LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT BY ATTY. ANSELMO S.

RODIEL IV
1. Legislative power
1. Scope and limitations
1. Scope
1. Legislative power is the power to propose, enact, amend, and
repeal laws. (Abakada v Purisima, 2008)
2. It shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall
consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives, except to the
extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and
referendum. (Sec. 1, Art. VI)
2. Limitations
1. Substantive limitations - it cannot contravene the Constitution and
the basic concepts of Political law.
2. Procedural limitations - it must follow the procedure of passing
laws, as stated in the Art. VI.
2. Principle of non-delegability; exceptions
1. Already discussed in basic concepts.
2. Chambers of Congress; qualification
1. Senate
1. Composition
1. 24 senators to be elected at large by qualified voters of the
Philippines. (Sec. 2, Art. VI)
2. Qualifications: (N35ARR)
1. Natural-born citizens
2. At least 35 years old on the day of election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 2 years immediately
preceding the day of election. (Sec. 3, Art. VI)
1. Residency in election law means “domicile.”
1. The two (2) requisites of “domicile” are: (RR)
1. the fact of Residence or physical presence in a fixed
place; and
2. Whenever absent, the intention of Returning
permanently. (Makalintal v COMELEC, 2003;
Romualdez-Marcos v COMELEC, 1995)
1. Hence, Romualdez-Marcos has been a resident of
Leyte for 65-66 years, despite once living in
Ilocos Norte/Manila/Hawaii.
 2. To acquire a new domicile, the following are three (3)
requisites: (RRA)
1. Residence or bodily presence in a new locality;
2. An intention to Remain there; and
3. An intention to Abandon the old domicile. (Poe-
Llamanzares v COMELEC, 2016)
3. The Court stated that it is the fact of residence, not a
statement in a certificate of candidacy which determines
whether an individual has satisfied the residency
qualification requirement." (Romualdez-Marcos v
COMELEC)
3. Term:
1. The term of office shall be six (6) years and shall commence at
noon on the 30th day of June next following their election.
2. No Senator shall serve for more than two (2) consecutive terms.
3. Voluntary renunciation of office for any length of time shall NOT
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected. (Sec. 4, Art. VI)
1. What can be considered as an interruption?
1. Interruption involves an involuntary loss of title to office.
(Aldovino Jr v COMELEC, 2009)
2. Suspension is not interruption.
1. If there is interruption, there are no two (2)
consecutive terms.
2. House of Representatives
1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
250 members, unless otherwise fixed by law.
1. The “law” can be a general law or special law, since the provision
does not distinguish. (Mariano Jr. v COMELEC, 1995)
2. The COMELEC cannot reapportion the legislative districts, since it
is only “fixed by law.”
3. The Congress cannot delegate such power to the ARMM since the
reapportionment must be “fixed by law,” and Sec. 20, Art. X does
not grant the ARMM such power. (Sema v COMELEC, 2008)
4. The Philippines currently has 304 representatives
1. 243 district representatives and 61 party-list representatives.
2. District representatives
1. District representatives are those elected from legislative districts
apportioned amount the provinces, cities, and Metropolitan Manila
Area. (Sec. 5(1), Art. VI)
2. Rules on apportionment
1. Each city with a population of at least 250, 000 inhabitants,
shall have at least 1 representative. (Sec 5(3), Art. VI)
 1. The 250,000 requirement applies only to the first
apportionment of a legislative district in cities. There is no
need for another 250,000 population for the second and
subsequent apportionments. Why? The provision merely
states “at least 1 representative” so it can be 2 or more.
(Mariano v COMELEC, 1995)
2. Each province shall have at least 1 representative. (Sec 5(3),
Art. VI)
1. For a province, the number of population is immaterial. It
is automatically entitled to “at least 1 representative” or
more. (Aquino v COMELEC, 2010)
3. Qualifications: (N25ARR)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 25 years of age at the time of election
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter in the district which he shall be elected
5. Resident thereof for at least 1 year immediately preceding the
day of election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
4. Term:
1. The Members of the House shall be elected for a term of three
(3) years.
2. No Member of the House shall serve for more than three (3)
consecutive terms.
3. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time
shall NOT be considered as interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Sec. 7,
Art. VI)
3. Party-list system
1. Party-list representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number
of representatives, elected through a party-list system of
registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(Sec. 5(2), Art. VI; RA 7941)
2. Qualifications: (N25ARRM)
1. Natural-born citizen
2. At least 25 years of age at the time of election
1. In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least
be 25, but not more than 30 years of age.
1. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age
of 30 during his term shall be allowed to continue in
office until the expiration of his term. (Sec, 9, RA
7941)
3. Able to read and write
4. Registered voter
 5. Resident of the Philippines for at least 1 year immediately
preceding the day of election. (Sec. 6, Art. VI)
6. A bona fide Member of the party or organization which he
seeks to represent for at least 90 days preceding the day of
the election. (Sec. 9, RA 7941)
3. Term:
1. Same as above.
4. What organizations may participate in the party-list system?
1. The new 8-point parameters for screening party-list
participants as set by the Supreme Court are as follows:
1. Three (3) different groups may participate in the party-list
system:
1. National parties or organizations
2. Regional parties or organizations
3. Sectoral parties or organizations
2. National or Regional parties or organizations do not
need to organize along sectoral lines and do not need to
represent the “marginalized or underrepresented” sector.
3. Political (National or Regional) parties can participate in
the party-list elections, provided they register under the
party-list system and do not field candidates in
legislative district elections.
4. A political party that fields candidates in legislative
district elections may still participate in party-list
elections but only through its sectoral wing that must
separately register under the party-list system. The
sectoral wing is, by itself, an independent sectoral party
and is linked to the political party only through a
coalition.
5. A sectoral party or organization is one whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of
a specific sector of the population. A sectoral party may
either be one that:
1. Represents the “marginalized and underrepresented”,
i.e., laborer, peasants, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, handicapped,
veterans, and overseas Filipinos; OR
2. Lacks a well-defined political constituency, i.e.,
women, security guards, jeepney drivers, LPG
dealers, animal rights advocates, etc.
6. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
organizations that represent “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector or those “lacking a well-defined
 6.

