need for global mechanisms is
supported both by logic and by the fact th a t nation states have
not found lasting resolution* to global problems.5
W hat nonsense! Of course nation states have not found
laHting resolutions to global problems. They haven’t even found
laHting resolutions to national problems! Within the United
States, our federal government has actually created and/or
sustained most national problems by usurping increasing power
Get US out! 191
and authority allegedly to “solve" them. Governments don't
solve problems; they create them . People can solve problems —
if they are let alone by government. There is absolutely no basis
for believing that huge government entities at the international
level can solve “global” problems any better than big national
governments have "solved" such problems as rocketing infla
tion, depressing unemployment, oppressive regulation, and bur
densome taxation.
Other UN supporters argue th at it is in our national interest
to have the organization’s headquarters situated in New York
City. Representative Edward J. Derwinski (R-IUinois), for in
stance, hatt claimed:
The exposure of United Nations delegates and staff to the
atmosphere of freedom and democracy th at prevails in the
United States offers a rare opportunity for the United States to
exert a positive influence on the attitudes of those delegates.
Hopefully, this will result in the development of free institutions
around the world.1
Again — sheer nonsense! We have (thank goodness) a free
press in this country. Unfortunately, most emphasis by the
media is on the nation’s warts and moles, not on its many
positive aspects. United Nations delegates in New York have not
been exposed to the good points of America in recent years.
They have instead been inundated with W atergate, attacks
against our FBI and CIA, public exposure of the immoral
behavior of a few Members of Congress and many occupants
of the Carter White House, and other depressing revelations too
numerous to mention. All of this was amidst speculation th at
New York City may itself face outright bankruptcy.
The view of our country from Turtle Bay is horribly jau n
diced, and hardly calculated to affect UN delegates in the
manner desired by Congressman Derwinski.
Still other UN apologists argue, as does Jam es J. Wadsworth
(CFR), th a t abandoning the UN would leave the field of
struggle to the enemy. Wadsworth claims: "If the United States
192 The United Nations Conspiracy
should withdraw from the United Nations, the Soviet Union
would then be the most powerful country in the organization
and, therefore, in command of the field.”1
This incredible logic implies th a t if the United StateB stays in
the UN, it will remain the most powerful country and therefore
“ in command of the field.” Since when have we “commanded
the field” in the UN? If we leave, the Soviets would a t best have
“ command” of a disjointed nonentity th a t they (instead of us)
would have to finance. It would be their white elephant, and
would likely leave the Soviets with the alternative of getting out
themselves or collapsing financially. It is yet another reason why
United States withdrawal from the UN would be one of the
most significant anti-Communist actions we could take.
Then, there are those who insist that we stay in the UN for
the sake of the alleged good done by the specialized agencies.
Withdrawal from the primary UN political apparatus (the
General Assembly and Security Council) would still leave us the
option of supporting various specialized agencies should we
desire to do so. There would be nothing, for example, to stop us
from financing the training of witch doctors through the World
Health Organization:
Witch doctors and other traditional myitica play a crucial role
in looking after the sick in much of the developing world, and
should get more encouragement from the medical profession. So
says the World Health Organization (WHO), the UN agency
which fights disease around the world. Since these healers form
the basic corps of primary health workers for about 90 percent of
the rural population of th e third world, WHO believes th a t they
should be given supplementary health training.'
Or, we can continue to assist UNESCO in producing such
historically enlightening publications as the one th a t aimed a t
acquainting the public "with one of the major social triumphs
of our day, namely, the way in which the problem of national
ities has been solved in the Soviet Union.” According to the
UNESCO booklet:
Get US o u t! 193
It was the Communist Party which showed the peoples of
Russia the way to free themselves from social and national
oppression. . . .
Only the October Revolution made it possible to liquidate the
system of oppression of minorities and give equal political rights
to all the nationalities and all the races of the USSR. . . .
The Soviet Union is a brotherhood of free and equal peoples
comprising 15 sovereign Soviet republics in voluntary association
on a footing of complete equality. . . . Each of them embodies
the collective will of its people and can decide ita own future in
entire freedom. . . .
In 1940, the Soviet regime was restored in the Baltic Republics
(Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), which voluntarily joined the
Union.*
We could also contribute independently to UNICEF, ade
quately preparing it to assist the next Marxist enemy with whom
we may become militarily engaged.
The point is simply th a t the first order of business —
dissolving our financial and political ties to the Security Council
and General Assembly — is largely unrelated to action that
might (or might not) be taken against this or th a t specialized
agency. No longer can the alleged good accomplished by such
agencies be used as the excuse to justify our continuing partici
pation in the UN’s political mischief.
Author Marya Mannes, a former staff writer for the Leftist
magazine, The Reporter, once wrote sarcastically:
In the literature of the American far right, the UN is nothing
less than the tool of communism and nothing more than an
assemblage of knaves, gabbing their way through interminable
debates in elegant surroundings at the expense of the heaviest
taxpayer, Mr. American.10
Precisely! The only significant flaw in that statem ent is the
implication that such a view is held by only a few on the so-
called “Far Right,” when in fact Americans from all walks of
life are now reaching the same conclusions. Secretary of State
Dean Acheson (CFR), hardly a “ Far Rightist,” devoted an entire
194 T he unuea nations conspiracy
career to promoting the interests and policies of the UN, only to
acknowledge in 1970: “ I never thought the United Nations was
worth a damn. To a lot of people it was a Holy Grail, and those
who set store by it had the misfortune to believe their own
bunk.” "
Ralph Bunche (CFR), who promoted “ brotherhood" at the
UN for years, later confided: “There are a hell of a lot of
people in the world — black and white that I wouldn’t want even
as distant cousins, much less as brothers.” 13
Even “ Liberal” Senator Robert Packwood (R-Oregon) has
expressed the belief that “ The United Nations has shown th a t it
does not take itself seriously as a body designed to try to keep
world peace, let alone world morality, and I think the time has
come when we can well ask the question: Does this nation any
longer belong in that body?” 13
Meanwhile Senator William L. Langer (R-North Dakota) had
told his Senate colleagues as early as July 28, 1945, th a t he could
not vote for the UN Charter because “I believe it is fraught with
danger to the American people, and to American institutions.” 14
He was right, but only one of hiB colleagues paid attention and
joined him in voting “ N ay.” With many years of UN history aB a
guide, another U.S. Senator, Barry Goldwater (R-Arizona), has
advised:
. . . the time has come to recognize the United Nations for the
anti-American, anti-freedom organization th a t it has become.
The time has come for ua to cut off all financial help, withdraw
as a member, and ask the United Nations to find a headquarters
location outside the United States that is more in keeping with the
philosophy of the majority of voting members, someplace like
Moscow or Peking.11
During an address at the University of Wisconsin on July 14,
1975, then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (CFR) asserted:
“ Dag HammarskjOld once predicted that the day would come
when people would see the United Nations for w hat it really
Get US out! 196
is. .' . .” 16 It has been the purpose of this overview to hasten that
day.
Lord Acton once observed: “Power tends to corrupt and
absolute power corrupts absolutely.”17 Nowhere does power tend
to become so concentrated, all-pervasive, and absolute as in
government. The bigger the government — as measured by the
taxes it collects, the land it owns, the people it employs, the
citizens dependent on it, and the regulations it imposes — the
more the corruption. The biggest of all governments would be,
of course, an economically collectivist world government, with
sufficient military power to coerce the earth's population to do
its will.
The United Nations, as its founders intended, is on its way to
becoming such a world government. We are confronted with the
basic choice of either getting out or going under. Ab one of 0.
Henry’s timeless characters put it, in a somewhat different
context, “ it is a rat trap, and you, madam and sir and all of us,
are in it.” 18
Let’s get out!
Chapter 24
United Nations Update*
O n J anuary 30,1981, the United Nations Postal Administra
tion issued a set of three stam ps commemorating the "Inalien
able Rights of the Palestinian People.” The political force
behind the stam p project was the Committee on the Exercise of
the Inalienable Rights of the Palestinian People (C.E.I.R.P.P.),
a U.N. outfit spawned by a Resolution adopted by the General
Assembly on November 10,1976. According to Facta On File, that
Resolution was “drafted by” the terrorist Palestine Liberation
Organization (P.L.O.). Congressman Hamilton Fish Jr. (R.-New
York) recently noted th a t the C.E.I.R.P.P. "is merely a front in
•Thl» chapter originally appeared a* "T H E U.N.: T erro riiti From Arafat to
Zimbabwe" in American Opinion magazine for May, 1981.
198 The United Nations Conapiracy
the United Nations for the Palestine Liberation Organization.”
And the new U.N. stam p series is at once a propaganda effort
on behalf of the P.L.O. and yet another example of how the
U.N. consistently glorifies and promotes the cause of inter
national terrorists.
In the whole field of internal security the main threat to life
and property is terrorism. A few years ago the Central Intelli
gence Agency revealed th at more than one hundred forty ter
rorist organizations, from some fifty countries on four conti
nents, were now linked together to comprise a formidable
international terrorist network. And a State Departm ent sum
mary of the problem released in December of last year reported:
“ From January 1968 to October 1980, there have been more than
7,300 international terrorist incidents. Of these, 2,700 [thirty-
seven percent] were directed a t US citizens or installations.
During the same period, 173 Americans were killed and 970
wounded.”
Most terrorist attacks have in recent years fallen into five
major categories. While completely up-to-date statistics are not
available, those at hand are sufficient to indicate the nature
and scope of the terrorism problem.
Assassinations: According to the C.I.A., there were 283 inci
dents of terrorist assassination between 1968 and 1979, resulting
in the deaths of 366 victims. Approximately eighty percent of
all such assassination attem pts result in the death of the in
tended victim(s).
S kyjackings: Between January 1970 and November 1977
there were seventy-two terrorist skyjacking incidents which
resulted in thirty-seven hostage deaths and fifteen woundings.
Eventually, 1,707 hostages were released, 361 were rescued, and
eighteen managed to escape.
K idnappings: During th at same eight-year tim e frame there
were 347 kidnapping incidents which resulted in death for 133
victims. (Forty percent of the kidnapping victims were Ameri
cans.) The kidnappings led to the release, as demanded by the
terrorists, of 267 so-called “political prisoners” and the payment
of $146 million in ransom.
United Nations Update 199
S eizure Of F acilities: Between 1968 and 1979 there were 290
incidents of terrorist attacks on, and the seizure of, Buch
facilities as government officeB, banks, and private residences.
As a result, 358 persons were killed, 332 wounded, and 664 held
hostage. M aterial damage to these facilities amounted to
$31,300,000.
B ombings: This most frequent form of terrorist attack
accounts for nearly forty percent of all terrorist operations.
Between 1974 and 1980 there were 1,947 significant terrorist
bombings which took the lives of 1,010 individuals. Nearly half
of those attacks were against U.S. citizens or property.
The days of simple bombings and skyjackingB may soon be
replaced (or a t least supplemented) by such even more repulsive
tactics as bacteriological warfare and the use of small nuclear
devices. Police in Paris, for example, recently perm itted publi
cation of papers seized in an apartm ent occupied by a member
of a terrorist organization who was posing as a student. Among
the documents was a formula for introducing lethal germs into
a city’s water supply. And other reliable evidence indicated th a t
a team of scientists based in Paris was working to produce a
miniature nuclear weapon. Foreign affairs analyst Hilaire du
Berrier recently drew the attention of his readers to a new
report by French researcher Roland Laurent which, according to
Mr. du Berrier, “ contains disclosures so alarming that West
European governments may move to restore the death penalty.
The problem will surface as people learn the full extent to
which terrorists have developed, diversified, and acquired the
most sophisticated arms and methods.” Conceivably, terrorist
tactics of the future will make those of the recent past seem the
equivalent of pillow fightB.
The situation is very serious and fully merits the priority
attention which the Reagan Administration has promised to give
it. During his initial press conference, on January twenty-eighth,
Secretary of State Alexander Haig declared: “International
Terrorism^will take the place of human rights in our concern
because it iB the ultim ate abuse of human rights.” International
200 The United Nations Conspiracy
terrorism, he announced, was “the greatest problem . . . in the
human rights area today.”
If implemented, this policy change will be a welcome suc
cessor to the Carter A dm inistration’s incredible “hum an rights”
ploy — which in practice served as a weapon to destroy human
rights in one pro-Western nation after another. A S tate Depart
m ent summ ary of the Carter Adm inistration’s policy on terror
ism, released during December of last year, asserted at one
point: “ Because of the inhumane character of international
terrorism . . . we have been actively working to com bat terror
ism in all its forms.” Which must have appeared a wry joke to
those victimized by Carter Administration policies which weak
ened and undermined the once-friendly Governments of Iran,
Rhodesia, and Nicaragua, while perm itting millions of U.S. tax
dollars to be channelled to terrorists through our contributions to
the U.N. and other international agencies.
Maybe this is a good place to pause and define th a t term
"terrorism .” The most precise and useful definition we have yet
discovered was offered a few years ago by Representative
Lawrence Patton McDonald (D.-Georgia), one of our nation’s
best-informed authorities on m atters pertaining to internal
security.
Terrorism, wrote McDonald, is "a violent attack on non-
com batants of the community for the purpose of intimidation,
to achieve a political or m ilitary objective.”
That is an excellent description, for it makes clear that the
essence of terrorist activity is the harm inflicted on defenseless
civilian populations. It does not include unconventional (or
guerrilla) warfare directed exclusively at military targets.
The United Nations has been striving off and on for years to
settle on a definition of “terrorism ,” but without success, since
any rational description always proves offensive to the terrorist-
abetting nations which control the world body. The “Liberal”
Boston Globe reported as far back as November 15, 1972: “The
failure by the United Nations to accurately spell out what it
means by the term ‘terrorism’ appears to have stalled any ef
United Nations Update 201
forts by concerned countries to deal with the problem in the
international community. The UN General Assembly’s legal
committee has taken up the issue but so far has been unable to
come up with any concrete definition.”
No meaningful progress has been made bince th at time.
According to a Representative from Syria, in fact, “ the interna
tional community is under legal and moral obligation to promote
the struggle for liberation and to resist any attem pt to depict
this struggle as synonymous with terrorism and illegitimate
violence.”
In the context of the United Nations, one man's terrorism iB
simply another m a n ’B patriotism. It has proved difficult indeed
to entice an organization controlled by foxes to condemn the
ravaging of chickens.
On occasion, the United Nations has itself been an active
participant in what can only be described bb terrorist activity.
The most notorious examples occurred during the U.N .’s war
against the anti-Communist province of Katanga in the Congo
early in the Sixties. So numerous were the atrocities inflicted on
non-com batants by U.N. troops th at the forty-six civilian
doctors in the Katangan capital of Elizabethville prepared a
heavily detailed report fully documenting the U .N .’s bombing
of clearly-marked hospitals, its bazooka attacks on ambulances,
its bayonetting of children and the elderly, etc. Regarding one
such incident, the doctors wrote: “These U.N.O. snipers seemed
to have no other motive of thus killing unexpectedly and
without warning, than to terrorize the civilian population by
shooting a t peaceful citizens, going about their daily occupa
tions, as though they were shooting at clay pipes a t a fair!!!” *
One of the doctors, a former Harvard Fellow who was a
professor of surgery a t the University of Elizabethville, spoke
for his colleagues in a telegram to th e president of the
Harvard Faculty of Medicine:
*The entire report, entitled 46 Angry Men, w ai translated from the French
and wanpubliihed by American Opinion, Belmont, Mauachuaett«0217H in 1962.
(Out of print).
The United Nation* Connpiracy
We urgently request your intervention in order to put a atop to
the killing of civilian coloured and European men and women
and children by U.N. force* — itop — Women have been ahot at
and wounded in their homes, workers in the itreets - stop — Ho
have Red Cross servants — stop — During last two days Jet planes
have been shooting at civilian cars downtown and in the country
— stop — Mortars are systematically shelling residential areas —
stop — For the second time Prince Leopold general African
hospital has been shelled — stop — Please inform academic and
medical world and public opinion and insist on U.N. giving up
such repulsive methods — stop — In name of the 46 civilian
practitioners at Elisabethville.
In his im portant book on the U.N., The Fearful Master, G.
Edward Griffin described one especially revealing — and
revolting — incident. Griffin reports: "A t the height of the UN
attack on Elizabethville, Mr. Georges Olivet, the Swiss interna
tional Red Cross representative there, cabled an appeal to his
Geneva office to persuade the United Nations to stop firing on
Red Cross vehicles. A few days later he disappeared while on a
mercy mission to UN headquarters. It w b b not until eleven days
afterward th at his wrecked ambulance was found. It had been
h it with bazooka rockets and machine-gunned by United N a
tions troops. In an attem pt to conceal the crime, the UN soldiers
had hurriedly buried Mr. Olivet and his two companions in a
shallow grave next to the road."
At first, the U.N. attem pted to blame the European-led
Katangese Army for the atrocity. Later, in the light of irrefuta
ble evidence, it adm itted th a t the vehicle had been struck by
U.N. fire. When the Red Cross asked for an official investiga
tion, the U.N. denied the request.
More th an ninety percent of the buildings bombed by the
U.N . in this conflict were strictly civilian structures with no
possible m ilitary value. The Roman Catholic bishop of Eliza
bethville accused the United Nations of "sacrilegious profan
ities” and revealed th a t itB troops had deliberately destroyed and
looted churches and had brutally m urdered innocent civilians.
And so it went, in one instance after another, as the U.N. waged
its “ peacekeeping operation.”
United Nations Update 203
In its later drive to topple the anti-Com m unist Government
of Rhodesia, the U.N .’s approach was largely economic and
diplomatic rather than m ilitary, although there were instances
where U.N . funds and supplies were channelled to the Patriotic
Front terrorists butchering helpless civilians. Tragically, the
United S tates sided with the U.N., providing one of the clearest
examples yet of th e malevolent influence our association with
the United Nations has had on American foreign policy.
Rhodesia had declared her independence from Great Britain
(in a m anner sim ilar to our own nation’s declaration of two
centuries before) on November 11, 1965. The General Assembly
condemned Rhodesia that same day, and the Security Council
followed suit the day after. On November 20, 1966, the Security
Council formally branded little Rhodesia “ a threat to interna
tional peace and security." It was a ludicrous contention, as
evidenced by the fact that the original version of the condemna
tion Resolution had not contained a finding th a t Rhodesia was a
threat to peace in any way whatsoever. Only when it was pointed
out th at such a finding was necessary before the U.N. could
take action was the desired conclusion inserted — with no
supporting facts — and the Resolution sent on its way.
That Security Council Resolution of November 20, 1965,
called for voluntary sanctions againBt Rhodesia, but it m et with
little success. So, on December 16, 1966, the Council voted to
impose mandatory sanctions. To this day, it stands as the only
time in U.N. history that such sanctions have been applied.
On January 6, 1967, President Lyndon Johnson signed Execu
tive Order 11322, declaring it to be a criminal offense for any
American to engage in the import of a wide range of Rhodesian
products, and severely restricting U.S. exports to th at country.
And on July 29, 1968, President Johnson went even further and
Bigned Executive Order 11419, barring all United States imports
from, and exports to, Rhodesia. Remember th a t this was a t a
time when, despite the Vietnam W ar, our government leaders
were perm itting extensive shipm ents of goodB and m aterial to
the Soviet Union and other Communist countries that were arm-
204 The United Nations Conspiracy
in# the North Vietnamese forceB killing American troops in the
field.
One result of the Rhodesian embargo was to make us increas
ingly dependent on the Soviet Union for chrome, a vital stra
tegic material. The world’s main sources of chrome ore are
Rhodesia and the Soviet Union. Following imposition of sanc
tions against Rhodesia, the Soviet Union greatly increased the
price of its chrome ore, and we were soon paying an outrageous
premium for the privilege of becoming dependent on an enemy
for a material essential to the production of stainless steel and
other high-performance steels and superalloys. It was this
outrageous situation which prompted Senator Harry F. Byrd Jr.
(I.-Virginia) to introduce his famous am endm ent, approved by
Congress in 1971, to perm it the U.S. to im port strategic m ateri
al! from Rhodesia if those materials were also being imported
from Communist nations.
I he Byrd Amendment immediately sent the International
Left into a frenzy because it allowed circumvention of the
United Nations sanctions against Rhodesia which were designed
to turn the country over to the terrorists.
I he Byrd Amendment went into effect on January 1, 1972,
w u h promptly challenged in the courts, and was upheld as
thoroughly Constitutional. A number of unsuccessful attem pts
were made in Congress to repeal the am endm ent between 1972
and 1976. On one such occasion, former Senator Gale McGee
(I).-Wyoming), one of the Senate's most outspoken advocates
ol the United Nations, adm itted: "The central issue is not
chrome from Rhodesia. The central issue is not repealing
something ju st to repeal it. The central issue is, w hat is going to
huppen to the United Nations? It is the United Nations that is on
the line."
In early 1977 a post-W atergate Congress buckled under the
presNure, voted to scrap the Byrd Amendment, and once again
p u t our nation in compliance with the U .N .’s destructive and
intensely immoral boycott of Rhodesia.
Hnally, on April 18, 1980, Rhodesia officially became Zim
babwe after an election in February which established Commu
United Nations Update 205
nist terrorist Robert Mugabe as Prime Minister. At last, the
United Nations and our State Department were satisfied. Red
terrorists were in power.
Again and again we find the U.N. on jthe side of the
terrorists. Since the United Nations C hildrens Fund
(U.N.I.C.E.F.) is the world body’B moet revered and respected
agency, it may come as a shock to m any to learn th at
U.N.I.C.E.F. funds and supplies have time and again gone not
to needy children but to terrorists engaged in committing
atrocities againut such children. During the U .N .’s own terrorist
war against Katanga, for instance, ten million dollars ear
marked for U.N.I.C.E.F. were instead “temporarily" diverted to
finance the war effort. As outlined by former Representative
Richard D. McCarthy (D.-New York), a “ Liberal" advocate of
both the U.N. and U.N.I.C.E.F.:
In 1961, the U.S. G overnm ent allocated $10 million in support
of UNICEF. Prior to actual paym ent, the Secretary General
required emergency funds to carry on U.N. actions in th e Congo.
Acting under U.N. Resolution 1341, authorizing him to borrow
fundB from special accounts, and after consulting with U N IC EF
and the U.S. G overnm ent, th e Secretary G eneral was advanced
the $10 million.
During the Vietnam War as well, U .N .I.C .E.F.’s effortB
consistently favored the Communist side. Colonel Robert D.
Heinl Jr. reported in Human Events for June 7, 1975:
In programs purportedly established "to help children in
In d o -c h in a," th e U nited N ation*' C h ild re n ’* Em ergency
Fund gave ju st sh o rt of tw o -th ird s of its collectio n s to
N orth V ietnam ese or to th e "P ro v isio n a l R evolutionary
Government of South V ietnam ," som etim es confused with
the Vietcong.
T he exact num bers, conceded by a UNICEF' spokesm an,
run as follows: U N IC EF collected and disbursed a to ta l of
$13,649,433 for its In d o ch in a c h ild re n ’* program s. W hile
sm idges of th is cam e from ab ro a d , th e overw helm ing
am ount came out of th e pockets of U.S. taxpayers.
The United Nations Conspiracy
Of this eight-figure turn, $8,976,567 w ent to Com m unist
re c ip ie n ts . . . .
W hile C o m m u n ists were th u s g ettin g 61 p er cen t of
U N IC K K ’s largess, o u r ally, S outh V ietn am , got only
$5,360,707 ____
Did the supplies sent to the Communists reach needy chil
dren? When Colonel Heinl asked a U.N.I.C.E.F. spokesman
about the m atter, he w b b told: “ UNICEF has no way to make
sure the supplies to the Communists got to children. They were
dropped off at the airports and docks and we assume they wore
used as we intended.” It was a ludicrous assum ption, considering
th at some of those supplies, according to Colonel Heinl, in
cluded “trucks, bulldozers, heavy engineer construction equip
m ent, and construction tools and equipm ent.”
In 1970 the U.N.I.C.E.F. Executive Board approved a
$200,000 purchase of cloth, allegedly for clothing to go to North
Vietnamese children. The cloth was purchased from the Soviet
Union, with rubles held by U.N .I.C.E.F., and was allegedly
delivered to North Vietnam by the Soviet Union (not by
U.N.I.C.E.F.) in 1972. Again, no one but the Communists know
if th a t cloth went to children or to Bupport the terrorism against
the South. In most instances U.N.I.C.E.F. insists on controlling
the disbursement of its aid. But, as the Religious News Service
reported in April of 1975, “ UNICEF officials in New York
acknowledge that this has not been the case in their dealings
with the Vietcong, North Vietnam, or the Khmer Rouge rebel
forces in Cambodia. In these areas UNICEF merely arranges for
the types of materials requested by those authorities to be
shipped to Hanoi. From there on the goods go into the field
without any further UNICEF control over it.”
