Investigation (weeks 3-5)

1. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335- At the stage of registration of
a crime (FIR) or a case on the basis of the information disclosing a cognizable offense in
compliance with the mandate of Section 154(1) of the Code, the police officer concerned
cannot embark upon an inquiry as to whether the information, laid by the informant is
reliable and genuine or otherwise and refuse to register a case on the ground that the
information is not reliable or credible. An FIR can be quashed by the HC under s 482 in
the following circumstances-

 Where the allegations made in the First Information Report or the complaint, even if they are
taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima-facie constitute any
offence or make out a case against the accused.

 Where the allegations in the First Information Report and other materials, if any,
accompanying the F.I.R. do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by
police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within
the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

 Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence
collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out
a case against the accused.

 Where, the allegations in the F.I.R. do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only
a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of
a Magistrate as contemplated Under Section 155(2) of the Code.

 Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable
on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is
sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.
  Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the
concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and
continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the
concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

 Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the
proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the
accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.” (Para 102)

2. Lalita Kumari v. Government of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1 - If the information received does

not disclose a cognizable offense but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary
inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether cognizable offense is disclosed or
not. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the veracity or otherwise of the
information received but only to ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable
offense. The category of cases in which preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

a. Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

b. Commercial offences
c. Medical negligence cases
d. Corruption cases
e. Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in initiating criminal prosecution, for
example, over 3 months' delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily
explaining the reasons for delay.

3. Yanub Sheikh v. State of WB (2013) 6 SCC 428

a) Telephonic information inviting the police to the place of occurrence of an offence is not an
FIR
b) Subsequent FIRs can be filed if concerning different offences; cannot be a second FIR
concerning the same occurrence

4. Nandini Satpathy v. PL Dani (1978) 2 SCC 424-

The witness shall undertake to answer all questions put to her which do not materially incriminate her
in the pending or imminent investigations or prosecutions. If she claims immunity regarding any
questions she will, without disclosing details, briefly state in which case or offence in the offing
makes her reasonably apprehend self- incrimination by her refused answers

5. Mahabir Singh v. State of Haryana (2001) 7 SCC 148-

If the Magistrate does not know that he is concerned in a case for which investigation has been
commenced under the provisions of Chapter XII it is not permissible for him to record the confession.
If any person simply barges into the court and demands the Magistrate to record his confession as he
has committed a cognizable offence, the course open to the Magistrate is to inform the police about it.

6. Joginder Nahak v. State of Orissa (2000) 1 SCC 272-

If a Magistrate is obliged to record the statements of all such persons who approach him the situation
would become anomalous and every Magistrate's Court will be further crowded with a number of
such intending witnesses brought up at the behest of accused persons.

7. Anju Chaudhary v. State of UP (2013) 6 SCC 384-

Where the incident is separate; offences are similar or different or even where subsequent crime is of
such magnitude that it does not fall within the ambit and scope of FIR first recorded first, then second
FIR can be registered. It has to be examined on the basis of each case that the FIR is about the same
incident or different offence based on facts of the case.

8. TT Antony v. State of Kerala (2001) 6 SCC 181 –

Registering second FIR and making fresh investigation and forwarding the report to the magistrate
would be irregular and court cannot take cognizance on the same. The Court in order to examine the
impact of one or more FIRs has to rationalise the facts and circumstances of each case and then apply
the test of ‘sameness’ to find out whether both FIRs relate to the same incident and to the same
occurrence, are in regard to incidents which are two or more parts of the same transaction or relate
completely to two distinct occurrences. If the answer falls in the first category, the second FIR may be
liable to be quashed

9. Shivappa v. State of Karnataka (1995) 2 SCC 76-

It was held that given that no efforts had been made to ensure that the confession made before the
magistrate was actually voluntary, the confession cannot be used when determining the guilt of the
accused.

10. Sakiri Vasu v. State of UP, (2008) 2 SCC 409—

The facts of the case involved the custodial death of a person, who was arrested by the police in
connection with a theft case. The petitioner in the case, Sakiri Vasu, was the father of the deceased
and alleged that the police officers had tortured his son to death while in custody.

