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Asset Management in A Low Price Oil

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100% found this document useful (1 vote)
136 views17 pages

Asset Management in A Low Price Oil

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Arrif Imran
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© © All Rights Reserved
We take content rights seriously. If you suspect this is your content, claim it here.
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OTC-27076-MS

Novel Methods for Asset Integrity Management in a Low Oil-Price


Environment

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Jeremy Rosen, Andrew Potts, Paul Sincock, Chris Carra, Andrew Kilner, Peter Kriznic, and Jonathan Gumley,
AMOG Consulting

Copyright 2016, Offshore Technology Conference

This paper was prepared for presentation at the Offshore Technology Conference held in Houston, Texas, USA, 2–5 May 2016.

This paper was selected for presentation by an OTC program committee following review of information contained in an abstract submitted by the author(s). Contents
of the paper have not been reviewed by the Offshore Technology Conference and are subject to correction by the author(s). The material does not necessarily reflect
any position of the Offshore Technology Conference, its officers, or members. Electronic reproduction, distribution, or storage of any part of this paper without the
written consent of the Offshore Technology Conference is prohibited. Permission to reproduce in print is restricted to an abstract of not more than 300 words;
illustrations may not be copied. The abstract must contain conspicuous acknowledgment of OTC copyright.

Abstract
The most cost-effective solution to ongoing production in a low oil price environment is often to extend
the life of ageing producing assets past the original design intent. The offshore oil and gas industry
therefore faces the challenge of extending the useful production life of ageing assets whilst ensuring their
integrity. The challenges to increased life include ensuring integrity given potential modifications to the
floating or fixed assets, modifications to the loading design conditions over their service life, as well as
the cumulative effect of fatigue loading on key structural components. Operators and designers increas-
ingly have access to relatively low-cost, high-accuracy instrumentation systems that can be used to
monitor the loading and dynamic response of FPSOs and offshore platforms. This paper details a suite of
cost-effective ongoing health monitoring measures that can be used to extend the life of producing assets.
A design verification process is envisaged to validate original design assumptions and update them against
more detailed local site knowledge. Instrumentation can supply health-monitoring data that can be
analysed in close to real-time, and which can signal to operators the advent of elevated risk scenarios
requiring a higher level of intervention and inspection. This facilitates a methodology for applying
risk-based inspections to key components, under which production can be extended while relatively riskier
locations are targeted for priority inspections and, if necessary, repair or modification. The technologies
investigated here provide cost-effective methods for implementing the concepts of Mooring Integrity
Management (MIM) recently expounded by DeepStar®, as well Risk-Based Inspections (RBI). Use of
these procedures can allow safe, extended operation of productive assets beyond their original design life
at minimum ongoing cost. The techniques will be of significant benefit to offshore operators with ageing
assets, as well as to FPSO and fixed platform designers and contractors.

Introduction
The oil and gas industry faces the combined challenges of a low oil price environment rendering new
investment difficult, and maintaining ageing assets in still productive fields. Often the most cost-effective
solution is to extend the useful productive life of existing floating units (FPUs and FPSOs) and fixed
structures such as jackets and platforms. The key challenge for the industry is to ensure the integrity of
these ageing assets as part of any life extension, which must account for changes in both the loading
2 OTC-27076-MS

assumptions and structural resistance of key components. On the loading side, changes can occur over the
service life in the assumptions and modelling of key loads imparted onto the asset, such as advances in
meteorological and ocean predictions that modify the basis of design. On the resistance side, the life
extension must take into account degradation of the asset, including the cumulative effect of fatigue
loading on key components. Only after developing a full understanding of the system and the risks of
different failures can the operator develop strategies to cost-effectively manage the risks of life extension
through targeted, Risk-Based Inspections (RBI).
There has been significant recent industry focus on managing moorings in a risk-based framework.
Industry surveys such as those conducted by AMOG for DeepStar® Project CTR11405 (Fontaine et. al.,

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2014, Kilner et. al., 2015) expanded on previous failure data reported in the public domain in (Ma et. al.,
2013), (Majhi and D’Souza, 2013), (Smedley, 2012), (Brown et. al., 2005), and (UK HSE 2006). The
DeepStar® survey data concluded that current mooring failure rates are of the order of 2.5 ⫻ 10⫺3 per
mooring line per year, which is an order of magnitude higher than typically assumed in mooring codes.
In addition, the study found there is clear evidence that past integrity management practices have not
prevented threats to system integrity, arising from the design, construction/manufacturing and installation
phases, from propagating through to the operations phase, with the numerous causes of failure charted in
Figure 1. Salient points from Figure 1 are as follows:

Figure 1—FPSO Mooring Failures Root Cause (DeepStar® CTR11405 Final Report).

