The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony

Author(s): A. A. Long
Source: Phronesis , 1963, Vol. 8, No. 2 (1963), pp. 90-107
Published by: Brill

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 The Principles of Parmenides' Cosmogony'
A. A. LONG

THE SIGNIFICANCE claimed by Parmenides for the cosmogony which

forms the second half of his poem continues to be highly contro-
versial. The interpretations offered by Owen and Chalmers, to nanme
two recent criticisms, are so wi(iely divergent that one might despair
of arriving at any measure of agreement.2 But since the significance of
The Way of Truth must itself remain in some doubt until the status of
the cosmogony is determined, further examinations of the evi(dence are
justified. The purpose of this article is to (liscuss the passage sthroughout
the poem which are concerned with mortal beliefs, and to suggest an
interpretation of the fundamental lines o-6bi of B8.3 In this way the
function of the cosmogony may, I believe, become clearer.
Of the solutions to the problem suggested by ancient and modern
critics, four main trends can be discerned:
I. The cosmogony is not Parmnenides' own but a systematized account of
contemporary beliefs.
2 The cosmogony is an extension of The Way of Truth.
3. The cosmogony has relative vali(lity as a second-best explanation of
the world.
4. Parmenides claims no truth for the cosmogony.
The first view, canvassed by Zeller and modified by Burnet to a "sketch
of contemporary Pythagorean cosmology", finds few adherents among
modern scholars.4 It has never been explained, on this interpretation,
why the goddess should be made to expound in detail a critiquLe of fallaci-
ous theories. Bowra5 has taught us to see the poem as demonstrably apoca-
lyptic, and Parmenides needed no god(less's patronage to set forth his
contemporaries' cosmological systems. Moreover, there is nothing in
the later part of the poem which can be explicitly attribtuted to any
attested philosopher. The doxographers in general, from Aristotle,
assign the cosmogony to Parmnenides himself.
I In revising this article 1 am much indebted to Professor T. B. L. Webster, Mr D. J.
Furley and Mr W. R. Chalmers for valuable criticism and stimulus.
2 G. E. L. Owen, 'Eleatic Questions', C.Q. NS X (1960) pp. 84-102; W. R. Chalmers,
'Parmenides and the Beliefs of Mortals', Phronesis V (X960) pp. ?-22.
3 All frauments of Parmenides are quoted fromn Diels-Kranz, Fragmente der Vorsokratiker,
(Berlin i95i).
4 J. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, (London 1930) p. I85.
5 C. M. Bowra, 'The Proem of Parmenides', C.P. xxxii, 2 (1937) pp. 97-1 12.

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 The second and third views above have received much support. It is
argued, following Aristotle,I that Parmenides cannot have countenanced
absolute denial of phenomena. Such an explanation, however, fails entire-
ly to account for the later activity of the Eleatics, and is quite at variance
with the evidence of the poem. It belittles the achievement of Parme-
nides, and fails to take into account the evidence in favour of 4., even
when this is equivocal. I shall argue that the cosmogony gives a totally
false picture of reality; that it is the detailed exposition of the false way
mentioned in The Way of Truth (B 6. 4-9) and promised by the goddess
in the proem (B I . 30-32); that it takes its starting point from the premise
of that false way, the admission of Not-being alongside Being, not from
the introduction of two opposites, Fire and Night; and finally, that its
function is entirely ancillary to the Way of Truth, in the sense of offering
the exemplar, par excellence, of all erroneous systems, as a criterion for
future measurement.

MORTAL OPINIONS IN THE PROEM

At the outset of the Proem we encounter, in symbolical language, a

broad general division between truth and error. The Light and Dark
of this section need have no connexion with their namesakes in the
cosmogony (B 8. g6 ff), but as Frinkel2 shows, they represent enlighten-
ment on the one hand, and benightedness on the other. Moreover, before
the conclusion to the proem (B i. 27), the path to revelation on which
Parmenides is sent is set in implicit contrast with another path travelled
by ordinary men. The parallelism between divine insight and truth, and
between human belief and error is made explicit in the next two lines:

e ppo'rov 860Cx4, Ta4 OUX eVL 7LSCya a0'.3

(Bi. 29-30)
The next couplet is difficult owing to the uncertain state of the text4;
but its general drift can be discerned:

Cf. Aristotle, Met. AS 986b i 8; ivctyxozo,Lvoq 8' axoIXouXEiv O rotcq pLV0%L6VOLq.

2H. Frankel, C.P. xli (1946), p. 170, reviewing Verdenius, Parmenides.
3 The stability of truth, OCTptV hTrop, is in telling contrast with B6. 4-9 where the
want of permanence and unchangeableness in mortal opinions is stressed. To emphasise
that mortal opinions lack 7rta-rOt iX-n because they rely on sense-perception, Parme-
nides uses the very same term (B8. 28) as the justification for rejection of y?veaCt xcit
6XeOpoq. cf. G. Jameson, "'Well-rounded Truth' and circular thought in Parmenides",
Phronesis iii (I X g8), pp. 2 6- 2 9.
4 For a full discussion of the textual difficulties of this passage v.Owen, op.cit. pp. 85-89.