Supplies from U.N.I.C.E.F. also turned up in encampments
of the Patriotic Front terrorists in Rhodesia. In June of 1979,
for example, the Combined Operations H eadquarters in Salis
bury disclosed that terrorists entering the country had been
issued medical combat packs provided by U.N.I.C.E.F. Accord
ing to the Bulawayo Chronicle for June 23, 1979, “ A military
United Nations Update 207
spokesman said a medical pack taken from the body of a dead
terrorist, killed in a recent contact with security forces, con
tained a variety of pharmaceutical products made in Western
Europe, as well as the usual communiBt-made items. He Baid the
labels on the items each bore makers’ names and country of
origin. Each label also clearly bore the name UNICEF.’’ The
dispatch continued:
In M ay last year the U N IC EF ann u al report showed th a t the
organisation w b b providing "aid” to the four Southern Africa
terro rist movements recognised by th e O rganization for African
U nity.
T he report — presented by the organisation’s Executive Direc
tor, Mr. Henry Labouisse — showed th a t U N IC EF as well as
providing cash support for the terrorists, wa* giving w h at the
report described as "hum anitarian aid and social service train in g "
to members of th e terrorist organisations.
A senior officer a t Com bined O perations sa id th a t th e cap
tu red medical kit "w as hardly of th e type th a t a social worker,
dealing with children's ailm ents, would carry.
“ T he contents,” he said, "indicate clearly th a t it was a com bat
p ack."
Yet another example of support by U.N .I.C.E.F. for the
terrorists in Rhodesia surfaced on October 2, 1979, when a
dispatch in London's Daily Telegraph described the results of a
raid by Rhodesian forces on a terrorist encampment in Mozam
bique. Discovered at one point along a half-mile line of trenches
and bunkers was an underground medical dispensary. A reporter
on the scene at the time later wrote th at "Piles of medical
equipm ent from UNICEF . . , \were\ littered throughout the
area.”
In July of 1980, the U.N. M onthly Chronicle reported th a t
U.N.I.C.E.F. had recently given approximately $244 million to
such countries as Red China, Communist Ethiopia, Marxist
India, Communist Vietnam, and CommuniBt Zimbabwe. T hat
additional aid to Zimbabwe is especially revealing. As columnist
John F. McManus commented at the time:
208 The United Nations Conspiracy
It* new leader, Robert M ugabe, waged a cold-blooded war on
Rhodesia for a decade. Tens of thouaanda periahed, many of
them women and children who were victim a of aheer terror.
Before U.N. and U.S. preaaurea forced ita demise, Rhodeaia’a
government preaented conclusive evidence th a t M ugabe'a m u r
derers were receiving auppliea from U N IC EF, apecifically m edi
cal com bat packs: Rhodeaia never received anything from
UNICEF, b u t now th a t the nation ia Zimbabwe and it ia run by
the m urdering M ugabe, millions of dollars in U N ICEF funds will
be delivered.
T hat is something to keep in mind next Halloween when the
“ trick or treaters” come calling a t your door for U.N.I.C.E.F.
Still another terrorist gang receiving assistance from the
United Nations is the South West African Peoples Organization
(S.W.A.P.O.), whose goal is the wresting of control over N am i
bia (South West Africa) from South Africa. According to a
detailed background paper on S.W.A.P.O. prepared in 1979 by
London's Foreign Affairs Research Institute:
T he U nited N ations Commissioner for N am ibia, his three of-
ficea in New York, Luanda and Botawana, the UN Council for
N am ibia, the UN fund for N am ibia and th e UN approved In sti
tu te for N am ibia are all organizations which co-operate closely
with SW APO as th e ‘aole and au th en tic representative of th e
N am ibian P eople.’* All are bodiea in receipt of generous funds
from th e UN budget. T he UN Com mission for Refugees and th e
Economic and Social Council’s U nited N ations D evelopm ent
Program m e are other organisations providing “hum anitarian a id ”
on a lavish scale for refugees and others from N am ibia. T h e
U nited N ations Development Program m e (UNDP) provided
$31,500 to SW A PO for "education an d training in th e field of
public inform ation” during the year 1976-1977. It has also p ro
vided $151,000 in general education assistance to SW APO w ithin
Angola.
'Elsewhere, the K.A.R.l. report asserta: “Despite its [S', W A P . O. ‘s| lack of
military success, incessant lobbying at the United Nations resulted in the
astonishing decision | by the General Ansembly] to grant it recognition as th e sole
legal representative of the Namibian people despite the known minority nature
of its support."
U nited Nations Update 209
Almost as an aside, the report states: "During the course of
raids by the South African Army on SWAPO bases in Angola
during the summer of 1979, food cartons , . . originating from
the UN’s world food programme were found in the cam ps.”
On October 2, 1978, S.W.A.P.O. president Sam Nujoma told
a meeting of non-aligned nations in New York th at S.W.A.P.O.
shared a common bond of m ilitant comradery and solidarity
with Rhodesia’s terrorist Patriotic Front, the terrorist P.L.O.,
and “other gallant forces of liberation.” Remember, U.S.
taxpayers pay one-fourth of the bill for the U.N. largesse which
finds its way into the hands of such terrorists.
The U.N.’s love affair with the world’s premier terrorist
gang, the P.L.O., is typical. An article in the W inter 1977 issue
of Soldier Of Fortune described “ How U.S. Tax Dollars Pay For
PLO Terrorism” by being passed through “ hum anitarian” U.N.
agencies. Based on eyewitness reports gathered by Michael
Schiff, an investigator who spent eleven days posing as a pro-
P.L.O. journalist, the article declared:
T he U nited N ations Works Relief Agency, which ostensibly
cares for P alestinian refugees in Lebanon, has been effectively
tak en over hy the P alestinian L iberation O rganization (PLO) in
th a t country and is actively involved in guerrilla causes . . . .
A major PLO propaganda production and d istrib u tio n opera
tion is based in UNWRA headquarters in B eirut, and P alestinian
guerrilla employees of UNWRA routinely pass along to th e F atah
organization [of the P. L. 0 . ] reports of Israeli troop m ovem ents
gathered by United N ations truce observers stationed along the
borders.
Millions of dollars in UNWRA funds, originally contributed
by the U nited States for refugee relief, are diverted to pay for
th e in tern ational agency’s activities in support of the P L O .
It seems th a t a P.L.O. official named Ahmad Jada was
assigned to investigator Schiff and readily adm itted to being a
“ full-time employee of the United Nations" while sim ultan
eously Berving as “coordinator for the Fatah, the P.L.O., and the
United Nations” in Beirut, Lebanon. Jad a’s departm ent and one
210 The United Nation* Con*piracy
ollwr, located in the basement of a building in (he U,N.
compound, hhlulled the production of F.L.O. propaganda and
it* distribution throughout the world. When Comrnde Jnda
nakwl Sc hi II whnt pictures he needed to supplement hi* »up-
|iiwmily pro-P.L.O. story, Schiff replied, “ anything th at you
have th at can be good propaganda shots th a t will make the world
■land up." Jada declared, “ Oh we have quite a few of those,"
Ixmsting th a t U.N. photographers "do all our photography for
u n ." ,lnda and a colleague also adm itted, according to Schiff,
tlint "the only funds they have coming in are the funds
allocated by the United States to the United N ationi Works
Kolief Agency." Indeed:
He [Schiff] said he later aaked Ja d a “ if the money in being
u»ed for this, w hat money it being used for the refugeea?"
And he said the fundi are allocated for th e refugee*, b u t they
(the Palestinians working in UNWRA headquarter*) have com
plete control over the fund* in th a t building, to do w ith a* they
*«e fit.
.lada told Schiff th a t they com ider the propaganda operation
to be "m ore im portant toward* th e P alestinian cauae” th an
refugee relief.
The U.N. escalated its public display of affection for the
I'.L.O. in 1974 when Yasir Arafat was invited to address the
(i«innral Assembly on November thirteenth. It was the first time
th a t a representative of any group lacking official U.N. status
had appeared before the Assembly. The next day, Arafat flew
to Communist Cuba for a meeting with Fidel Castro. And, on
the first anniversary of his U.N. speech (November 13, 1976),
A ralat’s A1 Fatah branch of the P.L.O. “ celebrated” by bomb
ing Zion Square in Jerusalem, killing six civilians and injuring
forty-two.
According to Hilaire du Berrier, Arafat’s speaking engage
ment at the U.N. was the “ break th at changed everything for
the Palestine Liberation Organization . . . . since then it has
been going great guns.”
Indeed it has.
United Nations Update 211
On November 8, 1976, the P.L.O. was granted observer status
by the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization.
On November 10, 1976, the General Assembly adopted a
Resolution urging th at the terrorist P.L.O. be invited to partici
pate in all conferences on the Middle East held under U.N.
auspices and asking that Bteps be taken to secure participation
of the P.L.O. in the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle
East. (It was on this same date th a t the General Assembly
adopted its notorious Resolution defining Zionism as “a form
of racism and racial discrimination.” )
On July 22, 1977, the P.L.O. was granted admission to the
U.N. Economic and Social Council’s Economic Commission for
Western Asia. It was the first time th a t a non-nation had been
granted full membership in a U.N. agency.
In October of 1977 the U.N. Civil Aviation Organization
granted observer status to the P.L.O. Although the Palestinians
had no airlines, they were nevertheless given the right to have
representatives a t all meetings where the U.N. discusses moves
to assure air security. Incredibly, the U.N.'s excuse for allowing
the P.L.O. to participate in such closed meetings was th at this
terrorist gang’s experience with air piracy could be helpful in the
search for preventative measures! It is as if the Secret Service
were to invite John W. Hinckley Jr. to advise on protecting the
President. As Hilaire du Berrier commented a t the time, “The
United Nations will learn less from the Palestinians on how to
prevent skyjacking than the Palestinians and their allies will
learn about how to thwart any defensive measures the U.N.
proposes.”
On October 7, 1978, it was announced that the U.N. Secretar
iat was launching a $500,000 publicity campaign to promote
Palestinian rightB and create a moderate image for the P.L.O. in
the United StateB and other Western countries. Scheduled for
inclusion in the propaganda package waa a film, Palestinians Do
Have Rights, in which terrorist leader Arafat was to play a
leading role and be depicted in an entirely positive light. The
2»i! The United Nations Conspiracy
film wan eventually produced by the U.N. Division of Kmlio
mid Visual Services.*
The publicity campaign was timed to reach a peuk on
November 29, 1978, with an observance of the first “ Day <>f
Solidarity with the Palestinian People." The observance, which
was sponsored by the P.L.O.-m anipulated Special Unit on
Palestinian Affairs, concluded with an exhibition sponsored by
the P.L.O. The opening was briefly delayed while U.N. offi
cials arranged to remove two especially embarrassing photo
graphs — one showing Secretary-General Waldheim in conversa
tion with terrorist leader Arafat in 1974, and the other depicting
tinned P.L.O. terrorists.
And, finally, the U.N.-sponsored Mid-Decade Women's
Conference, held in Copenhagen between July 14 and 30, 1980,
adopted without debate an official paper entitled, "Assistance
lo Palestinian Women Inside and Outside the Occupied Territor
ies," with such assistance to be channelled through the terrorist
I*.L.O. Among other things, the P.L.O. was to be authorized to
list’ U.N. funds to "collect and disseminate information and
data about the effects of Israeli occupation on the social and
economic conditions of the Palestinian women and their strug-
for achieving self-determination, right of return, and to
putnhlish their independent state in Palestine."
The point, of course, is th a t the P.L.O, was an almost
universally despised congregation of terrorist thugs, best known
Inr perpetrating such tragedTes as the slaughter of Israeli
athletes during the 1972 Olympics, until it was brought under
the U.N .’s wing. Now, thanks primarily to the million-dollar
U.N. public relations campaign on its behalf, the P.L.O. has
International influence and prestige far surpassing that of
many U.N. member-nations.
'('<>iiKr«M nought to withhold $190,000 of the American (hare of the publicity
(iiini)iiiKn, an well an the $960,000 earmarked for the U.N. Special Unit On
I'ulestinian Righta (which had been established in 1977 over U.S. objection!).
T hr Senate supported the cut, but the S ta te Department eventually persuaded
Cimifremi to be content with a mere (and meaningless) statem ent of protest.
United Nations Update 213
O ne o f the most encouraging developments in the new
Congress was establishment by the Senate of its new Subcom
mittee on Security and Terrorism, to be Chaired by Senator
Jeremiah Denton (R.-Alabama). Senator Denton has announced
that he intends soon to conduct Hearings on matters related to
terrorist activities. Information gathered during those Hearings
will (with a few classified exceptions) be made available to the
public and could prove to be an important educational tool for
us all. Naturally the Far Left has already launched a vigorous
campaign to sabotage the Subcommittee’s efforts.
A similar investigative body is needed in the House. House
Resolution 48, which is currently pending before the House
Rules Committee, would re-establish the House Committee on
Internal Security. ThiB im portant Resolution merits the support
of all who oppose the threat of terrorism.
But w hat about the United Nations? The Senate Security and
Terrorism Subcommittee should definitely include on its agen
da a detailed investigation of the extent to which U.S. contribu
tions to the U.N. are in fact financing the terrorists. And the
Reagan Administration, as part of its anti-terrorism commit
ment, should seriously consider withholding further contribu
tions to the U.N. until the m atter is clarified — even if it means
outright withdrawal from the General Assembly, the Security
Council, and those U.N. agencies which can be shown to be
aiding and abetting terrorism.
In 1959 the Gallup Foil reported th at eighty-Beven percent of
Americans questioned thought the U.N. was doing a good job. By
near the end of last year it was a far different story, as
indicated by the following dispatch from the Salt Lake Tribune
for November 20, 1980:
T he public’s rating of th e U nited N ations’ perform ance has
declined to a 36-year-low. C urrently, only three Am ericans in 10
(31 percent) feel th e U.N. is doing a “ good job” in trying to solve
the problem s it has had to face, while 53 percent feel it is doing a
^ ^poor jo b ." . . .
T he G allup Poll has m easured the p u b lic’s a ttitu d e s tow ard the
2U The United Nations Conspiracy
U .N . since its form ation in 1045 . . . . At no point since then has
satisfaction w ith the overall performance of the world organiza
tion been as low as it is today.
Which simply means th at the more the American people learn
about what the U.N. is actually doing, the less they like it.
Beyond doubt, the slogan ‘‘Get US out!” (of the United N a
tions) iB an idea whose time has come. ■ ■
Appendix A 215
A p p e n d ix A
M em bers of th e A m erican In stitu te of In te rn a tio n a l A ffairs
(merged in 1921 with the Council on Foreign Relations):
H am ilton Fish Armstrong Stanley K. H om beck
George B arr Baker Edward M. House
Ray S tan n a rd Baker Charles P. Howland
T asker H. Bliss Manley 0 . H udson
A rchibald C. Coolidge Douglas Johnson
F. T rubee Davison T.B. K itteredge
Clive Day Thom as W, Lam ont
M artin Egan Robert H. Lord
Raym ond B. Fosdick George Rublee
Edwin F. Gay Jam es Brown S co tt
Louis H. Gray Charles Seymour
Jerom e Green W hitney H. Shepardson
C harles H. Haskins Jam es T . Shotwell
G erard C. Henderson Alonzo E. Taylor
C h ristian A. H erter V anderbilt W ebb
H erb ert Hoover
S ource: A rm strong, H am ilto n Fish, Peace and C o u n te r p e a c e
(New York: H arper & Row, 1971), p. 566.
Appendix B 217
Appendix B
This is a listing of the Officers and Directors of the Council on
Foreign Relations for 1980-81. A com plete m em bership list follows on
pages 218 to 242.
Officers
David Rockefeller Gabriel Hauge
Chairman of the Board Treasurer
W inston Lord John Tem ple Swing
President Vice President and Secretary
D irectors
Term expiring 1981 Lucian W. Pye
W . M ichael B lum enthal David Rockefeller
P hilip L. Geyelin W illiam D. Ruckelshaus
Jam es Hoge M artha R. W allace
H enry A. Kissinger W inston Lord, ex-officio
C. Peter M cColough
W illiam D. Rogers Term expiring 1983
Robert V. Roosa George S. Franklin
M arina v.N . W hitm an Edw ard K. H am ilton
Nicholas deB . K atzenbach
Term expiring 1982 Lane K irkland
G raham T . Allison, Jr, Peter G. Peterson
Richard L. Gelb George P. S hultz
G abriel H auge Stephen Stam as
Theodore M . H esburgh F ranklin H all W illiam s
H onorary Officer*
Jo h n J. M cCloy Frank A ltschul
Honorary Chairman Honorary Secretary
D irecto r* E m e riti
Frank A ltschul Joseph E. Johnson
E lliott V. Bell G rayson Kirk
W illiam A .M . Burden H enry R. Labouisae
A rthur H. D ean Jo h n J . McCloy
Douglas Dillon P hillip D. Reed
W illiam C. Foster C harles M. Spofford
C aryl P. H askins Jo h n H. W illiam*
218 The United Nations Conspirai
A Anderson, Robert 0 .
Angell, Jam es W.
Aaron, D avid L. Angulo, M anuel R.
Abboud, A. Robert Anschuetz, N orbert L.
Abegglen, Jam es C. A nthoine, Robert
Abel, Blie A pter, D avid E.
Abelson, Philip H auge A rm acoft, M ichael H.
Abely, Joseph F., J r. Arm strong, Anne
Abram, Morris B. A rm strong, DeW itt C., Ill
Abramowitz, M orton I. A rm strong, John A.
Abrams, Elliott Arm strong, Willis C.
Abshire, David M. Arnold, M illard W.
Achilles, Theodore C, Aron, A dam M.
Adam, Ray C. A rt, R obert J.
Adams, R uth Salzm an Asher, R obert E.
Adamson, David Aspin, Les
Agee, W illiam M. Assousa, George E.
Agnew, H arold M. A therton, Alfred L., Jr.
Aidinoff, M. Bernard A tkins, C harles Agee
Akins, Ja m es E- Attwood, William
Albert, Ju d ith D. Auspitz, Josiah Lee
Albright, Archie E. A verett, E lliott
A lbright, M adeleine
A lderm an, M ichael H. B
Aldrich, George H.
A lexander, Clifford L., Jr. Bader, W illiam B.
Alexander, Robert J . Bailey, C harles W.
Allan, F. Aley Baird, C harles F.
A llbritton, Joe L. _ _ Baker, H ow ard H., Jr.
Allen, P hilip E. Baker, Ja m e s E.
Allen, R aym ond B. Baker, P au lin e H.
Alley, Ja m e s B. Baldrige, M alcolm
Allison, G raham T . Baldwin, Robert E.
Allison, R ichard C. Baldwin, Robert H.B.
Allport, A lexander W. Bales, C a rter F.
Alpern, A lan N. Ball, D avid George
A ltm an, Roger C. Ball, George W.
Altschul, A rthur G. Ballou, George T.
Altachul, Frank B ancroft, H arding F.
A ndersen, Harold W . Banks, L ouis L.
A nderson, John B. Barber, C harles F.
A nderson, Robert Barber, Joseph
A nderson, Robert B. Barber, P erry 0 ., Jr.
Appendix R 219
Barger, T hom as C. Bell, J . Bowyer
Barghoorn, Frederick C. Bell, T ravers J., Jr.
Barker, R obert R. Bellamy, Carol
Barkin, Solomon Benbow, Terence H.
Barlow, W illiam E. Bennet, Douglas J ., Jr.
Barnds, W illiam J. B ennett, D onald V.
Barnes, H arry G., Jr. Bennett, <J.F,
B arnet, Richard J. B ennett, W. T apley, Jr.
B arnett, A. Doak Benson, Lucy Wilson
B arnett, F rank R. Beplat, T ristan E.
B arnett, R obert W. Berger, P eter L.
Barrand, H arry P., Jr. Berger, S uzanne
B arrett, Edw ard W. Bergold, H arry E ., Jr.
Barron, Deborah Durfee Bergsten, C. Fred
Barrows, Leland Berm an, M aureen R.
Bartholom ew, Reginald Bernstein, R obert L.
B artlett, Joseph W. Berry, Sidney B.
B artlett, T hom as A. Bessie, Sim on M ichael
B artley, Robert L. B etts, Richard K.
Bass, R o b ert P., Jr. Bialer, Seweryn
Bassow, W hitm an Bienen, H enry S.
Bastedo, P h ilip Bienstock, A braham L.
B atkin, A lan R. Bierley, John C.
Bator, F rancis M. Billington, Jam es H.
Bator, P ete r A. Binger, Ja m es H.
B attle, L ucius D. Bingham, Jo n a th a n B.
B aum an, Robert P. Birkelund, John P.
B aum ann, Carol Edler B im baum , Eugene A.
Baxter, R ichard R. Bisnow, M ark C.
Bayne, E dw ard Ashley Bissell, R ichard E.
Beam, Ja c o b D. Bissell, R ichard M ., Jr.
Bean, A therton Black, Cyril E.
Bechtel, S.D . Black, Edw in F.
Becker, E . Lovell Black, Jo seph E.
Beckler, D avid Z. Black, Leon D.
Beem an, R ichard E. Black, Shirley T em ple
Begley, Louis Blackm er, D onald L.M .
Behrm an, Ja ck N. Blake, R obert 0 .
Beim, D avid 0 . Blake, V aughn R. Downey
Beinecke, W illiam S. Blank, S tephen
Bell, D aniel Blechm an, Barry M.
Bell, D avid E. Blendon, R obert J.
Bell, Holley Mack Bliss, R ichard M.
220 The United Nations Conspiracy
Bloch, Henry Sim on Brock, Mitchell
Bloomfield, Lincoln P. Brock, William E ., III
Bl(x>mfield, Richard J, Brock way, George 1’.
Blum, John A. Broda, Frederick C.
B lum enthal, VV. Michael Bromery, Randolph Wilson
Boardm an, H arry Bronfm an, Edgar M.
Boccardi, Louis D. Bronwell, A rthur
Bodine, W illiam W., Jr. Brooke, Kdward W,
BoeHchenstein, William W. Brookhiser, Richard S.
Bogdan, N orhert A. Brooks, Harvey
Boggs, M ichael I). Brooks, John W.
Bohen, Frederick M. Brorby, Melvin
Bolling, L andrum R. Broaa, John A.
Bond, Robert D. Brower, Charles N.
Bonney, J . D ennis Brown, Frederic J.
Bonsai, D udley B. Brown, Harold
Bonsai, Philip W. Brown, Harrison Scott
Bookout, John F. Brown, Irving
Boorman, Howard L. Brown, L. Dean
Borton, Hugh Brown, Lester R.
Bower, Joseph L. Brown, Richard P., Jr,
Bowers, John Z. Brown, Seyom
Bowie, Robert R. Brown, W alter H.
Bowles, C hester Browne, Robert S.
Bowman, Richard C. Bruce, Judith
Boyd, W illiam M,, II B ryant, Ralph C.
B radem as, John Brzezinski, Zbigniew
Bradford, Zeb B., Jr. Buchm an, M ark E.
Bradley, W illiam L. Buckley, W illiam F., Jr.
B radshaw , T hornton F. Bucy, J. Fred, Jr.
B raisted, P aul J. B ullitt, John C.
B ranscom b, Lewis M. Bullock, Hugh
Branson, W illiam H. Bullock, Mary Brown
Bray, Charles, W .r III Bundy, McGeorge
Breck, H enry C. Bundy, William P.
Breck, H enry Reynolds B unker, Carol Laise
B resnan, Jo h n J. B unker, Ellsworth
Brewster, K ingm an B unnell, C. Sterling
B rim m er, Andrew F. B unting, John R.
Brinkley, D avid B urden, William A.M.
Brinkley, George A. Burgess, C arter L.
B rittain , Alfred, III B urns, A rthur F.
B ritten h a m , Raym ond, L. B urns, Jam es MacGregor
Appendix ti 221
B um s, P atrick Owen C ary, Frank T .
B urt, R ichard R. C ary, William L.
Bush, D onald F. Case, Clifford P.
Bushner, Rolland H. Case, E verett N .,
Bussey, D onald S. Case, John C. |
Butcher, Goler Teal Casey, W illiam J.
Butcher, W illard C, C ater, Douglass
Butler, S am uel C. C ates, John M ., Jr.
Butler, W illiam J. C atto, Henry E ., Jr.
Buttenw ieser, B enjam in J. Chace, Jam es
Byrnes, R obert F. Chaikin, Sol Chick
Byrom, Fletcher Challenor, H erschelle
Chancellor, Jo h n
c Chandler, George A.
