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FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SECTION 4
ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES
This Section is divided into two separate Sub-sections as follows:
Sub-section Contents
4.05 ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
4.10 NORMAL PROCEDURES
Section 4 Page 1FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
Intentionally left blank
Section 4 Page 2FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.05
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
POWERPLANT
ENGINE RELIGHT
IMMEDIATE RELIG!
WINDMILL RELIGHT
STARTER ASSISTED (NORMAL) RELIGHT
Figure 4.05 -1 ~ Engine Relight Envelope ..
ENGINE COMPUTER FAILURE e
ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OR BEHAVIOR
HIGH ENGINE VIBRATION
THRUST REVERSER MALFUNCTIONS (if installed)
RUDDER BIAS NOT INHIBITED.
UNLOCK AND/OR ARM INDICA’
AUTOSTOW ..
APU MALFUNCTIONS,
APU FAILURE.
APU GENERATOR OVERHEAT
APU GENERATOR FAILURE.
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL LOW LEVEL ...
FUEL LOW PRESSURE
VENTRAL FUEL TRANSFER FAILURE (if ventral tank is installed)
ENGINE FUEL MALFUNCTION E
AIR CONDITIONING/PRESSURIZATION ..
DUCT OVERHEAT ..
AUTOMATIC TEMPERATURE CONTROL FAILURE
FLIGHT DECK HEAT VALVE STUCK OPEN ...
MAIN AIR VALVE NOT IN SELECTED POSITION
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL FAILURE
FAILURE TO PRESSURIZE ..
AUXILIARY COOLING PACK (if installed)
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 1 aFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.05
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
‘SINGLE GENERATOR FAILURE ...
BUS TIE OPEN..
ABNORMAL ELECTRICAL INDICATIONS.
GENERATORS OUT OF BALANCE
BATTERY HOT (Nicad Only).
BATTERY CONTACTOR
XS 1 OR XS 2 FAIL :
SINGLE INVERTER FAILURE...
DOUBLE INVERTER FAILURE
LOSS OF xS1 ..
LOSS OF xs2
LOSS OF XE
MWS DIMMER FAIL
FLYING CONTROLS .
ELEVATOR TRIM WARNING
RUDDER BIAS MALFUNCTION
‘STALL WARNING/STALL IDENTIFICATION
STALL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM ..
STALL IDENTIFICATION WARNINGS
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM ..
MAIN HYDRAULIC FAILURE ...
EMERGENCY BRAKE LOW PRESSURE ..
HYDRAULIC LOW PRESSURE
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OVERHEAT
HYDRAULIC AUXILIARY SYSTEM LOW FLUID LEVEL.
LANDING GEAR ...
LANDING GEAR DOES NOT RETRACT ..
LANDING GEAR LEVER CANNOT BE MOVED ...
MAIN LANDING GEAR VIBRATION
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 2 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.05
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION ..
ENGINE ANTICE ...
ANTICE LOW QUANTITY
ANTICE LOW PRESSURE ........
AIRFRAME ICE PROTECTION SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
PITOT HEATER FAILURE
VANE HEATER FAILURE
WINDSCREEN OVERHEA’
SIDESCREEN OVERHEAT ..
WINDSCREEN DAMAGE.
ALTERNATOR FAILURE
AUTOPILOT AND NAVIGATION with Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 E (4).
AP TRIM WARNING ..
ELEVATOR FAIL WARNING ..
AUTOPILOT AND NAVIGATION with Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1).
ELEVATOR MISTRIM
AILERON MISTRIM.
Figure 4.05 - 2 ~ Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~
Collins APS-85 Installed
Figure 4.05 - 3 ~ Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~
Collins APS-80 InstalledWith CAT 2 Selected OFF
Figure 4.05 - 4 ~ Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~
Collins APS-80 InstalledWith CAT 2 Operative
AIR DATA and FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS
with Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4)
ATTITUDE HEADING REFERENCE S
EFIS FAILURE with Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1) ..
DOUBLE DPU FAILURE ..
EFIS FAILURE with Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4) ..
DOUBLE DPU FAILURE ..
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 3 aaFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.05
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
PFD FAILURE with Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4)
ND FAILURE ...
DISPLAY FAILURES ..
EFIS FAN FAIL.
EFIS OVERHEAT
CATEGORY 2 APPF
MISCELLANEOUS.
ENTRY DOOR UNLOCKED .
EMERGENCY LIGHTS NOT SELECTED (f Installed)...
Sub-section 4.05 Page 4 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
SUB-SECTION 4.05
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
‘The procedures contained in this section have been developed and recommended by the
manufacturer for use in the operation of this airplane. These procedures are for guidance
only in identifying acceptable operating procedures for abnormal conditions. An abnormal
n, in this context, is defined as an unusual situation in which immediate and precise
action will substantially reduce the risk of degradation to the airplane operation.
Silencing of audible warnings will enhance crew co-ordination in the performance of
abnormal procedures.
NOTE: In these Procedures it is assumed that the positions of the Captain and First Officer
are as follows:
Captain - Occupying the loft crew seat.
First Officer - Occupying the right crew seat.
Annunciators
Annunciators within the procedural sections of this Airplane Flight Manual are shown by
the following symbols:
EMERGENCY (RED) ABNORMAL (AMBER) ADVISORY (WHITE)
AIR
BRAKE
The hash sign (#) is used to indicate that two (or more) annunciators exist for a particular
service or warning. Prior to initiating the actions required by the appropriate procedure, the
crew must establish the exact source of the annunciated condition, e.g: ENGINE 1 FIRE or
ENGINE 2 FIRE.
MWS annunciators located on the roof panel are shown on the left side of a page.
‘Annunciators located on the main MWS panel are shown on the right side of a page.
The red master warning flashers on the glareshield are not shown, it is expected that the
crew are familiar with the need to push either flashers to acknowledge a new indication.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 5 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 6FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
POWERPLANT
ENGINE RELIGHT
CAUTION: RELIGHTS SHOULD NOT BE ATTEMPTED IF:
1, ENGINE FAILURE IS ACCOMPANIED BY SYMPTOMS OF INTERNAL ENGINE DAMAGE.
or
2. NO INDICATION OF N,.
IMMEDIATE RELIGHT
NOTE: This procedure may be used if flame-out is detected quickly.
CAUTION: IF Np FALLS BELOW 15%, COMPLETE THE NORMAL RELIGHT
PROCEDURE.
ENG IGNITION.
Thrust Lever
FUEL ENRICH (if required)
Fuel Flow,
ON
Close
. Push up to 400°C
- Observe starting flow
. Monitor
If relight unsuccessful (N1 and Nz RPM do not increase within 10 seconds)
or
ITT rapidly approaches 952° C:
HP COCK....
ENG IGNITION...
When engine has relit:
Thrust Lever..
ENG IGNITION
Engine Indications
GEN..
BUS TIE (if open).
tfengine does not relight, carry out ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR FAILURE IN FLIGHT
procedure.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 7 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
WINDMILL RELIGHT
Airspeed and altitude . Within envelope shown in
Figure 4.05-1
N, RPM.. Indicating
Np RPM 10% or more
HP COCK.. Close
LP COCK. OPEN
ENG ANTICE .. OFF
Fuel PUMP. ON
ENG SYNC. OFF
MAIN AIR VLV.. CLOSE
ENG IGNITION ON
HP COCK.. OPEN
FUEL ENRICH (if required)... Push up to 400°C
NOTE: FUEL ENRICH will not be available with the engine computer inoperative.
Observe starting flow
Monitor.
or
If ITT rapidly approaches 952° C
or
If no oil pressure indicated within 10 seconds of light up:
HP COCK. Close
If relight is unsuccessful, wait 10 seconds before making another attempt.
After Start:
ENG IGNITION... . OFF
GEN... . Check on line
BUS TIE (if open} CLOSE
Engine Indications..
MAIN AIR VLV.
Thrust Lever
ALTERNATOR,
ENG SYNC
Wing Fuel XFEED/TRANSFER Lever.
Close when fuel is balanced
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 8 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
STARTER ASSISTED (NORMAL) RELIGHT
Airspeed and Altitude. Within envelope shown in
Figure 4.05-1
Both indicating
Close
eeOpen
OFF
N, & No RPM.
HP COCK
LP COCK
ENG ANTICE.
Fuel PUMP ON
ENG SYNC.. OFF
MAIN AIR VLV .CLOSE
START PWR ..... -Push ~ light illuminates
ENG Starter esse Push ~ light illuminates
HP COCK asso Open atfabove 10% Nz
FUEL ENRICH (if required) Push up to 400°C
NOTE: FUEL ENRICH will not be available with the engine computer inoperative.
Fuel Flow
ITT a
If light up does not occur within 10 seconds
bserve starting flow
Monitor
or
If ITT rapidly approaches 952° C
or
If no oil pressure indicated within 10 seconds of light up:
HP COCK
lose
START PWR Switch.. -PUSH FOR ABORT
If relight is unsuccessful, wait 10 seconds before making another attempt.
After Start:
ENG Starter ight extinguishes above 45% Nz
START PWR .. LOff ~ light extinguished
GEN. .Check on line
BUS TIE (If Open). ensensese CLOSE
Engine Indications ..Normal
MAIN AIR VLY sss OPEN
Thrust Lever ssn Set as required
ALTERNATOR. sso ON
ENG SYNC
Wing Fuel XFEED/TRANSFER Lever
As required
.Close when fuel is balanced
Sub-section 4.05 Page 9 osALTITUDE - THOUSANDS OF FEET
FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
INDICATED AIRSPEED - KNOTS
Starter Assisted Relight
Windmill Relight
Engine Computer
Complete envelope
OPERATIVE || (including shaded area) Serine shaded area of erwetape
available anne
, ‘Complete envelope Sai 5
Engine Computer ‘Shaded area of envelope below. ~
{including shaded area)
INOPERATIVE | (eluding shade 20,000 ft. available
NOTE: It is recommended that windmill relights should not be attempted with the engine
computer inoperative.
Engine Relight Envelope
Figure 4.05-1
Sub-section 4.05 Page 10 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ENGINE COMPUTER FAILURE
NOTE: Engine synchronizer also disengages
ENG CMPTR..
‘Thrust Lever.
-OVSPD PROT
Adjust to keep required RPM & ITT.
‘Monitor imitations.
If malfunction occurs during take-off:
Below 80 knots -Abort
Above 80 knots Continue take-off ~ Keep engine
within Niaee
IFN, rises, reduce thrust to achieve N; ger and monitor limitations.
Monitor engine limitations.
If malfunction occurs at Maximum Continuous Power:
‘Thrust Lever..
Adjust to achieve maximum
continuous ITT (924°C)
Engine Indications .. Monitor limitations
ABNORMAL INDICATIONS OR BEHAVIOR
1. RPM fluctuating or not controlled:
Thrust Lever. Mid-range position
ENG CMPTR .OVSPD PROT
Thrust Lever. Adjust to keep required RPM.
(Monitor ITT Limitations)
2. Oiltemperature above limits:
Carry out ENGINE FAILURE procedure.
Note maximum temperature and duration.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 11 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
HIGH ENGINE VIBRATION
If engine matfunction is confirmed or general vibration is present, carry out ENGINE
FAILURE procedure.
If high engine vibration is suspected, carry out the following procedure on each engine, one
ata time:
* Slowly retard the engine thrust lever to idle and monitor the engine instruments for any
abnormalities. Note if there is any reduction in the vibration levels as the thrust lever is being
retarded. Slowly move the thrust lever to its original position and note if there is any increase
in vibration levels or if there are any abnormalities on the engine instruments.
