Philosophy of Science

Final Exam Coverage

Faculty: Henry Robles

Our Lady of the Angels Seminary
First Semester SY2018-2019
 Philosophy of Science: Oral Exams Coverage

• Francis Bacon: Knowledge is power

• Thomas Hobbes: Man is a machine
• David Hume (Problem of Induction): Custom is the great guide to life
• Charles Sanders Peirce (Pragmatism): Consider what effects things
have
• William James (Pragmatism): Act as if what you do makes a difference
• John Dewey (Pragmatism): We only think when we are confronted
with problems
• Karl Popper (Falsification)
• Thomas Kuhn (Paradigm Shift)
• Paul Feyerabend (Anything Goes)
• Imre Lakatos (Research Programme)
• Immanuel Velikovsky (Worlds in Collision)
 Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
Knowledge is Power
• Scientific knowledge builds upon itself
• Scientific knowledge advances steadily and cumulatively, discovering new laws and making new inventions possible. It enables
people to do things that otherwise could not be done. Knowledge is Power.
• Bacon saw in science, if it was properly understood and undertaken, nothing less than its possibility of understanding the natural
world and, in so doing, becoming master of it
• Science must be separated from religion, in order to make the acquisition of knowledge quicker and easier, so that it can be
used to improve the quality of people’s lives.
• There are two ways of acquiring knowledge, one through reason, the other by experiment
• Bacon saw that scientific knowledge could give men power over nature, and therefore that the advance of science
could be used to promote human plans and prosperity in an unimaginable scale
• Bacon advocated a methodical interrogation of natural phenomena in pursuit of more comprehensive laws,
resulting in not just knowledge for its own sake, but the control of things and thus improvement of human life
• Science can improve human life.
• Bacon established a new method for conducting scientific experiments, based on detailed observations and deductive reasoning. He
considered the practical application of scientific discoveries to be their purpose and point
• In order to advance our knowledge of the natural world, one has to use controlled and systematic procedure, observe the facts, record
observations and amass a body of reliable data; the more the better
• Form a hypothesis, test it via experiment, then make general statements.
• Bacon put forward a logical system for the scientific process:
• The inductive method combining the process of carefully observing nature with systematically accumulating data
• Take observations from nature and attempt to uncover laws and theories pertaining to how nature works
• Bacon emphasized the importance of experimentation in his work and believed experiments need to be carefully recorded
so that the results could be both reliable and repeatable.
 Francis Bacon (1561-1626)
• We have to be careful not to impose our ideas on the facts. When we have amassed enough of them will we begin to do so:
regularities and patterns will begin to emerge, casual corrections will reveal themselves, and we shall start to perceive the
laws of nature at work.
• It is also important to keep our eyes skinned for contrary instances. Negative instances are as important as positive ones in
guiding us to the right conclusions
• Bacon stressed the need to test new theory by variation of approach, by going on to look for negative instances, eg metals
expanding when heated (heat must cause all metals to expand; other causes?)
• On how to overcome the problem of induction (the scientific habit of drawing general conclusions from limited amounts of
data): develop a system combining data drawn from experience with a form of negative reasoning -- this provides for a solid
base for certain knowledge while allowing the widest possible range of ideas and research
• By careful experimentation, one identifies and lists the many circumstances in which all instances of nature of appear
(Presence), all instance of nature does not (Absence) and all cases involving an increase or decrease in the presence of nature
in the same objects (Decreasing/ Increasing)
• Based on the above, one can formulate axioms and interpretations – which we now call hypothesis.
• Bacon on Plato: through examination of the meaning of words (and looking inward for knowledge), this is just like spinning
web inside your head
• Bacon on Aristotle: Aristotle’s method is like ants forever collecting tiny fragments and sticking them together into a great
heap of info; it is like hoovering up of empirical data and then expecting the truth to emerge almost mechanically
• We are like ants, who mindlessly collect data but have only limited ideas about what to do with them. The traditional
logic of Aristotle was less useful as a tool for discovery. It compels assent (acceptance/ approval) after the fact, but
reveals nothing new.
• We instead need a theoretical insight that will make sense of the mass of data
• The true philosopher is like a honeybee – bees gather the ingredients they need for the natural world, but
then transform them into mathematically perfect honeycombs and yummy honey itself
• The true philosopher does not rely solely on the powers of the mind (Plato), neither solely on just data
empirically gathered (Aristotle), but instead take the middle course like a bee.
 Thomas Hobbes (1528-1679)
Man is a Machine