political constituency” must belong to such sector they

represent.
1. Piston - jeepney/bus drivers
2. Butil - farmers
7. The nominees of sectoral parties or organizations that
represent such sector, either must belong to such sector,
or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional
parties or organizations must be bona fide members of
such parties or organizations.
8. National, regional, and sectoral parties shall NOT be
disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified,
provided that they have at least 1 nominee who remains
qualified. (Aton Paglaum v COMELEC, 2013)
5. The COMELEC has the constitutional duty to disclose and release
the names of the NOMINEES of the party-lists; not just the names
of the party-lists
1. Basis? Sec. 7, Art. III on the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern as complemented by the policy
of full disclosure and transparency in Government. (Bantay
Republic Act v COMELEC, 2007)
6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration
1. Any of the following grounds:
(RFF) Ideology
1. Religious sect;
2. Foreign party or organization;
3. Foreign government support;
(UVU) Unlawful
4. Unlawful means or violence to seek its goal;
5. Violates or fails to comply with election laws;
6. Untruthful statements declared in its petition
(CPO) Inactivity; Losing
7. Ceased to exist for at least one (1) year;
8. Fails to Participate in the last two (2) preceding elections;
OR
9. Fails to Obtain at least 2% of the votes cast under the
party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections for the
constituency in which it has registered.
6. Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives.
1. A person may be nominated in one (1) list only.
2. Only persons who have given their consent in writing may be
named in the list.
3. The list shall NOT include: (EL)
 1. any candidate for any Elective office; OR
2. a person who has Lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election.
4. No change of names or alteration of the order of nominees
shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to
the COMELEC, except:
1. in cases where the nominee dies, or
2. withdraws in writing his nomination, or
3. becomes incapacitated.
7. Section 15. Change of Affiliation; Effect.
1. Any elected party-list representative who changes his political
party or sectoral affiliation during his term of office shall
forfeit his seat:
2. Provided, That if he changes his political party or sectoral
affiliation within six (6) months before an election, he shall
NOT be eligible for nomination as party-list representative
under his new party or organization.
8. Section 16. Vacancy.
1. In case of vacancy in the seats reserved for party-list
representatives, the vacancy shall be automatically filled by
the next representative from the list of nominees.
9. What are the parameters in the election of party-lists?
1. 20% allocation - 20% of the total membership of the House
is the maximum number of seats allocated for party-list
representatives.
1. Currently, the Philippines has 304 representatives, 64 of
which belongs to party-list system. (20%)
2. 2% threshold - A guaranteed seat for a party-list garnering
2% of the total votes cast.
3. Proportional representation - the additional seats, that is,
the remaining seats after the allocation of the guaranteed
seats, shall be distributed to the party-list organizations,
including those that received less than 2% of the total votes.
4. Three-seat cap - Each qualified party, regardless of the
number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled only to a
maximum of 3 seats.
(BANAT v COMELEC, 2009)
3. Legislative privileges, inhibitions, and disqualifications
1. Salaries; prohibition
1. Salaries - No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate
and the House of Representatives approving such increase. (Sec. 10,
Art. VI)
2. Privilege from arrest; Privilege speech
1. Privilege from arrest - All offenses punishable by not more than 6
years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session.
1. “Session” covers the entire period from its initial convening to its
final adjournment. (Cruz)
2. Privilege speech - No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof. (Sec. 11, Art. VI)
1. The late Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago was not disbarred for
her slanderous remarks against the Supreme Court during a
privilege speech in Congress. (Pobre v Defensor-Santiago, 2009)
2. However, he can be subjected to disciplinary action by the
Congress. (Chavez v JBC, 2013)
3. During the senate hearing regarding the overpriced Makati City Hall II
Parking Building, some references were made on a 350-hectare estate
in Batangas also referred to as Hacienda Pinay, supposedly owned by
XX. During media interviews in between the hearings and in response
to media’s request for him to comment on the matter, Senator YY
expressed his opinion that XX appears to be a “nominee” or “front” or
acting as “dummy” of the actual beneficial owner, former Vice
President Pinay. XX sued for damages against Senator YY’s
defamatory and libelous statements. May Senator YY invoke
parliamentary immunity?
1. No, Senator YY cannot invoke parliamentary immunity. The
privilege of speech or debate under Sec. 11, Art. VI of the
Constitution covers speech delivered in Senate or any of its
committees, spoken in the course of any debate in said fora, or
made in the official discharge or performance of duties as a
Senator. The statement must be part of or integral to legislative
process. Here, the statements were made during the breaks and
gaps of the hearing, not delivered in Senate committees not
spoken during a debate therein. They were also not made in the
official discharge of duties as a Senator. To participate in or
respond to media interviews is not demanded by his sworn duty
nor is it a component of the process of enacting laws. Senator YY
therefore cannot invoke parliamentary immunity (Trillanes IV vs.
Hon. Castillo-Marigomen, G.R. No. 223451, March 14, 2018).
3. Incompatible office; Forbidden office; Disqualification
1. Incompatible office - No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their
 1.

subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.

1. The FORFEITURE of seat as a Senator/Congressman shall be
automatic upon his ASSUMPTION of such other office deemed
incompatible. (Adaza v Pacana, 1985)
2. A is an incumbent Senator for 2016 to 2022. On 2018, he filed his
certificate of candidacy to become the Mayor of Manila. Is there
forfeiture of office?
1. No, because the mere filing of the COC is not equivalent to
holding another office. Hence, there is no forfeiture of office.
3. When can there be “holding”?
1. When there is assumption of office already, i.e., proclamation
and oath taking.
4. The Philippine National Red Cross is NOT an instrumentality of the
Government. It is a sui generis and independent body. Hence,
Senator Gordon can be a Senator and the Chairman of Red Cross.
(Liban v Senator Gordon, 2011)
5. “Any other office” does not include ex officio membership, i.e., a
Senator may become part of CoA.
1. However, he shall not have a separate salary for being an ex
officio member, because he is deemed compensated from his
salary as a Member of Congress.
2. Forbidden office - Neither shall he be appointed to any office which
may have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during
the term for which he was elected. (Sec. 13, Art. VI)
4. Parliamentary Inhibitions
1. Personally appear as counsel - NO Senator or Member of the House
of Representatives may personally appear as counsel:
1. Before any court of justice
2. the Electoral Tribunals,
3. Quasi-judicial bodies, and
4. Other administrative bodies.
2. Interested financially - NEITHER shall he, directly or indirectly, be
interested financially:
1. in any contract with, or
2. in any franchise or
3. special privilege granted
1. by the Government, or
2. any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
3. including any government-owned or controlled corporation,
4. or its subsidiary, during his term of office.
3. Intervene - He shall NOT intervene in any matter
1. before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or
2. where he may be called upon to act on account of his office. (Sec.
 2.
14, Art. VI)
4. JAR faces a dilemma: should he accept a Cabinet appointment now or
run later for Senator? Having succeeded in law practice as well as
prospered in private business where he and his wife have substantial
investments, he now contemplates public service but without losing
the flexibility to engage in corporate affairs or participate in
professional activities within ethical bounds. Taking into account the
prohibitions and inhibitions of public office whether as Senator or
Secretary, he turns to you for advice to resolve his dilemma. What is
your advice? Explain briefly. [2004 Bar]
1. I shall advise JAR to run for Senator. As Senator, he can retain his
investments in his business, although he must make a full
disclosure of his business and financial interests and notify the
Senate of a potential conflict of interest if he authors a bill.
(Section 12, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.) He can continue
practicing law, but he cannot personally appear as counsel before
any court of justice, the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and
other administrative bodies (Sec. 14, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution).
2. As a member of the Cabinet, JAR cannot directly or indirectly
practice law or participate in any business. He will have to divest
himself of his investments in his business (Section 13, Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution). In fact, the Constitutional prohibition
imposed on members of the Cabinet covers both public and
private office or employment [Civil Liberties Union v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (199I)].
4. Quorum and voting majorities (Sec. 16)
1. Basis for determining the existence of a quorum?
1. It shall be the total number of Senators/Representatives who are in the
country and within the coercive jurisdiction of the Senate. (Avelino v
Cuenca, 1949) In the case, since one Senator was in USA, only 23
shall be the basis.
2. “Majority of EACH House” shall constitute a quorum.
1. It means simple majority.
2. Hence, 12 out of 23 Senators shall constitute quorum.
3. “Majority vote of ALL it respective Members” to elect Senate President
and House of Representatives
1. It means absolute majority.
2. Hence, to elect a Senate President, the basis is always 24.
5. Discipline of members (Sec. 16)
1. Each House may:
1. Determine the rules of its proceedings,
2. Punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and,
 3. With the concurrence of 2/3 of ALL its Members, suspend or expel a
Member.
4. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall not exceed 60 days.
1. Can the Court overrule the sanction if the rules of its proceedings
were not followed by the House?
1. Yes. As a rule, the rules of procedure and the failure to comply
with the same are political questions. As exception, when it
impairs the rights of private persons, the Court can intervene.
2. The meaning of “disorderly behavior” may be defined by the
Congress.
3. “Suspend or expel a Member”
1. The suspension in this provision is different from the
suspension in Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019).
The former is a penalty, while the latter is merely a preliminary
preventive measure imposed during the pendency of the
criminal case. Further, the former is a suspension for
disorderly behavior as a member of Congress, while the latter
is a suspension for being charged for violation for RA 3019.
(Paredes v. Sandiganbayan, 1995)
1. In Defensor-Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, the following are
the findings of the Court:
1. In Sec. 13, RA 3019, there is ministerial duty of the
court to issue an order of suspension upon
determination of the validity of the information filed
before it.
2. Sec. 13, RA 3019 states “shall be suspended from
office.” The law is clear. It does not state that the
public officer shall be suspended only for the office
where he allegedly committed the acts charged.
Hence, whatever may be the public office of the
accused, he shall be suspended.
3. Sec. 13, RA 3019 does not violate the doctrine of
separation of powers, because as stated, they are
different.
2. The election of the Speaker of the House of Representatives was held with
252 members voting for A and 8 members voting for B, the 2nd highest of
votes. A “long-standing tradition” of the House is that, the candidate who
garnered the 2nd highest number of votes for Speakership automatically
becomes the Minority Leader. Pursuant to such tradition, B should be
declared and recognized as the Minority Leader. However, those who did
not vote for Speaker A convened and elected X as the Minority Leader. A
petition for mandamus was filed insisting that B should be recognized as
the Minority Leader in light of the “long- standing tradition”. Will the
 petition for mandamus lie?
1. No, mandamus will not lie. The Senate shall elect its President and the
House of Representative, its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members. Each House shall choose such other officers as
it may deem necessary (CONST. Art. VI, Sec. 16, par. (1)). Sec. 16 (3),
Art. VI of the Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the
sole authority to “determine the rules of its proceedings.” These
“legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of
permanence and obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they
‘are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of
the body adopting them”. Being merely matters of procedure, their
observance are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives]. As such,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a
derivative of the exercise of the prerogative conferred by the
aforequoted constitutional provision (Baguilat v. Alvarez, G.R. No.
227757, July 25, 2017). Therefore, X is rightfully elected as the
Minority Leader.
3. Summary of the necessary votes in Congress:
1. Elect Senate President/Speaker - majority vote of ALL respective
members (Sec. 16(1))
2. Quorum - majority of each house constitutes a quorum
3. Do business - majority vote of members constituting a quorum (Sec.
16(2))
4. Suspend/Expel for disorderly behavior - 2/3 vote of ALL its
respective members (Sec. 16(3))
5. Adjourn for more than three (3) days - consent of other
6. Other place where the House is sitting - consent of other (Sec.
16(5))
7. Commission on Appointments - majority vote of ALL its members
(President of Senate;12 senators; 12 congressmen)
8. Call for meeting of Commission on Appointments - majority vote of
ALL its members (Sec. 18)
9. Declaration of existence of state of war - 2/3 vote of ALL members
of each House
10. Tax exemption - majority vote of ALL its members (Sec. 28(4))
11. Amnesty concurrence - majority vote of ALL of the Members of
Congress. (Sec. 19, Art. VII)
12. Treaty approval - majority vote of ALL of the Members of Senate
(Sec. 21, Art. VII)
1. In all these instances, the Houses must vote SEPARATELY. On the
other hand, to the Congress must vote JOINTLY to revoke or
 1.