+ Ifithas been determined from this procedure that there are high levels of vibration from one
of the engines, carry out the ENGINE FAILURE procedure on the affected engine.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 12 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
THRUST REVERSER MALFUNCTIONS (if installed)
RUDDER BIAS NOT INHIBITED
On the ground WITH thrust reverse selected.
Both Thrust Reverse Levers ... Reverse Idle
UNLOCK AND/OR ARM INDICATIONS IN FLIGHT
and/or ARM
Associated POWER Switch(es)...
AUTOSTOW
ARM in flight
OFF
If indications normal: If indications persist:
Engine may be used as required| Select engine to idle and land as soon!
as practicable.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 13 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
APU MALFUNCTIONS
APU FAILURE
(Sunstrand Turbomach T-62T-40C8D1~ if installed)
MASTER Switch OFF (see NOTE:)
NOTE: Do not reselect MASTER switch to ON. The cause of the APU shut-down must be
established by reference to the BITE system in the Rear Equipment Bay. Prior to
flight, the APU and the Rear Equipment Bay must be inspected for damage that may
have resulted from an APU rotor failure
APU GENERATOR OVERHEAT
(Sunstrand Turbomach T-627-40C8D1~ if installed)
MASTER Switch ... OFF
APU GENERATOR FAILURE
No action required.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 14 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
FUEL SYSTEM
FUEL LOW LEVEL
When the fuel contents of either wing tank are reduced to less than 320 Ib (150 kg), set the
WING FUEL cock to X FEED.
‘A fuel quantity of at least 400 Ib (180 kg) is required to complete a go-around and
subsequent circuit and landing. If fuel contents are reduced to below 400 Ib (180 kg), a
Go Around should not be attempted.
FUEL LOW PRESSURE
WING FUEL Cock.
FUEL LO PRESS Annunciator
Failed Fuel PUMP
If ventral fuel tank is installed, proceed as appropriate:
VENTRAL TANK NOT EMPTY VENTRAL TANK EMPTY
Select WING FUEL cock alternately
Use AUX FUEL TRANSFER cock to X FEED and TRANSFER to keep
Wing Fuel contents balanced within
selectively to maintain Wing Fuel
balance within 500 Ib (227 kg) 500 Ib (227 kg)
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 15 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
VENTRAL FUEL TRANSFER FAILURE (f ventral tank is installed)
VENTRAL TANK indicator does not change from FULL within two minutes of selecting
AUX FUEL TRANSFER cock.
Check
Wing FUEL Contents ..
Proceed as appropriate:
WING CONTENTS INCREASING || WING CONTENTS DECREASING
Continue flight. Land as soon as possible using normal
technique.
Leave AUX FUEL TRANSFER cock
open for 20 minutes plus 5 minutes in] | CAUTION: PROLONGED FLIGHT
cruise. COULD RESULT IN CG
EXCEEDING THE AFT
If LO Vivo horn operates after this time, LIMIT.
momentarily pull SPEED WARN relay
circuit breaker (Panel DA-D)
ENGINE FUEL MALFUNCTION
Thrust Lever
Reduce power of affected engine
nti! the warning is cancelled, or to
idle.
If warning persists and is accompanied by engine matfunction, carry out
ENGINE SHUTDOWN OR FAILURE IN FLIGHT procedure.
NOTE: The malfunction indicates either Fuel Filter blocked, or Fuel overheat.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 16 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AIR CONDITIONING/PRESSURIZATION
DUCT OVERHEAT
CABIN TEMP (if installed) ... LT DK
CABIN TEMP Selector... seeeutnenMANUAL ~ Hold full COOL
If warning ceases:
CABIN TEMP Selector. ..USE in MANUAL mode
NOTE: Temperature changes in Manual mode should be made by short applications of the
control. Allow sufficient time for each change to take effect.
If warning persists:
CABIN TEMP Selector.
If warning persists:
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2 ese
Wait 2 minutes. If warning persists:
\UTO ~ Full COOL
PON
No. 2 Engine Increase power to a high setting
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2 CLOSE
FIDK VLV.. PEN fully
NOTE: With the F/DK VLV open the hot bleed air can maintain a cabin altitude of
approximately 9,000 ft at 40,000 airplane altitude, assuming no abnormal leaks in the
cabin. The temperature in the flight compartment and cabin will become high.
AUTOMATIC TEMPERATURE CONTROL FAILURE
CABIN TEMP (if installed) .......
CABIN TEMP Selector..
FLT DK
.nuMANUAL ~ Select COOL or HOT
as required.
NOTE: Temperature changes in Manual mode should be made by short applications
of the control. Allow sufficient time for each change to take effect.
If the manual temperature control is not effective, proceed as follows:
(a) If the temperature is too low:
MAIN AIR VLV No. 2.
FIDK VLV
(b) Ifthe temperature is too hig)
LP ON
OPEN as required
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2. LP ON
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 17 anoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
FLIGHT DECK HEAT VALVE STUCK OPEN
Air conditioning noise and warm incoming air with F/DK VLY selected CLOSE
FIDK VLV .... . OPEN then CLOSE
. If Flight Deck valve remains open:
MAIN AIR VLV 2,
MAIN AIR VALVE NOTIN SELECTED POSITION
Airplane on ground
‘Annunciator remains on after MAIN AIR VLV is selected CLOSE.
Have fault rectified before take-off.
Airplane in fight
Relevant MAIN AIR VLV. CLOSE then OPEN
It warning recurs:
Relevant MAIN AIR VLV ... CLOSE
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL FAILURE
1. Cabin Altitude Rising (Cabin Pressure Decreasing) or
Cabin Altitude Fluctuating (Cabin Pressure Oscillating)
Altitude
No. 2 Engine
MAIN AIR VLV 2.
FIDK VLV ...
MAIN AIR VLV 1.
Cabin Altitude.
Fly at 35,000 ft or below
Set high power
CLOSE
OPEN fully (see NOTE)
CLOSE
Check:
gfhappreximately 8.000 ft continue
flight.
w= Hising rapidly towards, or above
15,000 ff carry out EMERGENCY
DESCENT procedure.
NOTE: Flight Compartment and Cabin temperature may become hot with the F/DK VLV fully
open.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 18 aeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOMATIC PRESSURE CONTROL FAILURE (Continued)
If pressurization system not controlling:
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2... OPEN
FIDK VLV CLOSE
Carry out procedure 2 below.
2. Cabin Altitude Decreasing (Cabin Pressure Increasing) or If Above Procedure is
Ineffective:
MANUAL CABIN ALTITUDE CONTROL
‘Slowly tun towards INCREASE
until cabin altitude increases
slightly.
GROUND TEST
Control as necessary
GROUND PRESS TEST VALVE
MANUAL CABIN ALTITUDE CONTROL
FAILURE TO PRESSURIZE
DUMP VALVE
PRESSN Switch ..
Check SHUT
OvRD
AUXILIARY COOLING PACK (if installed)
AUXILIARY COOLING PACK ...
NOTES:
1. ifbelow 8,000 feet altitude and/or the outside ambient temperature is above 5°C do not
reselect the system ON. RECIRC may be selected if required.
2, If above 8,000 feet altitude and/or the outside ambient temperature is below 5°C the
‘system may be reselected, if required, when the aircraft is below 8,000 feet altitude and
the outside ambient temperature is greater than 5°C.
If the AUXILIARY COOLING PACK VALVE annunciator remains illuminated after the ON
‘selection, select control switch to OFF for the remainder of the flight. RECIRC may be selected
if required,
Sub-section 4.05 Page 19 onFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
Sub-section 4.05 Page 20FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
SINGLE GENERATOR FAILURE
Failed GEN
BUS TIE (if open).
GEN AMPS (operative unit)
Check ~ If above limit,
reduce non-essential loads.
NOTE: _Itis recommended that no attempt should be made to reinstate the failed generator.
Ifitis considered necessary, then making only one attempt, the following procedure should
be used:
BUS TIE.
Applicable GEN Switch...
OPEN
CLOSE and hold for 5 seconds
If this is unsuccessful:
Ger
BUS TIE ...
BUS TIE OPEN
Voltage high (above 29.5) or low (below 24.5)
Dc vouTs Check PS1 and PS2 ~
Identify affected generator.
GEN (abnormal side).
BUS TIE.
GEN AMPS (operative unit
ABNORMAL ELECTRICAL INDICATIONS
Ifthe current or voltage is fluctuating, proceed as follows:
BUS TIE.
GEN (abnormal side)..
reduce non-essential loads.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 21 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
GENERATORS OUT OF BALANCE
Generator amps differ by more than 40 amps.
BUS TIE OPEN
GEN 1 and GEN 2 AMPS Check each less than limit
PS1 and PS2 Volts.. Check each within 24.5 to 29.5
If currents and voltages are normal:
BUS TIE, CLOSE
Ifan abnormality is observed then proceed with (a) or (b) as applicable:
(a) If One Generator Current Is Above Limit:
‘Shed non-essential loads on abnormal side
Hf current cannot be reduced below the limit:
Associated GEN..
FUEL PUMP (abnormal side) ..
TRIP
ws EMERG
NOTE: Do not CLOSE the BUS TIE:
() Ifone Busbar Voltage Is Not Between 24.5 To 29.5
Associated GEN..
BUS TIE
TRIP
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 22 aeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
BATTERY HOT (Nicad Only)
If the BATT HOT annunciator does not extinguish after take-off, or if the battery AMPS.
begin to increase, proceed with In Flight procedures below.
In Flight
BATT HEATER Circuit Breaker (if installed).. Pull
BATT ISOLATE .Select affected BATT
(see NOTE: 1 below)
‘On The Ground (see NOTE: 2 below)
BATT AMPS. —
Proceed with (a) or (b) below, as applicable.
-Monitor
(a) BATT AMPS increasing:
‘Shut down the engines and APU, and select BATT switch to OFF.
(b) BATT AMPS decreasing:
Take-Off is permitted.
BATT AMPS and Temperature. Check every 5 minutes
until BATT HOT extinguishes.
NOTES:
1. BATT CNTCTR annunciator will iluminate when a BATT is isolated.
2, BATT HOT condition can occur after engine start with high ambient air temperature.
The sequence of starting engines and subsequently charging the batteries will raise the
battery temperature. In conditions of high ambient temperature, BATT HOT conditions
an occur after engine start.
The batteries should be below the BATT HOT caution temperature prior to the
‘commencement of the engine starting procedure.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 23 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
BATTERY CONTACTOR
Illumination indicates the Emergency Contactor has opened, or battery is not charging.
XS 1 OR XS 2 FAIL
Establish by use of the AC voltmeter whether supplies are available on the affected busbar.
Proceed as appropriate:
‘Supplies not available: ‘Supplies available:
Proceed in this condition. No further action.
Leave the inverter associated with the failed
busbar running.
NOTE: Fora listing of systems lost refer to pages 25 and 26.
SINGLE INVERTER FAILURE
The following is applicable only if Leland Static Inverters P/N ASH664-1P or
‘ASH664-1PF are installed through the incorporation of modifications
253135A or 253246A:
|WARNING: DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RESET IF INV 1 FAIL OR INV2
FAIL ANNUNCIATORS COME ON.
NOTE: Airplane may be operated in accordance with MMEL.
NOTE: All AC systems are available
The following is applicable if other than Leland Static Inverters P/N ASH664-1P or
ASH664-1PF are installed:
Failed INV..
Ht annunciator remains on, no further action.
‘Momentarily select START
INOTE: Airplane may be operated in accordance with MMEL.
NOTE: All AC systems are available
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 24 asFAA Approved Doc. No. HS.1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 20
ISSUE: 1 Approved: July 25, 2005
REASON FOR ISSUE: Reset procedures for static inverter failure.
ACTIO!
Insert this page to face Page 25 of Sub-Section 4.05, Abnormal Procedures.