• As a materialist, Hobbes believed the world to be a purely mechanical system made of nothing but matter and
motion, driven by forces of attraction and repulsion under the laws of nature
• Nothing without substance can exist so everything in the universe is physical. A human being is therefore entirely
physical.
• Man is a machine, made of material and whose functions could be explained by mechanical processes (eg
sensation is caused by the mechanical processes of the nervous system).
• All animals and humans are nothing more than flesh and blood machines
• “The universe, that is the whole mass of things that are, is corporeal, that is to say body, hath the dimension of
magnitude, namely length, breadth, and depth. Also every part of body is likewise body, and hath the like
dimensions. And consequently, every part of the universe is body, and that which is not body is not part of the
universe. And because the universe is all, that which is no part of it is nothing, and consequently nowhere.”
• Everything in the world can be explained in physical terms – mechanistic theory about the nature of the world
• Some bodies or objects are imperceptible, even though they occupy physical space and have physical dimensions;
they are called “spirits” or “animal spirits”. These spirits move around the body carrying and passing information
• Hobbes incorporated the science of mechanism and motion into his thinking as a way to explain human behaviour.
• Concepts such as incorporeal substance are self-contradictory and could mean nothing at all. Only matter existed,
every moving object including human beings, as some sort of machine
• The mind is also a machine; all mental processes were to be understood as consisting movements of matter inside
an individual’s skull
• Hobbes did not believe in dualism or the existence of a soul
• All religious matters are matter of faith and not science. God is incorporeal. God will remain beyond our
comprehension.
 Pragmatism: Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
Knowing is doing. To do is to know.
• Pragmatism: That we do not acquire knowledge simply by observing, but by doing, and that we rely on the knowledge only so long as it is
useful, in the sense that it adequately explains things for us. When it no longer fulfills that function, or better explanations make it
redundant, we replace it
• We acquire knowledge by participating and not spectating. For example, when we learn to drive a car, we gain knowledge from our action
as a participant. This contradicted the main view of earlier scientists that knowledge is impersonal and is read from observations
• We are part of this world, living in amongst it all, and it is chiefly in pursuit of survival in it that we strive for knowledge and understanding
of it. So we are interested parties
• Older assumptions worked perfectly adequately in their time, yet they are not (necessarily) true.
• “Consider what effects that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our
conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.”
• Conception of object = effects
• Effects = conception of objec
• What do we mean by things called “hard”?: the concept “hard” gets its meaning from the things which happen when we put hard
objects to the test, eg they don’t scratch, they don’t crumble when touched, they will dent soft objects
• What we do mean by things called “heavy”?: they will fall when not supported.
• Knowledge is an explanatory tool but can be different from facts
• Truth is provisional and had to be constantly reassessed in the light of the results of new experiences
• Science is progressing by means of the testing of prepositions derived from hypotheses about the nature of the world
• Scientific truths are provisional; one should not be committed to the truth of current scientific opinion, but rather merely accept it as a
stage on the way towards the truth. The truth about them would eventually be known.
• Science as a practice is proceeding according to three principles of inference:
• Abduction: the generation of hypothesis for the purpose of explaining particular phenomenon
• Deduction: the mechanism by which testable propositions are derived from hypotheses
• Induction: the whole process of experimentation which takes place to test hypotheses
 Pragmatism
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
Deduction
• From true premises one can derive necessarily true conclusions by following the rules of deductive logic
• If all M are P, ad S is M, then S is P

• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.

• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.
• Result: These ballpens are blue.
Induction
• Draws conclusions which are not certain from multiple examples
• If all OLAS seminarians in this classroom have black hair, then the conclusion “all OLAS seminarians have
black hair” is accepted as true
• If a jar contains 100 pingpong balls, 60 black and 40 white, then the probability of drawing a black ball is
6 out of every 10 draws.
• If the sun rose yesterday and other day, then it will rise again tomorrow.

• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.

• Result: These ballpens are blue.
• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.
 Pragmatism
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
Abduction
• A form of reasoning to infer a premise from a conclusion
• The generation of hypothesis for the purpose of explaining particular phenomenon
• A fallacious, a logical error?
• Example: Since if it rains, the grass gets wet, one can abduce (hypothesize) that it probably
rained
• Peirce argued that this kind of reasoning has evolved in humans, who have become
adept at selecting the best hypothesis to explain the condition
• Peirce identified his abduction with the scientific method of hypothesis-deduction-
observation-experiment. In this case, the scientist makes various guesses (hypotheses)
to explain observations. Once the hypothesis is formed, deduction is used to predict
other logical consequences. Experiments then establish the truth or falsity of these
conseqences.

• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.

• Result: These ballpens are blue.
• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.
 Pragmatism
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914)
Deduction
• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.
• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.
• Result: These ballpens are blue.

Induction
• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.
• Result: These ballpens are blue.
• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.