Design, manufacturing and overload constitute 13% of failures and are conventionally covered by
design codes issued by industry bodies such as API and classification societies such as ABS, BV and
DNV.
● Only 1% of failures are caused by the environmental loading at the facility being greater than that
anticipated during design, indicating that this is an area that is largely understood and managed.
● 7% of failures are attributed to inherent design faults, which again indicates that codified practices
are minimizing this as a root cause of failure.
● 5% are attributed to manufacturing defects, which pertains to quality assurance of components and
is largely covered by classification society and industry codes and company quality assurance
protocols.
● 18% of failures are associated with installation and could be caused by inadequate engineering,
poor control of operations. Installation is a one-off event requiring its own detailed engineering,
OTC-27076-MS 3

and any installation program should include detailed as-built surveys whereby damage arising
from installation should be detected and rectified as required.
● 69% of failures are associated with through-life degradataion mechanisms such as fatigue,
corrosion, mechanical abrasion and wear, in addition to failures attributed to multiple causes.
Whilst Figure 1 relates to FPSO mooring failures, it is anticipated that a similar proportion of failures
would be attributed to through-life degradation of fixed structures.
Through-life degradation mechanisms require continuous monitoring and inspection programs to verify
safety and integrity. Conventionally, inspection programs have focused on visual inspections by divers

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and Remote Operated Vehicles (ROVs) to identify degradation including cracking and Loss of Metallic
Area (LMA). These inspection programs are expensive and time-consuming, typically requiring addi-
tional support vessels or modified facility operations, and can only be conducted at intervals. Often the
inspections are performed at code-mandated frequencies without targeting the riskiest areas. Further,
conventional inspections typically lack the precision to reliably identify anything but well-advanced
degradation. More refinement is available through underwater Non-Destructive Testing (NDT) performed
by divers or ROV, but these further increase the cost, typically require cleaning and extended residence
time to complete, and due to these requirements can only be used on some parts of the structure.
The proposed solution is to replace costly, untargeted inspections with a two-pronged strategy of
Risk-Based Inspections (RBI) and novel condition monitoring techniques that can be conducted above
water. Inspections will always be required, but risk-based targeting allows scarce resources to be directed
toward areas of the structure where degradation is most likely and/or most damaging. Condition
monitoring techniques discussed here such as motion measurement conducted at the surface allow direct
measurement of the structural loading and response. When designed carefully, these measurements can
supply a proxy indication of gross degradation, e.g. through monitoring subtle changes in natural
frequency or offset, obviating the need for some visual inspections. The measurements feed into a risk
targeted monitoring campaign by identifying risky loading scenarios, and also allow a facility-specific
loading history to be developed that can support the case for life extension toward the completion of the
fatigue life.

Mooring Integrity Management


DeepStar® Project CTR11405 also proposed several advances in Mooring Integrity Management (MIM)
and developed Model Guidelines for MIM for permanent mooring systems (Kilner et. al 2015). These
Model Guidelines for MIM serve as the foundation for future implementation of risk-based inspection
planning for mooring systems. The framework for a risk-based inspection program can be used by the
operator to meet the risk profile of the individual facility as well as corporate and regulatory guidelines.
The guidelines identify the required practices at each stage of the mooring system life cycle in order to
minimize the risk of degradation mechanisms arising from design, construction, installation and opera-
tions practices.
Within the risk-based inspection philosophy, inspection timings are scheduled based on critical
components, and their potential rate of degradation, as identified early in the design process, and based
on mooring line failure statistics and known failures. The critical components are then monitored through
the design process and into fabrication, installation and then operations phases. Here it is critical that the
operator capture deviations or anomalies of the design through the life of the mooring system. This is
ideally started as early in the design process as possible however the principles of the DeepStar® MIM
Guidelines can be adopted at any stage through the life cycle of the field development.
Figure 2 sets out the major activities to be completed across each of the project phases. With reference
to the failure statistics presented in Figure 1:
4 OTC-27076-MS