extend the proclamation suspending the privilege of writ habeas

corpus or placing the Philippines under martial law. (Sec. 18, Art.
VII)
6. Process of law-making
1. Basic
1. Sec. 26(1)
1. Every bill shall embrace only one subject.
1. What is a “subject”? It is the thing that is being discussed
about. (Oxford Dictionary)
1. It can be determined by analyzing the provisions of the
law, not the title.
1. In the RH Law, the Court, by analyzing the provisions,
found that the subject is population control, and not
“reproductive health” nor “responsible parenthood.
Why? Because if the provisions relating to population
control are removed, the law will lose its foundation.
(Imbong v Ochoa, 2014)
2. Case law dictates that the provisions must be RELATED OR
GERMANE to the subject of the bill.
1. A provision NOT germane to the subject is called a “rider.”
It is unconstitutional for violation of procedural due
process. (Fariñas v Executive Secretary, 2003; Alalayan v
NPC, 1968)
2. The act of including a rider in a bill is called “logrolling” or
“hodge podge” legislation. (Government of the Philippine
Islands v HSBC, 1938)
2. The subject shall be expressed in the title.
1. It is sufficient if the title is GENERAL OR COMPREHENSIVE
enough to reasonably include the subject which the statute
seeks to effect.
2. The legislative is not required to make the title of the act a
complete index of its contents. (Bata Lidasan v COMELEC,
1967)
1. In the RH Law, the Court ruled that the title “Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Law” expresses the
subject of the law, which is population control. (Imbong v
Ochoa, 2014)
3. All in all, how is Sec. 26(1), Art. VI violated?
1. If the bill contains 2 subjects
2. If the subject is not expressed in the title.
2. Sec. 26(2)
1. Three readings on separated days
2. Printed copies in its final form shall be distributed before its
 2.
passage
1. Except when the President certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency
1. The Court held that presidential certification dispensed
with the requirement not only of “printing” but also of
“reading the bill on separate days.” (Tolentino v Secretary
of Finance, 1995)
2. Hence, in case of Presidential certification, the bill can be
read three times on the same day, i.e., Bayanihan to Heal
as One Act.
3. Upon the last reading of a bill,
1. No amendment shall be allowed, and
2. The vote shall be taken immediately thereafter.
1. If the President rejects/vetoes the bill, can the House
AMEND the same bill to the wishes of the President? No,
because upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment
thereto shall be allowed.
1. Hence, if the Congress is adamant in enacting the law,
they should override the Presidential veto.
2. Bicameral Conference Committee
1. It is within the power of the Committee to include in
its propose an entirely NEW provision that is not
found either in the House or Senate bill. Hence, the
Committee can propose several provisions, so long as
the amendments are GERMANE to the subject of the
bills. (Tolentino v Secretary of Finance, 1995)
3. Is the “no amendment on the last reading” clause
applicable to the Committee?
1. No. The clause refers only to the procedure to be
followed by each House. It does not prohibit the
introduced of modifications by the Committee.
(Abakada v Ermita, 2005)
3. Sec. 27 (1)
1. Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law,
be presented to the President.
1. If he approves the same, he shall sign it;
2. Otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his
objections to the House where it originated.
3. The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the
House where it originated within thirty days after the date of
receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had
signed it.
2. If 2/3 of ALL the Members of such House shall agree to pass the
 2.
bill, it shall become a law.
2. Special
1. Sec. 24
1. Appropriation - The purpose of an appropriation bill is to
appropriate/allocate a sum of money from the public treasury.
2. Revenue - A revenue bill is a bill to raise money or revenue
through imposition or levy, like taxes.
3. Tariff - To impose tariff on goods coming into the country.
4. Public debt
5. Local application - A bill that would only apply to a specific
province/city/municipality, i.e., conversion of a municipality to a
city.
6. Private bill - A bill that would only apply to a particular individual
or group, i.e., naturalization of a professional athlete.
7. These bills shall originate EXCLUSIVELY with the House of
Representatives.
1. However, the Senate may propose or concur with
AMENDMENTS.
1. In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an
entirely new bill as a substitute measure. This is
consistent with the CO-EQUALITY OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER of the Senate and the HOR. (Tolentino v Secretary
of Finance, 1995)
2. Sec. 29
1. No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
1. Hence, despite the waiver of immunity from suit, the judgment
cannot be executed against the State. A general or special
appropriation is needed.
3. Implied limitations on the appropriation
1. It must be for a public purpose
2. The MAXIMUM amount of appropriation must be indicated,
1. Can a donation to the government cure the defect of an
appropriation devoted to private purpose?
1. No. In Pascual v Secretary of Public Works, an
appropriation measure contained an item for the
construction of roads in a private subdivision.
Subsequently, the roads were turned over to the
Government. The Court annulled the item because the
appropriation was devoted to private purpose. The
donation did not cure the defect of the appropriation.
2. In Data Privacy Act, it provides that the Commission shall
be provided with an initial appropriation of P20M. (Sec. 41
 2.