Abduction
• Rule: All the ballpens in this bag are blue.
• Result: These ballpens are blue.
• Case: These ballpens are from this bag.
 Pragmatism
William James (1842-1910)

• The truth of an idea depends on how useful it is, whether or not it does what is required of it
• If an idea does not contradict the known facts (eg laws of science), and it provides a means of predicting things accurately enough
for our purposes, there can be no reason not to consider it true
• Any idea, if acted upon, is found to be true by the action we take; putting the idea into practice is the process
• Belief in an idea is an important factor in choosing to act upon it, and in this way belief is a part of the process that makes an
idea true
• Belief that life is worth living and your belief will help you create the fact.
• If faced with a difficult decision, one’s belief in a particular idea will lead to a particular course of action and so contributes to its
success
• “True beliefs” are those that prove useful to the believer (but careful to distinguish them from facts)
• Every time we try to establish a new belief, it would be useful if we had all the available evidence and the time to make a
considered decision. But regardless, we have to rely on our beliefs to guide our actions (eg lost in the forest example).
• Our actions and decisions make our belief in an idea become true.
• Act as if what you do makes a difference. It does
• The emphasis is clearly on what difference that idea makes for practical affairs. An idea of x is only a useful idea if it helps one deal
with x should x exist. Truth really does correspond to reality for a pragmatist
• But we do not just accept any outlandish belief –
• The available evidence must weigh on its favour
• The idea must be sufficient and able to withstand criticism
• If a concept means literally what you do with it, then its truth must consist in doing whatever it is successfully
• If you follow the pragmatic method, you must bring out its practical cash-value (its usefulness to us), set it at work within the
stream of your experience
• Concepts are part of an action process, not just static things to be examined.
 Pragmatism: John Dewey (1859-1952)
We only think when we are confronted with problems
• Pragmatism starts from the position that the purpose of philosophy, or “thinking”, is not just to provide us with a true picture of the
world, but to help us to act more effectively within it
• If we are taking a pragmatic perspective, we should not be asking “is this the way things are?” but rather, “what are the practical
implications of adopting this perspective?”
• Philosophical problems are not abstract problems divorced from people’s lives. Problems occur because humans are living beings
trying to make sense of their world, struggling to decide how best to act within it
• Philosophy starts from our everyday human hopes and aspirations, and from the problems that arise in the course of our lives. This
being the case, philosophy should also be a way of finding practical responses to these problems
• Philosophizing is not about being a “spectator” who looks at the world from afar, but about actively engaging in the problems of life
• Dewey takes from Charles Darwin the idea that nature as a whole is a system that in a constant state of change; an idea that echoes the
philosophy of Heraclitus
• We only think when confronted with problems. We are organisms that find ourselves having to respond to a world that is subject to
constant change.
• Existence is a risk, or a gamble, and the world is fundamentally unstable. We depend upon our environment to be able to survive and
thrive, but the many environments in which we find ourselves are themselves always changing. And these environments do not change
in a predictable fashion (eg good harvest now, drought next; good weather now and then storm comes)
• In the face of this uncertainty, we can adopt two strategies:
• a) appeal to higher beings and hidden forces in the universe for help via religion, magical rites, ceremonies and sacrifices, or
• b) we can seek to understand the world and gain control of our environment. To develop various techniques of mastering the
world, so that we can live in it more easily (eg weather forecasting , building houses that can withstand strong typhoons, floods,
earthquake, etc.)
• Rather than attempting to ally ourselves with the hidden powers of the universe, this strategy involves finding ways of revealing
how our environment works, and then working out how to transform it to our benefit
• It is important to realize that we can never completely control our environment or transform it to such an extent that we can drive out
all uncertainty. At best, we can modify the risky, uncertain nature of the world in which we find ourselves. But life is inescapably risky.
 Pragmatism: John Dewey (1859-1952)
We only think when we are confronted with problems

• Religion versus science/technology.