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 &x epr( xodt toJ5ToV T XOYFa- L q O& aoxov-ra
X CpWv 8ox14L&)v ?L(X% 7tocvT0 7mVTW 7Ep(i)V7a.
(Bi. 30-31)

'But nevertheless you shall learn these things too, how the things
which seem had to have genuine existence, permeating everything conm-
pletely.'
So far the goddess has been concerned with the distinction between
truth and opinion. Mortal opinions lack any basis of truth, yet in spite oj
this (z,utc), she will give an account of them. (TavTa (B 1. 31) mlost
naturally refers to the 3po-7v 0ocq, a connexion which is confirmed by
the affinities in context and language between this passage an(d U6ocq
posLtaq . .. . a'vOocve (B8. gi- 2). Thus a further contrast is to be seen
between the fallacious beliefs of mortals on the one han(, and the
assertion that Parmenides is nevertheless to learn them. But in view of
the goddess's emphatic denunciation of mortal opinions it is at first
sight hard to see why she should think it necessary for Parmenides to
learn beliefs which have no basis in truth.
The first clue to this difficulty is to see that the clause beginning 'q. . .
is not a subjective judgment by the goddess. Neither her divine status,
as some have thought, nor the context permits this interpretation.
Elsewhere (B 8. 5 2) she declares that her account is deceptive, Owx7rioX6v,
in a context specifically reminiscent of this passage. And she intro(duces
the cosmogony in the third person, xorTOzvro, as if abrogating personal
responsibility for its content (B 8. 53). Finally, in another passage which
seems to recall the proem (B8. 6o-6i), the goddess promises that
her own essay in cosmogony will not be outstripped by any mortal
account. But those lines (for a full account v. p. I o4) do not, pace Wila-
mowitz,' contain any concession to the appearances by the goddess.
The second pointer to an objective statement by the goddess is
contained in Xpiv and 8oxL4uw. Now the imperfect Xpnv2 need not always
express an obligation existing in the past, but that it does so here is
clear from 8O0X'LWq.3 For whether this word means 'genuinely', as seems

I Wilamowitz, Hermes xxxiv (i 8 9 9), pp. 2 o4- 2 o E.

2 For Xp<v standing for Xpr cf. Ar. Pi. 487; Reinhardt argues that in the case of Par-
menides this is an anachronism, Parmenides, (Bonn I916) pp. 6-9.
3 The word is attested at Xen. Cyrop. i, 6, 7; and Aesch. Pers. Wj. The (lifficulty of
interpretation in the latter passage must leave the meaning in Parineniles open to
conjecture, cf. H. D. Broadhead, The Persae of Aeschy,lus, p. 146. For a discussion and
criticism of Diels' emendation to 3oxt[L&c' cf. Owen op. cit. pp. 86-87, and Chalmers
op. cit. p. 7.

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the case in its two attested instances, or 'acceptably' as Verdenius'
suggests, it is clear from her condemnation of mortal views (B i. 30)
that the goddess cannot suddenly posit genuine or acceptable existence
for phenomena. There is no implication then of a general statement
about the present validity of mortal beliefs. The transition is too abrupt
and unwarranted by the reasoning of The Way of Truth.
The last phrase 86&... vrZpxZVrC2 has been variously interpreted. It
seems to emphasise a truism, the complete pervasion of the world of
mortals by phenomena.3 As such the expression is again an objective
comment by the goddess foreshadowing her condemnation of sense-
perception. Owing to their omnipresence, the goddess seems to be
saying, the appearances had to be accorded genuine existence in mortal
accounts; it is this that she promises to communicate, after issuing a
warning against mistaking mortal beliefs for truth.
The proem thus concludes with a contrast and a promise: the contrast
is twofold, first between divine insight and mortal opinions, second be-
tween truth and its converse; the promise is to enunciate this contrast.
No suggestion is made at this stage that the contrast may turn into a
compromise, and no claims for the validity of the opinions of men are
advanced.

MORTAL OPINIONS IN THE WAY OF TRUTH

The next reference made to mortals is in the familar rejection of a

second false way of thinking in addition to absolute Nonentity, (B6.
4-9). This road is travelled by mortals who 'know nothing, two-headed;
for helplessness directs the wandering thought in their breasts; they are
carried along deaf and blind alike, bemused, crowds incapable of judge-
ment by whom to be and not to be are regarded as the same and not the
same; and the path of all (mortals) is backward turning.'4
These lines are full of problems and I propose to omit discussion on

I Verdenius, Parmenides (Groningen I942) pp. 49-SO.

2 Owen op. cit. p. 8 9, and Zafiropulo, L'tcole t)e'ate (Paris X 9 50) p. 1 3 3 accept 7tep 6vrX,
the reading of D E and F. Chalmers, op. cit. p. i9 objects to this 'on the ground that
Parmenides invariably uses the epsilon form of the present participle of etlvt.' This
is not quite accurate, cf. `ntov ov (B8. 57), where Diels comments 'nur hier sicher'.
But the Ionic of the poem and the uniqueness of ov in a line which is partially corrupt
are firmly against 7rep OVTX. Ultimately both readings amount to much the same.
3 Perhaps there is a reminiscence of this in the cosmogony, Bg. 3-4.
4 1 would punctuate with a colon at Tmu'Cr6v and take 7r%'v-rv as masculine, following the
suggestion of M. C. Stokes, C.R. NS x (X960) p. I93.