SUB-SECTION 4.05 - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ELECTRICAL SYSTEM
DOUBLE INVERTER FAILURE
IF BOTH INV 4 FAIL AND INV 2 FAIL ANNUNCIATORS ILLUMINATE, A RESET OF ONE
INVERTER MAY BE ATTEMPTED IF THE FLIGHT CONDITION DICTATES.
NOTE: Airplane may be operated in accordance with MMEL.
Approved By: Mat) Lt
Gerald M. Baker, Acting Manager
Aircraft Certification Office
Federal Aviation Administration
Wichita, Kansas
USA
Approval Date: tpsles-
Page 2 of 2FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
DOUBLE INVERTER FAILURE
‘The following is applicable only if Leland Static Inverters PIN ASH664-1P or
ASH664-1PF are installed through the incorporation of modifications.
253135A or 253246A:
WARNING: DO NOT ATTEMPT TO RESET IF INV 1 FAIL OR INV2
FAIL ANNUNCIATORS COME ON.
NOTE: Airplane may be operated in accordance with MMEL.
The following is applicable if other than Leland Static Inverters P/N ASH664-1P or
‘ASH664-1PF are installed:
Failed INV. Momentarily select START
Hf annunciator remains Illuminated, no further action.
NOTE: Airplane may be operated in accordance with MMEL.
LOSS OF XS1 WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE FOLLOWING:
(a) Stall IDENT 1
(b) AOA Indicator
(©) Weather Radar
(d) No. 2 Altimeter
{e) No. 2 Pitch Trim Servo
(f) No. 2 Nav.
(9) No2. ADF
(h) No, 2 ADC
() No. 2 Compass System
() No. 2 EFIS.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 25 aoFAA approved Doc, No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
LOSS OF XS2 WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE FOLLOWING:
(a) Stall IDENT 2
(b) Ice Detector
(0) Cabin Pressurization Fan Venturi
LOSS OF XE WILL RESULT IN THE LOSS OF THE FOLLOWING:
(@) No. 1 Altimeter
(b) No. 1 Pitch Trim Servo
(6) No, 1 Nav.
(@) No.1 ADF
(e) No. 1 ADC
(f) No. 1 Compass System
(9) No.1 EFIS,
(h) 26 VAC Lights
MWS DIMMER FAIL
MWS NORM/DIM OVRD Switch, .. DIM OVRD
Sub-section 4.05 Page 26 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
FLYING CONTROLS
ELEVATOR TRIM WARNING
If on take-off and below 80 KIAS ...
Thrust Levers
Pitch and Aileron Trim Indicators.
Idle
. Check
RUDDER BIAS MALFUNCTION
Rudder bias gives unwanted rudder deflection when both engines are operating normally
at the same No.
RUDDER BIAS (AB) OFF
RUDDER BIAS (A) .--.ON (in turn to identify faulty system)
RUDDER BIAS (faulty system). OFF
Sub-section 4.05 Page 27 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
STALL WARNING/STALL IDENTIFICATION
STALL IDENTIFICATION SYSTEM
Operation of the STALL IDENTIFICATION (stick push force) or STALL WARNING (stick shake)
must be accepted as indicative of a stall. Proceed with normal stall recovery actions.
If stick push force or stick shake persists, proceed as appropriate:
Stick Push Force persists:
STALL IDNT 1 and 2...
Push both together ~ System is now
inhibited.
Stick Shake persists:
Circuit Breakers:
‘STALL WARN MOTOR L ang R ... Pull
NOTE: With stall identification system inhibited or stall warming system disabled, normal stall
protection is not available. Continue flight with caution.
‘STALL IDENTIFICATION WARNINGS
and
Relevant IDNT Switch Push ~ Relevant INHIB annunciator
illuminates.
NOTE: Remaining channels of stall identification system will continue to provide stick pusher
stall protection.
‘One or more of:
No in-flight action.
CAUTION: SYSTEM MAY BE INOPERATIVE.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 28 oeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM
MAIN HYDRAULIC FAILURE.
Hydraulic SUPPLY pressure reduces to approximately 2,300 psi or below. No immediate
action necessary. Use of the Auxiliary Hydraulic System will be necessary to lower the
LANDING GEAR and FLAPS before landing. Follow the appropriate procedures given
below.
If EMERG BRK LO PRESS annunciator is illuminated, referto EMERGENCY BRAKE LOW
PRESSURE procedure.
NOTE: Thrust reversers (if installed) should be available for one deploy and one stow
operation.
Landing Gear And Flaps Lowering
AUX HYD SYSTEM PULL Handle
ull ~ Do not re-set
Hand Pump. Operate (see NOTES: below)
LANDING GEAR Lever. elect down
FLAP Selector When required, set to desired
position.
Hand Pump.. ..Operate until desired position is
achieved.
NOTES:
1. After 3 greens are seen, continue pumping until significant resistance is felt.
2, AIR BRAKE and LIFT DUMP inoperative.
Wheel brake Operation
Before Landing:
WHEEL BRAKE Lever.
If supply pressure is approximately
£2,300 psi leave brake lever in the
NORMAL (forward) position ~
lf supply pressure is zero, select
EMERGY.
Avoid use before landing
Actions on Landing:
Brake Pedal
ssnseeeeApply gently ~ Use one continuous
‘application if possible. Do not taxi
NOTE: Nosewheel steering inoperative.
If normal braking fails:
Brake Pedals...
WHEEL BRAKE Lever
Brake Pedals..
‘Apply gently ~ Use one continuous
‘appieston ¥ possible.
NOTE: Anti-skid inoperative.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 29 onFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
EMERGENCY BRAKE LOW PRESSURE
MAIN HYDRAULIC FAILURE and
Emergency brake system probably inoperative. On landing, use normal braking sparingly
to conserve remaining pressure.
HYDRAULIC LOW PRESSURE
No in-flight action.
HYDRAULIC SYSTEM OVERHEAT
During Taxi (High Ambient Temperatures)
Cycle the flaps twice over the operating range. If warning is extinguished continue taxi.
If annunciator remains illuminated, have fault rectified before flight.
During Flight
No in-flight action.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 30 aeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
HYDRAULIC AUXILIARY SYSTEM LOW FLUID LEVEL
AUX HYD LO LEVEL annunciator is illuminated whenever the auxiliary system is used. If
this annunciator illuminates without using the auxiliary system, it indicates that insufficient
hydraulic fluid may exist for extension of the gear and flaps using the auxiliary system.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 31 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
Sub-section 4.05 Page 32
osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
LANDING GEAR
LANDING GEAR DOES NOT RETRACT
AUX HYD SYSTEM Hand Pump ..
AUX HYD SYSTEM PULL Handle.
Check socket fully down
If gear stil fails to retract:
If necessary, reduce and land.
LANDING GEAR LEVER CANNOT BE MOVED
If retraction is essential:
BAULK Lever or OVRD Button (as installed)......... Operate
LANDING GEAR Lever... Seer ee
MAIN LANDING GEAR VIBRATION
Main gear vibration on landing is most likely to occur at high speed and when the main gear
leg is nearly fully extended (.e: in a position where the torque link geometry provides least
resistance to the onset of vibration.) This combination of circumstances will occur if a very
‘smooth touchdown is made at high airspeed and if the airplane is then maintained in a
nose-up attitude. To minimize the risk of main landing gear vibration, the following landing
technique is recommended:
(@) Fly the approach at Vagr +10, reducing speed to cross the threshold at Vagr and complete
a normal flare. This should result in touchdown a few knots below Vaee
This does not preclude the pilot from adding a suitable gust factor in windy and gusty
conditions.
NOTE: Vper is approximately 30 KIAS above the stall speed.
(b) After touchdown, without delay, lower the nose gear to the runway and deploy lift dump.
Commence braking, at least gently. This procedure makes sure maximum weight is put on
the main gear.
Braking is recommended because even light braking will help reduce the risk of vibration.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 33 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Sundstrand Mark 2 BAe Mod. 259551B or equivalent
(if installed)
a PULL UP warning is received in flight, fully advance the thrust levers immediately and
simultaneously adopt an attitude to produce the maximum climb gradient consistent with
the airplane configuration.
If a warning occurs while in the landing configuration, select flaps to 15° and retract the
landing gear when a positive rate of climb is established.
For information relating to GPWS installed, other than the above, refer to the supplement
Provided in the back of this Airplane Flight Manual.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 34 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
ENGINE ANTICE
Affected Engine
Annunciator remains illuminated:
‘Avoid icing conditions it possible.
ANTICE LOW QUANTITY
Monitor antice fluid quantity.
Approximately 30 minutes operation of the airframe antice system is available when the
warning illuminates.
ANTICE LOW PRESSURE
Avoid icing conditions. Airframe ice protection system has failed.
If the antice fluid tank is empty and spare fluid is available:
WING/TAIL Antice Switch
Tank...
Vent Valve
Syster
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 35 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AIRFRAME ICE PROTECTION SYSTEM MALFUNCTION
Hf maifunction is apparent, or suspected, during flight proceed as follows:
{a) Leave icing conditions as soon as possible.
b) Before starting the landing approach, observe the wing leading edge to determine if ice is
s ig leading edg
present.
‘+ fice is present, make a flaps up landing
+ Ifice is not present, make a normal landing
PITOT HEATER FAILURE
PITOT/VANE HEAT sane Check Land R switches ON
Ifswitched ON:
PITOT AMPS. 7 heck left and right AMPS to
identify failed heater.
(current below 1 AMP)
Associated instruments. Monitor
Hf discrepancies occur, the following equipment may fail to operate satisfactorily:
(a) Left Pitot Heat Heater Failed:
Left air data computer and associated displays, overspeed warnings, 150 KIAS warning
horn.
(b) Right Pitot Heat Heater Failed:
Right air data computer and associated displays, overspeed warnings, 150 KIAS warning
horn, standby airspeed indicator.
CAUTION: AUTOPILOT PERFORMANCE MAY BE ADVERSELY AFFECTED
The fault must be rectified before the next flight.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 36 aoFAA Approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 29
ISSUE: 1 Approved: November 11, 2013
REASON FOR ISSUE:
Revision of existing SIDESCREEN OVERHEAT text and addition of instructions for SIDE
SCRN OVHT waming recurrence.
ACTION:
Insert Advance Amendment Bulletin No. 28, Page 2 of 2, to face Page 37 in Section 4 -
ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES, Sub-section 4.05 - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES.
SECTION 4 - ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES.
SUB-SECTION 4.05 - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
SIDESCREEN OVERHEAT
Refer to Page 2 of 2.
Page 1 of 2FAA Approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 29 (continued)
SECTION 4 - ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES
SUB-SECTION 4.05 - ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION
SIDESCREEN OVERHEAT
of
..OFF and ON, one at a time to
identify the overheating
screen.
NOTE: Left SCREEN HEAT switch controls LH Windscreen + RH Sidescreen.
Right SCREEN HEAT switch controls RH Windscreen + LH Sidescreen.
‘The warning will extinguish when the switch is turned OFF, but may recur either
immediately or subsequently when the switch is turned ON.
Left and Right SCREEN HEAT
Leave the switch ON and continue in that condition, if necessary. The relevant screen will
be controlled at a higher temperature than normal.
Refer also to WINDSCREEN DAMAGE procedure.
‘Approved by:
Randbipn Bhidlds, ODA Leadfadministrator
Beechoraft Corporation
‘ODA-290339-CE
‘Approval Date: if it [26
Page 2 of 2FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
VANE HEATER FAILURE
|
No pilot action is required. However, when flying through icing conaiions, extreme caution
should be exercised.