- Special Appropriations Clause, RA 10173)

4. Congressman Z filed House Bill No. 123 converting the Municipality of
Santan to City of Sampaguita. A month later, Senator Y filed Senate
Bill 456 also converting the Municipality of Santan to City of
Sampaguita. The HB 123 was approved by the lower house and was
subsequently transmitted to the upper house; however, the Senate
adopted the version of Senator Y which was approved by President X.
Now, Mr. CDE, a resident of Municipality of Santan assailed the newly
passed law, arguing among others that it did not originate exclusively
from HOR as mandated by Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution
since it had a counterpart in the Senate. Decide.
1. The contention of the petitioner is without merit. A bill of local
application, such as one asking for the conversion of a
municipality into a city, is deemed to have originated from the
House provided that the bill of the House was filed prior to the
filing of the bill in the Senate even if, in the end, the Senate
approved its own version.
2. The filing in the Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its
receipt of the bill from the House, does not contravene the
constitutional requirement that a bill of local application should
originate in the House of Representatives, for as long as the
Senate does not act thereupon until it receives the House bill.
Hence, Sec. 24, Art. VI of the Constitution was not violated
(Alvarez v. Guingona, G.R. No. 118303, January 31, 1996).
7. Electoral tribunals
1. Nature
1. The tribunal is independent of the House. (Angara v Electoral
Commission, 1936)
2. Its decisions may only be reviewed by the Supreme Court upon
showing of grave abuse of discretion in a special civil action for
certiorari filed under Rule 65. (Peña v HRET, 1997)
3. The tribunal is also independent of the COMELEC. Cases before the
tribunal are governed by own rules. (Lazatin v HRET, 1988)
4. The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and
the CA is not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional
rule on proportional representation of political parties/party-list
system. (Pimentel v HOR, 2001)
1. The same is true for Commission on Appointments
5. Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution, party-list
representatives must first show to the House that they possess the
required numerical strength to be entitled to seats in the HRET and
the CA. Only if the House fails to comply with the directive of the
Constitution on proportional representation of political parties in the
 HRET and the CA can the party-list representatives seek recourse to
this Court under its power of judicial review. This is consistent with
the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. (Pimentel v HOR, 2001)
1. The same is true for Commission on Appointments. (Drilon v De
Venecia, 2009)
6. The tribunal was created as a non-partisan court. The members enjoy
security of tenure, and their membership may not be terminated
except for a just cause, such as expiration of his term, death,
resignation from the political party, or transfer of affiliation to another
party. (Bondoc v Pineda, 1991)
7. When does the SET/HRET acquire jurisdiction over the election case?
1. Once a winning candidate is duly proclaimed, taken his oath, and
ASSUMED OFFICE as a Member of the House/Senate, the
jurisdiction of HRET/SET begins, and the jurisdiction of COMELEC
ends. (Limkaichong v COMELEC, 2009)
1. Hence, before assumption of office, election contests must be
filed with the COMELEC.
2. Powers
1. Sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. (Sec. 17, Art. VI)
2. Power to promulgate rules and regulations relative to matters within
its jurisdiction, including the period for filing election protests before
it. (Lazatin v HRET, 1988)
3. What if the disqualification case was filed against ALL of the members
of the SET? Should they inhibit in the disqualification case?
1. No, they shall not inhibit. If the Senator-members will inhibit, the
Electoral Tribunal will abandon its duty which no other court or
body can perform, i.e., to be the sole judge of all contests on the
qualification of Senators/Congressmen. Hence, the Senator-
members shall not inhibit. (Abbas v SET, 1988)
4. The power of HRET does NOT carry with it the authority to determine
the legality of the judgment of the naturalization of respondent’s
father, in the pursuit of disqualifying the respondent as a candidate.
To rule otherwise would allow a collateral attack on citizenship. This is
prohibited. (Renald Vilando v HRET, 2011)
5. What is the remedy from the decision of the SET or HRET?
1. Sandoval: No appeal lies, because the Constitution made these
electoral tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of their respective
members (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution). In the first place,
appeal is not a constitutional right as it is not found in the Bill of
Rights; it is merely statutory, so that if there is no law that grants a
person the right to appeal, he may not appeal.
 2. Sandoval: The only remedy available to a party adversely affected
by the decision of these electoral tribunals in Congress is not an
appeal, but the special civil action for certiorari governed by
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court based on grave abuse of
discretion.
8. Commission on Appointments
1. Nature
1. For the Senate, a political party must have at least 2 members to be
entitled to one seat in the Commission. Rounding off is not allowed.
(Guingona v Gonzales, 1992)
2. The Commission is independent of the Houses. Its employees are not
employees of Congress. It has the power to promulgate its own rules
of proceedings. It does not legislate when it confirms or refuses a
Presidential appointment. (Pimentel Jr. v Ermita, 2005)
3. The Commission shall meet only while the Congress is in session, at
the all of its Chairman or a majority of all Members. (Sec. 19, Art. VI)
2. Powers
1. The Commission acts as a legislative check on the appointing
authority of the President. It shall act on ALL appointments submitted
to it within 30 session days of the Congress from their submission.
(Sec 18, Art. VI)
1. Which appointments need the concurrence of the Commission?
(HAAC)
1. Heads of executive department
2. Ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls
3. Officers of the AFP from the rank of colonel or naval captain
4. Officers whose appointments are vested in him by the
Constitution
1. Regular members of the JBC (Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII)
2. Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions. (Sec. 1(2), Art. IX-B)
2. Which appointments do NOT need confirmation from the
Commission? (VJOO)
1. Appointment of the VP to a Cabinet position. (Sec. 3, Art. VII)
2. Judges and justices. (Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
3. Ombudsman and his deputies (Sec. 9, Art. XI)
4. All Other officers of the Government he may be authorized by
law to appointment or whose appointments are not otherwise
provided by law, such as:
1. Commissioner of Customs (Sarmiento v Mison, 1987)
2. Chairman of CHR (Bautista v Salonga, 1989)
3. Appointments in the Philippine Coast Guard (Soriano v
Lista, 2003)
 3. The Commission shall rule by a majority vote of ALL the Members.
(Sec. 18, Art. VI)
4. Nominees who are NOT acted upon at the CLOSE of the session
may again be nominated by the President.
5. Nominees who are DISAPPROVED by the Commission cannot be
nominated again.
9. Powers of Congress
1. Legislative inquiries
1. What is the scope of legislative inquiry by the Congress?
1. Power to conduct inquiry in aid of legislation in accordance with
its duly published rules of procedure
2. Power to issue summons and notices in connection with matters
subject of its investigation or inquiry
3. Power to punish or declare a person in contempt during or in the
course of the investigation
4. Power to determine the rules of its proceedings. (Arnault v
Nazareno, 1950)
2. What are the limitations on the power of legislative inquiry?
1. It must be in aid of legislation
2. It must be in accordance with duly published procedure
3. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiry
shall be respected. (Sec. 21, Art. VI)
4. Executive/Judicial privilege/Inter-departmental courtesy.
3. The power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate.
Hence, the Congress is given a broad power to conduct the same.
(Senate v Ermita, 2007)
1. However, such power can be abused. Hence, it may be subject to
judicial review pursuant to the Court’s certiorari powers under
Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the Constitution. (Senate v Ermita, 2007)
1. In Bengzon v Senate, the inquiry was NOT in aid of legislation
because it was conducted merely to look into the possible
violation of RA 3019. Hence, it is tantamount to grave abuse
of discretion.
2. The mere filing of criminal or administrative complaint should not
automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert the same. (Standard
Chartered Bank v Senate, 2007)
4. “Duly published rules of procedure” requires the Senate of EVERY
CONGRESS to publish its rules of procedure because every Congress
is DISTINCT from the one before or after it. Not having published its
Rules, the subject hearings in aid of legislation are procedurally infirm.
(Neri v Senate, 2008)
5. Persons invited to the legislative hearings, as resource persons or
 5.
witnesses, CANNOT validly invoke their right to counsel. (Philcomsat
Holdings v Senate, 2012)
6. The right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntary or under compulsion of subpoena,
in ANY civil, criminal or administrative proceeding. (Rosete v Lim,
2006) Hence, witnesses in a legislative inquiry can invoke the right
against self-incrimination, if the question has the tendency to
incriminate him for some crime.
7. As a rule, the Congress has the liberty of establishing its own rules of
procedure. Failure to comply with their rules is a political question
which is not cognizable by the courts.
1. As exception, it becomes justiciable when the failure to comply
impairs on the rights of private persons subjected to the powers
of congress.
8. A few months before the end of the present Congress, Strongwill was
invited by the Senate to shed light in an inquiry relative to the alleged
siphoning and diverting of the pork barrel of members of Congress to
non-existent or fictitious projects. Strongwill has been identified in the
news as the principal actor responsible for the scandal, the leader of a
nongovernmental organization which ostensibly funnelled the funds to
certain local government projects which existed only on paper. At the
start of the hearings before the Senate, Strongwill refused at once to
cooperate. The Senate cited him in contempt and sent him to jail until
he would have seen the light. The Congress, thereafter, adjourned
sine die preparatory to the assumption to office of the newly-elected
members. In the meantime, Strongwill languished behind bars and the
remaining senators refused to have him released, claiming that the
Senate is a continuing body and , therefore, he can be detained
indefinitely. Are the senators right? [2014 Bar]
1. No. The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of
contempt is not indefinite. The period of imprisonment under the
inherent power of contempt by the Senate during inquiries in aid
of legislation should only last until the termination of the
LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY under which the said power is invoked.
The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two instances:
first, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report;
and second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates
upon the expiration of one (1) Congress (ADJOURNMENT OF
CONGRESS) (Balag v. Senate of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234608,
July 3, 2018).
2. Oversight functions; Question hour
1. A distinction has to be made between the power to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation, and the power to conduct a question hour.
 1.