C hapm an, Jo h n F.
Cabot, Jo h n M. Charpie, R obert A.
Cabot, Louis W. Chase, W. Howard
Cabot, T hom as D. Chayes, A bram J.
Cabrafies, Jos6 A. Chayes, A ntonia H andler
Calder, A lexander, Jr. Cheever, D aniel S.
Califano, Joseph A., Jr. C hen, K im ball C.
Calkins, Hugh Chenery, H ollis B.
Callander, R obert J. C hilds, M arquis W.
Calleo, D avid P. C hittenden, George H.
Campbell, Jo h n C. Chollar, R obert G.
Camps, M iriam C hristopher, R obert C.
Canal, Carlos M ., Jr. Christopher, W arren
Canfield, Cass Chubb, H endon
Canfield, Franklin 0 . Church, E dgar M.
Carey, Hugh L. Cisler, W alker L.
Carey, Ja n e C. Clapp, Priscilla A.
Carey, John Clark, Bronson P.
Carlucci, Frank C. Clark, Dick
Carmichael, W illiam D. Clark, Howard L.
Carnesale, A lbert C lark, K enneth B.
Carroll, J . Speed Clark, Ralph L.
Carroll, M itchell B. Clarke, Jack G.
Carson, C harles W., Jr. Cleveland, H arlan
Carter, Barry E. Cleveland, H arold van B.
Carter, Edw ard W illiam Cleveland, S tanley M.
Carter, Hodding, 111 Clifford, D onald K., Jr.
Carter, Robert L. Cline, Ray S.
Carter, W illiam D. C lurm an, Richard M.
The United Nations Conspiracy
Cochetti, Roger J. Cowles, G ardner
Coffey, Joseph Irving Cowles, Jo h n , Jr.
Cohen, B enjam in J. Cox, Robert G.
Cohen, B enjam in V. Craig, Earl D., Jr.
Cohen, Jerom e Alan Crane, W inthrop M urray
Cohen, Jerom e B. Crassweller, Robert D.
Cohen, Roberta Creel, D ana S.
Cohen, Stephen B. C rittenden, Ann
Cohen, Stephen F. Crocker, C hester A.
Colby, W illiam E. Crook, W illiam H.
Coleman, Jam es E., Jr. Crosby, R alph D.
Coleman, Jam es S. Crowe, W illiam J.
Coleman, W illiam T „ Jr. Crystal, L ester M.
Coles, Jam es Stacy Culver, Jo h n C.
Collado, Emilio G. Cum m ings, Robert L.
Collingwood, Charles C. Cum m iskey, Frank J.
Colwell, K ent G. C unningham , A lexander A.
Combs, Richard E., Jr. Curtis, G erald L.
Conant, Melvin A. Cusick, P ete r
Condon, Joseph F. C utler, Lloyd N.
Cone, Sydney M., Ill C utler, W alter L.
Conlon, Richard P. Cyr, A rthur
Connor, John T.
Connor, John T ., Jr. D
Connor, Joseph E.
Cook, G ary M. Daddario, Em ilio Q.
Cook, Howard A. Dale, W illiam B.
Coolidge, Nicholas J. Dailey, George A.
Coolidge, T .J ., Jr. Dallin, A lexander
Coombs, C harles A. D arlington, Charles F.
Coombs, Philip H. D arm an, Richard G.
Cooney, Joan Ganz Darrell, N orris
Cooper, C harles A. D avant, Ja m e s W.
Cooper, C hester L. Davidson, D aniel I.
Cooper, Franklin S. Davidson, R alph K.
Cooper, R ichard N. Davidson, R alph P.
C opeland, Lam m ot du Pont Davis, Jo h n A.
Costanzo, G.A. Davis, Lynn E.
C ott, Suzanne Davis, N athaniel
C otter, W illiam R. Davison, D aniel P.
C oughran, Tom B. Davison, W. Phillips
Cousins, N orm an Dawkins, P ete r M.
Cowan, L. Gray Dawson, H orace G., Jr.
Appendix B
Day, A rthur R. Dominguez, Jorge 1.
Deagle, Edw in A., Jr. Donahue, Donald J.
D ean, A rthur H. Donahue, Thom as R.
D ean, Jo n ath an Donaldson, William H.
Debevoise, E li W hitney Donnell, Ellsworth
Debevoise, E li W hitney, II Donnell, Jam es C., II
De Borchgrave, Arnaud Donnelly, Harold C.
Debs, Richard A. Donovan, Hedley
D ecter, M idge Doty, P au l M., Jr. ,
De Cubas, Jos6 Douce, W m . C.
Dee, Robert F. Douglas, Paul W.
Dees, Bowen C. Douglass, Robert R.
De Janosi, P eter E. Draper, Theodore
De Kiewiet, C.W. Dreier, Jo h n C.
De Lima, O scar A. Drell, Sidney D.
De Menil, Lois Pattison Drew, E lizabeth
Deming, Frederick L. D rum w right, J.R .
D eM uth, C hristopher C. Dubow, A rthur M.
Denison, R obert J. DuBrul, Stephen M.
Dennison, Charles S. Duffey, Joseph
D ePalm a, Sam uel Duffy, Ja m e s H.
De Rosso, Alphonse Duke, A ngier Biddle
Destler, I.M . D uncan, John C.
Deutch, Jo h n M. Dungan, Ralph A.
D eutch, M ichael J. Durkee, W illiam P.
Devine, C.R. Raoul-Duval, M ichael
Devine, T hom as J. Dyke, N ancy Bearg
DeVries, H enry P.
DeVries, Rim m er E
De W indt, E. M andell
Diaz Alejandro, Carlos F. Eagleburger, Lawrence S.
Dickey, Jo h n Sloan Earle, R alph, II
Dickson, R. Russell, J r. Easum , D onald B.
Diebold, John Eaton, D avid
Diebold, W illiam, Jr. Eaton, Frederick M.
D ietel, W illiam M. Eaton, Leonard J ., Jr.
Dillon, Douglas Eberle, W illiam D.
Dilworth, J . Richardson Eckholm , Erik P.
Dine, T hom as A. E delm an, Albert I.
Dixon, George H. E delm an, Gerald M.
Dodge, Cleveland E. E delstein, Ju liu s C.C.
Doherty, W illiam C., J r . Edgerton, W allace B.
Dolin, Arnold E dw ards, Howard L.
224 The United Nations Conspiracy
Edw ards, Robert H. Ferguson, G lenn W.
Khrlich, Thom as Ferguson, Jam es L.
Kilt*, H erm ann F. Fessenden, H art
K inaudi, Luigi K. Field, Robert E.
K inaudi, Mario Field, W illiam Osgood, Jr,
Kinhorn, Jessica IV Fierce, M ilfred C.
Kliot, Theodore L., Jr. Fifield, Russell H.
Klliott, Byron K. Finger, Seym our M.
Hlliott, Osborn Finkelstein, Lawrence S.
Klliott, Randle Finley, M urray H.
Ellison, K eith P. Finn, Jam es
Ellaberg, Daniel Finney, P au l B.
Ellsw orth, Robert F. Firmage, Edw in B.
Klaon, Robert T. Fisher, A drian S.
Kmbree, Ainslie T. Fisher, P ieter A.
Em eny, Brooks Fisher, R ichard W.
Knders, T hom as Ostrom Fisher, Roger
E nthoven, Alain Fishlow, A lbert
E rb, Guy F. Fitzgerald, E dm und B.
E rbsen, Claude E. FitzG erald, Frances
E rb u ru, Robert F. Fitzgibbons, H arold E.
Estabrook, R obert H. Flanigan, P eter M.
E tzioni, Amitai Fleck, G. P eter
E vans, John C.- Fogg, Joseph G., Ill
Evans, John K. Forrestal, M ichael V.
Ewing, W illiam, Jr. Foster, W illiam C.
E xter, John Fousek, Peter
Fowler, H enry H.
F Fox, D onald T.
Fox, Joseph C.
F abian, Larry L. Fox, M erritt Baker
F airb ank, John King Fox, W illiam T .R .
Fairbanks, Douglas Franck, T hom as M.
Falk, R ichard A. Francke, A lbert, III
Farer, T om J. Frank, Charles R., Jr.
F arm er, Thom as L. Frank, Isaiah
Fascell, D ante B. Frank, R ichard A.
Feer, M ark C. Frankel, F rancine R.
Feiner, Ava S. Frankel, M ax
F eld m an, M ark B. Franklin, George S.
F eldstein, M artin S. Fraser, D onald M.
F enster, Steven R. Frederick, P auline
Ferguson, C, Clyde, Jr. Fredericks, J . W ayne
Appendix H
Freem an, Orville L. Gati, T oby T rister
Frelinghuysen, Peter H.B. Geertz, Clifford
French, Jo h n Geier, Paul E.
Freund, Gerald Geiger, Theodore
Frey, D onald N. Gelb, Leslie H.
Freytag, R ichard A. Gelb, Richard L.
Fribourg, Michel G ell-M ann, M urray
Fried, E dw ard R. George, Alexander L.
Friedm an, Benjamin M. George, W.H. K rom e
Friedm an, Irving S. Geyelin, Henry R.
Friedm an, Paul E. Geyelin, Philip L.
Friele, B erent G iam atti, A. B artlett
Friendly, H enry J. Gibney, Frank B.
Fromkin, David Giffen, Jam es H.
Frye, Alton Gil, P e te r P.
Frye, W illiam R. G ilbert, H.N.
F uerbringer, O tto G ilbert, Jackson B.
Fuller, K eith G ilbert, Jarobin, J r.
Funari, Jo h n Gillespie, S. H azard
Funkhouser, E .N ., Jr. G ilpatric, Roswell L.
Furlaud, Richard M. G ilpin, Robert
Fuzesi, S tephen, Jr. G insburg, David
Fye, P aul M. Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
G insburgh, R obert N.
G Gleysteen, Peter
G loberm an, N orm a
Gaer, Felice D. G lushien, Ruth N.
Gallagher, C harles F. (iodchaux, Frank A., Ill
G allatin, Jam es P. G oekjian, Sam uel V.
Ganoe, C harles S. Gog61, Donald J a y
Gard, R obert G., Jr. G oheen, Robert F.
G ardner, R ichard N. Goldberg, A rthur J .
G arm ent, Leonard Goldberger, M arvin L.
G arm ent, S uzanne Weaver G olden, William T .
G arretson, A lbert H. G oldin, Harrison J.
G art, M u rray J. G oldm an, G uido
G arten, Jeffrey E. G oldm an, M arshall 1.
G arthoff, R aym ond L. G oldm an, M erle
Garvin, C lifton C., J r. G oldm ark, P eter C., Jr.
Garvy, George Goldsborough, Jam es 0 .
Garwin, R ichard L.
Gates, T h o m as S. G om pert, David C.
G ati, C harles Good, Robert C.
226 The United Nations Conspiracy
Goodby, Jam es E. ( Gulliver, Adelaide Cromwell
Goodman, George JiW'. Gunn, Hartford N., Jr.
Goodman, Herbert I. Gurganus, William R.
Goodpaster, Andrew J. Gutfreund, John H.
Good sell, Jam es Nelson Guthman, Edwin O.
Gordon, Albert H. Gwin, Catherine B.
Gordon, Lincoln
Gorman, Paul F. H
Gornick, Alan L.
Gotbaum, Victor Haas, Peter E.
Gousseland, Pierre Haass, Richard N.
Grace, J. Peter Habib, Philip C.
Graff, Robert D, Hadley, Stephen J.
Graham, Katharine Haig, Alexander M., Jr.
Grant, Jam es P. Haight, G. Winthrop
Grant, Stephen A. Halaby, Najeeb E.
Granville, Maurice F. Hale, Roger L.
Graubard, Stephen R. Hale, William E.
Gray, Gordon Haley, John C.
Grayson, Bruns H. Hallett, Douglas L.
Greenberg, Maurice R. Hallingby, Paul, Jr.
Greenberg, Sanford D. Halperin, Morton H.
Greene, James.C. Halsted, Thomas A.
Greene, Jam es R. Hamilton, Charles V.
Greene, Joseph N., Jr. Hamilton, Edward K.
Greene, M argaret L. Hamilton, Fowler
Greenfield, Jam es L. Hamilton, Michael P.
Greenfield, Meg Hansen, Roger D.
Greenhill, Robert F. Hanson, Thor
Greenough, William C. Harari, Maurice
Greenspan, Alan Harding, Harry
Greenwald, Joseph A. Hardy, Randall W.
Greenwood, Ted Hare, Raymond A.
Griffith, Thomas Hargrove, John L.
Griffith, William E. Harpel, James W.
Grohman, Robert T. Harper, Conrad K.
Grose, Peter B. Harper, Paul C., Jr.
Gross, Ernest A. Harriman, W. Averell
Gross, Patrick W. Harris, Irving B.
Grover, Allen Harris, Joseph E.
Groves, Ray J. Harris, Patricia Roberts
Grunwald, Henry A. Harrison, Selig S.
Gullion, Edmund A. Harsch, Joseph C.
Appendix B
Hart, Augustin S. Herzog, Paul M.
Hart, Parker T. Hesburgh, Theodore M.
Hartley, Fred L. Hester, James M.
Hartman, Arthur A. Hewitt, Marilyn Berger
Haskell, Broderick Hewitt, William A.
Haskell, John H.F., Jr. Heyns, Roger W.
Haskins, Caryl P. Hickey, William M.
Hauge, Gabriel Higgins, Robert F.
Hauge, John R. Highet, Keith
Hauser, Rita E. Hillenbrand, M artin J.
Hauser, William L. Hilsman, Roger
Haviland, H. Field, Jr. Hines, Gerald D.
Hawkins, Ashton Hinshaw, Randall
Hayes, Alfred Hinton, Deane R.
Hayes, Samuel P. Hirschman, Albert 0 .
Haynes, Fred Hoagland, Jim
Haynes, Ulric St. C., Jr. Hobby, William P.
Haywood, Oliver G. Hoch, Frank W.
Hazard, John N. Hochschild, Harold K.
Healy, Harold H., Jr. Hochschild, W alter
Heard, Alexander Hodgson, Jam es D.
Heck, Charles B. Hoffman, A. Michael
Heckscher, August Hoffman, Michael L.
Hehir, J. Bryan Hoffmann, Stanley
Heifetz, Elaine F. Hoge, Janies
Heintzen, Harry L. Hoguet, George R.
Heinz, H .J., II Hoguet, Robert L.
Helander, Robert C. Hohenberg, John
Heldring, Frederick Holbrooke, Richard C.
Heilman, F. Warren Holland, Jerome H.
Helms, Richard Holland, Robert C.
Henderson, Julia Hollick, Ann L.
Henderson, Lawrence J., Jr. Holloway, Anne Forrester
Henderson, Loy W. Holmes, Alan R.
Henderson, William Holst, Willem
Henkin, Louis Holt, Pat M.
Hennessy, John M. Homer, Sidney
Henry, John B. Hooks, Benjamin L.
Herling, John Hoopes, Townsend W,
Herring, Robert R. Hoover, Herbert W., Jr.
Herskovits, Jeaji__________ Horan, John J.
Herter, Christian A., Jr. Hormats, Robert I).
Herzfeld, Charles M. Horn, Garfield H.
228 The United Nations Conspiracy
Horowitz, Irving l»ui» Isaacs, Norman E.
Horton, Alan W. Isaacson, Walter
Horton, Philip C. j Iselin, John Jay
Hosmer, Bradley C. Issawi, Charles
Hottelet, Richard C. Istel, Yves-Andr6
Houghton, Amory Izlar, William H., Jr.
Houghton, Amory, .Jr.
Houghton, Arthur A., Jr. J
Houghton, Jam es R.
House, Karen Elliott Jablonski, Wanda
Hovey, Allan, Jr. Jacklin, Nancy P.
Hovey, Graham Jackson, Elmore
Howard, John B. Jackson, Eugene D.
Howell, John I. Jackson, Henry F.
Hoyt, Mont P. Jackson, John H.
Hudson, Manley 0 ., Jr. Jackson, William E.
Huebner, Lee W. Jacobs, Eli S.
Huffington, Roy M. Jacobs, Norman
Hughes, John Jacobson, Harold K.
Hughes, Thomas L. Jacobson, Jerome
Huglin, Henry C. Jaff'e, Sam A.
Huizenga, John W. Jam es, John V.
Hunsberger, Warren S. Jamieson, J.K .
Hunter, Robert E. Janis, Mark W.
Hunter-G ault, Charlayne Janklow, Morton L.
Huntington, Samuel P. Jansen, MariuB B.
Hurewitz, J.C . J as trow, Robert
Hurlock, Jam es B. Javits, Jacob K.
Huyck, Philip M. •Jaworski, Leon
Hyde, Henry B. Jensen, Reuben R.
Hyde, Jam es N. Jessup, Alpheus W.
Hyland, William G. Jessup, Philip C.
Jessup, Philip C., Jr.
I Johnson, Chalmers
Johnson, Harold K.
Ikl«, Fred C. Johnson, Howard W.
Ilchman, Alice S. Johnson, Joseph E.
Inderiurth, Karl F. Johnson, L. Oakley
Ingersoll, Robert S. Johnson, Robbin S.
Inman, B.R. Johnson, W. Thomas, Jr.
Ireland, R.L., III Johnson, Willard R.
Irwin, John N ., II Johnstone, W.H.
Irwin, Wallace, Jr. Jones, David C.
Appendix B
Jones, Gilbert E. Kelly, George Armstrong
Jones, Peter T. Kemp, Geoffrey.
Jones, Reginald H. Kempner, Frederick C.
Jones, Thomas V. Kempner, Maximilian W.
Jordan, Amos A. Kenen, Peter B.
Jordan, Vernon E., Jr. Keniston, Kenneth
Jorden, William J. Kennan, George F.
Josephson, William Kennedy, David M.
Jungers, Frank Kennedy, Roger G.
Junz, Helen B. Kenney, F. Donald
Keohane, Robert 0 .
K Keppel, Francis
Kern, Harry F.
Kahan, Jerome H. Kester, John G.
Kahin, George McT. Keydel, John F.
Kahler, Miles Khuri, Nicola N.
Kahn, Harry Killefer, Tom
Kahn, Herman Kilpatrick, Robert D.
Kaiser, Philip M. Kimmitt, Robert M.
Kaiser, Robert G. King, James E.
Kaiser, Walter J. King, John A., Jr.
Kalb, Marvin Kintner, William R.
Kalicki, Jan H. Kirk, Grayson
Kamarck, Andrew M. Kirkland, Lane »
Kaminer, Peter H. Kissinger, Henry A.
Kanter, Arnold Kitchen, Jeffrey C.
Kaplan, Gilbert E. Klaemer, Curtis M.
Kaplan, Harold Kleiman, Robert
Kaplan, Mark N. Klein, David
Karalekas, Anne Klein, Edward
Karnow, Stanley Klntz, Frank G.
Kassof, Allen H. Knight, Robert Huntington
Katz, Milton Knoppers, Antonie T.
Katzenbach, Nicholas deB. Knowlton, William A.
Kaufman, Henry Knowlton, Winthrop
Kaufmann, William W. Kohler, Foy D.
Kaysen, Carl Kolodziej, Edward A.
Keatley, Anne Koonce, Wayne Allan
Keenan, Edward L. Korb, Lawrence J.
Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr. Korbonski, Andrzej
Kehrl, Howard H. Korry, Edward M.---------
Kelleher, Catherine M. Kotschnig, W alter M.
Keller, George M. Kourides, P. Nicholas
The United Nations Conspiracy
Krunr, I.null Leddy, John M.
KruPinnr, Lillian E. , Lederberg, Joshua
Krwll, JiMnph Lederer, Ivo John
Kmmrr, .litnr Lee, Ernest S.
Kruiixn, l<nwri>nca H. Lee, Jam es E,
Kroltllrr, Robert N, Lee, John M.
Krii|nlit*rK, Paul H. Lee, William L.
K i p | w, Ju a n ita M. Leebaert, Derek
Krlnlipr, Bernard Lefever, Ernest
Krlstul, Irving Leghorn, Richard S.
K ruldrnlrr, David Legvold, Robert H.
Kulilaeh, Jack H. Lehman, John R.
Kurlli, Ja m es K. Lehman, Orin
Lehrer, Jim
Lehrman, Hal
Lehrman, Lewis E.
I^lilmk, Miriam H. Leich, John Foster
I.nlmiilime, Henry R. Leigh, Monroe
I.itcy, Alex S. LeMelle, Tilden J,
Dan M. LeMelle, Wilbert J.
Lnkn, W, Anthony Lemnitzer, Lyman L.
I .nil, Hetty (ioetz Leonard, James F.
l.nmlirlnldoK, Andrea H. Leonard, James G.
I .itiiim, Donald 8 , Leslie, John E.
I .wmnntMgnr, knymond A. Le Sueur, Lawrence E.
Unnmui, Roy, Jr. Levine, Irving R.
I.midry, Lionel Levitas, Mitchel
l 4tnti«r, Paul F. Levy, Marion J., Jr.
Utngimm, David K. Levy, W alter J.
l.itnMipr, Hermit Lewis, Flora
L u l’nlom hara, Joseph Lewis, John P.
I.MpliNtn, I-ewi* H. Lewis, John Wilson
Iwirdy, Nicholas R. Lewis, Samuel W.
Lurry, It. H eath Li, Victor H.
I .nry, Hal H. Lichtblau, John H.
l.m iK w , Alice Young Lieberman, Henry R.
IjttikhulT, Perry Lilienthal, David E.
I jiurenso n , Kriwin Charles Linder, Harold F.
I.nvent hoi, David A. Lindquist, Warren T.
L azarus, R alph Lindsay, Franklin A.
L azarus, Steven Lindsay, George N.
L aliuron, Eugene Lindsay, John V.
I a> Hlond, Richard K „ II Linen, Jam es A.
Appendix B
Linowitz, SolM . Lyford, Joseph P.
Lipper, Kenneth Lyman, Richard W.
Lipscomb, James S. Lynch, Edward S.
Lipscomb, Thomas H. Lynn, James T.
Lipset, Seymour M artin Lynn, Laurence E., Jr.
Lipson, Leon Lyon, E. Wilson
Lissakers, Karin M. Lyon, Roger A.
Little, David Lythcott, George I.
Little, L.K.
Livingston, Robert Gerald M
Locke, Edwin A,, Jr.
Lockwood, John E. McCabe, Thomas B.
Lodal, Jan M. McCarthy, John G.
Lodge, George C, McCarthy, Robert E.
Lodge, Henry Cabot McCloy, John J.
Loeb, Frances Lehman McCloy, John J., II
Loeb, John L. McColough, C. Peter
Loeb, Marshall McCormack, Elizabeth J.
Loft, George McCormick, Brooks
Long, Franklin A. McCracken, Paul W.
Longstreet, Victor M. McDermott, Walsh
Loomis, Henry McDonald, Alonzo L.
Loos, A. William McDonough, William J.
Lord, Charles Edwin McDougal, My res S.
Lord, Winston McFadden, W. Clark, II
Loucks, Harold H. McGee, Gale W.
Lovestone, Jay McGhee, George C.
Lowe, Eugene Y., Jr. McGiffert, David E.
Lowenfeld, Andreas F. McGovern, George S.
Lowenstein, James G. McHenry, Donald F.
Lowenthal, Abraham F. McKee, James W., Jr.
Loy, Frank E. McKeever, Porter
Lubar, Robert A. McKinley, John K.
Luce, Charles F. McKinney, Robert M.
Luck, Edward C. McLean, Sheila Avrin
Luckey, E. Hugh McLin, Jon B.
Ludt, R.E. McNamara, Robert S.
Luers, William H. McNeill, Robert L.
Luke, David L., Ill McPherson, Harry C,, Jr,
Lupfer, Timothy T. McQuade, Lawrence C.
—MacArthur, Douglas, It
Luter, Yvonne MacDonald, Gordon J.
Lyet, J. Paul MacEachron, David W.
232 The United Nations Conspiracy
MacGregor, lan K. Mayer, Gerald M„ Jr,
Maclver, Murdoch Mayer, Lawrence A.
MacLaury, Bruce K.] Maynes, Charles William
Machlup, Fritz Mead, Dana G.
Machold, William F. Meadows, Dennis L.
Macioce, Thomas M. Meagher, Robert F.
Macomber, John D. M ehta, Ved
Macomber, William H. Meister, Irene W.
Macy, Robert M., Jr. Melville, Richard A.
Maged, Mark J. Mendlovitz, Saul H.
Magowan, Peter A. Menke, John R.
Mahoney, Margaret E. Merow, John E.
Malin, Clement B. Meselson, M atthew
Mallery, Richard Messner, William C., Jr.
Malmgren, Harald B. Metcalf, George R.