NOTES:
1. Accumulation of ice on the stall vanes may cause a spurious stick shake.
2. The fault must be rectified before next flight.
WINDSCREEN OVERHEAT
Relevant SCREEN HEAT Switch....
.. OFF then ON
The warning will extinguish when the switch is turned OFF, but may re-occur either
immediately or subsequently when the switch is turned ON. Leave the switch ON and
continue in that condition if necessary.
‘The relevant screen will be controlled at a higher temperature than normal.
SIDESCREEN OVERHEAT
Left and Right SCREEN HEAT ..
FF and ON, one at a time to
identify the overheating screen.
NOTE: Left SCREEN HEAT switch controls LH Windscreen + RH Sidescreen.
Right SCREEN HEAT switch controls RH Windscreen + LH Sidescreen.
If any of the SCREEN OVHT or SIDESCRN OVHT warnings persist or are repeated, leave
the relevant switch in ON position.
WINDSCREEN DAMAGE
Cracks or other visible damage:
Relevant SCREEN HEAT.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 37 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
ALTERNATOR FAILURE
Appropriate ALTERNATOR:
Proceed as follows:
Warning cancels:
No further action.
Warning persists:
ALTERNATOR... . OFF
NOTE: Both windscreens (A panels) will remain heated but both sidescreens (B panels) will
be unheated.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 38 aoFAA approved Doe. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
with
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2)
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 E (4)
AP TRIM WARNING
A or E displayed in yellow on
+ the PFD
Move Appropriate Trim Wheel .. Zero AP TRIM (AIL or EL) indicator.
If mistrims are still present
Autopilot. ...Disconnect ~ anticipate heavy
‘out-of-trim loads.
ELEVATOR FAIL WARNING
ELEVATOR TRIM Wheel Check free
Move Trim Wheel Zero AP TRIM EL indicator
Autopilot. Disconnect
NOTES:
1. If en-route, the autopilot may be re-engaged and the flight continued. If the failure
recurs, manual trimming will be necessary to keep the AP TRIM EL indicator at zero.
2. If the failure occurs below 1,000 feet AGL, the autopilot should be disconnected.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 39 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
with
Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1)
ELEVATOR MISTRIM
Elevator Trim Whee!
Move trim Wheel...
Autopilot
Check freedom of movement
Zero AP TRIM EL indicator
Disconnect
NOTES:
1. Ifen-route, autopilot may be re-engaged. If fault recurs, trim manually to keep the AP
TRIM EL indication at zero.
2. If fault occurs below 1,000 feet when coupled to a glideslope, the autopilot should be
disconnected,
AILERON MISTRIM
Aileron Trim Wheel. Move to zero AP TRIM AIL indicator
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 40 anFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
‘The following is provided for airplanes having Collins APS-85 installed
Tests have established the height lost due to autopilot matfunction in the most adverse
combination of altitude, airspeed, weight and center of gravity position. The minimum
height limitations with the autopilot engaged are based on these results.
Inflight, when not coupled to an ILS glidestope, a height lost of 825 ft could occur following
a nose down runaway at terrain clearance altitudes before level flight can be regained,
assuming the recovery action is taken by the pilot 4 seconds after commencement of the
Tunaway and a total recovery 'g’ of 1.5 is used,
When coupled to an ILS glidestope, it is assumed that recovery action is taken by the pilot
three seconds after commencement of the runaway and a total recovery 'g' of 1.3is used.
‘The demonstrated altitude loss due to a simulated hardover autopilot malfunction when
‘coupled to the ILS glidesiope is shown below (80 ft minimum use height).
Runaway
YETGHT LOSS FOLLOWING AUTOPILOT
a eta)
100
oo
60.
“0
iccisestore
207
= iter sro.0]
Ge 200 400 400 _eo0 1000 1200 14001600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2400
a rn
° 100-200 500 400-500-600 700800
RANGE
Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~ Collins APS-85 Installed
Figure 4.05-2
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 41 onFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 42FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
The following is provided for airplanes having Collins APS-80 installed
With CAT 2 selected OFF
Tests have established the height lost due to autopilot malfunction in the most adverse
combination of altitude, airspeed, weight and center of gravity position. The minimum
height limitations with the autopilot engaged are based on these results
In fight, when not coupled to an ILS glideslope, a height lost of 420 ft could occur following
a nose down runaway at terrain clearance altitudes before level flight can be regained,
assuming the recovery action is taken by the pilot 4 seconds after commencement of the
runaway and a total recovery 'g' of 1.5 is used.
‘When coupled to an ILS glideslope, it is assumed that recovery action is taken by the pilot
two seconds after commencement of the runaway and a total recovery ’g' of 1.5 is used.
The demonstrated altitude loss due to a simulated hardover autopilot malfunction when:
coupled to the ILS glideslope and, if installed ~ Category 2 system selected OFF,
(90 feet minimum use height) is shown below.
VETO Loss FOLLOWING AUTOPILOT
aur Tadeinch aN
es
&
¥
reer
200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000 2200 2400 2600
VETERS © 50 100 150 200 250 300 350 400 450 500 550 600 650 700 750 800
RANGE
Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~ Collins APS-80 Installed
With CAT 2 Selected OFF
Figure 4.05-3
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 43 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
Sub-section 4.05 Page 44
osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
The following is provided for airplanes having Collins APS-80 installed
with CAT 2 Operative
HEIGHT (FT)
‘The demonstrated altitude loss due to a simulated hardover autopilot malfunction when
coupled to the ILS glideslope and, if installed ~ Category 2 system operative,
(60 feet minimum use height) is shown below.
RUNAWAY
INJECT
HEIGHT LOSS FOLLOWING AUTOPILOT
120 MALFUNCTION WITH CAT 2 OPERATIVE
100:
20
6
a
SER,
3
20: a
ovat See
a
>
° 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000
THRESHOLD GLIDESLOPE
ORIGIN
RANGE (FT)
Height Loss Following Autopilot Malfunction ~ Collins APS-80 Installed
With CAT 2 Operative
Figure 4.05-4
Sub-section 4.05 Page 45 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Intentionally left blank
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 46FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
AIR DATA and FLIGHT INSTRUMENTS with Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4)
Management of the Air Data System, during abnormal conditions, is confined to fault
finding and remedial action. In flight faults, which may be remedied, are mainly power
supply failures. In the event of a failure, check the related circuit breaker.
If either AIR DATA FAIL annunciators illuminate, check the associated altimeter, Mach
Airspeed Indicator, and Vertical Speed Indicator.
fan instrument displays a fail flag, perform a self-test as follows:
1. Mach Speed Indicator:
(@) Push and hold the PUSH TEST knob.
(©) Check the fail fiag is in view and the MACH display is blank.
(c) Check both pointers slew to 300 KIAS for approximately 1 second, then move to zero.
(@) Release the knob, turn and check the airspeed bug slews.
2. Barometric altimeter:
(a) Push and hold the TEST button.
(b) Check the fail flag is in view and the pointer moves to 750 ft.
(©) Release the TEST button.
3. Vertical Speed Indicator:
(@) Push and hold the PUSH TEST knob.
(b) Check the fail flag is in view and the pointer moves to 6,000 fpm UP.
(©) Release and turn the knob to check the bug slews.
Ifa self-test fails, continue flight and use the standby altimeter and airspeed indicator as
required.
NOTE: If the Captain’s altimeter has failed, the pre-selector/alerter will also show a fail flag.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 47 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
Ifthe instrument self-test is satisfactory and if the altitude and airspeed failures have
‘occurred together, the associated computer will be unserviceable.
Only in this event, push the relevant AIR DATA TRANSFER switch to CAPT 2 or F/O 1. This
action connects all main flight instruments to the remaining serviceable computer.
NOTE: Selecting either AIR DATA TRANSFER switch to CAPT 2 or F/O 1 transfers the input
to the associated flight director channel. With the autopilot and yaw damper engaged
when the TRANSFER switch is operated, the system monitors may cause a
disengagement. If this occurs, the autopilot and yaw damper may be subsequently re-
engaged.
Selecting either AIR DATA TRANSFER switch to CAPT 2 or F/O 1 also causes the
command bug function of the MSI and VSI on the side transferred to the cross-side
Air Data Computer, to be inhibited.
fa faultis suspected in the TEMP/TAS indicator, perform a self-test as follows:
(@) Push and hold the FLT ANNUN TEST button,
(b) Check the TEMP/TAS indicator displays 888 888,
(©) Release the FLT ANNUN TEST button and cross-check the displayed SAT with the
indicated Outside Air Temperature.
ATTITUDE HEADING REFERENCE SYSTEM (if installed)
Management of the Attitude Heading Reference System, during abnormal conditions, is
confined to fault finding and remedial action.
In the event of a power failure, check the related circuit breaker.
Failure of an Attitude Heading Computer will cause the autopilot and Yaw Damper to disengage
and the following will be displayed on the associated Electronic Flight Displays:
(@) A red ATT failure flag on the Primary
roll pointer, sky/ground raster and flight
i Display, with loss of the pitch scale, roll scale,
irector bars.
(b) A red HDG failure flag on the Navigation Display.
Both failure flags will flash for 10 seconds, then remain steady. The flashing may be
cancelled by pushing the associated CMPRTR PTR annunciator switch.
If attitude or heading flags are annunciated, push the appropriate AHRS TRANSFER
annunciator switch. The relevant green CAPT 1 or F/O 2 legend will guish and the
associated white CAPT 2 or F/O 1 legend illuminates,
NOTE: Failure of the white legend to illuminate indicates a failure to the AHAS transfer
switching.
Correct transfer to EFIS is identified by the ATT 1(2) and HDG 1(2) legends on the
PFD and ND respectively.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 48 aisFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
With transfer selected, the PFD returns to a normal display, with the exception that red ATT.
and FD failure flags are annunciated with the FD bars out of view.
NOTE: Operation of an AHRS TRANSFER annunciator switch renders the other switch
‘inoperative.
If an amber AHS TAS annunciator illuminates, this will indicate a failure of the ADS true
airspeed input to the associated AHC.
The AHC reverts to the reversionary mode and the performance levels will be similar to that
of a conventional gyroscope.
‘Subsequent discrepancies between the two systems may cause the Autopilot and Yaw
Damper to disengage.
NOTE: Close monitoring should be exercised.
In the unlikely event of a temporary power failure to a system, or if a significant discrepancy
appears between the systems, carry out the following:
(a) Cross check both PFDs with the standby indicators.
(b) Maintain wings level, constant pitch attitude, and constant speed during alignment.
(©) By reference to the standby attitude indicators, determine which system is in error.
(d) Push the relevant RE-ALN pushbutton.
Re-alignment will take approximately 30 seconds. During this time, the ADC data will
become invalid and the ATT and HDG failure flags will be annunciated.
Cross check the PFDs and standby attitude indicators for correct re-alignment and make
sure all failure flags and CMPRTR warnings are removed.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 49 anFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
EFIS FAILURE with Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1)
In the event of any failures, the airplane should be flown by the pilot who has the fully
operational system, or the better system in the case of multiple failures.
Fail annunciation is displayed in red letters on the PFD. In the event of failure, unusable
functions and the recommended action are presented in the table below.
‘Annunciation Unusable functions ‘Recommended Actions
Push DSP Transfer switch, white legend
nates. Pull circuit breaker of the failed
All display functions controlled
psp by DSP
(Panel C, A2 for DSP 1 ~ C2 for DSP 2)
‘On-side PFD and ND cannot —_|(1) Continue with available sensors
display the following cross-side | (2) Monitor standby attitude indicator
data:
+ Attitude
+ Heading
. NOTE:
XDATA : ae Comparator
5 ots Inhibited
° ADF
+ DME
* as
NOTE: DPU ALTN may not be available
when required.
