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2019-12

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL

DETACHMENT-A IN 2035

Mann, Eric S.; Soto, Maximilian L.

Monterey, CA; Naval Postgraduate School

http://hdl.handle.net/10945/64016

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun

 NAVAL
POSTGRADUATE
SCHOOL
MONTEREY, CALIFORNIA

THESIS

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT-A

IN 2035

by

Eric S. Mann and Maximilian L. Soto

December 2019

Thesis Advisor: Robert E. Burks

Second Reader: Michael Richardson
Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.
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SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT-A IN 2035

6. AUTHOR(S) Eric S. Mann and Maximilian L. Soto

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13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
In accordance with the U.S. Army’s current modernization efforts, this thesis examines the Special
Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha in great power competition. The purpose of this research is to
analyze the current tactical capability of Army Special Forces to determine what organizational modification
or optimization is required to be successful in the future operating environment. The authors examined case
studies of historic modification and determined that the prevailing causes of capability adaptation have been
driven by political, economic, societal, and technological environmental change. The authors then applied
these factors to current global trends to determine necessary future adaptation. Based on this research, the
authors recommend an information warfare specialist within the Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha to ensure relevancy and success in the future environment.

14. SUBJECT TERMS 15. NUMBER OF

SFOD-A, unconventional warfare, irregular warfare, political warfare PAGES
113
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CLASSIFICATION OF CLASSIFICATION OF THIS CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT
REPORT PAGE ABSTRACT
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 Approved for public release. Distribution is unlimited.

SPECIAL FORCES OPERATIONAL DETACHMENT-A IN 2035

Eric S. Mann
Major, United States Army
BS, Wayland Baptist University, 2008

Maximilian L. Soto
Major, United States Army
BS, San Diego State College, 2008

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN DEFENSE ANALYSIS

(IRREGULAR WARFARE)

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

December 2019

Approved by: Robert E. Burks

Advisor

Michael Richardson
Second Reader

Kalev I. Sepp
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis

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iv
 ABSTRACT

In accordance with the U.S. Army’s current modernization efforts, this thesis
examines the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha in great power competition.
The purpose of this research is to analyze the current tactical capability of Army Special
Forces to determine what organizational modification or optimization is required to be
successful in the future operating environment. The authors examined case studies of
historic modification and determined that the prevailing causes of capability adaptation
have been driven by political, economic, societal, and technological environmental
change. The authors then applied these factors to current global trends to determine
necessary future adaptation. Based on this research, the authors recommend an
information warfare specialist within the Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha
to ensure relevancy and success in the future environment.

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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES ORIGINS ............................................1

A. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY IN WWII .....................1
1. The Office of Strategic Service; European Concept ...................2
2. The Operational Groups ...............................................................3
3. Jedburgh Teams .............................................................................4
4. The Office of Strategic Service; Pacific Theater Concept ..........5
B. POST-WAR DOLDRUMS FOR U.S. SOF .............................................6
1. Birth of the U.S. Psychological Warfare Center .........................6
2. Creating the Special Forces construct..........................................7
C. RECRUITMENT WOES ..........................................................................8
1. The Lodge Act ................................................................................9

II. THE FIRST SFOD-A MODEL DURING THE BEGINNING OF THE

COLD WAR .........................................................................................................13
A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS .................................................13
1. The Political Environment ..........................................................13
2. Social Change ...............................................................................15
3. The Economic Environment .......................................................16
4. Technological Change..................................................................17
B. MISSION AND TASKS ..........................................................................17
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES ............................................18
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................22

III. MODEL II: VIETNAM AND THE WARS OF LIBERATION .....................23

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS .................................................23
1. The Political Environment ..........................................................23
2. Social Change ...............................................................................27
3. The Economic Environment .......................................................28
4. Technological Change..................................................................28
B. MISSION AND TASKS (1950–1973) .....................................................30
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES ............................................35
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................39

IV. BEYOND VIETNAM AND TO THE WAR OF TERROR .............................41

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS .................................................41
1. The Political Environment ..........................................................41
2. Social Change ...............................................................................45
vii
 3. The Economic Environment .......................................................46
4. Technological Change..................................................................46
B. MISSION AND TASKS ..........................................................................49
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (1973-2019) .......................56
D. CONCLUSION ........................................................................................59

V. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT ..................................................................61

A. A SHIFT IN PRIORITY .........................................................................61
B. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT ......................................................63
C. THE COMPETITIVE SPACE ...............................................................67
D. COMPETITIVE WORLD ACTORS ....................................................68
1. Russia ............................................................................................68
2. China .............................................................................................72
3. Islamic Republic of Iran ..............................................................73

VI. CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................77

A. THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT ..........................................................77
B. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (FUTURE) ........................78

LIST OF REFERENCES ................................................................................................83

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ...................................................................................95

viii
 LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1. The OSS Operational Group structure .........................................................4

Figure 2. 10th SFG organizational chart. ..................................................................19

Figure 3. The structure of the original SFOD-A tasked with the experimental
CIDG mission ............................................................................................36

Figure 4. The Mike Force Battalion Organization ....................................................37

Figure 5. SFOD-A with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations imbed ............38

Figure 6. Causal loop diagram of the strategic nature of the environment ...............67

Figure 7. Estimation of Quds Force partners 2011–2018. ........................................76

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 LIST OF TABLES

Table 1. Russian SOF operations in Ukraine. ..........................................................71

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 LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS

ANA Afghan National Army

ANP Afghan National Police
ASD Assistant Secretary of Defense
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CA Civil Affairs
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
CIDG Civilian Irregular Defense Group
CLD Causal Loop Diagram
COIN Counter Insurgency
CSAR Combat Search and Rescue
CSD Combined Studies Division
CST Coalition Support Teams
CT Counter Terrorism
CTS Counter-Terrorist Service
CTZ Corps Tactical Zones
DA Direct Action
DoD Department of Defense
DP Displaced Person
EU European Union
FA Functional Area
FB Functional Bravo
FC Functional Charlie
FID Foreign Internal Defense
FTX Field Training Exercise
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GIRoA Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
GPC Great Power Competition
GWOT Global War on Terrorism
HA Humanitarian Assistance
HHC Headquarters and Headquarters Company
xiii
HIMARS High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
ICDC Iraqi Civil Defense Corps
ICTF Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force
IRI Islamic Republic of Iran
ISOF Iraqi Special Operations Force
IW Irregular Warfare
JTAC Joint Terminal Air Controller
L.H. Lebanese Hezbollah
LZ Landing Zones
MACV Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MDO Multi-Domain Operations
MFP Major Force Program
MISO Military Information Support Operations
MNFI Multi National Forces Iraq
MOS Military Occupational Specialty
MTT Mobile Training Team
NCO Non-commissioned Officer
NDS National Defense Strategy
NSS National Security Strategy
OCPW Office of the Center for Psychological Warfare
OG Operational Group
OSS Office of Strategic Services
PLA People’s Liberation Army (China)
PMC Private Military Contractors
PSYOP Psychological Operations
PSYWAR Psychological Warfare
QRF Quick Reaction Force
RIF Reductions in Force
RMA Revolution in Military Affairs
ROK Republic of Korea
SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

xiv
SFARTAETC Special Forces Advanced Reconnaissance Target Analysis and
Exploitation Techniques Course
SFAUCC Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course
SFG Special Forces Group
SFOD Special Forces Operational Detachment
SFOD-A Special Forces Operational Detachment-Alpha
SHAEF Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force
SO Special Operations
SOE Special Operations Executive
SOF Special Operations Forces
SOLIC Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
SOTAC Special Operations Tactical Air Controller
SR Special Reconnaissance
TO&E Table of Organization and Equipment
U.S. United States
UN United Nations
USASFV United States of America Special Forces Vietnam
USSF United States Special Forces
UW Unconventional Warfare
VEO Violent Extremist Organizations
VFC Volunteer Freedom Corps
VSO Village Stability Operations

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 I. UNITED STATES SPECIAL FORCES ORIGINS

As a primer to this topic, it is essential to examine the origin of the United

States Special Forces (USSF) and comprehend the unit’s original capability. From this, it
is possible to depict an uninterrupted line of adaptation of the Special Forces Operational
Detachment-Alpha (SFOD-A). While there are numerous Special Operations units which
preceded its creation, USSF and its core mission of Unconventional Warfare (UW) can
most definitively trace its origin to the Office of Strategic Service (OSS) during World War
II (WWII).

A. U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS CAPABILITY IN WWII

The United States’ late entry into WWII meant that mobilization efforts lagged
behind axis and allies in the war. To enable rapid expansion of capability, especially in
regard to specialized units, the United States drew from British units that demonstrated
strategic capability. Such was the case of with OSS, which drew its impetus from the
British Special Operations Executive (SOE). Formed in 1940, the SOE was created by
merging the offices of “Section D of MI6” and “General Staff (Research),” a branch of the
War Office. 1 The initial purpose of this unit was to organize and establish British-backed
resistance groups, provide intelligence, and wage a guerrilla war against the Nazis and
Italians in occupied territories. 2 Impressed with the British commando units, U.S. senior
ranking generals like George C. Marshall became interested in creating similar capabilities
for the United States. 3

As the U.S. had no SOF at the start of WWII, multiple avenues were initially
attempted to create units capable of generating operational and strategic effects similar the
SOE. The initial focus of the U.S. Army was the creation of elite infantry units to execute

1
A. R. B. Linderman, Rediscovering Irregular Warfare: Colin Gubbins and the Origins of Britain’s
Special Operations Executive (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 2016), 2.
2
Richard Gough, SOE Singapore: 1941-42 (Singapore: Heinemann, 1985).
3
Alfred H. Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare: Its Origins, Rev. ed, (Lawrence, KS University Press
of Kansas, 2002).
1
commando operations. These units included the U.S. Army Rangers and the joint U.S. /
Canadian venture known as the 1st Special Service Force. 4 However, like their British
counterparts, these units suffered excruciating losses and provided limited strategic impact
because they were often employed conventionally to achieve tactical results. 5

1. The Office of Strategic Service; European Concept

Similarly impressed by the British SOE was WWI Medal of Honor recipient turned
influential attorney and personal advisor to President Roosevelt, William “Wild Bill”
Donovan. 6 The concept that Donovan lobbied and ultimately received approval for, was
drastically different than the commando operations that were to be executed. Rather than
creating shock-troops, Donovan foresaw the need for a “paramilitary-like organization [to
conduct] a variety of wartime missions unconventional in nature.” 7 This unit would not
focus on attacking hard targets but would instead, follow Winston Churchill’s directive to
the SOE and attempt to “set Europe ablaze” through sabotage, subversion, and ambush. 8

Donovan’s personality and understanding of the strategic context which, in his view
demanded the creation of the OSS, shaped his initial perceptions of the unit’s wartime role.
To this end, Donovan assumed that any mission that was not conventional would naturally
belong to his organization. 9 However, clarification via a directive from the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, limited his unit’s role to “the organization and conduct of guerilla warfare” and
restricted assigned personnel to roles as “organizers, fomenters, and operational nuclei of

4
For a more detailed history of the U.S. Army Ranger contributions during WWII, read David W.
Hogan, “The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983” (Duke University, 1986).
5
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare.
6
Douglas C. Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American
Espionage (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011).
7
Thomas K. Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional
Warfare (London ; Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1998), 34.
8
Hugh Dalton and Ben Pimlott, The Second World War Diary of Hugh Dalton: 1940 - 1945 (London:
Cape, 1986), 62.
9
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action.
2
guerilla units.” 10 These restrictions became part of the OSS’ culture and shaped how its
operational units organized to accomplish the organization’s objectives.

2. The Operational Groups

As the OSS grew into a formal unit, its responsibilities increased, and it organized
into unique elements based on mission demand. In Europe, the largest of these units was
the Operational Group (OG). The OGs consisted of U.S. Army French-speaking volunteers
divided into two 15-man sections each with two officers and 13 enlisted men. Many of the
personnel had backgrounds in combat arms and had previously served as engineers,
signalmen, and medics. 11 The main task of the OG was to insert behind enemy lines,
organize resistance elements, and conduct sabotage and subversion to cut off enemy lines
of communication (see Figure 1). 12 These capabilities and missions would later be
mirrored during the creation of the SFOD-A.

10
United States. War Department, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Services) (NY: Walker,
1976), 223.
11
Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986);
OSS, “Operational Groups Field Manual of Strategic Services, Office of Strategic Services,” World War II:
U.S. Documents on Planning, Operations, Intelligence, Axis War Crimes, and Refugees : Records of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Part 1: 1942-1945, Strategic Issues: Production and Assignment of War Materials,
Shipping, Aircraft, Petroleum, Propaganda and Unconventional Warfare, War Crimes and Prisoners of
War, Conferences, 1944.
12
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action.
3
 Figure 1. The OSS Operational Group structure 13

3. Jedburgh Teams

Another element, smaller in size compared to the OGs, were Jedburgh Teams.
These three-man units derived their name from the listed codename of their base in
Scotland and parachuted into occupied Europe to support resistance operations in
Europe. 14 An important difference in the Jedburgh’s capability was the requirement that
each team incorporate a non-American native speaker from the assigned operational
area. 15 Additionally, because of their size, Jedburgh teams were not formed by a higher
headquarters but instead allowed individuals to form their own unit from a pool of
operators. The use of this unique unit formation technique ensured team cohesion for the
units which were destined to operate deep behind enemy lines.

13
Office of Strategic Services, “Operational Group Command,” OSS Primer, December 1944,
https://www.soc.mil/OSS/assets/operational-groups-overview.pdf.
14
Wyman W. Irwin, “A Special Force: Origin and Development of the Jedburgh Project in Support of
Operation Overlord,” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1991).
15
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets; Irwin, “A Special Force.”
4
 4. The Office of Strategic Service; Pacific Theater Concept

While there were many successes for the OSS in Europe, there were also many
failures due in large part to the organization’s lack of experience. 16 The OSS unit which
saw perhaps the greatest success during WWII was Detachment 101 which conducted
operations in Burma. Established in 1942, Detachment 101 grew from a modest 21-man
force, to one that consisted of over 9,200 guerillas with over 1,000 allied servicemembers
serving in its ranks throughout the war. 17 Like other OSS units, Detachment 101 initially
benefitted by its commander’s ability to hand select personnel. These men were then
trained and cross-trained for a variety of missions throughout the Pacific Theater of
Operations. As noted by Troy Sacquety in his detailed account of the unit’s history:

One each was involved in administration, photography, medical, research

and development, secret intelligence, special funds, two in supply, three in
training; while five personnel each were assigned to communications, and
special operations. It must be stressed again that each of these men
performed a multitude of tasks. Their duties represent the first melding of
OSS functions in Detachment 101; however, that these men were in reality
all from the Special Operations (SO) Branch is significant. This established
from the beginning that regardless of a man’s branch and training, he
performed the duties deemed of the greatest need. 18

As important for success as the hand-selection of candidates was the geographic

benefit of the unit due to its basing proximity near the forward edge of Allied defenses
against the Japanese. Whereas European OSS units generally had to infiltrate and remain
in occupied territory, Detachment 101, was able to conduct short-duration penetration
patrols, return, reassess, and retrain. Moreover, because Detachment 101 operated outside
the main theater of operations, their operations were largely more independent and less
available for misuse by right-intentioned but misguided officers. This operational
familiarity, independency, and cross-training would have a lasting impact on the OSS and
the future USSF.

16
Troy James Sacquety, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–
1945,” PhD Diss., Texas A&M University, 2008.
17
Kermit Roosevelt, War Report of the OSS (Office of Strategic Service).: The Overseas Targets,
1976, 391–92.
18
Sacquety, “The Organizational Evolution of OSS Detachment 101 in Burma, 1942–1945,” 37.
5
B. POST-WAR DOLDRUMS FOR U.S. SOF

Following the surrender of Germany and Japan, the U.S. began to rapidly decrease
the number of personnel and units within the military. Following historic precedent, SOF
were some of the first units offered by Army leadership for immediate deactivation. The
death of President Roosevelt six months prior to the end of WWII, left the OSS without
presidential protection and on 20 September 1945, President Truman ordered the unit’s
deactivation. Unrelenting in his vision of the need for the OSS, Donovan protested the
deactivation and, following President Truman’s decision, he began a two-year lobbying
campaign to reactivate the capability. The result of his effort was the creation of the Central
Intelligence Agency. 19 In the meantime, the military continued to purge itself of SOF
reducing the United States’ strategic capability outside of conventional operations.