● The first four columns of Figure 2 (Feasibility/concept, FEED, Detail Design and Fabrication)
represent 13% of failures.
● The next two columns (Installation and Commissioning) represent 18% of failures. At this point
the in-situ service life of the facility begins.
● The final column (Operation) represents 69% of failures, and the near totality of the service life
excluding decommissioning and abandonment.

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Figure 2—Mooring Integrity Management Framework (DeepStar® CTR11405 Final Report).

It is however, instructive to recognise that inspection planning commences at FEED, whereby the
inspectability of the facility must be considered as inherent in the design. When moving to the detail
design phase, this is further developed with consideration of condition assessment. Commencing the
operational phase, whilst it is essential to maintain numerical models of the as-designed, as-built and
current state of the facility, major elements of integrity management centre around inspection planning,
inspections records and condition assessment. Given the prevalence of failures in the operational phase,
and the inspection and condition assessment requirements during the service life, consideration at an early
(FEED) stage of the inspectability of the facility is essential and can produce important savings. This
should be combined with consideration of the merits of continuous condition monitoring strategies that
can minimise ongoing expense while providing the necessary confidence in the structural integrity of the
facility.
Condition assessment is not solely a matter of periodic inspections, evaluation of inspection data and
planning for the next inspection campaign. Where serious anomalies or degradation are identified, it is
important to understand their immediate impact on the integrity of the facility (diagnostic evaluation), and
the projected condition with respect to the known rate of degradation (prognostic evaluation), necessi-
tating the through-life maintenance and upgrade of high fidelity numerical models of the facilities.
Figure 3 depicts the structure of the MIM system health monitoring approach, which relies on condition
monitoring and risk-based inspections and models to direct ongoing maintenance activities. The risk-
OTC-27076-MS 5

based approach requires a very good understanding of the possible failure mechanisms of the various
components in the facility. It is then important to understand the ways in which controls can be put in
place to reduce the risk of failure from the various failure mechanisms. These may be controls that are put
in place at design, fabrication or installation phases. This also then leads into the method and frequency
of the inspection conducted on the mooring system. It has been proposed in the DeepStar® Guidelines that
for a new design it is important to consider the MIM strategy at the FEED stage or earlier, and to carry
verification activities further through the design and installation stages.

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Figure 3—System health monitoring framework (DeepStar® CTR11405 Final Report).

Another key item to consider is the need for either planned or unplanned replacement of the mooring
system through the design life of the facility, where such Emergency Response Plans (ERPs) are essential
risk mitigation measures to avoid catastrophic events and unnecessary production downtime. As part of
an ERP, this may influence the keeping of critical spares (bearing in mind long lead times for many items
and manufacturing obsolence), the maintenance of critical operational plans and equipment, and standing
contracts with vessel and subsea contractors and equipment suppliers. Unfortunately, many facilities are
designed for a once-only installation where they have not been engineered to enable change-out or to
facilitate ready replacement (i.e. as may be required for more rapidly degrading elements). A recognition
early in the design stage of such foreseeable events and requirements is essential to minimise cost in the
operational phase, particularly as the site-specific degradation mechanisms become more apparent.
Designers need to be provided with the information necessary to complete their mooring design, particularly
corrosion rates, and also there needs to be better guidance on the integrity management of mooring systems.
It is recognized that more inspections are not necessarily the answer, as this can be very costly, but also it can
lead to other problems such as inspection-related damage and increased corrosion rates due to cleaning.
Furthermore, it is not enough to simply have inspection data, but that data needs to be reviewed and the
inspection anomalies identified. Having identified the anomalies, their extent, critically and potential growth
6 OTC-27076-MS

rates require characterization and their likely impact on the performance and/or integrity of the mooring system.
These should then form the basis of further inspections. The operator also needs to understand the impact of
the anomaly on the original design to understand if the design has been compromised.
Recent advances in the understanding of fundamental degradation mechanisms applicable to mooring
systems will allow for significant improvements in management of mooring system integrity. The SCORCH
JIP (Rosen et. al 2015, OTC-26017) and the Chain FEARS JIP (Rosen et. al 2015, OTC-26264) have provided
additional guidance to mooring designers in the areas of corrosion and remaining life strength estimates. The
SCORCH JIP has highlighted the importance of obtaining more accurate estimates in the corrosion rates and
demonstrated that one corrosion rate is not adequate for all locations. The SCORCH JIP also highlighted the