• Philosophy is the process by which we try to work through the contradictions between these two different kinds of
response to the problems in our lives. These contradictions are not just theoretical; they are also practical.
• My belief on what constitutes a “good life” may be in tension with my knowledge on the sciences. Philosophy then can
be seen as the art of finding both theoretical and practical responses to these problems and contradictions.
• Two ways to judge whether a form of philosophy is successful:
• a) We should ask whether it has made the world more intelligible. Does this particular philosophy make our
experience “more luminous” or “more opaque”?
• Dewey agreed with Peirce that philosophy’s purpose is to make our ideas and our everyday experience clearer
and easier to understand. Dewey is critical of any philosophical approaches that ultimately make our
experience more puzzling or more mysterious
• b) We should judge to what extent a philosophical theory succeeds in addressing the problems of living. Is it useful
to us, in our everyday lives?
• On Science.
• The greatest successes in the acquisition of knowledge have been in the sciences:
- It is more reliable than our knowledge in other fields
- It is also more useful to us in the sense that it makes more differences to the actual lives we lead
• On Education.
• Education should be based on a problem-solving approach – “learning by doing” -- because it combined being
practical with taking full account of the importance of theory, and encouraged children to be imaginative at both
levels. The more interactions we ascertain, the more we know the object in question.
 The Problem of Induction
David Hume (1711-1776)
• Induction: If a situation holds true in all observed cases, then it holds true in all cases.
• The rational basis of such inference was challenged by Hume. How many observed cases do we need to
arrive at a conclusion? Would we need an infinite number of cases?
• Hume believed that induction presupposed belief in the uniformity of nature; that the future will be like the
past.
• This belief has no defence in reason and merely reflected a habit or custom of the mind (which leads us
to expect like causes to produce like effects).
• That the future will not be like the past is perfectly conceivable and not self-contradictory.
• All inductive knowledge is based on the fallacy of assuming that the future will resemble the past
• But just because something has happened for a long time is no guarantee that it will always happen (eg
sunrise)
• I see the sun rise every morning. I get into a habit of expecting the sun to rise every morning
• I refine this into the judgment “the sun rises every morning”. This judgment cannot be a truth of logic,
because the sun not rising (however unlikely that seems to us) is conceivable. This judgment cannot be
empirical, because I cannot observe future risings of the sun
• I have no rational grounds for my belief, but custom tells me that it is probable. Custom is the great
guide of life
• Hume acknowledged that although inductive inferences are not provable, this does not mean that they are
not useful. After all, we still have a reasonable claim to expect something to happen, judging from past
observation and experience. In the absence of rational justification for inductive inference, custom is a good
guide.
David Hume and the Problem of Induction
Karl Popper (1902-1994)
Karl Popper (1902-1994) ): In So Far as a Scientific Statement Speaks About Reality, It Must Be Falsifiable

• Induction inferences seem supported by a principle of this form: if a very large number of things have been observed under all sorts
of different conditions, and every one of them had a certain kind of property, then all such things have that property. As per Hume,
this principle cannot be justified
• Popper challenged the idea that science is a process of induction, with theories coming from repeated observation and proved by
experiment
• If science depends on induction, and induction has no rational justification, is scientific enquiry therefore irrational?
• Main property of science is falsifiability – a hypothesis is true if it is disprovable
• Scientific rationality consists in the falsification of theories, not the inductive verification of them
• No experiment can ever verify a hypothesis/ theory or even a probable one. But to be true, it has to be disproved. A scientific
theory/ hypothesis to be true must be proved false by a single contrary incident
• It may be logically impossible to prove the truth of a theory by observation, but just one negative observation is enough to falsify a
theory
• In so far as a scientific statement speaks about reality, it must be falsifiable; and in so far as it is not falsifiable, it does not speak about
reality
• That all As = Bs can’t be proved. But it can be refuted by a single instance of A = B.
• Seek knowledge by rooting out counter-examples to demolish old theories with the intention of producing new and better theories
• We must test these theories as severely as we can, find faults in them
• Theories which survived ruthless testing (eg falsification) should be the ones used to guide us
• A good theory is not always a true theory, and so it is simply one that has withstood attempts to falsify it so far
• Theories may resist being falsified and taken as reliant but even the best theories are always open to the possibility of being refuted
• Physical reality exists independently of the human mind, and is of radically different order from human experience, so we can never
apprehend it. We create theories to explain it, and use them for as long as they work. However, eventually each theory will prove
inadequate, and we replace it with a better one
 Karl Popper (1902-1994)
• There is no certainty in science.
• We make progress not by adding new certainties to a body of existing ones but by perpetually replacing existing theories with better
theories. The search for certainties has to be given up because certainty is not available
• It is impossible to prove, finally and forever the truth of any scientific theory or to put the whole of science on ultimately secure
foundations. “Justificationism” is completely wrong-headed
• However, although no general theory can be proved, it can be disproved. We can test general statements by searching for contrary
instances. This being so, criticism becomes the chief means by which we do in fact progress (and this also applies to the social sciences)
• The most undesirable and indefensible forms of modern society are those which centralized planning is imposed and dissent is
disallowed. The imposition of a single viewpoint is never justified.
• Criticism is the chief way in which social policies can be improved before they are implemented, and the noting of undesirable
consequences is the promptest cause of their modification or abandonment after they have been implemented
• A society that allows critical discussion and opposition (what Popper calls “open society”), will almost certainly be more effective at
solving the practical problems of its policy-makers than one that does not. Progress will be quicker and less costly. And all these are true
regardless of moral considerations.
• On politics, as in science, we are continuously replacing established ideas with what we hope are better ideas.
• Society, too, is in a state of perpetual change, and the pace of that change is increasingly fast. These being so, the creation and
perpetuation of an ideal state of society is not an option for us. What we have to do is manage a process of endless change that
has no stopping place
• We should all the time be seeking out the worst social evils and trying to remove them: poverty and powerlessness, threats to peace, bad
education, bad medical care, and so on.
• Because perfection and certainty are unattainable, we should concern ourselves less with the idea of building model schools or model
hospitals than getting rid of the worst ones and improving the lot of people.
• We do not know how to make people perfectly happy, but we can remove avoidable suffering and handicap
• Modern society is constantly changing, and as a result it will never be possible to create the perfect society. What we must do is
concentrate on removing the worst social problems such as bad education and poverty
• We cannot prove a theory, but we can disprove it. We cannot prove and create a perfect society, but we can search for contrary
instances (eg poverty, injustice, bad health care, bad education, etc) and doing something about them.
 Thomas Kuhn
• Scientists operate within a framework/ belief system or world view. It is not possible to isolate a
hypothesis from one’s own world view
• Scientists can never divorce their subjective perspective from their work; so our understanding of
science can never rely on full “objectivity” – we must account for subjective perspectives as well.
• Science alternates between periods of normal science and revolutionary science (crisis)
• Normal science: what scientists do routinely within established paradigms. Observations are
valid within these paradigms
• Revolutionary science: New paradigms taking over old ones and these new paradigms will
become normal science (current paradigms) until replaced by another/new paradigm
• But new paradigms are suppressed because they are subversive of current paradigms
• Science does not progress by a linear method of gathering new knowledge, but undergoes
periodic revolutions, also called paradigm shifts in which the nature of scientific inquiry within
a particular field is suddenly transformed
• Think of a paradigm shift as a change from one way of thinking to another. It’s a revolution, a
transformation, a sort of metamorphosis.
• Far from discovering truth, scientists are actually solving puzzles within an established world
view
• A period of normal science is dedicated to solving “puzzles”. This gives scientists the chance to
look at their field with exacting detail, thereby enlarging their picture of the natural world
• As long as there are no real problems that threaten the paradigm, normal science continues.
But inevitably, anomalies start to develop.
Thomas Kuhn
Thomas Kuhn
 Popper vs Kuhn
• Popper sees falsification as the unique feature of science. Kuhn sees puzzle solving
within a paradigm as the unique feature of science