1. Birth of the U.S. Psychological Warfare Center

Whereas the CIA owes its official creation in 1947 to the struggles of General
Donovan, the rebirth of Army SOF, particularly Psychological Warfare and USSF, owe
their reestablishment to the efforts of General Robert McClure. McClure had been the
Chief of Psychological Warfare in the Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force
(SHAEF) during WWII. Following the military’s SOF purge at the end of WWII, McClure
began an “aggressive letter writing campaign in 1946” extolling the virtues of
Psychological Operations (PSYOP) and UW. 20 The outbreak of the Korean War, and the
communists’ adept use of propaganda facilitated the precipitous return of U.S. PSYOP
efforts. To facilitate the rapid return, McClure received approval to create the Special
Operations Division at Smoke Bomb Hill on Fort Bragg, NC. Unsurprisingly, the new
division staff was filled with respected former members of the OSS who “put their
collective experiences to work” for McClure.” 21

19
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 34–35.
20
Jared Tracy, “The Psychological Warfare Division, the Office of the Chief of Psychological
Warfare, and the Psywar School at Fort Riley, 1950-1951,” Veritas 7, no. 2 (2011): 26–35.
21
Charles H. Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring Cheap, Practical SF Training in the Post-Vietnam
Turmoil,” Veritas 14, no. 1 (2018): 103.
6
 2. Creating the Special Forces construct

Like Donovan, McClure was untiring in his attempt to create a UW capability for
the military and he recruited former OSS operators to support his initiative. 22 These men,
such as, Aaron Bank, Wendel Fertig, and Russell Volkmann, had extensive experience
building resistance networks during WWII and formed the nucleus of McClure’s staff. At
Smoke Bomb Hill, the new staff began the long journey toward creating the framework for
USSF. Critical to the effort was Lieutenant Colonel Russell Volckmann, who had drafted
the Army’s field manuals for the Organization and Conduct of Guerrilla Warfare and
Combatting Guerilla Forces while assigned to the Infantry School. 23 These manuals, along
with other research and analysis of guerrilla activities, provided a doctrinal grounding for
the need for a specialized UW centric unit. Equally important were the real-world
experiences of Volkmann and the others which made them the only experts of UW in the
military at the time. These men’s efforts during WWII gave them immense credibility and
they were widely respected throughout the military. Although they differed in their opinion
of how the proposed force should be organized, the central theme of stay-behind guerilla
operations remained a constant. 24

Key to the development of the framework and doctrine of Special Forces were
numerous engagements by Office of Chief of Psychological Warfare (OCPW) staff, to
promote the Special Forces concept to the U.S. Army. These engagements included
meetings between Volkmann and General Lawton Collins, the Chief of Staff of the Army.
In written correspondence between the two, Volkmann succinctly described and outlined
the early tenets of the OCPW’s interpretation of what missions Special Forces would
conduct. 25 Additionally, McClure’s staff prepared a brief for General Taylor, the Army
G-3, about the skills, capabilities, and strategic necessity of a special force. 26 As briefed

22
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 119–25.
23
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring”; Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare.
24
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare; Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring.”
25
Paddock, U.S. Army Special Warfare, 122–23.
26
Paddock, 126–29.
7
to General Taylor, the mission of UW was a way to generate additional combat power for
U.S. and the NATO forces, through cooperation with indigenous peoples. 27 Or as noted
more clearly in a training circular the mission of Special Forces was:

To infiltrate its component operational detachments, by air, sea, or land, to

designated areas within the enemy’s sphere of influence and organize the
indigenous guerrilla potential on a quasi-military or a military basis for
tactical and strategic exploitation in conjunction with our land, sea, and air
forces. 28

Impressed with the concept, General Taylor approved the unit’s creation giving the
OCPW their first victory for the UW concept and enabled the creation of the first Special
Forces unit, the 10th Special Forces Group (SFG).

Following Taylor’s approval, the staff of OCPW organized to meet the demands
associated with the new unit. Here, the OCPW began to run into issues. After a world-wide
recruiting tour, Lieutenant Colonels Melvin Blair and Volckmann returned to Ft. Bragg
having enticed many talented individuals to join the unit. 29 However, the Adjutant
Generals office delayed many of the Soldier’s transfer requests resulting in a manning
crises at the activation of the 10th SFG. 30

C. RECRUITMENT WOES

The slow transfer rates were due in part to a bureaucratic issue of personnel slots.
While General Taylor approved the creation of the unit, there were no personnel slots
available within the Army to fill it. 31 Through coincidence, slots were found from the
Army Rangers which had been activated at the onset of the Korean War, suffered shocking

27
Richard. Bitzinger, Assessing the Conventional Balance in Europe, 1945-1975, N-2859-FF/RC
(Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corp., 1989), 4–7.
28
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 106.
29
Briscoe, 104.
30
Alfred H. Paddock Jr, US Army Special Warfare, Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional
Warfare, 1941-1952 (The Minerva Group, Inc., 2002), 21; Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 105.
31
Hogan, “The Evolution of the Concept of the U.S. Army’s Rangers, 1942-1983,” 292–93.
8
causalities, and were subsequently deactivated by General Ridgeway. 32 In a trend that
would repeatedly plague USSF, recruitment also suffered from conventional commanders
who were unenthusiastic about losing their most talented and often most experienced
personnel to an unknown “special unit.” These officers went so far as to discourage
volunteers and sabotage their transfer paperwork. 33 To overcome these challenges, the
Army Chief of Staff, published a directive to subordinate commanders directing them to
eliminate all obstacles. 34 With the bureaucratic issues solved, transfer rates slowly
climbed as the organization grew to meet perceived operational demands. 35

1. The Lodge Act

One event that offered USSF a recruitment boost was the Lodge-Philbin Act of
1950. 36 The Lodge-Philbin Act, commonly referred to as “the Lodge Act,” was a piece of
legislation introduced by Senator Henry Cabot Lodge. This law was based on Lodge’s
understanding of the German and Russian ability to incorporate foreign units into their
militaries during WWII. 37 Lodge’s vision was to create a means of enlisting and
mobilizing Europe’s Displaced People (DP) against the threat of communism and under
the banner of a “Volunteer Freedom Corps” (VFC). 38 The VFC concept later evolved into
the Lodge Act and allowed an initial enlistment of 2,500 unmarried, foreign volunteers into
the U.S. Army. 39 In an attempt to rapidly boost personnel numbers the newly established
USSF “allowed for over half the enlisted men to be Lodge Act recruits.” 40

32
James Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite,
1956-1990, Kindle Edition (Philadelphia ; Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2017).
33
Stejskal, 380 of 3604.
34
Stejskal, 380 of 3604.
35
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 105.
36
Briscoe, 104.
37
Charles H. Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part I,” Veritas 5, no.
1 (2005): 34.
38
Briscoe, 34.
39
Briscoe, 34.
40
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 330 of 3604.
9
 Despite the positive idea of enlisting the displaced population in Europe against
Communism, the Lodge Act program was not without obstacles. First, many of the DPs
were required to undergo intense background investigations by the Army’s Counter
Intelligence Corps (CIC). 41 Due to the nature of the applicant’s arrival in Western Europe,
investigations took a long time due to the difficulty in investigating an applicant who
conducted “street work,” a common job for DP’s. 42 The process was also prolonged by
the inability of investigators to verify information from emigres who had lived behind the
iron curtain. Moreover, because of the “red scare,” any association, or relative with links
to communism were scrutinized, causing fewer candidates to arrive for initial training than
anticipated.

Another challenge to the Lodge Act was the prohibition of countries from which
applicants could be recruited. Restrictions on recruiting in Austria, Belgium, France, The
Netherlands, Luxembourg, and Germany limited the potential for the Lodge Act to attain
its initial enlistment goals. 43 Even when end strength for the Lodge Act increased to 12,500
personnel, the goal would never be realized due to the recruiting restrictions of the
program.

The lack of established standards and processes through which Lodge Act Soldiers
enlisted proved anther challenge with the program. Many Lodge Act Soldiers processed
into the Army in diverse means and one group’s process was rarely the same as its
predecessors. 44 The lack of standards combined with the testing, background
investigations, and registration of the Lodge Act Soldiers dismayed Senator Lodge who
repeatedly complained to Army officials. 45

While the Lodge Act seemed like it would be a boost USSF recruitment of
individuals who had language expertise, knowledge of local areas and customs, and a desire

41
Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part I,” 37.
42
Briscoe, 37.
43
Charles H. Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part II,” Veritas 5,
no. 2 (n.d.): 29.
44
Briscoe, 29.
45
Briscoe, 31.
10
to fight communism, it only officially produced 800 soldiers. 46 Of these, only around 100
went on to serve in USSF, a number highlighted by the 22 available for duty with USSF in
the first few months after the establishment of 10th SFG. 47 Even after another year of
Lodge-Act recruitment effort, the total number in USSF in 1953 was only 33. 48 This
number does not highlight the appeal that USSF had to foreign emigres and literature on
the Lodge Act often conflates all foreign volunteers with SF Lodge-Act recruits. Had the
Lodge Act not been stymied by military bureaucracy, lack of command emphasis, and
inefficiency, it would have given SF a large ready-made force of language proficient and
cultural experts. Instead, USSF made gradual growth which enabled organizational
adaptation and development flexibility.

46
Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part I,” 34.
47
Briscoe, 34.
48
Briscoe, “America’s Foreign Legionnaires: The Lodge Act Soldiers-Part II,” 43.
11
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12
 II. THE FIRST SFOD-A MODEL DURING THE
BEGINNING OF THE COLD WAR

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

1. The Political Environment

The organizational design of the initial SFOD-A, like so many units, was heavily
influenced by its environment. This environment included political and social fear of the
global specter of communism, the economics of a post-WWII U.S., and the historically
unique technological circumstance of the nuclear age. The combination of these factors led
to a demand for a unique force that was capable of using native populations to serve as
force multipliers to deter or combat communist expansion. The result was the birth of USSF
and its initial mission of UW. The SFOD-A, USSF’s sole tactical level unit, was
specifically designed to meet the requirements of UW tasks to accomplish this mission.

USSF arrived in a political environment dominated by the U.S. policy of

communist containment. While the Truman administration had naively attempted to turn a
blind eye to the communists’ intent, George Kennan’s 1947 publication, The Sources of
Soviet Conduct, detailed communist expansionist ideology. 49 Moreover, in Kennan’s
publication, he outlined a containment policy which the U.S. implemented in National
Security Council (NSC) 68. 50 Secretary of State Dean Acheson first voiced President
Truman’s policy of containment publicly on 12 January 1950. In this address, Acheson
stated that U.S. containment would rely on air and naval supremacy, using the western
Pacific island chain as a line of demarcation. 51 However, rather than having a deterrence
effect on communist expansion, this decision emboldened Stalin who gave the North
Korean dictator, Kim Il Sung, approval to launch an invasion of South Korea in June 1950.
President Truman, faced with the reality of Asia falling to communism, broke from his

49
George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs 25 (1946): 566.
50
John Lewis Gaddis and Paul Nitze, “NSC 68 and the Soviet Threat Reconsidered,” International
Security 4, no. 4 (1980): 164–76, https://doi.org/10.2307/2626672.
51
John Lewis Gaddis, On Grand Strategy (New York, New York: Penguin Press, 2018), 53.
13
island chain strategy and ordered the deployment of U.S. troops to Korea commanded of
General MacArthur and with the approval of the U.N. 52

While MacArthur gathered his forces in Japan, the defeat of rapidly deployed and
unprepared U.N. forces caused their retreat toward the Southeastern port city of Pusan. The
initial problems of the war occurred partially because the piecemeal manner in which U.N.
forces were deployed but also because of inter-war budget cuts and a general lack of
contingency planning. 53 This strategic failure stemmed from U.S. political sensitivity to
confront Soviet interests following WWII which created inner-service bureaucratic
problems. 54 For instance, during the inter-war period, the U.S. had predominantly
deployed non-combat units to South Korea in ad hoc, constantly rotated units. These units
focused on internal security and developing the Republic of Korea (ROK) military.55
However, budget cuts effectively hamstrung their efforts and denied the ROK an effective
U.S. sponsored defense. Meanwhile, the Soviets created a communist North Korean
government equipped with effective population control, robust propaganda, and a
modernized military. As the capability of the North Koreans grew, the Soviets withdrew
the bulk of their forces to the point that prior to the onset of hostilities, only a small
contingent of advisors remained in place. By doing this, the Soviets maintained deniability
of direct involvement in North Korea’s offensive actions. 56 This provided a clear indicator
of the prospect of proxy forces to enable strategic decisions which undoubtedly had an
effect on U.S. decision makers when considering the development of USSF.

MacArthur’s invasion and initial success penetrating North Korea, unintentionally

brought the Chinese into the war and drove U.N. forces from the banks of the Yalu back to
the 39th parallel. As the war ground into a stalemate, U.S. leaders began to experiment
with non-typical units to enable effects to break the deadlock. Some of these non-

52
Gaddis, 53.
53
James F. Schnabel, United States Army in the Korean War (Washington, DC: Center of Military
History, United States Army, 1987).
54
Schnabel, 23.
55
Schnabel, 18.
56
Schnabel, 25.
14
conventional options can be considered Special Operations because they were conducted
by specialized units with a specific mission orientation. These efforts included actions by
U.S. Army Rangers during their brief reactivation to conduct raids and harass enemy
supply lines. 57 However, lack of strategic application of these forces by their conventional
commanders resulted in high causalities with minimal positive effect. Additionally, the
8th Army developed a concept for a partisan unit of pro-democratic North Koreans.
However, initial attempts to deploy members of the partisan unit to conduct UW behind
enemy lines resulted in disaster due to the communist’s detailed population control
measures and the lack of prior preparation by the U.S. and ROK. 58 As a consequence, the
partisan units were largely relegated to raiding operations along the North Korean coast.

2. Social Change

The weeks preceding the Korean War were perhaps some of the most hopeful in
U.S. history as a sense of normalcy had settled in following the tumultuous years of WWII.
In a national poll, newspaper editors were asked to respond with what news they believed
the American people would most like to see. The highest responses were that the “Stalinist
dictatorship had collapsed” and that “war had permanently been abolished.” 59 The utopian
atmosphere of stability imploded with word of the North Korean invasion and the
population grimly accepted President Truman’s decision to deploy the military into what
many assumed was the first theater of World War III. However, unlike the Vietnam War a
decade later, the vast majority of the U.S. population believed the U.S. involvement in
Korea was justified. This sentiment remained throughout the war despite the cost of 34,000
U.S. personnel who died fighting. 60 Therefore, instead of focusing on the human cost, the
true national fear of the nation was that military weakness had inspired the communist

57
Robert P. Wettemann, “ARSOF in the Korean War: Part I,” Veritas 6, no. 1 (2010): 9.
58
While some members of 10th SFG deployed to Korea later in the war, by the time of their
deployment, the fight had largely become static and they produced few tangible results. For more
information on U.S. backed partisan operations during the Korean War, read: Ben S. Malcom, White
Tigers : My Secret War in North Korea (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1996).
59
John E. Wiltz, “The Korean War and American Society,” The Wilson Quarterly 2, no. 3 (1978): 128.
60
Wiltz, “The Korean War and American Society.”
15
aggression and resulted in the perceived decline of U.S. hegemony. 61 The stalemate fueled
public perception that the might of the U.S. had faltered due to a lack of strong military
leadership and President Eisenhower was elected in part due to his previous military
leadership combined with his knowledge of “how to bring the Korean conflict to an early
honorable end.” 62 In other words, while the population wanted to end the Korean War,
the perceived need for U.S. strength outweighed the demand. This resulted in relatively
few adaptations within the military.

3. The Economic Environment

Military investment at the start of the Cold War was heavily influenced by
congressional leaders who wanted to reduce the national deficit accrued during WWII. As
General Omar Bradley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in his 1949
congressional testimony, “we realize…that our nation’s economy under existing conditions
can only afford a limited amount for defense.” 63 This sense of fiscal responsibility
occupied the minds of senior military and governmental leaders up to and at the outbreak
of the Korean War. As a consequence, the military was neither postured to contain nor
defeat communist offensive operations.

The stalemate of the Korean War brought to light important lessons for both U.S.
and Soviet decision makers about the costs and strategies for great power competition
during the Cold War. For the Soviets, it demonstrated that the U.S. was willing to risk
escalation to counter overt communist advances. It also demonstrated that the U.S. could
be baited into costly wars that would accrue an intolerable monetary cost leading to
defeat. 64

61
Wiltz, 133.
62
Dwight Eisenhower, speech on October 24, 1952 as cited by Robert A. Divine, Eisenhower and the
Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981), 19.
63
General Omar Bradley testimony to the House Armed Service committee as cited by John Lewis
Gaddis, The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War (New York: Oxford University Press
on Demand, 1987), 91.
64
Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense: Strategic Programs in National Politics (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1961), 66.
16
 4. Technological Change

By far the greatest technological advancement of the period came with the growth
of the U.S. nuclear arsenal and it increasingly became a preferred method of deterrence.
The Soviet atomic test, resultant arms race deepened attachment to this method through
“mutually assured destruction.” This policy came to be a cornerstone of defense for every
administration that followed President Truman and President Eisenhower was no
exception. Whereas President Truman had responded conventionally to communist
operations, President Eisenhower, realized that conventional operations’ costs had the
potential to bankrupt the treasury. Consequently, President Eisenhower’s foreign policy,
which was called “The New Look,” downplayed conventional deterrence and relied
heavily upon the nuclear option to provide “massive retaliation.” As noted by Kenneth
Osgood, Eisenhower’s “experience, combined with the awesome destructive power of
nuclear weapons, convinced [him] that general war should be avoided at all costs.” 65 To
this end, outside of “massive retaliation,” the chief tenet of the “New Look” policy was to
enable the “free community to be willing and able to respond vigorously at places and
means of its own choosing” through advisory missions.” 66 “The New Look” policy forced
the military to downsize its land and naval conventional capability while increasing its
aerial atomic and Special Operations capability, particularly psychological warfare. 67 For
USSF, this policy represented a “boom” in funding and, as will be discussed, precipitated
mission growth and organizational adaptation.