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significant impact of Microbial Influenced Corrosion and the negative impact that chain cleaning for inspection
has on the corrosion rates, which has been further described by (Lee et. al 2015). The Chain FEARS JIP
completed in 2015 provides the necessary proof and guidance for estimating the remaining life of severely
corroded chain. As such it provides operators with an understanding of the strength loss to allow them to then
plan for replacement in a more structured manner or in the case of life extension provide a means to assess the
remaining strength and fatigue life in mooring chains. Further fundamental work, however, is still required to
elevate industries understanding of other degradation mechanisms that threaten the ability to design and
maintain floating facilities safety on location.
Condition Monitoring Advances for Moored FPSOs
The loss of integrity of a mooring system, such as a mooring line failure, if undetected, has the potential
to cause a riser system failure, extended production downtime or a result in a hydrocarbon spill.
Traditional mooring systems are designed such that a Single Line Failure (SLF) is not catastrophic,
however operating with one fewer line will result in the other mooring lines being exposed to loads greater
than designed for – such as larger tension cycles. In circumstances where a single line fails, its loss is not
always readily detected, where the remaining lines have increased their load duty, with a correspondingly
lower level of system integrity. This gets more severe the longer the failure is not detected.
Existing techniques to monitor mooring line failures are either expensive or unreliable. Load cells and strain
gauges are very expensive to retrofit if not planned for initially and are often required to be tuned for the
maximum mooring line response, and are therefore only suited for detecting a mooring line overload failure.
Several mooring line failures occur for other reasons than a peak loading event (e.g. due to mechanical failure
at connections). Load cells and strain gauges tuned to the peak event may therefore not be able to pick up a
change in tension far below the peak. Alternatively, the most reliable way to monitor mooring line integrity is
by ROV or diver inspection – which is very expensive if constantly relied upon.
As such, a reliable and robust means of continuously monitoring the integrity of mooring systems for
floating installations is required. It has historically been difficult or expensive to achieve accurate
predictions of mooring line failures, with subsea instrumentation system or with load cells that are capable
of operating in both ambient and extreme storm conditions, being very difficult to retrofit – and expensive.
Numerical models of a floating installation are well understood and several commercial packages for
floating installations are available, but these packages are computationally expensive and can require
several months of calibration to the in field system to achieve a high enough level of accuracy.
Condition monitoring using above-water, real-time instrumentation obviates many of the reliability and
cost drawbacks inherent in conventional subsea instrumentation. AMOG developed and implemented a
cost-effective deck-based instrumentation system providing real-time information to operators on their
floating assets. This has been deployed on a turret-moored, tanker-based FPSO in the Cook Strait, New
Zealand, and is described in (Gumley et. al., 2016). The concept involves continuously tracking and
predicting the performance of a moored floating body (see e.g. Figure 4) under the full spectrum of
metocean conditions, and using this capability to rapidly detect a change in the system’s performance (e.g.
a single mooring line failure or a loss of station event). These events are often not identified offshore when
OTC-27076-MS 7

they occur, as a small change in displacement from a nominal mooring center is difficult to detect without
a reference point, especially when the facility is subjected to a sustained mean offsets due to the prevailing
metocean conditions. Upon review of industry practice, there have been many instances of mooring line
failure that continued undetected for periods of time. While in the cases reviewed a loss of station did not
occur, the risk of a catastrophic failure is greatly increased – it was fortunate that a second failure did not
occur which would have lead to a loss of station event.