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whether or not an allusion is intended to Heraclitus or to the Pythago-
reans, or any specific school of thought.' Most naturally the language
suggests a diatribe against all men, philosophers included. Other diffi-
culties remain; it is not imnme(liately clear wlhy Parmenides introduces
this third road; it seems to be something of an afterthought. We nlay
begin by observing that the Way of Truth is established by the elinmination
of alternatives, so that Parmenides can say (B8. 2), XCtUTCL @; C'7TLV.
The first alternative to e"crTL 'it is not', is summarily disnmissed in two
brief passages. A third possibility remains, 'It is an(d it is not'. Parnme-
nides might have introduced this third way in abstract terminology, as
he does with the previous two ways. Instead he identifies it with the
behaviour of nmortals, doubtless because this seemed the most con-
venient illustration of his second alternative, but also becatuse it fore-
shadows the attitude of thinking which is fully developed in the cosnmo-
gony. Now if there are only three possible answers, as stated above,
and clearly Parmenides does not follow either of the first two exactly
in the cosmogony, he must follow this third way there; though, as
Verdenius says, he may do so 'not in the manner of other people'.2
Yet several have argued against identifying the third way with the
cosmogony. Loenen3 claims that the confusion of mortals is simply an
offshoot of The Way of Not-being. Thus there are only two wNays but
each contains various modifications. It is certainly possible that Parnme-
nides felt both false ways came to much the sanme thing. But logically,
they cannot be identified; for there is an absolute distinction between
saying 'It is not' and between regarding Being and Not-being as identical
and not identical, aulTov... xov troe>rv.
A more forceful case is set out by H. Schwabl,4 who shows that while
the third way has to do with Being an(d Not-being turning into one
another, in the Doxa Light and Night confront each other as absolutely
distinct. Thus the Doxa might be the continuation of the first way. Yet
the indissoluble unity of Being is constantly stressed throughout the
Way of Truth, whereas it is vitiated by the introduction of two princi-
ples at the beginning of the cosmogony. Moreover the goddess's words
(B I. 30-32) give us no grounds for Schwabl's assumption.

' if Tcxvrpo7to4 is read with DK in Heraclitus fr. i it is hard not to see the echo as
deliberate. But cf. Owen op. cit. p. 84 n. i, and 9 I n. 3.
2 Verdenius op. cit. p. S6.
3 Loenen, Parmenides, Melissus, Gorgias, (Assen i9q9), pp. 84-98.
4 H. Schwabl, 'Sein und Doxa bei Parmenides', Wiener Studien lxvi (19E3) pp. 50-7S.

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 We have still to explain what Parmenides means by 'the back-turning
way,' (B6. 9). The crucial passage and the most difficult is:

o6U T'O 7eLV 'e XoL OUX eLvaX TWTOV vevop.LLG-o

Xou 'rcuTOV TCV7V9 7tXLV-7pOT6q ECan XE?XeUO0.
(B6. 8-9).

This seems to mean that men have identified and at the same time
distinguished Being and Not-being. But it is not immediately clear how
they have done this. Yet unless Parmenides was being esoteric, as
Reich' suggests, he must have made his meaning fairly readily apparent.
Some light is thrown on this crux by the terms used to describe men's
behaviour: they wander 'two-headed'; one naturally thinks of Janus,
and the paraphrase 'looking two ways at once' is probably justified; -
cxpocoL seems to be Parmenides' own word, coined to give just this
nuance. They are 'helpless' because they cannot decide which way to
follow, and their path turns back on itself because, having fixed on one
thing, they change their minds. It is not fully clear why they are 'deaf'
and 'blind' though they are said to be undiscerning.
Now the deafness and blindness might be a part of the rhetorical
description which culminates in TrO Io'rC &XpLL70C pUa - men who fail
to know how to deal wvith Being and Not-being- and largely metaphorical.
Or it may, if only indirectly, be connected with the condemnation of
sense perception in B7. 3-6. The uncertain place in the poem of B7,
(it was given as a continuation of the proem in an earlier edition of DK),
and its piecemeal quotation by various writers make its original function
hard to assess.2 These lines appear to give a warning against reliance on
the senses, and the passage ends with a plea by the goddess to judge with
reason her 7oXA8ptv e`XeyXov. The warning against the senses retains
the language of roads familiar from the account of the third way (B6),
and the prohibition against using 'an aimless eye and an echoing ear
and tongue' (B17. +-), strongly suggests a contrast with the behaviour
of the rpo-roL in B 6. Cornford, and more recently Zafiropulo, understand
the warning against reliance on the senses (B17) as an expansion of the
third way.3 In the unsatisfactory state of the text this is too dogmatic;

I K. Reich, 'Parmenides und die Pythagoreer', Hermes lxxxii (1954) p. 291, who
thinks that the 7rcxALvTpo7toq X?X?UOo4 is an allusion to Pythagorean [kez[LUWaL.
2 Plato quotes B7. 1-2 at Sophist 237a and 2s8d; Sextus omits the first line (quoted by
Aristotle Met. N2, I089 a2) and gives lines 2-6 at 7, i i i and 3-6 at ib. X I4.
3 Cornford, 'Parmenides' Two Ways', C.Q; xxvii (1933) p. Ioo, Zafiropulo, op. cit. p.
1Os.

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on the other hand there can be little doubt that the nmortals of B6 are
guilty of just such reliance on the 7XO?)CCrzspOV 0 ov, which leads plhi-
losophers to construct cosmologies and all men to live in confusion.
We may now suggest an explanation of lines 8 an(l 9 of B 6; 'By whon
Being and Not-being are held to be the same and not the same'. The
senses tell us that we see certain things and not others, that we hear
sounds here and not there. This is the activity of all nmen and the criterion
used to determine existence and non-existence. But the only answer
permitted by Parmenides is an unqualified, 'Is', and this the senses fail
to give. Thus the distinction which mortals thinik they are nmaking
becomes an equation of Being and Not-being.
That this is Parmenides' meaning in the third wvay is, I think, confirnmedl
by an important passage which is also of direct relevance to the cosnio-
gony:

T CO 7rT VO[090 STr L,

6aca p3potro' . XorCOeV-rO 7CC7tOLO6"rCq eLV%XL
OCCTOt~ ~~~~ pOO XXtrT N?000? L Vt2Tf
ytyVeaOaCL r? xcl 6?)XuaOwt, VXl T xrta ?uX
(B8. 38-40).