B. MISSION AND TASKS

While all organizational capability adaptations of the SFOD-A have been heavily
influenced by the environment of the time, the initial model was also heavily influenced
by internal military politics. As noted, the suspension of Army Ranger units provided USSF

65
Kenneth A. Osgood, “Form before Substance,” Diplomatic History 24, no. 3 (2000): 405–33,
https://doi.org/10.1111/0145-2096.00225.
66
Secretary of State John Foster Dulles in a speech to the Council on Foreign Relations dated 12
January, 1954 as cited by Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 2015), 248.
67
Osgood, “Form before Substance.”
17
with the necessary personnel slots to facilitate the manning of the new force. The
deactivation of the Army Ranger units also demonstrated the pervasive belief by military
leaders that the elite capability of the Rangers could be developed quickly in an emergency
and required no peacetime units. 68 In contrast, the OCPW staff realized that UW
operations were longer in duration requiring preparation during peacetime for wartime
employment. Accordingly, USSF initially remained hyper-focused on its mission of UW
to ensure there was no misconception and consequent misuse as a commando force by the
conventional army. USSF’s operating concept was ubiquitous throughout the early years
and transcended all ranks. As noted by Sergeant First Class Dick Shevchenko “our mission
was to go behind enemy lines, gather up guerrillas, and train them.” 69

When Colonel Bank took command of the first USSF unit, the 10th SFG, the
OCPW staff was still diligently developing a model for the force’s employment into
various theaters of operation. While the Korean War provided a short-term option, its
conventional nature provided few opportunities for USSF to prepare the environment for
UW operations. Consequently, the OCPW staff focused their initial organizational design
on employment in the European Theater. As the staff had various backgrounds and
experience in UW, there was some debate on which European WWII model the unit should
follow and each staff member advocated primarily based on their individual experience. 70
In the end, the OCPW staff settled on the OSS Jedburgh concept as the capability model
and the OGs as the size model for the SFOD-A. 71

C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

As individuals transferred to the 10th SFG at Fort Bragg, the work of organizing
subordinate units began to take shape. The initial naming construct was borrowed from the
Jedburgh model of “Functional Area Teams” or FA Teams and was adapted for each

68
Darren Sapp, Aaron Bank and the Early Days of US Army Special Forces, Kindle Edition (Collins &
Halsey Publishers, 2011).
69
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 107.
70
Briscoe, 106; Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 172.
71
Sapp, Aaron Bank and the Early Days of US Army Special Forces.
18
echelon of command within 10th SFG. For instance, the tactical level unit kept the FA
designation while the company and battalion level units were referred to as Functional B
(FB) and Functional C (FC) Teams, respectively. According to the unit’s Table of
Organization and Equipment (TO&E) dated 1952, the 10th SFG consisted of a
Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and three Special Forces Battalions or
FCs. Each FC had five companies (FBs) and each FB had 10 FAs (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. 10th SFG organizational chart. 72

The responsibility for each echelon of command was broken up according to the
level of guerilla unit that was being advised. For instance, the FA Teams were responsible
for training a company size guerilla force and FB Teams were responsible for training a

72
Eugene G. Piasecki, "The A-Team Numbering System," Veritas 5, no. 4 (n.d.): 39; Piasecki, “The
Psywar Center Part II: Creation of the 10th Special Forces Group,” 110.
19
battalion level unit. Meanwhile, the FCs provided logistics while the SFG Headquarters
was responsible for the development of a guerilla area command. 73

As the organization of the SFG took shape, the manning of each respective unit
began to evolve. For FA teams, the predecessor of the SFOD-A, the first manning attempt
mirrored the OSS OG model and consisted of 15-man teams (two officers and 13
enlisted). 74 SFG leaders though feared that the size too closely mirrored that of a Ranger
section which could precipitate misuse. The size was therefore adjusted to a 12-man
team. 75 Like their Detachment 101 and OG progenitors, each team was capable of splitting
into smaller elements based on the environment they were operating within. 76

Individual capabilities known as Military Occupational Specialties (MOS) within

the FA Teams was an evolving concept. Colonel Bank’s experiences in occupied France
shaped the initial FA teams’ specialties and, like their WWII predecessors, every team
would cross-train in mission required skills. The two most concrete specialties in Colonel
Bank’s vision were the medics and the radio operators. 77 As the training was further
refined for the expected operating environment, communication and medical skills were
added to enable operations deep inside enemy zones of occupation. Later, capabilities such
as weapons, demolitions, survival, and tactics were taught to all personnel on the FA
teams. 78

Initially, there was no established school for the USSF training. Nevertheless, the
leadership and staff of the new 10th SFG, worked to establish an initial training regimen
worthy of the new unit and its mission. Training in Guerrilla Warfare was facilitated by the
Army’s Psychological Warfare Department and individuals received an initial 8-week

73
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 106.
74
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 172,176, 176–77.
75
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin.
76
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 176.
77
Bank, 189.
78
Bank, 189.
20
course on basic partisan warfare. 79 Special considerations for officers and enlisted who
could not attend the course forced 10th SFG to create an internal individual skills program
which supplemented the 8-week course. 80

Individual MOS training followed the Guerrilla course, which prepared each
member of the FA team in his skill. Although Colonel Bank’s opinion of specialty skills
consisted of medical and radio expertise; the SF hopefuls trained many of the skills learned
and used by Allied forces during WWII. These added capabilities such as small unit tactics
and intelligence gathering operations enabled the activities of the new unit. 81 Outside of
collective training. Select individuals also received additional training to enable the
insertion of teams behind enemy lines. This training included, rough terrain parachute
insertion, provided by a smokejumper school in Montana, and waterborne insertion,
provided by a small-boat operators course in Virginia. 82

Despite the novelty of the initial training the new USSF recruits received, their
skills were watchfully and carefully evaluated to ensure the strictest professionalism and
standards were enforced. Assessment of the new skills of the SFG fell to the training staff
of unit’s headquarters and the SFG Operations Officer developed evaluations for FA, FB,
and FC teams. Field Training Exercises such as FREE LEGION and LEGIONNAIRE
RALLY tested the newly trained teams’ individual and collective skills. 83 Colonel Bank
was ever-present during these evaluations and often opted to personally talk to a team to
ensure they understood the demands of their respective missions during a UW operation. 84
The initial training regimen culminated in an evaluation of the entire SFG during FTX
CLEO held at Camp Castro in the Chattahoochee National Forest. 85 Upon completion,
10th SFG was certified and prepared to conduct its UW mission.

79
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 106.
80
Briscoe, 107.
81
Briscoe, 106–7; Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 188–95.
82
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 107.
83
Briscoe, 107.
84
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 200.
85
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 107.
21
 Shortly after 10th SFG’s certification, President Eisenhower ordered its
deployment to Germany. This deployment was based on several events which coincided to
create a ripe atmosphere for a UW operation. Following the death of Joseph Stalin in March
of 1953, U.S. leaders sensed a feeling of change within the Soviet Union and sought
opportunities to exploit the transition. 86 This sense of vulnerability also reached the
German population living under Soviet oppression who rose in riotous revolt against their
communist oppressors. Though discounted by the Soviets and communist German
Democratic Republic as minor and fractured, the labor strikes and nation-wide rebellion
constituted roughly ten percent of the population. 87 President Eisenhower, sensing an
opportunity to create wider rebellion at low political and economic cost, ordered the
deployment of the 10th SFG.

Upon arrival to Germany, the 10th SFG represented a trained and certified UW
force capable of meeting the President’s desired goal. However, officers at United States
Army Europe command were unable to include the unit into theater plans. 88 Consequently,
although certified in UW and deployed to take advantage of the East German uprising, the
10th SFG was sidelined while the Soviets crushed the insurrection with tank armies.

D. CONCLUSION

Despite significant lobbying effort by the OCPW to establish a UW unit, it was

changes in the environment, particularly the financial and human costs of conventional
deterrence in Korea, that drove U.S. leaders toward alternative means of combatting
communist expansion. While USSF was created, organizationally designed and deployed
with the required capability to conduct UW in Europe, the inability of military leaders to
see the significance of left it struggling for relevancy. As a consequence, USSF adapted its
capability toward other missions that supported the global defense against communist
aggression.

86
Hope M. Harrison, Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953 - 1961
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 2005), 31.
87
Gareth Dale, “The East German Rising of June 1953,” Journal of Contemporary Central and
Eastern Europe 11, no. 2 (2003): 110, https://doi.org/10.1080/0965156032000167207.
88
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 406; Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 210–13 of 3604.
22
 III. MODEL II: VIETNAM AND THE WARS OF LIBERATION

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

The first model focused on the environment and missions which demanded the
capabilities required by the initial SFOD-A and determined its organizational design. The
second model focuses on the environment and adaptations that USSF undertook as it was
sidelined from strategic employment in Europe and instead found work in Southeast Asia.
Like the first model, the capabilities of the SFOD-A remained heavily influenced by the
environment and missions of the regiment as it transitioned focus to the Pacific. This model
demonstrates USSF’s adaptation from a specialized niche force to one capable of
conducting full spectrum Special Operations.

1. The Political Environment

The political environment influenced changes in missions and the organization of

SFOD-As during the lead up to and execution of the Vietnam War. A major contributing
factor of this was the U.S. policy of containment which was carried by every President
during the Cold War. While the initial containment policy focused on reacting
conventionally to communist offensives, the policies of President Eisenhower and
Kennedy focused on enabling defense by enabling partner nations’ efforts. To meet this
strategic goal, the U.S. military increased advisory missions as a means of furthering
partner nation defense efforts. While USSF in Europe seemed to fade out of utility, new
USSF units formed to meet the demand.

Although USSF was still held in dubious regard by many high-ranking military
leaders, the ability of the newly formed USSF units to expound upon their original mission
highlighted the units as flexible alternatives to large footprint conventional forces. The
adaptability of these units for various Special Operations missions meshed well within
President Eisenhower and Kennedy’s respective strategies and gained USSF relevancy. 89

89
Andrew F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986),
3; Chalmers Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard: Inside Special Forces, 1953-1963 (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2001), 6.
23
Moreover, the rapid transition from its core mission task of UW left an indelible mark on
the culture of USSF which is still evident today.

The mid to late 1950s saw much change to U.S. national foreign policy regarding
what some called the “Wars of National Liberation and Liberation Fronts.” 90 As policy
demanded smaller force sizes to save fiscal and manpower cost, advisory missions for
USSF grew. The initial name for these missions were Mobile Training Teams (MTT) and
they became a common mission for USSF in Asia. The MTT mission in Vietnam began
under President Eisenhower in 1957 and rapidly gained additional authorities as the
security situation in that country deteriorated and economy-of-force operations
expanded. 91

Another environmental challenge for USSF units in Vietnam came from the after-
effects of the Korean War stalemate. As noted by Andrew Krepinevich, many senior U.S.
Army leaders accustomed to winning conflicts, like WWI and WWII, “adopted a never
again” attitude toward the limited objectives imposed on them by the civilian leadership
during the Korean War. 92 This sense of limiting was felt within the public and political
arenas and was echoed in Presidential policy.93 However, without a strategy which
matched means and ends, the U.S. population and military were largely unprepared for the
requirements of winning an “irregular war.”

Correspondingly, France’s post-WWII delay of decolonialization and

independence of Asian states created an environment primed for the spread of communist
ideology. Even when forced through U.S. and international pressure, France’s effort in
assisting the transition of several of its Southeast Asian colonies failed, and U.S. support
was increasingly required. 94 Guided by the domino theory, which demanded the defense

90
Wars of National Liberation and Liberation Fronts were common terms used during this time to
explain Communist movements designed to overthrow Western-style governments. For more information,
see Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard, 10.
91
Shelby L. Stanton, Green Berets at War (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1985), 35.
92
Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, 16.
93
Krepinevich, 17.
94
Stanton, Green Berets at War, 16.
24
of every state from communist aggression, the U.S. began to increase its support to
vulnerable governments throughout the world. As noted, this necessitated the deployment
of SFOD-As to serve as MTTs providing the training, advisement, and equipping of
forces. 95 While training conventional forces was not a prevailing concept of employment
at USSF’s inception, the professionalism and training of the SFOD-As made them the force
of choice for OPERATION WHITESTAR. The purpose of OPERATION WHITESTAR
was to create “shock forces” to combat communist insurgents through Direct Action (DA)
strikes. 96 While USSF MTT missions were largely successful, U.S. Army senior
leadership felt that USSF was too independent and later cancelled the program. 97 Despite
the cancellation of WHITESTAR, SFOD-As gained valuable skills and experience which
were carried over during the Vietnam War.

A substantial increase in strength and employment for USSF came following the
election of President Kennedy whose departure from the concept of “massive retaliation”
espoused by President Eisenhower made USSF the premiere force for his foreign policy.
Adding emphasis to President Kennedy’s point was the best-selling 1959 book Uncertain
Trumpets by General Maxwell Taylor which concluded that “massive retaliation limited
U.S. options to nuclear deterrence.” 98 Instead of continuing the massive retaliation policy,
President Kennedy developed the “Flexible Response” policy which gave the U.S.
deterrence options at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels by rebuilding and
refocusing the military.

President Kennedy’s early view of warfare was fueled by his understanding of the
growth of communist “Wars of Liberation.” As noted in his speech to the graduating class
of West Point on June 6, 1962:

95
Stanton, 17.
96
Chalmers Archer Jr’s book Green Berets in the Vanguard recounts Chalmer’s experiences during
this initial early period of USSF in SE Asia. He recounts several deployments which discuss in detail the
various objectives and initiatives USSF undertook in that region. Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard.
97
Stanton, Green Berets at War, 24.
98
Maxwell Davenport Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet. (New York: Harper, 1959).
25
 Korea has not been the only battleground since the end of the Second World
War. Men have fought and died in Malaya, in Greece, in the Philippines, in
Algeria and Cuba and Cyprus, and almost continuously on the Indo-Chinese
Peninsula. No nuclear weapons have been fired. No massive nuclear
retaliation has been considered appropriate. This is another type of war, new
in its intensity, ancient in its origin -- war by guerrillas, subversives,
insurgents, assassins, war by ambush instead of by combat; by infiltration,
instead of aggression, seeking victory by eroding and exhausting the enemy
instead of engaging him. 99

USSF’s subsequent adoption of counterinsurgency (COIN) into its core mission

tasks gained traction as President Kennedy’s refocus on the military intensified. At this
point, USSF had already executed several MTTs in Southeast Asia. Like OPERATION
WHITESTAR, USSF was again the force of choice for the military’s initial effort in
Vietnam.

As security in Europe stabilized with tank armies facing off with one another along
the East-West German border, the U.S. began to increasingly focus on the Pacific. Linked
to this shift was the pervasive belief by U.S. leaders that the European powers should
decolonize the region and permit the indigenous populations the right of self-
determination. This concept was problematic though as noted by the European leaders who
believed the U.S. “failed to recognize that the continuation of colonial rule, or at least
influence, was the only thing preventing the emergence of states hostile to the West.” 100
Undeterred, the U.S. continued to pressure the Europeans to decolonize while indigenous
communist nationalists began violent revolts.

In Vietnam, colonial grievances led to The First Indochina War as France struggled
against communist forces desiring to free Vietnam from its unwanted host. U.S. leaders
had, in accordance with the containment policy, offered assistance to the struggling French
with the provision that France allow the Vietnamese the right to self-determination.
However, colonial interests prevailed and the French, unwilling to accept U.S.

99
J. F. Kennedy, “Remarks at West Point (June 6, 1962),” Speech, Transcript at Http://Millercenter.
Org/President/Kennedy/Speeches/Speech-5766, 1962.
100
Damien Fenton, To Cage the Red Dragon SEATO and the Defense of Southeast Asia, 1955-1965
(Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), 21.
26
preconditioned support, began to lose the war. While the U.S. ultimately acquiesced and
provided materiel aid, the decision came too late to change the outcome and the French
suffered a major defeat at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1953 and consequently lost Vietnam. 101

The Geneva Accords of 1954, which the U.S. helped organize, finalized the
conclusion of the First Indochina War and split Vietnam along the 17th parallel. Fearing
the vulnerability of the neighboring of Laos and Cambodia, U.S. leaders determined that
“any further territorial loss to Communist expansion in SE Asia was inevitable unless a
regional defense alliance under U.S. leadership could be established. 102 With President
Eisenhower’s approval, the U.S. created a plan for an America-led security framework for
the region which included nations such as the United Kingdom, France, Australia, New
Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand, and the Philippines. 103 This security framework, took its
design from the NATO construct and included provisions for collective defense between
all signatories. 104 Although many were happy with the defense pact, it did not take long
for U.S. leaders to realize that “they were not dealing with a mirror image of the security
situation in Europe” and that additional U.S. forces would be required to maintain regional
stability. 105

2. Social Change

Much of the U.S. population initially supported Presidents Eisenhower and

Kennedy’s policies in Vietnam. The relatively few numbers of troops deployed to the
country under the MTT concept, left the greater U.S. population relatively unaffected by
the military support. This ignorance resulted in very little societal change throughout the
initial years of U.S. deployments. However, President Johnson’s 1965 decision to escalate
U.S. involvement began to generate profound societal change. As noted by Lunch and
Sperlich, from 1966–1967 “increasing numbers of people began to tell pollsters that

101
Fenton, 25.
102
Fenton, 25.
103
Fenton, 26.
104
Fenton, 26.
105
Fenton, 28.
27
American involvement in the Vietnam War was a mistake.” 106 This downward trend of
American public sentiment strained the relationship between the policymakers and the
military. Moreover, the loss of public support for the war generated additional restrictions
on the means U.S. forces could use to execute operations in order to limit U.S. causalities.
This resulted in U.S. military leaders’ continual attempts to bring the war to a swift close
through large conventional operations. These efforts affected USSF’s mission focus and
organizational requirements throughout the war.

3. The Economic Environment

While the cost of the Vietnam War in blood, drove rapid societal change at home,
equally costly was the financial burden. Unlike the human cost, the full burden of financial
capital was slowed by the incremental increases in the war but was nevertheless debilitating
over time. 107 While the initial buildup of the military for participation in the conflict
generated an increase to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) the length of the war
ultimately demanded increased spending. 108 The combination of the government
“blowout [of the] budget deficit” combined with “an expansionary monetary policy” led to
a rise in inflation by the close of the war. 109 This slow path toward recession produced
little change during the war but had a long-term effect following its conclusion.

4. Technological Change

Adding to the complexities of the environment during this time period was a
significant technological advancement; the helicopter. Born out of the inter-service rivalry
between the U.S. Air Force and the U.S. Army since its breakup after WWII, the helicopter
gave rise to the concept of air-mobile units. This concept promised a variety of increased

106
William L. Lunch and Peter W. Sperlich, “American Public Opinion and the War in Vietnam,” The
Western Political Quarterly 32, no. 1 (1979): 22, https://doi.org/10.2307/447561.
107
George C. Herring, “America and Vietnam - the Unending War,” Foreign Affairs 70, no. 5 (1991):
116.
108
Institute for Economics and Peace, The Economic Consequences of War on US Economy (New
York: Institute for Economics and Peace, 2011), http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/06/The-Economic-Consequences-of-War-on-US-Economy_0.pdf.
109
Institute for Economics and Peace, 11.
28
capabilities including, a more flexible response force, faster reaction times, improved
tactical mobility, increased early detection, a quicker counter-attack reserve, and a force
“more likely to surprise and eradicate guerrilla forces.” 110

The first test of the air-mobile concept came by the Army’s first air-mobile unit,
the 1st Cavalry Division. In this “test,” the 1st Cavalry Division was not only able to launch
forces and artillery into an enemy stronghold but reinforce and resupply them all via
helicopter. 111 Recognizing that increased mobility enabled offensive operations, a U.S.
advantage and concept it frequently gravitates toward, the U.S. military strategy throughout
much of the war focused on area denial and clearance operations. 112 In essence, military
leaders saw air-mobility as the tool to break from the stalemate of the Korean War by
enabling rapid movement into denied areas. As a consequence, conventional military units
were often focused on clearance operations while USSF, being resupplied by air, could
perform economy-of-force operations in rural areas.