(Senate v Ermita, 2006)

2. In inquiries in aid of legislation, the department head must appear,
despite the fact that the questions to be asked are privileged matters.
1. In the inquiry, he can then invoke the privilege in order to refuse to
divulge such information.
1. However, executive privilege cannot be implied. It must be
clearly asserted, and the grounds for invoking the same must
be disclosed. Otherwise, the power of inquiry by the Congress
would be violated. (Senate v Ermita, 2006)
Inquiries in aid of legislation Question Hour
Any person Department Heads only
Committees Entire House
Any matter for the purpose of Matters related to the department only
legislation
To elicit information that may be used To obtain information in pursuit of
for legislation oversight function
Mandatory: Congress can compel the Discretionary; Congress cannot compel
appearance of executive officials, and the appearance of executive officials if
can punish contumacy therefor the required consent of the President
is not obtained.
3. Non-legislative
1. Informing function
1. The informing function involves investigation for the purpose of
enlightening the electorate. (Azcuna in his dissenting opinion,
Akbayan v Thomas Aquino, 2008)
2. It is the proper duty of a representative body to look diligently into
every affair of government and to talk much about what it sees. It
is meant to be the eyes and the voice, and to embody the wisdom
and will of its constituents. The informing function of Congress
should be preferred even to its legislative function. (Puno in his
concurring and dissenting opinion, Macalintal v COMELEC, 2003)
2. Power of impeachment
1. Return to this once “Art. XI - Accountability of Public Officers” is
tackled.
10. Initiative and referendum
1. People’s initiative
1. People’s initiative is the power of the people to propose amendments
to the Constitute or propose or enact legislation through an election
called for the purpose. (Sec. 3(a), RA 6735)
2. Classes of people’s initiative
1. Initiative on the Constitution
2. Initiative on Statutes
 3. Initiative on Local Legislation
3. Referendum
1. Referendum is the power of the electorate to approve or reject
legislation through an election called for the purpose. (Sec. 2(c), RA
6735)
4. Classes of referendum
1. Referendum of Statutes - petition to approve/reject an act or law
passed by Congress. (Sec. 32, Art. VI)
2. Referendum of Local laws - legal process whereby the registered
voters of the LGU may approve/amend/reject any ordinance enacted
by the Sanggunian. (Sec. 126, LGC)
5. Initiative shall be used if the people want to enact laws. Referendum shall
be used if the people want to approve or reject an Act passed by
Congress/Sanggunian.

Judicial Department

1. Concepts
1. Judicial power
1. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice:
1. To settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable (TRADITIONAL CONCEPT); and
2. To determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (EXPANDED POWER)
(Sec. 1(2), Art. VIII)
2. Who exercises judicial power?
1. Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such
lower courts as may be established by law. (Sec. 1(1), Art. VIII)
2. The Court, sitting en banc or in Division, acts as a collegial body
as it exercises judicial power through the collective action of its
individual members. (FASAP v PAL, 2018)
3. Although the Chief Justice is “primus inter pares,” he cannot
legally decide/overturn a case on his own. (Complaint of Arrienda
Against Justice Puno, 2005)
1. “Primus inter pares” means the first among equals.
2. Judicial review
1. Judicial review means the power of the courts to test the validity of
executive or legislative acts in light of their conformity with the
Constitution. (Angara v Electoral Commission, 1936)
2. From the requisites of judicial review, the first two are the most
important. (Belgica vs. Ochoa)
3. Requisites (ALEL)
1. Actual case or controversy (COSCo - Conflict of legal rights;
Opposite legal claims; Susceptible of judicial resolution;
COnjectural)
1. Jurisprudence provides that an actual case or controversy is
one which involves a CONFLICT of legal rights, an assertion
of OPPOSITE legal claims, SUSCEPTIBLE of judicial
resolution.
2. It cannot be conjectural or anticipatory, or that which seeks
to resolve hypothetical cases/cases based on assumptions/
render advisory opinions.
3. Related to this is the requirement of "ripeness.” Hence, it is a
prerequisite that an act had been performed by either branch,
causing adverse effects on the individual challenging it,
before a court may come into the picture." (Francisco v HOR,
2003)
4. Also, the case must not be moot or academic. A moot and
academic case is one that CEASES to present a justiciable
controversy by virtue of SUPERVENING EVENTS, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. (Gunsi v
Commissioners, 2009)
1. Exceptions: (VPGR)
1. Grave Violation of the Constitution;
2. Paramount Public interest;
3. Guide the Bench, the Bar and the public; and
4. Capable of Repeating yet evading review. (Garcia v
Executive Secretary, 2009)
1. There are two (2) factors to be considered
before a case is deemed one capable of repetition
yet evading review:
1. Evading - The challenged action is in its
duration too short to be fully litigated prior to
its cessation or expiration; and
2. Repeating - There is a reasonable
expectation that the same complaining party
would be subjected to the same action
(Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. 223505, October 3, 2017).
2. Locus standi
1. He must have a PERSONAL AND SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST
in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct
injury as a result of its enforcement
2. Exceptions:
1. Transcendental importance - the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed when public
interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance.
2. Facial challenges involving free speech - Such as void-
for-vagueness and overbreadth. The rule on locus standi
does not apply. (Spouses Romualdez v COMELEC,
Separate Opinion, Carpio)
3. Third party standing - Requisites: (ICA - Injury; Close
relation; Ability hindrance of 3rd party)
1. Injury suffered by litigant - The litigant must suffer
an injury-in-fact, giving him or her a "sufficiently
concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue in
dispute
2. Close relation to party in interest - The litigant must
have Close relation to a third party (who has that
personal and substantial interest)
3. No ability - Hindrance to third party’s ABILITY to
protect his right/interest
1. Illustration of third party standing: White Light
Corporation v City of Manila, 2009
1. In this case, there is a challenge on Ordinance
7774, which is an ordinance prohibiting short-
time admission in hotels/motels/inns
2. Here, the motel owners are the litigants. The
third parties are the customers of the motels.
3. Injury - There is injury-in-fact on the motel
owners because their income suffered
because of the ordinance. It is clear that the
business interests of the petitioners are
likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely
on the patronage of their customers for their
continued viability which appears to be
threatened by the enforcement of the
Ordinance.
4. Close relation - there is close relation
between the motel owner and the customers
(who are the persons with personal and
substantial interest)
5. Hindrance/No ability to protect their rights
- There is hindrance on the part of the
customers because people would be reluctant
in filing the petition due to suspicion from
 5.