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Figure 4 —FPSO and mooring system elevation view

Gumley et. al (2016) report on an advancement on this deck-based system, using an intelligent
⬙black-box⬙ system that employs machine learning algorithms to predict the motions of the floating body
by being trained with the measured metocean inputs and the FPSO response. Several algorithms were
investigated for this purpose, and two leading candidates, Kriging and Neural Networks (as shown in
Figure 5), performed well when used to predict complex multivariate systems such as offshore floating
vessels. Both learning algorithms were trained using metocean and GPS data from an operating FPSO.
The system was developed using data from two distinct phases; a phase where the mooring system was
degraded and a phase when the mooring configuration changed due to the repair of some of the mooring
legs. This mooring configuration change provided a distinct change in the systems, which was taken to
be analogous to a mooring line failure event. It would be expected that a change in vessel response would
occur due to a change in the mooring system configuration, especially if the system responds due to
second order wave forcing. Both learning methods were trained on a subset of the collected data and the
accuracy of each validated by a second distinct subset of the data, with the same mooring configuration.

Figure 5—Example of neural network diagram for mean East-West direction offset
8 OTC-27076-MS

Both models were able to accurately predict the motions of the FPSO in the time and frequency domain, as
shown in Figure 6, with errors less than 10% for both mean and significant offset. Models that were trained
on the original data were then passed data for the changed mooring configuration. Both methods were able to
successfully identify the mooring system change by accurately predicting the motion of the FPSOs for the
mooring configuration they were trained on. The methods investigated were found to reliably predict the
motions of the FPSO as the learning algorithms provided a means of detecting changes in state of the mooring
system. These predictions using the studied learning algorithms provided a more robust means of continuously
monitoring the integrity of mooring systems for FPSOs and FPUs than subsea instrumentation systems or
resorting to real-time computing using classical hydrodynamic analyses.

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Figure 6 —Predictions of significant offset in Y-direction

Machine learning methods have significant potential for allowing operators to cost-effectively and
reliably monitor the condition of their moorings. In particular, this method requires only metocean
monitoring and a DGPS, both of which are easily installed on any floating platform on commissioning or
retrofit further into the platforms lifetime. Machine learning methods present a novel and reliable way to
predict the motion of a moored floating body on its mooring system, which is easily installed on ageing
systems. This prediction can be used to detect a change in the mooring system, and ultimately provide the
early detection of a mooring line failure.
Condition Monitoring Advances for Fixed Offshore Platforms
Just as for floating vessels, the industry faces a number of challenges in extending the useful production
life of fixed platforms whilst ensuring their integrity. Some effort has been made in (Seto, 1964),
(Vandiver et. al., 1982) and (Rodrigues, 2005) to more accurately ascertain key dynamic characteristics
of the structures, including multiple methods employed to characterize the directional effective structural
damping, with varying reliability in different sea-states and under different motion thresholds. The
motivation for measuring damping is to validate original design assumptions against more detailed local
site knowledge. Effective structural damping is heavily influenced by the foundation damping and the
effective structural damping levels can be substantially greater than those currently recommended in codes
and in the literature for steel jacket offshore platforms, e.g. 2% of critical for offshore jackets recom-
mended in API RP 2A (2005).
Herein are presented two successful life-extension programs that were conducted on the basis of health-
monitoring instrumentation for two fixed offshore platforms off the coasts of Western Australia and New
Zealand. Figure 7 is a schematic of a Well-Head Platform (WHP) in 100m water depth that was instrumented
with several accelerometers, and Figure 8 shows a schematic of an instrumented mono-tower in 52m water
OTC-27076-MS 9

depth. The instrumentation campaigns were for extended periods, enabling reliable trends covering multiple
seasonal cycles. For the WHP data was collected for the period of November 2009 to June 2014, while for the
mono-tower the data was collected for the period December 2011 to August 2013. One accelerometer
installation on the mono-tower is shown in Figure 9 and an antenna was installed on the mono-tower as shown
in Figure 10 to allow continuous logging of results and warning of dangerous loading scenarios for the operator.