Another technological advancement which influenced events throughout the

Vietnam War came in the form of news as it transitioned from paper reporting to television
as a means to recount the war’s progress. In the advisory years of the Vietnam War (1954–
1961), media coverage of Vietnam or events in Southeast Asia rarely occurred. 113 With
little to spark the interest of the American public, journalists focused elsewhere for
newsworthy events. Troop escalation and increase in combat casualties brought additional
attention and televised news broadcasts focusing on the war increased. 114 According to a
Trilateral Commission of 1975, television journalism’s ability to quickly report on the news
with graphic photographs or videos on the horrors of war represented a new source of

110
“U.S. Army Tactical Mobility Requirements Board Final Report, 20 August 1962. :: General
Military History,” 14–15, accessed August 13, 2019,
http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll11/id/1689.
111
Harold G. Moore, We Were Soldiers Once -and Young : Ia Drang, the Battle That Changed the War
in Vietnam (New York: Harper Perennial, 1993).
112
Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy
and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1977).
113
Michael Mandelbaum, “Vietnam: The Television War,” Daedalus 111 (1982): 158.
114
Mandelbaum, 159.
29
national power. 115 This concept was reflected by Richard Nixon who stated, “news media
had come to dominate domestic opinion about its purpose and conduct [of the war].” 116
This constant influence by the media increased resentment of the war, contributed to the
lack of American public resolve, and fueled war protests effecting how the war was
executed.

B. MISSION AND TASKS (1950–1973)

The aforementioned factors played a contributing role in the way the military
executed their missions. As the environment shifted, the missions asked of USSF during
Vietnam can be categorized under the four separate missions of COIN, Direct Action (DA),
Foreign Internal Defense (FID) and Special Reconnaissance (SR). Although the original
mission of USSF was UW, the growth of communist backed insurgencies led to additional
missions and demanded adaptation. 117 While some units operating in Southeast Asia, such
as the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment, did include temporary missions to
“seek out, train, and support men capable of becoming effective guerillas in Vietnam,” this
mission paled in comparison to the larger programs under the conventional strategy
employed in Vietnam. 118

As part of the larger COIN strategy in Southeast Asia, the U.S. Army initially
employed MTTs and advisory groups to provide military assistance through equipment,
training and combined operations. 119 These programs spanned several countries including
Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam, and Indonesia while necessitating the creation and rapid

115
Michel Crozier, Samuel P. Huntington, and Joji Watanuki, “The Crisis of Democracy: Report on
the Governability of Democracies to the Trilateral Commission,” ed. Bibiana Muñoz Clares, Sociología
Histórica: Revista de Investigación Acerca de La Dimensión Histórica de Los Fenómenos Sociales, no. 1
(New York: New York University Press, 1975): 311–29.
116
Daniel C. Hallin, The “Uncensored War”: The Media and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), 3.
117
Not to say that during the Vietnam war there were not units capable or conducting some level of
UW For more on such forces read: Stanton, Green Berets at War.
118
Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard, 30.
119
Archer, 60.
30
deployment of the 1st SFG. 120 Not only did the MTTs assist foreign governments by
strengthening host-nation military capabilities, they also demonstrated that USSF was
capable of operating alongside a multitude of foreign forces. This allowed detachments to
engage within the culture of their host nation, a skill critical to any foreign interaction. 121

In Vietnam, USSF missions morphed over time as the U.S. military commitment to
the security of the peninsula increased. By far, one of the longest enduring programs USSF
participated in during the conflict was the Civilian Irregular Defense Groups (CIDG). The
CIDG was a concept started by the CIA’s Military Assistance Advisory Group’s Combined
Studies Division (CSD) to enable disaffected South Vietnamese rural peasants to defend
their own areas while denying the communists safe haven. By design, this program
received CIA funding but used USSF to recruit, train, and equip the locals. 122 The concept
was largely successful and effectively created friendly safe areas as a thorn in the side of
the communists’ operations in South Vietnam. 123

The CIDG program marked a shift from the typical training or advisory missions
of the same period. In essence, the program was more akin to the UW mission of USSF
with slight modifications. Instead of going deep behind enemy lines, SFOD-As would be
in a host nation’s “free territory” persuading local minority groups from joining the
communists and enabling their own internal security. Selected as the first test village, the
“Buon Enao Experiment” in Darlac province was solely under the control of the CSD and
not the Vietnamese government. 124 The basic concept of the CIDG program was to obtain
approval from village chiefs and elders to adopt the program, swear allegiance to the
Republic of Vietnam, and establish a security force and defensive structure in the
village. 125 After two-and-a-half months of work in Buon Enao, the initial experiment

120
Stanton, Green Berets at War, 1; Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard, 59.
121
Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard, 59–60.
122
Eugene G. Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group,” Veritas 5, no. 4 (2009): 20.
123
Piasecki, 8.
124
Piasecki, 20.
125
Piasecki, 24.
31
concluded with such success that the provincial chief requested the program expand to
neighboring villages. 126

Part of the success of the early CIDG program was that it belonged to the CIA
which had fewer bureaucratic challenges when it came to organization, funding, and
support for various civic projects than the military did. 127 The result was an early success
of the program and 1962 brought with it an increase in the CIDG program throughout
Darlac Province. The program initially expanded to include 40 additional villages within a
15 km radius of Buon Enao but by the end of the year, the program encompassed over 200
villages. 128 The increased activity brought with it a greater demand for SFOD-As which
necessitated the creation of the Headquarters United States Army Special Forces Vietnam
(USASFV). 129 By the close of 1962, USSF had increased in strength to “530 USSF
soldiers serving on four B-Teams and twenty-eight SFOD-As throughout Vietnam. 130

As USSF’s strength in Vietnam increased, the U.S. military in country reorganized

into the Military Assistance Command-Vietnam (MACV). MACV’s leaders then pressured
the CIA to pass control of the CIDG and USSF to the new command. 131 After relenting,
the CIA and MACV co-sponsored OPERATION SWITCHBACK to transfer complete
control of the CIDG program to MACV. This transfer changed several of the essential
components of the program. 132 First, instead of being a U.S. centric effort, the
responsibility for the camps reverted to South Vietnamese control following the completion
of training and the establishment of security. This led to lapses in support by the South

126
Piasecki, 24.
127
Christoper K. Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam (New York: Rutledge,
2007), 21, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203964941.
128
Francis J. Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971 (Washington, DC: Dept. of the Army,
1973), 23–25.
129
Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group,” 24.
130
Piasecki, 24.
131
Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam; Robert W. Jones Jr., “A Team Effort:
Special Forces in Vietnam June-December 1964,” Veritas 3, no. 1 (2007); Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular
Defense Group,” 25.
132
Ives, US Special Forces and Counterinsurgency in Vietnam, 24.
32
Vietnamese Government for the villages. 133 Additionally, instead of a population centric
approach focusing on minority groups, SWITCHBACK changed the focus of CIDG
operations to a more offensive minded strategy. 134 Instead of local area security, the CIDG
began targeting communist infiltration routes into Vietnam. 135 This demanded half of the
security force from villages to at all times, be out on patrols actively seeking out the
communists. 136

The new shift toward an offensive strategy under the COIN effort changed the
mission for USSF in Vietnam. Several of these changes included: support for offensive
operations of conventional forces with Apache Forces, the modification of the CIDG
mission to include placing camps in contested areas along infiltration routes, and the
creation of the MIKE force as a DA mobile strike force to conduct offensive operations
against the enemy.

Apache Forces were formed in response to ambushes of helicopter Landing Zones

(LZs). 137 To combat this threat, MACV ordered the USASFV to respond using indigenous
forces to augment their operations. 5th SFG’s concept was simple; take ethnic Chinese
anti-communist Nungs assigned to CIDG companies, provide them with advanced training
and deploy them as 10-man reconnaissance units to scout LZs prior to large, air-mobile
operations. 138 Once the air-mobile unit was on the ground, the Apache Force fell under
the incoming commander until completion of the operation. Although short lived, all the
Corps Tactical Zones (CTZ) developed this capability. The cost of these operations to the
CIDG program was drastic as the indigenous force losses through attrition while working
in unfamiliar terrain produced a negative response in future CIDG programs.

133
Ives, 24.
134
Ives, 24.
135
Ives, 28.
136
Ives, 28.
137
Kenneth Finlayson, “‘Colonel Mike’ The Origins of the MIKE Force in Vietnam,” Veritas 5, no. 2
(2008): 24.
138
Finlayson, 24.
33
 USSF and the CIDG program suffered additional losses as the focus of the
military’s effort transitioned. Instead of providing local area security and civic projects for
the villages the CIDG locations became bases for strike operations in their respective
areas. 139 To facilitate this shift, by late 1964, CIDG camps were moved along the borders
of Laos and Cambodia. Once again, this meant that rather than focusing on the population,
USSF expanded in regions where there was either no population or where the population
was so primitive that they avoided all contact with “outsiders.” 140 Left without a willing
population from which to source the CIDG, the mayors of Danang and Hue provinces
began to press teenage hoodlums into service. This led to a precipitous decline in the
capability of USSF and the CIDG, which degraded the original concept. 141

As the communist insurgency gained momentum in South Vietnam, USSF and their
CIDG counterparts isolation left them exceedingly vulnerable. Losses from several attacks
from 1964–1965 at Ben Cat and other CIDG bases near the dangerous “iron triangle”
demanded USSF create quick reaction forces capable of rapidly reinforcing besieged
SFOD-As. 142 To fulfill this requirement, MACV created the Mike Forces.

Mike Forces, like their Apache Force and CIDG predecessors, recruited, trained,
and equipped the indigenous population to augment USSF operations, in this case, Quick
Reaction Forces (QRF). As the capability of these units grew, they became an invaluable
asset as they were able to save numerous outposts that would have otherwise been overrun.
Conventional force commanders began to see the Mike Forces as a rapidly deployable force
that could be moved to hostile areas that were too risky for other South Vietnamese or U.S.
conventional forces. This became the method of employment of the MIKE forces
throughout the rest of the Vietnam war and allowed “USSF and their ‘stikers’ to
aggressively seek out and destroy the enemy.” 143

139
Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, 34.
140
Charles M. Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1983), 114.
141
Simpson III, 115.
142
Finlayson, “‘Colonel Mike’ The Origins of the MIKE Force in Vietnam,” 21.
143
Finlayson, 26.
34
C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES

The missions for USSF evolved thought the Vietnam period, however the structure
of the SFOD-A changed little; especially with regard to MOS capabilities. There were,
however, several experiments that the 14th Special Forces Operational Detachment
(SFOD) attempted in the late 1950s which included a 16-man detachment as a model for
the SFOD-A. This unit was commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, the Executive officer
was a Major, the Operations Officer was a Captain, and contained a Master Sergeant in
charge of 12 senior Sergeants. 144 All members of this unit had to apply and were
thoroughly screened prior to execution of FID tasks throughout the Pacific. Under this
model the 14th SFOD conducted several deployments to Thailand, Taiwan, and Vietnam.
However, with the creation of 1st SFG, the members of this unit became the cadre for the
new unit and the concept faded away as it was determined that FID missions, outside of
combat, required no organizational adaptation of the SFOD-A. 145

The introduction of USSF into Vietnam and the development of the CIDG program
initially required little organizational adaptation for the SFOD-A. While the pilot teams
that made initial contact with village elders generally consisted of an USSF medic and CIA
counterpart, the execution of the CIDG program was ultimately filled by SFOD-As. 146 As
USSF was short personnel, it was not uncommon for CIDG programs to be filled with
incomplete SFOD-As. For example, in the experiment at Buon Enao the SFOD-A113
medic and a CIA representative made initial contact prior to bringing the six remaining
men of the detachment in (see Figure 3). 147

144
Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard, 27.
145
Archer, Green Berets in the Vanguard.
146
Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group,” 20–24.
147
Piasecki, 22–23.
35
 Figure 3. The structure of the original SFOD-A tasked with the
experimental CIDG mission 148

The success of the CIDG program and subsequent expansion necessitated

additional SFOD-As and marked the first field adaption of its organizational structure.
Through experimentation, it was determined that the ideal force structure for the CIDG
program was a Vietnamese Special Forces unit and a SFOD-A operating as a split-team. 149
The focus of the U.S. personnel was to advise and assist the Vietnamese Special Forces to
accomplish what the initial USSF teams had done in other locations. 150 In practice, this
concept was not always possible as some SFOD-As were not partnered with a Vietnamese
Special Forces unit. 151

As the military increased its role in Vietnam, it expanded offensive operations and
USSF followed suit. Unlike the CIDG program which initially focused on local security
and remained small, the Mike Forces were more formalized into the military construct.

148
Piasecki, “Civilian Irregular Defense Group.”
149
Kelly, U.S. Army Special Forces, 1961-1971, 25.
150
Kelly, 25.
151
Kelly, 28.
36
Generally comprised of 185 indigenous personnel, the Mike Forces were organized in a
battalion with a headquarters, three companies, and a weapons platoon (see Figure 4).
Similar to the CIDG program, the SFOD-A assigned to the Mike Force supervised
recruiting and conducted training and advisory operations within the battalion. 152 This
model for the MIKE force proliferated throughout Vietnam as a means to actively pursue
the enemy.

Figure 4. The Mike Force Battalion Organization 153

As the MIKE force dominated the USSF effort in Vietnam, the CIDG program
began to take a back seat because population centric programs did not mesh with the
strategic means of prosecuting the war at that time. Driven by a precarious political
environment which insisted on quantifiable metrics of success, the U.S. military focused
on body counts and areas cleared instead of the previous population centric metrics. This
lack of a singular focus prevented doctrinal acceptance of SFOD-A adaptation that had
occurred during the height of the CIDG program. The most pervasive of these adaptations

152
Finlayson, “‘Colonel Mike’ The Origins of the MIKE Force in Vietnam,” 23–26.
153
Finlayson, “‘Colonel Mike’ The Origins of the MIKE Force in Vietnam.”
37
had been the addition of two billets per SFOD-A to allow for an imbedded Civil Affairs
(CA) specialist and a Psychological Operations (PSYOP) officer (see Figure 5).

Figure 5. SFOD-A with Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations imbed 154

Experience gained from years of population engagement demonstrated the

importance of having a full time CA and PSYOP personnel on the detachment. Stanton
states that while the role of CA or PSYOP may not always be present on a detachment, it
was however, “the primary duty of one man.” 155 Within the CIDG camps, civic action
programs focused on programs such as medical care, agriculture, and animal husbandry
expertise but also focused on training local Vietnamese on the skills necessary to become
self-sufficient. 156 The additional slots for CA and PSYOP at the detachment level also
changed the structure of the USSF battalions CA and PSYOP functions and combined them
under the S-3 operations for renewed emphasis. 157 The success of many of the early CIDG
camps hinged on the fact that the civic action programs accompanied the security programs
within the village. This established a “social contract” between the people, the SFOD-As

154
Shelby L. Stanton, U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team Vietnam Combat Manual (Boulder, CO:
Paladin Press, 1988), xiii; Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, 154–55.
155
Stanton, U.S. Army Special Forces A-Team Vietnam Combat Manual, 120.
156
Simpson III, Inside the Green Berets, 151–53.
157
Simpson III, 155.
38
and the government and turned large numbers of indigenous Vietnamese into local self-
supporting security forces.

D. CONCLUSION

The period encompassing the Vietnam War was unique for the relatively new USSF
and required some capability adaptation and organizational modification of the SFOD-A.
The vast diversity of the missions and the dynamic nature of the environment required
several adjustments to USSF’s original construct. Although the changes USSF made were
temporary in nature, those teams which incorporated CA and PSYOP in conjunction with
their village defense program tended to be more successful.

Recognizing that the character of warfare was changing, the U.S. initially sought to
employ population-centric military capabilities under COIN which it did not possess.
Because counterinsurgency is population based, a broad range of population-centric
capabilities were required at the detachment level. The shift towards a more offensive
attitude in operations post-SWITCHBACK shifted the objective of USSF’s presence away
from the population. While strike operations are a necessary requirement, especially in a
COIN environment, it can be viewed as the easy and measurable way to demonstrate
success despite short-term gains. The popularity of the strike companies, and their
proliferation, demonstrate continued attempts to fight offensively.

The integrated capabilities at the detachment level under the CIDG program might
be useful for the future environment where interconnectivity and other globalization factors
will require a different kind of capability beyond those which USSF currently possesses.
Whereas the temporary changes to USSF were ad-hoc at best, limited wars, where indirect
actions dominate all aspects on the battlefield and beyond it, will require change in USSF
structure to meet the demands placed on the detachment by the environment.

39
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40
 IV. BEYOND VIETNAM AND TO THE WAR OF TERROR

A. THE ENVIRONMENTAL FACTORS

Military change, and especially organizational military change, in times of relative

peace, is rarely, if ever a fast process. Instead, change within military bureaucracies often
occurs over several decades and is broadly shaped by the environment of the time. 158 This
chapter scopes the history of the SFOD-A detachment construct from the U.S. departure of
Vietnam to the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT). By doing this, one can understand how
the shifting environment, in terms of political, technological, social, and economic change,
drove missions, focus, and organizational adaptation of the SFOD-A. Given that USSF has
undertaken a vast array of missions since Vietnam, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to
categorize all of the regiment’s missions. Instead, this chapter will seek to highlight several
missions which best characterized the efforts of USSF and drove organizational adaptation
during the selected period.

1. The Political Environment

UW is by nature, a political decision. Consequently, USSF has, perhaps more than

any other military organization, either contracted, adapted, or expanded depending upon
presidential administrations’ desired means of combatting threats. Such has been the
environment since Vietnam, as the national desire to distance the prestige of the country
from the failures dictated defense strategy and funding. Shifts in strategy and funding
affected the military as a whole after Vietnam but its consequences shocked the core of
USSF. One important consequence was an ebb and flow of USSF’s appetite to conform
and adapt to conventional military demands. 159 This malleability is not relegated to the
immediate post-Vietnam period but instead can be seen in the assignments of SFOD-As
over the past four decades.