The Supreme Court, in its judgment, held that a judicial magistrate has the power to monitor an
investigation under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. The court observed that while a magistrate cannot
interfere with the investigation being carried out by the police, he can certainly keep a check on the
same to ensure that it is fair and impartial.

The following are the key principles laid down by the Supreme Court in the Sakiri Vasu case

• A judicial magistrate has the power to monitor the investigation being carried out
by the police under Section 156(3) of the CrPC. This power is not limited to cases
where the investigation is being carried out in a mala fide manner or is biased, but
extends to all cases where the magistrate feels that the investigation needs to be
monitored to ensure that it is being conducted properly.
• The magistrate has the power to issue necessary directions to the police officers
carrying out the investigation to ensure that it is being conducted in a fair and
impartial manner. These directions may include ordering the collection of
additional evidence, recording the statements of additional witnesses, or any other
direction that the magistrate feels is necessary.
• The power of the magistrate to monitor the investigation is not an empty
formality. The magistrate must take an active interest in the investigation and
ensure that it is being conducted in a fair and impartial manner. The magistrate
cannot simply accept the report submitted by the police officers without
scrutinizing it and ensuring that it is based on a proper and impartial
investigation.
• The magistrate has the power to direct the police officers to re-investigate the
case if he finds that the investigation conducted so far has been deficient or
biased.
 • The magistrate also has the power to order a fresh investigation if he feels that the
investigation carried out so far has been so deficient or biased that no useful
purpose would be served by continuing with it.

Process to Compel Appearance and Production of Things (weeks 3-5)

1. DK Basu v State of West Bengal AIR 1997 SC 610 –

Court dealt with the issues of arbitrary exercise of power by policemen. Issued guidelines regarding
the same -

● Arrested person has the right to meet with his lawyer

● Right to medical examination every 48 hours

● Right to inform relatives after arrest

● To be produced in front of the magistrate in 24 hours

● The arresting officer has to prepare a memo and has to be attested by at least one witness

● An entry has to be made regarding the arrest in the diary

● A police control room shall be set up in all districts and information regarding the
arrest shall be made to all districts

● All the documents including the memo has to be sent to the magistrate

● Arresting officer shall have clear identification of his name and designation

● The time, place, arrest and place of custody has to be notified to the interested person

● Person arrested has to be made aware of his right to have notified someone on his behalf

2. Joginder Kumar v. State of UP 1994 SCC (4) 260 –

The Court issued requirements for the effective enforcement of fundamental rights u/Art. 21 and 22(1)
-

- An arrested person being held in custody is entitled, if he so requests to have one friend,
relative or other person who is known to him or likely to take an interest in his welfare
told as far as is practicable that he has been arrested and where he is being detained.
 - The police officer shall inform the arrested person when he is brought to the police station
of this right.
- An entry shall be required to be made in the diary as to who was informed of the arrest.
These protections from power must be held to flow from Articles 21 and 22(1) and
enforced strictly.
- It shall be the duty of the Magistrate, before whom the arrested person is produced, to
satisfy himself that these requirements have been complied with.” [Para 21]

3. V S Kuttan Pillai v. Ramakrishnan, AIR 1980 SC 185 –

The Court was faced with a question of whether S.93(1)(c) of the CrPC would be hit by the Art.20(3)
of the Constitution i.e., the right against self-incrimination. The Court ruled in the negative. It held
that the immunity against self incrimination extends to any incriminating evidence which the accused
may be compelled to give but does not extend to cover a situation where evidence which may have a
tendency to incriminate the accused is being collected without compelling him to be a part to the
collection of the evidence. The search of the premises occupied by the accused, without compelling
the accused to be a party to such search, would not be violative of Art.20(3).

- Search u/S.93(1)(c) would not have the remotest tendency to compel an accused to
incriminate himself because (i) he is not required to participate in the search and he may
be a passive spectator or even be absent.