The first clause of this passage is generally translated, 'Therefore all

these are mere names. . .., which is taken to mean that the descriptions
of phenomena given by mortals are words and nothing more. This
interpretation has recently been challenged by Leonard Woodbury,2
both as a rendering of the Greek and, nmore convincingly, on the ground
that it fails to explain the context which the goddess has just elaborated:
- the necessary connexion between thought and Being, and the absolute
exclusion of Not-being. It is indeed hard to see how this is explaine(i
by introducing the terms of Doxa and saying they are all names. For if
Parmenides means they refer to nothing real his assertion is unsupported
by proof here or elsewhere. Woodbury therefore proposes to read
Ovo[loc6ta- (for which the mss. authority is quite as good as OvoK' `arou),
and take rC as referring to Being. We should then translate, 'With
reference to it (the real world) are all the names given that mortal nmen
have instituted in the belief that they were true... '.3

I e.g. Kirk and Raven, The Presocratic Philosophers (Canmbridge 1957) 1). 278. This
account is over simple in stressing the summary character of the lines under discussion.
2 L. Woodbury, 'Parmenides on Names', HSCP 63 (I9s8), pp. i45-i6o.
3 For his translation of O'v6wotart Woodbury makes use of a construction OV[a'ELV
)i T vL, quoting for the passive Empedocles B8.4; for omission of ?5d he compares
Parmenides Bi9.3, and Herodotus i. 148.I, wvhich are close, though not exact parallels.

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 This interpretation removes many more problems than it creates. The
thought now follows on clearly and we are given a valuable comment
on mortal opinions, consistent with previous deductions. The names
which men give to phenomena, coming to be, passing away, change
of place... do have an object - they are really all applied to Being, for
there is nothing else to which speech can refer. But men believe them
to be true, in themselves; - i.e. to name separate realities. Thus the name,
which in itself may contain a glimpse of reality is at once ruled out by its
contrary which affirnms the opposite. The resemblance with the intro-
ductory lines of the cosmogony (B8. s3) is striking; there Parmenides
says men name two form-s - i.e. attempt to give reality to two forms;
but there is only one. (This passage is fully discussed in the section which
follows). In both passages, the linguistic parallel of which is surely de-
liberate, Parmenides stresses the disastrous consequences of conceding
truth to dualism.
At this point we leave the Way of Truth, which, far from making
concession to the appearances, censures mortal opinions for their
reliance on the senses and their recognition of self-contradictory prin-
ciples, Being and Not-being. It is my contention that in the cosmogony
Parmenides shows that the very best explanation possible from such
principles is utterly fallacious.

THE COSMOGONY

The goddess concludes her account of the True Way as follows

(B8. soff):

'At this point I put an end to positive reasoning and thought concerning truth; from now
on learn what seems to mortals, listening to the deceptive arrangement of my words.'

The absolute distinction between the account concerning truth and

what is to follow has been clearly marked. The true way concludes 'v rut,
and mortal opinions commence, rzo TO58S. To emphasise this distinction
and to show that the goddess is fulfilling the second part of her bargain
(B I . 3 1 if) there are several verbal reminiscences. The account of the
true way is 7rLa-ok, the antithesis of mortal opinions, (cf. B I.30, B8. 28).
In recounting 36Aota Ppor[cxg (cf. B I. 3o, B6. 4) Parmenides offers an
arrangement, xoapov, which is stated at the outset to be deceitful, MM
TrjX6V. So far then there is no controversy; the Aristotelian tradition and
modern scholars are unanimous, as they must be, in the interpretation
of these lines; at the very least the account of mortal opinions is avowedly
inferior to the Way of Truth.
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 But the interpretation of the next couplet seems to be quite arbitrary:

[Lopy X4 yap xoca-rvro &io yv4ac, ovo,Locv,

TCOV plLXV ?D XpeV CCGtV - 'V @t 7CVJAVpzV0L EI[V.
(B 8. 53 -54).
These lines purport (taking the yap in its natural sense) to explain why
the description of mortal opinions is to be deceptive. Line 53 is generally
translated, 'For mortals nmade up their minds to nanme two forms'.,
The next line is highly controversial; since it is fundanmental to an un(ler-
standing of the cosmogony it is important to distinguish what it niay
mean. Three possibilities are favoured:

i. One of which ought not to be named ...

2. Not one of which ought to be named ...
3. Of which a unity may not be named/ of which one may not be
named without the other.

The first interpretation was followed by Aristotle, and is accepted by

Gigon2 and Vlastos,3 among mnodern scholars. On this view it has
generally, since Aristotle, been held that the one form which is not to be
named is identical with the opposite, Night, while the second opposite,
Fire, may legitimately be named.
Many recent scholars have adopted the second translation. There is
certainly no difficulty in understanding adwv ou as the equivalent of 'not
one', cf. Ar. Thesm. g49, Xen. Anab. v.6. I2. Moreover this interpre-
tation avoids the obvious difficulty in the first. For l'arnmeni(ies stresses
the equality of the opposites (B9. 4), and this is extremely odd if Night
is the equivalent of Not-being. If, on the other hand, neither fornm
should be named, and the PLOpcpOL are the two opposites, Fire an(d Night,
then a perfectly good sense is obtained, since neither form fully is.
But I find it a little difficult to understand the fundamental error of
mortals as the naming of two specific opposites, Fire and Night. No
system known to us held just this view. And since Parmenides is making
a general statement (B8. S3-S4), even though the cosmogony is his
own, we should expect something less cryptic.