158
Suzanne C. Nielsen, An Army Transformed: The U.S. Army’s Post-Vietnam Recovery and the
Dynamics of Change in Military Organizations, Letort Papers, no. 43 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies
Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2010), 3.
159
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 159.
41
 The first post-Vietnam defense strategy modification actually occurred while the
U.S. was still embroiled in the conflict. Faced with an increasing anti-war movement, and
growing national distaste for the draft, President Nixon abandoned the “two-and-one-half
war” defense strategy (meaning the military must be prepared to fight two conventional
wars and one irregular war simultaneously) and adopted the “one-and-a-half war” defense
strategy. 160 This departure meant that rather than supplying troops to defend allies and
partners globally, the U.S. would provide materiel aid and economic support. 161 For
USSF, which, like the rest of the military, was suffering from weak leadership and
numerous ethical scandals, the transition threatened the organization’s existence. While
President Nixon’s implementation of this strategy was cut short by his resignation,
President Ford not only kept the policy but also its authors who supervised implementation.

For the military, the shift in strategy meant that while the U.S. was withdrawing
from Vietnam, it would downsize the force. 162 USSF’s contemptuous relationship with
the conventional Army, due to its “absence from the cannon of strategic theory,” was
consequently starved of funding. 163 Conventional Army officers, seeing no future in the
unique force, further dissuaded talented personnel from joining. 164 By the late 1970s, the
confluence of these two factors nearly put USSF out of business. Seeing the proverbial
writing on the wall, “the vast majority of officers and non-commissioned officers with
[USSF] experience and knowhow fled into retirement or the conventional army.” 165 This
exodus left USSF in a state of organizational paralysis and resulted in attempts to rebrand

160
Previous administrations formulated the two-and-a-half-war strategy upon the concept that the U.S.
would need to defend Europe and Korea conventionally while also defending Southeast Asia through
irregular means. This necessarily linked China and Russia into a monolithic threat in strategists minds.
The one-and-a-half war strategy cognitively dissected the monolith and created opportunities. Henry
Kissinger, White House Years, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979), 220.
161
Richard Nixon, “Informal Remarks in Guam with Newsmen,” The American Presidency Project,
July 25 (1969).
162
Nielsen, An Army Transformed.
163
Alastair Finlan, Special Forces, Strategy and the War on Terror: Warfare by Other Means, 28
(New York: Routledge, 2008), 12.
164
Stanley A. McChrystal, My Share of the Task: A Memoir (New York: Portfolio, 2014), 33.
165
Charles M. Simpson III and Robert B. Rheault, Inside the Green Berets: The First Thirty Years, a
History of the US Army Special Forces (New York: Presidio Press, 1983), 219.
42
the organization as a reconnaissance and direct-action force offering commanders
enhanced but nevertheless conventional capability. As Mark Boyatt describes, “Special
Forces became a very expensive (in rank and training) conventional force. The
unconventional operations aspect [of USSF] remained only barely viable.” 166

President Carter’s foreign policy attempted to create a more peaceful global

environment by creating détente with the Soviet Union while promoting human rights
internationally. This led to bi-lateral talks with the Soviets focused on limiting the
proliferation of nuclear weapons that became known as the Strategic Arms Limitation
Talks (SALT) I and II. President Carter predicated the SALT talks upon the Soviet’s
limiting their expansion. However, as the Soviets proved throughout the 1970s, the
communists had no interest in restraint. Not wanting to repeat another Vietnam, President
Carter shifted his defense policy to protect U.S. vital interests, specifically those in the
Persian Gulf and Europe through conventional deterrence. This era of “limited goals”
further constrained USSF’s role as there was “no taste among executive branch
policymakers for anything like unconventional involvements by the military.” 167

The Reagan administration was in some ways a double-edged sword for USSF. On
the one hand, the administration sought to roll back Soviet expansion, spoke openly about
supporting anti-communist insurgencies, and increased funding for and the size of SOF
units. 168 On the other hand, the administration was mostly unable to penetrate the
military’s “traditional close focus on the Soviet conventional threat in Europe.” 169

Moreover, the administration’s reluctance to support anti-communist insurgencies

with troops limited its goals to supplying military aid. Left with a national policy that
supported irregular warfare but military leadership and a political environment that did not,
USSF throughout the 1980s concentrated on conforming into the conventional apparatus.

166
Mark D Boyatt, Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army
War College Press, 1993), 8.
167
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 159.
168
Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, “Anti-Communist Insurgency and American Policy,” The National Interest,
no. 1 (1985): 91–96.
169
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 184.
43
In many ways, USSF distanced itself from its core, mission of UW and instead focused on
“raiding and deep reconnaissance for large conventional operations.” 170 This is not to say
that unconventional and irregular operations and training did not occur and succeed,
particularly under the revamped MTT construct, but rather that the focus was based upon
tactics most useful in conventional battle. 171

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, remaining political interest in UW

evaporated. Except for the Persian Gulf War, the predominance of U.S. military endeavors
throughout the 1990s was in peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance operations. These
operations, combined with sweeping budget cuts under the Clinton administration, should
have necessitated a conventional military adaptation toward a lighter, more expeditionary
force. 172 However, once again, “conventional wisdom” prevailed and the military writ
large remained focused on conventional warfare. This predominance of focus came to a
climax in the days and weeks following the 9–11 attacks, as senior ranking military leaders
recommended courses of action to President Bush that were conventional minded but
politically unsuitable. 173

September 11, 2001 brought USSF and UW back in vogue because it “offered
significant military advantages, emphasized partnerships to reduce U.S. causalities, and
reduced international perception of the U.S. killing Muslims.” 174 Moreover, the
unprecedented speed with which SOF, particularly SFOD-As, were able to oust the Taliban
elevated the participants to hero status and bolstered the administration’s political

170
Adams, 169.
171
Richard Shultz, “The Low-Intensity Conflict Environment of the 1990s,” Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science 517 (1991): 124.
172
Alan Tonelson, “Superpower without a Sword,” Foreign Affairs 72, no. 3 (1993): 166–80,
https://doi.org/10.2307/20045630.
173
Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown : A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 358.
174
Paul Wolfowitz to Donald Rumsfeld, “Using Special Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the Line,”
Memorandum, September 23, 2001, 9/11 Documents, The Rumsfeld Papers,
http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library/page/911-documents; Donald Rumsfeld to George Bush, “Strategic
Thoughts,” Memorandum, September 30, 2001, http://papers.rumsfeld.com/library/page/911-documents.
44
standing. 175 As a consequence, USSF emerged in 2002 from Afghanistan as triumphant
victors and the vindicators of American sovereignty. This desire to “fight smart,” was
replicated during the invasion of Iraq, and SFOD-As deployed en masse to conduct UW as
well as a variety of other missions in support of the 2003 invasion.

Following the defeat of the Iraqi military and subsequent “de-Baathification,” the
situation in Iraq degraded into anarchy as rival insurgent groups battled for supremacy of
the country. The chaos of Iraq and the associated increase in U.S. causalities represented a
significant political risk for the Bush administration. As noted by Eichenberge, Stoll, and
Lebo, President Bush’s approval rating dropped “about one percentage point for every 100
deaths of American personnel in Iraq.” 176 To overcome this, the military leadership
abandoned longstanding precedent and began to report the ratio of U.S. deaths vs.
insurgents killed. This framing of the deteriorating situation served to demonstrate
“measures of success” and were designed to decrease the impact of individual
servicemember deaths’ on the U.S. population. 177 From 2004 until 2007, when General
Petraeus took command of the Multi-National Force-Iraq (MNFI), the military, including
USSF, conducted DA centric CT operations while continually providing the media with
body-count statistics reminiscent of the Vietnam War. Operations in Afghanistan mirrored
the DA focused approach as the Taliban insurgency gained momentum.

2. Social Change

Entertainment has affected military investment as artists depict hyperbolic

examples of SOF as either rogues who have gone “full native” or counter-terrorists who
can accomplish the impossible. While entertainment can be seen as a reflection of the
society’s perception of SOF, it can also drive the military’s vision of itself at present and

175
Richard C. Eichenberg, Richard J. Stoll, and Matthew Lebo, “War President: The Approval Ratings
of George W. Bush,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (December 2006): 783–808,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706293671.
176
Eichenberg, Stoll, and Lebo, 788.
177
William A Boettcher and Michael D Cobb, “Echoes of Vietnam?: Casualty Framing and Public
Perceptions of Success and Failure in Iraq,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 50, no. 6 (2006): 833,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002706293665.
45
what it should be in the future. Moreover, entertainment and war futurists have recently
coincided in their predictions of future environments. As Sean McFate describes:
“Washington’s visions of future war look like they came off a Hollywood set [and] come
in three flavors: nihilists, patriots, and technophiles.” 178 Nihilists predict future Mad-Max-
style dystopias, patriots predict environments where military strength wins the day, and
technophiles predict a technology-driven future with sentient machines controlling
warfare. 179 All of these predictions miss the mark but have effectively driven strategy
and investment in technology within the military. 180 At times, the technological focus has
left the military with a capability gap regarding population based operations in support of
strategic goals.

3. The Economic Environment

As is the case with any unit, funding has always played a pivotal role in the
organization of USSF. As previously noted, before the adoption of the Nunn-Cohen
amendment, USSF was profoundly affected by disproportionate funding cuts compared to
the conventional military. In the post-Vietnam environment, this also led to significant
reductions in force, which “destroyed USSF operational readiness as effectively as
grapeshot.” 181 To overcome the perceived lack of value, USSF focused on becoming
proficient at individual and collective tasks that fit into the greater construct of warfare as
envisioned by the conventional military at the time. This was particularly true prior to the
Nunn-Cohen amendment when USSF’s focus centered upon DA and SR operations in
support of the AirLand Battle operating concept.

4. Technological Change

Without a doubt, the greatest technological change since the U.S. departure from
Vietnam has been the proliferation of computers. While computers and technology

178
Sean McFate, The New Rules of War: Victory in the Age of Durable Disorder, First edition (New
York: William Morrow & Co, 2019), 12.
179
McFate, 12–14.
180
McFate, The New Rules of War.
181
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 26.
46
profoundly impacted the daily lives of the global population, in terms of the U.S. military,
it gave rise to the concept of a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). By “shifting the
balance between offense and defense,” the RMA concept meshed well with the U.S.
military’s propensity for offensive and conventional operations. 182 This contributed to a
belief within the military that technological superiority would ensure battlefield success
and the DoD focused heavily on expensive technological innovations. 183 As described by
H.R. McMaster, the RMA “took a very technological approach to the very complex human
and political problem of war.” 184 Accordingly, the U.S. predominantly focused its
modernization efforts in the 1990s on the tenets of the RMA: “precision strike and delivery,
information warfare, dominant maneuver, and space (systems and/or operations). 185 For
USSF, this meant that while the conventional military focused on defeating conventional
opponents, the non-conventional role for USSF expanded.

The speed of news dissemination also contributed to the adaptation of USSF from
its traditional role of UW. This growth was initially seen in the Vietnam War and, as noted,
it had a huge impact on how that conflict was prosecuted. Following the Vietnam War, the
media began to focus on terrorism as an emerging global trend of violence. Consequently,
as terrorist attacks began to occur against the U.S. abroad as well as at home, American
interest steadily grew. This is not to say that terrorism grew because of interest but rather
that the growth of the media provided terrorists with a global audience and made
terrorism’s impact larger than before.

In the 1970s, the growth of terrorism generated particular attention during the Ford
administration as the Soviets began to promote its use as a new form of proxy warfare. 186

182
Thierry Gongora and Harald Von Riekhoff, eds., Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs: Defense
and Security at Teh Dawn of the Twenty-First Century, Contributions in Military Studies, no. 197
(Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2000).
183
McFate, The New Rules of War, 43.
184
H.R. McMaster, A Conversation with Lieutenant General H. R. McMaster, December 4, 2014,
https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20141204-a-conversation-with-lieutenant-general-h-r-
mcmaster.
185
Gongora and Von Riekhoff, Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs, 141.
186
Neil C. Livingstone and David Halevy, Inside the PLO: Covert Units, Secret Funds, and the War
against Israel and the United States (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1990), 243.
47
In May 1976, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld published a memo entitled “Terrorism”
which highlighted the “concern within the Government over the difficult problem.” 187 The
high-profile Israeli rescue of hostages in Entebbe led to even greater interest in the military
for Counterterrorism (CT) operations. For USSF, which was held in “precarious value” at
the time, CT represented an opportunity for renewed relevancy. 188

By 1979, the military had gone from having no CT forces to several “full-time”
units and even more “semi-pros” from across the services. 189 The failed attempt to rescue
American hostages held in Iran in 1980, and the subsequent Holloway Commission
Report, highlighted several deficiencies of SOF that contributed to the failure. As a
consequence, Congress was primed to enact legislation to address the problems that had
become rampant throughout SOF. President Reagan’s inauguration and his “peace through
strength” foreign policy further set the conditions for sweeping change within the Defense
Department.

Despite the findings of the Holloway Commission, which highlighted service

parochialism as a factor that led to the failure of the Iran-Hostage rescue mission, the
military remained mostly unchanged in terms of support to SOF. However, failed and near-
failed operations as part of the U.S. invasion of Grenada grew political interest and
necessitated further congressional inquiry. 190 After conducting a two-year study, which
included a review of SOF, Senators Goldwater and Nichols introduced legislation to end
the rampant parochialism and force necessary jointness within the services.

While the Goldwater-Nichols Act produced organizational change within the

military, SOF remained subject to financial restriction dependent upon the service chiefs’

187
Rumsfeld as cited in: Forrest L. Marion, Brothers in Berets: The Evolution of Air Force Special
Tactics, 1953-2003 (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2018), 123.
188
Susan L. Marquis, Unconventional Warfare: Rebuilding U.S. Special Operations Forces
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 7.
189
Sean Naylor, Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 2015).
190
United States Special Operations Command History : 20 (1987-2007) Proven in the Past, Vigilant
Today, Prepared for the Future, 20th anniversary ed., USSOCOM History (MacDill AFB, FL: U.S. Special
Operations Command, 2007).
48
vision for the force. Consequently, USSF continued to struggle for relevancy in the
military’s new operational design: AirLand Battle. Seeing this, Senators Nunn and Cohen
introduced legislation which created a four-star combatant command for all of SOF.
“Additionally, the legislation created an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict
within the National Security Council, and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF
(the so-called ‘SOF checkbook’).” 191 In 1987, Congress passed this legislation and for the
first time protected USSF from funding and personnel cuts by giving SOF the same level
of representation as other combatant commands.

B. MISSION AND TASKS

Since Vietnam, USSF has had a variety of missions ranging from elite commando
operations to UW in support of national objectives. These missions, driven by the
environmental factors, necessarily demanded capability adaptation within the SFOD-A.
The variety of these missions though resulted in a force more capable of executing ad hoc
capability adaptation while decreasing the potential long-term changes that would more
specifically enable UW operations.

With the departure of the U.S. military from Vietnam, “Pentagon service staffs
declared acronyms such as COIN and UW to be ‘bad words.’” 192 As a result of this lack
of enthusiasm for traditional USSF operations, USSF sought new avenues to display
relevance within the national defense apparatus. 193 In the late 1970s, the growth of
terrorism provided USSF with such an opportunity. For a time, some USSF units
concentrated exclusively on conducting CT operations. This capability requirement was so
prevalent that it even affected “Detachment Berlin,” the regiment’s most fully capable and

191
United States Special Operations Command History, 7.
192
Briscoe, “Training on a Shoestring,” 26.
193
Hy S. Rothstein, “A Tale of Two Wars: Why the United States. Cannot Conduct Unconventional
Warfare” (PhD, diss., Tufts University, 2004).
49
mission-focused UW element. The result was mission competition, meaning that USSF
units began to give up training time to prepare for CT rather than UW. 194

With the realization of the need for a National CT unit, USSF seemed to policy
makers to be the likely unit from which to create the force. Under the direction of General
Edward Myer, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, an experienced USSF officer, began organizing
an elite DA-focused unit. 195 Colonel Mountel, the 5th SFG(A) commander at the time,
was unimpressed with Beckwith’s vision and advocated for a parallel unit with a greater
focus on SR and clandestine activities and owned by USSF. 196 The unit Mountel created
came to be known as “Blue Light,” and although it was only active for a short period of
time the members went on to create what would later be called the Special Forces
Advanced Reconnaissance Target Analysis and Exploitation Techniques Course
(SFARTAETC), a course still active today. 197

Despite being effectively forced out as the national CT force, CT remained one of
USSF doctrinal tasks but was no longer the focus mission. The military’s adoption of the
AirLand Battle operating concept effectively refocused the Army toward high-intensity
conflict. Left without political backing for UW or CT, USSF found itself increasingly
willing to “play ball with the services” and throughout the 1980s, the regiment adopted
mostly conventional missions such as DA and SR in support of the new AirLand Battle
concept. 198

The AirLand Battle concept, was conceived by General Starry in 1977 but largely
implemented in the 1980s and was formulated upon two assumptions. The first was that
the Army could not withstand another protracted fight like the one in Vietnam. 199 The
second was that conventional war could be fought and won against the Soviets in Europe.

194
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 1939 of 3604.
195
Charlie A. Beckwith, Delta Force (San Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1983).
196
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 162.
197
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 1911 of 3604.
198
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 159.
199
John L. Romjue, The Army of Excellence. The Development of the 1980s Army (Fort Monroe, VA:
Army Training and Doctrine Command, 1993), 15.
50
The latter of these assumptions was based on the Israeli Army’s ability to defeat Soviet-
style opponents during the Yom Kippur War by using advanced U.S. weapons. 200
Consequently, General Starry’s operating concept focused on defeating a Soviet invasion
of Europe by concentrating on winning the first battle. 201 This transition of thought from
a protracted war to one of massive conventional battle left little room for typical USSF
missions.