4. Arnesh Kumar V. State of Bihar 2014 8 SCC 273

Facts:

• This case is a landmark case on 2 folds, firstly, on misuse of Section 498-A of

Indian Penal Code, 1860(IPC) and secondly, on putting further checks and
balances on power of Police to arrest without warrant.
• The marriage between Arnesh Kumar and Sweta Kiran was solemnized on
01/07/2007.
• Sweta Kiran alleged before the court that her mother-in-law and father-in-law has
demanded Rupees 8 lakhs, a Maruti Car, an Air-Conditioner, Television set etc.
and when this fact was brought to the Arnesh Kumar’s notice, he supported his
mother and threatened to marry another woman. Further she also alleged that, she
 was driven out of her matrimonial home due to non-fulfilment of the demand of
dowry.
• Arnesh Kumar denied these allegations and preferred an application for
anticipatory bail which was earlier rejected by the learned Sessions Judge and
thereafter by the High Court.
• Hence Arnesh Kumar has moved to Supreme Court by the way of Special Leave
Petition.

Issues Involved:

i. Whether it is necessary for a Police officer to arrest a person against a

complaint if such person is suspected to commit a cognizable offence?

ii. What are the remedies available to a person, if the women misuse section
498-A, of IPC to her own advantage?

iii. Whether the appellant should be granted anticipatory bail?

Judgement:

The Supreme Court granted provisional bail to the appellant on certain conditions.The Apex Court
said that “Section 498-A is a cognizable and non-bailable offence has lent it a dubious place of pride
amongst the provisions that are used as weapons rather than shield by disgruntled wives. The simplest
way to harass is to get the husband and his relatives arrested under this provision.” The Apex Court
gave some mandatory directions for Police to be followed before arresting a person to avoid
unnecessary arrest of accused.

Supreme Court Stated Directions for Police to be followed:

 All the State Governments to instruct its Police officers not to automatically arrest when
a case under section 498-Aof the IPC is registered but to satisfy themselves about the
necessity for arrest under the parameters laid down above flowing from Section 41,
Cr.PC.
  All Police officers be provided with a check list containing specified sub-clauses under
section 41(1)(b)(ii).

 The Police officer shall forward the check list duly filed and furnish the reasons and
materials which necessitated the arrest, while forwarding/producing the accused before
the Magistrate for further detention.

 The Magistrate while authorising detention of the accused shall peruse the report
furnished by the Police officer in terms aforesaid and only after recording its
satisfaction, the Magistrate will authorise detention.

 The decision not to arrest an accused, be forwarded to the Magistrate within two weeks
from the date of the institution of the case with a copy to the Magistrate which may be
extended by the Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in
writing.

 Notice of appearance in terms of Section 41A of Cr. PC be served on the accused within
two weeks from the date of institution of the case, which may be extended by the
Superintendent of Police of the District for the reasons to be recorded in writing.

 Failure to comply with the directions aforesaid shall apart from rendering the Police
officers concerned liable for departmental action, they shall also be liable to be punished
for contempt of Court to be instituted before High Court having territorial jurisdiction.

 Authorising detention without recording reasons as aforesaid by the Judicial Magistrate

concerned shall be liable for departmental action by the appropriate High Court.

Section 167 - Default Bail (weeks 6-8)

1. CBI v. Anupam Kulkarni 1992 AIR 1768 –

The period of ninety days or sixty days has to be computed from the date of detention as per the
orders of the Magistrate and not from the date of arrest by the police. Consequently, the first period of
fifteen days mentioned in Section 167(2) has to be computed from the date of such detention and after
the expiry of the period of first fifteen days it should be only judicial custody. If the investigation is
not completed within the period of ninety days or sixty days then the accused has to be released on
bail as provided under the proviso to Section 167(2).

2. Sanjay Dutt v. State (1994) 5 SCC 410 –

The indefeasible right granted to an accused to be released on bail in default of completion of

investigation and filing of challan within time allowed is enforceable by the accused only from the
time of default till the filing of the challan. It does not remain enforceable after the filing of the
challan.

3. Sudha Bharadwaj v. NIA January 2021 SCC Online Bom 4568 –

There was an expiration of period of detention of 90 days (excluding the period of house arrest - the
court held that house arrest is not counted as detention u/S.167), there was no charge-sheet lodged
post this and there was no lawful order of extension of period of detention. Given the circumstances,
Sudha Bhardwaj got default bail u/S.167(2) because she was detained beyond the period of 180 days
without the cognizance of offenses being taken by the competent court.