I I am not satisfied that this is the correct rendering; Mr. D. J. Furley points out to me
that by reading yvw' to (attested in D and E), piopy&g may be taken as the object of
xae'Oevto. This would be consistent with the construction of B8. 39 and more natural
word order. Cf. also Bt9, 3: TOZq 8-vO4L cVOp7T.rOt XOCT?OEv-' STLThLV SX, T O A.
2 0. Gigon, Der Ursprung der Antiken Philosophie (Basel 1943).
3 G. Viastos, 'Parmenides' Theory of Knowledge', TAPA 77 (1946) pp. 7 3-74.

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 The third interpretation avoids this difficulty to some extent. Frankel,
thinks it is the naming of two (of anything) that is the fundamental error.
This makes the error one of logic and of general application. Verdeniusz
thinks that 'both forms must be named, and that the parenthesis follow-
ing, elv GA 7 VirpzVoL 66Lv is a condemnation of line S3, in addition
to the first part of S4.' And Schwabl3 finds the error of mortals in
naming 'a unity of these', interpreting that unity as true Being. No
interpretation of this third category seems to be a natural rendering of
the Greek.
I wish to suggest, following the first translation above, that the two
s?oppoc (B8. 53) are Being and Not-being, not in the first instance the
opposites, Fire and Night. This means that the fundamental mistake
common to all mortal opinions consists in the naming, i.e. conceding
existence to, what is not as well as what is. On such an interpretation,
the cosmogony is vitiated from the start, although Parmenides guarantees
that within such false terms it cannot be bettered, (B8. 6i).
In the analysis of the third way (B6) Parmenides criticises mortals
for recognising a duality, Being and Not-being, which they confuse and
differentiate. We saw that there is no good reason for giving B6 a
restricted application; on the most natural interpretation it is directed
to mortals en bloc. Again, in the passage concerned with naming phe-
nomena (B8. 38-39) it appeared that the recognition of contraries, in
mortal terminology, could have only one object, Being, in spite of its
apparent application to a number of separate realities. Hence it is a
priori reasonable to interpret B8. g3-S4 in the context of these earlier
passages for all three are concerned with mortal opinions and the
incorrect recognition of more than one principle. Cornford4 evidently

I H. Frinkel, Wege und Formen Fr6h-Gricchischen Denkens (Miinchen I955) p. o80, 'Nun
ist bisher nichts uber das Wesen und den Namen der beiden Gestalten ausgesagt; nur
ihre Zweizahl wurde festgestellt. Und an eben diesem Punkt, setzt mit guten Bedacht,
die Kritik ein; Zwei ist falsch, eine Eins davon hatte man nicht ansetzen durfen.'
2 op. cit. p. 62.
3 Op. Cit. pp. 53-?4.
4 Plato and Parmenides, p. 46. It is pointless to object to this as E. L. Minar, 'Parmenides
and the World of Seeming', A.J.P. lxx ( I 949) p. f i on the grounds that only the goddess
has named Being; Parmenides has been at pains to show that no one takes the standpoint
'It is not'. It is because mortals have set Not-being alongside their conviction that 'It is'
that their conception of Being has gone awry. Reinhardt (op. cit.) also goes to the third way
for the subject of the Doxa which he finds as the equation of Being and Not-being, p. 69.
He follows other scholars in identifying the Lopcpc'L with Light and Night, but comes closer
to my interpretation when he says, P. 31, 'these are to be understood "nicht als Stoffe,
sodern als Begriffe"'. I cannot, however, accept his view, ibid., that mortal opinions about

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did this, for he says, 'Mortals, though they have rightly named Being,
have been wrong in going further and naming in addition two forms.. . '
The first part of Cornford's statement is unexceptionable; the second
clause is more difficult. It implies a tripartite conception of reality in
mortal thinking which Parmenides at no point even suggests. (Nor
could justification for such a view be found from the Aristotelian
conception of Being as an attribute of existence. cf. n, 4 p. 1 0 3). DualisIll is
the keynote of the cosnmogony and of the earlier references to mortal
beliefs. If therefore Parmenides intends us to interpret the introduction
to the cosmogony in the light of his earlier comments on mortal beliefs
then it is wholly reasonable to identify the popypo with Being and
Not-being.
But even if this method of approach is denied, the conclusion still
follows, if we translate 'One of which nmust not be named'.' For, fronm
the arguments of the Way of Truth, if one form is legitimate it must
be Being, the second, whatever its nature, cannot be; all else is excluded
by the one.
It is, however often objected that the above translation is inmpossible
since pudxv is being taken in the sense of r6TpnV. Thus Schwabl2 says:
'Dabei darf das 7Cov nicht partitiv aufgefasst und uniter der einen Gestalt
nicht "eine von den beiden" verstanden werden, wveil ja dann das grie-
chische &74pnv forderte.'
Yet the fact that Parmenides is emphasising the nunmbers here involved
is enough to make the contrast between I.LOv and 8i%o the nmost natural
expression for the context. For it showvs the cardinal distinction between
truth and delusion. Moreover if Parmenides has the Pythagoreans in
mind here, a further significance might be seen in this contrast at the
outset between unity an(d plurality, renmembering the high place assigned
to T?pv7-r6ov and aptov in their table of opposites. But there is a second
argument for such a translation: Aristotle, who repeatedly identifies
the two opposites with Being and Not-being,3 could not have given such
an interpretation, if he had not taken the sense to be, 'One of the fornms

the world are a "sanktionierten lrrtum", or that the Doxa may not be regar(led as a
hypothesis, p. 2 5. For Parmenides, as I hope to show, the Doxa is a hypothetical account
of something whiclh is unreal. Reinhardt seeins to make a quite illegitinate distinction
when he goes on to say, ibid., 'dass die Falsclheit nicht in dem steckt, was die G6ttin
lehrt, sondern in dem woriiber sie lehrt.'
With ovoV4s cf. B8. 17, where o'jx toTrv in contrast with gcrtv is described as
axwVGuVLoV.