During the Persian Gulf War, the AirLand Battle concept was put on display as
conventional Army units produced one of the finest examples of a Jominian “battle of
annihilation” in history. American citizens at home were, for the first time, awed by the
accuracy of airstrikes through video images distributed by the military from the nose cones
of guided bombs. Moreover, the technological capability gap between ground forces
enabled victory in battle despite incidents where U.S. forces faced a numerically superior
opponent. 202 The consequence of the 100-hour-long blitzkrieg had an enduring effect on
the minds of military theorists throughout the 1990s and, for many, confirmed the advent
of a RMA.

The Persian Gulf War both exemplified USSF’s capability to support AirLand
Battle through conventional support to high-intensity operations such but also began a slow
revival of USSF irregular warfare capability. As stated by General Tovo, “Special Forces
conducted a wide range of missions during the Gulf War, with varying degrees of effect on
the overall campaign. The majority of these activities fell into four broad categories:
coalition support, combat search and rescue (CSAR), SR, and DA.” 203 While three of the
activities of CSAR, SR, and DA can widely be seen as a result of the 1980s focus within
USSF, coalition support, can be seen as an activity more closely related to a traditional
USSF task. This task ultimately necessitated the deployment of 109 Coalition Support

200
Romjue, 9.
201
U. S. Army, FM 100-5 Operations (Department of the Army (US), 1977).
202
Douglas A. Macgregor, Warrior’s Rage: The Great Tank Battle of 73 Easting (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 2009).
203
Kenneth E. Tovo, Special Forces’ Mission Focus for the Future (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College, 1995), 17, http://handle.dtic.mil/100.2/ADA309816.
51
Teams (CST) from the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 5th SFG(A), to hold together what General
Schwarzkopf considered his center of gravity: the coalition. 204 While assigned in this role,
USSF teams not only trained the pan-Arab force but also provided conventional
commanders with “ground truth” of coalition force capabilities. 205 The proliferation of
coalition operations in support of U.N. mandates throughout the1990s repeatedly
demanded USSF to perform this role.

The reclamation of Kuwait and the defeat of the Iraqi military brought an end to
Operation Desert Storm. However, with encouragement from the allied forces, Iraqi Shia
and Kurdish populations rose up in revolt against Saddam Hussein. 206 Although the Iraqi
military was defeated, it was far from destroyed. Consequently, Saddam Hussein turned
his military loose on the rebels who were hopelessly overmatched by Iraqi armor and
continuously attacked by helicopter gunships. Faced with nightly broadcasts of Iraqi
brutality, the Bush administration, with U.N. approval, acted to stop what was sure to
become a genocide. Almost immediately, the U.S. began supplying aid via airdrops to the
displaced Kurds in what would become the most massive aerial delivery of aid since the
Berlin Airlift. 207 Members of the 1st Battalion, 10th SFG(A), who had been deployed to
Northern Iraq during the war to provide CSAR capability, were once again called upon.
Beginning in April 1991, just one month after the Kurdish uprising, these members entered
Northern Iraq, to meet with Kurdish leaders and to coordinate aerial aid. 208 The
demonstrated success of USSF to conduct this type of operation made it the “go-to” for
Humanitarian Assistance (HA). operations throughout the 1990s.

USSF deployments throughout the 1990s saw four-fold increases as the

conventional Army struggled between budgetary constraints and the need to continue to

204
N.M. Cowling, “It Doesn’t Take a Hero; GEN H. Norman Schwarzkopf - the Autobiography,”
Scientia Militaria 25, no. 1 (2012), https://doi.org/10.5787/25-1-267.
205
United States Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress:
Pursuant to Title V Persian Gulf Conflict Supplemental Authorization and Personnel Benefits Act of 1991
(Public Law 102-25). (Department of Defense, 1992).
206
Adams, US Special Operations Forces in Action, 247.
207
Adams, 247.
208
Adams, 247.
52
modernize the force. 209 However, as noted, the prevailing strategic thought of the 1990s
was dedicated to the RMA, which saw the technological edge demonstrated by U.S. forces
in the Persian Gulf War as a vision for the future. 210 This vision predicted that wars could
be fought and won through the application of firepower from the air and sea onto land. In
essence, and despite indications to the contrary, the military remained focused on high-
intensity warfare, effectively allowing USSF to play a more significant role in countering
irregular threats as it was intended to do.

By the close of the 1990s, the reputation of USSF had recovered from the Vietnam
stigma and it was seen as the “go-to” force when strategic effects were required. This was
demonstrated in the wake of the 2001 terrorist attacks when ”the shock of 9/11 failed to
provoke originality or imagination” from conventional Army leadership. 211 Faced with
courses of action which emphasized kinetic strikes from afar with minimal to no “boots on
the ground,” President Bush opted to use USSF and CIA teams to link up with Afghan
tribesmen and provide intelligence for the approaching armada of airpower. 212 For the
first few months in Afghanistan, USSF was able to accomplish multiple goals including
facilitating the union of many tribes against the Taliban, the removal of the oppressive
regime from power, and providing limited humanitarian assistance. These activities
enabled the creation of what would become the Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan (GIRoA).

Although the U.S. removed the Taliban from power, the subsequent decades of
fighting proved the insurgents’ capability to reform and regain momentum while attacking
coalition forces and destabilizing the GIRoA. To combat this threat, USSF’s focus
throughout the initial years of the conflict centered on DA raids with pro-GIRoA

209
James Kitfield, “New World Warriors,” Government Executive, November, 1995, 39.
210
Sean M. Maloney and Scot Robertson, “The Revolution in Military Affairs: Possible Implications
for Canada,” International Journal 54, no. 3 (1999): 445, https://doi.org/10.2307/40203405.
211
Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 358.
212
George W. Bush, Decision Points (Crown, 2010), 191; Wolfowitz to Rumsfeld, “Using Special
Forces on ‘Our Side’ of the Line,” September 23, 2001.
53
militias. 213 With pressure from the international community, these activities were later
curtailed and replaced with efforts to build the Afghan National Army (ANA) and Afghan
National Police (ANP). 214 However, the resurgence of the Taliban demonstrated that the
enemy-focused strategy could not succeed and required that the U.S. and GIRoA
concentrate on local security. While several programs were attempted, Village Stability
Operations (VSO) eventually became the consummate operation for SFOD-As in
Afghanistan.

The VSO program was begun in 2009 and paired SFOD-As with local villages to
capitalize on the Pashtunwali concept of arbakai or local militia. 215 While this operation
was similar in form to previous USSF efforts with pro-GIRoA militias, the difference was
in focus. Rather than attacking the Taliban, VSO, like its Vietnam CIDG predecessor,
concentrated its efforts on the population. This indirect approach to COIN fit in well with
the 2007 joint COIN Field Manual and consequently received support from the military
leadership. As the concept was refined, VSO maintained focused on four tenets of
successful COIN operations: Shape, Hold, Build, and Expand. 216 Although these
operations varied in their ability to create stability and link villages back to the government
in Kabul, the concept nonetheless consumed the predominance of USSF’s effort in
Afghanistan from 2010–2014.

The early success of USSF in Afghanistan boosted USSF’s credibility within the
joint force, and many of the SFOD-As that participated in the invasion of Afghanistan were
again called upon for the invasion of Iraq. As Linda Robinson notes, USSF “had led the
conventional military to appreciate what they could do. Whereas they had been restricted
to a small set of missions in the first Gulf War, General Tommy Franks, the Central
Command four-star in charge of Operation Iraqi Freedom, was willing to entertain any

213
Mark Moyar, Village Stability Operations and the Afghan Local Police (MACDILL AFB, FL: Joint
Special Operations University, 2014), 6.
214
Moyar, 6.
215
Moyar, 3.
216
Ty Connett and Bob Cassidy, “Village Stability Operations: More than Village Defense,” Special
Warfare 24, no. 3 (2011): 23.
54
proposal they made.” 217 In what would become the most massive deployment of Western
SOF in history, SFOD-As conducted a “very broad” array of missions during the invasion
of Iraq. 218 Whether it was UW in Northern Iraq with the Kurds or DA and SR in Western
Iraq to find and destroy SCUD launch sites, USSF time and again demonstrated its
capability to execute tactical level operations with operational and strategic impacts. 219

While it took the Taliban years to develop an insurgency model in Afghanistan that
could destabilize the country, the anarchic environment in Iraq following the invasion
proved to be fertile ground for Sunni and Shia insurgent groups. The resultant civil war,
combined with political risk for the Bush administration, necessitated USSF to take part in
the enemy-centric COIN strategy. While USSF teams conducted a variety of missions
throughout the country, perhaps the operation with the most significant long-term impact
was the creation of the Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Force (ICTF), which would eventually
grow into the Division-sized Iraqi Counter-Terrorism Service (CTS).

As noted in David Witty’s seminal work on the history of the CTS, in December
2003, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld mandated the creation of an Iraqi counterterrorism
unit. 220 USSF’s inherent ability to develop indigenous populations into fighting units and
experience in (what had become) FID, made it the best candidate to execute the
directive. 221 Beginning in early 2004, USSF chose individuals from across religious
groups, trained them in Jordan for 98 days, and returned them to Iraq to conduct combined
CT operations with USSF. 222 For a short time, USSF’s efforts to create an Iraqi

217
Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces (New York: Public
Affairs, 2004), 243.
218
Michael Smith, Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America’s Most Secret Special Operations Team
(New York: Macmillan, 2008), 252; Charles H Briscoe, All Roads Lead to Baghdad: Army Special
Operations Forces in Iraq (Fort Bragg, NC: USASOC History Office, 2006), 80.
219
Linda Robinson, Masters of Chaos; Smith, Killer Elite, 252.
220
David Witty, The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2015),
6.
221
Glenn D. Furbish et al., SIGIR 11-004 Iraqi Security Forces: Special Operations Force Program Is
Achieving Goals, but Iraqi Support Remains Critical to Success (ARLINGTON, VA: Special Inspector
General for Iraq Reconstruction, 2010), 1.
222
Witty, The Iraqi Counter Terrorism Service.
55
counterterrorism unit were broken into two disparate battalions: the ICTF battalion and the
Iraqi Civil Defense Corps (ICDC). However, in May 2004, USSF was directed to combine
these battalions under the First Iraqi Special Operations Brigade (ISOF). The combination
of these units under one banner, as well as the integration of support and reconnaissance
battalions, created a force capable of executing the find, fix, and finish tasks of the targeting
cycle internally. The growth of ISOF necessitated a more significant concentration of
USSF on a rotating basis to ensure the concept remained valid. The result has been the
longest-enduring relationship between USSF and any foreign military unit and created one
of the most successful Iraqi Security Force Organizations. 223

C. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (1973-2019)

The period from the close of the Vietnam War to the Global War on Terrorism has
been marked by profound political, technological, and economic environmental change.
This fluctuation of the environment combined with the persistent need for relevancy has,
at times, created a pendulum effect of focus for USSF. For instance, at times, the force has
focused on unilateral, direct operations in support of national or conventional military
objective and at others focused on working “by, with, and through” partners and allies to
achieve goals. 224 This mission variation has produced some long-term organizational
adaptation which has mostly centered on increasing detachment’s lethality. More
commonly though, these changes have demanded ad hoc capability adaptation as dictated
by the mission and environment.

Perhaps the greatest lethality adaptation which has occurred within the SFOD-A
was the creation of the SFOD-A internal Special Operation Tactical Air Controller
(SOTAC). Although USSF has always maintained the ability to call in airstrikes, advanced
education in precision bombing provided by airpower experts was identified as a need
within the SFOD-A during the invasion of Afghanistan. As noted by Dan Schilling, SFOD-

223
Department of Defense, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq (Washington, DC: Department of
Defense, 2009),
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Master_9204_29Jan10_FINAL_SIGNED.pdf.
224
Boyatt, Unconventional Operations Forces of Special Operations.
56
A 595 (one of the initial teams into Afghanistan) self-recognized that “they were ‘yard-
saleing’ bombs all over the place” and requested support. 225 To fill the gap in capability,
USSF in Afghanistan requested Air Force Joint Terminal Air Controllers (JTAC). 226
However, the increased demand for SFOD-As within the GWOT combined with the
precision strike capability offered by manned and unmanned air support outpaced the Air
Force’s ability to provide qualified JTACs. 227 This necessitated the development of an
additional skill within the SFOD-A.

Almost immediately after the first troops returned from operations in Afghanistan,
USSF developed a program to build a Special Operations Tactical Air Controller (SOTAC)
with JTAC capability and authority. In the fall of 2002, a pilot program was run at Ft.
Bragg and was incorporated into the USSF Warrant Officer Basic Course. 228 After the
concept was validated, it became operational and ran the first SOTAC course in December
2002. 229 Between 2002 and 2017, the SOTAC program produced more than 500 graduates
and drove requirements for SFOD-As to maintain two qualified SOTAC’s at all times. 230

Similar to the SOTAC course, the Special Forces Advanced Urban Combat Course
was initiated by General Boykin, who saw the necessity for urban combat training during
his deployment to Somalia. 231 This program was then disseminated throughout the active
duty groups to increase collective DA skills in an urban environment. In 1999, leaders
within the 7th SFG(A), saw the predictions of population growth and urbanization as

225
Dan Schilling and Lori Chapman Longfritz, Alone at Dawn: Medal of Honor Recipient John
Chapman and the Untold Story of the World’s Deadliest Special Operations Force (New York: Grand
Central Publishing, 2019), 5.
226
Schilling and Longfritz, Alone at Dawn.
227
Sean Mulholland, Singleton M.A., and Shannon Boehm, “SOTACC: Training SF Soldiers in Close
Air Support and Terminal Air Control,” Special Warfare 16, no. 1 (April 2003),
https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8228.
228
Mulholland, M.A., and Boehm, 7.
229
Mulholland, M.A., and Boehm, 7.
230
David M. Nolan, “SF JTAC,” Special Warfare 30, no. 3 (July 2017): 8–9,
https://www.soc.mil/SWCS/SWmag/archive/SW3003/30-3_JUL_SEP_2017.pdf.
231
Robinson, Masters of Chaos: The Secret History of the Special Forces, 155.
57
indicators of future metropolitan conflict and redoubled efforts in SFAUCC training.232
To prepare their SFOD-As, 7th SFG(A) leaders honed the program to include “34 hours of
combat marksmanship, 60 hours advanced urban combat, and 26 hours of general subjects”
training. 233 By the Spring of 2000, the revamped SFAUCC graduated ten 7th SFG(A)
SFOD-As and the concept was again disseminated throughout the regiment. 234 This
course was undeniably prescient in its creation and lifesaving on the battlefields of Iraq
and Afghanistan.

While ad hoc changes are as diverse as the missions that USSF has conducted, there
are several worth mentioning because they highlight internal organizational adaptability.
Moreover, some of these changes demonstrate the need for a scaled version of a SFOD-As
while others highlight the need for additional external capability. In either of these cases,
what is telling is that the variety of missions has resulted in an inability to specialize SFOD-
As to conduct UW operations.

In terms of scaling up the size of an SFOD-A, the best example is that of Project
Blue Light which combined five SFOD-As into one company-sized organization with a
CT mission. 235 Just a decade and a half later, SFOD-As conducting SR in the deserts of
Iraq and Kuwait justifiable scaled their organizations down to decrease detection risk and
increase coverage area. 236 While splitting teams is doctrinally supported and the primary
reason for duplication within the SFOD-A, joining teams is doctrinally and culturally
unsupported. Moreover, while these adaptations demonstrate the individual flexibility of
USSF Soldiers, they fail to demonstrate a true organizational adaptation because they
offered more or less of the same capability.

While SFOD-A size has been adjusted dependent upon the demand of the mission
at hand, SFOD-As have also proven adept at requesting and incorporating external enablers

232
Salvatore Cambria, Edward Reeder, and James Kraft, “Warrior Ethos: The Key to Winning,”
Special Warfare 13, no. 2 (April 2000): 7, https://www.dvidshub.net/publication/issues/8126.
233
Cambria, Reeder, and Kraft, 7.
234
Cambria, Reeder, and Kraft, 7.
235
Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 1895 of 3604.
236
Robinson, Masters of Chaos, 99.
58
to cover capability gaps. For example, during the VSO operations in Afghanistan, many
SFOD-As requested embedded Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and CA
Teams. These additional teams increased detachment’s ability to leverage gains within the
rural villages of Afghanistan and link them back to the government in Kabul. However,
unlike their CIDG predecessor, the VSO operating concept never codified the best practices
for the organization of the SFOD-A with enablers. Consequently, some SFOD-As VSO
programs were inundated with enablers while others opted for a more minimalist approach.

D. CONCLUSION

From the close of the Vietnam War to the Global War on Terrorism, USSF has
conducted a myriad of missions and executed countless ad hoc organizational changes.
These changes have been executed as a result of the missions assigned and the environment
in which they occurred. The results of a wide variety of missions has enabled USSF to gain
and maintain relevancy. Reciprocally though, it has also denied long-term organizational
adaptation that would better prepare the SFOD-A to execute its raison d’etre, UW.

59
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60
 V. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

A. A SHIFT IN PRIORITY

In the 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the 2018 National Defense
Strategy (NDS), the Trump administration identified great power competition, particularly
the growing threats of Russia and China, as primary security concerns for the United States.
As demonstrated by recent defense investments, it is clear the U.S. is attempting to counter
these threats and others through technological superiority. 237 This “third offset strategy,”
a term popularized by former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, seeks to create a
technological capability gap so large that it serves as a deterrent against aggressive peer
and near peer state actors. 238 The problem, as demonstrated in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria,
Crimea, etc, is that technological superiority does little to dissuade states from employing
asymmetric or unconventional operations to combat U.S. interests below the threshold of
conventional response.