their partners.
2. Another illustration of third party standing:
Craig v Boren
1. The United States Supreme Court held that a
licensed beverage vendor has standing to
raise the equal protection claim of a male
customer challenging a statutory scheme
prohibiting the sale of beer to males under
the age of 21 and to females under the age of
18. The United States High Court explained
that the vendors had standing "by acting as
advocates of the rights of third parties who
seek access to their market or function.
4. Citizen - when the proceeding involves the assertion of a
public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the
requirement of personal interest.
5. Taxpayer - he is allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed, or that public
money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
there is a wastage of public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
1. When is taxpayer suit available?
1. Tax law
2. Expenditure of public funds
6. Legislator - he is allowed to sue to question the validity
of any official action which he claims infringes his
prerogatives as a legislator.
3. Earliest possible opportunity
1. As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity, so that if not raised by the
pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised at the trial, and if
not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on
appeal. This rule, which is subject to exceptions, is applicable
to criminal cases. (Robb v People, 1939)
1. The Supreme Court has held that the requirement that the
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity
refers ONLY to raising the issue in a competent court.
Here, the Office of the Ombudsman before which
proceedings against Hipolito were had is not a competent
court but only an administrative body. Hence, Hipolito
may still raise the issue of constitutionality before the
Court of Appeals. (Estarija v Ranada, 2006)
4. Lis mota
 1. Lis mota means the MAIN ISSUE OF THE CASE.
2. It is a well-settled maxim that an issue of constitutionality
should be AVOIDED whenever possible, unless it is very lis
mota or crux of the controversy.
5. Previous petitions challenging the intended burial of the mortal
remains of Marcos at the Libingan ng mga Bayani were dismissed
by the Supreme Court. Marcos was finally laid to rest at the LNMB
around noontime of Nov 18, 2016. Petitioners argue that the burial
of Marcos at the LNMB should not be allowed because it has the
effect of not just rewriting history as to the Filipino people's act of
revolting against an authoritarian ruler but also condoning the
abuses committed during the Martial Law, thereby violating the
letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution, which is a "post-
dictatorship charter" and a "human rights constitution." Does the
Court have authority to check and override the President’s
decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB?
1. No, Court has no authority to check and override the
President’s decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB. The
President's decision to bury Marcos at the LNMB is in
accordance with the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence.
Judicial power covers only the recognition, review or
reversal of the policy crafted by the political departments
if and when a case is brought before it on the ground of
illegality, unconstitutionality or GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION (i.e., blatant abuse of power or capricious
exercise thereof). The determination of the wisdom,
fairness, soundness, justice, equitableness or expediency
of a statute or what "ought to be" as a MATTER OF POLICY
is within the realm of and should be addressed to the
legislature. If existing laws are inadequate, the policy-
determining branches of the government, specifically the duly
elected representatives who carry the mandate of the popular
will, may be exhorted peacefully by the citizenry to effect
positive changes. No matter how well- meaning, the Court can
only air its views in the hope that Congress would take notice
(Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017).
1. The answer is in the meaning of judicial power, not in the
requisites of judicial review.
2. Remember that judicial review are just requisites in
order to determine if the Court will hear the petition.
3. The judicial power is the legal basis to determine if the
law/governmental act will be held unconstitutional,
i.e., grave abuse of discretion.
 6. One day after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 9372 "An Act to
Secure the State and Protect our People from Terrorism,"
Samahang XYZ filed a petition assailing the said law’s
constitutionality. XYZ alleged that they were tagged as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines
(CPP) and the National People’s Army (NPA). In addition, they
claim that sporadic “surveillance” is being conducted in their
persons. The tagging, according to them, is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the
law. Will the petition prosper?
1. No, the petition will not prosper because petitioners fail to
present an actual case or controversy.
2. The power of judicial review has four requisites: (a) there must
be an actual case or controversy; (b) petitioners must possess
locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
3. An actual case or controversy means an existing case or
controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination,
not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court
would amount to an advisory opinion. A reasonable certainty
of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional
interest suffices to provide a basis for mounting a
constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
requirement that there must be sufficient facts to enable the
Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.
4. Here, petitioners’ obscure allegations of sporadic
"surveillance" and supposedly being tagged as "communist
fronts" in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution.
From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an
advisory opinion, which is not its function (Southern
Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc v. Anti-Terrorism
Council, G.R. No. 178552, October 5, 2010)
4. Operative fact doctrine (EPUE - EFFECTS of unconstitutional law,
PRIOR to declaration, is UNDISTURBED for EQUITY/FAIR)
1. The operative fact doctrine provides that, when a law or
governmental act is declared unconstitutional, its EFFECTS, prior
to the declaration, may be left UNDISTURBED as a matter of
EQUITY and fair play. (League of Cities v COMELEC, 2010)
2. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its
effects. (Yap v Thenamaris, 2011)
1. Disbursement Acceleration Program (DAP) issue
1. We find the doctrine of operative fact applicable to the
 1.
adoption and implementation of the DAP. Unless the
doctrine is held to apply, the Executive as the disburser
and the offices under it and elsewhere as the recipients
could be required to undo everything that they had
implemented in good faith under the DAP. That scenario
would be enormously burdensome for the Government.
Equity alleviates such burden. (Araullo v Aquino III, 2014)
3. Congress passed RA No. 1234, providing that producers of certain
graded films be entitled to incentives equivalent to the
amusement tax imposed and collected on the graded films by
cities and municipalities in Metro Manila and other highly
urbanized and independent component cities in the Philippines.
Under Sec. 14 thereof, all revenue from the amusement tax on the
graded film shall be deducted and withheld by the proprietors,
operators or lessees of theaters or cinemas and remitted within
30 days from the termination of the exhibition to the Philippine
Film Council which shall reward the corresponding amusement tax
to the producers of the graded film within 15 days from receipt
thereof. Such legislative grant of tax incentives was however
declared by law to be unconstitutional, having been enacted in
violation of local fiscal autonomy. On the date of finality of the
decision, the Cebu City alone is entitled to the taxes which it
should have collected under the Local Government Code.
The City of Cebu argues that a law which is declared
unconstitutional produces no effect and is deemed not to have
been enacted at all. Thus, the Philippine Film Council and the
producers must remit the taxes due to all LGUs. However, the
latter argue that they should not be required to refund under the
doctrine of operative fact. Decide.
1. Philippine Film Council and the producers are correct. It is a
well-settled rule that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it;
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not
been passed at all. An exception to the above rule, however, is
the doctrine of operative fact, which applies as a matter of
equity and fair play. It applies when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who
have relied on the invalid law. Here, to order the return of all
the amounts remitted to the Film Council and given to the
producers of graded films, by all of the covered cities, actually
amounts to hundreds of millions, if not billions. To order the
Film Council and producers to refund the incentives would
certainly impose a heavy, and possibly crippling, financial
 burden upon them who merely, and presumably in good faith,
complied with the legislative fiat subject of this case (Film
Development Council of the Philippines vs. Colon Heritage
Realty Corp., G.R. No. 203754, October 15, 2019,
Resolution)
5. Political question doctrine
1. Political question is a question of policy or wisdom (exercised by
the PEOPLE (political) or DEPARTMENT (discretionary)).
(Congressman Garcia v Executive Secretary, 2009)
1. It is to be exercised by the PEOPLE in their primary political
capacity, or
2. It has been specifically delegated to some other
DEPARTMENT, with DISCRETIONARY power to act. (Tañada v
Cuenco, 1957)
2. As a rule, political questions cannot be interfered with by courts.
3. As exception, when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government, it becomes a
justiciable question.
1. It has been settled that the expanded certiorari or prohibition
is the proper remedy to question the act. (Jardeleza v Sereno,
2014)
1. An example of grave abuse of discretion is infringing upon
the freedom of speech. (Diocese of Bacolod v COMELEC,
2015, Leonen)
4. Does judicial restraint apply in our courts?
1. No, because the Court would be shirking from its DUTY
vested under Art. VIII. Hence, the Court must exercise the
power of judicial review over justiciable issues in
impeachment proceedings. (Francisco v HOR, 2003)
2. Judicial independence and autonomy; Constitutional Safeguards
1. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body; it may not be abolished by
Legislature
2. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment
(Sec. 2, Art. XI) or a petition for quo warranto against an illegible public
official for acts committed prior to the appointment. (Republic v Sereno,
2018)
1. From 1986 to 2006, X served as a member of the faculty of the ABC
University College of Law, a state university. While being employed as
such, X was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the
government in two international arbitrations from 2003 to 2006. After
a break from government service, X was appointed Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court in 2010. When the position of the Chief Justice
was declared vacant in 2012, X was required to submit all previous
SALNs (up to December 31, 2011). However, X submitted only the
SALNs from the end of 2009 up to December 31, 2011 when he was
appointed Associate Justice. And in lieu of his SALNs from his
previous government service, he submitted a clearance from ABC
University College of Law, attesting that he has been cleared from all
administrative responsibilities and accountabilities. According to X, his
government records in the academe are more than 15 years old, and
thus it is reasonable to consider them impossible to be retrieved.
Nonetheless, X’s nomination has been accepted. He was appointed as
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court in 2012. In 2017, an impeachment
complaint was filed by Atty. Y against Chief Justice X, alleging that he
failed to make truthful declarations in his SALNs. Meanwhile, the
Office of the Solicitor General initiated a quo warranto proceeding
against Chief Justice X on the ground that the latter failed to show
that he is a person of proven integrity which is an indispensable
qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section 7(3),
Article VIII of the Constitution. Is a quo warranto proceeding a proper
remedy to remove Chief Justice X, an impeachable officer?
1. Yes, Chief Justice X may be removed via a quo warranto
proceeding. Sec. 2 of Art. XI of the Constitution provides that The
President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme
Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment. The
term “may” denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect. Therefore, the Constitution allows the
institution of a quo warranto action against an impeachable
officer. The rule therefore is that an act or omission committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official's qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a quo
warranto petition. However, acts or omissions, even if it relates to
the qualification of integrity, being a continuing requirement but
nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly
appointed and/or validly elected official, cannot be the subject of
a quo warranto proceeding, but which may either be impeachment
if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or
omission constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise (Republic v. Sereno,
G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018). In this case, Chief Justice X was
shown to have been remiss in submitting all his SALNs prior to or
at the time of his appointment, which failure goes into the very
qualification of integrity. Hence, Chief Justice X may be removed
via a quo warranto petition.
3. The Supreme Court cannot be deprived of its jurisdiction under Sec. 5
(Sec. 2, Art. VIII)
4. No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when undermines
security of tenure (Sec. 2, Art. VIII) The treatment is different from
executive departments because the judiciary is independent.
5. Its appellate jurisdiction cannot be increased without its advice and
concurrence. (Sec. 30, Art. VI)
1. Sec. 14 of the Ombudsman Act (RA 6770) is unconstitutional
2. Section 14. Restrictions. - No writ of injunction shall be issued by any
court to delay an investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman
under this Act, unless there is a prima facie evidence that the subject
matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of
the Ombudsman.
3. No court shall hear any appeal or application for remedy against the
decision or findings of the Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court,
on pure question of law.
4. The first paragraph is ineffective because it violates the doctrine of
separation of powers. Under the Constitution, the Court has the power
to “promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts.”
Hence, the issuance of an injunction, which is a provisional remedy to
protect or enforce rights, cannot be prohibited by law. Otherwise, the
Congress will encroach upon the rule-making authority of the Court,
which will then violate the doctrine of separation of powers. (Morales
v CA and Binay, 2015)
5. The second paragraph is unconstitutional because it increased the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice or
concurrence. (Morales v CA and Binay, 2015)
6. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all its courts and
personnel thereof. (Sec. 6, Art. VIII)
7. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline the judges/
justices of inferior courts. (Sec. 11, Art. VIII)
1. The first clause, which is “shall have the power to discipline judges of
lower courts,” did NOT intend that all administrative disciplinary cases
should be heard by the Court en banc. This would result in an
absurdity. Hence, if they are not for dismissal, they can be heard in
division.
2. The second clause is “order their dismissal by a vote of a majority of
the Members who actually took part in the deliberations.” In this
instance of dismissal, the administrative case must be deliberated
upon and decided by the Court en banc itself. (People v Judge Gacott,
1995)
8. The members of the Judiciary have security of tenure (Sec. 2(2), Art.
 8.
VIII)
9. Appointments to the Judiciary are always permanent. Temporary/Acting
appointments can undermine the independence of the Judiciary. (De
Castro v JBC, 2010)
10. Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy
11. Appropriations cannot be reduced by the legislature below the amount
appropriated for the previous year; After approval, they shall be
automatically and regularly released
12. The salaries of justices and judges cannot be decreased during their
tenure;
13. The members of the Judiciary cannot be designated to any agency
performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Sec. 12, Art. VIII)
This does not include ex-officio positions held by Justices.
14. The Supreme Court, alone, has the power to promulgate rules for
pleading, practice, procedure in all courts, admission to the practice of
law, and the Integrated Bar. (Estipona v Lobrigo, 2017)
15. The Supreme Court may order temporarily detail of judges
16. The Supreme Court can appoint all officials and employees of the
Judiciary, in accordance with Civil Service Law (Sec. 5(6), Art. VIII) This
means appointees OTHER than justices and judges.
1. “Administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof”
1. Hence, the President cannot remove justices, judges, and court
personnel from their position. Only the Supreme Court has that
power.
2. The Court ruled that the Ombudsman may NOT initiate or
investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office
against the judge. He must first indorse/defer the case to the
Supreme Court for appropriate action. (Fuentes v Ombudsman-
Mindanao, 2001)
3. Prescinding from this premise, the Ombudsman cannot determine
for itself and by itself whether a criminal complaint against a
judge, or court employee, involves an administrative matter. The
Ombudsman is duty bound to have all cases against judges and
court personnel filed before it, referred to the Supreme Court for
determination as to whether an administrative aspect is involved
therein. This rule should hold true regardless of whether an
administrative case based on the act subject of the complaint
before the Ombudsman is already pending with the Court. For,
aside from the fact that the Ombudsman would not know of this
matter unless he is informed of it, he should give due respect for
and recognition of the administrative authority of the Court,
because in determining whether an administrative matter is
 involved, the Court passes upon not only administrative liabilities
but also other administrative concerns, as is clearly conveyed in
the case of Maceda v. Vasquez. (Judge Caoibes v Ombudsman,
2001)
1. Hence, if a person files an administrative case against a judge
or court personnel with the Ombudsman, the same must be
dismissed. (Maceda v Vasquez, 1993)
4. The House of Representatives Committee on Good Government
and Public Accountability (House Committee) conducted an
inquiry, in aid of legislation, pertaining to the use by the Provincial
Government of Ilocos Norte of its shares from the excise taxes on
locally manufactured virginia-type cigarettes for a purpose other
than that provided for by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7171. When they
refused to answer or when they answered that they could no
longer remember, they were cited in contempt and ordered
detained. Petitioners filed a Petition for Habeas Corpus against
respondent House Sergeant-at-Arms Lieutenant General before
the CA. While the Habeas Corpus Petition was still pending before
the CA, petitioners filed an Omnibus Petition with the Supreme
Court. Petitioners insist that the Habeas Corpus Petition then
pending before the CA can be transferred to the Court stressing
that the Court exercises administrative supervision over all courts
as provided under Section 6, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Further, citing People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez, et al.,
petitioners likewise argue that the administrative power of the
Court to transfer cases from one court to another is based on its
inherent power to protect the judiciary and prevent a miscarriage
of justice. Are the petitioners correct?
1. No. The Court's administrative supervision over lower
courts does not equate to the power to usurp jurisdiction
already acquired by lower courts. Jurisdiction over
petitions for habeas corpus and the adjunct authority to
issue the writ are shared by the Supreme Court and the
lower courts. However, petitioners are without unbridled
freedom to choose which between this Court and the CA
should decide the habeas corpus petition. Mere
concurrency of jurisdiction does not afford the parties
absolute freedom to choose the court to which the
petition shall be filed. After all, the hierarchy of courts "also
serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for
petitions for the extraordinary writs.”
2. Administrative supervision merely involves overseeing the
operations of agencies to ensure that they are managed
 2.