2 op. cit- p. 53-

3 cf. Met. As 986 b i8 ff, De Gen et Corr. 3i8b6-7.

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may be named and one may not.' Aristotle is certainly incorrect in many
of his statements concerning Parmenides, but he can hardly be accused
of deliberately misunderstanding his own language.
The use of the word popyp' is at first sight curious. Form is a somewhat
misleading translation. The natural sense of the word is 'shape,' though
as early as Philolaus (DK B g) ,uopyax are used of 'appearances) as
opposed to the ?-8a5 of number. But such an interpretation is impossible
here, as the third person XocT?0evro shows (B8. Oa). The point is men
think they are naming reality, not appearance. ~iuopypo need not have an
entirely concrete significance. Where the word occurs in Homer (Od.
II, 367; ib. 8, 170) it means shapeliness rather than shape. And the
abstract connotation is even more marked in Aesch. P. V. 2 1 2, where the
sense seems close to the Parmenides passage. Prometheus there says
'My mother was not only Themis but Gaia, one topcpy belonging to many
names.' If Parmenides is using the word in an abstract sense, similar to
that above, it is most difficult to identify the ,opcpycx with the opposites,
Fire and Night. For they are characterized by the qualities, light and
dark etc. Thus Parmenides says (B9. I ff) "Since everything has been
named light and night, and the names corresponding to their several
powers (8uv4'sL,) have been assigned to these things and to those, all
is full of light and dark night alike. . . ' It is not the shape of the opposites
which is in question but the qualities with which they endow the sensible
world. On the other hand Being for Parmenides does possess shape;
it is 'like a well-rounded sphere' (B8. 43).' There is no reason then
why Parmenides should not refer to Being with the word popyp; and we
may say that the two popyxL embrace Being characterized quantitatively,
and Not-being which has been erroneously put on a par with Being by
mortals. It is hard to see what other single term Parmenides could have
used to express this meaning.
Now if Parmenides means us to understand the p.opcpocL as Being and
Not-being, the cosmogony is shown to be a natural development from
the goddess's previous comments on mortal thinking; for it involves
the very error we should expect, the elevation of something in addition to
Being as a principle. Furthermore, by showing that all cosmogonies
have this fault at least, Parmenides has an apparently irrefutable weapon
against any rival system.
This raises the question of the status and function of the opposites,
Fire and Night. For the duality of these, which is stressed (B 8. 56, 58),
I cf. H. C. Baldry, 'Plato's Technical Terms', CQxxxi (1937) p. 147. ,Parmenides' k6v
has shape, but no qualities in the narrower sense of the term'.

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suggests perhaps they ought to be the same pair as the two [opypoL; and
the statement VuT&p ESL8r 7&v-ocx pOC xXL vU OvOPatOCT (B9. i) might
seem to support such a conclusion. But the identification of the .ropycxL
with Being and Not-being need not make the opposites an additional set
of principles. We might say that the cosniogony proper, a specific
system, begins with the distinguishing of opposites; but in the previous
two lines (53-54), Parmenides shows the principles which are comnmon
to and vitiate all cosmogonies; Fire and Night denmonstrate merely a
particular plausible exemplification of these principles. Indeed, on two
occasions Simplicius' seems to suggest that Fire and Night are not
primary and unique in the manner of the .topypoc, but that dense and
fine, soft and hard, and other qualitative oppositions have at least equal
right to be regarded as material principles; in other words, as a cos-
mogonist any pair of contraries will serve Parmenides' purpose.
Now it is by no means clear from what Parmenides himaself says
(B8. ?) that he intends any direct identification of the Opposites with
the Fioppox. The Siniplicius nmanuscripts at this point read &vtLto F and
Evav-rLo DE. Diels-Kranz adopt the reading rMvTca wlhich is clearly
attested in v. Sq. There the expression is adverbial, and a like inter-
pretation is proposed for the earlier passage - 'They separate the forms
gegensatzlich.' With the adverbial rendering an object for CxpLvCv-ro is
required and it is reasonable to supply this from ,toppcp' (B8. g3). Now
with or without the definite article &v-Lac could still be adverbial here.
But the presence of the unmetrical &vOvTL-, which at once looks like a
gloss, suggests that XvtLx is to be taken as a noun. The sense would then
be, 'And they distinguish opposites,...' for which Cvav-[oc would be
the more normal expression. This clarifies the gramnmatical structure
of the line and makes the introduction of sensible opposites separate
from the naming of two i.opcpya. Having shown the error which bedevils
all mortal accounts in the recognition of Not-being, as well as Being,
the goddess presents her own cosmology as a particular instance of the
form this might most reasonably take. She can still talk in the third
person (0xpcWavro v. gS) since the establishment of material opposites
is as pervasive as the errors from which it stems.
But if the Opposites are not identical with the Fiopyou' there is never-
theless a highly relevant connexion between them. Discussing the
character of Fire and Night Parmenides says (B8. 57ff.), 'Light is on
all sides the same as itself and not the same as the other; while darkness,

I In Phys. 30, 21-2 and 3!. 4-7. Cf. also Frankel, Wege und Formen, pp. i8o-i8i.