In his 1948 memorandum, George Kennan highlighted the ability of great powers
to use “all the means at a nation’s command, short of war, to achieve its national
objectives.” 239 This “political warfare” as Kennan described it, enables nations to advance
their strategic objectives through overt and covert actions while mitigating the risk of direct
military confrontation. Kennan was not alone in seeing the necessity of options to project
national power outside of conventional military confrontation. In 1952, General Robert

237
For more information regarding U.S. recent defense investments, see: David Larter, “US Navy
Signs Mammoth Contract with Huntington Ingalls for Two Aircraft Carriers,” Defense News, February 1,
2019, https://www.defensenews.com/breaking-news/2019/01/31/us-navy-has-inked-a-contract-for-two-
carriers-congressman-says/; Jon Harper, “Army S&T Money Focused on ‘Big Six’ Priorities,” National
Defense 102, no. 775 (2018): 8–8.
238
Chuck Hagel, “Secretary of Defense Speech: Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote,” U.S.
Department of Defense, accessed July 8, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech-
View/Article/606635/reagan-national-defense-forum-keynote/.
239
George F. (George Frost) Kennan 1904-2005, “George F. Kennan on Organizing Political Warfare”
(April 30, 1948), Obtained and contributed to CWIHP by A. Ross Johnson. Cited in his book Radio Free
Europe and Radio Liberty, Ch1 n4 – NARA release courtesy of Douglas Selvage. Redacted final draft of a
memorandum dated May 4, 1948, and published with additional redactions as document 269, FRUS,
Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment., History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive,
https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/114320.
61
McClure and Lieutenant Colonels Aaron Bank and Russel Volkmann founded the U.S.
Army Special Forces (USSF). 240 For these men, the ability to support resistance and
insurgent groups to coerce, disrupt, or overthrow a government or an occupying power was
critical to U.S. defense. 241 These actions which would later be codified under the term
Unconventional Warfare (UW) were USSF’s raison d’etre. Today, USSF remains the only
organization in the U.S. military specifically designed to conduct these types of operations.

Throughout the Cold War, the U.S. and the USSR conducted UW operations
against one another’s interests. 242 As the current geopolitical environment returns to a
cold war atmosphere, it is unsurprising that our competitors are once again executing UW
operations. In fact, as Frank Hoffman argues, U.S. conventional overmatch has
incentivized these types of operations. 243 This is also indicative of a change of
environment which has seen a decrease in the usefulness of the “weight of numbers and
advanced weaponry.” 244 It is therefore paramount that USSF remains prepared and
organized to conduct or combat UW operations with increased frequency. If we do not,
then we risk the fate of French leaders at the outbreak of World War II whose minds had
become too “inelastic” to realize changes that had occurred to the character of warfare. 245

To maximize USSF’s competitive advantage to conduct UW operations, it must be

organizationally tailored for its operational environment. Preparing for the current
environment in an era characterized by rapid change is tantamount to preparing for the last

240
Bank, From OSS to Green Berets.
241
Department of the Army, Special Forces Unconventional Warfare Army Training Circular 18-01
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 2010).
242
Sergey Sukhankin, ‘Continuing War by Other Means’: The Case of Wagner, Russia’s Premier
Private Military Company in the Middle East, ed. Theodore Karasik and Stephen Blank (Washington, D.C:
The Jamestown Foundation, 2018), 290, https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Russia-in-the-
Middle-East-online.pdf?x87069#page=303; Joseph L. Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray
Zone,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 80 (2016): 101.
243
Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA, Potomac
Institute for Policy Studies, 2007).
244
John. Arquilla and Nancy C. Roberts, Design of Warfare (Monterey, CA, Naval Postgraduate
School, 2017), http://hdl.handle.net/10945/62564.
245
French minds “were too inelastic”: Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1949), 36–37, 45 quoted in McFate, The New Rules of War, 4.
62
war. Instead, USSF must be organizationally aimed to succeed in the next 10–20 years.
This requires an analysis of current global trends and peer activities that will likely play
large parts in determining the future environment. It also requires an analysis of previous
USSF adaptations to ensure that mistakes of the past are not replicated in the future.

B. THE CURRENT ENVIRONMENT

Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the world has significantly benefitted from Pax
Americana. This has witnessed the breakdown of barriers in communication and
economics that had previously been enforced by nation-states. As a result, throughout the
1990s and 2000s, the global number of deaths as a result of war declined as well as the
percent of the global population living in extreme poverty. 246 For the globalists who had
predicted that open trade between nations would promote peace, economic prosperity, and
establish a more modern world-order, these decades were evidence of truth. 247 Buried
within this economic prosperity, though, are the trends of globalization, urbanization, and
littoralization which are increasingly changing this global environment.

Perhaps the most impactful of the current global trends has been globalization itself.
Globalization is an umbrella term used to describe the interconnectivity of the international
community as a result of transnational economics and associated technological
advancement. 248 The combination of these two factors has facilitated a rise in the transfer
of capital between countries. As noted by the economist Anthony Giddens, “...the biggest
difference is in the level of finance and capital flows. Geared as it is to electronic money –
money that exists only as digits in computers – the current world economy has no parallels
in earlier times.” 249 This accelerated transfer of currency has led to the growth of
transnational corporations, which in turn has funded investments in technological and

246
Max Roser, “War and Peace,” Our World in Data, December 13, 2016,
https://ourworldindata.org/war-and-peace; Max Roser and Esteban Ortiz-Ospina, “Global Extreme
Poverty,” Our World in Data, May 25, 2013, https://ourworldindata.org/extreme-poverty.
247
Anthony Giddens, Runaway World: How Globalization Is Reshaping Our Lives (Taylor & Francis,
2003).
248
Nicholas C. Georgantzas et al., “Giddens’ Globalization: Exploring Dynamic Implications,” in
Proceedings of the 27th System Dynamics Society International Conference, 2009, 26–30.
249
Giddens, Runaway World, 9.
63
consumer products, particularly those associated with communications. As a result,
societies around the world, even those who have been historically isolated from external
influences, are being inundated with foreign culture. As Anna Simons notes, in more
traditional/tribal communities, this imposition of external influence has resulted in violent
reactions or “nativism.” 250 As exemplified by Islamist terrorism, this “nativism” can be
used to foment insurgencies or induce terrorist actions. 251

For many emerging societies, globalization has been beneficial to their economies
while resources have been plentiful; there is however, a growing downside. As a result of
economic growth and increases in the previously mentioned standard of living, the global
population has experienced unprecedented and near exponential growth. 252 This
population growth has not been equally distributed and the majority has taken place in
under-developed nations. 253 In some cases, the resultant decline in resources available
combined with “small wars,” has caused mass migrations, particularly to littoral areas
where trade, as a result of globalization, continues to thrive. 254 In other regions, the
demand for government provision of security and prosperity has increased making
governance progressively more difficult. 255 An example of this can be found along
Lebanon’s coast, where over a million refugees from the Syrian Civil War have emigrated
and threaten to destabilize an already-strained government.

Linked to the demand for better governance is that these issues rarely remain within
the confines of the state. This has made singular governments’ management more

250
Anna Simons, “Making Enemies: An Anthropology of Islamist Terror, Part I,” The American
Interest 1, No. 4, Summer 2006, http://hdl.handle.net/10945/38362.
251
Simons.
252
“United Nations World Population Prospects 2019: Highlights,” Population and Development
Review 36, no. 4 (2019): 854–55, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1728-4457.2010.00368.x.
253
Michael Krepon, The Stability-Instability Paradox, Misperception, and Escalation Control in South
Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, n.d.), 261–79.
254
David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains: The Coming Age of the Urban Guerrilla (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2013).
255
National Intelligence Council Washington United States, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress,
(Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 2017), 6.
64
challenging as non-governmental power brokers “block or circumvent political action.” 256
Externally, this has resulted in evolving state interests, which in some cases has
necessitated the growth of coalitions like the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and
the European Union and in others, led to requests for support from great power states.
Internally, though, the inability of governments to meet their populations’ governance
demand has left power vacuums which are then filled by Violent Extremist Organizations
(VEO), insurgents, local strongmen, and/or proxy militias. All of these factors have
contributed to the diminishment of state power particularly in the Middle East and Latin
America. 257

Great power states’ societies have generally been unaffected by the decline of
resources and mass migration occurring in emerging countries. This is not to say that these
societies are not depleting their own and the world’s resource availability, but rather that
the impact has not been felt to the same degree yet and, as a consequence, consumer
demand has not yet changed. This is mostly resultant from the positive economic effect of
globalization, technological investment, and the build-up of these governments’ militaries
as power projection platforms. As the pace of technology development, populations, and
consumption increase, the reciprocal demand for resources is also increased. This has and
will continue to lead great power states closer to confrontation. 258

Figure 6 is a Causal Loop Diagram (CLD) which graphicly depicts the current
global environment and emphasizes the aforementioned factors which are driving Great
Power Competition. CLDs help individuals to “see” problems systemically rather than
linearly by mapping the relationship between independent and dependent variables and
assigning a positive or negative polarity. 259 This polarity indicates whether the
independent variable results in the same (positive) or opposite (negative) effect in the

256
Global Trends, “Paradox of Progress,” National Intelligence Council, 2017, 6.
257
Trends, 19.
258
Robert R. Schaller, "Moore's Law: Past, Present, and Future," IEEE Spectrum 34, no. 6 (1997): 52–
59.
259
John. Sterman, Business Dynamics : Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (Boston:
Irwin/McGraw-Hill, 2000), 102.
65
dependent variable. If increasing/decreasing the independent variable causes the dependent
variable to increase/decrease beyond what it otherwise would have been, a positive polarity
is assigned. Reciprocally, if increasing/decreasing the independent variable causes the
dependent variable to decrease/increase beyond what it otherwise would have been, a
negative polarity is assigned. With this in mind, a CLD can help analyze a problem as
complex as the current global environment through “the identification of the behavior of
feedback structures at play within bounded systems and subsystems.” 260 The loops formed
in this process can be either balancing (opposing exponential growth) or reinforcing
(displaying exponential growth)

In this case, three balancing loops (B) demonstrate that economic growth will
continue to drive international trade, leading to the depletion of natural resources and
compelling the aforementioned state evolution and interest. The reinforcing loop (R)
demonstrates that more economic growth will continue to result in greater
interconnectedness between peoples and likely result in more “nativism.” The key
takeaway from this diagram, though, is the central role that economic growth has played
in leading to the current “Great Power Competition.” The outcome of this analysis is that
the global trends that have dominated the last two decades stem from globalization and will
continue unless otherwise abated. This means that the current environment of “Great Power
Competition” will continue in parallel to “small wars.” In fact, nuclear deterrence between
great power states increases the likelihood that proxy warfare such as UW will dominate
future conflict between great powers.

260
Norman Wayne Porter, “The Value of System Dynamics Modeling in Policy Analytics and
Planning,” in Policy Analytics, Modelling, and Informatics: Innovative Tools for Solving Complex Social
Problems, ed. J. Ramon Gil-Garcia, Theresa A. Pardo, and Luis F. Luna-Reyes (Cham: Springer
International Publishing, 2018), 262, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-61762-6_6.
66
 Figure 6. Causal loop diagram of the strategic nature of the environment

C. THE COMPETITIVE SPACE

As the confrontation between the U.S. and its peers / near peers seems inevitable,
it is necessary to examine the U.S. defense strategy to determine USSF’s role in the future.
Perhaps the most important concept of the 2018 National Defense Strategy is the direction
to “increase the competitive space.” 261 The Army’s recent publication Multi-Domain
Operations (MDO) has done an excellent job at reorienting the force toward multi-modal
operations designed to penetrate and “dis-integrate” conventional challengers in large-
scale battle. 262 The goal of this concept is to maintain the inter-domain dominance
advantages the Army has benefitted from during the GWOT in the event that great power
competition becomes great power combat.

261
Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy,” 2018,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf.
262
Department of the Army, The Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028 TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2018), 525-3–1,
https://www.tradoc.army.mil/Portals/14/Documents/MDO/TP525-3-1_30Nov2018.pdf.
67
 SOF’s success and consequent growth during GWOT have clearly manifested itself
in the MDO concept. However, in its current form, the MDO concept depicts SOF as acting
either in support of a larger campaign or preventing instability by building partner
capacity. 263 While USSF must be prepared to support a larger strategy by conducting
these operations, there is another operation that has even greater strategic utility: UW. As
the “only element in the U.S. Armed Forces organized, trained, and equipped specifically
for UW,” USSF must remain focused, organized, and prepared to conduct these
operations. 264

To better understand the total value that USSF can provide in this regard, it is
necessary to briefly examine the operations of our opponents. These opponents have,
through an application of UW and hybrid warfare strategies, routinely “outmaneuvered
their seemingly less nimble U.S. competitor.” 265 This examination is not intended to
provide a complete picture of each nation’s SOF and UW activities but rather to provide a
snapshot of current required capability with which USSF must be prepared to compete.

D. COMPETITIVE WORLD ACTORS

1. Russia

In his 2007 speech at the Munich Conference on Security Policy, President Putin
decried the U.S. dominated global order stating that the “unipolar model is not only
unacceptable but also impossible in today’s world.” 266 This speech signaled that Russia
was not only breaking from the concept of U.S. leadership but also Putin’s desire to roll
back western advances in the Russian sphere of influence. However, the Russian Army’s
poor performance during the Georgian War in 2008 made it clear to the Kremlin that
competition on the global stage in the 21st century required military reform. In a unique

263
Department of the Army, 525-3–1.
264
Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” 103.
265
Nathan Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone (Carlisle, PA:
Army War College, 2016), 6.
266
Vladimir Putin, “Putin’s Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security Policy,”
Washington Post 12 (February 12, 2007), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html.
68
maneuver in 2008, the Russian military decreased in size while increasing funding by a
third. 267 The result was an efficient, mobile, and adaptable force which borrowed from
traditional Russian military strengths such as maskirovka (deception) and reflexive control
as well as from western powers’ SOF capability. 268 The appointment of General Valery
Gerasimov in 2012 and his advocation for the inclusion of non-military means as a
component of war, furthered the new Russian hybrid warfare capability. 269 The first test
of the revised Russian way of war came in 2013–2014 with the annexation of Crimea and
outbreak of violence in the eastern Ukraine.

Following weeks of rioting in Kiev and the departure of the pro-Russian Ukrainian
President Yanukovych, the focus of the Kremlin’s interest shifted from national control
toward annexation of wealthy regions along the Ukraine’s eastern border. The first step
toward this goal was the annexation of Crimea, a predominantly ethnic Russian region of
the country. While western reporters and analysts observed, pro-Russian separatist units
took control of key facilities backed by unknown soldiers who wore sterile uniforms.
Despite these units being clearly of Russian origin, President Putin’s claims that there were
no Russian units participating in the secession left western news reporters dumbfounded as
to what to label these units, so they became known as “the little green men.”

As time progressed, more has become known about these “little green men” and
they have gone from shallow anonymity to being recognized as Russian SOF. In the days
leading up to the Crimean referendum, Russian SOF quietly infiltrated Crimea to conduct
reconnaissance, organize separatist units, create a sense of chaos, and, when the time was
right, execute limited direct-action operations. 270 These actions, which included the
seizure of the Crimean Parliament building, enabled the passage of a secession referendum

267
Maria Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine, vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Institute for
the Study of War, 2015), 133–35.
268
Timothy Thomas, “Russia’s Reflexive Control Theory and the Military,” Journal of Slavic Military
Studies 17, no. 2 (2004): 237–56; Tor Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and
Donbas.(Russian Military Power),” Parameters 46, no. 2 (2016): 13.
269
Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science Is in the Foresight,” Military Review 96, no. 1 (2016):
23.
270
Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas.(Russian Military Power).”
69
and the subsequent request for Russian annexation. Throughout this campaign, information
operations retained primacy and enabled the Kremlin to shape the environment while
simultaneously providing greater “flexibility and efficiency” to the Russian SOF units on
the ground. 271 These actions were so adeptly synchronized that at the time of the Crimean
parliament referendum vote, Kiev was still searching for a means to respond. Russian SOF,
backed by well-developed information operations, were able to create a fait accompli
before Kiev or NATO could muster an effective response. 272

Following the Russian annexation of Crimea, additional Russian SOF units began
to appear in other regions of Eastern Ukraine. While the Kremlin’s operations in Crimea
benefitted from a predominantly ethnic Russian population and local popular support, its
UW operations in eastern Ukraine did not. As a consequence, Russian SOF were forced to
take a more active role in inciting rebellion, conducting sabotage operations, intelligence
collection, and directing attacks against Ukrainian military targets. As early as April 2014,
Russian SOF units (again without insignia) were observed training local separatist units in
several cities within the Donbas region of the Ukraine. 273 Had it not been for Ukrainian
nationalist resistance units, the return of Ukrainian conscription, and sanctions by NATO,
the Russian operations in Eastern Ukraine would likely have ended in a similar result as
Crimea. Now, even after the deployment of thousands of Russian regulars to the region,
combat has ground into stalemate. 274 While the fate of the Donbass region remains
unclear, what is clear is that 21st century UW requires an adaptable force capable of
conducting a range of activities including covert and clandestine operations in support of a
detailed information operations campaign. Table 1 highlights the adaptability Russian SOF
demonstrated in the Crimea and Donbas campaigns.