effectively, efficiently and economically, but without

interference with day-to-day activities. Thus, to effectively
exercise its power of administrative supervision over all courts
as prescribed by the Constitution, Presidential Decree No.
828, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 842, created the
Office of the Court Administrator. Nowhere in the functions of
the several offices in the Office of the Court Administrator is it
provided that the Court can assume jurisdiction over a case
already pending with another court.
3. The import of the Court's pronouncement in Gutierrez is the
recognition of the incidental and inherent power of the Court
to transfer the trial of cases from one court to another of
equal rank in a neighboring site, whenever the imperative of
securing a fair and impartial trial, or of preventing a
miscarriage of justice, so demands. Such incidental and
inherent power cannot be interpreted to mean an authority on
the part of the Court to determine which court should hear
specific cases without running afoul with the doctrine of
separation of powers between the Judiciary and the
Legislative (Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. Fariñas, et al., G.R. No.
232395, July 3, 2018).
2. “Fiscal autonomy” contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to
allocate and utilize the resources with the wisdom and dispatch that
their needs require. In short, fiscal autonomy means freedom from
outside control.
1. Thus, the Court En Banc can determine and decide the who, what,
where, when and how of the privileges and benefits they extend to
justices, judges, court officials and court personnel within the
parameters of the Court’s granted power. Any kind of interference
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the Judiciary.
(Re: COA Opinion on the Computation of the Appraised Value of
the Properties Purchased by the Retired Chief/Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court, 2012)
2. As example, vetoing an item in the appropriations bill for the
pension fund of the Judiciary violates fiscal autonomy. Why?
Because that President touched/controlled/interfered with the
funds of Judiciary.
3. “Promulgate rules concerting pleading, practice, and procedure
in all courts”
1. The provision prohibiting the issuance of injunction by any court
other than the Supreme Court is unconstitutional because a) the
Congress encroached upon the rule-making authority of the Court
and b) it violated the separation of powers. (Morales v CA and
 1.