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Figure 7—Finite element model of the WHP

Figure 8 —Finite element model of the mono-tower


10 OTC-27076-MS

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Figure 9 —Accelerometer installation on mono-tower

Figure 10 —Antenna installed for continuous measurement

The value of the damping used for structural assessment of both platforms was assumed to be 2% of
critical as recommended in API RP 2A. This was considered to be conservative and it was therefore
anticipated that higher damping values could be appropriate for use in both strength and fatigue analysis.
Instrumentation of the fixed platforms allowed validation of the dynamic response of the original
structural design model against in-field measured response data, in this case with regard to the natural
response period and the damping of the platforms. These dynamic characteristics were used to assess the
ongoing structural compliance of the platforms with both fatigue and strength requirements, as well as in
ongoing health monitoring to quickly alert the operators to loading scenarios which may present elevated
risk.
The data series were analysed using a variety of processing techniques to establish the natural
frequency of vibration in each orthogonal direction and the associated total effective structural damping.
The natural frequency being a function of platform mass and stiffness can detect changes in topside mass,
as well as changes in structural stiffness, such as may occur with damage, cracking and other forms of loss
of integrity.
For each platform, acceleration time histories were recorded in the NS and EW directions by two
accelerometers digitized simultaneously. The data was processed to displacements, and the natural period
of the platform in two orthogonal directions was calculated, as shown in Figure 11 for the WHP. The peak
hourly platform displacements were logged over time, as shown in Figure 12 for the WHP. With this data
OTC-27076-MS 11

available to operators in real time, dangerous loading scenarios could be quickly identified, and inspection
frequencies could be modified based on past loading histories.

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Figure 11—Fourier spectra of WHP NS and EW directions

Figure 12—Peak WHP displacements over time

Natural Period
The natural period of the two platforms in the NS and EW directions that were calculated by taking the
peak spectral ordinate from the Power Spectral Density (PSD) are shown in Table 1. These were averaged
over the 2⫹ years for each platform, and are compared in Table 1 with the original natural period
calculations used in design. Salient points from the measurements of the WHP natural period included:
● For both platforms, the measured natural periods were significantly different to the calculated
values used in the initial design. As such, measuring the WHP natural period allowed a much more
accurate description of the system dynamics compared to the original calculation during the WHP
design phase. Figure 13 shows the difference between the measured and design values of the
natural period.
● Figure 13 also shows the correlation of the moving average of the measured natural period with the
results of an updated structural model that included the results of the dynamic assessment and changes
in topside mass. The average natural period shows remarkable agreement over time with the natural
periods calculated from the updated structural model. The increase over November 2009 to September
2010, and the decrease in February 2014, followed documented changes in topside mass.
12 OTC-27076-MS

Table 1—Natural Period Results from Dynamic Measurements


Platform EW Average Natural Period (s) NS Average Natural Period (s)

Measured Design Measured Design

Mono-tower 3.10 2.4 2.93 2.4


Well Head Platform (WHP) 3.00 4.2 3.56 4.9

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Figure 13—Natural period of the WHP over time

As such, instrumentation of the platform has been demonstrated as capable of validating topside mass
changes over time, as well as highlighting potential deviations from as-designed assumptions as the asset
ages.

Damping
Platform damping was calculated by the random decrement method, as described by Vandiver et. al (1982)
for damping of an offshore platform, and refined in Rodrigues (2005). Using the random decrement
method, the damping was calculated by finding the average of the log decrement of the first two maxima
of an averaged time signal for a range of displacement exceedance thresholds. The threshold levels were
chosen to provide consistent benchmarks for comparison of damping between the NS and EW direction
and to generate a sufficient number of events per hour according to Vandiver et. al 1982. The final results
for the damping calculation are shown for both the mono-tower and the WHP in Table 2. For both
platforms, the damping ratios for the NS and EW directions were significantly higher than the default 2%
critical recommended by API RP 2A for jacket damping. The increase in structural damping over the
conservative value based on API RP 2A recommendations that was employed in previous structural
assessments, when applied to the structural analyses for the platforms, has the effect of significantly
reducing the predicted dynamic response, and extending the predicted fatigue life.
OTC-27076-MS 13

Table 2—Random Decrement Damping Calculation


Platform EW Damping (% of critical) NS Damping (% of critical)

Mono-tower 6.6 4.3


Well Head Platform (WHP) 6.3 3.1
API RP 2A recommended jacket damping 2.0 2.0

Development of Risk-Based Inspection Criteria

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The procedure to develop risk-based inspections is outlined here for the WHP, although a similar process
was followed for the monotower. The damping derived from the WHP monitoring program was used as
an input into a structural model of the WHP illustrated in Figure 14. The structural modelling also
included high fidelity modelling and representation of the base and the foundation including soil
interaction in order to improve the correlation of the predicted natural period of the platform with
measured data and the associated platform dynamic response. This detailed structural model allowed a
compliance assessment of the primary jacket structure and a criticality assessment to identify and
prioritise members and joints for inspection. An example of members that were found deficient subject
to design requirements is shown in Figure 15.