Push DPU Transfer switch,
ae ee (white legend comes on)
DOUBLE DPU FAILURE
Following a failure of both PFD’s and with both DPU Transfer switches selected, normal
conditions are:
* The Captain's DSP controls the displays.
* No. 1 attitude and No.1 compass are normally shown, together with No 1 Flight Director
mode indications.
Alternative Conditions:
* No. 2 attitude and No. 2 compass can be displayed by operating the relevant ATT or HDG
changeover switches.
‘* The displays can be controlled by the First Officer's DSP by pushing the Captain's DSP
Transfer switch.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 50 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
EFIS FAILURE with Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4)
In the event of any failures, the airplane should be flown by the pilot who has the fully
operational system, or the better system in the case of multiple failures.
Fail annunciation is displayed in red letters on the PFD. In the event of failure, unusable
functions and the recommended action are presented in the table below.
“Annunciation Unusable functions Recommended Actions
= ‘All display functions controlled | Push DSP Transfer switch ~
by DSP white ALTN legend illuminates.
‘On-side PFD and ND cannot _| (1) Continue with available sensors
oe the following cross-side | (2) Monitor standby attitude indicator
lata:
© Attitude
* Heading ~ NOTE: DPU ALTN may not be available
+ VOR when required.
XDATA 2 yee Comparator requit
E eae Inhibited
+ ADF
* DME
+ as
Push DPU Transfer switch,
CEE poo ana ND (white ALTN legend comes on)
DOUBLE DPU FAILURE
Following a failure of both PFD's and with both DPU Transfer switches selected, normal
conditions are:
* The Captain's DSP controls the displays.
* No, 1 attitude and heading are normally shown, together with No 1 Flight Director mode
indications.
Alternative Conditions:
+ No. 2 attitude and heading can be displayed by operating the AHRS CAPT 1 switch.
* The displays can be controlled by the First Officer's DSP by pushing the Captain's DSP
Transfer switch.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 51 oeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
PFD FAILURE with Collins APS-80 and EFIS-85 B (1) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-85 B (2) or
Collins APS-85 and EFIS-86 E (4)
Relevant Transfer switches:
PFD TONI .. Push ~ White legend illuminates
If PFD is displayed on ND, continue in this condition.
If PFD data is not displayed:
PFD TO ND .
DPU ALTN.
Push ~ White legend extinguishes
Push ~ White legend illuminates
ND data displayed on MFD.
ND FAILURE
Wit is required to restore ND information, operate Transfer switches as A or B below:
(a) ND TO MFD Switch (Captain only) Push ~ White legend illuminates.
or
(b) DPUALTN Switch... Push ~ White legend illuminates
ND data displayed on MFD.
DISPLAY FAILURES
It is not practicable to provide annunciation of every failure of processors or displays.
Failures of this nature are characterized by illegible data or complete removal of the
displays. If reversionary mode switching does not restore operation, the relevant display
circuit breaker should be pulled.
Should both displays fail on the same side and selection of the appropriate DPU switch fails
to restore normal operation, the relevant EFD MSTR should be selected off.
EFIS FAN FAIL
No further action if en-route and not accompanied by an EFIS OVHT warning.
Sub-section 4.05 Page 52 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
EFIS OVERHEAT
NOTE: EFIS equipment must not be operated continuously for longer than 5 minutes
after an EFIS OVHT waming has come on.
Proceed according to the type of overheat annunciation installed.
(a) Airplanes where source annunciation is NOT provided on the left m:
‘System Switching Unit.
instrument panel
‘Warning on Captain's panel only ~ Isolate the left EFIS displays and MFD as follows:
Left EFD MSTR
MFD MSTR..
OFF
OFF
‘Warning on First Officer's panel only ~ Isolate the left EFIS displays and MFD as follows:
Right EFD MSTR OFF
Warning on both panels ~ Isolate all EFIS displays as follows:
Loft EFD MSTR ss
Right EFD MSTR
MFD MSTR..
() Airplanes with source annunciation provided on the left main instrument panel System
Switching Unit.
‘Warning on Captain's panel ~ According to which annunciator has illuminated, isolate the
affected equipment as follows:
EFD (Left EFD MSTR).. OFF
MFD (MFD MSTR). OFF
MPU (circuit breakers)
ull ~ As installed:
Either panei C, A3 & C3
or panel DA-A, G4 & Ha,
Warning on First Officer's panel ~ Isolate the right EFIS displays as follows:
Right EFD MSTR. OFF
Warning on both panels ~ Isolate all EFIS displays as follows:
Left EFD MSTR
Right EFD MSTR...
MFD MSTR.
OFF
NOTE: Provided that the affected EFIS displays have been turned off for at least 30 minutes
following an overheat warning they may be turned on again for the final approach and
landing (5 minute use maximum).
Sub-section 4.05 Page 53 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
CATEGORY 2 APPROACH (if applicable)
Before the "100 ABOVE" call:
In the event of an excessive deviation warning, the approach may be continued provided
the excursion is less than 1 dot glideslope with 1/2 dot localizer and the flight path is stable
and returning to the ILS center line.
Following an autopilot Category 2 system failure or engine failure, the approach may be
continued to the Category 1 Decision Height (not less than 200 feet ARTE).
NOTE: A Category 2 system failure is defined as any red or yellow warning annunciators
within the EFIS or the CMPTR or CAT 2 warning annunciators illuminating.
After the "100 ABOVE" call:
In the event of an excessive deviation warning, engine, autopilot, Category 2 system or
PFDIND failure, the approach must be discontinued by executing a Go Around unless the
flight path is stable and the required visual references for landing have already been
established.
If a Go Around procedure is executed, monitor the airplane attitude with the primary and
‘standby attitude indicators.
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 54 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
MISCELLANEOUS
ENTRY DOOR UNLOCKED
Ensure all occupants have seats belts fastened and remain clear of the door
Cabin Sign... ON
. Reduce to the lowest value practical (zero
preferred) by descending and/or selecting
higher cabin altitude setting.
Cabin Pressure.
Oxygen As required
NOTE: Land as soon as possible.
EMERGENCY LIGHTS NOT SELECTED (if installed)
AUTO
‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 55 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ABNORMAL PROCEDURES
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‘Sub-section 4.05 Page 56
aeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.10
NORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
HANDLING
FLIGHT IN TURBULENT AIR
GENERAL
STORM TURBULENC!
Figure 4.10-1 ~ Maximum Altitude for Flight When Storm or
Severe Turbulence May Be Expected.
STALLS.
PROCEDURE
TECHNIQUE
CHARACTERISTICS
Figure 4.10-2 ~ Power Off Stalling Speeds.
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION.
AUTOPILOT PROCEDURE:
VOR APPROACH
ILS APPROACH AND LANDI
GLIDESLOPE CAPTURE
NAVIGATION.
Figure 4.10-3 ~ Speed for Use in Ieing Conditions.
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION SYSTEMS ....
GENERAL .
BEFORE TAKE-OFF
IN FLIGHT .
DESCENT .
LEAVING ICING CONDITIONS
SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS
PROCEDURES FOR EXITING THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT.
WHEEL BRAKES
GENERAL .
COOLING TIMES
AFTER NORMAL LANDING
Table 1 ~ Maximum Take-Off Weights with a 5 Minute
Waiting Period for Cooling Brakes
AFTER REJECTED TAKE-OFF
CREW TRAINING
‘THRUST REVERSERS (if installed)
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM if installed) .
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES
FLIGHTS IN EXCESS OF Myo ..
FLIGHTS IN EXCESS OF Vo.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 1 eyFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
SUB-SECTION 4.10
NORMAL PROCEDURES
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHECKLIST
INTRODUCTION .. :
Figure 4.10-4 ~ Recommended Walk-Around Pattern.
EXTERNAL CHECKS,
INTERNAL CHECKS ..
BEFORE START CHECKS
START CHECKS
AFTER START CHECKS
TAX! CHECKS ..
BEFORE TAKE-OFF CHECKS
LINE UP CHECKS...
AFTER TAKE-OFF CHECKS
CLIMB CHECKS
COLLINS AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS
WITH MODIFICATION 25F7318 (if installed).........
HONEYWELL AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS
WITH MODIFICATION 25F731A (if installed).
CABIN ALTITUDE SETTING FOR LANDING.
LANDING REFERENCE SPEED Vper
DESCENT CHECKS ..
APPROACH CHECKS ..
LANDING CHECKS ...
AFTER LANDING CHECKS
SHUT DOWN CHECKS
LEAVING AIRPLANE (TERMINATING FLIGHT) CHECKS
CABIN HI DATUM CHECKS.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 2 onFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
SUB-SECTION 4.10
NORMAL PROCEDURES
INTRODUCTION
This Sub-section consists of two parts:
+ Handling
+ Checklist
These parts contain normal operating procedures which relate primarily to the handling of
the airplane and the management of the airplane engines and systems.
Operating procedures in this section include only those where an action or sequence of
actions, of, prohibition of incorrect action(s), which if not observed, could result in a
significant adverse effect on the airworthiness of the airplane or the safety of the passengers
and crew.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 3 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 4
osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
HANDLING
FLIGHT IN TURBULENT AIR
GENERAL
‘Severe turbulence may be classified into two groups, as follows:
‘+ Clear air and non-storm turbulence
* Storm turbulence
Whenever possible, severe turbulence should be avoided. In all types of turbulence it is
important to avoid actions which could give rapid changes in attitude, altitude or airspeed;
whenever possible, achieve a steady condition before entry into turbulence.
Apart from the actions detailed below, pilot control movements should be kept to the
minimum and restricted to limiting long term changes in attitude and airspeed. All control
actions should be small and gentle and use of the trimmers should be restricted to
compensating for intentional change of airspeed. The airplane should be flown through
turbulence on a straight course or, if this is not practicable, bank angles should be limited to
approximately 15°. The autopilot in TURB mode and yaw damper may be used in storm
turbulence at the pilot's discretion. If APS-80 is installed, the ALT SEL, ALT, VS, IAS and
MACH modes must not be engaged.
NOTE: The high true airspeed of which the airplane is capable can considerably increase the
extent of the damage to airframe and engines which may result from encountering
hail.
FLIGHT PROCEDURE
CLEAR AIR and NON-STORM TURBULENCE.
Airspeed need not be reduced except for reasons of passenger comfort. If it is changed it is
recommended that an airspeed of 230 KIAS or 0.70 Mach Indicated be used.
STORM TURBULENCE
{fits not certain that the conditions are non-storm, then the conditions must be assumed to be
storm turbulence.
When severe turbulence is forecast or expected:
‘The weight/altitude boundary shown in Figure 4.10 -1 should be observed for that part of the
flight where severe turbulence is expected in order to avoid the possibility of encountering heavy
buffet. The airplane should be stabilized at 230 KIAS or 0.70 Mach Indicated, as appropriate,
before entry into the area of turbulence. Where a change to the flight path is made to avoid a
region of storm turbulence, it shall be assumed that severe turbulence might stil be expected for
the purpose of defining the maximum allowable altitude,
When severe turbulence is not forecast or expected:
Air speed should be changed slowly to 280 KIAS or 0.70 Mach Indicated, as appropriate, at
constant altitude.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 5 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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Sub-section 4.10 Page 6FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
1.8G MANOEUVRE AT THE
ROUGH AIR SPEED OF 0.70M IND.
rr a a a a a a
Maximum Altitude for Flight
When Storm ot Severe Turbulence May Be Expected
Figure 4.10-1
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 7 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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Sub-section 4.10 Page 8
onFAA approved Doc. No. HS.1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 21
ISSUE: 1 ‘Approved: August 11, 2005
REASON FOR ISSUE:
Provide clarification and additional information concerning stall flight checks.