Binay, 2015)
2. The prohibition on plea-bargaining in drug cases is
unconstitutional. Why? Plea bargaining has been defined as "a
process whereby the accused and the prosecution work out a
mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court
approval."
3. Hence, plea-bargaining is a matter of procedure, and RA 9165, in
prohibiting plea-bargaining, encroached into the rule-making
power of the Court. (Estipona v Lobrigo, 2017)
4. “Promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of
law, and the Integrated Bar”
1. The LEB imposed a requirement that law students must become
interns before they take the Bar. Is this valid?
1. No. It is clear from the plain text of Section 7(g) that another
requirement, i.e., completion of a law internship program, is
imposed by law for taking the bar examinations. This
requirement unduly interferes with the exclusive jurisdiction of
the Court to promulgate rules concerning the practice of law
and admissions thereto. (Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
2. The LEB was given the power by RA 7662 for “continuing legal
education.” Is this valid?
1. No. Inasmuch as the LEB is authorized to compel mandatory
attendance of practicing lawyers in such courses, the same
encroaches upon the Court's power to promulgate rules
concerning the Integrated Bar, which includes the education
of lawyers. The mandatory continuing legal education of the
members of the bar is, in fact, covered by B.M. No. 850,
promulgated by the Supreme Court. (Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
3. Can LEB prescribe minimum standards for admission to legal
education?
1. Yes. The LEB's power to prescribe admission requirements
refers only to those seeking enrollment to a school or college
of law and not to the practice of law. Hence, the rule-making
authority of the Supreme Court was not encroached.
(Pimentel v LEB, 2019)
4. Does the PHILSAT violate the authority to promulgate rules
admission to the practice of law?
1. No. As stated, minimum standards for admission to school or
college of law does not encroach upon the rule-making power
of the Court (Pimentel v LEB, 2019) However, it violates the
academic freedom of educational institutions.
3. Appointments to the Judiciary
1. Qualifications of members of Judiciary
 1. For Justice of Supreme Court: (N-40-15-CIPI)
1. Natural-born citizen;
2. At least 40 years of age; and
3. At least 15 years as a judge or engaged in the practice of law in
the Philippines.
4. Proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence. (Sec.
7, Art. VIII)
2. Should a justice of lower collegiate court be a natural-born citizen?
1. Yes, as provided by Sec. 7, Art. VIII)
3. Should a judge be a natural-born citizen?
1. Yes, as provided by BP 129.
4. Competence - he knows the law
5. Integrity - Integrity contemplates both adherence to the highest moral
standards and obedience to laws and legislations. (Republic v Sereno,
2018)
6. Probity - honesty and decency (Oxford Dictionary)
7. Independence - he is free from outside control
2. Judicial and Bar Council
1. Composition (7)
1. Ex officio members - Chief Justice (Chairman), DOJ Secretary,
and Representative from Congress
2. Regular members - Retired Justice of the Supreme Court, law
Professor, representative of the Integrated Bar, and representative
from the Private Sector.
1. Only 1 member from both Houses may sit in the JBC. The
tenor of Sec. 8(1), Art. VIII is unmistakeable. (Chavez v JBC,
2013)
2. The regular members of the JBC shall be appointed by the
President, with the consent of the CoA. (Sec. 8(2), Art. VIII)
2. Powers
1. The JBC has the principal function of recommending appointees
to the Judiciary. It may exercise other functions and duties as the
Supreme Court may assign. (Sec. 8(5), Art. VIII)
1. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of lower
courts shall be appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council
for every vacancy. Such appointments need no confirmation.
(Sec. 9, Art. VIII)
2. It shall also recommend appointees to the Office of the
Ombudsman and his 5 deputies. (Sec. 9, Art. XI)
3. The Court's supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring
that it complies with its own rules.
1. The JBC is an independent constitutional body. (Villanueva v
 1.
JBC, 2015)
2. The Court cannot dictate on the JBC the results of its
assigned task, i.e., who to recommend or what standards to
use to determine who to recommend.
3. However, the Court can, under its power of supervision, direct
the JBC to "take such action or step as prescribed by law to
make them perform their duties," if the duties are not being
performed. (De Castro v JBC, 2010)
4. Qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or
bargained away by the JBC
1. Hence, despite the nomination of the JBC, a person who was
appointed as Justice without proven integrity can be removed
by quo warranto. (Republic v Sereno, 2018)
5. The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) published in the Philippine Star
and Philippine Daily Inquirer and posted on the JBC website an
announcement calling for applications or recommendations for 6
vacant positions of Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. After
screening and selection of applicants, the JBC submitted to the
President 6 separate lists, with five to seven nominees each, for
the 6 vacancies in the Sandiganbayan. However, X, who was a
nominee for the 6th vacancy, was instead appointed by the
President to the 1st vacancy. The nominees for the 1st vacancy,
after having been bypassed, assailed the President’s appointment
of X to the first vacancy, insisting that the President could only
choose one nominee from each of the 6 separate shortlists
submitted by the JBC for each specific vacancy, and no other, and
that any appointment made in deviation of this procedure is a
violation of the Constitution. Is the argument correct?
1. No, the argument is not correct. Under Sec. 9, Art. VIII of the
Constitution, the Members of the Supreme Court and judges
of lower courts shall be appointed by the President from a list
of at least 3 nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar
Council for every vacancy. The power to recommend of the
JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President's power
to appoint as the latter's prerogative to choose someone
whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in
the Judiciary is still paramount. As long as in the end, the
President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the
appointment is valid.
Here, although X was nominated for the 6th vacancy, his
appointment to the 1st vacancy is not unconstitutional as he
was nonetheless appointed by the President from a list of at
least three nominees prepared by the JBC. Hence, the
 argument is not correct (Aguinaldo v. His Excellency President
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, G.R. No. 224302, November 29,
2016).
4. The Supreme Court
1. Composition (15)
1. 1 Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in its
discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven members. Any vacancy
shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof. (Sec. 4(1), Art.
VIII)
2. Powers and functions
1. SECTION 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions for
certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas
corpus.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari,
as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and
orders of lower courts in:
1. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
2. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment,
or toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
3. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in
issue.
4. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
5. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.
4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of
justice.
5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the Integrated Bar,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. Such rules shall
provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy
disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same
grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive
rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme
 Court.
6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law.
3. Spouses H and W filed Petitions for Mandamus and Prohibition with Prayer
for TRO and a subsequent Petition for Review on Certiorari before the
Supreme Court in 2012 and 2013 respectively. Both Petitions were
assigned to the Supreme Court’s First Division and were raffled to then
Justice X. Despite the lapse of more than five (5) years, Justice X failed to
decide on both Petitions of Spouses. Spouses maintain that Justice X’s
failure to promptly act within 24 months on the Petitions resulted in a
violation of the spouses’ constitutional right to speedy disposition of their
cases. Are the Spouses correct?
1. No. Both the 1987 Constitution (under Article VIII, Section 15) and
the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court state that the 24-month
period for deciding on or resolving a case is reckoned from the
date of its submission for resolution. This 24-month period does
not run immediately upon the filing of a petition before this Court,
but only when the last pleading, brief, or memorandum has been
submitted. A provision of similar import was written under Article X,
Section11 (1) of the 1973 Constitution. It has been ruled in several
jurisprudence that this constitutional provision was merely directory in
nature so that noncompliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment. If the statute had intended such result, it would clearly have
indicated it (Re: Complaint-Affidavit of Elvira N. Enalbes, A.M. No.
18-11-09-SC, January 22, 2019, J. Leonen).
4. QUESTION: Is the decision of the division of the SC appealable to the SC
En Banc?
1. No.
2. Decision of the division of the SC is not appealable to the SC en banc.
3. Decision of a division is actually a decision of the SC.
4. GITO: The Division can establish judicial precedents.