4. Chaganti Satyanarayan v State of AP –

The period of 60/90 days can run only from the date of the remand. If it was the intention of the
Legislature that the period of remand of 15 days in the whole envisaged in sub-section (2) or the total
period of 90 days/60 days prescribed in proviso (a) should be calculated from the date of arrest then
the Legislature would have expressly said so as it had done under Section 167(5)

Commencement of Judicial Proceedings (Week 6-8) -

1. Abhinandan Jha v. Dinesh Mishra AIR 1968 SC 117 –

The question before the Court was whether a Magistrate can direct the police to submit a charge-sheet
when police
have, after investigation into a cognizable offense, had submitted a final report u/S.173 of the CrPC.
The court held that it is open to the Magistrate to agree or disagree with the opinion of the police, and
if he disagrees, he is entitled to ask the police to conduct further investigation u/S.156(3). But the
Magistrate cannot ask the police to submit a

charge-sheet because the submission of the report depends upon the opinion formed by the police and
not on the opinion of the Magistrate. The Magistrate cannot compel the police to form a particular
opinion on investigation and to submit a report according to such opinion.

- The police can also send a report viz. a charge-sheet u/S.170 of the CrPC which the
Magistrate can accept or reject. The Magistrate does not have the power, however, to
differ from the police and call upon them to submit a final report u/S.169. The Magistrate
has no power to direct the police to submit a charge-sheet when the police have submitted
a final report that no case is made out for sending the accused for trial.
- The functions of the Magistracy and the police, are entirely different, and though, in the
circumstances mentioned earlier the Magistrate may or may not accept the report, and
take suitable action, according to law, he cannot certainly infringe upon the jurisdiction of
the police, by compelling them to change their opinion, so as to accord with his view

2. Bhagwant Singh v. Commissioner of Police (1985) 2 SCC 537 –

The Court was faced with the question as to whether the first informant or the relative of the deceased
or any other aggrieved person is entitled to be heard at the time of consideration of the report by the
Magistrate was thought to be a question of general importance, and the SC, therefore, sought to settle
it once and for all. The Court said that when a Magistrate to whom a report is forwarded u/S.173(2)(i)
of the CrPC, decides not to take cognizance of the offence and to drop the proceeding or takes the
view that there is no sufficient ground for proceeding against some of the persons mentioned in the
FIR, the magistrate must give notice to the informant and provide him with an opportunity to be heard
at the time of consideration of the report. There is no obligation, however, on the Magistrate to give
notice to the injured person or to a relative of the deceased unless such person is the informant. The
injured person/relative of the deceased can come before the

Magistrate and make their submissions when the report is considered but they are not entitled to
notice from the Magistrate. Magistrate may exercise discretion and give notice to the injured person.

3. Vinubhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat (2019) 14 SCALE 1 –

The Court was faced with the question of whether, after a charge-sheet is filed in a case, the
Magistrate has the power to order further investigation, and if so, upto what stage in a criminal
proceeding can she do so? The Court reiterated and approved the following observations in this regard
from Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali (2013) 5 SCC 762: [Para 40]

- The Magistrate has no power to direct “reinvestigation” or “fresh investigation” (de novo)
in the case initiated on the basis of a police report.
- A Magistrate has the power to direct “further investigation” after filing of a police report
in terms of Section 173(6) of the Code [in conformity with Bhagwant Singh v. Commr of
Police (see above)].
- Neither the scheme of the Code nor any specific provision therein bars exercise of such
jurisdiction by the Magistrate. The language of Section 173(2) cannot be construed so
restrictively as to deprive the Magistrate of such powers particularly in face of the
provisions of Section 156(3) and the language of Section 173(8) itself. In fact, such power
would have to be read into the language of Section 173(8).
- The Code is a procedural document, thus, it must receive a construction which would
advance the cause of justice and legislative object sought to be achieved. It does not stand
to reason that the legislature provided power of further investigation to the police even
after filing a report, but intended to curtail the power of the court to the extent that even
where the facts of the case and the ends of justice demand, the court can still not direct
the investigating agency to conduct further investigation which it could do on its own.
- It has been a procedure of propriety that the police have to seek permission of the court to
continue “further investigation” and file supplementary charge-sheets. This approach has
been approved by this Court in a number of judgments. This as such would support the
view that we are taking in the present case.