Maloney, Robert F. M ettler, Ruben F.
Manca, Marie Antoinette Meyer, Albert J .
Mandelbaum, Michael E. Meyer, Charles A.
Manning, Bayless Meyer, Cord, Jr.
Manning, Robert J. Meyer, Edward C,
Mansager, Felix N. Meyer, Herbert E.
Manshel, Warren Demian Meyer, John R.
Marcy, Carl Meyer, Karl E.
Marder, Murrey Meyereon, Adam
Mark, David E. Meyerson, M artin
Marks, Leonard H. Mickelson, Sig
Marmor, Theodore R. Middleton, Drew
Marous, John C. Midgley, Elizabeth
Marron, Donald B. Millard, Mark J.
M arshak, Robert E. Miller, Franklin C.
M arshall, C. Burton Miller, J. Irwin
M artin, David A. Miller, Judith
M artin, Edwin M. Miller, Judith A.
M artin, Malcolm W. Miller, Paul L.
M artin, William McC., Jr. Miller, William G.
M artinuzzi, Leo S., Jr. Miller, William J.
M asten, John E. Mills, Bradford
Mathews, Jessica Tuchman Mladek, Jan V.
Mathews, Michael S. Modami, Fern Gold
M athias, Charles McC., Jr. Model, Leo
M atteson, W'illiam B. Moe, Sherwood G.
Maw, Carlyle E. Molina, Edgar R.
May, E rnest R. Moller, John V., Jr.
Appendix B
Mondale, Walter F. Nachmanoff, Arnold
Monson, Judith H. Nacht, Michael‘L.
Montgomery, Parker G. Nagorski, Zygmunt, Jr.
Moody, William S. Nason, John W.
Moore, John Norton N athan, James A.
Moore, Jonathan N athan, Robert R.
Moore, Maurice T. Neal, Alfred C.
Moore, Paul, Jr. Nelson, Clifford C.
Moose, Richard M . Nelson, Merlin E.
Moran, Theodore H. N eustadt, Richard E.
Morgan, Cecil Newburg, Andr6 W.G.
Morgan, Henry S. Newhouse, John
Morgan, Lee L. Newman, Richard T.
Morgan, Thomas E. Newsom, David D.
Morgenthau, Hans J. Newton, Quigg, Jr.
Morgenthau, Lucinda L. Franks Ney, Edward N.
Morley, Jam es William Nichols, Rodney W.
Morley, Roger H. Nichols, Thomas S.
Morrell, Gene P. Niehuss, John M.
Morris, Grinnell Nielsen, Waldemar A.
Morris, Max K. Nierenberg, William A.
Morrisett, Lloyd N. Nimetz, M atthew
Morse, David A. Nitze, Paul H.
Morse, Edward L. Nolte, Richard H.
Moree, F. Bradford Nooter, Robert H.
Morse, Kenneth P. Norman, William S.
Moses, Alfred H. N'orstad, Lauris
Moyers, Bill Nossiter, Bernard D.
Moynihan, Daniel P. Notestein, Frank W.
Mulford, David C. Novak, Michael
Mulholland, William D. Noyes, Charles Phelps
Muller, Steven Noyes, W. Albert, Jr.
Munger, Edwin S. Nye, Joseph S.
Munroe, George B.
Munroe, Vernon, Jr. 0
Munyan, W inthrop R.
Murphy, Grayson M-P. Oakes, John B.
Murray, Douglas P. Oberdorfer, Don
Muse, Martha Twitchell Odeen, Philip A.
Myers, Anne R. Odom, William E.
Myerson, Bess O'Donnell, Kevin
Oettinger, Anthony G.
N O'Flaherty, J. Daniel
Ogden, Alfred
234 The United Nations Conspiracy
Ogden, W illiamS. Patrick, Hugh T.
O'Keefe, Bernard J. Patterson, Charles J.
Okimoto, Daniel I. Patterson, Ellmore C.
Oksenberg, Michel Patterson, Gardner
Oliver, Covey 'P. Patterson, Hugh B„ Jr.
Olmstead, Cecil J. Patterson, Robert P., Jr.
Olson, Lawrence Pauker, Guy J.
Olson, William C. Paul, Roland A.
Olvey, Lee D. Payne, Samuel B.
O’Malley, Cormac K.H. Pearce, William R.
O'Neill, Michael J. Pearson, John E.
Oppenheimer, Franz M. Peay, T. Michael
Ornstein, Norman Pedersen, Richard F.
Oaborn, George K. Pelgrift, Kathryn C.
Osborne, Richard de J. Pell, Claiborne
Osgood, Robert G. Penfield, James K.
Osmer, M argaret Pennoyer, Robert M.
Osnos, Peter Perera, Guido R.
Ostrander, F. Taylor, Jr. Peretz, Don
Overby, Andrew N. Perkins, JameB A.
Owen, Henry Perkins, Roswell B.
Oxman, Stephen A. Perle, Richard N.
Oxnam, Robert Bromley Perlm utter, Amos
Perry, Hart
P Petersen, Donald E.
Petersen, Gustav H.
Packard, George R. Petersen, Howard C.
Paffrath, Leslie Peterson, Peter G.
Page, Howard W. Peterson, Rudolph A.
Page, John H. Petschek, Stephen R.
Page, W alter H. Petty, John R.
PaiB, Abraham Pfaff, William W., Ill
Paley, William S. Pfaltzgraff, Robert L., Jr.
Palm, Gregory K. Pfeiffer, Jane Cahill
Palmer, Norman D. Pfeiffer, Ralph A., Jr.
Palmer, Ronald D. Pfeiffer, Steven B.
Palmieri, Victor H. Phillips, Christopher H.
Panofsky, Wolfgang K.H. Phillips, Russell A„ Jr.
Park, Richard L. Phleger, Herman
Parker, Daniel Picker, Harvey
Parker, M aynard Picker, Jean
Parsky, Gerald L. Pickering, Thomas R.
Passin, Herbert Piel, Gerard
Appendix H
Pierce, William C. Pugh, Richard C.
Piercy, George T. Pulling, Edward
Pierotti, Roland Pursley, Robert E.
Pierre, Andrew J, Pusey, Nathan M.
Pifer, Alan Pustay, John S.
Pigott, Charles M. Putnam, George E., Jr.
Pilliod, Charles J., Jr. Pye, Lucian W.
Pincus, Lionel 1.
Pincus, W alter H. Q
Pino, John A.
Pipes, Daniel Quandt, William H.
Pipes, Richard E. Quester, George H.
Pippitt, Robert M. Quigg, Philip W.
Place, John B.M. Quigley, Leonard V.
Plank, John N.
Platig, E. Raymond R
Platt, Jonas M.
Platt, Nicholas Rabb, Maxwell M.
Platten, Donald C. Rabi, Isidor 1.
Plimpton, Calvin H. Rabinowitch, Victor
Plimpton, Francis T.P. Rad way, Laurence I.
Podhoretz, Norman Ramsey, Douglas K.
Pogue, L. Welch Ranis, Gustav
Polk, William R. Rashish, Myer
Pollack, Gerald A. Rather, Dan
Polsby, Nelson W. Rathjens, George W.
Pool, Ithiel DeSola Rattner, Steven L.
Poor, J. Sheppard Ravenal, Earl C.
Portes, Richard D. Ravenholt, Albert
Posner, Michael H. Raveson, Thomas J.
Posvar, Wesley W. Rawson, Merle R.
Potter, Robert S. Raymond, David A.
Power, Philip H. Raymond, Jack
Power, Thom as F„ Jr. Read, Benjamin H.
Powers, .Joshua B. Reed, J.V ., Jr.
Powers, Thom as Moore Reed, Philip D.
Pranger, Robert J. Reeves, Jay B.L.
Pratt, Edm und T., Jr. Regan, Donald T.
Press, Frank Rehm, John H.
Preston, Lewis T. Reid, Ogden R.
Prewitt, Kenneth Reid, Whitelaw
Price, John R., Jr. Reinhardt, John E .
Price, Robert Reisman, Michael M.
The United Nations Conspiracy
Kesnicow, Norman J. Rogovin, Mitchell
Resor, Stanley R, ) Rohlen, Thomas P.
Renton, Jam es H. Roosa, Robert V,
Revelle, Roger Roosa, Ruth AmEnde
Rey, Nicholas A, Roosevelt, Kermit
Reynolds, Lloyd (1. Root, Oren
Rhinelander, John B. Rose, Daniel
Rhinesmith, Stephen H. Rose, Elihu
Rhodes, John B., Jr. Rose, Frederick P.
Ribicoff, Abraham A. Rosecrance, Richard
Rice, Kmmett Rosen, Jane K.
Rich, John H., Jr. Rosenblum, Mort
Richard, Eric L. Rosengarten, Adolph G., Jr.
Richardson, David B. Rosenthal, A.M.
Richardson, Elliot L. Rosenthal, Jack
Richardson, John, Jr. Roeenwald, William
Richardson, Richard W. Rosin, Axel G.
Ridgway, Rozanne L. Rosovsky, Henry
Riegelman, Harold Ross, Roger
Rielly, John E. Rostow, Eugene V.
Ries, Hans A. Rostow, W alt W.
Riesel, Victor Rotberg, Robert I.
Ripley, 8 . Dillon, II Roth, Richard H.
Rivers, Richard R. Roth, William M., Jr.
Rivkin, Donald H. Roth, William V., Jr.
Rivlin, Alice M. Rnthermel, Joan Ebert
Robbins, Donald G., Jr. Rowen, Henry S.
Roberts, Chalmers M. Rubin, Seymour J.
Roberts, Walter Orr Ruckelshaus, William D.
Robinson, Charles W. Ruebhausen, Oscar M.
Robinson, James L).,111 Ruenitz, Robert M.
Robinson, Marshall A. Ruina, J.P .
Robinson, Michael D. Rumsfeld, Donald
Robison, Olin C. Rush, Kenneth
Roche, John P. Rusk, Dean
Rockefeller, David Russell, Harvey C.
Rockefeller, John D., IV Russell, T.W ., Jr.
Rockefeller, Rodman C. Rustow, Dankwart A.
Rodriguez, Vincent A. R uttan, Vernon W.
Roett, Riordan Ryan, Hewson A.
Rogers, David E. Ryan, John T ., Jr.
Rogers, William D.
Rogers, William P.
I
Appendix ti
S Schwab, William B.
Schwartz, Harry
Safran, Nadav Schwarz, Frederick A.O., Jr.
Sage, Mildred D. Schwarz, H. Marshall
Said, Edward Schwebel, Stephen M.
Salisbury, Harriiion E. Scott, Harold B.
Salomon, Richard E. Scott, Stuart N.
Salomon, William R. Scoville, Herbert, Jr.
Saltzman, Charles E. Scowcroft, Brent
Salzman, Herbert Scranton, William W.
Sample, Steven B. Scrimshaw, Nevin S.
Samuel, Howard D, Seaborg, Glenn T.
Samuels, Michael A. Seabury, Paul
Samuels, Nathaniel Seagrave, Norman P.
Sargeant, Howland H. Seamans, Robert C., Jr.
Saunders, Harold H. Seawell, William T.
Sawhill, John C. Segal, Sheldon
Sawyer, John E. Seibold, Frederick C., Jr.
Sawyier, Stephen K. Seidman, Herta Lande
Scalapino, Robert A. Seigenthaler, John L.
Scali, John A. Seigle, John W.
Schacht, Henry B. Seitz, Frederick
Schachter, Oscar Selin, Ivan
Schaetzel, J. Robert Sellers, Robert V.
Schafer, John H. Semple, Robert B., Jr.
Schecter, Jerrold Sewell, John W.
Scheinman, Lawrence Sexton, William C.
Schell, Orville H., Jr. Seymour, Whitney North
Schiff, Frank W. Shapiro, Eli
Schiff, John M. Shapiro, George M.
Schilling, Warner R. Shapiro, Irving S.
Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. Shapiro, Isaac
Schlosser, Herbert S. Shaplen, Robert
Schmertz, Herbert Sharp, Daniel A.
Schraoker, John B. Shayne, Herbert M.
Schneider, Jan Shearer, Warren W.
Schneiderman, David Sheeline, Paul C.
Schneier, Arthur Sheffield, James R.
Schoettle, Enid C.B. Sheinkman, Jacob
Schorr, Daniel L. Sheldon, Eleanor Bernert
Schubert, Richard F, Shelley, Sally Swing
Schumer, Charles E. Shelp, Ronald K.
Schuyler, C.V.R. Shelton, Sally A.
21)8 The United Nations Conspiracy
Shepherd, Mark, Jr. \ Smithies, Arthur
Sherry, George L. Smyth, Henry DeW.
Shipley, Walter V. Smythe, Mabel M.
Shirer, William L Sneath, William S.
Shiithkin, Boris Sneider, Richard L.
Shoemaker, Don Sohn, Louis B.
Shriver, R. Sargent, Jr. Solarz, Stephen J.
Shulman, Colette Solbert, Peter O.A.
Hhulman, Marshall D. Solomon, Adam
Shultz, George P. Solomon, Anthony M.
Shute, Benjamin R. Solomon, Richard H.
Sick, (iary G. Solomon, Robert
Silherman, l^aurence H. Sonne, Christian R.
Silk, Leonard S. Sonnenfeldt, Helmut
Silvern, Robert B. Sonnenfeldt, Richard W.
Simmons, Adele Sm ith Sorensen, Gillian Martin
Simmons, Richard S. Sorensen, Theodore C.
Simon, William E. Soubry, Emile E.
Simons, Howard Southard, Frank A., Jr.
Sims, Albert G, Sovern, Michael I.
Sisco, Joseph J. Spain, James W.
Skidmore, Thomas K. Spang, Kenneth M.
Skinner, Klliott'P. Spector, Phillip L.
Hkolnikoff, Eugene B. Spencer, Edson W.
Sluter, Joseph K. Spencer, John H.
Slnwson, John Spencer, William C.
Sloane, Ann B. Spero, Joan E.
Slocombe, Walter B. Spiegel, Daniel L.
Slocum, John J. Spiegel, Marianne A.
Smart, S. Bruce, Jr. Spiers, Ronald I.
Smith, Carleton Sprague Spiro, Herbert J.
Smith, I)atus C., Jr. Spofford, Charles M.
Smith, David S. Sprague, Robert C.
Smith, DeW itt C., J r. Stackpole, Stephen H.
Smith, (iaddis Staley, Eugene
Smith, (ierard C. Stalson, Helena
Smith, Hedrick L. Stamas, Stephen
Smith, John T„ U Stanley, Timothy W.
Smith, Larry K. Stanton, Frank
Smith, Ferry M. Staples, Eugene S.
Smith, Roger B. Starr, S. Frederick
Smith, William Y. Stassen, Harold E.
Smith, W. Mason Stauffacher, Charles B.
Appendix B
Steadman, Richard C. Stroud, Joe H.
Stebbins, Jam es H. Sullivan, William H.
Steel, Ronald Sulzberger, C.L.
Stein, Eric Sunderland, Jack B.
Stein, Howard Surena, Andri M.
Steinbruner, John D. Surrey, Walter Sterling
Steiner, Daniel Suslow, Leo A.
Stepan, Alfred C. Sutterlin, James S.
Sterling, Richard W. Sutton, Francis X.
Stern, Ernest Swank, Emory
Stern, Fritz Swanson, David H.
Stern, H. Peter Swearer, Howard R.
Sternlight, David Sweitzer, Brandon W.
Stevens, Charles R. Swenson, Eric P.
Stevens, Norton Swing, John Temple
Stevenson, Adlai E., Ill Swinton, Stanley M.
Stevenson, H.L. Symington, W. Stuart
Stevenson, John R. Szanton, Peter L.
Stewart, Patricia Carry
Stewart, Ruth Ann T
Sticht, J. Paul
Stifel, Laurence D. Taber, George M.
Stilwell, Richard G. Talbot, Phillips
Stobaugh, Robert B. Talbott, Strobe
Stoessel, W alter J., Jr. Tanham, George K.
Stoessinger, John G. Tannenwald, Theodore, Jr.
Stoga, Alan Tanner, Harold
Stone, Jeremy J. Tanter, Raymond
Stone, Robert G., Jr. Taubm an, William
Stone, Roger D. Tavoulareas, William P.
Stone, Shepard Taylor, Arthur R.
Stookey, John Hoyt Taylor, George E.
Stratton, Julius A. Taylor, Maxwell D.
Straus, Donald B. Taylor, William J., Jr.
Straus, Jack I. Teitelbaum, Michael S.
Straus, Oscar S. Tempelsman, Maurice
Straus, R. Peter Tennyson, Leonard B.
Straus, Ralph I. Thayer, Robert H.
Straus, Robert K, Theobald, Thomas C.
Strauss, Simon D. Thoman, G. Richard
Strausz-Hup4, Robert Thomas, Evan
Strayer, Joseph R. Thomas, Franklin A.
Strem lau, John J. Thomas, Lee B., Jr.
240 The United Nations Conspiracy
Thompson, KdwardT, Ulman, Cornelius M.
Thompson, W. Scot’t Ulmer, Alfred C., Jr.
'I'hom pBon, William F ratt Ungar, Sanford J.
Thomson, Jam es C., Jr. Urfer, Richard P,
Thornell, Richard P. Usher, William R.
Thornton, Thomas P, Uzielli, Giorgio
Thorp, Willard L.
Tillinghast, David R. V
Tillman, Seth P.
Timberlake, Clare H. Vagliano, Alexander M.
Todaro, Michael P. Vaky, Viron P.
Todman, Terence A., Jr. Valdez, Abelardo Lopez
Tomlinson, Alexander C. Vance, Cyrus R.
Topping, Seymour van den Haag, Ernest
Townsend, Edward Van Slyck, DeForest
Trager, Frank N. Van Vlierden, Constant M.
Train, Russell E. Veit, Lawrence A.
Trani, Eugene P, Vermilye, Peter H.
Travis, M artin B., Jr. Vernon, Raymond
Tree, M arietta Vojta, George J.
'Frees, Jam es F. Volcker, Paul A.
Trewhitt, Henry Von Klemperer, Alfred H.
Treziie, Philip-H. Von Mehren, Robert B.
Triffin, Robert
Trooboff, Peter D. w
Trost, Carlisle A.H.
Trowbridge, Alexander B. Wadsworth, Mary Ames
Tucher, H. Anton Wagley, Charles W.
Tuchman, Barbara Wahl, Nicholas
Tuck, Edward Hallam Walinsky, Adam
Tucker, Robert W. Walker, A. Lightfoot
Turck, Nancy Walker, Charts E.
Turkevich, John Walker, G.R.
Turner, Stansfield Walker, George G.
Turner, William C. Walker, Joseph, Jr.
Tuthill, John W. Walker, William N.
Tweedy, Gordon B. Walkowicz, T.F.
Tyrrell, R. Emmett, J r. Wallace, M artha R.
Wallich, Henry C.
u Wallis, Gordon T.
Walters, Barbara
Udovitch, Abraham L. Waltz, Kenneth N.
Ullman, Richard H. Ward, F. Champion
Appendix ft
Ward, Martin j Wickham, John A., Jr.
Warner, R ^ h , Jr. Wiesner, Jerome B.
Warnke, F«y, c Wilbur, Brayton, Jr.
Washburn,Abbott M. Wilcox, Francis 0 .
Watson, T ^ a g j Mj ri Wilcox, Robert B.
Watts, Glenr. g Wildavsky, Aaron
Watts, John 4 tii Wilds, Walter W.
Watts, Willi,m’ Wiley, Richard A.
Weaver, Gtow L p Wiley, W. Bradford
Webster, B.|hue) M Wilhelm, Harry E.
Wehrle, Leioyg Wilkins, Roger W.
Weidenbau^ Murray L. Will. George F.
Weiksner, C ^ g y Willes, Mark H.
Weinberg, St,ven Willey, Fay
Weiner, M jt^ Williams, Franklin Hall
Welander, Rcbert 0 Williams, Haydn
Welch, JaHpf, a 1. Williams, Joseph H.
Weller, Raljb^ ’’ Williams, Maurice J.
Wells, Hernii;, y Willrich, Mason
Wells, LouiiT,, Jr, Wilson, Carroll L.
Wertheim, Mitii M. Wilson, Donald M.
Wessell, Niiiy Wilson, John D.
West, J. Robia,on Wimpfheimer, Jacques D.
West, R o b e r t ^ Winder, R. Bayly
Westphal, Aibert c F Wingate, Henry S.
Whalen, Ch,,.M W ( j r Winks, Robin W.
Wharton, Clihon R _ J r Winslow, Richard S.
Wheeler, Joh|^ Winterer, Philip S.
Wheeler, Joh,p in Wisner, Frank G., II
Wheeler, R ic ^ j'w . Witunski, Michael
Whipple, T i^ r t Wofford, Harris L.
Whitaker, *l>n.iifer Seymour W ohlstetter, Albert
White, Barb#, M W ohlstetter, Roberta
White, Betsy Buttri„ Wolf, Charles, Jr.
White, Franks Wolf, Milton
White, Rob«nj Wolff, Alan Wm.
White, Theodffg j_j Wood, Harleston R.
Whitehead, Jj(in c ‘ Wood, Richard D.
Whitehouse Charles S. Wood bridge, Henry S.
Whiting, Alld,g W'oolf, Harry
Whitman, N*jn’a v, N Woolsey, R. James
Whitney, Jo t,n ay Wortman, Sterling
Whitridge, ^ ld Wriggins, W. Howard
242 The United Nations Conspiracy
Wright, Jerauld Young, Richard
Wriiton, W alter B. Young, Stephen B.
Wurf, Jerry Youngman, William S.
Wyle, Frederick S. Yudkin, Richard A.
Wyman, Thomas H,
z
Y
Zagoria, Donald S.
Yang, Chen Ning Zarb, Frank G.
Yankelovich, Daniel Zartman, I. William
Yarmolinsky, Adam Zeidenstein, George
Yellen, Jan et L, Zelnick, C. Robert
Yeo, Edwin H., Ill Zilkha, Ezra K.
Yergin, Daniel H. Zimmerman, Edwin M.
Yntema, Theodore O. Zimmerman, Warren
Yoder, Edwin M„ Jr. Zimmerman, William
Yoat, Charles W. Zinberg, Dorothy S.
Young, Andrew Zorthian, Barry
Young, Edgar B. Zumwalt, E.R., Jf>
Appendix C 243
Appendix C
Membero of U.S. Delegation to the San Francisco Conference who
were, had been, or would later become members of the Council on
Foreign Relations (CFR).
Theodore C. Achilles Foy D. Kohler
James W. Angel 1 John K. Lockwood
Hamilton Fish Armstrong Archibald Macl^eish
Charles K. Hohlen John J. McCloy
Isaiah Bowman Cord Meyer, Jr.
Ralph Hunche Kdward (J. Miller, Jr.
John M . Cabot Hugh Moore
Mitchell B. Carroll l/eo PasvoUky
Andrew W. Cordier Dewitt C. Poole
John S. Dickey William L. Ransom
John Foster Dulles Nelson A. Rockefeller
James Clement Dunn .James T. Shotwell
Clyde Kagleton Harold E. Stassen
Clark M. Kichelberger Kdward R. Stettinius, Jr.