Figure 14 —Structural model of the WHP with regions of focused assessment

Figure 15—Members that did not meet strength requirements


14 OTC-27076-MS

A spectral fatigue analysis was conducted to determine the fatigue life of the jacket welded joints under
ambient environmental conditions. The fatigue life of the WHP was assessed with respect to a target
fatigue life of 30 years, based on a design life of 15 years and a fatigue life safety factor of 2 for
failure-critical inspectable joints. Fatigue calculations included:
● Predicted fatigue life with consideration of the historic changes in platform configuration.
● Baseline fatigue performance of the jacket tubular connections and base to jacket connections
under ambient environment parameters.
● An assessment of the influence of measured marine growth levels on fatigue performance. A

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prorating approach was used to estimate the fatigue damage accumulated to date with an increasing
level of marine growth on critical joints.
A criticality assessment of the WHP was conducted with the objective of supporting the prioritisation
of inspection of members and joints. The assessment was conducted by evaluating the performance of the
jacket structure subsequent to the failure of a member or joint. The scope of this assessment included
first-level failures only and did not consider subsequent failures that may occur as a consequence of the
initial first-level failure and the associated redistribution of loads. As such, progressive collapse scenarios
of the WHP were not determined in this assessment, however, the likelihood of progressive collapse was
estimated based on the strength utilisations for the remaining intact structure. Criticality assessments were
conducted for both overloaded members and the joints most susceptible to fatigue cracking, and the
assessments included both a strength and fatigue assessment of the remaining intact structure consistent
with design level code requirements for utilisations as applied in the baseline assessment.
The results of the criticality assessments, along with the baseline strength and fatigue assessments
allowed the key areas of the jacket structure to be categorised with respect to relative likelihood and
consequence of failure. Relative Likelihood and Relative Consequence categories were intended to define
the relative likelihood and consequence of failure between different parts of the structure for the purposes
of prioritising inspections and did not necessarily align with any absolute measure of likelihood or
consequence as defined in API RP 2A.
A specification for the underwater inspection activities for the WHP underwater systems was devel-
oped to target areas of the structure that were identified as higher risk, as well as to achieve compliance
with Code requirements. The inspection activities were categorised according to Remotely Operated
Vehicle (ROV) or diver inspection methods and detailed drawings were created for ease of inspection. The
inspection strategy complied with the periodical inspection requirements as defined by ISO19902:2007
(Chapter 23). A range of inspection methods were assessed for their efficacy of implementation by divers
and ROV’s, along with the possibility of implementation by divers and ROVs.
Based on the inspection objectives and evaluation of the inspection methods, an inspection regime was
developed that assigned inspection methods to WHP subsystems and specified recurring tasks for the
operator of the WHP to add to their maintenance schedule. This tasklist ensured both compliance with
relevant industry codes, and increased efficiency by targeting areas and subsystems that presented a higher
risk with increased levels of inspection. The structural analysis also allowed a recommendation to be made
on the planned frequency of cleaning of marine growth. An example of marine growth on the WHP is
shown in Figure 16. Figure 17 shows the effect of different marine growth cleaning strategies on
accumulated fatigue damage, which was calculated by simulating ongoing fatigue damage under the
ambient environment with increasing marine growth load. This information allowed the operator to
quantify the value equation of in-field cleaning campaigns by comparing the cost of cleaning the platform,
with respect to the benefit gained through potential increase in production life.
OTC-27076-MS 15

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Figure 16 —Marine growth on WHP structure

Figure 17—Effect of different cleaning intervals on fatigue

The risk-based inspections outlined here were augmented by the additional information provided by the
ongoing information from the instrumentation on the platforms. This provided an ongoing health-
monitoring measure, in which dynamic behaviour of the platform was monitored for changes in behaviour
that could signal a decrease in structural integrity.