4. Kishun Singh v. State of Bihar (1993) 2 SCC 16 –

The question before the Court was whether a Court of Session to which a case is committed for trial
by a Magistrate can, without itself recording evidence, summon a person not named in the Police
Report presented under Section 173 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (‘The Code’ for short)
to stand trial along with those already named therein, in exercise of power

conferred by Section 319 of the Code; and whether this power can be exercised before evidence is
recorded in the case?

- The Court held that on a plain reading of S.319(1) - it must appear from the
 - evidence tendered in the course of inquiry/trial that any person not being the accused has
committed any offense for which he could be tried together with the
- accused. This power can be exercised only if it so appears from the evidence at trial and
not otherwise.
- S.319 can be invoked by both the court having original jurisdiction as well as the Court to
which the case has been committed for trial. Thus, the Section does not apply to all
situations and cannot be interpreted to be a repository of all power for summoning such
person or persons to stand trial along with others arraigned before the Court.

Similar powers u CrPC?

- Thus, on a plain reading of section 193 as it presently stands, once the case is committed
to the Court of Session by a Magistrate under the Code, the restriction placed on the
power of the Court of Session to take cognizance of an offense as a court of original
jurisdiction gets lifted. On the magistrate committing the case under section 209 to the
Court of Session the bar of section 193 is lifted thereby investing the Court of Session
complete and unfettered jurisdiction of the Court of original jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the offense which would include the Summoning of the person or persons
whose complicity in the commission of the crime can prima facie be gathered from the
material available on record.

The exercise of power under a wrong provision will not render the order illegal or invalid.

5. DL Reddy v. VN Reddy (1976) 3 SCC 252 (overruled by Vinubhai) -

a. Taking of cognizance by magistrate- Broadly speaking, when on receiving a complaint,
the Magistrate applies his mind for the purposes of proceeding under Section 200 and the
succeeding sections in Chapter XV of the Code of 1973, he is said to have taken
cognizance of the offence within the meaning of Section 190(1)(a). If, instead of
proceeding under Chapter XV, he has in the judicial exercise of his discretion, taken
action of some other kind, such as issuing a search warrant for the purpose of
investigation, or ordering investigation by the police under Section 156(3), he cannot be
said to have taken cognizance of any offence.
b. Diff b/w investigation u/s 156(3) and 202- 156 is pre-cognizance and 202 is post
cognizance.

6. HS Bains v. State (UT of Chandigarh) (1980) 4 SCC 631

Magistrate, who takes cognizance of an offence on basis of the facts disclosed in a police report,
cannot be said to have taken cognizance on mere personal suspicion just because he and the police
arrived at different conclusions. Not bound by the conclusions of the police.

Framing of Charge (Week 9-10)-

1. William Slaney v State of MP AIR 1956 SC 116-

Mere irregularities in procedure and inconsequential errors cannot vitiate the entire trial unless
substantial prejudice is caused to the accused. Omission to frame an alternative charge was not
considered an illegality that affected the fair trial of the accused.

2. State of Orissa v Debendra Nath Padhi 2005 1 SCC 568-

At the stage of framing of charge, only the material filed by the prosecution is to be considered and
not that of the accused. At such a stage, a roving and fishing inquiry is impermissible. Section 91
cannot be invoked by the defence at the framing of charge stage.

3. Union of India v Prafulla Kumar Samal AIR 1979 SC 366-

While considering the framing of charges u/s 227 the judge has undoubted power to sift and weigh the
evidence for the limited purpose of finding out whether or not prima facie case against the accused
has been made out.

Law of Bail (Week 11-12)-

1. Gudikanti Narsimhulu v. Public Prosecutor (1978) 1 SCC 240-

Post conviction bail criteria. “It makes sense to assume that a man on bail has a better chance to
prepare or present his case than one remanded in custody.”