Muir S. Fairchild Adlai E. Stevenson
Thomas K. Finletter Arthur Sweetser
Artemus Gates James Swihart
Arthur J. Hepburn Llewellyn K. Thompson
Julius C. Holmes Herman B. Wells
Philip C. Jessup Francis Wilcox
Joseph E. Johnson Churles W. Yost
R. Keith Kane
Appendix D 245
Appendix I)
Members of Congress who signed "A Declaration of INTERdepen-
dence" (Asterisks indicate those who repudiated their connection with
the Declaration after the list of names was made public):
SENATE
James Abourezk (D.-SD) Charles Me. M athias (R.-MD)
Edward W, Brooke (K.-MA) Lee M etcalf (D.-MT)
Dick Clark (D.-IA) W alter F. Mondale (D.-MN)
Alan Cranston (D.-CA) Gaylord Nelson (D.-Wl)
Frank Church (I).-ID) Robert Packwood (R.-OR)
Jacob K. Javits (R.-NY) James B. Pearson (R.-KS)
Mike Gravel (D.-AK) Claiborne Pell (D.-Rl)
Philip H art (D.-MI) William Proxmire (D.-WI)
Vance Hartke (D.-1N) Abraham A. Kibicolf (D.-CN)
Mark Hatfield (R.-OR) Richard S. Schweiker (R.-PA)*
Hubert H. Humphrey (I).-MN) Hutch D. Scott (R.-PA)
Daniel K. Inouye (D.-HI) John Sparkman (D.-AL)
Gale W. McGee (D.-WY) Adlai K. Stevenson, III (D.-1L)
George McGovern (D.-SD) John V. Tunney (D.-CA)
Thomas J. McIntyre (D.-NH) Milton R. Young (R.-Nl))*
Mike Mansfield (D.-MT) Harrison A. Williams, Jr. (D.-NJ)
HOUSE OF REPR ESEN TA TIV ES
Carl Albert (l).-OK) Kdward G. Biester, Jr. (R.-PA)
Mark Andrews (R.-ND)* Jonathan B. Bingham (I).-NY)
John B. Anderson (R.-IL) Kdward P. Boland (D.-MA)
Les Aspin (D.-WI) Richard Bolling (I).-MO)
Herman Badillo (D.-NY) John Brademas (D.-IN)
W'illiam A. Barrett (D»?PA) George K. Brown, Jr. (D.-CA)
Berkley Bedell (D.-IA) William M. Brodhead (I).-MI)
246 The United Nations Conspiracy
Yvonne B. Burke (D.-CA) Clarence I). I/m g (D.-MD)
(ioodloe K. Byron (I).-MI))* Torbort H. Macdonald (I).-MA)
Robert Carr (I).-MI) Paul N, McCloskey, Jr. (R.-CA)
('ardis* Collins (I).-II,) Matthew F. McHugh (D.-NY)
Silvio 0 . Conte (R.-MA) Spark M atsunaga (I).-HI)
John J. Conyers, Jr. (I),-MI) Lloyd Meeds (D.-WA)
Janies C. Corman (I).-CA) Ralph H. M etcalf (D.-IL)
(leorge K. Danielson (D.-CA) Helen 1). Meynor (D.-NJ)
Ronald V. Heliums (I).-CA) Kdward Mezvinsky (D.-IA)
Hubert F. Drinan (I).-MA) Abner J. Mikva (D.-IL)
Robert B. Duncan (I).-OR) Norman Y. Mineta (D.-CA)
Robert W. Kdgar (I).-PA) Patsy Mink (D.-HI)
Don Kdwards (D.-CA) William S. Moorhead (I).-PA)
Joshua Kilberg (I).-PA) John K. Moss (D.-CA)
Millicent H. Fenwick (R.-NJ) 'I’homas E. Morgan (D.-PA)
Daniel J. Flood (D.-PA)* John M. Murphy (D.-NY)*
Jam es J. Florio (D.-NJ) Robert N.C. Nix (D.-PA)
William D. Ford (D.-MI) Richard Nolan (I).-MN)
Kdwin B. Forsythe (R.-NJ) Richard Ottinger (D.-NY)
Donald M. Fraser (l).-M N) Claude I). Pepper (D.-FL)
Sam M. (iibhons (D.-FL) Charles B. Rangel (D.-NY)
William J. Green (D.-PA) 'I'homas M. Rees (D.-CA)
(tilbert (iude (R.-MD) Henry S. Reuss (D.-WI)
Thomas R. Harkin (D.-IA) Frederick W. Richmond (D.-NY)
Michael Harrington (I).-MA) Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (D.-NJ)
Augustus F. HawkiiTu (D.-CA) Fred B. Rooney (D.-PA)
Henry Helstoki (D.-NJ) Charles Rose (D.-NC)*
Frank Horton (R.-NY) Kdward Roybal (D.-CA)
Robert K. Jones (D.-AL) l^eo J. Ryan (D.-CA)
Barbara Jordan (I).-TX) Fernand J. St. Germain (D.-RI)
M artha K ey B (I).-KS) Herman T, Schneebeli (R.-PA)
Robert l^eggett (D.-CA) Patricia Schroeder (I).-CO)
Norman F. Lent (R.-NY) John F. Seiberling, Jr. (D.-OH)
A ppendix D 247
Paul Simon (D.-1L) Morris K, Udall,(D..AZ)
Fortney H. Stark (D.-CA) Lionel van Deerlin (D.-CA)
Louis Stokes (I).-OH) Richard F. Vander Veen (D.-MI)
Jam es W. Symington (I).-MO) Charles A. Vanik (D.-OH)
Frank Thompson, Jr. (D.-NJ) Hob Wilson (K.-CA)*
Paul E. Tsongas (D.-MA) Clement Zablocki (D.-WI)*
W hat's Wronfi With Democracy? 249
Appendix E
W HAT’S WHONG W ITH DEMOCRACY?
(A Clarification)
Here and there throughout thin book will be found alighting refer*
enceB to "democracy," as if there were something wrong with the
concept of “democracy” as a form of government.
There is.
Fifty years ago the explanation th at follows would have been
unnecessary, since the organized drive to mislead Americans into
believing that the United States is a ‘‘democracy” was barely underway.
Today, however, a clarification is required lest critics of “democracy”
be branded unpatriotic, disloyal, or worse. A few years ago, the leader
of a prominent patriotic society accurately described “democracy” as a
“deceptive phrase, a weapon of demagoguery, and a perennial fraud.” 1
A national magazine subsequently ran a nasty profile which began by
urging readers to “Turn the page for the story of the man who believes
‘democracy it . . . a fraud.’ The obvious intent was to smear the
individual with an implication of disloyalty to our form of govern
ment. Yet, our government was never intended by its Founders to be a
"democracy.”
Democracy is rule by the majority. A republic is rule by law even
when th at law precludes the majority from having its way. Under a true
republic the right* of individuals and minorities are protected against
the tyranny of the majority by a written code of laws, often called a
Constitution. Thus, our Bill of Rights, when respected, makes it
possible for us to worship as we please, or speak as we please, as long as
wc do not harm or hinder others in exercising the same rights. This is so
even if we are the only ones who are practicing a particular faith or
expounding a particular point of view; legally, even a majority of the
Congress cannot interfere with such rights.
You may recall our earlier reference to Congressman John Rousse-
lot’s observation that the best example of "democracy” is a lynch mob,
since there is only one man against it. When a dozen riders on horseback
capture the suspected cattle rustler, and the “ vote” comes out twelve to
one against the suspect, the democratic thing to do is hang him then and
there. But when the principles of a republic prevail, M arshall M att
Dillon rides up and lays down the law. He tells the mob, “ You can't
hang him unless he's proven guilty after a fair trial.” So th e suspect is
transported to jail, a trial is held before a jury of his peers, and the jury
decides the question of his guilt or innocence based on the evidence
gleaned from both the defense and the prosecution. In the meantime,
250 The United Nations Conspiracy
the Buspect is not to be held for excessive bail or compelled to testify
against himself — regardless of what the majority of townsmen
might desire.
If the United States was founded as a democracy, then why doesn't
th at word appear even once in the Declaration of In d e p e n d en c e , the
Constitution, the Bill of Rights, the Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, or
the Constitutions of any of the fifty states? In contrast, the United
States Constitution guarantees each state a Republican form of
government, and it is to the Republic for which our Flag s ta n d s that we
pledge our allegiance.
In 1928, the U.S. War Department used a training manual for the
Armed Forces which included this startling definition of democracy:
Oovernmentof the masnes.
Authority derived through m ats meeting or any other form of "direct"
expression.
Hesults in mobocracy.
A ttitude toward property is communistic — negating property rights.
A ttitude toward law is th a t the will of the majority shall regulate,
w hether it be based upon deliberation or governed by passion,
prejudice ancfimpulse, without restraint or regard to consequence*.1
In contrast, th a t same training manual included the definition ol
republic found in historian Harry Attwood’s book, Our Republic'.
A republic is a form of government under a constitution which
provides for the election of (1) an executive and (2) a legislative body,
who, working together in a representative capacity, have all the power of
appointment, all power of legislation, all power to raise revenues and
appropriate expenditure#, and are required to create (3) a judiciary to pass
upon the justice and legslity of their governmental acts and to recognize
(4) certain inherent individual rights.
T ake away any one or more of those four elements and you are
drifting into autocracy. Add one or more to those four elements and you
are drifting into democracy.4
The executive, legislative, and judicial branches referred to in thi
training manual comprise yet another distinguishing characteristii
of a true republic: a system o f checks and balances. If Congress passei
a law th a t is subsequently vetoed by the President, it may then override
the President's veto by a two-thirds vote of both Houses; the Supremi
Court can strike down the law as unconstitutional; the Congress cai
impeach and remove from office the Supreme Court Justices or th
President; and the President may sign a treaty th a t the Senate refuse
to ratify. ThiB system of checks and balances is an invaluabl
W h a t’s Wronn With Democracy? 251
protection against dictatorship, preventing any one branch of govern
m ent from obtaining too much power. It is also very undemocratic!
Former Senator Margaret Chase Smith (K.-Maine) once summarized
the crucial differences between a republic and a democracy in these
words:
The basic distinction between democracy and republic it in the degree
of majority rule. Majority rule i« unrestricted in a democracy while it is
restricted in a republic. "The Bill of Hights" part of our Constitution
places definite limitations on the power of the representatives of the
people. They are denied the power to abridge our freedom of speech, right
of assembly, press, trial by jury, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, and other individual rights — regardless of how much the
majority might he opposed to such individual rights. Under a pure or true
democracy, there is no protection of such individual rights against the
rule of the majority.
Democracy actually means unrestricted majority rule that our Consti
tution so carefully prohibits. . . .
A republic is a truly representative government. It provides representa
tion for the minority as well as the majority. It places individual freedom
and rights above majority rule. If we were really a political democracy,
instead of the republic we are, the will of the majority would habitually
ride roughshod over the will of the minority. A republic creates and
develops tolerance that acts as a bulwark against tyranny by the majority.1'
The United States was founded as a republic — not a democracy —
lor very sound reasons, and our future as a free nation largely depends
on the extent to which we can keep it that way.
Footnotes 253
Footnotes
Forew ord were racists; th a t anti-Comm uniit
1. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit Rhodesian Prime Minister Ian Smith
tee, The U nited S ta te s A nd The had massacred missionaries who were
United N ations (Hearing*), May 7-8, actually slaughtered by the Marxist
14-18, 21-22, and Ju n e 4, 197ft, p. 6 terrori*t* who eventually succeeded
(atatement of former UN Ambassa- Sm ith; and th a t he would probably
dor Henry Cabot Lodge, May 7th). support the deatruction of Western
2. Charle* Malik, M an In The Strug Civilization if he were to become con
gle For Peace (New York: Harper & vinced that it would "liberate” the rest
Row, 196.1). p. B7. of th e world. On July 26, 1979, Young
3. Speech at Drake Univeraity; re met clandestinely with an official of
printed, Congressional Record, No the terrorist Palestine Liberation Or
vember 24, 1970, p. E9874. ganization, later lied to his superiors
4. H uman Events, November 27, about what transpired, then resigned
1971, p. 2. on August 18th. The next day he as
6. Cited by I<odge, Senate Foreign Re serted that it would be in "th e best
lations Committee, op. cit., p. 6. interest of our nation" to recognize the
6. Human Event*, January 10, 1976, Communist Vietnamese government
p. 2. "at once" and lift the trade embargo
7. Salt Lake Tribune, November 20, ag ain st Red C uba "im m ediately."
1980, p. 6A. (See T he Review Of The News, Sep
8. Lodge, op. cit., p. 6. tem ber 6, 1978, p. 36 and August 29,
9. Parade, February 9, 1978, p. 4. 1979, p. 3.)
10. Charle* H. Percy, The United N a 18. Arizona Republic, October 9,1976,
tions, Report to the Senate Foreign p. A-6.
Relation* Committee, March 14, 1975, 16. Article, V F W Magazine, June,
p. 23. 1971; reprinted, Congressional Record,
11. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit June 16,1971, p. E6901.
tee, op. cit., p. 299 (May 22nd).
12. Congressional Record, November C hapter One
10, 1876, p. S19620. 1. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American For
13. Addreu prepared for delivery to eign Policy In The Nuclear Age, Sec
th e Governor’* Conference on the ond Kdition (New York: Harper &
United Nation*, Milwaukee, Wiscon- Row, 1968), p. 394.
*in, May 12, 1976; reprinted, Congres 2. George Sylvester Viereck, The
sional Record, June 1ft, 1976, p. S932A. Strangest Friendship in History (New
14. On July 13, 1978, 82 member* of York: Uveright, Inc.. 1932), p. 249.
the House of Representative* actually 3. Ibid., pp. 63-64
voted to ouat Young. On one occasion 4. Francis X. Gannon, Biographical
or another during his career, Young Dictionary of the Left (Boston: West
had claimed that U.S. jail* hold hun ern Inlands, 1969), Volume 1, p. 64.
dreds of thouaand* of political prison 6. Alan Stang, The Actor (Boston:
ers; that Cuban troops brought " s ta Western Islands, 1968), p. 19.
bility" to Angola; th at former presi 6. Ibid.
dents Richard Nixon and G«rald Ford 7. Gannon, op. cit., pp. 64-66.
(as well as the Swedes and the Hritiih) 8. The Federalist l*apers, Eaaay No. 8
254 Thv Unitvd Natii him ('tiim/nmr)
(New York: The Modern Library, no 1945, and Congressional H rniril
date), p. 42. October 21, 1971, |i K illftft.
9 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, Peace
A nd Counterpeace (New York: Harper C hapter Two
& How, 1971), p. 565. 1. Slntcmvnt at press I'o n lx ro iu U N
10. Phyllis Schlafly and Chester headquarters In New York. |)prt>mli»
W ard, Kissinger on the Couch (New 21, 11NI2; reprinted, Department o
Kochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, State bulletin, .Ismmrv 2H, UNCI, nik
1975), pp. 150-151. na Department ol S ln lr I'uhllm iloi
11. Ibid , p. 151. 7505, released March, IIHIII, |> ft
12. H.A. Washington (Kditorl, The 2. Leland (iouilrli'h (ro n trlliu to r)
Works of Thomas Jefferson (Townsend The United Nations, Tivents Yenn
Mac (’oun., 1884), Volume 1, p. 130; a* (New York: The United Nations A*
quoted in Jerrald L. Newquist (Com nocin I ion of I he U nited S tale* n
piler), Prophet>, I’rinciples and Na- America, 1965), p. 77.
Imnal Surviual (Salt Lake City: Pub- 3. Dean Acheson, / ‘w ienf At The Cre
linh«'r’n Press, 1964), p. 145, ation (New York: W.W. Norton &
1.1. John W’. Davis, The Council On Company, 1969), p. 334.
Foreign Relations: A Record of Twenty- 4. Washington Daily New*, August
h'wv Yean, 1921-1946 (New York: IB, 1948, p. 27.
Council on Foreign Relations, 1947), 5. Quoted In Francis X. ( inn non, flio-
11|>. 15-17. graphical Dictionary of the Left I lt<ni
14. D epartm ent of Slate, Report to ton: WoKtern Inlands, IIMt9), Volume I,
thv R esid en t on the Results of the San p. 229.
Francisco Conference, Publication «. Ihid.
■!349, June 26, 1945, p. 20. 7. Acheson, up n t., pp. 4HII-470,
1ft Time, May 18, 195.1. 8. Alexander Uhl, The US and the
III John Foster Du Ileu. War or Peace I W: Partners for Peace I Wnshington:
I \ p w York: The Macmillan Company, Public Affairs Institute, 19H2), p. 3.
19501, p. 33. 9. United Staten Committee for the
IV Dean Achenon, / ‘resent A t The United Nation*, Facts for Fallacies:
t ‘rent ion (New York: W.W. Norton & Answers to Current (Questions about
Company, Inc., 1909), p. 149. the United Nations, Revised Kdition,
in (Quoted in Jam es F, Hymen, March, 1963, p, 4.
Speaking Frankly (New York: Harper 10. House Committee on Un-American
A Mrnthers Publishers, 1947), p. 41. Activities, H earing Regarding Com
Ill Ihid. m un ist Espionage in the U n ited
.Ml Ihid. States, 1948, p. 657.
Ji Robert K. Sherwood, Roosevelt 11. Foreign Affairs, October, 1950,
unil llopkins, Revised Kdition (New pp. 76-77,
York Orossetfli Dunlap, 1950), p. 876. 12. (5. Kdward (iriffin. The Fearful
'U .liilm T. Flynn, The Roosevelt M aster (Hoston: W estern Islands,
M vth, Revised Kdition (New York: 1964), p. 110.
I'll.' I h'vln-Adtiir Company, 1956), 13. Ibid., p. 111.
|i Mhl 14. LID News bulletin, April, 1947,
-M Ni't ri'tary S tettinius’s speech wan pp. 2-4; as quoted in Philip Crane, 7'he
lirnaili'Hut by the Columbia Hroadcast- Democrat's Dilemma (Chicago: Henry
ii*M System network and reprinted, Dr- Kegnery Company, 1964), p. 352.
im rlm ent of State bulletin, April 8, IB. Trygve Lie, In The Cause Of Peace
Footnotes 255
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 38. Toward Peace and Democracy
1964). pp. 8, 9. (Burmese Ministry of Information,
16. George E. Taylor and Ben Cash- 1949), as quoted in Griffin, op. cit.,
man, The New United Nations: A Re p. 117.
appraisal of United States Policies 39. W ashington Post Rook World,
(Washington: American Enterprise In May 8, 1966, p. 3.
stitute for Public Policy Research, 40. Washington Post, December 2,
June, 1966), pp. 67-68; see also: Lie, 1966, p. A-l.
op. cit., p. 26. 41. Human Events, March 16, 1969,
17. Foreign Affairs, op. cit., p. 69. p. 14.
18. Ibid., p. 73. 42. Kxcerpted, New York Times, Sep
19. Ibid., pp. 67-68. tem ber 19, 1966; quoted, The Review
20. Lie, op. cit., p. 171. of the News, October 6, 1966, p. 17.
21. [bid. 43. Washington Post, November 12,
22. Foreign Affairs, op cit., p. 77. 1966.
23. Taylor and Cashman, op. cit., 44. Ibid., April 2,1967.
pp. 57-68. 45. Ibid., July 31,1967.
24. New York Daily Newt, October 14, 48. Ibid.
1966. 47. Salt Lake Tribune, May 27, 1964,
26. H um an Events, January 22, 1966, p. 10A.
p. 1. 48. Los Angeles Times, April 7, 1970.
26. New York Times, December 4, 49. John Barron, KGH The Secret
1972. Work of Soviet Secret Agents (New
27. Norris McWhirter and Ron* Me- York: Header's Digest Press, 1974),
Whirter, (Suinnes Hook Of World Rec p. 19.
ords (New York: Sterling Publishing 60. Ibid.
Co., 1976 edition), p. 397. 61. New York Times, December 22,
28. Senate Internal Security Subcom 1971.
mittee, The Human Cost of C om m u 62. Ibid.
nism in China (Study), August 12, 63. The Review O f The News, January
1971, p. 16. 26, 1972, p. 25.
29. Griffin, op. cit., p. 114. 64. Specch reprinted, Congressional
30. Taylor and Caahman, op. cit., Record, May 8, 1975, p. S7718.
p. 60. 55. Vista, April, 1973, p. 46.
31. 46 Angry Men (Belmont, Ma»».: 56. Ibid.
American Opinion, 1962). 67. Ibid.
32. Senate Internal Security Subcom 58. Ibid., p. 26.
mittee, The Rang-Jensen Case (Re 69, Gannon, op. cit., p. 224.
port), September 14, 1961, p. 61, 6(1. New York Times, December 22,
33. Griffin, op. cit., p. 115, 1971.
34. Senate Internal Security Subcom 61. Ibid., February 11, 1972.
mittee, The Rang-Jensen Case, op. 62. Ibid., (editorial), August 10, 1972.
cit., p. 61. 63. Peking Review (published in Red
35. Family Weekly, August 18, 1963, China), January 23,1976, p. 41.
p. 4. 64. The Inter Dependent (successor to
36. Taylor and Caahman, op cit., Vista as official publication of the
p. 66. UNA-U8A), April, 1975, p. 5.
37. Washington H ist, July 28, 1966, 65. WWim/fton Post, April 5, 1975,
p. A21. p. A5.
m The United Nations Conspiracy
•HI I'rwu conference i t UN hesdquar- February 10-11, 1976, p. 12. Professor
lt>r« In New York, January 14, 1976, Bloom field’s statem ent was given
UN |>m m release SG/SM/2139, p. 17. February 10th.
19. S tuart Chase, The Road We Are
('h u p te r T hree Traveling: 1914-1942 (New York: The
I Itaim rtm ent of State, Report to the Twentieth Century Fund, 1942), p. 26.
President on the Results of the San 20. Vista, April, 1973, p. 23.
Francisco Conference, Publication 21. Statem ent to the Joint Congres
2.I4U, June 26, 1946, p. 11. sional Committee on the Investigation
I. N ational Review, May 4, 1966, of the Pearl Harbor Attack, March 21,
p. IlfWV 1946, as quoted in George Morgen-
II. Foreign Affair*, October, 1946, p. 19. stern, Pearl Harbor (New York: Devin-
4 Ibid., July, 1966, pp. 463-464. Adair Company, 1947), p. 309.
ft Ibid., p. 464. 22. Ibid., p. 292.
H. Charles Malik, M an In The Strug- 23. Wendell Willkie, One World (New
ulr Fur Peace (New York: Harper & York: Simon and Schuster, 1943),
How, 196.1), pp. 124-126. p. 171.
7 J. Reuben Clark, Jr., unpublished 24. Vernon Duckworth-Barker, ArraJe-
nirwiry analysis of the UN Charter, through to Tomorrow: The Story of
pp II, 10, 13. (Author has copy.) International Co-operation for Devel
M Ibid., p. 26. opm ent Through the United Nation*
II Address published as The United (United Nations, N.Y.: United N a
Nations: A Hope or a Menace (1962), tions Centre for Kconomic and Social
p. 2.1 Information, 1970), p . 6.
III. Clarence K. Streit, Freedom Against 26. Quoted, Los Angeles Times, April
llni’lf (New York: Harper & Brothers, 7. 1970
IIM4), p. 106. 26. Foreign Affairs, September, 1923,
II Malik, op. cit., p. 64. p. 48.
I'i Fortune, November, 1976; re- 27. Ibid., January, 1949, p. 186.
printed, Congressional Record, No 28. Subcommittee on Future Foreign
vember 11, 1976, p. S19708. Policy Research and Development of
i:i Ibid. th e House In ternational R elations
14. Krprinted, U S Newt & World Committee, Reassessment o f U.S. For
Report, August 20, 1962, p. 84. eign Policy (Hearings), July 16, 22-24,
I ft K ing Henry IV (I'art Two) by WII- 1976, p. 132.
liNiii Shakespeare, in The Works of 29. U NESC O Courier, November,
W illiam Shakespeare (C om plete) 1970, p. Z3.
lltualvn, N.Y.: Black's Readers Her- 30. Clark M. Eichelberger, UN: The
vUs, 1972), p. 624. First Fifteen Years (New York: Harper
III In lan d M. Goodrich and Bdvard & Brothers, 1960), p. 6.
llitmhri), Charter of the United N a• 31. W ashington Star, O ctober 24,
turns: Commentary and Documents, 1976, p. A16.
Nentnd And Reviaed E dition (Boston: 32. Clark, op. cit., p. 4.
World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 3. 33. Foreign Affairs, January, 1967,
17. Malik, op. cit., p. 66. pp. 186-186.
IH. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, teatimony, 34. “ Introduction to the Report of the
Hulicommittee on International Or- Secretary General on the Work of the
ganlintiona of the House Committee Organization — August, 1973," re
mi International R elations, The printed, Congressional Record, Sep-
I 'm tfd States In The United Nations,
Footnotes 257
tember 11,1973, p. S16249. tee, The United States and the U nited
35. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit Nations, op. cit., p. 94.
tee, The United Staten and the United 52. Ibid.
Nations (Hearing*), May 7-8, 14-16,
21-22 and June 4, 1975, p. 129 (May C hapter 4
14th). 1. D epartm ent of State, Report to the
36. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit President on the Results of the San
tee, The Charter of the United Nations Francisco Conference, Publication
(Hearing*), July 9-13, 1945, p. 216 2349, June 26, 1945, p. 41.
(July 9th). 2. Quoted, Foreign Affairs, January,
37. Intellect, April, 1976, p. 4.10, 1954,p. 214.
38. Ibid. 3. Quoted, “ Aggre**ion, According To
39. Fortune, op. cit., p. S19708, U .N .," by John F. McManus, *yndi-
40. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., American For cated column (pre-publication copy),
eign Policy In The Nuclear Age, Sec July 18, 1974.
ond Edition (New York: Harper & 4. Annex to "Renolution Adopted By
Row, 1965), p. 413. The General Anaembly |on the report
41. G. Kdward Griffin, The Fearful of th e S ixth C om m ittee (A/9H90)\
M aster (Bo*ton: W estern Inland*, 3314. Definition of Aggression,” J a n
1964), p. 229. uary 14, 1976, p. 2.
42. Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit., 6. Ibid.
p. 38.
43. Congressional Record, June 13, C hapter 5
1974, p. S I0543. 1. Departm ent of State, United
44. Socialist International Informa States Participation in the United N a
tion, November, 1970, a* quoted in tions: Report by the President to the
Ro*e L. Martin, The Selling of A m eri Congress for the Year 1961, Publica
ca (Santa Monica, Calif.: Fidelia Pub- tion Number 4583, released July, 1952,
liiher*, 1973), p. 17. p. 49.
45. Ibid., p. 34. 2. Sir Leslie Munro, United Nations:
46. Karl Marx, Critique of the (iotha Hope For A Divided World (New York:
Program (1875), a* quoted in John Holt, Rinehart and Win*ton, 1960),
Bartlett, Familiar (Quotations, Four p. 47.
teenth Kdition (Ronton: Little, Hrown 3. Christian Herter, Toward A n A t
& Company, 196H), p. 087. lantic C om m unity (New York: Harper
47. The Federalist Papers (New York: & Row, 1963), p. 62.
The Modem Library, no date), Ksaay 4. Congressional Record, Ju n e 30,
Seven, p. 39. 1965. p. 14844.
48. Quoted in Departm ent of State, 6. Nikita S. Khrushchev, Khrushchev
UNESCO Leaders Speak (Wa*hing- Remembers (Boston: Little, Brown &
ton: U.S. Government Printing Of Company, 1970), pp. 367-369.
fice, 1949), p. 4. 6. Ibid., p. 370.
49. Malik, op cit., p. 101. 7. Foreign Affairs, October, 1960, p. 67.
50. Harlan Cleveland (contributor), 8. Ibid., October, 1951, p. 8.
The United Nations: Twenty Years 9. Ibid., April, 1962, p. 361.
(New York: The United Nation* A m o - 10. D epartm ent of Defense (Office
ciation of the United State* of Amer of Public Information) release N um
ica. 1965). p. 144. ber 465-64, Mav 16,1954, p. 1.
51. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit 11. Ibid.
258 The United Nation m ('annpiracy
12. Ibid., p. 0. ment edition of Rhodesian Vifii/ioint
13. Ibid. entered into the Congressional Record,
14. Ibid. March 10,1970, p. H:i;iii
16. Dougla* M acA rthur, R em in is 6. Kepreientative John Hnrlrk (I),-
cences (New York: McGraw-Hill Hcxik Ivouiaiana), Congressional Record,
Company, 1964), p. 366. March 12, 1070, p. H1768.
16. Harry 8 Trum an, Memoirs (G ar 6. UN document H/HKS/2M2 ( 1INW).
den City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Com 7. Section 8, paragraph M.
pany, 1956), Volume II, p. 330. 8. Weekly Compilation of I ’resiilential
17. MacArthur, op. cit., p. 331. Documents, January U, 1067, pp. It 10.
18. MacArthur, op. cit., p. 369. 9. Ibid., Augual 6, IINI8, pp. 1170 1171.
19. Senate Internal Security Subcom 10. I'rivate Hoyrotts Vs The N ational
mittee, Institute of Pacific Relations Interest, Department of State Publi
(Hearing*), P art 13, April 8, 1962, cation 8117, releaard Auguat, IWifi,
p. 4637. pp. 18, 10.
20. Ibid., p. 4636. 11. Testimony before joint hearing of
21. Ibid. the Hou*e Subcommittee on Africa
22. Senate Internal Security Subcom and the Subcommittee on Internation
m ittee, Interlocking Subversion in al Organization* and Movementa, Oc
(lovernm ent D epartments (Hearing*), tober 17, 1973; cited, ('ongressional
Part 24, September 29, 1964, p. 2032. Record. October 18, 197.1, p. H028O.
23. House Committee on Un-Ameri 12. Kepreitentatlve Glrnard M|>acomb
can A ctivities, World Com m unist (R.-California), Congressional Rec
M ovem ent: Selective Chronology, ord, October 17, 11MW, p, 26088,
IHI8-I957, Volume III (1961-1963), 13. Reader's Digest, July, 1000, p. 84.
p. 670. 14. IKS. News A World R eport,
24. Mark Clark, From the Danube to March 22, 1971, p, 8.
th e Yalu (New York: Harper & Broth 16. Congressional Record, June 14,
er*, 1964), p. 11.' 1973, p. SI 1222.
26. MacArthur, op cit., pp. 374-376. 10. Congressional Record, Decem
26. Ibid., p. 376. ber 13, 1973, p. S22834.
27. Senate Internal Security Subcom 17. Colloquy reprinted, Congressional
m ittee, Interlocking Subversion in Record, March 20, 1974, p. 83983.
(lovernm ent Departments, op. cit., 18. Weekly Compilation of 1‘residen-
p. 2033. tial D ocum ents, M arch 21, 1977,
28. Washington Post, October 8, 1967, p. 402.
p. A22. 19. 46 Angry M en (Belmont, Ma»*.
29. Clark, op. cit., p. 1. American Opinion, 1962), pp. 23, 62,
etc.
C hapter 6
1. UN document A/RES/2024 (X X ). C hapter 7
2. UN document S/RES/216 (1966)/ 1. Congressional Record, June 23,
Hev. 1. 1904, p. 14291.
M. UN document S/RES/217 (1966). 2. Departm ent of State, You and the
4. Baited on finding* of Charle* Bur United Nations, Publication Number
ton Marnhall, I’rnfeuor of Interna 6887 (1966), a* quoted in Cecil V.
tional Politic* at John* Hopkin* Crabb Jr., American Foreign Policy in
School of Advanced International the Nuclear Age ( New York: Harper &
Studied, a* reported in ipecial aupple- Row, 1966), p. 410.
Footnotes 259
3. Quoted, United S tatei Committee 17. Constitution of the C om m unitt
for the United N ationi, The United Party, U.S.A. (flew York: New Cen
Nations in Action (folder), August, tury ftiblishers, April, 1967), pp. 4, 6.
1963, p. 4. 18. Quoted, Gardner, op. cit., p. 60.
4. U.S. N ew t & World Report, Sep 19. People‘t World (editorial), Octo
tember 27, 1976, p. 34. ber 7, 1961.
5. Gale McGee and Jam es B. Pearson, 20. The Worker, January 21, 1962,
The U.S. and the U.N.: An Urgent p. 6.
Need for an Increated U.S. Comm it 21. People't World, January 23, 1966,
ment, Report to the Senate Commit p. 7.
tee on Foreign Relation!, September, 22. Moscow radio broadcast, June 27,
1973, p. 6. 1966, as quoted in Lot Angelet Herald
6. Earl Browder, Victory and After American editorial, July 29, 1966; edi
(New York; International Publisher*, torial reprinted, Congressional Record,
1942), p. 110. August 4, 1966, p. A4317.
7. Departm ent of State, Foreign Rela 23. Political A ffairs, April, 1973, p. 39.
tion* of the I foiled Statei: The Soviet 24. U.S. Newt & World Report, Sep
Union, l9,Vi-JM9 (Washington: U.S. tem ber 24, 1962, p. 21.
Government Printing Office, 1962), 26. U.S. News £ World Report (inter
p. 227; as quoted in Anthony Kubek, view), November 26, 1964, p. 88.
How The Far East Wag Lott (Chicago: 26. Q uoted, D epartm ent of S tate,
Henry Regnery Company, 1963), p. United Nations: Guardian o f Peace,
xiv. Publication Number 7226, released
8. Bella V. Dodd, School of Darkness September, 1961, p. 24.
(New York: The Devin-Adair Com 27. United Press International report,
pany, 1964), p. 179. Deseret News (Salt Lake City, Utah),
9. Political A ffa irt, April, 1946, December 26,1961.
pp. 289-300. 28. Reprint of speech, B.Y.U. Speeches
10. Francit O. Wilcox, Congrett, the of the Year series, p. 7.
Executive, and Foreign Policy (New 29. Deseret N ew t, Ju n e 13, 1964,
York: Harper & Row, 1971), p. 116. p. Al.
11. United World Federaliita, No 30. Salt Lake Tribune, November 8,
Longer A Dream (booklet, 1966); ex 1964, p. 12A.
cerpted, Congrettional Record, 31. U.S. N ewt <fi World Report, De
June 26, 1966, p. 14269. cember 12,1962, p. 32.
12. Corliss I<amont, Soviet Foreign 32. Washington Post, November 3,
Policy, Second Edition (New York: 1971, p. B ll.
Philosophical L ibrary, Inc., 1966), 33. Quoted, John Barron, KGR: The
pp. 300-301. Secret Work of Soviet Secret Agents
13. Quoted, D epartm ent of S tate, (New York: Reader's Digest Press,
The K rem lin S p e a k t, Publication 1974), p. 364.
Number 4264, released October, 1961, 34. Ibid., p. 20.
p. 36. 36. The Freeman, March, 1966, p. 340.
14. Ibid. 36. Trygve Lie, In The Cause Of Peace
16. Quoted, Richard N. Gardner, In (New York: The Macmillan Company,
Pursuit of World Order (New York: 1964), p. 46.
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 47. 37. Louis Dolivet, The United Nations
16. Daily Worker, December 21, 1964, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Com
p. 6. pany, 1946), p. 29.
The United Nations Conspiracy
IK U».,u/> cit , p. 45 411 17. Clark M. Kichelberger, UN: The
■Ml Ifail., p. 4H First Fifteen Years (New York: Harper
& Brothers, 1960), pp. 29-30.
C h u p tp r H 18. Quoted by Francis 0 . Wilcox (As
I l>«|mrtment of State, l/n ited sistant Secretary of State for Interna
Shitr* Participation in the U n ited N a tional Organization Affairs), speech
tions Hrpart by the /^resident to the to the American Association for the
<'imgrv,s for the Year IM l, Publics- United Nations, September 16, 1967;
lion Number 4683, released July, 1962, reprinted as D epartm ent of S tate
| ), I V , Publication 6663, released November,
I U S New* ft World Report (In ter 1967, pp. 6-6.
view), November 26, 1954, p, 92. 19. Foreign Affairs, April, 1967, p. 431.
II Department of State, You a n d the (Article by Professor Hans Morgen
United Nations, Publication N um ber thau.)
744'.!, released December, 1962 (re
vised), pp. 64 -66. C hapter 9
4. ('Iisrles Malik, M an In The S tru g 1. U.S. News <6 World Report, No
gle bur Peace (New York: H arper & vember 30, 1964, p, 40.
How, IfHIM), p. 78. 2. December 22, 1963, p. 2 of printed
ft Holier! S. Benjamin, Foreword, The transcript.
I hiih'H Nations: Tw enty Years (New 3. Congressional Record, Ju n e 23,
York. The United Nations Association 1964, p. 14291.
of the U nited S tates of A m erica, 4. Department of State, The United
IIMlft), p. A. States and the ( tnited Nations: Re
II, Senate Foreign Relations C om m it flections on the nth General Assembly,
tee, The I !nited States and the United Publication N um ber 7436, released
Nations (Hearings), May 7-8, 14-16, October, 1962, p. 19.
21 22 and June 4, 1976, p. 69 (May 6. T ex t rep rin ted , D epartm ent of
Mlhi, S ta te Bulletin, November 9, 1964,
7 Foreign Affairs, April, 1981, p. 690.
pp 4(i:i 4(14. 6. Text reprinted, Ibid., pp. 687-688.
H. W ashington Post, November 26, 7. Ibid., November 16,1964, p. 699.
11174, p. ( ‘7. 8. Washington Post, July 1, 1966,
II. Ilnnry A. Kissinger, Nuclear Weap- p. F7.
mis tmd Foreign Policy (New York: 9. Department o f State Bulletin, Sep
I l«r|H>r & Brother*, 1967), pp. 332, 333. tem ber 13, 1966, pp. 466-466.
10, Ibid.. p. 33,'). 10. Washington Star, August 17,1966;
11. Foreign Affairs, April, 1967, p. 431. reprinted, Congressional Record,
I 2. Foreign A ffairs, July, 1949, August 17, 1966, p. 19879.
pp. 1122 H2U. 11. Stoessinger, John (contributor),
i;». /hid., p. 621. The United Nations: Twenty Years
14. Ibid., p, 623. (New York: T he United Nations As
Ifi Qiiolcd in N athan H. Mager and sociation of th e United States of
•Im bues Kntel (Editors), Conquest America, 1963), pp, 80-81.
W ithout War (New York: Pocket 12. Washington Star, August 17,1966,
Hooka, Inc., 1961), p. 186. p. A7.
HI. Hugh Gaitskell, The Challenge of 13. W ashington Post, O ctober 13.
i'o e tis ie n c e (C am bridge: H arvard 1966, p. A26.
U niversity Press, 1967), p. 29. 14. Saturday Review World, March
Footnotes 261
23, 1974; reprinted, Congressional 13. Clark M, Kichelberger, The
Record, April 23, 1974, p. Sfl()06. United Nations Charter: What Was
Done At San Frvnciico, booklet (New
C hapter 10 York: American Association for the
1. Adverti«in|f Council, Challenge to United Nations, July, 1946), p. 4.
American)/ (booklet), 1962, a* quoted 14. Goodrich and Hambro, op, cit.,
in Francis X. Gannon, Biographical p. 20.
Dictionary of the Left (Boston: West 16. Revet, op. cit., p. 286.
ern Islands, 1971), Volume II, p. 6. 16. Alexander Uhl, The US and The
2. Richard E. Stebbins, The United U N ' Partners for Peace (Washington:
Staten in World Affairs, 1949 (New Public Affair* Institute, 1962), p. 29.
York: Harper & Brother*, 1950), 17. Department of H ealth, Educa
p. 278. tion, and Welfare (Office of Educa
3. Adlai K. Stevenion, atatem ent to tion), Teaching About the United N a
pres* conference, December 21, 1902; tions in the United States: January I,
reprinted a* D epartm ent of S tate I960, through December 31, 1963, Re
Publication 7605, released March, port of the United States of America
1973, p. 14. to the United Nations Economic and
4. Harry S Truman, quoted in "An Social Council (OE-14038-63, Bulletin
Open Letter to the American People,” 1964, No. 25), p. 107.
in Bmery Revet, The A natom y of 18. Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of
Peace (New York: Harper & Brothers, World Order (New York: Frederick A.
1946), dust cover. Praeger, 1964), p. 241.
5. J. William Fulbright (testimony), 19. Weekly Compilation of Presiden
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, tial Documents, December 13, 1971,
The United State a and the United p. 1632.
Nation* (H earing), May 7-8, 14-16, 20. Ibid., December 9, 1974, p. 1521.
21-22 and June 4, 1975, p. 56 21. Ibid., December 12, 1977, p. 1838.
(May 8th). 22. Quoted in John Foater Dulles, War
6. Frank K. Holman (article), The or Peace (New York» The Macmillan
Freeman, March, 1966, p. 360. Company, 1950), p. 203.
7. The Federali»t Papers (New York: 23. The In te r D ependent, July-
The Modern Library, no date), Essay August, 1975, p. 120.
Two, pp, 8-9. 24. The Freeman, December, 1976,
8. Foreign Affairs, Jan u ary , 1969, p. 721.
p. 364. 26. Goodrich and Hambro, op. c it.,
9. Washington Pott, April 24, 1974, p. 97.
p. A26. 26. Edgar Snow, Stalin Must Have
10. Robert A. Taft, A Foreign hilicy Peace (New York: Random Houae,
For Americans (New York: Doubleday 1947), p. 41.
& Company, 1961), p, 44. 27. Charles Malik, M an In The S tru g
11. Iceland M. Goodrich and Kdvard gle For Peace (New York: Harper &
Hambro, Charter of the United N a Row, 1963), p. 89.
tions (Boston: World Peace Founda 28. Universal Declaration of H um an
tion, 1949), p. 89. Rights, final authorized text, United
12. The Am erican C itizens H and N ations Office of Public Inform a
book, United Nations edition (W ash tion, Septem ber, 1966, p. 8.
ington: National Education Associa 29. United Nation* Office of Public
tion, 1946), p. 232. Inform ation, P ublication N um ber
262 The United Nation* Conspiracy
0 PI/422 — 03306, February, 1973, p. 9. 46. Ibid., p. 6.
30. Ibid., p. 11. ) 47. The Covenant n» printed In UN
31. United Nation* Office of Public M onthly Chronicle, February, 1967,
Inform ation, P ublication Number pp. 58-59.
OPI/542 — 75-38308, February, 197ft, 48. New York J'imns, September 29,
p. 6. 1973.
32. Ibid., p. 6.
33. Ibid., p. 10. C hapter 11
34. Subcommittee on International 1. Senate Foreign Relations Comm it
Organization* of the House Commit tee, The Charter of the United Nations
tee on International Relation*, The (h earin g ), Senate Foreign Relation*
1 Inited States In The United Nation* Committee, July 9 13, 1946, p. 533.
(Hearing*), February 10-11, 1976, 2. Ibid., pp. 611, BI3.
p. 39. 3. Ibid., p . m .
35. The Convention a* printed in UN 4. /5irf.,p. 624.
M onthly Chronicle, January, 1966, p. 5. Ibid., p. 616.
7 (reprint). fl. U.S. News World Report, Jan u
36. Foreign Affairs, April, 1967, p. 423. ary 19, 1976, p. 25.
37. T ext of Convention reprinted, 7. Senate Foreign Relation* Commit
Congressional Record, January 28, tee, op. cit., p. 613.
1974, pp. S560-581. 8. Ibid.
38. Testim ony reprinted, Congres 9. Foreign Affairs, April, 1952, p. 367.
sional Record, April 10, 1973, p. S6964. 10. U.S. News & World Report (Inter
39. John Barron and Anthony Paul, view), November 26, 1954, p. 92.
"M urder of a Gentle Land," Reader's 11. Congressional Record, June 23,
Digest, February, 1977, pp. 227ff. 1964, pp. 14288 -14289.
40. Congressional Record, May 26, 12. Dean Acheson, l*resent A t The
1970, p. S7732. Creation (New York: W.W. Norton St
41. Dan Smoot, "The T rap,” Ameri Company, Inc., 1969), p. 160.
can Opinion, March, 1973, p. 33. 13. Gale McGee (D.-Wyoming) and
42. Petition wa* photographically re Jam es H. Pearson (R.-Kansas), The
produced, Ibid., p. 29. U.S. A nd The U.N.: An Urgent Need
43. D epartm ent of S tate , U nited For A n Increased U.S. C om m itment,
States Participation in the United N a report to the Senate Committee on
tions: Report by the President to the Foreign Relations, September, 1973,
Congress for the year I9SI (Washing p. 2.
ton: U.S. Government Printing Of 14. Abraham Yeselson and Anthony
fice, 1952), p. 196. Gaglione, "The Use of The United
44. This and subsequent excerpt* ta Nation* In World Politics,” Intellect
ken from the Covenant as printed in Magazine, April, 1975, p. 430.
U N M onthly Chronicle, February, 15. New York Times Magazine (ar
1967, pp. 41-61. ticle), January 14, 1962; reprinted,
45. The International "Hill of Human Congressional Record, January 16,
R ights”: A Hrief History of the Inter 1962, p. A203.
national Covenants on Human Rights 16. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace
(and Optional Protocol), background (New York: The Macmillan Company,
paper, United N ations Office of 1960), p. 204.
Public Inform ation, Ju n e, 1976, 17. Foreign Affairs, April, 1961, p. 393.
pp. 2-3. 18. Clark Kichelberger, UN: The First
Footnotes 263
Fifteen Years (New York: Harper & 1978, p. A3.
Brothers, I960), p. 100. 10. Goodrich and Hambro, op. cit.,
19. United Nations Office of Public p. 120.
Information, United Nations General 11. Senate Committee on Foreign Re
Assembly, PublicationOPI/163-64-08210 lations, Review of the U .S. Charter —
(4th Kdition), March, 1964, p. 2. A Collection of Documents, January 7,
20. Hugh Gaitskell, The Challenge of 1964, pp. 108-109.
C oexistence (Cambridge: Harvard 12. G. Edward Griffin, The Fearful
University Press, 1957), p. 21, Master (Boston: Western Islands, 1964),
21. Cecil Crabb, American Foreign p. 188,
Policy In The Nuclear Age, Second 13. Foreign Affairs, April, 1974,
Kdition (New York: Harper & Row, p. 5Sfl ff.
1965), p. 402. 14. Foreign Affairs, July, 1970, p. 676.
22. The In ter D ependent, July-
August, 1976, p. 62. Chapter 13
23. Richard N. Gardner, In Pursuit of 1. Clarence Streit, Union Now (short
World Order (New York: Frederick A. version) (New York: Harper & Broth
Praeger, Inc., 19641, p. 9. ers, 1940), pp. 182-183.
24. Ibid., p. 12. 2. Quoted, Washington Star-News,
January 6, 1973, p. A5.
Chapter 12 3. Willard Clopton, "W ashington's
1. Lel-and M. Goodrich, and Edvard Honesty Is Upheld Again," Washing
Hambro, Charter of the United N a ton Post, September 21, 1966, p. B l.
tions: Commentary and Documents 4. Ronald G. Shafer, "Presidents and
(Boston: World Peace Foundation, Pot, Or Were Washington and Jeffer
1949), pp. 22-23. son Stoned?” Wall Street Journal, Oc
2. James J, Wadsworth, The (Hass tober 20, 1971, p. 1.
House: The United Nations In Action 6. National Review, January 6, 1973,
(New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966), p. 6.
p. 123. 6. Eira T aft Benson, Title of Liberty
3. William Carr, One World In The (Salt Lake City: Deseret Book Com
M aking (Boston: Ginn and Company, pany, 1964), p. 201.
1946), p. 45. 7. Renata Adler, "W ar Movie Arrives
4. American liar Association Journal, at the W arner T heater," New York
April, 1949 (35 AHA.) 286). Times, June 20, 1968; reprinted, Con
5. Departm ent of State, Foreign A f gressional Record, Ju n e 26, 1968,
fairs Policy (Foreword), Publication p. 87817.
Number 3972, released September, 1950. 8. Clive Barnes, " ‘H air’ — It's Fresh
6. Amelia C. Leiss (Editor), Apar and Frank — Likable Rock Musical
theid And United Nations Collective Moves to B roadw ay," New York
Measures: A n Analysis (New York: Times, May 1, 1968; reprinted, Con-
Carnegie Endowment for Internation grestional Record, Ju n e 26, 1968,
al Peace, March, 1966), p. 159. p. S7817.
7. Clarence Manion, The Conserva 9. Republican Congressional C om m it
tive American (New York: The Devin- tee Newsletter, June 15, 1982, p. 2.
Adair Company, 1964), p. 145. 10. Look, December 1, 1970, p. 19 ff.
8. Human Events, Septem ber 9,1972, (article by I<eonard A. Stevens).
p. 20. 11. Associated Press dispatch, Soft
9. Salt Lake Tribune, September 7, Lake Tribune, August 17,1977, p. 2A.
264 The United Nationn Ctm»i»rucy
12. William P. Buckley, Jr., "Getting quoted in Albert Kushnell 11MrI and
Involved Can He Perplexing" Wash Herbert Rimnld Fsrlvger (Keillors),
ington Evening Star, June 24, 1970, T hr Theodore Hoosecelt Cyclopedia
p. A-18. (Roosevelt Memorial A ssociation,
13. Washington Pant,' December 17, 1041), |>. 415,
1971, p. A32. 35. dreat Ideas Today, IH7! (Chicago:
14. Washington Evening Star, De Encyclopedia Hrltannica, Inc.I, p. HA,
cember 29, 1971, p. C3.
15. W ashington E vening S ta r and C hapter 14
Daily N ew t, January 16, 1973, p. D3. 1. Department of State, Report to the
16. W ashington Post, Ja n u ary 17, I‘resident on the Results of the San
1973, p. C8. Francisco Conference, Publication
17. Life, September 13, 1968, p. 20. 2340, June 26, 194A, p. 18.
18. Senior Scholastic, October 6,1969, 2. T hestntem ent, which hndnp|>eared
p. 11. in the press earlier, was printed on the
19. Saturday Review, June 26, 1966, dust jacket o f Kmery Reves, The
pp. 46 ff. Anatom y of Peace (New York: Harper
20. N ew sw eek, December 2, 1968, & Brothers, 1045). It was signed by Ju s
pp. 86, 89. tice Owen J. Roberts; Senator J.W .
21. Reader's Digest, December, 1968, Fulbright (I).-A rkansas); S enator
pp. 179-180 (b condensation of Life Clnude Pepper (D.-Florida); Senator
article, footnote 17 supra. Elbert I). Thomns (I).-Utah); Ht. Rev.