Conclusions
The oil and gas industry faces significant challenges associated with ageing assets in a sustained low oil
price environment. As such, considerable industry effort is focused on life extensions, and on maintaining
structural integrity with minimum cost, in particular through reducing the frequency and scope of
expensive offshore operations through risk-based inspections.
DeepStar® Project CTR11405 indicated that mooring failures are occurring at a far higher rate than
industry standards generally suppose, and there is clear evidence that conventional inspection and integrity
management practices have not prevented threats to system integrity arising from the design, construction/
manufacturing and installation phases from propagating through to the operations phase. Almost 70% of
failures occur as a consequence of through-life degradation mechanisms, as opposed to design overload
events, and consideration of condition monitoring from an early design stage is key to extending safe
operating life and saving costs. DeepStar® Project CTR11405 proposed several advances in mooring
integrity management and developed Model Guidelines for Mooring Integrity Management for permanent
mooring systems. These Model Guidelines for MIM serve as the foundation for future implementation of
16 OTC-27076-MS

risk-based inspection planning for mooring systems. The framework for a risk-based inspection program
can be used by operators to meet the risk profile, as well as corporate and regulatory guidelines, for
floating and fixed facilities.
Some of the key benefits of instrumenting existing facilities, and anticipating instrumentation of new
builds during the design stage are:
1. Condition monitoring using above-water, real-time instrumentation obviates many of the reliabil-
ity and cost drawbacks inherent in conventional subsea instrumentation.
2. Instrumenting floating systems has demonstrated significant potential for allowing operators to

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cost-effectively and reliably monitor the condition of their moorings. The prediction can be used
to detect a change in the mooring system, and ultimately provide the early detection of a mooring
line failure.
3. Instrumentation has been used as a basis for health-monitoring, structural assessment and risk-
based inspection planning for fixed offshore platforms. The natural period assessment provided an
update to the values that were assumed in the design stage, and successfully tracked changes in
topside mass over time. The increase in structural damping over that used in design had the effect
of reducing the predicted dynamic responses, resulting in an extended predicted fatigue life.
4. Data from instrumentation allows verification of assumptions made during design. In cases where
these original design assumptions, such as the natural period or effective structural damping, can
be updated, this can significantly affect the revised service life estimate of the structure.
5. Instrumentation data combines with structural assessment to allow a criticality assessment of key
areas of the platform structure with respect to the relative likelihood and consequence of failure,
supporting the prioritisation of inspections.
6. Continuous condition monitoring data can promptly signal to operators the advent of elevated risk
scenarios requiring a higher level of intervention and inspection.
7. Instrumentation of the facility on a continuing basis is also of benefit for health-monitoring over
the longer term, by tracking changes in dynamic behaviour that could signal a decrease in
structural integrity.
Use of continuous condition monitoring in conjunction with mooring or structural integrity manage-
ment procedures (such as those promulgated by DeepStar) can enable safe, extended operation of
productive assets beyond their original design life at minimum ongoing cost. Although ideally the use of
instrumentation would commence at the beginning of facility life in order to provide through-life
health-monitoring information, assets at all stages of operation can benefit from installing instrumentation
to verify performance and more effectively managing ongoing inspections.

Acknowledgements
The Authors would like to thank the DeepStar® Floating Systems Committee chaired by Paul Devlin (Chevron
ETC) and the working committee of CTR 11405, championed by Amal Phadke (ConocoPhillips), Derrick
Laskowski (ConocoPhillips) and K.T. Ma (Chevron ETC). The authors would equally like to thank Vermilion
Energy Inc. and OMV New Zealand for allowing the publication of results. Finally, the authors would like to
acknowledge the support of the management of AMOG Consulting, and in particular the contributions from
Mr. Gary Farrow, Mr. Simon Dimopoulos, Mr. Kanishka Jayasinghe, Mr. Daniel Johnstone, Mr. Brent Paradis,
Mr Craig Dillon-Gibbons and Ms. Madeleine Henry in preparation of this paper.

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