ACTION:
Insert Page 1 of 2 to face Page 9 of Sub-Section 4.10 - Normal Procedures.
SECTION 4 - ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES
Sub-section 4.10 - NORMAL PROCEDURES
STALLS
Read the following information in place of the existing PROCEDURE:
PROCEDURE
When intentional stalls are carried out, the following conditions apply:
. The altitude must be above 10,000 ft AGL, 10,000 ft above clouds and below 18,000 ft MSL.
p
. Stalls must be conducted during day VMC with good visual horizon.
3. The autopilot must be disengaged.
4, The Stall Identification System must be operative.
5. All extemal surfaces must be free from ice.
6. The ventral tank (if installed) must be empty.
7. ‘The weather radar (i installed) must be in standby.
Stalls may be demonstrated with the yaw damper switched on or off,
To limit altitude toss, to maintain acceptable stalling characteristics and to limit structural abuse,
itis strongly recommended that the TECHNIQUE given below should be followed.
Page 1of2FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
STALLS
PROCEDURE
When intentional stalls are carried out the following conditions apply:
1, The altitude must be between 10,000 feet and 18,000 feet.
2. The autopilot must be disengaged.
3. The Stall Identification System must be operative.
4. All the external surfaces must be free from ice.
5. The ventral fuel tank (if installed) must be empty.
6. The weather radar (if installed) must be at standby.
Stalls may be demonstrated with the yaw damper switched on or off
To limit the height loss, to maintain acceptable stalling characteristics and to prevent
structural abuse, it is strongly recommended that the procedure given below be followed.
TECHNIQUE
The stalling technique is as follows:
1. Allstalls are to be made in straight (wings level) fight.
2. Stalls with flaps retracted and in the take-off configuration should be carried out at idle thrust.
To reduce altitude loss with approach or landing flaps, thrust should be adjusted not to
exceed 77% Nj. Once thrustis set, it should not be reduced during the approach to the stall
and recovery.
3. The airplane should be trimmed at an air speed of approximately 1.4 Vs in the appropriate
configuration after setting the required thrust.
4. The airspeed should be reduced at not more than one knot per second. Rapid or violent
movements of any control during the approach to the stall should be avoided particularly at
speeds below the operation of the stick shaker. With the yaw damper off, any tendency to
‘yaw during the approach to the stall should be corrected by normal use of the rudder.
5. The stallis identified by a short forward movement of the control column provided by the Stall
Identification System. The red STALL VLV OPEN annunciators to the left of each main
attitude display will come on. The airplane should be allowed to pitch nose down until the
stick push has cancelled, and should then be recovered to normal controlled flight. Any
tendency to roll should be corrected by use of ailerons.
NOTE: Do not attempt to hold the airplane in the stall.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 9 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
CHARACTERISTICS
There is no natural stall warning or aerodynamic buffet prior to the stall. Stall warning is provided
by a stick shaker which is set to operate at an indicated airspeed of 7% to 9% above the stalling
speed. It is acceptable for stick pusher operation to be coincident with the natural stall, provided
that any rolling tendency can be restrained to within 20° of bank angle by normal use of ailerons.
NOTE: Some aerodynamic buffet may occur briefly at the point of stall.
Power-off stalling speeds in terms of indicated air speed (IAS) are given for various
configurations on Figure 4.10 - 2. These airspeeds apply to an altitude of 15,000 feet and are the
stall identification speeds at forward CG and therefore differ from the values shown in
Figure 4.10 - 3 which are based on the minimum airspeed obtained during the stall.
Sub-section 4.10 Page 10 as“ISSUE: 1
_ REASON FOR ISSUE:
Provide clarification and additional information concerning stall flight checks.
ACTION:
Insert Page 2 of 2 to face Page 10 of Sub-Section 4.10 - Normal Procedures.
ee
‘SECTION 4 - ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES
‘Sub-section 4.10 - NORMAL PROCEDURES
STALLS
Read the following CAUTION at the beginning of the existing CHARACTERISTICS:
CHARACTERISTICS
CAUTION: A FREQUENT REASON FOR UNACCEPTABLE STALL CHARACTERISTICS
IS A TENDENCY TO ROLL AT THE STALL. IT IS ACCEPTABLE FOR A
MODERATE ROLL TO OCCUR, PROVIDED THAT NORMAL USE OF
‘AILERONS CAN LIMIT THE ROLL ANGLE TO NO MORE THAN 20°.
AILERON SNATCH MAY OCCUR AT OR PRIOR TO STALL AND IS NOT
es da ce ‘
THROUGHOUT THE aFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
STALLING SPEED
Power Off Stalling Speeds
Figure 4.10-2
©)
2:
6:
8
Z:
S:
S:
3:
=
fi
ie
O:
M3459
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 11FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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Sub-section 4.10 Page 12FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
AUTOPILOT and NAVIGATION
AUTOPILOT PROCEDURES
VOR APPROACH
If APS-85 is installed, when coupled to a VOR course for an approach and landing, the APPR
mode should be engaged. If EFIS-858 (2) is installed, the deviation selector (DEV) should
be selected OFF (EFIS annunciator ANG).
ILS APPROACH AND LANDING - LOCALIZER AND GLIDESLOPE CAPTURE
With VOR/LOC (APS-80) or NAV (APS-85) or APPR mode armed, localizer capture is
achieved by flying the airplane in the heading mode towards the localizer center line at the
desired intercept angle.
Glideslope arm requires the selection of APPR. Glideslope capture will occur automatically
after localizer capture.
‘Where practical, approach the glidesiope from below with flaps 15° and landing gear down,
At glideslope capture, select flaps 25° and reduce the airspeed to Vrcr +20 knots. Select
flaps 45° not later than 1,000 ARTE and then reduce the speed slowly to Vrer +10 knots.
Carefully maintain this airspeed down to the Decision Height and avoid large or rapid engine
ower changes because large changes in airspeed may result in excessive deviation from
the glidesiope beam.
The ILS display should be monitored throughout the approach.
NAVIGATION
If the airplane systems are to be shut down after landing, airplane equipped with IRS must
not make normal landings at airfields whose latitude is greater than 78° 25’ North or
78° 25’ South.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 13 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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Sub-section 4.10 Page 14
osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
M3457
Speed For Use in Icing Conditions
Figure 4.10-3
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 15 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
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‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 16FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
ICE AND RAIN PROTECTION SYSTEMS
GENERAL
{fice has formed on the airframe prior to approach, or icing conditions exist, the flight speeds
for use on approach are provided in LANDING IN ICING CONDITIONS in this section.
Where planned operation exceeds 5 hours, it is recommended an additional 12 liters of TKS
fluid (26 U.S. Pints) container be carried.
BEFORE TAKE-OFF
Prime the airframe ice protection system by setting the WING/TAIL ANTICE time switch to
run the pump for two minutes. Check that priming is complete before start of take-off.
If the outside air temperature is 5°C or below and is associated with conditions of high
humidity, i.e. mist or fog reducing visibility to approximately 1,000 yards (915 meters), or with,
a wet runway surface, set ENG ANTICE 1 and 2 and ENG IGNITION 1 and 2 to ON.
NOTE: ENG ANTICE 1 and 2 should be selected ON before setting take-off thrust.
When take-off is made with ENG ANTICE 1 and 2 selected ON, ITT must be monitored
during take-off and initial climb. Allowance must be made for the use of ENG ANTICE on
performance by reference to the appropriate figures in Sub-sections 4.10 and Section 5.
If necessary, the airframe WING/TAIL ANTICE switch may also be selected ON for take-off.
‘Switch ENG ANTICE 1 and 2 to OFF and the ENG IGNITION 1 and 2 to OFF when
conditions permit.
NOTE: There is a fuel penalty when the engine antice systems are in use.
In icing conditions, the ICE DET switch should normally be set to AUTO but should be set to
OVRD before taxi in icing conditions. Whether icing conditions are present or not, both PITOT
HEAT switches must be set to ON and it is recommended that SCREEN HEAT for all panels
should also be set to ON.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 17 aeFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
IN FLIGHT
Maintain the airframe system in the fully primed condition (see NOTE: 1 below).
Ificing conditions are present or expected, proceed as follows:
ENG IGNITION 1
ENG ANTICE 1.
WING/TAIL ANTICE..
ON
ON
... Select before entering icing and
set for 10 minutes.
(see NOTES: 1 and 2 below)
Airspeed... Adjust airspeed to 230 KIAS.
(see NOTE: 3 below)
ENG IGNITION 2... ON
ENG ANTICE 2... ON
ENG 1 & 2 A-ICE annunciators.. Not on ~ Monitor during flight
in icing conditions.
NOTES:
1. The airframe system should be maintained fully primed by selecting it on for 30 seconds
at the start of climb, for 2 minutes at the top of descent, and, if icing conditions are
expected, preferably for 2 minutes prior to entering icing conditions.
2. If icing conditions still prevail or are expected, a further period of operation should be
selected prior to the time switch reaching zero. Termination of the WING/ TAIL ANTICE
selection will be given by an audio chime.
3. This is a recommended speed. However, if it is necessary to take advantage of the full
range of airspeeds permitted for fight in icing conditions and if other conditions permit,
the airspeed may be adjusted to within the limits given in Figure 4.10 - 3.
4, Allowance should be made for the adverse effect of the engine anticing system upon
cruise, hold and baulked landing performance (see Section 5).
5. With either of the ENG ANTICE switches selected ON in flight, the windscreen
temperature is increased to provide windscreen ice protection. This increase is not
provided when the airplane is on the ground.
(NOTE: 5 does not apply to airplanes that do not have two-level windscreen heating)
DESCENT
When descending into icing conditions, select the airframe ice protection system on 2
minutes before entering icing (approximately 5,000 ft above cloud). With ENG ANTICE
selected in flight and thrust lever at idle, a raised N, is automatically applied at which
adequate intake and engine ant-ice is available.
NOTES:
1. The procedural use of flap 15° for descent and holding is not permitted in icing
conditions.
2. In icing conditions, ice may accumulate on the unprotected areas between the TKS
panels on the leading edge of the wings.
Sub-section 4.10 Page 18 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
LEAVING ICING CONDITIONS
ENG ANTICE 1 and 2.
ENG IGNITION 1 and 2
WING/TAIL ANTICE time switch
OFF
OFF
‘SEVERE ICING CONDITIONS
NOTE: The following weather conditions may be conducive to severe in-flight icing:
1. Visible rain at temperatures below 0°C ambient air temperature.
2. Droplets that splash or splatter on impact at temperatures below 0 °C ambient air
temperature.
PROCEDURES FOR EXITING THE SEVERE ICING ENVIRONMENT
These procedures are applicable to all flight phases from takeoff to landing. Monitor the
ambient air temperature, While severe icing may form at temperatures as cold as -18°C,
increased vigilance is warranted at temperatures around freezing with visible moisture
present. If the visual cues specified in Section 2 LIMITATIONS of this Flight Manual for
identifying severe icing conditions are observed, accomplish the following:
1. Immediately request priority handling from Air Traffic Control to facilitate a route or an altitude
change to exit the severe icing conditions in order to avoid extended exposure to flight
conditions more severe than those for which the airplane has been certified.
2. Avoid abrupt and excessive maneuvering that may exacerbate control difficulties.
3. Do not engage the autopilot.
4. If the autopilot is engaged, hold the ram’s-horn control column firmly and disengage the
autopilot.
5. If an unusual roll response or uncommanded roll control movement is observed, reduce the
Angle-Of-Attack.
6. Do not extend flaps during extended operations in icing conditions. Operations with flaps
extended can result in a reduced wing Angle-Of-Attack, with the possibilty of ice forming on
the upper surface further aft on the wing than normal, possibly aft of the protected area.