271
Snegovaya, Putin’s Information Warfare in Ukraine, (Washington, DC Institute for the Study of
War, 2015), 17; US Army Special Operations Command, “Little Green Men" (Fort Bragg, NC: United
States Special Operations Command, 2016), 5.
272
Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas.(Russian Military Power),”
17.
273
Bukkvoll, 18.
274
US Army Special Operations Command, “Little Green Men": 60
70
 Table 1. Russian SOF operations in Ukraine. 275

Crimea Donbas
Direct action X
Special reconnaissance X X
Military assistance X
Covert action X X

The totality of Russian Special Operations cannot be understood without

considering its use of Private Military Contractors (PMC) to further its objectives while
providing the Kremlin greater deniability. In 2007, the Russian Duma and the Federation
Council passed a law allowing companies to legally use arms and “special means” for the
procurement and transfer of hydrocarbons. 276 This initial narrow focus of Russian PMCs
expanded as operations in the Ukraine ground to a stalemate and requests for support began
to arrive from Syria, Russia’s strategic partner in the Middle East. While PMC are
ostensibly private, their ownership by wealthy oligarchs with direct ties to the Kremlin has
made these organizations an extension of Russia’s foreign policy. 277 The colocation of
the Wagner Group, a premier Russian PMC company, and the 10th Special Forces Brigade
as well as its ownership by Yevgeny Prigozhin, an oligarch with direct ties to Putin further
validates this fact. 278

Whether operating in the Ukraine or in Syria, the Wagner Group’s actions closely
mirrored those of other Russian SOF units. This deliberate ambiguity has further provided
Putin with deniability of Russian activity while maintaining an adept expeditionary UW

275
Bukkvoll, “Russian Special Operations Forces in Crimea and Donbas.(Russian Military Power),”
20.
276
Sukhankin, ‘Continuing War by Other Means,’ 297.
277
Sukhankin, 297.
278
Sukhankin, 301–4.
71
capability. This force’s total capability was put on display when hundreds of Wagner PMC
and attached Syrian Army units attacked a U.S. / Kurdish base in Eastern Syria. 279

On February 7, 2018, after a week-long build-up of men and materiel, Wagner PMC
equipped with T-72 tanks, artillery and mortars attacked a small outpost containing
approximately 40 U.S. SOF and Kurdish Syrian Defense Force fighters. While the
motivation for this attack was most likely to seize the massive Conoco oil fields, the truly
fascinating factor was the tenaciousness of the attackers. As noted by Sean McFate, these
forces did not waiver but pressed their attack for four hours under relentless air attack by
U.S. rotary and fixed wing aircraft as well as High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS). 280 This clearly indicates that the Russian PMC was trained and equipped to
fight against an aggressive adversary. Moreover, it demonstrates that Russia is prepared to
use its PMCs like SOF to achieve political objectives which, had they originated from a
less ambiguous organization, would have been declared an act of war.

2. China

Despite its revolutionary origins and Mao’s central role in formulating international
UW strategy, China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is noticeably lacking a SOF UW
capability. This capability gap is especially interesting considering that during the Cold
War, China adeptly conducted UW operations as part of its strategy to expand communism
throughout Asia. The current gap in a SOF UW force highlights that China’s strategy sees
no need for the capability. Rather than investing in military UW as a means of power
projection, PLA SOF capability more closely resembles that of the U.S. Army Ranger
Regiment, which focuses on swift Direct-Action missions in support of a national
objective. 281 This deliberate choice indicates the China’s belief that “non-military
warfare” is the future form of global competition. 282

279
McFate, The New Rules of War, 131.
280
McFate, 132.
281
Dave Majumdar, “China’s Special Forces Units Are Getting Ready for War,” The National Interest,
July 17, 2018.
282
Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare (Beijing: PLA Literature and Arts
Publishing House Arts, 1999).
72
 In what has become a founding document for the PLA’s current operations, the
book Unrestricted Warfare highlighted the need for China to change “the views of what is
the key arena for conflict.” 283 As Colonels Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, the authors
of Unrestricted Warfare, noted, the release of the “technological plague” represents the
opening of a pandora’s box. 284 In this case, though, the box comes with a “charm,” and
leads the authors toward developing several non-military means to achieve China’s
strategic objectives through political warfare grounded in information control.

Examining China’s military capability, which is designed to create “political power

for the party, lacks a clear concept for appreciating political warfare.” 285 However, detailed
examination of China’s strategy and use of non-military means to effect similar ends as
USSF is beyond the scope of this research. Instead, we note that, like Russia, China has
weaponized information and adeptly uses it to conduct political warfare.

3. Islamic Republic of Iran

While not referred to as a “great power” in the National Security Strategy, the
actions of the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the realm of UW have been well
documented. This matters because, as noted in the Joint Operating Environment 2035, the
ability of regional powers to attain global reach will likely result in increased competition
throughout multiple domains. 286 A brief examination into how regional powers like the
IRI have used SOF to hit above their weight class on the geopolitical stage is therefore
appropriate.

283
Dean Cheng, “Unrestricted Warfare: Review Essay II,” Small Wars & Insurgencies 11, no. 1
(2000): 122, https://doi.org/10.1080/09592310008423266.
284
Liang and Xiangsui, Unrestricted Warfare, 9.
285
Peter Mattis, “China’s ‘Three Warfares’ in Perspective,” War on the Rocks 30 (2018),
https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/chinas-three-warfares-perspective/.
286
Joint Chiefs of Staff-JCS, Joint Operating Environment JOE 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested
and Disordered World. US Joint Chiefs of Staff, J7, Joint Force Development (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2016),
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-
162059-917.
73
 Almost from its inception, the IRI has been able to asymmetrically oppose U.S.
foreign policy in the Middle East through the use of SOF-trained proxy forces. The linkages
between the revolution in 1979, the subsequent “republic,” and extremist organizations
such as the Palestine Liberation Organization. 287 Nevertheless, the ability of Iran to
oppose U.S. goals and initiatives in the Middle East despite recourse has enabled them to
obtain several key strategic objectives. For example, in the early 1980s in Lebanon, the
Quds Force, the IRI’s premier SOF unit, was able to train, arm, equip, and advise
previously disparate Shia militia groups to join forces under the Lebanese Hezbollah (L.H.)
umbrella. 288 After just a few years, the fledgling proxy movement was able to force the
U.S. and Israeli militaries to withdraw. 289

Despite the unprecedented success of LH in the 1980s, it was the IRI’s war with
Iraq and realization of conventional weakness that solidified Iran’s affinity for proxies and
UW operations. 290 This continued focus has enabled LH to achieve not only a standing
army with advanced weapons but also political backing as part of an influential block
within Lebanon’s government. This move toward local credibility was bolstered by LH’s
information dominance. As noted by Hoffman, the transformation of focus was
exemplified during the 2006 Lebanon War when “the battle for perception dominance was
just as critical as the strategic strike competition and the gritty defense of the villages in
southern Lebanon.” 291 A trained and advised UW force tied to an information warfare
dominated strategy was able to produce effects below the threshold of retaliation against
the true sponsor.

287
Christos P Ioannides, “The PLO and the Iranian Revolution,” American-Arab Affairs., no. 10
(September 30, 1984): American-Arab affairs. , 1984, (10), 89.
288
Shannon W. Caudill, Hizballah Rising: Iran’s Proxy Warriors (Washington, DC: National Defense
University, 2008).
289
Matthew Levitt, Hezbollah: The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God (Washington, DC:
Georgetown University Press, 2015).
290
Seth Jones, War by Proxy: Iran’s Growing Footprint in the Middle East (Washington, DC: Center
for Strategic and International Studies, 2019), https://www.csis.org/war-by-proxy.
291
Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, 38.
74
 The scope and proximity of American involvement in the region seems to have no
effect on the decision-making calculus of Iran to attempt to thwart U.S. plans through UW.
For instance, in Iraq, as early as 2003, the Quds Force began training, equipping, and
advising thousands of Muqtada al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army to counter U.S. military
objectives. 292 While trainers assisted the Mahdi Army in building its core cadre and
development of tactics, the injection of Iranian technology to increase the human cost of
U.S. involvement in Iraq had a hastening effect on the U.S. withdrawal. The ability of Iran
to compete with the U.S. asymmetrically through the use of UW proxies and information
warfare dominance again enabled strategic effects.

Since the U.S. departure from Iraq in 2011, subsequent regional civil wars saw the
IRI’s need for capable SOF grow (see Figure 7). In Syria, the ability of Iranian Quds Force
to work alongside the Syrian Army is an illustration of Foreign Internal Defense as
described in the U.S. Army’s Multi-Domain Operations Training Circular. 293 Here, the
Quds force exemplified a long-held belief within USSF that the best UW force can also
provide the best assistance in a Counter-Insurgency campaign. For instance, shortly after
arriving, Quds Force officers “encourage [d] Assad to restore access to social media
internet sites he had blocked and then showed the Syrians how to track [and target]
opponents through their Facebook and Twitter accounts.” 294 As noted in a recent study
by the Army War College, “the IRI thrives by asserting itself into fragile sometimes
disordered environments.” 295

292
Michael R. Gordon and Dexter Filkins, “Hezbollah Said to Help Shiite Army in Iraq,” New York
Times 27 (November 28, 2006), https://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/world/middleeast/28military.html.
293
Department of the Army, TRADOC Pamphlet 525-3-1.
294
Steven O’Hern, Iran’s Revolutionary Guard: The Threat That Grows While America Sleeps
(Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, Inc., 2012), 95.
295
Freier et al., Outplayed: Regaining Strategic Initiative in the Gray Zone, 49.
75
 Figure 7. Estimation of Quds Force partners 2011–2018. 296

While the IRI was in the middle of supporting the Assad regime in western Syria,
the civil war spilled out of the country to the east and into Iraq. This threatened to undo the
decade of progress the IRI had made in Iraq and represented a strategic problem for the
IRI. Once again, the IRI was able to capitalize on weakness and instability to attain greater
control over its neighbor. As ISIS forces marched through Mosul and Fallujah and
threatened Baghdad, many Iraqi volunteers opted to join the Popular Mobilization Forces
(PMF) rather than the collapsing Iraqi military and police units. These PMF forces backed
by Iran swelled in strength and in political reputation or as one PMF fighter stated: “you
can criticize any politician or even religious cleric, but you cannot speak against the Hashd
[PMF] and its martyrs.” 297 The effect of this standing “heroes army” in Iraq has been to
create further division within the political sphere to enable greater opportunities for Iranian
influence and control. Moreover, this provides an example of how the IRI through the
employment of adaptable SOF was able to support conventional forces in one region while
building an irregular force in a neighboring country simultaneously.

296
Jones, War by Proxy.
297
Renad Mansour and Fāliḥ ʻAbd al-Jabbār, The Popular Mobilization Forces and Iraq’s Future, vol.
28 (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2017), 3.
76
 VI. CONCLUSION

A. THE FUTURE ENVIRONMENT

While many scholars, experts, and defense analysts have prophesied about the
future of warfare, most have focused on the technological aspects about the future of
warfare. As a result, futurist literature is replete with predictions of cyber Armageddon
scenarios which then drive investment and focus from the DoD into acquiring more
technology. 298 While developing and incorporating new and revolutionary technological
advancements is critical to the success of the SFOD-A, the reality will be quite like the past
competitive environment of the cold war. Rather than massed armies invading territories
or truly crippling cyber-attacks, modern warfare seeks to advance the political agendas of
the state strictly below the threshold for conventional war. However, whether by
conventional or irregular means, modern war but still capable of producing political end-
states. As a result, our opponents in the modern continuum are increasing their capacity to
conduct warfare below the threshold of a conventional response while still eliciting positive
results. 299

Whether it is called political warfare, information warfare, or UW, the ability to

influence the mind of the population remains the center of gravity and should be the focus
for increasing lethality for the SFOD-A. As demonstrated previously in Chapter V, as
economic growth and relative international prosperity continue to increase, the likelihood
of this (what this?) form of warfare increases. It is therefore necessary for the U.S. military
to maintain a force organized to be capable of either conducting or defeating these
operations with regularity. Current USASOC strategy dictates that for ARSOF to be
competitive in the future environment, one of the essential risks necessary for enabling
success it to divest of legacy missions and force structure.(add USASOC strategy citation)
This future force cannot be massed formations but rather ought to be smaller units equipped

298
McFate, The New Rules of War.
299
United States Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy
(Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2019), 2,
https://www.soc.mil/AssortedPages/ARSOF_Strategy.pdf.
77
and empowered with the requisite capabilities and permissions to accomplish this mission.
As noted by T.E. Lawrence, “the smaller the unit the better its performance.” 300

B. ORGANIZATION AND CAPABILITIES (FUTURE)

As noted by the first SFOD-A model in Chapter II, the current environment of Great
Power Competition (GPC) emulates a similar environment which the U.S. faced during the
Cold War. When assessing the future capability of the SFOD-A, it is therefore necessary
to examine the capability of the SFOD-A during the Cold War. However, as terrorists
continue to threaten our nation, it is also necessary to examine the capabilities of the SFOD-
A throughout the GWOT to ensure that those valuable lessons learned are not forgotten.
Therefore, any recommended change to the SFOD-A cannot be a step backward but must
rather build upon existing capability. To that end, the following recommended change is a
combination of the examination of the past, the current global trends and most likely future
environment.

The current focus of the U.S. military’s manning, training, and equipping for
potential large-scale ground combat is likely to require additional SOF capabilities and
operations. This increased requirement for SOF capabilities will occur for three reasons.
First, the increased capability of our conventional forces and the United States’ nuclear
deterrence, will most likely mean a return to a “cold-war atmosphere” requiring an increase
in covert and clandestine deployments, not large-scale wars. Second, adversaries like
Russia, China, and Iran, will continue to turn toward asymmetric options to create room
within the competitive space to achieve their interests. These operations will, by design,
deny the U.S. the ability to respond conventionally. Finally, as has been the case since
President Eisenhower’s administration, a primary means that the United States will employ
to counter aggression will be through the development of partners and allies. Following
historic precedent, the force that will be most heavily relied upon for these operations will
be USSF.

300
Thomas Edward Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom (London: Penguin UK, 2000), 69.
78
 Adversarial investment in asymmetric means to achieve effects does not mean that
the U.S. should divest of large-scale conventional capability as this would give up
conventional deterrence. However, the shift in focus by the conventional military may give
state and non-state actors additional space to develop into more robust networks with
increased capability. This capability increase has the potential to edge the U.S. out of the
competitive space changing the status quo of U.S. hegemony. Therefore, it is incumbent
upon USSF to cover any gaps left by the transition of focus. To do this appropriately, USSF
must modernize in parallel though not in mirror as it did while supporting the AirLand
Battle operating concept.

U.S. Army Special Operations Command (USASOC) identified that U.S.

adversaries are already creating leverage in the competitive space by weaponizing
information to gain effects without provoking a conventional military response. 301 To
combat this threat, the USASOC Commander, has directed the force to “power-down”
mission command to the lowest levels to achieve success. 302 The strategy goes on to state
that USASOC “will expand and leverage our irregular warfare capabilities and partnership
networks [while operationalizing] the CONUS base whenever possible to support
information warfare.” 303 Finally, the strategy states that readiness success “will be
achieved using cyber and information warfare in all aspects of training.” 304 As defined
by ADP 3–05 Army Special Operations, “in today’s complex and rapidly evolving
information environment, perceptions, decisions, and, ultimately, behavior are influenced
by the psychological effects of actions and information.” 305 Following the USASOC
Commander’s “power-down” guidance it is necessary to incorporate information
operations capability at the lowest level.

301
United States Army Special Operations Command, Army Special Operations Forces Strategy.
302
United States Army Special Operations Command.
303
United States Army Special Operations Command.
304
United States Army Special Operations Command.
305
Department of the Army, Army Special Operations, ADP 3-05 (Washington, DC: Army Doctrine
Reference Publication, 2019), 2–11.
79
 Historically, SFOD-As have relied upon PSYOP attachments to achieve
information dominance. Like the challenges which SOF face in continually providing
relevance to conventional commanders. These attachments have performed well in past
conflicts, and in the case of the CIDG, have resulted in short-term organizational adaptation
of the SFOD-A. This temporary additive capability enhancement was again reflected
during VSO operations in Afghanistan highlighting the fact that while PSYOP is a core
competency of USSF, it is something that individual soldiers receive little training on and
are almost never validated in. If USSF is to be successful in Great Power Competition by
gaining information dominance, it is necessary to exceed the capability of U.S. adversaries
to leverage information. This means that rather than simply attaching PSYOP specialists
to a SFOD-A when necessary, information dominance must be the umbrella under which
all other operations take place. This is unlikely to happen if it is not trained consistently
within the SFOD-A and integrated throughout operational planning and execution.

To meet the stated goals of the USASOC strategy, excel in the current environment,
and remain operationally and strategically relevant, the authors recommend the creation of
an additional PSYOP skill within the SFOD-A. This should be done without adding
additional personnel to the unit, as this would also bring an untold number of logistical
adjustments. The capability adaptation should instead be treated as an individual skill with
associated MOS identification, like SOTACs. By having a subject matter expert embedded
and advising SFOD-A commanders, it would provide a “bottom up” approach toward
building the information umbrella that is ubiquitous during modern U.W. and COIN.

As USSF prepares to modernize in support of Great Power Competition,

incorporating PSYOP skills will enhance partners efforts to recruit and build popular
support. As partners’ capability increases, the indigenous approach that USSF is best suited
for will be reinforced. This increase in relevancy will decrease the likelihood of adaptations
of USSF for unilateral / direct roles such as were seen during the post-Vietnam time period.
Moreover, as other SOF units begin to modernize, it is likely that they will focus heavily
on their respective core capabilities. The reinforcement of focus of USSF on indigenous
populations through partner operations under an information dominance umbrella will
ensure the U.S. is not left with a capability gap.
80
 The individual training for the USSF soldier should be done without creating an
additional course at the John F. Kennedy Special Forces Center and School (SWCS), as
this would necessarily mean additional soldiers being removed from their detachments to
serve as instructors. As the current PSYOP course falls under SWCS and is manned by
individuals with years of PSYOP experience, SWCS should reserve billets for USSF
soldiers to attend relevant sections of the PSYOP course. In so doing, SWCS would enable
an expedited course for USSF soldiers who already have core SOF capabilities such as
language training and small unit tactics. Equipping these soldiers with necessary equipment
at the SFOD-A would accrue cost but this could be differed by dual using equipment such
as cameras and computers that are already organic to the SFOD-A.

Finally, the addition of USSF PSYOP specialists on the SFOD-A would not have
no negative effect on the relevancy of traditional PSYOP specialists. As necessary, SFOD-
As should still request Tactical PSYOP Teams (TPT) to augment their deployments but
instead of these teams working on basic PSYOP tasks, they would enable larger
distribution and messaging. This would reciprocally enhance the information dominance
umbrella of the SFOD-As operations while having the added benefit of decreasing
tribalism between the two branches.

As USSF prepares to modernize in support of Great Power Competition, it is

necessary to understand historic modernization efforts that resulted in the adaptation of the
SFOD-A. With a sound understanding of the environment and missions that drove these
adaptations, it becomes clear that the prevailing cause of transformation was the desire to
remain relevant. If USSF is to stay ahead of the relevancy curve, it stands to reason that
information dominance at the lowest level is critical to the success of operations in the
information age. However, while this is one recommended change, the intention of this
thesis has been to provide future research with a solid historic grounding from which to
spring future organizational adaptation of the SFOD-A.

81
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