• A scientific revolution:
- Popper: cumulative, governed by rules of logic. Ultimately settled by comparing the
competing hypotheses’ ability to resist attempts to falsify them

- Kuhn: not cumulative, not progressive and gradual; not governed by rules. Ultimately
settled by comparing the puzzle-solving power of the competing ideas

• On Openness:
- Popper: A good scientist is one who is creative and open to criticism

- Kuhn: A good scientist is one who is creative; however, he/she is not open criticism.
During a period of normal science, scientists are actually close-minded; they can only
see data in terms of their paradigm. If scientists were as open as Popper wishes they
couldn’t do science at all. Science required cooperation and consensus, which in turn
require closing off debate about fundamentals
 Paul Feyerabend

• When a paradigm shift occurs, all scientific concepts are altered, so there is no permanent scientific
framework
• No description of scientific method could possibly be broad enough to encompass all the approaches and
methods used by scientists
• Body of knowledge is not cast in stone, but organically developing. Science today, however, has become
about choosing theories that best suits our own purposes
• Feyerabend objected to prescriptive scientific method on the grounds that any such would stifle and cramp
scientific progress
• There is no one scientific method. Every project, every theory, every procedure has to be judged on its
own merits and by standards adapted to the processes with which it deals
• The only method is “anything goes”. Anything goes allows progress
• Many great scientists are irrational dogmatists
• Science’s appeal to reason is nothing but empty and tyrannical
• Science must be subordinate to the needs of citizens and communities
• The progress of science depends on novel ideas and on intellectual freedom
• Science has never progressed according to strict rules
• Knowledge is not a series of self consistent theories that converges towards an ideal view; it is rather an
ever increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives, each single theory, each fairy tale, each myth
• Facts are constituted by older ideologies, and a clash between facts and theories may be proof of progress
• The best education consists of immunizing people against systematic attempts at education.
Paul Feyerabend
 Imre Lakatos (1922-1974)
• “Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes” or MSRP - a radical revision of Popper’s Demarcation Criterion
between science and non-science, leading to a novel theory of scientific rationality
• For Popper, a theory is only scientific if is empirically falsifiable, that is if it is possible to specify observation statements
which would prove it wrong.
• A theory is good science, the sort of theory you should stick with, if it is refutable, and problem-solving and has
stood up to successive attempts at refutation. It must be highly falsifiable, well-tested but (thus far) unfalsified
• Lakatos objects that although there is something to be said for Popper’s criterion, it is far too restrictive, since it would
rule out too much of everyday scientific practice as unscientific and irrational.
• For scientists often persist—and, it seems, rationally persist—with theories, such as Newtonian celestial mechanics
that by Popper’s standards they ought to have rejected as “refuted”, that is theories that (in conjunction with other
assumptions) have led to falsified predictions.
• A key example for Lakatos is the “Precession of Mercury” that is, the anomalous behaviour of the perihelion of Mercury,
which shifts around the Sun in a way that it ought not to do if Newton’s mechanics were correct and there were no other
sizable body influencing its orbit.
• The problem is that there seems to be no such body. The difficulty was well known for decades but it did not cause
astronomers to collectively give up on Newton until Einstein’s theory came along. Lakatos thought that the
astronomers were right not to abandon Newton even though Newton eventually turned out to be wrong and
Einstein turned out to be right
• But if scientists often persist with “refuted” theories, either the scientists are being unscientific or Popper is wrong about
what constitutes good science, and hence about what scientists ought to do. Lakatos’s idea is to construct a
methodology of science, and with it a demarcation criterion, whose precepts are more in accordance with scientific
practice
• How does it work? Well, falsifiability continues to play a part in Lakatos’s conception of science but its importance is
somewhat diminished. Instead of an individual falsifiable theory which ought to be rejected as soon as it is refuted, we
have a sequence of falsifiable theories characterized by a shared a hard core of central theses that are deemed
irrefutable—or, at least, refutation-resistant—by methodological fiat. This sequence of theories constitutes a research
programme.
 Imre Lakatos (1922-1974)