2. Gurcharan Singh v. State AIR 1978 SC 179-

While S. 437(1) excludes the HC or the Court of Sessions, any court before which an application for
bail is filed must consider whether the applicant may be guilty of a serious offence. Ordinarily, the
HC will not exercise its discretion to interfere with an order of the Sessions Court granting bail.
However, in this case, the Sessions Court had not given due consideration to the grave apprehensions
of the prosecution of the likelihood of intimidation of witnesses. These apprehensions were in fact
borne out by the behaviour of the eye-witnesses and their statement that they had been intimidated by
one of the accused. If there were absolutely no basis for the prosecution’s apprehension, the matter
would have been different. Due and proper weight should be given to two factors: the likelihood of
the accused fleeing from the investigation, and the likelihood of the accused influencing witnesses or
tampering with evidence. Beyond these principles, each case would have to be examined on its own
merits

3. Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020) 5 SCC 1-

Nothing in Section 438 CrPC, compels or obliges courts to impose conditions limiting relief in terms
of time, or upon filing of FIR, or recording of statement of any witness, by the police, during
investigation or inquiry, etc. While considering an application (for grant of anticipatory bail) the court
has to consider the nature of the offence, the role of the person, the likelihood of his influencing the
course of investigation, or tampering with evidence (including intimidating witnesses), likelihood of
fleeing justice (such as leaving the country), etc. The courts would be justified — and ought to impose
conditions spelt out in Section 437(3) CrPC [by virtue of Section 438(2)]. The need to impose other
restrictive conditions, would have to be judged on a case-by-case basis, and depending upon the
materials produced by the State or the investigating agency. Such special or other restrictive
conditions may be imposed if the case or cases warrant, but should not be imposed in a routine
manner, in all cases. Likewise, conditions which limit the grant of anticipatory bail may be granted, if
they are required in the facts of any case or cases; however, such limiting conditions may not be
invariably imposed. The anticipatory bail given to a person, can continue till end of the trial

4. P Chidambaram v. ED 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1549 (INX Media case)-

Triple test of flight risk, tampering with evidence, and influencing witnesses. Such consideration with
regard to the gravity of offence is a factor which is in addition to the triple test or the tripod test that
would be normally applied. In that regard what is also to be kept in perspective is that even if the
allegation is one of grave economic offence, it is not a rule that bail should be denied in every case
since there is no such bar created in the relevant enactment passed by the legislature nor does the bail
jurisprudence provide so.

Secrets Act, 1923 with which the respondent is charged relates to military affairs and it is punishable
with imprisonment which may extend to fourteen years.
Trial (Week 13-14)-

1. Hardeep Singh v State of Punjab (2014) 3 SCC 92 –

A reference was made to the SC because of conflicting decisions of lower courts.

ISSUE 1 - At what stage can the power under Section 319 CrPC be exercised?

ANSWER - The power u/S.319 can be exercised upon receipt of evidence, although this evidence can
be evidence found during the inquiry stage i.e., pre-cognizance stage. As a trial commences after
framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under
Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C.; and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated
by Section 319 Cr.P.C.

ISSUE 2 - What is the nature of evidence in S.319?

ANSWER - Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for
corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of
power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column
2 of the chargesheet. The word ‘evidence’ in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and
not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial.

ISSUE 3 - At what stage does the trial against the accused proposed to be summoned begin? Does the
Court need to wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by
cross examination?

ANSWER 3 - Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is
disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) CrPC the
proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court
need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-
examination.

ISSUE 4 - What is the nature of satisfaction required to invoke power u/S.319 to arraign an accused?
Is the likelihood of conviction necessary?

ANSWER 4 - The degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person u/S.319 is the
same as for framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original
accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced
against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the
newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial - therefore
the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different.

Furthermore, the purpose of S.319 is for the Court to be satisfied that there is evidence that a person,
not accused, could be tried with the accused and not for which person, not accused, could be
convicted. So, it is NOT important for there to be a likelihood of conviction.

ISSUE 5 - Does the power u/S.319 extend to persons not named in the FIR, or named but not
charged, or discharged?

ANSWER 5 - A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been
chargesheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C.
provided from the evidence it appears that such a person can be tried along with the accused already
facing trial. However, insofar as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of
Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.

2. Nar Singh v State of Haryana (2015) 1 SCC 496-

Any omission on the part of the Court to question the accused on any incriminating circumstance
would not ipso facto vitiate the trial, unless some material prejudice is shown to have been caused to
the accused.

Judgment and Sentencing (Week 15)-

3. Mukhtiar Singh v State of Punjab (1995) 1 SCC 760-

A decision does not merely mean the conclusion that was reached by the court, but also the basis for
reaching that conclusion. The judgment must state what evidence was appreciated and what the
reasons were for arriving at the judgment to satisfy the criteria of S. 354.