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for its part is the very opposite.' Coxon' has shown that this statement
is fully explicable in the context of the third way, 'By whom Being and
Not-being are regarded as the same and not the same.' As he puts it,
'Each (Light and Night), by hypothesis is, yet neither is the other;
therefore neither can be. Hence Light and Dark both are and are not.'
But, afortiori, if the ipypopoL are themselves Being and Not-being Coxon's
interpretation gains greater significance; for each Opposite will manifest
in itself both ,uopypxL, an interesting, if unconscious, anticipation of
Plato's Forms of the Same and the Different, (cf. n. 4).
Finally some comments by Aristotle are in accordance with this view
of the .topypcxt. It is well known that Aristotle interprets The Way of
Truth as referring to the physical world and that he supposes Parmeni-
des 'to be forced to follow phenomena' in the second part of the poem.
Moreover Aristotle calls the two opposites 'Fire' and 'Earth' and
identifies them with the qualities 'Hot' and 'Cold.'2 All these statements
are an attempt to fit Parmenides into a pre-arranged pattern of pre-
Socratic thought. But Aristotle then says that Parmenides identifies Fire
with Being and Earth (Night) with Not-being. Cherniss3 argues that
Aristotle is induced to make this distinction between the Opposites
by his notion of potentiality and privation. This is doubtless correct,
but Cherniss does not show how Aristotle came to draw such a distinction
in this particular context. Now if Aristotle regarded one of the ,uopypot
as illegitimate, as seems probable, and went on to identify them with
the Opposites, he was bound logically to arrive at such a conclusion.
Sometimes Aristotle speaks as if Being and Not-being were the prin-
ciples of The Way of Seeming, cf. De. Gen. et Corr. 3 i 8 b 4-8. And Ross,4
commenting on Met. 986b28, comes to a similar conclusion:

'Aristotle describes the transition from 'The Way of Truth' to 'The Way of Seeming'
by saying that Parmenides, though he thinks that of necessity only -r6 OV exists, is forced
to follow the observed facts, and therefore to admit two causes, nor ov and ro ,vj Ov.5

I A. H. Coxon, 'Th-e Philosophy of Parmenides', C.Q: xxviii (1934) p. 141.

2 cf. Physics i88a 20-22, Met. 986b 33-34, De Gen et Corr. 3I8b 6-7, id. 33obI4.
3 H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Presocratic Philosophy (Johns Hopkins x93 5), p. 48 n.
192.

4 W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics, (Oxford 1924) Vol. X p. 133.

5 There is the further statement (Met. io8ga 2-6) 'in which Aristotle comments on the
Platonic thesis of the Sophist (cf. 237a, 24id, 2S6e) which recognises Not-being in the
sensible world. 'They, (followers of Plato) had to show that that which is not is; for
only so - of that which is and of something else could existing things be composed, if
they are more than one.' Now this statement has equal validity for the cosmogony of

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 The unnecessary step taken by Aristotle was the identification of the
[wopypoL with the two Opposites. Once this has been done the parallelism
between Not-being and Earth (Night) fits his doctrine of privation and
potentiality admirably. But it does not seem correct to suppose that
Aristotle first nominates the Opposites and then decides, purely arbi-
trarily, to identify them with Being and Not-being.
It is clear that on such an interpretation of the pLopcpyo no claims for the
validity of the cosmogony are made. No amount of internal evidence
can repair the fallacies on which it is based. To claim with Chalmers'
that the Cosmogony gives us the real world viewed from the point of
view of time instead of eternity goes against the whole tenor of the
poem. For it introduces degrees of reality which The Way of Truth
is designed to discredit. Moreover the sinmilarities of language and
subject-matter between the two halves of the poenm, though they may
be evidence for the overall unity of Parmenides' scheme, tell us nothing
in themselves about the validity of the cosmogony. On the contrary,
the recognition of Not-being as a principle puts Parnienides' account
on the same level as that of the mortals who are two-headed and re-
cognise the sensible world.
It remains to consider why the go(ddess deliberately commits the
errors of mortal thinking. Having introduced the cosmogony, Parme-
nides, as if by way of summary has these two lines:

Uo!v GO ty c AxoGsLov ?CXOT.6 7t&vr OTL,

WQ Ou 7rOTe 'TC COZ rPOT@CV YV(i)tj 7rMpEXaGY)L.
(B8. 6o, 6i)

The second line presents no problems of translation; 'In this way no

mortal opinion shall drive past you.'2 The first line is less straightforward:

Parmenidles. Aristotle does not say so, since he regards the unity of Parmenides' Being
as formal, and seems to think it may be regarded as an attribute of existence for all
things, cf. Met. 9861) i8 rllpEVL8jA ' t- V y&p 0LXYE '5 xa-r& -rOv TO'yov iv? ,TrC7OE00
andid. 0 ooia 29-6 1. But if the arguments of the Way of Truth are valid for the cosmogony,
Parmenides does there what Aristotle shows has to be done in any system which begins
by pointing out the unity of Being. The difference between Parmenides' approach and
that of the Sophist is fundamental; Parmenides is not conceding quasi-validity to the
sensible world; he merely shows the principles which would necessarily be assumed if it
were valid.
I op. cit. pp. i6-22.
2 The metaphor in 7rapeX&aLt is best retained in translation; as such it reflects the
'travel' motif of the proem, and the numerous references to 'roads'; the literal sense
of the word is predominant in classical Greek.