• The shared hard core of this sequence of theories is often unfalsifiable in two senses of the term.
• Firstly, scientists working within the programme are typically (and rightly) reluctant to give up on the claims that
constitute the hard core
• Secondly, the hard core theses by themselves are often devoid of empirical consequences. For example, Newtonian
mechanics by itself—the three laws of mechanics and the law of gravitation— won’t tell you what you will see in
the night sky. To derive empirical predictions from Newtonian mechanics you need a whole host of auxiliary
hypotheses about the positions, masses and relative velocities of the heavenly bodies, including the earth.
• (This is related to Duhem’s thesis that, generally speaking, theoretical propositions—and indeed sets of theoretical
propositions—cannot be conclusively falsified by experimental observations, since they only entail observation-
statements in conjunction with auxiliary hypotheses. So when something goes wrong, and the observation
statements that they entail turn out to be false, we have two intellectual options: modify the theoretical propositions or
modify the auxiliary hypotheses.)
• For Lakatos an individual theory within a research programme typically consists of two components: the (more or less)
irrefutable hard core plus a set of auxiliary hypotheses. Together with the hard core these auxiliary hypotheses entail
empirical predictions, thus making the theory as a whole—hard core plus auxiliary hypotheses—a falsifiable affair
• When refutation strikes, the scientist constructs a new theory, the next in the sequence, with the same hard core but a
modified set of auxiliary hypotheses
• Lakatos evidently thinks that when one theory in the sequence has been refuted, scientists can legitimately persist with
the hard core without being in too much of a hurry to construct the next refutable theory in the sequence. The fact that
some planetary orbits are not quite what they ought to be should not lead us to abandon Newtonian celestial mechanics,
even if we don’t yet have a testable theory about what exactly is distorting them
• It is worth remarking too that the auxiliary hypotheses play a rather paradoxical part in Lakatos’s methodology. On the
one hand, they connect the central theses of the hard core with experience, allowing to them to figure in testable, and
hence, refutable theories. On the other hand, they insulate the theses of the hard core from refutation, since when
refutation strikes, we direct it at the auxiliary hypotheses rather than the hard core.
 Imre Lakatos (1922-1974)
• So far we have had an account of what scientists typically do and what Lakatos thinks that they ought to do.
But what about the Demarcation Criterion between science and non-science or between good science and
bad? Even if it is sometimes rational to persist with the hard core of a theory
• Even when the hard core plus some set of auxiliary hypotheses has been refuted, there must surely be some
circumstances in which is it rational to give it up! The Methodology of Scientific Research Programme has got
to be something more than a defence of scientific pig-headedness! As Lakatos himself puts the point:
- Now, Newton’s theory of gravitation, Einstein’s relativity theory, quantum mechanics, Marxism,
Freudianism [the last two stock examples of bad science or pseudo-science for Popperians], are all
research programmes, each with a characteristic hard core stubbornly defended, each with its more
flexible protective belt and each with its elaborate problem-solving machinery. Each of them, at any stage
of its development, has unsolved problems and undigested anomalies. All theories, in this sense, are born
refuted and die refuted. But are they [all] equally good?
• Lakatos, of course, thinks not. Some science is objectively better than other science and some science is
so unscientific as to hardly qualify as science at all. So how does he distinguish between “a scientific or
progressive programme” and a “pseudoscientific or degenerating one”?

