10 - Indicating Systems
10 - Indicating Systems
RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Etihad has been suffering poor reliability on the A32X cockpit display units Thales PN C19755BA01 due to display
unit failure at push back or during flight over the past years.
During 2019 the A32X fleet suffered a total of 35 replacement of cockpit display units on a fleet of 30 aircraft.
Among other reasons, during 2019 Thales confirmed that the units arriving to shop were showing extreme signs
of dust contamination that explained part of the high number of on wing failures and removals. Figure 1 shows
pictures taken at a Display Unit after been disassembled in shop back in 2019.
In order to combat the unit dirtiness Etihad launched a lengthy cleaning campaigned that target the units that
were flying for a longer period of time and commanded the removal of these units to be exclusively sent to shop
for disassembly and cleaning.
By October 2020 Etihad sent to Thales approximately a total of 20 display units for cleaning. Even though the
units are removed in serviceable condition in order to be disassembled and cleaned at the Thales shop, most of
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RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
them failed the incoming test and required replacement of internal electronic boards Back Lighting Unit (BLU) and
Dimming Monitoring Board (DMB).
On the 25th November 2020 Thales requested to Etihad to stop sending display units for cleaning due to shortage
suffered on the electronic components used to manufacture the BLU and DMB boards.
Questions to Thales:
1. Is there a design issue that makes the Thales Display Unit PN C19755BA01 especially susceptible to failures
due to dust?
2. Knowing that a large portion of the Display Units required BLU and DMB boards replacement, how Thales did
not foresee the potential shortage of the components used to manufacture the boards?
3. Why Display Unit PN C19755BA01 removed from Etihad fleet in serviceable condition fail the incoming test and
require BLU and DMB replacement?
TAP is having is having several removals of Display Unit P/N C19755BA01. The result of the majority of the
investigations completed at Thales are “Reloaded ADL and Software”.
TAP would like to know if other operators are experiencing the same situation?
AA currently operates 120 A319/A321 and 29 A321NX with the Teledyne 3G WGL-QAR P/N 2243800-362 units.
AA was planning on using the Teledyne WGL-QAR on future A321NX/A321XLR deliveries. AA uses the AT&T
Cellular system which plans to sunset the 3G system in February 2022.
AA has asked Airbus if they will be supporting a 4G LTE upgrade for the current Teledyne WGL-QAR for existing
aircraft and future deliveries and they confirmed they would not. This forces AA to either take the FOMAX with 4G
LTE or find a STC solution for the existing WGL-QARs. AA prefers not to add a second AID to its A320 fleet which
would require an additional ground system and additional cybersecurity requirements. AA would like Airbus to
continue to support the Teledyne WGL-QAR for future cellular system upgrades.
Questions:
1. Do other operators have this concern with Airbus' lack of 4G LTE support for existing WGL/QAR/AIDs?
2. Can Airbus consider extending support for the Teledyne WGL-QARs for 4G LTE and future 5G cellular
connectivity?
3. If Airbus is not willing to continue support the WGL-QAR installations on the production line, will Airbus at
least consider installing provisions for the WGL-QAR system.
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RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Referring to former AMC Discussion Items 12-172, 13-184, and13-185, we would like to ask, if there was a
solution and final answer available from Collins concerning the reliability problem with Rotary Switches on the
DCP. See below:
*****13-184*****
At 2012 AMC, British Airways raised the issue with regards the reliability of the Rotary Switch Part Numbers
837-2001-090 used on the DCP-7000 LRUs.
Rockwell Collins promised to provide BAW with an update in approximately 60 days after their review of the
issue. To date, January 2013, BAW has received no correspondence.
MODERATOR – The next 3 items I think we can combine. Those are from 2013: 184, 185, and 186. British
Airways, Delta, and Air France/KLM. Are we good with combining all three?
LATENDORF/LUFTHANSA – We support this issue as well as we have seen that the reliability problem still
exists on the Rotary Switch.
VAN VLIET/AIR FRANCE/KLM – KLM would like to express again that we are looking for an improved design
of the switch. We would like to have comps available.
PARPART/ROCKWELL COLLINS – We agree that questions 13-184, 13-185, and 13-186 be combined.
Rockwell Collins apologizes for not meeting the commitment date communicated during the 2013 AMC
Meeting of having a solution for our customers on these switches. We are still working on it.
Rockwell Collins Engineering received four (4) suspect switches in February 2014 and is employing those
switches as part of our root cause investigation. Currently Rockwell Collins Engineering and supplier quality
are working with the component manufacturer to determine root cause and to develop corrective action.
Rockwell Collins has investigated the possibility of a more robust replacement switch, and we have
determined that there is not a more robust switch available which is suitable for this application. Therefore, we
are committed to improve the existing design.
Rockwell Collins requests that this item remain open as we continue to work toward determining root cause
and developing corrective action. Rockwell Collins will communicate results to the airlines in these three
questions when they are available.
LHT would like to have the operator’s comments and Collins Aerospace.
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RECORDING/INDICATING SYSTEMS/INSTRUMENTS
Item Summary Title LRU PN Vendor Aircraft ATA From If MRO, the
Associate
Airline
Air France has been waiting for more than one year to receive repair and test data to allow performing
maintenance on B787 Ice detector P/N 0877B2/B1.
Collins has finally responded and stated that the data provided in CMM 30-81-39 is sufficient. However, data is
missing or unreadable in this CMM 30-81-39.
Air France is insisting that Collins provided the proper TSDP or corrected CMM to allow to performing
maintenance on these Ice detectors.