7. Ifthe flaps are extended, do not retract them until the airframe is clear of ice.
8. Report these weather conditions to Air Traffic Control.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 19 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
WHEEL BRAKES
GENERAL
‘The normal wheel brake system incorporates Maxaret anti-skid units which automatically
reduce the brake pressure should a wheel tend to skid. Since the Maxaret unit does not
operate until the wheel is revolving, the brakes must not be applied before touchdown. It
should be noted that the emergency braking system by-passes the anti-skid units and
therefore care should be exercised when using this system.
NOTE: if any of the wheel fusible plugs blow, the brakes must be inspected and certified
serviceable before the next take-off.
‘The brakes are of adequate capacity to bring the airplane to a stop under all circumstances:
{including a rejected take-off from V;) provided that the procedures stated below have been
carried out.
COOLING TIMES
After the airplane has made a normal landing or a stop from a rejected take-off, a waiting period
should be established to make sure the brakes are both sufficiently cool and in serviceable
condition for a further rejected take-off (critical case).
Sub-section 4.10 Page 20 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
AFTER NORMAL LANDING
The required waiting period from completion of taxi-in from landing to before start of taxi-out for
take-off is 5 minutes, except when the take-off weight exceeds the values given in Table 1.
When the weight exceeds these values, a period of 30 minutes must be allowed.
Aon Temperature °C
Altitude -10 0 to | 20 | 30 | 40 | 50
feet Take-off Weight ~ Lb
10,000 22,300 | 21,900 | 21,500 | 21,100 | 19,500
‘9,000 22,800 | 22,400 | 21,900 | 21,600 | 20,300
8,000 23,300 | 22,800 | 22,400 | 22,000 | 21,100
7,000 23,800 | 23,300 | 22,900 | 22,400 | 21,900
6,000 24,300 | 23,800 | 23,300 | 22,900 | 22,500 | 20,900
5,000 24,700 | 24,200 | 23,800 | 23,300 | 22,900 | 21,600
4,000 25,200 | 24,700 | 24,300 | 23,800 | 23,400 | 22,400
3,000 25,700 | 25,200 | 24,700 | 24,300 | 23,800 | 23,100
2,000 26,300 | 25,700 | 25,200 | 24,700 | 24,300 | 23,900
1,000 26,800 | 26,200 | 25,700 | 25,200 | 24,700 | 24,300 | 23,300
SL 27,300 | 26,700 | 26,200 | 25,700 | 25,200 | 24,800 | 24,100
Table 1
Maximum Take-Off Weights with a 5 Minute
Waiting Period for Cooling Brakes
This table is based on stil air and a downhill slope not exceeding 1/2%.
Corrections for more adverse conditions are given in the following NOTES:
NOTES:
1. In 0-5 knots tailwind subtract 500 Lb.
2. In 6-10 knots tailwind subtract 1,500 Lb.
3. If the downhill slope exceeds 1/2%, subtract 500 Lb.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 21 GoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
AFTER REJECTED TAKE-OFF
Required period from completion of taxi-in following a rejected take-off from a speed of 90
knots or less, to before start of taxi-out for take-off.
After a single rejected take-off.
After two or more successive rejected take-off.
If the rejected take-off is made from a speed greater than 90 KIAS the brakes must be
inspected and certified to be serviceable before the next take-off.
CREW TRAINING
‘The waiting times obtained by the table on the previous page relate to normal operations in
which the brakes and tires have time to cool between landings. If repeated braked landings
are made for crew training or any other reason, the brakes and tires may not have time to
cool between runs and their temperatures may rise to an undesirable level. The following
restrictions should therefore be observed.
Heavy braking should not be used more than necessary for the purpose of the exercise, and
the landing gear should be extended as long as possible ~ never less than 5 minutes in each
circuit.
Landings with light braking may be repeated at intervals of not less than 15 minutes. After a
landing with heavy braking, one or more touch and go circuits should be done, and a time of
30 minutes should elapse before the next braked landing.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 22 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
THRUST REVERSERS
(If installed)
Before the first flight of the day, the thrust reversers and associated annunciators should be
checked for correct operation. With the RUDDER BIAS A and 8 on, confirm that selection of
thrust reverse on each engine in turn inhibits the rudder bias system.
If the thrust reverser system is known to be inoperative or unserviceable, it must be disabled
and locked in the forward thrust position.
The thrust reversers should be armed (ARM annunciator illuminated) before each flight
unless the system is inoperative or unserviceable.
Reverse thrust should only be used when the main and nose gears are on the ground.
‘Movement of the thrust levers above IDLE is inhibited during thrust reverser deployment and
stowage, the UNLCK annunciators will be illuminated when the thrust reverser doors are not
locked in the stowed position. When the thrust reversers doors are fully deployed, and fan
flap doors extended, the REVSR annunciator will illuminate. The UNLCK annunciator
remains illuminated.
Maximum reverse thrust is automatically controlled at approximately 65% Ny.
GROUND PROXIMITY WARNING SYSTEM
Sundstrand Mark 2 BAe Mod. 259551B or equivalent
(if installed)
Pre-Flight Check (with flaps up)
GPWS PULL UP GP INHIBIT annunciator switch
GPWS FAIL annunciator..
Push and hold
Check ~ Illuminated
GLIDESLOPE Audible warning.. Check itis heard once
After a short pause. Check the PULL UP.
annunciator comes on and the
audible warning “WHOOP
WHOOP PULL UP" is heard.
. Check the voice stops. The
PULL UP annunciator should be
extinguished.
. Release and check the GPWS
FAIL annunciator extinguishes.
Atter several repetitions of PULL UP"......
Annunciator switch ....
Sub-section 4.10 Page 23 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
MISCELLANEOUS PROCEDURES
FLIGHTS IN EXCESS OF Myo
As permitted by the LIMITATIONS in Section 2, Myo may be exceeded when authorized for the
purpose of pilot training or routine test fights provided the following conditions are observed:
* Passengers are not carried.
‘+ The maximum air speed is an indicated Mach number of 0.82.
+ The altitude should be at least 30,000 feet throughout the maneuver with wings level and no
applied‘g’.
+ There is no significant turbulence.
‘Commence the maneuver in level fight by selecting Maximum Continuous Power and then push
the nose gently.
Recovery action is to reduce power to idle, extend the airbrakes and carry out a gentle pull up.
fa Mach number greater than 0.82 indicated or an air speed greater than 20 knots above Viio
inadvertently achieved, or if any airframe or aileron buffet is encountered, take recovery action
immediately.
FLIGHTS IN EXCESS OF Vo
It is permissible, for the purpose of pilot training or routine test flights, to exceed the maximum
operating speed Viso, as stated in Section 2 LIMITATIONS, by 20 knots provided that:
* Passengers are not carried.
© There is no significant turbulence.
+ The altitude is not greater than 20,000 feet.
Ifa Mach number greater than 0.82 indicated or an air speed greater than 20 knots above Vivo
is inadvertently achieved, or if any airframe or aileron buffet is encountered, take recovery action
immediately.
Sub-section 4.10 Page 24 GisFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
CHECKLIST
INTRODUCTION
This Checklist has been developed and recommended by the manufacturer for use in the
operation of this airplane.
It should be noted that the INTERNAL CHECKS offer the choice between:
EXTERNAL POWER AND/OR APU AVAILABLE
or
INTERNAL CHECKS - BATTERY ONLY
Follow the appropriate series of checks when that stage of the procedure is reached.
NOTE: Figure 1 is a typical 800 Series airplane with Thrust Reversers
installed.
Recommended Walk-Around Pattern
Figure 4.10-4
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 25 aoFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
EXTERNAL CHECKS
The Recommended "Walk-Around" Pattern is shown on Figure 4.10-4
All surfaces.
(see LIMITATIONS)
Protective covers, blanks and plugs... Remove and stow
Engine, APU and CAU
Landing gear... Extension normal ~ Check tires,
brakes and hoses.
Landing gear locking pins Remove (3)
Nose wheel steering pin. Check
Nose gear doors Closed. Manual release secure.
Static Plates Free from dust, corrosion, and
contaminants.
Avionics Access doors (if installed)... Correctly seated and secured
Nose Skin (forward of static plates)
and sealant bulges.
Fasteners and panels, All secure
‘Thrust Reversers (if installed)
removed.
Check level
Undamaged, Free from oil, fuel,
or hydraulic leaks.
Engine oil
General condition.
Wing and Horizontal Tait.
panels.
INTERNAL CHECKS
Cabin Check
Cabin Overwing Emergency Exit
Locking Pin (if installed) Check removed and stowed
REFUEL switches.
Circuit Breakers..
+All OFF
Set
Safety equipment Check and stow
Pump hand .»- Stowed
LANDING GEAR. ‘Selector down. Nose gear
indicator visible.
Brakes. PARK
All trims Check, set
Thrust Reverse levers (if installed). Stow, POWER OFF
HP COCKS a OFF
LP COCKS. Levers up
XFEED and TRANSFER. Levers up
BATT ON ~ Check gear 3 greens
BATT ISOLATE, = NORM
BUS TIE OPEN annunciator . Check illuminated
Battery Volts .. Above 23,
Fire extinguisher switches. Off (2) Indicators clear (2)
... Free from snow, ice and frost ~
Intake and exhaust ports clear
Free from dents, paint bubbles
Stowed ~ Check safety pins (2)
smssnnennee Check antice fluid distributed at
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 26 os"REASON FOR ISSUE: Additional Ios Protection Limitations prior to takeoff and revised —
_ctiteria for in-flight icing. jh cae
kM e of : 1 in Section 2 -
ACTION: tiranone en ian Pege? to face Page 21 in Section
Insert Advance Bulletin 4.
ORNAL PROCEDURES. Subsection 10" 26 in Section
PROCEDURES. F
‘SECTION 4- ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES
‘Sub-section 4.10 - NORMAL PROCEDURES ae
CHECKLIST
‘EXTERNAL CHECKS
Read the following procedural check in place of the first procedural check:
All surfaces and wing leading edges... Free trom snow, ice and frost -
: ‘see AFM Section 2 - LIMITATIONS.FAA approved Doc. No. HS.1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 28 (continued)
Intentionally left blank
Page 4 of 4FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
if External Power or APU available:
i Battery Power initially only available:
EXT PWR... .... AS required EXT PWR. OFF
EXT BATT CHG... Off No 1 VHF Comm. ON
TEST panel Test
APU FIRE warnin, TEST ENG FIRE
182
os em BEACON
R PUMP
ENG CMPTR2
No2MAIN AIR VLV..
START PWR.
Continue with:
BUS TIE (if EXT PWR OFF) .CLOSE
IRS's (if installed).
Avionics MSTR switches (as installed) ..
RADIO, ADS, EFIS and MFD master
‘Transponders
EFIS FAN FAIL annunciators (2),
STBY INV...
Inverters.
Air conditioning
Oxygen ..
Passenger oxygen
LH mask and mictophone.
LH side panels..
FLT ANNUN..
STBY INSTS
Standby attitude.
ws
No. 2 Standby Attitude Indicator (if installed)
TRANSFER switches.
AUX HYD SYSTEM handle
Avionics Emergency Power (if installed
RADAR MASTER (f installed)
Pannier Heat (if installed).
-NAV or ALIGN
.On
ON
Signal from flying pilot's ADC
(Ghanigo as fying Blot erangos)
..Not illuminated
ARM ~ Check XE VOLTS:
.ON and check
LAs required
_SUPPLY ON ~ Check contents
.ON
Check
.Check
.. TEST ~ DIM OVRD - NORM
EMERG PWR TEST
Erect
.. TEST ~ DIM OVRD - NORM
Erect
All green
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 27 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
Continue with:
AUXILIARY COOLING PACK (if installed)
FLT RCDR (If installed ~ first flight of the day)
RH side panels.