• To begin with, the unit of scientific evaluation is no longer the individual theory (as with Popper), but
the sequence of theories, the research programme.
• We don’t ask ourselves whether this or that theory is scientific or not, or whether it constitutes
good or bad science. Rather we ask ourselves whether the sequence of theories, the research
programme, is scientific or non-scientific or constitutes good or bad science.

Lakatos’s basic idea is that a research programme constitutes good science—the sort of science it is rational
to stick with and rational to work on—if it is progressive, and bad science—the kind of science that is, at
least, intellectually suspect—if it is degenerating
 Imre Lakatos ((1922-1974)
• What is it for a research programme to be progressive? It must meet two conditions.
- Firstly it must be theoretically progressive. That is, each new theory in the sequence must have excess
empirical content over its predecessor; it must predict novel and hitherto unexpected facts
- Secondly it must be empirically progressive. Some of that novel content has to be corroborated, that
is, some of the new “facts” that the theory predicts must turn out to be true. As Lakatos himself put the
point, a research programme “is progressive if it is both theoretically and empirically progressive,
and degenerating if it is not”
- Thus a research programme is degenerating if the successive theories do not deliver novel predictions or
if the novel predictions that they deliver turn out to be false.

• A degenerating research programme, on the other hand (unlike the theories of Newton and
Einstein) either fails to predict novel facts at all, or makes novel predictions that are systematically
falsified.
• Marxism, for example, started out as theoretically progressive but empirically degenerate (novel
predictions systematically falsified) and ended up as theoretically degenerate as well (no more novel
predictions but a desperate attempt to explain away unpredicted “observations” after the event)

• Thus good science is progressive and bad science is degenerating and a research programme may
either begin or end up as such a degenerate affair that it ceases to count as science at all. If a
research programme either predicts nothing new or entails novel predictions that never come to
pass, then it may have reached such a pitch of degeneration that it has transformed into a
pseudoscience.
 Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979)