22. M y Weekly Reader, February 28, Henry St. Geo Tucker; Rev, Kdward A.
1968, p. 3. Conway, S .J.; Dr. Umii Finkelstein;
23. This Week, February 9, 1969, Mortimer Adler; Charle* G. Bolte;
pp. 2, 14-15. Gardner Cowles, Jr.; Albert Kinstein;
24. Scholastic Teacher, November 22, Dorothy Canfield Fisher; Albert D.
1968, p. 7. Lasker; Thomas Mann; Lieutenant
25. Christian Century, October 23, Cord .Vleyer, U.S.M.C.R.; Christopher
1968, pp. 1327-1328. Morley; Carl Van Doren; Mark Van
26. "W aiter Cronkite R eporting," Doren; W alter F. Wanger; and Robert
Septem ber 8,1972, traniicript supplied J. Watt.
by CBS. 3. The U nited N ation 9 (booklet),
27. "The World Tonight," September Headline Series No. 59 (New York: For
13, 1972, transcript supplied by CBS. eign Policy Aaaociation, Septemher-
28. The Review Of The News, Sep October, 1946), pp. 43-44.
tem ber 27, 1972, p. 16. 4. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Crusade In
29. Quoted, The Dan Sm oot Report, Europe (New York: Doubleday & Com
Septem ber 3, 1962, p. 281. pany, Inc., 1948), p. 459.
30. Ibid. 5. Quoted, D epartm ent of S tate,
31. Resolution (with signatures) pho I ’NESCO Leaders Speak (1949), p. 1.
tographically reproduced, B utler 6. John Foster Dulles, War or Peace
C ounty (Ohio) American, September (New York: The Macmillan Company,
21, 1968, p. 4. 1950), p. 40.
32. Ibid. 7. Saturday Review, March 23,1953.
33. Text supplied by World Affairs 8. Clark Eichelberger, U.N.: The First
Council of Philadelphia. Ten Years (New York: Harper &
34. Lafayette Day exercises, New Brothers, 1955), p. 89.
York City, Septem ber 6, 1918; as 9. United States Committee for the
Footnotes 265
United N ationi, Fact* for Fallacies: Struggle: The United Nation*,” Politi
Answer* to Current Question* about cal Affairs (theoretical journal of the
the United Nation*, Reviied Edition, Oommunwt Party, U.S.A.), April, 1973,
March, 1963, p. 5. p. 37.
10. Great Ideai Today, 1971 (Chicago: 13. Washington Post, November 27,
Encyclopedia Rrltannica, Inc.), p. 87. 1976, p. A13.
11. Ibid.
12. Foreign Affair*, April, 1962, Chapter 16
pp. 349-360. 1. Quoted in Henry A. Kiuinger, N u
clear Weapons and Foreign Policy
C hapter 15 (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957),
1. Fortune, November, 197S; reprinted, p. 337,
Congressional Record, November 11, 2. Q uoted, D epartm ent of S tate,
1975, p. 819710. United Nations; Guardian of Peace,
2. Teitimony, Subcommittee on Fu Publication 7226, releaaed September,
ture Foreign Policy Research and De 1961, p. 20.
velopment of the Home Committee on 3. U.S. News & World Report, July
International Relation*, Reassessment 22. 1960, p. 8.
of U.S. Foreign Policy (Hearing*), 4. U.S. News & World Report, De
July 15, 22-24,1975, p. 60 (July 22nd). cember 19, I960, pp. 18-17.
3. Testimony, Subcommittee on Inter 6. Statem ent reprinted in Gale Mc
national Organization* of the House Gee (D.-Wyoming) and Jame* Peanon
Committee on International Relation*, (R.-Kanaa*), The U.S. and the U.N.:
The United States In The United N a An Urgent Need for An Increased U.S.
tion* (Hearing*), February 10-11,1976, C om m itm ent, report to the Senate
pp. 4-5 (February 10th). Committee on Foreign Relation*. Sep
4. New America (article), Novem tem ber, 1973, p. 27.
ber 30, 1974; reprinted, Congressional 8. Ibid., p. 32.
Record, January 27, 1976, p. E184. 7. M eet The Press (NBC radio and
6. Congressional Record, Auguit 1, television), September 14, 1976, p. 3
1975, p. 814961. of transcript.
6. Clarence K. Streit, Union Now 8. Face The Nation (CBS radio and
(short edition) (New York: Harper & television), October 26, 1975, p. 14 of
Brother*, 1940), p. 93. transcript.
7. Ibid., p. 96. 9. U.S. N ewt & World Report, De
8. Congressional teitim ony, Feb cember 1,1975, p. 10.
ruary 10, 1976. See footnote 3 supra, 10. "Conversation* With Eric Seva-
p. 10. reid,” CBS Television Network broad
9. New York Time* Magazine (speech cast, May 30, 1976, p. 3 of transcript.
text), May 4,1975; reprinted, Congres- 11. Great Ideas Today Yearbook, 1971
sional Record, June 9, 1976, p. 810068. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica,
10. Foreign Affair», July, 1953, p. 602. Inc.), p. 83.
U . Yale Review, Summer, 1967;
quoted in Strengthening Free World Chapter 17
Security: N ATO A nd Atlantic Coop 1. U.S. News & World Report, Auguit
eration, The United State* And World 29, 1977, p. 61.
Government, Senate Committee on 2. U nited N ationi General Asiembly,
Foreign Relation*, July 26,1960, p. 61. Introduction to the Report o f the Sec
12. John Pittman, "Aren* of Claa* retary-General on the Work of the Or-
gani t a tinn (provision al version), docu
266 The United Nation* Conspiracy
ment A/8401/Add.l, September 17, 1071, aid needy children and mothers in over
p. MB. 100 countries."
■i. Wall Street Journal, August 27, 8. New York Time*, April 16, 1974;
1974; reprinted, Congressional Record, reprinted, Congressional Record, April
September 19, 1974, p. E6897. 26, 1974, p. B2621.
4. Ibid. 9. See statem ent by Martin F. Her*,
B. Item from the R ichm ond News Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
leader (date not given), quoted in for International O rganization Af
Human Events, February 12, 1972, fairs, in Foreign Assistance and Re
p. 15. lated Agencies Appropriations for 1974
6. Letter to the author from Louii E. (hearings), Subcommittee on Foreign
Frechtling, Director of the S tate De Operations and Related Agencies of
p a rtm e n t'. Office of International the House Committee on Appropria
Administration, September 11, 1970. tions, Part 2, July 12, 1973, p. 1309.
10. Human Events, June 7, 1976, p. 9.
Chapter 18 11. Ibid.
1. foreign Policy Decision Making: 12. Ibid.
The New Dimensions, report of a N a 13. National S ta m p News, May 20,
tional Policy Panel established by the 1972, pp. 1, 3.
United Nation* Association of the
USA in cooperation with the Carnegie C hapter 19
Endowment for International Peace, 1. U.S. Committee for UNICEF Bul
May, 1973, p. 46. letin, November 6, 19B9.
2. "NGO — The Special Ingredient,” 2. Redbook, October, 1967, p. 26.
by Herman VV. St«inkraua, President 3. Dennis The Menace I*ochet Full Of
of the United Nations Association of Fun (X m asX tra), No. 14, published by
the USA, in The United Nations: the Hallden Division of Fawcett Pub
Tw enty Years (New York: The United lications Inc., Sparta, Illinois, Octo
Nations Association of the USA, 1966), ber, 1972, pp. 32-40.
p. 96. 4. Photocopies of all quoted docu
3. Washington P ott, March 4, 1976, m ents are in the author's files.
p. D6.
4. Washington Star, March 3, 1976, C hapter 20
p. A8
1. Quoted, Salt Lake Tribune, April
5. Congressional Record, Ju n e 19, 20, 1963, p. 23.
1961, p. 10690.
fl. Congressional Record, D ecem C hapter 21
ber 27,1967, p. A8409. 1. Trygve Lie, In The Cause Of Peace
7. Quoted, "U NICEF Official Dis (New York: The Macmillan Company,
guises Facts in U tte r to The News," 1964), pp. 68-69, 60.
by M. Stanton Evans, Editor, In 2. Leland M. Goodrich and Edvard
dianapolis News, January 26, 1962. Hambro, Charter nf the United Na
The official referred to in the head tions: Commentary and Documents,
line was not Mr. Pate, but rather C. Second and Revised Edition (Boston:
Lloyd Bailey, Executive Director of World Peace Foundation, 1949), p. 64.
the U .S. C om m ittee for U NICEF, 3. Foreign Affairs, October, 1960, p. 71.
who had denied in a letter to Mr. 4. Louis Dolivet, The United Nations
Evans th a t UNICEF money had been (New York: Farrar, Straua and Com
used for any purpose other than “to pany, 1946), p. 24.
Footnotes 267
6. Senate Internal Security Subcom Seminar A t T h i United Nations, *pon-
mittee, U nited Nation* Headquarters *ored by the Stanley Foundation, De
S ite Statu* of Agreement Resolutions, cember 1-3, 1971; excerpted, Congres
March 16, 1967. sional Record, July 21, 1972, p. E6971.
6. Ibid., p. 14. 6. Quoted, T he Inter Dependent,
7. Congressional Record, Decem July-August, 1975, p. 27.
ber 13, 1967, p. S18587. 7. .lame* J. Wad*worth, The Glass
8. Congressional Record, Decem House: The United Nations In Action
ber 11, 1967, p. S18347. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1966),
p. 97.
C hapter 22 8. The Inter Dependent, May, 1976,
1. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela p. 6.
tion*, The Charter of the United N a 9. I.P. T»amerian and 8.L. Ronin,
tioni, July 9-13,1946, pp. 232-233. (Tes Equality of Rights Between Races and
timony of Dr. Paivolsky, July 9, 1946.) Nationalities in the U SSR (UNESCO,
2. D epartm ent of State, Report to the 1962), pp. 11, 12, 13,37.
President on the Results of the San 10. The U nited N ations: Tw enty
Francisco Conference, P ublication Years (New York: The United Nation*
2349, June 26, 1946, p. 48. Association of the USA, 1966), p. 106.
3. Senate Committee on Foreign Rela 11. Quoted by forijier Senator J.W.
tion*, op. cit., p. 234. Fulbright (D.-Arkansas), testimony,
4. Ibid., p. 236. Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
6. Ibid., p. 346. (Testimony of Green May 8, 1976; see The United States
H. Hackworth, July 10, 1946.) And The United Nation* (hearing*),
6. Lift of Treaties and Other Interna Senate Foreign Relation* Committee,
tional Agreement/i Between the United May 7-8,14-15, 21-22 and June 4,1975,
States of America and the Union of p. 56.
Soviet Socialist Republics, With Indi 12. Quoted by Brian Urquhart, Under
cations of Those Which It It Consid Secretary General of the United Na
ered the Soviet Union Has Violated, tion* for Special Political Affair*, at
prepared by the A**iitant I-egal Ad the first Annual Award* Dinner of
visor for T reaty Affair*, Departm ent The Ralph Bunche In*titute, May 22,
of S tate; reprinted, Congressional 1974; see Congressional Record, July
Record, September 24, 1963, p. 16606. II, 1974, p. S 12231.
13. Washington Post, November 27,
C hapter 23 1976, p. K22.
I. The Inter Dependent, June, 1976, 14. Congressional Record, July 28,
p. 2. 1945; reprinted, Congressional Record,
2. Quoted in Hubert Welch, The Blue October 18, 1972, p. E8848.
Book of T h e John Birch S o ciety, 15. Congressional Record, October 26,
Eighteenth Printing (Ho*ion: We*tern 1971, p. S 16764.
Island*, 1961), p. 160. 16. Transcript (PR 370) supplied by
3. Robert W hite and H .h. Imel, A m e r the Bureau of Public Affair*, Office
ican (lovernm ent: Democracy A t of Media Service*, Department of
Work (New York: I). Van Nostrand State, p. 8.
Company, Inc., 1961), p. 616. 17. l<etter to Bishop Mandell Creigh
4. Human Events, November 13, 1971, ton, April 5, 1887, as quoted in John
p. 10. B artlett, Familiar Quotations (Emily
6. Report O f The Third News Media Morison Berk, Editor), Fourteenth
268 The United Nations Conspiracy
Kdition (Hotton: Little, Brown & 3. War Department Training Manual
Company, 1968), p. 760. No. 2000-26, November 30,1928, p. 91.
18. ‘T h e Harbinger" (short »tory) 4. Ibid, (with minor typographical er
from The Voice of the City In The ror*) and Harry Attwood, Our Repub
Complete Work* o f 0. Henry (New lic (MnMRchusett*: Deatiny Publish
York: Doubleday & Company, Inc., er*, 1918), pp. 28-29.
1963), Volume II, p. 1277. 6. Margaret Cha*e Smith, "Our Re
public — Bulwark Againit the T yran
Appendix E ny of M ajoritit*," undated (tatem ant
1. Robert Welch. The Blue Book of reprinted a* Mo. 60 in the Spotlight
The John Birch Society (Boiton: W est for the Nation Serie* diitributed by
ern Islands, 1969), sixteenth printing, th e C om m ittee for C o m tltu tio n al
p. 163. Government, Inc., New York City.
2. Look, September 26, 1961, p, 23 ff.
Index
AAUN, see American Association Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, Jr.,
for the United Nations 197
Abernathy, Reverend Ralph, 106 Article 19, see UN Charter
Abourezk, James, 246 Asia, 97
Abram, Morris B., 96 Aspaturian, Vernon, 146
Acheson, Dean, 9, 14,16,113, 116, Aspin, Les, 245
193 Assembly of the League of N a
Achilles, Theodore C., 243 tions, 8
Acton, Lord, 195 "Assistance to Palestinian Wom
Advisory Committee on Post-War en Inside and Outside the Oc
Foreign Policies, 7 cupied Territories,” 212
Africa, 40, 97, 148 Associated Press, 24, 26, 72,76, 97,
AHA, see American Institute of 122
International Affairs Atlantic Charter, 8
The Alam o, 131 Atlantic Union Movement, 35,144
Albert, Carl, 245 Attwood, Harry, 250
American Association for the Austin, Warren, 184
United Nations, 40, 111 Austria, 28
American Bar Association, 36, 96,
104 Badillo, Herman, 245
American H istorical Reference Baily, C. Lloyd, 158
Society, 129 Baker, George Barr, 216
American In stitu te of In te rn a Baker, Ray Stannard, 215
tional Affairs, 6, 216 Ball, George, 91
American Jewish Committee, 103 Baltic Republics, 193
American Opinion, 197 Bang-Jensen, Povl, 21, 22, 23
American Opinion Bookstore, 201 Barmine, Alexandr, 30
Anderson, Jack, 77 Barnes, Joseph, 30
Anderson, John B., 245 Barrett, William A., 245
Andrews, Mark, 246 Barron, John, 77
Angel), Jam es W„ 243 Bay of Pigs, 86
Angola, 208 Beall, Senator J. Glenn, Jr., 144
Animal Farm, 166 Bedell, Berkley, 245
A nti-Fascist People’s Freedom Beirut, 209
League, 24 Biester, Kdward G., 245
Arizona Republic, x Benson, Ezra Taft, 129
Arafat, Yasir, 210 Bentley, Elizabeth, 16
Arkadev, Georgy, 78------------------- Berber, Marilyn, 149-------------------
Armstrong, Hamilton Fish, 5, 7, Bill of Rights, see U.S. Constitu
83, 115, 215, 243 tion
270 The United Nations Conspiracy
Bingham, Jonathan B., 245 Carnegie Endowment., 14
Hlack Panther*, 105 Carr, Robert, 246
Bliss, Tasker H., 216 Carr, William, 120
Bloomfield, Lincoln P,, 37, 117, Carroll, Mitchell B., 243
145 Carson, Dr. Clarence B., 101
Blount, William, 170 Carter Administration, 191, 200
B’nal B’rith, 100, 143 Carter, President Jimmy, 67, 100,
Bohlen, Charles E., 243 103, 107, 123
Boland, Kdward P., 245 Castro, Fidel, 210
Bolling, Richard, 245 Catholic People's Party, 28
Halshevik, 73 CBS, nee Columbia Broadcasting
The Boston (I lobe, 200 System
Bowman, Isaiah, 7, 243 CEIRPP, nee Committee on the
Brademas, John, 245 Exercise of the Inalienable
Brandeis University, 144 Rights of the Palestinian Peo
Brent, Henry, 128 ple
Brigham Young University, 76 Central Intelligence Agency, 4, 22,
Brinkley, David, 128 191, 198
British lab o u r Party, 85, 116 CKR, see Council on Foreign Re
Brodhead, William M., 245 lations
Brooke, Kdward W,, 245 Chambers, W hittaker, 15,16, 30
Browder, Earl, 15, 71 Chapultepec Conference, 14
Brown, George ft., 245 Charter Organization, 35
Buchanan, Congressman John, 64 Chase, S tuart, 38
Budenz, hm is, 15, 30 Cheka, 27
Hulawayo Chronicle, 206 Chiang Kai-shek, 57
Bullit, William C., 57, 58, 71 Chicago Council on Foreign Rela
Bunche, Ralph, 194, 243 tions, 29
Bundy, McCeorge, 84 Chicago Seed, 129
Burke, Dr., 128, 129 China, Red, xii, 8, 18, 20, 25, 28,
Burke, Yvonne B., 246 30, 40, 51, 54, 57, 58, 59, 60, 70
Burma, 24 China, Republic of, 30, 40,69, 70,
Burma's Educational Reorganiza 71, 112, 162
tion Committee, 24 Chisolm, Representative Shirley,
Byrd, Senator Harry F., Jr., 66-67, 106
204 Chou En-lai, 20, 30, 31
Byrd Amendment, 65-67, 204 Christian Century, 134
Byrnes, James, 10, 14 Christian Children’s Fund, 158
Byron, (Joodloe E., 246 Church, Senator Frank, 69,70, 76,
90, 113, 245
Cabot, John M., 243 Churchill, Winston, 8
Cairo Conference, 9 CIA, see Central Intelligence
Cambodia, 206 Agency
Index 271
CIC, see Citizens Information Corman, James C., 246
Committee Council on Foreign Relations, 5-7,
Citizens Information Committee, 9-11, 13, 16, 22, 29, 30, 34,
174-179 36-38, 40, 44, 46, 52-64, 56-59,
City College of New York, 4 64, 66. 69-72, 74, 75, 83-86, 90-
Civil Rights Congress, 105 92, 96, 99, 111, 116, 117, 123,
Clark, Senator Dick, x, 245 128, 132, 136, 137, 139-141, 143,
Clark, Senator Joseph, 137, 142, 145, 146, 148, 182,191,193,194,
160 215, 217, 243
Clark, J. Reuben, 34, 3ft, 40 The CFR Packet, 6
Clark, General Mark, 69, 60 Covenant of the League of Na
Cleveland, Ambassador Harlan, tions, 3
46, 145 Cowles, Gardner, Jr., 30
Clyde, Governor George D., 176 Crabb, Cecil V., Jr., 3, 42,116
Cobden, Richard, 189 Crane, R. Keith, 34
Collins, Cardiss, 246 Cranston, Alan, 24{i
Columbia Broadcasting System, Cronkite, W alter, 1)35
135,149, 150 Csepel Iron and Steel Works, 85
Commager, Henry Steele, 137 Cuba, 25, 210
Commager Declaration, 137 Currie, Lauchlin, 15
Committee on the Exercise of the Cyprus, 76
Inalienable Rights of the Pal Czechoslovakia, 28, 49, 85
estinian People, 197
Committee on Post-W ar Prob Daily Telegraph, London, 207
lems, 7 Daily Worker, 73, 74
Committee on the Question of Daily World, 66, 106
Defining Aggression, 48 Dallin, Professor Alexander, 41
Communist Party, 15, 71-73, 109, Danielson, George E., 246
193 Davis, Norman H., 7
Confucius, 30 Davison, F. Trubee, 215
Congo, 21, 75, 76, 91,147,148,160, Day, Clive, 215
174 Day of Solidarity with the Pales
Congressional Record, 184 tinian People, 212
Connally, Tom, 123,186 Declaration of Independence, 96,
Connally Amendment, 122,142 128, 250
Connally Reservation, 123 Declaration of Mterdependence,
Connally Resolution, see Connally 136, 137, 245, see also Com
Amendment, see Connally Res mager Declaration
ervation "A Declaration of World Citizen
Conte, Silvio O., 246 ship", 136
Conyers, John J., Jr., 246 Dellums, Ronald V., 246
Coolidge, Archibald C,, 215 D entonrSenator Jeremiah, 213
Cordier, Andrew W., 243 DerwinBki, R epresentative Ed-
272 The United Nations Conspiracy
ward J., 191 Facts On File, 197
de Toledano, Ralph, 16 Fairchild, Muir S., 243
Dickey, -John S., 243 FAC), see Food and Agriculture
Dobrynin, Anatoly, 78 Organization
Doctor, Bobby, 122 FAR1, 208
Dodd, Dr. Bella, 71 Fatah, Al, 209, 210
Dolgin, Colonel, 65 FBI, nee Federal Bureau of Inves
Dolivet, Louis, 182 tigation
Douglas, Senator Paul, 53, 54 Fearful Master, The, 202
Drinan, Fr. Robert F., 246 Federal Bureau of Investigation,
du Berrier, Hilaire, 28, 199, 210, xi, lfi, 191
211 Federalist Papers, The, 96
Dulles, Allen Welsh, 4, 22, 140 Fenwick, Millicent H., 246
Dulles, John Foster, 4, 56, 115, Fifth Committee on Scale of As
141,243 sessments for the Apportion
Dumbarton Oaks Conference, 9, ment of the United Nations,
14 148
Duncan, Robert B., 246 Finland, 27
Dunham, William E., 169 Finletter, Thomas K., 243
Dunn, James Clement, 243 Flood, Daniel J „ 246
Florio, James J., 246
Eagleton, Clyde, 146, 243 Flynn, John T,, 112, 113
East Stroudsburg State College, 42 Food and Agriculture Organiza
Edgar, Robert W„ 246 tion, 159
Edwards, Don, 246 Ford, President Gerald, 100
Egan, M artin, 215 Ford. William D„ 246
Egypt, 85. 86, 116,117 Foreign Affairs, 5-7, 16, 18, 34, 37,
Eichelberger, Clark M„ 40, 86, 39, 53, 64, 83, 84, 96, 104, 123,
111, 116, 141, 243 126
Kilberg, Joshua, 246 Foreign Relations Committee, 183
Einstein, Albert, iT f Formosa, 57-59, 162, see Republic
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 58, 86, of China
140, 141 Forsythe, Edwin B„ 246
Eisenhower, Dr. Milton, 140 46 Angry M en, 201
Emergency Conference Commit Fosdick, Raymond B., 216
tee, 106 Founding Fathers, 95, 98,127, 249
England, 46, 60, 61, 116 “ Fourteen Points", 4
Ervin, Senator Sam J., 106 France, 57, 117, 187
Estonia, 193 Fraser, R epresentative Donald
Ethiopia, 207 M„ 137, 246
Freedom House, 112
Fabian Society, The, 38, 174, 176, Fremantle, Anne, 176
177 Fulbright, Senator J.W ., 82
Index 273
Fulbright Resolution, 8 Hamilton, Thomas J., 16,19,182
HammarskjOld, Dag, 20, 21, 23,
Gaglione, Anthony, 42, 114 24, 76, 194
Gaitskell, Hugh, 86, 116 Hannibal, 177
Gallup, Dr. George, ix Hanoi, 206
Gallup Poll, ix, 46, 213 Harkin, Thomas R., 246
Gardner, Professor Richard, 91, Harrelson, Max, 76
99, 117, 123-126, 190 Harrington, Michael, 246
Gates, Artemun, 243 Hart, Philip, 246