RH mask and microphone
Glareshield..
If External ‘and/or : = ——
‘APU avallable then: With No 2 engine running:
TEST panel... “Test all functions]| |] TEST Pane! estat cxent
}
Continue with:
Roof Panel
BEFORE START CHECKS
External and internal checks...
Autopilot.
Electric trim
EFD (EFIS)
CAT 2 (if installed)
EMERG Lights (if installed).
IRSs (f installed)...
‘START CHECKS.
Brakes,
BEACON.
ENG CMPTRs.
Fuel pumps
START PWR
No.2 Engine .
No.1 Engine .
Check
Complete
Test
Test
Test
Check as required
Set
Reset
Set
Set
Set
Set
Set and checked
Set
Set
Given
On
‘ARM
NAV
PARK
On
AUTO
ON
ON
. Start
. Start
Sub-section 4.10 Page 28 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
AFTER START CHECKS
START PWR.
EXT PWR (if used)
Generator 1 & 2.
APU GEN..
Volts and Amps...
Ai conditioning
ALTERNATORS ..
Heaters
PITOT AMPS
CVR (If installed ~ first fight of the day) .
AIR BRAKES.
APR
OFF
TAXI CHECKS
one SOt
As required
-As required
Given
Closed
Secure
Exterior lights..
Take-Off Briefing
Flight Deck Windows
Harnesses
Controls
soeeatenAS Tequired
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 29FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
BEFORE TAKE-OFF CHECKS
Brakes... . Check
Instruments .. . Check
Altimeters. . LH and RH reading within 40 ft
of each other
THRUST REVERSERS: . ARM.
ENG CMPTR
RUDDER BIAS ~ first fight of the day
Thrust Reversers (if installed ~ first flight of the day)
APU...
Seats and harnesses
Windows
Briefing..
BATT 1 & 2 (Nicad only)
BATT AMPS.
FMS...
Check (if required)
LINE UP CHECKS
EXTERIOR LIGHTS ..
‘Transponder
Flying controls.
Antice and ENG IGNITION ..
MWS:
Flaps, Airbrakes, Trims and Vspeeps.
APR
As required
Set
Full and free movement
Sub-section 4.10 Page 30 coFAA Approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 22
ISSUE: 1 Approved: 14 May 2001
REASON FOR ISSUE:
Addition of Cruise Checks.
ACTION:
Insert this page to face Page 31 of SUB-SECTION 4,10, NORMAL PROCEDURES.
‘SECTION 4 - ABNORMAL/NORMAL PROCEDURES:
SUB-SECTION 4.10 - NORMAL PROCEDURES
CHECKLIST
The following information is to be inserted after CLIMB CHECKS.
‘CRUISE CHECKS
Prossurization .. Check
OXYGEN... Check contents
Antice and ENG IGNITION .....As required
Systems Check and monitor
‘Approved aL. few
‘Manager,
Aircraft Certification Office
Federal Aviation Administration
Wichita, Kansas
USA
Page 1 of 1FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
AFTER TAKE-OFF CHECKS
LANDING GEAR... Up
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2.. OPEN
Yaw damper Engage
Flaps up
APR. Disarm
SYNC
Antice and ENG IGNITION.
Ny oF No
AS required ~ Prime
Airplanes modified with CABIN HI DATUM
and the departure or landing airfield is above 9,000 ft.
Refer to CABIN HI DATUM CHECKS:
following the LEAVING AIRPLANE CHECKS (TERMINATING FLIGHT)
CLIMB CHECKS
. Set and checked
. As required
. As required
. Check
. Check contents
Altimeters ..
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 31 weFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
COLLINS AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS WITH MODIFICATION 25F731B (i
In Airspace designated as RVSM
ADC 1, 2. ‘Operational
Altimeters.. .-Compare. Repeat at least once per hour.
‘Transponder _ Signal from flying plots ADC
(change as flying pilot changes)
‘Operation in Airspace Designated as RVSM
‘The maximum permited Mach number for operations in airspace designated as RVSM is:
Pressure Altitude - feet Mach
29,000 068
30,000 0.69
31,000 0.70
132,000 o71
33,000 072
35,000 and above 0.80 (Myo)
RVSM Malfunctions
Discontinue operations in Airspace designated as RVSM ift
ADC 1 of ADC 2 FAIL annunciator illuminates
HONEYWELL AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS WITH MODIFICATION 25F731A
(if installed)
In Airspace designated as RVSM
ADC 1,2. Operational
‘Alimeters Compare. Repeat at least once per hour.
‘Transponders.
.» Signal from flying pilot's ADC
{change as ying plot changes)
RVSM Limitations
‘No additional timitations
RVSM Malfunctions
Discontinue operations in Airspace designated as RVSM if:
‘ADC 1 or ADC 2 FAIL annunciator illuminates
Sub-section 4.10 Page 32 aoFAA Approved Doc. No. HS.1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN No. 24
ISSUE: 1 Approved: 7 January 2003
REASON FOR ISSUE:
a yee ne asl eee eo ies Naar os Sections Bee
and to update procedures which pertain to flight in RVSM airspace with failed components.
ACTION: ==
Insert this page to face Page 32 of SECTION 4, Sub-Section 4.10, NORMAL PROCEDURES.
ee
SUB-SECTION 4.10 - NORMAL PROCEDURES
(CHECKLIST
COLLINS AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS for AIRPLANES WITH ADC-82A AIR DATA
go arinmere: INSTALLED BY SERVICE BULLETIN No. 34-3381 (if incorporated)
COLLINS AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS for AIRPLANES WITH ADC-86 AIR DATA
COMPUTERS INSTALLED BY MODIFICATION 25F731B (if installed)
In Airspace designated as RVSM
ADC 1,2... Operational
Atimeters ‘Compare. Repeat atleast once per hour.
‘Transponders ‘Signal from flying pilots ADC
(change as flying pilot changes)
RVSM Malfunctions
‘When Flying In RVSM Airspace
Failure of components or systems that may affect flight in RVSM airspace should be handled by
the following:
2) Reterto the applicable procedures forthe faled components or systems in Sub-section 4.05,
b) Utilize the specific contingency procedures applicable to individual ICAO RVSM regions.
HONEYWELL AVIONICS RVSM CHECKS WITH MODIFICATION 25F731A
(if installed)
In Airspace designated as RVSM
pct, Operational
‘Compare. Repeat atleast once per hour.
‘Signal from flying pilot's ADC
(change as flying pilot changes)
RVSM Malfunctions
When Fiying In AVSM Airspace . ;
ale ot ieee 3 aon Wi ay tec Ratt VAM atopy ikl Majid,
2) Refer othe applicable procedures forthe failed components or systems in Sub-section 4.05.
‘b) Utilize the specific contingency procedures applicable to individual ICAO RVSM regions,
Page 1 of 2FAA Approved Doc. No. HS.1.16
ADVANCE AMENDMENT BULLETIN NO. 24 (continued)
Approved By: Can Babe
LPPonald K. Rathgeber, Manager
Aircraft Certification Office
Federal Aviation Administration
Wichita, Kansas
USA
1 2/0.3.
Approval Date:
Page 2 of 2FAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
CABIN ALTITUDE SETTING FOR LANDING
(Apply setting correction to airfield elevation)
QNH-mb_ || 970 975 980 985 990 995 1000
in.Hg 28.64 | 28.79 | 28.94 | 29.09 | 2923 | 29.38 | 29.53
ee
QNH-mb || 1005 | 1010 | 1015 | 1020 | 1025 | 1030 | 1035
in.Hg 29.68 | 29.82 | 29.97 | 30.12 | 30.27 | 30.41 | 30.56
LANDING REFERENCE SPEED Vper
UP TO Maximum Landing Weight
Weight Ibs | 17,000 | 18,000 | 19,000 | 20,000 | 21,000 | 22,000 | 23,000
VaerKIAS] 112 | 115 | 119 | 122 | 125 | 128 | 130
ABOVE Maximum Landing Weight
FOR EMERGENCY USE ONLY
.Use Vagr + 10
Ise Vper + 15
Icing/Flapless
Use Vper +30
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 33 asFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
DESCENT CHECKS
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2
Pressurization .
Veer --
Briefing.
Antice
OPEN both
. Set
Calculate and Set
Given
Prime
APPROACH CHECKS
Altimeters . ‘Set and checked
F/DK VLV . CLOSE
EXTERIOR LIGHTS. As required
Cabin notices ..... On
Seats and harnesses .. . Secure
Nosewheel steering. . Handwheel clear
CAT 2 Checks ..
. Complete (if applicable)
LANDING CHECKS
AIR BRAKES .. ‘SHUT
LANDING GEAR. own ~ 3 Greens
Nosewheel steering, entered
ENG SYNC..
Altimeters
FLAPS...
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2
AP & YD...
AFTER LANDING CHECKS
AIR BRAKES & FLAPS..
EXTERIOR LIGHTS.
PITOTVANE HEAT L & R...
Antic
XPDR & RADAR
‘Only the SHUT DOWN CHECKS needs to be completed for a short turnaround. Before the
Taxi Checks go to BEFORE START CHECKS, ignoring EXTERNAL and INTERNAL
CHECKS.
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 34 osFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
‘SHUT DOWN CHECKS:
With both engines and APU running
Brakes.
THRUST REVERSERS
(if installed)...
EMERG LIGHTS
(if installed).
Air conditioning
HP cocks.
Fuel pumps
ENG CMPTRS..
BEACON,
Cabin notices...
PARK
OFF
GEN FAI.
‘SCREEN HEAT &
ALTERNATORS:
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 35 GsFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
If the LEAVING AIRPLANE (TERMINATING FLIGHT) CHECKS are completed, the
EXTERNAL CHECKS AND INTERNAL CHECKS should be completed before the next
flight.
LEAVING AIRPLANE (TERMINATING FLIGHT) CHECKS.
With APU only running
BATT 1 & 2 Temperature
(Nicads only)
IRS's ({f installed).
FMs.
Avionics MSTR switches
{as installed) .
Check
OFF
OFF
OFF
Standby Inverte OFF
APU, ‘Shut down
EXTERIOR and INTERIOR
LIGHTS ..
Flying controls .
OXYGEN SUPPLY
BATT.
VESTIBULE LIGHT.
Sub-section 4.10 Page 36 ooFAA approved Doc. No. HS 1.16
NORMAL PROCEDURES
The following procedures are for airplane modified with CABIN HI DATUM
and the departure or landing airfield is above 9,000 ft.
eter twee
eee ee eens
NOTE:
CLIMB CHECKS
Altimeters.. ‘Set and checked
EXTERIOR LIGHTS As required
Cabin notices As required
Antice. : As required
Pressurization Check
OXYGEN... heck contents
CABIN HI DATUM... )e-Select ~ see NOTE:
Cabin Hi Datum should be de-selected once cabin pressure altitude
drops below 8,000 ft.
Cabin Hi Datum must be de-selected by the time the airplane has
reached 25,000 ft.
DESCENT CHECKS
(if the landing airfield is above 9,000 ft)
MAIN AIR VLVs 1 & 2
Pressurization..
CABIN HI DATUM...
Veer:
Briefing
Antice.
APPROACH CHECKS
Altimeters.
Exterior Lights..
Seat Belts
Nosewheel Steering
..Set and check
As required
ON
..Handwheel clear
LANDING CHECKS
Air Brakes
Flaps
Gear.
Nosewheel Steering.
Brakes...
Harnesses
SYNC.
Refer to previous AFTER LANDING CHECKS
‘Sub-section 4.10 Page 37 or
ng eee
San