• Worlds in Collision is a book of wars in the celestial sphere that took place in historical times. In these wars the planet earth participated
too. The historical-cosmological story of this book is based in the evidence of historical texts of many people around the globe, on classical
literature, on epics of the northern races, on sacred books of the peoples of the Orient and Occident, on traditions and folklore of primitive
peoples, on old astronomical inscriptions and charts, on archaeological finds, and also on geological and paleontological material.
• Velikovsky arrived at these proposals using a methodology called comparative mythology -- he reviewed the myths and written history of
unconnected cultures across the world. He argues on the basis of ancient cosmological myths from places as disparate as India and China,
Greece and Rome, Assyria and Sumer.
• For example, ancient Greek mythology asserts that the goddess Athena sprang from the head of Zeus. Velikovsky identifies Zeus (or the
Roman god, Jupiter) with the planet Jupiter. Velikovsky identifies Athena with the planet Venus, although the Greek counterpart of the
Roman Venus was Aphrodite. This myth, along with others from ancient Egypt, Israel, Mexico, etc. are used to support the claim that "Venus
was expelled as a comet and then changed to a planet after contact with a number of members of our solar system”.
• According to Velikovsky, about 4000 years ago a giant volcano on Jupiter erupted and spewed a vast glob of debris into space, leaving the
Great Red Spot behind as a permanent scar. The red hot lump ejected from Jupiter (referred to as a comet by Velikovsky) wandered into the
inner Solar System, repeatedly crossing the Earth’s orbit and in fact often passing close to our helpless planet in the following millennia.
• About 1500 BC the Earth was showered with materials from the “comet” including hydrocarbons (all Earth’s oil reserves date from these
events), iron-rich red dust which poisoned and stained the rivers red, and even primitive organisms such as bacteria and insects. Earth
baked in the heat of the blazing comet. Meanwhile gigantic electric discharges torn across our planet and flaming meteors rained down
laying waste to whole civilisations. The comet’s gravitational pull sparked horrendous seismic events on our planet which was devastated by
tsunamis, volcanoes and earthquakes. Many of Earth’s mountains were formed in these cataclysms.
• These events were not universally bad news though. In Egypt, the Israelites escaped from slavery as their oppressors were distracted by the
chaos, the fleeing Hebrews followed the comet which appeared as a pillar of fire in the sky. It led them across the Red Sea via a landbridge
raised by earthquakes. This was a temporary structure which collapsed when the pursuing Egyptians tried to follow. Later the Israelites were
sustained in the wilderness by edible hydrocarbons (or carbohydrates) which rained from the comet, the Old Testament’s manna from
Heaven.
 Immanuel Velikovsky (1895-1979)
• Over the centuries, the comet returned. On one instance its influence temporarily halted the Earth’s rotation,
causing the Sun and Moon to stand still for Joshua. Eventually the comet settled into a steady orbit between
Mercury and Earth, it is still there today and we call it Venus.
• It was while researching a book on Freud and his heroes that Velikovsky first wondered about the
catastrophes said to have accompanied the Hebrew Exodus, when fire and hailstones rained upon Egypt,
earthquakes decimated the nation, and a pillar of fire and smoke moved in the sky. Biblical and other
traditional Hebrew sources speak so vividly that Velikovsky began to wonder if some extraordinary natural
event might have played a part in the Exodus.
• To explore this possibility, Velikovsky sought out a corresponding account in ancient Egyptian records, finding
a remarkable parallel in a papyrus kept at the University of Leyden Museum, called the Papyrus Ipuwer. The
document contains the lamentations of an Egyptian sage in response to a great catastrophe overwhelming
Egypt, when the rivers ran red, fire blazed in the sky, and pestilence ravaged the land.
• Velikovsky also encountered surprising parallels in Babylonian and Assyrian clay tablets, Vedic poems,
Chinese epics, and North American Indian, Maya, Aztec, and Peruvian legends. From these remarkably
similar accounts, he constructed a thesis of celestial catastrophe. He concluded that a very large body --
apparently a "comet" -- passed close enough to Earth to violently perturb its axis, as global earthquakes,
wind and falling stone decimated early civilizations.
• Before Velikovsky could complete his reconstruction, he had to resolve an enigma. He had found that in the
accounts of far-flung cultures, the cometary agent of disaster was identified as a planet. And the closer he
looked, the more clear it became to him that this planet was Venus
• So Velikovsky proposes that many myths and traditions of ancient peoples and cultures are based on actual
events: worldwide global catastrophes of a celestial origin, which had a profound effect on the lives, beliefs
and writings of early mankind.
 Immanuel Velikovsky
• Velikovsky presents documentation of global catastrophes in prehistorical and historical times: the evidence
of stone and bone. This evidence from the natural sciences indicates that these great disturbances which
rocked our world were caused by forces outside the Earth itself.
• Velikovsky brings together a multitude of facts, such as palms found in northern Greenland, corals in Alaska,
the unfossilized bones of hippopotamuses in England, and the remains of polar bears and arctic foxes crushed
together in one mass with ostriches and crocodiles.
• Velikovsky claims that the earth's orbit changed more than once and with it the length of the year
• That the polar regions shifted, the polar ice became displaced into moderate latitudes, and other regions
moved into the polar circles.“
• Velikovsky explains the origin of the canals of Mars and the craters and seas of lava on the moon as brought
about in stress and near collisions.
• The excessive evaporation of water from the surface of the oceans and seas, a phenomenon that was
postulated to explain the excessive precipitation and formation of ice covers, was caused by extraterrestrial
agents
• That the religions of the peoples of the world have a common astral origin.
• "We learned why there are common ideas in the folklore of peoples separated by oceans“
• Further data verifies that at the very time that Dr Velikovsky claimed as the date of the recent global
catastrophe only 3500 years ago, the level of the world's oceans dropped sharply, climate was violently
altered, and ancient civilizations were plunged into destruction.
 Immanuel Velikovsky

Velikovsky described his work on collective amnesia as follows:

• The subject that Velikovsky has chosen is the psychological condition and case history of the human race. Virtually every
aspect of human behavior, every pattern in human history, and every article of human belief, if examined and illuminated
in the light of the thesis of this book, reveals how human thought and action have been shaped and molded by repressed
collective memories of cosmic catastrophes that befell our ancestors as recently as one hundred generations ago.
• Velikovsky outlined his principal psychological thesis -- his theory of collective amnesia explains the inability of people to
look at the overwhelming evidence of global catastrophes -- from all parts of the world -- that is unequivocally there, and
the unwillingness to see the implications of that evidence.
• Velikovsky put this as follows in Worlds in Collision:
The memory of the cataclysms was erased, not because of lack of written traditions, but because of some characteristic process
that later caused entire nations, together with their literate men, to read into these traditions allegories or metaphors where
actually cosmic disturbances were clearly described.
• Velikovsky presented the revolutionary results of his 10-year-long interdisciplinary research to the public, founded modern
catastrophism - based on eyewitness reports by our ancestors - shook the doctrine of uniformity of geology as well as
Darwin's theory of evolution, put our view of the history of our solar system, of the Earth and of humanity on a completely
new basis - and caused an uproar that is still going on today
• The ancient traditions are our best guide to the appearance and arrangement of the earliest remembered solar system, not
some fancy computer's retrocalculations based upon current understanding of astronomical principles
• Time, further research, new historical documentation, new science evidence, new thinking and theories seem to show that
not everything Immanuel Velikovsky said was correct or that it needs to be modified or updated. But what is shocking is
that the general idea of planets colliding and planetary orbital chos and migration is being suggested by more and more
scientific theories and evidence.