GATT, see General Agreement on Hartke, Vance, 246
Tariffs and Trade Hartley, Livingston, 111, 112
Gay, Edwin, E., 216 Harvard University, 201
General Agreement on Tariffs Haskins, Charles H., 216
and Trade, 124 Hatfield, Mark, 246
Genocide Convention, 104, 106, Hawkins, Augustus F., 246
107 Heinl, Colonel Robert D., Jr., 161,
George, Senator Walter F., 186 162, 206, 206
Germany, 26, 46, 106 Helstoki, Henry, 246
Gibbons, Sam M., 246 Henderson, Gerard C., 216
Goldberg, A rthur J., 92, 93 Henry, Patrick, 129
Goldwater, Senator Barry, 194 Hepburn, Arthur J., 243
Goodrich, Inland, 37, 119, 122, Herman, George, 149
181 Herter, Christian A., 4, 62, 216
Gravel, Mike, 246 Hinckley, John W„ Jr., 211
Gray, lx>uis H., 216 Hiroshima, 26, 33, 71
Great Britain, nee England Hiss, Alger, 9, 13-16
Green, Jerome, 216 Hitler, Adolf, 28,102, 113
Green, William .J„ 246 Holman, Frank E., 36, 96
Green Herein, The, 131 Holmes, Julius C., 243
Gregory, Dick, 106 Hoover, President Herbert, 36,216
Griffin, G. Edward, 43, 123, 202 Hoover, J. Edgar, xi, 16
Gromyko, Andrei, 17-19,181 Hopkins, Harry, 29, 86
Gross, Representative H.R., 160 Hornbeck, Stanley K., 14, 216
Gude, Gilbert, 246 Horton, Frank, 246
Guinneaa Book of World Recordn, House, Colonel Edward Mandell,
20 3-6,216
House, Harold Pratt, 10
Hackworth, Green H., 187 House Committee on Internal Se
Haig, Alexander, 199 curity, 213
Hair, 132 Hovde, Bryn J., 17
Hale, Nathan, 129, 189 "How U.S. Tax Dollars Pay For
Hambro, Edvard, 37, 119, 122,181 PLO Terrorism”, 209
Hamilton, Alexander, 4, 44 Howland, Charles P., 216
21 4 7'he United Nations Conspiracy
Huilson, Manley 0 ., 215 Jones, Hubert K., 246
I lull, Cordell, 71 •Iordan, Barbara, 246
H uman Kuents, 27, 121, 161, 205 Joyce, Jam es Avery, 38, 174-176,
H um an Rights-Bill of Right* 178
l)ny, 100
"H um an Rights Day", 99 Kane, R. Keith, 243
Humphrey, Hubert H., 245 Katanga, 21, 25, 40, 47, 49, 68, 89,
Hungarian Freedom Fighters, 23 147, 1H0, 201, 205
Hungary, 21, 84-86, 116 Kennedy, President John F., 74,
84, 136
limtl, H.L., 190 Keys, M artha, 246
IMF, see International Monetary KGB, (Soviet Com m ittee for
Fund State Security), 27, 77
"Inalienable Rights of the Pales Khmer Rouge, 206
tinian People", 197 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 102
India, 207 Khrushchev, Nikita, 53,69,73, 76,
Inouye, Daniel K., 245 85
Intrr Dependent, The, 189 Kirn II-aung, 53
International Convention on the King, Mrs. Martin Luther, Jr.,
Klimination of All Forms of 106
Racial Discrimination, 103, 104 Kiselev, K.D., 78
International Court of Justice, 89, Kissinger, Henry, xii, 66, 67, 83,
91, 122, 123 194
International Monetary Fund, 124 Kitteredge, T.B., 215
Inquiry, The, 3, 4 Knopf Publishers, 16
Iran, 18, 200 Kohler, Foy D„ 243
Ireland, 33 Korea, 18, 20, 35, 40, 51-60, 62
Iron Curtain, 77 Korea, North, 51-60
Korea, South, 51-60
Jackson, President Andrew, 128 Korean War, 54, 115
Jacobson, Max, 94 Korey, William, 100, 104, 143
Jndu, Ahmed, 209, 210 Koaygin, Alexei N., 24
Japan, 38, 71 Kremlin, 22, 70
Javits, Jacob K., 44, 245 Kutakov, I^onid N„ 78
Jay, John, 96
Jt'fferson, Thomas, 6, 128 Labouisse, Henry, 161, 207
Jtmsup, Philip C., 243 Lamb, Beatrice Pitney, 140
John Birch Society, The, x, xi, 74 Lamont, 'I’homas W., 215
Johnson, Douglas, 215 Langer, Senator William L., 72,
Johnson, Joseph E., 243 194
Johnson, President Lyndon B., 63, Laski, Harold, 39
84, 103, 130, 203 liatvia, 193
Jones, John Paul, 129 Laurent, Roland, 199
Index 275
League for Industrial Democracy, Majestic Hotel, 6
17 Malik, Charles, 34, 36, 38, 46, 81
League of Nations, 3, 4, 68, 98, 101
144 Mallory, Walter H., 7
Lebanon, 209 Manion, Clarence, 121
Lee, Robert W., 197 Mannes, Marya, 193
Leggett, Robert, 246 Mansfield, Mike, 245
Leiss, Amelia C., 121 Manuilsky, Dmitri Z., 18
Lenin, Vladimir I., 26, 27, 39 Tse-tung, Mao, 20, 71,102
I^ent, Norman F., 246 Marx, Karl, 44
Lessiovsky, Viktor Mechislavo Massing, Hede, 30
vich, 27 Matsunaga, Spark, 246
LeVander, Governor Harold, 137 1 Maximus, Quintus Fabius, 177
Lewis, Samuel, x McCarthy, Richard D., 205
Liberal Americans for Democrat McCarthy, Congressman Richard
ic Action, 144 I)., 160
LID, see League for Industrial McCloskey, Paul N., Jr., 246
Democracy McCloy, John J ., 243
Lie, Trygve, 16-20,78, 79,181,184 McDonald, Representative Law
Life Magazine, 14, 134 rence Patton, 200
Linowitz, Sol, 74 McDonnell Douglas Corporation,
Lippmann, Walter, 4 40
Liskofsky, Sidney, 103 McGee, Senator Gale W., x, 66,
Lithuania, 193 70, 148, 149, 204, 245
Lockheed Aircraft Corporation, McGovern, George, 246
148 McHugh, M atthew F., 246
Lockwood, .John E„ 243 McIntyre, Thomas J., 245
I/idge, Henry Cabot, 40, 70, 75, McManus, John F„ 207
81, 113 Mathias, Charles McC„ 246
London's Foreign Affairs R e McNamara, Robert S., 64, 132
search Institute, 208 McKnaught, Professor Kenneth,
Long, Clarence 1)., 246 34,
Look Magazine, 133 Meeds, Lloyd, 246
Lord, Robert H., 215 “Meet the Press", 90
Lvov, Mikhail Sergeyevich, 74 Metcalf, I^ee, 245
Metcalf, Ralph H., 246
MacArthur, General Douglas, 56, Meyer, Cord, Jr., 243
57, 69, 60 Meyner, Helen D., 246
MacDonald, Torbert H., 246 Mexico, 14, 17, 33, 34
Macl.can, Donald, 60 Mezes, Sidney, 4
Mc zvinskv, Edward, 246
Madison, James, 128 Middle East, 211
Madison Square Garden, 133, 134 Mikoyan, Anastas, 23
276 The United Nations Conspiracy
Mikvu, Abner J., 246 New Left, 129
Miller, Kdward G., Jr., 243 Newman, Barry, 154
Mineta, Norman Y., 246 New School for Social Research,
Mink, Patsy, 246 17
Mission to the United Nations Newsweek, 134
(USSR), xii Newton, Huey, 106
Mondale, W alter F., 24ft New York Tim et, 16, 27, 28, 53,
Monroe, President James, 128 56, 73, 131, 132, 136
Monroe, M arilyn, 129 Nicaragua, 200
Moore, Hugh, 243 Nix, Robert N.C., 246
Moorhead, William S., 246 Nixon, Richard, xii, 46, 63, 100,
Morgan, Thom as E., 246 128
Morgenthau, Professor Hans J., Nolan, Richard, 246
84 North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
Moscow Declaration, 8, 9 tion, 46, 145
Moskowitz, Moses, 120 Norway, 16, 17
Moss, John E., 246 Notre Dame I<uw School, 121
Moynihan, Senator Daniel, 149, NU, U, 24, 25
160 Nuclear Weaponn and Foreign Pol
Mugabe, Robert, 205, 208 icy, 83
M undt, Karl, 16 Nujoma, Sam, 209
Murphy, John M., 246
MVD, 22, 23 Oliver, Judge L. Stauffer, 111
M y Weekly Header, 134 Olivet, Georges, 202
Olympic Games, 133, 135, 136,
Nabisco, Inc., 159 190,212
Nagasaki, 26, 33 One World, 29, 30, 39
Namibia, 208 One World Government, 139-142
Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 85 Organization for African Unity,
National Archives, 128 207
National Broadcasting Company, Orwell, George, 156
90 Ottinger, Richard, 246
National Commission on Mari
juana and Drug Abuse, 128,129 Packwood, Senator Robert, 194,
National Geographic Society, 128 245
NBC, nee National Broadcasting Palestine, 19, 212
Company Palestine Liberation Organization
NATO, spp North Atlantic Treaty (PLO), 70, 197, 198, 209, 210,
Organization 212
NATO Flag, 132 “ Palestinians Do Have Rights”
Nelson, Gaylord, 245 (film), 211
Nesterenko, Alexei E,, 78 Paris Convention, 96
New Deal, 29 Pasvolsky, I^eo, 7,8,9,14,186,243
Index 277
Pate, Maurice, 160 R eader’» Digest, 134
Patriotic Front, 209 Reagan Administration, 199, 213
Patterson, William, 106 Reagan, President Ronald, 211
Pavlichenko, Vladimar P., 27 Red Cross, 202
Peace and Countenipace, 215 Rees, Thomas M., 246
Pearl Harbor, 7, 38, 39 Religious News Service, 206
Pearson, Drew, 92, 128 The Reporter, 193
Pearson, James B., 245 Republican Party, 29
Pell, Claiborne, 246 Reston, James, 136
People'll World, 73, 74 Reuss, Henry S., 246
Pepper, Claude D., 246 The Review Of The News, 130
Percy, Senator Charles, x Revolutionary War (U.S.), 26
Perjury: The Hitta-Chambera Rhodesia, 23, 26, 39, 47, 49, 61-68,
Cane, 16 112, 121, 200, 203, 204, 206-209
Piao, Lin, 59 see Zimbabwe
Pierce, President Franklin, 128 R1AA, nee Royal Institute for In-
Pilot, 28 ternational Affairs
Pledge of Allegiance to the Flag, Ribicoff, Abraham A., 246
132, 133, 260 Richmond, Frederick W., 246
PLO, see Palestine Liberation Or* Ridgway, (Jeneral Matthew, 59
ganization Riviana Foods, Inc., 159
Politburo, 66 Roche, John, 144
Political Affair/, 72, 73 The Rockefeller Foundation, 7
Poole, Dewitt C., 243 Rockefeller, John D., Jr., 18]
Portugal, 49 Rockefeller, Nelson A., 243
Pravda, 73 Rodino, Peter W., Jr., 246
President’s Commission for the Rooney, Fred B., 246
Observance of the 25th An* Roosevelt, Eleanor, 15
niversary of the United Na Roosevelt, Franklin (FDR), 9, 10,
tions, ix 14, 15, 16, 29, 74, 84
Prince Leopold, 202 Roosevelt, President Theodore, 8
Protitch, Dragoslav, 78 9, 137
"Provisional Revolutionary Gov Rose, Charles, 246
ernment of South Vietnam", Rotary International, 190
205 Rousselot, Representative John
Proxmire, William, 246 H„ 143, 146, 249
Puerto Rico, 121 Royal Institute for International
Affairs, 5
Quintanilla, Luis, 33 Roybal, Edward, 246
Rublee, George, 216
Random House Publishing, 16------ Rumania, 84
Rangel, Charles B., 246 Rusk, Dean, 143
Ransom, William L., 243 Russia, nee Soviet Union
27H The United Nation* Conspiracy
H u n h I h m , 1H1 Subcommittee, 213
Rutger* University, 42, 46 Senior Scholastic, 134
Hvnn, I*eo.),, 246 Sevareid, Kric, 135, 150
l<«ymow*ky, Wincenty, 18 Seymour, Charles, 215
Shakespeare, 37
Hi. (lerm ain, Fernand J., 246 Shepardson, Whitney H., 215
Suit Lake Tribune, 213 Shevchenko, Arkady N., 78
Nnn Francisco Conference, 10, 11, Shipsteud, Senator Henrik, 72
111. 14, 33, 48, 72, 120, 140, 185 Shotwell, James T., 4, 7, 215, 243
Santa Ana Register (California), Simon, Paul, 247
174,178 Simon and Schuster Publishing
Saturday Review, 134, 141 Co., 30
Saturday Review World, 94 Smith, Howard K., 76
Stive the Children Foundation, Smith, Ian, 121
1RH Smith, Senator Margaret Chase,
Hcnli, John (U.S. Ambassador to 52, 251
the UN), ix Smithsonian Institution, 128, 129
HchitT. Michael, 209, 210 Sobolev, Arkady, 78
Hclwieebeli, Herman T ., 246 Social Democratic l^abor Party, 17
Scholastic Teacher, 134 Socialist International, 44
Hebrooder, Patricia, 246 Soldier of Fortune, 209
Hrhwrikcr, Rifthard S., 24(5 Sourwine, J.(i„ 182, 183
Nrhwoitzer, Dr. Albert, 174 South Africa, 2ft, 26. 64, 121, 208
Ht'liwppiw, Dr. Alfred J „ 104 South African Army, 208
Hcoll, I lugh I)., 24ft Southeast Asia Treaty Organiza
Hcolt, Jumes Hrown, 215 tion, 56
HUS, di*<> Student* for a Demo South West Africa, 209
cratic Society South West African Peoples Or
M*>«le, Hobby, 106 ganization (S.W.A.P.O.), 208,
HKATO, »ee S o u th east Asia 209
'Treaty Organization Soviet Union, 8-10, 17-20, 22, 24-
Hm rnt Service, 211 26, 28, 49, 52, 53, 57, 60, 63-67,
Security Council Resolution, 62, 70, 71, 73-78, 81, 83, 84, 86, 89,
20:1 90, 93, 105, 109, 137, 161, 174,
nj Treason, 16 181, 187, 192, 193, 203, 204,
NHberling, John F., Jr., 246 206
Hi'nate Finance Committee, 66 Spaak, Paul-Henri, 18, 41
Senate Foreign Relations Com Special Unit on Palestinian Af
mittee, 41, 46, 72, 82, 104, 111, faire, 212
114, 123 Spock, Dr. Benjamin, 165
Senate Internal Security Subcom Stalin, Josef, 9, 10, 16, 17, 24, 39,
mittee, 16, 21, 57, 58, 182 53, 73, 84, 147
Senate Security and Terrorism Stanford University, 41
Index 279
Stanley, C. Maxwell, 190 Teheran Conference, 9
Stanley Foundation, 190 "T h e U.N.: Terrorist# From
Stark, Fortney H., 247 Arafat To Zimbabwe", 197
"The Star Spangled Banner", 133, T hant. U, 23-28, 30, 39, 83, 91,
134 154, 160
Stassen, Harold E., 243 Thin Little Hand of Prophets, 176
Sparkman, John, 245 This Week, 129,134
Statistical Yearbook, 30 Thomas, Norman, 4
Steinfield, Jesse (Surgeon Gener Thompson, Frank, Jr., 247
al), 128 Thompson, Llewellyn E „ 243
Stettinius, Edward R., Jr., (Secre Thurmond, Senator Strom, 184
tary of State), 9, 10, 41, 47, 79, Tibet, 20, 49
139, 243 Tim e Magazine, 8, 14
Stevenson, Adlai, 13, 54, 75, 76, Toronto, Lamont (U tah Secretary
90, 91, 92. 113, 115, 142, 147, of State), 175-177
243, 246 Trotsky, Leon, 17
Stimson, Henry, 38 Troy, xi
Stoddard, George I)., 46 Truman, President Harry S, 16,
Stokes, Louis, 247 48, 51, 67, 69, 81, 104, 120, 139,
Streit, Clarence K., 35, 127, 144, 182, 183
145 “The Truth About UNICEF", 169
StudentH for a Democratic Socie Tsongas, Paul E., 247
ty (SDS), 17 Tunney, John V., 246
Suez, 20, 86 Turtle Bay, 189,191
Suez Canal, 85,117
Sulzberger, C. L , 66 U Nu, 24, 25
Suslov, V. P., 78 U Thant, 23-28, 30, 39, 83, 91,
Sweden, 33 154, 160
Swedish Foreign Office, 20 Udall, Morriii K., 247
Sweetser, Arthur, 243 IJdall, Stewart L,, (Secretary of
Swihart, Jam es, 243 Interior), 75
Switzerland, 33, 122 UNESCO, see U nited N ations
Symington, Jam es W„ 247 Educational, Scientific, and
Syria, 201 Cultural Organization
Sytenko, Mikhail D„ 78 UNESCO Courier, 40
UNICEF, see United Nations In
Taft, Senator Robert A., 97 ternational Children’s Fund
Tansill, Charles Callan, 77 United Kingdom, 8
Taylor, Alonzo K., 216 United Nations
Taylor, Henry J., 190 Charter, 8,11, 16, 19, 27,33-36,
Taylor, Myron C., 7 37, 39, 43, 47, 49, 52, 53, 56,
Taylor, President Zachary, 128 67, 72, 77, 86, 90, 91, 94, 96,
Tchernychev, Ilya, 78 98,99, 101,111-117,119,120,
The U nited N ations Connpiracy
122,146,186-18^ Secretariat, 22, 27, 116, 1M.
Charter: Article 19, 89-94 211
"C harter of Economic Rights Security Council, 9, 11, 18, 28,
nnd Duties of States", 103 41, 49, 51, 52, 55, 61, 75,
<-lvll Aviation Organization, 78, 86,115-117,120,1,19, 140,
211 142, 145, 147, 157, 160, 163,
Commission on Human Right*, 165, 193, 213
122 Special Committee on Colo
('o m m iM io n for Refugees, 208 nialism, 121
Covenant on Civil and Political Special Committee on Peace-
Rights, 107-109 Keeping Operations, 92
Covenant on Economic, Social, Special Unit on Palestinian
and Cultural Righta, 107-109 Rights, 212
Covenant on Human Rights, Works Relief Agency
174 (UNWRA), 209, 210
Declaration of Human Righta, World Food Conference, 125
96, 101, 102, 106, 108 United Nations Association, 29,
"Declaration on the Right* of 82, 159, 189
the Child", 102 United Nations Day, ix, 40, 91,
Development Program (UNDP), 137
124, 208 UNDP, see United Nations Devel
Division of Radio and Visual opment Program
Services, 212 United Nations Educational, Sci
Economic and Social Council’s entific and Cultural Organiza
Economic Commission, 211 tion (UNESCO), 27, 46, 141,
Flag, 132, 136, 177 192
(Jeneral Assembly, 9, 10, 17,30, United Nations H eadquarters
33, 41-43, 48, 61, 69, 70, 73, Agreement, 182-184
81, 82, 8ft, 86, 89, 90-92, 94, United N ations International
100-104, 106, 107, 115-117, C hildren’s Fund (U NICEF),
120, 121, 139, 142-146, 154, 157-162, 165-171, 193, 205, 208
157, 160, 163, 165, 182, 183, United N ations In te rn a tio n a l
192, 193, 197, 201, 208, 210, Children’s Emergency Fund,
211, 213 see United Nations In te rn a
Headquarters, ix, 189 tional Children’s Fund
Law of the Sea Conference, United Nations Organization, see
154 United Nations
Mid-Decade Women’s Confer U.N. M onthly Chronicle, 207
ence, 212 United States
M ilitary Staff Committee, 55 Air Force. 132, 148
Office of Public Information, Army, 65
116 Bill of Righta, see U nited
Postal Administration, 197 States Constitution
Index 281
Civil Rights Commission, 122 U.S. News & World Report, 75,90,
Commerce Department, 04 147, 148, 160, 163
Congress, *, xi, 4,10, 48, 61, 66, U.S.S.R. United Soviet Socialist
68, 62, 66-67, 86, 90, 91, 93, Republics, see Soviet Union
96, 97,104,108,182-184,187, USSR’s Mission to the United Na
204, 212, 246 tions, xii
Constitution, 62, 95, 98-101,
104, 108, 109, 128, 249-251 Vail, Thomas, ix
Defense Department, 64 van Deerlin, Lionel, 247
Delegation to the San Francis Van Fleet, General Jam es A., 58,
co Conference, 243 60
Flag, 132,177, 178 Vander Veen, Richard F„ 247
Government, 6, 67 Vanik, Charles A., 247
House of Representatives, x, 8, Vaailiev, Lieutenant General, 65
64, 67, 91, 160, 170, 183, 213, Venezuela, 154
260 Vietcong, 63, 130,161, 205, 206
Navy, 6 Vietnam, 26, 31, 40, 54, 56, 63, 83,
Post Office Department, 167 93, 130, 146, 161, 162, 168, 206,
Senate, x, 4, 8, 20, 72, 90, 103, 207
106, 107, 111-113, 123, 149, Vietnam War, 26, 35, 63, 129,131,
150, 170, 183, 194, 204, 212, 203, 205
250 Vista, 29
State Department, 7, 14-16, 60, Vyshinsky, Andrei, 19, 73, 79, 84,
62, 63, 70, 81, 91, 93, 153, 100
156, 183, 184, 187, 198, 200,
206. 212 Wadsworth, James J., 119,191
Supreme Court, 260 Waldheim, K urt, 28-31, 212
War Department, 260 Wall Street Journal, 154
United World Federalists, 137,142 W ard, Admiral Chester, 6, 6
‘‘Uniting For Peace” Resolution, Washington, George, 95, 128, 129
116-117 Washington Evening Star, 93
Universal Declaration of Human Washington Post, 93, 149, 155
Rights, The, 99, 100, 120 W ashington-Star News, 158
Universal Postal Union (IJPU), Watergate, 191, 204
162 Watkins, Senator Arthur V., 58
University of Elixabethville, 201 Wayne, John, 131
University of Utah. 173-177, 179 Weaver, Paul, 36, 42, 143
University of Utah Alumni Asso Webb, Vanderbilt, 216
ciation, 179 W eekly Compilation of P resides
University of Wisconsin, 194 tial Documents, 63, 130
The Utah Alumnus, 179 Weinstein. Allen (author Perjury:
U.S. Committee for UNICEF, The Hiss-Chambers Case), 16
168-170 Welles, Sumner, 7, 8
282 T h e United Nationn Connpiracy
Well*, Herman B., 243 World War II, 7, 28, 38, 40, 46, 83
Western bland* Publisher*, 16
White, Robert, 190 Xerox Corporation, 74
White, Senator Wallace H., Jr.,
187 Yalta Conference, 9, 10, 14, 71,
WHO, nee World Health Organi 72, 84
zation Ye*el*on, Abraham, 42, 46, 114
Wilcox, Francis O., 72, 243 Y.M .C.A., nee Young M en’*
William*, Harrison A., 246 Christian Association
Willkie, Wendell, 29, 39 Young, Andrew, x
Wilson, Bob, 246 Young, Milton R., 245
Wilson, President Woodrow, 3, 4 Young M en’s Christian Associa
Witness, 16 tion, 190
Wittfogel, Karl, 30 Yo*t, Charles W., 243
World Book Encyclopedia, 177 Yugoslavia, 78
World (lovernment, 196
World Health Organization, 167, Zablocki, Clement, 247
192 Zimbabwe, 68, 204, 207, 208, see
World Affairs Council, 137 Rhodesia
World Government, xii Zinchenko, Konstantin E., 55, 78
World Refugee Year, 159 Zionism, 211
World War I, 3, 4, 38, 45
About The Author
ROBERT W. LEE bom and raised
in Salt Lake City, is a graduate of
the University of Utah, and spent a
dozen years in Washington, D.C., pri
marily as a journalist and correspon
dent for The Review Of The News
(of which he is a Contributing E di
tor) and American Opinion maga
zines. His wife, Karen, and their five
sons returned to Utah in 1977, and
Mr. Lee is presently an Administra
tive Assistant with the Salt Lake
County Commission.
His legislative column, "From The
Hopper,” appears regularly in The
Review Of The News, and he has
become nationally known for his
profiles of such political figures as
former Senators Moss of Utah, Gale
McGee of Wyoming, Dick Clark of
Iowa, Floyd Haskell of Colorado, and
Thomas McIntyre of New Ham p
shire. Mr. Lee also compiles the m ag
azine's popular Congressional voting
guide, "The Conservative Index."
The United Nations Conspiracy is
his first book.
"Today the UN i n increasingly retfurded not as a
*Acred oow but rather as a troika composed of a
white elephant, a Trojan horse and a Judas g o a t . ”
To deHcribc* even erstwhile sacred cows in terms of s y m b o l s
lliiii denote u gilt intended to impoverish the recipient, a
vehicle fur subversion and a dpvice to lead unsuspecting v i c
tims calmly to (heir slaughter not only requires n degree o f
courage but also demands that a strong case be m ade for e a c h
point. We helieve that, alter reading The I'nited Nations
Corupiracy, you will agree that a u th o r Robert W. haw
fleshed nut those symbols both thoroughly an d convincingly.
- Western Islands l* u b lish c r s