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&caxoau.ov may mean no more than x6aozo4 used in the technical sense,
'world order'; (so Plutarch, B. io, and Simplicius, B. I9, take it). It
would be attractive, in view of the immediately preceding division into
two opposites to translate, 'this separation into two elements," but the
easiest interpretation is 'this system,' with perhaps, a reminiscence of
the 'deceptive arrangement of words' (B8. 52). e0oLx6-7cx is difficult;
Verdenius argued that it means 'fitting,' finding such a use in Homerz;
and this suggestion has been accepted by many recent critics. It is
much more likely that the word means 'probable' carrying an allusion
to etz6, as distinct from what is the case of necessity. This maintains
Parmenides' contrast between truth and appearance, and is consistent
with the distinction seen throughout the fifth century between what is
Mvcxyxocov and 6oc or six64.3
The most important word however is Tavro. Parmenides thinks it
right to declare the entire system, as it seems. And so far as the fragments
show, he ranges widely in the sensible world, fulfilling his promise of the
proem, (B I . 31 if.). Prior to the goddess's revelation of the true nature
of Being the sensible world had to be accepted as real. As I understand
the cosmogony Parmenides there sets out to describe that world in full.
In this way there will be no mortal opinion for which he has not ac-
counted, (B 8. 6I). But cosmogonies cannot reveal truth, and the
goddess's essay is no exception; for they all introduce two principles,
Ionian monism being merely a disguised plurality. And so no one will
be able to overtake Parmenides with an opinion which he has not already
exposed as false. By its admitted falseness the cosmogony thus serves
to show up the deceptiveness of all phenomena, and by contrast, the
truth of the first part of the poem.
Owen's account,4 (to which I am much indebted), overlooks this
didactic element. Dialectical the cosmogony no doubt is, in the sense
that its author lays no claim to the truth of what is stated; but to call it
'wholly dialectical' seems to put Parmenides in the sophistic tradition,
at the same time failing to explain the comprehensiveness of the cosmo-

I Cf. &oxxoa,u6 used of reparation, Homer, IL. 2, 476.

2 op. cit. p. i. Verdenius' citation of Od. 4, 239, is apt; but his second example, ib.
3, 1 2 E should mean 'like' rather than 'fitting'.
3 See T. B. L. Webster, Greek Art and Literature 700-53o B.C., Dunedin i9q9, p. 99 and
notes 44 and 45. Objections to this sense of oLtx6ro appear groundless, once it is seen
that the clause beginning diO o" i3n is not a purpose sentence (where the use of cq and
oii un' is unknown), but a strong negative assertion. True cosmogonies are a contradiction
in terms, but within the range of 86E,a the goddess can promise an unparalleled account.
4 op. cit. p. 89.

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gony. The more plausibly this is set out, so much the more devastating
a weapon it becomes against rival theories which claim to be true.
That is to say, the cosmogony does account for the appearances in the
scientific fashion of Parmenides' contemporaries, but with the re-
cognition that neither it, nor what it purports to explain has any validity.
To put it another way, Parmenides accepts the appearances as a contingent
fact of experience; he does not attempt to explain why they occur, for
it is enough to have proved them false. But by giving the best possible
account of them, he has a criterion against which any conception of
reality based on the senses may be measured and found wanting.
On this interpretation the cosmogony, by showing that Parmenides
can beat the scientists at their own game, is chiefly useful for the nega-
tive purpose of confirming the Way of Truth as the only possible account
of reality. It is significant that Empedocles, who reveals the influence
of Parmenides in so many aspects of language and thought, should mark
his divergence most clearly just at this point. For Empedocles accepts
the reality of the sensible world and echoes Parmenides most strikingly
when he begins his description of that world with the alternating rule
of Love and Strife:

au 8'&xou% ?'yoU ar'XO6ov o'x '=XrtX'rv.

(DK3I. BI7,26)

LxAvOave x6a[Lov ei&Cv ire6v abrocx)Xo6v &xoju'v.

(DK28, B8,s2)
This similarity and difference of expression suggests that Empedocles
is claiming positive value for his description of the sensible world just
where Parmenides had expressly denied it.
There are of course difficulties in every solution; the goddess appears
to countenance knowledge of certain aspects of the sensible world,
eta-n 8'axspLv -r ypuctv. ... (B. Io) But this need not be pressed if we
remember that the goddess is here talking within the -narXv xocr6ov.
More serious is the denial of reality to Parmnenides himself and all men
if the sensible world is entirely false. Yet is it not clear that this troubled
Parmenides himself or later Eleatics. The problem is perhaps hinted at
in the section which describes thought as due to the xpoamv CXe'V
7roXucryx0'v' (B. i 6). But the assumption of divine power which
permeates the poem suggests that only by revelation can any glimpse of
and communion with reality be obtained. Otherwise the separateness

I For an interesting discussion of this point cf. Vlastos op. cit. pp. 66-77.

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of the sensible world and its members is completely an illusion, in-
compatible with the one Being.2
To sum up: there is some evidence to show that Parmenides takes
Being and Not-being as the basic principles governing the second part of
his poem. This is consisistent with his previous condemnation of mortal
thinking and tightens the logical unity of the work. The cosmogony is
thus seen to be, exempli gratia, an excursus within the false premisses
which vitiate all such accounts. It is dialectical in the sense that Parme-
nides makes no claims for its truth; but by virtue of its plausible and
comprehensive doctrines which are dismissed before they are begun,
it demonstrates that the sensible world has an insidious appearance which
is not to be conceded any validity.

University of Otago.

2 See E. D. Phillips, 'Parmenides on Thought and Being', Ph. R. lxiv (x9S5), p. 558.

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